aia
 
 Copyright jguo liy J . h. funty 
 
 WU TING-FANG, 
 
 CHINHSE MINISTHK TO THE UNITED STATES
 
 iMKorlli's i3eet ^fetotice 
 
 CHINA 
 
 BY 
 
 DEMETRIUS CHARLES BOULGER 
 
 Illustrated 
 
 WITH A SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER OF RECENT EVENTS 
 
 BY GILSON WILLETS 
 
 NEW YORK AND LONDu^ 
 THE CO-OPERATIVE PUBLICATION SOCIETY
 
 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 2064907
 
 I DEDICATE THIS SHORT 
 
 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 TO 
 
 Sir halliday macartney, K.C.m.G. 
 
 AS A SLIGHT TEIBDTB OF PERSONAL RESPECT AND ADMIRATION FOR ONE WHO 
 
 HAS MAINTAINED THE RIGHT OF CHINA TO BE TREATED BY THE 
 
 GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE WITH THE DIGNITY AND 
 
 CONSIDERATION THAT BECOME A 
 
 GREAT EMPIRE. 
 
 iP TO LORD MACARTNEY WE OWE THE FIRST SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIU 
 AUDIENCE OF THE EMPEROR OF CHINA ON THE SAME CONDI- 
 TIONS AS THOSE ON WHICH FOREIGN EMBASSADORS 
 ARE RECEIVED AT EUROPEAN COURTS, TO 
 
 SIR HALLIDAY MACARTNEY 
 
 A SCION OF THE SAME FAMILY 
 
 CHINA 
 
 OWES MUCH OF THE SUCCESS THAT HAS ATTENDED HER DIPLOMACY 
 IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAP. PAG EC 
 
 I. The Early Ages c -,..11 
 
 II. The First National Dynasty „ » . 25 
 
 III. A Long Period of Disunion . „ 42 
 
 IV. The Sungs and the Kins 66 
 
 V. The Mongol Conquest of China „ . 86 
 
 YI. KUBLAI AND the MONGOL DYNASTY ......... 123 
 
 VII. The Ming Dynasty 1.S9 
 
 YIII. The Decline op the Mings <, ... 163 
 
 IX. The Manchu Conquest of China .......... 175 
 
 X. The First Manchu Ruler ,..,.. 194 
 
 XI. The Emperor Kanghi c . , . . . 204 
 
 XII, A Short Reign and the Beginning op a Long One . . .218 
 
 XIII. Keen Lung's Wars and Conquests . 229 
 
 XIV. The Commencement of European Intercourse 240 
 
 XV. The Decline of the Manchus . 249 
 
 XVI. The Emperor Taoukwang 261 
 
 XVn. The First Foreign "War . 271 
 
 XVIII. Taoukwang and His Successor , 310 
 
 XIX. The Second Foreign War 335 
 
 XX. The Taeping Rebellion 390 
 
 XXI. The Regency 427 
 
 XXII. The Reign of Kwangsu - .... „ 468 
 
 The War With Japan and Subsequent Events . . . o . 506 
 
 The Future of China 532
 
 /k
 
 m
 
 PREFACE 
 
 As China has now fairly taken her place in the 
 family of nations, it is unnecessary to elaborate an 
 argument in support of even the humblest attempt to 
 elucidate her history. It is a subject to which we can 
 no longer remain indifferent, because circumstances are 
 bringing every day more clearly into view the impor- 
 tant part China must play in the changes that have 
 become imminent in Asia, and that will affect the 
 security of our position and em]3ire in that continent. 
 A good understanding with China should be the first 
 article of our Eastern policy, for not only in Central 
 Asia, but also in In do- China, where French ambition 
 threatens to create a fresh Egypt, her interests coincide 
 with ours and furnish the sound basis of a fruitful 
 alliance. 
 
 This book, which I may be pardoned for saying is 
 not an abridgment of my original work, but entirely 
 rewritten and rearranged with the view of giving 
 prominence to the modern history of the Chinese Em- 
 pire, may appeal, although they generally treat Asiatic 
 subjects with regrettable indifference, to that wider circle 
 of English readers on whose opinion and efforts the de- 
 velopment of our political and commercial relations with 
 the greatest of Oriental States will mainly depend. 
 
 D. C. BOULGER, 
 
 April 28, 1893. 
 
 (9)
 
 A SHORT 
 
 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE EARLY AGES 
 
 The Cliinese are unquestionably the oldest nation in the 
 world, and their history goes back to a period to which no 
 prudent historian will attempt to give a precise date. They 
 speak the language and observe the same social and political 
 customs that they did several thousand years before the 
 Christian era, and they are the only living representatives 
 to-day of a people and government which were contempo- 
 rary with the Egyptians, the Assyrians, and the Jews. So 
 far as our knowledge enables us to speak, the Chinese of the 
 present age are in all essential points identical with those of 
 the time of Confucius, and there is no reason to doubt that 
 before his time the Chinese national character had been 
 thoroughly formed in its present mold. The limits of the 
 empire have varied from time to time under circumstances 
 of triumph or disunion, but the Middle Kingdom, or China 
 Proper, of the eighteen provinces has always possessed more 
 or less of its existing proportions. Another striking and 
 peculiar feature about China is the small amount of influ- 
 ence that the rest of the world has exercised upon it. In 
 fact, it is only during the present century that that influence 
 can be said to have existed at all. Up to that point China 
 had pursued a course of her own, carrying on her own strug- 
 gles within a definite limit, and completely indifferent to, and 
 
 (11)
 
 12 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 ignorant of, tlie ceaseless competition and contests of man- 
 kind outside her orbit, which make up the history of the rest 
 of the Old World. The long struggles for supremacy in 
 "Western Asia between Assyrian, Babylonian and Persian, 
 the triumphs of the Greek, followed by the absorption of 
 what remained of the Macedonian conquests in the Empire 
 of Home, even the appearance of Islam and the Mohamme- 
 dan conquerors, who changed the face of Southern Asia from 
 the Ganges to the Levant, and long threatened to overrun 
 Europe, had no significance for the people of China, and 
 reacted as little on their destiny as if they had happened in 
 another planet. Whatever advantages the Chinese may 
 have derived from this isolation, it has entailed the pen- 
 alty that the early history of their country is devoid of in- 
 terest for the rest of the world, and it is only when the long 
 independent courses of China and Europe are brought into 
 proximity by the Mongol conquests, the efforts of the medie- 
 val travelers, the development of commerce, and the wars 
 carried on for the purpose of obtaining a secure position for 
 foreigners in China — four distinct phases covering the last 
 seven centuries — that any confidence can be felt in success- 
 fully attracting notice to the affairs of China. Yet, as a 
 curiosity in human existence, the earlier history of that 
 country may justly receive some notice. Even though the 
 details are not recited, the recollection of the antiquity of 
 China's institutions must be ever present with the student, 
 as affording an indispensable clew to the character of the 
 Chinese people and the composition of their government. 
 
 The first Chinese are supposed to have been a nomad 
 tribe in the province of Shensi, which lies in the northwest 
 of China, and among them at last appeared a ruler, Fohi, 
 whose name at least has been preserved. Ilis deeds and his 
 person are mythical, but he is credited with having given 
 his country its first regular institutions. One of his succes- 
 sors was Ilwangti (which means Heavenly Emperor), who 
 was tlie first to employ the imperial style of Emperor, the 
 earlier rulers having been content with the inferior title of
 
 THE EARLY AGES 13 
 
 Wang, or prince. He adopted the convenient decimal divis- 
 ion in his administration as well as his coinage. His domin- 
 ions were divided into ten provinces, each of these into ten 
 departments, these again into ten districts, each of which 
 held ten towns. He regulated the calendar, originating the 
 Chinese cycle of sixty years, and he encouraged commerce. 
 He seems to have been a wise prince and to have been the 
 first of the great emperors. His grandson, who was also 
 emperor, continued his good work and earned the reputation 
 of being "the restorer or even founder of true astronomy." 
 But the most famous of Hwangti's successors was his 
 great-grandson Yao, who is still one of the most revered of 
 all Chinese rulers. He was "diligent, enlightened, polished 
 and prudent, ' ' and if his words reflected his actions he must 
 have been most solicitous of the welfare of his people. He 
 is specially remarkable for his anxiety to discover the best 
 man to succeed him in the government, and during the last 
 twenty-eight years of his reign he associated the minister 
 Chun with him for that purpose. On his death he left the 
 crown to him, and Chun, after some hesitation, accepted the 
 charge; but he in turn hastened to secure the co-operation of 
 another minister named Yu in the work of administration, 
 just as he had been associated with Yao. The period cov- 
 ered by the rule of this triumvirate is considered one of the 
 most brilliant and perfect in Chinese history, and it bears a 
 resemblance to the age of the Antonines. These rulers seem 
 to have passed their leisure from practical work in framing 
 moral axioms, and in carrying out a model scheme of gov- 
 ernment based on the ]3urest ethics. They considered that 
 "a prince intrusted with the charge of a State has a heavy 
 task. The happiness of his subjects absolutely depends 
 upon him. To provide for everything is his duty; his min- 
 isters are only put in ofhce to assist him," and also that "a 
 prince who wishes to fulfill his obligations, and to long pre- 
 serve his people in the ways of peace, ought to watch with- 
 out ceasing that the laws are observed with exactitude." 
 They were stanch upholders of temperance, and they ban-
 
 14 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 ished the unlucky discoverer of the fact that an intoxicating 
 drink could be obtained from rice. They also held fast to 
 the theory that all government must be based on the popular 
 will. In fact, the reigns of Yao, Chun and Yu are the ideal 
 period of Chinese history, when all questions were decided by 
 moral right and justice, and even now Chinese philosophers 
 are said to test their maxims of morality by the degree 
 of agreement they may have with the conduct of those 
 rulers. 
 
 "With them passed away the practice of letting the most 
 capable and experienced minister rule the State. Such an 
 impartial and reasonable mode of selecting the head of a 
 community can never be perpetuated. The rulers them- 
 selves may see its advantages and may endeavor as honestly 
 as these three Chinese princes to carry out the arrangement, 
 but the day must come when the family of the able ruler 
 will assert its rights to the succession, and take advantage 
 of its opportunities from its close connection with the gov- 
 ernment to carry out its ends. The Emperor Yu, true to 
 the practice of his predecessors, nominated the president 
 of the council as his successor, but his son Tiki seized the 
 throne, and became the founder of the first Chinese dynasty, 
 which was called the Hia, from the name of the province 
 first ruled by his father. This event is supposed to have 
 taken place in the year 2197 B.C., and the Hia dynasty, of 
 which there were seventeen emperors, ruled down to the 
 year 1776 B.C. These Ilia princes present no features of 
 interest, and the last of them, named Kia, was deposed by 
 one of his principal nobles, Ching Tang, Prince of Chang. 
 
 This prince was the founder of the second dynasty, known 
 as Chang, which held possession of the throne for 654 years, 
 or down to 1122 B.C. With the exception of the founder, 
 who seems to have been an able man, this dynasty of 
 twenty-eight emperors did nothing very noteworthy. The 
 public morality deteriorated very much under this family, 
 and it is said that when one of the emperors wanted an 
 honest man as minister he could only find one in the person
 
 THE EARLY AGES 15 
 
 of a common laborer. At last, in the twelfth century before 
 our era, the enormities of the Chang rulers reached a climax 
 in the person of Chousin, who was deposed by a popular ris- 
 ing headed by Wou Wang, Prince of Chow. 
 
 This successful soldier, whose name signifies the Warrior 
 King, founded the third Chinese dynasty of Chow, which 
 governed the empire for the long space of 867 years down to 
 255 B. c. During that protracted period there were necessa- 
 rily good and bad emperors, and the Chow dynasty was ren- 
 dered specially illustrious by the appearance of the great 
 social and religious reformers, Laoutse, Confucius and Men- 
 cius, during the existence of its power. The founder of the 
 dynasty instituted the necessary reforms to prove that he 
 was a national benefactor, and one of his successors, known 
 as the Magnificent King, extended the authority of his 
 family over some of the States of Turkestan. But, on the 
 whole, the rulers of the Chow dynasty were not particu- 
 larly distinguished, and one of them in the eighth century 
 B.C. was weak enough to resign a portion of his sovereign 
 rights to a powerful vassal, Siangkong, the Prince of Tsin, 
 in consideration of his undertaking the defense of the fron- 
 tier against the Tartars. At this period the authority of the 
 central government passed under a cloud. The emperor's 
 prerogative became the shadow of a name, and the last three 
 centuries of the rule of this family would not call for notice 
 but for the genius of Laoutse and Confucius, who were both 
 great moral teachers and religious reformers. 
 
 Laoutse, the founder of Taou.ism, was the first in point 
 of time, and in some respects he was the greatest of these 
 reformers. He found his countrymen sunk in a low state of 
 moral indifference and religious infidelity which corresponded 
 with the corruption of the times and the disunion in the 
 kingdom. He at once set himself to work with energy and 
 devotion to repair the evils of his day, and to raise before 
 his countrymen a higher ideal of duty. He has been called 
 the Chinese Pythagoras, the most erudite of sinologues have 
 pronounced his text obscure, and the mysterious Taouism
 
 1(5 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 which he founded holds the smallest or the least assignable 
 part in what passes for the religion of the Chinese. As a 
 philosopher and minister Laoutse will always attract atten- 
 tion and excite speculation, but as a practical reformer and 
 politician he was far surpassed by his younger and less theo- 
 retical contemporary Confucius. 
 
 Confucius was an official in the service of one of the 
 great princes who divided the governing power of China 
 among themselves during the whole of the seventh century 
 before our era, which beheld the appearance of both of these 
 religious teachers and leaders. He was a trained adminis- 
 trator with long experience when he urged upon his prince 
 the necessity of reform, and advocated a policy of union 
 throughout the States. His exhortations were in vain, and 
 so far ill-timed that he was obliged to resign the service of 
 one prince after another. In his day the authority of the 
 Chow emperor had been reduced to the lowest point. Each 
 prince was unto himself the supreme authority. Yet one 
 cardinal point of the policy of Confucius was submission to 
 the emperor, as implicit obedience to the head of the State 
 throughout the country as was paid to the father of every 
 Chinese household. Although he failed to find a prince 
 after his own heart, his example and precepts were not 
 thrown away, for in a later generation his reforms were 
 executed, and down to the present day the best points in 
 Chinese government are based on his recommendations. If 
 "no intelligent monarch arose" in his time, the greatest 
 emperors have since sought to conform with his usages and 
 to rule after the ideal of the great philosopher. His name 
 and his teachings were perpetuated by a band of devoted 
 disciples, and the book which contained the moral and philo- 
 sophical axioms of Confucius passed into the classic litera- 
 ture of the country and stood in the place of a Bible for the 
 Chinese. The list of the great Chinese reformers is com- 
 ])]eted by the name of Mencius, who, coming two centuries 
 later, curried on with V)etter opportunities the reforming 
 work of Confucius, and left behind him in his Sheking the
 
 THE EARLY AGES 17 
 
 most popular book of Chinese poetry and a crowning tribute 
 to the great Master. 
 
 From teachers we must again pass to the chronicle of 
 kmgs, although few of the later Chow emperors deserve 
 their names to be rescued from oblivion. One emperor suf- 
 fered a severe defeat while attempting to establish his au- 
 thority over the troublesome tribes beyond the frontier; of 
 another it was written that "his good qualities merited a 
 happier day," and the general character of the age may be 
 inferred from its being designated by the native chroniclers 
 "The warlike period." At last, after what seemed an in- 
 terminable old age, marked by weakness and vice, the Chow 
 dynasty came to an end in the person of Nan Wang, who, 
 although he reigned for nearly sixty years, was deposed in 
 ignominious fashion by one of his great vassals, and reduced 
 to a humble position. His conqueror became the founder of 
 the fourth Chinese dynasty. 
 
 During the period of internal strife which marked the last 
 four centuries of the Chow dynasty, one family had steadily 
 waxed stronger and stronger among the princes of China: the 
 princes of Tsin, by a combination of prudence and daring, 
 gradually made themselves supreme among their fellows. 
 It was said of one of them that "like a wolf or a tiger he 
 wished to draw all the other princes into his claws, so that 
 he might devour them." Several of the later Tsin princes, 
 and particularly one named Chow Siang Wang, showed 
 great capacity, and carried out a systematic policy for their 
 own aggrandizement. When Nan Wang was approaching 
 the end of his career, the Tsin princes had obtained every- 
 thing of the supreme power short of the name and the right 
 to wear the imperial yellow robes. Ching Wang, or, to give 
 him his later name as emperor, Tsin Chi Hwangti, was the 
 reputed great-grandson of Chow Siang Wang, and under 
 him the fame and power of the Tsins reached their culmi- 
 nating point. This prince also proved himself one of the 
 greatest rulers who ever sat on the Dragon throne of 
 China.
 
 18 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 The country had been so long distracted by internal strife, 
 and the authority of the emperor had been reduced to such a 
 shadow, that peace was welcomed under any ruler, and the 
 hope was indulged that the Tsin princes, who had succeeded 
 in making themselves the most powerful feudatories of the 
 empire, might be able to restore to the central government 
 something of its ancient power and splendor. Nor was the 
 expectation unreasonable or ungratified. The Tsins had 
 fairly earned by their ability the confidence of the Chinese 
 nation, and their principal representative showed no dimi- 
 nution of energy on attaining the throne, and exhibited in a 
 higher post, and on a wider field, the martial and statesman- 
 like qualities his ancestors had displayed when building up 
 the fabric of their power as princes of the empire. Their 
 supremacy was not acquiesced in by the other great feuda- 
 tories without a struggle, and more than one campaign was 
 fought before all rivals were removed from their path, and 
 their authority passed unchallenged as occupants of the 
 Imperial office. 
 
 It was in the middle of this final struggle, and when the 
 result might still be held doubtful, that Tsin Chi Hwangti 
 began his eventful reign. When he began to rule he was 
 only thirteen years of age, but he quickly showed that he 
 possessed the instinct of a statesman, and the courage of a 
 born commander of armies. On the one hand he sowed dis- 
 sension between the most formidable of his opponents, and 
 brought about by a stratagem the disgrace of the ablest gen- 
 eral in their service, and on the other he increased his army 
 in numbers and efficiency, until it became unquestionably the 
 most formidable fighting force in China. While he endeav- 
 ored thus to attain internal peace, he was also studious in 
 providing for the general security of the empire, and with 
 this object he began the construction of a fortified wall across 
 the northern frontier to serve as a defense against the trou- 
 blesome Iliongnou tril)es, who are identified with the Huns 
 of Attila. This wall, which he began in the first years of 
 his reign, was finished before his death, and still exists as the
 
 THE EARLY AGES 19 
 
 Great Wall of China, whicli has been considered one of the 
 wonders of the world. He was careful in his many wars 
 with the tribes of Mongolia not to allow himself to be drawn 
 far from his own border, and at the close of a campaign he 
 always withdrew his troops behind the Great Wall. Toward 
 Central Asia he was more enterprising, and one of his best 
 generals, Moungtien, crossed what is now the Gobi Desert, 
 and made Hami the frontier fortress of the empire. 
 
 In his civil administration Hwangti was aided by the 
 minister Lisseh, who seems to have been a man of rare 
 ability, and to have entered heartily into all his master's 
 schemes for uniting the empire. While Hwangti sat on the 
 throne with a naked sword in his hand, as the emblem of 
 his authority, dispensing justice, arranging the details of his 
 many campaigns, and superintending the innumerable affairs 
 of his government, his minister was equally active in reor- 
 ganizing the administration and in suj)porting his sovereign 
 in his bitter struggle with the literary classes who advocated 
 archaic principles, and whose animosity to the ruler was in- 
 flamed by the contempt, not unmixed with ferocity, with 
 which he treated them. The empire was divided into thirty- 
 six provinces, and he impressed upon the governors the im- 
 portance of improving communications within their jurisdic- 
 tion. Not content with this general precept, he issued a speci al 
 decree ordering that "roads shall be made in all directions 
 throughout the empire," and the origin of the main routes 
 in China may be found with as much certainty in his reign 
 as that of the roads of Europe in the days of Imperial Rome. 
 When advised to assign some portion of his power to his rela- 
 tives and high officials in the provinces he refused to repeat 
 the blunders of his predecessors, and laid down the perma- 
 nent truth that "good government is impossible under a mul- 
 tiplicity of masters. ' ' He centralized the power in his own 
 hands, and he drew up an organization for the civil service of 
 the State which virtually exists at the present day. The two 
 salient features in that organization are the indisputable 
 supremacy of the emperor and the non-employment of the
 
 20 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 officials in their native provinces, and tlie experience of two 
 thousand years has proved their practical value. 
 
 When he conquered his internal enemies he resolved to 
 complete the pacification of his country by effecting a gen- 
 eral disarmament, and he ordered that all weapons should 
 be sent in to his capital at Hienyang. This "skillful disarm- 
 ing of the provinces added daily to the wealth and prosperity 
 of the capital," which he proceeded to embellish. He built 
 one palace within the walls, and the Hall of Audience was 
 ornamented with twelve statues, each of which weighed 
 twelve thousand pounds. But his principal residence, named 
 the Palace of Delight, was without the walls, and there he 
 laid out magnificent gardens, and added building to build- 
 ing. In one of the courts of this latter palace, it is said he 
 could have drawn up 10,000 soldiers. This eye to military 
 requirements in even the building of his residence showed 
 the temper of his mind, and, in his efforts to form a regular 
 army, he had recourse to "those classes in the community 
 who were without any fixed profession, and who were pos- 
 sessed of exceptional physical strength." He was thus the 
 earliest possessor in China of what might be called a regular 
 standing army. With this force he succeeded in establishing 
 his power on a firm basis, and he may have hoped also to 
 insure permanence for his dynasty ; but, alas ! for the fallacy 
 of human expectations, the structure he erected fell with 
 him. 
 
 Great as an administrator, and successful as a soldier, 
 Hwangti was unfortunate in one struggle that he provoked. 
 At an early period of his career, when success seemed uncer- 
 tain, he found that his bitterest opponents were men of let- 
 ters, and that the literary class as a body was hostile to his 
 interests and person. Instead of ignoring this opposition or 
 seeking to overcome it by the same agency, Hwangti ex- 
 pressed his hatred and contempt, not only of the literary 
 class, but of litci-ature itself, and resorted to extreme meas- 
 ures of coercion. The writers took up the gage of battle 
 thrown down by the emperor, and Hwangti became the
 
 THE EARLY AGES 21 
 
 object of the wit and abuse of every literate who could use 
 a pencil. His birth was aspersed. It was said that he was 
 not a Tsin at all, that his origin was of the humblest, and 
 that he was a substituted child foisted on the last of the Tsin 
 princes. These personal attacks were accompanied by un- 
 favorable criticism of all his measures, and by censure where 
 he felt that he deserved praise. It would have been more 
 prudent if he had shown greater indifference and patience, 
 for although he had the satisfaction of triumphing by brute 
 force over those who jeered at him, the triumph was accom- 
 plished by an act of vandalism, with which his name will be 
 quite as closely associated in history as any of the wise meas- 
 ures or great works that he carried out. His vanquished 
 opponents left behind them a legacy of hostility and revenge 
 of the whole literary class of China, which has found expres- 
 sion in all the national histories. 
 
 The struggle, which had been in progress for some years, 
 reached its culminating point in the year 213 B.C., when a 
 Grand Council of the empire was summoned at Hienyang. 
 At this council were present not only the emperor's chief 
 military and civil officers from the different provinces, but 
 also the large literary class, composed of aspirants to office 
 and the members of the academies and College of Censors. 
 The opposing forces in China were thus drawn up face to 
 face, and it would have been surprising if a collision had not 
 occurred. On the one side were the supporters of the man 
 who had made China again an empire, believers in his person 
 and sharers in his glory; on the other were those who had 
 no admiration for this ruler, who detested his works, pro- 
 claimed his successes dangerous innovations, and questioned 
 his right to bear the royal name. The purpose of the em- 
 peror may be detected when he called upon speakers in this 
 assembly of his friends and foes to express their opinions of 
 his administration, and when a member of his household rose 
 to extol his work and to declare that he had "surpassed the 
 very greatest of his predecessors." This courtier-like dec- 
 laration, which would have been excusable even if it had
 
 22 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 had a less basis of truth than it unquestionably possessed in 
 the case of Hwangti, was received with murmurs and marks 
 of dissent by the literati. One of them rose and denounced 
 the speaker as "a vile flatterer," and proceeded to expatiate 
 on the superior merit of several of the earlier rulers. Not 
 content with this unseasonable eulogy, he advocated the 
 restoration of the empire to its old form of principalities, and 
 the consequent undoing of all that Hwangti had accom- 
 plished. Hwangti interrupted this speaker and called upon 
 his favorite minister Lisseh to reply to him and explain his 
 policy. Lisseh began by stating what has often been said 
 since, and in other countries, that "men of letters are, as a 
 rule, very little acquainted with what concerns the govern- 
 ment of a country, not that government of pure speculation 
 which is nothing more than a phantom, vanishing the nearer 
 we approached to it, but the practical government which 
 consists in keeping men within the sphere of their proper 
 duties." He then proceeded to denounce the literary class 
 as being hostile to the State, and to recommend the destruc- 
 tion of their works, declaring that "now is the time or never 
 to close the mouths of these secret enemies and to place a 
 curb on their audacity." The emperor at once from his 
 throne ratified the policy and ordered tliat no time should be 
 lost in executing the necessary measures. All books were 
 proscribed, and orders were issued to burn every work except 
 those relating to medicine, agriculture, and such science as 
 then existed. The destruction of the national literature was 
 carried out with terrible completeness, and such works as 
 were preserved are not free from the suspicion of being 
 garbled or incomplete versions of their original text. The 
 burning of the books was accompanied by the execution of 
 five hundred of the literati, and by the banishment of many 
 thousands. By this sweepmg measure, to which no parallel 
 is to be found in the history of other countries, Hwangti 
 silenced during the last few years of his life the criticisms 
 of his chief enemies, but in revenge his memory has had to 
 bear for two thousand years the sully of an inexcusable act
 
 THE EARLY AGES 23 
 
 of tyranny and narrow-mindedness. The price will be pro- 
 nounced too heavy for what was a momentary gratification. 
 
 The reign of Hwangti was not prolonged many years 
 after the burning of the books. In 210 B.C. he was seized 
 with a serious illness, to which he succumbed, partly because 
 he took no precautions, and partly, no doubt, through the 
 incompetence of his physicians. His funeral was magnifi- 
 cent, and, like the Huns, his grave was dug in the bed of a 
 river, and with him were buried his wives and his treas- 
 ure. This great ruler left behind him an example of vigor 
 such as is seldom found in the list of Chinese kings of effete 
 physique and apathetic life. He is the only Chinese emperor 
 of whom it is said that his favorite exercise was walking, 
 and his vigor was apparent in every department of State. 
 On one occasion when he placed a large army of, it is said, 
 600,000 men at the disposal of one of his generals, the com- 
 mander expressed some fear as to how this huge force was 
 to be fed. Hwangti at once replied, "Leave it to me. I 
 will provide for everything. There shall be want rather in 
 my palace than in your camp," He does not seem to have 
 been a great general himself, but he knew how to select the 
 best commanders, and he was also so quick in discovering 
 the merits of the generals opposed to him, that some of his 
 most notable victories were obtained by his skill in detaching 
 them from their service or by ruining their reputation by 
 some intrigue more astute than honorable. Yet, all deduc- 
 tions made, Tsin Chi Hwangti stands forth as a great ruler 
 and remarkable man. 
 
 The Tsin dynasty only survived its founder a few years. 
 Hwangti' s son Eulchi became emperor, but he reigned no 
 more than three years. He was foolish enough to get rid 
 of the general Moungtien, who might have been the buttress 
 of his throne; and the minister Lisseh was poisoned, either 
 with or without his connivance. Eulchi himself shared the 
 same fate, and his successor, Ing "Wang, reigned only six 
 weeks, committing suicide after losing a battle, and with 
 him the Tsin dynasty came to an end. Its chief, nay its
 
 24 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 only claim to distinction, arises from its having produced 
 the great ruler Hwangti, and its destiny was Napoleonic in 
 its brilliance and evanescence. 
 
 Looking back at the long period which connects the 
 mythical age with what may be considered the distinctly 
 historical epoch of the Tsins, we find that by the close of 
 the third century before the Christian era China possessed 
 settled institutions, the most remarkable portion of its still 
 existing literature, and mighty rulers. It is hardly open to 
 doubt that the Chinese annalist finds in these remote ages 
 as much interest and instruction as we should in the record 
 of more recent times, and proof of this may be discovered 
 in the fact that the history of the first four dynasties, which 
 we must dismiss in these few pages, occupies as much space 
 in the national history as the chronicle of events from Tsin 
 Chi Hwangti to the end of the Ming dynasty in 1644, at 
 which date the official history of China stops, because the 
 history of the Manchu dynasty, which has occupied the 
 throne ever since, will only be given to the world after it 
 has ceased to rule. We must not be surprised at this dis- 
 cursiveness, because the teachings of human experience are 
 as clearly marked in those early times as they have been 
 since, and Chinese historians aim as much at establishing 
 moral and philosophical truths as at giving a complete rec- 
 ord of events. The consequences of human folly and in- 
 competence are as patent and conspicuous in those days as 
 they are now. The ruling power is lost by one family and 
 transferred .to another because the prince neglects his busi- 
 ness, gives himself over to the indulgence of pleasure, or 
 fails to see the signs of the times. Cowardice and cor- 
 ruption receive their due and inevitable punishment. The 
 founders of the dynasties are all brave and successful war- 
 riors, who are superior to the cant of a hypercivilized state 
 of society, which covers declining vigor and marks the first 
 phase of e£Eeteness, and who see that as long as there are 
 human passions they may be molded by genius to make the 
 many serve the few and to build up an autocracy. Nor are
 
 THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY 25 
 
 the lessons to be learned from history applicable only to in- 
 dividuals. The faults of an emperor are felt in every house- 
 hold of the community, and injure the State. Indiiference 
 and obtuseness at the capital entailed weakness on the fron- 
 tier and in the provincial capitals. The barbarians grew 
 defiant and aggressive, and defeated the imperial forces. 
 The provincial governors asserted their independence, and 
 founded ruling families. The empire became attenuated by 
 external attack and internal division. But, to use the phrase 
 of the Chinese historians, "after long abiding disunion, union 
 revived." The strong and capable man always appears in 
 one form or another, and the Chinese people, impressed with 
 a belief in both the divine mission of their emperor and also 
 in the value of union, welcome with acclaim the advent of 
 the prince who will restore their favorite and ideal system 
 of one-man government. The time is still hidden in a far- 
 distant and undiscoverable future when it will be otherwise, 
 and when the Chinese will be drawn away from their con- 
 sistent and ancient practice to pursue the ignis fatuus of 
 European politics that seelcs to combine human equality 
 with good practical government and national security. The 
 Chinese have another and more attainable ideal, nor is there 
 any likelihood of their changing it. The fall of dynasties 
 may, needs must, continue in the ordinary course of nature, 
 but in China it will not pave the way to a republic. The 
 imperial authority will rise triumphant after every struggle 
 above the storm. 
 
 CHAPTEE II 
 
 THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY 
 
 As the Chinese are still proud to call themselves the sons 
 of Han, it will be understood that the period covered by the 
 Han rulers must be an important epoch in their history, and 
 in more than one respect they were the first national dynasty. 
 When the successors of Tsin Chi Hwangti proved unable to 
 
 China — 2
 
 26 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 keep the throne, the victorious general who profited by their 
 discomfiture was named Liu Pang. He had been a trusted 
 ofhcial of the Emperor Hwangti, but on finding that his 
 descendants could not bear the burden of government, he 
 resolved to take his own measures, and he lost no time in 
 collecting troops and in making a bid for popularity by 
 endeavoring to save all the books that had not been burned. 
 His career bears some resemblance to that of Macbeth, for 
 a soothsayer meeting him on the road predicted, "by the 
 expression of his features, that he was destined to become 
 emperor." He began his struggle for the throne by defeat- 
 ing another general named Pawang, who was also disposed 
 to make a bid for supreme power. After this success Liu 
 Pang was proclaimed emperor as Kao Hwangti, meaning 
 Lofty and August Emperor, which has been shortened into 
 Kaotsou. He named his dynasty the Han, after the small 
 state in which he was born. 
 
 Kaotsou began his reign by a public proclamation in favor 
 of peace, and deploring the evils which follow in the train of 
 war. He called upon his subjects to aid his efforts for their 
 welfare by assisting in the execution of many works of public 
 utility, among which roads and bridges occupied the fore- 
 most place. He removed his capital from Loyang in Honan 
 to Singanfoo in Shensi, and as Singan was difficult of access 
 in those days, he constructed a great highroad from the cen- 
 ter of China to this somewhat remote spot on the western 
 frontier. This road still exists, and has been described by 
 several travelers in our time. It was constructed by the 
 labor of one hundred thousand men through the most diffi- 
 cult country, crossing great mountain chains and broad 
 rivers. The Chinese engineers employed on the making of 
 this road, which has excited the admiration of all who have 
 traversed it, first discovered and carried into execution the 
 suspension bridge, which in Europe is quite a modern inven- 
 tion. One of these "flying bridges," as the Chinese called 
 them, is one hundred and fifty yards across a valley five 
 hundred feet below, and is still in use. At regular intervals
 
 THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY 27 
 
 along this road Kaotsou constructed rest-liouses for travel-
 
 o
 
 THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY 27 
 
 along this road Kaotsou constructed rest-houses for travel- 
 ers, and postal-stations for his couriers. No Chinese ruler 
 has done anything more useful or remarkable than this ad- 
 mirable road from Loyang to Singanfoo. He embellished 
 his new capital with many fine buildings, among which was 
 a large palace, the grandeur of which was intended to corre- 
 spond with the extent of his power. 
 
 The reign of Kaotsou was, however, far from being one 
 of uncheckered prosperity. Among his own subjects his pop- 
 ularity was great because he promoted commerce and im- 
 proved the administration of justice. He also encouraged 
 literature, and was the first ruler to recognize the claims of 
 -Confucius, at whose tomb he performed an elaborate cere- 
 mony. He thus acquired a reputation which induced the 
 King of Nanhai — a state composed of the southern provinces 
 of China, with its capital at or near the modern Canton — to 
 tender his allegiance. But he was destined to receive many 
 slights and injuries at the hands of a foreign enemy, who at 
 this time began a course of active aggression that entailed 
 serious consequences for both China and Europe. 
 
 Reference has been made to the Hiongnou or Hun tribes, 
 against whom Tsin Hwangti built the Great Wall. In the 
 interval between the death of that ruler and the consolida- 
 tion of the power of Kaotsou, a remarkable chief named 
 Meha, or Meta, had established his supremacy among the 
 disunited clans of the Mongolian Desert, and had succeeded 
 in combining for purposes of war the whole fighting force 
 of what had been a disjointed and barbarous confederacy. 
 The Chinese rulers had succeeded in keeping back this threat- 
 ening torrent from overflowing the fertile plains of their coun- 
 try, as much by sowing dissension among these clans and by 
 bribing one chief to fight another, as by superior arms. But 
 Meha's success rendered this system of defense no longer 
 possible, and the desert chieftain, realizing the opportunity 
 of spoil and conquest, determined to make his position secure 
 by invading China. If the enterprise had failed, there would 
 have been an end to the paramounce of Meha, but his rapid
 
 28 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 success convinced the Huns that their proper and most profit- 
 able policy was to carry on imjilacable war with their weak 
 and wealthy neighbors. Meha's success was so great that 
 in a single campaign he recovered all the districts taken from 
 the Tartars by the general Moungtien. He turned the west- 
 ern angle of the Great Wall, and brought down his frontier 
 to the river Hoangho. His light cavalry raided past the 
 Chinese capital into the province of Szchuen, and returned 
 laden with the spoil of countless cities. These successes were 
 crowned by a signal victory over the emperor in person. 
 Kaotsou was drawn into an ambuscade in which his troops 
 had no chance with their more active adversaries, and, to 
 save himself from capture, Kaotsou had no alternative but 
 to take refuge in the town of Pingching, where he was 
 closely beleaguered. It was impossible to defend the town 
 for any length of time, and the capture of Kaotsou seemed 
 inevitable, when recourse was had to a stratagem. The 
 most beautiful Chinese maiden was sent as a present to 
 propitiate the conqueror, and Meha, either mollified by the 
 compliment, or deeming that nothing was to be gained by 
 driving the Chinese to desperation, acquiesced in a conven- 
 tion which, while it sealed the ignominious defeat of the 
 Chinese, rescued their sovereign from his predicament. 
 
 This disaster, and his narrow personal escape, seem to 
 have unnerved Kaotsou, for when the Huns resumed their 
 incursions in the very year following the Pingching conven- 
 tion, he took no steps to oppose them, and contented himself 
 with denouncing in his palace Meha as "a wicked and faith- 
 less man, who had risen to power by the murder of his 
 father, and one with whom oaths and treaties carried no 
 weight." Notwitlistanding this opinion, Kaotsou proceeded 
 to negotiate with Meha as an equal, and gave this barbarian 
 prince his own daughter in marriage as the price of his ab- 
 staining from further attacks on the empire. Never, wrote 
 a historian, "was so great a shame inflicted on the Middle 
 Kingdom, which then lost its dignity and honor." Meha 
 observed this peace during the life of Kaotsou, who found
 
 THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY 29 
 
 that his reputation was much diminished by his coming to 
 terms with his uncivilized opponent, but although several of 
 his generals rebelled, until it was said that "the very name 
 of revolt inspired Kaotsou with apprehension, ' ' he succeeded 
 in overcoming them all without serious difficulty. His 
 troubles probably shortened his life, for he died when he 
 was only fifty-three, leaving the crown to his son, Hoeiti, 
 and injunctions to his widow, Liuchi, as to the conduct of 
 the administration. 
 
 The brief reign of Hoeiti is only remarkable for the rigor 
 and terrible acts of his mother, the Empress Liuchi, who is 
 the first woman mentioned in Chinese history as taking a 
 supreme part in public affairs. Another of Kaotsou's wid- 
 ows aspired to the throne for her son, and the chief direction 
 for herself. Liuchi nipped their plotting in the bud by poi- 
 soning both of them. She marked out those who differed 
 from her, or who resented her taking the most prominent 
 part in public ceremonies, as her enemies, to be removed 
 from her path by any means. At a banquet she endeav- 
 ored to poison one of the greatest princes of the empire, but 
 her plot was detected and baffled by her son. It is perhaps 
 not surprising that Hoeiti did not live long after this episode, 
 and then Liuchi ruled in her own name, and without filling 
 up the vacancy on the throne, until the public dissatisfaction 
 warned her that she was going too far. She then adopted a 
 supposititious child as her grandson and governed as regent 
 in his name. The mother of this youth seems to have made 
 inconvenient demands on the empress, who promptly put her 
 out of the way, and when the son showed a disposition to 
 resent this action, she caused him to be poisoned. She 
 again ruled without a puppet emperor, hoping to retain 
 power by placing her relatives in the principal offices; but 
 the dissatisfaction had now reached an acute point, and 
 threatened to destroy her. It may be doubted whether she 
 would have surmounted these difficulties and dangers, when 
 death suddenly cut short her adventurous career. The pop- 
 ular legend is that this Chinese Lucretia Borgia died of
 
 so HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 fright at seeing tlie apparitions of her many victims, and 
 there can be no doubt that her crimes did not conduce to 
 make woman government more popular in China. 
 
 It says much for the excellence of Kaotsou's work, and 
 for the hold the Han family had obtained on the Chinese 
 people, that when it became necessary to select an emperor 
 after the death of Liuchi the choice should have fallen unan- 
 imously on the Prince of Tai, who was the illegitimate son 
 of Kaotsou. On mounting the throne, he took the name ot 
 Wenti. He began his reign by remitting taxes and by ap- 
 pointing able and honest governors and judges. He ordered 
 that all old men should be provided with corn, meat and 
 wine, besides silk and cotton for their garments. At the 
 suggestion of his ministers, who were alive to the dangers 
 of a disputed succession, he proclaimed his eldest son heir to 
 the throne. He purified the administration of justice by de- 
 claring that prince and peasant must be equally subject to 
 the law; he abolished the too common punishment of mutila- 
 tion, and had the satisfaction of seeing crime reduced to such 
 low proportions in the empire that the jails contained only 
 four hundred prisoners. Wenti was a strong advocate of 
 peace, which was, indeed, necessary to China, as it had not 
 recovered from the effects of the last Hun invasion. He suc- 
 ceeded by diplomacy in inducing the Prince at Canton, who 
 had shown a dis])Osition to assert his independence, to recog- 
 nize his authority, and thus averted a civil war. In his re- 
 lations with the Huns, among whom the authority of Meha 
 had passed to his son, Lao Chang, he strove to preserve the 
 peace, giving that chief one of his daughters in marriage, and 
 showing moderation in face of much provocation. When war 
 was forced u])on liim b}"" their raids he did everything he could 
 to mitigate its terrors, but the ill success of his troops in their 
 encounters with the Tartars broke his confidence, and he died 
 prematurely after a reign of twenty- three years, which was 
 remarkable as witnessing the consolidation of the Hans. The 
 good work of Wenti was continued during the peaceful reign 
 of sixteen years of his son Kingti.
 
 THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY 31 
 
 The next emperor was Vouti, a younger son of Kingti, 
 and one of his earliest conquests was to add the difficult and 
 inaccessible province of Fuhkien to the empire. He also 
 endeavored to propitiate the Huns by giving their chief one 
 of the princesses of his family as a wife, but the opinion was 
 gaining ground that it would be better to engage in a war 
 for the overthrow of the national enemy than to purchase 
 a hollow peace. Wang Kua, a general who had commanded 
 on the frontier, and who knew the Hun mode of warfare, 
 represented that success would be certain, and at last gained 
 the emperor's ear. Vouti decided on war, and raised a large 
 army for the purpose. But the result was not auspicious. 
 Wang Kua failed to bring the Huns to an engagement, and 
 the campaign which was to produce such great results ended 
 ingloriously. The unlucky general who had promised so 
 much anticipated his master's displeasure by committing 
 suicide. Unfortunately for himself, his idea of engaging 
 in a mortal struggle with the Tartars gained ground, and 
 became in time the fixed policy of China. Notwithstanding 
 this check, the authority of Vouti continued to expand. He 
 annexed Szchuen, a province exceeding in site and popula- 
 tion most European states, and he received from the ruler 
 of Manchuria a formal tender of submission. In the last 
 years of his reign the irrepressible Hun question again came 
 up for discussion, and the episode of the flight of the Yuchi 
 from Kansuh affords a break in the monotony of the strug- 
 gle, and is the first instance of that western movement which 
 brought the tribes of the Gobi Desert into Europe. The 
 Yuchi are believed to have been allied with the Jats of India, 
 and there is little or no doubt that the Sacae, or Scythians, 
 were their descendants. They occupied a strip of territory 
 in Kansuh from Shachow to Lanchefoo, and after suffering 
 much at the hands of the Huns under Meha, they resolved 
 to seek a fresh home in the unknown regions of Western 
 Asia. The Emperor Vouti wished to bring them back, and 
 he sent an envoy named Chang Keen to induce them to re- 
 turn. That officer discovered them in the Oxus region, but
 
 32 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 all his arguments failed to incline tliem to leave a quarter 
 in which thej had recovered power and prosperity. Power- 
 less against the Huns, they had more than held their own 
 against the Parthians and the Greek kingdom of Bactria. 
 They retained their predominant position in what is now 
 Bokhara and Balkh, until they were gathered up by the 
 Huns in their western march, and hurled, in conjunction 
 with them, on the borders of the Roman Empire. 
 
 Meantime, the war with the Huns themselves entered 
 upon a new phase. A general named Wei Tsing obtained 
 a signal victory over them, capturing 15,000 prisoners and 
 the spoil of the Tartar camp. This success restored long- 
 lost confidence to the Chinese troops, and it was followed by 
 several other victories. One Chinese expedition, composed 
 entirely of cavalry, marched through the Hun country to 
 Soponomo on the Tian Shan, carrying everything before it 
 and returning laden with spoil, including some of the golden 
 images of the Hun religion. Encouraged by these successes, 
 Vouti at last took the field in person, and sent a formal sum- 
 mons to the Tartar king to make his submission to China. 
 His reply was to imprison the bearer of the message, and to 
 defy the emperor to do his worst. This boldness had the 
 effect of deterring the emperor from his enterprise. He 
 ' employed his troops in conquering Yunnan and Leaoutung 
 instead of in waging another war with the Huns. But he 
 had only postponed, not abandoned, his intention of over- 
 throwing, once and for all, this most troublesome and for- 
 midable national enemy. He raised an enormous force for 
 the campaign, which might have proved successful but 
 for the mistake of intrusting the command to an incompe- 
 tent general. In an ill-advised moment, he gave his brother- 
 in-law, Li Kwangli, the supreme direction of the war. His 
 incompetence entailed a succession of disasters, and the only 
 redeeming point amid them was that Li Kwangli was taken 
 prisoner and rendered incapable of further mischief. Liling, 
 the grandson of this general, was intrusted with a fresh 
 army to retrieve the fortunes of the war; but, although
 
 THE FTRST NATIONAL DYNASTY 33 
 
 successful at first, he was outmaneuvered, and reduced to 
 the unpleasant pass of surrendering to the enemy. Both Li 
 Kwangli and Liling adapted themselves to circumstances, 
 and took service under the Tartar chief. As this conduct 
 obtained the approval of the historian Ssematsien, it is clear 
 that our views of such a proceeding would not be in harmony 
 with the opinion in China of that day. The long war which 
 Vouti waged with the Huns for half a century, and which 
 was certainly carried on in a more honorable and successful 
 manner than any previous portion of that historic struggle, 
 closed with discomfiture and defeat, which dashed to the 
 ground the emperor's hopes of a complete triumph over 
 the most formidable national enemy. 
 
 After a reign of fifty-four years, which must be pro- 
 nounced glorious, Vouti died, amid greater troubles and 
 anxieties than any that had beset him during his long reign. 
 He was unquestionably a great ruler. He added several 
 provinces to his empire, and the success he met with over the 
 Huns was far from being inconsiderable. He was a Nimrod 
 among the Chinese, and his principal enjoyment was to 
 chase the wildest animals without any attendants. Like 
 many other Chinese princes, Vouti was prone to believe iu 
 the possibility of prolonging human life, or, as the Chinese 
 put it, in the draught of immortality. In connection with 
 this weakness an anecdote is preserved that will bear telling. 
 A magician offered the emperor a glass containing the pre- 
 tended elixir of eternal life, and Vouti was about to drink it 
 when a courtier snatched it from his hand and drained the 
 goblet. The enraged monarch ordered him to prepare for 
 instant death, but the ready courtier at once replied, "How 
 can I be executed, since I have drunk the draught of immor- 
 tality?" To so convincing an argument no reply was pos- 
 sible, and Vouti lived to a considerable age without the aid 
 of magicians or quack medicines. Of him also it may be 
 said that he added to the stability of the Han dynasty, and 
 he left the throne to Chaoti, the youngest of his sons, a 
 child of eight, for whom he appointed his two most experi-
 
 S4 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 enced ministers to act as governors. As these ministers were 
 true to their duty, the interregnum did not affect the fort- 
 unes of the State adversely, and several claimants to the 
 throne paid for their ambition with their lives. The reign 
 of Chaoti was prosperous and successful, but, unfortunately, 
 he died at the early age of thirty-one, and without leaving 
 an heir. 
 
 After some hesitation, Chaoti's uncle Liucho was pro- 
 claimed emperor, but he proved to be a boor with low tastes, 
 whose sole idea of power was the license to indulge in coarse 
 amusements. The chief minister, Ho Kwang, took upon 
 himself the responsibility of deposing him, and also of plac- 
 ing on the throne Siuenti, who was the great-grandson, or, 
 according to another account, the grandson, of Vouti. The 
 choice was a fortunate one, and "Ho Kwang gave all his 
 care to perfecting the new emperor in the science of govern- 
 ment. " As a knowledge of his connection with the Impe- 
 rial family had been carefully kept from him, Siuenti was 
 brought from a very humble sphere to direct the destinies 
 of the Chinese, and his greater energy and more practical 
 disposition were probably due to his not having been bred in 
 the enervating atmosphere of a palace. He, too, was brought 
 at an early stage of his career face to face with the Tartar 
 question, and he had what may be pronounced a unique ex- 
 perience in his wars with them. He sent several armies 
 under commanders of reputation to wage war on them, and 
 the generals duly returned, reporting decisive and easily 
 obtained victories. The truth soon leaked out. The vic- 
 tories were quite imaginary. The generals had never ven- 
 tured to face the Tartars, and they were given no option by 
 their enraged and disappointed master but to poison them- 
 selves. Other generals were appointed, and the Tartars 
 were induced to sue for peace, partly from fear of the Chi- 
 nese, and partly because they were disunited among them- 
 selves. Such was the reputation of Siuenti for justice that 
 several of the Tartar ciiiefs carried their grievances to the 
 foot of his throne, and his army became known as "the
 
 THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY 85 
 
 troops of justice. " It is said that all tlie tribes and countries 
 of Central Asia as far west as the Caspian sent him tribute, 
 and to celebrate the event he built a kilin or pavilion, in 
 which he placed statues of all the generals who had contrib- 
 uted toward his triumph. Only one incident marred the 
 tranquillity of Siuenti's reign. The great statesman, Ho 
 Kwang, had sunk quietly into private life as soon as he 
 found the emperor capable of governing for himself; but his 
 wife Hohien was more ambitious and less satisfied with her 
 position, although she had effected a marriage between her 
 daughter and Siuenti. This lady was only one of the queens 
 of the ruler, and not the empress. Hohien, to further her 
 ends, determined to poison the empress, and succeeded only 
 too well. Her guilt would have been divulged by the doctor 
 ehe employed, but that Ho Kwang, by an exercise of his 
 authority, prevented the application of torture to him when 
 thrown into prison. This narrow escape from detection did 
 not keep Hohien from crime. She had the satisfaction of 
 seeing her daughter proclaimed empress, but her gratifica- 
 tion was diminished by the son of the murdered Hiuchi being 
 selected as heir to the throne. Hohien resolved to poison 
 this prince, but her design was discovered, and she and all 
 the members of her family were ordered to take poison. The 
 minister. Ho Kwang, had taken no part in these plots, which, 
 however, injured his reputation, and his statue in the Im- 
 perial pavilion was left without a name. 
 
 Siuenti did not long survive these events, and Yuenti, the 
 son of Hiuchi, became emperor. His reign of sixteen years 
 presents no features of interest beyond the signal overthrow 
 of the Tartar chief. Chichi, whose head was sent by the vic- 
 torious general to be hung on the walls of Singan. Yuenti 
 was succeeded by his son Chingti, who reigned twenty-six 
 years, and who gained the reputation of a Chinese Vitellius. 
 His nephew Gaiti, who was the next emperor, showed him- 
 self an able and well-intentioned prince, but his reign of six 
 years was too brief to allow of any permanent work being 
 accomplished. One measure of his was not without its influ-
 
 S6 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 ence on tlie fate of his successors. He had disgraced and 
 dismissed from the service an official named Wang Mang, 
 "who had attained great power and influence under ChingtL 
 The ambition of this individual proved fatal to the dynastj. 
 On Gaiti's death he emerged from his retirement, and, in 
 conjunction with that prince's mother, seized the govern- 
 ment. They placed a child, grandson of Yuenti, on the 
 throne, and gave him the name of Pingti, or the Peace- 
 ful Emperor, but he never governed. Before Pingti was 
 fourteen, Wang Mang resolved to get rid of him, and he 
 gave him the poisoned cup with his own hands. This was 
 not the only, or perhaps the worst, crime that Wang Mang 
 perpetrated to gain the throne. Pressed for money to pay 
 his troops, he committed the sacrilege of stripping the graves 
 of the princes of the Han family of the jewels deposited in 
 them. One more puppet prince was placed on the throne, 
 but he was soon got rid of, and Wang Mang proclaimed 
 himself emperor. He also decreed that the Han dynasty 
 was extinct, and that his family should be known as the Sin. 
 Wang Mang the usurper was certainly a capable adminis- 
 trator, but in seizing the throne he had attempted a task to 
 which he was unequal. As long as he was minister or 
 regent, respect and regard for the Han family prevented 
 many from revolting against his tyranny, but when he seized 
 the throne he became the mark of popular indignation and 
 official jealousy. The Huns resumed their incursions, and, 
 curiously enough, put forward a proclamation demanding 
 the restoration of the Hans. Internal enemies sprang up on 
 every side, and Wang Mang's attempt to terrify them by 
 severity and wholesale executions only aggravated the situa- 
 tion. It became clear that the struggle was to be one to the 
 death, but this fact did not assist Wang Mang, who saw his 
 resources gradually reduced and his enemies more confident 
 as the contest continued. After twelve years' fighting, 
 Wang Mang was besieged at Singan. The city was soon 
 carried by storm, and Wang Mang retired to the palace to 
 put an end to his existence. But his heart failed him, and
 
 THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY 37 
 
 he was cut down by the foe. His last exclamation and the 
 dirge of his short-lived dynasty, which is denied a place in 
 Chinese history, was, "If Heaven had given me courage, 
 what could the family of the Hans have done?" 
 
 The eldest of the surviving Han princes, Liu Hiuen, was 
 placed on the throne, and the capital was removed from 
 Singan to Loyang, or Honan. Nothing could have been 
 more popular among the Chinese people than the restoration 
 of the Hans. It is said that the old men cried for joy when 
 they saw the banner of the Hans again waving over the 
 palace and in the field. But Liu Hiuen was not a good 
 raier, and there might have been reason to regret the change 
 if he had not wisely left the conduct of affairs to his able 
 cousin, Liu Sieou. At last the army declared that Liu Sieou 
 fihould be emperor, and when Liu Hiuen attempted to form 
 a faction of his own he was murdered by Fanchong, the 
 leader of a confederacy known as the Crimson Eyebrows, 
 on whose co-operation he counted. The Crimson Eyebrows 
 were so called from the distinguishing mark which they had 
 adopted when first organized as a protest against the tyranny 
 of Wang Mang. At first they were patriots, but they soon 
 became brigands. After murdering the emperor, Fanchong, 
 their leader, threw off all disguise, and seizing Singan gave 
 it over to his followers to plunder. Liu Sieou, on becoming 
 emperor, took the style of Kwang Vouti, and his first task 
 was to overthrow the Crimson Eyebrows, who had become a 
 public enemy. He intrusted the command of the army he 
 raised for this purpose to Fongy, who justified his reputation 
 as the most skillful Chinese general of his day by gaining 
 several victories over a more numerous adversary. Within 
 two years Kwang Vouti had the satisfaction of breaking up 
 the formidable faction known as the Crimson Eyebrows, and 
 of holding its leader Fanchong as a prisoner in his capital. 
 
 Kwang Vouti was engaged for many more years in sub- 
 duing the numerous potentates who had repudiated the 
 imperial authority. His eft'orts were invariably crowned 
 with success, but he acquired so great a distaste for war
 
 3S HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 that it is said when his son. asked him to explain how an army- 
 was set in battle array he refused to reply. But the love of 
 peace will not avert war when a State has turbulent or am- 
 bitious neighbors who are resolved to appeal to arms, and so 
 Kwang Vouti was engaged in almost constant hostilities to 
 the end of his days. Chingtse, the Queen of Kaochi, which 
 may be identified with the modern Annam, defied the Chi- 
 nese, and defeated the first army sent to bring her to reason. 
 This reverse necessitated a still greater effort on the part of 
 the Chinese ruler to bring his neighbor to her senses. The 
 occupant of the Dragon throne could not sit down tamely 
 under a defeat inflicted by a woman, and an experienced 
 general named Mayuen was sent to punish the Queen of 
 Kaochi. The Boadicea of Annam made a valiant defense, 
 but she was overthrown, and glad to purchase peace by 
 making the humblest submission. The same general more 
 than held his own on the northern and northwest frontiers. 
 When Kwang Youti died, in a.d. 57, after a brilliant reign 
 of thirty-three years, he had firmly established the Han 
 dynasty, and he left behind him the reputation of being 
 both a brave and a just prince. 
 
 His son and successor, Mingti, was not unworthy of his 
 father. His acts were characterized by wisdom and clem- 
 ency, and the country enjoyed a large measure of peace 
 through the policy of Mingti and his father. A general 
 named Panchow, who was perhaps the greatest military 
 commander China ever produced, began his long and re- 
 markable career in this reign, and, without the semblance 
 of an effort, kept the Huns in order, and maintained the 
 imperial authority over them. Among other great and im- 
 portant works, Mingti constructed a dike, thirty miles long, 
 for the relief of the Hoangho, and the French missionary 
 and writer, Du Halde, states that so long as this was kept 
 in repair there were no floods. The most remarkable event 
 of Mingti's reign was undoubtedly the official introduction 
 of Buddhism into China. Some knowledge of the great 
 Indian religion and of the teacher Sakya Muni seems to
 
 THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY 39 
 
 have reached China through either Tibet, or, more prob- 
 ably, Burma, but it was not until Mingti, in consequence 
 of a dream, sent envoys to India to study Buddhism, that 
 its doctrine became known in China. Under the direct 
 patronage of the emperor it made rapid progress, and al- 
 though never unreservedly popular, it has held its ground 
 ever since its introduction in the first century of our era, 
 and is now inextricably intertwined with the religion of the 
 Chinese state and people. Mingti died after a successful 
 reign of eighteen years in 75 A. d. His son, Changti, with 
 the aid of his mother, Machi, the daughter of the general 
 Mayuen, enjoyed a peaceful reign of thirteen years, and 
 died at an early age lamented by his sorrowing people. 
 
 After Changti came his son, Hoti, who was only ten at 
 the time of his accession, and who reigned for seventeen 
 years. He was a virtuous and well-intentioned prince, who 
 instituted many internal reforms, and during his reign a 
 new writing paper was invented, which is supposed to have 
 been identical with the papyrus of Egypt. But the reign 
 of Hoti is rendered illustrious by the remarkable military 
 achievements of Panchow. The success of that general in 
 his operations with the Huns has already been referred to, 
 and he at last formed a deliberate plan for driving them 
 away from the Chinese frontier. Although he enjoyed the 
 confidence of his successive sovereigns, the imperial sanction 
 was long withheld from this vast scheme, but during the life 
 of Changti he began to put in operation measures for the 
 realization of this project that were only matured under 
 Hoti. He raised and trained a special army for frontier 
 war. He enlisted tribes who had never served the emperor 
 before, and who were specially qualified for desert warfare. 
 He formed an alliance with the Sienpi tribes of Manchuria, 
 who were probably the ancestors of the present Manchus, 
 and thus arranged for a flank attack on the Huns. This 
 systematic attack was crowned with success. The pres- 
 sure brought against them compelled the Hiongnou to give 
 way, and, as they were ousted from their possessions, to
 
 40 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 seek fresh homes further west. In this they were, no 
 doubt, stimulated by the example of their old opponents, 
 the Yuchi, but Panchow's energy supplied a still more con- 
 vincing argument. He pursued them wherever they went, 
 across the Gobi Desert and beyond the Tian Shan range, 
 taking up a strong position at modern Kuldja and Kashgar, 
 sending his expeditions on to the Pamir, and preparing to 
 complete his triumph by the invasion of the countries of the 
 Oxus and Jaxartes. When Hoti was still a youth, he com- 
 pleted this programme by overrunning the region as far as 
 the Caspian, which was probably at that time connected with 
 the Aral, and it may be supposed that Khiva marked the 
 limit of the Chinese general's triumphant progress. It is 
 afhrmed with more or less show of truth that he came into 
 contact with the Roman empire or the great Thsin, as the 
 Chinese called it, and that he wished to establish commer- 
 cial relations with it. But however uncertain this may be, 
 there can be no doubt that he inflicted a most material in- 
 jury on Rome, for before his legions fled the Huns, who, 
 less than four centuries later, debased the majesty of the 
 imperial city, and whose leader, Attila, may have been a 
 descendant of that Meha at whose hands the Chinese suf- 
 fered so severely. 
 
 After this brilliant and memorable war, Panchow re- 
 turned to China, where he died at the great age of eighty. 
 With him disappeared the good fortune of the Han dynasty, 
 and misfortunes fell rapidly on the family that had gov- 
 erned China so long and so well. Hoti's infant son lived 
 only a few months, and then his brother, Ganti, became 
 emperor. The real power rested in the hands of the widow 
 of Hoti, who was elevated to the post of regent. Ganti was 
 succeeded in a.d. 124 by his son, Chunti, in whose time 
 several rebellions occurred, threatening the extinction of the 
 dynasty. Several children were then elevated to the throne, 
 and at last an ambitious noble named Leangki, whose sister 
 was one of the empresses, acquired the supreme direction of 
 affairs. He gave a great deal of trouble, but at last, finding
 
 THE FIRST NATIONAL DYNASTY 41 
 
 that liis ambitious schemes did not prosper, he took poison, 
 thus anticipating a decree passed for his execution. Hwanti, 
 the emperor who had the courage to punish this powerful 
 noble, was the last able ruler of the Hans. His reign was, 
 on the whole, a brilliant one, and the Sienpi tribes, who had 
 taken the place of the Hiongnou, were, after one arduous 
 campaign, defeated in a pitched battle. The Chinese were on 
 the verge of defeat when their general, Twan Kang, rushed 
 to the front, exclaiming: "Recall to your minds how often 
 before jou have beaten these same opponents, and teach 
 them again to-day that in you they have their masters." 
 
 After Hwanti's death the decline of the Hans was rapid. 
 They produced no other ruler worthy of the throne. In the 
 palace the eunuchs, always numerous at the Chinese court, 
 obtained the upper hand, and appointed their own creatures 
 to the great governing posts. Fortunately this dissension at 
 the capital was not attended by weakness on the frontier, 
 and the Sienpi were again defeated. The battle is chiefly 
 memorable because the Sienpi endeavored to frighten the 
 Chinese general by threatening to kill his mother, who was 
 a prisoner in their hands, if he attacked. Not deterred by 
 this menace, Chow Pow attacked the enemy, and gained a 
 decisive victory, but at the cost of his mother's life, which so 
 affected him that he died of grief shortly afterward. After 
 some time dissensions rose in the Han family, and two half- 
 brothers claimed the throne. Pienti became emperor by the 
 skillful support of his uncle. General Hotsin, while his rival, 
 Hienti, enjoyed the support of the eunuchs. A deadly feud 
 ensued between the two parties, which was aggravated by 
 the murder of Hotsin, who rashly entered the palace without 
 an escort. His soldiers avenged his death, carrying the pal- 
 ace by storm and putting ten thousand eunuchs to the sword. 
 After this the last emperors possessed only the name of em- 
 peror. The practical authority was disputed among several 
 generals, of whom Tsow Tsow was the most distinguished 
 and successful; and he and his son Tsowpi founded a dy- 
 nasty, of which more will be heard hereafter. In a.d. 220
 
 42 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Hienti, the last Han ruler, retired into private life, thus 
 bringing to an end the famous Han dynasty, which had 
 governed China for four hundred and fifty years. 
 
 Among the families that have reigned in China none 
 has obtained as high a place in popular esteem as the Hans. 
 They rendered excellent work in consolidating the empire 
 and in carrying out what may be called the imperial mis- 
 sion of China. Yunnan and Leaoutung were made prov- 
 inces for the first time. Cochin China became a vassal 
 state. The writ of the emperor ran as far as the Pamir. 
 The wealth and trade of the country increased with the 
 progress of its armies. Some of the greatest public works, 
 in the shape of roads, bridges, canals, and aqueducts, were 
 constructed during this period, and still remain to testify to 
 the glory of the Hans. As has been seen, the Hans produced 
 several great rulers. Their fame was not the creation of one 
 man alone, and as a consequence the dynasty enjoyed a 
 lengthened existence equaled by few of its predecessors or 
 successors. No ruling family was ever more popular with 
 the Chinese than this, and it managed to retain the throne 
 when less favored rulers would have expiated their mistakes 
 and shortcomings by the loss of the empire. With the strong 
 support of the people, the Hans overcame innumerable diffi- 
 culties, and even the natural process of decay; and when 
 they made their final exit from history it was in a graceful 
 manner, and without the execration of the masses. That 
 this feeling retains its force is shown in the pride with which 
 the Chinese still proclaim themselves to be the sons of Han. 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION 
 
 The ignominious failure of the usurper Wang Mang to 
 found a dynasty was too recent to encourage any one to take 
 upon himself the heavy charge of administering the whole
 
 A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION 48 
 
 of the Han empire, and so the state was split up into three 
 principalities, and the period is known from this fact as the 
 Sankoue. One prince, a member of the late ruling family, 
 held possession of Szchuen, which was called the principal- 
 ity of Chow. The southern provinces were governed by a 
 general named Sunkiuen, and called Ou. The central and 
 northern provinces, containing the greatest population and 
 resources, formed the principality of Wei, subject to Tsowpi, 
 the son of Tsow Tsow. A struggle for supremacy very soon 
 began between these princes, and the balance of success grad- 
 ually declared itself in favor of Wei. It would serve no use- 
 ful purpose to enumerate the battles which marked this strug- 
 gle, yet one deed of heroism deserves mention, the defense 
 of Sinching by Changte, an officer of the Prince of Wei. 
 The strength of the place was insignificant, and, after a 
 siege of ninety days, several breaches had been made in the 
 walls. In this strait Changte sent a message to the besieg- 
 ing general that he would surrender on the hundredth day 
 if a cessation of hostilities were granted, "as it was a law 
 among the princes of Wei that the governor of a place which 
 held out for a hundred days and then surrendered, with no 
 prospect of relief visible, should not be considered as guilty. ' * 
 The respite was short and it was granted. But the disap- 
 pointment of the besieger, already counting on success, was 
 great when a few days later he saw that the breaches had 
 been repaired, that fresh defenses had been improvised, and 
 that Sinching was in better condition than ever to withstand 
 a siege. On sending to inquire the meaning of these prep- 
 arations, Changte gave the following reply: "I am prepar- 
 ing my tomb and to bury myself in the ruins of Sinching. ' ' 
 Of such gallantry and resource the internecine strife of the 
 Sankoue period presents few instances, but the progress of 
 the struggle steadily pointed in the direction of the triumph 
 of Wei. 
 
 The Chow dynasty of the Later Hans was the first to 
 succumb to the princes of Wei, and the combined resources 
 of the two states were then directed against the southern
 
 44 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 principality of Ou. The supreme autlioritj in "Wei had be- 
 fore this passed from the family of Tsowpi to his best gen- 
 eral, Ssemachow, who had the satisfaction of beginning his 
 reign with the overthrow of the Chow dynasty. If he had 
 carried out the wishes of his own commander, Tengai, by 
 attacking Ou at once, and in the flush of his triumph over 
 Chow, he might have completed his work at a stroke, for 
 as Tengai wrote, "An army which has the reputation of 
 victory flies from one success to another." But Ssemachow 
 preferred a slower and surer mode of action, with the result 
 that the conquest of Ou was put off for twenty years. Ssem- 
 achow died in a. D, 265, and his son Ssemachu founded the 
 new dynasty of the Later Tsins under the name of Vouti, or 
 the warrior prince. 
 
 The main object with Vouti was to add the Ou principal- 
 ity to his dominions, and the descendants of Sunkiuen thought 
 it best to bend before the storm. They sent humble embas- 
 sies to Loyang, expressing their loyalty and submission, but 
 at the same time they made strenuous preparations to defend 
 their independence. This double policy precipitated the col- 
 lision it was intended to avert. Vouti paid more heed to the 
 acts than the promises of his neighbor, and he ordered the 
 invasion of his territory from two sides. He placed a large 
 fleet of war junks on the Yangtsekiang to attack his oppo- 
 nent on the Tunting Lake. The campaign that ensued was 
 decided before it began. The success of Vouti was morally 
 certain from the beginning, and after his army had suffered 
 several reverses Sunhow threw up the struggle and surren- 
 dered to his opponent. Thus was China again reunited for 
 a short time under the dynasty of the Later Tsins. Having 
 accomplished his main task, Vouti gave himself up to the 
 pursuit of pleasure, and impaired the reputation he had 
 gained among his somewhat severe fellow-countrymen by 
 entertaining a theatrical company of five thousand female 
 comedians, and by allowing himself to be driven in a car 
 drawn by sheep through the palace grounds. Vouti lived 
 about ten years after the unity of the empire was restored,
 
 A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION 45 
 
 and his son, Ssemachong, or Hweiti, became emperor on his 
 death in A. d. 290. One of the great works of his reign was 
 the bridging of the Hoangho at Mongtsin, at a point much 
 lower down its course than is bridged at the present time. 
 
 The reign of Hweiti was marred by the ambitious vin- 
 dictiveness of his wife, Kiachi, who murdered the principal 
 minister and imprisoned the widow of the Emperor Vouti. 
 The only good service she rendered the state was to discern 
 in one of the palace eunuchs named Mongkwan a great gen- 
 eral, and his achievements bear a strong resemblance to those 
 of Narses, who was the only other great commander of that 
 unfortunate class mentioned in history. Wherever Mong- 
 kwan commanded in person victory attended his efforts, but 
 the defeats of the other generals of the Tsins neutralized his 
 success. At this moment there was a recrudescence of Tar- 
 tar activity which proved more fatal to the Chinese ruler 
 than his many domestic enemies. Some of the Hiongnou 
 tribes had retired in an easterly direction toward Manchuria 
 when Panchow drove the main body westward, and among 
 them, at the time of which we are speaking, a family named 
 Lin had gained the foremost place. They possessed all the 
 advantages of Chinese education, and had married several 
 times into the Han family. Seeing the weakness of Hweiti 
 these Lin chiefs took the title of Kings of Han, and wished 
 to pose as the liberators of the country. Hweiti bent before 
 the storm, and would have made an ignominious surrender 
 but that death saved him the trouble. 
 
 His brother and successor, Hwaiti, fared somewhat bet- 
 ter at first, but notwithstanding some flashes of success the 
 Lin Tartars marched further and further into the country, 
 capturing cities, defeating the best officers of the Tsins, and 
 threatening the capital. In a. d. 310 Linsong, the Han chief, 
 invaded China in force and with the full intention of ending 
 the war at a blow. He succeeded in capturing Loyang, and 
 carrying off Hwaiti as his prisoner. The capital was pil- 
 laged and the Prince Boyal executed. Hwaiti is considered 
 the first Chinese emperor to have fallen into the hands of
 
 46 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 a foreign conqueror. Two years after his capture, Hwaiti 
 was compelled to wait on his conqueror at a public banquet, 
 and when it was over he was led out to execution. This 
 foul murder illustrates the character of the new race and 
 men who aspired to rule over China. The Tartar successes 
 did not end here, for a few years later they made a fresh 
 raid into China, capturing Hwaiti' s brother and successor, 
 Mingti, who was executed, twelve months after his capture, 
 at Pingyang, the capital of the Tartar Hans. 
 
 After these reverses the enfeebled Tsin rulers removed 
 their capital to Nankin, but this step alone would not have 
 sufficed to prolong their existence had not the Lin princes 
 themselves suffered from the evils of disunion and been com- 
 pelled to remove their capital from Pingyang to Singan. 
 Here they changed their name from Han to Chow, but the 
 work of disintegration once begun proceeded rapidly, and in 
 the course of a few years the Lin power crumbled completely 
 away. Released from their most pressing danger by the fall 
 of this family, the Tsin dynasty took a new lease of life, but 
 it was unable to derive any permanent advantage from this 
 fact. The last emperors of this family were weak and in- 
 competent princes, whose names need not be given outside 
 a chronological table. There would be nothing to say about 
 them l)ut that a humble individual named Linyu, who owed 
 everything to himself, found in the weakness of the govern- 
 ment and the confusion in the country the opportunity of 
 distinction. He proved himself a good soldier and able 
 leader against the successors of the Lin family on one side, 
 and a formidable pirate named Sunghen on the other. Dis- 
 satisfied with his position, Linyu murdered one emperor and 
 placed another on the throne, and in two years he compelled 
 his puppet, the last of the Later Tsins, to make a formal ab- 
 dication in his favor. For a considerable portion of their 
 rule they governed the whole of China, and it is absolutely 
 true to say tliat they were the least worthy family ever in- 
 trusted with so great a charge. Of the fifteen emperors who 
 ruled for one hundred and fifty-five years there is not more
 
 A LONG PERIOD OF DISlTNION 47 
 
 than the founder whose name calls for preservation on his 
 own merits. 
 
 Although Linyu's success was complete as far as it went, 
 his dynasty, to which he gave the name of Song, never pos- 
 sessed exclusive power among the Chinese. It was only one 
 administration among many others, and during his brief 
 reign of three years he could do nothing toward extending 
 his power over his neighbors, although he may have estab- 
 lished his own the more firmly by poisoning the miserable 
 Tsin emperor whom he deposed. His son and successor, 
 Chowti, was deposed and murdered after a brief reign of 
 one year. His brother Wenti succeeded him, and he was 
 soon drawn into a struggle for power, if not existence, with 
 his northern neighbor the King of Wei, who was one of the 
 most powerful potentates in the empire. The principal and 
 immediate bone of contention between them was the great 
 province of Honan, which had been overrun by the Wei 
 ruler, but which Wenti was resolved to recover. As the 
 Hoangho divides this province into two parts, it was ex- 
 tremely difficult for the Wei ruler to defend the portion south 
 of it, and when Wenti sent him his declaration of war, he 
 replied, "Even if your master succeeds in seizing this prov- 
 ince I shall know how to retake it as soon as the waters of 
 the Hoangho are frozen. ' ' Wenti succeeded in recovering 
 Honan; but after a protracted campaign, during which the 
 Wei troops crossed the river on the ice, his armies were again 
 expelled from it, and the exhausted combatants found them- 
 selves at the close of the struggle in almost the same position 
 they had held at the commencement. For a time both rulers 
 devoted their attention to peaceful matters, although Topa- 
 tao, king of Wei, varied them by a persecution of the Bud- 
 dhists, and then the latter concentrated all his forces with 
 the view of overwhelming the Song emperor. When suc- 
 cess seemed certain, victory was denied him, and the Wei 
 forces suffered severely during their retreat to their own 
 territory. This check to his triumphant career injured his 
 reputation and encouraged his enemies. A short time after
 
 48 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 tliis campaign, Topatao was murdered by some discontented 
 officers. 
 
 Nor was the Song ruler, Wenti, any more fortunate, as 
 lie was murdered by his son. The parricide was killed in 
 turn by a brother who became the Emperor Vouti. This 
 ruler was fond of the chase and a great eater, but, on the 
 whole, he did no harm. The next two emperors were cruel 
 and bloodthirsty princes, and during their reigns the execu- 
 tioner was constantly employed. Two more princes, who 
 were, however, not members of the Song family, but only 
 adopted by the last ruler of that house, occupied the throne, 
 but this weakness and unpopularity — for the Chinese, unlike 
 the people of Japan, scout the idea of adoption and believe 
 only in the rights of birth — administered the finishing stroke 
 to the Songs, who now give place to the Tsi dynasty, which 
 was founded by a general named Siaotaoching, who took the 
 imperial name of Kaoti. The change did not bring any 
 improvement in the conditions of China, and it was publicly 
 said that the Tsi family had attained its pride of place "not 
 by merit, but by force. ' ' The Tsi dynasty, after a brief and 
 ignominious career, came to an end in the person of a youth- 
 ful prince named Hoti. After his deposition, in A.D. 502, 
 his successful enemies ironically sent him in prison a present 
 of gold. He exclaimed, "What need have I of gold after 
 Liy death? A few glasses of wine would be more valuable." 
 They complied with his wish, and while he was drunk they 
 strangled him with his own silken girdle. 
 
 After the Tsi came the Leang dynasty, another of those 
 insignificant and unworthy families which occupy the stage 
 of Chinese history during this long period of disunion. The 
 new Emperor Vouti was soon brought into collision with the 
 state of Wei, which during these years had regained all its 
 power, and had felt strong enough to transfer its capital 
 from the northern city of Pingching to Honan, while the 
 Leang capital remained at Nankin. The progress of this 
 contest was marked by the consistent success of Wei, and 
 the prince of that kingdom seems to have been as superior
 
 A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION 49 
 
 in the capacity of his generals as in the resources of his 
 state. One incident will be sufficient to show the devotion 
 which he was able to inspire in his officers. During the 
 absence of its governor, Vouti attempted to capture the 
 town of Ginching, and he would certainly have succeeded 
 in his object had not Mongchi, the wife of that officer, an- 
 ticipating by many centuries the conduct of the Countess of 
 Montfort and of the Countess of Derby, thrown herself into 
 the breach, harangued the small garrison, and inspired it 
 with her own indomitable spirit. Vouti was compelled to 
 make an ignominious retreat from before Ginching, and his 
 troops became so disheartened that they refused to engage 
 the enemy, notwithstanding their taunts and their marching 
 round the imperial camp with the head of a dead person 
 decked out in a widow's cap and singing a doggerel ballad 
 to the effect that none of Vouti' s generals was to be feared. 
 In the next campaign Vouti was able to restore his declining 
 fortunes by the timely discovery of a skillful general in the 
 person of Weijoui, who, taking advantage of the division of 
 the Wei army into two parts by a river, gained a decisive 
 victory over each of them in turn. If Vouti had listened to 
 his general's advice, and followed up this success, he might 
 have achieved great and permanent results, but instead he 
 preferred to rest content with his laurels, with the result 
 that the Wei prince recovered his military power and confi- 
 dence. The natural consequence of this was that the two 
 neighbors once more resorted to a trial of strength, and, not- 
 withstanding the valiant and successful defense of a fortress 
 by another lady named Liuchi, the fortune of war declared 
 in the main for Vouti. This may be considered one of the 
 most remarkable periods for the display of female capacity 
 in China, as the great state of Wei was governed by a queen 
 named Houchi ; but the general condition of the country does 
 not support an argument in favor of female government. 
 
 The tenure of power by Houchi was summarily cut short 
 by the revolt of the Wei commander-in-chief, Erchu Jong, 
 who got rid of his mistress by tying her up in a sack and 
 
 China— 3
 
 50 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 throwing her into the Hoangho. He then collected two 
 thousand of her chief advisers in a plain outside the capital, 
 and there ordered his cavalry to cut them down. Erchu 
 Jong then formed an ambitious project for reuniting the 
 empire, proclaiming to his followers his intention in this 
 speech: "Wait a little while, and we shall assemble all the 
 braves from out our western borders. We will then go and 
 bring to reason the six departments of the north, and the 
 following year we will cross the great Kiang, and place in 
 chains Siaoyen, who calls himself emperor. ' ' This scheme 
 was nipped in the bud by the assassination of Erchu Jong. 
 Although the death of its great general signified much loss 
 to the Wei state, the Emperor Vouti experienced bitter dis- 
 appointment and a rude awakening when he attempted to 
 turn the event to his own advantage. His army was de- 
 feated in every battle, his authority was reduced to a 
 shadow, and a mutinous officer completed in his palace 
 the overthrow begun by his hereditary enemy. Vouti was 
 now eighty years of age, and ill able to stand so rude a 
 shock. On being deposed he exclaimed: "It was I who 
 raised my family, and it was I who have destroyed it. I 
 have no reason to complain' ' ; and he died a few days later, 
 from, it is said, a pain in his throat which his jailers refused 
 to alleviate with some honey. On the whole, Vouti was a 
 creditable ruler, although the Chinese annalists blame him 
 for his superstition and denounce his partiality for Buddhism. 
 Vouti's prediction that his family was destroyed proved 
 correct. He was su.cceeded in turn by three members of his 
 family, but all of these died a violent death. A general 
 named Chinpasien founded a fresh dynasty known as the 
 Cliin, but he died before he had enjoyed j)ower many years. 
 At this period also disappeared the Wei state, which was 
 dissolved by the death of Erchu Jong, and now merged 
 itself into that of Chow. The growth of this new power 
 proved very rapid, and speedily extinguished that of the 
 unfortunate Chins. The Chow ruler took the name of 
 Kaotsou Wenti, and ruled over a great portion of China.
 
 A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION 51 
 
 He changed the name of his dynasty to the Soui, which, 
 although it did not hold possession of the throne for long, 
 vindicated its claim to supremacy by successful wars and 
 admirable public works. This prince showed himself a very 
 capable administrator, and his acts were marked by rare 
 generosity and breadth of view. His son and successor, 
 Yangti, although he reached the throne by the murder of 
 a brother, proved himself an intelligent ruler and a bene- 
 factor of his people. He transferred his capital from Nan- 
 kin to Honan, which he resolved to make the most magnifi- 
 cent city in the world. It is declared that he employed two 
 million men in embellishing it, and that he caused fifty 
 thousand merchants to take up their residence there. But 
 of all his works none will compare with the great system of 
 canals which he constructed, and in connection with which 
 his name will live forever in history. Although he reigned 
 no more than thirteen years, he completed nearly five thou- 
 sand miles of canals. Some of these, such as the Grand 
 Canal, from the Hoangho to the Yangtsekiang, are splendid 
 specimens of human labor, and could be made as useful to- 
 day as they were when first constructed. The canal named 
 is forty yards wide and is lined with solid stone. The banks 
 are bordered with elms and willows. These works were 
 constructed by a general corvee or levy en masse, each fam- 
 ily being required to provide one able-bodied man, and the 
 whole of the army was also employed on this public under- 
 taking. It is in connection with it that Yangti 's name will 
 be preserved, as his wars, especially one with Corea, were 
 not successful, and an ignominious end was put to his ex- 
 istence by a fanatic. His son and successor was also mur- 
 dered, when the Soui dynasty came to an end, and with it 
 the magnificent and costly palace erected at Loyang, which 
 was denounced as only calculated "to soften the heart of a 
 prince and to foment his cupidity. ' ' 
 
 There now ensues a break in the long period of disunion 
 which had prevailed in China, and for a time the supreme 
 authority of the emperor recovered the general respect and
 
 52 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 vigor whicli by right belonged to it. The deposer of the 
 Souis was Liyuen, who some years before had been given 
 the title of Prince of Tang. In the year a.d. 617 he pro- 
 claimed himself emperor under the style of Kaotsou, and he 
 began his reign in an auspicious manner by proclaiming an 
 amnesty and by stating his "desire to found his empire only 
 on justice and humanity." While he devoted his attention 
 to the reorganization of the administration at Singan, which 
 he chose for his capital, his second son, Lichimin, was in- 
 trusted with the command of the army in the field, to which 
 was assigned the task of subjecting all the provinces. Lichi- 
 min j^roved himself a great commander, and his success was 
 both rapid and unqualified. He was equally victorious over 
 Chinese rebels and foreign enemies. His energy and skill 
 were not more conspicuous than his courage. At the head 
 of his chosen regiment of cuirassiers, carrying black tiger 
 skins, he was to be found in the front of every battle, and 
 victory was due as often to his jDersonal intrepidity as to his 
 tactical skill. Within a few years the task of Lichimin was 
 brought to a glorious completion, and on his return to Sin- 
 gan he was able to assure his father that the empire was 
 pacified in a sense that had not been true for many centu- 
 ries. His entry into Singan at the head of his victorious 
 troops reminds the reader of a Koman triumph. Surrounded 
 by his chosen bodyguard, and followed by forty thousand 
 cavalry, Lichimin, wearing a breastplate of gold and accom- 
 panied by the most important of his captives, rode through 
 the streets to make public offering of thanks for victory 
 achieved, at the temple of his ancestors. His success was 
 enhanced by his moderation, for he granted his prisoners 
 their lives, and his reputation was not dimmed by any acts 
 of cruelty or bloodshed. 
 
 The magnitude of Lichimin's success and his consequent 
 popularity aroused the envy and hostility of his elder brother, 
 who aspired to the throne. The intrigues against him were 
 so far successful that he fell into disgrace with the emperor, 
 and for a time withdrew from the court. But his brother
 
 A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION 53 
 
 was not content with anything short of taking his life, and 
 formed a conspiracy with his other brothers and some prom- 
 inent officials to murder him. The plot was discovered, and 
 recoiled upon its authors, who were promptly arrested and 
 executed. Then Lichimiti was formally proclaimed heir to 
 the throne ; but the event sinks into comparative insignifi- 
 cance beside the abdication of the throne by Kaotsou in the 
 same year. The real cause of this step was probably not 
 disconnected with the plot against Lichimin, but the official 
 statement was that Kaotsou felt the weight of years, and 
 that he wished to enjoy rest and the absence of responsibil- 
 ity during his last days. Kaotsou must be classed among 
 the capable rulers of China, but his fame has been over- 
 shadowed by and merged in the greater splendor of his son. 
 He survived his abdication nine years, dying in a.d. 635 at 
 the age of seventy-one. 
 
 On ascending the throne, Lichimin took the name of 
 Taitsong, and he is one of the few Chinese rulers to whom 
 the epithet of Great may be given without fear of its being 
 challenged. The noble task to which he at once set himself 
 was to prove that the Chinese were one people, that the in- 
 terests of all the provinces, as of all classes of the commu- 
 nity, were the same, and that the pressing need of the hour 
 was to revive the spirit of national unity and patriotism. 
 Before he became ruler in his own name he had accom- 
 plished something toward this end by the successful cam- 
 paigns he had conducted to insure the recognition of his 
 father's authority. But Taitsong saw that much more re- 
 mained to be done, and the best way to do it seemed to him 
 to be the prosecution of what might be called a national war 
 against those enemies beyond the northern frontier, who ' 
 were always troublesome, and who had occasionally founded 
 governments within the limits of China like the Topa family 
 of Wei. In order to achicA'^e any great or lasting success in 
 this enterprise, Taitsong saw that it was essential that he 
 should possess a large and well-trained standing army, on 
 which he could rely for efficient service beyond the frontier
 
 54 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 as well as in China itself. Before his time Chinese armies 
 had been little better than a rude militia, and the military 
 knowledge of the officers could only be described as con- 
 temptible. The soldiers were, for the most part, peasants, 
 who knew nothing of discipline, and into whose hands weap- 
 ons were put for the first time on the eve of a war. They 
 were not of a martial temperament, and they went unwill- 
 ingly to a campaign; and against such active opponents as 
 the Tartars they would only engage when superiority of 
 numbers promised success. They were easily seized with a 
 panic, and the celerity and dash of Chinese troops only be- 
 came perceptible when their backs were turned to the foe. 
 So evident had these faults become that more than one 
 emperor had endeavored to recruit from among the Tartar 
 tribes, and to oppose the national enemy with troops not less 
 brave or active than themselves. But the employment of 
 mercenaries is always only a half remedy, and not free from 
 the risk of aggravating the evil it is intended to cure. But 
 Taitsong did not attempt any such palliation ; he went to the 
 root of the question, and determined to have a trained and 
 efficient army of his own. He raised a standing army of 
 nine hundred thousand men, which he divided into three 
 equal classes of regiments, one containing one thousand two 
 hundred men, another one thousand, and the third eight 
 hundred. The total number of regiments was eight hun- 
 dred and ninety-five, of which six hundred and thirty- 
 four were recruited for home service and two hundred and 
 sixty-one for foreign. By this plan he obtained the assured 
 services of more than a quarter of a million of trained troops 
 for operations beyond the frontier. Taitsong also improved 
 the weapons and armament of his soldiers. He lengthened 
 the pike and supplied a stronger bow. Many of his troops 
 wore armor; and he relied on the co-operation of his cav- 
 alryi a branch of military power which has generally been 
 much neglected in China. He took special pains to train a 
 large body of officers, and lie instituted a Tribunal of War, 
 to which the supreme direction of military matters was in-
 
 A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION 55 
 
 trusted. As tliese measures greatly shocked the civil man- 
 darins, who regarded the emperor's taking part in reviews 
 and the physical exercises of the soldiers as "an impropri- 
 ety," it will be allowed that Taitsong showed great moral 
 courage and surmounted some peculiar difficulties in carry- 
 ing out his scheme for forming a regular army. He over- 
 came all obstacles, and gathered under his banner an army 
 formidable by reason of its efficiency and equipment, as well 
 as for its numerical strength. 
 
 Having acquired what he deemed the means to settle it, 
 Taitsong resolved to grapple boldly with the ever- recurring 
 danger from the Tartars. Under different names, but ever 
 with the same object, the tribes of the vast region from 
 Corea to Koko Nor had been a trouble to the Chinese agri- 
 culturist and government from time immemorial. Their sole 
 ambition and object in life had been to harry the lands of the 
 Chinese, and to bear back to their camps the spoils of cities. 
 The Huns had disappeared, but in their place had sprung up 
 the great power of the Toukinei or Turks, who were probably 
 the ancestors of the Ottomans. With these turbulent neigh- 
 bors, and with others of different race but of the same dispo- 
 sition on the southern frontier, Taitsong was engaged in a 
 bitter and arduous struggle during the whole of his life ; and 
 there can be little or no doubt that he owed his success to 
 the care he bestowed on his army. The Grreat Wall of Tsin 
 Hwangti had been one barrier in the path of these enemies, 
 but, held by a weak and cowardly garrison, it had proved 
 inadequate for its purpose. Taitsong supplied another and 
 a better defense in a consistent and energetic policy, and in 
 the provision of a formidable and confident army. 
 
 The necessity for this military reform was clearly shown 
 by the experience of his first campaign with these implacable 
 enemies, when, in the year of his accession and before his 
 organization had been completed, a horde of these barbarians 
 broke into the empire and carried all before them, almost to 
 the gates of the capital. On this occasion Taitsong resorted 
 to diplomacy and remonstrance. He rode almost unattended
 
 56 HISTORY OF CHINA- 
 
 to the Tartar camp, and reproaclied tlieir chiefs with their 
 "breach of faith, reminding them tliat on his sending one of 
 his sisters to be the bride of their chief they had sworn by a 
 solemn oath to keep the peace. He asked: "Are these pro- 
 ceedings worthy, I will not say of princes, but of men pos- 
 sessing the least spark of honor ? If they forget the benefits 
 they have received from me, at the least they ought to be 
 mindful of their oaths. I had sworn a peace with them; 
 they are now violating it, and by that they place the justice 
 of the question on my side. ' ' The Chinese chroniclers de- 
 clare that the Tartars were so impressed by Taitsong's 
 majestic air and remonstrances that they agreed to retire, 
 and fresh vows of friendship and peace were sworn over the 
 body of a white horse at a convention concluded on the Pien- 
 kiao bridge across the Weichoui Eiver. The only safe de- 
 duction from this figurative narrative is that there was a 
 Tartar incursion, and that the Chinese army did not drive 
 back the invaders. Their retreat was probably purchased, 
 but it was the first and last occasion on which Taitsong 
 stooped to such a measure. 
 
 The peace of Pienkiao was soon broken. The tribes 
 again drew their forces to a head for the purpose of invad- 
 ing China, but before their plans were complete Taitsong. 
 anticipated them by marching into their territory at the head 
 of a large army. Taken by surprise, the Tartars offered but 
 a feeble resistance. Several of their khans surrendered, and 
 at a general assembly Taitsong proclaimed his intention to 
 govern them as Khan of their khans, or by the title of Tien 
 Khan, which means Celestial Ruler. This was the first occa- 
 sion on which a Chinese ruler formally took over the task of 
 governing the nomad tribes and of treating their chiefs as 
 his lieutenants. Down to the present day the Chinese em- 
 peror continues to govern the Mongol and other nomadic 
 tribes under this very title, which the Russians have ren- 
 dered as Bogdo Khan. The success of this policy was com- 
 plete, for not only did it give tranquillity to the Chinese 
 borders, but it greatly extended Chinese authority. Kash-
 
 A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION- 57 
 
 garia was then, for the first time, formed into a province 
 under the name of Lonugsi, and Lichitsi, one of the em- 
 peror's best generals, was appointed Warden of the Western 
 Marches. Some of the most influential of Taitsong's advisers 
 disapproved of this advanced policy, and attempted to thwart 
 it, but in vain. Carried out with the vigor and consistency 
 of Taitsong there cannot be two opinions about its wisdom 
 and efhcacy. 
 
 During this reign the relations between China and two of 
 its neighbors, Tibet and Corea, were greatly developed, and 
 the increased intercourse was largely brought about by the 
 instrumentality of war. The first envoys from Tibet, or, as 
 it was then called, Toufan or Toupo, are reported to have 
 reached the Chinese capital in the year 634. At that time 
 the people of Tibet were rude and unlettered, and their chiefs 
 were little better than savages. Buddhism had not taken 
 that firm hold on the popular mind which it at present pos- 
 sesses, and the power of the lamas had not arisen in what 
 is now the most priest-ridden country in the world. A chief, 
 named the Sanpou — which means the brave lord — had, 
 about the time of which we are speaking, made himself 
 supreme throughout the country, and it was said that he 
 had crossed the Himalaya and carried his victorious arms 
 into Central India. Curiosity, or the desire to wed a Chi- 
 nese princess, and thus to be placed on what may be termed 
 a favored footing, induced the Sanpou to send his embassy to 
 Singan; but although the envoys returned laden with pres- 
 ents, Taitsong declined to trust a princess of his family in a 
 strange country and among an unknown people. The Sanpou 
 chose to interpret this refusal as an insult to his dignity, and 
 he declared war with China. But success did not attend his 
 enterprise, for he was defeated in the only battle of the war, 
 and glad to purchase peace by paying five thousand ounces 
 of gold and acknowledging himself a Chinese vassal. The 
 Sanpou also agreed to accept Chinese education, and as his 
 reward Taitsong gave him one of his daughters as a wife. 
 It is stated that one of his first reforms was to abolish the
 
 58 . HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 national practice of painting the face, and lie also built a 
 walled city to proclaim his glory as the son-in-law of the 
 Emperor of China. During Taitsong's life there was no 
 further trouble on the side of Tibet 
 
 Taitsong was not so fortunate in his relations with Corea, 
 where a stubborn people and an inaccessible countr}^ imposed 
 a bar to his ambition. Attempts had been made at earlier 
 periods to bring Corea under the influence of the Chinese 
 ruler, and to treat it as a tributary state. A certain measure 
 of success had occasionally attended these attempts, but on 
 the whole Corea had preserved its independence. When 
 Taitsong in the plenitude of his power called upon the King 
 of Corea to pay tribute, and to return to his subordinate posi- 
 tion, he received a defiant reply, and the Coreans began to 
 encroach on Sinlo, a small state which threw itself on the 
 protection of China. The name of Corea at this time was 
 Kaoli, and the supreme direction of affairs at this period 
 was held by a noble named Chuen Gaisoowun, who had 
 murdered his own sovereign. Taitsong, irritated by his defi- 
 ance, sent a large army to the frontier, and when Gaisoowun, 
 alarmed by the storm he had raised, made a humble submis- 
 sion and sent the proper tribute, the emperor gave expression 
 to his displeasure and disapproval of the regicide's acts by 
 rejecting his gifts and announcing his resolve to prosecute 
 the war. It is never prudent to drive an opponent to des- 
 peration, and Gaisoowun, who might have been a good 
 neighbor if Taitsong had accepted his offer, proved a bitter 
 and determined antagonist. The first campaign was marked 
 by the expected success of the Chinese army. The Coreans 
 were defeated in several battles, several important towns 
 were captured, but Taitsong had to admit that these suc- 
 cesses were purchased at the heavy loss of twenty-five thou- 
 sand of his best troops. The second campaign resolved itself 
 into the siege and defense of Anshu, an important town near 
 the Yaloo River. Gaisoowun raised an enormous force with 
 the view of effecting its relief, and he attempted to over- 
 whelm the Chinese by superior numbers. But the better
 
 A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION 59 
 
 discipline and tactics of tlie Chinese turned the day, and the 
 Corean army was driven in rout from the field. But this 
 signal success did not entail the surrender of Anshu, which 
 was gallantly defended. The scarcity of supplies and the 
 approach of winter compelled the Chinese emperor to raise 
 the siege after he had remained before the place for several 
 months, and it is stated that as the Chinese broke up their 
 camp the commandant apj)eared on the walls and wished 
 them "a pleasant journey." After this rebuff Taitsong did 
 not renew his attempt to annex Corea, although to the end 
 of his life he refused to hold any relations with Gaisoowun. 
 During the first portion of his reign Taitsong was greatly 
 helped by the labors of his wife, the Empress Changsun- 
 chi, who was a woman of rare goodness and ability, and 
 set a shining example to the whole of her court. She said 
 many wise things, among which the most quotable was that 
 "the practice of virtue conferred honor upon men, especially 
 on princes, and not the splendor of their appointments." 
 She was a patron of letters, and an Imperial Library and 
 College in the capital owed their origin to her. She \%as 
 probably the best and most trustworthy adviser the emperor 
 had, and after her death the energy and good fortune of 
 Taitsong seemed to decline. She no doubt contributed to 
 the remarkable treatise on the art of government, called 
 the "Golden Mirror," which bears the name of Taitsong as 
 its author. Taitsong was an ardent admirer of Confucius, 
 whom he exalted to the skies as the great sage of the world, 
 declaring emphatically that "Confucius was for the Chinese 
 what the water is for the fishes." The Chinese annalists 
 tell many stories of Taitsong' s personal courage. He was a 
 great hunter, and in the pursuit of big game he necessarily 
 had some narrow escapes, special mention being made of his 
 slaying single-handed a savage boar. Another instance was 
 his struggle with a Tartar attendant who attempted to mur- 
 der him, and whom he killed in the encounter. He had a 
 still narrower escape at the hands of his eldest son, who 
 formed a plot to assassinate him which very nearly sue-
 
 60 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 ceeded. The excessive anxiety of Prince Lichingkien to 
 reach the crown cost him the succession, for on the discovery 
 of his plot he was deposed from the position of heir- apparent 
 and disappeared from the scene. 
 
 After a reign of twenty-three years, during which he 
 accomplished a great deal more than other rulers had done 
 in twice the time, Taitsong died in a.d. 649, leaving the 
 undisturbed possession of the throne to his son, known as 
 the Emperor Kaotsong. There need be no hesitation in call- 
 ing Taitsong one of the greatest rulers who ever sat on the 
 Dragon Throne, and his death w^as received with extraor- 
 dinary demonstrations of grief by the people he had ruled 
 BO well. Several of his generals wished to commit suicide 
 on his bier, the representatives of the tributary nations at 
 his capital cut off their hair or sprinkled his grave with their 
 blood, and throughout the length and breadth of the land 
 there was mourning and lamentation for a prince who had 
 realized the ideal character of a Chinese emperor. Nor does 
 his claim to admiration and respect seem less after the lapse 
 o| so many centuries. His figure still stands out boldly as 
 one of the ablest and most humane of all Chinese rulers. He 
 not only reunited China, but he proved that union was for 
 his country the only sure basis of prosperity and 230wer. 
 
 Under Kaotsong the power of the Tangs showed for thirty 
 years no diminution, and he triumphed in directions where 
 his father had only pointed the way to victory. He began 
 his reign with a somewhat risky act by marrying one of his 
 father's widows, who then became the Empress "Wou. She 
 was perhaps the most remarkable woman in the whole range 
 of Chinese history, acquiring such an ascendency over her 
 husband that she practically ruled the state, and retained 
 this jjower after his death. In order to succeed in so excep- 
 tional a task she had to show no excessive delicacy or scrupu- 
 lousness, and she began by getting rid of the other wives, 
 including the lawful empress of Kaotsong, in a summary 
 fashion. It is stated that she cast them into a vase filled 
 with wine, having previously cut off their hands and feet
 
 A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION 61 
 
 to prevent their extricating themselves. But on the whole 
 her influence was exerted to promote the great schemes of 
 her husband. 
 
 The Tibetan question was revived bj the warlike pro- 
 clivities of the new Sanpou, who, notwithstanding his blood 
 relationship with the Chinese emperor, sought to extend his 
 dominion at his expense toward the north and the east. A 
 desultory war ensued, in which the Chinese got the worst 
 of it, and Kaotsong admitted that Tibet remained "a thorn 
 in his side for years. ' ' A satisfactory termination was given 
 to the struggle by the early death of the Sanpou, whose 
 warlike character had been the main cause of the dispute. 
 Strangely enough the arms of Kaotsong were more triumph- 
 ant in the direction of Corea, where his father had failed. 
 From A.D. 658 to 670 China was engaged in a bitter war 
 on land and sea with the Coreans and their allies, the 
 Japanese, who thus intervened for the first time in the 
 affairs of the continent. Owing to the energy of the Em- 
 press "Wou victory rested with the Chinese, and the Japa- 
 nese navy of four hundred junks was completely destroyed. 
 The kingdom of Sinlo was made a Chinese province, and 
 for sixty years the Coreans paid tribute and caused no 
 trouble. In Central Asia also the Chinese power was main- 
 tained intact, and the extent of China's authority and repu- 
 tation may be inferred from the King of Persia begging the 
 emperor's governor in Kashgar to come to his aid against 
 the Arabs, who were then in the act of overrunning Western 
 Asia in the name of the Prophet. Kaotsong could not send 
 aid to such a distance from his borders, but he granted shel- 
 ter to several Persian princes, and on receiving an embassy 
 from the Arabs, he impressed upon them the wisdom and 
 magnanimity of being lenient to the conquered. Kaotsong 
 died in 683, and the Empress Won retained power until the 
 year 704, when, at the age of eighty, she was compelled to 
 abdicate. Her independent rule was marked by as much 
 vigor and success as during the life of Kaotsong. She van- 
 quished the Tibetans and a new Tartar race known as the
 
 62 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Khitans, who appeared on tlie northern borders of Shensi. 
 She placed her son in confinement and wore the robes as- 
 signed for an emperor. The extent of her power may be 
 inferred from her venturing to shock Chinese sentiment bj 
 offering the annual imperial sacrifice to heaven, and by her 
 erecting temples to her ancestors. Yet it was not until she 
 was broken down by age and illness that any of her foes 
 were bold enough to encounter her. , She survived her dep- 
 osition one year, and her banished son Chongtsong was 
 restored to the throne. 
 
 Chongtsong did not reign long, being poisoned by his 
 wife, who did not reap the advantage of her crime. Several 
 emperors succeeded without doing anything to attract notice, 
 and then Mingti brought both his own family and the Chinese 
 empire to the verge of ruin. Like other rulers, he began 
 well, quoting the maxims of the "Golden Mirror" and pro- 
 claiming Confucius King of Literature. But defeats at the 
 hands of the Khitans and Tibetans imbittered his life and 
 diminished his authority. A soldier of fortune named Gran- 
 lochan revolted and met with a rapid and unexpected success 
 owing to "the people being unaccustomed, from the long 
 peace, to the use of arms." He subdued all the northern 
 provinces, established his capital at Loyang, and compelled 
 Mingti to seek safety in Szchuen, when he abdicated in favor 
 of his son. The misfortunes of Mingti, whose most memor- 
 able act was the founding of the celebrated Hanlin College 
 and the institution of the "Pekin Gazette," the oldest period- 
 ical in the world, both of which exist at the present day, fore- 
 told the disruption of the empire at no remote date. His son 
 and successor Soutsong did something to retrieve the fort- 
 unes of his family, and he recovered Singan from Ganlochan. 
 The empire was then divided between the two rivals, and 
 war continued unceasingly between them. The successful 
 defense of Taiyuen, where artillery is said to have been used 
 for the first time, a.d. 757, by a lieutenant of the Emperor 
 Soutsong, consolidated his power, which was further in- 
 creased by the murder of Ganlochan shortly afterward.
 
 A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION 63 
 
 The struggle continued with varying fortune between the 
 northern and southern powers during the rest of the reign 
 of Soutsong, and also during that of his successor, Taitsong 
 the Second. This ruler showed himself unworthy of his 
 name, abandoning his capital with great pusillanimity when 
 a small Tibetan army advanced upon it. The census returns 
 threw an expressive light on the condition of the empire dur- 
 ing this period. Under Mingti the population was given at 
 fifty-two million; in the time of the second Taitsong it had 
 sunk to seventeen million. A great general named Kwo 
 Tsey, who had driven back the Tibetan invaders, enabled 
 Tetsong, the son and successor of Taitsong, to make a good 
 start in the government of his dominion, which was sadly 
 reduced in extent and prosperity. This great statesman in- 
 duced Tetsong to issue an edict reproving the superstitions 
 of the times, and the prevalent fashion of drawing auguries 
 from dreams and accidents. The edict ran thus: "Peace 
 and the general contentment of the people, the abundance 
 of the harvest, skill and wisdom shown in the administra- 
 tion, these are prognostics which I hear of with pleasure; 
 but 'extraordinary clouds,' 'rare animals,' 'plants before 
 unknown,' 'monsters,' and other astonishing productions 
 of nature, what good can any of these do men as auguries of 
 the future ? I forbid such things to be brought to my notice. ' ' 
 The early death of Kwo Tsey deprived the youthful ruler of 
 his best adviser and the mainstay of his power. He was a 
 man of magnificent capacity and devotion to duty, and when 
 it was suggested to him that he should not be content with 
 any but the supreme place, he proudly replied that he was 
 "a general of the Tangs." It seems from the inscription on 
 the stone found at Singan that he was a patron of the Nesto- 
 rian Christians, and his character and career have suggested 
 a comparison with Belisarius. 
 
 Tetsong lived twenty- four years after the death of his 
 champion, and these years can only be characterized as un- 
 fortunate. The great governors claimed and exacted the 
 privilege that their dignities should be made hereditary, and
 
 64 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 this surrender of the imperial prerogative entailed the usual 
 deterioration of the central power which preceded a change 
 of dynasty. Unpopularity was incurred by the imposition of 
 taxes on the principal articles of production and consump- 
 tion, such as tea, and, worst symptom of all, the eunuchs 
 again became supreme in the palace. Although the dynasty 
 survived for another century, it was clear that its knell was 
 sounded before Tetsong died. Under his grandson Hien- 
 tsong the mischief that had been done became more clearly 
 apparent. Although he enjoyed some military successes, 
 his reign on the whole was unfortunate, and he was poisoned 
 by the chief of the eunuchs. His son and successor, Mou- 
 tsong, from his indifference may be suspected of having been 
 privy to the occurrence. At any rate, he only enjoyed power 
 for a few years before he was got rid of in the same sum- 
 mary fashion. Several other nonentities came to the throne, 
 until at last one ruler named Wentsong, whose intentions 
 at least were stronger than those of his predecessors, at- 
 tempted to grapple with the eunuchs and formed a plot for 
 their extermination. His courage failed him and the plot 
 miscarried. The eunuchs exacted a terrible revenge on their 
 opponents, of whom they killed nearly three thousand, and 
 "VVentsong passed the last year of his life as a miserable pup- 
 pet in their hands. He was not allowed even to name his 
 successor. The eunuchs ignored his two sons, and placed 
 his brother Voutsong on the tlirone. 
 
 The evils of the day became specially revealed during 
 the reign of Ytsong, who was scarcely seated on the throne 
 before his troops suffered several defeats at the hands of a 
 rebel prince in Yunnan, who completely wrested that prov- 
 ince from the empire. He was as pronounced a patron of 
 Buddhism as some of his predecessors had been oppressors, 
 and he sent, at enormous expense, to India a mission to pro- 
 cure St bone of Buddha's body, and on its arrival he received 
 the relic on bended knees before his whole court. His ex- 
 travagance of living landed the Chinese government in fresh 
 difficulties, and he brought the exchequer to the verge of
 
 A LONG PERIOD OF DISUNION 65 
 
 bankruptcy. Nor was he a humane ruler. On one occa- 
 sion he executed twenty doctors because they were unable 
 to cure a favorite daughter of his. His son Hitsong came 
 to the throne when he was a mere boy, and at once experi- 
 enced the depth of misfortune to which his family had sunk. 
 He was driven out of his capital by a rebel named Hwang 
 Chao, and if he had not found an unexpected ally in the 
 Turk chief Likeyong, there would then have been an end 
 to the Tang dynasty. This chief of the Chato immigrants 
 — a race supposed to be the ancestors of the Mohammedan 
 Tungani of more recent times — at the head of forty thou- 
 sand men of his own race, who, from the color of their uni- 
 form, were named "The Black Crows," marched against 
 Hwang Chao, and signally defeated him. The condition of 
 the country at this time is painted in deplorable colors. The 
 emperor did not possess a palace, and all the great towns of 
 Central China were in ruins. Likeyong took in the situa- 
 tion at a glance, when he said, "The ruin of the Tangs is 
 not far distant." Likeyong, who was created Prince of 
 Tsin, did his best to support the emperor, but his power was 
 inadequate for coping with another general named Chuwen, 
 prince of Leang, in whose hands the emperor became a mere 
 puppet. At the safe moment Chuwen murdered his sov- 
 ereign, and added to this crime a massacre of all the Tang 
 princes upon whom he could lay his hands. Chao Siuenti, 
 the last of the Tangs, abdicated, and a few months later 
 Chuwen, to make assurance doubly sure, assassinated him. 
 Thus disappeared, after two hundred and eighty-nine years 
 and after giving twenty rulers to the state, the great Tang 
 dynasty which had restored the unity and the fame of China. 
 It forms a separate chapter in the long period of disunion 
 from the fall of the Hans to the rise of the Sungs. 
 
 After the Tangs came five ephemeral and insignificant 
 dynasties, with the fate of which we need not long detain 
 the reader. In less than sixty years they all vanished from 
 the page of history. The struggle for power between Chu- 
 wen, the founder of the so-called Later Leang dynasty, and
 
 66 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Likeyong was successfully continued by the latter' s son, 
 Litsuuhiu, who proved himself a good soldier. He won a 
 decisive victory at Houlieoupi, and extinguished the Leang 
 dynasty by the capture of its capital and of Chuwen's son, 
 who committed suicide. Litsunhiu ruled for a short time 
 as emperor of the Later Leangs, but he was killed during 
 a mutiny of his turbulent soldiers. This dynasty had a very 
 brief existence; the last ruler of the line, finding the game 
 was up, retired with his family to a tower in his palace, 
 which he set on fire, and perished, with his wives and chil- 
 dren, in the flames. Then came the Later Tsins, who only 
 held their authority on the sufferance of the powerful Khitan 
 king, who reigned over Leaoutung and Manchuria. The 
 fourth and fifth of these dynasties, named the Later Hans 
 and Chows, ran their course in less than ten years; and 
 when the last of these petty rulers was deposed by his prime 
 minister a termination was at last reached to the long period 
 of internal division and weakness which prevailed for more 
 than seven hundred and fifty years. The student reaches 
 at this point firmer ground in the history of China as an 
 empire, and his interest in the subject must assume a more 
 definite form on coming to the beginning of that period of 
 united government and settled authority which has been 
 established for nearly one thousand years, during which no 
 more than four separate families have held possession of the 
 throne. 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE SUNGS AND THE KINS 
 
 One fact will have been noticed during the latter por- 
 tion of the period that has now closed, and that is the in- 
 creasing interest and participation in Chinese affairs of the 
 races neighboring to, but still outside, the empire. A large 
 number of the successful generals, and several of the princely 
 families which attained independence, were of Tartar or Turk
 
 THE SUNOS AND THE KINS 67 
 
 origin; but tlie founder of the new dynasty, whicli restored 
 the unity of the empire, was of pure Chinese race, although 
 a native of the most northern province of the country. Chow 
 Kwang Yn was born in Pechihli, at the small town of Yeou- 
 tou, on the site of which now stands the modern capital of 
 Pekin. His family had provided the governor of this place 
 for several generations, and Chow himself had seen a good 
 deal of military service during the wars of the period. He 
 is described as a man of powerful physique and majestic 
 appearance, to whose courage and presence of mind the 
 result of more than one great battle was due, and who had 
 become in consequence the idol of the soldiery. The ingenu- 
 ity of later historians, rather than the credulity of his con- 
 temporaries, may have discovered the signs and portents 
 which indicated that he was the chosen of Heaven; but his 
 army had a simple and convincing method of deciding the 
 destiny of the empire. Like the legionaries of Kome, they 
 exclaimed, "The empire is without a master, and we wish 
 to give it one. Who is more worthy of it than our general ?" 
 Thus did Chow Kwang Yn become the Emperor Taitsou and 
 the founder of the Sung dynasty. 
 
 Taitsou began his reign by proclaiming a general am- 
 nesty, and he sent the proclamation of his pardon into prov- 
 inces where he had not a shred of authority. The step was 
 a politic one, for it informed the Chinese people that they 
 again had an emperor. At the same time he ordered that 
 the gates and doors of his palace should always be left open 
 so that the humblest of his subjects might have access to him 
 at any time; His own words were that "his house should 
 resemble his heart, which was open to all his subjects. ' ' He 
 also devoted his attention to the improvement of his army 
 and particularly to the training of his officers, who were 
 called upon to pass an examination in professional subjects 
 as well as physical exercises. A French writer said forty 
 years ago that "The laws of military promotion in the states 
 of Europe are far from being as rational and equitable as 
 those introduced by this Chinese ruler. ' ' His solicitude for
 
 68 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the welfare of his soldiers was evinced during a campaign 
 when the winter was exceedingly severe. He took off his 
 own fur coat and sent it to the general in command, with 
 a letter stating that he was sorry that he had not one to 
 send to every soldier in the camjD. A soldier himself, he 
 knew how to win a soldier's heart, and the affection and 
 devotion of his army never wavered nor declined. He had 
 many opportunities of testing it. His first war was with 
 the Prince of Han, aided by the King of Leaoutung, whom 
 he speedily vanquished, and whose capacity for aggression 
 was much curtailed by the loss of the frontier fortress of 
 Loochow. His next contest was with an old comrade-in- 
 arms named Li Chougsin, whom he had treated very well, 
 but who was seized with a foolish desire to be greater than 
 his ability or power warranted. The struggle was brief, 
 and Li Chougsin felt he had no alternative save to commit 
 suicide. 
 
 The tranquillity gained by these successes enabled Tai- 
 tsou to institute a great reform in the civil administration of 
 the empire, and one which struck at the root of the evil 
 arising from the excessive power and irresponsibility of the 
 provincial governors. Up to this date the governors had 
 jiossessed the power of life and death without reference to 
 the capital. It had enabled them to become tyrants, and 
 had simplified their path to complete independence. Taitsou 
 resolved to deprive them of this jDrerogative and to retain it 
 in his own hands, for, he said, "As life is the dearest thing 
 men possess, should it be placed at the disposal of an official 
 who is often unjust or wicked ?' ' This radical reform greatly 
 strengthened the emperor's position, and weakened that of 
 the provincial viceroys ; and Taitsou thus inaugurated a rule 
 which has prevailed in China down to the present day, where 
 the life of no citizen can be taken without the express author- 
 ity and order of the emperor. Taitsou then devoted his at- 
 tention to the subjugation of those governors who had either 
 disregarded his administration or given it a grudging obedi- 
 ence. The first to feel the weight of his hand was the vice-
 
 THE SUNGS AND THE KTNS 69 
 
 toy of Honan; but his measures were so well taken, and the 
 military force he employed so overwhelming, that he suc- 
 ceeded in dispossessing him and in appointing his own lieu- 
 tenant without the loss of a single man. The governor of 
 Szchuen, believing his power to be greater than it was, or 
 trusting to the remoteness of his province, publicly defied 
 Taitsou, and prepared to invade his dominions. The em- 
 peror was too quick for him, and before his army was in 
 the field sixty thousand imperial troops had crossed the fron- 
 tier and had occupied the province. By these triumphs Tai- 
 tsou acquired possession of some of the richest provinces and 
 forty millions of Chinese subjects. 
 
 Having composed these internal troubles with enemies 
 of Chinese race, Taitsou resumed his military operations 
 against his old opponents in Leaoutung. Both sides had 
 been making preparations for a renewal of the struggle, 
 and the fortress of Taiyuen, which had been specially 
 equipped to withstand a long siege, was the object of the 
 emperor's first attack. The place was valiantly defended 
 by a brave governor and a large garrison, and although 
 Taitsou defeated two armies sent to relieve it, he was com- 
 pelled to give up the hope of capturing Taiyuen on this 
 occasion. Some consolation for this repulse was afforded 
 by the capture of Canton and the districts dependent on 
 that city. He next proceeded against the governor of 
 Kiangnan, the dual province of Anhui and Kiangsu, who 
 had taken the title of Prince of Tang, and striven to proj^iti- 
 ate the emperor at the same time that he retained his own 
 independence. The two things were, however, incompati- 
 ble. Taitsou refused to receive the envoys of the Prince of 
 Tang, and he ordered him to attend in person at the capital. 
 With this the Tang prince would not comply, and an army 
 was at once sent to invade and conquer Kiangnan. The 
 campaign lasted one year, by which time the Tang power 
 was shattered, and his territory resumed its old form as a 
 province of China. With this considerable success Taitsou's 
 career may be said to have terminated, for although he sue-
 
 70 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 ceeded in detacliing tlie Leaoutung ruler from the side of 
 the Prince of Han, and was hastening at the head of his 
 forces to crush his old enemy at Taiyuen, death cut short 
 his career in a manner closely resembling that of Edward 
 the First of England. Taitsou died in his camp, in the midst 
 of his soldiers; and, acting on the advice of his mother, 
 given on her death-bed a few years before, "that he should 
 leave the throne to a relation of mature age," he appointed 
 his brother his successor, and as his last exhortation to him 
 said, "Bear yourself as becomes a brave prince, and govern 
 well." Many pages might be filled with the recitation of 
 Taitsou's great deeds and wise sayings; but his work in 
 uniting China and in giving the larger part of his country 
 tranquillity speaks for itself. His character as a ruler may 
 be gathered from the following selection, taken from among 
 his many speeches: "Do you think," he said, "that it is so 
 easy for a sovereign to perform his duties ? He does noth- 
 ing that is without consequence. This morning the thought 
 occurs to me that yesterday I decided a case in a wrong 
 manner, and this memory robs me of all my joy. ' ' 
 
 The new emperor took the style of Taitsong, and during 
 his reign of twenty-three years the Sung dynasty may be 
 fairly considered to have grown consolidated. One of his 
 first measures was to restore the privileges of the descendants 
 of Confucius, which included a hereditary title and exemp- 
 tion from taxation, and which are enjoyed to the present 
 day. After three years' deliberation Taitsong determined 
 to renew his brother's enterprise against Taiyuen, and as he 
 had not assured the neutrality of the King of Leaoutung, 
 his task was the more difftcult. On the advance of the Chi- 
 nese army, that ruler sent to demand the reason of the at- 
 tack on his friend the Prince of Han, to which the only 
 reply Taitsong gave was as follows: "The country of the 
 Hans was one of the provinces of the empire, and the prince 
 having refused to obey my orders I am determined to punish 
 him. If your prince stands aside, and does not meddle in 
 this quarrel, I am willing to continue to live at peace with
 
 THE SUNOS AND THE KINS 71 
 
 him; if he does not care to do this we will fight him." On 
 this the Leaou king declared war, but his troops were re- 
 pulsed by the covering army sent forward by Taitsong, 
 while he prosecuted the siege of Taiyuen in person. The 
 fortress was well defended, but its doom was never in doubt. 
 Taitsong, moved by a feeling of humanity, offered the Prince 
 of Ilan generous terms before delivering an assault which 
 was, practically speaking, certain to succeed, and he had 
 the good sense to accept them. The subjugation of Han 
 completed the pacification of the empire and the triumph of 
 Taitsong; but when that ruler thought to add to this success 
 the speedy overthrow of the Khitan power in Leaoutung he 
 was destined to a rude awakening. His action was cer- 
 tainly precipitate, and marked by overconfidence, for the 
 army of Leaoutung was composed of soldiers of a warlike 
 race accustomed to victory. He advanced against it as if it 
 were an army which would fly at the sight of his standard, 
 but instead of this he discovered that it was superior to his 
 own forces on the banks of the Kaoleang River, where he 
 suffered a serious defeat. Taitsong was fortunate enough 
 to retain his conquests over the southern Han states and to 
 find in his new subjects in that quarter faithful and valiant 
 soldiers. The success of the Leaou army was also largely 
 due to the tactical skill of its general, Yeliu Hiuco, who 
 took a prominent part in the history of this period. When 
 Taitsong endeavored, some years later, to recover what he 
 had lost by the aid of the Coreans, who, however, neglected 
 to fulfill their part of the contract, he only invited fresh 
 misfortunes. Yeliu Hiuco defeated his army in several 
 pitched battles with immense loss; on one occasion it was 
 said that the corpses of the slain checked the course of a 
 river. The capture of Yang^^eh, the old Han defender of 
 Taiyuen, who died of his wounds, completed the triumph 
 of the Leaou general, for it was said, "If Yangyeh cannot 
 resist the Tartars they must be invincible." Taitsong's 
 reign closed under the cloud of these reverses; but, on the 
 whole, it was successful and creditable, marking an im-
 
 72 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 provement in the condition of the country and the people, 
 and the triumph of the Sungs over at least one of their 
 natural enemies. 
 
 His son and successor, Chintsong, must be pronounced 
 fortunate in that the first year of his reign witnessed the 
 death of Yeliu Hiuco. The direct consequence of his death 
 was that the Chinese were, for the first time, successful in 
 their campaign against the Leaous. But this satisfactory 
 state of things did not long continue, and the Leaous be- 
 came so aggressive and successful that there was almost a 
 panic among the Chinese, and the removal of the capital to 
 a place of greater security was suggested. The firm counsel 
 and the courageous demeanor of the minister Kaochun pre- 
 vented this course being adopted. He figuratively described 
 the evil consequences of retreat by saymg, "Your majesty 
 can, without serious consequences, advance a foot further 
 than is absolutely necessary, but you cannot retire, even to 
 the extent of an inch, without doing yourself much harm." 
 Chintsong, fortunately for himself and his state, adopted 
 this course; and the Tartars thought it best to come to 
 terms, especially as the Chinese emperor was willing to pay 
 annually an allowance in silk and money as the reward of 
 their respecting his frontier. The arrangement could not 
 have been a bad one, as it gave the empire eighteen years 
 of peace. The country, no doubt, increased greatly in pros- 
 perity during this period; but the reputation of Chintsong 
 steadily declined. He seems to have been naturally super- 
 stitious, and he gave himself up to fortune-tellers and sooth- 
 sayers during the last years of his reign; and when he died, 
 in A. D. 1022, he had impaired the position and power of the 
 imperial office. Yet, so far as can be judged, the people 
 were contented, and the population rose to over one hun- 
 dred million. 
 
 Chintsong was succeeded by his sixth son, Jintsong, a 
 boy of thirteen, for whom the government was carried on 
 by his mother, a woman of capacity and good sense. She 
 took oil objectionable taxes on tea and salt — prime neces-
 
 THE SUNGS AND THE KINS 73 
 
 saries of life in China — and slie instituted surer measures 
 against the spiritualists and magicians who had flourished 
 under her husband and acquired many administrative offices 
 under his patronage. After ruling for ten peaceful years she 
 died and Jintsong assumed the personal direction of affairs. 
 During the tranquillity that had now prevailed for more 
 than a generation a new power had arisen on the Chinese 
 frontier in the principality of Tangut or Hia. This state 
 occupied the modern province of Kansuh, with some of the 
 adjacent districts of Koko Nor and the Gobi Desert. Chao 
 Yuen, the prince of this territory, was an ambitious war- 
 rior, who had drawn round his standard a force of one 
 hundred and fifty thousand fighting men. With this he 
 waged successful war upon the Tibetans, and began a course 
 of encroachments on Chinese territory which was not to be 
 distinguished from open hostility. Chao Yuen was not con- 
 tent with the appellation of prince, and "because he came of 
 a family several of whose members had in times past borne 
 the imperial dignity," he adopted the title of emperor. Hav- 
 ing taJien this step, Chao Yuen wrote to Jintsong express- 
 ing "the hope that there would be a constant and solid peace 
 between the two empires." The reply of the Chinese ruler 
 to this insult, as he termed it, was to declare war and to 
 oflier a reward for the head of Chao Yuen. 
 
 It was soon made evident that Chao Yuen possessed the 
 military power to support an imperial dignity. He defeated 
 the emperor's army in two pitched battles at Sanchuen and 
 Yang Moulong, and many years elapsed before the Sung 
 rulers can be held to have recovered from the loss of their 
 best armies. The Khitans of Leaoutung took advantage of 
 these misfortures to encroach, and as Jintsong had no army 
 with which to oppose tliem, they captured ten cities with little 
 or no resistance. The Chinese government was compelled 
 to purchase them back by increasing the annual allowance 
 it paid of gold and silk. A similar policy was resorted to 
 in the case of Chao Yuen, who consented to a peace on 
 receiving every year one hundred thousand pieces of silk 
 
 China — 4
 
 T4 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 and thirty thousand pounds of tea. Not content with this 
 payment, Chao Yuen subsequently exacted the right to 
 build fortresses along the Chinese frontier. Soon after this 
 Chao Yuen was murdered by one of his sons, whose be- 
 trothed he had taken from him. If Jintsong was not fort- 
 unate in his wars he did much to promote education and to 
 encourage literature. He restored the colleges founded by 
 the Tangs, he built a school or academy in every town, 
 he directed the public examinations to be held impartially 
 and frequently, and he gave special prizes as a reward for 
 elocution. Some of the greatest historians China has pro- 
 duced lived in his reign, and wrote their works under his 
 patronage; of these Szemakwang was the most famous. 
 His history of the Tangs is a masterpiece, and his "Garden 
 of Szemakwang" an idyll. He was remarkable for his sound 
 judgment as well as the elegance of his style, and during the 
 short time he held the post of prime minister his administra- 
 tion was marked by ability and good sense. The character 
 of Jintsong was, it will be seen, not without its good points, 
 which gained for him the affection of his subjects despite his 
 bad fortune against the national enemies, and his reign of 
 thirty years was, generally speaking, prosperous and satis- 
 factory. After the brief reign of his nephew, Yngtsong, 
 that prince's son, Chintsong the Second, became emperor. 
 The career of Wanganchi, an eccentric and socialistic 
 statesman, who wished to pose as a great national reformer, 
 and who long possessed the ear and favor of his sovereign, 
 lends an interest to the reign of the second Chintsong. Wan- 
 ganchi did not possess the confidence or the admiration of 
 his brother officials, and subsequent writers have generally 
 termed him an impostor and a charlatan. But he may only 
 have been a misguided enthusiast when he declared that 
 "the State should take the entire management of commerce, 
 industry, and agriculture into its own hands, with the view 
 of succoring the working classes, and preventing their being 
 ground to the dust by tlie rich." The advocacy of such a 
 scheme is calculated to earn popularity, as few of those who
 
 THE SUNOS AND THE KINS 75 
 
 are to benefit by it stop to examine its feasibility, and Wan- 
 ganchi might have been remembered as an enlightened 
 thinker and enthusiastic advocate of the rights of the 
 masses if he had not been called upon to carry out his 
 theories. But the proof of experience, like the touch oi 
 Ithuriel's spear, revealed the practical value of his sugges- 
 tions, and dissolved the attractive vision raised by his per- 
 fervid eloquence and elevated enthusiasm. His honesty of 
 purpose cannot, however, be disputed. On being appointed 
 to the post of chief minister he took in hand the application 
 of his own project. He exempted the poor from all taxa- 
 tion. He allotted lands, and he supplied the cultivators 
 with seeds and implements. He also appointed local boards 
 to superintend the efforts of the agricultural classes, and to 
 give them assistance and advice. But this paternal govern- 
 ment, this system of making the state do what the individ- 
 ual ought to do for himself, did not work as it was expected. 
 Those who counted on the agricultural laborer working with 
 as much intelligence and energy for himself as he had done 
 under the direction of a master were doomed to disappoint- 
 ment. Want of skill, the fitfulness of the small holder, 
 aggravated perhaps by national calamities, drought, flood, 
 and pestilence, being felt more severely by laborers than 
 by capitalists, led to a gradual shrinkage in the area of cul- 
 tivated land, and at last to the suffering of the classes who 
 were to specially benefit from the scheme of Wanganchi. 
 The failure of his scheme, which, to use his own words, 
 aimed at preventing their being any poor or over-rich per- 
 sons in the state, entailed his disgrace and fall from power. 
 But his work and his name have continued to excite interest 
 and speculation among his countrymen down to the present 
 day. His memory has been aspersed by the writers of China, 
 who have generally denounced him as a free-thinker and a 
 nihilist, and although, twenty years after his death, a tablet 
 bearing his name was placed in the Hall of Confucius as the 
 greatest Chinese thinker since Mencius, it was removed after 
 a brief period, and since then both the name and the works
 
 76 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 of Wanganchi have been consigned to an oblivion from which 
 only the curiosity of European writers has rescued them. 
 
 Chintsong's reign was peaceful, but he seems to have 
 only avoided war by yielding to all the demands of the Tar- 
 tars, who encroached on the frontier and seized several Chi- 
 nese cities. His son Chetsong was only ten when he became 
 emperor, and the administration was carried on by his mother, 
 the Empress Tefei, another of the capable women of Chinese 
 history. Her early death left Chetsong to rule as he listed, 
 and his first acts of independent authority were not of happy 
 augury for the future. He had not been on the throne many 
 months before he divorced his principal wife without any 
 apparent justification, and when remonstrated with he merely 
 replied that he was imitating several of his predecessors. 
 The censor's retort was, "You would do better to imitate 
 their virtues, and not their faults." Chetsong did not have 
 any long opportunity of doing either, for he died of grief at 
 the loss of his favorite son, and it is recorded that, as "he 
 did not expect to die so soon," he omitted the precaution of 
 selecting an heir. Fortunately the mischief of a disputed 
 succession was avoided by the unanimous selection of his 
 brother Hoeitsong as the new emperor. He proved him- 
 self a vain and superstitious ruler, placing his main faith 
 in fortune-tellers, and expecting his subjects to yield im- 
 plicit obedience to his opinions as "the master of the law 
 and the prince of doctrine." Among other fallacies, Hoei- 
 tsong cherished the belief that he was a great soldier, and 
 he aspired to rank as the conqueror of the old successful 
 enemy of China, the Khitans of Leaoutung. He had no 
 army worthy of the name, and the southern Chinese who 
 formed the mass of his subjects were averse to war, yet his 
 personal vanity impelled him to rush into hostilities which 
 promised to be the more serious because a new and formi- 
 dable power had arisen on the northern frontier. 
 
 The Niuche or Chorcha Tartars, who had assumed a dis- 
 tinct name and place in the vicinity of the modern Kalgan, 
 about the year 1000 a.d., had become subservient to the
 
 THE SUNOS AND THE KINS 77 
 
 great Kliitan chief Apaoki, and their seven hordes had re- 
 mained faithful allies of his family and kingdom for many 
 years after his death. But some of the clan had preferred 
 independence to the maintenance of friendly relations with 
 their greatest neighbor, and they had withdrawn northward 
 into Manchuria. For some unknown reason the Niuche be- 
 came dissatisfied with their Khitan allies, and about the year 
 1100 A.D. they had all drawn their forces together as an in- 
 dependent confederacy under the leadership of a great chief 
 named Akouta. The Niuche could only hope to establish 
 their independence by offering a successful resistance to the 
 King of Leaoutung, who naturally resented the defection of 
 a tribe which had been his humble dependants. They suc- 
 ceeded in this task beyond all expectation, as Akouta inflicted 
 a succession of defeats on the hitherto invincible army of 
 Leaoutung. Then the Niuche conqueror resolved to pose 
 as one of the arbiters of the empire's destiny, and to found 
 a dynasty of his own. He collected his troops, and he ad- 
 dressed them in a speech reciting their deeds and his pre- 
 tensions. "The Khitans," he said, "had in the earlier days 
 of their success taken the name of Pintiei, meaning the iron 
 of Pine how, but although that iron may be excellent, it is 
 liable to rust and can be eaten away. There is nothing save 
 gold which is unchangeable and which does not destroy it- 
 self. Moreover, the family of Wangyen, with which I am 
 connected through the chief Ilanpou, had always a great 
 fancy for glittering colors such as that of gold, and I am 
 now resolved to take this name as that of my imperial fam- 
 ily. I therefore give it the name of Kin, which signifies 
 gold." This speech was made in the year 1115, and it 
 was the historical introduction of the Kin dynasty, which 
 so long rivaled the Sung, and which, although it attained 
 only a brief lease of power on the occasion referred to, was 
 remarkable as being the first appearance of the ancestors 
 of the present reigning Manchus. 
 
 Like other conquerors who had appeared in the same 
 quarter, the Kins, as we must now call them, owed their
 
 id HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 rise to tlieir military qualifications and to their high spirit. 
 Their tactics, although of a simpler kind, were as superior 
 to those of the Leaous as the latter' s were to the Chinese. 
 Their army consisted exclusively of cavalry, and victory 
 was generally obtained by its furious attacks delivered from 
 several sides simultaneously. The following description, 
 taken from Mailla's translation of the Chinese official his- 
 tory, gives the best account of their army and mode of 
 fighting: 
 
 "At first the Niuche had only cavalry. For their sole 
 distinction they made use of a small piece of braid on which 
 they marked certain signs, and they attached this to both 
 man and horse. Their companies were usually composed of 
 only fifty men each, twenty of whom, clothed in strong cui- 
 rasses, and armed with swords and short pikes, were placed 
 m the front, and behind those came the remaining thirty in 
 less weighty armor, and with bows and arrows or javelins 
 for weapons. When they encountered an enemy, two men 
 from each company advanced as scouts, and then arranging 
 their troops so as to attack from four sides, they approached 
 the foe at a gentle trot until within a hundred yards of his 
 line. Thereupon charging at full speed, they discharged 
 their arrows and javelins, again retiring with the same 
 celerity. This maneuver they repeated several times until 
 they threw the ranks into confusion, when they fell upon 
 them with sword and pike so impetuously that they gen- 
 erally gained the victory." 
 
 The novelty, as well as the impetuosity, of their attack 
 supplied the want of numbers and of weapons, and when 
 the Khitans raised what seemed an overwhelming force to 
 crush the new power tliat ventured to play the rival to theirs 
 in Northern China, Akouta, confident in himself and in his 
 people, was not dismayed, and accepted the offer of battle. 
 In two sanguinary battles he vanquished the Khitan armies, 
 and threatened with early extinction the once famous dynasty 
 of Leaoutung. When the Sung emperor heard of the defeats 
 of his old opponents, he at once rushed to the conclusion that
 
 THE SUNOS AND THE KINS 79 
 
 the appearance of this new power on the flank of Leaoutung 
 must redound to his advantage, and, although warned by 
 the King of Corea that "the Kins were worse than wolves 
 and tigers," he sent an embassy to Akouta proposing a joint 
 alliance against the Khitans. The negotiations were not at 
 first successful. Akouta concluded a truce with Leaoutung, 
 but took offense at the style of the emperor's letter. The 
 peace was soon broken by either the Kins or the Khitans, 
 and Hoeitsong consented to address Akouta as the Great 
 Emperor of the Kins. Then Akouta engaged to attack 
 Leaoutung from the north, while the Chinese assailed it on 
 the south, and a war began which promised a speedy termi- 
 nation. But the tardiness and inefficiency of the Chinese 
 army prolonged the struggle, and covered the reputation of 
 Hoeitsong and his troops with ignominy. It was compelled 
 to beat a hasty and disastrous retreat, and the peasants of 
 Leaoutung sang ballads about its cowardice and inefficiency. 
 
 But if it fared badly with the Chinese, the armies of 
 Akouta continued to be victorious, and the Khitans fled not 
 less precipitately before him than the Chinese did before 
 them. Their best generals were unable to make the least 
 stand against the Kin forces. Their capital was occupied 
 by the conqueror, and the last descendant of the great 
 Apaoki fled westward to seek an asylum with the Prince 
 of Hia or Tangut. He does not appear to have received the 
 protection he claimed, for after a brief stay at the court of 
 Hia, he made his way to the desert, where, after undergoing 
 incredible hardships, he fell into the hands of his Kin pur- 
 suers. With his death soon afterward the Khitan dynasty 
 came to an end, after enjoying its power for two hundred 
 years; but some members of this race escaped across the 
 Gobi Desert, and founded the brief-lived dynasty of the Kara 
 Khitay in Turkestan. Akouta died shortly before the final 
 overthrow of the Leaoutung power, and his brother Oukimai 
 ruled in his place. 
 
