GIFT or 
 
 1^juJoJLJ/^< 
 
 ^^>si. 
 
GANG'S COMMERCIAL LAW 
 REVISED 
 
 BY 
 
 RALPH E. ROGERS 
 
 ATTORNEY AT LAW 
 
 AND 
 
 CLYDE O. THOMPSON 
 
 PRINCIPAL OF THE COMMERCIAL HIGH SCHOOL 
 MOUNT VERNON, N. Y. 
 
 AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY 
 
 NEW YORK CINCINNATI 
 
 BOSTON 
 
 ATLANTA 
 
 CHICAGO 
 

 Copyright, 1921, by 
 AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY 
 
 • • « 
 
 • • » • 
 
 C^na's«CV>mni^rci?l Law, copyright, 1904, by L. L, Williams and 
 • P. E. Hb^eis; copyright, 191 j, by American Book Company 
 
 . •* ' i '< ,.\ c' « '. « . ^^^ Rights Reserved 
 
 Commercial Law Revised 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The authors of this edition of Gano's Commercial Law have 
 had a definite aim in the plan, arrangement, scope, and purpose 
 of this text, in which they have incorporated the results of their 
 experience in business, in legal practice, and in the class room. 
 
 In general, the plan of the text is to treat each subdivision of 
 a subject intensively in an expository manner, and whenever 
 necessary to clarify each principle of law or subject explained, by 
 a concrete example which is usually an actual court case. These 
 cases have been selected with great care from authoritative 
 sources and stated in such a clear and concise manner that the 
 student will readily comprehend them. » 
 
 Each subdivision is followed by questions which are intended 
 primarily to aid the student in lesson preparation. The ''Im- 
 portant Points" following each general subject will focus the 
 student's attention and afford him a means of rapid review. 
 
 The test questions and case problems may be used in various 
 ways, at the discretion of the teacher. Their use will enliven the 
 subject and add to the interest of the student. 
 
 The important statutes near the end of the book will be useful 
 for reference and will put the student in closer touch with the 
 great questions of the day, many of which involve a knowledge 
 of these statutes. 
 
 The illustrative legal forms have been collected in an appendix 
 near the end of the book where they are readily accessible for 
 reference or for class assignments. 
 
 In the plan of this book the arrangement of general subjects 
 is not a material factor. The different subjects treated may be 
 taken up and studied in any order, but the arrangement is logical 
 and a proper sequence has been observed. Following a brief dis- 
 cussion of law in general, and property to which commercial law 
 directly relates, there is a very full treatment of the rules of law 
 governing contracts. This forms the basis for the discussion of 
 the subjects immediately following: sales, agency, and nego- 
 tiable paper. These four subjects are the most important, as the 
 
 459828 
 
iv PREFACE 
 
 business man comes most frequently into contact with them. 
 The other subjects may be taken up in any order. We believe, 
 however, it is more logical to study all the subdivisions of con- 
 tract law before the laws relative to the different types of business 
 organizations, and that the bankruptcy laws, which relate 
 directly to business organizations, should follow. 
 
 The scope of the book has been made sufficiently broad and 
 complete to satisfy the needs of business school and high school 
 students, and the important phases of the subject have been 
 treated in such a full and comprehensive manner as will give the 
 student a thorough working knowledge of the fundamentals of 
 applied commercial law. 
 
 In addition to this the authors have endeavored to make the 
 text thoroughly teachable by omitting involved technicalities and 
 including ample illustrative and problem material. Technical 
 terms have rarely been used and when used they have been 
 defined at once. Definitions of common legal terms are added, 
 just before the index, for the convenience of the student. 
 
 While the purpose of this text is primarily for class use, it 
 will be valuable to any one who may desire information on the 
 various topics of commercial law. It should be noted that the 
 text is based on the common law, except those subjects in which 
 uniform statutes have been quite generally adopted, and that an 
 attorney should be consulted for possible statutory modifications. 
 This book is not intended to teach the student to be his own 
 lawyer, but to give him a thorough and correct understanding of 
 the fundamental principles of commercial law. 
 
^7 
 
 1 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 Law in General i 
 
 Property in General 8 
 
 Contracts: 
 
 1. In General ii 
 
 2. Contracting Parties _ 14 
 
 3. Offer and Acceptance " 22 
 
 4. Reality of Consent 26 
 
 5. Subject Matter 34 
 
 6. Consideration 39 
 
 7. Operation of'Contracts 48 
 
 r 8. Statute of Frauds 52 
 
 9. Discharge of Contract 57 
 
 10. Damages 66 
 
 11. Discharge of Right of Action 69 
 
 Sales of Personal Property: 
 
 1. In General ' 85 
 
 2. Parties to a Sale 87 
 
 3. The Contract of Sale 90 
 
 ^ 4. Written Contracts of Sale 94 
 
 5. Conditional Sale 97 
 
 6. Warranties 100 
 
 7. Remedies for Breach 105 
 
 8. Auction Sales 109 
 
 Agency: 
 
 1. In General 119 
 
 2. How Created 122 
 
 3. Obligation of Principal to Agent 125 
 
 4. Obligation of Agent to Principal 127 
 
 5. Obligations of Principal and Agent to Third Party, and of 
 
 Third Party to Principal 132 
 
 6. Liability of Principal for Torts or Wrongs of Agent ... 134 
 
 7. Termination of the Relation of Principal and Agent . . . 136 
 Negotiable Instruments: 
 
 1. In General 146 
 
 2. Promissory Notes 151 
 
 3 Bills of Exchange . . . . : 154 
 
 4. Checks 158 
 
 5. Special Forms of Negotiable Instruments 160 
 
 6. Negotiation 163 
 
 7. Defenses 175 
 
 8. Discharge 180 
 
 9. Interest and Usury 182 
 
 10. Credits . 184 
 
 Guaranty 194 
 
 y 
 
't 
 
 b 
 
 vi CONTENTS 
 
 Bailment: 
 
 1. In General 204 
 
 2. Bailment for the Bailor's Sole Benefit 207 
 
 3. Bailment for Bailee's Sole Benefit 209 
 
 4. Bailment for Mutual Benefit 211 
 
 5. Innkeepers 218 
 
 ■^ 6. Common Carriers 220 
 
 7. Liability of Common Carriers ............ 222, 
 
 8. Carriers of Passengers 229 
 
 Insurance: 
 
 1. In General 238 
 
 2. Fire Insurance 238 
 
 3. Fire Insurance Policy 241 
 
 4. Life Insurance 246 
 
 5. Marine Insurance 250 
 
 6. Casualty Insurance 253 
 
 Real Property: 
 
 I. In General 262 
 
 ^ 2. Estates in Land 263 
 
 3. Ownersliip, Sale, and Conveyance 270 
 
 4. Mortgages 279 
 
 5. Landlord and Tenant 283 
 
 Fixtures 293 
 
 Partnership: 
 
 I. In General 302 
 
 ^ 2. Rights of Partners between Themselves 308 
 
 3. Liability of Partners to Third Parties 313 
 
 4. Remedies against the Partnership 315 
 
 5. Dissolution 315 
 
 Corporations: 
 
 1. In General 328 
 
 2. Powers and Liabilities of Corporations 332 
 
 3. Membership in a Corporation 335 
 
 4. Management of Corporations 338 
 
 5. Rights of Creditors of Corporations 339 
 
 6. Dissolution of a Corporation 341 
 
 7. Joint Stock Companies 343 
 
 Bankruptcy 348 
 
 Courts and Their Jurisdiction 354 
 
 Pleading and Practice 361 
 
 Test Case Problems 368 
 
 Important Statutes 376 
 
 Appendix — Forms 381 
 
 Common Legal Terms . 391 
 
 Index 399 
 
 1 
 

 COMMERCIAL LAW 
 
 LAW IN GENERAL 
 
 Definition. — In a general sense the law with which we are 
 concerned is a rule of action or conduct prescribed by the supreme 
 governing authority, commanding that which is right and pro- 
 hibiting that which is wrong. The laws of nature, or scientific 
 laws, are entirely outside the scope of this book. From the stand- 
 point of business or commerce, law may be defined as the system 
 of principles and rules which relate to the actions of men in their 
 dealings and relations with one another. 
 
 The supreme authority is any organized form of government. 
 The legislative department of the national government makes 
 laws for the people of the United States. The legislative depart- 
 ment of each state does the same for the people of the state; 
 counties, cities, villages, and towns likewise have legislative 
 departments which make laws or regulations for the people. All 
 these legislative departments lay down many rules or laws for 
 the guidance of all within their jurisdictions or boundaries. 
 
 There must be no conflict of authority. No state can make 
 a law which conflicts with the Constitution or statute laws of the 
 United States. Nor can a county, city, or town make regulations 
 which conflict with the laws of the state in which it is located. 
 
 Origin of Law. — There has been some form of law or " rule 
 of action " from the earliest time. An individual isolated from 
 others in an uninhabited region might be said to be without 
 law, but as soon as any number of human beings are associated 
 together, rules and customs become recognized in the regu- 
 lation of their rights and soon have the force of law. 
 
 In the time of the nomadic tribes the chief dictated many 
 of the laws by which his people were governed. In later times 
 kings made many laws. To-day laws for the most part are 
 made by representatives elected by the people to the different 
 lawmaking or legislative bodies. 
 
z. ] ., ' I 1 ^ " ''.LAW IN GENERAL 
 
 The less civilize'd* people of early times needed few laws, 
 but the highly organized state of society at the present time 
 requires many laws. 
 
 Law Classified. — Law may be classified as moral, inter- 
 national, and municipal. 
 
 Moral Law. — The code of ethics which prescribes the right 
 and wrong in the conduct of one toward another is called the 
 moral law. Its rules are enforced by the sentiment of the people 
 derived from their beHef in, and understanding of, right and 
 wrong. It is moral law that tells us to deal honestly, to speak 
 truthfully, and not to take advantage of any one. 
 
 It is necessary, sometimes, to make a distinction between 
 what is morally right and legally right, or morally wrong and 
 legally wrong. For example, a man is morally but not legally 
 bound to support a dependent parent. The rules of law tend to 
 represent the collective moral sense of the community, but they 
 rarely reflect that sense in its entirety, because lawmaking bodies 
 do not usually act as rapidly as morals are developed, being held 
 back by the force of precedent and the necessity for avoiding 
 numerous and sudden changes in law. There are many legal 
 rules which have no moral quahty, but are based on the necessity 
 for having some rule, e.g. the rule requiring vehicles to pass to the 
 right. A legal right can be enforced at law, while a moral right 
 which does not amount to a legal right cannot be enforced. 
 
 International Law. — The law which regulates the inter- 
 course of nations is international law. It consists of rules and 
 principles founded on customs, treaties, the weight of opinion 
 as to justice, and the mutual obligations which civilized nations 
 recognize as binding upon them in their dealings with other 
 nations. The conduct of the vessels of different nations toward 
 one another on the high seas, which are open to all, is a question 
 of international law, as are the rights and protection of repre- 
 sentatives of one country within the boundary of another. 
 
 Municipal Law. — The rules of action prescribed by the 
 supreme power in a state or nation, or a subdivision of a state or 
 nation, commanding what is to be done and prohibiting what is 
 not to be done, constitute municipal law. 
 
 Every state or nation must have some head or supreme 
 
MUNICIPAL LAW CLASSIFIED- ' * 3 
 
 : A : ?>•• :;.;•■•.:•• •* 
 
 power, and in a republic like ours this power rest^ in tn^ people 
 and is administered by the officers whom they elect. The laws 
 are made by the legislators, administered by the executive de- 
 partment of the government, and interpreted by the courts 
 which apply these laws to the cases that are brought before 
 them. 
 
 It is necessary in civilized nations that the conduct of man 
 in relation with his brother man be regulated and restricted. 
 Otherwise a resort to arms would be the only redress for a , 
 wrong. So it is that municipal law is required in order to in- 
 sure justice and harmony. Because of this branch of the law 
 contracts can be enforced, possession of real property acquired 
 by its true owner, and crimes punished. 
 
 Municipal Law Classifieci. — Municipal law can be classified 
 as constitutional law, statute law, and common law and equity. 
 
 Constitutional Law. — Every nation or state has a constitu- 
 tion, either written or unwritten, under which the nation exists 
 and which as the basis of its power regulates, distributes, and 
 limits its different functions and departments. The law em- 
 bodied in these constitutions, especially as applying to the 
 establishment, powers, and limitations of the government, is 
 known as constitutional law. The United States Constitution 
 provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop- 
 erty without due process of law. This limitation of govern- 
 mental powers is a provision of constitutional law. 
 
 Statute Law. — A statute law is a law made by a legisla- 
 tive body. The laws passed by Congress or by a state legisla- 
 ture and the ordinances passed by a city council or board of alder- 
 men are all statute laws. In this class also come laws proposed 
 by initiative petitions and adopted by yote of the people. 
 
 The law that is embodied in constitutions, in acts of Con- 
 gress, in acts of state legislatures and all other legislative bodies, 
 and in acts adopted by vote of the people, is known as the ''writ- 
 ten law." The modern tendency is to reduce all rules of law to 
 written law, generally displacing the unwritten rules of common 
 law and equity. 
 
 Common Law and Equity. — The great body of municipal 
 law in early English practice was known as the common law 
 
4 LAW IN GENERAL 
 
 and consisted originally only of customs. These, however, be- 
 cause of long usage, came in time to have the force of laws. As 
 the affairs of a growing commercial country became more intri- 
 cate, the hard and fast rules of common law which were firmly 
 bound down by precedent were found inadequate for all the 
 needs of the people, and there sprang up the chancery courts 
 which decided controversies from an equitable standpoint and 
 gave relief independent of precedent. This chancery or equity 
 court still exists in a modified form, but the distinction between 
 common law and equity has in a great measure disappeared. 
 The distinction of to-day consists in the relief sought; if it be 
 merely money damages, then it is a common law case; if some 
 extraordinary rehef, as prohibiting a man from erecting on his 
 land a powder factory which would endanger his neighbor's dwell- 
 ing, or correcting a deed of land which was improperly drawn, 
 then the case is in equity. 
 
 Criminal and Civil Law. — Both common law and statute 
 law can be divided into criminal and civil law. 
 
 Criminal Law. — The preservation of society demands that 
 certain rules be laid down regulating the acts of its members 
 toward the community in general. A violation of these laws is 
 an offense against the state and is called a crime. The law 
 which treats of crimes and their punishment is called criminal 
 law. It forbids one man to steal from another, making it a 
 crime, because such acts endanger the security of property and 
 the safety of society, and a punishment of imprisonment for 
 such an offense is therefore provided. 
 
 Civil Law. — As distinguished from the criminal law, that 
 branch of law which looks to the establishment and recovery 
 of private rights is called civil law. It controls the private 
 rights and remedies of men in their relations with each other, 
 in contrast with those that are public and affect the community 
 in general. 
 
 Penalties. — A crime is an offense against the state in which 
 it is committed, and the penalties are fines, imprisonment, and, 
 for a few offenses, death. 
 
 In a criminal case the state, through its officers, is the 
 plaintiff and the one who committed the crime is the defendant. 
 
, COMMERCIAL LAW 5 
 
 In a civil case the injured party is the plaintiff, the one 
 against whom action is brought is the defendant, and the penalty 
 is damages in the form of a judgment, which is directed against 
 the property of the defendant or, in a proper case of equit- 
 able relief, against the defendant personally. 
 
 Commercial Law. — Commercial law is a branch of the civil 
 law, and includes the laws regulating the rights and relations 
 of persons engaged in trade or commercial pursuits. 
 
 Importance of Commercial Law. — Certain principles of 
 commercial law are involved in every business transaction. It 
 is important, therefore, that everybody who has business to 
 transact should have such knowledge of the fundamental princi- 
 ples of commercial law as will enable him to avoid mistakes 
 which might involve him in legal difficulties. The legal maxim, 
 " Ignorance of the law excuses no one," applies to all. 
 
 Sources of Laws. — Our laws may be considered as derived 
 from three sources, the common law, the statutes, and the con- 
 stitutions. The common law, which was derived primarily from 
 the English law, was established in this country by the early 
 English settlers. It is made up of the rules and customs which 
 were in use from time immemorial and came to be recognized 
 as laws. It is also termed the unwritten law, because in the 
 early times it consisted merely of the customs of the people. 
 Now it is embodied in the decisions of our courts, the great 
 mass of our reports of these decisions being the common law in this 
 way reduced to writing. 
 
 The United States and also the several states have their 
 lawmaking bodies. Congress and the legislatures from time to 
 time pass laws, which are known as statute laws, also called 
 written laws. These statutes may expressly change the common 
 law, as is often the case, when the condition of the state or the 
 progress of the people requires it. For instance, by the common 
 law a wife could hold no property, as at her marriage it reverted 
 to her husband, but by the statute law in all of the states this is 
 changed, and now in most of them she can hold property to the 
 same extent as though unmarried. In other cases the statutes 
 declare and put in express terms a part of what formerly existed 
 in the common law; for example, under the common law persons 
 
6 LAW IN GENERAL 
 
 meeting on the highway were to turn to the right, and the same 
 rule is now laid down in the statutes. 
 
 Order of Authority. — In the United States the Constitu- 
 tion is first in authority, and, in so far as it appHes, all other 
 laws must give way. It provides that certain subjects that 
 come within the province of the general government shall be 
 under the exclusive authority of Congress, and that the consti- 
 tutions and legislatures of the several states cannot provide 
 or make laws to the contrary. On the other hand, all subjects 
 not expressly confided to Congress are left to the state authorities, 
 and are under the control of the constitution and statutes of 
 the state. Every state statute must be in conformity with the 
 constitution of the state, as well as with the Constitution and 
 laws of the United States. The common or unwritten laws 
 also must be in conformity with the statutes of the state, as 
 well as with the state constitutions and the Constitution and 
 laws of the United States. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is law? Why is law necessary? 
 
 2. What is meant by the " supreme authority "? 
 
 3. What is the rule as to the conflict of authority in making laws? 
 
 4. What is the origin of law? 
 
 5. How are our laws made? 
 
 6. Why is it that highly civilized people need many laws? 
 
 7. What are the three general classes of law? 
 
 8. What is the difference between a moral right and a legal right? 
 
 9. Interpret the following: " Law is based on right and justice." 
 
 10. How are international laws made? 
 
 11. Wherein does municipal law differ from international law? 
 
 12. What are the classes of municipal law? 
 
 13. Explain the following statement as it applies to law: " The con- 
 stitution is the framework of government." 
 
 14. In what are our common law rules embodied? 
 
 15. Into what two classes are common law and statute law divided? 
 
 16. How is criminal law enforced? What are the penalties? 
 
 17. How is civil law enforced? What are the penalties? 
 
 18. What is the importance of commercial law? 
 
 19. What are the sources of law in the order of authority? 
 
 20. What is the source of the early laws in this country? 
 Ti. In what way do laws limit individual liberty? 
 
IMPORTANT POINTS 
 
 IMPORTANT POINTS 
 
 In the order of authority our laws may be classified as follows: 
 
 1. Constitution of the United States. 
 
 2. Laws of Congress. 
 
 3. Constitutions of the states. 
 
 4. Laws of the state legislatures. 
 
 5. The common law. 
 Law is a rule of action. 
 
 The authority of any municipality or poUtical subdivision does 
 not extend beyond the boundaries thereof. 
 
 Much of the early unwritten or common law has been embodied 
 in statute laws. 
 
 The correct decision in law is usually the same as the answer 
 to the question : What is right? 
 
 Municipal law is the law in force in a particular country, state, 
 county, or city. 
 
 Individual Uberty is restricted only so far as is necessary to 
 secure observance of the rules of law. 
 
 International law can be enforced, in the last resort, only by war. 
 
 Municipal law is enforced by courts of law maintained for that 
 purpose. 
 
 In criminal cases the state prosecutes. 
 
 In civil cases the injured party brings suit. 
 
 Most of our common law rules come from reported decisions of 
 courts of record. 
 
 Law is necessary for protection and the security of rights. 
 
PROPERTY IN GENERAL 
 
 Property. — The term '^ property" implies ownership, and 
 ownership implies certain rights, such as the right of possession 
 and the right of use. The owner of property has the right of 
 possession of the things owned to the exclusion of every one else, 
 and he has a right to the exclusive use of the thing owned in any 
 way he sees fit to use it, so long as he does not, in its use, interfere 
 with the rights of others. 
 
 Property has Value. — Property has value because it has 
 uses which create a demand for it: the greater the demand 
 for a particular property, the more valuable it becomes, and 
 its possession and control are more eagerly sought. It is due 
 to this fact that many laws have been made and are still being 
 made for the purpose of regulating property rights, ownership, 
 and transfers. 
 
 Early Laws. — Early laws had for their purpose the settle- 
 ment of quarrels and the suppression of violence resulting from 
 disputes over rights of ownership and possession of property. 
 They necessarily established rules under which an individual 
 who has acquired property would be recognized and protected 
 as its owner. 
 
 One of the earliest distinctions of this early law was the 
 division of property into two classes, real and personal. 
 
 Real Property. — Real property includes land and every- 
 thing that belongs with the land or is permanently affixed 
 thereto, as trees and houses. It is generally defined as fixed 
 or immovable property. 
 
 Personal Property. — Personal property includes all prop- 
 erty that can be easily moved from place to place or carried 
 about. Furniture, stocks, bonds, money, cattle, clothing, and 
 personal effects are classed as personal property. 
 
 It sometimes happens that property in one condition is 
 classed as real, and the same property in another condition is 
 classed as personal. Coal in the mine is real property, but as 
 soon as it is mined and ready for use it is personal property. 
 
 8 
 
POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP 9 
 
 Likewise trees and grass or shrubs which grow naturally are 
 realty, while growing or standing, but as soon as they are cut 
 for use they are personalty. Crops which are planted and 
 cultivated are considered personalty. 
 
 Possession. — Possession is not essential to ownership. 
 Any one may own property which he does not possess. The 
 possession of the property may be with some one else for a 
 certain purpose or under certain conditions. This may bring 
 about a joint interest which restricts the rights of ownership 
 in that the owner will have to respect the rights of the one in 
 possession of the property. For example, the owner of a house 
 may lease it for a term. The tenant has certain rights which 
 the owner must respect. 
 
 Kinds of Ownership. — Ownership is either several or joint. 
 When the ownership is several, one person is the sole owner. 
 When the ownership is joint, two or more persons are owners. 
 In an ownership called a "joint tenancy," if one owner dies his 
 interest passes to the surviving owners. In an ownership 
 called a "tenancy in common," if one owner dies his interest 
 passes to his heirs. If it is desired, at any time, to divide the 
 property, those interested may agree among themselves on a 
 division, or they may resort to a court to have an equitable 
 division made. 
 
 Limitations upon Ownership. — While ownership of property 
 implies exclusive rights as to possession and use, there are certain 
 Umitations which must be considered. 
 
 1. The owner must not use his property in such a way as 
 to injure others. 
 
 2. The owner of property must respect the mandates or 
 judgments of a court, and his property may be taken by due 
 process of law to pay his debts. 
 
 3. Taxation is a sovereign right of a nation or municipahty, 
 and the owner of property must respect this right. Faihng to pay 
 his taxes he may forfeit his right of ownership. 
 
 4. The state reserves to itse f the right to control private 
 property under certain extreme conditions, as in the case of 
 uprisings and riots. This is an example of what is known as 
 police power. 
 
10 PROPERTY IN GENERAL 
 
 5. The right of eminent domain " gives to a sovereign |: 
 power (nation, state, city, etc.) the right to take private property ,•; 
 for pubhc purposes by paying the owner a fair compensation. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What does property imply? 
 
 2. What does ownership imply? 
 
 3. What are the two classes of property? 
 
 4. Give an example of each class. 
 
 5. Give an illustration of one kind of property being changed to 
 the other kind. 
 
 6. What is meant by absolute ownership in property? 
 
 7. What limitations are placed on ownership? 
 
 8. Explain the police power of a state. 
 
 9. What is the right of eminent domain? 
 
 10. What are the different kinds of ownership? 
 
 11. Are trees and plants growing naturally and attached to the soil 
 realty or personalty? 1 
 
 12. Are cultivated crops realty or personalty? ' l 
 
 I 
 
 IMPORTANT POINTS | 
 
 Property is anything that is owned. 1 
 
 Property is of two kinds, personal and real. j 
 
 Real property includes all fixed or immovable property. ! 
 
 Personal property includes all property which is easily moved j 
 
 from place to place. j 
 
 Ownership is several when held by one person and joint or in 1 
 
 common when held by more than one person. \ 
 
 The ownership of property is subject to the rights of others, 
 debts, taxation, police power, and eminent domain. 
 
 Ownership of property is acquired through gift, grant, purchase, j 
 
 devise, or inheritance. J 
 
CONTRACTS 
 
 I. IN GENERAL 
 
 Definition. — A contract is an agreement between two or 
 more parties, resulting from an offer or proposition and its accept- 
 ance. This agreement is governed by many rules of law. 
 
 All contracts are agreements but not all agreements are 
 contracts. To be a contract, an agreement must be legally 
 enforceable. 
 
 Brown agrees to sell a bicycle to Moore for $25. Moore agrees to pay 
 $25 for the bicycle and pays $5 to bind the bargain. This is a contract. 
 If Brown refuses to deliver the bicycle, Moore has an action at law against 
 Brown for damages. 
 
 Arnold promised to meet Swift at the Union R. R. Station at nine 
 o'clock A.M. He failed to appear. This is not a contract, as the parties 
 did not intend it to be a contract. It is a broken promise which gives 
 no right of action for damages. 
 
 Oral and Written Contracts. — Contracts may be either oral 
 or written. All contracts under seal and some simple contracts, 
 as explained later, must be written; but the majority of con- 
 tracts in business are simple, unwritten contracts. When we 
 consider that every time anybody pays his fare on a trolley car 
 or makes a purchase in a store he has made a contract, we 
 realize how great is the number of simple, unwritten contracts. 
 
 Written Contracts. — While an oral contract may be just 
 as valid as a written one, it is desirable to have a written con- 
 tract where a number of conditions and specifications are in- 
 volved or where the contract is to continue in force for some 
 time. An oral contract that is in dispute must be established 
 by the testimony of witnesses or circumstances must be relied 
 upon to determine the rights of the parties. A written contract 
 is established by producing the written copy, and no oral evi- 
 dence can be admitted to vary or contradict that which is 
 written. (For forms of written contracts see Appendix.) 
 
 Express and Implied Contracts. — In an express contract 
 the agreement on each side fe completely stated. 
 
12 CONTRACTS 
 
 Martin expressly agrees to pay Harris $12 per ton for 5 tons of coal 
 if Harris will deliver it to Martin's hdtne on the following day. Harris 
 expressly agrees to deliver the coal. As the terms of this contract are 
 fuUy stated, it is an express contract. 
 
 In an implied contract, the terms are understood from acts, 
 conditions, or circumstances. 
 
 Mr. Martin stops at the coal dealer's office and orders 5 tons of 
 coal to be delivered to his home. Nothing is said about the time of de- 
 livery or payment. It is implied that the coal will be delivered promptly 
 and that Mr. Martin will pay the market price for it when delivered or 
 when he receives the bill. 
 
 Formal and Simple Contracts. — Contracts are again classi- 
 fied as formal and simple. 
 
 Formal contracts must be in writing and under seal; that 
 is, with a seal affixed. 
 
 In early times the seal was an impression on wax, but statutes 
 have relaxed the rigor of the rule, and now the impression may 
 be on a wafer or on the document itself, and in some states a 
 scroll or mark made with the pen, or the word "seal," printed or 
 written, if used in place of the seal, is sufficient. 
 
 L. S. are letters commonly used to designate a seal. They 
 are the initial letters of the Latin words locus sigilli, meaning 
 the place of the seal. 
 
 The principal requisite to the validity of the seal is that it 
 must be the intent of the parties to use the scroll or mark as 
 such, and this is usually expressed by the words, " In witness 
 whereof we have hereunto set our hands and seals the day and 
 year first above written," or some form equivalent thereto. 
 
 A simple contract (known also as a parol contract) is one not 
 under seal; it depends for its vaHdity not upon its form but upon 
 the presence of consideration. It may be a contract required by 
 the Statute of Frauds to be in writing. It may also be a contract 
 that is valid whether written or oral; for instance, a contract of 
 employment for less than a year. 
 
 Snyder employed Marsh for six months at $100 per month. Marsh 
 agreed. This is a simple contract. 
 
 Executed and Executory Contracts. — An executed contract 
 is one in which the terms of the agreement have been fulfilled. 
 It is a contract which has been completed. 
 
IN GENERAL 13 
 
 Marks sold Jordan a trunk for $40. The trunk was delivered and^the 
 $40 paid. This is an executed contract. 
 
 An executory contract is one which has not been completed. 
 
 Hand sold Lang 100,000 feet of lumber at a certain price, to be de- 
 livered during the twelve months following and to be paid for when 
 delivered. This is an executory contract, until the lumber has all been 
 delivered and paid for. 
 
 In some cases the contract may be executed on the part of 
 one party to the contract and executory on the part of the other 
 party, as when goods purchased are delivered but not yet paid for. 
 
 Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts. — A bilateral contract is 
 one in which both parties to the contract are bound by promises 
 they have made, as in the last example above. 
 
 A unilateral contract is one in which only one party is ever 
 bound by a promise; it is an offer in the form of a promise which 
 is accepted by an act. 
 
 Hand offers to sell and deliver 100,000 feet of lumber, within two 
 months, for $4,000. Lang accepts the offer by paying the $4,000 in cash. 
 This contract is, from the beginning, executed on the part of Lang, and 
 executory on the part of Hand; therefore the written agreement would 
 need to be signed by Hand only. 
 
 Divisible and Entire or Indivisible Contracts. — When a 
 contract is made up of two or more parts, which are independent 
 of each other, the contract is divisible and the party to the 
 contract who performs part as agreed, but not all, may recover 
 for the part performed. When a contract has only one indivisible 
 promise or act on one side and one on the other it is an entire 
 contract ahd must be completely performed. 
 
 Matthews purchased from Bliss a team of horses for $400, a harness 
 for $150, and a wagon for $200. The harness was stolen before delivery, 
 but as this is a divisible contract Bliss can deliver the team and the wagon, 
 and he is entitled to be paid for them. But if the contract stated $750 
 for the outfit and did not mention distinctly the articles and the price of 
 each, it would be an entire contract and complete performance would be 
 required. 
 
 In installment contracts, where, for example, 100 tons of 
 coal are to be delivered each month for twelve months, it is diffi- 
 cult to decide whether failure for one month would be a breach 
 of the whole contract or not. Decisions on this question vary 
 in the different states. 
 
14 CONTRACTS 
 
 * Necessary Elements. — There are four elements at the 
 foundation of all contracts. These are: 
 
 1. Competent parties. 
 
 2. Agreement (Offer and Acceptance). 
 
 3. Legal subject matter. 
 
 4. Consideration. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is a contract? 
 
 2. Are all agreements contracts? Explain and give examples. 
 
 3. How are contracts classified? Give examples. 
 
 4. Explain the difference between an express and an implied contract. 
 
 5. Give an example of an express contract; of an implied contract. 
 
 6. Explain the difference between a formal contract and a simple 
 contract. 
 
 7. What is the seal? What is its effect? 
 
 8. What is necessary to constitute a seal? 
 
 9. On what does a simple contract depend for its validity? 
 
 10. Give an example of a simple contract. 
 
 11. When is a contract said to be executed? Give an example. 
 
 12. When is a contract said to be executory? Give an example. 
 
 13. When is a contract said to be executed on the part of one party 
 and executory on the part of the other party? 
 
 14. What is a bilateral contract? Give an example. 
 
 15. What is a unilateral contract? Give an example. 
 
 16. When is a contract said to be divisible? Give an example. 
 
 17. When is a contract said to be entire or indivisible? Give an example. 
 
 18. What are the four necessary elements in every enforceable con- 
 tract? 
 
 4 
 
 2. CONTRACTING PARTIES 
 
 Two or More Parties Necessary. — We have learned that a 
 contract is an agreement between two or more parties. The 
 question arises as to what persons can be parties to a contract. 
 
 There must be two competent parties to every binding 
 contract. An individual cannot contract with himself; that is, 
 a man as trustee or agent cannot, in such capacity, deal with 
 himself in his individual capacity. 
 
 Ward appointed White as agent with a power of attorney to sell certain 
 property. White purchased the property and executed the transfer to 
 himself. This transaction was invalid. White as agent could not contract 
 with himself. 
 
CONTRACTING PARTIES 15 
 
 The parties to a contract are usually designated as party 
 of the first part and party of the second part. In this connec- 
 tion we must distinguish between parties and persons; while 
 there must be two parties to every contract, there may be any 
 number of persons. 
 
 Harrison, Morgan, and Smith, of the first part, contracted with Loomis 
 and King, of the second part. 
 
 Infants. — Legally, all persons under the age of twenty-one 
 are infants or minors, except that by statute in a few states 
 females are declared of age at eighteen and males or females upon 
 marriage at any age. An infant becomes legally of age on the day 
 preceding his twenty-first birthday. 
 
 Law Protects Infants. — It is an accepted principle of law 
 that an infant is not competent to contract, and the law affords 
 him certain protection so that he shall not be imposed upon or 
 advantage taken of him. The law provides in general that any 
 contract made by an infant is voidable at the option of the infant. 
 
 The Contract of an Infant is Voidable and Not Void. — An 
 infant's contract may contain all the necessary elements and 
 be in every respect a good contract, yet he may, nevertheless, 
 avoid it; that is, he need not perform his part if he does not 
 wish to do so. An infant may even after he has performed the 
 contract return the property and demand his money back, or 
 vice versa. 
 
 A void contract is one that is not a contract at all because 
 it is unenforceable. A voidable contract is one that may or 
 may not be avoided at the option of one of the parties thereto. 
 
 When a contract with an infant is made by a person of full 
 age, the infant alone has the right to avoid or disaffirm the 
 contract. No one but the infant, or his legal representative 
 after his death, can disaffirm a contract which the infant has 
 made. 
 
 Lambert, an infant, contracted for the purchase of an automobile for 
 $1450. He paid $100 cash at the time of signing the contract and agreed 
 to pay $1350 when the car was delivered. Before delivery he disaffirmed 
 the contract and demanded a return of his money. This he has a right to 
 do and the automobile company will have to return the $100 and cancel 
 the contract. • 
 
i6 CONTRACTS 
 
 Carpenter, an infant, had traded horses. He tired of his bargain and, 
 having tendered back the horse he received, demanded his original horse. 
 He has this right and can recover his horse even though he could not tender 
 back the horse he got in the trade. 
 
 If the infant falsely represents himself to be of age he does not 
 forfeit his right to avoid the contract, but he may be liable to a 
 criminal prosecution for fraud. 
 
 Aflirmance of Executed Contracts. — The question at once 
 arises, Must the infant, upon becoming of age, disaffirm to 
 avoid the contract, or will it be considered to be avoided unless 
 he actually affirms it? The answer depends entirely upon the 
 nature of the contract. The rule varies in its appHcation to 
 executed and executory contracts. In the case of an executed 
 contract the benefit which the infant sought to bestow has been 
 given to the other party and is good until it is disaffirmed, and 
 the disaffirmance must be by express words or by some distinct 
 and positive act which leaves no doubt of the intent. 
 
 Towle, an infant, sold a horse to Dresser and took two notes in pay- 
 ment. Later he tendered back the notes, rescinded the contract, and sued 
 for possession of the horse. It was held that he could recover the horse. 
 This, it will be seen, is a case in which express disaffirmance is necessary. 
 This case also holds that the disaffirmance can be made during the in- 
 fancy, and this suit was brought by Towle, through his father, while he 
 was yet an infant. — Towle v. Dresser, 73 Maine 252.1 
 
 Silence for a reasonable time after majority will be construed, 
 in many cases of this kind, as an affirmance, if it is coupled 
 with a retention of the benefits. 
 
 J The cases cited throughout this book arose in the state or country indicated in the 
 title. Thus the case of Towle v. Dresser, 73 Maine 252 arose in the state of Maine and will be 
 found in volume 73 of the reports of the Supreme Court of that state at page 252. Towle 
 was the plaintiff in this case and Dresser the defendant. 
 
 In most of the states the plaintiff's name is given first, followed by the abbreviation 
 "v.," standing for the Latin word versus, meaning against, and this is followed by the name 
 of the defendant. The title of the above case should be read, Towle against Dresser. 
 
 In some states the title of the case is changed when it is appealed to a higher court, and 
 the name of the person appealing from the decision of the lower court is placed first, so if the 
 appeal should be taken by the defendant, the title would be exactly reversed. If that were 
 the rule in Maine and the defendant had been taking the appeal, the title in the above case 
 would have been Dresser v. Towle; but this is not the practice in a majority of the states. 
 
 Some of the reports of the courts are not known by the name of the state, but by the 
 name of the reporter who compiled and edited the decision. In such cases the name of the 
 state has been inserted in parenthesis, as in the case of Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 
 (N. Y.) 2& 
 
CONTRACTING PARTIES 17 
 
 Affirmance of Executory Contracts. — On the other hand, if 
 the contract is executory, it is necessary for the infant to affirm, 
 upon becoming of age, or the contract is avoided. In such an 
 agreement infancy is a defense if the contract is sued upon, unless 
 it can be shown that the contract was affirmed after maturity. 
 
 Edwards, one month before he became of age, contracted with the 
 Eureka Co. for the purchase of a building lot 50' x 150', in the city of 
 Atianta. He was to take title ninety days later. This contract required 
 that Edwards affirm it on becoming of age, and as he failed to affirm, the 
 contract was declared avoided. 
 
 Disaffirmance of Contracts. — ^The rule is well established 
 that the infant cannot avoid a part and affirm the rest. He 
 cannot affirm as to part and disaffirm as to the balance. 
 
 Heath, an infant, purchased a horse and wagon for $125, on the under- 
 standing that the horse was worth $75 and the wagon $50. After he became 
 of age he tendered the horse and demanded the return of $75. He must 
 either disaffirm the contract entirely or not at all, and cannot return part of 
 what he has received and demand part of what he paid. 
 
 When an infant disaffirms an executed contract he must 
 return whatever he has received under the contract, if he has 
 the property, and he is liable to an action at law for its, recovery. 
 If the property has disappeared he may still disaffirm the con- 
 tract even though he cannot return the thing received, or its equivalent. 
 
 West, an infant, purchased furniture by paying for it on the install- 
 ment plan. He made several payments and not being able to make further 
 payments, he refused to give up the furniture even after the seller agreed 
 to refund the amount paid. He must give up the furniture as he cannot 
 retain the benefits and refuse to fulfill the contract. 
 
 Clafk, an infant, purchased a valuable watch, which he did not need, 
 on credit. The watch was stolen from him and he refused to pay for it. 
 Clark has a right to disaffirm, even if it is not possible for him to return 
 the watch. 
 
 Agents Appointed by Infants. — There is a particular class of 
 infants' contracts that are always void and therefore of no effect. 
 This class is the infant's power of attorney under seal, which is in 
 no case valid. Power of attorney is a written instrument by 
 which one party appoints another to act for him. Many juris- 
 dictions extend the rule to every appointment of an agent in 
 any case, except where such appointment is necessary. When, 
 however, the welfare of the infant requires the employment by 
 
i8 CONTRACTS 
 
 him of others to perform services in his behalf, his appointment 
 of an agent will be valid. The reason for these rules is that the 
 law will not permit an infant to perform by an agent what he 
 could not do personally, but what he might or could do person- 
 ally he can do through an agent. 
 
 Contracts for Necessaries. — There exist a number of cases 
 in which an infant cannot avoid payment for benefits received, 
 the ^ principal illustration being his contracts for necessaries. 
 Necessaries include food, clothing, shelter, education, medical 
 attention, and those things needed for the comfort and welfare 
 of the infant. 
 
 If the law did not give protection to parties furnishing the 
 necessaries of life to an infant, we can see that many cases 
 would arise in which the infant might suffer. Therefore the 
 law says that when an infant is not supplied with necessaries 
 by his parents or guardian or others to whom he may look, he 
 may contract for them himself. The law creates a promise on 
 the part of the infant to pay what they are reasonably worth, 
 but this does not mean that the tradesman can charge what he 
 pleases, so it will be seen that the infant is still protected. 
 
 Cain, who was an orphan about nine years of age, boarded with Hyman 
 for about two years. An action was brought for his board. The court 
 held that the law will imply a promise on the part of an infant to pay a 
 reasonable price for necessaries furnished to him. 
 
 — Hyman v. Cain, 48 N. C. iii. 
 
 Necessaries Defined. — The question is often in dispute as 
 to what are necessaries, and the rule generally laid dpwn is 
 that they are anything required by the particular person for his 
 reasonable comfort, subsistence, and education, regard being 
 had to his means, occupation, and standing in society. It has 
 been held that a watch and other useful articles of jewelry 
 might be considered as necessaries. 
 
 Foote, a minor fifteen years of age, and the owner of a large fortune, 
 had his teeth filled by Strong, a dentist. The bill rendered amounted 
 to $93. It was proved that the teeth were decayed and pained Foote. 
 Held, that the work was for necessaries. — Strong v. Foote, 42 Conn. 203. 
 
 An infant is liable for necessaries supplied to his wife the 
 same as if he were an adult. 
 
CONTRACTING PARTIES 19 
 
 A tradesman who furnishes an infant with supplies is bound 
 to show that they are necessaries, and if the infant already has 
 a sufficient supply, he cannot recover. 
 
 Barnes brought an action for the price of necessaries furnished Toye, 
 an infant. The defense was that the infant was already" sufficiently sup- 
 plied with goods of the same class and was not in want of these. The court 
 held that Toye could show that the goods were not necessaries as he was 
 already supplied with sufficient goods of a similar description, and it was 
 immaterial whether Barnes did or did not know of the existing supply. 
 
 — Barnes v. Toye, 13 Q. B. D. (Eng.) 410. 
 
 Infants Liable for Torts. — That an infant has a right to 
 avoid his contracts and that the law gives him protection, does 
 not imply that he is not liable for wrongs or torts which he com- 
 mits. The law does not uphold or protect any one guilty of torts 
 or wrongful acts. 
 
 A tort is a wrongful act, other than a breach of contract, 
 for which a court will give damages. 
 
 Examples of torts are assault and battery, trespass, slander, 
 neghgence, threatened violence, and illegal detention of goods for 
 which damages can be recovered. 
 
 Insane Persons. — Since a contract requires a meeting of 
 the minds of the contracting parties, it is evident that a person 
 lacking the mental capacity cannot make a valid contract. 
 Some insane persons appear perfectly rational and others have 
 rational periods. It is difficult, therefore, to determine the 
 mental condition of the party, and one may deal with an insane 
 person and be in ignorance of his insanity. 
 
 The rule as generally adopted in this country is that if the 
 insanity of an individual has not been decreed by the courts, 
 and a party dealing with him is ignorant of the insanity, and 
 the contract is fair and has been so far executed that the parties 
 cannot be restored to their original position, the insane party 
 is liable on the contract. 
 
 But if the lunatic has been declared by the courts to be 
 insane, or the party dealing with him knew of his insanity, the 
 contract is void. 
 
 Carter, an attorney, upon the request of Beckwith, who had been 
 legally declared insaiie, instituted proceedings to have him adjudged sane, 
 and to have the control of his property restored to him. In this proceed- 
 
20 CONTRACTS 
 
 ing it was determined that he was still insane, and the application was 
 refused. After Beckwith's death, Carter presented his claim for services. 
 It was held that he could not recover on the ground of a contract with 
 Beckwith, as any contract entered into with a person judicially declared 
 insane is absolutely void. — Carter v. Beckwith, 128 N. Y. 312. 
 
 If the lunatic afterwards becomes sane, he may then ratify 
 or disaffirm all of his voidable contracts, the same as an infant 
 upon attaining his majority, unless he has been declared insane 
 by a court, in which case the court will have to remove this 
 disability. 
 
 The contracts of an incompetent person for necessaries are 
 subject to the same rules as those of an infant. 
 
 Idiots. — There is a distinction between idiocy and insanity. 
 An insane person is one who has had reasoning power but through 
 some cause has lost it. An idiot never has had reasoning power; 
 he was born mentally defective. A contract with an idiot is 
 always voidable, and in most cases it is absolutely void. 
 
 Aliens. — ^An ahen is a person who owes his allegiance to a 
 foreign power. During times of peace all valid contracts are 
 binding between aliens and citizens. In certain states restric- 
 tions are imposed on aliens in acquiring and holding land. In 
 case of war between this country and the country to which the 
 alien owes his allegiance he is an alien enemy; and, where the 
 safety of this country demands it or the contracts result in 
 giving aid or comfort to the enemy, contracts between an alien 
 and a citizen of this country may be declared void. Contracts 
 entered into during peace may be suspended during the war, 
 or, in the interests of trade, contracts may be allowed to con- 
 tinue, either by treaty or by special trading agreements. 
 
 Married Women. — In early times under the common law 
 married women had no property or contract rights. Now we 
 find that by statute a married woman can conduct her own 
 separate business, can contract independently of her husband, 
 and in fact in most of the states she has the same legal rights 
 and powers as an unmarried woman, except generally a married 
 woman cannot bind herself as a surety or guarantor. 
 
 One should consult the laws of one's own state before entering 
 into a contract with a married woman, as a few states still 
 restrict her freedom to contract. 
 
CONTRACTING PARTIES 21 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 / 
 
 1. How many parties must there be to a contract? 
 
 2. Can an individual contract with himself? Explain. 
 
 3. How are parties to a contract usually designated? 
 
 4. Distinguish between parties to a contract and persons. 
 
 5. Who is an infant or minor? 
 
 6. When does a person become legally of age? 
 
 7. How does the law protect infants who enter into contracts? 
 
 8. What is a void contract? What is a voidable contract? 
 
 9. Are infants' contracts void or voidable? 
 
 10. Is a contract between an infant and an adult binding upon the 
 adult? Explain. 
 
 11. Give an example of an infant's contract that may be avoided by 
 him. 
 
 12. An infant bought a bicycle on credit; has he a right to keep the 
 bicycle and not pay for it? 
 
 13. The bicycle which the infant bought on credit was stolen from 
 him; can he avoid paying for it? 
 
 14. Explain an infant's right to affirm or disaffirm an executed con- 
 tract. What steps must he take? 
 
 15. Is it necessary for an infant to affirm an executory contract if he 
 wishes to live up to it? 
 
 16. When will silence amount to affirmation? 
 
 17. When is infancy a defense to an action on an executory contract? 
 When is it not a defense? 
 
 18. Can an infant avoid a part of a contract and affirm the rest? Ex- 
 plain. 
 
 19. What class of infants' contracts are always void? Explain. 
 
 20. What exception is there to the rule that an infant's contracts are 
 voidable at the option of the infant? Why this exception? 
 
 21. What is included under necessaries? 
 
 22. Can a dealer coUect from an infant more than the necessaries are 
 worth? Or for necessaries that the infant did not need? 
 
 23. Is an infant Hable for his torts? Explain. Give examples. 
 
 24. What is the rule as to the contracts of insane persons? 
 
 25. When is a person said to be insane and incompetent to corttract? 
 
 26. Can an insane person make a valid contract? Explain. 
 
 27. Has a lunatic a right during a sane interval to affirm or disaffirm 
 his voidable contracts? 
 
 28. What is the distinction between idiots and lunatics? 
 
 29. Who is an alien? 
 
 30. What are the rules governing contracts with aliens? 
 
 31. What are the rules governing a contract with a married woman? 
 Explain. 
 
22 CONTRACTS 
 
 / 
 
 3. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE 
 
 The Foundation of a Contract. — Every contract is the re- 
 sult of an offer, by one party, which is accepted by another 
 party. Traced back to its origin a contract amounts to this: 
 The first party says, " I will take a certain sum for this article "; 
 to which the second party answers, " I will accept your offer 
 and give you the specified sum." 
 
 You enter a furniture store. The tradesman by exhibiting 
 his wares virtually says he will take the stated price for such 
 articles. You say you will take a certain chair, marked $10. 
 Here we have an offer and acceptance. 
 
 The offer must be explicit. If A says, " I may take $100 
 for this horse when I get ready to sell him," this is not an offer 
 which B can accept and thereby create a contract. 
 
 The acceptance must be absolute and on the exact terms 
 contained in the offer. If A offers to sell a load of hay for $10, 
 and B says he will give him $9 for it, no contract is made be- 
 cause there is no acceptance of the offer. 
 
 The Offer and Acceptance must Pertain to the Same Ob- 
 ject. — A may offer to sell his bay horse for $100. B says, 
 " I will give you that amount for your gray." There is no 
 contract because the minds of the parties have not met. 
 
 Myers owns four auto trucks, all different makes. Jerome said to 
 Myers, 'T will give $1000 for one of your trucks." Myers replied, 'T will 
 accept $1000 for one." This is not a contract, as there is a chance that 
 Jerome has one truck in mind and Myers has another, and their minds 
 have not met on the same proposition. 
 
 The Offer must be Communicated to the Party Accepting 
 
 it. — The offer may be communicated orally, in writing, or by 
 
 acts and conduct, or it may be published. In whatever way it 
 
 is cornmunicated it must actually reach the party accepting it. 
 
 A contract cannot result until the offer reaches the offeree and 
 
 he accepts it. 
 
 An offer unintentionally communicated indirectly cannot be 
 
 said to have been communicated. 
 
 Dann says to Lewis, *T will sell my horse to Brush for $200, if he will 
 give that amount." This does not constitute an offer to Brush, even though 
 Lewis, without authority, tells Brush about it, as it cannot be said to have 
 been communicated by Dann. 
 
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE 23 
 
 In some states it is held that a person who gives information 
 concerning the parties to a crime without any knowledge of the 
 reward which has been offered, cannot claim the reward, as tho 
 offer has not really been communicated to him. Other states 
 hold that he can recover, as the reward is a public offer and 
 when acted upon binds the offerer. The weight of authority 
 seems to be in favor of denying the right of the plaintiff to 
 recover when he had no knowledge of the reward prior to the 
 time of the giving of the information. 
 
 When a man works for another without his request or knowl- 
 edge, there is no contract and he cannot recover. 
 
 Jackson owned a field in which Bartholomew had a stack of wheat 
 which he had promised to move in time for plowing. Notice having been 
 given, he promised that it would be moved at 10 a.m. Relying on this 
 promise, Jackson, shortly after 10 a.m., set fire to the stubble in a distant 
 part of the field, but later found the stack was not removed, so did it him- 
 self to save the grain, and then sued Bartholomew for the work. Held, 
 the services were rendered without request and with no promise express 
 or implied to pay for them, and there can be no recovery. The judge said, 
 "If a man humanely bestows his labor, and even risks his life, in voluntarily 
 aiding to preserve his neighbor's house from destruction by fire, the law 
 considers the services rendered as gratuitous." 
 
 — Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 28. 
 
 If, however, the person for whom the work is being done 
 knows of it and does not order the doer to stop, acceptance is 
 implied and he will have to pay. 
 
 The Acceptance must be Communicated. — Not only must 
 the offer be communicated, as we have seen, but the acceptance 
 must also be communicated, and whether it reaches the offerer 
 or not, it must be something more than a mere mental assent. 
 
 Andrews offered Loomis $500 to erect a portable garage. Loomis, 
 intending to accept the offer but without communicating his acceptance 
 to Andrews, purchased the lumber and proceeded with the work. I^ater 
 Andrews decided he would not need the garage and notified Loomis with- 
 drawing his offer. Loomis cannot recover damages as he failed to com- 
 municate his acceptance to Andrews and there was no contract. 
 
 Acceptance must be Made as Prescribed. — The offerer may 
 prescribe a particular way in which the acceptance must be 
 made. For example, if the offer is made by mail and expressly 
 requires that the acceptance shall be telegraphed back, it will 
 not be sufficient to send the acceptance by mail. 
 
24 CONTRACTS 
 
 Adams offered by letter to sell Snow 600 bushels of potatoes at $1 per 
 bushel and stated in his letter — "If you wish these potatoes at this price, 
 wire me at once." Snow waited three days and then sent Adams a letter 
 accepting the offer. There was no contract, as the acceptance was not 
 made as prescribed. 
 
 There must be No Qualification in the Acceptance. — If 
 
 Aller offers to sell his automobile to Baker for $600, and Baker 
 accepts if Aller will take $300 down and his note for the balance 
 at 30 days, the acceptance is quaHfied and does not constitute 
 a contract. 
 
 Harper offered to sell Randell 600 tons of coal for $5 per ton. Randell 
 replied, "I will buy 500 tons at the price named." This was a qualified 
 acceptance and no contract resulted. 
 
 A qualified acceptance is a refusal of the offer and terminates 
 the offer. If Randell after his first reply had accepted the offer 
 exactly as made, still no contract would have resulted, as there 
 was no longer an offer open for his acceptance. In each case, 
 however, the reply made by Randell might be treated as a new 
 offer, and a contract would be created by Harper's acceptance 
 of that offer. 
 
 An Acceptance is Binding as soon as Made. — An accept- 
 ance is binding as soon as made, even though it has not come to 
 the knowledge of the offerer. If the offerer requires or suggests 
 a mode of acceptance, he takes the risk of the acceptance reach- 
 ing him. A common illustration of this is the case of an offer 
 made through the post ofhce, for in such a case it may be as- 
 sumed that the acceptance is to be made in the same way un- 
 less otherwise expressly stated. When made in the required 
 way, it is held that as soon as the acceptance is sent the contract 
 is made. And the completion of the agreement dates from the 
 time of mailing the letter or sending the telegram, and not from 
 the time of receiving it. 
 
 The Merchants Fire Insurance Company wrote they would insure 
 Taylor's house for $57. This letter was received on December 21, and on 
 that day Taylor accepted the offer and sent his letter of acceptance with 
 check inclosed. On December 22, and before Taylor's letter of acceptance 
 and check reached the Merchants Fire Insurance Company, the house 
 was burned down. Held that this contract was completed when the letter 
 of acceptance was mailed, and therefore the company was liable. 
 
 — Taylor v. Merchants Fire Insurance Co., 9 How. (U. S.) 390. 
 
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE 25 
 
 The offer may be withdrawn any time before acceptance, 
 but the notice of withdrawal dates from the time it reaches the 
 offeree. The offer is made irrevocable only by acceptance. 
 
 Barron wrote to Newcome as follows: "I will sell you my farm tractor 
 for $600 and you may have ten days in which to accept." A week later 
 Barron sent a letter withdrawing the offer, but before it was received by 
 Newcome he wrote Barron agreeing to buy the tractor at the price named. 
 As Barron's offer was accepted by Newcome before he received the with- 
 drawal notice there was a valid contract that could be enforced. 
 
 The Parties may Fix a Time during which the Offer will 
 Remain Open. — When the time an offer is to remain open is 
 fixed by the parties the offerer is not bound to keep the offer 
 open for this time unless he is paid something for doing so, as 
 his promise is without consideration and is not binding. An 
 offer that is not withdrawn is construed to be open for a rea- 
 sonable time. What constitutes a reasonable time depends en- 
 tirely upon circumstances of the case, the relations of the parties, 
 and other facts which would tend to determine what would be 
 fair and just under the circumstances. In some cases it might 
 be a few days and in others a number of months. 
 
 Stone offered to sell his feed store to Harmon for $2800. No time was 
 set for accepting the offer. Six months later Harmon notified Stone that 
 he would accept the offer. Under the circumstances, six months would 
 be an unreasonable time for Stone to keep the offer open and he would 
 not have to sell his feed store to Harmon if he were not disposed to do so. 
 
 Taking an Option. — Sometimes an offer is made and a 
 certain amount is paid by the offeree to the offerer for keeping 
 the offer open a certain length of time. This is called taking an 
 option and constitutes an enforceable contract. 
 
 An Offer may Lapse. — The lapse of an offer may be caused 
 by the expiration of the time named or a reasonable time or 
 by death or insanity of either party before acceptance or, in 
 the case of a partnership or corporation, by the dissolution of 
 the concern. The reason is that there are no longer two parties 
 in existence capable of contracting. 
 
 Pratt gave a note to the trustees of a church as a subscription to 
 enable them to procure a bell. Pratt died before the bell was purchased. 
 Held, that the note was an offer and could be revoked until acted upon by 
 purchasing the bell. The death of the offerer revoked the offer and the 
 note could not be collected. — Trustees v. Pratt's Estate, 93 111. 475. 
 
26 CONTRACTS 
 
 Silence not Acceptance. — When the offerer words his propo- 
 sition in such a way that silence on the part of the offeree is to 
 be considered as an acceptance of the offer, the silence of the 
 offeree does not bind him to the contract. 
 
 " A man cannot be forced to break silence or be bound in a 
 contract." 
 
 Broom wrote to McGuire as follows: "I am offering potatoes at $2 
 per bushel and if I do not hear from you by return mail I shall ship you 
 500 bushels at this price." McGuire will not have to reply and he may 
 refuse to accept the potatoes. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. From what does a contract result? 
 
 2. Mention some ways in which offers may be made. 
 
 3. Explain the meaning of the following statements: 
 " The offer must be explicit." 
 
 "The acceptance must be absolute." 
 
 " The offer and acceptance must pertain to the same thing." 
 " The offer must be communicated to the party accepting it." 
 " The acceptance must be made as prescribed." 
 
 4. Under what conditions do courts, as a rule, hold that a reward is 
 collectible? 
 
 5. Can a man who works for another without his request or knowl- 
 edge collect? 
 
 6. Must the acceptance be communicated? Explain. 
 
 7. What is a qualified or modified acceptance? 
 
 8. Does a contract result from an offer and a qualified acceptance? 
 
 9. When is an acceptance binding? 
 
 10. When is an acceptance by mail binding? 
 
 1 1 . When may an offer be withdrawn? When is a withdrawal effective? 
 
 12. How is an offer made irrevocable? 
 
 13. State the rules in regard to the time of acceptance. 
 
 14. State the way in which the offer may be terminated. 
 
 15. What may cause the lapse of an offer? 
 
 16. What is an option? Give an example. 
 
 17. Does silence ever amount to an acceptance? Explain. 
 
 18. Give an example of an offer prescribing a particular way of ac- 
 cepting. 
 
 4. REALITY OF CONSENT 
 
 An agreement resulting from an offer by one party and its 
 acceptance by another party indicates that the minds of the 
 parties have met on a definite proposition, but the one qualify- 
 
REALITY OF CONSENT 27 
 
 ing element, reality of consent, may be lacking. There are five 
 different things that may deprive an agreement of reality of 
 consent: first, mistake; second, misrepresentation; third, fraud; 
 fourth, duress; fifth, undue influence. 
 
 Mistake. — A mistake is a misunderstanding, wrong idea, or 
 wrong impression relative to some material fact connected with 
 the contract. 
 
 The parties may not have meant the same thing. It may not 
 have been the intent of one or both of two parties to make a 
 contract into which they have been brought by the misrepre- 
 sentations of a third party. Should such a condition be occa- 
 sioned by the carelessness of either party, he is not excused; 
 as when a man, able to read, signs a contract thinking it is 
 something different from what it really is. 
 
 Ebert, who had been induced through misrepresentation to sign a 
 promissory note, proved that at the time he signed the note he was unable 
 to read or write the English language, and that it was represented to him, 
 and he believed it to be, an agreement in reference t© a patented machine, 
 about which the party to whom he gave the note had been talking to him. 
 Held that the note, having been procured by false representations as to 
 the character of the instrument itself, and Ebert being ignorant of its 
 character and having no intention to sign such a paper, the note was void. 
 
 — Walker v. Ebert, 29 Wis. 194. 
 
 The mistake as to the nature of the transaction usually arises 
 from some deceit which ordinary diligence could not foresee or 
 from some accident which ordinary diligence could not avert. 
 
 Again, the mistake may be in the identity of the one with 
 whom the party deals. X may enter into a contract, thinking 
 and intending to contract with Y, when in fact he has been 
 dealing with Z. There is no meeting of their minds, for X 
 never contemplated dealing with Z. 
 
 Potter was supplied with ice by the Boston Ice Co. and, becoming 
 dissatisfied, terminated his contract and made a new one with the Citizens 
 Ice Company. Two years later this company sold out to the Boston Ice Co. 
 The court found that Potter had no notice of the change. Held, the Boston 
 Ice Co. could not recover for ice furnished Potter, as there was no meeting 
 of the minds of these parties to this action. A man has a right to select and 
 determine the persons with whom he will deal, and cannot have others thrust 
 upon him without his consent. — Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28. 
 
 Bevington received an order for linen signed ''A. E. Blenkarn, 753 
 Broadway." The name and address were not distinct and Bevington 
 
28 CONTRACTS 
 
 thought the order was from the firm of Blenkiron & Co., 783 Broadway, 
 with whom he had previously dealt. Bevington accepted the order. There 
 was no contract because of Bevington's mistake as to the identity of the 
 person with whom he was dealing. 
 
 There may be a mistake as to the subject matter of the thing 
 contracted for, as where one party contracts expecting to re- 
 ceive one article and the other party thinks the agreement refers 
 to another. The parties clearly have not agreed upon the same 
 thing and the agreement is void. 
 
 It transpired that Kavanagh was negotiating for one piece of land and 
 Kyle was selling another. It was held by the court that, as their minds 
 did not meet on the subject matter, they could not be said to have entered 
 into a contract, and although there was no fraud on the part of Kyle, the 
 mistake alone was a good defense. — Kyle v. Kavanagh, 103 Mass. 356. 
 
 The mistake may be as to the existence of the thing con- 
 tracted for. 
 
 Thwing made a contract to sell certain timberlands to Hall, thinking 
 they contained seven million feet of fine lumber. Hall also believing there 
 was good lumber thete. The facts were that, unknown to either party, 
 the land had been practically stripped of good lumber. Hall sent a man 
 who mistook the location and reported good timber. Held, a mutual mis- 
 take, which was a sufficient cause for the court to cancel the contract. 
 There was a mistake as to the existence of the thing contracted for. 
 
 — Thwing V. Hall, 40 Minn. 184. 
 
 When a mutual mistake is made regarding the legal effect 
 of the contract where neither party is at fault, the contract is 
 void. 
 
 Hughes entered into a contract with Morgan to furnish two auto buses 
 and drivers at $40 per day for service on a bus line which Morgan was going 
 to operate. It happened that Morgan could not secure a permit to operate 
 the proposed bus line, so the contract failed. To have operated the bus 
 line without a permit would have been illegal. 
 
 Misrepresentation. — Misrepresentation is defined as an in- 
 nocent misstatement of fact as distinguished from fraud or a 
 willful misstatement, and as thus defined it is almost, if not 
 entirely, identical with mistake. 
 
 A party, in making a misstatement, either does it willfully, 
 which is fraud, or does it innocently, which is a mistake; still 
 many writers and judges make a distinction between misrepre- 
 sentation and mistake. 
 
REALITY OF CONSENT 29 
 
 Innocent Misrepresentation. — An innocent misrepresenta- 
 tion or nondisclosure of fact does not vitiate a contract unless 
 it belongs to a special class of agreements in which the utmost 
 good faith is required or is between persons who occupy a pe- 
 culiar relation of trust and confidence to one another. Such 
 contracts are called uberrima fides (utmost good faith) con- 
 tracts. Examples are contracts of insurance and contracts be- 
 tween principal and agent, parent and child, etc. 
 
 Fraud. — Fraud is a false representation of fact, made 
 either with a knowledge of its falsity or recklessly, without 
 belief in its truth, with the intention of having it acted upon 
 by another party, and actually inducing him to act upon it to 
 his damage. Where fraud enters into the making of a con- 
 tract, the contract will not only be voidable, but the party 
 guilty of committing the fraud is liable to a criminal action. 
 
 A party about to purchase a farm asked the owner whether the neigh- 
 borhood was sickly or not, and declined to purchase if it was. The owner 
 assured him that it was free from sickness, whereas fever and ague were 
 prevalent in the locality. The court held that the agreement to purchase 
 could not be enforced, it having been induced by the vendor's misrepre- 
 sentations. — Holmes's Appeal, 77 Pa, State 50. 
 
 Fraud may also arise where there is active or artful con- 
 cealment. 
 
 Jones bought a horse which had a sweeny, stiffness in the neck, and 
 other ailments. He cut the cords of his neck and doctored him up. Later 
 Edwards came and wanted to buy a farm team. Jones showed him this 
 one and another horse, saying they were sound, as far as he knew, but that 
 he never warranted a horse. He did not say a word as to the former ail- 
 ments. Held, that it was fraud on the part of Jones in not acquainting 
 Edwards with conditions affecting the value of the horse, which, if known, 
 would have prevented him from buying. — Jones v. Edwards, i Nebr. 170. 
 
 One who conceals a fact which he ought, as a legal duty, to 
 disclose is guilty of fraud. 
 
 In an action upon a life insurance policy, the defense was fraud in 
 obtaining it. In the physician's examination it was asked whether insurer 
 had cough, occasional or habitual expectoration, or difficulty in breathing. 
 The answer was, "No cough; walking fast upstairs or up hill produced 
 difficulty in breathing." The facts were that he had raised blood for two 
 and one half years and that he died three months after the policy was issued. 
 Held, that there was a fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation which 
 would avoid the policy. 
 
 — Smith V. jEtna Life Insurance Company, 49 N. Y. 211. 
 
30 CONTRACTS 
 
 The false representation may arise from the suppression of 
 the truth, amounting to the suggestion of a falsehood. 
 
 Grigsby sold Stapleton a herd of cattle at the ordinary market price, 
 knowing that they had Texas fever, a disease not easily detected by one 
 having had no experience with it. He did not disclose this to Stapleton. 
 Held, that Grigsby was guilty of a fraudulent concealment, for which he 
 was liable. — Grigsby v. Stapleton, 94 Mo. 423. 
 
 Mere nondisclosure does not vitiate a contract unless the 
 parties stand in a relation of confidence to each other, and one 
 party has the- means of knowing facts that are inaccessible to 
 the other. He is then bound to tell everything that is Hkely 
 to affect the other party's judgment. 
 
 King bought of Knapp at an auction sale a lot in the city of New York, 
 paying ten per cent down. Printed handbills were circulated containing 
 a diagram of the lot, which represented it to be 25 x 100 feet, the handbill 
 also stating this to be the size. Relying on the description. King purchased 
 the premises without inspection. As a matter of fact a building upon the 
 adjoining lot encroached upon the premises. This was known to Knapp, 
 but there was no mention of it in the handbills or at the sale. King refused 
 to complete the sale and brought action to recover the amount paid. 
 Held, King had bought under the suppression of a material fact, and the 
 contract could not be upheld. — King v. Knapp, 59 N- Y. 462. 
 
 It is held also that in contracts for the sale of shares of stock 
 
 in a company the utmost candor and fullness of statement are 
 
 required of the promoter and of those who make statements 
 
 upon the strength of which purchasers subscribe. 
 
 Hatch, a supposed representative of a certain mining company, repre- 
 sented to Barns, a prospective purchaser of shares of stock, that the com- 
 pany was doing a business of a million a month; that it had paid a divi- 
 dend of 10 per cent from the beginning, and as a result of the enormous 
 business it was doing the dividends would be increased. On the strength 
 of these statements, which were all false. Barns subscribed for one hun- 
 dred shares of stock at ten dollars each to be paid for in ten installments 
 of one hundred dollars each. Barns, learning the facts, can avoid the 
 contract and Hatch is liable to criminal action. 
 
 The statement, in order to render the contract voidable be- 
 cause of fraud, must be a misrepresentation of fact. A mere ex- 
 pression of opinion which turns out to be without foundation 
 or a statement of intention which is not carried out will not 
 invalidate the contract. 
 
 Butler borrowed money of Gordon and gave as security a mortgage 
 upon real estate containing some sandstone quarries which had not been 
 
REALITY OF CONSENT 31 
 
 sufficiently worked to show their value. Butler furnished the certificates 
 of two persons, saying they had lived near the place for twenty years and 
 giving the value of the property in their best judgment to be an amount 
 one hundred and fifty per cent more than the loan. Upon a sale under 
 foreclosure the land brought one sixth of the amount of the loan. Gordon 
 sued, charging fraud. Held, he could not recover; that an, action will 
 not lie for an expression of opinion, however inaccurate, in regard to the 
 value of property which depends upon contingencies that may never 
 happen. — Gordon v. Butler, 105 U.S. 553. 
 
 The representation must be a statement of something that 
 exists or has happened; for instance, that a wagon cost $50 — 
 not that the wagon is worth $50, which would be a statement of 
 opinion, or that if you buy this wagon you can sell it again in 
 the spring for $50, as this is merely a prediction for the future. 
 
 The law tolerates considerable prevaricating by the trades- 
 man, in the matter of pufhng his goods or wares, provided the 
 thing bargained for is open to the inspection of the buyer. 
 
 Poland bought out a half interest in Brownell's stock of goods and 
 business. He looked over the stock and books and had ample opportunity 
 to investigate. Held that he had no right to hold the seller upon his repre- 
 sentations of the value of the goods or the amount of business he had 
 previously done. The Judge said, ''It is everywhere understood that such 
 statements and commendations are to be received with great allowance 
 and distrust." — Poland v. Brownell, 131 Mass. 138. 
 
 The representation, in order to render the contract voidable 
 because of fraud, must be made with a knowledge of its falsity 
 or without behef in its truth. 
 
 Cowley brought an action for fraud in that Mrs. Dobbins represented 
 to hirn that William Dobbins left an estate of $40,000 above all liabilities, 
 whereas in truth he was insolvent. The evidence showed that Mrs. Dob- 
 bins believed her representations to be true. Held that Cowley had no 
 cause of action. — Cowley v. Dobbins, 136 Mass. 401. 
 
 If a man makes a false statement, honestly believing it to be 
 true, he is not liable for fraud. He can be held only when he 
 knows it to be false or has no knowledge either of its truth or 
 falsity. The false statement must be made with the intention 
 of its being acted upon, either by the party to whom it is made, 
 or by others to whom that party communicates it. 
 
 Avery made false representations to a mercantile agency as to the 
 financial responsibility of the firm of Avery & Reggins, of which he was 
 a memb«r. This firm asked credit of Eaton, who went to the mercantile 
 
32 CONTRACTS 
 
 agency and obtained the information given by Avery, and relying on this 
 he extended the firm credit. In an action for fraud it was held that the 
 purpose for which such information is given to mercantile agencies is to 
 enable them to furnish it to their subscribers for guidance in extending 
 credit; and that Avery would therefore be liable, as the case justified the 
 finding that the false statements were made with the intent to defraud any 
 person who might inquire of the agency. — Eaton v. Avery, 83 N. Y. 31. 
 
 The false representation must actually deceive, as in the case 
 of Eaton v. Avery. If Eaton had not been deceived by the 
 information, he could not have succeeded in his suit. 
 
 The effect of fraud on a contract is to give the injured party 
 grounds for an action for damages for deceit. And the person 
 who has. been led into a contract by means of the fraudulent 
 misrepresentations may either afhrm the contract and compel 
 the fulfillment of the agreement or he may avoid it, provided 
 that he signifies his intention to do so as soon as he becomes 
 aware of the fraud. If he accepts any benefits under the con- 
 tract after he learns of the fraud, the contract is affirmed. 
 
 Duress. — Duress is actual or threatened violence or un- 
 prisonment exercised upon a man, or some member of his im- 
 mediate family, whereby he is forced to do some act against 
 his will. To amount to duress, the power to put the threat into 
 execution must be apparent. 
 
 A contract entered into by a party under duress is voidable 
 at his option. The duress must be inflicted or threatened by a 
 party to the contract or one acting for him and with his knowl- 
 edge, and the subject of the duress must be the contracting 
 party himself or his wife, parent, or child. 
 
 Morrill procured several promissory notes to be executed by Night- 
 ingale under coercion and intimidation, caused by threats of arrest, and 
 he also had a warrant of arrest issued by a Justice of the Peace, not for the 
 purpose of punishing Nightingale for a crime but to compel him to pay 
 the money or execute the notes. Held, that this constituted duress and 
 was a good defense to the action to recover on the notes. 
 
 — Morrill v. Nightingale, 93 Calif. 452. 
 
 At common law wrongful detention of goods did not con- 
 stitute duress, but by the modern doctrine threats of destruc- 
 tion or detention of goods constitute duress and will avoid a 
 contract. Duress may also consist of threats of illegal or wrong- 
 ful imprisonment or of resort to criminal prosecution for an 
 
REALITY OF CONSENT 2>2> 
 
 improper purpose. Threatened arrest in lawful prosecution does 
 not constitute duress. 
 
 Undue Influence. — In the creation of a contract undue influ- 
 ence arises where the parties are not on an equality as to knowl- 
 edge or capacity. 
 
 A promise made by a child to its parent, a client to his at- 
 torney, a patient to his physician, a ward to his guardian, or a 
 person to his spiritual adviser, will not necessarily be set aside 
 by the court, but such relations call for clear evidence that the 
 party benefited did not take advantage of his position. 
 
 Buckholz was the stepfather of Tucke, who had been accustomed for 
 many years to obey him implicitly and to rely on him in all business mat- 
 ters. When Tucke came of age Buckholz induced him to execute deeds 
 of his property for less than one half its value, telling him he was likely 
 to lose the land and making requests that were practically commands. 
 Held, the deeds were obtained by undue influence and should be set aside. 
 
 — Tucke V. Buckholz, 43 Iowa 415. 
 
 Undue influence, like duress, renders the contract voidable 
 at the instance of the injured party. 
 
 A guardian induced his ward to accept certain shares of stock in set- 
 tlement of a balance due to the ward, representing that the stock was a 
 good investment and would pay good dividends, whereas it was purely 
 speculative. Held, a transaction between a guardian and his ward re- 
 quires the utmost good faith on the part of the guardian and this transac- 
 tion should be set aside at the request of the ward. 
 
 — McConkey v. Cockey, 69 Md. 286. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What does an agreement between the parties to a contract indi- 
 cate? 
 
 2. Mention five different things that may deprive an agreement of 
 reality of consent. 
 
 3. What is a mistake as applied to a contract? 
 
 4. Can a man, able to read, who signs a contract without reading it, 
 be held liable? 
 
 5. Give an example of each of the five kinds of mistakes. 
 
 6. Distinguish between misrepresentation and fraud. 
 
 7. How does an innocent misrepresentation affect a contract? 
 
 8. When does a misrepresentation amount to fraud? Give example. 
 
 9. Where fraud enters into the contract what is the effect? 
 
 10. In what different ways may fraud arise? 
 
 11. What is the effect of nondisclosure? 
 
34 CONTRACTS 
 
 12. Will a mere expression of opinion affect a contract? 
 
 13. When can a man who makes a false statement be held liable? 
 
 14. What happens if a defrauded party accepts benefits under the con- 
 tract after he learns of the fraud? 
 
 15. What is duress? Give an example. What is the effect? 
 
 16. How will undue influence affect a contract? Give an example. 
 
 17. Is fraud an actionable wrong? Explain. 
 
 5. SUBJECT MATTER 
 
 Subject Matter of a Contract. — The subject matter of a 
 contract is that which the promisee agrees to do or not to do, 
 or about which the contract is made. It is the act or thing to 
 which the agreement relates. 
 
 Harris enters into a contract with Evans & Co. whereby Evans & Co. 
 is to build a pleasure boat, according to a certain design, for Harris. The 
 boat is the subject matter of the contract. 
 
 The subject matter of a contract may be anything of value, 
 credits, or services. 
 
 The Object of a Contract must Not be Unlawful. — The 
 object of the contract must not be contrary to law. Certain 
 things are forbidden by law, and if these things are in the con- 
 templation of the parties at the time the contract is entered 
 into, it is not enforceable; otherwise the law would be aiding 
 in an indirect way what it expressly forbids. 
 
 The contracts usually forbidden by law are gambling or 
 wagering contracts, contracts for usury (interest in excess of 
 the legal rate), and, in some states, contracts for unnecessary 
 acts to be performed on Sunday. 
 
 This principle applies only to executory contracts, for if the 
 contract has been voluntarily executed by the parties it is bind- 
 ing; th^ law will not compel the return of anything acquired 
 under such a contract any more than it will compel its perform- 
 ance. The rule is that if parties have voluntarily completed a 
 contract, illegal as to the subject matter, the law will leave them 
 where they are. 
 
 Illegal Objects. — The object of the contract may be illegal 
 by express statutory enactment or because, of rules of the com- 
 mon law. The statutes declare some contracts illegal and void. 
 
SUBJECT MATTER 35 
 
 and impose a penalty for the making of some others without 
 rendering the contracts void. A statute requiring a lawyer or a 
 physician to be licensed renders a contract made without com- 
 pliance with it void. 
 
 Buckley, acting as a real estate broker in Chicago, purchased certain 
 property for Humason. The ordinance of Chicago required all real estate 
 brokers to be licensed and fixed the license fee at $25, providing a penalty 
 for its violation. Buckley at this time had no license. In an action for his 
 commissions it was held that he could recover nothing for his services. 
 Business transacted in violation of law cannot be the foundation of a valid 
 contract. — Btickley v. Humason, 50 Minn. 195. 
 
 In the above case, if the contract had been executed, the 
 money paid could not be recovered. When an illegal contract 
 has been executed the law leaves the parties where they are. 
 
 A law requiring weights and measures to be sealed, as a con- 
 dition precedent to a sale of goods by a merchant, renders a 
 contract made in violation thereof void. 
 
 A Massachusetts statute provided that all oats and meal should be 
 bargained for and sold by the bushel. Held, the seller could not recover the 
 price of the meal and oats sold by the bag. — Eaton v. Kegan, 1 14 Mass. 433. 
 
 Sometimes a statute simply imposes a penalty and does not 
 invalidate the contract. 
 
 Where a city has an ordinance requiring a license of a peddler before 
 he is allowed to sell his wares a penalty is imposed for violation of this 
 ordinance, but usually any contracts which he made before he secured a 
 license are allowed to stand. 
 
 In this country statutes against wagers or bets have been 
 passed in most of the states, and all wagers are now practically 
 declared contrary to pubhc poHcy and void. 
 
 Love made a wager of $20 with Harvey that the body of one Dr. Cahill 
 was buried on a certain side of the main avenue in Holywood cemetery. 
 The stakeholder, although forbidden so to do, paid the $40 left with him 
 to Harvey. Held, that all wagers are unlawful. The party receiving the 
 money from the stakeholder after being forbidden to receive it is liable to 
 the other for a return of the money, even though he be the winner of the 
 wager. — Love v. Harvey, 114 Mass. 80. 
 
 Adams and Corbin enter into a contract whereby if Adams's horse wins 
 a race with Corbin's horse, Corbin shall pay Adams $100, but if Corbin's 
 horse wins the race, Adams shall pay Corbin $100. Adams's horse won the 
 race and Corbin paid the $100. Afterwards Corbin learned that wagering 
 contracts were illegal in his state and he attempted to recover the $100 paid. 
 As the contract was completed Corbin had no redress. 
 
36 CONTRACTS 
 
 Statutes in many states also prohibit the desecration of the 
 Sabbath day, and any contract entered into on that day con- 
 trary to the statutes is void. It is generally held that a contract 
 entered into on Sunday to be performed on any other day is 
 valid, if the parties thereto recognize it as valid on a subsequent 
 week day, while a contract entered into at any time which is 
 to be performed on Sunday is void. Statutes in the different 
 states vary in this regard. 
 
 Sunday contracts which result from necessity such as calling 
 a doctor, or contracts which do not concern worldly business 
 such as contracts in aid to a church, are not affected by the 
 statutes. 
 
 The court held, in an action on a promissory note made on Sunday, 
 that contracts made on Sunday are void, and a promissory note made upon 
 that day will not support an action. — Clough v. Goggins, 40 Iowa 325. 
 
 In some states it is illegal for one to follow his *' ordinary 
 calling " or work; in others, to make any contracts, etc. The 
 different statutes differ so materially that no general rule can be 
 laid down as to what acts are prohibited. 
 
 Aside from the contracts declared unlawful and void by 
 statute, there are contracts which are illegal at common law. 
 The courts will not enforce an agreement to commit a crime or 
 to do a civil wrong. 
 
 Held, that in a composition of a debtor with his creditors, any contract 
 with one of them whereby he is to receive more than his pro rata share is 
 void and any security given upon such a promise is void. 
 
 — White V. KuntZj 107 N. Y. 518. 
 
 Contracts Against Public Policy. — All contracts which if en- 
 forced would be contrary to the good of the public or opposed 
 to the welfare of the community, are said to be against public 
 policy and therefore void. Those contracts which tend to injure 
 the government in its relations witli other countries, those with 
 alien enemies which involve any communication over the border 
 line, and those in restraint of trade are illustrations of this class 
 of contracts. 
 
 A contract to break a law of a sister state is also against 
 pubHc policy. 
 
 Agreements to prevent or hinder the course of justice are 
 
SUBJECT MATTER 37 
 
 illegal; as, to agree to conceal a crime of which one has knowl- 
 edge, to refrain for a certain consideration from prosecuting a 
 criminal, to agree not to testify as a witness, to influence a wit- 
 ness's testimony, or to bribe a juror. 
 
 Held, that a contract to deed a certain piece of property, where the 
 real consideration was an agreement to drop a criminal prosecution against 
 the grantor's son, was void as against public policy. 
 
 — Partridge v. Hood, 120 Mass. 403. 
 
 A contract tending to injure the public service is contrary to 
 public policy and therefore void — for example, an agree- 
 ment by a public officer to assign his salary to a creditor, or an 
 undertaking to influence the action of a legislature by lobbying, 
 or an agreement to hinder or prevent competition for public 
 contracts. 
 
 Agreements which tend to promote and encourage Htigation 
 are also void; that is, it is not legal to speculate in lawsuits. 
 A may have a cause of action against B but it is not lawful for 
 C to buy the action for the purpose of instituting suit. The 
 rule was formerly more strict than now. The holding in most 
 states at the present time is that an attorney can institute a suit 
 on a "contingent fee," which means that he is to receive for his 
 services a percentage of what he recovers. In the earlier days 
 this was forbidden. 
 
 Agreements contrary to good morals are illegal. So also are 
 contracts which affect the freedom or security of marriage, as 
 an agreement not to marry, and contracts made in consideration 
 of the procuring or bringing about of a marriage, or mutual 
 agreements to obtain a divorce. 
 
 Restraint of Trade. — There is another class of agreements, 
 known as contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade, which are 
 prohibited by law as against public policy. It is for the good of 
 the community and the welfare of the individual that compe- 
 tition in trade should exist and that every man should be free 
 to engage in the occupation or vocation he may prefer. Still it 
 is but fair that a man in selling out his business shall include 
 with it the good will, and refrain from opening up a like busi- 
 ness at the next door or on the same street. The rule is^ there- 
 forey that if the restraint imposed upon the one party is not 
 
38 CONTRACTS 
 
 greater than the protection the other party requires, the contract 
 is valid. 
 
 Martin sold his lumber business, situated in Denver, to Long and 
 agreed not to engage in the lumber business for a period of five years. This 
 is a contract in general restraint of trade and cannot be enforced. If 
 Martin had agreed in writing not to engage in the lumber business in the 
 city of Denver for a period of five years, this would have been a contract 
 in reasonable -restraint of trade and would have been enforceable. 
 
 From the nature of the case it will be seen that a covenant to 
 refrain from engaging in the same business within the same 
 city might be reasonable in a grocery business, while in another 
 business, the limitation of the whole state would be only just, as 
 in the case of a manufacturer of heavy machinery requiring a 
 wider territory for his sales. 
 
 Dandelet sold his dyeing and scouring establishment, and leased the 
 premises to Guerand, entering into a covenant that he would not at any 
 time thereafter engage in a like business in the city of Baltimore. Held, 
 that this covenant was valid, as it was not too comprehensive in its restric- 
 tion. — Guerand v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 561. 
 
 Roeber, who was engaged in the manufacture and sale of matches 
 throughout the United States, sold his stock of machinery and good will 
 to Diamond Match Co. He covenanted that he would not, at any time 
 within ninety-nine years, engage in such business in any of the states or 
 territories except Nevada and Montana. Held, that the covenant was 
 valid, as the restraint was reasonable considering the interests to be pro- 
 tected. — Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473. 
 
 Perry sold his patent on a sandpapering machine to Berlin Machine 
 Works and in the contract agreed "not to manufacture, sell, or cause to be 
 sold any sandpapering machines of any description." He violated the 
 agreement and Berlin Machine Works sued for an injunction and damages. 
 It was held that the agreement was not a just and lawful protection to the 
 business of manufacturing and selling under the patent, was in unreasonable 
 restraint of trade, and therefore void. 
 
 — Berlin Mack. Works v. Perry, 71 Wis. 495. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is the subject matter' of a contract? Give an example. 
 
 2. What may be the subject matter of a contract? 
 
 3. Can an illegal object be the subject matter of a contract? Ex- 
 plain. Mention some illegal objects. 
 
 4. What contracts are usually forbidden by law? 
 
 5. Will courts entertain an action based on an illegal contract? Ex- 
 plain. 
 
 6. Can a lawyer or physician practice in your state without a license? 
 
CONSIDERATION 39 
 
 7. How does the law regard contracts made on Sunday? What is the 
 law of your state? 
 
 8. Mention a contract which would be against public policy. 
 
 9. Is there any difference in effect between an illegal agreemant and 
 one against public policy? 
 
 10. What is the effect of a contract in violation of an existing law? 
 
 11. Are wagering contracts lawful in your state? 
 
 12. Explain the meaning of "in restraint of trade." 
 
 13. Under what conditions are contracts in restraint of trade binding? 
 
 14. Distinguish between general restraint of trade and reasonable re- 
 straint of trade. Give an example of each. 
 
 6. CONSIDERATION 
 
 Consideration in an Executory Contract. — Consideration is 
 the inducement to a contract. There must be some act or 
 thing of value given or promised by the promisee in order to 
 make the promise of the promisor enforceable, unless the terms 
 thereof are fully carried out or executed. Therefore there must 
 be consideration in every executory contract. 
 
 Jackson offered Hart $500 for the automobile he was driving. Hart ac- 
 cepted the offer and a sale resulted. The $500, which was the considera- 
 tion, was what induced Hart to sell his automobile. 
 
 A contract under seal is in a way, under the common law, an 
 exception, for the seal is said to import a consideration, and the 
 instrument being sealed, no other evidence of consideration is 
 required. Now, however, in a few of the states, the seal is by 
 statute regarded as only a presumption of consideration in an 
 executory contract and is not sufhcient without some actual con- 
 sideration. But if the seal is used on a gratuitous promise for 
 the purpose of creating a consideration, the effect is the same 
 as at common law. 
 
 A father gave his daughter a written instrument under seal by which 
 he promised to pay her $312. This was understood to be a part of the 
 money which the father had owed his wife, now deceased, and he felt it 
 should go to the daughter, although there was no legal oJDligation. The 
 defense to this promise was want of consideration. Held, that as the prom- 
 ise was intended to be a gratuitous one the seal imported sufficient con- 
 sideration. — • Aller V. Aller, 40 N. J. Law 446. 
 
 The Consideration must have Value. — While consideration 
 is an essential element of every legally enforceable contract, 
 
40 CONTRACTS 
 
 it is not necessary that the consideration be adequate in value 
 to the thing promised, but it must be of some value in the eyes 
 of the law. It will be seen that it would be impossible for the 
 courts to require an adequate or full consideration, as they 
 would then have to determine the merits of every bargain. 
 
 A may elect to sell a piece of jewelry worth $ioo to B fo^ 
 $io. The fact that the consideration is not equal to the value of 
 the article does not affect the contract. An article worth $1000, 
 or any amount, might be transferred by sale to the purchaser 
 in consideration of $1, or any amount, being paid. In the 
 absence of fraud the contract would be good. 
 
 Moore came into possession of a watch which he sold to Lambert for 
 $10. Shortly afterwards Moore learned that the watch was valuable and 
 easily worth $100. He tried to collect $90 from Lambert. As fraud had not 
 been practiced, Moore could not recover. Courts will not attempt to make 
 bargains for people. 
 
 The Consideration must be Legal. — The doing or promising 
 to do an illegal act is not sufhcient consideration to support an 
 agreement. 
 
 It was held that a contract to pay money in consideration of the ab- 
 duction of a person is unenforceable and void. 
 
 — Barker v. Parker, 23 Ark. 390. 
 
 McBratney, an attorney, sued for services in presenting the claim of 
 the Miami Indians at Washington. It was contended that the services 
 were those of a lobbyist and illegal. The court held it was for the jury to 
 decide whether the services were those of an attorney in drawing papers 
 and making agreements, or of a lobbyist in influencing the legislators. 
 If the former, he could recover; if the latter, the consideration was illegal 
 and void, and he could not recover. If for both, the illegal part of the 
 consideration vitiated and avoided the whole contract. 
 
 — McBratney v. Chandler, 22 Kans. 692. 
 
 A Consideration must be Possible. — A promise to do an im- 
 possible act is never a sufficient consideration to support a 
 promise. This does not mean a mere pecuniary impossibility, 
 but an obvious physical impossibility. The non-existence of the 
 thing given as consideration would render the consideration void 
 and a promise m^de thereon invalid. 
 
 Strong contracted to travel for Harper and Company for one year; 
 during this time he was to represent them in every state in the United 
 States, and spend at least two weeks in each state. This was a physical 
 impossibility and the contract was void. 
 
CONSIDERATION 41 
 
 The Consideration must be Present or Future. — A past 
 consideration is no consideration at all, for it confers no value. 
 It is simply some act or forbearance in time past, which has 
 been conferred without bringing about any legal liability. If 
 afterwards, from a feeling of thankfulness or good will, a promise 
 is made to the person by whose acts or forbearance the promisor 
 has been benefited, such promise is gratuitous and cannot be 
 enforced. 
 
 James Kingston, the son of a wealthy merchant, was taken ill while 
 traveling some distance from home and strangers cared for him for several 
 weeks until he recovered. His father, when he heard of this, promised to 
 pay the strangers $1000 for what they had done for his son. As this promise 
 was made after the son had been cared for, it could not be enforced. This 
 is an example of a moral obligation, but no legal obligation existed. 
 
 Bowman was nominated for senator. Dearborn rendered services and 
 furnished literature to advance Bowman's cause, but without any solici- 
 tation on Bowman's part. After the election Bowman gave Dearborn 
 his note for $60 for such services. The court held that the note was void 
 for want of consideration. Past performance of services constitutes no 
 consideration for an express promise, unless the services were performed at 
 the express or implied request of the defendant. 
 
 — Dearborn v. Bowman, 3 Met. (Mass.) 155. 
 
 Some courts hold that if there was an express or implied 
 request when the act was performed, the subsequent promise is 
 supported by a consideration, as the request showed that the 
 promisor intended to pay for the act. So in the example last 
 cited if Bowman had requested Dearborn to render the services, 
 Bowman's subsequent promise to pay would have been enforce- 
 able. 
 
 Consideration in an Executed Contract. — A contract that 
 has been executed will not be set aside because of lack of con- 
 sideration; it is therefore those contracts which have not yet 
 been carried out that we are to consider. 
 
 * Matthews purchased of Smith a quantity of fertilizer and gave his 
 note for it. When it became due, he said the fertilizer was not good and 
 had injured his land; still he paid the note, and then brought suit to re- 
 cover the money paid. Held, that as he had paid the money with a full 
 knowledge of the facts he could not maintain his action. 
 
 — Matthews v. Smith, 67 N. C. 374. 
 
 Consideration for a Gift. — A familiar illustration of lack of 
 consideration is the case of a gift. A mere promise to give a 
 
42 CONTRACTS 
 
 present is void for want of consideration, but when the promise 
 is executed by the deHvery of the gift the defect is remedied, 
 and the gift cannot be reclaimed. 
 
 Miss Brewer's father pointed out a colt to her when she was but twelve 
 years old and said, "This is your property ; I give it to you." It was known 
 by the family as her colt, but the father kept possession of it until he died. 
 The daughter brought an action to recover the horse. Held, that it being a 
 gift, there was no valuable consideration. To make the agreement valid 
 there must have been either an actual or a constructive delivery. There 
 having been no delivery, the title did not pass to the daughter. 
 
 — Brewer v. Harvey, 72 N. C. 176. 
 
 Newton handed Camp some money to put in the savings bank for him, 
 and when the books were brought back he said, *'I give you these bank 
 books." Camp kept them, and in an action by Newton's administrator 
 to recover the books it was held thai this was a good delivery, sufficient 
 to constitute a complete gift. — Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88. 
 
 A Promise may be a Sufficient Consideration. — The con- 
 sideration must come from the promisee, and it may consist of 
 a present act or a promise to be performed in the future. In 
 the latter case the promisee is also a promisor, and his promise 
 may be to give or to do something, to refrain from doing some- 
 thing which he has a legal right to do, or to surrender some 
 right. 
 
 Mrs. Kilcome promised to pay Flanagan a certain sum if he would 
 drop a lawsuit which he had commenced against her. This was done, 
 but she did not pay it, and suit was brought for the sum promised. It was 
 held that there was a valuable consideration for the promise, even though 
 it be shown that she would have succeeded if the suit had come to trial. 
 Mrs. Kilcome surrendered her right to have it tried. 
 
 — Flanagan v. Kilcome, 58 N. H. 443. 
 
 An action was brought on a note given in consideration of a parent 
 naming a child after the maker of the note. The court held that this was 
 based upon a sufficient consideration. The parent surrendered his right to 
 name the child. — Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294. 
 
 Consideration for the Discharge of a Debt. — The payment 
 of a smaller sum of money in satisfaction of a debt for a larger* 
 sum is not a sufficient consideration for the discharge of the en- 
 tire debt, as it is, in fact, doing no more than the party is 
 already legally bound to do. 
 
 Waters owed Hempy $600 which was several months past due. Waters 
 offered Hempy $400 in full satisfaction of the debt, which he accepted and 
 gave a receipt in full. The debt is not paid and Hempy can sue Waters 
 
CONSIDERATION 
 
 43 
 
 for the balance due. Part payment of a debt after maturity does not 
 cancel it or bar action to recover. 
 
 If something else than money is taken in part satisfaction of 
 the debt, the rule will be different. 
 
 If Waters had paid Hempy $400 cash and given him a wagon 
 worth not more than $50 which Hempy accepted in full satis- 
 faction of the debt, the debt would have been canceled. The 
 acceptance of a chattel of uncertain value in full satisfaction of 
 a debt cancels the debt. This is true even though the debt is 
 past due. 
 
 Thomas owed Singleton $826.15, and in full settlement he gave Single- 
 ton two notes, one for $200 and one for $213.07, guaranteed by one Nix. 
 Held, that, although payment or promise to pay part of a debt is not good 
 consideration for the release of the balance, when the creditor receives a 
 guaranty from a third person, or a note indorsed by a third person, the 
 release will be good. — Singleton v. Thomas, 73 Ala. 205. 
 
 But if the amount due is in dispute, the promise to pay any 
 sum in settlement of the disputed claim is valid, even though 
 such sum be less than that actually due. The liquidation of the 
 claim constitutes a good consideration. 
 
 Croft was indebted to Howe. The amount of the debt was in dispute. 
 Croft claimed it was $785 and Howe claimed it was $875. They reached 
 a compromise agreement whereby Croft paid $830. This compromise was 
 fairly made and the debt was canceled even though $875 was the correct 
 amount. 
 
 It has been held where part payment i^ made and accepted 
 and a release under seal is given for the whole debt, that the 
 debt is canceled. 
 
 Call owed money to the Union Bank which he did not pay. Later he 
 paid part of the debt and received from the bank a receipt and release 
 under seal for the whole debt. It was held that the release being under 
 seal was good without full consideration. — Union Bank v. Call, 5 Fla. 409. 
 
 A promise of additional compensation to a party for carry- 
 ing out his uncompleted contract is not enforceable, as the 
 undertaking of the promisee to do what he is legally bound to 
 do does not furnish consideration for the promise. 
 
 Carhart contracted to build a house for Stone to cost when completed 
 $12,000. During the course of construction Carhart reported that a cer- 
 tain kind of material which the specifications called for had advanced in 
 
44 CONTRACTS 
 
 price to such an extent that he could not use it unless Stone would agree 
 to pay $500 more than the original contract price. Stone agreed to this 
 and Carhart completed the house. Stone will not have to pay the $500 
 as Carhart did for it no more than he was already legally bound to do. 
 
 Five men were engaged as a crew on a pleasure yacht to make the 
 round trip from Duluth to Buffalo. When the yacht reached Buffalo, one 
 man left the crew. The owner of the yacht told the other four men that if 
 they would man the yacht on the return trip he would divide the salary of 
 the man who left the crew among them. They agreed. The owner of the 
 yacht is not bound, as the men are doing no more than they originally 
 contracted to do. 
 
 Ayres entered into a contract to build a certain section of road 
 for C. R. I. & P. R. Co. After building a part Ayres informed the 
 C. R. I. & P. R. Co. that he owed for supplies and could not go on at 
 the contract price. C. R. I. & P. R. Co. told him to go on and his actual 
 expenditures would be met and his creditors paid. Held, that the agree- 
 ment was without consideration, as it simply bound Ayres to do what he 
 was already under a legal obligation to do. 
 
 — Ayres v. C. R. I. b' P. R. Co., 52 Iowa 478. 
 
 Accord and Satisfaction. — This is the making and execut- 
 ing of an agreement by which one party agrees to give or per- 
 form, and the other party agrees to accept, in satisfaction of a 
 claim, something other or different from what he is entitled to. 
 It results in the settlement of a claim by compromising the 
 amount which is in dispute, or by giving something else than 
 that which was originally agreed upon. 
 
 Whitney sued on four promissory notes. Cook pleaded that the notes 
 had been discharged by an agreement by which Whitney agreed to accept 
 an interest in Cook's claim against the United States in satisfaction of the 
 notes. Held, the agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction and 
 was a good defense to the suit. It depended on the intention of the 
 parties whether the agreement or its performance was to constitute full 
 satisfaction. — Whitney v. Cook, 53 Miss. 551. 
 
 Settlement to Avoid Litigation. — A settlement to avoid liti- 
 gation, where the party forbears to sue or consents to drop a 
 pending suit, is a valuable consideration, and the promise made 
 for this consideration can be enforced. 
 
 Parker had been in the habit of going into Enslow's store and filling 
 his pipe from tobacco left on the counter for the use of the public. Ens- 
 low, for a joke, mixed powder with the tobacco, and when Parker lit it, 
 an explosion followed and injured his eyesight. Parker threatened, and was 
 intending to sue Enslow. As a compromise and settlement of this cause 
 of action, Enslow gave Parker a promissory note, upon which he sued. The 
 court held that as the note was given in settlement of a threatened suit, 
 
CONSIDERATION 45 
 
 if the payee supposed or believed that he had a cause of action and the note 
 was given and accepted in good faith as a compromise, it was supported 
 by a sufficiient consideration and could be enforced. 
 
 — Parker v. Enslow, 102 111. 272. 
 
 Compromise with Creditors. — If the creditors of a party 
 agree with each other and with the debtor to accept a part of 
 what he owes each of them in discharge of the whole debt, the 
 forbearance of each one is the consideration to the others, who 
 might otherwise lose the whole. A compromise with all the 
 creditors is therefore held to be for a valuable consideration, 
 and such an agreement can be enforced. 
 
 Jones & Co., an insolvent firm, entered into a written agreement with 
 their creditors whereby the creditors were to accept twenty-five cents on 
 the dollar in payment of their several claims and give receipts in full, pro- 
 vided that all of the creditors assented to the agreement. Held, that this 
 was a valid agreement, and that the firm by complying therewith was 
 discharged from the balance of the indebtedness. 
 
 — Pierce v. Jones, 8 S. C. 273. 
 
 Consideration for Extension of Time. — But a promise to ex- 
 tend the time of payment of a debt already due is void for want 
 of consideration unless the debtor makes some concession; as, 
 giving some security, paying interest in advance, or doing some- 
 thing that will form a consideration for the promise to extend 
 the time. 
 
 It was held, that an agreement to extend the time of piayment of a 
 promissory note upon the payment of the interest in advance is valid, as 
 it is founded upon a valuable consideration. 
 
 — Warner v. Campbell, 26 111. 282. 
 
 Moral Obligations. — A distinction is sometimes made be- 
 tween " good " consideration and " valuable " consideration. In 
 defining these terms, Bla-ckstone says, " A good consideration is 
 such as that of blood, or of natural love and affection, when a 
 man grants an estate to a near relative, being founded on 
 motives of generosity, prudence, and natural duty. A valuable 
 consideration is such as money, marriage, or the like, which the 
 law esteems an equivalent given for the grant, and is therefore 
 founded on motives of justice." 
 
 Accordingly it was held by some old authorities that a moral 
 obligation was a sufficient consideration to make a promise 
 valid. 
 
46 CONTRACTS 
 
 But the courts are now practically united on the point that 
 neither a moral obligation nor a " good " consideration is suffi- 
 cient to make a promise valid and enforceable at law. 
 
 A father promised his son that he would give him twenty shares of 
 bank stock when he became of age. As this promise is supported by ** good " 
 consideration, which in reality is no consideration, it is not binding. The 
 father is morally bound to fulfill his promise, but he is not legally bound. 
 "Good" consideration will not support an executory contract, but it will 
 support an executed contract. 
 
 Consideration for Subscriptions. — Some courts hold that 
 there is no consideration for subscriptions to a fund for a special 
 purpose unless the purpose is carried out. Others hold that one 
 subscription is consideration for another and that the promises 
 mutually support each other. Still other courts hold that if 
 the organization accepting the subscription agrees to carry 
 out the purpose, this promise on their part is consideration for 
 the subscriptions, and the subscribers are bound. In reality 
 there is no consideration for a voluntary subscription, but the 
 court rulings are justified by the conditions surrounding such 
 cases. 
 
 A fund of $100,000 is raised by popular subscription for a new Y. M. C. A. 
 building. Is Mr. Blank, who subscribed $1000, legally bound by his sub- 
 scription? According to the first ruling, if the Y. M. C. A. ofhcials act 
 upon the subscription and start the building, he is bound. According to 
 the second ruHng, he is bound with the other subscribers, as one subscrip- 
 tion is consideration for another, and if one subscriber pays, all others are 
 legally bound. According to the third ruling, if the Y. M. C. A. officials 
 accept the subscriptions and agree to erect the building, all subscribers 
 are legally bound. 
 
 Contracts Entered into over the Telephone. — In these days 
 a great deal of business is transacted by means of the telephone. 
 When a contract is entered into in this way a question may 
 arise as to the identity of the contracting parties, and in case 
 this identity cannot be established to the satisfaction of the 
 court or jury, the contract may be declared void. For this 
 reason it is best to require the confirmation in writing of all 
 contracts entered into over the telephone. 
 
 Brown sent to McGuire a carload of coal which he claimed McGuire 
 had ordered by telephone. McGuire refused to accept or pay for the 
 coal. Unless Brown could prove that McGuire had ordered the coal he 
 could not enforce the contract. 
 
CONSIDERATION 47 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 • 
 
 1. What is consideration in a contract? 
 
 2. Is consideration in a contract necessary? Explain. 
 
 3. How does the seal affect a contract in regard to consideration? 
 
 4. Is it necessary that the consideration have value? Explain. 
 
 5. What may be consideration in a contract? 
 
 6. Does the law with reference to consideration apply to executed 
 contracts the same as to executory contracts? Explain. 
 
 7. How does illegal consideration affect a contract? Give example. 
 
 8. Can a thing that is impossible be the consideration in a contract? 
 
 9. Explain the meaning of " consideration must be present or future." 
 
 10. Under what circumstances, if any, can a promise to pay for services 
 performed in the past be enforced? 
 
 11. Is a mere promise to make a gift enforceable? Explain. 
 
 12. May a promise be a sufficient consideration? Give an example. 
 
 13. What is the usual way of discharging a debt? 
 
 14. In case of part payment of a debt, if a receipt is given in full, is 
 the debt discharged? 
 
 15. Under what circumstances will part payment discharge a debt? 
 
 16. Mention a case where the court will look into the adequacy of the 
 consideration. 
 
 17. Give an example of inadequate consideration. 
 
 18. Will a compromise of a disputed claim constitute a good con- 
 sideration? Explain. 
 
 19. How will a release under seal in case of part payment affect the 
 debt? 
 
 20. Explain " accord and satisfaction." 
 
 21. Is a promise to forbear bringing suit sufficient consideration? 
 
 22. Is a compromise with creditors a sufficient consideration? 
 
 23. Discuss a promise to extend the time of payment of a debt. 
 
 24. Distinguish between a legal obligation and a moral obligation. 
 
 25. Is a person who subscribes to a fund bound by his subscription? 
 
 26. Why 'should contracts entered into by telephone be confirmed? 
 
 27. Name the elements in the following: 
 
 (i) Kent offered to employ Houston as a yard foreman for one year 
 at $125 per month. Houston accepted the offer and started to work. 
 
 (2) Myers rented a store building on Main Street, from Jackson, for 
 one year for $1200 and paid one month's rent in advance. 
 
 (3) Harris entered the University of Minnesota and paid one year's 
 tuition', $150, in advance. 
 
 (4) Whitmore & Co. engage space in Lincoln's garage for three 
 trucks at $15 each per month. 
 
 (5) Morran and Wilkins enter into a written agreement whereby 
 Wilkins is to erect a house for Morran, according to certain plans and speci- 
 fications, for the sum of $12,000. 
 
48 CONTRACTS 
 
 7. OPERATION OF CONTRACTS 
 
 Parties Acquiring Rights under Contracts. — We have now 
 considered every element necessary for a valid and binding 
 contract, and the question arises as to the extent and limitation 
 of the rights conferred and of the obligations incurred. 
 
 As a general principle only the parties to a contract acquire 
 
 any rights under it. It is clear that it cannot impose liabilities 
 
 upon any one not a party to it. A man cannot voluntarily and 
 
 without being asked to do so pay another man's debts and thus 
 
 establish himself as a creditor. 
 
 Jameson paid a debt of $600 for a friend of his without being asked 
 to do so. If the friend does not see fit to pay Jameson he cannot recover. 
 
 Rights of Third Parties. — In nearly all of the states (Massa- 
 chusetts and Michigan excepted) if a contract is made by E 
 with F for the benefit of G, G may recover upon it, although 
 the consideration came from E and F's promise was made to E. 
 
 Empy lends $100 to Foster and Foster promises Empy that he will 
 repay it to Grant. Grant can maintain an action against Foster upon this 
 promise made for his benefit. 
 
 The contrary ruling is illustrated by the following case: 
 
 A father agreed with his son that he would revoke a provision in his 
 will in favor of his daughter and devise the same property to the son in 
 consideration of the son's paying the daughter $10 a month as long as she 
 might live. The daughter was not a party to the agreement. Held, that 
 she could not enforce it. — Linneman v. Moross, 98 Mich. 178. 
 
 The New York courts in the celebrated case of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 
 N. Y. 268, held that the third person, for whose benefit a promise was made, 
 might maintain an action upon the promise, provided that he was the person 
 directly intended to be benefited, and provided that the promisee was at the 
 time under an existing obligation to him, which the promisee sought to dis- 
 charge by giving him the benefit of the promisor's promise. The facts in 
 this case were that one Holly, at the request of Fox, loaned him $300. Holly 
 stated at the time that he owed that sum to Lawrence and had agreed to pay 
 it to him the next day. Fox, in consideration of the loan, promised Holly 
 that he would pay the sum to Lawrence on the next day. Lawrence sued 
 Fox on this promise and the court held that he could recover on the promise, 
 although he was not a party to it. 
 
 The rule as applied in New York state has been very largely 
 adopted throughout the United States. 
 
 Harrison purchased Lambert's interest in the firm of Lamb'^rt and 
 Hoyt, and agreed with Lambert to pay his obligations to the partnership 
 
OPERATION OF CONTRACTS 49 
 
 creditors. The creditors of the old firm of Lambert and Hoyt may sue 
 Harrison on this promise made for their benefit 
 
 X sold certain real property to Walker, the property being mortgaged 
 to Dean. As a part of the purchase price Walker agreed with X to assume 
 the mortgage and pay the amount named therein to Dean. Held, that 
 Dean, who was not a party to this agreement, could claim the benefits 
 thereof and maintain an action to recover the amount of the mortgage 
 from Walker. — Dean v. Walker, 107 111. 540. 
 
 Joint and Several Liability. — When two or more persons are 
 liable in a contract, their liability may be joint or several. 
 
 1. Persons jointly liable must all be sued together, a dis- 
 charge to one discharges all, and if one dies the liability rests in 
 the survivors. 
 
 2. If the persons are severally liable, each for only a part of 
 the contract, they must be sued individually, and a discharge to 
 one does not discharge the others. There is no survivorship. 
 
 Assignment of Rights and Liabilities. — Having now deter- 
 mined upon whom the rights and liabilities fall, we must as- 
 certain how and when other persons may take their places and 
 succeed to their rights, if at all. It is well established that the 
 promisor cannot assign his liabilities under the contract; that 
 is, the promisee cannot be compelled to accept performance 
 from any but the promisor. This is only just, for if A contracts 
 with B to have him do a certain thing for him, A is entitled to 
 know with whom he is dealing, as he may have taken into con- 
 sideration B's particular adaptability to the work. 
 
 This rule is qualified in the case of B undertaking to do cer- 
 tain work for A in which no particular knowledge or skill is 
 required. He can then have the work done by another, but 
 still B is responsible for the work being well done. 
 
 H agreed to sell to Groezinger all the grapes he might raise in a certain 
 vineyard during a period of ten years, and Groezinger agreed to pay there- 
 for $25 per ton. At the end of five years H sold the vineyard and assigned 
 the contract to LaRue. Groezinger refused to accept grapes from LaRue, 
 saying he had no contract with him. Held, that the contract could be 
 assigned, as it was not for services of a personal nature. 
 
