1919-1921 GEORGE A. SCHNEIDER THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW GIFT OF John Adams A Supplemental Compilation of THE DECISIONS AND DICTA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS AS APPLIED TO The 'Workmen's Compensation Act IN FORCE 1912-1921 WITH NOTES ON THE AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT IN FORCE JULY 1, 1921 GEORGE A. SCHNEIDER OF THE CHICAGO BAR Counsel for the Industrial Commission T COPYRIGHT 1921 by GEORGE A. SCHNEIDER Chicago. Illinois PREFACE. Since the publication of our last book on the Workmen's Compensation Act, 123 new cases in- volving important principles of this law have been decided by the Supreme Court. The Workmen's Compensation Act itself has been amended in sev- eral respects by the Legislature. The instantaneous success of our first book has convinced us that there are many attorneys and others who make use of a book which is a glossary and not a theoretical treatise of legal principles. Therefore, we have adhered to the same method of treatment in the text and have made cross references in each paragraph to the original work. Thus, this supplement and the original treatise cover all of the decisions and dicta of the Supreme Court down to the June, 1921, term. Four cases in which opinions were filed in June are held up on petitions for re- hearing and will not receive the further consider- ation of the Court until October, 1921. The material collected in this volume represents all of the published decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois from the case of Bowman v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 126, to Ridge Coal Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 298 111. 532. The Act as it is in force on July 1, 1921, is set out in full. The writer gratefully acknowledges the support that he has received from the members of the bar and others who have supported his efforts. He has PEEPACE on hand at all times most of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and will be glad to forward ref- erences to such cases at any time to subscribers. It is suggested that attorneys, having cases in the Supreme Court on petitions for writ of error, send the writer copies of the briefs and reply briefs. These cases are not reported and as some of them involve important principles which later become precedents, authorities presented in such cases are useful and the writer is glad to act as a Clearing House in order to preserve this information for the members of the bar who are interested in Work- men's Compensation cases. The numerals in the right-hand margin of the Act refer to the text of the book published in 1919. Where the prefix "s" appears before the numerals it refers to the page in this text. In the table of cases, reference is also made to the original book and to this text, the supplement, the bold face type numerals preceded by "s" refer to the text in this volume. The numbers in the left hand margin of the text refer to the page in the text of the book published in 1919. The rules of the Industrial Commission and of the Circuit Court of Cook County have not been changed. Nor do we find it necessary to include herein any new forms, therefore the material at pages 491 to 535 in the 1919 reference book has not been included. The Supreme Court has changed Rule 43 which may be found at page 353. GEORGE A. SCHNEIDER. Chicago, Illinois, October 1, 1921. TABLE OF CONTENTS. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. The Workmen's Compensation Act 1 Table of Compensation 31 Scope 35 Constitutionality 37 Foundation on police power 37 Due process 38 Class legislation 38 The right to trial by jury 39 Delegation of judicial powers 39 Impairment of right of contract 39 Scope of legislative enactment 40 As to regulating practice 40 Interpretation of legislative intention 40 Statutory construction 41 Presumptions 45 Miscellaneous interpretations 45 Common law rights as affected by the act 45 Extra-territorial effect 46 Section 1 48 Liability 48 "May elect to provide and pay compensation" 50 "Accidental injuries" 51 Definition of accident 52 The occurrence 53 Illustrations of accidental injuries 57 Injury by disease 58 Suicide 59 Pre-existing diseases 59 Industrial or occupational disease 61 External force 66 Elements Vis major 66 "Arising out of and in the course of employment" 67 Negligence 68 "Arising out of" 69 Examples of accidents not arising out of 73 Examples of accidents arising out of and in the course of employment 77 "In the course of" 81 Duration of employment 83 11 TABLE OP CONTENTS Commencement and termination 84 Interruption of employment 89 Scope of employment 90 Volunteer 91 Disobeying orders 97 The risk must be incidental to employment 100 Risks common to public 104 Exposed to the hazard 106 Assaults 107 Street risks 110 Accidents during meal hours Ill Proof of accident 114 Found dead 114 Section 1 (a) 117 Section 1 (b) 117 "Every employer within the provisions" 117 Section 1 (c) 118 Section 1 (d) 118 Section 3 118 Constitutionality 120 "Enterprises or businesses" 120 "Declared to be extra-hazardous" 123 Par. 1 125 "Maintaining" 125 Par. 2 126 "Electrical Work" 126 Par. 3 126 "Carriage by land" 126 Par. 4 127 Par. 5 127 Par. 6 127 Par. 7 127 Par. 8 127 "Municipal ordinance regulations" 127 "Guarding of appliances" 129 Hazard in enterprise or occupation 130 Section 3% 138 Section 4 140 "Employer" 141 "Contract of Hire" 142 Section 5 142 "Employee" 143 "Entitled to receive a pension" 144 "Except any official" 144 "One employed by a contractor who has contracted".. 145 Contract of employment 146 Casual employment 147 Employees engaged in Interstate Commerce 149 Independent contractor 156 TABLE OF CONTENTS lii Section 6 162 Section 7 163 "The amount of compensation" 163 Section 7 (a) 164 "Children" 164 "Under legal obligation to support" 165 Emancipation of child 168 Marriage 169 Section 7 (b) 170 "Leaves any parent, totally dependent" 171 Section 7 (c) 173 "Partially dependent" 173 "At time of injury was dependent" 175 Section 7 (d) 177 Section 7 (e) 177 Section 7 (f ) 177 Section 7 (g) 178 "Compensation shall be paid to the persons" 179 Section 7 (h) 181 Section 8 182 "The amount of compensation which shall be paid". . . 182 Section 8 (a) 182 "Medical, etc., services for a period of eight weeks". . 183 "And in addition thereto, etc., hospital services" 183 Section 8 (b) 184 "Period of temporary total incapacity" 184 Section 8 (c) 186 "For any serious and permanent disfigurement" 186 "Disfigurement to hand, head or face" 187 Section 8 (d) 188 "Partially incapacitated" 188 "Average amount earned" 190 "Equal to fifty per centum" 192 "Earning or is able to earn" 193 Section 8 (e) 193 "Temporary total incapacity" 194 "The amount of compensation which shall be paid". . . 194 Section 8 (e), Pars. 1 to 6 195 "Loss of phalange" 195 Section 8 (e), Pars. 7-12 197 "Loss of a hand" 198 Section 8 (e) , Par. 13 198 Section 8 (e), Pars. 14-15 199 Section 8 (e), Par. 16 .200 Iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Section 8 (e), Par. 17 202 Section 8 (e), Par. 18 203 Section 8 (f) 204 Section 8 (g) 206 Section 8 (h) 207 Section 8 (i) 207 Section 8 (j) 207 Section 9 209 "Commutation of Compensation" 210 "Probable future payments" 211 Miscellaneous Constructions 213 Review of Lump Sum settlements 216 Evidence and orders 217 Section 10 218 Section 10 (a) 218 "Salary, wages or earnings" 218 Section 10 (b) 221 Section 10 (c) 222 Section 10 (d) 222 Section 10 (e) 222 Section 10 (f ) 223 Section 10 (g) 223 Section 10 (h) 224 Section 10 (i) 224 Section 11 225 Section 12 225 "Entitled to receive disability payments" 227 "Submit to examination" 228 Section 13 (a) 229 Section 13 (b) 229 Section 14 229 Section 15 230 Section 16 233 "Reasonableness of any fee" 235 Section 17 235 Section 18 235 Section 19 ' 236 "Disputed questions of law or fact" 236 Section 19 (a) 236 "Commission designates arbitrator" 237 TABLE OP CONTENTS v Section 19 (b) 237 Application for adjustment of claim 238 "Proper evidence" 239 Statements of injured 244 Doctors Experts 245 Inferences 247 Presumption 248 Hearsay 252 Burden of proof 252 Circumstantial evidence 255 Evidence not objected to 256 Award or decision 257 "Statement of facts" 260 "Stenographic report" 260 "May grant further time" 261 "Authentication" 261 Sufficiency of evidence 261 Section 19 (c) 267 Section 19 (d) 267 Section 19 (e) 271 "The Commisison shall review" 273 "May find specially upon any question of fact" 273 "Shall be the record, etc." 275 "The Decision of the Industrial Commission" 275 Section 19 (f) 279 "Acting within its powers" 279 Section 19 (f ) (1) 280 Authorities on review of facts 281 Jurisdiction 289 "By writ of certiorari" 290 "Upon praecipe" 292 Transfer of cause 293 Scope of review 294 Method of raising question 295 "Circuit Court has power to review, etc." 298 Commission certifying proceedings costs 299 Section 19 (f ) (2) 300 "File a bond" 300 "Court may confirm or set aside decision" 300 Judgments and execution in certiorari 303 "Remand" 304 Supreme Court practice 306 Court powers 310 "Supersedeas" 311 "Writ of error" 311 Scope of review 312 Sufficiency of evidence 314 The record 317 Costs . 318 vl TABLE OF CONTENTS Section 19 (g) 318 Judgment 319 Interest on the award 320 Section 19 (h) 321 Section 19 (i) 325 Section 19 (j) 326 Section 19 (k) 326 Section 20 326 Section 21 326 "Right to compensation extinguished" 327 Section 22 328 Section 23 330 Section 24 332 "Provided employee returns" 338 Section 25 339 Section 26 340 Section 27 342 Section 28 343 "Primarily liable to pay" 344 Section 29 346 Section 30 347 Section 31 348 Section 32 350 Section 33 351 Section 33% 351 Section 34 351 Section 35 351 Supreme Court rule 353 Index . . 355 TABLE OF CASES Til TABLE OF CASES Note: The numbers in bold face type preceded by "S" indi- cate page of text in this volume. All other page numbers refer to Schneider's Workmen's Compensation Act, 1912-1919. Adams & Westlake Co. v. I.C., 292 111. 590. 8.76-94-96. Alabach v. I.C., 291 111. 338. 8.122-124-125-136-849. Albaugh-Dover Co. v. I.E., 278 111. 179. 280-282-311-323-345. Alden Coal Co. v. I.C., 293 111. 597. 8.175-265. Alexander v. I.E., 281 111. 201. 52-72-73-76-78-82-90-93-95-97- 98-102-110. American Milling Co. v. I.E., 279 111. 560. 209-303-349-351. American Steel Foundries Co. v. I.E., 284 111. 99. 3-189-190-205- 455-456. American Steel Foundries v. Melenik (Ind.), 126 N.E. 33. S.lltt, Anderson & Co. v. Adamson, 50 S.L. 855. S.77. Anderson v. Balfour, 3 B.W.C.C. 588. 101-164. Andrew v. Failsworth Ind. Society (1904), 2 K.B. 32. 56-101. S.77 Anslow v. Cannock, 2 B.W.C.C. 365. 8.225. Arcade Mfg. Co. v. I.E., 282 111. 27. 336-341. Ardery v. Smith, 35 Ind. App. 94. 123. Armitage v. London & Western Ry. Co., 86 L.T. 883. 55-106. Armour & Co. v. I.E., 273 111. 590. 281-283-284-353-356-358-364- 388. Armour & Co. v. I.E., 275 111. 328. 3-15-23-26-136-147-148-159. Armour & Co. v. I.C., Supreme Court, No. 13149. 8.61. Arnold-Murdock Co. v. I.E., 277 111. 295. 27,248,270,311,391,392,397, 398,412,414,415,416. Arter v. Byington, 44 111. 468. 8.331. Atchison T.& S.F.Ry.Co. v. I.C., 290 111. 590. S.154,155. Auburn & Alton Coal Co. v. I.C., 296 111. 568. 8.165,166. Aurora Brewing Co v. I.E., 277 111. 142. 3,20,32,167,185,186,187, 188,268,270,345. Baer's Express Co. v. I.E., 282 111. 44. 84,85,88,93,182,279,312, 338,348,355. Baggott v. I.C., 290 111. 530. S.52,53,54,56,57,58,61,66,262^99,303. Bailey v. I.C., 286 111. 623. 66,78,238,329. Baird v. Burley, 45 Scott. L. R. 416. 55,106. Ballard v. Louisville & N.R.R.Co., 128 Ken. 826. 8.73,206. Ballou v. I.C., 296 111. 434. 8.40,195,203,205,242,314. Barnabus v. Bersham Colliery Co., 3 B.W.C.C. 216. 60. S.253. Barnes v. Illinois Fuel Co., 283 111. 173. 121,124,126,131. Barnhard v. American Concrete Steel (N.Y.), 125 N.E. 675. 8.48. Barrett Co. v. I.C., 288 111. 39. 118,420,422. Baum v. I.C., 288 111. 516. 75,79,82,96,110,277,300,356,358,363,405. Bekkedal Lbr. Co. v. I.C. (Wis.), 169 N.W. 561. 8.250. Bell v. Toluca Coal Co., 272 111. 576. 5,132. Till TABLE OF CASES Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio R. Valley Co., 253 U.S. 287. S.287, 288,289. Bennett v. Russell & Sons Co., 12 N.& C.C.A. 659. 8.86, Bereda Mfg. Co. v. I.B., 275 111. 514. 262,274,275,307,318,330. Bergstrom v. I.e., 286 111. 29. 65,78,376. Bernstein v. Brothmann, 275 111. 290. 352,383. Beveridge v. 111. Fuel Co., 283 111. 31. 124,129,131,171,206. Big Muddy Coal & I. Co. v. I.E., 279 111. 235. 48,52,55,58,59,63, 64,72,233,324,346; 8.60. B.D.&C.R.R.CO. v. I.E., 276 in. 120. 302,304,352,394,395,396. B.D.&C.R.R.CO. v. I.B., 276 in. 239. 84,m,308. B.D.&C.R.R.CO. v. I.E., 275 in. 454. 53,299,303,306,308,319,370,371. Big Muddy Coal & I. Co. v. I.C., 289 111. 515. 8.275,276,312,320, 323,325. Bishop v. Chicago Ry. Co., 290 111. 194. 8.189,140,163. Bishop v. Busse, 69 111. 403. 8.282,288. Bitter v. Saathoff, 98 111. 266. 8.282. Bolden's Case (Mass.), 126 N.B. 668. S.91. Bowman v. I.C., 289 111. 126. 4,26,27,28,29,31,32,235,236,403,413, 420,422,425,427. Bowman Dairy Co. v. I.C., 292 111. 284. 8.106,120,121,124,127,128,129, 183,135,186,232,291. Bradley Mfg. Works v. I.B., 283 111. 468. 118,372,373,378,389. Brennan v. I.C., 289 111. 49. 98,103,135,137,140,166. S.1 19,124,186. Brice v. Lloyd, 2 B.W.C.C. 26. 8.112. Brimie v. Belden Mfg. Co., 287 111. 11. 133. Bristol & Gale Co. v. I.C., 292 111. 16. 8.157,158,160,161,162,295, 296,303. Brodhead v. Minges, 198 111. 513. 368. Broforst v. Owners S.S. Blenfleld, 6 B.W.C.C. 613. 61. Brost v. Whitall-Tatum Co., 89 N.J.L. 531. 122. Brown v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 155 111. A. 434. 8.288. Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N.J.L. 72. 8.103. Bullis v. City of Chicago, 235 111. 475. 181. Burke v. Balentine & Co., 38 N.J.L. 105. 8.105. Bushnell v. I.B., 276 111. 262. 263,414,415,416,419,420,421,424. Butler St. Foundry & I. Co. v. I.E., 277 111. 70. 179,228,454,455. Bylow v. St. Regis Paper Co., 166 N.Y.S. 874. 8.82^9. Bystrom v. Jacobsen, 162 Wis. 180. 66. Cambra v. Santos, 123 N.E. 503. 8.221. Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470. 8.43. Carson-Payson Co. v. I.C., 285 111. 635. 243,329,350,376,391,402. Carter v. Gunnells, 67 111. 270. S.282. Casparis Stone Co. v. I.E., 278 111. 77. 8,10,20,22,397,398,400, 415.417,425. C.C.C.&St.L.Ry. Co., v. I.C., 294 111. 374. 8.89,118,149,150,158, Central Garage v. I.C., 286 111. 291. 74,79,97,109,117,301; 8.72,98. Centralia Coal Co. v. I.C., 294 111. 325. S.257.302,30r>,806. Centralia Coal Co. v. I.C., 297 111. 451. 8.236,275,276,325,338. Centralia Coal Co. v. I.C., 297 III. 513. S.2 18,220,22 1,222,223,22*, 225,260. TABLE OF CASES Jx Central 111. Pub. S. Co. v. I.C., 291 111. 256. S.55,66,70,7 1,72,73, 77,78,79,103,1W,105,106,107,1H. Central 111. Pub. S. Co. v. I.C., 293 111. 62. S.30,51,290,291,292, 293, 294, 306. Central Locomotive Works v. I.C., 290 111. 436. S.182,334,335,336, 337. Challenge Co. v. I.C., 292 111. 596. S.80,295, Challis v. London & S.W. Ry. Co. (1905), 2 K.B. 154. 57,102,108. Chenoweth v. Burr, 242 111. 312. S.282. Chicago v. Marsh, 238 111. 254. S.282. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. I.E., 274 111. 336. 280,281,288,291, 297,306. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. I.C., 288 111. 603. 201,202,203,265. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. I.C., 290 111. 599. S.151,152,153,304. Chicago & Interurban Traction Co. v. I.E., 282 111. 230. 178,182, 254,388. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. City of Chicago, 148 111. 141. 368. Chicago B.&Q.R.R. Co. v. Dickenson, 88 111. 431. S.283. Chicago B.&Q.R.R. Co. v. Stumps, 55 111. 367. S.283. Chicago Cleaning Co. v. I.E., 283 111. 177. 29,34,77,89,114,136,137 139,172, S.123. Chicago Dry Kiln Co. v. I.B., 276 111. 556. 89,104,136,155,163,164, 165,309,371. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. I.E., 284 111. 573. 35,186,188, 189,190,191,298. Chicago Home of Friendless v. I.C., 297 111. 286. S.187,188,19o, 198,310. Chicago Junction R.R. Co. v. I.E., 277 111. 512. 196,197. Chicago Packing Co. v. I.E., 282 111. 497. 77,263,269,288,297,313, 351. Chicago Rys. Co. v. I.E., 276 111. 112. 4,6,7,8,10,11,14,75,92,96, 136,144,411. S.328. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. I.C., 291 111. 616. S.52,57,59,64,79, 240,241,252,256,333. Chicago R. Co. v. Fischer, 141 111. 614. S.282. Chicago R. Co. v. Hirsch, 132 111. A. 656. S.283, Chicago, R.I.&P. Ry. Co. v. I.E., 273 111. 528. 143,195,200,290. Chicago, R.I.& P. Ry. Co. v. I.C., 288 111. 126. 110,203,300. S.90, 108. Chicago Sandoval Coal Co. v. I.C., 294 111. 351. S.183,184,316,817. Chicago Steel Foundry Co. v. I.C., 286 111. 544. 317,350,376. Chicago Traction Co. v. I.E., 282 111. 230. 207. Chisholm v. Walker & Co., 2 B.W.C.C. 261. S.162. Chludzinski v. Standard Oil Co., 162 N.Y. Supp. 225. S.78. Christensen v. Bartelmann Co., 273 111. 346. 335. Chytraus v. Chicago, 160 111. 18. S.282. Cinofsky v. I.C., 290 111. 521. S.122-123-186-143-146-157-161.278. City of Chicago v. I.C., 293 111. 188. S.143-144. City of Chicago v. I.C., 291 111. 23. S.39-43-136-145. City of Chicago v. I.C., 292 111. 406. S.100-107-108-109-110. City of Chicago v. I.C., 292 111. 409. S.42-297-306-307.310-311-313. x TABLE OF CASES City of Chicago v. I. C., 294 111. 388. S.-87-88-147. City of Chicago v. I.C., 295 111. 291. S.-125.146-349-850. City of Joliet v. I.e., 291 111. 555. S.62.58.65.56.58.254.26S-279. City of Pana v. I.E., 279 111. 279. 304-344-379-393-400-402. City of Rock Island v. I.C., 287 111. 76. 136-139-140-141-155-177. Clark Co. v. I.C., 291 111. 561. 8.42-48-46.210-211.212.213.214.215- 216-218-236-308-827. Clark v. Getts, 1 111. A. 454. 8.288. Clark v. Vorhees, 131 N.E. 553. 8.274. Clyde S.S. Co. v. Walker, 244 U.S. 255. 203. Columbia School Co. v. Lewis, 116 N.E. (Ind.), 1. S.161. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. I.E., 277 111. 74. 32-212-370-371. Compton v. I.C., 288 111. 41. 45-68-154-155-171. S.-136. Consumers Mutual Oil Producing Co. v. I.C., 289 111. 423. S.-147- 148-254. Conway Co. v. I.E., 282 111. 313. 268-271-417-418-426. Coon v. Kennedy, 248 U.S. 457. 203. Courter v. Simpson Construction Co., 264 111. 488. 21-31-261-333- 337-380-382. Coyne v. City of Chicago, 180. Crabtree v. Reid, 50 111. 206. 8.282. Craig v. Royal Ins. Co., 8 B.W.C.C. 339. 7. Crescent Coal Co. v. I.C., 286 111. 102. 227-228. Cronin's Case (Mass.), 124 N.E. 669. S.177. Crooks v. Tazewell Coal- Co., 263 111. 343. 6-8-9-18-19-120-126- 127. Curran v. Wells Bros., 281 111. 615. 43-121-123-124. Dalgleish v. Roperie Co., 50 S.L.R. 916. 256. Davies v. Gillespie, 5 B.W.C.C. 64. S-77. Davis v. I.C., 297 111. 29. S..121.128-125-126-141.142.159-248-296. 349. Davis v. St. Paul Coal Co., 286 111. 64. 132. Decatur Construction Co. v. I.C., 296 111. 290. 8.44-199-248- 245-260-276-279-280-293-301. Decatur Ry. Co. v. I.E., 276 111. 472. 43-75-80-204-257. Deibeikis v. Link Belt Co., 261 111. 454. 2-6-8-9-10-12-13-14-18- 20-44-157-271-275-446. 8.287. Delano v. Devine, 272 111. 166. 6. Devine v. Delano, 272 111. 166 130-280-290. Dewhurst v. Mather (1908), 1 B.W.C.C. 328. 187. Diamond Livery Co. v. I.C., 289 111. 591. S.147-149-311. Dickinson v. I.E., 280 111. 342. 75-118-197-198. Dietrich v. I.E., 286 111. 50. 153-155. Dietz v. Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co., 263 111. 480. 6-8-14-15-21- 23-24-30-31-126-128-129-157. Dietzen Co. v. I.E., 279 111. 11. 51-67-68-70-71-79-81-91-92-94-95- 97-117-269-319-324-346-377. 8.67,93,98,100. Dietzen & Co. v. I.C., Sup. Ct. No. 14017. 8.289. Di Saldlo v. Menahan, 225 N.Y. 766. 8.82. Donnelly v. Baird, 1 B.W.C.C. 95. 8.268. Dotzauer v. Strand Hotel, 3 B.W.C.C. 387. 61. Dragovich v. Iroquois Iron Co., 269 111. 478. 5-16-17-33-75-96. TABLE OF CASES xl Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450. S.283. Drtina v. Charles Tea Co., 281 111. 259. 357-361-379-386-387. Dzikowska v. Superior Steel Co., 259 Pa. 578. S.77. East St. Louis Board of Education v. I.C., 298 111. 61. S.-119- 122-129-134-163-165-827-828. Eckert's Case (Mass.), 124 N.E. 421. S.-146. Edelweiss Gardens v. I.C., 290 111. 459. S.54-67-69-71-79-100-107- 109-114-253-314-317. Edmunds v. Owners of S.S. Peterson, 5 B.W.C.C. 157. S.lll Eldridge v. Endicott-Johnson Co. (N.Y.), 126 N.E. 254. S.64. Ellsworth v. I.C., 290 111. 514. S.51-121-217-321-322-325. Emery Motor Livery Co. v. I.C., 291 111. 532. S.56-75-88-100. Emmert v. Trustees of Preston School, 1 Cal. Ind. Com. Dec. (Nov. 4, 1914), 17,101. Enterprise Fence & Foundry Co. v. Majors, 121 N.E. (Ind.), 6. S.-269. Erie R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 270. 203. Europe v. Addison Amusement Co., 131 N.E. 750. S. 132-133. Ewen v. Wilbor, 208 111. 492. S.281. Fairbank Co. v. I.C., 285 111. 11. 79-83-87-89-105-106-112. S.88- 102. Fallin v. L.E.M.L.&A. Ins. Assn., 102 S.E. 177. S.202. Federal Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic, 162 Wis. 341. S.74. Feldman v. Braunstein, 87 N.J.L. 20. S.269. Fisick v. Lorber, 95 Misc. 574; 159 N.Y.S. 722. S.284. Fitt v. Central 111. Public Service Co., 273 111. 617. 382. Floccher v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 221 Mass. 54. 237. Forschner & Co. v. I.E., 278 111. 99. 247-250-251-339-342. Foth v. Macumber, 161 Wis. 559. 183. Franklin Coal & C. Co. v. I.C., 296 111. 329. S.157-158-159-160- 278. Frantz v. Lenhart, 56 Pa. 365. S.283. Frey v. Kerens-Donnewald Co., 271 111. 121. 6-17-371. Friebel v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 280 111. 76. 43-83-87-88-112-127- 136-148-165-206-442-446-447-450. S.88. Friedman Mfg. Co. v. Ind. Com., 284 111. 554. 38-39-40-264-331- 354-384-385-387. Frings v. Pierce Arrow Motor Car Co., 169 N.Y.S. 309. S.200. 1-rizell v. Cole, 42 111. 362. S.2S3. Fruit v. I.E., 284 111. 154. 142-146-174-175-340. S.124-127. Gage v. Eddy, 179 111. 492. S.282. Geigher v. Gotham Can Co., 177 App. Div. (N.Y.) 29; 163 N.Y.S. 678. S.196. Gibson v. Ind. Bd., 276 111. 73. 53-75-85-136-149-150. Gillen v. D.A.&G., 215 Mass. 96. S.224. Gilliland v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771. S.57. Goelitz Co. v. I.E., 278 111. 164. 207-208-209-210-226-245-246-248- 251-252-300-302-311-323-345. S.189-214. Gones v. Fisher, 286 111. 606. 446-448. Granite Sand & Gravel Co. v. Willoughby, 123 N.E. (Mass.) 194. S.89. xii TABLE OF CASES Graves v. Colwell, 90 111. 612. 8.281. Gray v. Ames, 220 111. 251. 368. Great Northern R.R. Co. v. Dawson (1905), 1 K.B. 331. 255. Grimm v. Clark Delivery Car Co., 199 111. App. 553. 8.281. Grosby v. Thorpe-Hawley Co., 206 Mich. 250. 8.54. G.T.W.R.R. Co. v. I.C., 291 111. 167. S.35.86-87.88-89.40.45-46- 116-120.150-152.154-156-231-234.287.305-817. Gunn v. Donoghue, 135 111. 479. 368. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. I.C., 293 111. 425. 8.226-227 -289-240- 245-276-277-284-295-816. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. I.C., 295 111. 578. 8.93-99-208-241- 244-264. Hagenbeck v. Randall (Ind.), 126 N.E. 501. 8.46. Haggard's Case, 125 N.E. (Mass.) 565. 8.76. Hahnemann Hospital v. I.E., 282 111. 316. 34-53-73-77-82-86-88- 93-134-136-137-152-168-169-173- 178-263-320-321-327-338-348. S. 100-123. Haiselden v. I.E., 275 111. 114. 423. Haish v. Dreyfus, 111 111. App. 44. 8.235. Halsted Co. v. I.C., 287 111. 509. 314-315-373-422. Hamilton v. State, 103 Ind. 96-98. 123. Hammond Co. v. I.C., 288 111. 262. 65-224-225-422. 8.238. Hannibal v. 111. Indemnity Exchange, Circuit Court, Cook County, General No. B.18926. 433-436. Hanstock v. Long (Ind.), 124 N.E. 509. 8.218. Harper v. Owen Fay Livery, 177 111. A. 138. 8.288. Harris v. Hatfleld, 71 111. 298. 8.831. Hartz v. Hartford Faience Co., 97 Atl. 1020. 58. 8.98. Havey v. Erie R.R. Co. (N.J.), 95 Atl. 124. 8.177. Heed v. I.E., 287 111. 505. 201-288. Heinze v. I.E., 288 111. 342. 302-427. Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N.Y. 148. 57-108. Henderson v. Meyer, 225 U.S. 631. 407. Henry v. I.C., 293 111. 491. 8.49-95-96-101.182. Henry Pratt Co. v. I.C., 293 111. 367. 8.176-177-180. Herrick v. Gary, 83 111. 85. 8.281. Higgins v. Midland Casualty Co., 281 111. 431. 8.58. Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20. 8.88. Hines v. I.C., 295 111. 231. 8.150.153-156.262. Hochspeier v. I.B., 278 111. 523. 32-145-146-173. Hoening v. I.C., 159 Wis. 646. 8.74. Horn v. Baltimore Ry. Co., 54 Fed. 301. 8.283. Hoskins v. Lancaster, 3 B.W.C.C. 476. 8.88. Hotel Bond Co., 93 Atl. 245. 8.176. Houghton v. Sutton Heath & Lea Green Collieries Co., 3 B.W.C.C. 221. 8.221. Houlihan v. Sulzberger Sons, 282 111. 76. 438,448. Hoyne v. Danisch, 264 111. 467. 30. Hughes v. Clover & Co., 3 B.W.C.C. 275. 60-66. Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N.J.L. 161. 56-107. Humphrey v. I.E., 285 111. 372. 58-77-112-117-215. 8.250. Hydrox Chemical Co. v. I.C., 291 111. 579. 8.122-123-135-248-253- 256-266-333. TABLE OF CASES xiii I.C. v. Pera (Ohio), 125 N.E. 662. S.110. Ide v. Faul & Timmons, 179 App. Div. (N.Y.) 567; 166 N.Y.S. 858. 8.197. Ideal Fuel Co. v. I.C., 298 111. 463. S.51-54-55-56-58-108-114.251- 253.25o-262-335-336-337-338. 111. Central Railroad v. I.E., 284 111. 267. 182-199. 111. Central R.R. Co. v. Smith, 208 111. 608. 8.246. 111. Electric Co. v. Town of Cicero, 282 111. 468. 8.43. 111. Indemnity Exchange v. I.C., 289 111. 233. 8.85-40-41-231-232- 330-331-340-341-342-343-344.345-346-348. 111. Publishing & Printing Co. v. I.C., Supreme Court No. 14012. S.119. 111. Steel Co. v. I.C., 290 111. 594. 8.169-170-179-239-318. 111. Midland Coal Co. v. I.E., 277 111. 333. 229-234-241-303-304- 308-320-323-330. Indian C.C.&M. Co. v. Wehr (Ind.), 128 N.E. 765. S.90. International Coal & Mining Co. v. I.C., 293 111. 524.. .8.47-186- 187-188-194-202-210-213-214-218-231 - 232-233-240-241-242 - 244- 246-273-328-329-330-331. International Harvester Co. v. I.E., 282 111. 489. 39-78-90-94-97- 111-117-298-299-328-361. S.88-100. Iroquois Iron Co. v. I.C., 294 111. 106. S.167-168-169. Ismay v. Williamson, 1 B.W.C.C. 231. 61. Ivissen v. Miller (Ind.), 125 N.E. 652. S.162. Jackson Coal Co. v. I. C., 295 111. 18. S.204.205-226-227-228-229. 258. Jackson Coal Co. v. I.C., 295 111. 85. 8.204. Jackson (Receiver) C.&E.I.R.R. Co. v. I.E., 280 111. 526. 6-8-198- 199-263-272-415-419. Jakub v. I.C., 288 111. 87. 49-51-54-63-66-274-321-322-331-332. 8.60-66. Jendrus v. Detroit Steel Products Co. (Mich.), 144 N.W. 563. 8. 268. Johnson v. Choate, 284 111. 214. 136-137-138-174-182-446. Joliet Motor Co. v. I.E., 280 111. 148. 228-238-316-421. 8.238- 267-271. Juergens Bros. Co. v. I.C., 290 111. 420. 8.44-198-200-201-202-300- 303. Keefe v. Armour & Co., 258 111. 28. 8.245. Keeran v. Peoria, Bloomington & Champaign Traction Co., 277 111. 413. 2-6-10-19-20-24-27-35-36-41-42-44-166-205-440-446- 447. Keller v. I.C., 291 111. 314. S.173.174-175.177-179-180.240.257.265- 266. Kelly v. Kerry County Council, 1 B.W.C.C. 194. 8.78. Kennedy v. Public Utilities Com., 286 111. 490. 355. Kenney v. City of Boston, 222 Mass. 401. Ill N.E. 47. 8.177. Keokuk North Line Pack Co. v. True, 88 111. 608. 8.282. Keremaker v. Owners of S.S. Corsican, 4 B.W.C.C. 295. 8.78. Kerens-Donnewald Co. v. I.E., 277 111. 35. 266-273-352-368-369- 372. Kerr v. Ritchies, 6 B.W.C.C. 419. 61. xiv TABLE OF CASES Kettles v. People, 221 111. 221. 246. Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. I.C., 289 111. 587. S.171-180-240- 248-2i9-2&>-265. Kinghorn v. Guthrie, 50 S.L.R. 863. S.78. King's Case (Mass.), 125 N.E. 153. S.218-221. Kirby v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 187 Ala. 443. S.73. Klawinski v. L.S.&M.S.R.R. Co., 185 Mich. 643. 8.106. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149. 8.156. Knowles v Knowles, 86 111. 1. 8.283. Krcinovich v. American Car & Foundry Co. (Mich.), 159 N.W. 362. S.268. Labanowski v. Hoyt Metal Co., 292 111. 218. 8.64-65-66. La May v. I.C., 292 111. 76. 8.124-147-158-159. Lamieux v. Contractors Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 223 Mass. 346. 237. Larke v. Hancock Life Insurance Co., 90 Conn. 303. 102. S.66. La Salle v. Evans, 111 111. A. 69. 8.288. Lasley v. Tazewell Coal Co., 294 111. 399. 8.235. Lauruszka v. Empire Mfg. Co., 271 111. 304. 5-335. La Veck v. Parke Davis & Co., 190 Mich. 604. S.105. Lavin v. Wells Bros., 272 111. 609. 18-44-275. Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. I.C., 298 111. 175. 8.51 -246-247 -260- 261-263-264-290. Lefens v. I.E., 286 111. 32. 74-77-277-278-302-329-348-377. Lenning v. Lenning, 176 111. 180. S.282. Lesh v. 111. Steel Co., (Wis.) 157 N.W.539. S.268. Leveroni v. Travellers Ins. Co., 219 Mass. 488. 8.88. Liberty Foundries Co. v. I.C., 289 111. 601. 8.819-820. Lombard College v. I.C., 294 111. 548. S.123.348-349. Lorchitsky v. Gotham Folding Box Co., 128 N.E. 899. 8.274. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. I.B., 282 111. 136. 23-24-27-28- 33-34-301-318-319-336-340-341. 8.43. Lundon v. Chicago, 83 111. App. 208. S.282. Mackenzie v. Coltness Iron Co., 6 Sess. Case (5th series) Scot. Ct. of Sess 8. 8.86. Madden v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 222 Mass. 487. 64. Maggert v. Peoria R. Co., 179 111. A.229. 8.282-283. Mailers v. I.B., 281 111. 418. 218-219. Maranofsky's Case, (Mass.) 125 N.E. 565. 8.68. Marion County Coal Co. v. I.C., 292 111. 463. 8.48-67-90-102-108- 109-268. Mark Mfg. Co. v. I.C., 286 111. 620. 237. S.198. Marshall v. Owners of Ship Wild Rose, 2 B.W.C.C. 76. 8.112. Marshall v. Owners of Ship Wild Rose, 3 B.W.C.C. 514. 295. Marshall v. City of Pekin, 276 111. 187. 41-45-103-161-162-176- 177-262. 8.136. Marshall Field & Co. v. I.C., 285 111. 333. 12-87-180-192-313. Marvin's Case (Mass.) 125 N.E. 154. S.218. Matter of Dose v. Moehle Lithographing Co., 221 N.Y. 401, 117 N.E. 616. 8.132. TABLE OF CASES xv Matthiessen-Hegeler Zinc Co. v. I.E., 284 111. 378. 4-9-37-42-48- 49-50-51-63-66-77-151-175. S.52-64. Mattoon Clear Water Co. v. I.C., 291 111. 487. S.123-125-127-135- 136-232. McDeed v. McDeed, 67 111. 545. 8.282. McGarry v. I.C., 290 111. 577. S.61-278-279-301-303-309-310-313-316. McGuire & White Detective Agency v. I.C., Supreme Court. No. 13978. 8.138-139. Mclnerney v Buffalo & Susquehanna R.R. Corp., 225 N.Y. 130. S.88. Mclnnes v. Dunsmair, 1 B.W.C.C. 226. S.55. Mclntyre v. Rodgers & Co., 41 Scott, L.R. 107. 57-108. McLaughlin v. Anderson, 4 B.W.C.C. 376. S.77. McLaughlin v. I.E., 281 111. 100. 23-45-105-128-133-137-138-140- 150-167-169-173-174-177-188-189-191. S.134. McMorran v. I.C., 290 111. 569. 8.44-185-195-196-197. McMurray v. Peabody Coal Co., 281 111. 218. 384-385-386-387-388- 389. McNally v. Hudson & Manhattan Ry. Co., 87 N.J.L. 455. S.269. McNiece v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 4 B.W.C.C. 351. 101. Mechanics Furniture Co. v. I.E., 281 111. 530. 73-109-115-117-209- 213-214-290-291-373. S.253. Meeker v. Boylan, 28 N.J.L. 274. S.283. Mepham & Co. v. I.C., 289 111. 484. S.67 -93-94-95-255-309. Meredosia Levee & Drainage District v. I.C., 285 111. 68. 204-205. Merlo v. Johnston City Coal Co., 258 111. 328. S.43. Messmer v. Bell, et al., 19 Ann. Gas. (Ky.) 1. S.157. Messmer v. I.E., 282 111. 562. 184. Metal Stamping Corporation v. I.E., 285 111. 528. 215-216-329-376. Meyer v. I.C., 286 111. 642. 351-402-426. Meyer v. Mead, 83 111. 19. S.282. Michigan Central Ry. Co. v. I.C., 290 111. 503. 8.71-73-82-83-84- 87-146-182. Miller v. Riverside Storage & Cartage Co., (Mich.) 155 N.W. 462. 8.177. Miner v. Franklin County Telephone Co., 83 Vt. 311. 8.96, Mississippi River Power Co. v. I.C., 289 111. 353. 8.37-97-99-140- 162-163-172-179-180-181-225-231-234-235- 236-237-238-239-251-275-336-338. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Taber, 244 U.S. 200. 203. Mitchell v. Hinman, 150 111. 538. S.282. Mockler v. Hawkes, 173 (N.Y.) App. Div. 333, 158 N.Y.S. 759. S.196. Moll v. I.C., 288 111. 347. 184-265. Moran's Case (Mass.) 125 N.E. 157. S.177. Morgan v. Owners of S. S. Zenaida, 2 B.W.C.C. 19. S.77. Morris & Co. v. I.E., 284 111. 67. 19-278-282-283-287-297. Morris & Co. v. I.C., 295 111. 49. 8.41-67-69-75-76-95-253-265. Mortimer v. McMullen, 202 111. 413. S.281. Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U.S. 219. 5-9 Mount Olive Coal Co. v. I.C., 295 111. 429. 8.54-185-186-194-198- 203-206-259-267-268-269-270. Moustgaard v. I.C., 287 111. 156. 279-281-426. xvl TABLE OF CASES Mueller v. Illngman (Ind.) 125 N.E. 464. S.110. Mueller Construction Co. v. I.E., 283 111. 148. 47-53-58-67-70-74- 82-86-89-97-98-99-101-102-105-108-111-171- 328-372. Munn v. I.E., 274 111. 70. 84-86-96-306-320-330-351-362-366-367. Murphy v. Burwlck, 43 Ir.L.T.126. 55-107. Murrell v. I.C., 291 111. 334. 8.42-44.164.165-207. National Zinc Co. v. I.C., 292 111. 598. S.172.176-179-238-249-250. 251.256.34U.305. Nawkosas v. Western Paper Stock Co., 260 111. 172. 5-15. Nawkosas v. Western Paper Stock Co., 272 111. 138. 6-17. Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 12 N.& C.C.A. 660. 8.86. Nelson v. Fend, 203 111. 120. S.282. Nelson Construction Co. v. I.E., 286 111. 632. 91-95-113. S.82-88- 90-92-103. Nesbit v. Rayne & Bean (1910) 2 K.B.689. 56-101-107. Neustadt v. Hall, 58 111. 172. 8.881. New Staunton Coal Co. v. Fromm, 286 111. 254. 130. New York Central Rd. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188. 9-43-434-446. New York Central Rd. Co. v. Winfleld, 244 U.S. 147. 202-203. Nicol v. Young's Parafine Oil Co., 52 S.L. 354. .8.86. North Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 176 111. 635. S.282. North Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Fitzgibbons, 180 111. 466. 8.281-282. Northern 111. Light & Traction Co. v. I.E., 279 111. 565. 72-76-93- 299-347-354. S.98-258-254. Northwestern Iron Co. v. I.C., 160 Wis. 633. 8.112. N.Y.C.R.R. Co. v. Tonsellito, 244 U.S. 360. 203. O'Brien v. Albrecht Co., 6 A.L.R. Ann. 1257, 206 Mich. 101. 8.182. O'Brien v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 293 111. 140. 8.50.133-139-140-347. O'Callaghan v. I.C., 290 111. 222. 8.189-266-279-313-315-817. Odin Coal Co. v. I.C., 297 111. 392. 8.288-295-296-297-306-313-318. O'Donnell v. Clare County Council, 6 B.W.C.C. 457. 8.161. Ohio Oil Co. v. I.C., 293 111. 461. 8.50-289-256.322.329-330-331-388- 337-338-339. Ohio Bldg. Safety Vault Co. v. I.E., 277 111. 96. 42-47-71-75-99- 100-101-102-105-110-116-280-281-291-296- 299-310-322-345. 8.90-108-116.253. Old Ben Coal Co. v. I.C., 296 111. 229. 8.189-190-191-244-245.278- 274. Olson v. Owners of S.S. Dorset (1913) 6 B.W.C.C. 658. 60. Oriental Laundry Co. v. I.C., 293 111. 539. 8.48.118.120-129-130- 187-291-292-294. Otis Elevator Co. v. I.C., 288 111. 396. 26-28-235-355-357-363-405- 427-429-430-431. Owners of Ship Swansea Vale v. Rice, 4 B.W.C.C. 298. 296. Packer v. Olds Motor Works, 195 Mich. 497. 162 N.W. 80. 8.196. Panther Creek Mines v. I.C., 296 111. 565. 8.166-167-173-251. Parker-Washington Co. v. I.E., 274 111. 498. 11-12-21-135-143-144- 146-179-323-330-351-367-420-421-452. Paskewie v. E.SI.L.& S.Ry.Co., 281 111. 385. 222. Paul v. I.C., 288 111. 532. 44-47-119-126-128-134-217-222-224-225- 315-348-353-378-434. 8.236. TABLE OP CASES xvii Payne v. I.C., 296 111. 223. 8.86-89-114.146.150.152.199. Payne v. i.e.. 295 111. 388. S.49-57-67-78-74-75-76-92.102-103.107. Peabody Coal Co. v. I.E., 281 111. 579. 213-214-215. Peabody Coal Co. v. I.C., 287 111. 407. 267-356-357-358-362-363- 365-366-368-381. Peabody Coal Co. v. I.C., 289 111. 330. S.171.249-251-801-302. Peabody Coal Co. v. I.C., 289 111. 449. S.188-199-241-242-243-245. 246-247-256-278-801-302. Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Rd. Co., 229 U.S. 146. 202. Peak v. People, 76 111. 289. 8.282. P.C.C.&St.L.R.R.Co. v. I.C., 291 111. 396. 8.150-151-155. Pekin Cooperage Co. v. I.E., 277 111. 53. 90-98-104-107-136-165- 166. 8.57-108-119. Pekin Cooperage Co. v. I.C., 285 111. 31. 47-48-51-54-58-70-76-77- 100-106-108-329-375. 8.51.107-108. People v. Highway Commrs., 270 111. 141. 30. People v. McGoorty, 270 111. 610. 22-34-333-336-337-342-348-354- 358. 8.290. People v. SteWart, 281 111. 365. 8.43. People v. Wren, 4 Scam. 269. 30. Peoria Cordage Co. v. I.E., 284 111. 90. 279-282-283-284-294-374- 417-418. S.189. Peoria Rd. Terminal Co. v. I.E., 279 111. 352. 54-60-61-62-64-66- 69-72-293-296-326-347. 8.116. Peoria Ry. Co. v. I.C., 290 111. 177. S.215.216-217-247 -321-324-825. Perry County Coal Co. v. I.e., 294 111. 117. 8.59-200. Perry v. Wright (1908) 1 B.W.C.C. 351. 256. Peterson & Co. v. I.E., 281 111. 326. 53-115-117-118-263-293-312- 326. 8.254. Phenix v. Castner, 108 111. 207. S.282. Piatt v. Swift & Co., 188 Mo. App. 584. 122. Pierce v. Boyer Coal Co. 99 Neb. 321. 56-107. Pierce v. Supply Co. I K.B. 997; 4 B.W.C.C. 242. 101. Pinkerton's Detective Agency v. I.C., Supreme Ct. No. 13892. S.187-138. Podger v. Parsley, S.C. 584. 100. Pomphrey v. South wark Press (1901), 1 Q.B. 86. 255. Protection Life Ins. Co. v. Dill, 91 111. 174. 8.281. Przykopenski v. Citizens Coal Mining Co. 270 111. 275. 5. Rainford v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 289 111. 427. S.69-78-82-89-90- 102. Ralph v. Chicago R. Co. 32 Wis. 177. 8.283. Re Bennett, 153 Fed. 673. 407. Re Bollman (Ind.) 126 N.E. 639. S.90. Re Branconnier, 223 Mass. 273. 237. Re Bratesi, 126 Fed. 588. 407. Re Emslie, 102 Fed. 291. 408. Re Gibbons, 168 N.Y.S. 412. 8.54. Re Hallett, 121 N.E. (Mass.) 503. 8.89. Re Harvard (Ind.) 125 N.E. 215. 8.224. Re Holland, (Ind.) 126 N.E. 236. 8.329. xviii TABLE OF CASES Re Howard, 125 N.E. 215. S.221. Re Kirby-Dinnis Co., 25 Fed. 116. 406. Re London G.& A.Co. (Mass.) 124 N.E. 286. S.881. Re Loper, 64 Ind. App. 57. S.74. Re McCarthy, 230 Mass. 429. S.57. Re McManaman, 224 Mass. 554. S.107. Re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497. 57-72-74-81-102-108. S.70. Re Meley, 219 Mass. 136. 237. Rennie v. Reid, 1 B.W.C.C. 324. 187. Re Petri, 215 N.Y. 335, 109 N.E. 549. S.195-197. Re Stacy, 225 Mass. 174. S.82-89. Re Stewart, (Ind.) 126 N.E. 42. S.177. Re Sundine, 218 Mass. 1. S.S9. Re Von Ette. (Mass.) Ill N.E. 696. S.250. Reynolds v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 287 111. 124. 120-122-123-125- 129-130-131-259 Richards v. Indianapolis Abattoir Co., 92 Conn. 274. S.112. Richardson v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 271 111. 325. 6. Richardson Sand Co. v. I.C., 296 111. 335. S.172-178-174-276. Ridge Coal Co. v. I.C., 298 111. 532. S.257-258-259-291-295-297-298- Robinson v. Melville Mfg. Co., 165 N.C. 495. S.74. Robson, Eckford & Co. v. Blakely, 5 B.W.C.C. 536. S.78, Rockford Cabinet Co. v. I.e., 295 111. 332. S.92-97.114-174.175- 254-262.266. Rockford City Traction Co. v. I.C., 295 111. 358. S.60-141-142-143- 151-152-201-308-315. Rock Island Bridge & Iron Works v. I.e., 287 111. 648. 216-217- 218 S.177 Rockwell v. Lewis, 154 N.Y.S. 893. 237. Rogers v. School Board, (1912) S.C. 584. S.78. Rose v. Morrison et al., 4 B.W.C.C. 277. S.113. Rosenthal v. Board of Education, 239 111. 29. 368. Rosenthal & Co. v. I.C., 290 111. 323. S.191-299-303-31 1-312-313. Rosenthal & Co. v. I.C., 295 111. 182. S.182-269-270-271-34U-317-818. Roszek v. Bauerle & Stark Co., 282 111. 557. 182-183. Rowland v. Wright (1909), 1 K.B. 963. 56-101-108. Ruda v. I.B., 283 111. 550. 29-230-243-254-257-258-259-274. Ruff v. Jarrett, 94 111. 475. S.281. Sabella v. Braziliere, 6 Neg.& C.C.A. (N.J.) 958. 187. Sanitary District v. I.E., 282 111. 182. 97-103-170-173-174-328-344- 379 Savoy Hotel Co. v. I.B., 279 111. 329. 16-69-83-116-280-294-298-312- 318-325-349-353-361. S.189. Schaeffer v. DeGrotiola, 86 N.J. 505. S.147. Schroetke v. Jackson-Church Co., 193 Mich. 616. S.58. Schwab v. Emporium Co., 216 N.Y. 712. 237. Schwarm v. Thompson Co., 281 111. 486. 245-250-251-252-327-353. Schweiss v. I.C., 292 111. 90. S.49.67.69-70-81-82-83-84.87-89-91- 304. Scully v. I.C., 284 111. 567. 77-86-99-112-114-136-141-142-191-238- 242. TABLE OF CASES xix Sedlock v. Carr Coal Co., 98 Kan. 680. 8.86. Seggebruch v. I.C., 288 111. 163. 46-103-104-133-134-148-156-159- 165-172-265. Sesser Coal Co. v. I.C., 296 111. 11. 8.98-116-247-308-309-310-318. Sheldon v. Needham, 7 B.W.C.C. 471. 101. Simonds v. King, 8 B.W.C.C. 189. 100. Simpson Construction Co. v.I.B., 275 111. 366. 331-391-393-395. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. I.C., 296 111. 511. 8.119-122-124- 126-129-131-1M. Skarpeletzes v. Counes (N.Y.), 126 N.E. 268. S.177. Slago Coal Co. v. I.C., 293 111. 271. 8.188-190-192-193-198-203. Smith-Lohr Coal Co. v. I.E., 279 111. 88. 241-305-320-321-339-346- 378-417. S.290. Smith-Lohr Coal Mining Co. v. I.C., 286 111. 34. 78-207-208-209- 210-222-223-295-299-300-377. 8.117-180. Smith-Lohr Coal Co. v. I.C., 291 111. 355. S.187-189. Smith v. Bates Machine Co., 182 111. 166. 8.219. Snyder v. I.C., 297 111. 175. 8-238-244.257-262-267-270-271-274- 296-308-314-315. Sonneman v. Mertz, 221 111. 362. 8.281. So. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205. 203. Sparks Milling Co. v. I.C., 293 111. 350. 8.70-99-115-117-248-250- 252-254-256-314. Spiegel's House Furnishing Co. v. I.C., 288 111. 422. 279-285-286- 287-297. Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526. 102. Springfield Coal Mining Co. v. I.C., 291 111. 408. 8.219-220-221- 222-223-224-225. Spring Valley Coal Co. v. I.C., 289 111. 315. 8.60-201-202-207-255- 263-266. Squire-Dingee Co. v. I.E., 281 111. 359. 278-287-288-289-326-373- 401. Staley v. 111. Central Rd. Co., 268 111. 356. 192. State v. District Court, 129 Minn. 502. 8.105. State v. District Court, 138 Minn. 250. 8.57-250. State v. Ind. Com., 126 N.E. 317. 8.210. State v. St. Louis, etc., 129 Minn. 178. 102. Steel Sales Corp. v. I.C., 293 111. 435. 8^1-52-53-77-78-80-81-90- 98-99-244-252.253.257. Steers v. Dunnewald (N.J.), 89 Atl. 1007. 8.250. Stephens Engineering Co. v. I.C., 290 111. 88. 8.117-315-324-334- 338. Stertz v. I.C., 158 Pacific Reports, pg. 285. 1. Stetz v. Mayer Boot & Shoe Co., 163 Wis. 151. 184. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co. v. I.C., 298 111. 272; 131 N.E. 617. 8.59-65-199-245-254-276. Storrs v. I.C., 285 111. 595. 136-138-141-175-350-424. Stratton v. Central City Ry. Co., 95 111. 25. 8.281. Strom v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 271 111. 544. 130. Stubbs v. I.E., 280 111. 208. 227-229-230-231-233. Stubbs v. I.C., 289 111. 525. 8.187-188-259-260-265-279-312-313. xx TABLE OP CASES Suburban Ice Co. v. I.E., 274 111. 630. 3-23-25-33-104-136-159-163- 165-307-341-352-413-419-423-427. S.119. Sulzberger & Sons Co. v. I.E., 285 111. 223. 54-62-65-305-314-375- 417. Sunnyside Coal Co. v. I.C., 291 111. 523. S.48-49-68-91-98.94-96. 316. Swift & Co. v. I.C., 287 111. 564. 70-79-109. S.107-108. Swift & Co. v. I.C., 288 111. 132. 46-207-208-209-210-222-226-227- 246-377-378-382-410-422-427. Tarpper v. Western-Mott Co., 200 Mich. 275. 8.74. Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331. 8.282. Taylor v. Jones, 1 B.W.C.C. 3. S.86. Tazewell Coal Co. v. I.C., 287 111. 465. 247-252-264-266-343. Thackway v. Connelley & Son, 3 B.W.C.C. 37. 60. Thede Bros. v. I.C., 285 111. 483. 192-264-378. Thompson v. Sherwood Shoe Co., 178 (N.Y.) App. Div. 319; 164 N.Y.S. 869. S.196. Thornton v. Duffy (Oh.), 124 N.E. 54. S.87. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Foster, 43 111. 480. S.282. Tombs v. Bomford (1912), 5 B.W.C.C. 338. 187. Tribune Co. v. I.C., 290 111. 402. 8.230-303-322-323-328-329.338- 335-336 Trim Joint School District Board v. Kelley (1914), A. C. 667. 56-101-102-107. Union Bridge & Constr. Co. v. I.e., 287 111. 396. 20-25-37-39-40- 265-275-301-384. S.16-47. United Breweries Co. v. Anderson, 185 111. App. 386. 267. United Disposal & Recovery Co. v. I.e., 291 111. 480. S.44-67-68- 70-71-72.87-88-92.97-101-10S.110.141. Uphoff v. I.E., 271 111. 312. 23-24-30-45-133-134-140-141-143-156- 179-262. 8.124. Valley S.S. Co. v. Wattawa, 244 U.S. 202-203. Van Simaeys v. Cook County, 201 Mich. 540. 8.161. Vaughan's Seed Store v. Simonini, 275 111. 477. 41-103-135-137- 156-157-158-160-163-164-176. 8.124-131. Victor Chemical Works v. I.E., 274 111. 11. 4-7-8-21-25-32-36-37- 38-119-122-186-188-192-211-269-275-276-278- 281-307-328-330-335-349-358-369-418. Voight v. I.C., 297 111. 109. S.190.191.192-193-242-246-298-309-814. Von Boeckmann v. Corn Products Refining Co., 274 111. 605. 5-16- 157-367. Vose v. C.I.P.S. Co., 286 111. 519. 142-439-450. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. I.C., 295 111. 141. S.43-59-60-89.103.113. 115-250-251-252-255-307-808-315. Wabash R.R. Co. v. I.C., 286 111. 194. 64-200-237-239-242-390- 411-412-420. 8.60-322.328-381. Wabash Ry. Co. v. I.e., 294 111. 119. S.48-81-84-85-86.90.91-92-102. Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 111. 180. 8.43. Walsh v. River Spinning Co., 41 R.I. 490. 8.57. Walsh v. Waterford Harbor Commrs., 7 B.W.C.C. 960. 8.162. Walsh Teaming Co. v. I.C., 290 111. 536. S.59.68.80-83-98-101-113- 117-256-316. TABLE OF CASES xxi Walsh v. Lock, 7 B.W.C.C. 117. 8.268. Walther v. American Paper Co., 89 N.J.L. 732. 56-107. Wangerow v. I.E., 286 111. 441. 200. Wangler Boiler & Sheet Metal Works v. I.C., 287 111. 118. 4-22- 47-210-250-384-410. Warner v. Couchman (1911), 1 K.B. 351. S.78. Warner v. Crandall, 65 111. 195. S.282. Warner v. King, 267 111. 82. 30. Wasson Coal Co. v. I.C., 296 111. 217. 8.114-116-248-254.261. Waters v. Pioneer Fuel Co., 38 Am. St. Rep. (Minn.) 564. S.161. Weeks v. Stead, 7 B.W.C.C.398. 101. Weil v. Federal Ins. Co., 264 111. 425. 267. Weis Paper Mill Co. v. I.C., 293 111. 284. 8^0-54-67-72-75-76-81- 82.83-90-97-98.100-101.104-111-112.113. Wells Bros. v. I.E., 285 111. 647. 230-232. 8.187. Wendzinski v. Madison Coal Co., 282 111. 32. 132. West Chicago R.C. v. Dean, 112 111. A. 10. Western Coal & Mining Co. v. I.C., 296 111. 408. 8.68-71-81-85- 116-169-250. Western Electric Co. v. I.C., 285 111. 279. 30-62-65-328-363-364- 365-366-374-375-380-381. 8.808. Western Indemnity v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686. 57-108. Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 807. 8.162. West Side Coal & Mining Co. v. I.C., 291 111. 301. 8.68-91-92-97. White v. Wiseman, 5 B.W.C.C. 654. 8.225. Wilcox v. International Harvester Co., 278 111. 465. 8.65. Wilkinson v. Aetna Ins. Co., 240 111. 205. 8.115. Wilks v. Dowell & Co. (1905), 21 T. L. R. 487. 61. Willett & Co. v. I.C., 287 111. 487. 122-123-128-267. Wiscaless v. Hammond, Standish & Co. (Mich.), 166 N.W. 993. 8.115. Wisconsin Steel Co. v. I.C., 288 111. 206. 83-97-117-291-293-294-295- 296-298-344-369. 8.254. Workmen's Banking Co. v. Rautenberg, 103 111. 460. 8.381. Yarbour v. Chicago & Alton Ry. Co., 235 111. 589. 8.245. Zukas v. Appleton Mfg. Co., 279 111. 171. 44-130. xxii TABLE OF CASES TABLE OF CASES IN WHICH WHIT OF ERROR HAS BEEN DENIED BY THE SUPREME COURT. 13891 Alden Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (David Bohan- non). 13149 Armour & Co. v. Industrial Commission (Anna Reinhard, Admx.). 13689 Armstrong Paint & Varnish Co. v. Industrial Commisison (Emelie Suchard). 13068 Buehler, Matt. v. Industrial Commission (Waldheim Cem- etery). 13262 Burlin W. S. v. Industrial Commission (John Russo). 13298 Caldwell & Son Co. v. Industrial Commission (Mary Wis- niewski). 13243 Carder v. Industrial Commission (Kurrus Livery & Un- dertaking Co.). 13377 Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission (Re- becca Latham, Admx.). 13710 C. C. C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission (H. W. Seibert). 13142 Chicago Sandoval Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (H. J. Schneider, Admx.). 13072 Chicago West Pullman & Co. v. Industrial Commission (Mary A. Bender.) 12947 Clark Coal & Coke Co. v. Industrial Conunission (Frank Grundler). 13255 Dawson Manfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission (Rosanna Heckrotte). 13888 Federal Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (Anna Hurley). 13478 Felman, M. A. v. Industrial Commission (Jos. jjwansbro). 13688 Flint Sanitary Milk Co. v. Industrial Commission (Otto Schaller, Admx.). 13250 Green & Sons Co. v. Industrial Commission (Harry Mohr). 13702 Harris v. Industrial Commission (West Frankfort Coal Co.). 13875 Hines Lumber Co. v. Industrial Commission (Jos. Ku- bicek). 13717 111. Sixth Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (Liz- zie Ashauer, Admx.). 12892 Inderrieden Canning Co. v. Industrial Commission (Eliz- abeth Schmelz). 13578 Linn & Scruggs Co. v. Industrial Commission (Chris. Hendrion, Admx.). 13264 Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion (Mary Perry). 13780 Mandel v. Industrial Commission (Tina Schaeffer, Admx.). TABLE OF CASES ' xxiii 13082 Oakland Fdy. Co. v. Industrial Commission (Straus, et al). 13470 Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (Fred Bud- insky). 13697 Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission i ('Stella Kavish). 13892 Pinkerton's Detective Agency v. Industrial Commission (Chi. Savings Bank, Admx.). 13715 Radium Coal Co. -v. Industrial Commission (William Roberts). 13138 Ramsay, Gordon A., Admx. v. Industrial Commission (Chi. City Ry. Co.). 13707 Ritchey Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (H. Gal- braith). 13708 Ritchey Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (Chas. Kend- zoria) . 13889 Sykes Steel Roof'g Co. v. Industrial Commission (Elmer Lawless). 13886 Taylor Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (Mon. Jack- son). 13065 Taylor Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission (Ida B. Green, Admx.). 13378 Tobey Furniture Co. v. Industrial Commission (Peter Amundsen). 13685 U. S. Brewing Co. v. Industrial Commission (Jos. Main- hart). 13719 U. S. Crushed Stone Co. v. Industrial Commission Selma McClain). 13368 Village of East Dundee v. Industrial Commission (Min- nie Fritz). 13897 Wahlfeld Manfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission (Geo. Echels). 13879 Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission (Paul Dorris, Admx.). 13259 Williamson County Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (Jas. 0. Boyd). Hemmer v. Industrial Commission. Keystone Wheel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Commission. McGuire et al. v. Industrial Commission. Stellen Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT OF THE STATE OF ILLINIOS In Force July 1, 1921. Compensation Accidental Injuries Employer Election to Pay Compensation Notice of Election Bound to Employees NOTE. The following sections were amended in 1921: one (1), three (3), seven (7), eight (8), twelve (12), four- teen (14), nineteen (19), twenty-four (24) and twenty-five (25). The figures in the margin indicate the page at which the section is treated in Schneider's "Workmen's Com- pensation Act, 1912-1919." The figures with the prefix "a" (indicating supplement) refer to the pages of the text in this volume. AN ACT to promote the gener.al welfare of the people of this State by providing compensation for accidental in- juries or death suffered in the course of employment within this State; providing for the enforcement and administering thereof, and a penalty for its violation, and repealing an Act entitled, "An Act to promote the general welfare of the people of this State by pro- viding compensation for accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of employment," approved June 10, 1911, in force May 1, 1912. [Approved June 28, 1913, in force July 1, 1913, with amendments in force July 1, 1921.] 1. That an employer in this State, who does not come within the classes enumerated by section three (3) of this Act, may elect to provide and pay compensation for acci- dental injuries sustained by any employee arising out of and in the course of the employment according to the provisions 'of this Act, and thereby relieve himself from any liability for the recovery of damages, except as herein provided. (a) Election by any employer to provide and pay com- pensation according to the provisions of this Act shall be made by the employer filing notice of such election with the Industrial Board. (b) Every employer within the provisions of this Act who has elected to provided [provide] and pay compensa- (1) S48 40 S51 43 S62 47 S81 79 118 S117 119 S117 THE ACT tion according to the provisions of this Act, shall be bound thereby as to all his employees until January 1st of the next succeeding year and for terms of each year thereafter: Provided, any such employer who may have once elected, 120 Rejection may ei^t not to provide and pay the compensation herein Filed Whe provided for accidents resulting in either injury or death and occurring after the expiration of any such calendar year by filing of notice of such election with the Industrial 121 Board at least sixty days prior to the expiration of any Kotle* such calendar year^'and by posting such notice at a con- FostUf spicuous place in the plant, shop, office, room or place 123 where such employee is employed, or by personal service, in written or printed form, upon such employees, at least sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of any such cal- endar year. UTrct of (c) In the event any employer mentioned in this sec- 127 Mrction tion, elects to provide and pay the compensation provided S118 in this Act, then every employee of such employer, as a part of his contract of hiring or who may be employed at the time of the taking effect of this Act and the accept- ance of its provisions by such employer, shall be deemed to have accepted all the provisions of this Act and shall bo bound thereby unless within thirty (30) days after such hiring or after the taking effect of this Act, and its Rejertloi by acceptance by such employee, he shall file a notice to the Employer contrary with the Industrial Board, whose duty it shall be to immediately notify the employer, and until such notice to the contrary is given to the employer, the measure of liability of such employer shall be determined according to the compensation provisions of this Act: Provided, hoto- Kmployees ever,, that any employee may withdraw from the opera- withdrawai tion of this Act upon filing a written notice of withdrawal at least ten (10) days prior to January 1st of any year with the Industrial Board, whose duty it shall be to imme- diately notify such employer by registered mail, and, Kotlee until such notice to the contrary is given to such em- ployer, the measure of liability of such employer shall be determined according to the compensation provisions of this Act. Rejection. (d) Any such employer or employee may, without preju- 128 withdrawal of dice to any existing right or claim, withdraw his election S118 Klectloi to to reject this Act by giving thirty (30) days' written notice in such manner and form as may be provided by the Industrial Board. [Amended by Act approved June 29, 1921.] S 2. Section two of an Act entitled, "An Act to promote the general welfare of the people of this State by pro- viding compensation for accidental injuries or death suf- fered in the course of employment within this State; providing for the enforcement and administering thereof, and a penalty for its violation, and repealing an Act en- THE ACT State, etc., Extra- Hazardous Automatically Structure Construction Carriage Warehouse Mining Explosive- .Materials Explosive Gases Statutes or Ordinances Farmers Excluded titled 'An Act to promote the general welfare of the people of this State by providing compensation for accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of employment, approved June 10, 1911, in force May 1, 1912,' " approved June 28, 1913, in force July 1, 1913, as subsequently amended, is hereby repealed. [Amended by Act ap- proved June 25, 1917.] 