 The ill-success of Hoeitsong' s army in its joint campaign 
 against Leaoutung cost the emperor his share in the spoiL
 
 80 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 The Kins retained the whole of the conquered territory, and 
 the Sung prince was the worse off, because he had a more 
 powerful and aggi'essive neighbor. The ease of their con- 
 quest, and the evident weakness of the Chinese, raised the 
 confidence of the Kins to such a high point that they de- 
 clared that the Sungs must surrender to them the whole 
 of the territory north of the Hoangho, and they prepared to 
 secure what they demanded by force of arms. The Chinese 
 would neither acquiesce in the transfer of this region to the 
 Kins nor take steps to defend it. They were driven out of 
 that portion of tlie empire like sheep, and they even failed 
 to make any stand at tlie passage of the Hoangho, where 
 the Kin general declared that "there could not be a man 
 left in China, for if two thousand men had defended the 
 passage of this river we should never have succeeded in 
 crossing it." Hoeitsong quitted his capital Kaifong to seek 
 shelter at Nankin, where he hoped to enjoy greater safety, 
 and shortly afterward he abdicated in favor of his son Kin- 
 tsong. The siege of Kaifong which followed ended in a con- 
 vention binding the Chinese to pay the Kins an enormous 
 sum — ten millions of small gold nuggets, twenty millions of 
 small silver nuggets, and ten million pieces of silk; but the 
 Tartar soldiers soon realized that there was no likelihood of 
 their ever receiving this fabulous spoil, and in their indig- 
 nation they seized both Hoeitsong and Kintsong, as well as 
 any other members of the royal family on whom they could 
 lay their hands, and carried them off to Tartary, where both 
 the unfortunate Sung princes died as prisoners of the Kins. 
 Although the Kins wished to sweep the Sungs from the 
 throne, and their general Walipou went so far as to proclaim 
 the emperor of a new dynasty, whose name is forgotten, 
 another of the sons of Hoeitsong, Prince Kang Wang, had 
 no difficulty in establishing his own power and in preserving 
 the Sung dynasty. He even succeeded in imparting a new 
 vigor to it, for on the advice of his mother, who pointed out 
 to him that "for nearly two hundred years the nation ap- 
 pears to have forgotten the ai't of war, ' ' he devoted all his
 
 THE SUNOS AND THE KINS 81 
 
 attention to the improvement of his army and the organiza- 
 tion of his military resources. Prince Kang Wang, on be- 
 coming emperor, took the name of Kaotsong, and finally 
 removed the southern capital to Nankin. He was also driven 
 by his financial necessities to largely increase the issue of 
 paper money, which had been introduced under the Tangs. 
 As both the Kins and the Mongols had recourse to the same 
 expedient, it is not surprising that the Sungs should also 
 have adopted the simplest mode of compensating for a de- 
 pleted treasury. Considering the unexpected difficulties with 
 which he had to cope, and the low ebb to which the fortunes 
 of China had fallen, much might be forgiven to Kaotsong, 
 who found a courageous counselor in the Empress Mongchi, 
 who is reported to have addressed him as follows : ' ' Although 
 the whole of your august family has been led captive into 
 the countries of the north, none the less does China, which 
 knows your wisdom and fine qualities, preserve toward the 
 Sungs the same affection, fidelity, and zeal as in the past. 
 She hopes and expects that you will prove for her what 
 Kwang Vouti was for the Hans." If Kaotsong did not 
 attain the height of this success, he at least showed himself 
 a far more capable prince than any of his immediate pre- 
 decessors. 
 
 The successful employment of cavalry by the Kins nat- 
 urally led the Chinese to think of employing the same arm 
 against them, although the inhabitants of the eighteen 
 provinces have never been good horsemen. Kaotsong also 
 devoted his attention especially to the formation of a corps 
 of charioteers. The chariots, four-wheeled, carried twenty- 
 four combatants, and these vehicles drawn up in battle array 
 not only presented a very formidable appearance, but afforded 
 a very material shelter for the rest of the army. Kaotsong 
 seems to have been better in imagining reforms than in the 
 task of carrying them out. After he had originated much 
 good work he allowed it to languish for want of definite 
 support, and he quarreled with and disgraced the minister 
 chiefly responsible for these reforms. A short time after this
 
 82 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the Kins again advanced southward, but thanks to the im- 
 provement effected in the Chinese army, and to the skill and 
 valor of Tsongtse, one of Kaotsong's lieutenants, they did 
 not succeed in gaining any material advantage. Their ef- 
 forts to capture Kaifong failed, and their general Niyamoho, 
 recognizing the improvement in the Chinese army, was con- 
 tent to withdraw his army with such spoil as it had been 
 able to collect. Tsongtse followed up this good service 
 against the enemy by bringing to their senses several rebel- 
 lious officials who thought they saw a good opportunity of 
 shaking off the Sung authority. At this stage of the war 
 Tsongtse exhorted Kaotsong, who had quitted Nankin for 
 Yangchow, to return to Kaifong to encourage his troops 
 with his presence, especially as there never was such a favor- 
 able opportunity of delivering his august family out of the 
 hands of the Kins. Tsongtse is reported to have sent as 
 many as twenty formal petitions to his sovereign to do this, 
 but Kaotsong was deaf to them all, and it is said that his 
 obtuseness and want of nerve caused Tsongtse so much pain 
 that he died of chagrin. 
 
 The death of Tsongtse induced the Kins to make a more 
 strenuous effort to humiliate the Sungs, and a large army 
 under the joint command of Akouta's son, Olito, and the 
 general Niyamoho, advanced on the capital and captured 
 Yangchow. Kaotsong, who saved his life by precipitate 
 flight, then agreed to sign any treaty drawn up by his con- 
 queror. In his letter to Niyamoho he said, "Why fatigue 
 your troops with long and arduous marches when I will 
 grant you of my own will whatever you demand ?" But the 
 Kins were inexorable, and refused to grant any terms short 
 of the unconditional surrender of Kaotsong, who fled to 
 Canton, pursued both on hind and sea. The Kin conquerors 
 soon found that they had advanced too far, and the Chinese 
 rallying their forces gained some advantage during their 
 retreat. Some return of confidence followed this turn in the 
 fortune of the war, and two Chinese generals, serving in 
 the hard school of adversity, acquired a military knowledge
 
 THE SUNOS AND THE KINS 83 
 
 and skill which made them formidable to even the best of 
 the Kin commanders. The campaigns carried on between 
 1131 and 1134 differed from any that had preceded them in 
 that the Kin forces steadily retired before Oukiai and Ohang- 
 tsiun, and victory, which had so long remained constant in 
 their favor, finally deserted their arms. The death of the 
 Kin emperor, Oukimai, who had upheld with no decline of 
 luster the dignity of his father Akouta, completed the dis- 
 comfiture of the Kins, and contributed to the revival of Chi- 
 nese power under the last emperor of the Sung dynasty. 
 The reign of Oukimai marks the pinnacle of Kin power, 
 which under his cousin and successor Hola began steadily 
 to decline. 
 
 The possession of Honan formed the principal bone of 
 contention between the Kins and Sungs, but after consider- 
 able negotiation and some fighting, Kaotsong agreed to leave 
 it in the hands of the Kins, and also to pay them a large 
 annual subsidy in silk and money. He also agreed to hold 
 the remainder of his states as a gift at the hands of his north- 
 ern neighbor. Thus, notwithstanding the very considerable 
 successes gained by several of the Sung generals, Kaotsong 
 had to undergo the mortification of signing a humiliating 
 peace and retaining his authority only on sufferance. Fort- 
 unately for the independence of the Sungs, Hola was mur- 
 dered by Ticounai, a grandson of Akouta, whose ferocious 
 character and ill-formed projects for the subjugation of the 
 whole of China furnished the Emperor Kaotsong with the 
 opportunity of shaking off the control asserted over his ac- 
 tions and recovering his dignity. The extensive preparations 
 of the Kin government for war warned the Sungs to lose no 
 time in placing every man they could in the field, and when 
 Ticounai rushed into the war, which was all of his own mak- 
 ing, he found that the Sungs were quite ready to receive him 
 and offer a strenuous resistance to his attack. A peace of 
 twenty years' duration had allowed of their organizing their 
 forces and recovering from an unreasoning terror of the 
 Kins. Moreover, there was a very general feeling among
 
 84 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the inliabitaiits of both the north and the south that the war 
 was an unjust one, and that Ticounai had embarked upon a 
 course of lawless aggression which his tyrannical and cruel 
 proceedings toward his own subjects served to inflame. 
 
 The war began in 1161 A. d., with an ominous defeat af 
 the Kin navy, and when Kaotsong nerved himself for the 
 crisis in his life and placed himself at the head of his troops, 
 Ticounai must have felt less sanguine of the result than his 
 confident declaration that he would end the war in a single 
 campaign indicated. Before the two armies came into col- 
 lision Ticounai learned that a rebellion had broken out in his 
 rear, and that his cousin Oulo challenged both his legitimacy 
 and his authority. He believed, and perhaps wisely, that 
 the only way to deal with this new danger was to press on, 
 and by gaining a signal victory over the Sungs annihilate 
 all his enemies at a blow. But the victory had to be gained, 
 and he seems to have underestimated his opponent. He 
 reached the Yangtsekiang, and the Sungs retired behind it. 
 Ticounai had no means of crossing it, as his fleet had been 
 destroyed and the Sung navy stood in his path. Such river 
 junks as he possessed were annihilated in another encounter 
 on the river. He offered sacrifices to heaven in order to 
 obtain a safe passage, but the powers above were deaf to his 
 prayers. Discontent and disorder broke out in his camp. 
 The army that was to have carried all before it was stopped 
 by a mere river, and Ticounai 's reputation as a general was 
 ruined before he had crossed swords with the enemy. In 
 this dilemma his cruelty increased, and after he had sen- 
 tenced many of his officers and soldiers to death he was mur- 
 dered by those who found that they would have to share the 
 same fate. After this tragic ending of a bad career, the Kin 
 army retreated. They concluded a friendly convention with 
 the Sungs, and Kaotsong, deeming his work done by the 
 repulse of this grave peril, abdicated the throne, which had 
 proved to him no bed of roses, in favor of his adopted heir 
 Hiaotsong. Kaotsong ruled during the long period of thirty- 
 six years, and when we consider the troubled time through
 
 THE SUNOS AND THE KINS 85 
 
 whioli he passed, and the many vicissitudes of fortune ho 
 underwent, he probably rejoiced at being able to spend the 
 last twenty-five years of his life without the responsibility of 
 governing the empire and free from the cares of sovereignty. 
 
 The new Kin ruler Oulo wished for peace, but a section 
 of his turbulent subjects clamored for a renewal of the ex- 
 peditions into China, and he was compelled to bend to the 
 storm. The Kin army, however, had no cause to rejoice in 
 its bellicoseness, for the Chinese general, Changtsiun, de- 
 feated it in a battle the like of which had not been seen for 
 ten years. After this a peace was concluded which proved 
 fairly durable, and the remainder of the reigns of both Oulo 
 and Hiaotsong were peaceful and prosperous for northern 
 and southern China. Both of these princes showed an aver- 
 sion to war and an appreciation of peace which was rare in 
 their day. The Kin ruler is stated to have made this noble 
 retort when he was solicited by a traitor from a neighboring 
 state to seize it: "You deceive yourself if you believe me to 
 be capable of approving an act of treason, whatever the pre- 
 sumed advantage it might procure me. I love all peoples of 
 whatever nation they may be, and I wish to see them at 
 peace with one another. " It is not surprising to learn that 
 a prince who was so thoroughly imbued with the spirit of 
 civilization should have caused the Chinese classics to be 
 translated into the Kin language. Of all the Kin rulers 
 he was the most intellectual and the most anxious to elevate 
 the standard of his people, who were far ruder than the in- 
 habitants of southern China. 
 
 Hiaotsong was succeeded by his son Kwangtsong, and 
 Oulo by hi-s grandson Madacou, both of whom continued 
 the policy of their predecessors. Kwangtsong was saved 
 the trouble of ruling by his wife, the Empress Lichi, and 
 after a very short space he resigned the empty title of em- 
 peror, which brought him neither satisfaction nor pleasure. 
 Ningtsong, the son and successor of Kwangtsong, ventured 
 on one war with the Kins in which he was worsted. This 
 was the last of the Kin successes, for Madacou died soon
 
 86 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 afterward, just on the eve of the advent of the Mongol peril, 
 wliich threatened to sweep all before it, and which eventu- 
 ally buried both Kin and Sung in a common ruin. The long 
 competition and the bitter contest between the Kins and 
 Sungs had not resulted in the decisive success of either side. 
 The Kins had been strong enough to found an administra- 
 tion in the north but not to conquer China. The Sungs very 
 naturally represent in Chinese history the national dynasty, 
 and their misfortunes, rather than their successes, appeal 
 to the sentiment of the reader. They showed themselves 
 greater in adversity than in prosperity, and when the Mongol 
 tempest broke over China they proved the more doughty 
 opponent, and the possessor of greater powers of resistance 
 than their uniformly successful adversary the Kin or Q-olden 
 Dynasty. 
 
 CHAPTER Y 
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OP CHINA 
 
 While the Kins were absorbed in their contest with the 
 Southern Chinese, they were oblivious of the growth of a 
 new and formidable power on their own borders. The 
 strength of the Mongols had acquired serious dimensions 
 before the Kins realized that they would have to fight, not 
 only for supremacy, but for their very existence. Before 
 describing the long wars that resulted in the subjection of 
 China by this northern race, we must consider the origin 
 and the growth of the power of the Mongols, who were 
 certainly the most remarkable race of conquerors Asia, or 
 perhaps the whole world, ever produced. 
 
 The home of the Mongols, whose name signifies "brave 
 men," was in the strip of territory between the Onon and 
 Kerulon rivers, which are both tributaries or upper courses 
 of the Amour. They first appeared as a separate clan or 
 tribe in the ninth century, when they attracted s])ecial at- 
 tention for their physical strength and courage during one
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 87 
 
 of China's many wars with the children of the desert, and 
 it was on that occasion they gained the appellation under 
 which they became famous. The earlier history of the 
 Mongol tribe is obscure, and baffles investigation, but there 
 seems no reason to doabt their affinity to the Hiongnou, 
 with whose royal house Genghis himself claimed blood rela- 
 tionship. If this claim be admitted, Grenghis and Attila, 
 who were the two specially typical Scourges of God, must 
 be considered members of the same race, and the probability 
 is certainly strengthened by the close resemblance in their 
 methods of carrying on war. Budantsar is the first chief 
 of the House of Genghis whose person and achievements are 
 more than mythical. He selected as the abode of his race the 
 territory between the Oaon and the Kerulon, a region fertile 
 in itself, and well protected by those rivers against attack. It 
 was also so well placed as to be beyond the extreme limit 
 of any triumphant progress of the armies of the Chinese em- 
 peror. If Budantsar had accomplished nothing more than 
 this, he would still have done much to justify his memory 
 being preserved among a free and independent people. But 
 he seems to have incited his followers to pursue an active 
 and temperate life, to remain warriors rather than to be- 
 come rich and lazy citizens. He wrapped up this counsel 
 in the exhortation, "What is the use of embarrassing our- 
 selves with wealth ? Is not the fate of men decreed by 
 heaven?" He sowed the seed of future Mongol greatness, 
 and the headship of his clan remained vested in his family. 
 In due order of succession the chiefship passed to Kabul 
 Khan, who in the year 1135 began to encroach on the do- 
 minion of Hola, the Kin emperor. He seems to have been 
 induced to commit this act of hostility by a prophecy, to the 
 effect that his children should be emperors, and also by dis- 
 courteous treatment received on the occasion of his visit to 
 the court of Oukimai. Whatever the cause of umbrage, 
 Kabul Khan made the Kins pay dearly for their arrogance 
 or short-sighted policy. Hola sent an army under one of his 
 best generals, Hushahu, to bring the Mongo. chief to reason,
 
 88 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 but the inaccessibility of his home stood him in good stead. 
 The Kin army suffered greatly in its futile attempt to cross 
 the desert, and during its retreat it was harassed by the 
 pursuing Mongols. "When the Kin army endeavored to 
 make a stand against its pursuers, it suffered a crushing 
 overthrow in a battle at Hailing, and on the Kins sending 
 a larger force against the Mongols in 1189, it had no better 
 fortune. Kabul Khan, after this second success, caused 
 himself to be proclaimed Great Emperor of the Mongols. 
 His success in war, and his ambition, which rested satisfied 
 with no secondary position, indicated the path on which the 
 Mongols proceeded to the acquisition of supreme power and 
 a paramount military influence whithersoever they carried 
 their name and standards. The work begun by Kabul was 
 well continued by his son Kutula, or Kublai. He, too, was 
 a great warrior, whose deeds of prowess aroused as much 
 enthusiasm among the Mongols as those of Coeur de Lion 
 evoked in the days of the Plantagenets. The struggle with 
 the Kins was rendered more bitter by the execution of sev- 
 eral Mongols of importance, who happened to fall into the 
 hands of the Kins. When Kutula died the chief ship passed 
 to his nephew, Yissugei, who greatly extended the influence 
 and power of his family among the tribes neighboring to 
 the Mongol home. Many of these, and even some Chinese, 
 joined the military organization of the dominant tribe, so 
 that what was originally a small force of strictly limited 
 numbers became a vast and ever-increasing confederacy of 
 the most warlike and aggressive races of the Chinese north- 
 ern frontier. Important as Yissugei's work in the develop- 
 ment of Mongol power undoubtedly was, his chief historical 
 interest is derived from the fact that he was the father of 
 Genghis Khan. 
 
 There are several interesting fables in connection with 
 the birth of Genghis, which event may be safely assigned 
 to the year 1162. One of these reads as follows: "One 
 day Yissugei was hunting in company with his brothers, 
 and was following the tracks of a white hare in the snow.
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 89 
 
 They struck upon the track of a wagon, and following it np 
 came to a spot where a woman's yart was pitched. Then 
 said Yissugei, 'This woman will bear a valiant son.' He 
 discovered that she was the damsel Ogelen Eke {i.e., the 
 mother of nations), and that she was the wife of Yeke 
 Yilatu, chief of a Tartar tribe. Yissugei carried her oft' 
 and made her his wife." Immediately after his overthrow 
 of Temujin, chief of one of the principal Tartar tribes, Yis- 
 sugei learned that the promised "valiant son" was about to 
 be born, and in honor of his victory he gave him the name 
 of Temujin, which was the proper name of the great Gen- 
 ghis. The village or encampment in which the future con- 
 queror first saw the light of day still bears the old Mongol 
 name, Dilun Boldak, on the banks of the Onon. When 
 Yissugei died, Temujin, or Genghis, was only thirteen, and 
 his clan of forty thousand families refused to recognize him 
 as their leader. At a meeting of the tribe Genghis en- 
 treated them with tears in his eyes to vStand by the son of 
 their former chief, but the majority of them mocked at 
 him, exclaiming, "The deepest wells are sometimes dry, 
 and the hardest stone is sometimes broken, why should we 
 cling to thee?" Genghis owed to the heroic attitude of his 
 mother, who flung abroad the cow-tailed banner of his race, 
 the acceptance of his authority by about half the warriors 
 who had obeyed his father. The great advantage of this 
 step was that it gave Genghis time to grow up to be a 
 warrior as famous as any of his predecessors, and it cer- 
 tainly averted what might have easily become the irretriev- 
 able disintegration of the Mongol alliance. 
 
 The youth of Genghis was passed in one ceaseless strug- 
 gle to regain the whole of his birthright. His most formi- 
 dable enemy was Chamuka, chief of the Juriats, and for a 
 long time he had all the worst of the struggle, being taken 
 prisoner on one occasion, and undergoing the indignity of 
 the cangue. On making his escape he rallied his remaining 
 followers round him for a final effort, and on the advice of 
 his mother, Ogelen Eke, who was his principal adviser and
 
 90 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 stancliest supporter, he divided his forces into thirteen regi- 
 ments of one thousand men each, and confined his attention 
 to the defense of his own territory. Chamuka, led away by 
 what he deemed the weakness of his adversary, attacked 
 him on the Onon with as he considered the overwhelming 
 force of thirty thousand men; but the result dispelled his 
 hopes of conquest, for Genghis gained a decisive victory. 
 Then was furnished a striking instance of the truth of the 
 saying that "nothing succeeds like success." The despised 
 Temujin, who was thought to be unworthy of the post of 
 ruling the Mongols, was lauded to the skies, and the tribes 
 declared with one voice, "Temujin alone is generous and 
 worthy of ruling a great people. ' ' At this time also he began 
 to show the qualities of a statesman and diplomatist. He 
 formed in 1194 a temporary alliance with the Kin em- 
 peror, Madacou, and the richness of his reward seems to 
 have excited his cupidity, while his experience of the Kin 
 army went to prove that they were not so formidable as 
 had been imagined. The discomfiture of Chamuka has 
 been referred to, but he had not abandoned the hope of 
 success, and when he succeeded in detaching the Kerait 
 chief, Wang Khan, from the Mongols, to whom he was 
 bound by ties of gratitude, he fancied that he again held 
 victory in his grasp. But the intrigue did not realize his 
 expectations. Wang Khan deserted Grenghis while engaged 
 in a joint campaign against the Naimans, but he was the 
 principal sufferer by his treachery, for the enemy pursued 
 his force, and inflicted a heavy defeat upon it. In fact, he 
 was only rescued from destruction by the timely aid of the 
 man he had betrayed. 
 
 But far from inspiring gratitude, this incident inflamed 
 the resentment of AVang Khan, who, throwing off the cloak 
 of simulated friendship, declared publicly that either the 
 Kerait or the Mongol must be supreme on the great steppe, 
 as there was not room for both. Such was the superiority 
 in numbers of the Kerait, that in the first battle of this long 
 and keenly-contested struggle, Wang Khan defeated Temu-
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 91 
 
 jin near Ourga, wliere the mounds that cover the slain are 
 still shown to the curious or skeptical visitor. After this 
 serious, and in some degree unexpected reverse, the fort- 
 unes of Genghis sank to the lowest ebb. He was reduced 
 to terrible straits, and had to move his camp rapidly from 
 one spot to another. A small section of his followers, mind- 
 ful of his past success and prowess, still clung to him, and 
 by a sudden and daring coup he changed the whole aspect 
 of the contest. He surprised Wang Khan in his camp at 
 night, and overwhelmed him and his forces. Wang Khan 
 escaped to his old foes, the Naimans, who, disregarding the 
 laws of hospitality, put him to death. The death of Wang 
 Khan signified nothing less than the wholesale defection of 
 the Kerait tribe, which joined Genghis to the last man. 
 Then Genghis turned westward to settle the question of 
 supremacy with the Kaimans, who were both hostile and 
 defiant. The Naiman chief shared the opinion of Wang 
 Khan, that there could not be two masters on the Tian 
 Shan, and with that vigorous illustration which has never 
 been wanting to these illiterate tribes, he wrote, "There 
 cannot be two suns in the sky, two swords in one sheath, 
 two eyes in one eyepit, or two kings in one empire. ' ' Both 
 sides made strenuous efforts for the fray, and brought every 
 fighting man they could into the field. The decisive battle 
 of the war was fought in the heart of Jungaria, and the 
 star of Genghis rose in the ascendant. The Naimans fought 
 long and well, but they were borne down by the heavier 
 armed Mongols, and their desperate resistance only added 
 to their loss. Their chief died of his wounds, and the tri- 
 umph of Genghis was rendered complete by the capture of 
 his old enemy, Chamuka. As Genghis had sworn the oath 
 of friendship with Chamuka, he would not slay him, but he 
 handed him over to a relative, who promptly exacted the 
 rough revenge his past hostility and treachery seemed to 
 call for. On his way back from this campaign the Mongol 
 chief attacked the Prince of Hia, who reigned over Kansuh 
 and Tangut, and thus began the third war he waged for the
 
 92 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 extension of his power. Before this assumed serious propor- 
 tions he summoned a Grand Council or Kuriltai, at his camp 
 on the Onon, and then erected outside his tent the royal 
 Mongol banner of the nine white yak-tails. It was on this 
 occasion that Temujin took, and was proclaimed among the 
 Mongol chiefs by, the highly exalted name of Genghis Khan, 
 which means Very Mighty Khan. The Chinese character 
 for the name signifies "Perfect Warrior," and the earlier 
 European writers affirm that it is supposed to represent the 
 sound of "the bird of heaven." At this assemblage, which 
 was the first of a long succession of Mongol councils, sum- 
 moned at the same place on critical occasions, it was pro- 
 posed and agreed that the war should be carried on with the 
 richer and less warlike races of the south. Among soldiers 
 it is necessary to preserve the spirit of pre-eminence and 
 warlike zeal by granting rewards and decorations. oren- 
 ghis realized the importance of this matter and instituted 
 the order of Baturu or Bahadur, meaning warrior. He 
 also made his two leading generals Muliula and Porshu 
 princes, one to sit on his right hand and the other on his 
 left. He addressed them before the council in the follow- 
 ing words: "It is to you that I owe my empire. You are 
 and have been to me as the shafts of a carriage or the 
 arms to a man's body." Seals of office were also granted 
 to all the officials, so that their authority might be the 
 more evident and the more honored. 
 
 In 1207 Genghis began his war with the state of Hia, 
 which he had determined to crush as the preliminary to 
 an invasion of China. In that year he contented himself 
 with the capture of Wuhlahai, one of the border fortresses 
 of that principality, and in the following year he established 
 his control over the tribes of the desert more fully, thus 
 gaining many Kirghiz and Naiman auxiliaries. In 1209 he 
 resumed the war with Hia in a determined spirit, and placed 
 himself in person at the head of all his forces. Although 
 the Hia ruler prepared as well as he could for the struggle, 
 he was really unnerved by the magnitude of the danger he
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 93 
 
 had to face. His army was overtlirown, his best generals 
 were taken prisoners, and he himself had no resource left 
 but to throw himself on the consideration of Genghis. For 
 good reasons the Mongol conqueror was lenient. He mar- 
 ried one of the daughters of the king, and he took him into 
 subsidiary alliance with himself. Thus did Genghis absorb 
 the Hia power, which was very considerable, and prepared to 
 enroll it with all his own resources against the Kin empire. 
 If the causes of Mongol success on this occasion and after- 
 ward are inquired for, I cannot do better than repeat what 
 I previously wrote on this subject: "The Mongols owed 
 their military success to their admirable discipline and to 
 their close study of the art of war. Their military su- 
 premacy arose from their superiority in all essentials as a 
 fighting power to their neighbors. Much of their knowledge 
 was borrowed from China, where the art of disciplining a 
 large army and maneuvering it in the field had been brought 
 to a high state of perfection many centuries before the time 
 of Genghis. But the Mongols carried the teaching of the 
 past to a further point than any of the former or contem- 
 porary Chinese commanders, indeed, than any in the whole 
 world, had done; and the revolution which they effected in 
 tactics was not less remarkable in itself, and did not leave 
 a smaller impression upon the age, than the improvements 
 made in military science by Frederick the Great and Napo- 
 leon in their day. The Mongol played in a large way in 
 Asia the part which the Normans on a smaller scale played 
 in Europe. Although the landmarks of their triumph have 
 now almost wholly vanished, they were for two centuries 
 the dominant caste in most of the states of Asia. ' ' 
 
 Having thus prepared the way for the larger enterprise, 
 it only remained to find a plausible pretext for attacking the 
 Kins. With or without a pretext, Genghis would no doubt 
 have made war, but even the ruthless Mongol sometimes 
 showed a regard for appearances. Many years before, the 
 Kins had sent as envoy to the Mongol encampment Chong- 
 hei, a member of their ruling house, and his mission had
 
 94 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 been not only unsuccessful, but bad led to a personal an- 
 tipathy between tbe two men. In the course of time Cbong- 
 bei succeeded Madacou as emperor of tbe Kins, and wben a 
 Kin messenger brought intelligence of tbis event to Grengbis, 
 tbe Mongol ruler turned toward tbe soutb, spat upon tbe 
 ground, and said, "I tbougbt tbat your sovereigns were of 
 tbe race of tbe gods, but do you suppose tbat I am going 
 to do homage to such an imbecile as tbat?" The affront 
 rankled in the mind of Chonghei, and while Genghis was 
 engaged with Hia, be sent troops to attack tbe Mongol out- 
 posts. Chonghei thus placed himself in tbe wrong, and gave 
 Genghis justification for declaring that the Kins and not he 
 began the war. The reputation of tbe Golden dynasty, al- 
 though not as great as it once was, still stood sufficiently 
 high to make the most adventurous of desert chiefs wary in 
 attacking it. Genghis bad already secured the co-operation 
 of the ruler of Hia in bis enterprise, and be next concluded 
 an alliance with Yeliu Liuko, chief of the Khitans, who were 
 again manifesting discontent with tbe Kins. Genghis finally 
 circulated a proclamation among all tbe desert tribes, calling 
 upon them to join him in bis attack on tbe common enemy. 
 This appeal was heartily and generally responded to, and it 
 was at the bead of an enormous force that Genghis set out 
 in March, 1211, to effect the conquest of China. Tbe Mon- 
 gol army was led by Genghis in person, and under him his 
 four sons and bis most famous general, Chepe Noyan, held 
 commands. 
 
 The plan of campaign of tbe Mongol ruler was as simple 
 as it was bold. From bis camp at Karakoram, on the Keru- 
 lon, he marched in a straight line through Kuku Khoten and 
 tbe Ongut country to Taitong, securing an unopposed pas- 
 sage through the Great VYall by the defection of the Ongut 
 tribe. The Kins were unprepared for this sudden and vigor- 
 ous assault directed on their weakest spot, and successfully 
 executed before their army could reach tbe scene. During 
 the two years tbat tbe forces of Genghis kept the field on 
 tbis occasion they devastated the greater portion of the three
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 95 
 
 nortliern provinces of Shensi, Shansi, and Pechihli. But tte 
 border fortress of Taitong and the Kin capital, Tungking, 
 successfully resisted all the assaults of the Mongols, and 
 when Genghis received a serious wound at the former place, 
 he reluctantly ordered the retreat of his army, laden with an 
 immense quantity of spoil, but still little advanced in its main 
 task of conquering China. The success of the Khitan Yeliu 
 Liuko had not been less considerable, and he was proclaimed 
 King of Leaou as a vassal of the Mongols. The planting of 
 this ally on the very threshold of Chinese power facilitated 
 the subsequent enterprises of the Mongols against the Kins, 
 and represented the most important result of this war. 
 
 In 1213 Genghis again invaded the Kin dominions, but 
 his success was not very striking, and in several engage- 
 ments of no very great importance the Kin arms met with 
 some success. The most important events of the year were, 
 however, the deposition and murder of Chonghei, the mur- 
 der of a Kin general, Hushahu, who had won a battle against 
 the Mongols, and the proclamation of Utubu as emperor. 
 The change of sovereign brought no change of fortune to 
 the unlucky Kins. Utubu was only able to find safety be- 
 hind the walls of his capital, and he was delighted when 
 Genghis wrote him the following letter: "Seeing your 
 wretched condition and my exalted fortune, what may 
 your opinion be now of the will of heaven with regard 
 to myself? At this moment I am desirous to return to 
 Tartary, but could you allow my soldiers to take their 
 departure without appeasing their anger with presents?" 
 In reply Utubu sent Genghis a princess of his family as 
 a wife, and also "five hundred youths, the same number of 
 girls, three thousand horses, and a vast quantity of precious 
 articles." Then Genghis retired once more to Karakoram, 
 but on his march he stained his reputation by massacring 
 all his prisoners — the first gross act of inhumanity he com- 
 mitted during his Chinese wars. 
 
 When Utubu saw the Mongols retreating, he thought to 
 provide against the most serious consequences of their return
 
 96 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 by removing his capital to a greater distance from the fron- 
 tier, and with this object he transferred his residence to Kai- 
 fong. The majority of his advisers were against this change, 
 as a retirement could not hut shake public confidence. It 
 had another consequence, which thej may not have contem- 
 plated, and that was its providing Genghis with an excuse 
 for renewing his attack on China. The Mongol at once 
 complained that the action of the Kin emperor implied an 
 unwarrantable suspicion of his intentions, and he sent his 
 army across the frontier to recommence his humiliation. On 
 this occasion a Kin general deserted to them, and thencefor- 
 ward large bodies of the Chinese of the north attached them- 
 selves to the Mongols, who were steadily acquiring a unique 
 reputation for power as well as military prowess. The great 
 event of this war was the siege of Yenking — on the site of 
 which now stands the capital Pekin — the defense of which 
 had been intrusted to the Prince Imperial; but Utubu, more 
 anxious for his son's safety than the interests of the state, 
 ordered him to return to Kaifong. The governor of Yen- 
 king offered a stout resistance to the Mongols, and when he 
 found that he coald not hold out, he retired to the temple 
 of the city and poisoned himself. His last act was to write 
 a letter to Utubu begging him to listen no more to the per- 
 nicious advice of the man who had induced him to murder 
 Hushahu. 
 
 The capture of Yenking, where Genghis obtained a large 
 supply of war materials, as well as vast booty, opened the 
 road to Central China. The Mongols advanced as far as 
 the celebrated Tunkwan Pass, which connects Sliensi and 
 Honan, but when their general, Samuka, saw how formi- 
 dable it was, and how strong were the Kin defenses and 
 garrison, he declined to attack it, and, making a detour 
 through very difficult country, he marched on Kaifong, 
 ■where Utubu little expected him. The Mongols had to 
 make their own road, and they crossed several ravines by 
 improvised "bridges made of spears and the branches of trees 
 bound together by strong chains." But the Mongol force
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 97 
 
 was too small to accomplish any great result, and the im- 
 petuosity of Samuka nearly led to his destruction. A 
 prompt retreat, and the fact that the Hoangho was frozen 
 over, enabled him to extricate his army, after much fatigue 
 and reduced in number, from its awkward position. The 
 retreat of the Mongols inspired Utubu with sufficient confi- 
 dence to induce him to attack Yeliu Liuko in Leaoutung, 
 and the success of this enterprise imparted a gleam of sun- 
 shine and credit to the expiring cause of the Kins. Yeliu 
 Liuko was driven from his newly-created kingdom, but 
 Genghis hastened to the assistance of his ally by sending 
 Muhula, the greatest of all his generals, at the head of a 
 large army to recover Leaoutung. His success was rapid 
 and remarkable. The Kins were speedily overthrown, Yeliu 
 Liuko was restored to his authority, and the neighboring 
 King of Corea, impressed by the magnitude of the Mongol 
 success, hastened to acknowledge himself the vassal of 
 Grenghis. The most important result of this campaign 
 was that Genghis intrusted to Muhula the control of all 
 military arrangements for the conquest of China. He is 
 reported to have said to his lieutenant: "North of the 
 Taihing Mountains I am supreme, but all the regions to the 
 south I commend to the care of Muhula, ' ' and he ' ' also pre- 
 sented him with a chariot and a banner with nine scalops. 
 As he handed him this last emblem of authority, he spoke 
 to his generals, saying, 'Let this banner be an emblem of 
 sovereignty, and let the orders issued* from under it be 
 obeyed as my own.' " The principal reason for intrusting 
 the conquest of China to a special force and commander 
 was that Genghis wished to devote the whole of his personal 
 attention to the prosecution of his new war with the King 
 of Khwaresm and the other great rulers of Western Asia. 
 
 Muhula more than justified the selection and confidence 
 of his sovereign. In the year 1218-19 he invaded Honan, 
 defeated the best of the Kin commanders, and not merely 
 overran, but retained possession of the places he occupied 
 in the Kin dominions. The difficulties of Utubu were ag- 
 
 China — 5
 
 98 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 gravated by an attack from Ningtsong, the Sung emperor, 
 who refused any longer to pay tribute to the Kins, as they 
 were evidently unable to enforce the claim, and the Kin 
 armies were as equally unfortunate against their southern 
 opponents as their northern. Then Utubu endeavored to 
 negotiate terms with Muhula for the retreat of his army, but 
 the only conditions the Mongol general would accept were the 
 surrender of the Kin ruler and his resignation of the impe- 
 rial title in exchange for the principality of Honan. Utubu, 
 low as he had sunk, declined to abase himself further and to 
 purchase life at the loss of his dignity. The sudden death 
 of Muhula gained a brief respite for the distressed Chinese 
 potentate, but the advantage was not of any permanent sig- 
 nificance; first of all because the Kins were too exhausted by 
 their long struggle, and, secondly, because Genghis hastened 
 to place himself at the head of his army. The news of the 
 death of Muhula reached him when he was encamped on 
 the frontier of India and preparing to add the conquest of 
 that country to his many other triumphs in Central and 
 Western Asia. He at once came to the conclusion that he 
 must return to set his house in order at home, and to pre- 
 vent all the results of Muhula's remarkable triumphs being 
 lost. What was a disadvantage for China proved a benefit 
 for India, and possibly for Europe, as there is no saying 
 how mucii further the Mongol encroachment might have 
 extended westward, if the direction of Genghis had not 
 been withdrawn. While Genghis was hastening from the 
 Cabul River to the Kerulon, across the Hindoo Koosh and 
 Tian Shan ranges, Utubu died and Ninkiassu reigned in 
 his stead. 
 
 One of the first consequences of the death of Muhula 
 was that the young king of Hia, believing that the fort- 
 unes of the Mongols would then wane, and that he might 
 obtain a position of greater power and independence, threw 
 ofl[ his allegiance, and adopted hostile measures against 
 them. The prompt return of Genghis nipped this plan in 
 the bud, but it was made quite evident that the conquest
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 99 
 
 of Hia was essential to the success of any permanent an« 
 nexation of Chinese territory, and as its prince could dis- 
 pose of an army which he boasted numbered half a million 
 of men, it is not surprising to find that he took a whole year 
 in perfecting his arrangements for so grave a contest. The 
 war began in 1225 and continued for two years. The suc- 
 cess of the Mongol army was decisive and unqualified. The 
 Hias were defeated in several battles ; and in one of them, 
 fought upon the frozen waters of the Hoangho, Genghis 
 broke the ice by means of his engines and the Hia army was 
 almost annihilated. The king Leseen was deposed, and Hia 
 became a Mongol province. 
 
 It was immediately after this successful war that Genghis 
 was seized with his fatal illness. Signs had been seen in 
 the heavens which the Mongol astrologers said indicated the 
 near approach of his death. The five planets had appeared 
 together in the southwest, and so much impressed was Gen- 
 ghis by this phenomenon that on his death- bed he expressed 
 "the earnest desire that henceforth the lives of our enemies 
 shall not be unnecessarily sacrificed." The expression of 
 this wish undoubtedly tended to mitigate the terrors of war 
 as carried on by the Mongols. The immediate successors 
 of Genghis conducted their campaigns after a more humane 
 fashion, and it was not until Timour revived the early Mon- 
 gol massacres that their opponents felt there was no chance 
 in appealing to the humanity of the Mongols. Various ac- 
 counts have been published of the cause of his death; some 
 authorities ascribing it to violence, either by an arrow, light- 
 ning, or drowning, and others to natural causes. The event 
 seems to have unquestionably happened in his camp on the 
 borders of Shansi, August 27, 1227, when he was about 
 sixty- five years of age, during more than fifty of which he 
 had enjoyed supreme command of his own tribe. 
 
 The area of the undertakings conducted under his eye 
 was more vast and included a greater number of countries 
 than was the case with any other conqueror. Not a country 
 from the Euxine to the China Sea escaped the tramp of the
 
 100 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Mongol horsemen, and if we include the achievements of 
 his immediate successors, the conquest of Russia, Poland, 
 and Hungary, the plundering of Bulgaria, Roumania, and 
 Bosnia, the final subjection of China and its southern tribu- 
 taries must be added to complete the tale of Mongol triumph. 
 The sphere of Mongol influence extended beyond this large 
 portion of the earth's surface, just as the consequence of an 
 explosion cannpt be restricted to the immediate scene of the 
 disaster. If we may include the remarkable achievements 
 of his descendant Baber, and of that prince's grandson Ak- 
 bar, in India three centuries later, not a country in Asia 
 enjoyed immunity from the effect of their successes. Per- 
 haps the most important result of their great outpouring 
 into Western Asia — which certainly was the arrest of the 
 Mohammedan career in Central Asia, and the diversion of 
 the current of the fanatical propagators of the Prophet's 
 creed against Eurojje — is not yet as fully recognized as it 
 should be. The doubt has been already expressed whether 
 the Mongols would ever have risen to higher rank than that 
 of a nomad tribe but for the ajjpearance of Genghis. Leav- 
 ing that supposition in the category of other interesting but 
 jjroblematical conjectures, it may be asserted that Genghis 
 represented in their highest forms all the qualities which 
 entitled his race to exercise governing authority. He was, 
 moreover, a military genius of the very first order, and it 
 may be questioned whether either Csesar or Napoleon can 
 as commanders be placed on a par with him. Even the 
 Chinese said that he led his armies like a god. The man- 
 ner in which he moved large bodies of men over vast dis- 
 tances without an apparent effort, the judgment he showed 
 in the conduct of several wars in countries far apart from 
 each other, his strategy in unknown regions, always on the 
 alert, 3^et never allowing hesitation or overcaution to inter- 
 fere with his enterprise, the sieges which he brought to a 
 successful termination, his brilliant victories, a succession 
 of "suns of Austerlitz, " all combined make uj) the picture 
 of a career to which Europe can offer nothing that will sur-
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 101 
 
 pass, if indeed she has anything to bear comparison with it. 
 After the lapse of centuries, and in spite of the indillerence 
 with which the great figures of Asiatic history have been 
 treated, the name of Genghis preserves its magic spell. It 
 is still a name to conjure with when recording the great 
 revolutions of a period which beheld the death of the old 
 system in China, and the advent in that country of a newer 
 and more vigorous government which, slowly acquiring 
 shape in the hands of Kublai and a more national form 
 under the Mings, has attained the pinnacle of its utility 
 and strength under the influence of the great emperors of 
 the Manchu dynasty. But great as is the reputation Gren- 
 ghis has acquired it is probably short of his merits. He 
 is remembered as a relentless and irresistible conqueror, a 
 human scourge ; but he was much more. He was one of the 
 greatest instruments of destiny, one of the most remarkable 
 molders of the fate of nations to be met with in the history 
 of the world. His name still overshadows Asia with its 
 fame, and the tribute of our admiration cannot be denied. 
 The death of Genghis did not seriously retard the progress 
 of the war against the Kins. He expressed the wish that 
 war should be carried on in a more humane and less vindic- 
 tive manner, but he did not advocate there being no war or 
 the abandonment of any of his enterprises. His son and 
 successor Ogotai was indeed specially charged to bring the 
 conquest of China to a speedy and victorious conclusion. 
 The weakness of the Mongol confederacy was the delay con- 
 nected with the proclamation of a new Khan and the neces- 
 sity of summoning to a Grand Council all the princes and 
 generals of the race, although it entailed the suspension 
 and often the abandonment of great enterprises. The death 
 of Genghis saved India but not China. Almost his last 
 instructions were to draw up the plan for attacking and 
 turning the great fortress of Tunkwan, which had provided 
 such an efficient defense for Honan on the north; and, in 
 1230, Ogotai, who had already partitioned the territory taken 
 from the Kins into ten departments, took the field in person,
 
 102 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 giving a joint command to his brother Tuli, under whom 
 served the experienced generals Yeliu Chutsia, Antchar, 
 and Subutai. At first the Mongols met with no great suc- 
 cess, and the Kins, encouraged by a momentary gleam of 
 victory, ventured to reject the terms offered by Ogotai and 
 to insult his envoy. The only important fighting during 
 the years 1230-31 occurred round Fongsian, which after a 
 long siege surrendered to Antchar, and when the campaign 
 closed the Kins presented a bold front to the Mongols and 
 still hoped to retain their power and dominions. 
 
 In 1232 the Mongols increased their armies in the field, 
 and attacked the Kins from two sides. Ogotai led the main 
 force against Honan, while Tuli, marching through Shensi 
 into Szchuen, assailed them on their western flank. The 
 difficulties encountered by Tuli on this march, when he had 
 to make his own roads, were such that he entered the Kin 
 territories with a much reduced and exhausted army. The 
 Kin forces gained some advantage over it, but by either a 
 feigned or a forced retreat, Tuli succeeded in baffling their 
 pursuit, and in effecting a junction with his brother Ogotai, 
 who had met with better fortune. Tuli destroyed every- 
 thing along his line of march, and his massacres and sacks 
 revived the worst traditions of Mongol ferocity. In these 
 straits the Kins endeavored to flood the country round their 
 capital, to which the Mongols had now advanced, but the 
 Mongols fell upon the workmen while engaged in the task, 
 and slew ten thousand of them. When the main Kin army 
 accepted battle before the town of Yuchow, it was signally 
 defeated, with the loss of three of its principal generals, and 
 Ninkiassu fled from Kaifong to a place more removed from 
 the scene of war. The garrison and townspeople of Kaifong 
 — an immense city with walls thirty-six miles in circumfer- 
 ence, and a population during the siege, it is said, of one 
 million four hundred thousand families, or nearly seven mil- 
 lion people — offered a stubborn resistance to the Mongols, 
 who intrusted the conduct of the attack to Subutai, the most 
 daring of all their commanders. The Mongols employed
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 103 
 
 their most formidable engines, catapults hurling immense 
 stones, and mortars ejecting explosives and combustibles, 
 but twelve months elapsed before the walls were shattered 
 and the courage and provisions of the defenders exhausted. 
 Then Kaifong surrendered at discretion, and Subutai wished 
 to massacre the wliole of the population. But fortunately 
 for the Chinese, Yeliu Chutsai was a more humane and a 
 more influential general, and under his advice Ogotai re- 
 jected the cruel proposal. 
 
 At this moment, when it seemed impossible for fate to 
 have any worse experience in store for the unfortunate Kins, 
 their old enemies, the Sungs, wishing to give them the coup 
 de grace, declared war upon them, and placed a large army 
 in the field under their best general, Hongkong, of whom 
 more will be heard. The relics of the Kin army, under their 
 sovereign Ninkiassu, took shelter in Tsaichau, where they 
 were closely besieged by the Mongols on one side and the 
 Sungs on the other. Driven thus into a corner, the Kins 
 fought with the courage of despair and long held out against 
 the combined efforts of their enemies. At last Ninkiassu 
 saw that the struggle could not be prolonged, and he pre- 
 pared himself to end his life and career in a manner worthy 
 of the race from which he sprang. "When the enemy broke 
 into the city, and he heard the stormers at the gate of his 
 palace, he retired to an upper chamber and set fire to the 
 building. Many of his generals, and even of his soldiers, 
 followed his example, preferring to end their existence rather 
 than to add to the triumph of their Mongol and Sung oppo- 
 nents. Thus came to an end in 1234 the famous dynasty of 
 the Kins, who under nine emperors had ruled Northern China 
 for one hundred and eighteen years, and whose power and 
 military capacity may best be gauged by the fact that with- 
 out a single ally they held out against the all-powerful Mon- 
 gols for more than a quarter of a century. Ninkiassu, the 
 last of their rulers, was not able to sustain the burden of 
 their authority, but he at least showed himself equal to end- 
 ing it in a worthy and appropriately dramatic manner.
 
 104: HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 The folly of tlie Sungs had completed the discomfiture of 
 the Kins, and had brought to their own borders the terrible 
 peril which had beset every other state in Asia, and which 
 had in almost every case entailed destruction. How could 
 the Sungs expect to avoid the same fate, or to propitiate the 
 most implacable and insatiable of conquering races ? They 
 had done this to a large extent with their eyes open. More 
 than once in the early stages of the struggle the Kin rulers 
 had sent envoys to beg their alliance, and to warn them that 
 if they did not help in keeping out the Mongols, their time 
 would come to be assailed and to share in the common ruin. 
 But Ningtsong did not pay heed to the warning, and scarcely 
 concealed his gratification at the misfortunes of his old op- 
 ponents. The nearer the Mongols came, and the worse the 
 plight to which the Kins were reduced, the more did he re- 
 joice. He forgave Tuli the violation of Sung territory nec- 
 essary for his flank attack on Honan, and when the knell of 
 the Kins sounded at the fall of Kaifong, he hastened to help 
 in striking the final blow at them, and to participate, as he 
 hoped, in the distribution of the plunder. By this time Li- 
 tsong had succeeded his counsin Ningtsong as ruler of the 
 Sungs, and it is said that he received from Tsaichau the 
 armor and personal spoils of Ninkiassu, which he had the sat- 
 isfaction of offering up in the temple of his ancestors. But 
 when he requested the Mongols to comply with the more im- 
 portant part of the convention, by which the Sung forces 
 had joined the Mongols before Tsaichau, and to evacuate 
 the province of Honan, he experienced a rude awakening 
 from his dream that the overthrow of the Kins would re- 
 dound to his advantage, and he soon realized what value 
 the Mongols attached to his alliance. The military capac- 
 ity of Mongkong inspired the Sung ruler with confidence, 
 and he called upon the Mongols to execute their promises, 
 or to prepare for war. The Mongol garrisons made no 
 movement of retreat, and the utmost that Litsong was 
 offered was a portion of Honan, if it could be practically 
 divided. The proposition was probably meant ironically,
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 105 
 
 but at all events Litsong rejected it, and sent Mongkong 
 to take by force possession of the disputed province. Tlie 
 Mongol forces on the spot were fewer than the Chinese, and 
 they met with some reverses. But the hope of the Sungs 
 that the fortune of war would declare in their favor was 
 soon destroyed by the vast preparations of the Mongols, 
 who, at a special kuriltai, held at Karakoram, declared that 
 the conquest of China was to be completed. Then Litsong'a 
 confidence left him, and he sent an appeal for peace to the 
 Mongols, giving up all claim to Honan, and only asking to 
 be left in undisturbed possession of his original dominions. 
 It was too late. The Mongols had passed their decree that 
 the Sungs were to be treated like the Kins, and that the last 
 Chinese government was to be destroyed. 
 
 In 1235, the year following the immolation of Ninkiassu, 
 the Mongols placed half a million men in the field for the 
 purpose of destroying the Sung power, and Ogotai divided 
 them into three armies, which were to attack Litsong' s king- 
 dom from as many sides. The Mongol ruler intrusted the 
 most difficult task to his son Kutan, who invaded the inac- 
 cessible and vast province of Szchuen, at the head of one of 
 these armies. Notwithstanding its natural capacity for oft'er- 
 ing an advantageous defense, the Chinese turned their op- 
 portunities to poor account, and the Mongols succeeded in 
 capturing all its frontier fortresses, with little or no resist- 
 ance. The shortcomings of the defense can be inferred from 
 the circumstances of the Chinese annalists making special 
 mention of one governor having had the courage to die at 
 his post. For some reason not clearly stated the Mongols 
 did not attempt to retain possession of Szchuen on this occa- 
 sion. They withdrew when they were in successful occupa- 
 tion of the northern half of the province, and when it seemed 
 as if the other lay at their mercy. In the two dual provinces 
 of Kiangnan and Houkwang, the other Mongol armies met 
 with considerable success, which was dimmed, however, by 
 the death of Kuchu, the son and proclaimed heir of Ogotai. 
 This event, entailing no inconsiderable doubt and long- con-
 
 106 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 tinued disputes as to the succession, was followed by the 
 withdrawal of the Mongol forces from Sung territory, and 
 during the last six years of his life Ogotai abstained from 
 war, and gave himself up to the indulgence of his gluttony. 
 He built a great palace at Karakoram, where his ancestors 
 had been content to live in a tent, and he intrusted the gov- 
 ernment of the old Kin dominions to Yeliu Chutsai, who ac- 
 quired great popularity among the Chinese for his clemency 
 and regard for their customs. Yeliu Chutsai adopted the 
 Chinese mode of taxation, and when Ogotai's widow, Tura- 
 kina, who acted as regent after her husband's death, ordered 
 him to alter his system and to farm out the revenues, he 
 sent in his resignation, and, it is said, died of grief shortly 
 afterward. Ogotai was one of the most humane and ami- 
 able of all the Mongol rulers, and Yeliu Chutsai imitated his 
 master. Of the latter the Chinese contemporary writers said 
 "he was distinguished by a rare disinterestedness. Of a 
 very broad intellect, he was able, without injustice and 
 without wronging a single person, to amass vast treasures 
 (D'Ohsson says only of books, maps, and pictures), and to 
 enrich his family, but all his care and labors had for their 
 sole object the advantage and glory of his masters. Wise 
 and calculating in his plans, he did little of which he had 
 any reason to repent. ' ' 
 
 During the five years following the death of Ogotai, the 
 Mongols were absorbed in the question who should be their 
 next Great Khan, and it was only after a warm and pro- 
 tracted discussion, which threatened to entail the disruption 
 of Mongol power, and the revelation of many rivalries 
 among the descendants of Genghis, that Kuyuk, the eldest 
 son of Ogotai, was proclaimed emperor. At the kuriltai 
 held for this purpose, all the great Mongol leaders were 
 present, including Batu, the conqueror of Hungary, and 
 after the Mongol chiefs had agreed as to their chief, the 
 captive kings, Yaroslaf of Russia and David of Georgia, 
 paid homage to their conqueror. We owe to the monk 
 Carpino, who was sent by the Pope to convert the Mon-
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 107 
 
 gol, a graphic account of one of the most brilliant ceremo- 
 nies to be met with in the whole course of Mongol history. 
 The delay in selecting Kuyuk, whose principal act of sover- 
 eignty was to issue a seal having this inscription: "God in 
 Heaven and Kuyuk on earth; by the power of God the 
 ruler of all men," had given the Sungs one respite, and his 
 early death procured them another. Kuyuk died in 1248, 
 and his cousin, Mangu, the son of Tuli, was appointed his 
 successor. By this time the Mongol chiefs of the family of 
 Genghis in Western Asia were practically independent of 
 the nominal Great Khan, and governed their states in com- 
 plete sovereignty, and waged war without reference to 
 Karakoram. This change left the Mongols in their origi- 
 nal home of the Amour absolutely free to devote all their 
 attention to the final overthrow of the Sungs, and Mangu 
 declared that he would know no rest until he had finally 
 subjected the last of the Chinese ruling families. In this 
 resolution Mangu received the hearty support of his younger 
 but more able brother, Kublai, to whom was intrusted the 
 direction in the field of the armies sent to complete the con- 
 quest of China. 
 
 Kublai received this charge in 1251, so that the Sungs 
 had enjoyed, first through the pacific disposition of Ogotai, 
 and, secondly, from the family disputes following his death, 
 peace for more than fifteen years. The advantage of this 
 tranquillity was almost nullified by the death of Mongkong, 
 a general whose reputation may have been easily gained, 
 but who certainly enjoyed the confidence of his soldiers, and 
 who was thought by his countrymen to be the best com- 
 mander of his day. When the Chinese emperor, Litsong, 
 saw the storm again approaching his northern frontier, he 
 found that he had lost the main support of his power, and 
 that his military resources were inferior to those of his 
 enemy. He had allowed himself to be lulled into a false 
 sense of security by the long inaction of the Mongols, and 
 although he seems to have been an amiable prince, and a 
 typical Chinese ruler, honoring the descendants of Confucius
 
 108 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 with the hereditary title of duke, which still remains in that 
 family, and is the only title of its kind in China, and en- 
 couraging the literary classes of his country, he was a bad 
 sovereign to he intrusted with the task of defending his 
 realm and people against a bold and determined enemy. 
 
 Kublai prepared the way for his campaigns in Southern 
 China by following a very wise and moderate policy in 
 Northern China similar to that begun by Muhula, and car- 
 ried out with greater effect by Yeliu Chutsai. He had 
 enjoyed the advantage of a Chinese education, imparted 
 by an able tutor named Yaochu, who became the prince's 
 private secretary and mentor in all Chinese matters. At 
 his instigation, or, at least, with his co-operation, Kublai 
 took in hand the restoration of the southern portion of 
 Honan, which had been devastated during the wars, and 
 he succeeded in bringing back its population and prosperity 
 to that great province of Central China. He thus secured a 
 base for his operations close to the Sung frontier, while he 
 attached to his person a large section of the Chinese nation. 
 There never was any concealment that this patronage of 
 Chinese officials, and these measures for the amelioration 
 of many millions of Chinese subjects, were the well calcu- 
 lated preliminaries to the invasion of Southern China and 
 the extinction of the Sung dynasty. 
 
 If Kublai had succeeded in obtaining a wise adviser in 
 Yaochu, he was not less fortunate in procuring a great 
 general in the person of Uriangkadai, the son of Subutai, 
 and his remarkable and unvarying successes were largely 
 due to the efforts of those two men in the cabinet and the 
 field. The plan of campaign, drawn up with great care 
 and forethought by the prince and his lieutenant, had the 
 double merit of being both bold and original. Its main 
 purpose was not one that the Sung generals would be likely 
 to divine. It was determined to make a flank march round 
 the Sung dominions, and to occupy what is now the prov- 
 ince of Yunnan; and, by placing an army in the rear of 
 their kingdom, to attack them eventually from two sides.
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 109 
 
 At this time Yunnan formed an independent state, and its 
 ruler, from his position behind the Sung territory, must 
 have fancied himself secure against any attack by the Mon- 
 gols. He was destined to a rude awakening. Kublai and 
 Uriangkadai, marching across Szchuen and crossing the 
 Kinchakiang, or "river of golden sand," which forms the 
 upper course of the Great Eiver, on rafts, burst into Yun- 
 nan, speedily vanquished the frontier garrisons, and laid 
 siege to the capital, Talifoo. That town did not hold out 
 long, and soon Kublai was in a position to return to his 
 own state, leaving Uriangkadai with a considerable gar- 
 rison in charge of Yunnan. That general, believing that 
 his position would be improved by his resorting to an active 
 offensive, carried the standard of his race against the many 
 turbulent tribes in his neighborhood, and invaded Burma, 
 whose king, after one campaign, was glad to recognize the 
 supremacy of the Mongols. The success and the boldness, 
 which may have been considered temerity, of this cam- 
 paign, raised up enemies to Kublai at the court of Kara- 
 koram, and the mind of his brother Mangu was poisoned 
 against him by many who declared that Kublai aspired to 
 complete independence. These designs so far succeeded, 
 that in 1257 Mangu finally deprived Kublai of all his com- 
 mands, and ordered him to proceed to Karakoram. At this 
 harsh and unmerited treatment Kublai showed himself in- 
 clined to rebel and dispute his brother's authority. If he 
 had done this, although the provocation was great, he 
 would have confirmed the charges of his accusers, and a 
 war would have broken out among the Mongols which 
 would probably have rent their power in twain in Eastern 
 Asia. But fortunately Yaochu was at hand to give pru- 
 dent advice, and after much hesitation Kublai yielded to 
 the impressive exhortations of his experienced and sagacious 
 minister. He is reported to have addressed Kublai in the 
 following terms: "Prince! You are the brother of the em- 
 peror, but you are not the less his subject. You cannot, 
 without committing a crime, question his decisions, and,
 
 110 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 moreover, if you were to do so, it would only result in 
 placing you in a more dangerous predicament, out of which 
 you could hardly succeed in extricating yourself, as you are 
 so far distant from the capital where your enemies seek to 
 injure you. My advice is that you should send your family 
 to Mangu, and by this step you will justify yourself and re- 
 move any suspicions there may be." 
 
 Kublai adopted this wise course, and proceeded in person 
 to Karakoram, where he succeeded in proving his innocence 
 and in discomfiting his enemies. It is said that Mangu was 
 so affected at the mere sight of his brother that he at once 
 forgave him without waiting for an explanation and rein- 
 stated him in all his offices. To ratify this reconciliation 
 Mangu proclaimed that he would take the field in person, 
 and that Kublai should hold joint command with himself. 
 When he formed this resolution to proceed to China in per- 
 son, he ajDpointed his next brother, Arikbuka, to act as his 
 lieutenant in Mongolia. It is necessary to recollect this ar- 
 rangement, as Mangu died during the campaign, and it led 
 to the separation of the Chinese empire and the Mongolian, 
 which were divided after that event between Kublai and 
 Arikbuka. 
 
 Mangu did not come to his resolution to prosecute the 
 war with the Sungs any too soon, for Uriangkadai was be- 
 ginning to find his isolated position not free from danger. 
 Large as the army of that general was, and skillfully as he 
 had endeavored to im23rove his position by strengthening 
 the fortresses and recruiting from the warlike tribes of 
 Yunnan, Uriangkadai found himself threatened by the 
 collected armies of the Sungs, who occupied Szchuen with 
 a large garrison and menaced the daring Mongol general 
 with the whole of their power. There seems every reason 
 to believe that if the Sungs had acted with only ordinary 
 promptitude they might have destroyed this Mongol army 
 long before any aid could have reached it from the north. 
 Once Mangu had formed his resolution the rapidity of his 
 movements left the Sungs little or no chance of attacking
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 111 
 
 Uriangkadai. This campaign began in the winter of 1267, 
 when the troops were able to cross the frozen waters of the 
 Hoangho, and the immense Mongol army was divided into 
 three bodies, while Uriangkadai was ordered to march north 
 and effect a junction with his old chief Kublai in Szchnen. 
 The principal fighting of the first year occurred in this part 
 of China, and Mangu hastened there with another of his 
 armies. The Sung garrison was large, and showed great 
 courage and fortitude. The difficulty of the country and 
 the strength of several of their fortresses seconded their 
 efforts, and after two years' fighting the Mongols felt so 
 doubtful of success that they held a council of war to de- 
 cide whether they should retreat or continue to prosecute 
 the struggle. It has been said that councils of war do not 
 come to bold resolutions, but this must have been an excep- 
 tion, as it decided not to retreat, and to make one more 
 determined effort to overcome the Chinese. The campaign 
 of 1259 began with the siege of Hochau, a strong fortress, 
 held by a valiant garrison and commander, and to whose 
 aid a Chinese army under Luwenti was hastening. The 
 governor, Wangkien, offered a stout resistance, and Lu- 
 wenti succeeded in harassing the besiegers; but the fall of 
 the fortress appeared assured, when a new and more formi- 
 dable defender arrived in the form of dysentery. The Mon- 
 gol camp was ravaged by this foe, Mangu himself died of 
 the disease, and those of the Mongols who escaped beat a 
 hasty and disorderly retreat back to the north. Once more 
 the Sungs obtained a brief respite. 
 
 The death of Mangu threatened fresh disputes and strife 
 among the Mongol royal family. Kublai was his brother's 
 lawful heir, but Arikbuka, the youngest of the brothers, 
 was in possession of Karakoram, and supreme throughout 
 Mongolia. He was hostile to Kublai, and disposed to assert 
 all his rights and to make the most of his opportunities. No 
 Great Khan could be proclaimed anywhere save at Karako- 
 ram, and Arikbuka would not allow his brother to gain that 
 place, the cradle of their race and dynasty, unless he could
 
 112 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 do so by force of arms. Kublai attempted to solve tlie difl&- 
 culty by holding a grand council near his favorite city of 
 Cambaluc, the modern Pekin^ and he sent forth his procla- 
 mation to the Mongols as their Khan. But they refused to 
 recognize one who was not elected in the orthodox fashion 
 at Karakoram; and Arikbuka not merely defied Kublai, but 
 summoned his own kuriltai at Karakoram, where he was 
 ])roclaimed Khakhan in the most formal manner and with 
 all the accustomed ceremonies. Arikbuka was undoubtedly 
 popular among the Mongols, while Kublai, who was re- 
 garded as half a Chinese on account of his education, had 
 a far greater reputation south of the wall than north of it. 
 Kublai could not tolerate the open defiance of his authority, 
 and the contempt shown for what was his birthright, by 
 Arikbuka; and in 1261 he advanced upon Karakoram at 
 the head of a large army. A single battle sufficed to dis- 
 pose of Arikbuka's pretensions, and that prince was glad to 
 find a place of refuge among the Kirghiz. Kublai proved 
 himself a generous enemy. He sent Arikbuka his full par- 
 don, he reinstated him in his rank of prince, and he left him 
 virtually supreme among the Mongol tribes. He retraced 
 his steps to Pekin, fully resolved to become Chinese emperor 
 in reality, but prepared to waive his rights as Mongol Khan. 
 Mangu Khan was the last of the Mongol rulers whose au- 
 thority was recognized in both the east and the west, and 
 his successor, Kublai, seeing that its old significance had 
 departed, was fain to establish his on a new basis in the 
 fertile, ancient and wide-stretching dominions of China. 
 
 Before Kublai composed the difficulty with Arikbuka he 
 had resumed his operations against the Sungs, and even 
 before Mangu' s death he had succeeded in establishing 
 some posts south of the Yangtsekiang, in the impassabil- 
 ity of which the Chinese fondly believed. During the year 
 1260 he laid siege to Wochow, the modern Wouchang, but 
 he failed to make any impression on the fortress on this 
 occasion, and he agreed to the truce which Litsong pro- 
 posed. By the terms of this agreement Litsong acknowl-
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 113 
 
 edged himself a Mongol vassal, just as his ancestors had 
 Bubjected themselves to the Kins, paid a large tribute, and 
 forbade his generals anywhere to attack the Mongols. The 
 last stipulation was partly broken by an attack on the rear 
 of Uriangkadai's corps, but no serious results followed, for 
 Kublai was well satisfied with the manner in which the 
 campaign terminated, as there is no doubt that his advance 
 across the Yangtsekiang had been precipitate, and he may 
 have thought himself lucky to escape with the appearance 
 of success and the conclusion of a gratifying treaty. It was 
 with the reputation gained by this nominal success, and by 
 having made the Sungs his tributaries, that Kublai hastened 
 northward to settle his rivalry with Arikbuka. Having ac- 
 complished that object with complete success, he decided to 
 put an end to the Sung dynasty. The Chinese emperor, acting 
 with strange fatuity, had given fresh cause of umbrage, 
 and had provoked a war by many petty acts of discourtesy, 
 culminating in the murder of the envoys of Kublai, sent 
 to notify him of his proclamation as Great Khan of the 
 Mongols. Probably the Sung ruler could not have averted 
 war if he had shown the greatest forbearance and humility, 
 but this cruel and inexcusable act precipitated the crisis and 
 the extinction of his attenuated authority. If there was 
 any delay in the movements of Kublai for the purpose of 
 exacting reparation for this outrage, it was due to his first 
 having to arrange a difficulty that had arisen in his rela- 
 tions with the King of Corea. That potentate had long 
 preserved the peace with his Mongol neighbors, and per- 
 haps he would have remained a friend without any inter- 
 ruption, had not the Mongols done something which was 
 construed as an infraction of Coreau liberty. The Corean 
 love of independence took fire at the threatened diminution 
 of their rights, they rose en masse in defense of their coun- 
 try, and even the king, Wangtien, who had been well dis- 
 posed to the Mongol rulers, declared that he could not con- 
 tinue the alliance, and placed himself at the head of his 
 people Seeing himself thus menaced with a costly war in
 
 114 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 a difficult country on the eve of a more necessary and hope- 
 ful contest, Kublai resorted to diplomacy. He addressed 
 Wangtien in complimentary terms and disclaimed all in- 
 tention of injuring the Coreans, with whom he wished to 
 maintain friendly relations, but at the same time he pointed 
 out the magnitude of his power and dilated on the extent of 
 the Mongol conquests. Half by flattery and half by menace 
 Kublai brought the Corean court to reason, and Wangtien 
 again entered into bonds of alliance with Cambaluc and re- 
 newed his old oaths of friendship. 
 
 At this point of the long struggle with the Sungs it will 
 be appropriate to consider what was the exact position of 
 Kublai with regard to his own Chinese subjects, who now 
 formed the backbone of his power. By this time Kublai 
 had become to all practical intents and purposes a Chinese 
 emperor. He had accepted all the traditional functions of 
 the typical Hwangti, and the etiquette and splendor of his 
 court rivaled that of the Sungs. He had not merely adopted 
 the Chinese system of taxation and the form of administra- 
 tion to which the larger portion of his officials, being of Chi- 
 nese race, had been accustomed, but he declared himself the 
 patron of learning and of Buddhism, which had gained a 
 hold on the minds of the Mongols that it has not lost to the 
 present day. One of the most popular of his early measures 
 had been the order to liberate all the literate class among his 
 Chinese prisoners, and they had formed the nucleus of the 
 civil service Kublai attached to his interests and utilized 
 as his empire expanded. In his relations with Buddhism 
 Kublai showed not less astuteness, and in realizing that to 
 attain durable success he must appeal to the religious side of 
 human character, he showed that he had the true instincts 
 of a statesman. 
 
 At this time two facts were clearly apparent. The Chi- 
 nese were sunk in a low state of religious disl)elief, and the 
 Sung rulers were not disposed to play the part of regener- 
 ators of their country. The second fact was that the only 
 vigorous religion in China, or, indeed, in Eastern Asia, was
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 115 
 
 Buddhism, whicli, since the establishment of Brahmanism 
 in India, had taken up its headquarters in Tibet, where, how- 
 ever, the supreme authority was still secular — that is to say, 
 it was invested in the hands of a prince or king, and not in 
 those of a priest or Grand Lama. It so happened that there 
 was resident at Kublai's court a Tibetan priest, of the family 
 which had always supplied the Sanpou with his minister, 
 who gained the ear of Kublai, and convinced him how politic 
 and advantageous to him personally it would be if he were 
 to secure the co-operation and sympathy of his priestly order. 
 Kublai fell in with his plans, and proclaimed his friend Pakba 
 Lama, and sent him back to Tibet, there to establish the 
 ecclesiastical authority, which still exists in that country, 
 in intimate alliance and sympathy with the Chinese rulers. 
 By this and other similar proceedings Kublai gained over to 
 his side several influential classes among the Chinese people, 
 and many reflecting persons thought they saw in him a true 
 regenerator of the em23ire, and a worthy successor of their 
 greatest rulers. It was, therefore, with a thoroughly paci- 
 fied country, and to a great extent a contented people, that 
 Kublai began his last war with the rulers of Southern China. 
 In 1263 Kublai issued his proclamation of war, calling 
 on his generals "to assemble their troops, to sharpen their 
 swords and their pikes, and to prepare their bows and ar- 
 rows," for he intended to attack the Sungs by land and sea. 
 The treason of a Chinese general in his service named Litan 
 served to delay the opening of the campaign for a few weeks, 
 but this incident was of no importance, as Litan was soon 
 overthrown and executed. Brief as was the interval, it was 
 marked by one striking and important event — the death of 
 Litsong, who was succeeded by his nephew, Chowki, called 
 the Emperor Toutsong. Litsong was not a wise ruler, but, 
 compared with many of his successors, he might be more 
 accurately styled unfortunate than incompetent. Toutsong, 
 and his weak and arrogant minister, Kiassetao, hastened to 
 show that there were greater heights of folly than any to 
 which he had attained. Acting on the advice of a renegade
 
 116 HISTORY OF CHIJSIA 
 
 Sung general, well acquainted witli the defenses of Southern 
 China, Kublai altered his proposed attack, and prej)ared for 
 crossing the Yangtsekiang by first making himself supreme 
 on its tributary, the Han River. His earlier attack on 
 "VVouchang has been described, and his compulsory retire- 
 ment from that place had taught him the evil of making a 
 premature attack. His object remained the same, but in- 
 stead of marching direct to it across the Yangtsekiang he 
 took the advice of the Sung general, and attacked the for- 
 tress of Sianyang on the Han River, with the object of mak- 
 ing himself supreme on that stream, and wresting from the 
 Sungs the last first-class fortress they possessed in the north- 
 west. B}^ the time all these preliminaries were completed 
 and the Mongol army had fairly taken the field it was 1268, 
 and Kublai sent sixty thousand of his best troops, with a 
 large number of auxiliaries, to lay siege to Sianyang, which 
 was held by a large garrison and a resolute governor. The 
 Mongol lines were drawn up round the town, and also its 
 neighbor of Fanching, situated on the opposite bank of the 
 river, with which communication was maintained by several 
 bridges, and the Mongols built a large fleet of fifty war junks, 
 with which they closed the Han River and effectually pre- 
 vented any aid being sent up it from Hankow or Wouchang. 
 Liuwen Hoan, the commandant of Sianyang, was a brave 
 man, and he commanded a numerous garrison and possessed 
 supplies, as he said, to stand a ten years' siege. He repulsed 
 all the assaults of the enemy, and, undaunted by his isola- 
 tion, replied to the threats of the Mongols, to give him no 
 quarter if he persisted in holding out, by boasting that he 
 would hang their traitor general in chains before his sov- 
 ereign. The threats and vaunts of the combatants did not 
 bring the siege any nearer to an end. The utmost that the 
 Mongols could achieve was to prevent any provisions or re- 
 enforcements being thrown into the town. But on the for- 
 tress itself they made no impression. Things had gone on 
 like this for three years, and the interest in the siege had 
 begun to languish, when Kublai determined to make a su-
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 117 
 
 preme effort to carry the place, and at the same moment 
 the Sung minister came to the conclusion to relieve it at all 
 hazards. 
 
 The campaign of 1270 began with a heroic episode — the 
 successful dispatch of provisions into the besieged town, un- 
 der the direction of two Chinese officers named Changkoua 
 and Changchun, whose names deserve to be long remem- 
 bered for their heroism. The flotilla was divided into two 
 bodies, one composed of the fighting, the other of the store- 
 ships. The Mongols had made every preparation to block- 
 ade the river, but the suddenness and vigor of the Chinese 
 attack surjDrised them, and, at first, the Chinese had the best 
 of the day. But soon the Mongols recovered, and from their 
 superior position threatened to ovei-whelm the assailing Chi- 
 nese squadron. In this perilous moment Changchun, devot- 
 ing himself to death in the interest of his country, collected 
 all his war-junks, and making a desperate attack on the 
 Mongols, succeeded in obtaining sufficient time to enable 
 the storeships under Changkoua to pass safely up to Sian- 
 yang. The life of so great a hero as Changchun was, 
 however, a heavy price to pay for the temporary relief of 
 Sianyang, which was more closely besieged than ever after 
 the arrival of Kublai in person. 
 
 After this affair the Mongols pushed the siege with greater 
 vigor, and instead of concentrating their efforts on Sianyang 
 they attacked both that fortress and Fauching from all sides. 
 The Mongol commander, Alihaya, sent to Persia, where the 
 Mongols were also supreme, for engineers trained in the 
 working of mangonels or catapults, engines capable of throw- 
 ing stones of 160-pounds' weight with precision for a consid- 
 erable distance. By their aid the bridges across the river 
 were first destroyed, and then the walls of Sianyang were 
 so severely damaged that an assault appeared to be feasible. 
 But Fanching had suffered still more from the Mongol bom- 
 bardment, and Alihaya therefore attacked it first. The gar- 
 rison offered a determined resistance, and the fighting was 
 continued in the streets. Not a man of the garrison escaped,
 
 118 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 and when the slaughter was over the Mongols found that 
 they had only acquired possession of a mass of ruins. But 
 they had obtained the key to Sianyang, the weakest flank 
 of which had been protected by Fanching, and the Chinese 
 garrison was so discouraged that Liuwen Hoan, despairing 
 of relief, agreed to accept the terms offered by Kublai. Those 
 terms were expressed in the following noble letter from the 
 Mongol emperor: "The generous defense you have made 
 during five years covers you with glory. It is the duty of 
 every faithful subject to serve his prince at the expense 
 of his life, but in the straits to which you are reduced, your 
 strength exhausted, deprived of succor and without hope of 
 receiving any, would it be reasonable to sacrifice the lives 
 of so many brave men out of sheer obstinacy ? Submit in 
 good faith to us and no harm shall come to you. We prom- 
 ise you still more ; and that is to provide each and all of you 
 with honorable employment. You shall have no grounds 
 of discontent, for that we pledge you our imperial word. ' ' 
 
 It will not excite surprise that Liuwen Hoan, who had 
 been, practically speaking, deserted by his own sovereign, 
 should have accepted the magnanimous terms of his con- 
 queror, and become as loyal a lieutenant of Kublai as he had 
 shown himself to be of the Sung Toutsong. The death of 
 that ruler followed soon afterward, but as the real power 
 had been in the hands of the Minister Kiassetao, no change 
 took place in the policy or fortunes of the Sung kingdom. 
 At this moment Kublai succeeded in obtaining the services 
 of Bay an, a Mongol general who had acquired a great repu- 
 tation under Khulagu in Persia. Bayan, whose name sig- 
 nifies the noble or the brave, and who was popularly known 
 as Bayan of the Hundred Eyes, because he was supposed to 
 see everything, was one of the greatest military leaders of 
 his age and race. He was intrusted with the command 
 of the main army, and under him served, it is interesting 
 to state, Liuwen Hoan. Several towns were captured after 
 more or less resistance, and Bayan bore down with all his 
 force on the triple cities of Hankow, Wouchang, and Han-
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 119 
 
 yang. Bajan concentrated all his efforts on the capture of 
 Hanyang, while the Mongol navy under Artchu compelled 
 the Chinese fleet to take refuge under the walls of Wou- 
 chang. None of these towns offered a very stubborn resist- 
 ance, and Bay an had the satisfaction of receiving their sur- 
 render one after another. Leaving Alihaya with 40,000 men 
 to guard these places, Bayan marched with the rest of his 
 forces on the Sung capital, Lingan or Hangchow, the cele- 
 brated Kincsay of medieval travelers. The retreating fleet 
 and army of the Sungs carried with them fear of the Mon- 
 gols, and the ever- increasing representation of their extraor- 
 dinary power and irresistible arms. In this juncture public 
 opinion compelled Kiassetao to take the lead, and he called 
 upon all the subjects of the Sung to contribute arms and 
 money for the purpose of national defense. But his own 
 incompetence in directing this national movement deprived 
 it of half its force and of its natural chances of success. 
 Bayan' s advance was rapid. Many towns opened their 
 gates in terror or admiration of his name, and Liuwen Hoan 
 was frequently present to assure them that Kublai was the 
 most generous of masters, and that there was no wiser course 
 than to surrender to his generals. 
 
 The Mongol forces at last reached the neighborhood of 
 the Sung capital, where Kiassetao had succeeded in collect- 
 ing an army of 130,000 men; but many of them were ill- 
 trained, and the splendor of the camp provided a poor 
 equivalent for the want of arms and discipline among the 
 men. Kiassetao seems to have been ignorant of the danger 
 of his position, for he sent an arrogant summons to the Mon- 
 gols to retire, stating also that he would grant a peace based 
 on the Yangtsekiang as a boundary. Bayan 's simple reply 
 to this notice was, "If you had really aimed at peace you 
 would have made this proposition before we crossed the 
 Kiang. Now that we are the masters of it, it is a little 
 too late. Still if you sincerely desire it, come and see me 
 in person, and we will discuss the necessary conditions." 
 Very few of the Sung lieutenants offered a protracted re-
 
 120 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 sistance, and even the isolated cases of devotion were con- 
 fined to the official class, who were more loyal than the mass 
 of the people. Chao Maofa and his wife Yongchi put an 
 end to their existence sooner than give up their charge at 
 Chichow, but the garrison accepted the terms of the Mon- 
 gols without compunction, and without thinking of their 
 duty. Kiassetao attempted to resist the Mongol advance 
 at Kien Kang, the modern Nankin, but after an engage- 
 ment on land and water the Sungs were driven back, and 
 their fleet only escaped destruction by retiring precipitately 
 to the sea. After this success Nankin surrendered without 
 resistance, although its governor was a valiant and appar- 
 ently a capable man. He committed suicide sooner than 
 surrender, and among his papers was found a plan of cam- 
 paign, after perusing which Bayan exclaimed, "Is it possible 
 that the Sungs possessed a man capable of giving such pru- 
 dent counsel ? If they had paid heed to it, should we ever 
 have reached this spot ?' ' After this success Bayan pressed 
 on with increased rather than diminished energy, and the 
 Sung emperor and his court fled from the capital. Kublai 
 showed an inclination to temporize and to negotiate, but 
 Bayan would not brook any delay. "To relax your grip 
 even for a moment on an enemy whom you have held by 
 the throat for a hundred years would only be to give him 
 time to^recover his breath, to restore his forces, and in the 
 end to cause us an infinity of trouble." 
 
 The Sung fortunes showed some slight symptoms of im- 
 proving when Kiassetao was disgraced, and a more com- 
 petent general was found in the person of Chang Chikia. 
 But the Mongols never abated the vigor of their attack or 
 relaxed in their efforts to cut off all possibility of succor from 
 the Sung capital. "When Chang Chikia hoped to improve 
 the position of his side by resuming the offensive he was 
 destined to rude disappointment. Making an attack on the 
 strong position of the Mongols at Nankin he was repulsed 
 with heavy loss. The Sung fleet was almost annihilated 
 and 700 war-junks were taken by the victors. After this
 
 THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF CHINA 121 
 
 the Chinese never dared to face the Mongols again on the 
 water. This victory was due to the courage and capacity 
 of Artchu. Bayan now returned from a campaign in Mon- 
 golia to resume the chief conduct of the war, and he signal- 
 ized his return by the capture of Changchow. At this town 
 he is said to have sanctioned a massacre of the Chinese 
 troops, but the facts are enwrapped in uncertainty; and 
 Marco Polo declares that this was only done after the Chi- 
 nese had treacherously cut up the Mongol garrison. Alarmed 
 by the fall of Changchow, the Sung ministers again sued for 
 peace, sending an imploring letter to this effect: "Our ruler 
 is young and cannot be held responsible for the differences 
 that have arisen between the peoples. Kiassetao the guilty 
 one has been punished ; give us peace and we shall be better 
 friends in the future." Bayan' s reply was severe and un- 
 compromising. "The age of your prince has nothing to do 
 with the question between us. The war must go on to its 
 legitimate end. Further argument is useless." The de- 
 fenses of the Sung capital were by this time removed, and 
 the unfortunate upholders of that dynasty had no option save 
 to come to terms with the Mongols. Marco Polo describes 
 Kincsay as the most opulent city of the world, but it was in 
 no position to stand a siege. The empress- regent, acting for 
 her son, sent in her submission to Bayan, and agreed to pro- 
 ceed to the court of the conqueror. She abdicated for her- 
 self and family all the pretensions of their rank, and she 
 accepted the favors of the Mongol with due humility, saying, 
 "The Son of Heaven (thus giving Kublai the correct im- 
 perial style) grants you the favor of sparing your life; it is 
 just to thank him for it and to pay him homage. ' ' Bayan 
 made a triumphal entry into the city, while the Emperor 
 Kongtsong was sent off to Pekin. The majority of the 
 Sung courtiers and soldiers came to terms with Bayan, but 
 a few of the more desperate or faithful endeavored to uphold 
 the Sung cause in Southern China under the general, Chang 
 Chikia. Two of the Sung princes were supported by this 
 commander, and one was proclaimed by the empty title of 
 China — 6
 
 122 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 emperor. Capricious fortune rallied to their side for a brief 
 space, and some of the Mongol detachments which had ad- 
 vanced too far or with undue precipitancy were cut up and 
 destroyed. 
 
 The Mongols seem to have thought that the war was 
 over, and the success of Chang Chikia's efforts may have been 
 due to their negligence rather than to his vigor. As soon as 
 they realized that there remained a flickering flame of op- 
 position among the supporters of the Sungs they sent two 
 armies, one into Kwantung and the other into Fuhkien, and 
 their fleet against Chang Chikia. Desperate as was his posi- 
 tion, that officer still exclaimed, "If Heaven has not resolved 
 to overthrow the Sungs, do you think that even now it can- 
 not restore their ruined throne ?" But his hopes were dashed 
 to the ground by the capture of Canton, and the expulsion 
 of all his forces from the mainland. One puppet emperor 
 died, and then Chang proclaimed another as Tiping. The 
 last supporters of the cause took refuge on the island of Tai 
 in the Canton estuary, where they hoped to maintain their 
 position. The position was strong and the garrison was nu- 
 merous ; but the Mongols were not to be frightened by appear- 
 ances. Their fleet bore down on the last Sung stronghold 
 with absolute confidence, and, although the Chinese resisted 
 for three days and showed great gallantry, they were over- 
 whelmed by the superior engines as well as the numbers of 
 the Mongols. Chang Chikia with a few ships succeeded in 
 escaping from the fray, but the emperor's vessel was less 
 fortunate, and finding that escape was impossible, Lousion- 
 foo, one of the last Sung ministers, seized the emperor in his 
 arms and jumped overboard with him. Thus died Tiping, 
 the last Chinese emperor of the Sungs, and with him expired 
 that ill-fated dynasty. Chang Chikia renewed the struggle 
 with aid received from Tonquin, but when he was leading 
 a forlorn hope against Canton he was caught in a typhoon 
 and he and his ships were wrecked. Ilis invocation to 
 Heaven, "I have done everything I could to sustain on the 
 throne the Sung dynasty. When one prince died, I caused
 
 KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY 123 
 
 another to be proclaimed emperor. He also has perished, 
 and I still live! Oh, Heaven, shall I be acting against thy 
 desires if I sought to place a new prince of this family on the 
 throne ?' ' sounded the dirge of the race he had served so well. 
 Thus was the conquest of China by the Mongols com- 
 pleted. After half a century of warfare the kingdom of the 
 Sungs shared the same fate as its old rival the Kin, and 
 Kublai had the personal satisfaction of completing the work 
 begun by his grandfather Genghis seventy years before. Of 
 all the Mongol triumphs it was the longest in being attained. 
 The Chinese of the north and of the south resisted with ex- 
 traordinary powers of endurance the whole force of the 
 greatest conquering race Asia had ever seen. They were 
 not skilled in war and their generals were generally incom- 
 petent, but they held out with desperate courage and obsti- 
 nacy long after other races would have given in. The stu- 
 dent of history will not fail to see in these facts striking 
 testimony of the extraordinary resources of China, and of 
 the capacity of resistance to even a vigorous conqueror pos- 
 sessed by its inert masses. Even the Mongols did not con- 
 quer until they had obtained the aid of a large section of the 
 Chinese nation, or before Kublai had shown that he intended 
 to prove himself a worthy Emperor of China and not merely 
 a great Khan of the Mongol Hordes. 
 
 CHAPTEE VI 
 
 KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY 
 
 While Bayan was winning victories for his master and 
 driving the Chinese armies from the iield, Kublai was en- 
 gaged at Pekin in the difficult and necessary task of consoli- 
 dating his authority. In 1271 he gave his dynasty the name 
 of Yuen or Original, and he took for himself the Chinese 
 title of Chitsou, although it will never supersede his Mongol 
 name of Kublai. Summoning to his court the most experi-
 
 124 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 enced Chinese ministers, and aided by many foreigners, lie 
 succeeded in founding a government which was imposing by 
 reason of its many-sidedness as well as its inherent strength. 
 It satisfied the Chinese and it was gratifying to the Mongols, 
 because they formed the buttress of one of the most imposing 
 administrations in the world. All this was the distinct work 
 of Kublai, who had enjoyed the special favor of Genghis, 
 who had predicted of him that "one day he will sit in my 
 seat and bring you good fortune such as you have had in 
 my time." He resolved to make his court the most splendid 
 in the world. His capital Cambaluc or Khanbalig — "the 
 city of the Khan" — stood on or near the present site of 
 Pekin, and was made for the first time capital of China by 
 the Mongols. There were, according to Marco Polo, twelve 
 gates, at each of which was stationed a guard of 1,000 men, 
 and the streets were so straight and wide that you could see 
 from one end to the other, or from gate to gate. The extent 
 given of the walls varies: according to the highest estimate 
 they were twenty-seven miles round, according to the lowest 
 eighteen. The khan's palace at Chandu or Kaipingfoo, 
 north of Pekin, where he built a magnificent summer palace, 
 kept his stud of horses, and carried out his love of the chase 
 in the immense park and preserves attached, may be con- 
 sidered the Windsor of this Chinese monarch. The position 
 of Pekin had, and still has, much to recommend it as the 
 site of a capitaL The Mings, after proclaiming Nankin the 
 capital, made scarcely less use of it, and Chuntche, the first 
 of the Manchus, adopted it as his. It has since remained 
 the sole metropolis of the empire. 
 
 When Kublai permanently established himself at Pekin 
 he drew up consistent lines of policy on all the great ques- 
 tions with which it was likely he would have to deal, and he 
 always endeavored to act upon these set principles. In fram- 
 ing this system of government he was greatly assisted by 
 his old friend and tutor Yaochu, as well as by other Chinese 
 ministers. He was thus able to deal wisely and also vigor- 
 ously with a society with which he was only imperfectly
 
 KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY 125 
 
 acquainted; and the impartiality and insight into human 
 character, which were his main characteristics, greatly sim- 
 plified the difficult task before him. His impartiality was 
 shown most clearly in his attitude on the question of relig- 
 ion ; but it partook very largely of a hard materialism which 
 concealed itself under a nominal indifference. At first he 
 treated with equal consideration Buddhism, Mohammedan- 
 ism, Christianity, and even Judaism, and he said that he 
 treated them all with equal consideration because he hoped 
 that the greatest among them would help him in heaven. 
 If some doubt may be felt as to the sincerity of this state- 
 ment, there can be none as to Kublai's effort to turn all 
 religions to a political use, and to make them serve his turn. 
 Some persons have thought he showed a predilection for 
 Christianity, but his measures in support of Buddhism, and 
 of his friend the Pakba Lama, are a truer indication of his 
 feelings. But none was admitted into his private con- 
 fidence, and his acts evinced a politic tolerance toward 
 all creeds. But his religious tolerance or indifference did 
 not extend to personal matters. He insisted on the proper 
 prayers being offered to himself and the extreme reverence of 
 the kow-tow. Priests were appointed and specially enjoined 
 to offer up prayers on his behalf before the people, who were 
 required to attend these services and to join in the responses. 
 Images of himself were also sent to all the provincial towns 
 for reverence to be offered. He also followed the Chinese 
 custom of erecting a temple to his ancestors, and the coins 
 that passed current bore his efhgy. Thus did Kublai more 
 and more identify himself with his Chinese subjects, and as 
 he found his measures crowned with success he became him- 
 self more wedded to Chinese views, less tolerant of adverse 
 opinions, and more disposed to assert his sovereign majesty. 
 Having embellished his capital, it is not surprising to find 
 that he drew up a strict court ceremonial, and that he pre- 
 scribed gorgeous dresses for those who were to be allowed to 
 approach him. His banquets were of the most sumptuous 
 description. Strangers from foreign states were admitted to
 
 126 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the presence, and dined at a table set apart for travelers, 
 while the great king himself feasted in the full gaze of his 
 people. His courtiers, guard, and ministers attended by a 
 host of servitors, and protected from enemies by 20,000 
 guards, the flower of the Mongol army ; the countless wealth 
 seized in the capitals of numerous kingdoms; the brilliance 
 of intellect among his chief adherents and supporters; the 
 martial character of the race that lent itself almost as well 
 to the pageantry of a court as to the stern reality of battle; 
 and finally the majesty of the great king himself — all com- 
 bined to make Kublai's court and capital the most splendid, 
 at that time, in the world. Although Kublai's instincts 
 were martial, he gave up all idea of accompanying his ar- 
 mies in the field after his war with Arikbuka. As he was 
 only forty-four when he formed this decision, it must be 
 assumed that he came to it mainly because he had so many 
 other matters to attend to, and also, no doubt, because he 
 felt that he possessed in Bayan a worthy substitute. 
 
 The most fortunate and successful monarch rarely es- 
 capes without some misfortune, and Kublai was not destined 
 to be an exception to the rule. The successes of the Mongol 
 navy undoubtedly led Kublai to believe that his arms might 
 be carried beyond the sea, and he formed the definite plan 
 of subjecting Japan to his power. The ruling family in that 
 kingdom was of Chinese descent, tracing back its origin to 
 Taipe, a fugitive Chinese prince of the twelfth century before 
 our era. The Chinese in their usual way had asserted the 
 superior position of a suzerain, and the Japanese had as 
 consistently refused to recognize the claim, and had main- 
 tained their independence. As a rule the Japanese abstained 
 from all interference in the affairs of the continent, and the 
 only occasion on which they departed from this rule was 
 when they aided Corea against China. In 1266 Kublai sent 
 two embassadors by way of Corea to Japan with a letter 
 from himself complaining that the Japanese court had taken 
 no notice of his accession to power, and treated him with 
 indifference. The mission never had a chance of success,
 
 KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY 127 
 
 for the Coreans succeeded in frightening the Mongol envoys 
 with the terrors of the sea, and by withholding their assist- 
 ance prevented them reaching their destination. The envoys 
 returned without having been able to deliver their letter. 
 Kublai decided that the Japanese were hostile to him, and 
 he resolved to humble them. He called upon the King of 
 Corea to raise an auxiliary force, and that prince promised 
 to supply 1,000 ships and 10,000 men. In 1274 he sent a 
 small force of 800 ships and 15,000 men to begin operations 
 in the direction of Japan; but the Japanese navy came out 
 to meet it, and attacking it off the island of Tsiusima, in- 
 flicted a crushing defeat. As this expedition was largely 
 composed of the Corean contingent, Kublai easily persuaded 
 himself that this defeat did not indicate what would happen 
 when he employed his own Mongol troops. He also suc- 
 ceeded in sending several envoys to Japan after his first 
 abortive attempt, and they brought back consistent reports 
 as to the hostility and defiance of the Japanese, who at last, 
 to leave no further doubt on the subject, executed his envoy 
 in 1280. For this outrage the haughty monarch swore he 
 would exact a terrible revenge, and in 1280-81, when the last 
 of his campaigns with the Sungs had been brought to a tri- 
 umphant conclusion, he collected all his forces in the eastern 
 part of the kingdom, and prepared to attack Japan with all 
 his power. 
 
 For the purposes of this war he raised an army of over 
 100,000 men, of whom about one-third were Mongols; and 
 a fleet large enough to carry this host and its supplies was 
 gathered together with great difficulty in the harbors of 
 Chekiang and Fuhkien. It would have been wiser if the 
 expedition had started from Corea, as the sea voyage would 
 have been greatly reduced; but the difficulty of getting his 
 army to that country, and the greater difficulty of feeding it 
 when it got there, induced him to make his own maritime 
 possessions the base of his operations. From the beginning 
 misfortunes fell thick upon it, and the Japanese, not less 
 than the English when assailed by the Spanish Armada and
 
 128 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Boulogne invasions, owed mucii to tlie alliance of the sea. 
 Knblai had felt bound to appoint a Chinese generalissimo as 
 well as a Mongol to this host, but it did not work well. One 
 general fell ill and was superseded, another was lost in a 
 storm, and there was a general want of harmony in the 
 Mongol camp and fleet. Still the fleet set sail, but the ele- 
 ments declared themselves against Kublai. His shattered 
 fleet was compelled to take refuge off the islets to the north 
 of Japan, where it attempted to refit, but the Japanese 
 granted no respite, and assailed them both by land and sea. 
 After protracted but unequal fighting the Mongol commander 
 had no choice left but to surrender. The conquerors spared 
 the Chinese and Coreans among their prisoners, but they 
 put every Mongol to the sword. Only a stray junk or two 
 escaped to tell Kublai the tale of the greatest defeat the 
 Mongols had ever experienced. Thirty thousand of their 
 best troops were slaughtered, and their newly-created fleet, 
 on which they were founding such great expectations, was 
 annihilated, while 70,000 Chinese and Coreans remained as 
 prisoners in the hands of the victor. Kublai executed two 
 of his generals who escaped, but it is clear no one was to 
 blame. The Mongols were vanquished because they under- 
 took a task beyond their power, and one with which their 
 military experience did not fit them to cope. The most for- 
 midable portion of their army was cavahy, and they had no 
 knowledge of the sea. ISIor could their Chinese auxiliaries 
 supply this deficiency; for, strange as it may appear, the 
 Chinese, although many of them are good fishermen and 
 sailors, have never been a powerful nation at sea. On the 
 other hand, the Japanese have always been a bold and ca- 
 pable race of mariners. They have frequently proved that 
 the sea is their natural element, and all the power and re- 
 sources of Kublai availed not against the skill and courage 
 of these hardy islanders. Kublai was reluctant to acquiesce 
 in his defeat, and he endeavored to form another expedition, 
 but the Chinese sailors mutinied and refused to embark. 
 They were supported by all the Chinese ministers at Pekin,
 
 KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY VId 
 
 and Kublai felt himself compelled to yield and abandon all 
 designs of conquest beyond the sea. 
 
 The old success of the Mongols did not desert them on 
 land, and Kublai received some consolation for his rude 
 repulse by the Japanese in the triumph of his arms in 
 Burma. The momentary submission of the King of Bur- 
 ma, or Mien, as it was, and is still, called by the Chinese, 
 had been followed by a fit of truculence and open hostility. 
 This monarch had crossed over into Indian territory, and 
 had assumed the title of King of Bengala in addition to his 
 own. Emboldened by his success, he did not conceal his 
 hostility to the Mongols, sent a defiant reply to all their rep- 
 resentations, and even assumed the offensive with his frontier 
 garrisons. He then declared open war. The Mongol gen- 
 eral, Nasiuddin, collected all the forces he could, and when 
 the Burmese ruler crossed the frontier at the head of an 
 immense host of horse, foot, and elephants, he found the 
 Mongol army drawn up on the plain of Yungchang. The 
 Mongols numbered only 12,000 select troops, whereas the 
 Burmese exceeded 80,000 men, with a corps of elephants 
 estimated between 800 and 2,000, and an artillery force of 
 sixteen guns. Notwithstanding this numerical disadvantage 
 the Mongols were in no way dismayed by their opponents' 
 manifest superiority; but seldom has the struggle between 
 disciplined and brute force proved closer or more keenly con- 
 tested. At first the charge of the Burmese cavalry, aided 
 by the elephants and artillery, carried all before it. But 
 Nasiuddin had provided for this contingency. He had dis- 
 mounted all his cavalry, and had ordered them to fire their 
 arrows exclusively against the elephant corps; and as the 
 Mongols were then not only the best archers in the world, 
 but used the strongest bows, the destruction they wrought 
 was considerable, and soon threw the elephants into hopeless 
 confusion. The crowd of elephants turned tail before this 
 discharge of arrows, as did the elephants of Pyrrhus, and 
 threw the whole Burmese army into confusion. The Mon- 
 gols then mounting their horses, charged and completed the
 
 180 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 discomfiture of the Burmese, who were driven from the field 
 with lieavy loss and tarnished reputation. On this occasion 
 the Mongols did not pursue the Burmese very far, and the 
 King of Burma lost little or no part of his dominions, but 
 Nasiuddin reported to Pekin that it would be an easy matter 
 to add the kingdom of Mien to the Mongol empire. Kublai 
 did not act on this advice until six years later, when he sent 
 his kinsman Singtur with a large force to subdue Burma. 
 The king took shelter in Pegu, leaving his capital Amien 
 at the mercy of the conqueror. The Mongol conquests were 
 thus brought down to the very border of Assam. In Ton- 
 quin and Annam the arms of Kublai were not so successful. 
 Kublai 's son Togan made an abortive campaign in these 
 regions. Whenever an open force had to be overcome, the 
 Mongol army was successful, but when the Mongols encoun- 
 tered the difficulties of a damp and inclement climate, of the 
 absence of roads, and other disadvantages, they were dis- 
 heartened, and suffered heavily in men and morale. With 
 the loss of his two generals, and the main portion of his 
 army, Togan was lucky in himself escaping to China. Kublai 
 wished to make another effort to subdue these inhospitable 
 regions and their savage inhabitants, but Chinese public 
 opinion proved too strong, and he had to yield to the rep- 
 resentations of his ministers. 
 
 Kublai was the more compelled to sacrifice his feelings 
 on this point, because there were not wanting indications 
 that if he did not do so he would find a Chinese rebellion 
 on his hands. Notwithstanding his many successes, and 
 his evident desire to stand well with his Chinese subjects, 
 it was already clear that they bore their new leader little 
 love. Several of the principal provinces were in a state of 
 veiled rebellion, showing that the first opportunity would 
 be taken to shake off the Mongol yoke, and that Kublai's 
 authority really rested on a quicksand. The predictions of 
 a fanatic were sufficient to shake the emperor on his throne, 
 and such was Kublai's apprehension that he banished all 
 the remaining Sung prisoners to Mongolia, and executed
 
 KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY 131 
 
 their last faithful minister, who went to the scaffold with a 
 smile on his face, exclaiming, "I am content; my wishes 
 are about to be realized." It must not be supposed from 
 this that Kublai's authority had vanished or become effete. 
 It was absolutely supreme over all declared enemies, but be- 
 low the surface was seething an amount of popular hostil- 
 ity and discontent ominous to the longevity of the Mongol 
 dynasty. The restless ambition of Kublai would not be 
 satisfied with anything short of recognition, in some form 
 or other, of his power by his neighbors, and he consequently 
 sent envoys to all the kingdoms of Southern Asia to obtain, 
 by lavish presents or persuasive language, that recognition 
 of his authority on which he had set his heart. In most 
 cases he was gratified, for there was not a power in East- 
 ern Asia to compare with that of the Mongol prince seated 
 on the Dragon Throne of China, and all were flattered to be 
 brought into connection with it on any terms. 
 
 These successful and gratifying embassies had only one 
 untoward result: they induced Kublai to revert to his idea 
 of repairing the overthrow of his son Togan in Annam, and 
 of finally subj ugating that troublesome country. The inten- 
 tion was not wise, and it was rendered more imprudent by 
 its execution being intrusted to Togan again. Another com- 
 mander might have fared better, but great as was his initial 
 success, he could not hope to permanently succeed. Togan 
 began as he formerly commenced by carrying all before 
 him. He won seventeen separate engagements, but the 
 further he advanced into the country the more evident did 
 it appear that he only controlled the ground on which he 
 stood. The King of Annam was a fugitive ; his capital was 
 in the hands of the Mongols, and apparently nothing more 
 remained to be done. Apachi, the most experienced of the 
 Mongol commanders, then counseled a prompt retreat. 
 Unfortunately the Mongol prince Togan would not take 
 his advice, and the Annamites, gathering fresh forces on 
 all sides, attacked the exhausted Mongols, and compelled 
 them to beat a precipitate retreat from their country. All
 
 ]rt2 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 \he fruits of early victory were lost, and Togan's disgrace 
 was a poor consolation for the culminating discomfiture of 
 Kublai's reign. The people of Annam then made good their 
 independence, and they still enjoy it, so far as China is con- 
 cerned; though Annam is now a dependency of the French 
 republic 
 
 We cannot doubt that the failure of the emperor's en- 
 deavor to popularize his rule was as largely due to the 
 tyrannical acts and oppressive measures of some of his 
 principal ministers as to unpopular and unsuccessful expe- 
 ditions. Notwithstanding the popular dislike of the system, 
 and Kublai's efforts to put it down, the Mongols resorted to 
 the old plan of farming the revenue, and the extortion of 
 those who purchased the right drove the Chinese to the 
 verge of rebellion, and made the whole Mongol regime 
 hateful. Several tax farmers were removed from their 
 posts, and punished with death, but their successors car- 
 ried on the same system. The declining years of Kublai's 
 reign were therefore marred by the growing discontent of 
 his Chinese subjects, and by his inability or unwillingness 
 to put down official extortion and mismanagement. But 
 he had to cope with a still greater danger in the hostility 
 of some members of his own family. The rivalry between 
 himself and his brother Arikbuka formed one incident of 
 his earlier career, the hostility of his cousin Kaidu proved a 
 more serious peril when Kublai was stricken in years, and 
 approaching the end of his long reign. 
 
 Kaidu was one of the sons of Ogotai, and consequently 
 first cousin to Kublai. He held some high post in Mongolia, 
 and he represented a reactionary party among the Mongols, 
 who wished the administration to be less Chinese, and who, 
 perhaps, sighed for more worlds to conquer. But he hated 
 Kublai, and was jealous of his pre-eminence, which was, 
 perhaps, the only cause of his revolt. The hostility of 
 Kaidu might have remained a personal grievance if he 
 had not obtained the alliance of Nayan, a Mongol general 
 of experience and ability, who had long been jealous of the
 
 KVBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY 133 
 
 superior reputation of Bayan. He was long engaged in 
 raising an army, with which, he might hope to make a bid 
 for empire, but at last his preparations reached the ear of 
 Kublai, who determined to crush him before his power had 
 grown too great. Kublai marched against him at the head 
 of 100,000 men, and all the troops Nay an could bring into 
 the field were 40,000, while Kaidu, although hastily gath- 
 ering his forces, was too far off to render any timely aid. 
 Kublai commanded in person, and arranged his order of 
 battle from a tower supported on the backs of four elephants 
 chained together. Both armies showed great heroism and 
 ferocity, but numbers carried the day, and Nayan's army 
 was almost destroyed, while he himself fell into the hands 
 of the victor. It was contrary to the practice of the Mon- 
 gols to shed the blood of their own princes, so Kublai or- 
 dered Nay an to be sewn up in a sack, and then beaten to 
 death. The war with Kaidu dragged on for many years, 
 and there is no doubt that Kublai did not desire to push 
 matters to an extremity with his cousin. Having restored 
 the fortunes of the war by assuming the command in per- 
 son, Kublai retarned in a short time to Pekin, leaving his 
 opponent, as he hoped, the proverbial golden bridge by 
 which to retreat. But his lieutenant, Bayan, to whom 
 he intrusted the conduct of the campaign, favored more 
 vigorous action, and was anxious to bring the struggle to 
 a speedy and decisive determination. He had gained one 
 remarkable victory under considerable disadvantage, when 
 Kublai, either listening to his detractors or desirous of re- 
 straining his activity, dismissed him from his military posts 
 and, summoning him to Pekin, gave him the uncongenial 
 office of a minister of State. This happened in 1293, and in 
 the following year Kublai, who was nearly eighty, and who 
 had occupied the throne of China for thirty-five years, sick- 
 ened and died, leaving behind him a great reputation which 
 has survived the criticism of six centuries in both Europe 
 and China. 
 
 Kublai' s long reign marked the climax of the Mongol
 
 184 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 triumph wliicli lie liad all the personal satisfaction of ex- 
 tending to China. Where Genghis failed, or attained only 
 partial success, he succeeded to the fullest extent, thus veri- 
 fying the prophecy of his grandfather. But although he 
 conquered their country, he never vanquished the preju- 
 dices of the Chinese, and the Mongols, unlike the Manchus, 
 failed completely to propitiate the good will of the histori- 
 ographers of the Hani in. Of Kublai they take some recog- 
 nition, as an enlightened and well-meaning prince, but for 
 all the other emperors of the Yuen line they have nothing 
 good to say. Even Kublai himself could not assure the sta- 
 bility of his throne, and when he died it was at once clear 
 that the Mongols could not long retain the supreme position 
 in China. 
 
 But Kublai 's authority was sufficiently established for it 
 to be transmitted, without popular disturbance or any insur- 
 rection on the part of the Chinese, to his legal heir, who was 
 his grandson. Such risk as presented itself to the succession 
 arose from the dissensions among the Mongol princes them- 
 selves, but the prompt measures of Bayan arrested any 
 trouble, and Prince Timour was proclaimed emperor under 
 the Chinese style of Chingtsong. A few months after this 
 signal service to the ruling family, Bayan died, leaving 
 behind him the reputation of being one of the most capa- 
 ble of all the Mongol commanders. Whether because he 
 could find no general worthy to fill Bayan' s place or be- 
 cause his temperament was naturally pacific, Timour car- 
 ried on no military operations, and the thirteen years of his 
 reign were marked by almost unbroken peace. But peace 
 did not bring prosperity in its train, for a considerable part 
 of China suffered from the ravages of famine, and the crav- 
 ings of hunger drove many to become brigands. Timour's 
 anxiety to alleviate the public sujffering gained him some 
 small measure of popularity, and he also endeavored to limit 
 the 0])i)ortunities of the Mongol governors to be tyrannical 
 by taking away from them tlic power of life and death. 
 Timour was compelled by the sustained hostility of Kaidu
 
 KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY 185 
 
 to continue the struggle with that prince, but he confined 
 himself to the defensive, and the death of Kaidu, in 1301, 
 deprived the contest of its extreme bitterness, although it 
 still continued. 
 
 Timour was, however, unfortunate in the one foreign 
 enterprise which he undertook. The ease with which Bur- 
 ma had been vanquished and reduced to a tributary state 
 emboldened some of his officers on the southern frontier to 
 attempt the conquest of Papesifu — a state which may be 
 identified with the modern Laos. The enterprise, com- 
 menced in a thoughtless and light-hearted manner, re- 
 vealed unexpected peril and proved disastrous. A large 
 part of the Mongol army perished from the heat, and the 
 survivors were only rescued from their perilous position, 
 surrounded by the numerous enemies they had irritated,- 
 by a supreme effort on the part of Koko, the viceroy of 
 Yunnan, who was also Timour 's uncle. The insurrection- 
 ary movement was not confined to the outlying districts 
 of Annam and Burma, but extended within the Chinese 
 border, and several years elapsed before tranquillity was 
 restored to the frontier provinces. 
 
 Timour died in 1806 without leaving a direct legitimate 
 heir, and his two nephews Haichan and Aiyuli Palipata 
 were held to possess an equal claim to the throne. Haichan 
 was absent in Mongolia when his uncle died, and a faction 
 put forward the pretensions of Honanta, prince of Gansi, 
 who seems to have been Timour's natural son, but Aiyuli 
 Palipata, acting with great energy, arrested the pretender 
 and proclaimed Haichan as emperor. Haichan reigned five 
 years, during which the chief reputation he gained was as 
 a glutton. When he died, in 1311, his brother Palipata was 
 proclaimed emperor, although Haichan left two sons. Pali- 
 pata's reign of nine years was peaceful and uneventful, and 
 his son Chutepala succeeded him. Chutepala was a young 
 and inexperienced prince who owed such authority as he 
 enjoyed to the courage of Baiju, a brave soldier, who was 
 specially distinguished as the lineal descendant of the great
 
 136 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 general, Muliula. The plots and intrigues which compassed 
 the ruin of the Yuen dynasty began during this reign, and 
 both Chutepala and Baiju were murdered by conspirators. 
 The next emperor, Yesun Timour, was fortunate in a peace- 
 ful reign, but on his death, in 1328, the troubles of the dy- 
 nasty accumulated, and its end came clearly into view. In 
 little more than a year, three emperors were proclaimed and 
 died. Tou Timour, one of the sons of Haichan, who ruled 
 before Palipata, was so far fortunate in reigning for a longer 
 period, but the most interesting episode in his barren reign 
 was the visit of the Grand Lama of Tibet to Pekin, where 
 he was received with exceptional honor; but when Tou 
 Timour attempted to compel his courtiers to pay the rep- 
 resentative of Buddhism special obeisance he encountered 
 the opposition of both Chinese and Mongols. 
 
 After Tou Timour' s death the imperial title passed to 
 Tohan Timour, who is best known by his Chinese title of 
 Chunti. He found a champion in Bayan, a descendant 
 of the general of that name, who successfully defended the 
 palace against the attack of a band of conspirators. In 1337 
 the first distinct rebellion on the part of the Chinese took 
 place in the neighborhood of Canton, and an order for the 
 disarmament of the Chinese population aggravated the situa- 
 tion because it could not be effectually carried out. Bayan, 
 after his defense of the palace, became the most powerful 
 personage in the state, and to his arrogance was largely due 
 the aggravation of the Mongol difficulties and the imbittering 
 of Chinese opinion. He murdered an empress, tyrannized 
 over the Chinese, and outshone the emperor in his apparel 
 and equipages, as if he were a Wolsey or a Buckingham. 
 For the last offense Chunti could not forgive him, and Bayan 
 was deposed and disgraced. While these dissensions were 
 in progress at Pekin the Chinese were growing more daring 
 and confident in their efforts to liberate themselves from the 
 foreign yoke. They had adopted red bonnets as the mark 
 of their patriotic league, and on the sea the piratical confed- 
 eracy of Fangkue Chin vanquished and destroyed such navy
 
 KUBLAI AND THE MONGOL DYNASTY 137 
 
 as the Mongols ever possessed. But in open and regular 
 fighting on land the supremacy of the Mongols was still 
 incontestable, and a minister, named Toto, restored the sink- 
 ing fortunes of Chunti until he fell the victim of a court 
 intrigue — being poisoned by a rival named Hamar. With 
 Toto disappeared the last possible champion of the Mongols, 
 and the only thing needed to insure their overthrow was the 
 advent of a capable leader who could give coherence to the 
 national cause, and such a leader was not long in making his 
 appearance. 
 
 The deliverer of the Chinese from the Mongols was an 
 individual named Choo Yuen Chang, who, being left an 
 orphan, entered a monastery as the easiest way of gaining 
 a livelihood. In the year 1345, when Chunti had been on 
 the throne twelve years, Choo quitted his retreat and joined 
 one of the bands of Chinese who had thrown off the authority 
 of the Mongols. His physique and fine presence soon gained 
 for him a place of authority, and when the chief of the band 
 died he was chosen unanimously as his successor. He at 
 once showed himself superior to the other popular leaders 
 by his humanity, and by his wise efi:orts to convince the 
 Chinese people that he had only their interests at heart. 
 Other Chinese so-called patriots thought mainly of plunder, 
 and they were not less terrible to peaceful citizens than the 
 most exacting Mongol commander or governor. But Choo 
 strictly forbade plundering, and any of his band caught rob- 
 bing or ill-using the people met with prompt and summary 
 punishment. By this conduct he gained the confidence of 
 the Chinese, and his standard among all the national leaders 
 became the most popular and attracted the largest number 
 of recruits. In 1356 he captured the city of Nankin, which 
 thereupon became the base of his operations, as it was subse- 
 quently the capital of his dynasty. He then issued a proc- 
 lamation declaring that his sole object was to expel the 
 foreigners and to restore the national form of government. 
 In this document he said, "It is the birthright of the Chinese 
 to govern foreign peoples and not of these latter to rule in
 
 138 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 China. It used to be said that the Yuen or Mongols, who 
 came from the regions of the north, conquered our empire 
 not so much by their courage and skill as by the aid of 
 Heaven. And now it is sufficiently plain that Heaven itself 
 wishes to deprive them of that empire, as some punishment 
 for their crimes, and for not liaving acted according to the 
 teaching of their forefathers. The time has now come to 
 drive these foreigners out of China." While the Mongols 
 were assailed in every province of the empire by insurgents, 
 Choo headed what was the only organized movement for 
 their expulsion, and his alliance with the pirate Fangkue 
 Chin added the command of the sea to the control he had 
 himself acquired over some of the wealthiest and most pop- 
 ulous provinces of Central China. The disunion among the 
 Mongols contributed to their overthrow as much as the valor 
 of the Chinese. The Emperor Chunti had quite given him- 
 self up to pleasure, and his debaucheries were the scandal of 
 the day. The two principal generals, Chahan Timour and 
 Polo Timour, hated each other and refused to co-operate. 
 Another general, Alouhiya, raised the standard of revolt in 
 Mongolia, and, while he declared that his object was to 
 regenerate his race, he, undoubtedly, aggravated the em- 
 barrassment of Chunti. 
 
 In 1366, Choo, having carefully made all the necessary 
 preparations for war on a large scale, dispatched from Nankin 
 two large armies to conquer the provinces north of the 
 Yangtsekiang, which were all that remained in the posses- 
 sion of the Mongols. A tiiird army was intrusted with the 
 task of subjecting the provinces dependent on Canton, and 
 this task was accomplished with rapidity and without a 
 check. Such Mongol garrisons as were stationed in this 
 quarter were annihilated. The main Chinese army of 250,- 
 000 men was intrusted to the command of Suta, Choo's 
 principal lieutenant and best general, and advanced direct 
 upon Pekin. In 1367 Suta had overcome all resistance south 
 of the Hoangho, which river he crossed in the autumn of 
 that year. The Mongols appeared demoralized, and at-
 
 THE MING DYNASTY I'Sd 
 
 tempted little or no resistance. Chunti fled from Pekin 
 to Mongolia, where lie died in 1370, and Suta carried the 
 capital by storm from the small Mongol garrison which 
 remained to defend it. Choo hastened to Pekin to receive 
 the congratulations of his army, and to prove to the whole 
 Chinese nation that the Yuen dynasty had ceased to rule. 
 The resistance offered by the Mongols proved surprisingly 
 slight, and, considering the value of the prize for which they 
 were fighting, quite unworthy of their ancient renown. The 
 real cause of their overthrow was that the Mongols never 
 succeeded in propitiating the good opinion and moral support 
 of the Chinese, who regarded them to the end as barbarians, 
 and it must also be admitted that the main force of the Mon- 
 gols had drifted to Western Asia, where the great Timour 
 revived some of the traditions of Grenghis. At the end of 
 his career that mighty conqueror prepared to invade China, 
 but he died shortly after he had begun a march that boded 
 ill to the peace and welfare of China. Thus, with the flight 
 of Chunti, the Mongol or Yuen dynasty came to an end, and 
 the Mongols only reappear in Chinese history as the humble 
 allies of the Manchus, when they undertook the conquest of 
 China in the seventeenth centurv- 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE MING DYNASTY 
 
 Having expelled the Mongols, Choo assumed the style of 
 Hongwou, and he gave his dynasty the name of Ming, which 
 signifies "bright." He then rewarded his generals and offi- 
 cers with titles and pecuniary grants, and in 1369, the first 
 year of his reign after the capture of Pekin, he erected a 
 temple or hall in that city in honor of the generals who had 
 been slain, while vacant places were left for the statues of 
 those generals who still held command. But while he re- 
 warded his army, Hongwou very carefully avoided giving
 
 140 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 liis government a military character, knowing that the 
 Chinese resent the superiority of military officials, and he 
 devoted his main efforts to placing the civil administration 
 on its old and national basis. In this he received the cordial 
 support of the Chinese themselves, who had been kept in the 
 background by their late conquerors, whose administration 
 was essentially military. Hongwou also patronized litera- 
 ture, and endowed the celebrated Hanlin College, which was 
 neglected after the death of Kublai. He at once provided a 
 literary task of great magnitude in the history of the Yuen 
 dynasty, which was intrusted to a commission of eighteen 
 writers. But a still greater literary work was accomplished 
 in the codified Book of Laws, which is known as the Pandects 
 of Yunglo, and which not merely simplified the administra- 
 tion of the law, but also gave the people some idea of the 
 laws under which they lived. He also passed a great meas- 
 ure of gratuitous national education, and, in order to carry 
 out this reform in a thoroughly successful manner, he ap- 
 pointed all the masters himself. He also founded many 
 public libraries, and he wished to establish one in every 
 town, but this was beyond the extent of his power. Not 
 content with providing for the minds of his subjects, Hong- 
 wou did his utmost to supply the needs of the aged. He cut 
 down the court expenses and issued sumptuary laws, so that 
 he might devote the sums thus economized to the support of 
 the aged and sick. His last instructions to the new officials, 
 on proceeding to their posts, were to "take particular care 
 of the aged and the orphan." Thus did he show that the 
 Chinese had found in him a ruler who would revive the 
 ancient glories of the kingdom. 
 
 The frugality and modesty of his court have already been 
 referred to. The later Mongols were fond of u lavish dis- 
 play, and expended large sums on banquets and amusements. 
 At Pekin one of their emperors had erected in the grounds 
 of the palace a lofty tower of porcelain, at enormous expense, 
 and had arranged an ingenious contrivance at its base for 
 denoting the time. Two statues sounded a bell and struck
 
 THE MING DYNASTY 141 
 
 a drum at every hour. When Hongwou saw this edifice, he 
 exclaimed, "How is it possible for men to neglect the most 
 important affairs of life for the sole object of devoting their 
 attention to useless buildings ? If the Mongols, in place of 
 amusing themselves with these trifles, had applied their 
 energies to the task of contenting the people, would they not 
 have preserved the scepter in their family?" He then or- 
 dered that this building should be razed to the ground. Nor 
 did this action stand alone. He reduced the size of the 
 harein maintained by all the Chinese as well as the Mongol 
 rulers, and he instituted a rigid economy in all matters of 
 state ceremonial. Changtu, the Xanadu of Coleridge, the 
 famous summer palace of Kublai, had been destroyed during 
 the campaigns with the Mongols, and Hongwou systemati- 
 cally discouraged any attempt to embellish the northern cap- 
 ital, Pekin, which, under the Kin and Yuen dynasties, had 
 become identified with foreign rulers. Pekin, during the 
 whole of the Ming dynasty, was only a second-rate city, and 
 all the attention of the Ming rulers was given to the embel- 
 lishment of Nankin, the truly national capital of China. 
 
 The expulsion of the Mongols beyond the Great Wall and 
 the death of Chunti, the last of the Yuen emperors, by no 
 means ended the struggle between the Chinese and their late 
 northern conquerors. The whole of the reign of Hongwou 
 was taken up with a war for the supremacy of his authority 
 and the security of his frontiers, in which he, indeed, took 
 little personal part, but which was carried on under his 
 directions by his great generals, Suta and Fuyuta. The 
 former of these generals was engaged for nearly twenty 
 years, from 1868 to 1385, in constant war with the Mongols. 
 His first campaign, fought when the Chinese were in the 
 full flush of success, resulted in the brilliant and almost 
 bloodless conquest of the province of Shansi. The neighbor- 
 ing province of Shensi, which is separated from the other by 
 the river Hoangho, was at the time held by a semi-inde. 
 pendent Mongol governor named Lissechi, who believed that 
 he could hold his ground against the Mings. The principal
 
 142 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 fact upon wliich this hope was based was the breadth and 
 assumed impassability of that river. Lissechi believed that 
 this natural advantage would enable him to hold out indefi- 
 nitely against the superior numbers of the Chinese armies. 
 But his hope was vain if not unreasonable. The Chinese 
 crossed the Hoangho on a bridge of junks, and Tsinyuen, 
 which Lissechi had made his capital, surrendered without a 
 blow. Lessechi abandoned one fortress after another on the 
 approach of Suta. Expelled from Shensi, he hoped to find 
 shelter and safety in the adjoining province of Kansuh, 
 where he took up his residence at Lintao. For a moment 
 the advance of the Chinese army was arrested while a great 
 council of war was held to decide the further course of the 
 campaign. The majority of the council favored the sugges- 
 tion that did not involve immediate action, and wished Suta 
 to abandon the pursuit of Lissechi and complete the conquest 
 of Shensi, where several fortresses still held out. Bat Suta 
 was of a more resolute temper, and resolved to ignore the 
 decision of the council and to pursue Lissechi to Lintao. 
 The vigor of Suta's decision was matched by the rapidity 
 of his march. Before Lissechi had made any arrangements 
 to stand a siege he found himself surrounded at Lintao by 
 the Ming army. In this plight he was obliged to throw him- 
 self on the mercy of the victor, who sent him to the capital, 
 where Hongwou granted him his life and a small pension. 
 
 The overthrow of Lissechi prepared the way for the more 
 formidable enterprise against Ninghia, where the Mongols 
 had drawn their remaining power to a head. Ninghia, the 
 old capital of Tangut, is situated in the north of Kansuh, on 
 the western bank of the Hoangho, and the Great Wall passes 
 through it. Strongly fortified and admirably placed, the' 
 Mongols, so long as they possessed this town with its gates 
 through the Great Wall, might hope to recover what they 
 liad lost, and to make a fresh bid for power in Northern 
 China. North and west of Ninghia stretched the desert, 
 "but while it continued in their possession the Mongols re- 
 mained on the threshold of China and held open a door
 
 THE MING DYNASTY 143 
 
 througli wliicli their kinsmen from the Amour and Central 
 Asia might yet re-enter to revive the feats of Genghis and 
 Bayan. Suta determined to gain this place as speedily as 
 possible. Midway between Lintao and Ninghia is the fortified 
 town of Kingyang, which was held by a strong Mongol garri- 
 son. Suta laid close siege to this town, the governor of which 
 had only time to send off a pressing appeal for aid to Kuku 
 Timour, the governor at Ninghia, before he was shut in on 
 all sides by the Ming army. Kuku Timour apparently did 
 his best to aid his compatriot, but his forces were not suih- 
 cient to oppose those of Suta in the open field, and Kingyang 
 was at last reduced to such straits that the garrison is said 
 to have been compelled to use the slain as food. At last the 
 place made an unconditional surrender, and the commandant 
 was executed, not on account of his stubborn defense, but 
 because at the beginning of the siege he had said he would 
 surrender and had not kept his word. After the fall of 
 Kingyang the Chinese troops were granted a well-earned 
 rest, and Suta visited Nankin to describe the campaign to 
 Hongwou. 
 
 The departure of Suta emboldened Kuku Timour so far 
 as to lead him to take the field, and he hastened to attack 
 the town of Lanchefoo, the capital of Kansuh, where there 
 was only a small garrison. Notwithstanding this, the place 
 offered a stout resistance, but the Mongols gained a decisive 
 success over a body of troops sent to its relief. This force 
 was annihilated and its general taken prisoner. The Mon- 
 gols thought to terrify the garrison by parading this general, 
 whose name should be preserved, Yukwang, before the walls, 
 but he baffled their purpose by shouting out, " Be of good 
 courage, Suta is coming to your rescue." Yukwang was 
 cut to pieces, but his timely and courageous exclamation, 
 like that of D' Assas, saved his countrymen. Soon after this 
 incident Suta reached the scene of action, and on his ap- 
 proach Kuku Timour broke up his camp and retired to 
 Ninghia. The Chinese commander then hastened to occupy 
 the towns of Souchow and Kia-yu-kwan, important as being
 
 144 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 tte soutliern extremity of the Great Wall, and as isolating 
 Ninghia on the west. Their loss was so serious that the 
 Mongol chief felt compelled to risk a general engagement. 
 The battle was keenly contested, and at one moment it 
 seemed as if success was going to declare itself in favor of 
 the Mongols. But Suta had sent a large part of his force 
 to attack the Mongol rear, and when this movement was 
 completely executed, he assailed the Mongol position at the 
 head of all his troops. The struggle soon became a mas- 
 sacre, and it is said that as many as 80,000 Mongols were 
 slain, while Kuku Timour, thinking Ninghia no longer safe, 
 fled northward to the Amour. The success of Suta was 
 heightened and rendered complete by the capture of a large 
 number of the ex-Mongol ruling family by Lj Wenchong, 
 another of the principal generals of Hongwou. Among the 
 prisoners was the eldest grandson of Chunti, and several of 
 the ministers advised that he should be put to death. But 
 Hongwou instead conferred on him a minor title of nobility, 
 and expressed his policy in a speech equally creditable to his 
 wisdom as a statesman and his heart as a man: 
 
 ' ' The last ruler of the Yuens took heed only of his pleas- 
 ures. The great, profiting by his indolence, thought of noth- 
 ing save of how to enrich themselves; the public treasures 
 being exhausted by their malpractices, it needed only a few 
 years of dearth to reduce the people to distress, and the ex- 
 cessive tyranny of those who governed them led to the form- 
 ing of parties which disturbed the empire even to its founda- 
 tions. Touched by the misfortunes with which I saw them 
 oppressed, I tooii up arms, not so much against the Y"uens 
 as against the rebels who were engaged in war with them. 
 It was over the same foe that I gained my first successes. 
 And if the Yuen prince had not departed from the rules of 
 wise government in order to give himself up to his pleasures, 
 and had the magnates of his court performed their duty, 
 would all honorable men have taken vip arms as they did and 
 declared against him ? The misconduct of the race brought 
 me a large number of partisans who were convinced of the
 
 THE MING DYNASTY 145 
 
 rectitude of my intentions, and it was from their hands and 
 not from those of the Yuens that I received the empire. If 
 Heaven had not favored me should 1 have succeeded in de- 
 stroying with such ease those who withdrew into the desert 
 of Shamo? We read in the Chiking that after the destruc- 
 tion of the Chang family there remained more than ten thou- 
 sand of their descendants who submitted themselves to the 
 Chow, because it was the will of Heaven. Cannot men 
 respect its decrees ? Let them put in the public treasure- 
 house all the spoil brought back from Tartary, so that it may 
 serve to alleviate the people's wants. And with regard to 
 Maitilipala (Chunti's grandson), although former ages supply 
 examples of similar sacrifice, did Wou Wang, 1 ask you, 
 when exterminating the Chang family, resort to this barbar- 
 ous policy ? The Yuen princes were the masters of this em- 
 pire for nearly one hundred years, and my forefathers were 
 their subjects, and even although it were the constant prac- 
 tice to treat in this fashion the princes of a dynasty which 
 has ceased to reign, yet could I not induce myself to 
 adopt it." 
 
 These noble sentiments, to which there is nothing contra- 
 dictory in the whole life of Hongwou, would alone place his 
 reign high among the most civilizing and humanly inter- 
 esting epochs in Chinese history. To his people he appeared 
 as a real benefactor as well as a just prince. He was ever 
 studious of their interests, knowing that their happiness de- 
 pended on what might seem trivial matters, as well as in 
 showy feats of arms and high policy. He simplified the 
 transit of salt, that essential article of life, to provinces 
 where its production was scanty, and when dearth fell on 
 the land he devoted all the resources of his treasury to its 
 mitigation. His thoughtfulness for his soldiers was shown 
 by sending fur coats to all the soldiers in garrison at Ninghia 
 where the winter was exceptionally severe. A final instance 
 of his justice and consideration may be cited in his ordering 
 certain Mongol colonies established in Southern China, to 
 whom the climate proved uncongenial, to be sent back at his 
 
 China — 1
 
 146 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 expense to their northern homes, when his ministers exhorted 
 him to proceed to extremities against them and to root them 
 out by fire and sword. 
 
 The pacification of the northern borders was followed by 
 the dispatch of troops into the southern provinces of Szchuen 
 and Yunnan, where officials appointed by the Mongols still 
 exercised authority. One of these had incurred the wrath 
 of Ilongwou by assuming a royal style and proclaiming him- 
 self King of Hia. He was soon convinced of the folly of 
 taking a title which he had not the power to maintain, and 
 the conquest of Szchuen was so easily effected that it would 
 not call for mention if it were not rendered interesting as 
 providing Hongwou's other great general Fuyuta with the 
 first opportunity of displaying his skill as a commander. 
 The self-created King of Hia presented himself laden with 
 chains at the Chinese camp and begged the favor of his life. 
 The conquest of Szchuen was little more than completed 
 when the attention of Hongwou was again directed to the 
 northwest frontier, where Kuku Timour was making one 
 more effort to recover the footing he had lost on the fringe 
 of the Celestial Empire, and for a time fortune favored his 
 enterprise. Even when Suta arrived upon the scene and 
 took the command of the Chinese forces in person, the Mon- 
 gols more than held their own. Twice did Suta attack the 
 strong position taken up by the Mongol chief in the desert, 
 and twice was his assault repulsed with heavy loss. A de- 
 tachment under one of his lieutenants was surprised in the 
 desert and annihilated. Supplies were difficult to obtain, 
 and discouraged by defeat and the scarcity of food the Chi- 
 nese army was placed in an extremely dangerous position. 
 Out of this dilemma it was rescued by the heroic Fuyuta, 
 who, on the news of the Mongol recrudescence, had marched 
 northward at the head of the army with which he had con- 
 quered Szchuen. He advanced boldly into the desert, oper- 
 ated on the flank and in the rear of Kuku Timour, vanquished 
 the Mongols in many engagements, and so monopolized their 
 attention that Suta was able to retire in safety and without
 
 THE MING DYNASTY 147 
 
 loss. The war terminated witli the Chinese maintaining all 
 their posts on the frontier, and the retreat of the Mongols, 
 who had suffered too heavy a loss to feel elated at their 
 repulse of Suta. At the same time no solid peace had been 
 obtained, and the Mongols continued to harass the borders, 
 and to exact blackmail from all who traversed the desert. 
 When Hongwou endeavored to attain a settlement by a 
 stroke of policy his efforts were not more successful. His 
 kind reception of the Mongol Prince Maitilipala has been 
 referred to, and about the year 1374 he sent him back to 
 Mongolia, in the hope that he would prove a friendly neigh- 
 bor on his father's death. The gratitude of Maitilipala 
 seems to have been unaffected; but, although he was the 
 legitimate heir, the Mongols refused to recognize him as 
 Khan on the death of his father. Gradually tranquillity 
 settled down on those borders. The Chinese officials were 
 content to leave the Mongols alone, and the Mongols aban- 
 doned their customary raids into Chinese territory. The 
 death of Kuku Timour was followed by the abandonment 
 of all ideas of reviving Mongol authority in China. Not 
 long after that event died the great general Suta, of whom 
 the national historians give the following glowing description 
 which merits preservation: "Suta spoke little and was en- 
 dowed with great penetration. He was always on good 
 terms with the generals acting with him, sharing the good 
 and bad fortune alike of his soldiers, of whom there was not 
 one who, touched by his kindness, would not have done his 
 duty to the death. He was not less pronounced in his mod- 
 esty. He had conquered a capital, three provinces, several 
 hundred towns, and on the very day of his return to court 
 from these triumphs he went without show and without 
 retinue to his own hoiise, received there some learned pro- 
 fessors and discussed various subjects with them. Through- 
 out his life he was in the presence of the emperor respectful, 
 and so reserved that one might have doubted his capacity to 
 speak." Hongwou was in the habit of speaking thus in hia 
 praise: "My orders received, he forthwith departed; his
 
 14:3 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 task accomplisTied, he returned without pride and without 
 boasting. He loves not women, he does not amass wealth. 
 A man of strict integrity, without the slightest stain, as pure 
 and clear as the sun and moon, there is none like my first 
 general Suta. " 
 
 Hongwou had the satisfaction of restoring amicable rela- 
 tions with the King of Corea, a state in which the Chinese 
 have always taken naturally enough a great interest from 
 its proximity, as well as from an apprehension that the Jap- 
 anese might make use of it as a vantage ground for the 
 invasion of the continent. The King of Corea sent a formal 
 embassy to Nankin, and when he died his son asked for and 
 received investiture in his authority with the royal yellow 
 robes at the hands of the Ming ruler. During this period it 
 will be convenient here to note that the ruling power in 
 Corea passed from the old royal family to the minister Li 
 Chungwei, who was the ancestor of the present king. The 
 last military episode of the reign of Hongwou was the con- 
 quest of Yunnan, which had been left over after the recovery 
 of Szchuen, in consequence of the fresh outbreak of the Mon- 
 gols in the north. This task was intrusted to Fuyuta, who 
 at the head of an army of 100,000 men, divided into two 
 corps, invaded Yunnan. The prince of that state offered 
 the utmost resistance he could, but in the one great battle 
 of the war his army, lighting bravely, was overthrown, and 
 he was compelled to abandon his capital. The conquest of 
 Yunnan completed the pacification of the empire, and the 
 authority of Hongwou was unchallenged from the borders 
 of Burma to the Great Wall and the Corean frontier. The 
 population of the empire thus restored did not much exceed 
 sixty millions. The last ten years of the reign of Hongwou 
 were passed in tranquillity, marred by only one unpleasant 
 incident, the mutiny of a portion of his army under an ambi- 
 tious general. The plot was discovered in good time, but it 
 is said that the emperor did not consider the exigencies of 
 the case to be met until he had executed twenty thousand 
 of the mutineers.
 
 THE MING DYNASTY 149 
 
 In 1398 Hongwou was attacked with the illness which 
 ended his life. He was then in his seventy-first year, and 
 had reigned more than thirty years since his proclamation 
 of the Ming dynasty at Nankin. The Emperor Keen Lung, 
 in his history of the Mings, states that Hongwou possessed 
 most of the virtues and few of the vices of mankind. He 
 was brave, patient under suffering, far-seeing, studious of 
 his people's welfare, and generous and forbearing toward his 
 enemies. It is not surprising that he succeeded in establish- 
 ing the Ming dynasty on a firm and popular basis, and that 
 his family have be^n better beloved in China than any dy- 
 nasty with the possible exception of the Hans. In his will, 
 which is a remarkable document, he recites the principal 
 events of his reign, how he had "pacified the empire and 
 restored its ancient splendor. " With the view of providing 
 for the stability of his empire, he chose as his successor his 
 grandson Chuwen, because he had remarked in him much 
 prudence, a gentle disposition, good intelligence, and a readi- 
 ness to accept advice. He also selected him because he was 
 the eldest son of his eldest son, and as his other sons might 
 be disposed to dispute their nephew's authority he ordered 
 them to remain at their posts, and not to come to the capital 
 on his death. They were also enjoined to show the new 
 emperor all the respect and docility owed by subjects to their 
 sovereign. Through these timely precautions Chuwen, who 
 was only sixteen years of age, was proclaimed emperor 
 without any opposition, and took the title of Kien Wenti. 
 
