UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORh
AT LOS ANGELES
S>econ& edition.
THREE
MEMORIALS
ON
FRENCH AFFAIRS
entered at >tationerg'
[ Price 3s. d.
THREE
MEMORIALS
ON
.FRENCH AFFAIRS
WRITTEN IN THE YEA.RS
, 1792 AND 1793.
BY THE LATE
RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE.
PRINTED FOR F. AND C. RIVINGTON,
ST. PAUL'S CHURCH- YARD}
SOLD ALSO BY J. HATCHARD, PICCADILLY.
1797-
DC
39/t?
PREFACE
"> r T^ O be engaged in a contention with iri-
-* gratitude and fraud> is neither pleafing
nor honourable ; but they who in difcharging
the facred obligations of friendship are forced
1 into it, miift fubmit to the humiliation. They
^ would themfelves be criminal in the next de-
gree, were they to cdniult their own perfonal
feelings ; they are bound to confider only
their
'* In the beginning of the prefent year, a
^confidential paper, written by the late Mr.
< Burke, was furreptitiouily publifhed in his
name ; and at the end of it was advertifed a
volume of pretended memoirs, anecdotes, and
letters, of the Author. Some of his friends
: ! (he was himfelf at Bath, ftruggling with the
A difeafe which ultimately proved fatal to him)
^ obtained an injunction from the Court of
a Chancery,
301S06
Chancery, on the very day of publication,
By this prompt interference of the law, by
the general discountenance of all liberal men,
and by the bankruptcy of the bookfeller, which
foon followed, the fale, though not wholly-
flopped, was considerably checked ; and the
memoirs, for the time, fupprefled. But fcarcely
is the hand that wrote, and the tongue that
dictated, yet cold in death, when, before it
has been practicable even to examine and ar-
range the numerous, papers which that admi-
rable man has left behind him, and which
bear imprefied upon them the living traces of
his great mind through his whole career of
publick action, and during the previous couife
of fevere ftudy, by which he prepared him-
felf to be what he became, a new notice is
thrown forth, enlarged and improved a little
in the language and arrangement, but in iub-
ftance nearly the fame with the former. It
Clearly comes, it can only come, from the
fame quarter ; though perhaps the work it-
felf may be coloured with fome more oilen-
fible name.
By this conduct, in addition to the turpi-
tude which marked the. former attempt, the
will
will oFthe dead, regarded by all civilized na-
tions with peculiar fan&ity, is violated. The
friends, to whole care and judgment Mr.
Burke confided the feleclion and ufe of his
manufcripts, are no longer at liberty to exer-
cife their own difcretion. They are not maf-
ters even of the time, order, and method to
be obferved in the execution of their truft.
Without a choice, they are dragged along to
meet or to overtake the diverfified arts of a
man, who, fed by his bounty while alive, en-
deavoured to difquiet the laft moments of his
dying benefactor, and ceafes not to injure him
in his grave. It is true, they have already
obtained another injunction, but they are well
aware, that crafty men will too often contrive
to evade the law ; defperate men will dare to
defy it. They know, indeed, from the for-
mer experiment, that no deliberate encou-
ragement will be given to the thefts and fa-
brications of avarice or indigence : the new
iyftem of morals has not made quite fo much
progrefs in this kingdom : but they alfo know
that publick curioiity, ftrongly excited as it
muft be, by a promife of " Mr. Burke's ie-
" cret correfpondence with the mofr. diftin-
a 2 " guifhed
guimed chara&ers of Europe," will demand
to be indulged. It will feck irregular, if it
be denied regular means of gratification. The
thirft which is not permitted to drink of the
frefh fountain or the clear ftream, will flake
itfelf wherever it can, at the weedy pool or
the muddy ditch.
Their determination therefore is taken. It
is, upon the whole, they believe, the befr.
which their circumftances would allow ;
though they may be in fome danger of thus
furnifhing genuine materials, which are in
their hands alone, and which mingled up
with others of a different defcription, may be
employed to lend a fallacious credit to the
idle tales of credulity and folly, or the abfurd
calumnies of enmity and envy.
The prefent publication confifts of three
Memorials, which were written in the years
1791, 1792, 1793, anc ^ relate to three very
interefting epochs in the French Revolution.
They more particularly treat of the effects,
which, at thofe refpective periods, the author
^magined that event likely to produce on the
political
political ftate of all Europe. There is reafon
to fuppofe that incorred copies of two out of
the three have been fraudulently taken.
Some other pieces are in the hands of the
Printer, and will fhortly appear in a fecond
pamphlet. They relate to the conduce of our
two great parties at home, with a view to
French politicks.
Thefe two publications will fill up a very
important chafm in the recorded opinions of
the Author. There is nothing: on French af-
O
fairs in the quarto edition of his works later
than the middle of the year 1 79 1 ; long before
-the firft approach to actual hoililities between
the French and the neighbouring: Powers of
O O
Germany. What he afterwards publi(hed
takes up the fubjeft at the point of time,
-when the King's Minifters, defpairing of fuc-
cefs in the great purpofe of continuing, what-
ever was the immediate caufe of beginning
o O
the war, had avowed a difpofition to nego-
tiate a peace with the French Republick.
A collection alfo of Mr. Burke's more im-
portant
portant letters, during the laft years of his life,
efpecially on the fubjecl of France, is prepar-
ing for the prefs. Of courfe it will be much
more ample, than any thing which can be
furnimed by the perfon from whofe fcanda-
lous breach of truft alone any fpurious com-
pilation can draw it's materials.
Many of thefe letters were intended, not
for the prefs indeed, but for free circulation
in manufcript ; a channel, which through all
the principal tranfactions of his political life, he
ufed inilead of the publick prints, for explain-
ing, as occaiion required, his principles or his
conduct. Of thefe compofitions, ibmetiriies
himfelf, and fometimes thofe around him kept
copies.
Some few of his letters were preferved by
him as a fort of private proteft and record of
his opinions, when on queftions of impor-
tance he had the misfortune, (fuch he always
fmcerely felt it to be) of diflenting from thofe
with whom he generally acted. He was,
from conviction, a party-man ; but he ever
thought that party mould be fubfervient to
principle,
( vii )
principle, not principle to party. His princi-
ples are now, unhappily for his country and
the world, become mere matter of hiftory,
and whatever can elucidate them is due to
the inftruction of the pubiick.
His other letters, which paffed in the un-
referved freedom of confidential intercourfe,
can only be obtained from the liberality of
the friends to whom they were addreiTed,
many of whom have kindly promifed their
contributions, and all of whom are re/peel: -
fully defired to tranfmit to Meffrs. Riving-
tons whatever they may have in that kind,
which they may judge not unfit for the pub-
lick eye. There is very little indeed of his
correfpondence (and no man wrote more)
which does not contain fome portion of a
great body of ethicks and politicks, from
which mankind may grow wifer and better.
All thefe, and other fuch productions of his
pen, as it may be thought right to print fepa-
rately, will be given with all convenient fpeed
in the octavo fize, which he himfelf in his
life- time chofe for the firft editions of hi*
Speeches
( viii )
Speeches and Tracts. They will afterwards
be formed, with many other original pieces of
a lefs temporary nature, into quarto volumes ;
and to the whole will be prefixed a Life of
the Author, accompanied with various letters
and papers of a more early date, fome of
which were pointed out by himfelf as " do-
*' cuments for the hiftory, not of his own
" life," he obferved, " but of his times,"
It has been frequently fuppofed, that he was
himfelf employed in writing fuch a hiftory.
But they who fuppofed this knew little of
him. He bore too large a mare, much be-
yond what is commonly known, in the lite-
rature and politicks of the age, to be himfelf
the hiflorian. Though not without a jufl
fenfe of his own merits, he truly loved and
praclifed that humility, which he has fo beau-
tifully called, " the low, but deep and firm
*' foundation of all real virtue." On princi-
ple, he would never have confented to under-
take a tafk, in performing which, to have
done juftice to himfelf he muft have rifked
the imputation of vanity; a vice which he
abhorred to a degree, that by fuch as were
not
not intimately acquainted with his heart, might
have been fometimes miftaken for vanity itfelf.
He has left in manufcript fome biographical
(ketches both of his foil and his brother ;
none of himfelf. None are oftentatioufly in-
troduced in any of his works. Cicero feems
to have written fome of his books almoft for
the purpofe of putting his own praifes into
the mouths of others, and of fcuttering
around thofe numberlefs little intimations,
which at this difhnce of time we gather up
with ib much delight, of his childhood, his
education, his ftudies, his amufements, his
manners, his relations, his friends, his houfes
and pleafure- grounds, the gallery of Tufcu-
lum, and the oak ofArpinum; but what-
ever of that kind has fallen from Mr. Burke
is only to be found incidentally interfperfed,
where to have fuppreffed it would have been
to betray his own fair reputation, in which
his family, friends, and country, had an in-
rereft as well as himfelf : it is to be found
in his public or private anfwers to thofe who
had brought charges againft him, and who
were of a dignity to make a vindication of
himfelf decorous, if not neceflary. The reft
b mufl
muft be fupplied by the diligence and judg-
ment of others, partly from memory and
partly from information, which, it is hoped,
all who in any part of his life have been in-
timate with him will be fo obliging to com-
municate ; but principally from the different
fources already mentioned above, and the rich
ftore of detached hints, loofe notes, and un-
finilhed fragments which remain in his hand-
writing, relative to all the more momentous
bufinefs in which he was engaged. His
pen was always in his hand. He feldom
thought or read without it.
In the mean time, fome important parts of
his conduit and character will receive light
from this, and the fucceeding publications.
It will at once be feen, whether the fenti-
ments recently exprefled by him were indeed
the genuine conclufions of an early fagacity,
anticipating calamities to come with a certainty
that almoft approached to infpired prediction,
or nothing more than the falfe pretences of a
tardy wifdom too late inftructed by the event.
Thefc
Thefe papers will contain his inmoft doc-
trines. His countrymen have heard him in
the Senate; they have read him in hisdeme-
gorick writings defigned for popular effect;
they will now attend him, as it were, into
the Cabinet.
The year i 79 i was highly critical in the
developement of the French Revolution.
Mr. Neckar and his colleagues had been
driven with ignominy from their ports and
the country. A new miniftry had been
patched up from the accomplices and crea-
tures of the original leaders in the National
Aflfembly. Thofe leaders, to fecure the power
which they had obtained, (hewed a difpoiition
to put a flop tothofeconfufions, which they had
themfelves excited or promoted. In their
turn, they were ttamfelves attacked by a new
fet of bolder, more ferocious, but more con-
fiflent demagogues. The Priefts were de-
claredly perfecuted ; the Nobles plundered
and hunted into emigration. Civil authority
there was none. The army and navy were
corrupted, and all difcipline deftroved. The
King and Queen, after a fhort and infeeure
b 2 interval
interval of comparative tranquillity, were
again repeatedly infulted, and their lives open-
ly endangered.
In this Situation of things, Mr. Burke was
of opinion, that our AmbafTador ought not
to be an idle fpeclator of iuch icenes at the
Court of a Monarch, who was in erFel a
prifoner; that he ought to be recalled, or to
interpofe the good-offices of onr Court be-
tween Louis theXVIth and his feditious fub-
jecls, agreeably to our duty under the gene-
ral. law of nations, and the fpirit of onr pofi-
tive treaties. On this plan he drew up
" Hints for a Memorial to be delivered toM.
Montmorin," by Lord Gower.
Whether thefe Hints were ever actually
feen by the King's Minifters, there is no trace
among his papers to (hew, neither can thofe
friends, from whom he was accuftomed to
conceal nothing, undertake to fay from their
recollection. It is probable, that they were
not feen, as at that period hje had no diret
intercourfe with Government, and events
foon enfued in Franc*, which left no room
for
for fuch a mediation. The paper, however,
will be printed at the end of this Preface: it
was difcovered too late to be infertecl, where
it ought to have flood in the body of this
publication. It will bear a itrong, but not
the only, teftimony to the Author's real prac-
tical views, which have been fo malignantly
mifreprefented, with regard to the French
Revolution. However much he difapproved
and contemned the falfe and treacherous prin-
ciples, (ince renounced even by themfelves,
in which it glorified itfelf at it's outfet ; how-
ever early he warned his own country of
their pernicious tendency, and the fteady and
uniform march of their operation tobreak down
a flouriming Monarchy into a hideous barba-
rifm; however feelingly his nature detefted
the cruelties and atrocities of all kinds, with
which their progrefs was fyflematically ac-
companied, for the purpofe of cruming all
oppofition under the dominion of terrour ;
yet while there appeared to him a chance of
any quiet termination to thefe miferies and
horrours, his counfels were moderate, conci-
liatory, and healing. The very bafts of any
agreement which the King of Great Britain,
as
ss the King of a people " perfe&ly andfolicUy,
becaufe foberly^ rationally and legally free,"
could undertake to negociate, was to be the
fettlement, and, if required, the guarantee of
a free couftitution in France, but under an
efficient Monarchy ; both their government
and their freedom being eftablifhed " upon
*' principles of moderation, as the only means
" of fecuring permanence to both thefe blef-
44 fmgs, as well as internal and external tran-
" quillity to the kingdom of France, and to
** all Europe." It will hereafter appear from
his letters that, at a later period in the fame
year, he held a very fimilar language to the
exiled French Princes and their agents, when
they were preparing to aiTert their rights by
the fword. We mufh now pafs to the three
Memorials, which form the immediate con-
tents of this pamphlet.
The King of France in the April of that
year was prevented by the populace, with
every kind of menace and outrage, from going
to his Palace at St. Cloud. He complained
to the National Aflembly. The refult was
that he was compelled to fanclion a circular
letter,
letter, which was Soon after fent by 3\L
Montmorin to all foreign Courts, announcing
the new ConfHtution of France, it's nature,
and principles. This was followed by new
indignities and encreafed licentioufnefs, by the
flight to Montmedi, the actual cuftody of the
Royal Family, the mockery of reviling the
Constitution, and the final acceptance of it by
the King, which was notified in another cir-
cular letter from M. Montmorin. By thele
two official communications, unprecedented
in diplomacy, the right of confidering the in-
ternal Constitution of France was not only
given to other States, if they had no fuch
right before, but their attention was directly
called to the Subject. Nor was the purpofe
of the communications concealed. It was
profeffedly to lead to Similar Revolutions in
other countries. When the firStof thele ex-
traordinary difpatches was originally Submit-
ted to the ASTembly, long before any concert
of Princes againSt France, it was enthuSiafU-
cally applauded as " a Splendid example of a
" great King proclaiming afar the liberty of
" all people." It was, in fact, a general defi-
ance to all the old Governments of Europe.
Mr.
( xvi )
Mr. Burke had particular means of know-
ing the difpofitions of the continental Powers.
His fon during that fummer was at Coblentz,
though not at the expence, nor with the for-
mal authority, yet with the knowledge and
approbation of Government. He was early
convinced that the Declaration figned at Pil-
nitz by the Emperor and the King of Pruffia
was in a manner extorted by the Count d'Ar-
tois, and was never defigned to be carried into
ferious effect. The King of Pruffia refufed
to ftir, till the Emperor mould have put him-
felf in motion; and the Emperor hefitated
to move from a real or pretended diftruft of
this country. In general, the neighbouring
Potentates feemed for a long time blind to
the peril of their fituation, and when the au-
dacity of BrifTot's faction, as foon as he had
eftablimed his afcendency in the' fecond Af-
fembly, made them reluctantly open their
eyes, they were flruck with a fudden dread,
from which they fought refuge in fubmif-
iion.
At home Mr. Burke found as little agree-
ment with his views. Thofe leaders of
Opposition
( xvii )
Oppofition, who in reality did not differ much
from him, naturally wifhed to avoid as long
as they could, any quefKon that might preci-
pitate a direcl: breach with fome others of the
fame party, who from a long connexion flood
high in their confidence, and were dear tp
their affections. Between Minifters and him-
felf he believed there was a more efTential
difference. He underftood them to think (as
he afterwards told one of them) " that the
* c new principles might be encouraged ; that
" they might triumph over every interior and
" exterior refinance, and even overturn other
" States, as they had that of France, without
** any fort of hazard, that they would extend
" in their confequences to this kingdom.'- His
own opinion thus early was, that there never
exifted a crifis fo important to the world ;
that the power of France, which the preced-
ing year had feen in a manner annihilated by.
her internal anarchy, now appeared more for-
midable than ever ; that all hope of a quiet
fettlement to the diforders of that diffracted
country was gone; that the more furious
part of the Jacobin faction, who from the
firft had been eager to difturb the peace of all
c Europe,
( xviii )
Europe, was daily encreafing in ftrength and
folidity ; and as France had not then re-efta-
blimed her army after it's diflblution by de-
crees and intrigues, while the northern powers
had not yet begun to difband their forces after
the Turkifh war, that every thing was to be
gained to the former, every thing loft to the?
Jatter by delay.
Under thefe impreflions he wrote the Me-
morial of December 1 791. It was fent to fome
of the leaders of Oppofition, and to the Mini-
fters, by one of whom it was communicated to
the King. The ftyle and the topicks are thofe
of a ftatefman addreffing ftatefmen. It takes it's
rife fromM. Montmorin's two letters. It points
out the features and character which diflinguiih
this Revolution from moft others of ancient or
modern times : it delineates with a mafterly
hand the political map of Europe, and marks
with wonderful precifion the track which the
new principles were likely to purfue in their
progrefs : it combats the fuppofition that the
Revolution would fall by it's own weak-
nefs, by internal force, or the difcredit of
it's paper money : it confiders the difpo-
fitions
fit ions of the neighbouring powers, who
were moft interefted in flopping the courfe
of the mifchief, and the general leaning of all
Kings, AmbafTadors, and Ministers of State
in thefe days ; but it modeftly profefTes only
to make a cafe without offering advice, to
fhew the nature of the evil, without fuggefr.-
ing a remedy. His country, the world, and
pofterity, will now be able to judge how far
his fpeculations on this great queftion of poli-
ticks were juft: " the paper," he conceived
at the time, " did not meet the ideas of Mi-
" nifters."
The invafion of France by the Duke of
Brunfvvick in 1792, after the French had
declared war, and been repulfed in an attack
on the Netherlands, excited the moft fanguine
hopes of many. Mr. Burke, it is known to
thofe who converfed with him, and will ap-
pear-by fome of his letters, always difr.ruft.ed
the event. Befides the incalculable difference
which time had made, he faw a radical error
in not giving more importance and lead to the
exiled Princes and Nobility of France. He had
from the firft a fettled conviction that neither
c 2 infurrections
infurre&ions of the Royalifts within, nor a
foreign force from without, could feparately
avail. There was no found hope, in his judg-
ment, but from a well-combined, and cordial
co-operation of both. On the difaftrous and ig-
nominious retreat of the Duke of Brunfwick,
he haflily threw down his thoughts in an
unformal manner, and fubmitted them to the
confederation of thofe who had feen the for-
mer paper. He now proceeded further, and
intimated in general terms, what he thought
fhould be done for the fafety of Europe.
Upon all maxims of ancient policy, upon all
views of the actual circumftances, he Was
decided in his opinion, that England fhould
interpofe as the proteclirefs of the balance of
power. It was effential, he thought, that me
fhould be the prefiding foul of that concert,
which feemed to be now in difpen fable; that
fhe fhould govern it's counfels, and direcl: it's
efforts; fhe fhould negociate and confederate,
exhort on one fide, and remonftrate on the
other ; file fhould not precipitate a war, but
riik it, and firmly meet it, for the fafety of
Europe. But before this paper had been com-
municated to thofc for whole ufe it was in-
tended^
xx
tended, the French Convention ventured on
decrees and acts directly flriking at this coun-
try, and her old ally Holland. A fort of un-
official negociation enfued, which ended in a
declaration of war by the French Republick
ao-ainft Great Britain and Holland. Thus
o
forced feparately into open hoftility, Miniftera
were under the neceffity of joining the Powers
already in arms, on their own conditions*
They could not take that lead which, Mr,
Burke believed, might have been conceded to
them as the price of their voluntary interpo-
fition.
After the firft fuccefles of 1 793, Mr. Burke
was curforily informed in a converfation with
one of the King's Minifters, that they pur-
pofed to iflue a declaration of the motives,-
objecls, and end of the war. Sometime in
the fubfequent autumn, he heard again of
the fame defign. He doubted the prudence
and expediency of the meafure, cfpecially at
that time, juft after our retreat from Dunkirk.
He fought, but was not able to obtain, a con-
ference on the fubjecl:.
He
He had recourfe, therefore, to his pen,
This was the origin of the third memorial.
Accordingly at the head of one of the co-
pies found in his pofTeilion, it was called,
44 Thoughts refpeftfully fubmitted on the
" propofed Manifeflo ;" though it was en-
dorfed with the prefent title. He had not*
however, proceeded far before he learnt that
the Declaration was to be immediately iiTued;
He deiired it might be delayed a (ingle day,
that he might have an opportunity of previ-
oufly ftating his doubts ; but was told that
no alteration could be admitted, as the paper
had been approved by the allied Courts.
The Memorial in confequence lay for fome
time unfinished. But fome agents of the
Royalifts of Britanny and Poitou having about
that period prevailed on Mr. Burke to fecond
their reprefentations to Government with his
influence, and the furrender of Toulon having
made an opening in their favour, he re-
fumed what he had laid afide, and completed
it upon a more comprehenfive plan. It ieems
in if & ftyle and fpirit to approach more near-
( xxiii )
]y, than either of the other two Memorials, to
the animation and decifion of his own former
publications. It begins by flating the time
to be that of calamity and defeat. When it
proceeds to the main consideration, it paints
with a firm but rapid pencil the miferable
fltuation of France under the reign of Roberf-
pierre and terrour, the full efje&s of which
Mr. Burke confeffes himfelf not to have fore-
feen. The whole nation was divided into
the oppreflbrs and the oppreffed. He then
argues that the very fuccefs of the Allies on
their own plan would not reflore France to a
condition fafe for herfelf and for Europe, and
he ultimately ventures to give his own ad-
vice. Perhaps, if there is any paflage in it
more efpecially deferving of attention than
another, it is the noble fcheme of awful, but
difcriminating jnftice, tempered with enlight-
ened mercy, which he recommends and en-
forces, in the event of the Monarchy, and
ancient orders of the State being once more
reftored in France. The Memorial concludes
with an emphatick proteftagainft what he al-
ways confidered as the great, fruitful fource
of
( xxiv )
of every mifcarriage, the great leading miff
take, that of conducting the war, by prece-
dent, as a common war againft a common
enemy, for the ufual objects of ordinary ap-
peals to arms, and fearching hiffory for lef-
fons of civil prudence, to be derived from
former Revolutions, which refembled this
portent of our times in nothing but the name.
In every one of thefe three Memorials
reference is made to the writers on the law
of nations; and in one or two places Vattel is
cxprefsly named. It has been thought pro-
per, therefore, to fulpjoin an Appendix, con-
lifting of pafTages from that eminent publicift,
which were found among Mr. Butke's pa-
pers, drawn out for his private ufe under dif-
tin& heads, as they are here printed, and il-
luftrated in his hand-writing with marginal
o o
comments and fhojft notes, which are here
preierved. Some few notes have been added
to complete his plan. Even thefe are not
wholly without his authority. They are the
taint vertices of much difcourfe had with him
at different times on the effeft and application
of
( XXV )
of the extracts. A genius like his, rich in b
much natural and acquired wealth, might be
fuppofed to have been confident in itfelf. Yet
this was the laborious and accurate method
which to the end of his life he was habitu-
ated to purfue, in collecting and digefting the
heft information upon every fubject that oc-
cupied his mind ; working upon all, and ever
mingling up with it fomething of his own.
In explaining and connecting the hiftory
of the three Memorials, nothing, it is hoped,
has been faid, which can be conftrued to im-
ply a cenfure on thofe who direct the affairs
of this kingdom. They may have formed to
themfelves a wifer fyftem of action, and been
defeated in it by accidents, which could nei-
ther be forefeen nor controuled ; they may
have unwillingly compromifed in their coun*
fels with the irrefiftible force of circum-
ftancqs, and been compelled to adopt a fyftem
which they knew to be imperfect ; they may
even, by attempting Icfs, have actually done
more. Thefe are queilions too extenfive and
important for this place. All that it feems
(1 proper
( xxvi )
proper to fay here, is (imply, that whatever
may have been their fyfiem, and the merits
of that fyftem, it was not that of Mr. Burke.
And thus much is due to his memory, and to
truth. Whatever has been the failure of the
war, it is in no manner to be afcribed to him :
the time and mode of beginning it were not
his choice : the plan of operations for con-
du&ing it was not his fuggeftion : and the
declaration of principles, on which it has
been juftified, was not made by his advice,
nor with his concurrence. Neither did he
flatter thofe in power by a (ilent acquicfcencc
in a courfe of policy which he did not ap-
prove. According to his practice, in more in-
ftances than one, during his opposition to
Lord North's Adminiftration, " he chofe ra-
ther," as he has faid, " refpe&fully to ftate a
" doubt to Minifters whilft a meafure was
" depending, than to reproach them after-
*' wards with it's confequences."
In truth, he who never ufed any felicita-
tion to advance his own perfonal interefts,
was indefatigable in foliciting fupport to that
caufe,
( xxvii )
caufe, which he confidered as the common
intereft of mankind. There was no perfon
of rank or eminence in Europe with whom
he had any oecafion of coi i eipondence, that
he did not endeavour to conciliate, confirm,
or animate on the fi<!e of religion, morals,
and focial order, connected with moderated
liberty. He applied to each the feveral to-
picks which were befl fuited to his circum-
flances, his condition, his prejudices, or his
wants, but all centered in one point. If to
the people he again and again recommended,
and inculcated, and enforced, with all the
varied beauty and energy of his fafcinating elo-
quence, a principle of obedience, fubmiffion,
and refpedr, to their lawful Rulers of every
denomination ; to Princes and to all men in
the exercife of authority he did not fpare to
recount, in the calmer tone of more argu-
mentative difcuffion, the faults and errors to
which their ftations render them peculiarly
liable, to imprefs upon them the neceffity
of that union between Mercy and Juflice,
without which one degenerates into weaknefs,
and the other into cruelty ; and to admoniih
dz them
them, for their own tranquillity and happi-
nefs, to protect, not opprefs, their people, to
improve, not impair, the legal fecurity of the
i'ubject in his perfon and property, according
to the true nature of their refpeftive govern-
ments, for the great end of all government.
Founding, as he always did, his political on
his moral philoiophy, he told the different
clafTes of fociety, not of their extreme rights,
but of their duties, the root of which is in
the rights of others. He ardently loved his
country and wimed her profperity : yet he has
not fcrupled to fay, that " he dreaded our
*' own power and our own ambition ; he
" dreaded our being too much dreaded.'* He
conflantly profefled a jealoufy of France as
the natural rival and enemy of England ; yet
he was not lefs alarmed at her weakneis,
when, in the moment of the Monarchy being
diflblved, fhe feemed to leave a chafm in the
map of Europe, than afterwards at her terrific
power, when the monftrous republic of Brif-
fot and Roberfpierre grew too big for her an*
cient limits ; nor was he without his fears of
her being again reduced too low, if the Allies
had
( xxix )
had fucceedcd in what he believed to be their-
fyftem of difmembering her. In general, men
fee that fide only, which is neareft to them,
in the order of things, by which they are
furrounded, and in which they are carried
along ; but the clear and penetrating fight of
his mind comprehended in one view all the
parts of the immenfe whole, which varying
from moment to moment, yet continuing
through centuries efTentiaily the fame, ex-
tends around and above to every civilized peo-
ple in every age, and unites and incorporates
the prefent with the generations which are
paft. To preferve that whole unbroken to a
late poflerity, he knew no other way than by
refifting all mad or wicked attempts to de-
ftroy any of the great prominent parts. Not
that he was the enemy of reformations.
Quite the reverfe. But he would allow the
honour of that name to no changes which
affected the very fubftance of the thing : thofe
he approved, thofe he called true reforma-
tions, which patiently feeking the degree of
perfection alone attainable by man, and or-
dained to be only the flow refult of long ex-
perience
( XXX }
perience and much meditation, put the hap
pinefs of none to the hazard, while they bet-
ter the condition of all. If, like the early
fages of Greece, he were to be characterized
by fome peculiar fentiment, it mould be that
to which he defired to give the currency of a.
proverb to innovate is not to reform.
This Preface has been drawn by degrees
into an unexpected length. Much of Mr.
Burke's character may have been here antici-
pated, which might have come with more
propriety and force, hereafter. But on the
fpot where every objecl, to which the eye
can be directed, is full of his image, it was
impcffible that many little remembrances of
his opinions and habits, which muil involun-
tarily ariie in the bofom, mould not run over
on the paper. They will not be the leaft in-
terefting part to thofe who enjoyed the blef-
fing of an intimacy with him; and when the
name of a deceafed friend has been already
forged to a defpicable libel againft him, when
intelligence has been received, even while
this Preface has been paffing under the prefs,
of
( xxxi )
of new artifices, which have been pra&ifed
through the country, to folicit a party-fup-
port to an infidious attack upon his fame, that
fome correct notion of fuch a man mould be
early given, feemed to be of moment to the
cauie of public virtue,
Bea cornfield, Sept, 1, 17 97.
HINTS
HINTS
A MEMORIAL
TO BE DELIVERED TO
MONSIEUR DE M. M.
[WRITTEN IN THE EARLY PART OF 1791.]
THE King my Mafter, from his fincere defire
of keeping up a good correfpondence with
his Moft Chriftian Majefty, and the French na-
tion, has for fomc time beheld with concern, the
condition into which that fovereign and nation
have fallen.
Notwithftanding the reality and the warmth of
thofe fentiments, his Britannick Majefty has hither-
to forborne in any manner to take a part in their
affairs; in hopes, that the common intcrcft of
King and fubjecls would render all parties fenfible
of the neceffity of fettling, their government and
their freedom, upon principles of moderation ; as
the only means of fecuring permanence to both
e thefe
thefe blefTmgs, as well as internal and external
tranquillity,, to the Kingdom of France, and to all
Europe.
His Britannick Majefty finds, to his great re-
gret, that his hopes have not been realized. He
finds, that 'conmfions and diibrders have rather
increafed than diminifhed, and that they now
threaten to proceed to dangerous extremities.
In this fituation of things, the fame regard to a
neighbouring Sovereign living in friendfhip with
Great Britain, the fame fpir.it of good-will to the
Kingdom of France, the fame regard to the gene-
ral tranquillity, which have caufed him to view
with concern, the growth and continuance ofihe
_prefent diibrders, have induced the King of Great
Britain to intcrpofe his good- offices towards a re-
concilement of thofe unhappy differences. This
his Majefty does with the moft cordial regard to
the good of all descriptions concerned, and with
the moil perfect fincerity, wholly removing from
his Royal mind, all memory of every circumltance
.which might impede him in the execution of a
plan of benevolence which he has To much at
hear'.
His Majefty, having r.Iways thought it his great-
,eft glory, that he rules over a people, perfectly
and
( *3. >
and folidly, bccaufe foberly, rationally, aaa<i fegalTy
free, can never be fuppofed to proceed in offering
thus his Royal mediation, but with an unaffected
defire and full resolution, to confider the fettlement
of a free confiitution in France, as the very bail*
of any agreement between the Sovereign. and tho&
of his fubjects who are unhappily at variance with
him ; to guarantee it to them, if it fhould be de-
fired, in the moft folemn and authentick manner,
and to do all that in him lies to procure the like
guarantee from other powers.
His Britannick Majefty, in the fame imnner,
afTures the moil Chriftian King, that he knows too
well, and values too highly, what is due to the
dignity and rights of crowned Heads, and to the
implied faith of treaties which have always been
made with the Crown of France, ever to liften to
any proportion by which that Monarchy fhall be
defpoiled of all its rights, fo eflential for the fup-
port of the confederation of the Prince, and the
concord and welfare of the people.
If unfortunately, a due attention fhould not be
paid to thefe his Majefty 's benevolent and neigh-
bourly offers, or, if any circumftances fhoujd pre-
vent the Moft Chriftian King from acceding, (as
his Majefty has no doubt he is well difpofed to do)
to this healing mediation in favour of himfelf and
all
all his fubjects, his Majefty has commanded me
to take leave of this Court, as not conceiving it to
be fuitable to the dignity of his Crown, and to
what he owes to his faithful people, any longer to
keep a publick Minifter at the Court of a Sove-
reign who is not in pofieftion of his own liberty.
THOUGHTS
THOUGHTS
ON
FRENCH AFFAIRS,
&c. &c.
WRITTEN IX DECEMBER, 179 1 *
IN all our tranfactions with France, and at all
periods, we have treated with that State on the
footing of a Monarchy. Monarchy was confidered
in all the external relations of that kingdom with
every Power in Europe as it's legal and conflitu-
tional Government, and that in which aione it's
federal capacity was veiled.
It is not yet a year fince Monfieur de Mont-
morin, formally, and with as little refpecl as can
be imagined, to the King, and to all crowned
heads, announced a total revolution in that coun-
try. He has informed the Britim Miniftry that it's
frame of Government is wholly altered ; that he is
one of the Miniiters of the new fyftem ; and in ef-
fect, that the King is no longer his matter (nor
does he even call him fuc-hj but the " frft of the
Minifters" in the new lyilem.
B The
f ec ond notification was that of the King's
of the Con-
ftirmion ra- acceptance of the new Conftitution ; accompanied
with fanfaronades in the modern ftyle of the
French bureaus, things which have much more
the air and character of the fancy declamations of
their clubs, than the tone of regular office.
It has not been very ufual to notify to foreign
Courts, any thing concerning the internal arrange-
ments of any State. In the prefent cafe, the cir-
cumftance of thefe tvro notifications, with the ob
fervations with which they arc attended, does not
leave it in the choice of the Sovereigns of Chrif-
tendom to appear ignorant either of this French
Revolution, or (what is more important) of it's
principles.
We know that very foon after this Manifefto of
Monficur de Montmorin, the King of France, in
whofe name it was made, found himfelf obliged to
fly, with his whole family ; leaving behind him a
Declaration, in which he difavows and annuls that
Conftitution, as having been the effect of force on
his perfon and u/urpation on his authority. It is
equally notorious that this unfortunate Prince was,
with many circumftances of infult and outrage,
brought back prifoner, by a deputation of the pre-
tended National Aflembly, and aftenvards fufpend-
ed by their authority, frpm hi* Government. Un-
der
f 3 )
der equally notorious conftraint, and under me-
naces of total dcpofition, he has been compelled to
accept what they call a Conftitution, and to agree
to whatever elfe the ufurped power which holds
him in confinement, thinks proper to impofe.