 — LaRue v. Groezinger, 84 Calif. 281. 
 
 The case of Boston Ice Co v. Potter (page 27) is not in 
 conflict with this rule, as the courts hold that the promisor cannot 
 assign his Hability unless the -agreement contemplates that some 
 
so CONTRACTS 
 
 one else is to do the work or aid in it. This is true in the case of a 
 contractor agreeing to build a house, as it is plainly within the 
 contemplation of the parties that he will employ men to do part or 
 all of the work. 
 
 Deverman, a noted artist, agreed to paint a picture of a certain land- 
 scape for Morwitz. Deverman, not being able to paint the picture, at- 
 tempted to deliver to Morwitz on the contract a picture painted by an 
 assistant and student in Deverman's studio. As this contract calls for 
 services of a personal nature, Morwitz may refuse to accept a picture 
 painted by any one other than Deverman. 
 
 Gamzon contracted to build an apartment house for LeRoy. The 
 building of an apartment house requires the services of many different 
 artisans, such as carpenters, masons, and plumbers, and it is clearly within 
 the contemplation of the parties that others are to assist in the construc- 
 tion of this apartment house and the subletting or assigning of parts of 
 the work would not affect the contract. 
 
 As to rights and benefits under a contract, the general rule 
 is that a contract involving only money or property can be 
 assigned, but a contract involving personal service or some par- 
 ticular characteristic of a party cannot be assigned. In other 
 words a contract to pay money may be assigned, and also a con- 
 tract to deliver goods, but a contract of employment cannot be 
 assigned. An assignment is effective against the other party to 
 the contract only after he has received notice of the assignment. 
 
 Adams owed Mozier $500 for goods sold and delivered. On May i 
 Adams paid Mozier $100 on account. On May 15 Mozier assigned his 
 claim to Sheerman. On June i Adams paid Mozier $100 more on account. 
 On June 15 Sheerman gave Adams notice of the assignment. Adams will 
 be required to pay only $300 to Sheerman, as both payments were made 
 before he received notice of the assignment. 
 
 An assignment conveys to the assignee no better title than 
 his assignor had. In other words, the assignee is subject to all 
 the defenses that might be brought against the assignor up 
 to the time notice of the assignment has been given. This rule, 
 however, does not apply to negotiable paper, which is treated in a 
 later chapter. 
 
 Rights under an assigned contract, if assignable, can be 
 enforced by the assignee in his own name if the party Hable has 
 been given notice of the assignment. In the Boston Ice Co. case 
 (page 27), Potter had no notice of the assignment by the Citizens 
 Ice Co. to the Boston Ice Co. 
 
OPERATION OF CONTRACTS 51 
 
 Aside from the assignment of the rights and liabilities under a 
 contract by the voluntary acts of the parties, they may also be 
 transferred by operation of law. 
 
 By the death of a person all of his rights under his con- 
 tracts pass to his executor if he leaves a will, or to his adminis- 
 trator if he dies without one. This is not the rule if the contract 
 depends upon his performing some acts of personal service or 
 skill. In such cases the contract dies with the party. 
 
 Lacy contracted with M to work upon his farm as an ordinary farm 
 laborer for one year from March i. In July M died. Held, that his death 
 terminated the contract. — Lacy v. Getman, 119 N. Y. 109. 
 
 By the bankruptcy of a party all of his property, including his 
 rights under his contracts, passes to the trustee. This is ex- 
 plained fully in a later chapter on Bankruptcy. 
 
 Novation. — This is the substitution of a new contract for 
 an existing contract, either by substituting different parties or 
 different terms, and must be in all respects a valid contract. 
 
 Adams contracts with Johnson for the purchase of his automobile. 
 Adams decides that he does not want the car, so he enters into an agree- 
 ment with all concerned whereby Brown is to take his place as the pur- 
 chaser. This is a novation; Brown has been substituted for Adams. 
 
 Cummings had a contract for the sale of 500 tons of coal to Sherman 
 for $6 a ton. The parties made a new agreement, canceling the old one, 
 by which Cummings agreed to sell and Sherman to buy 1000 tons of coal 
 for $5.50 a ton. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Who acquires rights under a contract? 
 
 2. Can a man voluntarily pay the debt of another and establish him- 
 self as a creditor? 
 
 3. Can a third party acquire rights under a contract? Give an ex- 
 ample, f 
 
 4. Can the creditors of an old firm hold liable a new member of 
 the firm who agreed at the time he entered to assume responsibihty for 
 the debts already contracted? 
 
 5. Define joint liability, and several liability, and give an example of 
 each. 
 
 6. Can a promisor assign his liabilities under a contract? 
 
 7. Can a contract for personal services be assigned? Explain fully and 
 give examples. 
 
 8. What rights under a contract are assignable? 
 
 9. Does the assignee get any better title than the assignor had? 
 Explain, 
 
52 CONTRACTS 
 
 10. Can an assignee enforce rights in his own name? 
 
 11. Is notice of an assignment necessary? Explain. 
 
 12. Give an example of an assignment by operation of law. 
 
 13. What happens to rights under a contract fn case of death of a 
 contracting party? 
 
 14. What is a novation? Give an example. 
 
 8. STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
 
 Outline. — In the year 1676 a law was passed in England, 
 entitled " An act for the prevention of frauds and perjuries." 
 This statute required that written evidence should be supplied 
 in proving certain contracts. 
 
 The statute commonly called " the fourth section of the 
 Statute of Frauds" which has been reenacted by nearly all of 
 the states, provides in substance that in order to be enforceable 
 the following contracts, or some memorandum of them, shall 
 be in writing and signed by the party against whom it is sought 
 to enforce the contract or by his authorized agent: 
 
 1. The promise of an executor or administrator to pay 
 from his own funds or estate the debts of the estate he is ad- 
 ministering. 
 
 Johnson, the administrator of an estate, promised the undertaker that 
 if the estate was not sufficient to meet all expenses he would assume 
 responsibility for the funeral expenses and pay them from his own funds. 
 As this promise was not in writing it could not be enforced. 
 
 2. The promise of any one to answer for the debt .or de- 
 fault of another^ that is, to guarantee that another will pay 
 his debts or fulfill his legal obligations. 
 
 Morton was asked to guarantee payment of a debt contracted by Clark. 
 He said that he would pay the debt if Clark failed to do so. In order to 
 bind Morton on this guaranty it would have to be in writing, and it would 
 have to be given before or at the same time the debt was contracted or 
 there would have to be some new consideration for the guaranty. 
 
 3. The promise, as distinguished from a mutual promise to 
 marry, to perform any special act, as to transfer property rights, 
 in consideration of marriage, in a case where the marriage is the 
 consideration for such promise. 
 
 Whalan promised Miss Green that he would give her 500 shares of 
 U. C. R. R. stock if she would marry him. She consented. Unless this 
 agreement was in writing, signed by Whalan, she could not claim the stock. 
 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 53 
 
 4. Any contract for the sale of land or any interest in or 
 
 concerning lands. 
 
 Graves contracted verbally with Jameson for the purchase of a certain 
 building lot. They were to meet Jameson's attorney ten days later for the 
 purpose of executing papers necessary to transfer title. In the meantime 
 Jameson received a better offer and sold to another party. As this contract 
 was not in writing Graves had no right of action. 
 
 By the common law a lease of land was not required to be 
 in writing, but this rule was changed in England and the United 
 States by the adoption of the Statute of Frauds. By special 
 statute in some states a lease for one year or less need not be 
 in writing, even though it is to commence at a future date. 
 
 (For other contracts of sale, seepage 94.) 
 
 5. Any contract, which by its terms is not to be performed 
 within one year from the time of the making thereof; but if 
 performance within one year is possible, it does not have to be 
 in writing. 
 
 Some time prior to November, Hillhouse and Jennings made an oral 
 agreement by which Hillhouse was to work for Jennings for one year from 
 November 21. It was held that the contract was within the Statute of 
 Frauds, and not being in writing it was unenforceable. 
 
 It must be remembered that this special requirement is in 
 addition to all other requirements. In these contracts, as in 
 all others, there must be competent parties, agreement, legal 
 subject matter, and consideration. Most contracts may be 
 proved by oral evidence; these contracts may be proved only 
 by written evidence. 
 
 Object. — The object of this statute was to lessen the perjury 
 in the testimony of witnesses, especially in the important cases 
 included therein, and it therefore required that these contracts 
 be evidenced in writing. In nearly all of the states of the Union 
 this statute has been reenacted in somewhat the same form, 
 although the language of the different statutes varies. This 
 statute does not render any oral contracts void, but says that no 
 action shall be brought on them in the cases mentioned above. It 
 takes away the remedy. When action is brought in court upon 
 contracts of the kinds mentioned, it is necessary to show the 
 written agreement. The oral agreement is valid, and after it is 
 made, a sufficient writing may be given. 
 
54 CONTRACTS 
 
 A verbal contract was made which belonged to the class required by 
 the Statute of Frauds to be in writing. It was broken, and the parties 
 afterwards entered into a written agreement containing the terms of the 
 oral contract. After the writing was signed an action was brought for a 
 breach of the contract which occurred before the written agreement was 
 executed. Held, that the contract was sufficient to satisfy the statute. 
 The writing was not the contract itself, but the evidence necessary to 
 prove it. — Bird v. Munroe, 66 Maine 337. 
 
 The Statute of Frauds is a defense, solely, and the party avail- 
 ing himself of it must set it up, otherwise it is waived. 
 
 When Memorandum is Sufficient. — The writing need not be 
 a formal contract. A memorandum or note containing the 
 terms of the agreement, if signed by the party to be charged 
 or his authorized agent, i^ suihcient. 
 
 Action was brought to compel Brown to perform his part of the fol- 
 lowing contract and to convey the land to Hurley. 
 $50 * "Lynn, April 14, 1866. 
 
 "Received of John and Michael Hurley the sum of fifty dollars in part 
 pa5TTient of a house and lot of land situated on Amity Street, Lynn, Mass. 
 The full amount is $1700. This bargain is to be closed within ten days 
 of the date hereof." This was signed by Brown. Brown claimed that the 
 writing was not sufficient, as there were several houses and lots on the 
 street. It was shown that defendant owned no other house and lot on the 
 same street. The court held that the writing was sufficient, and that evi- 
 dence could be given as to the particular house meant. 
 
 — Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 545. 
 
 The memorandum or note required to be in writing need 
 merely contain the agreement and may consist of several writ- 
 ings or a number of letters and memorandums. 
 
 Promise of an Executor or Administrator. — The promise of 
 
 an executor or administrator to answer damages out of his own 
 
 estate, that is, to render him personally liable for the debts of 
 
 the deceased, must be in writing. But the writing does not 
 
 import any consideration, and there must be a consideration to 
 
 this as to any contract. 
 
 Shepherd, who owed Smithwick for board, died. Shepherd 's adminis- 
 trator, in a conversation with Smithwick, stated that "he would see it paid" 
 or, "it should be paid." Held, that the promise was not enforceable be- 
 cause it was not in writing. — Smithwick v. Shepherd, 4 Jones (N. C.) 196. 
 
 Promise to Answer for the Debts of Another. — In the case 
 of a promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of 
 another, there must be three parties: the debtor, the creditor, 
 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 55 
 
 and the person who guarantees the debtor's account. To bring 
 the case under the rule requiring a writing there must not be 
 an absolute promise to pay, but a promise to pay if the other 
 defaults. 
 
 To illustrate, A goes to a grocery with B and says, " Give 
 B a bill of groceries, and if he fails to pay for them, I will." 
 Such a promise is under the statute and must be in writing. 
 But if A says, '^ Give B the bill of goods and I will pay for 
 them," or, " I will see that you are paid," this is an independent 
 promise, making A the principal debtor, and is not within the 
 statute. 
 
 Boston, a physician, brought suit to recover for services rendered Farr's 
 stepson. Farr said to Boston, "Go and get a surgeon and do all you can 
 for the boy; I will see that you get your pay." Held, the jury were justi- 
 fied in finding that it was an original promise on the part of defendant by 
 which he charged himself with the bill, and did not come within the 
 statute. — Boston v. Farr, 148 Pa. State 220. • 
 
 The test seems to be whether the party for whose debt the 
 promise is made continues to be liable; if so, the promise is 
 within the statutes. 
 
 Agreements in Consideration of Marriage. — The agreement 
 here meant is not the promise to marry, but the promise to 
 settle property or to make a payment of money in consideration 
 of, or conditioned upon, a marriage. 
 
 It was held that a verbal agreement made by the woman before mar- 
 riage, whereby she released and renounced all interest in her proposed 
 husband's estate after his death, was void under the Statute of Frauds. 
 
 — McAnnuUy v. McAnnuUy, 120 111. 26. 
 
 Contracts for the Sale of Lands or Any Interest in or Con- 
 cerning Them. — This section does not apply to the deed of 
 conveyance of land, as that must be written and sealed without 
 statutory requirement. But the statute here refers to any 
 agreement to buy or sell land, or to any interest in or concern- 
 ing lands, as a grant of a right of way over one's land, which 
 is an interest concerning the realty and within the statute. 
 
 Agreements Not to be Performed within the Space of One 
 Year. — The mere fact that the contract may or naay not be 
 completed within one year is not sufficient to bring it within 
 the statute. It must be the plain intent and purpose of the 
 
56 CONTRACTS 
 
 contract that it is not to be performed within that time, to 
 bring it within the statute. If its performance depends upon a 
 contingency that may or may not happen within the year, no 
 writing is necessary. 
 
 It was held that a contract of partnership to continue for three years 
 was void under the Statute of Frauds unless in writing. 
 
 — Wahl V. Barnum, ii6 N. Y. 87. 
 
 An agreement to support a person during his lifetime is not 
 within the statute, as he may ^ie within the year. 
 
 Z, a stepfather, gave D, his stepson, the use of his farm during Z's 
 lifetime in consideration of D's supporting Z and his wife during their 
 lives. Held, that such an agreement is not within the statute. 
 
 — McCormick v. Drummett, 9 Nebr. 384. 
 
 But a contract for a year's service to be entered upon in the 
 future, even the next day, must be in writing under the statute. 
 
 About the middle of March Oddy and James entered into a verbal 
 agreement by which James employed Oddy to superintend his cement 
 works for one year from April i next. Oddy worked until August 3, when 
 James discharged him. Oddy sued, and James set up that the agreement 
 was void under the Statute of Frauds. Held, for James. The contract 
 was not to be performed within one year, so must be in writing. 
 
 — Oddy V. James, 48 N. Y. 685. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is the Statute of Frauds? 
 
 2. What contracts must be in writing under the Statute of Frauds? 
 
 3. Is any formal written instrument necessary? Explain. 
 
 4. How are most contracts proved? 
 
 5. How must contracts within the Statute of Frauds be proved? 
 
 6. What is the object of the Statute of Frauds? 
 
 7. How general has been its adoption? 
 
 8. Explain the following: " The Statute of Frauds is a defense, 
 solely, and the party availing himself of it must set it up, otherwise it is 
 waived." 
 
 9. Give an example of an oral promise to answer for the debt of 
 another that would not be enforceable. 
 
 10. Is an oral contract to sell land enforceable? 
 
 11. Merritt agreed to pay Love $20 per month to care for a horse 
 until he died. In case the horse lives three years would this contract have 
 to be in writing to be enforceable? , 
 
 12. Lyng agreed to work for Booth for one year and to begin work 
 on the first of the following month. Must this contract be in writing? 
 
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACT 57 
 
 9. DISCHARGE OF CONTRACT 
 
 Discharge by Agreement. — As the contract is created by 
 the agreement of the parties, so the parties may, if they choose, 
 terminate and discharge it in a Hke manner. If the contract 
 is executory, each party may waive his rights under it, and the 
 waiver of the rights of one is the consideration for the waiver of 
 the rights of the other. It is virtually a new contract, the sub- 
 ject matter of which is the waiver of the old contract, and all of 
 the elements of a contract are necessary to constitute a valid 
 waiver. If one party has performed his part of the contract, 
 there must be some consideration for his release of the other 
 party. 
 
 Andrews offered Hoff ten cords of wood and Hoff agreed to work for 
 Andrews five months to pay for it. Before anything had been done An- 
 drews released Hoff from his promise to work and Hoff released Andrews 
 from his promise to deliver the wood. The contract was discharged. 
 
 Suppose that after Andrews had delivered the wood he released Hoff 
 from his promise to work five months. Hoff's liability would not be dis- 
 charged, as there would be no consideration for Andrews's release. 
 
 A waiver may be effected by the substitution of a new con- 
 tract which so changes the terms of the old one that it either 
 expressly or impliedly waives the old agreement, but the inten- 
 tion to discharge the old contract must be clear. The contract 
 may by express terms provide for its own discharge, as, for 
 instance, a stipulation that one party may terminate it upon 
 giving certain notice or performing certain conditions. 
 
 A policy of insurance provided that if the premises should become 
 vacant and remain unoccupied for a period of more than ten days, without 
 the assent of the company indorsed upon the policy, the policy should 
 become void. The premises became vacant and remained so for over three 
 months. They were then occupied and thereafter burned. Held, that 
 by the terms of the policy it was terminated and discharged by the vacancy, 
 and subsequent occupation did not revive it. 
 
 — Moore v. Phcenix Insurance C(7., 62 N. H. 240. 
 
 Discharge by Performance. — This is the termination of the 
 contract contemplated by the parties when it is made. The 
 terms having been carried out and the conditions performed, 
 the contract is satisfied and discharged. This of course requires 
 performance upon both sides. If but one party has performed, 
 
S8 CONTRACTS 
 
 he alone is discharged and not the contract, for it remains in 
 force until all of its provisions are carried out. If the contract 
 is for the sale of a table for $40, the contract is discharged 
 when the table is delivered and the money paid. If the table 
 is delivered but payment not made, it is discharged as to the 
 seller but not as to the purchaser. 
 
 To constitute a performance the terms of the contract must 
 be carried out as to time, place, and conditions. Although a 
 substantial performance is held good, the party will be liable for 
 the damages caused by his deviation from the exact terms of the 
 contract. 
 
 Nolan brought an action to recover on a contract for building Whitney 
 a house. The court found that he had endeavored to live up to the agree- 
 ment and, acting in good faith, had substantially performed his part. He 
 could therefore recover, notwithstanding some slight defects in the plaster- 
 ing for which compensation would be made to Whitney. 
 
 — Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648. 
 
 Gillespie Tool Company brought an action to recover the contract 
 price for driUing a gas well. The contract called for a certain depth and 
 diameter. The tool company had drilled the required depth, but the 
 diameter of part of it was less than the contract specified. The only ex- 
 cuse for this was the saving of time and expense. Held, that this was not 
 a substantial compliance and the company could not recover, although the 
 well answered every purpose a larger one would. 
 
 — Gillespie Tool Co. v. Wilson, 123 Pa. State 19. 
 
 When the contract calls for the payment of money, the party 
 to whom it is to be paid need not accept a note or check. But 
 if it is accepted, the question arises as to whether or not this 
 discharges the original contract, or whether the note or check is 
 to be regarded as a conditional payment. If it is but a con- 
 ditional payment, it does not discharge the contract until it is 
 paid. The intent of the parties governs here, but in the absence 
 of any proof of intent to the contrary, the presumption is, in 
 most of the states, that it is taken conditionally. 
 
 The taking of a note for a preexisting debt was held to be no payment 
 unless the creditor expressly agreed to take the note as payment and to 
 run the risk of its being paid. The giving of a receipt for the amount is 
 not enough to establish such a positive agreement. 
 
 — Stone & Gravel Co. v. Gates Iron Works, 124 111. 623. 
 
 A contract in which the performance of one party is to be 
 satisfactory to the other gives rise to a nice question and we are 
 
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACT 59 
 
 confronted with the inquiry, Can the whims and personal taste 
 of the party for whom the work is done prevent the fulfillment 
 of the agreement when the performance is to all intents and 
 purposes well accomplished? The answer seems to be that if it 
 is a matter of personal taste, as a contract for painting a portrait, 
 or if it is a contract for the sale of goods where the parties can 
 be put in statu quo (i.e. the same condition in which they origi- 
 nally stood), the agreement will be strictly construed and the 
 buyer will be the sole judge. 
 
 Brown expressly agreed to make a suit of clothes for Foster that would 
 be satisfactory to him. The clothes were made and delivered, but Foster 
 declined to accept "them. Brown proved that they could easily be altered 
 and made to fit. But the court held that under the agreement it was for 
 Foster alone to decide whether or not he would accept the clothes. It was 
 Brown's fault if he entered into a contract that made his compensation 
 dependent upon the judgment and caprice of another. 
 
 — Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136. 
 
 An artist who agrees to paint a "satisfactory" portrait cannot re- 
 cover unless the buyer is satisfied, as the question of reasonable satisfac- 
 tion does not enter into contracts involving personal taste. 
 
 — Pennington v. Rowland, 21 R. I. 65. 
 
 But if it is a contract for work or labor which does not in- 
 volve the question of personal taste, as for machinery or mason 
 work, the courts hold that the party for whom the work is 
 performed must be satisfied when in justice and reason he ought 
 to be satisfied. That is, if the work has been substantially 
 performed it must be accepted. 
 
 Hawkins agreed with Graham in writing to furnish and set up a heat- 
 ing system in Graham's mill according to certain specifications, and he was 
 to be paid upon its satisfactory completion. If the system was not satis- 
 factory, he was to remove it at his own expense. Held, that the question 
 as to whether the system was satisfactory was to be determined, not by 
 the particular taste and liking of the mill owner, but by the judgment of 
 a reasonable man. — Hawkins v. Graham, 149 Mass. 284. 
 
 Richardson agreed to sink a well for Mead which would produce a flow 
 of water satisfactory to Mead. It was held that Mead cannot arbitrarily 
 say he is dissatisfied and refuse to pay, if the well does satisfy his needs and 
 should satisfy a reasonable man. — Richardson v. Mead, 11 S. D. 639. 
 
 Legal Tender. — The payment of money must be made in 
 what is termed legal tender, unless the creditor consents to 
 accept something else. Legal tender is money which Congress 
 has declared must be accepted if offered in payment of an un- 
 
6o CONTRACTS 
 
 disputed debt. All gold coins and silver dollars are legal tender 
 for any amount; Silver coins of denominations less than the 
 dollar are legal tender in amounts not exceeding ten dollars. 
 Minor coins such as nickel and copper pieces are legal tender 
 in amounts not exceeding twenty-five cents. Federal Reserve 
 notes are legal tender. United States notes or " greenbacks " 
 are legal tender in any amount, except for duties on imports 
 and interest on the public debt. National bank notes are not 
 legal tender, but are accepted by the United States government 
 for all debts except duties on imports. Gold and silver certifi- 
 cates are not legal tender. In actual practice the national bank 
 notes and the gold and silver certificates are taken without 
 question and pass as freely as any other kind of money, and 
 their acceptance constitutes good payment. The receipt of 
 counterfeit money does not constitute payment, and it can be 
 returned within a reasonable time and good money demanded 
 in its place. 
 
 Tender. — The creditor may refuse to accept the money 
 which the debtor claims is due him. In such a case if the debtor 
 makes a sufhcient tender of the amount the debt is not canceled, 
 but interest from that time stops and he will be relieved from 
 paying any costs in a suit against him for the debt. To consti- 
 tute a sufficient tender the exact amount of money must be pro- 
 duced and offered, and the offer must be made unconditionally, 
 that is, it must be made without any reservation. Even the 
 offer to pay upon condition that the creditor give a receipt for 
 the money is not a good legal tender. Unless the contract 
 provides a place of payment, the tender must be made to the 
 creditor personally if he is within the state. 
 
 Hart owed Mead $540. Hart went to Mead's office, tendered pay- 
 ment, and demanded a receipt. This was not a good tender, as a condition 
 was attached. Hart met Mead on the street where he tendered payment. 
 This was not a good tender, as it was not made in a proper place. Hart 
 offered Mead silver certificates to the amount of $540 in payment of the 
 debt. This was not a good tender, for silver certificates are not legal tender. 
 Hart went to Mead's home one evening and tendered currency in pay- 
 ment. This was not a good tender, for it was made at the wrong time and 
 place. Hart tendered nine fifty-dollar bills and one one-hundred-dollar 
 bill and demanded the change. This was not a good tender, for the exact 
 amount should be tendered. 
 
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACT 6i 
 
 Had Mead accepted any of these tenders the debt would 
 have been canceled. 
 
 Impossibility of Performance. — We have seen that when 
 the act to be performed is an impossibility on the face of it, 
 no contract exists, as such an act is not a valid consideration. 
 But the question comes up when the impossibility arises after 
 the formation of the contract, and the rule then is that it does 
 not excuse performance. 
 
 Anderson contracted in March to raise and deliver to May 591 bushels: 
 of beans. Anderson delivered only 152 bushels because most of his crop was 
 destroyed by early and unusual frost. Held, that this did not excuse his 
 nonperformance. When such causes may intervene they should be guarded 
 against in the contract. — Anderson v. May, 50 Minn. 280. 
 
 But if the promisor makes his promise conditional upon an 
 event, the happening of which makes the performance impos- 
 sible, this of course excuses him, as where a clause is inserted 
 providing for the contingency of fire, or strikes, or floods. If 
 the promise is made unconditionally, the promisor takes all risk. 
 
 There are contingencies which may arise, however, which the 
 courts hold are sufficient excuse for not fulfilHng the contract. 
 Among these are impossibilities arising from a change in the 
 law of one's own country. 
 
 Miller leased from Cordes, a wooden building in Grand Rapids, Mich., 
 for ten years. The lease contained this covenant, "If said building burns 
 down during this lease, said Cordes agrees to rebuild the same in a suitable 
 time, for said Miller." Miller occupied the premises for two years, when 
 it was destroyed by fire. About the time of the fire an ordinance was passed 
 prohibiting the erection of wooden buildings within certain limits which 
 embraced this site. Held, that the covenant was released by the ordinance, 
 making its fulfillment unlawful. — Cordes v. Miller, 39 Mich. 581. 
 
 Another contingency which will excuse the failure to fulfill is 
 where the continued existence of a specific thing is necessary to 
 the performance of the contract. The destruction of that thing 
 through no fault of either party discharges the contract. 
 
 The lessee of a coal mine covenanted in his lease to work the same 
 during the continuance of his lease in a good and workmanlike manner. 
 The court held he was excused from further performance when the coal 
 mine became exhausted. — Walker v. Tucker, 70 111. 527. 
 
 Cleary entered into a contract with Sohier to lath and plaster a cer- 
 tain building. After he had partially completed his part of the contract 
 the building burned. Held, that Cleary was excused thereby from ful- 
 
62 CONTRACTS 
 
 filling the remainder of his contract, and could recover a reasonable amount 
 for the work already done. — Cleary v. Sohier, 120 Mass. 210. 
 
 A contract for the rendering of personal services is discharged 
 by the death or illness of the promisor. 
 
 Rosa contracted with Spalding, who was proprietor of a theater, to 
 furnish an opera troupe to give a certain number of performances. The 
 leader and chief attraction of the company became ill and unable to sing, 
 and Rosa did not perform his agreement. In an action to recover damages 
 for the breach it was held that as the illness of the chief singer made it prac- 
 tically undesirable and impossible to appear without him, and as it was 
 caused by circumstances beyond his control, it constituted a valid excuse for 
 nonperformance. — Spalding v. Rosa, N. Y. 40. 
 
 Blakely *and Sousa made an agreement by which Blakely was to be 
 manager and Sousa the leader of a band which was to tour the country. 
 The peculiar abilities of both Blakely and Sousa were an important con- 
 sideration in making the contract. It was held that the death of Blakely 
 dissolved the contract and that his administratrix could not substitute 
 another manager and insist on the performance of the contract. 
 
 — Blakely v. Sousa, 197 Pa. State 305. 
 
 Discharge by Operation of Law. — Where a new law is 
 
 passed which makes an existing contract illegal, the parties will 
 
 not be expected to perform, and the contract will be discharged. 
 
 Gains contracted to erect a five-story frame apartment house for Lurch 
 on a certain lot near the center of the city. Before the permit was secured 
 a city ordinance was passed establishing a "fire zone" and in this zone all 
 buildings must be hereafter constructed of brick or some fire proof material. 
 Lurch's lot was within this zone, so the contract was discharged. 
 
 Other examples may be found in case of war. When two 
 countries go to war contracts between citizens of the respective 
 countries on which nothing has been done are discharged. 
 Contracts on which something has been done may be suspended 
 until the war is over. 
 
 Discharge by Alteration of a Written Instrument. — If a 
 written instrument is altered or erased in a material part by a 
 party to the contract, or by a stranger while the instrument is 
 in the possession of the party to it, and with said party's con- 
 sent' and without the consent of the other party to the instru- 
 ment, the contract will be discharged, if the alteration is made 
 with an intent to defraud; but if innocently made there can 
 be recovery on the original consideration. 
 
 A promissory note dated October 11, was made by Steele and Newson, 
 payable to their own order one year from date. It was indorsed by them 
 
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACT 63 
 
 to Wood. "September" had been struck out and "October" put in as 
 the date. The change was made after Steele had signed the note as surety 
 and without his knowledge or consent. Held, that it was a material altera- 
 tion -and extinguished Steele's liability. — Wood v. Steele, 6 Wall. (U.S.) 80. 
 
 But if the alteration be made without intention to defraud, 
 
 there can be a recovery on the original contract. 
 
 At the maturity of a joint promissory note a renewal note was given 
 which was invalidated as to one of the makers on account of a material 
 alteration made after he signed. The alteration was the insertion of the 
 words "with interest" without his knowledge or consent. Held, that 
 recovery could be had against him on the original cause of action, as there 
 was no fraudulent intent in the alteration. — Owen v. Hall, 70 Md. 97. 
 
 Discharge by Breach. — We have already considered how a 
 contract may be terminated and discharged by fulfilling the 
 terms thereof. We have now to consider how it may be dis- 
 charged by failure or refusal of one or both of the parties to 
 fulfill the agreement. When the terms of the agreement have 
 been broken, there arises in the place of the contract a new obli- 
 gation under which the party in default is placed. That obliga- 
 tion is tQ pay to the other party the damage arising therefrom. 
 The injured party acquires a new right through the breach 
 called a right of action. 
 
 A contract may be broken in any one of . three ways: 
 
 1. A party may renounce his liability under the contract. 
 
 2. A party may, by his own acts, make it impossible for 
 himself to fulfill the contract. 
 
 3. A party may wholly or partially fail to perform what he 
 promised. 
 
 Breach by Renouncing Liability. — When one party to the 
 contract renounces his liability thereunder before performance 
 is due and declares that he will not perform, a breach of con- 
 tract arises and the injured party may at once institute an 
 action for damages. 
 
 Roehm brought an action to recover damages for breach of a contract 
 to accept and pay for hops. Before the time of delivery Horst advised 
 Roehm that he would not accept the hops. The Court held that the abso- 
 lute refusal to abide by the contract, made before performance was due, 
 gave Roehm an immediate right of action for damages. 
 
 , — Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. i. 
 
 If during the course of the performance one of the parties 
 clearly refuses to continue with his part, the contract is broken, 
 
64 CONTRACTS 
 
 and the other party is excused from further performance, — in 
 fact, he must not go on if his continuing would increase the 
 damage. 
 
 Marsiglia delivered to Clark a number of pictures to be cleaned and 
 repaired. After he had commenced Marsiglia gave him orders to stop, as 
 he had decided not to have the work done. Clark, however, finished the 
 work and claimed the whole amount of the contract. Held, that he had no 
 right to increase the amount of damages by going on with the work. When 
 the contract was broken he was entitled to just compensation for the injury- 
 he had sustained by the breach of the agreement. 
 
 — Clark V. Marsiglia, i Denio (N. Y.) 317. 
 
 Breach by Making Performance Impossible. — If one of the 
 parties puts it out of his power to perform before the perform- 
 ance is due, the other party need not wait, but may consider 
 the contract broken. 
 
 Marsh promised in writing to pay Wolf a certain sum of money. The 
 note contained the following condition: "This note is made with the ex- 
 press understanding that if the coal mines in the Marsh Ranch yield no 
 profit to me this note is not to be paid and the obligation herein expressed 
 shall be null and void." Thereafter and before the mines had yielded any- 
 thing Marsh sold them. Held, that the yielding of profit by* the mines 
 was a condition precedent to the payment of the note, but Marsh had ren- 
 dered the happening of that condition impossible by selling the mine; there- 
 fore he must pay the note. — Wolf v. Marsh, 54 Calif. 228. 
 
 And this is true if the impossibility is created after the con- 
 tract is performed in part. 
 
 Woodberry, the owner of a steamboat, employed Warner, a pilot, at a 
 salary of $720 per year with the further agreement that as soon as the net 
 earnings of the boat should amount to $8000 he should become the owner 
 of a one-fourth interest. In about two years Woodberry sold the boat. 
 Held, that as he had put it out of his power to fulfill the contract, he was 
 liable to Warner for the value of his services over and above his regular 
 wages. — Woodberry v. Warner, 53 Ark. 488. 
 
 In order that one party may recover damages for a breach 
 of contract on the part of the other the first party must show 
 that the second party's promise was not dependent upon the 
 acts of the first party; that is, if A is to draw a ton of coal for 
 B for $7, A cannot sue B for payment until he has performed 
 his own part. 
 
 Clark owned a tarm of 200 acres and agreed to pay Webfer $100 if he 
 would find a purchaser for it. Weber found a man who bought part of it, 
 and then sued for the $100. Held, that he could not recover, as he was 
 
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACT 65 
 
 not entitled to the money until he had performed his part of the contract 
 and found a purchaser for the whole farm. — Weber v. Clark, 24 Minru 354. 
 
 This rule does not apply to contracts in which the promises 
 
 are independent of each other. Here a breach by one does not 
 
 discharge the other. 
 
 The covenant in a lease provided that Tracy, the lessee, might have 
 the refusal of the premises at the expiration of the lease for three years longer. 
 When the lease expired the Albany Exchange Company, the landlord, refused 
 to renew it at the same rate, but asked $200 per year more. Tracy was some- 
 what in arrears of rent at the expiration of the first lease. Held, that the 
 payment of the rent was not a condition precedent to the right of Tracy 
 to a renewal of the lease, the covenant to renew and the covenant to pay 
 rent being independent promises. Tracy could bring his action for breach 
 of the contract to renew, although he was guilty of default in the pay- 
 ment of his rent. — Tracy v. Albany Exchange Co., 7 N. Y. 472. 
 
 Breach by Failure to Perform — Entire and Divisible Con- 
 tracts. — It is clear that when one party wholly fails in the act 
 that was the entire consideration for the second party's promise, 
 and that must be done before the second party can be required 
 to perform his part, the second party will be excused. But 
 certain cases come up in which one party has done part of what 
 he promised or a part of the contract has been carried out, and 
 we have to consider whether or not the whole contract has 
 therefore failed. In other words, is it an entire or a divisible 
 contract? A common illustration of the cases under which this 
 question arises is an agreement to deliver and pay for goods in 
 installments at different times. 
 
 Myer sold to Wheeler ten carloads of barley, like sample, to be delivered 
 from time to time on the railroad tracks at Calmar, Iowa, and Wheeler was 
 to pay seventy cents per bushel for each carload when delivered. After the 
 first car was delivered Wheeler refused to allow more than sixty-five cents, 
 saying that the barley was not equal to sample, but urged Myer to ship 
 balance. Myer refused. Held, that the contract was divisible, and that the 
 refusal to pay for the first carload did not entitle Myer to rescind and refuse 
 to deliver the other carloads; that Myer could recover the actual value of 
 the car delivered, and Wheeler could recover damages for the failure to 
 deliver the other nine cars. — Myer v. Wheeler, 65 Iowa 390. 
 
 But the courts in this country generally seem to hold the 
 contrary view, and make the test the real intent of the parties. 
 If it was intended to be all one contract, the courts do not make 
 it divisible because it is to be executed or carried out at stated 
 periods. 
 
66 CONTRACTS 
 
 Norrington made a contract of sale to Wright of 5000 tons of iron rails 
 for shipment from a European port at the rate of about 1000 tons per month, 
 beginning in February, the whole contract to be shipped before August. 
 Norrington shipped only 400 tons in February and 885 tons in March. 
 As soon as Wright learned of the failure of Norrington to ship as agreed, 
 he refused to accept and pay for what was shipped, and sought to rescind 
 the whole contract for the failure to ship 1000 tons per month. In this case 
 the contract was held to be entire and not divisible, and Wright had the 
 right to rescind the whole contract. — Norrington v. Wright, 115 U.S. 188. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. How may a contract be discharged by agreement? Give an example. 
 
 2. How may a waiver be effected? 
 
 3. When is a contract said to be terminated by performance? 
 
 4. Give an example of a contract substantially performed. 
 
 5. When a contract calls for the payment of money, does the ac- 
 ceptance of a check discharge the contract? Explain. 
 
 6. What rules of law are applied to ''performance by one party satis- 
 factory to the other party?" 
 
 7. What is legal tender? 
 
 8. (a) What constitutes a good tender in the payment of a debt? 
 (b) What is the effect of a good tender? 
 
 9. How does impossibility of performance affect a contract? 
 
 10. Give an example of a contract where performance is impossible. 
 
 11. How should the promisor protect himself against contingencies 
 which may arise? 
 
 12. How does death of the promisor affect a contract involving per- 
 sonal services? 
 
 13. When will a contract be discharged by operation of law? 
 
 14. Under what conditions will the alteration of a written instrument 
 discharge the contract? 
 
 15. When is a contract said to be discharged by breach? 
 
 16. In what three ways may a contract be broken? 
 
 17. What right has the injured party when the other party to the 
 contract renounces his Hability? 
 
 18. What happens if one party refuses to continue with his part of 
 the contract? 
 
 19. How may a contract be broken by making performance impossi- 
 ble? 
 
 20. How may a breach result from failure to perform? 
 
 21. When is a contract said to be entire or indivisible? When di- 
 visible? 
 
 10. DAMAGES 
 
 Nature and Extent. — As we have already learned, the party 
 who is guilty of a breach in the performance of his part of the 
 
DAMAGES 67 
 
 contract may be compelled by the courts to make good the loss 
 incurred by the other party. If the contract be discharged by 
 the breach, the party not in default is released from further 
 performance. He may also recover a pro rata amount upon the 
 part performed if he has done anything under the contract. In 
 certain cases there is also provided the extraordinary relief of 
 an injunction or a specific performance. 
 
 If the action brought by the party not in default is for money 
 damages, the amount allowed will be the loss or injury caused 
 as the natural result of the breach or that would ordinarily be 
 within the contemplation of the parties. The object is to com- 
 pensate the party injured and not to punish the party in default. 
 
 Banta contracted to construct a refrigerator for Beeman, who was 
 engaged in preparing poultry for market, and with a knowledge that he 
 intended to make use of it at once for freezing and keeping chickens for the 
 May market, expressly warranted that the freezer would keep them in 
 perfect condition. This it failed to do, and as a consequence a large number 
 of chickens spoiled. It was held that Beeman, in an action on the war- 
 ranty, could recover as damages the difference in the value of the refrigera- 
 tor as constructed and its value as it would have been if made according 
 to contract, and that he could also recover the market value of the chickens 
 lost, less the cost of getting them to market and selling them. 
 
 — Beeman v. Banta, 118 N. Y. 538. 
 
 Specific Performance and Injunction. — The special relief of 
 specific performance and injunction is granted only when money 
 damages do not constitute an adequate remedy, as in a contract 
 calling for the conveyance of land. The particular place could 
 not be duplicated elsewhere, and it might have a special value 
 to the purchaser for which money would but poorly compensate 
 him. Specific performance would therefore be decreed at the 
 instance of the purchaser compelling the vendor to convey, but 
 it would not be decreed against the purchaser to compel him to 
 accept the property because there would be an adequate remedy 
 at law in the way of damages, as the owner could sell to some 
 one else, and the difference between what the purchaser had 
 agreed to pay and what he could get for the land after the 
 breach would be the amount of his damages. 
 
 So also the remedy by injunction is exercised only in special 
 cases in which damages would not afford adequate relief to the 
 injured party. An injunction is an order from a court restraining 
 
68 CONTRACTS 
 
 one from doing a certain thing, the doing of which would cause 
 injury to some one else. 
 
 Douglas contracted with Vale for the purchase of a tract of land, near 
 a rapid stream of water, on which to erect a factory. When the time came 
 to deliver the deed to the property Vale refused delivery on the ground 
 that the neighbors in the vicinity objected to a factory being erected on 
 this particular site. As this contract calls for the conveyance of land, Doug- 
 las has the special relief of specific performance. Vale will have to deliver 
 the deed according to the terms of the contract. 
 
 Cort, a theatrical manager, sought to restrain the Lassards, who were 
 acrobats, from performing at a rival theater in the same place. The Las- 
 sards had agreed to perform for Cort exclusively for six weeks, and 
 Cort alleged that he had prepared for them and advertised them and that 
 he would lose large profits, as they were unique attractions. Held, that 
 when a contract stipulates for special, unique, or extraordinary personal 
 services, involving special merit, skill, or knowledge, so that in case of 
 default the same services could not be easily obtained elsewhere nor be 
 compensated for by an action at law, a court of equity will be warranted 
 in applying its preventive remedy of injunction. 
 
 — Cort V. Lassard, i8 Oregon 221. 
 
 Damages Allowed. — Damages are allowed only for actual 
 
 loss sustained. The amount of damage is estimated by the 
 
 judge or jury after hearing the case. The party damaged must 
 
 show by a preponderance of evidence that he has suffered a loss 
 
 in dollars and cents as a result of failure on the part of the other 
 
 party to the contract. The damages must be shown to be a 
 
 direct or natural result of the breach of contract. No damage 
 
 as an indirect result of a breach of contract will be allowed. 
 
 Evans purchased a machine, for use in his factory, from the Bedford 
 Manufacturing Company. The machine was not delivered and Evans 
 brought suit for damages, claiming that he had lost a great amount of 
 business by not having the machine. He could collect no damage result- 
 ing indirectly from the non-delivery of the machine. The only damage he 
 could collect would be the difference between the price he agreed to pay 
 for the machine and the price he would have to pay for one elsewhere. 
 
 In order to avoid the necessity of proving in court the amount 
 of damages suffered the parties sometimes provide in the con- 
 tract, that in case of breach damages shall be paid at a specified 
 rate or lump sum. Damages so fixed in advance are called 
 liquidated damages. The amount fixed must be reasonably near 
 the actual loss of the injured party. If it is so large as to amount 
 to a penalty the stipulation will not be enforced, as courts seek 
 to recompense the injured party and not to punish the guilty. 
 
DISCHARGE OF RIGHT OF ACTION 69 
 
 Duties of Injured Party. — When a contract is broken the 
 
 party damaged must do his part to reduce the damages as much 
 
 as possible. 
 
 Harcourt was a business tenant in a building in which a water pipe 
 broke and damaged his stock. Feeling that the landlord was responsible 
 for the loss, he did not put forth any effort to move or protect his goods. 
 Under the circumstances Harcourt could not collect damages which re- 
 sulted from a neglect of duty. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What are damages? How are damages recovered? 
 
 2. What determines the amount of damage allowed? 
 
 3. What is specific performance? 
 
 4. When will the special relief of specific performance be granted? 
 Give an example. 
 
 5. What is an injunction? 
 
 6. Is injunction a remedy' for a breach of contract? Explain. 
 
 7. Define and explain liquidated damages. 
 
 8. What are the duties of the injured party as to decreasing the 
 amount of damages? 
 
 II. DISCHARGE OF RIGHT OF ACTION 
 
 As the breach of a contract gives rise to a right of action 
 for the damages suffered, we have to determine how this right 
 may be discharged, and we find there are three means by which 
 it may be effected, namely, by mutual agreement, by the judg- 
 ment of a court, and by the Statute of Limitations. 
 
 By Mutual Agreement. — The parties may discharge the 
 right of action by mutual agreement if a valuable consideration 
 be given as a payment in satisfaction of the damages, or if the 
 agreement is made by an instrument under seal. 
 
 Spaulding agreed in writing to pay Hale six sevenths of any loss he 
 might be subjected to as the indorser of a certain note. Thereafter Hale 
 executed, under seal, a receipt "in full satisfaction of Spaulding's liability 
 on the document." This discharged the right of action on the original 
 agreement. — Hale v. Spaulding, 145 Mass. 482. 
 
 By Judgment. — The party may prosecute the right of 
 action in the courts and obtain a judgment, the right of action 
 being then merged in the judgment. A judgment is the final 
 determination by a court of the rights of the parties in an action. 
 
 By Statute of Limitations. — If the right of action is not 
 
70 CONTRACTS 
 
 merged in a judgment or discharged by consent within a given 
 time, the law will refuse to enforce it by reason of the lapse of 
 time under what is termed the Statute of Limitations. 
 
 This statute, which was first enacted in England, provided 
 that all actions upon account, and some others, shall be com- 
 menced and sued within six years. Like the Statute of Frauds it 
 has for its object the discouraging of litigation and the suppres- 
 sion of perjury, as the lapse of time makes the proof less certain 
 and the resurre^ction of old and stale claims would be a fruitful 
 field for fraud and perjury. A provision similar to the Eng- 
 lish statute has been enacted in all of the states. In New York 
 and most of the other states the period is six years on contracts 
 not under seal and twenty years on sealed instruments or judg- 
 ments of the court duly recorded. Certain other actions are 
 barred in three years, two years, and one year. 
 
 The statutes in the different states vary, and in a number of 
 them negotiable instruments are not barred for a longer time 
 than simple contracts. In most of the states real property actions 
 are given a longer period to run. 
 
 When the Time under the Statute Begins. — The time be- 
 gins to run from the day the injured party would be entitled to 
 bring a suit for the claim. 
 
 In an action to recover money paid under mistake it was held, that it 
 was barred unless the action was brought within six years from the date 
 of the payment of the money, because the right of action accrued upon that 
 day. — Sturgis v. Preston, 134 Mass. 372. 
 
 Most of the statutes provide that the absence of the de- 
 fendant from the state at the time the cause of action arises 
 will postpone the running of the statute until his return. 
 
 Emerson made a note, due in 1863, but did not come into the state 
 until 1868. It was held that an action on the note, begun in 1870, was not 
 barred by a three-year Statute of Limitations, because the statute did not 
 run during the debtor's absence from the state. 
 
 — Hoggett V. Emerson, 8 Kans. 262. 
 
 If the plaintiff is under disability, such as infancy, insanity, 
 or imprisonment, at the time the right of action arises, the time 
 will be extended. But the disability must exist at the time the 
 statute begins to run or it will have no effect. 
 
IMPORTANT POINTS 71 
 
 New Promise. — The promise or right of action may be re- 
 newed, either by a new agreement, which by some of the stat- 
 utes must be in writing, or by a payment on account. The 
 statute then begins to run under the new promise or after the 
 new payment. 
 
 Blaskower, between the years 1878 and 1885, sold to Steel a quantity 
 of cigars. On May 18, 1885, there was a credit on the account. The court 
 held, that this credit revived the whole account for a further statutory 
 period, and the claim would not outlaw until six years after the payment. 
 
 — Blaskower v. Steel, 23 Oregon 106 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is the meaning of "discharge of right of action"? 
 
 2. In what three ways may a right of action be discharged? 
 
 3. What is a judgment? 
 
 4. What are usual provisions of the Statute of Limitations? 
 
 5. When does time under the statute begin to run? Mention two 
 exceptions; explain in full. 
 
 6. How does a new promise or a payment on account affect the 
 running of the statute? 
 
 7. After how long will an action on an open book account be barred 
 in your state? 
 
 8. After how long will an action on a note given for one year be barred 
 in your state? 
 
 IMPORTANT POINTS 
 
 A contract is an agreement between two competent parties based 
 upon sufficient legal consideration to do or not to do some particular 
 thing which is possible to be done and is not prohibited by law. 
 
 The four necessary elements in every binding contract are : com- 
 petent parties, agreement, legal subject matter, and consideration. 
 
 Contracts under seal are known as formal contracts. 
 
 A parol contract is one not under seal. It may be oral or written. 
 
 An express contract is one in which all of the conditions and 
 terms are fully stated. 
 
 An implied contract is one in which some condition or term is not 
 expressed, and the circumstances of the case determine the missing 
 condition. 
 
 An executed contract is one fully performed. 
 
 An executory contract is one wherein something is yet to be 
 done by one or both of the parties. 
 
 The parties to a contract must be competent under the law. . 
 
 Infants* contracts in general are voidable and not void. 
 
 An infant's contract with an adult is binding upon the adult. 
 
72 CONTRACTS 
 
 An infant has a right to ratify or disaffirm his contract upon be- 
 coming of age. He may disaffirm at any time before he becomes 
 of age. 
 
 An infant cannot disaffirm a part of a contract and affirm a part. 
 
 An infant's contract for necessaries at a reasonable price is 
 binding. 
 
 The right of a married woman to make a contract has been en- 
 larged by statute until she has nearly the same right as any other 
 person. 
 
 Contracts between citizens and alien enemies are void if they 
 tend to give aid, comfort, or information to the enemy. 
 
 A promise not supported by consideration cannot be enforced. 
 
 "Good" consideration alone will not support a promise. 
 
 Past consideration will not support a promise. 
 
 Part payinent of a debt after it is due does not cancel the debt, 
 even though it is accepted in full satisfaction and a receipt in full is 
 given. 
 
 In case the amount of a debt is in dispute and a compromise 
 agreement is entered into, this agreement is binding. 
 
 There is no contract until the minds of the parties meet. 
 
 Agreement is the offer on the part of one party and the acceptance 
 on the part of the other party to a contract. 
 
 Unless otherwise directed, the acceptance should be made in the 
 same way the offer is made. 
 
 An offer may be withdrawn at any time before there is an accept- 
 ance unless consideration has been given for keeping it open a 
 stated time. 
 
 An offer made by mail is binding as soon as the letter of accept- 
 ance is mailed. 
 
 There must be no condition attached to the acceptance. 
 
 The offerer cannot bind the offeree on a contract where he so 
 words his proposition that the absence of a reply will be considered 
 to be an acceptance of the offer. 
 
 Business relations, past deaUngs, and customs are sometimes 
 factors in determining the meaning of a contract. 
 
 The acceptance must be communicated. 
 
 A mere intention to accept is not a good acceptance. 
 
 An acceptance properly made binds both parties. 
 
 Contracts obtained by duress or undue influence are voidable. 
 
 Assignments of contracts may be made by act of the parties or 
 by operation of law. 
 
 Contracts to pay money or deliver goods are assignable. 
 
 Contracts involving personal services are not assignable without 
 the consent of the parties concerned. 
 
 The assignee of a contract is subject to all the defenses that 
 
IMPORTANT POINTS 73 
 
 might have been set up between the original parties, up to the time 
 of notice of the assignment. 
 
 A third person who interferes with the performance of a contract 
 is liable to the injured party. 
 
 Witnesses may be called to prove an oral contract. 
 
 The instruments themselves are the best evidence of written 
 contracts. 
 
 In case a written instrument is lost or destroyed the existence of 
 the contract may be estabhshed by parol evidence. 
 
 Parol evidence cannot be used to vary, change, or contradict the 
 terms of a written contract. 
 
 Contracts entered into over the telephone, for the protection of 
 all concerned, should be confirmed in writing. 
 
 The subject matter of a contract may be any legal act to be done 
 or omitted. 
 
 Wagering contracts are void. 
 
 Fraud practiced in connection with any contract makes the con- 
 tract voidable at the option of the innocent party. 
 
 Contracts in general restraint of trade are void. Contracts in 
 reasonable restraint of trade are binding. 
 
 There must be some consideration in every executory contract. 
 
 Consideration must be present or future. 
 
 A promise to do or to forbear doing some act is sufficient con- 
 sideration. 
 
 Any thing or any promise which is a loss or inconvenience to the 
 promisor is sufficient consideration in a contract. 
 
 Consideration does not have to be adequate. 
 
 Where there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of terms in 
 a contract the intention of the parties is ascertained. 
 
 Letters exchanged between two parties may constitute a con- 
 tract. 
 
 In general a contract is divisible when the consideration is 
 divisible. 
 
 Liquidated damages which amount to a penalty cannot be sus- 
 tained. 
 
 Specific performance is a remedy only where money damages 
 are not adequate. 
 
 If one party fails to perform, the other party may treat the con- 
 tract as terminated. 
 
 A contract is discharged by any means whereby the relationship 
 of the parties thereto is terminated. 
 
 A contractual obligation may be terminated by agreement, sub- 
 stitution, impUcation, performance, death of one party, impossibility 
 of performance, pajmient, operation of law, breach, accord and 
 satisfaction. Statute of Limitations, bankruptcy. 
 
74 CONTRACTS 
 
 The effect of tender is to stop the running of interest and the pay- 
 ment of costs. The following rules must be observed in tendering 
 payment : 
 
 1. The exact amount due must be tendered. 
 
 2. It must be in legal currency of the country. 
 
 3. It must be unconditional. 
 
 4. The tender must be kept good. 
 
 The debtor is under obUgation to seek the creditor and tender 
 payment. 
 
 Payment by check does not cancel the debt until the check is 
 honored at the bank. 
 
 The Statute of Limitations does not extinguish the debt, but bars 
 suit to recover. 
 
 Time under the Statute of Limitations begins to run when a suit 
 might be brought to enforce the obligation. A note given for one 
 year would be enforceable for seven years in states where the time 
 under the statute is six years. 
 
 When one party renounces his contract the injured party may 
 take action at once without waiting for the time under the contract 
 to expire. 
 
 TEST QUESTIONS 
 
 1. When are formal contracts necessary? 
 
 2. What importance is attached to the use of the seal? 
 
 3. What is the relative importance of consideration in executed and 
 executory contracts? 
 
 4. How does incompetency of one of the parties thereto affect a 
 contract? 
 
 5. What purpose does a "power of attorney" serve? 
 
 6. How is the identity of the parties to a contract a factor in deter- 
 mining its validity? 
 
 7. Under what conditions will misrepresentation vitiate a contract? 
 
 8. Is an adequate consideration necessary to the validity of a 
 contract? 
 
 9. Are contracts entered into over the telephone binding? Explain. 
 
 10. Under what conditions is the remedy of specific performance avail- 
 able? 
 
 11. If a minor ratifies a contract on becoming of age, must he do so 
 in writing? 
 
 12. What is the meaning of "performance satisfactory to one of the 
 parties" and "substantial performance"? 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 75 
 
 13. What is the effect of a strike on the carrying out of a contract? 
 
 14. Are the rights of an assignee affected by any counter claim or 
 set-off? 
 
 15. Can a minor avoid his contract when he cannot return the article 
 received under the contract? Explain. 
 
 16. Is a consideration of one dollar generally sufficient? 
 
 17. How are contracts enforced or damages collected? 
 
 18. What are the provisions of the fourth section of the Statute of 
 Frauds? 
 
 19. Under what conditions is a person bound by a contract which he 
 does not read before signing? 
 
 20. How may an existing contract be changed? 
 
 21. When the parties cannot agree on the meaning of a contract, what 
 should they do? 
 
 22. What facts outside the contract may have a bearing on its inter- 
 pretation? 
 
 23. How are injunctions secured? 
 
 CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 Give the decision and the principle or principles of law involved in each 
 case. 
 
 1. Morris says to Larson, "I will sell you my horse and delivery 
 wagon for $200." Larson replies, "I will take them at that price." Is 
 there a contract? Explain. 
 
 2. A agrees to give B $10 for delivering to him one ton of hay. B de- 
 livers the hay, but A has not yet paid him for it. Is the contract executed 
 or executory on A's part? On B's part? 
 
 3. Baker offers to sell Holt his automobile for $600. Holt replies, "I 
 will accept your offer and take the machine at $600, provided you will 
 accept $300 in cash and my note at two months for the balance." Is this 
 a contract? Give reason. 
 
 4. If Baker agrees to Holt's proposition in problem 3, is there a con- 
 tract? 
 
 5. Green, in the course of conversation with Lane, agreed to sell his 
 automobile for $600. Lane replied he would accept. Nothing more was 
 said. A few days later Lane demanded of Green the delivery of the auto- 
 mobile. Green in the meantime had decided not to sell. What are the 
 rights of the parties? Explain. 
 
76 CONTRACTS 
 
 6. Jackson, a grocer, by mistake sent a bushel of potatoes to the home 
 of Loomis, where they were consumed. It was known that a mistake had 
 been made before the potatoes had been consumed. Will Loomis have to 
 pay for the potatoes? Explain. 
 
 7. Carpenter, an infant, traded with Smith a flock of sheep for a 
 horse. Later, becoming tired of his bargain, he tendered back the horse 
 and demanded his sheep. At the time of the trade Carpenter had stated 
 that he was over twenty-one years of age, when, in fact, he was but eighteen. 
 Could he recover his sheep? 
 
 8. After the trade in problem 7, suppose that Smith becomes tired 
 of the bargain, tenders back the sheep, and demands the horse, claiming 
 his right to disaffirm the contract because Carpenter was not of age. Can 
 he recover his horse? 
 
 9. In problem 7 suppose neither party tires of the bargain, but Car- 
 penter, after he becomes of age, is in debt and his creditors seek to recover 
 the sheep on the ground that the contract was made during Carpenter's 
 infancy. Can they succeed? 
 
 10. Edwards, an infant, agreed with Larkin to purchase his automobile. 
 After Edwards became of age and before he had disaffirmed the contract, 
 Larkin sued him for damages because of his failure to take the machine. 
 Was the contract binding, or was Edwards bound to disaffirm the contract 
 upon becoming of age? 
 
 11. One Stewart sold to Haines, an infant, a suit of clothes, which were 
 necessaries and with which he was not properly provided. The suit was 
 reasonably worth $25. Stewart charged him $50 for it. Could Haines 
 recover the $50 or any part of it? 
 
 12. Strong, an infant and a son of a laboring man, bought of McGuire 
 a gold watch worth $50. McGuire sought to hold Strong for the price of 
 the watch, claiming that it was for necessaries. Could he recover? 
 
 13. In problem 12, if Strong were the son of a bank president and a 
 wealthy man, would the contract be for necessaries? 
 
 14. In problem 13, if Strong's father had already provided him with a 
 good gold watch before he purchased the watch of McGuire, could McGuire 
 recover as for necessaries? 
 
 15. Dent, an infant, contracted for the purchase of furniture. He paid 
 $100 at the time of signing the contract and agreed to pay $25 each month 
 for twelve months. When the furniture was delivered Dent refused to 
 accept it and he demanded the return of the $100 paid. What are the 
 rights of the parties? 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 77 
 
 16. Larson, an infant, bought a watch on credit for which he agreed 
 to pay $75. He kept the watch but refused to pay on the ground that it 
 was bought during infancy. What are the rights of the parties? 
 
 17. Cosgrove, an infant, bought a horse for $200 from Demuth. Within 
 six months the horse died. What are the legal rights of the parties when 
 Cosgrove becomes of age? 
 
 18. A contracted with B, an insane person, not knowing of B's insanity. 
 B's condition was such at times that it was not noticeable that he was of 
 unsound mind. Under their contract A purchased a horse and wagon of 
 B and paid him a fair price for it, and afterwards disposed of the wagon. 
 Could B repudiate the contract? 
 
 19. Harper owes Wilson $100 which is due to-day. Wilson calls to 
 collect, but on request of Harper, agrees to wait 60 days longer. Can 
 Wilson, notwithstanding this new agreement, collect the amount before the 
 expiration of 60 days? 
 
 20. Morton meets with an accident and becomes unconscious from in- 
 juries. Bowers hires a conveyance and takes Morton home. Is Morton 
 liable to Bowers for the expense? Explain. 
 
 21. Williams, an infant twenty years old, buys a horse of Jackson and 
 pays the price agreed upon. Two years later Williams seeks to return the 
 horse and recover the purchase price. Can he recover? 
 
 22. Manning wrote Johnson: "I will sell you two hundred tons of 
 first-grade rye straw at $20 per ton. Answer by return mail." Johnson 
 accepted as directed, but the letter was never received by Manning. Did a 
 contract arise? Explain. 
 
 23. Leslie, in company with Gates, went into Hart's store and said on 
 one occasion: "Let Gates have a suit of clothes and I will pay for it," and 
 on another occasion under the same circumstances he said, "Let Gates 
 have a suit of clothes and I will pay for it if he does not." Is Leslie liable 
 in either case? Explain. 
 
 24. Howe wrote to Marks as follows: "I wiU give you $20 per M for 
 50,000 No. I H. red brick delivered f.o.b. this city." Marks did not reply, 
 but shipped one carload at oiice, which Howe refused to accept. What 
 are the rights of the parties? 
 
 25. Fisher wrote Daniels, offering to sell him one hundred barrels of 
 apples at $10 per barrel, giving him ten days in which to accept or reject 
 the offer. On the third day thereafter Fisher, without notice to Daniels, 
 sold the apples to Gacon and on the fourth day Daniels wrote to Fisher 
 accepting the offer. What are the rights of the parties? 
 
78 CONTRACTS 
 
 26. Clark wrote Harper on the 21st of June that he would sell him his 
 piano for $250. On the 25th of June Harper deposited in the post office 
 an acceptance of the offer. This letter in the regular course of the mails 
 reached Clark at noon on the 26th, but about nine o'clock on the morn- 
 ing of the 26th Clark sold the piano to another party and sent Harper 
 word. Could Harper recover damages for breach of contract against Clark? 
 
 27. In the above case suppose Clark sent the offer to Harper by a 
 messenger. Harper, instead of replying by the messenger, sent the letter 
 through the mail, but before the letter reached Clark he had sold the piano. 
 Could Harper recover for breach of contract? 
 
 28. Bates writes to Conley, "I will sell you 100,000 feet of No. i cypress 
 siding for $90 per thousand." Conley replies at once by letter, ''I will 
 accept your offer." Bates supposed he had offered to sell 10,000 feet and 
 when he discovered his mistake he refused delivery. What are the rights 
 of the parties? Does a contract exist? Explain. 
 
 29. Stone promises to give his grandson $100 when the grandson be- 
 comes of age. Stone does not fulfill his promise. Can the grandson compel 
 him to pay? 
 
 30. If in the above case Stone had paid the $100, could he recover it? 
 
 31. One Powers promised Evans $100 if he would name his child 
 after Powers. The child was so named and Powers refused to pay. 
 Could Evans recover? 
 
 32. Blake owed Ayers $500 which was due July i. July 2 Blake paid 
 $400, and Ayers, in consideration of getting the money then, agreed to 
 accept it in full payjfient. Thereafter Ayers sued for the balance of $100. 
 Could he recover? 
 
 33. In problem 32 if the sum owed by Blake to Ayers had been in dis- 
 pute, Ayers claiming it to be $500 and Blake claiming it to be $350, and they 
 had agreed upon a settlement of $400, which was accepted in full payment, 
 could Ayers then sue for the balance of $100 which he claims to be due? 
 
 34. Berry owes Hunt $100 which is due. Hunt makes a promise to 
 extend the time of payment one year. Thirty da3^s after Hunt makes this 
 promise to extend the time of payment, he'sues Berry for the amount. Berry 
 claims the amount is not yet due. Can Hunt recover? 
 
 35. If in the above case Berry gives Hunt a chattel mortgage on his 
 household furniture in consideration of the extension of one year, can 
 Hunt sue before the year has elapsed? 
 
 36. Young, who had lost his watch, which he valued at $250, offered 
 through the local paper a reward of $25. Hinkle found a watch in which 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 79 
 
 was inscribed Young's name. He advertised it and Young claimed the 
 watch. Later Hinkle learned that a reward had been offered by Young. 
 Can he recover it? 
 
 37. Anderson, a dealer in paints, offered a well-known brand, through 
 an advertisement in a local paper, at $4 per gallon. Green, a painter, 
 ordered 100 gallons and inclosed his check for $400 in payment. x\nderson 
 refused to sell him the paint and returned his check. Did a contract exist? 
 Explain. 
 
 38. Gibson rescues Rogers from being run over by a railroad train. 
 Out of a spirit of thankfulness Rogers promises to give Gibson $100. When 
 he fails to keep his promise, Gibson sues him. Can he recover? 
 
 39. Gilbert, who is unable to read or write the English language, signs 
 a paper which is presented to him as an agreement for a particular kind 
 of paint. It turns out to be a promissory note for $50. Is the note valid? 
 
 40. Ingham contracted with Brown to purchase one of the two horses 
 which Brown owned. Ingham thought he was buying the bay horse, while 
 Brown thought he was selling the brown horse. Could Ingham recover 
 damages for Brown's refusal to deliver the bay horse? 
 
 41. Nobel sells Dyer his grocery store and stock of goods. Dyer has 
 an opportunity of inspecting the store, and does look through it. Most 
 of the stock had previously been injured by a flood which filled Nobel's 
 cellar. Dyer purchases, and later upon discovering this, sues Nobel for 
 damages. Can he recover? 
 
 42. Allen was indebted to Watson for the sum of $800. Allen, not being 
 able to pay the full amount, offered Watson $500 in cash and a secured 
 note for $150^ which Watson agreed to accept in full satisfaction of the 
 debt. Is the debt discharged? Explain. 
 
 43. Gordon sells Brownell a horse, telling him that it is the best horse 
 in the neighborhood, and that if he keeps it until fall he can sell it for $50 
 more than he pays for it. As a matter of fact the horse is an inferior animal 
 and Brownell loses on his purchase. Can he recover damages from Gordon? 
 
 44. If in problem 43 Gordon had represented that the horse was but 
 eight years old, when in fact it was twelve, but Gordon believed it was only 
 eight, could Brownell have recovered damages? 
 
 45. If in the above case when Gordon stated the horse was but eight 
 years old he knew that he was twelve, but made the statement falsely, 
 and Brownell knew all the time that the horse was twelve years old and 
 was 'not deceived by the statement, could Brownell recover damages of 
 Gordon? 
 
8o CONTRACTS 
 
 46. A statute in New York state requires a physician to have a license 
 before practicing. A physician practicing without such a license sues for 
 his services. Can he recover? 
 
 47. Cooley makes a wager with Baxter that Newman will be elected 
 governor at the coming election. Newman is defeated and the money is 
 paid to Baxter. Cooley brings an action to recover the money wagered. 
 Can he succeed? 
 
 48. Berton, who is an important witness against Frank, a criminal 
 on trial, is promised $100 by Frank if he will refrain from testifying. He 
 refuses to testify against Frank, and later sues him for the $100. Can he 
 recover? 
 
 49. Anson promises Barber $500 if he will not marry in two years. 
 At the end of two years. Barber, having not married, demands the $500. 
 Can he recover? 
 
 50. Cross sold his meat market to Sterling and agreed that he would 
 not engage in the same Hne of business in the same city, which had 10,000 
 inhabitants, for the period of ten years. Was this agreement valid? 
 
 51. If in the above case Cross had agreed not to engage in the same 
 business within the state for a period of ten years, would the agreement 
 have been valid? 
 
 52. If Cross had been engaged in manufacturing automobiles, would 
 the restrictions in problem 51 have been valid? 
 
 53. Adams and Bentley go into a grocery store together. Bentley is 
 asked by the grocer to pay an account which he owes. Being unable to 
 pay it, he refuses. Adams thereupon, without Bentley's knowledge or re- 
 quest, pays the bill to save his friend's credit. He then seeks to recover the 
 amount from Bentley. Can he recover? 
 
 54. Holder wrote to Bronson & Co., as follows: "I am closing out all 
 the No. I H. brick I have on hand at $12 per M. If I do not hear from 
 you by return mail I shall ship you one carload at the price named." 
 Bronson & Co. did not reply and Holder shipped the bricks. Was there a 
 contract? Discuss the rights of the parties. 
 
 55. Blanchard offered apples to Minard at $8 per barrel and gave him 
 until 3 o'clock the next day to decide. About noon the next day Blanchard 
 received an offer of $8.50 per barrel and sold them. Before 3 o'clock Min- 
 ard accepted the offer. Minard sued Blanchard for breach of contract. 
 Can he succeed? 
 
 56. Benedict said to Marrell: "Your offer to sell 1000 boxes of 
 XXX oranges at $3.80 per box interests me and I will give you $25 to keep 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 8i 
 
 this ofifer open until 2 o'clock to-morrow." Marrell agreed. Two hours 
 later Marrell sold the oranges to some one else for $4 per box. There was 
 a sudden rise of $1 per box in the price of oranges. What rights has 
 Benedict? Explain. 
 
 57. Limanowes Davis $500. Liman agrees to sell to Noble a team of 
 horses for $550, provided Noble will pay him $50 in cash and will pay- 
 Davis $500 within ten days. Noble takes the team and pays the $50 in 
 cash. Liman departs from the country. Davis brings action against Noble 
 for the $500. Can he recover? 
 
 58. Drake undertakes to do certain fine decorating and interior fin- 
 ishing in Hopkins's house. Drake assigns the contract to Cooper, who 
 seeks to go on with the work. Can he complete the work and recover 
 of Hopkins? 
 
 59. Grant, who was administrator of the estate of Shepherd, stated 
 orally to Downs, a creditor of Shepherd's, that he would see that Downs 
 was paid the sum due him; if it did not come out of the estate he would 
 pay it himself. The estate did not pay. Could the promise be enforced? 
 
 60. Samuels employs Lynch to work for him for the period of one 
 year from the coming March. Must this contract be in writing to be 
 enforceable ? 
 
 61. If Samuels employs Lynch to work during the life of Samuels, 
 would an oral contract be valid? 
 
 62. Roberts enters into an oral contract with Archer whereby the 
 latter is to do a job of interior decorating and complete the work within 
 fifteen months. Archer works five months and then is discharged by 
 Roberts, who claims that the contract is void under the Statute of Frauds. 
 Can Archer recover on this contract? Explain. 
 
 63. Larson wrote to Moore, "I will sell 100 acres from my Hartley 
 tract for $200 per acre." Moore replied by letter, "I will buy 100 acres 
 at the price you name." Is there a contract? Explain. 
 
 64. Hustis sold his drug business to Andrews for $5000 and agreed not 
 to start in the drug business again in the same city. Six months later 
 Hustis bought out the City Drug Company and started in business again. 
 What are Andrews's legal rights? 
 
 65. Baldwin, a grain buyer, called on Wilson while the latter was 
 preparing a field in which he expected to sow wheat. Baldwin offered Wil- 
 son $500 for the crop when it should be harvested and Wilson accepted^ 
 both parties signing a contract to this effect. Baldwin refused to fulfill his 
 contract. Is he bound? Explain. 
 
82 CONTRACTS 
 
 66. Gage sold Stone his express business, including equipment and good 
 will. He represented to Stone that there were 15 customers who paid $25 
 per month each and the business was earning $5000 a year. Stone dis- 
 covered that these representations were false. What are his rights? 
 
 67. Emerson enters into a contract with Foster, who agrees to build 
 him an engine and boiler and install it in his flour mill in complete run- 
 ning order to the entire satisfaction of Emerson. Foster does the work, 
 and the plant seems to run satisfactorily; but Emerson is not satisfied, 
 says he does not want it, and orders Foster to take it out. Expert ma- 
 chinists claim that the work is done in a satisfactory manner. Must Em- 
 erson accept it, or has he the right to reject it under the agreement? 
 
 68. Hawks orders a suit of clothes of Blare, his tailor, and specifies 
 that he will not take them unless they are satisfactory to him, he being the 
 sole judge. The suit, as far as any third party could determine, is a good 
 fit; but Hawks says he does not want it, as it is not satisfactory to him. 
 Can he refuse to accept the suit? 
 
 69. Darrow agrees with Fisher to manufacture and deliver 1000 pairs 
 of shoes in 90 days, but because of a strike in Darrow's factory he is un- 
 able to fulfill his agreement. Is the strike which renders the performance 
 of the contract practically impossible an excuse for his nonperformance? 
 
 70. If in the above case Darrow's agreement to furnish the shoes to 
 Fisher had stipulated that the contract was subject to strikes, etc., would 
 he have been liable for nonperformance? 
 
 71. Breden employs Heinrick to paint his house. When the work is 
 partially done the house burns. Does this excuse Heinrick's nonperformance 
 of his contract, and can Heinrick recover a portion of his pay? 
 
 72. Hall gives Wood his promissory note, payable one month after 
 date. Wood changes the note, making it payable twenty days after date. 
 What effect has this upon the instrument? 
 
 73. If in the above case the alteration was made without any intention 
 to defraud, could Wood recover on the original contract? 
 
 74. Young employs Burr to deliver 100 loads of stone for him within 
 30 days, for $100. After he has delivered 10 loads. Burr, within 3 days 
 after the agreement is made, throws up the contract and says that he will 
 not perform any further. What remedy has Young? May he proceed at 
 once with his remedy, or must he wait until the 30 days have expired? 
 
 75. In the above case, suppose that Burr, after dehvering five loads, 
 refused to perform further until he received his pay for the whole con- 
 tract. Had he the right? 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 83 
 
 76. For breach of the contract to deliver the stone in problem 74, 
 what would be the damages that would be allowed for the injury? That 
 is, by what rule would they be measured? 
 
 77. A publisher has been sending his magazine to you every month 
 for over a year. You never subscribed for the magazine nor have you ever 
 received a bill from the pubUsher. Can he compel you to pay for the 
 magazine? Explain. 
 
 78. An Oregon mill owner visited a Chicago lumber dealer and bar- 
 gained to sell the dealer 100,000 feet of lumber which was piled in the 
 mill owner's yard ready for shipment. Afterwards it was found that the 
 lumber had burned before the contract was closed. Was there a contract? 
 Explain. 
 
 79. A son of a well-to-do business man was taken ill while away from 
 home. A family who knew the father took the young man into their home 
 and cared for him for some time. When he returned home his father learned 
 of this and wrote a letter to the family, promising to pay them $50 per week 
 for caring for his son. Later he refused to pay. Is he liable? 
 
 80. Dibble offered to sell his trucking business and equipment to 
 Lawrence for $5600. Lawrence was undecided and asked for an option for 
 one week for which he paid $50. In the meantime Dibble received an offer 
 of $6200 and he told Lawrence that he had decided not to sell just yet, 
 intending to accept the other offer later. What course is open to Lawrence? 
 
 81. Graham contracted to build a house for Bowers for $18,000. When 
 the house was nearly completed Graham told Bowers that he could not 
 finish the house for the price named in the contract and that it would cost 
 $2000 more. Bowers agreed to pay the $2000 and Graham completed the 
 house according to the specifications. In settling with Graham, Bowers 
 paid the $18,000 but refused to pay the $2000. Can Graham collect?. 
 
 82. Myres, whose shop had been robbed, offered and paid $25 to a 
 policeman for catching the thief. Later Myres learned that the policeman 
 was not legally entitled to it; can he recover the $25? Explain. 
 
 83. Hartman Lumber Co., Augusta, Georgia, sent a circular letter to 
 Hartford Builder's Supply Co. as follows: 
 
 "A break in the lumber market makes it possible for us to offer No. i, 
 Georgia pine lumber in any dimension at $60 per M feet f .o.b. Augusta. ' ' 
 
 The Hartford Builder's Supply Co. wrote at once that they would 
 take 100,000 feet of various dimensions at the price named in the circular 
 letter which they received. The Hartman Lumber Co. refused to make 
 delivery. Was there a contract? Explain. 
 
84 CONTRACTS 
 
 84. A hotel where Demuth and his wife were guests was destroyed by 
 fire. Demuth offered $500 to any person who would rescue his wife from 
 the burning buildmg. Dodson heard the offer and rescued Mrs. Demuth 
 from the burning building, but Demuth refused to pay. Can Dodson col- 
 lect? Explain. 
 
 85. Osborn, who has been adjudged insane, purchases a valuable pic- 
 ture from Gordon and gives his note for $25,000 in part payment. Dis- 
 cuss the rights of the parties. 
 
 86. Mattis entered into a contract with a member of the legislature 
 named Horton, agreeing to pay him $100 if he would procure the passage 
 of a certain bill. Horton procured the passage of the bill. Could he col- 
 lect the $100? 
 
 87. Lamb contracted with Morton for the purchase of a factory site. 
 When the time came to execute the deed Morton refused to complete the 
 sale. What are Lamb's rights? 
 
 88. Darrow owes Lyman $1000 on a promissory note which has run 
 eight years. Lyman was absent from the state the last three years and 
 when sued his defense was that the note had outlawed under the Statute 
 of Limitations. How would the case be decided? 
 
 89. Bepler owed Jerome $150. Howe, a friend of Bepler, subsequently 
 promised to pay the debt. He failed to do so and Jerome sues him. Can 
 Jerome recover? Explain. 
 
SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 I, IN GENERAL 
 
 Sales of Goods Act. — The law as to the sale of goods has 
 been complicated by the different rules in force in the different 
 states or localities. To correct this condition a uniform '' Sales 
 of Goods Act " has been adopted in a number of states. 
 
 Other uniform acts which are allied with sales are: the 
 Warehouse Receipts . Act and the Bills of Lading Act. The 
 Warehouse Receipts Act has been adopted in all the forty-eight 
 states. The Bills of Lading Act and the Uniform Sales Act are 
 being adopted generally. 
 
 The object of these acts is to combine the best features of 
 the laws in the different states. 
 
 The discussion of the subject of sales in this chapter is based 
 on the Uniform Sales Act. 
 
 Contract to Sell ; Sale. — There are two kinds of agreements 
 to be considered in this chapter, namely contracts to sell and sales. 
 A contract to sell is a contract whereby the seller agrees to 
 transfer the property in the goods to the buyer at a future time 
 for a consideration called the price. A sale is an agreement 
 whereby the seller transfers the property in the goods to the 
 buyer for a consideration called the price. Both are contracts 
 and subject to all the requirements of a valid contract. The 
 parties must be competent to enter into a binding contract. There 
 must be mutual assent and there must be a consideration. If 
 there is an absence of consideration, the transfer is a gift. The 
 price or consideration must be paid or promised in money. This 
 distinguishes sale from barter. 
 
 Barter. — A barter is the exchange of one article of personal 
 property for another. The same rules apply to a barter as to a 
 sale, and we can consider that the law applicable to a case of 
 barter is practically the same as that explained in this chapter 
 on sales. It seems, however, that the power or authority vested 
 in an agent to sell does not give him authority to barter. 
 
 • 8s 
 
86 SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 Grey appointed Haskel as agent to sell mining stock. Haskel traded 
 50 shares of stock for an automobile. Haskel did not have this right and 
 Grey would not have to accept the automobile, as authority to sell does 
 not give authority to barter. 
 
 Delivery and Payment. — To complete the sale it is neces- 
 sary for the seller to deliver the goods and for the purchaser to 
 pay for them, and unless there is an express agreement to the 
 contrary these acts are concurrent. Delivery in this sense does 
 not necessarily mean the passing of the article itself, but rather 
 the passing of the ownership or title. That is to say, the delivery 
 need not be actual; it may be constructive. It is actual when 
 the article itself is handed over. It is constructive when a bill 
 of sale or a receipt is handed over instead. 
 
 Transfer of the Right of Property. — There must be a trans- 
 fer of the right of property, that is, a transfer of the absolute 
 property in the thing sold, in order to constitute a sale. This 
 ^' absolute property " is a term used to distinguish it from a 
 special property or right in personal property. For instance, 
 when property is pledged, the special property passes to the 
 pledgee and the general title remains in the owner. The transfer 
 of a special property in a chattel constitutes bailment and will 
 be considered in another chapter. 
 
 Morton deposited $1000 worth of bonds with his banker to secure a 
 loan of $1000, This is a pledge to secure a debt and not a sale. When 
 Morton pays the debt the bank will return the bonds. 
 
 Edwards delivered 500 bales of cotton to a buyer who agreed to store 
 them for three months and within this time to buy them at the market 
 price or to return them as Edwards may elect. Inasmuch as this contract 
 provides for the return of the same cotton that was delivered it is one of 
 bailment and not of sale. 
 
 Sale and Bailment. -7 The rule is that if the identical thing 
 
 is to be returned, even though in a different form, as wheat 
 
 ground into flour, it is a bailment; but if the identical thing 
 
 is not to be returned, the general rule is that it is a barter or a 
 
 sale. 
 
 The court has ruled: "Where logs are delivered to be sawed into 
 boards, or leather to be made into shoes, rags into paper, olives into oil, 
 grapes into wine, wheat into flour, if the product of the identical articles 
 delivered is to be returned to the original owner in a new form, it is said 
 to be a bailment, and the title never vests in the manufacturer. If, on the 
 other hand, the manufacturer is not bound to return the same wheat or 
 
PARTIES TO A SALE 87 
 
 flour or paper, but may deliver any other of equal value, it is said to be a 
 sale or a loan, and the title to the thing delivered vests in the manufac- 
 turer." — Powder Co. v. Biirkhardt, 97 U. S. no. 
 
 The importance of the distinction is realized when we per- 
 ceive that if it is a bailment the title does not pass from the 
 original owner by the delivery, but if the transaction constitutes 
 a sale, the title passes. The question often arises when the 
 stock or material delivered is destroyed by fire, or otherwise, 
 and it is required to be determined upon whom the loss shall 
 fall. An exception to the rule is the case of a warehouseman 
 who receives grain and mixes it with like grain in the same 
 storage. Here there is evidently no intention to return the 
 identical grain, but some of the same kind; still some cases 
 hold that this transaction is one of bailment in which title does 
 not pass, but others follow the general rule and hold it a sale 
 under which the title passes to the warehouseman. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Why has the uniform " Sales of Goods Act " been adopted in a 
 niunber of states? 
 
 2. Define a sale and a contract to sell and state the difference between 
 them. 
 
 3. What contract requirements apply to sales? 
 
 4. Does an agent who is appointed to sell have authority to barter? 
 
 5. What constitutes a complete sale? 
 
 6. What is the difference between a bailment and a sale? Between a 
 sale and a gift? Between a sale and a barter? 
 
 7. Does an inadequate price affect the agreement to sell? 
 
 8. When is delivery said to be actual? When constructive? 
 
 9. Why is it important to determine just when the title to the prop- 
 erty is transferred? 
 
 2. PARTIES TO A SALE 
 
 Seller and Purchaser. — The parties to a sale are the seller 
 or vendor and the purchaser or vendee. The general rule is 
 that no man can sell goods and convey a valid title unless he is 
 the owner or his duly authorized agent. Possession is not an 
 essential to the right to sell, ownership being enough, and the 
 rightful owner can sell what is wrongfully held by another. 
 
88 SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 Webber, while in possession of a delivery wagon belonging to Davis, 
 sold it to Mann for a good price. In this transaction Mann gets no title to 
 the wagon and does not become the owner. Davis can demand the return 
 of the wagon and Mann will have to look to Webber for the return of the 
 money paid. 
 
 Seller must have Good Title. — The principle of a holder in 
 good faith which is discussed under the negotiable instrument 
 law does not apply in the sale of personal property, the general 
 rule being that one cannot give a better title than he himself 
 has. 
 
 Bennett & Co. had a quantity of cotton seed hulls in storage with one 
 Johnson as warehouseman. Brooks purchased them from Johnson. It 
 was held that Brooks acquired no better title than Johnson had, although 
 he purchased the goods in good faith and for a valuable consideration, and 
 Bennett & Co. recovered the value of the hulls. 
 
 — Bennett 6" Co. v. Brooks, 146 Ala. 490. 
 
 When a person has acquired goods by fraud or trick from the 
 true owner, he has a voidable title. If he transfers the goods 
 for value, to a bona fide purchaser who has no knowledge of 
 the fraud, such purchaser is allowed to retain the goods against 
 the original owner, on the principle that where one of two inno- 
 cent parties must suffer through fraud, the loss should fall on 
 the one who made the fraud possible. 
 
 Truxton had delivered to one Morrow a large quantity of tin cans by 
 reason of false and fraudulent misrepresentations made to him by said 
 Morrow. While the cans were in Morrow's possession they were levied 
 upon by a sheriff, representing bona fide creditors of Morrow. In a suit 
 to recover the cans it was held that Morrow had a voidable title; that the 
 sheriff stood in the same position as the creditors; that they, having taken 
 the cans in good faith and for a valuable consideration, without knowl- 
 edge of the fraud, had acquired a good title to the property as against the 
 original seller; and that Truxton could not recover the cans. 
 
 — Truxton v. Fait b° Slagle Co., 17 Del. 493. 
 
 The distinction between the last two cases is that Johnson 
 had no title at all, and so could convey none, whereas Morrow 
 had a voidable title which became a good title on being trans- 
 ferred to a bona fide creditor or purchaser. 
 
 However innocent, therefore, the person may be who buys 
 property from one not the owner, he obtains no title whatever, 
 except in a few special cases, as, for instance, the one just men- 
 tioned, and in the case of negotiable instruments. It follows 
 
PARTIES TO A SALE 89 
 
 then that a person buying goods that were either lost or stolen 
 has no claims on them as against the true owner. 
 
 An auctioneer who sells stolen goods is liable to the owner, notwith- 
 standing that the goods were sold and the proceeds turned over to the 
 thief without knowledge that they were stolen. 
 
 — Hofman v. Carow, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 21. 
 
 A thief acquires no title and can convey none, and no matter 
 how many sales or transfers of the property there may have 
 been after the thief disposed of it before it came into the posses- 
 sion of the holder, the true owner can recover. It makes no 
 difference that the purchase was made in good faith and for 
 full value. 
 
 Breckenridge brought an action for the value of wheat which his hired 
 man had stolen and sold to McAfee. Held, that a thief acquires no title 
 to property stolen and can confer none on a person to whom he sells the 
 same. And such person is liable to the owner for the value of such goods 
 without regard to his innocence or good faith in making the purchase. 
 
 — Breckenridge v. McAfee, 54 Ind. 141. 
 
 Pledgee may Sell. — An exception to the rule that a person 
 not the owner cannot sell personal property is the case of a 
 pledgee, or one with whom the chattels are left as security for 
 money loaned, as he can sell after default in payment by the 
 owner. So also the master of a vessel can sell the cargo in 
 cases of absolute necessity, but actual necessity must exist or 
 the purchaser gets no title. 
 
 Factor may Sell. — A factor or commission merchant is a 
 person to whom goods are shipped or consigned for the purpose 
 of sale. A sale made by him conveys a good title and binds the 
 original owner under statutes passed in most of the states, even 
 though he goes beyond his authority and sells when he is not 
 authorized to do so by the owner; but the factor or commission 
 merchant must have actual possession or he will not give a good 
 title if he exceeds his authority. This statute is limited to 
 mercantile transactions and applies only to factors or com- 
 mission merchants. 
 
 If the owner of goods trusts the possession of them to an- 
 other, thereby enabling the other party to hold himself out to the 
 world as having not only the possession but also the ownership 
 of the goods, a sale by such party to a person without notice 
 
go SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 who acted upon the strength of such apparent ownership will 
 bind the true owner, if the person having possession is one who 
 from the nature of his employment might ordinarily be taken 
 to have the right to sell. 
 
 Roberts, a truckman, hired a truck from Bartow for one year. The 
 agreement was that Roberts should be allowed to paint his name on the 
 truck and use it as his own. During the year Roberts sold his business and 
 entire equipment including the hired truck to D arrow. As the owner of 
 the truck in question allowed Roberts to paint his name on the truck and 
 to hold himself out as the owner, the purchaser got a good title and Bar- 
 tow cannot demand the return of the truck. Roberts will have to settle 
 with Bartow. 
 
 As we have learned in contracts the purchaser must be a 
 party competent to contract except in the case of necessaries. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What are the parties to a sale called? 
 
 2. Who has a right to offer an article for sale? 
 
 3. Under what conditions can a buyer get" a better title to goods than 
 the seller has? 
 
 4. To whom do stolen goods belong, regardless of who has bought 
 them? 
 
 5. Can the finder of lost property transfer a good title to it? 
 
 6. Who is a pledgee? 
 
 7. Under what conditions has a pledgee a right to sell pledged goods? 
 
 8. When has the master of a vessel a right to sell the cargo or any 
 portion of it? Does the purchaser get a good title? 
 
 9. Who is a factor? 
 
 10. Has a factor a right to sell goods consigned to him and accept a 
 note in payment from the buyer? 
 
 11. Under what conditions can a factor give a good title to goods 
 consigned to him to sell? 
 
 3. THE CONTRACT OF SALE 
 
 Sales Contracts. — In the contract to sell the title has not 
 passed to the purchaser. It is simply an agreement to make a 
 transfer at some future time. In the sale the title has passed 
 and the sale is complete. At the time of the sale the subject 
 matter or thing sold must be in existence. If it has ceased to 
 exist, the sale is void. That is, if the agreement is to sell certain 
 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE 91 
 
 goods, which have been destroyed without the knowledge of 
 the seller at the time the agreement is made, the agreement is 
 void, as the subject matter of the sale had ceased to exist be- 
 fore the contract of sale was entered into. Similarly if there is 
 a contract to sell certain goods, and they are destroyed without 
 the fault of either party before the title passes to the buyer, 
 the contract is avoided. 
 
 Norton sold 621 bales of cotton, marked and numbered as specified in 
 the contract, at a certain price. After Nortoii had delivered 460 bales the 
 remaining 161 bales were destroyed by fire. In an action for damages the 
 court held that where the title has not passed to the buyer and the property 
 is destroyed without the fault of the seller so that delivery is impossible, 
 the seller is excused from delivery. — Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62. 
 
 Future Goods. — The subject matter of a contract to sell 
 may be either existing goods, owned or possessed by the seller, 
 or future goods, to be manufactured or acquired by the seller. 
 At common law the natural products or expected increase of 
 what was already owned, constituted a special class of future 
 goods. For example, growing crops, wool to be clipped from 
 sheep, cheese to be produced from milk, etc., were said to have 
 '' potential existence " and a buyer could acquire a present title 
 to them. This distinction has been abolished by the Uniform 
 Sales Act, although it still obtains in states where the act has not 
 been adopted. 
 
 It was held that, where a lease of a farm provided that all crops raised 
 by the tenant were the property of the landlord until the rent was paid, 
 the landlord acquired title to the crops on account of their potential 
 existence, and could hold them against creditors of the tenant. 
 
 — Smith V. Atkins, 18 Vt. 461. 
 
 A purported sale of future goods operates as a Contract to 
 sell and the buyer obtains no present title, but if the seller fails 
 to deliver, the buyer has a right of action for damages. 
 
 When Title Passes. — The question of when title to the 
 goods passes from the seller to the buyer is an important one, 
 since the risk of loss follows the title. The Uniform Law pro- 
 vides that, in a contract to sell specific goods, the title passes 
 when the parties intend it to be transferred, and states various 
 rules for ascertaining intention. 
 
 I. When there is a contract to sell specific goods in a 
 
92 SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 deliverable state, title passes when the contract is made, whether 
 the time of pa)niient, or the time of delivery, or both, be post- 
 poned. 
 
 Baker made a contract with McDonald to buy thirty stacks of hay 
 then in McDonald's field, the hay to be measured and payment and de- 
 livjery to be made later. It was held that under this contract title passed 
 to McDonald at once. — Baker v. McDonald, 74 Nebr. 595. 
 
 2. Where there is a contract to sell specific goods and the 
 seller is bound to do something to the goods to put them in a 
 deliverable state, title does not pass until such thing be done. 
 
 Restad contracted to sell to Engemoen a cow and a steer, Restad 
 to feed and fatten them and deliver them about two months later. It was 
 held that title did not pass at the time of the contract, as the seller had to 
 do something to put the goods in deliverable condition. 
 
 — Restad v. Engemoen, 65 Minn. 148. 
 
 3. When goods are delivered to the buyer on " sale or re- 
 turn " the title passes on delivery, but the buyer may transfer 
 the title back to the seller by returning the goods within the 
 time fixed, or within a reasonable time. 
 
 When goods are delivered to the buyer on approval, or on 
 trial, title passes when the buyer signifies his approval, or re- 
 tains the goods, without rejecting them, beyond the time fixed 
 by the contract or beyond a reasonable time. 
 
 Mengel bought a match machine from Forsaith Machine Company on 
 approval. He retained the machine for a year and declared himself dis- 
 satisfied with it. It was held, that he had retained the machine an un- 
 reasonable time, that title had passed, and that he must pay for the machine. 
 — Forsaith Machine Co. v. Mengel, 99 Mich. 280. 
 
 4. Whe"n a contract is made to sell unascertained or future 
 goods, that is, goods to be weighed or measured or goods to be 
 made by the seller, the buyer becomes the owner when goods 
 answering the description in the contract are delivered to him 
 or to a carrier for transmission to him. 
 
 Gratto agreed to build a boat of a certain description for the Yukon River 
 Steamboat Co., who was to pay for it in installments. The boat was built 
 and launched, but was sold by Gratto to some one else. It was held that 
 no title passed, by force of the contract, to the Yukon River Steamboat Co., 
 since the boat had not been delivered. 
 
 — Yukon River Steamboat Co. v. Gratto, 136 Calif. 538. 
 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE 93 
 
 F.O.B. and C.O.D. Shipments. — The shipping term " f.o.b. 
 Chicago" means that the seller must deliver the goods free on 
 board in Chicago, either transported or ready to be transported. 
 Where the goods are shipped f.o.b. destination, the title does 
 not pass to the buyer until they reach their destination, but 
 where they are shipped f.o.b. shipping point, the title passes to 
 the buyer as soon as the goods are delivered to the common 
 carrier. 
 
 In c.o.d. (cash on delivery) shipments, whether the title 
 passes or not depends upon the law of the state where the sale 
 is made. This term under the Uniform Sales Act indicates that 
 the seller intends to withhold delivery until the goods are paid for, 
 and the title does not pass until payment is made and the goods 
 delivered. 
 
 Mail Orders. — In case of an order by mail the title passes 
 as soon as the seller selects the goods and they are delivered to 
 the common carrier, who is considered the agent of the buyer. 
 The goods must be according to the contract; otherwise the 
 buyer may reject them. This general rule may be changed by 
 a special contract. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 t 
 
 1. Is the physical existence of the subject matter necessary to the 
 sale? Explain. 
 
 2. In the case of destruction of the subject matter in a sale, who 
 bears the loss? 
 
 3. In a contract to sell who bears the loss if the goods are destroyed? 
 
 4. What are future goods? 
 
 5. Can future goods be the subject matter of a contract to sell? 
 
 6. Explain " potential existence." 
 
 7. Mention the four rules of the Uniform Law which relate to the 
 passing of title in a sale. 
 
 8. (a) What is the difference between a sale on trial and a sale with 
 the privilege of returning the goods? (b) When does the title pass in the 
 case of each? 
 
 9. Hinkel took a vacuum cleaner home with him on a ten-day trial. 
 He neglected to return it 'within the ten days; will he be liable for the price 
 of the cleaner? 
 
 10. What is the distinction in a sale between ascertained goods and 
 unascertained goods? 
 
94 SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 11. Can a portion of a larger quantity be sold and title passed with- 
 out separating the portion sold from the larger portion? Explain by giv- 
 ing an illustration. 
 
 12. When does the title pass in f.o.b. shipments? 
 
 13. What does c.o.d. indicate under the Uniform Sales Act? 
 
 14. When goods are ordered by mail, when does the title pass to the 
 buyer? 
 
 4. WRITTEN CONTRACTS OF SALE 
 
 Contracts in Writing. — Except as required by the Statute of 
 Frauds, an oral sales contract is as valid as a written contract. 
 However, in any important purchase, it is desirable to secure 
 from the seller a bill of sale. This is a formal instrument in writ- 
 ing (see form in Appendix) by which the seller transfers his 
 interest in certain specified personal property to the buyer. It 
 certifies that the buyer is the owner of the property and warrants 
 the title thereto. 
 
 The Statute of Frauds. — Section seventeen of the English 
 Statute of -Frauds provides: "No contract for the sale of goods, 
 wares, and merchandise, for the price of ten pounds sterling or 
 upward, shall be allowed to be good except: 
 
 I. The buyer shall accept part of the goods sold, and actu- 
 ally receive the same; or 
 
 . 2. Give somethftig in earnest to bind the bargain, or in part 
 payment; or, 
 
 3. That some note or memorandum in writing of the said 
 bargain be made and signed by the parties to be charged by such 
 contract or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized." 
 
 As will be seen, the statute includes most of the articles re- 
 garded as personal property under the terms, j goods, wares, 
 and merchandise." 
 
 The English statute has been followed in most states in this 
 country; but the amounts vary from $10 to $2500. 
 
 Value and Price. — A distinction is made between the words 
 " in value " and '' in price." " In value " is used where the 
 Uniform Sales Act is in force, and "in price" was used in the 
 old statutes. 
 
 The value is what the goods are worth in the market; the 
 price is the amount agreed upon by the parties. 
 
WRITTEN CONTRACTS OF SALE 95 
 
 The Note or Memorandum. — Under the Statute of Frauds 
 the note or memorandum need not be formal. It may be a 
 sales memorandum, a letter, a telegram, or it may consist of 
 several papers, passing between the parties, which amount to 
 a sales contract. The memorandum must state the essential 
 facts, the parties, the price, if agreed upon, and specify the 
 articles to be sold. It must be signed by the party to be charged 
 or by his authorized agent. 
 
 The two exceptions are: 
 
 1. When a part of the purchase price has been paid; or 
 
 2. When a part of the goods has been delivered and ac- 
 cepted. 
 
 Under the Uniform Sales Act the payment may be made at 
 any time; under the common law, when the contract is made. 
 
 It was held that a written memorandum of a sale of goods did not 
 satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds when it omitted to state 
 that payment was to be "net cash on delivery f.o.b. Baltimore" which was 
 one of the terms of the contract. — Fisher v. Andrews, 94 Md. 46. 
 
 Part Payment. — Part payment makes the contract good 
 and enforceable, and the parties concerned will have to complete 
 the contract or suffer damages. The amount paid may either 
 be a part of the price or " earnest " given or paid to " bind the 
 bargain." Strictly speaking, this should be in addition to the 
 price, but in most cases the payment is allowed to apply on 
 the purchase price. In England the amount paid as " earnest " 
 is no part of the purchase price. The amount is not material. 
 
 Part Delivery. — The contract is enforceable where the buyer 
 has received and actually accepted part of the goods. That is, 
 the buyer m 1st take possession of the goods and indicate his 
 decision to become the owner. This may be done by words or 
 by conduct. 
 
 'Tart of the goods" must be taken from the actual goods 
 to be delivered. Samples or specimens, as such, are not con- 
 sidered "part of the goods." 
 
 Other Exceptions. — When the amount of the contract is 
 less than the minimum established by law in the state, the 
 contract need not be in writing. Suit could be brought on an 
 oral contract and proof would be all that would be necessary 
 
96 SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 to enforce it, but oral contracts are hard to prove. But when 
 there are a number of articles each of which is valued less than 
 the minimum amount established by law, the contract must be in 
 writing if the value of all the articles together is greater than 
 that amount. 
 
 When a contract of sale above the minimum value has been 
 executed, even though it was not in writing, the sale stands. 
 
 Work or Service Provisions. — When the contract is es- 
 sentially one for work, labor, or services, although a transfer of 
 personal property is included, the contract may be oral. 
 
 Hayes placed an order with a machine shop for an automobile part 
 which had to be made to fit a certain car that Hayes owned. This order 
 was for more than the minimum amount specified in the statute, but as 
 it chiefly involved work and skill it did not come under the statute, and no 
 written contract was necessary. 
 
 Numerous tests were adopted by different courts to settle 
 this question. The provision of the uniform " Sales of Goods 
 Act " is that the Statute of Frauds applies to all contracts or 
 sales of goods '' notwithstanding that the goods may be intended 
 to be delivered at some future time, or may not at the time of 
 such contract or sale be actually made, procured, or provided, 
 or fit or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for the 
 making or completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for 
 delivery; but if the goods are to be manufactured by the seller 
 especially for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others 
 in the ordinary course of the seller's business, the provisions of 
 this section shall not apply." 
 
 The fact that the goods are not in existence, or that they are 
 to be made or prepared by the seller, is not important. The 
 real test is the one given in the preceding paragraph. 
 
 Rules often Referred to. — The New York rule, before New York 
 state adopted the Uniform Sales Act, provided that if any work was to be 
 performed on the article to put it in shape for delivery, the contract was not 
 a sale but a contract for work and services. 
 
 Under the English rule if the contract would result in the transfer of a 
 chattel, the contract is one of sale, even though work and services were 
 involved. 
 
 The Massachusetts rule, before Massachusetts adopted the Uniform 
 Sales Act, provided that if the contract is for articles in existence or the kind 
 
CONDITIONAL SALE 97 
 
 the seller makes in the ordinary course of his business, even though not at 
 the time in existence, it is within the statute; but if it is for articles to be 
 manufactured especially for the purchaser and not for the general market, 
 it is not. 
 
 Any of these rules may apply in states which have not adopted the 
 Uniform Sales Act. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is a bill of sale? 
 
 2. What distinction is made between " in value " and " in price " ? 
 
 3. What are the provisions of the seventeenth section of the English 
 Statute of Frauds? 
 
 4. How does the statute of your state differ from the English statute? 
 
 5. What will constitute a sufficient note or memorandum of sale 
 under the Statute of Frauds? 
 
 6. Explain the meaning of " earnest." 
 
 7. What are the rules governing part payment? Under the Uniform 
 Sales Act when may part p^ments be made? 
 
 8. What are the rules governing part delivery? 
 
 9. Mention a sales contract which would have to be in writing to be 
 enforceable, and one -which would not have to be in writing. 
 
 10. What are the " work or service " provisions as applied to sales 
 contracts? 
 
 11. Hensel ordered a suit of clothes to cost $75. Will this contract 
 have to be in writing to be binding? 
 
 12. The suit is not satisfactory to Hensel; Will he have to take it 
 (a) if the contract is in writing, (b) if the contract is not in writing? 
 
 13. If an article valued at more than the minimum amount under the 
 statute is sold, but the seller has to get new parts and paint it before de- 
 livery, will the contract have to be in writing? 
 
 14. How is it possible, where a sales contract comes under the Statute 
 of Frauds, to avoid using the written form? 
 
 5. CONDITIONAL SALE 
 
 Installment Sales. — It is common in business for certain 
 articles such as pianos, sewing machines, furniture, etc. to be 
 sold conditionally, the title to remain in the vendor until the 
 purchase price shall be fully paid. This mode of making sales 
 is employed by all installment dealers who sell goods on weekly 
 or monthly payments.. The payment of the last installment is 
 a condition precedent to the passing of the title to the purchaser. 
 
gS SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 As between the original parties, a conditional sale is valid and 
 the title does not pass until the condition is fulfilled, even though 
 the property is given into the possession of the vendee at the 
 time the parties enter into the contract. 
 
 Action was brought to recover an engine, sawmill, and lot of tools sold by 
 McRea under a contract of sale which expressly agreed that the title should 
 remain in the vendor until the purchase price was fully paid. Payment 
 was never fully made. It was held that the title did not pass to the pur- 
 chaser until the payment was made. The contract constituted a conditional 
 sale and the vendor could recover the property. 
 
 — McRea v. Merrifield, 48 Ark. 160. 
 
 But the opportunity for fraud is great if the party in posses- 
 sion, that is, the vendee, is enabled to present every appearance 
 of ownership when the title does not rest in him. A third party 
 who purchases of him without notice of the title in the vendor 
 may easily be imposed upon and defrauded. Still the general 
 rule is that in the absence of any fraucf in the conditional sale 
 the condition is valid against third persons. The seller can give 
 no better title than he possesses. 
 
 A mule was sold conditionally by Mcintosh to a third party, the title 
 to remain in the vendor until the animal was paid for. The muie was 
 atterwards sold by this third party to Beam, who bought it in good faith 
 for a valuable consideration and without notice of the conditional sale. 
 Held, that Mcintosh could recover. The purchaser acquired no better 
 title than the seller had. — Mcintosh v. Beam, 47 Ark. 363. 
 
 Filing Conditional Contracts. — Statutes have been passed 
 in many of the states requiring every such contract of sale to 
 be filed, and if it is not, the condition is void as to persons who 
 buy of the party in possession without notice of the conditional 
 contract. 
 
 Penland sold a horse to one Bleckley for $30, but Bleckley not having 
 the money it was agreed that he should take the horse, but that title should 
 remain in Penland until paid for. The horse was taken from Bleckley by 
 Cathey levying under a judgment. It was held that the attempted reserva- 
 tion of title in Penland was void since the contract, not being in writing and 
 recorded, as required by statute, was invalid against third parties. 
 
 — Penland v. Cathey, no Ga. 431. 
 
 In some states many formalities are required in the filing of the 
 sales contract, while in a few states the sales contract as filed is 
 only required to be signed by the purchaser. In some states an 
 
CONDITIONAL SALE 99 
 
 affidavit by the seller, setting forth the nature of the sale, is 
 required. Other states require the contract to be witnessed. 
 Most of the states require the contract to be acknowledged by 
 the buyer. 
 
 In some states, however, the vendor's title in a conditional 
 sale is good against third parties without filing. 
 
 In any particular case, it will be necessary to consult the 
 state law. 
 
 Sale on Trial. — Sale on trial or on approval is another form 
 of conditional sale as explained on page 92. 
 
 Chattel Mortgage. — The chattel mortgage is a special form 
 of conditional sale. It consists of the sale of certain chattels or 
 goods, subject to defeat upon the payment by the vendor or 
 mortgagor of a certain debt or the performance of a certain 
 obligation. It differs from an ordinary conditional sale in that 
 the title passes to the purchaser at once, but it is liable to be 
 defeated upon the fulfilling of certain conditions, while in an 
 ordinary conditional sale the title does not pass until the condi- 
 tions are fulfilled. 
 
 A chattel mortgage is frequently employed by a borrower of 
 money as security for the loan. The goods may remain in the 
 possession of either party, but if they are allowed to remain in the 
 mortgagor's possession, the statutes of nearly all of the states 
 require that the mortgage shall be filed with some public officer, 
 where it will be open to the inspection of the public, as a protec- 
 tion to third parties who might otherwise buy the mortgaged 
 property in good faith and without notice of the mortgage. As 
 between the parties themselves the mortgage is vaUd without 
 being filed. 
 
 Foreclosure. — After default in the payment of the mortgage, 
 the mortgagee must foreclose the mortgage in order to cut off 
 all of the rights of the mortgagor. The procedure differs under 
 the statutes of the different states. It consists in giving notice 
 to the mortgagor and selling the property at pubUc sale. The 
 mortgage itself may contain provisions for the foreclosure. 
 The mortgagor is usually allowed the time until the date of the 
 sale in which to pay the amount due and redeem the property 
 mortgaged. 
 
loo SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 The Rule as to Losses. — The usual rule in sales is that the 
 risk of loss follows the title to the goods, and in some states 
 that rule is applied to conditional sales and in case of destruction 
 of the goods the loss falls on the vendor. However, in most 
 states the courts hold that the loss falls on the vendee, because 
 he is in possession of the goods and has exclusive control of them. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Give an example of an installment sale. 
 
 2. Under what conditions "does the title pass to the purchaser in an 
 installment sale? 
 
 3. (a) Has the purchaser of goods on the installment plan a right to 
 sell them? (b) Can he give a good title to the goods? 
 
 4. Can a merchant who has purchased goods on credit sell them and 
 transfer a good title? 
 
 5. Wherein do conditions differ in questions 3 and 4? 
 
 6. Why is it important to require that conditional contracts be filed? 
 
 7. Give an example of a sale where there is a change of possession of 
 the goods without a change of title. 
 
 8. What is a chattel mortgage? What purpose does it serve? 
 
 9. What right has the mortgagee in case the mortg:.gor fails to pay 
 the debt? 
 
 10. Who is responsible if the property is destroyed before payments 
 are completed? 
 
 11. Mention some particulars in which laws on conditional sales 
 differ. / 
 
 6. WARRANTIES 
 
 Classification. — We have seen that a condition in a contract 
 of sale which is required to be performed before the contract is 
 completed will defeat the sale if it is not carried out. Aside 
 from this there are certain warranties which are collateral 
 undertakings on the part of the seller to be responsible in dam- 
 ages if certain conditions as to quality, amount, or title of the 
 article are not as represented. The warranty is a separate con- 
 tract, and, if made at a different time from the contract of sale, 
 it must be supported by a separate consideration. If made at 
 the same time, the consideration of the sale will also operate as 
 a consideration for the warranty. 
 
 Mrs. Green purchased a coat for which she paid a good price. A friend 
 of hers told her it would fade, and she took it back to the merchant, who 
 
WARRANTIES \'\''^i>%i 
 
 ■'''•■''''•'■'■' 
 warranted the coat not to change color. The merchant is not bound by 
 this warranty, as it was made after the sale, and there was no consideration. 
 Had the merchant warranted the coat not to fade at the time the sale 
 was made, the consideration of the sale would have been consideration for 
 the warranty. 
 
 There are two classes of warranty, express and imp*lied. 
 
 Express Warranty. — -The express warranty, as its title 
 would indicate, is an express undertaking or agreement made by 
 the seller. No special form of words is necessary to create a 
 warranty. Any statement framed with the intention of making 
 a warranty will be so construed. It must be distinguished from 
 a mere expression of opinion on points regarding the chattel, of 
 which the seller has no special knowledge and on which the 
 buyer may be expected to exercise his own judgment. A war- 
 ranty is an assertion of a fact of which the buyer is ignorant. 
 
 The vendor, in selling a patent right in a ditching machine, exhibited 
 the letters patent and the model and stated that if properly constructed 
 it would work well. It was claimed that it was properly constructed and 
 did not work well. It was not shown that the vendor had ever made and 
 used a machine constructed after this model or that he represented that 
 he had made and used one. The court held that the statements were nothing 
 more than mere expressions of opinion, which" did not amount to a war- 
 ranty. — Hunter v. McLaughlin, 43 Ind. 38. 
 