 Hongwou had rightly divined that his sons might prove 
 a thorn in the side of his successor, and his policy of employ- 
 ing them in posts at a distance from the capital was only 
 half successful in attaining its object. If it kept them at a 
 distance it also strengthened their feeling of independence, 
 and enabled them to collect their forces without attracting 
 much attention. Wenti, as it is most convenient to call the 
 new emperor, felt obliged to send formal invitations to his 
 uncles to attend the obsequies of their father. Most of them 
 had the tact to perceive that the invitation was dictated by
 
 150 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 a regard for decency, and not by a wish that it should be 
 accepted, and gave the simplest excuse for not attending the 
 funeral. But Ty, Prince of Yen, the most powerful and 
 ambitious of them all, declared that he accepted the em- 
 peror's invitation. This decision raised quite a flutter of 
 excitement, almost amounting to consternation, at Nankin, 
 where the Prince of Yen was regarded as a bitter and vin- 
 dictive enemy. The only way Wenti saw out of this dilem- 
 ma was to send his uncle a special intimation that his pres- 
 ence at the capital would not be desirable. Before he had 
 been many weeks on the throne Wenti was thus brought into 
 open conflict with the most powerful and ambitious of all his 
 relatives. He resolved, under the advice of his ministers, to 
 treat all his uncles as his enemies, and he sent his officers 
 with armies at their back to depose them, and bring them as 
 prisoners to his court. Five of his uncles were thus sum- 
 marily dealt with, one committed suicide, and the other four 
 were degraded to the rank of the people. But the Prince 
 of Yen was too formidable to be tackled in this fashion. 
 Taking warning from the fate of his brothers, he collected 
 all the troops he could, prepared to defend his position against 
 the emperor, and issued a proclamation stating that it was 
 lawful for subjects to revolt for the purpose of removing the 
 pernicious advisers of the sovereign. The last was, he an- 
 nounced, the cause of his taking up arms, and he disclaimed 
 any motive of ambitious turbulence for raising his standard. 
 He said, "I am endeavoring to avert the ruin of my family, 
 and to maintain the emperor on a throne which is placed in 
 jeopardy by the acts of traitors. My cause ought, therefore, 
 to be that of all those who keep the blood of the great Hong- 
 wou, now falsely aspersed, in affectionate remembrance." 
 A large number of the inhabitants of the northern provinces 
 joined his side, and proclaimed him as "The Prince. " Wenti 
 had recourse to arms to bring his uncle back to his allegiance, 
 and a civil war began, which was carried on, with excep- 
 tional bitterness, during five years. The resources of the 
 emperor, in men and money, were the superior, but he did
 
 THE MING DYNASTY 151 
 
 not seem able to turn them to good account; and the prince's 
 troops were generally victorious, and his power gradually 
 increased. In the year 1401 both sides concentrated all their 
 strength for deciding the contest by a single trial of arms. 
 The two armies numbered several hundred thousand men, 
 and it is stated that the imperial force alone mustered 600,- 
 000 strong. The battle — which was fought at Techow in 
 Shantung — considering the numbers engaged, it is not sur- 
 prising to learn, lasted several days, and its fortune alter- 
 nated from one side to the other. At last victory declared 
 for the prince, and the imperial army was driven in rout 
 from the field with the loss of 100,000 men. 
 
 After this great victory the further progress of the prince 
 was arrested by a capable general named Chinyong, who 
 succeeded in gaining one great victory. If Wenti had known 
 how to profit by this success he might have turned the course 
 of the struggle permanently in his own favor. But instead 
 of profiting by his good fortune, Wenti, believing that all 
 danger from the prince was at an end, resumed his old 
 practices, and reinstated two of the most obnoxious of his 
 ministers, whom he had disgraced in a fit of apprehension. 
 Undoubtedly this step raised against him a fresh storm 
 of unpopularity, and at the same time brought many sup- 
 porters to his uncle, who, even after the serious disaster 
 described, found himself stronger than he had been before. 
 The struggle must have shown little signs of a decisive issue, 
 for in 1402 the prince made a voluntary offer of peace, with 
 a view to putting an end to all strife and of giving the em- 
 pire peace; but Wenti could not make up his mind to forgive 
 him. The success of his generals in the earlier part of the 
 struggle seemed to warrant the belief that there was no 
 reason in prudence for coming to terms with his rebellious 
 uncle, and that he would succeed in establishing his indispu- 
 table supremacy. The prince seemed reduced to such straits 
 that he had to give his army the option of retreat. Address- 
 ing his soldiers he said: "I know how to advance, but not to 
 retreat' ' ; but his army decided to return to their homes in
 
 152 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the north, when the extraordinary and unexpected retreat 
 of the greater part of the army of "Wenti revived their 
 courage and induced them to follow their leader through 
 one more encounter. Like Frederick the Great, the Prince 
 of Yen was never greater than in defeat. He surprised the 
 lately victorious army of "Wenti, smashed it in pieces, and 
 captured Tingan, the emperor's best general. The occupa- 
 tion of Nankin and the abdication of Wenti followed this 
 victory in rapid succession. Afraid to trust himself to the 
 mercy of his relative, he fled, disguised as a priest, to Yun- 
 nan, where he passed his life ignominiously for forty years, 
 and his identity was only discovered after that lapse of time 
 by his publishing, in his new character of a Buddhist priest, 
 a poem reciting and lamenting the misfortunes of Wenti. 
 Then he was removed to Pekin, where he died in honorable 
 confinement. As a priest he seems to have been more fort- 
 unate than as a ruler, and history contains no more striking 
 example of happiness being found in a private station when 
 unattainable on a throne. 
 
 After some hesitation the Prince of Yen allowed himself 
 to be proclaimed emperor, and as such he is best known as 
 Yonglo, a name signifying "Eternal Joy." Considering his 
 many declarations that his only ambition was to reform and 
 not to destroy the administration of his nephew, his first act 
 obliterating the reign of Wenti from the records and consti- 
 tuting himself the immediate successor of Hongwou was not 
 calculated to support his alleged indifference to power. He 
 was scarcely seated on the throne before he was involved in 
 serious troubles on both his northern and his southern fron- 
 tiers. In Mongolia he attempted to assert a formal supremacy 
 over the khans through the person of an adventurer named 
 Kulitchi, but the agent was unable to fulfill his promises, and 
 met with a speedy overthrow. In Tonquin an ambitious 
 minister named Likimao deposed his master and established 
 himself as ruler in his place. The emperor sent an army to 
 bring him to his senses, and it met with such rapid success 
 that the Chinese were encouraged to annex Tonquin and
 
 THE MING DYNASTY 153 
 
 convert it into a province of the empire. When Yonglo's 
 plans failed on the steppe he was drawn into a struggle with 
 the Mongols, which necessitated annual expeditions until he 
 died. During the last of these he advanced as far as the 
 Kerulon, and on his return march he died in his camp at 
 the age of sixty-five. Although he bore arms so long against 
 the head of the state there is no doubt that he greatly con- 
 solidated the power of the Mings, which he extended on one 
 side to the Amour and on the other to the Songcoi. It was 
 during his reign that Tamerlane contemplated the reconquest 
 of China, and perhaps it was well for Yonglo that that great 
 commander died when he had traversed only a few stages of 
 his march to the Great Wall. One of his sons succeeded 
 Yonglo as emperor, but he only reigned under the style of 
 Gintsong for a few months. 
 
 Then Suentsong, the son of Gintsong, occupied the throne, 
 and during his reign a vital question affecting the constitu- 
 tion of the civil service, and through it the whole adminis- 
 tration of the country, was brought forward and fortunately 
 settled without recourse to blows, as was at one time feared 
 would be the case. Before his reign the public examinations 
 had been open to candidates from all parts of the empire, and 
 it had become noticeable that all the honors were being 
 carried off by students from the southern provinces, who 
 were of quicker intelligence than those of the north. It 
 seemed as if in the course of a short time all the posts would 
 be held by them, and that the natives of the provinces north 
 of the Hoangho would be gradually driven out of the service. 
 Naturally this marked tendency led to much agitation in the 
 north, and a very bitter feeling was spreading when Suen- 
 tsong and his minister took up the matter and proceeded to 
 apply a sound practical remedy. After a commission of 
 inquiry had certified to the reality of the evil, Suentsong 
 decreed that all competitors for library honors should be 
 restricted to their native districts, and that for the purpose 
 of the competitive examinations China should be divided into 
 three separate divisions, one for the north, another for the
 
 154 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 center, and the third for the south. The firmness shown by 
 the Emperor Suentsong in this matter was equally conspicu- 
 ous in his dealings with an uncle, who showed some inclina- 
 tion to revolt. He took the field in person, and before the 
 country was generally aware of the revolt, Suentsong was 
 conducting his relative to a state prison. The rest of Suen- 
 tsong' s reign was peaceful and prosperous, and he left the 
 crown to his son, Yngtsong, a child eight years old. 
 
 During his minority the governing authority was exer- 
 cised by his grandmother, the Empress Changchi, the mother 
 of the Emperor Suentsong. At first it seemed as if there 
 would be a struggle for power between her and the eunuch 
 Wangchin, who had gained the affections of the young 
 emperor; but after she had denounced him before the court 
 and called for his execution, from which fate he was only 
 rescued by the tears and supplications of the young sover- 
 eign, the feud was composed by Wangchin gaining such an 
 ascendency over the empress that she made him her associate 
 in the regency. Unfortunately Wangchin did not prove a 
 wise or able administrator. He thought more of the sweets 
 of ofl&ce than of the duties of his lofty station. He appointed 
 his relations and creatures to the highest civil and military 
 posts without regard to their qualifications or ability. To 
 his arrogance was directly due the commencement of a dis- 
 astrous war with Yesien, the most powerful of the Mongol 
 chiefs of the day. When that prince sent the usual presents 
 to the Chinese capital, and made the customary request for 
 a Chinese princess as wife, Wangchin appropriated the gifts 
 for himself and sent back a haughty refusal to Yesien 's pe- 
 tition, although it was both customary and rarely refused. 
 Such a reception was tantamount to a declaration of war, 
 and Yesien, who had already been tempted by the apparent 
 weakness of the Chinese frontier to resume the raids which 
 were so popular with tl^e nomadic tribes of the desert, gath- 
 ered his fighting men together and invaded China. Alarmed 
 by the storm he had raised, Wangchin still endeavored to 
 meet it, and summoning all the garrisons in the north to his
 
 THE MING DYNASTY 155 
 
 aid, he placed himself at the head of an army computed to 
 number half a million of men. In the hope of inspiring his 
 force with confidence he took the boy-emperor, Yngtsong, 
 ■with him, but his own incompetence nullified the value of 
 numbers, and rendered the presence of the emperor the cause 
 of additional ignominy instead of the inspiration of invincible 
 confidence. The vast and unwieldy Chinese army took up 
 a false position at a place named Toumon, and it is aflfirmed 
 that the position was so bad that Yesien feared that it must 
 cover a ruse. He accordingly sent some of his officers to 
 propose an armistice, but really to inspect the Chinese lines. 
 They returned to say that there was no concealment, and 
 that if an attack were made at once the Chinese army lay at 
 his mercy. Yesien delayed not a moment in delivering his 
 attack, and it was completely successful. The very numbers 
 of the Chinese, in a confined position, added to their discom- 
 fiture, and after a few hours' fighting the battle became a 
 massacre and a rout. Wangchin, the cause of all this ruin, 
 was killed by Fanchong, the commander of the imperial 
 guards, and the youthful ruler, Yngtsong, was taken pris- 
 oner. There has rarely been a more disastrous day in the 
 long annals of the Chinese empire than the rout at Toumon. 
 Then Yesien returned to his camp on the Toula, taking 
 his prisoner with him, and announcing that he would only 
 restore him for a ransom of 100 taels of gold, 200 taels of 
 silver, and 200 pieces of the finest silk. For some unknown 
 reason the Empress Changchi did not feel disposed to pay 
 this comparatively low ransom, and instead of reclaiming 
 Yngtsong from his conqueror she placed his brother, Kingti, 
 on the throne. The struggle with the Mongols under Yesien 
 continued, but his attention was distracted from China by 
 his desire to become the great Khan of the Mongols, a title 
 still held by his brother-in-law, Thotho Timour, of the House 
 of Genghis. Yesien, suddenly releasing of his own accord 
 Yngtsong — who returned to Pekin — hastened to the Keru- 
 lon country, where he overthrew and assassinated Thoiho 
 Timour, and was in turn himself slain by another chieftain.
 
 156 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 While the Mongol was thus pursuing his own ambition, and 
 reaching the violent death which forms so common a feature 
 in the history of his family, the unfortunate Yngtsong re- 
 turned to China, where, on the refusal of his brother Kingti 
 to resign the throne, he sank quietly into private life. Kingti 
 died seven years after his brother's return, and then, failing 
 a better or nearer prince, Yngtsong was brought from his 
 confinement and restored to the throne. He reigned eight 
 years after his restoration, but he never possessed any real 
 power, his authority being wielded by unscrupulous minis- 
 ters, who stained his reign by the execution of Yukien, the 
 most honest and capable general of the period. If his reign 
 was not remarkable for political or military vigor, some use- 
 ful reforms appear to have been instituted. Among othera 
 may be named the formation of state farms on waste or con- 
 fiscated lands, the establishment of military schools for teach- 
 ing archery and horsemanship, and the completion of some 
 useful and elaborate educational works, of which a geography 
 of China, in ninety volumes, is the most famous. 
 
 Yngtsong died in the year 1465, and was succeeded by 
 his son, Hientsong, who began his reign with acts of filial 
 devotion that attracted the sympathy of his subjects. He 
 also rendered posthumous honors to the ill-used general, 
 Yukien, and established his fame as a national benefactor. 
 During the twenty-eight years that he occupied the throne 
 he was engaged in a number of petty wars, none of which 
 requires specific mention. The only unpopular measure as- 
 sociated with his name was the creation of a Grand Council 
 of Eunuchs, to which was referred all questions of capital 
 punishment, and this body soon acquired a power which 
 made it resemble the tyrannical and irresponsible British 
 Star Chamber. After five years this institution became so 
 unpopular and was so deeply execrated by the nation that 
 Hientsong, however reluctantly, had to abolish his own 
 creation, and acquiesce in the execution of some of its 
 most active members. 
 
 During Hientsong' s reign a systematic attempt was
 
 THE MING DYNASTY 157 
 
 made to work the gold mines reputed to exist in Central 
 China, but although half a million men were employed 
 upon them it is stated that the find did not exceed thirty 
 ounces. More useful work was accomplished in the build- 
 ing of a canal from Pekin to the Peiho, which thus enabled 
 grain junks to reach the northern capital by the Euho and 
 Shaho canals from the Yangtsekiang. Another useful pub- 
 lic work was the repairing of the Great Wall, effected along 
 a considerable portion of its extent, by the efforts of 50,000 
 soldiers, which gave the Chinese a sense of increased secu- 
 rity. In connection with this measure of defense, it may 
 be stated that the Chinese advanced into Central Asia and 
 occupied the town of Hami, which then and since has 
 served them as a useful watch-tower in the direction of the 
 west. The death of Hientsong occurred in 1487, at a mo- 
 ment when the success and prosperity of the country under 
 the Mings may be described as having reached its height. 
 
 During the reign of his son and successor, Hiaotsong, 
 matters progressed peacefully, for, although there was some 
 ■fighting for the possession of Hami, which was coveted by 
 several of the desert chiefs, but which remained during the 
 whole of this reign subject to China, the empire was not 
 involved in any great war. An insurrection of the black 
 aborigines of the island of Hainan was put down without 
 any very serious difficulty. These events do not throw any 
 very clear light on the character and personality of Hiao- 
 tsong, who died in 1505 at the early age of thirty-six; but 
 his care for his people, and his desire to alleviate the mis- 
 fortunes that might befall his subjects, was shown by his 
 ordering every district composed of ten villages to send in 
 annually to a State granary a specified quantity of grain, 
 until 100, 000 bushels had been stored in every such build- 
 ing throughout the country. The idea was an excellent one; 
 but it is to be feared that a large portion of this grain was 
 diverted to the use of the peculating officials, whence arose 
 the phrase, ' ' The emperor is full of pity, but the Court of 
 Finance is like the never- dymg worm which devours the
 
 158 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 richest crops. ' ' To Hiaotsong succeeded his son, Woutsong, 
 during whose reign many misfortunes fell upon the land. 
 The emperor's uncles had designs on his authority, but these 
 fell through and came to naught, rather through Wou- 
 tsong' s good fortune than the excellence of his arrange- 
 ments. In Szchuen a peasant war threatened to assume 
 the dimensions of a rebellion, and in Pechihli bands of 
 mounted robbers, or Hiangmas, raided the open country. 
 He succeeded in suppressing these revolts, but his indiffer- 
 ence to the disturbed state of his realm was shown by his 
 passing most of his time in hunting expeditions beyond the 
 Great Wall. His successors were to reap the result of this 
 neglect of business for the pursuit of pleasure; and when he 
 died in 1519, without leaving an heir, the outlook was be- 
 ginning to look serious for the Ming dynasty. One event, 
 and perhaps the most important of Woutsong' s reign, calls 
 for special mention, and that is the arrival at Canton of the 
 first native of Europe to reach China by sea. Of course it 
 will be recollected that Marco Polo and others reached the 
 Mongol court by land, although the Venetian sailed from 
 China on his embassy to southern India. In 1511, Kaphael 
 Perestralo sailed from Malacca to China, and in 1517 the 
 Portuguese officer, Dom Fernand Perez d'Andrade, arrived 
 in the Canton Hiver with a squadron, and was favorably re- 
 ceived by the mandarins. D'Andrade visited Pekin, where 
 he resided for some time as embassador. The commence- 
 ment of intercourse between Europeans and China was thus 
 effected most auspiciously; and it might have continued so 
 but that a second Portuguese fleet appeared in Chinese 
 waters, and committed there numerous outrages and acts 
 of piracy. Upon this, D'Andrade was arrested by order of 
 Woutsong, and, after undergoing imprisonment, was exe- 
 cuted by his successor in 1523. It was a bad beginning for 
 a connection which, after nearly four hundred years, is 
 neither as stable nor as general as the strivers after per- 
 fection could desire. 
 
 The death of Woutsong without children, or any recog-
 
 THE MING DYNASTY 159 
 
 nized heir, threatened to involve the realm in serious dan- 
 gers ; but the occasion was so critical that the members of 
 the Ming family braced themselves to it, and under the aus- 
 pices of the Empress Changchi, the widow of the late ruler, 
 a secret council was held, when the grandson of the Emperor 
 Hientsong, a youth of fourteen, was placed on the throne un- 
 der the name of Chitsong. It is said that his mother gave 
 him good advice on being raised from a private station to 
 the lofty eminence of emperor, and that she told him that he 
 was about to accept a heavy burden ; but experience showed 
 that he was unequal to it. Still, his shortcomings were 
 preferable to a disputed succession. The earlier years of 
 his reign were marked by some successes over the Tartars, 
 and he received tribute from chiefs who had never paid it 
 before. But Chitsong had little taste for the serious work 
 of administration. He showed himself superstitious in mat- 
 ters of religion, and he cultivated poetry, and may even 
 have persuaded himself that he was a poet. But he did 
 not pay any heed to the advice of those among his ministers 
 who urged him to take a serious view of his position, and to 
 act in a manner worthy of his dignity. It is clear that his 
 influence on the lot of his people, and even on the course of 
 his country's history, was small, and such reigns as his in- 
 spire the regret expressed at there being no history of the 
 Chinese people; but such a history is impossible. 
 
 It might be more instructive to trace the growth of 
 thought among the masses, or to indicate the progress of 
 civil and political freedom; yet, not only do the materials 
 not exist for such a task, but those we possess all tend to 
 show that there has been no growth to describe, no progress 
 to be indicated, during these comparatively recent centuries. 
 It is the peculiar and distinguishing characteristic of Chi- 
 nese history that the people and their institutions have re- 
 mained practically unchanged and the same from a very 
 early period. Even the introduction of a foreign element 
 has not tended to disturb the established order of things. 
 The supreme ruler possesses the same attributes and dis-
 
 160 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 charges the same functions; the governing classes are 
 chosen in the same manner; the people are bound in the 
 same state of servitude, and enjoy the same practical lib- 
 erty: all is now as it was. Neither under the Tangs nor 
 the Sungs, under the Yuens nor the Mings, was there any 
 change m national character or in political institutions to be 
 noted or chronicled. The history of the empire has always 
 been the fortunes of the dynasty, which has depended, in 
 the first place, on the passive content of the subjects, and, 
 in the second, on the success or failure of its external and 
 internal wars. This condition of things may be disappoint- 
 ing to those who jDride themselves on tracing the origin of a 
 constitution and the growth of civil rights, and also would 
 have a history of China a history of the Chinese people; 
 although the fact is undoubted that there is no history of 
 the Chinese people apart from that of their country to be 
 recorded. The national institutions and character were 
 formed, and had attained in all essentials their present 
 state, more than two thousand years ago, or before the de- 
 struction of all trustworthy materials for the task by the 
 burning of the ancient literature and chronicles of China. 
 Without them we must fain content ourselves with the his- 
 tory of the country and the empire. 
 
 Chitsong was engaged in three serious operations beyond 
 his frontier, one with a Tartar chief named Yenta, another 
 with the Japanese, and the third in Cochin China. Yenta 
 was of Mongol extraction, and enjoyed supreme ])ower on 
 the borders of Shansi. His brother was chief of the Ordus 
 tribe, which dwells within the Chinese frontier. Changtu, 
 the old residence of Kublai, was one of his camps, and it 
 was said that he could bring 100,000 horsemen into the field. 
 The success of his raids carried alarm through the province 
 of Shansi, and during one of them he laid siege to the capi- 
 tal, Taiyuen. Then the emperor placed a reward on his 
 head and offered an official post to the person who would rid 
 him of his enemy by assassination. The offer failed to ])ring 
 forward either a murderer or a patriot, and Yenta' s liostil-
 
 THE MING DYNASTY 161 
 
 ity was increased by the personal nature of this attack, and 
 perhaps by the apprehension of a sinister fate. He invaded 
 China on a larger scale than ever, and carried his ravages 
 to the southern extremity of Shansi, and returned laden 
 with the spoil of forty districts, and bearing with him 
 200,000 prisoners to a northern captivity. After this suc- 
 cess Yenta seems to have rested on his laurels, although. 
 he by no means gave up his raids, which, however, assumed 
 more and more a local character. The Chinese annalists 
 state that never was the frontier more disturbed, and even 
 the establishment of horse fairs for the benefit of the Mon- 
 gols failed to keep them quiet. In Cochin China the 
 emperor gained some gratifying if not very important 
 successes, and asserted his right as suzerain over several 
 disobedient princes. But a more serious and less satisfac- 
 tory question had to be settled on the side of Japan. 
 
 The Japanese had never forgiven the formidable and 
 unprovoked invasion of their country by Kublai Khan. 
 The Japanese are by nature a military nation, and the 
 Chinese writers themselves describe them as "intrepid, 
 inured to fatigue, despising life, and knowing well how 
 to face death; although inferior in number a hundred of 
 them would blush to flee before a thousand foreigners, and 
 if they did they would not dare to return to their country. 
 Sentiments such as these, which are instilled into them from 
 their earliest childhood, render them terrible in battle." 
 Emboldened by their success over the formidable Mongols, 
 the Japanese treated the Chinese with contempt, and fitted 
 out piratical expeditions from time to time with the object 
 of preying on. the commerce and coasting towns of China. 
 To guard against the descents of these enterprising islanders 
 the Chinese had erected towers of defense along the coast, 
 and had called out a militia which was more or less ineffi- 
 cient. On the main they did not so much as attempt to 
 make a stand against their neighbors, whose war junks 
 exercised undisputed authority on the Eastern Sea. While 
 this strife continued, a trade also sprang up between the two
 
 162 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 peoples, who share in an equal degree the commercial in- 
 stinct; but as the Chinese government only admitted Japa- 
 nese goods when brought by the embassador, who was sent 
 every ten years from Japan, this trade could only be carried 
 on by smuggling. A regular system was adopted to secure 
 the greatest success and profit. The Japanese landed their 
 goods on some island off the coast, whence the Chinese re- 
 moved them at a safe and convenient moment to the main- 
 land. The average value of the cargo of one of the small 
 junks which carried on this trade is said to have been 
 $20,000, so that it may be inferred that the profits were 
 considerable. But the national antipathies would not be 
 repressed by the profitable character of this trade, and the 
 refusal of a Chinese merchant to give a Japanese the goods 
 for which he had paid lit the embers of a war which went 
 on for half a century, and which materially weakened the 
 Ming power. During the last years of Chitsong's long 
 reign of forty-five years this trouble showed signs of get- 
 ting worse, although the Japanese confined their efforts to 
 irregular and unexpected attacks on places on the coast, 
 and did not attempt to wage a regular war. In the midst 
 of these troubles, and when it was hoped that the exhorta- 
 tion of his ministers would produce some effect, Chitsong 
 died, leaving behind him a will or public proclamation to 
 be issued after his death, and which reads like a long con- 
 fession of fault. Mea culpa, exclaimed this Eastern ruler 
 at the misfortunes of his people and the calamities of his 
 realm, but he could not propound a remedy for them. 
 
 His third son succeeded him as the Emperor Moutsong, 
 and the character and capacity of this prince gave promise 
 that his reign would be satisfactory if not glorious. Unfort- 
 unately for his family, and perhaps for his country, the 
 public expectations were dispelled in his case by an early 
 death. The six years during which he reigned were ren- 
 dered remarkable by the conclusion of a stable peace with 
 the Tartar Yenta, who accepted the title of a Prince of the 
 Empire. Moutsong when he found that he was dying grew
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE MINGS 163 
 
 apprehensive lest the youth of his son might stir up dis- 
 sension and provoke that internal strife which had so often 
 proved the bane of the empire and involved the wreck of 
 many of its dynasties. He exhorted his ministers to stand 
 by his son who was only a boy, to give him the best advice 
 in their power, and to render him worthy of the throne. 
 That the apprehensions of Moutsong were not without rea- 
 son was clearly shown by the mishaps and calamities which 
 occurred during the long reign of his son and successor 
 Wanleh. With the death of Moutsong the period ends 
 when it was possible to state that the majesty of the 
 Mings remained undimmed, and that this truly national 
 dynasty wielded with power and full authority the impe- 
 rial mandate. When they had driven out the Mongol, the 
 Mings seem to have settled down into an ordinary and in- 
 tensely national line of rulers. The successors of Hongwou 
 did nothing great or noteworthy, but the Chinese acquiesced 
 in their rule, and even showed that they possessed for it a 
 special regard and affection. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE MINGS 
 
 The reign of Wanleh covers the long and important 
 epoch from 1573 to 1620, during which period occurred 
 some very remarkable events in the history of the coun- 
 try, including the first movements of the Manchus with a 
 view to the conquest of the empire. The young prince was 
 only six when he was placed on the throne, but he soon 
 showed that he had been well-trained to play the part of 
 ruler. The best indication of the prosperity of the realm is 
 furnished by the revenue, which steadily increased until it 
 reached the great total, excluding the grain receipts, of sev- 
 enty-five millions of our money. But a large revenue be-
 
 164: HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 comes of diminished value unless it is associated with sound 
 finance. The public expenditure showed a steady increase; 
 the emperor and his advisers were incapable of checking 
 the outlay, and extravagance, combined with improvidence, 
 soon depleted the exchequer. Internal troubles occurred to 
 further embarrass the executive, and the resources of the 
 state were severely strained in coping with more than one 
 serious rebellion, among which the most formidable was the 
 mutiny of a mercenary force under the command of a Turk 
 cfScer named Popai, who imagined that he was unjustly 
 treated, and that the time was favorable to found an ad- 
 ministration of his own. His early successes encouraged 
 him to believe that he would sacceed in his object; but 
 when he found that all the disposable forces of the empire 
 were sent against him, he abandoned the field, and shut 
 himself up in the fortress at Ninghia, where he hoped to hold 
 out indefinitely. For many months he succeeded in baffling 
 the attacks of Wanleh's general, and the siege might even 
 have had to be raised if the latter had not conceived the 
 idea of diverting the course of the river Hoangho, so that it 
 might bear upon the walls of the fortress. Popai was un- 
 able to resist this form of attack, and when the Chinese 
 stormers made their way through the breach thus caused, 
 he attempted to commit suicide by setting fire to his resi- 
 dence. This satisfaction was denied him, for a Chinese 
 officer dragged him from the flames, slew him, and sent 
 his head to the general Li Jusong, who conducted the 
 siege, and of whom we shall hear a great deal more. 
 
 The gratification caused by the overthrow of Popai had 
 scarcely abated when the attention of the Chinese govern- 
 ment was drawn away from domestic enemies to a foreign 
 assailant who threatened the most serious danger to China. 
 Reference was made in the last chapter to the relations be- 
 tween the Chinese and the Japanese, and to the aggressions 
 of the latter, increased, no doubt, by Chinese chicane and 
 their own naval superiority and confidence. But nothing 
 Berious might have come out of these unneighborly relations
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE MINGS 105 
 
 if they had not furnished an ambitious ruler with the oppor- 
 tunity of embarking on an enterprise which promised to in- 
 crease his empire and his glory. The old Japanese ruling 
 family was descended, as already described, from a Chinese 
 exile; but the hero of the sixteenth century could claim no 
 relationship with the royal house, and owed none of his suc- 
 cess to the accident of a noble birth. Fashiba, called by 
 some English writers Hideyoshi; by the Chinese Pingsiuki; 
 and by the Japanese, on his elevation to the dignity of 
 Tycoon, Taiko Sama, was originally a slave ; and it is said 
 that he first attracted attention by refusing to make the pre- 
 scribed obeisance to one of the daimios or lords. He was on 
 the point of receiving condign punishment, when he pleaded 
 his case with such ingenuity and courage that the daimio 
 not only forgave him his offense, but gave him a post in 
 his service. Having thus obtained honorable employment, 
 Fashiba devoted all his energy and capacity to promoting 
 the interests of his new master, knowing well that his posi- 
 tion and opportunities must increase equally with them. In 
 a short time he made his lord the most powerful daimio in 
 the land, and on his death he stepped, naturally enough, 
 into the position and power of his chief. How long he 
 would have maintained himself thus in ordinary times may 
 be matter of opinion, but he resolved to give stability to his 
 position and a greater luster to his name by undertaking an 
 enterprise which should be popular with the people and 
 profitable to the state. The Japanese had only attempted 
 raids on the coast, and they had never thought of estab- 
 lishing themselves on the mainland. But Fashiba proposed 
 the conquest of China, and he hoped to effect his purpose 
 through the instrumentality of Corea. With this view he 
 wrote the king of that country the following letter: "I will 
 assemble a mighty host, and, invading the country of the 
 Great Ming, I will fill with hoarfrost from my sword the 
 whole sky over the 400 provinces. Should I carry out this 
 purpose, I hope that Corea will be my vanguard. Let her 
 not fail to do so, for my friendship to your honorable coun-
 
 166 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 try depends solely on your conduct when I lead my army 
 against China." 
 
 Fashiba began with an act of aggression at Corea's ex- 
 pense, by seizing the important harbor of Fushan. Having 
 thus secured a foothold on the mainland and a gateway into 
 the kingdom, Fashiba hastened to invade Corea at the head 
 of a large army, Tlie capital was sacked and the tombs of 
 Lipan's ancestors desecrated, while he himself fled to the 
 Chinese court to implore the assistance of Wanleh. An 
 army was hastily assembled and marched to arrest the 
 progress of the Japanese invader, who had by this reached 
 Pingyang, a town 400 miles north of Fushan. An action 
 was fought outside this town. The advantage rested with 
 the Japanese, who succeeded in destroying a Chinese regi- 
 ment. After this a lull ensued in the campaign, and both 
 sides brought up fresh forces. Fashiba came over from 
 Japan with further supplies and troops to assist his general, 
 Hmgchang, while, on the Chinese side, Li Jusong, the captor 
 of Ninghia, was placed at the head of the Chinese army. A 
 second battle was fought in the neighborhood of Pingyang, 
 and after some stubborn fighting the Japanese were driven, 
 out of that town. 
 
 The second campaign was opened by a brilliant feat on 
 the part of Li Jusong, who succeeded in surprising and de- 
 stroying the granaries and storehouses constructed by the 
 Japanese, near Seoul. The loss of their stores compelled 
 the Japanese to retire on Fushan, but they did so with such 
 boldness and confidence that the Chinese did not venture to 
 attack them. The ultimate result of the struggle was still 
 doubtful when the sudden death of Fashiba completely 
 altered the complexion of the situation. The Japanese 
 army then withdrew, taking with it a vast amount of 
 booty and the ears of 10,000 Coreans. The Chinese troops 
 also retired, leaving the Corean king at liberty to restore 
 his disputed authority, and his kingdom once more sank 
 into its primitive state of exclusion and semi- darkness. 
 
 For the first time m Chinese history the relations between
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE MINOS 167 
 
 the Middle Kingdom and Europeans became of importance 
 during the reign of Wanleh, whicli would alone give it a 
 special distinction. The Portuguese led the way for Euro- 
 pean enterprise in China, and it was very unfortunate that 
 they did so, for it was soon written of them that ' ' the Portu- 
 guese have no other design than to come under the name of 
 merchants to spy the country, that they may hereafter fall 
 upon it with fire and sword." As early as the year 1560 
 they had obtained from the local officials the right to found 
 a settlement and to erect sheds for their goods at a place 
 which is now known as Macao. In a few years it became of 
 so much importance that it was the annual resort of five or 
 six hundred Portuguese merchants ; and the Portuguese, by 
 paying a yearly rent of 500 taels, secured the practical mo- 
 nopoly of the trade of the Canton River, which was then and 
 long afterward the only vent for the external trade of China. 
 No doubt the Portuguese had to supplement this nominal 
 rent by judicious bribes to the leading mandarins. Next 
 after the Portuguese came the Spaniards, who, instead of 
 establishing themselves on the mainland, made their head- 
 quarters in a group of the Philippine Islands. 
 
 The promotion of European interests in China owed little 
 or nothing to the forbearance and moderation of either the 
 Spaniards or Portuguese. They tyrannized over the Chinese 
 subject to their sway, and they employed all their resources 
 in driving away other Europeans from what they chose to 
 consider their special commercial preserves. Thus the Dutch 
 were expelled from the south by the Portuguese and com- 
 pelled to take refuge in Formosa, while the English and 
 French did not make their appearance, except by occasional 
 visits, until a much later period, although it should be re- 
 corded that the English Captain Weddell was the first to 
 discover the mouth of the Canton River, and to make his 
 way up to that great city. 
 
 One of the principal troubles of the Emperor Wanleh 
 arose from his having no legitimate heir, and his ministers 
 impressed upon him, for many years, the disadvantage of
 
 168 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 this situation before lie would undertake to select one of his 
 children hj the inferior members of the harem as his suc- 
 cessor. And then he made what may be termed a divided 
 selection. He proclaimed his eldest son heir-apparent, and 
 declared the next brother to be in the direct order of succes- 
 sion, and conferred on him the title of Prince Fou Wang. 
 The latter was his real favorite, and, encouraged by his 
 father's preference, he formed a party to oust his elder 
 brother and to gain the heritage before it was due. The 
 intrigues in which he engaged long disturbed the court and 
 agitated the mind of the emperor. Supported by his mother, 
 Prince Fou "Wang threatened the position and even the life 
 of the heir-apparent. Prince Chu Changlo, but the plot was 
 discovered and Fou "Wang's rank would not have saved him 
 from the executioner if it had not been for the special inter- 
 cession of his proposed victim, Chu Changlo. In the midst 
 of these family troubles, as well as those of the state, the 
 Emperor Wanleh died, after a long reign, in 1620. The last 
 years of his life were rendered unhappy and miserable by the 
 reverses experienced at the hands of the new and formidable 
 opponent who had suddenly appeared upon the northern fron- 
 tier of the empire. 
 
 Some detailed account of the Manchu race and of the 
 progress of their arms before the death of Wanleh will form 
 a fitting prelude to the description of the long wars which 
 resulted in the conquest of China and in the placing of the 
 present ruling family on the Dragon Throne. 
 
 The first chief of the Manchu clan was a mythical per- 
 sonage named Aisin Gioro, who flourished in the middle of 
 the fourteenth century, while Hongwou, the founder of the 
 Mings, was employed in the task of driving out the Mongols. 
 Aisin Gioro is said to mean Golden Family Stem, and thus 
 the connection with the Kin dynasty finds recognition at an 
 early stage. His birth is described in mythical terms — it is 
 said that a magpie dropped a red fruit into the lap of a 
 maiden of the Niuche, who straightway ate it and conceived 
 a son. The skeptical have interpreted this as meaning that
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE MINGS 109 
 
 Aisin Gioro was a runaway Mongol, who was granted shelter 
 by the Ninche of Hootooala. At all events he became lord 
 of the valley, and five generations later, in the reign of 
 Wanleh, his descendant Huen was head of the Manchus. 
 His grandson, the great Noorhachu, was born in the year 
 1569, and his birth was attended by several miraculous cir- 
 cumstances. He is said "to have been a thirteen-months' 
 child, to have had the dragon face and the phenix eye, an 
 enormous chest, large ears, and a voice like the tone of the 
 largest bell." 
 
 A chief named Haida was the first to stir up the embers 
 of internecine strife among the ISTiuche clans. To gratify 
 his own ambition or to avenge some blood feuds, he obtained 
 the assistance of one of the principal Chinese ofiicers on the 
 Leaoutung borders, and thus overran the territory of his 
 neighbors. Encouraged by his first successes, Haida pro- 
 ceeded to attack the chief of Goolo, who was married to a 
 cousin of Noorhachu, and who at once appealed to Hootooala 
 for assistance. The whole Manchu clan marched to his res- 
 cue, and it was on this occasion that Koorhachu had his first 
 experience of war on a large scale. The Manchus presented 
 such a bold front that there is every reason to believe that 
 Haida and his Chinese allies would have failed to conquer 
 G oolo by force, but they resorted to fraud, which proved only 
 too successful. Haida succeeded in enticing the old chief 
 Huen and his son, the father of Noorhachu, into a confer- 
 ence, when he murdered them and many of their compan- 
 ions. The momentary success gained by this breach of faith 
 was heavily paid for by the incentive it gave Noorhachu to 
 exact revenge for the brutal and cowardly murder of his 
 father and grandfather. Haida constructed a fortified camp 
 at Toolun, but he did not feel secure there against the open 
 attacks of Noorhachxi or the private plots he formed to gain 
 possession of his person. Several times Haida fled from 
 Toolun to Chinese territory, where he hoped to enjoy greater 
 safety, until at last the Chinese became tired of giving him 
 shelter and protecting one who could not support his own 
 
 China — 8
 
 170 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 pretensions. Then, with strange inconstancy, they deliv- 
 ered him over into the hands of Noorhachu, who straight- 
 way killed him, thus carrying out the first portion of his 
 vow to avenge the massacre at Groolo. 
 
 Then Noorhachu turned all his attention and devoted all 
 his energy to the realization of the project which Haida had 
 conceived, the union of the Niuche clans ; but whereas Haida 
 had looked to Chinese support and patronage for the attain- 
 ment of his object, Noorhachu resolved to achieve success as 
 an enemy of China and by means of his own Manchu fol- 
 lowers. His first measure was to carefully select a site for 
 his capital on a plain well supplied with water, and then to 
 fortify it by surrounding it with three walls. He then drew 
 up simple regulations for the government of his people, and 
 military rules imposing a severe discipline on his small 
 army. The Chinese appear to have treated him with in- 
 difference, and they continued to pay him the sums of money 
 and the honorary gifts which had been made to Haida. 
 Several of the Niuche clans, won over by the success and 
 reputation of Noorhachu, voluntarily associated themselves 
 with him, and it was not until the year 1591 that the Manchu 
 chief committed his first act of open aggression by invading 
 the district of Yalookiang. That territory was soon overrun 
 and annexed; but it roused such a fear among the other 
 Niuche chiefs, lest their fate should be the same, that seven 
 of them combined, under Boojai, to overthrow the upstart 
 who aspired to play the part of a dictator. They brought 
 into the field a force of 30,000 men, including, besides their 
 own followers, a considerable contingent from the Mongols; 
 and as Noorhachu's army numbered only 4,000 men, it 
 seemed as if he must certainly be overwhelmed. But, small 
 as was his force, it enjoyed the incalculable advantage of 
 discipline; and seldom has the superiority of trained troops 
 over raw levies been more conspicuously illustrated than by 
 this encounter between warriors of the same race. This 
 battle was fought at Goolo Hill, and resulted in the decisive 
 victory of Noorhachu. Boojai and 4,000 of his men were
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE HillXGS 171 
 
 killed, a large number of his followers were taken prisoners 
 and enrolled in the ranks of the victor, and the spoil inchided 
 many suits of mail and arms of offense which improved the 
 state of Noorhachu's arsenal. Several of the districts which 
 had been subject to these confederated princes passed into 
 the hands of the conqueror, and he carried his authority- 
 northward up the Songari Eiver over tribes who had never 
 recognized any southern authority. These successes paved 
 the way to an attack on Yeho, the principality of Boojai, 
 which was reputed to be the most powerful of all the Niuche 
 states; and on this occasion it vindicated its reputation by 
 repelling the attack of Noorhachu. Its success was not en- 
 tirely due to its own strength, for the Chinese governor of 
 Leaoutung, roused at last to the danger from Noorhachu, sent 
 money and arms to assist the Yeho people in their defense. 
 The significance of this repulse was diminished by other 
 successes elsewhere, and Noorhachu devoted his main atten- 
 tion to disciplining the larger force he had acquired by his 
 later conquests, and by raising its efficiency to the high point 
 attained by the army with which he had gained his first 
 triumphs. He also meditated a more daring and important 
 enterprise than any struggle with his kinsfolk; for he came 
 to the conclusion that it was essential to destroy the Chinese 
 power in Leaoutung before he should undertake any further 
 enterprise in Manchuria. His army had now been raised to 
 an efliective strength of 40,000 men, and the Manchu bow- 
 man, with his formidable bow, and the Manchu man-at- 
 arms, in his cotton mail, proof to the arrow or spear, were 
 as formidable warriors as then existed in the world. Confi- 
 dent in his military power, and thinking, no doubt, that a 
 successful foreign enterprise was the best way to rally and 
 confirm the allegiance of his race, Noorhachu invaded 
 Leaoutung, and published a proclamation against the Chi- 
 nese, which became known as the Seven Hates. Instead of 
 forwarding this document to the Chinese Court he burned 
 it in the presence of his army, so that Heaven itself might 
 judge the justice of the cause between him and the Chinese.
 
 172 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 It was in tlie year 1618 tliat Noorliacliu invaded Leaou- 
 tung, and so surprised were tlie Chinese at his audacity that 
 they offered little or no resistance. The town of Fooshun was 
 captured and made the headquarters of the Mancliu prince. 
 From this place he sent a list of his requirements to the gov- 
 ernor of Leaoutung, and it is said that he offered, on the Chi- 
 nese complying with his terms, to withdraw and desist from 
 hostilities. But the Chinese did not appreciate the power of 
 this new enemy. They treated his grievances with indiffer- 
 ence and contempt, and they sent an army to drive him out 
 of Leaoutung. The Chinese troops soon had a taste of the 
 quality of the Manchu army. They were defeated in several 
 encounters, and the best Chinese troops fled before the im- 
 petuous charge of the Manchu cavalry. Noorhachu then 
 laid siege to the prefectural town of Tsingho, which he cap- 
 tured after a siege of some weeks, and where he massacred 
 nearly 20,000 of the garrison and townspeople. He would 
 have continued the campaign but that his followers de- 
 manded to be led back, stating that they feared for the 
 safety of their homes at the hands of Yeho, still hostile and 
 aggressive in their rear. The conquest of Leaoutung was 
 therefore discontinued for the i3urpose of closing accounts 
 with the last of the Niuche principalities; but enough had 
 been accomplished to whet the appetite of the Manchu leader 
 for more, and to show him how easy it was to vanquish the 
 Chinese. On his return to his capital, Hingking, he pre- 
 pared to invade Yeho, but his plans were undoubtedly de- 
 layed by the necessity of resting his troops and of allowing 
 many of them to return to their homes. This delay, no 
 doubt, induced the Chinese to make a supreme effort to 
 avert the overthrow of Yeho, who had proved so useful an 
 ally, and accordingly the governor of Leaoutung advanced 
 with 100,000 men into Manchuria. He sacrificed the ad- 
 vantage of superior numbers by dividing his army into four 
 divisions, with very inadequate means of inter-communica- 
 tion. Noorhachu could only bring 60,000 men into the field; 
 but, apart from their high training, they represented a com-
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE MINGS 173 
 
 pact body subject to the direction of Noorbachu alone. The 
 Manchu leader at once perceived the faulty disposition of 
 the Chinese army, and he resolved to attack and overwhelm 
 eacli corps in detail before it could receive aid from the oth- 
 ers. The strongest Chinese corps was that operating most 
 to the west, and marching from Fooshun on Hingking; and 
 Noorhachu perceived that if he could overthrow it the flank 
 of the rest of the Chinese army would be exposed, and its 
 line of retreat imperiled. The Chinese general in command 
 of this corps was impetuous and anxious to distinguish him- 
 self. His courage might on another occasion have helped 
 his country, but under the circumstances his very ardor 
 served the purpose of Noorhachu. Tousong, such was his 
 name, marched more rapidly than any of his comrades, and 
 reached the Hwunho — the Tiber of the Manchus — behind 
 which Noorhachu had, at a little distance, drawn up his 
 army. Without pausing to reconnoiter, or to discover with 
 what force he had to deal, Tousong threw liimself across the 
 river, and intrenched himself on Sarhoo Hill. His overcon- 
 fidence was so extreme and fatuous that he weakened his 
 army by sending a detachment to lay siege to the town of 
 Jiefan. The Manchus had, however, well provided for the 
 defense of that place, and while the Chinese detachment sent 
 against it was being destroyed, Noorhachu attacked Tousong 
 in his position on Sarhoo Hill with the whole of his ariny. 
 The Chinese were overwhelmed, Tousong was slain, and the 
 majority of those who escaped the fray perished in the waters 
 of the Hwunho, beneath the arrows and javelins of the pur- 
 suing Manchus. 
 
 Then Noorhachu hastened to attack the second of the 
 Chinese divisions under a capable officer named Malin, who 
 selected a strong position with great care, and wished to 
 stand on the defensive. His wings rested on two hills which 
 he fortified, and he strengthened his center in the interven- 
 ing valley with a triple line of wagons. H he had only re- 
 mained in this position he might have succeeded in keeping 
 Noorhachu at bay until he could have been joined by the two
 
 174: HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 remaining Chinese corps ; but the impetuosity of his troops, 
 or it may have been the artifice of the Manchu leader, drew 
 him from his intrenchments. At first the Chinese seemed 
 to have the best of the battle, bat in a short time victory 
 turned to the side of the Manchus, and Malin fled with the 
 relics of his force back to Chinese territory. After these two 
 successes Noorhachu proceeded to attack the third Chinese 
 corps under Liuyen, who had acquired a cheap reputation 
 by his success over the Miaotze. He had no better fortune 
 than any of his colleagues, and his signal defeat completed 
 the Manchu triumph over the Chinese army of invasion. 
 The defeat of Liuyen was effected by a stratagem as much 
 as by superior force. Noorhachu dressed some of his troops 
 in the Chinese uniforms he had captured, and sent them 
 among the Chinese, who received them as comrades until 
 they discovered their mistake in the crisis of the battle. 
 During this campaign it was computed that the total losses 
 of the Chinese amounted to 310 general officers and 45,000 
 private soldiers. Among other immediate results of this 
 success were the return of 20,000 Yeho troops to their homes 
 and the defection of 5,000 Coreans, who joined Noorhachu. 
 Like all great commanders, Noorhachu gave his enemies no 
 time to recover from their misfortunes. He pursued Malin 
 to Kaiyuen, which he captured, with so many prisoners that 
 it took three days to count them. He invaded Yeho, which 
 recognized his authority without a blow, and gave him an 
 additional 30,000 fighting men. All the Niuche clans thus 
 became united under his banner, and adopted the name of 
 Manchu. He had succeeded in the great object of his life, 
 the union of his race, and he had well avenged the death of 
 his father and grandfather; but his ambition was not satis- 
 fied with this success. It had rather grown with the widen- 
 ing horizon opened by the discomfiture of the Chinese, and 
 with the sense of military superiority. 
 
 Amid these national disasters the long reign of Wanleh 
 closed in the year 1620. That unhappy monarch lived long 
 enough to see the establishment on his northern borders of
 
 THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA 175 
 
 the power wliicli was to destroy liis dynasty. The very last 
 act of his reign was, whether by accident or good judgment, 
 the most calculated to prevent the Manchus overrunning the 
 State, and that was the selection of a capable general in 
 the person of Hiung Tingbi. With the death of Wanleh the 
 decadence of Ming power became clearly marked, and the 
 only question that remained was whether it could be arrested 
 before it resulted in absolute ruin. 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA 
 
 Tingbi, with the wrecks of the Chinese armies, succeeded 
 in doing more for the defense of his country than had been 
 accomplished by any of his predecessors with undiminished 
 resources. He built a chain of forts, he raised the garrison 
 of Leaoutung to 180,000 men, and he spared no effort to 
 place Leaouyang, the capital of that province, in a position 
 to stand a protracted siege. If his counsels had been fol- 
 lowed to the end, he might have succeeded in permanently 
 arresting the flood of Manchu conquest; but at the very 
 moment when his plans promised to give assured success, he 
 fell into disgrace at the capital, and his career was summa- 
 rily ended by the executioner. The greatest compliment to 
 his ability was that Noorhachu remained quiescent as long 
 as he was on the frontier, but as soon as he was removed he 
 at once resumed his aggression on Chinese soil. 
 
 Meanwhile, Wanleh had been succeeded on the Chinese 
 throne by his son, Chu Changlo, who took the name of 
 Kwangtsong. He was an amiable and well-meaning prince, 
 whose reign was unquestionably cut short by foul means. 
 There is little doubt that he was poisoned by the mother of 
 his half-brother, from a wish to secure the throne for her 
 son; but if so she never gained the object that inspired her 
 crime, for the princes of the family met in secret conclave.
 
 176 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 and selected Kwangtsong' s son, a youth of sixteen, as liis 
 successor. The choice did not prove fortunate, as this prince 
 became known as Tienki the Unhappy; whose reign wit- 
 nessed the culmination of Ming misfortunes. One of his 
 first acts was the removal of Tingbi from his command, 
 and this error of judgment, aggravated by the ingratitude 
 it implied to a faithful servant, fitly marked the commence- 
 ment of a reign of incompetence and misfortune. 
 
 In 1621 the Manchu war reopened with an attack on 
 Moukden or Fanyang, which jS'oorhachu had marked out 
 as his next object. The garrison was numerous, and might 
 have made a good defense, for the walls were strong; but the 
 commandant was brave to the degree of temerity, and, leav- 
 ing his fortress, marched out to meet the Manchus in the 
 open. The result was a decisive overthrow, and the victors 
 entered Moukden at the heels of the vanquished. The Chi- 
 nese still resisted, and a terrible slaughter ensued, but the 
 Manchus retained their conquest. At this juncture the Chi- 
 nese were offered the assistance of the Portuguese at Macao, 
 who sent a small body of 200 men, armed with arquebuses 
 and with several cannon, to Pekin; but after some hesita- 
 tion the Chinese, whether from pride or contempt of so small 
 a force, declined to avail themselves of their service, and 
 thus lost an auxiliary that might have turned the fortune of 
 the war in their favor. The Portuguese were sent back to 
 Macao, and, although the Chinese kept the cannon, and em- 
 ployed the Jesuit priests in casting others for them, nothing 
 came of an incident which might have exercised a lasting 
 influence not merely o^ the fortune of the war, but also on 
 the relations between the Chinese and Europeans. The Chi- 
 nese sent several armies to recover Moukden; but, although 
 they took these guns with them, they met with no success, 
 and Noorhachu made it the base of his plan of attack on 
 Leaouyang, the capital of the province. The defense of this 
 important town was intrusted to Yuen Yingtai, the court 
 favorite and incompetent successor of Tingbi. That officer, 
 unwarned by the past, and regardless of the experience of
 
 THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA 177 
 
 SO many of his predecessors, weakened himself and invited 
 defeat bj attempting to oppose the Manchus in the open. 
 He was defeated, losing some of his best soldiers, and com- 
 pelled to shut himself up in the town with a disheartened 
 garrison. The Manchus gained an entrance into the city. 
 Then a terrible encounter took place. The garrison was 
 massacred to a man, Yuen Yingtai, brave, if incapable, com- 
 mitted suicide, and those of the townspeople who wished to 
 save their lives had to shave their heads in token of sub- 
 jection. This is the first historical reference to a practice that 
 is now universal throughout China, and that has become 
 what may be called a national characteristic. The badge 
 of conquest has changed to a mark of national pride ; but it 
 is strange to find that the Chinese themselves and the most 
 patient inquirers among sinologues are unable to say what 
 was the origin of the pig-tail. They cannot tell us whether 
 shaving the head was the national custom of the Manchus, 
 or whether Noorhachu only conceived this happy idea of dis- 
 tinguishing those who surrendered to his power among the 
 countless millions of the long-haired people of China. All 
 that can be said of the origin of the pig-tail is that it was 
 first enforced as a badge of subjugation by the Manchus at 
 the siege of Leaouyang, and that thenceforward, until the 
 whole of China was conquered, it was made the one condi- 
 tion of immunity from massacre. 
 
 The capture of Leaouyang signified the surrender of the 
 remaining places in Leaoutung, which became a Manchu 
 possession, and Noorhachu, to celebrate his triumph, and 
 also to facilitate his plans for the further humiliation of the 
 Chinese, transferred his capital from Moukden to Leaouyang. 
 Misfortunes never come singly. In Szchuen a local chief had 
 raised a force of 30,000 men for service on the frontier in the 
 wars with the Manchus, and the viceroy of the province not 
 only declined to utilize their services, but dismissed them 
 without reward or even recognition of their loyalty. These 
 slighted and disbanded braves easily changed themselves 
 into brigands, and as the government would not have them
 
 IJTS HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 as supporters, they determined to make it feel their enmity. 
 Chetsong Ming, the chief who had raised them, placed him- 
 self at their head, and attracted a large number of the in- 
 habitants to his standard. The local garrisons were crushed, 
 the viceroy killed, and general disorder prevailed among the 
 people of what was the most fertile and prosperous province 
 of the empire. Chetsong attempted to set up an administra- 
 tion, but he does not seem to have possessed the capacity or 
 the knowledge to establish a regular government. While 
 he headed the rebellious movement, a woman named Tsin- 
 leang, the hereditary chieftainess of a small district, placed 
 herself at the head of the loyalists in the state, and, leading 
 them herself, succeeded in recovering the principal cities 
 and in driving Chetsong out of the province. She has been 
 not inappropriately called by one of the missionary historians 
 the Chinese Penthesilea. The success she met with in paci- 
 fying Szchuen after a two years' struggle was not attained 
 in other directions without a greater effort and at a still 
 heavier cost. In Kweichow and Yunnan a rebel named 
 Ganpangyen raised an insurrection on a large scale, and if 
 his power had not been broken by the long siege of a strong 
 fortress, obstinately defended by a valiant governor, there 
 is no telling to what success he might not have attained. 
 But his followers were disheartened by the delay in carrying 
 this place, and they abandoned him as soon as they found 
 that he could not command success. In Shantung another 
 rising occurred; but after two years' disturbance the rebel 
 leader was captured and executed. These internal disorders, 
 produced by the corruption and inertness of the officials as 
 much as by a prevalent sense of the embarrassment of the 
 Mings, distracted the attention of the central government 
 from Manchuria, and weakened its preparations against 
 Noorhachu. 
 
 For a time Noorhachu showed no disposition to cross the 
 River Leaou, and confined his attention to consolidating his 
 position in his new conquest. But it was clear that this lull 
 would not long continue, and the Chinese emperor, Tienki,
 
 THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA 179 
 
 endeavored to meet the coming storm by once more intrust- 
 ing the defense of the frontier to Tingbi. That general de- 
 vised a simple and what might have proved an efficacious 
 line of defense, but his colleague, with more powerful influ- 
 ence at court, would have none of it, and insisted on his 
 own plan being adopted. Noorhachu divined that the coun- 
 cils of the Chinese were divided, and that Tingbi was ham- 
 pered. He promptly took advantage of the divergence of 
 opinion, and, crossing the frontier, drove the Chinese behind 
 the Great Wall. Even that barrier would not have arrested 
 his progress but for the stubborn resistance offered by the 
 fortress of Ningyuen— a town about seventy miles north- 
 east of Shanhaikwan, once of great importance, but now, 
 for many years past, in ruins. When he reached that place 
 he found that Tingbi had fallen into disgrace and been ex- 
 ecuted, not for devising his own plan of campaign, bub for 
 animadverting on that of his colleague in satirical terms. 
 The Chinese had made every preparation for the resolute 
 defense of Ningyuen, and when Noorhachu sat down before 
 it, its resolute defender, Chungwan, defied him to do his 
 worst, although all the Chinese troops had been compelled to 
 retreat, and there was no hope of re -enforcement or rescue. 
 At first Noorhachu did not conduct the siege of Ningyuen 
 in person. It promised to be an affair of no great impor- 
 tance, and he intrusted it to his lieutenants, but he soon per- 
 ceived that Chungwan was a resolute soldier, and that the 
 possession of Ningyuen was essential to the realization of 
 his future plans. Therefore, he collected all his forces and 
 sat down before Ningyuen with the full determination to 
 capture it at all costs. But the garrison was resolute, its 
 commander capable, and on the walls were arranged the 
 cannon of European construction. Noorhachu led two as- 
 saults in person, both of which were repulsed, and it is said 
 that this result was mainly due to the volleys of the Euro- 
 pean artillery. At last, Noorhachu was compelled to with- 
 draw his troops, and although he obtained some successes in 
 other parts of the country, he was so chagrined at this re-
 
 180 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 pulse that he fell ill and died some months later at Moukden, 
 in September, 1626. 
 
 Noorhachu was succeeded by his fourth son, the fourth 
 Beira or Prince, known as Taitsong, who continued both his 
 work and policy. Taitsong was as determined to humiliate 
 the Mings as his father had been. He commenced his offen- 
 sive measures by an attack on Corea, which he speedily re- 
 duced to such a pass that it accepted his authority and trans- 
 ferred its allegiance from the Mings to the Manchus. This 
 was an important success, as it secured his eastern flank and 
 deprived the Chinese of a useful ally in the Forbidden King- 
 dom. It encouraged Taitsong to think that the time was 
 once more ripe for attacking Ningyuen, and he laid siege 
 to that fortress at the head of a large army, including the 
 flower of his troops. Notwithstanding the energy of his at- 
 tack, Chungwan, the former bold, defender of the place, had 
 again the satisfaction of seeing the Manchus repulsed, and 
 compelled to admit that the ramparts of Ningyuen presented 
 a serious if not insuperable obstacle to their progress. Al- 
 most at the very moment of this success the Emperor Tienki 
 died, and was succeeded, in 1627, by his younger brother, 
 Tsongching, who was destined to be the last of the Ming 
 rulers. 
 
 The repulse of Taitsong before Ningyuen might have 
 been fatal if he had not been a man of great ability and 
 resource. The occasion called for some special effort, and 
 Taitsong proved himself equal to it by a stroke of genius 
 that showed he was the worthy inheritor of the mission of 
 Noorhachu. Without taking anybody into his confidence 
 he ordered his army and his allies, the Kortsin Mongols, to 
 assemble in the country west of Ningyuen, and when he 
 had thus collected over a hundred thousand men, he an- 
 nounced his intention of ignoring Ningyuen and marching 
 direct on Pekin. At this juncture Taitsong divided his 
 army into eight banners, which still remain the national 
 divisions of the Manchu race. The Manchus seem to have 
 been a little alarmed by the boldness of Taitsong's scheme,
 
 THE MANCnU CONQUEST OF CHINA 181 
 
 and they might have hesitated to follow him if he had given 
 them any time for reflection, but his plans were not fully 
 known until his forces were through the Dangan Pass on 
 the march to the capital. The Chinese, relying altogether 
 on Ningyuen as a defense, had made no preparation to hold 
 their ground on this side, and Taitsong encountered no oppo- 
 sition until he reached Kichow. Then Chungwan, realizing 
 that he had been outmaneuvered, and that the defenses of 
 Ningyuen had been turned, hastened back by forced marches 
 to defend Pekin. Owing to his road being the better of the 
 two he gained the capital in time, and succeeded in throw- 
 ing himself and his troops into it in order to defend it 
 against the assault of the Manchus. After Taitsong sat 
 down before Pekin he engaged in an intrigue for the ruin 
 of Chungwan, whose disgrace would be equivalent to a 
 great victory. The method is not to be approved on gen- 
 eral grounds, but Taitsong conceived that he was justified 
 in bribing persons in Pekin to discredit Chungwan and 
 compass his ruin. The emperor was persuaded that Chung- 
 wan was too powerful a subject to be absolutely loyal, and 
 it was asserted that he was in communication with the 
 enemy. Chungwan, who had been so long the buttress of 
 the kingdom, was secretly arrested and thrown into a prison 
 from which he never issued. The disappearance of Chung- 
 wan was as valuable to Taitsong as a great victory, and he 
 made his final preparations for assaulting Pekin; but either 
 the want of supplies or the occurrence of some disturbance 
 in his rear prevented the execution of his plan. He drew 
 off his forces and retired behind the Great Wall at the very 
 moment when Pekin seemed at his mercy. 
 
 During four years of more or less tranquillity Taitsong 
 confined his attention to political designs, and to training a 
 corps of artillery, and then he resumed his main project of 
 the conquest of China. Instead of availing themselves of 
 the lull thus afforded to improve their position, the Chinese 
 ministers seemed to believe that the danger from the ^fan- 
 chus had passed away, and they treated all the comraunica-
 
 182 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 tions from Taitsong with imprudent and unnecessary dis- 
 dain. Their attention was also distracted by many internal 
 troubles, produced by their own folly, as well as by the 
 perils of the time. 
 
 Taitsong, in 1634, resumed his operations in China, and 
 on this occasion he invaded the province of Shansi, at the 
 head of an army composed largely of Mongols as well as of 
 Manchus. Although the people of Shansi had not had any 
 practical experience of Mancliu prowess, and notwithstand- 
 ing that their frontier was exceedingly strong by nature, 
 Taitsong met with little or no resistance from either the 
 local garrisons or the peoj^le themselves. One Chinese 
 governor, it is said, ventured to publish a boastful report 
 of an imaginary victory over the Manchus, and to send a 
 copy of it to Pekin. Taitsong, however, intercepted the 
 letter, and at once sent the officer a challenge, matching 
 1,000 of his men against 10,000 of the Chinese. That the 
 offer was not accepted is the best proof of the superiority 
 of the Manchu army. 
 
 It was at the close of this successful campaign in Shansi 
 that Taitsong, in the year 1635, assumed, for the first time 
 among any of the Manchu rulers, the style of Emperor of 
 China. Events had long been moving in this direction, but 
 an accident is said to have determined Taitsong to take this 
 final measure. The jade seal of the old Mongol rulers was 
 suddenly discovered, and placed in the hands of Taitsong. 
 When the Mongols heard of tliis, forty-nine of their chiefs 
 hastened to tender their allegiance to Taitsong, and the only 
 condition made was that the King of Corea should be com- 
 pelled to do so likewise. Taitsong, nothing loth, at once 
 sent off letters to the Corcan court announcing the adhesion 
 of the Mongols, and calling upon the king of that state to 
 recognize his supremacy. But the Corean ruler had got 
 wind of the contents of these letters and declined to open 
 them, thus hoping to get out of his difficulty without offend- 
 ing his old friends the Chinese. But Taitsong was not to be 
 put off in this fashion. He sent an army to inflict chastise-
 
 THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA 183 
 
 ment on his neighbor, and its mission was successfully dis- 
 charged. The king and his family were taken prisoners, 
 although they had fled to the island of Gangwa for safety, 
 and Corea became a Manchu possession. The last years of 
 Taitsong's life were spent in conducting repeated expedi- 
 tions into the provinces of Shansi and Pechihli, but the 
 strength of the fortresses of Ningyuen and Shanhaikwan on 
 the Great Wall effectually prevented his renewing his at- 
 tempt on Pekin. These two places with the minor forts of 
 Kingchow and Songshan formed a quadrilateral that effect- 
 ually secured Pekin on its northern side, and being intrvisted 
 to the defense of Wou Sankwei, a general of great capacity, 
 of whom much more will be heard, all Taitsong's ability 
 and resources were taxed to overcome those obstacles to his 
 progress south of the Great Wall. He succeeded after great 
 loss, and at the end of several campaigns, in taking King- 
 chow and Songshan, but these were his last successes, for in 
 the year 1643 he was seized with a fatal illness at Moukden, 
 which terminated his career at the comparatively early age 
 of fifty-two. Taitsong's premature death, due, in all prob- 
 ability, to the incompetence of his physicians, cut short a 
 career that had not reached its prime, and retarded the con- 
 quest of China, for the supreme authority among the Man- 
 chus then passed from a skillful and experienced ruler into 
 the hands of a child. 
 
 The possession of a well-trained army, the production of 
 two great leaders of admitted superiority, and forty years 
 of almost continuously successful war, had not availed to 
 bring the authority of the Manchus in any permanent form 
 south of the Great Wall. The barrier of Tsin Che Hwangti 
 still kept out the most formidable adversary who had ever 
 borne down upon it, and the independence of China seemed 
 far removed from serious jeopardy. At this juncture events 
 occurred that altered the whole situation, and the internal 
 divisions of the Chinese proved more serious and entailed a 
 more rapid collapse than all the efforts of the Manchus. 
 
 The arch rebel Li Tseching, who proved more formidable
 
 '184 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 to tlie Ming ruler than liis Manchu opponent, was tlie son 
 of a peasant in the province of Shansi. At an early age he 
 attached himself to the profession of arms, and became well 
 known as a skillful archer and horseman. In 1629, he first 
 appears on the scene as member of a band of robbers, who 
 were, however, destroyed by a rare display of energy on the 
 part of one of the emperor's lieutenants. Li was one of the 
 few who were fortunate enough to escape with their lives 
 and liberty. He soon gathered round him another band, 
 and under his successful and courageous leading it shortly 
 acquired the size of an army. One reason of his success 
 was his forming an alliance with the Mohammedan settlers 
 in Kansuh, who were already known as Tungani or "Colo- 
 nists." But the principal cause of his success was his skill 
 and promptitude in coming to terms with the imperial au- 
 thorities whenever they became too strong for him, and he 
 often purchased a truce when, if the officials had pushed 
 home their advantage, he must have been destroyed. His 
 power thus grew to a high i3oint, while that of other robber 
 chiefs only waxed to wane and disappear; and about the 
 year 1640, when it was said that his followers numbered 
 half a million of men, he began to think seriously of dis- 
 placing the Ming and placing himself on the throne of 
 China. With this object in view he laid siege to the town 
 of Honan, the capital of the province of the same name. 
 At first the resolution of the governor baffled his attempt, 
 but treachery succeeded when force failed. A traitor opened 
 a gate for a sum of money which he was never paid, and 
 Li's army burst into the city. The garrison was put to the 
 sword, and horrible outrages were perpetrated on the towns- 
 people. From Honan, Li marched on Kaifong, which he 
 besieged for seven days; but he did not possess the neces- 
 sary engines to attack a place of any strength, and Kaifong 
 was reputed to be the strongest fortress in China. He was 
 obliged to beat a hasty retreat, pursued by an army that 
 the imperial authorities had hurriedly collected. There is 
 reason to think his retreat was a skillful movement to the
 
 THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA 185 
 
 rear in order to draw the emperor's troops after him. Cer- 
 tain it is that they pursued him in four separate corps, and 
 that he turned upon them and beat them one after the other. 
 When he had vanquished these armies in four separate en- 
 counters he again laid siege to Kaifong, and it was thought 
 that he woukl have taken it, when Li was wounded by an 
 arrow, and called off his troops in consequence. Several 
 times afterward he resumed the attempt, but with no better 
 fortune, until an accident accomplished what all his power 
 had failed to do. The governor had among other precau- 
 tions flooded the moat from the Hoangho, and this extra; 
 barrier of defense had undoubtedly done much toward dis- 
 comfiting the besiegers. But in the end it proved fatal to 
 the besieged, for the Hoangho, at all times capricious in its 
 movements, and the source of as much trouble as benefit to 
 the provinces it waters, rose suddenly to the dimensions of 
 a flood, and, overflowing its banks, spread over the country. 
 Many of Li's soldiers were drowned, and his camp was 
 flooded, but the most serious loss befell the Imperialists in 
 Kaifong. The waters of the river swept away the walls 
 and flooded the town. Thousands perished at the time, 
 and those who attempted to escape were cut down by the 
 rebels outside. Kaifong itself was destroyed and has never 
 recovered its ancient importance, being now a town of only 
 the third or fourth rank. This great success established the 
 reputation of Li Tseching on a Arm basis, and constituted 
 him one of the arbiters of his country's destiny. He found 
 himself master of one-third of the state; proclaimed himself 
 Emperor of China, under the style of Yongchang, and gave 
 his dynasty the name of Tachun. Having taken this step of 
 open defiance to the Ming government, Li invaded Shansi, 
 which he reduced to subjection with little difficulty or blood- 
 shed. An officer, named Likintai, was sent to organize some 
 measures of defense, but, on arrival, he found the province 
 in the hands of the rebel, and he had no choice save to beat 
 a discreet and rapid retreat. The success of Li continued 
 unchecked. Important places like Taiyuen and Taitong
 
 186 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 surrendered to him after a merely nominal resistance, and 
 when they fell there was no further impediment in the 
 way of his marching on Pekin. 
 
 No preparations had been made to defend Pekin. The 
 defenses were weak, the garrison insufficient, as all the best 
 troops were on the frontier, and the citizens disposed to come 
 to terms with the assailant rather than to die in the breach 
 for their sovereign. When Li pitched his tent outside the 
 western gate of the capital, and sent a haughty demand to 
 the emperor to abdicate his throne, he was master of the situ- 
 ation; but Tsongching, ignorant of his own impotence, defied 
 and upbraided his opponent as a rebel. His indignation was 
 turned to despair when he learned that the troops had aban- 
 doned his cause, that the people were crying out for Li 
 Tseching, and that that leader's followers were rapidly ap- 
 proaching his palace. Tsongching strangled himself with 
 his girdle, but only one ofhcer was found devoted enough to 
 share his fate. Although Tsongching had some nominal 
 successors, he was, strictly speaking, the last of the Ming 
 emperors, and with him the great dynasty founded by Hong- 
 wou came to an end. The many disasters that preceded its 
 fall rendered the loss of the imperial station less of a blow 
 to the individual, and the last of the Ming rulers seems to 
 have even experienced relief on reaching the term of his 
 anxieties. The episode of the faithful officer, Li Kweiching, 
 concludes the dramatic events accompanying the capture of 
 Pekin and the fall of the dynasty. After the death of his 
 sovereign he attempted to defend the capital ; but overpow- 
 ered by numbers he surrendered to the victor, who offered 
 him an honorable command in his service. Li Kweiching 
 accepted the offer on the stipulation that he should be allowed 
 to give the Emperor Tsongching honorable burial, and that 
 the surviving members of the Ming family should be spared. 
 These conditions, so creditable to Li Kweiching, were grant- 
 ed; but, at the funeral of his late sovereign, grief or a spirit 
 of duty so overcame him that he committed suicide on the 
 grave of Tsongching. Li Tseching, who had counted on
 
 THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA 187 
 
 valuable assistance from this oflEicer, became furious at this 
 occurrence. He plundered and destroyed the ancestral tem- 
 ple of the Mings, and he caused every member of the im- 
 perial family on whom he could lay hands to be executed. 
 Thus terminated the events at Pekin in the absolute and 
 complete triumph of the rebel Li Tseching, and the panic 
 produced by his success and severity blinded observers to 
 the hollowness of his power, and to the want of solidity 
 in his administration. Yet it seemed for a time as if he 
 were left the virtual master of China. 
 
 While the Ming power was collapsing before the onset of 
 Li Tseching, there still remained the large and well-trained 
 Ming army in garrison on the Manchu frontier, under com- 
 mand of the able general, Wou Sankwei. At the eleventh 
 hour the Emperor Tsongching had sent a message to Wou 
 Sankwei, begging him to come in all haste to save the capi- 
 tal; and that general, evacuating Ningyuen, and leaving a 
 small garrison at Shanhaikwan, had begun his march for 
 Pekin, when he learned that it had fallen and that the Ming 
 dynasty had ceased to be. Placed in this dilemma, between 
 the advancing Manchus, who immediately occupied Ningyuen 
 on his evacuation of it, and the large rebel force in possession 
 of Pekin, Wou Sankwei had no choice between coming to 
 terms with one or other of them. Li Tseching offered him 
 liberal rewards and a high command, but in vain, for Wou 
 Sankwei decided that it would be better to invite the Manchus 
 to enter the country, and to assist them to conquer it. There 
 can be no doubt that this course was both the wiser and the 
 more patriotic, for Li Tseching was nothing more than a 
 successful brigand on a large scale; whereas the Manchu 
 government was a respectable one, was well organized, and 
 aspired to revive the best traditions of the Chinese. Having 
 come to a prompt decision, Wou Sankwei lost no time in 
 promptly carrying it out. He wrote a letter to the Manchus, 
 asking them to send an army to co-operate with his in driv- 
 ing Li Tseching out of Pekin; and the Manchus, at once 
 realizing that the moment had arrived for conquering China,
 
 1B8 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 acquiesced promptly in his plans, sent forward their advanced 
 corps, and ordered a levee en masse of the nation for the 
 conquest of China. Assured of his rear, and also of speedy 
 re- enforcement, Wou Sankwei did not delay a day in march- 
 ing on Pekin. Li Tseching sent out a portion of his army 
 to oppose the advance of Wou Sankwei; but the officer's 
 instructions were rather to negotiate than to fight, for to the 
 last Li Tseching expected that Wou Sankwei would come 
 over to his side. He was already beginning to feel doubtful 
 as to the security of his position; and his fears were increased 
 by his superstition, for when, on entering Pekin, he passed 
 under a gate above which was written the character "joong" 
 (middle), he exclaimed, drawing his bow at the same time, 
 "If I hit this joong in the middle, it is a sign I have gained 
 the whole empire, as the empire is joong, the middle king- 
 dom. " His arrow missed its mark. The apprehensions of 
 Li Tseching were soon confirmed, for Wou Sankwei defeated 
 the first army he had sent out with a loss of 20, 000 men. Li 
 does not seem to have known of the alliance between that 
 officer and the Manchus, for he marched at the head of 
 60,000 men to encounter him. He took with him the aged 
 father of Wou Sankwei and two Ming princes, who had sur- 
 vived the massacre of their family, with a view to appealing 
 to the affection and loyalty of that commander; but these 
 devices proved vain. 
 
 Wou Sankwei drew up his forces at Yungping in a strong 
 position near the scene of his recent victory ; his front seems 
 to have been protected by the river Zanho, and he calmly 
 awaited the attack of Li Tseching, whose army far out- 
 numbered his. Up to this point Wou Sankwei had not been 
 joined by any of the Manchus, but a body was known to be 
 approaching, and he was anxious to put off the battle until 
 they arrived. For the same reason Li Tseching was as anx- 
 ious to begin the attack, and, notwithstanding the strength 
 of Wou Sankwei's position, he ordered his troops to engage 
 without delay. Adopting the orthodox Chinese mode of 
 attack of forming his army in a crescent, so that the extreme
 
 THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA 189 
 
 wings should overlap and gradually encompass those of the 
 enemy, Li trusted to his numerical superiority to give him 
 the victory. At one moment it seemed as if his expectation 
 would be justified; for, bravely as Wou Sankwei and his 
 army fought, the weight of numbers was telling its inevi- 
 table tale when a Manchu corps opportunely aiTived, and 
 attacking the Chinese with great impetuosity, changed the 
 fortune of the day and put the army of Li Tseching to 
 the rout. Thirty thousand men are said to have fallen 
 on the field, and Li himself escaped from the carnage with 
 only a few hundred horsemen. 
 
 After this, Li met with disaster after disaster. He was 
 driven out of Shansi into Honan, and from Honan into 
 Shensi. Wou Sankwei took Tunkwan without firing a shot, 
 and when Li attempted to defend Singan he found that his 
 soldiers would not obey his orders, and wished only to come 
 to terms with Wou Sankwei. Expelled from the last of his 
 towns he took refuge in the hills, but the necessity of obtain- 
 ing provisions compelled him now and then to descend into 
 the plains, and on one of these occasions he was surprised in 
 a village and killed. His head was placed in triumph over 
 the nearest prefecture, and thus ended the most remarkable 
 career of a princely robber chieftain to be found in Chinese 
 annals. At one time it seemed as if Li Tseching would be 
 the founder of a dynasty, but his meteor-like career ended 
 not less suddenly than his rise to supreme power was rapid. 
 Extraordinary as was his success, Wou Sankwei had rightly 
 gauged its nature when he declared that it had no solid basis. 
 
 The overthrow of Li Tseching paved the way for a fresh 
 difficulty. It had been achieved to a large extent by the 
 military genius of Wou Sankwei and by the exertions of his 
 Chinese army. That officer had invited the Manchus into 
 the country, but when victory was achieved he showed some 
 anxiety for their departure. This was no part of the com- 
 pact, nor did it coincide with the ambition of the Manchus. 
 They determined to retain the territory they had conquered, 
 at the same time that they endeavored to propitiate Wou
 
 190 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Sankwei and to retain the command of his useful services. 
 He was given the high-sounding title of Ping-si Wang, or 
 Prince Pacifier of the West, and many other honors. Grat- 
 ified by these rewards and unable to discover any person 
 who could govern China, Wou Sankwei gradually reconciled 
 himself to the situation and performed his duty faithfully as 
 the most powerful lieutenant of the young Manchu ruler, 
 Chuntche, the son of Taitsong, who, after the fall of Li 
 Tseching, removed his capital to Pekin, and assumed the 
 style and ceremony of a Chinese emperor. The active ad- 
 ministration was intrusted to Prince Dorgun, brother of 
 Taitsong, who now became known as Ama Wang, the 
 Father Prince, and who acted as regent during the long 
 minority of his nephew. The new dynasty was inaugurated 
 at Pekin with a grand ceremony and court. 
 
 After this formal and solemn assumption of the govern- 
 ing power in China by the young Manchu prince, the 
 activity of the Manchus increased, and several armies were 
 sent south to subject the provinces, and to bring the whole 
 Chinese race under his authority. For some time no serious 
 opposition was encountered, as the disruption of Li's forces 
 entailed the surrender of all the territory north of the 
 Hoangho. But at Nankin, and in the provinces south of 
 the Yangtsekiang, an attempt had been made, and not 
 unsuccessfully, to set up a fresh administration under one 
 of the members of the prolific Ming family. Fou Wang, 
 a grandson of Wanleh, was placed on the Dragon Throne 
 of Southern China in this hope, but his character did not 
 justify the faith reposed in him. He thought nothing of the 
 serious responsibility he had accepted, but showed that he 
 regarded his high station merely as an opportunity for grati- 
 fying his own pleasures. There is little or no doubt that if 
 he had shown himself worthy of his station he might have 
 rallied to his side the mass of the Chinese nation, and Wou 
 Sankwei, who had shown some signs of chafing at Manchu 
 authority, might have been won back by a capable and sym- 
 pathetic sovereign. But notwithstanding the ability of Fou
 
 THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA 101 
 
 "Wang's minister, Shu Kofa, wlio strove to repair the errors 
 of his master, the new Ming power at Nankin did not pros- 
 per. Wou Sankwei, cautious not to commit himself, rejected 
 the patent of a duke and the money gifts sent him by Shu 
 Kofa, while Ama Wang, on his side, sought to gain over 
 Shu Kofa by making him the most lavish promises of re- 
 ward. But that minister proved as true to his sovereign 
 as Wou Sankwei did to the Manchu. The result of the long 
 correspondence between them was nil, but it showed the 
 leaders of the Manchus in very favorable colors, as wishing 
 to avert the horrors of war, and to simplify the surrender of 
 provinces which could not be held against them. When 
 Ama Wang discovered that there was no hope of gaining 
 over Shu Kofa, and thus paving his way to the disintegra- 
 tion of the Nankin power, he decided to prosecute the war 
 against the surviving Ming administration with the greatest 
 activity. 
 
 While these preparations were being made to extend the 
 Manchu conquest over Central China, all was confusion at 
 Nankin. Jealousies between the commanders, none of whom 
 possessed much merit or experience, bickerings among the 
 ministers, apathy on the part of the ruler, and bitter disap- 
 pointment and disgust in the ranks of the people, all com- 
 bined to precipitate the overthrow of the ephemeral throne 
 that had been erected in the Southern capital. Ama Wang 
 waited patiently to allow these causes of disintegration time 
 to develop their full force, and to contribute to the ruin of 
 the Mings, but in the winter of 1644-45 he decided that the 
 right moment to strike had come. Shu Kofa made some 
 efiort to oppose the Manchu armies, and even assumed the 
 command in person, although he was only a civilian; but 
 his troops had no heart to oppose the Manchus, and the de- 
 vices to which he resorted to make his military power appear 
 more formidable were both puerile and ineffective. Yet one 
 passage may be quoted to his credit if it gave his opponent 
 an advantage. It is affirmed on good authority that he could 
 have obtained a material advantage if he would only have
 
 192 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 flooded tlie country, but he "refused to do so, on the ground 
 that more civilians would perish than Manchus, and he said, 
 'First the people, next the dynasty.' " The sentiment was 
 a noble one, but it was too severe a crisis to admit of any 
 sentiment, especially when fighting an up-hill battle, and 
 Shu Kofa, soon realizing that he was not qualified to play 
 the part of a great soldier, resolved to end his existence. He 
 took shelter with a small force in the town of Yangchow, 
 and when he heard that the Manchus were entering the 
 gate, he and his officers committed suicide. The Chinese 
 lamented and were crushed by his death. In him they saw 
 the last of their great men, and, no doubt, they credited him 
 with a higher capacity even than he possessed. Only a 
 military genius of the first rank could have saved the Mmgs, 
 and Shu Kofa was nothing more than a conscientious and 
 capable civil mandarin, ignorant of war. His fortitude could 
 only be measured by his indifference to life, and by his 
 resolve to anticipate the fall of his sovereign as soon as he 
 saw it to be inevitable. 
 
 Fou Wang speedily followed the fate of his faithful min- 
 ister; for, when the Manchus marched on Nankin, he aban- 
 doned his capital, and sought safety in flight. But one of 
 his officers, anxious to make favorable terms for himself with 
 the conqueror, undertook his capture, and coming up with 
 him when on the point of entering a junk to put to sea, Fou 
 M^ang had no alternative left between an ignominious sur- 
 render and suicide. He chose the latter course, and throw- 
 ing himself into the river was drowned, thus ending his 
 own career and the Ming dynasty in its southern capital 
 of Nankin. 
 
 Meantime dissension further weakened the already dis- 
 couraged Chinese forces. The pirate Ching Chelong, who 
 was the mainstay of the Ming cause, cherished the hope 
 that he might place his own family on the throne, and he 
 endeavored to induce the Ming prince to recognize his son, 
 Koshinga, as his heir. Low as he had fallen, it is to the 
 credit of this prince that he refused to sign away the birth-
 
 THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA 193 
 
 right of Lis family. Ching was bitterly chagrined at this 
 refusal, and after detaching his forces from the other Chi- 
 nese he at last came to the resolution to throw in his lot with 
 the Manchus. He was promised honorable terms, but the 
 Tartars seem to have had no intention of complying with 
 them, so far at least as allowing him to retain his liberty. 
 For they sent him off to Pekin, where he was kept in honor- 
 able confinement, notwithstanding his protests and promises, 
 and the defiant threats of his son Koshinga. In preserving 
 his life he was more fortunate than the members of the Ming 
 family, who were hunted down in a remorseless manner and 
 executed with all their relations on capture. The only place 
 that offered any resistance to the Manchus was the town of 
 Kanchow, on the Kan River, in Kiangsi, The garrison de- 
 fended themselves with desperate valor during two months, 
 and a council of war was held amid much anxiety, to con- 
 sider whether the siege should be abandoned. Bold counsels 
 prevailed. The Manchus returned to the attack, and had the 
 satisfaction of carrying the town by assault, when the garri- 
 son were put to the sword. 
 
 The relics of the Chinese armies gathered for a final stand 
 in the city of Canton, but unfortunately for them the leaders 
 were still divided by petty jealousies. One Ming prince pro- 
 claimed himself Emperor at Canton, and another in the ad- 
 joining province of Kwangsi. Although the Manchus were 
 gathering their forces to overwhelm the Chinese in their last 
 retreat, they could not lay aside their divisions and petty 
 ambitions in order to combine against the national enemy, 
 but must needs assail one another to decide which should 
 have the empty title of Ming emperor. The Manchus had 
 the satisfaction of seeing the two rivals break their strength 
 against each other, and then they advanced to crush the 
 victor at Canton. Strong as the place was said to be, it 
 offered no serious resistance, and the great commercial city 
 of the south passed into the hands of the race who had sub- 
 dued the whole country from Pekin to the Tonquin frontier. 
 At this moment the fortune of the Manchus underwent a 
 
 China — 9
 
 194 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 sudden and inexplicable change. Two repulses before a for- 
 tress southwest of Canton, and the disaffection of a large 
 part of their Chinese auxiliaries, who clamored for their pay, 
 seem to have broken the strength of the advanced Manchu 
 army. A wave of national antipathy drove the Tartars out 
 of Canton and the southern provinces; but it soon broke its 
 force, and the Manchus, returning with fresh troops, speed- 
 ily recovered all they had lost, and by placing stronger gar- 
 risons in the places they occupied consolidated their hold on 
 Southern China. Although the struggle between the Man- 
 chus and their new subjects was far from concluded, the 
 conquest of China as such may be said to have reached its 
 end at this stage. How a small Tartar tribe succeeded after 
 fifty years of war in imposing its yoke on the skeptical, 
 freedom-loving, and intensely national millions of China 
 will always remain one of the enigmas of history. 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 THE FIRST MANCHU RULER 
 
 While the Manchu generals and armies were estab- 
 lishing their power in Southern China, the young Emperor 
 Chuntche, under the direction of his prudent uncle, the 
 regent Ama Wang, was setting up at Pekin the central 
 power of a ruling dynasty. In doing so, little or no oppo- 
 sition was experienced at the hands of the Chinese, who 
 showed that they longed once more for a settled govern- 
 ment; and this acquiescence on the part of the Chinese 
 people in their authority no doubt induced the Manchu 
 leaders to adopt a far more conciliatory and lenient policy 
 toward the Chinese than would otherwise have been the 
 case. Ama Wang gave special orders that the lives and 
 property of all who surrendered to his lieutenants should 
 be scrupulously respected. This moderation was only de- 
 parted from in the case of some rebels in Shensi, who, after
 
 THE FIRST MANCHU RULER 195 
 
 accepting, repudiated the Manchu authority, and laid close 
 siege to the chief town of Singan, which held a garrison of 
 only 3,000 Manchus. The commandant wished to make his 
 position secure by massacring the Chinese of the town, but 
 he was deterred from taking this extreme step by the repre- 
 sentations of a Chinese officer, who, binding himself for the 
 good faith of his countrymen, induced him to enroll them 
 in the ranks of the garrison. They proved faithful and ren- 
 dered excellent service in the siege; and when a relieving 
 Manchu army came from Pekin, the rebels were quickly 
 scattered and pursued with unflagging bitterness to their 
 remotest hiding places. 
 
 In the province of Szchuen, a Chinese leader proclaimed 
 himself Si Wang, or King of the West. He was execrated 
 by those who were nominally his subjects. Among the most 
 heinous of his crimes was his invitation to literary men to 
 come to his capital for employment, and when they had as- 
 sembled to the number of 30,000, to order them to be mas- 
 sacred. He dealt in a similar manner with 8,000 of his cour- 
 tiers, because one of them happened to omit a portion of his 
 full titles. His excesses culminated in the massacre of Chen- 
 tu, when 600,000 innocent persons are said to have perished. 
 Even allowing for the Eastern exaggeration of numbers, the 
 crimes of this inhuman monster have rarely, if ever, been 
 surpassed. His rage or appetite for destruction was not ap- 
 peased by human sacrifices. He made equal war on the 
 objects of nature and the works of man. He destroyed 
 cities, leveled forests, and overthrew all the public monu- 
 ments that embellished his province. In the midst of his 
 excesses he was told that a Manchu army had crossed the 
 frontier, but he resolved to crown his inhuman career by a 
 deed unparalleled in the records of history, and, what is 
 more extraordinary, he succeeded in inducing his followers 
 to execute his commands. His project was to massacre all 
 the women in attendance on his army. 
 
 When the assembly took place. Si Wang slew his wives 
 coram populo, and his followers, seized with an extreme
 
 196 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 frenzy, followed liis example. It is said that as many as 
 400,000 women were slain that day, and Si Wang, intoxi- 
 cated by his success in inducing his followers to execute his 
 inhuman behests, believed that he had nothing to fear at 
 the hands of the Manchus. But he was soon undeceived, 
 for in one of the earliest affairs at the outposts he was killed 
 by an arrow. His power at once crumbled away, and 
 Szchuen passed under the authority of the Manchus. The 
 conquest of Szchuen paved the way for the recovery of the 
 position that had been lost in Southern China, and close 
 siege was laid to the city of Canton. Outside Canton the 
 Manchus carried everything before them, and that city itself 
 at last was captured, after what passed for a stubborn re- 
 sistance. Canton was given over to pillage. 
 
 At this moment of success, Ama Wang, the wise regent, 
 died, and Chuntche assumed the reins of government. He 
 at once devoted his attention to administrative reforms. 
 Corruption had begun to sway the public examinations, and 
 Chuntche issued a special edict, enjoining the examiners to 
 give fair awards and to maintain the purity of the service. 
 But several examiners had to be executed and others ban- 
 ished beyond the Wall before matters were placed on a 
 satisfactory basis. He also adopted the astronomical system 
 in force in Europe, and he appointed the priest Adam Schaal 
 head of the Mathematical Board at Pekin. But his most 
 important work was the institution of the Grand Council, 
 which still exists, and which is the supreme power under the 
 emperor in the country. It is composed of only four mem- 
 bers — two Manchus and two Chinese — who alone possess the 
 privilege of personal audience with the emperor whenever 
 they may demand it. As this act gave the Chinese an equal 
 place with the Manchus in the highest body of the empire it 
 was exceedingly welcome, and explains, among other causes, 
 the popularity and stability of the Manchu dynasty. When 
 allotting Chuntche his place among the founders of Manchu 
 greatness, allowance must be made for this wise and far- 
 reaching measure.
 
 THE FIRST MANCHU RULER 107 
 
 An interesting event in tlie reign of Chuntche was the 
 arrival at Pekin of more than one embassy from European 
 States. The Dutch and the Russians can equally claim the 
 honor of having had an envoy resident in the Chinese capi- 
 tal during the year 1656. 
 
 In 1661 the health of Chuntche became so bad that it 
 was evident to his courtiers that his end was drawing near, 
 although he was little more than thirty years of age. On 
 his deathbed he selected as his successor the second of his 
 sons, who afterward became famous as the Emperor Kanghi. 
 Kanghi assumed the personal direction of affairs when only 
 fourteen years of age. Such a bold step undoubtedly be- 
 tokened no ordinary vigor on the part of a youth, and its 
 complete success reflected still further credit upon him. 
 
 The interest of the period passes from the scenes at court 
 to the camp of Wou Sankwei, who, twenty years earlier, 
 had introduced the Manchus into China. During the Man- 
 chu campaign in Southern China he had kept peace on the 
 western frontier, gradually extending his authority from 
 Shensi into Szchuen and thence over Yunnan. "When a 
 Ming prince, Kwei Wang, who had fled into Burma, re- 
 turned with the support of the king of that country to make 
 another bid for the throne, he found himself confronted by 
 all the power and resources of Wou Sankwei, who was still 
 as loyal a servant of the Manchu emperor as when he car- 
 ried his ensigns against Li Tseching. Kwei Wang does not 
 appear to have expected opposition from Wou Sankwei, and 
 in the first encounter he was overthrown and taken prisoner. 
 The conqueror, who was already under suspicion at the 
 Manchu court, and whom every Chinese rebel persisted in 
 regarding as a natural ally, now hesitated as to how he 
 should treat these important prisoners. Kwei Wang and 
 }iis son — the last of the Mings — were eventually led forth to 
 execution, although it should be stated that a less authen- 
 tic report affirms they were allowed to strangle themselves. 
 Having made use of Wou Sankwei, and obtained, as they 
 thought, the full value of his services, the Manchus sought
 
 198 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 to treat him with indifference and to throw him into the 
 shade. But the splendor of his work was such that they 
 had to confer on him the title of Prince, and to make him 
 viceroy of Yunnan and the adjacent territories. He exerted 
 such an extraordinary influence over the Chinese subjects 
 that they speedily settled down under his authority ; revenue 
 and trade increased, and the Manchu authority was main- 
 tained without a Tartar garrison, for Wou Sankwei's army 
 was composed exclusively of Chinese, and its nucleus was 
 formed by his old garrison of Ningyuen and Shanhaikwan. 
 There is no certain reason for saying that "Wou Sankwei 
 nursed any scheme of personal aggrandizement, but the 
 measures he took and the reforms he instituted were calcu- 
 lated to make his authority become gradually independent 
 of Manchu control. For a time the Manchu government 
 suppressed its apprehensions on account of this powerful 
 satrap, by the argument that in a few years his death in 
 the course of nature must relieve it from this peril ; but Wou 
 Sankwei lived on and showed no signs of paying the com- 
 mon debt of humanity. Then it seemed to Kanghi that 
 Won Sankwei was gradually establishing the solid founda- 
 tion of a formidable and independent power. The Manchu 
 generals and ministers had always been jealous of the greater 
 fame of Wou Sankwei. When they saw that Kanghi wanted 
 an excuse to fall foul of him, they carried every tale of al- 
 leged self-assertion on the part of the Chinese viceroy to the 
 imperial ears, and represented that his power dwarfed the 
 dignity of the Manchu throne and threatened its stability. 
 
 At last Kanghi resolved to take some decisive step to 
 bring the question to a climax, and he accordingly sent 
 Wou Sankwei an invitation to visit him at Pekin. Wou 
 Sankwei excused himself from going to court on the 
 ground that he was very old, and that his only wish was 
 to end his days in peace. He also deputed his son to tender 
 his allegiance to the emperor and to ])erform the Kotao in 
 his name. But Kanglii was not to be put off in this way, 
 and he sent two trusted officials to Wou Sankwei to repre-
 
 THE FIRST MANCHU RULER 199 
 
 sent tliat lie must comply with the exact terms of his com- 
 mand, and to point out the grave consequences of his refus- 
 ing. Wou Sankwei cast oil his allegiance to the Manchus, 
 and entered upon a war which aimed at the subversion of 
 their authority. Such was the reputation of this great com- 
 mander, to whose ability and military prowess the Manchus 
 unquestionably were indebted for their conquest of the em- 
 pire, that a large part of Southern China at once admitted 
 his authority, and from Szchuen to the warlike province of 
 Hunan his lieutenants were able to collect all the fighting 
 resources of the state, and to array the levies of those prov- 
 inces in the field for the approaching contest with Kaughi. 
 While Wou Sankwei was making these extensive prepa- 
 rations in the south, his son at Pekin had devised an ingen- 
 ious and daring plot for the massacre of the Manchus and the 
 destruction of the dynasty. He engaged in his scheme the 
 large body of Chinese slaves who had been placed in servi- 
 tude under their Tartar conquerors, and these, incited by the 
 hope of liberty, proved very ready tools to his designs. They 
 bound themselves together by a solemn oath to be true to one 
 another, and all the preparations were made to massacre the 
 Manchus on the occasion of the New Year's Festival. This 
 is the grand religious and social ceremony of the Chinese. 
 It takes place on the first day of the first moon, which falls 
 in our month of February. All business is stopped, the tri- 
 bunals are closed for ten days, and a state of high festival 
 resembling the Carnival prevails. The conspirators resolved 
 to take advantage of this public holiday, and of the excite- 
 ment accompanying it, to carry out their scheme, and the 
 Manchus appear to have been in total ignorance until the 
 eleventh hour of the plot for their destruction. The discov- 
 ery of the conspiracy bears a close resemblance to that of the 
 Gunpowder Plot. A Chinese slave, wishing to save his mas- 
 ter, gave him notice of the danger, and this Manchu officer 
 at once informed Kanghi of the conspiracy. The son of Wou 
 Sankwei and the other conspirators were immediately arrested 
 and executed without delay. The Manchus thus escaped by
 
 200 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the merest accident from a clanger whicli threatened them 
 with annihilation, and Kanghi, having succeeded in getting 
 rid of the son, concentrated his power and attention on the 
 more difficult task of grappling with the father. 
 
 But the power and reputation of Wou Sankwei were so 
 formidable that Kanghi resolved to proceed with great cau- 
 tion, and the emperor began his measures of offense by issu- 
 ing an edict ordering the disbandment of all the native 
 armies maintained by the Chinese viceroys, besides Wou 
 Sankwei. The object of this edict was to make all the 
 governors of Chinese race show their hands, and Kanghi 
 learned the full measure of the hostility he had to cope with 
 by every governor from the sea- coast of Fuhkien to Canton 
 defying him, and throwing in their lot with Wou Sankwei. 
 The piratical confederacy of Formosa, where Ching, the son 
 of Koshinga, had succeeded to his authority, also joined in 
 with what may be called the national party, but its alliance 
 proved of little value, as Ching, at an early period, took 
 ■umbrage at his reception by a Chinese official, and returned 
 to his island home. But the most formidable danger to the 
 young Manchu ruler came from an unexpected quarter. 
 The Mongols, seeing his embarrassment and believing that 
 the hours of the dynasty were numbered, resolved to take 
 advantage of the occasion to push their claims. Satchar, 
 chief of one of the Banners, issued a proclamation, calling 
 his race to his side, and declaring his intention to invade 
 China at the head of 100,000 men. It seemed hardly possible 
 for Kanghi to extricate himself from his many dangers. 
 With great quickness of perception Kanghi saw that the 
 most pressing danger was that from the Mongols, and he 
 sent the whole of his northern garrisons to attack Satchar 
 before the Mongol clans could gather to his assistance. 
 The Manchu cavalry, by a rapid march, surprised Satchar 
 in his camp and carried him and his family ofi as prison- 
 ers to Pekin. The capture of their chief discouraged the 
 Mongols and interrupted their plans for invading China. 
 Kanghi thus obtained a respite from what seemed his great-
 
 THE FIRST MANCHU RULER 201 
 
 est peril. Then lie turned his attention to dealing with Wou 
 Sankwei, and the first effort of his armies resulted in the 
 recovery of Fuhkien, where the governor and Ching had 
 reduced themselves to a state of exhaustion by a contest 
 inspired by personal jealousy not patriotism. From Fuhkien 
 his successful lieutenants passed into Kwantung, and the 
 Chinese, seeing that the Manchus were not sunk as low as 
 had been thought, abandoned all resistance and again rec- 
 ognized the Tartar authority. The Manchus did not dare 
 to punish the rebels except in rare instances, and, therefore, 
 the recovery of Canton was unaccompanied by any scenes 
 of blood. But a garrison of Manchus was placed in each 
 town of importance, and it was by Kanghi's order that a 
 walled town, or "Tartar city," was built within each city 
 for the accommodation and security of the dominant race. 
 But notwithstanding these successes, Kanghi made little 
 or no progress against the main force of Wou Sankwei, 
 whose supremacy was undisputed throughout the whole of 
 southwest China. It was not until 1677 that Kanghi ven- 
 tured to move his armies against Wou Sankwei in person. 
 Although he obtained no signal success in the field, the 
 divisions among the Chinese commanders were such that 
 he had the satisfaction of compelling them to evacuate 
 Hunan, and when Wou Sankwei took his first step back- 
 ward the sun of his fortunes began to set. Calamity rapidly 
 followed calamity. Wou Sankwei had not known the mean- 
 ing of defeat in his long career of fifty years, but now, in his 
 old age, he saw his affairs in inextricable confusion. His 
 adherents deserted him, many rebel officers sought to come 
 to terms with the Manchus, and Kanghi's armies gradually 
 converged on Wou Sankwei from the east and the nortli. 
 Driven out of Szchuen, Wou Sankwei endeavored to make a 
 stand in Yunnan. He certainly succeeded in prolonging tLc 
 struggle down to the year 1679, when his death put a sudden 
 end to the contest, and relieved Kanghi from much anxiety ; 
 for although the success of the Manchus was no longer un- 
 certain, the military skill of the old Chinese warrior might
 
 202 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 tave indefinitelj prolonged tlie war. Wou Sankwei is 
 one of the most conspicuous and attractive figures to be met 
 "witli in the long course of Chinese history, and his career 
 covered one of the most critical periods in the modern exist- 
 ence of that empire. From the time of his first distinguish- 
 ing himself in the defense of Ningyuen until he died, half a 
 century later, as Prince of Yunnan, he occupied the very 
 foremost place in the minds of his fellow-countrymen. The 
 part he had taken, first in keeping out the Manchus, and 
 then in introducing them into the state, reflected equal credit 
 on his ability and his patriotism. In requesting the Manchus 
 to crush the robber Li and to take the throne which the fall 
 of the Mings had rendered vacant, he was actuated by the 
 purest motives. There was only a choice of evils, and he 
 selected that which seemed the less. He gave the empire 
 to a foreign ruler of intelligence, but he saved it from an 
 unscrupulous robber. He played the part of king-maker 
 to the family of Noorhachu, and the magnitude of their 
 obligations to him could not be denied. They were not as 
 grateful as he may have expected, and they looked askance 
 at his military power and influence over his countrymen. 
 Probably he felt that he had not been well treated, and 
 chagrin undoubtedly induced him to reject Kanghi's request 
 to proceed to Pekin. If he had only acceded to that arrange- 
 ment he would have left a name for conspicuous loyalty and 
 political consistency in the service of the great race, which 
 he had been mainly instrumental in placing over China. 
 But even as events turned out he is one of the most re- 
 markable personages the Chinese race ever produced, and 
 his military career shows that they are capable of producing 
 great generals and brave soldiers. 
 
 The death of "Wou Sankwei signified the overthrow of 
 the Chinese uprising which had threatened to extinguish the 
 still growing power of the Manchu under its youthful em- 
 peror Kanghi. Wou Shufan, the grandson of that prince, 
 endeavored to carry on the task of holding Yunnan as an 
 independent territory, but by the year 1681 his possessions 
 
 '
 
 THE FIRST MANCHU RULER 208 
 
 were reduced to the town of Yunnanfoo, where he was 
 closely besieged by the Manchu forces. Although the Chi- 
 nese fought valiantly, they were soon reduced to extremities, 
 and the Manchus carried the place by storm. The garrison 
 were massacred to the last man, and Wou Shufan only 
 avoided a worse fate by committing suicide. The Manchus, 
 not satisfied with his death, sent his head to Pekin to be 
 placed on its principal gate in triumph, and the body of Wou 
 Sankwei himself was exhumed so that his ashes might be 
 scattered in each of the eighteen provinces of China as a 
 warning to traitors. Having crushed their most redoubtable 
 antagonist, the Manchus resorted to more severe measures 
 against those who had surrendered in Fuhkien and Kwan- 
 tung, and many insurgent chiefs who had surrendered, and 
 enjoyed a brief respite, ended their lives under the knife 
 of the executioner. The Manchu soldiers are said to have 
 been given spoil to the extent of nearly ten million dollars, 
 and the war which witnessed the final assertion of Manchu 
 power over the Chinese was essentially popular with the sol- 
 diers who carried it on to a victorious conclusion. A very 
 short time after the final overthrow of Wou Sankwei and 
 his family, the Chinese regime in Formosa was brought to 
 an end. Kanghi, having collected a fleet and concluded a 
 convention with the Dutch, determined on the invasion and 
 conquest of Formosa. In the midst of these preparations 
 Ching, the son of Koshinga, died, and no doubt the plans 
 of Kanghi were facilitated by the confusion that followed. 
 The Manchu fleet seized Ponghu, the principal island of the 
 Pescadore group, and thence the Manchus threw a force into 
 Formosa. It is said that they were helped by a high tide, 
 and by the superstition of the islanders, who exclaimed, "The 
 first Wang (Koshinga) got possession of Taiwan by a high 
 tide. The fleet now comes in the same manner. It is the 
 will of Heaven. " Formosa accepted the supremacy of the 
 Manchus without further ado. Those of the islanders who 
 had ever recognized the authority of any government, ac- 
 cepted that of the Emperor Kanghi, shaved their heads in
 
 204 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 token of submission, and became, so far as in tliem lay, 
 respectable citizens. 
 
 The overthrow of Wou Sankwei and tbe conquest of 
 Formosa completed what may be called the pacification 
 of China by the Manchus. From that period to the Taeping 
 Kebellion, or for nearly 200 years, there was no internal 
 insurrection on a large scale. On the whole the Manchus 
 stained their conclusive triumph by few excesses, and 
 Kanghi's moderation was scarcely inferior to that of his 
 father, Chuntche. The family of Wou Sankwei seems to 
 have been rooted out more for the personal attempt of the 
 son at Pekin than for the bold ambition of the potentate 
 himself. The family of Koshinga was spared, and its prin- 
 cipal representative received the patent of an earl. Thus, 
 by a policy judiciously combined of severity and moderation, 
 did Kanghi make himself supreme, and complete the work 
 of his race. "Whatever troubles may have beset the govern- 
 ment in the last 220 years, it will be justifiable to speak of the 
 Manchus and the Tatsing dynasty as the legitimate author- 
 ities in China, and, instead of foreign adventurers, as the 
 national and recognized rulers of the Middle Kingdom. 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE EMPEROR KAXGHI 
 
 Among- the Mongol tribes the noblest at this period were 
 the Khalkas. They prided themselves on being the descend- 
 ants of the House of Genghis, the representatives of the 
 special clan of the great conqueror, and the occupants of 
 the original home in the valleys of the Onon and Kerulon. 
 Although their military power was slight, the name of the 
 Khalka princes stood high among the Mongol tribes, and 
 they exercised an influence far in excess of their numbers or 
 capacity as a figliting force. Kanghi determined to establish 
 amicable relations with this clan, and by the dispatch of
 
 THE EMPEROR KANQHI 205 
 
 friendly letters and costly presents lie succeeded in inducing 
 the Khalka chiefs to enter into formal alliance with himself, 
 and to conclude a treaty of amity with China, which, be it 
 noted, they faithfully observed. Kanghi's efforts in this 
 direction, which may have been dictated by apprehension 
 at the movements of his new neighbors, the Russians, were 
 thus crowned with success, and the adhesion of the Khalkas 
 signified that the great majority of the Mongols would thence- 
 forth abstain from acts of unprovoked aggression on the 
 Chinese frontier. But the advance of China and her influ- 
 ence, even in the form of paying homage to the emperor as 
 the Bogdo Khan, or the Celestial Euler, so far west as the 
 upper course of the Amour, involved the Pekin Grovemment 
 in fresh complications by bringing it into contact with tribes 
 and peoples of whom it had no cognizance. Beyond the 
 Khalkas were the Eleuths, supreme in Hi and Kashgaria, 
 and divided into four hordes, who obeyed as many chiefs. 
 They had had some relations with the Khalkas, but of China 
 they knew nothing more than the greatness of her name. 
 When the surrender of the Khalka princes became known 
 the Eleuth chiefs held a grand assembly or kuriltai, and at 
 this it was finally, and, indeed, ostentatiously, decided not 
 to yield Kanghi his demands. Important as this decision 
 was, it derived increased weight from the character of the 
 man who was mainly instrumental in inducing the Eleuths 
 to take it. 
 
 Much has been written of the desert chiefs from Yenta 
 to Yakoob Beg, but none of these showed greater ability or 
 attained more conspicuous success than Galdan, who strained 
 the power of China, and fought for many years on equal 
 terms with the Emperor Kanghi. Galdan determined that 
 the easiest and most advantageous beginning for his enter- 
 prise would be to attack his neighbors the Khalkas, who, by 
 accepting Kanghi's offers, had made themselves the advanced 
 guard of China in Central Asia. He began a systematic 
 encroachment into their lands in the year 1679, but at the 
 Bame time he resorted to every device to screen his move-
 
 206 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 ments from the Chinese court, and such was the delay in 
 receiving intelligence, and the ignorance of the situation 
 beyond the border, that in the very year of his beginning to 
 attack the Khalkas, his envoy at Pekin received a flattering 
 reception at the hands of Kanghi, still hopeful of a peaceful 
 settlement, and returned with the seal and patent of a Khan. 
 Events had not reached a state of open hostility three years 
 later, when Kanghi sent special envoys to the camp of 
 Galdan, as well as to the Khalkas. They were instructed 
 to promise and pay much, but to rest content with nothing 
 short of the formal acceptance by all the chiefs of the 
 supremacy of China. Galdan, bound by the laws of hos- 
 pitality, nowhere more sacred than in the East, gave them 
 an honorable reception, and lavished upon them the poor 
 resources he commanded. In hyperbolic terms he declared 
 that the arrival of an embassy from the rich and powerful 
 Chinese emperor in his poor State would be handed down as 
 the most glorious event of his reign. But he refused to 
 make any tender of allegiance, or to subscribe himself as a 
 Chinese vassal. The dissensions among the Khalka princes 
 assisted the development of Galdan's ambition, and added 
 to the anxiety of the Chinese ruler. Kanghi admonished 
 them to heal their differences and to abstain from an inter- 
 necine strife, which would only facilitate their conquest by 
 Galdan, and he succeeded so far that he induced them to 
 swear a peace among themselves before an image of Buddha. 
 At this juncture the Chinese came into collision with the 
 Russians on the Amour. The Russians had built a fort at 
 Albazin, on the upper course of that river, and the Chinese 
 army located in the Khalka country, considering its proximity 
 a menace to their own security, attacked it in overwhelming 
 force. Albazin was taken, and those of the garrison who 
 fell into the hands of the Chinese were carried of! to Pekin, 
 where their descendants still reside as a distinct Russian 
 colony. But when the Chinese evacuated Albazin the Rus- 
 sians returned there with characteristic obstinacy, and 
 Kanghi, becoming anxious at the increasing activity of
 
 THE EMPEROR KANQHI 207 
 
 Galdan, accepted tlie overtures of the Eussian authorities 
 in Siberia, who, in 1688, sent the son of the Governor- gen- 
 eral of Eastern Siberia to Pekin to negotiate a peace. After 
 twelve months' negotiation, protracted by the outbreak of 
 war with Galdan, the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the first con- 
 cluded between China and any European power, was signed, 
 and the brief and only war between Russia and China was 
 thus brought to a speedy and satisfactory termination. The 
 Eussians agreed to the destruction of Fort Albazin, but they 
 were allowed to build another at Nerchinsk. 
 
 There is reason to believe that Galdan thought that he 
 might derive some advantage from the complications with 
 Eussia, for his military movements were hastened when he 
 heard that the two powers were embroiled on the Amour, 
 and he proclaimed his intention of invading the Khalka re- 
 gion, because some of their people had murdered his kins- 
 men. Galdan endeavored to conclude an alliance with the 
 Eiissians, who sent an officer to his camp; but they soon 
 came to the determination that it would be more advanta- 
 geous to keep on friendly terms with the Chinese than to em- 
 bark on a hazardous adventure with the chief of an Asiatic 
 horde. The mere rumor of a possible alliance between Gal- 
 dan and the Eussians roused Kanghi to increased activity, 
 and all the picked troops of the Eight Manchu Banners, the 
 Forty-nine Mongol Banners, and the Chinese auxiliaries, 
 were dispatched across the steppe to bring the Napoleon of 
 Central Asia to reason. In face of this formidable danger 
 Galdan showed undiminished courage and energy. Eealiz- 
 ing the peril of inaction, he did not hesitate to assume the 
 offensive, and the war began with a victory he gained over 
 a general named Horni, within the limits of Chinese terri- 
 tory. The moral of this success was that it showed that 
 Kanghi had not decided a moment too soon in resorting to 
 extreme measures against the ambitious potentate who found 
 the Gobi Desert and the surrounding region too circumscribed 
 for his ambition. 
 
 Kanghi intrusted the chief command of his armies to his
 
 208 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 brother, Yu Tsing Wang, who justified his appointment by 
 bringing the Eleuth forces speedily to an engagement, and 
 by gaining a more or less decisive victory over them at Oulan 
 Poutong. The loss was considerable on both sides, among 
 the imperial officers killed being an uncle of the emperor; 
 but Gal dan's forces suffered a great deal more during the 
 retreat than they had done in the action. After this dis- 
 aster Galdan signed a treaty with the Chinese commander, 
 Yu Tsing Wang. At first he attempted to gain an advan- 
 tage by excluding his personal enemies, the Khalkas, from 
 it, but the Chinese were not to be entrapped into any such 
 arrangement, and, standing up for their dependants, the 
 provisions of the treaty provided equally for their safety 
 and for the acceptance by Galdan of the supremacy of 
 China. This new arrangement or treaty was concluded in 
 1690, but Kanghi himself seems to have placed no great 
 faith in the sincerity of Galdan, and to have regarded it 
 merely as a truce. This view was soon found to be correct, 
 for neither side laid aside their arms, and the unusual vigi- 
 lance of the Chinese gave Galdan additional cause for um- 
 brage. Kanghi showed that he was resolved not to let the 
 terms, to which Galdan had subscribed, become a dead let- 
 ter. He summoned a great assemblage of the Khalka tribes 
 on the plain of Dolonor — the Seven Springs near Changtu — 
 and he attended it in person, bestowing gifts and titles with 
 a lavish hand. Kanghi was thus able to convince himself 
 that, so far as the Mongol tribes were concerned, he might 
 count on their loyalty and support. He then began to estab- 
 lish an understanding with Tse Wang Rabdan, and thus ob- 
 tain an ally in the rear of Galdan. This latter circumstance 
 was the direct cause of the second war with Galdan, for 
 Kanghi's embassador was waylaid and murdered in the 
 neighborhood of Hami. The outrage for which, whether he 
 inspired it or not, Galdan was held blameworthy, aroused 
 the strongest resentment and anger of Kanghi. 
 
 Kanghi made extraordinary preparations for the cam- 
 paign. He placed four armies in the field numbering about
 
 THE EMPEROR KANQHI 209 
 
 150,000 combatants, and it has been computed that, with 
 non-combatants, the total of men employed did not fall 
 short of a million. The first of these armies numbered 
 35,600 men, and was intrusted to Feyanku, the Ney of the 
 Manchu army. Kanghi took personal command of the sec- 
 ond, and its strength is given at 37,700 men; and the third 
 army, 35,400 men, was placed under the orders of Sapsu. 
 The fourth, of unstated but greatest numerical strength, 
 acted as the reserve force for the others, and did not, prop- 
 erly speaking, come into action at all. In order to render 
 the war popular, Kanghi offered special pay to the soldiers, 
 and undertook to provide for the widows and orphans of 
 those slain. At the same time, Kanghi neglected no precau- 
 tion to insure the success of his arms. He provided cotton 
 armor which was proof to the bullet for his cavalry and 
 part of his infantry, and he organized a corps of artillerista 
 mounted on camels, which also carried the light pieces, and 
 rendered good service as "flying artillery." Before setting 
 out for the campaign, the emperor reviewed his army, and 
 he chose for the occasion the date of the popular Feast of 
 Lanterns, when all China takes a holiday. After the in- 
 spection of the numerous and well equipped army an im- 
 pressive ceremony took place. Feyanku approached his 
 sovereign, and received at his hands a cup of wine, which 
 the general took while on his knees, and which, on descend- 
 ing from the steps of the throne, he quaffed in full view of 
 the spectators. Each of his assistant generals and the sub- 
 ordinate officers in groups of ten went through the same 
 ceremony, and the ruin of Galdan was anticipated in the 
 libations of his conquerors. While Feyanku marched to en- 
 counter Galdan wherever he should find him, the ministers 
 and courtiers at Pekin made a strenuous eft'ort to prevent 
 Kanghi taking the field in person, expatiating on the dan- 
 gers of a war in the desert, and of the loss to the empire if 
 anything happened to him. But Kanghi, while thanking 
 them for their solicitude, was not to be deterred from his 
 purpose. He led his army by a parallel route to that pur-
 
 210 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 sued by Feyanku across the Gol)i Desert to Kobdo, where 
 Galdan had established his headquarters. Tlie details of 
 the march are fully described by the Roman Catholic priest, 
 Gerbillon, in his interesting narrative. They reveal the diffi- 
 culties of the enterprise as well as its success. Some detach- 
 ments of the Chinese army were compelled to beat a retreat, 
 but the main body succeeded in making its way to the valley 
 of the Kerulon, where some supplies could be obtained. Fe- 
 yanku's corps, when it reached the neighborhood of the mod- 
 ern Ourga, was reduced to an effective strength of 10,000 
 men, and of Sapsu's army only 2,000 ever reached the scene 
 of operations, and they formed a junction with the force 
 under Feyanku. But Galdan did not possess the military 
 strength to take any advantage of the enfeebled state in 
 which the Chinese armies reached his neighborhood. He 
 abandoned camp after camp, and sought to make good his 
 position by establishing an empty alliance with the Russians 
 in Siberia, from whom he asked 60,000 troops to consum- 
 mate the conquest of China. Such visionary projects as this 
 provided a poor defense against the active operations of a 
 Chinese army in his own country. In a fit bordering on 
 desperation Galdan suddenly determined to risk an attack 
 on the camp of Feyanku at Chowmodo. That general, less 
 fortunate than his sovereign, had been reduced to the verge 
 of distress by the exhaustion of his supplies, and was even 
 meditating a retreat back to China, when the action of Gal- 
 dan relieved him from his dilemma. The exact course of 
 the battle at Chowmodo is not described in any authentic 
 document. During three hours Feyanku stood on the de- 
 fensive, but when he gave the order for attack, the Eleuths 
 broke in confusion before the charge of his cavalry. Two 
 thousand of their best warriors were slain, their organization 
 was shattered, and Galdan became a fugitive in the region 
 where he had posed as undisputed master. This victory un- 
 doubtedly relieved the Chinese from serious embarrassment, 
 and Kanghi felt able to return to Pekin, leaving the further 
 conduct of the war and the pursuit of Galdan in the hands
 
 THE EMPEROR KANOHl 211 
 
 of Fejanku. Formidable enemy as Galdan had proved liim- 
 self, tlie defeat at Chowmodo put an end to his career, and 
 destroyed all his schemes of greatness. The Chinese pur- 
 sued him with great persistence, and at last he died in 1697, 
 either of his deprivations or by the act of his own hand. 
 With Galdan disappeared one of the most remarkable of the 
 desert chiefs; but, although Kanghi flattered himself tliat 
 such would be the case, peace did not settle down on Cen- 
 tral Asia as the consequence of the death of his active and 
 enterprising antagonist. The Chinese armies were recalled 
 for this occasion, and the only force left on the remote fron- 
 tier was a small one under the command of the gallant 
 Feyanku. 
 
 The overthrow and death of Galdan brought Tse Wano' 
 Rabdan into direct contact with the Chinese. He had from 
 his hostile relations with Galdan — the murderer of his father 
 Tsenka — acted as the ally of Kanghi, but when he became 
 the chief of the Eleuths on the death of his uncle, his ideas 
 underwent a change, and he thought more of his dignity 
 and independence. No rupture might have taken place, but 
 that the Chinese, in their implacable resolve to exterminate 
 the family of their enemy Galdan, demanded from Tse Wano- 
 Rabdan not only the bones of that chieftain, but also the 
 persons of his son and daughter, who had taken refuge with 
 him. Tse Wang Rabdan resented both the demand itself 
 and the language in which it was expressed. He evaded 
 the requests sent by Feyanku, and he addressed a letter of 
 remonstrance to Kanghi, in the course of which he said, 
 "The war being now concluded, past injuries ought to be 
 buried in oblivion. Pity should be shown to the vanquished, 
 and it would be barbarous to think of nothing but of how to 
 overwhelm them. It is the first law inspired by humanity, 
 and one which custom has consecrated from the earliest pe- 
 riod among us who are Eleuths." Kanghi, undeterred by 
 this homily, continued to press his demand, and sent several 
 missions to the Eleuth camp to obtain the surrender of Gal- 
 dan's remains and relations. His pertinacity was at last
 
 212 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 rewarded, and the bones of his old opponent were surren- 
 dered to be scattered as those of a traitor throughout China, 
 and his son was sent to Pekin, where, however, he received 
 an honorable appointment in lieu of being handed over to 
 the public executioner. Although Tse Wang Eabdan at 
 last conceded to Kanghi what he demanded, his general 
 action soon marked him out as the antagonist of the Chinese 
 in Central Asia. He first vanquished in battle, and then 
 established an alliance with the Kirghiz, and thus his mili- 
 tarv forces were recruited from the whole of the vast terri- 
 tory from Hami on the east to Khokand on the west. 
 
 The main object of his policy was to assert his influence 
 and authority in Tibet, and to make the ruling lama at 
 Lhasa accept whatever course he might dictate for him. 
 Galdan had at one time entertained the same idea; but 
 probably because he had not as good means of access into 
 the country as Tse Wang Rabdan had, on account of his 
 possession of Khoten, it lay dormant until it was dispelled 
 by the rupture after his adoption of Mohammedanism. Up 
 to this time China had been content with a very shadowy 
 hold on Tibet, and she had no resident representative at 
 Lhasa. But Kanghi, convinced of the importance of main- 
 taining his supremacy in Tibet, took energetic measures to 
 counteract the Eleuth intrigues, and for a time there was a 
 keen diplomatic struggle between the contending potentates. 
 From an early period the supremacy in the Tibetan admin- 
 istration had been disputed between two different classes, 
 the one which represented the military body making use of 
 religious matters to forward its designs, the other being an 
 order of priests supported by the unquestioning faith and 
 confidence of the mass of the people. The former became 
 known as Red Caps and the latter as Yellow Caps. The 
 rivalry between these classes had been keen before, and was 
 still bitterly contested when Chuntche first ascended the 
 throne; but victory had finally inclined to the side of the 
 Yellow Caps before the fall of Galdan. The Dalai Lama 
 was their great spiritual head, and his triumph had been
 
 THE EMPEROR RANG HI 213 
 
 assisted by the intervention and influence of the Manchu 
 emperor. The Red Caps were driven out of the country 
 into Bhutan, where they still hold sway. After this suc- 
 cess a new functionary, with both civil and military author- 
 ity, was appointed to carry on the administration, under the 
 orders of the Dalai Lama, who was supposed to be lost in 
 his spiritual speculations and religious devotions. This func- 
 tionary received the name of the Tipa, and, encouraged by 
 the little control exercised over his acts, he soon began to 
 carry on intrigues for the elevation of his own power at the 
 expense of that of his priestly superiors. The ambition of 
 one Tipa led to his fall and execution, but the offense was 
 attributed to the individual, and a new one was appointed. 
 This second Tipa was the reputed son of a Dalai Lama, and 
 when his father died in 1682 he kept the fact of his death 
 secret, giving out that he had only retired into the recesses 
 of the palace, and ruled the state in his name for the space 
 of sixteen years. The Tipa well knew that he could not 
 hope to obtain the approval of Kanghi for what he had done, 
 and he had made overtures to the princes of Jungaria for 
 protection, whenever he might require it, against the Chi- 
 nese emperor. At last the truth was divulged, and Kanghi 
 was most indignant at having been duped, and threatened 
 to send an army to punish the Tipa for his crime. Then the 
 Tipa selected a new Dalai Lama, and endeavored to appease 
 Kanghi, but his choice proved unfortunate because it did 
 not satisfy the Tibetans. His own general, Latsan Khan, 
 made himself the executor of public opinion. The Tipa was 
 slain with most of his supporters, and the boy Dalai Lama 
 shared the same fate. These occurrences did not insure the 
 tranquillity of the state, for when another Dalai Lama was 
 found, the selection was not agreeable to Latsan Khan, and 
 his friends had to convey the youth for safety to Sining, in 
 China. 
 
 It was at this moment that Tse Wang Rabdan determined 
 to interfere in Tibet, and, strangely enough, instead of at- 
 tempting to make Latsan Khan his friend, he at once resolved
 
 214 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 to treat tim as an enemy, throwing his son, who happened 
 to be at Hi, into prison. He then dispatched an army into 
 Tibet to crush Latsan Khan, and at the same time he sent a 
 force against Sining in the hope of gaining possession of the 
 person of the young Dalai Lama. The Eleuth army quitted 
 the banks of the Hi in 1709, under the command of Zeren 
 Donduk, and having crossed Eastern Turkestan appeared in 
 due course before Lhasa. It met with little or no resistance. 
 Latsan Khan was slain, and the Eleuth army collected an 
 incalculable quantity of spoil, with which it returned to the 
 banks of the Hi. The expedition against Sining failed, and 
 the rapid advance of a Chinese army compelled the retreat 
 of Zeren Donduk without having attained any permanent 
 success. As the Eleuth army had evacuated Tibet there 
 was no object in sending Chinese troops into that state, and 
 Kanghi's generals were instructed to march westward from 
 Hami to Turfan. But their movements were marked by 
 carelessness or over-conlidence, and the Eleuths surprised 
 their camp and inflicted such loss upon Kanghi's commanders 
 that they had even to evacuate Hami. But this was only 
 a temporary reverse. A fresh Manchu army soon retrieved 
 it, and Hami again became the bulwark of the Chinese 
 frontier. At the same time Kanghi sent a garrison to Tibet, 
 and appointed resident ambans at Lhasa, which officiala 
 China has retained there ever since. The war with Tse 
 Wang Rabdan was not ended by these successes, for he 
 resorted to the hereditary tactics of his family, retiring when 
 the Chinese appeared in force, and then advancing on their 
 retreat. As Kanghi wrote, they are "like wolves who, at 
 the sight of the huntsmen, scatter to their dens, and at the 
 withdrawal of danger assemble again round the prey they 
 have abandoned with regret. Such was the policy of these 
 desert robbers." The last year of Kanghi's reign was illus- 
 trated by a more than usually decisive victory over the 
 forces of Tse "Wang Rabdan, which a courtier declared to 
 be "equivalent to the conquest of Tibet"; but on the whole 
 the utmost success that can be claimed for Kanghi's policy
 
 THE EMPEROR KANGHI 215 
 
 was that it repelled the chronic danger from the deaert chiefs 
 and their turbulent followers to a greater distance from the 
 immediate frontier of the empire than had been the case for 
 many centuries. He left the task of breaking the Eleuth 
 power to his grandson, Keen Lung. 
 
 The close of Kanghi's reign witnessed a decline in the 
 interest he took in the representatives of Europe, and this 
 was not revived by the splendor of the embassy which Peter 
 the Great sent to Pekin in 1719. The embassy consisted 
 of the embassador himself, M. Ismaloff; his secretary, M. de 
 Lange; the English traveler, Mr. Bell, and a considerable 
 suite. Kanghi received in the most gracious manner the let- 
 ter which Peter addressed to him in the following terms: 
 "To the emperor of the vast countries of Asia, to the Sover- 
 eign Monarch of Bogdo, to the Supreme Majesty of Khitay, 
 friendship and greeting. With the design I possess of hold- 
 ing and increasing the friendship and close relations long 
 established between your Majesty and my predecessors and 
 myself, I have thought it right to send to your court, in the 
 capacity of embassador-extraordinary, Leon Ismaloff, cap- 
 tain in my guards. I beg you will receive him in a manner 
 suitable to the character in which he comes, to have regard 
 and to attach as much faith to what he may say on the sub- 
 ject of our mutual affairs as if I were speaking to you myself, 
 and also to permit his residing at your Court of Pekin until 
 I recall him. Allow me to sign myself your Majesty's good 
 friend, Peter." Kanghi gave the Russian envoy a very 
 honorable reception. A house was set apart for his accom- 
 modation, and when the difficulties raised by the mandarins 
 on the question of the kotao ceremony at the audience threat- 
 ened to bring the embassy to an abortive end, Kanghi him- 
 self intervened with a suggestion that solved the difficulty. 
 He arranged that his principal minister should perform the 
 kotao to the letter of the Russian emperor, while the Russian 
 envoy rendered him the same obeisance. The audience then 
 took place without further delay, and it was allowed on all 
 hands that no foreign embassy had ever been received with
 
 216 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 greater honor in China than this. Ismaloff returned to his 
 master with the most roseate account of his reception and 
 of the opening in China for Kussian trade. A large and rich 
 caravan was accordingly fitted out bj Peter, to proceed to 
 Pekin; but when it arrived it found a very different state 
 of affairs from what Ismaloff had pictured. Kanghi lay on 
 his deathbed, the anti-foreign ministers were supreme, de- 
 claring that "trade was a matter of little consequence, and 
 regarded by them with contempt," and the Russians were 
 ignominiously sent back to Siberia with the final declaration 
 that such intercourse as was unavoidable must be restricted 
 to the frontier. Thus summarily was ended Peter's dream 
 of tapping the wealth of China. 
 
 Although Kanghi was not altogether free from domestic 
 trouble, through the ambition of his many sons to succeed 
 him, his life must on the whole be said to have passed along 
 tranquilly enough apart from his cares of state. The public 
 acts and magnificent exploits of his reign prove him to have 
 been wise, courageous, and magnanimous, and his private 
 life will bear the most searching examination, and only 
 render his virtue the more conspicuous. He always showed 
 a tender solicitude for the interests of his people, which was 
 proved, among other things, by his giving up his annual 
 tours through his dominions on account of the expense thrown 
 on his subjects by the inevitable size of his retinue. His 
 active habits as a hunter, a rider, and even as a pedestrian, 
 were subjects of admiring comment on the part of the Chi- 
 nese people, and he was one of their few rulers who made 
 it a habit to walk through the streets of his capital. He 
 was also conspicuous as the patron of learning; notably 
 in his support of the foreign missionaries as geographers 
 and cartographers. He was also the consistent and ener- 
 getic supporter of the celebrated Haulin College, and, as he 
 was no ordinary litterateur himself, this is not surprising. 
 His own works filled a hundred volumes, prominent among 
 which were his Sixteen Maxims on the Art of Government, 
 and it is believed that he took a large part in bringing out
 
 THE EMPEROR KANOHI 217 
 
 the Imperial Dictionary of tlie Hanlin College. His writings 
 were marked by a high code of morality as well as by the 
 lofty ideas of a broad-minded statesman. His enemies have 
 imputed to him an excessive vanity and avarice; but the 
 whole tenor of his life disproves the former statement, and, 
 whatever foundation in fact the latter may have had, he 
 never carried it to any greater length than mere prudence 
 and consideration for the wants of his people demanded. 
 We know that he resorted to gentle pressure to attain his 
 ends rather than to tyrannical force. When he wished to 
 levy a heavy contributioa from a too rich subject he had 
 recourse to what may be styled a mild joke, sooner than to 
 threats and corporal punishment. The following incident 
 has been quoted in this connection: One day Kanghi made 
 an oificial, who had grown very wealthy, lead him, riding 
 on an ass, round his gardens. As recompense the emperor 
 gave him a tael. Then he himself led the mandarin in sim- 
 ilar fashion. At the end of the tour he asked how much 
 greater he was than his minister? "The comparison is im- 
 possible," said the ready courtier. "Then I must make the 
 estimate myself," replied Kanghi. "lam 20,000 times as 
 great, therefore you will pay me 20,000 taels." His reign 
 was singularly free from the executions so common under 
 even the best of Chinese rulers; and, whenever possible, he 
 always tempered justice with mercy. 
 
 Notwithstanding his enfeebled health and the many ill- 
 nesses from which he had suffered in later life, he persisted 
 in following his usual sporting amusements, and he passed 
 the winter of 1722 at his hunting-box at Haidsu. He seems 
 to have caught a chill, and after a brief illness he died on the 
 20th of December in that year. 
 
 The place of Kanghi among Chinese sovereigns is clearly 
 defined. He ranks on almost equal terms with the two 
 greatest of them all— Taitsong and his own grandson, Keen 
 Lung— and it would be ungracious, if not impossible, to say 
 in what respect he falls short of complete equality with 
 either, so numerous and conspicuous were his talents and his 
 
 China— 10
 
 218 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 virtues. His long friendship and high consideration for the 
 Christian missionaries have no doubt contributed to bring 
 his name and the events of his reign more prominently before 
 Europe than was the case with any other Chinese ruler. 
 But, although this predilection for European practices may 
 have had the effect of strengthening his claims to precede 
 every other of his country's rulers, it can add but little to the 
 impression produced on even the most cursory reader by the 
 remarkable achievements in peace and war accomplished by 
 this gifted emperor. Kanghi's genius dominates one of the 
 most critical periods in Chinese history, of which the narra- 
 tive should form neither an uninteresting nor an uninstruc* 
 tive theme. Celebrated as the consolidator and completer 
 of the Manchu conquest, Kanghi's virtue and moderation 
 have gained him permanent fame as a wise, just, and benefi- 
 cent national sovereign in the hearts of the Chinese people. 
 
 CHAPTER XH 
 
 A SHORT REIGN AND THE BEGINNING OF A LONG ONE 
 
 Immediately after the death of Kanghi, his fourth sou, 
 who had long been designated as his heir, was proclaimed 
 emperor, under the style of Yung Ching, which name meana 
 *'the indissoluble concord or stable peace." The late em- 
 peror had always favored this prince, and in his will he 
 publicly proclaimed that he bore much resemblance to him- 
 self, and that he was a man of rare and precious character. 
 His first acts indicated considerable vigor and decision of 
 mind. In the edict announcing the death of his father and 
 his own accession he said that on the advice of his ministers 
 he had entered upon the discharge of his imperial duties 
 without giving up precious time to the indulgence of his 
 natural grief, which would be gratifying to his feelings but 
 injurious to the public interests. As Yung Ching was of the 
 mature age of forty-five, and as he had enjoyed the confi-
 
 4 SHORT REIGN 219 
 
 dence of his predecessor, he was fully qualified to carry on 
 the administration. He declared that his main purpose was 
 to continue his father's work, and that he would tread as 
 closely as he could in Kanghi's footsteps. While Yung 
 Ching took these prompt steps to secure himself on the 
 throne, some of his brothers assumed an attitude of menacing 
 hostility toward him, and all his energy and vigilance were 
 required to counteract their designs. A very little time was 
 needed, however, to show that Kanghi had selected his 
 worthiest son as his successor, and that China would have 
 no reason to fear under Yung Ching the loss of any of the 
 benefits conferred on the nation by Kanghi. His fine pres* 
 ence, and frank, open manner secured for him the sympathy 
 and applause of the public, and in a very short time he also 
 gained their respect and admiration by his wisdom and 
 justice. 
 