His next brother, who had fled with him, and
his third brother, who had fled before him, all the
Princes of his blood, who remained faithful to him,
and the flower of his Magiftracy, his Clergy, and
his Nobility, continue in foreign countries, pro-
tefling againfl all acts done by him in his prefent
fituation, on the grounds upon which he had him-
felf protcfted againfl them at the time of his flight ;
with this addition, that they deny his very com-
petence, (as on good grounds they may) to abro-
gate the Royalty, or the ancient conititutional
Orders of the Kingdom. In this proteft they are
joined by three hundred of the late AtTembly it-
fclf, and in effect, by a great part of the French
Nation. The new Government (fo far as thd
people dare to difclofe their fentiments) is difdain-
ed, I am perfuaded. by the greater number ; who
as M. de la Fayette complains, and as the truth is,
have declined to tae any (hare in the new elec-
tions to the National Aflembly, either as candi-
dates or electors.
B2 Iii
In this ftate of things (that is in the cafe of a
divided kingdom) by * the law of nations, Great
Britain, like every other Power, is free to take any
part (he pleafes. She may decline, with more or
lefs formality, according to her difcretion, to ac-
knowledge this new lyftem ; or (he may recognize
it as a Government de fafto, fctting afide all dif-
cuffion of it's original legality, and confidering the
ancient Monarchy as at an end. The law of na-
tions leaves our Court open to it's choice. We
have no direction but what is found in the well-
umlerftood policy of the King and kingdom.
This Declaration of a newfyccies of Government,
on new principles (fuch it profeffes itfelf to be) is
a real crifis in the politicks of Europe. The con-
dn<5l which prudence ought to diclate to Great-
Britain, will not depend (as hitherto our connexion
or quarrel with other States has for fome time de-
pended) upon merely external relations ; but, in a
great meafure alfo upon the lyftem which we may
think it right to adopt for the internal government
of our own country.
If it be our policy to aflimilate our Govern-
ment to that of Fran"., we ought to prepare for
this change, by encou.r, p;ing the fchcmes of au-
thority eftablifhed there. We ought to wink at
* See Vattel, b. ii. c. 4. feft. 56. and b. iii. c 18. feet. 296*
the
( 5 )
the captivity and deposition of a Prince, with
whom, if not in clofc alliance, we were in friend-
fhip. We ought to fall in with the ideas of Monf.
Montmoriri's circular Manifefto ; and to do bufi-
nefs of courfe with the functionaries who act under
the new power, by which that King to whom his
Majeny's Minifter has been fent to relide, has been
depofed and imprifoned. On that idea we ought
allb to with -hold all forts of direct or indirect
countenance from thofe who are treating in Ger-
many for the re-eftablidimcnt of the French Mo-
narchy and the ancient Orders of that State. This
conduct is fuitable to this policy.
The queftion is, whether this policy be fuitabie
to the interefls of the Crown and fubjects of Great
Britain. Let us therefore a little conlider the true
nature and probable effects of the Revolution
which, in fuch a very unufual manner, has been
twice diplomatically announced to his Majefty.
There have been many internal revolutions in Difference
the Government of countries, both as to perfons Revolution
and forms, in which the neighbouring States have
had little or no concern. Whatever the Govern-
ment might be with refpect to thofe perfons and
thofe forms, the ftationary iriterclis of the nation
concerned, have molt commonly influenced the
new Governments in the fame manner in which
they
( 6 )
they influenced the old ; and the Revolution,
turning on matter of local grievance or of local
accommodation , did not extend beyond it's ter-
ritory.
Nature of The prefent Revolution in France feems to me
the French l
Revolution, to be quite of another characlcr and defcription ;
and to bear little relemhlance or analogy to any of
thofe which have been brought about in Europe,
upon principles merely political. // is a Revolu-
tion of dotlrme and tkeoretick dogma. It has a much
greater refemblance to thofe changes which have
been made upon religious grounds, in which a Ipi-
rit of profelytifm makes an eflential part.
The laft Revolution of doctrine and theory
which has happened in Europe, is the Reformation.
It is not for my pnrpofe to take any notice here of
the merits of that Revolution, but to ftate one only
of it's effects.
i:*sefch. _.-' That effect was to introduce other inter efts into
I all countries., than thofe -which arofe from their loca-
lity and natural circumftances. The principle of the
"Reformation was fuch, as by it's effence, could not
be local or confined to the country in which it had
it's origin. For inftance, the doclrine of " Jufti-
fication by Faith or by Works/' which was the ori-
ginal balis of the Reformation, could not have one
of
( 7 )
of it's alternatives tru? as to Germany, and falie
as to every other country. Neither are queftions
of theoretick truth and falfehood governed by cir-
cumftances any more than by places. On that
occafion, therefore, the fpirit of profelytifm ex-
panded itfelf with great elafticity upon all fides ;
and great divilions were every where the refult.
Thefe divifions however, in appearance merely
tlogmatick, foon became mixed with the political ;
and, their effects were rendered much more intenfe
from this combination. Europe was for a long
time divided into two great factions, under the
name of Catholidk and Proteftant, which not only
often alienated State from State, but alfo divided
almoft every State within itfelf. The warm parties
in each State were more affectionately attached to
thofe of their own doctrinal intereft in fome other
country than to their fellow citizens, or to their
natural Government, when they or either of them
happened to be of a different perfuafion. Thefe
factions, wherever they prevailed, if they did not
abfolutely deftroy, at leaft weakened and difiracted
the locality of patriotifm. The publick affections
'came to have other motives and other ties.
It would be to repeat the hiftory of the two laft
centuries to exemplify the effects of this Revo-
lution.
Although
Although the principles to which it gave rife,
did not operate with a perfect regularity and con-
ftancy, they never wholly ceafed to operate. Few
wars were made, and few treaties were entered
into in which they did not come in for fome part.
They gave a colour, a character, and direction to
all the politicks of Europe.
Thcfe principles of internal, as well as externaf
divifion and coalition, are but juft now cxtin-
guifhed. But they who will examine into the true
character and genius of fome late events, muft be
latisfied thafc other fources of faction, combining
parties among the inhabitants of different coun-
tries into one connexion, are opened, and that
from thcfe fources are likely to arifc effects full as
important as thofe which had formerly arifen from
the jarring interefls of the religious fects. The
intention of the feveral actors in the change in
France, is not a matter of doubt. It is very
openly profcflcd.
In the modern world, before this time, there has
been no inltance of this fpirit of general political
faction, feparatcd from religion, pervading feveral
countries, and forming a principle of union be-
tween the partizans in each. But the thing is not
lefg in human nature. The antient world has fur-
niftied
( )
nifhed a itrong and flriking inftance of fuch a
ground for fa6lion, full as powerful and full as mif-
chievous as our i'pirit of religious fyftem had ever
been, exciting in all the States of Greece (Euro-
pean and Afiatick) the inoft violent animofitics, and
the mofl cruel and bloody perfections and pro-
fcriptions. Thefe ancient faclions in each com-
monwealth of Greece, connected themfelves with
thofeof the fame defcription in fome other States 5
and fecret cabals and publick alliances were carried
on and made, not upon a conformity of general po-
litical intercfts, but for the fupport and aggran-
dizement of the two leading States which headed
the Ariftocratick and Democratick Faclions. For,
as in later times, the King of Spain was at the head
of a Catholick, and the King of Sweden of a Protcf-
tant intereft,Francc,(though Catholick, acting fub-
ordinately to the latter,) in the like manner the
Lacedemonians were every where at the head of
the Ariftocratick interefts, and the Athenians of
the Democratick. The two leading Powers kept
alive a conftant cabal and confpiracy in every State,
and the political dogmas concerning the confutu-
tion of a Republick. were the great inftruments by
which thefe leading States chofe to aggrandize
themfelves. Their choice was not unwile ; be-
caufe the intereft in opinions (merely as opinions,
and without any experimental reference to their
effects) when once they take ftrong hold of the
C mind,
mind, become the moft operative of all interefts,
and indeed very often iupercede every other.
. I might farther exemplify the poflibility of a
political fentiment running through various (rates
and combining factions in them, from the hiltory
of the middle ages in the Guelfs and Ghibellines.
Thefe were political factions originally in favour of
the Emperor and the Pope, with no mixture of re-
ligious dogmas; or ii any thing religioufly doc-
trinal they had in them originally, it. very foon dil-
appeared; as the : r firft political objects difappeared
alfo, though the ipirit remained. They became
no more than names to diitinguifh faclions; but
they were not the lefs powerful in their operation,
when they had no direct: point of doctrine, either
religious or civil, to aficrt. For a long-time, how-
ever, thofc faclions gave no fmall degree of influ-
ence to the foreign Chiefs in every commonwealth
in which they exifted. I do not mean to purfue
further the track of thcfe parties. I allude to this
part of hiftory only, as it furnifhes an initancc of
that fpccics of faction which broke the locality of
publick affections, and united defcriptions of citi-
zens more with itrangcrs than with their country-
men of different opinions.
The political dogma, which upon the new
French fyftem, is to unite the faclions of different
nations,
( 11 )
nations, turns is this, " That the majority told, by
" the head, of the taxable people in every country,
(< is the perpetual, natural, uneeafing, indefeafible
" fovcreign ; that this majority is perfectly mailer
" of the form, as well as the adminiftration of the
" flate, and that the magistrates, under whatever
" names they are called, are only functionaries to
" obey the orders, (general as laws or particular as
" decrees) which that majority may make ; that
" this is the only natural government ; that all
" others are tyranny and ufurpation."
In order to reduce this dogma into practice, the
Republicans in France, and their afibciates in other
countries, make it always their buiinefs, and often
their publick profefiion, to deftroy all traces of an-
tient eftablilliments, and to form a new common-
wealth in each country, upon the bafis of the
French Rights of Men. On the principle of thefe
rights, they mean to inftitute in every country,
and as it were, the germe of the whole, parochial
governments, for the purpofe of what they call
equal reprefentation. From them is to grow, by
fome media, a general council and rcprefentative of
all the parochial governments. In thatreprefentative
is to be vefted the whole national power ; totally
aboliiliing hereditary name and office, levelling all
conditions of men, (except where money miift make
a difference) breaking all connexion between ter-
C 2 ritory
ritory and dignity, and abolifhing every fpecies of
nobility, gentry, and church eftablifhinents; all
their priefts, and all their magiftrates being only
creatures of election, and pensioners at will.
Knowing how oppofite a permanent landed 5n-
tereft is to that fchcme, they have refolved, and it
is the great drift of all their regulations, to reduce
jhat delcription of men to a mere peafantry, for the
fuftcnance of the towns, and to place the true effec-
tive government in cities, among the tradefmen,
bankers, and voluntary clubs of bold, prcfuming
young perfons ; advocates, attornies, notaries,
managers of newfpapers, and thofe cabals of lite-
rary men, called academies. Their Republick is to
have a firft functionary, (as they call him) under
the name of King, or not, as they think fit. This
officer, when fuch an officer is permitted, is how-
ever, neither in fact nor name, to be confidered as
fovereign, nor the people as his fubjccts. The very
life of thcfe appellations is offeniive to their ears.
Tirtiz-ms of This lyftem, as it has firft been realized, dogma-
fyitem. tically as well as practically, in France, makes
France the natural head of all factions formed on a
fimilar principle, wherever they may prevail, as
much as Athens was the head and fettled ally of
all democratick factions, wherever they exifted.
The other fyftem has no head.
This
( 13 )
This fyftem has very many partisans in every
country in Europe, but particularly in England,
where they arc already formed into a body, com-
prehending moil of the diilenters of the three lead-
ing denominations ; to thcfe are readily aggre-
gated all who are dificnters in character, temper,
and clifpofition, though not belonging to any of
their congregations that is, all the reftlefs people
who refemble them, of all ranks and all parties
Whigs, and even Tories the whole race of half-
bred fpeculators ; all the Athcifts, Deills, and So-
cinians ; all thofe who hate the Clergy, and envy
the Nobility, a good many among the monied
people ; the Eaft Indians almoft to a man, who
cannot bear to find that their prefent importance
does not bear a proportion to their wealth. Thefe
latter have united thcmfelves into one great, and
in my opinion, formidable Club*, which, though
now quiet, may be brought into action with conii-
dcrable unanimity and force.
Formerly few, except the ambitious great, or the
defperate and indigent, were to be feared as inftru-
ments in revolutions. What has happened in
France teaches us, with many other things, that
there are more caufcs than have commonly been
* Originally called the Bengal Club, but (ince opened to per-
fons from th other Prefuiencies, for the purpofc of confolidaN
ing the whole Indian intcreil.
taken
taken into our confederation, by which Govern-
ment may be fubverted. The monied men. mer-
chants, principal tradefmen, and men of letters
(hitherto generally thought the peaceable and even
timid part of fociety) are the chief actors in the
French Revolution. Bift the fact is, that as money
increafes and circulates, and as the circulation of
news, in politicks and letters, becomes more and
more diffufed, the perfons who diffufe this money,
and this intelligence, become more and more im-
portant. This was not long undiscovered. Views
of ambition were in France, for the firft time, pre-
fented to thefe claries of men. Objects in the
State, in the Army, in the fyftem of civil offices
of every kind. Their eyes were dazzled with this
new profpect. They were, as it were, electrified
and made to lofe the natural fpirit of their fitua-
tion. A bribe, great without example in the hif-
tory of the world, was held out to them the whole
government of a very large kingdom.
There are feveral who are perfuaded that the
fame thing cannot happen in England, becaufe
here, (they fay) the occupations of merchants,
tradefmen,and manufacturers, are not held as de-
grading fituations. I once thought that the low
efiimation in which commerce was held in France,
might be reckoned among the caufes of the late
revolution ; and I am ftill of opinion, that the ex-
clufive
( 15 )
clufive fpirit of the French nobility, did irritate the
wealthy of other clafhs. But I found long mice,
that pcrfons in trade and buimefs were by no
means defpifcd in France in the manner I had been
taught to believe. As to men of letters, they were
fo far from being defpifed or neglected, that there
was no country perhaps in the univcrfe, in which
they were fo highly efleemed, courted, carciied,
and even feared ; tradefmen naturally were not fo
much fought in fociety (as not furniming fo largely
to the fund of convcrfation as they do to the reve-
nues of the ftate) but the latter defcription got for-
ward every day. M. Bailly, who made himfelf the -Literary in-
popular Mayor on the rebellion of the Baftile, and
is a principal actor in the revolt, before the change
poileffed a penlion or office under the Crown, of
fix hundred pound Englifh, a year, for that coun-
try, no contemptible provifion : And this he ob-
tained folely as a man of letters, and on no other
title. As to the monied men whilft the Monar- Moniedir.-
chy continued, there is no doubt, that merely as
fuch, they did not enjoy the privileges of nobility,
but nobility was of fo eafy an acquifition, that it
was the fault or neglect of all of that defcription,
who did not obtain it's privileges, for their lives at
leaft, in virtue of office. It attached under the
royal government to an innumerable multitude of
places, real and nominal, that were vendible ; and
fuch nobility were as capable of every thing as
their
their degree of influence or intereft could make
them, that is, as nobility of no confiderable rank
or confequence. M. Necker, fo far from being a
French gentleman, was not fo much as a French-
man born, and yet we all know the rank in which
he flood on the day of the meeting of the States.
As to the mere matter of eftimation of the mer-
cantile or any other clafs, this is regulated by opi-
nion and prejudice. In England a fecurity againft
the envy of men in thele clafles, is not fo very
complete as xve may imagine. We muft not im-
pofe upon ourfelves. What inftitutions and man-
ners together had done in France, manners alone
do here. It is the natural operation of things
where there exifts a Crown, a Court, fplendid Or-
ders of Knighthood, and an Hereditary Nobility;
where there exifts a fixed, permanent, landed Gen-
try, continued in greatnefs and opulence by the
law of primogeniture, and by a protection given
to family fettlements; where there exifts a (land-
ing Army and Navy; where there exifts a Church
Eftablilliment, which beftows on learning and
parts an intereft combined with that of Religion
and the State ; in a country where fuch things
exift, wealth, new in it's acquifition, and precarious
in it's duration, can never rank firlt, or even near
the firft; though wealth has it's natural weight,
further, than as it is balanced and even preponde-
rated
( 17 )
rated amongft us as amongft other nations, by ar-
tificial institutions and opinions growing out of
them. At no period in the hiftory of England
have fo few Peers been taken out of trade or from
families newly created by commerce. In no pe-
riod has fb fmall a number of noble families en-
tered into the counting-houfe. I can call to mind
but one in all England, and his is of near fifty
years Handing. Be that as it may, it appears plain
to me from my befr obfcrvation, that envy and
ambition may by art, management and difpoiition,
be as much excited amongft thefe defcriptions of
men in England, as in any other country ; and
that they are juft as capable of acting a part in any
great change.
What direction the French fpirit of profelytifm
f the French
is likely to take, and in what order it is likely to Spirit. it's
T - courfe.
prevail in the fevcral parts of Europe, it is not
eafy to determine. The feeds are fown almoft
every where, chiefly by newfpaper circulations,
infinitely more efficacious and extend ve than ever
they were. And they are a more important in-
ftrument than generally is imagined. They are a
part of the reading of all, they are the whole of
the reading of the far greater number. There are
thirty of them in Paris alone. The language dif-
fufes them more widely than the Englifh, though
the Englim too are much read. The writers of
D thefe
( 13 )
thefe papers indeed, for the greater part, are either
unknown or in contempt, but they are like a bat-
tery in which the ftroke of any one ball produces
no great efrecl, but the amount of continual repe-
tition is decifive. Let us only fufrer any perfon to
tell us his llory, morning and evening, but for one
twelvemonth, and he will become our mafter.
All thofe countries in which feveral States are
comprehended under lome general geographical
defcription, and loofely united by fome federal con-
ftitution ; countries of which the members are
fmall, and greatly cliverfified in their forms of go-
vernment, and in the titles by which they are held
thefe countries, as it might be well expecled, are
the principal objects of their hopes and machina-
tions. Of thefe, the chief are Germany and Swit-
zerland : after them, Italy has it's place as in cir-
cumitanccs fomewhat fimilar.
As to Germany (in which from their relation to
the Emperor, I comprehend the Belgick provinces)
it appears to me to be from feveral circumftances,
internal and external, in a very critical fituation,
and the laws and liberties of the Empire are by no
means ierure from the contagion of the French
doclrines and the effe6l of French intrigues; or
from the ufe which two of the greater German
powers may make of a general derangement, to
the
( 19 )
the general detriment. I do not fay that the
French" do not mean to beftow on thcfe German
States, liberties and laws too, after their mode ;
but thofe are not what have hitherto been under-
flood as the laws and liberties of the Empire.
Thcfe exift and have always exifted under the prin-
ciples of feodal tenure and fucceflion, under Im-
perial conftitntions, grants and conceffions of So-
vereigns, family compacts and publick treaties,
made under the fanclion, and fome of them gua-
ranteed by the Sovereign Powers of other nations,
and particularly the old Government of France,
the author and natural fupport of the treaty of
Wcilphalia,
In fhort, the Germanick body is a vaft mafs of
heterogeneous States, held together by that hete-
rogeneous body of old principles which formed the
publick law pofitive and doctrinal. The modern
laws and liberties which the new power in France
propofcs to introduce into Germany., and to fup-
port with all it's force, of intrigue and of arms, is of
a very different nature, utterly irreconcileable with
the firll, and indeed fundamentally the reverie of
it: I mean the Rights and Liberties of tne Man, the
Droit de fHomme. That this doclrine has made
an amazing progrefs in Germany, there cannot be
.n. fhadow of doubt. They are infecled by it along
the whole courfe of the Rhine, the Maefe, the
D 2 Mofelle.
Mofeile, and in the greater part of Suabia and
Franconia. It is particularly prevalent amongil
all the lower people, churchmen and laity, in the
dominions of the Ecclefialiical Electors. It is not
eafy to find or to conceive Governments more
mild and indulgent than thcfe Church Sovereign-
ties; but good government is as nothing when the
Rights of Man take pofleffion of the mind. In-
deed the loofe rein held over the people in thefe
provinces, muft be confidered as one caufe of the
facility with which they lend thcmfelves to any
fchemes of innovation, by inducing them to think
lightly of their governments, and to judge of
grievances not by feeling, but by imagination.
It is in thefe Electorates that the firft imprcf-
(ions of France are likely to be made, and if they
fucceed, it is over with the Germanick body as it
Hands at prefent. A great revolution is preparing
in Germany ; and a revolution, in my opinion,
likely to be more decifive upon the general fate of
nations than that of France itfelf ; other than as
in France is to be found the firft fource of all the
principles which are in any way likely to diftin-
guifh the troubles and convulfions of our age. If
Europe docs not conceive the independence, and
the equilibrium of the Empire to be in the very
eflence of the fyftem of balanced power in Europe,
and if the fcheme of publick law, or mafs of laws
upon
upon which that independence and equilibrium
are founded, be of no leading confequence as they
are preferved or deftroyed, all the politicks of Eu-
rope for more tlian two centuries have been mi-
ferably erroneous.
If the two great leading Powers of Germany do Pruffia a
not regard this danger (as apparently they do not)
in the light in which it prefents itfelf fo naturally,
it is becaufe they are powers too great to have a
focial intereft. That fort of intereil belongs only
to thofe, whofe ftate of weaknefs or mediocrity is
fuch, as to give them greater caufe of apprehenfion
from what may deftroy them, than of hope from
any thing by which they may be aggrandized.
As long as thofe two Princes are at variance, fo
long the liberties of Germany are fafe. But if
ever they fhould fo far underfiand one another as
to be perfuaded that they have a more ctirecl and
more certainly defined intereft in a proportioned
mutual aggrandizement than in a reciprocal reduc-
tion, that is, if they come to think that they are
more likely to be enriched by a divifion of fpoil,
than to be rendered fecure by keeping to the old
policy of preventing others from being fpoiled by
either of them, from that moment the liberties of
Germany are no more.
That
( 22 )
That -a junction of two in fuch a fcheme is nei-
ther impofliblc nor improbable, is evident from the
partition of Poland in 1 773, which was effected by
fuch a junction as made the interpofition of other
nations to prevent it, not eafy. Their circumftances
at that time hindered any other three States, or in-
deed any two, from taking mea lures in common
to prevent it, though France was at that time an
exiting power, and had not yet learned to act
upon a (yllem of politicks of her own invention.
The geographical pofition of Poland was a great
obitacle to any movements of France in oppoli-
tion to this, at that time unparalleled league.
To my certain knowledge, if Great Britain had at
that time been willing to concur in preventing the
execution of a project fo dangerous in the exam-
ple, even cxhaufted as France then was by the
preceding war, and under a lazy and unenterpriz-
ing Prince, fhe would have at every rifque taken
an active part in this bufinefs. But a languor
with regard to fo remote an intereft, and the prin-
ciples and paffions which were then ftrongly at
work at home, were the caufes why Great Britain
would not give France any encouragement in fuch
an enterprize. At that time, however, and with
regard to that object., in my opinion. Great Britain
and France had a common interefr.
But
But the portion of Germany is not like that of Poffibicpro-
jedt of the
Poland, with regard to France, either for good or Emperor and
for evil. If a conjunction between Pruffia and the fu.
Emperor fhould be formed for the purpofe of fecu-
larifing and rendering hereditary the Ecclefiaftical
Electorates and the Bifhoprick of Munfter, for
fettling two of them on the children of the Em-
peror, and uniting Cologne and Munfter to the
dominions of the King of Pruffia on the Rhine,
or if any other project of mutual aggrandizement
fhould be in profpect, and that to facilitate fuch a
fcheme, the modern French Ihould be permitted
and encouraged to fhake the internal and external
fecurity of thefe Ecclefiaftical Electorates, Great
Britain is fo fituated that fhe could not with any
effect fet herfelf in oppofition to fuch a defign.
Her principal arm, her marine, could here be of
no fort of ufe.
France, the author of the treaty of Weftphalia, TO be refill-
is the natural guardian of the independence and France,
balance of Germany. Great Britain (to fay no-
thing of the King's concern as one of that auguft
body) has a fcrious intereft in preferving it; but,
except through the power of France, offing upon
the common old principles of State policy, in the
cafe we have fuppofed, (he has no fort of means
of fupporting that intereft. It is always the inte-
reft of Great Britain that the power of France
fhould
( 24 )
fhould be kept within the bounds of moderation.
It is not her intereft that that power fhould be
wholly annihilated in the iyftem of Europe.
Though at one time through France the indepen-
dence of Europe was endangered, it is and ever
was through her alone that the common liberty of
Germany can be fecured againft the fingle or the
combined ambition of any other power. In truth,
within this century the aggrandizement of other
Sovereign Houfes has been fiich that there has
been a great change in the whole ftate of Europe,
and other nations as well as France may become
objects of jealoufy and apprehcniion.
Newprincj. In this ftate of things, a new principle of alli-
ance, ances and wars is opened. The treaty of Weft-
phalia is, with France, an antiquated fable. The
rights and liberties fhe was bound to maintain are
now a lyftem of wrong and tyranny which fhe is
bound to deuroy. Her good and ill difpolitions
are fhewn by the fame means. To communicate
feacealfy the rights of men is the true mode of
her (hewing her friend/hip; to force Sovereigns to
fulmit to thofe rights is her mode of hqftilily. So
that either as friend or foe her whole fcheine has
been and is, to throw the Empire into confufion :
and thofe Statefmen, who follow the old routine
of politicks, may fee in this general confufion, and
in the danger of the leffer Princes, an occaiion as
protectors
proteclors or enemies,, of connecting their territo-
ries to one or the other of the two great German,
Powers. They do not take into confideration that
the means which they encourage, as leading to the
event they defire, will with certainty not only ravage
and deftroy the Empire, but if they {hould for a
moment feem to aggrandize the two great houfes,
will alfo eftablifh principles, and confirm tempers
amongft the people, which will preclude the two
Sovereigns from the poffibility of holding what
they acquire, or even the dominions which they
have inherited. It is on the fide of the Ecclefiafti-
cal Electorates that the dykes, railed to fupport
the German liberty, firfl will give way.
The French have begun their general operations
by feizing upon thofe territories of the Pope, the
fituation of which was the moft inviting to the
enterprize. Their method of doing it was by excit-
ing fedition and fpreading maflacre and defolation
thro' thcfe unfortunate places, and then under an
idea of kindnefs and protection, bringing forward an
antiquated title of the Crown of France and an-
nexing Avignon and the two cities of the Comtat
with their territory to the French Republick. They'
have made an attempt on Geneva, m which they Geneva."'
very narrowly failed of fuccefs. It is known that
they hold out from time to time the idea of unit-
ing all the other provinces of which Gaul was an-
E tisntly
( 26 )
tiently compofed, including Savoy on the other fide,
and on this fide bounding themfelves by the Rhine.
As to Switzerland, it is a country whofe long
union rather than it's poffible divifion, is the mat-
ter of wonder. Here I know they entertain very
fanguine hopes. The aggregation to France of
the Democratick Swifs Republicks appears to them
to be a work half done by their very form; and it
might feem to them rather an encreafe of impor-
tance to thefe little Commonwealths., than a dero-
gation from their independency, or a change in
the manner of their Government. Upon any
quarrel amongil the Cantons nothing is more like-
ly than fuch an event. As to the Ariftocratick Re-
publicks, the general clamour and hatred which
the French excite againft the very name, (and with
more facility and fuccefs than againft Monarchs)
and the utter impoflibility of their Government
making any fort of refinance againft an infurrec-
tion, where they have no troops, and the people
are all armed and trained, render their hopes
in that quarter, far indeed from unfounded. It is
certain that the Republick of Berne thinks itfelf
obliged to a vigilance next to hoftile, and to impri-
fon or expel all the French whom they find in their
territories. But indeed thofe Ariftocracies which
comprehend whatever is confiderable, wealthy, and
valuable in Switzerland, do now fo wholly depend
upon
( 27 )
upon opinion, and the humour of their multitude, ow. French
' maxims the
that the lierhteft puff of wind is fufficient to blow furit y of
1 its indepen-
them down. If France, under it's antient regimen, <*
and upon the antient principles of policy, was the
fupport of the Germanick Conftitution, it was
much more fo of that of Switzerland, which al-
moft from the very origin of that confederacy reft-
ed tfpon the clofenefs of it's connexion with
France, on which the Swifs Cantons wholly re-
pofed themfelves for the prefervation of the parts
of their body in their refpective rights and perma-
nent forms, as well as for the maintenance of all
in their general independency.
Switzerland and Germany arc the firft objects
of the new French politicians. When I contem-
plate what they have done at home, which is in
effect little lefs than an amazing conqueft wrought
by a change of opinion, in a great part (to be fure
far from altogether) very fudden, I cannot help
letting my thoughts run along with their defigns,
and without attending to geographical order, to
confider the other States of Europe fo far as they
may be any way affected by this aftonifhing Re-
volution. If early fteps are not taken in fome way
or other to prevent the fpreading of this influence,
I fcarcely think any of them perfectly fecure,
Italy is divided, as Germany and Switzerland to'y-
are, into many fmaller States, and with fomc con-
E 2 fiderable
fiderable diverfity as to forms of Government; but
as thefe divifions and varieties in Italy are not fo
confiderable, fo neither do I think the danger al-
together fo imminent there as in Germany and
Switzerland. Savoy I know that the French con-
lider as in a very hopeful way, and I believe not at
all without reafon. They view it as an old mem-
ber of the Kingdom of France which may be eafily
re-united in the manner, and on the principles of
the re-union of Avignon. This country commu-
nicates with Piedmont ; and as the King of Sardi-
nia's dominions were long the key of Italy, and as
fuch long regarded by France, whiltt France acted
on her old maxims, and with views on Italy; fo in
this new French empire of fedition, if once fhe
gets that key into her hands, fhe can eafily lay
open the barrier which hinders the entrance of
her prefent politicks into that inviting region.
Milan, I arn fure, nourifhcs great difquiets and if
Milan fhould ftir, no part of Lombardy is fecure
to the prefent poffeflbrs whether the Venetian or
the Auflrian. Genoa is clofely connected with
France.
The firft Prince of the Hcufe of Bourbon has
been obliged to give himfelf up entirely to the
new fyftem, and to pretend even to propagate it
with all zeal ; at lead that Club of intriguers who
affemble at the Feuillans, and whofe cabinet
meets
meets at Madame Stahl's, and makes and directs
all the Minifters, is the real Executive Government
of France. The Emperor is perfectly in concert,
and they will not long fuffer any Prince of the
Houfe of Bourbon, to keep by force the French
emjlTaries out of their dominions; nor whilft
France has a commerce with them, efpecially thro*
Marfeilles, (the hotteft focus of fedition in France)
xvill it be long poffible to prevent the intercourfo
or the effects.
Naples has an old inveterate difpofition to Re-
publicanifm, and (however for fome time pait
quiet) is as liable to explofion as it's own Vefuvius.
Sicily I think has thefe difpofitions in full as ftrong
a degree. In neither of thefe countries exifis any
thing which very well deferves the name of Go-
vernment or exact police.
In the Eftates of the Church, notwithstanding Ecciefiafti.
their ftrictnefs in banifhing the French out of that
country, there are not wanting the feeds of a re-
volution. The fpirit of Nepotifm prevails there
nearly as ftrong as ever. Every Pope of courfe
is to give origin or restoration to a great family,
by the means of large donations. The foreign reve-
nues have long been gradually on the decline, and
feem now in a manner dried up. To fupply this
defect the refource of vexatious and impolitick
jobbing
( 30 )
jobbing at home, if any thing, is rather encreafed
than lefTened. Various, well intended but ill un-
derftood practices, fome of them exifting, in their
fpirit at leaft, from the time of the old Roman
empire, ftill prevail ; and that Government is as
blindly attached to old abufive cuftoms, as others
are wildly difpofed to all forts of innovations and
experiments. Thefe abufes were lefs felt whilfi;
the Pontificate drew riches from abroad, which in
fome meafure counterbalanced the evils of their
remifs and iobbifh Government at home. But
now it can fubfift only on the reiburces of clomellick
management; and abufes in that management of
courle will be more intimately and more feverely
felt,
In the, midft of the apparently torpid languor of
the Ecclefiaftical State, thofe who have had oppor-
tunity of a near obfervation, have feen a little rip~
pling m that fmooth water, which indicates fome-
thing alive under it. There is in the Ecclefiafti-
cal State, a perfonage who feems capable of acling
(but with more force and Iteadinefs) the part of
the Tribune Rienzi. The people once inflamed
will not be deftitute of a leader. They have fuch
an one already in the Cardinal or Archbiihop Buon
Camfagna. He is, of all men, if I am not ill in-
formed, the moft turbulent, feditious, intriguing,
bold, and defperate. He is not at all made for a
Roman
( 31 )
Roman of the prefent day. I think he lately held
the firft office of their State, that of Great Cham-
berlain, which is equivalent to High Treafurer.
At prefent he is out of employment, and in dif-
grace. If he fhould be elected Pope, or even
come to have any weight with a new Pope, he will
infallibly conjure up a democratick fpirit in that
country. He may indeed be able to effe6t it
without thefe advantages. The next interreg-
num will probably mew more of him. There
may be others of the fame character, who have not
come to my knowledge. This much is certain,
that the Roman people, if once the blind reverence
they bear to the fanctity of the Pope, which is
their only bridle, fhould relax, are naturally tur-
bulent, ferocious, and headlong, whilft the police
is defective, and the Government feeble and re-
fourcelefs beyond all imagination.
As to Spain, it is a nervelefs country. It does Spain,
not poffefs the ufe, it only fuffers the abufe of a
nobility. For fome time, and even before the fet-
tlement of the Bourbon Dynafty, that body has
been fyftematically lowered, and rendered incapa-
ble by exclufion, and for incapacity excluded from
affairs. In this circle the body is in a manner
annihilated and fo little means have they of any
weighty exertion either to controul or to fupport
the Crown, that if they at all interfere, it is only
by
(32)
by abetting defperate and mobbifli infurrection?,
like that at Madrid which drove Squillace from his
place. Florida Blanca is a creature of office, and has
Jittle connexion, and no fympathy with that body.
As to the Clergy, they are the only thing in
Spain that looks like an independent order, and
they are kept in fome refpect by the Inquifi-
tion, the fole but unhappy refource of publick
tranquillity and order now remaining in Spain.
As in Venice, it is become moftly an engine of
State,which indeed to a degree it has always been in
Spain. It wars no longer with Jews and Hereticks :
It has no fuch war to carry on. It's great object
is to keep atheiftick and republican doctrines from
making their way in that kingdom. No French
book upon any fubjcct can enter there which does
not contain fuch matter. In Spain, the clergy are
of moment from their influence, but at the fame
time with the envy and jealoufy that attend great
riches and power. Though the Crown has by ma-
nagement with the Pope got a very great fhare of
the ecclefiaiiical revenues into it's own hands, much
ftill remains to them. There will always be about
that Court thofe who look out to a farther divifion
of the Church property as a refource, and to be
obtained by (horter methods than thofe of negotia-
tions with the Clergy and their Chief. But at pre-
fent I think it likely that they will flop, left the
bulinef*
bufmefs fhould be taken out of their hands ; and
left that body in which remains the only life that
exifts in Spain, and is not a fever, may with their
property lofe all the influence neceflary to prefcrve
the Monarchy, or being poor and defperate, may
employ whatever influence remains to them as ac^
tive agents in it's deftruclion.