 It was held that a statement by a piano agent that the instrument is 
 "well made and will stand up to concert pitch" is a warranty, it being a 
 representation of fact. — Stroud v. Pierce, 6 Allen (Mass.) 413. 
 
 If the representation is a warranty, the contract will not be 
 broken if the representation is untrue, but an action for damages 
 will arise. If it is a mere expression of opinion, there is no remedy 
 if it turns out to be unfounded. 
 
 A general warranty is held not to include defects apparent 
 on simple inspection and requiring no skill to discover them, 
 nor defects known to the buyer. 
 
 Morey sold Dean a horse that was a crihber. Held, that he was not 
 bound to disclose this fact to Dean, as the horse was subject to the inspec- 
 tion of the buyer, and a simple examination of the horse's mouth would have 
 shown the defect. — Dean v. Morey, 2>2> Iowa 120. 
 
 Implied Warranty. — Imphed warranty differs from express 
 warranty in that although it exists in the contract of sale, it 
 is not mentioned or stated in express words. In every contract 
 of sale there is an imphed warranty that the seller has the right 
 
i<y2 , ;; - • /SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 • 
 
 to sell the goods, or will have such right when title is to pass. 
 At common law this warranty of title was not implied when the 
 seller was not in possession of the goods sold, but the Uniform 
 Sales Act seems to have altered the common law in this respect. 
 
 Nevels sued the Kentucky Lumber Co. for damages for refusal to 
 accept certain logs he sold to them. Nevels had bought all the poplar 
 timber on a tract, but it appeared that he had bought from a man who 
 owned only an undivided one-fourth of the tract, and so he did not have 
 a good title to the logs. It was held that there was a breach of implied 
 warranty of title and the Kentucky Lumber Co. was justified in refusing 
 the logs. — Nevels v. Kentucky Lumber Co., io8 Ky. 550. 
 
 As to the implied warranty of quality, we find the maxim, 
 caveat emptor, meaning ^'Let the buyer beware," to be the 
 general rule of law. When there has been a sale of specific 
 goods which the buyer has an opportunity to inspect, he buys 
 at his own risk as to quality, unless there is an express war- 
 ranty. There is no implied warranty of the quality. The vendor 
 is under no obligation to communicate the existence of even 
 latent defects in his wares unless, by act or impHcation, he repre- 
 sents that such defects do not exist. 
 
 Harvey sold Frazier some hogs which, unknown to both parties, had 
 a disease of which they died later. Action was brought on the implied war- 
 ranty of soundness of the hogs. Held, that when there is no express war- 
 ranty and no fraud in the sale of personal property, the purchaser takes 
 the risk of its quality and condition. — Frazier v. Harvey, 34 Conn. 469. 
 
 But when the chattel is to be made or supplied to the order 
 of the purchaser, there is an implied warranty that it is reason- 
 ably fit for the purpose intended, if that purpose is communi- 
 cated to the seller. 
 
 Held, that the vendor of a patent churn, being himself the manufac- 
 turer, and contracting to furnish the purchaser with a quantity of churns, 
 must be held to have warranted that they were useful and reasonably suit- 
 able for the intended purpose; and if they proved to be worthless, there 
 would be a breach of the implied warranty which would be a good defense 
 against an action for the purchase price. — Tahor v. Peters, 74 Ala. 90. 
 
 If the sale is by sample, there is an implied warranty that 
 the quality of the bulk is equal to that of the sample. 
 
 Myer sold Wheeler 10 carloads of barley like sample, to be delivered 
 from time to time. Wheeler had never seen the barley. Held, that there 
 was a warranty that the barley would be equal to the sample. 
 
 — Myer v. Wheeler, 65 Iowa 390. 
 
WARRANTIES . 103 
 
 To constitute a sale by sample it must appear that the con- 
 tract of the parties was made solely with reference to the sample 
 exhibited. 
 
 The court held that the sale of an article which was represented to 
 be five per cent better than the sample shown was not a sale by sample. 
 
 — Day V. Raguet, 14 Minn. 273. 
 
 In a sale by description there is an implied warranty that 
 the goods shall be salable, aside from the fact that a condition 
 precedent to the sale is that the goods shall answer the de- 
 scription. In such a case, the buyer having no opportunity to 
 inspect the goods, the rule of caveat emptor does not apply, and 
 the buyer has a right to expect that he is getting a salable article 
 answering the description in the contract, and not an article 
 that is worthless. 
 
 Weiger sold Gould oats and represented them to be a good grade of 
 white oats, such as he was purchasing at forty cents. Held, that Weiger 
 must deliver salable oats and cannot deliver wet, dirty oats. 
 
 — Weiger v. Gould, 86 III. 180". 
 
 When a person buys of a manufacturer an article made for 
 a particular purpose, there is an implied warranty that it is- fit 
 for the desired purpose, also that it is free from latent defects, 
 arising from the process of manufacture and unknown to the 
 purchaser, which render it unfit for the purpose intended. 
 
 Niles agreed with Rodgers that he would deliver to him at a future time 
 three steam boilers with which to run the engines in his roller mill. Held, 
 that there was an implied warranty that the boilers should be free from all 
 such defects in material or workmanship, either latent or otherwise, as 
 would render them unfit for the usual purposes of such boilers. 
 
 — Rodgers v. Niles, 11 Ohio State 48. 
 
 Conditions. — The two kinds of conditions are " pure con- 
 dition " and '' promissory condition." A pure condition is one 
 over which neither party has any control. For example, a 
 contract is made to manufacture trolley cars if a certain fran- 
 chise or right of way is secured, or a contract is made to buy 
 goods " on arrival." The parties to the contract would not 
 be bound unless the conditions are carried out. The franchise 
 may not be secured, or the goods may never arrive. 
 
 A promissory condition in a sales contract is a statement to 
 
I04 SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 the effect that the goods will answer a certain description, or 
 that they will be ready for deHvery on a certain date. 
 
 Where the Uniform Sales Act applies, the promissory con- 
 ditions only are treated as warranties. 
 
 SECTION ON IMPLIED WARRANTY FROM UNIFORM 
 SALES ACT 
 
 Implied Warranties of Title. In a contract to sell or in a sale, unless 
 a contrary intention appears, there are 
 
 1. An implied warranty on the part of the seller that in case of a sale 
 he has a right to sell the goods, and that in case of a contract to sell he will 
 have a right to sell the goods at the time when the property is to pass; 
 
 2. An implied warranty that the buyer shall have and enjoy quiet 
 possession of the goods as against any lawful claims existing at the time of 
 the sale; 
 
 3. An implied warranty that the goods shall be free at the time of 
 the sale from any charge or encumbrance in favor of any third person, not 
 declared or known to the buyer before or at the time when the contract or 
 sale is made. 
 
 4. This section shall not, however, be held to render liable a sheriff, 
 auctioneer, mortgagee, or other person professing to sell by virtue of 
 authority in fact or law goods in which a third person has a legal or 
 equitable interest. 
 
 Implied Warranty in Sale by Description. When there is a 
 contract to sell or a sale of goods by description, there is an implied war- 
 ranty that the goods shall correspond with the description, and if the con- 
 tract or sale be by sample, as well as by description, it is not sufficient 
 that the bulk of the goods corresponds with the sample if the goods do not 
 also correspond with the description. 
 
 Implied Warranties of Quality. Subject to the provisions of this 
 act, of any statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or con- 
 dition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods sup- 
 pHed under a contract to sell or a sale, except in the following paragraphs 
 I, 2, 5, and 6. 
 
 1. Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to 
 the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required and it 
 appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skiU or judgment (whether he be 
 the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the 
 goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. 
 
 2. Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals 
 in goods of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer 
 or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable 
 quality. 
 
REMEDIES FOR BREACH 105 
 
 3. If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty 
 as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed. 
 
 4. In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article under 
 its patent or other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fit- 
 ness for any particular purpose. 
 
 5. An implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for a 
 particular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade. 
 
 6. An express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or 
 condition implied under this act unless inconsistent therewith. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is a warranty? 
 
 2. What are the two classes of warranty? 
 
 3. Is a warranty made after the sale good? 
 
 4. What is an express warranty? 
 
 5. Distinguish between a warranty and a mere expression of opinion. 
 
 6. In case of breach of warranty what right arises? 
 
 7. What is the meaning of the term caveat emptor? 
 
 8. Mention a case where caveat emptor applies. 
 
 9; Distinguish between an express warranty and an implied war- 
 ranty. 
 
 10. Under the Uniform Sales Act is there an implied warranty of 
 title if the seller is not in possession of the goods? 
 
 11. What is the general rule as to the implied warranty of quality? 
 
 12. When is there an impUed warranty of fitness for a particular 
 purpose? 
 
 13. What is the implied warranty in case of a sale by sample? 
 
 14. What is necessary to constitute a sale by sample? 
 
 15. Hooker ordered a casting for a particular machine; what is the 
 implied warranty on the part of the seller? 
 
 16. In case of a sale by description, what is the implied warranty? 
 
 17. Does the rule of caveat emptor apply where the buyer does not 
 have an opportunity to inspect the goods? 
 
 18. Why is it desirable to secure a warranty? 
 
 19. If a buyer relies on his own judgment, will statements made by 
 the seller be held to be warranties? 
 
 20. What is the difference between the two classes of conditions? 
 
 21. To which condition does the Sales Act apply? 
 
 7. REMEDIES FOR BREACH 
 
 Rights of Seller. — The parties may not fulfill their contract 
 of sale, and the question then arises as to what are their respec- 
 tive rights. The vendee may refuse to complete the contract of 
 
io6 SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 sale by declining to accept the goods, or after accepting and 
 retaining the goods, he may refuse to pay the purchase price. 
 In case the goods have not been delivered and the title has 
 not passed to the purchaser, the vendor may elect to avail 
 himself of any one of three remedies. 
 
 1. He may resell the goods, after having tendered them and 
 been refused, and recover damages for the loss, if any; or, 
 
 2. He may store the goods for the vendee and sue for the 
 entire purchase price; or, 
 
 3. He may keep the goods and sue for the damages, which 
 will be the difference between the contract price and the market 
 price at the time and place of delivery. 
 
 The Uniform Law limits the right to store the goods for the 
 buyer and recover the full contract price to cases where the 
 goods cannot readily be sold for a reasonable price. The right 
 of resale is given when the goods are of a perishable nature, or 
 the buyer has been in default in the payment of the price an 
 unreasonable time. It is not essential to the validity of a re- 
 sale that the seller shall give the buyer notice of his intention 
 to resell, nor of the time and place of the resale, but the seller 
 is bound to exercise reasonable care and judgment in making 
 the resale. 
 
 If the title and possession have passed to the purchaser, the 
 only remedy is an action against the purchaser for the contract 
 price, or if not for the contract price, for the reasonable value 
 of the goods. 
 
 Seller's Lien. — While the seller has possession or control 
 of the goods which have not been paid for, he has what is known 
 as a seller's Hen on them; that is, he may refuse to deliver them 
 until he is paid, unless the contract of sale provides otherwise. 
 This lien is lost by giving up possession of the goods and the 
 buyer will not have to return them, even though he does not 
 pay for them. 
 
 Stoppage in Transitu. — The seller who has sold goods on 
 credit has a right under certain conditions to stop delivery of 
 the goods while they are in the hands of the common carrier 
 (express, railroad, or steamship company). This is known as 
 the right of stoppage in transitu. 
 
REMEDIES FOR BREACH 107 
 
 Conditions which give rise to the right of stoppage in tran- 
 situ are: 
 
 1. The goods must have been sold on credit. 
 
 2. The buyer must be insolvent at the time the delivery of 
 the goods is stopped. 
 
 3. The goods must be in the hands of the common carrier 
 at the time the right of stoppage is exercised. 
 
 The seller exercises this right by notifying the common 
 carrier not to dehver the goods to the buyer or his agent. 
 
 This right exists when the purchaser becomes insolvent after 
 the sale or was insolvent when the sale was made, though the 
 fact was unknown to the seller. 
 
 The right of stoppage in transitu extends not only to the 
 seller himself but to an agent who, upon the order of his princi- 
 pal, has purchased goods and paid for them with his own money. 
 So also a third person who advances the money for the purchase 
 and takes an assignment of the bill of lading can exercise the 
 right of stoppage in transitu. 
 
 Gossler advanced the money on a cargo of iron for Schepeler and re- 
 ceived the bill of lading as security for the advance. Gossler sent the bill 
 of lading to Schepeler, who became insolvent before he received the goods. 
 Held, that Gossler could stop the goods in transit and could retake them 
 and compel Schepeler to deliver to him the bill of lading. 
 
 — Gossler v. Schepeler, 5 Daly (N. Y.) 476. 
 
 This right can be exercised only against an insolvent or 
 bankrupt person. By an insolvent is meant one unable to pay 
 his debts in the usual course of his business. 
 
 It was held that the fact that the vendee's notes went to protest be- 
 cause of his inability to pay them in the regular course of business was suf- 
 ficient to justify the vendor in exercising the right of stoppage in transitu. 
 
 — Durgy Cement Co. v. O'Brien, 123 Mass. 12. 
 
 The Uniform Law provides that a person is insolvent who 
 has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business, 
 or cannot pay them as they become due, whether he has com- 
 mitted an act of bankruptcy or is insolvent within the meaning 
 of the federal bankruptcy law, or not. 
 
 If the vendor stops the goods when the purchaser is solvent, 
 he does so at his peril, and will be obliged to deliver the goods 
 in addition to becoming liable for damages to the vendee. 
 
io8 SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 The right of stoppage in transitu is defeated in case the bill 
 of lading is in the hands of the buyer and he transfers it to a 
 third person who in good faith pays value for it. The third 
 party can hold the goods. 
 
 Rights of Buyer. — When the seller refuses to deliver the 
 goods to the buyer, who has acquired the right of ownership: 
 
 1. The buyer may sue the seller for damages for withhold- 
 ing the goods. 
 
 2. The buyer may bring an action in replevin to force the 
 seller to deliver the goods to him. 
 
 An action in replevin is an action brought by one who is 
 entitled to the possession of certain goods to compel the one 
 who is wrongfully retaining possession of them to give them up. 
 It is based on the principle that the one who is the owner 
 of the goods is entitled to the possession of them. 
 
 3. If the buyer does not have the right of ownership, but 
 instead the right of contract to have the goods delivered to him, 
 he may sue the seller for damage for breach of contract, or under 
 certain conditions may demand specific performance. 
 
 The amount of damages will be the difference between the 
 contract price and the market price at the time. 
 
 It was held that a purchaser can recover as damages from a vendor 
 who refuses or fails to deliver the goods bought, the difference between 
 the agreed price and the market price at the time they ought to have been 
 delivered, that is, the loss which the vendee would suffer if he had to go 
 out and buy the articles in the market. — Harralson v. Stein, 50 Ala. 347. 
 
 The remedy of specific performance will be granted by a 
 court of equity when, from the pecuHar nature of the case, money 
 damages are an inadequate remedy. This means simply fulfill- 
 ing a contract according to its precise terms (page 67). 
 
 Myer purchased three pieces of antique furniture from The Molton Co. 
 for which he paid $300. The Molton Co. refused to deliver the furniture. 
 As this furniture cannot be obtained elsewhere, Myer is entitled to the 
 remedy of specific performance. He can bring action and a court of equity 
 will compel The Molton Co. to deliver the furniture. 
 
 Remedies for Seller's Breach of Warranty. — When there 
 has been a breach of warranty on the part of the seller: 
 
 I. The buyer may keep the goods and deduct from the pur- 
 chase price (or, if he has paid for the goods, may recover from 
 
REMEDIES FOR BREACH 109 
 
 the seller) an amount equal to the difference between the value 
 of goods as contracted for and the value of the goods as delivered. 
 
 2. The buyer may refuse to accept the goods, or, if he has 
 already accepted them in ignorance of their condition, he may 
 return them within a reasonable time after discovering the 
 breach of warranty. He should give prompt notice to the seller. 
 
 When an order for goods separately specifies the quantity 
 and price of each article, the contract is several and the buyer 
 may retain the articles which are in accordance with the contract 
 and refuse or return those which are not. 
 
 When the buyer refuses or returns the goods, he has a right 
 of action for damages against the seller for breach of the covenant 
 of warranty. 
 
 8. AUCTION SALES 
 
 Sales at Auction. — In an auction sale the assumption is 
 that the goods will be sold to the highest bidder. By-bidding 
 is illegal in most states. By-bidding is bidding on the articles 
 offered for sale, by pre-arrangement with the seller, for the pur- 
 pose of running up the price or keeping the articles from being 
 sold for less than the seller is willing to accept. 
 
 A purchaser who buys an article where by-bidding was 
 practiced may return it and demand a return of the money 
 paid. 
 
 General Regulations. — Auction hand bills are usually 
 printed which contain the regulations. These regulations must 
 not conflict with any law in force with reference to auction 
 sales. 
 
 Bids are made by signs or nods. 
 
 The sale is made when the auctioneer lets his hammer fall. 
 
 The auctioneer may refuse to recognize insignificant bids. 
 
 The seller may reserve the right to reject any or all bids. 
 
 The sale may be made on some conditions which are speci- 
 fied. 
 
 The buyer must comply with the conditions of the sale or 
 forfeit any amount deposited on the purchase. 
 
 The seller has a right of action for damages against a buyer 
 who fails to take property " knocked down to him." 
 
no SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 The auctioneer acts as agent for the seller in selling the 
 property. 
 
 The seller is bound to carry out the sales made by the auc- 
 tioneer according to the sales memorandum. 
 
 The auctioneer is not allowed to bid for himself. 
 
 The law usually requires an auctioneer to have a license. 
 
 The auctioneer has a lien on the property for his commission 
 and he may require that he be paid before giving up the prop- 
 erty to the purchaser. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What three rights has the seller for breach of contract on the 
 part of the buyer? 
 
 2. What limitation is placed by the Uniform Law on the right to 
 store goods? 
 
 3. If the title and possession have passed to the buyer, what is the 
 only remedy the seller has for breach of contract? 
 
 4. (a) What is the seller's right of lien? (b) When does it arise? 
 
 5. What conditions give rise to the right of stoppage in transitu? 
 
 6. Who may exercise the right of stoppage in transitu? 
 
 7. How does the seller exercise this right of stoppage? 
 
 8. How is insolvency of the buyer determined? 
 
 9. What risk does the seller assume when he stops the goods? 
 
 10. How may the right of stoppage in transitu be defeated? 
 
 11. What are the rights of the buyer when the seller refuses to de- 
 liver the goods? 
 
 12. In case of suit what would determine the amount of damage? 
 
 13. Explain the term " specific performance." 
 
 14. Grant contracted to purchase a picture by a noted artist. The 
 seller refused delivery; what remedy has Grant? Why? 
 
 15. What remedies has the buyer in case of breach of warranty on 
 the part of the seller? 
 
 16. Wherein does an auction sale differ from a regular sale? 
 
 17. What are the rights of the purchaser where by-bidding is practiced? 
 
 18. Downs bought a carload of potatoes from Fennel. When the 
 potatoes were delivered, Downs refused to accept them. What remedies 
 has Fennel for Downs's breach of contract? 
 
 19. In what case must the seller sell the goods on the buyer's failure 
 to accept them? 
 
 IMPORTANT POINTS 
 A sale is a contract. 
 
 All the elements and underlying principles of a contract are found 
 in a sale. 
 
IMPORTANT POINTS in 
 
 In a sale, the price must be a money consideration. 
 
 In a barter, one article is exchanged for another article. 
 
 Where no price is mentioned, a reasonable price is presumed. 
 
 In a sale, the title and possession may pass together, or either 
 may pass without the other. 
 
 In a bailment, there is a change of possession without a change 
 of title. 
 
 In a mortgage, the title is transferred as security. The posses- 
 sion generally does not pass. 
 
 The one who offers goods for sale warrants that he is the owner, 
 or has a right to sell them. 
 
 An agent appointed to sell has no authority to barter. 
 
 The price agreed upon may be any amount. It need not be ade- 
 quate. 
 
 Any one who is competent to contract can contract to buy or sell. 
 
 An infant as agent for an adult may contract to buy or sell. 
 
 As a rule, a person who buys property from one not the owner 
 obtains no title. 
 
 If the owner of an article makes it possible for another party to 
 hold himself out as the owner, an innocent purchaser of the article 
 gets a good title as against the true owner. 
 
 A good title never accompanies stolen goods. 
 
 The finder of lost property never acquires a good title to it. 
 
 Pledgee may sell when pledgor fails to fulfill conditions of pledge. 
 
 The master of a vessel may sell any portion of cargo when con- 
 ditions make it necessary. 
 
 Destruction of the goods before the contract was made and 
 without the knowledge of either party renders the contract voidable. 
 
 When goods which are the subject of a sale are destroyed, the 
 one vested with the title must suffer the loss. 
 
 When the title passes in a sale is, as a general rule, determined 
 by the intention of the parties. 
 
 A sale of part of a mass of similar goods passes title without sep- 
 arating the part sold. If the goods are not all alike the part sold must 
 be separated before title passes. 
 
 There can be no complete sale in the case of unascertained 
 goods. 
 
 The sales contract may be oral, except where the Statute of 
 Frauds requires that it be written. 
 
 A sales memorandum, containing the essential facts, and signed 
 by the party to be charged, will, as a rule, satisfy the law requiring 
 written contracts. 
 
 A bill of sale is a formal written contract of sale. 
 
 Work and service contracts do not come under the Statute of 
 Frauds. 
 
112 SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 A conditional sale is a sale based on some specific conditions 
 mentioned in the contract. 
 
 In a sale on trial, title does not pass until conditions have been 
 fulfilled. 
 
 A chattel mortgage is a conditional transfer of title to personal 
 property to secure a debt. 
 
 In an installment sale, the goods may be delivered in install- 
 ments, or the price may be paid in installments. 
 
 When the title to property is passed, the right of ownership 
 becomes absolute. 
 
 A warranty is a separate contract which amounts to a collateral 
 undertaking, 
 
 ImpUed warranties are just as effective as expressed warranties. 
 
 Caveat emptor applies only where the buyer has a chance to 
 inspect the goods. 
 
 Mere statements of opinion do not constitute warranties. 
 
 The seller has a right to demand payment as a condition pre- 
 cedent to delivery. 
 
 The seller may stop goods in transit if they have been sold on 
 credit and the buyer is insolvent. 
 
 Specific performance is a remedy only where money damages 
 will not suffice. 
 
 Things not in existence cannot be the subject of a sale, although 
 they may be the subject of an agreement to sell. 
 
 A contract of sale will not be set aside because of inadequacy of 
 price, unless there is proof of fraud or undue advantage. 
 
 What is termed ** giving a refusal " of an article to a party who 
 may or may not take it within a certain time is not vaUd unless the 
 agreement is supported by consideration or under seal. 
 
 When goods are sent to a party by mistake and he makes use 
 of them with full knowledge of the facts, he becomes the purchaser 
 and must pay full value for the goods. 
 
 A fraudulent representation to be actionable must be false; must 
 have been known to be false by the seller at the time it was made ; 
 must be in regard to a material part of the contract; must be made 
 with the intent that it be relied upon; and the buyer must rely on it 
 to his injury. 
 
 Fraud renders a sale voidable and not void. 
 
 Possession of personal property is not title. It is evidence of 
 title but will not protect one who buys against the true owner. 
 
 TEST QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Are uniform state laws desirable on all subjects that affect business? 
 
 2. Of what importance is the question, whether a transaction is a 
 sale or a contract to sell? 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 113 
 
 3. Can an article not in existence become the subject of an executed 
 sale? Explain. 
 
 4. Must selection precede the transfer of the ownership of goods? 
 Explain. 
 
 5. Is a written contract necessary when a sale comes under the 
 Statute of Frauds, if both parties carry out the contract? 
 
 6. Does a statement on the part of the buyer to the effect that the 
 goods are to be used for a certain purpose affect the sale? Explain. 
 
 7. Under what circumstances has the buyer the right to have the 
 contract of sale carried out specifically? 
 
 8. Do conditional sales contracts in your state have to be filed? If 
 so, where are they filed? 
 
 9. (a) What purpose do chattel mortgages serve? (b) Where do 
 chattel mortgages have to be filed? 
 
 10. What constitutes fraud in sales contracts? 
 
 CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 Give the decision and state fully the principles of law involved in each case. 
 
 1. Morton kept a borrowed plow for several months and finally sold 
 it to Ham, who thought Morton was the owner. Has Ham a good title? 
 
 2. Pond, a hired man, stole several chickens from the farmer for whom 
 he worked and sold them to a hotel-keeper, who consumed them, not know- 
 ing they had been stolen. What legal remedy has the farmer? 
 
 3. Dorety bought a moving van from Owen, on which was painted 
 "J. W. Owen — Storage — Moving." The moving van did not belong to 
 Owen. Did Dorety get a good title as against the true owner? 
 
 4. Ordway contracted to deliver to Logan 1000 bales of hay at $25 
 per ton, to be paid for as delivered. Ordway had delivered 650 bales when a 
 fire destroyed the 350 bales remaining. What should be the result of an 
 action by Logan against Ordway for damages for breach of contract? 
 
 5. Dyre, an apple buyer, contracted with Metz, an exporter, for the 
 sale of the apples from an orchard Dyre expected to buy. Was this trans- 
 action a sale or a contract to sell? Explain. 
 
 6. Bowden agreed to buy a wagon from a blacksmith who was to 
 repair one wheel and paint it before delivery. Bowden paid ten dollars 
 on the purchase price. Before the wagon was ready for delivery the shop 
 and its contents, including the wagon in question, was destroyed by fire. 
 Who should bear the loss? 
 
114 SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 7. ToUe accepted on thirty days' trial a machine for use in his laundry. 
 After keeping it six months without paying for it, he sought to return it on 
 the ground that it was not satisfactory. The seller refused to take the 
 machine back and brought action to recover the price. How should this 
 case be decided? 
 
 8. Nixon contracted to build a portable garage for Hand. The 
 garage was to be built according to a design which Nixon had, and the 
 price was to be $700. When the garage was completed for delivery Hand 
 refused to accept it, claiming it was not built according to directions. Un- 
 der the circumstances what courses are open to Hand? 
 
 9. Swartz contracted orally with Green for the purchase of 1000 
 bushels of wheat at $2 per bushel. Swartz was to take the wheat within 
 thirty days, but failed to do so. Green waited nearly sixty days and then 
 brought action for damages, as wheat had dropped in price in the mean- 
 time to $1.50 a bushel. How should this case be decided? 
 
 10. Jackson contracted to purchase and sell 100 light auto delivery 
 trucks during a certain season. He purchased and delivered forty and then 
 before the season was half over he declared his intention not to accept or 
 sell any more trucks. What rights has the seller? Can he take action at 
 once or must he wait until the time under the contract expires? 
 
 11. Kent ordered a new body for his automobile from the Rush Auto 
 Body Co., to be built according to a design furnished by Kent and unlike 
 bodies built regularly by the Rush Co. When the body was completed 
 for delivery, Kent refused to accept it and claimed he was not bound by 
 the contract, as it was not in writing. How should this case be decided? 
 
 12. "I hereby agree to purchase 1000 50-pound chests of Y. H. tea 
 from the Gordon Co., 100 chests to be delivered each month for ten months, 
 same to be paid for as delivered. 
 
 J. C. Flinch." 
 Does this memorandum satisfy the requirements of the Statute of 
 Frauds? 
 
 13. Brewer purchased a piano on a conditional sale contract, payments 
 to be made in installments. Before paying all the installments he had an 
 auction sale and sold all his personal property, including this piano. Parks 
 purchased the piano, not knowing Brewer had purchased it on the install- 
 ment plan and had not paid all the installments. Did Parks get a good title ? 
 Explain. 
 
 14. Morley purchased a quantity of office furniture on which there 
 was a chattel mortgage. He did not know that there was a mortgage on 
 the furniture. Did he get a good title as against the mortgagee? When he 
 discovered that the furniture was mortgaged, what could he do? 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 115 
 
 15. Dempsey has a chattel mortgage on a number of articles belonging 
 to Wood. Wood failed to pay the debt secured by this mortgage. What 
 course is open to Dempsey? 
 
 16. Lowery purchased a used automobile from Sanderson, who war- 
 ranted it to be in good running order. After using it a few days, Lowery 
 discovered that several of the bearings were worn out, that the car leaked 
 oil, and that one spring was cracked. Could Lowery maintain an action 
 against Sanderson for breach of warranty and collect damages? 
 
 17. Ingham contracted to buy 1000 bushels of oats by sample. When 
 the oats were delivered the first lots were clean and like the sample, but 
 those delivered later were dirty and unfit for market. Ingham refused to 
 accept the later deliveries, and the seller took action for breach of con- 
 tract. What should be the outcome of this case? 
 
 18. Wilkins and Company sold a bill of goods amounting to $1200 to 
 J. C. Hemper, Denver, terms 5% ten days, net sixty days. After the goods 
 had been shipped Wilkins and Company learned through the Bradstreet 
 Agency that Hemper had filed a petition in bankruptcy. What can 
 Wilkins and Company do to protect their interests? 
 
 19. Benson, not knowing its real value, sold a very valuable piece of 
 antique furniture for $50. The purchaser paid $10 on the purchase price 
 and agreed to call the next day, pay the balance, and take the article. In 
 the meantime Benson's friends told him the piece of furniture was worth 
 $500 and discouraged him in making the sale. When the purchaser called 
 Benson ofifered to give back the $10 paid and refused to deliver the article. 
 What can the purchaser do? 
 
 20. Gaynor purchased a team and wagon at an auction sale. After 
 the team had been "knocked down to him" a neighbor who knew the 
 team told him they would run away and were not safe to drive. Gaynor 
 refused to take the team or to comply with the terms of the sale. Is he 
 bound? Explain. 
 
 21. Allen delivers to Barker 100 yards of cloth to be made into coats. 
 When the coats are nearly completed Barker's shop burns and the coats 
 are destroyed. Upon whom will the loss fall? 
 
 22. Brown delivered two black walnut logs at Smith's sawmill. Smith 
 in return was to give him 500 feet of planed pine lumber. What was the 
 transaction, a sale, a barter, or a bailment? 
 
 2S- Groves sold to Smith his horse which had broken out of the pasture 
 lot and wandered away, its whereabouts at the time being unknown to 
 Groves. Later it came back to Groves's farm and Smith claimed it. Could 
 he recover? 
 
ii6 SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 24. Gordon loses his watch and it is afterwards picked up on the street 
 by Hogan, a jeweler. Hogan puts it in his shop and sells it to Lane. Gor- 
 don discovers it in the possession of Lane and sues for its recovery. Lane 
 bought the watch in good faith, believing it to belong to Hogan, and paid 
 what it was reasonably worth. Who gets the watch? 
 
 25. In the above case, if Hogan had stolen the watch, would the re- 
 sult have been any different? 
 
 26. Good sold a team of horses to Farnum. He was driving the horses 
 when the sale took place and immediately delivered them over. It was 
 found afterwards that the horses did not belong to him, and an action 
 was brought against him for breach of warranty. Was there any war- 
 ranty? If so, what? 
 
 27. Suppose at the time Good sold the horses he did not have them 
 in his possession, but stated that they were in Cain's livery stable. Farnum 
 brought an action against him for breach of warranty. Was there any 
 warranty? If so, what? 
 
 28. Frank sold a carload of apples to Jeffreys, nothing being said as 
 to their quality. They were in the possession of Frank at the time and 
 each party had an opportunity to inspect them. It was found that they 
 were of an inferior grade, and Jeffreys sued for damages for breach of an 
 implied warranty of quality. Could he recover? What rule would apply? 
 
 29. Hayes contracted to make for Young a new improved hayrack. 
 When Young received it he found that it was not suitable for the purpose 
 for which it was purchased and would not remain in position on the wagon. 
 Was there any implied warranty on the part of Hayes? 
 
 30. Meyer purchased a quantity of cloth from Scott. The order was 
 taken from a sample which Scott carried with him. When the cloth was 
 received it was an entirely different quaHty, being much lighter in weight. 
 Meyer sued for damages on an implied warranty that the cloth was to be 
 like the sample. Was there such an implied warranty and could he recover? 
 
 31. Aaron sold Bailey 100 barrels of sugar to be delivered in 30 days. 
 When the time for delivery arrived, Bailey refused to accept the sugar or 
 pay the purchase price. What three remedies had Aaron? 
 
 32. If the sugar had been delivered and accepted by Bailey, but Bailey 
 had refused to pay for it, what remedies had Aaron? 
 
 33. Watson went to Treulib and Co., fish merchants, and bought $20 
 worth of clams, stating that he intended to use them the same day at a 
 clam bake. The clams proved to be unfit for food. Treulib and Co. re- 
 fused to take them back or to return the money paid for them. What are 
 Watson's rights? Explain. 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 117 
 
 34. Mahoney buys a stove from Fisher, paying $5 down and signing 
 a contract which provides that the stove has been merely leased to Ma- 
 honey, the title remaining in Fisher until the whole purchase price of $40 
 is paid. Mahoney at once sells the stove to Burns, who gives him $20 for 
 it, believing the stove belongs to Mahoney. Can Fisher take the stove from 
 Burns? 
 
 35. If the above transaction takes place in a state requiring condi- 
 tional contracts to be filed, and the above contract is not filed, who is en- 
 titled to the stove? 
 
 36. Coon, a sewing-machine agent, sells a machine to Mrs. Randall, 
 telling her that it is the best machine on the market, and that it runs so 
 easily that it will nearly run alone. She finds out that the machine is of 
 inferior quality, runs hard, and does not work well, so seeks to recover dam- 
 ages for breach of warranty. Does the representation constitute a 
 warranty? 
 
 37. A stove is sent to Lyng by Fisher for trial, to be returned if not 
 found satisfactory, no specified time within which it must be returned 
 being given. Lyng keeps the stove a year without offering to return it 
 and then, when a bill is presented for the stove, he says that it is not satis- 
 factory and offers to bring it back. Has the sale been completed, and can 
 Lyng be compelled to pay? 
 
 38. C, a commission merchant, receives a carload of watermelons 
 from Logan & Co., with instructions to hold them until Logan & Co.'s 
 agent arrives. C sells them to Weaver as soon as they are received. Lo- 
 gan & Co. brings an action against Weaver to recover them. Who is en- 
 titled to the melons? 
 
 39. Harrison, a horse dealer, employed Rice to purchase a horse for 
 him to match one he then owned. Rice bought a horse, taking a bill of 
 sale to himself. Harrison knew of this and allowed Rice to keep the horse 
 and bill of sale. Rice sold the horse without authority to Hooker. Could 
 Harrison recover the horse from Hooker? 
 
 40. Clark, a farmer, sells to Spence in the spring, the hay and com 
 that he shall raise on his farm during the coming season. The corn has not 
 yet been planted. Is the sale good? 
 
 41. Clark also sells to Spence the wool from 100 sheep which he agrees 
 to buy within 30 days, but which he does not yet own. Is the sale good? 
 
 42. Brown goes to Anderson, a cattle dealer, and out of a herd of 50 
 cattle in the field buys 10, pays for them, and promises to take them the 
 next day. Without picking out the particular 10, he leaves. Has the title 
 in these 10 passed to Brown or is it still in Anderson? 
 
ii8 SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
 43. In the above case suppose Brown, before leaving, picked out and 
 branded the 10 cattle, paid the purchase price, and agreed to call and drive 
 them away the next day. Did the title pass to Brown or was it still in 
 Anderson? 
 
 44. Potter goes to Cams, a grain merchant, and buys 50 bushels of 
 wheat out of a bin containing several thousand bushels. He pays for the 
 wheat, but it is not measured. That night the warehouse burns. Upon 
 whom does the loss of the 50 bushels of wheat fall. Potter or Cams? 
 
 45. Fitch makes a written agreement with Boyd for the purchase of 
 1000 yards of silk at $1 per yard, to be delivered May 31. On May i, 
 Fitch meets Boyd and tells him that he cannot use the silk and will not 
 take it. What are Boyd 's rights and what is the measure of damages if any? 
 
 46. Miner found a very valuable uncut diamond. Without knowing 
 what it was he sold it to Ashley for $20. Ashley took it to an expert, who 
 bought it for $5000. Miner sued to get the full yalue of the diamond. 
 Could he collect? Explain. 
 
 47. Wheeler, a tailor, contracted with Banks to make a suit of clothes 
 and an overcoat for him for $60. When the suit and overcoat were finished, 
 Banks refused to take them and when sued pleaded the Statute of Frauds. 
 Is his defense good? Explain. 
 
 48. In a horse deal with Bryan, McKay stated that his horse was 
 8 years old and sound. Bryan found on examination that the horse was 
 12 years old and was suffering from spavin; nevertheless he bought the 
 horse for $150. Later Bryan became dissatisfied, claimed that he had been 
 defrauded, and sued for damages. What should be the outcome of the 
 suit? Explain. 
 
AGENCY 
 
 I. IN GENERAL 
 
 Definition. — Agency is the legal relation existing between 
 one party known as the principal and another party known as 
 the agent. This relation is usually the result of a contract 
 whereby one party is to act for the other, and this contract is 
 known as an agency contract. 
 
 The capabilities of one person are limited, and it can readily 
 be seen how impossible it may be for any one to transact all his 
 business without assistance, and we realize how important a busi- 
 ness factor this legal relationship' of agency is when we consider 
 that by far the greater part of the world's business is carried on 
 through the instrumentality of agencies. Transportation com- 
 panies, insurance companies, the government departments, and 
 the various sales organizations are the best examples of agency. 
 
 The Principal. — The principal is the person for whom an- 
 other acts as agent. Any person who is competent to contract 
 may appoint an agent to act for him. The theory of agency is 
 based on the fundamental principle that whatever a person may 
 do for himself he may have another person do for him. 
 
 The Agent. — The agent is the person employed by another 
 to do some act or acts for the employer's benefit or on his ac- 
 count. Any one who is capable of doing as directed may act 
 as agent. One particular fact to be noted is that a person may 
 be legally incompetent to act for himself, yet he may lawfully 
 act as agent for some one else. 
 
 Classes of Agents. — Agents are usually classified as general, 
 special, and public. 
 
 General Agent. — A general agent is one who is authorized 
 to transact all of his principal's business of a particular kind, or 
 in a certain place. Having received from his principal a general 
 authority to do certain acts, he is not limited to the performance 
 of a specific act, but is permitted a certain amx)unt of discretion 
 in carrying on the particular line of business for which he is 
 
 119 
 
I20 AGENCY 
 
 employed. The acts of a general agent, while acting within 
 the scope of his authority, will bind his principal, whether or 
 not they are in accordance with his private instructions. If he 
 is apparently clothed with authority, the principal is bound. 
 
 One Chappell was appointed general agent to manage Gasharie's 
 store, buy and sell goods, issue notes, etc. He purchased goods on Gasha- 
 rie's credit, which was contrary to orders. Held, Chappell was a general 
 agent and as such his acts were binding on Gasharie, even though con- 
 trary to his private instructions. — Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399. 
 
 Special Agent. — A special agent is one who is appointed 
 for a special purpose, or to transact a particular piece of busi- 
 ness. He is given but limited authority. His acts do not bind 
 his principal beyond the scope of the particular authority given 
 him. 
 
 In the case of a general agent there has been general power 
 delegated, the authority is necessarily broad, and a person deal- 
 ing with such agent may reasonably infer that he has the au- 
 thority usually conferred upon such agents under like cir- 
 cumstances; while in the appointment of a special agent, the 
 object is to accomplish a special purpose or to carry out a par- 
 ticular piece of business, and one would naturally infer the 
 authority was limited. 
 
 In the case of a railroad company, a ticket agent would be considered 
 a special agent to sell tickets, and his duties and authority would be con- 
 fined to the sale of tickets, while the general superintendent of the road 
 would be considered a general agent, as he would have general duties to 
 perform and general authority over all departments of the road. 
 
 Public Agents. — All public officials and all employees of 
 every department of our government are public agents. In 
 one particular there is a difference between pubHc agents and 
 other agents. A public agent who exceeds his authority in the 
 making of contracts is not liable, for the reason that every one 
 is supposed to know what authority a public agent has. 
 
 ^ If the Chief of Police in a certain city should contract with a local 
 painter to paint the building used as police headquarters and the painter 
 should perform his part of the contract, he could not collect from the city, 
 as he had not been officially authorized to paint the building, and he could 
 not hold the Chief of PoHce, as he is not liable in this instance for having 
 exceeded his authority. 
 
IN GENERAL 121 
 
 Del Credere Agents. — Sometimes an agent who is employed 
 to sell goods guarantees his principal against loss from any of 
 the customers to whom he sells. In such case the agent is 
 termed a " del credere agent.'' In the United States it is the 
 rule that the agent is held primarily and not as a guarantor, 
 so his promise need not be in writing. Sales made in this way 
 amount practically to sales by the principal to the agent. 
 
 Persons Known as Agents. — A person appointed as agent 
 may be known as agent, factor, commission merchant, broker, 
 attorney, or special representative to some person. Sometimes 
 other employees may be authorized to act as agent; for instance, 
 chauffeurs, factory workers, and domestic servants may, at 
 times, act in the capacity of agent. There is this distinction 
 between servant or employee and agent. The servant or em- 
 ployee is considered a mere mechanical worker, whereas the 
 agent is a business representative, and it is his duty to repre- 
 sent his employer in business transactions. There are many 
 cases, however, where the employee is also an agent; for ex- 
 ample, the chauffeur may be directed to buy supplies for his 
 employer, or the domestic servant may be authorized to purchase 
 provisions for the household, in which cases they are acting as 
 agents. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is an agency? How is an agency created? 
 
 2. Why is the subject of agency important? 
 
 3. What are the parties to an agency called? 
 
 4. What does the word "agent" mean? 
 
 5. Why are agents necessary? 
 
 6. Who may act as principal? Who may act as agent? 
 
 7. Has an infant a legal right to act as agent? 
 
 8. What are the different classes of agents? Define each. 
 
 9. What limit is there on the authority of a general agent? 
 10. What limit is there on the authority of a special agent? 
 
 li. What is the principal difference between public agents and other 
 agents? 
 
 12. Who is a del credere agent? 
 
 13. May servants and other employees act as agents? 
 
 14. Give some examples of agents. 
 
 15. What is the distinction between employees and agents? Give 
 examples. 
 
122 AGENCY 
 
 2. HOW CREATED 
 
 Agreement. — The relation of principal and agent may be 
 created in several different ways. The ordinary way is by 
 agreement, as where one man employs or appoints another to 
 represent him in a certain transaction or in a general way. 
 This is really an agency by contract, except in case of a gratui- 
 tous agent (one who is not to receive any pay for his services), 
 and all the rules governing contracts govern also the relations 
 of the principal and agent as between themselves. 
 
 The reason why a gratuitous agent is not an agent by con- 
 tract is that, there being no consideration, the agreement cannot 
 be enforced as a contract, as we have learned in the chapter on 
 contracts. 
 
 Form of Agreement. — An agent by agreement may be ap- 
 pointed orally except in the following cases: 
 
 1. When by the terms of the agency the service is not to be 
 performed within one year; then, by the Statute of Frauds, the- 
 agreement must be in writing. 
 
 Southgate made an oral agreement in February with Hinckley that 
 Hinckley would carry on Southgate's gristmill for one year from April i, 
 next. Hinckley offered to perform, but Southgate would not allow him. 
 It was held by the court that the case was clearly within the Statute of 
 Frauds, since the work was not to be performed within one year; conse- 
 quently the parol agreement could not be enforced. 
 
 — Hinckley v. Southgate, ii Vt. 428. 
 
 2. When the contract between the principal and the third 
 party, to be executed by the agent, is required to be under seal; 
 then the authority of the agent to execute the instrument must 
 itself be under seal. 
 
 In a suit on a bond signed by one Williams as agent for one Pierce, it 
 was proved that Williams' authority was oral. It was held that authority 
 to execute a sealed instrument must itself be under seal and Pierce was not 
 liable on the instrument. — Overman v. Atkinson, 102 Ga. 750. 
 
 The following are exceptions to the rule that an agent to 
 make a contract under seal must receive his appointment under 
 seal: 
 
 I. When the agent signs the contract in the presence of 
 his principal. 
 
HOW CREATED 123 
 
 2. When the instrument signed by the agent, although under 
 seal, is not required to have a seal. 
 
 3. When the agent signs as a member of his firm. 
 
 4. When the agent signs for a corporation. 
 
 Agent^s Appointments under Seal. — The formal way of ap- 
 pointing an agent is by a written instrument under seal known 
 as the power of attorney. Certain instruments such as deeds 
 and mortgages are required to be under seal and are usually 
 witnessed and then acknowledged before a notary public (an 
 official appointed to take acknowledgments, administer oaths, 
 etc.), and for this reason the power of attorney by which the 
 agent receives his authority to make a deed and mortgage or 
 any other instrument under seal on behalf of his principal 
 must be executed in the same formal way. 
 
 A contract for the sale of land does not necessarily have to 
 be under seal, although it must be in writing under the Statute 
 of Frauds. An agent could contract for the purchase or sale of 
 real property, but he could not execute a sealed instrument 
 such as deeds or mortgages without having a power of attorney. 
 
 Ratification. — The second way in which the relation of prin- 
 cipal and agent may be created is by ratification. 
 
 The assent of the principal to the act of the agent may be 
 given either before or after the agent's act. If given before, 
 then it is an agency by agreement and has already been ex- 
 plained. If given after the act has been performed by the 
 agent, it is a ratification of this act and gives the same effect to 
 it as though there had been a previous appointment. This may 
 be true in a case where the agent had no previous authority 
 whatever, or where the agent had some prior authority but 
 exceeded this authority in the particular act. The ratification 
 operates as an extension of the authority to this act. 
 
 The principal may ratify an agent's acts: 
 
 1. By expressed words. 
 
 2. By acquiescing in them and allowing the agent to con- 
 tinue. 
 
 3. By accepting the benefits resulting therefrom. 
 
 It was held that where a person was clothed with some authority as 
 agent, the ratification by his principal of his unauthorized acts relates 
 
124 AGENCY 
 
 back and makes such acts of the agent the acts of the principal from the 
 beginning, the same as though they had been duly authorized at the 
 start. — Merritt v. Bissell, 84 Hun (N. Y.) 194. 
 
 A person without authority purchased a bill of goods for persons about 
 to form a copartnership, in their name and on their credit as partners. 
 They received the goods and sold them. One of the partners afterwards 
 repudiated the purchase, claiming that the other partner was to buy the 
 goods and that the agent had no authority to buy for him, and he so ad- 
 vised the sellers. Held, this was not sufficient. He should have restored 
 the goods, but as they kept the goods they were liable as partners; they had 
 ratified the act by retaining the benefit. — Pike v. Douglass, 28 Ark. 59. 
 
 The ratification to bind the principal must be made with a 
 knowledge of all the material facts; if made under a misunder- 
 standing, or through a misrepresentation, the principal will not 
 be bound. The principal must repudiate the agent's unauthor- 
 ized act within a reasonable time after he learns of it, or he will 
 be presumed to have ratified it. 
 
 But if the principal ratifies the act it must be as a whole, 
 for he cannot accept the benefits of a part and reject the re- 
 mainder. 
 
 An axiom of the law is, "A man cannot take the benefits of 
 
 a contract without bearing its burdens." 
 
 A subscription agent, canvassing for a history to cost $10, had a book 
 for signatures, and on this it was printed that no terms except those printed 
 thereon should be binding. A justice of the peace consented to sign on con- 
 dition that his office fees from that time to the time of delivery of the book 
 should be taken in payment. This was agreed, and he was given a written 
 memorandum by the agent to that effect. Held, if the company ratified 
 the contract it must be upon the terms agreed upon. As the agent went 
 beyond his authority they could repudiate the contract and refuse to deliver 
 the book, but they could not repudiate part and still hold the subscriber. 
 
 — Eherts v. Selover, 44 Mich. 519. 
 
 Necessity. — The third way in which the relation between 
 principal and agent may be created is by necessity. 
 
 This is where the relations or positions of the parties are 
 
 such that the authority of the principal is presumed. The 
 
 leading illustration of this is the case of husband and wife. The 
 
 wife can contract for the necessities of the household and bind 
 
 the husband for their payment. 
 
 It was held that a wife becomes her husband's agent by necessity to 
 procure board and lodging for herself and minor children on his credit 
 when he has driven her away without means of subsistence. 
 
 — East V. King, 77 Miss. 738. 
 
OBLIGATION OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT 125 
 
 Another illustration is that of a shipmaster, who has au- 
 thority in case of necessity to purchase supplies for the vessel 
 and pledge, the credit of the owner. 
 
 A libel was filed against a vessel for necessary supplies and labor fur- 
 nished to the vessel in a foreign port on the authority of the shipmaster. 
 It was held that the vessel and owner were liable, as a master has authority 
 in a foreign port to bond his owners for necessary repairs and supplies. 
 
 — The H. C. Grady. 87 Federal Reporter 232. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. How is the relation of principal and agent established? 
 
 2. Who is a gratuitous agent? 
 
 3. Why is it that a gratuitous agent is not an agent by contract? 
 
 4. In what three ways may an agent be appointed? 
 
 5. What are the exceptions to the rule that an agent may be ap- 
 pointed orally? 
 
 6. Is an appointment in writing preferred to an oral appointment? 
 Why? 
 
 7. What is meant by an implied appointment? 
 
 8. What exceptions are there to the rule that an agent, to make a 
 contract under seal, must receive an appointment under seal? 
 
 9. What is a power of attorney? 
 
 10. How is an agency created by ratification? 
 
 11. Name three ways by which a principal may ratify an agent's acts. 
 
 12. What are the special rules governing ratification? 
 
 13. How may an agency be created by necessity? Give an example. 
 
 14. What are the usual powers of an agent? 
 
 15. If Brown should act for Grant without authority, what two courses 
 are open to Grant? 
 
 3. OBLIGATION OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT 
 
 Compensation. — The principal is under obligation to the 
 agent to compensate him for his services. 
 
 When the agreement fixes the compensation the agent is to 
 receive, this, of course, will control. 
 
 Wallace agreed to work for a given time at a certain salary. He stayed 
 beyond the time, and nothing was said about the salary for the additional 
 period. It was held that he could recover the salary only at the rate agreed 
 upon. It was said that the best valuation of services was that mutually 
 agreed upon by the parties themselves. 
 
 — Wallace v. Floyd, 29 Pa. State 184. 
 
126 AGENCY 
 
 In the absence of an express contract, the law will imply an 
 agreement to pay what the services are reasonably worth, un-. 
 less it can be fairly inferred that the services were intended to 
 be gratuitous. 
 
 Sloan hired out to work for McGuire during harvest; nothing was said 
 about wages. As Sloan is an able-bodied workman and did a good day's 
 work, it is implied that he can collect from McGuire what other workmen 
 are receiving in the same locality and what his services are reasonably 
 worth. 
 
 Even if the service was unauthorized but is subsequently 
 ratified, and the benefit is accepted by the principal, the agent, 
 ordinarily, can recover for the service to the same extent as 
 though the service had been originally authorized. 
 
 Gelatt was employed to sell real estate on the owner's terms. He sold 
 on other terms, but the principal ratified the sale. Held, that the agent 
 was entitled to his commissions as originally agreed. 
 
 — Gelatt v. Ridge, 117 Mo. 553. 
 
 The principal is also under obligation to reimburse the agent 
 for any sums which he may have paid out, or for which he may 
 have become individually liable in the due course of his agency 
 and for the principal's benefit. 
 
 Maitland, a broker, purchased for Martin certain bonds which Martin 
 left in his hands several years, when he directed that they be sold. It was 
 then learned that three of the bonds had been repudiated by the state where 
 issued. Held, that the broker might be reimbursed; that the loss fell on 
 Martin if the broker acted within the lines of his duty and in good faith. 
 
 — Maitland v. Martin, 86 Pa. State 1 20. 
 
 The agent is further entitled to indemnity from his principal 
 for the consequences of any act performed within his authority 
 and in the execution of his employment. But to be entitled to 
 indemnity the act must be lawful, or the agent must have been 
 ignorant of the fact that the act was illegal. 
 
 Moore brought an action to be reimbursed for damages which he had 
 been obliged to pay because of certain acts performed by him as agent 
 for Appleton in dispossessing a third party of lands claimed by Appleton 
 and which Moore had reason to believe belonged to Appleton. Held, that 
 the act was not manifestly illegal, and that the law implies a promise of 
 indemnity by the principal for losses which flow directly and immediately 
 from the execution of the agency. ^ — Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633. 
 
OBLIGATION OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL 127 
 
 The Employer's Duty to Employees. — The employer's first 
 and most important duty to his employees is to afford them pro- 
 tection by providing a safe, sanitary, and suitable place in which 
 to work, and safe tools with which to work. In addition to this 
 no workman is required to expose himself to dangers of working 
 with reckless or incompetent associates. If the employee himself 
 is in any way careless, the rule of contributory negligence relieves 
 the employer from responsibihty. 
 
 Laws have been passed in many states which define the 
 duties of employers and the rights of employees. There are 
 two classes of these laws: 
 
 1. The employers' liability laws, which aim to define the 
 employer's duties and liabilities and to change or remove the 
 objectionable rules of the common law. 
 
 2. The workmen's compensation laws, which aim to regu- 
 late and systematize responsibility for injury and to provide 
 insurance for the injured. 
 
 Detailed information on these laws and on other important 
 statutes will be found in a chapter on important statutes near 
 the end of the text. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What are the obligations of the principal to his agent? 
 
 2. How is the compensation of the agent fixed? 
 
 3. In case nothing is said about compensation, what is implied? 
 
 4. What is the rule if the service rendered was unauthorized? 
 
 5. What are the obligations of the principal in the matter of (a) reim- 
 bursing the agent? (b) indemnifying the agent for loss? 
 
 6. What are the employer's duties to employees? 
 
 7. Under what conditions is the principal liable for injury to the 
 
 agent? 
 
 8. What is an employers' liability law? 
 
 9. What is a workmen's compensation law? 
 
 10. What is meant by " contributory negligence "? 
 
 4. OBLIGATION OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL 
 
 Agent must Obey Instructions. — The agent is under obliga- 
 tion to his principal to obey the principal's instructions. So 
 long as the agent carries out his instructions he is protected, 
 
liB AGENCY 
 
 but if he goes contrary to them and loss ensues, he is liable for 
 the damage; as, where an agent is instructed by his principal 
 to send a certain claim for collection to A, and instead he sends 
 it to B, and loss ensues, the agent is liable. 
 
 The Express Company received for collection a draft with instructions 
 to return at once if not paid. They instead held the draft until the drawee 
 wrote for some explanation. They then failed to present it for two days 
 after the drawee had received a reply from the drawer, and at this time 
 the drawee became insolvent. Held, that the Express Company was Hable 
 to the drawer. — Whitney v. Merchants Union Express Co., 104 Mass. 152. 
 
 Adams hired Robinson as her agent to lease certain premises for $600 
 per year with good and approved security. Robinson leased the premises 
 without security in violation of his instructions. Held, Robinson was 
 hable for any damages suffered by Adams. — Adams v. Robinson, 65 Ala. 586. 
 
 Agent must Use Judgment. — The agent owes the duty to 
 his principal to exercise judgment and skill necessary to the 
 prudent and careful discharge of his agency. This prudence 
 and skill can generally be said to be the same as is ordinarily 
 observed by prudent and careful men, under similar circum- 
 stances and engaged in similar business. 
 
 Thus, an agent to purchase a carload of wheat must exer- 
 cise and possess only such knowledge and skill as is common to 
 careful dealers in grain ; while an agent to purchase an expensive 
 and intricate engine is bound to exercise the caution and skill 
 of an engineer. 
 
 Reynolds was general manager of the San Pedro Lumber Co. and it 
 was one of his duties to cause to be kept regular and accurate accounts of 
 the San Pedro Lumber Co.'s business. Such accounts were not kept and 
 the San Pedro Lumber Co. suffered losses because of it. Held, Reynolds 
 was the agent of the San Pedro Lumber Co., and was required to exercise 
 reasonable skill, diligence, and care in the performance of his duties. For 
 his failure to do so he was responsible to his principal. 
 
 — San Pedro Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 121 Calif. 74. 
 
 Fiduciary Relation. — There exists between the principal and 
 his agent what is said to be a fiduciary relation, which means 
 that their relations are such that the utmost good faith is re- 
 quired in their dealings. An agent cannot, therefore, acquire 
 any rights that are contrary to the interests of the principal. 
 He must not act for both the principal and the third party in a 
 transaction without their consent. 
 
OBLIGATION OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL 129 
 
 Worden was appointed the Company's agent to sell a herd of cattle 
 and horses. The agent produced a purchaser to whom a sale was later 
 made. In an action by the agent to recover for his services it was shown 
 that the agent had acted for both the buyer and the seller, neither of whom 
 knew that the agent was acting also for the other. The court held that 
 neither party was liable to the agent for his services. 
 
 — Alta Inv. Co. v. Worden, 25 Colo. 215. 
 
 This rule is based on the principle that no one can serve two 
 masters. 
 
 Neither must the agent use his position or authority for his 
 own benefit. 
 
 Miles was employed by Bunker to buy a certain horse for him for $80 
 or as much less as he could, and was to have $1 for his trouble. Miles 
 bought the horse for $72.50, and returned to Bunker no part of the $80. 
 The court allowed Bunker to recover the balance of $7.50, holding that the 
 agent could not make a profit for himself out of the transaction. 
 
 ■ — Bunker v. Miles, 30 Maine 431. 
 
 An agent authorized to sell or rent will not be permitted to 
 buy or lease the property himself without the principal's consent. 
 
 Kerfoot owned certain land and employed Hyman to sell it for a cer- 
 tain amount. Hyman bought it himself and took the title in the name of 
 a third party, but for his own benefit without the owner's consent, and at 
 the same time had a part of it sold for as much as he obtained for the 
 whole of it for Kerfoot. Held, that the agent must account to Kerfoot 
 for the excess received, and the remainder not sold will revert to the 
 principal. — Kerfoot v. Hyman, 52 111. 512. 
 
 Also an agent commissioned to compromise a claim cannot 
 purchase it at a discount and then enforce it in full against the 
 principal. 
 
 The agent is under obligation to his principal to render a true 
 account of all of the proceeds and profits of the agency. In the 
 absence of an express agreement to the .contrary the agent must 
 render an accoimt to his principal upon demand or within a 
 reasonable time. 
 
 Subagents. — Another obligation of the agent to his princi- 
 pal is to act in person, except when authorized either by his 
 principal or by established custom to appoint subagents. The 
 reason for this is obvious: the principal employs the agent be- 
 cause of his confidence and trust in his ability and honesty to 
 act in his stead, and the agent appointed cannot delegate to 
 another the duty or trust which has been confided to him. 
 
I30 AGENCY 
 
 Still, an agent can in some cases appoint subagents to per- 
 form duties which do not involve an exercise of his discretion, 
 but are merely mechanical or ministerial acts. 
 
 Penwick was employed by Bancroft to sell a piece of realty and to fix the 
 price, etc. After looking over the property he employed a subagent to find 
 a purchaser, and this subagent did find such a purchaser and sold the prop- 
 erty. It was held that the agent might properly appoint such a subagent, 
 as there was no discretion placed in the subagent, and Penwick could employ 
 such party as he wished to help him in carrying out the agency. 
 
 — Renwick v. Bancroft, 56 Iowa 527, 
 
 Sometimes, from the nature of the case, it is implied that 
 the agent is to appoint another agent for his principal. In that 
 case the first agent is relieved from liability for the acts of the 
 third party if he himself uses care and discretion in his appoint- 
 ment; whereas if he but employs a subagent, he is personally 
 liable to the principal for the acts of the subagent to the same 
 extent precisely that he would be in case they were his own acts. 
 
 The most common illustration of this point is the case where 
 a holder of commercial paper, payable at another place, places 
 it in the hands of his home bank for collection. In such cases 
 it is generally held that the home bank has authority, implied 
 from the nature of the transaction and the usual course of busi- 
 ness, to appoint a bank at the place of payment of the paper 
 agent for the principal, and the home bank is not liable for the 
 negligence or default of the other agent if due care was usedv 
 in the selection. 
 
 Planters & Farmers Nat'l Bank sent for collection to First Nat'l 
 Bank in Wilmington, N. C, a draft in Planters & Farmers Nat'l Bank's 
 favor, drawn on one Adams residing in Washington, D. C. First Nat'l 
 Bank sent the draft to a firm in Washington for collection, the firm then 
 being in good standing and Credit and regarded as solvent. The firm col- 
 lected the money and failed before turning it over to the First Nat'l Bank. 
 It was held that where the business obviously or reasonably cannot be done 
 by an agent except through a subagent, or where there is a known and 
 established usage of substitution, then the principal has authorized such 
 substitution and the agent is not liable for the failure of the substitute if 
 care has been exercised in the selection. 
 
 — Planters b' Farmers Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 75 N. C. 534. 
 
 Gratuitous Agent. — It may be well to note also the legal 
 relation of the agent who undertakes to perform some service 
 for the principal without compensation. 
 
OBLIGATION OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL 131 
 
 In such a case the promise being without consideration is 
 not enforceable, and the agent cannot be held liable for neglect- 
 ing or refusing to perform. 
 
 Goods were sent by Vickery to Lanier with a request that they be 
 insured. Lanier said he would procure insurance, but did not do so. No 
 offer was made to pay Lanier for his services. Held, there was no agree- 
 ment between the parties, as there was no consideration, and Lanier was 
 not liable for his failure to perform. — Vickery v. Lanier, 58 Ky. 133. 
 
 But if the agent enters upon the performance of the under- 
 taking, he is bound to exercise skill and care in what he does. 
 
 A party undertook voluntarily and gratuitously to invest money for 
 another. It was held that in such a case the gratuitous agent must use 
 due diligence and exercise proper caution or he will be liable, and if he is 
 given positive instructions, he will be liable if he disregards them. 
 
 — Williams v. Higgins, 30 Md. 404. 
 
 The question of gratuitous agent often comes up in the case 
 of bank directors, who fill their offices without compensation. 
 
 If bank directors are guilty of negligence in permitting their bank to 
 be held out to the public as solvent, when in fact it is insolvent, and thereby 
 induce parties to deposit their money there and it is lost, such depositors 
 may recover from the directors, as they are bound to exercise care and 
 diligence in their offices. — Delano v. Case, 121 111. 247. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is the principal obligation of an agent to his principal? 
 
 2. Under what conditions is the agent liab'e for damage suffered by 
 his principal? 
 
 3. What prudence and skill is an agent expected to show in the dis- 
 charge of his duties as agent? 
 
 4. What is the meaning of fiduciary relation? 
 
 5. Can an agent use his position for his own benefit? 
 
 6. Who are subagents? Give an example of a subagent. 
 
 7. Under what conditions has an agent the right to appoint some 
 one else to do the work for him? 
 
 8. Is the gratuitous agent liable for neglecting or refusing to do 
 what he agreed to do? 
 
 9. What is the responsibihty of a gratuitous agent who attempts 
 to perform? 
 
 10. To whom do the profits made by an agent belong? 
 
 11. If an agent disobeys instructions, what can the principal do? 
 
 12. Can an agent act for both parties (principal and third party)? 
 Give reasons. 
 
132 AGENCY 
 
 5. OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT TO THIRD 
 PARTY, AND OF THIRD PARTY TO PRINCIPAL 
 
 Obligation of Principal to Third Party. — The main object 
 of agency is to effect a contractual relation between the princi- 
 pal and the third party. The identity of the principal may be 
 disclosed or it may be withheld. In the case of either a dis- 
 closed or an undisclosed principal, he is bound by such acts of 
 the agent as are within the actual or apparent scope of his 
 authority. 
 
 The difficult question then is to determine what is the scope 
 of his authority. If the principal clothes the agent with ap- 
 parent authority to do an act, the principal is bound, although 
 the agent had private instruction to the contrary, or had a 
 limit put upon this authority. 
 
 A doctor employs an agent to buy for him a particular horse. He 
 has no apparent authority to buy a team or any other horse. Should a 
 stock dealer employ an agent to buy horses for him, the agent has apparent 
 authority to buy a team, although he may have had private instructions 
 to the contrary. The one is clearly a special and the other a general agent. 
 
 * 
 
 It seems settled that when the agent has apparent authority 
 
 the principal is bound. It is only required in such a case that 
 the person dealing with the agent, acting with average prudence 
 and in good faith, is justified in believing that the agent pos- 
 sesses the necessary authority. 
 
 Notice to Agent. — It is the rule that notice to the agent of 
 anything within the scope of the agency is notice also to the 
 principal. And the principal is chargeable with knowledge of 
 all the facts that have been brought to his agent's attention in 
 the transaction in which the agent is acting for the principal. 
 
 If this were otherwise, the principal would be in a position 
 to claim ignorance whenever he might' wish to do so, and there- 
 fore would be in a better position than if he dealt with the third 
 party direct. 
 
 Obligation of Agent to Third Party. — When an agent makes 
 a contract on behalf of his principal, he may in certain cases 
 bind himself. If he holds himself out as having authority to 
 act for a principal in a transaction in which he has no such 
 
OBLIGATIONS TO THIRD PARTY 133 
 
 authority, he is Hable to the third party for the damages suf- 
 fered, not on the contract which he purported to make for the 
 principal, but for breach of his implied warranty of authority. 
 
 Pitcairn, the agent for an insurance company, obtained and delivered 
 to Kroeger a policy of insurance on his store, containing a clause that no 
 petroleum should be kept on the premises. Kroeger told Pitcairn it was 
 necessary to keep a little, and Pitcairn assured him if he kept only a barrel 
 it need not be noted in the policy, and was all right. The store burned, 
 and Kroeger could not recover because he had a barrel of petroleum. Held, 
 Pitcairn, the agent, was liable, as he gave positive assurance in excess of 
 his authority. — Kroeger v. Pitcairn, loi Pa. State 311. 
 
 The agent is also presumed to represent not only that he 
 has authority, but that his principal was competent to give 
 such authority. 
 
 In the case in which there is no real principal, but the one 
 so represented is fictitious, the agent himself becomes the princi- 
 pal, and is liable as such. 
 
 It was held, an unincorporated organization cannot be a party to a 
 contract, and persons contracting in the name of such an organization are 
 themselves personally liable either as being themselves in fact principals, 
 or as holding themselves out as agents for a principal which never in law 
 existed. — Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa 220. • 
 
 In some instances, the agent expressly pledges his credit, 
 and of course in such cases he is liable. 
 
 Obligation of Third Party to Principal. — It is clear that 
 the third party is liable to the principal for contracts entered 
 into with the agent, within his authority, or which are subse- 
 quently ratified by the principal. 
 
 The third party is also liable to the principal for moneys 
 or property obtained from the agent by duress or fraud; hence, 
 if an agent is compelled to pay illegal charges to protect his 
 principal's interest the principal may recover of the third party. 
 
 The third party may also be liable to the principal for fraud 
 or wrong, or for collusion with the agent to injure the principal. 
 
 It was the duty of the manager of a city gas works to obtain and 
 recommend bids for coal and supplies. Lever, a coal dealer, bribed the 
 manager to recommend his bid, and added the price of the bribe to the 
 bid. In an action against them, it was held that the Mayor, for the city, 
 could recover the damages from the agent who had accepted the bribe, or 
 from Lever who had given it. They were joint wrongdoers, and could be 
 held jointly or severally. — Mayor v. Lever, 1891, i Q.B. (Eng.) 168. 
 
134 AGENCY 
 
 A third party is also liable for unlawfully interfering with the 
 agent in the performance of his duties as agent. 
 
 It was held, that maliciously to cause the arrest of the Railroad Com- 
 pany's engineer while running a train, and then to delay the train and 
 thereby damage the company, is actionable, and the railroad company 
 can recover for such damages from the person so causing the arrest. 
 
 — Railroad Co. v. Hunt, 55 Vt. 570. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is the main object of agency? 
 
 2. What is meant by " undisclosed principal "? 
 
 3. What acts of an agent bind the principal? 
 
 4. What is meant by "scope of authority"? 
 
 5. Is the principal bound where the agent had apparent authority? 
 Explain. 
 
 6. What is the rule as to notice to the agent? Why? 
 
 7. When is an agent liable to a third party? Give an example. 
 
 8. What is the obligation of the third party to the principal? 
 
 6. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR TORTS OR WRONGS 
 
 OF AGENT 
 
 General Rule. — The principal is liable for the contractual 
 obligations of his agent in his behalf, and there are various ways 
 in which he can be rendered liable by the agent for the agent's 
 torts or wrongful acts. 
 
 The rule is that the principal is liable for the wrongs com- 
 mitted by the agent in the course of his employment and for 
 the principal's benefit. 
 
 This is obviously true where the principal commands or rati- 
 fies the act, and we find that it is also true where the principal 
 neither ratifies nor commands it. The law considers that when 
 a person chooses to conduct his affairs through another, he must 
 see that they are managed with due regard for the rights and 
 safety of others. 
 
 A principal was held liable for the tort of his agent in selling to Lutz 
 a diseased horse, which ran with other horses of Lutz and caused several 
 of them to die. — Lutz v. Forbes, 13 La. Annual 609. 
 
 Fraud and Negligence. — Fraud is one of the wrongs of 
 frequent occurrence in the relation of agency, the agent having 
 
LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR TORTS 135 
 
 made false and fraudulent representations in carrying out his 
 principal's business. It is the general holding that the princi- 
 pal is liable for the agent's fraud in the course of the principal's 
 business and for his benefit. 
 
 The negligence of the agent is among the wrongs for which 
 the principal is liable, if such negligence was committed in the 
 ordinary discharge of the agency. 
 
 An agent of Shaw hired a driver, wagon, and team from Ewing, and 
 through the agent's negligence one of the horses was drowned. Held, the 
 principal was liable for the damages resulting from the negligent act of his 
 agent. — Ewing v. Shaw, 83 Ala. ^,7,7,. 
 
 When the wrong is committed by the agent in the course of 
 his employment, and even to benefit himself personally and not 
 his principal, some authorities hold that the principal is never- 
 theless liable. 
 
 An engineer willfully and unnecessarily blew the whistle and frightened 
 a horse. Held, that the railway company was liable for acts done by its 
 engineer maliciously, wantonly, and willfully while in the exercise of his 
 duties, whether in the course of his employment or not. 
 
 — Cohh V. Railway Co., 37 S. C. 194. 
 
 Others hold that the principal is not liable. 
 
 A railway engineer intentionally and wantonly backed his engine 
 toward a street car that was crossing the track, with the simple intent of 
 frightening the passengers, without colliding with the car. As a result 
 Stephenson, a passenger, was frightened and jumped from the car and was 
 injured. Held, that the act of the engineer was without any reference to 
 the service for which he was employed and not for the purpose of perform- 
 ing his employer's work, and that the principal was not responsible. 
 
 — Stephenson v. Southern Pacific Co., 93 Calif. 558. 
 
 More recent court decisions show an inclination to hold 
 the principal liable under such circumstances. 
 
 Liability for Malicious Wrongs. — But it is held that the 
 principal is not liable for the malicious wrongs or crimes of the 
 agent, unless he expressly authorized the same. There is an 
 exception to this in the case of laws or statutes which are said 
 to be in the nature of police regulations designed to promote 
 the safety and health of the community. In cases of this kind 
 the principal is liable, even though the agent act directly con- 
 trary to instructions and without his knowledge and consent. 
 
136 AGENCY 
 
 The laws regulating the speed of automobiles on the public 
 roads, and those prohibiting the selling of tobacco to children, 
 may be mentioned as examples under this head. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is the rule as to a principal's liability for the agent's torts or 
 wrongs? 
 
 2. Give an example of an agent's tort for which the principal would 
 be liable; one for which the principal would not be responsible. 
 
 3. Are authorities agreed on the liability of the principal for an 
 agent's wrongs? Explain. 
 
 4. Is the principal liable for the " malicious wrongs " of an agent? 
 
 7. TERMINATION OF THE RELATION OF PRINCIPAL 
 AND AGENT 
 
 The agency may be terminated by limitation, by acts of the 
 parties, or by a change in the condition of the parties. 
 
 Termination by Limitation. — If the contract of agency is 
 by its terms to continue for but a limited time, the agency 
 terminates when the time expires; or if the particular business 
 for which the agency was created has been completed, the 
 agency is terminated. 
 
 An agent was employed to negotiate for the purchase of certain property. 
 He obtained the contract for the conveyance, the first payment was made, 
 and the agent was paid for his services. Held, the agency was then termi- 
 nated, as the object for which the agency was created had been accomplished. 
 Here the agent, after he was paid for his services, bought in the property 
 at tax sale, and the principal sought to set it aside on the ground that he 
 was still his agent, but as the agency was held to be terminated, the court 
 refused to interfere. — Moore v. Stone, 40 Iowa 259. 
 
 Termination by Act of the Parties. — Under certain con- 
 ditions either party may terminate the relation. This may be 
 done by mutual agreement, by the principal revoking the agent's 
 authority, or by the agent renouncing the agency. 
 
 Since the principal appoints the agent, and the relation is 
 one of confidence for his own protection, he has the power to 
 terminate it at will. It is therefore the general rule that the 
 principal may terminate the agent's authority at any time and 
 with or without good cause. 
 
TERMINATION OF AGENCY 137 
 
 It may be well to note here the distinction between the 
 power to terminate the agency and the right to terminate it. 
 The principal generally has the power, but if it violates an 
 agreement with the agent, he does not have the right to so 
 terminate the agency, and he is therefore liable to the agent for 
 damages. 
 
 There was a written contract for one year, fixing the agent's compensa- 
 tion. This was renewed the next year, and from then on was lived up to, 
 but nothing was said about the agreement. Held, that there was a tacit 
 renewal from year to year, and that the principal could not, during the 
 year, deprive the agent of his salary before the expiration of the year. 
 Though the power of revocation existed, the right to revoke did not exist. 
 
 — Standard Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 84 Ga. 714. 
 
 The revocation of the agency by the principal need not be 
 made in any formal way, but may be by oral instructions or by 
 written notice. In some cases it may be implied by the condi- 
 tions; as, when a principal gives an agent authority to sell his 
 house, and before the agency is executed it is destroyed by fire, 
 in which case a revocation must be implied. 
 
 A revocation is binding only upon those who have notice of 
 it. The principal must therefore not only give notice to the 
 agent but to those who upon the strength of the previous au- 
 thority are likely to deal with him; otherwise he may be held 
 for the acts of the agent after the revocation. 
 
 An Agency Coupled with an Interest. — There is a class of 
 cases in which the principal has no authority to revoke the 
 agency. This is where, as it is said, the agency is coupled with 
 an interest; as when the agent has an interest in the subject 
 matter of the agency by way of security. For example, when 
 a person has possession of property with power to sell and 
 apply the proceeds to the payment of a debt due the agent, 
 such a case constitutes an agency coupled with an interest. 
 
 Graves, wishing to sell his house and lot, as he has to move to another 
 place on account of his health, entered into an agreement with a local real 
 estate agent, in whose hands he put his house for sale, whereby the agent 
 advanced him $1000, which amount he is to deduct from the sale price 
 when the house is sold. Graves cannot, without the agent's consent, re- 
 voke this agreement, as the agent has an agency coupled with an interest. 
 
 As to the rights of the agent to renounce the agency, it 
 seems that he also has the power but not the right to renounce 
 
138 AGENCY 
 
 at will. And the renunciation may be either express or implied; 
 as, if the agent abandons his work, the principal may consider 
 the agency as renounced. 
 
 Change in Condition of the Parties. — The agency may also 
 terminate by a change in the condition of the parties caused by 
 death, insanity, bankruptcy, marriage, and war. 
 
 Death. — The death of either the principal or the agent 
 
 terminates the agency, and it is no longer binding on the estate 
 
 of the deceased or the survivor. And in this case no notice of 
 
 the termination need be given to third parties. The agency 
 
 terminates upon the principal's death, and any contract made 
 
 thereafter by the agent acting for the principal is a nullity. 
 
 An agent appointed by one Wiley commenced an action against Mer- 
 rett and conveyed land to and received money from him. It developed 
 that, unknown to any of the parties, Wiley had died before the commence- 
 ment of the suit. Held, that Wiley's death revoked the agency and the 
 conveyance by the agent and the payments to him were both void. 
 
 — Clayton v. Merrett, 52 Miss. 353. 
 
 Insanity. — If either the principal or the agent become in- 
 sane, the effect is to terminate the agency, as the principal is 
 no longer competent to enter into a contract, and the agent, if 
 insane, is not competent to carry out the instructions of the 
 principal. But if the principal has not been legally declared 
 insane, persons dealing with the agent in ignorance of his in- 
 sanity are protected. 
 
 Any other cause that may render the agent incompetent 
 to carry out the agency will also terminate the agency, as the 
 illness of the agent or his imprisonment. 
 
 Bankruptcy. — The mere insolvency of either party does not 
 affect the agency, but it will be terminated when either party 
 becomes technically bankrupt, because when a party becomes a 
 bankrupt his property passes out of his hands and he is unable 
 to carry out any contract in reference to it. The above rule 
 does not apply, however, when the agency is coupled with an 
 interest. In the case of the bankruptcy of the agent his au- 
 thority ceases except to perform some formal act not involving 
 the transfer of any property. 
 
 Marriage. — Under the common law many restrictions were 
 placed about a married woman, the control o! her property pass- 
 
TERMINATION OF AGENCY 139 
 
 ing to her husband. Consequently, upon her marriage, any 
 contract of agency in which she was principal was dissolved, as 
 she no longer had the power to deal with her own property. 
 But every state has passed laws enlarging the rights of married 
 women, in most instances giving them fullpower to own and 
 manage their property and to carry on their own separate 
 business. The result is that a married woman may appoint 
 agents, and the act of marrying does not affect her status in a 
 business way and therefore has no effect on the relation of 
 principal and agent, nor does it dissolve an agency then existing. 
 War. — It is the general law in this country that the ex- 
 istence of a state of war between the country of the principal 
 and that of the agent terminates the agency. This is because 
 of the rule prohibiting all trading or commercial intercourse be- 
 tween two countries at war. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Mention three ways by which an agency may be terminated. 
 
 2. How may an agency be terminated by limitation? 
 
 3. How may an agency be terminated by acts of the parties? 
 
 4. Distinguish between the power to terminate an agency and the 
 right to terminate it. 
 
 5. How may an agency be revoked? 
 
 6. On whom is the revocation binding? 
 
 7. Give an example of an irrevocable agency. 
 
 8. Has the agent the right to renounce the agency at will? 
 
 9. What change in the condition of the parties will terminate the 
 agency? 
 
 10. In what cases is it necessary to give notice to third parties of the 
 termination of an agency? 
 
 11. Does mere insolvency of either the principal or the agent termi- 
 nate the agency? 
 
 12. What exception is there to the rule that bankruptcy terminates 
 the agency? 
 
 13. What are the rights of married women with reference to appoint- 
 ing agents? 
 
 14. How does war affect an agency contract between citizens of two 
 countries at war? 
 
 15. An agent was employed to sell an automobile. In a fire the 
 automobile was destroyed. Did this terminate the agency? 
 
I40 ' AGENCY 
 
 IMPORTANT POINTS 
 
 Agency is a subdivision of contracts and is regulated by the laws 
 of contracts. 
 
 Agency is the legal relation existing between a principal and 
 an agent, and is usually created by agreement. 
 
 Only one who is competent to contract for himself can act as 
 principal. 
 
 Any one who is capable of following instructions can act as agent. 
 
 The principal difference between special agent and general agent 
 's the extent of authority. 
 
 The general assumption is that an agent is a personal repre- 
 sentative. 
 
 Any one who acts for another without pay is not liable for failure. 
 
 That an agent may make contracts under seal, his appointment 
 must be under seal. 
 
 The formal way of appointing an agent is by power of attorney. 
 
 Ratification creates an agency as well as agreement. 
 
 Where an agency is created by necessity, the principal is bound. 
 
 The obligations of the principal to the agent include compensa- 
 tion, reimbursement, indemnification, and protection. 
 
 The obligations of the agent to the principal include obedience, 
 loyalty, judgment, skill, and honesty. 
 
 The agent cannot appoint another to do what he is expected to do. 
 
 Subagents may be appointed where circumstances require it. 
 
 An undisclosed principal is bound by the acts of his agent the 
 same as a disclosed principal. 
 
 The principal is bound by the acts of his agent so long as the 
 agent acts within the scope of his authority. 
 
 A principal is bound when the agent acts within his apparent 
 authority. 
 
 Notice to the agent concerning agency matters is notice to the 
 principal. 
 
 When an agent exceeds his authority he is personally liable; 
 except that a public agent who exceeds his authority is not liable. 
 
 A third party is liable to an undisclosed piincipal when the agent 
 acts within his authority. 
 
 A third party is liable for unlawfully interfering with an agent in 
 the performance of his duties. 
 
 A principal is usually liable for torts or wrongs committed by an 
 agent in his behalf. 
 
 A principal is liable for fraud of the agent practiced in the course 
 of the principal's business and for his benefit. 
 
TEST QUESTIONS 141 
 
 The principal is usually not liable for malicious wrongs committed 
 by the agent. 
 
 When an agency is terminated, in every case except death, 
 notice should be sent to all parties who have dealings with the agent. 
 
 Legally, the agent's acts are considered the acts of the principal. 
 
 Through the medium of the agent contractual relations are es- 
 tablished between his principal and a third party. 
 
 Agencies may be joint, or joint and several. 
 
 The principal may, at any time, revoke the authority of the agent. 
 
 The agent may, at any time, renounce the contract of agency. 
 
 An agency coupled with an interest cannot be terminated by the 
 principal. 
 
 The agent must make accounting to his principal of funds be- 
 longing to the agency. 
 
 An agent has no legal right to act for himself contrary to his prin- 
 cipal's interest. 
 
 An agent cannot represent both parties to a transaction without 
 the knowledge of both. 
 
 An agent warrants existence and competency of his principal. 
 
 State of war between the respective countries of the parties to 
 an agency terminates the relationship during the war. 
 
 A contract made by an agent subsequent to the death of his 
 principal is void. 
 
 TEST QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Why does it concern a merchant who sells a suit of clothes to a 
 minor on credit whether the minor is acting as agent for his father or acting 
 for himself? 
 
 2. How can you tell whether an agent is acting as a general agent 
 or as a special agent? 
 
 3. Are there any reasons why a written appointment of agency is 
 more satisfactory than an oral appointment? 
 
 4. Can a married woman bind her husband by any contract pertain- 
 ing to household affairs? 
 
 5. Waters acts for Brown without authority. What courses are open 
 to Brown? 
 
 6. Is there any difference between the obligations to the principal 
 of a general agent and of a special agent? 
 
 7. What has a third party who deals with an agent a right to know? 
 
 8. In all contracts made through an agent, who are the real parties? 
 
142 AGENCY 
 
 9. Under what circumstances would an agent have a claim for dam- 
 ages against his principal? 
 
 10. What is meant by the agency being terminated automatically? 
 
 11. What is the effect where an agent has an interest in the subject 
 matter? 
 
 12. Hooker gave Mason authority to buy grain and pay a certain 
 price for it. He pays more. Under what circumstances would the principal 
 be bound? 
 
 13. A merchant directed his salesman not to sell a certain article from 
 stock. The salesman, nevertheless, sold the article. Has the merchant a 
 right to revoke the sale? 
 
 14. An agent, although acting for a principal, made a contract with 
 a third party in his own name. Is the principal liable? 
 
 15. A purchasing agent bought supplies after the death of his princi- 
 pal. Is the contract binding? 
 
 16. Grant instructed Bowers to sell his automobile for $600. Bowers 
 sold it for $750. To whom does the $150 belong? 
 
 17. What is the meaning of the terms "subsequent ratification," and 
 "prior authority"? 
 
 18. What is the essential difference between the power and the right 
 of an agent to act? 
 
 19. Has an agent a right to delegate authority or power to some one 
 else? 
 
 20. Explain the meaning of the statement, "A principal who accepts 
 the benefits cannot refuse to be bound." 
 
 CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 Give the decision and the principle of law involved in each case. 
 ^ I. Hadden was employed by a railroad company as a local ticket 
 
 agent. He contracted with Bard, a carpenter, to build a partition in the 
 waiting room of the station. The carpenter completed the partition and 
 sent the bill to the railroad company's main office. The company refused 
 to pay the bill, claiming the agent had no authority to have this work 
 done. Bard takes action against the agent. Can he recover? Explain. 
 
 2. Morton was elected to the city council from his district. Very 
 soon after his election he contracted with Green, a local contractor, to 
 pave a street in his district. The contractor did the work and presented 
 his bill to the city council. The council refused to honor the bill and Green 
 brought action against Morton. Can he recover? Explain. 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 143 
 
 3. A maid, employed by Mrs. Blain, had been allowed to order pro- 
 visions from local dealers for Mrs. Blain's use in the household. On one 
 occasion, the maid ordered a quantity of provisions which she appropri- 
 ated for her own use. Mr. Blain refused to pay the bill and the dealer 
 brought action to recover. Can he succeed? 
 
 4. Brown and Co. appointed one Cary, who was but nineteen years 
 old, as their agent to buy certain goods for them. Later they refused to 
 take the goods, setting up that the agent was an infant and the contract 
 could not be enforced. Was this a good defense to the contract? 
 
 5. Wright, a farmer, is on his way to town and Young, his neighbor, 
 asks him to bring back for him a wheel for his mowing machine, which has 
 been broken. Wright agrees to do this without any compensation. Wright 
 forgets to obtain the wheel and returns without it. Young is unable to 
 proceed with his work and sues Wright for damages. Can he recover? 
 
 6. The Brown Medicine Co., by oral agreement, employ Hartman, 
 who is an experienced agent, to travel for them, advertising and selling 
 their medicines. By their agreement he is to travel in every state in the 
 Union and is to spend not less than two weeks in each state. Hartman, 
 before commencing his work, obtains a better offer elsewhere, and the com- 
 pany sue him for breaking the contract. Can they recover? 
 
 7. An agent was authorized to sell a car of coal for his principal at 
 $6 a ton. Contrary to his authority he sold it for $5 per ton, and received 
 $120 down. The principal accepted the $120 and delivered 20 tons of 
 coal, then refused to deliver more until the full price of $6 a ton was paid. 
 Could the principal refuse to deliver the balance under the contract? 
 
 8. Blum represented himself as Weinberg's agent but had not been so 
 appointed. Without authority he made a contract with Loeb in Wein- 
 berg's name and in negotiating the contract spent $500 for traveling ex- 
 penses. Weinberg agreed to carry out the contract. Can Blum recover 
 for his services and expenses and if so how much? 
 
 9. Bown & Co., through the Merchants Bank of Denver, draw on 
 S. P. Kendall, merchant, of New York. The Merchants Bank forward 
 the draft to their correspondent, the Commercial National Bank of New 
 York. This bank negligently fails to present the draft for one week, and 
 in the meantime S. P. Kendall becomes insolvent. Bown & Co. sue the 
 Merchants Bank of Denver. Can they recover? 
 
 10. The American Bicycle Co. opened a store in Buffalo and placed 
 Hunt there in charge of the business. He employed Harvey as head clerk 
 at $40 per week. Hunt was expressly instructed by the company not to 
 
144 AGENCY 
 
 pay any employee over $30 per week. Harvey worked several weeks and 
 sued the company for his wages. Could he recover? 
 
 11. Darrow is driving on the city streets, and through the negligence 
 and carelessness of the street car motorman he is run into and injured. Can 
 Darrow recover of the street car company? 
 
 12. An agent, without any authority so to do, accepts a bill of exchange 
 in the name of his principal, believing that the principal will ratify his 
 act. The principal refuses to ratify. Is the agent liable? 
 
 13. Van Horn appointed Barth, his agent, to represent him for one 
 year at a salary of mpioo a month. At the end of three months he discharged 
 him without cause. Could Van Horn so discharge his agent, and if so, was 
 he liable to Barth for damages? 
 
 14. Suppose that in the above case Barth deals with parties as the 
 agent of Van Horn after he has been discharged. The parties with whom he 
 deals have no knowledge of his discharge. Can they hold Van Horn on the 
 agreement made by Barth? 
 
 15. An agent employed to sell goods for his principal sells to Howard 
 the day after his principal's death, neither Howard nor the agent knowing 
 that the principal is dead. Can Howard hold the principal's estate on the 
 contract? 
 
 16. If in the above case the principal had become insane, but had not 
 been legally so declared, could the principal have been held? 
 
 17. Cory is purchasing agent for Rice. Rice dies while traveling in 
 Europe. After Rice's death, but before the news arrives, Cory, acting for 
 Rice, contracts for an automobile to be delivered next month. Rice's 
 executor refuses to take the car. Has he the legal right to do so? Explain. 
 
 18. Ross was engaged as agent by the Childs Toy Co. to advertise 
 their goods by distributing hand bills in various towns. In one town Ross 
 was fined $25 for violating an ordinance, of which he was ignorant, pro- 
 hibiting the distribution of hand bills without a license. Could Ross re- 
 cover the $25 from his employer? 
 
 19. Warren owned a house and lot which he desired to sell. He put 
 the property into the hands of a real estate agent, with instructions to sell 
 it for $20,000 and to remit the proceeds to him after the deduction of 5 % 
 commission. The agent sold the house for $21,000 and kept the $1000 in 
 addition to his commission on $20,000. What are Warren's rights? 
 
 20. Jackson appointed Muth his agent to sell his automobile, instruct- 
 ing him to sell for cash only. Muth accepted the purchaser's note for part 
 of the price and the note was uncollectible. Has Jackson any claim against 
 Muth? 
 
CASE PROBLEMS i4S 
 
 21. Foster, on moving from the city, sent most of his furniture to a 
 local auctioneer to be sold. The auctioneer advanced $ioo in part payment, 
 with the understanding that he should withhold this amount when the 
 furniture was sold. Later Foster wrote to the auctioneer revoking the 
 agreement. Had he this right? Explain. 
 
 22. An agent was authorized to sell goods for his principal at a stated 
 price. The agent without authority sold at a less price, made part delivery, 
 received payment for part delivered, and turned the amount over to the 
 principal. When the time came to deliver the balance the principal ad- 
 vised the buyer that the agent had exceeded his authority and therefore he, 
 the principal, would not permit further delivery. What are the buyer's 
 rights? Explain. 
 
 23. Norman & Son placed with an agent of a manufacturing company 
 an order for machinery subject to the approval of the manufacturing com- 
 pany. The manufacturing company wrote Norman & Son that they would 
 give the matter their attention, but they did not definitely accept the order. 
 Thereafter Norman & Son countermanded the order. The manufacturing 
 company shipped the machinery and Norman & Son refused to take it. 
 Were Norman & Son liable? 
 
 24. An agent, in selling goods for his principal, makes false representa- 
 tions without the knowledge or consent of the principal. A defrauded 
 customer brings an action against the principal, who defends on the ground 
 that the agent, in making such false representations, exceeded his authority. 
 Is this a good defense? State the principle involved. 
 
 25. Slater, as agent for the Commonwealth Fire Insurance Company, 
 insured a building belonging to Rowe. At the time of the interview Rowe 
 stated to Slater that the building was used for storage purposes only and 
 that at times he kept a quantity of paper stored in it. To this Slater re- 
 plied that he would be allowed to do this and his pohcy would hold good. 
 The policy contained a provision that the company would not be liable for 
 loss by fire of any unoccupied building in which loose or inflammable ma- 
 terial was stored. The building burned and Rowe took action against the 
 Insurance Company. Can he recover? What are his rights? 
 
 26. The publishers of a daily paper hired a young and inexperienced 
 driver to deliver papers to their different city agencies. By his careless 
 driving he knocked down and injured an elderly gentleman. Are the pub- 
 lishers liable? 
 
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 I. IN GENERAL 
 
 Definition. — A negotiable instrument may be defined as a 
 written instrument or evidence of debt which may be trans- 
 ferred from one person to another by indorsement and delivery, 
 or by delivery only, so that the legal title becomes vested in 
 the transferee. The principal forms of negotiable instruments 
 are promissory notes, bills of exchange, foreign and inland, and 
 checks. (See forms in Appendix.) 
 
 Negotiable instruments are an important factor in business 
 transactions of the present day, passing from hand to hand, in 
 a sense, as a substitute for money. As a means of transferring 
 funds and paying debts the check is as common among busi- 
 ness houses as money itself, while the promissory note is also 
 a very important factor of our business system. The note is 
 taken to the bank when the borrower desires money advanced 
 to him by that institution. It is given to close a business trans- 
 action when so agreed if the date of payment is a day in the 
 future; and as a large part of the business of to-day is trans- 
 acted on credit, we can see the great usefulness of the promis- 
 sory note as a transferable evidence of debt. 
 
 The term " negotiable " is applied to these instruments be- 
 cause they pass freely from hand to hand, they by their terms 
 providing for such transfer. 
 
 Statute Law. — It is very important that contracts which 
 are to pass from hand to hand and from state to state with al- 
 most the freedom of money should be subject to practically the 
 same laws and rules, and to this end a statute covering the 
 principal questions concerning negotiable instruments has been 
 adopted in all of the forty-eight states except Georgia, giving 
 a uniformity that renders these instruments more freely ne- 
 gotiable than they would otherwise be. This statute is known 
 as the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. We speak of 
 negotiable instruments as contracts, and in reality they are 
 
 146 
 
IN GENERAL 147 
 
 written contracts, possessing special characteristics which give 
 them privileges and qualities different from those in ordinary 
 contracts. 
 
 Essential Conditions. — The question arises as to what con- 
 ditions are essential to constitute a contract a negotiable instru- 
 ment. In general we find that no exact form need be followed, 
 although custom has prescribed forms that are very generally 
 used, but an instrument to be negotiable must conform to the 
 following requirements: 
 
 1. It must be in writing (printed forms may be used). 
 
 2. It must be signed by the party executing it (maker or 
 drawer). 
 
 3. It must be negotiable in form, i.e. payable to the order 
 of a designated payee, or to bearer. 
 
 4. It must be payable in money, and the amount must be 
 definite and certain. 
 
 5. It must be payable absolutely and unconditionally. 
 
 6. It must contain a promise or order to pay. 
 
 7. It must be payable on demand or at a fixed or deter 
 minable future time. 
 
 The Instrument must be in Writing. — The first require- 
 ment is that the instrument be in writing. No oral contract 
 could be negotiable. By a written contract we mean one in 
 either writing or printing or both, and the writing may 
 be executed with any substance, as ink or pencil. 
 
 The whole instrument must be written. No essential part, 
 as the names of the parties, or the amount, can be omitted 
 from the writing. 
 
 The Instrument must be Signed by the Party Executing it. 
 — It is usual that the signature be made by writing the name 
 of the signer, but it is not necessary, as he may affix his mark 
 or any other character intended to be a signature. 
 
 It is usual to place the signature at the close of the instru- 
 ment, but if it is shown that it is meant for a signature, it may 
 be placed on any other part, unless the statute requires that the 
 name be subscribed. 
 
 A note and a power of attorney to confess judgment were both written 
 on the same sheet of paper. The note was not signed by the maker, but his 
 
148 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 signature was written after the power of attorney at the foot of the sheet. 
 It was held that the note was sufficiently executed. 
 
 — Heslip V. Anderson, 134 111. Appeals 8. 
 
 The Instrument must be Negotiable in Form. — The instru- 
 ment must be payable to " Order " or '' Bearer." If made 
 payable to a particular person or persons only, it is not a ne- 
 gotiable instrument, and falls under the rules governing a 
 simple contract. In other words, the intent of the party mak- 
 ing the instrument to execute a negotiable paper must appear 
 by some express words showing such a purpose. 
 
 A note read as follows: 
 
 MuRFREESBORO, Tenn., Feb. 5, 1903. 
 On the 24th day of December, 1903, I promise to pay to Robert B. 
 Meeks the sum of Three hundred ($300) dollars, with interest from date. 
 
 J. R. Harrell. 
 This was held to be not negotiable, since it did not contain the words 
 "or order," which are necessary to negotiability. 
 
 — Gilley v. Harrell, ti8 Tenn. 115. 
 
 The Instrument must be Payable in Money, and the Amount 
 must be Definite and Certain. — The very reason it must be 
 payable in money is that if it were payable in any other com- 
 modity the value might not be definite and certain. If payable 
 in a given number of bushels of wheat, the person taking it 
 would be obliged to determine the value of wheat at that place; 
 the value at another place might be materially different. By 
 the term " money " is meant the legal tender of the country; 
 that is, a note payable in Spanish money is not a negotiable 
 instrument in the United States. 
 
 The Attoyac River Lumber Company issued to its employees checks 
 which were redeemable only in merchandise at the Company's store. It 
 was held that the checks were not negotiable instruments. 
 
 — Attoyac River Lumber Co. v. Payne, 57 Tex. Civil Appeal 327. 
 
 In a suit on a note made and dated at Buffalo, N. Y., for $2500, payable 
 twelve months after date at the Commercial Bank of Buffalo, N. Y., in 
 Canadian money, it was held that the note was not negotiable. A promis- 
 sory note, in order to be negotiable with'n the meaning of the law, must 
 be payable in current money and not in the money of some other country. 
 
 — Thompson v. Sloan, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 71. 
 
 A note ''payable to the Protection Insurance Co., or order, for $271.25, 
 with such additional premium as may arise on policy No. 50, issued at the 
 Calais Agency" was held to be a non-negotiable instrument, the amount 
 payable being indefinite and uncertain. — Dod^e v. Emerson, 34 Ma ne 96. 
 
IN GENERAL 149 
 
 The sum payable is considered fixed and certain although 
 it is payable with interest, or in stated installments, or with 
 exchange, or with the costs of collection in case payment is 
 not made at maturity, or if the holder is given the option to 
 require payment in money or some other way. But an instru- 
 ment promising to pay money and something else is not ne- 
 gotiable, as there is no sum certain ir^ money. 
 
 An instrument containing a promise to pay $3400 and one half of the 
 wheat grown on certain land was held to be non-negotiable. 
 , — Thomson v. Koch, 62 Wash. 438. 
 
 The Instrument must be Payable Absolutely and Uncon- 
 ditionally. — If the instrument i.) r,o drawn that any condition 
 may arise which would render it of no effect, it is not a negoti- 
 able paper. Consequently, a promise to pay a certain sum out 
 of a designated fund is not negotiable, and this is the case even 
 though the fund exists at the time or the condition that would 
 nullify the contract never arises. 
 
 An , instrument reading ''Please pay to the order of Woodward $600, 
 the same to be the last $600 due me on my contract, and charge the same 
 to my account" was held not to be a negotiable instrument, being payable 
 out of a specific fund. — Woodward v. Smith, 104 Wis. 365. 
 
 Promise or Order. — The instrument must contain a prom- 
 ise or order to pay. 
 
 $17.14 Bridgeport, Conn., Jan. 22, 1863. 
 
 Due Currier & Barker seventeen dollars and fourteen cents, value 
 received. Frederick Lockwood. 
 
 It was held that the above instrument was not a promissory note. 
 
 — Currier v. Lockwood, 40 Conn. 349. 
 
 This is merely a due bill. It does not contain a promise to 
 pay. A bare acknowledgment of a debt does not in legal con- 
 struction import an express promise to pay. 
 
 The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that an instrument 
 is payable to bearer when payable to '^Bearer"; or to "A or 
 Bearer "; or to the order of a fictitious or non-existent person, as 
 "Estate of A"; or when the payee does not purport to be the 
 name of a person, as "Cash," or "Pay Roll." 
 
 When the instrument is payable to order the payee must 
 be named or indicated with reasonable certainty. 
 
I50 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 $2500. La Crosse, Wisconsin, Sept. 2, 1897. 
 
 Four months after date I promise to pay to the order of twenty-five 
 hundred dollars. Value received. John Wilding. 
 
 It was held that this was not a negotiable instrument, as it neither 
 designated the payee nor left a blank space for the payee's name. 
 
 — Smith V. Wilding, 123 Wis. 377. 
 
 The Uniform Law provides that negotiability is not destroyed 
 by the fact the instrument is payable to one or some of sev- 
 eral payees. Thus a note payable to A, B, or C is nego- 
 tiable upon indorsement by any one of the three. 
 
 The Time must be Certain. — The time of payment must 
 be definite and fixed. That is, the date of payment must be 
 definitely stated, or it must be on or before a certain definite 
 date, or at a certain time after the happening of an event that 
 is sure to occur, or on demand. A note payable a certain number 
 of days after the death of a person is negotiable, the date being 
 certain because the time is sure to arrive. 
 
 It was held, that the following was a negotiable instrument, as the 
 .meaning was that it should be payable after the death of the maker: 
 ''After my death date I promise to pay Hanson Camp or order the sum of 
 $750 without interest." — Shaw v. Camp, 160 111. 425. 
 
 But the contingent event must be certain to occur or the 
 promise will not be absolute, and the fact that the contingency 
 has happened does not cure the defect. 
 
 Castleton, April 27, 1844. 
 
 Due Henry D. Kelley fifty- three dollars, when he is twenty-one years 
 old, with interest. David Kelley. 
 
 In. an action on the above instrument it was proved that Henry D. 
 Kelley became of age before the action was commenced. The court held 
 that the instrument was not negotiable, as payment was contingent on an 
 event that might or might not happen. The money was therefore not 
 payable ''absolutely and at all events," and the paper lacked one of the 
 necessary elements of a negotiable instrument. 
 
 — Kelley v. Hemmingway, 13 111. 604. 
 
 The law simply requires that the time of payment shall be 
 sure to arrive. 
 
 Omissions. — The date, the place where the instrument is 
 drawn, the place where it is payable, and the term " value 
 received " may be omitted and the instrument will still be good. 
 
 The law provides that when the date is omitted any holder 
 
PROMISSORY NOTES 151 
 
 may insert the true date. He may fill in any other particulars 
 which have been omitted, but in doing so he must act honestly 
 and according to the original agreement, or he will lose his 
 rights. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is a negotiable instrument? 
 
 2. What are the principal forms of negotiable instruments? 
 
 3. In general what use is made of (a) the check, (b) the promissory 
 note? 
 
 4. Why is the term " negotiable " applied to checks, notes, etc.? 
 
 5. What is the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law? 
 
 6. What are the essential requirements of negotiable instruments? 
 
 7. Explain the statement: "The instrument must be in writing." 
 
 8. Where should the signature be placed? 
 
 9. What makes an instrument negotiable in form? Explain fuUy. 
 
 10. Why must a negotiable instrument be payable in money? 
 
 11. What is meant by the term "money"? 
 
 12. Explain the meaning of " payable absolutely." 
 
 13. What are the words usually used to indicate negotiability? 
 
 14. Is an instrument negotiable which is payable to "O. H. Jarvis or 
 James Shan"? Explain. 
 
 15. Is a negotiable instrument payable after death good? Explain. 
 
 16. Explain the statement, " The time must be certain." 
 
 17. What are the four ways of fixing the due date? 
 
 18. What may be omitted from a negotiable instrument without 
 affecting its validity? 
 
 2. PROMISSORY NOTES 
 
 Definition. — A promissory note is an unconditional written 
 promise made by one or more persons to pay to another or his 
 order or bearer a certain sum of money at a specified time. 
 
 The party who makes the note and whose promise is con- 
 tained therein is called the makers and the party to whom the 
 promise is made is called the payee. 
 
 Form. — There is no form of note prescribed by law. In 
 ordinary business practice a printed blank form is used, which 
 may be filled in. The words "with interest" indicate that the 
 note bears interest from its date. In the absence of such words, 
 it bears interest only after maturity. 
 
152 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 Notes are either several, joint, or joint and several, depend- 
 ing on the wording and the number of makers. 
 
 Bangor, Maine, Aug. ii, 19 — . 
 
 Thirty days after date I promise to pay to the order of J. W. Strouss 
 
 One Hundred-^ Dollars. 
 
 $100^. H. S. Dickson. 
 
 This is a several note, as it has only one maker. 
 
 In a joint note there are two or more makers and the ob- 
 ligation to pay rests upon them jointly, and they must be sued 
 together; if one is released the other or others cannot be held. 
 
 Denver, Col. Aug. 11, 19 — 
 
 Thirty days after date we promise to pay to the order of E. E. 
 Bishop, One Hundred ^^ Dollars. 
 
 $100^. L. W. Manker, 
 
 E. D. Lander. 
 
 This is a joint note and the makers are responsible jointly 
 for the pajmaent of the note. This note is worded *' We promise 
 to pay," but it might be worded "We jointly promise to pay." 
 
 When two or more persons make a note and agree to pay 
 
 jointly and severally the form is substantially as follows: — 
 
 $400-^. Fall River, Mass., Aug. 2,19 — . 
 
 One month after date we jointly and severally promise to pay to 
 the order of The Fall River Savings Bank 
 
 Four Hundred— Dollars 
 
 100 
 
 payable at the office of the bank. George M. Holden, 
 
 R. W. Penhollow, 
 
 E. E. Bishop. 
 
 Upon this joint and several note the makers may be sued 
 together or any one can be held severally for the full amount. 
 
 If a note is worded, " I promise to pay" and is signed by 
 two or more parties, it is considered a joint and several note. 
 
 $400. RiPON, Wis., Nov. 4, 1856. 
 
 Thirty days after date, for value received, I promise to pay Putnam C. 
 Dart, or order, four hundred dollars with interest at the rate of twelve 
 per cent per annum. j q Sherwood, 
 
 Wm. C. Sherwood. 
 
 This was held by the court to be a joint and several note; joint because 
 signed by both parties and several because each defendant promised sever- 
 ally. — Dart V. Sherwood, 7 Wis. 523. 
 
PROMISSORY NOTES 153 
 
 The following note was held to be joint and several, and separate judg- 
 ments might be rendered against the two makers. 
 $270. Stockton, March 14, 1875. 
 
 One day after date I promise to pay Lorenzo Ely, or bearer, two 
 hundred and seventy dollars at the post office in Stockton. Value received 
 with use. Thomas W. Clu.te, 
 
 J. B. Clute. 
 — Ely V. Clute, 19 Hun (N. Y.) 35. 
 
 In a few of the states the distinction between joint notes and 
 joint and several notes has been abolished, and all notes signed 
 by two or more parties have been declared to be joint and 
 several. 
 
 In either a joint note or a joint and several note if one 
 party has to pay the whole amount he has a valid claim against 
 the other makers for their shares. 
 
 The Negotiable instruments. Law provides that the signature 
 of any party may be made by a duly authorized agent. Where 
 the instrument contains, or a person adds to his signature, words 
 indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a 
 representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he 
 was duly authorized;- but the mere addition of words describing 
 him as an agent, without disclosing his principal, does not 
 exempt him from personal liability. 
 
 An action was brought on an instrument reading, "I, J. L. De Give, 
 President of the Southern Historical Association, hereby agree to pay 
 Governor A. D. Candler $250," and signed "J. L. De Give, President." 
 It was held that De Give was personally liable on the instrument, as the 
 word "President" was merely descriptive. 
 
 — Candler v. De Give, 133 Ga. 486. 
 
 The proper way for an individual who is acting as agent 
 for another individual to sign an instrument is: " James Lane, 
 by George Chapman, Agent." An officer of a corporation 
 should sign as follows: "Michigan Rubber Company, by 
 George Chapman, President." 
 
 $637.40. Milwaukee, Jan. i, 1887. 
 
 Ninety days after date we promise to pay to Leo Liebscher, or order, 
 the sum of six hundred and thirty-seven dollars and forty cents, value 
 received. San Pedro Mining & Milling Co., 
 
 F. Kraus,- President. 
 
 Liebscher demanded judgment against the corporation and Kraus as 
 ioint makers of this note. The court held that it was the note of the 
 
154 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 company alone and that Kraus signed for the company as its president. The 
 signature alone showed plainly enough that Kraus was acting as officer or 
 agent of the company. — Liebscher v. Kraus, 74 Wis. 387. 
 
 Some cases are in conflict with the above. It would be safer for 
 Kraus to put "By'' before his name. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is a promissory note? 
 
 2. What are the parties to a promissory note called? 
 
 3. How are promissory notes usually made out? 
 
 4. What is a several note? 
 
 5. What is a joint note? 
 
 6. What is a joint and several note? 
 
 7. In a joint and several note if one party has to pay the whole sum, 
 what are his rights? 
 
 8. What are the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law with 
 reference to signatures? 
 
 9. How would you sign as agent for J. C. Milton and Co.? 
 10. Is a promissory note a contract? Explain. 
 
 3. BILLS OF EXCHANGE 
 
 Definition. — A bill of exchange, or draft, is a written order 
 from one person to another to pay to a third party or his order 
 a certain amount of money at a specified time. 
 
 The parties to a bill of exchange or draft are: the drawer, 
 the party who draws the draft; the payee, the party to whom 
 the draft is payable; and the drawee, the party on whom the 
 draft is drawn, or the one who is to pay it. 
 
 Bank Draft. — When the drawer and drawee are banks the 
 bill of exchange is known as a bank draft and constitutes a 
 common method of paying the debts of parties residing in 
 different localities. 
 
 Allen owes Brown of Boston $100 and wishes to pay him; therefore he 
 goes to his bank in Chicago and purchases a draft on a New York bank and 
 sends it to Brown. This draft he has made payable to himself and on the 
 back indorses "Pay to the order of William Brown" and signs *' Charles M. 
 Allen." 
 
 The draft might have been made payable to Brown on its face, but the 
 advantage of the other form is that when the draft is returned to the 
 Merchants Bank, having been indorsed by Brown, it contains a complete 
 record of the transaction, and in case of a dispute is a receipt which Allen 
 could procure for use in evidence. 
 