3. The provisions of this Act hereinafter following 133 shall apply automatically and without election to the S118 State, county, city, town, township, incorporated village or school district, body politic or municipal corporation, and to all employers and all their employees, engaged in S120 anv department of the following enterprises or businesses 134 which are declared to be extra hazardous, namely: S123 1. The erection, maintaining, removing, remodeling, 136 altering or demolishing of any structure, except as pro- 140 vided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section. S125 2. Construction, excavating or electrical work, except 141 as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section. S126 3. Carriage by land or water and loading or unloading 142 in connection therewith, including the distribution of any S126 commodity by horse-drawn or motor driven vehicle where the employer employs more than three employees in the enterprise or business, except as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section. 4. The operation of any warehouse or general or termi- 147 nal storehouses. S127 5. Mining, surface mining or quarrying. 149 6. Any enterprise in which explosive-materials are man- 149 ufactured, handled or used in dangerous quantities. 7. In any enterprise wherein molten metal, or explosive 151 or injurious gases or vapors, or inflammable vapors or fluids, or corrosive acids are manufactured, used, gen- erated, stored or conveyed in dangerous quantities. 8. In any enterprise in which statutory or municipal or- 151 dinance regulations are now or shall hereafter be imposed S128 for the regulating, guarding, use or the placing of machin- S129 ery or appliances or for the protection and safeguarding of the employees or the public therein; each of which occupations, enterprises or businesses are hereby declared to be extra hazardous: Provided, nothing contained herein shall be construed to apply to any work, employment or operations done, had or conducted by farmers and others 155 engaged in farming, tillage of the soil, or stock raising, or to those who rent, demise or lease land for any such pur- poses, or to any one in their employ or to any work done on a farm or country place, no matter what kind of work or service is being done or rendered. [Amended by Act approved June 29, 1921.] THE ACT OrtllrBte N ,.11. r Proof IB Law AetloB V ..mi ef Ortlrat State BBd SBB-lTltlOBt Pvrtoai ProB IB I 3%. (a) If the plaintiff in any action mentioned in 176 section 3 shall in his declaration or in his other pleading 8138 allege that the employer has filed notice of his election not to provide and pay compensation according to the provi- sions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and such allega- tion be not denied by a verified pleading, then such em- ployer shall for the purpose of that action be conclusively presumed to have filed his notice of non-election. (b) A certificate of the fact of the filing by an em- ployer of the notice of non-election provided in section 2 and of the non-withdrawal thereof shall be prima facie proof in any action mentioned in section 3 of the fact of the filing of such notice of non-election and of the non- withdrawal thereof. Such certificate may be under the seal of the industrial board and signed by any member or the Secretary thereof, of which seal and signature as such officer the court shall take judicial notice. Said cer- tificate may be in substantially the following form: This is to certify that the attached is a correct copy of notice filed with the industrial board by on the day of , 19 electing not to provide and pay compensation according to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of Illinois, and that the original of said notice is now on file in the office of the industrial board and has not been with- drawn since the date of the filing thereof. In witness whereof, this certificate has been subscribed and the seal of the industrial board affixed this day of , 19 of Industrial Board. [Amended by Act approved May 31, 1917.] 9 4. The term "employer" as used in this Act shall be construed to be: Firtt: The State, and each county, city, town, township, Incorporated village, school district, body politic, or munic- icapal corporation therein. Second: Every person, firm, public or private corpora- tion, including hospitals, public service, eleemosynary, re- ligious or charitable corporations or associations who has any person in service or under any contract for hire, express or implied, oral or written, and who is engaged COB tract of Hlr in any of the enterprises or businesses enumerated in sec- BB*IBM IB m tion three (3) of this Act, or who at or prior to the time of the accident to the employee for which compensation under this Act may be claimed, shall in the manner pro- vided In this Act, have elected to become subject to the provisions of this Act. and who shall not, prior to such accident, have effected a withdrawal of such election in the manner provided In this Act. [Amended by Act ap- proved June 25, 1917.] THE ACT Employee 5. The term "employee" as used in this Act, shall be Construed construed to mean: Employment First Every person in the service of the State, county, by State city, town, township, incorporated village or school dis- trict, body politic or municipal corporations therein, under appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, Official oral or written, except any official of the State, or of any Excepted county, city, town, township, incorporated village, school district, body politic or municipal corporation therein: Effect of Provided, that any such employee, his personal representa- Fenslon tive, beneficiaries or heirs, who is, are or shall be entitled to receive a pension or benefit for or on account of dis- ability or death arising out of or in the course of his employment from a pension or benefit fund to which the State or any county, town, township, incorporated village, school district, body politic or municipal corporation there- in is a contributor, in whole or in part, shall be entitled to receive only such part of such pension or benefit as is in excess of the amount of compensation recovered and received by such employee, his personal representative, beneficiaries or heirs under this Act, And, provided, fur- Independent ther, that one employed by a contractor who has con- Contractor tracted with the State,' or a county, city, town, township, incorporated village, school district, body politic or munici- pal corporation, therein, through its representatives, shall not be considered, as an employee of the State, county, city, town, township, incorporated village, school dis- trict, body politic or municipal corporation which made the contract. Contract of Hire Second Every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, Aliens including aliens, and minors who are legally permitted to Minors work under the laws of the State, who, for the purpose of this Act, shall be considered the same and have the same Excluded When power to contract, receive payments and give quittances Not In Usual therefor, as adult employees, but not including any person Course of Trade w ^ * s not engaged in the usual course of the trade, busi- ness, profession or occupation of his employer; Provided, Exclusion toy that employees shall not be included within the provisions Laws of United ot this Act when excluded by the laws of the United States States relating to liability of employers to their employees for personal injuries where such laws are held to be exclusive. [Amended by Act approved May 31, 1917.] Damages at 6. No common law or statutory right to recover dam- Common Law ages for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee other than the compensation herein provided shall be available Employees to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Corered by Act Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his estate, or any one other- wise entitled to recover damages for such injury. THE ACT widow aBd ( hiurm Mir itinc obligation to Support vm.mnt Payment* Drdnrted Parent. Child i ..tail) Dependent Awommt Parent, Children Partial Dependenry Apportionment Collateral Heln Dependency Perreatairt K Helm Fnaeral KxpeBtcs Compensation installment-. How Fixed. S 7. The amount of compensation which shall be paid for an injury to the employee resulting in death shall be: (a) If the employee leaves any widow, child or children whom he was under legal obligations to support at the time of his injury, a sum equal to four times the average annual earnings of the employee, but not less in any event than one thousand six hundred fifty dollars and not more in any event than three thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars. Any compensation payments other than necessary med- ical. surgical or hospital fees or services shall be deducted in ascertaining the amount payable on death. (b) If no amount is payable under paragraph (a) of this section and the employee leaves any parent, husband, child or children who at the time of injury were totally dependent upon the earnings of the employee, then a sum equal to four times the average annual earnings of the employee, but not less in any event than one thousand six hundred fifty dollars, and not more in any event than three thousand seven hundred fifty dollars. (c) If no amount is payable under paragraph (a) or 216 (b) of this section and the employee leaves any parent, S173 child or children, grandparent or grandchild, who at the time of injury were dependent upon the earnings of the S174 employee, then such proportion of a sum equal to four times the average annual earnings of the employee as such dependency bears to total dependency, but not less in any event than one thousand six hundred fifty dollars and not more in any event than three thousand seven hundred fifty dollars. Any compensation payments other than necessary medical, surgical or hospital fees or services shall be de- ducted in ascertaining the amounts payable on death. on- Fatal to the employee for an injury not resulting in death shall in.inrj be: Medical (a) The employer shall provide the necessary first aid Hospital medical and surgical services; all necessary hospital serv- ices during the period for which compensation may be pay- able; also all necessary medical and surgical services for a period not longer than eight weeks, not to exceed, how- ever, an amount of two hundred dollars, and in addition such medical or surgical services in excess of such limits as may be necessary during the time such hospital services are furnished. All the foregoing services shall be limited to those which are reasonably required to cure and relieve Employee from the effects of the injury. The employee may elect to Own Doctor secure his own physician, surgeon or hospital services at his own expense. Compensation (b) If the period of temporary total incapacity for work Temporary lasts for more than six working days, compensation equal Total incapacity to fifty percentum of the earnings, but not less than $7.50 nor more than $14.00 per week, beginning on the eighth day of such temporary total incapacity and contin- uing as long as the temporary total incapacity lasts, but Limitation on not after the amount of compenastion paid equals the \ MI..UIH amount which would have been payable as a death benefit under paragraph (a), section 7, if the employee had died as a result of the injury at the time thereof, leaving heirs surviving as provided in said paragraph (a), section 7: Commencement Provided, that in the case where temporary total inca- pacity for work continues for a period of four weeks from the day of the injury, then compensation shall commence on the day after the injury. Compensation (c) For any serious and permanent disfigurement to the Dlsflgnreraent hand, head or face, the employee shall be entitled to com- pensation for such disfigurement, the amount fixed by agreement or by arbitration in accordance with the provi- Anionnt sions of this Act, which amount shall not exceed one- Limited quarter of the amount of the compensation which would have been payable as a death benefit under paragraph (a), section 7, if the employee had died as a result of the in- jury at the time thereof, leaving heirs surviving, as pro- When Wot vided in said paragraph (a), section 7: Provided, that no Allowed compensation shall be payable under this paragraph where compensation is payable under paragraph (d), (e) or (f) of this section: And, provided further, that when the disfigurement is to the hand, head or face as a result of any injury, for which injury compensation is not pay- able under paragraph (d), (e) or (f) of this section, compensation for such disfigurement may be had under this paragraph. THE ACT Compensation (d) If, after the injury has been sustained, the em- Partiai ployee as a result thereof becomes partially incapacitated incapacity from pursuing his usual and customary line of employ- ment, he shall, except in the cases covered by the specific schedule set forth in paragraph (e) of this section, receive compensation, subject to the limitations as to time and maximum amounts fixed in paragraphs (b) and (h) of this section, equal to fifty per centum of the difference he- Amount Earned tween the average amount which he earned before the acci- Before and dent, and the average amount which he is earning or is After Accident able to earn in some suitable employment or business after the accident. Compensation (e) For injuries in the following schedule, the em- ployee shall receive in addition to compensation during Additional for the period of temporary total incapacity for work result- Specific Losses ing from such injury, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, compensation, for a further period, subject to the limitations as to time and amounts fixed in paragraphs (b) and (h) of this sec- Schedule tion, for the specific loss herein mentioned, as follows, but shall not receive any compensation for such injuries under any other provisions of this Act. Thnmb * For ^ e l ss * a thumb, or the permanent and com- plete loss of its use, fifty percentum of the average weekly wage during sixty weeks; First Finger 2 - For tne l s s of a first finger, commonly called the index finger, or the permanent and complete loss of its use, fifty percentum of the average weekly wage during thirty-five weeks; Second Finger 3. For the loss of a second finger, or the permanent and complete loss of its use, fifty percentum of the average weekly wage during thirty weeks; Third Finger 4. For the loss of a third finger, or the permanent and complete loss of its use, fifty percentum of the average weekly wage during twenty weeks; Fomrth Finger 5. For the loss of a fourth finger, commonly called the little finger, or the permanent and complete loss of its use, fifty percentum of the average weekly wage during fifteen weeks ; Phalange 6. The loss of the first phalange of the thumb, or of any finger, shall be considered to be equal to the loss of one- half of such thumb or finger and compensation shall be one-half the amounts above specified; More Than 7. The loss of more than one phalange shall be consid- One Phalange ered as the loss of the entire finger or thumb; Provided, however, that in no case shall the amount received for more than one finger exceed the amount provided in this schedule for the loss of a hand; Great Toe 8. For the loss of a great toe, fifty percentum of the av- erage weekly wage during thirty weeks; 10 THE ACT Other Toct Phalange of Toe More Thai One Phalange Hand Arm Foot Leg Eye-Sight Permanent Partial Loss Proportioning Loss of Aajr Two Total Permanent Disability Compennatlon Disability Complete Pension for Life 9. For the loss of one toe other than the great toe, fifty percentum of the average weekly wage during ten weeks, and for the additional loss of one or more toes other than the great toe, fifty percentm of the average weekly wage during an additional ten weeks; 10. The loss of the first phalange of any toe shall be con- sidered to be the equal to the loss of one-half of such toe, and compensation shall be one-half of the amount above specified; 11. The loss of more than one phalange shall be con- sidered as the loss of the entire toe; 12. For the loss of a hand, or the permanent and com- plete loss of its use, fifty percentum of the average weekly wage during one hundred and fifty weeks; 13. For the loss of an arm or the permanent and com- plete loss of its use, fifty per centum of the average weekly wage during two hundred weeks; 14. For the loss of a foot, or the permanent and com- plete loss of its use, fifty percentum of the average weekly wage, during one hundred and twenty-five weeks; 15. For the loss of a leg, or the permanent and com- plete loss of it use, fifty percentum of the average weekly wage, during one hundred and seventy-five weeks; 16. For the loss of the sight of an eye or for the perma- nent and complete loss of its use, fifty percentum of the average weekly wage during one hundred weeks: 17. For the permanent partial loss of use of a member or sight of an eye, fifty percentum of the average weekly wage during that portion of the number of weeks in the foregoing schedule provided for the loss of such member or sight of an eye which the partial loss of use thereof bears to the total loss of use of such member or sight of eye. 18. The loss of both hands, or both arms, or both feet, or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, or the permanent and complete loss of use thereof, shall con- stitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the compensation fixed by paragraph (f) of this section: Provided, that these specific cases of total and permanent disability shall not be construed as excluding other cases. (f) In case of complete disability, which renders the employees wholly and permanently incapable of work, compensation equal to fifty percentum of his earnings but not less than $7.50 nor more than $14.00 per week, com- mencing on the day after the injury, and continuing until the amount paid equals the amount which would have been payable as a death benefit under paragraph (a), section 7, if the employee had died as a result of the injury at the time thereof, leaving heirs surviving as provided in said THE ACT Amount of Return to Work. Pension Cut Off. Award Modified. Compensation Death, Pay- ment of Part Minimum $500.00 Period of Payment Employees Incompetent Limitations Tolled Compensation Paid in Installments paragraph (a), section 7, and thereafter a pension during life annually equal to 8 per cent of the amount which would have been payable as a death benefit under para- graph (a), section 7, if the employee had died as a result of the injury at the time thereof, leaving heirs surviving, as provided in said paragraph (a), section 7. Such pen- sion shall not be less than $10.00 per month and shall be payable monthly: Provided, any employee who receives S204 an award under this paragraph and afterwards returns to work, or is able to do so, and who earns or is able to earn as much as before the injury, payments under such aw'ard shall cease; if such employee returns to work, or is able to do so and earns or is able to earn part but not as much as before the injury, such award shall be modified so as to conform to an award under paragraph (h) of this section: provided, further, that disability as enumerated in subdivi- sion 18, paragraph (e) of this section shall be considered complete disability. (g) In case death occurs as a result of the injury 242 before the total of the payments made equals the amount S206 payable as a death benefit, then in case the employee leaves any widow, child or children, parents, grandparents, or other lineal heirs, entitled to compensation under sec- tion 7, the difference between the compensation for death and the sum of the payments made to the employee, shall be paid to the beneficiaries of the deceased employee, and distributed as provided in paragraph (f) of section 7, but in no case shall the amount payable under this para- graph be less than $500.00. (h) In no event shall the compensation to be paid 242 exceed fifty percentum of the average weekly wage, or ex- S207 ceed $14.00 per week in amount; nor, except in case of com- plete disability, as defined above, shall any payments extend over a period of more than eight years from the date of the accident. In case an injured employee shall be incompetent at the time when any right or privilege accrues to him under the provisions of this Act, a con- servator or guardian may be appointed pursuant to law, and may, on behalf of such incompetent, claim and exercise any such right or privilege with the same force and effect as if the employee himself had been competent and had claimed or exercised said right or privilege; and no lim- itations of time by this Act provided shall run so long as said incompetent employee is without a conservator or a guardian. (i) All compensation provided for in paragraphs (b), 243 (c), (d), (e), and (f) of this section, other than case of 3207 pension for life, shall be paid in installments at the same intervals at which the wages or earnings of the employee were paid at the time of the injury, or if this shall not be feasible, then the installments shall be paid weekly. 12 THE ACT Compensation Increase of Percentage Weekly Minimum Increase for One Child Two Tkree Maximum Increased Compensation Lump Sum Notice < <>ni mutation How Made Complete Disability (J) 1. Wherever in this section there is a provision for fifty percentum, such percentum shall be increased five pcrcentum for each child of the employee under 16 years of age at the time of the injury to the employee until such percentum shall reach a maximum of sixty-five percentum. 2. Wherever in this section a weekly minimum of $7.50 is provided, such minimum shall be increased in the fol- lowing cases to the following amounts: $8.50 in a case of any employee having one child under the age of 16 years at the time of the injury to the em- ployee; $9.50 in a case of an employee having two children under the age of 16 years at the time of the injury to the em- ployee; $10.50 in a case of an employee having three or more children under the age of 16 years at the time of the in- jury to the employee. 3. Wherever in this section a weekly maximum of $14.00 is provided, such maximum shall be increased in the following cases to the following amounts: $15.00 in case of an employee with one child under the age of 16 years at the time of the injury to the employee. $16.00 in case of an employee with two children under the age of 16 years at the time of injury to the employee. $17.00 in case of an employee with three or more child- ren under the age of 16 years at the time of injury to the employee. [Amended by Act approved June 29, 1921.] 9. Any employer or employee or beneficiary who shall desire to have such compensation, or any unpaid part there- of, paid in a lump sum, may petition the Industrial Board, asking that such compensation be so paid, and if, upon proper notice to the interested parties and a proper show- ing made before such board, it appears to the best interest of the parties that such compensation be so paid, the board may order the commutation of the compensation to an equivalent lump sum, which commutation shall be an amount which will equal the total sum of the probable future payments capitalized at their present value upon the basis of interest calculated at three per centum per annum, with annual rests: Provided, that in cases indicating com- plete disability no petition for a commutation to a lump sum basis shall be entertained by the Industrial Board until after the expiration of six months from the date of the injury, and where necessary, upon proper application being made, a guardian, conservator or administrator, as the case may be, may be appointed for any person under disability who may be entitled to any such compensation, and an employer bound by the terms of this Act, and liable to pay such compensation, may petition for the appointment of the public administrator, or a conservator, THE ACT Award Rejection of Compensation Computation Annual Earnings Basis Employment Grade of Basis Employment Same Class Basis Employment Annual Earnings SOOx Employment Part Time Annual Earnings 200x Employee Earning No Wage or guardian, where no legal representative has been ap- pointed or is acting for such party or parties so under disability. Either party may reject an award of a lump sum payment of compensation, except an award for com- pensation under section 7 or paragraph (e) of section 8 or for the injuries denned in the last paragraph of para- graph (e) of section 8 as constituting total and perma- nent disability, by filing his written rejection thereof with the said board within ten days after notice to him of the award, in which event compensation shall be payable in installments as herein provided. [Amended by Act ap- proved June 28, 1915; in force July 1, 1915.] 10. The basis for computing the compensation pro- vided for in section 7 and 8 of the Act shall be as fol- lows: (a) The compensation shall be computed on the basis of the annual earnings which the injured person received as salary, wages or earnings if in the employment of the same employer continuously during the year next pre- ceding the injury. (b) Employment by the same employer shall be taken to mean employment by the same employer in the grade in which the employee was employed at the time of the accident, uninterrupted by absence from work due to ill- ness or any other unavoidable cause. (c) If the injured person has not been engaged in the employment of the same employer for the full year im- mediately preceding the accident, the compensation shall be computed according to the annual earnings which per- sons of the same class in the same employment and same location, (or if that be impracticable, of neighboring em- ployments of the same kind) have earned during such period. (d) As to employees in employments in which it is the custom to operate throughout the working days of the year, the annual earnings, if not otherwise determinable, shall be regarded as 300 times the average daily earnings in such computation. (e) As to employees in employments in which it is the custom to operate for a part of the whole number of work- ing days in each year, such number, if the annual earnings are not otherwise determinable, shall be used instead of 300 as a basis for computing the annual earnings: Pro- vided, the minimum number of days which shall be so used for the basis of the year's work shall be not less than 200. (f) In the case of injured employees who earn either no wage or less than the earnings of adult day laborers in the same line of employment in that locality, the yearly wage shall be reckoned according to the average annual 14 THE ACT Earnings Day's Work as Bails < o Where Prerlons ln.lurl.-v Compensation Determination Of lll-tlllllllrlll Period Employer Responsibility Measnre of Compensation Limits Employee Examined Expense of Employee Time Medical Examination earning of adults of the same class in the same (or if that is impracticable then of neighboring) employments. (g) Earnings, for the purpose of this section, shall be based on the earnings for the number of hours commonly S223 regarded as a day's work for that employment, and shall exclude overtime earnings. The earnings shall not include any sum which the employer has been accustomed to pay the employee to cover any special expense entailed on him by the nature of his employment. (h) In computing the compensation to be paid to any 259 employee, who, before the accident for which he claims S224 compensation, was disabled and drawing compensation under the terms of this Act, the compensation for each subsequent injury shall be apportioned according to the proportion of incapacity and disability caused by the re- spective injuries which he may have suffered. (i) To determine the amount of compensation for each 254 installment period, the amount per annum shall be ascer- 259 tained pursuant hereto, and such amount divided by the S224 number of installment periods per annum. 11. The compensation herein provided, together with 259 the provisions of this Act shall be the measure of the re- S225 sponsibility of any employer engaged in any of the enter- prises or businesses enumerated in section three (3) of this Act, or of any employer who is not engaged in any such enterprises or businesses, but who has elected to pro- vide and pay compensation for accidental injuries sus- tained by any employee arising out of and in the course of the employment according to the provisions of this Act, and whose election to continue under this Act, has not been nullified by any action of his employees as pro- vided for in this Act. [Amended by Act approved June 25, 1917.1 12. An employee entitled to receive disability pay- 259 ments shall be required, if requested by the employer, to S225 submit himself, at the expense of the employer, for ex- S228 amination to a duly qualified medical practitioner or sur- 260 geon selected by the employer at a time and place reason- ably convenient for the employee, as soon as practicable after the injury, and also one week after the first examina- tion and thereafter at intervals not oftener than once every four weeks, which examination shall be for the purpose of determining the nature, extent and probable duration of the injury received by the employee, and for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of compensation which may be due the employee from time to time for disability according to the provisions of this Act: Pro- vided, however, that such examination shall be made in the presence of a duly qualified medical practitioner or surgeon provided and paid for by the employee, if such employee so desires: Provided, further, that such ex- amination shall not be made on the day of the hearing. THE ACT In all cases where the examination is made by a surgeon engaged by the employer, and the injured employee has Heport no surgeon . present at such examination, it shall be the duty of the surgeon making the examination at the in- stance of the employer to deliver to the injured employee, upon his request, or that of his representative, a statement in writing of the condition and extent of the injury to the same extent that said surgeon reports to the employer. Examination If the employee refuses so to submit himself to examina- Obstrneted tion or unnecessarily obstructs the same, his right to Compensation compensation payments shall be temporarily suspended suspended until such examination shall have taken place, and no com- pensation shall be payable under this Act for such period. It shall be the duty of surgeons treating an injured em- ployee who is likely to die, and treating him at the in- Burgeon's Duty stance of the employer to have called in another surgeon Employee to be designated and paid for by either the injured em- About to Die ployee or by the person or persons who would become his beneficiary or beneficiaries, to make an examination before the death of such injured employee. [As amended by an Act approved June 29, 1921.] ndustrial 13. ( a ) There is hereby created a board which shall 260 Board Created be known as the Industrial Board to consist of five mem- S229 bers to be appointed by the Governor, by and with the consent of the Senate, two of whom shall be representa- tive citizens of the employing class operating under this Act, and two of whom shall be representative citizens of the class of employees operating under this Act, and one of whom shall be a representative citizen not identified with either the employing or employee classes and who shall be designated by the Governor as chairman. Ap- pointment of members to places on the first board or to fill vacancies on said board may be made during recesses of the Senate, but shall be subject to confirmation by the Senate at the next ensuing session of the Legislature. (b) When there shall become effective the Act known as "The Civil Administrative Code of Illinois," being an Act entitled "An Act in relation to the civil administra- tion of the State Government," there shall thereupon be vested in the Industrial Commission and the industrial 261 officers thereof by said Act created, all of the powers and duties vested in the Industrial Board by the Workmen's Compensation Act and thereupon wherever in the Work- men's Compensation Act reference, shall be made to the Industrial Board, the board or to any member thereof, it shall be construed as referring and shall apply to said Industrial Commission, the said commission, and any in- dustrial officer thereof, respectively. [Amended by Act approved June 25, 1917.] Salaries 14. The salary of each of the members of the com- 261 mission appointed by the Governor shall be six thousand S229 16 THE ACT Board dollars ($6,000.00) per year, except that the salary of the chairman shall be seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) per year. The commission shall appoint a secretary whose salary shall be five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) per year and shall employ such assistants and clerical help as may be necessary. The salary of the arbitrators designated by the com- mission shall be at the rate of four thousand two hun- dred dollars per year. Relmbarftement The members of the commission and the arbitrators shall have reimbursed to them their actual traveling ex- penses and disbursements made or incurred by them in the discharge of their official duties while away from their places of residence in the performance of their duties. The commission shall provide itself with a seal for the authentication of its orders, awards and proceedings upon which shall be inscribed the name of the commission and the words "Illinois Seal." [Amended by Act approved June 29, 1921.] 15. The Industrial Board shall have jurisdiction over the operation and administration of this Act, and said board shall perform all the duties imposed upon it by this Act, and such further duties as may hereafter be im- posed by law and the rules of the board not inconsistent therewith. Rile* nd { 16- The board may make rules and orders for carry- Orders ing out the duties imposed upon it by law, which rules and Procedure orders shall be deemed prima facie reasonable and valid; and the process and procedure before the board shall be as simple and summary as reasonably may be. The board upon application of either party may issue dcdimus potes- tatem directed to a commissioner, notary public, justice of the peace or any other officer authorized by law to admin- ister oaths, to take the depositions of such witness or wit- nesses as may be necessary in the judgment of such appli- Dedlnti cant. Such dcdimus potestatem may issue to any of the i',. i. -tat. in officers aforesaid in any state or territory of the United States or in any foreign country. The board shall have the power to adopt necessary rules to govern the issue of such ih iiinius potestatem. The board, or any member Power* thereof, or any arbitrator designated by said board shall have the power to administer oaths, subpoena and examine witnesses, to issue subpoenas duccs tecum, requiring the production of such books, papers, records and documents as may be evidence of any matter under inquiry, and to examine and inspect the same and such places or prem- ises as may relate to the question in dispute. Said board, or any member thereof, or any arbitrator designated by said board, shall, on written request of either party to the dispute, issue subpoenas for the attendance of such wit- nesses and production of such books, papers, records, and THE ACT 17 Refusing to Comply With Order Contempt How Punished Provision for Stenographers Fixing of Fees Blank Forms Records Books Questions Determined documents as shall be designated in said applications, -pro- viding, however, that the parties applying for such sub- poena shall advance the officer and witness fees provided for in suits pending in the Circuit Court. Service of such subpoenas shall be made by any sheriff or constable or other person. In case any person refuses to comply with an order of the board or subpoena issued by it or any member thereof, or any arbitrator designated by said board, or to permit an inspection of places or premises, or to produce any books, papers, records, or documents, or any witness refuses to testify to any matters regarding which he may be lawfully interrogated, the County Court of the county in which said hearing or matter is pending, on application of any member of the board or any arbi- trator designated by the board, shall compel obedience by attachment proceedings, as for contempt, as in a case of disobedience of the requirements of a subpoena from such court on a refusal to testify therein. The board at its expense shall provide a stenographer to take the testimony and record of proceedings at the hear- ings before an arbitrator, committee of arbitration, or the board, and said stenographer shall furnish a transcript of such testimony or proceedings to any person requesting it upon payment to him therefor of five cents per one hun- dred words for the original and three cents per one hun- dred words for each copy of such transcript. The board shall have the power to determine the reason- S235 ableness and fix the amount of any fee or compensation charged by any person for any service performed in con- nection with this Act, or for which payment is to be made under this Act or rendered in securing any right under this Act. [Amended by Act approved May 31, 1917.] 17. The board shall cause to be printed and furnish 267 free of charge upon request by any employer or employee S235 such blank forms as it shall deem requisite to facilitate or promote the efficient administration of this Act, and the performance of the duties of the board; it shall provide a proper record in which shall be entered and indexed the name of any employer who shall file a notice of declina- tion or withdrawal under this Act, and the date of the filing thereof; and a proper record in which shall be en- tered and indexed the name of any employee who shall file such a notice of declination or withdrawal, and the date of the filing thereof; and such other notices as may be re- quired by the terms and intendment of this Act; and rec- ords in which shall be recorded all proceedings, orders and awards had or made by the board, or by the arbitration committees, and such other books or records as it shall deem necessary, all such records to be kept in the office of the board. 18. All questions arising under this Act, if not settled 268 by agreement of the parties interested therein, shall, ex- 8235 18 THE ACT By Board cept as otherwise provided, be determined by the Indus- trial Board. Qaeitlons of 19. Any disputed question of law or fact shall be de- Law or Fact termined as herein provided. Arbitrator (a) It shall be the duty of the Industrial Commission Designated upon notification that the parties have failed to reach an agreement, to designate an arbitrator; Provided, that if the compensation claimed is for a partial permanent or total DUpiU permanent incapacity or for death, then the dispute may, at the election of either party, be determined by a commit- tee of arbitration, which election for determination by a committee shall be made by petitioner filing with the com- mission his election in writing with his petition or by the other party filing with the commission his election in writ- ing within five days of notice to him of the filing of the pe- tition, and thereupon it shall be the duty of the Industrial Commission, upon either of the parties having filed their election for a committee of arbitration as above provided, to notify both parties to appoint their respective represen- Deilgnatlon tatives on the committee of arbitration. The commission of Committee shall designate an arbitrator to act as chairman, and if of Arbitration either party fails to appoint its member on the committee within seven days after notification as above provided, the commission shall appoint a person to fill the vacancy and notify the parties to that effect. The party filing his elec- tion for a committee of arbitration shall with his election deposit with the commission the sum of twenty dollars, to be paid by the commission to the arbitrators selected by the parties as compensation for their services as arbi- trators, and upon a failure to deposit as aforesaid, the elec- tion shall be void and the determination shall be by an arbitrator designated by the commission. The members of the committee of arbitration appointed by either of the parties or one appointed by the commission to fill a vacancy by reason of the failure of one of the parties to appoint, shall not be a member of the commission or an employee thereof. Arbitration (b) The arbitrator or committee of arbitration shall make such inquiries and investigations as he or they shall deem necessary, and may examine and inspect all books, papers, records, places, or premises relating to the ques- tions in dispute, and hear such proper evidence as the par- Hearlag* ties may submit. The hearings before the arbitrator or committee of arbitration shall be held in the vicinity where *otire the injury occurred, after ten days' notice of the time and place of such hearing shall have been given to each of the !>< M..n parties or their attorneys of record. The decision of the arbitrator or committee of arbitration shall be filed with the Industrial Commission, which commission shall imme- diately send to each party or his attorney a copy of such decision, together with a notification of the time when it Rerlew was filed, and unless a petition for a review is filed by THE ACT Physician Appointed Fees for Services Tim* for either party within fifteen days after the receipt by said party of the copy of said decision and notification of time when filed, and unless such party petitioning for a review shall within twenty days after the receipt by him of the copy of said decision, file with the commission either an agreed statement of the facts appearing upon the hearing before the arbitrator or commitee of arbitration, or if such Stenographic party shall so elect, a correct stenographic report of the Report Filing proceedings at such hearings, then the decision shall be- come the decision of the Industrial Commission and in the absence of fraud shall be conclusive: Provided, that such Extension Industrial Commission may for sufficient cause shown of Time grant further time not exceeding thirty days, in which to petition for such review or to file such agreed statement or stenographic report. Such agreed statement of facts or correct stenographic report, as the case may be, shall be authenticated by the signatures of the parties or their attorneys, and in the event they do not agree as to the cor- rectness of the stenographic report it shall be authenti- cated by the signature of the arbitrator designated by the commission. (c) The Industrial Commission may appoint, at its own expense, a duly qualified, impartial physician to exam- ine the injured employee and report to the commission. The fee for this service shall not exceed five dollars and traveling expenses, but the commission may allow addi- tional reasonable amounts in extraordinary cases. The fees and the payment thereof of all attorneys and phy- sicians for services authorized by the commission under this Act shall, upon request of either the employer or the employee or the beneficiary affected, be subject to the review and decision of the Industrial Commission. Insanitary (d) If any employee shall persist in insanitary or in- Practlces jurious practices which tend to either imperil or retard his recovery or shall refuse to submit to such medical, surgical or hospital treatment as is reasonably essential to promote his recovery, the commission may, in its dis- Compensation cretion, reduce or suspend the compensation of any such Suspended injured employee. Review by (e) If a petition for review and agreed statement of Commission facts or stenographic report is filed, as provided herein, the Industrial Commission shall promptly review the de- cision of the arbitrator or committee of arbitration and all questions of law or fact which appear from the said Additional statement of facts or stenographic report, and such addi- Evldenee tional evidence as the parties may submit. After such hearing upon review, the commission shall file in its office its decision thereon, and shall immediately send to each party or his attorney a copy of such decision and a noti- fication of the time when it was filed. Hearing Such review and hearing may be held in its office or elsewhere as the commission may deem advisable: Pro- 20 THE ACT vided, that the taking of testimony on such hearing may be had before any member of the commission and in the event either of the parties may desire an argument before others of the commission, such argument may be had upon written demand therefor filed with the commission within five days after the commencement of such taking of testi- ComnUsloB mony, in which event such argument shall be had before MI iia in not less than a majority, of the commission: Provided, that the commission shall give ten days' notice to the parties or their attorneys of the time and place of such taking of testimony and of such argument. Special In any case the commission in its decision may in its Finding! discretion find specially upon any question or questions of law or fact which shall be submitted in writing by either party, whether ultimate or otherwise. Any party may, within twenty days after receipt of notice of the commission's decision, or within such further time, not exceeding thirty days, as the Commission may grant, file with the commission either an agreed statement of the facts appearing upon the hearing, or, if such party shall so elect a correct stenographic report of the additional proceedings presented before the commission, in which re- port the party may embody a correct statement of such other proceedings in the case as such party may desire Report to have reviewed, such statement of facts or stenographic Authentication report to be authenticated by the signatures of the parties or their attorneys, and in the event that they do not agree, then the authentication of such stenographic report shall be by the signature of any member of the commission. If a reporter does not for any reason furnish a tran- script of the proceedings before the arbitrator in any case for use on a hearing for review before the industrial commission, within thirty (30) days of the filing of the petition for review, the industrial commission may, in its discretion, order a trial de novo before the industrial commission in such case, upon application of either party. Record of The applications for adjustment of claim and other docu- i-r. ..,.,-, line- ments in the nature of pleadings filed by either party, to- gether with the decisions of the arbitrator and of the In- dustrial Commission and the statement of facts or steno- graphic reports hereinbefore provided for in paragraphs (b) and (c) shall be the record of the proceedings of said commission, and shall be subject to review as hereinafter provided. Decision (f) The decision of the Industrial Commission acting Conelniire within its powers, according to the provisions of paragraph (e) of this section shall, in the absence of fraud, be con- clusive unless reviewed as in this paragraph hereinafter provided. circuit Conrt (1) Tn e Circuit Court of the county where any of the parties defendant may be found shall by writ of certiorari Rtriew to the Industrial Commission have power to review all Writ of Certiorarl Issued Time Certiorarl Record of Proceedings Certification Costs Receipt for Costs. Certiorarl Bond Confirming Setting Aside THE ACT questions of law and fact presented by such record: Pro- vided, that no additional evidence shall be heard in the Circuit Court, and the findings of fact made by the com- mission shall not be set aside unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, except such as arise in a proceeding in which under paragraph (b) of this section a decision of the arbitrator or committee of arbitration has become the decision of the Industrial Commission. Such writ shall be issued by the clerk of such court upon praecipe. Service upon any member of the Industrial Commission or the secretary thereof shall be service on the commission, and service upon other parties interested shall be by scire facias, or service may be made upon said commission and other parties in interest by mailing notice of the commencement of the proceedings and the return day of the writ to the office of said commission and the last known place of residence of the other parties in interest at least ten days before the return day of said writ. Such suit by writ of certiorari shall be commenced within tweflty days of the receipt of notice of the decision of the commis- sion. The Industrial Commission shall not be required to cer- tify the record of their proceedings to the Circuit Court, unless the party commencing the proceedings for review in the Circuit Court, as above provided, shall pay to the commission the sum of five cents per one hundred words of testimony taken before said commission and three cents per one hundred words of all other matters contained in such record. In its decision on review the industrial commission shall determine in each particular case the amount of the prob- able cost of the record to be filed as a return to the writ of aertiorari in that case and no praecipe for a writ of certiorari may be filed and no writ of certiorari shall is- sue unless the party seeking to review the decision of the industrial commission shall exhibit to the clerk of the said Circuit Court a receipt showing payment of the sums so determined to the secretary of the industrial commis- sion. (2) No such writ of certiorari shall issue unless the one against whom the Industrial Commission shall have rendered an award for the payment of money shall upon the filing of his praecipe for such writ file with the clerk of said court a bond conditioned that if he shall not suc- cessfully prosecute said writ, he will pay the said award and the costs of the proceedings in said court. The amount of the bond shall be fixed by any member of the Indus- trial Commission and the surety or sureties on said bond shall be approved by the clerk of said court. The court may confirm or set aside the decision of the Industrial Commission. If the decision is set aside and 22 THE ACT DrrUIoa Rtnaadlar Judgments RTlew Writ of Error Mm.- to Mi.- out Writ Bond J uAslgnable Act shall be assignable or subject to any lien, attachment or garnishment, or be held liable in any way for any lien, Decision debt, penalty or damages. A decision or award of the In- Recorded dustrial Commission against an employer for compensation under this Act, or a written agreement by an employer to pay such compensation shall, upon the filing of a certified copy of the decision or said agreement, as the case may be, with the recorder of deeds of the county, constitute Men a lien upon all property of the employer within said county, paramount to all other claims or liens, except mortgages, trust deeds, or for wages or taxes, and such liens may be enforced in the manner provided for the foreclosure of mortgages under the laws of this State, compensation Any right to receive compensation hereunder shall be KxtlnguUhed extinguished by the death of the person or persons en- titled thereto, subject to the provisions of this Act rela- tive to compensation for death received in the course of neneflclary employment: Provided, that upon the death of a benefici- Ueath ary, who is receiving compensation provided for in section THE ACT 7, leaving surviving a parent, sister or brother of the deceased employee, at the time of his death dependent upon him for support, who were receiving from such bene- ficiary a contribution to support, then that proportion of the compensation of the beneficiary which would have been paid but for the death of the beneficiary, but in no event exceeding said unpaid compensation, which the contribu- tion of the beneficiary to the dependent's support within one year prior to the death of the beneficiary bears to the compensation of the beneficiary within that year, shall be continued for the benefit of such dependents, notwith- standing the death of the beneficiary. [Amended by Act approved June 28, 1919.] 22. Any contract or agreement made by any employer or his agent or attorney with any employee or any other beneficiary of any claim under the provisions of this Act within seven days after the injury shall be presumed to be fraudulent. 23. No employee, personal representative, or bene- ficiary shall have power to waive any of the provisions of this Act in regard to the amount of compensation which may be payable to such employee, personal representative or beneficiary hereunder except after approval by the In- dustrial Board. 