The Caflilians have ftill remaining a good deal Caftiiedif-
terent trom
of their old character, their Gravidad, Leal J fid, c^cma *
Anapn,
and il Timor de Dios- but that character neither is,
or ever was exactly -true, except of the Caftilians
onlv. The feveral kingdoms which compofe Spain,
have perhaps fome features which run through the
whole ; but they are in many particulars as diffe-
rent as nations who go by different names; the Ca-
talans, for inftance, and the Arragonians too, in a
good meafure have the fpirit of the Miquelcts, and
much more of republicanism than of an attach-
ment to royalty. They are more in the way of
trade and intercourfe with France ; and upon the
leafl internal movement, wjll diiclolc and probably
let loofe a fpirit that may throw the whole Spanifh
Monarchy into convuifions.
It is a melancholy rcflcclion that the fpirit of
melioration which has been going on in that part
of Europe, more or lefs during this century, and
the various fchemes very lately on foot for further
F advance*
( 34 )
advancement are all put a flop to at once. Refor-
mation certainly is nearly Connected with innovation
and where that latter comes in for too large a
fhare, thole who undertake to improve their coun-
try may rifque their own fafety. In times where
the correction, which includes the confeffion of an
abufe, is turned to criminate the authority which
has long mffered it, rather than to honour thofc
who would amend it (which is the fpirit of this
malignant French diftemper) every ftep out of the
common courfe becomes critical, and renders it a
tafk full of peril for Princes of moderate talents to
engage in great undertakings. At prefent the only
fafety of Spain is the old national hatred to the
French. How far that can be depended upon, if
any great ferments fhould be excited, it is impof-
fible to fav.
As to Portugal, ilie is out of the high road of
thcfe politicks I (hall, therefore, not divert my
thoughts that way ; but return again to the North
of Europe, which at prefent feems the part moft in-
terefted, and there it appears to me that the French
fpeculation on the northern countries, may be
valued in the following, or fome fuch manner.
Denmark and Norway do not nppear to fiirnifli
any of ilic materials of a democratick revolution, or
the difpolitions to it. Denmark can only be cot:-
fequential/y
( 35 )
fiquentlally affected by any thing done in France ;
but of Sweden I think quite otherwife. The. pre-
lent power in Sweden is too new a fyftcm, and too
green and too fore from it's late Revolution, to be
confidered as perfectly affurcd. The King by his
aftonifhing activity, his boldnefs, his dccifion, his
ready verfatility, and by rouzing and employing
the old military fpirit of Sweden, keeps up the top
with continual agitation and laftiing. The mo-
ment it ceafes to fpin, the Royalty is a dead bit of
box. Whenever Sweden is quiet externally for
fome time, there is great danger that all the repub-
lican elements fhe contains will be animated by
the new French fpirit, and of this I believe the
King is very fenfible.
The Ruffian Government is of all others the
moft liable to be fubvertedby military feditions. by
Court confpiracies, and fometimcs by headlong re-
bellions of the people, fuch as the turbinating move-
ment of Pugatchef. It is not quite fo probable
that in any of thefe changes the fpirit of fyftem
may mingle in the manner it has done in France.
The Mufcovites are no great fpeculators But I
fhould not much rely on their uninquifitive difpo-
fition. if any of their ordinary motives to fedition
fhould arife. The little catechifm of the Rights of
Men is loon learned; and the inferences are in the
paffions.
F 2 Poland,
( 36 )
Poland, from one cnufc or another, is always un-
quiet. The newConftitution only fervcs to fupply
that reftlefs people .with new means, at leaft new
modes, of chcrifhing their turbulent difpofition.
The bottom of the character is the fame. It is
a great queftion, whether the joining that Crown
with the Electorate of Saxony, will contribute moft
to ftrcngthen the Royal authority of Poland, or to
fhake the Ducal in Saxony. The Elector is a Ca-
tholick ; the people of Saxony are, fix fevenths at
the very leaft, Proteftants. He mnjl continue a Ca-
tholick according to the Polifh law, if he accepts
that Crown. The pride of the Saxons, formerly
flattered by having a Crown in the Houfe of their
Prince, though an honour which coft them dear ;
the German probity, fidelity and loyalty; the weight
of the Conftitution of the Empire under the Treaty
of Weftphalia ; the good temper and good nature
of the Princes of the Iloufe of Saxony; had for-
merly removed from the people all apprehenfion
with regard to their religion, and kept them per-
fectly quiet, obedient, and even affectionate. The
feven years war made fome change in the minds of
the Saxons. They did not, I believe, regret the lofs
of what might be conlidcred alrnoft as the fuccef-
fion to the Crown of Poland, the pofleffion of
which, by annexing them to a foreign interefi, had
often obliged them to act an arduous part, towards
tbc fupport of which that foreign intcreft a Horded'
no
( 37 )
no proportionable ftrcngth. In this very delicate
lituation of their political intcrefts, the fpeculations
of the French and German (Economi/ls, and the ca-
bals, and the lecrct^ as well as public doctrines of
the lllummatenorden* and Free Mafons y have made
a coniiderable progrefs in that country ; and a tur-
bulent fpirit under qolour of religion, but in reality
arifmg from the French Rights of Man, has al-
ready fhewn itfelf, and is ready on every occafion
to blaze out.
The prefent Elector is a Prince of a fafe and
quiet temper, of great prudence, and goodnefs.
He knows that in the actual ftate of things, not
the power and refpect belonging to Sovereigns, but
their very cxiftence depends on a reafonable fruga-
lity. It is very certain that not one Sovereign in
Europe can either promife for the continuance of
his authority in a ftate of indigence and infolvency,
or dares to venture on a new impofition to relieve
himfelf. Without abandoning wholly the ancient
magnificence of his Court, the Elector has con-
ducted his affairs with infinitely more ceconomy
than any of his predecefTors, fo as to reftore his
finances beyond what was thought poffible from the
ftate in which the feven years war had left Saxony.
Saxony during the whole of that dreadful period
having been in the hands of an exafperatcd enemy,
rigorous by refentment, by nature and by necef-
fity,
CD130G
ITty, was obliged to bear in a manner the whole
burthen of the war; in the intervals when their al-
lies prevailed, the inhabitants of that country were
not better treated.
The moderation and prudence of the prefent
Elector, in my opinion, rather perhaps refpites the
troubles than lecures the peace of the Electorate.
The offer of the fucceffion to the Crown of Poland
is truly critical, whether he accepts, or whether he
declines it. If the States will confent to his ac-
ceptance, it will add to the difficulties, already
great, of his fituation between the King of Pruifia
and the Emperor. But thefe thoughts lead me too
far, when I mean to fpeak only of the interior con-
dition of thefe Princes. It has always however fome
ncccflary connexion with their foreign politicks.
With regard to Holland and the ruling party
there, I do not think it at all tainted, or likely to
be fo except by fair; or that it is likely to be mil-
led unlefs indirectly and circuitoufly. But the pre-
dominant party in Holland is not Holland. The
fuppreflcd faction, though fupprefled, exiits. Un-
der the afhes, the embers of the late commotions
are {"till warm. This Anti-Orange party has from
the day of it's origin been French, though alienated
in fomc degree for fomc time, through the pride
and folly of Louis the Fourteenth. It will ever
hanker
hanker after a French connexion ; and now that
the internal Government in France has been afii-
milated in fo confiderable a degree to that which
the immoderate Republicans began fo very lately
to introduce into Holland, their connexion, as ftill
more natural, will be more defired. I do not well
junderltand the prefent exterior politicks of the
Stadtholder, nor the Treaty into which the news-
papers fay he has entered for the States with the
Emperor. But the Emperor's own politicks with
regard to the Netherlands feem to me to be exactly
calculated to anfwer the purpofe of the French Re-
volutionifh. He endeavours to crufh the Arifto-
cratick party and to nourifh one in avowed con-
nexion with the moft furious Democrats in
France.
Thefe Provinces in which the French game is fo
well played, they coniider as part of the Old French
Empire : certainly they were amongft the oldeft
parts of it. Thefe they think very well iituatcd,
as their party is well-difpofed to a re-union. As to
the greater nations, they do not aim at making a
direct conqueft of them, but by difturbing them
through a propagation of their principles, they
liope to weaken, as they will weaken them, and to
/keep them in perpetual alarm and agitation, and
thus render all their efforts againft them utterly
impracticable,
( 40 )
impracticable, whilft they extend the dominion of
their fovereign anarchy on all fides.
As to England, there may be fome apprehenfion
from vicinity, from conflant communication, and
from the very name of Liberty, which, as it ought to
be very dear to us, in it's worn: abufcs carries fome-
thing feduclive. It is the abufe of the firft and beft
of the objects which we cherim. I know that many
who fufficiently diflike the fyflem of France, have
yet no apprehenfions of it's prevalence here. I fay
nothing to the ground of this fecurity in the at-
tachment of the people to their Conltitution, and
their fatisfa&ion in the difcrcet portion of liberty
which it mealures out to them. Upon this I have
faid all I have to fay, in the Appeal I have pub-
lifhed. That fecurity is fomething, and not in-
conliderable. But if a ftorm arifcs I fhould not
much rely upon it.
There are other views of things which may bo
ufed to give us a perfecl (though in my opinion a
delufive) affurancc of our own fecurity. The firft
of thefe is from the weaknefs and ricketty nature
of the new fvftem in the place of it's iirfl formation.
It is thought that the monfler of a Commonwealth
cannot poffibly live that at any rate the ill con-
trivance of their fabrick will make it fall in pieces
Qf
( 41 )
of itfelf that the Aflembly muft be bankrupt, and
that this bankruptcy will totally deftroy that fyf-
tem, from the contagion of which apprehenfions
are entertained.
For my part I have long thought that one great
caufe of the liability of this wretched fchenie of
things in France was an opinion that it could not
Hand ; and, therefore, that all external mcafures
to deftroy it were wholly ufelefs.
As to the bankruptcy, that event has happened Bankruptcy.
long ago, as much as it is ever likely to happen.
So foon as a nation compels a creditor to take
paper currency in difcharge of his debt, there is a
bankruptcy. The compulfory paper has in fome
degree anfwered ; not becaufe there was a furplus
from Church lands, but becaufe faith has not been
kept with the Clergy. As to the hqjders of the
old fundSj to them the payments will be dilatory,
but they will be made, and whatever may be the
difcount on paper, whilil paper is taken, paper
will be iifued.
As to the reft, they have fhot out three branches Refurc.
of revenue to fupply all thofe which they have de-
ftroyed, that is, the Unherfal Regifter of all Tranf-
aflions, the heavy and univcrfal Stamp Duty, and
the new Territorial Lnpoft, levied chiefly on the
G reduced
reduced eftatcs of the gentlemen. Thefe branches
of the revenue, efpecially as they take affignats in
payment, anfwer their purpofe in a confiderable
degree, and keep up the credit of their paper; for
as they receive it in their treafury, it is in reality
funded upon all their taxes and future refourccs
of all kinds, as well as upon the church eftates. As
this paper is become in a manner the only vifible
maintenance of the whole people, the dread of a
bankruptcy is more apparently connected with the
delay of a counter-revolution, than with the du-
ration of this Republick ; becaufe the interefl of
the new Republick manifcftly leans upon it ; and
in my opinion, the counter-revolution cannot exift
along with it. The above three projects ruined fome
Minifters under the old Government, merely for
having conceived them. They are the falvation
of the prefent Rulers.
As the Ailembly has laid a moft unfparing and
cruel hand on all men who have lived by the
bounty, the juftice, or the abufes of the old Go-
vernment, they have leflened many expences.
The royal eftablifhment, though cxccfTively and
ridiculously great for their fcheme of things, is re-
duced at leaft one half; the eflates of the King's
Brothers, which under the ancient Government had
been in truth royal revenues, go to the general
Hock of the confifcation ; and as to the crown
lands,
( 43 )
lands, though under the Monarchy they never
yielded two hundred and fifty thoufand a year, by *
many they are thought at leaft worth three times
as much.
As to the ecclefiaftical charge, whether as a
cornpenfation for lofTes, or a proviflon for religion,
of which they made at firft a great parade, and
entered into a folemn engagement in favour of it,
it was eflimated at a much larger fum than they
could expect from the church property, moveable
or immoveable : they are completely bankrupt as
to that article. It is juil what they with ; and it
is not productive of any ferious inconvenience.
The non-payment produces difcontent and occa-
iional fedition ; but is only by fits and fpafms,
and amongfl the country people who are of no
confequcnce. Thefc feditions furnilh new pre-
texts for non-payment to the church eftablifhment,
and help the AfFembly wholly to get rid of the
Clergy, and indeed of any form of religion, which
is not only their real, but avowed object.
They are embarraflcd indeed in the higheil de- Want of
grec, but not wholly refourcelcfs. They are with- fu PP iied.
out the fpecies of money. Circulation of money
is a great convenience, but a fubflitute for it may
be found. Whilft the great objects of production
and confumption, corn, cattle,, wine, and the like,
G 2 exift
C 44 )
exift in a country, the means of giving them cir-
culation with more or lefs convenience, cannot be
wholly wanting. The great confiscation of the
church and of the crown lands, and of the ap-
penages of the princes, for the purchafe of all
which their paper is always received at par, gives
means of continually deftroying and continually
creating, and this perpetual deftruclion and reno-
vation feeds the fpcculative market, and prevents,
and will prevent, till that fund of conftfcation be-
gins to fail, a total depreciation.
But all confederation of public credit in France
is of little avail at prefent. The action indeed
of the monied intereft was of abfolute neccffity
'at the beginning of this Revolution; but the
French Republicks can ftand without any aflift-
ancc from that defcription of men, which, as things
are now circumftanced, rather frauds in need of
afliftance itfelf from the power which alone fub-
ftantially exifts in France ; I mean the feveral
diftricts and municipal republicks, and the feveral
clubs which direct all their affairs and appoint all
their magiftrates. This is the power now para-
mount to every thing, even to the Aflembly itfelf
called National, and that to which tribunals,
priefthood, laws, finances, and both defcriptions of
military power, are wholly fubfervient, fo far as
the military power of either defcription yields obe-
dience to any name of authority.
The
The world of contingency and political combi-
nation is much larger than we are apt to imngijic.
We never can fay what may, or may not happen,
without a view to all the actual circumftances.
Experience upon other data than thofe, is of all
things the mofl delufive. Prudence in new cafes
can do nothing on grounds of retrofpect. A con-
iTant vigilance and attention to the train of things
as they fucceffively emerge., and to act on what
they direct, arc the only fure courfes. The phy-
fician that let blood, and by blood-letting cured
one kind of plague, in the next added to it's ra-
vages. That power goes with property is not imi-
vcrfally true, and the idea that the operation of it
is certain and invariable, may miflead us very fa-
tally.
Whoever will take an accurate view of the ft ate P..WT fcj-
of thofe Republicks, and of the competition of the property.
prefcnt Aflembly deputed by them (in which Af-
fcmbly there are not quite fifty perfons poftefled
of an income amounting to lOOl. fieri ing yearly)
muit difcern clearly, tlmt the political and civil
power of France is ivJiolly feparated from it's property
of every Btfcnption\ and of courfe that neither the
landed nor the monied intereft pofiefles the
fmallefi weight or confideration in the direction
of any publick concern. The whole kingdom is
directed by the refufe of ifs chicane, with tiie aid
of
( 46 )
of the buftling, prefumpUious young clerks of
count! ng-houfes and {hops, and fome intermix-
ture of ^oung gentlemen of the fame character in
the feveral towns. The rich peafants are bribed
with church lands ; and the poorer of that defcrip-
tion are, and can be, counted for nothing. They
may rife in ferocious, ill-directed tumults but
they can only difgrace themfelves and lignalize
the triumph of their adverfarics.
The truly active citizens, that is, the above dc-
fcriptions, arc all concerned in intrigue reflecting
the various objects in their local or their general
government. The rota which the French have
eftablifhed for their National Afiembly, holds out
the higheft objects of ambition to fuch van: mul-
titudes as, in an unexampled meafure, to widen
the bottom of a new fpecies of intereft merely po-
litical, and wholly unconnected with birth or pro-
perty. This Icheme of a rota, though it enfeebles
the Hate, confidered as one folid body, and indeed
wholly difables it from acting as fuch, give? a
great, an equal, and a diffufive itrcngth to the de-
mocratick fcheme. Seven hundred and fifty peo-
ple, every two years raifcd to the fupreme power,
has already produced at leaft fifteen hundred bold,
acting politicians; a great number for even fo
great a country as France. Thcfe men never
will quietly fettle in ordinary occupations, nor
fubmit
( 4; )
fubmit to any fcheinc which mufl reduce them to
an entirely private condition, or to the cxercife of
a fteady, peaceful, but obfcure and unimportant
induftry. Whilft they fit in the Aflembly they
are denied offices of trufl and profit but their
fhort duration makes this no reflraint during
their probation and apprenticefhip they are all
falaried with an income to the greateft part of
them immenfe ; and after they have pafTed the
novitiate, thofe who take any fort of lead are
placed in very lucrative offices, according to their
influence and credit, or appoint thofe who divide
their profits with them.
This fupply of recruits to the corps of the highefl
civil ambition, goes on with a regular progreffion.
In very few years it muft amount to many thoufands.
Thefe, however, will be as nothing in comparifon
to the multitude of municipal officers, and officers
of diftrict and department, of all forts, who have
tafted of power and profit, and who hunger for the
periodical return of the meaL To thefe needy
agitators, the glory of the ftate, the general wealth
and profperity of the nation, and the rife or fall of
publick credit, are as dreams; nor have arguments
deduced from thefe topicks any fort of weight with
them. The indifference with which the Aflembly
regards the liate of their Colonies, the only valu-
able part of the French commerce, is a full proof
how
how little they are likely to be affected by any-
thing but the lelfifh game of their own ambition,
now univerfally diffuled.
It is true, amidft all thefe turbulent means of
fecurity to their fyftem, very great difcontents
evcrv where prevail. But they only produce mi-
fery to thofe who nurfe them at home, or exile,
beggary, and in the end, confifcation, to thofe who
are fo impatient as to remove from them. Each
Municipal Republick has a Committee, or fome-
thing in the nature of a Committee of Refearck. In
thefe petty Republicks the tyranny is fo near it's
object, that it becomes inftantly acquainted with
every act of every man. It ftifles confpiracy in
it's very firft movements. Their power is abfolute
and uncontroulable. No ftand can be made againft
it. Thefe Rcpublieks are beiiclcs fo difconnected,
that very little intelligence of what happens in
them is to be obtained, beyond their own bounds,
except by the means of their clubs, who keep up
a conltant corrcfpondence, and who give what co-
lour they plcafe to fuch facts as they choofe to
communicate out of the track of their correfpon-
dence. They all have fome fort of communica-
tion, juft as much or as little as they pleafe, with
the center. By this confinement of all commu-
nication to the ruling faction, any combination
grounded on the abufes and difeontents in one.
fcarcely
( 49 )
fcarcely can reach the other. There is not one
man, in any one place, to head them. The old
Government had fo much abftracled the Nobility
from the cultivation of provincial intereft, that no
man in France exifts, whofe power, credit or con-
fequence extends to two diftricts, or who is capa-
ble of uniting them in any defign, even if any
man could aflemble ten men together, without be-
ing fure of a fpeedy lodging in a prifon. One
muft not judge of the ftate of France by what has
been obferved elfewhere. It does not in the leaft
referable any other country. Analogical reafoning
from hiftory or from recent experience in other
places is wholly delufive.
In my opinion there never was feen fo ftrong
a government internally as that of the French
Municipalities. If ever any rebellion can arife
againft the prefent fyftem, it muft begin, where
the Revolution which gave birth to it did, at the
Capital. Paris is the only place in which there is
the leaft freedom of intercourfe. But even there,
fo many fervants as any man has, fo many ipies,
and irreconcileable domeftick enemies.
But that place being the chief feat of the power Gentlemen
and intelligence of the ruling faction, and the tiv s .
place of occanonal refort for their fierceft fpirit3,
H even
( 50 )
even there a revolution is not likely to have-any
thing to feed it. The leaders of the ariftocratick
party have been drawn out of the kingdom by
Order of the Princes, on the hopes held out by the
Emperor and the King of Pruffia at Pilnitz ; and
as to the democratick factions in Paris, amongft
them there are no leaders pofTefied of an influence
for any other purpofe but that of maintaining the
prefent ftate of things. The moment they are feen
to warp, they .are reduced to nothing. They
have no attached army no party that is at all
perfonal.
It is not to be imagined becaufe a political fyf-
tem is, under certain afpecls, very unwife in it's
contrivance, and very mifchievous in it's effects,
that it therefore can have no long duration. It's
very defects may tend to it's liability, becaufe they
are agreeable to it's nature. The very faults in the
conftitution of Poland made it laft; the veto which
deflroyed all it's energy preferved it's life. What
can be conceived fo monitrous as the Rcpublick of
Algiers ? and that no lefs ItrangeRepublick of the
Mammalukes in Egypt ? They are of the word
form imaginable, and exercifcd in the worft man-
ner, yet they have exilled as a nuifance on the
earth for fcveral hundred years.
From
( 51 )
From all thefe confederations, and many more,
that croud upon me, three concluiions have long
lince arifen in my mind
Firft, that no counter-revolution is to be ex-
pected in France from internal caufes folely.
Secondly, that the longer the prefent fyftem ex-
ifts, the greater will be it's flrength ; the greater
it's power to deftroy difcontents at home, and to
refill all foreign attempts in favour of thefe dif-
contents.
Thirdly, that as long as it exifts in France, it
will be the intereft of the managers there, and it is
in the very eflence of their plan, to difturb and
diflracl all other governments, and their endlefs
fucceffion of reftlefs politicians will continually
flimulate them to new attempts.
Princes are generally fenfible that this is their preceding
common caufe ; and two of them have made a DtfcR&t
publick declaration of their opinion to this effect.
Againft this common danger, fome of them, fuch
as the King of Spain, the King of Sardinia, and the
Republick of Berne, are very diligent in ufing de-
fenfive meafures.
H2 If
( 52 )
If they were to guard againft an invafion from
France, the merits of this plan of a merely defen-
live refiftance might be fupported by plaufible to-
picks ; but as the attack does not operate againft
thefe countries externally, but by an internal cor-
ruption (a fort of dry rot) ; they who purfue this
merely defenfive plan, againft a danger which the
plan itfclf fuppofes to be fenous, cannot poflibly
cfcape it. For it is in the nature of nil defenfive.
meafures to be fharp and vigorous under the im-
preflions of the firft alarm, and to relax by de-
grees ; until at length the danger, by not operat-
ing inftantly, comes to appear as a falfc alarm ; ib
much fo that the next menacing appearance will
look lefs formidable, and will be lefs provided
againft. But to thofe who are on the offenfive it
is not neceflary to be always alert. Poffiblv .it is
more their intercft not to be fo. For their unfore-
feen attacks contribute to their fuccefs.
The French In the mean time a fvftem of French confpiracy
Party how ... . .
compofed. is gaining ground in every country. This fyitem
happening to be founded on principles the moft
delufive indeed, but the moft flattering to the na-
tural pro pen fi ties of the unthinking multitude,
and to the (peculations of all thofe who think,
without thinking very profoundly, muft daily ex-
tend it's influence. A predominant inclination
towards
( 53 )
towards it appears in all thofe who have no reli-
gion, when othenvife their difpofition leads them
to be advocates even for defpotifm. Hence
Hume, though I cannot lay that he does not
throw out fome expreffions of difapprobation on
the proceedings of the levellers in the reign of
Richard the Second, yet affirms that the doctrines
of John Ball were "conformable to the ideas of
primitive equality, which are engraven in the hearts
of oil men."
Boldnefs formerly was not the character of
Athcifts as fuch. They were even of a character
nearly the reverfe ; they were formerly like the
old Epicureans, rather an unenterprizing race. But
of late they arc grown active, defigning, turbulent
and feditious. They arc fworn enemies to Kings,
Nobility and Priefthood. We have feen all the
Academicians at Paris, with Condorcet, the friend
and correfpondent of Pricttley, at their head, the
moil furious of the extravagant Republicans.
The late Affembly, after the laft captivity of the
King, had actually chofcn this Condorcet by a ma-
jority on the ballot, for Preceptor to the Dauphin,
who was to be taken out of the hands and direction
of his parents, and to be delivered over to this fana-
tick Atheift, and furious democratick Republican.
His untraclability to thefe leaders, and his figure
in
( 54 )
in the Club of Jacobins, which at that time they
wifhed to bring under, alone prevented that part
of the arrangement, and others in the fame ftyle,
from being carried into execution. Whilft he was
candidate for this office, he produced his title to it
by promulgating the following ideas of the title of
his royal pupil to the crown. In a paper written
by him, and publifhed with his name, againft the
re-eftablifhment, even of the appearance of monar-
chy under any qualifications, He fays, " Jufqu'a
" ce moment ils [I'AfTemblee Nationale] n'ont
" rien prejuge encore. En fe refervant de noin-
" mcr un Gouverneur au Dauphin, ils n'ont pas
of " prononce que cet enfant dut regner ; mais feulc-
= Trench. mcnt ^ ^- f ^fa ^ j a Conftitution 1'y def-
<f limit ; ils ont voulu que 1'education, effacjant
" tout ce que les prefixes du Trone ont pu lui in-
'* fpirer de prejugcs fur les droits pretendus de fa
" naiilance,qu'clle lui fit connoitre de bonne heure,
" et lEgalite naturelle dcs Homines, et la Soui'e-
*' ramete du penple\ qu'clle lui apprit a ne pas ou-
(( blier que c'efl du peuple qu'il tiendra le titre de
" Roi, et que le peuple iia pas meme h dr&it de re-
" noncer a celui de T en deixnull&r.
i
" Ils ont voulu que cette education le rendit
" cgalement digne, par fes lumieres, et fes vertus,
" de rccevoir avec refignation, le fardeau dangereu^
" d'une couronne, ou de la depofcr avecjoie entre les
<c mains
( 55 )
" mains de ces freres, qu'il fentit quc Ic devoir, et
<e la gloire du Roi d'un peuple Iibre 7 eft de hater le
" moment de n'etre plus qu'un citoyen ordinaire.
" Us out voulu que Tinutilite cTiui Roi, la ndcef-
" lite de chercher lesmoyensde vcmp&aGCfunjMUvm*
" fondefur les illiifions, tut unc des premieres veri-
" tes offertes a fa railbn ; / 'obligation d*y concourir
" lui mfrne un des premieres devoirs de fa morale; et
i( le dejir, de rietre plus affranchi du joug de la /e/,
" par une injurieuje inviolabilite, le premier fentiment
tf dejon cceur. Us n'ignorent pas que dans ce mo-
* f ment il s'agit bien moins de former un Roi que
ff de lui apprendre a ftrvoir, a vwdoir m plus Te-
" Ire."*
Such
* Until now, they (the National Aflembly) have prejudged
nothing. Referving to themfelves a right to appoint a Precep-
tor to the Dauphin, they did not declare that this child was to
reign ; but only that poffibly the Conftitution might ileftine him
to it : they willed that while education (hould efface from his
mind all the prejudices arifing from the Jelufant of the throne re-
fpefting his pretended birth-right, it (honld alfo teach him not
to forget, that it is/row the people he is to receive the title of King,
and that toe people do not even poffefs the right of giving up their
power to take it from him,
They willed that this education fhould render him worthy by
his knowledge, and by his virtues, both to receive -~itbfiibmij-
Jim the dangerous burden of a crown, and to rejign it i\:hh plea-
fure into the hands of his brethren ; that he fliould be confcious
that the haftening of that moment when he is to be only a com-
mon
( 56 )
Such are the ientiments of the man who has oo
cafionally' filled the chair of the National AfTembly,
who is their perpetual fecretary, their only ftanding
officer, and the moft important by far. He leads
them to peace or war. He is the great theme of
the Republican faclion in England. Thefe ideas of
M. Condorcet, are the principles of thofe to whom
Kings are to entruft their fucceffors, and the inte-
refts of their fucceflion. This man would be ready-
to plunge the poignard in the heart of his pupil, or
to whet the axe for his neck. Of all men, the moft
dangerous is a warm, hot-headed, zealous Atheift.
This fort of man aims at dominion, and his means
are, the words he always has in his mouth, " L'e-
" galite naturelle des Homines, et la Souverainte
" du Peuple."
All former attempts grounded on thefe Rights of
Men, had proved unfortunate. The fucccfs of this
mon citizen, conftitutes the duty and the glory of a King of
a free people.
They willed that the ufelrfsncfs of a King, the neceffity of feek-
ing means to eftablifh fomething in lieu of a power founded on.
illnfans, fliould be one of the firft truths offered to his reafon ;
tie obligation of conforming bimfelf to this, the firft of bis moral du-
ties; aiul the dejire of no longer being freed from the yoke of the la-x,
ty an injurious invidability, tbefirjl and chief Jentiment of hi* heart.
They are not ignorant that in the prefent moment the object is
lefs to form a King than to teach him that le Jhwld kna-w bma
to wi/b no Unger to bejuch.
laft
( 57 )
laft makes a mighty difference in the effect of the
doctrine. Here is a principle of a nature, to the
multitude, the moft feductive, always exifting be,
fore their eyes, as a thing feafible in practice. After
fo many failures, fuch an enterprize previous to the
French experiment, carried ruin to the contrivers,
on the face of it ; and if any enthufiaft was fo wild
as to wifh to engage in a fchsme of that nature, it
was not eafy for him to find followers : Now there
is a party almoft in all countries, ready made, ani-
mated with fuccefs, with a fure Ally in the very
center of Europe. There is no cabal fo obfciire in
any place, that they do not protect, cherifh, fofter,
and endeavour to raife it into importance at home
and abroad. From the loweft, this intrigue will
creep up to the highelt. Ambition, as well as
enthufiafm, may find it's account in the party and
in the principle.
The Minifters of other Kings, like thofe of the charafler
to ' Mir.ifters.
King of France (not one of whom was perfectly
free from this guilt, and fomc of whom were very
deep in it) may themfelves be the perfons to foment
fuch a difpofition and fuch a faction, Hertzberg,
the King of Pruffia's late Minifter, is fo much of
what is called a philolbpher, that he was of a fac-
tion with that fort of politicians in every thing, and
in every place. Even when he defends himlelf
from the imputation of giving extravagantly into
' I thcfe
( 53 )
thefe principled, he ftill confiders the revolutiort-
of France as a great publick good, by giving credit
to their fraudulent declaration of their univerfal be-
nevolence, and love of peace. Nor are his Pruf-
iian Majefty's prefent minifters at all difinclined
to the famefyftem. Their oftentatious preamble
to certain late edicts, demonftrates (if their actions
had not been fu-fficiently explanatory of their caft
of mind) that they are deeply infected with the
fame diftemper of dangerous, becaufe plaufiblc,
though trivial, and fhallow fpeculation.
Minifters turning their backs on the reputation
which properly belongs to them, afpire at the
glory of being ipeculative writers. The duties of
thefe two fituations arc, in general, directly oppo-
fite to each other. Speculators ought to be neu-
tral. A Minifter cannot be fo. He is to fupport
the intereft of the publick as connected with that
of his mailer. He is his mailer's truilee, advocate,
attorney, and fteward and he is not to indulge
in any fpeculation which contradicts that charac-
ter or even detracts from its efficacy. Necker had
an extreme thiril for this fort of glory ; fo had
others ; and this purfuit of a mifplaced and mif-
underftood reputation, was one of the caufcs of the
ruin of thefe minifters, and of their unhappy mal-
ter. The Pruffian minifters in foreign courts, have
(at lealt not long fince) talked the moil democra-
tic*
tick language with regard to France, and in the
moft unmanaged terms.
The whole corps diplomatique, with very few Corps dipio-
exceptions, leans that way. What caufe produces
in them a turn of mind, which at firft one would
think unnatural to their fituation, it is not impoffi-
ble to explain. The difcuffion would however be
fomewhat long and fomewhat invidious. The
fact itfelf is indifputable, however they may dif-
guife it to their feveral courts. This difpofition is
gone to fo very great a length in that corps, in it-
felf ib important, and fo important as furnijhmg the
intelligence which (ways all cabinets, that if Princes
and States do not very fpeedily attend with a vi-
gorous controul to that fource of direction and in-
formation, very ferious evils are likely tobefal them.
But indeed Kings arc to guard againft the. fame sowreigne-
' * their difpofi-
fort of difpoiitions in themfelves. They are very "ons.
eafily alienated from all the higher orders of their
fubjectsj whether civil or military, laick or eccle-
fiaftical. It is with pcrfons of condition that Sove-
reigns chiefly come into contact. It is from them
that they generally experience oppoiition to their
will. It is with their pride and impracticability,
that Princes are molt hurt; it is with their fertility
and bafenefs, that they arc molt commonly difguft-
cd ; it is from their humours and cabals, that they
J 2 find
( 60 )
find their affairs moft frequently troubled and dif-
tracled. But of the common people in pure mo-
narchical governments, Kings know little or no-
thing; and therefore being unacquainted with their
faults (which are as many as thofe of the great,
and much more decifive in their effects when ac-
companied with power) Kings generally regard
them with tendernefs and favour, and turn their
eyes towards that defcription of their fubjecls, par-
ticularly when hurt by oppofltion from the higher
orders. It was thus that the King of France (a
perpetual example to all fovereSgns) was ruined. I
have it from very fure information (and it was in-
deed obvious enough from the meafurcs which
were taken previous to the aflembly of the States
and afterwards) that the King's counfellors had
filled him with a ftrong diflike to his nobility, his
clergy, and the corps of his magiftracy. They re-
prefented to him, that he had tried them all feve-
rally, in feveral ways, and found them all untracK
able. That he had twice called an Affcmbly (the
Notables) compofed of the firft men of the clergy,
the nobility, and the magiftratcs ; that he had him-
felf named every one member in thofe affemblies,
and that though fo picked out, he had not, in this
their collective ftate, found them more difpofed to
a compliance with his will than they had been fe-
parately. That there remained for him. with the leaft
profpecl: of advantage to his authority in the States
General,
General,, which were to be compofed of the fame
forts of men, but not chofen by him, only the Tiers
Etat. In this alone he could repofe any hope of
extricating himfelf from his difficulties,, and of fet-
tling him in a clear and permanent authority. They
reprefented (thefe are the words of one of my in-
formants) " That the Royal Authority comprcfted
" with the weight of thefe ariftocratick bodies, full
" of ambition, and of faction, when once unloaded,
" would rife of itfelf, and occupy it's natural place
" without difturbance or controul :" That the com-
mon people would protect, cherifh, and fupport, in-
ftead of crufhing it. " The people," (it was faid)
" could entertain no objects of ambition ;" they
were out of the road of intrigue and cabal; and
could poffibly have no other view than the fupport
of the mild and parental authority by which they
were inverted, for the firit time colleelivcly with
real importance in the State, and protected in
their peaceable and ufeful employments.