 The most important and formidable of his brothers was 
 the fourteenth son of Kanghi, by the same mother, however, 
 as that of Yung Ching. He and his son Poki had been 
 regarded with no inconsiderable favor by Kanghi, and at 
 one time it was thought that he would have chosen them 
 as his successors; but these expectations were disappointed. 
 He was sent instead to hold the chief command against the 
 Eleuths on the western borders. Yung Ching determined 
 to remove him from thi§ post, in which he might have oppor- 
 tunities of asserting his independence, and for a moment it 
 seemed as if he might disobey. But more prudent counsels 
 prevailed, and he returned to Pekin, where he was placed 
 in honorable confinement, and retained there during the 
 whole of Yung Ching's reign. He and his son owed their 
 release thirteen years later to the greater clemency or self- 
 confidence of Keen Lung. Another brother, named Sessaka, 
 also fell under suspicion, and he was arrested and his estates 
 confiscated. He was then so far forgiven that a small mili- 
 tary command was given him in the provinces. Others of 
 more importance were involved in his affairs. Lessihin, son 
 of Prince Soumiama, an elder brother of Kanghi, was de-
 
 220 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 nounced aa a sympathizer and supporter of Sessaka. The 
 charge seems to have been based on slender evidence, but 
 it sufficed to cause the banishment of this personage and all 
 his family to Sining. It appears as if they were specially 
 punished for having become Christians, and there is no doubt 
 that their conversion imbittered the emperor's mind against 
 the Christian missionaries and their religion. It enabled him 
 to say, or at least induced him to accept the statement, that 
 the Christians meddled and took a side in the internal politics 
 of the country. Yung Ching saw and seized his opportunity. 
 His measures of repression against the recalcitrant party in 
 his own family culminated in the summary exile of Sourni- 
 ama and all his descendants down to the fourth generation. 
 Sourniama vainly endeavored to establish his innocence, 
 and he sent three of his sons, laden with chains, to the 
 palace, to protest his innocence and devotion. But they 
 were refused audience, and Sourniama and his family sank 
 into oblivion and wretchedness on the outskirts of the empire. 
 Having thus settled the difficulties within his own fam- 
 ily, Yung Ching next turned his attention to humbling the 
 bold band of foreigners who had established themselves in 
 the capital and throughout the country, as much by their 
 own persistency and indifference to slight as by the acquies- 
 cence of the Chinese government, and who, after they had 
 reached some of the highest official po'sts, continued to preach 
 and propagate their gospel of a supreme power and mercy 
 beyond the control of kings, a gospel which was simply de- 
 structive of the paternal and sacred claims on which a Chi- 
 nese emperor based his authority as superior to all earthly 
 interference, and as transmitted to him direct from Heaven. 
 The official classes confirmed the emperor's suspicions, and 
 encouraged him to proceed to extreme lengths. On all sides 
 offenses were freely laid at the doors of the missionaries. It 
 was said of them that "their doctrine sows trouble among 
 the people, and makes them doubt the goodness of our laws. " 
 In the province of Fuhkien their eighteen churches were 
 closed, and the priests were summarily ordered to return to
 
 A SHORT REION 221 
 
 Macao. At Pekin itself the Jesuits lost all their influence. 
 Those who had been well-disposed toward them were either 
 banished or cowed into silence. The emperor turned his 
 back on them and refused to see them, and thej could only 
 wait with their usual fortitude until the period of imperial 
 displeasure had passed over. When they endeavored to en- 
 list in their support the sympathy and influence of the em- 
 peror's brother — the thirteenth prince — who in Kanghi's time 
 had been considered their friend, they met with a rebuff not 
 unnatural or unreasonable when the mishaps to his relations 
 for their Christian proclivities are borne in mind. This prince 
 said, in words which have often been repeated since by Chi- 
 nese ministers and political writers, "What would you say 
 if our people were to go to Europe and wished to change 
 there the laws and customs established by your ancient sages ? 
 The emperor, my brother, wishes to put an end to all this in 
 an effectual manner. I have seen the accusation of the 
 Tsongtou of Fuhkien. It is undoubtedly strong, and your 
 disputes about our customs have greatly injured you. What 
 would you say if we were to transport ourselves to Europe 
 and to act there as you have done here ? Would you stand 
 it for a moment ? In the course of time I shall master this 
 business, but I declare to you that China will want for noth- 
 ing when you cease to live in it, and that your absence will 
 not cause it any loss. Here nobody is retained by force, and 
 nobody also will be siiffered to break the laws or to make 
 light of our customs. ' ' 
 
 The influence of Yung Ching on the development of the 
 important foreign question arrested the ambition and san- 
 guine flight of the imagination of the Eoman Catholic mis- 
 sionaries, who, rendered overconfident by their success un- 
 der Kanghi, believed that they held the future of China in 
 their own hands, and that persistency alone was needed to 
 secure the adhesion of that countiy to the Christian Churck 
 Yung Ching dispelled these illusions, and so far as they 
 were illusions, which nearly two subsequent centuries have 
 proved them to be, it was well that they should be so dis-
 
 222 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 pelled. He asserted himself in very unequivocal terms as. 
 an emperor of China, and as resolute in maintaining his sov- 
 ereign position outside the control of any religious potentate 
 or creed. The progress of the Christian religion of the Ro- 
 man Catholic Church in China was quite incompatible with 
 the supposed celestial origin of the emperor, who was alleged 
 to receive his authority direct from Heaven. It is not sur- 
 prising that Yung Ching, at the earliest possible moment, 
 decided to blight these hopes, and to assert the natural and 
 inherited prerogative of a Chinese emperor. There is no 
 room to doubt that the Catholic priests had drawn a too 
 hasty and too favorable deduction from the favor of Kanghi. 
 They confounded their practical utility with the intrinsic 
 merit and persuasive force of Christianity. An enlightened 
 ruler had recognized the former, but a skeptical people showed 
 themselves singularly obdurate to the latter. The persecu- 
 tion of the Christians, of which the letters from the mission- 
 aries at Pekin at this time are so full, did not go beyond the 
 placing of some restraint on the preaching of their religion. 
 No wholesale executions or sweeping decrees passed against 
 their j^ersons attended its course or marked its development. 
 Yung Ching simply showed by his conduct that they must 
 count no longer on the favor of the emperor in the carrying 
 out of their designs. The difficulties inherent in the task 
 they had undertaken stood for the first time fully revealed, 
 and having been denounced as a source of possible danger 
 to the stability of the empire, they became an object of 
 suspicion even to those who had sympathized with them 
 personally, if not with their creed. 
 
 The early years of the reign of Yung Ching were marked 
 by extraordinary public misfortunes. The flooding of the 
 Hoangho entailed a famine, which spread such desolation 
 througliout the northern provinces that it is affirmed, on 
 credible authority, that 40,000 persons were fed at the state 
 expense in Pekin alone for a period of four months. The 
 taxes in some of the most important cities and wealthiest 
 districts had to be greatly reduced, and the resources of the
 
 A SHORT REIGN 223 
 
 exchequer were severely strained. But tlie loss and suffering 
 caused by the famine were speedily cast into the shade by a 
 terrible and sudden visitation which carried desolation and 
 destruction throughout the whole of the metropolitan prov- 
 ince of Pechihli. The northern districts of China have for 
 many centuries been liable to the frequent recurrence of 
 earthquakes on a terribly vast and disastrous scale, but none 
 of them equaled in its terrific proportions that of the year 
 1730. It came without warning, but the shocks continued 
 for ten days. Over 100,000 persons were overwhelmed in 
 a moment at Pekin, the suburbs were laid in ruins, the im- 
 perial palace was destroyed, the summer residence at Yuen 
 Ming Yuen, on which Yung Ching had lavished his taste 
 and his treasure, suffered in scarcely a less degree. The 
 emperor and the inhabitants fled from the city, and took 
 shelter without the walls, where they encamped. The loss 
 was incalculable, and it has been stated that Yung Ching 
 expended seventy-five million dollars in repairing the damage 
 and allaying the public misfortune. Notwithstanding these 
 national calamities the population increased, and in some 
 provinces threatened to outgrow the production of rice. 
 Various devices were resorted to to check the growth of the 
 population ; but they were all of a simple and harmless char- 
 acter, such as the issue of rewards to widows who did not 
 marry again and to bachelors who preserved their state. 
 
 The military events of Yung Ching' s reign were confined 
 to the side of Central Asia, where Tse "Wang Rabdan emu- 
 lated with more than ordinary success the example of his 
 predecessors, and where he transmitted his power and author- 
 ity to his son, Galdan Chereng, on his death in 1727. He 
 established his sovereignty over the whole of Kashgaria, 
 which he ruled through a prince named Daniel, and he 
 established relations with the Russians, which at one time 
 promised to attain a cordial character, but which were sud- 
 denly converted into hostility by the Russian belief that the 
 Upper Urtish lay in a gold region which they resolved to 
 conquer. Instead of an ally they then found in Tse Wang
 
 224 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Rabdan the successful defender of that region. But the 
 wars of Central Asia had no interest for Yung Ching. He 
 was one of the Chinese rulers who thought that he should 
 regard these matters as outside his concern, and the experi- 
 ence of Kanghi's wars had divided Chinese statesmen into 
 two clearly- defined parties: those who held that China should 
 conquer Central Asia up to the Pamir, and those who thought 
 that the Great Wall was the best practical limit for the exer- 
 cise of Chinese authority. Yung Ching belonged to the lat- 
 ter school, and, instead of dispatching fresh armies into the 
 Gobi region to complete .the triumph of his father, he with- 
 drew those that were there, and publicly proclaimed that the 
 aggressive chiefs and turbulent tribes of that region might 
 fight out their own quarrels, and indulge their own petty 
 ambitions as best they felt disposed. The success of this 
 policy would have been incontestable if it had been reflected 
 in the conduct of the Central Asian princelets, who, how- 
 ever, seemed to see in the moderation and inaction of the 
 Chinese ruler only a fresh incentive to aggression and turbu- 
 lence. Yung Ching himself died too soon to appreciate the 
 shortcomings of his own policy. 
 
 In the midst of his labors as a beneficent ruler the life 
 of Yung Ching was cut short. On October 7, 1735, he gave 
 audience to the high oflicials of his court in accordance with 
 his usual custom; but feeling indisposed he was compelled 
 to break off the interview in a sudden manner. His indis- 
 position at once assumed a grave form, and in a few hours 
 lie had ceased to live. The loss of this emperor does not 
 seem to have caused any profound or widespread sentiment 
 of grief among the masses, although the more intelligent 
 recognized in him one of those wise and prudent rulers whose 
 tenure of power makes their people's happiness. 
 
 Yung Ching died so suddenly that he had not nominated 
 his heir. He left three sons, and, after brief consideration, 
 the eldest of these — to whom was given the name of Keen 
 Lung — was placed upon the throne. The choice was justi- 
 fied by th^ result, although the chroniclers declare that it
 
 A SHORT REION 225 
 
 came as a surprise to the recipient of the honor, as he had 
 passed his life in the pursuit of literary studies rather than 
 in practical administrative work. His skill and proficiency 
 in the field of letters had already been proved before \na 
 father's death; but of public affairs and the government of 
 a vast empire he knew little or nothing. He was a student 
 of books rather than of men, and he had to undergo a pre- 
 liminary course of training in the art of government before 
 he felt himself capable of assuming the reins of power. 
 Moreover, Keen Lung, although the eldest son, was not the 
 offspring of the empress, and the custom of succession in 
 the imperial family was too uncertain to allow any one in his 
 position to feel absolute confidence as to his claims securing 
 the recognition they might seem to warrant. His admission 
 of his being unequal to the duties of his lofty position, not- 
 withstanding that he was twenty- five years of age, was 
 thoroughly characteristic of the man, and augured well for 
 the future of his reign. He appointed four regents, whose 
 special task was to show him how to rule; but in the edict 
 delegating his authority to them he expressly limited its ap- 
 plication to the period of mourning, covering a space of four 
 years; and as a measure of precaution against any undue 
 ambition he made the office terminable at his discretion. 
 
 Keen Lung began his reign with acts of clemency, which 
 seldom fail to add a special luster to a sovereign's assump- 
 tion of power. His father had punished with rigor some of 
 the first princes of the court simply because they were his 
 relations, and there is some ground for thinking that he had 
 put forward antipathy to the foreign heresy of the Christians 
 as a cloak to conceal his private animosities and personal 
 apprehensions. Keen Lung at once resolved to reverse the 
 acts of his predecessor, and to offer such reparation as he 
 could to those who had suffered for no sufficient offense. 
 The sons of Kanghi and their children who had fallen under 
 the suspicion of Yung Ching were released from their con- 
 finement, and restored to their rank and privileges. They 
 showed their gratitude to their benefactor by sustained loy-
 
 226 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 alty and practical service that contributed to the splendor 
 of his long reign. The impression thus produced on the 
 public mind was also most favorable, and already the people 
 were beginning to declare that they had found a worthy suc- 
 cessor to the great Kanghi. 
 
 There is nothing surprising to learn that in consequence 
 of the pardon and restitution of the men who had nominally 
 suffered for their Christian proclivities the foreign mission- 
 aries began to hope and to agitate for an improvement in 
 their lot and condition. They somewhat hastily assumed 
 that the evil days of persecution were over, and that Keen 
 Lung would accord them the same honorable positions as 
 they had enjoyed under his grandfather, Kanghi. These 
 expectations were destined to a rude disappointment, as the 
 party hostile to the Christians remained as strong as ever at 
 court, and the regents were not less prejudiced against them 
 than the ministers of Yung Ching had been. The emperor's 
 own opinion does not ajDpear to have been very strong one 
 way or the other, but it seems probable that he was slightly 
 prejudiced against the foreigners. He certainly assented to 
 an order prohibiting the practice of Christianity by any of 
 his subjects, and ordaining the punishment of those who 
 should obstinately adhere to it. At the same time the for- 
 eign missionaries were ordered to confine their labors to the 
 secular functions in which they were useful, and to give 
 up all attempts to propagate their creed. Still some slight 
 abatement in practice was procured oi these rigid meas- 
 ures through the mediation of the painter Castiglione, who, 
 while taking a portrait of the emperor, pleaded, and not in- 
 effectually, the cause of his countrymen. There was one 
 distinct persecution on a large scale in the province of Fuh- 
 kien, where several Spanish missionaries were tortured, their 
 chief native supporters strangled, and Keen Lung himself 
 sent the order to execute the missionaries in retaliation for 
 the massacre of Chinese subjects by the Spaniards in the 
 Philippines. After he had been on the throne fifteen years, 
 Keen Lung began to unbend toward the foreigners, and to
 
 A SHORT REIGN- 227 
 
 avail himself of tlieir services in the same manner as his 
 grandfather liad done. The artists Castiglione and Attiret 
 were constantly employed in the palace, painting his por- 
 trait and other pictures. Keen Lung is said to have been 
 so pleased with that drawn by Attiret that he wished to 
 make him a mandarin. The French in particular strove 
 to amuse the great monarch, and to enable him to while away 
 his leisure with ingeniously constructed automatons worked 
 by clockwork machinery. He also learned from them much 
 about the politics and material condition of Europe, and it 
 is not surprising that he became imbued with the idea that 
 France was- the greatest and most powerful state in that 
 continent. Almost insensibl}'- Keen Lung entertained a more 
 favorable opinion of the foreigners, and extended to them 
 his protection with other privileges that had long been with- 
 held. But this policy was attributable to practical considera- 
 tions and not to religious belief. 
 
 Very little detailed information is obtainable about the 
 inner working of the government and the annual course of 
 events, owing to the practice of not giving the official history 
 of the dynasty publicity until after it has ceased to reign; so 
 all that can be said with any confidence of the first fifteen 
 years of Keen Lung's reign, is that they were marked by 
 great internal prosperity arising from the tranquillity of the 
 realm and the content of the people. Any misfortunes that 
 befell the realm were of personal importance to the sovereign 
 rather than of national significance, although some of the 
 foreign priests affected to see in them the retribution of 
 Providence for the apathy and tyranny of the Chinese rulers. 
 In 1751 Keen Lung lost both his principal wife, the empress, 
 and his eldest son. His disagreements with his ministers 
 also proved many and serious, and the letters from Pekin 
 note, with more than a gleam of satisfaction, that those 
 who were most prominent as Anti- Christians suffered most 
 heavily. Keen Lung suffered from physical weakness, and 
 a susceptibility to bodily ailments, that detracted during the 
 first few years of his reign from his capacity to discharge all
 
 228 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the duties of liis position, and more tlian their usual share 
 of power consequently fell into the hands of the great tri- 
 bunals of the state. When Keen Lung resolutely devoted 
 himself to the task of supervising the acts of the official 
 world the evils became less perceptible, and gradually the 
 provincial governors found it to be their best and wisest 
 course to obey and faithfully execute the behests of their 
 sovereign. For a brief space Keen Lung seemed likely to 
 prove more indifferent to the duties of his rank than either 
 of his predecessors; but after a few years' practice he hast- 
 ened to devote himself to his w^ork with an energy which 
 neither Kanghi nor Yung Ching had surpassed. 
 
 Keen Lung seems to have passed his time between his 
 palace at Pekin and his hunting-box at Jehol, a small town 
 beyond the Wall. The latter, perhaps, was his favorite resi- 
 dence, because he enjoyed the quiet of the country, and the 
 purer and more invigorating air of the northern region 
 agreed with his constitution. Here he varied the monotony 
 of rural pursuits — for he never became as keen a hunter as 
 Kanghi — with grand ceremonies which he employed the for- 
 eigners in j)ainting. It was at Jehol that he planned most 
 of his military campaigns, and those conquests which carried 
 his banners to the Pamir and the Himalaya. If the earlier 
 period of Keen Lung's reign was tranquil and undisturbed 
 by war, the last forty years made up for it by their sustained 
 military excitement and achievement. As soon as Keen 
 Lung grasped the situation and found that the administra- 
 tion of the country was working in perfect order, he resolved 
 to attain a complete settlement of the questions pending in 
 Central Asia, which his father had shirked. Up to this time 
 Keen Lung had been generally set down as a literary student, 
 as a man more of thought than of action. But his reading 
 had taught him one thing, and that was that the danger to 
 China from the side of Central Asia was one that went back 
 to remote ages, that it had never been allayed, save for brief 
 intervals, and then only by establishing Chinese authority on 
 either side of the Tian Shan. His studies showed Keen Lung
 
 KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS 229 
 
 what ought to be done, and the aggressions of his neighbors 
 soon gave him the opportunity of carrying out the policy 
 that he felt to be the best. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 KEEN lung's wars AND CONQUESTS 
 
 It was the arrival of a chief named Amursana at his 
 court that first led Keen Lung to seriously entertain the idea 
 of advancing into Central Asia, and having determined on 
 the Central Asian campaign, Keen Lung's military prepara- 
 tions were commensurate with the importance and magni- 
 tude of the undertaking. He collected an army of 150,000 
 men, including the picked Manchu Banners and the cele- 
 brated Solon contingent, each of whom was said to be worth 
 ten other soldiers. The command of this army was given 
 to Fanti, the best of the Manchu generals, and Amursana, 
 who accompanied it, received a seal and the honorary title 
 of Great General. But Keen Lung superintended all the 
 operations of the war, and took credit to himself for its 
 successful issue. 
 
 The triumph of Amursana, by the aid of the Chinese, did 
 not bring tranquillity to Central Asia. He was not con- 
 tented with the position to which the friendship of Keen 
 Lung had raised him, and, placing too high an estimate on 
 his own ability and resources, he was inclined to dispute the 
 accepted opinion that all his success was due to the Chinese 
 army. On the termination of the campaign the major por- 
 tion of that army returned to China, but Pauti was left 
 with a select contingent, partly to support Amursana, and 
 partly to secure the restoration of China's authority. Amur- 
 sana, however, considered that the presence of this force 
 detracted from the dignity of his position. Having risen to 
 the greatness he coveted, Amursana meditated casting aside
 
 230 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the prop by whicli lie had risen ; but before he took an irre- 
 traceable step he resolved to make use of the Chinese forces 
 for extending his authority south of the Tian Shan range 
 into Kashgaria. With some hesitation Panti lent him 500 
 Chinese soldiers, and with their aid the Eleuth prince cap- 
 tured the cities of Kashgar and Yarkand, and set up a chief 
 named Barhanuddin Khoja as his nominee. This success 
 confirmed Amursana in his good opinion of himself "and his 
 resources, and when Keen Lung, who had grown mistrustful 
 of his good faith, summoned him to Pekin, he resolved to 
 throw off the mask and his allegiance to China. At this 
 supreme moment of his fate not the least thought of grati- 
 tude to the Chinese emperor, who had made him what he 
 was, seems to have entered his mind. He determined not 
 merely to disregard the summons to Pekin and to proclaim 
 his independence, but also to show the extent of his hostility 
 by adding to his defiance an act of treachery. Before he 
 fully revealed his plans he surprised the Chinese garrison 
 and massacred it to the last man; the valiant Panti, who 
 had gained his victories for him, being executed by the 
 public executioner. 
 
 The impression produced by this event was profound, and 
 when Amursana followed up the blow by spreading abroad 
 rumors of the magnitude of his designs they obtained some 
 credence even among the Mongols. Encouraged by this 
 success he sought to rally those tribes to his side by imputing 
 sinister intentions to Keen Lung, llis emissaries declared 
 that Keen Lung wished to deprive them all of their rank 
 and authority, and that he had summoned Amursana to 
 Pekin only for the purpose of deposing him. To com- 
 plete the quarrel, Amursana declared himself King of the 
 Eleuths, and absolutely independent of China. But the 
 energy and indignation of Keen Lung soon exposed the hol- 
 hiwness of these designs, and the inadequacy of Amursana's 
 power and capacity to make good his pretensions. Keen 
 Lung collected another army larger than that which had 
 placed him on his throne, to hurl Amursana from the su-
 
 KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS 231 
 
 premacy which, had not satisfied him and which he had 
 grossly abused. 
 
 The armies of Keen Lung traversed the Gobi Desert and 
 arrived in Central Asia, but the incapacity of his generals 
 prevented the campaigns having those decisive results which 
 he expected. The autocratic Chinese ruler treated his gen- 
 erals who failed like the fickle French Eepublic. The pen- 
 alty of failure was a public execution. Keen Lung would 
 accept nothing short of the capture of Amursana as evidence 
 of his victory, and Amursana escaped to the Kirghiz. His 
 celerity or ingenuity cost the lives of four respectable Chinese 
 generals, two of whom were executed at Pekin and two were 
 slain by brigands on their way there to share the same fate. 
 Emboldened by the inability of the Chinese to capture him, 
 Amursana again assembled an army and pursued the retiring 
 Chinese across the desert, where he succeeded in inflicting 
 no inconsiderable loss upon them. 
 
 When the Chinese army retired before Amursana one 
 corps maintained its position and successfully defied him, 
 thanks to the capacity of its commander, Tchaohoei. Tchao- 
 hoei not merely held his ground, but drew up a -scheme for 
 regaining all that had been lost in Central Asia, and Keen 
 Lung was so impressed by it that he at once resolved to 
 intrust the execution of his policy to the only ofiicer who 
 had shown any military capacity. Two fresh armies were 
 sent to the Hi, and placed, on their arrival there, under the 
 command of Tchaohoei, who was exhorted, above all things, 
 to capture Amursana, dead or alive. Tchaohoei at once 
 assumed the offensive, and as Amursana was abandoned by 
 his followers as soon as they saw that China was putting 
 forth the whole of her strength, he had no alternative but 
 once more to flee for shelter to the Kirghiz. But the condi- 
 tions imposed by Keen Lung were so rigorous that Tchaohoei 
 realized that the capture of Amursana was essential to his 
 gaining the confidence and gratitude of his master. He, 
 therefore, sent his best lieutenant, Fouta, to pursue the 
 Eleuth prince. Fouta pursued Amursana with the energy
 
 232 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 of one who has to gain his spurs, and he almost succeeded 
 in effecting his capture, but Amursana just made his escape 
 in time across the frontier into Russian territory. But Keen 
 Lung was not satisfied with this result, and he sent both to 
 Fouta and Tchaohoei to rest satisfied with nothing short 
 of the capture of Amursana. The close of that unfortunate 
 prince's career was near at hand, although it was not ended 
 by the act of the Chinese officers. He died in Russian ter- 
 ritory of a fever, and when the Chinese demanded of their 
 neighbors that his body should be surrendered they refused, 
 on the ground that enmity should cease with death; but 
 Fouta was able to report to his sovereign that he had seen 
 with his own eyes the mortal remains of the Eleuth chief 
 who had first been the humble friend and then the bitter 
 foe of the Manchu ruler. 
 
 Keen Lung decided to administer the country which he 
 had conquered. But another step was seen to be necessary 
 to give stability to the Chinese administration, and that was 
 the annexation of Kashgaria. The great region of Little 
 Bokhara or Eastern Turkestan, known to us now under the 
 more convenient form of Kashgaria, was still ruled by the 
 Khoja Barhanuddin, who had been placed in power by 
 Amursana, and it afforded a shelter for all the disaffected, 
 and a base of hostility against the Chinese. Even if Tchao- 
 hoei had not reported that the possession of Kashgaria 
 was essential to the military security of Jungaria, there is 
 no doubt that sooner or later Keen Lung would have pro- 
 ceeded to extreme lengths with regard to Barhanuddin. The 
 Chinese were fully warranted, however, in treating him as 
 an enemy when he seized an envoy sent to his capital by 
 Tchaohoei and executed him and his escort. This outrage 
 precluded all possibility of an amicable arrangement, and 
 the Chinese prepared their fighting men for the invasion and 
 conquest of Kashgaria. They crossed the frontier in two 
 bodies, one under the command of Tchaohoei, the other 
 under that of Fouta. Any resistance that Barhanuddin 
 and his brother attempted was speedily overcome; the
 
 KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS 233 
 
 principal cities, Kashgar and Yarkand, were occupied, 
 and the ill-advised princes were compelled to seek their 
 personal safety by a precipitate flight. The conquest and 
 annexation of Kashgaria completed the task with which 
 Tchaohoei was charged, and it also realized Keen Lung's 
 main idea by setting up his authority in the midst of the 
 turbulent tribes who had long disturbed the empire, and 
 who first learned peaceful pursuits as his subjects. The 
 Chinese commanders followed up this decided success by 
 the dispatch of several expeditions into the adjoining states. 
 
 The ruler of Khokand was either so much impressed by 
 his neighbor's prowess, or, as there is much reason to believe, 
 experienced himself the weight of their power by the occupa- 
 tion of his principal cities, Tashkent and Khokand, that he 
 hastened to recognize the authority of the emperor and to 
 enroll himself among the tributaries of the Son of Heaven. 
 The tribute he bound himself to pay was sent without a 
 break for a period of half a century. The Kirghiz chiefs 
 of low and high degree imitated his example, and a tirm 
 peace was thus established from one end of Central Asia to 
 the other. The administration was divided between Chinese 
 and native officials, and if there was tyranny, the people 
 suffered rather from that of the Mohammedan Hakim Beg 
 than that of the Confucian Amban. 
 
 Keen Lung was engaged in many more wars than those 
 in Central Asia. On the side of Burma he found his bor- 
 ders disturbed by nomad and predatory tribes not less than 
 in the region of Gobi. These clans had long been a source 
 of annoyance and anxiety to the viceroy of Yunnan, but tlie 
 weakness of the courts of Ava and regu, who stood behind 
 these frontagers, had prevented the local grievance becom- 
 ing a national danger. But the triumph of the remarkable 
 Alompra, who united Pegu and Burma into a single state, 
 and who controlled an army with which he effected many 
 triumphs, showed that this state of things might not always 
 continue, and that the day would come when China might 
 be exposed to a grave peril from this side. The successors
 
 234 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 of Alompra inlierited his pretensions if not his ability, and 
 when the Chinese called upon them to keep the borders in 
 better order or to punish some evil-doers, they sent back a 
 haughty and unsatisfactory reply. Sembuen, the grandson 
 of Alompra, was king when Keen Lung ordered, in the year 
 17^8, his generals to invade Burma, and the conduct of the 
 war was intrusted to an officer in high favor at court, named 
 Count Alikouen, instead of to Fouta, the hero of the Central 
 Asian war, who had fallen under the emperor's grave dis- 
 pleasure for what, after all, appears to have been a trifling 
 offense. The course of the campaign is difficult to follow, 
 for both the Chinese and the Burmese claim the same battles 
 as victories, but this will not surprise those who remember 
 that the Burmese court chroniclers described all the encoun- 
 ters with the English forces in the wars of 1829 and 1858 as 
 having been victorious. The advance of the Chinese army, 
 estimated to exceed 200,000 men, from Bhamo to Ava shows 
 clearly enough the true course of the war, and that the Chi- 
 nese were able to carry all before them up to the gates of the 
 capital. Count Aliicouen did not display any striking mili- 
 tary capacity, but by retaining possession of the country 
 above Ava for three years he at last compelled the Burmese 
 to sue for peace on humiliating terms. 
 
 In previous chapters the growth of China's relations with 
 Tibet has been traced, and especially under the Manchu 
 dynasty. The control established by Kanghi after the retire- 
 ment of the Jungarian army was maintained by both his 
 successors, and for fifty years Tibet had that perfect tran- 
 quillity which is conveyed by the expression that it had 
 no history. The young Dalai Lama, who fled to Sining 
 to escape from Latsan Khan, was restored, and under the 
 name of Lobsang Kalsang pursued a subservient policy to 
 China for half a century. In the year 1749 an unpleasant 
 incident took place through a collision between the Chinese 
 ambaiis and the Civil Regent or Gyalpo, who administered 
 the secular affairs of the DaLai Lama. Tlie former acted in 
 a high-handed and arbitrary manner, and put the Gyalpo
 
 KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS 2'6G 
 
 to death. But in this they went too far, for both tfie Lamas 
 and the people strongly resented it, and revolted against the 
 Chinese, whom they massacred to the last man. For a time 
 it looked as if the matter might have a very serious ending, 
 but Keen Lung contented himself with sending fresh ambans 
 and an escort to Tibet, and enjoining them to abstain from 
 undue interference with the Tibetans. But at the same time 
 that they showed this moderation the Chinese took a very 
 astute measure to render their position stronger than ever. 
 They asserted their right to have the supreme voice in nomi- 
 nating the Gyalpo, and they soon reduced that high official, 
 the Prime Minister of Tibet, to the position of a creature of 
 their own. The policy was both astute and successful. The 
 Tibetans had welcomed the Chinese originally because they 
 saved them from the Eleuth army, and provided a guarantee 
 against a fresh invasion. But the long peace and the de- 
 struction of the Eleuth power had led the Tibetans to think 
 less of the advantage of Chinese protection, and to pine for 
 complete independence. The lamas also bitterly resented the 
 assumption by the ambans of all practical authority. How 
 long these feelings could have continued without an open 
 outbreak must remain a matter of opinion ; but an unexpected 
 event brought into evidence the unwarlike character of the 
 Tibetans, and showed that their country was exposed to 
 many dangers from which only China's protection could 
 preserve them. In Kanghi's time the danger had come 
 from Hi; in the reign of Keen Lung it came from the side 
 of Nepaul. 
 
 As a general rule the mighty chain of the Himalaya has 
 effectually separated the peoples living north and south of 
 it, and the instances in history are rare of any collision be- 
 tween them. Of all such collisions the most important was 
 that which has now to be described as the main cause of the 
 tightening of the hold of China upon Tibet. The mountain 
 kingdom of Nepaul was equally independent of the British 
 and the Mogul Empire of Delhi. It was ruled by three sep- 
 arate kings, until in the year 1769 the Goorkha chief Prithi
 
 236 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Narajan establisted the supremacy of tliat warlike race. 
 The Goorkhas cared nothing for trade, and their exactions 
 resiilted in the cessation of the commercial intercourse which 
 had existed under the Nepaulese kings between India and 
 Tibet. "Their martial instincts led them to carry on raids 
 into both Tibet and India. The Tibetans were unequal to 
 the task of punishing or restraining them, and at last the 
 Goorkhas were inspired with such confidence that they un- 
 dertook the invasion of their country. It is said that the 
 Goorkhas were encouraged to take this step by the belief that 
 the Chinese would not interfere, and that the lamaseries con- 
 tained an incalculable amount of treasure. The Goorkhas 
 invaded Tibet in 1791 with an army of less than 20,000 men, 
 and, advancing through the Kirong and Kuti passes, over- 
 came the frontier guards, and carried all before them up to 
 the town of Degarchi, where they plundered the famous 
 lamasery of Teshu Lumbo, the residence of the Teshu Lama. 
 Having achieved this success and gratified their desire for 
 plunder, the Goorkhas remained inactive for some weeks, 
 and wasted much precious time. The Tibetans did not 
 attempt a resistance, which their want of military skill and 
 their natural cowardice would have rendered futile, but they 
 sent express messengers to Pekin entreating the Chinese 
 emperor to send an army to their assistance. Keen Lung 
 had not sent troops to put a stop to the raids committed on 
 the frontier by the Goorkhas; but when he heard that a por- 
 tion of his dominions was invaded, and that the predomi- 
 nance of his country in the holy land of Buddhism was in 
 danger, he at once ordered his generals to collect all the forces 
 they could and to march without delay to expel the foreign 
 invader. He may liave been urged to increased activity by 
 the knowledge that the Tibetans had also appealed for aid 
 to the British, and by his being ignorant what steps the 
 Indian Government would take. Within a very short time 
 of the receipt of the appeal for assistance a Chinese army of 
 70,000 men was dispatched into Tibet, and the Goorkhas, 
 awed by this much larger force, began their retreat to their
 
 KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS 237 
 
 own country. Their march was delayed by the magnitude 
 of their spoil, and before they had reached the passes through 
 the Himalaya the Chinese army had caught them up. In 
 the hope of securing a safe retreat for his baggage and 
 booty, the Groorkha commander drew up his force in battle 
 array on the plain of Tengri Mai dan, outside the northern 
 entrance of the Kirong Pass, and the Chinese general, Sund 
 Fo, made his dispositions to attack the Goorkhas; but before 
 delivering his attack he sent a letter reciting the outrages 
 committed, and the terms on which his imperial master 
 would grant peace. Among these were the restitution of 
 the plunder and the surrender of the renegade lama, whose 
 tales were said to have whetted the cupidity of the Goorkhas. 
 A haughty reply was sent back, and the Chinese were told 
 to do their worst. 
 
 In the desperately contested battle which ensued the vic- 
 tory was decisive, and the Goorkha king at once sued for 
 peace, which was readily granted, as the Chinese had at- 
 tained all their objects, and Sund Fo was beginning to be 
 anxious about his retreat owing to the approach of winter. 
 "When, therefore, the Goorkha embassy entered his camp 
 Sund Fo granted terms which, although humiliating, were 
 as favorable as a defeated people could expect. The Goor- 
 khas took an oath to keep the peace toward their Tibetan 
 neighbors, to acknowledge themselves the vassals of the 
 Chinese emperor, to send a quinquennial embassy to China 
 with the required tribute, and, lastly, to restore all the 
 plunder that had been carried off from Teshu Lumbo. The 
 exact language of this treaty has never been published, but 
 its provisions have been faithfully kept. The Goorkhas still 
 pay tribute to China; they have kept the peace with one in- 
 significant exception ever since on the Tibetan border; and 
 they are correctly included among the vassals of Pekin at 
 the present time. The gratitude of the Tibetans, as well as 
 the increased numbers of the Chinese garrison, insured the 
 security of China's position in Tibet, and, as both the Tibe- 
 tans and the Goorkhas considered that the English deserted
 
 238 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 tiiem in their hour of need, for the latter when hard pressed 
 also appealed to us for assistance, China has had no diffi- 
 culty in effectually closing Tihet to Indian trade. China 
 closed all the passes on the Nepaul frontier, and only 
 allowed the quinquennial mission to enter by the Kirong 
 Pass. Among all the military feats of China none is more 
 remarkable or creditable than the overthrow of the Goor- 
 khas, who are among the bravest of Indian races, and who, 
 only twenty years after their crushing defeat by Sund Fo, 
 gave the Anglo-Indian anny and one of its best command- 
 ers, Sir David Ochterloney, an infinity of trouble in two 
 doubtful and keenly contested campaigns. 
 
 Keen Lung's war in Formosa calls for only brief notice; 
 but, in concluding our notice of his many military conquests 
 and campaigns, some description must be given of the great 
 rising in an island which Chinese writers have styled "the 
 natural home of sedition and disaffection." In the year 
 1786 the islanders rose, slaughtered the Tartar garrisons, 
 and completely subverted the emperor's authority. The re- 
 volt was one not on the part of the savage islanders them- 
 selves, but of the Chinese colonists, who were goaded into 
 insurrection by the tyranny of the Manchu officials. At 
 first it did not assume serious dimensions, and it seemed as 
 if it would pass over without any general rising, when the 
 orders of the Viceroy of Fuhkien, to which Formosa was 
 dependent until made a separate province a few years ago, 
 fanned the fuel of disaffection to a flame. The popular 
 leader Ling organized the best government he could, and, 
 when Keen Lung offered to negotiate, laid down three con- 
 ditions as the basis of negotiation. They were that "the 
 mandarin who had ordered the cruel measures of repres- 
 sion should be executed," that "Ling personally should 
 never be required to go to Pekin," and, thirdly, that "the 
 mandarins should abandon their old tyrannical ways." 
 Keen Lung's terms were an unconditional surrender and 
 trust in his clemency, which Ling, with perhaps the Miaotze 
 incident fresh in his mind, refused. At first Keen Lung sent
 
 KEEN LUNG'S WARS AND CONQUESTS 239 
 
 numerous but detached expeditions to reassert lus power; 
 but tliese were attacked in detail, and overwhelmed by 
 Ling. Keen Lung said that "his heart was in suspense 
 both by night and by day as to the issue of the war in 
 Formosa' ' ; but, undismayed by his reverses, the emperor 
 sent 100,000 men under the command of a member of his 
 family to crush the insurrection. Complete success was at- 
 tained by weight of numbers, and Formosa was restored to 
 its proper position in the empire. 
 
 A rising in Szchuen, which may be considered from some 
 of its features the precursor of the Taeping Rebellion, and the 
 first outbreak of the Tungan Mohammedans in the northwest, 
 Vv^hom Keen Lung wished to massacre, marked the close of 
 this long reign, which was rendered remarkable by so many 
 military triumphs. The reputation of the Chinese empire 
 was raised to the highest point, and maintained there by 
 the capacity and energy of this ruler. Within its borders 
 the commands of the central government were ungrudg- 
 ingly obeyed, and beyond them foreign peoples and states 
 respected the rights of a country that had shown itself so 
 well able to exact obedience from its dependents and to pre- 
 serve the very letter of its rights. The military fame of the 
 Chinese, which had always been great among Asiatics, at- 
 tained its highest point in consequence of these numerous 
 and rapidly-succeeding campaigns. The evidences of mili- 
 tary proficiency, of irresistible determination, and of per- 
 sonal valor not easily surpassed, were too many and too 
 apparent to justify any in ignoring the solid claims of 
 China to rank as the first military country in Asia — a posi- 
 tion which, despite the appearance of England and Russia 
 in that continent, she still retains, and which must event- 
 ually enable her to exercise a superior voice in the arrange- 
 ment of its affairs to that of either of her great and at 
 present more powerful and better prepared neighbors.
 
 240 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 CHAPTEE XIY 
 
 THE COMMENCEMENT OF EUROPEAN INTERCOURSE 
 
 Keen Lung was the first Mancliu prince to receive for- 
 mal embassies from the sovereigns of Europe. Among these 
 the Portuguese were the first in point of time, although they 
 never attained the advantage derivable from that priority; 
 and indeed the important period of their connection with 
 China may be said to have terminated before the Manchus 
 had established their authority. Still, as the tenants of 
 Macao, the oldest European settlement in China, for more 
 than three centuries and a half, their connection with the 
 Chinese government must always possess some features of 
 interest and originality. The Portuguese paid their rent to 
 and carried on all their business with the mandarins at Can- 
 ton, who lost no opportunity of squeezing large sums out of 
 the foreigners, as they were absolutely in their power. The 
 Portuguese could only pay with good or bad grace the bribes 
 and extra duty demanded as the price of their being allowed 
 to trade at all. The power of China seemed so overwhelm- 
 ing that they never attempted to make any stand against its 
 arbitrary decrees, and the only mode they could think of for 
 getting an alleviation of the hardships inflicted by the Can- 
 ton authorities was to send costly embassies to the Chinese 
 capital. These, however, failed to produce any tangible re- 
 sult. Their gifts were accepted, and their representatives 
 were accorded a more or less gratifying reception; but there 
 was no mitigation of the severity shown by the local man- 
 darine, and, for all practical purposes, the money expended 
 on these missions was as good as thrown away. The Port- 
 uguese succeeded in obtaining an improvement in their lot 
 only by combining their naval forces with those of the Chi-
 
 COMMENCEMENT OF EUROPEAN INTERCOURSE 241 
 
 nese in punishing and checking the raids of the pirates, who 
 infested the estuary of the Canton River known as the Bogac. 
 Biit they never succeeded in emancipating themselves from 
 that position of inferiority in which the Chinese have always 
 striven to keep all foreigners; and if the battle of European 
 enterprise against Chinese exclusiveness had been carried on 
 and fought by the Portuguese it would have resulted in the 
 discomfiture of Western progress and enlightenment. 
 
 The Dutch sent an embassy to Pekin in 1795, but it was 
 treated with such contumely that it does not reflect much. 
 credit on those who sent it. The Spaniards never held any 
 relations with the central government, all their business 
 being conducted with the Viceroy of Fuhkien ; and the suc- 
 cessive massacres of Manila completely excluded them from 
 any good understanding with the Pekin government. "With. 
 Russia, China's relations have always been different from 
 those with the other powers, and this is explained partly by 
 the fact of neighborship, and partly by Russia seeldng only 
 her own ends, and not advantages for the benefit of every 
 other foreign nation. 
 
 With France, the relations of China, owing to a great 
 extent to the efforts and influence of the missionaries, had 
 always been marked with considerable sympathy and even 
 cordiality. The French monarchs had from time to time 
 turned their attention to promoting trade with China and 
 the Far East. Henry the Fourth sanctioned a scheme with 
 this object, but it came to nothing; and Colbert only suc- 
 ceeded in obtaining the right for his countrymen to land 
 their goods at Whampoa, the river port of Canton. But 
 French commerce never flourished in China, and a bold but 
 somewhat Quixotic attempt to establish a trade between that 
 country and the French settlements on the Mississippi failed 
 to achieve anything practical. But what the French were 
 nnable to attain in the domain of commerce they succeeded 
 in accomplishing in the region of literature. They were the 
 first to devote themselves to the study of the Chinese litera- 
 ture and language, and what we know of the history of 
 
 China — 11
 
 242 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 China down to the last century is exclusively due to their 
 laborious research and painstaking translations of Chinese 
 histories and annals. They made China known to the polite 
 as well as the political world of Europe. Keen Lung him- 
 self appreciated and was flattered by these efforts. His 
 poetry, notably his odes on "Tea," and the "Eulogy of 
 Moukden" as the cradle of his race, was translated by 
 P^re Amiot, and attracted the attention of Voltaire, who 
 addressed to the emperor an epistolary poem on the re- 
 quirements and difficulties of Chinese versification. The 
 French thus rendered a material service in making China 
 better known to Europe and Europe better known in China, 
 which, although it may be hard to gauge precisely, entitles 
 them still to rank among those who have opened up China 
 to Europeans. The history of China, down to the eighteenth 
 century at least, could not have been written but for the 
 labors of the French, of Mailla, Du Halde, Amiot, and 
 many others. 
 
 There remains only to summarize the relations with the 
 English, who, early in the seventeenth century, and before 
 the Manchus had established their supremacy, possessed 
 factories at Amoy and on the island of Chusan. But their 
 trade, hampered by official exactions, and also by the jeal- 
 ousy of the Portuguese and Dutch, proved a slow growth; 
 and at Canton, which they soon discovered to be the best 
 and most convenient outlet for the state, they were more 
 hampered than anywhere else, chiefly through the hostile 
 representations of the Portuguese, who bribed the mandarins 
 to exclude all other foreigners. The English merchants, like 
 the Portuguese, believed that the only way to obtain a rem- 
 edy for their grievances was by approaching the imperial 
 court and obtaining an audience with the emperor; but they 
 were wise in not attempting to send delegates of their own. 
 They saw that if an impression was to be created at Pekin 
 the embassador must come fully accredited by the British 
 government, and not merely as the representative of a body 
 of merchants who were suppliants for commercial privileges.
 
 COMMENCEMENT OF EUROPEAN INTERCOURSE 243 
 
 The war with the Goorkhas had made tlie Chinese authori- 
 ties acquainted with the fact that the English, who were 
 only humble suitors for trade on the coast, were a great 
 power in India. The knowledge of this fact undoubtedly 
 created a certain amount of curiosity in the mind of Keen 
 Lung, and when he heard that the King of England con- 
 templated sending an embassy to his court he gave every 
 encouragement to the suggestion, and promised it a wel- 
 come and honorable reception. Permission was given it to 
 proceed to Pekin, and thus was a commencement made in 
 the long story of diplomatic relations between England and 
 China, which have at length acquired a cordial character. 
 As great importance was attached to this embassy, every 
 care was bestowed on fitting it out in a worthy manner. 
 Colonel Cathcart was selected as the envoy, but died on 
 the eve of his departure, and a successor was found in the 
 person of Lord Macartney, a nobleman of considerable at- 
 tainments, who had been Governor of Madras two years 
 before. Sir George Staunton, one of the few English sino- 
 logues, was appointed secretary, and several interpreters 
 were sought for and obtained, not without difficulty. The 
 presents were many and valuable, chosen with the double 
 object of gratifying the emperor and impressing him with 
 the wealth and magnificence of the English sovereign. In 
 September, 1792 — the same month that witnessed the over- 
 throw of the Goorkhas at Nayakot — the embassy sailed 
 from Portsmouth, but it did not reach the Peiho, on which 
 Pekin is inaccurately said to stand, until the following 
 August. 
 
 An honorable and CKceedingly gratifying reception 
 awaited it. The embassador and his ^uite, on landing 
 from the man-of-war, were conducted with all ceremony 
 and courtesy up the Peiho to Tientsin, where they received 
 what was called the unusual honor of a military salute. 
 Visits were exchanged with the Viceroy of Pechihli and 
 some of the other high officials, and news came down from 
 Pekin that "the emperor had shown some marks of great
 
 244 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Batisfaction at the news of the arrival of the English em- 
 bassador." Keen Lung happened to be residing at his 
 summer palace at Jehol beyond the Wall, but he sent per- 
 emptory instructions that there was to be no delay in send- 
 ing the English up to Pekin. Up to this point all had gone 
 well, but the anti-foreign party began to raise obstructions, 
 and, headed by Sund Fo, the conqueror of the Goorkhas, to 
 advise the emperor not to receive the embassador, and to 
 reject all his propositions. Whether to strengthen his case, 
 or because he believed it to be the fact, Sund Fo declared 
 that the English had helped "the Goorkha robbers," and 
 that he had found among them "men with hats," i.e., Eu- 
 ropeans, as well as "men with turbans." As Sund Fo was 
 the hero of the day, and also the viceroy of the Canton 
 province, his views carried great weight, and they were 
 also of unfavorable omen for the future of foreign relations. 
 But for this occasion the inquisitiveness of the aged emperor 
 prevailed over the views of the majority in his council and 
 also over popular prejudice. When the embassy had been 
 detained some time at Pekin, and after it looked as if a 
 period of vexatious delay was to herald the discomfiture of 
 the mission, such positive orders were sent by Keen Lung 
 for the embassy to proceed to Jehol that no one dared to 
 disobey him. Lord Macartney proceeded to Jehol with his 
 suite and a Chinese guard of honor, and he accomplished 
 the journey, about one hundred miles, in an English car- 
 riage. The details of the journey and reception are given 
 in Sir George Staunton's excellent narrative; but here it 
 may be said that the emperor twice received the British em- 
 bassador in personal audience in a tent specially erected for 
 the ceremony in the gardens of the palace. Tlie embassy 
 then returned to Pekin, and, as the Gulf of Pechihli was 
 frozen, it was escorted by the land route to Canton. On 
 this journey Lord Macartney and his party suffered consid- 
 erable inconvenience and annoyance from the spite and ani- 
 mosity of the Chinese inferior ofTicials; but nothing serious 
 occurred to mar wliat was on the whole a successful mis-
 
 COMMENCEMENT OF EUROPEAN INTERCOURSE 245 
 
 sion. Keen Lung is said to have wished to go further, but 
 his official utterance was limited to the reciprocation of "the 
 friendly sentiments of His Britannic Majesty." His ad- 
 vanced age and his abdication already contemplated left 
 him neither the inclination nor the power to go very closely 
 into the question of the policy of cultivating closer relations 
 with the foreign people who asserted their supremacy on the 
 sea and who had already subjugated one great Asiatic em- 
 pire. But it may at least be said that he did nothing to 
 make the ultimate solution of the question more difficult, 
 and his flattering reception of Lord Macartney's embassy 
 was an important and encouraging precedent for English 
 diplomacy with China. 
 
 The events of internal interest in the history of the coun- 
 try during the last twenty years of this reign call for some 
 brief notice, although they relate to comparatively few mat- 
 ters that can be disentangled from the court chronicles and 
 official gazettes of the period. The great floods of the 
 Hoangho and the destruction caused thereby had been a 
 national calamity from the earliest period. Keen Lung, 
 filled with the desire to crown his reign by overcoming it, 
 intrusted the task of dealing with this difficulty to Count 
 Akoui, whose laurels over the Miaotze had raised him to 
 the highest position in public popularity and his sovereign's 
 confidence. Keen Lung issued his personal instructions on 
 the subject in unequivocal language: He said in his edict, 
 "My intention is that this work should be unceasingly car- 
 ried on, in order to secure for the people a solid advantage 
 both for the present and in the time to come. Share my 
 views, and, in order to accomplish them, forget nothing in 
 the carrying out of your project, which I regard as my 
 own, since I entirely approve of it, and the idea which 
 originated it was mine. For the rest, it is at my own 
 charge, and not at the cost of the province, that I wish all 
 this to be done. Let expenses not be stinted. I take upon 
 myself the consequences, whatever they may be." Akoui 
 threw himself into his great task with energy, and it is
 
 246 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 said that he succeeded in no small degree in controlling the 
 waters and restricting their ravages. We are ignorant of 
 the details of his work, but it may certainly be said that the 
 Hoangho has done less damage since Akoui carried out his 
 scheme than it had effected before. The question is still 
 unsolved, and probably there is no undertaking in which 
 China would benefit more from the engineering science of 
 Europe than this, if the Chinese government were to seri- 
 ously devote its attention to a matter that affects many mil- 
 lions of people and some of the most important provinces of 
 the empire. 
 
 A great famine about the same period is chiefly remark- 
 able for the persecution it entailed on the Christian mission- 
 aries and those among the Chinese themselves professing 
 the foreign religion. The cause of this scarcity was mainly 
 due to the extraordinary growth of the population, which 
 had certainly doubled in fifty years, and which, according 
 to the official censuses, had risen from sixty millions in 1735 
 to three hundred millions in 1792. Of course the larger part 
 of this increase was due to the expansion of the empire and 
 the consolidation of the Manchu authority. So great was 
 the national suffering that the gratuitous distribution of 
 grain and other supplies at the cost of the state provided 
 but a very partial remedy for the evil, which was aggra- 
 vated by the peculation of the mandarins, and the evidence 
 of the few European witnesses shows that the horrors of 
 this famine have seldom been surpassed. The famine was 
 laid to the charge of the Christians, and a commission of 
 mandarins drew up a formal indictment of Christianity, 
 which has stood its ground ever since as the text of the 
 argument of the anti-foreign school. It read as follows: 
 "We have examined into the European religion (or the doc- 
 trine) of the Lord of Heaven, and although it ought not to 
 be compared with other different sects, which are absolutely 
 wicked, yet, and that is what we lay to its blame, it has had 
 the audacity to introduce itself, to promulgate itself, and to 
 establish itself in secret. No permission has ever been given
 
 COMMENCEMENT OF EUROPEAN INTERCOURSE 247 
 
 to the people of this country to embrace it. Nay, the laws 
 have absolutely long forbidden its adoption. And now all 
 these criminals have had the boldness to come, all of a sud- 
 den, into our kingdom, to establish their bishops and priests 
 in order to seduce the people ! This is why it is necessary 
 to extinguish this religion by degrees and to prevent its mul- 
 tiplying its votaries. ' ' The fury of the Chinese, fortunately, 
 soon exhausted itself; and although many Europeans were 
 injured none lost their lives, but several thousand native 
 converts were branded on the face and sent to colonize the 
 Hi valley. 
 
 While Lord Macartney was at Pekin it was known that 
 the emperor contemplated abdicating when he had completed 
 the sixtieth year of his reign — the cycle of Chinese chronology 
 — because he did not desire his reign to be of greater length 
 than that of his illustrious grandfather, Kanghi. This date 
 was reached in 1796, when on New Year's day (6th of Feb- 
 ruary) of the Chinese calendar, he publicly abdicated, and 
 assigned the imperial functions to his son, Kiaking. He 
 survived this event three years, and during that period he 
 exercised, like Charles the Fifth of Germany, a controlling 
 influence over his son's administration; and he endeavored 
 to inculcate in him the right principles of sound government. 
 But in China, where those principles have been expressed in 
 the noblest language, their practical application is difficult, 
 because the official classes are underpaid and because the 
 law of self-preservation, as well as custom, compels them to 
 pay themselves at the equal expense of the subjects and the 
 government. Even Keen Lung had been unable to grapple 
 with this difficulty of the Chinese civil service, which is as 
 formidable at the present time as ever. One of the ablest 
 and most honest of Keen Lung's ministers, when questioned 
 on the subject, said that there was no remedy. "It is im- 
 possible, the emperor himself cannot do it, the evil is too 
 widespread. He will, no doubt, send to the scene of these 
 disorders mandarins, clothed with all his authority, but they 
 will only commit still greater exactions, and the inferior
 
 248 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 mandarins, in order to be left undisturbed, will offer them 
 presents. The emperor will be told that all is well, while 
 everything is really wrong, and while the poor people are 
 being oppressed." And so the vicious circle has gone on 
 to the present day, with serious injury to the state and the 
 people. When Keen Lung had the chance of bringing 
 matters under his own personal control he did not hesitate 
 to exercise his right and power, and all capital punishments 
 were carried out at the capital only after he had examined 
 into each case. It is declared that he always tempered 
 justice with mercy, and that none but the worst offenders 
 suffered death. Transportation to Hi, which he wished to 
 develop, was his favorite form of punishment. 
 
 To the end of his life Keen Lung retained the active 
 habits which had characterized his youth. Much of his 
 ofhcial work was carried on at an early hour of the morn- 
 ing, and it surprised many Europeans to find the aged ruler 
 so keen and eager for business at these early conferences. 
 His vigor was attributed by competent observers to the 
 active life and physical exercises common among the Tar- 
 tars. It will be proper to give a description of the personal 
 appearance of this great prince. A missionary thus de- 
 scribed him: "He is tall and well built. He has a very 
 gracious countenance, but capable at the same time of in- 
 spiring respect. If in regard to his subjects he employs a 
 great severity, I believe it is less from the promptings of 
 his character than from the necessity which would other- 
 wise not render him capable of keeping within the bounds 
 of dependence and duty two empires so vast as China and 
 Tartary. Therefore the greatest tremble in his presence. 
 On all the occasions when he has done me the honor to 
 address me it has been with a gracious air that inspired 
 me with the courage to appeal to him in behalf of our re- 
 ligion. . . . He is a truly great prince, doing and seeing 
 every thing for himself. " Keen Lung survived his abdica- 
 tion about three years, dying on the 8th of February, 1799 — 
 which also happened to be the Chinese New Year's day.
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE MANCHUS 24y 
 
 With the death of Keen Lung the vigor of China reached 
 a term, and just as the progress had been consistent and 
 rapid during the space of 150 years, so now will its down- 
 ward course be not less marked or swift, until, in the very 
 hour of apparent dissolution, the empire will find safety in 
 the valor and probity of an English officer, Charles George 
 Gordon, and in the ability and resolution of the empress- 
 regents and their two great soldier-statesmen, Li Hung 
 Chang and Tso Tsung Tang. 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE MANCHUS 
 
 The favorable opinion which his father had held of Kia- 
 king does not seem to have been shared by all his ministers. 
 The most prominent of them all, Hokwan, who held to Keen 
 Lung the relation that Wolsey held to Henry the Eighth, 
 soon fell under the displeasure of the new emperor, and was 
 called upon to account for his charge of the finances. The 
 favor and the age of Keen Lung left Hokwan absolutely 
 without control, and the minister turned his opportunities to 
 such account that he amassed a private fortune of eighty mil- 
 lion taels, or more than one hundred and twenty-five million 
 dollars. He was indicted for peculation shortly after the 
 death of Keen Lung, and, without friends, he succumbed to 
 the attack of his many enemies incited to attack him by the 
 greed of Kiaking. But the amount of his peculations amply 
 justified his punishment, and Kiaking in signing his death 
 warrant could not be accused of harshness or injustice. 
 The execution of Hokwan restored some of his ill-gotten 
 wealth to the state, and served as a warning to other offi- 
 cials; but as none could hope to enjoy his opportunities, it 
 did not act as a serious deterrent upon the mass of the Chi- 
 nese civil service. If arraigned, they might have justified 
 their conduct by the example of their sovereign, who, in-
 
 250 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 stead of devoting the millions of Hokwan to the necessities 
 of the state, employed them on his own pleasure, and in a 
 lavish palace expenditure. 
 
 The Portuguese were the tenants, as has previously been 
 stated, of Macao, for which they paid an annual rent to the 
 Chinese ; but the nature of their tenure was not understood 
 in Europe, where Macao was considered a Portuguese pos- 
 session. During the progress of the great European strug- 
 gle, the French, as part of one of their latest schemes for 
 regaining their position in the East, conceived the idea of 
 taking possession of Macao; but while they were contem- 
 plating the enterprise, an English squadron had accom- 
 plished it, and during the year 1802 Macao was garrisoned 
 by an English force. The Treaty of Amiens provided for 
 its restoration to Portugal, and the incident closed, chiefly 
 because the period of occupation was brief, without the Chi- 
 nese being drawn into the matter, or without the true nature 
 of the Portuguese hold on Macao being explained. The exi- 
 gencies of war unfortunately compelled the re-occupation of 
 Macao six years later, when the indignation of the Chinese 
 authorities at the violation of their territory fully revealed 
 itself. Peremptory orders were sent to the Canton authori- 
 ties from Pekin to expel the foreigners at all costs. The 
 government of India was responsible for what was a dis- 
 tinct blunder in our political relations with China. In 1808, 
 when alarm at Napoleon's schemes was at its height, it sent 
 Admiral Drury and a considerable naval force to occupy 
 Macao. The Chinese at once protested, withheld supplies, 
 refused to hold any intercourse with that commander, and 
 threatened the English merchants at Lintin with the com- 
 plete suspension of the trade. In his letter of rebuke the 
 chief mandarin at Canton declared that, "as long as there 
 remained a single soldier at Macao," he would not allow 
 any trade to be carried on, and threatened to "block up the 
 entrance to Macao, cut oif your provisions, and send an 
 army to surround you, when repentance would be too late." 
 The English merchants were in favor of compliance with 
 
 "d
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE MAKCHUS 251 
 
 the Chinese demands, but Admiral Drurj held a very ex- 
 alted opinion of his own power and a corresponding con- 
 tempt for the Chinese. He declared that, as "there was 
 nothing in his instructions to prevent his going to war with 
 the Emperor of China," he would bring the Canton officials 
 to reason by force. He accordingly assembled all his avail- 
 able forces, and proceeded up the river at the head of a 
 strong squadron of boats with the avowed intention of forc- 
 ing his way up to the provincial capitah On their side the 
 Chinese made every preparation to defend the passage, and 
 they blocked the navigation of the river with a double line 
 of junks, while the Bogue forts were manned by all the 
 troops of the province. When Admiral Drury came in sight 
 of these defenses, which must have appeared formidable to 
 him, he hesitated, and instead of delivering his attack he 
 sent a letter requesting an interview with the mandarin, 
 again threatening to force his way up to Canton. But the 
 Chinese had by this time taken the measure of the English 
 commander, and they did not even condescend to send him 
 a reply; when Admiral Drury, submitting to their insult, 
 hastily beat a retreat. On several subsequent occasions he 
 renewed his threats, and even sailed up the Bogue, but al- 
 ways retreated without firing a shot. It is not surprising 
 that the Chinese were inflated with pride and confidence by 
 the pusillanimous conduct of the English officer, or that 
 they should erect a pagoda at Canton in honor of the defeat 
 of the English fleet. After these inglorious incidents Ad- 
 miral Drury evacuated Macao and sailed for India, leaving 
 the English merchants to extricate themselves as well as 
 they could from the embarrassing situation in which his 
 hasty and blundering action had placed them. If the offi- 
 cials at Canton had not been as anxious for their own selfish 
 ends that the trade should go on as the foreign merchants 
 themselves, there is no doubt that the views of the ultra 
 school at Pekin, who wished all intercourse with foreigners 
 interdicted, would have prevailed. But the Hoppo and his 
 associates were the real friends of the foreigner, and opened
 
 252 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the back door to foreign commerce at tlie very moment ttat 
 they were signing^ edicts denouncing it as a national evil 
 and misfortune. 
 
 The Macartney mission had attracted what may be called 
 the official attention of the British government to the Chi- 
 nese question, and the East India Company, anxious to ac- 
 quire fresh privileges to render that trade more valuable, 
 exercised all its influence to sustain that attention. On its 
 representations a costly present was sent to Sung Tajin, one 
 of the ablest and most enlightened of all the Chinese officials 
 who had shown cordiality to Lord Macartney, but the step 
 was ill-advised and had unfortunate consequences. The 
 present, on reaching Pekin, was returned to Canton with a 
 haughty message that a minister of the emperor dare not 
 even see a present from a foreign ruler. The publicity of 
 the act rather than the offer of a present must be deemed 
 the true cause of this unqualified rejection, but the return 
 of the present was not, unfortunately, the worst part of the 
 matter. The Emperor Kiaking sent a letter couched in lofty 
 language to George the Third, declaring that he had taken 
 Buch British subjects as were in China under his protection, 
 and that there was "no occasion for the exertions of your 
 Majesty's Government." The advice of the Minister Sung, 
 who was suspected of sympathy with the foreigners, was 
 much discredited, and from a position of power and influ- 
 ence he gradually sank into one of obscurity and impotence. 
 This was especially unfortunate at a moment when several 
 foreign powers were endeavoring to obtain a footing at 
 Pekin. The Russian emperor, wishing no doubt to emulate 
 the English, sent, in 1805, an imposing embassy under 
 Count Goloyken to the Chinese capital. The presents 
 were rich and numerous, for the express purpose of im- 
 pressing the Chinese ruler with the superior wealth and 
 power of Russia over other European states, and great 
 hopes were entertained that Count Goloyken would estab- 
 lish a secure diplomatic base at Pekin. The embassy 
 reached Kalgan on the Great Wall in safety, but there
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE MANCHUS 253 
 
 it was detained iintil reference had been made to the cap- 
 ital. The instructions came back that the Russian envoy- 
 would only be received in audience provided he would per- 
 form the kotow, or prostration ceremony, and that if he 
 would not promise to do this he was not to be allowed 
 througb the Wall. Count Goloyken firmly refused to give 
 this j^romise, and among other arguments he cited the ex- 
 emption accorded to Lord Macartney. The Chinese re- 
 mained firm in their purpose, Count Goloyken was informed 
 that his visit had been prolonged too far, and the most bril- 
 liant of all Russian embassies to China had to retrace its 
 steps without accomplishing any of its objects. This was 
 not the only rebuff Russia experienced at this time. The 
 naval officer Krusenstern conceived the idea that it would 
 be possible to attain all the objects of his sovereign, and to 
 open up a new cbannel for a profitable trade, by establishing 
 communications by sea with Canton, where the Russian 
 flag had never been seen. The Russian government fitted 
 out two ships for bim, and he safely arrived at Canton, 
 where he disposed of their cargoes. When it became known 
 at Pekin that a new race of foreigners bad presented them- 
 selves at Canton, a special edict was issued ordering that 
 "all vessels belonging to any other nation than tbose whicb 
 have been in tbe habit of visiting this port shall on no ac- 
 count whatever be permitted to trade, but merely suffered 
 to remain in port until every circumstance is reported to us 
 and our pleasure made known." Thus in its first attempt 
 to add to its possession of a land trade, via Kiachta and the 
 Mongol steppe, a share in the sea trade with Canton, Russia 
 experienced a rude and discouraging rebuff. 
 
 The unsatisfactory state of our relations with the Chinese 
 government, which was brought home to the British authori- 
 ties by the difficulty our ships of war experienced in obtain- 
 ing water and other necessary supplies on the China coast, 
 which had generally to be obtained by force, led to the de- 
 cision that another embassy should be sent to Pekin, for the 
 purpose of effecting a better understanding.
 
 254 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Lord Amherst, who was specially selected for the mis- 
 sion on account of his diplomatic experience, reached the 
 mouth of the Peiho in August, 1816. When the embassy 
 reached Pekin, the Emperor Kiaking's curiosity to see the 
 foreigners overcame his political resolutions, and with the 
 natural resolve of an irresponsible despot to gratify his wish 
 without regard to the convenience of others, he determined 
 to see them at once, and ordered that Lord Amherst and his 
 companions should be brought forthwith into his presence. 
 This sudden decision was most disconcerting to his own 
 ministers, who had practically decided that no audience 
 should be granted unless Lord Amherst performed the 
 kotow, and especially to his brother-in-law Ho Koong 
 Yay, who, at the emperor's repeated wish to see the 
 English representatives, was compelled to abandon his 
 own schemes and to remove all restrictions to the audi- 
 ence. The firmness of Lord Amherst was unexpected and 
 misunderstood. Ho Koong Yay repeated his invitation 
 several times, and even resorted to entreaty ; but when the 
 Chinese found that nothing was to be gained they changed 
 their tone, and the infuriated Kiaking ordered that the em- 
 bassador and his suite should not be allowed to remain at 
 Pekin, and that they should be sent back to the coast at 
 once. Thus ignominiously ended the Amherst mission, 
 which was summarily dismissed, and hurried back to the 
 coast in a highly inconvenient and inglorious manner. In a 
 letter to the Prince Regent, Kiaking suggested that it would 
 not be necessary for the British government to send another 
 embassy to China. He took some personal satisfaction out 
 of his disappointment by depriving Ho Koong Yay of all his 
 offices, and mulcting him in five years of his pay as an im- 
 perial duke. The cause of his disgrace was expressly stated 
 to be the mismanagement of the relations with the English 
 embassador and the suppression of material facts from the 
 emperor's knowledge. Sung Tajin, who had been specially 
 recalled from his governorship in Hi to take part in the re- 
 ception of the Europeans, and whose sympathy for them
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE MANCHUS 255 
 
 was well known, was also disgraced, and did not recover 
 tis position until alter the death of Kiaking. The failure 
 of the Amherst mission put an end to all schemes for diplo- 
 matic intercourse with Pekin until another generation had 
 passed away; but the facts of the case show that its failure 
 was not altogether due to the hostility of the Chinese em- 
 peror. No practical results, in all probability, would have 
 followed; but if Lord Amherst had gone somewhat out of 
 his way to humor the Chinese autocrat, there is no doubt 
 that he would have been received in audience without any 
 humiliating conditions. 
 
 Long before the Amherst mission reached China evidence 
 had been afforded that there were many elements of disorder 
 in that country, and that a dangerous feeling of dissatisfac- 
 tion was seething below the surface. The Manchus, even 
 in their moments of greatest confidence, had always dis- 
 trusted the loyalty of their Chinese subjects, and there is no 
 dispute that one of their chief reasons for pursuing an exclud- 
 ing policy toward Europeans was the fear that they might 
 tamper with the mass of their countiymen. What had been 
 merely a sentiment under the great rulers of the eighteenth 
 century became an absolute conviction when Kiaking found 
 himself the mark of conspirators and assassins. The first 
 of the plots to which he nearly fell a victim occurred at such 
 an early period of his reign that it could not be attributed to 
 popular discontent at his misgovernment. In 1803, only 
 four years after the death of Keen Lung, Kiaking, while 
 passing through the streets of his capital in his chair, carried 
 by coolie bearers, was attacked by a party of conspirators, 
 members of one of the secret societies, and narrowly escaped 
 with his life. His eunuch attendants showed considerable 
 devotion and courage, and in the struggle several were killed; 
 but they succeeded in driving oS. the would-be assassins. 
 The incident caused great excitement, and much consterna- 
 tion in the imperial palace, where it was noted that out of 
 the crowds in the streets only six persons came forward to 
 help the sovereign in the moment of danger. After this the
 
 256 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 emperor gave up his practice of visiting tlie outer city of 
 Pekin, and confined himself to the imperial city, and still 
 more to the Forbidden Palace which is situated within it. 
 But even here he could not enjoy the sense of perfect 
 security, for the discovery was made that this attempted 
 assassination was part of an extensive plot with ramifica- 
 tions into the imperial family itself. Inquisitorial inquiries 
 were made, which resulted in the disgrace and punishment 
 of many of the emperor's relatives, and thus engendered an 
 amount of suspicion and a sense of insecurity that retained 
 unabated force as long as Kiaking filled the throne. That 
 there was amj)le justification for this apprehension the sec- 
 ond attempt on the person of the emperor clearly revealed. 
 Whatever dangers the emperor might be exposed to in the 
 streets of Pekin, where the members of the hated and dreaded 
 secret societies had as free access as himself, it was thought 
 that he could feel safe in the interior of the Forbidden City — 
 a palace-fortress within the Tartar quarter garrisoned by a 
 large force, and to which admission was only permitted to 
 a privileged few. Strict as the regulations were at all times, 
 the attempt on Kiaking and the rumors of sedition led un- 
 doubtedly to their being enforced with greater rigor, and 
 it seemed incredible for any attempt to be made on the 
 person of the emperor except by the mutiny of his guards 
 or an open rebellion. Yet it was precisely at this moment 
 that an attack was made on the emperor in his own private 
 apartments which nearly proved successful, and which he 
 himself described as an attack under the elbow. In the year 
 1813 a band of conspirators, some two hundred in number, 
 made their way into the palace, either by forcing one of the 
 gates, or, more probably, by climbing the walls at an un- 
 guarded spot, and, overpowering the few guards they met, 
 some of them forced their way into the presence of the em- 
 peror. There is not the least doubt that Kiaking would then 
 have fallen but for the unexpected valor of his son Prince 
 Meenning, afterward the Emperor Taoukwang, who, snatch- 
 ing up a gun, shot two of the intruders. This prince had 
 
 I
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE MANCHUS 257 
 
 been set down as a harmless, inoffensive student, but his 
 prompt action on this occasion excited general admiration, 
 and Kiaking, grateful for his life, at once proclaimed him 
 his heir. 
 
 Toward the close of his reign, and very soon after the 
 departure of Lord Amherst, Kiaking was brought face to 
 face with a very serious conspiracy, or what he thought 
 to be such, among the princes of the Manchu imperial 
 family. By an ordinance passed by Chuntche all the de- 
 scendants of that prince's father were declared entitled to 
 wear a yellow girdle and to receive a pension from the state; 
 while, with a view to prevent their becoming a danger to 
 the dynasty, they were excluded from civil or military 
 employment, and assigned to a life of idleness. This im- 
 perial colony was, and is still, one of the most peculiar and 
 least understood of the departments of the Tartar govern- 
 ment; and although it has served its purpose in preventing 
 dynastic squabbles, there must always remain the doubt as 
 to how far the dynasty has been injured by the loss of the 
 services of so many of its members who might have possessed 
 useful capacity. They purchased the right to an easy and 
 unlaborious existence, with free quarters and a small income 
 guaranteed, at the heavy price of exclusion from the public 
 service. No matter how great their ambition or natural 
 capability, they had no prospect of emancipating themselves 
 from the dull sphere of inaction to which custom relegated 
 them. Toward the close of Kiaking's reign the number of 
 these useless Yellow Girdles had risen to several thousand, 
 and the emperor, alarmed by the previous attacks, or having 
 some reason to fear a fresh plot, adopted strenuous measures 
 against them. Whether the emperor's apprehensions over- 
 came his reason, or whether there were among his kinsmen 
 some men of more than average ability, it is certain that the 
 princes of the Manchu family were goaded or incited into 
 what amounted to rebellion. The exact particulars remain 
 unknown until the dynastic history sees the light of day; 
 but it is known that many of them were executed, and that
 
 258 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 many hundreds of them were "banished to Manchuria, where 
 they were given employment in taking care of the ancestral 
 tombs of the ruling family. 
 
 Special significance was given to these intrigues and 
 palace plots by the remarkable increase in the number and 
 the confidence of the secret societies which, in some form or 
 other, have been a feature of Chinese public life from an 
 early period. Had they not furnished evidence by their in- 
 creased numbers and daring ot the dissatisfaction prevalent 
 among the Chinese masses, whether on account of the hard- 
 ships of their lot, or from hatred of their Tartar lords, they 
 would scarcely have created so much apprehension in the 
 bosom of the Emperor Kiaking, whose authority met with 
 no open opposition, and whose reign was nominally one of 
 both internal and external peace. These secret societies 
 have always been, in the form of fraternal confederacies 
 and associations, a feature in Chinese life; but during the 
 present century they have acq^uired an importance they could 
 never previously claim, both in China and among Chinese 
 colonies abroad. The first secret society to become famous 
 was that of the "Water-Lily, or Pe-leen-keaou, which associa- 
 tion chose as its emblem and title the most popular of all 
 plants in China. Although the most famous of the socie- 
 ties, and the one which is regarded as the parent of all that 
 have come after it, the Water-Lily had, as a distinct organi- 
 zation, a very brief existence. Its organizers seem to have 
 dropped the name, or to have allowed it to sink into dis- 
 use in consequence of the strenuous official measures taken 
 against the society by the government for the attempt, in 
 1803, on Kiaking's life in the streets of Pekin. They merged 
 themselves into the widely extended confederacy of the 
 Society of Celestial Reason — the Theen-te-Hwuy — which 
 became better known by the title given to it by Europeans 
 of tlie Triads, from their advocacy of the union between 
 Heaven, earth, and man. The Water-Lily Society, before 
 it was dissolved, caused serious disturbances in both Shan- 
 tung and Szchuen, and especially in the latter province,
 
 THE DECLINE OF THE MANCHU3 259 
 
 where the disbanded army that had rescued Tibet and pun- 
 ished the Goorkhas furnished the material for sedition. With 
 more or less difficulty, and at a certain expense of life, these 
 risings were suppressed, and Kiaking's authority was ren- 
 dered secure against these assailants, while for his successors 
 was left the penalty of feeling the full force of the national 
 indignation of which their acts were the expression. 
 
 With regard to the organization of these secret societies, 
 which probably remain unchanged to the present day, China 
 had nothing to learn from Europe either as to the objects to 
 be obtained in this way or as to how men are to be bound 
 together by solemn vows for the attainment of illegal ends. 
 By signs known only to themselves, and by pass- words, these 
 sworn conspirators could recognize their members in the 
 crowded streets, and could communicate with each other 
 without exciting suspicion as to their being traitors at heart. 
 In its endeavors +o cope with this formidable and widespread 
 organization under different names, Kiaking's government 
 found itself placed at a serious disadvantage. Without an 
 exact knowledge of the intentions or resources of its secret 
 enemies, it failed to grapple with them, and, as its sole rem- 
 edy, it could only decree that proof of membership carried 
 with it the penalty of death. 
 
 During the last years of the reign of Kiaking the secret 
 societies rather threatened future trouble than constituted a 
 positive danger to the state. They were compelled to keep 
 quiet and to confine their attention to increasing their num- 
 bers rather than to realizing their programme. The emperor 
 was consequently able to pass the last four years of his life 
 with some degree of personal tranquillity, and in full indul- 
 gence of his palace pleasures, which seem at this period to 
 have mainly consisted of a theatrical troupe which accom- 
 panied him even when lie went to offer sacrifice in the tem- 
 ples. His excessive devotion to pleasure did not add to his 
 reputation with his people, and it is recorded that one of the 
 chief causes of the minister Sung's disgrace and banishment 
 to Hi was his making a protest against the emperor's pro-
 
 260 , HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 ceedings. Some time before liis death, Kiaking drew up his 
 will, and on account of his great virtues he specially selected 
 as his successor his second son, Prince Meenning, who had 
 saved his life from assassins in the attack on the palace. 
 Kiaking died on September 2, 1820, in the sixty- first year 
 of his age, leaving to his successor a diminished authority, 
 an enfeebled power, and a discontented people. Some miti- 
 gating circumstance may generally be pleaded against the 
 adverse verdict of history in its estimation of a public char- 
 acter. The difficulties with which the individual had to 
 contend may have been exceptional and unexpected, the 
 measures which he adopted may have had untoward and 
 unnatural results, and the crisis of the hour may have called 
 for genius of a transcendent order. But in the case of 
 Kiaking not one of these extenuating facts can be pleaded. 
 His path had been smoothed for him by his predecessor, his 
 difficulties were raised by his own indifference, and the con- 
 sequences of his spasmodic and ill- directed energy were 
 scarcely less unfortunate than those of his habitual apathy. 
 So much easier is the work of destruction than the labor of 
 construction, that Kiaking in twenty-five years had done 
 almost as much harm to the constitution of his country and 
 to the fortunes of his dynasty as Keen Lung had conferred 
 solid advantages on the state in his brilliant reign of sixty 
 years. 
 
 On the whole it seems as if the material prosperity of the 
 people was never greater than during the reign of Kiaking. 
 The population by the census of 1812 is said to have exceeded 
 860 millions, and the revenue never showed a more flourish- 
 ing return on paper. To the external view all was still fair 
 and prosperous when Kiaking died; under his successor, 
 who was in every sense a worthier prince, the canker and 
 decay were to be clearly revealed.
 
 THE EMPEROR TAOUKWANG 261 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THE EMPEROR TAOUKWANG 
 
 The earlj years of the new reign were marked by a 
 number of events unconnected with each other but all con- 
 tributing to the important incidents of the latter period which 
 must be described, although they cannot be separated. The 
 name of Taoukwang, which Prince Meenning took on as- 
 cending the throne, means Reason's Light, and there were 
 many who thought it was especially appropriate for a prince 
 who was more qualified for a college than a palace. Most of 
 the chroniclers of the period give an unfavorable picture 
 of the new ruler, who is described as "thin and toothless," 
 and as "lank in figure, low of stature, with a haggard face, 
 a reserved look, and a quiet exterior. ' ' He was superior to 
 his external aspect, for it may be truly said that although 
 he had to deal with new conditions he evinced under critical 
 circumstances a dignity of demeanor and a certain royal 
 patience which entitled him to the respect of his opponents. 
 
 Taoukwang began his reign in every way in a creditable 
 manner. While professing in his proclamations the greatest 
 admiration for his father, his first acts reversed his policy 
 and aimed at undoing the mischief he had accomplished. 
 He released all the political prisoners who had been con- 
 signed to jail by the suspicious fear of Kiaking, and many 
 of the banished Manchu princes were allowed to return to 
 Pekin. He made many public declarations of his intention 
 to govern his people after a model and conscientious fashion, 
 and his subsequent acts showed that he was at least sincere 
 in his intentions, if an accumulation of troubles prevented 
 his attaining all the objects he set before himself when he 
 first took the government in hand. Nothing showed his in- 
 tegrity more clearly than his restoration of the minister Sung
 
 262 • HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 to tlie favor and offices of wliicli lie liaci been dispossessed. 
 Tlie vicissitudes of fortune passed through by this official 
 have been previously referred to, and his restoration to 
 power was a practical proof of the new ruler's good resolu- 
 tions, and meant more than all the virtuous platitudes ex- 
 pressed in vermilion edicts. Sung had gained a popularity 
 that far exceeded that of the emperor, through the lavish 
 way in which he distributed his wealth, consistently refus- 
 ing to accumulate money for the benefit of himself or his 
 family. But his independent spirit rendered him an un- 
 pleasant monitor for princes who were either negligent of 
 their duty or sensitive of criticism, and even Taoukwang 
 appears to have dreaded, in anticipation, the impartial and 
 fearless criticism of the minister whom he restored to favor. 
 Sung was employed in two of the highest possible posts, 
 Viceroy of Pechihli and President of the Board of Censors, 
 and until his death he succeeded in maintaining his position 
 in face of his enemies, and notwithstanding his excessive 
 candor. One of the first reforms instituted by the Emperor 
 Taoukwang was to cut down the enormous palace expenses, 
 which his father had allowed to increase to a high point, and 
 to banish from the imperial city all persons who could not 
 give some valid justification for their being allowed to re- 
 main. The troupes of actors and buffoons were expelled, 
 and the harem was reduced to modest dimensions. Taouk- 
 wang declared himself to be a monogamist, and proclaimed 
 his one wife empress. He also put a stop to the annual visits 
 to Jehol and to the costly hunting establishment there, which 
 entailed a great waste of public funds. The money thus 
 saved was much wanted for various national requirements, 
 and the sufferings caused by flood and famine were alleviated 
 out of these palace savings. How great the national suffer- 
 ing had become was shown by the marked increase of crime, 
 especially all forms of theft and the coining of false money, 
 for which new and severe penalties were ordained without 
 greatly mitigating the evil. During all these troubles and 
 trials Taoukwang endeavored to play the part of a beneficent
 
 THE EMPEROR TAOUKWANO 263 
 
 and merciful sovereign, tempering tlie severity of the laws 
 by acts of clemency, and personally superintending every 
 department of the administration. He seems thus to have 
 gained a reputation among his subjects which he never lost, 
 and the blame for any unpopular measures was always as- 
 signed to his ministers. But although he endeavored to play 
 the part of an autocrat, there is every ground for saying that 
 he failed to realize the character, and that he was swayed 
 more than most rulers by the advice of his ministers. The 
 four principal officials after Sung, whose death occurred at 
 an early date after Taoukwang's accession, were Ilengan, 
 Elepoo, Keying and Keshen. 
 
 The first ten years of Taoukwang's reign have been 
 termed prosperous, because they have left so little to re- 
 cord, but this application of the theory that "the country is 
 happy which has no history, ' ' does not seem borne out by 
 such facts as have come to our knowledge. There is no 
 doubt that there was a great amount of public suffering, 
 and that the prosperity of the nation declined from the high 
 point it had reached under Kiaking. Scarcity of food and 
 want of work increased the growing discontent, which did 
 not require even secret societies to give it point and expres- 
 sion, and as far as could be judged it was worse than when 
 the Water- Lily Society inspired Kiaking with most appre- 
 hension. Kiaking, as has been observed, escaped the most 
 serious consequences of his own acts. There was much pop- 
 ular discontent, but there was no open rebellion. Taouk- 
 wang had not been on the throne many years before he was 
 brought face to face with rebels who oj^enly disputed his 
 authority, and, strangely enough, his troubles began in 
 Central Asia, where peace had been undisturbed for half 
 a century. 
 
 The conquest of Central Asia had been among the most 
 brilliant and remarkable of the feats of the great Keen Lung. 
 Peace had been preserved there as much by the extraordi- 
 nary prestige or reputation of China as by the skill of the 
 administration or the soundness of the policy of the govern-
 
 264 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 ing power, whlcli left a large share of tlie work to tlie sub- 
 ject races. Outside each of the principal towns the Chinese 
 built a fort or gulbagh, in which their garrison resided, and 
 military ofhcers or ambans were appointed to every district. 
 The Mohammedan officials were held responsible for the 
 good conduct of the people and the due collection of the 
 taxes, and as long as the Chinese garrison was maintained 
 in strength and efficiency they discharged their duties with 
 the requisite good faith. The lapse of time and the embar- 
 rassment of the government at home led to the neglect of 
 the force in Central Asia, which had once been an efficient 
 army. The Chinese garrison, ill-paid and unrecruited, grad- 
 ually lost the semblance of a military force, and was not to 
 be distinguished from the rest of the civil population. The 
 difference of religion was the only unequivocal mark of dis- 
 tinction between the rulers and the ruled, and it furnished 
 an ever-present cause of enmity and dislike, although apart 
 from this the Mohammedans accepted the Chinese rule as 
 not bad in itself, and even praised it. The Chinese might 
 have continued to govern Hi and Kashgar indefinitely, not- 
 withstanding the weakness and decay of their garrison, but 
 for the ambition of a neighbor. The Chinese are to blame, 
 however, not merely for having ignored the obvious aggres- 
 siveness of that neighbor, but for having provided it with 
 facilities for carrying out its plans. The Khanate of Kho- 
 kand, the next-door state in Central Asia, had been inti- 
 mately connected with Kashgar from ancient times, both in 
 politics and trade. The Chinese armies in the eighteenth 
 century had advanced into Khokand, humbled its khan, 
 and reduced him to a state of vassalage. For more than 
 fifty years the khan sent tribute to China, and was the 
 humble neighbor of the Chinese. He gave, however, a 
 place of refuge and a pension to Sarimsak, the last repre- 
 sentative of the old Khoja family of Kashgar, and thus re- 
 tained a hold on the legitimate ruler of that state. Sarimsak 
 had as a child escaped from the pursuit of Fouta and the 
 massacre of his relations by the chief of Badakshan, but he
 
 THE EMPEROR TAOUKWANG 265 
 
 was content to remain a pensioner at Khokand to the end of 
 his days, and he left the assertion of what he considered his 
 rights to his children. His three sons were named, in the 
 order of their age, Yusuf, Barhanuddin, and Jehangir, and 
 each of them attempted at different times to dispossess the 
 Chinese in Kashgar. In the year 1812, when Kiaking's 
 weakness was beginning to be apparent, the Khan of Kho- 
 kand, a chief of more than usual ability, named Mahomed 
 All, refused to send tribute any more to China, and the 
 Viceroy of Hi, having no force at his disposal, acquiesced in 
 the change with good grace, and no hostilities ensued. The 
 first concession was soon followed by others. The khan 
 obtained the right to levy a tax on all Mohammedan mer- 
 chandise sold in the bazaars of Kashgar and Yarkand, and 
 deputed consuls or aksakals for the purpose of collecting 
 the duties. These aksakals naturally became the center of 
 all the intrigue and disaffection prevailing in the state 
 against the Chinese, and they considered it to be as much 
 their duty to provoke political discontent as to supervise the 
 customs placed under their charge. Before the aksakals 
 appeared on the scene the Chinese ruled a peaceful terri- 
 tory, but after the advent of these foreign officials trouble 
 soon ensued. 
 
 Ten years after his refusal to pay tribute the Khan of 
 Khokand decided to support the Khoja pretenders who en- 
 joyed his hospitality, and in 1822 Jehangir was provided 
 with money and arms to make an attempt on the Chinese 
 position in Kashgaria. Although the youngest, Jehangir 
 seems to have been the most energetic of the Khoja princes; 
 and having obtained the alliance of the Kirghiz, he at- 
 tempted, by a rapid movement, to surprise the Chinese in 
 the town of Kashgar. In this attempt he was disappointed, 
 for the Chinese kept better guard than he expected, and he 
 was compelled to make an ignominious retreat. The Khan 
 of Khokand, disappointed at the result and apprehensive of 
 counter action on the part of the Chinese, repudiated all par- 
 ticipation in the matter, and forbade Jehangir to return to 
 
 China— 12
 
 266 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 his country. That adventurer then fled to Lake Issik Kul, 
 whither the Chinese pursued him; but when his fortunes 
 seemed to have reached tlieir lowest ebb a revulsion sud- 
 denly took place, and by the surprise and annihilation of a 
 Chinese force he was again able to pose as an arbiter of 
 affairs in Central Asia. The fortitude of Jehangir con- 
 firmed the attachment of his friends, and the Khokandian 
 ruler, encouraged by the defeat of the Chinese, again took 
 up his cause and sent him troops and a general for a fresh 
 descent on Kashgaria. The khan had his own ends in view 
 quite as much as to support the Khoja pretender; but his 
 support encouraged Jehangir to leave his mountain retreat 
 and to cross the Tian Shan into Kashgaria. This happened 
 in the year 1826, and the Chinese garrison of Kashgar very 
 unwisely quitted the shelter of its citadel and went out to 
 meet the invaders. The combat is said to have been fiercely 
 contested, but nothing is known about it except that the 
 Chinese were signally defeated. This overthrow was the 
 signal for a general insurrection throughout the country, 
 and the Chinese garrisons, after more or less resistance, 
 were annihilated. An attempt was then made to restore 
 the old Mohammedan administration, and Jehangir was 
 proclamied by the style of the Seyyid Jehangir Sultan. 
 One of his first acts was to dismiss the Khokandian con- 
 tingent, and to inform his ally or patron, Mahomed Ali, that 
 he no longer required his assistance. His confidence re- 
 ceived a rude check when he learned a short time after- 
 ward that the Chinese were making extraordinary prepa- 
 rations to recover their lost province, and that they had 
 collected an immense army in Hi for the purpose. Then 
 he wished his Khokandian allies back again; but he still re- 
 solved to make as good a fight as he could for the throne 
 he had acquired; and when the Chinese general Chang 
 marched on Kashgar, Jehangir took up his position at 
 Yangabad and accepted battle. He was totally defeated ; 
 the capture of Kashgar followed, and Jehangir himself fell 
 into the hands of the victors. The Khoja was sent to
 
 THE EMPEROR TAOUKWANG 2Cu 
 
 Pekin, where, after many indignities, lie was executed 
 and quartered as a traitor. The Chinese punished all open 
 rebels with death, and as a precaution against the recur- 
 rence of rebellion they removed 12,000 Mohammedan fami- 
 lies from Kashgar to Hi, where they became known as the 
 Tarantchis, or toilers. They also took the very wise step 
 of prohibiting all intercourse with Khokand, and if they 
 had adhered to this resolution they would have saved 
 themselves much serious trouble. But Mahomed Ali was 
 determined to make an effort to retain so valuable a per- 
 quisite as his trade relations with Kashgar, and as soon as 
 the Chinese had withdrawn the main portion of their force 
 he hastened to assail Kashgar at the head of his army, and 
 put forward Yusuf as a successor to Jehangir. Only des- 
 ultory fighting ensued, but his operations were so far suc- 
 cessful that the Chinese agreed to resort to the previous 
 arrangement, and Mahomed Ali promised to restrain the 
 Khojas. Fourteen years of peace and prosperity followed 
 this new convention. 
 
 Serious disorders also broke out in the islands of Formosa 
 and Hainan. In the former the rebellion was only put 
 down by a judicious manipulation of the divisions of the 
 insurgent tribes; but the settlement attained must be pro- 
 nounced so far satisfactory that the peace of the island was 
 assured. In Hainan, an island of extraordinary fertility and 
 natural wealth, which must some day be developed, the 
 aboriginal tribes revolted against Chinese authority, and 
 massacred many of the Chinese settlers, who had begun to 
 encroach on the possessions of the natives. Troops had to 
 be sent from Canton before the vdisorders were suppressed, 
 and then Hainan reverted to its tranquil state, from which 
 only the threat of a French occupation during the Tonquin 
 war roused it. These disorders in different parts of the 
 empire were matched by troubles of a more domestic char- 
 acter within the palace. In 1831 Taoukwang's only son, a 
 young man of twenty, whose character was not of the best, 
 gave him some cause of offense, and he struck him. The
 
 268 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 young prince died of tlie blow, and the emperor was left for 
 the moment without a child. His grief was soon assuaged 
 by the news that two of his favorite concubines had borne 
 him sons, one of whom became long afterward the Emperor 
 Hienfung. At this critical moment Taoukwang was seized 
 with a severe illness, and his elder brother, Ilwuy Wang, 
 whose pretensions had threatened the succession, thinking 
 his chance had at last come, took steps to seize the throne. 
 But Taoukwang recovered, and those who had made prema- 
 ture arrangements in filling the throne were severely pun- 
 ished. These minor troubles culminated in the Miaotze Re- 
 bellion, the most formidable internal war which the Chinese 
 government had to deal with between that of Wou Sankwei 
 and the Taepings. From an early period the Miaotze had 
 been a source of trouble to the executive, and the relations 
 between them and the officials had been anything but har- 
 monious. The Manchu rulers had only succeeded in keep- 
 ing them in order by stopping their supply of salt on the 
 smallest provocation; and in the belief that they possessed 
 an absolutely certain mode of coercing them, the Chinese 
 mandarins assumed an arrogant and dictatorial tone toward 
 their rude and unreclaimed neighbors. In 1832 the Miaotze, 
 irritated past endurance, broke out in rebellion, and their 
 principal chief caused himself to be proclaimed emperor. 
 Tlieir main force was assembled at Lienchow, in the north- 
 west corner of the Canton province, and their leader as- 
 sumed the suggestive title of the Golden Dragon, and called 
 upon the Chinese people to redress their wrongs by joining 
 his standard. But the Chinese, who regarded the Miaotze 
 as an inferior and barbarian race, refused to coml)iiie with 
 them against the most extortionate of officials or the most 
 unpopular of governments. Although they could not enlist 
 the support of any section of the Cliincse people, the Miaotze, 
 by their valor and the military skill of their leader, made so 
 good a stand against the forces sent against them by the 
 Canton viceroy that the whole episode is redeemed from ob- 
 livion, and may be considered a romantic incident in modern
 
 THE EMPEROR TAOUKWANG 269 
 
 Chinese history. The Miaotze gained the first successes of the 
 war, and for a time it seemed as if the Chinese authorities 
 would be able to effect nothing against them. The Canton 
 viceroy fared so badly that Hengan was sent from Pekin to 
 take the command, and the chosen braves of Hoonan were 
 sent to attack the Miaotze in the rear. The latter gained 
 a decisive victory at Pingtseuen, where the Golden Dragon 
 and several thousand of his followers were slain. But, al- 
 though vanquished in one quarter, the Miaotze continued to 
 show great activity and confidence in another, and when 
 the Canton viceroy made a fresh attack on them they re- 
 pulsed him with heavy loss. The disgrace of this officer 
 followed, and his fall was hastened by the suppression of 
 the full extent of his losses, which excited the. indignation 
 of his own troops, who said, ' ' There is no use in our sacri- 
 ficing our lives in secret; if our toils are concealed from the 
 emperor neither we nor our posterity will be rewarded." 
 This unlucky commander was banished to Central Asia, 
 and after his supersession Hengan had the satisfaction of 
 bringing the war to a satisfactory end within ten days. 
 Some of the leaders were executed, the others swore to keeji 
 the peace, and a glowing account of the pacification of the 
 Miaotze region was sent to Pekin. Some severe critics sug- 
 gested that the whole arrangement was a farce, and that 
 Hengan 's triumph was only on paper; but the lapse of time 
 has shown this skepticism to be unjustified, as the Miaotze 
 have remained tranqu.iI ever since, and the formidable 
 Yaoujin, or Wolfmen, as they are called, have observed 
 the promises given to Hengan, which would not have been 
 the case unless they had been enforced by military success. 
 Should they ever break out again, the government would 
 possess the means, from their command of money and mod- 
 ern arms, of repressing their lawlessness with unprecedented 
 thoroughness, and of absolutely subjecting their hitherto 
 inaccessible districts. 
 
 If the first ten or twelve years of the reign of the Em- 
 peror Taoukwang were marked by these troubles on a minor
 
 270 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 scale, an undue importance should not be attaclied to them, 
 for they did not seriously aHect the stability of the govern- 
 ment or the authority of the emperor. It is true that they 
 caused a decline in the revenue and an increase in the ex- 
 penditure, which resulted in the year 1834 in an admitted 
 deficit of fifty million dollars, and no state could be consid- 
 ered as flourishing with the public exchequer in such a con- 
 dition. But this large deficit must be regarded rather as a 
 floating debt than an annual occurrence. 
 
 The Chinese authorities continued to hinder and protest 
 against the foreign trade and intercourse between their sub- 
 jects and the merchants of Europe as much as ever; but 
 their opposition was mainly confined to edicts and proclama- 
 tions. When Commissioner Lin resorted to force and vio- 
 lence some years later the auspicious moment for expelling 
 all foreigners had passed away, and the weakness of tlie 
 government contributed in no small degree to this result. 
 Taoukwang, although his claims as occupant of the Dragon 
 Throne were unabated, could not pretend to the power of a 
 great ruler like Keen Lung, who would have known how to 
 enforce his will. Nor was it possible after 1834 to continue 
 th.e policy of uncompromising hostility to all foreign nations 
 whose governments had become directly interested in, and 
 to a certain extent responsible to, their respective peoples, 
 for the opening of the Chinese empire to civilized intercourse 
 and commerce. Up to this point Taoukwang's only experi- 
 ence of the pretensions of the foreign powers had been the 
 Amherst mission, in the time of his father, which had ended 
 so ignominiously, and the Russian mission which arrived at 
 Pekin every ten years to recruit the Russian college there, 
 and to pay the descendants of the garrison of Albazin the 
 sum allotted by the Czar for their support. But from these 
 trifling matters Taoukwang's attention was suddenly and 
 completely distracted to the important situation at Canton 
 and on the coast, the settlement of the questions arising out 
 of which filled the remainder of his reign.
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 271 
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 
 
 At the very time that the Emperor Taoukwang, bj the 
 dismissal of the Portuguese astronomers at Pekin and by 
 his general indifference to the foreign question, was showing 
 that no concessions were to be expected from him, an un- 
 known legislature at a remote distance from his capital was 
 decreeing, in complete indifference to the susceptibilities of 
 the occupant of the Dragon Throne, that trade with China 
 might be pursued by any English subject. Up to the j^ear 
 1834 trade with China had, by the royal charter, remained 
 the monopoly of the East India Company; but when the 
 charter was renewed in that year for a further period of 
 twenty years, it was shorn of the last of its commercial 
 privileges, and an immediate change became jjerceptible in 
 the situation at Canton, which was the principal seat of the 
 foreign trade. The withdrawal of the monopoly was dic- 
 tated solely by English, and not Chinese, considerations. 
 Far from facilitating trade with the Chinese, it tended to 
 hinder and prevent its developing; for the Chinese officials 
 had no objection to foreigners coming to Canton, and buy- 
 ing or selling articles of commerce, so long as they derived 
 personal profit from the trade, and so long as the laws of the 
 empire were not disputed or violated. The servants of the 
 East India Company were content to adapt themselves to 
 this view, and they might have carried on relations with 
 the Hong merchants for an indefinite period, and without 
 any more serious collision than occasional interruptions. 
 Had the monopoly been renewed things would have been 
 left in precisely the same position as when intercourse was 
 first established, and trade might have continued within its 
 old restricted limits. But the abolition of the monopoly and
 
 272 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the opening of the trade created quite a new situation, and, 
 bj intensifying the opposition of the Chinese government, 
 paved the way to the only practicable solution of the ques- 
 tion of foreign intercourse with China, which was that, how- 
 ever reluctantly, she should consent to take her place in the 
 family of nations. 
 
 The Chinese were not left long in doubt as to the signifi- 
 cance of this change. In December, 1833, a royal commis- 
 sion was issued appointing Lord Napier chief superintend- 
 ent of trade with China, and two assistants under him, of 
 whom one was Sir John Davis. The Chinese had to some 
 extent contributed to this appointment, the Hoppo at Canton 
 having written that "in case of the dissolution of the Com- 
 pany it was incumbent on the British government to appoint 
 a chief to come to Canton for the general management of 
 commercial dealings, and to prevent affairs from going to 
 confusion." But in this message the Hoppo seems to have 
 expressed his own view rather than that of the Pekin gov- 
 ernment or the Canton viceroy; and certainly none of the 
 Chinese were prepared to find substituted for "a chief of 
 commercial dealings" an important commissioner clothed 
 with all the authority of the British ruler. How very dif- 
 ferent was the idea formed of this functionary by the Chi- 
 nese and English may be gathered from their official views 
 of his work. What the Chinese thought has been told in 
 the words of the Hoppo. Lord Palmerston was more precise 
 from his point of view. His instruction to Lord Napier read, 
 "Your lordship will announce your arrival at Canton by let- 
 ter to the viceroy. In addition to the duty of protecting and 
 fostering the trade at Canton, it will be one of your principal 
 objects to ascertain whether it may not be practicable to ex- 
 tend that trade to other parts of the Chinese dominions. It 
 is obvious that, with a view to the attainment of this object, 
 the establishment of direct communication with the imperial 
 court at Pekin would be most desirable." The two points 
 of radical disagreement between these views were that the 
 Chinese wished to deal with an official who thought exclu-
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 273 
 
 sivelj of trade, whereas Lord Napier's task was not less dip- 
 lomatic than commercial', and, secondly, that they expected 
 him to carry on his business with the Hoppo, as the Com- 
 pany's agents had done, while Lord Napier was specially 
 instructed to communicate with the viceroy, whom those 
 agents had never dared to approach. 
 
 If it was thought that the Chinese would not realize all 
 the significance of the change, those who held so slight an 
 opinion of their clear-headedness were quickly undeceived. 
 Lord Napier reached the Canton River in July, 1834, and 
 he at once addressed a letter of courtesy to the viceroy an- 
 nouncing his arrival. The Chinese officers, after perusing 
 it, refused to forward it to the viceroy, and returned it to 
 Lord Napier. Such was the inauspicious commencement 
 of the assumption of responsibility by the crown in China. 
 The Chinese refused to have anything to do with Lord 
 Napier, whom they described as "a barbarian eye," and they 
 threatened the merchants with the immediate suspension of 
 the trade. The viceroy issued an order forbidding the new 
 superintendent to proceed to Canton, and commanding him 
 to stay at Macao until he had applied in the prescribed form 
 for permission to proceed up the river. But Lord Napier 
 did not listen to these representations, nor did he condescend 
 to delay his progress a moment at Macao. He proceeded 
 up the river to Canton, but, although he succeeded in mak- 
 ing his way to the English factory, it was only to find him- 
 self isolated, and that, in accordance with the viceroy's order, 
 the Hoppo had interdicted all intercourse with the English. 
 The Chinese declared that the national dignity was at stake, 
 and so thoroughly did both officials and merchants harmon- 
 ize that the English factory was at once deserted by all Chi- 
 nese subjects, and even the servants left their employment. 
 On his arrival at Canton, Lord Napier found himself con- 
 fronted with the position that the Chinese authorities refused 
 to have anything to do with him, and that his presence effect- 
 ually debarred his countrymen from carrying on the trade, 
 which it was his first duty to promote. At this conjuncture
 
 274 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 it liappened that the Chinese had discovered what they 
 thought to be a new grievance against the foreign traders 
 in the steady efflux of silver as the natural consequence of 
 the balance of trade being against China. In a report to 
 the throne in 1833 it was stated that as much as 60,000,000 
 taels of silver, or $100,000,000, had been exported from 
 China in the previous eleven years, and, as the Chinese 
 of course made no allowance for the equivalent value im- 
 ported into their country, this total seemed in their eyes an 
 incredibly large sum to be lost from the national treasure. 
 It will be easily understood that at this particular moment 
 the foreign trade appeared to possess few advantages, and 
 found few patrons among the Chinese people. 
 
 In meeting this opposition Lord Napier endeavored to 
 combine courtesy and firmness. He wrote courteous and 
 argumentative letters to the mandarins, combating their 
 views, and insisting on his rights as a diplomatist to be 
 received by the officials of the empire; and at the same 
 time he issued a notice to the Chinese merchants which was 
 full of threats and defiance. "The merchants of Great 
 Britain," he said, "wish to trade with all China on prin- 
 ciples of mutual benefit; they will never relax in their ex- 
 ertions till they gain a point of equal importance to both 
 countries, and the viceroy will find it as easy to stop the 
 current of the Canton Eiver as to carry into effect the in- 
 sane determinations of the Hong." This notice was natu- 
 rally enough interpreted as a defiance by the viceroy, who 
 placed the most severe restrictions he could on the trade, 
 sent his troops into the foreign settlements to remove all 
 Chinese servants, and ordered the Bogue forts to fire on 
 any English ship that attempted to pass. The English mer- 
 chants, alarmed at the situation, petitioned Lord Napier 
 to allay the storm he had raised by retiring from Canton to 
 Macao, and, harassed in mind and enfeebled in body. Lord 
 Napier acquiesced in an arrangement that stultified all his 
 former proceedings. The Chinese were naturally intoxi- 
 cated by their triumph, which vindicated their principle
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 275 
 
 that no English mercliant or emissary should be allowed 
 to come to Canton except hj the viceroy's permit, granted 
 only to the petition and on the guarantee of the llong mer- 
 chants. The viceroy had also carried his point of holding 
 no intercourse with the English envoy, to whom he had 
 written that "the great ministers of the Celestial Empire, 
 unless with regard to affairs of going to court and carrying 
 tribute, or in consequence of imperial commands, are not 
 permitted to have interviews with outside barbarians." 
 While the Chinese officials had been both consistent and 
 successful, the new English superintendent of trade had 
 been both inconsistent and discomfited. He had attempted 
 to carry matters with a high hand and to coerce the man- 
 darins, and he was compelled to show in the most public 
 manner that he had failed by his retirement to Macao. He 
 had even imperiled the continuance of the trade which he 
 had come specially to promote, and all he could do to show 
 his indignation was to make a futile protest against "this 
 act of unprecedented tyranny and injustice." Very soon 
 after Lord Napier's return to Macao he died, leaving to 
 other hands the settlement of the difficult affair which 
 neither his acts nor his language had simplified. 
 
 On Lord Napier's departure from Canton the restrictions 
 placed on trade were removed, and the intercourse between 
 the English and Chinese merchants of the Hong was re- 
 sumed. But even then the mandarins refused to recognize 
 the trade superintendents, and after a short time they issued 
 certain regulations which had been specially submitted to 
 and approved by the Emperor Taoukwang as the basis on 
 which trade was to be conducted. These Regulations, eight 
 in number, forbade foreign men-of-war to enter the inner 
 Beas, and enforced the old practice that all requests on the 
 part of Europeans should be addressed through the Hong 
 in the form of a petition. It therefore looked as if the Chi- 
 nese had completely triumphed in carrying out their views, 
 that the transfer of authority from the East India Company 
 to the British crown, with the so-called opening of the trade,
 
 276 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 had effected no change in the situation, and that such com- 
 merce as was carried on should be as the Chinese dictated, 
 and in accordance with their main idea, which was to "pre- 
 vent the English establishing themselves permanently at 
 Canton." The death of the Viceroy Loo and the familiar- 
 ity resulting from increased intercourse resulted in some 
 relaxation of these severe regulations, and at last, in March, 
 1837, nearly three years after Lord Napier's arrival in the 
 Bogue, the new superintendent of trade. Captain Elliot, 
 received, at his own request, permission through the Hong 
 to proceed to Canton. The emperor passed a special edict 
 authorizing Captain Elliot to reside in the factory at Canton, 
 where he was to "control the merchants and seamen"; but 
 it was also stipulated that he was to strictly abide by the old 
 regulations, and not to rank above a supercargo. As Cap- 
 tain Elliot was the representative of a government not less 
 proud or exacting than that of China, it was clear that these 
 conditions could not be permanently enforced; and although 
 he endeavored for a period to conciliate the Chinese and to 
 obtain more favorable terms by concessions, there came a 
 time when it was impossible to assent to the arrogant de- 
 mands of the mandarins, and when resort became necessary 
 to the ultima ratio regum. But for the first two critical 
 years Captain Elliot pursued the same policy as Lord Na- 
 pier, alternating concessions with threats, and, while vaunt- 
 ing the majesty of his sovereign, yielding to demands which 
 were unreasonable and not to be endured. 
 
 The balance of trade against China was the principal 
 cause of the export of silver, and the balance of trade was 
 only against China through the increasing import of opium. 
 Without acquiescing in the least with the strong allegations ,; 
 of the anti-opium party, there is no reason to doubt that the 
 excessive use of opium, especially in a crowded city like Can- 
 ton, was attended with sufficient mischief to justify its official 
 denunciation. The Pekin government may be so far credited 
 with the honest intention to reduce the mischief and to pre- 
 vent a bad habit from becoming more and more of a national
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 277 
 
 vice, when they determined for far other reasons to place it 
 in the front of their tirade against foreign trade generally. 
 They soon found that it would be more convenient and more 
 plausible to substitute the moral opposition to the opium 
 traffic for the political disinclination to foreign intercourse 
 in any form. They scarcely expected that in this project 
 they would receive the assistance and co-operation of many 
 of the Europeans themselves, who shared with them the 
 opinion that opium was detestable, and its use or sale a 
 mark of depravity. 
 
 In January, 1839, Taoukwang ordered Lin Tsihseu, vice- 
 roy of the double province of Houkwang and an official of 
 high reputation, to proceed to Canton as Special Commis- 
 sioner to report on the situation, and to propound the best 
 remedy for the opium evil. At this moment the anti- opium 
 party was supreme in the imperial council, and three Man- 
 chu princes were disgraced and banished from Pekin for in- 
 dulging in the practice. The peremptory instructions given 
 to Commissioner Lin, as he is historically known, were "to 
 cut off the fountain of evil, and, if necessary for the attain- 
 ment of his object, to sink his ships and break his caldrons, 
 for the indignation of the great emperor has been fairly 
 aroused at these wicked practices — of buying and selling 
 and using opium — and that the hourly thought of his heart 
 is to do away with them forever. ' ' 
 
 Before Lin reached Canton there had been frequent fric- 
 tion between Captain Elliot and the local mandarins, and 
 more than one interruption of the trade. Less than six 
 months after his installation at Canton his official relations 
 were broken off, and he wrote home to his government a 
 dispatch complaining of the difficulty of conducting any sort 
 of amicable relations with the local mandarins, and indors- 
 ing the growing demand for the right of dealing direct with 
 the Pekin government. Captain Elliot, acting under in- 
 structions from homis, issued a public notice warning all 
 English subjects to discontinue the illicit opium trade, and 
 stating that "her Majesty's Government would not in any
 
 278 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 way interfere if the Cliinese Government should think fit to 
 seize and confiscate the same." 
 
 At this juncture Commissioner Lin, whose fervor and 
 energy carried him away, appeared upon the scene, and, 
 whereas a less capable or honest man would have come to 
 an arrangement with Captain Elliot, his very ability and 
 enthusiasm tended to complicate the situation and render a 
 pacific solution unattainable. Commissioner Lin, on taking 
 up his post, lost no time in showing that he was terribly in 
 earnest; but both his language and his acts j)roved that he 
 had a very much larger programme than was included in his 
 propaganda against the opium traffic. He wished to achieve 
 the complete humiliation of the foreigners, and nothing less 
 would satisfy him. Within a week of his arrival at Canton 
 he issued an edict denouncing the ojjium trade; throwing 
 all the blame for it on the English, and asserting what was 
 absolutely untrue; viz., that "the laws of England prohib- 
 ited the smoking of opium, and adjudged the user to death." 
 The language of the edict was unfriendly and offensive. The 
 Europeans were stigmatized as a barbarous people, who 
 thought only of trade and of making their way by stealth 
 into the Flowery Land. At the same time that he issued 
 this edict he gave peremptory orders that no foreigner was 
 to leave Canton or Macao until the opium question had been 
 settled to his satisfaction. Even then English merchants 
 and officials, who felt no great sympathy with the opium 
 traffic, saw that these proceedings indicated an intention to 
 put down the trade in other articles, and to render the posi- 
 tion of foreigners untenable. Lin's demands culminated in 
 the request for all stores of opium to be surrendered to him 
 within three days. By the efforts of some of the merchants 
 about a thousand chests were collected and handed over to 
 the Chinese for destruction; but this did not satisfy Lin, 
 who collected a large rabble force, encamped it outside the 
 settlement, and threatened to carry the place by storm. In 
 this crisis Captain Elliot, who had declared that his confi- 
 dence in the justice and good faith of the provincial govern-
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 279 
 
 ment was destroyed, and who had even drawn up a scheme 
 for concentrating all his forces at Hongkong, called upon all 
 the English merchants to surrender to him, for paramount 
 considerations of the lives and property of every one con- 
 cerned, all the stores of opium in their possession. More 
 than 20,000 chests, of an estimated value of $10,000,000, were 
 placed at his disposal, and in due course handed over by 
 him to Commissioner Lin for destruction. This task was 
 performed at Chuenpee, when the opium was placed in 
 trenches, then mixed with salt and lime, and finally poured 
 off into the sea. After this very considerable triumph, Lin 
 wrote a letter to Queen Victoria — whose reign witnessed the 
 most critical periods of the China question and its satisfac- 
 tory settlement — calling upon her Majesty to interdict the 
 trade in opium forever. The letter was as offensive in its 
 tone as it was weak in argument, and no answer was vouch- 
 safed to it. Before any reply could be given, the situation, 
 moreover, had developed into one of open hostilities. 
 
 But great as were the concessions made by Captain El- 
 liot, in consequence of the threatening attitude of Commis- 
 sioner Lin, the Chinese were not satisfied, and made fresh 
 and more exacting demands of those who had been weak 
 enough to make any concession at all. They reasserted their 
 old pretension that Europeans in China, must be subject to 
 her laws, and as the sale of opium was a penal offense they 
 claimed the right to punish those Englishmen who had been 
 connected with the traffic. They accordingly drew up a list 
 of sixteen of the principal merchants, some of whom had 
 never had anything to do with opium, and they announced 
 their intention to arrest them and to punish them with death. 
 Not only did Commissioner Lin and the Canton authorities 
 claim the right to condemn and punish British subjects, but 
 they showed in the most insolent manner that they would 
 take away their liberty and lives on the flimsiest and falsest 
 pretext. Captain Elliot, weak and yielding as he was on 
 many points, declared that "this law is incompatible with 
 safe or honorable continuance at Canton." Apparently the
 
 280 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Chinese autliorities acted on tlie assumption tliat so long as 
 tliere remained even one offending European the mass of his 
 countrymen ought to be hindered in their avocations, and 
 consequently petty restrictions and provocations continued 
 to be enforced. Then Captain Elliot, seeing that the situa- 
 tion was hopeless and that there was no sign of improve- 
 ment, took the bold, or at least the pronounced, step of or- 
 dering all British subjects to leave Canton or to stay at their 
 own peril. It was on this occasion that he explained away, 
 or put a new interpretation on, his action with regard to the 
 opium surrendered for destruction, which most of the mer- 
 chants thought represented an irrecoverable loss. It will be 
 best to give the precise words used in his notice of the 22d 
 of May, 1839. "Acting on behalf of her Majesty's Gov- 
 ernment in a momentous emergency, he has, in the first 
 place, to signify that the demand he recently made to her 
 Majesty's subjects for the surrender of British-owned opium 
 under their control had no special reference to the circum- 
 stances of that property ; but (beyond the actual pressure of 
 necessity) that demand was founded on the principle that 
 these violent compulsory measures being utterly unjust ^Je^ 
 se and of general apj)lication for the enforced surrender of 
 any other property, or of human life, or for the constraint 
 of any unsuitable terms or concessions, it became highly 
 necessary to vest and leave the right of exacting effectual 
 security and full indemnity for every loss directly in the 
 queen." Unfortunately, Captain Elliot's language at the 
 time of the surrender of the opium had undoubtedly led to 
 the conclusion that he sympathized with Commissioner Lin, 
 and that he took the same view as the Chinese oflicials of 
 the moral iniquity of selling or using opium. The whole 
 mercantile community adopted Captain Elliot's counsel, and 
 the English factory at Canton, which had existed for nearly 
 two hundred years, was abandoned. At the same time a 
 memorial was sent home begging the government to protect 
 the English merchants in China against "a capricious and 
 corrupt government," and demanding compensation for the
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 281 
 
 $10,000,000 wortli of opium destroyed by Commissioner Lin. 
 Pending the reply of the home government to that appt-iii, 
 nothing could be more complete than the triumph of Com- 
 missioner Lin. The Emperor Taoukwang rewarded him 
 with the important viceroyship of the Two Kiang, the seat 
 of which administration is at Nankin. 
 
 But the limit of endurance had been reached, and the 
 British Government was on the point of taking decisive action 
 at the very moment when the Chinese triumph seemed most 
 complete and unthreatened. Even before the action of the 
 home authorities was known in the Bogue the situation had 
 become critical, and the sailors in particular had thrown off 
 all restraint. Frequent collisions occurred between them 
 and the foreigners, and in one of them a Chinaman was 
 killed. Commissioner Lin characterized this act as "going 
 to the extreme of disobedience to the laws," and demanded 
 the surrender of the sailor who committed the act, so that 
 a life might be given for a life. This demand was flatly 
 refused, and in consequence of the measures taken by the 
 Chinese at Lin's direction to prevent all supplies reaching 
 the English, Captain Elliot felt "bound to remove his resi- 
 dence from Macao to Hongkong. The Chinese called out 
 all their armed forces, and incited their people along the 
 Canton River to attack the foreigners wherever found. An 
 official notice said, "Produce arms and weapons; join to- 
 gether the stoutest of your villagers, and thus be prepared 
 to defend yourselves. If any of the said foreigners be found 
 going on shore to cause trouble, all and every of the people 
 are permitted to fire upon them, to withstand and drive them 
 back, or to make prisoners of them. ' ' This appeal to a force 
 which the Chinese did not possess was an act of indiscretion 
 that betrayed an overweening confidence or a singular depth 
 of ignorance. When the mandarins refused to supply the 
 ships with water and other necessaries they carried their 
 animosity to a length which the English naval officers at 
 once defined as a declaration of open hostilities. They 
 retaliated by ordering their men to seize by force whatever
 
 282 History of china 
 
 was necessary, and thus began a state of things which may 
 be termed one of absolute warfare. The two men-of-war 
 on the station had several encounters with the forts in the 
 Bogue, and on November 3, 1839, they fought a regular 
 engagement with a Chinese fleet of twenty-nine junks off 
 Chuenpee. The Chinese showed more courage than skill, 
 and four of their junks were sunk. It is worth noting that 
 the English sailors pronounced both their guns and their 
 powder to be excellent. While this action deterred the Chi- 
 nese fleet from coming to close quarters, it also imbittered 
 the contest, and there was no longer room to doubt that if 
 the Chinese were to be brought to take a more reasonable 
 view of foreign trade it would have to be by the disagree- 
 able lesson of force. And at the end of 1839 the Chinese 
 were fully convinced that they had the power to carry out 
 their will and to keep the European nations out of their 
 country by the strong hand. 
 
 A short time after the action at Chuenpee an English- 
 man named Mr. Cribble was seized by the Canton oihcials 
 and thrown into prison. The English men-of-war went up 
 the river as far as the Bogue forts, which they threatened to 
 bombard unless he was released; and, after considerable 
 discussion, Mr. Cribble was set free, mainly because the 
 Chinese heard of the large force that was on its way from 
 England. Before that armament arrived, the Emperor 
 Taoukwang had committed himself still further to a policy 
 of hostility. A report of the fight at Chuenpee was duly 
 submitted to him, but the affair was represented as a very 
 creditable one for his commander, and as a Chinese victory. 
 The misled monarch at once conferred a high honor on his 
 admiral, and commanded his officers at Canton "to at once 
 put a stop to the trade of the English nation." This had, 
 practically speaking, been already accomplished, and the 
 English merchants had taken refuge at Macao or in their 
 ships anchored at Ilongkong. 
 
 Before describing the military operations now about to 
 take place, a survey may conveniently be taken of eventa
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 283 
 
 since the abolition of tlie monopoly, and it may be pardon- 
 able to employ the language formerly used. From an 
 impartial review of the facts, and divesting our minds, so 
 far as is humanly possible, of the prejudice of accepted 
 political opinions, and of conviction as to the hurtful or 
 innocent character of opium in the mixture as smoked by 
 the Chinese, it cannot be contended that the course pursued 
 by Lord Napier and Captain Elliot, and particularly by the 
 latter, was either prudent in itself or calculated to promote 
 the advantage and reputation of England. Captain Elliot's 
 proceedings were marked by the inconsistency that springs 
 from ignorance. The more influential English merchants, 
 touched by the appeal to their moral sentiment, or impressed 
 by the depravity of large classes of the Canton population, 
 of which the practice of opium-smoking was rather the mark 
 than the cause, set their faces against the traffic in this 
 article, and repudiated all sympathy and participation in it. 
 The various foreign publications, whether they received their 
 inspirations from Mr. Grutzlaff or not matters little, differed 
 on most points, but were agreed on this, that the trade in 
 opium was morally indefensible, and that we were bound, 
 not only bj our own interests, but in virtue of the common 
 obligations of humanity, to cease to hold all connection with 
 it. Those who had surrendered their stores of opium at the 
 request of Captain Elliot held that their claim for compensa- 
 tion was valid, in the first place, against the English Govern- 
 ment alone. They had given them up for the service of the 
 country at the request of the queen's representative, and, 
 considering the line which Captain Elliot had taken, many 
 believed that it would be quite impossible for the English 
 Government to put forward any demand upon the govern- 
 ment of China. The ten million dollars, according to 
 these large-hearted and unreflecting moralists, would have 
 to be sacrificed by the people of England in the cause of 
 humanity, to which they had given so much by emancipat- 
 ing the slaves, and the revenue of India should, for the fu- 
 ture, be poorer by the amount that used to pay the dividend
 
 284: HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 of the great Company ! The Chinese authorities could not 
 help being encouraged in their opinions and course of pro- 
 ceeding by the attitude of the English. Their most sweep- 
 ing denunciations of the iniquity of the opium trafhc elicited 
 a murmur of approval from the most influential among the 
 foreigners. No Europeans stood up to say that their allega- 
 tions as to the evil of using opium were baseless and absurd. 
 What is more, no one thought it. Had the Chinese made 
 sufficient use of this identity of views, and shown a desire 
 to facilitate trade in the so-called innocent and legitimate 
 articles, there is little doubt that the opium traffic would 
 have been reduced to very small dimensions, because there 
 would have been no rupture. But the action of Commis- 
 sioner Lin revealed the truth that the Chinese were not to 
 be satisfied with a single triumph. The more easily they 
 obtained their objects in the opium matter the more anxious 
 did they become to impress the foreigners with a sense of 
 their inferiority, and to force them to accept the most onerous 
 and unjust conditions for the sake of a continuance of the 
 trade. None the less, Captain Elliot went out of his way to 
 tie his own hands, and to bind his own government, so far 
 as he could, to co-operate with the emperor's officials in the 
 suppression of the opium traffic. That this is no random 
 assertion may be judged from the following official notice, 
 issued several months after the surrender of the stores of 
 opium. In this Captain Elliot announced that "Her Maj- 
 esty's flag does not fly in the protection of a traffic declared 
 illegal by the emperor, and, therefore, whenever a vessel 
 is suspected of having opium on board Captain Elliot will 
 take care that the officers of his establishment shall accom- 
 pany the Chinese officers in their search, and that if, after 
 strict investigation, opium shall be found, he will offer no 
 objection to the seizure and confiscation of the cargo." 
 
 The British expedition arrived at the mouth of the Can- 
 ton River in the month of June, 1840. It consisted of 4,000 
 troops on board twenty-five transports, with a convoy of 
 fifteen men-of-war If it was thought that this considerable
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 285 
 
 force would attain its objects without fighting and merely 
 by making a demonstration, the expectation was rudely dis- 
 appointed. The reply of Commissioner Lin was to place a 
 reward on the person of all Englishmen, and to offer $20,000 
 for the destruction of an English man-of-war. The English 
 fleet replied to this hostile step by instituting a close blockade 
 at the mouth of the river, which was not an ineffectual re- 
 tort. Sir Gordon Bremer, the commander of the first part 
 of the expedition, came promptly to the decision that it would 
 be well to extend the sphere of his operations, and he accord- 
 ingly sailed northward with a portion of his force to occupy 
 the island of Chusan, which had witnessed some of the 
 earliest operations of the East India Company two centuries 
 before. The capture of Chusan presented no difficulties to a 
 well-equipped force, yet the fidelity of its garrison and inhab- 
 itants calls for notice as a striking instance of patriotism. 
 The officials at Tinghai, the capital of Chusan, refused to 
 surrender, as their duty to their emperor would not admit 
 of their giving up one of his possessions. It was their duty 
 to fight, and although they admitted resistance to be useless, 
 they refused to yield, save to force. The English commander 
 reluctantly ordered a bombardment, and after a few hours 
 the Chinese defenses were demolished, and Tinghai was 
 occupied. Chusan remained in our possession as a base of 
 operations during the greater part of the war, but its insalu- 
 brity rather dissipated the reputation it had acquired as an 
 advantageous and well-placed station for operations on the 
 coast of China. Almost at the same time as the attack on 
 Chusan, hostilities were recommenced against the Chinese 
 on the Canton Eiver, in consequence of the carrying off of 
 a British subject, Mr. Vincent Stanton, from Macao. The 
 barrier forts were attacked by two English men-of-war and 
 two smaller vessels. After a heavy bombardment, a force 
 of marines and blue-jackets was landed, and the Chinese 
 positions carried. The forts and barracks were destroyed, 
 and Mr. Stanton released. Then it was said that "China 
 must either bend or break," for the hour of English for-
 
 286 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 bearance had passed away, and unless China conld vindicate 
 her policy by force of arms there was no longer any doubt 
 that she would have to give way. 
 
 While these preliminary military events were occurring, 
 the diplomatic side of the question was also in evidence. 
 Lord Palmerston had written a letter stating in categorical 
 language what he expected at the hands of the Chinese 
 government, and he had directed that it should be delivered 
 into nobody else's hands but the responsible ministers of 
 the Emperor Taoukwang. The primary task of the English 
 expedition was to give this dispatch to some high Chinese 
 official who seemed competent to convey it to Pekir, This 
 task proved one of unexpected difficulty, for the mandarins, 
 basing their refusal on the strict letter of their duty, which 
 forbade them to hold any intercourse with foreigners, re- 
 turned the document, and declared that they could not 
 receive it. This happened at Amoy and again at Ningpo, 
 and the occupation of Chusan did not bring our authorities 
 any nearer to realizing their mission. Baffled in these 
 attempts, the fleet sailed north for the mouth of the Peiho, 
 when at last Lord Palmerston 's letter was accepted by 
 Keshen, the viceroy of the province, and duly forwarded 
 by him to Pekin. The arrival of the English fleet awoke 
 the Chinese court for the time being from its indifference, 
 and Taoukwang not merely ordered that the fleet should be 
 provided with all the supplies it needed, but appointed Keshen 
 High Commissioner for the conclusion of an amicable ar- 
 rangement. The difficulty thus seemed in a fair way toward 
 settlement, but as a matter of fact it was only at its com- 
 mencement, for the wiles of Chinese diplomacy are infinite 
 and were then only partially understood. Keshen was re- 
 markable for his astuteness and for the yielding exterior 
 which covered a purpose of iron, and in the English political 
 officer, the Captain Elliot of Canton, he did not find an oppo- 
 nent worthy of his steel. Although experience had shown 
 how great were the delays of negotiation at Canton, and how 
 inaccessible were the local officials, Captain Elliot allowed
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 287 
 
 himself to be persuaded tliat the best place to cany cfa 
 negotiations was at that city, and after a brief delay the 
 fleet was withdrawn from the Peiho and all the advantages 
 of the alarm created by its presence at Pekin were surren- 
 dered. Believed by the departure of the foreign siiips, 
 Taoukwang sent orders for the dispatch of forces from the 
 inland provinces, so that he might be able to resume the 
 struggle with the English under more favorable conditions, 
 and at the same time he hastened to relieve his overcharged 
 feelings by punishing the man whom he regarded as respon- 
 sible for his misfortunes and humiliation. The full weight 
 of the imperial wrath fell on Commissioner Lin, who from 
 the position of the foremost official in China fell at a stroke 
 of the vermilion pencil to a public criminal arraigned before 
 the Board of Punishments to receive his deserts. He was 
 stripped of all his offices, and ordered to proceed to Pekin, 
 where, however, his life was spared. 
 
 Keshen arrived at Canton on November 29, 1840, but his 
 dispatch to the emperor explaining the position he found 
 there shows that his view of the situation did not differ ma- 
 terially from that of Lin. "Night and day I have consid- 
 ered and examined the state of our relations with the En- 
 glishi. At first, moved by the benevolence of his Majesty 
 and the severity of the laws, they surrendered the opium. 
 Commissioner Lin commanded them to give bonds that they 
 would never more deal in opium — a most excellent plan for 
 securing future good conduct. This the English refused to 
 give, and then they trifled with the laws, and so obstinate 
 were their dispositions that they could not be made to submit. 
 Hence it becomes necessary to soothe and admonish them 
 with sound instruction, so as to cause them to change their 
 mien and purify their hearts, after which it will not be too 
 late to renew their commerce. It behooves me to instruct 
 and persuade them so that their good consciences may be 
 restored, and they reduced to submission." The language 
 of this document showed that the highest Chinese officers 
 still believed that the English would accept trade facilities
 
 288 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 as a favor, that they would be treated de haut en has^ and 
 that China possessed the power to make good her lofty 
 pretensions. China had learned nothing from her military 
 mishaps at Canton, Amoy, and Chusan, and from the ap- 
 pearance of an English fleet in the Gulf of Pechihli. Keshen 
 had gained a breathing space by procrastination in the north, 
 and he resorted to the same tactics at Canton. Days ex- 
 panded into weeks, and at last orders were issued for an 
 advance up the Canton River, as it had become evident that 
 the Chinese were not only bent on an obstructive policy, 
 but were making energetic efforts to assemble a large army. 
 On January 7, 1841, orders were consequently issued for an 
 immediate attack on the Bogue forts, which had been placed 
 in a state of defense, and which were manned by large num- 
 bers of Chinese. Fortunately for us, the Chinese possessed 
 a very rudimentary knowledge of the art of war, and showed 
 no capacity to take advantage of the strength of their posi- 
 tion and forts, or even of their excellent guns. The troops 
 were landed on the coast in the early morning to operate on 
 the flank and rear of the forts at Chuenpee. The advance 
 squadron, under Captain, afterward Sir Thomas, Herbert, 
 was to engage the same forts in front, while the remainder 
 of the fleet proceeded to attack the stockades on the adjoin- 
 ing island of Taikok. The land force of 1,500 men and three 
 guns had not proceeded far along the coast before it came 
 across a strongly intrenched camp in addition to the Chuen- 
 pee forts, with several thousand troops and many guns in 
 position. After a sharp cannonade the forts were carried 
 at a rush, and a formidable army was driven ignominiously 
 out of its intrenchments with hardly any loss to the f.ssail- 
 ants. The forts at Taikok were destroyed by the iire cf the 
 ships, and their guns spiked and garrisons routed by storm- 
 ing parties. In all, the Chinese lost 600 killed, besides an 
 incalculable number of wounded, and many junks. The 
 Chinese showed some courage as well as incompetence, and 
 the English officers deecribed their defense as "obstinate 
 and honorable.'*
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 289 
 
 The capture of the Bogue forts produced immediate and 
 important consequences. Keshen at once begged a cessation 
 of hostilities, and offered terms which conceded everything 
 we had demanded. These were the payment of a large in- 
 demnity, the cession of Hongkong, and the right to hold 
 official communication with the central government. In 
 accordance with these preliminary articles, Hongkong was 
 proclaimed, on January 29, 1841, a British possession, and 
 the troops evacuated Chusan to garrison the new station. 
 It was not considered at the time that the acquisition was 
 of much importance, and no one would have predicted for 
 it the brilliant and prosperous position it has since attained. 
 But the promises given by Keshen were merely to gain time 
 and to extricate him from a very embarrassing situation. 
 The morrow of what seemed a signal reverse was marked 
 by the issue of an imperial notice, breathing a more defiant 
 tone than ever. Taoukwang declared, in this edict, that he 
 was resolved "to destroy and wash the foreigners away 
 without remorse," and he denounced the English by name 
 as "staying themselves upon their pride of power and fierce' 
 strength. ' ' He, therefore, called upon his officers to proceed 
 with courage and energy, so that "the rebellious foreigners 
 might give up their ringleaders, to be sent encaged to Pekin, 
 to receive the utmost retribution of the laws." So long as 
 the sovereign held such opinions as these it was evident that 
 no arrangement could endure. The Chinese did not admit 
 the principle of equality in their dealings with the English, 
 and this was the main point in contention, far more than 
 the alleged evils of the opium traffic. So long as Taoukwang 
 and his ministers held the opinions which they did not hesi- 
 tate to express, a friendly intercourse was impossible. There 
 was no practical alternative between withdrawing from the 
 country altogether and leaving the Chinese in undisturbed 
 seclusion, or forcing their government to recognize a com- 
 mon humanity and an equality in national privileges. 
 
 It is not surprising that under these circumstances the 
 suspension of hostilities proved of brief duration. The con- 
 
 China— 13 -
 
 290 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 flict was hastened by the removal of Keshen from his post, 
 in consequence of his having reported that he considered the 
 Chinese forces unequal to the task of opposing the English. 
 His candor in recognizing facts did him credit, while it cost 
 him his position; and his successor, Eleang, was compelled 
 to take an opposite view, and to attempt something to justify 
 it. Eleang refused to ratify the convention signed by Keshen, 
 and, on February 25, the English commander ordered an 
 attack on the inner line of forts which guarded the ap- 
 proaches to Canton. After a brief engagement, the really 
 formidable lines of Anunghoy, with 200 guns in position, 
 were carried at a nominal loss. The many other positions of 
 the Chinese, up to Whampoa, were occupied in succession; 
 and on March 1 the English squadron drew up off Howqua's 
 Folly, in Whampoa Reach, at the very gateway of Canton. 
 On the following day the dashing Sir Hugh Gough arrived 
 to take the supreme direction of the English forces. After 
 these further reverses, the Chinese again begged a suspen- 
 sion of hostilities, and an armistice for a few days was 
 granted. The local authorities were on the horns of a 
 dilemma. They saw the futility of a struggle with the 
 English, and the Cantonese had to bear all the suffering 
 for the obstinacy of the Pekin government; but, on the other 
 hand, no one dared to propose concession to Taoukwang, 
 who, confident of his power, and ignorant of the extent of 
 his misfortunes, breathed nothing but defiance. After a few 
 days' delay, it became clear that the Cantonese had neither 
 the will nor the power to conclude a definite arrangement, 
 and consequently their city was attacked with as much for- 
 bearance as possible. The fort called Dutch Folly was cap- 
 tured, and the outer line of defenses was taken possession 
 of, but no attempt was made to occupy the city itself. Sir 
 Hugh Gough stated, in a jmblic notice, that the city was 
 spared because the queen had desired that all peaceful people 
 should be tenderly considered. The first English successes 
 had entailed the disgrace of Lin, the second were not less 
 fatal to Keshen. Keshen was arraigned before the Board
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 201 
 
 at Pekin, his valuable property was escheated to the crown, 
 and he himself sentenced to decapitation, which was com- 
 muted to banishment to Tibet, where he succeeded in amass- 
 ing a fresh fortune. The success of the English was pro- 
 claimed by the merchants re-occupying their factories on 
 March 18, 1841, exactly two years after Lin's first fiery edict 
 against opium. It was a strange feature in this straggle 
 that the instant they did so the Chinese merchants resumed 
 trade with undiminished ardor and cordiality. The officials 
 even showed an inclination to follow their example, when 
 they learned that Taoukwang refused to listen to any con- 
 clusive peace, and that his policy was still one of expelling 
 the foreigners. To carry out his views, the emperor sent a 
 new commission of three members to Canton, and it was 
 their studious avoidance of all communication with the En- 
 glish authorities that again aroused suspicion as to the Clii- 
 nese not being sincere in their assent to the convention which 
 had saved Canton from an English occupation. Taoukwang 
 was ignorant of the success of his enemy, and his commis- 
 sioners, sent to achieve what Lin and Keshen had failed to 
 do, were fully resolved not to recognize the position which 
 the English had obtained by force of arms, or to admit that 
 it was likely to prove enduring. This confidence was in- 
 creased by the continuous arrival of fresh troops, until at 
 last there were 50,000 men in the neighborhood of Canton, 
 and all seemed ready to tempt the fortune of war again, and 
 to make another effort to expel the hated foreigner. The 
 measure of Taoukwang' s animosity may be taken by his 
 threatening to punish with death any one who suggested 
 making peace with the barbarians. 
 
 While the merchants were actively engaged in their com- 
 mercial operations, and the English officers in conducting 
 negotiations with a functionary who had no authority, and 
 who was only put forward to amuse them, the Chinese were 
 busily employed in completing their warlike preparations, 
 which at the same time they kept as secret as possible, in 
 the hope of taking the English by surprise. But it was
 
 292 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 impossible for sucli extensive preparations to be made with- 
 out their creating some stir, and the standing aloof of the 
 commissioners was in itself ground of suspicion. Suspicion 
 became certainty when, on Captain Elliot paying a visit to 
 the perfect in the city, he was received in a disrespectful 
 manner by the mandarins and insulted in the streets by the 
 crowd. He at once acquainted Sir Hugh Grough, who was 
 at Hongkong, with the occurrence, and issued a notice, on 
 May 21, 1841, advising all foreigners to leave Canton that 
 day. This notice was not a day too soon, for, during the 
 night, the Chinese made a desperate attempt to carry out 
 their scheme. The batteries which they had secretly erected 
 at various points in the city and along the river banks began 
 to bombard the factories and the shij)s at the same time that 
 fire-rafts were sent against the latter in the hope of causing 
 a conflagration. Fortunately the Chinese were completely 
 baffled, with heavy loss to themselves and none to the En- 
 glish; and during the following day the English assumed 
 the offensive, and with such effect that all the Chinese bat- 
 teries were destroyed, together with forty war- junks. The 
 only exploit on which the Chinese could compliment them- 
 selves was that they had sacked and gutted the English 
 factory. This incident made it clearer than ever that the 
 Chinese Grovernment would only be amenable to force, and 
 that it was absolutely necessary to inflict some weighty pun- 
 ishment on the Chinese leaders at Canton, who had made so 
 bad a return for the moderation shown them and their city, 
 and who had evidently no intention of compljdng with the 
 arrangement to which they had been a party. 
 