24. No proceedings for compensation under this Act shall be maintained unless notice of the accident has been given to the employer as soon as practicable, but not later than 30 days after the accident. In cases of mental in- capacity of the employee, notice must be given within six months after such accident. No defect or inaccuracy of such notice shall be a bar to the maintenance of proceed- ings of arbitration or otherwise by the employee unless the employee proves that he is unduly prejudiced in such proceedings by such defect or inaccuracy. Notice of the accident shall state the name and address of the employee injured, the approximate date and place of the accident, if known, and in simple language the cause thereof; which notice may be served personally or by registered mail, ad- dressed to the employer at his last known residence or place of business; provided no proceedings for compensa- tion under this Act shall be maintained unless claim for compensation has been made within six months after the accident, or in the event that payments have been made under the provisions of this Act unless written claim for compensation has been made within six months after such payments have ceased and a receipt therefor or a state- ment of the amount of compensation paid shall have been filed with the Commission: Provided, that no employee who after the accident returns to the employment of the employer in whose services he was injured shall be barred for failure to make such claim if an application for ad- justment of such claim is filed with the Industrial Commis- 26 THE ACT sion within eighteen months after he returns to such employment and the said commission shall give notice to the employer of the filing of such application in the manner provided in this Act. [Amended by Act approved June 29, 1921.] Liability S 25. Any employer against whom liability may exist 431 Belief From for compensation under this Act, shall upon the order and 8339 direction of the Industrial Commission: Depositing ( a ) Deposit the commuted value of the total unpaid < "inpeni ation compenstaion for which such liability exists, computed at three per centum per annum in the same manner as pro- vided in section 9, with the State Treasurer, or County Treasurer in the county where the accident happened, or with any State or National bank or Trust Company doing business in this State, or in some other suitable depository approved by the Industrial Commission: Provided, that any such depository to which such compensation may be paid, shall pay the same out in installments as in this Act provided, unless such sum is ordered paid in, and is com- muted to a lump sum payment in accordance with the provisions of this Act; or Anility (b) Purchase an annuity, in an amount of compen- sation due or computed, under this Act within the limita- tion provided by law in any insurance company grant- ing annuities and licensed or permitted to do business in this State which may be designated by the employer or the Industrial Commission. [Amended by Act approved June 29, 1921.] Prorlsloi 26. (a) Any employer who shall come within the 431 to Pay provisions of section 3 of this Act, and any other employer S340 who shall elect to provide and pay the compensation pro- vided for in this Act shall: -i. 1 1. ni i- nt (1) File with the commission a sworn statement show- ing his financial ability to pay the compensation provided for in this Act, or ) iirnuiiinif (2) Furnish security, indemnity or a bond guarantee- Aeeirlty Ing the payment by the employer of the compensation provided for in this Act, or in MIC in * (3) Insure to a reasonable amount his liability to pay such compensation in some corporation or organization au- thorized, licensed or permitted to do such insurance busi- ness in this State, or Alteraatlre (4) Make some other provisions for the securing of the payment of compensation provided for in this Act, and (5) Upon becoming subject to this Act and thereafter as often as the commission may in writing demand, file with the commission in form prescribed by it evidence of his compliance with the provisions of this paragraph. \ PIT.. MI i by (b) The sworn statement of financial ability, or secur- CommissioB ity, indemnity or bond, or amount of insurance, or other THE ACT Insurer Insolvent Delay and Unfairness Discontinuance of Business Order Review of Kon-Compilance Penalty provision, filed, furnished, carried, or made by the em- ployer, as the case may be, shall be subject to the ap- proval of the commission, upon the approval of which, the commission shall send to the employer written notice of its approval thereof. The filing with the commission of evidence of compliance with paragraph (a) of this section as therein provided shall constitute such compliance until ten days after written notice to the employer of the dis- approval by the commission. (c) Whenever the Industrial Commission shall find that any corporation, company, association, aggregation of individuals, or other insurer affecting workmen's compen- sation insurance in this State shall be insolvent, finan- cially unsound, or unable to fully meet all payments and liabilities assumed or to be assumed for compensation in- surance in this State, or shall practice a policy of delay or unfairness toward employees in the adjustment, settle- ment, or payment of benefits due such employees, the said Industrial Commission may after reasonable notice and hearing order and direct that such corporation, company, association, aggregation of individuals, or insurer, shall from and after a date fixed in such order discontinue the writing of any such workmen's compensation insurance in this State. Subject to such modification of said order as the commission may later make on review of said order, as herein provided, it shall thereupon be unlawful for any such corporation, company, association, aggregation of individuals, or insurer to effect any workmen's compen- sation insurance in this State. Any such order made by said Industrial Commission shall be subject to review by the courts, as in the case of other orders of said Indus- trial Commission, provided that upon said review the Circuit Court shall have power to review all questions of fact as well as of law. (d) The failure or neglect of an employer to comply with the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall be deemed a misdemeanor punishable by a fine equal to ten cents per each employee of such employer at the time of such failure or neglect, but not less than one dollar nor more than fifty dollars, for each day of such refusal or neglect until the same ceases. Each day of such refusal or neglect shall constitute a separate offense. [Amended by Act approved June 28, 1919.] 27. (a) This Act shall not affect or disturb the con- tinuance of any existing insurance, mutual aid, benefit, or relief association or department, whether maintained in whole or in part by the employer or whether maintained by the employees, the payment of benefits of such associa- tion or department being guaranteed by the employer or by some person, firm or corporation for him: Provided, the employer contributes to such association or depart- ment an amount not less than the full compensation herein 28 THE ACT provided, exclusive of the cost of the maintenance of such association or department and without any expense to the .Mutual Benefit employee. This Act shall not prevent the organization Society and maintaining under the insurance laws of this State of any benefit or insurance company for the purpose of insur- ing against the compensation provided for in this Act, the expense of which is maintained by the employer. Thiv Act shall not prevent the organization or maintaining under the insurance laws of this State of any voluntary mutual aid, benefit or relief association among employees for the payment of additional accident or sick benefits. Insurer (b) No existing insurance, mutual aid, benefit or re- Can Not lief association or department shall, by reason of anything Discontinue herein contained be authorized to discontinue its operation without first discharging its obligations to any and all persons carrying insurance in the same or entitled to re- lief or benefits therein. (c) Any contract, oral, written or implied, of employ- ment providing for relief benefit, or insurance or any other device whereby the employee is required to pay any prem- ium or premiums for insurance against the compensation provided for in this Act shall be null and void, and any employer withholding from the wages of any employee any amount for the purpose of paying any such premium shall ^ e suilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than one thousand dol- lars, or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court. 28 - In tne event the employer does not pay the com- pensation for which he is liable, then an insurance com- pany, association or insurer which may have insured such employer against such liability shall become primarily liable to pay to the employee, his personal representative or beneficiary the compensation required by the provisions joint f tn i s Act to be paid by such employer. The insurance Award carrier may be made a party to the proceedings to which the employer is a party and an award may be entered jointly against the employer and the insurance carrier. [Amended by Act approved June 28, 1919.] Third Person 29- Where an injury or death for which compensation in.iiir.i by ls payable by the employer under this Act, was not proxi- mately caused by the negligence of the employer or his employees, and was caused under circumstances creat- ing a legal liability for damages in some person other than the employer to pay damages, such other person having also elected to be bound by this Act, or being bound there- by under section three (3) of this Act, then the right of the employee or personal representative to recover against Subrogation such other person shall be subrogated to his employer and such employer may bring legal proceedings against such other person to recover the damages sustained in an Wages withheld for Premium Carrier THE ACT amount not exceeding the aggregate amount of compensa- tion payable under this Act, by reason of the injury or death of such employee. Where the injury or death for which compensation is payable under this Act, was not proximately caused by the negligence of the employer or his employees and was caused under circumstances cre- ating a legal liability for damages on the part of some per- Thlrd Person son other than the employer to pay damages, such other Not Under Act person having elected not to be bound by this Act, then legal proceedings may be taken against such other person to recover damages notwithstanding such employer's pay- ment of or liability to pay compensation under this Act, but in such case if the action against such other person is brought by the injured employee or his personal represen- tative and judgment is obtained and paid, or settlement is made with such other person, either with or without suit, then from the amount received by such employee or per- sonal representative there shall be paid to the employer the amount of compensation paid or to be paid by him to such employee or his personal representative: Provided, that if the injured employee or his personal representative shall agree to receive compensation from the employer or to institute proceedings to recover the same or accept from the employer any payment on account of such compensa- tion, such employer shall be subrogated to all the rights of such employee or personal representative and may maintain, or in case an action has already been instituted, may continue an action either in the name of the em- ployee or personal representative or in his own name against such other person for the recovery of damages to which but for this section the said employee or personal representative would be entitled, but such employer shall nevertheless pay over to the injured employee or personal representative, all sums collected from such other person by judgment or otherwise in excess of the amount of such compensation paid or to be paid under this Act, and all costs, attorneys' fees and reasonable expenses incurred by such employer in making such collection and enforcing such liability. [Amended by Act approved June 25, 1917.] 30. It shall be the duty of every employer within the provisions of this Act to send to the Industrial Board in writing an immediate report of all accidental injuries aris- ing out of or in the course of the employment and re- sulting in death; it shall also be the duty of every such employer to report between the 15th and the 25th of each month to the Industrial Board all accidental injuries for which compensation has been paid under this Act, which injuries entail a loss to the employee of more than one week's time, and in case the injury results in permanent disability, a further report shall be made as soon as it is determined that such permanent disability has resulted or will result from such injury. All reports shall state the 30 THE ACT Compensation Coatraet With Others I'llt > tO Insnre Recorery Against Contractor Immediate Premises Invalidity of Part Bight of Action date of the injury, including the time of day or night, the nature of the employer's business, the name, address, the age, sex, conjugal condition of the injured person, the specific occupation of the injured person, the direct cause of the injury and the nature of the accident, the character of the injury, the length of disability, and, in case of death, the length of disability before death, the wages of the in- jured person, whether compensation has been paid to the injured person, or to his legal representatives or his heirs or next of kin, the amount of compensation paid, the amount paid for physicians', surgeons' and hospital bills, and by whom paid, and the amount paid for funeral or burial expenses, if known. The making of reports as pro- vided herein shall release the employer covered by the provisions of this Act from making such reports to any other officer of the State. 31. Any one engaging in any business or enterprise referred to in sub-sections 1 and 2 of section 3 of this Act who undertakes to do any work enumerated therein, shall be liable to pay compensation to his own immediate em- ployees in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and in addition thereto if he directly or indirectly engages any contractor whether principal or sub-contractor to do any such work, he shall be liable to pay compensation to the employees of any such contractor or sub-contractor unless such contractor or sub-contractor shall have insured, in any company or association authorized under the laws of this State to insure the liability to pay compensation under this Act, or guaranteed his liability to pay such compen- sation. In the event any such person shall pay compensation under this section he may recover the amount thereof from the contractor or sub-contractor, if any, and in the event the contractor shall pay compensation under this section he may recover the amount thereof from the sub-contract- or, if any. This section shall not apply in any case where the acci- dent occurs elsewhere than on, in or about the immediate premises on which the principal has contracted that the work shall be done. [Amended by Act approved June 28, 1919.] 32. If any of the provisions of this Act providing for compensation for Injuries to or death of employees shall be repealed or adjudged invalid or unconstitutional, the period intervening between the occurrence of any in- jury or death and such repeal or final adjudication of in- validity, shall not be computed as a part of the time limited by law for the commencement of any action re- lating to such injury or death, but the amount of any com- pensation which may have been paid for any such injury shall be deducted from any judgment for damages recov- THE ACT ered on account of such injury. Any claim, disagreement or controversy existing or arising under "An Act to pro- claim Under mote the general welfare of the people of this State, by Previous Act providing compensation for accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of employment," approved June 10, 1911, in force May 1, 1912, shall be. adjusted, in accordance with the provisions of said Act, notwithstanding the repeal thereof, or may by agreement of the parties be adjusted in accordance with the method of procedure provided in this Act for the adjustment of differences, jurisdiction to adjust such differences so submitted by the parties being hereby conferred upon the Industrial Board or committee of arbitration provided for in this Act. [Amended by Act t approved June 25, 1917.] 33. Any wilful neglect, refusal, or failure to do the things required to be done by any section, clause, or provi- sion of this Act, on the part of the persons herein required to do them, or any violation of any of the provisions or re- quirements hereof, or any attempt to obstruct or interfere with any court officer, or any other person charged with the duty of administering or enforcing the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not less than $10.00 nor more than $500.00 at the discretion of the court. 33%. This Act may be cited as the Workmen's Com- pensation Act. [Added by an Act approved June 28, 1915.] 34. The invalidity of any portion of this Act shall in no way affect the validity of any other portion thereof which can be given effect without such invalid part. 35. That an Act to promote the general welfare of the State of Illinois by providing compensation for acci- dental injuries or death suffered in the course of employ- ment, approved June 10, 1911, in force May 1, 1912, be, and the same is, hereby repealed. S351 TABLE OF COMPENSATION. To find the present value of any sum payable weekly, multiply that sum by the present value of $1 payable for thfi number of weeks for which such sum is payable. Example. To find the present value of $7.20 payable at end of each week for 100 weeks multiply $7.20 by the present value of $1 payable weekly for 100 weeks (shown in the tables to be $97.1833). $7.20 X 97.1833 $699.72, present value. 32 THE ACT PRESENT VALUE TABLES. Present value at 3 per cent., compounded annually at $1 per Week, payable at the end of each week, for any term from one week up to eight years. Term weeks years 1 year and weeks 2 years and weeks 3 years and weeks 4 years and weeks 5 years and weeks 6 years and weeks 7 years and weeks One O't'.i'M 52.1947 101.8989 150.1554 Mi7.oor.-J 242.4928 286.0543 329.5296 Two 1.9983 53.1645 102.8405 151.0695 197.8930 243.3544 287.4908 330.3417 Three 2.MM 54.1337 103.7814 151.0881 198.7808 244.2155 288.3200 331.1534 Four 3.9943 55.1024 104.7219 152.8962 199.6673 245.0762 289.1625 331.9647 Five 4.9915 56.0705 105.6618 153.8087 200.5533 245.9364 289.9976 332.7755 Six 5J681 .-7.03S1 106.6012 154.7207 201.4387 246.7900 290.8322 333.5858 Seven &9841 58.0051 107.5401 155.6323 202.3237 247.6552 29i.fir,04 334.3957 Eight 7.9796 58.9716 108.4784 156.5432 203.2082 248.5139 292. .'001 335.2051 Nine Ten Eleven 8.9745 i.'ir.ss 10.9026 59.9375 60.9029 61.8677 109.4162 110.3534 111.2901 157.4537 158.3637 159.2731 204.0921 204.9756 205.8585 249.3721 250.2298 251.0871 293.3333 294.Ui<;<) 294.9983 336.0140 330.8225 337.6305 Twelve 11.9558 62.8320 112.2263 160.18:0 206.7410 251.9438 295.8301 338.4381 Thirteen 12.9484 63.7957 113.1620 161.0904 207.6229 252.8001 290.0014 339.2452 Fourteen 13.9405 f.4.7. r .S'. 114.0971 161.9983 208.5043 253.6558 297.4922 340.0518 Fifteen 14.9320 65.7215 115.0317 162.9057 209.3853 254.5111 uiis.3220 340.8580 Sixteen 15.9229 66.6836 115.9658 163.8125 210.2657 255.3659 299.1525 341.6637 Seventeen 16.9133 67.6451 116.8993 164.7189 211.1457 256.2202 299.0819 342.4690 Eighteen 17.9031 68.0061 117.8323 165.6247 212.0251 257.0741 300.8109 343.2738 Nineteen 18.8924 69.5666 118.7648 166.5300 21.2.9041 257.9274 301.6394 344.0782 Twenty I'.t.SSll 70.5265 119.6967 167.4348 213.7825 258.7803 302.4674 344.8821 Twenty-one L'O Sf.92 71.4858 120.6281 1C8.3391 214.6605 2.V.U1320 303.2949 34.-..C855 Twenty-two 21.8568 72.4446 121.5590 169.2429 215.5379 200.4845 304.1220 346.4885 Twenty-three 22 X43S 73 4029 122.4894 170.1461 216.4148 261.3359 304.9486 347.2911 Twenty-four 23 s:>3 74.3000 123.4192 171.9489 217.2913 262.1868 305.7748 348.0931 Twenty-five Twenty-six Twenty-seven 24.8161 25.8015 2' 1 . 7X''.2 75.3178 76.2744 77.2305 124.348.5 125.2772 126 2055 171.6511 172.8528 173.7540 218.1672 219.0427 219.9176 263.0373 203.8872 264.7367 300.0004 307.4256 308.2504 348.8947 349.0959 350.4966 Twenty-eight 27.7705 7S IXMI 127.1332 174.6547 220.7921 268.5867 309.0740 351.2969 Twenty-nine 28.7541 79.1410 128.0004 175.5549 221.6661 260.4342 300.8984 352.0967 Thirty". 29.7372 XO.O'.l.V, 128.9870 176.4546 222.5395 267.2822 310.7217 352.8960 Thirty-one 30.7197 81 0494 129 9132 177.3537 223.4125 268.1298 311.5446 353.6949 Thirty-two 31.7017 82.0028 130.8388 178.2524 224.2850 208.9768 312.3670 354.4933 Thirty-three :!2.r,K3i S2.'.I.V,li 131.7638 179.1505 225.1569 269.8234 313.1889 355.2913 Thirty-four 33.6640 S3 .9079 132.6884 180.0481 226.0248 270.6695 314.0103 356.0888 Thirty-five 34.6443 xi X.V.H; 133.6124 180.9452 226.8994 271.5151 314.8313 3. r ,o.8S59 Thirty-six 35.6240 x:, sio'.i 134.5359 181.8418 227.7699 272.3003 315.6519 357.6825 3ii r,032 86 7615 135 4589 182.7379 228.6399 273.2049 316.4719 358.4787 Thirty-eight. . . 37 '.sis 87 7116 136 3814 183.6335 229.5094 274.0491 317.2915 359.2744 Thirty-nine 3s r,:,w xs ;ti 12 137.3033 1X4 .VJSO 230.3784 274.8928 318.1106 300.0097 Forty 39.5374 X'.i r,io3 138.2247 185.4232 231.2409 275.7360 318.9293 3fiO.S64.-i Forty-one. 40.5144 '10 :,sx 139.1456 186.3172 232.1149 276.5787 319,7475 361.6589 Forty-two 41 4'.IOX '.U MltlX 140 0659 187.2108 232.9825 277.4210 320.5652 302.4528 Forty-three 4J 4.'',7 92 4.542 140 <'8:,K 188.1038 233.8495 278.2628 2 1.3825 363.2462 Forty-four 43 14-.'0 93 4011 141.9051 188.9964 234.7160 279.1041 322.199:', 364.0392 Forty-five. . . 44 4167 '.14 3474 142 8239 IX 1 . xxxi 235.5821 279.9449 323.0156 364.8318 Forty-six 4.'> 3'.fr.t 95 2933 143 7421 190 7799 236.4476 2S0.7S.V.' 323.8315 305.6239 Forty-seven 4'". :i''.4."p 96 2385 144.6599 191.6709 237.3127 281.6251 324.6409 306.4156 Forty-eitht 47 3376 97 1833 145 5771 192.5714 238.1773 282.4645 325.4618 367.2068 Forty-nine . . 4S 3101 9X 127", 146 4938 193.4514 239.0414 283.3034 320.2763 367.9975 Fifty 49 2821 99 0711 147 4100 194.3409 239.9049 284.1419 327.0903 368.7878 Fifty-one ;V) 2."i3f UK) 01 43 148.3257 195.2299 240.7080 284.9788 327.9039 369.5777 Fifty-two 51.2244 100.9569 14' 1.2408 196.1184 241.6307 285.8173 328.7169 370.3671 THE ACT 33 PRESENT VALUE TABLES Continued. Present value at 3 per cent, compounded annually, of $1 semi-monthly payable at the end of each half month, for any term from one-half month up to eight years. (For method of computation, see example given under weekly table.) Term-half Months years 1 year and Months 2 years and Months 3 years and Months 4 years and Months 5 years and Months 6 years and Months 7 years and Months One-half .9978 24.6020 47.5272 69.7927 91.4194 112.4242 132.8254 152.6394 One 1.9962 25.5705 48.4676 70.7058 92.3060 113.2850 133.6611 153.4509 One and one-half . . . Two 2.9925 3.9875 26.5378 27.5040 49.4068 50.3450 71.6178 72.5288 93.1915 94.0761 114.1449 115.0038 134.4961 135.3301 154.2616 155.0714 Two and one-half . . Three 4.9812 5.9738 28.4090 29.4329 51.2821 52.2172 73.4388 74.3477 94.9597 95.8423 115.8619 116.7190 136.1633 136.9956 155.8805 156.6887 Three and one-half Four 6.9651 7.9552 30.3956 31.3571 53.1520 54.0858 75.2556 76.1624 96.7240 97.6047 117.5752 118.4305 137.8270 138.6576 157.4961 158.3027 Four and one-half . . Five 8.9441 9.9317 32.3175 33.2767 55.0186 55.9502 77.0683 77.9731 98.4844 99.3631 119.2848 120.1383 139.4873 140.3162 159.1085 159.9134 Five and one-half . . Six 10.9182 11.9034 34.2348 35.1917 56.8807 57.8102 78.8769 79.7796 100.2409 101.1177 120.9908 121.8425 141.1442 141.9713 160.7176 161.5210 Six and one-half . . . Seven 12.8874 13.8702 36.1475 37.1022 58.7385 59.6658 80.6814 81.5821 101.9936 102 8685 122.6932 123 5430 142.7976 143.6231 162.3235 163.1252 Seven and one-half. Eight 14.8517 15.8321 38.0557 39.0081 60.5921 61.5172 82.4818 83.3806 103.7424 104.6154 124.3920 125.2400 144.4477 145.2714 163.9262 164.7263 Eight and one-half . Nine 16.8113 17.7893 39.9593 40.9094 62.4413 63.3643 84.2783 85.1750 105.4875 106.3585 126.0871 126.9334 146.0943 146.9163 165.5257 166.3242 Nine and one-half. . Ten 18.7661 19.7417 41.8584 42.8063 64.2863 65.2071 86.0706 86.9653 107.2287 108.0979 127.7787 128.6231 147.7375 148.5579 167.1219 167.9189 Ten and one-half . . . Eleven 20.7161 21.6894 43.7530 44.6986 66.1270 67.0457 87.8590 88.7517 108.9661 109 8334 129.4667 130.3094 149.3774 150.1961 168.7150 169.5104 Eleven and one-half Twelve 22.6614 23.6323 45.6431 46.5857 67.9635 68.8786 89.6434 90.5319 110.G998 111.5625 131.1512 131.9887 151.0139 151.8271 170.3050 171.0944 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. SCOPE. The theory of the Workmen's Compensation Act is that the question of compensation for injuries of an employee shall be adjusted speedily through the Industrial Commission. Central Illinois Public Ser- vice Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 62, 66; 127 N. E. 80. By the Act, the legislature intended to make pro- vision for a speedy disposition and settlement of the claim of the injured employee and the Act should re- ceive a liberal construction to accomplish that pur- pose. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 239 ; 124 N. E. 665. The Workmen's Compensation Act takes away the cause of action on the one hand and the ground of defense on the other hand and merges both in a statutory indemnity fixed and certain. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 176; 125 N. E. 748. The Act evidently is intended as a settlement of a difficult problem, affecting one of the most important of social relations and is to be judged in its en- tirety. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 291 111. 167, 174; 125 N. E. 748. The whole doctrine of employer 's liability for neg- ligence with its defenses of contributory negligence, fellow servants' negligence and assumption of risk (35) 36 SCOPE is based upon fiction and is inapplicable to modern conditions of employment. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 173; 125 N. E. 748. The Workmen's Compensation Act sets aside one body of rules to establish another system in its place. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 174; 125 N. E. 748. The Workmen's Compensation Act takes away the cause of action and the ground of defense and merges both in a statutory indemnity, fixed and cer- tain. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 176; 125 N. E. 748. The modern tendency is to compensate for loss of earning power, such a loss stands to the employee as his capital in trade. His loss arises out of the business in which he is employed and this is an ex- pense of the operation just as the cost of repairing broken machinery or any other expense that ordi- narily is paid by the employer, and the business should bear this charge. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 174; 125 N. E. 748. The statute under consideration sets aside one body of rules to establish another system in its place. The employee or his personal representative is no longer able to recover as much as before in case of an injury growing out of the employer's negligence but is entitled to moderate compensation in all cases of injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy with- out the difficulty and expense of establishing negli- gence or proving the amount of damages. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 174 ; 125 N. E. 748. CONSTITUTIONALITY 37 CONSTITUTIONALITY. It is the duty of the court to declare a law consti- tutional, regardless of how desirable or beneficial the legislation is, if no constitutional limitation has been violated. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 291 111. 167, 172; 125 N. E. 748. Where it was claimed that Section 2, of the 1915 Act was unconstitutional, it was held that the constitutional question had already been decided ad- versely to the party claiming its invalidity in an- other case. Mississippi River Power Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 289 111. 353, 354; 124 N. E. 552. The scheme of the Act is so wide a departure from the common law standards respecting responsibility of employer to employee that doubts naturally arise respecting its constitutional validity. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 173; 125 N. E. 748. See also: Thornton v. Duffy (Oh.) 124 N. E. 54. Foundation on Police Power. The test of the validity of a law which creates lia- bility without fault and under which the property of one is taken without compensation to pay the obliga- tions of another is not whether it does objectionable things, but whether there is any reasonable ground to believe that the public safety, health or general welfare is promoted thereby. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 175; 125 N. E. 748. 38 FOUNDATION ON POLICE POWER 9 The public has a direct interest in respect to com- pensation for human life lost or disability incurred in the course of a hazardous employment and for that reason, it is proper to restrict the right to contract with reference to this subject matter, as it affects the common welfare. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 177 ; 125 N. E. 748. 9 Under the police power the legislature exercises supervision over matters affecting the common weal and enforces the observance of duties of members of society to each other and to the community at large and prescribes regulations promoting the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the peo- ple and legislates so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wel- fare and prosperity. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 175 ; 125 N. E. 748. 9 The police power under which reasonable regula- tions touching the health and safety of employees are made, is a power inherent in every sovereignty. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 175; 125 N.E. 748. Due Process. 9 The legislature has the power to bring extra-haz- ardous employments under the act without election, and the act is not subject to the objection that the employer is deprived of his property without due process of law. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 176; 125 N. E. 748. Class Legislation. 10 The question, what classes of persons shall be en- 173 titled to the benefits of the Act is legislative, and if CONSTITUTIONALITY TRIAL BY JURY 39 it should be deemed wise to include officers while performing duties beyond the scope of the usual duties of an officer, such a provision is not for the courts but for the General Assembly. City of Chi- cago v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 23, 27; 125 N. E. 705. The Right to Trial by Jury. 12 As the right of jury trial is incidental to a right of action, to destroy the latter, is to leave the former nothing upon which to operate. G. T. W. E. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 176; 125 N. E. 748. 12 The constitutional provision guaranteeing that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, guarantees that right only to causes of action rec- ognized by law. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 176 ; 125 N. E. 748. Delegation of Judicial Powers. 13 The Workmen's Compensation Act is automatic in practical working and it delegates no judicial powers to the Commission. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 176 ; 125 N. E. 748. Impairment of Right of Contract. 13 The authority of the State to prohibit contracts made in derogation of a lawfully established policy of the state repecting compensation for accidental death or disabling personal injury is perfectly clear. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 177 ; 125 N. E. 748. 20 The legislature under a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State may limit the freedom of 40 SCOPE OF LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT the employer and employee relative to contracts without being in violation of the constitution. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 177; 125 N. E. 748. SCOPE OF LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT. 21 The legislature is without restriction in the exer- cise of its power, except as restrictions are imposed by the Constitution. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 172 ; 125 N. E. 748. As to Regulating Practice. 21 The liability for death caused by wrongful act both within and without the relation of employer and employee is a modern stautory innovation, the legislature may modify this right of action, extend it or limit it or even abolish it altogether. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 173 ; 125 N. E. 748. Interpretation of Legislative Intention. 23 Although an injury is serious and claimant should receive the full amount that he is entitled to under the law, yet the courts must construe the laws as it finds them. Ballou v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 434, 437; 129 N. E. 755. 23 The reasoning of the court, in construing other provisions of the Act, supports the giving of a liberal construction to the Act, in order to accomplish the legislative intention. Illinois Indemnity Ex- change v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 239; 124 N. E. 665. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 41 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 24 The courts should always construe the Workmen's Compensation Act liberally in favor of the employee, but it can not create a liability, where the law cre- ates none and they are not authorized to hold an employer where the accident did not arise out of the employment. Morris & Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 295 111. 49, 53 ; 128 N. E. 727. 25 Craig v. Royal Insurance Co., 8 B. W. C. C. 339, discussed and pointed out that the provision in the English Act is more analogous to Section 31 of the Illinois Act than Section 28. Illinois Indemnity Ex- change v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 239; 124 N. E. 665. 25 The construction placed upon an Act worded dif- ferently than the Illinois Act will not be followed where the foreign Act is different from the Illinois Act. IHinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 239; 124 N. E. 665. 25 The Act in force in British Columbia not followed by the Court in construing a question of jurisdiction. Illinois Indemnity Exchange. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 111. 233, 239 ; 124 N. E. 665. 27 The court should construe the act reasonably, so 436 that each part of it will be given effect, and, the only way that it can be given effect, is to construe it to mean that in case of the employer's insolvency, the insurance company can be substituted and required to make the payments to the employee provided for by the Act and require it to pay to the employee in installments as required by the Act. Illinois Indem- 42 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION nlty Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233,238; 124 N. E. 665. 29 The words of a statute will be construed in their ordinary sense and with the meaning ordinarily attributed to them. Clark Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 291 111. 561, 569 ; 126 N. E. 579. 29 It is well settled that in construing any statute all the language shall be considered and such inter- pretation placed upon any word or phrase appear- ing therein as was within the manifest intention of the body which enacted the law. Clark Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 561, 569; 126 N. E. 579. 29 The extent of the modification of the statute from the common law in its attitude towards children born out of wedlock is a question for the determina- tion of the legislative department and not for the courts. Murrell v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 334, 337 ; 126 N. E. 189. 31 Statutes will not be construed so as to give them a retrospective operation, yet when the change affects the remedy or procedure, all rights of action are enforcible under the new procedure. City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 409, 411; 127 N. E. 46. 31 Statutes will not be construed so as to give them retrospective effect unless it clearly appears that such was the intent of the legislature. City of Chi- ccuin v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 409, 411; 127 N. E. 46. 31 Where the wording of a statute is clear and admits of but one interpretation, there is no need or occasion for construction of a statute and the court will give effect to its plain meaning. (Illinois STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 43 Electric Co. v. Town of Cicero, 282 111. 468; People v. Stewart, 281 111. 365; Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 111. 180; Caminetti v. U. S., 242 U. S. 470.) Clark Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 561, 569; 126 N. E. 579. 32 The Act is a humane law of a remedial nature, and wherever construction is permissible its language should be liberally construed. City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 23, 27; 125 N. E.- 705. 32 The intention of the legislature in construing this statute is to be gathered from the necessity or reason of the enactment and the meaning of the words, enlarged or restricted according to such intention as ascertained from a consideration of the whole act. (Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Indus- trial Board, 282 111. 136.) Oriental Laundry Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 539, 544; 127 N. E. 676. 32 Generally, statutes operate in the future, only, and do not affect past transactions. A retrospective effect will not be given unless the intention of the legislature is clear. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 295 111. 141, 143 ; 128 N. E. 917. 32 Section 4 of law on statutes construed and applied to the Workmen 's Compensation Act and the section construed as not applying retrospectively to pend- ing claims or actions. (Merlo v. Johnston City Coal Co., 258 111. 328.) Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 141, 144; 128 N. E. 917. 32 The words of a statute will be construed in their ordinary sense and with the meaning commonly attributed to them under such construction, unless 44 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION such construction will defeat the manifest intention of the legislature. Murrell v. Industrial Commis- sion, 291 111. 334, 336; 126 N. E. 189. 32 The Workmen's Compensation Act must receive a liberal construction so that its beneficent intent and purpose may be reasonably accomplished. United Disposal and Recovery Co. v. 'Industrial Commission, 291 111. 480, 485; 126 N. E. 183. 32 The remedial nature of the Workmen's Compensa- tion Act and its beneficent purpose should be given due weight in its construction, but its purpose can only be realized by even-handed justice to both employer and employed, so that one shall receive that to which he is entitled and the other one shall pay no more. Decatur Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 290, 293; 129 N. E. 738. 32 A liberal interpretation should be given in com- pensation cases, but such interpretation should not go to the extent of becoming absurd. McMorran v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 569, 571 ; 125 N. E. 284. 32 The court will not place a construction on a reme- dial act which will deprive it of all practical effect. For this is not in keeping with the intention of the Legislature. Juerfjens Bros. Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 290 111. 420, 423; 125 N. E. 337. 32 The application of compensation laws should not be made to depend upon fine-spun theories based upon scientific technicalities. Such laws should be given a practical construction and application. Juergens Bros. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 420,423; 125 N. E. 337. MISCELLANEOUS INTERPRETATIONS 45 PRESUMPTIONS. 33 All presumptions are in favor of the validity of a statute, and in doubtful cases the doubt is resolved in favor of the law. The motive or the wisdom of the legislature is never questioned, unless the re- striction imposed by the fundamental law has been violated. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 291 111. 167, 172 ; 125 N. E. 748. MISCELLANEOUS INTERPRETATIONS. 34 Chapter 131 provides that all phrases and expres- sions in the statute shall be liberally construed in order that the true intent and meaning of the legis- lature may be fully carried out. Clark Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 291 111. 561, 569; 126 N. E. 579. COMMON LAW RIGHTS AS AFFECTED BY THE ACT. 35 The courts have repeatedly upheld the authority of the legislature to establish departures from the common law rule affecting the employer's right for personal injuries to the employee. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 174; 125 N. E. 748. 35 The matter of liability for death is a modern statutory innovation, which the legislature may modify and no person has a vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him to insist that it shall not 46 EXTRA-TERRITORIAL EFFECT be changed. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 291 111. 167, 173; 125 N. E. 748. 35 No person has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain un- changed for his benefit. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 291 111. 167, 173; 125 N. E. 748. 35 The entire matter of liability for death caused by wrongful act both within and without the relation of employer and employee is a modern statutory innovation. Grand Trunk Western R. R. Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 173; 125 N. E. 748. 35 The employer is left without defense respecting the question of fault, but he is at the same time assured that the recovery is limited and that it goes directly to the relief of the designated beneficiaries, and just as the employee's assumption of ordinary risk at common law presumably was taken into ac- count in fixing the rate of wages, so the fixed respon- sibility of the employer will be reflected in the wage scale. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 174; 125 N. E. 748. Extra-Territorial Effect. 39 The Workmen's Compensation Act has no effect beyond the territorial limits of the State. Union Bridge & Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 287 111. 396. The Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Acts have been construed by the Commissions and the Courts in these states that the employee must seek his remedy in the forum where the contract of employment is made. Haustrial Commission, 291 111. 408, 414; 126 N. E. 133. 255 Stoppages due to break-down of machinery and public holidays are normal and recognized incidents of employment and should not be deducted in deter- mining annual earnings. Centralia Coal Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 297 111. 513, 517 ; 130 N. E. 725. SECTION 10 (b) 221 255 In Bought on v. Button Heath and Lea Green Col- liers Co. 3 B. W. C. C. 173, it was held that where sixpence a week was deducted from a miner 's wages to pay for the oil of his lamp, the court held the deduction to be a part of his earnings, saying : ' ' His wages were subject to this deduction, but that did not make his earnings or wages any less." Spring- field Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111.408,415; 126 N. E. 133. See : Cambra v. Santos, 123 N. E. 503 ; In re How- ard, 125 N. E. 215. 256 (b) Employment by the same employer shall be taken to mean employment by the same employer in the grade In winch the employee was employed at the time of the accident, uninter- rupted by absence from work dne to illness or any other nn- avoidable cause. "Grade" denned. King's case (Mass.) , 125 N. E. 153. 256 Where the inability to earn as much as the average miner is due to a condition imposed by an employer, such employee is entitled to compensation based upon the average wage of the adults employed in said mine in the same class or grade of employment. Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 513, 518; 130 N. E. 725. 256 Where an employee is shown to be in a certain grade or class of employment, there would be no reason for adopting the average wage of employees employed by the same employer in such class or grade of employment as a basis for computation where the income of the employee depends upon his ability and diligence in his work and not upon con- ditions which were not normal or recognized inci- dents of the employment. Centralia, Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 513, 518; 130 N. E. 725. 222 SECTION 10 (c), (d), (e) 256 Where an employee is unable to earn the average amount by reason of his own inability or lack of industry he is not entitled to have his compensa- tion computed upon a basis of the average earnings of miners in that mine, because it would place a premium upon idleness and inefficiency. Centralia Coed Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 513, 518 ; 130 N. E. 725. 256 (c) If the Injured person has not been engaged in the em- ployment of the same employer for the full year Immediately preceding the accident, the compensation shall be computed ac- cording to the annual earnings which persons of the same class in the same employment and same location, (or if that be im- practicable, of neighboring employments of the same kind) have earned dnring such period. 256 In paragraph (c) the annual earnings of the em- ployees are the same as those of persons of the same class in the same employment and same location, etc. Springfield Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 291 111. 408, 411 ; 126 N. E. 133. 257 (d) As to employees in employments in which it is the cus- tom to operate throughout the working days of the year, the an- nual earnings, if not otherwise determinable, shall be regarded as 300 times the average daily earnings in such computation. 257 In paragraph (d) the annual earnings, if not other- wise determinable, are 300 times the average daily earnings. Springfield Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 408, 411 ; 126 N. E. 133. 257 (e) As to employees in employments in which it is the cus- tom to operate for a part of the whole number of working days in each year, such number, if the annual earnings are not other- wise determinable, shall be used instead of 300 as a basis for computing the annual earnings: Provided, the minimum num- ber of days which shall be so used for the basis of the year's work shall not be less than 200. 257 For employees mentioned in paragraph (e) the annual earnings are the average daily earnings multiplied by the actual number of days employed, such actual days to be not less than 200. Springfield SECTION 10 (f), (g) 223 Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 408, 411 ; 126 N. E. 133. 258 (f) In the case of injured employees who earn either no wage or less than the earnings of adult day laborers in the same line of employment in that locality, the yearly wage shall be reck- oned according to the average annual earning of adults of the same class in the same (or if that is impracticable then of neighboring) employments. 258 It will be noted that in paragraph (f) " yearly wage" is used as the equivalent of the words "an- nual earnings." Springfield Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 408, 411; 126 N. E. 133. 258 For the employees mentioned in paragraph (f) "the yearly wage shall be reckoned according to the average annual earnings of adults of the same class in the same" employment, etc. Springfield Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 408, 411; 126 N. E. 133. 258 Where an adult, experienced and able-bodied work-man is made to work under conditions by the employer, which prevent him from making as much as the average man, such circumstances justify the computing of compensation on the average earnings of adults of the same class in the same employment. Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 513, 516; 130 N. E. 725. 258 (g) Earnings, for the purpose of this section, shall be based on the earnings for the number of hours commonly regarded as a day's work for that employment, and shall exclude overtime earnings. The earnings shall not include any sum which the employer has been accustomed to pay the employee to cover any special expense entailed on him by the nature of his employ- ment. 258 Section 10, (g), defines how earnings shall be computed. Springfield Coal Mining Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 291 111. 408, 410; 126 N. E. 133. 224 SECTION 10 (h), (i) 258 Where an employee did not earn as much as the average miner but it is due to a condition created by the employer and not by lack of industry of the employee, such a normal and recognized incident is not to be considered in computing the earnings of the employee. Centralia Coed Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 297 111. 513, 517; 130 N. E. 725. 258 Paragraph (g) requires no reduction of the com- pensation allowed by the Commission in this case on account of the various items deducted from his wages on pay-days by plaintiff in error. Spring- field Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 408, 412; 126 N. E. 133. 258 Paragraphs (a) and (g), of Section 10, govern the computation of the compensation in Sections 7 and 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Spring- field Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111.408,410; 126 N.E. 133. See: In re Harvard (Ind.) 125 N. E. 215; Gillen v. D. A. & G., 215 Mass. 96; L. R. A. 1916A, 371. 259 (h) In computing the compensation to be paid to any em- ployee, who, before the accident for which he claims compensa- tion, was disabled and drawing compensation under the terms of this Act, the compensation for each subsequent injury shall be apportioned according to the proportion of incapacity and dis- ability caused by the respective injuries which he may have suf- fered. 259 (1) To determine the amount of compensation for each in- stallment period, the amount per annum shall be ascertained pursuant hereto, and such amount divided by the number of in- stallment periods per annum. 258 English rule: That in computing compensation, the circumstances which are normal and recognized incidents of the employment are not to be considered in computing the earnings of the employee, as for instance the closing down of the business (White v. SECTIONS 11-12 225 Wiseman, 5 B. W. C. C. 654; Anslow v. Cannock, 2 id. 365) followed. Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 513, 517; 130 N. E. 725. SECTION 11. 259 The compensation herein provided, together with the pro- visions of this Act shall be the measure of the responsibility of any employer engaged in any of the enterprises or businesses enumerated in section three (3) of this Act, or of any employer who is not engaged in any such enterprises or businesses, but who has elected to provide and pay compensation for accidental injuries sustained by any employee arising out of and in the course of the employment according to the provisions of this Act, and whose election to continue under this Act, has not been nullified by any action of his employees as provided for in this Act. 259 Section 11 declares that the compensation pro- vided by the Act shall be the measure of the respon- sibility of the employer who is within its terms. Mississippi River Power Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 111. 353, 358; 124 N. E. 552. 259 Section 11 of the Compensation Act fixes the meas- ure of responsibility of the employer and 10 (a) and (g) fixes the basis for computing the compen- sation. Springfield Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 408, 410; 126 N. E. 133. SECTION 12. 259 An employee entitled to receive disability payments shall be required, if requested by the employer, to submit himself, at the expense of the employer, for examination to a duly qualified medical practitioner or surgeon selected by the employer at a time and place reasonably convenient for the employee, as soon as practicable after the injury, and also one week after the first examination and thereafter at intervals not oftener than once every four weeks, which examination shall be for the purpose of determining the nature, extent and probable duration of the injury received by the employee, and for the purpose of ascer- taining the amount of compensation which may be due the em- ployee from time to time for disability according to the pro- visions of this Act: Provided, however, that such examination 226 SECTION 12 shall be made in the presence of a duly qualified medical prac- titioner or surgeon provided and paid for by the employee, if such employee so desires: Provided, further, that such exami- nation shall not be made on the day of the hearing. In all cases where the examination is made by a surgeon engaged by the employer, and the injured employee has no surgeon present at such examination, it shall be the duty of the surgeon making the examination at the instance of the employer to deliver to the injured employee, upon his request, or that of his representative, a statement in writing of the condition and extent of the injury to the same extent that said surgeon reports to the employer. If the employee refuses so to submit himself to examination or unnecessarily obstructs the same, his right to compensation pay- ments shall be temporarily suspended until such examination shall have taken place, and no compensation shall be payable under this Act for such period. It shall be the duty of sur- geons treating an injured employee who is likely to die, and treating him at the instance of the employer to have called in another surgeon, to be designated and paid for by either the injured employee or by the person or persons who would become his beneficiary or beneficiaries, to make an examination before the death of such injured employee. [As amended by an Act in force July 1, 1921.] Section 12 was amended by inserting after the word " desires" in the first proviso of said section, the words " provided, further, that such examina- tion shall not be made on the day of the hearing." The rule in Jackson Coal Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 295 111. 