This unfortunate King (not without a large fhare King O f
of blame to himfelf) was deluded to his ruin by a
defire to humble and reduce his Nobility, Clergy,
and his corporate Magiftracy ; not that I fuppofc
he meant wholly to eradicate thefe bodies, in the
manner iince effected by the Democratick power :
J rather believe that even Necker's deligns did not
go to that extent. With his own hand, however,
Louis
'Louis the XVIth pulled down the pillars which up-*
held his throne; and this he did, becaufe he could
not bear the inconveniences which are attached
to every thing human ; becaufe he found himfelf
cooped up, and in durance by thofe limits which
pature prefcribes to dcfire and imagination ; and
was taught to confider as low and degrading, that
mutual dependance which Providence has ordain-
ed that all men fhould have on one another. He
is not at this minute perhaps cured of the dread
of the power and credit like to be acquired by
thofe who would fave and refcue him. He leaves
thofe who fuffer in his caufc to their fate; and
hopes by various mean delufive intrigues in which
I am afraid he is encouraged from abroad, to re-
gain, among Traitors ai:d Regicides, the power he
has joined to take from his own family, whom he
quietly fees proferibed before his eyes, and called
to anlwer to the lowelt of his rebels^ as the vileft
of all criminals.
It is to be hoped that the Emperor may be
taught better things by this fatal example. But
it is fure that he has advifers who endeavour to fill
him with the ideas which have brought his bro-
ther-in-law to his prefent iituation. Jofcph the
Second was far gone in this philofophy, and fome,
if not moil who ferve the Emperor, would kindly
initiate him into all the mvileries of this free-mas
fonry.
fonry. They would perfuade him to look on the
National Aflembly not with the hatred of an ene-
my, but the jealoufy of a rival. They would make
him dcfirous of doing, in his own dominions, by a
Royal defpotifm. what has been done in France
by a Democratic k. Rather than abandon fuch
enterprifes, they would perfuade him to a ftrange
alliance between thofe extremes. Their grand
object being now, as in his brother's time, at any
rate to deftroy the higher orders, they think he
cannot compafs this end, as certainly he cannot,
without elevating the lower. By deprefling the
one and by railing the other, they hope in the
firft place to encreafe his treafures and his army ;
and with thefc common inftruments of Royal
Power they flatter him that the Democracy which
they help, in his name, to create, will give him
but little trouble. In defiance of the frefhert ex-
perience, which might (hew him that old impof-
libilities are become modern probabilities, and
that the extent to which evil principles may go,
when left to their own operation, is beyond the
jpower of calculation, they will endeavour to per-
fuade him that fuch a Democracy is a thing which
cannot fubfift by itfelf; that in whofever hands
the military command is placed, he muft be in
the neceflary courfe of affairs, fooner or later the
mafter; and that being the mafter of various un-
connected countries, he may keep them all in or-
der
( 64 )
clcr bv employing a military force, which to each
of them is foreign. This maxim too, however
formerly plaufible, will not now hold water. This
fcheme is full of intricacy, and may caufe him
every where to lofe the hearts of his people. Thefe
Counfellors forget that a corrupted army was the
very caufe of the ruin of his brother-in-law; and
that he is himfelf far from fecure from a fimilar
corruption.
Inftead of reconciling himfelf heartily and bona,
fide according to the moft obvious rules of policy
to the States of Brabant as they are co-nftiPuted, and
who in \h prefent ftate of th'mgs Hand on the fame
foundation with the Monarchy itfelf, and who
might have been gained with the greateft facility,
they have advifed him to the moft nnkingly pro-
ceeding which, either in a good or in a bad light,
has ever been attempted. Under a pretext taken
from the fpirit of the loweft chicane, they have
counfelled him wholly to break the publick faith,
to annul the amnefty, as well as the other condi-
tions through which he obtained an entrance into
the Provinces of the Netherlands, under the guar-
rantee of Great Britain and Prullia. He is made
to declare his adherence to the indemnity in a cri-
minal fcnfe, but he is to keep alive in his own
name, and to encourage in others a ch'd proccfs in
the nature of an action of damages for what has
been
( 65 )
been fuffered during the troubles. Whillt he
keeps up this hopeful la\v-fuit in view of the da-
mages he may recover againtt individuals, he lofes
the hearts of a. whole people, and the vaft fubti-
dies which his ancestors had been ufed to receive
from them.
This defigil once admitted, unriddles the rnvf- Fmpcror'
/- I i r /" i T ' i\"/r- ctm^uft
ten* or the whole conduct ot the Jsmperor s mi- wkh reg
miters with regard to France. As loon as they
law the life of the King and Queen of France no
longer as they thought in danger, they entirely
changed their plan with regard to the French na-
tion. I believe that the chiefs of the Revolution
(thole who led the Conftituting Affembly) have
tontrived as far as they can do it, to give the Em-
peror fatisfaclion on this head. He keeps a con-
tinual tone and pofture of menace to fecure this
hi? only point. But it muft be obferved, that he
all along grounds his departure from the engage-
ment at Pilnitz to the Princes, on the will and ac-
tions of the King and the majority of the people,
without any regard to the natural and conftitu-
lional orders of the State, or to the opinions of the
whole Houfe of Bourbon. Though it is manifeftly
under the constraint of imprifonment and the fear
of death, that this unhappy man has been guilty of
ull thole humilities which have aftonifhed mankind,
the advilcrs of the Emperor will confider nothing
K but
but the phyfical perfon of Louis, which, even in his
prefent degraded and infamous ftate, they regard
as of Sufficient authority to give a compleat ianc-
tion to the perfccution and utter ruin of all his fa-
niilv, and of every perfon who has fhcwn any de-
gree of attachment or fidelity to him, or to his
caufe ; as well as competent to deftroy the whole
antient conftitution and frame of the French mo-
narchy.
The prefent policy therefore of the Auftrian po-
liticians, is to recover dcfpotifrn through demo-
cracy ; or at leaft, at any expence, every where to
ruin the defcription of men who are every where
the objects of their fettled and fyflematick avcrfion,
but more especially in the Netherlands. Compare
this with the Emperour's refuting at firft all inter-
courfe with the prefent powers in France, with his
endeavouring to excite all Europe againft them,.,
and then his not only withdrawing all affifiance
and all countenance from the fugitives who had
been drawn by his declarations from their houfe?,
iituations, and military commifiions, many even
from the means of their very exiftcnce, but treat-
ing them with every fpecies of infult and outrage.
Combining this unexampled conduct in the Em-
peror's advifers, with the timidity (operating as per-
iidy) of the King of France, a fatal example is held
out
( 67 )
out to all fubjects, tending to (hew what little fup-
port, or evea countenance they are to expect from
thofe for whom their principle of fidelity may in-
duce them to rifque life and fortune. The Em-
peror's advifers would not for the world rcfcind
one of the acts of this or of the late French AlFem-
bly ; nor do they wifh any thing better at prefent
for their matter's brother of France, than that he
fhould really be, as he is nominally, at the head of
the fyftem of perfecution of religion and good or-
der, and of all defcriptions of dignity, natural and
inftitutcd ; they only wifh all this done with a little
more refpecl to the King's perlbn, mid with more
appearance of confideration for his new fubordi-
natc office ; in hopes that yielding himfelf for the
prefent, to the perfons who have effected thefe
changes, he may be able to game for the reft here-
after. On no other principles than thefe, can the
conducl of the Court of Vienna be accounted for.
The fubordinate Court of BrufTcls talks the lan-
guage of a ckib of Fcuillans and Jacobins,
In this ftate of general rottennefs among fub- Moderate
jecls, and of dclufion and falfe politicks in Princes,
comes a new experiment. The King of France is in
the hands of the Chiefs of the Regicide Faclion, the
Barnvacs, Lameths, Fayettes, Perigords, Duports,
Robefpierre's, Camus's, &c. &c. &c. They who
had imprifoned, fufpendcd, and conditionally de-
K 2 pofed
pofed him, are his confidential counicliors. The
next defpcratc of the dcfperate rebels,, call than-
ielves the Moderate Party. They are the Chiefs of
the fir't Afieznblyj who are confederated to fupport
their power during their fufpeniion from the pre-
ient, and to govern the exiftent bodv with as fove-
reign a fway as they had done the laft. They have,
for the greater part, fueccedcd ; and they have
many advantages towards procuring their fuccefi
in future. Juii before the dole of their regular
power, they bellowed foine appearance of preroga-
tives on the King, which in their firft plans they
had refilled to him ; particularly the mifchicvous,
and in his Situation, dreadful prerogative of a Veto.
This prerogative (which they hold as their bit in
the mouth of the National AfFembly for the time
being) without the direct aili llance of their Club, it
was impoffible for the King to Shew even the defire
of exerting with the fmallclt effect, or even with
lafety tp his perfon. However, bv playing through
this J^clo, the Aflemblv againtt the King, arid the
Kingagainft the Aflemblv, they have made them-
felvcs maftcrs of both. In this lituation, having
deftroyed the old Government by their ledition,
they would preferve as much of order as is neccf-
fary for the fupport of their own usurpation.
French Am- It is believed that this, bv far the worft party of
the mifcreants of France, has received direct en-
couragement from the cpuufellors who betray the
Emperor,
Emperor. Thus ftrengthened by the pofitfiion of
the captive King (now captive in his mind as well
as in body) and by a good hope of the Emperor,
they intend to fend their Minilters to every Court
in Europe ; having fent before them inch a de-
nunciation of terror and fuperiority to every na-
tion without exception, as has no example in the
diplomatick world. Hitherto the Mini fters to fo-
reign Courts had been of the appointment of
the Sovereign of France previous to llie Revolu-
tion \ and either from inclhial ion, duty or decorum,
molt of them were contented with a merely paf-
iive obedience to the new power. At prefent the
King being entirely in the hands of his jailors, and
his mind broken to his lituation, can fend none but
the enthulialts of the fyfiem men framed by the
fecret Committee of the Fcuillans, who meet in the
houfe of Madame de Stahl, Mr. Necker's daugh-
ter. Such is every man whom they have talked of
fending hither. Thcfe Minifters will be fo mar.y
fpies and incendiaries ; fo many active cmiiiaries
of Democracy. Their houfes will become places
of rendezvous here, as every where elfe, and cen-
ters of cabal for whatever is mifchievous and ma-
lignant in this country, particularly among thofe
of rank and fafhion. As the Minifter of the Na-
tional Afiembly will be admitted at this Court, at
lea ft with his ufual rank, and as entertainments
Yvi]l be naturally given and received by the King's
own
( 70 )
own Minifters, any attempt to difcoimtencmce the
refort of other people to that Minifter would be
ineffectual, and indeed abfurd, and full of con-
tradiction. The women who come with theie
AmbafThdors will affiit in fomenting factions
"nongft ours, which cannot fail of extending the
evil. Some of them I hear aro already arrived.
There is no doubt they will do as much mifchief
as they can.
Whilft the publick Miuiriers are received under
the general law of the communication between na-
tions, the correfpondences between the factious
clubs in France and ours, will be, as they now are,
kept up : but this pretended embafly will be a
clofer, more ftea<ly and more effectual link be-
tween* the partizans of the new fyftem on both
fides of the water. I do not mean that thefe
Anglo- Gallick clubs in London, Manchester, Sec.
arc not dangerous in a high degree. The ap-
pointment of feftive anniverfaries has ever in the
fenfe of mankind been held the beft method of
keeping alive the fpirit of any institution. We
have one fettled in London ; and at the lait of
them, that of the 14th of July, the itrong difcoun-
tenance of Government, the unfavourable time of
the year, and the then uncertaintv of the difpoii-
tion of foreign Powers, did not hinder the meeting
of at leaft nine hundred people, with good coats on
* their
( 71 )
their backs, who could afford to pay half a guinea
a head to Ihew their 7.eal for the new principles.
They were with great difficulty, and all poffiblc
addrcfs, hindered from inviting the French Am-
haffador. His real indifpolition, besides the fear
of offending anv party, fent him out of town. But
when our Court ihail have recognized a Govern-*
inent in France,, founded on the principles an-
nounced in Montmorin's Letter, how can the
French Ambaflador be frowned upon for an atten-
dance on thole meetings wherein the eftablifhment
of the Government he represents is celebrated ?
An event happened a few days ago, which in many
particulars was very ridiculous ; yet even from the
ridicule and abfnrdity of the proceedings, it marks
the more ikongly the fpirit of the French Aflem-
bly. I mean the reception they have given to the
Frith -Street Alliance. This, though the delirium
of a low, drunken alehoufe-club, they have pub-
licly announced as a formal alliance with the people
of England, as fuch ordered it to be prelented to
their King, and to be publiflied in every province
in France. This leads more directly and with
much greater force than any proceeding with a
regular and rational appearance, to two very ma--
terial eorifulerations. Firit, it {hews that they are
of opinion that the current opinions of the Englifli
have the greatetl influence on the minds of the
people in France, and indeed of all the people in,
Europe*
( n )
Europe, mice they catch with fuch aftonifhing
eagernefs at every the moft trifling fhew of fuch
opinions in their favour. Next, and what appeal's
to me to be full as important, it fhcws that they
arc willing publickly to countenance and even to
adopt every factious confpiracy that can be formed
in this nation, however low and bale in itfelf^ in
order to excite in the moft mifcrable wretches here,
an idea of their own fovcrcign importance, and to
encourage them to Jook up to France, whenever
they mav be matured into fomething of more force,
for affi fiance in the fubvcrfion of their domcltick,
Government. This addrefs of the alehoufe club
was actually propofed and accepted by the Aflem-
bly as an alliance. The procedure was in my opi-
nion a high mifdemeanor in thole who acled thus
in England, if they were not fo very low and fo
very bale, that no acls of theirs can be called high,
even as a description of criminality ; and the Af-
fembly in accepting, proclaiming and publishing
this forged alliance, has been guilty of a plain ag-
greflion, which would jultify our Court in demand-
ing a direct difavowal, if our policy fhouhl not lead
us to wink at it.
Whilft I look over this paper to have it copied.
I fee a Manifefto of the Aflembly, as a preliminary
to a declaration of war againft the German Princes
on the Rhine. This Manifefto contains the whole
fub fiance
( 73 )
fubftanceof the French politicks with regard to fo-
reign States. They have ordered it to be circu-
lated amongft the people in every country of Eu-
rope even previoufly to it's acceptance by the
King and his new Privy Council, the club of the
Feuillans. Therefore, as a fummary of their po-
licy avowed by themfelves, let us conikler fome of
the circumftanccs attending that piece, as well as
the fpirit and temper of the piece itfelf.
It was preceded by a fpeech from Briflbt, full of
unexampled infolence towards all the Sovereign Em ? eror
States of Germany, if not of Europe. The Aflem-
bly, to exprefs their fatisfaction in the fentiments
which it contained, ordered it to be printed. This
Briflbt had been in the loweft and bafeft employ
under the depofed Monarchy ; a fort of thief-
taker, or fpy of police, in which character he acled
alter the manner of perfons in that defcription. He-
had been employed by his mavter, the Lieutenant
de Police, for a considerable time in London, in
the fame or fome fuch honourable occupation.
The Revolution which has brought forward all
merit of that kind, railed him, with others of a
iimiiar clafs and difpofition, to fame and eminence.
On the Revolution he became a publifher of an
infamous newfpaper, which he flill continues. He
is charged, and I believe juflly, as the firft 'mover
of the troubles in Hifpaniola. There is no wick-
L ednefs,
( 74 )
ednefs, if I am rightly informed, in which he is not
verfed, and of which he is not perfectly capable.
His quality of news-writer, now an employment of
the firft dignity in France, and his practices and
principles, procured his election into the AfTembly,
where he is one of the leading members. Mr.
Condorret produced on the fame day a draft of a
Declaration to the King, which the Aflembly pub-
lifhed before it was prefentcd.
Condorcct (though no Marquis, as he ftyled
himfelf before the Revolution) is a man of arother
fort of birth, failiion, and occupation from Briflot;
but in every principle, and in every difpoiition to
the loweft as well as the higheft and moft deter-
mined villainies, fully his equal. He feconds Brif-
fot in the Aflembly, and is at once his coadjutor
and his rival in a newfpapcr, which in his own
name and as fucceflbr to Mr. Garat, a Member
alfo of the Aflembly, he has juft fet up in that
Empire of Gazettes. Condorcet was chofen to
draw the rirft Declaration prefentcd by the Aflem-
bly to the King, as a threat to the Elector of
Treves, and the other Princes on the Rhine. In
that piece, in which both Feuillans and Jacobins
concurred, they declared publickly, and molt
proudly and inlolently, the principle on which they
xnci'.n 'O proceed in their future difputcs with any
pf the Sovereigns of Europe, for they fay, " That
( 75 )
" it is not with fire and fword they mean to attack
" their territories, but by what will be mure dread-
" fid to them, the introduction of liberty." I
have not the paper by me to give the exact words
but I believe they are nearly as I llaie thenii
Dreadful indeed will be their hoftility, if they
fliould be able to carry it on according to the ex-
ample of their modes of introducing liberty. They
have (hewn a perfect model of their whole deiign,
very complete, though in little. This gang of
murderers and favages have wholly laid wafte and
utterly ruined the beautiful and happy country of
the Comtat Venaiffin and the city of Avignon.
This cruel and treacherous outrage the Sovereigns
of Europe, in mj opinion, with a great miftake of
their honour and intereft, have permitted even
without a remonftrance to be carried to the defired
point, on the principles on which they are now
themfclves threatened in their own States; and this,
becaufe, according to the poor and narrow fpirit now
in fafhion, their brother Sovereign, whofe fubjecls
have been thus traitcroufly and inhumanly treated
in violation of the law of nature and of nations,
has a name ibmcvvhat different from theirs, and
inftead of being ftyled King or Duke, or Land-
grave, is ufually called Pope.
The Electors of Trcves and Mentz were fright- Jj^-jj*"
cned with the menace of a fimilar mode of wan
L 2 The
( 76 )
The Affembly, however, not thinking that the
Electors of Treves and Mentz had done enough
under their firft terror, have again brought forward
Condorcet, preceded by Briflbt, as I have jufl flat-
ed. The Declaration which they have ordered now
to be circulated in all countries, is in fubftance the
fame as the firft, but ftill more infolent, becaufe^
more full of detail. There they have the impu-
dence to ftate that they aim at no conqueft ; rnfi-
nuating that all the old lawful Powers of the World
Lad each made a conftant open profeffibn of a de-
fign of fubcluing his neighbours. They add, that
if they are provoked, their war will be directed only
againft thofe who aimmc to be Mttjlers. But to
the People they will bring peace, law, liberty, &c.
&c. There is not the Icafl hint that they conlider
thofe whom they call perfons " ajjuming to be
Mafters" to be the lawful Government of their
country, or perfons to be treated with the leaft ma-
nagement or refpect. They regard them as uftirp-
ers and enflavers of the people. If I do not mif-
take they arc defcribed by the name of tyrants
in Condorcct's firft draft. I am fure they are fo
in Briflbt's fpecch, ordered by the Aflembly to be
printed at the lame time and for the fame purpofes.
The whole is in the fame ftrain, full of fiilfe philo-
fophy and fa lie rhctorick, both however calculated
to captivate and influence the vulgar mind, and to
excite fedition in the countries in which it is or-
dered
( 77 )
dered to be circulated. Indeed it is fuch, that if*
any of the lawful acknowledged Sovereigns of Eu-
rope had publickly ordered fuch a manifefto to be
circulated in the dominions of another, the Am-
baffador of that power would inftantly be ordered
to quit every Court without an audience.
The powers of Europe have a pretext for con- Effia of
cealing their fears, by faying that this language is sovereign
not ufed by the King; though they well know that
there is in effect no fuch pcrfon, that the Af-
fembly is in reality, and by that King is acknow-
ledged to be the Majlcr, that what he does is but
matter of formality, and that he can neither caufe'
nor hinder, accelerate or retard any meafure what--
foever, nor add to or foften the manifefto which
the Aflembly has directed to be publifhed, with the
declared purpofe of exciting mutiny and rebellion
in the feveral countries governed by thefe power-.
By the generality alfo of the menaces contained in
this paper (though infinitely aggravating the out-
rage) they hope to remove from each power fepa--
rately the idea of a diftint affront. The perfons
firfl pointed at by the menace are certainly the
Princes of Germany, who harbour the periecuted
houfe of Bourbon and the Nobility of France; the
declaration, however, is general, and goes to every
ftate with which they may have a caufe of quarrel.
But the terror of France has fallen upon all nations.
A few months fmce all Sovereigns feemed difpofed
to
( 78 )
to unite againft her, at prefent they all feem to
combine in her favour. At no period has the power
of France ever appeared with fo formidable an
afpecl:. In particular the liberties of the Empire can
have nothing more than an exigence the moft tot-
tering and precarious, whilft France exifts with a
great power of fomenting rebellion, and the grcateft
in the \veakeil ; but with neither power nor difpo-
iition to fupport the fmaller ftates in their indepen-
dence againft the attempts of the more powerful.
I wind up all in a full conviclion within my own
brcair, and the fubftance of which I mult repeat
over and over again, that the ftate of France is the
firft confederation in the politicks of Europe, and
of each flatc, externally as well as internally con-
fidercd.
Moft of the topicks I have ufed are drawn from
fear and apprehenfion. Topicks derived from fear
or addrcflcd to it, are, I well know, of doubtful
appearance. To be fare, hope is in general the
incitement to action. Alarm fome men -vou do
not drive them to provide for their fccurity ; you
put them to a ftand ; you induce them not to take
meafures to prevent the approach of danger, but
to remove fo unpleafant an idea from their minds ;
you perfuade them to remain as thev are, from a
new fear that their activity may bring on the ap-
prehended luifchief before it's time. I confefs
freely
( 79 )
freely that this evil fometimes happens from au
overdone precaution ; but it is when the meafures
are rafh, ill chofen, or ill combined,, and the ef-
fects rather of blind terror than of enlightened
forcfight. But the few to whom I wifh to fubmit
my thoughts, are of a character which will enable
them to fee danger without aftonifhment, and to
provide agaiuft it without perplexity.
To what lengths this method of circulating
mutinous manifeftos, and of keeping emiflaries of
fcdition in every Court under the name of Am-
bafladors, to propagate the fame principles and
to follow the practices, will- go, and how foon they
will operate, it is hard to fay but go on it will
more or lefs rapidly, according to events, and to
the humour of the time. The Princes menaced
with the revolt of their" fubjects, at the fame time,
that they have obfequioufly obeyed the fovcreign
mandate of the new Roman Senate, have received
with diftinction, in a publick character, Ambafia-
dors from thofe who in the fame act had circulated
the manifefto of fcdition in their dominions. This
was the only thing wanting to the degradation
and difgracc of the Gcrmanick Body.
The Ambafiadors from the Rights of Man, and
their admiflion into the diplomatic^ lyilem, I hold
to be a new aera in this bulincls. It will be the
moft important Hep yet taken to affect the exiit-
cnce
( SO )
cnce of Sovereigns, and the higher clafics of lite
I do not mean to exclude it's effects upon all
clafics but the firft blow is aimed at the more
prominent parts in the ancient order of things.
What is to be done ?
It would be prefumption in me to do more than
to make a cafe. Many things occur. But as
they, like all political meafures, depend on difpofi-
tions, tempers, means, and external circumftances,
for all their effect, not being well afTured of thefe,
I do not know how to let looie any fpcculations
of mine on the fubject. The evil is ftated in my
opinion as it exifts. The remedy muft be where
power, wifdom and information, I hope are more
united with good intentions than they can be with
me. I have done with this fubjecl, I believe for
ever. It has given me many anxious moments for
the two laft years. If a great change is to be made
in human affairs, the minds of men will be iitted
to it ; the general opinions and feelings will draw
that way. Every fear, every hope, will forward it;
and then they who perfift in oppofing this mighty
current in human affairs, will appear rather to re-
fift the decrees of Providence ittelf, than the mere
dc ' ^ of men. They will not be refolute and
firm., buc perverfe and obftinatc.
HEADS
FOR
CONSIDERATION
ON THE
PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS.
WRITTEN IX NOVEMBER,
M
HEADS
FOR
CONSIDERATION,
WRITTEN IN NOVEMBER,
THAT France, by it's mere geographical po-
lition, independently of every other cir-
cumftance, muft affect every State of Europe;
Ibme of them immediately, all of them through
mediums not very remote.
That the Handing policy of this kingdom ever
has been to watch over the external proceedings of
France (whatever form the inter lour Government
of that kingdom might take) and to prevent the
extenfion of it's dominion or it's ruling influence,
over other States.
That, there is nothing in the prefent internal
ftate of things in France, which alters the na-
tional policy with regard to the exteriour relations
of that country.
That there are, on the contrary, many things in
the internal circumilances of France (and perhaps
M2 of
( 84 )
of this country too) which tend to fortify the prin-
ciples of that fundamental policy; and which ren-
der the active affertion of thofe principles more
prefling at this, than at any former time.
That, by a change effected in about three weeks,
:France has been able to penetrate into the heart
of Germany; to make an abfolute conquer! of
Savoy; to menace an immediate invasion of the
Netherlands ; and to awe and overbear the whole
Helvetick Body, which is in a moft perilous fitua-
tion. The great Ariftccratick Cantons having,
perhaps, as much or more to dread from their own
people whom they arm, but do not chufc or dare
to employ, as from the foreign enemy, which
againf! all publick faith has butchered their troops,
ferving by treaty in France. To this picture, it is
hardly necdlary to add, the means by which
France has been enabled to effect all this, namely
the apparently entire deftruction of one of the.
larger!, and certainly the higheft difciplincd, and
beft appointed army ever feen, headed by the firft
military Sovereign in Europe, with a Captain un-
der him of the greater! rcnoWn ; and tb.it without
a blow given or received on any fide. This it ate
of things feems to me, even if it went no further,
truly ferious.
Circumftances
( 85 )
- Circumftances have enabled France to do all
/this by land. On the other element (he has begun
to exert herfelf; and {he muft fucceed in her de-
figns, if enemies very different from thofe (lie has
hitherto had to encounter, do not refill her.
' She has fitted out a naval force, now actually
at fea, by which flic is enabled to give law to the
whole Mediterranean. It is known as a fact (and
if not fo known, it is in the nature of things highly
probable) that (he propofes the ravage of the Ec-
clcfiaftical State, and the pillage of Rome, as her
firfl object ; that next (lie means to bombard Na-
ples; to awe, to humble, and thus to command
all Italy to force it to a nominal neutrality, but
to a real dependence to compel the Italian Prin-
ces and Republicks to admit the free entrance of
the French commerce, an open intercourfe, and
the fure concomitant of that intercourfe, the affili-
ated focieties, in a manner fimilar to thofe (lie has
ellablifhed at Avignon, the Corn tat, Chamberry,
London, Manchefter, 8cc. &c. which are fo many
colonies planted in all thefe countries, for extend-
ing the influence, and fecuring the dominion of
the French Republick.
That there never has been hitherto a period in
which this kingdom would have fufFered a French
fleet to domineer in the Mediterranean, and to
force
( 86 )
force ITALY to fubmit to fuch terms as France
would think fit to impofe to fay nothing of what
has been done upon land in fupport of the fame
fyftem. The great object for which we preferred
Minorca, whilft we could keep it, and for which
we flill retain Gibraltar, both at a great expence,
was, and is, to prevent the predominance of France
over the Mediterranean.
Thus far as to the certain and immediate cfFect
of that armament upon the Italian States. The
probable effect which that armament, and the other
armaments preparing at Toulon, and other ports
may have upon SPAIN, on the fide of the Medi-
terranean, is worthy of the fcrious attention of the
Britifh councils.
That it is moft probable, we may fay, in a man-
ner certain, that if there fhould be a rupture be-
tween France and Spain, France will not confine
her oftenfive piratical operations againft Spain, to
her efforts in the Mediterranean ; on which fide,
however, flie may grievoufly affect Spain, efpecially
if fhe excites Morocco and Algiers, which un-
doubtedly fhe will, to fall upon that power.
//That flic will fit out armaments upon the ocean,
hy which the flota itfelf may be intercepted, and
tli us the treafures of all Europe, as well as the
largefl
( 87 )
largeft and fureft refources of the Spanifh monar-
chy, may be conveyed into France, and become
powerful innruments for the annoyance of all her
neighbours.
That fhe makes no fecret of her defigns.
That, if the inward and outward bound flota
fhouldefcape,ftill France has moreand better means
of diffevering many of the provinces in the Weft
and Eaft Indies, from the ftate of Spain, than Hol-
land had when fhe fucceeded in the fame attempt.
The French marine refembles not a little the old ar-
maments of the Flibuftriers, which about a century
back, in conjunction with pirates of our nation,
brought fuch calamities upon the Spanish colonies.
They differ only in this, that the prelent piratical
force is, out of all meafure and comparifon, greater;
one hundred and fifty mips of the line, and frigates
being ready built, moft of them in a manner new,
and all applicable in different ways to that fervice.
Privateers and Mooriih corfaires poilefs not the
beft fearnonfhip, and very little difcipline, and in-
deed can make no figure in regular fervice, but in
defperate adventures, and animated with a lufl of
plunder, they are truly formidable.
That the 'and forces of France are well adapted
to concur with their marine in conjunct expeditions
of
( 83 )
of this nature. In fuch expeditions, enterprize fup-
plies the want of difcipline, and perhaps more than
fupplies it. Both for this, and for other fervice
(however contemptible their military is, in other re-
fpecls) one arm is extremely good, the Engineer-
ing and Artillery branch. The old officer corps
in both being compofed for the greater part of thofe
who were not gentlemen, or gentlemen newly fuch,
few have abandoned the fervice, and the men are
veterans well enough difciplined, and very expert.
In this piratical way they muft make war with good
advantage. They muft do fo, even on the fide of
Flanders, either offenfively or defenfively. This
fhews the difference between the policy of Louis
the XlVth. who built a wall of brafs about his
kingdom ; and that of Jofeph the Second, who
premeditatedly uncovered his whole frontier.
That Spain from the actual and expected preva-
lence of French power, is in a moft perilous fitua-
tion; perfectly dependent on the mercy of that
Republick. If Auftria is broken, or even hum-
bled, fhe will not dare to difpute it's mandates.
In the prefent ftatc of things, we have nothing at
all to dread from the power of Spain by fea, or by
land, or from any rivalry in commerce.
That
That we have much to dread from the con-
nexions into which Spain may be forced.
From the circumftances of her territorial poflefr
fions, of her refourccs,and the whole of her civil and
political ftate, we may be authorized fafely, and
with undoubted confidence to affirm, that
Spain is not afubftanti've Power:
That fhe muft lean on France, or on England,
That it is as much for the intereft of Great Britain \
to prevent the predominancy of a French intereft
in that kingdom, as if Spain were a province of the
Crown of Great Britain, or a State actually depen-
dent on it; full as much fo as ever Portugal was
reputed to be. This is a dependency of much
greater value : and it's definition, or it's being
carried to any other dependency, of much more
Icrious misfortune,
One of thefe two things muft happen, Either
Spain muft fubmit to circumftances, and take fuch
conditions as France will impofe ; or fhe muft en-
gage in hoftilities along with the Emperor,, ^n4
the King of Sardinia.
N If
( 90 )
If Spain fhould be forced or awed into a treaty
with the Republick of France, fhe muft open her
ports and her commerce, as well as the land com^
munication for the French labourers,' who were ac-
cuftomed annually to gather in the harveil in
Spain. Indeed fhe "muft grant a free communica-
tion for travellers and traders through her whole
country. In that cafe it is not conjectural, it is
certain, the Clubs will give law in the Provinces ;
Bourgoing, or fome fuch mifcreant, will give law
at Madrid.
In this England may acquiefce if Hie pleafes ;
and France will conclude a triumphant peace,
with Spain under her abfolute dependence, with a
broad highway into that, and into every State of
Europe. She actually invites Great Britain to di-
vide with her the fpoils of the new world, and to
make a partition of the Spanifh Monarchy. Clearly
it is better to do fo, than to fuffer France to poilefs
thofe fpoils, and that territory alone ; which, with-
out doubt, unrefifted by us, fhe is altogether as
able, as fhe is willing to do.
Thi? plan is propofcd by the French, in the way
in which they prnpofc all their plans ; and in the
only way in which indeed they can propofc them,
where there is no regular communication between
Tajeftyand their Repiiblick.
What
( 91 )
What they propofe is a flan. It is a plan alfo
to refift their predatory project. To remain quiet,
and to differ them to make their own ufe of a na-
val power before our face, fo as to awe and bully
Spain, into a fubmiffive peace, or to drive them into
a ruinous war, without any nieafure on our part, I
fear is no plan at all.
However, if the plan of co-operation which
France defires, and which her affiliated focieties
here ardently wifh and are conftantly writing up,
fhould not be adopted, and the war between the
Emperor and France fhould continue, I think it
not at all likely that Spain fhould not be drawn
into the quarrel. In that cafe, the neutrality of
England will be a thing abfolutely impoffible.
The time is only the fubject of deliberation.
Then the queftion will be, whether we are to de-
fer putting ourfelvcs into a pofture for the common
defence, either by armament, or negotiation, or
both, until Spain is actually attacked ; that is,
whether our Court will take a decided part for
Spain, whilit Spain on her fide, is yet in a condi-
tion to act with whatever degree of vigour fhe may
have 5 whilit that vigour is yet unexhaulted ; or
whether we fhall connect ourfelves with her broken
fortunes ; after fhe fhall have received material
blows, and when we fhall have the whole flow
N 2 length
length of that always unwieldy, and ill conftructed,
and then wounded and crippled body, to drag af-
ter us, rather than to aid us. Whilft our difpoli-
tion is uncertain, Spain will not dare to put herfelf
in fuch a ftate of defence as will make her hofti-
lity formidable, or her neutrality refpeclable.
If the decifion is fuch as the folution of this
queftion (I take it to be the true queftion) con-
cludls to no time is to be loft. But the meafures
though prompt, ought not to be rafh and indi-
gefted. They ought to be well chofen, well com-
bined, and well purfued. The fyftem muft be ge-
neral ; but it muft be executed, not fucceffively,
or with interruption, but all together, unofatu, in
one melting, and one mould.
For this purpofe, we muft put Europe before
us, which plainly is, juft now, in all it's parts, in a
flate of difmay, derangement and confufion ; and
very poffibly amongft all it's Sovereigns, full of fe-
cret heart-burning, diftrufl, and mutual accufation.
Perhaps it may labour under worfe evils. There is
no vigour any where, except the diltempered vi-
gour and energy of France. That country has
but too much life in it, when every thing around is
fo difpofcd to tamenefs and languor. The very
vices of the French fyftem at home tend to give
force to foreign exertions. The Generals muft join
the
( 03 )
the armies. They mufl lead them to enterprize,
or they are likely to perifh by their hands. Thus
without law or government of her own, France
gives law to all the Governments in Europe.
This great mafs of political matter muft, have
been always under the view of thinkers for the pub-
lick, whether they act in office or not. Amongft
events, even the late calamitous events were in the
book of contingency. Of courfe, they muft have
been in delign, at leaft, provided for. A plan
which takes in as many as poilible of the States
concerned, will rather facilitate and fimplify a ra-
tional fcheme for preferving Spain, (if that were our
fole, as I think it ought to be our principal object)
than to delay and perplex it.