 Sir Hugh Gough arrived at Canton with all his forces on 
 May 24, and on the following morning the attack commenced 
 with the advance of the fleet up the Macao passage, and with 
 the landing of bodies of troops at different points which 
 appeared well suited for turning the Chinese position and 
 attacking the gates of Canton. The Chinese did not molest 
 the troops in landing, which was fortunate, as the operation 
 proved exceedingly difficult and occupied more than a whole
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 293 
 
 day. The Chinese had taken up a strong position on the 
 hills lying north of the city, and they showed considerable 
 judgment in their selection and no small skill in strengthen- 
 ing their ground by a line of forts. The Chinese were said 
 to be full of confidence in their ability to reverse the previous 
 fortune of the war, and they fought with considerable con- 
 fidence, while the turbulent Cantonese populace waited im- 
 patiently on the walls to take advantage of the first symptoms 
 of defeat among the English troops. The English army, 
 divided into two columns of nearly 2,000 men each, with 
 a strong artillery force of seven guns, four howitzers, five 
 mortare, and fifty- two rockets, advanced on the Chinese 
 intrenchments across paddy fields, rendered more difficult 
 of passage by numerous burial-grounds. The obstacles were 
 considerable and the progress was slow, but the Chinese did 
 not attempt any opposition. Then the battle began with the 
 bombardment of the Chinese lines, and after an hour it 
 seemed as if the Chinese had had enough of this and were 
 preparing for flight, when a general advance was ordered. 
 But the Chinese thought better of their intention or their 
 movement was misunderstood, for when the English streamed 
 up the hill to attack them they stood to their guns and pre- 
 sented a brave front. Three of their forts were carried with 
 little or no loss, but at the fourth they ofi:ered a stubborn if 
 ill-directed resistance. Even then the engagement was not 
 over, for the Chinese rallied in an intrenched camp one mile 
 in the rear of the forts, and, rendered confident by their 
 numbers, they resolved to make a fresh stand, and hurled 
 defiance at the foreigners. The English troops never halted 
 in their advance, and, led by the 18th or Royal Irish, they 
 carried the intrenchment at a rush and put the whole Chi- 
 nese army to flight. The English lost seventy killed and 
 wounded ; the Chinese losses were never accurately known. 
 It was arranged that Canton was to be stormed on the fol- 
 lowing day, but a terrific hurricane and deluge of rain pre- 
 vented all military movements on May 26, and, as it proved, 
 saved the city from attack. Once more Chinese diplomacy
 
 294 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 came to the relief of Chinese arms. To save Canton the 
 mandarins were quite prepared to make every concession, 
 if thej only attached a temporary significance to their lan- 
 guage, and they employed the whole of that lucky wet day 
 in getting round Captain Elliot, who once more allowed 
 himself to place faith in the promises of the Chinese. The 
 result of this was seen on the 27th, when, just as Sir Hugh 
 Gough was giving orders for the assault, he received a 
 message from Captain Elliot stating that the Chinese had 
 come to terms and that all hostilities were to be suspended. 
 The terms the Chinese had agreed to in a few hours were 
 that the commissioners and all the troops should retire to 
 a distance of sixty miles from Canton, and that $6,000,000 
 should be paid "for the use of the English crown." 
 
 Five of the $6,000,000 had been handed over to Captain 
 Elliot, and amicable relations had been established with the 
 city authorities, when the imperial commissioners, either 
 alarmed at the penalties their failure entailed, or encouraged 
 to believe in the renewed chances of success from the impo- 
 tence into which the English troops might have sunk, made 
 a sudden attempt to surprise Sir Hugh Gough's camp and 
 to retrieve a succession of disasters at a single stroke. The 
 project was not without a chance of success, but it required 
 prompt action and no hesitation in coming to close quarters 
 — the two qualifications in which the Chinese were most 
 deficient. So it was on this occasion. Ten or fifteen thou- 
 sand Chinese braves suddenly appeared on the hills about 
 two miles north of the English camp; but instead of seizing 
 the opportunity created by the surprise at their sudden ap- 
 pearance and at the breach of armistice, and delivering home 
 their attack, they merely waved their banners and uttered 
 threats of defiance. They stood their ground for some time 
 in face of the rifle and artillery fire opened upon them, and 
 then they kept up a sort of running fight for three miles as 
 they were pursued by the English. They did not suffer any 
 serious loss, and when the English troops retired in conse- 
 quence of a heavy storm they became in turn the pursuers
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 295 
 
 and inflicted a few casualties. The advantages they obtained 
 were due to the terrific weather more than to their courage, 
 but one party of Madras sepoys lost its way, and was sur- 
 rounded by so overwhelming a number of Chinese that they 
 would have been annihilated but that their absence was fort- 
 unately discovered and a rescuing party of marines, armed 
 with the new percussion gun, which was to a great degree 
 secure against the weather, went out to their assistance. 
 They found the sepoys, under their two English officers, 
 drawn up in a square firing as best they could and presenting 
 a bold front to the foe — "many of the sepoys, after extract- 
 ing the wet cartridge very deliberately, tore their pocket 
 handkerchiefs or lining from their turbans and, baling water 
 with their hands into the barrel of their pieces, washed and 
 dried them, thus enabling them to fire an occasional volley. ' ' 
 Out of sixty sepoys one was killed and fourteen wounded. 
 After this Sir Hugh Gough threatened to bombard Canton 
 if there were any more attacks on his camp, and they at once 
 ceased, and when the whole of the indemnity was paid the 
 English troops were withdrawn, leaving Canton as it was, 
 for a second time "a record of British magnanimity and 
 forbearance." 
 
 After this trade reverted to its former footing, and by 
 the Canton convention, signed by the imperial commission- 
 ers in July, 1841, the English obtained all the privileges 
 they could hope for from the local authorities. But it was 
 essentially a truce, not a treaty, and the great point of direct 
 intercourse with the central government was no nearer set- 
 tlement than ever. At this moment Sir Henry Pottinger 
 arrived as Plenipotentiary from England, and he at once set 
 himself to obtaining a formal recognition from the Pekin 
 executive of his position and the admission of his right to 
 address them on diplomatic business. With the view of 
 pressing this matter on the attention of Taoukwang, who 
 personally had not deviated from his original attitude of em- 
 phatic hostility, Sir Henry Pottinger sailed northward with 
 the fleet and a large portion of the land forces about the end
 
 296 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 of August. The important seaport of Amoy was attacked 
 and taken after what was called "a short but animated re- 
 sistance." This town is situated on an island, the largest 
 of a group lying at the entrance to the estuary of Lung- 
 kiang, and it has long been famous as a convenient port and 
 flourishing place of trade. The Chinese had raised a ram- 
 part of 1, 100 yards in length, and this they had armed with 
 ninety guns, while a battery of forty- two guns protected its 
 flank. Kulangsu was also fortified, and the Chinese had 
 placed in all 500 guns in position. They believed in the 
 impregnability of Amoy, and it was allowed that no incon-. 
 siderable skill as well as great expense had been devoted to 
 the strengthening of the place. When the English fleet ar- 
 rived off the port the Chinese sent a flag of truce to demand 
 what it wanted, and they were informed the surrender of 
 the town. The necessity for this measure would be hard 
 to justify, especially as we were nominally at peace with 
 China, for the people of Amoy had inflicted no injury on 
 our trade, and their chastisement would not bring us any 
 nearer to Pekin. Nor was the occupation of Amoy neces- 
 sary on military grounds. It was strong only for itself, and 
 its capture had no important consequences. As the Chinese 
 determined to resist the English, the fleet engaged the bat- 
 teries, and the Chinese, standing to their guns "right man- 
 fully," only abandoned their position when they found their 
 rear threatened by a landing party. Then, after a faint 
 resistance, the Chinese sought safety in flight, but some of 
 their officers, preferring death to dishonor, committed sui- 
 cide, one of them being seen to walk calmly into the sea 
 and drown himself in face of both armies. The capture of 
 Amoy followed. 
 
 As the authorities at Amoy refused to hold any inter- 
 course with the English, the achievement remained barren 
 of any useful consequence, and after leaving a small garri- 
 son on Kulangsu, and three warships in the roadstead, the 
 English expedition continued its northern course. After be- 
 ing scattered by a storm in the perilous Formosa channel,
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 207 
 
 the fleet reunited off Ningpo, whence it proceeded to attack 
 Chusan for a second time. The Chinese defended Tinghai, 
 the capital, with great resolution. At this place General 
 Keo, the chief naval and military commander, was killed, 
 and all his officers, sticking to him to the last, also fell with 
 him. Their conduct in fact was noble; nothing could have 
 surpassed it. On the reoccupation of Chusan, which it was 
 decided to retain until a formal treaty had been concluded 
 with the emperor, Sir Henry Pottinger issued a proclama- 
 tion to the effect that years might elapse before that place 
 would be restored to the emperor's authority, and many 
 persons wished that it should be permanently annexed as 
 the best base for commercial operations in China. A gar- 
 rison of 400 men was left at Tinghai, and then the expedi- 
 tion proceeded to attack Chinhai on the mainland, where 
 the Chinese had made every preparation to offer a strenuous 
 resistance. The Chinese suffered the most signal defeat and 
 the greatest loss they had yet incurred during the war. The 
 victory at Chinhai was followed by the unopposed occupa- 
 tion of the important city of Ningpo, where the inhabitants 
 shut themselves up in their houses, and wrote on their doors 
 "Submissive People." Ningpo was put to ransom and the 
 authorities informed that unless they paid the sum within 
 a certain time their city would be handed over to 2)illage 
 and destruction. As the Pekin Government had made no 
 sign of giving in, it was felt that no occasion ought to be 
 lost of overawing the Chinese, and compelling them to ad- 
 mit that any further prolongation of the struggle would be 
 hopeless. The arrival of further troops and warships from 
 Europe enabled the English commanders to adopt a more 
 determined and uncompromising attitude, and the capture 
 of Ningpo would have been followed up at once but for the 
 disastrous events in Afghanistan, which distracted attention 
 from the Chinese question, and delayed its settlement. It 
 was hoped, however, that the continued occupation of Amoy, 
 Chusan and Ningpo would cause sufficient pressure on the 
 Pekin Government to induce it to yield all that was demanded.
 
 298 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 These anticipations were not fulfilled, for neither tlie swift- 
 recurring visitation of disaster nor the waning resources of 
 the imperial government in both men and treasure, could 
 shake the fixed hostility of Taoukwang or induce him to 
 abate his proud pretensions. Minister after minister passed 
 into disgrace and exile. Misfortune shared the same fate 
 as incompetence, and the more the embarrassments of the 
 state increased the heavier fell the hand of the ruler and the 
 verdict of the Board of Punishments upon beaten generals 
 and unsuccessful statesmen. The period of inaction which 
 followed the occupation of Ningpo no doubt encouraged the 
 emperor to think that the foreigners were exhausted, or that 
 they had reached the end of their successes, and he ordered 
 increased efforts to be made to bring up troops, and to 
 strengthen the approaches to Pekin. The first proof of 
 his returning spirit was shown in March, 1842, when the 
 Chinese attempted to seize Ningpo by a coup de main. Sud- 
 denly, and without warning, a force of between ten and 
 twelve thousand men appeared at daybreak outside the south 
 and west gates of Ningpo, and many of them succeeded in 
 making their way over the walls and gaining the center of 
 the town ; but, instead of proving the path to victory, this 
 advance resulted in the complete overthrow of the Chinese. 
 Attacked by artillery and foot in the market-place they were 
 almost annihilated, and the great Chinese attack on Ningpo 
 resulted in a fiasco. Similar but less vigorous attacks were 
 made about the same time on Chinhai and Chusan, but they 
 were both repulsed with heavy loss to the Chinese. In con- 
 sequence of these attacks and the improved position in Af- 
 ghanistan it was decided to again assume the ofi!ensive, and 
 to break up the hostile army at Hangchow, of which the 
 body that attacked Ningpo was the advanced guard. Sir 
 Hugh Gough commanded the operations in person, and he 
 had the co-operation of a naval force under Sir William 
 Parker. The first action took place outside Tszeki, a small 
 place ten miles from Ningpo, where the Chinese fancied 
 they occupied an exceedingly strong position. But careful
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 299 
 
 inspection showed it to be radically faulty. Their lines cov- 
 ered part of the Segaou hills, but their left was commanded 
 by some higher hills on the right of the English position, 
 and the Chinese left again commanded their own right. It 
 was evident, therefore, that the capture of the left wing of 
 the Chinese encampment would entail the surrender or 
 evacuation of the rest. The difficulties of the ground caused 
 a greater delay in the advance than had been expected, and 
 the assault had to be delivered along the whole line, as it 
 was becoming obvious that the Chinese were growing more 
 confident, and, consequently, more to be feared from the 
 delay in attacking them. The assault was made with the 
 impetuosity good troops always show in attacking inferior 
 ones, no matter how great the disparity of numbers; and 
 here the Chinese were driven out of their position — although 
 they stood their ground in a creditable manner — and chased 
 over the hills down to the rice fields below. The Chinese 
 loss was over a thousand killed, including m.any of the Im- 
 perial Guard, of whom 500 were present, and whom Sir 
 Hugh Go ugh described as "remarkably fine men," while 
 the English had six killed and thirty-seven wounded. For 
 the moment it was intended to follow up this victory by an 
 attack on the city of Hangchow, the famous Kincsay of 
 medieval travelers; but the arrival of fresh instructions 
 gave a complete turn to the whole war. 
 
 Little permanent good had been effected by these suc- 
 cessful operations on the coast, and Taoukwang was still as 
 resolute as ever in his hostility; nor is there any reason to 
 suppose that the capture of Hangchow, or any other of the 
 coast towns, would have caused a material change in the 
 situation. The credit of initiating the policy which brought 
 the Chinese Government to its knees belongs exclusively to 
 Lord Ellenborough, then governor-general of India. He 
 detected the futility of operations along the coast, and he 
 suggested that the great waterway of the Yangtsekiang, 
 perfectly navigable for warships up to the immediate neigh- 
 borhood of Nankin, provided the means of coercing the Chi-
 
 300 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 nese and effecting tlie objects which the English Gov- 
 ernment had in view. The English expedition, strongly 
 re-enforced from India, then abandoned Ningpo and Chin- 
 hai, and, proceeding north, began the final operations of the 
 war with an attack on Chapoo, where the Chinese had made 
 extensive measures of defense. Chapoo was the port ap- 
 pointed for trade with Japan, and the Chinese had collected 
 there a very considerable force from the levies of Chekiang, 
 which ex- Commissioner Lin had been largely instrumental 
 in raising. Sir Hugh Gough attacked Chapoo with 2,000 
 men, and the main body of the Chinese was routed without 
 much difficulty, but 300 desperate men shut themselves up 
 in a walled inclosure, and made an obstinate resistance. 
 They held out until three-fourths of them were slain, when 
 the survivors, seventy-five wounded men, accepted the quar- 
 ter offered them from the first. The English lost ten killed 
 and fifty-five wounded, and the Chinese more than a thou- 
 sand. After this the expedition proceeded northward for 
 the Great Eiver, and it was found necessary to attack Woo- 
 sung, the port of Shanghai, en route. This place was also 
 strongly fortified with as many as 175 guns in position, but 
 the chief difficulty in attacking it lay in that of approach, 
 as the channel had first to be sounded, and then the sailing 
 ships towed into position by the steamers. Twelve vessels 
 were in this manner placed broadside to the batteries on 
 land, a position which obviously they could not have main- 
 tained against a force of anything like equal strength; but 
 they succeeded in silencing the Chinese batteries with com- 
 paratively little loss, and then the English army was landed 
 without opposition. Shanghai is situated sixteen miles up 
 the Woosung River, and while part of the force proceeded up 
 the river another marched overland. Both columns arrived 
 together, and the disheartened Chinese evacuated Shanghai 
 after firing one or two random shots. No attempt was 
 made to retain Shanghai, and the expedition re-embarked, 
 and proceeded to attack Chankiang or Chinkiangfoo, a town 
 on the southern bank of the Yangtsekiang, and at the north-
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 301 
 
 ern entrance of the wsouthern branch of the Great Canal. 
 This town has always been a place of great celebrity, both 
 strategically and commercially, for not merely does it hold 
 a very strong position with regard to the Canal, but it forms, 
 with the Golden and Silver Islands, the principal barrier in 
 the path of those attempting to reach Nankin. At this 
 point Sir Hugh Gough was re-enforced by the 98th Eegi- 
 ment, under Colonel Colin Campbell. The difficulties of 
 navigation and the size of the fleet, which now reached 
 seventy vessels, caused a delay in the operations, and it 
 was not until the latter end of July, or more than a month 
 after the occupation of Shanghai, that the English reached 
 Chinkiangfoo, where, strangely enough, there seemed to be 
 no military preparations whatever. A careful reconnais- 
 sance revealed the presence of three strong encampments at 
 some distance from the town, and the first operation was to 
 carry them, and to prevent their garrisons joining such 
 forces as might still remain in the city. This attack was 
 intrusted to Lord Saltoun's brigade, which was composed of 
 two Scotch regiments and portions of two native regiments, 
 with only three guns. The opposition was almost insignifi- 
 cant, and the three camps were carried with comparatively 
 little loss and their garrisons scattered in all directions. At 
 the same time the remainder of the force assaulted the city, 
 which was surrounded by a high wall and a deep moat. 
 Some delay was caused by these obstacles, but at last the 
 western gate was blown in by Captain Pears, of the Engi- 
 neers, and at the same moment the walls were escaladed at 
 two different points, and the English troops, streaming in on 
 three sides, fairly surrounded a considerable portion of the 
 garrison, who retired into a detached work, where they per- 
 ished to the last man either by our fire or in the flames of 
 the houses which were ignited partly by themselves and 
 partly by the fire of our soldiers. The resistance did not 
 stop here, for the Tartar or inner city was resolutely de- 
 fended by the Manchus, and owing to the intense heat the 
 Europeans would have been glad of a rest; but, as the Man-
 
 302 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 chus kept up a galling fire, Sir Hugli Gough felt bound to 
 order an immediate assault before the enemy grew too dar- 
 ing. The fight was renewed, and the Tartars were driven 
 back at all points; but the English troops were so exhausted 
 that they could not press home this advantage. The inter- 
 val thus gained was employed by the Manchus, not in mak- 
 ing good their escape, but in securing their military honor 
 by first massacring their women and children, and then 
 committing suicide. It must be remembered that these were 
 not Chinese, but Manchu Tartars of the dominant race. 
 
 The losses of the English army at this battle — 40 killed, 
 and 130 wounded — were heavy, and they were increased by 
 several deaths caused by the heat and exhaustion of the day. 
 The Chinese, or rather the Tartars, never fought better, and 
 it appears from a document discovered afterward that if 
 Ilailing's recommendations had been followed, and if he had 
 been properly supported, the capture of Chinkiangfoo would 
 have been even more difficult and costly than it proved. 
 
 Some delay at Chinkiangfoo was rendered necessary by 
 the exhaustion of the troops and by the number of sick and 
 wounded ; but a week after the capture of that place in the 
 manner described the arrangements for the further advance 
 on Nankin were completed. A small garrison was left in an 
 encampment on a height commanding the entrance to the 
 Canal; but there was little reason to apprehend any fresh 
 attack, as the lesson of Chinkiangfoo had been a terrible 
 one. That city lay beneath the English camp like a vast 
 charnel house, its half-burned buildings filled with the self- 
 immolated Tartars who had preferred honor to life; and so 
 thickly strewn were these and so intense the heat that the 
 days passed away without the ability to give them burial, 
 until at last it became absolutely impossible to render the 
 last kind office to a gallant foe. Despite the greatest pre- 
 cautions of the English authorities, Chinkiangfoo became 
 the source of pestilence, and an outbreak of cholera caused 
 more serious loss in the English camp than befell the main 
 force intrusted with the capture of Nankin. Contrary winds
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 303 
 
 delayed tte progress of the English fleet, and it was not un- 
 til the fifth of August, more than a fortnight after the battle 
 at Chinkiangfoo, that it appeared off Nankin, the second 
 city in reputation and historical importance of the empire, 
 with one million inhabitants and a garrison of 15,000 men, 
 of whom two-thirds were Manchus. The walls were twenty 
 miles in length, and hindered, more than they promoted, 
 an efficient defense; and the difficulties of the surrounding 
 country, covered with the debris of the buildings which con- 
 stituted the larger cities of Nankin at an earlier period of 
 history, helped the assailing party more than they did the 
 defenders. Sir Hugh Gough drew up an admirable plan for 
 capturing this vast and not defenseless city with his force of 
 5,000 men, and there is no reason to doubt that he would 
 have been completely successful ; but by this the backbone 
 of the Chinese Government had been broken, and even the 
 proud and obstinate Taoukwang was compelled to admit that 
 it was imperative to come to terras with the English, and to 
 make some concessions in order to get rid of them. 
 
 The minister Elepoo, who once enjoyed the closest inti- 
 macy with Taoukwang, and who was the leader of the 
 Peace party, which desired the cessation of an unequal 
 struggle, had begun informal negotiations several months 
 before they proved successful at Nankin. He omitted no 
 opportunity of learning the views of the English officers, and 
 what was the minimum of concession on which a stable 
 peace could be based. He had endeavored also to give 
 something of a generous character to the struggle, and he 
 had more than once proved himself a courteous as well as 
 a gallant foe. After the capture of Chapoo and Woosung 
 he sent back several officers and men who had at different 
 times been taken prisoners by the Chinese, and he expressed 
 at the same time the desire that the war should end. Sir 
 Henry Pottinger's reply to this letter was to inquire if he 
 was empowered by the emperor to negotiate. If he had 
 received this authority the English plenipotentiary would 
 be very happy to discuss any matter with him, but if not
 
 304 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the operations of war must proceed. At tliat moment Ele- 
 poo had not the requisite authority to negotiate, and the war 
 went on until the victorious English troops were beneath the 
 walls of Nankin. At the same time as these pourparlers 
 were held with Elepoo at Woosung, Sir Henry Pottinger 
 issued a proclamation to the Chinese stating what the Brit- 
 ish Government required to be done. In this document the 
 equality of all nations as members of the same human fam- 
 ily was pointed out, and the right to hold friendly inter- 
 course insisted on as a matter of duty and common obliga- 
 tion. Sir Henry said that "England, coming from the 
 utmost west, has held intercourse with China in this utmost 
 east for more than two centuries past, and during this time 
 the English have suffered ill-treatment from the Chinese 
 officials, who, regarding themselves as powerful and us as 
 weak, have thus dared to commit injustice." Then followed 
 a list of the many high-handed acts of Commissioner Lin 
 and his successors. The Chinese, plainly speaking, had 
 sought to maintain their exclusiveness and to live outside 
 the comity of nations, and they had not the power to attain 
 their wish. Therefore they were compelled .to listen to and 
 to accept the terms of the English plenipotentiary, which 
 were as follows: — The emperor was first of all to appoint a 
 high officer with full powers to negotiate and conclude ar- 
 rangements on his own responsibility, when hostilities would 
 be suspended. The three principal points on which these 
 negotiations were to be based were compensation for losses 
 and expenses, a friendly and becoming intercourse on terms 
 of equality between officers of the two countries, and the 
 cession of insular territory for commerce and for the resi- 
 dence of merchants, and as a security and guarantee against 
 the future renewal of offensive acts. The first step toward 
 the acceptance of these terms was taken when an imperial 
 commission was formed of three members, Keying, Elepoo, 
 and Niu Kien, viceroy of the Two Kiang; and to the last 
 named, as governor of the provinces most affected, fell the 
 task of writing the first diplomatic communication of a satis-
 
 TEE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 305 
 
 factory character from the Chinese Govemment to the En- 
 glish plenipotentiary. This letter was important for more 
 reasons than its being of a conciliatory nature. It lieid out 
 to a certain extent a hand of friendship, and it also sought 
 to assign an origin to the conflict, and Niu Kien could find 
 nothing more handy or convenient than opium, which thus 
 came to give its name to the whole war. With regard to 
 the Chinese reverses, Nin Kien, while admitting them, ex- 
 plained that "as the central nation had enjoyed peace for a 
 long time the Chinese were not prepared for attacking and 
 fighting, which had led to this accumulation of insult and 
 disgrace." In a later communication Niu Kien admitted 
 that "the English at Canton had been exposed to insults 
 and extortions for a series of years, and that steps should be 
 taken to insure in future that the people of your honorable 
 nation might carry on their commerce to advantage, and not 
 receive injury thereby." These documents showed that the 
 Chinese were at last willing to abandon the old and impos- 
 sible principle of superiority over other nations, for which 
 they had so long contended; and with the withdrawal of 
 this pretension negotiations for the conclusion of a stable 
 peace became at once possible and of hopeful augury. 
 
 The first step of the Chinese commissioners was to draw 
 up a memorial for presentation to the emperor, asking his 
 sanction of the arrangement they suggested. In this docu- 
 ment they covered the whole ground of the dispute, and 
 stated in clear and unmistakable language what the English 
 demanded, and they did not shrink from recommending 
 compliance with their terms. Keying and his colleagues 
 put the only two alternatives with great cogency. Which 
 will be the heavier calamity, they said, to pay the English 
 the sum of money they demand (21,000,000 dollars, made 
 up as follows: Six million for the destroyed opium, 3,000,000 
 for the debts of the Hong merchants, and 12,000,000 for the 
 expenses of the war), or that they should continue those 
 military operations which seemed irresistible, and from 
 •which China had suffered so grievously ? Even if the lat-
 
 806 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 ter alternative were faced and the war continued, the evil 
 day would only be put off. The army expenses would be 
 very great, the indemnity would be increased in amount, 
 and after all there would be only "the name of fighting 
 without the hope of victory. ' ' Similar arguments were used 
 with regard to the cession of Hongkong, and the right of 
 trading at five of the principal ports. The English no doubt 
 demanded more than they ought, but what was the use of 
 arguing with them, as they were masters of the situation ? 
 Moreover, some solace might be gathered in the midst of 
 affliction from the fact that the English were willing to pay 
 certain duties on their commerce which would in the end 
 repay the war indemnity, and contribute to "the expenditure 
 of the imperial family." With regard to the question of 
 ceremonial intercourse on a footing of equality, they de- 
 clared that it might be "unreservedly granted." The reply 
 of Taoukwang to this memorial was given in an edict of 
 considerable length, and he therein assented to all the views 
 and suggestions of the commissioners, while he imposed on 
 Keying alone the responsibility of making all the arrange- 
 ments for paying the large indemnity. All the preliminaries 
 for signing a treaty of peace had therefore been arranged 
 before the English forces reached Nankin, and as the Chi- 
 nese commissioners were sincere in their desire for peace, 
 and as the emperor had sanctioned all the necessary ar- 
 rangements, there was no reason to apprehend any delay, 
 and much less a breakdown of the negotiations. 
 
 It was arranged that the treaty should be signed on 
 board a British man-of-war, and the Chinese commissioners 
 were invited to pay a visit for the purpose to the "Corn- 
 wallis, " the flagship of the admiral. The event came off 
 on the 20th of August, 1842, and the scene was sufficiently 
 interesting, if not imposing. The long line of English war- 
 ships and transports, drawn up opposite to and within short 
 range of the lofty walls of Nankin; the land forces so dis- 
 posed on the raised causeways on shore as to give them 
 every facility of approach to the city gates, while leaving
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR '607 
 
 it doubtful to the last which gate would be the real object 
 of attack; and then the six small Chinese boats, gayly dec- 
 orated with flags, bearing the imperial commissioners and 
 their attendants, to sign for the first time in history a treaty 
 of defeat with a foreign power. The commissioners were 
 dressed in their plainest clothes, as they explained, because 
 imperial commissioners are supposed to proceed in haste 
 about their business, and have no time to waste on their 
 persons, but there is reason to believe that they thought 
 such clothing best consorted with the inauspicious charac- 
 ter for China of the occasion. The ceremony passed off 
 without a hitch, and four days later Sir Henry Pottinger 
 paid the Chinese officers a return visit, when he was re- 
 ceived by them in a temple outside the city walls. A third 
 and more formal reception was held on the 26th of August 
 in the College Hall, in the center of Nankin, when Sir 
 Henry Pottinger, twenty officers, and an escort of native 
 cavalry rode through the streets of one of the most famous 
 cities of China. It was noted at the time that on this date 
 an event of great importance had happened in each of the 
 three previous years. On the 26th of August, 1839, Lin 
 had expelled the English from Macao, in 1840 the British 
 fleet anchored off the Peiho, and in 1841 Amoy was cap- 
 tured. Three days after this reception the treaty itself was 
 signed on board the "Cornwallis," when Keying and his 
 colleagues again attended for the purpose. The act of sign- 
 ing was celebrated by a royal salute of twenty- one guns, 
 and the hoisting of the standards of England and China at 
 the masthead of the man-of-war. The Emperor Taouk- 
 wang ratified the treaty with commendable dispatch, and 
 the only incident to mar the cordiality of the last scene in 
 this part of the story of Anglo- Chinese relations was the 
 barbarous and inexcusable injury inflicted by a party of 
 English officers and soldiers on the famous Porcelain Tower, 
 which was one of the finest specimens of Chinese art, hav- 
 ing been built 400 years before at great expense and the 
 labor of twenty years.
 
 ^08 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 The ports in addition to Canton to be opened to trade 
 were Shanghai, Ningpo, Amoy and Foochow, but these 
 were not to be opened until a tariff had been drawn up 
 and consular officers appointed. As the installments of 
 the indemnity were paid the troops and fleet were with- 
 drawn, but a garrison was left for some time in Chusan 
 and Kulangsu, the island off Amoy. The attack and mas- 
 sacre of some shipwrecked crews on the coast of Formosa 
 gave the Chinese Government an occasion of showing how 
 marked a change had come over its policy. An investiga- 
 tion was at once ordered, the guilty officials were punished, 
 and the emperor declared, "We will not allow that, because 
 the representation came from outside foreigners, it should 
 be carelessly cast aside without investigation. Our own 
 subjects and foreigners, ministers and people, should all 
 alike understand that it is our high desire to act with even- 
 handed and perfect justice." Sir Henry Pottinger's task 
 was only half performed until he had drawn up the tariff 
 and installed consular officers in the new treaty ports. 
 Elepoo was appointed to represent China in the tai'Lff nego- 
 tiations, and Canton was selected as the most convenient 
 place for discussing the matter. Within two months of the 
 resumption of negotiations they seemed on the point of a 
 satisfactory termination, when the death of Elepoo, the 
 most sincere and straightforward of all the Chinese offi- 
 cials, caased a delay in the matter. Elepoo was a member 
 of the Manchu imperial family, being descended from one 
 of the brothers of Yung Ching, who had been banished by 
 that ruler and reinstated by Keen Lung. That the Pekin 
 Government did not wish to make his death an excuse for 
 backing out of the arrangement was shown by the prompt 
 appointment of Keying as his sviccessor. At this stage of 
 the question the opium difficulty again rose up as of the first 
 importance in reference to the settlement of the commercial 
 tariff. The main point was whether opium was to appear 
 in the tariff at all or to be relegated to the category of con- 
 traband articles. Sir Ilenry Pottinger disclaimed all sym-
 
 THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR 309 
 
 patliy witli tlie traffic, and was quite willing that it should 
 Le declared illicit; but at the same time he stated that the 
 responsibility of putting it down must rest with the Chinese 
 themselves. The Chinese were not willing to accept this 
 responsibility, and said that "if the supervision of the En- 
 glish representatives was not perfect, there will be less or 
 more of smuggling." Keying paid Sir Henry Pottinger a 
 ceremonious visit at Ilongkong on the 26tli of June, 1843, 
 and within one month of that day the commercial treaty 
 was signed. Sir Henry issued a public proclamation calling 
 upon British subjects to faithfully conform with its provis- 
 ions, and stating that he would adopt the most stringent 
 and decided measures against any offending persons. On 
 his side Keying published a notification that "trade at the 
 five treaty ports was open to the men from afar." The 
 only weak point in the commercial treaty was that it con- 
 tained no reference to opium. Sir Henry Pottinger failed 
 to obtain the assent of the Chinese Government to its legali- 
 zation, and he refused to undertake the responsibility of a 
 preventive service in China, but at the same time he pub- 
 licly stated that the "traffic in opium was illegal and con- 
 traband by the laws and imperial edicts of China. ' ' Those 
 who looked further ahead realized that the treaty of Nankin, 
 by leaving unsettled the main point in the controversy and 
 the primary cause of difference, could not be considered a 
 final solution of the problem of foreign intercourse with 
 China. The opium question remained over to again dis- 
 turb the harmony of our relations. 
 
 As has been said before, it would be taking a narrow 
 view of the question to affirm that opium was the principal 
 object at stake during this war. The real point was whether 
 the Chinese Grovernment could be allowed the possession of 
 rights which were unrecognized in the law of nations and 
 which rendered the continuance of intercourse with foreign- 
 ers an impossibility. What China sought to retain was never 
 claimed by any other nation, and could only have been estab- 
 lished by extraordinary military power. When people talk,
 
 310 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 therefore, of tlie injustice of tliis war as another instance of 
 the triumph of might over right, they shoukl recollect that 
 China in the first place was wrong in claiming an impossible 
 position in the family of nations. We cannot doubt that if 
 the acts of Commissioner Lin had been condoned the lives 
 of all Europeans would have been at the mercy of a system 
 which recognizes no gradation in crime, which affords many 
 facilities for the manufacture of false evidence, and which 
 inflicts punishment altogether in excess of the fault. It is 
 gratifying to find that many unprejudiced persons declared 
 at the time that the war which resulted in the Nankin treaty 
 was a just one, and so eminent an authority on international 
 law as John Qaincy Adams drew up an elaborate treatise to 
 show that "Britain had the righteous cause against China." 
 We may leave the scene of contest and turn from the record 
 of an unequal war with the reflection that the results of the 
 struggle were to be good. However inadequately the work 
 of far-seeing statesmanship may have been performed in 
 1842, enough was done to make present friendship possible 
 and a better understanding between two great governing 
 peoples a matter of hope and not desponding expectancy. 
 
 CHAPTER XYIII 
 
 TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR 
 
 . The progress and temporary settlement of the foreign 
 question so completely overshadows every other event during 
 Taoukwang's reign that it is difficult to extract anything of 
 interest from the records of the government of the country, 
 although the difficult and multifarious task of ruling three 
 hundred millions of people had to be performed. More than 
 one fact went to show that the bonds of constituted authority 
 were loosened in China, and that men paid only a qualified 
 respect to the imperial edict. Bands of robbers prowled 
 about the country, and even the capital was not free from
 
 TAOUKWANO AND HIS SUCCESSOR 311 
 
 tlieir presence. While one band made its headquarters 
 within the imperial city, another established itself in a 
 fortified position in the central provinces of China, whence 
 it dominated a vast region. The police were helpless, and 
 such military forces as existed were unable to make any 
 serious attempt to crush an opj^onent who was stronger than 
 themselves. The foreign war had led to the recruiting of a 
 large number of braves, and the peace to their sudden dis- 
 bandment, so that the country was covered with a large 
 number of desperate and penniless men, who were not 
 particular as to what they did for a livelihood. It is not 
 surprising that the secret societies began to look up again 
 witb so promising a field to work in, and a new association, 
 known as the Grreen Water- Lily, became extremely formidable 
 among the truculent braves of Hoonan. But none of these 
 troubles assumed the extreme form of danger in open rebel- 
 lion, and there was still wanting the man to weld all these 
 hostile and dangerous elements into a national party of in- 
 surgents against Manchu authority, and so it remained until 
 Taoukwang had given up his throne to his successor. 
 
 In Yunnan there occurred, about the year IS'IG, the first 
 simmerings of disaffection among the Mohammedans, which 
 many years later developed into the Panthay Rebellion, but 
 on that occasion the vigor of the viceroy nipped the danger 
 in the bud. In Central Asia there was a revival of activity 
 on the part of the Khoja exiles, who fancied that the dis- 
 comfiture of the Chinese by the English and the internal 
 disorders, of which rumor had no doubt carried an exag- 
 gerated account into Turkestan, would entail a very much 
 diminished authority in Kashgar. As it happened, the Chi- 
 nese authority in that region had been consolidated and ex- 
 tended by tbe energy and ability of a Mohammedan official 
 named Zuhuruddin. He had risen to power by the thorough- 
 ness with which he had carried out the severe repressive 
 measures sanctioned after the abortive invasion of Jehan- 
 gir, and during fifteen years he increased the revenue and 
 trade of the great province intrusted to his care. His loy-
 
 312 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 alty to the Chinese Government seems to liave "been unira- 
 peachable, and the only point he seems to have erred in was 
 an overconfident belief in the strength of his position. He 
 based this opinion chiefly on the fact of his having con- 
 structed strong new forts, or yangyshahr, outside the prin- 
 cipal towns. But a new element of danger had in the mean- 
 time been introduced into the situation in Kashgar by the 
 appointment of Khokandian consuls, who were empowered 
 to raise custom dues on all Mohammedan goods. These of- 
 ficials became the center of intrigue against the Chinese 
 authorities, and whenever the Khan of Khokand determined 
 to take up the cause of the Khojas he found the ground 
 prepared for him by these emissaries. 
 
 In 1842 Mahomed All, Khan of Khokand, a chief of 
 considerable ability and character, died, and his authority 
 passed, after some confusion, to his kinsman, Khudayar, 
 who was a man of little capacity and indisposed to meddle 
 with the affairs of his neighbors. But the Khokandian 
 chiefs were loth to forego the turbulent adventures to which 
 they were addicted for the personal feelings of their nominal 
 head, and they thought that a descent upon Kashgar of- 
 fered the best chance of glory and booty. Therefore they 
 went to the seven sons of Jehangir and, inciting them by 
 the memory of their father's death as well as the hope of a 
 profitable adventure, to make another attempt to drive the 
 Chinese out of Central Asia, succeeded in inducing them to 
 unfurl once more the standard of the Khojas. The seven 
 Khojas — Haft Khojagan — issued their proclamation in the 
 winter of 1845-46, rallied all their adherents to their side, 
 and made allies of the Kirghiz tribes. 
 
 When the Mohammedan forces left the hills they ad- 
 vanced with extreme rapidity on Kashgar, to which they 
 laid siege. After a siege of a fortnight they obtained pos- 
 session of the town through the treachery of some of the 
 inhabitants; but the citadel or yangyshahr continued to hold 
 out, and their excesses in the town so alienated the sympathy 
 of the Kashgarians, that no popular rising took place, and
 
 TAOUKWANO AND HIS SUCCESSOR 313 
 
 the Cliinese were able to collect all their garrisons to expel 
 the invaders. The Khojas were defeated in a battle at Kok 
 Robat, near Yarkand, and driven out of the country. The 
 affair of the seven Khojas, which at one time threatened the 
 Chinese with the gravest danger, thus ended in a collapse, 
 and it is remarkable as being the only invasion in which the 
 Mohammedan subjects of China did not fraternize with her 
 enemies. Notwithstanding the magnitude of his services as 
 an administrator, Zuhuruddin was disgraced and dismissed 
 from his post for what seemed his culpable apathy at the 
 beginning of the campaign. 
 
 Another indication of the weakness of the Chinese execu- 
 tive was furnished in the piratic confederacy which estab- 
 lished itself at the entrance of the Canton River, and defied 
 all the efforts of the mandarins until they enlisted in their 
 behalf the powerful co-operation of the English navy. The 
 Bogue had never been completely free from those lawless 
 persons who are willing to commit any outrage if it holds 
 out a certain prospect of gain with a minimum amount of 
 danger, and the peace had thrown many desperate men out 
 of employment who thought they could find in piracy a mode 
 of showing their patriotism as well as of profiting them- 
 selves. These turbulent and dangerous individuals gathered 
 round a leader named Shapuntsai, and in the je&r of which 
 we are speaking, 1849, they controlled a large fleet and a 
 well-equipped force, which levied blackmail from Fochow 
 to the Gulf of Tonquin, and attacked every trading ship, 
 European or Chinese, which did not appear capable of defend- 
 ing itself. If they had confined their attacks to their own 
 countrymen it is impossible to say how long they might have 
 gone on in impunity, for the empire possessed no naval 
 power; but, unfortunately for them, and fortunately for 
 China, they seized some English vessels and murdered some 
 English subjects. One man-of-war under Captain Hay was 
 employed in operations against them, and in the course of 
 six months fifty-seven piratical vessels were destroyed, and 
 a thousand of their crews either slain or taken prisoners. 
 
 China — 14
 
 314 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Captain Hay, on being joined by another man-of war, had 
 the satisfaction of destroying the remaining junks and the 
 depots in the Canton River, whereupon he sailed to attack 
 the headquarters of Shapuntsai in the Grulf of Tonquin. 
 After some search the piratical fleet was discovered off an 
 island which still bears the name of the Pirates' Hold, and 
 after a protracted engagement it was annihilated. Sixty 
 junks were destroyed, and Shapuntsai was compelled to 
 escape to Cochin China, where it is believed that he was 
 executed by order of the king. The dispersion of this pow- 
 erful confederacy was a timely service to the Chinese, who 
 were informed that the English Government would be at all 
 times happy to afford similar aid at their request. Even at 
 this comparatively early stage of the intercourse it was ap- 
 parent that the long- despised foreigners would be able to 
 render valuable service of a practical kind to the Pekin 
 executive, and that if the Manchus wished to assert their 
 power more effectually over their Chinese subjects they 
 would be compelled to have recourse to European weapons 
 and military and scientific knowledge. The suppression of 
 the piratical confederacy of the Bogue was the first occasion 
 of that employment of European force, which was carried 
 to a much more advanced stage during the Taeping re- 
 bellion, and of which we have certainly not seen the last 
 development. 
 
 One of the last acts of Taoukwang's reign showed to 
 what a depth of mental hesitation and misery he had sunk. 
 It seems that the Chinese New Year's Day — February 12, 
 1850 — was to be marked by an eclipse of the sun, which was 
 considered very inauspicious, and as the emperor was espe- 
 cially susceptible to superstitious influences, he sought to get 
 out of the difliculty, and to avert any evil consequences, by 
 decreeing that the new year should begin on the previous 
 day. But all-powerful as a Chinese emperor is, there are 
 some things he cannot do, and the good sense of the Chinese 
 revolted against this attempt to alter the course of nature. 
 The imperial decree was completely disregarded, and re-
 
 TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR 315 
 
 ceived with expressions of derision, and in several towns 
 the placards were torn down and defaced. Notwithstanding 
 the eclipse, the Chinese year began at its appointed time. 
 Some excuse might be made for Taoukwang on the ground 
 of ill-health, for he was then suffering from the illness which 
 carried him off a few weeks later. His health had long been 
 precarious, the troubles of his reign had prematurely aged 
 him, and he had experienced a rude shock from the death, 
 at the end of 1849, of his adopted mother, toward whom he 
 seems to have preserved the most affectionate feelings. 
 From the first day of his illness its gravity seems to have 
 been appreciated, and an unfavorable issue expected. On 
 February 25, a grand council was held in the emperor's 
 bed-chamber, and the emperor wrote in his bed an edict 
 proclaiming his fourth son his heir and chosen successor. 
 Taoukwang survived this important act only a very short 
 time, but the exact date of his death is uncertain. There 
 is some reason for thinking that his end was hastened by the 
 outbreak of a fire within the Imperial City, which threatened 
 it with destruction. The event was duly notified to the 
 Chinese people in a proclamation by his successor, in which 
 he dilated on the virtues of his predecessor, and expressed 
 the stereotyped wish that he could have lived a hundred 
 years. 
 
 Taoukwang was in his sixty-ninth year, having been born 
 on September 12, 1781, and the thirty years over which his 
 reign had nearly extended were among the most eventful, 
 and in some respects the most unfortunate, in the annals of 
 his country. "When he was a young man, the power of his 
 grandfather, Keen Lung, was at its pinnacle, but the mis- 
 fortunes of his father's reign had prepared him for the 
 greater misfortunes of his own, and the school of adversity 
 in which he had passed the greater portion of his life had 
 imbued him only with the disposition to bear calamity, and 
 not the vigor to grapple with it. Yet Taoukwang was not 
 without many good points, and he seems to have realized 
 the extent of the national trouble, and to have felt acutely
 
 316 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 his inability to retrieve wliat had been lost. He was also 
 averse to all unnecessary display, and his expenditure on the 
 court and himself was less than that of any of his predeces- 
 sors or successors. He never wasted the public money on 
 his own person, and that was a great matter. His habits 
 were simple and manly. 
 
 Although Taoukwang's reign had been marked by un- 
 qualified misfortune, he seems to have derived consolation 
 from the belief that the worst was over, and that as his 
 authority had recovered from such rude shocks it was not 
 likely to experience anything worse. He had managed to 
 extricate himself from a foreign war, which was attended 
 with an actual invasion of a most alarming character, with- 
 out any diminution of his authority. The symptoms of in- 
 ternal rebellion which had revealed themselves in more than 
 one quarter of the emj)ire had not attained any formidable 
 dimensions, and seemed likely to pass away without en- 
 dangering the Chinese constitution. Taoukwang may have 
 hoped that while he had suffered much he had saved his 
 family and dynasty from more serious calamities, and that 
 on him alone had fallen the resentment of an offended 
 Heaven. The experience of the next fifteen years was to 
 show how inaccurately he had measured the situation, and 
 how far the troubles of the fifteen years following his death 
 were to exceed those of his reign; for just as he had inherited 
 from his father, Kiaking, a legacy of trouble, so did he pass 
 on to his son an inheritance of misfortune and difficulty, 
 rendered all the more onerous by the pretension of supreme 
 power without the means to support it. 
 
 The accession of Prince Yihchoo — who took the name 
 of niQ,nfung, which means "great abundance," or "complete 
 prospt th»y" — to the throne threatened for a moment to be 
 distui'in-d by the ambition of his uncle, Hwuy Wang, who, 
 it will be remembered, had attempted to seize the throne 
 from his brother Taoukwang. This prince had lived in re- 
 tirement during the last years of his brother's reign, and 
 the circumstances which emboldened him to again put for-
 
 TAOUKWANQ AND HIS SUCCESSOR 317 
 
 ward his pretensions will not be known until the state his- 
 tory of the Manchu dynasty is published. His attemi)t 
 signally failed, but Hienfung spared his life, while he pun- 
 ished the ministers, Keying and Muchangah, for their 
 supposed apathy, or secret sympathy with the aspirant to 
 the imperial ofifice, by dismissing them from their posts. 
 When Hienfung became emperor he was less than twenty 
 years of age, and one of his first acts was to confer the title 
 of Prince on his four younger brotliers, and to associate them 
 in the administration with himself. This was a new depart- 
 ure in the Manchu policy, as all the previous emperors had 
 systematically kept their brothers in the background. Hien- 
 fung's brothers became known in the order of their ages as 
 Princes Kung, Shun, Chun, and Fu, and as Hienfung was 
 the fourth son of Taoukwang, they were also distinguished 
 numerically as the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth princes. 
 Although Hienfung became emperor at a time of great na- 
 tional distress, he was so far fortunate that an abundant 
 harvest, in the year 1850, tended to mitigate it, and by hav- 
 ing recourse to the common Chinese practice of "voluntary 
 contributions," a sufficiently large sum was raised to remove 
 the worst features of the prevailing scarcity and suffering. 
 But these temporary and local measures could not improve 
 a situation that was radically bad, or allay a volume of pop- 
 ular discontent that was rapidly developing into unconcealed 
 rebellion. 
 
 An imperial proclamation was drawn up by the Haulin 
 College in which Hienfung took upon himself the whole 
 blame of the national misfortunes, but the crisis had got 
 far beyond a remedy of words. The corruption of the public 
 service had gradually alienated the sympathies of the people. 
 Justice and probity had for a time been banished from the 
 civil service of China. The example of the few men of 
 honor and capacity served but to bring into more prominent 
 relief the faults of the whole class. Justice was nowhere to 
 be found; the verdict was sold to the highest bidder. The 
 guilty, if well provided in worldly goods, escaped scot-free;
 
 818 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 tlie poor suffered for their own frailties as well as the crimes 
 of wealthier offenders. There was seen the far from uncom- 
 mon case of individuals sentenced to death obtaining substi- 
 tutes for the capital punishment. Offices were sold to men 
 who had never passed an examination, and who were wholly 
 illiterate, and the sole value of office was as the means of 
 extortion. The nation was heavily taxed, but the taxes to 
 the state were only the smaller part of the sums wrung from 
 the people of the Middle Kingdom. How was honor, or a 
 sense of duty, to be expected from men who knew that their 
 term of office must be short, and who had to receive their 
 j^urchase money and the anticipated profit before their post 
 was sold again to some fresh and possibly higher bidder ? 
 The officials waxed rich on ill-gotten wealth, and a few in- 
 dividuals accumulated enormous fortunes, while the govern- 
 ment sank lower and lower in the estimation of the people. 
 It lost also in efficiency and striking power. A corrupt and 
 effeminate body of officers and administrators can serve but 
 as poor defenders for an embarrassed prince and an assailed 
 government against even enemies who are in themselves in- 
 significant and not free from the vices of a corrupt society 
 and a decaying age, and it was only on such that Hienfung 
 had in the first place to lean against his opponents. Even 
 his own Manchus, the warlike Tartars, who, despite the 
 smallness of their numbers, had conquered the whole of 
 China, had lost their primitive virtue and warlike efficiency 
 in the southern climes which they had made their home. To 
 them the opulent cities of the Chinese had proved as fatal 
 as Capua to the army of the Carthaginian, and, as the self- 
 immolations of Chapoo and Chinkiangfoo proved to have no 
 successors, they showed themselves unworthy of the empire 
 won by their ancestors. For the first time since the revolt 
 of Wou Sankwei, the Manchus were brought face to face 
 with a danger threatening their right of conquest; yet on 
 the eve of the Taeping llebellion all Hienfung could think 
 of to oppose his foes with was fine words as to his short- 
 comings and lavish promises of amendment.
 
 TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR 310 
 
 Among the secret societies the Triads were tlje first to 
 give a political and dynastic significance to their pro})a- 
 ganda. The opening sentence of the oath of membership 
 read as follows: "We combine everywhere to recall the 
 Ming and exterminate the barbarians, cut oS. the Tsing 
 and await the right prince." But as there were none of 
 the Mings left, and as their name had lost whatever hold 
 it may have possessed on the minds of the Chinese people, 
 this proclaimed object tended rather to deter than to invite 
 recruits to the society. Yet if any secret society shared in 
 the origination of the Taeping Rebellion that credit belongs 
 to the Triads, whose anti-Manchu literature enjoyed a wide 
 circulation through Southern China, and they may have 
 had a large share in drafting the programme that the 
 Taeping leader, Tien Wang, attempted to carry out. 
 
 The individual on whom that exalted title was subse- 
 quently bestowed had a very common origin, and sprang 
 from an inferior race. Hung-tsiuen, such was his own 
 name, was the son of a small farmer near Canton, and 
 he was a haJcka, a despised race of tramps who bear some 
 resemblance to our gypsies. He was born in the year 1813, 
 and he seems to have passed all his examinations with spe- 
 cial credit; but the prejudice on account of his birth j>re- 
 vented his obtaining any employment in the civil service of 
 his country. He was therefore a disappointed aspirant to 
 office, and at such a period it was not surprising that he 
 should have become an enemy of the constituted authorities 
 and the government. As he could not be the servant of the 
 state he set himself the ambitious task of being its master, 
 and with this object in view he resorted to religious practices 
 in order to acquire a popular reputation, and a following 
 among the masses. He took up his residence in a Buddhist 
 monastery; and the ascetic deprivations, the loud prayers 
 and invocations, the supernatural counsels and meetings, 
 were the course of training which every religious devotee 
 adopts as the proper novitiate for those honors based on the 
 superstitious reverence of mankind which are sometimes no
 
 320 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 inadequate substitute for temporal power and influence, even 
 when they fail to pave the way to their attainment. He left 
 his place of seclusion to place himself at the head of the larg- 
 est party of rebels, who had made their headquarters in the 
 remote province of Kwangsi, and he there proclaimed him- 
 self as Tien "Wang, which means the Heavenly Prince, and 
 as an aspirant to the imperial dignity. Gradually the rebels 
 acquired possession of the whole of the territory south of the 
 Canton Eiver, and when they captured the strong and im- 
 portant military station at Kanning the emperor sent three 
 commissioners, one of them being his principal minister 
 Saichangah, to bring them to reason, but the result was 
 not encouraging, and although the Taepings were repulsed 
 in their attempt on Kweiling, they remained masters of the 
 open part of the province. One of the Chinese officers had 
 the courage to write and tell the emperor that "the outlaws 
 were neither exterminated nor made prisoners. ' ' Notwith- 
 standing the enormous expenditure on the war and the col- 
 lection of a large body of troops the imperial forces made no 
 real progress in crushing the rebels. Fear or inexperience 
 prevented them from coming at once to close quarters with 
 the Taepings, when their superior numbers must have de- 
 cided the struggle in their favor and nipped a most formi- 
 dable rebellion in the bud. That some of Hienfung's officers 
 realized the position can be gathered from the following let- 
 ter, written at this period by a Chinese mandarin: "The 
 whole country swarms with rebels. Our funds are nearly 
 at an end, and our troops few; our officers disagree, and the 
 power is not concentrated. The commander of the forces 
 wants to extinguish a burning wagonload of fagots with a 
 cupful of water. I fear we shall hereafter have some serious 
 affair — that the great body will rise against us, and our own 
 people leave us." The military operations in Kwangsi lan- 
 guished during two years, although the tide of war declared 
 itself, on the whole, against the imperialists ; but the rebels 
 themselves were exposed to this danger — that they were ex- 
 clusively dependent on the resources of the province, and
 
 TAOUKWANO AND HIS SUCCESSOR 321 
 
 that tliese being exhausted, they were in clanger of being 
 compelled to retire into Tonquin. It was at this exceed- 
 ingly critical moment that Tien Wang showed himself an 
 able leader of men by coming to the momentous decision 
 to march out of Kwangsi, and invade the vast and yet un- 
 touched provinces of Central China. If the step was more 
 the pressure of dire need than the insjiiration of genius, it 
 none the less forms the real turning-point in the rebellion. 
 
 Tien Wang announced his decision by issuing a proclama- 
 tion, in the course of which he declared that he had received 
 "the Divine commission to exterminate the Manchus, and to 
 possess the empire as its true sovereign" ; and, as it was also 
 at this time that his followers became commonly known as 
 Taepings, it may be noted that the origin of this name is 
 somewhat obscure. According to the most plausible ex- 
 planation it is derived from the small town of that name, 
 situated in the southwest corner of the province of Kwangsi, 
 where the rebel movement seems to have commenced. An- 
 other derivation gives it as the style of the dynasty which 
 Tien Wang hoped to found, and its meaning as "Universal 
 peace. ' ' Having called in all his outlying detachments and 
 proclaimed his five principal lieutenants by titles which have 
 been rendered as the northern, southern, eastern, western 
 and assistant kings, Tien Wang began his northern march 
 in April, 1852. At the town of Yungan, on the eastern 
 borders of the province of Kwangsi, where he seems to have 
 hesitated between an attack on Canton and the invasion of 
 Hoonan, an event occurred which threatened to break up 
 his force. The Triad chiefs, who had allied themselves with 
 Tien Wang, were superior in knowledge and station to the 
 immediate followers of the Taeping leader, and they took 
 offense at the arrogance of his lieutenants after they had 
 been elevated to the rank of kings. These officers, who pos- 
 sessed no claim to the dignity they had received, assumed 
 the yellow dress and insignia of Chinese royalty, and looked 
 down on all their comrades, especially the Triad organizers, 
 who thought themselves the true originators of the rebellion.
 
 322 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Irritated by this treatment, the Triads took their sudden and 
 secret departure from the Taeping camp, and hastened to 
 make their peace with the imperialists. Of these Triads one 
 chief, named Chang Kwoliang, received an important com- 
 mand, and played a considerable part in the later stages of 
 the struggle. 
 
 The defection of the Triads put an end to the idea of 
 attacking Canton, and the Taepings marched to attack 
 Kweiling, where the Imperial Commissioners still remained. 
 Tien Wang's assault was repulsed with some loss, and, afraid 
 of discouraging his troops by any further attempt to seize so 
 strong a place, he marched into Hoonan. Had the imperial 
 commanders, who had shown no inconsiderable capacity in 
 defense, exhibited as much energy in offensive measures, 
 they might then and there have annihilated the power of 
 the Taepings. Had they pursaed the Taeping army they 
 might have harassed its rear, delayed its progress, and event- 
 ually brought it to a decisive engagement at the most favor- 
 able moment. But the Imperial Commissioners did nothing, 
 being apparently well satisfied with having rid themselves 
 of such troublesome neighbors. The advance of the Tae- 
 pings across the vast province of Hoonan was almost un- 
 opposed. The towns were unprepared to resist an assailant, 
 and it was not until Tien Wang reached the provincial capi- 
 tal, Changsha, that he encountered any resistance worthy 
 of the name. Some vigorous preparations had been made 
 here to resist the rebels. Not merely was there a garrison 
 in the place, but it so happened that Tseng Kwofan, a man 
 of considerable ability and of an influential family, was re- 
 siding near the town. Tseng had held several offices in the 
 public service, and, as a member of the Hanlin, enjoyed a 
 high position and reputation ; but he happened to be at his 
 own home in retirement in consequence of the death of a 
 near relation when tidings of the approaching Taepings 
 reached him, and he at once made himself responsible for 
 the defense of Changsha. He threw himself with all the 
 forces his influence or resources enabled him to collect into
 
 TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR 323 
 
 that town, aud at tlie same time he ordered all the militia 
 of the province to collect and harass the enemy. lie called 
 upon all those who had the means to show their duty to the 
 state and sovereign by raising recruits or by promising re- 
 wards to those volunteers who would serve in the army 
 against the rebels. Uad the example of Tseng Kwofan 
 been generally followed, it is not too much to say that tlie 
 Taepings would never have got to Nankin. When the reb- 
 els reached Changsha, therefore, they found the gates closed, 
 the walls manned, and the town victualed for a siege. They 
 attempted to starve the place into surrender, and to frighten 
 the garrison into yielding by threats of extermination; but 
 when these efforts failed they delivered three separate as- 
 saults, all of which were repulsed. After a siege of eighty 
 days, and having suffered very considerable losses, the Tae- 
 pings abandoned the attack, and on the 1st of December re- 
 sumed their march northward, which, if information could 
 have been rapidly transmitted, would have soon resulted 
 in their overthrow. On breaking up from before Changsha 
 they succeeded in seizing a sufhcient number of junks and 
 boats to cross the great inland lake of Tungting, and on reach- 
 ing the Yangtsekiang at Yochow they found that the impe- 
 rial garrison had fled at the mere mention of their approach. 
 The capture of Yochow was important, because the Tae- 
 pings acquired there an imj^ortant arsenal of much-needed 
 weapons and a large supply of gunpowder, which w^as said 
 to have been the property of Wou Sankwei. Thus, well 
 equipped and supplying their other deficiencies by celerity 
 of movement, they attacked the important city of Hankow, 
 which surrendered without a blow The scarcely less im- 
 portant town of Wouchang, on the southern and opposite 
 bank of the river, was then attacked, and carried after a 
 siege of a fortnight. The third town of Hanyang, which 
 forms, with the others, the most important industrial and 
 commercial hive in Central China, also surrendered without 
 any attempt at resistance, and this striking success at once 
 restored the sinking courage of the Taepings, and made the
 
 324 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 danger from them to the dynasty again wear an aspect of 
 the most pressing importance. 
 
 It would be difficult to exaggerate the effect of this suc- 
 cess on the spirits of the Taepings, who had been seriously 
 discouraged before they achieved this gratifying result. 
 The capture of these towns removed all their most serious 
 causes of doubt, and enabled them to repay themselves for 
 the losses and hardships they had undergone, while it also 
 showed that the enterprise they had in hand was not likely 
 to prove unprofitable. After one month's rest at Hankow, 
 and having been joined by many thousands of new follow- 
 ers, the Taepings resolved to pursue their onward course. 
 To tell the truth, they were still apprehensive of pursuit 
 from Tseng Kwofan, who had been joined by the Triad 
 leader, Chang Kwoliang; but there was no ground for the 
 fear, as these officials considered themselves tied to their 
 own province, and unfortunately the report of the success 
 of the imperialists in Hoonan blinded people to the danger 
 in the Yangtse Valley from the Taepings. The Taepings 
 resumed active operations with the capture of Kiukiang 
 and Ganking, and in March, 1853, they sat down before 
 Nankin. The siege continued for a fortnight, but notwith- 
 standing that there was a large Manchu force in the Tartar 
 city, which might easily have been defended against an 
 enemy without artillery, the resistance offered was singu- 
 larly and unexpectedly faint-hearted. The Taepings suc- 
 ceeded in blowing in one of the gates, the townspeople 
 fraternized with the assailants, and the very Manchus who 
 had defied Sir Hugh Grough in 1842 surrendered their lives 
 and their honor to a force which was nothing more than an ' 
 armed rabble. The Tartar colony at Nankin, numbering . 
 4,000 families, had evidently lost the courage and discipline 
 which could alone enable them to maintain their position in 
 China. Instead of dying at their posts they threw them- 
 selves on the mercy of the Taeping leader, imploring him 
 for pity and for their lives when the gate was blown in by 
 Tien Wang's soldiery. Their cowardice helped them not;
 
 TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR 325 
 
 of 20,000 Manclius not one hundred escaped. The tale rests 
 on undoubted evidence. A Taeping who took }>art in the 
 massacre said, "We killed them all, to the infant in arms; 
 we left not a root to sprout from, and the bodies of the slain 
 we cast into the Yangtse. " 
 
 The acquisition of Nankin at once made the Taepings a 
 formidable rival to the Manchus, and Tien Wang a contest- 
 ant with Hienfung for imperial honors. The possession of 
 the second city in the empire gave them the complete con- 
 trol of the navigation of the Yangtsekiang, and thus en- 
 abled them to cut off communications between the north and 
 the south of China. To attain this object in a still more per- 
 fect manner they occupied Chinkiangfoo at the entrance to 
 the Grand Canal. They also seized Yangchow on the north- 
 ern bank of the river immediate!}'' opposite the place where 
 Sir Hugh Gough had gained his decisive victory in 1842. 
 Such was the terror of the Taepings that the imperial gar- 
 risons did not attempt the least resistance, and town after 
 town was evacuated at their approach. Tien Wang, en- 
 couraged by his success, transferred his headquarters from 
 Hankow to Nankin, and proclaimed the old Ming city his 
 capital. By rapidity and an extraordinary combination of 
 fortunate circumstances, the Taepings had advanced from 
 the remote province of Kwangsi into the heart of the em- 
 pire, but it was clear that unless they could follow up their 
 success by some blow to the central government they would 
 lose all they had gained as soon as the Muuehus recovered 
 their confidence. At a council of war at Nankin it was de- 
 cided to send an army against Pekin as soon as Nankin had 
 been placed in a proper state to undergo a protracted siege. 
 Provisions were collected to stand a siege for six or seven 
 years, the walls were repaired and fresh batteries erected. 
 By the end of May, 1853, these preparations were com- 
 pleted, and as the Taeping army had then been raised to 
 a total of 80,000 men, it was decided that a large part of it 
 could be spared for operations north of the Yangtsekiang. 
 That army was increased to a very large total by volunteers
 
 326 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 who thought an expedition to humble the Manchus at the 
 capital promised much glory and spoil. The progress of 
 this northern army very closely resembled that of the Tae- 
 pings from Kwangsi to Nankin. They overran the open 
 country, and none of the imperial troops ventured to oppose 
 them, but when any Manchu officer showed valor in defend- 
 ing a walled city they were fain to admit their inadequate 
 engineering skill and military capacity. They attacked Kai- 
 fong, the capital of Honan, but were repulsed, and pursuing 
 their former tactics continued their march to Pekin. Hav- 
 ing crossed the Hoangho they attacked Hwaiking, where, 
 after being delayed two months, they met with as signal a 
 repulse as at Kaifong. Notwithstanding this further re- 
 verse, the Taepings pressed on, and defeating a Manchu 
 force in the Lin Limming Pass, they entered the metropol- 
 itan province of Pechihli in September, 1853. The object of 
 their march was plain. Not only did they mystify the em- 
 peror's generals, but they jjassed through an untouched 
 country where supplies were abundant, and they thus suc- 
 ceeded in coming within striking distance of Pekin in al- 
 most as fresh a state as when they left Nankin. Such was 
 the effect produced by their capture of the Limming Pass 
 that none of the towns in the southern part of the province 
 attempted any resistance, and they reached Tsing, only 
 twenty miles south of Tientsin, and less than a hundred 
 from Pekin, before the end of October. This place marked 
 the northern limit of Taeping progress, and a reflex wave of 
 Manchu energy bore back the rebels to the Yangtse. 
 
 The forcing of the Limming Pass carried confusion and 
 terror into the imperial palace and capital. The fate of the 
 dynasty seemed to tremble in the balance at the hands of a 
 ruthless and determined enemy. There happened to be very 
 few troops in Pekin at the time, and levies had to be hastily 
 summoned from Mongolia. If the Taepings had only shown 
 the same enterprise and rapidity of movement that they had 
 exhibited up to this point, there is no saying that the central 
 government would not have been subverted and the Man-
 
 TAOUKWANG AND HTS SUCCESSOR 327 
 
 cliu family extinguished as completely as the MingB. l^ut 
 fortunately for Hienfung, an unusual apathy fell upon the 
 Taepings, who remained halted at Tsing until tlie Mongol 
 levies had arrived, under their great chief, Sankolinsin. 
 They seem to have been quite exhausted by their efforts, 
 and after one reverse in the open field they retired to their 
 fortified camp at Tsinghai, and sent messengers to Tien 
 Wang for succor. In this camp they were closely belea- 
 guered by Sankolinsin from October, 1853, to March, 1854, 
 when their provisions being exhausted they cut their way 
 out and began their retreat in a southerly direction. They 
 would undoubtedly have been exterminated but for the timely 
 arrival of a relieving army from Nankin. The Taepings 
 then captured Lintsing, which remained their headquarters 
 for some months; but during the remainder of the year 1854 
 their successes were few and unimportant. They were vigi- 
 lantly watched by the imperial troops, which had expelled 
 them from the whole of the province of Shantung before 
 March, 1856. Their numbers were thinned by disease as 
 well as loss in battle, and of the two armies sent to capture 
 Pekin only a small fragment ever regained Nankin. While 
 these events were in progress in the region north of Nankin, 
 the Taepings had been carrying their arms up the Yangtse- 
 kiang as far as Ichang, and eastward from Nankin to the 
 sea. These efforts were not always successful, and Tien 
 Wang's arms experienced as many reverses as successes. 
 The important city of Kanchang, the capital of the province 
 of Kiangsi, was besieged by them for four months, and after 
 many attempts to carry it by storm the Taepings were com- 
 pelled to abandon the task. They were more successful at 
 Hankow, which they recovered after a siege of eighty days. 
 They again evacuated this town, and yet once again, in 1855, 
 wrested it from an imperial garrison. 
 
 The establishment of Taeping power at Nankin and the 
 rumor of its rapid extension in every direction had drawn 
 the attention of Europeans to the new situation thus created 
 in China, and had aroused opposite opinions in different
 
 S28 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 sections of the foreign community. While the missionaries 
 were disposed to regard the Taepings as the regenerators 
 of China, and as the champions of Christianity, the mer- 
 chants only saw in them the disturbers of peace and the ene- 
 mies of commerce. To such an extent did the latter antici- 
 pate the ruin of their trade that they petitioned the consuls 
 to suspend, if not withhold, the payment of the stipulated 
 customs to the Chinese authorities. This proposed breach 
 of treaty was emphatically rejected, and the consuls en- 
 joined the absolute necessity of preserving a strict neutrality 
 between the Taepings and the imperial forces. But at the 
 same time it became necessary to acquaint the Taeping ruler 
 with the fact that he would be expected to observe the pro- 
 visions of the Treaty of Nankin as scrupulously as if he 
 were sovereign of China or a Manchu viceroy. Sir George 
 Bonham, the superintendent of trade and the governor of 
 Hongkong, determined to proceed in person to Nankin, in 
 order to acquaint the Taepings with what would be expected 
 from them, and also to gain necessary information as to their 
 strength and importance by personal observation. But un- 
 fortunately this step of Sir George Bonham tended to help 
 the Taepings by increasing their importance and spreading 
 about the belief that the Europeans recognized in them the 
 future ruling power of China. It was not intended to be, 
 but it was none the less, an unfriendly act to the Pekin 
 Government, and as it produced absolutely no practical 
 result with the Taepings themselves, it was distinctly a 
 mistaken measure. Its only excuse was that the imperial 
 authorities were manifesting an increasing inclination to 
 enlist the support of Europeans against the rebels, and it 
 was desirable that accurate information should be obtained 
 beforehand. The Taotai of Shanghai even presented a re- 
 quest for the loan of the man-of-war at that port, and when 
 he was informed that we intended to remain strictly neutral, 
 the decision was also come to to inform the Taepings of this 
 fact. Therefore in April, 1858, before the army had left for 
 the northern campaign, Sir George Bonham sailed for Nan-
 
 TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR 329 
 
 kin in the "Hermes" man-of-war. On tlie twenty-seventh 
 of that month the vessel anchored off Nankin, and several 
 interviews were held v/ith the Taepiug Wangs, ol" whom the 
 Northern King was at this time the most infiuentiah The 
 negotiations lasted a week, and they had no result. It was 
 soon made apparent that the Taepings were as exclusive and 
 impracticable as the worst Manchii mandarin, and that they 
 regarded the Europeans as an inferior and subject people. 
 Sir George Bonham failed to establish any direct communi- 
 cation with Tien Wang, who had by this retired into private 
 life, and while it was given out that he was preparing sacred 
 books he was really abandoning himself to the pursuit of 
 profligacy. There is nothing to cause surprise in the fact 
 that the apathy of Tien Wang led to attempts to supersede 
 him in his authority. The Eastern King in particular posed 
 as the delegate of Heaven. He declared that he had inter- 
 views with the celestial powers when in a trance, he as- 
 sumed the title of the Holy Ghost or the Comforter, and he 
 censured Tien Wang for his shortcomings, and even inflicted 
 personal chastisement upon him. K he had had a following 
 he might have become the despot of the Taepings, but as he 
 offended all alike his career was cut short by a conspiracy 
 among the other Wangs, who, notwithstanding his heavenly 
 conferences, murdered him. 
 
 At this period one of the most brilliant military exploits 
 of the Taepings was performed, and as it served to introduce 
 the real hero of the whole movement, it may be described in 
 more detail than the other operations, which were conducted 
 in a desultory manner, and which were unredeemed by any 
 exhibition of courage or military capacity. The government 
 had succeeded in placing two considerable armies in the 
 field. One numbering 40,000 men, under the command of 
 Hochun and the ex-Triad Chang Kwoliang, watched Nankin, 
 while the other, commanded by a Manchu general, laid close 
 siege to Chankiang, which seemed on the point of surrender. 
 The Taepings at Nankin determined to effect its relief, and 
 a large force was placed under the orders of an officer named
 
 330 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Li, but whom it will be more couvenieut to designate by the 
 title subsequently conferred on him of Chung Wang, or the 
 Faithful King. His energy and courage had already at- 
 tracted favorable notice, and the manner in which he exe- 
 cuted the difficult operation intrusted to him fully established 
 his reputation. By a concerted movement with the Taeping 
 commandant of Chankiang, he attacked the imperialist lines 
 at the same time as the garrison made a sortie, and the result 
 was a decisive victory. Sixteen stockades were carried by 
 assault, and the Manchu army was driven away from the 
 town which seemed to lie at its mercy. But this success 
 promised only to be momentary, for the imperialist forces, 
 collecting from all sides, barred the way back to Nankin, 
 while the other Manchu army drew nearer to that city, and 
 its general seemed to meditate attacking Tien Wang in his 
 capital. An imperative summons was sent to Chung Wang 
 to return to Nankin. As the imperialist forces were for the 
 most part on the southern side of the river, Chung Wang 
 crossed to the northern bank and began his march to Nankin. 
 He had not proceeded far when he found that the imperial- 
 ists had also crossed over to meet him, and that his progress 
 was arrested by their main army under Chang Kwoliang. 
 With characteristic decision and rapidity he then regained 
 the southern bank, and falling on the weakened imperialists 
 gained so considerable a victory that the Manchu commander 
 felt bound to commit suicide. After some further fighting 
 he made good his way back to Nankin. But when he ar- 
 rived there the tyrant Tung Wang refused to admit him into 
 the city until he had driven away the main imperialist army, 
 which had been placed under the command of Hieufung's 
 generalissimo, Heang Yung, and which had actually seized 
 one of the gates of the city. Although Chung Wang's troops 
 were exhausted they attacked the government troops with 
 great spirit, and drove them back as far as Tanyang, where, 
 however, they succeeded in holding their ground, notwith- 
 standing his repeated efforts to dislodge them. Heang 
 Yung, taking his misfortune too deeply to heart, committed
 
 TAOUKWANO AND HIS SUCCESSOR 331 
 
 suicide, and thus deprived the emperor of at least a brave 
 officer. But with this success tlie Taci)ing tide of victory 
 reached its end, for Chang Kwoliang arriving with the other 
 imperialist army, the whole force fell upon Chung Wang 
 and drove him back into the city with the loss of 700 of his 
 best men, so that the result left of Chung Wang's campaign 
 was the relief of Chankiang and the return to the status qiw 
 at Nankin. It was immediately after these events that 
 Tung Wang was assassinated, and scenes of blood followed 
 which resulted in the massacre of 20,000 persons and the 
 disappearance of all, except one, of the Wangs whom Tien 
 Wang had created on the eve of his enterprise. Chung 
 Wang seems to have had no part in these intrigues and mas- 
 sacres, and there is little doubt that if the imperialist com- 
 manders had taken prompt advantage of them the Taepings 
 might have been crushed at that moment, or ten years earlier 
 than proved to be the case. 
 
 While the main Taeping force was thus causing serious 
 danger to the existing government of China, its offshoots or 
 imitators were emulating its example in the principal treaty 
 ports, which brought the rebels into contact with the Eu- 
 ropeans. The Chinese officials, without any military power 
 on which they could rely, had endeavored to maintain order 
 among the turbulent classes of the population by declaring 
 that the English were the allies of the emperor, and that 
 they would come to his aid with their formidable engines of 
 war if there were any necessity. Undoubtedly this threat 
 served its turn and kept the turbulent quiet for a certain 
 period; but when it could no longer be concealed that the 
 English were determined to take no part in the struggle, 
 the position of the government was weakened l)y the oft- 
 repeated declaration that they mainly relied on the .supi)ort 
 of the foreigners. The first outbreak occurred at Amoy in 
 May, 1853, when some thousand marauders, under an in- 
 dividual named Magay, seized the town and held it until 
 the following November. The imperialists returned in suffi- 
 cient force in that month and regained possession of the
 
 332 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 town, when, unfortunately for tlieir reputation, tliey avenged 
 their expulsion in a particularly cruel and indisciiminating 
 fashion. Many thousand citizens were executed without 
 any form of trial, and the arrest of the slaughter was en- 
 tirely due to the intervention of the English naval officer at 
 Amoy. The rising at Shanghai was of a more serious char- 
 acter, and took a much longer time to suppress. As the 
 European settlement there was threatened with a far more 
 imminent danger than anywhere else, preparations to defend 
 it began in April, 1853, and under the auspices of the consul, 
 Mr. Eutherford Alcock, the residents were formed into a 
 volunteer corps, and the men-of-war drawn up so as to 
 effectually cover the whole settlement. These precautions 
 were taken in good time, for nothing happened to disturb 
 the peace until the following September. The Triads were 
 undoubtedly the sole instigators of the rising, and the 
 Taepings of Nankin were in no sense responsible for, or 
 participators in it. They seized the Taotai's official residence, 
 and as his guard deserted him, that officer barely escaped 
 with his life. Other officials were not so fortunate, but on 
 the whole Shanghai was acquired by the rebels with very 
 little bloodshed. In a few hours this important Chinese city 
 passed into the hands of a lawless and refractory mob, who 
 lived on the plunder of the townspeople, and who were ripe 
 for any mischief. The European settlement was placed 
 meantime in a position of efficient defense, and although 
 the Triads wished to have the spoil of its rich factories, they 
 very soon decided that the enterprise would be too risky, if 
 not impossible. 
 
 After some weeks' inaction the imperialist forces, gath- 
 ering from all quarters, proceeded to invest the marauders 
 in Shanghai, and had the attack been conducted with any 
 degree of military skill and vigor they must have succumbed 
 at the first onset. But, owing to the pusillanimity of the 
 emperor's officers and their total ignorance of the military 
 art, the siege went on for an indefinite period, and twelve 
 months after it began seemed as far off conclusion as ever.
 
 TAOUKWANG AND HIS SUCCESSOR 333 
 
 While the imperialists laboriously constructed their lines 
 and batteries they never ceased to importune the Europeans 
 for assistance, and as it became clearer that the persons in 
 possession of Shanghai were a mob rather than a power, the 
 desire increased among the foreigners generally to put an 
 end to what was an intolerable position. On tliis occasion 
 the French took an initiative which had previously been left 
 to the English. The French settlement at Shanghai con- 
 sisted at this time of a consulate, a cathedral, and one house, 
 but as it was situated nearest the walls of the Chinese city it 
 was most exposed to the fire of the besiegers and besieged. 
 In consequence of this the French admiral, Laguerre, de- 
 termined to take a part in the struggle, and erecting a bat- 
 tery in the French settlement, proceeded to bombard the 
 rebels on one side of the city while the imperialists attacked 
 it on another. Although the bombardment was vigorous 
 and effective, the loss inflicted on the insurgents was incon- 
 siderable, because they had erected an earthwork behind the 
 main wall of the place, and every day the Triads challenged 
 the French to come on to the assault. At last a breach was 
 declared to be practicable, and 400 French sailors and marines 
 were landed to carry it, while the imperialists, wearing blue 
 sashes to distinguish them from the rebels, escaladed the 
 walls at another point. But the assault was premature, for, 
 although the assailants gained the inside of the fortification, 
 they could not advance. The insurgents fought desperately 
 behind the earthworks and in the streets, and after four 
 hours' fighting they put the whole imperialist force to flight. 
 The French were carried along by their disheartened allies, 
 who, allowing race hatred to overcome a temporary arrange- 
 ment, even fired on them, and when Admiral Laguerre reck- 
 oned up the cost of his intervention he found it amounted to 
 four officers and sixty men killed and wounded. Such was 
 the result of the French attack on Shanghai, and it taught 
 the lesson that even good European troops cannot ignore the 
 recognized rules and precautions of war. After this en- 
 gagement the siege languished, and the French abstained
 
 o34 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 from taking any further part in it. But the imperialists 
 continued their attack in their own bungling but persistent 
 fashion, and at last the insurgents, having failed to obtain 
 the favorable terms they demanded, made a desperate sortie, 
 when a few made their way to the foreign settlement, where 
 they found safety, but by far the greater number perished 
 by the sword of the imperialists. More than 1,500 insur- 
 gents were captured and executed along the highroads, but 
 the two leaders of the movement escaped, one of them to 
 attain great fortune as a merchant in Siam, The imperial- 
 ists unfortunately sullied their success by grave excesses and 
 by the cruel treatment of the unoffending townspeople, who 
 were made to suffer for the original incapacity and cowardice 
 of the officials themselves. At Canton, which was also 
 visited by the Triads in June, 1854, matters took a different 
 course. The Chinese merchants and shopkeepers combined 
 and raised a force for their own protection, and these well- 
 paid braves effectually kept the insurgents out of Canton. 
 They, however, seized the neighboring town of Fatshan, 
 where the manufacturing element was in strong force, and 
 but for the unexpected energy of the Cantonese they would 
 undoubtedly have seized the larger city too, as the govern- 
 ment authorities were not less apathetic here than at Shang- 
 hai. The disturbed condition of things continued until Feb- 
 ruary, 1855, when the wholesale executions by which its 
 suppression was marked, and during which a hundred thou- 
 sand persons are said to have perished, ceased. 
 
 The events have now been passed in review which marked 
 the beginning and growth of the Taeping Rebellion, from the 
 time of its being a local rising in the province of Kwangsi to 
 the hour of its leader being installed as a ruling prince in the 
 ancient city of Nankin. But from the growing Taeping 
 Rebellion, which we have now followed down to the year 
 1856, our attention must be directed to the more serious and 
 important foreign question which had again reached a crisis, 
 and which would not wait on the convenience of the Celestial 
 emperor and his advisers.
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 33i 
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 
 
 The events which caused the second foreign war began 
 to come into evidence immediately after the close of the first; 
 and for the sake of clearness and brevity they have been left 
 for consideration to the same chapter, although they hap- 
 pened while Taoukwang was emperor. After the departure 
 of Sir Henry Pottinger, who was succeeded by Sir John 
 Davis, and the arrival of the representatives of the other 
 European powers, who hastened to claim the same rights 
 and privileges as had been accorded to England, the main 
 task to be accomplished was to practically assert the rights 
 that had been theoretically secured, and to place the rela- 
 tions of the two nations on what may be called a working 
 basis. The consulates were duly appointed, the necessary 
 land for the foreign settlements was acquired, and the war 
 indemnity being honorably discharged, Chusan was restored 
 to the Chinese. With regard to the last matter there was 
 some maneuvering of a not altogether creditable nature, and 
 although the Chinese paid the last installment punctually to 
 date, Chusan and Kulangsu were not evacuated for some 
 months after the stipulated time. It was said that our hesi- 
 tation in the former case was largely due to the fear that 
 France would seize it; but this has been permanently re- 
 moved by the expressed assertion of our prior right to occupy 
 it. A far more gratifying subject is suggested by the har- 
 mony of the relations which were established in Chusan 
 between the garrison under Sir Colin Campbell and the 
 islanders, who expressed deep regret at the departure of 
 the English troops. The first members of the consular staff 
 in China were as follows: Mr. GT. T. Lay was consul at Can- 
 ton, Captain George Balfour at Shanghai (where, however,
 
 3S6 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 he was soon succeeded by Sir Rutherford Alcock), Mr. Henry 
 Gribble at Amoy, and Mr. Eobert Thorn at Ningpo. Among 
 the interpreters were the future Sir Thomas Wade and Sir 
 Harry Parkes. Various difficulties presented themselves 
 with regard to the foreign settlements, and the island of 
 Kulangsu at Amoy had to be evacuated because its name 
 was not mentioned in the treaty. At Canton also an attempt 
 was made to extend the boundaries of the foreign settlement 
 by taking advantage of a great conflagration, but in this 
 attempt the Europeans were baffled by the superior quick- 
 ness of the Chinese, who constructed their new houses in a 
 single night. These incidents showed that the sharpness 
 was not all on one side, and that if the Chinese were back- 
 ward in conceding what might be legitimately demanded, 
 the Europeans were not averse to snatching an advantage 
 if they saw the chance. 
 
 The turbulence of the Canton populace, over whom the 
 ofhcials possessed but a nominal control, was a constant cause 
 of disagreement and trouble. In the spring of 1846 a riot 
 was got up by the mob on the excuse that a vane erected on 
 the top of the flagstaff over the American Consulate inter- 
 fered with the Fung Shui, or spirits of earth and air; and 
 although it was removed to allay the excitement of the su- 
 perstitious, the disturbance continued, and several personal 
 encounters took place, in one of which a Chinese was killed. 
 The Chinese mandarins, incited by the mob, demanded the 
 surrender of the man who fired the shot; and that they 
 should have made such a demand, after they had formally 
 accepted and recognized the jurisdiction of consular courts, 
 furnished strong evidence that they had not mastered the 
 lessons of the late war or reconciled themselves to the pro- 
 visions of the Treaty of Nankin. The fortunate arrival of 
 Keying to "amicably regulate the commerce with foreign 
 countries" smoothed over this difflculty, and the excitement 
 of the Canton mob was allayed without any surrender. It 
 was almost at this precise moment, too, that Taoukwang 
 made the memorable admission that the Christian religion
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 337 
 
 might be tolerated as one inculcating the principles of virtue. 
 But the two pressing and practical difficulties in the foreign 
 question were the opening of the gates of Canton and the 
 right of foreigners to proceed beyond the limits of their fac- 
 tories and compounds. The Chinese wished for many rea- 
 sons, perhaps even for the safety of the foreigners, to confine 
 them to their settlements, and it might be plausibly argued 
 that the treaty supported this construction. Of course such 
 confinement was intolerable, and English merchants and oth- 
 ers would not be prevented from making boating or shooting 
 excursions in the neighborhood of the settlements. The Chi- 
 nese authorities opposed these excursions, and before long a 
 collision occurred with serious consequences. In March, 1847, 
 a small party of Englishmen proceeded in a boat to Fatshan, 
 a manufacturing town near Canton which has been called 
 the Chinese Birmingham. On reaching the place symptoms 
 of hostility were at once manifested, and the Europeans with- 
 drew for safety to the yamen of the chief magistrate, who 
 happened unfortunately to be away. By this time the pop- 
 ulace had got very excited, and the Englishmen were with 
 difficulty escorted in safety to their boat. The Chinese, how- 
 ever, pelted them with stones, notwithstanding the efforts 
 of the chief officer, who had by this time returned and taken 
 the foreigners under his protection. It was due to his great 
 heroism that they escaped with their lives and without any 
 serious injury. 
 
 The incident, unpleasant in itself, might have been ex- 
 plained away and closed without untoward consequences if 
 Sir John Davis had not seized, as he thought, a good oppor- 
 tunity of procuring greater liberty and security for English- 
 men at Canton. He refused to see in this affair an accident, 
 but denounced it as an outrage, and proclaimed "that he 
 would exact and require from the Chinese Government that 
 British subjects should be as free from molestation and in- 
 sult in China as they would be in England." This demand 
 was both unreasonable and unjust. It was impossible that 
 the hated foreigner, or "foreign devil," as he was called, 
 
 CUINA — 15
 
 338 HISTORY OF CHir^A 
 
 could wander about tlie country in absolute security when 
 the treaty wrung from the emperor as the result of an ardu- 
 ous war confined him to five ports, and limited the emperor's 
 capacity to extend protection to those places. But Sir John 
 Davis determined to take this occasion of forcing events, so 
 that he might compel the Chinese to afford greater liberty 
 to his countrymen, and thus hasten the arrival of the day 
 for the opening of the gates of Canton. On the 1st of April 
 all the available troops at Hongkong were warned for imme- 
 diate service, and on the following day the two regiments 
 in garrison left in three steamers and escorted by one man- 
 of-war to attack Canton. They landed at the Bogue forts, 
 seized the batteries without opposition and spiked the guns. 
 The Chinese troops, whether surprised or acting under or- 
 ders from Keying, made no attempt at resistance. Not a 
 shot was fired, not a man was injured among the assailants. 
 The forts near Canton, the very batteries on the island op- 
 posite the city, were captured without a blow, and on the 
 3d of April, 1847, Canton again lay at the mercy of an En- 
 glish force. Sir John Davis then published another notice, 
 stating that "he felt that the moderation and justice of all 
 his former dealings with the government of China lend a 
 perfect sanction to measures which he has been reluctantly 
 compelled to adopt after a long course of misinterpreted for- 
 bearance, " and made certain demands of the Chinese au- 
 thorities which may be epitomized as follows: The City of 
 Canton to be opened at two years' date from April 6, 
 1847; Englishmen to be at liberty to roam for exercise or 
 amusement in the neighborhood of the city on the one con- 
 dition that they returned the same day; and some minor 
 conditions, to which no exception could be taken. After 
 brief consideration, and notwithstanding the clamor of the 
 Cantonese to be led against the foreigners. Keying agreed 
 to the English demands, although he delivered a side-thrust 
 at the high-handed proceedings of the English officer when 
 he said, "If a mutual tranquillity is to subsist between the 
 Chinese and foreigners, the common feelings of mankind,
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 339 
 
 as well as the just principles of Heaven, must be considered 
 and conformed witli. " 
 
 Keying, by tlie terms of his convention with Sir John 
 Davis, had agreed that the gates of Canton were to be 
 opened on April 6, 1849, but the nearer that day approached 
 the more doubtful did it appear whether the promise would 
 be complied with, and whether, in the event of refusal, it 
 would be wise to have recourse to compulsion. The officials 
 on both sides were unfeignedly anxious for a pacific solution, 
 but trade was greatly depressed in consequence of the threat- 
 ening demeanor of the Canton populace. There was scarcely 
 any doubt that the Chinese authorities did not possess the 
 power to compel obedience on the part of the Cantonese to 
 an order to admit Europeans into their city, and on the ques- 
 tion being referred to Taoukwang he made an oracular reply 
 which was interpreted as favoring the popular will. ' ' That, ' ' 
 he said, "to which the hearts of the people incline is that on 
 which the decree of Heaven rests. Now the people of Kwan- 
 tung are unanimous and determined that they will not have 
 foreigners enter the city; and how can I post up everywhere 
 my imperial order and force an opposite course on the peo- 
 ple ?' ' The English Government was disposed to show gi-eat 
 forbearance and refrained from oj)posing Taoukwang's views. 
 But although the matter was allowed to drop, the right ac- 
 quired by the convention with Keying was not surrendered; 
 and, as Taoukwang had never formally ratified the promise 
 of that minister, it was considered that there had been no 
 distinct breach of faith on the part of the Chinese Govern- 
 ment.' The Chinese continued to cling tenaciously to their 
 rights, and to contest inch by inch every concession de- 
 manded by the Europeans, and sometimes they were within 
 their written warrant in doing so. Such a case happened 
 at Foochow shortly after the accession of Hienfung, when 
 an attempt was made to prevent foreigners residing in that 
 town, and after a long correspondence it was discovered that 
 the Chinese were so far right, as the treaty specified as the 
 place of foreign residence the Jciangkan or mart at the mouth
 
 840 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 of the river, and not the cliing or town itself. It was at this 
 critical moment that the Chinese were attracted in large num- 
 bers by the discovery of gold in California and Australia to 
 emigrate from China, and they showed themselves well ca- 
 pable by their trade organization and close union of obtain- 
 ing full justice for themselves and an ample recognition of 
 all their rights in foreign countries. The effect of this emi- 
 gration on Chinese public opinion was much less than might 
 have been exj^ected, and the settlement of the foreign ques- 
 tion was in no way simplified or expedited by their influence. 
 
 The j^osition of affairs at Canton could not, by the great- 
 est stretch of language, be pronounced satisfactory. The 
 populace was unequivocally hostile; the officials had the 
 greatest difficulty in making their authority respected, and 
 the English Government was divided between the desire to 
 enforce the stipulation as to the opening of the Canton gates, 
 and the fear lest insistence might result in a fresh and seri- 
 ous rujDture. Sir Greorge Bonham, who succeeded Sir John 
 Davis, gave counsels of moderation, and when he found that 
 some practical propositions which he made for improved in- 
 tercourse were rejected he became more convinced that the 
 question must wait for solution for a more convenient and 
 })romising occasion. 
 
 In 1852 Sir George Bonham returned to England on leave, 
 and his place was taken by Dr. John Bowring, who had offi- 
 ciated for a short period as consul at Canton, His instruc- 
 tions were of a simple and positive character. They were 
 "to avoid all irritating discussions with the authorities of 
 China." He was also directed to avoid pushing arguments 
 on doubtful points in a manner tliat would fetter the free 
 action of the government; but he was, at the same time, to 
 recollect that it was his duty to carefully watch over and 
 insist upon the performance by the Chinese authorities of 
 their engagements. The proper fulfillment of the latter duty 
 necessarily involved some infringement of the former rec- 
 ommendation; and while the paramount consideration with 
 the Foreign Office was to keep things quiet, it was natural
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 341 
 
 that the official on the spot should think a great deal, if not 
 altogether, of how best to obtain compliance to the fullest 
 extent with the pledges given in the treaty and the subse- 
 quent conventions. Dr. Bowring was not an oilicial to be 
 deterred from expressing his opinions by fear of headquar- 
 ters. He sent home his view of the situation, expressed in 
 very clear and intelligible language. "The Pottinger treat- 
 ies," he said, "inflicted a deep wound upon the pride, but by 
 no means altered the policy, of the Chinese Government. . . . 
 Their purpose is now, as it ever was, not to invite, not to 
 facilitate, but to impede and resist, the access of foreigners. 
 It must, then, ever be borne in mind, in considering the state 
 of our relations with these regions, that the two governments 
 have objects at heart which are diametrically opposed, except 
 in so far that both earnestly desire to avoid all hostile action, 
 and to make its own policy, as far as possible, subordinate 
 to that desire. ' ' At this point a Liberal administration gave 
 place to a Conservative; but Lord Malmesbury reiterated in 
 stronger language the instructions of Lord Granville. "All 
 irritating discussions with the Chinese should be avoided, 
 and the existing good understanding must in no way be im- 
 periled. " One of Dr. Bowring's first acts was to write a 
 letter to the viceroy ex]3ressing a desire for an interview, 
 with the object of suggesting a settlement of pending dilFi- 
 culties; but the viceroy made his excuses. The meeting did 
 not take place, and the whole question remained dormant 
 for two years, by which time not only had Sir John Bow- 
 ring been knighted and confirmed in the post of governor, 
 but the viceroy had been superseded by the subsequently 
 notorious Commissioner Yeh. Up to this point all Sir Jolm 
 Bowring's suggestions with regard to the settlement of the 
 questions pending with the Chinese had been received with 
 the official reply that he was to abstain from all action, and 
 that he was not to press himself on the Canton authorities. 
 But, in the beginning of 1854, his instructions were so far 
 modified that Lord Clarendon wrote admitting the desira- 
 bility of "free and unrestricted intercourse with the Chinese
 
 342 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 officials," and of "admission into some of the cities of China, 
 especially Canton. ' ' 
 
 Encouraged by tliese admissions in favor of tlie views he 
 had been advancing for some time. Sir John Bowring wrote 
 an official letter to Commissioner Yeh inviting him to an 
 early interview, but stating that the interview must be held 
 within the city of Canton at the viceroy's yamen. It will be 
 noted that what Sir John asked fell short of what Keying 
 had promised. The opening of the gates of Canton was to 
 have been to all Englishmen, but the English Government 
 would at this point have been satisfied if its representative 
 had been granted admission for the purpose of direct nego- 
 tiation with the Chinese authorities. To the plain question 
 put to him Yeh returned an evasive answer. All his time 
 was taken up with the military affairs of the province, and 
 he absolutely ignored the proposal for holding an interview 
 within the city. The matter had gone too far to be put on 
 one side in this manner, and Sir John Bowring sent his sec- 
 retary to overcome, if possible, the repugnance of Commis- 
 sioner Yeh to the interview, and in any case to gain some 
 information as to his objections. As the secretary could only 
 see mandarins of very inferior rank he returned to Hong- 
 kong without acquiring any very definite information, but he 
 learned enough to say that Yeh denied that Keying's arrange- 
 ment possessed any validity. The Chinese case was that it 
 had been allowed to drop on both sides, and the utmost con- 
 cession Yeh would make was to agree to an interview at the 
 Jinsin Packhouse outside the city walls. This proposition 
 was declared to be inadmissible, when Yeh ironically re- 
 marked that he must consequently assume that "Sir John 
 Bowring did not wish for an interview. ' ' It was hoped to 
 overcome Chinese finesse with counter finesse, and Sir John 
 Bowring hastened to Shanghai with the object of establish- 
 ing direct relations with the viceroy of the Two Kiang. 
 After coinj)laining of the want of courtesy evinced by Yeh 
 throughout his correspondence, he expressed the wish to 
 negotiate with any of the other high officials of the empire.
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 843 
 
 Th.e reply of Eleang, who held this post, and who was he- 
 lieved to be well disposed to Europeans, did not advance 
 matters. He had no authority, he said, in the matter, and 
 could not interfere in what was not his concern. Commis- 
 sioner Yeh was the official appointed by the emperor to con- 
 duct relations with the foreigners, and no other official could 
 assume his functions. Sir John Bowring therefore returned 
 to Hongkong without having effected anything by his visit 
 to Shanghai, but at this moment the advance of the rebels 
 to the neighborhood of Canton seemed likely to effect a 
 diversion that might have important consequences. In a 
 state of apprehension as to the safety of the town, Yeh ap- 
 plied to Sir John Bowring for assistance against the rebels, 
 but this could not be granted, and Sir John Bowring only 
 proceeded to Canton to superintend the preparations made 
 for the defense of the English settlement at that place. All 
 the consuls issued a joint proclamation declaring their inten- 
 tion to remain neutral. The prompt suppression of the re- 
 bellion, so far as any danger to Canton went, restored the 
 confidence of the Chinese authorities, and they reverted to 
 their old position on the question of the opening of the gates 
 of Canton. 
 
 In June, 1855, Sir John Bowring returned to the subject 
 of official interviews, and made an explicit demand for the 
 reception if not of himself, then at least of the consul at 
 Canton. Yeh took his time before he made any reply, and 
 when he did send one it was to the effect that there was no 
 precedent for an interview with a consul, and that as Sir 
 John had refused to meet him outside the city there was an 
 end of the matter. Mr. Harry Parkes succeeded Mr. Alcock 
 as consul at Canton, and no inconsiderable amount of tact 
 was required to carry on relations with officials who refused 
 to show themselves. But the evil day of open collision could 
 not be averted, and the antagonism caused by clashing views 
 and interests at last broke forth on a point which would have 
 been promptly settled, had there been direct intercourse be- 
 tween the English and Chinese officials.
 
 344 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 On October 8, 1856, Mr. Parkes reported to Sir Jolm 
 Bowriiig at Hongkong the particulars of an affair wliicli 
 had occurred on a British-owned lorcha at Canton. The 
 lorcha "Arrow," employed in the iron trade between Can- 
 ton and the mouth of the river, commanded by an English 
 captain, and flying the English flag, had been boarded by a 
 party of mandarins and their followers while at anchor near 
 the Dutch Folly. The lorcha — a Portuguese name for a fast 
 sailing boat — had been duly registered in the office at Hong- 
 kong, and although not entitled at that precise moment to 
 British protection, through the careless neglect to renew the 
 license, this fact was only discovered subsequently, and was 
 not put forward by the Chinese in justification of their action. 
 The gravity of the affair was increased by the fact that the 
 English flag was conspicuously displayed, and that, notwith- 
 standing the remonstrances of the master, it was ostenta- 
 tiously hauled down. The crew were carried off prisoners 
 with the exception of two men, left at their own request to 
 take charge of the vessel. Mr. Parkes at once sent a letter 
 to Yeh on the subject of this "very grave insult," request- 
 ing that the captured crew of the "Arrow" should be re- 
 turned to that vessel without delay, and that any charges 
 made against them should be then examined into at the En- 
 glish consulate. In his reply Commissioner Yeh justified 
 and upheld the act of his subordinates. Of the twelve men 
 seized, he returned nine, but with regard to the three whom 
 he detained, he declared one to be a criminal and the others 
 important witnesses. Not merely would he not release them, 
 but he proceeded to justify their apprehension, wJiile he did 
 not condescend to so much as notice the points of the insult 
 to the English flag and of his having violated treaty obliga- 
 tions. Yeh did not attempt to offer any excuse for the pro- 
 ceedings taken in his name. He asserted certain things as 
 facts which, in his opinion, it was sufficient U)V him to accept 
 that they should pass current. But the evidence on which 
 they were based was not sufficient to obtain credence in the 
 laxest court of justice; but even if it had been conclusive it
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN ^VAR 345 
 
 would not have justified the removal of the crew from the 
 "Arrow" when the British flag was flying conspicuously at 
 her mast. What, in brief, was the Chinese case ? It was 
 that one of the crew had been recognized by a man passint>- 
 in a boat as one of a band of pirates who had attacked, ill- 
 used, and plundered him several weeks before. lie had 
 forthwith gone to the Taotai of Canton, presented a demand 
 for redress, and that officer had at once given the order for 
 the arrest of the offender, with the result described. There 
 is no necessity to impugn the veracity of the Chinaman's 
 story, but it did not justify the breach of "the ex-territorial 
 rights of preliminary consular investigation before trial" 
 granted to all under the protection of the English flag. The 
 plea of delay did not possess any force either, for the man 
 could have been arrested just as well by the English consul 
 as by the mandarins, but it would have involved a damag- 
 ing admission of European authority in the matter of a 
 Chinese subject, and the mandarins thought there was no 
 necessity to curtail their claim to jurisdiction. Commis- 
 sioner Yeh did not attempt any excuses, and he even de- 
 clared that "the 'Arrow' is not a foreign lorcha, and, there- 
 fore," he said, "there is no use to enter into any discussion 
 about her. ' ' 
 
 The question of the nationality of the "Arrow" was 
 complicated by the fact that its registry had expired ten 
 days before its seizure. The master explained that this 
 omission was due to the vessel having been at sea, and 
 that it was to have been rectified as soon as he returned 
 to Hongkong. As Lord Clarendon pointed out, this fact 
 was not merely unknown to the Chinese, but it was also 
 "a matter of British regulation which would not justify 
 seizure by the Chinese. No British lorcha would be safe 
 if her crew were liable to seizure on these grounds." The 
 history of the lorcha "Arrow" was officially proved to l)e 
 as follows: "The 'Arrow' was heretofore employed in trad- 
 ing on the coast, and while so employed was taken by 
 pirates. By them she was fitted out and employed on the
 
 346 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Canton Eiver during the disturbances between the impe- 
 rialists and the insurgents. While on this service she was 
 captured by the braves of one of the loyalist associations 
 organized by the mandarins for the support of the govern- 
 ment. By this association she was publicly sold, and was 
 purchased by a Chin-chew Hong, a respectable firm at Can- 
 ton, which also laid out a considerable sum in repairing her 
 and otherwise fitting her out. She arrived at Hongkong 
 about the month of June, 1855, at which time a treaty was 
 on foot (which ended in a bargain) between Fong Aming, 
 Messrs. T. Burd & Co. 's comprador, and Lei-yeong-heen, 
 one of the partners in the Chin-chew Hong, for the purchase 
 of the lorcha by the former. Shortly after the arrival of the 
 vessel at Hongkong she was claimed by one Quantai, of 
 Macao, who asserted that she had been his property before 
 she was seized by the pirates. Of course, the then owner 
 disputed his claim ; upon which he commenced a suit in the 
 Vice- Admiralty Court. After a short time, by consent of the 
 parties, the question was referred to arbitration, but the arbi- 
 trators could not agree and an iimpire was appointed, who 
 awarded that the ownership of the lorcha should continue 
 undisturbed. The ownership of the vessel was then trans- 
 ferred to Fong Aming, and in his name she is registered. 
 These are the simple facts connected with the purchase of 
 the lorcha by a resident of the colony at Hongkong and her 
 registry as a British vessel, and it is from these facts that 
 the Imperial Commissioner Yeh has arrived at an erroneous 
 conclusion as to the ownership of the boat." As the first 
 step toward obtaining the necessary reparation, a junk, 
 which was supposed to be an imperial war vessel, was 
 seized as a hostage, and Mr. Parkes addressed another 
 letter to Yeh reminding him that "the matter which has 
 compelled this menace still remains unsettled." 
 
 Had there been that convenient mode of communication 
 between the governor of Hongkong and the Chinese officials 
 at Canton which was provided for by the Nankin Treaty 
 and the Keying Convention, the "Arrow" complication
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 847 
 
 would, in all probability, never have arisen, and it is also 
 scarcely less certain that it would not have produced such 
 serious consequences as it did but for the arrogance of Yeh. 
 He even attempted to deny that the "Arrow" carried the 
 English flag, but this was so clearly proved to be a fact by 
 both English and Chinese witnesses that it ceased to hold a 
 place in the Chinese case. As it was clear that Commis- 
 sioner Yeh would not give way, and as delay would only 
 encourage him, the admiral on the station. Sir Michael Sey- 
 mour, received instructions to attack the four forts of the 
 Barrier, and he captured them without loss. Thus, after an 
 interval of fourteen years, was the first blow struck in what 
 may be called the third act of Anglo- Chinese relations, but 
 it would be a mistake to suppose that the "Arrow" case was 
 the sole cause of this appeal to arms. A blue book, bearing 
 the significant title of "Insults to Foreigners," gives a list 
 and narrative of the many outrages and indignities inflicted 
 on Europeans between 1842 and 1856. The evidence con- 
 tained therein justifies the statement that the position of 
 Europeans in China had again become most unsafe and 
 intolerable. Those who persist in regarding the "Arrow" 
 affair as the only cause of the war may delude themselves 
 into believing that the Chinese were not the most blame- 
 worthy parties in the quarrel; but no one who seeks the 
 truth and reads all the evidence will doubt that if there had 
 been no "Arrow" case there would still have been a rupture 
 between the two countries. The Chinese officials, headed by 
 Yeh, had fully persuaded themselves that, as the English 
 had put up with so much, and had acquiesced in the con- 
 tinued closing of the gates of Canton, they were not likely 
 to make the "Arrow" affair a casus belli. Even the cap- 
 ture of the Barrier forts did not bring home to their minds 
 the gravity of the situation. 
 
 After dismantling these forts, Sir Michael Seymour pro- 
 ceeded up the river, capturing the fort in Macao Passage, 
 and arriving before Canton on the same day. An ulti- 
 matum was at once addressed to Yeh, stating that unless
 
 348 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 he at once complied with all the English demands the 
 admiral would "proceed with the destruction of all the de- 
 fenses and public buildings of this city and of the govern- 
 ment vessels in the river." This threat brought no satisfac- 
 tory answer, and the Canton forts were seized, their guns 
 spiked and the men-of-war placed with their broadsides 
 opposite the city. Then Yeh, far from being cowed, uttered 
 louder defiance than ever. He incited the population to 
 make a stubborn resistance; he placed a reward of thirty 
 dollars on the head of every Englishman slain or captured, 
 and he publicly proclaimed that there was no alternative but 
 war. He seems to have been driven to these extremities by 
 a fear for his own personal safety and official position. He 
 had no warrant from his imperial master to commit China 
 to such a dangerous course as another war with the English, 
 and he knew that the only way to vindicate his proceedings 
 was to obtain some success gratifying to national vanity. 
 While Yeh was counting on the support of the people, the 
 English admiral began the bombardment of the city, direct- 
 ing his fire principally against Yeh's yamen and a part of 
 the wall, which was breached in two days. After some re- 
 sistance the breach was carried; a gate was occupied, and 
 Sir Michael Seymour and Mr. Parkes proceeded to tlie 
 yamen of the viceroy, but as it was thought dangerous 
 to occupy so large a city with so small a force the posi- 
 tions seized were abandoned, although still commanded by 
 the fire of the fleet. After a few days' rest active opera- 
 tions were resumed against the French Folly fort and a 
 large fleet of war junks which had collected up the river. 
 After a warm engagement the vessels were destroyed and 
 the fort captured. Undaunted by these successive reverses, 
 Yeh still breathed nothing but defiance, and refused to make 
 the least concession. There remained no alternative but to 
 prosecute hostilities with renewed vigor. On the 12th and 
 18th of November, Sir Michael attacked the Bogue forts on 
 both sides of the river and captured them with little loss. 
 These forts mounted 400 guns, but only contained 1,000 men«
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 349 
 
 Notwithstanding these continuous reverses, the Chinese 
 remained defiant and energetic. As soon as the English 
 admiral left Canton to attack the Bogue forts the Chinese 
 hastened to re-occupy all their positions and to repair the 
 breaches. They succeeded in setting fire to and thus de- 
 stroying the whole foreign settlement, and they carried off 
 several Europeans, all of whom were put to death and some 
 of them tortured. The heads of these Europeans treach- 
 erously seized and barbarously murdered were paraded 
 throughout the villages of Kwangtung, in order to stimu- 
 late recruiting and to raise national enthusiasm to a liigh 
 pitch. Notwithstanding their reverses whenever it became 
 a question of open fighting, the Chinese, by their obstinacy 
 and numbers, at last succeeded in con^dncing Sir Michael 
 Seymour that his force was too small to achieve any decis- 
 ive result, and he accordingly withdrew from his positions 
 in front of the city, and sent home a request for a force of 
 5,000 troops. Meantime the Chinese were much encouraged 
 by the lull in hostilities, and for the time being Yeh himself 
 was not dissatisfied with the result. The Cantonese saw in 
 the destruction of the foreign settlement and the withdrawal 
 of the English fleet some promise of future victory, and at 
 all events sufficient reason for the continued confidence of 
 the patriot Yeh. Curiously enough, there was peace and 
 ostensible goodwill along the coast and at the other treaty 
 ports, while war and national animosity were in the ascend- 
 ant at Canton. The governor-generals of the Two Kiang 
 and Fuhkien declared over and over again that they wished 
 to abide by the Treaty of Nankin, and they threw upon Yeh 
 the responsibility of his acts. Even Hienfung refrained 
 from showing any unequivocal support of his truculent 
 lieutenant, although there is no doubt that he was im- 
 pressed by the reports of many victories over the English 
 barbarians with which Yeh supplied him. As long as Yeh 
 was able to keep the quarrel a local one, and to thus shield 
 the central government from any sense of personal danger, 
 he enjoyed the good wishes, if not the active support, of
 
 850 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 liis sovereign. But, unfortunately for tlie success of his 
 schemes, only the most energetic support of the Pekin Gov- 
 ernment in money and men could have enabled him to hold 
 his own; and as he did nothing but report victories in order 
 to gain a hearing for his policy, he could not grumble when 
 he was not sent the material aid of which he stood most in 
 need. His unreasonable action had done much to unite all 
 foreign nations against China. French, American and Span- 
 ish subjects, as well as English, had been the victims of Chi- 
 nese ignorance and cruelty, and they all saw that the success 
 of Yeh's policy would render their position untenable. 
 
 On the receipt of Sir Michael Seymour's request for a 
 force of 5,000 men, it was at once perceived in London that 
 the question of our relations with China had again entered 
 a most important and critical phase. It was at once decided 
 to send the force for which the admiral asked ; and, while 
 1,500 men were sent from England and a regiment from the 
 Mauritius, the remainder was to be drawn from the Madras 
 army. At the same time it was considered necessary to send 
 an embassador of high rank to acquaint the Pekin authori- 
 ties that, while such acts as those of Yeh would not be toler- 
 ated, there was no desire to press too harshly on a country 
 which was only gradually shaking off its exclusive preju- 
 dices. Lord Elgin was selected for the difficult mission, and 
 his instructions contained the following five categorical de- 
 mands, the fourth of which was the most important in its 
 consequences. 
 
 Those instructions were conveyed in two dispatches of 
 tlie same date, April 20, 1857. We quote the following as 
 the more important passages: "The demands which you are 
 instructed to make will be: (1), for reparation of injuries to 
 British subjects, and, if the French officers should co-operate 
 with you, for those to French subjects also; (2) for the com- 
 plete execution at Canton, as well as at the other ports, of 
 the stipulations of the several treaties; (3) compensation to 
 British subjects and persons entitled to British protection for 
 losses incurred in consequence of the late disturbances; (4)
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 851 
 
 the assent of the Chinese Government to the residence at 
 Pekin, or to the occasional visit to that capital, at the option 
 of the British. Government, of a minister duly accredited by 
 the queen to the emperor of China, and the recognition 
 of the right of the British plenipotentiary and chief super- 
 intendent of trade to communicate directly in writing with 
 the high officers at the Chinese capital, and to send his com- 
 munications by messengers of his own selection, such ar- 
 rangements affording the best means of insuring the dne 
 execution of the existing treaties, and of preventing future 
 misunderstandings; (o) a revision of the treaties with China 
 with a view to obtaining increased facilities for commerce, 
 such as access to cities on the great rivers as well as to 
 Chapoo and to other ports on the coast, and also permission 
 for Chinese vessels to resort to Hongkong for purposes of 
 trade from all ports of the Chinese empire without distinc- 
 tion. " These were the demands formulated by the English 
 Government for the consent of China, and seven proposals 
 were made as to how they were to be obtained should coer- 
 cion become necessary. It was also stated that "it is not 
 the intention of her Majesty's Government to undertake any 
 land operations in the interior of the country. ' ' 
 
 An event of superior, and, indeed, supreme importance 
 occurred to arrest the movement of the expedition to Canton. 
 When Lord Elgin reached Singapore, on June 3, 1857, he 
 found a letter waiting for him from Lord Canning, then 
 Governor-General of India, informing him of the outbreak of 
 the Indian Mutiny, and imploring him to send all his troops 
 to Calcutta in order to avert the overthrow of our authority 
 in the valley of the Ganges, where, "for a length of 750 
 miles, there were barely 1,000 European soldiers." To such 
 an urgent appeal there could only be one answer, and the 
 men who were to have chastised Commissioner Yeh followed 
 Havelock to Cawnpore and Lucknow. But while Lord Elgin 
 sent his main force to Calcutta, he himself proceeded to 
 Hongkong, where he arrived in the first week of July, and 
 found that hostilities had proceeded to a still more advanced
 
 852 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Stage than when Sir Michael Seymour wrote for re-enforce- 
 ments. The Chinese had become so confident during the 
 winter that that officer felt bound to resume offensive meas- 
 ures against them, and having been joined by a few more 
 men-of-war, and having also armed some merchant ships 
 of light draught, he attacked a main portion of the Chinese 
 fleet occupying a very strong position in Escape Creek. The 
 attack was intrusted to Commodore Elliott, who, with five 
 gunboats and the galleys of the larger men-of-war, carried 
 out with complete success and little loss the orders of his 
 superior officer. Twenty-seven armed junks were destroyed, 
 and the thirteen that escaped were burned the next day. 
 It was then determined to follow up this success by attack- 
 ing the headquarters of Yeh's army at Fatshan, the place 
 already referred to as being some distance from Canton. 
 By road it is six and by water twelve miles from that city. 
 The remainder of the Chinese fleet was drawn up in Fatshan 
 Channel, and the Chinese had made such extensive prepara- 
 tions for its defense, both on land and on the river, that they 
 were convinced of the impregnability of its position. 
 
 The Chinese position was unusually strong, and had been 
 selected with considerable judgment. An island named after 
 the hyacinth lies in midstream two miles from the entrance 
 to the Fatshan Channel, which joins the main course of the 
 Sikiang a few miles above the town of that name. The 
 island is flat and presents no special advantages for defense, 
 but it enabled the Chinese to draw up a line of junks across 
 the two channels of the river, and to place on it a battery of 
 six guns, thus connecting their two squadrons. The seventy- 
 two junks were drawn up with their sterns facing down 
 stream, and their largest gun bearing on any assailant pro- 
 ceeding up it. On tbe left bank of the river an elevated and 
 precipitous hill had been occupied in force and crowned with 
 a battery of nineteen guns, and other batteries had been 
 erected at different points along the river. There seems no 
 reason to question the accuracy of tlie estimate tliat more 
 than 300 pieces of artillery and 10,000 men were holding this
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 353 
 
 position, which had been admirably chosen and carefully 
 strengthened. The force which Sir Michael Seymour had 
 available to attack this formidable position slightly exceeded 
 2,000 men, conveyed to the attack in six gunboats and a 
 large flotilla of boats. The English advance was soon known 
 to the Chinese, who began firing from their junks and bat- 
 teries as soon as they came within range. Three hundred 
 marines were landed to attack the battery on the hill, whic-h 
 was found riot to be so strong as it appeared; for on the 
 most precipitous side the Chinese, believing it to be unscal- 
 able, had placed no guns, and those in position could not be 
 moved to bear on the assailants in that quarter. The ma- 
 rines gained the top with scarcely any loss, and as they 
 charged over the side the Chinese retired with little loss, 
 owing to the ill- directed fire of the marines. 
 
 Meantime the sailors had attacked the Chinese position 
 on the river. The tide was at low water, and the Chinese 
 had barred the channel with a row of sunken junks, leaving 
 a narrow passage known only to themselves. The leading 
 English boat struck on the hidden barrier, but the passage 
 being discovered the other vessels got through. Those boats 
 which ran aground were gradually floated, one after the 
 other, by the rising tide, and at last the flotilla, with little 
 damage, reached the line of stakes which the Chinese had 
 placed to mark the range of the guns in their jnnks. At 
 once the fire from the seventy-two junks and the battery on 
 Hyacinth Island became so furious and well-directed that 
 it was a matter of astonishment how the English boats 
 passed through it. They reached and pierced the line of 
 junks, of which one after another was given to the flames. 
 Much of the success of the attack was due to the heroic 
 example of Commodore Harry Keppel, who led the ailvance 
 party of 500 cutlasses, and who gave the Chinese no time to 
 rest or rally. Having broken the line of junks, he took 
 up the pursuit in his seven boats, having determined that 
 the only proof of success could be the capture of Fatshan, 
 and after four miles' hard rowing he came in sight of the
 
 354 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 elaborate defenses drawn up by the Chinese for the security 
 of that place. At the short range of a quarter of a mile the 
 fire of the Chinese guns was tremendous and destructive. 
 Keppel's own boat was reduced to a sinking state, and had 
 to be abandoned. Some of his principal officers were killed, 
 three of his boats ran aground, and things looked black for 
 the small English force. At this critical moment, the Chi- 
 nese, thinking that they had checked the English attack, 
 and hearing of the magnitude of their reverse down stream, 
 thought their best course would be to retire. Then the few 
 English boats resumed the attack, and hung on to the 
 retreating junks like bull- dogs. Many junks were given 
 to the flames, and five were carried off under the teeth of 
 the Fatshan populace; but Keppel's force was too small to 
 hold that town and piit it to the ransom, so the worn-out, 
 but still enthusiastic force, retired to join the main body 
 under Sir Michael Seymour, who was satisfied that he had 
 achieved all that was necessary or prudent with his squad- 
 ron. In these encounters thirteen men were killed and 
 forty wounded, of whom several succumbed to their wounds, 
 for it was noticed that the Chinese shot inflicted cruel in- 
 juries. The destruction of the Chinese fleet on the Canton 
 River could not be considered heavily purchased at the cost, 
 and the extent of the trepidation caused by Commodore 
 Keppel's intrepidity could not be accurately measured. 
 
 Lord Elgin reached Hongkong very soon after this event, 
 and, although he brought no soldiers with him, he found 
 English opinion at Hongkong very pronounced in favor of 
 an attack on Canton with a view of reopening that city 
 to trade. But the necessary force was not available, and 
 Lord Elgin refused to commit himself to tliis risky course. 
 Sir Michael Seymour said the attack would require 5,000 
 troops, and General Ashburnham thought it could be done 
 with 4,000 men if all were effective, while the whole Hong- 
 kong garrison numbered only 1,500, and of these one-sixth 
 were invalided. Lord Elgin decided to go to Calcutta, and 
 ascertain when Lord Canning would be able to spare him
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN ]\'AR 855 
 
 the troops necessaiy to bring China to reason. He returned 
 to Hongkong on September 20, and he found matters very 
 much as he had left them, and all the English force was 
 capable of was to blockade the river. To supplement the 
 weakness of the garrison a coolie corps of 750 Chinese was 
 organized, and proved very efficient, and toward the end of 
 November troops, chiefly marines, began at last to arrive 
 from England. A fleet of useful gunboats of small draught, 
 under Captain Sherard Osborn, arrived for the purpose of 
 operating against the junks in shallow creeks and rivers. 
 At the same time, too, came the French embassador. Baron 
 Gros, charged with a similar mission to Lord Elgin, and 
 bent on proving once for all that the pretensions of China to 
 superiority over other nations were absurd and untenable. 
 
 On December 12, Lord Elgin sent Yeli a note apprising 
 him of his arrival as plenipotentiary from Queen Victoria, 
 and pointing out the repeated insults and injuries inflicted 
 on Englishmen, culminating in the outrage to their flag and 
 the repeated refusal to grant any reparation for their wrongs. 
 But Lord Elgin went on to say that even at this eleventh 
 hour there was time to stay the progress of hostilities by 
 making prompt redress. The terms were plain and simple, 
 and the English demands were confined to two points — the 
 complete execution at Canton of all treaty engagements, 
 including the free admission of British subjects to the city, 
 and compensation to British subjects and persons entitled 
 to British protection for losses incurred in consequence of 
 the late disturbances. To this categorical demand Yeh 
 made a long reply, going over the ground of controversy, 
 reasserting what he wished to believe vrere the facts, and 
 curtly concluding that the trade might continue on the old 
 conditions, and that each side should pay its own losses. 
 Mr. Wade said that his language might bear the construc- 
 tion that the English consul, Mr. Harry Parkes, should pay 
 all the cost himself. If Commissioner Yeh was a humorist 
 he chose a bad time for indulging his proclivities, and, a 
 sufficient force being available, orders were at once given
 
 356 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 to attack Canton. On December 15, Ilonan was occupied, 
 and ten days were passed in bringing up the troops and tlie 
 necessary stores, when, all being in readiness, an ultimatum 
 was sent to Yeli that if lie would not give way witbin forty- 
 eigbt hours the attack would commence. At the same time 
 every effort was made to warn the unofEending townspeople, 
 so that they might remove to a place of safety. The attack- 
 ing force numbered about 5,000 English, 1,000 French, and 
 750 of the Chinese coolie corps, and it was agreed that the 
 most vulnerable point in the Chinese position was Lin's fort, 
 on the eastern side of the city. When the attack began, on 
 December 28, this fort was captured in half an hour, and 
 the Chinese retired to the northern hills, which they had 
 made their chief position in 18-12. The destruction of Lin's 
 fort by the accidental explosion of the magazine somewhat 
 neutralized the advantage of its capture. On the following 
 day the order was given to assault the city by escalade, and 
 three separate parties advanced on the eastern wall. The 
 Chinese kept up a good fire until the troops were within a 
 short distance, but before the ladders were placed against 
 the wall they abandoned their defenses and lied. The En- 
 glish troops reformed on the wide rampart of the wall and 
 pursued the Chinese to the north gate, where, being joined 
 by some Mancliu troops, the latter turned and charged up to 
 the bayonets of an English regiment. But they were re- 
 pulsed and driven out of the city, and simultaneously with 
 this success the fort on Magazine Hill, commanding both 
 the city and the Chinese position on the northern hills, was 
 captured without loss. In less than two hours the great city 
 of Canton was in the possession of the allies, and the Chinese 
 resistance was far less vigorous and worse directed than on 
 any occasion of equal importance. Still, the English loss 
 was fourteen killed and eighty -three wounded, while the 
 French casualties numbered thirty-four. The Chinese had, 
 however, to abandon their ])ositions north of the city, and 
 their elaborate fortifications were blown up. 
 
 Although all regular resistance had been overcome, the
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 357 
 
 greater part of the city remained in possession of the Chinese 
 and of Yeh in person. That official, although in the lowest 
 straits, had lost neither his fortitude nor his ferocity, lie 
 made not the least sign of surrender, and his last act of 
 authority was to order the execution of 400 citizens, whom 
 he denounced as traitors to their country. From his yamen 
 in the interior of the city, when he found that the English 
 hesitated to advance beyond the walls, he incited the popu- 
 lace to fresh efforts of hostility, and, in order to check their 
 increasing audacity, it was resolved to send a force into the 
 city to effect the capture of Yeh. On January 5, 1858, three 
 detachments were sent into the native city, and they ad- 
 vanced at once upon the official residences of Yeh and 
 Pihkwei, the governor. The Chinese were quite unprepared 
 for this move, and being taken unawares they offered 
 scarcely any resistance. The yamen was occupied and the 
 treasury captured, while Pihkwei was made prisoner in his 
 own house. The French at the same time attacked and 
 occupied the Tartar city — a vast stone-built suburb which 
 had been long allowed to fall into decay, and which, instead 
 of being occupied, as was believed, by 7,000 Manchu war- 
 riors, was the residence of bats and nauseous creatures. 
 But the great object of the attack was unattained, for Yeh 
 still remained at large, and no one seemed to know where 
 he ought to be sought, for all the official buildings had been 
 searched in vain. But Mr. Parkes, by indefatigable inquiry, 
 at last gained a clew from a poor scholar whom he found 
 poring over an ancient classic at the library, undisturbed in 
 the midst of the turmoil. From him he learned that Yeh 
 would probably be found in a yamen situated in the south- 
 west quarter of the city. Mr. Parkes hastened thither with 
 Captain (afterward Admiral) Cooper Key and a party of 
 sailors. They arrived just in time, for all the preparations 
 for flight had been made, and Captain Key caught Yeh with 
 his own hand as he was escaping over the wall. One of his 
 assistants came forward with praiseworthy devotion and 
 declared himself to be Yeh, in the hope of saving his su-
 
 358 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 perior; but the deception was at once detected by Mr. 
 Parkes, who assured Yeh that no harm would be done him. 
 The capture of Yeh completed the effect of the occupation 
 of Canton, and the disapj)earance of the most fanatical oppo- 
 nent of the foreigners insured the tranquillity of the Canton 
 region, which had been the main seat of disorder, during the 
 remainder of the war. The government of Canton was then 
 intrusted to Pihkwei and a commission of one Frenchman 
 and two Englishmen, and the Chinese admitted it had never 
 been better governed. Yeh himself was sent to Calcutta, 
 where he died two years later, and, considering the abun- 
 dant evidence of his cruel treatment of defenseless prisoners, 
 he had every reason to consider his punishment lenient. 
 
 Having thus settled the difficulty at Canton, it remained 
 for Lord Elgin to carry out the other part of his task, and 
 place diplomatic relations between England and China on a 
 satisfactory basis by obtaining the right of direct communi- 
 cation with Pekin. A letter dated February 11, 1858, was 
 sent to the senior Secretary of State at Pekin describing 
 what had occurred in the south, and summarizing what 
 would be required from the Chinese Government. The 
 English and French plenipotentiaries also notified that they 
 would proceed to Shanghai for the purpose of conducting 
 further negotiations. This letter was duly forwarded to 
 Pekin by the Governor of Kiangsu, and when Lord Elgin 
 reached Shanghai on March 30 he found the reply of Yu- 
 ching, the chief adviser of Ilienfung, waiting for him. 
 Yuching's letter was extremely unsatisfactory. It was 
 arrogant in its terms and impracticable as to its proposals. 
 Lord Elgin was told that "no imperial commissioner ever 
 conducts business at Shanghai," and that it behooved the 
 English minister to wait at Canton until the arrival of a new 
 imperial commissioner from Pekin. The only concession the 
 Chinese made was to dismiss Yeh from his posts, and as he 
 was a prisoner in the hands of the English this did not mean 
 much. Lord Elgin's reply to this communication was to 
 announce his intention of proceeding to the Peiho, and there
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN M^AR 359 
 
 negotiating direct with the imperial government. Lord 
 Elgin reached the Gulf of Pechihli about the middle of 
 April, and he again addressed Yuching in the hope of an 
 amicable settlement, and requested that the emperor would 
 appoint some official to act as his plenipotentiary. Three 
 minor officials were appointed, more out of curiosity than 
 from a desire to promote business, but on Lord Elgin discov- 
 ering that they were of inferior rank and that their powers 
 were inadequate, he declined to see them. But Yuching re- 
 fused to appoint any others; stating curtly that their powers 
 were ample for the adjustment of affairs, and then Lord 
 Elgin announced that he would proceed up the Peiho to 
 Tientsin. Some delay was caused by the non-arrival of the 
 fleet, which was not assembled in the Gulf of Pechihli, 
 through different causes of delay, until the end of May, or 
 about three weeks after Lord Elgin announced his intention 
 of forcing his way up to Tientsin. There is no doubt that 
 Sir Michael Seymour was in no sense to blame for this delay, 
 but unfortunately it aroused considerable irritation in the 
 mind of Lord Elgin, who sent home a dispatch, without 
 informing his colleague, stating that the delay was "a most 
 grievous disappointment, ' ' and attributing it to the supine- 
 ness of the admiral. 
 
 On May 19 the allied fleet proceeded to the mouth of the 
 river, and summoned the commandant to surrender the Taku 
 forts on the following morning. No reply being received, the 
 attack commenced, and after the bombardment had gone on 
 at short range for an hour and a quarter the Chinese gun- 
 ners were driven from their batteries, and the troops landed, 
 occupying the whole line of forts and intrenched camps. An 
 attempt to injure our fleet by fire-ships miscarried, and con- 
 sidering that the Chinese had some of their best troops pres- 
 ent, including a portion of the Imperial Guard, their resist- 
 ance was not as great as might have been expected. Their 
 general committed suicide, and the Chinese lost the best part 
 of their artillery, which had been removed from Pekin and 
 Tientsin for the defense of the entrance to the Peiho. The
 
 3G0 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 fleet proceeded up tlie river to Tientsin, and Lord Elgin took 
 up his quarters in that city. The Chinese Government was 
 "brought to reason by this striking success, and, with his 
 capital menaced, the emperor hastened to delegate full pow- 
 ers to two high commissioners, Kweiliang and Hwashana, 
 both Manchus and dignitaries of the highest birth and rank. 
 Their powers were superior to those granted to Keying at the 
 time of the old war, and they were commanded with affec- 
 tionate earnestness to show the foreigners that they were 
 competent and willing to grant anything not injurious to 
 China. Nothing could be more satisfactory than the pro- 
 posals of the new Chinese representatives, and they were 
 anxious to settle everything with the least possible delay. 
 At this point there reappeared upon the scene a man whose 
 previous experience and high position entitled him to some 
 consideration. Less than a week after his first interview 
 with the imperial representatives, Lord Elgin received a 
 letter from Keying, who, it was soon found, had come on 
 a self-appointed mission to induce the English by artifice 
 and plausible representation to withdraw their fleet from the 
 river. Ilis zeal was increased by the knowledge that the 
 penalty of failure would be death, and as his reputation had 
 been very great among Europeans there is no saying but that 
 he might have succeeded had there not been discovered in 
 Yeh's yamen at Canton some of liis papers, which showed 
 that he had played a double part throughout, and that at 
 heart he was bitterly anti-foreign. When he found that the 
 English possessed this information he hastened back to Pekin, 
 where he was at once summoned before the Board of Pun- 
 ishment for immediate judgment, and, being found guilty, 
 it was ordered that as he had acted "with stupidity and 
 precipitancy" he should be strangled forthwith. As an act 
 of extreme grace the emperor allowed him to put an end to 
 his existence in consideration of his being a member of the 
 imperial family. 
 
 After the departure of Keying, negotiations proceeded 
 very satisfactorily with Kweiliang and Hwashana, and all
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 361 
 
 tlie points were practically agreed upon, excepting the right 
 to have a resident minister at Pekin. This claim was op- 
 posed on several grounds. It was not merely something 
 that had never been heard of, but it would probably be at- 
 tended with peril to the envoy as well as to the Chinese 
 Government. Then the commissioners wanted to know if 
 he would wear the Chinese dress, if all the powers would 
 have only one minister, and if he would make the kotow ? 
 Finding such arguments fail, they asked that the visit of an 
 English embassador to Pekin should be postponed till a more 
 favorable occasion. They made the admission that "there 
 is properly no objection to the permanent residence at Pekin 
 of a plenipotentiary minister of her Britannic Majesty," and 
 they even spoke of sending a return mission to London; but 
 they deprecated the proposal as novel and as specially risky 
 at this moment in consequence of the formidable Taeping 
 Eebellion. These representations did not fail to produce their 
 effect, for it was not to the interest of Europeans generally 
 that the emperor's authority should be subverted on the 
 morrow of his signing a treaty with us. In consequence of 
 these feelings, and with a wish to reciprocate the generally 
 conciliatory attitude of the Chinese officials, Kweiliang and 
 Hwashana were informed that the right would be waived 
 for the present, except that it would be necessary for the 
 English minister to visit Pekin, twelve months later, on the 
 occasion of exchanging the ratifications of the treaty ; and 
 so the matter was left pending the arrival of that occasion. 
 While the Treaty of Tientsin provided for the conclusion of 
 a peace that promised to be enduring, and arranged for the 
 future diplomatic relations of the two countries, commis- 
 sioners were duly appointed to meet at Shanghai and draw 
 up a tariff. But at Tientsin the great crux in the com- 
 mercial relations between us and the Chinese had been set- 
 tled by the legalization of opium. It was agreed that opium 
 might be imported into China on payment of thirty taels, or 
 about fifty dollars, per ciiest. Experience had shown that 
 leaving the most largely-imported article into China contra- 
 
 China— T.6
 
 362 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 band had been both futile and inconvenient, while the Chi- 
 nese Government was a direct loser by not enjoying a legiti- 
 mate source of revenue. How general the view had become 
 that the evils of the use of opium were exaggerated, and, 
 even admitting them, that there was no better way of dimin- 
 ishing their effect than by legalizing the import of opium, 
 can be judged by the ready acquiescence of the Chinese com- 
 missioners; and here, from many other matured opinions, 
 we may quote the final and deliberate conviction of Sir 
 Henry Pottinger: 
 
 "I take this opportunity to advert to one important topic 
 on which I have hitherto considered it right to preserve a 
 rigid silence — I allude to the trade in opium; and I now 
 unhesitatingly declare in this public manner that after the 
 most unbiased and careful observations I have become con- 
 vinced during my stay in China that the alleged demoraliz- 
 ing and debasing evils of opium have been and are vastly 
 exaggerated. Like all other indulgences, excesses in its use 
 are bad and reprehensible; but I have neither myself seen 
 such vicious consequences as are frequently ascribed to it, 
 nor have I been able to obtain authentic proofs or informa- 
 tion of their existence. The great, and perhaps I might say 
 sole, objection to the trade, looking at it morally and ab- 
 stractedly, that I have discovered, is that it is at present con- 
 traband and prohibited by the laws of China, and therefore 
 to be regretted and disavowed; but I have striven — and I 
 hope with some prospect of eventual success — to bring about 
 its legalization ; and were that point once effected, I am of 
 opinion that its most objectionable feature would be alto- 
 gether removed. Even as it now exists it appears to me to 
 be unattended with a hundredth part of the debasement and 
 misery which may be seen in our native country from the 
 lamentable abuse of ardent spirits, and those who so sweep- 
 ingly condemn the opium trade on that principle need not, 
 I think, leave the shores of England to find a far greater and 
 more besetting evil." 
 
 The ink on the Tientsin treaty was scarcely dry before
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 363 
 
 reasons began to be furnished against the sincerity of the 
 emperor and his desire for peace. Before the fleet left the 
 Peiho workmen were already engaged repairing and re-arm- 
 ing the Taku forts, and the morrow of Lord Elgin's depart- 
 ure from Hongkong witnessed the revival of disturbances 
 round Canton, where the new imperial commissioner Hwang, 
 instead of seeking to restore harmony, had devoted himself 
 to inciting the population to patriotic deeds in emulation of 
 Commissioner Yeh. It was found necessary to take strenu- 
 ous measures against the turbulent patriots of Kwantung, 
 and to break up their main force in their strong and well- 
 chosen position at Shektsin, which was accomplished by a 
 vigorous attack both on land and water. The suspicion that 
 the Chinese were not absolutely straightforward in their 
 latest dealings with us was confirmed by the discovery at 
 Shektsin of secret imperial edicts, breathing defiance to the 
 foreigners and inciting the people to resistance. These and 
 other facts warned the European authorities on the spot that 
 there was no certainty that the Treaty of Tientsin would be 
 ratified, or that a British envoy would be admitted into the 
 capital for even the temporary business of a diplomatic cere- 
 mony. While people in Europe were assuming that the 
 Chinese question might be dismissed for twenty years, the 
 English consuls and commanders in the treaty ports were 
 preparing themselves for a fresh and more vigorous demon- 
 stration of Chinese hostility and animosity. The matter that 
 was to prove the sincerity and good faith of the Chinese 
 Government was the reception at Pekin of the English offi- 
 cer intrusted with the duty of exchanging the ratified copies 
 of the treaty. If he were allowed to proceed to Pekin there 
 would be reason for accepting the assurances of the emperor 
 that a permanent arrangement should be effected later on, 
 when it would not injure his dignity or authority. 
 