18, was responsible for this amend- ment. 260 Employer is entitled to obtain opinion as to the employee's condition, for the purpose of settling the claim and for the purposes of presenting the evi- dence to the arbitrator. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425, 429; 127 N. E. 752. 260 The request of the employer for an examination of the employee should be made at a reasonable time, ordinarily before the case is called for a hear- ing. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 293 111. 425, 429; 127 N. E. 752. SEC. 12 "ENTITLED TO DISABILTY PAYMENTS" 227 260 Where an employer had requested the employee two months before the hearing to submit himself to a doctor for an examination, and had advanced mon- ey to cover the expense of the trip to the doctor and when the case was called for hearing, the employer again requested that the employee submit to the examination; it was held error by the Commission not to require the employee to submit to the exam- ination. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 293 111. 425, 429; 127 N. E. 752. 260 The employee must comply with the provisions of the section to entitle him to the benefits of the Act. Jackson Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 18, 20; 128 N. E. 813. 260 Section 12 is not intended to afford the employer opportunity to harass or oppress the employer by unnecessary examinations and reasonable safe- guards are provided. Jackson Coal Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 295 111. 18, 20; 128 N. E. 813. 260 The fact that the request for a physical examina- tion is not made until at the time of the hearing by the Commission does not prove that it is not made in good faith. Jackson Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 18, 20; 128 N. E. 813. "Entitled to Receiye Disability Payments." 260 This provision cannot be construed as giving the employee the right to refuse to submit to examina- tion, where the employer is denying that the em- ployee is entitled to receive compensation. Jackson Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 18; 128 N. E. 813. 228 SEC. 12 "SUBMIT TO EXAMINATION" 260 The provision of Section 12 requiring the em- ployee to submit to physical examination applies to all cases where the employee is entitled to receive disability payments, and whether he is entitled to them is not dependent on whether the employer acknowleges liability by making payments. Jackson Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 18, 21; 128 N. E. 813. 260 Under Section 12, if the making of the examina- tion at the time of the hearing before the Commis- sion placed the employee at a disadvantage, it would be proper to continue the hearing to enable employee properly to present his case, on a proper showing. Jackson Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 18, 20; 128 N. E. 813. 260 Allowing employer to make a physical examina- 496 tion of injured employee is not restricted to cases where the employer acknowledges his liability and makes compensation payments. Jackson Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 18, 20; 128 N. E. 813. "Submit to Examination." 260 Where a demand was made by the employer to have the injured employee examined at the hearing before the Industrial Commission and the Com- mission denied the request of the employer for the examination, such action was held to be error on the part of the Commission which warranted a reversal of the award. Jackson Coal Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 295 111. 18; 128 N. E. 813. 260 The limitation placed on the time for the request for the examination, is that it must be a time, rea- sonably convenient for the employee. Jackson Coal SECTIONS 13-14 229 Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 18, 20; 128 N. E. 813. SECTION 13. 260 (a) There is hereby created a board which shall be known as the Industrial Board to consist of five members to be appointed by the Governor, by and with the consent of the Senate, two of whom shall be representative citizens of the employing class operating nnder this Act, and two of whom shall be representa- tive citizens of the class of employees operating nnder this Act, and one of whom shall be a representative citizen not identified with either the employing or employee classes and who shall be designated by the Governor as chairman. Appointment of mem- bers to places on the first board or to fill vacancies on said board may be made during recesses of the Senate, but shall be subject to confirmation by the Senate at the next ensuing session of the Legislature. (b) When there shall become effective the Act known as "The Civil Administrative Code of Illinois," being an Act entitled "An Act in relation to the civil administraton of the State Govern- ment,'* there shall thereupon be vested in the Industrial Com- mission and the industrial officers thereof by said Act created, all of the powers and duties vested in the Industrial Board by the Workmen's Compensation Act, and thereupon wherever in the Workmen's Compensation Act reference shall be made to the Industrial Board, the board or to any member thereof, it shall be construed as referring and shall apply to the said Industrial Commission, the said commission, and any industrial officer thereof, respectively. (Amended by Act approved June 25, 1917.) SECTION 14. 261 The salary of each of the members of the Commission ap- pointed by the Governor shall be six thousand dollars ($6,000.00) per year, except that the salary of the chairman shall be seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) per year. The Com- mission shall appoint a secretary, whose salary shall be five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) per year, and shall employ such assistants and clerical help as may be necessary. The salary of the arbitrators designated by the Commission shall be at the rate of four thousand two hundred dollars per year. The members of the Commission and the arbitrators shall have reimbursed to them their actual traveling expenses and disbursements made or incurred by them in the discharge of their official duties while away from their places of residence in the performance of their duties. The Commission shall provide itself with a seal for the authentication of its orders, awards 230 SECTION 15 and proceedings upon which shall be Inscribed the name of the Commission and the words "IllinoIs-SeaL" In Section 14 the salaries of the members of the Commission were raised to six thousand dollars per year, except that the Chairman was to receive seven thousand five hundred dollars per year. The salary of the Secretary of the Commission was fixed at five thousand dollars per year and the salaries of .the Arbitrators at four thousand two hundred dol- lars per year. SECTION 15. 261 The Industrial Board shall li:m- jurisdiction over the opera* tion and administration of this Ad, and said board shall perform all the duties imposed upon it by this Act, and such further duties as may hereafter be imposed by law and the rules of the board not inconsistent therewith. 261 On August 23, 1915, employee slipped and in- jured his knee. He was paid compensation for nine weeks. The last payment was in October, 1915. In March, 1917, employee entered into negotiations and made a settlement which was approved by the Commission. July 23, 1918, employee filed a peti- tion under Section 19 (h), on the ground that the injury had recurred and increased so as to derange the hip and on March 5, 1919, the Commission found for the employee and gave him an award. Employer contends that as there was no demand within six months that there was no jurisdiction. Held, that by the settlement agreement both parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the Commission and the ques- tion of jurisdiction on the six month's provision of Section 24, was waived. Tribune Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 290 111 402, 406; 125 N. E. 351. 261 Where there is no attempt to secure the approval of the Commission, an agreement made by the em- SECTION 15 231 ployee with the employer to dismiss the matter and to accept a lesser amount in settlement, cannot de- prive the Commission of jurisdiction. International Coal <& Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524,530; 127 N. E. 703. 260 The Industrial Commission is an administrative body and has no judicial functions. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 176; 125 N. E. 748. 261 The Industrial Commission is not a court but a ministerial body having jurisdiction over the opera- tion and administration of the act with power to make rules and orders for carrying out the duties imposed upon it by law and the staute provides that the process and procedure before it shall be as simple and summary as reasonably may be. Mis- sissippi River Poiver Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 353, 359; 124 N. E. 552. 261 Any controversy arising concerning the mere ad- ministration of the act may be decided in such sum- mary manner as the legislature shall prescribe. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 176; 125 N. E. 748. 261 The Industrial Commission had jurisdiction un- 432 der a rider contract to enforce the payment of a claim against an insurance carrier, regardless of the provisions of the original insurance policy. Illinois Indemnity, Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 241 ; 124 N. E. 665. 261 The Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to en- 436 force a claim of an employee against an insurance carrier where the employer has become insolvent. 232 SECTION 15 Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 111. 233, 241, 242; 124 N. E. 665. 261 Section 15 provided that the Industrial Commis- sion shall have jurisdiction over the operation and administration of the act. Illinois Indemnity Ex- change v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 238; 124 N. E. 665. 262 To sustain the jurisdiction of the Commission it is necessary to show that the employer was engaged in an extra-hazardous business and that the em- ployee was also engaged in an extra-hazardous oc- cupation and that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment in such extra-hazardous oc- cupation. Bowman Dairy Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 292 111. 284, 287 ; 126 N. E. 596. 262 Under the 1915 Act, where it does not appear that the employment of the employee is one of the extra- hazardous occupations enumerated in Section 3, in the absence of an election by the employer, the Com- mission is without jurisdiction to make an award for injuries sustained. Mattoon Clear Water Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 487, 490; 126 N. E. 168. 262 Even though the contract to make a settlement may be entered into in good faith, yet the purpose of the Compensation Act is that the economic loss from accidents does not rest on the public but should be absorbed by the industry and to carry out this purpose the Commission alone has jurisdiction to authorize settlement. International Coal & Min- ing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524, 533; 127 N. E. 703. 262 The Commission will not interfere where a set- tlement is made in accordance with the provisions of SECTION 16 233 the Act, yet where it has taken jurisdiction, it can- not be taken away from it by action of the parties, unless such action is in conformity with the Act. International Coal & Mining Company v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524, 529; 127 N. E. 703. SECTION 16. 266 The board may make rules and orders for carrying ont the duties imposed upon it by law, which rules and orders shall be deemed prima facie reasonable and valid; and the process and procedure before the board shall be as simple and summary as reasonably may be. The board upon application of either party may issue dedimus potestatem directed to a commissioner, notary public, justice of the peace or any other officer authorized by law to administer oaths, to take the depositions of such witness or witnesses as may be necessary in the judgment of such applicant. Such dedimus potestatem may issue to any of the officers afore* said in any state or territory of the United States or in any for- eign country. The board shall have the power to adopt necessary rules to govern the issue of such dedimus potestatem. The board, or any member thereof, or any arbitrator designated by said board shall have the power to administer oaths, subpoena and examine witnesses, to issue subpoenas duces tecum, requiring the production of such books, papers, records and documents as may be evidence of any matter under inquiry, and to examine and inspect the same and such places or premises as may relate to the question in dispute. Said board, or any member thereof, or any arbitrator designated by said board, shall, on written request of either party to the dispute, issue subpoenas for the attendance of such witnesses and production of such books, papers, records, and documents as shall be designated in said applications, pro- viding, however, that the parties applying for such subpoena shall advance the officer and witness fees provided for in suits pending in the Circuit Court. Service of such subpoenas shall be made by any sheriff or constable or other person. In case any person refuses to comply with an order of the board or subpoena issued by it or any member thereof, or any arbitrator designated by said board, or to permit an inspection of places or premises, or to produce any books, papers, records, or documents, or any witness refuses to testify to any matters regarding which he may be lawfully interrogated, the County Court of the county in which said hearing or matter is pending, on application of any member of the board or any arbitrator designated by the board, shall compel obedience by attachment proceedings, as for con- tempt, as in a case of disobedience of the requirements of a sub- poena from such court on a refusal to testify therein. 234 SECTION 16 The board at its expense shall provide a stenographer to take the testimony and record of proceedings at the hearings before an arbitrator, committee of arbitration, or the board, and said stenographer shall furnish a transcript of such testimony or pro- ceedings to any person requesting it upon payment to him there- for of fire cents per one hundred words for the original and three cents per one hundred words for each copy of such transcript. The board shall have the power to determine the reasonable- ness and fix the amount of any fee or compensation charged by any person for any service performed In connection with this Act, or for which payment is to be made under this Act or ren- dered in securing any right under this Act. 266 Section 16 provides that the Commission may make rules and orders, and, this is the only indi- cation in the Act as to the manner in which notifica- tion shall be given, and the person by whom it shall be given. Mississippi River Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 353, 357; 124 N. E. 552. 266 The Commission has power to formulate rules and to determine controversies which arise in the ad- ministration of the Act and any controversy aris- ing concerning the administration of the Act may be decided in such manner as the legislature shall prescribe. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 291 111. 167, 176; 125 N. E. 748. 266 If any question arises as to who is entitled to the 225 compensation, the Commission may require all claimants or possible claimants, to be notified and may determine who is entitled to it. Mississippi River Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 353, 360; 124 N. E. 552. 267 The Workmen's Compensation Act gives a right to compensation to certain persons. It provides for the adjustment of a right by an administrative body. Even if the Commission has no rule, the Commis- sion can act on the petition of the beneficiary, who alone is interested in the claim. Mississippi River SECTIONS 17-18 235 Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 353, 360; 124 N. E. 552. Dedinms may issue even after date in notice. Haish v. Dreyfus, 111 111. App. 44. "^Reasonableness of any fee." 267 This is an action in assumpsit by an attorney un- der the Attorneys' Lien Law against an employer for a $400 fee allowed by the Commission. The em- ployer demurs. An appeal is prayed to the Su- preme Court. Held, no franchise or freehold, nor the validity of a statute or any constitutional ques- tion being involved, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction and the cause is transferred to the Ap- pellate Court under Section 8 of the Appellate Court Act. Lasley v. Tazewell Coal Co., 294 111. 399; 128 N. E. 475. SECTION 17. 267 The board shall cause to be printed and furnish free of charge upon request by any employer or employee such blank form as it shall deem requisite to facilitate or promote the efficient ad- ministration of this Act, and the performance of the duties of the board; it shall pro Tide a proper record in which shall be entered and indexed the name of any employer who shall file a notice of declination or withdrawal under this Act, and the date of the filing thereof; and a proper record in which shall be entered and indexed the name of any employee who shall file such a notice of declination or withdrawal, and the date of the filing thereof; and such other notices as may be required by the terms and in- tend in ent of this Act; and records in which shall be recorded all proceedings, orders and awards had or made by the board, or by the arbitration committees, and such other books or records as it shall deem necessary, all such records to be kept in the office of the board. SECTION 18. 268 All questions arising under this Act, if not settled by agree- ment of the parties interested therein, shall, except as otherwise provided, be determined by the Industrial Board. 236 SECTION 19 (a) 269 Section 18 provides that all questions arising un- der the Act, if not settled by agreement, shall be de- termined by the Commission. Mississippi River Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 353, 356; 124 N. E. 552. 271 The proceedings before the Industrial Commission are wholly statutory and its authority is limited to that granted it by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 451, 454; 130 N. E. 727. SECTION 19. 269 Any disputed question of law or fact shall be determined as herein provided. "Disputed Questions of Law or Fact" 269 "Any disputed questions of law or fact if not set- tled by agreement of the parties interested therein" must be determined by the Industrial Commission and the proceedings to determine these questions is not judicial, though it has some of the elements of a judicial proceeding. Mississippi River Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 353, 359; 124 N. E. 552. 269 Where it is not stipulated what person or per- sons are entitled to the compensation, it is the duty of the Commission to determine that fact. (Paul v. Industrial Commission, 288 111. 532.) Clark Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 561, 565; 126 N. E. 579. 271 (a) It shall be the duty of the Industrial Commission upon notification that the parties have failed to reach an agreement, to designate an arbitrator: Provided, that if the compensation claimed is for a partial permanent or total permanent incapacity or for death, then the dispute may, at the election of either party, SECTION 19 (b) 237 be determined by a committee of arbitration, which election for determination by a committee shall be made by petitioner filing with the commission his election in writing with his petition or by the other party filing with the commission his election in writ- ing within five days of notice to him of the filing of the petition, and thereupon it shall be the duly of the Industrial Commission upon either of the parties having filed their election for a com- mittee of arbitration as above provided, to notify both parties to appoint their respective representatives on the committee of arbitration. The commission shall designate an arbitrator to act as chairman, and if either party fails to appoint its member on the committee within seven days after notification as above pro- vided, the commission shall appoint a person to fill the vacancy and notify the parties to that effect. The party filing his elec- tion for a committee of arbitration shall with his election de- posit with the commission the sum of twenty dollars, to be paid by the commission to the arbitrators selected by the parties as compensation for their services as arbitrators, and upon a fail- ure to deposit as aforesaid, the election shall be void and the determination shall be by an arbitrator designated by the com- mission. The members of the committee of arbitration appointed by either of the parties or one appointed by the commission to fill a vacancy by reason of the failure of one of the parties to appoint, shall not be a member of the commission or an employee thereof. "Commission Designates Arbitrator." 272 Section 19 provides that the Industrial Board upon notification that the parties have failed to reach an agreement, shall designate an arbitrator. Mis- sissippi River Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 353, 356, 357 ; 124 N. E. 552. 273 (b) The arbitrator or committee of arbitration shall make such inquiries and investigations as he or they shall deem neces- sary, and may examine and inspect all books, papers, records, places, or premises relating to the questions in dispute, and hear such proper evidence as the parties may submit. The hearings before the arbitrator or committee of arbitration shall be held in the vicinity where the injury occurred, after ten days' notice of the time and place of such hearing shall have been given to each of the parties or their attorneys of record. The decision of the arbitrator or committee of arbitration shall be filed with the Industrial Commission, which commission shall immediately send to each party or his attorney a copy of such decision, to- gether with a notification of the time when it was filed, and unless a petition for a review is filed by either party within fifteen days after the receipt by said party of the copy of said decision and notification of time when filed, and unless such party petitioning 238 SEC. 19 (b) APPLICATION ADJUSTMENT OF CLAIM for a review shall within twenty days after the receipt by him of the copy of said decision, file with the commission either an agreed statment of the facts appearing upon the hearing before the arbitrator or committee of arbitration, or if snch party shall so elect, a correct stenographic report of the proceedings at such hearings, then the decision shall become the decision of the In- dustrial Commission and In the absence of fraud shall be con- clusive: Provided, that such Industrial Commission may for sufficient cause shown grant further time not exceeding thirty days, In which to petition for such review or to file such agreed statement or stenographic report. Snch agreed statement of facts or correct stenographic report, as the case may be, shall be authenticated by the signatures of the parties or their attor- neys and in the event they do not agree as to the correctness of the stenographic report it shall be authenticated by the signature of the arbitrator designated by the commission. Application for Adjustment of Claim. 273 Under the 1913 Act, either the administrator, a beneficiary or an employer, may file a petition for the adjustment of claim. (Hammond Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 288 111. 262; Mississippi River Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 353.) National Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 598, 600; 127 N. E. 135. 315 The statutory provisions for reducing or suspend- ing compensation if an injured employee persists in such insanitary practices as tend to either imperil or retard a recovery or shall refuse to submit to such medical or surgical treatments as will reasonably be essential to promote his recovery, do not apply to an original application for compensation. (Joliet Motor Co. v. Industrial Board, 280 111. 148.) Snyder v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 175; 130 N. E. 517. 491 The petition for the adjustment of claim is a mat- ter of procedure and is governed by the law in effect at the time it was filed. National Zinc Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 292 111. 598, 604; 127 N. E. 135. SEC. 19 (b) PROPER EVIDENCE 239 271 The natural person to file the petition is the per- son to whom payment should be made. If the statute required the proceeding to be commenced in the name of the administrator, he alone could start it. Mississippi River Power Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 IU. 353, 360; 124 N. E. 552. "Proper Evidence." 277 A person cannot be affected by proceedings to which he is a stranger unless the judgment is upon some subject of a public nature or is in the nature of a proceeding in rem. Illinois Steel Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 290 111. 594, 596; 125 N. E. 252. 277 A judgment cannot be introduced in evidence to es- tablish facts upon which it has been rendered, except against parties to the suit or their representatives. Illinois Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 594, 596; 125 N. E. 252* 277 Husband or wife cannot testify as to any admis- sions or conversations between husband and wife or by either with third persons. Ohio Oil Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 293 111. 461, 465; 127 N. E. 743. 277 The wife is not a competent witness to a conversa- tion had between her husband and a third person. Ohio Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 461, 465; 127 N. E. 743. 277 The Commission should not base its finding on tes- timony which all the facts and circumstances in the record, show to be untrue. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425, 427 ; 127 N. E. 752. 277 Exaggerated statements and groundless asser- 240 SEC. 19 (b) PROPER EVIDENCE tions that have no foundation in fact are not the character of evidence which the law recognizes as worthy to support any legal finding. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425, 427; 127 N. E. 752. 277 Evidence of a witness who testified to the hand- writing in a letter which had no date and who re- ferred to a certain envelope, which was not pro- duced, but which would show when the letter was written is of no probative value. Keystone Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 587, 590; 124 N. E. 542. 277 Evidence in record and facts found held to be suf- ficient to constitute a basis for a proper decision. Keller v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 314, 316; 126 N. E. 162. 277 Evidence held to warrant conclusion by Commis- sion, that deceased contracted anthrax in the course of the employment and that the death was the re- sult of the accident. Chicago Rawhide Manufac- turing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 616, 620; 126 N. E. 616. 277 The determination of the per cent of the loss of use of an eye or an arm is an issue of the ultimate fact before the arbitrator or Commission. Interna- tional Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524, 532; 127 N. E. 703. 277 Evidence proving conditions, such as comparative ability to do certain things in the use of a member before and after an accident, or any other fac^s from which an inference as to an ultimate fact may be drawn, is competent. International Coal and Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524, 532; 127 N. E. 703. SEC. 19 (b) PROPER EVIDENCE 241 277 Where there is evidence, independent of opinion evidence, as to the loss of use of an arm, the fact that the injury was exhibited to and examined by the triers of fact, such evidence is entitled to some weight. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 295 111. 578, 581; 129 N. E. 521. 277 Witnesses must state facts and not draw conclu- sions or give opinions. It is the duty of the court to draw the conclusions from the evidence and to form the opinions from the facts proved. International Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524, 532; 127 N. E. 703. 279 Where the only evidence in the record as to the loss of use of the eye, and of the arms was the opin- ion of the applicant, it was held that such evidence was not competent and that there was no evidence in the record to sustain the finding as to the percent- age of the loss of use of the eye and the arms and such finding was erroneous. International Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524, 531; 127 N. E. 703. 277 Even though the anthrax bacillus was not seen to enter the body, if the sequence of events is suscepti- ble of only one explanation, the conclusion that the employee got the infection in the course of the em- ployment is reasonable. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 616, 619; 126 N. E. 616. 277 Where facts are established by the uncontroverted testimony of expert witnesses, the fact that the tes- timony is opinion evidence, does not authorize the Industrial Commission to disregard the evidence. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 449, 454; 124 N.E. 566. 242 SEC. 19 (b) PROPER EVIDENCE 277 Where facts are proven altogether by expert wit- nesses, who appear fair and unbiased, competent and well skilled in their profession, there is no good reason for a court disregarding the evidence as not establishing facts because much of the evidence is opinion evidence. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 449, 454 ; 124 N. E. 566. 279 A witness though not qualified as an expert may testify as to his state of health, that he is suffering pain or as to his physical condition, but he is not allowed to testify that it is his opinion that the in- jury will be permanent. Internatonal Coal & Min- ing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524, 531; 127 N. E. 703. 277 The testimony of a chiropractor is admissible in evidence as expert testimony if there is a showing that he has special skill or is schooled, educated or trained in any particular system for the treatment of an ailment or disease. Voight v. Industrial Com- mission, 297 111. 109, 113 ; 130 N. E. 470. 277 The weight of expert testimony should be deter- mined by the character, capacity, skill and opportu- nities for observation and the state of mind of the experts themselves, as seen and heard and by the nature of the case and its developed facts. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 449, 454 ; 124 N. E. 566. 277 Where there is no competent evidence showing that an employee is not totally permanently dis- abled rendering him wholly and permanently incapa- ble of work, a pension for life cannot be allowed under Section 8, (f). Ballou v. Industrial Commis- sion, 296 111. 434, 438; 129 N. E. 755. SEC. 19 (b) PROPER EVIDENCE 243 277 Where there is any evidence tending to show that an employee was an independent contractor, it is the exclusive duty of the Commission to weigh the evi- dence and thus make the question one of fact. Cin- ofsky v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 521, 525 ; 125 N. E. 286. 277 Where testimony is not objected to, the triers of 319 the facts and the attorneys are lulled into the belief 300 that the evidence is competent, and, so, if objections 348 are not made upon the trial before the Commission, such questions cannot be raised for the first time in the Circuit Court. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 449, 452; 124 N. E. 566. 277 An employee while starting a fire to give the men 233 a warm place to eat was burned on the hands and 323 legs. The arbitrator made an award of 50 per cent loss of use of legs and the Commission cut this down to 35 per cent. Applicant testified as to the percentage of loss of use of his legs and there was testimony as to what he could do with his legs and the pains that he felt. The doctor testified that the injuries were negligible, that the disability at a maxi- mum was about 15 per cent.. The award of the Com- mission was between the opinion of the doctor and the claimant. Held, as the finding of the Commis- sion as to the percentage of loss of use of the legs was not based on competent evidence, the award must be set aside and the case remanded on the ques- tion of the extent of loss of use of his legs. Decatur Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 290 ; 129 N. E. 738. 244 SEC. 19 (b) STATEMENTS OF INJURED Statements of Injured. 278 Statement made by employee to various co-work - 307 ers that he had stepped on a nail, sufficient to sup- port a finding that he sustained injury arising out of the employment. Snyder v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 175, 179; 130 N. E. 517. 277 Testimony that deceased told another that matches were ignited by striking against a locker, held suffi- cient where it was elicited from a witness on cross- examination without objection. Steel Sales Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 435, 439; 127 N. E. 698. 280 Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 449; International Coal Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 293 111. 524; both holding that an applicant cannot testify as to what he believes is the percent- age of loss of use of a member distinguished on the ground that it is competent to prove the compara- tive ability to do certain things before and after the accident or any other fact enabling the Commission to draw an inference as to the ultimate fact to be determined. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 578, 581 ; 129 N. E. 521. 280 Evidence of a claimant that his earning capacity 302 had been reduced 50 per cent is incompetent and does not form a sufficient basis in legal evidence for the finding of the Commission, Old Ben Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 229, 232; 129 N. E. 722. 280 Testimony of an employee that he can lift less 277 than before the injury; that his hip seems stiff in 233 walking; that his back is stiff, is competent testi- mony to be considered in determining the present SEC. 19 (b) DOCTORS EXPERTS 245 earning ability. Old Ben Coal Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 296 111. 229, 233 ;129 N. E. 722. 280 Where the applicant himself testified that he had suffered a fifty per cent loss of the vision of both eyes, the opinion evidence was error and the award based on this evidence was reversed. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425, 427, 428; 127 N. E. 752. 280 It is error for the Commission to permit the claim- 238 ant to express an opinion as to the loss of use he suffered on account of his injuries. Decatur Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 290, 294; 129 1ST. E. 738. 277 Where there is no evidence as to the permanent loss of the use of the leg and the amount awarded is based on the opinion of the injured employee as to the per cent of loss, such opinion is incompetent as a basis for an award. St. Louis Smelting & Re- fining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 272, 277; 131 N. E. 617. 280 WJiere an employee testified that he could not see as well after the accident, that he could not read by electric light, that the wind made his eyes water, that light and heat hurt his eyes ; this evidence was com- petent to be considered by the Commission. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425, 427; 127 N.E. 752. Doctors Experts. 287 Neither an expert, nor a lay witness is allowed to declare his belief as to an ultimate fact under the Illinois rule. (Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 289 111. 449 ; Keefe v. Armour & Co., 258 111. 28 ; I 'arbour v. Chicago & Alton Ey. Co., 235 111. 589 ; 246 SEC. 19 (b) DOCTORS EXPERTS J. C. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 208 111. 608). International Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524, 532; 127 N.E. 703. 287 Where the complaint was made by the plaintiff in error, that the testimony of the expert witnesses of the employee to the effect that the partial disability permanently impaired the earning capacity 25 per cent was inadmissible because an ultimate issue of fact before the Commission, it was held, that this position was not well taken, because they had not objected to the competency of this evidence. Pea- body Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 449, 452; 124 N. E. 566. 287 Evidence consisting of the opinion of two doctors, one stating that acute nephritis may result from trauma but that it was not common ; the other stat- ing that the injury relegated to and assisted the patient to deplete his vitality instead of gain are not opinions that the fall of the employee caused his death. Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 298 111. 175, 178, 179; 131 N. E. 369. 288 The weight of the testimony of a particular expert is to be determined by the character, capacity, skill and opportunity of the witness to know and under- stand the matters about which he testifies and his state of mind or fairness to the parties litigant. Voight v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 109, 113; 130 N. E. 470. 288 Any one who is shown to have special knowledge and skill in diagnosing and treating human ailments is qualified to testify as an expert if his learning and training show that he is qualified to give an opnion on the particular questions in issue. Voight v. In- dustrial Commission, 297 111. 109, 112; 130 N. E. 470. SEC. 19 (b) INFERENCES 247 As to inability of medical profession to forecast results, see: Peoria Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 290 111. 177, 179. " 288 Opinion of physician that employee was electro- cuted based on no knowledge of authorities, nor of the subject of electrocution, and no actual experi- ence, is incompetent as he was not qualified to give opinion. Sesser Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 11, 13, 14; 129 N. E. 536. 287 The opinion of a doctor that under certain condi- tions nephritis might have been set up by the fall is nothing more than an opinion that there was a possi- ble connection between the accident and the death, and being based upon a hypothesis unsupported by any evidence it is not admissible. Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 175, 178; 131 N. E. 369. 288 Expert evidence is legal and competent evidence 196 and is to be received, treated and weighed precisely as other evidence by triers of fact in this character of cases and by jurors in cases of law. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 449, 454 ; 124 N. E. 566. Inferences. 291 Where the agency likely to cause death is present and employee is found where the deadly agency was in effectual operation and certain to cause death, the facts warrant an inference being drawn. Sesser Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 11, 14 ; 129 N. E. 536. 291-6 Where no autopsy is held and the proof does not show with certainty what caused the death and there is present an agency likely to cause death an infer- 248 SEC. 19 (b) PRESUMPTION. ence that this particular agency caused the death is reasonable even though there is some evidence that the employee was suffering from flu. Wasson Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 217, 222 ; 129 N. E. 786. 291 Even though evidence is conflicting on the question of agency still it might warrant the conclusion that he was acting within the scope of the employment in making the employment. Davis v. Industrial Com- mission, 297 111. 29, 31, 32; 130 N. E. 333. 292 It is not necessary that there should be an eye- witness to the accident. Hydrox Chemical Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 291 111. 579, 582; 126 N. E. 564. 293 An eye-witness is not necessary to an accident, where there are facts from which an inference can be raised or it can be presumed that the accident arose out of the employment. Sparks Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 350, 354, 356; 127 N. E. 737. Presumption. 292 There is a rebuttable presumption of law that, if a person is absent from his usual place of abode, and no intelligence has been received from him within seven years, and no account can be given of him, he is presumed to be dead. Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 587, 589 ; 124 N. E. 542. 292 There is no presumption either of law or fact, at what time during the period of seven years the death occurred, or that the person lived during any partic- ular portion of the period. Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 587, 589; 124 N. E. 542. SEC. 19 (b) PRESUMPTION 249 292 There is a presumption of fact based on common experience, as to the continuance of life, which justi- fies a conclusion of fact that a person is alive short- ly after he has been proved to be living. Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 587, 589; 124 N. E. 542. 295 Legal presumptions are rules established either by common law or statute founded upon the first principles of justice or the laws of nature or the ex- perienced course of human conduct and affairs and the connection usually found to exist between cer- tain things ; where one fact is proved, another which uniformly exists is presumed without proof. Na- tional Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 598, 602; 127 N.E. 135. 296 Where one pays money to another and there is no 207 explanation of the cause of such payment, the ordi- nary presumption is that the money was paid be- cause it was due and owing and not by way of a loan, but where the relation existing between the parties is different than business, the presumption arises that it is in performance of a legal obligation rest- ing upon the father or husband to support the wife or child. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 111. 330, 333; 124 N. E. 603. 296 A presumption as to the payment of money may be one of fact rather than one of law, a mere rule of evidence, an inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 330, 333; 124 N. E. 603. 293 There is a general presumption of fact against a change under established and settled conditions. Na- tional Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 598, 602; 127 N.E. 135. 250 SEC. 19 (b) PRESUMPTION 295 There is no presumption of continuance of life during seven years or at what time during the period the death occurred. National Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 598, 602; 127 N. E. 135. 294 Presumptions are either of law or fact, and either conclusive or rebuttable. National Zinc Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 292 111. 598, 601 ; 127 N. E. 135. 293 What is evidence of a fact and what is merely guessing at the fact cannot be defined by any formula that one can invent. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 295 111. 141, 147; 128 N. E. 917. 293 Where an employee was found dead on a track generally used by miners on their way to work, it may be inferred that the deceased was on his way to work when he was killed. Western Coal & Min- ing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 408, 410; 129 N. E. 779. 293 Where there are three theories: any of which may account for the death of the employee, murder, suicide or accident; the presumption against the commission of a crime or suicide, is sufficient to sup- port a finding that the death was the result of acci- dent. (Humphrey v. Industrial Commission, 285 111. 372; in re Von Ette (Mass.) Ill N. E. 696; Steers v. Dunnewald (N. J.) 89 Atl. 1007; State v. District Court (Minn.) 164 N. W. 582; Bekkedal Lumber Co. v. Industrial Commission (Wis.) 169 N. W. 561) ; Sparks Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 350, 353; 127 N.E. 737. 299 The mere fact that the cerebral hemorrhage oc- curred a few minutes after a quarrel would not jus- tify any court in holding that it was caused by a quarrel, when the proof is that it can only be con- SEC. 19 (b) PRESUMPTION 251 jectured it was so caused. Ideal Fuel Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 298 111. 463, 467; 131 N. E. 649. 294 If a person is absent for seven years, a rebuttable presumption that he is dead is raised. National Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 598, 602 ; 127 N. E. 135. 295 No rule can be laid down as to the degree of proof sufficient to justify an inference being drawn. Vul- can Detinning Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 141, 147; 128 N.E. 917. 295 Until there is proof that the son is emancipated, the liability to support continues until the son reaches the age of twenty-one years. Panther Creek Mines v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 565, 567; 130 N. E. 321. 296 Where an employee was killed by electric shock by going over to a side where a live wire was, con- trary to directions, the conclusion may be drawn from the evidence that through his inexperience or carelessness, he moved too close to the live wires and in such case, the determination of the Commis- sion concludes the Court. Mississippi River Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 353, 356; 124 N. E. 552. 296 Where it is shown by a witness that a son con- tributed to a father by making two remittances of money to him in the old country, no legal presump- tion can be drawn from the mere payment to the father that it was made to assist in the father's sup- port rather than to pay an ordinary debt for services rendered, or for money loaned. Pedbody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 330, 333; 124 N. E. 603. 252 SEC. 19 (b) HEARSAY 296 The Commission cannot surmise, conjecture or guess its conclusion, yet it may draw an inference from proven facts, as long as the inference is a legitimate one. Sparks Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 350, 354; 127 N. E. 737. 296 The refusal to reply with a request for an autopsy after the body has been buried, where after the un- dertaker's preparation, the cause of death cannot be shown, should not be treated as an admission or legal presumption one way or the other as to the cause of death. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 141, 150; 128 N. E. 917. Hearsay. 297 Where there was testimony by the wife of the de- ceased employee that he told her that he had scratched his neck and that a hide fell on it, this testimony was not competent, being hearsay. Chi- cago Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 291 111. 616, 617; 126 N. E. 616. 297 Where the testimony of the wife as to a conversa- tion her husband had with the field boss, was ad- mitted over objection, it was held incompetent. Ohio Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 461, 465; 127 N. E. 743. 297 Where hearsay evidence is brought out on cross examination and no objection made nor motion to strike it out, the evidence is competent in the record. Steel Sales Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 435, 439; 127 N. E. 698. Burden of Proof. 298 It is incumbent on the applicant to prove by direct and positive evidence that the accident arose out of SEC. 19 (b) BURDEN OF PROOF 253 the employment, or by evidence from which such an inference could be drawn. Edelweiss Gardens v. In- dustrial Commission, 290 111. 459, 463 ; 125 N. E. 260. 295 The claimant has the burden of proving that the injury occurred in connection with the employment and to furnish evidence from which the inference can be logically drawn that the injury arose out of and in course of the employment. Hydrox Chemicdl Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 579, 582 ; 126 N. E. 564. 115 Where the cause is equally consistent with an ac- cident and with no accident, compensation must be denied. (Barnabas v. Bersham Colliery Co. 4 B. W. C. C. 119) ; Ideal Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 463, 467; 131 N. E. 649. 293 The burden is on the applicant to prove that the injury was accidental and its cause, but to make this proof, the testimony of eye-witnesses is not neces- sary, as the proof may be made by direct or cir- cumstantial evidence. (Ohio Building Vault Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 111. 96; Mechanics Furniture Co. v. Industrial Board, 281 111. 530; Northern Illi- nois Traction Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 111. 565) ; Steel Sales Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 435, 437 ; 127 N. E. 698. 298 The burden is on the claimant to show that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employ- ment, and the finding can not rest on conjecture or possibility. Morris & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295111. 49, 52; 128 N.E. 727. 298 The burden of proving that the accidental injury arose out of the employment is on the claimant. It must be shown by such direct and positive evidence from which such inference could be fairly drawn. 254 SEC. 19 (b) BURDEN OF PROOF Sparks Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 350, 353, 354; 127 N. E. 737. 298 The burden of proving that the accident arose out of the employment is on the applicant. (Wiscon- son Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 288 111. 206 ; Peterson v. Industrial Board, 281 111. 326 ; Northern Illinois Traction Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 111. 565) ; Rockford Cabinet Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 295 111. 332, 335; 129 N. E. 142. 298 The burden is on the applicant to prove by direct 114 and positive evidence, or by evidence from which such inference can be fairly drawn, without being based on conjecture, guess or surmise, that the acci- dent arose out of the employment. Wasson Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 2196 111. 217, 220? 129 N. E. 786. 298 The burden of proof is on the claimant to prove employment and injury, but the burden rests upon the employer to prove that the employment was but casual. Consumers Mutual Ofl, Producing OH Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 423, 424; 124 N. E. 608. 298 It is incumbent on the claimant to prove that an accident occurred in the course of his employment and arose out of it and that his condition for which he claimed compensation was a result of the acci- dent. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 298 111. 272, 277 ; 131 N. E. 617. 298 The burden is always on the claimant to show that the injury was the result of an accident. City of Joliet v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 555, 558; 126 N. E. 618. 299 It is incumbent on the applicant to prove that loss of sight is caused by the accident. Spring Valley SEC. 19 (b) CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 255 Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 315, 317 ; 124 N. E. 545. 298 It is necessary that the injury be traceable to something tangible by proof. Ideal Fuel Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 298 111. 463, 466 ; 131 N. E. 649. 298 A beneficiary, under the 1915 Act, had to prove 207 that the deceased employee contributed to his sup- port within four years and hearsay evidence, as to the sending of money, was not admissible to prove this fact. Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 587, 590; 124 N. E. 542. 298 While facts in case might give rise to conflicting inferences, there is ground for comparing probabili- ties at their respective values and if a reasonable conclusion can be reached, it will stand the scrutiny of the reviewing court. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 141, 148; 128 N. E. 917. 298 Where the question is, whether the proof tends to show that the death of the employee occurred while he was reasonably fulfilling duties of his employ- ment, or doing something incidental to it, the bur- den is on the applicant to prove that the accident arose in the course of and out of the employment by direct and positive evidence or by evidence by which such inference can be fairly drawn. Mepham v. In- dustrial Commission, 289 111. 484, 488; 124 N. E. 540. Circumstantial Evidence. 299 Proof of the facts may be established by circum- stantial as well as by direct evidence, and the greater or less probability leading on the whole to a satis- factory conclusion is all that can be reasonably re- quired to establish controverted facts. Hydrox 256 SEC. 19 (b) IMPROPER EVIDENCE MAY BE COMPETENT Chemical Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 579, 582; 126 N. E. 564. 299 The existence of a beneficiary must be proved by the administrator and not by the employer, and the presumption of life cannot be applied where there are circumstances which materially affect the chance of existence of the beneficiaries. National Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 598, 603; 127 N. E. 135. 299 The circumstances may tend to show that an acci- dent arose in a certain way. Chicago Rawhide Man- ufacturing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 616, 620; 126 N. E. 616. 299 A claimant does not have to prove the case by direct evidence; that somebody actually saw what took place, because that is impossible. Sparks Mill- ing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 350, 354; 127 N. E. 737. 299 Proof that an injury was sustained by an em- ployee in the performance of his employment may be made by circumstantial evidence. Walsh Team- ing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 536, 540; 125 N. E. 331. Improper Evidence May Be Competent. 300 Where incompetent evidence is elicited from wit- nesses on cross examination and that kind of evi- dence is not objected to, a complaint to that effect will not be heeded by the Supreme Court. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 449, 452 ; 124 N. E. 566. 