If we fhould think that a provident policy (per-
haps now more than provident, urgent and nccel-
fary) mould lead us to act, we cannot take mea-
fures as if nothing had been done. We muft fee
the faults, if any, which have conducted to the.
prefent misfortunes; not for the fake of criticifm,
military or political, or from the common motives
of blaming perfons and counfels which have not
been fuccefsful ; but in order, if we can, to admi-
nifter fome remedy to thefe difafters, by the adop-
tion of plans, more bottomed in principle, and
built
( 94 )
built on with more difcretion. Miftakes may be
kflbns.
There feem indeed to have been feveral miftakes
in the political principles on which the War was en-
tered into, as well as in the plans upon which it was
conducted; fome of them very fundamental, and
not only vilibly, but I may fay, palpably erroneous ;
and I think him to have lefs than the difcernment
of a very ordinary Statefman, who could not fore-
fee from the very beginning, unpleafant confe^
quences from thofe plans, though not the unparal-
leled difgraces and difafters which really did attend
them : for they were, both principles and mea-
fures, wholly new and out of the common courfe,
without any thing apparently very grand in the
conception, to juftify this total departure from all
rule.
For, in the firft place, the united Sovereigns
very much injured their caufe by admitting, that
they had nothing to do with the interiour arrange-
ments of France ; in contradiction to the whole
tenour of the publick Law of Europe, and to the
correfpondent practice of all it's States, from the
time we have any hiftory of them. In this parti-
cular, the two German Courts feem to have as
little confulted the Publicifts of Germany, as
their
( Q3 )
their own true interefts, and thofe of all the Sove-
reigns of Germany and Europe. This adrniffion
of a falfe principle in the Law of Nations, brought
them into an apparent contradiction, when they
inlifted on the re-eftablifhment of the Royal Au-
thority in France. But this confufed and contra-
dictory proceeding gave rife to a practical error of
worfe confequence. It was derived from one and
the fame root; namely, that the perfon of the Mo-
narch of France was every thing ; and the Mo-
narchy, and the intermediate orders of the State,
by which the Monarchy was upheld, were nothing.
So that, if the united Potentates had fucceeded fo
far, as to re-eftablifh the authority of that King,
and that he fhould be fo ill-advifed as to confirm
all the confifcations, and to recognize as a lawful
body, and to clafs himfelf with, that rabble of mur-
derers (and there wanted not perfons who would
Ib have advifed him) there was nothing in the
principle, or in the proceeding of the United
Powers, to prevent fuch an arrangement.
An expedition to free a brother Sovereign from
priibn, was undoubtedly a generous and chival-
rous undertaking. But the fpirit "and generofity
would not have been lefs, if the policy had been
more profound, and more comprehenfive ; that is,
if it had taken in thofe confiderations, and thofe
perfons, by whom, and, in fome meafure, for
whom.
( 96 )
; whom, Monarchy exilts. This would become a
bottom for a fyftem of folid and permanent policy,
and of operations conformable to that fyftem.
The fame fruitful error was the caufe why no-
thing was done to imprcfs the people of France (fo
far as we can at all confider the inhabitants of
France as a people) with an idea that the Govern-
ment was ever to be really French, or indeed any
thing elfethan the nominal government of a Mo-
narch, a Monarch abfolute as over them, but
whofe fole fupport was to arifc from foreign Poten-
tates, and who was to be kept on his Throne by
German forces ; in fhort, that the King of France
was to be a Viceroy to the Emperor and the King
ofPruffia.
It was the firft time that foreign Powers inter-
fering in the concerns of a nation divided into par-
tics, have thought proper to thruil wholly out or
their councils, to poftpone, to difcountcnance, tQ
reject, and in a manner to difgrace the party whom
thofe Powers came to fupport. The fmgle perfon
of a King cannot be a party. Woe to the King
who is himfelf his party ! The Royal party with
ihc King or his Reprefentatives at it's head, is the
Riyal caufe. Foreign Powers have hitherto chofen
to give to fuch wars as this, the appearance of a
civil conteft, and not that of an hoftile invafion.
When
( 97 )
When the Spaniards, in thefixteenth century, fent
aids to the chiefs of the League, they appeared as
Allies to that League, and to the imprilbned King
(the Cardinal de Bourbon) which that League had
let up. When the Germans came to the aid of
the Proteftant Princes, in the fame feries of civil
wars, they came as Allies. When the Englifh
came to the aid of Henry the Fourth, they appear-
ed as Allies to that Prince. So did the French
always when they intermeddled in the affairs of
Germany. They came to aid a party there.
When the Englifh and Dutch intermeddled in the
fucceffion of Spain, they appeared as Allies to
the Emperor Charles the Sixth. In fhort, the po-
licy has been as uniform as it's principles were ob-
vious to an ordinary eye.
According to all the old principles of law and
policy, a regency ought to have been appointed by
the French Princes of the Blood, Nobles, and Par-
liaments, and then recognized by the combined
Powers. Fundamental law and antient ufage, as
well as the clear reafon of the thing, have always
ordained it during an imprifonment of the King of
France; as in the cafe of John, and of Francis the
Firft. A Monarchy ought not to be left a mo-
ment without a Reprcfentative, having an intereft
in the fucceffion. The orders of the State, ought
glfo to have been recognized in thofe amongil
O whom
( 93 )
\vhom alone they exifted in freedom, that is, in
the Emigrants.
Thus laying down a firm foundation on the re-
cognition of the authorities of the Kingdom o
France, according to nature and to it's fundamen-
tal laws, and not according to the novel and incon-
liderate principles of the ufurpation which the
United Powers were come to extirpate. The
King of Pruffia and the Emperor, as Allies of the
antient Kingdom of France, would have proceeded
with dignity, firft, to free the Monarch, if poffible :
if not, to fecure the Monarchy as principal
In the defign - r and in order to avoid all rifques
to that great object (the object of other ages than-
the prefer) t, and of other countries than that
of France) they would ofcourfe avoid proceeding
with more hade, or in a different manner than
what the nature of fuch an object required.
Adopting this, the only rational fyftem. the ra-
tional mode of proceeding upon it, was to com-
mence with an effective fiege of Lifle, which the
French Generals mnil have icenttiken before their
faces, or be forced to fight. A plentiful country
of friends, from whence to draw fupplies, would
have been behind them ; a plentiful countvv of
enemies, from whence to force i applies, would
have- been before them. Good towns were always
within
< 99 )
within reach to depofit their hofpitals and maga-
zines. The March from Lifle to Paris, is through
a lefs defenfible country, and the diitance is hardly
fo great as from Longwy to Paris.
f If the old politick and military ideas had govern-
ed, the advanced guard would have been formed
of thofe who beft knew the country, and had forne
intereft in it, fupported by fome of the beft light
troops and light artillery, whilft the grand folid body
of an army difciplined to perfection, proceeded lei-
furely, and in clofe connexion with all it's ftorcs,
provisions, and heavy cannon, to lupport the ex-
pedite body in cafe of mifadventiirc, or to improve
and complcat it's fuccefs.
The direct, contrarv of all this was put in prac-
tice. In confequence of the original fin of this
project, the army of the French Princes was every
where thrown into the rear, and no part of it
brought forward to the lalt moment, the time of
the commencement of the fecret negotiation. This
naturally made an ill impreffion on the people,
and furnifhcd an occafion for the rebels at Paris to
give out that the faithful fubjecls of the King were
diiirultcd, dcfpifed, and abhorred by his allies.
The march was directed through a Ikirt of Lor-
raine, and thence into a part of Champagne, the
Duke of Brunfwick leaving all the ftrongeft places
O 2 behind
behind him ; leaving alfo behind him, the ftrength
of his artillery ; and by this means giving a lu-
periority to the French, in the only way in which
the prefent France is able to oppofe a German
force.
In confequence of the adoption of thofc falle
politicks, which turned every thing on the King's
fole and finglc pcribn, the whole plan of the war
was reduced to nothing but a coup de mam, in or-
der to fet that Prince at liberty. If that failed,
every thing was to be given up.
The fchcmeof a coup de main., might (under fa-
vourable circumftances) be very fit for a partizan
at the head of a light corps, by whofe failure no-
thing material would be deranged. But for a
royal army of eighty thoufand men, headed by a
King in perfon, who was to march an hundred and
fifty miles through an enemy's country furely
this was a plan unheard of.
Although this plan was not well chofcn, and
proceeded upon principles altogether ill judged
and impoliticly the fupcricritv of the militarv force,
might in a great degree have mpplicd the defects,
and furnifhed a corrective to the miftakes. The
greater probability was that the Duke of Brunfwick
would make his way to Paris, over the bellies of the \
rabble
rabble of drunkards,, robbers,, afTaffins, rioters, mu-
tineers, and half-grown boys, under the ill-obeyed
command of a theatrical, vapouring, reduced Cap-
tain of cavalry, who oppoled that great Comman-
der and great army. But Diis aliter I'lfum He
began to treat, the winds blew, and the rains beat,
the houfe fell becaufe it was built upon fand
and great was the fall thereof. This march was
not an exact copy of either of the txvo marches
made by the Duke of Parma into France.
There is fome fecret. Sicknefs and weather
may defeat an army purfuing a wrong plan ; not
that I believe the licknefs to have been fo great as
it has been reported ; but there is a great deal of
fuperfluous humiliation in this bufinefs, a perfect
prodigality of difgracc. Some advantage, real or
imaginary, muft compcnfate to a great Sovereign,
and to a great General, for fo immenfe a lofs of
reputation. Longwy, fituated as it is, might (one
iliould think) be evacuated without a capitulation
with a Republick juft proclaimed by the King
of Pruffia as an ufurping and rebellious body.
He was not far from Luxembourg. He might
have taken away the obnoxious French in his
flight. It does not appear to have been necef-
fary that thofe Magiflrates who declared for their
own King, on the faith, and under the immediate
protection of the King of Pruffia, (hould be deli-
vered over to the gallows. It was not neceflary that
the
( 102 )
the emigrant Nobility and Gentry who ferved with
the King of Pruffia's army, under his immediate
command, fhould be excluded from the cartel, and
given up to be hanged as rebels. Never was fo
grofs, and fo cruel a breach of the public faith, not
with an enemy, but with a friend. Dumouricr,
has dropped very iingular hints. Cuftine,has fpoken
out more broadly. Thcfe accounts have never been
contradicted. They tend to make an eternal rup-
ture between the Powers. The French have given
out, that the Duke of Brunfwick endeavoured to
negotiate fome name and place for the captive
King, amongft the murderers and profcribers of
thofe who have, loft their all for his caufe. Even
this has not been denied.
It is fingular, and indeed, a thing, under all it's
circumftanccS, inconceivable, that every thing
fhould bv the Emperor be abandoned to the King
of Pruflia. That Monarch was confidirc.d as prin-
cipal. In the nature of things, as well as in his
potition with regard to the war, he was only an
ally ; and a new ally, with eroding interefts in
many particulars, and of a policy rather uncertain.
At belt, and fuppofiug him to acl with the greateh;
fidelitv, the Emperor, and the Empire, to him muft
be but fccondary objects. Countries out of Ger-
many, mull affect him in a ftill more remote man--
ner. France, other than from the fc:ir of it's doc-
trinal
( 103 - )
trinal principles, cau to him be no object at nil.
Accordingly, the Rhine, Sardinia, and the Swifs,
arc left to their fate. The King of Pruffia has no
direQ and immediate concern with PYailce ; confe-
quentialJy, to be fure, a great deal ; but the Empe-
ror touches France d'n'etfly in many parts : he is ;i
near neighbour to Sardinia, by his Milanefc terri-
tories ; he borders on Switzerland ; Cologne, pof-
fefled by his uncle, is between Mentz and Treves,
the King of Pruffia's territories on the Lowef
Rhine. The Emperor is the natural guardian of
Italy and Germany ; the natural balance again ft
the ambition of France, whether Republican or
Monarchical. His Minifters and his Generals,
therefore, ought to have had their full fhare in every
material confutation, which I fufpect they had not.
If he has no Miniiter capable of plans of policy,
which comprehend the fuperintendancy of a war,
or no General with the leaft of a political head^
things have been as they muft be. However, in
all the parts of this ilrange proceeding, there muft-
be a fecret.
It is probably known to Minilters. I do not
mean to penetrate into it. My fpeculatioris on this
head muft be only conjectural. If the King of
Pruffia, under the pretext, or on the reality of
fome information relative to ill practice on the part
of the Court of Vienna, takes advantage of his
being
( 104 )
being admitted into the heart of the Emperor s do-
minions in the characler of an ally, afterwards to
join the common enemy, and to enable France to
feize the Netherlands, and to reduce and humble
the Empire, I cannot conceive, upon every prin-
ciple, any thing more alarming for this country, fe-
parately, and as a part of the general fyftem. After
all, we may be looking in vain in the regions of po-
liticks, for what is only the operation of temper and
characler upon accidental circumftances But I
never knew accidents to decide the whole of any
great buiincfs ; and I never knew temper to acl,
but that fome fyftem of politicks, agreeable to it's
peculiar fpirit, was blended with it, ftrengthened
it, and got flrength from it. Therefore the poli-
ticks can hardly be put out of the queftion.
Great miftakes have been committed ; at lealt I
hope fo. If there have been none, the cafe in fu-
ture is defperate. I have endeavoured to point out
fome of thofe which have occurred to me, and molt
of them very early.
Whatever may be the caufe of the prefent ft ate
of things, on a full and mature view and compa-
rifon of the hiftorical matter, of the tfanfaclions
that have pafTed before our eyes^ and of the future
profpe6l, I think I am authorized to form an opi-
nion without the Icaft hefitation.
That
( 105 )
That there never was, nor is, rior ever will be, or
ever can be, the leafl rational hope of making an
impreffion on France by any Continental Powers, ,
if England is not a part, is not the directing part,
is not the foul, of the whole confederacy again ft it.
This, fo far as it is an anticipation of future, is
grounded on the whole tenour of former hiftory
In fpeculation it is to be accounted for on two
plain principles.
Firft, That Great Britain is likely to take a more ;
fair and equal part in the alliance, than the other I
Powers, as having lefs of croffing intereft, or per- '
plexed difcuffion with any of them.
Secondly, Becaufe France cannot have to deal
with any of thefe continental Sovereigns, without
their feeling that nation, as a maritime Power,
greatly fuperiour to them all put together ; a force
which is only to be kept in check by England.
England, exceptduringthe excentrick aberration
of Charles the Second, has always confidered it as
her duty and intereft, to take her place in fuch a
confederacy. Her chief difputes mufl ever be
with France, and if England (hews herfelf indiffe-
rent and unconcerned when thefe Powers are com-
P bined
bined againft the cnterprizcs of France, '{he ijj to
1 look with certainty for the fame indifference on the
part of thefe Powers, when flic may be at war with
that nation* This will tend totally to difconnect
this kingdom from the fyftem of Europe, in which,
if fhe ought not ramly to meddle, flie ought never
wholly -to withdraw herfelf from it.
If then England is put in motion, whether by a
conlideration of the general fafety, or of the influ-
ence of France upon Spain, or by the probable
operations of this new fyftem on the Netherlands,
it muft embrace in it's project the whole as much
as poflible, and the part it takes ought to be as
much as poflible a leading and prefiding part.
I therefore beg leave to fuggeft,
Firft, That a Minifter fhould. forthwith be fent
to Spain, to encourage that Court to perfevere in
the meafures they have adopted againft France ;
to make a clofe alliance and guarantee of pofTef-
lions, as againft France, with that power, and whilft
the formality of the treaty is pending, to arlure
them of our protection, poftponing any leffer dif-
putes to another occafion.
Secondly, To afftire the Court of Vienna, of our
defire to enter into our anticnt connexions with
her,
( 107 )
1 her, and to fupport her effectually in the war which
France has declared againfi her.
Thirdly, To animate the Swifs, and the King of
Sardinia, to take a part, as the latter once did on
the principles of the Grand Alliance.
Fourthly, To put an end to onr disputes with
Ruffia, and mutually to forget the paft. I believe if
fhe is fatisfied of this oblivion, fhe will return to her
old fentiments, with regard to this Court, and will
take a more forward part in this bufinefs than any
other Power.
Fifthly,, If what has happened to the King of
Pi-uffia is only in confeqnenee of a fort of panick or
of levity, and an indifpofition to perfevere long in
one defign the fupport and concurrence of Ruffia
will tend to ileady him, and to give him resolution.
If he be ill difpofed, with that power on his back,
and without one ally in Europe, I conceive he will
not be eafily led to derange the plan.
Sixthly, To ufe the joint influence of our Court,
aiid of our then Allied Powers, with Holland, to
arm as fully as fhe can by fea a and to make fome ad-
dition by land.
P 2 Seventhly,
( 108 )
Seventhly, To acknowledge the King of France's
next brother (affifted by fuch a Council and fuch
Reprefentatives of the Kingdom of France, asfhall
be thought proper) Regent of France, and to lend
that Prince a fmall fupply of money, arms, cloath-
ing and artillery.
Eighthly, To give force to thefe negociations, an
inftant naval armament ought to be adopted ; one
fquadron for the Mediterranean ; another for the
Channel. The feafon is convenient, moft of our
trade being, as I take it, at home.
After fpeaking of a plan formed upon the an-
tient policy and practice of Great Britain, and of
Europe; to which this is exadlly conformable in
every refpecl:, with no deviation whatfoever, and
which is, I conceive much more lirongly called
for by the prefent circumflances, than by any
former, I muft take notice of another which I
hear, but cannot perfuade myfelf to believe, is in
agitation. This plan is grounded upon the very
fame view of things which is here ftated, namely,
the danger to all Sovereigns, and old Republicks,
from the prevalence of French power and influ-
ence.
It
It is to form a Congrefs of all the European
powers, for the purpofe of a general defenfive alli-
ance, the objects of which fhould be,
Firlt, The recognition of this new Republick
(which they well know is fonned on the princi-
ples, and for the declared purpofe of the deftruc-
tion of all Kings), and whenever the heads of this
new Republick fhall corifent to releafe the Royal
Captives, to make Peace with them.
Secondly, To defend thcmfelves with their joint
forces againft the open aggreffions or the fecret
practices, intrigues and writings, which are ufed
to propagate the French principles.
It is eafy to difcovcr from whofe fhop this com-
modity comes. It is fo perfectly abfurd, that if
that, or any thing like it, meets with a ferious
entertainment in any Cabinet, I fhould think it
the effect of what is called a judicial blindnefs, the
certain forerunner of the deftrucliori of all Crowns
and Kingdoms.
An offenfive alliance, in which union is pre-
ferred, by common efforts in common dangers,
againft a common active enemy, may prcferve it's
confiftcncy, and may produce for a given time,
fome
fomc confidcrable effect ; though this is not cafv,
and for any very long period, can hardly be ex-
pected. But a defenjvve alliance, formed of long.
clifcordant interefts, with innumerable clifcuffions,
exifling, having no one pointed objc6t to which it
is directed, which is to be held together with an \
unrcmittcd vigilance, as watchful in peace as in i
war, fa fo evidently impoffible, is fuch a chimera, is
fb contrary to human nature, and the courfe of
human affairs, . that I am perfuaded no perfon in
his fenfes, except thofe whofe Country'', Religion
and Sovereign, are depofited in the French funds,
could dream of it. There is not the flighted petty
boundary fuit, no difference between a family ar-
rangement, no fort of mifunderftanding, or crofs,
purpofe between the pride and etiquette of Courts,
that would not entirely disjoint this fort of alli-
ance, and render it as futile in it's eftecls, as it is
feeble in it's principle. But when we comider that
the main drift of that dcfenfive alliance mull be
to prevent the operation of intrigue, mifchievous
doctrine and evil example, in the fuccefs of un-
provoked rebellion, regicide, and iyftematick ai-
faffination and maflacre, the abfurdity of fuch a
fchemc becomes quite lamentable. Open the
communication with France, and the reft follows
of coin-fe-
llow
( 111 )
How fail the interio'ur circumft'ances of this coun-
try fupport what is laid \vith regard to it's foreign
politicks, muft be left to better judgments. I am
fure the French faction here is infinitely ftrength-
ened by the faccefs of the aflailins on the other
fide of the water. This evil in the heart of Europe \
muft be extirpated from that center, or no part of )
the circumference can be free from the mifchicf
which radiates from k, and which will fpread
circle beyond circle, in fpite of all the little I
defcnfive precautions which can be employed ]/
againft it.
I do not put my name to thefe hints fubmitted
to the confideration of reflecting men. It is of too
little importance to mppofe the name of the writer
could add any weight to the ftate of things con-
tained in this paper. That ftate of things prefles
irrefiftibly on my judgment, and it lies, and has
long lain, with an heavy weight upon my mind. I
cannot think that what is done in France, is bene-
ficial to the human race. If it were, the Englifli
Conftitution ought no more to ftand againft it
than the antient Conftitution of the kingdom in
which the new fyftcm prevails. I thought it the
duty of a man, not unconcerned for the publick,
and who is a faithful fubjecl to the King, reipect-
fully to fubmit this ftate of facts at this new ftep
in
in the pro.cjefs of the French arms and politicks,
to his Majefty, to his confidential fcrvants, and to
thofe perfons who, though not in office, by their
birth, their rank, their fortune, their character and
their reputation for wifdom, feem to me to have a
large flake in the {lability of the antient order of
things.
November 5, 37Q2.
POLICY OF THE ALLIES
RESPECT TO FRANCE.
BEGUN IN OCTOBER, 1793.
REMARKS
ON THE
POLICY OF THE ALLIES,
BEGUN IN OCTOBER, 1793.
AS the propofed manifefto is, I underftand, to
promulgate to the world the general idea of a
-plan for the regulation of a great kingdom, and
through the regulation of that kingdom probably to
decide the fate of Europe for ever, nothing requires a
more ferious deliberation with regard to the time
of making it, the circumftanc"es of thofe to whom
it is addreffed, and the matter it is to contain.
As to the time, (with the due diffidence in my
own opinion) I have fome doubts whether it is not
rather unfavourable to the iffuing any Manifefto,
with regard to the intended government of France ;
and for this reafon, that it is, (upon the principal
Q^2 point
point of our attack) a time of calamity and defeat.
Manifeftoes of this nature are commonly made
when the army of ibme Sovereign enters into the
enemy's country in grear force, and under the im-
pofing authority of that force employs menaces
towards thofe whom he defires to awe ; and makes
promifes to thofe whom he wifhes to engage in his
favour.
As to a party, what has been done at Toulon
leaves no doubt, that the party for which we de-
clare muft be that which fubftantially declares for
Royalty as the bafis of the government.
As to menaces Nothing, in my opinion, can
contribute more effectually to lower any Sovereign
in the publick eftimation, and to turn his defeats
into difgraces, than to threaten in a moment of im-
potence. The fccond Manifefto of the Duke of
Brunfwick appeared therefore to the world to be
extremely ill-timed. However, if his menaces in
that Manifefto had been feafonable, they were not
without an object. Great crimes then appre-
hended, and great evils then impending, were to
be prevented. At this time, every act, which
.early menaces might poffibly have prevented, is
done. Punifhment and vengeance alone remain,
and God forbid that they fhould ever be forgotten.
But the punilhment of enormous offenders, will
not
( "7 )
not be the lefs fevere, or the lefs exemplary when
it is not threatened at a moment when we have it
not in our pov/er to execute our threats. On the
other fide, to pafs by proceedings of fuch a nefa-
rious nature, in all kinds, as have been carried on
in France, without any fignification of refentmenr,
would be in effect to ratify them ; and thus to
become acceffaries after the fact, in all thofe enor-
mities which it is impoffible to repeat, or think of
without horror. An abfolute filence appears to
me to be at this time the only fafe courfe.
The fccond ufual matter of Manifeiloes is com-
pofed of promifes to thofe who co-operate with our
defigns. Thefe promiies depend in a great mea-
fure, if not wholly, on the apparent power of the
perfon who makes them to fulfil his engagements.
A time of difafter on the part of the promifer,
feems not to add much to the dignity of his per-
fon, or to the effect of his offers. One would
hardly wifh to feduce any unhappy perfons to give
the laft provocation to a mercilefs tyranny, without
very effectual means of protecting them.
The time therefore fee ms (aslfaid)not favourable
to a general Manifefto, on account of the unplea-
fant fituation of our affairs. However, I write in
a changing fcene, when a meaiure very imprudent
to day, may be very proper to-morrow. Some
4 great
great victory may alter the whole ftate of the quef-
tion, fo far as it regards our power of fulfilling any
engagement we may think fit to make.
But there is another confideration of far greater
importance for all the purpoies of this Manifefto.
The publick, and the parties concerned, will look
fbmewhat to the difpofition of the promifer indi-
cated by his conduct, as well as to his power of
fulfilling his engagements.
Speaking of this nation as part of a general com-
bination of powers, are we quite fure, that others
can believe us to be fincere, or that we can be
even fully affured of our own fincerity in the pro-
tection of thofe who mail rifque their lives for the
reftoration of Monarchy in France, when the world
fees, that thofe who are the natural, legal, confti-
tutional reprefentatives of that Monarchy, if it ha*
any, have not had their names fo much as men-
tioned in any one publick act; that in no way
' whatever are their perfons brought forward, thafc
their rights have not been exprefsly or implicitly
allowed, and that they have not been in the leaft
confulted on the important interefts they have at
ftake. On the contrary, they are kept in a ftate
of obfcurity and contempt, and in a degree of in-
digence at times bordering on beggary. They
are in fact, little lels prifoners in the village of
Hanau,
( "9 )
Hanau, than the Royal captives who are locked
up in the tower of the Temple. What is this,
according to the common indications which guide
the judgment of mankind, but, under the pretext
of protecting the crown of France, in reality to
ufurp it ?
I am alfo very apprehenfive, that there are other
circumftances which muft tend to weaken the force
of our declarations. No partiality to the allied
powers, can prevent great doubts on the fairnefs
of our intentions as fupporters of the Crown of
France, or of the true principles of legitimate
Government in oppofition to Jacobinifm, when it
is vifible that the two leading orders of the State
of France, who are now the victims, and who
muft always be the true and fole fupports of Mo-
narchy in that country, are, at beft, in fome of
their defcriptions, confidered only as objects of
charity, and others are, when employed, employed
only as mercenary foldiers; that they are thrown
back out of all reputable fervice, are in a manner
difowned, confidered as nothing in their own caule,
and never once confulted in the concerns of their
King, their country, their laws, their religion,
and their property ! We even affect to be afhamed
of them. In all our proceedings we carefully
avoid the appearance of being of a party with
them. In all our ideas of Treaty we do not regard
them
( 120 )
them as what they are, the two leading orders of
the kingdom. If we do not confider them in that
Jight, we muft recognize the iavages by whom they
have been ruined, and who have declared war
upon Europe, whilft they difgrace and perfecutc
human nature, and openly defy the God that made
them, as real proprietors of France.
I am much afraid, too, that we mall fcarcely
.be believed fair fupporters of lawful Monarchy
againft Jacobinilm, fo long as we continue to make
and to obferve cartels with the Jacobins, and on
fair terms exchange prifoners with them, whilft the
Royalifts, invited to our ftandard, and employed
under our publick faith, againft the Jacobins, if
taken by that favage faction, are given up to the
executioner without the leaft attempt whatfoever
at reprifal. For this, we are to look at the King
of Prufiia's conduct, compared with his Mani-
feftoes about a twelvemonth ago. For this we
are to look at the capitulations of Mentz and Va-
lenciennes, made in the courfe of the prefent cam-
paign. By thefe two capitulations, the Chriftian
-Royalifts were excluded from any participation in
the caufe of the combined powers. They were
confidered as the outlaws of Europe. Two armies
were in effect fent againft them. One of thofe
armies (that which furrendered Mentz) was very
near overpowering the Chriftians of Poitou, and
the
[{* 1
the other (that which furrendered at Valenciennes)
has actually crufhed the people whom oppreffion
and defpair had driven to reliftance at Lyons, has
maffacred feveral thousands of them in cold blood,
pillaged the whole fubftance of the place, and pur-
fued their rage to the very houfes, condemning
that noble city to defolation, in the unheard of
manner we have feen it devoted.
It is then plain by a conduct which overturns a.
thoufand declarations, that we take the Royalifts
of France only as an inftrument of fome conve-
nience in a temporary hoftilicy with the Jacobins,
but that we regard thofe athciftick and murderous
barbarians as the bona fide pofTeflbrs of the foil o
France. It appears at leaft, that we confider them
as a fair Government de faffo, if not de jure ; a
refiftance to which in favour of the King of France,
by any man who happened to be born within that
country, might equitably be confidered by other
nations, as the crime of treafon.
For my part, I would fooner put my hand into
the fire than fign an invitation to opprefled men to
fight under my ftandard, and then on every fmifler
event of war, cruelly give them up to be punifhed
as the bafeft of traitors, as long as I had one of the
common enemy in my hands to be put to death in
order to fecure thofe under my protection, and to
R vindi-
I I" ]
vindicate the common honour of Sovereigns. \Ve
hear nothing of this kind of fecurity in favour of
thofe whom we invite to the fupport of our caufe.
Without it, I am not a little apprehenfive that the
proclamations of the combined powers might
(contrary to their intention no doubt) be looked
upon as frauds, and cruel traps laid for their lives.
So far as to the correfpondence between OUT
declarations and our conduct, let the declaration
be worded as it will, the conduct is the practical
comment by which, and which alone it can be un-
derftood. This conduct acting on the declara-
tion, leaves a Monarchy without a Monarch ; and
without any repreientative or truftee for the Mo-
narch, and the Monarchy. It fuppofes a kingdom
without flates and orders ; a territory without pro-
prietors ,- and faithful fubjects, who are to be left
to the fate of rebels and traitors.
The affair of the eftablimmcnt of a Govern-
ment is a very difficult undertaking for foreign
powers to act in as principals ; though as auxiliaries
and mediators, it has been not at all unufual, and
may be a meafure full of policy and humanity, and
true dignity.
The firft thing we ought to do, fuppofing us
not giving the law as conquerors, but acting as
friendly
t "3 1
friendly powers applied to for counfel and afilftancc
in the fettiement of a diftracted country, is well
to confider the compofition, nature, and temper
of its objects, and particularly of thofe who
actually do, or who ought to exerciie power in
that ftate. It is material to know who they are,
and how conftituted, whom we confider as the
people cf France?
The next confide ration is, through whom our
arrangements are to be made, and on what princi-
ples the Government we propofe is to be efta-
bliihed.
The firft queflion on the people is this, Whether
we are to confider the individuals now aftually in v
France ', numerically taken and arranged into Jaccbin I
Clubs, as the body politick, conflicting the nation
of France ? or, Whether we confider the original
individual proprietors of lands, expelled fince the
Revolution, and the dates and the bodies politick,
fuch as the colleges of juftice called parliaments,
the corporations noble and not noble of balliages,
and towns, and cities, the bifhops and the clergy,
as the true conftituent parts of the nation, and
forming tne legally organized parts of the people
of France ?
R 2 In
[ "4 ]
In this ferious concern it is very neceflary that
we fhould have the moft diftinct ideas annexed to
the terms we employ ; becaufe it is evident, that
an abufe of the term people, has been the original
fundamental caufe of thofe evils, the pure of
which, by war and policy, is the prefent object of
all the Hates of Europe.
If we confider the acting power in France in any
legal conduction of publick law, as the people,
the queftion is decided in favour of the Republick
one and indivifible. But we have decided for
Monarchy. If fo, we have a King and Subjects j
and that King and Subjects have rights and privi-
leges which ought to be fupported at home ; for I
do not fuppofe that the Government of that king-
dom can, or ought to be regulated, by the arbi-
trary Mandate of a foreign Confederacy.
As to the faflion exercifing power, to fuppofe
that Monarchy can be fupported by principled
Regicides, Religion by prcfefled Atheifls, Order
by Clubs of Jacobins, Property by Committees
of Profcription, and Jurilbrudence by Revolu-
tionary Tribunals, is to be fanguine in a degree of
which I am incapable. On them I decide, for
jnyfelf, that thefe perfons are not the legal Corpo-
ration of France, and that it is not with them we
can (if we would) fettle the Government of
france.
Since,
t s 1
Since, then, we have decided for Monarchy in
that kingdom, we ought allb to fettle who is to be
the Monarch, who is to be the Guardian of a
Minor, and how the Monarch and Monarchy is to
be modified and fupported ? If the Monarch is to
be elected, who the Electors are to be : if heredi-
tary, what order is efrablilhed correfponding with
an hereditary Monarchy, and fitted to maintain it ?
Who are to modify it in its exercife ? Who are
to reftrain its powers where they ought to be
limited, to ftrengthen them where they are to be
fupp'Tted, or to enlarge them, where the ob-
ject, the time, and the circumftances, may de-
mand their excenfion ? Thefe are things which, in
the outline, ought to be made diftinct and clear;
for if they are not (efpecially with regard to thofe
great points, who are the proprietors of the foil,
and what is the corporation of the kingdom) there
is nothing to hinder the compleat eftablimment of
a Jacobin Repubiick, (fuchas that formed in 1790
and .791) under the name of a Democracie
Royale. Jacobinifm does not confift in the having
or not having, a certain Pageant under the name
of a King, but in taking the people as equal
individuals, without any corporate name or de-
fcription, without attention to property, without
.divifion of powers, and forming the government
of delegates from a number of men fo conftituted,
in
[ 126 ]
in deftroying or confifcating property, and bribing
the publick creditors, or the poor, with the fpoils,
now of one part of the community, now of ano-
ther, without regard to prefcription or poflefiion."
I hope no one can be fo very blind as to ima-
gine that Monarchy can be acknowledged and
fupported in France upon any other bafis than
that of its property, corporate and individual, or
that it can enjoy a moment's permanence or fecu-
rity upon any fcheme of things, which fets afide
all the antient corporate capacities and diftinctions
of the kingdom, and fubverts the whole fabrick of
its antient laws and ufages, political, civil and re-
ligious, to introduce a fyftem founded on the fup-
pofed Rights cf the Man 3 and the abfoliUe equality
of the human race. Unlefs, therefore, we declare
clearly and diftinclly in favour of the reftoration on
property, and confide to the hereditary property
of the kingdom, the limitation and qualifications
of its hereditary Monarchy, the blood and treafurc
of Europe is wafted for the eftablifhment of
Jacobinifm in France. There is no doubt that
Danton and Robefpiere, Chaumette and Barrere,
that Condcrcet, that Thomas Paine, that LaFayette,
and the Exbiftiop of Autun, the Abbe Gregoire,
with all the gang of die Syeyes's, the Henriots,
and the Santerres, if they could fecure themfelves
in the fruits of their rebellion and robbery, would
be perfectly indifferent, whether the moil unhappy
of
of all infants, whom by the leflbns of the fhoe-
maker, his governour and guardian, they are train-
ing up ftudiouily and methodically to be an idiot,
or what is worfe, the moft wicked and bafe of
mankind, continues to receive his civic education
in the Temple or the Thuilleries, whilft they, and
fuch as they, really govern the kingdom.