 Mr. Frederick Bruce, who had been secretary to his 
 brother, Lord Elgin, and who had previously served at 
 Hongkong, was appointed her Majesty's representative for 
 the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the treaty. He
 
 364 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 %■ 
 
 was instructed to inform the Chinese officials that, while the 
 British Government would not renounce the right of having 
 a permanent resident minister at Pekin, they were prepared 
 to waive it for a time by allowing diplomatic intercourse to 
 be carried on at Shanghai. But no deviation was to be per- 
 mitted from the arrangement that the ratifications were to 
 be exchanged at Pekin, and Lord Malmesbury warned the 
 new envoy that "all the arts at which the Chinese are such 
 adepts will be put in practice to dissuade you from repairing 
 to the capital." Mr. Bruce received his instructions on 
 March 1, 1859, and the exchange of ratifications had to be 
 effected before June 26. Mr. Bruce reached Hongkong in 
 April, and he found the air full of unsatisfactory rumors; 
 and when he reached Shanghai the uncertainty was inten- 
 sified by the presence of Kweiliang and Hwashana, who 
 seemed to think that everything might be settled without 
 a journey to Pekin. They endeavored to get up a discussion 
 on some unsettled details of minor importance, in the hope 
 that the period for the ratification of the treaty might be 
 allowed to expire. Mr. Bruce announced his imminent 
 departure for the Peiho to Kweiliang, and expressed the 
 hope that arrangements would be made for his safe convey- 
 ance to and appropriate accommodation at Pekin. Neither 
 Mr. Bruce 's instructions nor his own opinion justified any 
 delay in proceeding to the north, and the fleet sent on in 
 advance under the command of Admiral Hope reached the 
 mouth of the Peiho on June 17, three days before Mr. Bruce. 
 The admiral on arrival sent a notification to the Chinese 
 officers in command of the forts that the English envoy was 
 coming. But the reception given to the officers who con- 
 veyed this intimation was distinctly unfavorable and even 
 hostile. The two boats sent ashore found that the entrance 
 to the river was effectually barred by a row of iron stakes 
 and by an inner boom, and that a large and excited crowd 
 forbade them to land. A vague promise was given that an 
 opening would be made in the obstructions to admit the 
 passage of the English ships; but on the boats repeating
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 865 
 
 their visit on the succeeding clay they found that the small 
 passages had been more effectually secured, and that tlierc 
 could no longer be any doubt that the Chinese did nut intend 
 to admit the English envoy. It was therefore determined 
 to make a demonstration with the fleet, and if necessary to 
 resort to force, which it was never doubted would be attended 
 with little risk and crowned with complete success. 
 
 On June 25 the attack on the Taku forts began with the 
 removal of the iron stakes forming the outer barrier by 
 the steamer "Opossum," and this part of the operations was 
 performed without a shot being fired. When, howcA'er, the 
 eleven ships forming the English fleet reached the inner 
 boom all the Chinese forts and batteries began to fire with 
 an accuracy which showed that the guns had been trained 
 to bear on this precise spot. The result of this unexpectedly 
 vigorous bombardment was soon shown in the damaged 
 condition of our ships. Two gunboats were sunk, all the 
 vessels were more or less damaged, and when, after three 
 hours' cannonade, it was sought to retrieve the doubtful 
 fortune of the day by a land attack, the result only went to 
 accentuate the ill results of the naval engagement. In this 
 disastrous affair more than 300 men were killed and wounded, 
 which, added to the loss of three gunboats, represented a 
 very serious disaster. But the worst of it was that it con- 
 vinced the emperor and his advisers that they could hold 
 their own against Europeans, and that it placed the extreme 
 party once more in the ascendant at Pekin. Sankolinsin, the 
 Mongol prince who had checked the advance of the Taepings, 
 became master of the situation, and declared that there was 
 nothing to fear from an enemy who had been repulsed by 
 the raw levies of the province while he held the flat country 
 between the Peiho and Pekin with the flower of the Banner 
 army. Mr. Bruce returned to Shanghai, the fleet to Hong- 
 ' kong, and the matter remained suspended until fresh instruc- 
 tions and troops could be received from Europe. 
 
 After some hesitation and delay, a plan of joint action 
 was agreed upon in November, 1859, between France and
 
 366 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 England, and it was hoped that the whole expeditionary 
 force would have reached its destination by April, 1860. 
 Pending its arrival Mr. Bruce was instructed to present an 
 ultimatum with thirty days' grace demanding an immediate 
 apology, the payment of a large indemnity amounting to 
 $12,000,000 to both England and France, and the ratification 
 of the Treaty of Tientsin. The minister, Pang Wanching, 
 replied, categorically refusing all these requests; and, as 
 neither indemnity nor apology was offered, there remained 
 no alternative but the inevitable and supreme appeal to arms. 
 The troops which were to form the expedition were mainly 
 drawn from India, and Sir Hope Grant, who had not merely 
 distinguished himself during the Mutiny, but who had served 
 in the first English war with China during the operations 
 round Canton, was appointed to the command of the army; 
 while Admiral Hope, strongly re-enforced in ships, retained 
 the command of the naval forces. A force of five batteries 
 of artillery, six regiments of infantry, two squadrons of cav- 
 alry, together with a body of horse and foot from the native 
 army of India, amounting in all to about 10,000 men, was 
 placed at the general's disposal in addition to the troops 
 already in China. The French Government agreed to send 
 another army of about two-thirds this strength to co-operate 
 on the Peiho, and General Montauban was named for the 
 command. The collection of this large expedition brought 
 into prominence the necessity of employing as embassador a 
 diplomatist of higher rank than Mr. Bruce; and accordingly, 
 in February, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros were commissioned 
 to again proceed to China for the purpose of securing the 
 ratification of their own treaty. Sir Hope Grant reached 
 Hongkong in March, 1860, and by his recommendation a 
 stronger native contingent (one Sikh regiment, four Punjab 
 regiments, two Bombay regiments, one Madras regiment of 
 foot, and two irregular regiments of Sikh cavalry, known 
 as Fane's and Probyn's Horse; Sir John Michel and Sir 
 Robert Napier commanding divisions under Sir Hope Grant) 
 was added, raising the English force in the field to more
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 367 
 
 than 13,000 men. A lease was obtained iu perpetuity, 
 through the skillful negotiation of Mr. Parkes, of Kowlun 
 and Stonecutter Island, where, from their salubrious posi- 
 tion, it was proposed to place the troops on their arrival from 
 India or England. Chusan was occupied the following 
 month without opposition by an English brigade of 2,000 
 men. 
 
 The summer had commenced before the whole of the 
 expedition assembled at Hongkong, whence it was moved 
 northward to Shanghai about a year after the failure of 
 the attack on the forts on the Peiho. A further delay was 
 caused by the tardiness of the French, and July had begun 
 before the expedition reached the Gulf of Pechihli. Then 
 opposite opinions led to different suggestions, and while the 
 English advocated proceeding to attack Pehtang, General 
 Montauban drew up another plan of action. But the exi- 
 gencies of the alliance compelled the English, who were 
 ready, to wait for the French, who were not, in order that 
 the assault might be made simultaneously. Before that time 
 arrived the French commander had been brought round 
 to the view that the proper plan of campaign was that sug- 
 gested by the English commander; viz., to attack and cap- 
 ture Pehtang, whence the Taku forts might be taken in the 
 rear. It is somewhat remarkable to observe that no one 
 suggested a second time endeavoring to carry by a front 
 attack these forts, which had in the interval since Admiral 
 Hope's failure been rendered more formidable. 
 
 At Pehtang the Chinese had made few preparations for 
 defense, and nothing of the same formidable character aa 
 at Taku. The forts on both sides of the river were neither 
 extensive nor well-armed. The garrison consisted largely 
 of Tartar cavalry, more useful for watching the movements 
 of the foreigners than for working artillery when exposed to 
 the fire of the new Armstrong guns of the English. The 
 attacking force landed in boats and by wading, Sir Hope 
 Grant setting his men the example. No engagement took 
 place on the night of disembarkation. When morning broke,
 
 868 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 a suspicious silence in tlie enemy's quarters strengthened the 
 belief that Pehtang would not be defended. While the gar- 
 rison had resolved not to resist an attack, they had contem- 
 plated causing their enemy as much loss as if he had been 
 obliged to carry the place by storm by ^^lacing shells in the 
 magazine which would be exploded by the moving of some 
 gunlocks put in a spot where they could not fail to be trod- 
 den upon. This plot, which was thoroughly in accordance 
 with the practices of Chinese warfare, was fortunately 
 divulged by a native more humane than patriotic, and 
 Pehtang was captured and occupied without the loss of a 
 single man. This success at the commencement enabled 
 the whole of the expedition to land without further delay or 
 difficulty. Three days after the capture of Pehtang, recon- 
 noitering parties were sent out to ascertain what the Chinese 
 were doing, and whether they had made any preparations 
 to oppose an advance toward Taku or Tientsin. Four miles 
 from Pehtang they came in sight of a strongly intrenched 
 camp, where several thousand men opened fire upon the 
 reconnoitering parties with their gingalls, and several men 
 were wounded. The object being only to find out what the 
 Celestial army was doing, and where it was, the Europeans 
 withdrew on discovering the proximity of so strong a force. 
 The great difficulty was to discover a way of getting from 
 Pehtang on to some of the main roads leading to the Peiho; 
 for the whole of the surrounding country had been under 
 water, and was more or less impassable. In fact, the region 
 round Pehtang consisted of nothing but mud, while the one 
 road, an elevated causeway, was blocked by the fortified 
 camp just mentioned as having been discovered by the 
 reconnoitering party. A subsequent reconnaissance, con- 
 ducted by Colonel (now Lord) Wolseley, revealed the pres- 
 ence of a cart-track which might prove available for the 
 march of troops. This track was turned to advantage for 
 the purpose of taking the Chinese position in flank, and to 
 Sir Robert Napier's division was assigned this, as it proved, 
 difficult operation. When the maneuver of out- flanking
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 3G9 
 
 had been satisfactorily accomplished, the attack was com- 
 menced in front. Here the Chinese stood to their position, 
 but only for a brief time, as the fire from eighteen guns, 
 including some forty-pounders, soon silenced their gingalls, 
 and they precipitately abandoned their intrenchments. While 
 the engagement in front had reached this favorable termina- 
 tion, Sir Robert Napier had been engaged on the right hand 
 with a strong body of Tartar cavalry, which attacked with 
 considerable valor, and with what seemed a possibility of 
 success, until the guns opening upon them and the Sikh 
 cavalry charging them dispelled their momentary dream of 
 victory. The prize of this battle was the village of Sin ho 
 with its line of earthworks, one mile north of the Peiho, and 
 about seven miles in the rear of the Taku forts. 
 
 The next day was occupied in examining the Chinese 
 position and in discovering, what was more difficult than its 
 capture, how it might be approached. It was found that the 
 village, which formed a fortified square protected by bat- 
 teries, could be best approached by the river bank, and tlie 
 only obstacle in this quarter was that represented by the fire 
 of the guns of two junks, supported by a battery on the oppo- 
 site side of the river. These, however, were soon silenced 
 by the superior fire directed upon them, and the guns were 
 spiked by Captain Willis and a few sailors, who crossed the 
 river for the purpose. The flank of the advance being thus 
 protected, the attack on Tangku itself began with a cannon- 
 ade from thirty- six pieces of the best artillery of that age. 
 The Chinese fire was soon rendered innocuous, and their 
 walls and forts were battered down. Even then, however, 
 the garrison gave no signs of retreat, and it was not until 
 the Armstrongs had been dragged within a very short dis- 
 tance of the walls, and the foot-soldiers had absolutely 
 effected an entrance, that the garrison thought of their 
 personal safety and turned in flight. 
 
 Some days before the battle and capture of Tangku, Lord 
 Elgin received several communications from Hang, the Gov- 
 ernor-general of Pechihli, requesting a cessation of hostilities,
 
 370 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 and announcing the approach of two imperial commissioners 
 appointed for the express purpose of ratifying the Treaty 
 of Tientsin. But Lord Elgin very wisely perceived that it 
 would be impossible to negotiate on fair terms unless the 
 Taku forts were in his possession. The capture of Tangku 
 placed the allied forces in the rear of the northern forts on 
 the Peiho; and those forts once occupied, the others on the 
 southern side would be practically untenable and obliged to 
 surrender at discretion. Several days were passed in pre- 
 liminary observations and skirmishing. On the one side, the 
 whole of the Tartar cavalry was removed to the southern 
 bank; on the other, a bridge of boats was thrown across the 
 Peiho, and the approach to the northern fort carefully exam- 
 ined up to 600 yards from the wall. At this point the views 
 of the allied generals again clashed. General Montauban 
 wished to attack the southern forts. Sir Hope Grant was 
 determined to begin by carrying the northern. The attack 
 on the chief northern fort commenced on the morning of Au- 
 gust 21 with a heavy cannonade; the Chinese, anticipating 
 the plans of the English, were the first to fire. The Chinese 
 fought their guns with extraordinary courage. A shell ex- 
 ploded their principal magazine, which blew up with a ter- 
 rible report; but as soon as the smoke cleared off they recom- 
 menced their fire with fresh ardor. Although even this fort 
 had not been constructed with the same strength in the rear 
 as they all presented in the front, the resistance was most 
 vigorous. A premature attempt to throw a pontoon across 
 the ditch was defeated with the loss of sixteen men. The 
 coolie corps here came to the front, and, rushing into the 
 water, held up the pontoons while the French and some 
 English troops dashed across. But all their efforts to scale 
 the wall were baffled, and it seemed as if they had only gone 
 to self-destruction. While the battle was thus doubtfully 
 contested. Major Anson, who had shown the greatest intre- 
 pidity on several occasions, succeeded in cutting the ropes 
 that held up a drawbridge, and an entrance was soon effected 
 within the body of the works. The Chinese still resisted
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 371 
 
 nobly, and it was computed that out of a garrison of 500 
 men but 100 escaped. The English loss was 22 killed, and 
 179, including 21 ofhcers, were wounded. To these figures 
 must be added the French loss. 
 
 There still remained four more forts on the northern side 
 of the river, and it seemed as if these would offer further 
 resistance, as the garrisons uttered threats of defiance to a 
 summons to surrender. But appearances were deceptive, 
 and for the good reason that all of these forts were only pro- 
 tected in the rear by a slight wall. The French rushed im- 
 petuously to the attack, only to find that the garrison had 
 given up the defense, while a large number had actually 
 retired. Two thousand prisoners were made, and the fall 
 of the forts on the northern bank was followed by an imme- 
 diate summons to those on the southern to surrender; and 
 as they were commanded by the guns in the former tliey 
 yielded with as good a grace as they could muster. The 
 following day formal occupation was made, and the spoil 
 included more than 600 cannon of various sizes and degrees 
 of efficiency. On that day also the fleet, which had during 
 these operations been riding at anchor off the mouth of the 
 river, proceeded across the bar, removed the different ob- 
 stacles that had been intended to hinder its approach, and 
 Admiral Hope anchored in security off those very forts 
 which had repulsed him in the previous year, and which 
 would in all probability have continued to defy any direct 
 attack from the sea. Let it not be said, therefore, that Sir 
 Hope Grant's capture of the Taku forts reflected in any way 
 on the courage or capacity of Admiral Hope for the failure 
 in 1859. 
 
 By this decisive success the road to Tientsin was opened 
 both by land and by the river. The fleet of gunl)oats, which 
 had participated as far as they could without incurring any 
 undue danger in the attack on the forts, were ordered up the 
 Peiho; and the English embassador, escorted l)y a strong 
 naval and military force, proceeded to Tientsin, where it 
 would be possible, without any loss of dignity, to resume
 
 872 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 negotiations with the Pekin Government. The advanced 
 gunboats arrived at Tientsin on August 23, and three days 
 later the greater portion of the expedition had entered that 
 city. No resistance was attempted, although several batter- 
 ies and intrenched camps were passed on the way. Precau- 
 tions were at once taken to make the position of the troops 
 as secure as possible in the midst of a very large and pre- 
 sumably hostile population. The people showed, according 
 to the ideas of Europe, an extraordinary want of patriotic 
 fervor, and were soon engaged, on the most amicable terms, 
 in conducting a brisk trade with the invaders of their coun- 
 try; but there was never any doubt that on the first sign of 
 a reverse they would have turned upon the foreign troops, 
 and completed by all the means in their power their discom- 
 fiture. Several communications passed between the opposite 
 camps during these days; and when Hang announced the 
 withdrawal of all Chinese troops from Tientsin he expressed 
 a wish that the English embassador would not bring many 
 vessels of war with him. Bvit such requests were made 
 more with the desire to save appearances than from any 
 hope that they would be granted. The reality of their fears, 
 and of their consequent desire to negotiate, was shown by 
 the appointment of Kweiliang, who had arranged the Treaty 
 of Tientsin, as high commissioner to provide for the neces- 
 sary ceremonies in connection with its ratification. Kweiliang 
 apparently possessed powers of the most extensive character; 
 and he hastened to inform Lord Elgin, who had taken up 
 his residence in a beautiful yamen in Tientsin, that he had 
 received the emperor's authority to discuss and decide every- 
 thing. In response to this notilication the reply was sent 
 that the three conditions of peace were an apology for the 
 attack on the English flag at Peiho, the payment of an in- 
 demnity, including the costs of the war, and, thirdly, the 
 ratification and execution of the Treaty of Tientsin, includ- 
 ing, of course, the reception at Pekin of the representative 
 of the Queen of England on honorable terms adequate to 
 the dignity of that great sovereign. To none of these was
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 873 
 
 Kweiliang liimself disposed to raise any objection. Only in 
 connection with the details of the last-named point was tliere 
 likely that any difference of opinion would arise; and that 
 difference of opinion speedily revealed itself when it became 
 known that the English insisted on the advance of their 
 army to the town of Tungchow, only twelve miles distant 
 from the walls of Pekiu. To the Chinese ministers this sim- 
 ple precaution seemed like exacting the extreme rights of the 
 conqueror, before, too, the act of conquest had been consum- 
 mated; for already fresh troops were arriving from Mongolia 
 and Manchuria, and the valor of Sankolinsin was beginninc' 
 to revive. That the Chinese Government had, under the 
 hard taskmaster, necessity, made great progress in its views 
 on foreign matters was not to be denied, but somehow or 
 other its movements always lagged behind the requirements 
 of the hour, and the demands of the English were again 
 ahead of what it was disposed to yield. 
 
 If the Chinese Government had promptly accepted the 
 inevitable, and if Kweiliang had negotiated with as much 
 celerity as he pretended to be his desire, peace might have 
 been concluded and the Chinese saved some further igno- 
 miny. But it soon became clear that all the Chinese were 
 thinking about was to gain time, and as the months avail- 
 able for active campaigning were rapidly disappearing, it 
 was imperative that not the least delay should be sanctioned. 
 On September 8, Lord Elgin and Sir Hope Grant left Tien- 
 tsin with an advance force of about 1,500 men; and, march- 
 ing by the highroad, reached the pretty village of Hosiwu, 
 half-way between that town and the capital. A few days 
 later this force was increased by the remainder of one divis- 
 ion, while to Sir Robert Napier was left the task of guarding 
 with the other Tientsin and the communications with the sea. 
 At Hosiwu negotiations were resumed by Tsai, Prince of I, 
 a nephew of the emperor, who declared that he had received 
 authority to conclude all arrangements; but he was curtly 
 informed that no treaty could be concluded save at Tung- 
 chow, and the army resumed its advance beyond Hosiwu.
 
 37i HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 The marcli was continued without molestation to a point 
 beyond the village of Matow, but when Sir Hope Grant 
 approached a place called Chan- chia- wan he found himself 
 in presence of a large army. This was the first sign of any 
 resolve to offer military opposition to the invaders since the 
 capture of the Taku forts, and it came to a great extent in 
 the manner of a surprise, for by a special agreement with 
 Mr. Parkes the settlement of the difhculty was to be con- 
 cluded at Chan-chia-wan in an amicable manner. Instead, 
 however, of the emperor's delegates, the English commander 
 found Sankolinsin and the latest troops drawn from Pekin 
 and beyond the Wall in battle array, and occupying the 
 very ground which had been assigned for the English en- 
 campment. 
 
 The day before the English commander perceived that 
 he was in face of a strong force, Mr. Parkes and some other 
 olftcers and civilians had been sent ahead with an escort of 
 Sikh cavalry to arrange the final preliminaries with the im- 
 perial commissioners at Tungchow, both as to where the 
 camp was to be pitched and also as to the interview between 
 the respective plenipotentiaries of the opposing powers. This 
 party proceeded to Tungchow without encountering any op- 
 position or perceiving any exceptional military precautions. 
 Troops were indeed observed at several points, and officers 
 in command of pickets demanded the nature of their business 
 and where they were going, but the reply "To the Commis- 
 sioners" at once satisfied all inquiries and opened every bar- 
 rier. The one incident that happened was of happy augury 
 for a satisfactory issue if the result went to prove the falla- 
 ciousness of human expectations. A change had in the mean- 
 while come over the minds of the imperial commissioners, 
 whether in accordance with the working of a deep and long- 
 arranged policy, or from the confidence created by the sight 
 of the numerous warriors drawn from the cradle of the 
 Manchu race for the defense of the capital and dynasty, 
 can never be ascertained with any degree of certainty. 
 Their tone suddenly assumed greater boldness and arro-
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 875 
 
 gance. To some of tlie Englishmen it appeared "almost 
 offensive," and it was only after five hours' discussion 
 between Mr. Parkes and the commissioners at Tungchow 
 that some sign was given of a more yielding disposition. 
 The final arrangements were hastily concluded in the even- 
 ing of September 17 for the arrival of the troops at the pro- 
 posed camping ground on the morrow, and for the interview 
 that was to follow as soon after as possible. Wliile Mr. 
 Parkes and some of his companions were to ride forward in 
 the morning to apprise Sir Hope Grant of what had been 
 agreed upon, and to point out the site for his camp, the 
 others were to remain in Tungchow with the greater part 
 of the Sikh escort. 
 
 On their return toward the advancing English army in 
 the early morning of the following day, Mr. Parkes and his 
 party met with frequent signs of military movement in the 
 country between Tungchow and Chan-chia-wan. Large 
 bodies of infantiy and gingall-men were seen marching 
 from all quarters to the town. At Chan-chia-wan itself still 
 more emphatic tokens were visible of a coming battle. Cav- 
 alry were drawn up in dense bodies, but under shelter. In 
 a nullah one regiment of a thousand sabers was stationed 
 with the men standing at their horses' heads ready for in- 
 stant action. At another point a number of men were busily 
 engaged in constructing a battery and in placing twelve guns 
 in position. When the Englishmen gained the plain they 
 found the proposed site of the English camp in the actual 
 possession of a Chinese army, and a strong force of Tartar 
 cavalry, alone reckoned to number six or seven thousand 
 men, scouring the plain. To all inquiries as to what these 
 warlike arrangements betokened no reply was made by the 
 soldiers, and when the whereabout of the responsible general 
 was asked there came the stereotyped answer that ' ' he was 
 many li away." To the most obtuse mind these arrange- 
 ments could convey but one meaning. They indicated that 
 the Chinese Government had resolved to make another en- 
 deavor to avert the concessions demanded from them by the
 
 376 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 English cand their allies, and to appeal once more to the God 
 of Battles ere they accepted the inevitable. When the whole 
 truth flashed across the mind of Mr. Parkes, the army of Sir 
 Hope Grant might be, and indeed was, marching into the 
 trap prepared for it, with such military precautions perhaps 
 as a wise general never neglected, but still wholly unpre 
 pared for the extensive and well-arranged opposition planned 
 for its reception by a numerous army established in a strong 
 position of its own choosing. It became, therefore, of the 
 greatest importance to communicate the actual state of affairs 
 to him, and to place at his disposal the invaluable informa- 
 tion which the Englishmen returning from Tungchow had 
 in their possession. But Mr. Parkes had still more to do. 
 It was his duty to bring before the Chinese imperial commis- 
 sioners at the earliest possible moment the knowledge of this 
 flagrant breach of the convention he had concluded the day 
 before, to demand its meaning, and to point out the grave 
 consequences that must ensue from such treacherous hos- 
 tility; and in that supreme moment, as he had done on the 
 many other critical occasions of his career in China — at Can- 
 ton and Taku in particular — the one thought in the mind of 
 Mr. Parkes was how best to perform his duty. He did not 
 forget also that, while he was almost in a place of safety 
 near the limits of the Chinese pickets, and not far distant 
 from the advancing columns of Sir Hope Grant, there were 
 other Englishmen in his rear possibly in imminent peril of 
 their lives amid the Celestials at Tungchow. 
 
 Mr. Parkes rode back, therefore, to that town, and with 
 him went one English dragoon, named Phipps, and one 
 Sikh sowar carrying a flag of truce on his spear-point. We 
 must leave them for the moment to follow the movements 
 of the others. To Mr. Loch was intrusted the task of com- 
 municating with Sir Hope Grant; while the remainder of 
 the party were to remain stationary, in order to show the 
 Chinese that they did not suspect anything, and that they 
 were full of confidence. Mr. Loch, accompanied by two 
 Sikhs, rode at a hard canter away from the Chinese lines.
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 377 
 
 He passed through one body of Tartar cavalry without oppo- 
 sition, and reached the advanced guard of the English force 
 in safety. To tell his news was but the work of a minute. 
 It confirmed the suspicions which General Grant had begun 
 to feel at the movements of some bodies of cavalry on the 
 flank of his line of march. Mr. Loch had performed his 
 share of the arrangement. He had warned Sir Hope Grant. 
 But to the chivalrous mind duty is but half-performed if aid 
 is withheld from those engaged in fulfilling theirs. What 
 he had done had proved unexpectedly easy; it remained for 
 him to assist those whose share was more arduous and peril- 
 ous. So Mr. Loch rode back to the Chinese lines, Captain 
 Brabazon insisting on following him, again accompanied 
 by two Sikhs but not the same who had ridden with him 
 before. 
 
 Sir Hope Grant had given him the assurance that unless 
 absolutely forced to engage he would postpone the action for 
 two hours. This small party of four men rode without hesi- 
 tation, and at a rapid pace, through the skirmishers of the 
 Chinese army. The rapidity of their movements discon- 
 certed the Chinese, who allowed them to pass without oppo- 
 sition and almost without notice. They rode through the 
 streets of Chan-chia-wan without meeting with any moles- 
 tation, although they were crowded with the mustering men 
 of the imperial army. They gained Tungchow without let 
 or hindrance, after having j)assed through jDrobably not less 
 than 30,000 men about to do battle with the long hated and 
 now feared foreigners. It may have been, as suggested, 
 that they owed their safety to a belief that they were the 
 bearers of their army's surrender! Arrived at Tungchow, 
 Mr. Loch found the Sikh escort at the temple outside the 
 gates unaware of any danger — all the Englishmen being 
 absent in the town, where they were shopping — and a letter 
 left by Mr. Parkes warning them on return to prepare for 
 instant flight, and saying that he was off in search of Prince 
 Tsai. In that search he was at last successful. He found 
 the high commissioner, he asked the meaning of the change
 
 378 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 tliat had taken place, and was told in curt and defiant tones 
 that "there could be no peace, there must be war," 
 
 The last chance of averting hostilities was thus shown to 
 be in vain. Prince Tsai indorsed the action of Sankolinsin. 
 Mr. Parkes had only the personal satisfaction of knowing 
 that he had done everything he could to prove that the En- 
 glish did not wish to press their military superiority over an 
 antagonist whose knowledge of war was slight and out of 
 date. He had done this at the greatest personal peril. It 
 only remained to secure his own safety and that of his com- 
 panions. By this time the whole party of Englishmen had 
 re-assembled in the temple; and Mr. Loch, anxious for Mr. 
 Parkes, had gone into the city and met him galloping away 
 from the yamen of the commissioner. There was no longer 
 reason for delay. Not an Englishman had yet been touched, 
 Init between this small band and safety lay the road back 
 through the ranks of Sankolinsin' s warriors. From Tung- 
 chow to the advanced j^ost of Sir Hope Grant's army was a 
 ten mile ride; and most of the two hours' grace had already 
 expired. Could it be done ? By this time most of the Chi- 
 nese troops had reached Chan-chia-wan, where they had 
 been drawn up in battle array among the maize-fields and 
 in the nullahs as already described. From Tungchow to 
 that place the country was almost deserted; and the fugi- 
 tives proceeded unmolested along the road till they reached 
 that town. The streets were crowded partly with armed 
 citizens and peasants, but chielly with panic-stricken house- 
 holders; and by this time the horses were blown, and some 
 of them almost exhausted. Through this crowd the seven 
 Englishmen and twenty Sikhs walked their horses, and met 
 not the least opposition. They reached the eastern side with- 
 out insult or injury, passed through the gates, and descend- 
 ing the declivity found themselves in the rear of the whole 
 Chinese army. The dangers through which they had passed 
 were as nothing compared with those they had now to en- 
 counter. A shell burst in the air at this moment, followed 
 by the discharge of the batteries on both sides. The battle
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 879 
 
 had begun. The promised two hours had expired. Tlie 
 fugitives were some ten minutes too late. 
 
 The position of this small band in the midst of an Asiatic 
 army actually engaged in mortal combat with their kinsmen 
 may be better imagined than described. They were riding 
 down the road which passed through the center of the Chi- 
 nese position, and the banks on each side of them were lined 
 with matchlock-men, among whom the shells of the English 
 guns were already bursting. Parties of cavalry were not 
 wanting here, but out in the plain where the Tartar horse- 
 men swarmed in thousands the greatest danger of all awaited 
 them. Their movements were slow, painfully slow, and their 
 progress was delayed by the necessity of waiting for those 
 who were the worst mounted; but they were "all in the 
 same boat, and, like Englishmen, would sink or swim to- 
 gether. ' ' In the accumulation of difficulties that stared the in 
 in the face not the least seemed to be that they were advanc- 
 ing in the teeth of their own countrymen's fire, which was 
 growing -fiercer every minute. In this critical moment men 
 turned to Mr. Parkes, and Captain Brabazon expressed the 
 belief of those present in a cool brave man in arduous ex- 
 tremity when he cried out, "I vote Parkes decides what is to 
 be done." To follow the main road seemed to be certain 
 destruction and death without the power of resisting; for 
 even assuming that some of them could have cut their way 
 through the Tartar cavalry, and escaped from the English 
 shell, they could hardly have avoided being shot down by 
 the long lines of matchlock-men who were ready to fire on 
 them the instant they saw their backs. There was only one 
 possible avenue of escape, and that was to gain the right 
 flank of the army, and endeavor to make their way by a 
 detour round to the English lines. Assuredly this was not 
 a very promising mode of escape, but it seemed to have the 
 greatest chances of success. But when the Chinese, who 
 had up to this regarded their movements without interfering, 
 saw this change in their course, they at once took measures 
 to stop it. A military mandarin said if they persisted in
 
 380 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 their attempt they would be treated as enemies and fired 
 upon; but that he was willing to respect their flag of truce; 
 and that if they would accompany him to the general's pres- 
 ence he would obtain a safe conduct for them. The offer 
 was accepted, partly no doubt because it could not be re- 
 fused, but still also on its own merits. Safe conducts during 
 the heat of battle, even with civilized European peoples, are, 
 however, not such easy things either to grant or to carry 
 out. Mr. Parkes accepted his offer, therefore, and he, Mr. 
 Loch, and the Sikh trooper ISTalsing, bearing a flag of truce, 
 rode off with the mandarin in search of the general, while 
 the five other Europeans and the Sikh escort remained on 
 the road awaiting their return. They proceeded to the left, 
 where it was understood that Sankolinsin commanded in 
 person. They met with some adventures even on this short 
 journey. Coming suddenly upon a large body of infantry, 
 they were almost pulled from their horses, and would have 
 been killed but for the mandarin rushing between them and 
 shouting to the men "not to fire. " A short distance beyond 
 this they halted, when the approach of Sankolinsin was an- 
 nounced by loud shouts of his name from the soldiery. Mr. 
 Parkes at once addressed him, saying that they had come 
 under a flag of truce, and that they wished to regain their 
 army. The Chinese commander replied to his remarks on 
 the usages of war in true Tartar fashion — with laughter and 
 abuse. The soldiers pressed round the unfortunate English- 
 men and placed their matchlocks against their bodies. Es- 
 cape was hopeless, and death seemed inevitable. But insult 
 was more the object of the Mongol general than their death. 
 They were dragged before him and forced to press the ground 
 with their heads at the feet of Sankolinsin. They were sub- 
 jected to numerous other indignities, and at last, when it 
 became evident that the battle was going against the Chi- 
 nese, they were placed in one of the country carts and sent 
 off to Pekin, While Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch were thus 
 ill-used, their comrades waiting on the road had fared no 
 better. Shortly after their departure, the Chinese soldiers
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 381 
 
 began to liustle and jeer at the Englishmen and their native 
 escort. As the firing increased and some of the Chinese were 
 hit they grew more violent. When the news was received 
 of what had happened to Mr. Parkes, and of how Sanko- 
 linsin had laughed to scorn their claim to protection, the sol- 
 diers could no longer be restrained. The Englishmen and 
 the natives were dragged from their horses, cruelly bound, 
 and hurried to the rear, whence they followed at no great 
 distance their companions in misfortune. While the greater 
 portion of these events had been in progress, Colonel Walker, 
 Mr. Thompson, and the men of the King's Dragoon Guards, 
 had been steadily pacing up and down on the embankment 
 as arranged, in order to show the Chinese that they suspected 
 no treachery and had no fears. They continued doing this 
 until a French officer joined them ; but on his getting into a 
 dispute with some of the Chinese about his mule, he drew 
 his pistol and fired at them. He was immediately killed. 
 There was then no longer the least hope of restraining the 
 Chinese, so the whole of the party spurred their horses and 
 escaped to the English army under a heavy but ineffectual 
 fire from matchlocks and gingalls. Their flight was the 
 signal for the commencement of the battle, although at that 
 very moment, had they only known it, the chief party of 
 Englishmen had gained the road east of Chan-chia-wan, 
 and, if the battle had only been delayed a quarter of an 
 hour, they might all have escaped. 
 
 But the two hours of grace were up, and Sir Hope Grant 
 saw no further use in delay. General Montauban was still 
 more impatient, and the men were eager to engage. They 
 had to win their camping-ground that night, and the day 
 was already far advanced. The French occupied the right 
 wing, that is the position opposite the spot where we have 
 seen Sankolinsin commanding in person, and a squadron of 
 Fane's Horse had been lent them to supply their want of 
 cavalry. The battle began with the fire of their batteries, 
 which galled the Chinese so much that the Tartar cavalry 
 were ordered up to charge the guns, and right gallantly they
 
 382 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 did so. A battery was almost in their hands, its officers had 
 to use their revolvers, when the Sikhs and a few French 
 dragoons, led by Colonel Foley, the English commissioner 
 with the French force, gallantly charged them in turn, and 
 compelled them to withdraw. Neither side derived much 
 advantage from this portion of the contest, but the repulse 
 of the Tartar cavalry enabled the French guns to renew their 
 fire with great effect on the line of Chinese infantry. While 
 the French were thus engaged on the right, the English 
 troops had begun a vigorous attack on both the center and 
 the left. The Chinese appeared in such dense masses, and 
 maintained, so vigorous, but fortunately so ill- directed, a fire, 
 that the English force made but little progress at either 
 point. The action might have been indefinitely prolonged 
 and left undecided, had not Sir Hope Grant suddenly re- 
 solved to re- enforce his left with a portion of his center, and 
 to assail the enemy's right vigorously. This latter part of 
 the battle began with a charge of some squadrons of Probyn's 
 Horse against the bodies of mounted Tartars moving in the 
 plain, whom they, with their gallant leader at their head, 
 routed in the sight of the two armies. This overthrow of 
 their chosen fighting-men greatly discouraged the rest of the 
 Chinese soldiers, and when the infantry advanced with the 
 Sikhs in front they slowly began to give ground. But even 
 then there were none of the usual symptoms of a decisive vic- 
 tory. The French were so exhausted by their efforts that 
 they had been compelled to halt, and General Montauban was 
 obliged to curb his natural impetuosity, and to admit that 
 he could take no part in the final attack on Chan-chia-wan. 
 Sir Hope Grant, however, pressed on and occupied the town. 
 He did not call in his men until they had seized without re- 
 sistance a large camp about one mile west of the town, where 
 they captured several guns. Thus ended the battle of Chan- 
 chia-wan with the defeat and retreat of the strong army 
 which Sankolinsin had raised in order to drive the barbarians 
 into the sea. 
 
 Although the battle was won, Sir Hope Grant, measuring
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 383 
 
 the resistance with the eye of an experienced soldier, came 
 to the conclusion that his force was not sufficiently strong 
 to overawe so obstinate a foe; and accordingly ordered Sir 
 Robert Napier to join him with as many troops as he could 
 spare from the Tientsin garrison. Having thus provided for 
 the arrival of re-enforcements at an early date, he was will- 
 ing to resume his onward march for Tungchow, where it 
 was hoped some tidings would be obtained of the missing 
 officers and men. Two days intervened before any decisive 
 move was made, but Mr, Wade was sent under a flag of 
 truce into Tungchow to collect information. But he failed 
 to learn anything more about Mr. Parkes than that he had 
 quitted the town in safety after his final interview with 
 Prince Tsai. Lord Elgin now hastened up from Ilosiwu to 
 join the military headquarters, and on September 21, the 
 French having been joined by another brigade, offensive 
 operations were recommenced. The delay had encouraged 
 the Chinese to make another stand, and they had collected 
 in considerable force for the defense of the Palikao bridge, 
 which affords the means of crossing the Peiho west of Tung- 
 chow. Here again the battle commenced with a cavalry 
 charge which, despite an accident that might have had more 
 serious results, was completely successful. This achieve- 
 ment was followed up by the attack on several fortified posi- 
 tions which were not defended with any great amount of 
 resolution, and while these matters were in progress on the 
 side where the English were engaged, the French had car- 
 ried the bridge with its twenty-five guns in position in very 
 gallant style. The capture of this bridge and the dispersion 
 of the troops, including the Imperial Guard, which had been 
 intrusted with its defense, completed the discomfiture of 
 the Chinese. Pekin itself lay almost at the mercy of the 
 invader, and, unless diplomacy could succeed better than 
 arms, nothing would prevent the hated foreigners violat- 
 ing Its privacy not merely with their presence, but in the 
 most unpalatable guise of armed victors. 
 
 The day after the battle at the Palikao bridge came a
 
 S84 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 letter from Prince Kung, the emperor's next brother, stating 
 that Prince Tsai and his colleagues had not managed matters 
 satisfactorily, and that he had been appointed with plenipo- 
 tentiary powers for the discussion and decision of the peace 
 question. But the prince went on to request a temporary 
 suspension of hostilities — a demand with which no general 
 or embassador could have complied so long as officers were 
 detained who had been seized in violation of the usages of 
 war. Lord Elgin replied in the clearest terms that there 
 could be no negotiations for peace until these prisoners were 
 restored, and that if they were not sent back in safety the 
 consequences would be most serious for the Chinese Govern- 
 ment. But even at this supreme moment of doubt and dan- 
 ger, the subtlety of Chinese diplomacy would have free play. 
 Prince Kung was young in years and experience, but his 
 finesse would have done credit to a gray-haired statesman. 
 Unfortunately for him, the question had got beyond the 
 stage for discussion: the English embassador had stated 
 the one condition on which negotiations would be renewed, 
 and until that had been complied with there was no need 
 to give ear to the threats, promises and entreaties even of 
 Prince Kung. As the prince gave no sign of yielding this 
 point during the week's delay in bringing up the second 
 division from Tientsin, Lord Elgin requested Sir Hope 
 Grant to resume his march on Pekin, from which the ad- 
 vanced guard of the allied forces was distant little more 
 than ten miles. The cavalry had reconnoitered almost up 
 to the gates, and had returned with the report that the walls 
 were strong and in good condition. The danger to a small 
 army of attempting to occupy a great city of the size and 
 population of Pekin is almost obvious; and, moreover, the 
 consistent policy of the English authorities had been to cause 
 the Chinese people as little injury and suffering as possible. 
 Should an attack on the city become unavoidable, it was de- 
 cided that the point attacked should be the Tartar quarter, 
 including the palace, which occupied the northern half of the 
 city. By this time it had become known that Parkes and
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 385 
 
 Locli were living, tliat they were confined in the Kaou 
 Meaou Temple, near the Tehshun Gate, and that latterly 
 they had been fairly well treated. 
 
 In execution of the plan of attack that had been agreed 
 upon, the allied forces marched round Pekin to the north- 
 west corner of the walls, having as their object the Summer 
 Palace of the emperor at Yuen Min Yuen, not quite four 
 miles distant from the city. 
 
 On the approach of the foreign army, Hienfung fled in 
 terror from his palace, and sought shelter at Jehol, the hunt- 
 ing residence of the emperors beyond the Wall. His flight 
 was most precipitate ; and the treasures of the Summer Pal- 
 ace were left at the mercy of the "Western spoilers. The 
 French soldiers had made the most of the start they had 
 obtained, and left comparatively little for their English 
 comrades, who, moreover, were restrained by the bonds of 
 a stricter discipline. But the amount of prize property that 
 remained was still considerable, and, by agreement between 
 the two generals, it was divided in equal shares between the 
 armies. The capture and occupation of the Summer Palace 
 completed the European triumph, and obliged Prince Kung 
 to promptly acquiesce in Lord Elgin's demand for the imme- 
 diate surrender of the prisoners, if he wished to avoid the far 
 greater calamity of a foreign occupation of the Tartar quar- 
 ter of Pekin and the appropriation of its vaster collection of 
 treasures. 
 
 On October 6, Mr. Parkes wrote from his place of confine- 
 ment that the French and English detained were to be re- 
 turned on the 8th of the month, and that the imperial com- 
 manders had been ordered at the same time to retire for a 
 considerable distance from Pekin. These promises were car- 
 ried out. Prince Kung was at last resoh^ed to make all the 
 concessions requisite to insure the speedy conclusion of peace. 
 The restoration of these captives removed what was thought 
 to be the one obstacle to Lord Elgin's discussing the terms on 
 which the invading force would retire and to the respective 
 governments resuming diplomatic relations. It was fort- 
 
 China — 17
 
 386 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 unate for China that tlie exact fate of the other prisoners 
 was unknown, and that Lord Elgin felt able, in consequence 
 of the more friendly proceedings of Prince Kung, to overlook 
 the earlier treatment of those now returned to him, for the 
 narrative of Mr. Parkes and his fellow prisoners was one 
 that tended to heighten the feeling of indignation at the 
 original breach of faith. To say that they were barbarously 
 ill-used is to employ a phrase conveying a very inadequate 
 idea of the numerous indignities and the cruel personal treat- 
 ment to which they were subjected. Under these great 
 trials neither of these intrepid Englishmen wavered in their 
 refusal to furnish any information or to make any concession 
 compromising their country. Mr. Loch's part was in one 
 sense the more easy, as his ignorance of the language pre- 
 vented his replying, but in bodily suffering he had to pay 
 a proportionately greater penalty. The incidents of their 
 imprisonment afford the most creditable testimony to the 
 superiority which the pride of race as well as "the equal 
 mind in arduous circumstance" gives weak humanity over 
 physical suffering. They are never likely to pass out of the 
 public memory; and those who remember the daring and 
 the chivalry which had inspired Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch 
 on the day when Prince Tsai's treachery and Sankolinsin's 
 mastery were revealed, will not be disposed to consider it 
 exaggerated praise to say that, for an adventure so honor- 
 ably conceived and so nobly carried out, where the risk was 
 never reckoned and where the penalty was so patiently 
 borne, the pages of history may be searched almost in vain 
 for an event that, in the dramatic elements of courage and 
 suffering, presents such a complete and consistent record of 
 human gallantry and devotion as the capture and subse- 
 quent captivity of these English gentlemen and their Sikh 
 companion. 
 
 The further conditions as preliminary to the ratification 
 of the Treaty of Tientsin were gradually, if reluctantly, 
 complied with. On October 13 the northeast gate was 
 handed over to the allied troops, but not before Sir Hope
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 387 
 
 Grant had threatened to .open lire on the walls. At tho 
 same time Prince Kung returned eight sowars of Fane's 
 Honse and one Frenchman, all the survivors, besides those 
 already surrendered, of the small band which had ridden 
 from Tungchow nearly a month before. The Chinese prince 
 stated in explanation that "a certain number were missing 
 after the fight, or have died of their wounds or of sickness. ' ' 
 But the narrative of the Sikhs was decisive as to the fate 
 of the five Englishmen and their own comrades. They had 
 been brutally bound with ropes which, although drawn as 
 tight as human force could draw them, were tightened still 
 more by cold water being poured upon the bands, and they 
 had been maltreated in every form by a cruel enemy, and 
 provided only with food of the most loathsome kind. Some 
 of the prisoners weft-e placed in cages. Lieutenant Anderson, 
 a gallant young officer for whom future renown had been 
 predicted, became delirious and died on the ninth day of his 
 confinement. Mr. De Nermann died a week later. What 
 fate befell Captain Barbazon and his French companion, the 
 Abbe de Luc, is uncertain, but the evidence on the subject 
 inclines us to accept as accurate the statement that the Chi- 
 nese commander in the fight at Palikao, enraged at his 
 defeat, caused them to be executed on the bridge. The sol- 
 dier Phipps endured for a longer time than Mr. Bowlby the 
 taunts and ill-usage of their jailers, but they at last shared 
 the same fate, dying from the effects of their ill-treatment. 
 The bodies of all the Englishmen, with the exception of Cap- 
 tain Barbazon, were restored, and of most of the Sikhs also. 
 The Chinese officials were more barbarous in their cruelty 
 than even the worst scum among their malefactors; for the 
 prisoners in the jails, far from adding to the tortures of the 
 unfortunate Europeans, did everything in their power to 
 mitigate their sufferings, alleviate their pains, and supply 
 their wants. 
 
 The details of these cruel deeds raised a feeling of great 
 horror in men's minds, and, although the desire to arrange 
 the question of peace without delay was uppermost with
 
 388 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Lord Elgin, still it was felt that some grave step was neces- 
 sary to express the abhorrence with which England regarded 
 this cruel and senseless outrage, and to bring home to the 
 Chinese people and government the fact that Englishmen 
 could not be murdered with impunity. Lord Elgin refused 
 to hold any further intercourse with the Chinese Government 
 until this great crime had been purged by some signal pun- 
 ishment. Sir Hope Grant and he had little difficulty in 
 arriving at the decision that the best mode of expiation was 
 to destroy the Summer Palace. The French commander 
 refused to participate in the act which carried a permanent 
 lesson of political necessity to the heart of the Pekin Govern- 
 ment, and which did more than any other incident of the 
 cam])aign to show Ilienfung that the hour had gone by for 
 trifling. On October 18, the threat was carried into exe- 
 cution. The Summer Palace was destroyed by fire, and 
 the sum of $500,000 was demanded and obtained from the 
 Chinese as some compensation for the families of the mur- 
 dered men. The palace of Yuen Min Yuen had been the 
 scene of some of the worst sufferings of the English pris- 
 oners. From its apartments the high mandarins and the 
 immediate courtiers of the emperor had gloated over and 
 enjoyed the spectacle of their foreign prisoners' agony. The 
 whole of Pekin witnessed in return the destruction wrought 
 to the sovereign's abode by the indignant English, and the 
 clouds of smoke hung for days like a vast black pall over 
 the city. 
 
 That act of severe but just vengeance consummated, the 
 negotiations for the ratification of the treaty were resumed. 
 The Hall of Ceremonies was selected as the place in which 
 the ratifying act should be performed, while, as some pun- 
 ishment for the hostile part he had played, the palace of 
 Prince Tsai was appro})riatcd as the temporary official resi- 
 dence of Lord Elgin and Baron Gros. The formal act of 
 ratification was performed in this building on October 24. 
 Lord Elgin proceeded in a chair of state, accompanied 
 by his suite, and also by Sir Hope Grant with an escort
 
 THE SECOND FOREIGN WAR 389 
 
 of 100 officers and 500 troops, through the streets from the 
 Anting Grate to the Hall of Ceremonies. Prince Kung, 
 attended by a large body of civil and military mandarins, 
 was there in readiness to produce the imperial edict author- 
 izing him to attach the emperor's seal to the treaty, and to 
 accept the responsibility for his country of conforming with 
 its terms and carrying out its stipulations. Some further 
 delay was caused by the necessity of waiting until the edict 
 should be received from the emperor at Jehol authorizing the 
 publication of the treaty, not the least important point in 
 connection with its conclusion if the millions of China were 
 to understand and perform what their rulers had promised 
 for them. That closing act was successfully achieved, and 
 more rapidly than had been expected. The Pekinese beheld 
 English troops and officers in residence in their midst for 
 the first time, and when the army was withdrawn and the 
 plenipotentiary. Lord Elgin, transferred to his brother, Mr. 
 Frederick Bruce, the charge of affairs in China as Eesident 
 Minister, the ice had been broken in the relations between 
 the officials of the two countries, and the greatest, if not the 
 last, barrier of Chinese exclusiveness had been removed. 
 The last of the allied troops turned their backs upon Pekin 
 on November 9, and the greater portion of the expe- 
 dition departed for India and Europe just before the cold 
 weather set in. A few days later the rivers were frozen and 
 navigation had become impossible, which showed how nar- 
 row was tbe margin left for the completion of the operations 
 of war. 
 
 The object which the more far-seeing of the English 
 residents had from the first hour of difficulty stated to be 
 necessary for satisfactory relations — direct intercourse with 
 the Pekin Government — was thus obtained after a keen and 
 bitter struggle of thirty years. Although vanquished, the 
 Chinese may be said to have come out of this war with an 
 increased military reputation. The war closed with a treaty 
 enforcing all tlie concessions made by its predecessor. The 
 right to station an embassador in Pekin signified that the
 
 390 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 greatest barrier of all had been broken down; the old school 
 of politicians were put completely out of court, and a young 
 and intelligent prince, closely connected with the emperor, 
 assumed the personal charge of the foreign relations of the 
 country. As one who had seen with his own eyes the mis- 
 fortunes of his countrymen, Prince Kung was the more dis- 
 posed to adhere to what he had promised to perform. Under 
 his direction the ratified Treaty of Tientsin became a bond of 
 union instead of an element of discord between the cabinets 
 of London and Pekin; and a termination was put, by an ar- 
 rangement carried at the point of the sword, to the constant 
 friction and recrimination which had been the prevailing 
 characteristics of the intercourse for a whole generation. 
 The Chinese had been subjected to a long and bitter lesson. 
 They had at last learned the virtue of submitting to neces- 
 sity; but although they have profited to some extent both in 
 peace and war by their experience, it requires some assur- 
 ance to declare that they have even now accepted the inevi- 
 table. That remains the problem of the future ; but in 1860 
 Prince Kung came to the sensible conclusion that for that 
 period, and until China had recovered from her internal con- 
 fusion, there was nothing to be gained and much to be lost 
 by protracted resistance to the peoples of the West. What- 
 ever could be retained by tact and finesse were to form part 
 of the natural rights of China; but the privileges only to be 
 asserted in face of Armstrong guns and rifles were to be 
 abandoned with as good a grace as the injured feeling of a 
 nation can ever display. 
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 THE TAEPING REBELLION 
 
 We left the Taepings supreme at Nankin, but maintain- 
 ing themselves there with some difficulty against two im- 
 perial armies raised by the loyal efforts of the inhabitants of
 
 THE TAEPINO REBELLION 391 
 
 the central provinces. This was at the beginning of 1857; 
 and there is no doubt that if the government had avoided a 
 conflict with the Europeans, and concentrated its efforts and 
 power on the contest with the Taeping rebels, they would 
 have speedily annihilated the tottering fabricof Tien Wang's 
 authority. But the respite of four years secured by the 
 attention of the central government being monopolized by 
 the foreign question enabled the Taepings to consolidate their 
 position, augment their fighting forces, and present a more 
 formidable front to the imperial authorities. When Prince 
 Kung learned from Lord Elgin the full extent of the success 
 of the Taepings on the Yangtse, of which the officials at 
 Pekin seemed to possess a very imperfect and inaccurate 
 knowledge, the Manchu authorities realized that it was a 
 vital question for them to reassert their authority without 
 further delay, but on beginning to put their new resolve into 
 practice they soon experienced that the position of the Tae- 
 pings in 1861 differed materially from what it was in 1857, 
 The course of events during that period must be briefly 
 summarized. In 1858 the imperialists under Tseng Kwofan 
 and Chang Kwoliang renewed the siege of Nankin, but as 
 the city was well supplied with provisions, and as the impe- 
 rialists were well known to have no intention of delivering 
 an assault, the Taepings did not feel any apprehension. 
 After the investment had continued for nearly a year, Chung 
 Wang, who had now risen to the supreme place among the 
 rebels, insisted on quitting the city before it was completely 
 surrounded, with the object of beating up levies and gener- 
 ally relieving the pressure caused by the besiegers. In this 
 endeavor he more than once experienced the unkindness of 
 fortune, for when he had collected 5,000 good troops he was 
 defeated in a vigorous attempt to cut his way through a far 
 larger Imperial force. Such, however, was his reputation 
 that the imperial commanders before Nankin sent many of 
 their men to assist the officers operating against him, and 
 Chung Wang, seizing the opportunity, made his way by 
 forced marches back to Nankin, overcoiaing such resistance
 
 Sd2 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 as the enfeebled besiegers were able to oEer. The whole 
 of the year 1859 was passed in practical inaction, but at its 
 close the Taepings only retained possession of four towns, 
 besides Nankin, on the Yangtse. It again became necessary 
 for Chung Wang to sally forth and assume the offensive in 
 the rear and on the line of supplies of the beleaguering im- 
 perialists. His main difficulty was in obtaining the consent 
 of Tien Wang, who was at this time given over to religious 
 pursuits or private excesses, and Chung Wang states that 
 he only consented when he found that he could not stop him. 
 In January, 1860, Chung Wang began what proved to be a 
 very remarkable campaign. He put his men in good humor 
 by distributing a large sum of money among them, and he 
 succeeded in eluding the imperial commanders and in mis- 
 leading them as to his intentions. While they thought he 
 had gone off to relieve Ganking, he had really hastened to 
 attack the important city of Hangchow, where much spoil 
 and material for carrying on the war might be secured by 
 the victor. He captured the city with little or no loss, on 
 March 19, 1860, but the Tartar city held out until relieved 
 by Chang Kwoliang, who hastened from Nankin for the 
 purpose. Once again the imperial commanders, in their 
 anxiety to crush Chung Wang, had reduced their force in 
 front of Nankin to an excessively low condition, and the 
 Taeping leader, placed in a desperate position, seized the 
 only chance of safety by hastening from Hangchow to Nan- 
 kin at full speed, and attacking the imperial lines. This 
 battle was fought early in the morning of a cold snowy day 
 — May 3, 1860 — and resulted in the loss of 5,000 imperialists, 
 and the compulsory raising of the siege. The Taeping cause 
 might have been resuscitated by this signal victory if Tien 
 Wang had only shown himself able to act up to the great 
 part he assumed, but not merely was he incapable of playing 
 the part of either a warrior or a statesman, but his petty 
 jealousy prevented his making use of the undoubted ability 
 of his lieutenant Chung Wang, who after the greatest of his 
 successes was forbidden to re-enter Nankin.
 
 THE TAEPINO REBELLION 393 
 
 The energy and spirit of Chung Wang impelled hira to 
 fresh enterprises, and seeing the hopelessness of Tien Wang, 
 he determined to secure a base of operations for himself, 
 which should enable him to hold his own in the warring 
 strife of the realm, and perhaps to achieve the triumph of 
 the cause with which he was associated. It says much for 
 his military energy and skill that he was able to impart new 
 vigor to the Taeping system, and to sustain on a new field 
 his position single-handed against the main forces of the 
 empire. He determined to obtain possession of the impor- 
 tant city of Soochow, on the Grand Canal, and not very far 
 distant from Shanghai. On his way to effect this object he 
 gained a great victory over Chang Kwoliang, who was him- 
 self killed in the battle. As the ex-Traid chief possessed 
 great energy, his loss was a considerable one for the govern- 
 ment, but his troops continued to oppose the advance of the 
 Taepings, and fought and lost three battles before Chung 
 Wang reached Soochow. That place was too large to be 
 successfully defended by a small force, and the imperialists 
 hastily abandoned it. At this critical moment — May, 18G0 
 — Ho Kweitsin, the viceroy of the Two Kiang, implored the 
 aid of the English and French, who were at this moment 
 completing their arrangements for the march on Pekin, 
 against these rebels, and the French were so far favorable 
 to the suggestion that they offered to render the assistance 
 provided the English would combine with them. Mr. Bruce, 
 however, declined the adventure, which is not surprising, 
 considering that we were then engaged in serious hostili- 
 ties with the Chinese, but the incident remains unique of 
 a country asking another for assistance during the progress 
 of a bitter and doubtful war. The utmost that Mr. Bruce 
 would do was to issue a notification that Shanghai would 
 not be allowed to again fall into the hands of an insurgent 
 force. The viceroy who solicited the aid was at least con- 
 sistent. He memorialized the Throne, praying that the de- 
 mands of the Europeans should be promptly granted, and 
 that they should then be employed against the Taepings.
 
 ci94 HISTORY Oi CHINA 
 
 His memorial was ill-timed. He was summoned to Pekin 
 and executed for his very prudent advice. Witli tlie posses- 
 sion of Soochow, Chung Wang obtained fresh supplies of 
 money, material, and men, and once more it was impossible 
 to say to what height of success the Taepings might not 
 attain. But Chung Wang was not satisfied with Soochow 
 alone; he wished to gain possession of Shanghai. 
 
 Unfortunately for the realization of his project, the Eu- 
 ropeans had determined to defend Shanghai at all hazards, 
 but Chung Wang believed either that they would not, or 
 that their army being absent in the north they had not the 
 power to carry out this resolve. The necessity of capturing 
 Shanghai was rendered the greater in the eyes of Chung 
 Wang by its being the base of hostile measures against him- 
 self, and by a measure which threatened him with a new 
 peril. The wealthy Chinese merchants of Shanghai had 
 formed a kind of patriotic association, and provided the 
 funds for raising a European contingent. Two Americans, 
 Ward and Burgevine, were taken into their pay, and in 
 July, 1860, they, having raised a force of 100 Europeans 
 and 200 Manila men, began operations with an attack on 
 Sunkiang, a large walled town about twenty miles from 
 Shanghai. This first attack was repulsed with some loss, 
 but Ward, afraid of losing the large reward he was promised 
 for its capture, renewed the attack, and with better success, 
 for he gained possession of a gate, and held it until the 
 whole imperial army had come up and stormed the town. 
 After this success Ward was requested to attack Tsingpu, 
 which was a far stronger place than Sunkiang, and where 
 the Taepings had the benefit of the advice and leading of 
 several Englishmen who had joined them. Ward attacked 
 Tsingpu on August 2, 1860, but he was repulsed with heavy 
 loss. He returned to Shanghai for the purpose of raising 
 another force and two larger guns, and then renewed the 
 attack. It is impossible to say whether the place would 
 have held out or not, but after seven days' bombardment 
 Chung Wang suddenly appeared to the rescue, and, surpris-
 
 THE TAEPING REBELLION 395 
 
 ing "Ward's force, drove it away in utter confusion, and with 
 the loss of all its guns and stores. Encouraged by this suc- 
 cess, Chung Wang then thought the time opportune for 
 attacking Shanghai, and he accordingly marched against it, 
 burning and plundering the villages along the road. Tlie 
 imperialists had established a camp or stockade outside the 
 western gate, and Chung Wang carried this without any 
 difficulty, but when he reached the walls of the town lie 
 found a very different opponent in his path. The walls were 
 lined with English and French troops, and when the Tae- 
 pings attempted to enter the city they were received with 
 a warm fire, which quickly sent them to the right-about. 
 Chung Wang renewed the attack at different points during 
 the next four or five days, but he was then obliged to retreat. 
 Before doing so, however, he sent a boasting message that 
 he had come at the invitation of the French, who were trai- 
 tors, and that he would have taken the city but for the for- 
 eigners, as "there was no city which his men could not 
 storm. ' ' At this moment the attention of Chung Wang was 
 called off to Nankin, which the imperialists were investing 
 for a sixth time, under Tseng Kwofan, who had been ele- 
 vated to the viceroyalty of the Two Kiang. Tien Wang, in 
 despair, sent off an urgent summons to Chung Wang to 
 come to his assistance, and although he went with reluctance 
 he felt that he had no course but to obey. 
 
 Having done what he could to place Nankin in an efficient 
 state of defense, Chung Wang hastened back to Soochow to 
 resume active operations. It is unnecessary to describe these 
 in detail ; but although Chung Wang was twice defeated by 
 a Manchu general named Paochiaou, he succeeded, by ra- 
 pidity of movement, in holding his own against his more 
 numerous adversaries. In the meantime an important 
 'change had taken place in the situation. The peace between 
 China and the foreign powers compelled a revision of the 
 position at Shanghai. Admiral Hope sailed up to Nankin, 
 interviewed the Wangs and exacted from them a pledge 
 that Shanghai should not be attacked for twelve months,
 
 696 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 and that the Taeping forces should not advance within a 
 radius of thirty miles of that place. In consequence of this 
 arrangement Ward and Burgevine were compelled to desist 
 from recruiting Europeans; but after a brief interval they 
 were taken into the Chinese service for the purpose of drill- 
 ing Chinese soldiers, a measure from which the most impor- 
 tant consequences were to flow, for it proved to be the origin 
 of the Ever- Victorious Army. These preparations were not 
 far advanced wlien Chung Wang, elated by bis capture of 
 NingjDo and Hangcbow, resolved to disregard Tien Wang's 
 promise, and make a second attack on Shanghai, the posses- 
 sion of whicb he saw to be indispensable if his cause was to 
 attain any brilliant triumph. He issued a proclamation that 
 "tbe hour of the Manchus had come! Shangliai is a little 
 place, and we bave notbing to fear from it. We must take 
 Shanghai to complete our dominions. ' ' The death of Ilien- 
 fung seems to bave encouraged Chung Wang to take what 
 he hoped would prove a decisive step. 
 
 On January 14, 1862, the Taepings reached the imme- 
 diate vicinity of tbe town and foreign settlement. The sur- 
 rounding country was concealed by the smoke of the burning 
 villages, whicb tbey bad ruthlessly destroyed. The foreign 
 settlement was crowded with thousands of fugitives, implor- 
 ing the aid of the Europeans to save their houses and prop- 
 erty. Their sufferings, which would at tbe best bave been 
 great, were aggravated by the exceptional severity of the 
 winter. The English garrison of two native regiments and 
 some artillery, even when supported by the volunteers, was 
 far too weak to attemjDt more than the defense of the place; 
 but this it was fortunately able to perform. The rebels, dur- 
 ing tbe first week after their reappearance, plundered and 
 burned in all directions, threatening even to make an attack 
 on Woosung, the port at the mouth of the river, where they 
 were repulsed by the French. Sir John Michel arrived at 
 Shanghai with a small re-enforcement of English troops, 
 and Ward, having succeeded in disciplining two Chinese 
 regiments of about one thousand strong in all, sallied forth
 
 THE TAEPTNG REBELLION 897 
 
 from Sunkiang for the purpose of operating on the rear of 
 the Taeping forces. Ward's capture of Quanfuling, with 
 several hundred rebel boats which were frozen up in the 
 river, should have warned the Taepings that it was nearly 
 time for them to retire. However, they did not act as pru- 
 dence would have dictated, and during the whole of Feb- 
 ruary their raids continued round Shanghai. The suburbs 
 suffered from their attacks, the foreign factories and boats 
 were not secure, and several outrages on the persons of for- 
 eigners remained unatoned for. It was impossible to tolerate 
 any longer their enormities. The English and French com- 
 manders came to the determination to attack the rebels, to 
 enforce the original agreement with Tien Wang, and to clear 
 the country round Shanghai of the presence of the Taepings 
 for the space of thirty miles. 
 
 On February 21, therefore, a joint force composed of 836 
 English sailors and marines, 160 French seamen, and 600 
 men from Ward's contingent, accompanied by their respect- 
 ive commanders, with Admiral Hope in chief charge, ad- 
 vanced upon the village of Kachiaou, where the Taepings 
 had strengthened their position and placed guns on the 
 walls. After a sharp engagement the place was stormed, 
 Ward's men leading the attack with Burgevine at their 
 head. The drilled Chinese behaved with great steadiness, 
 but the Taepings were not to be dismayed by a single defeat. 
 They even resumed their attacks on the Europeans. On one 
 occasion Admiral Hope himself was compelled to retire be- 
 fore their superior numbers, and to summon fresh troops to 
 his assistance. The re-enforcements consisted of 450 Eu- 
 ropeans and 700 of Ward's force, besides seven howitzers. 
 With these it was determined to attack Tseedong, a place of 
 great strength, surrounded by stone walls and ditches seven 
 feet deep. The Taepings stood to their guns with great 
 spirit, receiving the advancing troops with a very heavy fire. 
 When, however, Ward's contingent, making a detour, ap- 
 peared in the rear of the place, they hastily evacuated their 
 positions; but the English sailors had carried the walls, and,
 
 398 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 cauglit between two fires, they offered a stubborn but futile 
 resistance. More tlian 700 were killed and 300 were taken 
 prisoners. The favorable opinion formed of "the Ever- Vic- 
 torious Army' ' by the action at Kachiaou was confirmed by 
 the more serious affair at Tseedong; and Mr. Bruce at Pekin 
 brought it under the favorable notice of Prince Kung and 
 the Chinese Government. Having taken these hostile steps 
 against the rebels, it necessarily followed that no advantage 
 would accrue from any further hesitation with regard to 
 allowing Europeans to enter the imperial service for the pur- 
 pose of opposing them. Ward was officially recognized, and 
 allowed to purchase weapons and to engage officers. An 
 Englishman contracted to convey 9,000 of the troops who 
 had stormed Ganking from the Yangtse to Shanghai. These 
 men were Honan braves, who had seen considerable service 
 in the interior of China, and it was proposed that they should 
 garrison the towns of Kiangsu accordingly as they were 
 taken from the rebels. The arrival of General Staveley 
 from Tientsin at the end of March, with portions of two 
 English regiments (the 31st and 67th), put a new face on 
 affairs, and showed that the time was at hand when it would 
 be possible to carry out the threat of clearing the country 
 round Shanghai for the space of thirty miles. 
 
 The first place to be attacked toward the realization of 
 this plan was the village of Wongkadza, about twelve miles 
 west of Shanghai. Here the Taepings offered only a brief 
 resistance, retiring to some stronger stockades four miles 
 further west. General Staveley, considering that his men 
 had done enough work for that day, halted them, intending 
 to renew the attack the next morning. Unfortunately Ward 
 was carried away by his impetuosity, and attacked this inner 
 position with some 500 of his own men. Admiral Hope ac- 
 companied him. The Taepings met them with a tremendous 
 fire, and after several attempts to scale the works they were 
 repulsed with heavy loss. Admiral Hope was wounded in 
 the leg, seven officers were wounded, and seventy men killed 
 and wounded. The attack was repeated in force on the fol-
 
 THE TAEPING REBELLION 899 
 
 lowing day, and after some fighting tlie Taepings evacuated 
 their stockades. The next place attacked was the village of 
 Tsipoo; and, notwithstanding their strong earthworks and 
 three wide ditches, the rebels were driven out in a few hours. 
 It was then determined to attack Kahding, Tsingpu, Nan jao, 
 and Cholin, at which places the Taepings were known to 
 have mustered in considerable strength. 
 
 The first place was taken with little resistance, and its 
 capture was followed by preparations for the attack on 
 Tsingpu, which were hastened rather than delayed by a 
 desperate attempt to set fire to Shanghai. The plot was 
 fortunately discovered in time, and the culprits captured and 
 summarily executed to the number of two hundred. Early 
 in May a strong force was assembled at Sunkiang, and pro- 
 ceeded by boat, on account of the difficulties of locomotion, 
 to Tsingpu. The fire of the guns, in which the expedition 
 was exceptionally strong, proved most destructive, and two 
 breaches being pronounced practicable the place was carried 
 by assault. The rebels fought well and up to the last, when 
 they found flight impossible. The Chinese troops slew every 
 man found in the place with arms in his hands. A few days 
 later Nan jao was captured, but in the attack the French 
 commander. Admiral Protet, a gallant officer who had been 
 to the front during the whole of these operations, was shot 
 dead. The rebels, disheartened by these successive defeats, 
 rallied at Cholin, where they prepared to make a final stand. 
 The allied force attacked Cholin on May 20, and an English 
 detachment carried it almost at the point of the bayonet. 
 "With this achievement the operations of the English troops 
 came for the moment to an end, for a disaster to the imperial 
 arms in their rear necessitated their turning their attention 
 to a different quarter. 
 
 The troops summoned from Ganking had at last arrived 
 to the number of five or six thousand men; and the Futai 
 Sieh, who was on the point of being superseded to make 
 room for Li Hung Chang, thought to employ them before 
 Ms departure on some enterprise which should redound to his
 
 400 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 credit and restore his sinking fortunes. The operation was 
 as hazardous as it was ambitious. The resolution he came 
 to was to attack the city and forts of Taitsan, a place north- 
 west of Shanghai, and not very far distant from Chung 
 Wang's headquarters at Soochow. The imperialist force 
 reached Taitsan on May 12, but less than two days later 
 Chung Wang arrived in person at the head of 10,000 chosen 
 troops to relieve the garrison. A battle ensued on the day 
 following, when, notwithstanding their great superiority in 
 numbers, the Taepings failed to obtain any success. In this 
 extremity Chung Wang resorted to a stratagem. Two thou- 
 sand of his men shaved their heads and pretended to desert 
 to the imperialists. When the battle was renewed at sunrise 
 on the following morning this band threw aside their as- 
 sumed character and turned upon the imperialists. A dread- 
 ful slaughter ensued. Of the 7,000 Honan braves and the 
 Tartars from Shanghai, 5,000 fell on the iield. The con- 
 sequences of this disaster were to undo most of the good 
 accomplished by General Staveley and his force. The im- 
 perialists were for the moment dismayed, and the Taepings 
 correspondingly encouraged. General Staveley 's communi- 
 cations were threatened, and he had to abandon his intended 
 plan and retrace his steps to Shanghai. 
 
 Chung Wang then laid regular siege to Sunkiang, where 
 Ward was in person, and he very nearly succeeded in carry- 
 ing the place by escalade. The attempt was fortunately dis- 
 covered by an English sailor just in time, and repulsed with 
 a loss to the rebels of 100 men. The Taepings continued to 
 show great daring and activity before both Sunkiang and 
 Tsingpu ; and although the latter place was bravely defended, 
 it became clear that the wisest course would be to evacuate 
 it. A body of troops was therefore sent from Shanghai to 
 form a junction with Ward at Sunkiang, and to effect the 
 safe retreat of the Tsingpu garrison. The earlier proceedings 
 were satisfactorily arranged, but the last act of all was 
 grossly mismanaged and resulted in a catastrophe. Ward 
 caused the place to be set on fire, when the Taepings, realiz-
 
 THE TAEPINO REBELLION 401 
 
 ing what was being done, hastened into the town, and as- 
 sailed the retiring garrison. A scene of great confusion 
 followed; many lives were lost, and the commandant who 
 had held it so courageously was taken prisoner. Chung 
 Wang coukl therefore appeal to some facts to support his 
 contention that he had got the better of the Europeans and 
 the imperialists in the province of Kiangsu. 
 
 From the scene of his successes Chung Wang was once 
 more called away by the timidity or peril of Tien Wang, 
 who was barely able to maintain his position at Nankin, but 
 when he hastened off to assist the chief of the Taepings he 
 found that he was out of favor, and that the jealousy or fear of 
 his colleagues had brought about his temporary disgrace and 
 loss of title. Shortly after Chung Wang's departure, Ward 
 was killed in action and Burgevine succeeded to the com- 
 mand, but it soon became apparent that his relations with 
 the Chinese authorities would not be smooth. General Ching 
 was jealous of the Ever-Victorious Army and wished to 
 have all the credit for himself. Li Hung Chang, who had 
 been appointed Futai or Governor of Kiangsu, entertained 
 doubts of the loyalty of this adventurer. Burgevine was a 
 man of high temper and strong passions, who met the wiles 
 of the Futai with peremptory demands to recognize the 
 claims of himself and his band. Nor was this all. Burge- 
 vine had designs of his own. Although the project had not 
 taken definite form in his mind, the inclination was strong 
 within him to play the part of military dictator with the 
 Chinese; or failing that, to found an independent authority 
 on some convenient spot of Celestial territory. The Futai 
 anticipated, perhaps, more than divined his wishes. In 
 Burgevine he saw, very shortly after their coming into con- 
 tact, not merely a man whom he disliked and distrusted, but 
 one who, if allowed to pursue his plans unchecked, would in 
 the end form a greater danger to the imperial authority than 
 even the Taepings. It is not possible to deny Li's shrewd- 
 ness in reading the character of the man with whom he had 
 to deal.
 
 402 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 The Futai Li, in order to test his obedience, proposed that 
 Burgevine and his men should be sent round by sea to Nan- 
 kin to take part in the siege of that city. The ships were 
 actually prepared for their conveyance, and the Taotai Wou, 
 who had first fitted out a fleet against the rebels, was in 
 readiness to accompany Burgevine, when Li and his col- 
 league, as suspicious of Burgevine' s compliance as they 
 would have been indignant at his refusal, changed their 
 plans and countermanded the expedition. Instead of carry- 
 ing out this project, therefore, they laid a number of formal 
 complaints before General Staveley as to Burgevine's con- 
 duct, and requested the English government to remove him 
 from his command, and to appoint an English oflficer in his 
 place. The charges against Burgevine did not at this time 
 amount to more than a certain laxness in regard to the ex- 
 penditure of the force, a disregard for the wishes and preju- 
 dices of the Chinese Government, and the want of tact, or 
 of the desire to conciliate, in his personal relations with the 
 Futai. If Burgevine had resigned, all would have been 
 well, but he regarded the position from the standpoint of 
 the adventurer who believes that his own interests form a 
 supreme law and are the highest good. As commander of 
 the Ever-Victorious Army he was a personage to be consid- 
 ered even by foreign governments. He would not volunta- 
 rily surrender the position which alone preserved him from 
 obscurity. Having come to this decision, it was clear that 
 even the partial execution of his plans must draw him into 
 many errors of judgment which could not but imbitter the 
 conflict. The reply of the English commander was to the 
 effect that personally he could not interfere, but that he 
 would refer the matter to London as well as to Mr. Bruce at 
 Pekin. In consequence of the delay thus caused the project 
 of removing the force to Nankin was revived, and, the 
 steamers having been chartered, Burgevine was requested to 
 bring down his force from Sunkiang and to embark it at 
 Shanghai. This he expressed his willingness to do on pay- 
 ment of his men, who were two months in arrear, and on the 

 
 THE TAEPESG REBELLION 40S 
 
 settlement of all outstanding claims. Burgevine was sup- 
 ported by kis troops. Whatever liis dislike to tlie proposed 
 move, tlieirs was immeasurably greater. Tliey refused to 
 move without the payment of all arre-ars; and on January 
 2 they even went so far as to openly mutiny. Two days 
 later Burgevine went to Shanghai and had an interview with 
 Takee. The meeting was stormy. Burgevine used personal 
 violence toward the Shanghai merchant, whose attitude was 
 at first overbearing, and he returned to his exasperated 
 troops with the money, which he carried o5 by force. The 
 Futai Li, on hearing of the assault on Takee, hastened to 
 General Staveley to complain of Burgevine' s gross insubor- 
 dination in striking a mandarin, which by the law of China 
 was punishable with death. Burgevine was dismissed the 
 Chinese service, and the notice of this removal was for- 
 warded by the English general, with a recommendation to 
 him to give up his command without disturbance. This 
 Burgevine did, for the advice of the English general was 
 equivalent to a command, and on January 6, 1S63, Burge- 
 vine was back at Shanghai. Captain Holland was then 
 placed in temporary command, while the answer of the 
 home government was awaited to Greneral Staveley 's prop- 
 osition to intrust the force to the care of a young captain of 
 engineers, named Charles G-ordon. Chung Wang returned 
 at this moment to Soochow, and in Kiangsu the cause of the 
 Taepings again revived through his energy. In February 
 a detachment of Holland's force attacked Fushan, but met 
 with a check, when the news of a serious defeat at Taitsan, 
 where the former Futai Si eh had been defeated, compelled 
 its speedy retreat to Sunkiang. Li had some reason to be- 
 lieve that Taitsan would surrender on the approach of the 
 imperialists, and he accordingly sent a large army, including 
 2.500 of the contingent, to attack it The affair was badly 
 managed. The assaulting party was stopped by a wide 
 ditch ; neither boats nor ladders arrived. The Taepings fired 
 furiously on the exposed party, several officers were killed, 
 and the men broke into confusion. The heavy guns stuck
 
 404 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 in tlie soft ground and had to be abandoned; and despite the 
 good conduct of the contingent the Taepings achieved a de- 
 cisive success (February 13). Chung Wang was able to feel 
 that his old luck had not deserted him, and the Taepings of 
 Kiangsu recovered all their former confidence in themselves 
 and their leader. This disaster inflicted a rude blow on the 
 confidence of Li and his assistants; and it was resolved that 
 nothing should be attempted until the English officer, at last 
 appointed, had assumed the active command. 
 
 Such was the position of affairs when on March 24, 1863, 
 Major Gordon took over the command of the Ever- Victorious 
 Army. At that moment it was not merely discouraged by 
 its recent reverses, but it was discontented with its position, 
 and when Major Grordon assumed the command at Sunkiang 
 there was some fear of an immediate mutiny. The new 
 commander succeeded in allaying their discontent, and be- 
 lieving that active employment was the best cure for insub- 
 ordination resolved to relieve Chanzu without delay. The 
 Taepings were pressing the siege hard and would probably 
 have captured the place before many days when Major 
 Gordon attacked them in their stockades and drove them 
 out with no inconsiderable loss. Having thus gained the 
 confidence of his men and the approbation of the Chinese 
 authorities Major Gordon returned to Sunkiang, where he 
 employed himself in energetically restoring the discipline of 
 his force, and in preparing for his next move, which at the 
 request of Li Hung Chang was to be the capture of Quinsan. 
 On April 24 the force left Sunkiang to attack Quinsan, but 
 it had not proceeded far when its course had to be altered to 
 Taitsan, where, through an act of treachery, a force of 1,500 
 imperialists had been annihilated. It became necessary to 
 retrieve this disaster without delay, more especially as all 
 hope of taking Quinsan had for the moment to be abandoned. 
 Major Gordon at once altered the direction of his march, 
 and joining en route General Ching, who had, on the news, 
 broken up his camp before Quinsan, hastened as rapidly as 
 possible to Taitsan, where he arrived on April 29. Bad
 
 THE TAEPING REBELLION 405 
 
 weather obliged the attack to be deferred until May 1, when 
 two stockades on the west side were carried, and their de- 
 fenders compelled to flee, not into the town as they would 
 have wished, but away from it toward Chanzu. On the fol- 
 lowing day, the attack was resumed on the north side, while 
 the armed boats proceeded to assault the place from the 
 creek. The firing continued from nine in the morning until 
 five in the evening, when a breach seemed to be practicable, 
 and two regiments were ordered to the assault. The rebels 
 showed great courage and fortitude, swarming in the breach 
 and pouring a heavy and well-directed fire upon the troops. 
 The attack was momentarily checked; but while the storm- 
 ers remained under such cover as they could find, the shells 
 of two howitzers were playing over their heads and causing 
 frightful havoc among the Taepings in the breach. Btit for 
 these guns. Major Gordon did not think that the place would 
 have been carried at all; but after some minutes of this firing 
 at such close quarters, the rebels began to show signs of 
 wavering. A party of troops gained the wall, a fresh regi- 
 ment advanced toward the breach, and the disappearance 
 of the snake flag showed that the Taeping leaders had given 
 up the fight. Taitsan was thus captured, and the three 
 previous disasters before it retrieved. 
 
 On May 4 the victorious force appeared before Quinsan, a 
 place of considerable strength and possessing a formidable ar- 
 tillery directed by a European. The town was evidently too 
 strong to be carried by an immediate attack, and Major 
 Gordon's movements were further hampered by the conduct 
 of his own men, who, upon their arrival at Quinsan, hurried 
 off in detachments to Sunkiang for the purpose of disposing 
 of their spoil. Ammunition had also fallen short, and the 
 commander was consequently obliged to return to refit and 
 to rally his men. At Sunkiang worse confusion followed, 
 for the men, or rather the officers, broke out into mutiny on 
 the occasion of Major Gordon appointing an English officer 
 with the rank of lieutenant-colonel to the control of the com- 
 missariat, which had been completely neglected. The men
 
 406 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 wlio had served with Ward and Burgevine objected to this, 
 and openly refused to obey orders. Fortunately the stores 
 and ammunition were collected, and Major Gordon an- 
 nounced that he would march on the following morning, 
 with or without the mutineers. Those who did not answer 
 to their names at the end of the first half -march would be 
 dismissed, and he spoke with the authority of one in com- 
 plete accord with the Chinese authorities themselves. The 
 soldiers obeyed him as a Chinese official, because he had 
 been made a tsungping or brigadier-general, and the oificers 
 feared to disobey him as they would have liked on account 
 of his commanding the source whence they were paid. The 
 mutineers fell in, and a force of nearly 3,000 men, well- 
 equipped and anxious for the fray, returned to Quinsan, 
 where General Ching had, in the meanwhile, kept the rebels 
 closely watched from a strong position defended by several 
 stockades and supported by the "Hyson" steamer. Imme- 
 diately after his arrival. Major Gordon moved out his force 
 to attack the stockades which the rebels had constructed on 
 their right wing. These were strongly built; but as soon 
 as the defenders perceived that the assailants had gained 
 their flank they precipitately withdrew into Quinsan itself. 
 General Ching wished the attack to be made on the eastern 
 gate, opposite to which he had raised his own intrenchments, 
 and by which he had announced his intention of forcing his 
 way; but a brief inspection showed Major Gordon that that 
 was the strongest point of the town, and that a direct attack 
 upon it could only succeed, if at all, by a very considerable 
 sacrifice of men. Like a prudent commander Major Gordon 
 determined to reconnoiter; and, after much grumbling on 
 the part of General Ching, he decided that the most hopeful 
 plan was to carry some stockades situated seven miles west 
 of the town, and thence assail Quinsan on the Soochow side, 
 which was weaker than the others. These stockades were 
 at a village called Chumze. On May 30 the force detailed 
 for this work proceeded to carry it out. The "Hyson" and 
 fifty imperial gunboats conveyed the land foroe, which con-
 
 THE TAEPING REBELLION 407 
 
 sisted of one regiment, some guns, and a large body of im- 
 perialists. The rebels at Chumze offered hardly the least 
 resistance; whether it was that they were dismayed at the 
 sudden appearance of the enemy, or, as was stated at the 
 time, because they considered themselves ill-treated by their 
 comrades in Quinsan. The "Hyson" vigorously pursued 
 those who fled toward Soochow, and completed the eifect of 
 this success by the capture of a very strong and well-built 
 fort covering a bridge at Ta Edin. An imperialist garrison 
 was installed there, and the "Hyson" continued the pursuit 
 to within a mile of Soochow itself. 
 
 The defenders of Quinsan itself were terribly alarmed at 
 the cutting off of their communications. They saw them- 
 selves on the point of being surrounded, and they yielded to 
 the uncontrollable impulse of panic. During the night, after 
 having suffered severely from the "Hyson" fire, the garrison 
 evacuated the place, which might easily have held out; and 
 General Ching had the personal satisfaction, on learning 
 from some deserters of the flight of the garrison, of leading 
 his men over the eastern walls which he had wished to as- 
 sault. The importance of Quinsan was realized on its cap- 
 ture. Major Gordon pronounced it to be the key of Soochow, 
 and at once resolved to establish his headquarters there, 
 partly because of its natural advantages, but also and not 
 less on account of its enabling him to gradually destroy the 
 evil associations which the men had contracted at Sunkiang. 
 
 The change was not acceptable, however, to the force 
 itself; and the artillery in particular refused to obey orders, 
 and threatened to shoot their officers. Discipline was, how- 
 ever, promptly reasserted by the energy of the commander, 
 who ordered the principal ringleader to be shot, and "the 
 Ever- Victorious Army" became gradually reconciled to its 
 new position at Quinsan. After the capture of Quinsan 
 there was a cessation of active operations for nearly two 
 months. It was the height of summer and the new troops 
 had to be drilled. The difficulty with Ching, who took 
 all the credit for the capture of Quinsan to himself, was
 
 408 BISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 arranged tliroiigTi the mediation of Dr. Macartney, wlio liad 
 just left the English army to become Li's right-hand man. 
 Two other circumstances occurred to embarrass the young 
 commander. There were rumors of some meditated move- 
 ment on the part of Burgevine, who had returned from Pekin 
 with letters exculpating him, and who endeavored to recover 
 the command in spite of Li Hung Chang, and there was a 
 further manifestation of insubordination in the force, which, 
 as Gordon said, bore more resemblance to a rabble than the 
 magnificent army it was popularly supposed to be. The 
 artillery had been cowed by Major Gordon's vigor, but its 
 efficiency remained more doubtful than could be satisfactory 
 to the general responsible for its condition, and also relying 
 upon it as the most potent arm of his force. He resolved to 
 remove the old commander, and to appoint an English offi- 
 cer, Major Tapp, in his place. On carrying his determina- 
 tion into effect the officers sent in "a round robin," refusing 
 to accept a new officer. This was on July 25, and the expe- 
 dition which had been decided upon against Wokong had 
 consequently to set out the following morning without a 
 single artillery officer. In face of the inflexible resolve of 
 the leader, however, the officers repented, and appeared in a 
 body at the camp begging to be taken back, and expressing 
 their willingness to accept "Major Tapp or any one else," as 
 their colonel. 
 
 With these troops, part of whom had only just returned 
 to a proper sense of discipline, Gordon proceeded to attack 
 Kahpoo, on the Grand Canal south of Soochow, where 
 the rebels held two strongly-built stone forts. The force 
 had been strengthened by the addition of another steamer, 
 the "Firefly," a sister vessel to the "Hyson." Major Gor- 
 don an-ived before Kahpoo on July 27; and the garrison, 
 evidently taken by surprise, made scarcely the least resist- 
 ance. The capture of Kahpoo placed Gordon's force between 
 Soochow and Wokong, the next object of attack. At Wokong 
 the rebels were equally unprepared. The garrison at Kah- 
 poo, thinking only of their own safety, had lied to Soochow,
 
 THE TAEPING REBELLION 409 
 
 leaving their comrades at Wokong unwarned and to tlieir 
 fate. So heedless were the Taepings at this place of all 
 danger from the north, that they had even neglected to 
 occupy a strong stone fort situated about 1,000 yards north 
 of the walls. The Taepings attempted too late to repair their 
 error, and the loss of this fort caused them that of all their 
 othar stockades. Wokong itself was too weak to offer any 
 eyffectual resistance; and the garrison on the eve of the as- 
 sault ordered for July 29 sent out a request for quarter, which 
 was granted, and the place surrendered without further 
 fighting. Meanwhile an event of far greater importance 
 had happened than even the capture of these towns, although 
 they formed the necessary preliminary to the investment of 
 Soochow. Burgevine had come to the decision to join the 
 Taepings. 
 
 Disappointed in his hope of receiving the command, 
 Burgevine remained on at Shanghai, employing his time 
 in watching the varying phases of a campaign in which he 
 longed to take part, and of which he believed that it was 
 only his due to have the direction, but still hesitating as to 
 what decision it behooved him to take. His contempt for all 
 Chinese officials became hatred of the bitterest kind of the 
 Futai, by whom he had been not merely thwarted but over- 
 reached, and predisposed him to regard with no unfavorable 
 eye the idea of joining his fortunes to those of the rebel Tae- 
 pings. To him in this frame of mind came some of the dis- 
 missed officers and men of the Ward force, appealing to his 
 vanity by declaring that his soldiers remembered him with 
 affection, and that he had only to hoist his flag for most of 
 his old followers to rally round him. There was little to 
 marvel at if he also was not free from some feeling of jeal- 
 ousy at the success and growing fame of Major Gordon, for 
 whom he simulated a warm friendship. The combination of 
 motives proved altogether irresistible as soon as he found 
 that several hundred European adventurers were ready to 
 accompany him into the ranks of the Taepings, and to en- 
 deavor to do for them what they had failed to perform for 
 
 China — 18
 
 410 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 tte imperialists. On July 15, Dr. Macartney wrote to Major 
 Gordon stating that lie had positive information that Burge- 
 vine was enlisting men for some enterprise, that he had 
 already collected about 300 Europeans, and that he had even 
 gone so far as to choose a S23ecial flag, a white diamond on a 
 red ground, and containing a black star in the center of the 
 diamond. On the 21st of the same month Burgevine wrote 
 to Major Gordon saying that there would be many rumors 
 about him, but that he was not to believe any of them, and 
 that he would come and see him shortly. This letter was 
 written as a blind, and, unfortunately, Major Gordon at- 
 tached greater value to Burgevine' s word than he did to the 
 precise information of Dr. Macartney. He was too much 
 disposed to think that, as the officer who had to a certain 
 extent superseded Burgevine in the command, he was bound 
 to take the most favorable view of all his actions, and to trust 
 implicitly in his good faith. Major Gordon, trusting to his 
 word, made himself personally responsible to the Chinese 
 authorities for his good faith, and thus Burgevine escaped 
 arrest. Burgevine's plans had been deeply laid. He had 
 been long in correspondence with the Taepings, and his terms 
 had been accepted. He proclaimed his hostility to the gov- 
 ernment by seizing one of their new steamers. 
 
 At this very moment Major Gordon came to the deci- 
 sion to resign, and he hastened back to Shanghai in order to 
 place his withdrawal from the force in the hands of the Futai. 
 He arrived there on the very day that Burgevine seized the 
 "Kajow" steamer at Sunkiang, and on hearing the news 
 he at once withdrew his resignation, which had been made 
 partly from irritation at the irregular payment of his men, 
 and also on account of the cruelty of General Ching. Not 
 merely did he withdraw his resignation, but he hastened 
 back to Quinsan, into which he rode on the night of the very 
 same day that had witnessed his departure. The immediate 
 and most pressing danger was from the possible defection 
 of the force to its old leader, when, with the large stores of 
 artillery and ammunition at Quinsan in their ijossession, not
 
 THE TAEPING REBELLION 411 
 
 even Shanghai, with its very weak foreign garrison, could 
 be considered safe from attack. As a measure of precaution 
 Major Gordon sent some of his heavy guns and stores back 
 to Taitsan, where the English commander. General Brown, 
 consented to guard them, while he hastened off to Kalipoo, 
 now threatened both by the Soochow force and by the for- 
 eign adventurers acting under Burgevine. He arrived at a 
 most critical moment. The garrison was hard pressed. Gen- 
 eral Ching had gone back to Shanghai, and only the presence 
 of the "Hyson" prevented the rebels, who were well-armed 
 and possessed an efficient artillery, from carrying the fort by 
 a rush. The arrival of Major Gordon with 150 men on board 
 his third steamer, the ' ' Cricket, ' ' restored the confidence of 
 the defenders; but there was no doubt that Burgevine had 
 lost a most favorable opportunity, for if he had attacked this 
 place instead of proceeding to Soochow it must have fallen. 
 General Ching, who was a man of most extraordinary 
 energy and restlessness, resolved to signalize his return to 
 the field by some striking act while Major Gordon was com- 
 pleting his preparations at Quinsan for a fresh effort. His 
 headquarters were at the strong fort of Ta Edin, on the creek 
 leading from Quinsan to Soochow, and having the "Hyson" 
 with him he determined to make a dash to some point nearer 
 the great rebel stronghold. On August 80 he had seized the 
 position of Waiquaidong, where, in three days, he threw up 
 stockades, admirably constructed, and which could not have 
 been carried save by a great effort on the part of the whole 
 of the Soochow garrison. Toward the end of September, 
 Major Gordon, fearing lest the rebels, who had now the sup- 
 posed advantage of Burgevine' s presence and advice, might 
 make some attempt to cut off General Ching' s lengthy com- 
 munications, moved forward to Waiquaidong to support him; 
 but when he arrived he found that the impatient mandarin, 
 encouraged either by the news of his approach or at the in- 
 action of the Taepings in Soochow, had made a still further 
 advance of two miles, so that he was only 1,000 yards distant 
 from the rebel stockades in front of the east gate. Major
 
 412 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Gordon had at this time been re- enforced by the Franco- 
 Chinese corps, which had been well disciplined, under the 
 command of Captain Bonnefoy, while the necessity of leav- 
 ing any strong garrison at Quinsan had been obviated by the 
 loan of 200 Belooches from General Brown's force. The 
 rebel position having been carefully reconnoitered, both on 
 the east and on the south. Major Gordon determined that 
 the first step necessary for its proper beleaguerment was to 
 seize and fortify the village of Patachiaou, about one mile 
 south of the city wall. The village, although strongly stock- 
 aded, was evacuated by the garrison after a feeble resistance, 
 and an attempt to recover it a few hours later by Mow Wang 
 in person resulted in a rude repulse chiefly on account of the 
 effective fire of the "Hyson." Burgevine, instead of fight- 
 ing the battles of the failing cause he had adopted, was 
 traveling about the country: atone moment in the capital 
 interviewing Tien Wang and his ministers, at another going 
 about in disguise even in the streets of Shanghai. But dur- 
 ing the weeks when General Ching might have been taken 
 at a disadvantage, and when it was quite possible to recover 
 some of the places which had been lost, he was absent from 
 the scene of military operations. After the capture of Pata- 
 chiaou most of the troops and the steamers that had taken 
 it were sent back to Waiquaidong, but Major Gordon re- 
 mained there with a select body of his men and three howitz- 
 ers. The rebels had not resigned themselves to the loss of 
 Patachiaou, and on October 1 they made a regular attempt 
 to recover it. They brought the "Kajow" into action, and, 
 as it had found a daring commander in a man named Jones, 
 its assistance proved very considerable. They had also a 
 32-pounder gun on board a junk, and this enabled them to 
 overcome the fire of Gordon's howitzers and also of the 
 "Hyson," which arrived from Waiquaidong during the en- 
 gagement. But notwithstanding the superiority of their 
 artillery, the rebels hesitated to come to close quarters, and 
 when Major Gordon and Captain Bonnefoy led a sortie 
 against tlieni at the end of the day they retired precipitately.
 
 THE TAEPING REBELLION 413 
 
 At this stage Burgevine wrote to Major Gordon two let- 
 ters — the first exalting the Taepings, and the second written 
 two days later asking for an interview, whereupon he ex- 
 pressed his desire to surrender on the provision of personal 
 safety. He assigned the state of his health as the cause of 
 this change, but there was never the least doubt that the 
 true reason of this altered view was dissatisfaction with his 
 treatment by the Taeping leaders and a conviction of the 
 impossibility of success. Inside Soochow, and at Nankin, 
 it was possible to see with clearer eyes than at Shanghai that 
 the Taeping cause was one that could not be resuscitated. 
 But although Burgevine soon and very clearly saw the hope- 
 lessness of the Taeping movement, he had by no means made 
 up his mind to go over to the imperialists. With a consid- 
 erable number of European followers at his beck and call, 
 and with a profound and ineradicable contempt for the whole 
 Chinese official world, he was loth to lose or surrender the 
 position which gave him a certain importance. He vacil- 
 lated between a number of suggestions, and the last he came 
 to was the most remarkable, at the same time that it revealed 
 more clearly than any other the vain and meretricious char- 
 acter of the man. In his second interview with Major Gor- 
 don he proposed that that officer should join him, and com- 
 bining the whole force of the Euro^Deans and the disciplined 
 Chinese, seize Soochow, and establish an independent au- 
 thority of their own. It was the old filibustering idea, 
 revived under the most unfavorable circumstances, of fight- 
 ing for their own hand, dragging the European name in the 
 dirt, and founding an independent authority of some vague, 
 undefinable and transitory character. Major Gordon list- 
 ened to the unfolding of this scheme of miserable treachery, 
 and only his strong sense of the utter impossibility, and in- 
 deed the ridiculousness of the project, prevented his contempt 
 and indignation finding forcible expression. Burgevine, the 
 traitor to the imperial cause, the man whose health would 
 not allow him to do his duty to his new masters in Soochow, 
 thus revealed his plan for defying all parties, and for decid-
 
 414 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 ing tlie fate of the Dragon Throne. The only reply he re- 
 ceived was the cold one that it would be better and wiser 
 to confine his attention to the question of whether he in- 
 tended to yield or not, instead of discussing idle schemes 
 of "vaulting ambition." 
 
 Meantime, Chung Wang had come down from Nankin 
 to superintend the defense of Soochow ; and in face of a more 
 capable opponent he still did not despair of success, or at the 
 least of making a good fight of it. He formed the plan of 
 assuming the offensive against Chanzu while Greneral Ching 
 was employed in erecting his stockades step by step nearer 
 to the eastern wall of Soochow. In order to prevent the 
 realization of this project, Major Gordon made several dem- 
 onstrations on the western side of Soochow, which had the 
 effect of inducing Chung "Wang to defer his departure. At 
 this conjuncture serious news arrived from the south. A 
 large rebel force, assembled from Chekiang and the silk dis- 
 tricts south of the Taho Lake, had moved up the Grand Canal 
 and held the garrison of Wokong in close leaguer. On 
 October 10 the imperialists stationed there made a sortie, 
 but were driven back with the loss of several hundred men 
 killed and wounded. Their provisions were almost ex- 
 hausted, and it was evident that unless relieved they could 
 not hold out many days longer. On October 12 Major Gor- 
 don therefore hastened to their succor. The rebels held a 
 position south of Wokong, and, as they felt sure of a safe 
 retreat, they fought with great determination. The battle 
 lasted three hours ; the guns had to be brought up to within 
 fifty yards of the stockade, and the whole affair is described 
 as one of the hardest fought actions of the war. On the 
 return of the contingent to Patachiaou, about thirty Eu- 
 ropeans deserted the rebels, but Burgevine and one or two 
 others were not with them. Chung Wang had seized the 
 opportunity of Gordon's departure for the relief of Wokong 
 to carry out his scheme against Chanzu. Taking the "Ka- 
 jow" with him, and a considerable number of the foreign 
 adventurers, he reached Monding, where the imperialists
 
 THE TAEPING REBELLION 415 
 
 were strongly intrenched at tlie junction of the main creek 
 from Chanzu with the Canal. He attacked them, and a 
 severely contested struggle ensued, in which at first the 
 Taepings carried everything before them. But the fortune 
 of the day soon veered round. The "Kajow" was sunk by 
 a lucky shot, great havoc was wrought by the explosion of a 
 powder-boat, and the imperialists remained masters of a hard- 
 fought field. The defection of the Europeans placed Burge- 
 vine in serious peril, and only Major Gordon's urgent rep- 
 resentations and acts of courtesy to the Mow Wang saved 
 his life. The Taeping leader, struck by the gallantry and 
 fair dealing of the English officer, set Burgevine free, and 
 the American consul thanked Major Gordon for his great 
 kindness to that misguided officer. Burgevine came out of 
 the whole complication with a reputation in every way tar- 
 nished. He had not even the most common courage which 
 would have impelled him to stay in Soochow and take the 
 chances of the party to which he had attached himself. 
 Whatever his natural talents might have been, his vanity 
 and weakness obscured them all. With the inclination to 
 create an infinity of mischief, it must be coQsidered fortu- 
 nate that his ability was so small, for his opportunities were 
 abundant. 
 
 The conclusion of the Burgevine incident removed a 
 weight from Major Gordon's mind. Established on the east 
 and south of Soochow, he determined to secure a similar 
 position on its western side, when he would be able to inter- 
 cept the communications still held by the garrison across the 
 Taho Lake. In order to attain this object it was necessary, 
 in the first place, to carry the stockades at Wuliungchow, a 
 village two miles west of Patachiaou. The place was cap- 
 tured at the first attack and successfully held, notwithstand- 
 ing a fierce attempt to recover it under the personal direction 
 of Chung Wang, who returned for the express purpose. 
 This success was followed by others. Another large body 
 of rebels had come up from the south and assailed the gar- 
 rison of Wokong. On October 26 one of Gordon's lieuten-
 
 416 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 ants, Major Kirkham, inflicted a severe defeat upon them, 
 and vigorously pursued tlaem for several miles. The next 
 operation undertaken was the capture of the village of 
 Leeku, three miles north of Soochow, as the preliminary 
 to investing the city on the north. Here Major Gordon re- 
 sorted to his usual flanking tactics, and with conspicuous 
 success. The rebels fought well; one officer was killed at 
 Gordon's side, and the men in the stockade were cut down 
 with the exception of about forty, who were made prisoners. 
 Soochow was then assailed on the northern as well as on the 
 other sides, but Chung Wang's army still served to keep 
 open communications by means of the Grand Canal. That 
 army had its principal quarters at Wusieh, where it was 
 kept in check by a large imperialist force under Santajin, 
 Li's brother, who had advanced from Kongyin on the Yang- 
 tse. Major Gordon's main difficulty now arose from the in- 
 sufficiency of his force to hold so wide an extent of country ; 
 and in order to procure a re-enforcement from Santajin, he 
 agreed to assist that commander against his able opponent 
 Chung Wang. With a view to accomplishing this the Tae- 
 ping position at Wanti, two miles north of Leeku, was 
 attacked and captured. 
 
 At this stage of the campaign there were 13,500 men 
 round Soochow, and of these 8,500 were fully occupied in 
 the defense of the stockades, leaving the very small number 
 of 5,000 men available for active measures in the field. On 
 the other hand, Santajin had not fewer than 20,000, and pos- 
 sibly as many as 30,000 men under his orders. But the Tae- 
 pings still enjoyed the numerical superiority. They had 
 40,000 men in Soochow, 20,000 at Wusieh, and Chung Wang 
 occupied a camp, half-way between these places, with 18,000 
 followers. The presence of Chung Wang was also estimated 
 to be worth a corps of 5,000 soldiers. Had Gordon been free 
 to act, his plan of campaign would have been simple and 
 decisive. He would have effected a junction of his forces 
 with Santajin, he would have overwhelmed Chung Wang's 
 18,000 with his combined army of double that strength, and
 
 THE TAEPINQ REBELLION 417 
 
 he would have appeared at the head of his victorious troops 
 before the bewildered garrison of Wusieh. It would prob- 
 ably have terminated the campaign at a stroke. Even the 
 decisive defeat of Chung Wang alone might have entailed 
 the collapse of the cause now tottering to its fall. But Major 
 Gordon had to consider not merely the military quality of 
 his allies, but also their jealousies and differences. General 
 Ching hated Santajin on private grounds as well as on pub- 
 lic. He desired a monopoly of the profit and honor of the 
 campaign. His own reputation would be made by the cap- 
 ture of Soochow. It would be diminished and cast into the 
 shade were another imperial commander to defeat Chung 
 Wang and close the line of the Grand Canal. Were Gordon 
 to detach himself from General Ching he could not feel sure 
 what that jealous and impulsive commander would do. He 
 would certainly not preserve the vigilant defensive before 
 Soochow necessary to insure the safety of the army operating 
 to the north. The commander of the Ever-Yictorious Army 
 had consequently to abandon the tempting idea of crushing 
 Chung Wang and to have recourse to slower methods. 
 
 On November 19, Major Gordon collected the whole of 
 his available force to attack Fusaiquan, a place on the Grand 
 Canal six miles north of Soochow. Here the rebels had 
 barred the Canal at three different points, while on the banks 
 they occupied eight earthworks, which were fortunately in a 
 very incomplete state. A desperate resistance was expected 
 from the rebels at this advantageous spot, but they preferred 
 their safety to their duty, and retreated to Wusieh with 
 hardly any loss. In consequence of this reverse Chung 
 Wang withdrew his forces from his camp in face of Santajin, 
 and concentrated his men at Mending and Wusieh for the 
 defense of the Grand Canal. The investment of Soochow 
 being now as complete as the number of troops under the 
 imperial standard would allow of. Major Gordon returned to 
 General Ching's stockades in front of that place, with the 
 view of resuming the attack on the eastern gate. General 
 Ching and Captain Bonnefoy had met with a slight repulse
 
 418 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 there on October 14. The stockade in front of the east gate 
 was known by the name of the Low Mun, and had been 
 strengthened to the best knowledge of the Taeping engineers. 
 Their position was exceedingly formidable, consisting of a line 
 of breastworks defended at intervals with circular stockades. 
 Major Gordon decided upon making a night attack and he ar- 
 ranged his plans from the information provided by the Euro- 
 pean and other deserters who had been inside. The Taepings 
 were not without their spies and sympathizers also, and the 
 intended attempt was revealed to them. The attack was 
 made at two in the morning of November 27, but the rebels 
 had mustered in force and received Major Gordon's men 
 with tremendous volleys. Even then the disciplined troops 
 would not give way, and encouraged by the example of their 
 leader, who seemed to be at the front and at every point at 
 the same moment, fairly held their own on the edge of the 
 enemy's position. Unfortunately the troops in support be- 
 haved badly, and got confused from the heavy fire of the 
 Taepings, which never slackened. Some of them absolutely 
 retired and others were landed at the wrong places. Major 
 Gordon had to hasten to the rear to restore order, and during 
 his absence the advanced guard were expelled from their 
 position by a forward movement led by Mow Wang in per- 
 son. The attack had failed, and there was nothing to do 
 save to draw off the troops with as little further loss as pos- 
 sible. This was Major Gordon's first defeat, but it was so 
 evidently due to the accidents inseparable from a night at- 
 tempt, and to the fact that the surprise had been revealed, 
 that it produced a less discouraging effect on officers and 
 men than might have seemed probable. Up to this day 
 Major Gordon had obtained thirteen distinct victories be- 
 sides the advantage in many minor skirmishes. 
 
 Undismayed by this reverse, Major Gordon collected all 
 his troops and artillery from the other stockades, and resolved 
 to attack the Low Mun position with his whole force. He 
 also collected all his heavy guns and mortars and cannonaded 
 the rebel stockade for some time; but on an advance being
 
 THE TAEPING REBELLION 419 
 
 ordered, the assailants were compelled to retire by the fire 
 which the Taepings brought to bear on them from every 
 available point. Chung Wang had hastened down from 
 Wusieh to take part in the defense of what was rightly 
 regarded as the key of the position at Soochow, and both he 
 and Mow Wang superintended in person the defense of the 
 Low Mun stockade. After a further cannonade the advance 
 was again sounded, but this second attack would also have 
 failed had not the officers and men boldly plunged into the 
 moat or creek and swum across. The whole of the stock- 
 ades and a stone fort were then carried, and the imperial 
 forces firmly established at a point only 900 yards from the 
 inner wall of Soochow. Six officers and fifty men were 
 killed, and three officers, five Europeans, and 128 men 
 were wounded in this successful attack. The capture of the 
 Low Mun stockades meant practically the fall of Soochow. 
 Chung Wang then left it to its fate, and all the other Wangs 
 except Mow Wang were in favor of coming to terms with 
 the imperialists. Even before this defeat, Lar Wang had 
 entered into communications with General Ching for coming 
 over, and as he had the majority of the troops at Soochow 
 under his orders Mow Wang was practically powerless, 
 although resolute to defend the place to the last. Several 
 interviews took place between the Wangs and General Ching 
 and Li Hung Chang. Major Gordon also saw the former, 
 and had one interview with Lar Wang in person. The En- 
 glish officer proposed as the most feasible plan his surrender- 
 ing one of the gates. During all this period Major Gordon 
 had impressed on both of his Chinese colleagues the impera- 
 tive necessity there was, for reasons of both policy and pru- 
 dence, to deal leniently and honorably by the rebel chiefs. 
 All seemed to be going well. General Ching took an oath 
 of brotherhood with Lar Wang, Li Hung Chang agreed 
 with everything that fell from Gordon's lips. The only 
 one exempted from this tacit understanding was Mow Wang, 
 always in favor of fighting it out and defending the town ; 
 and his name was not mentioned for the simple reason that
 
 420 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 he had nothing to do with the negotiations. For Mow 
 Wang Major Gordon had formed the esteem due to a gallant 
 enemy, and he resolved to spare no effort to save his life. 
 His benevolent intentions were thwarted by the events that 
 had occurred within Soochow. Mow Wang had been mur- 
 dered by the other Wangs, who feared that he might detect 
 their plans and prevent their being carried out. The death 
 of Mow Wang removed the only leader who was heartily 
 opposed to the surrender of Soochow, and on the day after 
 this chief's murder the imperialists received possession of 
 one of the gates. The inside of the city had been the scene 
 of the most dreadful confusion. Mow Wang's men had 
 sought to avenge their leader's death, and on the other hand 
 the followers of Lar Wang had shaved their heads in token 
 of their adhesion to the imperialist cause. Some of the more 
 prudent of the Wangs, not knowing what turn events might 
 take amid the prevailing discord, secured their safety by a 
 timely flight. Major Gordon kept his force well in hand, 
 and refused to allow any of the men to enter the city, where 
 they would certainly have exercised the privileges of a mer- 
 cenary force in respect of pillage. Instead of this, Major 
 Gordon endeavored to obtain for them two months' pay from 
 the Futai, which that official stated his inability to procure. 
 Major Gordon thereupon resigned in disgust, and on suc- 
 ceeding in obtaining one month's pay for his men, he sent 
 them back to Quinsan without a disturbance. 
 
 The departure of the Ever- Victorious Army for its head- 
 quarters was regarded by the Chinese officials with great 
 satisfaction, and for several reasons. In the flush of the suc- 
 cess at Soochow both that force and its commander seemed 
 in the way of the Futai, and to diminish the extent of his 
 triumph. Also neither Li nor Ching had the least wish for 
 any of the ex- rebel chiefs, men of ability and accustomed to 
 command, to be taken into the service of the government. 
 Of men of that kind there were already enough. General 
 Ching himself was a sufficiently formidable rival to the 
 Futai, without any assistance and encouragement from Lar
 
 THE TAEPING REBELLION 421 
 
 Wang and the others. Li had no wish to save them from 
 the fate of rebels ; and although he had promised, and Gen- 
 eral Ching had sworn to, their personal safety, he was bent 
 on getting rid of them in one way or another. He feared 
 Major Grordon, but he also thought that the time had arrived 
 when he could dispense with him and the foreign-drilled 
 legion in tbe same way as he had got rid of Sberard Osborn 
 and his fleet. The departure of the Quinsan force left him 
 free to follow his own inclination. The Wangs were invited 
 to an entertainment at the Futai's boat, and Major Gordon 
 saw tbem both in the city and subsequently when on their 
 way to Li Hung Chang. The exact circumstances of their 
 fate were never known; but nine headless bodies were dis- 
 covered on the opposite side of the creek, and not far distant 
 from the Futai's quarters. It then became evident that Lar 
 Wang and his fellow Wangs had been brutally murdered. 
 Major Gordon was disposed to take the office of their avenger 
 into his own hands, but the opportunity of doing so fortu- 
 nately did not present itself. He hastened back to Quinsan, 
 where he refused to act any longer with such false and dis- 
 honorable colleagues. The matter was reported to Pekin. 
 Both tbe mandarins sought to clear themselves by accusing 
 the otber; and a special decree came from Pekin conferring 
 on tbe English officer a very high order and the sum of 10,- 
 000 taels. Major Gordon returned the money, and expressed 
 his regret at being unable to accept any token of honor from 
 the emperor in consequence of the Soochow affair. 
 
 A variety of reasons, all equally creditable to Major 
 Gordon's judgment and single-mindedness, induced him 
 after two months' retirement to abandon his inaction and 
 to sink his difference with the Futai. He saW very clearly 
 that the sluggishness of the imperial commanders w^ould 
 result in the prolongation of the struggle with all its at- 
 tendant evils, whereas, if he took the field, he would be 
 able to bring it to a conclusion within two months. More- 
 over, the Quinsan force, never very amenable to discipline, 
 shook off all restraint when in quarters and promised to
 
 422 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 become as dangerous to the government in whose pay it 
 was as to the enemy against whom it was engaged to fight. 
 Major Gordon, in view of these facts, came to the prompt 
 decision that it was his duty, and the course most calculated 
 to do o-ood, for him to retake the field and strive as ener- 
 getically as possible to expel the rebels from the small part 
 of Kiangsu still remaining in their possession. On Febru- 
 ary 18, 1864, he accordingly left Quinsan at the head of 
 his men, who showed great satisfaction at the return to ac- 
 tive campaigning. Wusieh had been evacuated on the fall 
 of Soochow, and Chung Wang's force retired to Changchow, 
 while that chief himself returned to Nankin. A few weeks 
 later General Ching had seized Pingwang, thus obtaining 
 the command of another entrance into the Taho Lake. San- 
 ta j in established his force in a camp not far distant from 
 Changchow, and engaged the rebels in almost daily skir- 
 mishes. This was the j^osition of affairs when Major Gordon 
 took the field toward the end of February, and he at once 
 resolved to carry the war into a new country by crossing the 
 Taho Lake and attacking the town of Yesing on its western 
 shores. By seizing this and the adjoining towns he hoped 
 to cut the rebellion in two, and to be able to attack Chang- 
 chow in the rear. The operations at Yesing occupied two 
 days; but at last the rebel stockades were carried with tre- 
 mendous loss not only to the defenders, but also to a reliev- 
 ing force sent from Liyang. Five thousand prisoners were 
 also taken. Liyang itself was the next place to be attacked; 
 but the intricacy of the country, which was intersected by 
 creeks and canals, added to the fact that the whole region 
 had been desolated by famine, and that the rebels had broken 
 all the bridges, rendered this undertaking one of great diffi- 
 culty and some risk. However, Major Gordon's fortitude 
 vanquisle.d all obstacles, and when he appeared before Li- 
 yang he found that the rebel leaders in possession of the 
 town had come to the decision to surrender. At this place 
 Major Gordon came into communication with the general 
 ]*aochiaou, who was covering the siege operations against
 
 THE TAEPING REBELLION 423 
 
 Nankin, wliicli Tseng Kwofan was pressing with ever-in- 
 creasing vigor. The surrender of Liyang proved the more 
 important, as the fortifications were found to be admirably 
 constructed, and as it contained a garrison of fifteen thou- 
 sand men and a plentiful supply of provisions. From Li- 
 yang Major Gordon marched on Kintang, a town due north 
 of Liyang, and about half-way between Changchow and 
 Kankin. The capture of Kintang, by placing Gordon's 
 force within striking distance of Changchow and its com- 
 munications, would have compelled the rebels to suspend 
 these operations and recall their forces. Unfortunately the 
 attack on Kintang revealed unexpected difficulties. The 
 garrison showed extraordinary determination ; and although 
 the wall was breached by the heavy fire, two attempts to 
 assault were repulsed with heavy loss, the more serious in- 
 asmuch as Major Gordon was himself wounded below the 
 knee, and compelled to retire to his boat. This was the 
 second defeat Gordon had experienced. 
 
 In consequence of this reverse, which dashed the cup of 
 success from Gordon's hands when he seemed on the point 
 of bringing the campaign to a close in the most brilliant 
 manner, the force had to retreat to Liyang, whence the 
 commander hastened back with one thousand men to Wusieh. 
 He reached Wusieh on the 25th of March, four days after 
 the repulse at Kintang, and he there learned that Fushan 
 had been taken and that Chanzu was being closely attacked. 
 The imperialists had fared better in the south. General 
 Ching had captured Kashingfoo, a strong place in Chekiang, 
 and on the very same day as the repulse at Kintang, Tso 
 Tsung Tang had recovered Hangchow. Major Gordon, al- 
 though still incapacitated by his wound from taking his 
 usual foremost place in the battle, directed all operations 
 from his boat. He succeeded, after numerous skirmishes, 
 in compelling the Taepings to quit their position before 
 Chanzu ; but they drew up in force at the village of Waisso, 
 where they offered him battle. Most unfortunately. Major 
 Gordon had to intrust the conduct of the attack to his lieu-
 
 424 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 tenants, Colonels Howard and Rhodes, while he superin- 
 tended the advance of the gunboats up the creek. Finding 
 the banks were too high to admit of these being usefully 
 employed, and failing to establish communications with the 
 infantry, he discreetly returned to his camp, where he found 
 everything in the most dreadful confusion owing to a ter- 
 rible disaster. The infantry, in fact, had been outmaneu- 
 vered and routed with tremendous loss. Seven officers and 
 265 men had been killed, and one officer and sixty-two men 
 wounded. Such an overwhelming disaster would have 
 crushed any ordinary commander, particularly when com- 
 ing so soon after such a rude defeat as that at Kintang. It 
 only roused Major Gordon to increased activity. He at once 
 took energetic measures to retrieve this disaster. He sent 
 his wounded to Quinsan, collected fresh troops, and, having 
 alloM^ed his own wound to recover by a week's rest, resumed 
 in person the attack on Waisso. On April 10 Major Gordon 
 pitched his camp within a mile of Waisso, and paid his men 
 as the preliminary to the resumption of the offensive. The 
 attack commenced on the following morning, and promised 
 to prove of an arduous nature; but by a skillful flank move- 
 ment Major Gordon carried two stockades in person, and 
 rendered the whole place no longer tenable. The rebels 
 evacuated their position and retreated, closely pursued by 
 the imperialists. The villagers, who had suffered from 
 their exactions, rose upon them, and very few rebels 
 escaped. The pursuit was continued for a week, and the 
 lately victorious army of Waisso was practically annihi- 
 lated. The capture of Changchow was to be the next and 
 crowning success of the campaign. For this enterprise the 
 whole of the Ever- Victorious Army was concentrated, in- 
 cluding the ex-rebel contingent of Liyang. On April 23 
 Major Gordon carried the stockades near the west gate. In 
 their capture the Liyang men, although led only by Chinese, 
 showed conspicuous gallantry, thus justifying Major Gor- 
 don's belief that the Chinese would fight as well under their 
 own countrymen as when led by foreigners. Batteries were
 
 THE TAEPING REBELLION 425 
 
 then constructed, for the bombardment of the town itself. 
 Before these were completed the imperialists assaulted, but 
 were repulsed with loss. On the following day (April 27) 
 the batteries opened fire, and two pontoon bridges were 
 thrown across, when Major Gordon led his men to the as- 
 sault. The first attack was repulsed, and a second one, 
 made in conjunction with the imperialists, fared not less 
 badly. The pontoons were lost, and the force suffered a 
 greater loss than at any time during the war, with the 
 exception of Waisso. The Taepings also lost heavily; and 
 their valor could not alter the inevitable result. Chang- 
 chow had consequently to be approached systematically by 
 trenches, in the construction of which the Chinese showed 
 themselves very skillful. The loss of the pontoons compelled 
 the formation of a cask- bridge; and, during the extensive 
 preparations for renewing the attack, several hundred of 
 the garrison came over, reporting that it was only the Can- 
 tonese who wished to fight to the bitter end. On May 11, 
 the fourth anniversary of its capture by Chung Wang, Li 
 requested Major Gordon to act in concert with him for carry- 
 ing the place by storm. The attack was made in the middle 
 of the day, to the intense surprise of the garrison, who made 
 only a feeble resistance, and the town was at last carried 
 with little loss. The commandant, Hoo Wang, was made 
 prisoner and executed. This proved to be the last action of 
 the Ever- Victorious Army, which then returned to Quinsan, 
 and was quietly disbanded by its commander before June 1. 
 To sum up the closing incidents of the Taeping war. Ta- 
 yan was evacuated two days after the fall of Changchow, 
 leaving Nankin alone in their hands. Inside that city there 
 were the greatest misery and suffering. Tien Wang had 
 refused to take any of the steps pressed on him by Chung 
 Wang, and when he heard the people were suffering from 
 want, all he said was, "Let them eat the sweet dew." Tseng 
 Kwofan drew up his lines on all sides of the city, and grad- 
 ually drove the despairing rebels behind the walls. Chung 
 Wang sent out the old women and children; and let it be
 
 426 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 recorded to the credit of Tseng Kwotsiuen tliat "he did not 
 drive tliem back, but charitably provided for their wants, 
 and dispatched them to a place of shelter. In June Major 
 Gordon visited Tseng's camp, and found his works covering 
 twenty-four to thirty miles, and constructed in the most 
 elaborate fashion. The imperialists numbered 80,000 men, 
 but were badly armed. Although their pay was very much 
 in arrear, they were well fed, and had great confidence in 
 their leader, Tseng Kwofan. On June 30, Tien Wang, de- 
 spairing of success, committed suicide by swallowing golden 
 leaf. Thus died the Hungtsiuen who had erected the stand- 
 ard of revolt in Kwangsi thirteen years before. His son was 
 proclaimed Tien Wang on his death becoming known, but 
 his reign was brief. The last act of all had now arrived. 
 On July 19 the imperialists had run a gallery under the wall 
 of Nankin, and charged it with 40,000 pounds of powder. The 
 explosion destroyed fifty yards of the walls, and the impe- 
 rialists, attacking on all sides, poured in through the breach. 
 Chung Wang made a desperate resistance in the interior, 
 holding his own and the Tien Wang's palace to the last. 
 He made a further stand with a thousand men at the south- 
 ern gate, but his band was overwhelmed, and he and the 
 young Tien Wang fled into the surrounding country. In 
 this supreme moment of danger Chung Wang thought more 
 of the safety of his young chief than of himself, and he gave 
 him an exceptionally good pony to escape on, while he him- 
 self took a very inferior animal. As the consequence Tien 
 Wang the Second escaped, while Chung Wang was captured 
 in the hills a few days later. Chung Wang, who had cer- 
 tainly been the hero of the Taeping movement, was beheaded 
 on August 7, and the young Tien Wang was eventually cap- 
 tured and executed also, by Shen Paochen. For this decisive 
 victory, which extinguished the Taeping Eebellion, Tseng 
 Kwofan, whom Cordon called "generous, fair, honest and 
 patriotic," was made a Hou, or Marquis, and his brother 
 Tseng Kwotsiuen an Earl. 
 
 It is impossible to exaggerate the impression made by
 
 THE REGENCY 427 
 
 Gordon's disinterestedness on the Chinese people, who ele- 
 vated him for his courage and military prowess to the pedes- 
 tal of a national god of war. The cane which he carried 
 when leading his men to the charge became known as "Gor- 
 don's wand of victory"; and the troops whom he trained, 
 and converted by success from a rabble into an army, formed 
 the nucleus of China's modern army. The service he ren- 
 dered his adopted country was, therefore, lasting as well as 
 striking, and the gratitude of the Chinese has, to their credit, 
 proved not less durable. The name of Gordon is still one to 
 conjure with among the Chinese, and if ever China were 
 placed in the same straits, she would be the more willing, 
 from his example, to intrust her cause to an English officer. 
 As to the military achievements of General Gordon in China 
 nothing fresh can be said. They speak indeed for them- 
 selves, and they form the most solid portion of the reputa- 
 tion which he gained as a leader of men. In the history of 
 the Manchu dynasty he will be known as "Chinese Gordon"; 
 although for us his earlier sobriquet must needs give place, 
 from his heroic and ever- regrettable death, to that of "Gor- 
 don of Khartoum. ' ' 
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 
 THE REGENCY 
 
 While the suppression of the Taeping Rebellion was in 
 progress, events of great interest and importance happened 
 at Pekin. It will be recollected that when the allied forces 
 approached that city in 1860, the Emperor Hienfung fled to 
 Jehol, and kept himself aloof from all the peace negotiations 
 which were conducted to a successful conclusion by his 
 brother. Prince Kung. After the signature of the conven- 
 tion in Pekin, ratifying the Treaty of Tientsin, he refused 
 to return to his capital; and he even seems to have hoped 
 that he might, by asserting his imperial prerogative, trans- 
 fer the capital from Pekin to Jehol, and thus evade one oi
 
 428 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the principal concessions to tlie foreigners. But if this was 
 impossible, he was quite determined, for himself, to have 
 nothing to do with them, and during the short remainder 
 of his life he kept his court at Jehol. "While his brother was 
 engaged in meeting the difficulties of diplomacy, and in ar- 
 ranging the conditions of a novel situation, Hienfung, by 
 collecting round his person the most bigoted men of his 
 family, showed that he preferred those counselors who 
 had learned nothing from recent events, and who would 
 support him in his claims to undiminished superiority and 
 inaccessibility. Prominent among the men in his confi- 
 dence was Prince Tsai, who had taken so discreditable a 
 part in the arrest of Parkes and his companions at Tung- 
 chow, and among his other advisers were several inexperi- 
 enced and impetuous members of the Manchu family. They 
 were all agreed in the policy of recovering, at the earliest 
 possible moment, what they considered to be the natural and 
 prescriptive right of the occupant of the Dragon Throne to 
 treat all other potentates as in no degree equal to himself. 
 No respect for treaties would have deterred them from re- 
 asserting what had solemnly been signed away, and the per- 
 manent success of the faction at Jehol would have entailed, 
 within a comparatively short period, the outbreak of another 
 foreign war. But the continued residence of the emperor 
 at Jehol was not popular with either his own family or the 
 inhabitants of Pekin. The members of the Manchu clan, 
 who received a regular allowance during the emj^eror's resi- 
 dence at Pekin, were reduced to the greatest straits, and even 
 to the verge of starvation, while the Chinese naturally re- 
 sented the attempt to remove the capital to any other place. 
 This abnegation of authority by Hienfung, for his absence 
 meant nothing short of that, could not have been prolonged 
 indefinitely, for a Chinese emperor has many religious and 
 secular duties to perform which no one else can discharge, 
 and which, if not discharged, would reduce the office of em- 
 peror to a nonentity. Prince Tsai and his associates had no 
 difficulty in working upon the fears of this prince, who held
 
 THE REGENCY 429 
 
 the most exalted idea of liis own majesty, at tlie same time 
 that he had not the power or knowledge to vindicate it. 
 
 While such were the views prevailing in the imperial cir- 
 cle at Jehol, arrangements were in progress for the taking 
 up of his residence at Pekin of the British minister. After 
 Lord Elgin's departure, his brother. Sir Frederick Bruce, 
 who was knighted for his share in the negotiations, was ap- 
 pointed first occupant of the post of minister in the Chinese 
 capital, and on March 22, 1861, he left Tientsin for Pekin. 
 Mr. Wade accompanied Sir Frederick as principal secretary, 
 and the staff included six student interpreters, whose ranks, 
 constantly recruited, have given many able men to the public 
 service. Before Sir Frederick reached the capital, the Chi- 
 nese minister had taken a step to facilitate the transaction 
 of business with the foreign representatives. Prince Kung 
 — and the credit of the measure belongs exclusively to him — 
 will always be gratefully remembered by any foreign writer 
 on modern China as the founder of the department known 
 as the Tsungli Yamen, which he instituted in January, 1861. 
 This department, since its institution, has very fully answered 
 all the expectations formed of it; and, although it is errone- 
 ous to represent it as in any sense identical with the Chinese 
 government, or as the originating source of Chinese policy, 
 it has proved a convenient and well-managed vehicle for the 
 dispatch of international business. Prince Kung became its 
 first president, and acted in that capacity until his fall from 
 power in 1884. 
 
 Before long, reports began to be spread of the serious 
 illness of the emperor. In August, Prince Kung hastened 
 to Jehol, the object of his journey being kept secret. 
 \ The members of the Tsungli Yamen were observed by the 
 foreign officials to be pre-occupied, and even the genial 
 Wansiang could not conceal that they were passing through 
 a crisis. Not merely was Hienfung dying, but it had be- 
 come known to Prince Kung and his friends that he had 
 left the governing authority during the minority of his son, 
 a child of less than six years of age, to a board of regency
 
 430 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 composed of eight of the least intelligent and most arrogant 
 and self-seeking members of tlie imperial family, with Prince 
 Tsai at their head. The emperor died on August 22. A few- 
 hours later the imperial decree notifying the last wishes of 
 the ruler as to the mode of government was promulgated. 
 The board of regency assumed the nominal control of affairs, 
 and Hienfung's son was proclaimed emperor under the style 
 of Chiseang. In all of these arrangements neither Prince 
 Kung nor his brothers, nor the responsible ministers at the 
 capital, had had the smallest part. It was an intrigue 
 among certain members of the imperial clan to possess 
 themselves of the ruling power, and for a time it seemed 
 as if their intrigue would be only too successful. Nothing 
 happened during the months of September and October to 
 disturb their confidence, for they remained at Jehol, and at 
 PeMn the routine of government continued to be performed 
 by Prince Kung. That statesman and his colleagues em- 
 ployed the interval in arranging their own plan of action, 
 and in making sure of the fidelity of a certain number of 
 troops. Throughout these preparations Prince Kung was 
 ably and energetically supported by his brother, Prince Chun, 
 by his colleague, "Wansiang, and by his aged father-in-law, 
 the minister Kweiliang. But the conspirators could not keep 
 the young emperor at Jehol indefinitely, and when, at the 
 end of October, it became known that he was on the point 
 of returning to Pekin, it was clear that the hour of conflict 
 had arrived. At Jehol the Board of Eegency could do little 
 harm; but once its pretensions and legality were admitted 
 at the capital, all the ministers would have to take their 
 orders from it, and to resign the functions which they had 
 retained. The main issue was whether Prince Kung or 
 Prince Tsai was to be supreme. On November 1 the young 
 emperor entered his capital in state. A large number of 
 soldiers, still dressed in their white mourning, accompanied 
 their sovereign from Jehol; but Shengpao's garrison was 
 infinitely more numerous, and thoroughly loyal to the cause 
 of Prince Kung. The majority of the regents had arrived
 
 THE REGENCY 431 
 
 witli tlie reigning prince; tliose wlio had not yet come were 
 on the road, escorting the dead body of Hienfung toward its 
 resting-place. If a blow was to be struck at all now was the 
 time to strike it. The regents had not merely placed them- 
 selves in the power of their opponent, but they had actually 
 brought with them the young emperor, without whose per- 
 son Prince Kung could have accomplished little. Prince 
 Kung had spared no effort to secure, and had fortunately 
 succeeded in obtaining, the assistance and co-operation of 
 the Empress Dowager, Hienfung' s principal widow, named 
 Tsi An. Her assent had been obtained to the proposed plot 
 before the arrival in Pekin, and it now only remained to 
 carry it out. On the day following the entry into the capi- 
 tal. Prince Kung hastened to the palace, and, producing be- 
 fore the astonished regents an Imperial Edict ordering their 
 dismissal, he asked them whether they obeyed the decree 
 of their sovereign, or whether he must call in his soldiers 
 to compel them. Prince Tsai and his companions had no 
 choice save to signify their acquiescence in what they could 
 not prevent; but, on leaving the chamber in which this 
 scene took place, they hastened toward the emperor's apart- 
 ment in order to remonstrate against their dismissal, or to 
 obtain from him some counter-edict reinstating them in their 
 positions. They were prevented from carrying out their pur- 
 pose, but this proof of contumacy sealed their fate. They 
 were promptly arrested, and a second decree was issued or- 
 dering their degradation from their official and hereditaiy 
 rank. To Prince Kung and his allies was intrusted the 
 charge of trying and punishing the offenders. 
 
 The next step was the proclamation of a new regency, 
 composed of the two empresses, Tsi An, principal widow of 
 Hienfung, and Tsi Thsi, mother of the young emperor. Two 
 precedents for the administration being intrusted to an em- 
 press were easily found by the Hanlin doctors during the 
 Ming dynasty, when the Emperors Chitsong and Wanleh 
 were minors. Special edicts were issued and arrangements 
 made for the transaction of business during the continuance
 
 432 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 of tte regency, and as neither of tlie empresses knew Man- 
 chn, it was specially provided that papers and documents, 
 whicli were always presented in tliat language, should be 
 translated into Chinese. Concurrently with these measures 
 for the settlement of the regency happened the closing scenes 
 in the drama of conspiracy which began so successfully at 
 Jehol and ended so dramatically at Pekin. For complete 
 success and security it was necessary that all the ringleaders 
 should be captured, and some of them were still free. 
 
 The bravest, if not the ablest, of the late Board of Re- 
 gency, Sushuen, remained at large. He had been charged 
 with the high and honorable duty of escorting the remains 
 of Hienfung to the capital. It was most important that he 
 should be seized before he became aware of the fate that 
 had befallen his colleagues. Prince Chun volunteered to 
 capture the last, and in a sense the most formidable, of the 
 intriguers himself, and on the very day that the events de- 
 scribed hapjDened at Pekin he rode out of the capital at the 
 head of a body of Tartar cavalry. On the following night 
 Prince Chun reached the spot where he was encamped, and, 
 breaking into the house, arrested him while in bed. Sushuen 
 did not restrain his indignation, and betrayed the ulterior 
 plans entertained by himself and his associates by declaring 
 that Prince Chun had been only just in time to prevent a 
 similar fate befalling himself. He was at once placed on 
 his trial with the other prisoners, and on November 10 the 
 order was given in the emperor's name for their execution. 
 Sushuen was executed on the public ground set apart for 
 that purpose; but to the others, as a special favor from their 
 connection with the imperial family, was sent the silken cord, 
 with which they were permitted to put an end to their exist- 
 ence. In the fate of Prince Tsai may be seen a well merited 
 retribution for his treachery and cruelty to Sir Harry Parkes 
 and his companions. 
 
 Another important step which had to be taken was the 
 alteration of the style given to the young emperor's reign. 
 It was felt to be impolitic that the deposed ministers should
 
 THE REGENCY 433 
 
 retain any connection whatever in history with the young 
 ruler. Were Hienfung's son to be handed down to poster- 
 ity as Chiseang there would be no possibility of excluding 
 their names and their brief and feverish ambition from the 
 national annals. After due deliberation, therefore, the name 
 of Tungche was substituted for that of Chiseang, and mean- 
 ing, as it does, "the union of law and order," it will be al- 
 lowed that the name was selected with some proper regard 
 for the circumstances of the occasion. Prince Kung was re- 
 warded with many high offices and sounding titles in addi- 
 tion to the post of chief minister under the two empresses. 
 He was made president of the Imperial Clan Court in the 
 room of Prince Tsai, and the title of Iching Wang, or Prince 
 Minister, was conferred upon him. His stanch friends and 
 supporters, Wansiang, Paukwen, and Kweiliang, were ap- 
 pointed to the Supreme Council. Prince Chun, to whose 
 skill and bravery in arresting Sushuen Prince Kung felt 
 very much indebted, was also rewarded. With these inci- 
 dents closed what might have proved a grave and perilous 
 complication for the Chinese Government. Had Prince 
 Kung prematurely revealed his plans there is every rea- 
 son to suppose that he would have alarmed and forewarned 
 his rivals, and that they, with the person of the emperor in 
 their possession, would have obtained the advantage. His 
 patience during the two months of doubt and anxiety while 
 the emperor remained at Jehol was matched by the vigor 
 and promptitude that he displayed on the eventful 2d of No- 
 vember. That his success was beneficial to his country will 
 not be disputed by any one, and Prince Kung's name must 
 be permanently remembered both for having commenced, 
 and for having insured the continuance of, diplomatic rela- 
 tions with England and the other foreign powers. 
 
 The increased intercourse with Europeans not merely led 
 to greater diplomatic confidence and to the extension of 
 trade, but it also induced many foreigners to offer their 
 services and assistance to the Pekin government during the 
 embarrassment arising from internal dissension. At first 
 
 China — 19
 
 434 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 these persons were, as has been seen, encouraged and em- 
 ployed more in consequence of local opinion in the treaty- 
 ports than as a matter of State policy. But already the sug- 
 gestion had been brought forward in more than one form for 
 the employment of foreigners, with the view of increasing 
 the resources of the government by calling in the assistance 
 of the very agency which had reduced them. A precedent 
 had been established for this at an earlier period — before, in 
 fact, the commencement of hostilities — by the appointment 
 of Mr. Horatio N. Lay to direct and assist the local author- 
 ities in the collection of customs in the Shanghai district. 
 Mr. Lay's experience had proved most useful in drawing up 
 the tariff of the Treaty of Tientsin, and his assistance had 
 been suitably acknowledged. In 1862, when the advantages 
 to be derived from the military experience of foreigners had 
 been practically recognized by the appointment of Europeans 
 to command a portion of the army of China, and in pur- 
 suance of a suggestion made by the present Sir Robert Hart 
 in the previous year, it was thought desirable for many rea- 
 sons that something should also be done to increase the naval 
 resources of the empire, and Mr. Lay was intrusted with a 
 commission for purchasing and collecting in Europe a fleet 
 of gunboats of small draught, which could be usefully em- 
 ployed for all the purposes of the Pekin Government on the 
 rivers and shallow estuaries of the country. Mr. Lay, who 
 undertook the commission, said: "This force was intended 
 for the protection of the treaty-ports, for the suppression of 
 piracy then rife, and for the relief of this country from the 
 burden of 'policing' the Chinese waters" ; but its first use in 
 the eyes of Prince Kung was to be employed against the 
 rebels and their European supporters, of whom Burgevine 
 was the most prominent. Captain Sherard Osborn, a dis- 
 tinguished English naval officer, was associated with Mr. 
 Lay in the undertaking. An Order of Council was issued 
 on August 30, 1862, empowering both of these officers to act 
 in the matter as delegates of the Chinese. Captain Osborn 
 and Mr. Lay came to England to collect the vessels of this
 
 THE REGENCY 435 
 
 fleet, and the former afterward returned with them to China 
 in the capacity of their commodore. The transaction was 
 not well managed from the very commencement. Mr. Lay 
 wrote in August, 1862, to say that he had chosen as the na- 
 tional ensign of the Chinese navy "a green flag, bearing a 
 yellow diagonal cross," and he wrote again to request that 
 an official notification should appear in the ' ' Gazette. ' ' Had 
 his request been complied with, there would have been very 
 strong reason for avssuming that the English Government 
 was prepared to support and facilitate every scheme for 
 forcing the Chinese to accept and submit to the exact method 
 of progress approved of and desired by the European servants 
 of their government, without their taking any part in the 
 transaction save to ratify terms that might be harsh and 
 exorbitant. Fortunately, the instinctive caution of our For- 
 eign Office was not laid aside on this occasion. Mr. Lay was 
 informed that no notice could appear in the "London Ga- 
 zette' ' except after the approval of the Pekin authorities had 
 been expressed; and Prince Kung wrote, on October 22, to 
 say that the Chinese ensign would be of "yellow ground, 
 and on it will be designed a dragon with his head toward the 
 upper part of the flag." Mr. Lay preceded the vessels — 
 seven gunboats and one store-ship — and arrived at Pekin in 
 May, 1863. 
 