300 Where it was objected that the testimony of one of the witnesses was hearsay, it was held that coun- sel could not raise this point for the reason that the SEC. 19 (b) AWARD OR DECISION 257 evidence in question was brought out by counsel on cross examination. Steel Sales Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 435, 439; 127 N. E. 698. Award or Decision. 302 Miner was injured by a fall of rock from the ceil- 360 ing of a mine. He sustained injuries to the left leg and hip. The finding of the arbitrator was based on an injury to the left leg. In the final order of the Commission the word "right" was inserted before "leg" instead of "left." Held, the award will be modified by striking out the word "right" and in- serting the word "left" before the word "leg." Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 294 111. 325; 128 N. E. 554. 302 But where the evidence is conflicting as to notice 311 and there is a finding by the arbitrator as to notice, the court is not authorized to disregard the finding as to the fact, because in doing so it would simply be passing on the weight of the evidence. Ridge Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 532, 535 ; 131 N. E. 637. 302 Where award was allowed to the administrator, court thought it was apparent that payment was intended to be made to the mother, even though Commission did not state in its finding which rela- tives were dependent upon deceased. Keller v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 314, 316; 126 N. E. 162. It is not necessary for the commission to make a specific finding of all the facts where there is evi- dence in the record showing the jurisdiction of the parties and sufficient evidence to sustain the award. Snyder v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 175; 130 N. E. 517. 258 SEC. 19 (b) AWARD OR DECISION 302 The Commission should find specifically the nature and effect of the injury for which an award is made, rather than a finding that an award is made of a certain amount for a certain period under a certain provision of the statute. Jackson Coal Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 295 111. 18, 21; 128 N. E. 813. 302 The findings in the award should state in express terms whether the injury produced partial or total, permanent or temporary, disability or disfigure- ment. Jackson Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 18,21; 128 N. E. 813. 302 Even though the findings in the award might be insufficient to support it, it does not require a re- versal where the particular paragraphs of the sec- tion under which the award was made are referred to in the finding. Jackson Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 18, 21 ; 128 N. E. 813. 302 Where the employee refuses to submit to a physi- cal examination the award can be set aside and the case remanded to the Commission with directions for further proceedings. Jackson Coal Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 295 111. 18, 21; 128 N. E. 813. 420 Where there is an award and a finding that notice was not given, the award could only be sustained by a showing that the word "not" is a clerical error. Ridge Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 532, 534; 131 N. E. 637. 302 Where the interests of an employer are not being aided, protected or advanced by an employee, and the quarrel and consequent injury have no reason- able connection with the work then being done for the employer, there is no basis for an award. Marion County Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 463,466; 127 N. E. 84. SEC. 19 (b) AWARD OR DECISION 259 420 Where there is a finding that notice was not given and an award made and in order to sustain the award it is argued that notice must have been given or the arbitrator could not have made the award, such position is fallacious and cannot be sustained. Ridge Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 532, 534; 131 N.E. 637. 302 Where an award is entered by the Commission, it is presumed that the Commissioners did their duty and considered the evidence submitted. Stubbs v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 525, 527 ; 124 N. E. 527. 302 Where there is evidence that the healing process was completed and that the ensuing disability was due to the permanent character of the injuries and not to the temporary illness following the accident, it is error to make an award covering any period of the time when the healing process was completed. Mt. Olive Cod>l Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 429, 432 ; 129 N. E. 103. 302 Employee sustained an injury rendering him per- manently, wholly incapacitated from work. He was awarded a pension for life based on an annual earn- ing of $1248.00, and a weekly wage of $24.00. The record showed the earnings to be $741.39, or $14.25 weekly. The result of this computation was that it advanced the commencement of the annual pension by 200 weeks. Evidence showed that had he been permitted by the nature of the room in which he was working, he could have mined as much coal as the average miner. The Commission computed the compensation under par. (f ) of section 10, and it is contended by the employer that this paragragh has no application; that he was an adult earning 260 SEC. 19 (b) "STENOGRAPHIC REPORT" what all other men were earning in the same line of employment in that locality and that therefore the actual earnings should have been taken into con- sideration. Held, that the basis of the award was correct and the decision was affirmed. Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 513 ; 130 N. E. 725. 302 Employee, a stone mason, received injuries to his forehead by a fall from a scaffold and was allowed, in addition to temporary total disability, the sum of $11.55 for 50 weeks for disfigurement, which is claimed to be contrary to the mandate of the Su- preme Court. It was held that the fact that the second award was the same as the first award which was reversed did not establish the fact that the award was not the result of a consideration of the evidence by the Commission. Stubbs v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 525; 124 N. E. 527. "Statement of Facts." 304 Where it is stipulated that since the transcript of the testimony could not be obtained, the appli- cation may be tried de novo upon evidence produced before the Commission. Decatur Const. Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 296 111. 290, 292; 129 N 1 . E. 738. "Stenographic Report." 305 Where a stenographic report is withdrawn by the Commission because it is inaccurate, it is not error for the Circuit Court to allow the Commission to withdraw the return and amend it to corre- spond with the facts. Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 175, 180; 131 N. E. 369. SEC. 19 (b) "MAY GRANT FURTHER TIME" 261 305 On an assignment of cross-errors, the Supreme Court considered the question whether the steno- graphic report was filed in time and held that the authentication could be made after the stenographic report had been filed, if the report had been filed within the time allowed by the statute. Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 175, 180; 131 N. E. 369. "May Grant Further Time." 305 Where a stenographic report is filed within the time extended, as provided by the statute, and it is corrected and authenticated afterwards, this may be lawfully done. Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 298 111. 175, 180; 131 N. E. 369. "Authentication." 305 There is no error in allowing the authentication of a stenographic report which is filed within the time allowed by the statute, nor in allowing the Com- mission to withdraw the return and amend it to correspond with the facts. Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 175, 180; 131 N. E. 369. Sufficiency of Evidence. 307 Evidence considered and weighed and held to be 118 sufficient to sustain finding of the Commission that the accident arose out of the employment. Wasson Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 217 ; 129 N. E. 786. 312 Evidence held to show circumstances that warrant Commission in finding that hemorrhage was due to blood pressure intensified by vigorous muscular 262 SEC. 19 (b) SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE action. Baggott v. Industrial Commission, 290 III. 530, 534; 125 N. E. 254. 314 To sustain an award for compensation, there must be some competent evidence in the record that the accident or injury arose out of or in the course of the employment. Rockford Cabinet Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 295 111. 332, 335 ; 129 N, E. 142. 314 Where there was evidence that employee was re- pairing a bridge used in interstate commerce and some that he was repairing a bridge, the court may review the evidence to ascertain whether the injury was received in interstate commerce. Hines v. In- dustrial Commission, 295 111. 231, 233; 129 N. E. 175. 314 Evidence in the record held to warrant conclusion of Commission that death was due to infection from a rusty nail and not from probing the wound with a pocket knife, where doctor testified that he did not think the infection came from the knife. Snyder v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 175, 182; 130 N. E. 517. 314 Where the doctor testified that, where a man falls following a threat to strike him, the blood clot might be due to the excitement or the fall or many different causes ; that it would be impossible to determine the cause of the hemorrhage, that this was a matter of conjecture from the evidence and that he would not attempt to be positive, it was held that such proof is not sufficient to show that the accident was caused by the excitement. Ideal Fuel Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 298 111. 463; 131 N. E. 649. 315 The courts cannot determine the weight of evi- dence on controverted questions of fact, but can examine the record only to determine whether there SEC. 19 (b) SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 263 is competent evidence to sustain the award. Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 315, 317 ; 124 N. E. 545. 315 Where an employee in a mine lost the sight of his eye by reason of his being struck with a piece of coal, and the controversy concerned the amount of the award, which depended on the question whether the total loss of sight was due to the acci- dent, and the evidence was uncontradicted, that he had a pre-existing disease, known as choroiditis, which caused blindness, and that the accident caused only a partial loss of vision, such evidence did not sustain an award for the total loss of the eye as the result of accident. Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Indus-- trial Commission, 289 111. 315 ; 124 N. E. 545. 307 Where doctors testify that the accident did not produce the nephritis ; that there was no causal con- nection between the fall from the wagon and the death of the employee; and that the accident could not produce the condition from which the employee died, there is no evidence in the record upon which an award could be made. Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 175, 178 ; 131 N. E. 369. 315 An engineer employed at a city pumping station was killed by heat-stroke. The temperature of the building in which the engineer worked was notice- ably warmer than outside. Held, it is the duty of the Commission to pass on the evidence and where it finds that an employee is more exposed to heat stroke, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the find- ings. Cityi of Joliet v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 555 ; 126 N. E. 618. 264 SEC. 19 (b) SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 315 Employee, while driving a pit-car in a mine, was caught between some low-hanging coal, breaking his collar-bone and bruising shoulder. He was awarded temporary total and SS 1 /^ per cent loss of use of left arm. Employee testified that he believed that he had lost one-third of the use of his arm. Before the arbitrator he showed the various movements he could make with the arm and the injury was exhib- ited to and examined by the arbitrator and Commis- sion. Held, even though the testimony as to the loss of use might be incompetent, yet as the triers of fact (arbitrator and Commission) saw the arm, there was sufficient evidence and the award was al- lowed to stand. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Indies- trial Commission, 295 111. 578; 129 N. E. 521. 307 Employee was a driver for an ice-cream company and as the result of slipping from the wheel sus- tained bruises on the leg and back. He continued to work and several days later went to a hospital. He died there where the records showed that death was caused by nephritis and uraemia. The weight of the evidence was that the employee died from kidney trouble and that the accident did not con- tribute to the disease. There was some evidence to show that the death was superinduced by the fall. Held, as the evidence amounted only to an expres- sion of opinion that the trauma and the shock low- ered the vitality, it did not prove that the death was caused by accident and the award was set aside. Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298111. 175; 131 N.E. 369. 307 Where a deceased employee left him surviving a mother who permitted the son to work for her, but who, at the time of death, had been supported by a second husband. Held, that there was no evi- SEC. 19 (b) SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 265 dence in the record going to show that the mother was dependent on her son for support. Alden Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 597 ; 127 N. E. 641. 306 Where the testimony of various witnesses is con- tradictory on the question of drunkenness, the Su- preme Court can not weigh the testimony and review the decision of the Commission and the judgment of the court on the question of intoxication. Morris & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 49, 51 ; 128 N. E. 727. 306 Where there is evidence in the record, tending to prove permanent disfigurement, which affected the ability of the defendant to secure employment, and the Supreme Court has passed on the question, such decision is conclusive and operates as res judicata. Stubbs v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 525, 527; 124 N. E. 527. 312 Even though the husband may be under legal obligation to support the mother, the question whether she received support from her son or looked to him for support is a question of fact, which is concluded by the finding of the Commission that she was dependent upon the son. Keller v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 314, 316; 126 N. E. 162. There is a presumption of fact based on common experience as to the continuance of life, which justi- fies a conclusion of fact that a person is alive shortly after he has been proved to be living. Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 587, 589; 124 N. E. 542. That the proof on behalf of the employer was contradictory to that of the employee as to the effect 266 SEC. 19 (b) SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE of the injury on his ability to work and his earning power affords no basis to authorize the court to review the decree of the lower court. O'Callaffliaii v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 222, 226 ; 124 N. E. 811. Questions of dependency, and the extent of it, are questions of fact, with a decision of which by the Commission the courts cannot interfere, if there is evidence to sustain the finding. Keller v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 314, 316; 126 N. E. 162. Where the only evidence as to the accident was the testimony of the manager that the employee told him that he had hurt his arm and the testimony of the forelady that the employee showed his hand, which was covered with blood, and told her that he hurt it at the table back there, and the testimony of doctors as to a cut on the hand and an infection. Held, that there was evidence in the record from which the Commission could find that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. Hydrox Chemical Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 579; 126 N. E. 564. The question of dependency and the extent of it is a question of fact ; and when there is evidence to sustain the finding of the Commission, the court is without jurisdiction to review the finding. Rock- ford Cabinet Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 332,334; 129 N. E. 142. On a review by the Supreme Court, it was held that the evidence in the record did not sustain an award for the permanent total loss of a coal miner's eye as the result of accident. Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 315, 317; 124 N. E. 545. SECTION 19 (c), (d) 267 815 (c) The Industrial Commission may appoint, at its own ex- pense, a duly qualified, impartial physician to examine the in- jured employee and report to the commission. The fee for this service shall not exceed live dollars and traveling expenses, but the commission may allow additional reasonable amounts in ex- traordinary cases. The fees and the payment thereof of all at- torneys and physicians for services authorized by the commis- sion under this Act shall, upon request of either the employer or the employee or the beneficiary affected, be subject to the review and decision of the Industrial Commission. 315 (d) If any employee shall persist in insanitary or injurious practices which tend to either imperil or retard his recovery or shall refuse to submit to such medical, surgical, or hospital treatment as is reasonably essential to promote his recovery, the commission may, in its discretion, reduce or suspend the compensation of any such injured employee. Section 19, paragraph (d), amended in 1921 by inserting after the word " surgical" the words ''or hospital" before the word "treatment." 315 The statutory provisions for reducing or suspend- 271 ing compensation if an injured employee persists in such unsanitary practices as tend to either imperil or retard a recovery or shall refuse to submit to such medical or surgical treatments as will reason- ably be essential to promote his recovery, do not apply to an original application for compensation. (Joliet Motor Co. v. Industrial Bd., 280 111. 148.) Snyder v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 175, 182; 130 N. E. 517. 315 The court does not feel itself committed to follow the rule that where the continuation of the disability is due to the refusal to take treatment, as a reason- able man would take, the payment of compensation should be discontinued. Snyder v. Industrial Com- mission, 297 111. 175, 182; 130 N. E. 517. 316 There is no power in the Industrial Commission or elsewhere to compel an employee to submit to an operation. M t. Olive Coal Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 295 111. 429, 432 ; 129 N. E. 103. 268 SECTION 19 (d) 316 Where the Commission finds that an employee has lost time by his unreasonable refusal to submit to an operation, such time must be credited to the employer in awarding compensation. Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 429, 433 ; 129 N. E. 103. 316 The rule relative to operations generally followed is this : If the operation is not attended with danger to life or health, or extraordinary suffering, and if according to the best medical or surgical opinion, the operation offers a reasonable prospect of restoration or relief from the incapacity from which the work- man is suffering, then he must either submit to the operation or release his employer from the obliga- tion to maintain him. (Krcinovich v. American Car & Foundry Co. (Mich.), 159 N. W. 362; Jendrus v. Detroit Steel Products Co. (Mich.) 144 N. W. 563; Lesh v. Illinois Steel Co. (Wis.), 157 N. W. 539.) Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111 429, 433; 129 N. E. 103. 316 In compelling an employee to undergo an opera- tion, the question is whether the party who declines to submit is to be considered as a sufferer from the effect of an injury or whether his suffering is not attributable to his action in declining to avail him- self of surgical treatment ; if the sufferer is willing to live on the pittance allowed him under the Act and refuses to be operated upon, his inability to work is the result of his refusal to accept treatment, and he is not entitled to further compensation. Ap- proving: Donnelly v. Baird, 1 B. W. C. C. 95 ; Walsh v. Locke, 7 B. W. C. C. 117 ; Kricinovich v. American' Car & Foundry Co., 192 Mich. 687; Lesh v. Illinois Steel Co., 163 Wis. 124; Enterprise Fence & Foun- SECTION 19 (d) 269 dry Co. v. Majors, 121 N. E. (Ind.) 6.) Rosenthal & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 182, 185; 129 N. E. 176. 316 The cases of McNally v. Hudson & Manhattan Railroad Co., 87 N. J. L. 455, and Feldman v. Braun- stein, 87 N. J. L. 20, distinguished. Rosenthal & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 182, 186; 129 N. E. 176. 316 Where an employee suffering from a permanent injury submits to an operation and it proves unsuc- cessful, the employer would be liable for whatever loss of use of his hand the employee suffers, as well as the surgical and hospital services necessary for the operation and for treatment received. Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 429, 433 ; 129 N. E. 103. 316 If an employee submits to an operation, which is 227 successful, the liability of the employer would be for temporary loss of time and for treatments had and surgical and hospital expenses incurred in the operation. Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 295 111. 429, 433 ; 129 N. E. 103. 316 If the operation is one that any reasonable man would take advantage of, if he had no one against whom he could claim compensation, then a refusal to submit is unreasonable. Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 429, 432; 129 N. E. 103. 316 Where there was evidence that the condition re- sulting in the permanent incapacity was due to immobility over a long period of time and not due to the fracture, and that there would be a recovery if adhesions of the tendons were broken up by opera- tion, and the operation did not require the use of 270 SECTION 19 (d) surgical instruments, but the administering of some gas which would make the operation painless, the refusal to submit to such an operation was held to be unreasonable and an award for permanent in- capacity was reversed. Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 295 HI. 429, 433; 129 N. E. 103. 316 Section 19, (d), vests the Commission with the right to suspend compensation of an employee "if he refuses to submit to such surgical treatment as is reasonably essential to promate his recovery." Rosenthal & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 182,184; 129 N. E. 176. 316 The statement of a doctor that the chances are 287 that he would have administered serum if the em- ployee had submitted his case to him is not sufficient to warrant a finding that it was an unreasonable refusal to take treatment of a physician. Snyder v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 175, 181, 182; 130 N. E. 517. 316 Where the Commission had ordered compensation suspended on account of the refusal of the employee to submit to an operation for hernia upon evidence that the employee was a good surgical risk, that the hernia could be corrected, that statistics showed that two-tenths of one per cent were fatal, that it was a superficial operation and did not involve danger to life. Held, that the order of the Commis- sion was correct. Rosenthal & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 182 ; 129 N. E. 176. 316 Evidence tnat loss of sight of an eye is due to cataract and that sight could be restored by opera- tion does not warrant awarding compensation for loss of sight of eye, even though operation cannot be forced on employee. (Joliet Motor Co. v. Indus- SECTION 19 (e) 271 trial Board, 280 111. 148, approved.) Rosenthal & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 182, 185; 129 N. E. 176. 316 The treatment to which an employee must subject himself must be unattended by serious suffering or dangerous consequence. Snyder v. Industrial Com- mission, 297 111. 175, 182; 130 N. E. 517. 316 A carpenter employed by building contractors was 307 doing some work in a building owned by a third party and while at work stepped on a nail which punctured the sole of his foot. Three days later he went to a doctor, who dressed the wound. Eight days later lockjaw developed and he died. It was contended that the death was due to the unreason- able refusal on the part of the employee to take treatment. Held, that there was evidence in the record to sustain the award of the Commission and that there was no refusal on the part of the em- ployee to take medical treatment. Snyder v. Indus- trial Commission, 297 111. 175; 130 N. E. 517. 817 (e) If a petition for review and agreed statement of facts or stenographic report is filed, as provided herein, the Industrial Commission shall promptly review the decision of the arbitrator or committee of arbitration and all questions of law or fact which appear from the said statement of facts or stenographic report, and snch additional evidence as the parties may submit. After such hearing upon review, the commission shall file in its office its decision thereon, and shall immediately send to each party or his attorney a copy of snch decision and a notification of the time when it was filed. Snch review and hearing may be held in its office or elsewhere as the commission may deem advisable: Provided, that the tak- ing of testimony on such hearing may be had before any member of the commission and in the event either of the parties may de- sire an argument before others of the commission, such argu- ment may be had upon written demand therefor filed with the commission within five days after the commencement of such taking of testimony, in which event such argument shall be had before not less than a majority of the commission: Provided, that the commission shall give ten days' notice to the parties or 272 SECTION 19 (e) their attorneys of the time and place of such taking of testimony and of such argument. In any case the commission in its decision may in its discre- tion find specially upon any question or questions of law or fact which shall be submitted in writing by either party, whether ultimate or otherwise. Any party may, within twenty days after receipt of notice of the commission's decision, or within such further time, not exceeding thirty days, as the commission may grant, file with the commission either an agreed statement of the facts appearing upon the hearing, or, if such party shall so elect a correct stenographic report of the additional proceedings pre- sented before the commission, in which report the party may embody a correct statement of such other proceedings in the case as such party may desire to have reviewed, such statement of facts or stenographic report to be authenticated by the signa- tures of the parties or their attorneys, and in the event that they do not agree, then the authentication of such stenographic re- port shall be by the signature of any member of the commission. If a reporter does not for any re'ason furnish a transcript of the proceedings before the arbitrator in any case for use on a hear- ing for review before the Industrial Commission, within thirty (30) days of the filing of the petition for review, the Industrial Commission may, in its discretion, order a trial de novo before the Industrial Commission in such case, upon application of either party. The applications for adjustment of claim and other documents in the nature of pleadings filed by either party, to- gether with the decisions of the arbitrator and of the Industrial Commission and the statement of facts or stenographic reports hereinbefore provided for In paragraphs (b) and (c) shall be the record of the proceedings of said commission, and shall be subject to review as hereinafter provided. Section 19, paragraph (e), amended 1921 by in- serting after the word " Commission" and before the words "The applications" the following sen- tence, "If a reporter does not for any reason fur- nish a transcript of the proceedings before the arbitrator in any case for use on a hearing for review before the Industrial Commission, within thirty (30) days of the filing of the petition for review, the Industrial Commission may, in its dis- cretion, order a trial de novo before the Industrial Commission in such case, on application of either party. ' ' SEC. 19 (e) "THE COMMISSION SHALL REVIEW" 273 "The Commission shall reYiew." 318 The Commission, in determining the reduction of 323 earning capacity of an employee, can consider only competent evidence and cannot resort to conjecture or surmise. Old Ben Coal Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 296 111. 229, 233; 129 N. E. 722. 318 Where an employee was allowed to testify before 300 arbitrator without objection as to the percentage of his loss of earning capacity and on the hearing before the Commission he was asked whether he had not testified to that before the arbitrator, which was objected to, it was held that the objection was prop- erly in the record because testimony of this char- acter is not competent. Old Ben Coal Co. v Indus- trial Commission, 296 111. 229, 232; 129 N. E. 772. 318 Where the employee disaffirms the agreement to take a lesser amount, upon a hearing before the Commission, it is the right of the Commission to decline to recognize the settlement and to proceed to a hearing upon review. International Coal & Min- ing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524, 530; 127 N. E. 703. ".May find specially upon any question of fact." 319 Complaint that there was no finding that the work- man was in the employ of the employer, that they were working under the provisions of the Work- men's Compensation Act, or that he was injured, or that he died as the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. Held, that it is not necessary for the Commission to make a specific finding of all the facts where there is evi- dence in the record showing the jurisdiction of the parties and sufficient evidence to sustain the award. 274 SEC. 19 (e) "MAY FIND UPON QUESTION OF FACT" Snyder v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 175, 177; 130 N. E. 517. 319 Finding of Commission, where claimant testified that his earning capacity is reduced 50 per cent, but it is shown that he earns $18.00 as against $26.53, that his earning capacity was reduced to $14.25, is not justified by the evidence. Old Ben Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 229, 233 ; 129 N. E. 772. 320 Intimated that all of the jurisdictional facts and all of the ultimate facts necessary to entitle the employee to compensation ought to have been found by the Commission; but this is not necessary where all of the facts appear in the stenographic report or record. Snyder v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 175, 178; 130 N. E. 517. 320 Even though the findings of the Commission on all questions were not made, and even though the findings are not as complete as they should be, if the award is sustained by the evidence in the record, it will stand. Snyder v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 175, 178; 130 N. E. 517. 321 In the findings of the Commission, where the word 11 petitioner" was used instead of the word "de- ceased, ' ' such finding is faulty, but as it is a clerical error only, the award does not have to be set aside. Snyder v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 175, 178; 130 N. E. 517. The practice of the Commission of incorporating a written opinion in its findings was criticized in Lorchitsky v. Gotham Folding Box Co., 230 N. Y. 8, 128 N. E. 899; Clark v. Vorhees, 131 N. E. 553. SEC. 19 (e) "SHALL BE RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS" 275 "Shall be the Record of Proceedings." 320 Section 19 provides for the determination of the dispute, and what documents filed before the Com- mission constitute the record of the proceedings. Mississippi River Power Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 111. 353, 357; 124 N. E. 552. 321 An award by the Commission resembles a judg- 332 ment, in the respect that a review of the award does not vacate the award pending the decision in the court of review. Big Muddy\ Coal & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 515, 517 ; 124 N. E. 564. 322 A miner received an eye injury on October 29, 1917. Returned to work December, 1917. February 2, 1918, he was paid compensation. August 31, 1918, served written demand for compensation. Oc- tober 28, 1918, filed application for adjustment of claim. Arbitrator denied award December 3, 1918. Commission affirmed arbitrator. This decision not reviewed by certiorari. May 9, 1919, petition filed to review on the ground that disability had increased. Commission made finding that petition was under Section 8, (d), that employee returned to work for same employer, and set aside its former decision and awarded 100 weeks for the loss of eye. Held, the award must be set aside. The Commission has no power to review its former decision and set it aside and to substitute another decision in its stead. Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 451 ; 130 N. E. 727. 323 An award under the Compensation Act cannot rest upon speculation, conjecture or surmise. St. 276 SEC. 19 (e) "THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION" Louis Smelting & Refining Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 298 111. 272, 277; 131 N. E. 617. Where the Industrial Commission had affirmed an arbitrator who refused to make an award, such decision is res judicata and it has no authority on a subsequent hearing to review and set aside this previous decision. Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 451, 454; 130 N. E. 727. 322 The writ of error, when sued out, does not vacate 363 the award of the Commission, and it is not a trial de novo, but merely a hearing for the correction of errors found to exist in the record. Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 515, 518; 124 N. E. 564. 322 The date of the award, even in cases under re- view where such award is sustained, is the date when such award is entered by the Commission. Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 111. 515, 519; 124 N. E. 564. 323 It is for the Commission to determine as an ulti- 277 mate fact the per cent of loss and to hear all evi- dence which would aid in its conclusion. Decatur Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 290, 294; 129 N. E. 738. 323 Where there is a conflict in the evidence as to dependency, the Commission has a right to consider all of the evidence in reaching a conclusion as to dependency. Richardson Sand Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 296 111. 335, 339; 129 N. E. 751. 329 The finding of the Commission cannot be based on conjecture ; it must have some substantial founda- tion in the evidence. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425, 428 ; 127 N. E. 752. SEC. 19 (e) "THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION" 277 329 It is the duty of the Commission to hear and weigh the evidence and to make its finding for that party in whose favor the evidence preponderates. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425, 427; 127 N. E. 752. 329 The Commission is not justified in finding for one party because there is some evidence in the record which, standing undisputed, would justify that find- ing. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 293 111. 425, 427; 127 N. E. 752. 329 The Commission should not base its finding on testimony, which all the facts and circumstances in the record, show to be untrue. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425, 427; 127 N. E. 752. 329 A miner hung his lamp on a staple while he was drawing some gasoline, the fumes caught fire and the miner was burned. The miner makes statements that he was badly burned, that his eyes were burned so that he lost fifty per cent of the vision. There was testimony of other witnesses that he helped put out the fire and that he had no scars; that he went back to work in a few days, and that he made no complaint of his eyes. Held, that the Commission was not justified in finding for the claimant on the evidence. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425; 127 N. E. 752. 322 A carpenter employed by a coal mine agreed to build mine cars for the employer at $17.50 a car. The employer furnished the materials and tools, and directed the dimensions and sizes of the cars. The employee was subject to other orders of the employer while doing this work on the premises. Held, that the decision of the Commission that the 278 SEC. 19 (e) "THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION" man was an employee is conclusive, if there is any evidence to determine this fact. Franklin Coal & C. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 329; 129 N. E. 811. Where the evidence in the record as to the exist- ence of a certain relationship is conflicting, the Commission is justified in finding that a person is an employee and not an independent contractor. Cinofsky v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 521, 525; 125 N. E. 286. It is the exclusive duty and province of the Com- mission to weigh the evidence and their decision is binding on the reviewing court. Cinofsky v. Indus- trial Commission, 290 111. 521, 525 ; 125 N. E. 286. Where doctors testify that the employee is totally disabled and that the total disability would continue six months longer, and that thereafter the employee would be partially disabled to the extent of 25 per cent in work, which would require him to stand on his lower limbs, the Commission cannot substitute its judgment for the uncontroverted expert evidence and a finding that the employee is entitled to $2.00 a week for 175 weeks may be set aside by the Circuit Court. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 449, 454; 124 N. E. 566. It is the duty of the Commission to consider all of the evidence in a hearing and to render its decision in accordance with the preponderance of the evi- dence. McGarry v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 577, 578; 125 N. E. 318. The Commission should not grant an award merely because there is evidence in the record which tends to support that award, nor should it speculate upon a possible state of facts, which does not reason- SEC. 19 (f) "ACTING WITHIN ITS POWERS" 279 ably appear to exist from the evidence. McGarry v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 577, 578 ; 125 N. E. 318. 329 A finding of the Commission cannot be based on mere conjecture, but must have some substantial foundation in the evidence, and the Commission is not justified in finding for one party because there is some evidence which, standing undisputed, would justify the award. Decatur Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 290, 294; 129 N. E. 738. 329 Where an employee has a heat-stroke in the course of the employment and there is evidence from which the Commission may find that it arose out of the employment, the court must sustain the award. City of Joliet v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 555, 558; 126 N. E. 618. 329 That the proof, on behalf of the employer, was contradictory to that of the employee, as to the effect of the injury on his ability to work, and his earning power, affords no basis to authorize the court to review the decree of the lower court. O'Callaghan v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 222, 226 ; 124 N. E. 811. 321 (f) The decision of the Industrial Commission acting within its powers, according to the provisions of paragraph ~(e) of this section shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive unless re- riewed as in this paragraph hereinafter provided. "Acting within its Powers." 330 Public officials are presumed to do their duty. Stubbs v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 525, 527; 124 N. E. 527. 330 Even though the Commission, by seeing the legs, 240 discerned a strip of scar on the leg of the claimant, 280 SECTION 19 (f) 1 yet they could not determine from appearance that there was a degree of permanent disability for which an award could be made. Decatur Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 290, 294; 129 N. E. 738. 832 (1) The Circuit Court of the county where any of the parties defendant may be found shall by writ of certiorarl to the Indus- trial Commission have power to review all questions of law and fact presented by such record; Provided, that no additional evi- dence shall be heard in the Circuit Court, and the findings of fact made by the Commission shall not be set aside unless con- trary to the manifest weight of the evidence, except such as arise in a proceeding in which under paragraph (b) of this section a decision of the arbitrator or committee of arbitration has be- come the decision of the Industrial Commission. Such writ shall be issued by the clerk of such court upon praeclpe. Service upon any member of the Industrial Commission or the secretary thereof shall be service on the Commission, and service upon other parties interested shall be by scire facias, or service may be made upon said Commission and other parties in interest by mailing notice of the commencement of the proceedings and the return day of the writ to the office of said Commission and the last known place of residence of the other parties in interest at least ten days before the return day of said writ. Such suit by writ of certiprari shall be commenced within twenty days of the receipt of notice of the decision of the Commission. The Industrial Commission shall not be required to certify the record of their proceedings to the Circuit Court, unless the party commencing the proceedings for review in the Circuit Court, as above provided, shall pay to the Commission the sum of five cents per one hundred words of testimony taken before said Commission and three cents per one hundred words of all other matters contained in such record. Section 19 (f), (1), was amended by inserting the words "and fact" after the word "law" and by adding after the word "record" the following: "Provided, that no additional evidence shall be heard in the Circuit Court, and the findings of fact made by the Commission shall not be set aside unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." The idea that the findings of fact shall not be set aside unless contrary to the manifest weight of the SEC. 19 (f) 1 REVIEW OF FACTS 281 evidence was taken from Section 68, Chapter Ilia, Illinois Revised Statutes, in force July 1, 1913, known as the Public Utilities Act. Memorandum of Authorities on the Question of Review of Facts by the Circuit Court. Section 19 (f) (1), as amended, gives the Circuit Court the right to review questions of law and fact presented by the record, provided that no additional evidence shall be heard in the Circuit Court and the findings of fact made by the Commission shall not be set aside, unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. What is the meaning of the expression, "weight of the evidence"? It is undoubtedly the same as the expression "preponderance of evidence." This means evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than evidence offered in opposition to a certain fact. Ewen v. Wilbor, 208 111. 492 ; Mor- timer v. McMullen, 202 111. 413 ; North Chicago Street Railway Co. v. Fitzgibbons, 180 111. 466; Grimm v. Clark Delivery Car Co., 199 111. A. 553. Preponderance of the evidence does not require proof which satisfies the triers of fact without quali- fication, because such a rule would require proof beyond reasonable doubt. Sonnemann v. Mertz, 221 111. 362 ; Stratton v. Central City R. R. Co., 95 111. 25 ; Ruff v. Jarrett, 94 111. 475 ; Protection Life In- surance Co. v. Dill, 91 111. 174; Graves v. Colwell, 90 111. 612 ; Herrick v. Gary, 83 111. 85. Under the rules above stated it is not necessary that the triers of fact be entirely or thoroughly satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. 282 SEC. 19 (f) 1 REVIEW OF FACTS The rule as to preponderance of evidence is vio- lated where the court refers to a great weight of testimony or evidence as constituting a clear or full preponderance. Carter v. Gunnels, 67 111. 270 ; Lun- don v. Chicago, 83 111. A. 208 ; Nelson v. Fehd, 203 111. 120; Lenning v. Lenning, 176 111. 180; Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331; Mitchell v. Hindman, 150 111. 538 ; Bitter v. Saathoff, 98 111. 266 ; McDeed v. Mc- Deed, 67 111. 545; Crabtree v. Reid, 50 111. 206. The rule as to the preponderance of evidence re- ferred to the determination of probabilities, requir- ing the probabilities to be such that the conclusion of the court or jury may accept such probabilities in the light of the evidence of that case. Peak v. Peo- ple, 76 111. 289; Warner v. Crandell, 65 111. 195; To- ledo, etc., R. Co. v. Foster, 43 111. 480. There is no requirement as to the number of witnesses determining or establishing the weight of testimony. A single creditable witness may estab- lish the weight of evidence as against several con- tradictory witnesses. Chenoweth v. Burr, 242 111. 312; Bishop v. Busse, 69 111. 403; Meyer v. Mead, 83 111. 19 ; Phenix v. Castner, 108 111. 207 ; Chicago R. Co. v. Fischer, 141 111. 614 ; Chytraus v. Chicago, 160 111. 18; North Chicago Street R. Co. v. Anderson, 176 111. 635 ; Gage v. Eddy\, 179 111. 492 ; North Chicago R. Co. v. Fitzgibbons, 180 111. 466 ; Chicago v. Marsh, 238 111. 254. The testimony of a single witness, even though opposed by several witnesses whose evidence is con- trary, will support the finding. Phenix v. Castner, 108 111. 207 ; Keokuk North Line Pack. Co. v. True, 88 111. 608; Maggert v. Peoria R. Co., 179 111. A. 229. SEC. 19 (f) 1 REVIEW OF FACTS 283 In several cases the court has leaned toward the testimony given by the fewer number of witnesses. West Chicago R. Co. v. Dean, 112 111. A. 10; Clark v. Gotts, 1 111. A. 454; LaSalle v. Evans, 111 111. A. 69; Knowles v. Knowles, 86 111. I; Bishop v. Bitsse, 69 111. 403; Maggert v. Peoria R. Co., 179 111. A. 229. In compensation cases a great deal of the proof is of a negative character. Where negative testi- mony stands alone it is of some weight, but where there is some positive evidence, negative testimony is not entitled to much weight. The weight of the evidence depends on the question of the ability of one side to produce the evidence and the power of the other side to contradict it. Mere opinions are outweighed by positive evidence. Direct testimony overcomes a theoretical possibility and in deciding a question all the evidence presented must be con- sidered. Harper v. Owen Fay Livery\ Co., 177 111. A. 138; Brown v. Chicago City R. Co., 155 111. A. 434; Chicago R. Co. v. Hirsch, 132 111. A. 656. Evidence that a certain fact occurred is entitled to more weight than evidence that the fact did not occur. Frizell v. Cole, 42 111. 362 ; Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Stumps, 55 111. 367; Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dickenson, 88 111. 431. It is well settled that positive testimony of one witness is entitled to greater weight than negative testimony of a large number of witnesses. Horn v. Baltimore Ry. Co., 54 Fed. 301 ; Meeker v. Boylan, 28 N. J. L. 274; Fronts v. Lenhart, 56 Pa. 365; Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450 ; Ralph v. Chicago R. Co., 32 Wis. 177. 284 SECTION 19 (f) 1 REVIEW OP FACTS It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that the applicant in a compensation case has the burden of proving his case. See pages 253-255. The decision of the Industrial Commission can not rest upon surmise, guess, speculation or conjecture. In other words, this court required legal evidence to support the decision of the Industrial Commis- sion, long before the amendment giving the court the right to review questions of fact became the law. So, too, this court has held that a mere scintilla of evidence was not sufficient to sustain an award. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425 (semble, Fisick v. Lorber, 95 Misc. 574; 159 N. Y. S. 722.) And this Court, even under the old rule, set aside a decision of the Commission after reviewing and inquiring into the sufficiency of the evidence. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425. The court therefore thought that it had the right to set aside a decision where it was against the weight of the evidence and probably that power rested in the court under its right to review ques- tions of law. The amendment here may or may not be considered a limitation on the right of the court. For it is quite clear if the court had the right and power to set aside a decision which was against the weight of the evidence as it did, the same court now has the power only to set aside the decision where it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, which is undoubtedly one step further removed from the right that the court exercised in the case of Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425. SECTION 19 (f) 1 REVIEW OF FACTS 285 The question of the weight of the evidence must, of course, have been intended by the legislature to have been left as a question for determination with the triers of the fact ; the arbitrator or the commis- sioner hearing the case. The court can not be deemed to have been given the right to review the evidence, because the amendment specifically limits the right of the review on the fact question to those cases where the findings of the Commission are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. There is no other way to explain the insertion of the word "manifest," except in the light of this reason. Thus the legislature must have meant when they inserted that the findings of the Commission shall not be set aside unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, that such finding should not be disturbed unless it is absurd, ridiculous or im- possible in the light of the evidence in the record. This view seems to be in harmony with the spirit of the act. The reason for the Compensaton Act was to expedite the payment of claims to working- men and their families. It has been held that the act must be construed in the light of the beneficent purposes of the act. It would be in keeping with the spirit of the act, if the courts took the view that the triers of fact, having seen the witnesses and being best able to determine their truth and veracity and the weight of their testimony, this matter should be left to them in determining where the weight of the evidence lay and that the decision or award can not be disturbed unless it is so obviously and palpa-- bly wrong as to result in a miscarriage of justice. 286 SECTION 19 (f) 1 REVIEW OF FACTS Does the amendment in question limit the review of the facts to the Circuit Court only ? Or does this amendment carry with it a review of the facts, so that the Supreme Court must go into the question of the weight of the evidence I The Supreme Court has said in a long line of de- cisions before the enactment of this amendment that its jurisdiction was limited to a review of questions of law only and that it had no power to review the evidence under the Statute as it was then written. There is nothing in the law itself that limits the Supreme Court's right of review of the law. The Act says: " Judgments and orders of the Circuit Court under this Act shall be reviewed only by the Supreme Court upon a writ of error *." An investigation of the authorities fails to disclose any discussion by the Supreme Court as to its pow- ers under this wording of the act, but it has always held consistently that it was limited in its right of review to questions of law only. Whether it reached this conclusion because the Act said that the Cir- cuit Court had only power to review questions of law or whether a review of judgments and orders of the Circuit Court was construed to mean only questions of law is problematical. There is no decision of the Supreme Court which discusses that problem from that point of view. But in the light of the decisions, it may well be considered as settled law that the Supreme Court can under the language of the Workmen's Compensation Act review only the questions of law. If this be true, then its power of review remains the same because there is nothing in the Workmen 's Compensation Act as amended that affects the prac- SECTION 19 (f) 1 REVIEW OF FACTS 287 tice in the Supreme Court. The Court might how- ever, say that inasmuch as the Circuit Court was given the right to review questions of fact, that ipso facto, the power became vested in the Supreme Court because it could not determine that the judgment or order of the Circuit Court was correct unless it went over the facts to see whether the Circuit Court was correct in either affirming the decision of the Commission, or setting it aside, as the case might be. If this latter view be adopted by the Court, then there is no doubt that it would be compelled to re- view the evidence and determine whether the Circuit Court reached the right result. The history of the adoption of the amendment giv- ing the Circuit Court the right to review questions of law and fact is rather interesting. It had been supposed by the members of the bar that the Compensation Act was no longer subject to consti- tutional objections as the Court had passed upon these questions in the case of Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co., 261 111. 