It cannot be too often and too ftrongly incul-
cated, that Monarchy and property muft, in I
France, go together j or neither can exift. To
think of the poflibility of the exiftence of a per-
manent and hereditary Royalty, where nothing elje
is hereditary or permanent in -point either of perfonal /
or corporate dignity., is a ruinous chimera -worthy
of the Abbe Syeycs and thofe wicked Fools his
Aflbciates, who ufurped Power* by the Murders of
the 1 9th of July, and the 6th of October 1789,
and who brought forth the Monfter which they
called Democracie Royale, or the Conftitution.
I believe that moft thinking men, would prefer
infinitely fome fober and fenfible form of a Re-
publick, in which there was no mention at all of a
King, but which held out fome reafonable fecurity
to property, life, and perfonal freedom, to a fcheme
of things like this Democracie Royale, founded
on impiety, immorality, fraudulent currencies, the
confifcation of innocent individuals, and the pre-
tended Rights of Man ; and which, in effect,
excluding the whole body of the nobility, clergy,
and
and landed property of a great nation, threw every
thing into the hands of a delperate fet of obfcurc
adventurers who led to every mifchief, a blind and
bloody band of Sans-Culottes. At the head, or
rather at the tail of this fyflem, was a miferable
pageant as its oftenfible inftrument, who was to be
treated with every fpecies of indignity, till the
moment, when he was conveyed from the Palace
of Contempt to the Dungeon of Horrour, and
thence led by a Brewer of his Capital through the
applaufes of an hired, frantick, drunken multitude,
to lofe his head upon a fcaffold.
This is the Confutation, or Democracie Royale;
and this is what infallibly would be again fet up
in France to run exactly the fame round, if the
predominant power mould fo far be forced to fub-
mit as to receive the name of a King, leaving it
to the Jacobins, (that is, to thofe who have fub-
verted Royalty and deftroyed Property) to modify
the one, and to diftribute the other as fpoil. By
the Jacobins I mean indifcriminatcly the Briflbtins
and the Maratifts, knowing no fort of difference
between them. As to any other party, none exifts
in that unhappy country. The Royalifts (thofe
in Poitou excepted) are banimed and extinguimed ;
and as to what they call the Conftitutionalifts, or
Democrats Rcyaux y they never had an exiftence of the
imalleft degree of power, confideration or autho-
rity;
rity ; nor, if they differ at all from the reft of the
Atheiftick Banditti (which from their actions and
principles I have no reafon to think) were they
ever other than the temporary tools and inftru-
mcnts of the more determined, able, and fyfte-
matick Regicides. Several attempts have been
made to fupport this chimerical Democracie
Royale the firft was by La Fayette the laft by
Dumourier : they tended only to mew, that this
abfurd project had no party to fupport it. The
Girondifts under Wimpfen, and at Bourdeaux,
have made fome ftruggle. The Conftitutionalifts
never could make any ; and for a very plain rea-
fon , they were Leaders in Rebellion. All their
principles, and their whole fcheme of government
being Republican, they could never excite the
fmalleft degree of enthufiafm in favour of the un-
happy Monarch, whom they had rendered con-
temptible, to make him the Executive Officer in
their new Commonwealth. They only appeared
as traitors to their own Jacobin caufe, not as faith-
ful adherents to the King.
In an Addrels to France, in an attempt to treat
with it, or in confidering any fcheme at all relative
to it, it is impoffible we mould mean the geogra-
phical, we mud always mean the moral and poli-
tical country. I believe we mail be in a great
errour if we act upon an idea that there ejxifts in
S that
f .jo )
country any" organized body 'of men wRo
mi^ht be wrlling to treat on equitable terms, for
the reiteration of cheir Monarchy; but who are
nice in' balancing thofe terms, and who would
accept fuch as to them appeared reafonable, but
who would quietly fubmit to the predominant
power, if they were not gratified in the fafhion of
ibme conftitution. which fuited wkh their fancies..
I take the ftate of France to be totally different.
.1 know of no fuch body, and of no fuch party.
So far from a combination of twenty men (always
excepting Poitou) I never yet heard, that afmgle
man could be named of fufficient force or influ-
. ence to anfwer for another man, much lefs for
the fmallcit diitrid in the country, or for the
moft incomplete company of fbldiers in the army.
We fee every man that the Jacobins- chufe to
apprehend, taken up in his viHage y or in his houfe,
.and conveyed to prifon without the leaft fhadow
of refinance ; and this indifferently, whether he is
fufpected of Royalifrn or Federalifm, Moderan-
tifin, Democracy Royal, or any other of the
.names of faclion which they ftart by the hour.
What is much more aftonilhing, (and if we did
not carefully attend to the genius and circum-
xo indm.-ftances of this Revolution, muft indeed appear
e^e, "av'ii.incredibk) all their moft accredited military men,
1Ury ' from a generaliffimo to a corporal, may be arrefted,
(eacli
(each in the midft of his camp, and covered with
the laurels of accumulated victories) tied neck and
heels, thrown into a cart, and fen: to Paris to be
difpofed of at the pleafure of the Revolutionary
Tribunals.
As no individuals have power and. influence, 'fo NoCorpo-
there are no Corporations, whether of Lawyers or juftice,
Burghers exifting. The AfTembly called Conili- ?Sw :
tuer.t, dellroyed all iuch inftitutions very eariy.
The Primary and Secondary Aflemblies, by their
original conftitution, were' to be ditfblved when
they anfwered the purpofe 'of electing- the Ma-
gifbrates ; and were exprefsly difqiialified.from per-
forming any corporate act whatfoe-ver: The tran-
.fient Magift rates -have been almoft all removed
before the expiration of -their -terms, and new have
been lately impofed upon the people, without the
form or ceremony cf an election : thefc Magiftrates
.during: their exiftence are put under, as all the
Executive Authorities-. are from firil to laft, the
-popular -Societies (called Jacobin Clubs) of the
feveral countries, and this by an exprefs ouder of
-the National Convention : it is even -made a cafe
of death.- to oppofe or attack thofe-Chibs. They
<oo have been lately fubjected to an expurgatory
fcrutiny, to drive out from them every thing
-favouring of what they call the crime of Moderan-
.t\f&, of which offence however few were guilty.
2 But
But as people began to take refuge from their per-
fections amongft themfelves, they have driven
them from that laft afylum.
The State of France is perfectly fimple. It
confifts of but two defcriptions The Opprefibr:
and the OpiprcfTed.
The firft have the whole authority of the State
in their hands, all the arms, all the revenues of
the publick, all the confiscations of individuals and
corporations. They have taken the lower fort
from their occupations and have put them into
pay, that they may form them into a body of
Janifaries to overrule and awe property. The
heads of thefe wretches they never fuffer to cool.
They fupply them with a food for fury varied by
the day befides the fcnfuai ftate of intoxication
from which they are rarely free. They have made
the Priefts and people formally abjure the Divinity ;
they have eftranged them from every civil, moral,
and foci:il, or even natural and inftin&ive fenti-
rnent, habit, and practice, and havs rendered them
fyf,ematicaliy lavages, to make it impoflable for
them to be the initruments of any fober and vir-
tuous arrangement, or to be reconciled to any flare
of order, under any name whatsoever.
The
( 133 )
f The other defcription, the Opprejfed are people
of feme property j they are the fmafl reliques of
"the perfecuted Landed Intereil; they are the
Burghers and the Farmers. By the very circum-
ilance of their being of fome property, though
numerous in fome points of view, they cannot be
very confiderable as a number. In cities the nature
of their occupations renders them domeftick and
feeble ; in the country it confines them to their
farm for fubfiftence. The National Guards are
all changed and reformed. Every thing fufpiciou?
in the defcription of which they were compofed i$
rigoroufly difarmed. Committees, called of Vigi-
lance and Safety, are every where formed -, a mcft
fevere and fcrutinizing Inquifition, far more rigid
than any thing ever known or imagined. Two
perfons cannot meet and confer without hazard to
their liberty, and even to their lives. Numbers
fcarcely credible have been executed, and their
property confifcated. At Paris and in mod other
towns, the bread they buy is a daily dole which
they cannot obtain without a daily ticket delivered
to them by their Mailers. Multitudes of all ages
and fexes are actually imprifbned. I have reafon
to believe, that in France there are not, for various
flare crimes, fo few as twenty thoufand * adually
in jail a large portion of people of property in
ny State. If a father of a family (hould (hew any
f Some accounts make them five times as many.
difpo-
difpofitions to rcfift, or to withdraw himfclf fr: m
their power,- his wife and children are cruelly to
anfwer for it. It is by means of thefe hoftages,
that they keep the troops, which they force by
fnafles (as they call it) into the field true .to their
colours.
Another of their refources is not to be forgotten.
They have lately found a way of giving a fort
of ubiquity to the fupreme Sovereign Authority,
which no Monarch has been able yet to give to
any reprefentation of his.
The Commifiioners of the National Convention,
who are the Members of the Convention itfelf,
and really exercife all its powers, make continual
circuits through every province, and vifits to every
army. There they fuperfede all the ordinary Au-
thorities civil and military, and change arid alter
rvery thing at their pleafure. So that in effect no
deliberative capacity exifts in any portion of the
inhabitants.
Toulon, republican in principle, having takes
its decifion in a moment under the guillotine -, and
.before the arrival of thefe Commifiloners, Toulon,
being a place regularly fortified, and having in its
jbofom a navy in part highly difcontented, has
cfc.aped, though by a fort of miracle ; and it would
not have efcaped, if two powerful fleets had not
been
( '35 )
been at the door to give them not only ftrong, but
prompt and immediate fuccour, efpecially, as
neither this nor any other fea-port town in France
can be depended on, from the peculiarly favage
difpofitions, manners, and connexions among the
lower fort of people in thofe places. This I take
to be the true ftate of things in France ; Jo far
as it regards any exifting bodies, whether of legal or
voluntary affectation, capable of atting or of treathfg
in corps.
As to the opprefled individuals, they are many ;
and as difcontented as men muft be under the
monftrous and complicated tyranny of all forts, with
which they are crufhed. They want no ftimnlus
to throw off this dreadful yoke : but they do want
(not Manifeftoes, which they have had even to
furfeit, but) real protection, force and fuccour.
The difputes and queftions of men at their cafe,
do not at all affect their minds, or ever can occupy
the minds of men in their fituation. Thefe theories
are long fince gone by ; they have had their day,
and have done their mifchief. The queflion is
not between the Rabble of Syftems, Fayetteifm,
Condorcetifm, Monarchifm, or Democratifm or
Federaiifm, on the one fide, and the fundamental
Laws of France on the other or between ail thefe
fyfteins amongft themfelves. It is a controverfy
z (weak
(weak indeed and unequal on the one part) between
the proprietor and the robber $ between the
prifoner and the jailor > between the neck and the
guillotine. Four -fifths of the French inhabitants
would thankfully take protection from- the Emperor
of Morocco, and would never trouble their heads
about the abftract principles of the power by which
they were fnatched from imprifoninent, robber)*,
and murder. But then theie men can do little or
nothing for themfelves. They have no arms, nor
magazines, nor chiefs, nor union, nor the pofTi-
bility of thefe things within themfelves. On the
whole therefore I lay it down as a certainty, that in
the Jacobins, no change of mind is to be expected
and that no others in the territory of France
have an independent and deliberative exiftence.
The truth is, that France is out of itfelf The
moral France is feparated from the geographical.
The mafter of the houfe is expelled, and the
robbers are in poiTcffion. If we look for the
corporate people of France exifting as corporate in
the eye and intention of public Law, (that corpo-
rate people, I mean, who are free to deliberate
and to decide, and who have a capacity to treat
and conclude) they are in Flanders, and Germany,
in Switzerland, Spain, Italy, and England. There
are all the Princes of the Blood, there are all the
Orders
Orders of the State, there are all the Parliaments
of the kingdom.
This being, as I conceive, the true ftate of
France, as it exifts territorially,, and as it exifts
morally, the queflion will be, with whom we are
to concert our arrangements ; and whom we are to
ufe as our inflruments in the reduction, in the
pacification, and in the fettlement of France. The
work to be done muft indicate the workmen.
Suppofing us to have rational objects, we have two
principal, and one fecondary. The firft two are
fo intimately connected as not to be feparated even
in thought; the re-eflablifhment of Royalty, and
the re-eflablifhment of Property. One would think
it requires not a great deal of argument to prove,
that the moft ferious endeavours to reflore Royalty,
will be made by Royalifls. Property will be moft
energetically reflored by the antient proprietors of
that kingdom.
When I fpeak of Royalifts, I wifh to be under-
. flood of thofe who were always iuch from prin-
ciple. Every arm lifted up for Royalty from the
beginning, was the arm of a man fo principled.
I do not think there are ten exceptions.
The principled Royalifls are certainly not of
force to effect thefe objects by themfelves. If they
T were,
C 133 )
were, the operations of the prefent great Combi-
nation would be wholly unnecefiary. What I con-
tend for is, that they fhculd be confulted with,
treated v/ith, and employed; and that no Foreigners
whatibever are either in intereft fo engaged, or in
judgment and local knowledge fo competent, to
anfwer ail thefe purpofes as the natural proprietors
of the country.
Their number for an exiled party is alfo con-
fiderable. Almoft the whole body of the landed
proprietors of France, eeclefiaftical and civil, have
been fteadily devoted to the Monarchy. This
body does not amount to lefs than feventy thou-
fand a very great number in the compofition of
the refpeftable clafTes in any fociety. I am hire,
that if half that number of the fame defcription
were taken out of this country, it would leave
hardly any thing that I fhould call the people of
England. On the faith of the Emperor and the
King of Pruffia, a body of ten tjioufand Nobility
on horfeback, with the King's two brothers at their
head, ferved with the King of Pruffia in the cam-
paign of 1792, and equipped themfelves with the
laft milling of their ruined fortunes and exhaufted
credit *. It is not now the queftion how that great
force
* Before, the Revolution the French Nobleffe were fo re-
duced in numbers, that they did not much exceed twenty
thoufandj
( '39 )
force came to be rendered ufelefs and totally diffi-
pated. I ftate it now, only to remark, that a great
part of the fame force exifls, and would a<5r. if it
were enabled. I am fure every thing has fhewn
us that in this war with France, one Frenchman is
worth twenty foreigners. La Vendee is a proof of
If we wim to make an imprelfion on the minds
of any perfons in France, or to perfuade them to
join our ftandard, it is impoffible that they mould
not be more eafily led, and more readily formed
and difciplined, (civilly and martially difciplined)
by thofe who {peak their language, who are ac-
quainted with their manners, who are converfant
with their ufages and habits of thinking, and who
have a local knowledge of their country, and fome
remains of antient credit and confidefation, than
with a body congregated from all tongues and
tribes. Where none of the refpe&able native
interefts are fcen in the tranfaction, it is impoffible
that any declarations can convince thofe that are
within, or thofe that are without, that any thing
thoufand, at leaft of full grown men. As they have been
very cruelly formed into entire corps of foldiers, it is efti-
mated, that by the fword, and diftempers in the field, they
have not loit lefs than five thoufand men ; and if this courfe
is purfued, it is to be feared, that the whole body of the
French nobility may be extinguiihed. Several hundreds have
alfo perimed by famine and various accidents.
T a clfc
( HO )
elfe than fome fort of hoftility in the ftyle of a
conqueror is meant. At beft it will appear to fuch
wavering perfons, (if fuch there are) whom we
mean to fix with us, at bcft a choice whether they
are to continue a prey to domeftick banditti, or
to be fought for as a carrion carcafs, and picked
to the bone by all the crows and vultures of the
fky. They may take protection, (and they would
1 doubt not) but they can have neither alacrity nor
zeal in fuch a caufe. When they fee nothing but
bands of Englifh, Spaniards, Neapolitans, Sardi-
nians, Prufiians, Auftrians, Hungarians, Bohe-
mians, Sclavonians, Croatians, affing as 'principals y
it is impofifibie they mould think we come with a
beneficent defign. Many of thofe fierce and bar-
barous people have already given proofs how little
they regard any French party whatfoever. Some
of thefe nations the people of France are jealous
of i fuch are the Englifh, and the Spaniards others
they defpife ; fuch are the Italians others they
hate and dread ; fuch are the German and Danu-
bian powers. At beft fuch interpofition of
antient enemies excites apprehenfion ; but in this
cafe, how can 'they fuppofe that we come to main-
tain their legitimate Monarchy in a truly paternal
French Government, to protect their privileges,
their laws, their religion, and their property, when
they fee us make ufe of no one perfon who has
atoy intereft in them, any knowledge of them, or
any
any the leaft zeal for them ? On the contrary,
they fee, that we do not fufFer any of thofe who
have Ihewn a zeal in that caufe, which we feem to
make our own, to come freely into any place in
which the Allies obtain any footing.
If we wifh to gain upon any people, it is right
to fee what it is they expert. We have had a pro-
pofal from the Royalifts of Poitou. They are
well intitled, after a bloody war maintained for
eight months againft all the powers of anarchy, to
fpeak the fentiments of the Royalifts of France.
Do they defire us to exclude their Princes, their
Clergy, their Nobility ? The direft contrary.
They earneftly folicit that men of every one of
thefe defcriptions mould be fent to them. They
do not call for Englifh, Auftrian, or P ruffian
officers. They call for French emigrant officers.
They call for the exiled priefts. They have
demanded the Comte d'Artois to appear at their
head. Thefe are the demands, (quite natural
demands) of thofe who are ready to follow the
ftandard of Monarchy.
The great means therefore of reHBing the
Monarchy which we have made the main okjeft of
the war y is to afiift the dignity, the religion, and
the property of France, to repoflefs themfelves
of the means of their natural influence. This
4 ought
Might to be the primary objec~b of all our politicks*
and all our military operations. Otherwife every
thing will move in a prepoflerous order, and
nothing but confufion and deflruction will folio w*
I know that misfortune is not made to win ref-
pect from ordinary minds. I know that there is
a leaning to profperity however obtained, and a
prejudice in its favour -, I know there is a difpofition
to hope ibmething from the variety and incon-
itancy of villany, rather than from the tirefome
uniformity of fixed principle. There have been,
I admit, fituations in which a guiding perfon or
party might be gained over, and through him or
them, the whole body of a nation. For the hope
of fuch a converfion, and of deriving advantage
from enemies, it might be politick for a while to
throw your friends into the made. But examples
drawn from hiflory in occafions like the preient
will be found dangeroufly to miflead us. France
has no refemblance to other countries which have
undergone troubles and been purified by them.
If France, jacobinifed as it has been for four full
years, did contain any bodies of authority and
difpofition to treat with you, (moft afluredly fhe
does not) fuch is the levity of thofe who have
expelled every thing refpeclable in their country,
fuch their ferocity, their arrogance, their mutinous
fpirit, their habits of defying every thing human
( 143 )
and divine, that no engagement would hold with
them for three months j nor indeed could they
cohere together for any purpofe of civilized fociety,
if left as now they are. There muft be a means
not only of breaking their ftrength within them-
felves, but of civilizing them -, and thefe two
things muft go together, before we can poflibly
treat with them, not only as a nation, but with
any divifion of them. Deferiptions of men of
their own race, but better in rank, fuperiour in
property and decorum, of honourable, decent and
orderly habits, are abfolutely neceflary to bring
them to fuch a frame as to qualify them fo much
as to come into contact with a civilized nation,
A fet of thofe ferocious favages with arms in their
hands, left to themfelves in one part of the coun-
try, whilft you proceed to another, would break
forth into outrages at leaft as bad as their former.
They muft, as fail as gained (if ever they are
gained) be put under the guide, direction and
government of better Frenchmen than themfelves,
or they will inftantly relapfe into a fever of aggra-
vated Jacobinifm.
We muft not judge of other parts of France by
the temporary fubmiffion of Toulon, with two
vaft fleets in its harbour, and a garrifon far more
numerous than all the inhabitants able to bear
arms. If they were left to themfelves I am quite
( 144 J
furc they would not retain their attachment to Mo-
narchy of any name, for a fingle week.
To adminifter the only cure for the unheard of
diforders of that undone country, I think it infi-
nitely happy for us, that God has given into our
hands, more effectual remedies than human con-
trivance could point out. We have in our bofom,
and in the bofom of other civilized ftates, nearer
forty than thirty thoufand perfons, providentially
preferved not only from the cruelty and violence,
but from the contagion of the horrid practices,
fentiments and language of the Jacobins, and even
.facredly guarded from the view of fuch abominable
fcenes. If we mould obtain in any confiderablc
.diftrict, a footing in France, we poflefs an immenfc
body of phyficians and magiftrates of the mind,
whom we now know to be the moft difcreet, gentle,
well tempered, conciliatory, virtuous, and pious
perfons, who in any order probably exifted in the
world. You will have a mifiioner of peace and
order in every parifh. Never was a wifer national
ceconomy than in the charity of the Englifli and
of other countries. Never was money better ex- j
pended than in the maintenance of this body of
civil troops for re-cftablilhing order in France,
and for thus fecuring its civilization to Europe.
This means, if properly ufed, is of value inefti-
mable.
Nor
( 145 )
Nor is this corps of inftruments of civilization
confined to the firft order of that ftate, I mean
the clergy. The allied powers poffefs alfo, an
exceedingly numerous, well informed, fenfible,
ingenious, high principled and fpirited body of
cavaliers in the expatriated landed intereft of
France, as well qualified at lead, as I, (who have
been taught by time and experience to moderate
my calculation of the expectancy of human abili-
ties) ever expected to fee in the body of any
landed gentlemen and foldiers by their birth.
France is well winnowed and fifted. Its virtuous
men are, I believe, amongft the moft virtuous,
as its wicked are amongft the moft abandoned
upon earth. Whatever in the territory of. France
may be found to be in the middle between thefe,
muft be attracted to the better part. This will be
compafled, when every gentleman, every where
being reftored to his landed eftate, each on his
patrimonial ground, may join the Clergy in reani-
mating the loyalty, fidelity and religion of the
people ; that thefe gentlemen proprietors of land,
may fort that people according to the truft they
feverally merit, that they may arm the honeft and
well affected, and difarm and difable the factious
and ill difpofed. No foreigner can make this dif-
crimination nor thefe arrangements. The antient
corporations of Burghers according to their feveral
modes mould be reftored ; and placed, (as they
U ought
( 146 )
ought to be) in thehands of men of gravity and
property in the cities or baillages, according to the
proper conftitutions of the commons or third eftate
of France. They will reftrain and regulate the
feditious rabble there, as the gentlemen will on their
own eflates. In this way, and in this way alene,
the country (once broken in upon by foreign force
well directed) may be gained and fettled. It muft
be gained and fettled by itfelf, and through the
medium of its own native dignity and property,
It is not honeft, it is not decent, ftill lefs is it poli-
tick, for foreign powers themfelves to attempt any
thing in this minute, internal, local detail, in whidi
they could fhew nothing but ignorance, imbecility,
confufion and oppreflion. As to the Prince who
has a juft claim to exercife the regency of France,
like other men he is not without his faults and his
defects, But faults or defects (always fuppofing
them faults of common human infirmity) are not
what in any country deftroy a legal tide to Govern-
ment. Thefe princes are kept in a poor obfcure
country town of the King of Prufiia's. Their
reputation is entirely at the mercy of every calum-
niator. They cannot mew themfelves, they can-
not explain themfelves, as princes ought to do.
After being well informed, as any man here can
be, I do not find, that thek blernilhes in this emi-
nent perfon, are at all considerable, or that they
at all affect a character, which is full of probity,
honour.
( H7 )
honour, generofity, and real goodncfs. In fome
points he has but too much refcmblance to his un-
fortunate Brother ; who with all his weaknefles,
had a good underflanding and many parts of an
excellent man, and a good King. But Monfieur,
without fuppofing the other deficient, (as he was
not) excells him in general knowledge and in a
fharp and keen obfervation, with fomething of a
better addrefs, and an happier mode of fpeaking
and of writing. His converlation is open, agreeable
and informed, his manners gracious and princely.
His brother the Comte d'Artois fuftains ftill better
the reprefentation of his place. He is eloquent,
lively, engaging in die higheft degree, of a deci-
ded character, full of energy and activity. In a
word he is a brave, honourable, and accomplished
cavalier. Their brethren of Royalty, if they
were true to their own caufe and intereft, inftead
of relegating thefe illuftrious perfons to an obfcure
town, would bring them forward in their courts and
camps, and exhibit them to, what they would fpee-
dily obtain, the efteem, refpect, and affection of
mankind.
As to their knocking at every door, (which .
. made to the
feems to give offence) can any thine be more Regent-sen- /
deavourtoeo
natural ? Abandoned, defpifcd, rendered in a man- to Spain,
ner outlaws by all the powers of Europe, who have
treated their unfortunate brethren with all the
U 2 giddy
( 148 )
giddy pnde, and improvident infolence of blind
unfeeling profperity, who did not even fend them
a compliment of condolence on the murder of
their brother and filler -, in iiich aftate is it to be
wondered at, or blamed, that they tried every
way, likely or unlikely, well cr ii] cholen, to get
out of the horrible pit into which they are fallen,
and that in particular they tried whether the
Princes of their own blood, might at length be
brought to think the caufe of Kings, and of Kings
of their race, wounded in the murder and exile of
the branch of France, of as much importance as
the killing of a brace of partridges. If they were
abfolutely idle, and only eat in iloth their bread of
forrow and dependence, they would be forgotten;
or at beft thought of as wretches unworthy of their
pretenfions which they had done nothing to fup-
port. If they err from our interefts, what care has
been taken to keep them in thofe interefts ? or
what defire has ever been (hewn to employ them
in any other v ay. than as inftruments of their own
degradation, fhame, and ruin ?
The Parliament of Paris, by whom the title of
the Regent is to be recognized (not made) accord-
ing to the laws of the kingdom, is ready to recognize
it, and to regifter it, if a place of meeting was given
to them, which might be within their own jurifdic-
tion, fuppofing that only locality was required for the
exercife
exercife of their functions : for it is one of the ad-
vantages of Monarchy, to have no local feat. It
may maintain its rights out of the fphere of its ter-
ritorial juriiui<5lion, if other powers will fuffer it.
I am well apprifetl, that the little intriguers, and
whifpcrcrSj and feif-conceited thoughtlefs babblers,
worfe than either, run about to depreciate the
fa<kn virtue of a great nation. But whilft they
talk, we muft make our choice they or the
Jacobins. We have no other option. As to.
tliofe, who in the pride of a profperity, not ob-
tained by their wifdom, valour, or induftry, think
fo well of themfe Ives and of their own abilities and
virtues, and fo ill of other men ; truth obliges me
to fay, that they are not founded in their prefump-
tion concerning themfelves, nor in their contempt
of the French Princes, Magiftrates, Nobility,
and Clergy. Inftead of infpiring me with
diflike and difcruft of the unfortunate, engaged
with us in a common cauie againft our jacobin
enemy, they take away all my efteem for their own
charaflers, and all my deference to their judg-
ment.
There are fome few French gentlemen indeed
who talk a language not wholly different from this
jargon. Thofe whom I have in my eye, I reipe<5l
as gallant foldiers, as much as any one can do, but
on
( 150 )
on their political judgment, and prudence, I have
not the flighteft reliance, nor on their knowledge
of their own country, or of its laws and conftitu-
tion. They are, if not enemies, at lead not
friends to the orders of their own ftate ; not to the
Princes, the Clergy, or the Nobility; they poffefs
only an attachment to the Monarchy, or rather to
the perfons of the late King and Queen. In all
other refpects their converfation is Jacobin. I am
afraid they or fome of them, go into the clofets
of Minifters, and tell them that the affairs of France
will be better arranged by the allied Powers than
by the landed proprietors of the kingdom, or by
the Princes who have a right to govern ; and that
if any French are at all to be employed in the
fettlement of their country, it ought to be only
thofe who have never declared any decided opinion
or taken any active part in the Revolution *.
I fufpecl that the authors of this opinion are mere
foldiers of fortune, who, though men of integrity
and honour, would as gladly receive military rank
from Rufiia, or Auftria, or Pruflia, as from the
Regent of France. Perhaps their not having as
much importance at his court as they could wifh,
may incline them to this ftrange imagination.
Perhaps having no property in old France, they
This was the language of the ?viirn,levialifts.
arc
are more indifferent about its reftoration. Their
language is certainly flattering to all Minifters in
all courts. We all are men; we 'all love to be
told of the extent of our own power and our own
faculties. If we love glory, we are jealous of
partners, and afraid even of our own inftruments.
It is of all modes of flattery the moft effectual to be
told, that you can regulate the affairs of another
kingdom better than its hereditary proprietors.
It is formed to flatter the principle of conquefl fo
natural to all men. It is this principle which is
now making the partition of Poland. The powers
concerned have been told by fome perfidious Poles,
and perhaps they believe, that their ufurpation is a
great benefit to the people, efpecially to the com-
mon people. However this may turn out with
regard to Poland, I am quite fure that France
could not be fo well under a foreign direction as
under that of the reprefentatives of its own King,
and its own antient Eftates.
I think I have myfelf ftudied France, as much as
moft of thofe whom the allied courts are likely to
employ in fuch a work. I have likewife of myfelf
as partial and as vain an opinion as men commonly
have of themfelves. But if I could command the
whole military arm of Europe, I am fure, that a
bribe of the beft province in that kingdom, would
not tempt me to intermeddle in their affairs, except
3 in
( 15* )
in pcrfe& concurrence and concert with the natural
legal interefts of the country, compofed of the
Ecclefiaftical, the Military, the feveral Corporate
Bodies of Juflice, and of Burgherfhip, making
under a Monarch (I repeat it again and again) the
French Nation, according to its fundamental Confii-
tution. No confiderate Statefmen would undertake
to meddle with it upon any other condition.
The Government of that kingdom is funda-
mentally Monarchical. The publick law of Europe
has never recognized in it any other form of Go-
vernment. The Potentates of Europe have by
that law, a right, an intereft, and a duty to know
with what government they are to treat, and what
they are to admit into the federative Society, or
in other words into the diplomatick Republick of
Europe. This Right is clear and indifputable.
What other and further interference they have a
right to in the interior of the concerns of another
people, is a matter on which, as on every political
fubjeb, no very definite or pofitive rule can well
be laid down. Our neighbours are men; and who
will attempt to dictate the laws, under which it is
allowable or forbidden to take a part in the concerns
of men, whether they are confidered individually
or in a collective capacity, whenever charity to
them, or a care of my own fafety, -calls forth my
activity.
activity. Circumftances perpetually variable, di-
recting a moral prudence and difcretion, the gene-
ral principles of which never vary, muft alone
prcfcribe a conduct fitting on fuch occafions. The
lateft cafuifts of public law are rather of a Repub-
lican caft, and in my mind, by no means fo averfe
as they ought to be to a Right in the people (a
word which ill defined is of the moll dangerous
lift) to make changes at their pleafure in the fun-
damental laws of their country. Thefe writers,
however, when a country is divided, leave abun-
dant liberty for a neighbour to fupport any of the
parties according to his choice *. This interfer-
ence mufh indeed always be a Right, whilft the
privilege of doing good to others, and of averting
from them every fort of evil, is a Right: Circum-
ftances may render that Right a Duty. It depends
wholly on this, whether it be a bona fide charity to
a party, and a prudent precaution with regard to
yourfelf, or whether under the pretence of aiding
one of the parties in a nation, you ad in fuch a
manner as to aggravate its calamities, and accom-
plifh its final deftruction. In truth it is not the in-
terfering or keeping aloof, but iniquitous inter-
meddling, or treacherous inaction which is praifed
or blamed by the decifion of an equitable judge.
* Vattel.
X It
( '54 )
It will be a juft and irrefifliblc prefumption
againfl the fairnefs of the interpofmg power, that
he takes with him no party or defcription of men
m the divided ftate. It is not probable, that thefe
parties mould all, and all alike, be more adverfe
to the true interefts of their country, and lefs ca-
pable of forming a judgment upon them, than
thole who are abfolute ftrangers to their affairs,
and to the character of the actors in them, and
have but a remote, feeble, and fecondary lympa-
thy with their intereft. Sometimes a calm and
healing arbiter may be neceffary; but, he is to
compofe differences, not to give laws. It is im-
poflible that any one mould not feel the full force
of that prefumption. Even people, whofe poli-
tics for the fuppofed good of their own country
lead them to take advantage of the diffentions of a
neighbouring nation in order to ruin it, will not
directly propofe to exclude the natives, but they
will take that mode of confulting and employing
them which moft nearly approaches to an exclu-
fion. In fome particulars they propofe what
amounts to that exclufion, in others they do much
worfe. They recommend to Miniftry, " that no
Frenchman who has given a decided opinion, or
acted a decided part in this great Revolution for or
againft it, mould be countenanced, brought for-
ward, trufted or employed, even in the ftricteil
fubordination to the Miniflers of the allied powers."
Although
( 155 )
Although one would think that this advice would
ftand condemned on the firil propoiition, yet as
it has been made popular, and has been proceeded
upon practically, I think it right to give it a full
confide ration.
And firft, I have afked myfelf who thefe French-
men are, that, in the ftate their own country has
been in for thefe laft five years, of all the people
of Europe, have alone not been able to form a de-
cided opinion, or have been unwilling to act: a de-
cided part ?
Looking over all the names I have heard of in
this great Revolution, in all human affairs, I find
no man of any diftinction who has remained in that
more than ftoical apathy, but the Prince de Conti.
This mean, ftupid, felfifh, fwinifh, and cowardly
animal, univerfaily known and defpifed as fuch,
has indeed, execept in one abortive attempt to
elope, been perfectly neutral. However his neu-
trality, which it fcems would qualify him for truft,
and on a competition muft fet afide the Prince de
Conde, can be of no fort of fervice. His modera-
tion has not been able to keep him from a jail.
The allied powers muft draw him from that jail,
before they can have the full advantage of the ex-
ertions of this great neutralifl.
X 2 Except
Except him, I do not recollect a man of rank or
talents, who by his fpeeches or his votes, by his pen
or by his fword, has not been active on this fcene.
The time indeed could admit no neutrality in any
perfon worthy of the name of man. There were
originally two great divifions in France j the one is
that which overturned the whole of the Govern-
ment in Church and State, and erected a Republic
on the bafis of Atheifm. Their grand engine was
the Jacobin Club, a fort of feceflion from which, but
exactly on the fame principles, begat another fhort-
lived one, called the Club of Eighty Nine*, which
was chiefly guided by the Court Rebels, who, in
addition to the crimes of which they were guilty in
common with the others, had the merit of betray-
ing a gracious Matter, and a kind Benefactor.
Subdivifions of this faction, which fmce we have
feen, do not in the leaft differ from each other in
their principles, their difpofitions, or the means
they have employed. Their only quarrel has been
about power : in that quarrel, like wave fucceeding
wave, one faction has got the better and expelled
the other. Thus La Fayette for a while got the
better of Orleans j and Orleans afterwards prevailed
over La Fayette. Briffbt overpower'd Orleans;
Barrere and Roberfpiere, and their faction, mattered
* The firft objeft of this Club was the propagation of
Jacobin principles.
them
( 157 )
them both and cut off their heads. All who were
not Royalifts have been lifted in fome or other of
thefe divifions. If it were of any ufe to fettle a
precedence, the Elder ought to have his rank.