BILLS OF EXCHANGE 
 
 iSS 
 
 The banks have an arrangement among themselves through 
 the clearing house and their correspondents in the large financial 
 centers like New York and Chicago, by reason of which they 
 can issue these drafts. Here it may be seen how the bill 
 of exchange or bank draft acts as a convenient transfer of ob- 
 ligation without the necessity of conveying money between 
 distant points. 
 
 Bills of Exchange may be either Foreign or Inland. — A 
 foreign bill of exchange is a bill drawn in one state or country 
 and payable in another state or country. An inland bill of 
 exchange is one made payable in the same state in which it is 
 drawn. In the United States, however, a more usual distinction 
 is between domestic bills, drawn and payable in the United States 
 (whether in the same or in different states), and foreign bills, 
 drawn or payable in a foreign country. 
 
 A bill drawn or payable in a foreign country is usually drawn 
 in duplicate or triplicate, and upon the payment of one the other 
 or others become void. The several copies are termed a set, the 
 object in having them so drawn being that if one is lost, the other, 
 or others, being sent by different routes, will reach their destina- 
 tion. The first copy presented is the one paid. 
 
 Time and Sight Drafts. — A time draft is one payable at a 
 given time after demand or sight or date. It is usually worded 
 ''At thirty days' (or any number of days) sight pay to the order 
 of" etc., or "Thirty days (or any number of days) after date 
 pay to the order of" etc. When a draft is payable at a certain 
 number of days' sight it must be accepted by the drawee; the 
 time is reckoned from the date of the acceptance. A draft 
 payable a certain number of days after date does not have to be 
 accepted; however, it is best to have it accepted, as otherwise 
 the payee runs a greater risk of having it dishonored after hold- 
 ing it the full time, 
 
 A sight draft is worded, "At sight pay to," etc., and is pay- 
 able on presentation. 
 
 The draft is a common means employed by business houses to col- 
 lect debts due them from parties residing in other places. The cred- 
 itor draws upon the debtor forthepurpose of making the collection. 
 
iS6 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 Jackson, who is doing business in Chicago, owes Rupert, a wholesaler 
 in New York, $1000. Rupert draws a sight draft on Jackson payable to 
 "Myself" for $1000 and indorses it to his bank in New York for collection. 
 The New York bank sends the draft to its correspondent (some bank) in 
 Chicago, who collects it and the proceeds are returned and placed to the 
 credit of Rupert in the New York bank. 
 
 The bill of exchange and promissory note, like the bank draft, 
 may be transferred by the payee, and so may pass from hand 
 to hand, and thus take the place of money. 
 
 Acceptance. — A bill of exchange being an order on the 
 drawee to pay a certain amount of money to a third party, it 
 is not binding upon the drawee until he has accepted it. The 
 acceptance is signified, if a sight draft, by payment; if a time 
 draft, by the drawee writing the word "Accepted" and the date 
 across the face of the draft and signing his name. After he has 
 accepted the bill, he becomes the acceptor and his obligation is 
 then fixed and absolute and can be enforced against him, his 
 position becoming much the same as that of the maker of a note. 
 The acceptance may be upon the bill or in a separate written 
 statement. Barring the case of an acceptance for honor, which 
 will be discussed later, the only person who can accept a bill is 
 the drawee. 
 
 $1000. New York, Aug. 11, 19 — . 
 
 At sixty days' sight pay to the order of J. M. Brenen one thousand 
 dollars and charge to the account of 
 To E. H. Pell, Denver, Colo. Homer Johnson. 
 
 E. H. Pell writes across the face of this draft, "Accepted Aug. 21, 
 19 — E. H. Pell." This is a regular acceptance and the draft is due sixty 
 days after Aug. 21. 
 
 A drawee may accept the draft payable at a certain bank 
 where he has funds on deposit, or he may qualify the acceptance 
 in almost any way he sees fit. He may reduce the amount; he 
 may change the time; or, he may attach a condition. The holder 
 is not bound to take a qualified acceptance, and he may declare 
 the draft dishonored. 
 
 When the drawee accepts a draft unconditionally he is 
 bound by its terms, even though it is not genuine. 
 
 In an action to recover the money paid on a forged draft, the court held 
 that the drawee could not recover from an innocent holder. It is a well- 
 settled rule that it is incumbent upon the drawee of a bill to be satisfied that 
 
BILLS OF EXCHANGE 157 
 
 the signature of the drawer is genuine, and he is presumed to know the hand- 
 writing of such drawer, and if he accepts or pays a bill to which the drawer's 
 name has been forged, he is bound by the act and can neither repudiate the 
 acceptance nor recover the money paid to an innocent holder. 
 
 — National Park Bank v. Ninth National Bank, 46 N. Y. 77. 
 
 The Bill must be Presented to the Drawee for Acceptance 
 or Pajmient. — Until the bill is accepted the drawer is the party- 
 liable to the payee. He agrees that the drawee will accept it or 
 he himself will pay it if proper presentment and demand be made 
 upon the drawee and notice of dishonor be given him. If the bill 
 is payable a certain length of time after sight, it must be presented 
 for acceptance and the acceptance secured before the time will 
 begin to run. The acceptor should always include tte date in 
 his acceptance on this kind of draft. If the bill is payable at sight 
 or on demand, it must be presented to the drawee for payment 
 within a reasonable time. If the drawee refuses to accept, the 
 drawer must be duly notified and he thereupon becomes liable 
 for the bill. 
 
 A bill of exchange dated December 18, 1851, was not presented for 
 payment until two years and nine, months thereafter. The draft contained 
 no specific date for payment. Held, that the draft was payable on demand 
 and must be presented for payment within a reasonable time to hold the 
 drawer and indorser; and that an unexplained delay of two years and nine 
 months is unreasonable and the drawer and indorser are released. 
 
 — Chambers v. Hill, 26 Tex. 472. 
 
 When the drawee refuses to accept, the bill is said to be 
 dishonored. 
 
 Acceptance for Honor. — Mention has been made of ac- 
 ceptance for honor. This is also known as acceptance supra 
 protest. 
 
 When a bill has been protested for dishonor by nonaccep- 
 tance, and is not overdue, any person not being a party al- 
 ready liable thereon may, with the consent of the holder, accept 
 the bill supra protest for the honor of any party liable or for 
 whose account the bill is drawn. The acceptor for honor is 
 liable to all parties to the bill subsequent to the one for whose 
 honor he has accepted, and his undertaking is to pay the bill, 
 if it is duly presented to the drawee for payment, is dishonored 
 by nonpayment, is protested, and notice given to such acceptor. 
 
158 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 Virtual Acceptance. — There is another mode of acceptance 
 known as " virtual " acceptance, which is practically a promise 
 to accept. If the virtual acceptance consist of a written un- 
 conditional promise to accept a bill already drawn or one to be 
 drawn in the future, it is binding in favor of one who has taken 
 it for value with a knowledge of the acceptance and in reliance 
 thereon. The promise must clearly describe the bill and must 
 be absolute in its terms. 
 
 Burk wrote to Marsh as follows: *' Mr. A. D. Hunt, whom you know, has 
 offered me a thirty-day sight draft on you for $300 which he says you owe 
 him on account. I wish to know, before taking this draft, if you will honor 
 it when it is presented to you." To this Marsh replied as follows: ''I am 
 indebted to Mr. A. D. Hunt in the sum of $300, on open book account, 
 which is due in thirty days, and I will accept his thirty-day sight draft on 
 me for this amount payable to your order. " 
 
 This is a virtual acceptance, absolute in its terms, and binds 
 Marsh in the event Burk takes the draft on the strength of 
 this communication from Marsh. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is a bill of exchange? 
 
 2. How many parties are there to a bill of exchange and what are 
 they called? 
 
 3. (a) What is a bank draft? {b) Explain its use. 
 
 4. Distinguish between foreign and inland bills of exchange. Dis- 
 tinguish between domestic and foreign bills of exchange. 
 
 5. How are foreign bills usually drawn? 
 
 6. What is a time draft? 
 
 7. What is a sight draft? 
 
 8. What use is made of drafts? 
 
 9. Is a bill of exchange transferable? Explain. 
 
 10. What is acceptance as applied to drafts? How is it made? 
 
 11. What is the acceptor's obligation? 
 
 12. When should a draft be presented to the drawee for acceptance? 
 
 13. When the drawee refuses to accept, what is said of the draft? 
 
 14. What is an acceptance for honor? Explain. 
 
 15. What is a virtual acceptance? Explain. 
 
 4. CHECKS 
 
 Definition. — A check is an order to a bank upon demand to 
 pay to the order of some person named, or to bearer, a sum of 
 money to be charged to the account of the maker. 
 
CHECKS 159 
 
 A check is drawn by a party having money on deposit in 
 the bank and, as shown in the definition, is a special form of bill 
 of exchange with the bank as drawee. A check is intended for 
 immediate payment upon presentation, and the implied con- 
 tract of the drawer is that the bank will pay the check. In 
 case it does not, the drawer is entitled to notice of dishonor, 
 except in the special cases provided for in the Uniform Law. 
 
 Check must be Presented without Delay. — The payee of a 
 check must present it for payment within a reasonable time, or 
 the drawer will be discharged from loss occasioned by his delay. 
 What would be a reasonable time would depend upon circum- 
 stances, but it is generally considered that the check should be 
 presented within a day after its receipt. 
 
 A reasonable time for the presentment of a check is, by the consensus 
 of authority, limited to the next business day, or if the drawee bank is in 
 another place, on the day following its receipt at the place of payment. 
 
 — Aebi V. Bank of Evansville, 124 Wis. 73. 
 
 McCarthey drew a check on Clark and Brothers, bankers, to the 
 order of Morrisen, who held the check over three months before present- 
 ing it for payment. During that time Clark and Brothers had failed, but 
 McCarthey had withdrawn his deposits before the failure. Held, that 
 McCarthey was not released from liability on the check, as he had not 
 been injured by the delay in presentment. 
 
 — Morrisen v. McCarthey, 30 Mo. 183. 
 
 Certified Checks. — A check purports to be drawn upon a 
 deposit made by the drawer in the bank upon which it is drawn, 
 and although in fact there may be no such deposit, it is still a 
 check. 
 
 Checks pass freely between parties as money, yet, unless the 
 drawer is known to have on deposit in the bank funds sufficient 
 to meet the check, or unless his solvency is known, a person is 
 not safe in accepting the check. It is therefore customary in 
 such cases to have the bank certify the check, that is, the cashier 
 or teller stamps the word "Certified," or "Accepted," and the 
 date with his signature on the face of the check. The bank then 
 takes the amount from the drawer's deposit and puts it in a 
 separate account. The result is that the check is thereafter the 
 check of the bank rather than of the drawer, and it is good as 
 long as the bank is solvent. When the holder has the check 
 certified, the bank by so certifying becomes the principal and 
 
i6o NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 only debtor, and the holder by accepting the certified check 
 discharges the drawer and all indorsers. But if the drawer 
 procures the certification before delivering the check, he is not 
 thereby released from further Hability. 
 
 Russ received a check from Minot, on the First National Bank, for 
 $500. Russ did not have an account in the bank and as he did not wish 
 to carry $500 about on his person he took the check to the bank and had 
 it certified. By this act Minot is relieved from further Hability. The 
 bank alone is liable to Russ and in case it fails, Russ will have to bear 
 the loss. 
 
 Had Minot procured the certification before delivering the check he 
 would not be relieved from further liability. If the check is presented for 
 payment within a reasonable time, and not paid because of the failure of 
 the bank, Minot would have to pay it. 
 
 Special Statutes. — Some state laws provide a definite time 
 during which a check may be presented for payment, for in- 
 stance ten days, and if the bank fails within this time the maker 
 of the check is not released from liability. Other states make 
 the drawing of a check against a bank in which the drawer has 
 no funds a criminal offense punishable by a fine and imprison- 
 ment, one or both. The laws of one's own state should be con- 
 sulted. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is a check? 
 
 2. When must a check be presented? 
 
 3. What is a certified check? 
 
 4. Under what condition would the maker of a check that had been cer- 
 tified have to bear the loss if the bank failed? 
 
 5. Under what conditions would the holder of a certified check have 
 to bear the loss in case the bank failed? 
 
 5. SPECIAL FORMS OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 Special forms of negotiable instruments other than those men- 
 tioned are in common use, namely: certificate of deposit, cashier's 
 check, voucher check, traveler's check, letter of credit, express 
 money order, post office money order, warehouse receipt, order 
 bill of lading, trade acceptance, collateral note, judgment note, 
 and bond. 
 
SPECIAL FORMS i6i J 
 
 A Certificate of Deposit is issued by a bank or banker show- 
 ing that a certain sum of money has been deposited there, ■ 
 payable to a certain person or to his order. \ 
 
 A Cashier's Check is a check issued by the cashier of a 1 
 bank and is frequently used in place of the certified check. 
 It is an order on a bank, signed by its cashier, payable to a 
 certain person or order. i 
 
 The Voucher Check is a regular check to which is added a 
 description of the particular account that is being paid. The I 
 voucher is to be signed by the one authorized to receive the check, ! 
 and when it is signed it serves as a receipt for payment of a 
 particular account, while a canceled check serves only as a receipt 
 for payment of a certain sum. 
 
 Travelers' Checks are drafts for small amounts which are 
 procured from banks or from express companies. They are 
 useful to travelers, as they can be cashed in any country as 
 money is needed for expenses. 
 
 A Letter of Credit is a form of draft which may be purchased ; 
 at banks dealing in this form of exchange. It is payable, in \ 
 whole or in part, at the convenience of the,purchaser and serves 
 very much the same purpose that travelers' checks serve. ■ 
 
 Money Orders, which may be purchased from express com- 
 panies or at a post office, are orders on the issuing agency ] 
 payable at a specified branch and are used to transmit funds i 
 from one place to another. Either express or post oihce money i 
 orders permit one transfer by indorsement. j 
 
 Warehouse Receipts are receipts given for. salable commodi- ] 
 ties which are stored. A complete sale can be effected by selling \ 
 the commodity and indorsing the warehouse receipt to the pur- 
 chaser. In a few states the warehouse receipt is not negotiable. ! 
 
 The Order Bill of Lading is issued by transportation com- 
 panies to shippers or consignors. It is a receipt and a contract j 
 which may be used by the consignor to secure advance pay- 
 ment on a consignment. This he does by indorsing the bill of 
 lading to his banker to secure a draft on the consignee, which 
 the bank takes for collection and may cash in advance. The ' 
 bank, through its correspondent, will require payment by the i 
 consignee before delivering the bill of lading to him. \ 
 
i62 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 Trade Acceptance. — A special form of bill of exchange, 
 known as a trade acceptance, has recently been authorized by 
 the Federal Reserve Act and is in common commercial use. 
 
 A trade acceptance is defined by the Federal Reserve Board 
 as " a bill of exchange drawn by the seller on the purchaser of 
 goods sold, and accepted by such purchaser." It differs in use 
 from a promissory note, in that a note is generally used to 
 borrow money or settle past due obligations, whereas the trade 
 acceptance shows on its face that it was given for a current 
 transaction involving the sale of goods. In Great Britain the 
 trade acceptance is in general use in financing mercantile trans- 
 actions. A similar practice has begun in this country, and 
 under the encouragement of the Federal Reserve Board it is 
 expected that it will rapidly become the usual method of financ- 
 ing sales. 
 
 The advantages of a trade acceptance are that the credit 
 created by the sale becomes immediately available to the seller, 
 by discounting the "acceptance, instead of being tied up in a 
 book account; the date of payment is definitely fixed, and less 
 liable to be unduly extended; and if legal proceedings are 
 necessary for collection they are much more simple and easy. 
 
 A Collateral Note is one to which is added a certificate 
 stating that the maker has deposited with the payee certain 
 securities, such as bonds, as collateral to secure the payee against 
 default in payment and authorizes the payee to sell the securities 
 in case of such default. 
 
 The Judgment Note is a promissory note with a clause 
 added by which the maker confesses judgment in case the note 
 is not paid when due. 
 
 Bond. — A bond is a written promise, under seal, usually 
 one of a series, to pay a certain sum of money (in amounts 
 varying from $50 to $1000) at a fixed time in the future, usually 
 ten or more years, and bearing interest at a fixed rate payable 
 annually or semiannually. 
 
 Most bonds are negotiable. A negotiable bond might be con- 
 sidered a promissory note under seal. They are issued by the 
 United States government, states, counties, cities, towns, and 
 business corporations for the purpose of borrowing money. In 
 
NEGOTIATION 163 
 
 the hands of the owner they may be used as security for pro- 
 curing loans and for this purpose they are extensively used. 
 
 Bonds are usually secured by a mortgage or deed of trust 
 of the property of the borrower, which is described on the bonds 
 and by virtue of which the property is held in trust for the 
 bondholders. Such bonds are called mortgage bonds. Bonds 
 may also be issued without other security than the credit of 
 the borrower and are called debenture bonds. Coupon bonds 
 are payable to the holder and have attached to them interest 
 coupons which may be cut off by the owner and cashed as the 
 interest falls due. Registered bonds are payable to a specified 
 person whose name is registered by the government or corpo- 
 ration selling the bonds and the interest is paid direct. They 
 are transferable only by indorsement and registering the name 
 of the transferee. The registering of bonds is a measure of pro- 
 tection to the owner, as in case they are lost or stolen no one but 
 the true owner can recover on them. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is (a) a cashier's check, {b) a certificate of deposit, 
 (c) a voucher check, (d) a traveler's check, (e) a letter of credit? 
 
 2. What is (a) a money order, (b) a warehouse receipt, (c) an 
 order bill of lading? 
 
 3. What is (a) a collateral note? (b) a judgment note? 
 
 4. What is a trade acceptance? What are its uses and advantages? 
 
 5. Define a bond. How are bonds used? 
 
 6. Classify and define the different classes of bonds. 
 
 I 
 6. NEGOTIATION 
 
 Definition. — By negotiation we mean the transfer of a ne- 
 gotiable instrument from one person to another in such a way 
 that the transferee is the legal holder thereof. 
 
 Assignability. — In general the law permits the assignment of 
 any contract for the payment of money or the delivery of goods, 
 (page 50). In an assignment, however, the title passes to the 
 assignee subject to all the defenses which might be brought 
 against it in the hands of the original owner. It is in this par- 
 ticular that assignability and negotiability differ. 
 
i64 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 Thirty days after date I promise to pay to Charles E. Boust 
 
 One Hundred Dollars. 
 
 $100 W. H. Finch. 
 
 While this is not a negotiable note, as it is not payable to 
 "order" or to ''bearer/' it may be a good contract between Finch 
 and Boust. The payee may transfer this instrument but the 
 transfer will be an assignment and not a negotiation. 
 
 Negotiability. — Negotiability applies to all written promises 
 or orders to pay money to ''order" or "bearer," which conform 
 to the requirements of a negotiable instrument, and all such 
 promises or contracts may be transferred or assigned by one 
 party to another by indorsement and delivery or in some cases 
 by delivery only. Such transfer constitutes negotiation. When 
 a negotiable instrument is negotiated from one party to another 
 it passes free from certain defenses that might have been en- 
 tered against it in the hands of the original holder, and the trans- 
 feree has the right to collect it. 
 
 Principal Characteristic. — The principal characteristic of a 
 negotiable instrument, and that which makes it pass freely as a 
 substitute for money, is that in the hands of a third party who 
 purchases it in good faith and for value before it is due, it is en- 
 forceable, while the original holder, perhaps, could not enforce 
 it for the reason that the party who made the instrument has a 
 good defense or counterclaim. 
 
 Vance gave his son a promissory note for $500 without receiving any 
 consideration for it. The son cannot collect of the father, as between the 
 father and son lack of consideration is a defense, but had the son trans- 
 ferred this note before maturity by indorsing it to an innocent party for 
 value, the innocent party could collect from the father, and no defense 
 could be offered. 
 
 Connel holds a note for $400 against Hartman; Connel is indebted to 
 Hartman for $150 for services rendered. Should Connel hold this note 
 until it is due and demand payment of Hartman, the counterclaim of $150 
 which Hartman holds against Connel can be deducted from the amount 
 of the note and the difference paid. Should Connel transfer this note before 
 it is due, by indorsing it to an innocent purchaser for value, the counter- 
 claim could not be enforced against the innocent purchaser. 
 
 Indorsement. — Negotiable paper is transferred by indorse- 
 ment and delivery, that is, by the payee signing his name on the 
 back and handing it over to the transferee. When an instru- 
 
NEGOTIATION 165 
 
 ment is made payable to bearer, an indorsement, though usually 
 made, is not necessary to give a good title to the transferee, 
 delivery being sufficient, but if it is payable to a certain person 
 or order, the indorsement is necessary to give title. 
 
 Kinds of Indorsements. — Indorsements may be blank, in 
 full, or special, and may be unqualified or qualified. 
 
 The first indorsement should be written on the left or stub 
 end of the instrument about one inch from the top. 
 
 Blank indorsement: 
 
 James C. Barry 
 
 In a blank indorsement the payee simply writes his name 
 on the back of the instrument the same as it appears in the 
 instrument, and it is then payable to bearer. Any holder may 
 convert a blank indorsement into a full or special indorsement 
 by writing, "Pay to order of (holder's name)" over the blank 
 indorsement. 
 
 When a payee's name is incorrectly spelled in the instrument 
 he should indorse with the name as given in the instrument and 
 below sign his name properly spelled. 
 
 It is not safe to carry about negotiable paper indorsed in 
 blank, as it is payable to bearer and if it is lost or stolen the 
 holder might be able to recover on it. 
 
 Full or special indorsement: 
 
 Pay to order of 
 L. W. Newman 
 James C. Barry 
 
 A full indorsement does not destroy the negotiability of the 
 instrument. It could not in this case be negotiated or trans- 
 ferred again without L. W. Newman's indorsement. 
 
 An unqualified indorsement places no restrictions on the 
 further negotiation or transfer of the instrument or upon the 
 indorser's liability. The blank and full indorsements exhibited 
 are examples of unqualified indorsements. 
 
i66 
 
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 Qualified indorsement: 
 
 Without recourse 
 
 
 James 
 
 C. Barry 
 or 
 
 
 Pay tc 
 
 order of 
 
 
 L. W. 
 
 Newman without 
 
 recourse 
 
 
 
 James C. 
 
 Barry 
 
 A qualified indorsement simply passes title to the instru- 
 ment without rendering the indorser liable for payment in case 
 the maker fails. The indorser is liable, however, if the instru- 
 ment is not a good contract. 
 
 Restrictive indorsement: 
 
 Pay L. W . Newman 
 
 only 
 
 James C. Barry 
 
 A restrictive indorsement destroys the negotiability of the 
 instrument. It is payable to the indorsee only. Other forms 
 are: " Pay L. W. Newman for collection," which means that 
 Newman is an authorized agent for the collection of the instru- 
 ment; or, '' Pay Merchants Bank for deposit only," which re- 
 stricts the instrument to use for deposit to the account of the 
 indorsee. This is a common indorsement when deposits are 
 sent to the bank by a messenger. 
 
 Indorsement with a waiver: 
 
 Protest and notice 
 
 waived 
 
 James C. Barry 
 
 By waiving protest and notice the indorser gives up the 
 right of protest and notice of nonpayment in case the maker 
 fails to pay and he is liable unconditionally. Protest is fully 
 explained later. 
 
 Indorsing payment: 
 
 Aug. 12, 19 — 
 Received One Hundred 
 Dollars on the within 
 note. 
 
NEGOTIATION 167 
 
 When part payment is made on a promissory note the amount 
 paid is indorsed on the back of the note as shown. 
 
 The one receiving payment does not sign his name; the fact 
 that the authorized payee has possession of the note indicates 
 sufficiently that he was the one who received the payment. 
 
 Obligation of Indorser. — By indorsing an instrument un- 
 qualifiedly the indorser becomes responsible to the transferee 
 or rightful holder of the instrument for pa)nTient in case the 
 maker fails. In order to hold the indorser responsible the holder 
 must fulfill certain requirements as to protest and notice of 
 nonpayment which are fully explained later. 
 
 In indorsing an instrument, regardless of the kind of in- 
 dorsement used, the indorser admits and guarantees that the 
 instrument is genuine, that he has good title to it, that all prior 
 parties had capacity to contract, and that he has no knowledge 
 of any fact which would impair the vaHdity of the instrument 
 or render it valueless. 
 
 Indorsement: Where and How Made. — The indorsement 
 must be on the instrument itself or on a paper attached to it. 
 The indorsement must relate to the entire instrument; a part 
 cannot be transferred by indorsement, or a part to one party 
 and the remainder to another. 
 
 David Bush gave a note to Kiddell for £473 sterling. Kiddell after- 
 wards made the following indorsement: "I assign over to Hudson Hughes 
 the sum of $1930.50 as part of this note of hand. Benjamin Kiddell. " 
 
 Afterwards he made another indorsement and assigned the residue to 
 Hughes. The court held that each indorsement was bad, as it affected 
 only part of the note, and that being so, two bad indorsements would not 
 constitute one good one. — Hughes v. Kiddell, 2 Bay (S. C.) 324. 
 
 Any writing intended to transfer the title to the instrument 
 will be construed as an indorsement. 
 
 LiNNEUS, May 30, 1873. 
 
 I promise to pay James H. Blethen, or order, $137.50 at ten per cent 
 interest, on demand. Ebenezer Tozier. 
 
 On the back of this note was written, "I this day sold and delivered to 
 Catherine M. Adams the within note. James H. Blethen. ^ ' 
 
 Held, that Blethen assumed all of the liability of an ordinary indorser. 
 This indorsement but expressly stated what every indorsement impliedly 
 states, a sale or transfer of the note. The liability of an indorser can be 
 limited or qualified only by express terms. 
 
 — Adams v. Blethen, 66 Maine ip. 
 
i68 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 Presentment and Demand. — To fix the liability of the 
 drawer or indorser, the first step is presentment to the drawee 
 or maker and demand. Bills of exchange payable a certain 
 time after sight are presented for acceptance; notes, checks, 
 and bills payable on demand or sight are presented for payment. 
 Presentment consists in exhibiting the instrument to the payer 
 or handing it to him, while demand is a request to either accept 
 or pay it, as the case may be. If the paper is payable at a bank, 
 the mere fact that at the time of maturity the paper is at the 
 bank at which it is payable is sufficient presentment and de- 
 mand, provided the bank has knowledge of the fact. 
 
 Presentment and demand must always be made at the place 
 designated in the instrument. Promissory notes are often 
 drawn payable at a particular bank, in which case they are 
 called bank notes, but the place of payment designated may be 
 some other place than a bank. 
 
 A demand for payment was made by a letter addressed to the maker 
 at a business building in Los Angeles, which was not shown to have been 
 the place of payment named in the note. The demand was held insuf- 
 ficient as not having been made at the proper place and also because there 
 was no presentment. — Merchants Bank v. Bentel, 15 Calif. Appeals 170. 
 
 In case there is no designated place of payment, it is said 
 that the paper is payable generally. This means that it is pay- 
 able at the place of business or residence of the maker of the 
 note or acceptor of the draft, and when he has a known place 
 of business, that should have preference over his residence. 
 
 A note was payable generally at Union, Iowa. It was presented at 
 the maker's former place of business and at a bank in town, but no further 
 inquiry was made. Held, the presentment and demand were insufficient. 
 
 — Trease v. Haggin, 107 Iowa 458. 
 
 If there is no place of payment specified and the maker or 
 acceptor has no known place of business or residence, then it 
 may be presented to the person to make pa5mient wherever he 
 can be found, or at his last known place of business or residence. 
 Failing to present does not discharge the maker or acceptor. 
 
 Time. — Presentment for payment must be made on the day 
 on which the instrument falls due, unless some " inevitable 
 accident " or other legal obstacle prevents such presentment. 
 
NEGOTIATION 169 
 
 The fact that both the holder and indorser know that the note 
 will not be paid when due and that the maker is dead and the 
 estate insolvent does not relieve the holder from his obligation 
 to make presentment and give notice of dishonor. 
 
 Maturity. — Drafts, bills of exchange, and promissory notes 
 formerly had days of grace, that is, three days were added to 
 the time stated in which the instrument should become due. 
 The purpose of this was to give the payer in the early days of 
 slow transportation an opportunity to arrange for payment. 
 
 Days of grace have been abolished by statute in all the 
 states except in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, where 
 grace is allowed on inland bills of exchange payable at sight, 
 and in Texas, where grace is allowed on all paper payable other- 
 wise than on demand. 
 
 If by its terms an instrument is payable a certain number 
 of days after date, the day on which the instrument was drawn 
 is excluded; thus a note dated January 10, payable thirty days 
 after date, is due February 9. If the date, of maturity is a legal 
 holiday or Sunday, the instrument is payable on the next suc- 
 ceeding business day. 
 
 Where days of grace are allowed, the date of maturity is 
 extended for three days, but if the last day of grace falls on a 
 holiday or Sunday, the instrument is payable on the preceding day. 
 
 But when the time is reckoned by the month, as it is when 
 the instrument is made payable one or more months after date, 
 the note falls due on the corresponding date of the month in 
 which it is due. Thus a note dated January 31, 19 — , due one 
 month after date, would mature February 28, 19 — (or February 
 29, 19 — ), where no grace is allowed, and if dated February 28, 
 it would be due March 28. . 
 
 , An instrument dated November 8, and payable twelve months after 
 date, was held to have matured on November 8 of the following year, 
 and a presentment on November 9 was not proper. 
 
 — Lewy V. Winkelson^ 135 La. 105. 
 
 Not only must the presentment for payment be made on the 
 right day, but it must be made at a reasonable time on that day. 
 If presented at a bank, it must be during banking hours. In 
 other cases the time must be at a reasonable hour. 
 
I70 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 Presentment for payment was made at the maker's house between 
 eleven and twelve o'clock at night, the maker being called up from bed 
 for that purpose. Held, that the presentment was at an unreasonable hour, 
 and the demand was not sufficient. — Dana v. Sawyer, 22 Maine 244. 
 
 A note payable at a bank was presented after banking hours and the 
 clerk still there refused payment, although funds had been left with the 
 regular teller to pay it. Held, that the presentment and demand were not 
 sufficient. 
 
 — Newark India Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Bishop, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 48. 
 
 The demand must be made by the holder or his duly au- 
 thorized agent, upon the proper person, who is the maker or 
 acceptor, or, if he is dead, his personal representative. 
 
 A note was signed "A. G. Cunningham, Agent." Nothing appeared 
 on the face of the note showing for whom he professed to act. Present- 
 ment and demand of payment was made upon S. A. Cunningham, the wife 
 of A. G. Cunningham. Held, that the demand was insufficient. By the 
 signature the note was made by A. G. Cunningham, and the demand to 
 bind the indorser must be made on him. — Stinson v. Lee, 68 Miss. 113. 
 
 Notice of Dishonor. — After payment has been refused and 
 the instrument dishonored, notice of such dishonor must be 
 given to the drawer of a bill of exchange and to each indorser 
 of a bill or note, and any drawer or indorser to whom such 
 notice is not given is discharged. 
 
 This notice under the common law must be given within 
 a reasonable time, but by the Negotiable Instruments Law 
 it is expressly stipulated when the notice is to be given. If 
 the parties reside in the same place, it must be given the follow- 
 ing day. If they reside in different places, and notice is sent 
 by mail, it must be deposited in the post office so as to go the 
 day following the dishonor; if given otherwise than through 
 the mail, it must be done in time to be received as soon as the 
 mailed notice would have been. 
 
 The bank was the holder of a promissory note, payable at said bank, 
 made by James H. Jenkins and Anthony Debrell, and indorsed as follows, 
 "A. Debrell, S. Turney, John W. Simpson." Turney's residence was 
 within one mile of the bank. The note was due on February i, and was 
 protested on that day. On February 3 notice was sent Turney from the 
 bank. Simpson, the next indorser, gave him no notice. The court held 
 that the notice was not given in time. If it had been given by Simpson 
 on the 3d, it would have been good, as each indorser is given a day to notify 
 his prior indorser, but this was not done. The notice given was not valid 
 as to the bank, so could not be to any one to whose benefit it would inure. 
 
 — Simpson v. Turney, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 419. 
 
NEGOTIATION 171 
 
 The notice may be given by the holder or his agent or by 
 any party who may have to pay the debt and who is entitled 
 to be reimbursed. 
 
 A note with two indorsers was dishonored and notice given by the 
 holder to both indorsers. The second indorser sued the first, and it was 
 held, that the notice was sufficient; that it was not necessary for the 
 second indorser to give notice to the first. It was sufficient that notice 
 was given him, and the notice of the holder inures to the benefit of any 
 indorser. — Stafford v. Vates, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 327. 
 
 Notice to Indorsers. — • When there are several indorsers the 
 last indorser can look to the previous one, or in fact to any one 
 who has indorsed before him, as well as to the maker or ac- 
 ceptor. Therefore it often happens that the holder upon dis- 
 honor of the instrument gives notice to the last indorser, and 
 he in turn gives notice to the prior indorser, to whom he will 
 look to be reimbursed in case he is obliged to pay the instru- 
 ment. 
 
 The holder of a note notified the third indorser by mail and inclosed 
 notices for the second and first indorsers. The third indorser notified the 
 second and inclosed notice for the first. The second indorser received the 
 notice on the 6th, and mailed notice to the first indorser on the 7th, in time 
 to go on the second mail closing at i .30 p.m. The first mail closed at 9.30 a.m. , 
 and defendant contended that notice should have been sent by that mail. 
 The court held that the notice was sufficient and that plaintiff had used due 
 diligence in giving notice. — Smith v. Poillon, 87 N. Y. 590. 
 
 The notice of dishonor may be either oral or written, and 
 can be either delivered personally or sent through the mail. 
 Some cases hold that the postal service cannot be used when 
 the parties reside in the same town, but by statute in some 
 states the post office can be used even in that case. 
 
 Hobbs took a written notice of dishonor to Sfraine's office, and finding 
 no one there, left it. The court instructed the jury that if they deter- 
 mined that it was left in a conspicuous place, it was sufficient. Held, that 
 this was correct. It is sufficient to charge the indorser if the notice is de- 
 livered personally, left at the indorser's place of residence or business, or 
 deposited in the post office addressed to him at his residence or place of 
 business with the postage prepaid. — Hohhs v. Straine, 149 Mass. 212. 
 
 Waiver. — Notice may be waived, and frequently the in- 
 dorser adds '' protest waived," the effect of this being to waive 
 presentment and notice of dishonor as well as formal protest. 
 
172 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 Protest. — Protest is a formal declaration in writing and 
 under seal, made by a notary public, certifying to the demand 
 and dishonor. When it is impossible to command the services 
 of a notary, protest may be made by a resident of the place, in 
 the presence of two respectable citizens who sign as witnesses of 
 the act of presenting. Protest is required by law in the case 
 of foreign bills of exchange, and is customary with other dis- 
 honored instruments also. The notary (or resident) makes the 
 presentment and demand, and upon refusal issues a certificate 
 of protest. 
 
 After attaching the instrument to this certificate the notary 
 mails a regular form notice to all indorsers. 
 
 Irregular Indorser. — Frequently there appears on the back 
 of a bill or note the name of a person who is not a party to it 
 and to whom it was never indorsed. Such a person is known 
 as an irregular or anomalous indorser. The object of such an 
 indorsement is to give additional security to the payee. A 
 person so signing his name is liable as indorser, according to 
 these rules: if the instrument is payable to a third person, he 
 is liable to the payee and all subsequent parties; if payable 
 to the order of the maker or drawer, or to bearer, he is liable to 
 all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer; and if he has 
 signed for the accommodation of the payee, he is liable to all 
 parties subsequent to the payee. 
 
 Such indorsements are frequently used when the payee of 
 a note wishes to get it discounted at a bank, that is, to get the 
 money on it. The bank requires an indorser, and the payee 
 gets a friend to indorse the note. The irregular indorser is 
 liable to the bank the same as any other indorser. 
 
 A note was made by a railway company and indorsed by four individuals 
 not otherwise parties. It was held that their liability was that of irregular 
 indorsers, that as such they were entitled to the rights of indorsers, and 
 could not be held liable on the note without notice of presentment and 
 demand. — Rockjield v. First National Bank, 77 Ohio State 311. 
 
 Accommodation Party. — An accommodation party is one 
 who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor or 
 indorser, without receiving value therefor, for the purpose of 
 lending his name to some other person. Such party is liable to 
 
NEGOTIATION 173 
 
 any holder for value and to all parties except the party ac- 
 commodated. For example, Marsh wishes to borrow money, 
 but the bank will not lend it on his note. Marsh goes to Colby, 
 who makes a note to Marsh's order, which he discounts at the 
 bank. Colby is Hable to the bank and all subsequent holders, 
 but is not liable to Marsh. 
 
 An accommodation party has the same right under the 
 statute as to notice of dishonor as any other party. 
 
 A note made by a corporation was indorsed for its accommodation by 
 certain of the directors. Held, that the indorsers were entitled to notice 
 of dishonor, the same as any other indorsers and failure to give the notice 
 was not excused because they were directors of the maker. 
 
 — Houser v. Fayssoux, 168 N. C. i. 
 
 The Holder or Payee. — We have yet to consider the posi- 
 tion and rights of the holder or payee of the instrument. Whether 
 he be the original payee or an indorsee, he is the party in whose 
 hands the instrument rests and who has the right to the money 
 which it represents. We have already learned that negotiable 
 instruments have a distinguishing characteristic not possessed 
 by any other contract, which is that when they have passed into 
 certain parties' hands under particular conditions they are valid 
 and enforceable, even though not valid between the original 
 parties to them. A holder possessing such rights is called a 
 holder in due course. 
 
 Holder in Due Course. — A holder in due course is a holder 
 who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: 
 
 1. That it is complete and regular upon its face; 
 
 2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, 
 and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if 
 such was the fact; 
 
 3. That he took it in good faith and for value; 
 
 4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no 
 notice of any defects in the instrument or in the title of the 
 person negotiating it. 
 
 The instrument must be complete and regular on its face. 
 
 A note recited that it was payable "On or before four after date." 
 
 It was held that the instrument was not complete and regular on its face, 
 and that one who took such an instrument could not be a holder in due 
 course. — Philpott's Estate, 169 Iowa 555. 
 
174 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 He must be a holder " for value." He must have given 
 value for the instrument or must have taken it after value was 
 given by another. This is the provision of the Negotiable 
 Instruments Law and changes the rule in many states, which was 
 that to be a holder for value a person must have parted with a 
 present consideration. Where the holder comes into possession 
 of the instrument through false pretenses or for wrong motives 
 he cannot be said to be a holder in due course. 
 
 DeWitt, being acquainted with Perkins and knowing that he was 
 responsible, purchased shortly before maturity a promissory note against 
 him for $300, paying therefor $5. As between the original parties the note 
 was invalid for want of consideration. Held, that DeWitt was not a holder 
 in due course. The consideration paid by him was nominal. It was on 
 the face of it merely either a gift or a subterfuge to get the note into other 
 hands to cut off the defense of want of consideration. 
 
 — DeWitt V. Perkins, 22 Wis. 473. 
 
 We have discussed in the subject of contracts what is neces- 
 sary to constitute a valuable consideration. 
 
 The purchaser of a negotiable instrument must take it be- 
 fore maturity. The mere fact that a note or bill is past due is 
 considered sufficient notice of defect to put the purchaser on 
 his guard, and a party buying past due paper is not a holder in 
 due course. Likewise, if the purchaser of a bill of exchange has 
 notice that it has been presented for acceptance and dishonored, 
 he is not a holder in due course. 
 
 The Fairfield County National Bank sued on a note on which Hammer 
 had defenses against the original payee and first indorser. The note had not 
 been paid at maturity and the Fairfield County National Bank took the 
 note after maturity. It was held that the Fairfield County National Bank 
 was not a holder in due course and was subject to the defenses available 
 against the payee. — Fairfield County Nat. Bank v. Hammer, §9 Conn. 592. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is meant by " negotiation "? 
 
 2. What contracts are assignable? 
 
 3. What is the difference between assignability and negotiability? 
 
 4. Would a note payable one year after the maker becomes fifty years 
 old be negotiable? Would it be valid for any purpose? 
 
 5. What is the principal characteristic of a negotiable instrument? 
 
 6. How is negotiable paper transferred from one party to another? 
 
 7. When may an instrument be negotiated by delivery? 
 
DEFENSES 175 
 
 8. Mention the different kinds of indorsements. 
 
 9. What is the effect of a blank indorsement? 
 
 10. How can a blank indorsement be changed to a special indorse- 
 ment? 
 
 11. A check was made payable to John Bartow when the name should 
 have been John Barstow. How should it be indorsed? 
 
 12. What is the effect of a full or special indorsement? 
 
 13. What is an unqualified indorsement? 
 
 14. What is the effect of a qualified indorsement? Give an example. 
 
 15. What is the effect of a restrictive indorsement? Give an example. 
 
 16. Explain the meaning of " protest and notice waived." 
 
 17. How should part payment be indorsed on a note? 
 
 18. What does the indorser of a negotiable instrument admit and 
 guarantee? 
 
 19. What is the obligation of an indorser? 
 
 20. Is it necessary that the indorsement be made in any particular 
 place or way? 
 
 21. Is it allowable to indorse a part of the amount to one party? 
 
 22. Why is presentment and demand necessary? 
 
 23. What is a bank note? 
 
 24. When and where should presentment for payment be made? 
 
 25. Explain the term " maturity " applied to drafts and notes. 
 
 26. Who must make " demand " and upon whom must it be made? 
 
 27. What is a " notice of dishonor "? 
 
 28. To whom, how, and when should notice of dishonor be given? 
 
 29. When there are several indorsers, how is each affected in case the 
 note is dishonored? 
 
 30. What is a protest and when is it necessary? 
 
 31. Who is an irregular indorser? 
 
 32. What is the object, usually, of an irregular indorsement? 
 ^;^. Who is an accommodation party? 
 
 34. What rights has the holder or payee? 
 
 35. Who is a holder in due course? 
 
 36. What are the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law with 
 reference to a holder " for value "? 
 
 7. DEFENSES 
 
 In General. — It can be stated as a general proposition that 
 a holder in due course takes title free from all defenses, or, as 
 is often stated, " free from all equities," except such as affect 
 the very existence of the instrument and which are said to 
 constitute absolute defenses; that is, defenses which may be 
 used against the holder. 
 
 ■ i 
 
176 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 Personal Defenses. — Personal defenses arise out of the 
 transaction and relate to the acts or conditions surrounding 
 the instrument rather than to the instrument itself, and are 
 good and available as between the original parties. They are 
 not good as against a subsequent holder in due course. 
 
 Fraud. — Fraud is generally a personal defense only, but 
 when it vitiates the entire contract it is available to the maker 
 as an absolute defense, if he can show that he was not negligent 
 in allowing himself to be defrauded. 
 
 Maxwell sold securities to Childs by means of a fraudulent representa- 
 tion as to their value, and received a note from Childs in payment. Childs 
 could refuse to pay the note if Maxwell held it until maturity, on the ground 
 that it had been secured by fraud. If Maxwell should transfer the note to a 
 holder for value, such a holder could enforce the note against Childs, as the 
 defense of fraud in such a case is a personal one and does not affect the rights 
 of a subsequent holder in due course. 
 
 Duress. — Where a negotiable instrument is obtained through 
 duress, as between the immediate parties, it is voidable. The 
 same rule, in the case of duress, applies to negotiable contracts 
 as applies to other contracts. 
 
 Lack of Consideration. — Lack of consideration in any ex- 
 ecutory contract is a defense, and this rule applies to negotiable 
 instrument contracts the same as to any other contract, except 
 when the instrument comes into the hands of a subsequent 
 holder in due course; then it ceases to be a defense. 
 
 Counterclaims. — A counterclaim is a defense as between the 
 immediate parties to an instrument, but as against a subsequent 
 holder in due course it is of no avail. 
 
 Barnes holds Evans's note for $300. Barnes owes Evans on open account 
 $100. As between Barnes and Evans, the $100 is a good counterclaim; 
 but should Barnes transfer Evans's note to a holder in due course, that 
 holder could maintain an action to collect the full amount of the note. 
 
 Delivery. — A negotiable instrument is incomplete and revo- 
 cable until delivery, for the purpose of giving effect to the instru- 
 ment, is made. As between immediate parties, or a remote 
 party not a holder in due course, the delivery must be made by 
 or under the authority of the proper party, and may be made 
 conditionally, or for a special purpose and not to transfer title 
 to the instrument. 
 
DEFENSES 177 
 
 Sayre sued on a note in the usual form, made to his order by Leonard. 
 The defense was that the note was delivered to Sayre on condition that 
 it was to be void if Leonard's partner, Wingo, ratified a certain trans- 
 action and that Wingo had ratified it. Held, that, as between immediate 
 parties to the instrument, the defense of conditional delivery was avail- 
 able. This was properly proved by parol evidence and Sayre could not 
 recover. — Sayre v. Leonard, 57 Colo. 116. 
 
 But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in 
 due course, a valid delivery by all parties prior to him so as to 
 make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. This pro- 
 vision of the Negotiable Instruments Law changes the prior law 
 in some states, where it was held that a party could escape liabiUty 
 by showing that he had not delivered the instrument, but it had 
 been stolen or delivered without his authority. 
 
 Tobin arranged to buy two horses from one Leonard and had pre- 
 pared a check to Leonard's order for the price. Leonard delivered the 
 horses in Tobin's absence and his clerk delivered the check to Leonard 
 without authority. As soon as Tobin returned he discovered the horses 
 were unsound and stopped payment on the check, but meanwhile Leonard 
 had negotiated it to Buzzel, a holder in due course. It was held that 
 Buzzel could recover, as the defense of nondelivery was not available against 
 a remote holder in due course. 
 
 But an incomplete instrument not delivered will not be a 
 valid instrument in the hands of any holder, if completed and 
 negotiated without authority. 
 
 Bennet accepted a bill of exchange in blank and left it in his desk. It 
 was stolen by one Cartwright and negotiated to Baxendalle, a holder for 
 value. Held, Baxendalle could not recover. 
 
 — Baxendalle v. Bennett, L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. (Eng.) 525. 
 
 Absolute or Real Defenses. — Absolute or real defenses are 
 those which may be used against any holder of negotiable 
 paper. 
 
 Illegality. — The mere fact that a contract is illegal is not 
 an absolute defense to a negotiable instrument in the hands of 
 a holder in due course; but if the contract is expressly made 
 illegal and void by statute, an absolute defense is created. 
 
 If the maker of a note should agree in the instrument to pay a rate of 
 interest in excess of the legal rate in a state where usury is forbidden by 
 statute, an absolute defense would arise. 
 
 Incapacity of Parties. — The contract represented by the 
 instrument may not be binding, for the reason that the party or 
 

 178 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 parties did not have the capacity to contract; as, the note or 
 bill of an infant or lunatic. Still, if a valid negotiable instru- 
 ment comes into the hands of an infant, he may, if of full mental 
 capacity, transfer it to another. 
 
 Fraud. — Fraud as illustrated in the following example is 
 an absolute defense. 
 
 T. H. Brown signed an instrument in the following form: 
 
 The instrument was torn apart at the vertical dotted line and the left- 
 hand portion was discounted for J. B. Smith. Brown had been in no wise 
 negligent in signing this instrument and he could not be held. 
 
 — Brown v. Reed^ 79 Pa. State 370. 
 
 Alteration. — Another failure of contract arises when there 
 has been a material alteration, for in this instance the minds 
 of the parties have not met in the contract. When the instru- 
 ment has been materially altered and is in the hands of a holder 
 in due course, not a party to the alteration, he may enforce 
 payment thereof according to its original tenor. 
 
 An action was brought against Horn and Long, the makers of a promis- 
 sory note. The note was given for a threshing machine, and was originally 
 drawn payable to "H. C. Pitt's Sons' Manufacturing Company," and 
 after delivery to the company it was altered by substituting the name of 
 "O. B. Hildreth" as payee. The alteration was made without the knowl- 
 edge or consent of Long, and he never ratified the change. Horn and the 
 payee made the change. Held, that this was a material alteration and 
 released Long, although the bank was a holder in due course. 
 
 — Horn ^ Long v. Newton City Bank, 32 Kans. 518. 
 
 An action was brought against Wood and Higgins as makers of the 
 following promissory note: 
 
 $1000. North Hadley, Mar. 31, 1868. 
 
 For value received, we promise to pay L. L. Draper, or order, one 
 thousand dollars on demand, with interest at 12 per cent. 
 
 Geo. a. Wood, 
 H. S. Higgins. 
 Higgins defended on the ground that the note he signed had been 
 changed by substituting "we" for "I" and adding the words, ''at 12 per 
 cent." It was shown that Wood made the changes in good faith, but 
 
DEFENSES 179 
 
 without consulting Higgins. Held, that the note was void as against 
 Higgins. — Draper v. Wood, 112 Mass. 315. 
 
 Any alteration of a negotiable instrument which changes its 
 legal effect is a material alteration. 
 
 After a note was given by Moore, with Fuller as surety, Sullivan in- 
 nocently procured Rudisill to sign as surety. The court held the note void, 
 but allowed a recovery upon the original consideration. When a promis- 
 sory note has been innocently altered without any fraudulent purpose, the 
 payee may recover in an action on the original consideration. It was also 
 held that the signing by a party as a joint maker, after the execution by 
 the original maker and without his knowledge and consent, is a material 
 alteration. — Sullivan v. Rudisill, 63 Iowa 158. 
 
 There must be an intent to make the alteration, and it 
 must be made, of course, without the consent of the maker or 
 acceptor of the instrument. The alterat'on must also be made 
 by a party to the instrument or one in lawful possession of it. 
 The holder cannot be prejudiced or injured by the act of a 
 stranger without his consent. 
 
 A person not a party to the instrument, without authority wrote across 
 the face of a draft the words, "Payable in United States gold coin." Held, 
 that the alteration was not such as to vitiate the draft, although, if the 
 alteration had been made by the payee or by his instruction, it would have 
 invalidated the bill, as the change was evidently material. 
 
 — Lagenberger v. Kroeger, 48 Calif. 147. 
 
 Forgery. — When a signature to a negotiable instrument is 
 forged, it is unenforceable in the hands of any holder who must 
 derive title through the forgery. 
 
 The fact that there is an absolute defense to an instrument 
 does not discharge all of the parties to it, or through whose 
 hands it has passed. As we have seen, such defense exonerates 
 the maker or acceptor of a negotiable instrument, but it does 
 not relieve the liability of the indorser, because every person 
 who negotiates such an instrument warrants that it is genuine, 
 that he has a good title to it, and that all prior parties have 
 capacity to contract. 
 
 Tishomingo Savings Inst, indorsed a bill of exchange to which they 
 claimed title through a forged indorsement. The court held that the in- 
 dorser warranted the genuineness of the prior indorsements on the bill 
 and also his title to the paper. Should it be ascertained even after the 
 payment of the bill that any of the indorsements were forged, the drawee 
 
i8o NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 can recover the amount of the bill from the party to whom he paid it, 
 and each preceding indorser may recover from the party who indorsed the 
 bill to him. — Williams v. Tishomingo Savings Inst., 57 Miss. 633. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is a defense as appHed to negotiable- paper? 
 
 2. What are the two principal classes of defenses? 
 
 3. What are personal defenses? Name then. 
 
 4. What are absolute or real defenses? Name them. 
 
 5. How does fraud affect a negotiable instrument contract? 
 
 6. Is a party to a note bound when his signature was obtained by 
 fraud? 
 
 7. What is the effect of duress on a negotiable instrument contract? 
 
 8. Under what conditions is a negotiable instrument contract that 
 lacks consideration good? 
 
 9. When may counterclaims be offered as a defense? 
 
 10. How does no delivery affect a negotiable instrument? Explain. 
 
 11. Is a note given by a party who is without capacity to contract 
 good? Explain. 
 
 12. Is a note given for an illegal object good? Explain. 
 
 13. How does alteration or forgery affect an instrument? Explain. 
 
 14. What constitutes a material alteration? 
 
 15. What is the effect of a forged signature? 
 
 16. If a valid instrument comes into the hands of an infant, has he a 
 right to transfer it to another? 
 
 17. Is a holder in due course affected by a personal defense? 
 
 18. Does an absolute defense discharge all parties? Explain. 
 
 19. Will one who takes an overdue note be a holder in due course? 
 
 20. To be a holder in due course, is it necessary to pay face value for 
 the instrument? 
 
 8. DISCHARGE 
 
 Payment. — Negotiable instruments are discharged by pay- 
 ment. A payment by the maker or acceptor to the holder, and 
 the surrender of the instrument to him, ends the transaction 
 and releases all the parties to the paper. 
 
 Hayes-Eames Elevator Co. issued its check on the Bank of Bromfield 
 and it was paid by that bank. Later the bank reissued the check to Au- 
 rora State Bank, a holder in due course. It was held that when the Bank 
 of Bromfield paid the check the instrument was entirely extinguished. 
 The bank did not become a holder within the meaning of the Statute and 
 had no right to negotiate the instrument. 
 
 — Aurora State Bank v. Hayes-Eames Elevator Co., 88 Nebr. 187. 
 
DISCHARGE i8i 
 
 The agreement of the maker of a note or of the acceptor of 
 a bill of exchange is that upon the date of maturity of the note 
 or bill he will pay absolutely the amount named therein to the 
 payee or indorsee. His promise is absolute, and it can be dis- 
 charged only in some one of the ways in which a contract can be 
 discharged, as by payment, material alteration, etc. 
 
 The only condition the maker can require is that the holder 
 surrender the note or bill, and the maker is not obliged to pay 
 without receiving the instrument, as otherwise he might be 
 compelled to pay a second time, should the instrument come 
 into the hands of a holder in due course. 
 
 Best made a promissory note to Lamberson, who indorsed it before 
 maturity to Crall. Without notice of this transfer and before maturity 
 Best paid the amount of the note to Lamberson and got his receipt for the 
 payment. After the note became due Crall sued as indorsee. Held, that 
 Crall may recover, as one who pays to the payee of a negotiable note the 
 amount thereof before maturity, without surrender of the note, does so at 
 his peril and may be required to pay the amount again to a holder in due 
 course. — Best v. Crall, 23 Kans. 482. 
 
 When a payee has lost the instrument and so cannot sur- 
 render it, relief is generally given him by compelling the maker 
 to pay, upon being furnished a bond to indemnify him against 
 any loss because of the reappearance of the note. 
 
 When the maker pays a note, as a safeguard he should de- 
 tach his signature or deface the note in such a way that it could 
 not be negotiated again. 
 
 Payment by Indorser. — Payment by one of the indorsers 
 after the instrument has been dishonored does not discharge it, 
 as the prior indorsers and the maker or acceptor are still liable. 
 The payment to extinguish the instrument must be made by or 
 for the party primarily liable. 
 
 Gleason made a note which was indorsed by Lill for his accommoda- 
 tion. Gleason refused to pay the note at maturity and it was paid by 
 Lill, who sued to recover the amount so paid. It was held that the note 
 was not extinguished by payment and the indorser by his paying it suc- 
 ceeded to the rights of the holder against the maker and could recover on 
 the note. — Lill v. Gleason, 92 Kans. 754. 
 
 The instrument may also be discharged by the intentional 
 cancellation thereof by the holder or by any other act that 
 would discharge a simple contract. 
 
r82 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 A husband gave his wife a note. Later he purchased personal property 
 to the amount of the note, for their joint use, and at his request and in- 
 sistence she mutilated the note. It was held that the mutilation at the 
 husband's request was with the purpose of discharging the note and there- 
 fore the note was invalid. — Kester v. Kester, 38 Oregon 10. 
 
 Discharge of Indorser. — An indorser or drawer is discharged 
 by any act that discharges the instrument or that discharges 
 a prior party. Thus, the third indorser on a promissory note 
 would be discharged by any act that would discharge either the 
 maker (which would cancel the instrument) or the first or second 
 indorser. Any agreement on the part of the holder of a nego- 
 tiable instrument to extend the time of payment, unless with 
 the assent of the indorsers, discharges the indorsers' liability. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is the usual way of discharging a negotiable contract? 
 
 2. What danger accompanies payment before maturity? 
 
 3. How should the payment of a negotiable instrument be safe- 
 guarded? 
 
 4. Does payment by one indorser discharge prior indorsers? Ex- 
 plain. 
 
 5. How may an indorser be discharged? 
 
 6. What is the advantage of being a holder in due course? 
 
 9. INTEREST AND USURY 
 
 Definition. — As the question of interest is one that very 
 frequently arises in connection with negotiable instruments, it is 
 well to consider it here. A common definition of interest is, 
 " The compensation paid for the use of money." The amount 
 upon which the interest is reckoned is called the principal. The 
 interest is usually a certain annual per cent of the principal. 
 
 In most of the states the rate of interest is prescribed by 
 statute and known as legal interest, and when no rate is desig- 
 nated by the parties this rate will prevail. The usual legal rate 
 is 6 per cent. The laws of one's own state should be consulted. 
 
 The statutes of the different states also determine whether 
 or not a higher rate may be agreed upon between the parties 
 and, in most cases, say how high a rate may be charged by 
 agreement. 
 
INTEREST AND USURY 183 
 
 The taking of a higher rate than that allowed by the statute 
 of a particular state is called usury and is punished in some of 
 the states by the forfeiture of all of the interest; in others, 
 by the forfeiture of both principal and interest. Where such 
 statutes exist, a person a^^reeing to accept usurious interest 
 cannot collect either the money due or the interest. 
 
 Claims on which Interest can be Collected. — Interest can 
 be collected on all claims or amounts where it is mutually agreed 
 by the parties that it is to be paid, as on a promissory note 
 which contains the words '' with interest " or " with use," or 
 some words to the same effect. It can also, without stipulation 
 in the agreement, be collected upon debts from the time they 
 become due until they are paid; in other words, all overdue 
 debts draw interest. An illustration is the case of a promissory 
 note containing no provision for interest, as such a note draws 
 interest from the date it becomes due until it is paid, but does 
 not draw interest before maturity. 
 
 It was held that a note payable five years after date "with six per 
 cent interest from date " did not of itself fix the time when interest should 
 be payable, nor did a statute authorizing the calculation of interest by the 
 year determine that interest should be paid annually. But a provision in 
 the note giving the maker the privilege of making payments on account 
 of principal "at interest date" indicated that the parties intended interest 
 to be paid annually. 
 
 — Illinois Nat. Bank v. Trustees of Schools, iii 111. Appeals 189. 
 
 But when the amount of the debt is not determined and is 
 uncertain, or where the debt consists of a running account with 
 payments at different periods, it is held that interest does not 
 attach. 
 
 Pengra sued to recover rent under a lease of water power. The lease 
 provided that a fixed amount of renl irhould be paid quarterly, with a de- 
 duction if the water supply was deficient. During the period for which rent 
 was due the water supply had been deficient and also Wheeler had furnished 
 supplies and made repairs against his rent account. Held, that was a case 
 of mutual running accounts and no interest could be allowed either party. 
 
 — Pengra v. Wheeler, 24 Oregon 532. 
 
 Compound Interest. — Interest upon interest cannot be col- 
 lected in the absence of a special agreement, and some juris- 
 dictions do not allow it then. 
 
i84 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Define (a) interest, (b) legal rate, (c) usury. 
 
 2. What is the legal rate in your state? 
 
 3. On what claims can interest be collected? 
 
 4. Under what conditions can compound interest be collected? 
 
 10. CREDITS 
 
 Forms of Credit. — Every negotiable instrument we have 
 studied is a form of commercial credit. Credit, as used in busi- 
 ness, means postponed cash payments. The open account is a 
 form of credit where there is no negotiable credit instrument as 
 evidence of its existence. The open account is often converted 
 into other forms of credit by means of negotiable instruments, 
 such as the bill of exchange or draft, the promissory note, and 
 other negotiable instruments. 
 
 Extent of Credit. — It is hard to estimate what part of the 
 world's business is done on credit or on postponed cash pay- 
 ments, but it is safe to say by far the greater part. The capital 
 invested in our great enterprises is represented by stock certi- 
 ficates, bonds, mortgages, term notes, and other kinds of credit 
 instruments. It is this fact that makes the negotiable instrument 
 so important. 
 
 Classes of Credit. — The classes of credit which concern us 
 in this connection are: personal credit, business credit, banking 
 credit, and investment credit. 
 
 Personal credit is the credit a merchant, a banker, or any 
 one extends to an individual. This is done through loans and 
 open accounts. 
 
 Business credit is the credit established through the various 
 business transactions. In this connection the account purchase 
 and the short-term bank loan are the most common. 
 
 Banking credit is the credit business firms and others ob- 
 tain from a bank by means of short-term loans. Banks are the 
 financial agents of the country. They accept money from 
 depositors and under the banking laws they are permitted to 
 loan under approved conditions a large portion of the deposited 
 funds; in this way credit is extended in a general way to such 
 business enterprises as, in the judgment of the banks, merit it. 
 
CREDITS i8s 
 
 Investment credit is the credit extended to a business through 
 the purchase of its credit instruments, such as mortgages, corpo- 
 rate bonds, and long-term notes, which are issued against the 
 fixed assets of the business. The ultimate source of this credit 
 is, for the most part, individual investors. 
 
 All the different credit instruments are subject to the laws 
 governing negotiable instruments. 
 
 Discount Loans. — Many individuals and firms need at 
 different times additional ready funds to finance certain busi- 
 ness transactions. These funds are usually secured by dis- 
 counting a short-term note at the bank where their deposit 
 account is kept. 
 
 The Federal Reserve Act. — The Federal Reserve Act, 
 which operates generally throughout the country, has greatly 
 facilitated the securing of bank loans and has increased the 
 ability of merchants to borrow funds or extend their credit. 
 
 Section 13 of this act, which relates directly to bank loans, 
 reads as follows: 
 
 " Upon the indorsement of any of its member banks, which 
 shall be deemed a waiver of demand, notice, and protest by 
 such bank as to its own indorsement exclusively, any Federal 
 Reserve Bank may discount notes, drafts, and bills of exchange 
 arising out of actual commercial transactions; that is, notes, 
 drafts, and bills of exchange issued or drawn for agricultural, 
 industrial, or commercial purposes, or the proceeds of which 
 have been used, or are to be used, for such purposes — the 
 Federal Reserve Board to have the right to determine or define 
 the character of the paper thus eligible for discount, within the 
 meaning of this act. Nothing in this act contained shall be 
 construed to prohibit such notes, drafts and bills of exchange, 
 secured by staple agricultural products, or other goods, wares, 
 or merchandise from being eligible for such discount; but such 
 definition shall not include notes, drafts, or bills covering merely 
 investments or issued or drawn for the purpose of carrying or 
 trading in stocks, bonds, or other investment securities, except 
 bonds and notes of the Government of the United States. Notes, 
 drafts, and bills admitted to discount under the terms of this 
 paragraph must have a maturity at the time of discount of not 
 
i86 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 more than ninety days, exclusive of days of grace; provided, 
 that notes, drafts, and bills drawn or issued for agricultural 
 purposes or based on live stock and haying a maturity not 
 exceeding six months, exclusive of days of grace, may be dis- 
 counted in an amount to be limited to a percentage of the assets 
 of the Federal Reserve Bank to be ascertained and fixed by 
 the Federal Reserve Board." 
 
 The Federal Reserve Board. — The Federal Reserve Board 
 consists of seven members, including the Secretary of the Treas- 
 ury and the Comptroller of the Currency and five members 
 appointed by the President. The Board exercises general 
 supervision over reserve banks and regulates the activities of 
 member banks. 
 
 The Federal Reserve Board is empowered to issue -Federal 
 Reserve Bank Notes to Federal Reserve Banks upon receiving 
 on deposit commercial paper from such banks. These Federal 
 Reserve Notes are legal tender, and are redeemable in gold or 
 lawful money at any Federal Reserve Bank, or at the United 
 States Treasury. This makes it possible for the Federal Reserve 
 Bank to furnish relief in a stringent money market or when a 
 panic is threatened. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What are the principal forms of credit? 
 
 2. What are the different classes of credit? 
 
 3. What is personal credit and how is it extended to individuals? 
 
 4. How is business credit established? " 
 
 5. What is banking credit and how is it obtained? 
 
 6. What is investment credit and what is its principal source? 
 
 7. How are discount loans secured? 
 
 8. What are the main provisions of the Federal Reserve Act with 
 reference to loans and discounts? 
 
 9. Who compose the Federal Reserve Board? 
 
 10. What are the functions of this board? 
 
 11. How can the Federal Reserve Bank give relief in case of a stringent 
 money market? 
 
 IMPORTANT POINTS 
 
 Negotiable instruments are credit instruments which pass freely 
 from one party to another by indorsement and delivery or by delivery. 
 
IMPORTANT POINTS 1^7 
 
 A distinguishing quality of negotiable paper lies in the fact that 
 any person, not an original party, who is a holder in due course may 
 coUect it without regard to personal defenses that may be good as 
 between the original parties. 
 
 A forged signature makes the instrument absolutely void in the 
 hands of one claiming through the forgery. 
 
 A check is considered a conditional payment only. 
 
 Presentment of a negotiable promise to pay is an exception to 
 the rule that *' the debtor must seek the creditor." 
 
 A negotiable instrument is a contract which, as between the 
 immediate parties, requires consideration the same as any other 
 contract. 
 
 Where the sum payable is expressed in figures and also in words, 
 and there is a discrepancy between the two, the sum expressed in 
 words prevails. 
 
 The written provisions of an instilment prevail, where there is 
 a conflict between what is written and what is printed. 
 
 When it is not clear in what capacity a person has signed an 
 instrument, he is considered an indorser. 
 
 A check made payable to a fictitious payee is payable to bearer. 
 
 As to the liability of the maker or makers, notes are either several, 
 joint, or joint and several. 
 
 When the makers of a joint note indorse the note they become 
 severally Hable. 
 
 A holder in due course is one who acquires the instrument under 
 the following conditions: 
 
 1. That it is complete and regular upon its face. 
 
 2. That he acquired it before it was due. 
 
 3. That he acquired it in good faith and for value. 
 
 4. That he was ignorant of any defects in the instrument or in 
 the title of the transferor. 
 
 An infant who comes into possession of a negotiable instrument 
 rightfully may transfer it by indorsement. 
 
 A bill of exchange drawn in one state and payable in another 
 state is considered a foreign bill of exchange. 
 
 A foreign bill of exchange that has been dishonored must be 
 protested. 
 
 Any notary public has authority to protest, or any resident of the 
 place where the instrument is dishonored, in the presence of two or 
 more witnesses. 
 
 The protest must be annexed to the instrument and must specify : 
 
 1. The time and place of presentment. 
 
 2. The fact and manner of presentment. 
 
 3. The reason for protesting the instrument. 
 
 4. The demand made and tiie answer given, if any, or the fact 
 that the right party could not be found. 
 
i88 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 One who cannot write may have an instrument signed as follows : 
 J. C. Walker. 
 X his mark. 
 
 Some one writes "Walker's name, he makes his mark, after which 
 the party who wrote his name writes ** his mark." 
 
 The consideration paid for a negotiable instrument need not 
 equal its face value. 
 
 Payable absolutely means that there must be no condition named 
 in the instrument to prevent an absolute Uability. 
 
 Any future time that is sure to arrive satisfies the law. 
 
 In the case of ambiguous statements or signatures the law per- 
 mits oral evidence to explain the intentions of the parties. 
 
 All time drafts, whether due after sight or after date, should be 
 presented for acceptance. 
 
 The drawee who accepts a draft on which the drawer's signature 
 was forged is Uable. 
 
 A bank that pays a forged check is liable. 
 
 When an instrument has been dishonored and payment refused, 
 notice, unless waived by indorsement or otherwise, must be sent to 
 drawer and all indorsers. 
 
 An instrument must be presented promptly at maturity. 
 
 Personal defenses may be used against original parties ; absolute 
 defenses may be used against all parties. 
 
 Until deUvered a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revo- 
 cable as between original parties. 
 
 TEST QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Is the following a negotiable instrument? 
 
 Philadelphia, Pa., August 3, 1920. 
 Due Joseph Mitchell $100, value received. George Snyder. 
 
 2. An instrument is written in lead pencil in the following form: 
 
 Buffalo, New York. 
 I, James Andrews, promise to pay to Thomas McGrath or order 
 
 One Hundred Fifty Dollars 
 
 Value received. 
 
 Mention three particulars in which this paper is not in the usual form. 
 
 3. Is the following a negotiable instrument? Has it any legal effect? 
 
 Cleveland, Ohio, September i, 1920. 
 Five months after date I promise to pay George Williams the sum of 
 
 Twenty-five Dollars 
 
 Value received. E. D. Parsons. 
 
 4. Is an instrument payable to one of three different persons named 
 negotiable? 
 
TEST QUESTIONS 189 
 
 5. Is there any reason why the following is not a negotiable instru- 
 ment? 
 
 Three months after date for value received I promise to pay Charles 
 Barton, or order, One Hundred Dollars or Ninety-five Dollars if payable 
 60 days after date. Elmer Clark. 
 
 6. State whether or not the following is a negotiable instrument. 
 For value received, I promise to pay Thomas Rice or order $100 when he 
 shall be graduated from college. Charles Ellis. 
 
 7. What kind of promissory note is the following? 
 
 One month after date for value received I promise to pay E. F. 
 Sherwood $100. Edward F. Grant, 
 
 James Grant. 
 
 8. A note is signed, "James Willis by John Rogers, Agent." Which 
 of the two parties is liable? 
 
 9. A note is signed, " Frank Getman, Agent of William Carr." Which 
 is liable on the note, Getman or Carr? 
 
 10. A note is signed "Erie Gas Company, Edward Booth, President." 
 What is the effect of this signature? 
 
 11. The indorsement on a $500 note was as follows: "Pay George 
 Harris or order $300 of the within note. H. E. Young." Is this a good 
 indorsement? 
 
 12. Why is a note protested? 
 
 13. When is protest of a negotiable instrument required by law? 
 
 14. Explain fully the legal effect of an indorsement waiving a protest. 
 
 15. What is the distinction between a personal defense and an abso- 
 lute defense? 
 
 16. Is the following instrument negotiable? "On September i, 1920, 
 I promise to deliver to H. C. Dewitt or his order 150 bu. of A-i grade shell 
 corn for value received. H. W. Edwards." 
 
 17. If the indorsee of a note knew that the indorser had no interest 
 in the note and had only signed for accommodation, would that release 
 the indorser from liability? 
 
 18. If you receive a negotiable instrument indorsed in blank, how can 
 you protect yourself from the danger involved in the loss of the instrument? 
 
 19. Benson accepts a check on which there is an erasure and something 
 has been rewritten. Is he a holder in due course? 
 
 20. Explain the following as applied to a promissory note: (a) nego- 
 tiable in form, (b) payable in money to a designated payee at a time that 
 is certain, (c) unconditional promise to pay, (J) holder in due course. 
 
iQO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 21. Omaha, Nebraska, June i, 1920. 
 Sixty days after date I promise to pay to the order of Edmond Shaw 
 
 One Hundred and -^ Dollars 
 
 100 
 
 at the First National Bank. 
 Value received 
 
 $100^. W. D. Watson. 
 
 Explain the nature of each of the following indorsements on the above 
 note: 
 
 (a) Edmond Shaw (c) Pay A. L. Evans only 
 
 Edmond Shaw 
 
 (b) Pay to the order of (d) Pay Merchants National Bank 
 
 A. L. Evans for deposit 
 
 Edmond Shaw Edmond Shaw 
 
 22. Answer the following questions as applied to notes. What will 
 make an ordinary note a judgment note? How is the maturity of a note 
 determined? How long will a note run on which no payments are made 
 before action to collect is legally barred? 
 
 23. What is the indorser's contract? Explain fully. 
 
 24. (a) Name three forms of promissory notes and explain the effect 
 of each, (b) Name three forms of liability on notes. 
 
 25. What is the obligation of the drawee of a draft before and after the 
 acceptance? 
 
 CASE PROBLEMS 
 Give the decision and the principle of law involved in each case. 
 
 1. A promissory note, given to A. W. Read by O. E. Jansen, was 
 not signed, but on the same sheet of paper following the note were listed the 
 securities which Jansen gave Read to secure payment of the note. Jansen's 
 signature followed the list of securities. Is this a good note? Explain. 
 
 2. Rowe purchased a negotiable note before maturity. The note on 
 its face was for $500. The purchaser was acquainted with the maker and 
 knew that he was solvent. He paid $25 for the note. Was he a holder in 
 duS course? 
 
 3. If the purchaser had taken the above note after maturity and 
 paid the face value, $500, for it, would he have been a holder in due course? 
 
 4. Hempy becomes the holder in due course of a note upon which 
 the maker's name was forged. Can he collect of the indorser? 
 
 5. Rich made and delivered a promissory note payable three months 
 after date to the order of Gaynon. Gaynon after receiving the note changed 
 the time of payment to four months without the knowledge or consent of 
 Rich. Did this affect Rich's liability on the instrument? 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 191 
 
 6. Downs becomes a holder in due course of a promissory note which 
 was given by Rice* to Bates without consideration. Downs sues Rice on 
 the note and Rice sets up the defense of no consideration. Can Downs 
 recover? 
 
 7. Dyer executed a promissory note to Merrit for $100 payable three 
 months after date. One month after date he paid the note. The note 
 instead of being destroyed was lost and came into the hands of Mellon, a 
 holder in due course. Can Mellon recover on the note? 
 
 8. Brown makes a note for three months, but says nothing in refer- 
 ence to interest. He pays the note nine months after having made it. 
 Can interest be collected upon it, and, if so, for how long? 
 
 9. On the day of maturity, Foust, a holder in due course, presented a 
 note to Simpson, the maker. Simpson refused to pay, stating that he had 
 received no consideration for the note. What are the rights of the parties? 
 Explain. 
 
 10. Fitch and Mowery gave a note to Swan on which J. E. Green's 
 name as indorser had been forged. Swan transfers the note to Hickey by 
 indorsement. Fitch and Mowery become insolvent. How are the parties 
 to this note affected? Explain. 
 
 11. Jacobs indorsed for the accommodation of Hardman a note for 
 $1000 payable 60 days after date. Hardman changed the time to 90 days 
 and discounted the note at his bank. When the note came due Hardman 
 failed to pay and the bank protested the note and sent notice of nonpay- 
 ment to Jacobs. What are the rights of the parties? Explain. 
 
 12. Willson, the payee of a negotiable instrument, indorses it to Baker 
 by full indorsement. When the note came due the maker, J. C. Williams, 
 refused payment, claiming that the note had been given as a result of duress. 
 Is this a good defense against Baker? Explain. 
 
 13. Balford wrote his name on a blank note and left it where it was 
 picked up by Hearn, who filled it in for $1000 and transferred it to Max- 
 well, an innocent purchaser for value. Maxwell indorsed the note and dis- 
 counted it at his bank. Can Balford be held? Explain. 
 
 14. Suppose Maxwell in problem 13 had known the fact, but agreed 
 with Hearn to take the note for the purpose of collecting from Balford; 
 could Maxwell have collected it? 
 
 15. Could a bank have collected the note in problem 14 if Maxwell, 
 knowing the fact, had indorsed it to them and they became holders in due 
 course? 
 
 16. Norton gave Roder his three months' note for $500. Roder in- 
 dorsed the note to Walker to apply on account. The note was not pre- 
 
192 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
 
 sented for payment at maturity, but was presented two weeks later. Is 
 the indorser liable? Explain. • 
 
 17. At 2 o'clock on the afternoon of January 5, Milton accepted a 
 check from Conley for $5000 on the Merchants National Bank. The 
 same afternoon Milton went to the Merchants National Bank to cash the 
 check, but he decided that he did not wish to carry that amount of money 
 around, so he had the check certified. He was called out of town that 
 evening and when he returned the bank had failed. What course is open 
 to Milton? Explain. 
 
 18. Lamb is the holder of a negotiable note on which appear the fol- 
 lowing indorsements: 
 
 Homer Cranford 
 Pay to Charles White or order 
 
 F. D. Coon 
 Pay to Sam Harvey or order 
 without recourse to me 
 Charles White 
 Sam Harvey 
 
 The note is due; Lamb presents it to the maker and demands payment, 
 which is refused. What should be his procedure? Explain fully the rights 
 and the liabilities of each of these indorsers. 
 
 19. Odell indorsed a note for the accommodation of Engle. Engle 
 discounted the note at his bank and at maturity he failed to pay it. The 
 bank tried to collect from Odell, who set up the defense of no consideration. 
 Is he Hable? Explain. 
 
 20. Clary had his check certified by his bank and sent it to Mendel 
 and Company to apply on account. Mendel and Company held the check 
 for twenty-eight days before depositing it. The bank certifying the check 
 failed and closed its doors twenty-nine days after the check was certified 
 and before it was returned. Who must bear the loss? 
 
 21. Taylor made out a note, complete in every particular, payable 
 to Bryan and locked it up in his safe. That night he was taken ill and 
 died suddenly. Bryan knew the note had been prepared for him and 
 brought action to recover it. {a) Is it a good note? (6) Has Bryan any 
 rights? Explain. 
 
 22. A note is worded "We jointly promise to pay" and signed by 
 Harvey Long and Edmund Drew. It was not paid when due, and as Long 
 was to be away for a period of time, J. C. Humphrey, the holder, took 
 action against Drew. Can he succeed? Explain. 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 193 
 
 23. In problem 22 had Long and Drew both indorsed this note, 
 would the result of the action have been different? 
 
 24. J. W. Vance gave 0. E. McClure a note for $500 and in connec- 
 tion with the promise to pay he stipulated that he would pay the $500 
 when due or assign to the payee a half interest in a threshing machine which 
 he owned. When the note came due he refused to do either and set up as 
 a defense the nonnegotiability of the instrument. Has the payee a valid 
 claim against Vance? Explain. 
 
 25. Jarvis made a note dated at Detroit, Michigan, and payable in 
 Canadian money. The note was indorsed, in the usual course of business, 
 by the payee to M. O. Dodd. Jarvis failed to pay and M. O. Dodd, after 
 due notice, brought suit against the indorser. Can he collect? Explain. 
 
 26. Hatch holds a note for $500 against Dart. Hatch is indebted to 
 Dart for $500. Hatch transfers the note to Lyman in the usual course of 
 business for value. When the note falls due, Lyman presents it to Dart, 
 who refuses payment on the ground that Hatch is owing to him an amount 
 equal to the face of the note. Lyman protests the note and serves notice 
 on the maker and indorser. Has the maker a good defense? Explain. 
 
 27. Holcomb transferred a note to Merritt by indorsing it without 
 recourse. The note was signed by J. C. Crumb, a well-known builder, but 
 the signature had been forged, a fact known to Holcomb when he trans- 
 ferred the note. When the note came due Merritt presented it to Crumb, 
 who discovered that the signature was a forgery. Merritt took action 
 against Holcomb. Can he recover? Explain. 
 
 28. Johnson indorsed a note to Stewart as follows: "Pay A. H. Stewart 
 only. L. W. Johnson." Stewart indorsed it in full to O. T. Thayer. The 
 maker of the note failed to pay and Thayer brought action against the in- 
 dorsers. Is either of the indorsers liable? Explain. 
 
 29. Hardy signs and delivers a blank note to Spaulding and directs 
 him to fill it in for an amount sufficient to settle a claim held by Lansing, 
 to whom Spaulding was to deliver the note. Spaulding filled in the note 
 for $500 and negotiated it to Black, who demanded payment at maturity. 
 Hardy refused to pay the note and set up as a defense, fraud and lack of 
 consideration. Is he liable? Explain. 
 
 30. Lowry thought that he was signing a subscription blank for a set of 
 encyclopedias, when in reality he signed a cleverly contrived promissory 
 note. This note was negotiated and it got into the hands of an innocent 
 pajty, who took action to recover. Can he succeed? 
 
GUARANTY 
 
 Definition. — A guaranty is a contract resulting from a 
 promise by one party to answer for the debts, defaults, or legal 
 obligations of another party. It is collateral to the main con- 
 tract. 
 
 Jerome wiU not give Hines credit unless North will guarantee payment 
 of the account. North agrees to pay if Hines fails to do so. On the strength 
 of this guaranty in writing which North gave Jerome, Hines secured the 
 credit he desired. In case Hines fails to pay, North is liable. 
 
 Parties. — There are three parties to a guaranty. The 
 guarantor, the one who gives the guaranty; the creditor, the 
 one to whom the guaranty is given; and the principal, the one 
 whose performance or obligation is guaranteed. 
 
 The Contract. — The contract must be in writing as re- 
 quired under the Statute of Frauds, and signed by the guarantor. 
 As distinguished from an original undertaking, whereby one 
 assumes responsibility and is liable for the performance of his 
 part of the contract, it is an agreement to assume liability in 
 case the principal, the one whose performance or obligation is 
 being guaranteed, fails to meet his obligation. That is, it is a 
 promise contingent upon a failure or default. 
 
 Shelton contracted to erect an office building for Moon. One pro- 
 vision of the contract was that Shelton should secure two guarantors, satis- 
 factory to Moon, who would guarantee to reimburse Moon for any loss he 
 may suffer as a result of Shelton 's failure in any particular to fulfill his 
 contract. 
 
 The legal requirements of this guaranty are: 
 
 1. That it must be in writing and signed by the guarantors. 
 
 2. That it must be given concurrently with the original con- 
 tract as an inducement for Moon to enter into a contract with 
 Shelton or if made at another time, some consideration must be 
 given for the guaranty. 
 
 The contract of indemnity which is a simple contract must 
 not be confused with the contract of guaranty. If the contract 
 is one of indemnity only, that is to indemnify a person for any 
 
 194 
 
CONSIDERATION 195 
 
 loss he may suffer by reason of doing something at the request of 
 the guarantor, the contract need not be in writing. In such 
 cases there are but two parties. 
 
 Saunders engaged Lee, a truckman, to transfer some goods from a 
 warehouse to Saunders's store. The streets were sHppery and Lee refused 
 to take his truck out. Finally Saunders told Lee that he would make good 
 any loss resulting from accident caused by the slippery streets. Lee was 
 induced by this promise to attempt to move the goods, and his truck slid 
 against the curb and damaged a wheel. Saunders will have to reimburse 
 Lee, as this is an indemnity contract between two parties and does not need 
 to be in writing. 
 
 If the promise is an original instead of a collateral one it 
 does not have to be in writing. 
 
 North says to Jerome, "Let Hines have such articles as he desires and 
 I will see that you get your pay." In this instance North becomes the original 
 debtor and the contract does not need to be in writing. 
 
 Consideration. — Contracts of guaranty like all other con- 
 tracts must be supported by consideration. When the contract 
 of guaranty is made at the same time as the contract guaranteed, 
 the consideration for the original promise will also be the con- 
 sideration for the collateral promise. 
 
 When the contract of guaranty is made subsequent to the 
 contract which it guarantees, a new consideration is required. 
 
 Morrison leased a store to Economy Furniture Co. Several weeks after 
 the execution and delivery of the lease BuUen signed a written guaranty 
 of the lease. When sued on the guaranty Bullen defended on the ground of 
 no consideration. The Court held that the guaranty, made after the principal 
 contract, was a separate and distinct contract and was not binding without 
 a new and independent consideration. 
 
 — Bullen V. Morrison, 98 111. Appeals 669. 
 
 Guaranty of Collection and Guaranty of Payment. — There 
 is a difference between a guaranty of collection and a guaranty 
 of payment. In a guaranty of payment the guarantor agrees 
 to pay if the principal does not, while in a guaranty of collection 
 he agrees to pay if the debt cannot be collected from the principal. 
 
 Wymann indorsed a note for Hunt as follows: "I hereby guarantee 
 payment of the within note" and signed his name. In this case if Hunt 
 fails to pay the note when it is due, Wymann will have it to pay. 
 
 Had Wymann indorsed the note as follows: "I hereby 
 guarantee the collection of the within note " and signed his 
 
196 GUARANTY 
 
 name, the payee of the note would have to show that he could 
 not by any means collect of Hunt before he could hold Wymann. 
 
 Kinds of Guaranty. — There are many different kinds of 
 guaranty known in business. The most common are: guaranty 
 of quality of goods, guaranty of credit, guaranty of honesty or 
 fidelity, and guaranty of title to real property. 
 
 There are many business concerns engaged in making guaran- 
 ties and selling guaranty insurance. The title guaranty com- 
 panies and the fidelity insurance companies are the most common. 
 
 The purchaser of a building lot, who wishes to make sure that the title 
 to the lot is free from defect, makes application to a title company to have 
 the title searched and insured. The title company have their experts make 
 a search and if they find no defects they issue to the purchaser of the lot a 
 title insurance policy whereby they guarantee to indemnify him for any 
 loss which he may suffer by reason of defects in the title to the lot which he 
 purchased. 
 
 Fidelity insurance companies guarantee the honesty and 
 fidelity of employees and others who are trusted with the cus- 
 tody of property and funds belonging to some one else. 
 
 Nelson secured a position as cashier with the Shore Line Navigation 
 Company. They required him to furnish a bond for one thousand dollars, 
 by which his honesty and fidelity would be guaranteed. Nelson made ap- 
 plication to a bonding company, who furnished the bond. Should he default, 
 the bonding company will have to reimburse his employers for any loss that 
 they may suffer up to the amount of the bond. 
 
 Notice of Acceptance. — Notice of the creditor's acceptance 
 of the guarantee is not necessary when the guaranty is made 
 at the same time as the main contract, but in case of a continuing 
 guaranty it seems to be the prevailing opinion that notice by the 
 creditor is necessary to hold the guarantor. 
 
 Monroe gives a continuing guaranty to Wilson, the creditor, for pay- 
 ment for all goods purchased by Rhodes. In this case it would seem to be 
 the safest plan for Wilson to notify Monroe each time Rhodes makes a 
 purchase. The notice should give the date of purchase and the amount. 
 
 Notice of Default. — Courts dififer on the question of whether 
 the creditor must notify the guarantor in case the principal 
 defaults in his obKgations covered by the guaranty. 
 
 In states requiring notice the following rules are observed: 
 I. Failure to notify guarantor always discharges him if he 
 is injured as a result of not being notified. 
 
DISCHARGE OF GUARANTOR 197 
 
 2. The guarantor is discharged for want of notice if the 
 amount for which he is bound is not known to him. 
 
 In view of the many conflicting rules and opinions, the 
 safer plan is to give notice. 
 
 Discharge of Guarantor. — A guarantor may be discharged 
 from his contract of guaranty for the following reasons: 
 
 1. Alteration of the contract of guaranty. 
 
 2. Voluntary release of the principal. 
 
 3. Extension of time to the principal. 
 
 4. Revocation of guaranty by guarantor. 
 
 5. Surrendering possession of securities by the creditor. 
 
 6. Failure of creditor to take action against the debtor after 
 notice. 
 
 7. Death of the guarantor. 
 
 8. Continued employment of principal after dishonesty was 
 discovered. 
 
 9. Where the main contract is illegal and nonenforceable. 
 Alteration of a Contract of Guaranty. — Where the creditor 
 
 has changed the terms or made any other material alteration in 
 the contract with the principal without the guarantor's consent, 
 he is discharged. 
 
 Foster guaranteed the payment of a 6% interest 60-day note given by 
 Hatch to Munson. Munson on request of Hatch and without Foster's con- 
 sent changed the time to one month. This is a material alteration and dis- 
 charges Foster. 
 
 Release of the Principal. — Where the creditor voluntarily 
 releases or discharges the principal without the consent of the 
 guarantor the guarantor is also discharged. 
 
 Miner guaranteed a debt owed by Van Dyke to Wheeler. Wheeler 
 agreed with Van Dyke to accept 60 per cent of the amount of the debt 
 and give him a release under seal for the full amount of the debt. This 
 discharges Mirier. 
 
 Had Van Dyke been forced into bankruptcy and paid only 
 60 per cent on a dollar, this would have been an involuntary 
 release and Miner would not be discharged. 
 
 Extension of Time. — When the creditor makes a definite 
 extension of the time of payment to the debtor, without the 
 consent of the guarantor, the guarantor is discharged. 
 
198 GUARANTY 
 
 Bower guaranteed payment of a debt due September 15. The creditor, 
 without Bower's consent, extended the time to November 15. This act of 
 the creditor in extending the time discharged Bower. 
 
 Revocation of Guaranty. — When the consideration for the 
 guaranty is an act to be done in the future by the creditor, the 
 guarantor may revoke the guaranty any time before the act 
 is done and by so doing he is discharged. This applies to con- 
 tinuing guaranties. 
 
 Cummings guaranteed payment for all goods purchased by Steele from 
 Post, on and after September i. On December i, Cummings notified Post 
 that he would no longer guarantee payment for goods purchased by Steele. 
 As soon as Post receives this notice, Cummings is discharged as a guarantor 
 for all indebtedness incurred thereafter. 
 
 Surrender of Securities. — When the creditor voluntarily 
 surrenders securities held by him as security for the debt guar- 
 anteed, the guarantor is discharged. 
 
 Failure of the Creditor to Take Action. — In some states, 
 when the guarantor directs the creditor to take action, which 
 he has a legal right to take, and the creditor fails to do so, the 
 guarantor is discharged. 
 
 This rule does not apply to an indorser of a negotiable instru- 
 ment. 
 
 Death of Guarantor. — Death of the guarantor discharges 
 the contract of guaranty and has the same effect as a revocation. 
 In some states notice of the death must be given in order to 
 relieve the guarantor's estate from further liability. 
 
 Continued Employment of Principal after Dishonesty was 
 Discovered. — When the employer willingly retains in his em- 
 ploy a dishonest employee, after he is known to be dishonest, 
 the guarantor, who guaranteed his honesty, will be discharged. 
 
 Main Contract Nonenforceable. — When the main contract 
 
 is illegal and not enforceable against the principal, the contract 
 
 of guaranty, which is collateral to the main contract, could not 
 
 be enforced and the guarantor would be discharged. 
 
 Anderson guaranteed the payment of a note with interest at 8% 
 in a state where 8% was more than the legal rate. Because of the usury, 
 the contract was illegal and nonenforceable and Anderson would be dis- 
 charged from his contract of guaranty. 
 
 Guarantor's Liability. — Under the terms of the contract, 
 
 the guarantor's liabilities are fixed. In substance he guarantees 
 
RIGHTS OF GUARANTOR 199 \ 
 
 performance on the part of some one else, and if the one whose 
 obligation is guaranteed does not fulfill it, the guarantor is 
 liable. i 
 
 Rights of Guarantor. — A guarantor who has been required ] 
 to pay his principal's debt or obligation has certain rights which 
 he may exercise. ] 
 
 1. He has a right to claim indemnity from his principal. ] 
 
 2. He has a right to be subrogated to the creditors' claims j 
 to all collateral securities. { 
 
 3. He has a right to demand contribution from his co- j 
 guarantor. 
 
 Right of Indemnity. — The guarantor has a right to recover i 
 from his principal all moneys rightly paid on account of the 
 guaranty, together with all expenses reasonably incurred by \ 
 him in defending any action by creditors. j 
 
 Right to be Subrogated. — When the guarantor pays the 
 debt, he is entitled to all securities held by the creditors as ] 
 security for the debt which he has paid. Such a substitution of i 
 one person for another in the rights of a creditor is called sub- \ 
 rogation. 
 
 Contribution from Co-guarantors. — When two or more 
 persons guarantee a debt or obligation and one has to or does : 
 pay the entire debt, he is entitled to contribution from each co- ; 
 guarantor for his pro rata share, unless a different basis of 
 liability has been agreed upon by the guarantors. ] 
 
 Guaranty Compared with Suretyship. — In the case of a 
 guaranty, the guarantor becomes liable only where the principal 
 fails, while in the case of suretyship the surety makes the princi- ; 
 pal's debt or obligation his debt or obligation and he is bound 
 severally with the principal, upon the original contract. \ 
 
 Hayes gave Banning a promissory note for $500. Jewett signed the l 
 
 note with Hayes as surety. When the note falls due, Banning may ignore < 
 Hayes entirely and demand payment of Jewett and Jewett will have to 
 
 pay the note. . 
 
 Suretyship. — Aside from the difference in the nature of the ] 
 contracts, suretyship and guaranty conform to the same legal 
 requirements, and the principles of law applicable to one are 
 appUcable to the other. >. 
 
200 GUARANTY 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is a contract of guaranty? 
 
 2. Who are the parties to a contract of guaranty? 
 
 3. What are the special requirements in a contract of guaranty? 
 
 4. Why must a contract of guaranty be in writing? 
 
 5. What is the usual consideration for the guarantor's or surety's 
 promise? 
 
 6. When will a new consideration be required to support a contract 
 of guaranty? 
 
 7. What is the difference between a guaranty of collection and a 
 guaranty of payment? 
 
 8. Mention the different kinds of guaranty. 
 
 9. What is the purpose of a guaranty of title to real property? 
 
 10. Under what circumstances would an employer require a fidelity 
 bond of an employee? 
 
 11. What are fidelity bonds and who issues them? 
 
 12. What are the rules governing notice of acceptance by creditors? 
 
 13. In case of default, must notice be sent to the guarantor? Ex- 
 plain. 
 
 14. How is the guarantor's Hability fixed? 
 
 15. How may a guarantor be discharged from his contract? 
 
 16. What are the special rights of the guarantor? 
 
 17. How does the liability of a surety differ from the liability of a 
 guarantor? 
 
 i8<i What must the creditor do before he can proceed against a 
 guarantor? Against a surety? 
 
 19. What is the right of subrogation? 
 
 20. When there are two or more guarantors and one settles the whole 
 debt, what special right has he? 
 
 21. If the creditor and the principal debtor, without the consent of 
 the guarantor, alter the original contract, how does this affect the guaranty? 
 
 22. What effect does the death of the guarantor have upon his con- 
 tract? 
 
 IMPORTANT POINTS 
 
 A contract of guaranty or suretyship is subject to all legal re- 
 quirements of contracts in general. 
 
 A guarantor's undertaking is collateral to that of his principal. 
 
 A surety is one who makes his principaPs debt his own debt. 
 
 A guarantor is usually entitled to demand or notice within a 
 reasonable time after default of payment. 
 
 A surety is not entitled to demand or notice. He is bound 
 whether notice is given or not. 
 
 If one surety or guarantor pays the whole debt he is entitled to 
 contribution. 
 
TEST QUESTIONS 201 
 
 No additional consideration is required in a contract of guaranty 
 or suretyship made concurrently with the original contract. 
 
 A new consideration is required in all contracts of guaranty and 
 suretyship which are entered into subsequent to the original 
 contract. 
 
 A guarantor's obligations are fixed by the terms of the contract. 
 
 Causes which will discharge the principal will serve to discharge 
 the guarantor or surety. 
 
 An indorser's contract is collateral to that of the maker or princi- 
 pal the same as a guarantor's contract, while a surety's contract is 
 primary and directly enforceable. 
 
 TEST QUESTIONS 
 
 1. How must a contract of guaranty be evidenced? 
 
 2. What is the difference between an indorser's contract and a guar- 
 antor's contract? 
 
 3. When a guarantor is not notified of a default by the principal, 
 what is the effect on the guarantor's liability? 
 
 4. May the creditor proceed against the guarantor without first pro- 
 ceeding against the principal? 
 
 5. How does the liability of surety differ from that of the indorser 
 of a negotiable instrument? 
 
 6. Davis is indebted to Lamb and is unable to pay his debt. The 
 debt was overdue when Davis induced Merritt, a friend of his, to sign a 
 guaranty of the debt. Is Merritt liable on the guaranty? Explain. 
 
 7. In the case just mentioned, Lamb agreed to withdraw legal pro- 
 ceedings if Davis would get some one to guarantee the debt. Merritt was 
 induced by Davis to guarantee the debt. Is Merritt liable? Explain. 
 
 8. Maxwell is a surety for Green on Green's debt. Maxwell pays the 
 debt before any demand has been made on Green by the creditors. Is 
 Maxwell entitled to be reimbursed by Green? 
 
 9. James is the guarantor of Burt's debt to Hinds. Hinds gave Burt 
 a release. What effect does this have on James' obligation? Explain. 
 
 10. Has the surety a right to take advantage of any defenses that 
 might be used by the debtor? 
 
 CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 Give the decision and the principle oj law involved in each case. 
 I. Cochran wished to open an account with Dean and to purchase 
 provisions on credit. Dean would not give Cochran credit unless some one 
 
202 GUARANTY 
 
 would guarantee payment of the account. Cochran induced a friend of 
 his, by the name of Jacobs, to sign a statement as follows : 
 
 "I hereby guarantee to any person selling goods to Cochran, not ex- 
 ceeding $500, that if he does not pay the account when due, I will." Dated 
 and signed, John C. Jacobs. 
 
 When the account came due, Cochran failed to pay and Dean took 
 action against Jacobs. Can he recover? 
 
 2. Had this guaranty been made in writing as shown above after 
 the goods had been purchased and the credit given, could Dean have col- 
 lected from Jacobs? 
 
 3. Sullivan contracted to erect a house for Bertine. Bertine required 
 that Sullivan furnish a bond, signed by two responsible citizens, that he, 
 Sullivan, would faithfully perform his contract and that he would re- 
 imburse Bertine for any loss. Sullivan failed to pay his subcontractors 
 and the masons filed a mechanics' lien against the house. Bertine had to 
 settle this lien, which was more than the amount he still owed Sullivan. He 
 took action against the bondsmen. Can he recover from them? Explain. 
 
 4. Rupert guaranteed the collection of a certain note. When the 
 note became due, the holder presented it to the maker, who refused pay- 
 ment, and then sent notice to Rupert that payment had been refused and 
 that he would look to him for the payment of the note. Rupert paid no 
 attention to this and very soon after the holder of the note took action 
 against Rupert to recover payment. Can he succeed? 
 
 5. Hersh purchased a building lot and had the title searched and 
 insured by the Central Title Guaranty Company. Some time after, Hersh 
 received notice that there was a tax lien of several dollars against the 
 property. He notified the title company and they refused to pay the lien, 
 claiming that they were not responsible for tax items. Hersh took action 
 against the title company to recover damages. Can he succeed? 
 
 6. Clary secured a position as messenger with a local bank. The 
 bank required that Clary furnish a fidelity bond of $1000, which he did. 
 Clary was found guilty of appropriating bank funds to his own use. The 
 bank notified the Bonding Company and forwarded a claim to them for 
 the funds which Clary had appropriated, but did not discharge Clary. 
 The Bonding Co. refused to reimburse the bank for the loss and the bank 
 took action to recover. Can it succeed? Explain. 
 
 7. Harding guaranteed the payment of a 3 -months note given by 
 Murry to Philips. After Harding had guaranteed the payment of this 
 note. Philips changed the time to 6 months and added with interest at 6%. 
 Harding did not hear anything from his contract. When the note became 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 203 
 
 due, Murry failed to pay and Philips notified Harding. Harding dis- 
 covered the alterations and refused to settle. What are the rights of the 
 parties? 
 
 8. On October 27 Adams gave his promissory note to Marsh, with 
 Wendell as surety. The note was due on December 27. When it be- 
 came due Wendell requested Marsh to collect the note. Instead, he orally 
 agreed with Adams for a consideration to extend the note for one year. 
 At the end of this time Adams failed to pay and Marsh took action against 
 Wendell to recover. Can he succeed? 
 
 9. Ward signed a note with Harvey at Harvey's request and Harvey 
 agreed to hold Ward harmless and to indemnify him against loss. Ward 
 paid the note and brought suit against Harvey without giving him any 
 notice of his payment. Can he collect? 
 
 10. Baker was surety on a bond of an executor. The executor mis- 
 appropriated funds belonging to the estate, and when demands were made 
 on him by those who were entitled to the estate, he said he was unable to 
 pay. Suit was then brought against Baker as surety, who defended on the 
 ground that no demand had been made on him. Is he bound? Explain. 
 
BAILMENT 
 
 I. IN GENERAL 
 
 Definition. — Bailment is defined as a delivery of some chattel 
 by one party to another, to be held according to the special pur- 
 pose of delivery, and to be returned or redelivered when that 
 special purpose is accomplished. As we have already seen, a 
 bailment dififers from a sale, in that the title to the property 
 does not pass in a bailment. Practically every case in which 
 one receives and holds or handles the personal property of another, 
 without buying it or receiving it as a gift, is a case of bail- 
 ment. When one borrows or lends a book, hires a horse, or 
 sends a package by express, he is within the rules of bailment. 
 Where the possession but not the title has passed to the vendee, 
 which case we have considered in the chapter on sales, the ven- 
 dee holds as bailee. 
 
 The parties to a bailment are the bailor, or the owner of the 
 
 chattel who delivers it over, and the bailee, who is the party 
 
 vested with the temporary custody of the chattel. 
 
 All loans of articles to be used for a certain purpose and to be returned 
 by the borrower when that purpose has been accomplished; all storage 
 agreements whereby one party takes into his custody and care for a com- 
 pensation or otherwise the goods or property of another; and all cases of 
 hiring the use of any article or chattel for any particular purpose are bail- 
 ments. Whenever an article is found and taken into custody by the finder; 
 when an article is taken to a shop to be repaired; and, in fact, whenever there 
 is a change of possession of goods for a purpose agreed upon by the parties 
 without a change of ownership, the agreement is a bailment contract and 
 subject to the rules and laws governing bailments. 
 
 How Created. — A bailment is created by a contract be- 
 tween the bailor, the party who owns or controls and delivers 
 the goods, and the bailee, the party to whom the goods are 
 delivered. (Goods in this connection may be any personal 
 property.) The contract should specify the purpose for which 
 the bailment is created, the duration of the bailment, the use 
 that is to be made of the thing bailed, and any other facts which 
 may be necessary to determine the respective rights of the bailor 
 and bailee. 
 
 204 
 
IN GENERAL 205 
 
 Classification. — Bailments are generally classified as follows: 
 
 1. Bailment for the benefit of the bailor, 
 
 2. Bailment for the benefit of the bailee, 
 
 3. Bailment for the benefit of both the bailor and bailee. 
 The last bailment, for the mutual benefit of both parties, is 
 
 again classihed as ordinary and exceptional, the exceptional 
 bailments being those of innkeeper and of common carrier. All 
 other cases of bailment for mutual benefit of bailor and bailee 
 are ordinary bailments. 
 
 Degrees of Care. — In all cases of bailment a certain degree 
 of care is required of the bailee. A lack of the required care is 
 termed negligence and renders the bailee liable. 
 
 There are three degrees of care, namely, great, ordinary, 
 and slight. Ordinary care may be defined as the care which a 
 person of ordinary prudence would take of his own property. 
 Anything more than ordinary care would be considered great 
 care and anything less would be considered slight care. While 
 there are three degrees of negligence mentioned by some authors 
 the weight of authority seems to favor but one degree, and 
 whether or not negligence exists in a particular case will depend 
 upon whether the bailee has given the property the required 
 degree of care. 
 
 When the bailment is for the benefit of the bailor, the bailee 
 is expected to take slight care of the property, and failing to do 
 so he would be responsible for negligence, which some would 
 term gross negligence. - 
 
 When the bailment is for the benefit of the bailee he is ex- 
 pected to take great or extraordinary care of the property, and 
 should he fail to do so, he is responsible for negligence (slight 
 negligence) . 
 
 When the bailment is for the benefit of both the bailor and 
 bailee, the bailee is expected to take ordinary care of the prop- 
 erty, and his failing to do so would amount to negligence (ordi- 
 nary negligence). 
 
 Besides the degree of care that is demanded of the bailee, 
 the law requires that he act honestly and in good faith. He 
 must not abuse his trust nor sell, pledge, or otherwise deal 
 with the property in his hands as though he were the owner. 
 
2o6 BAILMENT ^ 
 
 Tortious Bailee. — When property comes into possession 
 of one not its owner as a result of theft, fraud, or of finding any 
 lost property, a tortious bailment results. This bailment is 
 not the result of a contract but is imposed by law for the pro- 
 tection of the owner. A tortious bailee will be held more strictly 
 accountable for the care of the property than an ordinary bailee. 
 He will be absolutely liable for any loss that may occur while 
 the property is in his possession, even if he is not negligent. 
 When one finds property he is not bound to take it into his 
 custody, but if he does he must assume full responsibility. He 
 should make a reasonable effort to find the right owner and in 
 case he fails to do so, he may treat the property as his own. 
 If he fails to make an effort to find the owner he is a tortious 
 bailee. Expenses incurred by the finder in connection with the 
 article found, may be recovered from the owner before the 
 article is surrendered to him. 
 
 Liability Varied by Contract. — As a general rule the parties 
 to a bailment may by contract vary the rights or liabilities of 
 the parties, making the liability of the bailee either greater or 
 less than it would otherwise be, except that the law will not 
 allow the bailee to be exempt, even by contract, from the conse- 
 quences of his own willful misconduct. 
 
 Bailment through an Agent. — Either party to a contract of 
 bailment may act through an agent, and delivery to the agent of 
 the bailee is delivery to the bailee. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is a bailment? 
 
 2. What is the difference between a sale and a bailment? 
 
 3. What are the parties to a bailment called? 
 
 4. Give an example of a bailment. 
 
 5. How is a bailment created? 
 
 6. What should the bailment contract specify? 
 
 7. How are bailments classified according to the benefit? 
 
 8. What are the three degrees of care required of the bailee? 
 
 9. How may ordinary care be defined? 
 
 10. How is it determined whether or not the bailee has been negligent? 
 
 11. What requirements other than the care does the law impose on 
 the bailee? 
 
 12. Wherein does a tortious bailment differ from an ordinary bailment?* 
 
BAILMENT FOR BAILOR'S SOLE BENEFIT 207 
 
 13. What responsibility is imposed on the finder of a lost article and 
 what are his duties with reference to the article found? 
 
 14. May a bailee vary or limit his liabilities by contract? Explain. 
 
 2. BAILMENT FOR THE BAILOR'S SOLE BENEFIT 
 
 Definition. — This class of bailment arises frequently in 
 everyday life. Every undertaking of a friend or neighbor to 
 hold or convey an article of personal property gratuitously and 
 as a favor comes under this class. 
 
 To illustrate, A stores B's wagon in his barn gratuitously; 
 or he takes it to perform some work upon it, as to paint it, with- 
 out charge; or it may be he carries it from one place to another, 
 as to take B's wagon home for him. A bailment for the bailor's 
 benefit may come under any one of these three classes, or it 
 may combine two or all of them. 
 
 Liability of Bailee. — An agreement by the bailee to carry 
 out the gratuitous bailment cannot be enforced because of the 
 lack of consideration, but when the bailee receives the property 
 and carries out the bailment, he is bound to do it with care, 
 and he will be liable for neglecting to take the required care of 
 the property or for wrongful acts in relation thereto. 
 
 It is often difficult to determine whether a bailment is gratui- 
 tous or is for the mutual benefit of the parties, that is, whether 
 or not the bailee is entitled to compensation. The original intent 
 of the parties is the test. If the bailee receives the chattel in the 
 usual course of his business, and business usage and his ordinary 
 method of dealing give him the right to demand compensation, 
 the bailment is not considered gratuitous, even though nothing 
 was said as to compensation. 
 
 Barton took twenty-five U. S. bonds to his bank and left them there 
 for safe keeping; nothing was said at the time about compensation. As 
 the bank makes a business of taking valuable securities and documents 
 for safe keeping and charging for doing so, Barton will be expected to pay 
 the bank's regular charges for keeping his bonds. 
 
 But if the bailee undertakes the service for a near relative or 
 personal friend, or out of mere charity or favor, and if the trust 
 puts him to but little trouble and the bailment is out of his usual 
 course of business, it is presumed to be without compensation. 
 
2o8 BAILMENT 
 
 Lowe expects to be away for a month and he leaves his motorcycle 
 with a friend of his to be cared for during this time. As this is a bailment 
 out of the usual course of the friend's business it is presumed to be with- 
 out compensation. 
 
 Degree of Care Necessary. — In this class of bailment, as we 
 have seen, only the lowest degree of care and diligence is re- 
 quired of the bailee; that is, slight care, and he is not held 
 liable for loss or injury unless guilty of not exercising the re- 
 quired degree of care. 
 
 No absolute rule can be laid down as to just how a gratuitous 
 bailee must care for the chattel in his charge. The circum- 
 stances of the case control; that is, different care would be 
 required of the person who receives a watch or a valuable vase, 
 from that expected of the person who receives a wagon or a load 
 of stone. It is said that a gratuitous bailment seldom demands 
 skilled labor or care, and the gratuitous bailee is excused from 
 the results of inevitable accident, accidental fire, etc. 
 
 Spooner and Mattoon were soldiers in camp, occupying tents lo rods 
 apart. Spooner had considerable money, and fearing it might not be safe 
 left it with his friend, Mattoon, without expectation of reward, for safe 
 keeping. For two nights he so left it, and came for it in the morning. On 
 the third morning he did not call for it, and Mattoon started for Spooner's 
 tent with the money. He put it under his arm inside of his vest, so that 
 the pocketbook would not be seen. It slipped out and was lost. Held, 
 that Mattoon was not guilty of gross negligence, so was not liable. 
 
 — Spooner v. Mattoon, 40 Vt. 300. 
 
 Use of Property. — In bailments of this class the question 
 arises as to whether or not the gratuitous bailee may use the 
 thing bailed to him. Clearly, he cannot make any use of it 
 except for the bailor's benefit, otherwise the bailment would 
 not be included in this class. When the bailee accepts the cus- 
 tody of an animal, he undertakes to feed and care for it. Proper 
 care would require him to drive a horse for exercise, to milk a 
 cow, etc., but the profits derived from the use of the animal in 
 this class of bailment go to the bailor. The bailee has a right 
 to incur necessary expenses in caring for the thing bailed. 
 
 Dillon deposited in the hands of Devalcourt merchandise to be sold, 
 the proceeds to be applied on a debt which he owed to Devalcourt. Held, 
 that whatever useful and necessary expenses Devalcourt incurred in ful- 
 filling the bailment were chargeable to Dillon. 
 