454, and again in G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167. A great num- ber of cases had been taken up to the Supreme Court of the United States and the Compensation Acts had uniformly been upheld. But in the spring of 1921, the United States Supreme -Court had handed down a decision in the case of Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio River Valley Co., 253 U. S. 287, in which case that court had reversed the Supreme Court of Penn- sylvania because the Utilities Act of Penn- sylvania did not give the right of a review of the facts to a public service company on the ques- tion of the valuation of its property in a rate-fixing case. This case was immediately seized upon as be- 288 SECTION 19 (f) 1 REVIEW OF FACTS ing an authority on the proposition that the Work- men's Compensation Act was unconstitutional be- cause it did not provide for a court review of the facts. The fact that the Compensation Acts were an exercise of the Police Power of the State, as dis- tinguished from the Ben Avon Borough case, supra, in which the question of the exercise of the Police Power was in no way involved, was not considered. The various precedents laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States relating to Workmen's Compensation Acts were thrown aside as having been expressly overruled, whereas there was not the slightest intimation by that highest tribunal that such was the case. Then came the case of Odin Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 392, in which it was urged that the Workmen's Compensation Act violated the 14th Amendment of the Federal Con- stitution. The Supreme Court said that the ques- tion of the constitutionality of the Compensation Act had not been raised and did not decide the question. This was taken as an indication that the Supreme Court would hold the Act unconstitutional. There followed the legislative session. Employers and legislators who did not believe in the principles of Workmen's Compensation Acts became very so- licitous for the welfare of the Compensation Act. They contended that the opinion in the Ben Avon Borough case settled as a legal proposition the rights of the courts to review questions of fact. They contended that they were the friends of the princi- ples declared in the Compensation Act and that they desired to conserve the Act in toto. But in order to conserve the Act and make it valid, one thing was necessary, the Circuit Court must be given the right SEC. 19 (f) 1 JURISDICTION 289 to review questions of fact. A committee of em- ployers and employees who had prepared amend- ments to the Compensation Act had examined into the merits of the Ben Avon Borough decision as af- fecting the Workmen's Compensation Act and had concluded that that decision had no bearing and had drafted and introduced amendments, which in no way changed the method of review. But when the agreed amendments were introduced in the Senate as Senate Bill 222, they were met with opposition. One bill had already been introduced giving the Cir- cuit Court the right to review questions of fact and another bill had been introduced by the representa- tives of a large industry, which tore the very vitals out of the Compensation Act and would have put labor in a worse position than it was in, prior to the enactment of the Compensation Act. There followed a long protracted fight which ended in the acceptance by the Senate Committee of the amendment giving the Circuit Court the right to re- view questions of fact and the amendment was put in the Act and became a law. Jurisdiction. The question has often been raised whether the Superior Court of Cook County has jurisdiction to award the writ of certiorari in compensation cases. Judge Hopkins of the Superior Court denied this right to an employer in the case of Dietzen Co. v. Industrial Commission. This case is pending in the Supreme Court and should be decided at the Octo- ber Term. The docket number is No. 14017. 332 Circuit Courts are courts of general jurisdiction and may have conferred upon it by statute, a special 290 SEC. 19 (f) 1 JURISDICTION statutory jurisdiction not arising out of the common law, but which is outside of the general jurisdic- tion of such court. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 62; 127 N. E. 80. 332 Where specia.1 jurisdiction is conferred upon a court, as under the Workmen's Compensation Act, its proceedings and judgments are treated as those of courts of special jurisdiction. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 62; 127 N. E. 80. 332 When a court is in the exercise of special jurisdic- tion, that jurisdiction is limited to the language of the act conferring it. That court has no powers from any other source. Central Illinois Public Serv- ic Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 62; 127 N. E. 80. 333 The powers of the court under the writ of certio- rari provided for in the Workmen's Compensation Act are different from those under the common law writ of certiorari and are limited to the powers and jurisdiction conferred by the Act. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 62, 66; 127 N. E. 80. 333 Where, in a special statutory proceeding, one form of review is especially given, all other forms of re- view are excluded. (Smith-Lohr Coal Co. v. Indus- trila Commission, 279 111. 88; People v. McGoorty, 270 111. 610.) Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 62, 66; 127 N. E. 80. "By Writ of Certiorari." 339 Where an affidavit was filed alleging the loss of the original writ of certiorari and sci. fa. and an SEC. 19 (f) 1 "BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI" 291 order was entered to have an alias writ of certiorari and sci. fa. issue, it was held that the Circuit Court had authority to enter an order directing the alias writ to issue and that having issued the alias writ, it had jurisdiction thereunder. Oriental Laundry Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 HI. 539, 543; 127 N. E. 676. 341 Where the applicant moves to quash the writ of certiorari, the fact that there was a finding by the Commission that notice was not given is an answer to the motion to quash, for it shows a want of juris- diction in the Commission. Ridge Coal Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 298 111. 532, 535; 131 N. E. 637. 332 The commencement of a suit takes place when the cqurt acquires jurisdiction of the plaintiff when he applies for its power and assistance to compel the defendant to render his rights under the law. Ori- ental Laundry Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 539,543; 127 N. E. 676. 334 Courts are bound to presume that absurd conse- quences leading to great injustice were not contem- plated by the legislature, and a construction should be adopted that it may be reasonable to presume was contemplated. Bowman Dairy Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 292 111. 284, 290, 291; 126 N. E. 596. 339 Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, courts are called upon to assist only as to questions of law. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 293 111. 62, 66; 127 N. E. 80. 339 The method of invoking the aid of the Circuit Court is prescribed by statute, as are the questions that can be raised and the orders the court may enter. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 293 111. 62, 66; 127 N. E. 80. 292 SEC. 19 (f) 1 "WHERE ANY OF THE PARTIES FOUND" The Circuit Court of the County where any of the parties de- fendant may be found." 336 Jurisdiction to hear a writ of certiorari thereby conferred on the Circuit Court ; and the jurisdiction being statutory, it is conferred only on those circuit courts selected by the legislature. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 62, 67; 127 N. E. 80. 337 The proceedings under the Workmen's Compen- sation Act, where the writ of certiorari was issued are not the same as in other similar suits but are governed, wholly by the statute in question. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293111. 62, 66; 127 N.E. 80. "Upon Praecipe." 340 The filing of the praecipe is the beginning of the suit, thus giving the Circuit Court jurisdiction to review the proceedings of the Industrial Commis- sion. Oriental Laundry Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 293 111. 539, 544; 127 N. E. 676. 333 When the plaintiff files with the clerk of court the praecipe for the process, the court gets jurisdiction of the plaintiff. Oriental Laundry Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 539, 543 ; 127 N. E. 676. 340 Although there is no provision in the Act for the issuance of an alias writ, nevertheless it may be is- sued if the praecipe is filed and the suit commenced within twenty days of the receipt of the board's de- cision. Oriental Laundry Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 293 111. 539, 542, 543; 127 N. E. 676. 340 An objection that the writ of certiorari was not sued out within twenty days of the time when the SEC. 19 (f) 1 TRANSFER OF CAUSE 293 decision was made and filed is not well taken as it should be sued out within twenty days of the receipt of notice of the decision of the Commission. Decatur Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 290, 292 ; 129 N. E. 738. Transfer of Cause. 341 The legislature has power to give the limited ju- risdiction to a court to transfer a cause, in which it has no jurisdiction, to the proper court. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293111. 62, 69; 127 N.E. 80. 341 Purpose of the Venue Act gives the court juris- diction to transfer cause to another court even though it has no jurisdiction of the subject matter. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 293 111. 62, 69; 127 N. E. 80. 341 Under Section 16 of the Venue Act, the clerk of the court files the transcript and the cause proceeds as if it had originated in that court. Central Illi- nois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293111.62, 69; 127 N. E. 80. 341 A person residing in Champaign County was ap- pointed administrator of the estate of a deceased workman in Coles County. A certiorari was sued out in Coles County to review a decision of the Commis- sion and notice sent to Champaign County. The administrator entered a limited appearance and con- tested the jurisdiction of the Coles County Circuit Court. The certiorari was quashed and later a mo- tion was made to vacate the order quashing the writ and to transfer the cause to Champaign County, which was allowed, and a transcript of the proceed- ings had in Coles County was sent to Champaign 294 SEC. 19 (f) 1 SCOPE OF REVIEW County. There the administrator entered a limited appearance and moved to quash the writ because it was not sued out of the proper court within twenty days after the decision of the Commission; that neither the Coles County nor the Champaign Coun- ty Circuit Court had jurisdiction. Held, under par- agraph 36 of the Venue Act, the Circuit Court of Coles County had jurisdiction to transfer the case to Champaign County and the court there should have proceeded to a hearing on the merits of the case. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 293 111. 62 ; 127 N. E. 80. 341 Even though the court has no jurisdiction of the parties or the subject matter, under the Venue Act it has the right and jurisdiction to transfer the cause to the proper court and that gives the court to which the case was transferred the jurisdiction to hear the cause of its merits. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 62, 68; 127 N. E. 80. 341 That there must be jurisdiction is necessary, but the tendency in Workmen's Compensation cases in following out the spirit of the Act, has been to per- mit the hearing and adjudication of claims with as little delay and formality as consistent with ordin- ary procedure. Oriental Laundry Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 539, 544; 127 N. E. 676. Scope of Review. 345 The court is not permitted to review the evidence for the purpose of determining where the prepon- derance lies, but it is authorized to consider the evi- dence to determine whether there is any evidence in the record to sustain the finding of the Commission. SEC. 19 (f) 1 METHOD OF RAISING QUESTION 295 Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425, 427; 127 N. E. 752. 348 Where there is evidence in the record justifying the decision of the Commission that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment, the Supreme Court will not set the decision aside. Challenge Co. v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 596, 597; 127 N.E. 83. Method of Raising Question. 349 If the question as to whether the employer is un- der the Act is raised for the first time in the Su- preme Court, it can not be passed upon. Questions to be considered by the Supreme Court must be raised affirmatively before the Commission and in the Circuit Court. Bristol & Gale Co. v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 16, 25, 26; 126 N. E. 599. 353 Where the motion of the employee does not set out the reasons for quashing the writ of certiorari and the employer does not set out his reasons for quashing the record, either party has the right to rely upon anything shown by the record in support of his position, and in the absence of some showing no waiver of any right or failure to present any answer can be presumed. Ridge Coal Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 298 111. 532, 535; 131 N. E. 637. 349 The record of the Circuit Court must disclose that the constitutional question was presented to it for determination. Odin Coal Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 297 111. 392, 394; 130 N. E. 704.* 15 A constitutional question cannot be presented in 349 the Supreme Court for review unless it was pre- sented to the lower court for determination. Odin 296 SEC. 19 (f) 1 METHOD OF RAISING QUESTION Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 392, 394 ; 130 N. E. 704. 349 Where there is no ruling on a motion by the In- dustrial Commission then the motion as made is waived. Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 298 111. 175, 180; 131. N. E. 369. 349 Where no question of the constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Act was raised in the Circuit Court, it cannot be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court. Davis v. Industrial Commis- sion, 297 111. 29, 33; 130 N. E. 333. 341 Where a delivery wagon driver was killed by a third person and it appeared that his employer did not engage in the manufacture or assembling of ma- chinery, but that he merely dealt in machinery and it appeared that the employee was not exposed to a hazard, the employer could not raise this question for the first time in the Supreme Court. Bristol & Gale Co. v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 16, 17, 25 ; 126 N. E. 599. 349 Where rules of procedure of Supreme Court are 15 not complied with, the right to have the validity of an act considered is waived. Snyder v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 175, 18.3; 130 N. E. 517. 349 The ruling of a lower court must be challenged by 378 errors properly assigned on the record. Snyder v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 175, 183; 130 N. E. 517. 353 Assignments of error must be based upon the rec- ord itself and not merely upon the argument of coun- sel or upon the fact that the question might have been raised in the pleadings or during the trial. Odin Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 392, 394 ; 130 N. E. 704. SEC. 19 (f) 1 METHOD OF RAISING QUESTION 297 353 Where the motion to quash the record fails to show a reference to a constitutional question, and the record, too, fails to show this question, the Supreme Court cannot consider this question. Odin Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 392, 394; 130 N. E. 704. 353 The record is presumed to speak the truth as to the finding and action of the tribunal whose record it is and a reviewing court must act upon the record as certified to it. Ridge Coal Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 298 111. 532, 534; 131 N. E. 637. 350 There can be no vested right in any particular remedy, method or procedure. City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 409, 411 ; 127 N. E. 46. 350 In a case where a miner was injured it was stip- ulated that the parties were under the Compensa- tion Act. The only question raised was the con- stitutionality of the Act. It was urged that it violated the provisions of the State and Federal con- stitutions with reference to due process. The rec- ord in the Circuit Court failed to show any ruling on these questions. Held, assignments of error must be based upon the record itself and not upon the arguments of counsel or upon the fact that the ques- tion was raised during the trial. Odin Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 392; 130 N. E. 704. 351 *NOTE. The point raised in Odin Coal Co. v. Industrial Com- mission. 297 111. 392, as disclosed by the brief was that the Work- men's Compensation Act violates the Federal Constitution be- cause it does not give the Circuit and Supreme Courts the right to review the facts. In Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, et al., 253 U. S. 287, a public service Commission had made a valuation of some property and ordered a new rate. The Superior Court reversed the Commission and the Supreme Court in 260 Penn. St. 289, reversed the Superior Court, holding that the finding of the Commission on the evidence was final. The 298 SEC. 19 (f) 1 "CIRCUIT COURT HAS POWER" 350 Where the record does not show that the Commis- 353 sion refused to have the employee examined by their own physician, there is no ruling on the mat- ter and the question is therefore not before the re- viewing court. Voight v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 109, 115; 130 N. E. 470. 353 Where there is any controversy in the evidence whether a certain word ought to be in the finding, the record cannot be disregarded. Ridge Coal Com- pany v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 532, 534; 131 N. E. 637. "Circuit Court has Power to Review Questions of Law." 352 There is a distinction between setting aside a de- cision of the Commission which finds that a certain state of facts proves that the death resulted from United States Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on the ground that the 14th Amendment required the state to provide a review by a judicial tribunal. They held that a person was entitled to a judicial review as to the confisca- tion of their property. The theory which underlies the reasoning in this case is that the action of the Commission in fixing the rates was "legislative" and conflscatory in character. 297 111. 392, 130 N. E. 704. 351 NOTE. The Fourteenth Amendment cannot interfere with the police power of the State. Babier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Stertz v. Industrial Commission. 91 Wash. 588; Hawkons v. Blakely. 243 U. S. 210; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 663; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.. Ill U. S. 746; Barbier v. Connolly. 113 U. S. 27; Yick Co. v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678. Odin Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission. 351 NOTE. The United States Supreme Court has placed all Com- pensation Acts under the Police Power of the State. N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. McOuire, 219 U. S. 549; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S.I; Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U. S. 219. 361 NOTE. The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that the scin- tilla rule does not apply in Compensation cases and that there must be substantial competent proof. Hajer Washed Coal Co. \. Industrial Commissoin, 293 111. 524. SECTION 19 (f) 1 "CIRCUIT COURT HAS POWER" 299 accidental injuries, than to confirm the decision of the Commission, that the death was not by accident. Baggott v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 530, 535 ; 125 N. E. 254. 353 Where the abstract shows that there was evidence tending to show that there was no notice given, it is not necessary for the reviewing court to look in the record, where there is a finding by the Commis- sion, as this would merely raise a question of fact with which the court is not concerned. Ridge Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 532, 535; 131 N. E. 637. 352 Where it appears from the record that the ques- tion of amendment is pending in the Circuit Court on a writ of certiorari which was filed after the original case was brought to the Supreme Court, that question should be passed upon by the Circuit Court on the certiorari proceedings. Rosenthal v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 323, 326; 125 N. E. 250. In Its decision on review the Industrial Commission shall de- termine in each particular case the amount of the probable cost of the record to be filed as a return to the writ of certiorari in that case and no praecipe for a writ of certiorari may be filed and no writ of certiorari shall issue unless the party seeking to review the decision of the Industrial Commission shall exhibit to the clerk of the said Circuit Court a receipt showing payment of the sums so determined to the secretary of the Industrial Commission. This paragraph was inserted by an amendment in 1921. The amendment was passed to cure an evil which existed under the old act. The attorney rep- resenting the employer who prayed the appeal could sue out the writ of certiorari. This would prevent proceedings under section 19 (g). By refusing to pay for the record, the Commission would hold up the 300 SEC. 19 (f) 2 "FILE A BOND" record, which would result in delay at the expense of the employee. The writ can not issue now unless the appealing party shows that they have paid for the costs of the record to be furnished by the Com- mission. S&5 (2) No sncli writ of certiorari shall issue unless the one against whom the Industrial Commission shall have rendered an award for the payment of money shall upon the filing of his praecipe for such writ file with the clerk of said court a bond conditioned that if he shall not successfully prosecute said writ, he will pay the said award and the costs of the proceedings In said court. The amount of the bond shall be fixed by any mem- ber of the Industrial Commission and the surety or sureties on said bond shall be approved by the clerk of said court. "File a Bond." 355 The employee is fully protected by the bond re- quired of the employer on petition for review. Juer- gens Bros. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 420, 424; 125 N. E. 337. 856 The court may confirm or set aside the decision of the Indus- trial Commission. If the decision is set aside and the facts found in the proceedings before the Commission are sufficient, the Court may enter such decision as is justified by law, or may remand the cause to the Industrial Commission for further pro- ceedings and may state the questions requiring further hearing, and give such other instructions as may be proper. "Court may confirm or set aside." 356 Where a coal miner suffered a fracture of the leg and was confined to bed, the Commission allowed him $7.79 for 78 weeks and $2.00 per week for 175 weeks as provided by paragraph (d), of Section 8, for partial disability. On review by the Circuit Court, the award was set aside and a judgment en- tered for 83 weeks at $7.79 a week and 333 weeks at $2.00 per week for permanent partial disability for the reason that the disability sustained was 25 per . SEC. 19 (f) 2 "COURT MAY CONFIRM OR SET ASIDE" 301 cent permanent disability. On review by the Su- preme Court the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 111. 449; 124 N. E. 566. 345 Where all the evidence without dispute showed an injury to the left leg but the Commission found the partial permanent loss of use of the right leg, the reviewing court may take notice of and correct the error. Ridge Coal Company v. Industrial Com- mission, 298 111. 532, 534; 131 N. E. 637. 357 Where opinion evidence cannot be considered and 280 the finding of the percentage of loss of use of the legs is not sustained by competent evidence, the award must be set aside. Decatur Construction Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 296 111. 290, 294 ; 129 N. E. 738. 356 Where the proof that the money was sent to the dependents, is not definite and positive, the Circuit Court can, on review by certiorari, set aside the deci- sion of the Commission or enter such decision upon the facts as is justified or required by law. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 330, 334; 124 N. E. 603. 356 Record held not to have sufficient facts upon which 378 an award or judgment could be based but if it ap- pears that it may be possible for the claimant to establish his case, then, the matter should be re- manded for further proceedings. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 330, 333; 124 N. E. 603. 356 When the trial court considers the findings and award of the Commission to be correct, its only authority is to confirm the decision. McGarry v. In- dustrial Commission, 290 111. 577, 579; 125 N. E. 318. 302 SEC. 19 (f) 2 "COURT MAY ENTER SUCH DECISION" The court may enter such decision as is justified by Law." 356 Where a workman left him surviving a father and mother aged 84 and 75 years, respectively, both re- siding in Italy, and it was shown that the deceased twice sent money to them, it was held under the 1915 Act, that the Circuit Court committed error in quash- ing the proceedings of the Commission, which en- tered an award, that the Circuit Court should have entered such decision as was justified by law, or should have remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings. Peabody Coal Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 289 111. 330; 124 N. E. 603. 356 Under paragraph (f), clause (2), Section 19, the Circuit Court is authorized to render such decision as is justified by law where evidence is undisputed and this carries with it the power to enter a judg- ment for the correct amount where there is no dis- pute as to the facts. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 449, 453; 124 N. E. 566. 356 Where it is clear, that the Commission misappre- hended the law applicable to the facts in a case, the Circuit Court may enter a judgment as to the amount of compensation, because, in entering this judgment, it merely passed upon a question of law and did not review any question of fact. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 449, 453, 454; 124 N. E. 566. 357 A clerical error in the record of the Commission, if discovered should be brought to the attention of the Circuit Court and corrected there. Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 294 111. 325, 326 ; 128 N. E. 554. SEC. 19 (f) 2 JUDGMENT AND EXECUTION 303 Judgment and Execution in Certiorari Proceeding. 357 The Circuit Court errs in entering a money judg- ment and ordering execution thereon. Bristol & Gale Co. v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 16, 26; 126 N. E. 599. 357 The Circuit Court erred in entering a money judg- ment in a certiorari proceeding ; in this proceeding it has only authority to confirm the findings of the Com- mission or to set them aside. Baggott v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 530, 535; 125 N. E. 254. 357 The Circuit Court had no authority to enter a money judgment and to issue execution and the case is, therefore, reversed and remanded as to that mat- ter with directions. Rosenthal v. Industrial Commis- sion, 290 111. 323, 326; 125 N. E. 250. 357 The Circuit Court cannot authorize a judgment and issue execution. Tribune Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 290 111. 402, 406; 125 N. E. 351. 357 The Circuit Court erred in entering judgment upon the award and in ordering execution to issue. It has only authority on review by certiorari to con- firm the findings and award of the Commission and order the petitioner to pay the costs. Juergens Bros. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 420, 424; 125 N. E. 337. 358 The Circuit Court errs in entering a decree direct- ing the payment of the award of the Commission and ordering execution thereon. McGarry v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 577, 579; 125 N. E. 318. 357 Where it was stipulated that the judgment of the trial court was entered by inadvertance, the Supreme Court modified without reversing that part pertain- 304 SEC. 19 (f) 2 "REMAND" ing to issuance'of execution. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 599, 603; 125 N. E. 378. 357 The Circuit Court held to have erred in setting aside the decision of the Commission suspending compensation. Rosenthal & Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 295 111. 182, 186; 129 N. E. 176. "Remand." 358 The provision of the Act with reference to re- manding the cause to the Commission, should be liberally construed to the end that the intent and purpose of the act may be reasonably accomplished. Schweiss v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 90, 99; 126 N. E. 566. 358 Where on the hearing before the Circuit Court affidavits were presented in support of a motion to remand the cause to the Commission for further evi- dence, on the ground that the language in an opinion of the Supreme Court had been modified, denying the motion to remand was held to be error. Schweiss v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 90, 99, 100; 126 N. E. 566. 359 Under Section 19, (f), the Circuit Court may re- mand the cause to the Industrial Commission for further hearing and a refusal to remand the cause because the beneficiaries are not in court or repre- sented, is error. National Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 598, 604; 127 N. E. 135. 358 Affidavits in support of motion to remand cause to Commission need not show diligence. Schweiss v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 90, 99 ; 126 N. E. 566. SEC. 19 (f) 2 REVIEW BY SUPREME COURT 305 358 An apparent clerical error is not ground for re- versal of an award. Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 294 111. 325, 326; 128 N. E. 554. 358 Where the Circuit Court on confirming an award ordered execution to issue and it was urged that the court had authority to modify its judgment, the Su- preme Court modified the judgment by striking out that part of the order relative to the execution with- out reversing and remanding the same. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 178; 125 N. E. 748. 359 Where there is an insufficiency of proof as to the existence of alleged beneficiaries, the application to remand the cause to the Commission for further proof as to that fact should have been granted. Na- tional Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 598, 604; 127 N. E. 135. 339 Judgments and orders of the Circuit Court under this Act shall be reriewed only by the Supreme Court upon a writ of error which the Supreme Court in its discretion may order to issue, if applied for not later than the second day of the first term of the Supreme Court following the rendition of the Circuit Court judgment or order sought to be reviewed: provided, that if the first day of said term is less than thirty days from the rendition of said judgment or order, then application for said writ of error may be made not later than the second day of the second term following the rendition of said judgment or order. The writ of error when issued shall operate as a supersedeas. The bond filed with the praecipe for the writ of certiorari as provided in this paragraph shall operate as a stay of the judg- ment or order of the Circuit Court until the time shall hare passed within which an application for a writ of error can be made, and until the Supreme Court has acted upon the applica- tion for a writ of error, If such application is made. The decision of a majority of the members of the committee of arbitration or of the Industrial Commission shall be consid- ered the decision of such committee or commission, respectively. 306 SEC. 19 (f) 2 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE Supreme Court Practice. 360 Where a cause is appealed to the Supreme Court on a question of jurisdiction and it appears that on the merits the decision of the lower court is con- trolled by a decision of the Supreme Court which will require merely an order confirming the decision of the Commission, the court should take the short cut by affirming the judgment on the merits, thus saving the delay and additional costs in connection with the other hearing. (Dissenting opinion) Cen- tral Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 293 111. 62, 70; 127 N. E. 80. 360 The delay in sending a case back to the Circuit Court to correct an error in procedure, where the merits of the cause are controlled by another deci- sion, is not in accordance with justice. (Dissenting opinion) Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. In- dustrial Commission. 293 111. 62, 70; 127 N. E. 80. 360 Where final judgment might be delayed by re- manding the cause for correction of a clerical error, the Supreme Court will modify the judgment and make the correction. Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 294 111. 325, 326; 128 N. E. 554. 360 Section 19 which was amended so as to give right to appeal to the Supreme Court by writ of error held to affect practice and procedure only. City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 409, 411; 127 N. E. 46. 360 Although an appeal under the Compensation Act is a statutory proceeding, the ordinary rules of practice and procedure will be followed upon a re- view of the judgment of the Circuit Court. Odin Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 392, 394; 130 N. E. 704. SEC. 19 (f) 2 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 307 360 When the change (by amendment to the law) merely affects the remedy or the law of procedure, all rights of action will be enforcible under the new procedure without regard to whether the suit had been instituted or not. City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 409, 411; 127 N. E. 46. 360 The Circuit Court affirmed an award of the Com- mission on June 10, 1919, the judge certifying that the case was a proper one to be reviewed by the Su- preme Court, the Section (19) providing for this practice was amended July 1, 1919, so that the Su- preme Court could in its discretion order a writ of error to issue. The writ of error was not sued out until February Term, 1920. Held, As the amend- ment affected practice and procedure, the Court was without jurisdiction to issue the writ at the February Term and the writ was dismissed. City of Chi- cago v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 409, 127 N. E. 46. 360 The amendment to Section 19, giving the Supreme Court the right to issue a writ of error merely affected a question of practice and procedure, and the right of action is enforcible under the new pro- cedure. City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 292111. 409, 411; 127 N.E. 46. 360 Where an order granting a certificate of review was entered June, 1919, and the case was brought to the Supreme Court by writ of error to the June, 1920, term, it was held that under Section 4 of the law on statutes, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to issue the writ even though the amendment of 1919 was in effect at the time that the writ was issued. (Revers- ing City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission 292 111. 409.) Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 295 111. 141; 128 N. E. 917. 308 SEC. 19 (f) 2 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 360 Section 4 of law on statutes construed in connec- tion with the amendment of 1919 of Workmen's Com- pensation Act permits the application of the pro- visions of the former Act as to the right of review by writ of error. (Western Electric Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 285 111. 279 approved). Vulcan De- tinning Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 141, 144; 128 N. E. 917. 360 Where final judgment was entered by the Circuit Court May 16, 1919, it was proper to bring the case to the Supreme Court on a certificate of review and not under the amendment of July 1, 1919. Clark Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 561, 570 ; 126 N. E. 579. 360 Where a point is presented by the evidence but abandoned in the brief, the Supreme Court will not consider it further. Rockford City Traction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 358, 360; 129 N. E, 135. 360 When defendants in error on petition for rehear- 15 ing raise the question that the Workmen's Compen- 9 sation Act violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution because it provides for judicial review only as to questions of law, the court cannot consider the ques- tion because it was not properly presented for con- sideration in the lower court. Snyder v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 175, 183; 130 N. E. 517. 360 Intimated that under Rule 43, it is better practice 512 for a respondent to reply to a petition for a writ of error and not to wait until the writ has issued to file a brief and abstract. Sesser Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 11, 16; 129 N. E. 536. SEC. 19 (f) 2 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 309 360 Petitions under Rule 43 for a writ of error receive 512 the consideration of the entire court. Sesser Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 111. 11, 16; 129 N. E. 536. 360 Costs may be taxed in the Supreme Court in a compensation case among both of the parties ac- cording to shares. Voight v. Industrial Commission, 297 HI. 109, 116; 130 N. E. 470. 360 Compensation computed by the Supreme Court and judgment entered in that court for compensa- tion and interest due, thus reversing the Circuit Court in part and affirmining in part. Voight v. In- dustrial Commission, 297 111. 109, 115, 116; 130 N. E. 470. 361 Where the award of the Commission was quashed by the Circuit Court, and the employee prayed an ap- peal to the Supreme Court, and the employer filed no brief but simply a printed argument, in violation of the rule that printed briefs must be filed in that court, the Court considered the case on the brief of the employee and affirmed the order of the Circuit Court quashing the award of the Commission. Mep- ham v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 484, 488; 124 N. E. 540. 361 Rule 15 of the Supreme Court requires that the brief shall contain the points made and the authori- ties relied upon in support of them. McGarry v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 577, 579; 125 N. E. 318. 361 Rule 27 of the Supreme Court provides that if a brief is not filed in accordance with the rules of court within the time prescribed, the judgment of the court below will be affirmed. McGarry v. Indus- trial Commission, 290 111. 577, 579; 125 N. E. 318. 310 SEC. 19 (f) 2 SUPREME COURT POWERS 512 Under Rule 43 of the Supreme Court, the respon- dent may reply to the petition ; if the petition or ab- stract is incomplete or incorrect the respondent should make a complete statement of the case so as to prevent awarding the writ without apparently good cause. Sesser Coal Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 296 111. 11, 16; 129 N. E. 536. 361 The filing of a printed argument in the Supreme Court does not comply with the rule of court, which requires a printed brief of the points and authorities relied upon for the reversal of the trial court. M c- Garry v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 577, 579; 125 N. E. 318. 361 Even though the decree of the Circuit Court was right on the merits, the Supreme Court could affirm for failure to comply with the rules. McGarry v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 577, 579; 125 N. E. 318. Court Powers. 360 The court is not authorized to write a provision into the act in order to sustain an award even though the case is a meritorious one. Chicago Home for the Friendless v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 286, 288; 130 N. E. 756. 362 Section 19 providing that judgments and orders of the Circuit Court shall be reviewed only by the Supreme Court upon writ of error construed so as not to give it retrospective operation. City of Chi- cago v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 409, 411 ; 127 N. E. 46. 362 Where the employment is but casual, the Circuit Court commits error in entering judgment by affirm- SEC. 19 (f) 2 "SUPERSEDEAS" 311 ing the award of the Commission in a case where the evidence shows that the employment is casual. Dia- mond Livery Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 591, 595; 124 N. E. 609. 363 The suing out of a writ of error is the bringing of a new suit and is governed by the rules of practice and procedure in effect when the writ is sued out. City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 292 111. 409, 410; 127 N. E. 46. "Supersedeas." 363 Where the amendment of the award by the Com- mission and the petition to have the Court amend its judgment was filed after the writ of error was granted and made a supersedeas in the case, the Circuit Court is without jurisdiction to enter any order in the case. Rosenthal v. Industrial Commis- sion, 290 111. 323, 325, 326; 125 N. E. 250. 363 A supersedeas operates to suspend all further action of the trial court touching the matter, as does the perfecting of an appeal. Rosenthal v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 323, 325; 125 N. E. 250. "Writ of Error." 363 Writ of error brings up the entire record, the same as an appeal. Rosenthal v. Industrial Commis- sion, 290 111. 323, 325 ; 125 N. E. 250. 363 Employee, a carpenter, suffered a rupture while carrying a heavy board. The trial court found that the employer and employee were under the Act and that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. Thereupon a writ of error was issued out of the Supreme Court. Thereafter a petition was filed with the Commission asking for a modifica- 312 SEC. 19 (f) 2 "WRIT OF ERROR" tion of the award on the ground that the employee refused to undergo an operation. A petition was then filed in the Circuit Court to modify the judg- ment, and this Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. Held, that the writ of error operated as a supersedeas and the Circuit Court was right in holding that it had no jurisdiction. Rosenthal v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 323, 326; 125 N. E. 250. 363 Even though the award is being attacked by writ 392 of error either party can file a petition under Section 19, (h), to have the award reviewed for the reasons set out in the section. Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 515, 518; 124 N. E. 564. 363 The right to file an application for review of an 392 award accrues as soon as the award is made and is not held in abeyance by appeal or writ of error. The period of time is eighteen months and extends from the time of the agreement or the award and is not affected by any appeal. Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289, 515, 519; 124 N. E. 564. 366 The question of what the amount of compensation should be, is for the Commission and is not subject to review by the Supreme Court, when the award is within the statutory limit as to amount, except for fraud. Stubbs v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 525, 527; 124 N.E. 527. Scope of Review. 366 The question whether the Circuit Court erred in refusing to conform its judgment to the amendment of the Commission for failure on the part of an em- SEC. 19 (f) 2 SCOPE OF REVIEW 313 ployee to submit to an operation. Held, not to be before the court. Rosenthal v. Industrial Commis- sion, 290 111. 323, 325; 125 N. E. 250. 366 Where the Supreme Court has passed on the ques- tion of there being evidence in the record tending to establish disfigurement, such decision is conclusive and operates as res judicata. Stubbs v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 525, 527; 124 N. E. 527. 366 The weight of competent evidence does not pre- 378 sent a question of law for the consideration of the reviewing court. O'Callaghan v. Industrial Commis- sion, 290 111. 222, 226; 124 N. E. 811. 367 Even though the Supreme Court might think that the preponderance of the evidence showed that the condition of an employee was due to an organic dis- ease, it cannot disturb the holding of the Commis- sion on that ground. McGarry v. Industrial Com- mission, 290 111. 577, 578; 125 N. E. 318. 367 Whether or not the Compensation Act or any sec- tion thereof, which it is claimed brings the case within its terms, is constitutional is a question of law presented by any record of the Industrial Board. Odin Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 392, 394; 130 N. E. 704. 367 There can be no vested right in any matter affect- ing practice or procedure. City of Chicago v. Indus- trial Commission, 292 111. 409, 411; 127 N. E. 46. 367 In the absence of fraud, if there is competent evi- dence to support the award, and no question of law, the award is binding on the Supreme Court. O'Cal- laghan v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 222, 226; 124 N. E. 811. 314 SEC. 19 (f) 2 SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 367 It is not the province of the courts to pass upon the merits of the various systems now in use and practice in the treatment and cure of diseases. Voight v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 109, 113; 130 N. E. 470. Sufficiency of Evidence. 369 Facts held to justify conclusion of the Commission that employee was knocked out of the open window or that he fell from the fire escape while trying to get the air. Sparks Milling Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 293 111. 350, 354; 127 N. E. 737. 370 Evidence that an employee was doing certain kinds of work considered by the Supreme Court and held that it did not show a condition which rendered the employee incapable of work. Ballou v. Indus- trial Commission, 296 111. 434, 437, 438; 129 N. E. 755. 370 Where there is no evidence to sustain the award, it must be set aside. Edelweiss Gardens v. Indus- trial Commission, 290 111. 459, 463; 125 N. E. 260. 371 Where the evidence indicated that the employee took reasonable care of his injury under the circum- stances, the Court cannot say from the evidence that the Commission was warranted in concluding that his conduct was such as to preclude the adminis- trator from recovering for death. Snyder v. Indus- trial Commission, 297 111. 175, 182; 130 N. E. 517. 371 An employee who worked as a welder had to wear heavy glasses while doing his work. While welding, one of the glasses broke and he received the flash of light in his naked eye. He returned to work right away but gradually his sight failed him. There was some evidence that he had a pre-existing disease. Sec. 19 (f) 2 SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 315 Held, that there was evidence in the record that jus- tified the finding that the blindness was the result of the accident. Rockford City Traction Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 295 111. 358; 129 N. E. 135. 375 It has been repeatedly held that the courts cannot weigh the evidence ; that in the absence of fraud the courts are bound by the decision of the Industrial Commission if there is any legal evidence to support it. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 141, 148; 128 N. E. 917. 377 Where there is evidence, that employees used a certain fire escape as a means of descent instead of a stairway and that the fire escape was apparently safe and that employees, after descending, turned in their numbers to the time-keeper and no eye-wit- ness saw the accident to the employee who was killed, it is sufficient to establish that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. Stephens Engineering Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 88, 92; 124 N.E. 869. 377 Evidence that an employee fell from a ladder and suffered injuries that impaired his working capacity after the accident is sufficient to sustain an award. O'Callaghan v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 222, 226; 124 N. E. 811. 377 Where the Commission makes an award and there is competent evidence in the record to sustain the award, neither the Circuit Court nor the Supreme Court are warranted in reversing a finding of the Commission where there are no errors of law which call for a reversal. Snyder v. Industrial Commis- sion, 297 111. 175, 183; 130 N. E. 517. 377 It has been said with tiresome regularity by the Supreme Court that it cannot weigh the evidence, 316 SEC. 19 (f) 2 SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE but that it must confirm the decision of the Commis- sion if there is any competent evidence in the record which justifies its finding. McGarry v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 577, 579; 125 N. E. 318. 377 Where there is evidence in the record that the in- jured employee reported the injury to the super- intendent within thirty days "under the rule many times stated" the Court is not allowed to weigh the evidence. Chicago-Sandoval Coed Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 294 111. 351, 352; 128 N. E. 567. 377 A trapper in a mine was killed while driving a mule. It was proved that it was the custom for trappers to change places with the drivers. The boss driver and the superintendent testified that the trapper was driving contrary to instructions. Held, as the question whether the mine authorities ac- quiesced in letting trappers drive was disputed, it was a question of fact passed on by the Commission, which cannot be disturbed by the courts. Sunny- side Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 523 ; 126 N. E. 196. 377 Where there is competent evidence, in the record, tending to support the findings of the Commission, the reviewing court is not authorized to disturb the award. Walsh Teaming Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 290 111. 536, 540; 125 N. E. 331. 377 Where there is sufficient evidence to justify an award, the Supreme Court is not allowed to set aside the award because it would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence. Hafer Washed Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 425, 428; 127 N. E. 752. 377 Evidence that a waiter was suddenly assaulted by a busboy who threw a platter at his head, is not SEC. 19 (f) 2 THE RECORD 317 sufficient to prove that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. Edelweiss Gardens v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 459, 463 ; 125 N. E. 260. 377 Where there is evidence in the record to justify the conclusion that an employee was either under interstate or in intrastate commerce and the Commis- sion finds that he is under the Workmen's Compen- sation Act, the Supreme Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission where there is evidence to justify its findings. G. T. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 167, 172; 125 N. E. 748. 378 Under section 19, (d), whether an operation is reasonably essential is for the Commission to de- termine based upon the evidence submitted to it, and unless the Commission acts unreasonably or abuses its discretion, the Court cannot interfere with its finding. Rosenthal & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 182, 184; 129 N. E. 176. 377 Held, that there was evidence in the record that justified the Commission in finding that the em- ployee had requested medical and hospital services. Cnicago-Sandoval Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 294 111. 351, 353; 128 N. E. 567. 378 Where there is competent legal evidence to sup- port the award, although there is contradictory evi- dence, the award cannot be disturbed on that ground. O'Callaghan v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 222, 226; 124 N. E. 811. The Record. 378 Where the record itself presents any question of law, the parties are entitled to have it determined 318 SEC. 19 (f) 2 COSTS by the Circuit Court. Odin Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 392, 394; 130 N. E. 704. 378 Cases arising under the provision permitting a suspension of the ward for failure to submit to an operation depend on the special facts and if the facts in the record justify the finding of the Com- mission, then the courts are bound by such finding. Rosenthal & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 182, 186; 129 N. E. 176. 378 There is a difference between proving the exist- ence of a record and using the record to prove mat- ters of fact found by it. Illinois Steel Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 290 111. 594, 596; 125 N. E. 252. Costs. 378 Costs for an additional abstract filed by defend- ant in error on submission of the cause for decision may be taxed to the plaintiff in error on affirming the judgment. Sesser Coal Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 296 111. 11, 16; 129 N. E. 536. 881 (g) Either party may present a certified copy of the decision of the Industrial Commission, when no proceedings for review thereof have been taken, or of the decision of such arbitrator or committee of arbitration when no claim for review is made, or of the decision of the Industrial Commission after hearing upon re- view, providing for the payment of compensation according to this Act, to the Circuit Court of the county in which such acci- dent occurred or either of the parties are residents, whereupon said court shall render a judgment in accordance therewith ; and In case where the employer does not institute proceedings for re- view of the decision of the Industrial Commission and refuses to pay compensation according to the award upon which such judg- ment Is entered, the court shall, in entering judgment thereon, tax as costs against him the reasonable costs and attorney fees in the arbitration proceedings and in the court entering the judg- ment, for the person In whose favor the judgment is entered, which judgment and costs, taxed as herein provided shall, until and unless set aside, have the same effect as though duly ren- dered in an action duly tried and determined by said court, and shall, with like effect, be entered and docketed. The Circuit Court shall have power, at any time, upon application, to make SECTION 19 (g) JUDGMENT 319 any such judgment conform to any modification required by any subsequent decision of the Supreme Court upon appeal, or as the result of any subsequent proceedings for review, as provided in this Act. Judgment shall not be entered until fifteen days' notice of the time and place of the application for the entry of judgment shall be served upon the employer by filing such notice with the Industrial Commission, which commission shall, in case it has on file the address of the employer or the name and address of its agent, upon whom notices may be served, immediately send a copy of the notice to the employer or such designated agent; and no judgment shall be entered in the event the employer shall file with the said commission its bond with good and sufficient surety in double the amount of the award, conditioned upon the payment of said award in the event the said employer shall fall to prose- cute with effect proceedings for review of the decision or the said decision, upon review, shall be affirmed. Judgment. 