The firft authors, plotters, and contrivers of this
monflrous fcheme, feem to me intitled to the firft
place in our diftruft and abhorrence. I have feen
fome of thofe who are thought the beft amongft
the original Rebels ; and I have not neglected the
means of being informed concerning the others.
I can very truly fay, that I have not found by ob-
feryation or enquiry, that any fenfe of the evils
produced by their projects has produced in them,
or any one of them, the fmalleft degree of repent-
ance. Difappointment and mortification undoubt-
edly they feel : but to them, repentance is a thing
impoffible. They are Atheifts. This wretched
opinion, by which they are porTerTed even to the
height of fanaticifm, leading them to exclude from
their ideas of a Commonwealth, the vital principle
of the phyfical, the moral, and the political world,
engages them in a thoufand abfurd contrivances, to
fill up this dreadful void. Incapable of innoxious
repofe, or honourable action, or wife Speculation, in
the lurking holes of a foreign land, into which (in
a common ruin) they are driven to hide their heads
amongft the innocent victims of their madnefs, they
are at this very hour, as bufy in the confection of
the dirr-pyes of their imaginary Conftitutions, as if
they
( '58 )
they had not been quite frefh from deftroying by
their impious and defperate vagaries, the fineft
country upon earth.
It is however, out of thefe, or of fuch as thefe,
guilty and impenitent, defpifmg the experience of
others, and their own, that fome people talk of
chufing their Negotiators with thofe Jacobins, who
they fuppofe may be recovered to a founder mind.
They flatter themfelves, it feems, that the friendly
habits formed during their original partnerfhip of
iniquity, a fimilarity of character, and a con-
formity in the ground-work of their principles,
might facilitate their converfion, and gain them
over to fome recognition of Royalty. But furely
this is to read human nature very ill. The feveral
Sectaries in this fchifm of the Jacobins, are the very
laft men in the world to truft each other. Fellow-
fhip in Treafon, is a bad ground of confidence.
The laft quarrels are the foreft; and the injuries
received or offered by your own aflbciates, are ever
the moft bitterly refented. The people of France
of every name and defcription, would a thoufand
times fooner liften to the Prince de Conde, or to
the Archbifhop of Aix, or the Bifhop of St. Pol,
or to Monfieur De Cazales, than to La Fayette, or
Dumourier, or the Vicomte De Noailles, or the
Bifhop of Autun, or Necker, or his Difciple Lally
Tolendal. Againft the firft defcription they have
i not
( 159 )
not the fmalleft animofity beyond that of a merely
political dififention. The others they regard as
Traitors.
The firft defcription is that of the Chriftian
Royalifts, men who as earneftly wifhed for refor-
mation, as they oppofed innovation in the funda-
mental parts of their Church and State. Their
part has been very decided. Accordingly they are
to be fet afide in the reftoration of Church and
State. It is an odd kind of difqualification where
the reftoration of Religion and Monarchy is the
queftion. If England mould (God forbid it fliould)
fall into the fame misfortune with France, and that
the Court of Vienna fliould undertake the reftora-
tion of our Monarchy, I think it would be extraor-
dinary to object to the admifiion of Mr. Pitt, or
Lord Grenville, or Mr. Dundas into any mare in
the management of that bufmefs, becaufe in a day
of trial they have ftood up firmly and manfully, as
I truft they always will do, and with diftinguimed
powers, for the Monarchy and the legitimate Con-
flitution of their country. I am fure if I were to
fuppofe myfelf at Vienna at fuch a time, I mould, as
a Man, as an Englifhman, and as a Royalift, proteil:
in that cafe, as I do in this, againft a weak and ruin-
ous principle of proceeding, which can have no other
tendency, than to make thofe who wifh to fupport
the Crown, meditate too profoundly on the confe-
quences
( 160 )
quences of the part they take and confider whe-
ther for their open and fonvard zeal in the Royal
Caufe, they may not be thruft out from any fort of
confidence and employment, where the interell of
crowned heads is concerned.
Thcfe are the Parties. I have faid, and laid
truly, that I know of no neutrals. But as a general
obfervation on this general principle of chufmg
neutrals on fuch occafions as the prelent, I have this
to fay that it amounts to neither more nor lefsthan
this mocking propofition that we ought to ex-
clude men of honour and ability from ferving theirs
and our caufe ; and to put the deareft interefts of
ourfelves and our pofterity into the hands of men
of no decided character, without judgment to
chufe, and without courage to profefs any prin-
ciple whatfoever.
Such men can fcrve no caufe, for this plain rea-
fon they have no caufe at heart. They can at
beft work only as mere mercenaries. They have
not been guilty of great crimes ; but it is only bc-
caufe they have not energy of mind to rife to any
height of wickednefs. They are not hawks or
kites ; they are only miferable fowls whofe flight is
not above their dunghill or henrooft. But they
tremble before the authors of thefe horrors. They
admire them at a fafe and refpectful diftance.
There
There never was a mean and abjedl mind that did
not admire an intrepid and dexterous villain. In
the bottom of their hearts they believe fuch hardy
mifcreants to be the only men qualified for great
affairs : if you fet them to tranfact with fuch per-
fons, they are inftantly fubdued. They dare not
fo much as look their antagonifl in the facCi They
are made to be their iiibjedts, not to be their
arbiters or controllers.
Thefe men to be fure can look at atrocious
acts without indignation, and can behold furrering
virtue without lympathy. Therefore they are
confidered .as fober difpaflionate men But they
have their paffions, though of another kind, and
Xvhich are infinitely more likely to carry them out
of the path of their duty. They are of a tame,
timid, languid, inert temper wherever the welfare
of others is concerned. In fuch caulesj as they
have no motives to action, they never poiTefs any
real ability, and are totally deftitute of all refource.
Believe a man who has feen much, and obferved
fomething. I have feen in the courfe of my life a
great many of that family of men. They are
generally chofen, becaufe they have no opinion of
their own ; and as far as they can be got in good
earneft to embrace any opinion, it is that of who-
ever happens to employ them (neither longer or
y (hotter,
fhorter, narrower or broader) with whom they have
no difcuffion or confultation. The only thing
which occurs to fuch a man when lie has got a
bufinefs for others into his hands, is how to make
his own fortune out of it. The perfon he is to
treat with, is not, with him, an adverfary over
whom he is to prevail, but a new friend he is to gain :
therefore he always fyftematically betrays fome
part of his truft'. Inftead of thinking how he mail
defend his ground to the laft,' and if forced to re-
treat, how little he lhal] give up, this kind .of man
confiders how much of the interefl of his employer
he is to facrifice to his adverfary. Having nothing
but himfelf in view, he knows, that in ferving his
principal with zeal, he muft probably incur fome
refentrnent from the cppofite party. His object is
to obtain the good will of the perfon with v;hom he
contends, that when an agreement is maJe, he may
join in rewarding him. I would not take one of
thefe as my arbitrator in a depute for ib much as a
fifh-pond for if he referred the mud to me, he
would be fare to give the water that fed the pool,
to my adverfary. In a great caufe I mould cer-
tainly with, that my agent mould pofiefs conciliat-
ing qualities ; that he fhould be of a frank, open,
and candid difpofition^ loft in his nature, and of a
temper to fpften anirnofities and to win confidence.
He ought not to be a man odious to the perfon he
treats with, by perfonal injury, by violence, or by
deceit,
deceit, or, above all, by the dereliction of his caufe
in any former tranfadtions. But I would be fure
that my Negotiator mould be mine, that he ihould
be as earncii: in the caufe as myfelf, and known to
be fo ; that he Ihould not be looked upon as a
ilipendiary advocate, but as a principled partizan.
In all treaty it is a great point that all idea of
gaining your agent is hopelefs. I would not truft
the caufe of Royalty with a man, who, profefimg
neutrality, is half a Republican. The Enemy has
already a great part of his fuit without a ftruggle
and he contends with advantage for all the
red. The common principle allowed between
your adverfary and your agent, gives your adverfary
the advantage in every difcufiion.
Before I fhut up this Difcourfe about neutral
Agency (which I conceive is not to be found, or
if found, ought not to be ufed) I have a few other
remarks to make on the caufe, which I conceive
gives rife to it.
In all that we do, whether in the ftruggle or after
it, it is neceflary that we mould conftantiy have in
our eye, the nature and character of the enemy we
have to contend with. The Jacobin Revolution
is carried on by men of no rank, of no confidera-
tion, of wild favage minds, full of levity, arrogance
and prefumption, without morals, without probity,
Y 2 without
without prudence. What have they then to fupply
their innumerable defects, and to make them terri-
ble even to the firmeil minds? One thing, and one
thin nly but that one thing is worth a thoufand
they have energy. In France, all things being
put into an univerfal ferment, in the decornpofition
of focjety, no man comes forward bur by his fpirit
of enterprize and the vigour of his mind. If we
meet this dreadful and portentous energy, retrained
by no confideration of God or man, that is always
vigilant, always on the attack, that allows itfelf no
repofe, and fufFers none to reft an hour with impu-
nity ; if we meet this energy with poor common r
place proceeding, with trivial maxims, paltry old
faws, with doubts, fears and fufpicions, with a
languid, uncertain hefitation, with a formal, official
fpirit, which is turned afide by every obflacle from
its purpofe, and which never fees a difficulty but to
yield to it, or at beft to evade it; down we go to
the bottom of the abyfs and nothing fhort of
Omnipotence can fave us. We muft meet a vi-
cious and diftempered energy with a manly and
rational vigour. As virtue is limited in its refources
Jj| we are doubly bound to ufe all that, in the circle
drawn about us by our morals, we are able to
command.
,
I do not contend againft the advantages of dif-
truft. In the world we live in it is but too necef-
far) r . Some of old called it the very finews of
difcretion. But what fignify common-places, that
always run parallel and equal ? Diftruft is good or
it is bad, according to our pofition and our pur-
pofe. Diitruft is a defenfive principle. They
who have much to lofe have much to fear. But
in France we hold nothing. We are to break in
upon a power in pofleflion ; we are to carry every
thing by ftorm, or by furprize, or by intelligence,
or by all. Adventure therefore, and not caution,
is our policy. Here to be too pr^efuming is the
better error.
The world will judge of the fpirit of our pro-
ceeding in thofe places of France which may fall
into our power, by our conduct in thofe that are
already in our hands. Our wifdom mould not be
vulgar. Other times, perhaps other meafures : But
in this awful hour our politicks ought to be made
up of nothing but courage, decifion, manlinefs, and
rectitude. We mould have all the magnanimity of
good faith. This is a royal and commanding po-
licy ; and as lone: as we are true to it we may give
the law. Never can we aflame this command if
we will not rifque the confequences. For which
reafon we ought to be bottomed enough in prin-
ciple not to be carried away upon the firft profpect
of any fmifter advantage. For depend upon it ?
that if we once give way to a fmifter dealing, we
mall
mall teach others the game, and v/e lhall be out-
witted and overborne: the Spaniards, the Pruflians,
God knows who, will put us under contribution at
their pleafure ; and inflead or* being the head of a
great confederacy, and the arbiters of Europe, we
mall, by our miftakes, break up a great defign
into a thoufand little felfiih quarrels ; the enemy
will triumph, and we Ihall fit down under the
terms of unfafe and dependent peace, weakened,
mortified, and difgraced, whilft all Europe, Eng-
land included, is left open and defencelefs on every
part, to jacobin principles, intrigues, and arms.
In the cafe of the King of France, declared to be
our friend and ally, we will flill be confidering
ourfelves in the contradictory character of an ene-
my. This contradiction, I am afraid, will, in
Jpite of us, give a colour of fraud to all our tranf-
actions, or at leaft will fo complicate our politicks,
that we mail ourfelves be inextricably entangled in
them.
I have Toulon in my eye. It was with infinite
ibrrow I heard that in taking the king of France's
fleet in truft, we inflantly unrigged and difmafled
the mips, inflead of keeping them in a condition to
cfcape in cafe of difafter, and in order to fulfil our
truft, that is, to hold them for the ufe of the
owner, and, in the mean time, to employ them
for our common fervice. Thefe mips are now fo
circumftanced,
circumftanced, that if we are forced to evacuate
Toukin, they muft fall into the hands of the enemy,,
or be burnt by ourfelves. I know this is by Ibme
confldcrtd as a fine thing for us. But the Athenians
ought noi <-.: be better than the Englifh, or Mr.
Pitt lefs virtuous than Ariitides.
Are \ve then fo poor in refources that we can do
no better with eighteen or twenty (hips of the line
than tc burn them ? Had .we fent for French Royalift
naval officers, of which fome hundreds are to be
load, and made them felect fuch feamen as they
could trufr, and rolled the reft with our ovn and
Mediterranean feamen, vhich are all over Italy to
be had by thcufands, and put them under judicious
Englifn commanders in chief, and with a judicious
mixture of our own fubordinates, the Weft Indies
would at this day have been ours. It may be faid
that thefe French officers would take them for the
King of France, and that they would not be in our
power. Be it fo. The iflands would not'be ours,
but they would not be jacobinized. This is how-
ever a thing impoiTible. They muft in effect and
fubfrance be ours. But all is upon that falfe prin-
ciple of diftruft, which, not confiding ir; flrength,
can nc\ er have the full ufe of it. They that pay,
and feed, and equip, muft direct. But I muft
(peak j.lc-in upon this fubject The French ifkrJ.s,
-re all our own, ought not to be all kept.
A fair
A fair partition only ought to be made of thofe
territories. This is a iubjeft of policy very ferious,
which has many relations and afpecls. Juft here
I only hint at it as anfwering an objection, whilft I
ftate the mifchievous confequences which fuffer us
to be furprized into a virtual breach of faith, by
confounding our ally with our enemy, becaufe they
both belong to the fame geographical territory.
My clear opinion is, that Toulon ought to be
made, what we fet out with, a royal French city.
By the neceflity of the cafe, it muft be under the
influence, civil and military, of the allies. But
the only way of keeping that jealous and difcordant
mafs from tearing its component parts to pieces,
and hazarding the lofs of the whole, is to put the
place into the nominal government of the regent,
his officers being approved by us. This, I fay, is
abfolutely neceflary for a poife amongft ourfelves.
Qtherwifc: is it to be believed that the Spaniards,
who hold that place with us in a fort of part-
nerfhip contrary to our mutual intercfr, will fee
us abfolute matters of the Mediterranean, with
Gibraltar on one fide, and Toulon on the other,
with a quiet and compofed mind, whilft we do little
lefs than declare that we are to take the whole Weft
Indies into our hands, leaving the vaft, unwieldy,
and feeble body of the Spanifh dominions in that
part of the world, abfolutely at our mercy, without
5 an 7
any power to balance us in the fmalleft degree.
Nothing is fo fatal to a nation as an extreme ot
felf-partiality, and the total want of confideration
of what others will naturally hope or fear. Spain
mutt think ihe fees, that we are taking advantage
of the confufions which reign in France, to difable
that country, and of courfe every country from,
affording her protection, and in the end to turn
the Spanim Monarchy into a province. If fhe
faw things in a proper point of light, to be fure,
Hie would not confider any other, plan of politicks
as of the lead moment in comparifon of the ex-
tinction of jacobinifm. But her minifters (to fay
the bejft of them) are vulgar politicians. It is no
wonder that they mould poftpone this great point,
or balance it, by confiderations of the common
politicks, that is, the queftions of power between
ftate and Jlatc. If we manifeftly endeavour to de-
ftroy the balance, efpecially the maritime and
commercial balance, both in Europe and the We%
Indies, (the latter their fore and vulnerable party
from fear of what France may do for Spain here-
after, is it to be wondered, that Spain, infinitely
weaker than we are, (weaker indeed that fuch a
mafs of empire ever was,) mould feel the fame
fears from our uncontroled power, that we give
way to ourfelves from a fuppofcd refurrefuon of
the antient power of France under a Monarchy ?
It fignifies nothing whether we are wrong or right
Z in
( '70 )
fn the abftract -, but in refpecl to our relation t'O
.Spain, with fuch principles followed up in practice^
-it is abfolutely impoflible that any cordial alliance
can fubfift between the two nations. If Spain
goes, Naples will fpeedily follow. Pruflia is quite
certain, and thinks of nothing but making a market
of the prefent confufions. Italy is broken and
divided j Switzerland is jacobinized, I am afraid.,
completely. I have long feen with pain the pro-
grefs of French principles in that country. Things
cannot go on upon the prefent bottom. The
-pofiefilon- of Toulon, which, well managed, might
be of the greateft advantage, will be the greateft
misfortune that ever happened to this nation. The
ariore we multiply troops there, the more we mall
anultiply caufes and means of quarrel amongft our-
-felves. I know but one way of avoiding it, which
is to give a greater degree of fimplicity to our
politicks. Our fituation does neceflarily render
them a good deal involved. And, to this evil, in-
ftead of increafing it, we ought to apply ail the
remedies in our power.
See what is, in that place, the confcqucnce
(to fay nothing of every other) of this complexity.
Toulon has, as it were, two gates, an Enghlh, and
a Spaniili. The Englifh gate is, by our policy,
fill barred againft the entrance of any Royalifts.
The Spaniards open theirs, I fear, upon no fixed
principle, and with very little judgment. By
means,
c i7i r
means, however, of this foolim, mean, and jeaious
policy on our fide, ail the Royalifts whom the
Englim might felect as mod practicable, and mofl
fubfervient to honeft views, are totally excluded."
Of thofe admitted., the Spaniards are mailers. As
to the inhabitants they are a neft of Jacobins which
is delivered into our hands, not from principle,
but from fear. The inhabitants of Toulon may
be defcribed in few words. It is differ turn nautis;
cauponibtts atque malignis. The reft of the feaports
are of the fame defcription.
Another thing which I cannot account for is, the
fending for the Bifhop of Toulon, and afterwards
forbidding his entrance. This is as directly con-
trary to the declaration, as it is to the practice of
the allied powers. The King df Pruffia did better.
When he took Verdun, he actually re-inftated the
Bifhop and his Chapter. When he thought he
fhould be the mafter of Chalons, he called the
bifliop from Flanders, to put him into pofieflion.
The Auftrians have reftored the clergy wherever
they obtained poffelfion. We have propofed to
reftore Religion as well as Monarchy j and in
Toulon we have reftored neither the one nor the
other. It is very likely that the Jacobin Sans-
Culottes, orfome of them, objected to this nieafure,
who rather chufe to have the atheiftick buffoons of
clergy they have got to fport with, till they are
Z 2 ready
( '7* )
ready to come forward, with the reft of their
worthy brethren, in Paris and other places, to de-
clare that they are a let of importers, that they
never believed in God, and never will preach any
fort of religion. If we give way to our Jacobins
in this point, it is fully and fairly putting the go-
vernment, civil and ecclefiaftical, not in the King
of France, to whom, as the protector and go-
vernor, and in fubftance the head of the Gallican
Church,. the nomination to the bimopricks" belonged,
and who made the bifhop of Toulon ; it docs not
leave it with him, or even in the hands of the King
of England, or the King of Spain j but in the
bafeft Jacobins of a low lea-port, to exercife, fro
tern-pore, the fovereignty. If this point of religion is
thus given up, the grand inftrument for reclaiming
France is abandoned. We cannot, if we would,
delude ourielves about the true ilate of this dread-
ful conteft. // is a religious war. It includes in
its object undoubtedly every other jntereil of fo-
ciety as well as this ; but this is the principal and
leading feature. It is through this deftructjon of
religion that our enemies propofe the accomplifh---
ment of all their other views. The French Reyo-
lution, impious at once and fanatical, had no other
plan for dorneftick poyvcr and foreign empire. Look
at all the proceedings of the National Affembly
from the firft day of declaring itielf fuch in the
year 1789, to this very hour, and you will find full
half
C 173 )
half of their bufmefs to be direcHy on this fubjech
In fad: it is the fpirit of the whole. The religious
fyftem, called the Conftitutional Church, was on
the face cf the whole proceeding fet up only as a
mere temporary amufement to the people, and fo
conftantiy ftated in all their converfations, till the
time ihould come, when they might with fafety caft
off the very appearance of all religion whatfoever,
and perfecute chriftianity throughout Europe with
fire and fword. The Conftitutional Clergy are not
the Minifters of any religion : they are the agents and
inftruments of this horrible confpiracy againft all
morals. It was from a fenfe of this, that in the
jEnglifh Addition to the Articles propofed at St.
Pomingo, tolerating all Religions, we very wifely
jefufed to fuffer that kind of traitors and buffoons.
This religious war is not a, controverfy between
feel: and feel: as formerly, but a war againft all fects
and all religions. The queftion is not whether
you are to overturn the catholick, to fet up the
proteftant. Such an idea in the prelent ftate of
the world is too contemptible. Our bufmefs is to
leave to the fchools the difcufTion of the contro-
verted points, abating as much as we can the
acrimony of difputants on all fides. It is for chriftian
Statefmen, as the world is now circumftanced, to
fecure their common Bafis, and not to rifque the
fubverfion. of the whole Fabrick by purfuing thefe
diftinclions
(174 )
di"ftincYins with an ill-timed zeal. We have in
the prefent grand Alliance, all modes of Govern-
ment as well as all modes of religion. In Govern-
ment, we mean to reftore that which, notwithftand-
ing our diverfity of forms we are all agreed in, as
fundamental in Government. The fame principle
ought to guide us in the religious part ; conforming
the mode, not to our particular ideas (for in that
point we have no ideas in common) but to
what will beft promote the great general ends
of the Alliance. As Statefmen we are to fee
which of thofe modes beft fuits with the interefts
of fuch a Commonwealth as we wifh to fecwre
and promote. There can be no doubt, but that
the catholick religion, which is fundamentally the
religion of France, muft go with the Monarchy
of France ; we know that the Monarchy did not
furvive the Hierarchy, no not even in appearance,
for many months j in fubftance, not for a fingle
hour. As little can it exift in future, if that pillar
is taken away, or even mattered and impaired.
If it mould pleafe God to give to the Allies the
means of reftoring peace and order in that focus
of war and confufion, I would, as I faid in the
beginning of this Memorial, firft replace the whole
of the old Clergy : becaufe we have proof more
than fufHcient, that whether they err or not in the
fcholaftick difputes with us, they are not tainted
with
( -75 )
-with atheifm, the great political evil .of the time.
I hope I need not apologize for this phrafe, as if
I thought religion nothing but policy ; it is far from
my thoughts ; and I hope it is not to be inferred
.from my expreflions. But in the light of policy
alone I am here confidering the queftion. I fpeak
of policy too in a large light ; in which large light,
policy too is a facred thing.
There are many, perhaps half a million or more,
calling themfelves proteftants, in the fouth of
France, and in other of the provinces. Some
raife them to a much greater number, but I think
this nearer to the mark. I am forry to fay, that
they have behaved mockingly fmce the very be-
ginning of this rebellion, and have been uniformly
concerned in its worft and mofl atrocious acts.
Their Clergy are juft the fame atheifts with thofe
of the Conftitutional catholicks ; but ftill more
wicked and daring. Three of their number have
met, from their Republican aflbciates, the reward
of their crimes.
As the antient catholick religion is to be reftored
for the body of France, the antient calviniftick
religion ought to be reftored for the proteflants
with every kind of protection and privilege. But
not one Miniiler concerned in this rebellion ought
to be fufrered arnongft them. If they have not-
Clergy
C 7 >
Clergy of their own, men well recommended as
untainted with Jacobinifm, by the fynods of thofe
places where calvinifm prevails and French is
fpoken, ought to be fought. Many fuch there are.
The prefbyterian difcipline ought, in my opinion,'
to be eftablilhed in its vigour, and the people pro- ]
felling it ought to be bound to its maintenance.
No man, under the falfe and hypocritical pretence
of liberty of conference, ought to be fuffered to
have no confcience at all. The King's com- ]
mifiioner ought alfo to fit in their fynods as before
the revocation of the Edict of Nantz. I am con-
fcious, that this difcipline difpofcs men to Repub-
licanifm : but it is ftill a difcipline, and it is a cure,
(fuch as it is) for the perverfe and undifciplined
habits which for fome time have prevailed. Re- '
publicanifm repreffed may have its ufe in the com-
polition of a State. Inipe&ton may be practicable,
and reiponfibility in the teachers and elders may be
eftabliihed in fuch an Hierarchy as the prefbyterian.
For a time like ours, it is a great point gained,
that people fhould be taught to meet, to combine,
and to be clail.ed and arrayed in fome other way
than in Clubs of Jacobins. If it be not the bcft
mode of proteftantifm under a Monarchy, it is
flill an orderly chriflian church, orthodox in the
fundamentals, and what is to our point, capable
enough of rendering men uleful citizens. It was
the impolitick Abolition of their difcipiine which
expofed
( '77 )
cxpofed them to the wild opinions and conduct,
that have prevailed amongft the Hugonots. The
toleration in 1787 was owing to the good dilpo-
fition of the late King ; but it was modified by the
profligate folly of his atheiftick Miniiter the Cardinal
de Lomenie. This mifchievous Minifter did not
follow, in the Edi<5t of toleration, the wifdom of
the Edict of Nantz. But his toleration was granted
to Non-Catbolicks a dangerous word, which might
fignify any thing, and was but too exprefllve of a
fatal indifference with regard to all piety. I fpeak
for myfelf : I do not wilh any man to be converted
from his feet. The diftinctions which we have
reformed from animofity to emulation, may be
even ufeful to the caufe of religion. By fome
moderate contention they keep alive zeal. Whereas
people who change, except under ftrong convic-
tion (a thing now rather rare) the religion of their
early prejudices, efpeciaily if the converfion is
brought about by any political machine, are very
apt to degenerate into indifference, laxity, and
often downright atheifm.
Another political queftion arifes about the mode
of Government which ought to be eftablifhed.
I think the proclamation (which I read before I
had proceeded far in this Memorial,) puts it on
the beft footing, by poflponing that arrangement
to a time of peace.
A a When
When our politicks lead us to entcrprizc a great,
nd almoft total political revolution in Europe, we
ought to look ferioufly into the confequences of
what we are about to do. Some eminent peribns
difcover an apprehenfion that the Monarchy, if
refrored in France, may be reftored in too great
ftrength for the liberty and happinefs of the natives,
and for the tranquillity of other States. They are
therefore of opinion that terms ought to be made
for the modification of that Monarchy. They are
perfons too configurable from the powers of their
mind, and from their fituation, as well as from the
real refpect I have for them, who feem to entertain
thefe apprehenfions, to let me pafs them by un-
noticed.
As to the power of France, as a State, and in
its exteriour relations, I confefs my frars are on the
part of its extreme reduction. There is un-
doubtedly fomething in the vicinity of France,
which makes it naturally and properly an objedl of
our watchfulnefs and jealoufy, whatever form its
Government may take. But the difference is great
between a plan for our own fecurity, and a fcheme
for the utter deftruction of France. If there were
no other countries in the political map but thefe
two, I admit that policy might juftify a wifh to
lower our neighbour to a ftandard which would
even render her in fonie meafure, if not wholly,
our
i 179 )
our dependent. But the iyftem of Europe is- ex*
tenfive and extremely complex. However formi-
dable to us as taken in this one relation, France is
not equally dreadful to all other States. On the
contrary, my clear opinion is, that the Liberties
of Europe cannot pofllbly be preferved, but by
her remaining a very great and preponderating
power. The defign at prefent evidently purfued
by the combined Potentates, or of the two who
lead, is totally to deftroy her as fuch a Power.
For Great Britain refolves that ihe fhall have no
Colonies, no Commerce, and no Marine. Auftria
means to take away the whole frontier from the
borders of Switzerland, to Dunkirk. It is their
plan alfo to render the interiour Government lax and
feeble, by prefcribing by force of the arms of rival
and jealous nations, and without confulting the
natural interefts of the kingdom; fuch arrange-
ments as in the aftual ftate of Jacobinifm in France,
and the unfettled ftate in which property muft re-
main for a long time, will inevitably produce fuch
diftra&ion and debility in Government, as to reduce
it to nothing, or to throw it back into its old con-
fufion. One cannot conceive fo frightful a ftate
of a Nation. A maritime country, without a ma-
rine, and without commerce $ a continental country
without a frontier, and for a thoufand miles iur-
rounded with powerful, warlike, and ambitious
neighbours ! It is pofiible, that fhe might fubmic
A a 2 to
( xo )
to lofc her commerce and her colonies ; her
fecurity me never can abandon. If, contrary to
all expectations, under fuch a difgraced and im-
potent Government, any energy mould remain in
that country, me will make every effort to recover
her fecurity, which will involve Europe for a cen-
tury in war and blood. What has it coft to France
to make that frontier ? What will it coft to re-
cover it ? Auftria thinks that without a Frontier
me cannot fecure the Netherlands. But without
her Frontier France cannot fecure berfelf. Auftria
has been however fecure for an hundred years in
thofe very Netherlands, and has never been difpof-
fefied of them by the chance of war, without a
moral certainty of receiving them again on the
reftoration of peace. Her late dangers have arifcn
not from the power or ambition of the King of
France. They arofe from her own ill policy,
which difmantled all her towns, and difcontented
all her fubjects by Jacobinical innovations. She
difmantles her own towns, and then fays, Give
me the Frontier of France. But let us depend
upon it, whatever tends, under the name of fear-
rity, to aggrandize Auftria, will difcontent and
alarm Prufiia. Such a length of Frontier on the
fide of France, fcparated from itfelf, and fepa-,
rated from the mafs of the Auftrian country, will
be weak, unlefs connected at the expence of the
Rleftor of Bavaria (the Elector Palatine) and
othej 1
other lefler Princes, or by fuch exchanges as will
again convulfe the Empire.
Take it the other way, and let us fuppofe that
France fo broken in fpirit as to be content to re-
main naked and defencelefs by fea and by land,
is fuch a country no prey ? Have other Nations
no views ? Is Poland the only country of which
it is worth while to make a partition ? We cannot
be fo childifh as to imagine, that ambition is local,
and that no others can be infected with it but thole
who rule within certain parallels of latitude and
longitude ? In this way I hold war equally certain.
But I can conceive that both thefe principles may
operate, ambition on the part of Auftria, to cut
more and more from France, and French impa-
tience under her degraded and unfafe condition.
In fuch a Conteft will the other Powers ftand by ?
Will not Pruffia call for indemnity as well as Auftria
and England ? Is me fatisfied with her gains in
Poland ? By no means. Germany mud pay; or
we mail infallibly fee Pruffia leagued with France
and Spain, and poflibly with other Powers for the
reduction of Auftria ; and fuch may be the fitua-
rion of things, that it will not be fo eafy to decide
what part England may take in fuch a Conteft.
I am well aware how invidious a tafk it is to
c-ppofe any thing which tends to the apparent
4 aggrandize-
( 182 )
aggrandizement of our own country. But I think
no country can be aggrandized whilft France is
Jacobinifed. This poll removed, it will be a
ferious queftion how far her further reduction will
contribute to the general fafety which 1 always con-
fider as included. Among precautions againfl am-
bition, it may not be amifs to take one precaution
againft our o^n. I muft fairly fay, I dread our
own power and pur own ambition; I dread our
being too much dreaded. It is ridiculous to fay
we are not men ; and that, as men, we mall never
wim to aggrandize ourfelves in fome way or other.
Can we fay, that even at this very hour we are not
invidioufly aggrandized ? We are already in pof-
feffion of almoft all the commerce of the world.
Our Empire in India is an awful thing. If we
mould come to be in a condition not only to have
all this afcendant in commerce, but to be abfo-
lutely able, without the lead controul> to hold the
commerce of all other Nations totally dependent
upon our good pleafure, we may fay that we mall
not abufe this aftonifhing, and hitherto unheard
of power. But every other Nation will think we
mall abufe it. It is impoflible but that fooner or
later, this ftate of things muft produce a com-
bination againft us which may end in our ruin.
As to France, I muft obferve that for a long
time flie has been ftationary. She has, during this
whole
whole century, obtained far lefs by conqueft or
negotiation than any of the three grear continental
Powers. Some part of Lorraine excepted, I re-
collect nothing fhe has gained -, no not a village.
In truth, this Lorraine acquifition does little more
than fccure her Barrier. In effect and fubftance it
was her own before.
However that may be, I confider thefe things at
prefent chiefly in one point of view, as obstructions
to the war on Jacobinifm, which mufl Hand as long
as the Powers think its extirpation but zjecondary
object, and think of taking advantage under the
name of indemnity andfecurify to make war upon
the whole Nation of France Royal, and Jacobin,
for the aggrandizement of the Allies on the ordi-
nary principles of intereft, as if no Jacobinifm
exifted in the world.
So far is France from being formidable to its
neighbours for its domeftick ftrength, that I conceive
it will be as much as all its neighbours can do by a
fceady guarantee, to keep that Monarchy at all
jpon its bafis. It will be their bufinefs to nnrfe
France, not to exhauft it. France, fuch as it is,
s indeed highly formidable. Not formidable,
however, as a great Republick ; but as the moft
dreadful gang of robbers and murderers that ever
was embodied. But this diftempered ftrength of
France,
( '84 )
France, will be the caufe of proportionable weak-
nefs on its recovery. Never was a country fo com-
pletely ruined j and they who calculate the refur-
reftion of her power by former examples, have not
fufficiently confidered what is the prefent ftate
of things. Without detailing the inventory of
what organs of Government have been deftroyed,
together with the very materials of which alone
they can be recompofed, I wifh it to be confidered
what an operofe affair the whole fyftem of taxa-r
tion is in the old ftates of Europe. It is fuch as
never could be made but in a long courfe of years.
In France, all taxes are abolilhed. The prefent
powers refort to the capital ; and to the capital in
kind. But a favage undifcipljned people fuffer a
robbery with more patience than an iwpoft. The
former is in their habits and their difpofitions.
They confider it as tranfient, and as what, in their
turn, they may exercife. But the terrours of the
prefent power are fuch as no regular Government
can pofiibly employ. They who enter into France
do not fucceed to their refources. They have not
a fyftem to reform, but a fyftem to begin. The
whole eftate of Government is to be re-acquired.
What difficulties this will meet with in a coun-
try exhaufted by the taking of the capital, and
among a people, in a manner new principled,
trained, and actually difciplined to anarchy, rebel-
lion,
lion, diforder, and impiety, may be conceived by
thofe who know what Jacobin France is, and who
may have occupied themfelves by revolving in
their thoughts, what they were to do if it fell to
their lot to rc-eftablifh the affairs of France.
What fupport, or what limitations the reftored
Monarchy muft have, may be a doubt, or how i:
will pitch and fettle at laft : But one thing I con-
ceive to be far beyond a doubt : that the fettle-
ment cannot be immediate -, but that it muft be
preceded by fome fort of power, equal at leafl in
vigour, vigilance, promptitude and decifion to a
military Government. For fuch a preparatory
Government, no flow-paced, methodical, formal,
Lawyer-like fyilem, ftill lefs that of a fhewy,
fuperfkial,trifling, intriguing Court, guided by cabals
of ladies, or of men like ladies ; leaft of all, a philo-
fophic, theoretic, difputatious fchool of fophiftry.