 Prince Kung had been most anxious for the speedy arrival 
 of the flotilla; and the doubtful fortune of the campaign in 
 Kiangsu, where the gunboats would have been invaluable, 
 rendered him extremely desirous that they should commence 
 active operations immediately on arrival. But he found, in 
 the first place, that Mr. Lay was not prepared to accept the 
 appointment of a Chinese official as joint-commander, and 
 in the second place, that he would not receive orders from 
 any of the provincial authorities. Such a decision was mani- 
 festly attended with the greatest inconvenience to China; for 
 only the provincial authorities knew what the interests of the 
 State demanded, and where the fleet might co-operate with 
 advantage in the attacks on the Taepings. Unless Captain
 
 436 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Osborn were to act on tlie orders of Tsen Kwofan, and par- 
 ticularly of Li Hung Chang, it was difficult to see of what 
 possible use he or his flotilla could be to China. The found- 
 ers of the new Chinese navy claimed practically all the privi- 
 leges of an ally, and declined the duties devolving on them 
 as directing a department of the Chinese administration. 
 Of course, it was more convenient and more dignified for the 
 foreign officers to draw their instructions and their salaries 
 direct from the fountain-head; but if the flotilla was not to 
 be of any practical use to China it might just as well never 
 have been created. The fleet arrived in safety, but remained 
 inactive. The whole summer and autumn of 1863, with its 
 critical state of affairs round Soochow, passed away without 
 anything being done to show what a powerful auxiliary Mr. 
 Lay's ships might be. The ultimate success of those opera- 
 tions without the smallest co-operation on the part of Captain 
 Osborn or his flotilla virtually sealed its fate. In October, 
 Wansiang, in the name of the Foreign Office, declared that 
 the Chinese could not recognize or ratify the private arrange- 
 ment between Mr. Lay and his naval officer, and that it was 
 essential for Captain Osborn to submit to receive his instruc- 
 tions from the provincial authorities. In the following month 
 Mr. Lay was summarily dismissed from the Chinese service, 
 and it was determined, after some delay and various counter 
 suggestions, to send back the ships to Europe, there to be 
 disposed of. The radical fault in the whole arrangement had 
 been Mr. Lay's wanting to take upon himself the responsi- 
 bility not merely of Inspector-General of Customs, but also 
 of supreme adviser on all matters connected with foreign 
 questions. The Chinese themselves were to take quite a 
 subordinate part in their realization, and were to be treated, 
 in short, as if they did know how to manage their own 
 affairs. Mr. Lay's dreams were suddenly dispelled, and his 
 philanthropic schemes fell to the ground. Neither Prince 
 Kung nor his colleagues had any intention to pave the way 
 for their own effacenlent. 
 
 After Mr. Lay's departure, the Maritime Customs were
 
 THE REGENCY 487 
 
 placed under the control of Mr. Eobert Hart, who had acted 
 during Mr. Lay's absence in Europe. This appointment was 
 accompanied by the transfer of the official residence from 
 Pekin to Shanghai, which was attended with much practical 
 advantage. Already the customs revenue had risen to three 
 millions, and trade was steadily expanding as the rebels were 
 gradually driven back, and as the Yangtsekiang and the 
 coasts became safer for navigation. Numerous schemes were 
 suggested for the opening up of China by railways and the 
 telegraph ; but they all very soon ended in nothing, for the 
 simple reason that the Chinese did not want them. They 
 were more sincere and energetic in their adoption of military 
 improvements. 
 
 The anxieties of Prince Kung on the subject of the dy- 
 nasty, and with regard to the undue pretensions and expecta- 
 tions of the foreign officials who looked on the Chinese merely 
 as the instruments of their self-aggrandizement, were further 
 increased during this period by the depredations of the 
 Nienfei rebels in the province of Shantung. During these 
 operations Sankolinsin died, leaving Tseng Kwofan in undis- 
 puted possession of the first place among Chinese officials. 
 Sankolinsin, when retreating after a reverse, was treacher- 
 ously murdered by some villagers whose hospitality he had 
 claimed. 
 
 The events of this introductory period may be appro- 
 priately concluded with the strange stroke of misfortune that 
 befell Prince Kung in the spring of 1865, and which seemed 
 to show that he had indulged some views of personal ambi- 
 tion. The affair had probably a secret history, but if so the 
 truth is hardly likely to be ever known. The known facts 
 were as follows: On April 2, 1865, there appeared an edict 
 degrading the prince in the name of the two regent-em- 
 presses. The charge made against him was of having grown 
 arrogant and assumed privileges to which he had no right. 
 He was at first "diligent and circumspect," but he has now 
 become disposed "to overrate his own importance. " In con- 
 sequence, he was deprived of all his appointments and dis-
 
 438 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 missed from tlie scene of public affairs. Five weeks after 
 his fall, however, Prince Kung was reinstated, on May 8, in 
 all his offices, with the exception of that of President of the 
 Council. This episode, which might have produced grave 
 complications, closed with a return to almost the precise 
 state of things previously existing. There was one impor- 
 tant difference. The two empresses had asserted their pre- 
 dominance. Prince Kung had hoped to be supreme, and to 
 rule uncontrolled. From this time forth he was content 
 to be their minister and adviser, on terms similar to those 
 that would have applied to any other official. 
 
 The year 1865, which witnessed this very interesting 
 event in the history of the Chinese Government, beheld 
 before its close the departure of Sir Frederick Bruce from 
 Pekin, and the appointment of Sir Eutherford Alcock, who 
 had been the first British minister to Japan during the crit- 
 ical period of the introduction of foreign intercourse with 
 that country, to fill the post of Resident Minister at Pekin. 
 Sir Rutherford Alcock then found the opportunity to put in 
 practice some of the honorable sentiments to which he had 
 given expression twenty years before at Shanghai. When 
 Sir Rutherford left Yeddo for Pekin, the post of Minister 
 in Japan was conferred on Sir Harry Parkes, who had been 
 acting as consul at Shanghai since the conclusion of the war. 
 The relations between the countries were gradually settling 
 down on a satisfactory basis, and the appointment of a Su- 
 preme Court for China and Japan at Shanghai, with Sir 
 Edmund Hornby as Chief Judge, promised to enforce obe- 
 dience to the law among even the unsettled adventurers of 
 different nationalities left by the conclusion of the Taeping 
 Rebellion and the cessation of piracy without a profitable 
 pursuit. 
 
 While the events which have been set forth were hap- 
 pening in the heart of China, other misfortunes had befallen 
 the executive in the more remote quarters of the realm, but 
 resulting none the less in the loss and ruin of provinces, and 
 in the subversion of the emperor's authority. Two great
 
 THB REGENCY 439 
 
 uprisings of the people occurred in opposite directions, both 
 commencing while the Taeping Rebellion was in full force, 
 and continuing to disturb the country for many years after 
 its suppression. The one had for its scene the great south- 
 western province of Yunnan; tne other the two provinces 
 of the northwest, Shensi and Kansuh, and extending thence 
 westward to the Pamir. They resembled each other in one 
 point, and that was that they were instigated and sustained 
 by the Mohammedan population alone. The Panthays and 
 the Tungani were either indigenous tribes or foreign immi- 
 grants who had adopted or imported the tenets of Islam. 
 Their sympathies with the Pekin Government were probably 
 never very great, but they were impelled in both cases to 
 revolt more by local tyranny than by any distinct desire 
 to cast oS the authority of the Chinese; but, of course, the 
 obvious embarrassment of the central executive encouraged 
 by simplifying the task of rebellion. The Panthay rising 
 calls for description in the first place, because it began at an 
 earlier period than the other, and also because the details 
 have been preserved with greater fidelity. Mohammedanism 
 is believed to have been introduced into Yunnan in or about 
 the year 1275, and it made most progress among the so-called 
 aboriginal tribes, the Lolos and the Mantzu. The officials 
 were mostly Chinese or Tartars, and, left practically free 
 from control, they more often abused theu' power than 
 sought to employ it for the benefit of the people they gov- 
 erned. In the very first year of Hienfung's reign (1851) a 
 petition reached the capital from a Mohammedan land pro- 
 prietor in Yunnan named Ma Wenchu, accusing the em- 
 peror's officials of the gravest crimes, and praying that "a 
 just and honest man' ' might be sent to redress the wrongs 
 of an injured and long-suffering people. The petition was 
 carefully read and favorably considered at the capital; but 
 beyond a gracious answer the emperor was at the time 
 powerless to apply a remedy to the evil. Four years passed 
 away without any open manifestation of the deep discontent 
 smoldering below the surface. But in 1855 the Chinese and
 
 440 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the Mohammedan laborers quarreled in one of the principal 
 mines of the province, which is covered with mines of gold, 
 iron, and copper. It seems that the greater success of the 
 Mohammedans in the uncertain pursuit of mining had roused 
 the displeasure of the Chinese. Disputes ensued, in which 
 the Mussulmans added success in combat to success in min- 
 ing; and the official appointed to superintend the mines, in- 
 stead of remaining with a view to the restoration of order, 
 sought his personal safety by precipitate flight to the town 
 of Yunnan. During his absence, the Chinese population 
 raised a levy e?i raasse^ attacked the Mohammedans who 
 had gained a momentary triumph, and compelled them by 
 sheer weight of numbers to beat a hasty retreat to their own 
 homes in a different part of the province. This success was 
 the signal for a general outcry against the Mohammedans, 
 who had long been the object of the secret ill-will of the 
 other inhabitants. Massacres took place in several parts of 
 Yunnan, and the followers of the Prophet had to flee for 
 their lives. 
 
 Among those who were slain during these popular dis- 
 orders was a young chief named Ma Sucheng; and when the 
 news of his murder reached his native village, his younger 
 brother, Ma Si en, who had just received a small military 
 command, declared his intention to avenge him, and fled to 
 join the Mohammedan fugitives in the mountains. In this 
 secure retreat they rallied their forces, and, driven to des- 
 peration by the promptings of want, they left their fastnesses 
 with the view of regaining what they had lost. In this they 
 succeeded better than they coukl have hoped for. The Chi- 
 nese population experienced in their turn the bitterness of 
 defeat; and the mandarins had the less difficulty in con- 
 cluding a temporary understanding between the exhausted 
 combatants. Tranquillity was restored, and the miners re- 
 sumed their occupations. But the peace was deceptive, and 
 in a little time the struggle was renewed with increased fury. 
 In this emergency the idea occurred to some of the officials 
 that an easy and efficacious remedy of the difficulty in which
 
 THE REGENCY 441 
 
 they found themselves would be provided by the massacre 
 of the whole Mussulman population. In this plot the fore- 
 most part was taken by Hwang Chung, an official who bit- 
 terly hated the Mohammedans. He succeeded in obtaining 
 the acquiescence of all his colleagues with the exception of 
 the viceroy of the province, who exposed the iniquity of the 
 design, but who, destitute of all support, was powerless to 
 prevent its execution. At the least he resolved to save his 
 honor and reputation by committing suicide, and he and his 
 wife were found one morning hanging up in the hall of the 
 yamen. His death simplified the execution of the project 
 which his refusal might possibly have prevented. May 19, 
 1856, was the date fixed for the celebration of this Chinese 
 St. Bartholomew. But the secret had not been well kept. 
 The Mohammedans, whether warned or suspicious, dis- 
 trusted the authorities and their neighbors, and stood vigi- 
 lantly on their guard. At this time they looked chiefly to a 
 high priest named Ma Tesing for guidance and instruction. 
 But although on the alert, they were, after all, taken to some 
 extent by surprise, and many of them were massacred after 
 a more or less unavailing resistance. But if many of the 
 Mussulmans were slain, the survivors were inspired with a 
 desperation which the mandarins had never contemplated. 
 From one end of Yunnan to the other the Mohammedans, 
 in face of great personal peril, rose by a common and spon- 
 taneous impulse, and the Chinese population was compelled 
 to take a hasty refuge in the towns. At Talifoo, where the 
 Mohammedans formed a considerable portion of the popula- 
 tion, the most desperate fighting occurred, and after three 
 days' carnage the Mussulmans, under Tu "Wensiu, were left 
 in possession of the city. The rebels did not remain without 
 leaders, whom they willingly recognized and obeyed ; for the 
 kwanshihs, or chiefs, who had accepted titles of authority 
 from the Chinese, cast off their allegiance and placed them- 
 selves at the head of the popular movement. The priest Ma 
 Tesing was raised to the highest post of all as Dictator, but 
 Tu Wensiu admitted no higher authority than his own
 
 442 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 within tlie walls of Talifoo. Ma Tesing liad performed the 
 pilgrimage to Mecca, he had resided at Constantinople for 
 two 3^ears, and his reputation for knowledge and saintliness 
 stood highest among his co-religionists. 
 
 While Ma Tesing exercised the supremacy due to his age 
 and attainments, the young chief Ma Sien led the rebels in 
 the field. His energy was most conspicuous, and in the 
 year 1858 he thought he was sufficiently strong to make an 
 attack upon the city of Yunnan itself. His attack was 
 baffled by the resolute defense of an officer named Lin 
 Tzuchin, who had shown great courage as a partisan leader 
 against the insurgents before he was intrusted with the de- 
 fense of the provincial capital. Ma Sien was compelled to 
 beat a retreat, and to devote himself to the organization 
 of the many thousand Ijen or Lolos recruits who signified 
 their attachment to his cause. For the successful defense of 
 Yunnan, Lin was made a Titu, and gradually collected into 
 his own hands such authority as still remained to the em- 
 peror's lieutenants. On both sides preparations were made 
 for the renewal of the struggle, but before the year 1858 
 ended Ma Sien met with a second repulse at the town of 
 Linan. The year 1859 was not marked by any event of sig- 
 nal importance, although the balance of success inclined on 
 the whole to the Mussulmans. But in the following year the 
 Mohammedans drew up a large force, com23uted to exceed 
 50,000 men, round Yunnanfoo, to which they laid vigorous 
 siege. The imperialists were taken at a disadvantage, and 
 the large number of people who had fled for shelter into the 
 town rendered the small store of provisions less sufficient for 
 a protracted defense. Yunnanfoo was on the point of sur- 
 render when an event occurred which not merely relieved 
 it from its predicament, but altered the whole complexion of 
 the struggle. The garrison had made up its mind to yield. 
 Even the brave Lin had accepted the inevitable, and begun 
 to negotiate with the two rebel leaders, Ma Sien and the 
 priest Ma Tesing. Those chiefs, with victory in their gossip, 
 manifested an unexpected and surprising moderation. In-
 
 THE REGENCY 443 
 
 stead of demanding from Lin a complete and unconditional 
 surrender, they began to discuss with him what terms could 
 be agreed upon for the cessation of the war and the restora- 
 tion of tranquillity to the province. At first it was thought 
 that these propositions concealed some intended treachery, 
 but their sincerity was placed beyond dispute by the suicide 
 of the mandarin Hwang Chung, who had first instigated the 
 people to massacre their Mohammedan brethren. The terms 
 of peace were promptly arranged, and a request was for- 
 warded to Pekin for the ratification of a convention con- 
 cluded under the pressure of necessity with some of the rebel 
 leaders. The better to conceal the fact that this arrange- 
 ment had been made with the principal leader of the dis- 
 affected, Ma Sien changed his name to Ma Julung, and 
 received the rank of general in the Chinese service; while 
 the high priest accepted as his share the not inconsiderable 
 pension of two hundred taels a month. It is impossible to 
 divine the true reasons which actuated these instigators 
 of rebellion in their decision to go over to the side of the 
 government. They probably thought that they had done 
 sufficient to secure all practical advantages, and that any 
 persistence in hostilities would only result in the increased 
 misery and impoverishment of the province. Powerful as 
 they were, there were other Mohammedan leaders seeking 
 to acquire the supreme position among their co-religionists; 
 and foremost among these was Tu Wensiu, who had reduced 
 the whole of Western Yunnan to his sway, and reigned at 
 Talifoo. The Mohammedan cause, important as it was, did 
 not afford scope for the ambitions of two such men as Ma 
 Julung and Tu Wensiu. The former availed himself of the 
 favorable opportunity to settle this difficulty in a practical 
 and, as he shrewdly anticipated, the most profitable man- 
 ner for himself personally, by giving in his adhesion to the 
 government. 
 
 This important defection did not bring in its train any 
 certainty of tranquillity. Incited by the example of their 
 leaders, every petty officer and chief thought himself de-
 
 444 BISTORT OF CHINA 
 
 serving of the highest honors, and resolved to fight for his 
 own hand. Ma Julung left Yunnanfoo for the purpose of 
 seizing a neighboring town which had revolted, and during 
 his absence one of his lieutenants seized the capital, mur- 
 dered the viceroy, and threatened to plunder the inhabitants. 
 Ma Julung was summoned to return in hot haste, and as a 
 temporary expedient the priest Ma Tesing was elected vice- 
 roy. When Ma Julung returned with his army he had to 
 lay siege to Yunnanfoo, and although he promptly effected 
 an entrance into the city, it took five days' hard fighting in 
 the streets before the force in occupation was expelled. The 
 insurgent officer was captured, exposed to the public gaze 
 for one month in an iron cage, and then executed in a cruel 
 manner. Ma Tesing was deposed from the elevated position 
 which he had held for so short a time, and a new Chinese 
 viceroy arrived from Kweichow. The year 1863 opened with 
 the first active operations against Tu Wensiu, who, during 
 these years of disorder in Central Yunnan, had been gov- 
 erning the western districts with some prudence. It would 
 have been better if they had not been undertaken, for they 
 only resulted in the defeat of the detachments sent by Ma 
 Julung to engage the despot of Talifoo. Force having failed, 
 they had recourse to diplomacy, and Ma Tesing was sent to 
 sound Tu Wensiu as to whether he would not imitate their 
 example and make his peace with the authorities. These 
 overtures were rejected with disdain, and Tu Wensiu pro- 
 claimed his intention of holding out to the last, and refused 
 to recognize the wisdom or the necessity of coming to terms 
 with the government. The embarrassment of Ma Julung 
 and the Yunnan officials, alread}^ sufiiciently acute, was at 
 this conjuncture further aggravated by an outbreak in their 
 rear among the Miaotze and some other mountain tribes in 
 the province of Kweichow. To the difficulty of coping with 
 a strongly placed enemy in front was thus added that of 
 maintaining communications through a hostile and difficult 
 region. A third independent party had also come into exist- 
 ence in Yunnan, where an ex-Chinese official named Liang
 
 THE REGENCY 4A& 
 
 SliiTimei had set up His own authority at Linan, mainly, it 
 was said, through jealousy of the Mohammedans taken into 
 the service of the government. The greatest difficulty of all 
 was to reconcile the pretensions of the different commanders, 
 for the Chinese officials, and the Futai Tsen Yuying in par- 
 ticular, regarded Ma Julung with no friendly eye. With 
 the year 1867, both sides having collected their strength, 
 more active operations were commenced, and Ma Julung 
 proceeded in person, at the head of the best troops he could 
 collect, to engage Tu Wensiu. It was at this time that the 
 imperialists adopted the red flag as their standard in contra- 
 distinction to the white flag of the insui'gents. A desultory 
 campaign ensued, but although Ma Julung evinced both cour- 
 age and capacity, the result was on the whole unfavorable to 
 him; and he had to retreat to the capital, where events of 
 some importance had occurred during his absence in the 
 field. The viceroy, who had been stanchly attached to Ma 
 Julung, died suddenly and under such circumstances as to 
 suggest a sus23icion of foul play; and Tsen Yuying had by 
 virtue of his rank of Futai assumed the temporary discharge 
 of his duties. The retreat of Ma Julung left the insurgents 
 free to follow up their successes; and, in the course of 1868, 
 the authority of the emperor had disappeared from every 
 part of the province except the prefectural city of Yunnan- 
 foo. This bad fortune led the Mussulmans who had fol- 
 lowed the advice and fortunes of Ma Julung to consider 
 whether it would not be wise to rejoin their co-religionists, 
 and to at once finish the contest by the destruction of the 
 government. Had Ma Julung wavered in his fidelity for 
 a moment they would have all joined the standard of Tu 
 "Wensiu, and the rule of the Sultan of Talifoo would have 
 been established from one end of Yunnan to the other; but 
 he stood firm and arrested the movement in a summary 
 manner. 
 
 Tu Wensiu, having established the security of his com- 
 munications with Burma, whence he obtained supplies of 
 arms and munitions of war, devoted his efforts to the cap-
 
 446 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 ture of Yunnanfoo, whicli lie completely invested. The 
 garrison was reduced to the lowest straits before Tsen Yu- 
 ying resolved to come to the aid of his distressed colleague. 
 The loss of the prefectural town would not merely entail 
 serious consequences to the imperialist cause, but he felt it 
 would j^ersoually compromise him as the Futai at Pekin. In 
 the early part of 1869, therefore, lie threw himself into the 
 town witli three thousand men, and the forces of Tu Wensiu 
 found themselves obliged to withdraw from the eastern side 
 of tbe city. A long period of inaction followed, but during 
 this time the most important events happened with regard 
 to the ultimate result. Ma Julung employed all bis artifice 
 and arguments to show the rebel cbiefs the utter hopeless- 
 ness of their succeeding against the whole power of the Chi- 
 nese empire, wbich, from tbe suppression of the Taeping 
 Eebellion, would soon be able to be employed against them. 
 They felt the force of his representations, and they were also 
 oppressed by a sense of the slow progress they had made 
 toward the capture of Yunnanfoo. Some months after Tsen 
 Yuying's arrival, those of the rebels who were encamped to 
 the north of the city hoisted the red flag and gave in their 
 adhesion to the government. Then Ma Julung resumed ac- 
 tive operations against the other rebels, and obtained several 
 small successes. A wound received during one of the skir- 
 mishes put an end to his activity, and the campaign resumed 
 its desultory character. But Ma Julung's illness had other 
 unfortunate consequences; for during it Tsen Yuying broke 
 faith with those of the rebel leaders who had come over, and 
 put tliem all to a cruel death. The natural consequence of 
 this foolish and ferocious act was that the Mohammedans 
 again reverted to their desperate resolve to stand firmly 
 by the side of Tu Wensiu. The war again passed into a 
 more active phase. Ma Julung had recovered from his 
 "wounds. A new viceroy, and a man of some energy, was 
 sent from Pekin. Lin Yuchow liad attracted the notice of 
 Tseng Kwofan among those of his native province who had 
 responded to his appeal to defend Hoonan against the Tae-
 
 THE REGENCY 447 
 
 pings sixteen years before; and shortly "before the deatli of 
 the last viceroy of Yunnan, he had been made Governor 
 of Kweicho. To the same patron at Pekin he now owed 
 his elevation to the viceroyalty. It is said that he had lost 
 the energy which once characterized him; but he brought 
 with him several thousand Hoonan braves, whose courage 
 and military experience made them invaluable auxiliaries 
 to the embarrassed authorities in Yunnan. In the course 
 of the year 1870 most of the towns in the south and the 
 north of Yunnan were recovered, and communications were 
 reopened with Szchuen. As soon as the inhabitants per- 
 ceived that the government had recovered its strength, they 
 hastened to express their joy at the change by repudiating 
 the white flag which Tu "Wensiu had compelled them to 
 adopt. The imperialists even to the last increased the diffi- 
 culty of their work of pacification by exhibiting a relentless 
 cruelty; and while the inhabitants thought to secure their 
 safety by a speedy surrender, the Mussulmans were ren- 
 dered more desperate in their resolve to resist. The chances 
 of a Mohammedan success were steadily diminishing when 
 Yang Yuko, a mandarin of some military capacity, who had 
 begun his career in the most approved manner as a rebel, 
 succeeded in capturing the whole of the salt-producing dis- 
 trict which had been the main source of their strength. In 
 the year 1872 all the preliminary arrangements were made 
 for attacking Talifoo itself. A supply of rifles had been re- 
 ceived from Canton or Shanghai, and a few pieces of artil- 
 lery had also arrived. With these improved weapons the 
 troops of Ma Julung and Tsen Yuying enjoyed a distinct 
 advantage over the rebels of Talifoo. The horrors of war 
 were at this point increased by those of pestilence, for the 
 plague broke out at Puerh on the southern frontier, and, 
 before it disappeared, devastated the whole of the province, 
 completing the effect of the civil war, and ruining the few 
 districts which had escaped from its ravages. The direct 
 command of the siege operations at Talifoo was intrusted to 
 Yang Yuko, a hunchback general, who had obtained a repu-
 
 448 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 tation for invincibility; and when Tsen Yuying had com- 
 pleted his own operations he also proceeded to the camp be- 
 fore the Mohammedan capital for the purpose of taking part 
 in the crowning operation of the war. 
 
 Tu Wensiu and the garrison of Talifoo, although driven 
 to desperation, could not discover any issue from their diffi- 
 culties. They were reduced to the last stage of destitution, 
 and starvation stared them in the face. In this extremity 
 Tu Wensiu, although there was every reason to believe that 
 the imperialists would not fulfill their pledges, and that sur- 
 render simply meant yielding to a cruel death, resolved to 
 open negotiations with Yang Yuko for giving up the town. 
 The emperor's generals signified their desire for the speedy 
 termination of the siege, at the same time expressing ac- 
 quiescence in the general j^roposition of the garrison being 
 admitted to terms. Although the Futai and Yang Yuko 
 had promptly come to the mutual understanding to cele- 
 brate the fall of Talifoo by a wholesale massacre, they ex- 
 pressed their intention to sf)are the other rebels on the sur- 
 render of Tu "Wensiu for execution and on the payment of 
 an indemnity. The terms were accepted, although the more 
 experienced of the rebels warned their comrades that they 
 would not be complied with. On January 15, 1873, Tu 
 Wensiu, the original of the mythical Sultan Suliman, the 
 fame of whose power reached England, and who had been 
 an object of the solicitude of the Indian government, ac- 
 cepted the decision of his craven followers as expressing the 
 will of Heaven, and gave himself up for execution. He at- 
 tired himself in his best and choicest garments, and seated 
 himself in the yellow palanquin which he had adopted as 
 one of the few marks of royal state that his opportunities 
 allowed him to secure. Accompanied by the men who had 
 negotiated the surrender, he drove through the streets, re- 
 ceiving for the last time the homage of his people, and out 
 beyond the gates to Yang Yuko's camp. Those who saw 
 the cortege marveled at the calm indifference of the fallen 
 despot. He seemed to have as little fear of his fate as con-
 
 THE REGENCY 449 
 
 scioTisness of Ms surroundings. The truth soon became evi- 
 dent. He had baffled his enemies by taking slow poison. 
 Before he reached the presence of the Futai, who had wished 
 to gloat over the possession of his prisoner, the opium had 
 done its work, and Tu Wensiu was no more. It seemed but 
 an inadequate triumph to sever the head from the dead body, 
 and to send it preserved in honey as the proof of victory to 
 Pekin. Four days after Tu Wensiu' s death, the imperialists 
 were in complete possession of the town, and a week later 
 they had taken all their measures for the execution of the 
 fell plan upon which they had decided. A great feast was 
 given for the celebration of the convention, and the most im- 
 portant of the Mohammedan commanders, including those 
 who had negotiated the truce, were present. At a given 
 signal they were attacked and murdered by soldiers con- 
 cealed in the gallery for the purpose, while six cannon shots 
 announced to the soldiery that the hour had arrived for them 
 to break loose on the defenseless townspeople. The scenes 
 that followed are stated to have surpassed description. It 
 was computed that 30,000 men alone perished after the fall 
 of the old Panthay capital, and the Futai sent to Yunnanfoo 
 twenty-four large baskets full of human ears, as well as the 
 heads of the seventeen chiefs. 
 
 With the capture of Talifoo the great Mohammedan re- 
 bellion in the southwest, to which the Burmese gave the 
 name of Panthay, closed, after a desultory struggle of nearly 
 eighteen years. The war was conducted with exceptional 
 ferocity on both sides, and witnessed more than the usual 
 amount of falseness and breach of faith common to Oriental 
 struggles. Nobody benefited by the contest, and the pros- 
 perity of Yunnan, which at one time had been far from in- 
 considerable, sank to the lowest possible point. A new class 
 of officials came to the front during this period of disorder, 
 and fidelity was a sufficient passport to a certain rank. Ma 
 Julung, the Marshal Ma of European travelers, gained a 
 still higher station; and notwithstanding the jealousy of his 
 colleagues, acquired practical supremacy in the province.
 
 450 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 The high priest, Ma Tesing, who may be considered as the 
 prime instigator of the movement, was executed or poisoned 
 in 1874 at the instigation of some of the Chinese officials. 
 Yang Yuko, the most successful of all the generals, only- 
 enjoyed a brief tenure of power. It was said that he was 
 dissatisfied with his position as commander-in-chief, and as- 
 pired to a higher rank. He also was summoned to Pekin, 
 but never got further than Shanghai, where he died, or was 
 removed. But although quiet gradually descended uj^on this 
 part of China, it was long before prosperity followed in its 
 train. 
 
 About six years after the first mutterings of discontent 
 among the Mohammedans in the southwest, disturbances 
 occurred in the northwest provinces of Shensi and Kansuh, 
 where there had been many thousand followers of Islam 
 since an early period of Chinese history. They were gen- 
 erally obedient subjects and sedulous cultivators of the soil; 
 but they were always liable to sudden ebullitions of fanati- 
 cism or of turbulence, and it was said that during the later 
 years of his reign Keen Lung had meditated a wholesale 
 execution of the male population above the age of fifteen. 
 The threat, if ever made, was never carried out, but the 
 report suffices to show the extent to which danger was ap- 
 prehended from the Tungan population. The true origin of 
 the great outbreak in 1862 in Shensi seems to have been a 
 quarrel between the Chinese and the Mohammedan militia as 
 to their share of the spoil derived from the defeat and over- 
 throw of a brigand leader. After some bloodshed, two im- 
 perial commissioners were sent from Pekin to restore order. 
 The principal Mohammedan leader formed a plot to murder 
 the commissioners, and on their arrival he rushed into their 
 presence and slew one of them with his own hand. His co- 
 religionists deplored the rash act, and voluntarily seized and 
 surrendered him for the purpose of undergoing a cruel death. 
 But although he was torn to pieces, that fact did not satisfy 
 the outraged dignity of the emperor. A command was is- 
 sued in Tungche's name to the effect that all those who per-
 
 THE REGENCY 451 
 
 sisted in following the creed of Islam should perish by the 
 sword. From Shensi the outbreak spread into the adjoin- 
 ing province of Kansuh ; and the local garrisons were van- 
 quished in a pitched battle at Tara Ussu, beyond the regular 
 frontier. The insurgents did not succeed, however, in tak- 
 ing any of the larger towns of Shensi, and after threatening 
 with capture the once famous city of Singan, they were grad- 
 ually expelled from that province. The Mohammedan rebel- 
 lion within the limits of China proper would not, therefore, 
 have possessed more than local importance but for the fact 
 that it encouraged a similar outreak in the country further 
 west, and that it resulted in the severance of the Central 
 Asian provinces from China for a period of many years. 
 
 The uprising of the Mohammedans in the frontier prov- 
 inces appealed to the secret fears as well as to the longings 
 of the Tungan settlers and soldiers in all the towns and mili- 
 tary stations between Souchow and Kashgar. The sense of 
 a common peril, more perhaps than the desire to attain the 
 same object, led to revolts at Hami, Barkul, Urumtsi, and 
 Turfan, towns which formed a group of industrious com- 
 munities half-way between the prosperous districts of Kan- 
 suh on the one side and Kashgar on the other. The Tun- 
 gani at these towns revolted under the leading of their 
 priests, and imitated the example of their co-religionists 
 within the settled borders of China by murdering all who 
 did not accept their creed. After a brief interval, which 
 we may attribute to the greatness of the distance, to the 
 vigilance of the Chinese garrison, or to the apathy of the 
 population, the movement spread to the three towns immer 
 diately west of Turfan, Karashar, Kucha, and Aksu, where 
 it came into contact with, and was stopped by, another in- 
 surrectionary movement under Mohammedan, but totally 
 distinct, auspices. West of Aksu the Tungan rebellion never 
 extended south of the Tian Shan range. The defection of 
 the Tungani, who had formed a large proportion, if not the 
 majority, of the Chinese garrisons, paralyzed the strength 
 of the Celestials in Central Asia. Both in the districts de«
 
 452 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 pendent on Hi, and in those ruled from Kasligar and Yar- 
 kand, the Chinese were beset bj many great and permanent 
 difficulties. They were with united strength a minority, and 
 now that they were divided among themselves almost a 
 hopeless minority. The peoples they governed were fanat- 
 ical, false, and fickle. The ruler of Khokand and the refu- 
 gees living on his bounty were always on the alert to take 
 the most advantage of the least slip or act of weakness on the 
 part of the governing classes. Their machinations had been 
 hitherto baffled, but never before had so favorable an oppor- 
 tunity presented itself for attaining their wishes as when it 
 became known that the whole Mohammedan population was 
 up in arms against the emperor, and that communications 
 were severed between Kashgar and Pekin. The attempts 
 made at earlier periods on the part of the members of the 
 old ruling family in Kashgar to regain their own by expel- 
 ling the Chinese have been described. In 1857 Wali Khan, 
 one of the sons of Jehangir, had succeeded in gaining tempo- 
 rary possession of the city of Kashgar, and seemed for a mo- 
 ment to be likely to capture Yarkand also. He fell by his 
 vices. The people soon detested the presence of the man to 
 -whom they had accorded a too hasty welcome. After a rule 
 of four months he fled the country, vanquished in the field 
 by the Chinese garrison, and followed by the execrations 
 of the population he had come to deliver. The invasion of 
 Wali Khan further imbittered the relations between the Chi- 
 nese and their subjects; and a succession of governors bore 
 heavily on the Mohammedans. Popular dissatisfaction and 
 the apprehension in the minds of the governing officials that 
 their lives might be forfeited at any moment to a popular 
 outbreak added to the dangers of the situation in Kashgar 
 itself, when the news arrived of the Tungan revolt, and of 
 the many other complications which hampered the action 
 of the Pekin ruler. We cannot narrate here the details of 
 the rebellion in Kashgar. Its influence on the history of 
 China would not sanction such close exactitude. But in 
 the year 1863 the Chinese officials had become so alarmed
 
 THE REGENCY 453 
 
 at their isolated position that they resolved to adopt the des- 
 perate expedient of massacring all the Mohammedans or 
 Tungani in their own garrisons. The amban and his officers 
 were divided in council and dilatory in execution. The Tun- 
 gani heard of the plot while the governor was summoning 
 the nervx to carry it out. They resolved to anticipate him. 
 The Mohammedans at Yarkand, the largest and most im- 
 portant garrison in the country, rose in August, 1863, and 
 massacred all the Buddhist Chinese. Seven thousand men 
 are computed to have fallen. A small band fled to the cita- 
 del, which they held for a short time ; but at length, over- 
 whelmed by numbers, they preferred death to dishonor, and 
 destroyed themselves by exploding the fort with the maga- 
 zine. The defection of the Tungani thus lost Kashgaria for 
 the Chinese, as the other garrisons and towns promptly fol- 
 lowed the example of Yarkand; but they could not keep it 
 for themselves. The spectacle of this internal dissension 
 proved irresistible for the adventurers of Khokand, and 
 Buzurg, the last surviving son of Jehangir, resolved to 
 make another bid for power and for the recovery of the posi- 
 tion for which his father and kinsmen had striven in vain. 
 The wish might possibly have been no more attained than 
 theirs, had he not secured the support of the most capable 
 soldier in Khokand, Mahomed Yakoob, the defender of Ak 
 Musjid against the Kussians. It was not until the early 
 part of the year 1865 that this Khoja pretender, with his 
 small body of Khokandian officers and a considerable num- 
 ber of Kirghiz allies, appeared upon the scene. Then, how- 
 ever, their success was rapid. The Tungan revolt in Alty- 
 shahr resolved itself into a movement for the restoration of 
 the Khoja dynasty. In a short time Buzurg was established 
 as ruler, while his energetic lieutenant was employed in 
 the task of crushing the few remaining Chinese garrisons, 
 and also in cowing his Tungan allies, who already regarded 
 their new ruler with a doubtful eye. By the month of Sep- 
 tember in the same year that witnessed the passage of the 
 invading force through the Terek defile, the triumph of
 
 454 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the Khoja's arms was assured. A few weeks later Maho- 
 med Yakoob deposed his master, and caused himself to be 
 proclaimed ruler in his stead. The voice of the people rati- 
 fied the success of the man; and in 1866 Mahomed Yakoob, 
 or Yakoob Beg, received at the hands of the Ameer of 
 Bokhara the jDroud title of Athalik Ghazi, by which he was 
 long known. The Mohammedan rising spread still further 
 within the limits of Chinese authority in Central Asia. 
 
 While the events which have been briefly sketched were 
 happening in the region south of the great Tian Shan range, 
 others of not less importance had taken place in Hi or Kuld ja, 
 which, under Chinese rule, had enjoyed uninterrupted peace 
 for a century. It was this fact which marked the essential 
 difference between the Tungan rebellion and all the disturb- 
 ances that had preceded it. The revolution in the metro- 
 politan province was complicated by the presence of different 
 races, just as it had been in Kashgaria by the pretensions of 
 the Khoja family. A large portion of the population con- 
 sisted of those Tarantchis who were the descendants of the 
 Kashgarians deported on more than one occasion by the 
 Chinese from their own homes to the banks of the Hi; and 
 they had inherited a legacy of ill-will against their rulers 
 which only required the opportunity to display itself. The 
 Tungan — or Dungan, as the Russians spell it — element was 
 also very strong, and colonies of the Sobo and Solon tribes, 
 who had been emancipated from their subjection to the 
 Mongols by the Emperor Kanghi for their bravery, further 
 added to the variety of the nationalities dwelling in this 
 province. It had been said with some truth that the Chinese 
 ruled in this quarter of their dominions on the old principle 
 of commanding by the division of the subjected; and it had 
 been predicted that they would fall whenever any two of the 
 dependent populations combined against them. There is 
 little difficulty in showing that the misfortunes of the Chi- 
 nese were due to their own faults. They neglected the 
 plainest military precautions, and the mandarins thought 
 only of enriching themselves. But the principal cause of the
 
 THE REGENCY 455 
 
 destruction of their power was the cessation of the supplies 
 which they used to receive from Pekin. The government 
 of these dependencies was only possible by an annual gift 
 from the imperial treasury. When the funds placed at the 
 disposal of the Hi authorities were diverted to other uses, it 
 was no longer possible to maintain the old efficiency of the 
 service. Discontent was provided with a stronger argument 
 at the same time that the executive found itself embarrassed 
 in grappling with it. 
 
 The news of the Mohammedan outbreak in China warned 
 the Tungani in Hi that their opportunity had come. But 
 although there were disturbances as early as January, 1863, 
 these were suppressed, and the vigilance of the authorities 
 sufficed to keep things quiet for another year. Their sub- 
 sequent incapacity, or hesitation to strike a prompt blow, 
 enabled the Mohammedans to husband their resources and 
 to complete their plans. A temporary alliance was con- 
 cluded between the Tungani and the Tarantchis, and they 
 hastened to attack the Chinese troops and officials. The 
 year 1865 was marked by the progress of a sanguinary 
 struggle, during which the Chinese lost their principal towns, 
 and some of their garrisons were ruthlessly slaughtered after 
 surrender. The usual scenes of civil war followed. When 
 the Chinese were completely vanquished and their garrisons 
 exterminated, the victors quarreled among themselves. The 
 Tungani and the Tarantchis met in mortal encounter, and 
 the former were vanquished and their chief slain. When 
 they renewed the contest, some months later, they were, 
 after another sanguinary struggle, again overthrown. The 
 Tarantchis then ruled the state by themselves, but the ex- 
 ample they set of native rule was, to say the least, not 
 encouraging. One chief after another was deposed and 
 murdered. The same year witnessed no fewer than live 
 leaders in the supreme place of power; and when Abul 
 Oghlan assumed the title of Sultan the cup of their iniquities 
 was already full. In the year 1871 an end was at last put 
 to these enormities by the occupation of the province by a
 
 456 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Bussian force, and the installation of a Russian governor. 
 Although it is probable that they were only induced to take 
 this step by the fear that if they did not do so Yakoob Beg 
 would, the fact remains that the Russian Grovernment did a 
 good thing in the cause of order by interfering for the res- 
 toration of tranquillity in the valley of the Hi. 
 
 The Mohammedan outbreaks in southwestern and north- 
 western China resulted, therefore, in the gradual suppression 
 of the Panthay rebellion, which was completed in the twelfth 
 year of Tungche's reign, while the Tungan rising, so far 
 as the Central Asian territories were concerned, remained 
 unquelled for a longer period. The latter led to the estab- 
 lishment of an independent Tungan confederacy beyond 
 Kansuh, and also of the kingdom of Kashgaria ruled by 
 Yakoob Beg. The revolt in Hi, after several alternations 
 of fortune, resulted in the brief independence of the Taran- 
 tchis, who were in tarn displaced by the Russians under a 
 pledge of restoring the province to the Chinese whenever 
 they should return. Judged by the extent of territory in- 
 volved, the Mohammedan rebellion might be said to be not 
 less important than the Taeping; but the comparison on that 
 ground alone would be really delusive, as the numerical 
 inferiority of the Mohammedans rendered it always a ques- 
 tion only of time for the central power to be restored. 
 
 The young Emperor Tungche, therefore, grew up amid 
 continual difficulties, although the successes of his principal 
 lieutenants afforded good reason to believe that, so far as 
 they arose from rebels, it was only a question of time before 
 they would be finally removed. The foreign intercourse still 
 gave cause for much anxiety, although there was no appre- 
 hension of war. It would have been unreasonable to suppose 
 that the relations between the foreign merchants and resi- 
 dents and the Chinese could become, after the suspicion and 
 dangers of generations, absolutely cordial. The commercial 
 and missionary bodies, into which the foreign community 
 was naturally divided, had objects of trade or religion to 
 advance, which rendered them apt to take an unfavorable
 
 THE REGENCY 457 
 
 view of the progress made by the Chinese Government in the 
 paths of civilization, and to be ever skeptical even of its good 
 faith. The main object with the foreign diplomatic repre- 
 sentatives became not more to obtain justice for their coun- 
 trymen than to restrain their eagerness, and to confine their 
 pretensions to the rights conceded by the treaties. A clear 
 distinction had to be drawn between undue coercion of the 
 Chinese Government on the one hand, and the effectual com- 
 pulsion of the people to evince respect toward foreigners and 
 to comply with the obligations of the treaty on the other. 
 Instances repeatedly occurred in reference to the latter mat- 
 ter, when it would have been foolish to have shown weak- 
 ness, especially as there was not the least room to suppose 
 that the government possessed at that time the power and 
 the capacity to secure reparation for, or to prevent the repe- 
 tition of, attacks on foreigners. Under this category came 
 the riot at Yangchow in the year 1868, when some mission- 
 aries had their houses burned down, and were otherwise 
 maltreated. A similar outrage was perpetrated in Formosa; 
 but the fullest redress was always tendered as soon as the 
 executive realized that the European representatives attached 
 importance to the occurrence. The recurrence of these local 
 dangers and disputes served to bring more clearly than ever 
 before the minds of the Chinese ministers the advisability of 
 taking some step on their own part toward an understanding 
 with European governments and peoples. The proposal to 
 depute a Chinese embassador to the West could hardly be 
 said to be new, seeing that it had been projected after the 
 Treaty of Nankin, and that the minister Keying had mani- 
 fested some desire to be the first mandarin to serve in that 
 novel capacity. But when the Tsungli Yamen took up the 
 question it was decided that in this as in other matters it 
 would be expedient to avail themselves in the first place 
 of foreign mediation. The favorable opportunity of doing 
 so presented itself when Mr. Burlinghame retired from his 
 post as minister of the United States at Pekin. In the win- 
 ter of 1867-68 Mr. Burlinghame accepted an appointment 
 China— 20
 
 458 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 as accredited representative of the Chinese Government to 
 eleven of the principal countries of the world, and two Chi- 
 nese mandarins and a certain number of Chinese students 
 were appointed to accompany him on his tour. The Chinese 
 themselves did not attach as much importance as they might 
 have done to his efforts, and Mr. Burlinghame's mission will 
 be remembered more as an educational process for foreigners 
 than as signifying any decided change in Chinese policy. 
 His death at St. Petersburg, in March, 1870, put a sudden 
 and unexpected close to his tour, but it cannot be said that 
 he could have done more toward the elucidation of Chinese 
 questions than he had already accomplished, while his bold 
 and optimistic statements, after awakening public attention, 
 had already begun to produce the inevitable reaction. 
 
 In 1869 Sir Rutherford Alcock retired, and was succeeded 
 in the difficult post of English representative in China by Mr. 
 Thomas Wade, whose services have been more than once 
 referred to. In the very first year of his holding the post an 
 event occurred which cast all the minor aggressive acts that 
 had preceded it into the shade. It may perhaps be surmised 
 that this was the Tientsin massacre — an event which threat- 
 ened to re- open the whole of the China question, and which 
 brought France and China to the verge of war. It was in 
 June, 1870, on the eve of the outbreak of the Franco- Prus- 
 sian War, that the foreign settlements were startled by the 
 report of a great popular outbreak against foreigners in the 
 important town of Tientsin. At that city there was a large 
 and energetic colony of Roman Catholic priests, and their 
 success in the task of conversion, small as it might be held, 
 was still sufficient to excite the ire and fears of the literary 
 and official classes. The origin of mob violence is ever diffi- 
 cult to discover, for a trifle suffices to set it in motion. But 
 at Tientsin specific charges of the most horrible and, it need 
 not be said, the most baseless character were spread about as 
 to the cruelties and evil practices of those devoted to the ser- 
 vice of religion. These rumors were diligently circulated, 
 and it need not cause wonder if, when the mere cry of "Fan-
 
 THE REGENCY 469 
 
 quai" — Foreign Devil — sufficed to raise a disturbance, these 
 allegations resulted in a vigorous agitation against the mis- 
 sionaries, who were already the mark of popular execration. 
 It was well known beforehand that an attack on the mission- 
 aries would take place unless the authorities adopted very- 
 efficient measures of protection. The foreign residents and 
 the consulates were warned of the coming outburst, and a 
 very heavy responsibility will always rest on those who 
 might, by the display of greater vigor, have prevented the 
 unfortunate occurrences that ensued. At the same time, 
 allowing for the prejudices of the Chinese, it must be allowed 
 that not only must the efforts of all foreign missionaries be 
 attended with the gravest peril, but that the acts of the 
 French priests and nuns at Tientsin were, if not indiscreet, at 
 least peculiarly calculated to arouse the anger and offend the 
 superstitious predilections of the Chinese. That the wrong 
 was not altogether on the side of the Chinese may be gath- 
 ered from an official dispatch of the United States Minister, 
 describing the originating causes of the outrage: "At many 
 of the principal places in China open to foreign residence, the 
 Sisters of Charity have established institutions, each of which 
 appears to combine in itself a foundling hospital and orphan 
 asylum. Finding that the Chinese were averse to placing 
 children in their charge, the managers of these institutions 
 offered a certain sum per head for all the children placed 
 under their control, to be given to them; it being understood 
 that a child once in their asylum no parent, relative, or 
 guardian could claim or exercise any control over it. It has 
 for some time been asserted by the Chinese, and believed by 
 most of the non-Catholic foreigners residing here, that the 
 system of paying bounties induced the kidnaping of children 
 for these institutions for the sake of the reward. It is also 
 asserted that the priests or sisters, or both, have been in the 
 habit of holding out inducements to have children brought 
 to them in the last stages of illness for the purpose of being 
 baptized in articulo mortis. In this way many children 
 have been taken to these establishments in the last stages
 
 460 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 of disease, baptized there, and soon after taken away dead. 
 All these acts, together with the secrecy and seclusion which 
 appear to be a part and parcel of the regulations which gov- 
 ern institutions of this character everywhere, have created 
 suspicions in the minds of the Chinese, and these suspicions 
 have engendered an intense hatred against the sisters." 
 
 At that time Chung How, the superintendent of trade 
 for the three northern ports, was the principal official in 
 Tientsin; but although some representations, not as forcible 
 however as the occasion demanded, were made to him by M. 
 Fontanier, the French Consul, on June 18, three days before 
 the massacre, no reply was given and no precautions were 
 taken. On the 21st a large crowd assembled outside the 
 mission house. They very soon assumed an attitude of 
 hostility, and it was clear that at any moment the attack 
 might begin. M. Fontanier hastened off in person to Chung 
 How, but his threats seem to have been as unavailing as his 
 arguments. On his return he found the attack on the point 
 of commencing. He made use of menaces, and he fired a 
 shot from his revolver, whether in self-defense or in the heat 
 of indignation at some official treachery will never be known. 
 The mob turned upon him, and he was murdered. The Chi- 
 nese then hastened to complete the work they had begun. 
 Chung How, like Surajah Dowlah, was not to be disturbed, 
 and the attack on the mission house and consulate proceeded, 
 while the officials responsible for order remained inactive. 
 Twenty- one foreigners in all were brutally murdered under 
 circumstances of the greatest barbarity, while the number 
 of native converts who fell at the same time can never be 
 ascertained. 
 
 The Tientsin massacre was followed by a wave of anti- 
 foreign feeling over the whole country; but although an 
 official brought out a work — entitled "Death-blow to Corrupt 
 Doctrine" — which obtained more than a passing notoriety, 
 and notwithstanding that some members of the imperial 
 family, and notably, as it was stated, Prince Chun, regarded 
 the movement with favor, the arguments of Prince Kung
 
 THE REGENCY 461 
 
 and the more moderate ministers carried the day, and it was 
 resolved to make every concession in the power of the gov- 
 ernment for the pacific settlement of the dispute that had 
 arisen with France. The outbreak of the war between 
 France and Germany, while it contributed to a peaceful 
 settlement of the question, rendered the process of diplomacy 
 slow and dubious. The Tsungli Yamen, as soon as it real- 
 ized that nothing short of the dispatch of a mission of apology 
 to Europe would salve the injured honor of France, deter- 
 mined that none other than Chung How himself should go to 
 Paris to assure the French that the government deplored the 
 popular ebullition and had taken no part in it. The untoward 
 result of the great war for France embarrassed her action in 
 China. Chung How's assurances were accepted, the prof- 
 fered compensation was received; but the Chinese were in- 
 formed that in recognition of France's moderation, and in 
 return for the reception of their envoy by M. Thiers, the 
 right of audience should be conceded to the French minister 
 resident at Pekin. The Audience Question naturally aroused 
 the greatest interest at Pekin, where it agitated the ofhcial 
 mind not merely because it signified another concession to 
 force, but also because it promised to produce a disturbing 
 effect on the mind of the people. The young emperor was 
 growing up, and might be expected to take a direct share 
 in the administration at an early date. It was not an idle 
 apprehension that filled the minds of his ministers lest he 
 might lay the blame on them for having cast upon him the 
 obligation of receiving ministers of foreign States in a man- 
 ner such as they had never before been allowe'd to appear in 
 the presence of the occupant of the Dragon Throne. The 
 youth of the sovereign served to postpone the question for a 
 short space of time, but it was no longer doubtful that the 
 assumption of personal authority by the young Emperor 
 Tungche would be accompanied by the reintroduction, and 
 probably by the settlement, of the Audience Question. It 
 was typical of the progress Chinese statesmen were making 
 that none of them seemed to consider the possibility of dis-
 
 462 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 tinctly refusing tliis privilege. Its concession was only post- 
 poned until after the celebration of the young emperor's 
 marriage. 
 
 It had been known for some time that the young ruler 
 had fixed his affections on Ahluta, a Manchu lady of good 
 family, daughter of Duke Chung, and that the empresses 
 had decided that she was worthy of the high rank to which 
 she was to be raised. The marriage ceremony was deferred 
 on more than one plea until after the emperor had reached his 
 sixteenth birthday, but in October, 1872, there was thought 
 to be no longer any excuse for postponement, and it was 
 celebrated with great splendor on the 16th of that month. 
 The arrangements were made in strict accordance with the 
 precedent of the Emperor Kanghi's marriage in 1674, that 
 ruler having also married when in occupation of the throne, 
 and before he had attained his majority. It was stated that 
 the ceremonial was imposing, that the incidental expenses 
 were enormous, and that the people were very favorably 
 impressed by the demeanor of their young sovereign. Four 
 months after the celebration of his marriage the formal act 
 of conferring upon Tungche the personal control of his 
 dominions was performed. In a special decree issued from 
 the Board of Kites the emperor said that he had received 
 "the commands of their majesties the two empresses to as- 
 sume the superintendence of business." This edict was 
 directed to the Foreign ministers, who in return presented 
 a collective request to be received in audience. Prince Kung 
 was requested "to take his Imperial Majesty's orders with 
 reference to their reception." The question being thus 
 brought to a crucial point, it was not unnatural that the 
 Chinese ministers should make the most vigorous resistance 
 they could to those details which seemed to and did encroach 
 upon the prerogative of the emperor as he had been accus- 
 tomed to exercise it. For, in the first place, they were no 
 longer free agents, and Tungche had himself to be consid- 
 ered in any arrangement for the reception of foreign envoys. 
 The discussion of the question assumed a controversial char-
 
 THE REGENCY 463 
 
 acter, in wMch stress was laid on the one side upon the 
 necessity of the kotow even in a modified form, while on the 
 other it was pointed out that the least concession was as 
 objectionable as the greatest, and that China would benefit 
 by the complete settlement of the question. It says a great 
 deal for the fairness and moderation of Prince Kung and the 
 ministers with him that, although they knew that the for- 
 eign governments were not prepared to make the Audience 
 Question one of war, or even of the suspension of diplomatic 
 relations, they determined to settle the matter in the way 
 most distasteful to themselves and most agreeable to foreign- 
 ers. On June 29, 1873, Tungche received in audience the 
 ministers of the principal powers at Pekin, and thus gave 
 completeness to the many rights and concessions obtained 
 from his father and grandfather by the treaties of Tientsin 
 and Nankin. The privilege thus secured caused lively grati- 
 fication in the minds of all foreign residents, to whom it sig- 
 nified the great surrender of the inherent right to superiority 
 claimed by the Chinese emperors, and we have recently seen 
 that it has been accepted as a precedent. 
 
 The sudden death of Tseng Kwofan in the summer of 
 1872 removed unquestionably the foremost public man in 
 China. After the fall of Nankin he had occupied the high- 
 est posts in the empire, both at that city and in the metrop- 
 olis. He was not merely powerful from his own position, 
 but from his having placed his friends and dependents in 
 many of the principal offices throughout the empire. At 
 first prejudiced against foreigners, he had gradually brought 
 himself to recognize that some advantage might be derived 
 from their knowledge. But the change came at too late a 
 period to admit of his conferring any distinct benefit on his 
 country from the more liberal policy he felt disposed to pur- 
 sue with regard to the training of Chinese youths in the 
 science and learning of the West. It was said that had he 
 been personally ambitious he might have succeeded in dis- 
 placing the Tartar regime. But such a thought never as- 
 sumed any practical shape in his mind, and to the end of his
 
 464 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 days Tseng Kwofan was satisfied to remain the steadfast 
 supporter and adherent of tlie Manclms. In this respect he 
 has been closely imitated by his most distinguished lieu- 
 tenant, Li Hung Chang, who succeeded to some of his 
 dignities and much of his power. 
 
 Another of Tseng's proteges, Tso Tsung Tang, had been 
 raised from the viceroyalty of Chekiang and Fuhkien to 
 that of Shensi and Kansuh. The promotion was of the more 
 doubtful value, seeing that both those provinces were in the 
 actual possession of the rebels; but Tso threw himself into 
 the task of reconquering them with remarkable energy, and 
 within two years of his arrival he was able to report that 
 he had cleared the province of Shensi of all insurgents. He 
 then devoted his attention to the pacification of Kansuh; and 
 after many desultory engagements proceeded to lay siege to 
 the town of Souchow, where the Mohammedans had massed 
 their strength. At the end of the year 1872 the imperial 
 army was drawn up in front of this place, but Tso does not 
 seem to have considered himself strong enough to deliver an 
 attack, and confined his operations to preventing the intro- 
 duction of supplies and fresh troops into the town. Even in 
 this he was only partially successful, as a considerable body 
 of men made their way in, in January, 1873. In the fol- 
 lowing month he succeeded in captiiring, by a night attack, 
 a temple outside the walls, upon which the Mohammedans 
 placed considerable value. The siege continued during the 
 whole of the summer, and it was not until the month of 
 October that the garrison was reduced to such extremities as 
 to surrender. The chiefs were hacked to pieces, and about 
 four thousand men perished by the sword. The women, 
 children, and old men were spared, and the spoil of the 
 place was handed over to the soldiery. It was Tso's dis- 
 tinctive merit that, far from being carried away by these 
 successes, he neglected no military precaution, and devoted 
 his main efforts to the reorganization of tlie province. In 
 that operation he may be left employed for the brief re- 
 mainder of Tungche's reign; but it may be said that in
 
 THE REGENCY 465 
 
 1874 the campaign against Kashgaria had been fully decided 
 upon. A thousand Manchu cavalry were sent to Souchow. 
 Sheepskins, horses, and ammunition in large quantities were 
 also dispatched to the far west, and General Kinshun, the 
 Manchu general, was intrusted with the command of the 
 army in the field. 
 
 The year 1874 witnessed an event that claims notice. 
 There never has been much good will between China and 
 her neighbors in Japan. The latter are too independent in 
 their bearing to please the advocates of Chinese predomi- 
 nance, at the same time that their insular position has left 
 them safe from the attack of the Pekin Government. The 
 attempt made by the Mongol, Kublai Khan, to subdue these 
 islanders had been too disastrous to invite repetition. In 
 Corea the pretensions of the ruler of Yeddo had been re- 
 pelled, if not crushed; but wherever the sea intervened the 
 advantage rested more or less decisively with him. The 
 island of Formosa is dependent upon China, and the west- 
 ern districts are governed by officials duly appointed by the 
 Viceroy of Fuhkien. But the eastern half of the island, sep- 
 arated from the cultivated districts by a range of mountains 
 covered with dense if not impenetrable forests, is held by 
 tribes who own no one's authority, and who act as they 
 deem fit. In the year 1868 or 1869 a junk from Loochoo 
 was wrecked on this coast, and the crew were murdered by 
 the islanders. The civil war in Japan prevented any prompt 
 claim for reparation, but in 1873 the affair was revived, and 
 a demand made at Pekin for compensation. The demand 
 was refused, whereupon the Japanese, taking the law into 
 their own hands, sent an expedition to Formosa. China 
 replied with a counter- demonstration, and war seemed in- 
 evitable. In this crisis Mr. Wade offered his good services in 
 the interests of peace, and after considerable controversy he 
 succeeded in bringing the two governments to reason. The 
 Chinese paid an indemnity of half a million taels, and the 
 Japanese evacuated the island. 
 
 In all countries governed by an absolute sovereign it is
 
 488 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 as interesting as it is difficult to obtain some accurate knowl- 
 edge of the character of the autocrat. A most important 
 change had been effected in the government of China, yet 
 it is impossible to discover what its precise significance was, 
 or to saj how far it influenced the fortunes of the country. 
 The empresses had retired into private life, and for a time 
 their regency came to an end. Prince Kung was only the 
 minister of a young prince who had it in his power to guide 
 affairs exactly as he might feel personally disposed. Prince 
 Kung might be either the real governor of the state or only 
 the courtier of his nephew. It depended solely on that 
 prince's character. There were not wanting signs that 
 Tungche had the consciousness, if not the capacity, of su- 
 preme power, and that he wished his will to be paramount. 
 Such evidence as was obtainable agreed in stating that he 
 was impatient of restraint, and that the prudent reflections 
 of his uncle were not overmuch to his fancy. On Septem- 
 ber 10 the young ruler took the world into his confidence 
 by announcing in a Vermilion Edict that he had degraded 
 Prince Kung and his son in their hereditary rank as princes 
 of the empire, for using "language in very many respects 
 unbecoming." Whether Tungche took this very decided 
 step in a moment of pique or because he perceived that 
 there was a plan among his chief relatives to keep him in 
 leading-strings, must remain a matter of opinion. At the 
 least he must have refused to personally retract what he 
 had done, for on the very following day (September 11) a 
 decree appeared from the two empresses reinstating Prince 
 Kung and his son in their hereditary rank and dignity, 
 and thus reasserting the power of the ex-regents. 
 
 Not long after this disturbance in the interior of the pal- 
 ace, of which only the ripple reached the surface of pub- 
 licity, there were rumors that the emperor's health was in a 
 precarious state, and in the month of December it became 
 known that Tungche was seriously ill with an attack of 
 smallpox. The disease seemed to be making satisfactory 
 progress, for the doctors were rewarded; but on December
 
 THE REGENCY 467 
 
 18 an edict appeared ordering or requesting the empresses 
 dowager to assume tlie personal charge of the administra- 
 tion. Six days later another edict appeared which strength- 
 ened the impression that the emperor was making good 
 progress toward recovery. But appearances were decep- 
 tive, for, after several weeks' uncertainty, it became known 
 that the emperor's death was inevitable. On January 12, 
 1875, Tungche "ascended upon the Dragon, to be a guest 
 on high," without leaving any offspring to succeed him. 
 There were rumors that his illness was only a plausible 
 excuse, and that he was really the victim of foul play ; but 
 it is not likely that the truth on that point will ever be re- 
 vealed. Whether he was the victim of an intrigue similar 
 to that which had marked his accession to power, or whether 
 he only died from the neglect or incompetence of his medical 
 attendants, the consequences were equally favorable to the 
 personal views of the two empresses and Prince Kung. 
 They resumed the exercise of that supreme authority which 
 they had resigned little more than twelve months. The 
 most suspicious circumstance in connection with this event 
 was the treatment of the young Empress Ahluta, who, it 
 was well known, was pregnant at the time of her husband's 
 death. Instead of waiting to decide as to the succession 
 until it was known whether Tungche 's posthumous child 
 would prove to be a son or a daughter, the empresses 
 dowager hastened to make another selection and to place 
 the young widow of the deceased sovereign in a state of 
 honorable confinement. Their motive was plain. Had 
 Ahluta' s child happened to be a son, he would have been 
 the legal emperor, as well as the heir by direct descent, and 
 she herself could not have been excluded from a prominent 
 share in the government. To the empresses dowager one 
 child on the throne mattered no more than another; but it 
 was a question of the first importance that Ahluta should be 
 set on one side. In such an atmosphere there is often griev- 
 ous peril to the lives of inconvenient personages. Ahluta 
 sickened and died. Her child was never born. The chari-
 
 468 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 table gave "her credit for having refused food through grief 
 for her husband, Tungche. The skeptical listened to the 
 details of her illness with scorn for the vain efforts to ob- 
 scure the dark deeds of ambition. In their extreme anxiety 
 to realize their own designs, and at the same time not to 
 injure the constitution, the two empresses had been obliged 
 to resort to a plan that could only have been suggested by 
 desperation. For the first time since the Manchu dynasty 
 occupied the throne it was necessary to depart from the due 
 line of succession, and to make the election of the sovereign 
 a matter of individual fancy or favor instead of one of in- 
 heritance. The range of choice was limited; for the son of 
 Prince Kung himself, who seemed to enjoy the prior right 
 to the throne, was a young man of sufiicient age to govern 
 for himself; and moreover his promotion would mean the 
 compulsory retirement from public life of Prince Kung, for 
 it was not possible in China for a father to serve under his 
 son, until Prince Chun, the father of the present reigning 
 emperor, established quite recently a precedent to the con- 
 trary. The name of Prince Kung's son, if mentioned at all, 
 was only mentioned to be dismissed. The choice of the em- 
 presses fell upon Tsai Tien, the son of Prince Chun or the 
 Seventh Prince, who on January 13 was proclaimed em- 
 peror. As he was of too tender an age to rule for himself, 
 his nomination served the purposes of the two empresses and 
 their ally, Prince Kung, who thus entered upon a second 
 lease of undisputed power. 
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANGSU 
 
 Thus after a very brief interval the governing power 
 again passed into the hands of the regents who had ruled 
 the state so well for the twelve years following the death of 
 Hienfung. The nominal emperor was a child of little more
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANGSU 469 
 
 than three years of age, to whom was given the style of 
 "Kwangsu," or "illustrious succession," and the empresses 
 could look forward to many years of authority in the name 
 of so young a sovereign. The only opposition to their return 
 to power seems to have come from the palace eunuchs, who 
 had asserted themselves during the brief reign of Tungche 
 and hoped to gain predominance in the imperial councils. 
 But they found a determined mistress in the person of Tsi 
 An, the Eastern Empress, as she was also called, who took 
 vigorous action against them, punishing their leaders with 
 death and effectually nipping in the bud all their projects 
 for making themselves supreme. 
 
 The return of the empresses to power was followed by 
 a great catastrophe in the relations between England and 
 China. For the moment it threw every other matter into 
 the shade, and seemed to render the outbreak of war between 
 the two countries almost inevitable. In the year 1874 the 
 government of India, repenting of its brief infatuation for 
 the Panthay cause, yet still reluctant to lose the advantages 
 it had promised itself from the opening of Yunnan to trade, 
 resolved upon sending a formal mission of explory under 
 Colonel Horace Browne, an officer of distinction, through 
 Burma to that province. The difficulties in the way of 
 the undertaking seemed comparatively few, as the King 
 of Burma was friendly and appeared disposed at that time 
 to accept his natural position as the dependent of Calcutta. 
 The Pekin authorities also were outwardly not opposed to 
 the journey; and the only opposition to be apprehended was 
 from the Yunnan officials and people. 
 
 It was thought desirable, with the view of preparing the 
 way for the appearance of this foreign mission, that a rep- 
 resentative of the English embassy at Pekin, having a 
 knowledge of the language and of the ceremonial etiquette 
 of the country, should be deputed to proceed across China 
 and meet Colonel Browne on the Burmese frontier. The 
 officer selected for this delicate and difficult mission was Mr. 
 Baymond Augustus Margary, who to the singular aptitude
 
 470 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 he had displayed in the study of Chinese added a buoyant 
 sjiirit and a vigorous frame that peculiarly fitted him for the 
 long and lonely journey he had undertaken across China. 
 His reception throughout was encouraging. The orders of 
 the Tsungli Yamen, specially drawn up by the Grand Secre- 
 tary Wansiang, were explicit, and not to be lightly ignored. 
 Mr. Margary performed his journey in safety; and, on Jan- 
 uary 26, 1875, only one fortnight after Kwangsu's accession, 
 he joined Colonel Browne at Bhamo. A delay of more than 
 three weeks ensued at Bhamo, which was certainly unfort- 
 unate. Time was given for the circulation of rumors as to 
 the aj^proach of a foreign invader along a disturbed frontier 
 held by tribes almost independent, and whose predatory 
 instincts were excited by the pros23ect of rich plunder, at the 
 same time that their leaders urged them to oppose a change 
 which threatened to destroy their hold on the caravan route 
 between Bhamo and Talifoo. When, on February 17, Colonel 
 Browne and his companions approached the limits of Burmese 
 territory, they found themselves in face of a totally different 
 state of affairs from what had existed when Mr. Margary 
 passed safely through three weeks before. The preparations 
 for opposing the English had been made under the direct en- 
 couragement, and probably the personal direction, of Lisitai, 
 a man who had been a brigand and then a rebel, but who at 
 this time held a military command on the frontier. 
 
 As Colonel Browne advanced he was met with rumors 
 of the opposition that awaited him. At first these were dis- 
 credited, but on the renewed statements that a large Chinese 
 force had been collected to bar his way, Mr. Margary rode 
 forward to ascertain what truth there was in these rumors. 
 The first town on this route within the Chinese border is 
 Momein, which, under the name of Tengyue, was once a 
 military station of importance, and some distance east of it 
 again is another town, called Manwein. Mr. Margary set 
 out on February 19, and it was arranged that only in the 
 event of his finding everything satisfactory at Momein was 
 he to proceed to Manwein.
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANGSU 471 
 
 Mr. Margary reached Momein in safety, and reported in 
 a letter to Colonel Browne tliat all was quiet at that place, 
 and that there were no signs of any resistance. That letter 
 was the last news ever received from Mr. Margary. On Feb- 
 ruary 19 he started from Momein, and the information sub- 
 sequently obtained left no doubt that he was treacherously 
 murdered on that or the following day at Manwein. An 
 ominous silence followed, and Colonel Browne's party de- 
 layed its advance until some definite news should arrive as 
 to what had occurred in front, although the silence was 
 sufficient to justify the worst apprehensions. Three days 
 later the rumor spread that Mr. Margary and his attendants 
 had been murdered. It was also stated that an army was 
 advancing to attack the English expedition; and on Febru- 
 aiy 22 a large Chinese force did make its appearance on the 
 neighboring heights. There was no longer any room to 
 doubt that the worst had happened, and it only remained 
 to secure the safety of the expedition. The Chinese num- 
 bered several thousand men under Lisitai in person, while 
 to oppose them there were only four Europeans and fifteen 
 Sikhs. Yet superior weajDons and steadfastness carried the 
 day against greater numbers. The Sikhs fought as they 
 retired, and the Chinese, unable to make any impression 
 on them, abandoned an attack which was both perilous and 
 useless. 
 
 The news of this outrage did not reach Pekin until a • 
 month later, when Mr. Wade at once took the most ener- 
 getic measures to obtain the amplest reparation in the power 
 of the Pekin Government to concede. The first and most 
 necessary point in order to insure not merely the punishment 
 of the guilty, but also that the people of China should not 
 have cause to suppose that their rulers secretly sympathized 
 with the authors of the attack, was that no punitive meas- 
 ures should be undertaken, or, if undertaken, recognized, 
 nintil a special Commission of Inquiry had been appointed 
 to investigate the circumstances on the spot. Mr. Margary 
 was an officer of the English Government traveling under
 
 472 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the special permission and protection of the Tsnngli Yamen. 
 The Chinese Government could not expect to receive consid- 
 eration if it failed to enforce respect for its own commands, 
 and the English Government had an obligation which it 
 could not shirk in exacting reparation for the murder of its 
 representative. The treacherous killing of Mr. Margary 
 was evidently not an occurrence for which it could be con- 
 sidered a sufhcient atonement that some miserable criminals 
 under sentence of death, or some desperate individuals anx- 
 ious to secure the worldly prosperity of their families, should 
 undergo painful torture and public execution in order to 
 shield official falseness and infamy. Although no one ever 
 sus23ected the Pekin Government of having directly insti- 
 gated the outrage, the delay in instituting an impartial and 
 searching inquiry into the affair strengthened an impression 
 that it felt reluctant to inflict punishment on those who had 
 committed the act of violence. Nearly three months elapsed 
 before any step was taken toward appointing a Chinese 
 official to proceed to the scene of the outrage in company 
 with the officers named by the English minister; but on 
 June 19 an edict appeared in the "Pekin Gazette" ordering 
 Li Han Chang, governor-general of Houkwang, to tempo- 
 rarily vacate his post, and "repair with all speed to Yunnan 
 to investigate and deal with certain matters." Even then 
 the matter dragged along but slowly. Li Han Chang, who, 
 as the brother of Li Hung Chang, was an exceptionally well- 
 qualified and highly-placed official for the task, and whose 
 appointment was in itself some evidence of sincerity, did not 
 leave Hankow until August, and the English commissioners, 
 Messrs. Grosvenor, Davenport and Colborne Baber, did not 
 set out from the same place before the commencement of 
 October. The intervening months had been employed by 
 Mr. Wade in delicate and fluctuating negotiations with Li 
 Hung Chang (who had succeeded Tseng Kwofan as Viceroy 
 of Pechihli and who had now come to the front as the chief 
 official in the Chinese service) at Tientsin and with the 
 Tsungli Yamen at Pekin. It was not till the end of the
 
 THE REION OF KWANGSU 473 
 
 year that the commission to ascertain the fate of Mr. Mar- 
 gary began its active work on the spot. The result was un- 
 expectedly disappointing. The mandarins supported one 
 another. The responsibility was thrown on several minor 
 officials, and on the border-tribes or savages. Several of the 
 latter were seized, and their lives were offered as atonement 
 for an offense they had not committed. The furthest act 
 of concession which the Chinese commissioner gave was to 
 temporarily suspend Tsen Yuying the Futai for remissness; 
 but even this measure was never enforced with rigor. The 
 English officers soon found that it was impossible to obtain 
 any proper reparation on the spot. 
 
 Sir Thomas Wade, who was knighted during the negoti- 
 ations, refused to accept the lives of the men offered, whose 
 complicity in the offense was known to be none at all, while 
 its real instigators escaped without any punishment. When 
 the new year, 1876, opened, the question was still unsettled, 
 and it was clear that no solution could be discovered on the 
 spot. Sir Thomas Wade again called upon the Chinese in 
 the most emphatic language allowed by diplomacy to con- 
 form with the spirit and letter of their engagements, and he 
 informed the Tsungli Yamen that unless they proffered full 
 redress for Mr. Margary's murder it would be impossible 
 to continue diplomatic relations. To show that this was no 
 meaningless expression, Sir Thomas Wade left Pekin, while 
 a strong re- enforcement to the English fleet demonstrated 
 that the government was resolved to support its representa- 
 tive. In consequence of these steps, Li Hung Chang was, 
 in August, 1876, or more than eighteen months after the 
 outrage, intrusted with full powers for the arrangement of 
 the difficulty; and the small seaport of Chefoo was fixed 
 upon as the scene for the forthcoming negotiations. Even 
 then the Chinese sought to secure a sentimental advantage 
 by requesting that Sir Thomas Wade would change the scene 
 of discussion to Tientsin, or at least that he would consent to 
 pay Li Hung Chang a visit there. This final effort to con- 
 ceal the fact that the English demanded redress as an equal
 
 474 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 and not as a suppliant Having been baffled, there was no 
 further attempt at delay. The Chefoo Convention was signed 
 in that town, to which the viceroy proceeded from Tientsin. 
 Li Hung Chang entertained the foreign ministers at a great 
 banquet; and the final arrangements were hurried forward 
 for the departure to Europe of the Chinese embassador, 
 whose dispatch had been decided upon in the previous 
 year. When the secret history of this transaction is re- 
 vealed it will be seen how sincere were Li Hung Chang's 
 wishes for a pacific result, and how much his advice con- 
 tributed to this end. 
 
 The most important passage in the Chefoo Convention 
 was unquestionably that commanding the difi:erent viceroys 
 and governors to respect, and afiord every protection to, all 
 foreigners provided with the necessary passport from the 
 Tsungli Yamen, and warning them that they would be held 
 responsible in the event of any such travelers meeting with 
 injury or maltreatment. The next most important passage 
 was that arranging for the dispatch of an embassy to Lon- 
 don bearing a letter of regret for the murder of the English 
 official. The official selected for this duty was Kwo Sung- 
 tao, a mandarin of high rank and unexceptionable charac- 
 ter. The letter was submitted to Sir Thomas Wade in order 
 that its terms should be exactly in accordance with Chinese 
 etiquette, and that no phrase should be used showing that 
 the Chinese Government attached less importance to the 
 mission than the occasion demanded. The embassy pro- 
 ceeded to Europe, and, whatever may be thought of its 
 immediate effect, it must be allowed that it established a 
 precedent of friendly intercourse with this country, which 
 promises to prove an additional guarantee of peace. Kwo 
 Sungtao was accompanied by the present Sir Halliday Ma- 
 cartney, who had rendered such good service to China, his 
 adopted country, during the Taeping war and afterward, 
 and who, during the last sixteen years, has taught the Chi- 
 nese Government how to make itself listened to by the most 
 powerful States of Europe.
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANGSU 475 
 
 A curious incident arising from the passion of gambling 
 whicli is so prevalent in China, and bearing incidentally 
 upon tlie national character, may be briefly referred to. 
 The attention of the Pekin Grovernment was attracted to 
 this subject by a novel form of gambling, which not merely 
 attained enormous dimensions, but which threatened to bring 
 the system of public examination into disrepute. This latter 
 fact created a profound impression at Pekin, and roused the 
 mandarins to take unusually prompt measures. Canton was 
 the headquarters of the gambling confederacy which estab- 
 lished the lotteries known as the Weising, but its ramifica- 
 tions extended throughout the whole of the province of 
 Kwantung. The Weising, or examination sweepstakes, 
 were based on the principle of drawing the names of the 
 successful candidates at the official examinations. They 
 appealed, therefore, to every poor villager, and every father 
 of a family, as well as to the aspirants themselves. The 
 subscribers to the Weising lists were numbered by hundreds 
 of thousands. It became a matter of almost as much im- 
 portance to draw a successful number or name in the lottery 
 as to take the degree. The practice could not have been 
 allowed to go on without introducing serious abuses into the 
 system of public examination. The profits to the owners of 
 the lottery were so enormous that they were able to pay not 
 less than eight hundred thousand dollars as hush-money to 
 the viceroy and the other high officials of Canton. In order 
 to shield his own participation in the profits, the viceroy 
 declared that he devoted this new source of revenue to the 
 completion of the river defenses of Canton. 
 
 In 1874 the whole system was declared illegal, and severe 
 penalties were passed against those aiding, or participating 
 in any way in, the Weising Company. The local officers did 
 not, however, enforce with any stringency these new laws, 
 and the Weising fraternity enjoyed a further but brief 
 period of increased activity under a different name. The 
 fraud was soon detected, and in an edict of August 11, 1875, 
 it was very rightly laid down that "the maintenance of the
 
 476 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 purity of government demands that it be not allowed under 
 any pretext to be re-establistied, " and for their apathy in 
 the matter tlie Viceroy Yinghan and several of the highest 
 officials in Canton were disgraced and stripped of their offi- 
 cial rank. 
 
 In China natural calamities on a colossal scale have often 
 aggravated political troubles. The year 1876 witnessed the 
 commencement of a dearth in the two great provinces of 
 Honan and Shansi which has probably never been surpassed 
 as the cause of a vast amount of human suffering. Al- 
 though the provinces named suffered the most from the 
 prevalent drought, the suffering was general over the whole 
 of Northern China, from Shantung and Pechihli to Honan 
 and the course of the Yellow River. At first the govern- 
 ment, if not apathetic, was disposed to say that the evil 
 would be met by the grant of the usual allowance made by 
 the provincial governors in the event of distress; but when 
 one province after another was absorbed within the famine 
 area, it became no longer possible to treat the matter as 
 one of such limited importance, and the high ministers felt 
 obliged to bestir themselves in face of so grave a danger. 
 Li Hung Chang in particular was most energetic, not merely 
 in collecting and forwarding supplies of rice and grain, but 
 also in inviting contributions of money from all those parts 
 of the empire which had not been affected by famine. Al- 
 lowing for the general sluggishness of popular opinion in 
 China, and for the absence of any large amount of currency, 
 it must be allowed that these appeals met with a large and 
 liberal response. The foreign residents also contributed their 
 share, and even the charity of London found a vent in send- 
 ing some thousands of pounds to the scene of the famine in 
 Northern China. This evidence of foreign sympathy in the 
 cause of a common humanity made more than a passing im- 
 pression on the minds of the Chinese people. 
 
 While the origin of the famine may be attributed to 
 either drought or civil war, there is no doubt that its exten- 
 sion and the apparent inability of the authorities to grapple
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANQSU 477 
 
 with it may be traced to the want of means of communi- 
 cation, which rendered it almost impossible to convey the 
 needful succor into the famine districts. The evil being so 
 obvious, it was hoped that the Chinese would be disposed to 
 take a step forward on their own initiative in the great and 
 needed work of the introduction of railways and other me- 
 chanical appliances. The viceroy of the Two Kiang gave his 
 assent to the construction of a short line between Shanghai 
 and the port of Woosung. The great difficulty had always 
 been to make a start; and now that a satisfactory com- 
 mencement had been made the foreigners were disposed in 
 their eagerness to overlook all obstacles, and to imagine the 
 Flowery Land traversed in all directions by railways. But 
 these expectations were soon shown to be premature. Half 
 of the railway was open for use in the summer of 1876, and 
 during some weeks the excitement among the Chinese them- 
 selves was as marked as among the Europeans. The hopes 
 based upon this satisfactory event were destined to be soon 
 dispelled by the animosity of the officials. They announced 
 their intention to resort to every means in their power to 
 prevent the completion of the undertaking. The situation 
 revealed such dangers of mob violence that Sir Thomas 
 Wade felt compelled to request the company to discontinue 
 its operations, and after some discussion it was arranged 
 that the Chinese should buy the line. After a stipulated 
 period the line was placed under Chinese management, 
 when, instead of devoting themselves to the interests of 
 the railway, and to the extension of its power of utility, 
 they willfully and persistently neglected it, with the express 
 design of destroying it. At this conjuncture the viceroy 
 allowed the Grovernor of Fuhkien to remove the rails and 
 plant to Formosa. The fate of the "Woosung railway de- 
 stroyed the hopes created by its construction, and postponed 
 to a later day the great event of the introduction of railways 
 into China. Notwithstanding such disappointments as this, 
 and the ever present difficulty of conducting relations with 
 an unsympathetic people controlled by suspicious officials,
 
 478 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 there was yet observable a marked improvement in the re- 
 lations of the different nations with the Chinese. Increased 
 facilities of trade, such as the opening of new ports, far 
 from extending the area of danger, served to promote a 
 mutual goodwill. In 1876 Kiungchow, in the island of 
 Hainan, was made a treaty port, or rather the fact of its 
 having been included in the Treaty of Tientsin was prac- 
 tically accepted and recognized. In the following year four 
 new ports were added to the list. One, Pakhoi, was intended 
 to increase trade intercourse with Southern China. Two of 
 the three others, Ichang and Wuhu, were selected as being 
 favorably situated for commerce on the Yangtse and its 
 affluents, while Wenchow was chosen for the benefit of the 
 trade on the coast. Mr. Colborne Baber, who had been a 
 member of the Yunnan commission, was dispatched to 
 Szchuen, to take up his residence at Chungking for the 
 purpose of facilitating trade with that great province. Tti3 
 successful tour of Captain Gill, not merely through South- 
 west China into Burma, but among some of the wilder and 
 more remote districts of Northern Szchuen, afforded reason 
 to believe that henceforth traveling would be safer in China, 
 and nothing that has since happened is calculated to weaken 
 that impression. 
 
 When Kwangsu ascended the throne the preparations for 
 the campaign against Kashgaria were far advanced toward 
 completion, and Kinshun had struck the first of those blows 
 which were to insure the overthrow of the Tungani and of 
 Yakoob Beg. The fall of Souchow had distinguished the 
 closing weeks of the year 1873, and in 1874 Kinshun had 
 begun, under the direction of Tso Tsung Tang, who was 
 described by a French writer as "very intelligent, of a brav- 
 ery beyond all question, and an admirable organizer," his 
 march across the desert to the west. He followed a cir- 
 cuitous line of march, with a view of avoiding the strongly 
 placed and garrisoned town of Hami. The exact route ia 
 not certain, bat he seems to have gone as far north as 
 Uliassutai, where he was able to recruit some of the most
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANGSU 479 
 
 faithful and warlike of tlie Mongol tribes. But early in 
 
 1875 lie arrived before tlie walls of Barkul, a town lying 
 to the northwest of Hami. No resistance was offered, and 
 a few weeks later Hami was also occupied. The Tungani 
 retreated on the approach of the Chinese, and assemljled 
 their main force for the defense of the two towns of Ururatsi 
 and Manas, which are situated on the northern side of the 
 eastern spurs of the Tian Shan. Once Barkul and Hami 
 were in the possession of the Chinese, it became necessary 
 to reopen direct communications with Souchow. This task 
 occupied the whole of the next twelve months, and was only 
 successfully accomplished after many difficulties had been 
 overcome, and when halting- stations had been established 
 across Gobi. There is nothing improbable in the statement 
 that during this period the Chinese planted and reaped the 
 seed which enabled them, or those who followed in their 
 train, to march in the following season. With the year 
 
 1876 the really arduous portion of the campaign com- 
 menced. The natural difficulties to the commencement of 
 the war from distance and desert had been all overcome. 
 An army of about twenty-five thousand effective troops, 
 besides a considerable number of Mongol and other tribal 
 levies, had been placed in the field and within striking dis- 
 tance of the rebels. The enemies were face to face. The 
 Tungani could retreat no further. Neither from Russia nor 
 from Yakoob Beg could they expect a place of refuge. The 
 Athalik Ghazi might help them to hold their own ; he cer- 
 tainly would not welcome them within the limits of the six 
 cities. The Tungani had, therefore, no alternative left save 
 to make as resolute a stand as they could against the Chi- 
 nese who had returned to revenge their fellow-countrymen 
 who had been slaughtered in their thousands twelve years 
 before. The town of Urumtsi, situated within a loop of the 
 mountains, lies at a distance by road of more than 300 miles 
 from Barkul. Kinshun, who had now been joined by Liu 
 Kintang, the taotai of the Sining district and a man of 
 proved energy and capacity, resolved to concentrate all his
 
 480 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 efforts on its capture. He moved forward his army to 
 Guclien, 200 miles west of Barkul, where he established a 
 fortified camp and a powder factory, and took steps to ascer- 
 tain the strength and intentions of the enemy. Toward the 
 end of July the Chinese army resumed its march. The diffi- 
 culties of the country were so great that the advance guards 
 of the opposing armies did not come into contact until Au- 
 gust 10. The Chinese general seems to have attempted on 
 that date a night surprise; but although he gained some suc- 
 cess in the encounter which ensued, the result must have 
 been doubtful, seeing that he felt obliged to call off his men 
 from the attack. It was only, however, to collect his forces 
 for the delivery of a decisive blow. On August 13 a second 
 battle was fought with a result favorable to the Chinese. 
 Two days later the enemy, who held a fortified camp at 
 Gumti, were bombarded out of it by the heavy artillery 
 brought from the coasts of China for the purposes of the 
 war, and after twenty-four hours' firing three breaches 
 were declared to be practicable. The place was carried by 
 storm at the close of four hours' fighting and slaughter, 
 daring which 6,000 men were stated to have been killed. 
 Kinshun followed up his victory by a rapid march on 
 Urumtsi. That town surrendered without a blow, and 
 many hundred fugitives were cut down by the unsparing 
 Manchu cavalry, which pursued them along the road to 
 Manas, their last place of shelter. As soon as the neces- 
 sary measures had been taken for the military protection of 
 Urumtsi, the Chinese army proceeded against Manas. Their 
 activity, which was facilitated by the favorable season of 
 the year, was also increased by the rumored approach of 
 Yakoob Beg with a large army to the assistance of the Tun- 
 gani. At Manas the survivors of the Tungan movement 
 proper had collected for final resistance, and all that des- 
 peration could suggest for holding the place had beea done. 
 Kinshun appeared before Manas on September 2. On the 
 7th his batteries were completed, and he began a heavy fire 
 upon the northeast angle of the wall. A breach of fourteen
 
 uJma REIGN OF KWANGSU 451 
 
 leet having been made, the order to assault was given, but 
 tbe stormers were repulsed with the loss of 100 killed. Tho 
 operations of the siege were renewed with great spirit on 
 both sides. Several assaults were subsequently delivered; 
 but although the Chinese always gained some advantage at 
 the beginning they never succeeded in retaining it. In one 
 of these later attacks they admitted a loss of 200 killed alone. 
 The imperial army enjoyed the undisputed superiority in 
 artillery, and the gaps in its ranks were more than filled by 
 the constant flow of re-enforcements from the rear. The 
 siege gradually assumed a less active character. The Chi- 
 nese dug trenches and erected earthworks. They approached 
 tbe *-alls by means of galleries in readiness to deliver the 
 attack on any symptom of discouragement among the be- 
 sieged. On October 16 a mine was sprung under the wall, 
 making a wide breach ; but although the best portion of the 
 Chinese army made two assaults on separate occasions, they 
 were both repulsed with loss. Twelve days later another 
 mine was sprung, destroying a large portion of tbe wall; 
 but when the Chinese stormers endeavored to carry the re- 
 maining works, they were again driven back with heavy 
 loss, including two generals killed in the breach. Although, 
 thus far repulsed, the imperialists had inflicted very heavy 
 losses on the besieged, who, seeing that the end of their re- 
 sources was at hand, that there was no hope of succor, and 
 that the besiegers were as energetic as ever, at last arrived 
 at the conclusion that tbey bad no choice left save to surren- 
 der on tbe best terms they could obtain. On November 4, 
 after a two months' siege, Haiyen, as the Chinese named the 
 Mohammedan leader, came out and offered to yield the town. 
 His offer seems to bave been partly accepted, and on the 6th 
 of the month the survivors of the brave garrison, to the 
 number of between two and three thousand men, sallied 
 forth from the west gate. It was noticed as a ground of 
 suspicion that all the men carried their weapons, and that 
 they had placed their old men, women and children in the 
 center of their phalanx as if they contemplated rather a sorfcie 
 China— 21
 
 482 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 than a tame and unresisting surrender. The Chinese com- 
 manders were not indisposed to deal with the least suspicious 
 circumstances as if they meant certain treachery. The im- 
 perialists gradually gathered around the garrison. The Mo- 
 hammedans made one bold effort to cut their way through. 
 They failed in the attemj)t, and were practically annihilated 
 on the ground. Those men who were taken by the cavalry 
 were at once beheaded, whether in the city or among those 
 who had gone forth, but the aged, the women and the children 
 were spared by Kinshun's express orders. All the leaders 
 taken were tortured before execution as rebels, and even the 
 bodies of the dead chiefs were exhumed in order that they 
 might be subjected to indignity. The siege of Manas was 
 interesting both for the stubbornness of the attack and de- 
 fense, and also as marking the successful termination of the 
 Chinese campaign against the Tungani. With its capture, 
 those Mohammedans who might be said to be Chinese in 
 ways and appearance ceased to possess any political impor- 
 tance. It would not be going much too far to say that they 
 no longer existed. The movement of rebellion which began 
 at Hochow in 1862 was thus repressed in 1876, after having 
 involved during those fourteen years the northwestern prov- 
 inces of China, and much of the interior of Asia, in a strug- 
 gle which, for its bitter and sanguinary character, has rarely 
 been surpassed. 
 
 The successes of the Chinese gave their generals and army 
 the confidence and prestige of victory, and the overthrow of 
 the Tungani left them disengaged to deal with a more formi- 
 dable antagonist. The siege of Manas had been vigorously 
 prosecuted in order that the town might be taken before the 
 army of Yakoob Beg should arrive. The Athalik Ghazi 
 may have believed that Manas could hold out during the 
 winter, for his movements in 1876 were leisurely, and be- 
 trayed a confidence that no decisive fighting would take 
 place until the following spring. His hopes were shown to 
 be delusive, but too late for practical remedy. Manas had 
 fallen before he could move to its support. The Chinese
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANQSU 483 
 
 had crushed the Tungani, and were in possession of the 
 mountain passes. Thej were gathering their whole strength 
 to fall upon him, and to drive him out of the state in which 
 he had managed to set up a brief authority. "While the 
 events recorded had been in progress, Yakoob Beg had been 
 ruling the state of Kashgaria with sufficient vigor and wis- 
 dom to attract the observation of his great neighbors, the 
 governments of England and Eussia. He had shown rare 
 skill in adapting circumstances to suit his own ends. The 
 people passively accepted the authority which he was pre- 
 pared to assert with his Khokandian soldiery, and the inde- 
 pendent state of Kashgaria might have continued to exist 
 for a longer period had the Chinese not returned. But in 
 1875 the arrival of Kinshun at Barkul showed Yakoob Beg 
 that he would have to defend his possessions against their 
 lawful owners, while the overthrow of the Tungani and the 
 capture of their strongholds, in 1876, carried with them a 
 melancholy foreboding of his own fate. The Athalik Ghazi 
 made his preparations to take the field, but there was no 
 certainty in his mind as to where he should make his stand. 
 He moved his army eastward, establishing his camp first at 
 Korla and then moving it on to Turfan, 900 miles distant 
 from Kashgar. The greatest efforts of this ruler only 
 availed to place 15,000 men at the front, and the barren- 
 ness of the region compelled him to distribute them. The 
 Ameer was at Turfan with 8,500 men and twenty guns. 
 His second son was at Toksoun, some miles in the rear, at 
 the head of 6,000 more and five guns. There were several 
 smaller detachments between Korla and the front. Opposed 
 to these was the main Chinese army under Kinshun at 
 Urumtsi, while another force had been placed in the field 
 at Hami by the energy of Tso, and intrusted to the direc- 
 tion of a general named Chang Yao. No fighting took 
 place until the month of March, 1877, and then the cam- 
 paign began with a rapid advance by Chang Yao from 
 Hami to Turfan. The Kashgarians were driven out of 
 Pidjam, and compelled, after a battle, to evacuate Turfan.
 
 484 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 The Chinese records do not help us to unravel the events 
 of the month of April. The campaign contained no more 
 striking or important episodes, and yet the reports of the 
 generals have been mislaid or consigned to oblivion. The 
 Athalik Ghazi fouglit a second battle at Toksoun, where he 
 rejoined his son's army, but with no better fortune. He 
 was obliged to flee back to his former camp at Korla. After 
 the capture of Turfan the Chinese armies came to a halt. It 
 was necessary to reorganize the vast territory which they 
 had already recovered, and to do something to replenish 
 their arsenals. During five months the Celestials stayed 
 their further advance, while the cities were being re-peopled 
 and the roads rendered once more secure. Tso Tsung Tang 
 would leave nothing to chance. He had accomplished two 
 of the three parts into which his commission might be natu- 
 rally divided. He had pacified the northwest and over- 
 thrown the Tungani, and he would make sure of his ground 
 before attempting the third and the most difficult of all. 
 And while the Chinese viceroy had, for his own reasons, 
 come to the very sensible conclusion to refresh his army 
 after its arduous labors in the limited productive region 
 situated between two deserts, the stars in their courses 
 fought on his side. 
 
 Yakoob Beg had withdrawn only to Korla. He still 
 cherished the futile scheme of defending the eastern limits 
 of his dominion, but with his overthrow on the field of bat- 
 tle the magic power which he had exercised over his sub- 
 jects vanished. His camp became the scene of factious 
 rivalry and of plots to advance some individual pretension 
 at the cost of the better interests and even the security of 
 the State. The exact details of the conspiracy will never 
 be known, partly from the remoteness of the scene, but also 
 on account of the mention of persons of whom nothing was, 
 or is ever likely to be, known. The single fact remains 
 clear that Yakoob Beg died at Korla on May 1, 1877, of 
 fever according to one account, of poison administered by 
 Hakim Khan Torah according to another. Still the Chi-
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANOSU 485 
 
 nese did not even then advance, and Yakoob's eons were 
 left to contest with Hakim Khan Torah over the dismem- 
 bered fragments of their father's realm. A bitter and pro- 
 tracted civil war followed close upon the disappearance of 
 the Athalik Ghazi. On the removal of his dead body for 
 sepulture to Kashgar his eldest son, Kuli Beg, murdered his 
 younger brother over their father's bier. It was then that 
 Hakim Khan came prominently forward as a rival to Kuli 
 Beg^ and that the Mohammedans, weak and numerically 
 few as they were, divided themselves into two hostile par- 
 ties. "While the Chinese were recruiting their troops and 
 repairing their losses, the enemy were exhausting them- 
 selves in vain and useless struggles. In June, 1877, Hakim 
 Khan was signally defeated and compelled to flee into Rus- 
 sian territory, whence on a later occasion he returned for a 
 short time in a vain attempt to disturb the tranquillity of 
 Chinese rule. When, therefore, the Chinese resumed their 
 advance much of their work had been done for them. They 
 had only to complete the overthrow of an enemy whom they 
 had already vanquished, and who was now exhausted by 
 his own disunion. The Chinese army made no forward 
 movement from Toksoun until the end of August, 1877. 
 Liu Kintang, to whom the command of the advance had 
 been given, did not leave until one month later; and when 
 he arrayed his forces he found them to number about 15, 000 
 men. It had been decided that the first advance should not 
 be made in greater force, as the chief difficulty was to feed 
 the army, not to defeat the enemy. 
 
 The resistance encountered was very slight, and the coun- 
 try was found to be almost uninhabited. Both Karashar and 
 Korla were occupied by a Chinese garrison, and the district 
 around them was intrusted to the administration of a local 
 chief. Information that the rebel force was stationed at the 
 next town, Kucha, which is as far beyond Korla as that place 
 is from Toksoun, induced Liu Kintang to renew his march 
 and to continue it still more rapidly. A battle was fought 
 outside Kucha in which the Chinese were victorious, but not
 
 486 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 until they had overcome stubborn resistance. However, the 
 Chinese success was complete, and with Kucha in their power 
 they had simplified the process of attacking Kashgar itself. 
 A further halt was made at this town to enable the men to 
 recover from their fatigue, to allow fresh troops to come up, 
 and measures to be taken for insuring the security of com- 
 munications with the places in the rear. At Kucha also the 
 work of civil administration was intrusted to some of the 
 local notables. The deliberation of the Chinese movements, 
 far from weakening their effect, invested their proceedings 
 with the aspect of being irresistible. The advance was 
 shortly resumed. Aksu, a once flourishing city within the 
 limits of the old kingdom of Kashgar, surrendered at the 
 end of October. Ush Turf an yielded a few days later. The 
 Chinese had now got within striking distance of the capital 
 of the state. They had only to provide the means of mak- 
 ing the blow as fatal and decisive as possible. In December 
 they seized Maralbashi, an important position on the Kashgar 
 Darya, commanding the principal roads to both Yarkand and 
 Kashgar. Yarkand was the chief object of attack. It sur- 
 rendered without a blow on December 21. A second Chinese 
 army had been sent from Maralbashi to Kashgar, which was 
 defended by a force of several thousand men. It had been 
 besieged nine days, when Liu Kintang arrived with his troops 
 from Yarkand. A battle ensued, in which the Mohamme- 
 dans were vanquished, and the city with the citadel outside 
 captured. Several rebel leaders and some eleven hundred 
 men were said to have been executed; but Kuli Beg escaped 
 into Russian territory. The city of Kashgar was taken on 
 December 26, and one week later the town of Khoten, fa- 
 mous from a remote period for its jade ornaments, passed 
 into the hands of the race who best appreciated their beauty 
 and value. The Chinese thus brought to a triumphant con- 
 clusion the campaigns undertaken for the reassertion of their 
 authority over the Mohammedan populations which had re- 
 volted. They had conquered in this war by the superiority 
 of their weapons and their organization, and not by an over-
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANOSU 487 
 
 whelming display of numbers. Although large bodies of 
 troops were stationed at many places, it does not seem that 
 the army which seized the cities of Yarkand and Kashgar 
 numbered more than twenty thousand men. Having van- 
 quished their enemy in the field, the Celestials devoted all 
 their attention to the reorganization of what was called the 
 New Dominion, the capital of which after much deliberation 
 was fixed at Urumtsi. Their rule has been described by a 
 Mussulman as being both very fair and very just. 
 
 Having conquered Eastern Turkestan, the Chinese next 
 took steps for the recovery of Hi. Without the metropolitan 
 province the undertaking of Tso Tsung Tang would lack 
 completeness, while indeed many political and military dan- 
 gers would attend the situation in Central Asia. But this 
 was evidently a matter to be effected in the first place by 
 negotiation, and not by violence and force of arms. Russia 
 had always been a friendly and indeed a sympathetic neigh- 
 bor. In this very matter of Hi she had originally acted with 
 the most considerate attention for China's rights, when it 
 seemed that they had permanently lost all definite meaning, 
 for she had declared that she would surrender it on China 
 sending a sufficient force to take possession, and now this 
 had been done. It was, therefore, by diplomatic representa- 
 tions on the part of the Tsungli Yamen to the Russian Min- 
 ister at Pekin that the recovery of Hi was expected in the 
 first place to be achieved. At about the same time the Rus- 
 sian authorities at Tashkent came to the conclusion that the 
 matter must rest with the Czar, and the Chinese official world 
 perceived that they would have to depute a Minister Pleni- 
 potentiary to St. Petersburg. 
 
 The official selected for the difficult and, as it proved, 
 dangerous task of negotiating at St. Petersburg, was that 
 same Chung How who had been sent to Paris after the 
 Tientsin massacre. He arrived at Pekin in August, 1878, 
 and was received in several audiences by the empresses while 
 waiting for his full instructions from the Tsungli Yamen. 
 He did not leave until October, about a month after the
 
 488 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Marquis Tseng, Tseng Kwofan's eldest son, set out from 
 Pekin to take tlie place of Kwo Sungtao as Minister in 
 London and Paris. Cliiing How reached St. Petersburg 
 in the early part of the following year, and the discussion 
 of the various points in question, protracted by the removal 
 of the court to Livadia, occupied the whole of the summer 
 months. At last it was announced that a treaty had been 
 signed at Livadia, by which Russia surrendered the Kuldja 
 valley, but retained that of the Tekes, which left in her 
 hands the command of the passes through the Tian Shan 
 range into Kashgar. Chung How knew nothing about fron- 
 tiers or military precautions, but he thought a great deal 
 about money. He fought the question of an indemnity with 
 ability, and got it fixed at five million roubles, or little more 
 than half that at which it was placed by the later treaty. 
 There was never any reason to suppose that the Chinese Gov- 
 ernment would accept the partial territorial concession ob- 
 tained by Chung How. The first greeting that met Chung 
 How on his return revealed the fate of his treaty. He had 
 committed the indiscretion of returning without waiting for 
 the Edict authorizing his return, and as the consequence he 
 had to accept suspension from all his offices, while his treaty 
 was submitted to the tender mercies of the grand secretaries, 
 the six presidents of boards, the nine chief ministers of state, 
 and the members of the Hanlin. Three weeks later, Prince 
 Chun was specially ordered to join the Committee of Delib- 
 eration. On January 27, Chung How was formally cashiered 
 and arrested, and handed over to the Board of Punishment 
 for correction. The fate of the treaty itself was decided a 
 fortnight later. Chung How was then declared to have 
 "disobeyed his instructions and exceeded his powers. " On 
 March 3 an edict appeared, sentencing the unhappy envoy 
 to ' ' decapitation after incarceration. ' ' This sentence was not 
 carried out, and the reprieve of the unlucky envoy was due 
 to Queen Victoria's expression of a hope that the Chinese 
 Government would spare his life. 
 
 At the same time that the Chinese refused their ratifica-
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANGSU 489 
 
 tion to Chung How's treaty, they expressed their desire for 
 another pacific settlement, which would give them more 
 complete satisfaction. The Marquis Tseng was accordingly 
 instructed to take up the thread of negotiation, and to pro- 
 ceed to the Russian capital as Embassador and Minister 
 Plenipotentiary. Some delay ensued, as it was held to be 
 doubtful whether Russia would consent to the reopening of 
 the question. But owing to the cautious and well-timed 
 approaches of the Marquis Tseng, the St. Petersburg For- 
 eign Office acquiesced in the recommencement of negotia- 
 tions, and, after six months' discussion, accepted the princi- 
 ple of the almost unqualified territorial concession for which 
 the Chinese had stood firm. On February 12, 1881, these 
 views were embodied in a treaty, signed at St. Petersburg, 
 and the ratification within six months showed how differ- 
 ently its provisions were regarded from those of its predeces- 
 sor. With the Marquis Tseng's act of successful diplomacy 
 the final result of the long war in Central Asia was achieved. 
 The Chinese added Hi to Kashgar and the rest of the New 
 Dominion, which at the end of 1880 was made into a High 
 Commissionership and placed under the care of the dashing 
 General Liu Kintang. 
 
 The close of the great work successfully accomplished 
 during the two periods of the Regency was followed within 
 a few weeks by the disappearance of the most important of 
 the personages who had carried on the government through- 
 out these twenty years of constant war and diplomatic ex- 
 citement. Before the Pekin world knew of her illness, it 
 heard of the death of the Empress Dowager Tsi An, who 
 as Hienfung's principal widow had enjoyed the premier 
 place in the government, although she had never possessed 
 a son to occupy the throne in person. In a proclamation 
 issued in her name and possibly at her request, Tsi An de- 
 scribed the course of her malady, the solicitude of the em- 
 peror, and urged upon him the duty of his high place to put 
 restraint upon his grief. Her death occurred on April 18, 
 from heart disease, when she was only forty- five, and her
 
 490 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 funeral obsequies were as splendid as lier services demanded. 
 For herself she had always been a woman of frugal habits, 
 and the successful course of recent Chinese history was largely 
 due to her firmness and resolution. Her associate in the 
 Eegency, Tsi Thsi, who has always been more or less of an 
 invalid, still survives. 
 
 The difficulty with Russia had not long been composed, 
 when, on two opposite sides of her extensive dominion, China 
 was called upon to face a serious condition of affairs. In 
 Corea, "the forbidden land" of the Far East, events were 
 forced by the eagerness and competition of European states 
 to conclude treaties of commerce with that primitive king- 
 dom, and perhaps, also, Ly their fear that if they delayed 
 Russia would appropriate some port on the Corean coast. 
 To all who had official knowledge of Russia's desire and 
 plan for seizing Port Lazareff, this apprehension was far 
 from chimerical, and there was reason to believe that Rus- 
 sia's encroachment might compel other countries to make 
 annexations in or round Corea by way of precaution. Prac- 
 tical evidence of this was furnished by the English occupa- 
 tion of Port Hamilton, and by its subsequent evacuation 
 when the necessity passed away; but should the occasion 
 again arise the key of the situation will probably be found 
 in the possession not of Port Hamilton or Quelpart, but of 
 the Island of Tsiusima. Recourse was had to diplomacy to 
 avert what threatened to be a grave international danger; 
 and although the result was long doubtful, and the situation 
 sometimes full of peril, a gratifying success was achieved in 
 the end. In 1881 a draft commercial treaty was drawn up, 
 approved by the Chinese authorities and the representatives 
 of the principal powers at Pekin, and carried to the court of 
 Seoul for acceptance and signature by the American naval 
 officer. Commodore Schufeldt. The Corean king made no 
 objection to the arrangement, and it was signed with the 
 express stipulation that the ratifications of the treaty were 
 to be exchanged in the following year. Thus was it harmo- 
 niously arranged at Pekin that Corea was to issue from her
 
 THE REIGN OF KW^NGSU 491 
 
 tennit's cell, and open lier ports to trading countries under 
 the guidance and encouragement of China. There can be 
 no doubt that if this arrangement had been carried out, the 
 influence and the position of China in Corea would have 
 been very greatly increased and strengthened. But, un- 
 fortunately, the policy of Li Hung Chang — for if he did 
 not originate, he took the most important part in directing 
 it — aroused the jealousy of Japan, which has long asserted 
 the right to have an equal voice with China in the control 
 of Corean affairs; and the government of Tokio, on hearing 
 of the Schufeldt treaty, at once took steps not merely to ob- 
 tain all the rights to be conferred by that document, to which 
 no one would have objected, but also to assert its claim to 
 control equally with China the policy of the Corean court. 
 With that object, a Japanese fleet and army were sent to 
 the Seoul Eiver, and when the diplomatists returned for 
 the ratification of the treaty, they found the Japanese in 
 a strong position close to the Corean capital. The Chinese 
 were not to be set on one side in so open a manner, and a 
 powerful fleet of gunboats, with 5,000 troops, were sent to 
 the Seoul River to uphold their rights. Under other cir- 
 cumstances, more especially as the Chinese expedition was 
 believed to be the superior, a hostile collision must have en- 
 sued, and the war which has so often seemed near between 
 the Chinese and Japanese would have become an accom- 
 plished fact; but fortunately the presence of the foreign di- 
 plomatists moderated the ardor of both sides, and a rupture 
 was averted. By a stroke of judgment, the Chinese seized 
 Tai Wang Kun, the father of the young king, and the leader 
 of the anti-foreign party, and carried him off to Pekin, where 
 he was kept in imprisonment for some time, until matters 
 had settled down in his own country. The opening of Corea 
 to the Treaty Powers did not put an end to the old rivalry 
 of China and Japan in that country, of which history con- 
 tains so many examples; and, before the Corean question 
 ■was definitely settled, it again became obtrusive. Such evi- 
 dence as is obtainable points to the conclusion that Chinese
 
 492 HISTORY OF CHI^A 
 
 influence was gradually getting the better of Japanese in the 
 countr}', and tlie attack on the Japanese legation in 1884 
 was a strimng revelation of popular antipathy or of an elab- 
 orate anti-Japanese plot headed by the released Chinese 
 prisoner, Tai Wang Kun. 
 
 At the opposite point of the frontier China was brought 
 face to face with a danger which threatened to develop into 
 a peril of the first magnitude, and in meeting which she was 
 undoubtedly hampered by her treaties with the general body 
 of foreign powers and her own peculiar place in the family 
 of nations. It is the special misfortune of China that she 
 cannot engage in any, even a defensive, war with a maritime 
 power without incurring the grave risk, or indeed the practi- 
 cal certainty, that if such a war be continued for any length 
 of time she must find herself involved with every other for- 
 eign country through the impossibility of confining the hostil- 
 ity of her own subjects to one race of foreigners in particu- 
 lar. In considering the last war with a European country 
 in which China was engaged, due allowance must be made 
 for these facts, and also for the anomalous character of that 
 contest, when active hostilities were carried on without any 
 formal declaration of war — a state of things which gave the 
 French many advantages. Toward the end of the year 1882, 
 the French Government came to the decision to establish a 
 "definite protectorate" over Tonquin. Events had for some 
 time been shaping themselves in this direction, and the colo- 
 nial ambition of France had long fixed on Indo- China as a 
 field in which it might aggrandize itself with comparatively 
 little risk and a wide margin of advantage. The weakness 
 of the kingdom of Annam was a strong enough temptation 
 in itself to assert the protectorate over it which France had, 
 more or less, claimed for forty years; but when the reports 
 of several French explorers came to promote the conviction 
 that France might acquire the control of a convenient and 
 perhaps the best route into some of the richest provinces of 
 interior China without much difficulty, the temptation be- 
 came irresistible. French activity in Indo- China was height-
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANGSU 483 
 
 ened by the declaration of Gramier, Eocher, and others, that 
 the Songcoi, or Red B-iver, furnished the best means of com- 
 municating with Yunnan, and tapping the wealth of the rich- 
 est mineral province in China. The apathy of England in 
 her relations with Burma, which presented, under its arro- 
 gant and obstructive rulers, what may have seemed an in- 
 superable obstacle to trade intercourse between India and 
 China, afforded additional inducement to the French to act 
 quickly; and, as they felt confident of their ability and power 
 to coerce the court of Hue, the initial diiliculties of their un- 
 dertaking did not seem very formidable. That undertaking 
 was, in the first place, defined to be a protectorate of Annam, 
 and, as the first step in the enterprise, the town of Hanoi, in 
 the delta of the Red River, and the nominal capital of Ton- 
 quin, was captured before the end of the year 1882. 
 
 Tonquin stood in very much the same relationship to 
 China as Corea; and, although the enforcement of the suze- 
 rain tie was lax, there was no doubt that at Pekin the opin- 
 ion was held very strongly that the action of France was an 
 encroachment on the rights of China. But if such was the 
 secret opinion of the Chinese authorities, they took no imme- 
 diate steps to arrest the development of French policy in 
 Tonquin by proclaiming it a Chinese dependency, and also 
 their intention to defend it. It is by no means certain that 
 the prompt and vigorous assertion of their rights would have 
 induced the French to withdraw from their enterprise, for 
 its difiiculties were not revealed at first; but if China is to 
 make good her hold over such dependencies, she must be 
 prepared to show that she thinks them worth fighting for. 
 While Li Hung Chang and the other members of the Chi- 
 nese Government were deliberating as to the course they 
 should pursue, the French were acting with great vigor in 
 Tonquin, and committing their military reputation to a task 
 from which they could not in honor draw back. During the 
 whole of the year 1883 they were engaged in military opera- 
 tions with the Black Flag irregulars, a force half piratical 
 and half patriotic, who represented the national army of the
 
 494 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 country. It was believed at the time, but quite erroneously, 
 that the Black Flags were paid and incited by tlie Chinese. 
 Subsequent evidence showed that the Chinese authorities did 
 not take even an indirect part in the contest until a much 
 later period. After the capture of Hanoi, the French were 
 constantly engaged with the Black Flags, from whom they 
 captured the important town of Sontaj, which was reported 
 to be held by imperial Chinese troops, but on its capture this 
 statement was found to be untrue. The French were in the 
 full belief that the conquest of Tonquin would be easily 
 effected, when a serious reverse obliged them to realize the 
 gravity of their task. A considerable detachment, under 
 the command of Captain Henri Riviere, who was one of the 
 pioneers of French enterprise on the Songcoi, was surprised 
 and defeated near Hanoi. Riviere was killed, and it became^ 
 necessary to make a great effort to recover the ground thav 
 had been lost. Fresh troops were sent from Europe, buV 
 before they arrived the French received another check al 
 Phukai, which the Black Flags claimed as a victory because 
 the French were obliged to retreat. 
 
 Before this happened, the French had taken extreme 
 measures against the King of Annam, of which state Ton- 
 quin is the northern province. The king of that country, 
 by name Tuduc, who had become submissive to the French, 
 died in July, 1883, and after his death the Annamese, per- 
 haps encouraged by the difficulties of the French in Tonquin, 
 became so hostile that it was determined to read them a 
 severe lesson. Hue was attacked and occupied a month 
 after the death of Tuduc, and a treaty was extracted from 
 the new king which made him the dependent of France 
 When the cold season began in Tonquin, the French forces 
 largely increased, and commanded by Admiral Courbet 
 renewed operations, and on December 11 attacked the main 
 body of the Black Flags at Sontay, which they had reoccu 
 pied and strengthened. They offered a desperate and well 
 sustained resistance, and it was only with heavy loss that 
 the French succeeded in carrying the town. The victors
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANOSU 495 
 
 were somewhat recompensed for their hardships and loss by 
 the magnitude of the spoil, which included a large sum of 
 money. Desultory fighting continued without intermission; 
 Admiral Courbet was superseded by General Millot, who 
 determined to signalize his assumption of the command by 
 attacking Bacninh, which the Black Flags made their head- 
 quarters after the loss of Sontay. On March 8, he attacked 
 this place at the head of 12,000 men, but so formidable were 
 its defenses that he would not risk an attack in front, and by 
 a circuitous march of four days he gained the flank of the 
 position, and thus taken at a disadvantage the Black Flags 
 abandoned their formidable lines, and retreated without 
 much loss, leaving their artillery, including some Krupp 
 gTins, in the hands of the victors. At this stage of the 
 question diplomacy intervened, and on May 11 a treaty of 
 peace was signed by Commander Fournier, during the min- 
 istry of M. Jules Ferry, with the Chinese Government. 
 One of the principal stipulations of this treaty was that the 
 French should be allowed to occupy Langson and other 
 places in Tonquin. When the French commander sent 
 a force under Colonel Dugenne to occupy Langson it was 
 opposed in the Bade defile and repulsed with some loss. 
 The Chinese exonerated themselves from all responsibility 
 by declaring that the French advance was premature, be- 
 cause no date was fixed by the Fournier Convention, and 
 because there had not been time to transmit the necessary 
 orders. On the other hand, M. Fournier declared on his 
 honor that the dates in his draft were named in the original 
 convention. The French Government at once demanded an 
 apology, and an indemnity fixed by M. Jules Ferry, in a 
 moment of mental excitement, at the ridiculous figure of 
 $50,000,000. An apology was offered, but such an in- 
 demnity was refused, and eventually France obtained one 
 of only $800,000. 
 
 After the Bade affair hostilities were at once resumed, 
 and for the first time the French carried them on not only 
 against the Black Flags, but against the Chinese. M. Jules
 
 496 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Ferry did not, however, make any formal declaration of war 
 against China, and lie thus gained an advantage of position 
 for his attack on the Chinese which it was not creditable 
 to French chivalry to have asserted. The most striking in- 
 stance of this occurred at Foochow, where the French fleet, 
 as representing a friendly power, was at anchor above the 
 formidable defenses of the Min Eiver. In accordance with 
 instructions telegraphed to him, the French admiral attacked 
 those places in reverse and destroyed the forts on the Min 
 without much difficulty or loss, thanks exclusively to his 
 having been allowed past them as a friend. The French 
 also endeavored to derive all possible advantage from there 
 being no formal declaration of war, and to make use of 
 Hongkong as a base for their fleet against China. But this 
 unfairness could not be tolerated, and the British minister at 
 Pekin, where Sir Harry Parkes had in the autumn of 1883 
 succeeded Sir Thomas Wade, issued a proclamation that the 
 hostilities between France and China were tantamount to a 
 state of war, and that the laws of neutrality must be strictly 
 observed. The French resented this step, and showed some 
 inclination to retaliate by instituting a right to search for 
 rice, but fortunately this pretension was not pushed to ex- 
 tremities and the war was closed before it could produce 
 any serious consequences. The French devoted much of their 
 attention to an attack on the Chinese possessions in Formosa 
 and the occupation of Kelung; a fort in the northern part of 
 that island was captured, but the subsequent success of the 
 French was small. The Chinese displayed great energy and 
 resource in forming defenses against any advance inland 
 from Kelung or Tamsui, and the French Government was 
 brought to face the fact that there was nothing to be gained 
 by carrying on these desultory operations, and that unless 
 they were prepared to send a large expedition, it was com- 
 puted of not less than 50,000 men, to attack Pekin, there 
 was no alternative to coming to terms with China. How 
 strong this conviction had become may be gathered from the 
 fact that the compulsory retreat, in March, 1885, of the
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANOSU 497 
 
 French from before Langson, where some of the Chinese 
 regular troops were drawn up with a large force of Black 
 and Yellow Flags — the latter of whom were in Chinese pay 
 — did not imperil the negotiations which were then far ad- 
 vanced toward completion. On June 9 of the same year a 
 treaty of peace was signed by M. Patenotre and Li Hung 
 Chang which gave France nothing more than the Fournier 
 Convention. 
 
 The military lessons of this war must be pronounced in- 
 conclusive, for the new forces which China had organized 
 since the Pekin campaign were never fully engaged, and the 
 struggle ended before the regular regiments sent to Langson 
 had any opportunity of showing their quality. But the im- 
 pression conveyed by the fighting in Formosa and the north- 
 ern districts of Tonquin was that China had made consider- 
 able progress in the military art, and that she possessed the 
 nucleus of an army that might become formidable. But 
 while the soldiers had made no inconsiderable improvement, 
 as much could not be said of the officers, and among the corn*- 
 manders there seemed no grasp of the situation, and a com- 
 plete inability to conduct a campaign. Probably these defi- 
 ciencies will long remain the really weak spot in the Chinese 
 war organization, and although they have men who will 
 fight well, the only capacity their commanders showed in 
 Tonquin and Formosa was in selecting strong positions and 
 in fortifying them with consummate art. But as the strong- 
 est position can be turned and avoided, and as the Chinese, 
 like all Asiatics, become demoralized when their rear is 
 threatened, it cannot be denied that, considerable progress 
 as the Chinese have made in the m.ilitary art, they have not 
 yet mastered some of its rudiments. All that can be said 
 is that the war between France and China was calculated 
 to teach the advisability of caution in fixing a quarrel upon 
 China. Under some special difficulties from the character 
 of the war and with divided counsels at Pekin, the Chinese 
 still gave a very good account of themselves against one o-f 
 the greatest powers of Europe.
 
 498 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 During the progress of this struggle a coup d'etat was 
 effected at Pekin of which at the time it was impossible to 
 measure the whole significance. In July, 1884, the Chinese 
 world was startled by the sudden fall and disgrace of Prince 
 Kung, who had been the most powerful man in China since 
 the Treaty of Pekin. A decree of the empress-regent ap- 
 peared dismissing him from all his posts and consigning him 
 to an obscurity from which after nine years he has not yet 
 succeeded in emerging. The causes of his fall are not clear, 
 but they were probably of several distinct kinds. While he 
 was the leader of the peace party and the advocate of a 
 prompt arrangement with France, he was also an opponent 
 of Prince Chun's desire to have a share in the practical ad- 
 ministration of the state, or, at least, an obstacle in the way 
 of its realization. Prince Chun, who was a man of an im- 
 perious will, and who, on the death of the Eastern Empress, 
 became the most important personage in the palace and su- 
 preme council of the empire, was undoubtedly the leader 
 of the attack on Prince Kung, and the immediate cause of 
 his downfall. Prince Kung, who was an amiable and well 
 intentioned man rather than an able statesman, yielded 
 without resistance, and indeed he had no alternative, for he 
 had no following at Pekin, and his influence was very slight 
 except among Europeans. Prince Chun then came to the 
 front, taking an active and prominent part in the govern- 
 ment, making himself president of a new board of national 
 defense and taking up the command of the Pekin Field 
 Force, a specially trai ned body of troops for the defense of the 
 capital. He retained possession of these posts after his son 
 assumed the government in person, notwithstanding the law 
 forbidding a father serving under his son, which has already 
 been cited, and he remained the real controller of Chinese 
 policy until his sudden and unexpected death in the first 
 days of 1891. Some months earlier, in April, 1890, China 
 had suffered a great loss in the Marquis Tseng, whose diplo- 
 matic experience and knowledge of Europe might have ren- 
 dered his country infinite service in the future. He was the
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANQSU 499 
 
 chosen colleague of Prince Chun, and lie is said to have 
 gained the ear of his young sovereign. "While willing to 
 admit the superiority of European inventions, he was also 
 an implicit believer in China's destiny and in her firmly 
 holding her place among the greatest powers of the world. 
 In December, 1890, also died Tseng Kwo Tsiuen, uncle of 
 the marquis, and a man who had taken a prominent and 
 honorable part in the suppression of the Taeping Rebellion. 
 In 1885 an important and delicate negotiation between 
 England and China was brought to a successful issue by the 
 joint efforts of Lord Salisbury and the Marquis Tseng. The 
 levy of the lekin or barrier tax on opium had led to many 
 exactions in the interior which were injurious to the foreign 
 trade and also to the Chinese Government, which obtained 
 only the customs duty raised in the port. After the subject 
 had been thoroughly discussed in all its bearings a conven- 
 tion was signed in London, on July 19, 1885, by which the 
 lekin was fixed at eighty taels a chest, in addition to the 
 customs due of thirty taels, and also that the whole of this 
 sum should be paid in the treaty port before the opium was 
 taken out of bond. This arrangement was greatly to the 
 advantage of the Chinese Government, which came into 
 possession of a large revenue that had previously been frit- 
 tered away in the provinces, and much of which had gone 
 into the pockets of the mandarins. This subject affords the 
 most appropriate place for calling attention to the conspic- 
 uous services rendered, as Director- General of Chinese Cus- 
 toms during more than thirty years, by Sir Robert Hart, 
 who, on the premature death of Sir Harry Parkes, was ap- 
 pointed British Minister at Pekin, which post, for weighty 
 reasons, he almost immediately resigned. It is impossible 
 to measure the consequences and important effect of his con- 
 duct and personal influence upon the policy and opinion of 
 China, while his work in the interests of that country has 
 been both striking and palpable. To his efforts the central 
 government mainly owes its large and increasing cash reve- 
 nue, and when some candid Chinese historian sums up the
 
 500 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 wort done for his country by foreigners, he will admit that, 
 what Gordon did in war and Macartney in diplomacy, Hart 
 accomplished in those revenue departments which are an 
 essential element of strength, and we must hope that this 
 truthful chronicler will also not forget to record that all these 
 loyal servants were English, members of a race which, after 
 fighting China fairly, frankly held out the hand of friend- 
 ship and alliance. In connection with this subject it may 
 be noted that the emperor issued an edict in 1890 formally 
 legalizing the cultivation of opium, which, although prac- 
 tically carried on, was nominally illegal. An immediate 
 consequence of this step was a great increase in the area 
 under cultivation, particularly in Manchuria, and so great 
 is the production of native opium now becoming that that of 
 India may yet be driven from the field as a practical revenge 
 for the loss inflicted on China by the competition of Indian 
 tea. But at all events these measures debar China from 
 ever again posing as an injured party in the matter of the 
 opium traffic. She has very rightly determined to make the 
 best of the situation and to derive all the profit she can by 
 taxing an article in such very general use and consumption; 
 but there is an end to all representations like those made by 
 prominent officials from Commissioner Lin to Prince Kung 
 and Li Hung Chang, that the opium traffic was iniquitous, 
 and constituted the sole cause of disagreement between China 
 and England. 
 
 During these years the young EmjDcror Kwangsu was 
 growing up. In February, 1887, in which month falls the 
 Chinese New Year, it was announced that his marriage was 
 postponed in consequence of his delicate health, and it was 
 not until the new year of 1889, when Kwangsu was well 
 advanced in his eighteenth year, that he was married to 
 Yeh-ho-na-la, daughter of a Manchu general named Knei 
 Hsiang, who had been specially selected for this great honor 
 out of many hundred candidates. The marriage was cele- 
 brated with the usual state, and more than $5,000,000 is said 
 to have been expended on the attendant ceremonies. At the
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANGSU 501 
 
 same time tlie empress-regent issued her farewell edict and 
 passed into retirement, but there is reason to believe that she 
 continued to exercise no inconsiderable influence over the 
 young emperor. 
 
 The marriage and assumption of governing power by the 
 Emperor Kwaugsu brought to the front the very important 
 question of the right of audience by the foreign ministers 
 resident at Pekin. This privilege had been conceded by 
 China at the time of the Tientsin massacre, and it had been 
 put into force on one occasion during the brief reign of 
 Tungche. The time had again arrived for giving it effect, 
 and, after long discussions as to the place of audience and 
 the forms to be observed, Kwangsu issued, in December, 
 1890, an edict appointing a day soon after the commence- 
 ment of the Chinese New Year for the audience, and also 
 arranging that it should be repeated annually on the same 
 date. In March, 1891, Kwangsu gave his first reception to 
 the foreign ministers, but after it was over some criticism 
 and dissatisfaction were aroused by the fact that the cere- 
 mony had been held in the Tse Kung Ko, or Hall of Trib- 
 utary Nations. As this was the first occasion on which 
 Europeans saw the young emperor, the fact that he made a 
 favorable impression on them is not without interest, and 
 the following personal description of the master of so many 
 millions may well be quoted. "Whatever the impression 
 'the Barbarians' made on him the idea which they carried 
 away of the Emperor Kwangsu was pleasing and almost 
 pathetic. His air is one of exceeding intelligence and gen- 
 tleness, somewhat frightened and melancholy looking. His 
 face is pale, and though it is distinguished by refinement and 
 quiet dignity it has none of the force of his martial ancestors, 
 nothing commanding or imperial, but is altogether mild, 
 delicate, sad and kind. He is essentially Manchu in feat- 
 ures, his skin is strangely pallid in hue, which is, no doubt, 
 accounted for by the confinement of his life inside these for- 
 bidding walls and the absence of the ordinary pleasures and 
 pursuits of youth, with the constant discharge of onerous,
 
 502 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 complicated and difficult duties of state which, it must be 
 remembered, are, according to imperial Chinese etiquette, 
 mostly transacted between the hours of two and six in the 
 morning. His face is oval shaped with a very long narrow 
 chin and a sensitive mouth with thin, nervous lips; his nose 
 is well shaped and straight, his eyebrows regular and very 
 arched, while the eyes are unusually large and sorrowful in 
 expression. The forehead is well shaped and broad, and the 
 head is large beyond the average. ' ' 
 
 Owing to the dissatisfaction felt at the place of audience, 
 which seemed to put the Treaty Powers on the same footing 
 as tributary states, the foreign ministers have endeavored to 
 force from the Tsungli Yamen the formal admission that a 
 more appropriate part of the imperial city should be assigned 
 for the ceremony; but as the Powers themselves were not 
 disposed to lay too much stress on this point, no definite con- 
 cession has yet been made, and the Chinese ministers have 
 held out against the pressure of some of the foreign repre- 
 sentatives. But, although no precise alteration has been 
 made in the place of audience, the question has been practi- 
 cally settled by a courteous concession to the new English 
 minister, Mr. O' Conor, who succeeded Sir John Walsham in 
 1892, and it is gratifying to feel that this advantage was 
 gained more by tact than by coercion. When Mr. O' Conor 
 wished to present his credentials to the emperor, it was ar- 
 ranged that the emperor should receive him in the Cheng 
 Kuan Tien Palace, which is part of the imperial residence of 
 Peace and Plenty within the Forbidden City. The British 
 representative, accompanied by his secretaries and suite in 
 accordance with arrangement, proceeded to this palace on 
 December 13, 1892, and was received in a specially honor- 
 able way at the principal or imperial entrance by the officials 
 of the court. Such a mark of distinction was considered 
 quite unique in the annals of foreign diplomacy in China, 
 and has since been a standing grievance with the other min- 
 isters at Pekin. It was noticed by those present that the 
 emperor took a much greater interest in the ceremony tban
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANQSU 503 
 
 on previous occasions, and that he showed special attention 
 as Prince Chiug, the President of the Yamen, translated the 
 letter from Queen Victoria. This audience, which lasted a 
 considerable time, was certainly the most satisfactory and 
 encouraging yet held with the Emperor Kwangsu by any 
 foreign envoy, and it also afforded opportunity of confirming 
 the favorable impression which the intelligence and dignified 
 demeanor of the Emperor Kwangsu have made on all who 
 have had the honor of coming into his presence. One inci- 
 dent in the progress of the audience question deserves notice, 
 and that was the emperor's refusal, in 1891, to receive Mr. 
 Blair, the United States Minister, in consequence of the hos- 
 tile legislation of that country against China. The anti- 
 foreign outbreak along the Yangtsekiang, in the summer 
 of 1891, was an unpleasant incident, from which at one time 
 it looked as if serious consequences might follow; but the 
 ebullition fortunately passed away without an international 
 crisis, and it may be hoped that the improved means of exer- 
 cising diplomatic pressure at Pekin will render these attacks 
 less frequent, and their settlement and redress more rapid. 
 During the last ten years events in Central Asia and 
 Burma have drawn England and China much more closely 
 together, and have laid the basis of what it must be hoped 
 will prove a firm and durable alliance. If suspicion were laid 
 aside and candid relations established on the frontier, it 
 should not be difficult to maintain an excellent understand- 
 ing with China, and at the present moment every diffi- 
 culty has been smoothed over with the exception of that on 
 the Burmese frontier. It is to be hoped that not less success 
 will be obtained in this quarter than in Sikhim and Hunza, 
 and Mr. O' Conor's convention of Pekin in July, 1886, recog- 
 nizing China's right to receive a tribute mission from Bur- 
 ma once in ten years went far to prove the extent of con- 
 cession England would make to China. It is divulging what 
 cannot long be kept secret, to explain the circumstances 
 under which Mr. 0' Conor's convention was signed, and the 
 unusual concession made by a British Government of admit-
 
 504 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 ting its liability to send a tribute mission. The Cbefoo Con- 
 vention, closing the Yunnan incident, contained a promise 
 from the Chinese Government to allow an English mission 
 to pass through Tibet. Years passed without any attempt 
 to give effect to this stipulation, but at last, in 1884, Mr. 
 Colman Macaulay, a member of the Indian Civil Service, 
 obtained the assent of his government to requesting the per- 
 mission of the Chinese Government to visit Lhasa. He went 
 to Pekin and he came to London, and he obtained the nec- 
 essary permission and the formal passport of the Tsungli 
 Yamen; and there is no doubt that if he had set off for Tibet 
 with a small party, he would have been honorably received 
 and passed safely through Tibet to India. On the other 
 hand there is no doubt that such a visit would have pre- 
 sented no feature of special or striking importance. It would 
 have been an interesting individual experience, but scarcely 
 an international landmark. This modest character for his 
 long- cherished project did not suit Mr. Macaulay, and un- 
 mindful of the adage that there may be a slip betwixt the cup 
 and the lip, he not merely delayed the execution of his visit, 
 but he made ostentatious preparations for an elaborate mis- 
 sion, and he engaged many persons with scientific qualifica- 
 tions to accompany him, with the view of examining the 
 mineral resources of Tibet. The Chinese themselves did not 
 like, and had never contemplated, such a mission, but their 
 dissatisfaction was slight in comparison with the storm it 
 raised in Tibet; and the Chinese Government was thus 
 brought face to face with a position in which it must either 
 employ its military power to coerce the Tibetans, who made 
 preparations to oppose the Macaulay mission by force of 
 arms, or acquiesce in the Tibetans ignoring its official pass- 
 ports, and thus provoke a serious complication with this 
 country. Such was the position of the Tibetan question 
 when Burma was annexed in January, 1886, and negotia- 
 tions followed with China for the adjustment of her claims 
 in the country. Negotiations were carried on, in the first 
 place by Lord Salisbury, and in the second by Lord Kose-
 
 THE REIGN OF KWANOSU 505 
 
 bery, -with the Chinese minister in London, and the draft of 
 more than one convention was prepared. Among such con- 
 templated arrangements were the dispatch of a mission from 
 Burma to China, and of a return one from China; the ap- 
 pointment of the Head Priest of Mandalay as the person to 
 •send the mission, thus making it a purely native matter, 
 outside the participation of the British Government ; and the 
 concession of material advantages on the Irrawaddy and in 
 the Shan country, as the equivalent for the surrender of the 
 tribute. It is probable that one of these three arrangements 
 would have been carried out, but that, on certain points 
 being referred to Pekin, the knowledge came to the ears 
 of the British Government that if the Tibetan mission were 
 withdrawn, the Chinese would be content with the formal 
 admission of their claim to receive the tribute mission from 
 Burma in accordance with established usage. • As both 
 governments wanted a speedy settlement of the question, 
 the Chinese, with the view of allaying the rising agitation 
 in Tibet and getting rid of a troublesome question, and the 
 English not less anxious to have the claims of China in Bur- 
 ma defined in diplomatic language, the convention which 
 bears Mr. O'Conor's name was drawn up and signed with 
 quite remarkable dispatch. For the abandonment of the 
 Macaulay mission, and the recognition of their right to re- 
 ceive the tribute mission from Burma, the authorities at 
 Pekin were quite, at the moment, willing to forego material 
 claims such as a port on the Irrawaddy. Diplomacy has 
 not yet said the last word on this matter, and the exact fron- 
 tier between Burma and China has still to be delimited, 
 but the fixing of a definite date for the dispatch of the first 
 mission from Mandalay to Pekin, which is timed to set out 
 in January, 1894, is in itself of hopeful augury for the settle- 
 ment of all difficulties. When this matter is composed there 
 will be no cloud in the sky of Anglo- Chinese relations, and 
 that such an auspicious result will be obtained is not open 
 to serious doubt. The most gratifying fact in the history 
 of China during the last ten years is the increasing sym- 
 China— 22
 
 606 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 pathy and tacit understanding between the two great em- 
 pires of England and China in Asia, which must in time 
 constitute an effective alliance against any common danger 
 in that continent, and the aggressive policy of Russia. 
 