386 A motion to vacate a judgment under Section 19, 199 paragraph (g), is addressed to the sound legal dis- cretion of the Court, and unless it appears that such discretion has been abused, the Supreme Court will not interfere. Liberty Foundries Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 601, 604; 124 N. E. 559. "Judgment Modified." 386 A judgment may be modified because there is no evidence of the item stricken out of the award. Ridge Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 HI. 532, 534; 131 N. E. 637. 386 Denial by the Circuit Court to vacate a judgment 199 entered under paragraph (g), of Section 19, is not an abuse of its judicial discretion. Liberty Foun- dries Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 601, 604; 124 N. E. 559. 386 Where the Circuit Court entered a judgment on an award made by an arbitrator, which became the award of the Commission by lapse of time, and it 320 SEC. 19 (g) INTEREST ON AWARD appeared that notice of the award had been received by the employer, that he did not file a petition for re- view; that, thereafter, notice was given under para- graph (g), of Section 19, that judgment would be asked for, with reasonable attorney's fees, and that, as no one appeared, judgment was accordingly en- tered, and on the next day it was moved by the em- ployer that the judgment be vacated for the reason that the employer had notified the employee that the money was in the hands of a certain person ready to be delivered to the employee, but the employee, nevertheless, asked for the entry of the judgment, and it was contended that the Court erred in not vacating the judgment. It was held, that no good reason was shown, why the Circuit Court erred in re- fusing to vacate the judgment, as this is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the Court. Liberty Foundries Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 601 ; 124 N. E. 559. Interest on the Award. 388 Although the Workmen's Compensation Act does not permit the allowance of interest, yet under the Interest Act the award bears interest, at the rate of five per cent on the amount due at the date of the award and from that date, on subsequent install- ments after they have respectively become due. Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 515, 519; 124 N. E. 564. 590 (h) An agreement or award under this Act providing for compensation in installments, may at any time within eighteen months after snch agreement or award be reviewed by the In- dnstrial Commission at the request of either the employer or the employee, on the ground that the disability of the employee has subsequently recurred, Increased, diminished or ended; and on snch review, compensation payments may be re-established, In* SECTION 19 (h) 321 creased, diminished or ended: Prorided, that the commission shall gire fifteen days' notice to the parties of the hearing for review: And provided, further, any employee, npon any petition for such review being filed by the employer, shall be entitled to one day's notice for each one hundred miles necessary to be traveled by him in attending the hearing of the commission upon said petition and three days in addition thereto, and snch em- ployee, shall, at the discretion of the commission, also be entitled to fire cents per mile necessarily trareled by him in attending snch hearing not to exceed a distance of 300 miles, to be taxed by the commission as costs and deposited with the petition of the employer. 382 The Commission erred in dismissing a petition for review under Section 19, (h), where there had been a previous lump sum settlement made. Peoria Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 177, 180; 125 N. E. 1. 390 Under paragraph (h) of Section 19, the Indus- trial Commission had authority to review its former proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that a lump sum settlement had been made with the employee under Section 9 of the Act. Ellsworth v. Indus- trial Commission, 290 111. 514, 518; 125 N. E. 246. 390 Employee was injured while riding a bucking horse for exhibition purposes. Bones in leg were broken, but he made settlement for a lump sum. Thereafter, a petition was filed under Section 19 (h), alleging that the settlement had been made under a misap- prehension of facts and that the disability had re- curred and increased. On the hearing, the Com- mission gave credit for the amount paid and awarded an additional amount. The Circuit Court set aside the award on the ground that the parties were not under the Act at the time of the accident. On re- view, the Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court erred and ordered the award of the Commission confirmed after reversing the trial court. Ellsworth 322 SECTION 19 (h) v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 514, 519; 125 N. E. 246. 390 By making a settlement with the employee, the employer waived the limitation of Section 24 and the agreement brought the employer and employee within the purview of Section 19 (h). Tribune Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 402, 405; 125 N. E. 351. 390 By settlement agreement, both parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the Commission on the merits of the case, and they waived jurisdiction as to the time limitation with reference to voluntary pay- ments, even though the agreement stated to the contrary. Tribune Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 402, 405; 125 N. E. 351. 391 Any agreement made between an employer oper- ating under the Act and an employee must be con- sidered as having been made under the Act, and is a submission to the jurisdiction of the Commission and a waiver as to any question of time limitation then existing, even though the agreement stated to the contrary. (W 'abash Ry. Co. v. Industrial Com- mission, 286 111. 194.) Ohio Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 461, 466; 127 N. E. 743. 391 The mere determination on the part of the em- ployer to do something for the employee is not an agreement to pay compensation. Ohio Oil Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 293 HI. 461, 467; 127 N. E. 743. 392 The Commission has jurisdiction to review a lump sum settlement and to modify its award on the ground that the injury recurred or increased. Tri- bune Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 402, 406 ; 125 N. E. 351. SECTION 19 (h) 323 392 Under paragraph (h), of Section 19, the review is not limited to a case where the payments are paid in installments. A voluntary settlement is a lump sum agreement that is reviewable under this pro- vision. Tribune Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 402,406; 125 N. E. 351. 392 Section 19 (h)^ providing for the review of an agreement or award within eighteen months, begins to run at the date of the award and not at the time of the filing of a Supreme Court opinion. Big Mud- dy Coal & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 515, 519; 124 N.E. 564. 392 Where no award has been entered by the Com- mission, until after review by the Supreme Court, the period of eighteen months for filing application for review of compensation begins to run when the Commission enters an award on such reconsidera- tion of the case. Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 289 111. 515, 519; 124 N. E. 564. 392 The provision, relative to an application for a 88 review, in paragraph (h) of Section 19, within eighteen months, is not a statute of limitations, but provides for a period of time in which it may be determined, whether the injuries received recurred, increased or diminished. Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 515, 518; 124 N. E. 564. 392 The eighteen months provision in paragraph (h) 95 of Section 19, extends from the time of the agree- ment or award. Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 515, 519, 520; 124 N. E. 564. 824 SECTION 19 (h) 392 Where an insurance company had been paying in- stallments of compensation to the widow of a de- ceased employee by checks sent to her and before all of the claim was paid, it became insolvent, and the widow commenced proceedings against the em- ployer, the casualty company in making the pay- ments was acting as the agent of the employer. Ste- phens Engineering Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 88, 92; 124 N. E. 869. 392 Section 19, (h), permits a review either before or after an award has been commuted to a lump sum. Peoria Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 177,180; 125 N. E. 1. 392 The employer and employee were both operating under the terms and provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act ; after a hearing on review by the Industrial Commission, a writ of certiorari was sued out in the Circuit Court which confirmed the award of the Industrial Commission; the case was then brought to the Supreme Court by writ of error and an opinion rendered by the Supreme Court affirming the Circuit Court (279 111. 235). After this pro- ceeding, the employee filed a petition with the Com- mission for a review under Section 19, (h), on the ground that the injury had increased. The employer urged that the petition was not filed within eight- een months after the award but the Commission found that the injury increased, and increased the compensation accordingly. On certiorari, the Cir- cuit Court quashed the proceedings of the Commis- sion. Held, that the time for filing review is eight- een months from the date of the award and this is not affected in any way or suspended by the pen- dency of an appeal by certiorari or writ of error. SECTION 19 (i) 325 Big Muddy Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 515; 125 N.E. 564. 392 The purpose of paragraph (h), Section 19, is to give a period of time in which it may be determined whether the injuries received recurred, increased or diminished. Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 289 111. 515, 519; 124 N. E. 564. 392 Where a petition is filed to review a previous de- cision of the Industrial Commission under the pro- visions of Section 8, (d), the Commission is not au- thorized to treat this as a review under Section 19, (h). Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 451, 453; 130 N. E. 727. 402 The period of eighteen months was inserted in Section 19, (h), by the law making body, because of the recognized inability of the medical profession to forecast with certainty, the results of an injury causing partial disability and the exact extent of the injury. Peoria Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290111.177, 179; 125 N. E. 1. 402 Where an employee accepts a settlement for what he considers a temporary disability and it turns out to be a permanent disability, the Commission is justified in finding that the injury had increased and recurred and its decision should be confirmed. Ells- worth v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 514, 518, 519; 125 N. E. 246. 402 (I) Each party, upon taking any proceedings or steps what- soever before any arbitrator, committee of arbitration, Industrial Commission or court, shall file with the Industrial Commission his address, or the name and address of any agent upon whom all notices to be given to such party shall be served, either per- sonally or by registered mail, addressed to such party or agent at the last address so filed with the Industrial Commission: Provided, that In the event such party has not filed his address, 326 SEC. 19 (j), (k), 20, 21 or the name and address of an agent, as above provided, service of any notice may be had by filing such notice with the Industrial Commission. 402 (j) Whenever in any proceeding testimony has been taken or a final decision has been rendered, and after the taking of snch testimony, or after snch decision has become final, the injured employee dies, then in any subsequent proceeding brought by the personal representative or beneficiaries of the deceased employee, such testimony in the former proceeding may be Introduced with the same force and effect as though the witness having so testified were present In person in such sub* sequent proceeding and such final decision, If any shall be taken as a final adjudication of any of the issues which are the same In both proceedings. 403 (k) In any case where there has been any unreasonable or vexations delay of payment or intentional underpayment of compensation, or proceedings have been Instituted or carried on by the one liable to pay the compensation, which do not pre- sent a real controversy, but are merely frivolous or for delay, then the commission may award compensation additional to that otherwise payable under this Act equal to fifty percentum of the amount payable at the time of such award. [Amended by Act approved June 29, 1921.] SECTION 20. 404 The Industrial Board shall report in writing to the Governor on the 30th day of June, annually, the details and results of its administration of this Act, in accordance with the terms of this Act, and may prepare and issue such special bulletins and re- ports from time to time as in the opinion of the board, seems advisable. SECTION 21. KH No payment, claim, award or decision under this Act shall be assignable or subject to any Hen, attachment or garnish- ment, or be held liable in any way for any lien, debt, pen- alty or damages. A decision or award of the Industrial Com- mission against an employer for compensation under this Act, or a written agreement by an employer to pay such compensa- tion shall, upon the filing of a certified copy of the decision or said agreement, as the case may be, with the recorder of deeds of the county, constitute a lien upon all property of the em- ployer within said county, paramount to all other claims or liens, except mortgages, trust deeds, or for wages or taxes, and such liens may be enforced in the manner provided for the foreclosure of mortgages under the laws of this State* Any right to receive compensation hereunder shall be extinguished by the death of the person or persons entitled thereto, subject to the provisions of this Act relative to compensation for death SEC. 21 "RIGHT TO COMPENSATION EXTINGUISHED" 327 received in the course of employment: Provided, that npon the death of a beneficiary, who is receiving compensation provided for in section 7, leaving surviving a parent, sister or brother of the deceased employee, at the time of his death dependent upon him for support, who were receiving from such beneficiary a contribution to support, then that proportion of the compensa- tion of the beneficiary which would have been paid but for the death of the beneficiary, but in no event exceeding said unpaid compensation, which the contribution of the beneficiary to the dependent's support within one year prior to the death of the beneficiary bears to the compensation of the beneficiary within that year, shall be continued for the benefit of such dependents, notwithstanding the death of the beneficiary. [Amended by Act approved June 28, 1919.] "Right to Compensation Extinguished." 405 Providing for the extinguishing of compensation to certain beneficiaries in Section 7 construed and considered in connection with Section 9 where an aged beneficiary petitioned for a lump sum settle- ment. Clark Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 561, 570; 126 N. E. 579. 404 Where a widow, who is entitled to compensation for the death of her husband, dies before the award is made, her right to receive the compensation is not extinguished within the meaning of this section, by her death. East St. Louis Board of Education v. In- dustrial Commission, 298 111. 61, 64; 131 N. E. 123. 404 The right to receive compensation is fixed at the time of the employee's death, and under Section 21 stops any further right to payments upon the death of the beneficiary, but is not retroactive so as to ex- tinguish the right to receive the payments for the period from the date of the injured employee 's death until the beneficiary's death. East St. Louis Board of Education v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 61, 65; 131 N.E. 123. 405 Section 7 determines dependency and the award while Section 21 provides for the extinguishment of 328 SECTION 22 the award by the death of the beneficiary subject to the provisions of Section 7, which determines the right, and it cannot be construed as retroactive but only to abate the right to receive payments due after the death of the beneficiary. East St. Louis Board of Education v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 61, 64; 131 N. E. 123. 410 The proviso in Section 7 shows the right to go forward with the proceeding and receive compensa- tion under the application, and under the circum- stances mentioned in the proviso, the right continues in the beneficiary after his death. East St. Louis Board of Education v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 61, 65; 131 N. E. 123. 209 While the right to receive compensation is extin- guished by the death of the beneficiary entitled there- to, it does not mean that if the widow had received installments under the award the amount she had received to the day of her death must be refunded be- cause the right had been extinguished by her death. East St. Louis Board of Education v. Industrial Com- mission, 298 111. 61, 65 ; 131 N. E. 123. Section 22. 410 Any contract or agreement made by any employer or his agent or attorney with any employee or any other beneficiary of any claim under the provisions of this Act within seven days after the injury shall be presumed to be fraudulent. 410 An employer cannot relieve himself from liability under the Compensation Act by a contract with his employee. (Tribune Co 4 v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 402; Chicago Ratttvays Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 111. 112. W abash Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 286 111. 194.) International Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524, SECTION 22 329 530; 127 N. E. 703. Semble, Receipt in full not a re- lease. Re Holland (Ind.) 126 N. E. 236. 410 Even though a settlement contract states that the settlement is made voluntarily and after jurisdiction had been lost, it does not stand, for the employer cannot relieve himself of liability by a contract with his employee. Tribune Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 290 111. 402, 405, 406; 125 N. E. 351. 410 Although the Compensation Act encourages the settlement of claims, yet settlements to be within the contemplation of the Act must be made in accordance with its terms and provisions. International Coal and Mining Company v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524,529; 127 N. E. 703. 410 Even though the parties may have intended no wrong in attempting to make the settlement, it is the tendency of such contracts to the perversion of justice that renders them illegal. International Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524, 533; 127 N. E. 703. 411 Where no claim for compensation is made with- in six months of the accident, though within that time payments are made and thereafter a contract of settlement is made which is approved by the Commission (Tribune Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 402) distinguished from the case at bar where no contract to pay anything, nor promise of any amount for any time made, Ohio Oil Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 293 111. 461, 466; 127 N. E. 743. 330 SECTION 23 Section 23. 411 No employee, personal representative, or beneficiary shall hare power to waive any of the provisions of this Act in regard to the amount of compensation which may be payable to snch employee, personal representative or beneficiary herennder except after approval by the Industrial Board. 411 Where there is no contract made to pay anything and no promise for any amount or for any time, there is nothing for the Commission to approve or disapprove. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indit^trial Commis- sion, 293 111. 461, 467; 127 N. E. 743. 411 Section 23 providing that an employee has no right to grant a release to his employer applies to the insurance carrier as well as the employer and the insurance carrier cannot take advantage of the fact that it is not specifically mentioned in that section. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 111. 233, 240; 124 N. E. 665. 411 The insurer is in the same place as the employer 436 whom he has insured with reference to the release of the claim and, therefore, a release given to an employer^ which is void under the Act, could not be availed of by the insurance carrier. Illinois Indem- nity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 240; 124 N. E. 665. 411 The provision which prohibits an employee from waiving any of the provisions of the act in regard to the compensation payments due precludes an em- ployer taking a release from his employee in which he waives any rights accruing to him under the Act. International Coal and Mining Company v. Indus- trial Commission, 293 111. 524, 528 ; 127 N. E. 703. 411 It would be anomolous to hold that the protec- tion of an employee should be guaranteed by the SECTION 23 331 Act against an insurer the same as against an em- ployer but that the insurer could be released regard- less of Section 23, while the employer could not be released. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 HI. 233, 240 ; 124 N. E. 665. 412 Even though it seems harsh to give employee the benefit of an attempted settlement, it is the law that the court will not assist either party to an illegal transaction but will leave them where they have chosen to place themselves. (Arter v. Byington, 44 HI. 468; Neustadt v. Hall, 58 111. 172; Harris v. Hat- field, 71 111. 298; Workmen's Banking Co. v. Rauten- berg, 103 111. 460.) International Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524, 533; 127 N. E. 703. Semble: Re London G. & A. Co. (Mass.) 124 N. E. 286. 412 It is contrary to the policy of the Act, to permit an employer, while choosing to come under its pro- visions by not filing an election in writing to the contrary, to relieve himself from liability under the Act by private agreement or contract with the em- ployee. (W abash Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 286 HI. 194.) International Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 524, 530; 127 N. E. 703. 412 Where there is no agreement, there is no waiver and consequently there can be nothing for the Com- mission to approve or disapprove. Ohio Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 HI. 461, 466; 127 N. E. 743. 332 SECTION 24 SECTION 24. 412 No proceedings for compensation under this Act shall be maintained unless notice of the accident hits been siren to the employer as soon as practicable, but not later than thirty days after the accident. In cases of mental incapacity of the employee notice must be given within six months after such accident. No defect or inaccuracy of such notice shall be a bar to the maintenance of proceedings of arbitration or otherwise by the employee unless the employee proves that he is unduly prejudiced In such proceedings by such defect or Inaccuracy. Notice of the accident shall state the name and address of the employee injured, the approximate date and place of the acci- dent, if known, and in simple language the cause thereof; which notice may be served personally or by registered mall, addressed to the employer at his last known residence or place of busi- ness; provided no proceedings for compensation under this Act shall be maintained unless claim for compensation has been made within six months after the accident, or in the event that payments have been made under the provisions of this Act unless written claim for compensation has been made within six months after such payments have ceased and a receipt there- for or a statement of the amount of compensation paid shall have been filed with the Commission: Provided, that no em- ployee who after the accident returns to the employment of the employer in whose service he was injured shall be barred for failure to make such claim If an application for adjustment of such claim is filed with the Industrial Commission within eigh- teen months after he returns to snch employment and the said commission shall give notice to the employer of the filing of snch application in the manner provided in this Act. Section 24 was amended and the following was stricken out: " Provided, that the failure on the part of any person entitled to such compensation to give such notice shall not relieve the employer from his liability for such compensation, when the facts and circumstances of such accident are known to such employer, his agent or vice principal in the enter- prise." 412 Section 24 provides that technical notice is not necessary, provided the employer has actual notice and the employer can only make a quasi appearance for the purpose of objecting, but if he appears to SECTION 24 333 the merits, he submits to the jurisdiction and must abide the consequences. Tribune Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 402, 405; 125 JJ. E. 351. 418 Where there was evidence that the wife of de- ceased told the president of the employer-company that her husband died from anthrax from a hide, this fulfilled the requirement of the thirty day no- tice. Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 291 111. 616, 621; 126 N. E. 616. Actual notice supplies any deficiency in the notice 420 if it is within the time prescribed and is to the prin- cipal, vice-principal or agent. Hydrox Chemical Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 579, 582, 583 ; 126 N. E. 564. 418 The thirty day notice and the claim for compen- 423 sation within six months are jurisdictional and if there is no evidence showing a compliance with these requirements, the award cannot be sustained. Ohio Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 461, 465; 127 N. E. 743. 419 Where it is shown that the f orelady of the depart- ment in which the employee worked knew that the employee hurt his hand and that she understood that it was hurt in the factory while he was engaged in work for the employer, it is held to be sufficient no- tice under Section 24. Hydrox Chemical Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 291 111. 579, 582; 126 N. E. 564. 419 Where the only evidence bearing on the question of notice within thirty days is the testimony of the wife as to a conversation she heard her husband have with the field boss, it is incompetent. Ohio Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 461, 465; 127 N. E. 743. 334 SECTION 24 419 Where an arbitrator found that the parties were operating under the Act, that the employee sustained accidental injuries which arose out of and in the course of his employment; that notice of the acci- dent was not given but demand for compensation was made, that the injured employee was entitled to receive compensation, which was affirmed by the Commission, it was held that the notice of accident within thirty days was jurisdictional and a condi- tion precedent to the right to maintain the proceed- ing, and as notice was not given the award was set aside. Ridge Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 532, 534; 131 N. E. 637. 422 Where the legislature has seen fit to fix the time for making claim for compensation at six months after the accident, such a provision is within the do- main of legislative power and the Supreme Court is without authority to modify it. Central Locomo- tive Works v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 436, 439, 440; 125 N. E. 369. 427 A written demand for compensation within the six months period of the date of the cashing the in- surance company's check is in time even though the date on the receipt is more than six months before the notice. StepJiens Engineering Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 88, 93; 124 N. E. 869. 423 The claim for compensation required by Section 24 is jurisdictional. Central Locomotive Works v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 436, 438; 125 N. E. 369. 419 Section 24 provides that no procedings shall be maintained unless notice of the accident has been given to the employer within thirty days. This notice is essential to the jurisdiction of the Com- SECTION 24 335 mission. Ridge Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 532, 534; 131 N. E. 637. 423 An employer can waive the question of the time when the claim shall be filed under Section 24, and it is not a question of jurisdiction of the subject matter rather than jurisdiction of the person. Tri- bune Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 402, 406 ; 125 N. E. 351. 423 Employee received injury to his eye October 12, 1913; he received a permit to see the doctor and was treated for eleven days. He returned to work the day after the accident. He worked for the com- pany until 1917. In 1915, he went to the company doctor, then to a clinic; in 1916 to another doctor. In May, 1916, he went to the general manager of the company and asked for compensation. Held, the demand for a permit to the doctor is a claim for compensation and if a writen demand is not made in six months thereafter that the employee is not entitled to compensation and the award was set aside. Central Locomotive Works v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 436, 438; 125 N. E. 369. 423 No special form for claim of compensation is re- quired and the claim need not be in writing, but it must apprise the employer that the employee has sustained injuries of such a character as to entitle him to compensation and that such claim will be made. Ideal Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111.463,468; 131 N. E. 649. 423 Under Section 24, where the request of employee for medical services was complied with and no claim for further compensation is made within six months after the accident or after the services of the doc- tor, the employee is barred. Central Locomotive 336 SECTION 24 Works v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 436, 438, 439; 125 N. E. 369. 423 The making of a claim for compensation within six months is jurisdictional and a condition prece- dent to the right to maintain the proceeding which is not waived by a failure to make the objection on the hearing before the arbitrator, the Commission, or the Circuit Court. Ridge Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 532, 535; 131 N. E. 637. 423 Section 24 provides that no proceedings shall be maintained unless claim has been made within six months of the accident and the filing of an applica- tion with the Commission satisfies this requirement. Mississippi River Power Co. v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 111. 353, 356; 124 N. E. 552. 423 A claim for compensation need not be in writing but may be verbal, and is sufficient if the employer is informed by it that the employee intends to claim the benefit of the Act. Ideal Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 463, 468; 131 N. E. 649. 427 Under Section 24, which requires a demand to be made within six months, if the parties voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction after the time has elapsed to make a settlement, that provision is waived. Tri- bune Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 402, 405 ; 125 N. E. 351. 423 Even though it is impossible to make a claim be- fore the expiration of the six months because the re- sult of the accident is not apparent, the employee is not entitled to compensation if he has not complied with the provisions of Section 24. Central Locomo- tive Works v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 436, 439; 125 N. E. 369. SECTION 24 837 423 Although in some states the claim runs from the culmination of the injury, under the Illinois Act, the accident is fixed as the. date from which the time shall run, and the court cannot extend the time to await the development of the injury, in the light of the express language of the Act. Central Locomotive Works v. Industrial Commission, 290 111. 436, 439; 125 N. E. 369. 423 Where there is nothing in a letter to inform the employer that the employee claimed the right to compensation and although the case appeals strongly to one's sense of humanity and kindness, the court cannot create liability where the law has not done so, where it appears that no demand was made with- in the time required by the statute. Ideal Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 463, 468; 131 N. E. 649. 425 Where payments are manifestly not made under the provisions of the act but are made voluntarily, liability being denied at the time, a written claim within six months after the last payment does not come within the provision of Section 24. Ohio Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 461, 466, 467; 127 N. E. 743. 423 An employee who was injured on February 4, 1919, made application for adjustment of claim Sep- tember 24, 1919, it was contended that a letter writ- ten February 14, 1919, was a sufficient claim under the Compensation Act, the letter was calculated to appeal to the kindness and generosity of the em- ployer but contained no intimation that he claimed any legal right to demand compensation. Held, that this was not a claim for compensation within the meaning of Section 24 of the Act. Ideal Fuel Co. 338 SEC. 24 "PROVIDED EMPLOYEE WHO RETURNS" v. Industrial Commission, 298 111. 463, 468; 131 N. E. 649. 427 Where question was raised as to demand made within the statutory time, it was held that the date of the receipt of a check was not payment of the debt and not until the check is honored or accepted is there a payment. Stephens Engineering Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 290 111. 88, 93; 124 N. E. 869. 427 Where the claim for compensation was filed with the Commission and notice served on the employer within the six months, it is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 24, as it is not essential that a claim be made previous to presenting it to the Commission. Mississippi River Power Co. v. In- dustrial Commission, 289 111. 353, 356; 124 N. E. 552. "Provided employee who returns." 427 Where a petition is filed to review proceedings of the Industrial Commission under this paragraph, it is error for the Industrial Commission to set aside the previous decision, inasmuch as the statute does not authorize any such review. Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 451, 453 ; 130 N. E. 727. 430 Section 8 (d) gives an employee eighteen months in which to file his claim with the Commission if he returns to the same employer and has a right to compensation, but it does not create in him a new right which he did not have at the time he returned to work. Ohio Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 461, 467; 127 N. E. 743. 430 The provision of Section 8 (d), which allows claim to be filed by employee eighteen months after he SECTION 25 339 returns to former employment, is intended to ex- tend the right of an employee to maintain an exist- ing claim and not to grant a new right. Ohio Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 461, 467; 127 N. E. 743. 431 Employee injured while cutting a piece of wood during the employment. The injury developed into cancer from which he later died. Accident occurred August 29, 1916, but employee continued at his work until March 22, 1917, when he went to hospital to get treatment for cancer. Returned to work Au- gust 13, 1917, to October 22, 1917. Held, that no claim was made for compensation within the six months and that the provision relative to the eight- een months does not grant a right but only gives the employee the right to maintain an existing claim. Ohio Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 111. 461; 127 N. E. 743. SECTION 25. Any employer against whom liability may exist for compensa- tion under this Act, shall upon the order and direction of the Industrial Commission: (a) Deposit the commuted value of the total unpaid com- pensation for which such liability exists, computed at three per- centum per annum in the same manner as provided in Section 9, with the State Treasurer or county treasurer in the county where the accident happened or with any State or National bank or trust company doing business in this State, or in some other suitable depository approved by the Industrial Commission: Provided, that any such depository to which such compensation may be paid, shall pay the same out in installments as in this Act provided, unless such sum is ordered paid in, and is com- muted to a lump sum payment in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or (b) Purchase an annuity, in an amount of compensation due or computed, under this Act within the limitation provided by 340 SECTION 26 law in any insurance company granting annuities and licensed or permitted to do business in this State, which may be desig- nated by the employer, or the Industrial Commission. This section was amended in 1921 by giving the Commission power to order the employer against whom liability exists to deposit the unpaid compen- sation or to purchase an annuity. This is a section that affords relief to employees, whose employers are on the brink of insolvency. By implication this section also applies to the insurance carrier because it is primarily liable and is standing in the shoes of the employer. See Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 237; 124 N. E. 665. This is a drastic provision and gives the In- dustrial Commission great latitude in its powers. SECTION 26. 481 (a) Any employer who shall come within the provisions of section 3 of this Act, and any other employer who shall elect to provide and pay the compensation provided for in this Act shall: (1) File with the commission a sworn statement showing his financial ability to pay the compensation provided for in this Act, or (2) Furnish security, indemnity or a bond guaranteeing the payment by the employer of the compensation provided for in this Act, or (S) Insure to a reasonable amount his liability to pay such compensation in some corporation or organization authorized, licensed or permitted to do such insurance business In this State, or (4) Make some other provisions for the securing of the pay- ment of compensation provided for In this Act, and (5) Upon becoming subject to this Act and thereafter as often as the commission may in writing demand, file with the commission in form prescribed by it evidence of his compliance with the provisions of this paragraph. (b) The sworn statement of financial ability, or security, in- demnity or bond, or amount of Insurance, or other provision, filed, furnished, carried, or made by the employer, as the case may be, shall be subject to the approval of the commission, upon SECTION 26 341 the approval of which, the commission shall send to the em- ployer written notice of Its approval thereof. The filing with the commission of evidence of compliance with paragraph (a) of this section as therein provided shall constitute such compliance until ten days after written notice to the employer of the dis- approval by the commission. (c) Whenever the Industrial Commission shall find that any corporation, company, association, aggregation of individuals, or other insurer affecting workmen's compensation insurance in this State shall he insolvent, financially unsound, or unable to fully meet all payments and liabilities assumed or to be assumed for compensation insurance in this State, or shall practice a policy of delay or unfairness toward employees in the adjustment, settlement, or payment of benefits due such employees, the said Industrial Commission may after reason- able notice and hearing order and direct that such corporation, company, association, aggregation of individuals, or insurer, shall from and after a date fixed in such order discontinue the writing of any such workmen's compensation insurance in this State. Subject to such modification of said order as the com- mission may later make on review of said order, as herein pro- vided, it shall thereupon be unlawful for any such corporation, company, association, aggregation of individuals, or insurer to effect any workmen's compensation insurance in this State. Any such order made by said Industrial Commission shall be subject to review by the courts, as in the case of other orders of said Industrial Commission, provided that upon said review the Circuit Court shall have power to review all questions of fact as well as of law. (d) The failure or neglect of an employer to comply with the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall be deemed a misdemeanor punishable by a fine equal to ten cents per each employee of such employer, at the time of such failure or neg- lect, but not less than one dollar nor more than fifty dollars, for each day of such refusal or neglect until the same ceases. Each day of such refusal or neglect shall constitute a separate offense. 432 Insurance carrier cannot accept a premium charged for insurance against industrial accidents and yet make its own contract as to its liability and method of payment. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 241; 124 N. E. 665. 432 The provisions of an insurance policy cannot pre- 436 vail over the provisions of the Workmen's Compen- 342 SECTION 27 sation Act. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Indus- trial Commission, 289 111. 233, 241; 124 N. E. 665. 432 Where an insurance carrier assumes the obliga- tions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, it waives all provisions in its policy in conflict with the Act. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 111. 233, 240, 241 ; 124 N. E. 665. 432 To permit a provision in an insurance policy, that no action for indemnity shall be maintained except for money paid, cannot be set up by the carrier to relieve him from liability where he has agreed to as- sume the obligations of the Act. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 241 ; 124 N. E. 665. SECTION 27. 434 (a) This Act shall not affect or disturb the continuance of any existing: insurance, mutual aid, benefit, or relief association or department, whether maintained in whole or in part by the employer or whether maintained by the employees, the payment of benefits of snch association or department being guaranteed by the employer or by some person, firm or corporation for him : Provided, the employer contributes to snch association or department an amount not less than the full compensation herein provided, exclusive of the cost of the maintenance of snch asso- ciation or department and without any expense to the employee. This Act shall not prevent the organization and maintaining under the insurance laws of this State of any benefit or insurance company for the purpose of insuring against the compensation provided for in this Act, the expense of which is maintained by the employer. This Act shall not prevent the organization or maintaining under the Insurance laws of this State of any vol- untary mutual aid, benefit or relief association among employees for the payment of additional accident or sick benefits. (b) No existing insurance, mutual aid, benefit or relief asso- ciation or department shall, by reason of anything herein con- tained be authorized to discontinue its operation without first discharging its obligations to any and all persons carrying insur- ance in the same or entitled to relief or benefits therein. (c) Any contract, oral, written or implied, of employment providing for relief benefit, or insurance or any other device SECTION 28 343 whereby the employee Is required to pay any premium or pre- miums for insurance against the compensation provided for in this Act shall be null and void, and any employer withholding from the wages of any employee any amount for the purpose of paying any such premium shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court. SECTION 28. 435 In the event the employer does not pay the compensation for which he is liable, then an insurance company, association or insurer which may have insured such employer against such liability shall become primarily liable to pay to the employee, his personal representative or beneficiary the compensation re- quired by the provisions of this Act to be paid by such employer. The insurance carrier may be made a party to the proceedings to which the employer is a party and an award may be entered jointly against the employer and the insurance carrier. (Amended by Act approved June 28, 1919.) 435 Where there is a stipulation that a policy shall be- come void on the happening of some subsequent event, and the insurer has notice that the event has occurred, but does not cancel the policy, the pro- vision is waived and the policy remains in force. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 111. 233, 241; 124 N. E. 665. 435 Where, after the dissolution of a partnership, a release was given, covering an accident happening prior to the dissolution, it is a waiver of any defense on account of the dissolution of the partnership. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 111. 233, 241 ; 124 N. E. 665. 435 The dissolution of a partnership does not render a policy void. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Indus- trial Commission, 289 111. 233, 241; 124 N. E. 665. 436 An employer had a contract with an insurance car- rier, which, by a rider, was amended to cover cases 344 SEC. 28 "PRIMARILY LIABLE" arising under the Compensation Act. One of his employees was injured and the Commission entered an award against the carrier. It appeared that the insured had been paid $250.00 by the carrier and had given a release to the insurance carrier and an agree- ment that he would hold the carrier harmless. The money had been paid by the employer to the em- ployee for hospital expenses who gave his employer a release. It was held that the insurance carrier was liable to the employee for the compensation even though the employer went into bankruptcy. Illinois Indemnity ExcJuinge v. Industrial Commission, 289 HI. 233; 124 N. E. 665. "Primarily Liable." 436 By Section 28, the legislature intended, under cer- tain conditions, to charge the liability directly to the insurer and it is not an unreasonable construction to hold, it intended to include the method of collection in compensation cases. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 237; 124 N. E. 665. 436 " Primarily liable to pay * * by the provi- sions of this Act," must necessarily include the method of collection in compensation cases. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 HI. 233, 237; 124 N. E. 665. 436 A rider attached to a policy of insurance, that in consideration of the premium, the contract is in- tended to cover liability under the Workmen's Com- pensation Act, makes the insurance carrier primarily liable. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 235, 238; 124 N. E. 665. SEC. 28 "PRIMARILY LIABLE" 345 436 Section 28 was not intended for the purpose of giving the applicant the common law or equitable right of subrogation, by which the employee would have no greater right than the employer and could not compel payment by the insurance company. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commis- sion, 289 111. 233, 237; 124 N. E. 665. 436 Where an insurance company, in a rider attached to a policy, assumed the responsibility to pay com- pensation it became liable in the same manner as the employer and the provisions of the original policy, which conflicted with the agreements in the riders, were set aside by said rider. Illinois Indemnity Ex- change v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 238; 124 N. E. 665. 436 Where an insurance company, by a rider attached to a policy, assumes responsibility under the Work- men's Compensation Act, the Act becomes a part of the company's contract liability. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 238; 124 N. E. 665. 436 By the provisions of Sections 26 and 28, the legis- lature intended, that in case of the employer's in- solvency, the insurance company should step into the shoes of the employer and make the payments as the employer would have made them, and that in the case of such insolvency, the insurance company would be primarily liable in the same manner as the employer would have been if solvent. Illinois In- demnity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 238; 124 N. E. 665. 436 Under the British Act, it was held that the em- ployee had a right to enforce the provisions of the policy directly against the insurance company. Illi- 346 SECTION 29 nois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 239; 124 N. E. 665. 436 The intention is clear to make the insurer or con- tractor primarily liable under the provision of the Act. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 289 111. 233, 239; 124 N. E. 665. SECTION 29. 487 Where an injury or death for which compensation is pay* able by the employer nnder this Act, was not proxlmately caused by the negligence of the employer or his employees, and was caused nnder circumstances creating a legal liability for damages in some person other than the employer to pay damages, such other person having also elected to be bound by this Act, or being bound thereby under section three (8) of this Act, then the right of the employee or personal representative to recover against such other person shall be subrogated to his employer and such employer may bring legal proceedings against such other person to recover the damages sustained in an amount not exceeding the aggregate amount of compensation payable nnder this Act, by reason of the injury or death of such em* ployee. Where the injury or death for which compensation is payable nnder this Act, was not proximately caused by the negligence of the employer or his employees and was caused nnder circumstances creating a legal liability for damages on the part of some person other than the employer to pay dam- ages, such other person having elected not to be bound by this Act, then legal proceedings may be taken against such other person to recover damages notwithstanding such employer's payment of or liability to pay compensation nnder this Act, but In such case if the action against such other person is brought by the injured employee or his personal representative and judgment Is obtained and paid, or settlement is made with such other per* son, either with or without suit, then from the amonnt received by such employee or personal representative there shall be paid to the employer the amount of compensation paid or to be paid by him to such employee or his personal representative: Pro* vided, that if the injured employee or his personal representa- tive shall agree to receive compensation from the employer or to Institute proceedings to recover the same or accept from the employer any payment on account of such compensation, snch employer shall he subrogated to all the rights of such employee or personal representative and may maintain, or in case an action has already been instituted, may continue an action either in the name of the employee or personal representative or In his own name against snch other person for the recovery of SECTION 30 347 damages to which but for this Section the said employee or personal representative would be entitled, but such employer shall nevertheless pay over to the injured employee or per- sonal representative, all snms collected from such other person by judgment or otherwise in excess of the amount of such com- pensation paid or to be paid under this Act, and all costs, attor- neys' fees and reasonable expenses incurred by such em- ployer in making such collection and enforcing such liability. (Amended by Act approved June 25, 1917.) 440 Where the Appellate Court held that the declara- tion was brought under the second Section of 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, Held, that the declaration presented a good cause of action at com- mon law and not under the Act and the Appellate Court was reversed. O'Brien v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 293 111. 140, 146; 127 N. E. 389. SECTION 30. 461 It shall be the duty of every employer within the provisions of this Act to send to the Industrial Board in writing an im- mediate report of all accidental injuries arising out of or in the course of the employment and resulting in death; it shall also be the duty of every such employer to report between the 15th and the 25th of each month to the Industrial Board all acci- dental injuries for which compensation has been paid under this Act, which injuries entail a loss to the employee of more than one week's time, and in case the injury results in permanent disability, a further report shall be made as soon as it is deter- mined that such permanent disability has resulted or will result from such injury. All reports shall state the date of the injury* including the time of day or night, the nature of the employer's business, the name, address, the age, sex, conjugal condition of the injured person, the specific occupation of the injured person, the direct cause of the injury and the nature of the accident, the character of the injury, the length of disability, and, in case of death, the length of disability before death, the wages of the injured person, whether compensation has been paid to the in- jured person, or to his legal representatives or his heirs or next of kin, the amount of compensation paid, the amount paid for physicians', surgeons' and hospital bills, and by whom paid, and the amount paid for funeral or burial expenses, if known. The making of reports as provided herein shall release the employer covered by the provisions of this Act from making such reports to any other officer of the State. 