 — Devalcourt v. Dillon, 12 La. Annual 672, A. 
 
BAILMENT FOR BAILEE'S SOLE BENEFIT 209 
 
 Termination. — This class of bailment is terminated either 
 by the accomplishment of the purpose of the bailment or by 
 the express act of either party. The bailee may surrender the 
 article bailed, and so terminate the relation, or the bailor may 
 make a demand and recover the chattel. When the bailment 
 is for the purpose of accomplishing some act, as the delivery 
 of a chattel from one place to another, the bailee, after under- 
 taking the bailment, must accomplish it with at least slight 
 care, or be responsible for breach of contract. But by mutual 
 assent, the bailment may be terminated at any time. The 
 delivery of the identical chattel is necessary. If it is in a bettered 
 condition, the bailee derives no benefit; and if in worse, it is 
 not his loss unless due to his lack of slight diligence or care. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Give an example of a bailment for the bailor's benefit. 
 
 2. Is an agreement for a gratuitous bailment enforceable by either 
 party? 
 
 3. May either party to a bailment contract act through an agent? 
 Explain. 
 
 4. What degree of care is necessary in a bailment for the bailor's 
 benefit? 
 
 5. In such a bailment, when may the bailee use the thing bailed? 
 
 6. How may a bailment for the bailor's benefit be terminated? 
 
 3. BAILMENT FOR BAILEE'S SOLE BENEFIT 
 
 Definition. — This class of bailment consists of the gratuitous 
 loan for use. The bailee is what we call in ordinary language 
 the " borrower." When a man lends his lawn mower or his 
 bicycle to a friend to use and afterwards to be returned, the 
 loan is a bailment for the bailee's sole benefit. 
 
 The bailor must voluntarily give the possession of the article 
 to the bailee without exacting any recompense for its use. This 
 bailment must be distinguished from the loan of something that 
 is to be consumed and afterwards to be paid back in kind, as 
 flour or grain, which is in fact no bailment at all, but a barter; 
 that is, the exchange of the particular property for another of a 
 like kind. 
 
2IO BAILMENT 
 
 The loan may be for a definite period or at the will of the 
 
 bailor, who may terminate it whenever he pleases. 
 
 Clapp sued to recover the possession of a wagon and two mules which 
 he had loaned to Nelson for "a day or two," but which Nelson had neglected 
 to return. Held, that when property is loaned for a definite period or for 
 a day or two or a week or two, if it is not returned at the end of the longer 
 period, the lender can bring an action for it without first making a demand 
 for the property. — Clapp v. Nelson, 12 Texas 370. 
 
 Responsibility of Bailee. — The bailee being the only one 
 benefited, the duty devolves upon him to exercise the highest 
 degree of care or diligence in the use of the chattel, or, as it is 
 expressed, he is bound to use great diligence, and is responsible 
 for every loss which is occasioned by not doing so. 
 
 Great diligence, then, is such as one more than ordinarily 
 careful would bestow upon his property under like circum- 
 stances. Such a high degree of care being required of the gra- 
 tuitous bailee, he is held strictly to the terms of the bailment, 
 and when he deviates from these terms he is liable for the loss 
 or damage ensuing. 
 
 Cuthbertson borrowed a horse to ride to the residence of one Cline and 
 return next day, but instead he rode a mile and a half farther and in a 
 different direction. The horse died during its absence on the third day 
 after leaving home. It was admitted that there was no negligence. Held, 
 that without regard to the question of negligence the bailee is liable for 
 any injury which results from his departure from the contract. 
 
 — Martin v. Cuthbertson, 64 N. C. 328. 
 
 But where the borrower, while using the chattel within the 
 
 terms of the bailment, encounters some accident whereby the 
 
 thing loaned is injured or lost without even slight negligence 
 
 on his part, he is not Hable. If the chattel is injured or destroyed 
 
 by inevitable accident or by fire, or if it is an animal and dies a 
 
 natural death, the loss will not fall upon the bailee unless he is 
 
 in fault. 
 
 Beller loaned a flag to Schultz. After it was hoisted a hailstorm came 
 up and damaged it. Held, that in the absence of proof that Schultz had 
 failed to take due care of the flag, he was not liable. A borrower of property 
 is not an insurer, even though it be gratuitously loaned. 
 
 — Beller v. Schultz, 44 Mich. 529. 
 
 Use of Property. — As we have seen, this class of bailment 
 carries with it the right to use the chattel, subject to such con- 
 ditions and limitations as the bailor may be reasonably sup- 
 
BAILMENT FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT 211 
 
 posed to have made. Such expense as may be necessary to 
 preserve the chattel while in use is to be paid by the borrower, 
 as feeding and sheltering a horse or other domestic animals. 
 But any extraordinary expense which wholly preserves the prop- 
 erty for the owner may properly be chargeable to the bailor. 
 
 It is expected when a person borrows an article to use that 
 the use will be personal; that is, the thing borrowed will be used 
 by the borrower. Circumstances may change this. For ex- 
 ample: a merchant, who is not known to engage in manual 
 labor, may borrow a plow. It would not be expected that he 
 was to use the plow, but instead, that it would be used by some 
 one employed by him. 
 
 A3 soon as the bailment is ended, either by the expiration of 
 the term, the act of the bailor, or the mutual agreement of the 
 parties, the borrower must immediately deliver the property to 
 the bailor or his order. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Give an example of a bailment for the bailee's benefit. 
 
 2. What degree of care is the bailee expected to exercise? 
 
 3. Under what conditions would the bailee be liable even though he 
 exercised the required degree of care? 
 
 4. Would the bailee be liable in case of accident if he had been duly 
 careful? 
 
 5. What are the rules with reference to the use of the property where 
 the bailment is for the bailee's benefit? 
 
 4. BAILMENT FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT 
 
 Definition. — This class of contract differs from those just 
 considered in that the benefits to be derived are mutual instead 
 of being confined to one side. It is a business transaction rather 
 than an act of favor or friendship. 
 
 Bailments of this class may consist of (i) the hired service 
 about a chattel, (2) the hired use of a chattel, or (3) pledge or 
 pawn. 
 
 In mutual benefit bailments it is essential that there be a 
 recompense for the use of the chattel or for the work to be be- 
 stowed upon it. The amount may be definitely fixed or, in the 
 
212 BAILMENT 
 
 absence of an agreed price, it may be such as shall be deter- 
 mined to be just and reasonable. 
 
 Chamberlin owned a horse for which he had no use, and, to avoid the 
 expense of keeping it, requested Cobb to take it and do his work with it 
 in consideration of its feed and keep. Held, to be not a mere gratuitous 
 loan, under which Cobb would be required to exercise extraordinary care, 
 but a contract for the mutual benefit of both parties, under which Cobb 
 was required to exercise ordinary care in the keeping and care of the 
 animal. — Chamberlin v. Cohh, 32 Iowa 161. 
 
 Hired Service about a Chattel. — In the hired service about 
 a chattel the bailment may be for the purpose of having the 
 chattel stored or cared for, or it may be for the purpose of having 
 work performed upon it, or for the purpose of having it carried 
 from place to place. Among the hired custodians who store or 
 care for property are safe depositaries, who for a consideration 
 keep valuables in a safe place, and warehousemen, who for a 
 certain charge keep goods and merchandise in storage. The 
 hired work upon a chattel includes that of the wagon-maker 
 who takes a wagon to repair it, of the watchmaker who takes a 
 watch to adjust it, and of other classes of mechanics who re- 
 ceive chattels to bestow labor of different kinds upon them. 
 The hired carriage of a chattel may be performed by a private 
 carrier, who for hire undertakes to transport a particular chattel, 
 or the public or common carrier who follows as a business the 
 conveying of chattels or persons. Private carriers are within 
 the usual rules of a mutual benefit bailment, while public carriers, 
 including railroads and express companies, come within a special 
 class, which will be discussed later. 
 
 In the bailment for hire the degree of care or diligence re- 
 quired of the bailee is said to be ordinary diligence, or such care 
 as a prudent person exercises toward his own property under 
 like circumstances. He is therefore liable for loss or injury to 
 the chattel caused by ordinary negligence or, in other words, a 
 failure to bestow ordinary care and diligence. 
 
 Piella wrote to Knights that he had a customer for a diamond and 
 requested him to send some for examination. The diamonds were sent by 
 Knights and were stolen while in Piella's possession. It was held to be a 
 bailment for mutual benefit and Piella was not liable for the loss unless he 
 failed to use ordinary care and diligence in his custody of the goods. 
 
 — Knights V. Piella, 1 1 1 Mich. 9. 
 
BAILMENT FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT 213 
 
 While the chattel is in the possession of the workman em- 
 ployed in working upon it, if it is destroyed by inevitable acci- 
 dent or through some natural cause and without any fault upon 
 his part, he will not be liable. 
 
 A greater degree of care is required of the safe depositary 
 
 who stores jewelry and valuables than is required of a cattle 
 
 keeper. So the exact care and precaution required of the bailee 
 
 depends much upon the circumstances of the particular case. 
 
 A bailee who stored cotton for hire, permitted some of it to remain 
 with the roping off, the bagging torn, and the under portion in water so 
 that it became stained and much was damaged. The court held that there 
 was a want of ordinary care and the bailee was Hable. 
 
 — Morehead v. Brown, 51 N. C. 367. 
 
 When the bailee is to perform some work upon the chattel, 
 
 he must exercise such skill as a prudent workman of the same 
 
 class would bestow upon a similar undertaking. And for a 
 
 failure to exercise ordinary skill he will be liable as for a lack 
 
 of ordinary diligence. 
 
 Meegan took Smith's boat to make certain repairs upon it. Held, 
 that he was bound to use ordinary diligence in the care of the boat and was 
 liable for any damages to it occasioned by launching it into the river at a 
 time and under circumstances of great danger which ought to have been 
 foreseen and which resulted in the destruction of the boat. 
 
 — Smith V. Meegan, 22 Mo. 150. 
 
 Thus it is apparent that the skill required in different cases 
 varies greatly according to the nature of the work required, but 
 in all cases honesty and good faith are required of the bailee. 
 
 Rights of the Bailee. — The bailee, for hire, has the right 
 to the undisturbed possession of the chattel during the ac- 
 complishment of the purposes of the bailment, and when the 
 work is completed he has the right to demand suitable com- 
 pensation. This compensation may be fixed in advance or left 
 to be computed later on a basis of what is just and reasonable. 
 
 Redelivery. — When the service required by the bailment 
 has been completed, it is the bailee's duty to deliver the chattel 
 to the bailor, and it is the duty of the bailor to pay the com- 
 pensation. The delivery back must be to the bailor, his agent, 
 or to his order. It is customary for warehousemen who conduct 
 places of storage, also wharfingers who keep wharves on which 
 goods are received and shipped for hire, to give to the bailor. 
 
214 BAILMENT 
 
 or owner of the goods, at the time the goods are delivered, a 
 receipt known as a warehouse or wharfinger's receipt. These 
 receipts are generally considered as representing the property 
 itself and are assignable from one person to another, and the 
 warehouseman is held to be the bailee of the person to whom 
 the receipt is transferred. 
 
 A bill of lading represents the property for which it is given, and by 
 its indorsement, or delivery without indorsement, the property in the goods 
 may be transferred where such is the intent in making the indorsement or 
 delivery. — Dodge v. Meyer, 6i Calif. 405. 
 
 Lien. — Although, as we have said, it is the duty of the 
 bailee to deliver back the chattel, still he may keep possession 
 until he is paid for his services on the chattel or payment has 
 been tendered to him. This right is called a lien and exists in 
 favor of any bailee who has performed services in regard to the 
 thing bailed such as repairing it or storing it. 
 
 This lien holds only for the service bestowed upon the par- 
 ticular chattel, and lasts only while the bailee retains possession. 
 
 Bowers had a truck repaired by Andrews. Andrews, by right of lien, 
 may retain possession of the truck until Bowers pays him for the work 
 done. He cannot, however, hold the truck for any other debt. 
 
 • Hired Use of a Chattel. — The hiring of a chattel for use is 
 frequently illustrated in everyday transactions, as in the hiring 
 of a bicycle or a rowboat. After the contract is made it is the 
 bailor's duty to deliver the chattel and to allow the bailee or 
 hirer to have possession for the agreed purpose or during the 
 stipulated time. 
 
 Buck leased Hickok a farm for one year, and agreed to provide a horse 
 for Hickok to use during the term. He furnished a horse at first, but took 
 it away and sold it before the expiration of the term. Held, that Hickok 
 had an interest in the horse for the period, and could recover damages 
 from Buck for taking it away. — Hickok v. Buck, 22 Vt. 149. 
 
 It is the bailee or hirer's duty to use the chattel with care, 
 and for no other purpose than that for which it was hired. He 
 also has a further duty to return it at the termination of the 
 bailment and to pay the consideration for its use. As in other 
 instances of a mutual benefit bailment, the bailee must use ordi- 
 nary care and diligence. This is the rule only when the chattel 
 is used as agreed. And if the bailee uses the hired property in 
 
BAILMENT FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT 215 
 
 a way materially different from that mutually agreed upon, he 
 is in most instances liable absolutely for any resulting loss or 
 injury. 
 
 Kyle hired a horse of Fisher to drive to a certain place. He drove 
 beyond the place stated, and the horse fell dead while being driven. Kyle 
 was held liable for the value of the horse. A person who hires a horse for 
 a specific journey and drives him .beyond that journey takes upon himself 
 all the consequences of such additional drive, and if the horse dies while 
 being so driven, the hirer is liable. — Fisher v. Kyle, 27 Mich. 454. 
 
 Pledge or Pawn. — This class of mutual benefit bailments 
 consists of the loan or deposit of a chattel as security for some 
 debt or agreement. This mode of securing a debt differs from 
 a chattel mortgage in that the possession is transferred in the 
 pledge, while in the case of a chattel mortgage the possession 
 is generally retained by the owner. In the mortgage the title 
 passes conditionally to the mortgagee, while in a pledge it 
 remains in the bailor. 
 
 Collateral Security. — ^''Collateral security" is another term 
 applied to this class of bailments, but the term has a broader 
 meaning and includes chattel mortgages as well. The name 
 " pawn " is the old expression, and is still in use as applied to 
 a class of persons called pawnbrokers, who make a business of 
 loaning money on articles of personal property deposited with 
 them. But the same object is accomplished by the banker who 
 loans money and accepts as collateral security, stocks, ware- 
 house receipts of grain, bills of lading, etc. From this we can 
 see that the subject of a pledge may be any kind of personal 
 property, including bills and notes, certificates of stock, bonds, 
 and bank deposits. But the thing pledged must be in existence, 
 for if it has ceased to exist, the pledge is void; as in a case 
 where the chattel has been burned or, if an animal, it is dead. 
 
 It was held, that the giving of a savings bank book to a third person 
 for delivery to a creditor as security for a debt will create a valid pledge of 
 the book and deposit. — Boynton v. Payrow, 67 Maine 587. 
 
 The pledgee must exercise ordinary care and diligence to- 
 ward the thing pledged, and when the property is delivered as 
 security for a particular loan, it cannot be held as security for 
 any other. 
 
2i6 BAILMENT 
 
 Baldwin borrowed $ioo from Bradley and pledged with him, as security 
 for this loan, one $ioo government bond. When Baldwin paid the $ioo 
 Bradley refused to return the bond until a preexisting debt of $50 was 
 paid by Baldwin. Bradley has no right to hold the bond for any other 
 debt than the one for which it was given as security. 
 
 The bailee must keep the chattel in his possession, and if he 
 voluntarily surrenders possession to the owner, the benefit of the 
 bailment or pledge as security is lost. An exception is the re- 
 delivery of the thing pledged to the bailor for some temporary- 
 purpose and with the understanding that the pledgee is again to 
 have possession, in which case the security is not lost. 
 
 The pledgee has the right to use the chattel pledged if it is 
 of such a nature that it requires use; for instance, a horse may 
 be driven for exercise. But if the article pledged would be the 
 worse for usage, then the pledgee is prohibited from using it. 
 All profits derived from the article pledged belong to the pledgor 
 and must be accounted for to him, but all necessary expenses 
 for the keeping of the property are chargeable to the owner. 
 
 Unlike other bailments, the pledgee may assign or repledge 
 his interest in the article pledged, but only subject to the origi- 
 nal pledge; that is, the original pledgor may always recover 
 the article by satisfying the terms of the original pledge. 
 
 The pledgee has a right to the undisturbed possession of the 
 chattel pledged. After the pledgor has made default in paying 
 the debt secured, the pledgee may sell the chattel, after giving 
 the pledgor a reasonable notice of the time and place of sale, 
 which notice must be preceded by demand of payment. The 
 sale, unless the pledgee is a pawnbroker, must be by public 
 auction, and the goods must be struck off to the highest bidder. 
 
 Sell borrowed $100 from Ward and pledged a musical instrument and 
 a dress suit as security. Ward accepted a note for the loan, which was 
 a redemption of the pledge and entitled Sell to the return of the articles. 
 The instrument was returned, but the suit had been sold by Ward and the 
 proceeds credited to Sell. This action was to recover the value of the suit. 
 It was held, that Ward had no right to sell the suit without calling upon 
 Sell to redeem and giving him notice of the time and place of sale. This 
 not having been done, the sale was unlawful and Sell was entitled to 
 recover. — Sell v. Ward, 81 111. Appeals 675. 
 
 In case the pledged property consists of notes, bills, or bonds, 
 which will soon become due, the proper procedure is to hold 
 
BAILMENT FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT 217 
 
 them until maturity and collect them if possible, applying the 
 proceeds on the debt. 
 
 A pledge of commercial paper as collateral security for a debt does not, 
 in the absence of a special power to that effect, authorize the pledgee to 
 sell the security so pledged either at public or private sale upon default of 
 payment of the original debt by the pledgor. The pledgee is bound to hold 
 and collect the same as it becomes due, and apply the net proceeds to the 
 payment of the debt so secured. — Union Trust Co. v. Rigdon, 93 111. 458. 
 
 The pledgee has the further remedy of bringing an action in 
 the equity court to foreclose his claim upon the article pledged, 
 and when large amounts are involved, this is a frequent pro- 
 cedure. When the original debt has been discharged without 
 recourse to the property pledged, the pledgor is entitled to the 
 return of his chattels, the object of the bailment having been 
 accomplished. But before the pledgor is entitled to the return 
 of the chattels pledged, the principal debt and also the interest 
 and all necessary expenses incidental to the pledge must be 
 paid. A tender made by the pledgor to terminate the pledge 
 must include both the interest, if any, and all such necessary 
 expenses. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. How do mutual benefit bailments differ from other bailments? 
 
 2. Name three classes of mutual benefit bailments and give an example 
 of each. 
 
 3. What is essential in a mutual benefit bailment? 
 
 4. What degree of care is the bailee expected to exercise? 
 
 5. What degree of skill must the bailee exercise? 
 
 6. What rights has the bailee? 
 
 7. What duty is imposed on the bailee with reference to redelivery? 
 
 8. Explain the bailee's right of lien. 
 
 9. What are the rights and duties of a bailee who hires a chattel for use? 
 
 10. What is a pledge or pawn bailment and wherem does it differ 
 Irom a chattel mortgage? 
 
 11. Explain the meaning of the term "collateral security." 
 
 12. May pledged securities be held for any other debt than the one 
 or which they were pledged? 
 
 13. Has the pledgee a right to use the thing pledged? Explain, 
 
 14. Has the pledgee a right to assign or repledge his interest in the 
 'pledged article? Explain, 
 
 15. What are the rights of the pledgee? 
 
 16. What remedy has the pledgee where the pledgor does not fulfill 
 his contract? 
 
2i8 BAILMENT 
 
 5. INNKEEPERS 
 
 Definition. — An innkeeper is one who keeps a house, or inn, 
 for the lodging and entertainment of travelers. In the modern 
 sense he is a hotel keeper, an inn being the same as our hotel 
 or tavern. The innkeeper or hotel keeper differs from a board- 
 ing-house keeper in that his is a public calling and he is required 
 by law to receive and give accommodations to all persons of 
 good behavior who apply and offer to pay for their accommo- 
 dation, unless his house is full. Boarding-house keepers, or 
 restaurant keepers, can receive or refuse such persons as they 
 please. 
 
 Guests. — The relation of innkeeper arises only with refer- 
 ence to such parties as are his guests, a guest being one who as a 
 transient traveler partakes of the entertainment of the inn or 
 hotel. He may be a guest, although he does not stay over- 
 night. 
 
 A person receiving a gratuitous accommodation is not a 
 guest. To create the relation of guest the innkeeper must receive 
 pay for the accommodation. 
 
 Innkeeper's Liability. — The innkeeper is a bailee of the 
 property and baggage of the guest, and this includes wearing 
 apparel^ jewelry, and money. 
 
 By the common law the responsibility of the innkeeper as 
 bailee was exceptionally great. He was in most cases held to 
 be an insurer of the goods and liable if they were lost, even 
 without any fault on his part, unless the loss was occasioned by 
 the guest's negligence or by an act of God, — flood, Kghtning, 
 etc. 
 
 Hulett's goods were destroyed by fire while he was a guest at Swift's 
 hotel. The cause of the fire was unknown, but Hulett was free from negli- 
 gence. Held, that the innkeeper was liable. An innkeeper is an insurer 
 of property committed to his custody by a guest unless the loss be due to 
 the negligence or fraud of the guest, or to the act of God or the public 
 enemy. — Hulett v. Swift, 2,3 N. Y. 571. 
 
 Other cases go so far as to reHeve the innkeeper from Ha^ 
 bility in case of loss if he can show positively that he was in 
 no way negligent, but this is a modification of the common law 
 rule. 
 
INNKEEPERS 219 
 
 When property committed to the custody of an innkeeper by his guest 
 is lost the presumption is that the innkeeper is liable for it, but he can re- 
 lieve himself from that liability by showing that he has used extreme 
 diligence. — Howth v. Franklin, 20 Tex. 798. 
 
 The innkeeper is responsible for the acts of his servants and 
 
 employees the same as for his own acts. 
 
 A suit was brought against Proctor, an innkeeper, for a coat which had 
 been left by Rockwell who was a guest at Proctor's hotel. The coat had 
 been given to a negro in charge. It was held that Proctor was liable as inn- 
 keeper for the act of his servant. — Rockwell v. Proctor, 39 Ga. 105. 
 
 Therefore the innkeeper is liable for any theft of the guest's 
 property, and he is not excused on the plea that he selected his 
 servants carefully and performed his own duty well. 
 
 Limitation of Liability. — The statutes in most of the states 
 now allow the innkeeper to relieve himself from the extreme 
 rigor of the common law, permitting him to limit his responsi- 
 bility for money and valuables by requiring the guest to deliver 
 them into his special custody. This is generally done by re- 
 quiring that they be placed in the innkeeper's safe. But notice 
 of this requirement must be given as required by the statute, 
 or the common law liability will attach. 
 
 Lang went to the Arcade Hotel, and retained in his own possession 
 money and jewelry, although the innkeeper had provided a safe for the 
 deposit of such articles and had posted notices of the privileges as required 
 by law. Held, the hotel was not liable for the theft of the money and 
 jewelry. — Lang v. Arcade Hotel Co., 9 Ohio 372. 
 
 Termination of Relation. — The liability of the innkeeper for 
 the guest's personal property exists as long as the owner of the 
 property maintains his relation as guest of the hotel or inn. 
 
 Burckhardt paid his bill at the Brown Hotel so as to cash a draft, but 
 it was understood that he. would return, meanwhile retaining his rooms, 
 and he gave no orders for the removal of his baggage. During his absence 
 his trunks were moved from the rooms and one was lost. Held, that Burck- 
 hardt was still a guest of the hotel and the Brown Hotel Company was 
 liable for the loss of the trunk. 
 
 — Burckhardt v. Brown Hotel Co., 13 Colo. Appeals 59. 
 
 But after the relation of guest has ceased, the innkeeper is 
 liable for property left with him only as an ordinary bailee. 
 
 Innkeeper's Lien. — As we have seen, the innkeeper is Com- 
 pelled to receive any proper person who may apply for accom- 
 
220 BAILMENT 
 
 modations, but he need not receive those who cannot pay, and 
 he may require payment to be made in advance. 
 
 When he is not paid in advance, the law gives him a lien for 
 all unpaid charges upon the property which the guest har. 
 brought into the house and placed in the custody of the inn- 
 keeper or bailee. 
 
 The innkeeper can detain the property until he is paid, but 
 if he voluntarily surrenders it, the lien is lost. Statutes in 
 most of the states now give boarding-house keepers a like lien, 
 but by common law it extended only to innkeepers. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Who is an innkeeper? 
 
 2. What is the difference between an innkeeper and a boarding- 
 house keeper? 
 
 3. Who is a guest? i 
 
 4. What is the difference between a guest and a boarder? 
 
 5. To what extent is an innkeeper liable for the property of his guest? 
 
 6. Are there any circumstances under which an innkeeper would be 
 relieved from liability in case of a loss of his guest's property? Explain. 
 
 7. Is an innkeeper responsible for the acts of his servant? Explain. 
 
 8. In what way may an innkeeper relieve himself from liability? 
 Explain. 
 
 9. Explain the innkeeper's right of Hen. 
 
 10. When is the relation of a guest of a hotel said to be terminated? 
 
 6. COMMON CARRIERS 
 
 Carriers of Goods. — A carrier of goods is one who under- 
 takes to transport personal property from one place to another. 
 He may be either a private carrier who comes under the class 
 of ordinary bailees or a common carrier who is subject to special 
 rules. A common carrier is one whose regular calling is to 
 transport chattels for hire for all who may choose to employ him, 
 while a private carrier is one who transports goods gratuitously 
 or only in special cases. 
 
 A carrier may be one who operates by land or by water, the 
 laws regulating their liability being much the same. Express, 
 railrbad, and steamboat companies are everyday examples of 
 common carriers. In order to constitute one a common carrier 
 
COMMON CARRIERS 221 
 
 two things are necessary: first, a continuous offer to the public 
 to carry, and second, the charge of a compensation for the 
 service. 
 
 Goods and Payment for Carriage. — Common carriers are 
 said to be carriers of ''goods," and this term includes animals, 
 money, and in fact any article of personal property that is 
 subject to transportation. Generally speaking, a common 
 carrier is bound to receive whatever may be offered him for 
 transportation, when the charges are paid or offered to be paid. 
 Payment must be offered, as the carrier is under no obHgation to 
 carry free or upon credit. If he does not obtain his pay upon 
 receipt of the goods, he may hold them until his charges are paid, 
 the law creating a lien upon the goods for the charges and expenses 
 in favor of the common carrier. This compensation is sometimes 
 termed "freight" when applied to the charge for carrying goods. 
 After the goods have been delivered to the carrier the shipper 
 cannot retake them without paying the freight, and if they are 
 intercepted before reaching their destination, the full freight 
 can be recovered by the carrier. The consignor or shipper is 
 the party primarily liable for the freight and not the consignee 
 or the person to whom the goods are shipped, unless the con- 
 signee expressly agrees to pay it. 
 
 Regulation of Charges. — Under the common law a carrier 
 could charge different rates to different shippers for the same 
 article, provided that all charges must be reasonable. Generally 
 throughout the United States, statutes have provided that 
 uniform rates muSt be charged and have created Commissions 
 which must fix or approve all rates. 
 
 Right to Refuse Goods. — As we have said, a common 
 carrier is generally bound to receive whatever is offered to him 
 to carry. This rule is subject to three qualifications, viz. : first, 
 the carriage of the chattel must be for hire; second, the carriage 
 must be within the carrier's facilities for conveyance; third, the 
 carriage must be in the line of the carrier's vocation. 
 
 We have already discussed the first qualification. As to the 
 second, it is but reasonable that the carrier may refuse to re- 
 ceive goods when he has not sufiicient room or adequate facil- 
 ities for carrying them safely. He is under no obligation to 
 
222 BAILMENT 
 
 furnish extra equipment to satisfy an unusual demand. So, 
 if the article carried be larger or heavier than the carrier can 
 handle, he may refuse it on that ground. Furthermore, he 
 may decline to receive particular property which may at the 
 time be exposed to extraordinary danger or hazard on his route. 
 
 The fact that the Illinois Central Railway was under the military con- 
 trol of the officers of the United States Army was a sufficient excuse for the 
 road to refuse to receive freight while it was under such a control, it not 
 being safe for the road to undertake the carriage of freight. 
 
 — Phelps V. Illinois Central Railway, 94 111. 548. 
 
 The article offered for transportation may not be in the line 
 of the carrier's vocation. A freight carrier may not necessarily 
 hold himself out to carry passengers. He need carry only the 
 class of goods included in his public profession. 
 
 This was an action for damages against the Midland Railway Co. for 
 refusing to transport five tons of coal. The railway company never car- 
 ried coal and did not hold itself out for any such business, and could not, 
 unless it gave up its passenger traffic. Held, that a common carrier is not 
 bound to carry every description of goods, but only such goods, and to and 
 from such places, as he has publicly professed to carry, and for which pur- 
 poses he has conveyances. 
 
 — Johnson v. The Midland Railway Co., 4 Exch. (Eng.) 367. 
 
 Interstate Commerce Act. — The carrier may prescribe 
 reasonable rules as to the time and manner of receiving goods. 
 He cannot be required to receive them at an unreasonable hour 
 or place, and he may insist that the goods be packed in a reason- 
 able way. By statutes passed in most of the states the carrier 
 is prohibited from discriminating in favor of one customer over 
 another either in rates or privileges of any kind. The common 
 carrier must not select his patrons arbitrarily, but must furnish 
 equal facilities to all. 
 
 To further this object a statute was passed by the Congress 
 of the United States in 1887 which is known as the Interstate 
 Commerce Act. This law was designed to regulate the com- 
 merce between the states and applies to all common carriers, 
 either by land or water, who transport persons or property 
 from one state to another or between the United States and 
 foreign countries. It provides that no discrimination shall be 
 made between large or small, constant or occasional, shippers, 
 and that no charges shall be unjust or unreasonable. It also 
 
LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS 223 
 
 provides that proportionate charges shall be made for long and 
 short distances. The law further requires that the schedule of 
 rates shall be published and filed with commissioners who aire 
 appointed to oversee the enforcement of the law and are known 
 as the Interstate Commerce Commission. The law also makes 
 it unlawful for any common carrier who comes under its pro- 
 visions to enter into any combination or agreement by which 
 the continuous carriage of freight from one point to another 
 shall be delayed or interrupted. 
 
 All of the large railroad and express companies come within 
 the provisions of this law. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Who is a common carrier of goods? 
 
 2. What is the difference between a common carrier and a private 
 carrier? 
 
 3. Give some examples of common carriers. 
 
 4. What is necessary to constitute one a common carrier? 
 
 5. What does the term " goods " as applied to common carriers include? 
 
 6. What are the rules governing the carriage of goods? 
 
 7. How. are charges usually regulated? Explain. 
 
 8. Under what conditions has a common carrier a right to refuse 
 goods? 
 
 9. What is the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act? 
 
 10. What are the main provisions of this law? 
 
 11. What carriers are subject to the provisions of this law? 
 
 7. LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS 
 
 When Liability Begins. — The common carrier becomes re- 
 sponsible for the goods when they are delivered to him for 
 carriage and accepted by him in the capacity of a carrier. The 
 delivery should be made to the agent or person whose business 
 it is to receive freight, not to any one who may be about the 
 place of delivery. 
 
 In the case of expressmen and other carriers who go after the 
 goods and receive them at the shipper's residence or place of 
 business, their liabihty begins when they receive the goods. 
 
 Receipts. — It is always prudent for the shipper or sender 
 of the goods to demand of the carrier a receipt for the articles 
 
224 • BAILMENT 
 
 delivered. This is termed a freight receipt or bill of lading. 
 Originally a bill of lading was given only by a carrier by water, 
 but it is now given by all carriers. It consists of a writing 
 showing the receipt of the goods and the terms of the contract 
 of carriage in brief form. 
 
 Limits of Liability. — As in the case of the innkeeper, the 
 liability of the common carrier is exceptionally great. He is 
 held liable as an insurer of the goods against all risks of loss or 
 injury, except when the loss arises from the following causes: 
 (i) by an act of God, or by a public enemy, (2) by the act of the 
 shipper, (3) by the act of the public authority, (4) from the 
 nature of the goods. In the early times this strict measure of 
 responsibility was placed upon the carrier for reasons of public 
 policy. In an age of thieving and lawlessness the carrier had 
 many opportunities to defraud his customers, and, by collusion 
 with thieves and robbers, to cause the shipper to be defrauded. 
 To this absolute liability as an insurer there were only two 
 exceptions under the common law, and these were losses occa- 
 sioned either by act of God or the king's enemies. But modern 
 methods make the- reason for the rule less urgent, and modern 
 legislation has relieved the carrier's liability in the other cases 
 just specified. 
 
 Loss or Injury by Act of God. — This includes those causes 
 which man neither produced nor can contend against; as, acci- 
 dents caused to the goods while the carrier is within the line of 
 duty, by lightning, tempest, earthquake, flood, sudden death, 
 snow, rough winds, freezing, and thawing. 
 
 It was held that an injury to property in transit, caused by an earth- 
 quake, was the result of an act of God and the So. Carolina Ry. Co. was not 
 liable for the injury. — Slater v. So. Carolina Ry. Co., 29 S. C. 96. 
 
 But a prudent man will foresee the less violent of these 
 causes, such as snow and freezing, and a carrier will not be 
 excused for loss in such cases, unless he has exercised prudence 
 and foresight in regard to them. 
 
 Fruit trees shipped on the Pacific R.R. were frozen while en route, and 
 the freezing was held to be an act of God for which the company was not 
 liable, unless caused by unnecessary delay in transporting the trees or by 
 their careless exposure to the cold. — Vail v. Pacific Railroad, 63 Mo. 230. 
 
LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS 225 
 
 Loss by Fire. — Loss by fire, unless caused by lightning, is 
 
 not an act of God and a common carrier is not excused from 
 
 loss by this cause unless it is expressly contracted for. 
 
 Unless a carrier limits his responsibility by the terms of a bill of ladin^'j 
 or otherwise, he cannot escape the obligation to deliver the goods at their 
 destination unless prevented by the public enemy or by an act of God. 
 A loss by accidental fire is not a sufficient excuse unless the fire be caused 
 by lightning. — Parker v. Flagg, 26 Maine 181. 
 
 Loss or Injury by Public Enemies. — This is a loss caused by 
 
 those at war with one's country. 
 
 Wood contracted with McCranie, a carrier by boat, to remove certain 
 cotton belonging to McCranie to places deemed safe from hostiUties during 
 the Civil War. It was stored where it was deemed safe, but hostilities arose 
 there and the cotton was destroyed. Held, that Wood had performed, 3,3 
 far as was in his power, and the goods having been destroyed by the pubUc 
 enemy, he was not liable. — McCranie v. Woods, 24 La. Annual 406. 
 
 But the violence of mobs or rioters does not bring the par- 
 ticipants within the term " public enemies." 
 
 Loss or Injury by Act or Fault of the Consignor. — This 
 cirises when the shipper carelessly packs the goods and they are 
 injured, or when he incorrectly addresses them so that they 
 are delayed or lost, in which cases the carrier is not liable. 
 
 Klauber shipped some clothing which was not entirely covered and 
 while being transported by the American Express Company was damaged 
 by rain. Held, that the owner is not required to cover goods shipped so 
 that they shall be safe from rain, mud, and fire, and the Express Company 
 here is liable. If there had been a hidden defect in the packing from which 
 damage resulted in the ordinary course of handling, it would have been the 
 act of the owner and the carrier would have been relieved. 
 
 — Klauber v. American Express Co., 21 Wis. 21. 
 
 Congar shipped via Chicago R.R., trees and other nursery stock from 
 Whitewater, Wis., directed to "luka, la." The consignee was a resident 
 of luka, Tama Co., la. The defendant took them to luka, Keokuk Co., la., 
 in consequence of which delay the stock became worthless. Chicago 
 Railway Co. proved that they examined the maps and found the place 
 in Keokuk Co. Held, that the company was not responsible. The negli- 
 gence, if any, was upon the part of Congar in not marking the goods with 
 the name of the county or the road by which they were to go. 
 
 — Congar v. Chicago Railway Co., 24 Wis. 157. 
 
 Any deception or bad faith on the part of the shipper as to 
 the article shipped, whereby it is made to appear less valuable 
 or less liable to be injured, will relieve the carrier from responsi- 
 bility for any injury. 
 
226 BAILMENT 
 
 An action was brought against the American Express Company to re- 
 cover for the value of .a package containing a wreath, made partially of 
 glass, which was broken. The company was not informed of the fragile 
 nature of the goods shipped. Held, that in order to charge a common 
 carrier as insurer he must be treated in good faith, and concealment or 
 suppression of the truth will relieve him from liability. 
 
 — Perkins v. American Express Co., 42 111. 458. 
 
 Loss or Injury Arising from the Nature of the Goods. — 
 When the loss arises, not from any act of the carrier, but be- 
 cause of the inherent nature of the goods, the carrier is relieved. 
 This applies to the natural decay of vegetables and fruit and 
 other perishable commodities, also to the loss of live stock aris- 
 ing from their own viciousness and habits-, as when cattle gore 
 or trample upon each other. But the carrier must take such 
 care of live stock as prudence and foresight demand, and must 
 feed and water them, unless the shipper undertakes this duty. 
 
 Cooper tried to recover damages for live stock shipped over the 
 Raleigh & Gaston R.R. It was held that the strict common law rule as 
 to the liabilities of carriers has been modified in favor of carriers of live 
 stock, on account of the nature of the goods, and where the damage arose 
 from the natural death of the animals or from their viciousness, and could 
 not be prevented by foresight, vigilance, and care, the carrier is not 
 liable. — Cooper v. Raleigh b' Gaston R.R. Co., no Ga. 659. 
 
 A cargo of oranges and lemons was shipped from Italy to New York. 
 On the voyage the vessel was damaged by storm and put into port for re- 
 pairs; by reason of the delay some of the fruit decayed. It was held that 
 there could be no recovery for damages arising from the inherent nature 
 of the cargo, even though caused by the delay, unless there was some fault, 
 misbehavior, or negligence of the master or crew contributing to the damage. 
 
 — The Brig Collenberg, 66 U. S. 170. 
 
 Loss or Injury Caused by Public Authority. — An example 
 of such -a loss is a seizure of the goods by process of law, or by 
 the direct act of one's own government. 
 
 In an action against a railroad company for failure to deliver wheat 
 shipped, the answer was that while the wheat was being shipped, one John- 
 son took out a writ of replevin, and by virtue of this writ the sheriff of the 
 county seized the grain and took it out of the possession of the company. 
 Held, that the common carrier is excused from liability when the goods are 
 seized by virtue of a legal process and taken out of his hands. 
 
 — Yohe V. Ohio Railway Co., 51 Ind. 181. 
 
 Limitation of Liability by Contract. — The carrier in most 
 of the states may Hmit his liability to a certain extent by con- 
 tract with the shipper. That is, by special agreement a lighter 
 
LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS 227 
 
 degree of responsibility may be stipulated for. He may stipu- 
 late not to be liable for loss by fire, robbery, accidental delay, or 
 dangers from navigation, provided he is not himself in fault; 
 but he cannot contract away his liability for the fraud, mis- 
 conduct, or negligence of himself, his agents, or servants. Not- 
 withstanding his attempt by contract to limit his liability, he 
 will stil be held to the responsibility of a mutxial benefit bailee, 
 and he is required to exercise ordinary care and diligence, as 
 well as honesty and good faith. 
 
 The bill of lading given by the Hartford Steamboat Co. when the goods 
 were shipped provided that the company should not be responsible for 
 damage to the goods from any perils or accidents not resulting from their 
 own negligence or that of their servants. Held, that the exemption stipu- 
 lated for was valid and lawful and the carrier was not liable for loss caused 
 by the boat running upon a rock. 
 
 — Camp V. Hartford Steamboat Co., 43 Conn. 333. 
 
 The carrier is also allowed to state a reasonable limit to the 
 amount for which he shall be held liable in case of loss, imless 
 the shipper shall state the valuation at the time of the delivery 
 of the goods to the carrier. Express companies generally con- 
 tract that in case no valuation is given, they will not be liable 
 for a sum to exceed $50, and such a provision is generally up- 
 held. 
 
 Durgin shipped goods by American Express Company and received 
 a receipt stating that the goods were of the value of $50 and the company 
 should not be liable for a greater amount, unless the value was stated in 
 the receipt. No such value was stated. The goods were lost. It was held 
 that the shipper was bound by thp terms of the receipt, although the value 
 of the goods was more than $50. 
 
 — Durgin v. American Exp. Co., 66 N. H. 277. 
 
 Delivery by Carrier. — The carrier is bound to transport the 
 goods with reasonable dispatch, and by the prescribed or cus- 
 tomary route, and at the termination of the journey to deliver 
 them over to the consignee or his authorized agent within a 
 reasonable time. 
 
 A stipulation in the bill of lading exempting the company from liability 
 for loss arising from delay for any cause, is unreasonable, and will not 
 relieve, the carrier from liability for losses caused by negligence. 
 
 — Berje v. Railway Co., 37 La. Annual 468. 
 
 The carrier is liable absolutely to deliver to the right party. 
 If he delivers to the wrong party, no matter how cautiously and 
 
228 BAILMENT 
 
 innocently, he is liable. Delivery on a forged order or through 
 
 the fraud of a stranger will not relieve him. 
 
 Glidewell sued the LitUe Rock, M. R. & T. Ry. Co. for the loss of goods. 
 The railway company received the goods, but by mistake of the conductor 
 they were delivered to a stranger and were lost. Held, the company was 
 Uable for the value of the goods. A carrier is liable for goods lost by mis- 
 delivery, whether made through mistake or by fraud or impositions prac- 
 ticed on it. — Little ^ock, M. R. b' T. Ry. Co. v. Glidewell, 39 Ark. 487. 
 
 When the carriage is by water a delivery on the usual wharf 
 is sufhc'ent, but while on the wharf, goods should be handled 
 with reasonable care. A railroad company may deliver the 
 goods at the depot or freight house, and according to the laws 
 of many states, must also notify the consignee, and is liable as a 
 common carrier until the consignee has had a reasonable oppor- 
 tunity to remove the goods. 
 
 Other states hold that the delivery and safe storage of the 
 goods in the freight depot relieve the carrier from further lia- 
 bility other than as a warehouseman. 
 
 If such carriers as express companies in the cities, whose 
 custom it is to deliver to the consignee at his residence or place 
 of business, deliver at any other place or store the goods in 
 the depot as is practiced by freight companies, such delivery 
 will not be sufficient. This rule applies also to draymen and 
 teamsters. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. When does a common carrier's liability begin? 
 
 2. Why is it advisable for the shipper to demand a receipt of the 
 carrier? Explain. 
 
 3. What is the liability of a common carrier of goods? 
 
 4. Mention four causes of loss for which a carrier will not be liable. 
 
 5. What causes of loss are included under acts of God? Explain. 
 
 6. Are there any exceptions to the rule that the carrier is not liable 
 for loss caused by acts of God? 
 
 7. Is a carrier liable for loss caused by fire? Explain. 
 
 8. Is a carrier liable for loss resulting from strikes? Explain. 
 
 9. Under what circumstances is tKe shipper liable for loss? 
 
 10. Who is liable where loss results from the nature of the goods? 
 Explain. 
 
 11. Has a carrier a right to limit his liability by contract? Explain. 
 
 12. What are the duties of a common carrier with reference to de- 
 livery? Explain. 
 
CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS i2g 
 
 8. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS \ 
 
 Definition. — A common carrier of passengers is one who 
 transports persons from one place to another for hire. A pub- 
 lic carrier may be both a carrier of goods and of passengers. \ 
 The passenger may be carried by .water or by land. The com- I 
 mon carrier of passengers is bound to receive and carry all persons ; 
 who shall .apply and are ready and willing to pay for their 
 transportation. 
 
 Rights and Duties. — A carrier may refuse to carry when j 
 he has no more room or when the party applying is not a suit- 
 able person. He need not receive a drunken person, a noto- 
 rious criminal, or a person infected with a contagious disease. 
 Neither is he obliged to take persons to a place which is not on 
 his route, or at which he is not accustomed to stop. 
 
 It was held, that where an unattended passenger becomes sick or un- 
 conscious or insane after entering upon a journey, it is the duty of the ; 
 company to remove him from the train and leave him until he is in a fit 
 condition to resume his journey. 
 
 — Atchison Railroad Co. v. Weber, ^s Kans. 543. 
 
 The fare required of the passenger must be reasonable, and 
 in many states it is regulated by statute. The carrier is bound 
 to have means and appliances suitable to the transportation, ; 
 and to use all reasonable precautions for the safety of passengers. 
 He can prescribe reasonable rules as to showing tickets, etc. 
 The carrier is not an insurer of the lives and safety of the pas- i 
 sengers, but he is held to a high degree of care, and will be liable ; 
 for even slight negligence. While the carrier does not warrant i 
 the safety of the passengers, he is held to the highest degree of ] 
 care practicable under the circumstances. i 
 
 A passenger was injured because the carrier did not allow her a reason- 
 able time to alight from the train, but started it suddenly whereby she ; 
 was thrown to the ground. Held, that a carrier is not an insurer of the 
 safety of passengers, but is required to exercise the highest degree of care, 
 foresight, prudence, and diligence demanded by the conditions, such rule 
 being for the purpose of stimulating efficiency in the carrier and in the 
 interest of humanity and the general welfare. In this case the carrier was i 
 held liable for the injuries. — Florida Ry. Co. v. Dorsey, 59 Fla. 260. \ 
 
 In most of the states the carrier is not permitted to limit j 
 his liability for injury to the passenger. It is considered con- i 
 
2^0 BAILMENT 
 
 trary to public policy to exempt the carrier from liability for 
 even slight negligence when the lives and safety of human beings 
 are concerned. 
 
 Baggage. — The passenger who pays his fare to the carrier 
 is entitled to have certain baggage taken without charge, and 
 for this baggage the carrier is liable as for the carriage of 
 freight. Baggage in this sense includes such articles of per- 
 sonal necessity, convenience, and comfort as travelers under the 
 circumstances are wont to take on their journeys. It does not 
 include merchandise or a stock of goods used in the traveler's 
 business. 
 
 Courson sued for the loss of certain quilts, pillows, pillow cases, sheets, 
 etc., contained in his trunk carried on the Central of Ga. Ry. Co.'s rail- 
 road, and intended for his use in housekeeping when he reached home. 
 It was held that a carrier's liability for baggage is confined to such ar- 
 ticles of personal convenience and adornment as are usually taken by a 
 passenger on a journey and does not extend to articles intended for house- 
 keeping. — Courson v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., lo Ala. Appeals 581. 
 
 A carrier was held not liable for delay in the delivery of a sample 
 trunk containing photographs of articles of furniture which McElroy was 
 engaged in selling as a commercial traveler, such articles not being in- 
 cluded in the term "baggage." 
 
 — McElroy v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co., 133 Iowa 544. 
 
 The carrier is also liable for money which the passenger 
 
 includes in his baggage for his traveling expenses and personal 
 
 use, not exceeding a reasonable amount. 
 
 A passenger is entitled to carry sufficient money and personal effects 
 as baggage to reasonably supply his wants for the entire journey, and the 
 carrier is liable for their loss. — Godfrey v. Pullman Co., 87 S. C. 361. 
 
 If the baggage is not delivered into the actual custody and 
 
 keeping of the carrier, but is retained in the possession of the 
 
 passenger, the carrier is under no such liability for its safety. 
 
 A carrier's liability for baggage does not commence until the actual 
 delivery of the baggage to the carrier, and therefore a carrier was not 
 liable for loss of a trunk for which a check or receipt had been issued, but 
 which actually was in the passenger's private dwelling. 
 
 — Hosking V. Southern Pac. Co., 148 111. Appeals 11. 
 
 The carrier may by special contract make reasonable modifi- 
 cations of his liability for baggage. But the carrier cannot 
 relieve himself wholly from liability, and the limitation must be 
 brought to the passenger's notice and must be reasonable. Con- 
 
CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS 231 
 
 ditions limiting the carrier's liability to each passenger to a 
 given amount have been upheld. 
 
 A railroad company cannot limit its liability for the safe carriage of 
 a passenger's baggage by a notice printed upon the face of a ticket, unless 
 the passenger's attention is called to it when purchasing the ticket, or un- 
 less the circumstances are such that it would be negligent of him not to 
 read it. The clause in the ticket was that the company would not be Hable 
 for lost baggage excepting wearing apparel, and then only for a sum not to 
 exceed $50. — Mauritz v. Railroad Co., 23 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 765. 
 
 The liability of the carrier for the baggage does not terminate 
 until the passenger has had reasonable opportunity to take 
 charge of it after it has reached its destination. If it is not 
 claimed after a reasonable time, the carrier may store it, and his 
 liability as a carrier ceases, he being liable thereafter only as a 
 warehouseman. 
 
 Jones delivered his trunk to the Central of Ga. Ry. Co. for transporta- 
 tion. After its arrival it was taken from the railroad station by somebody 
 other than Jones and lost. Held, that Jones's failure to take the trunk away 
 within a reasonable time after its arrival terminated the Central of Ga. 
 Ry. Co.'s liabihty as carrier, but its liabiHty as warehouseman remained; 
 and the trunk having been lost by the negligence of the station agent, 
 the Central of Ga. Ry. Co. was liable. 
 
 — Jones V. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 150 Ala. 379. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Who is a common carrier of passengers? 
 
 2. What are the rights of a common carrier of passengers? 
 
 3. What are the duties of a common carrier of passengers? 
 
 ■ 4. What degree of care is required of a common carrier of passengers? 
 
 5. To what extent is a common carrier of passengers Hable for their 
 safety? 
 
 6. Has a carrier of passengers a right to limit his liability? Ex- 
 plain. 
 
 7. What are the rights of a passenger with reference to baggage? 
 Explain. 
 
 8. What does the term " baggage " include? 
 
 9. What is the HabiHty of a carrier for baggage? 
 
 10. In what way may a carrier limit his liability for baggage? Ex- 
 plain. 
 
 11. Is the carrier liable for money which a passenger has in his baggage? 
 Explain. 
 
 12. When does a carrier's Hability for baggage terminate?^ Explain 
 in full. 
 
232 BAILMENT 
 
 IMPORTANT POINTS 
 
 A bailment is a delivery of goods by one party to another, without 
 change of ownership, for a specific purpose. 
 
 A bailment is created by contract and is subject to the same rules 
 of law as a contract. 
 
 No one can be made a bailee without his consent, express or 
 implied. 
 
 Only personal property can be the subject matter of a bailment. 
 
 The two general classes of bailments are gratuitous and for hire. 
 
 The three degrees of care required are slight, ordinary, and great. 
 
 Negligence is a breach of duty to exercise the required degree 
 of care. 
 
 The skill required of the bailee who attempts to do a piece of work 
 is that which a workman doing such work should possess, and the 
 degree of skill depends on the nature of the work. 
 
 A bailee who deviates from the original purpose of the bailment 
 is liable for all losses. 
 
 In a bailment for the bailor's sole benefit, the bailee is entitled 
 to be reimbursed for any expense in connection with the thing bailed. 
 
 Bailments for hire include the hiring of care and custody, hiring 
 the use of a thing, the hiring of labor, and the hiring of carriage. 
 
 The bailee has a lien on property on which he has bestowed 
 services that have not been paid for. 
 
 The bailee is not responsible for loss caused by an inevitable 
 accident. 
 
 An inn or hotel is a public place for the entertainment of transient 
 guests. 
 
 The liability of the innkeeper is said to be extraordinary. 
 
 Steamship and sleeping car companies are not innkeepers. 
 
 A common carrier is one who makes a business of carrying goods 
 or passengers. 
 
 The business of common carriers is, for the most part, regulated 
 by statute. 
 
 A common carrier has the right of lien on the goods carried to 
 secure the payment of charges. 
 
 A carrier of goods has a right to limit the amount for which he 
 shall be liable in case of loss. 
 
 A carrier may refuse to carry any one who refuses to pay the fare 
 in advance or who does not conduct himself properly. 
 
 TEST QUESTIONS 
 
 I. Earth, a friend of Edwards, agreed to keep Edwards's motor- 
 cycle for him while he was away on his vacation. Earth rode the motor- 
 cycle to a ball game and it was stolen. Is he responsible? Explain. 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 233 
 
 2. In case goods are burned up while in transit and no carelessness 
 on the part of the railroad company can be proved, does the loss fall on the 
 railroad company? Explain. 
 
 3. Can a person who has stolen goods ever become a bailor of the 
 goods stolen? 
 
 4. Goods consigned to Hall were lost through acts of a mob of strikers. 
 Would the carri^ be liable? 
 
 5. Would the carrier be Hable if goods were lost through acts of an 
 army while the country was at war? 
 
 6. A railroad company's receipt stated that it would not be Kable 
 for accidents of any kind that might cause loss. Has the company a right 
 to limit its liabilities in this way? 
 
 7. Brown, a respectable person, applied to the Pennsylvania Rail- 
 road Company for transportation on one of their passenger trains, offering 
 to pay the usual fare. Have they a right to refuse him if there is sufficient 
 room on the cars? 
 
 8. Under what conditions has the bailee a right to use the property 
 bailed? 
 
 9. What is the liability of a person who accepts goods delivered to 
 him to which he is not entitled? 
 
 10. What special privileges are granted to boarding-house keepers 
 that are not granted to innkeepers? 
 
 11. To what extent have statutes allowed an innkeeper to limit his 
 liability? 
 
 12. A shipper concealed money in a box of merchandise sent by ex- 
 press. The money was lost. Is the express company Uable? Explain. 
 
 CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 Give the decision and the principle of law involved in each case. 
 
 1. Brown borrowed Green's automobile without Green's permission, 
 and while driving it carefully was run into by another, and both cars were 
 destroyed. Brown was exercising the greatest care, and was not guilty of 
 any negligence whatever. Is he liable for the value of the borrowed car? 
 
 2. Adams, a farmer, intending to go to town the next day, promises 
 Groves that he will take two bags of wheat for him without charge. The 
 next morning he starts away without it, and Groves is put to the necessity 
 of hiring a man to take the wheat for him. Can he recover damages from 
 Adams for breach of Adams's agreement? 
 
234 BAILMENT 
 
 3. If in the preceding case Adams had taken Groves's wheat on his 
 wagon and started to town with it, but in loading it had carelessly put a 
 plow on the top of it, in consequence of which the bag was torn open and 
 the wheat scattered along the road, could Groves have recovered of Adams 
 for the loss of the wheat? 
 
 4. Bernard, as a favor to Webster, receives a sum of money to keep 
 for him until next day. He puts it with his own in his pocketbook which 
 was in his coat pocket. That night Bernard's house was robbed, and the 
 pocketbook that also contained money of his own was taken from his 
 coat, which hung on the foot of the bed. Was Bernard hable? What 
 degree of care was required of Bernard? 
 
 5. Nelson borrows a bicycle from Wood, rides it to a ball game, 
 and leaves it in the bicycle rack unlocked. The bicycle is stolen. It was 
 left in the same place with many other bicycles, but no one was placed in 
 guard over it. Is Nelson liable to Wood for the bicycle? 
 
 6. Andrews borrowed a horse of Bailey with which to work his garden. 
 He kept the horse two days, and then sent it back. While Andrews had 
 the horse he cared for it and furnished its feed. One shoe was off, and he 
 had the horse shod. The horse was injured during the bailment through the 
 slight negligence of Andrews. What are the rights of the parties? 
 
 7. Dodge employed a keeper of a garage to care for his automobile. 
 The keeper of the garage left the door open, and Dodge's car was stolen. 
 Was the garage keeper liable? 
 
 8. Pulver takes his wagon to Hooker, who represents himself to be a 
 wagon maker, and employs him to repair it. Hooker is incompetent and 
 does not understand the business, and as a result the wagon is damaged. 
 Is Hooker liable? 
 
 9. Harris takes his desk to a cabinet maker to be repaired and re- 
 varnished. After the work is completed he sends for the desk, and the 
 cabinet maker refuses to deliver it until he receives his pay, whereupon 
 Harris brings an action to recover the possession of the desk. Can he 
 succeed without paying for the work? 
 
 10. In the above case, if the cabinet maker had let Harris have the 
 desk, could he have compelled Harris to deliver it back to him or else pay 
 him for his services? 
 
 11. Reed enters Porter's hotel, and leaving his baggage with the clerk, 
 goes to dinner. After dinner he calls for his baggage, meaning to go away 
 on the next train. The baggage is lost. Does the relation of innkeeper and 
 guest exist between them? 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 235 
 
 12. Hewlett becomes a guest at Porter's hotel, and while he is there 
 the hotel is destroyed by fire. Porter is free from negligence. Is he liable 
 to Hewlett for baggage lost in the fire? 
 
 13. Porter gave notice to his guests according to statute that he would 
 be liable for money or valuables only when they were placed in the office 
 safe, and not when they were left in their rooms. Hewlett left $1000 in 
 bank notes locked in his trunk in his room. This was broken into and the 
 money stolen. Was Porter liable? 
 
 14. Hewlett was received as a guest by Porter, and after staying three 
 days packed up his trunk preparatory to leaving. Porter refused to allow 
 him to remove his trunk from the hotel until his bill was paid. Had Porter 
 this right? 
 
 15. The Pony Railroad Company, owners of a small line of railroad 
 being constructed to convey passengers to a pleasure resort, were called 
 upon to transport for Newton a heavy boiler. The company refused to 
 accept it on the grounds that they had no car sufficient in size to carry it 
 nor any faciUties to transport it. Had they the right so to refuse it? 
 
 16. Conger ships a barrel of crockery which has been but carelessly 
 packed and with no mark placed upon it to give the carrier notice of its 
 contents. While being handled in the usual course of transportation the 
 crockery is broken. Is the carrier Hable? 
 
 17. Clark shipped a carload of cattle from Chicago to the city of New 
 York. While on the way one of the cattle, being vicious, gored a number 
 of others so that they died from their wounds. Is the company Hable? 
 
 18. The carrier receives certain goods to be delivered to one J. R. 
 Myers of the city of New York. When the goods reach there, a person 
 applies to the freight office and asks for the goods, stating that his name is 
 Myers. The goods are delivered to him, and it later transpires that the 
 party who applied was not the consignee of the goods, but a party who 
 obtained them fraudulently. Can the consignee recover the value of the 
 goods from the carrier? 
 
 19. Certain goods are carried by the New York Central Railroad 
 consigned to one Powell at Buffalo. The goods reach Buffalo and are 
 placed in the depot at four in the afternoon. A notice is mailed to Powell 
 which reaches him the next morning. Within that time a fire occurs and 
 the goods are destroyed. Is the railroad company responsible? 
 
 20. Drew, a passenger on the New York Central Railroad, had his 
 trunk checked and placed in the baggage car of the train upon which he 
 received transportation. The trunk, which was lost, contained his wear- 
 ing apparel, a dress for his wife, which he had purchased on the journey. 
 
236 BAILMENT 
 
 some presents for his friends, and a sum of $20 in a purse, which money- 
 he intended to use on his journey. Was the railroad company Hable for 
 all of the contents of this trunk? If not, for what portion of it was the 
 company liable? 
 
 21. If the company had expressly contracted with Drew that their 
 Uability for baggage should be Hmited to $50 and he had had notice of this 
 limitation, would they have been liable for a greater amount? 
 
 22. Briggs checks a hand bag at a railway company's parcel room, pays 
 10 cents, and receives a check. When he returns later and presents the 
 check, it is discovered that the bag has been stolen. Is the railway com- 
 pany liable? Explain. 
 
 23. Cooper receives at 4 p.m. on the afternoon of a certain day, by 
 registered mail, $10,000 in negotiable bonds. It is too late to lock them in 
 his safe deposit box, so he goes to his bank, the vault of which is still open, 
 and gets the bank to take the bonds for safe-keeping overnight. When 
 he goes to get his bonds the next morning they cannot be found. Cooper 
 sues the bank for the value of the bonds. What must he prove to recover? 
 
 24. Anson, while traveling, stops at the Denver Hotel and for safe- 
 keeping places his valuables with the owner of the hotel, who puts them in 
 the safe for that purpose. The safe is broken open and Anson's valuables 
 are stolen. Anson brings action against the owner of the hotel. Can he 
 recover? Explain. 
 
 25. Warren delivered to the N. Y. C. R. R. Co. in New York a trunk 
 to be forwarded to Chicago and two days later called for it at Chicago. 
 It could not be found. Warren sued the company and in the suit proved 
 the delivery to the company, the demand, and the value. The company 
 did not offer any evidence. Should Warren recover? Explain. 
 
 26. Carr finds on the sidewalk a purse containing $10, which has been 
 lost by Chase. Chase learns that Carr has found the purse and demands 
 its return. Carr decUnes to return the purse and its contents unless Chase 
 pays him $1 for his trouble. Can Chase recover the purse and its contents? 
 Explain. 
 
 27. Harcourt found a valuable dog and took him into his custody. 
 He advertised and tried to find the owner, but did not succeed. After about 
 a month had passed, the owner of the dog discovered him in Harcourt's 
 possession and demanded his return. Harcourt refused to return the dog 
 to the owner until he was reimbursed for the expense incurred in adver- 
 tising and caring for the dog. The owner took action to recover possession 
 of the dog. Can he succeed? Explain. 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 237 
 
 28. Mrs. Darrow, who was to be away for several weeks, left her 
 silverware with Mrs. Emmel, a friend and neighbor of hers, to be cared for 
 during her absence. While Mrs. Emmel was out one afternoon, her house 
 was robbed, and her own silverware as well as Mrs. Darrow's was stolen. 
 Mrs. Emmel admitted that she 'eft the door of her house unlocked the 
 afternoon she was away. Should Mrs. Darrow bring action against Mrs. 
 Emmel to recover the value of her silverware, could she succeed? Explain. 
 
 29. Dempsey borrowed a wagon from Thomas to use in hauling stone. 
 Later and without telling Thomas he decided to use the wagon to make a 
 trip to the village, a distance of about three miles. While the wagon was 
 standing on the street, it was run into by an automobile and was badly 
 damaged. In an action by Thomas to recover the value of the wagon, 
 Dempsey proved that he had been in no way negligent. Can Thomas 
 recover? Explain. 
 
 30. Hendricks delivered 50 bushels of wheat to a miller and was to re- 
 ceive in return for it a certain amount of flour. That night the mill and its 
 contents were destroyed by fire. On whom does the loss of this wheat fall? 
 Explain. 
 
 31. Samuels took his hand bag on a train with him and put it in the 
 rack above his seat. While he was out of his seat the bag was stolen. He 
 sued the railroad company for the value. Should he recover? 
 
 32. Rankin hired Lowery to pasture 10 head of young stock for the 
 summer. Lowery's pasture was near a railroad and his hired man left 
 the gate to the pasture open so that two head of the young stock got on the 
 railroad track and were killed. Rankin took action against Lowery to re- 
 cover the value of the stock killed. Can he succeed? Explain. 
 
 33. Hopper delivered a quantity of mahogany lumber to Hensel, a 
 cabinet maker, to be made into furniture. Hensel had the work about half 
 done when the wood and furniture were stolen. How will this case have to 
 be adjusted? Explain. 
 
 34. As a result of an accident on a railroad, a quantity of fruit con- 
 signed to Benedict was delayed and suffered much damage. Benedict took 
 action against the railroad company to recover. Can he succeed? Explain. 
 
 35. A street car, running down grade, got to running at an excessive 
 speed, though not beyond control of the motorman. A passenger became 
 frightened, jumped off, and was severely injured. He took action against 
 the street car company to recover damages. Can he succeed? 
 
INSURANCE 
 
 I. IN GENERAL 
 
 Insurance. — The term " insurance " signifies indemnity against 
 losses. Certain misfortunes may happen which, although by no 
 means frequent in the experience of the average man, are 
 of so much importance and may entail upon him such severe 
 loss that he seeks a mode of protection. The impending loss 
 may be the destruction of one's property by fire, flood, or cy- 
 clone; or it may be the loss of one's earning capacity, by acci- 
 dent to his person; or the loss to his family, by reason of his 
 death. 
 
 Insurance is based on the principle of distribution and shar- 
 ing of losses. 
 
 Insurance Companies. — For the purpose of affording pro- 
 tection against these calamities there exist many large cor- 
 porations known as insurance companies, which engage in the 
 business of assuming such risks for a certain compensation 
 known as a premium. These premiums, although comparatively 
 small, being contributed by the many, form a large fund, out 
 of which the losses to the few are indemnified. 
 
 Every state has an insurance official, whose duty it is to 
 regulate and inspect the different insurance companies doing 
 business in his state and to see that they are solvent and that 
 their affairs are properly conducted. 
 
 Definition. • — Insurance is defined as a contract whereby for 
 a stipulated consideration one party undertakes to compensate 
 the other for damage to a particular subject resulting from a 
 specified peril. The party agreeing to make the compensation 
 is called the insurer, or the underwriter, the other party to the 
 contract being the insured. The written contract is called the 
 pojicy, and the event insured against, the risk. 
 
 2. FIRE INSURANCE 
 Definition. — Fire insurance is a contract whereby the 
 insurer agrees to assume the risk and indemnify the insured for 
 loss caused directly or indirectly by fire. 
 
 238 
 
FIRE INSURANCE 239 
 
 Insurable Interest. — The insured must have an insurable 
 
 interest in the property insured. This means that he must 
 
 have an interest of such a nature that the fire insured against 
 
 would directly injure him. If the person had no interest in 
 
 the property upon which he obtained insurance, the only object 
 
 would be a mere speculation, and the contract would not be 
 
 upheld in law. 
 
 Graham had insured certain property in a factory, of which he was 
 manager on a salary, under a contract having a number of years to run 
 and which also secured to him important and valuable privileges to pur- 
 chase the business. It was held that he had an insurable interest in the 
 property, since its destruction would cause him a pecuniary loss. 
 
 — Graham v. Insurance Co., 48 S. C. 195. 
 
 This interest may be an existing interest; as, for example, 
 the absolute ownership, or a life interest, or a right by mortgage 
 or lien. Or it may be only an interest in expected profits or 
 goods, as a shipowner's right to insure goods upon which he has 
 a claim for freight. 
 
 The owner of property does not lose his insurable interest by 
 mortgaging, leasing, or giving an executory contract to sell it, 
 as more than one person can have an insurable interest in the 
 property. For example, A owns a house and lot, and leases it 
 to B, mortgages it to C, and gives D an executory contract of 
 sale. Each one of these four parties has an insurable interest 
 in the house. 
 
 Divided Interest. — When a house subject to a mortgage is 
 insured for its full value, the mortgagee can recover on the 
 policy up to the amount of his mortgage, and the owner can 
 recover the balance of the policy being the value of the house 
 less the mortgage. The mortgagee is entitled to recover the 
 amount of his mortgage up to the amount of the policy whether 
 the owner's equity is adequately insured or not. The mortga- 
 gee loses his claim to the insurance as soon as the mortgage is 
 paid. 
 
 Form of Contract. — The contract of insurance is usually 
 in writing; although it may be oral, unless expressly required 
 by statute to be written. In most states a standard form of 
 policy has been established by statute. 
 
 This contract requires a meeting of the minds of the parties, 
 
240 INSURANCE 
 
 and certain terms must be definitely settled upon, viz.: the 
 property insured, the title or interest , of the insured, the risk 
 insured against, the rate of premium, and the term of duration 
 of the insurance. 
 
 An oral contract of insurance made with an agent represent- 
 ing two companies, the company assuming the risk not being 
 specified, is unenforceable. An oral contract of insurance must 
 possess all the requisites of a contract. In this case the agent 
 not having designated which of his two principals he intended 
 to bind, neither is bound, as there could be no "meeting of the 
 minds." 
 
 The contract is binding and in force as soon as the agree- 
 ment is completed, although the written policy may not have 
 been actually deHvered, nor in fact ever have been issued. 
 
 Taylor made a valid oral contract for insurance with the Franklin Fire 
 Ins. Co. Before a policy was issued the property was destroyed by fire. 
 It was held that a court of equity would compel the issuance and de- 
 livery of a policy even after the loss, and enforce payment thereon. 
 
 — Taylor v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 52 Miss. 441. 
 
 Effect of Fraud. — Any concealment of a material fact in- 
 quired into by the insurer will, if made intentionally by the in- 
 sured, avoid the policy. Still neither party is bound to volunteer 
 information regarding matters of which the other has knowl- 
 edge or of which in the exercise of ordinary care he ought to 
 have knowledge. But the insured must not withhold infor- 
 mation which would affect the judgment of the insurer. 
 
 One of the questions in the application for insurance was, "What is 
 the distance, occupation, and material of all buildings within 150 feet?" 
 No answer was made to this question and the company sought to avoid 
 the poUcy on that ground. Held, that they might have refused to issue the 
 policy or have sought further information, but that by issuing it they waived 
 the answer to this question. — Paul v. Armenia Ins. Co., 91 Pa. State 520. 
 
 Representation. — A representation in connection with this 
 subject is said to be a statement of fact made at the time of, or 
 before, the contract relating to the proposed adventure, and 
 upon the good faith of which the contract is made. A material 
 misrepresentation of fact, whether innocent or fraudulent, 
 avoids the contract. 
 
 Warranty. — A warranty is a statement of fact or promise of 
 performance relating to the subject of insurance or to the risk, 
 
FIRE INSURANCE POLICY 341 
 
 inserted in the policy itself or expressly made a part of it, which, 
 if not literally true or strictly complied with, will avoid the con- 
 tract. It differs from a representation, which, as we have seen, 
 is a collateral inducement outside of the contract and need be 
 only substantially complied with, whereas the warranty must be 
 contained in the policy and must be strictly performed. 
 
 Any statement or description oh the part of the insured on the face 
 of the policy which relates to the risk is an express warranty, and such a 
 warranty must be strictly complied with or the insurance is void. 
 
 — Wood V. Insurance Co., 13 Conn. 533. 
 
 If questions in the application are not answered or if the 
 answers are incomplete but not false, there is no breach of 
 warranty, provided the insurer accepts the application without 
 objection. 
 
 Although the breach of warranty or misrepresentation of a 
 material fact may not contribute to or cause the loss, neverthe- 
 less the policy is avoided, for the risk is different from that 
 which the insurer undertook to assume. 
 
 The application contained a statement that the factory insured was 
 operated for the account of the owner and that it was immediately super- 
 intended by one of the owners. This statement was untrue. It was held 
 that the misrepresentation avoided the policy whether they were material 
 to the loss or not. — Wilson v. Conway Ins. Co., 4 R. I. 141. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. On what principle is insurance based? 
 
 2. What is the source of this protection known as insurance? 
 
 3. How is fire insurance defined? 
 
 4. What is an insurable interest? Give three examples. 
 
 5. What are the requirements in insurance contracts? 
 
 6. What must the policy contain? 
 
 7. Is an oral contract of insurance binding? Explain. 
 
 8. What is the effect of fraud practiced in obtaining insurance? 
 
 9. How will a material misrepresentation of fact affect the contract? 
 
 10. What is a warranty as applied to insurance contracts? 
 
 11. What is the effect of not answering questions asked by the insurer? 
 
 3. FIRE INSURANCE POLICY 
 
 Standard Form of Policy. — Statutes have been passed in 
 several states adopting a standard form of fire insurance policy, 
 
242 INSURANCE 
 
 the object being to establish a uniformity of contract and to 
 avoid conflict between different companies insuring the same 
 property. 
 
 Policies may be either open or valued. In an open policy 
 the amount in case of loss is not fixed by the policy. It simply 
 states within what limits the company will be liable. A valued 
 policy fixes definitely the amount payable in case of total loss. 
 When a fire occurs the company pays the actual loss up to the 
 amount named in the policy. 
 
 Loss by Fire. — Loss by fire includes loss which is caused by 
 the burning of the property insured or which is the result of 
 fire in close proximity, the heat from which damages the prop- 
 erty insured. It also includes the loss or damage by the water 
 from the fire engines or from the exposure or theft of the goods 
 during their removal to a place of safety at the time of a fire. 
 
 It was held that the damage and expense caused by removing, with 
 a reasonable degree of care suited to the occasion, insured goods from ap- 
 parent immediate destruction by fire, are covered by a policy insuring the 
 goods against ''loss and damage by fire," although the building in which 
 they were insured and from which they were removed was not, in fact, 
 burned. — White v. Insurance Co., 57 Maine 91. 
 
 It includes loss by fire caused by lightning, but does not 
 include loss caused by lightning unless a lightning clause is 
 inserted; therefore it is customary to include such a clause. 
 
 If the fire is caused by the act of an incendiary, or by the 
 acts of the insured while insane, or by the careless acts of a 
 third person, the insurance company is liable. 
 
 Location. — The standard policy contains a statement of the 
 location of the property insured; and, if it is removed to another 
 or different place without the consent of the insurer, the policy 
 is no longer in effect. So if a party insures his household fur- 
 niture while living on a certain street, and then moves to an- 
 other street, the insurance ceases to be in force. The reason 
 for this rule is plain, for the risk is likely to vary in different 
 locations, and whether it does or not, the insurer has the right 
 to know what risk he is assuming. 
 
 A policy of insurance against fire was issued on furniture described as 
 contained in a house on McMillen Street, Providence, R. I. The insured, 
 without the knowledge of the insurer, moved the articles to a house on 
 
FIRE INSURANCE POLICY 243 
 
 another street, in which they were burned. Held, that the insured could 
 not recover. The statement of the location of the goods is a continuing 
 warranty. — Lyons v. Insurance Co., 14 R. I. 109. 
 
 Amount Recoverable. — The market or cash value of the 
 property at the time of the fire is the amount that can be re- 
 covered of the insurance company if this sum does not exceed 
 the amount of the policy. If the property is only partially 
 destroyed, the amount that may be recovered is the difference 
 in the value of the property before and after the fire. The 
 insurer generally reserves the right to replace the property, and in 
 case he elects so to do, this takes the place of money damages. 
 
 Additional Insurance. — The standard policy of insurance 
 contains a clause which provides that the policy shall be void 
 in case the insured now has, or shall hereafter make or procure, 
 any other contract of insurance, whether valid or not, on prop- 
 erty covered, in whole or in part by this policy, without an 
 agreement indorsed or added thereon, allowing such additional 
 insurance. The reason for this provision is that the companies 
 do not wish to have the property insured for more than its value, 
 and they also desire to know whether any other insurance is 
 carried on the property, so that in case of loss, if insured in 
 several companies, each need contribute only its proportionate 
 share. 
 
 Alienation Clause. — The standard policy also contains a 
 clause known as the alienation clause, which renders the policy 
 void if any change other than the death of the insured takes place 
 in the interest, title, or possession of the subject insured (except 
 change of occupants without increase of hazard) , whether by legal 
 process or judgment, or by the voluntary act of the insured. This 
 section means any parting with or sale of the premises, and does 
 not include the giving of a mortgage upon the insured premises. 
 
 Assignment. — A fire insurance policy is not assignable, and 
 
 if assigned without the consent of the insurer it is void. 
 
 A corporation was insured under a policy containing a provision that it 
 should not be assigned without the consent of the insurer. The corporation 
 transferred all its property, including the policy, to the Miles Lamp Chimney 
 Co., a corporation having the same stockholders as the original corporation, 
 but the consent of the insurer was not obtained. Held that the Miles Lamp 
 Chimney Co. acquired no rights under the policy. 
 
 ' — Miks Lamp Chimney Co., v. Erie Fire Ins. Co., 164 Ind. i8i. 
 
244 INSURANCE 
 
 If with the consent of the company the property insured as | 
 well as the policy is assigned, a new contract is formed which 
 will not be affected by any act of the assignor. 
 
 Unoccupied Dwelling. — The standard form of policy also 
 
 provides that if the property is a dwelling and remains vacant 
 
 or unoccupied without the consent of the company for the 
 
 period of ten days the insurance is of no effect. This clause is 
 
 held to be a reasonable restriction, as the insurer is entitled to 
 
 know that the premises are receiving ordinary supervision. It 
 
 means that the dwelling must have some one living in it. 
 
 The policy insured a "dwelling house" and provided that it should be 
 void if the premises were unoccupied for more than ten days. At the date 
 of the policy and for more than ten days thereafter, the house was unoccu- 
 pied, but Thomas's servants had been in the house for two days before the 
 fire, cleaning and preparing it to be occupied. Held, the policy was void 
 because of breach of condition. The presence of the servants did not con- 
 stitute occupancy within the policy. 
 — Thomas v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 21 Ky. Law Rep. 914 (53 S. W. 297). 
 
 Factory Buildings. — There is a further provision rendering . 
 the policy void if the subject insured is a factory building and 
 is operated after 10 o'clock at night or some other given hour, 
 or is not operated for ten consecutive days or some other specific 
 length of time. 
 
 The policy of insurance on a flour mill contained the provision that if 
 the mill were shut down 20 days without notice to the company, the policy 
 would be suspended from the expiration of that time until the mill resumed 
 work. Held, that the stoppage of the mill for more than 20 days without the 
 required notice suspended the policy, though the mill was stopped for neces- 
 sary repairs. — Day v. Insurance Co., 70 Iowa 710. 
 
 Renewals. -^^ The poHcy is often renewed by a short form of 
 receipt which obviates the necessity of a new policy. This 
 renewal, which may be either in writing or by parol, in sub- 
 stance creates a new contract on the same terms and conditions 
 as those agreed upon in the old policy. 
 
 Cancellation. — The standard form of policy contains a stipu- 
 lation that the poh'cy may be canceled at any time by the 
 company, or at the request of the insured upon giving five days' 
 notice of such cancellation. And in case of such cancellation 
 the unearned premiums paid shall be returned to the insured. 
 
 Mortgaged Property. — When the property insured is mort- 
 
FIRE INSURANCE POLICY 245 
 
 gaged and it is desired that in case of fire the insurance shall be 
 paid to the mortgagee to satisfy his claim, it is the custom to 
 attach a mortgage clause which provides that the insurance shall 
 be paid to the mortgagee named as his interest may appear. In 
 such cases it is customary for this mortgagee to hold the original 
 policy. 
 
 Notice of Loss. — After a loss it is the duty of the insured to 
 give immediate notice to the company. Under the standard 
 form of policy this notice must be in writing. The damaged 
 goods must be inventoried, and a proof of loss duly sworn to 
 must be filed within sixty days. 
 
 Unless the notice is given as stated and the proof of loss filed 
 within the specified time, no recovery can be had on the policy. 
 
 Pro Rata Clause. — The standard policy contains a pro rata 
 clause, under which the insured can not recover more than the 
 amount of his loss in the property insured, where there is more 
 than one policy on the same property. Thus a man may have 
 his house insured in three companies, as follows: in number one 
 for $4000, in number two for $6000, and in number three for 
 $2000. The house is damaged by fire to the amount of $6000. 
 The insured can recover only this amount, and the companies 
 will be con»pelled to pay their pro rata portions; that is, num- 
 ber one will be required to pay $2000, number two $3000, and 
 number three $1000. This rule does not apply to the case of 
 several persons with different interests in the same property, 
 but to the case of any insured who, if he recovered the full 
 amount on all poHcies, would be getting double insurance upon 
 the loss. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is the object of the "standard form of policy"? 
 
 2. What does the policy against loss by fire include? 
 
 3. Is damage caused by lightning covered by a policy against fire? 
 
 4. Is the company liable if the fire was caused by an incendiary? 
 
 5. How does change of location of the property insured affect the 
 policy? Why? 
 
 6. In case of fire what amount is recoverable on the policy? 
 
 7. (a) What is the "additional insurance" provision in the standard 
 policy? {h) What is the reason for this provision? 
 
 8. What is the "alienation clause"? 
 
246 INSURANCE 
 
 9. Are fire insurance policies assignable? Explain. 
 
 10. What are the provisions of the standard policy with reference to 
 occupancy of dwelling property? 
 
 11. Mention some of the provisions applicable to the insurance of 
 factory buildings. 
 
 12. {a) How may a policy be renewed? (b) How may it be canceled? 
 
 13. What is a "mortgagee clause" in insurance policies? 
 
 14. In case insured property is damaged by fire, what steps should be 
 taken? 
 
 15. What is the ''pro rata clause" contained in the standard policy? 
 
 4. LIFE INSURANCE 
 
 Definitions. — Another form of insurance is life insurance. 
 This kind of contract appears in an almost endless number of 
 forms. It is in its simplest form an agreement upon the part of 
 the insurer to pay a specific sum of money upon the death of a 
 certain person, called the insured, to a specific person called the 
 beneficiary. .The consideration paid by the insured is called the 
 premium, and is generally a certain amount payable annually 
 or monthly. 
 
 Forms of Agreement. — There are many different forms of 
 life insurance agreements. The most common are termed 
 endowment insurance, term payment insurance (ic^ 15, or 20 
 payment Hfe policies), investment or income insurance, and 
 straight or whole life insurance. In most forms of life insurance 
 except the whole life policy, the insured, after paying the pre- 
 mium for a given number of years, will receive a certain sum of 
 money, or if he dies before the expiration of the period, the 
 amount of the policy will go to the beneficiary. The beneficiary, 
 instead of being a specific person, may be the estate of the insured 
 
 Insurable Interest. — Every person has an insurable interest 
 in his own life and also in the life of any person upon whom he 
 depends either wholly or in part for education or support, and 
 in the life of any person who is under a legal obligation to him for 
 the payment of money. In short, a person may be said to have 
 an insurable interest in the life of any one whose death would 
 naturally cause him a pecuniary loss or disadvantage. 
 
 Bevin advanced to Barstow $300 and some articles of personal property, 
 under an agreement that Barstow should go to California and labor there for 
 
LIFE INSURANCE 247 
 
 at least one year, and then account to Bevin for one half the profits. Bevin 
 then insured Barstow's life for $1000. Held, that Bevin had an insurable 
 interest in Barstow's life and could recover the amount of the policy. 
 
 — Bevin v. Life Insurance Co., 23 Conn. 244. 
 
 A partner has an insurable interest in the life of his copartner, 
 and a creditor of the partnership in the life of each partner. 
 
 A creditor of a firm has an insurable interest in the life of one of the 
 partners thereof, although the other partner may be entirely able to pay the 
 debt, and although the estate of the insured is perfectly solvent. 
 
 — Morrell v. Life Insurance Co., 10 Cush. (Mass.) 282. 
 
 A woman has an insurable interest in her husband's life, and 
 a man has the same interest in the life of his wife. Mere rela- 
 tionship is not enough to give an insurable interest. There 
 must be an element of dependency coupled with the relationship. 
 A nephew has no insurable interest in the life of his uncle nor 
 has one brother in the life of another. 
 
 If the person taking out the policy has an insurable interest 
 to support the poKcy at the time it is obtained, he may make 
 it payaple to any one, and it is generally held that he may sub- 
 sequently assign it to any one whether such beneficiary or trans- 
 feree has an insurable interest or not, unless it is apparent that 
 the transaction is a mere cover for a wagering contract. 
 
 If the person taking out the insurance had an insurable 
 interest at the time, the fact that the interest ceases does not 
 affect the policy. Therefore, if a man insures the life of his 
 debtor and the debtor subsequently pays the debt, the policy 
 may still be continued and enforced at the death of the party 
 insured. 
 
 In the case in which the insured designates another person as 
 beneficiary the right of such beneficiary as a general rule becomes 
 vested at once and it cannot be disturbed by assignment or in 
 any other way without the consent of such beneficiary, unless 
 the right to make a new appointment is reserved in the policy 
 itself. 
 
 When a father takes out a policy of insurance upon his own life in favor 
 of an infant daughter, paying all of the premiums himself and retaining the 
 policy, the contract is between the insurance company and the daughter, 
 and upon the father's death the legal title to the policy vests in her and she 
 is entitled to the possession of it. — Glanz v. Gloeckler, 104 111. 573. 
 
248 INSURANCE 
 
 Premiums. — The premiums on life insurance are graded 
 according to the age of the insured. The person insured must 
 undergo a physical examination, as only healthy persons are 
 insured. The amounts of the premiums are determined by 
 average results computed upon the length of life of a large number 
 of persons carefully arranged and tabulated. These results so 
 arranged are called mortuary tables. 
 
 Effect of Concealment. — The contract of life insurance, like 
 that of fire insurance, requires the exercise of good faith between 
 the parties, but to avoid the policy the concealment of a material 
 fact not made the subject of an express inquiry must be inten- 
 tional. 
 
 Misrepresentation. — A misrepresentation, if material, will 
 avoid the poHcy. The same rules apply to misrepresentations 
 in life insurance as in fire insurance, but warranties are statements 
 of facts which are a part of the policy and must be strictly 
 performed or the policy is avoided. 
 
 The policy made the application a part thereof. In the application the 
 insured falsely stated that she had not consulted a physician and had not 
 had a certain disease. These false answers constituted a breach of warranty 
 and avoided the policy regardless of their materiality. 
 
 — Flippen v. Life Ins. Co., 30 Tex. Civil Appeal 362. 
 
 Life insurance companies generally ask many questions in 
 their applications and unless the application is expressly incor- 
 porated in and made a part of the policy, the answers to these 
 questions are considered as representations and not as warranties. 
 If they are so included, they must be strictly true. 
 
 If the questions are not answered or are only partially an- 
 swered, there is no misrepresentation or breach of warranty. 
 
 In the application this question was asked, "Has any application been 
 made to this or any other company for insurance on the life of the party? 
 If so, with what result?" To this inquiry there was no answer. Held, that 
 the failure to disclose unsuccessful applications for additional insurance did 
 not avoid the policy. The issuing of the policy without further inquiry was 
 a waiver by the company of the right to inquire further. 
 
 — Phoenix Life Insurance Co. v. Raddin, 120 U. S. 183. 
 
 Forms of Policies. — There is no standard form of life insur- 
 ance policy, and the forms of the different companies vary 
 materially. It is customary to have the policy provide that the 
 
LIFE INSURANCE 249 
 
 application be made a part of the contract, thereby making the 
 statements in the application express warranties. So a denial 
 that one is affected with a disease avoids the poHcy if untrue. 
 The application often inquires as to what other insurance is 
 carried, and a deceptive statement on this point is fatal to 
 the policy. So also a statement as to age is material and the 
 answer must be correct. 
 
 Payment. — If the policy contains a provision that the insur- 
 ance ceases unless the premium is paid when due and that the 
 policy is not to take effect until the first premium is actually 
 paid, the condition must be strictly comph'ed with or the policy 
 fails. Prompt payment is essential. 
 
 Sickness or other inability to comply with the terms of pay- 
 ment offers no excuse. If the insurer accepts the payment of 
 the premium after it is due, the breach will be waived. 
 
 Suicide. — If the policy contains no express stipulation to the 
 contrary, the insurance company is liable on a policy if the person 
 insured commits suicide, in case a third party is the beneficiary. 
 If the insured is the beneficiary, the rule will be otherwise. The 
 policy frequently contains a clause exempting the company from 
 liability if the insured commits suicide within a certain time. 
 
 A policy, payable to the insured, his executors, administrators, or 
 assigns, contained no stipulation against suicide. The insured killed him- 
 self while sane. The court held that there could be no recovery on the 
 policy, as being contrary to public policy and opposed to sound morality. 
 
 — Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 139. 
 
 It was held that suicide while sane is no defense to an action on a policy 
 of life insurance payable to third persons as beneficiaries, where there is no 
 stipulation against suicide in the policy, since the beneficiaries have acquired 
 vested rights in the policy which cannot be defeated by the wrongful act 
 of the insured. — Patterson v. Life Ins. Co., 100 Wis. 118. 
 
 When the exemption does not expressly state that the 
 company shall not be liable whether the insured be sane or 
 insane, the suicide clause does not vitiate the pohcy if the suicide 
 is committed while the person is insane. If the clause contains 
 these words, "it is vitiated in case of suicide under any con- 
 ditions"; then, if the insured dies by suicide, sane or insane, the 
 poHcy becomes null and void. 
 
 A life insurance poHcy provided that it should be null and void if the 
 insured died by suicide, "sane or insane." The company pleaded that he 
 
250 INSURANCE 
 
 died from a pistol wound, inflicted by his own hand, and that he intended 
 inflicting such a wound to destroy his own Hfe. Held, that the policy was 
 avoided even though the deceased was of unsound mind and unconscious of 
 his acts when he inflicted the wound. 
 
 — Bigelow V. Life Insurance Co., 93 U. S. 284. 
 
 Notice of Death. — In life insurance the company generally 
 requires immediate notice of death and due proof that the person 
 insured is dead. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. In its simplest form, what is life insurance? 
 
 2. What are the different forms of life insurance agreements? 
 
 3. When may a person be said to have an insurable interest in the life 
 of another? 
 
 . 4. Has a creditor an insurable interest in the life of a debtor? 
 
 5. Has a nephew an insurable interest in the life of an uncle? 
 
 6. What are the rules concerning an insurable interest at the time the 
 policy is taken out and subsequently? 
 
 7. How are premiums on life insurance graded? 
 
 8. How is the amount of the premium determined? 
 
 9. How does the concealment of a material fact affect a contract 
 of life insurance? 
 
 10. What will render a life insurance contract void? 
 
 11. How are answers to questions in the application considered? 
 
 12. Are hfe insurance policies uniformly the same? Explain. 
 
 13. What are the usual premium provisions in a policy? 
 
 14. Under what conditions is an insurance company liable if the person 
 insured commits suicide? 
 
 5. MARINE INSURANCE 
 
 Definition. — Marine insurance is a contract by which the 
 insurer agrees to indemnify the insured against certain perils or 
 risks to which his ships, cargo, and profits may be exposed 
 during a certain trip or during a specified time. 
 
 Insurable Interest. — The rules governing this class of insur- 
 ance closely follow the laws of fire insurance. The person 
 procuring the policy must have an insurable interest in the 
 property insured. The owner always has an insurable interest, 
 even though the property has been chartered to a person who 
 agrees to pay its value in case of loss. The charterer also has an 
 insurable interest in the ship. Practically the same rules apply 
 to the insurable interest here as in fire insurance. 
 
MARINE INSURANCE 251 
 
 Effect of Fraud. — The requirement of good faith between the 
 parties is even greater in marine insurance than in any other 
 branch of insurance. The reason for this is that the insured has 
 every opportunity to know all of the facts and the insurer but 
 limited opportunity to determine them. A concealment of a 
 material fact either innocently or fraudulently avoids the 
 contract. 
 
 Misrepresentation. — So a material misrepresentation of a 
 fact, whether innocently or fradulently made, avoids the con- 
 tract. The rule is even more strict here than in fire insurance, 
 
 A policy of marine insurance was obtained at and from Genoa. The load 
 was put on at Leghorn, bound for Dublin, but the vessel put in at Genoa and 
 had been there about five months before sailing. Richardson contended that 
 the policy was vitiated because of the nondisclosure to the insurer that the 
 vessel was not loaded at Genoa. Held, that Hodgson could not recover. The 
 concealment of the port of loading vitiated the policy. 
 
 — Hodgson V. Richardson, 1 W. Black (Eng.) 463. 
 
 Warranty. — A warranty, as in fire insurance, must be strictly 
 performed. In marine insurance there are three imphed war- 
 ranties which are understood in every contract. They are in 
 respect to seaworthiness, deviation, and legality. 
 
 Seaworthiness. — There is implied the warranty that the 
 ship is seaworthy at the time of the commencement of the risk. A 
 ship is seaworthy when reasonably fit to perform the services 
 and encounter the ordinary perils incident to the voyage. This 
 means that the ship shall be stanch, properly rigged, and provided 
 with a competent master and a sufficient number of seamen. 
 
 The steamship West was insured for a voyage from Montreal to Halifax. 
 At the time of starting the voyage there was a defect in the boiler of the 
 vessel which was not apparent in a river, but which disabled the vessel when 
 she got into salt water. It was held that the implied warranty of seaworthi- 
 ness had not been complied with as the vessel sailed with a defect which 
 rendered her unseaworthy for the complete voyage. 
 
 — Quebec Marine Ins. Co. v. Com. Bank, 7 Moore, P.C.N.S. (Eng.) i. 
 
 Deviation. — The second implied warranty is that there shall 
 be no voluntary deviation or departure from the course fixed by 
 mercantile usage, for the voyage contemplated by the poHcy; 
 and also that there shall be no unreasonable delay in commencing 
 or making the voyage. 
 
252 INSURANCE 
 
 s 
 A deviation is justified when caused by circumstances over 
 
 which neither the owner nor master had any control, as when 
 
 forced from the course by stress of weather, a mutinous crew, etc. 
 
 If the master of a vessel which has been insured, in departing from the 
 usual course of the voyage from necessity, because of leaking of the vessel, 
 acts in good faith and according to his best judgment, and has no other 
 object than to conduct the vessel by the safest and shortest course to the 
 port of destination, the insurance will not be forfeited. 
 
 — Turner v. Insurance Co., 25 Maine 515. 
 
 Legality. — The third implied warranty is that the voyage 
 shall be legal, both in its nature and in the manner in which it 
 is prosecuted. Smuggling voyages and trading trips to an 
 enemy's port are cases of illegal voyage. 
 
 Losses. — The loss may be total, in which case the whole 
 insurance is ordinarily recoverable; or it may be partial, and 
 then only a pro rata part can be recovered. When the loss is 
 total, it may be an actual total loss or a constructive total loss. 
 An actual total loss occurs when the subject insured wholly 
 perishes, as when a vessel is so completely wrecked that it can 
 not be repaired. 
 
 When a policy of insurance upon a vessel is against "actual total loss 
 only," if the vessel is afloat or it is practicable to put her afloat, or if she is 
 capable of being repaired, at any expense, it is not such a total loss. 
 
 — Carr v. Insurance Co., 109 N. Y. 504. 
 
 A constructive total loss occurs when the article insured is so 
 far damaged or lost that it can not be reclaimed or repaired, 
 except at a greater cost than its value. For example, a vessel 
 may be sunk in shallow water, but the cos.t of raising it would 
 be greater than it is worth. 
 
 An insured vessel was thrown on the rocks, her rudder and keel torn off, 
 one side beaten in so that the cargo of salt was washed out and the vessel 
 was in danger of destruction. Held that the vessel was a constructive total 
 loss. — King V. Middletown Ins. Co., 1 Conn. 184. 
 
 The rule adopted in some jurisdictions is, that if the property 
 insured by a marine insurance policy is damaged to such an 
 extent that its value is reduced one half or more; that is, if there 
 is a one-half loss or more, the person insured may abandon the 
 property as a constructive total loss, and claim the full amount 
 
CASUALTY INSURANCE 253 
 
 of insurance. Notice of the abandonment must be given the 
 insurers so that they may take measures to claim the property 
 and avail themselves of whatever may be saved. 
 
 General Average. — From very early times, it has been the 
 custom where goods were thrown overboard to save the vessel 
 from sinking, for the owners of goods on board and the owners of 
 the vessel to share proportionately the loss caused by sacrificing 
 certain goods that the vessel and a portion of the cargo might be 
 saved. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is marine insurance? 
 
 2. Has a person who hires a ship for the season an insurable interest? 
 
 3. Will a misrepresentation innocently made affect a marine policy? 
 Explain. 
 
 4. What are the three implied warranties in marine insurance? 
 
 5. Explain the terms ''total loss" and "partial loss." 
 
 6. When is a loss said to be a "constructive total loss"? 
 
 7. What is the meaning of the term "general average"? 
 
 6. CASUALTY INSURANCE 
 
 Definition. — Casualty insurance is an indemnity against loss 
 resulting from bodily injury or the destruction of certain kinds 
 of property. It may be accident insurance, which is an indemnity 
 against personal injury by accident, or it may be one of the 
 numerous classes of insurance that have sprung up within the 
 past few years, granting indemnity against almost every con- 
 ceivable form of catastrophe. Among these special forms of 
 casualty insurance may be mentioned plate glass, boiler, employ- 
 ers' liability, fidelity, credit, title, and automobile insurance. 
 
 Accident Insurance. — Accident insurance is a branch of hfe 
 insurance, the latter insuring against death by any cause, while 
 the former insures against death or injury caused by accident. 
 This class of insurance usually provides a certain payment in 
 case of accidental death, a weekly indemnity for either permanent 
 or total disabihty by reason of accident, and a fixed sum for such 
 permanent injury as the loss of one or b«th of the hands, feet, or 
 eyes. An accident in this sense is an unforeseen event which re- 
 sults in injury to one's person. Being thrown from an automobile 
 
254 INSURANCE 
 
 in a collision and being struck by a falling timber are accidental 
 
 injuries. 
 
 While the injured was pitching hay, the handle of the fork slipped 
 through his hands and struck him in the body, inflicting an injury which 
 caused inflammation resulting in his death. Held, that the death was the 
 result of an accident. 
 
 — North American Insurance Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. State 43. 
 
 Unless the policy expressly excludes death by poisoning, the 
 accident policy is held to cover death due to the accidental 
 taking of poison. 
 
 Employers' Liability Insurance. — Employers' liability insur- 
 ance is a class of protection afforded to employers engaged in 
 manufacturing or other business, against liability for damages 
 for personal injuries caused by the negligence of the employer or 
 his servants. One occasion for this class of insurance has arisen 
 because of the fact that when an employee in a factory is killed 
 by reason of some faulty machinery his survivors may sue the 
 employer for damages. The insurance company in which the 
 employer has insured this risk defends the case, and if the 
 proprietor is defeated, the insurance company pays the loss. 
 (See Important Statutes, page 379.) 
 
 Fidelity Insurance. — Fidelity or guaranty insurance is a con- 
 tract by which an employer is insured against loss by the fraud 
 or dishonesty of his employees. It is in fact a guaranty of the 
 honesty of an employee. Fidelity insurance companies issue 
 bonds guaranteeing the faithful performance of contracts as well, 
 and in all cases in which bonds are required it is now the common 
 practice to purchase them of such a company. 
 
 Credit Insurance. — Credit insurance protects merchants and 
 tradesmen from loss through the insolvency or dishonesty of 
 their customers. For a certain premium the insurance company 
 guarantees the merchant against bad debts. The merchants 
 must usually bear a certain small per cent, and all losses over 
 that amount are paid by the insurance company. 
 
 Title Insurance. — Title insurance is a guaranty to the owner 
 of real property that his title is clear. It is an insurance against 
 defects in the title to the property insured, and in case of loss 
 by reason of liens or incumbrances prior to the interest of the 
 insured, the company indemnifies him. 
 
CASUALTY INSURANCE 255 
 
 Plate Glass Insurance. — Plate glass insurance is another 
 branch of casualty insurance frequently employed. Many of 
 the larger stores and offices have plate glass fronts representing 
 a large investment, and to avoid the danger of loss the owners 
 employ insurance companies to take the risk of the breaking of 
 these windows. A certain premium is charged by the companies 
 assuming this risk, the premium being based upon the cost price 
 of the windows. 
 
 Elevator Insurance. — Elevator insurance consists of a con- 
 tract which covers the risk incidental to the use of elevators, 
 including both the damage to the elevators themselves and to 
 persons or property that may be injured by the use of, or by 
 accident occurring to, such elevators. 
 
 Steam Boiler Insurance. — Because of the frequent explosions 
 occurring from th,e use of steam boilers the damage caused not 
 only to the boilers themselves but to surrounding property is 
 insured under this head. This insurance does not cover a loss 
 by fire, even though it be caused by the explosion, but does cover 
 the injury to persons or property from such cause. 
 
 Health Insurance. — Some companies issue insurance policies 
 against sickness. These policies name a list of diseases, and in 
 the event of sickness caused by any one of the diseases named in 
 the policy the insured receives a stated indemnity, usually pay- 
 able weekly. Sometimes the poHcy covers doctors' bills, hospital 
 expenses, and loss of earnings. 
 
 Burglary Insurance. — This is a form of casualty insurance, 
 and as the name implies, it is insurance against loss of property 
 by theft. It applies only to theft committed by breaking into 
 the building where the property insured is kept. 
 
 Automobile Insurance. — Automobile insurance has become 
 a very important branch of the insurance business. What is 
 known as the "full cover" poKcy insures against loss resulting 
 from fire or explosion, damage by fire to personal effects in the 
 car or to other property set on fire by the burning car, trans- 
 portation accidents, theft, collisions, loss of Kfe or injury to 
 occupants of the car and legal liability for expenses in connection 
 therewith, and loss of life or injury to others and legal liability for 
 expenses in connection therewith. 
 
256 INSURANCE 
 
 The companies will, as a rule, issue policies covering any 
 single risk just mentioned. 
 
 Other Insurance Contracts. — Almost every risk to which one 
 may be subjected can be covered by insurance. Other common 
 forms are: tornado insurance, burial insurance, rent insurance, 
 strike insurance, and the insurance of property while in the 
 process of transportation by mail or otherwise, 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is casualty insurance? 
 
 2. What are the different forms of casualty insurance? 
 
 3. Is accident insurance life insurance? Explain. 
 
 4. What are the usual indemnity provisions in an accident policy? 
 
 5. What risk does employers' liability insurance cover? 
 
 6. Why is fidelity insurance considered necessary? 
 
 7. What is the purpose of credit insurance? 
 
 8. To what class of property does title insurance apply? 
 
 9. What is plate glass insurance? 
 
 10. What risk does elevator insurance cover? 
 
 11. What loss does steam boiler insurance cover? 
 
 12. What is the "full cover" policy in automobile insurance? 
 
 13. What are the main provisions of a health insurance contract? 
 
 14. Burglar insurance is protection against what losses? 
 
 15. Mention other kinds of casualty insurance. 
 
 IMPORTANT POINTS 
 
 The principal kinds of insurance are fire, life, marine, and casualty. 
 
 The two principal kinds of insurance companies are mutual com- 
 panies and stock companies. 
 
 A mutual company is an association of persons who insure each 
 other. Theoretically an assessment is levied on each policy holder 
 whenever a loss occurs. In practice, the policyholders pay regular 
 premiums and any surplus, after payment of losses and administra- 
 tion expenses, is returned in the form of dividends. 
 
 A stock company is a corporation which charges a fixed rate for 
 insurance and out of the fund thus created pays losses. 
 
 No one has an insurable interest in property unless its destruc- 
 tion would cause him financial loss. 
 
 The risk is the event insured against. 
 
 An insurable interest is the first requisite in insurance contracts. 
 
 A fire insurance policy may be canceled by either party by giving 
 five days' notice. 
 
IMPORTANT POINTS , 257 
 
 Fire insurance contracts are not assignable. They may be trans- 
 ferred by the company on application from the insured. 
 
 A coinsurance clause in a fire insurance policy provides that, in 
 return for a reduced rate, the insured must keep his property insured 
 up to a certain percentage of its value, usually 80 per cent. 
 
 Answers to questions and statements mad« by the insured which 
 are included in the policy amount to warranties. 
 
 False representations or misstatements which have any material 
 efifect on the policy render it void. 
 
 The contract of fire insurance is binding as soon as agreed to, 
 even before the policy is written. 
 
 The fire insurance policy covers loss resulting indirectly from the 
 fire, as loss caused by water in putting out the fire. 
 
 The conditions named in an insurance policy are a part of the 
 contract and binding upon the insured and the insurer. 
 
 In fire insurance, the hour and minute that the contract begins 
 and ends is stated. 
 
 Insurance companies may reinsure property on which they have 
 issued a policy. 
 
 In case of fire, officers of the insurance company, known as 
 adjusters, usually inspect the ruins, appraise the damage, and name 
 the amount which the company will pay. If the insured is not satis- 
 fied he may bring suit in court. 
 
 When the policy contains a rebuilding clause, the company may 
 replace or repair the property in lieu of paying damages. 
 
 Any change of ownership of insured property renders the policy 
 void unless a transfer of the policy is made by the insurance company. 
 
 An insurance agent is one who represents insurance companies. 
 
 An insurance broker is one who solicits and places insurance with 
 various companies. He is the agent of the insured. 
 
 Insured dwelling property should not be allowed to remain 
 unoccupied more than ten days at one time. 
 
 A renewal receipt serves to renew a fire insurance policy. 
 
 Any pecuniary dependency amounts to an insurable interest in 
 a life. 
 
 Relationship does not give an insurable interest in a life. 
 
 In an incontestable policy, the company agrees that after a certain 
 time it shall not be forfeited for any cause except nonpayment of 
 premiums. 
 
 Many secret societies provide insurance for their members, on 
 the mutual or assessment plan. 
 
 The beneficiary of a policy has a rested right of which he cannot 
 be deprived without his consent, unless the policy contains a claus 
 reserving to the insured the right to change the beneficiary at will. 
 In either case the consent of the insurer is necessary. 
 
258 INSURANCE 
 
 Concealment and misrepresentation, if intentional, will render 
 a life insurance policy void. 
 
 Life insurance policies usually contain restrictions as to travel 
 and occupation. 
 
 Innocent concealment of a material fact renders a marine policy 
 void. 
 
 Willful deviation from the regular route or voyage will render a 
 marine policy void. 
 
 The three implied warranties in marine insurance contracts are: 
 
 1. That the vessel is seaworthy. 
 
 2. That there will be no deviation from the usual course. 
 
 3. That the voyage shall be for legal purposes. 
 
 In case of emergency the captain of a vessel may throw overboard 
 part of the cargo and the rule of general average will apply. 
 
 Casualty insurance is an indemnity against loss resulting from 
 accidents. 
 
 TEST QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Must the contract of insurai>ce be in writing? Explain. 
 
 2. What insurable interest is sufficient to uphold a fire insurance 
 policy? 
 
 3. If Green made a contract to sell his house to Young, would Young 
 have an insurable interest in the house? 
 
 4. Would taking poison by mistake be an accidental injury under an 
 accident insurance policy? 
 
 5. Give three illustrations of persons who may have an insurable 
 interest in the life of another person. 
 
 6. On October 10, you insure your house for a period of three years, 
 paying the premium in advance. On December i, you sell the house to 
 Joseph Moore. What would you do with the policy of insurance? 
 
 7. What supervision is exercised over insurance companies? 
 
 8. Would a builder who had contracted to erect a large apartment 
 house have an insurable interest in the material and building in the course 
 of construction? Explain. 
 
 ,9. (a) When does a fire insurance contract become binding on the 
 insurer? (b) When does a life insurance contract become binding on the 
 insurer? 
 
 10. Who may conduct an insurance business? 
 
 CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 Give the decision and the principle of law involved in each case. 
 I. Dyer owns a house and lot which is mortgaged to Perkins for $1000. 
 Teets has a lease of the property for one year, and Dunn has agreed with 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 259 
 
 Dyer to purchase the property, Dyer having given him a contract whereby 
 he is to deed it to Dunn as soon as he has paid $1000 on the purchase price. 
 Which of the above parties have an insurable interest in the property? 
 
 2. Did Dyer, the owner in the above case, lose his insurable interest 
 in the house and lot when he mortgaged it to Perkins? Did he lose his 
 insurable interest when he gave the contract to Dunn? 
 
 3. Moore goes to Emery, an insurance agent, and asks him to insure 
 his house for $5000, giving him a description of the property. Emery 
 agrees to insure it for one year and states that the premium will be $12. 
 Emery has authority to bind the insurance company. Moore's house burns 
 before the policy of insurance is delivered to him. Can he recover? 
 
 4. If, in the above case, Moore's house had been set on fire twice within 
 one month previous to applying for the insurance, would the fact that this 
 information was not imparted to Emery affect the contract? 
 
 5. Rice, upon applying for insurance upon a warehouse, is asked the 
 distance of the warehouse from the railroad, as the insurance company will 
 not insure such buildings within 30 feet of the track. Rice, believing his 
 answer to be true, states that the warehouse is about 40 feet from the track, 
 as the party from whom he has recently purchased the building stated that 
 to be the distance of the building from the track. The building, in fact, 
 was less than 25 feet from the track. Would this affect the policy? 
 
 6. In a policy of insurance in which the application was attached to 
 and made a part of the policy, the party obtaining the insurance has repre- 
 sented that the building insured was brick for the first two stories and frame 
 for the third story, when, in fact, the building was brick for only the first 
 story and the remaining stories were frame. Did this avoid the policy? 
 
 7. Hall insured his household furniture located on the first floor of a 
 building, other tenants occupying the upper floors. Fire broke out in the 
 upper floors and Hall's goods were damaged by smoke and water, but the 
 fire did not reach him. Can Hall recover the damage under his fire insur- 
 ance policy? 
 
 8. If, in the above case, Hall had moved his goods out to avoid their 
 being ruined by water, and temporarily placed them across the street until 
 a place could be found to store them, and about an hour after they were 
 placed there a certain part of the goods were stolen, could the value of the 
 stolen goods be recovered under the fire insurance policy? 
 
 9. If, in the above case, the remainder of the goods left in the street 
 were damaged by rain which came just after they were removed from the 
 building, could this damage be recovered under the fire insurance policy? 
 
26o INSURANCE 
 
 10. If, in problem 7, the fire had been caused by hghtning and Hall's 
 goods had been destroyed by the fire, could he have recovered, nothing 
 having been said in the policy about lightning? 
 
 11. Evans insures his house and barn, and in the policy there is a con- 
 dition that the insurer will be liable for fire caused by lightning. Lightning 
 strikes his barn, tearing off the roof and greatly damaging it, but the barn 
 does not catch fire. Can Evans recover the damage from the insurance 
 company? 
 
 12. If, in the above case, Evans's barn had been set on fire by an incen- 
 diary, could he recover the damages from the insurance company? 
 
 13. If the insured owner, during a period of temporary insanity, sets 
 fire to the barn himself, could he recover from the insurance company? 
 