 THE WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT 
 
 EVENTS 
 
 We have seen that, up to 1892, it had been customary to 
 receive the representatives of foreign powers in the Tse Kung 
 Ko, or Hall of Tributary Nations. Naturally, much dissatis- 
 faction was provoked by the selection of a place of audience 
 which seemed to put the Treaty Powers on the same footing 
 as tributary states, and, accordingly, the foreign ministers 
 undertook to exact from the Tsungli Yamen, or Board for 
 Foreign Ajffairs, the designation of a more suitable locality 
 in the imperial city for the annual ceremony. The proposed 
 innovation was resisted for some time ; but when Sir Nicolas 
 0' Conor was appointed British Minister at Pekin, an ex- 
 ception was made in his favor, and a place of superior im- 
 portance to the Hall of Tributary Nations was chosen for 
 the presentation of his credentials. The Emperor Kwangsu 
 agreed to receive him in the Cheng Kuan Tien Palace, or 
 pavilion which forms part of the imperial residence of Peace 
 and Plenty within the Forbidden City. In pursuance of this 
 arrangement, the British representative, attended by his suite, 
 proceeded to this pavilion on December 13, 1892, and was re- 
 ceived at the principal entrance by the high court officials. It 
 was also noted that the emperor took a greater interest in the 
 ceremony than on preceding occasions, and followed with at- 
 tention the reading of Queen Victoria's letter, by Prince 
 Ching, then president of the Tsungli Yamen. Thenceforth, 
 there was observed with every year a decided improvement 
 in the mode of receiving foreign diplomatists, and, event- 
 ually, the imperial audience was supplemented with an an-
 
 WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 507 
 
 nvial dinner given by the Board for Foreign Affairs, Through 
 the personal reception accorded by the Emperor of China to 
 Prince Henry of Prussia on May 15, 1898, the audience ques- 
 tion was finally settled in favor of the right of foreign poten- 
 tates to rank on an equality with the so-called Son of Heaven. 
 We come now to the most memorable event in the modern 
 history of China since the Taeping Eebellion; to wit, the war 
 with Japan. In order to comprehend, however, the causes 
 of this contest between the two chief races of the Far East, 
 it is necessary to review the development of the Corean 
 question which gave rise to it. There seems to be no doubt 
 that Japan derived its first civilizing settlers, and most of 
 its arts and industries, from the Corean peninsula. It is 
 certain that, for centuries, the intercourse between the two 
 countries was very close, and that more than one attempt 
 was made by Japanese rulers to subjugate Corea. The lat- 
 est and most strenuous endeavor to that end was made near 
 the end of the sixteenth century, and, although it resulted 
 in a temporary occupation of the peninsula, the Japanese 
 troops were eventually withdrawn, and Corea resumed its 
 former status of a kingdom tributary to the Celestial Em- 
 pire. Thenceforth, for almost three centuries, Corea and 
 Tonquin bore, in theory, precisely the same relation to the 
 Middle Kingdom. In each instance, the practical question 
 was whether China was strong enough to make good her 
 nominal rights. The outcome of her resistance to French 
 aggression in Tonquin had shown that there, at least, she 
 had no such power. But, in the subsequent ten years, efforts 
 had been made to organize an efficient army and navy, and 
 the belief was entertained at Pekin that China was at all 
 events strong enough to uphold her claims in Corea, which 
 was, geographically and strategically, of far more impor- 
 tance to the Middle Kingdom than was Tonquin. Yet, 
 while it was evident that Corea would not be renounced 
 without a struggle, the Pekin authorities, for some years, 
 met the Japanese encroachments with a weak and vacillat- 
 ing policy. As early as 1876, the Mikado's advisers entered
 
 508 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 on a course wliicli obviously aimed at tlie attainment of com- 
 mercial, if not, also, political, ascendency in the Hermit 
 Kingdom. An outrage having been committed upon some 
 of her sailors, Japan obtained, by way of reparation from 
 the court of Seoul, the opening of the port of Fushan to her 
 trade. Four years later, Chemulpo, the port of Seoul, was 
 also oj)ened. These forward steps on the part of the Japa- 
 nese aroused the Chinese to activity, and, in 1881, a draft 
 commercial treaty was prepared by the Chinese authorities 
 in council with the representatives of the principal powers 
 at Pekin, and sent to Seoul, where it was accepted. The 
 Japanese alleged, however, that they possessed a historical 
 right to an equal voice, with China in the Corean peninsula, 
 and that, consequently, the treaty to which we have just 
 referred required their ratification. To sustain this claim, 
 the Japanese allied themselves with the Progressive party 
 in Corea, a move which compelled the Chinese to lean upon 
 the Reactionists, who were opposed to the concessions lately 
 made to foreigners, and who, as events were to show, were 
 preponderant in the Hermit Kingdom. In June, 1882, the 
 Corean Reactionists attacked the Japanese Legation at Seoul, 
 murdered some members of it, and compelled the survivors 
 to flee to the sea- coast. Thereupon, the Mikado sent some 
 troops to exact reparation, and the Chinese, on their part, 
 dispatched a force to restore order. A compromise was 
 brought about, and, for two years, Japanese and Chinese 
 soldiers remained encamped beside one another under the 
 walls of the Corean capital. In December, 1884, however, 
 a second collision occurred between the Japanese and the 
 Coreans, the latter being, this time, assisted by the Chi- 
 nese. The Mikado's subjects were again compelled to take 
 to flight. The Tokio Government now resolved upon firm 
 measures, and, while it exacted compensation from the Co- 
 reans, it sent Count Ito Hirobumi to China to bring about 
 an accommodation with the Pekin Government. At that 
 conjuncture, there is no doubt that China possessed advan- 
 tages in the Corean peninsula that were lacking to the Japa-
 
 WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 509 
 
 nese. Not only was she popular with the majority of the 
 people, but the Treaty Powers were more disposed to act 
 through her than through Japan in order to secure the gen- 
 eral extension of trade with the Hermit Kingdom. Those 
 advantages, nevertheless, were thrown away by an agree- 
 ment which the shortsighted advisers of the Chinese emperor 
 were persuaded to accept. Li Hung Chang was appointed 
 the Chinese Plenipotentiary to negotiate with Count Ito, 
 and, after a short conference, a convention was signed at 
 Tientsin on April 18, 1885. The provisions of the conven- 
 tion were: first, that both countries should withdraw their 
 troops from Corea; secondly, that no more officers should 
 be sent by either country to drill the Corean army; and, 
 thirdly, that if, at any future time, either of the two coun- 
 tries should send troops to Corea, it must inform the other. 
 It is manifest that, by this agreement, China, practically, 
 acquiesced in Japan's assertion of an equal right to control 
 the Hermit Kingdom. Thenceforth, it was impossible to 
 speak of Corea as being a vassal state of the Celestial Em- 
 pire. 
 
 For some nine years, nevertheless, after the conclusion 
 of the Tientsin agreement, there were no dangerous disturb- 
 ances in the Peninsular Kingdom, In the early part of 1894, 
 however, Kim-Ok-Kiun, a reformer, and the leader of the 
 Corean uprising in 1884, was assassinated at Shanghai, and 
 it subsequently transpired that the murder had been com- 
 mitted by the order of the Corean authorities. It is certain 
 that honors and rewards were bestowed upon the assassin 
 on his return to the Hermit Kingdom, while the body of his 
 victim was drawn and quartered as that of a traitor. Just 
 at this juncture, the Tonghaks, a body of religious reform- 
 ers, having failed to obtain certain concessions, revolted, 
 and, by the end of May, achieved so much success over the 
 Corean forces that the Seoul Government became alarmed, 
 and sent to China for assistance. In response to the request, 
 some two thousand Chinese troops were disembarked on June 
 10 at Asan, a seaport some distance south of the Corean capi-
 
 510 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 tal, and a few Chinese men-of-war were dispatclied to the 
 coast of the peninsula. Formal notice of these proceedings 
 was given to Japan under the terms of the Tientsin Conven- 
 tion. Thereupon, the Mikado's Government decided to un- 
 dertake a like interposition, and acted with so much energy 
 that, within forty-eight hours after the arrival of the Chi- 
 nese at Asan, they had placed at Seoul a much superior 
 force. They were thus able to dominate the court, although 
 it was in entire sympathy with China. The Fekin Govern- 
 ment now made the mistake of reviving its pretensions to 
 regard the Hermit Kingdom as a vassal state. These pre- 
 tensions Japan refused to tolerate, on the ground, first, that 
 she had never admitted them, and, secondly, that the Tien- 
 tsin Convention recognized an equality of rights in the two 
 states. The Japanese also called attention to the misrule 
 that prevailed in Corea, and proposed that the Chinese should 
 join them in carrying out needful reforms. To this proposal 
 China could not accede, being hampered by her alliance with 
 the reactionary party at Seoul; consequently, Japan under- 
 took the execution of the task alone. As a first step in that 
 direction, the Japanese got possession of the person of the 
 Corean ruler, and compelled him to act as the instrument of 
 his captors. The initial document which he was constrained 
 to sign was an order that the Chinese troops, who had come 
 at his invitation, should leave the country. The seizure of 
 the king's person, which occurred on July 23, 1894, was fol- 
 lowed by two successful acts of aggression. On the 25th, 
 the Japanese squadron attacked the Chinese transport 
 "Kowshing, " conveying fresh soldiers to Asan, and its 
 escort of warships. In the engagement one Chinese man- 
 of-war was sunk, one was disabled, and 1,200 soldiers were 
 destroyed on the "Kowshing," which was torpedoed. On 
 July 29, the Japanese general Oshima, at the head of a 
 small force, made a night attack upon the Chinese fortified 
 camp at Song Ilwang, and carried the place with a loss to 
 their opponents of 500 killed and wounded. These prelimi- 
 nary encounters were followed by a declaration of war on
 
 WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 511 
 
 August 1, 1894. During the ensuing six weeks, Japan 
 poured lier troops into the peninsula, while the Chinese 
 fleet, instead of harassing the enemy, remained in the 
 harbors of Port Arthur and Wei-hai-Wei. On September 
 15, the Japanese army in Corea was strong enough to de- 
 tach a corps of 14,000 men to attack the Chinese position 
 at Pingyang, a town on the northern banks of the Paidong 
 River. The passage of the river was difficult, and the Chi- 
 nese might have overwhelmed the Japanese when crossing 
 it, but they took no measures to this end, and the battle be- 
 gan at sunrise on the day just named. There were five forts 
 to be captured, and some of them were vigorously defended, 
 nor was it until night set in that the garrison finally deter- 
 mined upon evacuating the place. In the battle itself and 
 the retreat, over 2,000 Chinese were killed, to say nothing 
 of the wounded and the prisoners. The Japanese themselves 
 lost 162 killed, 438 wounded and 83 missing, and there seems 
 to be no reason to doubt that, had all the Chinese officers 
 been capable of the valor displayed by the general Tso-pao- 
 kuei, the Japanese would have been repulsed. As it was, 
 the battle proved decisive, for not a Chinaman paused until 
 he had reached the other side of the Yalu River, which forms 
 the northwest boundary of Corea. 
 
 On the very day of the fight at Pingyang, a number of 
 Chinese war vessels, under the command of Admiral Ting, 
 were transporting troops to the mouth of the Yalu, where 
 the Chinese were assembling a second army. On its return 
 from this task, it was encountered, September 17, off the 
 island of Haiyang, by a Japanese squadron under Admiral 
 Ito. Ostensibly, the two fleets were evenly matched. They 
 each numbered ten fighting vessels, and, if two of the Chi- 
 nese ships possessed a more powerful armament, the Japa- 
 nese were superior in steam power. Tt was to quickness in 
 maneuvering that the Japanese admiral trusted for victory, 
 and his first attack consisted mainly in circling around the 
 Chinese squadron. He was careful, also, to reserve his firo 
 until only two miles separated him from his adversaries.
 
 512 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 After a duel with the Japanese " Matsushima, " the Chi- 
 nese flagship "Tingyuen" was severely damaged, and only 
 saved from sinking by the intervention of her sister ship, the 
 "Chenyuen." These two ironclads, together with the tor- 
 pedo boats, succeeded in making their escape, but five of 
 the Chinese vessels were sunk or destroyed. In men, the 
 Chinese lost 700 killed or drowned and 300 wounded, while 
 the Japanese lost 115 killed and 150 wounded. The result 
 of this victory was that the Chinese never afterward at- 
 tempted to dispute the control of the sea, and their water 
 communication with the Yalu was effectually cut off. 
 
 After the battle of Pingyang, the Japanese army halted, 
 and it was not until after they received re-enforcements 
 under Marshal Yamagata that they resumed their forward 
 movement. On October 10 their advance guard reached the 
 Yalu, a river broad and difficult of passage, behind which 
 was stationed a considerable Chinese army, which, however, 
 after a nominal resistance, soon retreated. In the aban- 
 doned positions on the northern bank of the Yalu, the Jap- 
 anese captured a vast quantity of material of war, includ- 
 ing 74 cannons, over 4,000 rifles, and more than 4,000,000 
 rounds of ammunition. It was supposed that the retreating 
 Chinese force would make a stand at Feng Hwang, but, on 
 reaching that town, October 30, the Japanese found it evac- 
 uated, and were informed that the Chinese soldiers had 
 dispersed. 
 
 While Marshal Yamagata was beginning the invasion of 
 China from the direction of Corea, another Japanese army, 
 under Marshal Oyama, had landed on the Liau-Tung, or 
 Regent's Sword Peninsula, with the aim of capturing the 
 Chinese naval station of Port Arthur. Even in Chinese 
 hands, this was a redoubtable stronghold. It had 300 guna 
 in position, and the garrison numbered some 10,000 men, 
 while the attacking force did not exceed 13,000, although 
 ■we should bear in mind that it was aided by the Japanese 
 fleet. After landing at the mouth of the Huhua-Yuan 
 River, about 100 miles north of Port Arthur, the Japanese
 
 WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 513 
 
 advanced south, and took tlie fortified city of Chinchow, 
 without incurring any loss. The next day they reached 
 Talienwan, where the Chinese had five heavily armed bat- 
 teries, and a considerable garrison, which, however, on the 
 approach of the enemy, abandoned the post without firing 
 a shot. In the forts at this point were found over 120 can- 
 nons, two and a half million rounds of ammunition for the 
 artillery and nearly 34,000,000 rifle cartridges. On Novem- 
 ber 20, 1894, the Japanese army was drawn up in front of 
 Port Arthur, and the fleet prepared to co-operate in the 
 action. The attack began in the morning of November 22, 
 and, although, in one quarter, the Chinese offered sturdy 
 resistance, yet, by the end of the day, with the loss of no 
 more than 18 men killed and 250 wounded, the Japanese 
 were in possession of the strongest position in China, a naval 
 fortress and arsenal on which $30,000,000 had been spent. 
 
 Throughout December the force under Marshal Yama- 
 gata pushed forward into Manchuria, but met there with 
 more vigorous opposition than it had hitherto encountered. 
 In the fight at Kangwasai, the Japanese lost 400, and, in 
 the capture of the town of Kaiting, 300 killed and wounded. 
 About the middle of January, 1895, the Japanese began op- 
 erations against Wei-hai-Wei, the naval stronghold on the 
 northern coast of Shantung, in which the remnant of 
 China's fleet had taken refuge. Although not so strong as 
 Port Arthur, this harbor is considered one of the keys to the 
 Gulf of Pechihli. On January 20, the Japanese troops be- 
 gan to land at Yungchang, a little west of the point to be 
 attacked, and, on the 26th, they appeared at the gates of 
 Wei-hai-Wei. About half of the beleaguered garrison con- 
 sisted of 4,000 sailors from the fleet, under Admiral Ting, 
 who was to show himself a leader of courage and energy. 
 The assault on the land side of Wei-hai-Wei began on Jan- 
 uary 29, and continued throughout that and the following 
 day. At certain points, where Admiral Ting's squadron 
 was able to act with effect, the Japanese were repulsed, 
 but, eventually, the whole of the land garrison fled panic-
 
 514 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 stricken to Chefoo. Even then Ting's squadron and the 
 island force continued to resist, and it was not until Febru- 
 ary 9, wlien almost all the vessels had been taken or sunk, 
 that he consented to capitulate, after receiving a telegram 
 from Li Hung Chang to the effect that no help could be 
 given him. No sooner were the terms of capitulation agreed 
 upon than Admiral Ting retired to his cabin and took a fatal 
 dose of opium. He had held out for three weeks, whereas 
 Port Arthur had been lost in a day. The war continued for 
 a few weeks longer, the Japanese pursuing their advance in 
 Manchuria, and caj^turing the two places which are collect- 
 ively called Newchwang, thus threatening Pekin. They now 
 possessed an army of 100,000 men ready to advance upon 
 the Chinese capital. As there was no reason to suppose that 
 Pekin could be successfully defended, the necessity of con- 
 cluding peace as promptly as possible was recognized. To 
 that end it was needful to appoint a plenipotentiary whose 
 name would convince the Japanese Government that the 
 Chinese were in earnest in their overtures. The only two 
 men who possessed the requisite qualifications were Prince 
 Kung and Li Hung Chang. The former, however, be- 
 ing a prince of the imperial family, and the uncle of the 
 reigning emperor, Kwangsu, could not be induced to submit 
 to the humiliation of proceeding to Japan and suing for 
 peace. The only possible selection, therefore, was Li Hung 
 Chang, who was, accordingly, appointed plenipotentiary. 
 He reached Shimonoseki on March 20, 1895, and, four 
 days after his arrival, the success of his mission was 
 greatly promoted by the attempt of a fanatic to assassin- 
 ate him during his conference with Count Ito, the Japanese 
 representative. The wound was not very serious, but the 
 outrage caused a unanimous expression of sympathy and 
 regret on the part of the Japanese people, and the Mikado 
 sent his own physician to attend the wounded minister. To 
 attest their sorrow for this incident, the Japanese at once 
 granted an armistice, and the terms of peace which they at 
 first proposed were materially mitigated. On April 17, the
 
 WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 515 
 
 Treaty of Sliimonoseki was signed, and, on May 8, the rati- 
 fications were exclianged at Chefoo. The terms of the origi- 
 nal treaty were these: First, China was to surrender Formo- 
 sa and the Pescadores Islands and the southern part of the 
 Shingking province, including the Liau-Tung, or Regent's 
 Sword Peninsula, and of course, also, the naval fortress of 
 Port Arthur. China was likewise to pay in eight install- 
 ments a money indemnity of 200,000,000 Kuping taels, or, 
 say, $160,000,000. She was also to grant certain commer- 
 cial concessions, including the admission of ships under the 
 Japanese flag to the Chinese lakes and rivers, and the ap- 
 pointment of consuls. In view of the completeness of 
 Japan's triumph, these conditions could not be considered 
 onerous, but they, undoubtedly, disturbed the balance of 
 power in the Far East, and, had they been permitted to 
 stand, would have effectually thwarted Russia's plan of ad- 
 vancing southward, and of obtaining an ice-free port. The 
 Czar's Government, accordingly, determined to interpose, 
 and, having secured the co-operation of its French ally, and 
 also of Germany, it presented to the Mikado, in the name of 
 the three powers, a request that he should waive that part 
 of the Shimonoseki Treaty which provided for the surrender 
 of the Liau-Tung Peninsula. It was proposed that, in re- 
 turn for the renunciation of this territory on the Chinese 
 mainland, the pecuniary indemnity should be increased by 
 $30,000,000, and that Wei-hai-Wei should be retained until 
 the whole sum should have been paid. The demand was, 
 obviously, one that could not be rejected without war against 
 the three interposing powers, and the odds were too great 
 for Japan to face without the assistance of Great Britain, 
 which Lord Rosebery, then prime minister, did not see fit to 
 offer. The Mikado, accordingly, submitted to the loss of the 
 best part of the fruits of victory, retaining only Formosa 
 and the Pescadores, the value of which is, as yet, undeter- 
 mined; with the money indemnity, however, Japan has 
 been enabled so greatly to strengthen her fleet that, when 
 all the vessels building for her are completed, she will
 
 516 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 take rank as a naval power of tlie first class in the 
 Pacific. 
 
 For some time after the revision of the Shimonoseki 
 Treaty, the Chinese seem to have imagined that the Czar 
 had intervened from disinterested motives, but Count Cas- 
 sini, the Eussian minister at Pekin, eventually made it 
 clear that the interposition would not be gratuitous. In 
 what form the payment for Eussia's services should be 
 made was, for some time, the subject of debate, but, before 
 Li Hung Chang left China in the spring of 1896, as a special 
 embassador to attend the coronation of Nicholas II. at Mos- 
 cow, the heads of a convention had been drawn up, and, 
 on Li's arrival in Eussia, he signed an agreement which em- 
 bodied the concessions to be made to the Czar in return for 
 his services. This secret treaty gave Eussia the control of 
 the Liau-Tung Peninsula, which she had ostensibly saved, 
 at the cost to China of $30,000,000, and the St. Petersburg 
 Government was also to be allowed to build a branch of the 
 Trans- Siberian Eailway through Manchuria to Talienwan 
 and Port Arthur. A period of eighteen months elapsed be- 
 fore the details of this momentous agreement became known. 
 On the return of Li Hung Chang to Pekin, he not only 
 failed to recover the viceroyship of Chihli, but he found his 
 relations with the Emperor Kwangsu quite as unsatisfactory 
 as they had been after his return from Shimonoseki. He 
 was restored, indeed, to a seat on the Tsungli Yamen, or 
 Board of Foreign Affairs, but, for twelve months, it seemed 
 as if, despite the support of the Empress-Dowager Tsi An, 
 his influence would never revive. 
 
 The two years that followed the Shimonoseki Treaty 
 gave a breathing spell to China, and should have been de- 
 voted to energetic reforms in the military and naval admin- 
 istration. As a matter of fact, nothing had been accom- 
 plished, when, in 1897, a blow fell which brought the Middle 
 Kingdom face to face with the prospect of immediate par- 
 tition. In November of that year, without any preliminary 
 notice or warning to the Pekin Grovernment, two G-erman
 
 WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 517 
 
 men-of-war entered the "harbor of Kiao Chou, and ordered 
 the commandant to give up the place in reparation for the 
 murder of two German missionaries in the province of Shan- 
 tung. Germany refused to evacuate Kiao Chou unless due 
 reparation should be made for the outrage on the mission- 
 aries, and unless, further, China would cede to her the ex- 
 clusive right to construct railways and work mines through- 
 out the extensive and populous province of Shantung. This, 
 of course, was equivalent to the demarcation of a sphere of 
 influence. For a time, the Pekin Government showed itself 
 recalcitrant, but, in January, 1898, it consented to lease Kiao 
 Chou to Germany for ninety- nine years, and to make the 
 required additional concession of exclusive rights in Shan- 
 tung. Eussia, on her part, did not wait long after the Ger- 
 man seizure of Kiao Cho , to put forward her claim for 
 compensation on account of the services rendered in the 
 matter of the revision of the Shimonoseki Treaty. The 
 terms of the Cassini agreement were now gradually re- 
 vealed. In December, 1897, the St. Petersburg Government 
 announced that the Chinese had given permission to the 
 Eussian fleet to winter at Port Arthur; in February, 1898, 
 Eussia added Talienwan to Port Arthur, but essayed to dis- 
 arm criticism by declaring that the first-named port would 
 be opened to the ships of all the great powers like other ports 
 on the Chinese mainland. This promise was subsequently 
 qualified, and on March 27 a convention was signed at Pekin 
 giving the Eussians the "usufruct" of Port Arthur and 
 Talienwan, which, practically, meant that Eussia had ob- 
 tained those harbors unconditionally, and for an indefinite 
 period. France, on her part, obtained possession of the port 
 of Kwangchowfoo, which is the best outlet to the sea for the 
 trade of the southern province of Kwangsi ; she also secured 
 a promise that the island of Hainan should not be ceded to 
 any other power; and, finally, she gained a recognition of 
 her claim, first advanced in 1895, to a prior right to control 
 the commercial development of the province of Yunnan. 
 This claim is as reasonable as that put forward by Germany
 
 618 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 wiih reference to the province of Shantung, but it is incom- 
 patible with the northeastward development of British Bur- 
 ma. While these acts, which, virtually, amounted to mu- 
 tilations of the Middle Kingdom, were being committed by 
 Grermany, Russia and France, England undertook to assert 
 the principle of the "open door," the principle, namely, that, 
 whatever territorial concessions might be made by the Pekin 
 Government, no nation could be deprived of its treaty rights 
 in the ports ceded. That is to say, American citizens, Brit- 
 ish subjects, or the subjects of any other power which has a 
 treaty with China containing "the most favored nation" 
 clause, must be allowed to enjoy precisely the same rights in 
 Talienwan, Kiao Chou and Kwangchowfoo as they would 
 have enjoyed had not those places been surrendered to Rus- 
 sia, Germany and France respectively. This principle could 
 only have been enforced by war, in which England would 
 have needed the assistance of Japan; but Japan was not yet 
 ready to engage in a contest, for the reason that she still had 
 to receive $60,000,000 of the war indemnity due from China, 
 and because the war vessels which she had ordered to be 
 constructed in foreign shipyards were not yet sufficiently 
 near completion. Being thus constrained to abandon the 
 hope of maintaining its treaty rights in the ceded parts of 
 China, the British Foreign Office changed its ground and fell 
 back on the policy of exacting an equivalent for the advan- 
 tages gained by Russia, Germany and France. In the pur- 
 suance of this policy it obtained Wei-hai-Wei, which, as we 
 have said, is one of the two keys to the Gulf of Pechihli. It 
 is, however, very inferior to Port Arthur; only by the ex- 
 penditure of a large sum of money could it be made a naval 
 fortress of high rank, and, even then, it would require a 
 large garrison for its protection. This was not all that 
 England gained, however; she secured a promise from the 
 Pekin Government that the valley of the Yangtsekiang 
 should never be alienated to any foreign power except Great 
 Britain. The limits of the valley, nevertheless, were not 
 defined, and the Pekin authorities have acted on the hypoth-
 
 WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 519 
 
 esis that the covenant against alienation did not debar them 
 from giving commercial and industrial privileges within 
 the basin to the subjects of European powers other than 
 England. The right to build, for instance, a railway from 
 Pekin to Hangchow has been conferred upon a syndicate 
 nominally Belgian, in which, however, it is understood that 
 Kussia is deeply interested. On the other hand, in spite of 
 protests from St. Petersburg, the privilege of extending to 
 Newchwang in Manchuria the railway which already ex- 
 tends some distance in a northeasterly direction from Tien- 
 tsin, has been secured by a British corporation. 
 
 In September, 1898, a palace revolution occurred at 
 Pekin. For some time, the Emperor Kwangsu had been 
 known to be under the influence of a highly intelligent and 
 progressive Cantonese named Kang Yu Wei. At the lat- 
 ter 's suggestion, edicts were put forth decreeing important 
 administrative reforms which would have deprived the man- 
 darins of their opportunities of embezzlement, and also in- 
 dicating an intention to reorganize the educational system 
 of China upon European models. The necessity of such 
 changes is obvious enough if China is to follow Japan in the 
 path of progress, but it is equally plain that the advocacy of 
 them would render the Emperor obnoxious to the whole body 
 of mandarins and of the literati. The unpopularity caused 
 by his proposed innovations proved fatal to Kwangsu ; for 
 the party at court, headed by the Empress- Dowager Tsi An, 
 took advantage of it to arrest and imprison him. Kang Yu 
 "Wei, having received warning of the conspiracy, had fled, 
 and succeeded in gaining an asylum under the British flag, 
 but many of the Emperor's personal followers were put to 
 death. On September 22, appeared an edict ostensibly signed 
 by Kwangsu announcing that he had requested the Empress- 
 Dowager to resume authority over the affairs of State. The 
 immediate effect of the coup d'etat was to place all power at 
 Pekin in the hands of Manchus least friendly to the adoption 
 of European ideas, and more willing to lean upon Eussia 
 than upon any other foreign power. The early restoration
 
 520 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 to high office of Li Hung Chang, who had, for some time, 
 been a useful tool of the St. Petersburg Government, and 
 who is a favorite of the Empress- Dowager, was a foregone 
 conclusion. 
 
 Soon after, the rumor flashed around the world that the 
 young Emperor, at the instigation of the Empress- Dowager 
 and her advisers, had swallowed a fatal dose of opium. 
 Such credence did this report gain in the capitals of Christen- 
 dom that a dozen other silly tales followed, culminating in 
 the ludicrous story that Li Hung Chang and the Empress- 
 Dowager had eloped. But the young Emperor was after- 
 ward seen alive, though he was in more frail health than 
 ever. It was not to the interest of that shrewd old woman 
 whom Bismarck once dubbed "the only man in China" to 
 have the putative occupant of the throne killed. He was 
 necessary as the figure-head whose name must be signed to 
 her most odious decrees, and he was too completely in her 
 power to be able to thwart her plans. From 1898 to 1900 
 the palace at Pekin was the scene of countless political in- 
 trigues. Every important foreign government was plotting 
 to secure special consideration. The Empress-Dowager and 
 her advisers were playing off one power against another, 
 while all Europe, outside of Eussia, had an uneasy convic- 
 tion that the Czar's Government was secretly and exultantly 
 gathering all the diplomatic plums. The only decisive vic- 
 tory gained between the powers was the achievement of Sec- 
 retary of State Hay in obtaining the pledge of the nations 
 that, no matter what spheres of influence were created in 
 China, the "open door" policy should be applied to them all. 
 
 Early in 1900, whispers of the impending Boxer troubles 
 began to reach the outer world. Little attention was paid 
 to them. They were regarded only as the symptoms of an- 
 other of those more or less important internal disorders that 
 have ever harassed the Celestial Government. The Empress- 
 Dowager gave the most engaging assurances of the continued 
 safety of all alien sojourners in the realm. Her policy to- 
 ward the powers was on© of extreme conciliation. Yet as
 
 WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 521 
 
 the weeks went on the Boxers grew in strength, prestige 
 and power. They proselyted vigorously in many provinces, 
 though their greatest strength was in the province of Shan- 
 tung, where they originated many generations ago. They 
 came into existence first as a kind of Masonic order, and 
 many of their rites are said to bear a grotesque resemblance 
 to those of the Freemasons, thus suggesting the possibility 
 of great antiquity and foreign origin. Their belief is a curi- 
 ous blending of Oriental religions, child-like superstitions, 
 politics and fanatical hatred of foreigners. They practice 
 many mysteries, the parent of which is hypnotism — a thing 
 in itself wholly inexplicable to the mind of the Chinese peas- 
 ant or coolie. Susceptible persons are made the subjects of 
 these Boxer hypnotists. To the accompaniment of weird 
 rites and much hocus-pocus a subject is thrown into a trance 
 by a Boxer hypnotist in the presence of a multitude of pos- 
 sible converts. While in this trance the subject is made to 
 proclaim supposed communications from the gods. The 
 Boxer literature of 1900 abounded in the most marvelous 
 messages from on high that were so obtained. Other sub- 
 jects were made to endure thrusts from knives and cuts from 
 swords, and their invulnerability to pain while in the hyp- 
 notic condition was used to persuade the credulous masses 
 that Boxers were proof against death by assassination or in 
 battle. It was especially promised that at the propitious 
 moment 8,000,000 spirit soldiers would descend from heaven 
 to aid in sweeping the last barbarian from the soil of China. 
 Secret orders had gone out from the Regent to prepare every- 
 where to resist foreign invasion. This speedily leaked out, 
 both to the officials and to the masses, and its effect in in- 
 flaming the popular mind can be readily understood. All 
 the while the Celestial Government made outward show of 
 suppressing the "rebels." Officials who openly consorted 
 with the Boxers were degraded, summoned to Pekin, cau- 
 tioned to be outwardly more circumspect and sent elsewhere 
 to higher posts. Leading Boxers were secretly brought to 
 Pekin, where they gave exhibitions of their mysteries be-
 
 522 ,. HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 fore the Empress-Dowager and Prince Tuan, the father of Pu 
 Chun, a lad of fourteen, who had been named as successor 
 to the throne. Both of these keen and aged intriguers saw 
 in the Boxers tools that could be used to further their own 
 ends — or else they dreaded a tidal wave that could not be 
 resisted. General Nieh, who commanded the military at the 
 capital, took his orders for the suppression of the Boxers 
 so seriously that in an encounter he killed" several of them. 
 For this carelessness he was promptly reprimanded from the 
 palace. After that he was careful to provide his troops with 
 blank cartridges. 
 
 The propaganda swept over Shantung and the other 
 infected provinces with the rapidity of a prairie fire. Not 
 men alone were enrolled ; the young women were persuaded 
 to join. As the men and youths were known as the "Broth- 
 ers of the Long Sword," so were the women called by the 
 name of the "Sisters of the Eed Lantern." Thus the or- 
 ganization took its root at the very hearth-side. Yu Hien, 
 a Manchu governor who had supplied some of the Boxers 
 with long swords, in order that they might butcher the 
 builders of the German railway, was called to Pekin and 
 decorated with a breastplate. Immediately afterward he 
 was assigned to the governorship of the Shansi province, 
 where he soon afterward distinguished himself by causing 
 or permitting the slaughter of more than half a hundred 
 missionaries and native converts to a number that cannot be 
 accurately estimated. In Shantung and other provinces 
 white men and women, as well as native converts, fell un- 
 der the long swords as the Boxers continued to roll on to 
 Pekin. Recruits to the new "patriotic" movement poured 
 in by thousands. Yellow boatmen who found themselves 
 out of work because the hated foreigners had introduced 
 steam navigation on the Peiho River, joined the new stand- 
 ard in the desperation of starvation. Drivers of native carts 
 and coolies who had formerly existed by carrying prodigious 
 burdens great distances on their backs had found themselves 
 thrown out of employment by the operation of the railway
 
 WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 523 
 
 between Tong-ku and Pekin; tliey, too, and their women, 
 allied themselves with the movement that was to forever 
 drive out the barbarian who wanted to build railroads. 
 
 At last even the foreigners in sacred Pekin took alarm. 
 The heads ol the different Legations petitioned the Tsungli 
 Yamen for permission to have marine guards sent to Pekin 
 from the fleets of the world already assembled ojff the Taku 
 forts at the mouth of the Peiho, the river waterway from 
 the sea to the capital. With characteristic Oriental diplo- 
 macy the Yamen half consented, yet parleyed, and so the 
 negotiations went on for weeks. The crash came on May 
 27, when Boxers tore up the railway to Paoting Fu, burned 
 the station houses, killed some of the Belgian employes and 
 barely failed to bag the entire lot. Now the foreign Minis- 
 ters and naval commanders acted with tardy decision. Small 
 Legation guards of marines, aggregating not more than 450 
 officers and men, were rushed to Pekin by special train. 
 Hardly had the train passed when the tracks were torn up 
 — behind it — by infuriated Boxers. Communication between 
 the Legations and the outside world was cut off. The siege 
 had begun. China stood arrayed against the entire civilized 
 world, the vicious, implacable aggressor in the most exten- 
 sive and horrible transgression of the inviolability of em- 
 bassy known to history. It is a curious fact that during 
 the first few days of the siege the Boxers and their friends, 
 the rabble, were the assailants. The unorganized rabble 
 vanished first from the scene. After them the Boxers faded 
 gradually from view. Then the government's Imperial sol- 
 diery took stations just beyond the defenses of the besieged 
 foreigners in Pekin, and for two months maintained an un- 
 ceasing effort to crush out the few hundred indomitable ones 
 whom they had thought at their mercy. On June 9, all the 
 buildings belonging to foreigners in the southern or Chinese 
 part of the city, were burned, the owners being compelled 
 to flee to the Legations. Missionaries came flocking in. A 
 naval force from all the fleets, numbering some two thou- 
 sand men, set out from Tientsin by rail, in the expectation
 
 524 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 of being able to repair the torn-up track, and tlms reach the 
 capital in tliree or four days. The British admiral, Sey- 
 mour, commanded, and the American captain, McCalla, led 
 the advance guard. After several severe fights with Box- 
 ers, m which Chinese Government troops are known to have 
 acted as their allies, this expedition was compelled to fall 
 back upon Tientsin. 
 
 On the 17th of June the foreign naval commanders, ours 
 alone excepted, made a formal demand for the surrender of 
 the Taku forts, at the mouth of the Peiho Eiven This 
 demand being ignored, a brisk night bombardment resulted 
 in the speedy evacuation of the forts. That this action on 
 the part of the allies was an act of war cannot be ques- 
 tioned. The Chinese Government eagerly seized upon the 
 excuse, replacing the Boxers about the Legations with a 
 horde of the best Imperial soldiery. New conflagrations 
 were kindled in Pekin. A pall of smoke hung over the 
 city for days. Every scrap of property belonging to a 
 foreigner, or that could be considered to possess value to 
 him, was fired. On the 19th the Tsungli Yamen formally 
 notified the Ministers at their Legations of the act at the 
 mouth of the Peiho that constituted a declaration of war 
 ©n China. The Ministers, their suites and all foreigners 
 were ordered to leave Pekin, under escort of Imperial 
 soldiers, within twenty-four hours. It was plain to even 
 the dullest Occidental mind that compliance with this de- 
 mand meant wholesale slaughter on the plain beyond the 
 city's walls. At a meeting of the Ministers it was decided 
 to seek an extension of the time. On the morning of June 
 20, Baron von Ketteler, the German Minister, left his Lega- 
 tion, accompanied by his secretary. Hardly had he gained 
 the street when he was shot in the back, dying at once. 
 The secretary, wounded, reached a hospital, whence he suc- 
 ceeded in returning to the German Legation. There was 
 panic then in all the embassies. At a consultation it was 
 decided that the British Legation was the one best adapted 
 for defense. Sir Claude Macdonald placed it at the disposal
 
 WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 525 
 
 of all tlie foreign residents of Pekin. There all the endan- 
 gered ones souglit safety, and not a moment too soon. 
 Acting in admirable concert, the international naval com- 
 manders distributed tlieir forces and agreed upon a plan of 
 defense which they thought would be necessary for a few 
 days only. Dr. Gamewell, an American missionary-teacher 
 possessed of much engineering skill, undertook the con- 
 struction of the defense works. 
 
 One of the brightest auxiliary pages of the history of 
 the horrible siege is that on which is written the history 
 of the defense of the new cathedral, standing in open ground 
 some two miles from the British Legation. Monsignor 
 Favier, the French Catholic Bishop, believed that this 
 building, with its massive walls, would prove highly capa- 
 ble of defense. Three thousand of his native converts had 
 fled there. Aided by forty volunteers from the French, 
 Italian and Austrian marine forces, Monsignor Favier and 
 his flock held the cathedral and kept the enemy at bay 
 through all the grewsome weeks that followed. And this 
 despite the fact that from the moment of their isolation the 
 French bishop's followers were effectually cut off from 
 the slightest aid from the Legations. 
 
 From the evening of June 20, the besieged were fired 
 upon daily by Chinese forces. Yet even more dangerous 
 than the fusillade of bullets were the tongues of flame. 
 Arson ran riot in the capital. Nearly all of the buildings 
 near the British Legation were fired in the hope that the 
 foreigners would thus be destroyed. A conspicuous act of 
 vandalism was the firing of the Hanlin Academy, in which 
 were stored the most priceless manuscripts and books extant 
 in China. These rare books included in their scope all that 
 was valuable in Chinese history and philosophy. In order 
 to save themselves the foreigners drove the enemy back, 
 thus saving a large part of this priceless literature. Not 
 only did the troops of all nations display signal gallantry; 
 the civilians were equally heroic. The women disproved 
 the notion that their sex is a timid one by doing cheer-
 
 526 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 fully all that they could for tlie common defense. In espe- 
 cial they sewed bags of silk, cotton and other fabrics, and 
 filled them with earth. These bags were used in construct- 
 ing the walls of the defenses. Commanding points on the 
 Legation walls were occupied at great hazard by the marines. 
 Frequent sorties were made for the purpose of capturing can- 
 non from the enemy, or for driving back over-bold Chinese. 
 Superintended by an American marine, some of the defend- 
 ers constructed a cannon out of an old brass pump. As the 
 weeks wore on food became scarcer^ Horses and mules to 
 the number of eighty were killed and sparingly eaten. At 
 the last there were but three or four of the animals left. 
 The barrels of meal with which the besiegers had stocked 
 themselves were used to the very bottoms when relief came. 
 Despite the excellence of the defenses many of the officers 
 and men were killed and wounded, and the civilians were 
 hardly more fortunate. By day there was unending sharp- 
 shooting by concealed Chinese without, and by night the 
 greatest horror of all; for then the besiegers made their 
 most desperate assaults, generally with a prelude of artil- 
 lery fire fiendishly well served. It seemed to those despair- 
 ing ones within the Legation walls as though each rush of 
 the enemy must be the final act of the tragedyc Making the 
 night awful with their yells, countless thousands of Chinese 
 would swarm forward. Only their compact masses made 
 continued defense possible. The marines would fire as 
 fast as they could load, while the incessant play of the de- 
 fenders' machine guns carried wholesale death to the as- 
 sailants. Yet such courage did the Chinese display that it 
 seemed impossible to much longer keep them at a distance. 
 In the meantime the world was chafing over the slow ap- 
 proach of formidable relief to Pekin. From the Philippines 
 a few thousand American troops were sent, and General 
 Adna R. Chaffee was hastened across the Pacific to com- 
 mand them. The other seven powers that had taken part 
 in the defense of the foreigners at Pekin sent various con- 
 tingents. All the way to Tientsin, these troops were vigor-
 
 WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 527 
 
 ously opposed by the Chinese. The foreigners at this city 
 were in as much danger as those at the capital. Gordon 
 Hall, the largest building in the foreign settlement, was 
 made the headquarters of the menaced aliens. It was not 
 until the 23d of June that the Russians made their welcome 
 appearance at Tientsin in considerable force. After them 
 came the troops of other nationalities. But the Chinese still 
 held the formidable citadel. It was three weeks later that 
 this great fortress fell into the hands of the allies, and then 
 only on the second day of the most ferocious fighting. The 
 American forces engaged were the Ninth United States 
 Infantry and a picked body of American marines. They 
 were brigaded with British troops under General Dorward. 
 French and Japanese troops fought close to our men and 
 had practical illustration of the superb work of the Ameri- 
 can regular infantry. On the morning of the second day of 
 the attack upon the citadel the Japanese charged one of the 
 gates and blew it in with high explosives after the second 
 attempt. The citadel fell and was occupied by the allies. 
 
 Within a few days an army numbering some fifteen thou- 
 sands troops was organized, equipped and started on the 
 eighty-mile march to the capital. For purposes of transpor- 
 tation the river route was followed. The ground between 
 Tientsin and Pekin became the theater of operations in a cam- 
 paign in which the battles steadily decreased in severity. 
 The whipping at Tientsin had had its effect. The Chinese 
 lost confidence in themselves with every succeeding engage- 
 ment. At length, on the 13th of August, the allied armies, 
 marching from Tung Chow, reached the positions assigned 
 to them outside the Chinese capital. Knowing the prox- 
 imity of the hostile force, the Chinese made the fiercest 
 assault of all on the Legations that night. The noise of at- 
 tack and defense was plainly audible in the foreign camj^s. 
 Though it had been agreed to defer the attack upon Pekin 
 until the next day, the Russian troops moved forward with- 
 out delay. It was fortunate that they did so, for the re- 
 minder of the allies joined in the assault. At midnight the
 
 528 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 watchers at the Britisli Legation heard the din of opening 
 battle, during a lull in the attack upon themselves, and 
 shouted across the compound the glorious news that relief 
 was almost within rifle range. Discouraged by repeated 
 thrashings from inferior numbers, the Chinese did not long 
 hold out. By morning the allies were fighting their way 
 through the outer streets of PekiUo At ten o'clock in the 
 morning, amid the most deafening cheers from the lately 
 besieged, the gates of the British Legation were thrown 
 open to admit a company of mounted Sikhs who came as 
 the advance guard of safety. Later in the day our Minister, 
 Mr. E. H. Conger, and his secretary, Mr. Squiers, had the 
 delight of welcoming General Chaffee and the American 
 troops. While attacking the Imperial Palace, Captain 
 Eeilly, of the United States Artillery, was killed. His 
 death was the most notable that befell our forces, with the 
 single exception of the splendid Liscum, colonel of the 
 Ninth, who fell in the attack on the Tientsin citadel. 
 
 Soon after the rescue of the Legation a strong force went 
 to the aid of the French Cathedral, which had held out all 
 these weeks. Another body of troops was sent to the Meth- 
 odist compound, where many white and native Christians 
 had held out for the same length of time. While the 
 Methodists were well equipped for defense, they had 
 singularly escaped any severity of attack. 
 
 Of course the Empress-Dowager, the Emperor and all the 
 court suite were gone by the time that the allies found 
 themselves in possession of this Babylon of the East. They 
 had escaped to Singan-fu, an ancient imperial city which 
 had on former occasions sheltered the royal family from 
 threatening storm. An important strategic point in itself, 
 the route thither could be guarded by a comparative hand- 
 ful of determined soldiers, for the way lay through tortuous 
 mountain passes. Here China's court awaited the turn of 
 events, ready to parley over its own merited punishment. 
 As soon as the foreign military commanders had pause for 
 breath they divided the city into zones for government, each
 
 WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 529 
 
 nation represented taking the responsibility for order in its 
 own zone. The time had now come for soldiers to show 
 what they knew of civil administration. In the American, 
 British and Japanese zones life, property and justice were 
 notably secure. Courts were instituted, and all lawlessness, 
 whether of whites or natives, was rigorously suppressed. 
 The allies entered Pekin to find it almost a deserted city. 
 In a few weeks it was again a metropolis. There was one 
 blot, however, upon the fair name of Christendom. Certain 
 sections of the city were sacked by soldier looters, a work 
 in which they were most cheerfully assisted by many of the 
 civilian foreigners. In justification it has been urged 
 that the outrageous conduct of the Chinese in attack- 
 ing the Legations and the outlying missions called for a 
 punishment so severe that it would not be forgotten in 
 generations. There were the murders of scores of foreign 
 missionaries and laymen and thousands of native Christians 
 to avenge. There was the destruction of much property 
 belonging to Europeans and Americans to be punished. 
 Undoubtedly, General Chaffee did more than any other 
 commander among the allies to stop looting. In the end 
 his edicts beicame so potent that most American soldiers 
 were compelled to buy their trophies from the looting 
 troops of other nationalities. 
 
 There were many punitive expeditions sent out to points 
 within a few days' march of Pekin, the. most notable being 
 that to Paoting-fu. A spectacle arranged with great so- 
 lemnity was the memorable march of troops represent- 
 ing the eight allies through the Forbidden City. This is 
 the innermost part of Pekin, the Chinese Holy of Holies, 
 wherein no man but the Emperor is supposed to set his 
 foot. A reverent Chinaman would expect to be struck dead 
 by heaven for the sacrilege of entering the Forbidden City. 
 It was therefore important that the allies should complete 
 the humiliation of the Chinese by marching hostile troops 
 through the sacred precincts. 
 
 Immediately 9.fter the occupation of Pekin the question 
 
 China— 23
 
 680 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 of the partition of China came up among the powers. The 
 United States were foremost in their contention that there must 
 be no division, but that a stable Chinese Government must be 
 established and supported. To this proposition Great Brit- 
 ain gave ready assent. Japan, too, objected to division. 
 The other powers, influenced, doubtless by a dread that 
 partition would only bring about additional perplexities — 
 even disasters — followed the programme initiated by the 
 United States. The Empress-Dowager, finding herself 
 powerless for further mischief, prevailed upon her chief 
 advisers to allow her to appoint plenipotentiaries to nego- 
 tiate terms of peace. Upon Li Hung Chang, China's great- 
 est statesman, and the aged Prince Ching, who in the most 
 trying times had shown himself desirous of conciliating the 
 civilized nations, fell the task of wringing from the powers 
 such concessions — or rather, such mild terms of punishment 
 — as were possible. At first these negotiations were carried 
 on with the military commanders; afterward the diplomatio 
 representatives took up the tangled skein. China's repre- 
 sentatives fought with all the skill of Oriental diplomacy. 
 Couriers were ever in motion between the court and China's 
 negotiators. Every pretext for delay was seized. The first 
 victory gained by the powers was the admission of China's 
 liability for damages, actual and punitive. After that nu- 
 merous conferences were held to determine the sums to be 
 paid each of the powers, and the method of guaranteeing 
 payment. Another demand made, and lately admitted, was 
 that China abandon the antiquated system of "likin" charges 
 and follow the tariff system of the civilized world. All of 
 the powers are to be admitted on the same footing as to 
 customs charges and all internal taxes on foreign merchan- 
 dise are to be abolished. China has further consented to 
 take her place among the civilized nations of the earth, 
 observing all the obligations that are binding upon the 
 fraternity of nations. In other words, her peace commis- 
 sioners have virtually agreed that this great empire was 
 in the wrong, and that henceforth unrestricted trade and
 
 WAR WITH CHINA AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 531 
 
 all other features of modern civilization shall be as fully- 
 recognized in China as elsewhere. Eailways are to be built 
 wherever there appears to be a good opportunity for them; 
 telegraph lines are to span the empire; religious toleration 
 is to be established in thorough earnest; modern science is 
 to be encouraged, and reform such as Japan eagerly seized 
 at is to be permitted, and even encouraged, in China. How 
 much sincerity there was in these promises only the future 
 can show. The experience of the past has proved that the 
 Chinese are ready guarantors in times of adversity. They 
 have always been equally ready to forget as soon as the 
 cloud of danger passed over. 
 
 Early in 1901 it was deemed advisable by the powers to 
 remove the greater part of the allied army that had poured 
 into China. There were two reasons for this decision: In 
 the first place, the danger was over, or was believed to be, 
 and the Chinese were considered to be sufficiently cowed; 
 in the second place the imperial court refused to return to 
 Pekin while a foreign army of occupation held the city. As 
 the powers had decided that it was of prime importance to 
 retain Kwangsu upon the throne, it was necessary to make 
 any concession that would bring the court back to Pekin. 
 The embarkation of troops was therefore begun, each power 
 leaving only enough soldiers to constitute a guard for its 
 Legation. It is a noteworthy fact, however, that this was 
 the first time in the records of the world when nations 
 found it necessary to combine for the defense of their Lega- 
 tions. China, the oldest nation in the world, had to learn the 
 amenities of international life from nations which, excepting 
 Japan, had existed but a few centuries apiece. 
 
 So well had the American district of Pekin been gov- 
 erned by General Chaffee and his subordinates that, just be- 
 fore the departure of the American troops, a delegation of 
 Pekin merchants waited upon the American commander. 
 They presented him with a petition bearing five thousand 
 signatures praying that the American troops remain to gov- 
 ern Pekin. The request, of course, could not be granted.
 
 532 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 THE FUTURE OF CHINA 
 
 It is obvious that arterial communication is the first 
 organic need of all civilized States, and pre-eminently of a 
 country so vast and various in its terrestrial conditions as 
 is China. This need has been recognized by the ablest of its 
 rulers, who, from time to time, have made serious efforts to 
 connect the most distant parts of the empire by both land 
 and water routes. The Grand Canal, or Yunho ("Eiver of 
 Transports"), is pronounced as memorable a monument of 
 human industry in its way as is the Great Wall. It is not, 
 however, a canal in the Western sense of the word, but 
 merely, as Richthofen has explained, "a series of abandoned 
 river beds, lakes and marshes, connected one with another by 
 cuttings of no importance, fed by the Wan ho in Shantung, 
 which divides into two currents at its summit, and by other 
 streams and rivers along its course. A part of the water of 
 the Wanho descends toward the Hoangho and Gulf of Pe- 
 chihli; the larger part runs south in the direction of the 
 Yangtse." The Grand Canal links Hangchow, a port on 
 the East China Sea, south of the Yangtse, with Tientsin 
 in Chihli, where it unites with the Peiho, and thus may be 
 said to extend to Tungchow in the neighborhood of Pekin. 
 When the canal was in order, before the inflow of the Yel- 
 low River failed, there was uninterrupted water communica- 
 ■toni from Pekin to Canton, and to the many cities and towns 
 met with on the way. For many years past, however, and 
 especially since the carriage of tribute-rice by steamers along 
 the coast began, repairs of the Grand Canal have been prac- 
 tically abandoned. The roads in China, confined generally
 
 THE FUTURE OF CHINA 533 
 
 to the nortliern and western sections of the country, are de- 
 scribed as the very worst in the world. The paving, accord- 
 ing to Baber, "is of the usual Chinese pattern, rough bowl- 
 ders and blocks of stone being laid somewhat loosely together 
 on the surface of the ground; 'good for ten years and bad 
 for ten thousand, ' as the Chinese proverb admits. On the 
 level plains of China, where the population is sufficiently 
 affluent to subscribe for occasional repairs, the system has 
 much practical value. But, in the Yunnan mountains, the 
 roads are never repaired; so far from it, the indigent natives 
 extract the most convenient blocks to stop the holes in their 
 hovel walls, or to build a fence on the windward side of their 
 poppy patches. The rains soon undermine the pavement, 
 especially where it is laid on a steep incline; sections of it 
 topple down the slope, leaving chasms a yard or more in 
 depth." Where traveling by water is impossible, sedan 
 chairs are used to carry passengers, and coolies with poles 
 and slings transport the luggage and goods. The distances 
 covered by the sedan chair porters are remarkable, being 
 sometimes as much as thirty- five miles a day, even on a 
 journey extending over a month. The transport animals — 
 ponies, mules, oxen and donkeys — are strong and hardy, and 
 manage to drag carts along the execrable roads. The ponies 
 are said to be admirable, and the mules unequaled in any 
 other country. The distances which these animals will cover 
 on the very poorest of forage are surprising. 
 
 The rapid adoption of steamers along the coast and on the 
 Yangtse has paved the way for railways. Shallow steamers 
 have yet to traverse the Poyang and the Tungting Lakes, 
 which lie near the Yangtse, and Peiho and Canton Elvers, 
 as well as many minor streams. It is the railway, however, 
 that is the supreme necessity. Mr. Colquhoun has pointed 
 out that, except along the Yangtse for the thousand- odd 
 miles now covered by steamers, there is not a single trade 
 route of importance in China where a railway would not 
 pay. Especially would a line from Pekin carried through 
 the heart of China to the extreme south, along the existing
 
 534 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 trade routes, be advantageous and remunerative. The enor- 
 mous traffic carried on throughout the Celestial Empire in 
 the face of appalling difficulties, on men's backs, or by cara- 
 vans of mules or ponies, or by the rudest of carts and wheel- 
 barrows, must be, some day, undertaken by railways. In 
 the judgment of careful observers, too much stress should 
 not be laid on the introduction of the locomotive for strategic 
 purposes. The capital aim of railway construction should 
 be, they think, the development of the interprovincial trade 
 of China, the interchange of the varied products of a coun- 
 try which boasts so many climates and soils. This would 
 bring prosperity to the people, render administrative reforms 
 possible, and open China for the Chinese quite as much as 
 for the European merchant or manufacturer. From the 
 viewpoint of Chinese interests, the most useful lines would 
 be two that should connect Pekin, Tientsin and all the north- 
 ern part of the country with central and southern China. 
 Trunk lines could be constructed for this purpose without 
 any difficulty. They would pass along the old trade tracks, 
 and would encounter populous cities the whole way. Through 
 eastern Shansi and Honan, for example, to Hangchowon the 
 Yangtse; thence to the Si Kiang and Canton; such lines 
 would be shafts driven through the heart of the Middle King- 
 dom, connecting the North and the South. For the entire 
 distance, some 1,300 or 1,400 miles, the extent, fertility and 
 variety of the soil are described as remarkable. From the 
 North, abounding in cotton and varieties of grain and pulse, 
 to the South, where many vegetable products of the Orient 
 are met, the redundancy of the population is a striking feat- 
 ure. A constant succession of villages, towns and cities 
 would be transformed into a picture of bustle and business. 
 The internal economical conditions of China to-day are 
 very much the same as were those of India when railways 
 were introduced. The only difference is that the Chinese 
 people are better off per man, and that the Chinese and Indo- 
 Chinese, unlike the natives of India, are born travelers and 
 traders. Yet, even in India, contrary to expectation, the
 
 THE FUTURE OF CHINA 535 
 
 passenger traffic on tlie railways has, from the first, exceeded 
 the goods traffic. In 1857, the number of passengers carried 
 bj railway in India was 2,000,000; in 1896, it had risen to 
 160,000,000. In the first named year, the quantity of goods 
 transported was 253,000 tons; in 1896, it was 32, 500, 000 tons. 
 There has been witnessed in India during those forty years 
 an expansion of commerce which, at the outset of the period, 
 would have been deemed incredible. The imports and ex- 
 ports rose in that time from 400,000,000 to 2,000,000,000 
 rupees. Forty years ago, India was merely a dealer in 
 drugs, dyes and luxuries ; now she is one of the largest pur- 
 veyors of food grains, fibers, and many other staples. Few 
 persons are aware how favorably the earnings of Indian rail- 
 ways compare with those of other countries. The average 
 earnings of railways in the United States are 3 per cent: in 
 Great Britain, 3.60 per cent; in India, 5.46 per cent. This 
 in spite of the fact that, in India, a man can travel 400 miles 
 within twenty-four hours for the sum of $2.08. The policy 
 of low charges has answered well, the people, on its adop- 
 tion, at once having begun to travel and to send their prod- 
 uce by rail. In China, also, low rates will be a necessity. 
 Another fact of importance to China is that, out of the 
 260,000 people employed on Indian railways, 95.66 per cent 
 are natives. Only the higher posts are held by Europeans. 
 In China, the proportions would probably be even more in 
 favor of the native element. 
 
 Mr. Colquhoun, who is a high authority, has no doubt 
 that, as Eichthofen anticipated years ago, China will eventu- 
 ally be directly connected with Europe via Hami, Lanchow 
 and Sian. "No direct connection of this kind," says Kich- 
 thof en, ' ' is possible south of the Wei basin, and any road to 
 the north of it would have to keep entirely north of the Yel- 
 low Hiver and run altogether through desert countries. ' ' The 
 same reason which confined the commerce of China with the 
 West during thousands of years to the natural route via 
 Hami will be decisive as regards railway communication 
 also. In respect of natural facilities, and because of the
 
 536 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 existence of populous, productive and extensive commercial 
 regions at both ends of the line, it is the only practicable 
 route. It is further to be noted that the whole tract would be 
 provided with coal. The province of Kansuh rivals Shansi 
 in the richness and extent of its coal fields; no section of it 
 north of the Tsungling Mountains appears to be deficient in 
 coal measures, and, in some parts, a superabundance of the 
 combustible exists. The coal formation extends, with few 
 interruptions, from Eastern Shansi to Hi through thirty de- 
 grees of longitude. There is scarcely, remarks Eichthofen, 
 an instance on record ' ' where so many favorable and essen- 
 tial conditions co-operate to concentrate all future intercourse 
 on so long a line upon one single and definite channel. ' ' As 
 regards railways within the empire, a Pekin-Hankow line 
 has been arranged for, as we pointed out in the previous 
 chapter, with a so-called Belgian syndicate, and, if properly 
 executed, should be a good line; but, as we have said, it is 
 the opinion of experts that the best railway contemplated in 
 China would be that from Pekin via Tientsin to Hangchow, 
 with an extension later to Canton. The line would pass 
 some forty towns, with an average population of 25,000 each, 
 and a large number of villages. The length of the Grand 
 Canal from Tientsin to Hangchow is 650 miles. According 
 to Mr. Colquhoun, no better line for a railway exists in the 
 world, from the viewpoint of population, resources and cheap- 
 ness of construction. It follows the most important of the 
 actual routes of commerce in the empire, passes the greatest 
 possible number of cities, towns and villages, and connects 
 great seaports with rich coal regions of authenticated value. 
 We pass to the telegraph and postal service. It appears 
 that government telegraphs are being rapidly extended 
 throughout the empire. There are lines between Pekin and 
 Tientsin, and lines connecting the capital with the principal 
 places in Manchuria as far as the Russian frontier on the 
 Amour and the Usuri, while Kewchwang, Chefoo, Shang- 
 hai, Yangchow, Souchow, the seven treaty ports on the 
 Yangtse, Canton, Woochow, Lungchow, and, in fact, most 
 
 m
 
 THE FUTURE OF CHINA 537 
 
 of the principal cities in the empire, are now joined by wire 
 with one another and with the metropolis. The line from 
 Canton westward passes via Yunnanfoo to Manwein, on the 
 borders of Burma. Shanghai is in communication with 
 Foochow and Moy, Kashing, Shaoshing, Ningpo and other 
 places. Lines have been constructed between Foochow and 
 Canton and between Taku, Port Arthur and Seoul in Corea, 
 and the line along the Yangtse Valley has been extended to 
 Chungking. By an arrangement made with the Russian 
 telegraph authorities, the Chinese and Siberian lines in the 
 Amour Valley were joined in the latter part of 1892, and 
 there is now overland communication between Pekin and 
 Europe through Russian territory. The postal service of 
 China is unquestionably primitive from a Western point of 
 view. It is carried on by means of post carts and runners. 
 There are, besides, numerous private postal couriers, and, 
 during the winter, when the approach to the capital is closed 
 by sea and river, a service between the office of Foreign 
 Customs at Pekin and the outports is maintained. The Chi- 
 nese, it seems, have always been great believers in their own 
 postal system. Even those who have emigrated to British 
 colonies have adhered to their own method of transporting 
 letters, refusing to use the duly constituted government posts, 
 except under compulsion. Both Hongkong and the Straits 
 Settlements have been actually compelled to legislate in the 
 matter. It is said, however, to be remarkable how safe the 
 native post is, not merely for the carriage of ordinary letters, 
 but for the conveyance of money. We should add that, on 
 February 2, 1897, the Imperial Chinese Post Office was 
 opened under the management of Sir Robert Hart, and 
 China has since joined the Postal Union. 
 
 In a chapter of Mr. Colquhoun's book bearing the cap- 
 tion "England's Objective in China," we are told that there 
 are two ways of attacking the trade of China in the Middle 
 Kingdom, so far as England is concerned. The one is from 
 the seaboard, entering China by the chief navigable rivers, 
 notably the Yangtse, which is the main artery of China, and
 
 538 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the West River, which passes through the southem provinces. 
 The other mode of approach is from England's land base, 
 Burma, through Yunnan. It is acknowledged that the 
 sea approach, hitherto the only one, is, from the purely 
 trading point of view, incomparably the more important; 
 but the other, or complementary land route, is pronounced 
 a necessity if England's commercial and political influence 
 is to be maintained and extended. The isolation of China 
 over sea has long since been annuled by steam, and her for- 
 mer complete isolation by land has now ceased also. Hith- 
 erto cut off from access by land, she will, in the north, be 
 shortly placed in direct railway communication with Europe, 
 a fact which by itself renders imperative a corresponding ad- 
 vance from the south. It is many years since Mr, Colquhoun 
 began to advocate the railway communication of Burma 
 with southwestern China, first with the view to open Yunnan 
 and Szchuen, and, secondly, to effect a junction between 
 those two great waterways, the Yangtse and the Irrawaddy. 
 It seemed to him that the connection of the navigation limit 
 of the Yangtse with the most easterly province of Anglo- 
 India was a matter of cardmal importance, not merely be- 
 cause it was eminently desirable for commercial purposes to 
 connect the central and lower regions of the Yangtse with 
 Burma, but also for political reasons. It so happens that 
 the navigation limit of that river lies within the province of 
 Szchuen, which, in Mr. Colquhoun 's opinion, should be the 
 commercial and political objective of England. Szchuen, 
 from its size, population, trade and products, may, accord- 
 ing to Mrs. Bishop, be truly called the Empire Province. 
 Apart from its great mineral resources, the province pro- 
 duces silk, wax and tobacco, all of good quality; grass 
 cloth, grain in abundance, and tea, plentiful though of 
 poor flavor. The climate is changeable, necessitating a va- 
 riety of clothing. Cotton is grown in Szchuen, but Bourne 
 states that Indian yarn is driving it out of cultivation, not 
 apparently on account of the enormous saving through spin- 
 ning by machinery, but because the fiber can be grown more
 
 THE FUTURE OF CHINA 539 
 
 cheaply in India. The greater part of the surplus wealth 
 of Szchuen is devoted to the purchase of raw native and 
 foreign cotton and woolen goods. All the cotton bought is 
 not consumed in the province, for the inhabitants manufact- 
 ure from the imported raw material and export the product 
 to Yunnan and western Kweichow. Rich as it is, Szchuen 
 has the disadvantage of being difl&cult of access from the 
 rest of the world, for at present merchandise can only reach 
 it during certain months of the year, and after a difficult 
 voyage. Its trade would be increased very greatly were the 
 navigation of the Yangtse rendered easier and safer, thus 
 facilitating the establishment of effective steam communica- 
 tion not only to Chungking, but as far as Suifoo. 
 
 The natural channel of trade between Hongkong and 
 southwestern China is the Sikiang, or West River. Owing, 
 however, to the obstacles raised by taxation and the non- 
 enforcement by England of the transit-pass system, trade 
 has been diverted to other channels, such as the Pakhoi- 
 Nanning route, and later to the Tonquin route, the French 
 having insisted on the effective carrying out of the transit- 
 pass system via Mengtse. At present British goods are 
 actually sent from Hongkong through French territory via 
 Mengtse to a point within seven days of Bhamo in Burma. 
 The Lungchow route, whatever its merits might have been, 
 had the railway line from Pakhoi to Nanning not been se- 
 cured by the French Grovernment, is now, according to Mr. 
 Colquhoun, of quite secondary importance. He concedes 
 that unless the West River is at once effectively opened 
 throughout its course, the Pakhoi- Nanning- Yunnan route 
 is bound to command the largest share of the trade of south 
 and southwestern China. 
 
 Having passed under review the provinces of south and 
 southwestern China and the great waterways— to wit, the 
 Yangtse and West rivers — we may now inquire what meas- 
 ures should be adopted to improve the present state of affairs 
 in the interest of China and of foreign trade. The first step 
 suggested is the improvement of communication by railways
 
 540 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 and steam navigation. So far as railways are concerned, 
 Burma should be connected witli Tali and Yunnan foo, 
 Yunnanfoo with JSTanning, Canton vvith Kaulun. This 
 would thoroughly open the whole of Southern China lying 
 between Burma and the British colony of Hongkong. 
 Yunnanfoo should also be connected to the northeast with 
 Suifoo on the upper Yangtse, the navigation limit of that 
 waterway. Steam navigation should at once be extended to 
 Nanning and to Suifoo, and also, wherever it may be prac- 
 ticable, throughout all inland waters. Next in importance 
 to the creation of proper communication is the question of 
 taxation. All travelers, in Southern China especially, dwell 
 on the obstacles to trade resulting from the collection of so 
 many various imposts. The British Government should in- 
 sist on its treaty rights, especially the enforcement, success- 
 fully accomplished by the French Grovernment, of the transit- 
 pass system. It is, finally, the conviction of all competent 
 students of the subject that it is from Burma, on the one 
 hand, and from Shanghai and Hongkong on the other, that 
 England must, by the aid of steam applied overland and by 
 water, practically occupy the upjoer Yangtse region, which 
 will be found to be the key to a dominant position in China. 
 In some comments on China's prospective commercial 
 development, Mr. Colquhoun, the latest first-hand observer, 
 sets forth some statistics which are of interest not only to 
 Englishmen but to Americans. He shows that in 1896 the 
 total net value of imports and of exports was £55,768,500, 
 and the total gross value £57,274,000, of which the British 
 dominions contributed £39,271,000, leaving for all other 
 nations £18,003,000. Of this aggregate Eussia contributed 
 £2,856,000, the rest of Europe £4,585,000, Japan £4,705,000, 
 and other countries, including the United States, £5,767,000. 
 The percentage of the carrying trade of the Middle Kingdom 
 under foreign flags was: British, 82.04; German, 7.49; 
 French, 2.00; Japanese, 1.34; Russian, 0.59; other coun- 
 tries, 5.54. The percentage of dues and duties paid under 
 foreign flags was as follows: British, 76.04; German, 10.12; 
 
 dSi
 
 THE FUTURE OF CHINA 541 
 
 French, 2.95; Japanese, 2.28; Russian, 1.90; all other na- 
 tions, 6.71. It appears, then, that Great Britain not only 
 carries eighty-two per cent of the total foreign trade with 
 China, but pays seventy-two per cent of the revenue result- 
 ing from that trade. Until recently, British subjects were 
 at liberty to carry on business at but eighteen ports in Cliina. 
 They were Newchwang, Tientsin, Chifui, on the northern 
 coast; Chungking, Ichang, Hankow, Kiukiang, Wehu, 
 Chinldang and Shanghai, on the Yangtse River; Ningpo, 
 Wenchow, Foochow, Amoy, Swatow, Canton, Hoihow (Ki- 
 ungchow) and Pakhoi, on the coast south of the Yangtse. 
 To these must be now added Shansi on the Yangtse, be- 
 tween Ichang and Hankow; Hangchow and Soochow, two 
 inland cities near Shanghai; Woochow and Sanshui on the 
 "West River, and Ssumao and Lungchow in the south. It is 
 also reported that three other ports have been very recently 
 opened; viz., Yochow, on the Tungting Lake; Chungwang, 
 on the Gulf of Pechihli, and Funing in Fuhkien. 
 
 Let us now proceed to demonstrate how deeply the United 
 States are concerned in the China question from the indus- 
 trial point of view. Inasmuch as, owing to the fact that 
 Americans now manufacture more than they consume, they 
 are compelled to embark on a foreign policy and to look 
 increasingly to foreign markets, they cannot but feel that 
 the future of the Middle Kingdom is a matter of vital impor- 
 tance to themselves. It is manifest that the Pacific slope, 
 though at present playing but a small part, is destined to be 
 more profoundly affected by the development of China than 
 is any other section of the American republic. Our Pacific 
 States are possessed of enormous natural resources; their 
 manufactures have quadrupled in twenty years, and will, in 
 the course of time, find a most advantageous market in the 
 Far East. When the Nicaragua Canal shall have been dug, 
 the Atlantic States will also be brought into close connection 
 with China and with the rest of Eastern Asia. The volume 
 of the United States traffic with China already represented a 
 considerable part of the foreign trade of the empire in 1896.
 
 542 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 While the imports from China received by the United States 
 have increased but slowly, the exports from the last-named 
 country to the Middle Kingdom have increased 126 per cent 
 ia ten years, and are more than fifty per cent greater than 
 the exports of Germany to the same market. The export of 
 American cotton cloths to China amounted to $7,485,000 in 
 1897, or nearly one- half the entire value of cotton cloths sent 
 abroad by the United States. The export of kerosene oil 
 from the States to China now ranks second in importance 
 to that of cotton goods, and is likely to increase at a rapid 
 rate. The Chinese demand for the illuminating fluid is 
 quickly growing, and the delivery of it from the United 
 States to China has more than trebled in value during the 
 past ten years. That is to say, it has risen from $1,466,000 
 in 1888 to $4,498,000 in 1897. The Kussian oil has hitherto 
 been the only serious foreign competitor of the American 
 product, but the Langkat oil is coming to some extent into 
 use. The exports of American wheat flour to China reached 
 a value in 1897 of $3,390,000, and those of chemicals, dyes, 
 etc., $1,000,000. At present, the export trade of the United 
 States to China is confined mainly to cottons and mineral 
 oils; that is to say, it is largely restricted to commodities 
 which would be hard to sell in any Chinese port where the 
 conditions of equal trade did not prevail. It would probably 
 prove impossible to sell them in any Asiatic port controlled 
 by Russia or by France. It follows that, although England 
 has most to lose by the partition of China, even though she 
 should receive a large share of territory, the United States 
 are also deeply interested in the question, for their trade is 
 already considerable, and is likely, under favorable circum- 
 stances, to undergo great expansion. 
 
 Let us, finally, examine the Chinese question from a 
 political point of view. We concur with Mr. Colquhoun in 
 believing that Englishmen are now at the parting of the 
 ways, and that their failure to take the right course in tha 
 Far East will mean the loss of England's commercial su- 
 premacy, and, eventually, the disintegration of the British
 
 THE FUTURE OF CHINA 543 
 
 Empire. He maintains that, since November 16, 1896, when 
 the German government was compelled by Bismarck's reve- 
 lations to disclose the drift of its future policy, it has been 
 apparent that there is an increasing tendency toward co- 
 operation in the Near East and the Far East between Ger- 
 many and Russia, and therefore, also, between those powers 
 and France, which is Russia's ally. The understanding is 
 based upon mutual interest, territorial in the case of Russia, 
 commercial in that of Germany, and political in the case of 
 France. The cornerstone of the combination is Russia, 
 whose goodwill is sought for at all costs by France, in a 
 lesser degree by Germany, and, latterly, even by Austria- 
 Hungary. The chief aim of the combination is the reduc- 
 tion of England to a secondary position, politically and com- 
 mercially. In China, the outcome of the coalition has been 
 to isolate England completely. For some years past, her 
 efforts to secure concessions at Peldn have been frustrated 
 by Russia and France. Meanwhile, these two countries, 
 and, more lately, Germany as well, have secured for them- 
 selves solid advantages. Japan, on her part, since she was 
 compelled to submit to a revision of the Shimonoseki treaty, 
 has been watching silently and preparing anxiously for 
 eventualities. England's official optimists talked in 1895, 
 however, as they still talk, of the successes gained, the "recti- 
 fication" of the Burmo- Chinese frontier and the incomplete 
 "opening" of the West River. As a matter of fact, the 
 British Government has done little or nothing to establish 
 overland railway communication from Burma to China, or 
 to reach China "from behind," aa Lord Salisbury called it; 
 and the Upper Yangtse, the main artery of China, has re- 
 mained practically unopened. Such, indeed, is the situa- 
 tion at this writing. 
 
 To understand the present situation, which is the natural 
 sequel of 1896, it is needful, first of all, to recognize the fact 
 that Russia is, at this moment, the protector of China against 
 all comers, and that France supports her firmly, while Ger- 
 many, having once taken the decisive step of placing herself
 
 544 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 alongside Russia, is likely to follow the czar's lead for two 
 sufficient reasons; namely, for fear of displeasing the Russian 
 ally of France, and because concessions are not likely to be 
 obtained at Pekin by Germany, if the latter country places 
 itself in direct and open opj)osition to the St. Petersburg gov- 
 ernment. Russian influence has, for some time past, been 
 omnipotent at Pekin, mainly through the kindly assistance 
 rendered to China in 1895, followed up by what has been 
 practically an offensive and defensive league. The nature 
 of the understanding between Russia and the Middle King- 
 dom has, indeed, for some time been patent to all the world 
 except Englishmen, the chief features of it being: First, an 
 offensive and defensive alliance; secondly, branch railways 
 through Manchuria; thirdly, the refortification of Port 
 Arthur and Talienwan, both to be paid for by China, and 
 either or both of these harbors to be placed at Russia's dis- 
 posal whenever they may be required. It is true that China 
 has denied the existence of any agreement except that con- 
 cerning the northern Manchurian Railway, but Russia has 
 never denied anything except the accuracy of the version of 
 the so-called "Cassini" Convention, published by a Shanghai 
 paper. Apart from the existence of any written contract, the 
 facts speak for themselves. Russia, having had a prior lien 
 on Kiao Chou, it is obvious that Germany could not have 
 seized that harbor in opposition to Russia. Again, what is 
 to prevent Germany from discovering some day that Kiao 
 Chou does not "meet her requirements," in which event 
 what is there to hinder Russia from taking over Kiao Chou 
 and giving Germany another port? Provision has, in truth, 
 been made to enable Germany to treat Kiao Chou as a nego- 
 tiable bill of exchange. 
 
 There is really nothing unforeseen in the recent evolution 
 of affairs in the Far East. On the contrary, it has been 
 clearly indicated by various writers in the past fifty years. 
 As far back as 1850, Meadows wrote: "China will not be 
 conquered by any Western power until she becomes the 
 Persia of some future Alexander the Great of Russia, which
 
 THE FUTURE OF CHINA 545 
 
 is tlie Macedon of Europe. England, America and France 
 will, if tliey are wise, wage, severally or collectively, a war 
 of exhaustion with Kussia rather than allow her to conquer 
 China, for, when she has done that, she will be mistress 
 of the world." In reply to those who ridicule the policy of 
 "guarding against imaginary Eussian dangers in China," 
 he said: "Many may suppose the danger to be too remote 
 to be a practical subject for the present generation. The 
 subject is most practical at the present hour, for, as the 
 English, Americans and French now deal with China, and 
 with her relations to Eussia, so the event will be. For those 
 to whom 'it will last our time' is a word of practical wis- 
 dom, this volume is not written. ' ' Again, a few years later, 
 Meadows wrote: "The greatest, though not nearest, dan- 
 ger of a weak China lies precisely in those territorial ag- 
 gressions of Eussia which she began two centuries ago, and 
 which, if allowed to go on, will speedily give her a large 
 and populous territory, faced with Sveaborgs and Sebas- 
 topols on the seaboard of Eastern Asia. Let England, 
 America and France beware how they create a sick giant 
 in the Far East. China is a world-necessity." Foreshad- 
 owing the gradual extension of Eussia into China, and the 
 time when the former country would become dominant at 
 Pekin, and when, with all Manchuria organized behind her, 
 she would occupy the whole of the Yellow Eiver basin, 
 Meadows expressed the belief thatj should that occasion 
 occur, no combination of powers would then be able to 
 thwart Eussia' s purpose. "With 120,000,000 Chinese to 
 work or fight for her, nothing would stand between Eussia 
 and the conquest of the rest of the Celestial Empire; not 
 China alone, but Europe itself would then be dominated, 
 and it would cost the Eussian Emperor of China but little 
 trouble to overwhelm the Pacific States of the New World." 
 Such was the forecast of a writer whose name is to-day 
 forgotten. 
 
 What are the advantages which Eussia possesses over 
 England in dealing with China ? There is, in the first place,
 
 546 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the advantage of proximity. The Chinese people in the 
 northern provinces, and especially at the capital, which is not 
 far from the Great Wall, undoubtedly discriminate between 
 Russians and other foreigners. Like other Orientals, they 
 only believe what they see ; and Russia is seen and realized 
 on the northern frontier. Besides the effect of contact, the 
 Russians possess a gift in dealing with the Chinese. The 
 affinities and analogies which the Russians and Chinese 
 exhibit have been depicted by Michie in his book on the 
 "Siberian Overland Route." "Analogies in the manners, 
 customs and modes of thought of the two races are constantly 
 turning up, and their resemblance to the Chinese has become 
 a proverb among the Russians themselves. The Russians 
 and the Chinese are peculiarly suited to each other in the 
 commercial as well as in the diplomatic departments. They 
 have an equal disregard for truth, for the Russian, in spite 
 of his fair complexion, is, at the bottom, more than half 
 Asiatic. There is nothing original about this observation, 
 but it serves to explain how it is that the Russians have won 
 their way into China by quiet and peaceable means, while 
 we have always been running our heads against a stone 
 wall, and never could get over it without breaking it down. 
 The Russians meet the Chinese as Greek meets Greek; craft 
 is encountered with craft, politeness with politeness, and 
 patience with patience. They understand each other's char- 
 acter thoroughly, because they are so closely alike. " Michie 
 went on to say that "when either a Russian or a Chinese 
 meets a European, say an Englishman, he instinctively re- 
 coils from the blunt, straightforward, up-and-down manner 
 of coming to business at once, and the Asiatic either declines 
 a contest which he cannot fight with his own weapons, or, 
 seizing the weak point of his antagonist, he angles for him 
 until he wearies him into acquiescence. As a rule, the 
 Asiatic has the advantage. His patient equanimity and 
 heedlessness of the waste of time are too much for the im- 
 petuous haste of the European. This characteristic of the 
 Russian trading classes has enabled them to insinuate them-
 
 THE FUTURE OF CHINA 547 
 
 selves into the confidence of the Chinese ; to fraternize and 
 identify themselves with them, and, as it were, to make 
 common cause with them in their daily life ; while the West- 
 ern European holds himself aloof, and only comes in contact 
 with the Chinese when business requires it; for, in all the 
 rest, a great gulf separates them in thoughts, ideas and the 
 aims of life. ' ' 
 
 Of interest, also, as showing how history repeats itself, 
 are the observations made nearly forty years ago by Lock- 
 hart, a missionary, after a long residence in China. Lock- 
 hart wrote: "The Russian Government anticipated us, not 
 in the knowledge of the advantages of close commercial and 
 political relations with an empire so enormous in its resources, 
 but in the employment of those arguments that alone could 
 render a vain and effeminate State sensible of their value. . . 
 The map of all the Russias, published at St. Petersburg, 
 now includes that vast portion of Central Asia heretofore 
 constituting the outlying provinces of the Chinese empire 
 beyond the Great Wall. Having placed a mission in the 
 Chinese capital and organized an overwhelming army in 
 Chinese Tartary, with magazines of warlike resources, 
 Russia easily secured a permanent footing in region after 
 region, till she had dominated over, and then obtained the 
 cession of, all the intervening space, leaving the conquest of 
 the entire Chinese empire to the time when it should please 
 the reigning Czar to order his Cossacks to take possession. 
 It is impossible to state with any precision the amount of 
 moral or material support which the Chinese emperor re- 
 ceived from his imperial brother and formidable neighbor, 
 and which encouraged him to the obstinate resistance that 
 he offered to the demands of England and France [in 1860] ; 
 but a slight acquaintance with Russian policy must satisfy 
 any one that, having established itself as a favored nation, 
 Russia could not regard with complacency any attempt 
 made by another nation to share such advantages. ' ' Com- 
 prehending, therefore, the Chinese character, perceiving 
 clearly that the present Manchu dynasty is unable to perform
 
 548 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 the elementary functions of an organized society, that Pekin 
 is another Teheran or Constantinople, that, while the people 
 are sound, the courts and the officials are corrupt, Russia 
 has studied and gained over certain influential persons and 
 applied skillfully the maxim, divide et impera. What China 
 is taught night and day is that Russia is a land power, and, 
 therefore, alone can protect China; that she keeps her prom- 
 ises and threats; that, with England, on the other hand, it 
 is always a case of vox et proeterea nihil. In short, Russia 
 protects China in a peculiar sense, that is to say, for a price, 
 to be paid to Russia or even to her friends. The dominating 
 idea instilled into the Chinese court and bureaucracy, which, 
 in the absence of a strong policy on England's part, are in a 
 hypnotized condition, is to be saved from Japan. The great 
 object of Russian policy is to utilize China for territorial and 
 political expansion. 
 
 What would China be worth to Russia ? This question is 
 answered by Mr. Colquhoun at considerable length. What 
 the utilization of China would mean can be realized, he says, 
 only by a full appreciation of the extraordinary resources of 
 that country, judged from various points of view. The 
 Celestial Empire has the men with which to create armies 
 and navies; the materials, especially iron and coal, requisite 
 for the purposes of railway and steam navigation; all the 
 elements, in fact, out of which to evolve a great living force. 
 One thing alone is wanting, namely, the will, the directing 
 power, which, absent from within, is now being applied from 
 without. That supplied, there are to be found in abundance 
 within China itself the capacity to carry out, the brains to 
 plan, the hands to work. When, moreover, it is understood 
 that not merely is the soil fertile, but that the mineral 
 resources, the greatest, perhaps, in the whole world, are, 
 as yet, practically untouched, the merest surface being 
 scratched ; when we further consider the volume of China's 
 population, the ability and enterprise, and, above all, the 
 intense vitality of the people, as strong as ever after four 
 millenniums; when we reflect on the general characteristics
 
 THE FUTURE OF CHINA 649 
 
 of the race; it seems indisputable that the Chinese, under 
 wise direction, are destined to dominate the whole of Eastern 
 Asia, and, may be, to play a leading part in the affairs of 
 the world. Even although the Celestial Empire appears to 
 be now breaking up, it is capable, under tutelage, of becom- 
 ing reconsolidated. Often before now, when conquered, has 
 China either thrown off the yoke or absorbed its conquerors. 
 But never before has the conqueror come, as does the Czar 
 to-day, in the guise of a great organizing force. To much 
 the same effect wrote Michie, whose opinion is of weight, 
 and from whom we have already quoted: "The theory that 
 China's decadence is due to the fact that she has long since 
 reached maturity and has outlived the natural term of a 
 nation's existence does not hold good. The mass of the 
 people have not degenerated; they are as fresh and vigorous 
 as ever they were ; it is the government only that has become 
 old and feeble ; a change of dynasty may yet restore to China 
 the luster which belongs legitimately to so great a nation. 
 The indestructible vitality of Chinese institutions has pre- 
 served the country unchanged throughout many revolutions. 
 The high civilization of the people and their earnestness in 
 the pursuit of peaceful industry have enabled them to pre- 
 serve their national existence through more dynastic changes 
 than perhaps any other country or nation has experienced." 
 Mr. Colquhoun, for his own part, testifies that, in peaceful 
 pursuits, in agriculture, in the arts and manufactures, no 
 limit can be placed to the capabilities of China, Even in 
 the paths of war, he deems it difficult to foretell what, under 
 skillful direction, may not be accomplished. It is true that, 
 touching this point, there is a wide difference of opinion. 
 Prjevalski said, apropos of the Tonquin campaign: "She 
 [China] lacks the proper material; she lacks the life-giving 
 spirit. Let Europeans supply the Chinese with any number 
 of arms that they please: let them exert themselves ever 
 so energetically to train Chinese soldiers: let them even 
 supply leaders: the Chinese Army will, nevertheless, even 
 under the most favorable conditions, never be more than an
 
 550 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 artificially created, meclianically united, unstable organism. 
 Subject it but once to the serious test of war, speedy dis- 
 solution will overtake sucb an army, wbicli could never bope 
 for victory over a foe animated witb any real spirit." On 
 tbe other band, high testimony has been borne by other 
 travelers and military critics to the excellent quality of 
 China's raw material for military purposes. Wingrove 
 Cooke, the "Times" correspondent with the allied forces 
 in 1857-58, who is generally accounted one of the best critics 
 of Chinese men and affairs; Count d'Escayrac de Lauture, 
 one of the Pekin prisoners in 1859-60; Chinese Gordon and 
 Lord Wolseley, have all spoken highly of the courage and 
 endurance of the Chinese soldier. The following summary 
 of his capabilities was given by one who had had experience 
 with Gordon's "Ever- Victorious Army" : "The old notion is 
 pretty well got rid of that they are at all a cowardly people, 
 when properly paid and efl&ciently led; while the regularity 
 and order of their habits, which dispose them to peace in 
 ordinary times, give place to a daring bordering on reck- 
 lessness in times of war. Their intelligence and capacity 
 for remembering facts render them well fitted for use in 
 modern warfare, as do also the coolness and the calmness 
 of their disposition. Physically, they are, on the average, 
 not so strong as Europeans, but considerably more so than 
 most of the other races of the East; and, on a cheap diet of 
 rice, vegetables, salt fish and pork, they can go through a 
 vast amount of fatigue whether in a temperate climate or 
 a tropical one, where Europeans are ill fitted for exertion. 
 Their wants are few; they have no caste prejudices and 
 hardly any appetite for intoxicating liquors." 
 
 It is Mr. Colquhoun's opinion, based upon prolonged ob- 
 serv^ation, that, if Cliina were conquered by Russia, organ- 
 ized, disciplined and led by Eussian officers and Russian 
 administrators, an industrial and military organization would 
 be developed which India could not face, and which would 
 shake to its foundations the entire fabric of the British Em- 
 pire. If, he says, the Chinese failed to profit by their nu-
 
 THE FUTURE OF CHINA 651 
 
 merical superiority and their power of movement in Ton- 
 quin, it must be remembered that they were as ill-equipped 
 and supplied and nearly as unorganized and unofficered as 
 they were in the Chino-Japanese war. Transport, commis- 
 sariat, tents, medical service, all the paraphernalia employed 
 in organized army work, were then, as in the late campaign, 
 absolutely unknown. Notwithstanding the unfavorable judg- 
 ment of Prjevalski that the Chinese are animated by neither 
 military nor patriotic spirit, the conviction of many observ- 
 ers is that, however undisciplined they proved themselves in 
 the Chino-Japanese war; however badly the undrilled, unfed, 
 unled Chinamen in uniform compared with the highly or- 
 ganized troops of Japan, their capabilities, as the compo- 
 nents of a fighting machine, should be rated exceedingly 
 high. The apparent inconsistencies of the Chinese can, in 
 ail likelihood, be reconciled. That they offer excellent mili- 
 tary material when shaped and guided by foreigners may 
 be pronounced certain. If they come from the Manchurian 
 provinces or from Shantung, they are found to be steady, 
 willing to be taught and amenable to discipline, of splendid 
 physique and able to bear hardships and cold without a mur- 
 mur. If from Honan, they exhibit many of the best char- 
 acteristics of highland races — courage and loyalty to their 
 own leader — but they are more difficult to manage, and they 
 are not steady in any sense of the word. The southern Chi- 
 nese seem to be held generally in low esteem, but one should 
 not forget that the best fighters of the Taeping army were 
 the men from the Canton province, and that, as seamen, the 
 coast populations of Southern China are unequaled. The 
 western highlanders, whether Mohammedans or not, are 
 men of good physique, and would make good fighting ma- 
 terial. The Mongolians are horsemen from their early years, 
 and are suitable for light cavalry of the Cossack type. 
 
 Like the Central Asian peoples, the Chinese possess in a 
 high degree the virtue of passive bravery. At first the Rus- 
 sians, in their contests in Central Asia, expended much time 
 and wasted many lives in besieging towns. They acted with
 
 552 mSTORY OF CHINA 
 
 caution, tlirowing up approaches and opening trenches. This 
 method, however, was presently abandoned for that of open 
 escalade, as, for instance, at Tashkend, Khojand and Ura- 
 tapa. Finally, the plan was adopted of storming breaches, 
 to permit of which breaching batteries would be thrown up 
 at very close quarters, after which, a favorable time being 
 chosen, the place would be carried by storm. From every 
 point of view, this proved to be the most effective method. 
 The Chinaman, as has been proved repeatedly, is like other 
 Central Asiatics in this respect, that, under cover, he sus- 
 tains the heaviest fire with indifference; he never surrenders 
 except under bold assaults, which he cannot withstand. 
 
 What is the conclusion to which the observations of all 
 first-hand students of China have conducted them ? Their 
 conclusion is that it is a question of vital importance, a mat- 
 ter of commercial life and death, for England to maintain 
 and consolidate herself in the Yangtse basin, which cannot 
 possibly be done except by an effective occupation of the up- 
 per Yangtse, and by developing in every possible way her 
 communications along that watercourse, and by the West 
 Kiver from Hongkong, also by railway connection with 
 Upper Burma and through that province with India. Mr. 
 Colquhoun, for his part, also believes it to be high time that 
 countries like the United States, Australasia and Germany 
 should set themselves to watch with attention, not to say 
 anxiety, the situation in the Far East. He advises them 
 to reflect upon the history of the ancient empire formed by 
 Genghis Khan and his successors, for that history is repeat- 
 ing itself to-day. Russia is conquering by modern methods 
 the kingdoms of Genghis and Kublai Khan, and the Russian 
 Czar, once emperor of China, will take the place of the Tar- 
 tar conquerors who carried fire and sword beyond the Car- 
 pathians and the Vistula and throughout eastern, western 
 and southern Asia. 
 
 THE END
 
 TWENTIETH CENTURY VUINA 553 
 
 TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINA AND THE ERA 
 OE FOREIGN INFLUENCE 
 
 Twentieth Century China — The Awakening of the Chinese People 
 — Territorial Divisions — The Organization of the Government — 
 Return of the Emperor to Pekin — Important Events of the First 
 Years of the Century — Death of Li Hung Chang — Prince Ching 
 at the Head of the Government — Payment of the Indemnity to 
 the Powers — Financial and Commercial Status — Natural Re- 
 sources — Education and Religion — Reform in Missionary Meth- 
 ods — The Era of Foreign Influence — Chinese Dependencies — 
 Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan — China's Relation to Thibet 
 — The British Expedition to Thibet — Chinese Treaty Ports — 
 Districts Leased by Foreign Nations — Concessions to Russia, 
 Great Britain, Germany, and France — Japan's Leadership in 
 China — Occupation of Manchuria by the Russians — Russia's 
 Manchurian Railway — The Russo-Chinese Bank — United States 
 Interests in China — Foreign Railways in China — Chinese Trade 
 with Foreign Powers — China as the Battleground of the Russo- 
 Japanese War 
 
 AT the opening of the twentieth century, the -world was 
 paying more attention to the Chinese Empire than to 
 any other country on the globe. With the close of the 
 nineteenth centnry ended the period of Chinese isolation 
 that had lasted four thousand years. Enlightened Chinese, 
 including Government officials, were at last one with the 
 literati in openly acknowledging that China must throw wide 
 her doors to foreigners, ensure the safety of foreigners 
 throughout the Empire, and allow the Chinese people to 
 come to a full understanding of the fact that beyond their 
 walled cities, across the seas, their western neighbors had 
 some things which it were well they should possess. It 
 came as an awakening to the majority of China's millions 
 of people that, outside of their o^una domain, there could be 
 anything to be desired without which the Empire had existed 
 for forty centuries. And Chinese officials now declare that 
 the onlooking world must have patience if China's awaken- 
 ing is somewhat slow. 
 
 To give the people the benefit of the awakening, the Gov- 
 China— 24
 
 554 HISTORY OF CHiyi 
 
 emment understood that the peaceful, commercial invasion 
 of the country by foreigners must no longer be checked. 
 Hence, in the first year of the new century, began the era of 
 foreign influence. Such influence vras no longer to be at the 
 risk of the life and property of those who represented it, 
 but an influence that was welcomed on the understanding 
 that by it the Chinese people best served their own interests. 
 On this subject, the Chinese Minister to the United States, 
 Sir Shentung Liang-Cheng, said : 
 
 ''In China, seeing is believing, and the past few years has 
 brought the ocular proof which has gone far toward weaken- 
 ing the mighty pillars that have upheld this conservatism. 
 Xearly four hundred years ago, in a very small way, China 
 began her foreign trade. In the sixteenth century, Portu- 
 guese merchants established themselves at Macao, a port on 
 the south coast of China, and commenced trading with Can- 
 ton — an example which the Dutch and English were not slow 
 in following, as well as the Spaniards from Manila. But 
 the trade was not large and was confined to the city of Can- 
 ton alone. The fljst treaty ports were opened after the war 
 with England in 1843, and the first treaty with die United 
 States was signed in 1844 — a treaty which, it is pleasant to 
 note in passing, has remained intact and unbroken in all 
 these years. Five treaty ports — Canton, Shanghai, Eoochow, 
 Xingpo, and Amoy — ^were opened at this time, and for 
 twenty years were the only gateways for foreign trade with 
 the interior of the country. In 1858, plenipotentiaries from 
 other Governments were allowed to reside at the capital of 
 the Empire. 
 
 "Without doubt the war with Japan, in 1895, did more 
 to bring China to a realization of her own weakness than any- 
 thing that had occurred in her history, and the Boxer trouble 
 of 1900 resulted in creating vast trade possibilities, and pre- 
 pared the way for the industrial and commercial development 
 of the country as an ordinary Cycle of Cathay could by no 
 means have done. These possibilities are almost limitless. 
 China, through all the ages of her history, has lived content-
 
 TWENTIETH CEyTURY CfUXA 555 
 
 edly within her own domain, but now the conditions are un- 
 dergoing a marvelous change. Her people are eating of the 
 fruit of the tree of Western Knowledge, and it is creating 
 within them the insatiable appetite that will lead them to 
 cry for more. 
 
 ''It must be admitted that China's conservatism arises 
 from her lack of knowledge of what has been taking place in 
 other parts of the world, but it has now become evident to 
 her enlightened sons that they must equip themselves with 
 the machinery of modern production and defence, if they are 
 to become rich and strong. It is the realization of this which 
 has led the Government to grant the mining and railway 
 concessions that have been asked for by the European Powers 
 and the capitalists of all countries within the past five years. 
 The Chinese Government knows the vast, almost limitless, 
 possibilities of the country's resources, and it also knows 
 that their practical value depends upon the facilities for ex- 
 ploiting them." 
 
 To all of which the United States Commissioner in China, 
 Mr. W. W. Rockhill, adds : "China is little more than a vast 
 agglomeration of four hundred millions of people, spread 
 over half of eastern Asia, held together by a community of 
 language, social customs, and Confucian ethics, with a weak 
 and decentralized government, no militarism, no patriotism 
 but intense conceit, and no devotion to the reigning dynasty. 
 The governing class of China seeks but its individual profit; 
 the people have no higher object than to struggle as best they 
 can for their existence, to let good enough alone, and to keep 
 out of the way of the rapacious officials. Eefonn, then, in 
 China can but come from without ; if it is to be done quickly, 
 it must be under direct pressure from abroad. It is not un- 
 natural, therefore, that the Chinese should prefer the old 
 order of things, when they see that every change in the way 
 of modernizing the country will place them more completely 
 under the control of the foreigners, whose aid and guidance 
 they must seek." 
 
 Before defining the spheres of influence in China now
 
 556 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 dominated by various Western Powers, it is first necessary 
 to show the territorial extent of the Chinese Empire at fhe 
 opening of the twentieth century, and to define the status of 
 the Government. On January 1, 1901, China was the most 
 populous Empire in Asia, indeed, in the world. China 
 proper was remarkable as the most compact nationality on 
 the face of the globe, having an area of 1,532,000 square 
 miles, with a population of 407,253,000. The remainder of 
 the Empire included the dependencies of Manchuria, Mon- 
 golia, Thibet, Jungaria, and East Turkestan. All these de- 
 pendencies covered an area of 2,745,000 square miles, with a 
 population of 19,000,000 souls. 
 
 The government of this vast territory was organized, 
 theoretically, on the most careful plan. Practically, how- 
 ever, the government organization was far from being thor- 
 ough, and, further still, from being effective. The Emperor 
 Kwang Su was nominally the Supreme Priest and King, 
 while the real sovereign was the Empress Dowager, the Em- 
 peror's aunt. On January 7, 1902, the Emperor and the 
 Empress Dowager and the Chinese court re-entered Pekin, 
 after an absence dating back to the beginning of the Boxer 
 troubles in 1900. Their Majesties, more than a year after 
 their return, granted an audience to the representatives of all 
 foreign countries then in Pekin. Mr. Conger, the Minister 
 from the United States, as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, 
 made a speech expressing in complimentary terms the pleas- 
 ure of the Ministers in being present. Mr. George Lynch, 
 an American correspondent, and an eye-witness, describes the 
 ceremony as follows : 
 
 "The American envoy, Mr. Conger, addressed himself to 
 a member of his legation, who gave the message to the court 
 interpreter on the right of the Empress, who in turn, after 
 bowing to the ground, communicated it to her Majesty. She 
 smiled a very pleasant smile, and bobbed her head three or 
 four times. The Emperor smiled once — a curious, enig- 
 matic smile, as if it were given by order of the Empress or 
 the Board of Rights. There was nothing spontaneous or
 
 TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINA 557 
 
 genuine in it ; it was purely perfunctory, with perhaps a sug- 
 gestion of mockery. Having performed liis only act in the 
 ceremony, he looked around Avith that furtive, restless, 
 haunted look. Then the Empress in a low voice made her 
 reply, which was passed through the two interpreters back to 
 Mr. Conger. She spoke clearly and emphatically, with a 
 curious twitching of the right corner of her mouth, such as 
 one sees in people who have had a stroke of paralysis. Every 
 one bowed, and, stepping backward, still bowing, left the 
 audience-chamber." 
 
 On April 23, 1901, by Imperial edict, the supreme ad- 
 ministration of the Empire was vested in a General Board 
 of State Affairs ; which took the place of the Privy Council 
 of the nineteenth century. Under the General Board, ac- 
 cording to the government organization in 1904, is the Nei- 
 ko, or Cabinet, including two Manchu members, two Chinese, 
 and two assistants from the Hanlin or Great College. Under 
 the Cabinet are seven boards, or councils, each under the 
 presidency of a Manchu and a Chinese. These seven coun- 
 cils are intrusted with all civil affairs and all financial mat- 
 ters, together with the direction of rites and ceremonies, all 
 military affairs, public works, criminal jurisdiction, and 
 naval affairs. Under the councils are the various ministries. 
 The Wai-Wu-Pu, or Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is intrusted 
 with the direction of foreign relations, the maritime customs, 
 etc. The Board of Censors, a distinct branch of the Govern- 
 ment service, is a powerful body, its members having direct 
 access to the sovereign. The eighteen provinces of the Em- 
 pire are divided among a number of Viceroys, or Governors- 
 General, assisted by Governors of departments and districts, 
 and by the Taotais of the cities. 
 
 Several important events of the first years of the twen- 
 tieth century were as follows : In 1901, China lost the great- 
 est statesman the nation had produced in centuries, Li Hung 
 Chang. This peacemaker and genius of statecraft, whose 
 name is frequently mentioned in previous chapters, died on 
 iJI'ovember 7th. His death was regarded as an international
 
 558 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 calamity. On October 27, 1902, Wu Ting-Fang, the Minis- 
 ter to the United States, was recalled, and Sir Shentung 
 Liang-Cheng was appointed in his st^ad. On April 11, 1903, 
 Ynng-Lu, comptroller of the finances, died, and was succeeded 
 by Prince Ching, with the title of Grand Secretary. Prince 
 Ching thus became the head of the most powerful adminis- 
 trative body, the General Board of State Affairs. 
 
 On December 5, 1903, Yuan-Shih-Kai was appointed 
 Commander-in-chief of the Imperial Army and Navy, and a 
 committee consisting of himself, with Prince Ching and a 
 Manchu official, was directed to reorganize the armies of all 
 the provinces on a national basis. 
 
 On May 29, 1901, the Emperor, in atonement for the 
 loss to foreigners growing out of the Boxer uprising, agreed 
 to pay the Powers an indemnity of four hundred and fifty 
 million taels (about $340,000,000). This indemnity was 
 calculated at the rate of the tael to the gold currency of each 
 of the foreign countries to which the sum was to be paid. 
 The sum in gold was to bear interest at the rate of four per 
 cent a year, and was to be paid in instalments covering a 
 period of thirty-nine years, beginning January 1, 1902, and 
 finishing December 31, 1940. The authorizations were made 
 payable annually on January 1st. Interest was afterward 
 made payable semi-annually, January 1st and July 1st. The 
 revenues assigned as security for the bonds are as follows: 
 (1.) The balance of the revenues of the Imperial Maritime 
 Customs after payment of the interest and amortization of 
 preceding loans secured on these revenues, plus the proceeds 
 of the raising to five per cent effective of the tariff on mari- 
 time imports, but exempting rice, foreign cereals, and flour, 
 gold and silver bullion and coin. (2.) The revenues of the 
 native customs, administered in the open courts by the Impe- 
 rial Maritime Customs. (3.) The total revenues of the salt 
 gabelle, exclusive of the fraction previously set aside for 
 other foreign loans. 
 
 The proceeds of the assigned revenues are paid monthly 
 to a commission of bankers at Shanghai rei^resenting the Pow-
 
 TWENTIETH CEXTURY VHiyA 559 
 
 ers. By Articles 7, 8, and 9, of the agreement with the 
 Powers, the Chinese Government agreed that the quarter 
 occupied by the legations shall be considered as one specially 
 reserved for their use, and placed under their exclusive con- 
 trol, in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside, and 
 which may be made defensible. In the Protocol annexed to 
 the letter of January 16, 1901, China recognized the right 
 of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the said 
 quarter for the defence of its legation. Furthermore, the 
 Chinese Government consented to raze the forts of Taku, 
 and those which might impede free communication between 
 Pekin and the sea ; and conceded the right to the Powers to 
 occupy certain points to be determined by an agi-eement be- 
 tween them for the maintenance of open communication 
 between the capital and the sea. 
 
 On January 7, 1903, the foreign Ministers at Pekin, with 
 the exception of the United States Minister, signed a Joint 
 'Note, declaring that the Peace Protocol, following the Boxer 
 troubles, signed September Y, 1901, provided for the pay- 
 ment of the indemnity on a gold basis, and that failure to 
 fulfil her obligations would entail serious consequences on 
 China. The Chinese Government declared itself unable to 
 pay on a gold basis unless the Powers would agree to the new 
 customs tariff being made a gold tariff. In 1903, however, 
 the Shanghai Taotai informed the Secretary of the Bankers' 
 Commission that China would comply with the request of 
 the Powers regarding the indemnity, and that the Govern- 
 ment had issued orders for the immediate signature of the 
 Indemnity Gold Bonds, submitted in December, 1902. A 
 further important financial event in 1903 was an edict, 
 issued in April, directing Prince Ching to reorganize the 
 financial system of the Empire by establishing a monetary 
 standard for the whole country, and by opening at Pekin a 
 mint for the supply of all the provinces with a uniform 
 coinage. 
 
 Meantime, the financial and commercial status of the 
 Empire, together with the facts relating to her natural re-
 
 660 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 sources, in the first years of the twentieth century, were as 
 follows: In the matter of finance, the annual revenue and 
 expenditures were estimated at from $60,000,000 to $75,000,- 
 000. The imports, in 1902, amounted to $200,000,000 ; and 
 the exports to $150,000,000. The national debt, in 1900, 
 amounted to about $260,000,000, including the loan to 
 cover the war indemnity to Japan. In 1901, when China 
 agreed to pay the Powers the indemnity above mentioned 
 ($340,000,000), the total of the public debt was raised to 
 $600,000,000. 
 
 Concerning China's industries, the chief pursuit of the 
 people at the beginning of the new century was, as ever, agri- 
 culture. The principal products to-day are tea, silk, cereals, 
 and sugar. Of the total of exports named above, silk, in 1901, 
 amounted to $45,000,000, and tea to $15,000,000. Land 
 in China is still freehold, and is held by families in small 
 holdings, so long as an annual land-tax of from twenty-five 
 cents to one dollar and fifty cents per acre is paid to the 
 Government. Farms in a large part of the Empire still 
 produce three crops annually. 
 
 As to China's natural resources, safe within the keeping 
 of her mountain fastnesses are virgin beds of minerals, iron, 
 and coal, of inexhaustible quantities. It is estimated that 
 the coal fields of Shansi and Hunan provinces alone can sup- 
 ply the .needs of all Europe for the next fifty years. The 
 coal fields in the provinces and in the Lui-Yang district cover 
 an area of 21,000 square miles. These fields are worked in 
 a desultory 'way, here and there, by primitive methods, the 
 products finding an outlet through Hankow on the Yang- 
 tse-Kiang. Large coal fields also exist in the provinces of 
 Chili, Shantung, Sze-Chuan, and Honan. In Shansi, iron 
 abounds. Copper, lead, tin, and quicksilver have been mined 
 in Yunnan and Kweichau by primitive native metliods for 
 centuries, and the rich deposits have been but scratched. The 
 hills of slag cover many square miles over the immense copper 
 mines in Hunan proAnnce, where remnants of the ancient 
 smelting works are still to be seen, but an examination made,
 
 TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINA 561 
 
 in 1902, for deep-mining purposes revealed the copper huj)- 
 plies practically intact. In the provinces of Sze-chuan and 
 Kansu, which cover more territory than the States of Ohio, 
 Indiana, Kentucky, and California combined, are salt, gas, 
 and oil wells, which have had a local fame for many genera- 
 tions. Such a wonderful flow of petroleum resulted from a 
 precursory survey made there recently with modern drilling 
 implements, that it is safe to predict the day not far distant 
 when the bean oil, the vegetable oil, and the peanut oil, which 
 have supplied all artificial light for the poor class of natives 
 from time immemorial, will be supplanted by kerosene. This 
 item of oil is a fair index of the spirit that is now spreading 
 among the Chinese people. A few years ago no Chinese 
 would have protested against the use of bean oil for a light- 
 ing medium. But Russian and American enterprise brought 
 kerosene to his very door. He saw the better illumination 
 which it produced, and found that it could be had for what 
 he had heretofore paid for bean oil. He unhesitatingly cast 
 aside the poorer and adopted the better article. 
 
 The development of all China's natural resources depends 
 upon the construction of a proper system of railways. For- 
 eign nations understand this, and in the story to follow, re- 
 lating to the partition of the Empire through spheres of influ- 
 ence, it will be shown that railway concessions are, first of 
 all, in the hearts of foreigners in China. 
 
 The facts relating to education and religion in China in 
 the first years of the twentieth century afford only slight 
 evidence of the awakening of the nation. Education, for 
 example, is still, to a great extent, monopolized by a special 
 literary class of the jDopulatiou. Literary examinations still 
 constitute the principal avenue to the public service. The 
 result of the Imperial edict of 1902, however, will, within 
 the next few years, open the doors of the public service to a 
 much larger class of candidates. The edict referred to de- 
 creed that universities should be established in each province, 
 colleges in each prefecture, and schools in each district, the 
 whole scheme having for its object the gradual establishment
 
 562 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 of a system of popular education for the benefit of all classes. 
 In modem art China holds but a small place, the products of 
 her artists possessing little merit. In religious matters, the 
 Confucian religion is still the State religion, though Bud- 
 dhism and Taoism are the popular religions, the Buddhists 
 largely predominating. United States Commissioner Rock- 
 hill is of the opinion that there must be a radical reform in 
 the missionary methods of foreigners before any great good 
 can be accomplished, by Christian influence. In stating his 
 opinion, Mr. Rockhill says: 
 
 "A fertile cause of distrust, ill feeling, and even of anti- 
 foreign uprising in China, has been the methods followed in 
 the propagation of the Christian religion and in the hostility 
 frequently existing between native Christians of different 
 creeds. It would seem that the present lull in the storm 
 must be availed of to remove this serious source of danger, 
 to the maintenance of the very unstable equilibrium in China. 
 A body of rules and regiTlations defining the rights, privi- 
 leges, and duties of missionaries, both Protestants and Cath- 
 olics, must be agreed upon and strictly enforced, by which 
 all possible causes of friction with the local authorities and 
 the people could be carefully guarded against and minimized. 
 In 1871, the Chinese Government addressed a circular to the 
 Powers suggesting eight rules for the better regulation of 
 missionary enterprise. The British and American Govern- 
 ments declined to consider the subject, because none of the 
 abuses referred to in the note was specifically charged against 
 missionaries of their nationality. Since then things have 
 somewhat changed, and, although some of the gravest charges 
 made by the Chinese — especially the assumption of protected 
 jurisdiction over native Christians — are more particularly 
 directed against the Roman Catholics, it is incontrovertible 
 that missionary activity generally requires regulating, and 
 that rules of guidance applicable to all alike should be agTeed 
 upon. The great benefits which would result from the adop- 
 tion of such regulations would amply repay all the labor and 
 trouble their preparation might entail."
 
 THE ERA OF FOREIGN INFLUESCE 563 
 
 In 1901, following the Boxer movement, the provinces 
 of Shansi and Shensi were stricken by famine. Thousands 
 perished, but more thousands were saved by the promptness 
 with which money and supplies of food were sent to the suf- 
 ferers by foreigners, especially by Americans. Li Hung 
 Chang appealed to America for help, and Christian America 
 responded with $100,000 in cash. Relief expeditions, 
 headed by American missionaries, carried life itself to the 
 very people who the year before had been most active in 
 putting foreign missionaries to the sword. With Christian- 
 ity turning the other cheek, as it were, a profound impres- 
 sion was made upon the popular mind in China. The fam- 
 ine and the spirit of brotherly love that induced Americans 
 to contribute money and food and clothing, accomplished 
 more than bullets and punitive expeditions in the establish- 
 ment of friendly relations between Chinese and foreigners. 
 
 With the year 1901, as before stated, began the era of 
 foreign influence in China. Spheres of influence were sought 
 by many foreign Powers, and were obtained by Russia, Great 
 Britain, Germany, France, and Japan. This movement was 
 popularly referred to as the partition of China. Before giv- 
 ing the details concerning the various spheres of influence, 
 it will be well to give a summary of the facts relating to the 
 Chinese dependencies, thus clearing the way for a considera- 
 tion of foreign influence in China proper. As for Manchuria, 
 the facts will be set forth later in telling the story of Russian 
 influence in that province. Mongolia, second in importance 
 to Manchuria, with an area of 1,367,000 square miles and 
 a population of 2,580,000, is not yet dominated to any great 
 extent by any foreign Power. Chinese Turkestan, with an 
 area of 550,000 square miles and a population of 1,200,000, 
 contains the important towns of Kashgar, Yarkaug, and 
 Khotan. Both British and Russian representatives are now 
 (1904) stationed at Kashgar, a large trading centre, but 
 Russian influence is in the ascendant. 
 
 Next in importance is Thibet, with an area of 463,000 
 square miles and a population of 0,430,000. The capital is
 
 564 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Lhasa, with a population of 10,000. The Thibetans obsti- 
 nately refuse to allow foreigners to explore their country. 
 A Russian explorer, however, M. Zybikoff, despite the watch- 
 fulness of the people, spent twelve months at Lhasa and re- 
 turned to St. Petersburg in 1903. He reported that the 
 country was wholly under the rule of the Lamas or Buddhist 
 priests. The Dalai Lama is the Supreme Ruler, assisted by 
 a council comprising a prime minister and four laymen. 
 The country is divided into four lings, each governed by a 
 Lama. There are two Ambans, or Chinese residents, at 
 Lhasa, who represent the Chinese Government in the country. 
 In consideration of a commercial treaty vnth Thibet, signed 
 in 1893, Yatung, a town in the Chunbi Valley, was opened 
 for trade, with an Indian Government official and a Chinese 
 official resident there. According to that treaty, all articles, 
 except munitions of war, drugs, and liquors, were to pass 
 free of duty for the first five years. The import of tea from 
 India was forbidden for the same period. The treaty is 
 still in force in 1904. 
 
 In 1903, a British expedition to Thibet, under Colonel 
 Younghusband, was despatched by the Indian Government 
 to meet the officials of Thibet and China for the purpose of 
 discussing trade relations between India and Thibet. The 
 expedition reached Knamba Jong in July, 1903, this place 
 being thirty miles from the Thibetan frontier. There, how- 
 ever, as the result of the unfriendly attitude of the Thibetans, 
 the expedition remained encamped until I^ovember, when it 
 began an advance, with Gyangtzse Jong, about 150 miles 
 from Lhasa, as an objective point. On December 15th, the 
 expedition crossed the Jalep Pass, and in March, 1904, was 
 still advancing toward Lhasa. This disposes of the principal 
 facts relating to foreign influence in Mongolia, Chinese 
 Turkestan, and Thibet. 
 
 In the consideration of the partition of China proper, or 
 Middle Kingdom, the facts first to be noted are those relat- 
 ing to the treaty ports and leased districts. There are thirty- 
 nine treaty ports, all of which have been thrown open to
 
 THE ERA OP FOREIGN INFLUENCE 605 
 
 European trade. Over twenty thousand foreigners now re- 
 side in the treaty ports, of whom over five thousand are Brit- 
 ish subjects, though the number of Americans is increasing 
 annually. The principal foreig-n centre is Shanghai, with a 
 foreig-n population of seventy-five hundred, and a native pop- 
 ulation of four hundred thousand. On August 17, 1903, 
 through the pressure brought to bear upon China by United 
 States Secretary of State Hay, two ports in Manchuria were 
 opened to foreign trade, namely, Mukden, and Ta-Tung-Kau. 
 
 "A dozen years ago," says the Chinese Minister to the 
 United States, "China's great cities were each absorbed with- 
 in themselves ; to-day they are reaching out eager hands for 
 the commerce of the world. Canton, the first city to open its 
 doors, is the gateway to the southern part of the Empire, as 
 Tien-tsin is to the northern and Shanghai to the eastern. 
 Hankow, the objective point of the Belgian as well as the 
 American railway, is located on the Yang-tse Biver, midway 
 between Pekin and Canton, and can properly be called The 
 Hub of the country. Through it flow the imports and ex- 
 ports of the vast districts of the Middle West, together with 
 the trade carried on with Thibet and Western Mongolia by 
 caravans. Chung-king, the most westerly of the treaty ports, 
 stands about eight hundred miles west of Hankow, and is 
 the commercial centre for the vast districts of that section. 
 These and the other treaty ports are all flourishing mimici- 
 palities, which are gladly embracing any and all commercial 
 opportunities." 
 
 It should be stated here that at all the treaty ports the 
 Imperial customs dues on foreign trade are collected, and 
 the coast lights administered, by a really great service, pre- 
 viously referred to as the Imperial Maritime Customs of 
 China. In this service one thousand Europeans are engaged, 
 fully one-half of the number being British. 
 
 Among the leased districts, those first in importance are 
 Port Arthur and Dalny, held by Kussia. As the fruits of 
 victory in the Chino-Japanese War, Port Arthur and a largo 
 part of Southern Manchuria, as set forth in the previous
 
 566 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 chapter, was ceded to Japan. Two days after the ratifica- 
 tion of the treaty, however, the Powers compelled Japan to 
 give up her newly acquired territory. Russia was, of course, 
 the prime mover in this diplomatic game. After compelling 
 the Japanese to withdraw from Manchuria, Russia's next 
 move was to secure the privilege of extending a branch of the 
 Siberian Railway across Manchuria to the sea. Through the 
 Czar's influence, China secured a reduction of one-fifth of 
 the interest on her war debt. The Czar, further, guaranteed 
 the loan which the Chinese Government was obliged to make, 
 without which guarantee the loan could not have been nego- 
 tiated. Following this diplomatic move on the part of Rus- 
 sia, a treaty was signed on March 27, 1898, by the Russian 
 and Chinese Governments, whereby Port Arthur and Dalny 
 (Talienhwan), in Southern Manchuria, were leased to Russia 
 for a period of twenty-five years — the term to be extended by 
 mutual agreement. The treaty gave to Russia the rights of 
 extension of railway construction southward to the ports 
 named, from where the line of the Trans-Siberian Railroad 
 crosses Xorth-Central Manchuria on its way to Vladivostok. 
 It was stipulated, however, that the lease should not preju- 
 dice Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. It was further 
 agreed that the control of all military forces in the territory 
 leased by Russia, and of all naval forces in the adjoining seas, 
 as well as the civil affairs in it, should be vested in one high 
 Russian official, and that all Chinese military forces, without 
 exception, should be withdrawn. The Russian official chosen 
 for the post designated in the treaty was Admiral Alexieff, 
 to whom was given the title Viceroy, and who was in 
 supreme command at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese 
 War. 
 
 The concession which China granted to Russia for the 
 railway in Manchuria was made direct to the Russo-Chinese 
 Bank, a financial arm of the Russian Government. The 
 bank organized, under Russian law, the East China Railway 
 Company, with a capital of 5,000,000 rubles ($2,500,000), 
 almost all of which was controlled by the Russo-Chinese
 
 TEE ERA OF FOREIGN INFLVEyCE 3J7 
 
 Bank. This company undertook the construction of the 
 railway to Port Arthur. 
 
 To further secure the right-of-way in Manchuria, the 
 Russian Government effected an agreement called the Auglo 
 Russian agreement, signed April 28, 1899, whereby the re- 
 spective spheres of influence of Russia and Great Britain in 
 China were defined. By this agreement Great Britain en- 
 gaged not to seek railway concessions to the north of the 
 Great Wall of China, and not to oppose applications for rail- 
 way concessions in that region supported by the Russian 
 Government. Russia, on her part, agreed not to seek rail- 
 way concessions in the basin of the Yang-tse-Kiang, and 
 not to oppose applications for railway concessions in that 
 region supported by the British Government. 
 
 With the restoration of order in Manchuria, after the 
 Boxer uprising — order guaranteed by the presence of Rus- 
 sian arms — Russian emigTant peasants began pouring into the 
 province named. In the summer of 1901, the first vessel 
 of the Russian fleet arrived at Port Arthur, and about the 
 same time the first ship of the "Russian Volunteer Fleet" 
 landed fifteen hundred Russian peasants at Vladivostok. 
 These peasants formed the first Russian settlement in Man- 
 churia. Scores of other Russian colonies and well-built 
 towns with brick buildings now flourish all along the line 
 of the Manchurian Railway, side by side with squalid Chinese 
 villages. Referring to the decided benefits both to the 
 Chinese and to the foreigners by the occupation of Man- 
 churia by the Russians, Senator Beveridge says: 
 
 "The first thing that strikes you in the first beautiful 
 valley through which you go, after you enter Manehiiria, is 
 cultivated fields and peaceful people. In China itself you 
 will not observe greater liberty of action among an indus- 
 trious population. As a matter of fact, the Chinamen who 
 have returned to their fields are enjoying a peace and undis- 
 turbedness of industry never heard of before in this part of 
 Manchuria. 
 
 "Chinese towns are organized filthiness. They are quite
 
 568 HISTORY OF t'HlNA 
 
 impossible of description. The streets are rambling and 
 sickening; in rainy weather they are miry, with a slime 
 compounded from all the elements that might offend both 
 sight and smell. You see mixtures being made on the soil 
 in front of Chinese shops and stores in the ordinary Chinese 
 commercial town (not in the gTeat cities, although these are 
 hideous enough, as the ordinary traveler will tell you, nor 
 yet in mere rural villages) which will nauseate you if you 
 do not pass by raj^idly. The shops are poor structures of 
 wood and earth ; the homes themselves are of mud. This is 
 the kind of town you will see all over Manchuria, and this 
 the town you will see all over China. 
 
 "But side by side with it in Manchuria you will behold 
 something that you did not see in China — something so 
 surprising that it seems almost unreal. And, indeed, it is 
 a miracle — a modern European town planted adjacent to the 
 congeries of hovels which comprise the Chinese towns just 
 described. Brick buildings of substantial construction and 
 not uninviting architecture stand comj^leted, and others are 
 rising by their side. Broad streets, regularly laid out — 
 not paved yet, of course, for the town itself is only building 
 — but streets with gutters along the sides and with hard- 
 beaten gravel covering convex surface, and in far better con- 
 dition than the streets of most of the cities of modern Russia. 
 With all the outward necessaries of civilized life about you, 
 among which are five thousand sacks of American flour from 
 Washington, U. S. A., you stand in perfect security, where 
 ten years ago you probably would have been murdered by 
 bands of brigands." 
 
 After the Boxer troubles, Russia, as previously stated, 
 kept troops in Manchuria to maintain order and to guard 
 the new railway. To this Japan objected, and finally, on 
 April 8, 1902, a convention was signed at Pekin between 
 China and Russia, the hitter agreeing to evacuate Manchuria 
 by October Sth. Through astute diplomatic procedure on 
 the part of Russia, however, the Manchurian convention of 
 April Sth was allowed to lapse, and, on October Sth, a large 
 
 M
 
 THE ERA OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE 569 
 
 Russian army still occupied Manchuria. In April, 190:^, 
 the Eussian Charge d' Affaires at Pekin presented a nurnbor 
 of extraordinary demands, as conditions for the carrying 
 out of the Manchurian Convention and the evacuation of 
 Niu-Chwang and the two southern provinces of Manchuria. 
 In an introduction to this communication, the statement was 
 made that Russia had sacrificed thousands of lives and mil- 
 lions of rubles to pacify the country and restore the Chinese 
 authority. Therefore, by right of conquest Russia claimed 
 the right to occupy Manchuria, but signified her willing- 
 ness to restore the provinces of Mukden and Kirin, and the 
 port of Niu-Chwang on the following conditions: (1.) No 
 portion of the restored territory shall be transferred under 
 any form to another Power. (2.) The present administra- 
 tion of Mongolia shall not be disturbed. (3.) China will 
 undertake not to open new treaty ports in Manchuria or to 
 permit new consuls without the previous assent of the Rus- 
 sian Government. (4.) Should China desire to employ for- 
 eigners in any branch of her administration, their authority 
 shall not extend to affairs in North China where Russian 
 interests predominate. (5.) Russia will retain under her 
 own control the existing telegraph lines between Port Arthur, 
 Niu-Chwang, and Mukden. (6.) After the restoration of 
 the Niu-Chwang-Chinese administration, the Russo-Chinese 
 Bank will continue, as at present, its functions as a customs 
 bank. (Y.) All rights acquired in Manchuria by Russian 
 subjects during the occupation shall remain in force after 
 the evacuation. 
 
 In addition to these conditions of carrying out the Man- 
 churian Convention, Russia further demanded that since she 
 had become responsible for health along the line of railway, 
 and since the public health required the continuance of a 
 sanitary board, that such board should be composed of Rus- 
 sians, and that the Customs Commissioner and the Customs 
 doctor also should be Russians. 
 
 To these conditions Japan and the United States 
 promptly interposed objections, and China refused to agree
 
 570 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 to them. iN^evertheless, British correspondents in Pekin re- 
 ported that the Chinese were gradually agreeing to the con- 
 ditions named by Russia. 
 
 On May 8, 1903, the Russians occupied the Province of 
 Xiu-Chwang with a large force of troops. On September 
 6, 1903, however, the Russian representative at Pekin, M. 
 Lessar, gave a new pledge to the Chinese Foreign Office, 
 agreeing to evacuate the Niu-Chwang and Mukden provinces 
 on October 8th, subject to the following conditions; That 
 China should undertake that no portion of the territory 
 should be ceded to any other Power; that no concession 
 should be granted to England unless granted equally to 
 Russia ; that there should be no increase in the present im- 
 15ort tariff on goods entering Manchuria by railway; that 
 Russia should maintain her own military telegraph line 
 along the railway; that the Russo-Chinese Bank agencies 
 in Manchuria should be guarded by Chinese soldiers ; and 
 that Russia should be granted certain other privileges, includ- 
 ing the maintenance of military post stations. Thus, in 
 deference to the objections of foreign Powers to the demands 
 previously made, such objectionable demands were not now 
 included. 
 
 By the conditions of the pledge just mentioned, it would 
 seem that Russia hoped thus to pacify the resentment of 
 Japan by apparently acceding to her wishes, while retaining 
 absolute military control of the country. When the signifi- 
 cance of the demand for military post stations was under- 
 stood, however, China refused to accede to Russia's latest 
 demands, and the resentment of the Japanese people grew 
 still deeper. From that time forth war between Russia 
 and Japan was regarded by all nations as inevitable. 
 
 In October, 1903, despite the various treaties between 
 China and Japan, and between China and Russia, providing 
 for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria, the 
 Russian army in that territory was larger than ever before. 
 On October 20th, Russian troops took possession of Mukden, 
 and the Russian Ambassador at Pekin demanded that a 
 
 m
 
 THE ERA OF FOREIGX IXFLUEXCE 571 
 
 Russian resident should be appointed at ISIukden to advise 
 the Tartar General there on all affairs. 
 
 Other districts leased to European Powers include : Wei- 
 Hai-Wei, in Shantung and the Kow-Lung district ojjposite 
 ITong-Kong, to Great Britain; Kiao-Chau, in Shantung, to 
 Germany, and the Bay of Kwang-Chau-Wan, opposite to 
 Hainan Island, with two isles commanding the entrance 
 to the bay, to France. 
 
 Japan, meantime, holds only the Island of Formosa, 
 ceded to her by China in 1895, as already stated, in lieu of 
 Southern Manchuria. On January 30, 1902, a treaty of 
 offensive and defensive alliance between Japan and Great 
 Britain was signed in London. This treaty, having for its 
 principal object the preservation of the territorial integrity 
 of China and the independence of Corea, was confirmed by 
 the Japanese Government on February 12, 1902. Toward 
 China, as toward Corea and Siam, Japan now sustains a 
 natural position of leadership, a position she hopes further 
 to secure by victory in the war with Russia. 
 
 On September 5, 1902, China and Great Britain signed 
 a commercial treaty whereby the Likin were abolished 
 throughout the Empire, in return for a surtax on im])orts 
 equal to one and one-half times the duty provided for in 
 the Protocol of 1901, and a surtax of one-half the five per 
 cent duty on exports. Provision was also made for a na- 
 tional currency uniform throughout China, revision of the 
 mining regulations, the adoption of rules for the navigation 
 of inland waters, and the protection of British Trade Marks 
 in China. 
 
 While European nations are leasing various districts in 
 China, the interests of the United States in the Empire are 
 exclusively commercial. On October 8, 1903, China and the 
 United States signed a commercial treaty on the lines of 
 the British treaty just mentioned. 
 
 We come now to the all-important subject of that princi- 
 pal means of the development of China's natural resources 
 and of China's foreign trade, namely, railways.
 
 572 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Until a very few years ago, according to facts furnished 
 by the Chinese Minister to the United States, railroads were 
 unknown in the entire four million square miles of the Em- 
 pire, but China is blessed with thousands of miles of coast- 
 line, and an almost unsurpassed system of rivers which have 
 made her waterways the most important agency in her com- 
 merce. As long ago as the thirteenth century, the Mongol 
 Emperor, Kublai Khan, built the Grand Canal, with a net- 
 work of smaller ones connecting many of the cities of the 
 country. These have alwaya commanded the traflac of the 
 Yang-tse River, which penetrates for two thousand miles 
 the most densely populated and wealthiest section of the 
 Empire, as well as that of the Huang-ho, the great serpen- 
 tine stream whose mighty yellow waters overflow their banks 
 so often that it has been given the name of ^'China's Sorrow." 
 Upon all these watercourses, steam, until a comparatively 
 short time ago, was an unknown quantity, and the number- 
 less resources of the interior have remained untouched 
 through all the centuries for want of means of exportation. 
 Eor the utilization of these resources, China must be covered 
 with a network of railroads. To realize this necessity, it 
 should be borne in mind that, with practically no railways, 
 China's export and import trade has doubled since 1891 ; 
 and with less than five hundred miles of railroad in 1899, 
 her trade approximated three hundred and thirty-three mil- 
 lions of dollars. Is not that suggestive of what it wdll be 
 when she has a trackage equaling that which to-day girds the 
 United States? There is no doubt of the truth of the state- 
 ment that railway construction will do more toward making 
 China a world Power than any other single agency. With 
 her vast mines at work, and with railroads to bring to the 
 markets the output of these mines, China's potentialities 
 will become such mighty realities as will awaken the respect 
 and envy of every nation of the earth. To accomplish this 
 the Chinese Government is now bending every energy, and if 
 but half the projects which are on foot are put into ex- 
 ecution, the next few years will witness such a transfer-
 
 THE ERA OF FOREWS^ mPLVE'SCE 573 
 
 mation in the Empire as could not have been dreamed of 
 a cycle ago. 
 
 Referring to the spheres of influence in China, demanded 
 by foreign Powers following the Chino-Japanese War, 
 United States Commissioner Rockhill says: "The war was 
 hardly over when in quick succession came the seizures by 
 various Powers of points of vantage along the coast of China, 
 the bullying from the Government in the interest of rival 
 foreign concerns of concessions for railroads, mines, etc., the 
 throwing open of all the inland waters to foreign shipping, 
 regardless of vested Chinese interest, demands for the open- 
 ing of the whole Empire to foreign enterprise, and demands 
 that the foreign Catholic priests be given oflficial Chinese 
 rank. Everything demanded by the foreigners tended to 
 the rapid and complete disintegration of the Empire, to the 
 spread, in the avowed interest of the Christian religion and 
 Western civilization, of anarchy throughout the land. Rec- 
 ognizing, as the Chinese certainly did, the disruptive conse- 
 quence of the foreign schemes forced upon them, the inevita- 
 ble results of the concessions being wrung from them, was it 
 astounding that the anti-foreign feeling should have become 
 intensified and have sought some means of averting the 
 doom which seemed to be irresistibly weighing them down ?" 
 Thus to the grabbing, principally of railway concessions on 
 the part of foreign Powers, Mr. Rockhill places the origin 
 of the Boxer uprising and of the Yellow Peril which still 
 exists. 
 
 The Chinese railways may be divided into two classes — 
 native and foreign. The most important of the Chinese rail- 
 ways is the Imperial Railway of JSTorth China, which was 
 restored to China's control by Great Britain and Russia in 
 1902. 
 
 The Imperial Railway, which eventually is to connect 
 all North and West China, is the oldest railroad in the coun- 
 try, and was begun as a tramway for the coal mines at Kai- 
 ping in 1881. Its entire leng-th is now five hundred and fifty 
 miles. The success of this line has been demonstrated, for,
 
 674 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 from the day of its opening, it has been overburdened with 
 freight and passenger traffic. The construction of the Impe- 
 rial I^^orthern (known as the Belgian) Railway, and extend- 
 ing from Pekin to Hankow, is being rapidly pushed forward. 
 It is expected to have its seven hundred miles completed by 
 January, 1906. Trains are already running on the south- 
 ern end of this line. 
 
 Of the foreign railways, one of the most important is the 
 American enterprise, the Hankow-Canton line, reaching from 
 the two points named, and having numerous branches which 
 will pass through some of the most densely populated prov- 
 inces of the country — those of Hupeb, Hunan, Kwangsi, and 
 Kwangtung — ^now under way. This road was surveyed under 
 the direction of iNTew York's skilled engineer, Mr. William 
 Barclay Parsons. It will tap the rich mineral deposits of 
 the outlying regions and open enormous new fields for the 
 employment of capital, giving, without doubt, a great im- 
 petus to the trade with the United States. 
 
 Other foreign railways include the Russian railway in 
 Manchuria, which has already been described. The Anglo- 
 German road, called the Tien-tsin-Chinkiang, will follow the 
 route of the Grand Canal. It will become a feeder to the 
 many waterways of those districts. A branch road connects 
 this with Shanghai, the city which is so often called the 
 New York of China. The Germans will build the section 
 from Tien-tsin to the Shantung border, and the British the 
 section thence to Chin-Kiang. Other foreigTi railways in 
 China include a line from Pekin to Hankow, constructed by 
 a Franco-Belgian syndicate. Several lines are being built 
 by the British-Pekin syndicate, and by the British and Chi- 
 nese Corporation. Germany, also, has several lines under 
 way besides the one above mentioned. A French Company 
 obtained, in 1903, a concession for a railway line two hun- 
 dred and fifty miles long from Lao-Kai to Yun-lSTan-Sen. 
 
 While China has made every provision for the welfare 
 of the foreign capitalists who will invest their money in these 
 and other enterprises, she has not, so the Chinese Minister
 
 THE ERA OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE 575 
 
 to the United States declares, been so foolish as to neglect to 
 guard the interests and rights of her own people. In all the 
 concessions which have been granted, it is provided that event- 
 ually the property reverts to the Chinese Government. In 
 every case a good part of the capital invested must be Chi- 
 nese, and a proportion of the profits must be paid to the 
 Government. It is further provided that a certain number 
 of the employees shall be natives and subjects of the Empire. 
 In order to provide men capable of carrying on the enter- 
 prises in the future, when the foreigners have withdraA^m, 
 there is a proviso attached to each concession whereby the 
 syndicates agi*ee to establish schools of instruction in mining, 
 engineering, or the construction and management of rail- 
 ways, for a given number of Chinese young men. 
 
 After the railways comes the trade. In a number of 
 cities of the Empire, American mills and factories are being 
 established. American merchants are beginning to seize these 
 opportunities. American insurance companies are finding a 
 generous support, and there is a loud call for American banks. 
 American flour, American cotton goods, and American kero- 
 sene are commanding an increasing market. American 
 canned goods, lamps, and candles are growing in popularity, 
 while American farming implements and sewing machines 
 have made the entering wedge into a trade which may in 
 time assume gigantic proportions. 
 
 On this subject Commissioner Rockhill says: "The ex- 
 pansion of trade and the development of China's natural 
 resources might be done in a manner not necessarily disagi-ee- 
 able to the Chinese, or in open disregard of their wishes, but, 
 on the contrary, in such a way as to exercise a pacifying and 
 reassuring eifect. The existence of the so-called spheres of 
 influence have not so far proved prejudicial or in any way 
 interfered with American trade or enterprise. There has 
 been no discrimination anywhere in China against Ameri- 
 cans. If we wish to extend our trade with China the field 
 is before us. With the advantage secured to foreig-n trade in 
 China by the efforts of the United States in negotiations at
 
 576 HISTORY OF CHINA 
 
 Pekin, we may expect steady improvement of our relations, 
 both political and commercial, with the Chinese people." 
 
 Regarding the future of the various concessions to for- 
 eigners in China, Commissioner Rockhill is rather pessimis- 
 tic, asserting his belief that many of the concessions will 
 never be developed. He says : "Indications are not lacking 
 that the time for a mad rush for concessions in China by for- 
 eigners is drawing to a close. If all the vast concessions 
 already granted are worked, they will require vast amounts 
 of money — much greater than was at first supposed — if they 
 are to be made remunerative. Foreign capital will probably 
 come into the country more slowly every year as the immense 
 difficulties in the way of general development are better ap- 
 preciated." 
 
 At this writing, April, 1904, the Russo-Japanese War is 
 two months old, and Manchuria is the principal battle- 
 gTound. The question of the observance of strict neutrality 
 on the part of China is a question that is seriously troubling 
 the Russian Government. It is believed that China is se- 
 cretly helping Japan in various ways, notably by supplying 
 the Japanese fleet with a convenient coaling port. Russia 
 is further troubled by reports that Chinese troops are mass- 
 ing on the Manchurian frontier. The Russian Minister to 
 the United States, Count Cassini, predicts that if China 
 really gives Japan her aid now, or if Japan is ultimately the 
 victor in the war, Japan will then organize and drill the 
 Chinese army, and the civilized world will then come to 
 realize the true and deadly meaning of the Yellow Peril. 
 
 THE END
 
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