348 SECTION 31 SECTION 81. 451 Any one engaging In any business or enterprise referred to In sub-sections 1 and 2 of section 3 of this Act who undertakes to do any work enumerated therein, shall be liable to pay com- pensation to his own immediate employees in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and in addition thereto if he directly or indirectly engages any contractor whether principal or sub- contractor to do any such work, he shall be liable to pay compen- sation to the employees of any such contractor or sub-contractor unless such contractor or sub-contractor shall have insured, in any company or association authorized under the laws of this State to insure the liability to pay compensation under this Act, or guaranteed his liability to pay such compensation. In the event any such person shall pay compensation under this section he may recover the amount thereof from the con- tractor or sub-contractor, if any, and in the event the contractor shall pay compensation under this section he may recover the amount thereof from the sub-contractor, If any. This section shall not apply in any case where the accident occurs elsewhere than on, in or about the Immediate premises on which the principal has contracted that the work shall be done. (Amended by Act approved June 28, 1919.) 452 Where a person hires an independent contractor who might be engaged in a dangerous enterprise to do some work for him, and the principal is not under the Act, he cannot be held liable to the sub-con- tractor under the provision of Section 31. Lombard College v. Industrial Commission, 294 111. 548, 550; 128 N. E. 553. 452 Section 31 provides for recovery against the con- tractor when the sub-contractor failed to furnish the insurance. Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Indus- trial Commission, 289 111. 233, 238 ; 124 N. E. 665. 452 Where an employer has not elected to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act and is not under the Act by any of the provisions of Section 3, he can- not be held liable for failure to insure under Section 31. Lombard College v. Industrial Commission, 294 111. 548, 550; 128 N. E. 553. SECTION 31 349 452 Where it is contended that a man who is engaged 134 in the hardware and paint business is not liable under the Act because an employee of a contractor sustained injuries while working on a building which was maintained, it was Held, that one does not have to be exclusively engaged in one of the hazardous en- terprises enumerated to make him liable for com- pensation. Davis v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 29, 32; 130 N.E. 333. 452 A retail grocer who hired a builder to make alter- ations to his dwelling-house, not being engaged in an extra-hazardous occupation under Section 3, did not have to procure insurance for the contractor under Section 31, in order to relieve himself from liability. Alabach v. Industrial Commission, 291 111. 338; 126 N.E. 163. 452 In construing Section 31, the whole Act should be considered for the purpose of determining what the legislature meant, and it cannot be held that it in- tended to include any person, firm or corporation not covered by the Act or operating under it. Lom- bard College v. Industrial Commission, 294 111. 548, 549, 550; 128 N. E. 553. 456 If work is being done for an owner in maintain- ing his building, the contractor and the immediate employer of the injured workmen are bound by the Act, and if the contractor is insolvent and has no insurance, his employer is bound by the Act. Davis v. Industrial Commission, 297 111. 29, 32; 130 N. E. 333. 456 The provision of Section 31 requiring principal to see that sub-contractor takes out insurance applies to a city engaged in enterprise of the kind mentioned. City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 291, 293; 129 N. E. 112. 350 SECTION 32 456 "A" was engaged by "B M who was a sub-con- tractor of the city of "C." "B" furnished team, wagon, and driver to haul ashes for the city under the direction of the ward superintendent. Inspect- ors watched the teamster to see that he cleaned the streets and alleys. A street car ran into the wagon and injured "A." "B'' carried no insurance and "C" contended that it was excluded by Section 5 from the provision of Section 31. Held, city is liable to employee of sub-contractor for injuries under Sec- tion 31. City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 291 ; 129 N. E. 112. 456 Section 5 provides that employee of a contractor shall not be considered an employee of the city but under Section 31 the city is liable to such employee if the contractor does not carry insurance. City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 295 111. 291, 293; 129 N. E. 112. SECTION 82. 467 If any of the provision*, of this Act providing for compensa- tion for Injuries to or death of employees shall be repealed or adjudged invalid or unconstitutional, the period Intervening be- tween the occurrence of any injury or death and such repeal or final adjudication of invalidity, shall not be computed as a part of the time limited by law for the commencement of any action relating to such injury or death, but the amount of any com- pensation which may have been paid for any such injury shall be deducted from any judgment for damages recovered on ac- count of such injury. Any claim, disagreement or controversy existing or arising under "An Act to promote the general wel- fare of the people of this State, by providing compensation for accidental Injuries or death suffered in the course of employ- incut." approved June 10, 1911, In force May 1, 1912, shall be adjusted in accordance with the provisions of said Act, not- withstanding the repeal thereof, or may by agreement of the parties be adjusted in accordance with the method of procedure provided In this Act for the adjustment of differences, jurisdic- tion to adjust such differences so submitted by the parties being hereby conferred upon the Industrial Board or committee of arbitration provided for in this Act. (Amended by Act approved Jane 25, 1917.) SECTIONS 33-35 351 SECTION 38. 407 Any wilful neglect, refusal, or failure to do the things re- quired to be done by any section, clause, or provision of this Act, on the part of the persons herein required to do them, or any violation of any of the provisions or requirements hereof, or any attempt to obstruct or interfere with any court officer, or any other person charged with the duty of administer- ing or enforcing the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not less than $10.00 nor more than $500.00 at the discretion of the court. SECTION 468 This Act may be cited as the Workman's Compensation Act. (Added by an Act approved June 28, 1915.) SECTION 84. 458 The Invalidity of any portion of this Act shall In no way affect the validity of any other portion thereof which can be given effect without such invalid part, SECTION 85. 458 That an Act to promote the general welfare of the State of Illinois by providing compensation for accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of employment, approved June 10, 1911, in force May 1, 1912, be, and the same is, hereby repealed. RULE 43 OF THE SUPREME COURT. Supreme Court rule 43 as amended February 17, 1920. The amendment merely changes the second sentence of the rule as originally adopted. Rule 43. In case application shall be made for a writ of error to review any judgment or order of court under the Workmen's Compensation Act there shall be filed a petition for the writ signed by the applicant or his attor- ney, together with a transcript of the proceedings and judgment of the trial court, with an assignment of errors written upon or attached to the transcript, and with proof of notice to the respondent. There shall be filed with such transcript the transcript of proceedings of the Industrial Commission filed with the clerk of the circuit court. The petitioner shall file with his petition an ab- stract of the record, prepared in accordance with rules 14 and 16 of this court. The petition shall contain a con- cise statement of the case and of the points and authori- ties relied upon for the issuance of the writ. Twelve copies of such petition and abstract shall be filed with the clerk of this court within the time allowed by said Workmen 's Compensation Act for the filing of said peti- tion asking for a writ of error. If the petition is filed in vacation the respondent may file a reply within seven days after notice of the filing of the petition, and if the petition is filed at a term a reply may be filed on or before the following Tuesday. Such reply shall state briefly and concisely the points and authorities relied upon to meet or obviate the alleged errors and sustain the judg- 354 RULE 43 OF THE SUPREME COURT ment, which reply shall constitute an appearance in the case. Twelve copies of such reply shall be filed. Oral arguments will not be heard upon such application. In case the writ shall not be granted the transcript of the record of the trial court shall be returned forthwith to the clerk of the court from which the record was brought. The application shall be docketed, " , Petitioner, v. , Respondent. ' ' If the petition shall be granted the cause shall be docketed thereafter as in cases of ordinary writs of error, the petitioner being designated as plaintiff in error, but shall retain the original number of the peti- tion, and no additional docket fee shall be required of the petitioner. A scire facias to hear errors shall be issued in the manner provided by rule 6, returnable on the first day of the next term for all respondents who have not appeared in opposition to the petition. If the petition is granted the cause shall proceed as if pending on a writ of error. Either party may file a further brief or ab- stract or submit the cause on the petition and abstract or reply filed by such party on the application for the writ. At page 513 of Schneider's Workmen's Compensation Act, 1912-19, it was pointed out that the rule adopted October 27, 1919, would work a hardship in some in- stances. The amendment adopted February 17, 1920, meets these objections. The practice with reference to filing a reply to the peti- tion is different from the usual rule. The reply must be filed within seven days after notice of the filing of the petition for the writ of error, whether in vacation or term time. For a form of petition for writ of error, see Schneider's Workmen's Compensation Act, 1912-1919, at page 534. INDEX. A ACCIDENT accidental death presumed 59 injuries defined 51 adhesions in tendons of wrist 53 air-hose, cause of 73 altercation as 79 anthrax 57 as 79 as an 64 resulting in death 240 aorta ruptured 54 "arising out of" 69 arm injured 264 asphyxiation as Ill assault 107 as 48, 90 blindness resulting from 60 blister opened 79 blood pressure intensified 261 blood vessel ruptured 52 boy shot by air-hose 49 burned to death 80 cancer as cause of 339 carrying matches 80 casualty insurance rule, not followed 53 catching fire 78 causal connection 70 causative danger 100 cerebral hemorrhage 55, 250 chill as 78 cigarette causing 77 clot on brain 56 compressed air hose 76 condition, result of 254 conditions of employment 105 curiosity of employee 68 danger incurred by employee 103 death not by 299 defective vision not caused by 200 defined 52 (355) 356 INDEX ACCIDENT (Continued) disablement by occupational disease 63 disfigurement from lock-jaw 198 drunken condition, cause of 56 drunkenness, result of 75 during intervals 112 lunch-hour 89 duty to report 29 electrocution 116, 247 elemental forces 131 elements as cause of 73, 111 elevator cause of 89 employment 82 epilepsy causing death 61 evidence, to prove 256 exertion not shown 56 external force, considered 66 eye hurt by screw-driver 121 injury 122, 200 sight injured 314 lost 200, 254, 263 restored by lense 200 restored by operation 270 fall causing death 88 from fire escape 315 from scaffold 260 from wagon 51, 263 fear resulting in blood clot 58 finger 197 injured 79 lost 157 freezing hands 106 fright, causing stroke 55 frost-bite 66 getting fresh air 112 hand 198 heart disease from excitement 58 trouble 60 heat stroke 55, 57,78, 105, 263 hernia 182 horse-play 49, 57,. 101 incident to work 71 incurring own danger 71 infection by bacillus 241 cause of 79 injured by elements 66 INDEX 357 ACCIDENT ( Continued ) injured cutting wood 339 injury common to public 107 excluded 68 on elevator 113 to back 189 in the course of 82, 85 killed by elevator 80, 149 knee injury 230 larking, as cause of 74 lead poisoning as 62, 64 leg broken by fall 130 fracture 300 lost 152 pains 65 leisure period 90 lightning 77, 78, 105 local infection, as 65 lock-jaw as 186 from rusty nail 271 machinist killed 85 maritime commerce 156 moving freight train 73 nephritis, not an 51 no contract of employment 146 not common to neighborhood 72 notice of 25 occurrence 53 on way to work 86, 91 origin of 70, 104 paralysis, carrying baggage 54 partial loss of hand 203 phalange lost 195 physical exertion 54 premises 30, 86, 91 proof of 114 pulmonary hemorrhage, as 58 quarrel about work 55, 108 refusal to submit to operation 53 related to employment 85 relation of assault to work 108 requirement as to time, place and cause 53 risk common to public 66, 104 incidental to employment 70, 103 of employment 54, 100 rupture, cause of 311 rusty nail, causing 262 358 INDEX ACCIDENT (Continued) sciatica, not 59 sequence of events 59 shock, aggravating condition 61 sky-larking 49 sleeping, as 75 smoking, cause of 81 spine injury 191 statistics of 131 stomach pain, as 65 striking matches 78 sun-stroke 52, 77 tornado, as 79, 111 two theories of 11G ulcer of stomach 88 voluntary Work 95 weight-lifting, cardiac dilatation 54 while getting warm 112 wind-storm 77 ACT affects social relations 35 automatic provisions 3 constitutional 37 effect on law action 35 exercise of police power 37 expense of injury like cost of machinery 36 extra-territorial effect 46 invalidity of part, effect of 30 purpose of 232 refusal to comply with 31 referred to occupational disease 64 scope of 35 speedy remedy contemplated 36 statutory indemnity fixed 36 subject of statutory 51 ACTION AT COMMON LAW allegations in pleadings 4 averments in declaration 60, 133 of casual employment 139 compensation, as substitute 162 certificate as to non-election 4 form of 4 death of human being, not provided for 140 declaration amended 138 averring, neither under Act 140 specific averments 139 INDEX 359 ACTION AT COMMON LAW (Continued) employee, when under act 5 inapplicable to modern conditions 36 no judicial notice in absence of averments 139 no presumption, as to being under act 139 no vested right in 45 right given to administrator 140 of, taken away 162 to nullify 45 statement as to employment, in declaration 139 when abrogated 5 APPLICATION FOR ADJUSTMENT OF CLAIM claim previous, not required 338 how acted upon 234 insanitary practices 238 is claim for compensation 336 petition to suspend 267 who files 180, 238, 239 ARBITRATOR duties of 18 hearings 18 salary of 16 "ARISING OUT OF" accident as 69, 116 during intervals 112 applying principle 69 causal connection 69 clothing catching fire 80 danger incurred 71 defined 72 determination, as to 67, 71 disobeying orders 93, 97 drunkenness 69, 75 evidence as to 117, 317 as to heat-stroke 279 going to and from work 71 horse-play 76, 101 injury in performance of employment ; 101 when 125 killed by tornado Ill leaning against car 76 letting another do work 95 negligence, affect on 68 360 INDEX "ARISING OUT OP" (Continued) prank with air-hose 73 quarrel, about drink 109 regaining pipe 77 risk intensified 78 short-cut down fire-escape 315 voluntary act 72, 76, 94 not accepted 96 volunteering 94 "ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF" 67 ASSAULT felonious 108 injury by 258 origin in employment 109 personal grudge 107, 109 quarrel 102 over drink 109 over past event 108 over staves 107 when 90 ATTORNEY'S FEES reasonableness 235 when allowed 22 AWARD administrator, how distributed 179 against insurance carrier 28 binding on court, when 313 clerical error 258, 305 corrected 274 how corrected 257 competent evidence 189 to sustain 263 covering more than time for healing 259 date, how fixed 276 death of widow 128 decision on review, effect of 276 determination of earning capacity 390 disfigurement and loss of earning capacity 189 and same injury not allowed 187 double compensation, error 192 effect of writ of error 276 eighteen months review from when 323 evidence as to notice conflicting 257 does not sustain 263 INDEX 361 AWARD ( Continued) finding of dependency 175 of facts, unnecessary 257 of payment to another 257 referring to section of statute 258 should state nature of injury 258 that notice not given 258 foreclosure of 24 for leg not sustained , 65 for loss of leg set aside 199 for partial dependency 173 how computed 259 how modified 322 how reduced to judgment 319 interest on 320 judgment on 22 lien on property 24 limited by time of temporary total disability 186 modified, when 204 negligence affecting 68 no basis for 258 non-assignable 24 not allowed, when 92 not justified 108 not sustained, when 65, 266 not vacated pending review 275 opinion evidence, not competent 301 partial incapacity 188 partial loss of arm 203 pension ceases when 205 for life 259 permanent partial disability set aside 185 petition to review, though attacked by writ of error. . 312 requirement as to existence of beneficiary 179 res judicata 128 reversed, where employee refuses operation 270 review not statute of limitations 323 within eighteen months 23 second, after reversal 260 set aside 102 when 190, 258 where no evidence 243 where no notice 334 where notice not complied with 333 similar to judgment 275 suspension for failure to submit to operation 318 362 INDEX AWARD ( Continued ) sustained ] 54 by evidence 271 by evidence though findings incomplete 274 when 262, 315 when eye injured 201 time to review where wtit of error pending 323 time within which to review for increase 324 two injuries 187 vacated, where return to work 191 when modified 7 when not justified 279 where notice not given 259 where partial incapacity no percentage of loss 193 widow dies before 327 B BENEFICIARIES administration required 7 burden as to contribution 255 child emancipated 165, 168 supporting self 168 under sixteen years 207 child's share paid how 7 children defined 164 effect of divorce 166 out of wed-lock 42 common-law wife, rights 170 compensation increased, when 7 death before award 128 effect of 24 of widow 327 dependency determination of 7, 327 question of degree 177 question of fact 174, 175, 265 though no contribution 173 dependent defined 174 on beneficiary 25 rights of 163 determined, how 236 divorced wife 166 effect of contributions 176 emancipation 167 proof of 165 INDEX 363 BENEFICIARIES ( Continued) existence of will 172 expectancy of life considered 212 father not dependent 176 illegitimate child 164 insufficiency of proof 305 legal obligation to support 164 alimony 166 defined 168 lineal heir, defined 206 marriage, proof of 169 means of support 174 mother in Servia 171 partially dependent 174, 176 no lump sum to pay debts of ; . . 215 non-resident 7 order of dependency modified 7 parents as 171 partial dependency 172 pension entitled to, when 144 presumption as to existence 176 proof of existence 171, 256 receipt of check, time for claim 338 right in, after death 328 right to waive compensation 25 son in army 168 test of dependency 172 where partial dependency 173 widow dies 128 wife, dependency presumed 165 BUSINESSES acids 3 act refers to 133 altering structure 3 automatic effect on 120 carriage by land . 3, 126 and delivery, distinguished 134 cleaning walls of building 123 college as 122 not hazardous 123 delivery, as incident to 134 demolishing structure 3 departments, not connected with hazard 135 deriving income from building 125 detective agency 137 determination of hazard 131 distribution of commodities 3 electrical work . . 126 364 INDEX BUSINESSES ( Continued ) employer in hazardous 128 in two kinds 121 enterprise defined 132 establishes status 134 erecting own dwelling house 122 erection of structure 3 explosive-materials 3 farmers excluded 3 felling trees 124 fluids 3 gases 3 hazard of 130 question of fact 123 hazardous enterprise 122 when 132 horse-buying 120 horse-buying and selling 50 junk-dealer 122 legislature classifies, which are under 136 livery-stable keeper 129 machinery regulated by ordinance 3 maintaining structure 3 manufacturing chemicals 135 peroxide 122 mining 3 molten metal 3 non-hazardous, no duty to insure 349 ordinance regulations imposed 127 preparing junk, hazardous 123, 136 providing home, not hazardous 136 quarrying 3 removing structure 3 retail grocer 125 school subject to inspection 128 selling of sewing-machines 131 some departments, hazardous 133 stock-raising, excluded 3 storehouse 3 supplying water 127 under act 3 vapors 3 ware-house 3 what determines liability 119 when not specifically mentioned 137 INDEX 365 CIRCUIT COURT affidavits need not show diligence 304 alias writ of certiorari 291 how issued 292 appearance limited 293 authority, where finding is correct 301 bond required 300 clerical error corrected 301, 302 not reversed 305 certiorari, when commenced 21 constitutionality of review of law only 288 decision as justified by law 302 by 22 not set aside 304 reviewed 21 delay avoided 294 duty of clerk 293 judgment entered 300, 302 how stayed 23 on award 22 judicial review of facts 287 jurisdiction 292 contested 293 how obtained 292 of 289 special 290 transferred 293 may confirm or set aside 300 money judgment, error 303 motion to remand should have been granted 304 objection to writ of certiorari 292 orders reviewed, how 22 other forms of review excluded 290 power to review evidence 284 where no dispute as to facts 302 practice additional evidence 21 law and fact 21 notice for judgment 23 petition for judgment 22 power to modify judgment 23 prescribed by judgment 291 praecipe, filing 21, 292 proceedings, how governed 292 proof indefinite, power 301 366 INDEX CIRCUIT COURT (Continued) proving existence of record 318 quashing writ 294 question of fact not proper 299 record 295 insufficient 301 presents, what 317 presumed to be true 297 shows no ruling 297 refusal to remand, error 304 remanding 301, 304 remedy, vested right in 297 requirement for certiorari 21 review additional evidence not heard 281 evidence 294 how 20 is special statutory proceeding 290 of fact, question 280 record must show ruling 298 record not disregarded 298 remanding cause 22 scope of 294, 312 weight of evidence 281 scire facias 21 setting aside decision, distinguished 298 stay of judgment 22 suit commenced when 291 supersedeas, effect on jurisdiction 311 transfer of cause 293 Venue Act 293 writ of certiorari 290 authority 303 how quashed 291 no money judgment 303 receipt necessary 299 when sued out 293 writ of error, effect on jurisdiction 312 CLAIM See Notice, Compensation CLASS LEGISLATION legislative question 39 COMPENSATION additional for delay 24 agreement for, how reviewed 23 INDEX 367 COMPENSATION ( Continued) amount earned, not basis for reduction 191 limited 8 of, question for commission 163, 312 of, for death 6 of, not reviewed by court 312 recovered from contractor 30 to widow 164 annual earnings 222 effect of 6 annuity purchased 26 application satisfies 336 arm 10 assault 108 basis for computation 205, 222 on average earnings 222 where partial permanent incapacity 190 beneficiaries effect of 7 children's right to 6 claim for 25 for, condition precedent 336 for, verbal 335 from time of accident 337 in six months 329, 333 insufficient 337 jurisdictional 334 letter appealing to kindness 337 not extended by eighteen months' provision 339 not in writing 336 time from payment of check 338 where, return to work 25 within six months 334 collateral heirs, right to 6 collection by administrator 180 commuted when 211 computation dependent on ability 221 how made 218, 224 wages subject to deduction 221 where interruptions to employment 220 death effect on payments 11 of beneficiary 24 deductions allowed 6 demand for, permit to doctor as claim 335 required 230 denial of, no effect on examination 227 denied, when 253 368 INDEX COMPENSATION (Continued) dependent's right to 6 depositing, when required 26 determination as to person entitled 180 for installment period 14 of weekly rate 208 difference in earning capacity 9 disability and disfigurement 187 disfigurement 188 and loss of earning capacity 189 and loss of member 188 how fixed 8 distinction in term 182 double, not allowed 187, 192, 198 earnings effect on 218 as basis of 220 deductions allowable 220 how computed 223 effect of possible recovery 200 employee earning, same as before 192 refusing operation 182 employer discharged as to 7 estate, no interest in 163 extinguished, how 24, 327 not retroactive 327 eye-sight 10 finger 9 foot 10 for death 163 for loss of eye 201 grand-children's right to 6 grand-parent's right to 6 hand 10 how computed 13 impossibility to make claim in six months 336 increase of percentage 12 installments how fixed 6 how paid 11 maximum increased 12 minimum increased 12 leg 10 legal obligation to support 165 liability, where third person involved 28 loss of hand 198 loss of leg 199 loss of two members 10 maximum 6 in case of death.. . 178 INDEX 369 COMPENSATION (Continued) minimum 6 none, for pain and suffering 190 non-fatal injury 8 not dependent on acknowledging liability 228 official, not entitled to 145 original capacity returned 192 parents, right to 6 partial dependency 6 incapacity 188 loss of vision 60 permanent incapacity 9 payment of in lump sum 12 of, without reference to act 50 payments abated 328 beyond accrued amount 194 commenced when 8 not under act 337 pension amount of 11 for life 10, 61 when, ceases 11 period of payment 11 permanent partial loss of use of member 10 persons similarly situated 105 phalange 9 practice, printed argument 309 pre-existing disease 60 previous injuries, effect of 14 proceedings for 25 proportioning loss 10, 202 reduced, when 267 reduction, not allowed 224 refund of 328 refusal to accept operation, effect of 268 pay 22 take treatment 206 release from 330 report of amount paid .' 30 requirements as to 182 right to 234 specific losses 9 suspended, when 19, 270 table of 31 temporary total incapacity 8 third person not under act 29 thumb 9 toe 9 370 INDEX COMPENSATION ( Continued) total dependency 6 total permanent disability 10 to whom paid 1, 179 vested 163 waiver of amount 25 when illegal 213 when suspended 50 where employee recovers earning capacity 193 who entitled to 179, 236 widow's right to 6 written demand, when necessary 334, 335 yearly wage, how figured 223 CONSTITUTIONALITY automatic provisions 120 presumption favors 45 section three considered 120 CONTRACT accident with 73 contemplation of 98 effect of 158, 331 elements, discussed 147 employment necessary 82 terminated, when 146 evidence as to existence of 142 relationship 146 fulfilling service 101 hazardous outside of 93 implication from 81 in perversion of justice 329 insurance 344 of employer 328 of two employers as affecting employee 142 presumed fraudulent, when 25 requirement of 4, 5 right of, not impaired 39 risk incidental to 100 settlement by 232 where jurisdiction lost 329 volunteering, effect of 95 when casual employment 148 with employer, not affected 87 CONSTRUCTION absurd consequences avoided 291 British Act considered . , 41 INDEX 371 CONSTRUCTION ( Continued) court cannot go beyond law 41 courts, power limited 40 extent of modification not for courts 42 fine-spun theories disregarded 41 foreign act worded differently 41 humane law, liberal 43 intention of legislature considered 40, 42 liberal 35, 200, 304 reason of enactment considered 43 remedial nature considered 44 statute not retrospective 42 statutes operate in future 43 true intent carried out 45 words considered in ordinary sense 42, 43 D DEPENDENCY determination of 7 DISABILITY arm injury 198 broken bone 185 ceasing, rights 23 color blindness 202 complete, effect of 204 difficulty to ascertain extent of 325 disablement, accident 63 disfigurement 195 distal phalange 197 double compensation set aside 198 finger, phalange 196 green stick fracture 185 healing period considered 185 process completed 259 process defined 194 incapacity to use member 203 index finger 197 loss both hands 203 eye 201 leg, whole or part 199 one-sixteenth of phalange, not 185 partial, of phalange 195 partial permanent 194 percentage loss, not ascertainable 202 reduction in earning capacity 189 substitute for hand. . . 198 372 INDEX DISABILITY ( Continued ) temporary incapacity for work 190 total defined 194 total incapacity 184 thumb, phalange 196 DISEASE accident, when 79 anthrax 58, 62 arterio-sclerosis 61 bacillus inoculating 58 beat hand. 62 cardiac dilatation 54 epilepsy 61 excitement 58 heart trouble 60, 66 hemorrhage 54 hernia 182 correction of 270 injury by 58 lead poisoning 62 nephritis 61, 247, 263 no relation to accident 200 occupational, defined 61, 65 pre-existing 59, 314 affecting blindness 60 choroiditis 263 plumbism 65 prostate infected 65 pulmonary hemorrhage 58 sciatica 59 sun-stroke, as 58 teeth infected 65 tonsils infected 65 ulcer of stomach 88 vision lost by 59 wool sorter's 62 DISFIGUREMENT lock-jaw, as 186 serious and permanent 186 DISOBEYING ORDERS accident, not result of orders 73 conclusion from evidence 251 customary path 81 custom to violate 98 death, where 68 employee 92, 97, 110 paper rules 98 smoking 77, 98 INDEX 373 DOCTOR chiropractor, as expert 242 court won't pass on merits of systems 314 duty, where employee about to die 15 expert testimony 241 impossibility to determine cause 262 inability to forecast results 247 not allowed to express belief 245 opinion as to injury 242, 246, 247 qualification as expert 242 statement as to what he would have done 270 testimony as to cause of nephritis 263 disability 243 infection 262 plumbism 65 testimony of chiropractor 191 when not qualified 247 when qualified as expert 246 DUE PROCESS employer not deprived of property 38 EARNINGS how ascertained 14 EMPLOYEE ability to earn, effect on pension 11 able to earn 193 able to work, when 192 acting in emergency 94 acts incidental to comfort 89 after death, not 143 aliens 5 all-around man exposed to hazard 135 appointment, effect of 5 arrangement among 87 area of duty 91 asleep 90, 104 assault by 107 assisting in execution of order 99 assuming to act for himself 110 benefit from illegal settlement 331 bobbin-grinding as hazard 134 bridge-repairer hurt 153 burden of proof 102 burned starting fire 243 eager driving mule 99 374 INDEX EMPLOYEE ( Continued) carpenter injured 271, 277, 311 carrying matches 99 ceasing work '. 83 chauffeur drunk 56, 88 choosing dangerous place 71, 97 chore-man in stable 148 claim enforced against carrier 231 claiming compensation 336 climbing freight-train 73 coal digger injured 184, 204 coal miner injured 189, 300 compelled to work under adverse conditions 223 compensation, where he is earning 193 conductor ordering lunch 69 contractor as 145 contract required 5 contributions to family 172 crossing flag-man 155 curiosity of 76 custom, effect of 85 cyclone injuries 104 danger of own choosing 76 dead-heading 114 death of, evidence preserved 24 denned 5 delivery-wagon driver killed 296 determination of relationship 144 directions to 97 disabled by occupational disease 63 disfigurement and incapacity 187 doing duty not required 97 incidental act 102 piece work 157 work outside of contract 95 drunkenness of 69, 75, 100 duty apart from machinery 118 putting him in dangerous place 97 to show knowledge of employer 183 to submit to examination 227, 228 earnings denned 219 in ascertaining compensation 220 eating lunch 76 effect of beginning work 49 ordinance 129 electing own physician 8, 183 employed by two employers 141 INDEX 375 EMPLOYEE ( Continued) employment of abandoned 98 determines 119 not in act 124 engaged in maritime commerce 156 engineer asphyxiated -. Ill injured 152 killed 110, 262 evidence, as to duties 136 exchanging work 94 exclusion by Federal Laws 5 expecting to perform task in interstate commerce 151 exposed to hazard 104, 136 risk not incidental 101 express-man injured 157 extra switchman 146 facts determine status 161 falling asleep 112 fall from ladder 315 scaffold 126 wagon 134 filling bottle 91 fire-chief killed 143 freight-trucker handling interstate commerce 149 found dead 60, 70, 115, 116 getting fresh air 99 getting receipt 83 going to and from work 81, 88 going to toilet 89 grudge of 109 hazardous work of 132 health of 102 hide-sorter 79 horse-play, injures 76 hours of service act 152 hurt, answering phone 61 janitor killed 128 ice cream wagon driver killed 264 idleness and inefficiency 222 incidental duties 133 incompetent, rights of 11 in course of 82 incurring danger 103 independent contractor, as 5 in hazardous occupation 232 in heated building 57 376 . INDEX EMPLOYEE ( Continued) injured by elements 72 on elevator 113 on fire escape 315 riding bucking horse 321 in line outside of hiring 48 near premises 86 on premises 86 insanitary practises 19, 238, 267 insurance solicitor, frost-bitten 66 in interstate commerce 149 killed by electric shock 251 by lightning 106 by tornado 79 cutting trees 124, 158 in elevator 89 knocked out of window 314 laborer assaulted 109 laborer on street 57 laundress injured 186 laying switch in mine 189 lead poisoning 62 leaving premises 89 leaving work 71 legal obligation to support 165 leisure periods of 90 long shoreman 106 loss of accommodation of eye 201 lunch hour 89 machine-hand 80 medical examination of 14 wilk wagon driver injured 106, 128 mine examiner killed 116 miner assaulted 108 eye-sight lost 263 injured 275 injured by fire 277 killed by train 115 sustains eye-injury 200 minors 5 mode of payment, not controlling 158 mule-driver hurt 191 negligence 68 night watchman killed 137 no refusal to take treatment 271 not exposed to machinery 129, 130 not independent contractor 159 not in hazardous occupations 125 INDEX 377 EMPLOYEE ( Continued) not in usual course of trade 6 not on pay-roll 148 not performing duty 102 obeying orders 113 obstructing examination 15 occupations, hazardous 124, 133 officials excepted 5 officials excluded 144 on duty, when 146 operating elevator 113 operation does not have to submit to 267 rule as to 268 orchestra leader stabbed 132 orders disobeyed 68 from co-employee 95 ordinance protects 128 other person permitted to drive 95 overcome by heat 105 paint-mixer injured 93 parent under legal obligation to support 167 part in hazardous, part in non-hazardous work 135 partially incapacitated 188 pension effect of 5 rights 144 permanently disabled when 205 piece-work by 143 pit-car driver hurt 264 planer injured 157 playing with air-hose 74 plumber killed 56, 57 policeman killed 145 not an 144 powers of 5 power to waive rights 25 procuring lunch 102 prohibition as to work 99 protected by ordinance 129 punch-press worker 96 quarrel of 102 quenching thirst 113 railroad detective killed 153, 154 refusal of treatment by 19 to submit to examination 258 to submit to operation 182, 185, 205, 269, 312 to submit to treatment 203 378 INDEX EMPLOYEE ( Continued) rejection by 2 relationship ceases 84 repairing transmission line 99 resting in dangerous place 81 in shade 101 restored to work 194 return to former employment 11, 25, 339 riding free 91 right to control 159 right to pension 143 risk increased 98 satisfying curiosity 68 serious suffering, as result of treatment 271 setting up machinery 121 settlement by 322 shot by air-hose 49 simple work 161 slate-picker hurt 96 sleeping 75, 101 smelter injured 65 solicitor for laundry 130 special policeman killed 137, 154 stone-mason injured 260 street inspector 88 struck by lightning 105 subjected to peculiar risk Ill subject to risk of public 106 subrogation to employer 345 substantial part of work in inter-state 152 taking care of injury 314 teamster killed, by elevator 80 testimony as to injuries 244 test as to submitting to operation 269 testimony as to relation 143 track-welder injured 141 trapper killed 316 travelling salesman paralyzed 54 truck driver killed 69, 110 trucker killed 114 two injuries 187, 195 unfit for work 75 using substitute for hand 198 violating orders 92, 98 voluntary act of 72 volunteer defined 76, 93, 95 wages how ascertained 219 not subject to premium 28 waiter assaulted by bus-boy 109, 316 INDEX 379 EMPLOYEE ( Continued) warning, possible 91,98 welder injured 314 what is not refusal 270 when exposed to hazard 135 when, in hazardous business 128 when not entitled to compensation 192 when totally disabled 206 wholly incapacitated 259 withdrawal from act 2 wood- worker 79 wool-sorter dies 57 working for sales department 134 yard foreman injured 55 EMPLOYER ability to work 266 accepting by letter 50 agreement reviewed 322 automatically under, when 130 bond filed by 300 business of as factor 119 business of, hazardous 124 city liable as 125, 350 college as 122 compulsion to pay compensation 26 condition imposed by 221 contractor hired by agent 126, 141 not insured 348 contract with others 30 credited for compensation 268 defenses abolished 46 definition of 4 delivery of water incident to business 134 detective agency 138 discharge of liability 7 duty to guard air-hose 73 insure 26 procure insurance when 350 report accident 29 election bound, when 1 by writing letter 121 effect of 2, 50 not to pay compensation 2 to pay 1 engaged in inter-state commerce 150 two businesses . 125 380 INDEX EMPLOYER (Continued) erecting own home 122 failure to comply with occupational disease act 66 insure 348 reach agreement 237 forfeiture of amount paid 214 insurance not necessary, when 124 interests, not advanced 258 knowledge of 91, 93, 94 clerk 141 custom 49 foreman 49, 96, 266 imputed 70 necessary 48 liability dependent on, what 119, 130 for medical services 183, 184 how determined 130 how limited 14, 48 not released 331 when 74 where contractor 145 where employee submits to operation 269 where third person involved 28 without fault 120 limitation on request for examination 228 waived 322 measure of responsibility 225 medical services furnished by 8 necessity for contract 4 negligence 74 no duty to insure where, not in hazardous business... 349 no liability where official 145 non-election 117, 123 notice to agent, effect of 141 not insurer 50, 103 owner of home not under 136 payment not election 50 penalty for not insuring 27 premises of 81 question of time waived 335 released from reporting to other officers 30 release from employee 330 relief from liability 179, 328 request for examination 226 retail grocer 125 INDEX 381 EMPLOYER ( Continued) right to opinion as to employee's condition 226 settle 194 rights where third person sued 29 scope of agent's authority 141 settling without approval of commission 213 statement of financial ability 26 subrogated to employee when 28 transportation furnished by 86 trip in interest of 152 two businesses 121 violation by, penalty 31 voluntary offer accepted 96 payment 179 when not carrier 127 where servant lent 141 willing to settle, not waiver of right 212 who are within act 4 EMPLOYMENT acts incidental to 101, 113 area of 92 assault in 109 break in 90 casual 87, 147 ceases when 88 classification 132 commencement of 84 connection with hazard 135 consideration as to hazard 122 conveyance of employer 84 custom to change places 316 day to day 83 departure from 99 determination of hazard 131 duration of 83 effect of order 92 employee in line of 86 evidence as to scope of 248 exceptional risk Ill extra-hazardous 106 defined 135 occupation 133 extraordinary risk 100 getting receipt 83 going to and from work 84, 90 grade of 221 382 INDEX EMPLOYMENT ( Continued) hazard apart from 107 considered 134 horse-play 92 not incident to 75 not in scope of 74 incidental to 71, 85, 87, 102 interruption 89 lunch ordered 69 looking for work 84 lunch incidental to 102 not outside of 96 no work 83 premises 85 proximity considered 110 risk connected with 103 incidental to 72, 100 intensified 72 not common to public Ill of, public 105 of, rule 100 scope of 49, 83, 90, 91 effect of orders 97 sleeping, not incidental to 104 special risk 105 termination of 84, 88 transportation furnished 87 volunteering 95 while dead-heading 146 ENACTING CLAUSE 1 ENTERPRISES under act 3 EVIDENCE accidental death 115 admission, autopsy 252 agency causing death present 247 all of, taken into consideration 276 anthrax resulting in accident 240 as to accident 263 blindness 315 death 248 dependency 174, 176 earning capacity 189 emancipation 251 employment considered 148 INDEX 383 EVIDENCE ( Continued ) as to (Continued) expectancy required 215 heat stroke 279 incapacity considered 314 inter-state commerce 150 loss of eye 263 loss of leg 199 notice incompetent 333 permanent disfigurement 265 relationship conflicting 278 status of employee 243 support 264 what employee could do 245 autopsy effect of 247 refusal for request 252 award, contrary to 259 bacillus, as 79 based on inference 254 burden as to beneficiaries 171 burden of proof 252 as to inter-state 154 in inter-state commerce 150 on whom 253 casual employment 254 cerebral hemorrhage 250 circumstances of accident 256 circumstantial 103, 255 competency considered 80, 243, 301 condition of applicant 189 conflicting 248 not grounds for review by court 279 conjecture 114, 252 considered 216 as to proving disability 206 in connection with accident 59 sufficient 56 continuance of life 249 conversations of third parties 239 custom as ^ 99 degree of proof 251 dependency, question of fact 266 determination of probabilities 282 did not justify award 184 direct not required 169 effect of conflict of 160 existence of beneficiary 256 expert how weighed 247 not regarded 242 384 INDEX EVIDENCE ( Continued ) expression of opinion as to cause 264 eye-witness lacking 116 unnecessary 248, 253 facts equally consistent 253 failure to object to hearsay 256 finding cannot rest on conjecture 253 justified 80, 115 formula for guessing facts 250 found dead 60, 114, 116, 250 greater probability 255 hearsay 252 brought out on cross-examination 252 not admissible 255 hemorrhage 261 how preserved, where death occurs 24 husband or wife testifying 239 hypothesis unsupported 247 elicited on cross-examination competent 256 improper may be competent 256 incompetent as to permanent disability 242 not objected to 243 inferences 240, 247 conflicting 255 necessary 102 injury traceable by proof 255 insufficient 51, 65 judgment, not party to 239 judicial knowledge of war 172 lacking as to death 115 marriage how proved 169, 170 license lost 169 medical testimony considered 65 movements of arm shown 264 negative testimony 283 no eye-witness 315 not sufficient to show disability 280 number of witnesses 282 on lump sum settlement 216 order of Probate Court. 170 opinion as to percentage loss of vision 245 incompetent 202, 245 of applicant 241 of experts 241 payment of money as legal presumption 251 per cent of loss 240 preponderance of, defined 281 INDEX 385 EVIDENCE ( Continued) presumption as to beneficiaries 171 continuance of life 172, 265 death 251 defined 249 fact 249 fraud 25 legal obligation 167 payment of money 249 rebuttable, when 248 suicide 59 where war exists 171 proof as to emancipation 165 contradictory 265 of accident 114 of conditions 240 review by court 277, 316 when 262 reduction of earning capacity 190 relation of employee 158 requirement of 114 scintilla not sufficient 277 rule 284 scope of employment 102 scrutiny of reviewing court 255 sequence of events 58, 241 statements as to objective injuries 244 of claimant as to percentage loss 244 of injured 244 to co-employee 244 sufficiency as to contract 143 as to disfigurement 186 considered 80, 240 of 66, 114, 116, 154, 261, 314 of, where hernia 191 where elicited on cross-examination 244 sufficient to find accident 266 susceptible of one explanation 241 table of heirship not admissible 169 tending to support award, insufficient 278 testimony as to hand-writing in letter 240 as to loss of use 264 of co-employee 94 of expert 246 of single witness 282 of wife, incompetent 252 untrue . 239 386 INDEX EVIDENCE ( Continued ) theories vary 250 triers of fact examining injury 241 ultimate fact as issue 240, 246 violation of order 92 warranting conclusion as to death 262 weight of determined how 246, 285 not for courts 262, 313 witnesses must state facts 241 when entitled to weight 241 EXPOSED TO HAZARD driver, not to machine 134 employee, when 106, 117, 128, 158 employment 71 machinery 122 peculiar hazard 106 power-driven shears 122 question raised 296 risk of storm 106 work with simple tools 134 EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY 46 EYE-SIGHT lost by disease 59 partial loss of vision 60 F FOUND DEAD 114 employee 70, 250 in toilet vault 113 fall from heart trouble 60 special officer of railroad 154 I INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR defined 159 facts determine status 162 hiring by principal 126 insolvent 349 payment by piece 159 question of law 146 status depends on facts 160 fixed how 158 test of . 156 INDEX 387 INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION approval required 329 arbitrator designated 237 award like judgment 275 compensation not under Act 330 contempt, how punished 17 costs, for record 21 court will not interfere 317 decision according to preponderance of evidence 278 as res judicata 276 binding on court 315 not reviewable 275 on facts binding 278 when conclusive 20 disputes, how determined 236 disregarding evidence 241 duty to find with preponderance of evidence 277 pass on evidence 263 weigh evidence 243 duties of 16, 236 eighteen months for claim where return to employment 338 employer compelled to insure 26 evidence considered by 273 finding as to dependency, conclusive 265 injury 258, 314 notice 259 finding based on evidence 276 based on foundation in evidence 279 cannot be based on untrue evidence 277 must be based on evidence 243 not justified by evidence 274 of facts unnecessary 257, 273 of fact conclusive 277 on groundless assertions 240 further time 261 how created 15 inference drawn from facts 251 judgment not substituted for uncontroverted evidence. 278 jurisdiction 92 for disfigurement 188 in maritime commerce 156 lacking 117, 134, 232 of 16 once assumed 233 over employee in non-hazardous 130 over insurance carrier 27 to approve settlement 213 388 INDEX INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION (Continued) jurisdiction ( Continued ) to review settlement 322 wanting, where business non-hazardous 136 where inter-state field 151 members reimbursed 16 salaries 15 ministerial body 231 motion waived 296 nature of proceedings 236 no finding of ultimate facts where they appear in record 274 no power to compel operation 267 officials presumed to do duty 279 operation cannot be compelled by 270 order to suspend affirmed 270 petition for review 321, 324 eighteen months 312 increase of amount 321 not held in abeyance by appeal 312 purpose of 325 time 323 petition to review previous decision 338 power to examine employee 199 make rules 234 review 275 presumed to do duty .' 259 physician appointed by 19 practice adjustment of claim 238 argument before members 20 authentication of report 19, 20 bond fixed 21 cost of record determined 21 decision notice of 18 of majority 22 on review 19 reviewed how 21 dedimus 235 employer ordered to deposit compensation 26 evidence preserved how 24 filing stenographic report 19 hearings where held 19 notice for judgment 23 how given 23 of hearing 18 to attorneys 20 INDEX 389 INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION (Continued) notification 234 penalty for delay 24 petition for review 19 record of proceedings 20 review for increase 230 in eighteen months 23 of award or agreement 19, 23 of lump sum 217 report of proceedings 20 special findings 20 stenographic report lost 20 time for filing report 19 trial de novo 20 vexatious delay 24 questions under act 17 record must show jurisdiction 257 of proceedings 275 records of 17 refusal to testify 17 reports , 24 review evidence on 273 of previous decision not allowed 325 of settlement 323 right to fix fees 17 suspend compensation 270 rules and orders 16 secretary 16 settlements approved 210, 232 can not deprive of jurisdiction 231 not recognized 273 stenographers of 17 stenographic report amendment of 260 authentication 261 filing 261 inaccurate 260 not obtainable 260 withdrawal of 260 submission to jurisdiction, effect of 230 summary powers 231 transcript not furnished, practice 272 trial de novo 260 ultimate fact determined by 276 written opinion criticized 274 390 INDEX INJURY (See ACCIDENT) 66 INSURANCE carrier agent of employer 324 contract subject to commission 341 in shoes of employer 330, 345 insolvent 27, 324, 340, 345 party defendant 28 primarily liable 28, 344 release not valid 330 released when 331 substituted for employer 41 city liable to sub-contractor's employee 350 commission power over carrier 231 compelling employer to procure 26 discontinuance prohibited 28 dissolution of partnership 343 duty to procure where sub-contractor 30 effect of existing 27 rider 343 mutual benefit society 28 penalty if employer fails to procure 27 policy can not be cancelled 343 limited 344 of carrier 342 whole Act part of 345 premium not deductible from wages 28 required when 349 INTERSTATE COMMERCE 141 burden of proof 150, 155 crossing flag-man 155 dead-heading as 152 defined 150 delivering mail as 149 employee in 149 expectation to do certain work 155 Federal Employers' Liability Act 150 Intrastate train 155 railroad detective in 153 railroad watchman in 154 watchman killed 154 where none of business is 152 test as to 151 transmitting messages as 149 two bridges used 153 INDEX 391 'IN THE COURSE OF" accident arising out of 83 custom 82 denned 81 employee's leisure period 90 interruption of employment 69 using customary route 81 J JUDGMENT modified 319 motion to vacate 319 on award 319 vacation of 320 JUDICIAL POWERS not delegated 89 LEGISLATURE classification as to 121 of hazards 133 restricted by constitution 40 right to modify actions 40 LUMP SUM commutation how made 12 compensation paid in 12 complete disability, effect of 12 notice 12 rejection of 13 M MAINTAINING building for income 125 building own home 124 city, cleaning streets 125 cleaning walls 126 of building 123 delivery of water, not 134 dwelling house, not 125 operation of pipe-lines 125 382 INDEX MEDICAL SERVICES as claim for compensation 335 by whom furnished 8 employee refusing 206 employer when liable 184 liability for, when 183 refusal to pay expenses 183 when rendered . .183 N NEGLIGENCE crossing tracks 69 employee 68 NOTICE 332 by commission to employer 2 defect in 25 deficiency in 333 evidence of, incompetent 333 jurisdictional 334 posting of 2 requirement as to 25 statement by wife of deceased 333 statement to fore-lady 266 sufficient, where fore-lady knows 333 thirty days jurisdictional 334 withdrawal in thirty days 2 ORDINANCE building regulation 129 regulating stalls 129 OPERATIONS refusal to submit 54 OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES. (See DISEASE) . 61 POLICE POWER health subject to 38 regulating health permitted ::S INDEX 393 R RAISING QUESTION arguments of counsel 297 before commission 243 constitutionality 295 Federal Constitution 297 not first time in Supreme Court 295 record constitutionality 297, 313 record, what must be shown , 295 s SETTLEMENT according to act 329 based on temporary, reviewed for permanent 325 commutation of amount 210 credits for payment 194 for lesser amount 230 industrial commission authorizes 232 illegal when 194 jurisdiction as to time limit waived 322 lump sum commutation based on expectancy 215 commutation defined 211 compensation fixed before commutation 212 evidence for basis 215 evidence of age, health, etc 216 how reviewed 321 interest of parties 215 not for debts 215 petition necessary 210 probable future payments 211 right to review 216 when improper 218 when proper 212 without approval 210 without approval, illegal 214 public interest in 214 when illegal 213 when made in good faith 217 STREET RISKS ' 110 SUICIDE evidence as to 115, 250 presumption against 59 SUPERIOR COURT jurisdiction of 289 394 INDEX SUPREME COURT amendment affecting procedure 307 assignment of errors 296, 297 can not disturb finding 313 can not weigh evidence 265 can not write provision in act 310 clerical error corrected 306 decision not set aside 294 of other state 70 res judicata 265, 313 delays avoided 306 disregarding question of fact 257 error in procedure corrected 306 evidence not weighed 315 examination of record 362 judgment not substituted 317 judicial review of facts 298 jurisdiction amendment in Circuit Court : 299 to issue writ 307 modification of judgment 305 without reversal 303 not allowed to set aside, when 316 ordinary rules of practice followed 306 power 310 practice additional abstract, costs 318 brief 309 compensation computed 309 costs taxed 309 petition for writ of error 309 point abandoned in brief 308 points and authorities 309 printed brief required 310 question presented in lower court 308 reply brief to petition for writ 308, 310 rule 15 309 rule 27 309 rule 43 considered 308 rules not complied with 310 writ of error 22 question raised first time 296 record must show what 296 retrospective effect of amendment 308 review of facts by 285 law by 286 rules not complied with 296 INDEX 395 SUPREME COURT (Continued) supersedeas 22, 311 pending appeal 311 vested right in procedure 313 writ of error 276, 311 as supersedeas 22 effect on petition for review 324 new suit 311 practice affected 306 retrospective operation 310 when issued . . 307 T THIRD PERSON action against 28 liability where not under act 29 TRIAL BY JURY incident to right of action 39 V VOLUNTEER 93 definition of 95 knowledge of employer 93 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY A 000 873 874 2