 14. Waters insures his household furniture while living in a certain house 
 on Edmunds Street. Within a month after taking out such insurance, he 
 moves about one block away to a house on Meigs Street. Both of the 
 houses are frame dwellings, and there is apparently no difference in the 
 hazard. The policy contains a clause that if the property is removed with- 
 out the consent of the insurer the policy is no longer of any effect. Shortly 
 after moving, Waters' furniture burns. Can he recover from the company? 
 
 15. If Springer takes out a fire insurance poHcy of $1000 on a house 
 worth $2000 and the house burns, what amount can he recover? If the 
 insurance policy is for $3000 and the house is worth $2000, how much can he 
 recover? 
 
 16. Levitt insures his house and then sells it. The policy of insurance 
 contains the alienation clause. Shortly after the house is sold it burns. 
 Can Levitt recover under the policy? 
 
 17. If, in the above case, Levitt had mortgaged instead of sold his 
 house, could he have recovered under the policy? 
 
 18. If Levitt, upon selling the property in problem 16, had assigned 
 the policy to the purchaser without obtaining the consent of the company, 
 could the purchaser recover under the policy in case of fire? 
 
 19. Taylor takes out an insurance policy upon the life of Henderson, 
 his business partner, who owes him $10,000. After the policy has been 
 running about two years, Taylor and Henderson dissolve partnership, and 
 Henderson pays Taylor all that he owes him; but Taylor continues the- 
 policy upon Henderson's life. Is it valid? 
 
 20. Aller insures his own life in favor of his wife. After two years he 
 obtains a divorce from her, then marries another, and, wishing to make her 
 the beneficiary under his policy, seeks to change it. Can this be done? 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 261 
 
 21. In an application for a life insurance policy, Ford, the applicant, 
 was asked if any of his brothers or sisters had died of consumption. No 
 answer was given. Ford had, in fact, lost two brothers by this disease. The 
 policy was issued. Would the concealment render it void? 
 
 22. Dwight applied to a life insurance company for a policy of insurance 
 upon his life. He stated in answer to a question that he was engaged in 
 running a grocery, while in fact he was a farmer. One occupation was not 
 considered a greater hazard than the other by the insurance company. 
 Would this affect the policy? 
 
 23. If, in the above case, the answers of Dwight had been included in 
 his policy and made a part of it, would the misstatement affect the policy? 
 
 24. An insurance policy contains a stipulation that the company will 
 not be liable if the insured commits suicide, and he dies from the effects of a 
 revolver bullet fired by himself while insane. Is the company liable on the 
 policy? 
 
 25. If the stipulation in the policy had been that the company shall 
 not be liable if death is caused by suicide committed when either sane or 
 insane, would the company have been liabfecin the above case? 
 
 26. Richardson loads his vessel with aterchandise at Albany, runs it 
 down the Hudson River to New York, and ^%ere obtains a marine policy on 
 the ship and cargo at and from New York to London. He does not state 
 anything in reference to the loading at Albany. Would this affect the policy? 
 
 27. Elliott took out an accident policy insuring him against "bodily 
 injuries sustained through external violence and accidental means." He 
 was killed by accidentally drinking poison. Was the company liable? 
 
 28. Watson calls at the office of a duly authorized agent of an insurance 
 company and asks the agent to insure his house for $3000. The agent agrees 
 to write a policy for the amount. One day later the house is destroyed by 
 fire. Watson has not received the policy nor paid the premium. Will 
 Watson be able to reco /er from the insurance company? Explain. 
 
 29. Carter insured his house in the Mutual Insurance Company. At 
 the time arrangements w^ere made for issuing the policy Carter told the agent 
 of the company that the house was 200 feet from any barn or stable. Later 
 the house was destroyed by fire and the insurance company refused to 
 pay the policy on the ground that the house was only 195 feet from a stable. 
 Has the company the right to refuse payment? Explain. 
 
 30. Doran insured his life, naming his wife as beneficiary. When Doran 
 died he was heavily indebted to the Fourth National Bank. His widow 
 collected the insurance and the bank sued her to have the insurance money 
 applied to the payment of Doran's debt. Was the bank entitled to recover? 
 
REAL PROPERTY 
 
 I. IK GENERAL 
 
 Definition. — Real property or real estate is defined as land 
 and whatever is affixed to and issuing out of the land. It will 
 therefore be seen that it includes not only the land itself, but 
 buildings erected thereon, as well as trees growing therefrom and 
 oils and minerals included within the land extending downward 
 to the center of the earth. 
 
 Crops which are planted each year and which are considered 
 the fruits of labor, are personal property. If, however, the owner 
 of land and of the cultivated crops thereon sells this land, these 
 crops will go to the purchaser unless they are specially reserved 
 by a clause in the deed or in some other writing executed simul- 
 taneously with it. 
 
 Rights in Streams anc^^. Lakes. — In the case of navigable 
 waters, the title of the watjjr and the land beneath is held by the 
 state and adjoining ownei^j have no greater rights therein than 
 other people. Their ownership ceases at the water's edge. 
 
 In the case of non-navigable waters, the adjoining owners 
 
 have title thereto to the center of the stream or lake and have the 
 
 exclusive right to use and enjoy the waters over their lands. They 
 
 are not permitted to change the direction or interfere with the 
 
 flow of running streams to the injury of others. 
 
 A grantee from the United States, of land in Missouri on the banks of a 
 navigable river, such as the Missouri River, takes only to the water's edge 
 and not to the middle of the stream. The owner of the bank is not the owner 
 of an island which springs up in the river, no matter whether it be on one side 
 or the other of the center of the stream. — Cooley v. Golden, 117 Mo. 33. 
 
 Ice belongs to the owner of the land over which it forms, 
 except when it is on navigable waters, in which case it belongs 
 to the one first appropriating it. 
 
 When the water of a flowing stream, not navigable, freezes while in its 
 natural channel, the ice attached to the soil constitutes a part of the land, 
 and belongs to the owner of the bed of the stream, who has a right to remove 
 it. A person who owns the land on one side and cuts the ice beyond the 
 center of the stream is liable to the owner of the land lying under the ice 
 which was taken. — State v. Pottme.yer, t^t, Ind. 402. 
 
 262 
 
ESTATES IN LAND 263 
 
 The owner of the bank along the Kansas River, a navigable river, does 
 not own to the center of the stream, neither does he own the ice which is 
 formed on the stream adjacent to his land without first taking possession of 
 it. — Wood V. Fowler, 26 Kans. 682. 
 
 Corporeal and Incorporeal Real Property. — Corporeal real 
 property includes the land itself and the buildings, trees, min- 
 erals, and other tangible appurtenances thereto. The examples 
 of real property just discussed belong to this class. Incorporeal 
 real property is an intangible right in the land which does not 
 amount to the ownership of it. The principal illustration is an 
 easement, which is defined as a right that the owner of one 
 tract of land may exercise over the land of another. A right of 
 way which a man has over the land of his neighbor for the pur- 
 pose of reaching his own land is an easement. Lots in a city 
 are sometimes sold with the covenant that the purchaser will 
 not build within a given number of feet from the street. This 
 creates an easement in favor of the seller. The easement may 
 be granted perpetually or for a limited time. 
 
 An owner of land conveyed a part of it, with an agreement that the 
 tract should be preserved for residence purposes, and not for hotel, club, or 
 camping purposes. Held, that the deed and agreement together created an 
 easement on the entire tract for the benefit of those who might become 
 owners of separate parcels thereof and >vas enforceable by any purchaser 
 against any other purchaser. — Boyden v. Roberts, 131 Wis. 659. 
 
 An agreement between the owners of adjacent city lots that if one will 
 build a dwelling upon his lot three feet back from the line of the street the 
 other will set his buildings back the same distance when he builds, creates 
 an easement in the party so building in the land of the other. 
 
 — Wolfe V. Frost, 4 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 72. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 I. What is real property and in general what does it include? 
 2 (a) What are the rules as to property rights in the case of navigable 
 streams and lakes? (b) In the case of non-navigable streams and lakes? 
 
 3. To whom does ice that forms on navigable waters belong? 
 
 4. {a) What is corporeal real property? (6) Incorporeal real property? 
 
 5. Give an example of an easement. 
 
 2. ESTATES IN LAND 
 
 Definition. — The estate is the interest which one has in land. 
 This interest may amount to absolute ownership or it may be 
 only a temporary or conditional ownership. Under the early 
 
264 REAL PROPERTY 
 
 English law, what is called the feudal system was in force and 
 the absolute title to all real property was in the king, all others 
 holding under him as tenants. The king generally granted large 
 tracts of land to his nobles or followers, who in return for the 
 grant rendered him certain military service in the wars which 
 were frequently occurring between the different nations in those 
 times. Each follower of the king had his followers or servants to 
 whom he rented the land, and who gave him a certain amount 
 of their time as soldiers for the king. The estate of the tenant 
 in the land was called "fee." This feudal system does not 
 exist in the United States, but many of the terms and rules still 
 used in real property law are derived from it. 
 
 Estate in Fee Simple ; Eminent Domain. — Estate in fee 
 simple is the nearest approach to complete and absolute owner- 
 ship of real property. Excepting the right the state has to take 
 the owner's land for taxes or under the power of eminent domain, 
 it can not be taken from him without his consent, except by 
 creditors to pay his debts. It is an estate which exists for a man 
 during his life, and if not disposed of by him descends to his heirs. 
 When an estate of this nature exists in land, the owner can use 
 the land as he chooses, provided he does not cause injury to others, 
 and he may dispose of it or grant privileges in reference to it 
 as he may desire. The land can be taken by the state, under 
 the right of eminent domain, for public use only, as for a road, 
 railway, etc., and in every case just and adecjuate compensation 
 must be given the owner. This right is often delegated to cor- 
 porations or private persons who perform some public function, 
 as railroad companies, telegraph companies, etc. 
 
 The Supreme Court of the United States has defined eminent domain 
 as being ''The ultimate right of sovereign power to appropriate, not only 
 the public property, but the private property of all citizens within the 
 territorial sovereignty, to public purposes." 
 
 — Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, ii Pet. (U. S.) 420. 
 
 Were it not for this right in the state the construction of a 
 highway or a railroad might be prevented by the arbitrary acts 
 of a single individual. 
 
 Life Estate. — The fee in all real property must rest in some 
 one, but there may be carved out of it various lesser estates. 
 
ESTATES IN LAND 265 
 
 The absolute owner has the right to do what he will with his 
 land, therefore he may grant the use of it for life or for a term 
 of years to another person. Estates ranking next to estates in 
 fee are life estates. There are estates in land which are limited 
 by the life of some human being. It is not necessary that the 
 estate shall last during the life, but that an estate be created 
 which may continue during that period. An estate to a woman 
 during her widowhood is a life estate, although she may remarry 
 and thus defeat it before her death. 
 
 Tanner and one Bartlett executed an instrument under seal by which 
 Tanner leased to Bartlett two acres of land with use of water and the 
 privilege of conducting it to a cheese house to be erected by Bartlett. Bart- 
 lett agreed to pay $30 per year for the premises while he should use them for 
 the manufacture of cheese, and when the premises were no longer to be used 
 for that purpose, they were to revert to Tanner, Bartlett having the priv- 
 ilege of removing all buildings and fixtures erected by him. Held, that the 
 agreement created a life estate in Bartlett provided he continued to use the 
 premises for the manufacture of cheese and paid the rent. 
 
 — Warner v. Tanner, 38 Ohio State 118. 
 
 Tenant for Life. — The owner of the life estate, or the tenant 
 for Hfe, as he is called, unless restrained in the grant to him, may 
 dispose of his interest in the land, or out of it may grant a less 
 estate, as for a certain number of years, but he can grant to 
 another no rights in the land that will extend beyond his hfe. 
 The life tenant can recover nothing for the improvement which 
 he makes on the property, and he is bound to make ordinary 
 repairs at his own expense. 
 
 A life tenant by placing permanent improvements upon the land, how- 
 ever much they may enhance the value of the estate, can not create a charge 
 for the moneys thus expended against the party who takes the next estate 
 or the remainder. Such improvements are deemed to have been made by 
 the life tenant for his own benefit and enjoyment during the pendency of his 
 estate. — Hagan v. Varney, 147 111. 281. 
 
 A life tenant is bound to keep the premises in repair. If a new roof is 
 needed, he must put it on, and if paint wears off, he must repaint. 
 
 — Re Mary E. Steele, 19 N. J. Equity 120. 
 
 The life tenant has the right to cut timber on the land for use 
 as fuel and for the purpose of repairing the buildings and build- 
 ing fences. 
 
 An action was brought against Smith, a life tenant of certain premises, 
 for cutting down and carrying away two oak trees. They were cut and sold 
 
266 REAL PROPERTY 
 
 for the purpose of paying for labor and material in building fences on the 
 land. Held, that a tenant for life may cut trees for fuel, wood, and fencing, 
 but can not sell wood to pay for fencing the land. To justify the cutting, 
 the trees themselves must be used for these purposes. 
 
 — Elliot V. Smith, 2 N. H. 430. 
 
 A tenant for life must not commit waste, that is, cause or 
 allow any permanent and material injury to the property that 
 would affect the interest of the owner of the fee. The one who 
 is entitled to the property after the estate for life has terminated 
 has the right to have it come to him without being impaired by 
 injury to any part of the premises. For example, a tenant for 
 life has no right to cut and carry away timber. 
 
 The tenant may continue to work mines or take gravel from 
 
 pits that have been previously worked, but if he opens new 
 
 mines or quarries, he is guilty of waste. 
 
 In an action for waste brought against life tenants for mining coal and 
 quarrying limestone, it was shown that the quarries and mines were opened 
 and had been worked before the life estate of defendants began. Held, that 
 mines and quarries open at the beginning of a life estate may be worked by 
 the life tenant even until they are exhausted, without rendering him liable 
 in damages for waste. — Sayers v. Hoskinson, no Pa. State 473. 
 
 Emblements. — Emblements are the annual products of the 
 
 land which are the result of the tenant's labor, and which he 
 
 is entitled to take away after his tenancy has ended. All grains 
 
 and other products which are planted and cultivated by one 
 
 having an interest of uncertain duration, may be removed by 
 
 him if that interest terminates without his fault before they are 
 
 harvested. 
 
 Whittle was a tenant of certain lands for the life of his wife. During her 
 lifetime he planted his annual crops. Thereafter she died, thus terminating 
 his life estate, but he remained in possession of the lands a reasonable time 
 to harvest his crops. Held, since the estate of the life tenant was terminated 
 without his fault, he was entitled to the crops. — King v. Whittle, 73 Ga. 482. 
 
 Therefore, the representative of a tenant for life is entitled to 
 
 emblements, since the tenant's estate is of uncertain duration. 
 
 The executor of a tenant for life is entitled to crops sown during the 
 tenant's lifetime but maturing after his death. It does not affect this right 
 that the life tenant was rapidly failing in health and had reason to expect 
 his early death when the land was sown. — Bradley v. Bailey, 56 Conn. 374. 
 
 If the life tenant terminates the estate by his own act, he can 
 not claim emblements. 
 
ESTATES IN LAND 267 
 
 Estates in Remainder and Reversion. — When the life estate 
 ends, the final ownership of the property must rest with some one, 
 and it may either be granted to a person named or revert to the 
 original owner or his heirs. If the estate that is left is given to 
 some one else it is called an estate in remainder; if it comes back 
 to the original owner or his heirs it is called an estate in reversion. 
 
 Estates by Marriage. — Estates by marriage may now be 
 included under the heads of Curtesy and Dower. Under the 
 common law there existed an estate during coverture, or during 
 marriage, but- this has been practically abolished by statute in 
 all of the states. The estate during coverture arose from the 
 common law disability of a married woman to hold property; 
 therefore the husband acquired an interest in all of the wife's real 
 property, which gave him a right to the use and profits of it until 
 the marriage was terminated by death or divorce. If the wife 
 died first, her real property at once descended to her heirs, unless 
 a child was born of their marriage, in which case the husband 
 was entitled to curtesy. 
 
 Curtesy. — Curtesy is the estate for Hfe of the husband in the 
 real estate of his wife. Under the common law such an estate 
 was created when the wife died before the husband if a child had 
 been born which might have inherited the property. These 
 conditions existing, the husband had a life estate for the re- 
 mainder of his life in the real property of which the wife died 
 possessed. It was not necessary that the child should live until 
 the mother's death; if it lived but a moment after birth, it was 
 sufficient to vest this estate in the husband. This estate by 
 curtesy has been abolished by statute in some of the states, while 
 in others it exists only in case the wife dies without disposing of 
 her real property by will. In some states the husband takes the 
 same interest in the wife's estate as the wife takes in the hus- 
 band's. 
 
 Dower. — Dower is the provision which the law makes for the 
 support of a widow out of the lands of the husband. Under 
 the common law it was a life interest in one third of the hus- 
 band's realty. By statute in a few of the states this has been 
 changed to a life interest in one half of his realty. In order to 
 give rise to this estate, it is necessary that there be a legal mar- 
 
268 REAL PROPERTY 
 
 riage, that the husband own the land during some time after 
 their marriage, and that the husband die before the wife. The 
 husband may own the real property but an instant, still that will 
 be sufficient to cause the wife's right of dower to attach. There- 
 fore, if A buys a piece of land of B to-day and sells it to C to- 
 morrow, the right of A's wife attaches. But this is not so if it is 
 the same transaction, as, if A buys a farm and gives back a 
 purchase money mortgage, the wife of A gets a dower interest 
 in the farm subject to the mortgage. 
 
 Wheatley and Calhoun purchased from Mackay a tract of land and 
 simultaneously executed a mortgage of the land to secure the purchase 
 money. It was held that the rights of the mortgagee were paramount to 
 those of the purchasers' wives and that the wives' dower attached only to 
 the equity of redemption. — Wheatley v. Calhoun, 39 Va. 264. 
 
 Under her right of dower the wife has no vested interest until 
 the husband dies. He may sell the land without her consent, 
 and she will have no right in it until his death; but after that 
 event, into whatever hands it comes the wife can claim her 
 interest. Therefore, if one takes land from a married man, the 
 wife must join in the conveyance in order to cut off her right of 
 dower. The wife cannot release her dower to her husband nor 
 to any one else except the person to whom the land is conveyed. 
 
 A married man cannot defeat his wife's dower by devising his 
 real property to others by his will, except by making a provision 
 for his wife which is expressly stated to be in Heu of dower. In 
 such a case the wife may elect whether to accept the provision or 
 insist on her dower right. 
 
 Statutes in many of the states have changed the law as to 
 dower. In some states both dower and curtesy have been 
 abolished. In a few of the states the wife is not required to join 
 in a conveyance with her husband, as she takes dower only in the 
 property of which he dies possessed. 
 
 Homestead. — Homestead right is an exemption of certam 
 property from sale for debts, generally the home and a certain 
 number of acres of ground or land of a given value. Under the 
 common law there was no such provision, but statutes have been 
 passed in many of the states creating a homestead law. These 
 statutes vary in the different states, and grant the exemption 
 
ESTATES IN LAND 269 
 
 t 
 
 only to the head of a family or one upon whom there rests the 
 duty to support dependent persons living with him. A husband 
 and wife constitute such a family. 
 
 An unmarried man whose indigent mother and sisters live with him and 
 are supported by him is the head of a family in the sense in which the term 
 is used by the state constitution [of Georgia], and is entitled to a homestead. 
 
 — Marsh v. Lazenhy, 41 Ga. 153. 
 
 This homestead exemption is acquired by occupancy of the 
 premises as a home. In some states there must be recorded a 
 notice that the premises are claimed as a homestead. 
 
 Estate for Years. — Estate for years is an estate in real 
 property less than a life estate. This estate will be treated in the 
 section on Landlord and Tenant. 
 
 Equitable Estates. — The estates which we have been discuss- 
 ing are termed legal estates. There also exist equitable estates; 
 that is, the legal title may be in one party, while the equitable 
 title is in another. Property may be conveyed to A to hold in 
 trust, or as trustee, for the benefit and use of B. A is the legal 
 owner, but holds the property only for the purpose of turning 
 over the profits to B, who is the equitable owner. In this case, 
 A is the trustee and B is the cestui que trust or beneficiary. 
 
 Estates in Severalty and Joint Estates. — Estates are divided, 
 according to the number of owners, into estates in severalty and 
 joint estates, estates in severalty being those in which the own- 
 ership is in one person. Joint estates are those which are owned 
 by two or more persons. The common classes of joint estates 
 are joint tenancies and tenancies in common. The chief dis- 
 tinction between the two is that in the case of a joint tenancy, 
 upon the death of one of the joint tenants his interest vests in 
 the survivor or survivors, while upon the death of a tenant in 
 common his interest passes to his representatives. In the 
 United States, all joint estates are presumed to be tenancies in 
 common unless it appears that there was a contrary intention. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is an estate in land.^ 
 
 2. Explain the meaning of "estate in fee simple." 
 
 3. What is the right of eminent domain? Mention some conditions 
 under which the right of eminent domain may be delegated. 
 
270 REAL PROPERTY 
 
 4. Who is a tenant for life and what are his rights? 
 
 5. What restrictions are imposed on a tenant for Hfe? 
 
 6. What are emblements, and what are the tenant's rights with refer- 
 ence to emblements? 
 
 7. What is (a) an estate in remainder? (b) An estate in reversion? 
 
 8. How are estates by marriage classified? Define each. 
 
 9. Under what conditions will the husband have an estate by curtesy 
 in his wife's real property? 
 
 10. Under what conditions does the wife's dower interest attach to 
 her husband's real property? 
 
 11. (a) When does the wife's right of dower attach to her husband's 
 real property? (b) When does it become effective? 
 
 12. When and why is it necessary for the wife to join the husband in 
 deed to real property? 
 
 13. What are homestead rights and what constitutes a family? 
 
 14. What is the difference between legal estates and equitable estates? 
 
 15. When is an estate said to be held in trust? 
 
 16. How are estates divided according to the number of owners? 
 Explain. 
 
 17. (a) What is the chief distinction in the two classes of joint estates? 
 (b) In the United States, what is the presumption in the case of a joint 
 estate? 
 
 3. OWNERSHIP, SALE, AND CONVEYANCE 
 
 Ownership. — Ownership of real property was acquired in 
 the first place by taking possession of it and asserting the rights 
 of ownership. This is the way some of the early settlers in 
 undeveloped regions acquired their property. This method of 
 acquiring ownership is preserved to a Hmited extent by acts of 
 Congress which permit settlers to secure title to such land, 
 owned by the United States, as may be designated from time to 
 time, by living on it for a prescribed period and fiHng a claim to it. 
 
 Title. — The title to real property is the means by which the 
 ownership is acquired and held. It is, in other words, the evi- 
 dence which a person has of the right to the possession of prop- 
 erty. It may be either by descent or purchase. The title by 
 descent is acquired either by will or by the law of descent, 
 controlling the disposition of the real property of a person dying 
 without a will. Purchase includes all other means of acquiring 
 the title to real property, whether by gift or for a valuable 
 consideration. 
 
OWNERSHIP, SALE, AND CONVEYANCE 271 
 
 When any one has been in open continuous undisturbed 
 possession of property under a claim of right adverse to the owner 
 for a certain length of time, usually twenty years, he is s^aid to 
 have a good title to it. 'J'his is "title by prescription." 
 
 Land Contract, — When the title is acquired by purchase, the 
 transaction is the result of a contract or an agreement of one 
 party to purchase or take the property upon the prescribed 
 terms, and of the owner to sell and convey the particular prop- 
 erty for the stated consideration. This agreement is often 
 called a land contract, and is required by the fourth section of 
 the Statute of Frauds to be in writing. It must be remembered 
 that this contract does not convey the land, but agrees to con- 
 vey at some future time. If the conveyance immediately 
 follows the making of the agreement, the contract to convey is 
 unnecessary, but in the passing of the title to real property much 
 care is necessary to ascertain that the title of the person about 
 to sell, or the grantor, is clear; that is, that no third party or 
 parties have any claims on it. To ascertain that the title is 
 clear, a search is made in the public office where records of impor- 
 tant documents such as deeds and mortgages are kept. When the 
 results of this search are put in writing, the document shows all 
 of the transactions affecting the particular piece of land, and is 
 called an abstract of title. It requires some time to obtain this 
 abstract of title and to perfect other arrangements for the con- 
 veyance of the property, and the land contract binds the parties 
 to their agreement during this interval. 
 
 Deeds. — The conveyance of the title to the property may 
 be absolute, in which case it is made by deed, or conditional, in 
 which event it is made by mortgage. 
 
 A deed, in real property law, is defined as a written contract, 
 signed, sealed, and delivered, by means of which one party con- 
 veys real property to another. The two principal kinds of 
 deeds are warranty and quitclaim. The warranty deeds are 
 conveyances which, besides granting the land, contain certain 
 warrants or covenants concerning the title. A quitclaim deed 
 merely grants whatever interest the grantor has and nothing more. 
 
 Conditions. — All deeds must be in writing (or printing), and 
 must have parties competent to contract. To constitute a valid 
 
272 REAL PROPERTY 
 
 deed, or conveyance of property, it is also requisite that there 
 be (i) property to be conveyed, (2) words of conveyance, 
 (3) description of the property, (4) a writing signed, and in 
 some states sealed, by the grantor, (5) delivery and acceptance, 
 (6) acknowledgment in some states, witnesses in others, and in 
 still other states the instrument must be registered. 
 
 Property to be Conveyed. — The first condition is self-evident, 
 as a vaHd deed can not be given unless there is real property to 
 convey. 
 
 Words of Conveyance. — The deed must contain words of 
 conveyance, called the granting clause, which consists of words 
 sufficient to transfer the estate to the grantee. In most deeds 
 the words, "do hereby grant, sell, and convey," constitute this 
 clause. The words "give, grant, bargain, and sell" are some- 
 times used, or again the phrase, "grant, bargain, sell, remise, 
 release, convey, alien, and confirm." 
 
 It was held that a writing as follows, ''This indenture witnesseth, that I, 
 Jacob Smith, warrant and defend unto Christena Smith, her heirs and assigns 
 forever," certain real estate that was then described, the instrument being 
 then signed, sealed, and acknowledged like a deed, was not effective as a 
 conveyance, as it contained no granting clause, nor words signifying a grant. 
 
 — Hiimmelman v. Mounts, 87 Ind. 178. 
 
 The granting clause should contain the names of the parties, 
 also the words defining the estate, as "unto the said party of the 
 second part his heirs and assigns forever." By the clause used 
 in this case an estate in fee is granted. Under the common law, 
 if the word "heir" was omitted and the grant was to the grantee 
 alone, only a life interest would be conveyed. 
 
 It was held that a grant to A for her natural life and at her death to her. 
 children, conveyed a life estate to A and then an estate to her children during 
 their lives, but that they did not take it in fee, as the grant contained no 
 words of inheritance. — Adams v. Ross, 30 N. J. Law 505. 
 
 A grant to A and "his successors and assigns forever," conveyed only a 
 life estate. The court said that it is a well-settled rule of the common law 
 that the word "heirs" is necessary to create an estate of inheritance. 
 
 — Sedgwick V. Laflin, 10 Allen (Mass.) 430. 
 
 But this rule has been changed by statute in some of the states, 
 and a conveyance showing an intent to grant a fee will be so 
 construed. 
 
OWNERSHIP, SALE, AND CONVEYANCE 273 
 
 The conveyance clause may contain exceptions; that is, there 
 may be reserved something that would otherwise pass with the 
 property conveyed. The exception, for instance, might be of a 
 right of way over the land, or the right to mine coal or minerals. 
 The exception must be stated and particularly described. 
 
 The habendum is that part of the conveying clause which 
 begins with the words "To have and to hold." It designates 
 the estate which is to pass. If it does not agree with the granting 
 or conveying clause, it is void, and if the conveying clause de- 
 fines the estate granted, the habendum clause is not necessary, 
 although it is usually employed. 
 
 Where the granting clause grants an absolute estate to A, and the 
 habendum recites that a life estate was given to A, remainder to B, A takes 
 an absolute estate. When the granting clause and the habendum do not 
 agree, the latter gives way to the granting clause. 
 
 — Ralliffe v. Marrs, 87 Ky. 26. 
 
 Description. — The deed must contain a description of the 
 property sufficient to identify it. The description may include 
 references to maps, monuments, distances, or boundaries. 
 
 A creek is a monument which may be referred to as a boundary in a deed 
 or mortgage. — Travelers Insurance Co. v. Yount, 98 Ind. 454. 
 
 The description often closes with the words, "with the privi- 
 leges and appurtenances thereto belonging." But it is not 
 considered that this clause adds anything to the deed. The 
 appurtenances are such rights as watercourses, rights of way, 
 rights to light and air, etc., and these are all included in the 
 general grant, unless they are expressly reserved. 
 
 Signature and Seal. — At common law a seal was necessary 
 to the legality of a deed, but in many states this requirement has 
 been abolished. Between the parties themselves to a deed a 
 consideration is not necessary to its validity, although it may 
 in some cases be attacked by creditors of the grantor. A date 
 is not strictly necessary to the validity of a deed, and when used 
 may be placed in any part of the instrument. It is generally at 
 the commencement or just before the signature at the end. A 
 deed takes effect from the time of delivery, and the presumption 
 is that the date of delivery is the date of the instrument. 
 
 It is usual for the deed to close with the testimonium clause, 
 
274 REAL PROPERTY 
 
 which recites, ''In witness whereof the party of the first part 
 has hereunto set his hand and seal the day and year first above 
 written," and immediately thereafter the grantor signs his name. 
 By the Statute of Frauds the deed is required to be signed. In 
 some states the statutes require that the deed be subscribed, and 
 in that case it must be signed at the end, otherwise it may be 
 signed at any other place. 
 
 While the laws of North Carolina require all deeds conveying land to be 
 signed by the maker, the signing is not necessanly required to be at the end 
 of the deed. If the signature is in the body of the instrument, it is sufficient. 
 Nor is it essential that the maker should actually sign his name. He may 
 authorize another to do it in his presence, or he may affix his mark, which 
 will have the same effect as his own writing. 
 
 — ■ Devereux v. McMahon, io8 N. C. 134. 
 
 Delivery and Acceptance. — A deed does not become opera- 
 tive until it is delivered and accepted; that is, the instrument 
 must pass out of the control of the grantor, but it must be his 
 voluntary act, and if taken without his consent, as by theft, it is 
 not a delivery. 
 
 A deed had been signed, sealed, and acknowledged in due form, but 
 remained in the possession of the grantor until his death, and he managed 
 the property and received the rents and profits. It was held that the 
 grantees named in the deed received nothing by it as it was ineffective for 
 lack of delivery. — Fain v. Smith, 14 Oregon 82. 
 
 The instrument may be intrusted to a third person to be deliv- 
 ered to the grantee on the performance of some condition. This 
 is termed a "delivery in escrow." To constitute a valid delivery 
 in escrow there must be no power in the grantor to recall it. 
 
 The grantor duly executed the deed and said, "I deliver this as my act 
 and deed." The grantee not being present, the grantor gave the deed to his 
 sister and said, "Here, Bess, keep this, it belongs to Mr. Gamoris [the 
 grantee]." It was held that the grantor parted with control over the deed 
 and it was good delivery to the grantee. 
 
 — Doe V. Knight, 6 Barn & C. (Eng.) 671. 
 
 Not only must there be a delivery, but there must be an 
 acceptance by the grantee, though acceptance will sometimes 
 be presumed from the grantee having possession of the deed or 
 from the beneficial character of the instrument. 
 
 A deed is one of the forms of a contract and the grantor and grantee 
 must agree, the former to convey and the latter to accept. Therefore there 
 
OWNERSHIP, SALE, AND CONVEYANCE 275 
 
 must be more than a mere manual delivery of the deed; it must be accepted 
 and assented to. Where it is beneficial to the grantee, delivery and accept- 
 ance will easily be presumed from many circumstances, such as acknowledg- 
 ment, recording, possession and enjoyment of the estate by the grantee, etc. 
 
 — 'Kearny v. Jeffries, 48 Miss. 343. 
 
 Acknowledgment. — Acknowledgment is necessary to entitle 
 the instrument to be recorded in some states, and in other states 
 it is necessary to give it validity. An acknowledgment consists 
 in the grantor going before an officer designated by law and 
 declaring the deed to be genuine, and that it is his voluntary 
 act, the officer making a certificate to this effect. 
 
 In some states one or more witnesses to a deed are required 
 by statute in case there is no acknowledgment :n order to entitle 
 it to be recorded, while in other states they are necessary to 
 give it validity. 
 
 Record. — The statutes in all of the states provide for the 
 registration or recording in some public office of all deeds and 
 other instruments affecting real property. Instruments so re- 
 corded are notice to the whole world that they exist, as every 
 one can examine the records. Therefore the first instrument 
 recorded has priority over another hke instrument on the same 
 property. But as between the parties themselves and all parties 
 having actual notice, the instrument is in most of the states 
 equally valid without recording. It is only against subsequent 
 purchasers who buy in good faith that unrecorded instruments 
 are of no effect. 
 
 Warranties. — A deed may be a full warranty deed (see 
 Appendix), which contains the five covenants of title, or it may 
 be a simple warranty deed containing only the covenant of quiet 
 enjoyment and covenant warranting the title of the grantor. 
 Upon a breach of a covenant the grantor is liable for damages. 
 They are undertakings by which the grantor warrants certain 
 facts to the grantee. 
 
 Seizin. — In the full warranty deed above mentioned the first 
 covenant is that of seizin and right to convey. This is a covenant 
 that the grantor has possession of the property granted and has 
 a right to convey it. He must have the very estate in quantity 
 and quality which the deed purports to convey. This covenant 
 is broken when the grantor is not the sole owner, or when the 
 
276 REAL PROPERTY 
 
 property is in the adverse possession of another, or when the land 
 described does not exist, or there is a deficiency in the amount of 
 land conveyed. 
 
 The Mercantile Company had obtained its title to some land by the 
 foreclosure of a mortgage, but the foreclosure proceedings were defective 
 and the titles of six of the eight owners, against whom the proceedings were 
 brought, were not divested. Therefore the covenant of seizin in the deed 
 from the Trust Company was held to have been broken and damages were 
 awarded. — Mercantile Trust Co. v. South Park Residence Co., 94 Ky. 271. 
 
 This covenant is often set forth in the deed after the following 
 manner: 
 
 "The party of the first part does hereby covenant and agree 
 that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents he 
 was the lawful owner and was well seized, in fee simple, of the 
 premises above described, free and clear from all lien, right of 
 dower, or other incumbrances of every name and nature, legal or 
 equitable, and that he has good right and full power to convey 
 the same." 
 
 Quiet Enjoyment. — The second covenant is that of quiet 
 enjoyment, and is to the effect that the grantee and his heirs 
 and assigns shall not be legally disturbed in their quiet and 
 peaceable possession of the premises, but that they shall possess 
 it without suit, trouble, or eviction by the grantor or his heirs 
 or assigns. 
 
 A covenant of quiet enjoyment relates to the grantor's right to convey 
 the premises. It is a covenant that the grantee shall not be rightfully dis- 
 turbed in his possession, and not that he shall not be disturbed at all. So 
 where it appears that the grantee was kept out of possession by a party who 
 had no right or claim, it is not a breach of the covenant. 
 
 — Underwood v. Bir chard, 47 Vt. 305. 
 
 Incumbrances. — The third covenant is one against incum- 
 brances, and warrants that there are not outstanding rights in 
 third parties to the land conveyed. It is a covenant against 
 both mortgages and easements in favor of third parties. It is 
 broken by an outstanding mortgage, an unexpired lease, an 
 easement, unpaid taxes, or judgments that are unsatisfied. 
 
 A judgment against the vendor of land entered before the execution of 
 the deed, was a breach of the covenant against incumbrances. 
 
 , — Holman v. Creagnules, 14 Ind. 177. 
 
OWNERSHIP, SALE, AND CONVEYANCE 277 
 
 The usual covenant against incumbrances was broken by outstanding 
 taxes which were a lien on the property when the deed was made, and 
 the grantor can be compelled to pay them. — Milot v. Reed, 11 Mont. 568. 
 
 Further Assurance. — The fourth covenant is one of further 
 assurance, and is an agreement by the grantor to perform any 
 acts that may be necessary to perfect the grantee's title, includ- 
 ing the execution of such further instruments as may be required 
 for this purpose. 
 
 A deed made by Pascault to Cochran contained the covenant of further 
 assurance. A defect in title appeared, whereupon Pascault purchased all the 
 outstanding rights and deeded them to Cochran. It was held that this was 
 full performance of Pascault's obligation under the covenant. 
 
 — Cochran v. Pascault, 54 Md. i. 
 
 Warranty of Title. — The fifth and last covenant is the war- 
 ranty of title, which is an assurance by the grantor that the 
 grantee shall not be evicted from part or all of the premises by 
 reason of a superior title in any one else. This covenant is 
 broken by an eviction from any or all of the premises, the removal 
 of fixtures by one having a right to do so, or the taking of the 
 premises by one having a better title. 
 
 Held, that eviction by process of law is required to enable one to main- 
 tain an action for breach of covenant of warranty. 
 
 — Norton v. Jackson, 5 Calif. 262. 
 
 Quitclaim Deed. — The quitclaim deed contains none of the 
 covenants of a warranty deed, and purports to grant only what 
 interest the grantor has, if he has any. The quitclaim deed does 
 not even aver that he has any title. If he has a defective title, 
 the grantee has no claim on him. The words of conveyance differ 
 from those in the warranty deed. This form of deed is used when 
 the grantor has an interest in land, as one of several heirs or as a 
 joint owner, and wishes to convey his share to another heir or to 
 the other joint owner. It is also employed when a person having 
 an easement or other minor estate in land wishes to transfer his 
 estate to the owner in fee for the purpose of clearing the title. 
 
 Covenant against Grantor. — The covenant against the 
 grantor is the only covenant used in a quitclaim deed. It is also 
 sometimes used in a warranty deed, when the grantor is not 
 willing to warrant the title absolutely, but is willing to covenant 
 
27^ REAL PROPERTY 
 
 that he has not himself done or permitted to be done anything 
 that would injuriously affect the title to the premises. Such a 
 deed is called a special warranty deed. One form of this covenant 
 is as follows: "The said party of the first part covenants with 
 said party of the second part that the party of the first part has 
 not done or suffered anything whereby the said premises have 
 been incumbered in any way whatever." 
 
 It was held that a deed with a special warranty against all persons 
 claiming by, through, or under the grantor, can not be extended to a gen- 
 eral covenant of warranty against all persons. 
 
 — Buckner v. Street, 15 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 365. 
 
 Transfer by Will and Inheritance. — A will is an instrument 
 by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after 
 his death. When real property is left to some one by will it is 
 said to be devised, and the person who so receives it takes it by 
 devise. 
 
 When a man dies without making a will he is said to have 
 died "intestate," and the law, through a court for this purpose, 
 determines which of his relatives shall take his property, either 
 real or personal. Their title is acquired by inheritance. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. (a) How may ownership to real property be acquired? {b) What 
 is the usual way at the present time of acquiring ownership? 
 
 2. What is the title to real property? 
 
 3. Explain title by prescription. 
 
 4. What is a land contract and when is it necessary? 
 
 5. What is a deed and when is it used? 
 
 6. What are the requisites of a valid deed? 
 
 7. What are the words of conveyance? 
 
 8. What should the granting clause contain? 
 
 9. May the conveyance clause contain exceptions? Explain. 
 
 10. What is the "habendum"? Is it necessary? 
 
 11. How should the property be described in a deed? 
 
 12. Is a seal necessary to the legality of a deed? 
 
 13. What are the special requirements in the execution of a deed? 
 
 14. When does a deed become operative? 
 
 15. What is "delivery in escrow," and when is it valid? 
 
 16. What is an acknowledgment and when is it necessary? 
 
 17. Is it necessary to have witnesses to a deed? 
 
 18. Why is it usually required that deeds be recorded? Explain. 
 
MORTGAGES 279 
 
 19. What is the difference between a full covenant warranty deed and 
 a simple warranty deed? 
 
 20. What are the five covenants in a full warranty deed? 
 
 21. What is a quitclaim deed? 
 
 22. How is property transferred by will? 
 
 23. How is title to property acquired by inheritance? 
 
 4. MORTGAGES 
 
 Definition. — A mortgage is a conveyance of land as security 
 for a debt or some other obligation, subject to the condition 
 that upon the payment of the debt or the performance of the 
 obligation the conveyance becomes void. The debtor, or the 
 person who gives the mortgage, is called the mortgagor and 
 the creditor, or the person to whom it is given, is the mortgagee. 
 
 Equity of Redemption. — Under the common law the mort- 
 gage was strictly a conveyance, and the mortgagee held the legal 
 title to the property. His title was subject to be defeated upon 
 the payment of the debt secured, and in default of the payment 
 his estate became absolute. This often led to hardship and 
 injustice, for the value of the property might be greatly in excess 
 of the mortgage debt. The courts of equity recognized this 
 injustice and extended relief by giving the mortgagor the right 
 to redeem the land by paying the debt with interest. This 
 right was termed an '' equity of redemption," and to cut off such 
 right an action was brought in court giving the mortgagor a 
 certain time in which to pay or else lose the right entirely. 
 
 Lien. — Now, in many of the states, the mortgage is looked 
 upon as a lien which the mortgagee has on the mortgaged prem- 
 ises, the mortgagor still being the legal owner subject to the 
 lien which the mortgagee holds upon the land as security for 
 his debt. 
 
 Any Interest in Realty which is Subject to Sale may be 
 Mortgaged. — A widow may mortgage her right of dower, or a 
 mortgagee may mortgage his mortgage, and an heir may mort- 
 gage his undivided interest. 
 
 A and B entered into a written contract, by which B bound himself to 
 convey certain lands to A. Held, that A may mortgage his interest in the 
 land under this contract. Everything that is the subject of a contract or 
 that may be assigned, is capable of being mortgaged. 
 
 — Neligh V. Michenor, 11 r>. J. Equity 539. 
 
28o REAL PROPERTY 
 
 Form. — A mortgage is in substantially the same form as a 
 deed, with the addition of the defeasance clause. This is a clause 
 containing a statement that the conveyance is made conditional 
 upon the payment of a specific amount, which amount being 
 paid, the instrument is void. A mortgage is executed with all 
 of the formality of, and in practically the same manner as, a 
 deed. As a rule, when the mortgage is given to secure a debt, 
 it is accompanied by a note or bond or other evidence of indebted- 
 ness, making the mortgagor personally liable, so that the mort- 
 gagee may look to him personally in case the mortgaged property 
 is not sufficient to pay the debt. This is not necessary to the 
 vaHdity of the mortgage, as there may be a valid mortgage with- 
 out any personal Habihty on the part of the mortgagor, in 
 which case the creditor's only right to payment is out of the 
 mortgaged property. 
 
 Defeasance Clause. — This is the clause showing that the 
 instrument is given as security for a debt. No particular form is 
 necessary so long as this condition appears. And although on its 
 face the instrument may be a deed, a court of equity will permit 
 it to be shown that the agreement really was that the conveyance 
 should be made as security for a debt and not absolutely; there- 
 fore when this is shown, although the instrument be a deed in 
 form, it will be declared a mortgage. 
 
 Covenants. — The mortgage may or may not include one or 
 more covenants. They are usually inserted for the better security 
 of the mortgagee. One clause gives the mortgagee the right to 
 sell the property; that is, to foreclose the mortgage upon default 
 of the payment of any part of the principal as agreed. 
 
 The insurance clause is inserted to protect the mortgagee's 
 interest in the buildings on the mortgaged premises. 
 
 Another clause, called the interest, tax, and assessment clause, 
 compels the mortgagor to pay the interest, taxes, and all assess- 
 ments levied against the property, and in case of default for a 
 given number of days, the mortgagee may, if he choose, consider 
 the whole amount of the debt due and proceed with the same 
 remedies as though the time within which the debt was to have 
 been paid had expired. 
 
 A short form of mortgage is shown in the Appendix. 
 
MORTGAGES 281 
 
 Assignment. — The mortgagee may desire to sell the mortgage 
 or transfer it to another party. This he may do, as the interest 
 of the mortgagee in the property mortgaged is subject to sale as 
 well as the interest in the property remaining in the mortgagor. 
 The assignee takes the mortgage with all of the rights of the 
 assignor, but no others. The mortgage can be assigned only 
 by an instrument in writing and under seal, and the assignment 
 should be recorded, to protect the assignee against a subsequent 
 fraudulent assignment. 
 
 Foreclosure. — The remedy of the mortgagee when the debt 
 secured by the mortgage is not paid as agreed is to foreclose his 
 lien. The foreclosure of the mortgage means the proceedings 
 by which the mortgaged premises are applied to the payment of 
 the mortgage debt, and by which the equity of redemption is 
 barred or cut off. This remedy usually consists of an action in 
 the courts from which a judgment is obtained, decreeing that the 
 property be sold and the proceeds applied toward the payment 
 of the mortgage debt. If anything remains after the costs of 
 the proceedings and the mortgage debt are paid, it is turned over 
 to the mortgagor. This action bars all rights of the mortgagor 
 to the property and cuts off his equity of redemption. All parties 
 interested in the property must be made parties to the action, so 
 that they will have notice of the proceedings and can present 
 their claims to the court if they desire. The statutes generally 
 require that the property be advertised for sale in the papers for 
 a certain length of time before the sale takes place. In case the 
 property does not sell for enough to satisfy the debt, a personal 
 judgment on the note or bond is taken for the balance, this being 
 called a deficiency judgment. 
 
 Record. — Mortgages are required to be recorded in the same 
 manner as deeds, in order to give notice to subsequent pur- 
 chasers of the property. If not so recorded, they are in most 
 states valid as between the original parties, but not against 
 persons who have purchased in ignorance of the existence of 
 the mortgage. But in some states the statutes require the 
 mortgage to be recorded in order to render it valid. 
 
 Discharge. — If the mortgage is paid according to its terms 
 when it becomes due, it is discharged; or payment after it is due, 
 
2S2 REAL PROPERTY 
 
 but before an action is brought to foreclose, discharges the 
 mortgage. In order to cancel the mortgage on the records, 
 an instrument called a satisfaction of mortgage or discharge of 
 mortgage, executed by the mortgagee, must be filed in the office 
 where the mortgage was recorded, otherwise the mortgage, 
 although paid, would still appear by the records to stand against 
 the property. 
 
 Second Mortgage. — The mortgagor may place a second or 
 subsequent mortgage on the property. Unless it is otherwise 
 stipulated, the mortgages take priority according to their date; 
 that is, the second mortgagee gets nothing until the first is paid 
 in full. But in case the first mortgage is not recorded and the 
 second mortgagee has no notice of it, the second mortgage will, 
 if recorded, have priority. 
 
 Any mortgagee may foreclose his mortgage when it is past 
 due or the mortgagor is in default, but he can not affect the 
 interest of a prior mortgagee by such proceedings, although he 
 may cut off any subsequent mortgagee. By foreclosing his 
 mortgage, therefore, the holder of a first mortgage will bar the 
 second mortgage, and if the property sells for only enough to 
 pay the first mortgage, the second mortgagee will lose. Of 
 course if the property sells for more than enough to pay the 
 first mortgage, the balance will be applied on the second mort- 
 gage. If the second mortgagee forecloses, he must sell the 
 property subject to the lien of the first mortgage. 
 
 Deeds of Trust. — Mortgages may be given by means of a 
 deed of trust to a third party as trustee. These are called deeds 
 of trust. The trustee has the right to foreclose. Should he fail 
 to exercise his right, a bondholder may foreclose, for the benefit of 
 the other bondholders. Before he can do this, he must show the 
 court that the foreclosure is necessary to protect the interests of 
 the bondholders and that the trustee refused to take action. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is a mortgage on land? 
 
 2. Explain the term "equity of redemption." 
 
 3. Is a mortgage a lien on the property mortgaged? Explain. 
 
 4. What interests in realty may be mortgaged? 
 
LANDLORD AND TENANT 2S3 
 
 5. How do a mortgage and a deed compare in form? 
 
 6. What is the defeasance clause? P2xplain. 
 
 7. Mention three covenants usually contained in a mortgage. 
 
 8. In what way is the debt usually represented? 
 
 9. (a) Are mortgages assignable? Explain. (b) What are the 
 requirements? 
 
 10. What remedy has the mortgagor when the debt is not paid? 
 
 11. Is it necessary to record mortgages? Explain. 
 
 12. What is necessary to discharge and cancel a mortgage? 
 
 13. Can a second mortgage be placed on property? Explain. 
 
 14. Can a mortgagor who holds a second mortgage foreclose? Explain. 
 
 5. LANDLORD AND TENANT 
 
 Estates for Years. — We have discussed estates in fee simple 
 
 and estates for life. But estates in real property may be created 
 
 for a shorter definite period. These are called estates for years. 
 
 The grantor is known as the lessor or landlord, and the grantee as 
 
 the lessee or tenant. The contract creating an estate for years 
 
 is a lease. It is important to observe that an estate for years, or 
 
 a leasehold interest in real estate, is classed as personal property. 
 
 Taylor, at the time of his death, left a will giving his real estate to a 
 certain person and his personal property to his son absolutely. Taylor 
 owned a number of leases of property, some of which were to run ninety- 
 nine years. Held, these leases passed as personal property to the son. 
 
 — Taylor v. Taylor, 47 Md. 295. 
 
 Leases. — By the Statute of Frauds in most states the lease 
 must be in writing, if for a longer time than one year. Gener- 
 ally, if for one year or less it may be made orally, and this is 
 true even though the term is to commence at a date in the 
 future. In a few states leases can be made for only a limited 
 number of years, while in others a lease for more than a certain 
 number of years must be recorded. 
 
 Covenants. — A common form of lease is shown in the Appen- 
 dix. Besides the provisions in it, any further agreement between 
 the parties may be incorporated in the writing. A lease is but a 
 contract, and the full agreement of the parties should be set 
 forth. Frequently the following covenant is inserted: "It is 
 further mutually covenanted and agreed that, in case the build- 
 ings or tenements on said premises shall be destroyed or so injured 
 by fire as to become untenantable, then this lease shall become 
 
284 REAL PROPERTY 
 
 thereby terminated, if said second party shall so elect; and in 
 such case, he shall vacate said premises and give immediate 
 written notice thereof to said landlord, in which case rent shall 
 be due and payable up to and at the time of such destruction or 
 injury.'^ 
 
 Term. — The term of the lease is the time for which it is to 
 run. If the tenant has been in possession under a lease for one or 
 more years, and he retains possession without executing a new 
 lease, he is presumed, in the absence of some agreement, to be a 
 tenant from year to year, which means that his term after the 
 expiration of the lease is one year, and if he remains in possession 
 after the next year he is a tenant for another year. 
 
 Express and Implied Covenants. — The covenants contained 
 in a lease are either expressed or implied. ' The implied covenants 
 exist whether they are mentioned or not; the express covenants 
 must be included in the express conditions of the lease, and may 
 be many or few. 
 
 The implied covenants, on the part of the lessor, are those 
 regarding quiet enjoyment and the payment of taxes. The 
 usual words of grant in a lease are '' demise and lease," or "grant 
 and demise," these words being said to import a covenant of 
 quiet enjoyment. This covenant is broken when the tenant is 
 evicted by some one who has a paramount title. 
 
 Hanley leased certain premises to Banks, the lease containing no 
 covenant of quiet enjoyment. Hanley raised and adjusted the building to 
 conform to the grade of the street, doing the work while Banks was in pos- 
 session and in such a manner that Banks' possession and use of the prem- 
 ises was seriously interfered with. Held, that the law always implies a 
 covenant of quiet enjoyment from the fact of the leasing, and that the 
 covenant is broken by any event which prevents the tenant from enjoying 
 the premises as amply as he is entitled to by the lease. 
 
 — Hanley v. Banks, 6 Okla. 79. 
 
 The landlord also impliedly covenants that he will pay all 
 taxes assessed against the premises during the term. There is 
 no implied covenant on the part of the lessor, or landlord, that 
 the premises are in a tenantable condition. 
 
 In an action for rent of a store leased to one Coulter, the defense was, 
 that the store was rented for the selling of musical instruments, and that it 
 was so imperfectly and defectively constructed that rain came through the 
 roof and ceiling, causing damage to the instruments. Held, that in the letting 
 
LANDLORD AND TENANT 285 
 
 of a store, room, or house, there is no implied warranty that it is, or shall 
 continue to be, fit for the purpose for which it is let. The tenant must 
 determine for himself the safety and fitness of the premises. 
 
 — Lucas V. Coulter, 104 Ind. 81. 
 
 On the part of the lessee, or tenant, there is an implied cove- 
 nant that he shall pay the rent stipulated for. 
 
 The lessee also impliedly covenants to repair, and if the leased 
 premises consist of a farm, it is implied that he is to cultivate it 
 in a husbandlike manner. The covenant to repair is not to 
 rebuild when the property is burned down, but, as it is said, to 
 keep it ''wind and water tight"; that is, to keep the roof from 
 leaking and the siding tight. The premises must be kept in 
 repair, except for ordinary wear and tear. 
 
 An implied covenant may be set aside by express covenants. 
 
 Rights and Liabilities under a Lease. — Aside from the cove- 
 nants in a lease there are certain rights and liabilities which arise 
 from the relation of landlord and tenant. In the absence of an 
 agreement to the contrary the tenant is entitled to the exclusive 
 possession of the premises. He is liable for waste and is estopped 
 from denying his landlord's title; that is, the tenant cannot for 
 any purpose claim that the premises do not belong to his landlord. 
 
 If a tenant recognizes the title of his landlord by accepting a lease or by 
 paying the rent, he will be estopped during the term of his tenancy from 
 disputing it, although the want of title may appear from the landlord's own 
 testimony. — Gray v. Johnson, 14 N. H. 414. 
 
 The tenant is entitled to emblements when his estate is cut off 
 by some contingency without his fault. 
 
 Shoemaker owned some land, of which he gave a deed in trust to Toms to 
 secure a loan. Shoemaker afterwards leased the land to Worst for a year 
 and Worst paid the rent in full. Before Worst had harvested his crops Toms 
 foreclosed his claim and sold the property to Gray. Gray at once claimed 
 the crops as owner of the land, but Worst as lessee gathered them before 
 leaving. In this action for the value of the crops it was held that the lessee 
 was entitled to them and Gray could not recover. 
 
 — Gray v. Worst, 129 Mo. 122. 
 
 The landlord is under no obligation to repair unless the lease 
 expressly binds him to such duty. And he is entitled to the 
 fixtures annexed to and made a part of the realty. The ques- 
 tions as to when the fixtures may be removed by the tenant, and 
 
286 REAL PROPERTY 
 
 when they may be claimed by the landlord, will be discussed in 
 
 the following chapter on ''Fixtures." 
 
 The tenant sued the landlord for the value of a front window in the 
 leased store. The window had been broken by a storm during the tenancy 
 and replaced by the tenant, the landlord having refused to put in a new one. 
 Held, that he could not recover. The landlord is not bound either to repair 
 leased premises himself or to pay for the repairs made by his tenant unless 
 he has expressly contracted to make the repairs. 
 
 — Turner v. Townsend, 42 Nebr. 376. 
 
 Assigning or Subletting of Lease. — Unless the tenant is 
 restrained by an express covenant against subletting or assigning, 
 he may assign or sublet his lease without the consent of the land- 
 lord. If the interest granted by the lessee is for a shorter time 
 or for rights inferior to those granted in his own lease, it is a 
 sublease. 
 
 Where a lessee executes an instrument conveying the whole of his un- 
 expired term, but reserving rent at a rate and time of payment different from 
 those in the original lease, and a right of reentry on nonpayment of rent 
 and the breach of other conditions, and also providing for a surrender of the 
 premises to him at the expiration of the time, the instrument is a sublease 
 and not an assignment. — Collins v. Hasbrouck, 56 N. Y. 157. 
 
 And in the case of a sublease the subtenant is not Hable for 
 rent to the original lessor, but only to the original lessee. 
 
 If the interest conveyed by the tenant is his whole interest in 
 the lease, it is an assignment of the lease, and the assignee is Ha- 
 ble to the original lessor for rent. In the case of an assignment 
 of the lease the landlord may look to either the original lessee 
 or to the assignee of the lease for the rent. The assignee takes 
 all of the interest of the original tenant and is bound to pay 
 rent, to repair and to use the property in any special way pro- 
 vided for in the lease. But these obligations of the assignee of 
 the lease do not in any way release the original lessee from his 
 obligation to his lessor. 
 
 Eviction. — At the expiration of the lease the landlord is enti- 
 tled to the possession of the premises, and if the tenant does not 
 surrender them, the landlord may institute proceedings to evict 
 him. The statutes in the different states provide the procedure 
 by which the tenant holding over after his lease has expired may 
 be evicted on short notice. This is termed ''summary proceed- 
 ings." This form of procedure is also provided by statute for 
 
LANDLORD AND TENANT 287 
 
 the eviction of the tenant when he does not pay his rent. The 
 landlord who wishes to evict a tenant by summary proceedings 
 obtains a process from some court which is served upon the ten- 
 ant, and if it is found by the court when the case comes up for 
 a hearing that the landlord is entitled to the possession of the 
 premises, the court empowers one of its officers to evict the ten- 
 ant from the premises. 
 
 As a result of the shortage of houses after the World War, 
 some of the states passed laws to limit increases in rent and to 
 prevent evictions of tenants willing to pay reasonable rent. This 
 was done under the police power of the state, to protect public 
 health against profiteers. 
 
 Where the tenancy is not for any fixed period, but is a ten- 
 ancy from year to year or month to month, it cannot be termi- 
 nated by either party except by notice. Under the common law 
 a tenancy from year to year could be terminated by notice six 
 months before the expiration of the period, and in the case of 
 a tenancy for a shorter period, as from month to month, by a 
 notice equal to the length of the period. 
 
 In monthly tenancies a month's notice to quit is sufficient, but the 
 notice must be to quit at the end of one of the monthly periods. 
 
 — Stejfens v. Earl, 40 N. J. Law 128. 
 
 Until this notice has been given, the landlord can not evict the 
 tenant, and until the tenant has given a like notice to the land- 
 lord, he is liable to be held for the rent unless the landlord accepts 
 his surrender of the premises. The statutes in the different states 
 have in many instances changed the common law rule and a 
 shorter notice is rendered sufficient. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. How are estates for years created? 
 
 2. Must a lease of land be in writing? Explain. . 
 
 3. What are the usual covenants in a lease? 
 
 4. When is the tenant presumed to be a tenant from year to year? 
 
 5. What are the usual implied covenants in a lease? Explain. 
 
 6. What are the tenant's rights and liabilities under a lease? 
 
 7. What are the landlord's rights and liabilities under a lease? 
 
 8. Has a tenant a right to sublet? Explain. 
 
 9. In case of an assignment of a lease who is responsible for the rent? 
 
288 REAL PROPERTY 
 
 10. When and under what conditions has the landlord a right to evict 
 a tenant? 
 
 11. What are the notice requirements in case of eviction? 
 
 IMPORTANT POINTS 
 
 The conditions and term, and the rights and obligations in con- 
 nection with the hdlding of land constitute "tenure." 
 
 An estate is a specific right or interest in land. 
 
 Fee simple means a full ownership, clear of any conditions, 
 limitations, or restrictions. 
 
 A freehold is an estate of inheritance or a life estate. It has an 
 indefinite duration. 
 
 A leasehold is an estate of definite or fixed duration. 
 
 An estate of inheritance is one which descends to the heirs of the 
 owner upon his death. 
 
 A person who possesses a right to real property during his life or 
 the life of another has an estate for life. 
 
 All leaseholds of real property, regardless of the term, are con- 
 sidered personal property. 
 
 Realty covenants are written agreements fixing rights and lia- 
 bilities. 
 
 Real property is acquired by occupancy, prescription, will, inher- 
 itance, or deed. 
 
 A will made by the owner of property is a means of disposing of 
 the property after his death. 
 
 A will must be witnessed by two persons who are not beneficiaries. 
 
 When real property is left by will, it is said to be devised and the 
 person to whom it is willed takes it by devise. 
 
 When a person dies without making a will, his property descends 
 to his heirs by inheritance. 
 
 When property descends by inheritance the law determines which 
 relative shall take the property. 
 
 The purchaser of mortgaged property who assumes the mortgage 
 becomes liable absolutely for the mortgage; while the purchaser 
 who accepts the property subject to the mortgage, without assuming 
 the mortgage, is liable only to the extent of his equity or interest in the 
 property. 
 
 The special kinds of mortgages are: 
 
 I. Deeds of trust. A mortgage may be given as a deed of 
 
 trust to a third party as trustee. 
 2* Purchase money mortgages. These are mortgages given 
 
 for part or the whole of the purchase price of land. 
 3. Building and loan mortgages. These are given to secure 
 funds for the purpose of erecting buildings. 
 
 When one person holds property for the benefit of another, he is 
 said to hold it in trust as a trustee. 
 
TEST QUESTIONS 289 
 
 Restrictions in deeds for the benefit of the surrounding property 
 are binding so long as they are not against public policy. 
 
 TEST QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What are the ways by which title to real property may be acquired? 
 
 2. A has a farm upon which there is a pond one half mile in diameter. 
 Has A the right to prohibit people from fishing and rowing upon this pond? 
 
 3. A's farm has a small river running through it. Has A the exclusive 
 right to fish on the part running through his property? 
 
 4. In the above case, if the river had been a navigable stream, what 
 exclusive rights would A have had? 
 
 5. Give an illustration of (a) corporeal real property; (b) incorporeal real 
 property; (c) easement. 
 
 6. Why is it advisable before buying real property to have the title 
 searched? 
 
 7. What is an abstract of title? 
 
 8. Wilson owns the absolute title in a farm. He dies leaving his widow 
 the use of it during the remainder of her life. She leases it to Johnson for one 
 year. What estate in the land did Wilson have? What estate did his widow 
 receive after his death? What estate did Johnson have? Were there 
 other rights in the property? 
 
 9. (a) In the above case could Wilson's widow grant to any one an 
 estate in the land that would exist beyond her own life? (b) Could she grant 
 an estate in the land that would last as long as she hved? 
 
 10. Had Wilson's widow, in question 8, the right to cut timber on the 
 farm for the purpose of repairing the buildings? For use as fuel? To sell for 
 lumber? To use in manufacturing wagons? 
 
 11. Explain what is meant when it is said that a life tenant must not 
 commit waste. 
 
 12. Suppose there was a coal mine on Wilson's farm in question 8, which 
 he had been working during his life. Can his widow continue to work it under 
 her hfe estate? Can she open it and work it if it had never been worked? 
 
 13. If Wilson's widow should sow a field of wheat on the farm and then 
 die before it was harvested, would the wheat belong to her estate, or to the 
 person to whom Wilson had left the farm after his widow's death? 
 
 14. Harden, a married man, buys a farm for $5000, and gives back a 
 purchase money mortgage for $4000, paying the balance of $1000 in cash. 
 Harden's widow does not join in the mortgage. Upon Harden 's death will 
 
290 REAL PROPERTY 
 
 his widow have dower in the whole farm, or will the mortgage which she did 
 not sign come in ahead of it? 
 
 15. If, in the above case, the mortgage given by Harden had not been a 
 purchase money mortgage, but had been given some years after Harden 
 had purchased the farm and his wife had not joined in it, would the widow's 
 dower right be subject to the mortgage? 
 
 16. Property is conveyed to A to hold in trust for B, a minor child, 
 until he shall become of age, the use and benefit of the property to go to B. 
 What estate in the land has A? What estate has B ? 
 
 17. A gave a deed to B. In the granting clause it recited that an 
 absolute conveyance was given to B. In the habendum it recited that B had 
 a title in fee subject to a life estate in C. What estate did B get under the 
 deed? 
 
 18. Is a deed valid as between the parties when it is not recorded? Is 
 it valid as to third parties who had no notice of it and who acquired rights 
 to the land after it was given? 
 
 19. How does the transfer of property on which there is a mortgage 
 affect the mortgage? 
 
 20. Does the covenant to repair require the rebuilding of the premises 
 if they are burned down? 
 
 21. Emery hires a building for one year and then leases all but one 
 room to Boland for the whole length of his term. Which does this constitute, 
 an assignment or a subletting? 
 
 22. If in the above case Emery had rented the entire building for the 
 full term of his lease to Boland without any restrictions, what would it 
 have constituted, an assignment or a subletting? 
 
 23. If the tenant's lease of the property is for a definite time, how 
 may the landlord evict him at the end of his term, provided he does not 
 voluntarily surrender the property? 
 
 24. In the purchase of mortgaged property what is the difference 
 between the purchaser assuming the mortgage and buying the property 
 subject to the mortgage? 
 
 CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 Give the decision and the principle of law involved in each case. 
 
 I. Fisher draws a deed of a house and lot, naming his grandson as 
 grantee. He places the deed in his safe, and after two years dies. The deed 
 is found and the grandson claims the property under it. Can he hold the 
 property? 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 291 
 
 2. If, upon drawing the deed in the preceding case, Fisher had given it 
 to his banker to hold until his death and to deliver to the grandson at that 
 time, could the grandson hold the land? What kind of delivery to the 
 banker would this have been? 
 
 3. Hall sold a farm to Dexter. In the deed there was a covenant of 
 quiet enjoyment. After Dexter obtained possession. Griffin, a third party, 
 claimed title to the farm and brought an action against Dexter to recover it. 
 In this case Griffin was defeated, as the court decided he had no claim what- 
 ever. Was Hall's covenant of quiet enjoyment broken? If Griffin had' 
 recovered in his action, would the covenant of quiet enjoyment have been 
 broken? 
 
 4. If in the above case Hall's deed had contained a covenant against 
 incumbrances and there had existed a judgment on record against Hall 
 which was a lien upon the property, would the covenant have been broken? 
 If there had been unpaid taxes against the property, would the covenant 
 have been broken? 
 
 5. If Hall's deed to Dexter, in problem 3, had contained a warranty of 
 title, and after Dexter had possession Griffin had gone upon the land and 
 removed a building which he had erected temporarily and which he had the 
 right under an agreement to remove, would the covenant have been broken? 
 
 6. Miner rents a house and lot of Slater for one year at the annual 
 rental of $200. At the end of the year nothing is said and he remains for 
 another year, paying his rent. After remaining in the house for two months 
 of the third year Miner vacates it. Slater claims the rent for the whole year. 
 Can he recover? 
 
 7. Hamilton rents a house and lot of Turner. He does not pay his 
 rent and Turner sues him. Hamilton claims that Turner is not the owner of 
 the property, and it develops upon the trial that a third party has a para- 
 mount title. Can Hamilton defeat Turner's suit for rent in this way? 
 
 8. Fox leases his farm to White for one year. Brown, a mortgagee, 
 forecloses a mortgage on the farm against Fox and sells it to Wilson, who 
 takes possession and ousts White before he has an opportunity of harvesting 
 his crops. To whom do the crops belong, Wilson or White? 
 
 9. Snow rented part of his house to Gates for one year on an oral 
 contract, rent payable monthly in advance. Gates paid the first month's 
 rent and at the end of two weeks notified Snow that he had decided to move. 
 Is he held by the lease? Explain. 
 
 10. A father transferred to his son for a consideration of $1 a piece of 
 real estate worth $5000. The deed was duly executed and delivered. Can 
 
292 REAL PROPERTY 
 
 the son defend successfully a suit to set aside the transfer on the ground of 
 inadequate consideration? Explain fully. 
 
 11. In a purchase of a house and lot from a married man, you insist 
 that his wife join in making the deed. What is your reason for doing so? 
 Would you likewise require that a husband join in a deed made by a mar- 
 ried woman? Explain. 
 
 12. L. K. Ward, a married man, died. His will disposed of his prop- 
 erty as follows: daughter, $6000 cash; son, 200 acre farm; wife, $6000 cash. 
 What are the widow's rights? 
 
 13. Milton contracted orally to sell to the Hartman Lumber Co. all the 
 standing timber on a certain wood lot owned by Milton. Before the lumber 
 company started to cut and haul the logs Milton served notice on them not 
 to touch the timber as they would do some damage crossing a field belonging 
 to him which he had agreed to let them cross. What are the rights of the 
 parties? 
 
 14. The owner of a farm agreed to give a certain person a deed of it as 
 security for a debt. In conformity with this agreement, the owner of the 
 farm immediately, upon returning to his home, executed and acknowledged 
 the deed and sent it to the County Clerk's office to be recorded. The person 
 in whose favor the deed was executed did not know that it was made and 
 left at the County Clerk's office, as neither he nor any person representing 
 him was present to receive it. Was this a good delivery within the law? 
 Explain. 
 
FIXTURES 
 
 Personal or Real Property. — We understand in a general way 
 that real property is land and rights concerning it. As distin- 
 guished from this, personal property is property of a personal or 
 removable nature, and includes all property rights not included 
 in the classification of real property. Personal property is also 
 called chattels. We often find much difficulty in distinguishing 
 between the two classes of property. It is plain that a house and 
 lot or farm is real property, and it is equally apparent that a 
 horse and wagon or a suit of clothes is personal property. As we 
 have seen, also (page 283), a leasehold interest in real estate is 
 personal property. 
 
 Personal property also includes "choses in action"; that is, 
 rights of action against another person for money or property. 
 Promissory notes, drafts, shares of stock, corporation bonds and 
 debts are all choses in action. Any right of action for damage to 
 property is a chose in action. 
 
 Patents, trade-marks, and copyrights are personal property 
 and are also choses in action. They are forms of property which 
 may, under certain conditions, give rise to right of action to 
 protect the interests of the party concerned. 
 
 In all the above cases the laws are clear. But the classifica- 
 tion of certain articles known as fixtures, which may be either 
 personal or real property, is less clearly defined. The general 
 rule is that a fixture is real property when it is actually and 
 permanently annexed to the land or is to be used in connection 
 therewith. A fixture is personal property when it is detached or 
 movable. This general rule is modified by many special rules in 
 specific cases. 
 
 Tests concerning Fixtures. — Fixtures are chattels, either ac- 
 tually or constructively affixed to the land. In some cases they can 
 not be removed and are considered part of and pass with the land, 
 while under other conditions they may be separated from the 
 realty and do not pass with it. For example, fence posts which 
 have been cut and used for building or repairing a fence are a 
 
 293 
 
294 FIXTURES 
 
 part of the real property, but fence posts which have been cut 
 to sell would be considered personal property. The early com- 
 mon law was most favorable to the landowner, regarding any- 
 thing attached to the realty as his property, but the rule was 
 relaxed, at first in favor of the tenant who erected fixtures for use 
 in his trade or business, which were held to be removable. Now, 
 however, the question arises not only between landlord and 
 tenant, but also between mortgagor and mortgagee, and vendor 
 and vendee. A person seUing his farm must know what he can 
 remove and what he has sold with the land. The tenant must 
 determine what he can take with him and what passes to the 
 landlord because of its attachment to the realty. Different rules 
 have been laid down by different courts. 
 
 One of the tests often applied is the intention of the party 
 annexing the chattel to the land. This intention is inferred from 
 the nature of the article affixed, the relation of the party making 
 the annexation with the owner of the land, the structure and mode 
 of the annexation, and the purpose for which it is to be used. 
 
 Hinkley entered into possession of a tract of land under a contract for 
 its purchase, and erected large and substantial buildings with engines and 
 machinery for manufacturing an extract of bark for tanning purposes. 
 Hinkley failed to pay for the land, so never acquired title. In an action to 
 recover the machinery and engines it was held that they were a part of the 
 realty, and could not be sold as personal property as against the owners of 
 the land. — Hinkley v. Black, 70 Maine 473. 
 
 It seems that there are other tests that have to be applied in 
 connection with the intent, to determine whether or not the 
 chattel is a part of the realty. One is the mode and degree of 
 the annexation. That is, if the chattel is so firmly and securely 
 affixed to, and incorporated into, the building that it can not be 
 removed without injury to itself and the building it is generally 
 not removable. Under the common law the mode and degree 
 of annexation was practically the controlling question. 
 
 Looms in a woolen factory, connected with the motive power by leather 
 bands and so attached to the building by screws holding them to the floor 
 that they could be removed without injury to themselves or the building, are 
 chattels. The question arose between the mortgagor and mortgagee. 
 
 — Murdoch v. Giford, 18 N. Y. 28. 
 
 An engine used in a building and so placed that it can not be removed 
 without taking down part of the building is a fixture. The engine in this 
 
TESTS CONCERNING FIXTURES 295 
 
 case could not be removed without taking the boards off the side of the 
 building, and the boilers were set in brick, requiring the wall to be torn down 
 to remove them. In this case the question arose between the grantor and 
 the purchaser. — Despatch v. Bellamy, 12 N. H. 205. 
 
 A person may not intend to make a permanent improvement, 
 but the chattel may be so firmly annexed that the law will not 
 permit him to carry out his intention of removing it. In such a 
 case the damage to the realty must be very pronounced to 
 constitute the chattel a part of the real property if it is the 
 expressed intent of the party that the chattel shall remain 
 personalty. 
 
 But, on the other hand, the fact that it may be removed with- 
 out such injury does not necessarily make it personalty. 
 
 Fencing material that has been used as part of the fences on a farm, but 
 is temporarily detached without any intent to divert it from such use, is a 
 part of the realty and passes by a conveyance of the farm to a purchaser. 
 
 — Goodrich v. Jones, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 142. 
 
 Gas pipes running under the floors and between the walls are 
 not removable fixtures, but gas fixtures and chandeliers screwed 
 in through holes in the walls or floors are removable. Stoves 
 and furnaces put up in the usual way by a tenant are treated as 
 furniture and are removable, but if built into brickwork they 
 are nonremovable fixtures. 
 
 Gas fixtures which are screwed on to the gas pipes, and mirrors which 
 are not set into the wall but are supported by hooks so that they can be re- 
 moved without injuring the walls, form no part of the realty and do not 
 pass by deed or mortgage of the premises. 
 
 — McKeage v. Hanover Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. $8. 
 An electric chandelier, an annunciator and simJlar articles attached to a 
 house by the tenant for his own convenience, and removable without injury 
 to the building, form no part of the realty. 
 
 — Raymond v. Strickland, 1 24 Ga. 504. 
 A boiler installed by a tenant to replace an inadequate boiler, screwed 
 to pipes running through the building, but removable without injury, was 
 not a fixture and the tenant was entitled to remove it. 
 
 — McLain Inv. Co. v. Cunningham, 113 Mo. Appeal 519. 
 
 Another test is the appropriation of the chattel to the use or 
 purpose of that part of the realty to which it is connected. It 
 seems that an article which is essential to the use for which the 
 building or land is designed, or which is especially adapted to 
 
296 FIXTURES 
 
 the place where it is erected, is regarded as a nonremovable 
 fixture, although it is but slightly connected with the realty. 
 
 Articles such as shelving, racks, counters, cases, etc., although personal 
 in their nature, are realty when made to be used with real estate and essential 
 to its beneficial use. — Bullard v. Hopkins, 128 Iowa 703. 
 
 An engine and boiler, bought by the owner of a mill and hauled to the 
 mill with the intention of attaching them thereto, are realty even if not 
 actually attached, when they are necessary for the use of the mill. 
 
 — Patton V. Moore, 16 W. Va. 428. 
 
 Poles used necessarily in cultivating hops, but which are taken down for 
 the purpose of gathering the crop and piled in the yard with the intention of 
 being replaced in season next year, are a part of the realty. 
 
 — Bishop V. Bishop, 11 N. Y. 123. 
 
 A mortgagee claimed the machinery in a building erected expressly for 
 use as a twine factory. The machinery was heavy and was fastened to the 
 floor by bolts, nails, and cleats and was attached to the gearing. Most of the 
 machinery could have been removed without material injury to the building 
 and used elsewhere. It was proved that the machinery was put in the 
 building for permanent use. Held, that the evidence was sufficient to find 
 an intent to make the machinery part of the realty. The court said the 
 criterion of a fixture is the union of three requisites: i, Actual annexation 
 to the realty or something appurtenant thereto; 2, Application to the use or 
 purpose to which that part of the realty to which it is connected is appro- 
 priated; 3, The intention of the party making the annexation to make a 
 permanent accession to the realty. In such cases the court said the purpose 
 of the annexation and the intent with which it is made are the most important 
 considerations. — McRea v. Central Bank, 66 N. Y. 489. 
 
 This last rule in the case of McRea v. Central Bank does not 
 apply between landlord and tenant, as it is held that the tenant 
 cannot intend articles for permanent use on land that does not 
 belong to hirn. This rule inaugurates the theory of constructive 
 annexation and is contrary to the common law, which requires 
 actual annexation to the realty. 
 
 The owner of realty, after giving a mortgage, placed on his ground in 
 front of his house a statue of Washington, made by himself, and weighing 
 about three tons. It was on a base three feet high. This base rested upon a 
 foundation built of mortar and stone. The statue was not fastened to the 
 base, nor the base to the foundation. Held, that the statue was a part of the 
 realty and that it was as firmly attached to the soil by its own weight as it 
 could have been by clamps and screws. In the same case a sun dial, similarly 
 placed, was also held to be realty. — Snedeker v. Waring, 12 N. Y. 170. 
 
 The builders of a church left a recess in which an organ was to be placed. 
 The organ was required to complete the design and finish of the building and 
 was attached to the floor and intended to be permanent. Held, that the organ 
 was a part of the realty and passed to the purchaser of the land. 
 
 — Rogers v. Crow, 40 Mo. 91. 
 
RELATION OF THE PARTIES 297 
 
 Force pumps, pipes, and shafting, and machinery attached by 
 spikes, nails, and bolts, are part of the realty. 
 
 It was held, that machinery used in a sash and blind factory and attached 
 to the mill by spikes, bolts, and screws, and which was operated by belts 
 running from the permanent shafting driven by a water wheel under the 
 mill, was part of the realty. — Symonds v. Harris, 51 Maine 14. 
 
 Under the rule of constructive annexation some cases hold 
 that machinery, permanent in its character and essential for the 
 purposes of the building, becomes realty although not actually 
 attached thereto. 
 
 Illustrations of this class of fixtures are ponderous machinery 
 kept in place by its own weight, cotton gins, and duplicate 
 rollers for a rolHng mill, all of which are held to pass with the 
 realty. 
 
 A carding machine not fastened to the house and requiring several men 
 to move it, was held to be a fixture, and passed with the land to a purchaser. 
 
 — Deal V. Palmer, 72 N. C. 582. 
 
 Other cases hold that machinery is personal property unless 
 
 actually annexed. Such cases hold that heavy machinery in a 
 
 factory screwed to the floor but removable without injury is not 
 
 realty. 
 
 Lathes, planers, and similar machines, each a complete machine and 
 
 fastened to the floor by screws to keep it steady in operation, were not 
 
 covered by a real estate mortgage as they had not become part of the realty. 
 
 — Crane Iron Works v. Wilkes, 64 N. J. Law 193. 
 
 Relation of the Parties. — The relation of the parties has some 
 
 weight in determining the character of the fixtures. As between 
 
 landlord and tenant the presumption is that tenants do not 
 
 intend the improvements to be additions to the realty, and they 
 
 are therefore allow^ed greater rights in removing the chattels than 
 
 any other class of persons. For the encouragement of trade 
 
 and the promotion of industry the rule has been established that 
 
 trade fixtures erected by a tenant are removable. A carpenter 
 
 shop, a ballroom, and a bowling alley erected on blocks or posts 
 
 have all been held to be removable. 
 
 A scenic railway, consisting of a platform, undulating tracks, machinery, 
 etc., erected by a tenant on leased ground, was a trade fixture and could be 
 removed by the tenant during his term. 
 
 — Thompson Scenic Ry. Co. v. Young, 90 Md. 278. 
 
298 FIXTURES 
 
 As between landlord and tenant under a mining lease, engines and boilers 
 erected by the tenant on brick and stone foundations, bolted down solidly 
 to the ground and walled in with brick arches; also dwelling houses erected 
 by the tenant for miners to live in, standing on posts or dry stone walls, 
 where the intent was not to make them a part of the realty but merely to 
 use them in the mining operations, will be regarded as "trade fixtures" and 
 may be removed by the tenant at or before the termination of the lease. 
 
 — Conrad v. Saginaw Mining Co., 54 Mich. 249. 
 
 As between landlord and tenant wooden structures or buildings resting 
 by their own weight on flat stones laid upon the surface of the ground without 
 other foundation are not part of the realty. But if the building is a per- 
 manent structure on a foundation it becomes part of the real estate. 
 
 — Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478. 
 
 The parties may agree that the chattels annexed are to 
 remain as personalty, and effect will be given to the agreement. 
 
 The tenant must exercise his right to remove fixtures before 
 
 the expiration of his term. If he does not remove them before 
 
 he surrenders the premises, he can not reenter and claim them. 
 
 McCaddon after his lease had expired entered upon plaintiff's premises 
 to remove a vault and safe he had constructed, and an action was brought 
 to restrain him from removing them. Held, that the tenant could not exer- 
 cise his right of removing trade fixtures after he had surrendered possession of 
 the premises. — Dostal v. McCaddon, 35 Iowa 318. 
 
 When the question arises between vendor and vendee or 
 mortgagor and mortgagee the presumption is stronger against 
 the vendor and mortgagor, as being the owners of the realty they 
 are supposed to have intended the improvements to be perma- 
 nent. 
 
 The tenant placed on leased land an engine and other appliances for 
 working oil and gas wells, under a lease which provided that the tenant 
 could at any time remove all machinery and fixtures. It was held that the 
 articles did not become part of the realty, but could be removed by the 
 tenant within a reasonable time after the termination of the lease. 
 
 — Gartlan v. Hickman, 56 W. Va. 75. 
 
 Stage appointments and theater fittings, such as scenery, curtains, 
 ropes for scene shifting, opera chairs screwed to the floor, etc., having been 
 specially made and so far as their nature permitted, affixed to the realty, 
 were fixtures and passed to a purchaser of the realty. 
 
 — Oliver v. Lansing, 59 Nev. 219. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What does personal property include? 
 
 2. What are fixtures? They may be classified as what kind of property? 
 
 3. How may a fixture be annexed to realty? 
 
IMPORTANT POINTS 299 
 
 4. When is a fixture said to be realty? 
 
 5. When is a fixture said to be personalty? 
 
 6. What is the most important test to be applied in case a dispute arises 
 as to whom the fixture belongs? 
 
 7. From what is this test of ownership inferred? 
 
 8. Under the common law, what was the most important test? 
 
 . 9. In what way may the purpose of a person, who did not intend to 
 make a fixture permanent, be defeated? 
 
 10. Is a fence inclosing a lot personalty or realty? Why? 
 
 11. The fence is taken down. Is the fence material, which is on the lot, 
 personalty or i^ealty? Why? 
 
 12. Are gas and water pipes attached to a house and running through 
 it, personalty or realty? 
 
 13. A tenant installs lighting fixtures for his own use in a house which 
 is not equipped with them. Has he a right to remove them? 
 
 14. When must he exercise this right? 
 
 15. A tenant supplied his own hot-air furnace, which was not supplied 
 in a house piped for one. He set the furnace in the cellar and connected it 
 with the pipes already in the house. Has he a right to remove it? 
 
 16. What do you understand by mode of annexation? 
 
 17. What do you understand by degree of annexation? 
 
 18. Mention the three requisites which are necessarily combined to 
 make a fixture a part of the realty as laid down in McRea against Central 
 Bank. 
 
 19. Are improvements made by the mortgagor on mortgaged property 
 covered by the mortgage? Give an illustration. 
 
 20. What is constructive annexation? 
 
 21. Downing sold a farm on which there was a well equipped with a 
 force pump connected with pipes to the house and barn. Has he a right to 
 remove this pumping system? 
 
 22. Are there any conditions und^r which he might remove the pumping 
 system? 
 
 23. Explain the meaning of "relation of the parties" as applied to 
 fixtures. 
 
 24. What are trade fixtures? 
 
 25. Are trade fixtures as a rule removable by the tenant? Explain. 
 
 IMPORTANT POINTS 
 
 A fixture may be either personal or real property. 
 
 Fixtures are chattels affixed to realty or to be used in connection 
 therewith. 
 
 Mode of annexation, purpose for which it is to be used, intention 
 and relation of the parties annexing the fixture are factors in determin- 
 ing whether it is personalty or realty. 
 
 The intention of the party annexing the fixture is the most impor- 
 tant factor in determining its ownership. 
 
300 FIXTURES 
 
 Improvements in the way of fixtures which are annexed per- 
 manently to mortgaged realty by the mortgagor are covered by the 
 mortgage. 
 
 In case a mortgage on realty is foreclosed and the property sold 
 to satisfy the debt, all fixtures which are considered a part and parcel 
 of the realty are included in the sale. 
 
 Trade fixtures are fixtures used in connection with a business. 
 
 As a rule " trade fixtures " put in by the tenant are his property and 
 he has a right to remove them. 
 
 A tenant must exercise his right of removal of fixtures before 
 vacating or giving up his right of possession. 
 
 When the owner of realty annexes a fixture the presumption is 
 that he intended it as a part of the realty. 
 
 CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 Give the decision and the principle of law involved in each case. 
 
 1. Mowery purchased a large building for factory purposes for which 
 he gave a purchase money mortgage for $5000, Afterwards he installed a 
 quantity of machinery for use in connection with the building. His business 
 was not successful, and when he failed to pay off the mortgage, the mortgagee 
 foreclosed and sold the property. Mowery claimed the machinery. What 
 are the rights of the parties? 
 
 2. Johnson sold a factory building in which were a number of machines 
 connected therewith by means of screws, shafts, and belts. Nothing was 
 said about them at the time of the sale. Johnson did not intend to sell the 
 machines, but after the sale the buyer would not allow Johnson to remove 
 them. Who is entitled to the machines? Explain. 
 
 3. Lampson leased a building in which he constructed a boiler which 
 could not be removed without tearing down a portion of the end wall of the 
 building. When the lease expired Lampson attempted to remove the boiler 
 and the owner of the building stopped him. How should this case be 
 decided? 
 
 4. Manker sold a farm on which was piled a quantity of fencing ma- 
 terial which had been used on the farm and was to be used again. After the 
 sale Manker moved this material away and the purchaser brought action 
 for damages. Should he succeed? 
 
 5. Dunn rented a house which was piped for gas, but was not equipped 
 with fixtures for lighting. Dunn supplied the necessary fixtures. Before the 
 lease expired the owner of the house served notice on Dunn not to remove the 
 fixtures. What are the rights of the parties? Explain. 
 
 6. Wright rented a building for use as a store, in which he installed 
 shelves, racks, and various store accessories. When he vacated the owner 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 301 
 
 of the building enjoined him frofti taking any of the shelves and racks which 
 were in any way attached to the building. Who is entitled to the articles in 
 question? Explain. 
 
 7. Higgins owned some land which was mortgaged to Green. He 
 erected on this land a sawmill and placed therein an engine which was built 
 in masonry, and put in other machinery which was fastened to the floor, all 
 of which he intended at the time to be permanent. Green foreclosed the 
 mortgage and obtained the property. Who was entitled to the engine and 
 machinery? 
 
 8. In the above case, if the machinery had been set on the floor and 
 held there by its own weight, who would have been entitled to it? 
 
 9. Edwards, who is the owner of a house and lot, is repairing and paint- 
 ing his house. While the painters are at work the blinds are removed for the 
 purpose of painting. Before they are replaced Edwards sells the house and 
 lot to Gray. Are the blinds a part of the realty which passes to Gray, or are 
 they personal property, and can Edwards remove them? 
 
 10. In the above case, do the chandeliers and gas fixtures which are 
 screwed into the gas pipes pass to Gray or remain the property of Edwards? 
 
 11. In the above case, do the gas and water pipes pass with the realty to 
 Gray or remain the property of Edwards? 
 
 12. Wells, who rents a house of Myles, places a furnace in the cellar and 
 connects it with the house by pipes and registers in the usual way. It is not 
 attached to the floor. When Wells moves, Myles refuses to allow him to take 
 the furnace, claiming it belongs to the realty. Who gets the furnace? 
 
 13. A large stamping machine weighing ten tons is used in a building on 
 Bowers's land which passes to Coon, the purchaser, under a mortgage fore- 
 closure. The machine is not fastened to the building, but kept in place by 
 its own weight. To whom does it belong. Bowers or Coon? 
 
 14. In the above case if Bowers had been merely a tenant and had 
 placed the stamping machine in the building for his own use and Coon had 
 been the owner of the land, could Bowers have removed the machine at the 
 end of his tenancy, or would it have become the property of Coon? 
 
 15. Lucus, who had been a tenant in a store building belonging to 
 Tanner, vacated the building at the expiration of his lease but left therein 
 some fixtures to which he was entitled under the terms of the lease. About 
 a month later, he went back to remove the fixtures and the owner of the 
 building stopped him from taking them. Had Lucus a right to take the fix- 
 tures? Explain. 
 
PARTNERSHIP 
 
 I. IN GENERAL 
 
 The Uniform Partnership Law. — Partnership is a very old 
 form of business association, and the laws of the different states 
 regulating partnerships have not been uniform. Quite recently, 
 however, a Uniform Partnership Law has been adopted by 
 certain states. Its adoption is becoming general. Like other 
 uniform laws the Uniform Partnership Law combines the best 
 features of existing laws in the different states. 
 
 The discussion of partnership in this chapter is based primarily 
 on the Uniform Partnership Law. 
 
 Partnership Defined. — A partnership is an association of 
 two or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit. 
 The members of a partnership are called partners, and the 
 partners together are said to constitute a firm. 
 
 Agreement. — A partnership results from an. agreement under 
 which the partners are carrying on a business. An agree- 
 ment to form a partnership at some future time does not con- 
 stitute the parties to such an agreement partners. A partnership 
 is formed simply by the contract of the parties and requires no 
 authority from the government to create it. The contract of 
 partnership may be entered upon by a written agreement, by an 
 oral agreement, or in some cases by implication. 
 
 Written Contract. — It is a wise precaution to have the agree- 
 ment in writing and all of the terms and conditions of the part- 
 nership expressed. The written agreement, setting forth the 
 terms of the partnership and signed by the parties that are to 
 compose the firm, is called articles of copartnership. A great 
 many different clauses may be inserted, depending upon the 
 actual agreement of the parties. (See form in Appendix.) 
 
 Oral Contract. — As we have said, articles of copartnership 
 are desirable, but not necessary, to the formation of a partnership. 
 By the Statute of Frauds, however, a contract of partnership for 
 over one year must, in most of the states, be in writing. 
 
 302 
 
IN GENERAL 303 
 
 Virginia and some other jurisdictions hold to the contrary, 
 and expressly declare that a contract of partnership is not within 
 the Statute of Frauds. . 
 
 Implied Partnership. — Aside from a partnership formed by 
 an actual agreement, either oral or written, which we have just 
 discussed, a partnership may be imphed from transactions and 
 relations in which the word "partnership" has never been used, 
 but from which the law will imply a partnership whether it was 
 so intended by the parties or not. This implied partnership may 
 be an actual partnership by implication or a partnership by 
 implication as to third parties. 
 
 Partners by Estoppel. — Estoppel is a rule of law which 
 precludes a man from denying the existence of certain facts or 
 conditions which he has represented or allowed to be represented 
 as existing. Through this rule a person not actually a partner 
 may in some cases be liable or may in some cases bind others as 
 if he were a partner. 
 
 1. When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct, 
 represents himself, or consents to another representing him, 
 as a partner in an existing partnership or with one or more 
 persons not actual partners, he is liable to any person to whom 
 such representation has been made, who has, on the faith 
 of such representation, given credit to the actual or apparent 
 partnership. 
 
 2. When a person has been thus represented to be a partner 
 in an existing partnership, or with one or more persons not actual 
 partners, he is an agent of the persons consenting to such repre- 
 sentation to bind them to the same extent and in the same 
 manner as if he were a partner in fact, with respect to persons 
 who rely upon the representation. Where all the members of the 
 existing partnership consent to the representation, a partnership 
 act or obligation results; but in all other cases it is the joint act 
 or obligation of the person acting and the persons consenting to 
 the representation. 
 
 Essentials of a Partnership. — The essentials of a partnership 
 may be given as follows: 
 
 1. The partners (parties competent to contract). 
 
 2. The agreement or articles of copartnership. 
 
304 PARTNERSHIP 
 
 3. The firm capital or property. 
 , 4. The business to be conducted (must be a lawful business). 
 
 5. The business motive (always profit-sharing). 
 
 Partners. — The number of persons who may unite to form a 
 partnership is not limited, but a person, to become a partner, 
 must be competent to contract. An infant's contract of partner- 
 ship, like most of his contracts, is voidable, and may be affirmed 
 after he becomes of age, in which case he has all of the rights, and 
 is subject to all of the duties, of a partner. 
 
 Kinds of Partners. — Partners are (i) general, (2) secret, 
 (3) silent, (4) nominal, (5) dormant, (6) limited or special. 
 
 General Partner. — A general partner is one of the active 
 and known parties. He usually participates in the business and 
 is held out to the world as a partner. 
 
 Secret Partner. — A secret or unknown partner is one who is 
 in reality a partner active in the management of the business, 
 but conceals the fact both from the public and from the customers 
 of the partnership. This course is often taken when a person 
 risks money or credit in a business, but does not wish to assume 
 the risks and liabilities of a partner. So long as his concealment 
 is perfect, he is protected; but if he is at any time discovered to 
 be a partner, he may be held the same as a general partner. 
 
 Silent Partner. — A silent partner is one who as between the 
 members of the firm is an actual -partner, but who takes no 
 active part in the business of the firm except that of recovering 
 his share of the profits. He may be known to the outside world 
 as a partner, but in the business itself he takes no active part. 
 His liabilities are the same as those of a general partner. 
 
 Nominal Partner. — A nominal partner is one who is held 
 forth as a partner, with his own consent, and is liable as a partner 
 because he has given his credit to the firm and authorized engage- 
 ments and contracts on the strength of this relation. He has no 
 interest whatever in the business, and as between himself and 
 the true owner there is no actual partnership, but there exists 
 what we have spoken of as an implied partnership as to third 
 parties, and the nominal partner will be held Hable as a partner 
 to third parties to whom he has suffered himself to be held out as 
 a real partner. 
 
IN GENERAL 305 
 
 Dormant Partner. — A dormant partner does not differ mate- 
 rially from a silent partner, except that he is not known to the 
 outside world. He is both a secret and a silent partner, being 
 both unknown as a partner and inactive in the business. 
 
 Special Partner. — A special partner exists only in those 
 states in which the statutes provide for limited partnerships. By 
 complying with the statute, such a partner may contribute a 
 certain amount of capital and not become liable for tlie debts of 
 the firm beyond the amount so contributed. 
 
 The Uniform Partnership Law provides how such a part- 
 nership may be formed, the powers and liabilities of the general 
 and of the special partners and how such partnership is dis- 
 solved. 
 
 Reality of Partnership. — In the case of a partnership by 
 implication, which has already been mentioned, a nice question 
 often arises' as to whether or not a partnership really exists. 
 The agreement or understanding between the parties to a trans- 
 action may be such that the law will say they are partners al- 
 though they did not contemplate becoming partners. 
 
 If the parties either expressly or impliedly enter into an 
 association such as the law regards as a partnership, they will 
 be held to stand in that relation. Whether such an association 
 is intended to be formed depends upon the facts in each case. 
 
 There may be a partnership as to third parties though the 
 parties are not partners as between themselves, as is the case 
 where one holds himself out as a partner and by his conduct 
 induces others to trust the firm on the strength of his being a 
 partner. As to such outside parties, he will be so held although 
 the intent and agreement of the parties between themselves 
 do not create such a relation. 
 
 In an action brought against Marbut and Powell, doing business under 
 the firm name of S. P. Marbut, Powell denied being a partner. He con- 
 tributed the use of a dwelling, storehouse, and $200, which he called a loan,* 
 and Marbut contributed his time to the business and $200. No agreement 
 was made as to the rent of the house or the interest on the money, but Powell 
 was to receive one half of the profits of the business as profits and not as 
 compensation for the use of the house and money. Held, that this con- 
 stituted a partnership as to third parties. — Powell v. Moore, 79 Ga. 524. 
 
 Downey & Company had a contract for paving the city of Beaumont, 
 on which they expected to make a profit of $53,000. They did not have 
 
3o6 PARTNERSHIP 
 
 money to finance the work and Masterson agreed to advance the money, 
 under an agreement by which Downey & Company were to do the work, 
 receive payment therefor, settle all bills for labor, supplies, etc., and divide 
 the net profits with Masterson on the basis of two thirds to Downey & 
 Company and one third to Masterson. In a suit for the price of materials 
 furnished for the work, it was held that the agreement constituted Masterson 
 a partner in the firm of Downey & Company and he was personally liable to 
 Kelley Island L. & T. Co. for supplies furnished. 
 
 — Kelley Island L. b° T. Co. v. Masterson, loo Tex. 38. 
 
 In determining whether or not the parties are partners, the 
 fact that they are to divide the profits and to share the losses 
 is evidence of an intent to become partners, though this does 
 not absolutely create such a relation. That each party is to have 
 a voice and control in the business, and that each is to invest 
 his capital and labor in the undertaking and is not to occupy 
 the position of clerk or manager, are generally considered facts 
 sufficient to determine the relation one of partnership. 
 
 One who lends a sum of money to a partnership, under an agreement 
 that he shall be paid interest thereon and shall also be paid one tenth of the 
 yearly profits of the partnership business if those profits exceed the sum 
 lent, does not thereby become liable as a partner for the debts of the firm. 
 
 — Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611. 
 One Dunn had a contract for grading a railroad. Dunn and Conner made 
 an agreement by which Dunn furnished six mules and his services and Conner 
 furnished sixteen mules and harness, the profits of the work to be divided 
 equally. It was held there was a partnership as to third parties, although 
 Conner had nothing to do with the work and was not to be responsible for 
 debts, and Conner was liable as a partner to one who had furnished supplies. 
 
 — Brandon b" Dreyer v. Conner, 117 Ga. 759. 
 
 Existence of a Partnership. — The authorities have differed 
 very widely as to the rules that will control in determining who 
 are and who are not partners, and the only safe guide is to 
 determine the intention of the parties. 
 
 Beecher owned a hotel and Williams agreed in writing to hire the use of 
 it from day to day, to keep it open as a hotel, and to pay Beecher daily a 
 sum equal to one third of the gross receipts. Bush sold Williams a bill 
 of goods and then sought to hold Beecher as a partner. The goods were sold 
 to Williams, and Beecher was never held out as being in partnership with 
 him. Held, that their agreement did not constitute a partnership. The 
 court said that there can be no such a thing as a partnership as to third 
 persons when there is none as between the parties themselves, unless the 
 third persons have been misled by deceptive appearances or concealment of 
 facts. — Beecher v. Bush, 45 Mich. 188. 
 
IN GENERAL 307 
 
 The Uniform Partnership Law has laid down the following 
 rules for determining this question: 
 
 1. Except as provided under partner by estoppel (page 303) 
 persons who are not partners as to each other are not partners 
 as to third persons. 
 
 2. Joint tenancy, tenancy in common ^ joint property, 
 common property, or part ownership does not of itself estabUsh a 
 partnership, whether such coowners do or do not share any profits 
 made by the use of the property. 
 
 3. The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a 
 partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a 
 joint or common right or interest in any property from which 
 the returns are derived. 
 
 4. The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a busi- 
 ness is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, 
 but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received 
 inpayment: 
 
 {a) As a debt by installments or otherwise, 
 {h) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord, 
 (<:) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased 
 partner, 
 
 (d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of pa> ment vary 
 with the profits of the business, 
 
 (e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will of a 
 business or other property by installments or otherwise. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is a partnership? 
 
 2. How is a partnership formed? 
 
 3. What are the essentials of a partnership? 
 
 4. What are articles of copartnership? Are they necessary to the 
 formation of a partnership? Explain. 
 
 5. How may a partnership be formed by implication? 
 
 6. (a) How may a partnership be formed by estoppel? {b) Define 
 estoppel. 
 
 7. Who may become a partner? 
 
 8. Name and define the different kinds of partners. 
 
 9. How does a limited partnership differ from other partnerships? 
 
 10. Is it possible for a partnership to exist when the parties thereto do 
 iiot consider themselves partners? Explain. 
 
3o8 PARTNERSHIP 
 
 II. What are the rules for determining the existence of a partnership 
 under the Uniform Partnership Law? 
 
 2. RIGHTS OF PARTNERS BETWEEN THEMSELVES 
 
 Right to Choose Associates. — The first right of a partner is 
 to choose those with whom he is to be associated in this relation, 
 for as a person cannot be compelled to go into a partnership 
 against his will, so he cannot be compelled to allow any one to 
 come into the partnership without his consent. If one partner 
 draws out or dies, his interest cannot be purchased by another 
 who can come in without the consent of the other partners; and 
 if they give their consent, and he comes in, the result is that a 
 new partnership is created. 
 
 The mere purchase of interest in the partnership property of the estate 
 of a deceased partner does not create a new partnership between the pur- 
 chaser and the surviving partner of the old firm. 
 
 — Noonan v. Nunan, 76 Calif. 44. 
 
 Right of Purchaser or Inheritor. — The person who buys or 
 inherits the interest of a partner in a firm merely has the right 
 to demand a settlement of the affairs of the company and a 
 payment to him of his share, after the debts of the firm are 
 paid. 
 
 Partner may SeU. — Each partner has the absolute right to 
 sell the whole or any part of the partnership property included 
 in the regular course of the business, but a sale of any property 
 of the partnership not ordinarily kept for sale and not within 
 the course of the business is not within the power of one partner. 
 For example, one partner in a grocery business can sell the stock 
 in the regular way, but not the fixtures and store, as such sale 
 would not be in the regular course of the business. 
 
 Drake and Thyng were partners in the brickmaking business. While 
 Drake was away Thyng sold the stock and plant to a third party for an 
 insignificant and inadequate sum. Drake brought action to set aside 
 the sale. Held, that, while a partner may sell a part or the whole of any of 
 the effects of a firm which are intended for sale, if the sale is within the scope 
 of the partnership business, yet he cannot, without the consent of the other 
 partners, dispose of the partnership business itself or of all the effects, includ- 
 ing the means of carrying it on, as this is beyond the range of a partner's 
 implied powers. — Drake v. Thyng, 37 Ark. 228. 
 
RIGHTS OF PARTNERS 309 
 
 Partnership Property. — i. All property originally brought 
 into the partnership stock or subsequently acquired, by purchase 
 or otherwise, on account of the partnership is partnership 
 property. 
 
 2. Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired 
 with partnership funds is partnership property. 
 
 3. Any estate in real property may be acquired in the 
 partnership name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the 
 partnership name. 
 
 Capital. — The capital of the partnership consists of such 
 
 properties or amounts as are contributed to the common fund 
 
 by the different partners at the beginning, or that may be put 
 
 in thereafter. The claim of each partner to this partnership 
 
 capital does not extend to any particular article, but is an interest 
 
 in the whole, consisting of a right to share in the proceeds after 
 
 the firm debts are paid. The partners are owners "in common" 
 
 (page 9) of all property belonging to the firm. Aside from this, 
 
 individual property of the partners may be used in the business. 
 
 The store in which the business is conducted may belong to one 
 
 of the partners, and he can deal with this as his own and not as a 
 
 partner. 
 
 One partner mortgaged a certain number of bales of cotton out of the 
 partnership crop for the payment of an individual debt. The mortgagee had 
 notice of the partnership. Held, that the mortgagee had no right to the 
 specific property but only a right to the ultimate interest of the mortgagor in 
 the partnership effects, after all of the firm debts were paid, to an amount 
 equal to the value of the cotton. — Nichol v. Stewart, 36 Ark. 612. 
 
 Good Will. — The good will of the firm is partnership prop- 
 erty. The good will is defined to be the benefit arising from the 
 connection and reputation of the firm, the fact that the business 
 is established and going, that it has customers and is advertised 
 throughout the section to which it looks for trade. The sale of 
 the business as a whole, including stock, fixtures, etc., is under- 
 stood to include the good will. So the trade-marks and trade 
 name of a business are property belonging to the firm and pass 
 with the sale of the business in the same manner as the good 
 will, although either may be sold separately. 
 
 Hoopes and Merry were copartners engaged in manufacturing galvanized 
 iron under two trade-marks, one the "Lion brand" and the other the 
 
310 PARTNERSHIP 
 
 "Phoenix brand." Upon the dissolution of the firm Hoopes bought the 
 business. Thereafter Merry brought action to restrain him from the use of 
 the above-named trade-marks, nothing having been said about them in the 
 bill of sale. Held, that the exclusive right to use the trade-marks belonging 
 to the firm passed to the defendant. — Merry v. Hoopes, iii N. Y. 415. 
 
 Good Faith. — The first duty of each of the partners to the 
 others is that of exercising the utmost good faith toward them. 
 The reason for this is apparent when we realize how completely 
 each partner is at the mercy of the others. Each partner really 
 acts as agent in the transaction of the business for the firm and 
 for the other partners. 
 
 If one partner is the active agent of the firm, and as such receives a salary 
 beyond what comes to him from his interest as a partner, he is clothed with 
 a double trust in his relations with the other partners, which imposes upon 
 him the duty of exercising the utmost good faith in his dealings; and if he 
 obtains anything for his own benefit in disregard of that trust, a court of 
 equity will compel him to account to the other partners for it. 
 
 — Kimherly v. Arms, 129 U. S. 512. 
 
 Individual Liability. — Each partner is chargeable with any 
 loss to the firm which arises from his own breach of duty, whether 
 through fraud, negligence, or ignorance, but he is not Hable to 
 the firm for loss arising from an honest mistake of judgment. 
 
 Although a partner may act unwisely in incurring liabilities for the firm^ 
 the resulting loss cannot properly be charged to him personally upon a 
 dissolution, when it is not shown that his acts were wanton or fraudulent. 
 
 — Charlton v. Sloan, 76 Iowa 288. 
 
 If one partner takes a secret advantage of the partnership, 
 whereby he makes a profit for himself at the expense of the 
 firm, he can be required to restore it, the courts holding that he 
 acted for the partnership and it will be entitled to the benefits. 
 If the lease of a building occupied by a firm expires, one member 
 cannot secretly take out a new lease in his own name and seek 
 to sublet to the firm at an increased rate. The new lease taken 
 in the name of one member of the firm will be declared by the 
 courts as held by him for the benefit and use of the firm. 
 
 Hodge and Holden are partners engaged in the lumber business. Holden, 
 while away on his vacation, purchased a quantity of select lumber on his 
 own account. When he returned, he sold the lumber he had purchased to 
 his firm at an advance in price and took the profit for himself. Hodge can 
 require Holden to account to the firm for all profit resulting from this trans- 
 action. 
 
RIGHTS OF PARTNERS 311 
 
 Records of Transaction. — The firm must keep books of 
 account upon which each member is bound to enter, or have 
 entered, all of his transactions for the firm, as each partner has a 
 right to know of all the transactions in the business. 
 
 A member of a firm whose duty it is to keep the accounts, and who 
 claims that he has omitted to enter credits to which he is entitled, will be 
 required to furnish satisfactory proof of the mistake he asks to have cor- 
 rected. — Van Ness v. Van Ness, 32 N. J. Equity 669. 
 
 Compensation. — One partner is not entitled to any special 
 compensation for his services in the partnership unless it is 
 expressly provided for. Each partner is supposed to do all that 
 he can for the good of the partnership, and whatever he does 
 gives him no claim for extra compensatior beyond his share of 
 the profits of the business unless he has the consent of the other 
 partners. 
 
 In the absence of an agreement to that effect, one partner is not entitled 
 to charge his copartners for hfs services because he has done more than his 
 just proportion of the work. — Burgess v. Badger, 124 111. 288. 
 
 The claim of the surviving partner of a firm for compensation for his 
 services in closing up the partnership business was not allowed. The court 
 held that a surviving partner is not entitled to any compensation for such 
 services. — Gregory v. Menefee, 83 Mo. 413. 
 
 The sickness of a partner is one of the risks incident to a partnership, and 
 does not give another partner any claim for personal services in conducting 
 the entire business unless the articles of copartnership provide for such com- 
 pensation. — Heath v. Waters, 40 Mich. 457. 
 
 Partners may Sign Negotiable Paper. — It is the general rule 
 that one member can bind the firm by signing the firm name 
 as maker, indorser, or acceptor of negotiable paper if it is done 
 in connection with the firm business and not for a private debt 
 or account. 
 
 The Simmons brothers were partners in the business of buying and 
 selling cattle and produce. The court held that each member had the right 
 to draw, accept, or indorse bills of exchange in the firm name, and bind the 
 partnership as to third persons, dealing fairly and in "good faith, regarding 
 matters usually incident to the business. It is immaterial in such a case, as 
 to persons thus dealing with one of the partners, that the other partner was 
 not informed of the transaction and repudiated it as soon as it came to his 
 knowledge. — Wagner v. Simmons, 61 Ala. 143. 
 
 The power of any partner to use the firm name on negotiable 
 paper is presumed, and a stipulation between the partners that 
 
312 PARTNERSHIP 
 
 certain members of the firm shall not so use it will not affect 
 third persons having no knowledge of such agreement. But this 
 rule does not apply if it is obvious that the instrument is signed, 
 not for the firm, but for the individual benefit of a partner. 
 
 Power of Majority. — We have discussed the power of one 
 partner, and turning now to the question of what a majority of 
 the partners can do, we find that they may control the ordinary 
 conduct of the firm's business, and have power to act in all 
 matters within the scope of the partnership affairs, but they have 
 no power to change the nature of the business, the location of 
 the business, or the firm name. 
 