None of thefe ever will, or ever can lay the foun-
dations of an order that can laft. Whoever claims
a right by birth to govern there, muft find in his
breaft, or muft conjure up in it, an energy not to
be expected, perhaps not always to be wifhed for,
in well ordered States. The lawful Prince muft
have, in every thing but crime, the character of
an ufurper. He is gone, if he imagines himfelf
the quiet pofiefibr of a throne. He is to contend
for it as much after an apparent conqueft as before.
His talk is to win it 5 he muft leave poftcrity to
B b enjoy
enjoy and to adorn it. No velvet cufhions for
him. He is to be always (I fpeak nearly to the
letter) on horlcback. This opinion is the refult
of much patient thinking on the fubject, which I
conceive no event is likely to alrer.
A valuable friend of mine, who I hope will con-
duct thefe afrairs fo far as they fall to his fhare,
with great ability, aiked me what I thought of acts
of general indemnity and oblivion, as a means of
fettling France, and reconciling it to Monarchy.
Before I venture upon any opinion of my own in
this matter, I totally difclaim the interference of
foreign powers in a buunefs that properly be-
longs to the Government which we have declared
legal. That Government is likely to be the bed
.judge of what is to be done towards the fecurity
of that kingdom, which it is their duty and their
intereft to provide for by fuch meafures of juftice
or of lenity, as- at the time they mould find beft.
But if we weaken it, not only by arbitrary limita-
tions of our own, but prelerve fuch peribns in it
as are difpofcd to difturb its future peace, as they
- have its paft, I do not know how a mere direct
' declaration can be made of a difpofition to per-
petual hoftility againft a Government. The per-
; ions Caved from the juftice of the native Magii-
trate, by foreign authority, will owe nothing to his
, clemency. He will, and muft, look to thole .to
3 whom
( 1*7 )
whom he is indebted for the power he has of dif-
penfing it. A Jacobin faction, conftantly fettered
with the nourifhment of foreign protection, will be
kept alive.
This defire of fecuring the fafety of the actors
in the prefent fccne is owing to more laudable
motives. Minifters have been made to confider
the brothers of the late merciful King, and the
Nobility of France, who have been faithful to
their honor and duty, as a fet of inexorable and
remorfeleis tyrants. How this notion has been
infufed into them, I cannot be quite certain. I am
fure it is not juftified by any thing they have done.
Never were the two Princes guilty, in the day of
their power, of a fingle hard or ill-natured act.
No one inftance of cruelty on the part of the Gen-
tlemen ever came to my ears. It is true that the
Englijh Jacobins, (the natives have not thought of
it) as an excufe for their infernal fyftem of mur-
der, have lo reprefented them. It is on this prin.-
ciple that the maflacres in the month of Sep-
tember 1792 were juftified by a writer in the
Morning Chronicle. He fays, indeed, that " the
whole French nation is to be given up to the hands
of an irritated and revengeful Noblefie :" and
judging of others by himfeif and his brethren, lie
fays, "Whoever fucceeds in a civil war, will be
cruel. But here -the emigrants flying to revenge
B b 2 in
in the cars of military victory, will almoft infatiAbhr
call for their victims and their booty ; and a body
of emigrant traitors were attending the King of
Pruflla, and the Duke of Brunfwick, to fuggeft
the moft fanguinary counfels." So fays this wicked
Jacobin ; but fo cannot fay the King of Prultia nor
the Duke of Brunfwick, who never did receive
any fanguinary council ; nor did the King's bro-
thers, or that great body of Gentlemen who at-
tended thofe Princes, commit one fmgle cruel ac-
tion, or hurt the perfon or property of one indi-
vidual. It would be right to quote the inftance.
It is like the military luxury attributed to thefc
unfortunate fuffeirers in our common caufe.
If thefe Princes had Ihewn a tyrannic difpofition^
it would be much to be lamented. We have no
others to govern France. If we fcreened the body
of murderers from their juftice, we mould only
leave the innocent in future to the mercy of men
cf fierce and fanguinary difpofitions, of which in
fpite of all our intermeddling in their Conftitution,
v/e could not prevent the effects. But as we have
much more reafon to fear their feeble lenity than
any blameable rigour, we ought, in my opinion, to
leave the matter to themfelves.
If however I were afked to give an advice
merely as fuch here are my ideas. I am not for
a total
a total indemnity, nor a general punifhrr.ent. And
firft, the body and mafs of the people never ought
to be treated as criminal. They may become an
object of more or lefs conftant watchfulnefs and
fufpicion, as their prefervation may beft require,
but they can never become an object of punifh-
ment. This is one of the few fundamental and
unalterable principles of politicks.
To punifli them capitally would be to make
maflacres. MafTacres only increafe the ferocity
of men, and teach them to regard their own lives
and thofe of others as of little value ; whereas the
great policy of Government is to teach the people
to think both of great importance in the eyes of
God and the State, and never to be facrificed or
even hazarded to gratify their pafiions, or for any
thing but the duties prefcribed by the rules of
morality, and under the direction of public law
and public authority. To punilh them with letter
penalties would be to debilitate the commonwealth,
and make the nation miferable, which it is the
bufmefs of Government to render happy and flou-
riftiing.
As to crimes too, I would draw a flrong line of
limitation. For no one offence, politically an offence
cf rebellion, by council, contrivance, perfuafion
or compulfion, for none properly a military offence of
rebellion^
rebellion, or any thing done by open hoftility in
the field, fhould any man at all be called in quef-
lionj becaufc fuch feems to be the proper and
natural death of civil difientions. The offences
of war are obliterated by peace.
. Another clafs will of courfe be included in the
indemnity, namely, all thofe who by their activity
in reftoring lawful Government fhall obliterate
their offences. The offence previoufly known,
the acceptance of fervice is a pardon for crimes.
I fear that this clafs of men will not be very nu-
merous.
So far as to indemnity. But where are the
objects of juftice, and of example, and of future
fecurity to the public peace ? They are naturally
pointed out, not by their having outraged political
and civil laws, nor their having rebelled againft
the ftate, as a State, but by their having rebelled
againft the law of nature, and outraged man,
as man. In this lift, all the regicides in general,
all thofe who laid facriiegious hands on the King,
who without any thing in their own rebellious
million to the convention to juftify them, brought
him to his trial and unanimoufly voted him guilty ;
all thofe who had a (hare in the cruel murder of
the Queen, and the deteftable proceedings with
regard to the young King, and the unhappy Prin-
ce fie s
cefles ; all thofe who committed cold-blooded
murder any where, and particularly in their revo-
lutionary tribunals, where every idea of natural
juftice and of their own declared Rights of Man,
have been trod under foot with the moft infolent
mockery , all men concerned in the burning and
demolition of houfes or churches, with audacious
and marked acts of facrilege and fcorns offered to
religion ; in general, all the leaders of Jacobin
Clubs j not one of thefe mould efcape a punifh-
ment fuitable to the nature, quality and degree of
their offence, by a fteady but a meafured juftice.
In the firft place, no man ought to be fubjecl to
any penalty, from the higheft to the loweil, but
by a trial according to the courfe of law, carried
on with all that caution and deliberation which has
been ufed in the beft times and precedents of the
French jurifprudence, the criminal law of which
country, faulty to be lure in fome particulars, was
highly laudable and tender of the lives of men.
In reftoring order and juftice, every thing like re-
taliation, ought to be religioufly avoided ; and an
example ought to be fet of a total alienation from
the Jacobin proceedings in their accurfed revolu-
tionary tribunals. Every thing like lumping men in
maiTes, and of forming tables, of profcription
eught to be avoided.
:
( '9* )
In all thefe punilhments, any thing which can
be alledged in mitigation of the offence fhould
be fully confidcred. Mercy is not a thing oppofed
to juftice. It is an erTential part of it , as neceffary
in criminal cafes, as in civil affairs equity is to law.
It is only for the Jacobins never to pardon. They
have not done it in a fmgle inftance. A council
of mercy ought therefore to be appointed, with
powers to report on each cafe, to foften the
penalty, or entirely to remit it, according to cir-
cumftances.
With thefe precautions, the very firft founda-
tion of fettlement muft be to call to a ftricl:
account thofe bloody and mercilefs offenders. With-
out it Government cannot frand a year. People
little confider the utter impofiibility of getting thofc
who having emerged from very low, feme from the
loweft claflfes, of fociety, have exercifed a power fo
high, and with fuch unrelenting and bloody a rage,
quietly to fall back into their old ranks, and be-
come humble, peaceable, laborious and ufeful
members of fociety. It never can be. On the
other hand is it to be believed, that any worthy
and virtuous fubjecl, reftored to the ruins of his
houfe, will with patience fee the cold-blooded
murderer of his.father, mother, wife, or children,
or perhaps all of the/e relations (fuch things have
been) nofc him in his own village, and infult him
with
( '93 )
with the riches acquired from the plunder of his
goods, ready again to head a Jacobin Faction
to attack his life ? He is unworthy of the name of
man who would fuffcr it. It is unworthy of the
name of a Government, which taking juftice out
of the private hand, will not exercife it for the
injured by the public arm.
I know it founds plaufible, and is readily adopted
by thofe who have little fympathy with the fuffer-
ings of others, to wifli to jumble the innocent and
guilty into one mafs, by a general indemnity.
This cruel indifference dignities itfelf with the.
name of humanity.
It is extraordinary that as the wicked arts of this
regicide and tyrannous faction increafe in number,
variety, and atrocity, the defire of punifhing them
becomes more and more faint, and the talk of a/i
indemnity towards them, every day flronger and
flronger. Our ideas of juftice appear to be fairly
conquered and overpowered by guilt when it is
grown gigantick. It is not the point of view in
which we are in the habit of viewing guilt. The
crimes we every day puni'h are really below the
penalties we inflict. The criminals are obfcure
and feeble. This is the view in which we lee or-
dinary crimes and criminals. But wh:n guilt is
feen, though but for a time, to be furnimed with
C c the
C '94 )
the arms and to be invefted with the robes of
power, it feems to aflume another nature, and to
get, as it were, out of our jurifdidtion. This I
fear is the cafe with many. But there is another
caufe full as powerful towards this fecurity to enor-
mous guilt, the defire which poficffes people who
have once obtained power, to enjoy it at their eafe.
It is not humanity, but lazinefs and inertnefs of
mind which produces the defire of this kind of in-
demnities. This defcription of men love general
and fhort methods. If they punifh, they make a
promifcuous maffacre ; If they fpare, they make a
general act of oblivion. This is a want of difpofi-
tion to proceed laborioufly according to the cafes,
and according to the rules and principles of juftice
on each cafe ; a want of difpofition to aflbrt criminals,
to difcriminate the degrees and modes of guilt, to
feparate accomplices from principals, leaders from
followers, feducers from the fcduced, and then by
following the fame principles in the fame detail, to
clafs punifhments, and to fit them to the nature
and kind of the delinquency. If that were once
attempted, \ve fLould tbow fee that the talk was
i.cither infinite, nor the execution cruel. There
would be deaths, but for the number of criminals,
and the extent of France, not many. There would
be cafes of iranfportation -, cafes of labour to re -
ilore what has been wickedly deflroyed ; caies of
JmpriibnHient, and cafes of mere exile. But be
6 this
this as it may, I am fure that if juftice is not done
there, there can be neither peace or juftice there,
nor in any part of Europe.
Hiftory is reforted to for other acts of indem-
nity in other times. The Princes are delired
to look back to Henry the Fourth. We are
defired to look to the Reiteration of King
Charles. Thefe things, in my opinion, have
no refemblance whatsoever. They were cafes of
a civil war; in France more ferocious, in Eng-
land more moderate than common. In neither
country were the orders of fociety fubvertcd;
religion and morality deftroyed on principle, or
property totally annihilated. In England the Go-
vernment of Cromwell was to be fure fomewhat
rigid, but for a new power, no favage tyranny.
The country was nearly as well in his hands
as in thofe of Charles the Second, and in fome
points much better. The laws in general had
their' courfe, and were admirably administered.
The King did not in reality grant an aft of in-
demnity ; the prevailing power, then in a manner
the nation, in effect granted an indemnity to him.
The idea of a preceding Rebellion was-'not at all
admitted in that convention and that -parliament.
The Regicides were a common enemy, and as
fuch given up.
C c 2 Among
Among the ornaments of their place which emi-
nently diftinguifh them,, few people are better
acquainted with the hi (lory cf their own country
than the illuftrious Princes, now in exile: but I
caution them not to be led into errour by that which
has been fuppofed to be the guide of life. I would
give the fame caution to all Princes. Not that I
derogate from the ufe of hiflory. It is a great im-
prover of the underftaruiing, by fhewing both men
and affairs in a great variety of views. From this
fource much political wifdom may be learned; that
is, may be learned as habit, not as precept ; and as
an exercife to ftrengthen the mind, as furniming
materials to enlarge and enrich it, not as a repertory
of cafes and precedents for a lawyer : if it were, a
thoufand times better would it be that a Statefman
had never learned to read vellem mjctrent lit eras.
This method turns their underftanding from the
object before them, and from the prefent exigencies
of the world, to companions with former times, of
which after all, we can know very little and very
imperfectly ; and our guides, the hiflorians, who are
to give ::: iheir true interpretation, are often preju-
diced, often ignorant, often fonder of fyftem than of
truth. Whereas if a man with reafonable good
parts and natural fagacity, and not in the leading-
firings of any m after, will look fleadily on the
bufmefs before him, without being diverted by
retrofped and comparifon, he may be capable of
forming
( '97 )
forming a reafonable good judgment of what is to
be done. There are fome fundamental points in
which nature never changes but they are few and
obvious, and belong rather to morals than to poli-
ticks. But fo far as regards political matter, the
human mind and human affairs are fufceptible of
infinite modifications, and of combinations wholly
new and unlooked for. Very few, for inftance,
could have imagined that property, which has been
taken for natural dominion, mould, through the
whole of a vaft kingdom, lofe all its importance
and even its influence. This is what hiftory or
books of fpeculation could hardly have taught us.
How many could have thought, that the molt com-
plete and formidable Revolution in a great empire
Ihould be made by men of letters, not as fubordi-
nate inftruments and trumpeters of fedition, but as
the chief contrivers and managers, and in a fhort
time as the open adminiftrators and ibvereign
Rulers ? Who could have imagined that Atheifm
could produce one of the moft violently operative
principles of fanaticifm ? Who could have ima-
gined that, in a Commonwealth in a manner
cradled in war, and in an extern! ve and dreadful
war, military commanders mould be of little or no
account ? That the Convention ihould not contain
one military man of name ? That administrative
bodies in a flate of the utmoft confufion, and of
but a momentary duration, and compofed of men
with
with not one impofing part of character, ihould be
able to govern the country and its armies, with an
authority which the moll fettled Senates, and the
moft refpecled Monarchs fcarcely ever had in the
lame degree ? This, for one, I confefs I did not
forefee, though all the reft was prefent to rne very
early, and not out of my apprehenfion even for
leveral years.
I believe very few were able to enter into the
effects of mere terrour, as a principle not only for
the fupport of power in given hands or forms, but
in thofe things in which the foundeft political Spe-
culators were of opinion, that the leaft appearance
of force would be totally deftrucliive, fuch is the
the market, whether of money, provifion, or com-
modities of any kind. Yet for four years we have
ieen loans made, treafuries fupplied, and armies
levied and maintained, more numerous than France
ever fhewed in the field, by the effetts of fear alone.
Here is a ftate of things of which, in its totality,
if hiftory furnifhes any examples at all, they are very
remote and feeble. I therefore am not fo ready as
fome are, to tax with folly or cowardice, thofe who
were not prepared to meet an evil of this nature.
Even now, after the events, all the caufes may be
fbmewhat difficult to afcertain. Very many are
however traceable. But thefe things hiftory and
books
( '99 )
books of {peculation (as I have already faid) did
not teach men to forefce, and of courfe to refill.
Now that they are no longer a matter of fagacity,
but of experience, of recent experience, of our
own experience, it would be unjuftifiable to go
back to the records of other times, to inftruft us
to manage what they never enabled us to forelee.
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX,
EXTRACTS from VATFEL\ LAW of NATIONS.
[The Titles, marginal Abftracls and Notes, are by Mr. BURKE,
excepting fuch of the Notes as are here diftinguifhed.] -
CASES OF INTERFERENCE WITH INDE-
PENDENT POWERS.
BOOK II. CHAP. IV. 53.
IF then there is any where a Nation of a rejilefs and
mrfchitvous difpofition, always ready to injure others^
to traverfe their defigns, and to raife dome/lie troubles *,
.it is not to be doubted, that all have a right to join in
order to reprefi) chajiife, and put it ever after out of its
power to injure them. Such ihould be the juft fruits of
the policy which Machiavel praifes in Caefar Borgia.
The conduit followed by Philip II. king of Spain, was
adapted to unite all Europe again/I him ; and it was from
juft reafons that Henry the Great formed the defign of
humbling a power, formidable by its forces^ and pernicious
ly its maxims.
70. Let us apply to the unjuft, what we have faid
above ( 53), of a mifchievous, or maleficent Nation.
If there be any that makes an open profeffion of trampling
'Jujlice under foot^ pf defyifing and violating the right of
* This the cafe of France Semonville at Turin Jacobin clubs
~Liegois meeting Flemiih meeting La Fayette's aniwer Cloot's's
embaily Avignoiv,
D d 'others,
atktn *, whenever it finds an opportunity, tbi iniercft of
human fociety will authorize all others to unite, in order ia
humble and cbajtife it. We do not here forget the maxim
ettabliihed in our preliminaries, that it docs not belong to
nations to uiurp the power of being judges of each other.
In particular cafes, liable to the lea'lt doubt, it ought to
be iuppofed, that each of the parties may have fome right :
and the injuilice of that, which has committed the injury,
may proceed from error, and not from a general contempt
of juilice. But if, by conjlant maxims, and ly a continued
conlut.l, one Nations {hews, that it has evidently this per-
nidous"di{pdfitioh, and that it cbnfiders no right as ("acred,
the fafety of the human Race requires that it mould be
fuppreflcd. To form and fupport an unjuft pretenfion, is
to do ah injury not only to hbn ivJ-o is Interefted in this
prcttnfion, but to mock at jujlice in general, and to injure
all Nations.
To fuccour 56. If the Prince, attacking the fundamental laws,
gainft gives his fubjecb a legal right to refift. him ; if Ty-
iyrny. ra nny, becoming infuppirtalk, obliges the Nation to rife
in their defence ; every foreign power has a right tf
fuccour an oppreikd people whp implore their afliftance.
The Englifh ' juftly complained of James the Second.
Cafe of The .fch'dity, and the nioj: dijYinguified Patriots, refolved
ts!i!li Re- to put a check on his enterprises, which manifeiily tended
voiucion. to overthrow the Conititution, and to deftroy the liberties ^
and the religion of the people; and therefore applied tor
ajjyian^ to 'the United Provinces. The authority of the
jr/nnce of Orange had, doubtlels, an influence on the de-
liberations of the States-General-, but it did not make,
them commit injultice ; for when a people, from eood
reafons, take up arms againft an Oppreilbr, jaftite anj
gcnerofity require, that brave men Jhould he ajjijted in the
Cife of defence of their libf nits.. Whene\ r er, theretore, a civil
Civil War. war i s kj,^!^ ] n a fa^ foreign powers may.afliit that
party which appears to them to have juitice on their fide.
Aft baious He ic bo afiiji; an odisus Tyrant ; be iubo declares FOR AN".
Rebellious UNJUST AND REBELMOUi PEOPLE, offends againft his
people. duty. When the bajids of the political fociety are broken,
* The French acknowledge no power not direftiy enj^^ti
the ptcj.k.
ATP END IX.
or at leaft fufpcnded between the Sovereign and his people,
they may then he considered as two diftmcl powers ; and * '
fmce each is independent of all foreign authority, nobody ^en'
has a right to judge them. Either may be in the right ; diftirx9t
and each of thole who grant their afliirance may believe P ^' crt -
that he fupports a good caufe. It follows then, in virtue
of the voluntary Law of Nations, (fee Prelim. 2,1) that
the two parties may act as having an equal right, and
behave accordingly, till the decifion of the aftair.
But we ought not to abufe this maxim for authorizing ^etto .b*
odious proceedings againit the tranquility of {rates. It is purfued to
a violation of the Law of Nations to perfuade tbofefubjefts extreme.
to revolt ivbo aRnally obey their Sovereign, though they ioJ^t^l^
complain of his Government, tw'p&i* to
The practice of Nations is conformable to our maxims. riVoic .-
When the German Proteftants came to the afuftance of
the reformed in France, the Court never undertook, to
treat them otherwife than as common enemies, and accord T
ing to the Laws of War. France at the fame time
afnfted the Netherlands, which took up arms againit
Spain, and did not pretend that her troops ihould be cun-
fidered upon any other footing than as auxiliaries in a
regular war. But no power avoids complaining of an Attempt **
atrocious injury, if any one attempts by his em'rjfari'es to e *cit fb-
txdtc his fitfy'cl* to revolt. . . ^ to re '
As to thofe Monfters who, under the title of Sovereigns, Tyrants,
render themfelves the Icourges and horror of the human
race; thefe are favage Beaits, from which every brave
man may juftly purge the Earth. All afitiquity kis praifed
Hercules for delivering the world from an Antzu?, 4
Bufiris, and a J>romedes.
Book 4. Chap. 2. 14. After ftating, that nations
have HO right to interfere in domeftick concerns, he pro-
ceeds " But this rule does not preclude them from
efpoufing the quarrel of a dethroned King, and afliiting
him, if he appears to have juilice on his fide. They
then declare themfelves enemies to the Nation who has
acknowledged his rival, as when two different Nations
are at war they are at liberty to alTilt that whole quarrcj
they think has the faireft appearance."
D d 2
APPENDIX.
CASE OF ALLIANCES.
BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 196.
IT is afked if that Alliance fubfifts with the King and
the Royal Family, when by fome Revolution they are
deprived of their Crown ? We have lately remarked,
( 194) that a perfonal alliance expires with the reign
of him who contracted it : but that is to be underftood
of an alliance with the flate, limited as to its duration,
to the reign of the contracting King. This, of which
we are here fpeaking, is of another nature. For though
it binds the {late, iince it is bound by all the public acts
of its Sovereign, it is made directly in favour of the King
and his Family ; it would therefore be abfurd for it to
prefe'rve a" terminate at the moment when they have need of //, and
King takes a t an event agalnjl which it was made. Befide?, the King
KhT' does ^ Oes not 'J ^ n * s qu^ity merely by the lofs of his king-
not lofe his dom. * If he is gripped of it imjuftly by an Ufurper^ or
quality by by Rtbeli^ he preferves his' rights^ in the number of wrrfck
h^ kin* - f are ^' s a ^i ances -
* By the feventh Article of the Treaty of TRIPLE ALLIANCE,
between France, England, and Holland, figned at the Hague, in the
year 1717, it is ftipuicted, '' that if the kingdoms, countries, or
" provinces, of auy of the Allies, are diftxirbrd by inteitine quar-
' rels, cr by rebellions, en account of the fa'id fuccej/ions, [the Pro-
' tefbr.t fuccefi'on to the throne of Great Brita in, and the fucceflion
' to the throne cf France, as fettled by the Treaty of Utrecht]
' or under any other pretext -i^bc-ie'ver, the Ally thus in trouble
' fhall have nil! right to demand cf his Allies the fuccours above -
' mentioned ;" that is to fay, the fame fuccours as in the cafe of
an invafion from any foreign Power; 8000 foot and 2000 horfe to he
ftirnifhed by France or Ergjand, and 4.000 foot and icoo hprfe by
the States Genera!.
By the fourthArticIe of the Treaty of QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE,
between England, Frar.ce, Holland, and the Emperor of Germany,
fjgnfd in the Year TVI?, the contracting powers " pvomife and
41 oblige rhemtelves that thty will and ought to maintain, guarantee,
" and defend the right and fuccelfion to the kingdom of France,
" according to the tenor <;(' the Treaties made at Utrecht the jith
' day of April, 171 } ; and this they fhall perform awi/'ft a'l ftr-
" fons T.-fratjbever tctc mny prffutne to tiiJJurb tbe order of tke Jatd
" fuccejjicn, in contradiiflion to the previous Ac~ts and Treaties fub-
f fequent thereon."
The al-ove Treaties have been revived and confirmed by every
fub.equent Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and France.
EDIT.
But
APPENDIX.
But who {hall judge, if the King be dethroned lawfully
or K- violence? An independent Nation acknowledges
no judge. If the Body of the Nation declares the King
deprived of hi^ rights by the abufe he has made of them,
and depofes him, it may juftly do it when its grievances
are well founded, and no other power has a right to cen-
fure it. The peribnal Ally of this King, ought not then
to afiift him againft the Nation that has made ufe of its
right in depofmg him : if he attempts it, he injures that
Nation. England declared war againft Louis the XlVth,
in the year 1688, for fupporting the intereft of James the
Second, who was depofed in form by the Nation. The
fame country declared war againft him a fecond time, at
the beginning of the prefent century, becaufe that Prince
acknowledged the fon of the depofed James, under the
name of James the Third. In doubtful cafes, and when Csfe
the Body of the Nation has not pronounced^ or HAS NOT wherein wd
PRONOUNCED FREELY, a Sovereign may naturally fup- m ''>' bc
port and defend an Ally, and it is then that the voluntary deAofed *
Law of Nations fubfifts between different ftates. The King,
party that has driven out the King, pretends to have right
on its fide : this unhappy King and his Ally, flatter them-
felves with having the fame advantage, and as they have
no common judge upon earth, they have no other method
to take but to apply to arms to terminate the difpute :
i_ i r ir -'.,-. *
they therefore engage in a formal war.
In fhort, when the foreign Prince has faithfully fulfilled
his engagements towards an unfortunate Monarch, when Not obliged
he has done in his defence, or to procure his reftoration, f ? P urfue
all he was obliged to perform, in virtue of the alliance ; yond'^a cer"
if his efforts are ineffectual, the dethroned Prince cannot tain point,
require him to fupport an endiefs war in his favour, or
expert that he will eternally remain the Enemy of the
Nation, or of the Sovereign who has deprived him of the
Throne. He muft think of peace, abandon the Ally,
and con/ider him as having himfelf abandoned his right,
through neceffity. Thus Louis XIV. was obliged to
abandon James the Second, rnd to acknowledge K. Wil-
liam, though he had at firft treated him as an Ufurper.
The fame queftion p relents itfelf in real alliances, and
in general, in all alliances made with the ftate, and not
in particular with a King for the defence of his perfon.
An
fenc?
againft fub
APPEN'DIX.
de- -An Ally ought, doubtlefs, to be defended againft everv
invafion, againft every foreign violence, and even againft
his rebellious fubjetts \ in the fame manner a Republick
ought to be defended agamjl the enterprises, of one who at"
tt'mpts to deftroy the public liberty. But it ought to be re-
membered, that an Ally of the State, or the Nation, is
not its Judge. If the Nation has depofed its King in
form ; if the people of a Republick have driven out their
Magiftrates, and fet themfelves at liberty, or acknow-
ledged the authority of an Ufurper, either exprelsly or
tacitly; to oppofe thefe domeltick regulations, by dif-
puting their juilice or validity, would : e to interfere in
the Government of the Nation, and to do it an injury,
(fee 54, and following of this book). The Ally re-
mains the Ally of the State, notwithstanding the change
Caft where that has happened in it. However, when this change
real a*B- renders the alliance ufeufs, dangerous or difagreeablc, it
may renounce it : for it may fay, upon a good fcyrfl.ntnn,
that it would not have entered into an alliance with that
Nation, had it been under the prefent form of Government.
We may fay here, what we 'have laid on a perfonal
alliance: however juft the caufe of that King may be,
who is driven from the throne, either by his lubjccts or
by a foreign ufurper; his Allies are not obliged to fupport
an eternal ^var in his favour. After having made in-
effectual eflorts to reftore him, they muft at length give
peace to their people, and come to an accommodation
with the Ufurper, and for that purpofe treat with him as
with a lawful Sovereign. Louis XIV. exhaufted by a
bloody and unfuccefsful war, offered at Gertruidenburg to
abandon his grandfon, whom he had placed on the throne
of Spain : and when affairs had changed their appearance,
Charles of Auftria, the rival of Philip, law himfelf, in
his turn, abandoned by his Allies. They grew weary of
exhaufting their ftates, in order to give him the poffeffion
of a Crown, which they believed to be his due, but
which, to all appearance, they Ihould never be able to
procure for him,
ances may
fee re-
nounced.
Not an
DANGER-
APPENDIX.
DANGEROUS POWER.
BOOK, III. CHAP. III. 45.
IT is ft ill calier to prove, that (hould this formidable AH ntx>
Power betray any unjuft and ambitious difpofitions, by ma y X"*-
doing the leaft injuftice to another,, every Nation may
ayaJl themfelves of the occafion, and join their forces to
thoie of the party injured, in order to reduce that ambi-
tious Power, and dilable it from fo eaiily opprefling its
neighbours, or keeping them in continual awe and fear.
For an injury gives a Nation a right to provide for its
future fafety, by taking away from the violator the means
of oppreiTion. It is lawful, and even praife-worthy, to
aiftft thole who are oppreiTed, or unjuftly attacked.
SYSTEM OF EUROPE.
47. Europe forms a political fjftem, a body, whertf
the whole is connected by the relations and different in-
terefts of Nations inhabiting this part of the workl. It
is not, as anciently, a confufed heap of detached pieces,
each of which thought itfelf very little concerned in the
fate of others, and feldom regarded things which did im-
mediately relate to it. The continual attention of Sove-
reigns to what is on the carpet, the cpnftant reiidence of
minilters, and the perpetual, negotiations, make Europe a. Europe
kind of a Republic k i the members of which,, though in ^^ f ^
pendent^ unitf, through the ties of common "intersjly 'for the..* t T e *f
maintenance of order and liberty. Hence- arofe that famous liberty,
icheme of the political equilibrium, or bajtrnqe of power i .
by which is underftood luch a difpofition of things, as no
power is able abiblutely to predominate, or to prelcriie
laws to others.
49. Confederacies would be A fure way of prefer.ving
the equilibrium, and fupporting the liberty of Nations*
did all Princes thoroughly underftand their true interefts,
and regulate all thw fej^s.-fer the good pf. the ftate.
CON.
APPENDIX,
CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE ENEMY'S
COUNTRY.
BOOK III. CHAP. IX. 165.
INSTEAD of the pillage of the country, and defence-
lefs places, a cuftom has been fubftituted more humane
and more advantageous to the Sovereign making war : I
mean that of contributions. Whoever carries on a jttft
war *, has a right of making the enemy's country contribute'
to the fuppart of the army^ and towards defraying all the
charges of the war. Thus he obtains a part of what is
due to him, and the fubjects of the enemy, on fubmitting
to this impofition, are fecured from pillage, and the
country is preferved : but a general who would not fully
his reputation, is to moderate his contributions, and pro-
portion them to thofe on whom they are impoied. An
excels in this point, is not without the reproach of cruelty
and inhumanity : if it {hews lefs ferocity than ravage and
deduction, it glares with avarice.
ASYLUM.
BOOK I. CHAP. XIX. 232.
IF an exile or banilhed man is driven from his country
for any crime, it does not belong to the nation in whLh he
has taken refuge to punifh him for a fault committed in a
foreign country. For nature gives to mankind and to
nations the right of punifhing only for their defence and
fafety ; whence it follows that he can only be punifhed by
thofe whom he has offended.
. 233. But this reafon {hews, that if the juftice of
each nation ought in general to be confined to the punifh-
ment of crimes committed within its own territories, we
ought to except "from this rule the villains who, by the
quality and habitual" frequency of their crimes, violate all
* Contributions railed by the Duke of Bmnfwick in France.
Compare theie with the Contributions railed by the French in the
Netherlands. EDIT.
publick
APPENDIX.
public fecurity, and declare themfelves the enemies of tha
human race. Poifoners, affaflins, and incendiaries by pro-
feiEou, may be exterminated wherever they are feized ; for
they attack and injure all nations, by trampling under foot
the foundations of the common lafety. Thus pirates are
brought to the gibbet, by the firft into whofe hands they
fall. If the Sovereign of the country where thofe crimes
have been committed reclaims the authors of them, in order
to bring them to punifhment, they ought to be reftored to
him, as one who is principally interefted in punifhing them
in an exemplary manner : and it being proper to convict the
guilty, and to try them according to fome form of law ; this
is a fecond [not fole] reafon, why malefactors are ufually
delivered up at the defire of the ftate where their crimes
have been committed.
Ibid. 230. Every nation has a right of refufmg to
admit a Granger into the country, when he cannot enter
into it without putting it into evident danger, or without
doing it a remarkable prejudice *.
FOREIGN MINISTERS.
BOOK. IV. CHAP. 5. 66.
THE obligation does not go fo far as to fuffer at all
times, perpetual Minifters, who 'are deiirous of reiiding
with a Sovereign, though they have nothing to negociate.
It is natural, indeed, and very agreeable to the fentiments
which nations owe to each other, that thefe refident Mi-
nifters, when there is nothing to be feared from their flay,
{hould be friendly received : but if there be any folid reaion
againft this, what is for the good of the State ought un-
queftionably to be preferred ; and the foreign Sovereign
cannot take it amifs if his Minifter, who has concluded the
affairs of his commifTion, and has no other affairs to nego-
tiate, be defired to depart f. The cuftom of keeping every
* The third Article of the Treaty of TRIPLE ALLIANCE, and
the latter part of the fourth Article of the Treaty of QUADRUPLE
ALLIANCE ftipulate, that no kind of refuge or protection fhall be
givep to rebellious fubjeiSts of the contracting powers. EDIT.
f Difmiffion of Mr. Chauvelin. EDIT.
E e where
APPENDIX.
where Minifters continually refident, is now fo ftrongly
eftablifhed, that the refufal of a conformity to it would,
without very good reafons, give offence. Theie reafons
may arife from particular conjun&ures ; but there are alfo
common reafons always fubfifting, and fuch as relate to the
conftitution of a Government, and the Jlate cf a Nation.
The Republicks have often very good reafons of the latter
kind, to excufe themfelves from continually fuffering
Foreign Minifters, who corrupt the Citizens, in order to
gain them over to their Majiers, to the great prejudice of the
Republic, and fomenting of the Parties, &c. And fhould
they only diffule among a Nation, formerly plain, frugal,
^.nd virtuous, a tafte for luxury, avidity tor money ^ and
the manners of courts, thefe would be more than fuificient
for wife ^nd provident Rulers to difmifs them.
FINIS,
a ess
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES
rue- ii- -cT, S j T Y LIB
OJOVERSITY OF CAUFORJU*
AT
IS ANGELA
f .TOR A BY
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