 Five persons had agreed to cut and pack a quantity of ice for sale, and 
 after deducting all expenses to divide the proceeds equally. One of the 
 members, with the consent and approval of two others, sold a large quantity 
 of the ice. The remaining two brought suit to charge the others for damages 
 in seUing the ice at what they claimed was too low a price. Held, that the 
 agreement constituted a partnership, and if there be no fraud the majority 
 of a firm can make a valid sale of property belonging to the firm without the 
 consent of the minority. — Staples v. Spragne, 75 Maine 458. 
 
 Moore, Miller, and Manning are partners in the hardware business. 
 Moore and Miller favor putting in a stock of groceries and provisions. Man- 
 ning is opposed. As this would mean a change in the nature of the business, 
 it will be necessary for all the partners to consent, and unless they do con- 
 sent, the power of any two partners to act in this instance is denied. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What rights has a partner as to the choice of associates? 
 
 2 . Does the purchaser of a retiring partner's interest become a partner? 
 Explain. 
 
 3. How does a change of partners affect the partnership? 
 
 4. What are the rights of a purchaser or inheritor of a partner's share? 
 
 5. Has one partner a right to sell partnership property? Explain. 
 
 6. Of what may the capital of a partnership consist? 
 
 7. What is the good will of a business? 
 
 8. What is the first duty of each partner? 
 
 9. What is the extent of the individual partner's liability for loss? 
 
 10. What is the liability of a partner who takes secret advantage of 
 his firm? 
 
 1 1 . What are the requirements with reference to records of transactions? 
 
 12. Has one partner a right to claim extra compensation for services 
 to the partnership? Explain. 
 
 13. What is the rule as to one member of a firm signing negotiable paper? 
 
 14. What power has a majority of the partners? 
 
 15. What restrictions are imposed on the power of the majority? 
 
LIABILITY OF PARTNERS 313 
 
 3. LIABILITY OF PARTNERS TO THIRD PARTIES 
 
 Liability of Partners. — Each partner is liable for all of the 
 
 debts of the partnership, and this is so whether he is a secret, 
 
 nominal, or general partner. 
 
 Farmer and Jopes had been doing business under the name of W. H. 
 Jopes. It was shown that Farmer was a dormant or secret partner. Held, 
 that while the credit was given to a general partner, because no other was 
 known to the creditor, yet the creditor may also sue the secret partner when 
 discovered, and the credit will not be presumed to have been given on the sole 
 responsibiUty of the general partner. — Richardson v. Farmer , 36 Mo. 35. 
 
 Effect of Notice. — But neither the firm nor individual partners 
 will be liable for any particular acts of a partner if fair notice 
 that such acts are forbidden is given to the person with whom 
 the partner deals, prior to the transaction in question. 
 
 The partnership relation makes each partner the agent of the other when 
 acting within the scope of his power, but when the agency is denied and the 
 act forbidden by the copartner, with notice to the party assuming to deal 
 with him as agent of the firm, the act is then his individual act, and not that 
 of the firm. — Y eager v. Wallace, 57 Pa. State 365. 
 
 Limit of Authority. — The authority of a partner to bind the 
 firm by contract is limited to transactions within the scope of 
 the partnership business, and if he seeks to charge the firm 
 with matters outside of the scope of the firm's usual business, 
 he must show special authority from the other partners so to do. 
 A partnership to work a farm would not therefore give one 
 partner any implied authority to draw bills of exchange or 
 borrow money, while a partner in a mercantile or manufacturing 
 company would have such authority. 
 
 . Harris and Drake were partners in the hay and grain business. Harris, 
 without the knowledge or consent of Drake, purchased a building lot, in the 
 name of the firm, which he contended they needed to increase their facilities. 
 Harris had no authority to purchase this lot and Drake is not bound by this 
 transaction which he did not authorize and was not a party to. 
 
 While the presumption is that a partner has no authority to 
 use the goods or credit of the firm to pay his personal debts nor 
 to buy goods for his personal use with the partnership funds, 
 still he may have express authority so to do, and in that case the 
 transaction is valid. 
 
314 PARTNERSHIP 
 
 A partner indorsed a firm check in payment of his individual indebted- 
 ness without the knowledge, consent, or approval of his partner. It was held 
 that such an arrangement was a fraud on the partnership and the creditor 
 could not hold the check as he was not a bona fide holder under the circum- 
 stances. — Nichols & Co. V. Thomas, 51 Okla. 212. 
 
 Name. — A partnership should adopt some particular name 
 under which to do business. This may be simply the name or 
 names of one or more of the partners, either with or without the 
 words "and company" added, or any other designation that the 
 parties may adopt, but by statute in some states the term 
 ''and company" must not be used unless it actually represents 
 a partner. 
 
 Fraud. — The partners are held liable for the fraud and the 
 false representations of one partner when they are made in the 
 course of the firm business. 
 
 One partner is not liable for the wrongful acts of another partner unless 
 they were done within the proper scope of the business of the partnership, 
 or were authorized or adopted by him. — Taylor v. Jones, 42 N. H. 25. 
 
 Notice to One Partner is Notice to All. — It is a well- 
 established principle that notice to one partner in the course of 
 the business is notice to all. An illustration of this is the case of 
 partnership negotiable paper that has been dishonored, notice 
 of which dishonor to one partner is notice to the firm. 
 
 Where timber is purchased by a firm, prior notice to one member of the 
 firm that it was cut from land not belonging to the vendor is notice to all of 
 the partners. — Tucker v. Cole, 54 Wis. 539. 
 
 Where a partnership seeks to recover as a bona fide purchaser of a promis- 
 sory note, fraudulently procured, the burden is upon it to show that all of 
 the members of the partnership were ignorant of the fraud at the time of the 
 purchase. — Frank v. Blake, 58 Iowa 750. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 T. Is a secret or dormant partner liable to third parties? Explain. 
 
 2. What is the effect of notice that the firm will not be liable for the 
 acts of any particular partner? 
 
 3. What is a partner's limit of authority to bind the firm by a contract? 
 
 4. Have the partners a right to select a name under which to do busi- 
 ness? Explain. 
 
 5. Is the firm liable for fraud practiced by one partner? Explain. 
 
 6. Explain the following: "Notice to one partner is notice to all." 
 
REMEDIES AGAINST THE PARTNERSHIP 315 
 
 4. REMEDIES AGAINST THE PARTNERSHIP 
 
 In the eyes of the law a partnership does not have an individ- 
 uality of its own like a corporation, but it is looked upon as a 
 collection of persons and must be sued not in the firm name but 
 in the names of the persons composing it. In some of the states 
 this rule has been changed, and partnerships may sue and be 
 sued in the firm name. The members of a partnership are 
 proceeded against for a debt of the firm in the same way that 
 one proceeds against an individual. When the creditors of the 
 partnership and the individual creditors of the partners come in 
 conflict, a distinction is made and the law says they must proceed 
 in a particular way, the object being to give the individual 
 creditor his due out of the individual property of the partner, 
 and the firm creditor his due out of the partnership property. 
 If, after the partnership debts are paid, there remains a surplus, 
 the individual creditors of a partner may proceed against this 
 partner's share; but if, on the other hand^ there are not sufficient 
 partnership assets to satisfy the firm creditors, but there remain 
 individual assets after the individual creditors are satisfied, such 
 surplus is Hable for the firm debts. 
 
 In case there are no partnership assets, the firm creditors are 
 entitled to share in the individual assets of any partner equally 
 with his individual creditors. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. May suit be brought against a partnership in the name of the firm? 
 Explain. 
 
 2. What are the rules as to the respective rights of firm creditors and 
 individual creditors? 
 
 3. When may a partner's individual property be taken to pay firm 
 debts? 
 
 5. DISSOLUTION 
 
 Duration. — When the partnership is formed, the articles of 
 copartnership usually state how long it shall continue. Other 
 circumstances, however, may operate to change the time, and 
 when the relation terminates, the partnership is said to be 
 dissolved. 
 
3i6 PARTNERSHIP 
 
 Forms of Dissolution. — Dissolution may take place in any 
 one of the following ways : 
 
 1. By provision in the articles of copartnership. 
 
 2. By the mutual consent of all the partners. 
 
 3. By the act of one or more of the partners. 
 
 4. By a change in the partnership. 
 
 5. By the death of a partner. 
 
 6. By. the decree of a court of equity. 
 
 7. By bankruptcy. 
 
 1. Contract. — When the period for which the partnership 
 was formed has elapsed, it is thereupon dissolved unless continued 
 by the parties. The partnership may be formed for a temporary 
 purpose, and in that case when the purpose is accomplished the 
 partnership ceases. 
 
 2. Mutual Consent. — The partnership may be dissolved at 
 any time by the mutual assent of all the partners, though the 
 period for which it was formed has not elapsed. 
 
 3. Act of a Partner. — The firm may be dissolved by the act 
 of one or more of the parties. This is accomplished when one 
 partner makes an assignment for the benefit of his creditors or 
 becomes bankrupt or, being insolvent, his interest is sold upon 
 execution to pay his creditors. In these cases his property passes 
 beyond his control and he can no longer perform his part as a 
 partner. Also, where the partnership was formed for no definite 
 period, but at the will of the parties, any partner can terminate 
 the relation by notice to the other parties. 
 
 Blake, Huston, and Sweeting were engaged as partners in manufacturing 
 brick. After continuing in the business about three years Huston went 
 away, abandoned the business, and wrote to Blake, authorizing him and 
 Sweeting to settle the business as they pleased. Thereafter Blake and Sweet- 
 ing formed a new partnership and conducted the business themselves. Held, 
 that the acts of Huston operated as a dissolution of the old firm. A partner- 
 ship, when not formed for any definite time, may be dissolved by any mem- 
 ber of the firm at his pleasure. The withdrawal of one member is a dissolu- 
 tion of the firm. — Blake v. Sweeting, 121 111. 67. 
 
 4. Change in the Partnership. — The partnership may be dis- 
 solved by a change in the membership of the firm. A partner 
 may withdraw from the firm, or he may transfer his interest to 
 a stranger. In whatever way the members of a partnership 
 
DISSOLUTION 317 
 
 may be changed, the act at once terminates and dissolves the 
 
 partnership. One partner may sell his interest to another party 
 
 who is satisfactory to the remaining members of the firm, and 
 
 they may agree to take him in as a partner. In this case the 
 
 old partnership is dissolved and a new one formed. After the 
 
 partner has retired or sold out he is still liable upon all of the 
 
 uncompleted contracts of the firm made before the dissolution of 
 
 the partnership. 
 
 A retiring partner is bound by all previous contracts made within the 
 lines of the business, but after the dissolution of the partnership he is not 
 bound by any new contracts made by his former partner. 
 
 — Goodspeed v. Wiard Plow Co., 45 Mich. 322. 
 
 .5. Death of a Partner. — Another change which will work a 
 dissolution of the partnership is the death of a partner. This is 
 really a subdivision of the preceding class, as it is a change in the 
 'partnership. The dissolution of the partnership follows neces- 
 sarily immediately after a partner's death. The surviving part- 
 ners have the exclusive right to the possession and management 
 of the partnership business for the purpose of closing it out. 
 Frequently the articles of copartnership provide how the sur- 
 viving partner shall close out the business, and when such pro- 
 vision is made it must be followed. The surviving partner 
 holds the partnership assets in trust for the purpose of closing 
 up its affairs, paying the firm debts, and distributing the remain- 
 ing assets among the partners or their representatives. 
 
 Upon the death of a partner the title to the personal assets of the firm is 
 in the survivor, who is charged with the administration of the same, first for 
 the payment of the partnership debts and second for paying over the 
 deceased partner's share in the surplus to his legal representatives. Unless 
 there is a surplus none of the assets constitute any part of the estate of the 
 deceased. — Sellers v. Shore, 89 Ga. 416. 
 
 6. Decree of a Court. — A court of equity may decree a dis- 
 solution of the firm for good cause upon the application of one 
 or more of the partners. This relief will be granted when the 
 partnership was entered into through fraud or for a wrongful 
 and illegal purpose. After the partnership is formed a dissolu- 
 tion may be decreed because of the misconduct of one or more 
 of the partners, but this relief will not be granted for any slight 
 cause. Wild speculations, gross extravagance, quarrelsome and 
 
3i8 PARTNERSHIP 
 
 oppressive conduct, habitual intemperance, indolence and inat- 
 tention to business, or any conduct which brings disgrace and 
 discredit upon the firm, if sufficiently serious, will constitute 
 ground justifying such action by the court. 
 
 When one partner having the management of the partnership affairs 
 makes false entries in the books and defrauds his copartners of a portion of 
 the partnership receipts, the partners thus defrauded are entitled to a 
 dissolution of the partnership and an accounting. 
 
 — Cottle V. Leitch, 35 Calif. 434. 
 
 Ill feeling and differences between partners will not justify the appoint- 
 ing of a receiver to wind up the affairs of the concern, when the term for 
 which the partnership was created has not expired and it does not clearly 
 appear that the parties would suffer loss by continuing in possession of the 
 property. — Loomis v. McKenzie, 31 Iowa 425. 
 
 The denial by one partner of all rights of his copartners in the partner- 
 ship property and his claim of the right of exclusive possession and use of it, 
 entitle his copartners to a dissolution of the partnership. 
 
 — Groth V. Paymentj 79 Mich. 290. 
 
 The rule seems to be, if it is obvious that the parties cannot 
 longer be associated together with harmony and profit, the court 
 will decree a dissolution rather than cause the partnership to be 
 injurious to the innocent party. So also the financial inability 
 of one partner to fulfill his part of the transactions of the firm, 
 whether from his fault or his misfortune, will be a sufficient 
 cause for dissolution. Insanity or permanent failure of health 
 because of incurable disease is sufficient ground for dissolution. 
 
 The insanity of a partner does not in itself work a dissolution of the 
 partnership, but may constitute sufficient ground to justify a court of 
 equity in decreeing its dissolution. — Raymond v. Vaughn, 128 111. 256. 
 
 7. Bankruptcy. — Bankruptcy of either a partner or the firm 
 operates as a dissolution of the partnership. This is also true 
 when the firm or any partner makes an assignment for the benefit 
 of creditors. 
 
 Notice. — The retiring partner, if the business is to be con- 
 tinued by a new firm, which may have the same or a somewhat 
 similar name, will be liable for the debts and contracts of the 
 firm even after he is out, if they were entered into with parties 
 who had dealt with the firm while he was a member and had no 
 notice of his retirement. Therefore, to render him free from 
 liabihty for the debts and contracts of the new firm, he must 
 
DISSOLUTION 319 
 
 give notice of the dissolution of the old firm. This notice must 
 be given either orally or in writing to those who have had previous 
 dealing with the old firm, for the retiring partner is bound 
 unless those who have dealt with the old firm can be shown to 
 have had actual notice. 
 
 Stevens and one Boyd formed a partnership and dealt regularly and 
 continuously with Scheiffelin. The partnership was dissolved and notice of 
 the dissolution was published in the newspapers, but no actual notice was 
 sent to Scheiffelin. Thereafter Boyd received further goods from Scheiffehn 
 on the credit of the firm. It was held that Scheiffelin, having dealt regularly 
 with the firm, was entitled to actual notice of the dissolution, and, in the 
 absence of such notice, Stevens was liable for the value of the goods delivered 
 to Boyd after the dissolution. — Scheiffelin v. Stevens, 60 N. C. 106. 
 
 But direct notice from the firm or the retiring partner is not 
 required if the customer has actual knowledge of the withdrawal 
 of the partner. 
 
 Aside from notice to former customers, notice to the world is 
 necessary to enable the retiring partner to escape liability for 
 future debts of the continuing firm or partner. The ordinary 
 method of giving such notice by publication in a newspaper is 
 usually held sufficient, but the paper must be one which circulates 
 in the vicinity. 
 
 •As £0 persons who have never had any business transactions with a 
 partnership, notice of its dissolution or the withdrawal of a member by 
 publication in a newspaper published at the place of business of the firm is 
 sufficient, but as to those who have had previous dealings with the firm actual 
 notice or its equivalent must be shown to protect the retiring member from 
 liability for debts subsequently incurred in the firm name. 
 
 — Meyer v. Krokn, 114 111. 574. 
 
 A change in the name of the firm by which the name of the . 
 retiring partner is dropped and general attention is called to the 
 fact that the firm has dissolved, is sometimes held to be sufficient 
 notice to the general public to protect the retiring partner against 
 future dealings of the new firm. 
 
 A change of a partnership name which in itself indicates who the indi- 
 vidual partners are, may be sufficient evidence of a dissolution of such part- 
 nership; but when the name under which the business is transacted gives no 
 indication of the names of the persons composing the firm, a change in such 
 name is not notice of the retirement of a person who was previously known to 
 have been a partner in the business. — CoggsweU v. Davis, 65 Wis. 191. 
 
320 PARTNERSHIP 
 
 Liability of Incoming Partner. — Under the Uniform Part- 
 nership Law, a person admitted as a partner into an existing 
 partnership is Hable for all the obligations of the partnership 
 arising before his admission as though he had been a partner 
 when such obligations were incurred, except that his liability 
 shall be satisfied only out of partnership property. The new or 
 incoming partner is liable for all of the debts incurred after he 
 came into the firm. 
 
 Discontinuing the Business. — When a partnership business 
 has been discontinued for any reason it becomes necessary to 
 wind up the business. This is done by fulfilling or disposing of all 
 existing contracts, collecting all outstanding accounts, converting 
 all assets, so far as possible, into cash, settling all claims against 
 the firm, and making a distribution of profits or losses among the 
 partners. When this has been done, each partner's investment or 
 such portion of it as remains is returned to him, and the business is 
 declared closed. 
 
 The partners who take charge of winding up the business 
 should notify all people who have dealt with the firm of its 
 dissolution and of the fact they are engaged in winding up the 
 business. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. In what seven ways may a partnership be dissolved? • 
 
 2. How will acts of a partner effect a dissolution? Explain. 
 
 3. What changes in a partnership will effect a dissolution? 
 
 4. How does the death of a partner affect the partnership? 
 
 5. For what causes will a court decree a dissolution of a partnership? 
 
 6. How does bankruptcy of a partner or the firm affect the partnership? 
 
 7. Why is notice of a change in the partnership necessary? 
 
 8. How and to whom should notice be given? 
 
 9. What is the liabiHty of an incoming partner? 
 
 10. What is the course of procedure in winding up partnership business? 
 
 IMPORTANT POINTS 
 
 A partnership may be formed by a simple contract, either oral or 
 written, express or implied. 
 
 An association of persons who do not share in the profits of the 
 business is not a partnership. 
 
 Each partner is a general agent of his firm for the transaction of 
 any business within the scope of the partnerhip purposes. 
 
 Sharing of the profits implies sharing the losses. 
 
IMPORTANT POINTS 321 
 
 In case of insolvency each partner is personally liable for all of the 
 firm's obligations. 
 
 The firm property includes the business, firm name, good will, 
 trade-marks, and all other intangible possessions. 
 
 Any partner may call for an accounting at any time to ascertain 
 his interest in the business. 
 
 The partnership is a personal relation which may be terminated 
 at will for a cause. 
 
 A partnership, in most of the states, cannot sue or be sued in the firm 
 name. 
 
 A partnership cannot contract with nor bring suit against its 
 members, nor can its members bring suit against it. 
 
 The law presumes an equal division of profits, but the division 
 may be in any proportion, by agreement. 
 
 A partnership may be a trading company or a non-trading company. 
 
 A trading company is engaged in buying and selling; a npn- 
 trading company is organized for other pursuits, such as contracting, 
 building, practicing law, etc. 
 
 Coownership of property does not constitute a partnership. 
 
 Every change in the personnel of a partnership brings about a 
 dissolution of the old firm and a new relationship or new firm. 
 
 With the exception of a limited partner the classification of a 
 partner has nothing to do with his liability. 
 
 Each partner owns an undivided portion of every article owned 
 by the firm. 
 
 Each partner's power over firm property is the same. 
 
 One partner cannot give a valid deed to real estate held by the 
 firm. 
 
 One partner can be required to account to the other partners for 
 private gains resulting directly or indirectly from any partnership 
 business. 
 
 A partner cannot collect an extra compensation for extra service or 
 for overtime. 
 
 Notice to one partner is notice to the firm. 
 
 An innocent partner will not be held criminally liable for the 
 wrongdoings of his copartner. 
 
 A majority of the partners have power over any business trans- 
 action within the scope of the partnership purposes. 
 
 The partners must agree unanimously to change the firm name, to 
 change the nature of the business, or to change the location. 
 
 A partnership may be terminated voluntarily or involuntarily. 
 
 When a partnership is dissolved the power to carry on business is 
 terminated except for winding up the affairs of the firm. 
 
 A retiring partner is not relieved from liability in the case of a 
 former creditor who has not received notice. 
 
322 PARTNERSHIP 
 
 Partners cannot make any agreement among themselves which 
 will be effective as to creditors whereby one partner will not be liable 
 to third persons for the debts or obligations of the partnership. 
 
 The powers of any one or all of the partners, as among themselves, 
 may be restricted in the articles of copartnership, but these restric- 
 tions do not affect a third party unless he receives notice of them. 
 
 TEST QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What arc the advantages of a partnership over trading as individ- 
 uals? 
 
 2. What risk does one run when one enters a partnership? 
 
 3. What are some of the things which should be included in the articles 
 of copartnership? 
 
 4. For what reason are limited or special partnerships formed? 
 
 5. Has an infant in a partnership a right to withdraw and require 
 the other partners to return to him all the money he invested on the ground 
 that he is an infant? 
 
 6. What is the good will of a firm? Can it be sold separately from iVv 
 business? 
 
 7. Holmes is a member of the firm of Crawford and Holmes. Holmes 
 sells his interest in the business to Randall. What is the result? 
 
 8. Hendricks borrows $5000 from Bagley to promote a new business 
 and agrees to give Bagley 25% of the profits for the use of the money. Are 
 they partners? Explain. 
 
 9. Madden agrees to act as manager of a business for Flemming. It 
 is agreed that Madden is to have 20% of the profits for his services. Does a 
 partnership exist? Explain. 
 
 10. Holbrook and Clark form a partnership under the firm name of Hol- 
 brook & Co. Clark is a dormant partner. Will he be liable for the obliga- 
 tions of the firm? 
 
 11. Larson bought an interest in the partnership of J. B. White and 
 Company. Does this make Larson a partner in the firm? What right has 
 Larson? 
 
 12. Hickey and Curren are partners engaged in operating a factory. 
 Hickey contracts to sell all the machinery in the factory. Has he this 
 right? Explain. 
 
 13. One partner, without the consent of the other partners, gave a 
 mortgage on real estate owned by the firm for the purpose of raising money 
 to pay firm debts. Will the mortgage be binding? 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 323 
 
 14. What is the general rule for the division of profits? 
 
 15. Biddle and Beck are partners in the hardware business. Biddle, 
 without consulting his partner, gave the firm note for a bill of hardware. 
 Would the firm be liable on the note? 
 
 16. Would a third party be affected by any restrictions of the powers cf 
 a partner in the articles of copartnership? If so, when? 
 
 17. A partner, in selling goods for his firm, makes false representations 
 amounting to fraud. Are the other partners liable? 
 
 18. Why is it advisable for a partner to give notice when he withdraws 
 from a firm? 
 
 CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 Give the decision and the principle oj law involved in each case. 
 
 1. Gaynor and Foust, intending to engage in an automobile sales and 
 service business, agree orally to invest equal amounts of cash and give their 
 time to the business, arranging to divide the profits and losses equally. 
 Does this oral agreement constitute a partnership? Is it advisable to form a 
 partnership in this way? 
 
 2. If in the above case these parties in their oral agreement had 
 expressly understood that the partnership was to continue for five years, 
 would the agreement have been binding? 
 
 3. George Hicks and Charles Hutchinson agree to engage as partners 
 in the business of manufacturing furniture under the name of Charles 
 Hutchinson, Hicks's name not appearing in the firm and he taking no active 
 part in its management. They buy lumber, and before it is paid for, the 
 firm fails. The lumber company did not know of Hicks's partnership in the 
 business, the lumber being bought in Hutchinson's name. Can they hold 
 Hicks personally for the lumber? 
 
 4. Grover and Martin have been engaged for a number of years in the 
 wholesale grocery business. They dissolve partnership, and Grover retires 
 from the firm, though he still allows his name to remain in the firm. After 
 the dissolution Martin bought goods from Edwards & Co., using the name 
 "Grover & Martin" as before. Can Edwards & Co. hold Grover as a 
 partner? 
 
 5. Stanley is doing business under the name of A. H. Stanley, he and 
 Moore having an agreement whereby Moore, who owns the store,. con- 
 tributes the rent and loans Stanley $500. Stanley, on the other hand, 
 contributes $500 and his time in conducting the business. It is agreed that 
 the profits are to be shared equally. Are they partners as to third parties? 
 
324 PARTNERSHIP 
 
 6. If in the above case Moore had merely furnished the store and 
 nothing else, and the agreement had been that Stanley was to give him one 
 fourth of the profits as rent, would they have been partners as to third 
 parties? 
 
 7. Evans, Palmer, and Davis are engaged in conducting business as 
 copartners. Davis dies and D. C. Davis, his son, who is his executor and 
 heir, seeks to come into the firm as a partner and take his father's place. 
 What are his rights? 
 
 8. Leland and Scott were engaged in manufacturing and selling shoes, 
 Leland, without the knowledge or consent of Scott, sold 100 pairs of shoes 
 from their regular selling stock. Had he the right? 
 
 9. In the above case had Leland the right without the consent of 
 Scott to sell all the shoes they had manufactured? 
 
 10. In problem 8, suppose Leland, without the consent of Scott, sold 
 their machinery and lasts used in manufacturing their shoes. Had he that 
 right? 
 
 11. Long and Best were copartners in conducting a carting business 
 in which they employed six automobile trucks. Long gave Brown a mort- 
 gage on three of the trucks to secure an individual debt. Brown knew that 
 the trucks were partnership property. Had Long the right to take half of 
 the trucks as his share of the partnership assets to pay an individual debt? 
 
 12. A firm having been engaged in manufacturing collars and cuffs 
 under a certain brand sell out their business to Carpenter and include in the 
 sale all of their stock and machinery. They afterwards seek to sell to Young 
 the trade-mark or brand under which they had manufactured their collars 
 and cuffs. Carpenter claims it. To whom does it belong? 
 
 13. Carlton and Brown are engaged as partners in buying and selling 
 produce. Brown learAs of a man who has a large quantity of wheat, and as 
 the firm are looking for wheat and he knows that they can afford to pay 
 $.95 a bushel for it, he goes to the owner and tells him that if he will give him 
 one cent a bushel for his services, he will find him a purchaser for the wheat 
 at $.95. The owner agrees, and the firm buys the wheat. Carlton learns of 
 the transaction afterwards and sues Brown for one half of the one cent per 
 bushel received by him. Can he recover? 
 
 14. North and Bear are engaged in conducting a dry goods store. 
 North is taken sick and is obliged to go away for the benefit of his health. 
 During the time he is gone Bear conducts the business alone, and later 
 charges the firm for extra services in running the business alone. Has he a 
 right to such compensation, there being no agreement about the same? 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 325 
 
 15. Adams, Brown, and Coon are partners in the hardware business. 
 Brown gives the firm of Sloan & Co. a promissory note, due in 60 days, for a 
 bill of goods bought by his firm. He signs his note in the firm name. Has he 
 authority? 
 
 16. In the above case, suppose Brown gives the firm's note, payable 
 in 60 days, in payment of his individual grocery bill. Has he the right? 
 
 17. Suppose Adams and Brown, in problem 15, wish to buy a quantity 
 of stoves for sale in the course of their business. Coon objects. Have they 
 the right to buy them? 
 
 18. Suppose Adams and Brown, in problem 15, wishing to enlarge their 
 stock and make a general department store of it, decide to add a line of 
 crockery, glassware, and groceries. Coon objects. Have they the right? 
 
 19. Armour and Bowden were engaged as copartners in dealing in 
 horses. Armour sold a horse to Merritt fraudulently representing it to be 
 sound, when in fact it had the glanders, a contagious, incurable disease. 
 Merritt sued the partners for fraud. Was Bowden liable as well as Armour? 
 
 20. Randall and Cole were engaged in the mercantile business. In the 
 course of their business they received a note from Darrow which Randall in- 
 dorsed in the firm name. When the note became due it was not paid by 
 Darrow but was protested, and notice of nonpayment was given to Randall. 
 In a suit against Randall and Cole, to hold them as indorsers, Cole set up 
 the defense that he had not had notice. Could he be held, or was his defense 
 good? 
 
 21. In the above case, when the action is brought against Randall and 
 Cole, how should they be sued, as a firm or as individuals? 
 
 22. The firm of Keeler and Wilder, dry goods merchants, fail, having 
 assets amounting to $1500. The firm owes $5000. Keeler has individual 
 assets amounting to $3000, and Wilder has individual assets amounting to 
 $10,000. Page, to whom the firm owes $3000, seeks to satisfy his claim out 
 of Keeler's personal property, while Keeler has individual creditors to whom 
 he owes more than the amount of his property. Can Page so satisfy his 
 claim? To what property must he look first? Could he collect from Wilder? 
 
 23. Bates is a personal creditor of Wilder. Can he proceed against the 
 partnership property to satisfy his claim? Can he proceed against the 
 individual property of Wilder? 
 
 24. Hooker and Johnson enter into articles of copartnership, under 
 which they agree to continue the business as partners for three years. At 
 the expiration of three years, does the partnership become dissolved? Can 
 the parties by mutual assent dissolve the partnership before that time? 
 
326 PARTNERSHIP 
 
 25. Suppose, in problem 24, that Hooker sells out his interest to 
 Cole, who is accepted as a partner, but the firm continues under the old 
 name of Hooker and Johnson. The new firm of Johnson and Cole con- 
 tracts with one Everetts for some merchandise. Everetts had previously 
 sold to the old firm and had received no notice of Hooker's withdrawal, 
 although the latter published a notice of dissolution in the paper. The firm of 
 Johnson and Cole fails, and Everetts seeks to hold Hooker liable. Can he 
 succeed? 
 
 26. If in the above case Hooker had sent Everetts a notice, which he had 
 received, could Hooker be held? 
 
 27. If in problem 25 Hooker had mailed Everetts a notice which 
 Everetts had never received, could Hooker be held? 
 
 28. If in problem 25 Everetts had had notice that Hooker was no longer 
 a partner, although it had not been sent directly to him, could Hooker be 
 held? 
 
 29. If in problem 25 the firm of Hooker and Johnson had never dealt 
 with Everetts before, and notice of the change of partnership had been 
 published in the local papers, could Hooker be held? 
 
 30. In problem 25, could Cole be held liable on a contract entered into 
 by the old firm which Cole had not expressly agreed to pay? 
 
 3 1 . Raymond and Loomis are engaged in partnership, but do not agree. 
 Raymond is engaged in wild speculations, is habitually intemperate, and is 
 bringing the business into disrepute. The term during which they agreed to 
 conduct their partnership has not yet expired. Can Loomis have the part- 
 nership dissolved in an equity court? 
 
 32. If in the above case Raymond had become bankrupt, would this 
 have had any effect upon the partnership? 
 
 33. The partnership firm of Carter, Bailey and Co. becomes insolvent. 
 The members of the firm are Carter, Bailey, and Green. The firm debts are 
 $25,000 and the firm assets are $15,000. Carter has private property $8000 
 and private debts $2000. Bailey has private property $4000 and no private 
 debts. Green has no private property and private debts $2000. How 
 should the firm and private property be distributed among the several 
 creditors? 
 
 34. Wilson and Fullar are partners. By mutual agreement Fullar 
 withdraws from the firm and Ross assumes the firm debts, and further agrees 
 to release Fullar from all the firm obligations. Atkins, a creditor of the firm 
 when Fullar was partner, sues Wilson on a firm debt. Wilson has become 
 insolvent and does not pay. Atkins then sues Fullar. Fullar defends on the 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 327 
 
 ground that his agreement with Wilson releases him from all liability for 
 firm debts. Is this a good defense? Explain fully. 
 
 35. Barber, 18 years of age, joined the firm of Noland and Roberts as a 
 junior partner and invested $5000 cash. At the end of the year he became 
 dissatisfied, withdrew from the firm, and demanded the return of his money 
 on the plea that he was an infant. Should he succeed? Explain. 
 
 36. Archer and Daniels are partners in the business of manufacturing 
 hats. Archer sells and conveys his interest in the firm to Shepard. What 
 effect has the transfer on the partnership? What rights does Shepard, the 
 purchaser, acquire? 
 
 37. Austin, Rowe, and Mason are partners in the grocery business 
 located on Division St. Austin and Rowe do not like the location and 
 desire to move the business to another street. Mason objects. Finally, 
 during the absence of Mason, the other partners lease a place on Main St. 
 and move the business. Give the principle of law involved and state the 
 rights of the partners in the matter. 
 
 38. Heath and Hoven dissolve partnership. Heath allows his name 
 to remain on the door and on the stationery used in the business. Whole- 
 salers sell goods to the firm, believing Heath to be still a partner. Hoven 
 becomes insolvent and the creditors take action against Heath. Is he liable? 
 
CORPORATIONS 
 
 I. IN GENERAL 
 
 Origin, — Such vast undertakings as the modern railroads, 
 steamship lines, large manufacturing plants, etc., which are 
 controlled by private parties, have made it desirable and in fact 
 necessary for a large number of persons to join in a single enter- 
 prise that can be more successfully promoted by means of their 
 joint capital and endeavor. There has also arisen the need of 
 some method of organization that shall be free from certain 
 features of the copartnership law. This need is met by the 
 artificial person known as a corporation. 
 
 The distinctive features of a corporation are: 
 
 1. It is an organization that survives the life of any one mem- 
 ber. 
 
 2. The interest of any member may be sold or transferred 
 without affecting the organization. 
 
 3. A member of the organization is not personally liable for 
 debts of the corporation. He may lose what he invests but is 
 subject to no personal Habihty. 
 
 The statutes in all of the states provide now for the formation 
 of corporations, the purpose of which is to enable a number of 
 persons to associate themselves together under a corporate 
 name in some enterprise with the privileges just enumerated. 
 
 Definition. — A corporation is defined as a collection of indi- 
 viduals united by authority of law into one body, under a special 
 name, with the capacity of continuing indefinitely or for a fixed 
 period and of acting in many respects as an individual. 
 
 Corporations are in the eyes of the law separate from the 
 members who comj^se them. The property of the corporation 
 is owned by it and%ot by the members of the corporation, and 
 a conveyance or sale of such property must be made by the 
 corporation, as it cannot be made by the members as individuals. 
 
 The stockholders, as such, cannot convey the real property of the cor- 
 poration, though they all join in the deed. The name and seal of the cor- 
 poration must be affixed by an officer or agent having authority. 
 
 — Wheelock v. MouUon, 15 Vt. 519. 
 
 328 
 
CORPORATIONS IN GENERAL 329 
 
 Suits in favor of or against a corporation must be brought by 
 or against the corporation and not the individuals who compose 
 it personally. The corporation may convey to or take from its 
 individual members, and may sue them and be sued by them. 
 
 Created by the State. — The authority of the state is always 
 necessary for the creation of a corporation. No agreement among 
 the members can accomplish such a result. The mere act of the 
 members alone would result in a partnership. The corporation, 
 therefore, being created by the state, has only such powers as 
 are conferred upon it by its charter or act of incorporation. 
 
 There are several classifications of corporations, but the only 
 one of sufficient importance for us to consider here is the division 
 into municipal and private corporations. 
 
 Municipal Corporations. — Municipal corporations are such 
 as are created for the purposes of government and the manage- 
 ment of public affairs. Cities, towns, and villages are illustra- 
 tions of such corporations. The legislatures give them certain 
 powers to pass laws or ordinances, to build bridges, improve 
 streets, etc. They may take and hold property, and may sue and 
 be sued in their corporate names. 
 
 Private Corporations. — Private corporations are such as are 
 created for private purposes and for the management of affairs 
 in which the members are interested as private parties. All 
 corporations of a private nature, as railroad, bank, or insurance 
 companies, are private corporations as the stockholders are inter- 
 ested as private parties. Private corporations are either stock or 
 non-stock corporations. Those formed for the pecuniary profit 
 of their members generally have a capital stock divided into a 
 certain number of parts called shares of stock. A member's 
 interest is determined by the number of shares of stock which he 
 holds in the company. This stock is represented by a written or 
 printed certificate, which can be transferred from one person to 
 another without the consent of the other members of the 
 company. 
 
 Stock Certificates. — Stock certificates are issued to pur- 
 chasers of stock as an evidence of their interest in the corporation. 
 These certificates state the number of shares owned, their par 
 value, and any other facts affecting the stock. Stock certificates 
 
330 CORPORATIONS 
 
 are signed by the president and secretary or treasurer of the 
 corporation and are sealed with the corporate seal. 
 
 Non-Stock Corporation. — A non-stock corporation is one in 
 which there is no stock to be transferred, and the membership 
 of any individual depends upon the consent of the other mem- 
 bers. Incorporated societies and mutual benefit societies are 
 illustrations of this class. 
 
 Private Stock Corporations. — The class of corporations most 
 common in this country and to which we will direct our atten- 
 tion, is private stock corporations. 
 
 The following are the powers and attributes of practically all 
 private stock corporations: 
 
 1 . To have continuous succession of members or stockholders 
 under a special name. 
 
 2. To buy, sell, and hold property. 
 
 3. To enter into contracts, and to do all things necessary to 
 the furtherance of the corporate business. 
 
 4. To sue and be sued in the corporate name. 
 
 5. To have a common seal. 
 . 6. To make by-laws. 
 
 7. To appoint directors, officers, and agents. 
 
 8. To dissolve itself. 
 
 Name and Continuous Succession. — The attribute of con- 
 tinuous succession under a special name is essential to all cor- 
 porations. The corporation is not subject to dissolution by the 
 death or withdrawal of a member. A member may transfer his 
 shares without the consent of his associates, and the transferee 
 comes into the corporation as a member without in any way 
 changing or affecting its existence. A necessary attribute of 
 every corporation is a corporate name. This is essential, as the 
 corporation, being distinct from its members, could not other- 
 wise be known. 
 
 Real Estate. — Most corporations have the f)ower to hold 
 real estate, but it is not an essential to a corporation's existence. 
 So also the power to use a seal is ordinarily included in the 
 privileges of a corporation, but it is not essential, as a corporation 
 can contract without a seal. 
 
 By-laws. — 1 he right to make by-laws is a common incident 
 
IN GENERAL 331 
 
 of a corporation's powers. It is unnecessary to make them when 
 the charter is sufficiently full to provide for all contingencies, 
 but usually matters of detail are not included in the charter, 
 provision being made for them in the by-laws, and every private 
 corporation has the imphed power to make them. But the by- 
 laws to be valid must be reasonable, consistent with the charter, 
 and within the purposes of the corporation. They are generally 
 adopted by a majority vote of the stockholders, and having once 
 been adopted, bind all of the stockholders whether they have 
 assented to them or not. 
 
 Limited Liability. — One of the most important attributes of a 
 corporation is that which exempts the stockholders from liability 
 for the debts of the corporation. In a partnership, it will be 
 remembered, a partner is personally liable for the debts of the 
 firm, but this is not so in the case of a corporation except when 
 by statute the personal liability of a stockholder is increased to 
 a greater or less extent. In some corporations the law makes 
 stockholders personally hable for an amount equal to the par 
 value of their stock. 
 
 Incorporation. — A corporation can be created only by the 
 law of the state. This may be a special law which creates and 
 gives power to one particular company, although the constitu- 
 tions of most of the states prohibit the legislature from creating a 
 corporation by a special law except in some particular cases. The 
 great majority of corporations are formed under the general law, 
 which does not of itself create the corporation but authorizes 
 persons to form a corporation by taking certain prescribed steps. 
 It generally requires that articles of incorporation be executed 
 by the incorporators and filed in some public office. These 
 articles must usually set forth the names and residence of the 
 incorporators, the name by which the proposed corporation shall 
 be known, its principal place of business, the objects and purposes 
 of the association (which must be lawful), the period of time for 
 which it is to exist, the amount of capital stock and the number of 
 shares into which it is divided, the number of directors and the 
 names of those who are to act as directors until an election is held. 
 
 Any person who has the capacity to enter into a contract may 
 be an incorporator. The statutes generally prescribe the number 
 
332 CORPORATIONS 
 
 of incorporators necessary to organize. The minimum number 
 required in most states is three, though in a few states more are 
 required. 
 
 In most of the states a certain number of the incorporators 
 are required to be residents of the state in which the company 
 is incorporated. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What are the three distinctive features of a corporation? 
 
 2. How is a corporation defined? 
 
 3. What makes this form of organization desirable? 
 
 4. What authority is necessary to create a corporation? 
 
 5. How are corporations classified? 
 
 6. What is a municipal corporation? What is a private corporation? 
 
 7. What is the difference between stock and non-stock corporations? 
 
 8. What are the powers of a private corporation? 
 
 9. What is the meaning of the term "continuous succession"? 
 
 10. What are the by-laws of a corporation? 
 
 11. What is the liability of a stockholder in a corporation? 
 
 12. How may a business be incorporated? 
 
 13. Who may be an incorporator? 
 
 14. What number of persons generally may organize a corporation? 
 
 15. What are articles of incorporation? 
 
 2. POWERS AND LIABILITIES OF CORPORATIONS 
 
 Powers Limited. — A corporation has only such powers as 
 are conferred upon it by its charter or articles of incorporation 
 These powers may be expressly conferred, or they may be im- 
 plied, either because they are incidental to a corporate existence, 
 as the right of succession and the right to have a corporate name, 
 or because they are necessary in order to exercise the powers 
 expressly conferred. 
 
 A charter which gave a corporation the authority to make and keep in 
 repair a road to the top of Mt. Washington, to take toll of passengers and 
 carriages, to build and own toll houses, and to take land for a road, was held 
 not to authorize the corporation to establish a stage and transportation line, 
 nor to buy carriages and horses for that purpose. Corporations have no 
 powers except such as are given them by their charter, or such as are inciden- 
 tal and necessary to carry into effect the purposes for which they were 
 established. — Downing v. Mt. Washington Road Co., 40 N. H. 230. 
 
 Implied Powers. — The powers that are incidental to a corpo- 
 rate existence and that will always be implied, are these: to have 
 
POWERS AND LIABILITIES 333 
 
 continuous succession during the life of the corporation, to have a 
 corporate name by which to contract and to sue and be sued, to 
 purchase and hold real and personal property, to have a common 
 seal, and to make by-laws. 
 
 A corporation has also the implied powers that are reasonably 
 necessary for the execution of the powers expressly granted and 
 not expressly or impliedly excluded. A corporation generally has 
 the implied power to borrow money whenever the nature of its 
 business renders it necessary or expedient to do so. 
 
 The general power of doing business granted to a corporation carries 
 with it the power to borrow money for the legitimate objects of the corpora- 
 tion. — Wright V. Hughes, 119 Ind. 324. 
 
 A corporation formed for the purpose of encouraging athletic exercises 
 has the power to borrow money for building a clubhouse upon lands leased 
 by it, under the provisions of the statute that such a corporation may hold 
 real and personal estate and may purchase or erect suitable buildings for its 
 siccommodsition. — Bradbury v. Boston Canoe Club, 153 Mass. 77. 
 
 It also has the implied power to make, indorse, or accept bills 
 
 of exchange and promissory notes, if such is the usual or proper 
 
 means of accomplishing the results for which it was created. 
 
 Every corporation has, as a necessary incident of the powers expressly 
 granted by its charter, the power of incurring debts in the course of its 
 business, and of making and indorsing negotiable instruments in payment 
 thereof. — State v. Passaic Turnpike Co., 27 N. J. Law 217. 
 
 To sell or mortgage real property owned by it is another im- 
 plied power of a corporation. 
 
 A corporation chartered with power to purchase and hold water power, 
 created by the erection of dams, and to hold real estate may, when its water 
 privileges can no longer be profitably used, sell its land. 
 
 — Dupee V. Boston Water Power Co., 114 Mass. 37. 
 A corporation, without special authority in its charter, may dispose of 
 lands, goods, and chattels as it deems expedient. 
 
 — White Wafer Va. Canal Co. v. Vallette, 21 How. (U. S.) 414. 
 
 But a corporation has no implied power to enter into a con- 
 tract of partnership or suretyship. 
 
 The Central Railroad & Banking Co. of Georgia, which was authorized 
 by its charter to construct and operate a railroad between the cities of 
 Savannah and Macon and to organize and carry on a banking business, has 
 no power, express, implied, or incidental, to purchase and run a steamboat 
 on the Chattahoochee River, which is no part of its route, nor to form a 
 partnership with a natural person for carrying on that business. 
 
 — Central Railroad Co, v, Smith, 76 Aia. 572. 
 
334 CORPORATIONS 
 
 As a general rule it may be said that when a corporation is 
 
 given general authority to engage in business, it takes the powers 
 
 of a natural person to make all the necessary and proper contracts 
 
 to enable it to attain its legitimate objects. 
 
 A corporation organized as a life insurance company has power to 
 borrow money and secure its payment by mortgaging its real estate. When 
 general authority is given a corporation to engage in business, it takes the 
 power, in the absence of charter restraint, just as a natural person enjoys it 
 with all of its incidents, and may borrow money to attain its legitimate ob- 
 jects the same as an individual. — Wright v. Hughes, 119 Ind. 324. 
 
 Acts Ultra Vires. — When a corporation performs acts not 
 within its power to perform, the acts are said to be ultra vires. 
 An ultra vires contract, if executory, cannot be enforced; but 
 most courts hold that if the defense of ultra vires will work an 
 injustice, it will not be allowed, and this is also true if the party 
 seeking to enforce the contract has performed his part. 
 
 The Nassau Bank, which had subscribed for stock in a railroad corpora- 
 tion, sued for its share of the profits. Held, that the plaintiff was not author- 
 ized to make such a contract, and the courts would not enforce it. 
 
 — Nassau Bank v. Jones, 95 N. Y. 115. 
 
 Where a corporation has guaranteed the payment of other persons' 
 notes without consideration, an act not authorized by its charter, it may 
 plead the defense of ultra vires and the contract will not be enforced. 
 — Deaton Grocery Co. v. International Harvester Co., 47 Tex. Civil Appeal, 267. 
 
 Liability for Acts of Agents. — A corporation is liable to the 
 same extent as a natural person for the frauds and wrongs 
 of its agents and servants, committed in the course of their 
 employment. 
 
 Goodspeed brought an action against a banking corporation for dam- 
 ages for maliciously bringing vexatious and unjust lawsuits against him. 
 The defense was that a corporation was not liable for such a wrong, but the 
 court held that a suit of this nature may be maintained against a corporation. 
 
 — Goodspeed v. Bank, 22 Conn. 530. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What powers has a corporation? 
 
 2. What is meant by implied powers? 
 
 3. Mention some of the implied powers of a corporation. 
 
 4. Has a corporation implied power to enter into a contract of partner- 
 ship or suretyship? 
 
 5. What general rule may be laid down as to a corporation's powers? 
 
 6. What are "ultra vires acts"? Give an example. 
 
 7. What is the liability of a corporation for acts of its agents? 
 
MEMBERSHIP IN A CORPORATION 335 
 
 3. MEMBERSHIP IN A CORPORATION 
 
 Stockholders. — Membership in a private stock corporation is 
 acquired by the ownership of one or more shares of the capital 
 stock in the corporation. This may be acquired by subscrip- 
 tion to the capital stock either before or after incorporation, by 
 purchase from the corporation, or by a transfer from the owner. 
 The certificate of stock is a written acknowledgment of the 
 interest of the holder in the corporation. When the stock is 
 subscribed for after the incorporation of the company, it is simply 
 a contract between the corporation and the subscriber. 
 
 Greer was soliciting subscriptions for the building of a railway, and took 
 a subscription book, signed therein himself, and persuaded others to sub- 
 scribe. He kept the book about six months, and then, because of a disagree- 
 ment with the company, he cut out his own name from the book and returned 
 it to the company. Held, that by placing his name in the book he had per- 
 fected a contract with the company, and was just as much bound as if he 
 had left his name in the book. — Greer v. Railway Co., 96 Pa. State 391. 
 
 Rights of the Stockholders. — While the individual stock- 
 holder has but little part in the management of the corporation, 
 he has certain rights as a holder of common stock which may be 
 stated as follows: 
 
 1. To be notified of all stockholders' meetings. 
 
 2. To cast one vote, in person or by proxy, for each share of 
 stock held, on all matters which come before the stockholders 
 for action. 
 
 3. To share proportionately in all dividends declared on the 
 common stock. 
 
 4. To share proportionately in the net assets, in the event of 
 dissolution. 
 
 5. To inspect the corporate books and accounts. 
 
 6. To sell and transfer stock which he owns. 
 
 The rights of holders of preferred stock are the same as those 
 of the common stockholder except as extended or restricted by 
 conditions under which the stock was issued. 
 
 Stock Subscriptions. — The subscriptions of several persons 
 to an agreement to take stock in a corporation thereafter to be 
 formed, is a continuing offer to the corporation to be formed, 
 which may be accepted by the corporation, and is binding. 
 
336 CORPORATIONS 
 
 The delivery of the certificate is merely evidence of the owner- 
 ship of the shares, and is not necessary to make a subscriber a 
 stockholder. 
 
 Dividends. — Out of the surplus or net profits of the corporate 
 business the directors may vote a dividend. This is a certain 
 per cent upon the capital stock, and when the dividend is declared 
 the stockholders are entitled to their respective shares. Until 
 such dividend is declared, a stockholder has no legal right to a 
 share of the profits, although upon its being wrongfully with- 
 held a suit in equity may be brought to compel the corporation 
 to declare a dividend. 
 
 Whether the earnings of a corporation shall be distributed among its 
 stockholders is purely discretionary and until a dividend has actually been 
 declared, the stockholder has no claim thereto. 
 
 — Lauman v. Foster, 157 Iowa 275. 
 
 Preferred Stock. — The dividend declared must be equal on 
 all the stock except where a part of the stock is preferred. In 
 many corporations a certain part of the capital stock is declared 
 in the certificates to be preferred and the balance common stock. 
 The preferred stock gives the holder rights and privileges not 
 enjoyed by the holders of thecommon stock. These rights usually 
 include a prior claim for dividends. Six per cent preferred 
 stock would entitle the holder to a dividend of 6 per cent before 
 any dividend could be declared on the common stock. Cumula- 
 tive preferred stock entitles the holder to dividends at the pre- 
 scribed rate in every year. If the dividend is omitted in any year 
 it must be made up in subsequent years. Preferred stock usually 
 has also a prior right to the corporate assets in case of dissolution. 
 Preferred stock is generally considered a safer investment than 
 common stock, because of its prior rights, but may not be so 
 profitable, as the dividends are limited to the rate fixed. 
 
 Transfer of Stock. — Shares of stock are transferred from one 
 holder to another by an assignment which is usually upon the 
 back of the certificate of stock and in a form somewhat hke the 
 following: — 
 
 For value received I hereby sell, assign, and transfer unto James D. 
 Scott twenty shares of the capital stock represented by the within certificate, 
 and do hereby irrevocably constitute and appoint William A. Willis my 
 
MEMBERSHIP IN A CORPORATION 337 
 
 attorney to transfer the said stock on the books of the within named cor- 
 porktion, with full power of substitution in the premises. 
 
 Dated November 10, 19 — George W. Ellis. 
 
 In the presence of 
 
 E. A. Wagner. 
 
 The attorney named to transfer the stock is generally the 
 secretary of the company. 
 
 Stock in a corporation is subject to sale and transfer like any 
 other kind of personal property. 
 
 The transfer of stock must be recorded in the books of the 
 corporation and a new certificate issued to the transferee before 
 he is legally a stockholder. Until such transfer is made he cannot 
 exercise the rights of a stockholder, such as voting and receiving 
 dividends, although as between him and his transferor he is the 
 owner of the stock and entitled to the benefits therefrom. 
 
 Benedict was the owner of ten shares of the stock of the D . L. & W. R. R. 
 Co., transferable only on the books of the company upon surrender of the 
 certificate. In 1856 he sold his stock to Brisbane and executed a power of 
 attorney to Brisbane to transfer the shares on the books of the company. 
 Brisbane took the certificate, but the transfer on the books was not made. 
 Benedict died and after his death, in 1876, his administrator procured a 
 transfer of the shares to himself and also procured the payment of divi- 
 dends credited to Benedict between 1856 and 1876. Brisbane sued the 
 company for the value of the ten shares transferred to the administrator and 
 also for the amount of the dividends paid to him. Held, that the company 
 was liable for the value of the ten shares, as it had no right to issue a new 
 certificate without the surrender of the old one, but it was not Hable for the 
 dividends paid, as it was entitled to pay such dividends to the person who 
 should appear on their books as the stockholder of record. 
 
 — Brisbane v. D. L. b^ W. R. R. Co., 25 Hun (N. Y.) 438. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. How is membership in a corporation acquired? 
 
 2. What are the rights of the individual stockholder? 
 
 3. What are the powers of stockholders? 
 
 4. Is the one who subscribes for stock bound to take it? 
 
 5. Under what conditions has a stockholder a legal right to a share 
 of the profits? 
 
 6. What is preferred stock? 
 
 7. Is stock in a corporation subject to sale and transfer? Explain. 
 
 8. How may shares of stock be transferred from one holder to another? 
 
 9. Must a transfer of stock appear on the books of the company? 
 10. What is the liability of a stockholder to creditors? 
 
338 CORPORATIONS 
 
 4. MANAGEMENT OF CORPORATIONS 
 
 Vote of Stockholders. — As a general rule, each stockholder 
 in a corporation is bound by all acts adopted by a vote of a 
 majority of the stockholders of the corporation, provided such 
 acts are within the scope of the powers and authority conferred 
 by the charter. 
 
 A corporation was authorized to receive and hold for the benefit of a 
 high school any land by gift, devise, or purchase. A stockholder brought 
 action to restrain the corporation from purchasing certain real estate, claim- 
 ing that it could not afford it and the result would be the bankruptcy of the 
 corporation. Held, that the action could not be maintained, as the majority 
 of the stockholders had voted for the purchase. Every stockholder contracts 
 that the will of the majority shall govern in all matters coming within the 
 limits of the act of incorporation. 
 
 — Dudley v. Kentucky High School, 72 Ky. 576. 
 
 But the majority cannot bind the minority by any acts out- 
 side of the powers conferred by the charter. 
 
 It was provided in the articles of association of the Enterprise Loan Asso- 
 ciation that it should continue in operation eight years, unless it should 
 sooner have sufficient funds to pay its debts and redeem its stock. A reso- 
 lution was passed by a majority of the stockholders dissolving the association 
 before the time limit, and it was held that without the consent of all the 
 stockholders and with unredeemed stock outstanding, such a resolution is of 
 no effect. — Barton v. Enterprise Loan Association, 114 Ind. 226. 
 
 In most cases, the management of the corporation is vested 
 in the directors, and then the authority vested in the stock- 
 holders is the election of the directors. The directors alone are 
 authorized to act in the management of the business. The right 
 to make by-laws is generally in the majority of the stockholders, 
 although in some cases that power is by charter vested in the 
 directors. 
 
 Meetings and Voting. — Notice of the time and place of the 
 stockholders' meeting must be given to each stockholder unless 
 it is definitely designated by the charter or by-laws. Each 
 stockholder is usually entitled to one vote for each share of 
 stock owned by him, although at common law each stockholder 
 had but one vote without regard to the number of shares of 
 stock he owned. It is sometimes provided that each share of 
 stock is entitled to as many votes as there are directors to be 
 
MANAGEMENT OF CORPORATIONS 339 
 
 elected, and that these votes may all be cast for one director, or 
 divided as the stockholder may desire. This is called ''cumula- 
 tive voting" and is designed to secure to a minority interest repre- 
 sentation on the board of directors. At common law the right to 
 vote could be exercised only in person, but now the right to vote 
 by proxy is generally conferred by statute. The proxy or author- 
 ity to vote is in the form of a written power of attorney, and is 
 revocable at the pleasure of the person executing it. 
 
 Directors. — As stated above, the active management of the 
 corporate business is usually vested in a board of directors 
 selected by a majority of the stockholders. The directors act 
 by a majority vote. The powers and duties of the directors and 
 other officers are generally fully defined in the by-laws. 
 
 A director is not personally liable for the acts of the corpora- 
 tion, but he is considered in the nature of a trustee for the stock- 
 holders. He must act prudently and with, reasonable diligence in 
 their interest and is liable for his negligence or wrongdoing which 
 results in loss to them. He must act with the utmost good faith, 
 and any personal dealings he may have with the corporation, 
 such as borrowing money or selling goods, are regarded with 
 suspicion. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Does "majority rule" apply to the stockholders of a corporation? 
 Explain. 
 
 2. To what extent can a majority of the stockholders bind all? 
 
 3. How is a corporation managed? 
 
 4. When must stockholders be notified of a meeting? 
 
 5. (fl) How do stockholders vote? (6) What is "cumulative voting"? 
 
 6. Explain the proxy vote. 
 
 7. How are the powers and duties of directors defined? 
 
 8. What officers are usually selected to manage a corporation? 
 
 5. RIGHTS OF CREDITORS OF CORPORATIONS 
 
 In General. — . The creditors of a corporation generally have 
 the same rights and remedies against the corporation and its prop- 
 erty that they would have against a natural person. They may 
 obtain a judgment against it and issue an execution against its 
 property, or adopt the other remedies that they would have 
 
340 CORPORATIONS 
 
 against an individual. Aside from the rights of creditors to 
 proceed against the property belonging to the corporation, there 
 are cases in which the creditor may also look to the stockholder, 
 notwithstanding the general rule that a stockholder is not indi- 
 vidually hable for the debts of the corporation. 
 
 Liability of Stockholders. — The first of these cases is where 
 the original purchaser of stock from a corporation has not paid 
 to the corporation the full par value of his stock, and the pay- 
 ment of the amount is necessary to pay the creditors. It is held 
 that such a stockholder must contribute the full amount of his 
 subscription for stock if the amount is needed by the creditors. 
 This amount is a part of the capital stock of the company, and the 
 capital is held by the courts to be in the nature of a trust fund for 
 the payment of the corporate debts. 
 
 Where a person subscribes for a certain number of shares of bank stock, 
 but does not fully pay for it, he cannot afterwards by an agreement with 
 the bank diminish the number of his shares so as to affect the creditors of 
 the bank. Stock subscribed to a bank is in the nature of a trust fund for the 
 payment of its liabilities. — Payne v. Bullard, 23 Miss. 88. 
 
 Creditors of a corporation who have exhausted their remedy against the 
 corporation can, in order to satisfy their judgment, proceed against a stock- 
 holder to enforce his liability to the company for the amount remaining due 
 upon his subscription for stock. — Hatch v. Dana, loi U. S. 205. 
 
 The stockholder is also liable to the creditors of the corpora- 
 tion if any part of the capital assets has been unlawfully dis- 
 tributed or paid out to him, either directly or indirectly, leaving 
 creditors unpaid. This may be accomplished by distributing 
 funds as dividends when there are no surplus profits or in other 
 ways, but, however accomplished, the stockholder may be com- 
 pelled to refund for the benefit of the creditors the amount so 
 received. 
 
 The stockholders of a corporation sold all the assets of the corporation 
 and received and kept the proceeds of the sale. It was held that the stock- 
 holders were liable for the value of the goods sold, as their act was preju- 
 dicial to the rights of creditors, leaving certain creditors unpaid. 
 
 The statutes, which in some of the states have imposed addi- 
 tional liabilities upon the stockholders, vary greatly. Some make 
 the stockholder liable for all debts until the whole capital stock 
 is paid in. Others make him liable for a sum equal to the amount 
 
DISSOLUTION OF A CORPORATION 341 
 
 of stock held by him in addition to the amount yet due on his 
 stock, and so on, many different provisions being found in the 
 different states. 
 
 In Alabama it was held that by statute a stockholder in a life insurance 
 company was liable for the debts of the company, not only for the amount 
 of his unpaid subscription for stock, but also for an additional sum equal to 
 the amount of his stock. 
 
 — McDonnell v. Alabama Gold Life Insurance- Co., 85 Ala. 401. 
 
 In case of the failure of an incorporated bank (national or 
 state bank) each stockholder may lose the amount he has in- 
 vested in the stock and is liable to creditors for an additional 
 amount equal to the par value of his stock. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is the general rule as to the rights of creditors of a cor- 
 poration? 
 
 2. To what extent is a stockholder liable for the debts of the corporation? 
 Explain in full. 
 
 3. Is the liability of a stockholder in a national bank greater than the 
 liability of a stockholder in a manufacturing concern? Explain. 
 
 6. DISSOLUTION OF A CORPORATION 
 
 A private corporation may be dissolved in any one of four 
 ways : — 
 
 1. By the expiration of its charter. 
 
 2. By the surrender of its charter with the consent of the 
 state. 
 
 3. By an act of the legislature repealing its charter, under 
 the power reserved by the state when granting the charter. 
 
 4. By the forfeiture of its franchise or charter, upon the 
 judgment of a proper court, for misuse or non-use of its powers. 
 
 I. Expiration of Charter. — The charter usually stipulates 
 that the corporation shall be formed for a certain time, as for 
 twenty or fifty years. When this period expires, the association 
 no longer has an existence, and is therefore dissolved. 
 
 Where the existence of a corporation was for a term of years, the cor- 
 poration is dissolved upon the expiration of the time limited without further 
 action. — Merges v. Altenbrand, 45 Mont. 35.5. 
 
342 CORPORATIONS 
 
 2. Surrender of Charter. — The dissolution may be effected 
 by the association surrendering its charter, but, the charter being 
 a contract between the state and the association, this can be done 
 only with the consent of the'state. The statutes generally provide 
 certain formalities which must be complied with before the dis- 
 solution will be granted. 
 
 3. Repeal of Charter. — A charter when granted to the cor- 
 poration and accepted by it, constitutes a contract between the 
 state and the corporation. This contract exists under the clause 
 in our federal constitution prohibiting any state legislature from 
 passing a law impairing the obligation of the contract. The 
 state cannot, therefore, repeal the charter of a company unless it 
 has expressly reserved that right or unless the corporation assents 
 thereto. 
 
 4. Forfeiture of Charter. — The state may institute a suit in 
 the proper court to cause a corporate charter to be forfeited. The 
 ground for such a suit is the abuse or misuse of the corporate 
 powers, or the neglect or non-use of the same. But the mere 
 abuse or misuse alone does not work a forfeiture of the charter. 
 This results only from the judgment of the court after a hearing 
 in which the corporation has a chance to appear and present its 
 side of the case. A forfeiture will be decreed by the courts when 
 the corporation is guilty of acts or has omitted to do certain 
 things which by statute are expressly made a cause of forfeiture 
 of its franchise. 
 
 In one of the cases under the famous*' Anti-Trust "laws, it was held that 
 when a corporation has been guilty of misconduct in the exercise of its 
 franchise, which restricts or stifles competition, such acts will be regarded 
 as contrary to public policy and sufficient ground for forfeiting the corporate 
 franchise, even without proof of evil intent or injury to the public, since the 
 inevitable tendency of such acts is injury to the public. 
 
 — State Y. Standard Oil Co., 224 U. S. 270. 
 
 When a railway company without authority of law leases its road to 
 another railway company with all of its rights, property, and franchises, for 
 a long period of time, it thereby abandons the operation of its road and is 
 subject to forfeiture. — State v. Atchison Railroad Co., 24 Nebr. 143. 
 
 Combining with other corporations to form an unlawful 
 trust or monopoly is sufficient ground for a dissolution. This 
 is illustrated in the case of the State v. Standard Oil Co., above 
 quoted. 
 
JOINT STOCK COMPANIES 343 
 
 Effect of Dissolution. — The effect of the dissolution is that 
 thereafter the corporation no longer exists for any purpose, but 
 the statutes in practically all of the states now make provisions 
 under which the business of dissolved corporations may be 
 liquidated and settled and the rights of stockholders and cred- 
 itors may be adjusted. The usual method of doing this is the 
 appointment of a receiver to wind up the corporate affairs, col- 
 lect bills due to the corporation, and pay its creditors, after 
 which the remainder is divided among the stockholders, accord- 
 ing to the amount of stock they hold. 
 
 Held, that on the dissolution of a corporation at the expiration of the 
 term of its corporate existence, each stockholder has the right, as a general 
 rule, to have the corporate property converted into money, whether it be 
 necessary for the payment of debts or not. 
 
 — Mason v. Pewahic Mining Co., 133 U. S. 50. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. In what four ways may a private corporation be dissolved? 
 
 2. Explain the usual method of dissolution. 
 
 7. JOINT STOCK COMPANIES 
 
 Definition. — A joint stock company is a form of association 
 in appearance resembling a corporation while in reality it is 
 nothing more than a partnership. 
 
 Incorporation is expensive in England, and there the joint 
 stock company is common, but in the United States the joint 
 stock company is seldom found, as corporations generally are 
 more satisfactory. 
 
 As has been said, joint stock companies resemble corporations 
 in form. They have officers and by-laws. Their capital is 
 divided into shares which under their by-laws are transferable. 
 Their by-laws generally regulate the mode of conducting their 
 business and electing their officers. A member of a joint stock 
 company, although he may style himself but a stockholder, is a 
 partner, and as such is liable to the same extent and in the same 
 manner as any ordinary partner. 
 
 Holden and others associated themselves together without incorpora- 
 tion under the name of the Bridgeport Cooperative Association for the pur- 
 
344 CORPORATIONS 
 
 pose of procuring meat and provisions at a lower rate for the members of the 
 organization. Sales were made to persons not members at a higher rate, 
 but no profit was expected beyond the expense of management. The mem- 
 bers held meetings and elected officers. Held, that the individuals com- 
 posing the association were liable personally as partners for goods purchased 
 by the managers of the association for its benefit. It made no difference that 
 they did not intend to become individually responsible or that they did not 
 know or believe that they would be. — Davison v. H olden, 55 Conn. 103. 
 
 Sale of Shares. — It is generally held that under the by-lav^^s 
 of the company a member may sell or transfer his shares W\\h- 
 out working a dissolution of the company as would be the result 
 in a partnership. And the death of a member does not work 
 its dissolution. In some of the states joint stock companies are 
 given certain privileges by statute; as, for instance, allowing 
 them to sue or be sued in the name of their president or treas- 
 urer. The business of a joint stock company cannot be changed 
 or extended without the consent of all the members, although in 
 its ordinary business arrangements a majority will govern. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is a joint stock company? 
 
 2. Why is it that joinl stock companies are not common in this country? 
 
 3. In what ways does a joint stock company resemble (a) a corporation? 
 {h) a partnership? 
 
 5. Are shares of stock in a joint stock company transferable? Explain. 
 
 6. What is the liability of a stockholder in a joint stock company? 
 
 IMPORTANT POINTS 
 
 A corporation is an artificial person created or authorized by law. 
 
 A corporation is composed of a number of natural or corporate 
 stockholders. 
 
 Stockholders as individuals do not represent the corporation. 
 
 A stockholder may deal with the corporation, may sue it and may 
 be sued by it. 
 
 Change in the membership of a corporation does not affect its 
 existence. 
 
 The special powers of a corporation are granted by its charter. 
 
 The capital stock or share capital is the total amount of stock the 
 corporation is authorized by its charter to issue. 
 
 The capital is the actual assets or property owned by the corpora- 
 tion. 
 
IMPORTANT POINTS 345 
 
 Common stock is the ordinary stock of a corporation, issued with- 
 out special privileges or restrictions. 
 
 Preferred stock has some preference as to dividends and assets 
 over other stock in the same corporation. 
 
 The directors of a corporation are elected by the stockholders. 
 
 The directors usually elect the officers of a corporation (presi- 
 dent, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer). 
 
 A stock certificate is issued by the officers of the corporation. 
 
 No two corporations in the same state are permitted to have the 
 same name. 
 
 A majority of the stock and not a majority of the stockholders 
 usually controls a stock corporation. 
 
 A director in a corporation must be a stockholder unless this 
 requirement is waived by a provision in the charter. 
 
 The directors of a corporation represent the stockholders. 
 
 The transfer of stock must be entered on the books of the com- 
 pany before the purchaser becomes a stockholder of record, entitled 
 to vote and share in the dividends. 
 
 PARTNERSHIPS COMPARED WITH CORPORATIONS 
 
 A partnership is a relation resulting from a contract. 
 
 A corporation is an artificial person created by law. 
 
 Change in the membership of a partnership operates as a disso- 
 lution. 
 
 Change in the membership of a corporation does not affect its 
 existence. 
 
 A partner is individually liable for his firm's obligations. 
 
 A stockholder's liability is limited. 
 
 Each partner is a business agent of the partnership. 
 
 A corporation's business is managed by officers. 
 
 Membership in a partnership results from agreement between 
 the partners. 
 
 An interest in a stock corporation is acquired by purchasing stock. 
 
 Suit against a partnership, in most of the states, must be brought 
 in the name of the individuals composing it. 
 
 A corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its corporate 
 name. 
 
 A partnership cannot contract with or transact business with its 
 members. 
 
 In business transactions a corporation bears the same relation to 
 its members as to any one else. 
 
 TEST QUESTIONS 
 
 I. Would it be possible to form a corporation with only one incor- 
 porator? 
 
346 CORPORATIONS 
 
 2. Is it possible for a corporation to be organized without capital 
 stock? Give an illustration. 
 
 3. What are the principal differences between a partnership and a 
 corporation? 
 
 4. What advantages has a corporation over a partnership? 
 
 5. In a stock corporation, how are the profits divided? 
 
 6. What is the usual procedure in forming a corporation? 
 
 7. What is the difference between par value and actual value as applied 
 to stock? 
 
 8. What is the difference between the "capital stock" and "capital"? 
 
 9. Which would you consider the safer investment, preferred stock or 
 common stock? 
 
 10. Sometimes common stock is more valuable than preferred stock. 
 Why? 
 
 11. What is necessary after purchasing stock in a corporation before 
 the purchaser is entitled to the privileges of a stockholder? 
 
 12. Can a stockholder who owns more than half of the stock in a cor- 
 poration assume the management of the business and make contracts? 
 
 13. Explain the organization, management, and control of a stock cor- 
 poration. 
 
 14. What are the usual duties of the directors of a corporation and to 
 whom are they responsible? 
 
 15. What is the usual course of procedure in the dissolution of a cor- 
 poration? 
 
 CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 Give the decision and the principle of law involved in each case. 
 
 1. The Union Supply Co. was a corporation which owned a piece of 
 real property that was sold by the officers of the corporation, the deed being 
 signed personally by all of the stockholders in their individual names. Was 
 the conveyance good? 
 
 2. Webster owes the Standard Novelty Works, a corporation, $500. 
 Three persons own all the stock of the corporation. They in their individual 
 names sue Webster for the amount. Can they succeed? 
 
 3. The Georgia Railroad Co. has authority by its charter to main- 
 tain a railroad between the towns of Atlanta and Brunswick. It buys boats 
 and seeks to establish a boat system on one of the rivers running into the 
 town of Brunswick. Has it that authority? 
 
CASE PROBLEMS 347 
 
 4. The American Dry Goods Co. is incorporated for the purpose of 
 buying and seDing goods. In the course of its business the company borrows 
 $1000 and gives its note therefor. Has it this authority? 
 
 5. The above-named corporation owns a store and land where it con- 
 ducts business. It places a mortgage upon this property for the purpose of 
 raising $5000. Has it the right? 
 
 6. The above-named corporation forms a partnership with one Greene 
 in an adjoining town for the purpose of conducting a branch dry goods 
 store. Has it the authority? 
 
 7. The Southern Tobacco Co., a corporation, entered into a com- 
 bination with twenty other manufacturers of tobacco for the purpose of 
 forming a tobacco trust and combining all of their business under one man- 
 agement. An action is brought to dissolve the Southern Tobacco Co. Can 
 it be done? 
 
 8. Newell is a stockholder in a corporation. He learns that the profits 
 for the past year have been about 10 per cent on the amount of capital 
 stock, but no dividends have been declared. He therefore sues the corpora- 
 tion for an amount equal to 10 per cent on his stock. Can he recover? If not, 
 what remedy has he against the corporation? 
 
 9. In the above case suppose Newell sells his stock to Jordan on 
 January i, and no transfer is made on the company's books. On July i a 
 dividend of 10 per cent is declared. Jordan enters a claim against the com- 
 pany for the dividend. Can he recover? 
 
 10. Downs, Butler, and Hargan are original subscribers to the stock of 
 the Standard Glass Co. They have paid to the corporation only 50 per cent 
 of the par value of their stock. The corporation fails and the creditors, 
 finding that the company has no assets, sue Downs, Butler, and Hargan 
 personally for the amount of their subscription not yet paid. Can they 
 recover? 
 
 11. After a corporation is practically bankrupt, certain of the assets 
 are sold and the proceeds distributed among the stockholders. When the 
 corporation fails, can the creditors recover those proceeds from the stock- 
 holders? 
 
 12. A certain corporation has earned dividends equal to 10 per cent of 
 the stock. The directors do not declare a dividend but put the earnings aside 
 into a surplus fund. Beam, a stockholder, brings an action to compel the 
 directors to declare a dividend. Will he succeed? Explain. 
 
BANKRUPTCY 
 
 Early Bankruptcy Legislation. — Bankruptcy legislation can 
 be traced to an old Roman law under which an insolvent debtor 
 might, by surrendering all of his property to his creditors, obtain 
 immunity from the penalty imposed by the law, which was 
 imprisonment and severe corporal punishment. The first English 
 bankruptcy law was passed in 1542 and forms the basis for much 
 of our bankruptcy legislation. This English law, however, 
 contained no provision for voluntary bankruptcy or for the 
 discharge of the debtor's remaining unpaid debts. 
 
 National Bankruptcy Laws. — The United States Constitution 
 gives Congress the power to tnact uniform bankruptcy laws. 
 Congress has enacted five different bankruptcy laws. The last 
 law — the only one to be considered, as the others have all 
 been repealed — was enacted in 1898 and as amended in 1903, 
 1906, 1 9 10, and 191 7 is still in force. 
 
 The object of the National Bankruptcy Law is to protect an 
 insolvent debtor's property from seizure by any one or more 
 creditors to the exclusion of other creditors and to prevent an 
 insolvent debtor from giving one creditor preference over other 
 creditors in the distribution of his assets or payment of his debts. 
 
 Solvency and Insolvency. — Any business firm is said to be 
 solvent so long as its available assets are equal to or greater than 
 its liabilities, but just as soon as its liabiHties exceed its assets a 
 state of insolvency exists. Insolvency is said to be determined 
 by one's inability to pay one's debts. A state of temporary insol- 
 vency may come about through inability to realize promptly on 
 the assets of a business. A debtor may be insolvent due to the 
 fact that he is not able to meet his debts as they mature, although 
 his assets are greater than his liabilities. What he lacks is 
 sufficient cash and if time were given him he could convert his 
 assets into cash and meet his obligations. 
 
 Bankruptcy Statute. — The national bankruptcy law provides 
 that ''Any person, except a municipal, railroad, or banking 
 
 348 
 
FIVE ACTS OF BANKRUPTCY 349 
 
 corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits of this act as a 
 voluntary bankrupt. 
 
 ''Any natural person, except a wage-earner or a person en- 
 gaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil, any unincor- 
 porated company, and any moneyed, business, or commercial 
 corporation, except a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking 
 corporation, owing debts to the amount of one thousand dollars 
 or over, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon default 
 or an impartial trial, and shall be subject to the provisions and 
 entitled to the benefits of this Act. The bankruptcy of a cor- 
 poration shall not release its officers, directors, or stockholders, 
 as such, from any liabiHty under the laws of a state or territory, 
 or of the United States." 
 
 Before a person may be considered a bankrupt he must be 
 insolvent in the sense that his property at a fair valuation is less 
 than his liabilities, and in addition to this he must commit one 
 of the five acts of bankruptcy hereafter described. 
 
 Five Acts of Bankruptcy. — Before a court can decree an 
 insolvent debtor bankrupt without his own consent and take 
 charge of his property for the protection of his creditors, the 
 debtor must commit an act of bankruptcy, and this act must be 
 committed within four months of the filing of a petition by the 
 creditors. Insolvency alone does not give creditors the right to 
 start bankruptcy proceedings against a debtor. He must have 
 committed one of the following five acts : 
 
 1. Conveyed, transferred, concealed, or removed, or per- 
 mitted to be concealed or removed, any part of his property, with 
 intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or any of them. 
 
 2. Transferred, while insolvent, any portion of his property 
 to one or more of his creditors with intent to prefer such creditors 
 over his other creditors. The transfer must result in diminishing 
 the insolvent estate. Thus the payment while insolvent of a 
 preexisting debt will suffice, but the payment of a debt which 
 arose simultaneously with or after payment would not amount 
 to a preference. For example, the purchase of merchandise on 
 ^'C.O.D." or ''C.W.O." (cash with order) terms will not result 
 in a preference, or diminution of the estate, but merely in the 
 substitution of one asset (merchandise) for another asset (cash) . 
 
350 BANKRUPTCY 
 
 3. Suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to 
 obtain a preference through legal proceedings, and not having, at 
 least five days before a sale or final disposition of any property 
 affected by such preference, vacated or discharged such pref- 
 erence. This would result in depleting the insolvent's estate, to 
 the benefit of one creditor and to the detriment of all others. 
 
 4. Made a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors, 
 or, being insolvent, applied for a receiver or trustee for his 
 property, or, because of insolvency, a receiver or trustee having 
 been put in charge of his property under the laws of a state, of 
 a territory, or of the United States. 
 
 5. Admitted in writing his inability to pay his debts and his 
 willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt on that ground. 
 
 Until the insolvent debtor commits one of these acts, the 
 creditors may not force him into bankruptcy. Sometimes, in 
 order to create an act of bankruptcy, one creditor, with the 
 approval of the others, will bring suit for a claim, obtain judgment, 
 and levy execution against the debtor's property. Thus an act 
 of bankruptcy will be committed and the creditors may then 
 file their petition. 
 
 Settlement of a debtor's affairs by a bankruptcy court may 
 be of advantage to both the creditors and the debtor. Creditors 
 grow impatient and insist upon immediate settlement, sue the 
 debtor, obtain judgment, and authorize sale of the debtor's 
 property, usually at a sacrifice, and the amount realized is not 
 sufficient to pay all creditors in full. The bankruptcy law affords 
 the debtor protection against such an invasion by the appoint- 
 ment of a receiver. A receiver may be appointed upon applica- 
 tion of creditors or the debtor himself. When the application is 
 accompanied by proof of the debtor's inability to meet his debts 
 as they mature, a bankruptcy court will appoint a trustee or 
 receiver to sell the assets of the debtor and with the proceeds 
 settle with the creditors on a pro rata basis. In this way the 
 assets can be marketed to a greater advantage and the interests 
 of all protected. 
 
 . Trustee and Creditors. — As soon as a person is adjudged a 
 bankrupt a meeting of his creditors is called, at which time they 
 can examine the bankrupt and do any other business proper at 
 
DUTIES OF BANKRUPT 351 
 
 the time. As soon as the trustee is appointed and he has filed his 
 bond, he becomes vested by operation of law with the title of. 
 the bankrupt to all of his property except that exempt by law, to 
 all property transferred in fraud of creditors, and to all rights 
 arising upon his contracts and agreements. It is then the duty 
 of the trustee to convert the assets into cash, v/hich he divides 
 among the creditors whose claims have been accepted. 
 
 Duties of Bankrupt. — As soon as the voluntary petition is 
 filed, or after the hearing upon the involuntary petition, if 
 allowed, the party is a bankrupt, and the duties imposed upon 
 him are as follows: 
 
 I . He must attend the first meeting of his creditors, if directed 
 by the court, and also the hearing upon the application for his 
 discharge. 
 , 2. He must comply with the lawful orders of the court; 
 
 3. Examine the proofs of claims filed against his estate; 
 
 4. Execute such papers as shall be ordered by the court; 
 
 5. Execute to his trustee a transfer of all his property in 
 foreign countries; 
 
 6. Inform his trustee of any attempts of his creditors to 
 evade the provisions of the bankruptcy law, coming to his 
 knowledge, or of any attempt of creditors to prove false claims; 
 
 7. Prepare, make oath to, and file in court within ten days 
 after the adjudication, if an involuntary bankrupt, and with the 
 petition, if a voluntary bankrupt, a schedule of his property, 
 showing the amount and kind of property, the location thereof, 
 its money value in detail, and a list of his creditors, showing their 
 residences, if known (if unknown, that fact to be stated), the 
 amounts due each of them, the consideration therefor, the se- 
 curity held by them, if any, and a claim for such exemptions as 
 he may be entitled to. 
 
 8. He must submit to an examination concerning the conduct 
 of his business, the cause of his bankruptcy, his dealings with 
 his creditors and other persons, the amount, kind, and where- 
 abouts of his property, and, in addition, all matters which may 
 affect the administration and settlement of his estate. No 
 testimony given by him shall be offered in evidence against him 
 in any criminal proceeding. 
 
352 BANKRUPTCY 
 
 The bankrupt is entitled to the same exemptions as are 
 allowed to any other debtor by the laws of the state in which he 
 resides. 
 
 The National Bankruptcy Law further provides that when a 
 debtor avails himself of the law and his assets are all liquidated, 
 he may be discharged in bankruptcy proceedings and relieved 
 from any further obligations even though his assets were not 
 sufficient to pay his creditors in full. 
 
 Discharge in Bankruptcy. — The bankrupt, after one month 
 and within twelve months after being so declared, may file an 
 application for a discharge in the court of bankruptcy, and the 
 judge shall grant the discharge unless at the hearing held thereon 
 it shall appear that the bankrupt has ''committed an offense 
 punishable by imprisonment as herein provided ; or with intent 
 to conceal his financial condition, destroyed, concealed, or failed 
 to keep books of account or records from which such condition 
 might be ascertained; or obtained property on credit from any 
 person upon a materially false statement in writing made to such 
 person for the purpose of obtaining such property on credit; or 
 at any time subsequent to the first day of the four months 
 immediately preceding the filing of the petition, transferred, 
 removed, destroyed, or concealed, or permitted to be removed, 
 destroyed, or concealed, any of his property with intent to 
 hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors; or in voluntary proceed- 
 ings been granted a discharge in bankruptcy within six years; or 
 in the course of the proceedings in bankruptcy refused to obey 
 any lawful order of, or to answer any material question approved 
 by, the court." 
 
 The discharge of the bankrupt acts as a discharge of all of the 
 debts and contracts of the bankrupt at the time of the filing of 
 the petition except a certain class of debts which are tinged with 
 wrong' or fraud, or debts due the government, or debts due 
 creditors who were not duly notified of the proceedings, or whose 
 claims were not listed by the bankrupt on his schedules. 
 
 Hartman is insolvent; his assets are fifteen thousand dollars and his 
 liabilities are twenty thousand. He is discharged in bankruptcy by settling 
 with his creditors at seventy-five cents on a dollar. This relieves him from 
 further payment and his creditors will have to lose twenty-five per cent of 
 the claims they had against him. 
 
SETTLEMENT 353 
 
 Settlement. — The creditors frequently join in a composition 
 agreement whereby they accept a pro rata share of the assets in 
 full settlement of their claims. The legal effect is practically the 
 same as a final determination by the bankruptcy court, it avoids 
 delay, and usually gives the creditors more money by saving the 
 expenses of the proceeding. Such an agreement is not binding 
 on any creditor who does not join in it. 
 
 The Remedy of Iniunction. — Instead of asking for the 
 appointment of a receiver, the creditors may ask for an injunction 
 to restrain other creditors from taking action which would affect 
 their rights or interests as creditors. If an injunction will serve 
 to protect the rights of all creditors the court may not appoint 
 a receiver, but instead grant the remedy of injunction. 
 
 Exemption Laws. — Laws are in force in nearly all if not all 
 of the states by which certain property is exempt from seizure 
 to satisfy a judgment for debt. Usually household furniture up 
 to a certain amount, varying in the different states, tools used 
 in following a trade, and certain articles necessary in carrying on 
 a business are exempted. The laws of one's own state should be 
 consulted. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. What is the object of the National Bankruptcy Law? 
 
 2. When is a business firm said to be solvent? 
 
 3. When is a business firm said to be insolvent? 
 
 4. What conditions may cause a state of temporary insolvency? 
 
 5. What are the principal provisions of the bankruptcy statute? 
 
 6. When does a state of bankruptcy exist? 
 
 7. What are "acts of bankruptcy"? 
 
 8. What are the principal duties imposed upon one who is a bankrupt? 
 g. In what way does the bankruptcy law protect debtors? 
 
 10. Who is a trustee or receiver? 
 
 11. What are the principal duties of the trustee or receiver? 
 
 12. What is the meaning of "discharge in bankruptcy"? 
 
 13. What is the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy? 
 
 14. What is the special remedy of injunction? 
 
 15. What are exemption laws? 
 
COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION 
 
 Courts. — We have dealt with law as defining the rights and 
 limitations of individuals in their dealings with one another; but 
 these rights must often prove of Httle value in protecting the 
 individual in his property and personal relations unless a means 
 of enforcing them is provided. For this purpose the constitu- 
 tions of the United States and of the several states have estab- 
 lished a system of Courts. 
 
 Jurisdiction. — The jurisdiction of a court is defined as the 
 power to hear and determine a cause. The courts of a particular 
 class are empowered to hear only a certain fine of causes or dis- 
 putes; while another line of cases, involving different amounts or 
 arising between different parties or being of a different nature, 
 will be determined by entirely different courts. It is essential in 
 all cases that the particular court before which a question is 
 brought for determination shall have jurisdiction, for if it has 
 not, its decision is of no effect, and may be set aside at any time. 
 
 Jurisdiction of Subject-matter. — The jurisdiction of a court 
 must be both of the subject-matter and of the person. Juris- 
 diction of the subject-matter means the power of the court 
 regarding the subject or thing in dispute. Thus, in an action con- 
 cerning the title to a particular piece of land in one judicial district 
 in a state, if the case were brought in the district court of an- 
 other judicial district, this court would have no jurisdiction of 
 the question of the title to land outside its own district; 
 therefore, there would be a lack of jurisdiction of the subject- 
 matter. Again, the justice courts have no power to determine 
 questions affecting the title to real property, and, therefore, the 
 above case could not be determined by any justice court, as 
 such court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter. 
 
 Jurisdiction of the Person. — Jurisdiction of the person, or of 
 the party, against whom an action or cause is brought, is neces- 
 sary, or the decision will have no effect as against such person 
 or party. Jurisdiction of the person is generally acquired by 
 
 354 
 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS 355 
 
 service of a notice or command upon the party, which notice 
 is generally called a summons and will be treated later. 
 
 Classification of Courts. — The courts of the United States 
 and of the different states may be arranged under several classi- 
 fications, as follows: 
 
 Courts of Original Jurisdiction. — Courts of Original Juris- 
 diction are those courts that have authority to hear and deter- 
 mine questions when they are first presented for judicial deter- 
 mination or decision. They are the courts that hear both sides 
 of the dispute and render their decision therefrom. 
 
 Courts of Appellate Jurisdiction. — A Court of Appellate 
 Jurisdiction has no power to hear a case when it first arises. It 
 can only review the decision of a lower court when such deci- 
 sion is brought before it for determination. The taking of a 
 case from a lower court to a higher one is called an appeal. 
 
 Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — There are other courts 
 that have in some cases original and in other appellate juris- 
 diction; that is, they have jurisdiction to hear appeals from some 
 lower court or courts, and they can also try certain cases in the 
 capacity of courts of original jurisdiction. 
 
 Courts of Record and Not of Record. — Courts are known as 
 Courts of Record and Courts Not of Record. Courts of record 
 are, as their name implies, those which are required by law to 
 keep a record of their proceedings, this record being kept on file 
 in some safe place for future reference. Courts not of record, 
 on the other hand, have no permanent record of their pro- 
 ceedings. 
 
 Civil and Criminal Courts. — Courts are either Civil or Crim- 
 inal. Civil courts hear cases in which the rights and liabilities 
 of individuals towards each other are in dispute. A civil action 
 is one which seeks the establishment, recovery, or redress of 
 private rights, while a criminal action has for its purpose the 
 protection of the community against those whose acts would 
 endanger it. Criminal courts are those which administer criminal 
 law and hear and determine criminal actions. 
 
 Common Law and Equity Courts. — Civil Courts may be 
 either Common Law Courts or Equity Courts. The distinction 
 between the common law court and the equity or chancery court 
 
356 COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION 
 
 was in former times well defmed, a different set of judges pre- 
 siding over, and an entirely different system prevailing in, each 
 court. But the line of distinction is in most jurisdictions less 
 pronounced now than formerly, and in many of the states the 
 same judge presides in both a common law and an equity court ; 
 at one term of court hearing common law cases and at another 
 equity cases. 
 
 General and Special Jurisdiction. — Courts of general juris- 
 diction are those in which it is assumed, unless the contrary is 
 shown, that they have jurisdiction to hear the cases before them. 
 In such a court the fact that it has jurisdiction does not have to 
 be expressly pleaded or proved, while in the case of a court of 
 inferior or special jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the court over 
 the case in question is not presumed, but must be especially set 
 out in the pleadings. 
 
 Federal Courts. — The courts of the United States are called 
 Federal Courts and are empowered to hear cases arising under the 
 United States Constitution, laws, and treaties. The Constitution 
 provides that the judicial power of the United States shall be 
 vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as 
 Congress may from time to time establish. In pursuance of 
 this authority. Congress has established, in addition to the Su- 
 preme Court, inferior courts which are known as the Circuit 
 Court of Appeals, the District Court, and others. 
 
 The Federal courts have jurisdiction only in those cases in 
 which it is expressly conferred upon them by the Constitution, 
 and by Congress under the power granted to it by the Constitu- 
 tion. This jurisdiction extends to all cases arising under the 
 United States Constitution, the laws of the United States and 
 treaties made under their authority, and all cases affecting am- 
 bassadors, public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admi- 
 ralty and marine law, which includes all things done upon and 
 relating to the seas and all transactions in connection with com- 
 merce and navigation and to damages for injuries upon the high 
 seas and the navigable lakes and rivers of the United States. 
 They also have jurisdiction of controversies in which the United 
 States is a party, and of cases between two or more states, 
 between a state and citizens of another state, between citizens 
 
FEDERAL COURTS 357 
 
 of different states, between citizens of the safne state claiming 
 land under the grant of a different state, and between a state or 
 its citizens and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. 
 
 Supreme Court. — The Supreme Court consists of the chief 
 justice and eight associate justices. 
 
 This court has both original and appellate jurisdiction, its 
 original jurisdiction extending over all proceedings brought 
 against ambassadors, public ministers, and their families, and 
 over all controversies of a civil nature in which a state is a party. 
 
 It has appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals from the circuit 
 court of appeals and the district court. 
 
 Circuit Court of Appeals. — This is a court of intermediate 
 appeal between the District Court and the Supreme Court. It 
 has appellate jurisdiction by appeal or writ of error to review 
 final decisions in the District Courts, except in a few cases in 
 which appeals may be taken from the district court direct to 
 the Supreme Court. In many cases the decision of the Circuit 
 Court of Appeals is final. The United States is divided into nine 
 circuits, in each of which there is a Circuit Court of Appeals, to 
 which is assigned one of the Justices of the Supreme Court, who 
 with the circuit or district judges constitutes the Court. 
 
 District Court. — This is the federal court of original, general 
 jurisdiction. Part of its jurisdiction was formerly exercised by 
 the Circuit Courts, which were abolished in 191 1 and their 
 jurisdiction transferred to the District Courts. There are 
 numerous districts in the United States, each state having at 
 least one and some states having four. A District Court is 
 estabHshed in each district, presided over by a district judge. 
 
 The district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil suits 
 brought by the United States; and of suits which arise under the 
 Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or between 
 citizens of different states, or a citizen of a state and a foreign 
 country. Also of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the 
 authority of the United States; of civil cases of admiralty and 
 maritime jurisdiction; of cases arising under the revenue, postal, 
 patent, copyright, trade-mark, and bankruptcy laws; and many 
 other cases. Actions involving federal questions, or between 
 citizens of different states, which have been commenced in a state 
 
358 COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION 
 
 court may be removed to the District Court under certain cir- 
 cumstances and by proper procedure. 
 
 Other Federal Courts. — Congress has also established a 
 Court of Claims to hear and determine claims against the United 
 States; a Court of Customs Appeals, to hear certain matters 
 arising under the revenue laws imposing duties on imports; and, 
 in certain foreign countries, Consular Courts, at which American 
 citizens may have their cases heard, in order to be relieved of the 
 uncertain and sometimes barbarous laws of non-christian 
 countries. 
 
 State Courts. — While the federal or United States courts 
 above enumerated deal only with certain specific cases over 
 which they are given jurisdiction by the Constitution, the great 
 mass of questions not specifically placed within the jurisdiction 
 of these federal courts is within the jurisdiction of the state courts. 
 
 Justice Court. — The systems of courts in the dififerent states 
 differ somewhat, but in the more important features are essen- 
 tially the same. The lowest court is the Justice Court, presided 
 over by the justice of the peace. This court is called by various 
 other names in different states, such as District Court, etc. It is 
 a court not of record, and has original jurisdiction only. It hears 
 both civil and criminal cases and is of Hmited or special juris- 
 diction. 
 
 In the larger cities there are two modifications of this court, 
 one branch hearing civil cases and being known as the Munici- 
 pal or City Court, and the other branch dealing with the criminal 
 cases and known as the Pohce or Magistrate's Court. 
 
 The jurisdiction of the justice court is over the minor or more 
 trivial cases, and includes the punishment of petty offenses 
 which it is not thought necessary to bring before the higher 
 courts. In civil cases it has jurisdiction when the amount in- 
 volved does not exceed a sum fixed by statute. It has no juris- 
 diction when the title to real property is involved. In its criminal 
 branch it has exclusive jurisdiction of certain prescribed misde- 
 meanors, such as petit larceny, assault in the third degree, 
 malicious mischief, etc. 
 
 By way of definition ct the term '^ misdemeanor" it may be 
 said that crimes are classified as felonies and misdemeanors. A 
 
STATE COURTS 359 
 
 felony is- a crime punishable by either death or imprisonment in 
 a state's prison. All other crimes are misdemeanors. 
 
 County Court. — In most of the states the court next in impor- 
 tance is a county court of special or limited jurisdiction, confined 
 exclusively to those cases in which jurisdiction is expressly con- 
 ferred on it. In many states it is called the Probate Court, or 
 Orphans' Court, and has to deal with the settlement of the estates 
 of deceased persons, the probating of wills, and, the protection of 
 minor children. In some states it has jurisdiction also of certain 
 civil and criminal cases arising within the county. In a few 
 states there are two courts for each county, one held by the 
 county judge for civil and criminal cases, and the other by the 
 surrogate for the work of a probate court. 
 
 Circuit Court or District Court. — In each state there is a 
 court of original and general jurisdiction, which is called in some 
 states the Circuit Court, in others the District Court, Superior 
 Court, or the Supreme Court. This is a court of record and has 
 unlimited jurisdiction, both in law and equity, regardless of the 
 amount involved or the nature of the controversy, provided it is 
 not a case in which the federal courts, or minor state courts, have 
 exclusive jurisdiction. In some cases the equity powers of the 
 court are exercised by a separate tribunal, called Chancery, but 
 in most states law and equity are administered by the same court 
 and its judges. There usually is a separate circuit or district 
 court for each county or other judicial district in the state. 
 
 Courts of Intermediate Appeal. — In some of the states 
 appeals run from the circuit or district court to a court of in- 
 termediate appeal, called the Appellate Division or a similar 
 name, whose decision is final in certain cases. The purpose of the 
 courts is to dispose of some of the many appeals which otherwise 
 would seriously interfere with the work of the court of last resort. 
 
 Supreme Court. — The court of last resort in a state is usually 
 called the Supreme Court, but in some states is called the Court 
 of Appeals. This court has exclusively appellate jurisdiction. 
 It never hears the evidence in a case, which is presented to the 
 court in the form of a printed record of the proceedings in the 
 lower court, and it decides questions of law as to which its deci- 
 sion is final. 
 
36o COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION • 
 
 Court of Claims. — The state is a sovereign body and cannot 
 be sued without its permission. There are many claims against 
 the state which should be determined by some tribunal, and to 
 meet the necessity most states have established Courts of Claims, 
 which have exchisive jurisdiction to hear and determine such 
 claims. 
 
 Reference. — A Referee is a person appointed by the court to 
 hear the evidence in a case and to report thereon to the court. 
 It is customary for the court to grant a reference when the case 
 requires the examination of a long account. In some other 
 cases a reference may be had either upon motion of the parties 
 or in the discretion of the judge. 
 
 A case involving a long account is tried before a referee 
 because of the difficulty the jurors would have in carrying in 
 their minds the numerous items involved therein and the great 
 delay to which the court would be subjected on account of the 
 expenditure of time required to hear cases of this character. A 
 referee hears the case in the same manner as a judge, and has 
 the same power to preserve order and grant adjournments. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1. For what purpose are courts established? 
 
 2. What is the jurisdiction of a court? 
 
 3. What is the effect of a decision of a court not having jurisdiction of 
 the question? 
 
 4. Name and define the two different classes of jurisdiction. 
 
 5. (a) What is a court of original jurisdiction? (h) Of appellate juris- 
 diction? 
 
 6. Define courts of record ; courts not of record. 
 
 7. Define civil and criminal courts; common law and equity. 
 
 8. Distinguish between the courts of general jurisdiction and those of 
 special jurisdiction. 
 
 9. How are the courts of the United States established, and over what 
 question J have they jurisdiction? 
 
 10. Name the different United States courts, and describe each. 
 
 11. (a) What is the lowest court in your state? (b) What are the 
 limits of its jurisdiction, both civil and criminal? (c) By whom is it con- 
 ducted? 
 
 12. (a) Is there a county court in your state? {b) What is its name and 
 its jurisdiction? 
 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 361 
 
 13. (a) What court in your state has jurisdiction over the probate of 
 wills? (b) What other jurisdiction, if any, has it? 
 
 14. (a) What is the lowest court of general jurisdiction in your state? 
 (b) Are there any classes of cases which it cannot determine? 
 
 15. What courts in your state hear equity cases? 
 
 16. What court in your state, if any, has intermediate appellate juris- 
 diction? 
 
 17. What is the highest court in your state and what is its jurisdiction? 
 
 18. (a) Is there a court of claims in your state? {b) Why is such a court 
 established? (c) Over what questions does it have jurisdiction? 
 
 PLEADING AND PRACTICE 
 
 We have learned that a system of courts is established in 
 each state as well as in the United States. To enable the courts 
 to conduct their business in an orderly manner, Certain rules of 
 practice are prescribed which must be observed by those desir- 
 ing relief in these courts. 
 
 Action. — When a person desires the relief afforded by the 
 courts, he institutes an action or suit. An action is defined as 
 the legal and formal demand of one's rights made upon another 
 person or party and insisted upon in a court of justice. 
 
 Parties. — In an action at law it is necessary that there be 
 two or more parties. The party who brings the action is known 
 as the plaintiff, and the one against whom it is brought, as the 
 defendant. In a criminal action the plaintiff is the state or 
 the people of the state, and the defendant is the one accused 
 of the crime. The same person cannot be both plaintiff and 
 defendant. A party in all civil cases must be competent to 
 contract; but when incompetent, as in the case of an infant or 
 lunatic, he may bring suit through a person appointed for that 
 purpose and known as a guardian. 
 
 Summons. — An action is commenced by the service of a 
 notice upon the defendant, this notice being called a summons. 
 The summons is in some jurisdictions issued by the judge or 
 clerk of the court, while in other jurisdictions it may be issued 
 by the attorney for the plaintiff. 
 
 This summons must be served personally upon the defendant, 
 either by a sheriff or a constable, or by a person of suitable age. 
 The laws expressly provide in a few cases that the summons 
 
362 COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION 
 
 may be served upon the defendant by advertising it in a news- 
 paper, but this is only in case the defendant is not within the 
 state, or if within the state he cannot be located. 
 
 Pleadings. — After an action or suit has been commenced by 
 the service of a summons, the parties must serve their pleadings 
 within a certain prescribed time. These pleadings are the 
 formal allegations of the parties by which both plaintiff and 
 defendant present to the court and to each other their respective 
 versions of the question in dispute. 
 
 Complaint. — The complaint, which is the first pleading in a 
 case, and is in some states called the petition or declaration, 
 consists of a statement of the cause of action which the plaintiff 
 sets forth as his reason for seeking the aid of the court against 
 the defendant. Under the old common law the forms of plead- 
 ings* were very technical, but under the modern form of proce- 
 dure they are required only to set forth the facts in a clear and 
 concise manner. The complaint is commonly served with the 
 summons, but may be served later. After the complaint has 
 been served upon the defendant or filed with the court, as the 
 rules of the particular court may require, it is then necessary 
 for the defendant within a certain number of days (usually 
 twenty) to file or serve a statement of the reasons why he should 
 not comply with the demands of the plaintiff. If such a state- 
 ment is not filed, the plaintiff is given judgment against the 
 defendant by default. The pleading which is filed by the de- 
 fendant may be either an answer or a demurrer. 
 
 Answer. — The answer, or plea as it is sometimes called, is a 
 statement in concise form of the defendant's defense to the 
 matters set up in the complaint. The answer may deny the 
 claim of the plaintiff, or it may admit it and set up other facts 
 by way of counterclaim or set-off. 
 
 To illustrate, the plaintiff may sue for $ioo, which he alleges 
 in his complaint the defendant owes him for the purchase price 
 of a boat sold by plaintiff to defendant. The defendant in his 
 answer may allege that he did not purchase the boat, but 
 merely took it to keep for its use, and this would be a denial. 
 Again, he may admit purchasing the boat for $ioo, but allege 
 that he worked for defendant three months at $50 per month, 
 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 363 
 
 and that his wages had not been paid, and ask that this be an 
 offset against the price of the boat, and that he, the defendant, 
 be given a judgment for the balance of $50. This defense con- 
 stitutes a counterclaim or set-off. 
 
 Reply. — When a counterclaim is alleged, new facts are 
 brought up and it is necessary for the plaintiff, if he wishes 
 to deny them, to make a reply, or replication, which is really the 
 plaintiff's reply or answer to the new facts set forth by the 
 defendant. 
 
 Demurrer. — The defendant may consider that the facts set 
 up in the plaintiff's complaint, even if true, do not constitute a 
 sufficient case in law against him, and for this reason it does not 
 require that a defense be interposed, therefore he demurs to the 
 plaintiff's complaint. By demurring he in effect says, '^Admitting 
 that all the plaintiff sets forth in his complaint is true, still he is 
 not entitled to recover." The question on the demurrer must be 
 argued before the judge, and if the demurrer is sustained, the 
 plaintiff must correct or amend his complaint or he fails in his 
 action. If the demurrer is overruled, the defendant must answer 
 or the case will go against him. A demurrer may also be inter- 
 posed to an answer or a reply in the same manner as to the 
 complaint. 
 
 Trial. — After the pleadings are served the case comes to 
 trial. A trial is held before the court, consisting of the judge 
 alone in some cases and in others of a judge and a jury. A 
 jury is a body of men, usually twelve, who are brought together 
 to hear a case and sworn to decide the same according to the 
 evidence brought before them 
 
 Questions of Law or of Fact. — Questions which give rise to a 
 trial may be questions of law or questions of fact. In the former 
 the facts of the case are admitted, and the question to be decided 
 is the application of the law to these facts. This is a question 
 for the court and is tried without a jury. A question of fact 
 arises when the testimony of the witnesses differs and the true 
 state of facts remains to be determined. Questions of fact are 
 generally tried before a jury. Every criminal case may be tried 
 before a jury if the defendant demands a jury trial. As a 
 rule, an equity case is tried before the judge without a jury. 
 
364 COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION 
 
 All cases involving simply a question of law are tried before a 
 judge without a jury. It may be said that the law is to be 
 decided by the judge, and the facts by the jury. The jurors 
 are. sworn to determine the case according to the evidence. 
 
 Evidence. — The evidence consists of the testimony of per- 
 sons who know something about the facts and are sworn to 
 tell the truth. These persons are known as witnesses. Written 
 documents and papers pertaining to the case are also admitted 
 as evidence. 
 
 Subpoena. — In order to procure the attendance of the wit- 
 nesses at the trial of a case the court issues an order, called a 
 subpoena, commanding them to appear at a certain time to give 
 evidence in the case, and in default of their appearance they are 
 subject to a fine for contempt of court. Refusal to testify when 
 called as a witness is also contempt of court. 
 
 Deposition. — When a necessary witness is outside of the 
 state, or, in the justice court, outside of the county or an adjoin- 
 ing county, it is not within the power of the court to compel 
 his attendance, therefore statutes have been passed allowing his 
 testimony to be taken in a certain prescribed way before a 
 notary public or other officer, who reduces the testimony to 
 writing and returns it to the court. The opposing party must 
 have notice of the time and place of the taking of the deposi- 
 tion and also an opportunity to question the witness. 
 
 Lawyers. — The case for both the plaintiff and the defendant 
 is conducted by officers of the court known as lawyers. The 
 lawyer prepares the pleadings for his side of the case, presents 
 the case to the court, and questions the witnesses. In some courts 
 a party may conduct his own case. 
 
 Verdict. — After the jury has heard the witnesses for plaintiff 
 and defendant, it weighs the evidence on both sides of the ques- 
 tion and arrives at a decision as to the party in the right. This 
 decision is called the verdict. In order to render a verdict the 
 jurors must all agree. If, after a reasonable time, they have 
 failed to agree, they are dismissed, and a new trial is held before 
 another jury. 
 
 Judgment. — The verdict of a jury is but a determination of 
 the facts of a case. It is for the judge to give the judgment, 
 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 365 
 
 which is the official decision of the court upon the respective 
 rights and claims of the parties to the action. Thus in a suit for 
 damages against a taxicab company for a collision with plaintiff's 
 automobile, the jury might find that the plaintiff ought to recover 
 $ioo"from the defendant, and bring in its verdict to that effect. 
 Upon this verdict the judge decrees that tjie defendant shall 
 pay this amount to the plaintiff and so gives the judgment of 
 the court to the plaintiff for $100 and costs. The costs are 
 an allowance given to the successful party to compensate him 
 for his expenses in conducting the case. In a criminal matter 
 the jury finds the defendant guilty or not guilty and the judge 
 pronounces the penalty or punishment, or discharges the de- 
 fendant. 
 
 Execution. — After the judgment of the court has been ren- 
 dered, the party against whom the damages are adjudged may 
 not voluntarily pay them. In such an event, the law provides 
 a method of procedure called an execution, which is a command 
 issued by the court to one of its officers, either a sheriff, consta- 
 ble, or marshal, authorizing and requiring him to collect the 
 amount named as damages, and if not paid, to take certain prop- 
 erty of the person against whom the judgment is given, sell it, 
 and apply the proceeds upon the judgment. 
 
 Levy and Sale. — The taking of the property under the au- 
 thority of the execution is called a levy. The property, after 
 being levied upon, is advertised by the officer and sold at public 
 sale to the highest bidder. 
 
 Exemption. — The sheriff or officer can levy upon any prop- 
 erty owned by the judgment debtor except certain articles which 
 he is allowed by law to claim as exempt from execution and sale. 
 The exemptions differ in the different states and are generally 
 more liberal to a married man or one who supports a family, 
 than to a single man. The exemptions ordinarily consist of 
 clothing, household articles of a certain value, etc. 
 
 New TriaL — After the judgment has been given, the unsuc- 
 cessful party may within a certain time move for a new trial, 
 either for the reason that he has discovered some new evidence, 
 or because of some error of the judge in the first trial. If the 
 judge can be convinced that, during the trial, he has made a 
 
366 COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION 
 
 material error or that the defeated party really has discovered 
 new evidence that is material to his case, the judge may, at his 
 discretion, order a new trial. If a new trial is denied, the de- 
 feated party has no recourse but to pay the judgment or take 
 an appeal. 
 
 Appeal. — The party dissatisfied with the judgment of the 
 trial court may take an appeal to a higher court by fulfilling cer- 
 tain conditions, which usually consist in giving an undertaking 
 to pay the costs if the decision of the trial court is affirmed. 
 
 The appeal is generally on questions of law alone, the deci- 
 sion of the trial court on questions of fact being final. The 
 appellate court hears the arguments of the lawyers on each side, 
 and it may then affirm the decision of the trial court, or it may 
 reverse it and send the case back for a new trial. 
 
 When the case has been taken to the highest appellate court 
 to which a case of its kind can be carried, and this last court 
 affirms the judgment of the trial court, the case is finally deter- 
 mined. 
 
 Supplementary Proceedings. — In case the sheriff or other 
 officer intrusted with the execution is unable to collect the money 
 or find property sufficient to satisfy it, he may return the execu- 
 tion with his certificate that it is unsatisfied. The party who 
 obtained the judgment, and who is called the judgment creditor, 
 may then apply to the judge for an order to examine the judg- 
 ment debtor in reference to his property. This order of the 
 judge requires the judgment debtor to appear before a referee 
 appointed by the court and answer questions which may be 
 asked him in reference to his property. The referee also has 
 power to subpoena other witnesses and to adjourn the proceed- 
 ings from time to time. When the examination is completed 
 the referee reports the evidence to the judge who appointed him, 
 and if it is found that the judgment debtor has any property 
 which is not exempt, he is ordered to turn it over to the proper 
 officer. 
 
 Replevin. — This is an action brought to recover the posses- 
 sion of certain articles of personal property which have been 
 wrongfully taken, or, if rightfully taken, are being wrongfully 
 withheld. By giving a bond, the plaintiff can have the property 
 
COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION 367 
 
 taken from the defendant and held in the custody of an officer 
 until the action is determined. In this action their right to the 
 possession of the goods is the question in dispute. 
 
 Attachment. — In certain cases the court will issue a writ of 
 attachment, which is an order to the sheriff or other officers to 
 seize certain property of the defendant and hold it as security 
 for any judgment which may be obtained. This writ is used 
 principally against absconding, concealed, or fraudulent debtors, 
 but in some states is issued as a matter of course at the com- 
 mencement of every action. It is used also when the defendant 
 does not reside within the state, but the goods attached are 
 within it. In such a case the court gets jurisdiction of the 
 property, which it may dispose of to satisfy a judgment there- 
 after obtained in the action. 
 
 Garnishment. — In some states there is a provision in the law 
 by which a person owing money to the defendant may be brought 
 into the suit and ordered not to pay the money over to the 
 defendant, and he may also be ordered to pay it into court. This 
 procedure is frequently employed when the third party owes 
 wages to the defendant, as by garnishment proceedings he will 
 be compelled to pay over a part of the wages to the court, or 
 retain it to apply on any judgment the plaintiff may obtain. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 1 . (a) Define an action, (b) Name the parties in an action. 
 
 2. What is a summons and how must it be served? 
 
 3. What are the pleadings in an action? 
 
 4. What is (a) the complaint? {b) the reply? (c) a demurrer? 
 
 5. If the demurrer is sustained, what effect does it have on the action? 
 
 6. Before whom is (a) a question of law tried? (b) a question of fact? 
 
 7. Before whom is (a) a criminal case tried? (b) an equity case? 
 
 8. What is (a) a subpoena? (6) a deposition? 
 
 9. What is (a) the verdict in a case? (6) the judgment? 
 
 10. Define execution, levy, and sale. 
 
 11. When and how may a new trial be had? 
 
 12. What is an appeal, and upon what questions is it taken? 
 
 13. Describe supplementary proceedings. 
 
 14. What is a replevin action? 
 
 15. Define (a) attachment, (b) garnishment. 
 
TEST CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 Give the decision and the principle or principles of law involved in each case. 
 
 1. Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden, loi N. Y. 387. — The plain- 
 tiffs in this case entered into a contract with the defendant wherein it was 
 agreed that they, the plaintiffs, should alter boilers belonging to the defend- 
 ant and perform all the work connected with the repair of these boilers, and 
 complete the job by the loth of May following. It was further agreed that 
 the work should be done in such a manner as to satisfy the defendant that 
 the boilers as changed were a success and that they would not leak under a 
 pressure of steam. The work was done and the boilers were turned over to 
 the defendant within the stated time. They were accepted and used by the 
 defendant. Later, however, upon being requested to make payment, the 
 defendant said the boilers were not satisfactory and refused to pay. Experts 
 were called in, and after a thorough examination by them, the boilers were 
 pronounced satisfactory in every way. 
 
 2. Morton v. Steward, 5 Brad well (111.) 533, was an action on a note 
 given by an infant, and it was proved that the consideration was necessaries 
 furnished the infant. The amount of the note showed that an excessive price 
 had been charged for the necessaries. 
 
 3. In Eaton v. Avery, 83 N. Y. 31, defendant made false representa- 
 tions to a mercantile agency as to the financial responsibility of his firm, 
 which asked for credit of plaintiff. Plaintiff went to the mercantile agency 
 and obtained the information given by the defendant, and relying on this, 
 he delivered goods to the firm on credit. This action was brought to set 
 aside the contract of sale and recover the goods. 
 
 4. In Flanagan v. Kilcome, 58 N. H. 443, defendant promised to pay 
 plaintiff a certain sum if he would drop a lawsuit which he had com- 
 menced against her. This was done, but defendant did not pay the agreed 
 sum and suit was brought to recover it. 
 
 5. In Anderson v. May, 50 Minn. 280, plaintiff contracted in March to 
 raise and deliver to defendant 591 bushels of beans. Plaintiff delivered only 
 152 bushels because most of his crop was destroyed by early and unusual 
 frost. Defendant refused to accept or to pay for only 152 bushels. 
 
 6. Wood V. Steele, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 80, was an action on a promissory note 
 dated October 11, 1858, and made by Steele and Newson, payable to their 
 own order one year from date. It was indorsed by them to Wood, the 
 
 368 
 
TEST CASE PROBLEMS 369 
 
 plaintiff. " September " had been struck out and ''October" put in as the 
 date. The change was made after Steele had signed the note as surety and 
 without his knowledge or consent. 
 
 7. Bird V. Munroe, 66 Maine 337, was a case in which a verbal contract 
 was made. The contract belonged to the class required by the Statute of 
 Frauds to be in writing. It was broken, and the parties afterward entered 
 into a written agreement containing the terms of the oral contract. After 
 the writing was signed, an action was brought for breach of the contract 
 which occurred before the written agreement was executed. 
 
 8. In Oddy v. James, 48 N. Y. 685, about the middle of March the 
 parties entered into an oral agreement by which the defendant employed 
 plaintiff to superintend his cement works for one year from April i next. 
 Plaintiff worked until August 3, when defendant discharged him. Plaintiff 
 sued and defendant set up that the agreement was void under the Statute of 
 Frauds. 
 
 9. In Owen v. Hall, 70 Md. 97, at the maturity of a joint promissory 
 note a joint renewal note was given by the three makers. After Hall had 
 signed as maker, the other two makers added the words "with interest" 
 to the note without Hall's knowledge or consent. 
 
 10. White V. Corlies, 46 N. Y. 467. — Corlies got an estimate for fitting 
 up his offices from White, who was a builder. Then Corlies wrote White a 
 letter in which he said: "Upon an agreement to finish fitting up of offices at 
 57 Broadway in two weeks from date, you can commence at once." White 
 made no reply, but on the same day purchased lumber and made other 
 preparations to begin the job. On the following day he received a note from 
 Corlies in which Corlies countermanded his earlier letter. White brought 
 suit against Corlies for damages. 
 
 11. Drake v. Seaman, 97 N. Y. 230. — The plaintiff was engaged by the 
 defendant to act as salesman for a period of three years. The defendant gave 
 the plaintiff the following memorandum of the contract: "The under- 
 standing with Mr. Drake is as follows: $2000 for the first year; $2500 for 
 the second year sure, and, provided the increased sales will warrant it, he is 
 to have $3000." As the defendant refused to carry out the arrangement, 
 the plaintiff sued for breach of contract. Seaman's defense was the Statute 
 of Frauds. 
 
 12. Dixon V. Wilmington Savings & Trust Co., 115 N. C. 274; 20 S. E. 
 Rep. 464. — The plaintiff signed a paper, which was a mortgage on her land, 
 without reading it. She did this because she relied on Davis, her agent, who 
 told her that the paper amounted to nothing. The mortgage was made out 
 to the defendant, who took it in good faith and paid value for it. The money 
 
370 TEST CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 was obtained by the agent but was not turned over to the plaintiff. The 
 plaintiff brought this action to have the mortgage canceled on the ground 
 of mistake and fraud. 
 
 13. Lewis V. Jewell, 151 Mass. 345; 24 N. E. Rep. 52. — This was an 
 action based on fraudulent representations alleged to have been made by 
 the defendant in selling carpet. The carpet was represented to contain 900 
 yards, whereas it contained only 595 yards. The carpet at the time of the 
 sale covered four floors, a hall, and a stairway in a dwelling house. The 
 yardage of the carpet was an element in fixing its value. 
 
 14. Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633. — Plaintiff brought an action to be 
 reimbursed for damages which he had been obliged to pay because of certain 
 acts performed by him as agent for the defendant in dispossessing a third 
 party of lands claimed by the defendant, and which plaintiff had reason to 
 believe belonged to defendant. Is the plaintiff entitled to recover, and if so, 
 on what ground? 
 
 15. Walker v. Osgood, 98 Mass. 348. — This was an action by a real 
 estate agent for commissions. Defendant had employed plaintiff to sell or 
 trade his farm and the agent effected an exchange and made an agreement 
 with the third party that he was to receive from him a commission. Should 
 the plaintiff be allowed to recover his commissions from the defendant? 
 What would be his rights against the third party? 
 
 16. New York Tel. Co. v. Barnes, 85 N. Y. Supp. 327. — The defendant 
 made Purdy the general manager of his drug store. An agreement pro- 
 vided that Purdy should buy goods for the store only for cash and that he 
 should not run up any account for any goods or supplies of any kind what- 
 ever. Purdy made a contract with the plaintiff for telephone service. 
 The telephone company sued the defendant on this contract made by Purdy. 
 
 17. Power V. First National Bank, 6 Mont. 251; 12 Pac. Rep. 597. — 
 This action was brought to recover the amount of a bill of exchange which 
 had been deposited by the plaintiff with the defendant bank for collection. 
 The defendant, in the usual course of business, sent the bill of exchange to its 
 correspondent. The correspondent collected the draft but negligently 
 failed to remit the proceeds and it subsequently went into the hands of a 
 receiver. 
 
 18. Gaynor v. Jonas, 104 App. Div. (N. Y.) 35. — The plaintiff made a 
 contract with the defendant whereby the defendant agreed to employ the 
 plaintiff for three months at $16 a week. After one month the plaintiff was 
 discharged because she had been sick and away from business for one and 
 one half days. She sued for her salary for the balance of the employment 
 period, less what she had actually earned during that time. 
 
TEST CASE PROBLEMS 371 
 
 19. In Haynes v. Aldrich, 133 N. Y. 287, defendant leased certain 
 premises for a year, the term expiring May i. Before the expiration of the 
 term, defendant informed plaintiff that she did not wish to renew her lease 
 for another year. May i was a holiday, and possession was retained until 
 May 4, the excuse being the difficulty to get trucks to move defendant, also 
 that on the third of May one of the boarders was ill. On the afternoon of 
 the fourth of May the keys were tendered plaintiff and refused. Under these 
 circumstances what are the landlord's rights? 
 
 20. Kitsen v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Monroe (Ky.) 72. — In this tase the 
 defendant, Hildebrand, kept a boardmg house and occasionally entertained 
 transients. The plaintiff was a regular boarder. The plaintiff's trunk was 
 broken into and a large sum of money stolen. This action was brought to 
 hold Hildebrand liable as an innkeeper. 
 
 21. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Smith, 73 111. 360. — Smith purchased a 
 ticket on the Palace Car Company's car. While he was asleep on his trip, 
 his money was taken from his vest pocket. This action was brought against 
 the company as innkeepers. 
 
 22. Rockwell V. Proctor, 39 Ga. 105. — Defendant was an innkeeper, 
 and plaintiff went to his hotel and, while there, gave his coat to a negro who 
 was in charge of the check room. The coat was lost and this action was 
 brought to recover its value. 
 
 23. Dexter v. Syracuse Railroad Co., 42 N. Y. 326. — Plaintiff was a 
 passenger on the defendant road, and his trunk was lost while being trans- 
 ported by said road. The trunk contained, besides his wearing apparel, 
 material for two dresses for his wife, and for a dress for the landlady. 
 This action was brought to recover for the entire contents of the trunk. 
 
 24. Russel V. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. (Eng.) 514. — Langstaffe indorsed 
 his name upon the back of certain checks, blank as to amount, date, and 
 time of payment. The checks were filled in by Galley, the person to whom 
 Langstaffe gave them, with amounts, dates, and time of payment different 
 from those authorized, and were negotiated to Russel, a holder in due 
 course. Langstaffe refused to pay on the ground that the instruments had 
 been improperly filled out. 
 
 25. Shaw V. Smith, 150 Mass. 166. — Eugene Bridgeman made an 
 instrument in writing July 19, 1873, which read as follows: "For value 
 received, I promise to pay F. B. Bridgeman's estate or order $126 on demand 
 with interest annually." F. B. Bridgeman died and the plaintiff in this case 
 was appointed administrator of his estate. This action was brought to 
 recover on the instrument as a negotiable note. Does the instrument contain 
 all the essentials required to make it negotiable? 
 
372 TEST CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 26. Mathews & Co. v. Mattress Co., 87 Iowa, 246. — This action was 
 brought on a promissory note against the Dubuque Mattress Company and 
 John Kapp. The note read, "We promise to pay," and was signed, "Du- 
 buque Mattress Company, John Kapp, Pt." It was shown that the "Pt." 
 was an abbreviation used for president. Was Kapp personally liable on this 
 instrument? 
 
 27. Simpson v. Turney, 5 Humph (Tenn.) 419. — A certain bank was 
 the holder of a promissory note payable at said bank, made by James H. 
 Jenkins and Anthony Debrell, and indorsed as follows: "A. Debrell, S. 
 Turney, John W. Simpson." Turney lived within one mile of the bank. The 
 note matured on February ist and was protested on that day. On Feb- 
 ruary 3d notice was sent to Turney from the bank. Simpson, the next 
 indorser after Turney, had been notified of the failure of the maker to pay 
 the note but gave no notice to Turney, the prior indorser. Simpson, after 
 paying the note, brought action against Turney to recover the amount paid. 
 
 28. Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N. Y. 40; 27 Am. Rep. 7. — Rosa had made a 
 contract with Spalding, who was the proprietor of a theater, to furnish the 
 "Wachtel Opera Troupe" for a certain number of performances. Wachtel, 
 from whom the company took its name, was well known and was the chief 
 attraction and inducement for Spalding to make the contract. Wachtel 
 became ill and could not sing; because of this Rosa did not carry out the 
 contract. Spalding sued for damages for the alleged breach of contract. 
 
 29. Labaree Co. v. Crossman, 100 App. Div. (N. Y.) 499. — The 
 defendant sold a certain cargo of coffee to the plaintiff to be delivered in 
 New York at a certain time. Because the cargo came from an infected port, 
 the Board of Health at New York refused to allow it to be landed. The 
 plaintiff sued for damages for nondelivery. 
 
 30. Equitable Gas Light Co. v. Baltimore Coal Tar & Mfg. Co., 63 
 Md. 285. — The defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff all the coal tar 
 manufactured by it during a certam period. The defendant refused to carry 
 out the agreement and the plaintiff filed a bill for specific performance. It 
 was proved on the trial that coal tar was indispensable to the plaintiff's 
 business, that the plaintiff could not obtain the supply from any other 
 parties in Baltimore, and that it would be subjected to great additional 
 expense in trying to get the coal tar from distant cities, 
 
 31. Hammer v: Schoenfelder, 47 Wis. 455; 2 N. W. 1129. — The plain- 
 tiff, who was a butcher, had a contract with the defendant, whereby the 
 defendant was to furnish him with whatever ice he might require for his ice- 
 box for the season. The defendant had supplied the plaintiff with ice the 
 previous season and knew for what purpose the plaintiff needed the ice. In 
 
TEST CASE PROBLEMS 373 
 
 July the defendant stopped supplying ice and refused to continue the con- 
 tract. As a result the plaintiff lost a considerable quantity of fresh meat and 
 suit was brought for the value of the meat spoiled. What damages was the 
 plaintiff entitled to? 
 
 32. Clark V. Marsiglia, i Denio (N. Y.) 317. — This was an action for 
 work, labor, and material. The defendant had given to the plaintiff a num- 
 ber of paintings to be cleaned and repaired at a certain specified price. 
 After the plaintiff had started the work, the defendant directed him to stop, • 
 but the plaintiff insisted on going on and over the defendant's objection 
 finished the job, and then brought action to recover for the whole. 
 
 33. Terry v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 520. — The plaintiff's assignor had paid 
 the defendant for a quantity of lumber which was in the defendant's lumber- 
 yard. The lumber had been selected, set aside, and paid for; and the bill 
 of sale had been given. On the bill of sale there was indorsed a memorandum 
 that the lumber was "to be delivered to the cars free of charge." Before 
 being delivered to the railroad station, the lumber was destroyed by fire. 
 The plaintiff sued for the return of the price. 
 
 34. Garr Stock Co. v. Halverson, 128 Iowa 603; 105 N. W. Rep. 108. — 
 In this case the salesman, in selling a second-hand machine, stated that it was 
 practically as good as new, that it would steam well, and that it was of suffi- 
 cient power to drive the defendant's threshing machine. The engine turned 
 out to be defective and did not work well. When sued for the price, the 
 defendant set up breach of warranty. 
 
 35. Draper v. Wood, 112 Mass. 315. — A promissory note was made by 
 George A. Wood and H. S Higgins and read, " For value received, I promise 
 to pay L. L. Draper, or order, $1000 on demand, with interest." Higgins 
 refused to pay the instrument on the ground that Wood, without Higgins's 
 knowledge, changed "I" to "We" and added the words, "at 12%." It was 
 proved that Wood made the changes in good faith but without consulting 
 Higgins. Draper brings this action against both Wood and Higgins. 
 
 36. Richardson v. Carpenter, 46 N. Y. 660. — The instrument in this 
 case was in part as follows: "Please pay A or order $500 for value received 
 out of the proceeds of the claim against the Peabody Estate now in your 
 hands for collection when the same shall have been collected by you." Was 
 this a negotiable instrument? Why? 
 
 37. West River Bank v. Taylor, 34 N, Y. 128. — This case involved a 
 bill of exchange containing a number of indorsements. When the bill was 
 dishonored, notice was sent to the last indorser, who in turn sent notice to 
 the preceding indorser, and so on down the line. Ultimately the holder 
 sued the first indorser who defended on the ground that he did not receive 
 
374 TEST CASE PROBLEMS 
 
 notice of dishonor from the holder, although of course he had received notice 
 from his indorsee. 
 
 38. Huber v. Manchester Fire Assurance Co., 92 Hun (N. Y.), 223. — 
 The plaintiff insured the furniture in her house for $1500. The policy con- 
 tained a provision that the entire policy should be void if the building 
 described was or became vacant or unoccupied and so remained for ten days. 
 On the 24th of August, the plaintiff went away on a visit, intending to be 
 away five or six weeks. Before she left, she arranged to have the house 
 papered and painted, and a friend of hers went to the house frequently to 
 see how things were. The house and furniture burned on September i8th, 
 and the plaintiff brought suit on her policy. 
 
 39. Paul V. Armenia Insurance Co., 91 Pa. State 520. — Plaintiff took 
 out insurance with the defendant company, and in the application blank 
 which he filled out one of the questions was, ''What is the distance, occu- 
 pation, and material of all buildings within 150 feet?" Paul made no answer 
 to this question and the company issued the policy without insisting 
 upon the answer. This action was brought to recover on the policy. 
 
 40. Babcock v. Montgomery Insurance Co., 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 637. — 
 Plaintiff had his property insured under a policy which provided that the 
 insurer would be liable for "fire by lightning." It was proved that lightning 
 struck the building and so shattered it as to cause a heavy loss. No ignition 
 occurred. This action was brought to recover on the policy. 
 
 41. Cushmari v. Life Insurance Co., 63 N. Y. 404. — The insurance 
 policy in this case states that the representations made by the insured in his 
 application were made a part of the contract, and provided that if they were 
 untrue the policy would be void. The applicant stated that he had never 
 been afflicted with a certain disease. It was shown that he had twice been 
 ill with this disease before the policy was issued. What effect did this 
 statement have upon the policy? 
 
 42. Day V. Elmore, 4 Wis. 190. — Basset gave his promissory note to 
 Day, and Elmore signed a guaranty reading as follows: "I guarantee the 
 collection of the within note for value received." The note was not paid by 
 Bassett at maturity and Day took no proceeding to collect it for over two 
 years thereafter. When he did proceed against Bassett, he could recover 
 nothing and brought suit on the guaranty. 
 
 43. Sibley v. Stull, 15 N. J. Law 332. — Hood made his bond to StuU in 
 the sum of $1100 for a good consideration. Stull assigned the bond to Sibley 
 and for consideration guaranteed the payment of all sums to become due on 
 the bond, when they became due, and for the payment thereof by the maker 
 of the bond. Hood did not pay, and Sibley sued Stull on his guaranty with- 
 
TEST CASE PROBLEMS 375 
 
 out giving him any notice of nonpayment, or demanding payment from 
 Hood. Can Sibley recover? 
 
 44. Lindsey v. Stranahan, 129 Pa. State 635. — Stranahan had carried 
 on business alone prior to 1876, when he sold a half interest in his business 
 to J. K. Lindsey. After the new firm was formed, entire management and 
 control of the business was left to Lindsey. When settlement by Stranahan 
 and Lindsey was made, Lindsey claimed compensation for managing the 
 business. No express agreement was made regarding this matter. 
 
 45. Drake v. Thyng, 37 Ark. 228. — Drake and Thyng were partners 
 in the brickmaking business. While Drake was away, Thyng sold the stock 
 and plant to a third party for an inadequate sum. Drake brought this action 
 to set aside the sale. 
 
 46. Burchinell v. Koon, 8 Colo. App. 463; 46 Pac. Rep. 932. — In this 
 case, the surviving member of a partnership obtained a loan, to secure which 
 he gave a mortgage on firm property. The proceeds of the loan were used to 
 pay firm debts. Did the surviving partner have power to give this mort- 
 gage? 
 
 47. Foley V. Manufacturers & Builders Fire Ins. Co., 152 N. Y. 131. — 
 In this case the question arose as to whether the plaintiffs had an insurable 
 interest in certain buildings being erected on land owned by them. At the 
 time of the fire the buildings were incomplete; they were being erected under 
 a contract binding the contractors to furnish the materials and complete the 
 buildings for a sum to be paid on their completion. 
 
 48. Getchell ?;. Biddeford Savings Bank, 94 Maine 452; 47 Atl. Rep. 
 895. — A man deposited his own money in a savings bank in his wife's 
 name, and never delivered the bankbook to her. There was no evidence 
 that the wife ever saw the bankbook or knew of the deposits. To whom 
 did the money belong? 
 
 49. Dorsey v. Moore, 100 N. C. 41. — Defendant was tenant for her life 
 of a tract of land and plaintiff was the remainderman. Defendant sold stand- 
 ing timber to Bennett and permitted him to cut and remove it. Plaintiff 
 sued for damage for waste. 
 
 50. Kane v. Cortesy, 100 N. Y. 132. — The plaintiff was the owner of a 
 mortgage which was guaranteed by the defendant. When the time for the 
 payment of the mortgage fell due, the plaintiff granted an extension of time 
 to the mortgagor and the latter gave to the plaintiff a chattel mortgage on 
 certain personal property as additional security. When the defendant was 
 sued on the guaranty he claimed that the extension of time for paying the 
 mortgage released him from his obligation under the guaranty. 
 
IMPORTANT STATUTES 
 
 Interstate Commerce. — The Constitution of the United States declares 
 that the Congress shall have power "to regulate commerce with foreign 
 nations, and among the several States." It is evidently for the benefit of 
 the country as a whole that commerce between the states, called interstate 
 commerce, should be regulated by the federal government, rather than be 
 subjected to varying and inconsistent regulation by the different states. In 
 accordance with the power granted by the Constitution, Congress has 
 adopted several statutes which have a direct bearing on commercial life 
 because of their regulation of interstate commerce. 
 
 Interstate Commerce Act. — The most important of these regulatory 
 statutes is the Interstate Commerce Act. By this Act was created the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission, now composed of eleven commissioners sitting 
 at Washington, D. C. This Commission is given wide powers and is 
 charged with the execution of the provisions of the act. 
 
 The act, as amended at various dates, applies to common carriers en- 
 gaged in the transportation of passengers or property from one state to 
 another or to foreign countries, including pipe lines, telephone, telegraph 
 and cable companies, railroads, express and sleeping car companies, etc. 
 
 The service and charges of common carriers must be just and reasonable 
 under the circumstances. There can be no greater charge for a shorter than 
 for a longer distance over the same line in the same direction, the shorter 
 being included within the longer distance, except that such charges may be 
 authorized by the Commission in special cases. All rates must be published, 
 must be filed with the Commission, and kept open to public inspection. The 
 Commission has power to revise rates and divisions of rates when unreason- 
 able, to review all newly established rates, and, of its own motion, to estab- 
 lish new joint through routes and rates when necessary. Where there are 
 two or more established through routes, the shipper has the right to desig- 
 nate in writing by which of such routes his goods shall be shipped. 
 
 All property for transportation must fee classified, and rates, regulations, 
 and practices established on the basis of such classification. It is unlawful 
 for any railroad company to transport any commodity, other than timber 
 and its manufactured products, manufactured, mined, or produced by it or 
 which it owns or in which it has any interest, except such as may be intended 
 for its use in the conduct of its business as a common carrier. The purpose 
 of this provision was to attack the ownership of coal mines and lands by the 
 railroad companies, by reason of which they had too great an influence on 
 coal production and distribution. 
 
 This act contains many provisions to insure equal treatment for all 
 persons using the railroads. The issuance of free passes is forbidden, except 
 
 376 
 
CONTROL OF COMMERCE 377 
 
 to officers and employees cf the issuing carrier or other ccmmon carriers. It 
 is unlawful to discriminate unjustly between one shipper and another or be- 
 tween one passenger and another. It is unjust discrimination if the carrier, 
 by any special rate, rebate, or other device, charges or receives a greater or 
 less compensation from any person than it receives from any other person 
 for doing like service under similar circumstances and conditions. Common 
 carriers are forbidden to disclose any information about property shipped or 
 routes of shipment, which might be used to the detriment or prejudice of a 
 shipper or consignee, or might improperly disclose his business transactions 
 to a competitor. 
 
 Removal or lessening of competition between carriers by agreements for 
 pooling freights, or by dividing the earnings of such carriers, is expressly for- 
 bidden. While on its face this provision would appear to keep down freight 
 rates and so benefit the public, its merit is doubtful. Under the federal 
 administration of the railroads during the World War, the freight, earnings, 
 expenses, and everything were pooled, in order to secure the greatest possible 
 economy and efficiency. 
 
 The Commission has authority to inquire into .the management of the 
 business of all common carriers and to prescribe a uniform system of account- 
 ing. Annual reports are required from every carrier, showing in consider- 
 able detail all of its business during the year, and these enable the Com- 
 mission to maintain careful supervision over the entire transportation of the 
 country. 
 
 The Commission also investigates, either of its own motion or on com- 
 plaints, anything done or omitted to be done in contravention of the act. 
 In such investigations the Commission acts as a court, summons witnesses, 
 tries issues of fact, grants orders, and may award damages if the facts warrant. 
 
 Elkins Act. — This act was passed to give added force to the provisions 
 •of the Interstate Commerce Act in respect to giving or receiving rebates. 
 It provides that any person or corporation giving or receiving any concession 
 in respect to the transportation of property in interstate commerce, whereby 
 such property by any device whatever is transported at a less rate than the 
 published tariff, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of 
 not less than $1000, or more than $20,000, and individuals may be impris- 
 oned. 
 
 Bills of Lading Act. — This act makes uniform the law and practice of 
 issuing bills of lading for interstate commerce. It defines the "straight bill" 
 and the "order bill" and fixes the law as to negotiation of bills of lading, the 
 respective rights and duties of carriers and shippers as to delivery of goods, 
 damage to goods, etc. The subject is not of sufficient general importance to 
 warrant a detailed synopsis of the statute, but it should be consulted by any 
 person regularly engaged in interstate shipment of goods. 
 
 Anti-Trust Laws. — To prevent undue advancement of prices and 
 stiffing of competition Congress has passed laws "to protect trade and com- 
 merce against unlawful restraint and monopolies." These laws have given 
 
378 IMPORTANT STATUTES 
 
 rise to some of the most important and bitterly contested litigation in our 
 history. 
 
 Sherman Anti-Trust Act. — This act was the first of the so-called "anti- 
 trust laws" and was adopted in 1890. It provides that "every contract, 
 combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
 trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby 
 declared to be illegal" and every person making such contract or engaging 
 in such combination or conspiracy is guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable 
 by fine or imprisonment. Also every person who shall monopolize, or con- 
 spire or combine to monopolize, any part of such trade or commerce is 
 guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person injured in his business or property 
 by reason of anything forbidden by the act, may sue the offending person or 
 corporation therefor, and recover threefold the damages sustained by him. 
 
 Clayton Act. — This act was adopted in 19 14 "to supplement existing 
 laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies," and is much more far- 
 reaching and detailed in its provisions. 
 
 Under the act it is unlawful to discriminate in price between different 
 purchasers of commodities, where the effect of such discrimination might be 
 to substantially lessen competition or to create a monopoly; but there may 
 be discrimination on account of grade, quantity, or quality, or to allow for 
 differences in transportation or selling cost, or in different communities to 
 meet competition; and any seller of goods may select his own customers in 
 bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade. It is unlawful to sell or 
 lease goods, or to fix a price therefor or allow a discount from such price, on 
 condition that the purchaser or lessee shall not deal in goods of a competitor 
 of the seUer, where the effect might be to substantially lessen competition or 
 tend to create a monopoly. Threefold damages may be recovered as under 
 the Sherman Act. 
 
 The labor of a human being is expressly declared not to be a commodity 
 or an article of commerce, and labor unions and similar organizations shall 
 not be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracy in restraint 
 of trade under the anti-trust laws. 
 
 The act also forbids the acquisition by one corporation of all or part of 
 the stock of one or more separate corporations, whereby competition be- 
 tween them may be lessened or commerce restrained or a monopoly created. 
 This does not forbid the formation of subsidiary corporations to carry on the 
 legitimate business, or extensions thereof, of the parent corporation. 
 
 "Interlocking directorates" are also prohibited, by provisions forbidding 
 a person to be a director, officer, or employee of more than one bank of a cer- 
 tain kind, or a director of more than one corporation engaged in commerce, 
 having a capital, surplus, and undivided profits of more than $1,000,000 if 
 such corporations have been competitors, so that the lessening of competi- 
 tion between them by agreement would be a violation of the anti-trust laws. 
 
 Trade Commission Act. — This act was passed in 19 14 for the purpose 
 of preventing unfair competition in interstate and foreign commerce, and 
 
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY 379 
 
 generally to assist the commerce of the country by information and other- 
 wise. 
 
 The act creates a Federal Trade Commission, composed of five com- 
 missioners, with its principal office in Washington. The Commission has 
 power to compile information concerning, and to investigate the business 
 practices and management of, any corporation engaged in commerce, except 
 banks and common carriers, and its relations to other corporations and 
 persons; to require from such corporations annual or special reports; to 
 investigate the manner in which decrees of the courts in suits for violation 
 of the anti-trust laws are being carried out; to investigate and report on 
 alleged violations of such laws; to investigate and make recommendations 
 for the readjustment of the business of any corporation alleged to be violat- 
 ing such laws, in order that the corporation may maintain its organization 
 and conduct its business according to law; to make public such informa- 
 tion as it may have obtained, except trade secrets, as it shall deem to the 
 public interest; to make reports to Congress and recommendations for 
 legislation; and to investigate and report upon trade conditions in and with 
 foreign countries. 
 
 The act expressly declares that unfair methods of competition in com- 
 merce are illegal, empowers the Commission to prevent such unfair methods, 
 and to that end authorizes hearings on complaints and the issuance of 
 orders to cease the unfair methods. 
 
 Employers' Liability. — Reference has been made in the chapter on 
 Insurance to the fact that an employer may be liable for damages for the 
 injury or death of his employee. In actions at common law to recover such 
 damages the employer could defend on the ground that the employee's injury 
 was caused by his own negligence (contributory negligence) or by the negli- 
 gence of another employee (fellow servant doctrine), or that the employee 
 had assumed the risk of the accident (assumption of risk). These doctrines 
 often resulted in injustice to the injured employee. In recent years a number 
 of statutes have been passed which rest on the theory that accidents to 
 employees are necessary incidents to any business, and that the injured 
 employee should be compensated for his injury without regard to technical 
 defenses. 
 
 Federal Employers' Liability Act. — This act provides that every com- 
 mon carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce shall be liable for the 
 injury or death of an employee, caused by its negligence or any defect in its 
 equipment or appliances. In any action to recover damages for such injury 
 or death, assumption of risk is not a defense, and the contributory negli- 
 gence of the employee shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be 
 diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the 
 employee. Any contract, rule, or regulation by which the carrier seeks to 
 exempt itself from liability under the act is void. 
 
 "Workmen's Compensation Laws. — A number of states have passed 
 laws providing for the payment by the employer of compensation for injury 
 
38o IMPORTANT STATUTES 
 
 or death of an employee. These laws differ somewhat in details, but their 
 general characteristics are as follows: 
 
 The laws apply to all employees engaged in certain specified employ- 
 ments, which are characterized as hazardous. These employments are classi- 
 fied, and include nearly all forms of labor in which injury is likely to occur. 
 Farm labor and domestic service are not included. 
 
 Every employer of labor engaged in one of the classified occupations is 
 liable for compensation for the death or disability of his employee from an 
 accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, 
 without regard to negligence or the cause of the accident, unless it was 
 caused by the willful intention or resulted solely from the intoxication of the 
 injured employee. With these two exceptions the injured employee is 
 absolutely entitled to compensation, regardless of its cause, if it occurred in 
 the course of his employment. 
 
 This liability of the employer is exclusive and in place of any other 
 Hability whatsoever. 
 
 The compensation to be paid is based on the wages of the employee. 
 He receives his wages for a certain number of weeks as provided in a sched- 
 ule of different injuries and disabilities, and the employer is also required to 
 furnish medical, surgical, and hospital facilities for a certain period after the 
 accident. 
 
 The employee is required to notify his employer of his claim for com- 
 pensation, and if they cannot agree on the amount to be paid, the matter is 
 referred to a commission for determination. 
 
 To secure the payment of compensation the employer is required to 
 insure the payment with an insurance company or satisfy the commission of 
 his ability to make such payments. In case of his failure so to secure the 
 payment of compensation, he is liable to a penalty, and an injured employee 
 may elect to take compensation under the law, or may sue in the courts for 
 damages, and in any such suit the fellow servant doctrine, assumption of risk, 
 and contributory negligence are not available as defenses to the employer. 
 
APPENDIX— FORMS 
 
 Form i. SHORT FORM SIMPLE CONTRACT 
 
 This agreement made the first day of May, 19 — , between J. C. Boycrs 
 and Ralph Benson: Witnesseth that it is agreed that the said Ralph Benson 
 shall serve to the best of his ability the said J. C. Boyers, as manager of 
 the branch store of the said J. C. Boyers for the period of one year from and 
 after the first day of May, 19 — , and the said J. C, Boyers agrees to pay the 
 said Ralph Benson the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars per month, 
 payable monthly on the last working day of each month during the term of 
 this contract, and it is further agreed that the said Ralph Benson shall have 
 two weeks' vacation with full pay during the month of August. 
 
 Signed in duplicate on this first day of May, 19 — . 
 
 J. C. Boyers. 
 Ralph Benson. 
 
 Form 2. FORMAL CONTRACT 
 
 This agreement made in duplicate this first day of November one 
 
 thousand nine hundred and , by and between Andrew J. Mackey of 
 
 the city of Chicago, county of Cook and state of Illinois, of the first part, and 
 Howard M. Lee of the city, county, and state aforesaid, of the second part. 
 
 Witnesseth, that the said party of the first part for and in consideration 
 of the agreement hereinafter contained, to be performed by the party of the 
 second part, agrees to and with said party to construct and finish in a good 
 workmanlike manner five delivery trucks in accordance with the plans and 
 specifications hereto attached, on or before the first day of April next. 
 And the party of the second part, in consideration thereof, agrees to pay to 
 the said party of the first part for the same the sum of ten thousand dollars, 
 lawful money of the United States, as follows: the sum of one thousand 
 dollars at the time of signing this contract, the receipt whereof is hereby 
 acknowledged, and the balance of nine thousand dollars when the five trucks 
 are completed according to the plans and specifications, and delivered 
 f. o. b. Chicago. 
 . In Witness Whereof, the parties named herein have hereunto set 
 their hands and seals the day and year first above mentioned. 
 
 Andrew J. Mackey. (L.S.) 
 
 In the presence of Howard M. Lee. (L.S.) 
 
 D. W. Warner. 
 
 State of Illinois 1 
 
 County of Cook/ 
 
 On the first day of November, one thousand nine himdred and , 
 
 before me, the subscriber, personally appeared Andrew J. Mackey and 
 
 381 
 
 ss. 
 
382 APPENDIX— FORMS 
 
 Howard M. Lee, to me personally known to be the persons described in and 
 who executed the foregoing instrument, and they severally acknowledged 
 to me that they executed the same. 
 
 John W. Dodd, 
 Notary Public for Cook County, Illinois. 
 
 Form 3. ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT— INDORSEMENT FORM 
 
 For and in consideration of One Dollar and of other good and valuable 
 considerations, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the American 
 Utility Company does hereby sell, assign, transfer, and set over to Francis E. 
 Palmer the within contract with all the rights, privileges, obligations, and 
 undertakings thereof as therein set forth. 
 
 In Witness Whereof, the American Utility Company has caused this 
 instrument to be executed by its President and its corporate seal to be 
 hereunto affixed and attested by its Secretary this 17th day of November, 
 19—. 
 
 Attest seal: American Utility Company 
 
 R. O. North, By A. W. Walters, President. 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 Form 4. BILL OF SALE 
 
 Be it known that James B. Hunter of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in 
 consideration of the sum of Five Hundred Dollars paid by William J. Allen 
 of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, 
 does hereby sell, transfer, and deliver unto the said William J. Allen, the 
 following goods and chattels viz: 
 
 (List of the articles sold should be written in this space.) 
 
 To have and to hold the said goods and chattels unto the said William J. 
 Allen, his representatives and assigns forever. And I, the said James B. 
 Hunter, do hereby covenant that I am the lawful owner of the said goods 
 and chattels, that they are free from incumbrances, that I have a good right 
 to sell them, and that I will warrant and defend the title of the same against 
 the claims and demands of all persons. 
 
 In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal in Phila- 
 delphia, Pennsylvania, this 15th day of September, 19 — . 
 
 James B. Hunter. (L.S.) 
 
 Form 5. POWER OF ATTORNEY 
 
 Know all men by these presents that I, James George, of Chicago, 
 Illinois, have made, constituted, and appointed, and by these presents do 
 make, constitute, and appoint John Forbes of Portland, Oregon, my true 
 and lawful attorney for me and in my name, place, and stead to 
 (state fully what is to be done by the attorney) ; 
 
APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL AGENT 383 
 
 giving and granting unto my said attorney full power and authority to do 
 and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary 
 to be done in and about the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as 
 I might or could do if personally present, with full power of substitution and 
 revocation, hereby ratifying and confirming all that my said attorney or 
 his substitute shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof. 
 
 In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 
 
 eleventh day of May in the year one thousand, nine hundred and . 
 
 James George. (L.S.) 
 
 Executed and delivered in the presence of: 
 Matthew Arnold. 
 
 Form 6. APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL AGENT 
 I, the undersigned, do hereby constitute and appoint Daniel C. King, 
 of Salt Lake City, Utah, my agent and representative, for me and in my 
 place and stead to receive and receipt for the payment due from the business 
 of Robert Mason, deceased, late of Salt Lake City, Utah, and authorize 
 him to do all other things that may be necessary in connection therewith 
 and to carry into effect the intent of this appointment and I hereby ratify 
 and confirm all that my said agent may do in pursuance of the authority 
 herein conferred. 
 
 In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, in 
 Memphis, Tennessee, this loth day of April, 19 — . 
 
 Daniel C. King. (L.S.) 
 
 NEGOTIABLE IIn^STRUMENTS 
 
 Form 7. CHECK BY INDIVIDUAL 
 
 No. 849 Boston, Mass., Aug. 15, 19 — . 
 
 The Merchants National Bank 
 
 Pay to the order of James Farley 
 
 Dollars. 
 
 $200 ^o°u H. E. Eldrkge 
 
 Form 8. PROMISSORY NOTE 
 $100 ^5*V Cleveland, Ohio, July 15, 19—. 
 
 Sixty days after date ... T ... . promise to pay to 
 
 the order of George Bowman 
 
 One hundred j%% Dollars. 
 
 at The Merchants National Bank 
 
 Value received with interest at 6%. 
 
 No Due E. F. Sanford 
 
384 APPENDIX— FORMS 
 
 Form 9. CORPORATION NOTE 
 $1000 ^^% New York, Sept. 10, 19 — . 
 Ninety days .... after date .... Progress Construction Company prom- 
 ises to pay to the order of H. C. Lyman the sum of 
 
 One thousand i%% Dollars. 
 
 Value received with interest at 5%. 
 
 Payable at Progress Construction Company. 
 
 Commercial National Bank By John E. Blake 
 
 New York President. 
 
 Form 10. SIGHT DRAFT, INDIVIDUAL 
 
 $500 M New York, Aug. 5, 19—. 
 
 At sight pay to the order of Homer Randall 
 
 Five Hundred j%% Dollars. 
 
 Value received and charge to account of 
 
 To George Davis 1 John G. Hawley 
 
 Minneapolis, Minn. J 
 
 If this draft were worded *'At thirty days sight" or '' Thirty 
 days after date" it would be a time draft. 
 
 Form ii. BANK DRAFT 
 
 Merchants Bank of Chicago 
 
 No. 22527 • ' Chicago, III, Dec. 22, 19 — . 
 
 Pay to the order of . . . Charles M. Allen SiooTVff 
 
 One Hundred ^%% Dollars. 
 
 To The Chemical National Bank, William G. Gancourt 
 
 City of New York. Cashier. 
 
 Form 12. ARTICLES OF COPARTNERSHIP 
 
 This agreement made and entered into this thirty-first day of October, 
 
 One thousand nine hundred and , by and between Charles Snow 
 
 of Portland, Oregon, the first part, and Edward M. Chapin of the same 
 place of the second part, witnesseth as follows: — 
 
 1. The said parties, above named, hereby agree to become partners in 
 the business of buying and selling dry goods under the firm name of Snow & 
 Co., said business to be carried on in the city of Portland, or such other 
 place or places as the parties may hereafter determine. 
 
 2. The capital of the said partnership shall consist of the sum of ten 
 thousand dollars, to be contributed as follows: The party of the first part 
 shall contribute his stock of dry goods and the good will of the business 
 
ARTICLES OF COPARTNERSHIP 385 
 
 heretofore conducted by him, which are together valued by the parties 
 hereto at the sum of five thousand dollars; and the party of the second part 
 shall contribute the sum of five thousand dollars in cash. Such capital is 
 to be used and employed in common between the parties hereto for the 
 support and management of said business. 
 
 3. At all times during the continuance of their copartnership they and 
 each of them shall give their time and attention to said business, and to the 
 utmost of their skill and power exert themselves for their joint interest, 
 profit, benefit, and advantage, and truly employ, buy and sell, and trade 
 with their joint stock and the increase thereof in the business aforesaid; 
 and they shall also at all times during the said copartnership bear, pay, and 
 discharge equally between them all rents and expenses that may be required 
 for the management and support of said business; and all gains, profits, 
 and increase that shall grow or arise from or b)^ means of their said business 
 shall be equally divided, and all losses by bad debts or otherwise shall be 
 borne and paid by them equally. 
 
 4. Each of said partners shall be at liberty to draw out of the funds of 
 the firm each month for his private expenses the sum of one hundred dollars, 
 and neither of them shall take any further sum for his own separate use with- 
 out the consent in writing of the other partner. The sums so drawn shall 
 be charged against the partners respectively, and if at the annual settlement, 
 hereinafter provided for, the profits of either partner do not amount to the 
 sum so drawn out in that year, he shall at once repay such deficiency. 
 
 5. All the transactions of the said copartnership shall be entered in 
 regular books of account, and on the first day of January in each year during 
 the continuance of this copartnership account of stock shaU be taken, and 
 an account of the expenses and profits adjusted and exhibited on said books; 
 said profits shall then be divided, and one half carried to the separate account 
 of each partner. Either partner shall be at liberty to withdraw at any 
 time the whole or any part of his share of the accrued profits thus ascertained 
 and carried to his separate account. Each partner shall have open and 
 free access to the books and accounts of the copartnership at all times, and 
 no material or important changes shall at any time be made in the general 
 business of the firm, either in the buying of stock or in any other respect, by 
 either partner without the knowledge and consent of the other. 
 
 6. And the said parties hereby mutually covenant and agree, to and 
 with each other, that during the continuance of the said copartnership 
 neither of them shall indorse any note, or otherwise become surety for any 
 person or persons whomsoever, without the consent of the other of said 
 copartners. And at the determination of their copartnership, the said 
 copartners, each to the other, shall make a just and final account of all 
 things relating to their business, and in all things truly adjust the same; and 
 all and every, the stock and stocks as well as the gains and increase thereof, 
 which shall appear to be remaining, either in money, goods, wares, fixtures, 
 debts, or otherwise, shall be divided equally between them. 
 
386 APPENDIX— FORMS 
 
 7. This agreement and the partnership hereby created shall continue 
 in full force and effect for the period of ten years from the date hereof. 
 
 In Witness Whereof, the said parties have hereunto set their hands 
 and seals this thirty-first day of October, 19 — . 
 
 Charles Snow. (L. S.) 
 
 Edward M. Chapin. (L. S.) 
 
 (Many other provisions may be inserted, as the facts require.) 
 
 Form 13. PROXY— SIMPLE FORM 
 I hereby appoint David E. Singer my proxy, with full authority to vote 
 
 for me and in my place at any and all stockholders' meetings of the Union 
 
 Power Company. 
 
 Witness my hand and seal this loth day of June, 19 — . 
 
 In the presence of John Wendell 
 
 Martin Cook 
 
 Form 14. DEED WITH FULL COVENANTS 
 
 This Indenture, made the ist day of October, nineteen hundred and 
 -, between Homer Johnson of Rochester, New York, party of the 
 
 first part, and Benjamin Green of the same place, party of the second part: 
 
 WITNESSETH, that the party of the first part, in consideration of Two 
 Thousand Dollars ($2000), lawful money of the United States, paid by the 
 party of the second part, does hereby grant and release unto the party of 
 the second part, his heirs and assigns forever, all ... . 
 
 (Description of property to be conveyed.) 
 
 Together with the appurtenances and aU the estate and rights of the 
 party of the first part in and to said premises: 
 
 To have and to hold the premises herein granted unto the party of the 
 second part, his heirs and assigns forever. 
 
 And said Homer Johnson covenants as follows: 
 
 First — That said Homer Johnson is seized of said premises in fee 
 simple, and has good right to convey the same; 
 
 Second — That the party of the second part shall quietly enjoy the said 
 premises; 
 
 Third — ^That the said premises are free from incumbrances; 
 
 Fourth — That the party of the first part will execute or procure any 
 further necessary assurance of the title to said premises; 
 
 Fifth — That said Homer Johnson will forever warrant the title to said 
 premises. 
 
 In Witness Whereof, the party of the first part has hereunto set his 
 hand and seal the day and year above written. 
 
 Homer Johnson (L. S.) 
 In presence of: 
 
 R. H. Stolte 
 
 (Should be acknowledged in due form.) 
 
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE 387 
 
 Form 15. REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE— SHORT FORM 
 
 This Mortgage, made the loth day of January, nineteen hundred 
 and nineteen, between Robert C. Green of New York, N. Y., the mortgagor, 
 and John A. Delano of the same place, the mortgagee. 
 
 WITNESSETH, that to sccure the payment of an indebtedness in the sum 
 of Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars ($2500), lawful money of the United 
 States, to be paid on the loth day of January, nineteen hundred and twenty- 
 one, with interest thereon to be computed from date, at the rate of six per 
 centum (6%) per annum, and to be paid semi-annually, according to a certain 
 bond or obligation bearing even date herewith, the mortgagor hereby 
 mortgages to the mortgagee (Description of property covered by mortgage.) 
 
 And the mortgagor covenants with the mortgagee as follows: 
 
 1. That the mortgagor will pay the indebtedness as hereinbefore 
 provided. 
 
 2. That the mortgagor will keep the buildings on the premises insured 
 against loss by fire for the benefit of the mortgagee. 
 
 3. That no building on the premises shall be removed or demolished 
 without the consent of the mortgagee. 
 
 4. That the whole of said principal sum shall become due after default 
 in the payment of any installment of principal or of interest for thirty days, 
 or after default in the payment of any tax, water rate, or assessment for 
 ten days after notice and demand. 
 
 5. That the holder of this mortgage, in any action to foreclose it, shall 
 be entitled to the appointment of a receiver. 
 
 6. That the mortgagor will pay all taxes, assessments, or water rates, 
 and in default thereof, the mortgagee may pay the same, and all amounts 
 so paid shall be added to the amount already secured by this mortgage. 
 
 7. That the mortgagor, within five days upon request in person or 
 within ten days upon request by mail, shall furnish a statement of the 
 amount due on this mortgage. 
 
 8. That notice and demand or request may be in writing and may be 
 served in person or by mail. 
 
 9. That the mortgagor warrants the title to the premises. 
 
 In Witness Whereof, this mortgage has been duly executed by the 
 mortgagor. 
 In presence of: 
 
 C. C. Taylor Robert C. Green. (L.S.) 
 
 (This mortgage should be acknowledged in due form.) 
 
 Form 16. SATISFACTION OF MORTGAGE 
 
 Know all men by these presents that I, James S. Hopkins, do hereby 
 
 certify that a certain indenture of mortgage, bearing date the 25 th day of 
 
 June, 192-, made and executed by Horace L. Harding, to secure payment 
 
 of the principal sum of two thousand dollars and interest and duly recorded 
 
SS8 APPENDIX— FORMS 
 
 in the office of the Register of Westchester County in Liber 327 of mortgages, 
 page 186, in the i6th day of July, 19 2-, is paid and do hereby consent that 
 the same be discharged of record. 
 Dated the 14th day of August, 192- 
 
 In the presence of James S. Hopxins 
 
 M. L. Jones 
 
 (This instrument should be acknowledged in due form.) 
 
 Form 17. CHATTEL MORTGAGE 
 
 Know All Men by These Presents: 
 
 That I, William J. Curtis of Newark, New Jersey, am indebted unto 
 R. H. Denmore, of the city of New York, N. Y., in the sum of Two Hundred 
 Fifty Dollars ($250), being for goods sold and delivered to me: Now, for 
 securing the payment of the said debt, and interest from the date hereof, to 
 the said R. H. Denmore, I do hereby sell, assign, and transfer to the said 
 R. H. Denmore all the goods, chattels, and property described in the 
 following schedule, namely, 
 
 (List of property covered by mortgage.) 
 
 Said property now being and remaining in the possession of myself, at 
 my store, No. 840 Broad Street, Newark, New Jersey. 
 
 Provided always, and this mortgage is on the express condition, that if 
 the said William J. Curtis shall pay to R. H. Denmore the sum of Two 
 Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250), within one year and six months from the date 
 hereof, with interest at six per cent (6%) per annum, which said sum and 
 interest the said William J. Curtis hereby covenants to pay, then this transfer 
 is to be void and of no effect; but in case of nonpayment of the said sum at 
 the time or times above mentioned, together with interest, then the said 
 R. H. Denmore shall have full power and authority to enter upon the 
 premises of the said party of the first part, or any other place or places where 
 the goods and chattels aforesaid may be, to take possession of said property, 
 to sell the same, and the avails (after deducting all expenses of the sale and 
 keeping of the said property) to apply in payment of the above debt; and 
 in case the said R. H. Denmore shall at any time deem himself unsafe, it 
 shall be lawful for him to take possession of such property and sell the same 
 at public or private sale, previous to the time above mentioned for the pay- 
 ment of said debt, and apply the proceeds as aforesaid, after deducting all 
 expenses of the sale and keeping of said property. If from any cause said 
 property shall fail to satisfy said debt, interest, costs, and charges, the said 
 William J. Curtis hereby covenants and agrees to pay the deficiency. 
 
 In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto affixed my hand and seal, this 
 eleventh day of December, nineteen hundred and . 
 
 In the presence of: Willlajvi J. Curtis. (L.S.) 
 
 James C. Crawford 
 
 (This mortgage should be acknowledged in due form.) 
 
LEASE 389 
 
 Form 18. LEASE 
 
 This Indenture, made this i8th day of September, 19 — between 
 William E. Weaver of the City of New York, party of the first part, and 
 Lyman Collins, of the same place, party of the second part, 
 
 Witnesseth 
 
 That the party of the first part has let and by these presents does grant, 
 demise, and let unto the party of the second part the premises known as 
 No. 406 West 228th Street in said City, with the appurtenances, for the term 
 of two years from the first day of October, 19 — , at the yearly rent or sum 
 of $960. to be paid in equal monthly payments in advance in the first day of 
 each and every month during said term. 
 
 And it is agreed that if any rent shall be due or unpaid, or if default 
 shall be made in any of the covenants herein contained, then it shall be 
 lawful for the party of the first part to reenter said premises and to remove 
 all persons therefrom. 
 
 And the party of the second part hereby covenants to pay to the party 
 of the first part the said rent as herein specified. And also to pay the annual 
 rent or charge, assessed or imposed on said premises for the use of water. 
 
 And the party of the second part covenants that he will not assign this 
 lease, nor any interest therein, or let or underlet the whole or any part of 
 said premises, nor make any alterations therein, without the written consent 
 of the party of the first part, under penalty of forfeiture and damages; and 
 that he will not occupy or use said premises for any business deemed extra 
 hazardous on account of fire or otherwise, without the like consent, under 
 like penalty. 
 
 And at the expiration of said term the party of the second part will 
 quit and surrender the premises hereby demised in as good condition and 
 order as reasonable use and wear thereof will permit, damage by the elements 
 excepted. 
 
 And the party of the first part covenants that the party of the second 
 part, in paying the said yearly rent and performing the covenants aforesaid, 
 shall and may peaceably and quietly have, hold, and enjoy the said demised 
 premises for the term aforesaid. 
 
 And it is further understood that the covenants and agreements 
 herein contained are binding on the parties hereto and their legal represen- 
 tatives. 
 
 In Witness Whereof the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands 
 and seals the day and year first above written. 
 
 William E. Weaver. (L.S.) 
 Lyman Collins. (L.S.) 
 
 Sealed and delivered in the 
 presence of 
 
 Richard Abbot. 
 
390 APPENDIX— FORMS 
 
 Form 19. WILL 
 
 I, Martin E. Webb, of the city of Yonkers, County of Westchester, and 
 State of New York, being of sound mind, memory, and understanding, do 
 make, publish, and declare the following as and for my last Will and Testa- 
 ment; that is to say: 
 
 First. I hereby revoke all wills, codicils, or testamentary instruments 
 by me at any time heretofore made. 
 
 Second. I direct that my just debts and funeral expenses be paid as 
 soon after my death as may be practicable. 
 
 Third. I give, devise, and bequeath to my wife, Helen Webb, my 
 residence property in the city of Yonkers, known as No. 3582 Warburton 
 Avenue, including therewith all furnishings and household effects therein 
 contained; and also the sum of twenty thousand dollars. 
 
 Fourth. I give and bequeath to my son, George H. Webb, the sum of 
 twenty thousand dollars, my Packard automobile, and all my personal 
 effects. 
 
 Fifth. I give and bequeath to Children's Guardian Society, a cor- 
 poration conducting a home and school for orphan children in said City of 
 Yonkers, the sum of One Thousand Dollars. 
 
 Sixth. All the residue of my estate I give and bequeath, in four equal 
 shares, to my wife Helen Webb, my son George H. Webb, the above- 
 mentioned Children's Guardian Society, and my nephew James C. Katley. 
 
 Seventh. I nominate and appoint my nephew James C. Katley executor 
 of this my last will and testament, and direct that no bond be required of 
 him by reason of such appointment. 
 
 In Witness Whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal at my 
 residence in the City of Yonkers this 30th day of June in the year one 
 
 thousand nine hundred and . 
 
 Martin E. Webb. (L.S.) 
 
 On this 30th day of June in the year one thousand nine hundred and 
 Martin E. Webb, the above named testator, in our presence 
 
 and in the presence of each of us, signed and sealed the foregoing in- 
 strument and published and declared the same to be his last Will and 
 Testament, and we thereupon at his request, in his presence and in the 
 presence of each other, hereunto subscribed our names and residences as 
 a'ttesting witnesses. 
 
 Samuel Moore residing at 227 Fowler Avenue, Yonkers, New York. 
 Robert Moore residing at 252 Buckingham Road, Yonkers, New York. 
 
COMMON LEGAL TERMS 
 
 Note: — Many additional terms are defined in the text. 
 
 Abandonment: In marine insurance, the giving up of the property partly 
 
 destroyed to the insurer, the owner's purpose being to claim the full 
 
 amount of the insurance. 
 Abrogate: To annul or destroy; to abolish entirely. 
 Acceptance Supra Protest: Acceptance for the protection of the drawer, 
 
 by a person other than the drawee. 
 Accommodation Indorser: One who indorses a note or draft without con- 
 sideration, in order that another may raise money upon it. 
 Accommodation Paper: Notes or drafts for which no consideration passes 
 
 between the original parties. 
 Accord and Satisfaction: A means of settling a claim by compromising the 
 
 amount which is in dispute, or by giving something else than that 
 
 which was originally agreed upon. 
 Acknowledgment: The act by which a party who has executed an instru- 
 ment declares or acknowledges it before a competent officer to be his 
 
 or her act or deed. 
 Action: The formal means of recovering one's rights in a court of justice — 
 
 a suit at law. 
 Act of God : An accident resulting from a physical cause which is irresistible, 
 
 such as lightning, floods, etc. 
 Adjudication: The act of a court in giving judgment in a suit at law. 
 Administrator: One who is appointed to take charge of the property or 
 
 estate of a person who died without leaving a will. 
 Admiralty: The court or law dealing with controversies arising out of the 
 
 navigation of public waters. 
 Adult: A person twenty-one or more years of age. In some states, a female 
 
 eighteen or more years of age is an adult. 
 Adverse Possession: Open, actual, exclusive, and continuous possession of 
 
 real property under claim or color of title, hostile to the claim of 
 
 another. 
 Afladavit: A statement in writing, signed by the person making it, and 
 
 sworn to by him before an officer authorized to take oaths. 
 Age of Consent: The age at which infants are capable of entering into a 
 
 valid contract of marriage. 
 Agistor or Agister : One who takes cattle to pasture for hire. 
 Alias: A Latin word meaning otherwise or hitherto. 
 Alien: One owing allegiance to another country; usually a foreign-born 
 
 resident of a country in which he is not a citizen. 
 
 391 
 
392 COMMON LEGAL TERMS 
 
 Alien Enemy: An alien who is the subject of a country at war with the 
 
 country in which he then lives. 
 Alienate: To convey the title to property. 
 Alimony: An allowance made by order of a court to a woman out of the 
 
 property of him who is or was her husband, on legal separation or 
 
 divorce, or during a suit for it. 
 Aliunde: From another source; outside evidence; a.s, a, csise proved aliunde. 
 Allonge: A paper attached to a bill or note for indorsements which the 
 
 original paper will not hold. 
 Annuity: An amount payable yearly. 
 Annulment : The act of making void. 
 Anomalous Indorsement: An irregular indorsement. 
 Ante-dated: Bearing a date earlier than the actual date. 
 Appurtenance: In a deed or lease, anything that will go with the land, 
 
 as a right of way. 
 Arbitration: The hearing and determining of a cause in controversy by a 
 
 person or persons either chosen by the parties involved or appointed 
 
 by some authority. 
 Articles of Copartnership : The written agreement by which a partnership 
 
 is formed. 
 Attachment: The seizure of property by legal process. 
 Attestation: Signing an instrument as a witness. 
 Attorney in Fact: An agent appointed by power of attorney. 
 Award: The decision of arbitrators. 
 Barter: The exchange of articles of personal property: distinguished from a 
 
 sale, in which property is sold for money. 
 Beneficiary: The person who is entitled to the benefits of a contract or of an 
 
 estate held by another. 
 Bequeath: To give property by will; especially, to give personal property 
 
 , by will. 
 Bilateral Contract: A kind of contract in which an offer in the form of a 
 
 promise is accepted by a promise. 
 Bill of Lading: A document given by a carrier to a shipper; it is both a 
 
 receipt and a contract. 
 Bona Fide: In good faith. Openly and without deceit or fraud. 
 Bond: A sealed instrument by which one party agrees to pay another a 
 
 certain sum or to perform a certain act. 
 Breach: In the law of contracts the violation of an agreement or obligation. 
 By-laws: The regulations made by a corporation for its own government. 
 Caveat Emptor: "Let the buyer beware"; a rule which excludes or weakens 
 
 the implied warranty of goods which are before the buyer and open to 
 
 his examination. 
 Certificate of Deposit: A certificate issued by a bank, certifying to the de- 
 posit of a stated sum of money payable to order or bearer. 
 Cestui Que Trust: One for whose benefit property is held by a trustee. 
 
COMMON LEGAL TERMS 393 
 
 Chancery: In the United States a court of equity; a court of records or 
 office of public records. 
 
 Charter: (i) A formal instrument by which a government creates a cor- 
 poration or grants special rights or privileges to a particular person or 
 persons. (2) To hire or let a vessel or part of it. 
 
 Charter Party: The written instrument by which the owner of a vessel lets 
 it, or a part of it, to another. 
 
 Chattel: An article of personal property. 
 
 Chose in Action: A thing, the possession of which one has a right to demand 
 by action at law. 
 
 Chose in Possession: Personal property of which one has the actual pos- 
 session. 
 
 Client: A person who employs an attorney to act for him in any legal busi- 
 ness. 
 
 Code: Any systematic body of law having statutory force. 
 
 Collateral Security: Property, especially stocks and bonds, deposited as a 
 pledge to guarantee the payment of a promissory note. 
 
 Complainant: The person who brings an action at law; the plaintiff. 
 
 Complaint: A formal statement of a charge or cause of action against a 
 person named therein. 
 
 Compromise: To reach a settlement by mutual concessions. 
 
 Concurrent: Existing at the same time. 
 
 Condition Precedent: A condition in an agreement requiring some act to be 
 performed by one person before another is liable. 
 
 Condition Subsequent: A part of an agreement relating to a future event, 
 upon the happening of which the obligation is no longer binding upon 
 one of the parties to a contract. 
 
 Consanguinity: Relationship by blood. 
 
 Consignee: A person to whom goods are shipped. 
 
 Consignor: A person shipping goods. 
 
 Counterclaim: A claim existing in favor of a defendant. 
 
 Covenant: Any promise contained in a sealed instrument. 
 
 Coverture : The legal status of a married woman. 
 
 Curtesy: The estate a man has in the lands of his wife uppn her death, in 
 case a living child has been born to them during their marriage. 
 
 Customs: The established habits of a trade or business which will be consid- 
 ered by a court as applying to a contract in such trade or business. 
 
 Declaration: A formal statement of the facts on which a cause of action is 
 based; a complaint. 
 
 Decree: The judgment or decision of a court of equity. 
 
 De Facto: In fact, actually. 
 
 Default: Omission; neglect or failure. 
 
 Del Credere Agent: An agent who guarantees that the persons to whom 
 he sells will perform the contracts he makes with them. 
 
 Demise: A conveyance of an estate in real property for life or for years. 
 
394 COMMON LEGAL TERMS 
 
 Demurrer: A pleading by the defendant to an action, claiming that even if 
 
 all the plaintiff sets forth in his complaint is true, still he is not 
 
 entitled to recover. 
 Deponent: One who makes oath as to the truth of a written statement. 
 Devise: To grant real property by will. 
 
 Disability: Want of qualification; incapacity to do a legal act. 
 Disaffirm: To repudiate. 
 Domicile: A person's legal residence; his permanent home to which he 
 
 intends to return if absent from it. 
 Duress: Personal restraint or compulsion. 
 Earnest: Formerly money paid to bind a bargain; now, a part of the price 
 
 named in a contract paid by the vendee at the time the bargain is made. 
 Easement: The right one person has to use the land of another for a 
 
 particular purpose. 
 Embezzlement: Appropriating to one's own use money intrusted to one's 
 
 custody. 
 Emblements: Growing crops of any kind produced by expense and labor. 
 Eminent Domain: The right of the sovereign power to take private property 
 
 for public purposes. 
 Enact: To make a law, or to establish by law. 
 Equity (Chancery) : A system of courts granting extraordinary relief when 
 
 the remedies at law are not adequate. 
 Equity of Redemption: The right which a mortgagor has to redeem his 
 
 estate after he is in default on the mortgage. 
 Escheat: The reversion of land to the state upon the death of the owner 
 
 without lawful heirs. 
 Escrow: A deed or bond delivered to a third party to be held and delivered 
 
 to the grantee or creditor upon the performance of some condition. 
 Estate: An interest in property. 
 
 Estoppel: A rule of law which stops a man from asserting a fact or claim. 
 Eviction: The dispossession of a person by process of law from land which 
 
 he has previously held. 
 Execution: (i) A judicial writ directing the enforcement of a judgment. 
 
 (2) The act of signing and sealing a written instrument. 
 Executor: A person named in a will to carry out its provisions. 
 Exemption Laws: Laws under which a judgment debtor may hold certain 
 
 articles exempt from levy and sale. 
 Ex Post Facto Law: A law which makes criminal an act which was done 
 
 previously and which when done was not a crime. 
 Extradition: The surrender by one government to another of a person 
 
 charged with a crime. 
 Foreclosure : The process of enforcing a lien against property. 
 Forgery: The fraudulent making, signing, or altering of a written instru- 
 ment. 
 Franchise: A privilege or right conferred by governing authority. 
 
COMMON LEGAL TERMS 395 
 
 Garnishment : The process by which a person owing money to the defendant 
 
 in a case may be compelled to pay it in to the court to satisfy a claim 
 
 against the defendant. 
 Good Will: A property right attaching to a business and arising from its 
 
 established trade and reputation. 
 Hereditament: Any species of property that may be inherited. 
 Inchoate: Commenced, but not completed; imperfect. 
 Incorporeal: Intangible; existing only in contemplation of law, as a franchise 
 
 or right of way. 
 Incumbrance: A burden or lien upon property. 
 Indemnity : A compensation for damages suffered. 
 Indenture: A deed or sealed agreement. 
 In Esse: In existence. 
 
 Insolvency: State of being unable to pay one's debts. 
 In Statu Quo : In the same state or condition as before. 
 Inter Vivos: Between the living. 
 Intestate: One who dies without making a will. 
 Invalid: Of no legal force. 
 Issue: Offspring; in real property law, all persons who have descended from 
 
 a common ancestor. 
 Judgment: The final determination by a court of the rights of the parties 
 
 in an action. 
 Jurat: The certificate at the end of an affidavit showing when and before 
 
 whom it is verified (sworn to). 
 Jurisdiction: The legal authority of a court. 
 
 Lease: A contract granting the possession and use of real property. 
 Legacy: A gift by will. 
 Legal Tender: Those kinds of money which a creditor must accept as a 
 
 valid offer of payment. 
 Lessee: A person holding real property under lease; a tenant. 
 Lessor: A person who has leased real property to another; a landlord. 
 Letters of Administration: An instrument issued by the court having 
 
 jurisdiction, granting power to settle the estate of one dying without 
 
 leaving a will. 
 Letters Testamentary : An instrument issued by the court having jurisdic- 
 tion, granting power to the person named as executor in a will to carry 
 
 out the provisions of the will. 
 Levy: Taking legal possession of chattels by an officer of the law, under a 
 
 writ of execution. 
 Lien: A right a person has against the property of another by way of 
 
 security for a debt. 
 Liquidated Damages: The sum of money agreed upon in advance by the 
 
 parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach. 
 Litigation: A suit at law. 
 L. S.r Locus sigilli, meaning "the place of the seal." 
 
396 COMMON LEGAL TERMS 
 
 Mandamus: A writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court or to an 
 officer, commanding something to be done. 
 
 Maturity: The time at which a negotiable instrument is legally due. 
 
 Merger: The absorption or extinguishment of one thing in another; as of 
 contracts or corporations. 
 
 Nominal Damages: Those given for the violation of a right from which no 
 actual loss has resulted. 
 
 Non Compos Mentis: Not of sound mind. 
 
 Non-suit: The name of a judgment given against a plaintiff when he is 
 unable to prove his case. 
 
 Ordinance : An act or law passed by a municipality. 
 
 Outlawed: Uncollectible because too old. A debt is outlawed when it is 
 barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
 
 Par: Face value. Bills of exchange, bonds, and stocks are at par when 
 they sell for their face value. 
 
 Paramoimt Title : The title to property which will prevail when a dispute 
 as to ownership arises. 
 
 Parol Contract: Any contract not under seal ; usually, an oral contract. 
 
 Perjury: A willfully false statement made by a witness in judicial proceed- 
 ings. 
 
 Per Se: In or by itself; essentially. For example, an act which is not 
 negligent per se may be negligent under certain circumstances. 
 
 Plaintiff: The person who brings an action at law; the complainant. 
 
 Post-dated: Bearing a date subsequent to the true date. 
 
 Probate: The act or process of proving a will. 
 
 Prima Facie: At the first appearance. Prima facie evidence is that which is 
 sufficient to establish a fact unless it be controverted. 
 
 Prosecute: To proceed against by legal measures. 
 
 Protest: A formal declaration in writing by a notary public of the demand 
 and refusal to pay a note or bill. 
 
 Proxy: (i) One who represents another. (2) A writing by which one au- 
 thorizes another to vote in his place. 
 
 Quantum Meruit: As much as he deserved. 
 
 Quantum Valebat: Whatever it was worth. 
 
 Quasi: As if; corresponding to. 
 
 Quitclaim Deed: A form of deed in the nature of a release, granting what- 
 ever interest the grantor has or may have. 
 
 Ratification: Approval; giving force to a contract which otherwise is not 
 binding. 
 
 Receiver: A person appointed to hold and manage property in dispute, the 
 property of an insolvent, or the property of a dissolved corporation. 
 
 Recoupment: A reduction in amount of damages on account of a breach of 
 warranty or defects in performance. 
 
 Release: An instrument by which some claim or interest is surrendered to 
 another person. 
 
COMMON LEGAL TERMS ^. 397 
 
 Remainder: An estate in real property to take effect after another's estate is 
 
 terminated. 
 Replevin: An action to recover the possession of goods wrongfully taken 
 
 and retained. 
 Rescission: The annulling or dissolution of a contract either by mutual 
 
 consent or by one party. 
 Residuary Legatee : The person named in a will who has the residue of the 
 
 property after the payment of the other legacies specially mentioned in 
 
 the will. Sometimes the words legacy and legatee are restricted to 
 
 personal property; then devise and devisee are used for real property. 
 Severance: The removal of fixtures from the land. 
 Specialty: A contract under seal. 
 
 Specific Performance: Performance of a contract according to its terms. 
 SS.: Abbreviation for the Latin word sctlicet, meaning to wit; that is to 
 
 say. 
 Status: Standing state, or condition. 
 Statute : A law made by a legislature. ♦ 
 
 Statute of Frauds: An English statute, reenacted in varying form in the 
 
 different states, requiring certain contracts to be evidenced by a written 
 
 memorandum in order to be enforceable. 
 Statute of Limitations: A statute barring action unless begun within a 
 
 certain time after the debt is due and payable. 
 Subcontract: A contract made by one who has contracted to perform labor 
 
 or services, for the performance of all or part of such labor or services by 
 
 another. 
 Subpoena: A writ commanding the attendance of a person to testify as a 
 
 witness in court. 
 Subrogation: The substitution of one person or thing in the place of another, 
 
 particularly the substitution of one person in place of another as a cred- 
 itor, with a succession to the rights of the latter. 
 Survivorship : The right of the survivor or survivors, of two or more persons 
 
 having joint interest in an estate or other property, to take the interest 
 
 of any of the number dying. 
 Testator: A person who makes a will. 
 Tort: A private wrong or injury, other than that arising from the breach of 
 
 a contract, for which damages can be collected. 
 Trespass: Any wrongful act by one person whereby another is injured; 
 
 especially, unlawful entry upon the land of another. 
 Uberrima Fides: The most perfect good faith. 
 Ultra Vires: Beyond power. The acts of a corporation beyond the scope of 
 
 its powers are acts ultra vires. 
 Underwriter: Insurer. 
 Unilateral Contract: A contract in which an offer in the form of a promise 
 
 is accepted by an act. 
 Usury: Illegal interest. 
 
398 COMMON LEGAL TERMS | 
 
 Venue : The place in which an event occurs. ] 
 Vested: Already in force. \ 
 Waiver: The abandonment of a right, or a refusal to accept it. j 
 Ward: A minor under guardianship. ] 
 Wharfinger: One who keeps a wharf for hire for the purpose of receiving j 
 and shipping goods. ! 
 Writ: An instrument issued from a court, requiring or authorizing the per- 
 formance of an act. i 
 
INDEX 
 
 Absolute defenses, 177-180. 
 Abstract of title, 271. 
 Acceptance of bills of exchange, 156- 
 158. 
 
 acceptance for honor, 157. 
 
 acceptance supra protest, 157. 
 Acceptance of guaranty, 196. 
 Acceptance of offers, 22-26. 
 
 reality of consent, 26-33. 
 x\cceptor of a bill of exchange, 156. 
 Accident insurance, 253. 
 Accommodation party, 172. 
 Accord and satisfaction, 44. 
 Acknowledgment, 275; form, 381-382. 
 Act of God, defined, 224. 
 Action, or suit, in a court, 361. 
 Administrator, promise to pay debts of 
 
 the estate, 52, 54. 
 Adverse possession, 271. 
 Affirmance of contracts, 16-17. 
 Agency, 119-141; defined, 119. 
 
 coupled with an interest, 137. 
 
 how created, 122-125. 
 
 liability of principal for torts of 
 agent, 134-146. 
 
 obligation of agent, 1 27-131, 132. 
 
 obligation of principal, 125-127, 132. 
 
 obligation of third party, 132-134- 
 
 termination of , 136-139. 
 Agent, 119-141; defined, 119. 
 
 cannot contract with himself, 14. 
 
 compensation of, 125-126. 
 
 del credere, 121. 
 
 fraud of, 134-135. 
 
 general, 119. 
 
 gratuitous, 130-131. 
 
 how appointed, 122-125. 
 
 implied warranty of authority, 133. 
 
 maHcious wrongs or crimes of, 135. 
 
 must not use position for his benefit, 
 
 x29. 
 
 must obey instructions, 127, 
 must use judgment, 128. 
 
 Agent (cofUinued). 
 notice to, 132. 
 
 obligation to principal, 127-131. 
 obligation to third party, 132. 
 of infant, 17. 
 public, 120. 
 signature of, 153. 
 special, 120; form of appointment, 
 
 383. 
 
 subagents, 129-130. 
 
 termination of agency, 136-139. 
 
 torts of, 134-136. 
 Alien, 20; contracts of, 20. 
 Alienation clause in fire insurance, 243. 
 Alteration, of negotiable instruments, 
 178. 
 
 of written instruments, 62-63. 
 Anomalous indorser, 172. 
 Answer, in an action, 362. 
 Anti-trust laws, 377-379. 
 Appeal, 366. 
 
 Appellate jurisdiction, 355. 
 Appurtenances, defined, 273. 
 Articles of copartnership, 302. 
 
 form, 384. 
 Articles of incorporation, 331. 
 Assignability, 163-164. 
 Assignment, of contracts, 49-51; form, 
 382. 
 
 of fire insurance policy, 243, 244. 
 
 of lease, 286. 
 
 of mortgage, 281. 
 Assumption of risk, 379. 
 Attachment, writ of, 367. 
 Attorney, 121; see Agent. 
 Auction sales, 109-110. 
 Automobile insurance, 255-256. 
 
 Baggage, of passengers, 230-231. 
 Bailee, defined, 204. 
 
 liability of, 206, 207. 
 
 responsibility of, 205, 208, 210, 212- 
 213, 214, 218, 223-228. 
 
 399 
 
400 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Bailment, 204-232; defined, 204. 
 
 common carriers, 220-231. 
 
 degrees of care, 205, 208, 210, 212- 
 213, 214. 
 
 distinguished from sale, 86-87. 
 
 for bailee's sole benefit, 209-211. 
 
 for bailor's sole benefit, 207-209. 
 
 for hire, 212-214. 
 
 for mutual benefit, 21 1-2 17. 
 
 gratuitous, 207-211. 
 
 innkeepers, 218-220. 
 
 tortious, 206. 
 Bailor, defined, 204. 
 Bank drafts, 154-155; form, 384. 
 Banking credit, 184. 
 Bankruptcy, 348-353. 
 
 acts of, 349-350. 
 
 discharge in, 352. 
 
 duties of the bankrupt, 351. 
 
 effect on agency, 138. 
 
 laws, 348. 
 
 reason for stoppage in transitu, 
 107-108. 
 
 trustee or receiver, 350-351. 
 Barter, 85. 
 
 Beneficiary of life insurance, 246, 247. 
 Bets, unlawful, 35. 
 Bilateral contract, 13. 
 Bill of exchange, 154-158; defined, 154. 
 . acceptance of, 156-158. 
 
 defenses, 175-180. 
 
 discharge, 180-182. 
 
 essential conditions, 146-15 1. 
 
 foreign, inland, and domestic, 155. 
 
 forms, 384. 
 
 negotiation, 163-174. 
 
 special forms of, 161, 162. 
 Bill of lading, defined, 224. 
 
 order bill of lading, 161. 
 Bills of Lading Act, 85, 377. 
 BiU of sale, 94; form, 382. 
 Blank indorsement, 165. 
 Boarding-house keepers, 218, 220. 
 Bonds, 162-163. 
 Borrowing, 209-211. 
 Breach of contracts, 63-66. 
 
 damages for, 66-69. 
 
 discharge of right of action, 69-71. 
 
 remedies for breach of sale contract, 
 105-109. 
 
 Breach of warranty, 108-109. 
 
 Broker, 121; ^ee Agent. 
 
 Burglary insurance, 255. 
 
 Business credit, 184. 
 
 Buyer, remedies for breach, 108-109. 
 
 By-bidding, 109. 
 
 By-laws of a corporation, 330. 
 
 Care, degrees of, 205. 
 
 Carrier, see Common carrier. 
 
 Cases, manner of citation, 16. 
 
 Cashier's check, 161. 
 
 Casualty insurance, 253-256. 
 
 Caveat emptor, 102-103. 
 
 Certificate of deposit, 161. 
 
 Certified checks, 159. 
 
 Cestui que trust, 269. 
 
 Chancery courts, 4, 355, 359. 
 
 Charter of a corporation, 332, 341-342. 
 
 Chattel mortgage, 99; form, 388. 
 
 Check, 158-160; defined, 158. 
 
 certified, 159. 
 
 defenses, 175-180. 
 
 discharge, 180-182. 
 
 does not discharge contract, 58. 
 
 essential conditions, 146-151. 
 
 form, 383. 
 
 must be presented without delay, 
 
 159- 
 
 negotiation, 163-174. 
 
 special forms, 161. 
 Choses in action, 293. 
 Circuit court, state, 359. 
 Circuit Court of Appeals, 357. 
 Citations, 16. 
 Civil courts, 355. 
 Civil law, 4, 5. 
 Clayton Act, 378. 
 C.O.D. shipments, 93. 
 Coinsurance clause, 257. 
 Collateral note, 162. 
 Collateral security, 215. 
 Commercial law, defined, 5. 
 Commission merchant, 89, 121; see 
 
 Agent. 
 Common carriers, 220-231; defined, 220. 
 
 charges of, 221, 229. 
 
 delivery by, 227-228. 
 
 liability for baggage, 230-231. 
 
 liability of, 223-228, 229-231. 
 
INDEX 
 
 401 
 
 Common carriers (continued). 
 of passengers, 229-231. 
 regulation of, 221, 222-223, 229, 376. 
 right to refuse goods, 221. 
 
 right to refuse passengers, 229. 
 Common law, 3-4, 5. 
 Common law courts, 355-356. 
 Common stock, 336, 335. 
 Complaint, in an action, 362. 
 Compromise with creditors, 45, 353. 
 Concealment of facts in insurance, 
 
 240, 248. 
 Conditional sales, 97-100. 
 Conditions, kinds of, 103. 
 Consent in contracts, 22-33. 
 Consideration, 39-46. 
 
 compromise with creditors, 45. 
 
 effect of seal, 39. 
 
 for discharge of a debt, 42. 
 
 for extension of time, 45. 
 
 for gift, 41. 
 
 for subscriptions, 46. 
 
 good, 45-46. 
 
 in executed contract, 41. 
 
 in negotiable instruments, 176. 
 
 may be a promise, 42. 
 
 moral obligations, 45-46. 
 
 must be legal, 40. 
 
 must be possible, 40. 
 
 must be present or future, 41. 
 
 must have value, 39. 
 
 settlement to avoid litigation, 44. 
 
 valuable, defined, 45. 
 Constitutional law, defined, 3. 
 Contingent fee, defined, 37. 
 Continuous succession, 330. 
 Contracts, 11-74; defined, 11, 71. 
 
 affirmance of, 16-17. 
 
 against public policy, 36-38. 
 
 assignment of 49-51; form, 382. 
 
 bilateral, 13. 
 
 breach of, 63-71. 
 
 consideration in, 39-46. 
 
 disaffirmance of, 17. 
 
 discharge of, 57-66, 73. 
 
 divisible and entire, 13, 65-66. 
 
 elements in, 14. 
 
 executed, 12-13. 
 
 executory, 13. 
 
 express, 11. 
 
 Contracts {continued). 
 
 formal, 12. 
 
 forms, 381. 
 
 fraudulent, 29-32. 
 
 implied, 12. 
 
 installment, 13, 65-66. 
 
 kinds of, 11-13. 
 
 not to be performed within one year, 
 53, 55-56. 
 
 of aHens, 20. 
 
 of idiots, 20. 
 
 of infants, 15-19. 
 
 of insane persons, 19. 
 
 of married women, 20. 
 
 offer and acceptance, 22-26. 
 
 operation of, 48-51. 
 
 oral, II. 
 
 parties to, 14-20, 48-51. 
 
 required to be written, 52-56, 94-97. 
 
 restraint of trade, 37-38. 
 
 rights of third parties, 48. 
 
 satisfactory performance, 58-59. 
 
 simple, 12; form, 381. 
 
 Statute of Frauds, 52-56, 94-97. 
 
 subject matter of, 34-38, 91. 
 
 substantial performance, 58, 59. 
 
 Sunday, 36. 
 
 telephone, 46. 
 
 to sell, 85, 90-94; defined, 85; 
 remedies for breach, 105-109 ; when 
 required to be in writing, 94-97. 
 
 uberrima fides, 29. 
 unilateral, 13. 
 unlawful, 34-38. 
 void, 15, 28, 34-38. 
 voidable, 15, 29-33. 
 written, 11, 52-56, 94-97. 
 Contributory neghgence, 127, 379. 
 Copartnership, see Partnership. 
 Corporations, 328-345; defined, 328. 
 anti-trust laws, 377-379. 
 by-laws, 330. 
 charter, 332, 341-342. 
 common and preferred stock, 336, 335, 
 creditors of, 339. 
 directors, 338-339- 
 dissolution of, 341-343. 
 distinct from members, 328. 
 dividends, 336. 
 formation of, 331. 
 
402 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Corporations {contimied). 
 
 incorporation, 331, 
 
 liability for acts of agents, 334. 
 
 management of, 338. 
 
 membership in, 335-337- 
 
 municipal, 329. 
 
 name and continuous succession, 330. 
 
 powers, 330, 332-334. 
 
 private, 329, 330-345- 
 
 remedies against, 339. 
 
 stockholders, 335-337; see Stock, etc. 
 
 ^dtra vires acts, 334. 
 CorpKjreal real property, 263. 
 Costs, in an action, 365. 
 Counterclaim, 362-363. 
 Counterfeit money not payment, 60. 
 County Court, 359. 
 Coupon bonds, 163. 
 Court of Appeals, 359. 
 Court of Claims, 358; state, 360. 
 Courts, 354-365- 
 
 federal courts, 356-358. 
 
 jurisdiction of, 354-356. 
 
 of record, 355. 
 
 pleading and practice, 361-365. 
 
 state courts, 358-360. 
 Courts of record, 355. 
 Covenants, in a deed, 273-277. 
 
 in a lease, 283-285. 
 
 in a mortgage, 280. 
 Coverture, estate during, 267. 
 Credit insurance, 254. 
 Creditors, compromise with, 45, 353. 
 Credits, 184-186. 
 Crime, defined, 4. 
 Criminal law, 4, 5. 
 Criminal courts, 355. 
 Crops, real or personal property, 266. 
 Curtesy, 267. 
 
 Damages, 66-69. 
 
 amount allowed, 68. 
 
 liquidated, 68. 
 Days of grace, 169. 
 Death., effect on contracts, 51. 
 
 terminates agency, 138. 
 
 terminates guaranty, 198. 
 
 terminates partnership, 317. 
 Debenture bonds, 163. 
 Declaration, in an action. 362. 
 
 Deed, 271-278. 
 
 of trust, 282. 
 
 quitclaim, 277. 
 
 recording, 274. 
 
 requirements of, 271-273. 
 
 warranty, 275; form, 386. 
 Defeasance clause, mortgage, 280. 
 Defendant, defined, 4, 5, 361. 
 Deficiency judgment, 281. 
 Del credere agents, 121. 
 Delivery, in sale, 86. 
 
 of deed, 274. 
 
 of negotiable instruments, 176-177. 
 Demand, negotiable instruments, 168- 
 
 170. 
 Demurrer, in an action, 363. 
 Deposition, 364. 
 Devise, defined, 278. 
 Directors of corporations, 338-339. 
 Disaffirmance of contracts, 17. 
 Discharge in bankruptcy, 352. 
 Discharge of contracts, 57-66, 73. 
 
 by agreement, 57. 
 
 by alteration of a written instru- 
 ment, 62. 
 
 by breach, 63-66. 
 
 by impossibility of performance, 61. 
 
 by operation of law, 62. 
 
 by performance, 57-61. 
 Discharge of negotiable instruments, 
 
 180-182. 
 Discharge of right of action, 69-71. 
 Discount loans, 185. 
 Dishonor, notice of, 170-172. 
 
 of bill of exchange, 157. 
 
 of negotiable instruments, 170-172. 
 Dissolution, of corporation, 341-343. 
 
 of partnership, 3 1 5-3 20. 
 District Court, 357; state, 359. 
 Dividends of a corporation, 336. 
 Divisible contract, 13, 65-66. 
 Dormant partner, 305. 
 Dower, 267. 
 
 Draft, see Bill of Exchange. 
 Drawee of a bill of exchange, 154. 
 Drawer of a bill of exchange, 154. 
 
 liability of, 157, 158, 170-172. 
 Duress, defined, 32. 
 
 effect on contracts, 32. 
 
 in negotiable instruments, 176. 
 
INDEX 
 
 403 
 
 Earnest payment, 95. 
 
 Easement, 263. 
 
 Elevator insurance, 255. 
 
 Elkins Act, 377. 
 
 Emblements, 266. 
 
 Eminent domain, 10, 264. 
 
 Employees, rights of, 127, 379-380. 
 
 Employers' liability, 127, 379. 
 
 Employers' liability insurance, 254, 380. 
 
 Entire contract, 13, 65-66. 
 
 Equitable estates, 269. 
 
 Equity, 4, 355-356- 
 
 Equity of redemption, 279. 
 
 Escrow, delivery in, 274. 
 
 Estates in land, 263-269, 283. 
 
 by marriage, 267. 
 
 equitable, 269. 
 
 for years, 283-287. 
 
 in fee simple, 264. 
 
 in remainder and reversion, 267. 
 
 in severalty, 269. 
 
 joint, 269. 
 
 life, 265-266. 
 Estoppel, defined, 303. 
 Eviction, 286. 
 Evidence, in a trial, 364. 
 Executed contract, 12. 
 Execution, writ issued by a court, 365. 
 Executor, promise to pay debts of the 
 
 estate, 52, 54. 
 Executory contract, 13. 
 Exemption laws, 353, 365. 
 Express company, 220; see Common 
 
 carrier. 
 Express contract, 11. 
 Express warranty, loi. 
 
 Factor, 89, 121; see Agent. 
 Federal courts, 356-358. 
 Federal Reserve Act, 185. 
 Federal Reserve Board, 186. 
 Federal Reserve notes, 186. 
 Federal Trade Commission, 379. 
 Fee simple, estate in, 264. 
 Feudal system, 264. 
 FeUow servant doctrine, 379. 
 Felony, defined, 359. 
 Fidelity insurance, 196, 252. 
 Fiduciary relation, defined, 1 28. 
 Fire, loss by, defined, 242. 
 
 Fire insurance, 238-245. 
 
 amount recoverable, 243. 
 
 lightning clause, 242. 
 
 mortgaged property, 239, 245. 
 
 notice of loss, 245. 
 
 policy, 241-245; assignment, 243- 
 244. 
 
 pro rata clause, 245. 
 
 unoccupied dwelling, 244. 
 Firm, defined, 302. 
 Fixtures, 293-300; rules concerning, 
 
 294-298. 
 F.O.B. shipments, 93. 
 Foreclosure, of chattel mortgage, 99. 
 
 of mortgage, 281. 
 Foreign bill of exchange, 155. 
 Forgery of negotiable instruments, 179. 
 Formal contract, 12; form, 381. 
 Forms of contracts, etc., 381-390. 
 Fraud, 29-32; defined, 29. 
 
 by agent, 134-135- 
 
 effect on title, 88. 
 
 in fire insurance, 240. 
 
 in marine insurance, 251. 
 
 in negotiable instruments, 176, 178. 
 Frauds, Statute of, 52-56, 94-97. 
 Freehold, 288. 
 Freight charges, 221. 
 Full indorsement, 165. 
 Future goods, 91, 92. 
 
 Garnishment, 367. 
 
 General agent, 119. 
 
 General average, 253. 
 
 General partner, 304. 
 
 Gifts, 41-42. 
 
 God, act of, defined, 254. 
 
 Good consideration, 45-46. 
 
 Good will, defined, 309. 
 
 Gratuitous agent, 122, 130-131. 
 
 Gratuitous bailment, 207-211. 
 
 Guarantor, 194. 
 
 discharge of, 196-198. 
 
 liability of, 198. 
 
 rights of, 199. 
 Guaranty, 194-201, 52, 54-55; de- 
 fined, 194. 
 
 compared with suretyship, 199. 
 
 of collection and of payment, 195. 
 
 revocation of, 198. 
 
404 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Guaranty insurance, 196. 
 Guests, of innkeeper, 218. 
 
 Habendum, in a deed, 273. 
 
 Health insurance, 255. 
 
 Hired service about a chattel, 212. 
 
 Hired use of a chattel, 214. 
 
 Holder in due course, 1 73-1 74. 
 
 Homestead right, 268. 
 
 Hotel keepers, 218-220. 
 
 Ice, ownership of, 262. 
 
 Idiots, 20; contracts of, 20. 
 
 Illegal object of contract, 34-36. 
 
 Implied contract, 12. 
 
 Implied partnership, 303, 305-307. 
 
 Implied warranty, 101-105. 
 
 Impossibihties, contracts requiring, 40, 
 
 61. 
 Incorporation, 331. 
 Incorporeal real property, 263. 
 Incumbrances to title of real estate, 276. 
 Indemnity, contract of, 194. 
 Indorsements, kinds of, 165-166. 
 
 where and how made, 167. 
 Indorser, 167 
 
 discharge of, 182. 
 
 irregular, 172. 
 
 liability of, 168, 170-172. 
 
 notice to, 171. 
 
 obligation of, 167. 
 
 payment by, 181. 
 Infants, 15. 
 
 agents of, 17. 
 
 contracts of, 15-19. 
 
 liable for torts, 19. 
 
 negotiable instruments of, 178. 
 Inheritance, defined, 278. 
 Injunction, 67, 353. 
 Inland bill of exchange, 155. 
 Innkeepers, 218-220. 
 
 liability, of, 218-219. 
 
 lien of, 219-220. 
 Insane persons, 20; contracts of, 19-20. 
 Insolvency, defined, 107, 348. 
 
 reason for stoppage in transitu, 107- 
 108. 
 Installment contracts, 13, 65-66, 97. 
 Installment sales, 97. 
 Insurable interest, 239, 246-247, 250. 
 
 Insurance. 238-258; defined, 238. 
 
 accident, 253. 
 
 automobile, 255-256. 
 
 burglary, 255. 
 
 casualty, 253-256. 
 
 credit, 254. 
 
 elevator, 255. 
 
 employers' liability, 254, 380. 
 
 fidelity, 254. 
 
 fire, 238-245. 
 
 guaranty, 196. 
 
 health, 255. 
 
 insurable interest, 239, 246-247, 250. 
 
 life, 246-250. 
 
 marine, 250-253. 
 
 plate glass, 255. 
 
 steam boiler, 255. 
 
 title, 254. 
 Insurance companies, 238, 256. 
 Interest, 182-182; defined, 182. 
 
 compound, 183. 
 
 legal, 182. 
 
 on negotiable instruments, 177. 
 
 on notes, 151. 
 
 on what claims allowed, 183. 
 
 usury, 183. 
 International law, 2. 
 Interstate Commerce Act, 221, 222-223, 
 
 376. 
 Intestate, defined, 278. 
 Involuntary bankrupt, 349. 
 Irregular indorser, 172. 
 
 Joint and several note, 152-153. 
 
 Joint estates, 269. 
 
 Joint liability, 49. 
 
 Joint note, 152-153. 
 
 Joint stock companies, 343-344. 
 
 Joint tenancy, 9, 269. 
 
 Judgment, in an action, 69, 364-365. 
 
 deficiency, 281. 
 Judgment note, 162. 
 Jurisdiction of courts, 354-356. 
 Jury, 363-364. 
 Justice Court, 358. 
 
 Lakes, ownership of, 262. 
 Land, see Real property. 
 Land contract, 53, 55, 271. 
 Landlord and tenant, 283-287. 
 
INDEX 
 
 40s 
 
 Law, 1-6; defined, i. 
 
 kinds of, 2-5. 
 
 order of authority, 6, 7. 
 
 sources of, i, 5. 
 Lawyers, 364; license required, 35. 
 Lease, 283-287. 
 
 form, 389. 
 
 must be written, 53. 
 
 subletting, 286. 
 
 termination of, 284, 287. 
 Legal tender, 59-60. 
 Legislative bodies, i, 6. 
 Lessee, defined, 283. 
 Lessor, defined, 283. 
 Letter of credit, 161. 
 Levy and sale, 365. 
 Liability, joint and several, 49. 
 Lien, for payment of services, 214. 
 
 of auctioneer, 1 10. 
 
 of common carrier, 221. 
 
 of innkeeper, 219-220. 
 
 of seller of goods, 106. 
 Life estate, 265-266. 
 Life insurance, 246-250. 
 
 accident insurance, 253. 
 
 forms of, 246. 
 
 notice of death, 250. 
 
 requirements of contract, 246-249. 
 
 suicide, 249. 
 Lightning clause in fire insurance, 242. 
 Limitations, Statute of, 69-7 1 . 
 Limited partnership, 305. 
 Liquidated damages, 68. 
 Litigation, settlement to avoid, 44. 
 Lobbying, contracts for, 37. 
 Lost property, 89, 206. 
 L.S., meaning of, 12. 
 
 Machinery, as fixtures, 294-298. 
 Mail orders, 93. 
 
 Maker of a promissory note, 151. 
 Marine insurance, 250-253. 
 
 losses, 252. 
 Marriage, contracts affecting, 37. 
 
 effect on agency, 138-139. 
 
 estates by, 267. 
 
 promises in consideration of, 52, 55. 
 Married women, contracts of, 20. 
 
 agency contracts, 138-139. 
 Master of a vessel, powers, 89, 125. 
 
 Maturity of negotiable instruments, 169. 
 Minors, 15; see Infants. 
 Misdemeanor, defined, 359. 
 Misrepresentation, in contracts, 28-32. 
 
 in insurance, 240-241, 248, 249, 251. 
 Mistake, in contracts, 27. 
 Money, kinds legal tender, 60. 
 Money orders, 161. 
 Moral law, 2. 
 
 Moral obligations, consideration, 45-46. 
 Mortgage, 279-282; defined, 279. 
 
 assignment, 281. 
 
 chattel, 99; form, 388. 
 
 clause in fire insurance, 245. 
 
 discharge of, 281. 
 
 foreclosure of, 281. 
 
 form, 280, 387. 
 
 satisfaction of, 282; form, 387. 
 
 second, 282. 
 Mortgage bonds, 163. 
 Mortgagee, defined, 279. 
 Mortgagor, defined, 279. 
 Mortuary tables, 248. 
 Municipal law, 2-5. 
 
 Necessaries, defined, 18. 
 
 infant's contracts for, 18-19. 
 Negligence, of bailee, 205. 
 
 of injured employee, 127, 379. 
 Negotiability, 164. 
 
 Negotiable instruments, 146-188; de- 
 fined, 146, 147. 
 
 alteration of, 178. 
 
 bills of exchange, 154-158. 
 
 checks, 158-160. 
 
 credits, 184-186. 
 
 defenses, 175-180. 
 
 discharge, 180-182. 
 
 dishonor of, 170-172. 
 
 essential conditions, 146-151. 
 
 forms, 383-384- 
 
 indorsement, 164-167. 
 
 maturity of, 169. 
 
 negotiable form, 148. 
 
 negotiation, 163-174. 
 
 permissible omissions, 1 50-151. 
 
 presentment and demand, 168-170. 
 
 promissory notes, 1 51-154. 
 
 protest, 172. 
 
 special forms of, 160-163. 
 
4o6 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Negotiable Instruments Law, 146. 
 Negotiation, 163-174. 
 New trial, 365. 
 Nominal partner, 304. 
 Nondisclosure, effect on contracts, 30. 
 Note, see Promissory note. 
 Notice, by retiring partner, 318-319. 
 
 concerning partner's powers, 313. 
 
 of death, life insurance, 250. 
 
 of dishonor, 170-172. 
 
 of loss, fire insurance, 245. 
 
 to agent, 132. 
 
 to one partner notice to all, 314. 
 Novation, 51. 
 
 Offer and acceptance, 22-26. 
 
 lapse of offer, 25. 
 
 reality of consent, 26-33. 
 Option, 25. 
 Oral contract, 11. 
 Order bill of lading, 161. 
 Original jurisdiction, 355. 
 Ownership, 8-10. 
 
 kinds of, 9. 
 
 limitations upon, 9-10. 
 
 Parol contract, 12. 
 Parties, in an action, 5, 361. 
 
 in a contract, 14-20, 48-51. 
 
 to a sale, 87-90. 
 Partners, 302. 
 
 by estoppel, 303 
 
 compensation, 311. 
 
 death of, 317. 
 
 dormant, 305. 
 
 general, 304. 
 
 incoming, 320. 
 
 kinds of, 304. 
 
 liability of, 304-30S, 3io, 313-3 1 5, 3 1 8 
 320. 
 
 limited, 305. 
 
 may sell, 308. 
 
 nominal, 304. 
 
 notice to, 314. 
 
 power of majority, 312. 
 
 retiring, 318-319. 
 
 rights of, 308-313, 316. 
 
 secret, 304. 
 
 silent, 304. 
 
 special, 305. 
 
 Partnership, 302-322; defined, 302. 
 
 by estoppel, 303. 
 
 capital of, 309. 
 
 contract, 302; form, 384. 
 
 discontinuing the business, 320. 
 
 dissolution of, 315-320. 
 
 form of articles of copartnership, 384. 
 
 good will, 309. 
 
 implied, 303, 305-307. 
 
 liability of partners, 304-305, 310, 
 313-315, 318-320. 
 
 limited, 305. 
 
 name, 314. 
 
 notice to, 314. 
 
 property, 309. 
 
 reality of, 305-307. 
 
 remedies against, 315. 
 
 rights of partners, 308-313. 
 
 trade-marks and trade names, 309 
 Passengers, carriers of, 229-231. 
 Pawn, 215. 
 Payee, 151, 154. 
 
 rights of, 173. 
 Penalties, defined, 4, 5. 
 Personal credit, 184. 
 Personal defenses, 176-177. 
 Personal property, defined, 8, 293. 
 
 fixtures, 293-300. 
 
 sales of, 85-112. 
 Petition, in an action, 362. 
 Physician, hcense required for, 35. 
 Plaintiff, defined, 4, 5, 361. 
 Plate glass insurance, 255 
 Plea, in an action, 362. 
 Pleadings, in an action, 362-363. 
 Pledge, 215-217. 
 Pledgee may sell, 89. 
 Policy, defined, 238. 
 
 fire insurance, 239, 241-245; can- 
 cellation, 244; renewals, 244. 
 
 life insurance, 248. 
 Possession and ownership, 9. 
 Potential existence of goods sold, 91. 
 Power of attorney, 17, 123; form, 382. 
 Preferred stock, 336, 335. 
 Premium, defined, 238. 
 
 life insurance, 246, 248, 249. 
 Prescription, title by, 271. 
 Presentment and demand, 168-170. 
 Price, defined, 94. 
 
INDEX 
 
 407 
 
 Principal, in agency, defined, 119. 
 
 liability for torts of agent, 134-136. 
 
 obligation of third party to, 133-134. 
 
 obligation to agent, 125-127. 
 
 obligation to third party, 132. 
 
 termination of agency, 136-139. 
 Principal, in guaranty, 194. 
 Probate court, 359. 
 Promise, 11, 13, 39-46; see Contracts. 
 
 as consideration, 42. 
 Promissory condition, 103. 
 Promissory note, 151-154; defined, 151. 
 
 defenses, 175-180. 
 
 discharge, 180-182. 
 
 does not discharge contract, 58. 
 
 essential conditions, 146-151. 
 
 forms, 383, 384. 
 
 interest on, 183. 
 
 joint, several, etc., 152-153. 
 
 negotiation, 163-174. 
 
 paid note should be defaced, 181. 
 
 special forms of, 162. 
 Property, 8-10; defined, 10. 
 
 kinds of, 8. 
 
 lost, 206. 
 
 stolen, 89. 
 Pro rata clause, in fire insurance, 245. 
 Protest, 172; waived, 171. 
 Proxy of stockholder, 339; form, 386. 
 Public agents, 120. 
 Public enemies, 225. 
 Public policy, contracts against, 36-38. 
 Purchaser, remedies for breach, 108-109. 
 Pure condition, 103. 
 
 QuaHfied indorsement, 166. 
 Quitclaim deed, 277. 
 
 Railroad company, 220; see Common 
 
 carrier. 
 Ratification of agent's acts, 123-124. 
 Real defenses, 177-180. 
 Real estate, 262-263; 5ee Real property. 
 Real property, 262-289; defined, 8, 
 262-263, 293. 
 
 conveyance of, 271-278. 
 
 corporeal and incorporeal, 263. 
 
 estates in, see Estates. 
 
 fixtures, 293-300. 
 
 landlord and tenant, 283-287. 
 
 Real property {continued). 
 
 mortgages, 279-282. 
 
 ownership of, 270. 
 
 sale of, 271. 
 
 title to, 270. 
 Reality of consent in contracts, 26-33. 
 Receiver, for bankrupt's property, 350. 
 Recording, of deeds, 275. 
 
 of mortgages, 281. 
 Referee, 360, 366. 
 Registered bonds, 163. 
 Remainder, estate in, 267. 
 Replevin, 108, 366. 
 Reply, in an action, 363. 
 Representation in contracts, 28-32. 
 
 in fire insurance, 240. 
 Restaurant keepers, 218. 
 Restraint of trade, 37-38, 378. 
 Restrictive indorsement, 166. 
 Reversion, estate in, 267. 
 Reward for information as to criminals, 23 . 
 Right of action, 63-70. 
 Risk, defined, 238. 
 
 Sale, 85-87, 90. 
 
 auction sales, i'09-iio. 
 
 bill of sale, 94; form, 382. 
 
 by description, 103, 104. 
 
 by sample, 102-103. 
 
 conditional, 97-100. 
 
 contracts to sell, 85, 90-94; defined, 
 85; when required to l>e in writing, 
 94-97; remedies for breach, 105- 
 109. 
 
 distinguished from bailment, 86-87. 
 
 installment, 97. 
 
 of personal property, 85-112. 
 
 of real property, 271. 
 
 on approval, 92. 
 
 on "sale or return,*' 92. 
 
 parties to, 87-90. 
 
 remedies for breach, 105-109. 
 
 seller must have good title, 88. 
 
 Statute of Frauds, .94-97. 
 
 under execution, 365. 
 
 warranties, 100-105. 
 
 when title passes, 91-93. 
 Sales of Goods Act, 85. 
 Sample, sale by, 102-103. 
 Satisfaction of mortgage, 282; form, 387. 
 
4o8 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Satisfactory performance of contracts, 
 
 58-59. 
 Seal, on documents, 1 2. 
 
 effect of, 39, 43. 
 
 on a deed, 273. 
 Second mortgage, 282. 
 Secret partner, 304, 
 Seizin covenant in a deed, 275. 
 Seller, remedies for breach, 105-108. 
 Services, oral contracts for, are valid, 96. 
 Several liability, 49. 
 Several note, 152. 
 Sherman Act, 378. 
 Sight draft, 155; form, 384. 
 Signature, on promissory note, 153. 
 Silence not acceptance, 26. 
 Silent partner, 304. 
 Simple contract, 12; form, 381. 
 Sleeping car company not innkeeper, 
 
 232. 
 Solvency, defined, 348. 
 Special agent, 120. 
 
 form of appointment, 383. 
 Special indorsement, 165. 
 Special partner, 305. 
 Specific performance, 67, 108. 
 Statute law, 3, 5, 6. 
 Statute of Frauds, 52-56, 94-97. 
 
 contract for sale of goods, 94-97. 
 
 contract not to be performed within 
 one year, 53, 55-56. 
 
 guaranty of a debt, 52, 54-55* i94- 
 201. 
 
 land contracts, 53, 55, 271. 
 
 leases, 283. 
 
 memorandum required, 54, 95. 
 
 object, 53. 
 
 partnership contract, 302-303. 
 
 promise in consideration of marriage, 
 52, 55. 
 
 promise of executor or administrator, 
 52, 54; 
 
 what writing is sufficient, 54, 95. 
 Statute of Limitations, 69-71. 
 Steam boiler insurance, 255. 
 Steamship company not innkeeper, 232. 
 Stock, certificates, 329, 335, 336. 
 
 common and preferred, 336, 335. 
 
 subscriptions, 335. 
 
 transfer of, 33^337- 
 
 Stockholders, 335-33?- 
 
 liability, 331, 340. 
 
 meeting, 338. 
 ■ rights of, 335, 338. 
 Stolen property, title to, 89. 
 Stoppage in transitu, 106-108. 
 Streams, ownership of, 262. 
 Subagents, 129-130. 
 Subject matter of a contract, 34-38, 91. 
 Subletting of lease, 286. 
 Subpoena, 364. 
 Subrogation, defined, 199. 
 Subscriptions, consideration for, 46. 
 Suicide, in life insurance, 249. 
 Summary proceedings, 287. 
 Summons, in an action, 361. 
 Sunday contracts, 36. 
 Supplementary proceedings, 366. 
 Supreme Court, 357; state, 359. 
 Suretyship, 199. 
 Surrogate, 359. 
 
 Telephone, contracts made by, 46. 
 Tenancy, joint, 9, 269. 
 Tenancy in common, 9, 269. 
 Tenant, and landlord, 283-287. 
 
 right to fixtures, 294-298. 
 Tenant for life, 265-266. 
 Tender of payment, 59-60. 
 Tenure, 288. 
 
 Testimonium clause in a deed, 273. 
 Thief acquires no title, 89. 
 Third parties, in agency, 132-134. 
 
 in contracts, 48. 
 Time draft, 155. 
 Title, abstract of, 271. 
 
 insurance, 196, 254. 
 
 to real property, 270. 
 
 when title passes, 91-93. 
 Tort, defined, 19. 
 
 of agent, 134-136. 
 Tortious bailee, 206. 
 Trade, restraint of, 37-38. 
 Trade acceptance, 162. 
 Trade Commission Act, 378-379. 
 Trade fixtures, 297. 
 Trade-mark of partnership, 309. 
 Travelers' checks, 161. 
 Trial, 363; new trial, 365. 
 Trustee, in bankruptcy, 350-^51. 
 
INDEX 
 
 409 
 
 Uberrima fides contracts, 29. 
 
 Ultra vires contracts, 334. 
 
 Undue influence in contracts, 33. 
 
 Uniform acts, 85. 
 
 Uniform Negotiable Instruments LaW, 
 
 146. 
 Uniform Partnership Law, 302. 
 Unilateral contract, 13. 
 Unlawful contracts, 34-38. 
 Usury, 183. 
 
 Valuable consideration, 45. 
 Value, defined, 94. 
 Vendee, defined, 87. 
 
 remedies for breach, 108-109. 
 Vendor, defined, 87. 
 
 remedies for breach, 105-108. 
 Verdict, 364. 
 Virtual acceptance, 158. 
 Void contracts, 15, 28, 34-38. 
 Voidable contracts, 15, 29-33. 
 Voidable title, 88. 
 Voucher check, i6i. 
 
 Wagers, unlawful, 35. 
 Waiver of protest, 171. 
 War, efifects of, 139, 225. 
 Warehouse receipts, 161, 214. 
 Warehouse Receipts Act, 85. 
 Warranty, 100-105; defined, 100. 
 
 breach of, 108-109. 
 
 consideration for, 100. 
 
 express and implied, loi. 
 
 in insurance, 240-241, 248, 249, 251. 
 Warranty deed, 275; form, 386. 
 Waste, of life tenant, 266. 
 Wife, as agent of husband, 1 24. 
 
 rights to hold property, 5, 20. 
 Will, 278; form, 390. 
 Witnesses, 364. 
 
 Work or service, oral contracts for, 96. 
 Workmen's compensation laws, 127. 
 
 379-380. 
 World War, effects of, 287, 377. 
 Written contracts, 11, 52-56, 94-97. 
 
 alteration in, 62. 
 Written law, 3, 5, 6. 
 
YB 30853 * 
 
 459828 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY