UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORh 
 
 AT LOS ANGELES
 
 
 
 S>econ& edition. 
 
 THREE 
 
 MEMORIALS 
 
 ON 
 
 FRENCH AFFAIRS 
 
 entered at >tationerg' 
 [ Price 3s. d.
 
 

 
 THREE 
 
 MEMORIALS 
 
 ON 
 
 .FRENCH AFFAIRS 
 
 WRITTEN IN THE YEA.RS 
 , 1792 AND 1793. 
 
 BY THE LATE 
 
 RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE. 
 
 PRINTED FOR F. AND C. RIVINGTON, 
 
 ST. PAUL'S CHURCH- YARD} 
 SOLD ALSO BY J. HATCHARD, PICCADILLY. 
 
 1797-
 
 DC 
 39/t? 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 "> r T^ O be engaged in a contention with iri- 
 -* gratitude and fraud> is neither pleafing 
 nor honourable ; but they who in difcharging 
 the facred obligations of friendship are forced 
 1 into it, miift fubmit to the humiliation. They 
 ^ would themfelves be criminal in the next de- 
 gree, were they to cdniult their own perfonal 
 feelings ; they are bound to confider only 
 their 
 
 '* In the beginning of the prefent year, a 
 
 ^confidential paper, written by the late Mr. 
 
 < Burke, was furreptitiouily publifhed in his 
 
 name ; and at the end of it was advertifed a 
 
 volume of pretended memoirs, anecdotes, and 
 
 letters, of the Author. Some of his friends 
 
 : ! (he was himfelf at Bath, ftruggling with the 
 
 A difeafe which ultimately proved fatal to him) 
 
 ^ obtained an injunction from the Court of 
 
 a Chancery, 
 
 301S06
 
 Chancery, on the very day of publication, 
 By this prompt interference of the law, by 
 the general discountenance of all liberal men, 
 and by the bankruptcy of the bookfeller, which 
 foon followed, the fale, though not wholly- 
 flopped, was considerably checked ; and the 
 memoirs, for the time, fupprefled. But fcarcely 
 is the hand that wrote, and the tongue that 
 dictated, yet cold in death, when, before it 
 has been practicable even to examine and ar- 
 range the numerous, papers which that admi- 
 rable man has left behind him, and which 
 bear imprefied upon them the living traces of 
 his great mind through his whole career of 
 publick action, and during the previous couife 
 of fevere ftudy, by which he prepared him- 
 felf to be what he became, a new notice is 
 thrown forth, enlarged and improved a little 
 in the language and arrangement, but in iub- 
 ftance nearly the fame with the former. It 
 Clearly comes, it can only come, from the 
 fame quarter ; though perhaps the work it- 
 felf may be coloured with fome more oilen- 
 fible name. 
 
 By this conduct, in addition to the turpi- 
 tude which marked the. former attempt, the 
 
 will
 
 will oFthe dead, regarded by all civilized na- 
 tions with peculiar fan&ity, is violated. The 
 friends, to whole care and judgment Mr. 
 Burke confided the feleclion and ufe of his 
 manufcripts, are no longer at liberty to exer- 
 cife their own difcretion. They are not maf- 
 ters even of the time, order, and method to 
 be obferved in the execution of their truft. 
 Without a choice, they are dragged along to 
 meet or to overtake the diverfified arts of a 
 man, who, fed by his bounty while alive, en- 
 deavoured to difquiet the laft moments of his 
 dying benefactor, and ceafes not to injure him 
 in his grave. It is true, they have already 
 obtained another injunction, but they are well 
 aware, that crafty men will too often contrive 
 to evade the law ; defperate men will dare to 
 defy it. They know, indeed, from the for- 
 mer experiment, that no deliberate encou- 
 ragement will be given to the thefts and fa- 
 brications of avarice or indigence : the new 
 iyftem of morals has not made quite fo much 
 progrefs in this kingdom : but they alfo know 
 that publick curioiity, ftrongly excited as it 
 muft be, by a promife of " Mr. Burke's ie- 
 " cret correfpondence with the mofr. diftin- 
 a 2 " guifhed
 
 guimed chara&ers of Europe," will demand 
 to be indulged. It will feck irregular, if it 
 be denied regular means of gratification. The 
 thirft which is not permitted to drink of the 
 frefh fountain or the clear ftream, will flake 
 itfelf wherever it can, at the weedy pool or 
 the muddy ditch. 
 
 Their determination therefore is taken. It 
 is, upon the whole, they believe, the befr. 
 which their circumftances would allow ; 
 though they may be in fome danger of thus 
 furnifhing genuine materials, which are in 
 their hands alone, and which mingled up 
 with others of a different defcription, may be 
 employed to lend a fallacious credit to the 
 idle tales of credulity and folly, or the abfurd 
 calumnies of enmity and envy. 
 
 The prefent publication confifts of three 
 Memorials, which were written in the years 
 1791, 1792, 1793, anc ^ relate to three very 
 interefting epochs in the French Revolution. 
 They more particularly treat of the effects, 
 which, at thofe refpective periods, the author 
 ^magined that event likely to produce on the 
 
 political
 
 political ftate of all Europe. There is reafon 
 to fuppofe that incorred copies of two out of 
 the three have been fraudulently taken. 
 
 Some other pieces are in the hands of the 
 Printer, and will fhortly appear in a fecond 
 pamphlet. They relate to the conduce of our 
 two great parties at home, with a view to 
 French politicks. 
 
 Thefe two publications will fill up a very 
 important chafm in the recorded opinions of 
 the Author. There is nothing: on French af- 
 
 O 
 
 fairs in the quarto edition of his works later 
 than the middle of the year 1 79 1 ; long before 
 -the firft approach to actual hoililities between 
 the French and the neighbouring: Powers of 
 
 O O 
 
 Germany. What he afterwards publi(hed 
 takes up the fubjeft at the point of time, 
 -when the King's Minifters, defpairing of fuc- 
 cefs in the great purpofe of continuing, what- 
 ever was the immediate caufe of beginning 
 
 o O 
 
 the war, had avowed a difpofition to nego- 
 tiate a peace with the French Republick. 
 
 A collection alfo of Mr. Burke's more im- 
 portant
 
 portant letters, during the laft years of his life, 
 efpecially on the fubjecl of France, is prepar- 
 ing for the prefs. Of courfe it will be much 
 more ample, than any thing which can be 
 furnimed by the perfon from whofe fcanda- 
 lous breach of truft alone any fpurious com- 
 pilation can draw it's materials. 
 
 Many of thefe letters were intended, not 
 for the prefs indeed, but for free circulation 
 in manufcript ; a channel, which through all 
 the principal tranfactions of his political life, he 
 ufed inilead of the publick prints, for explain- 
 ing, as occaiion required, his principles or his 
 conduct. Of thefe compofitions, ibmetiriies 
 himfelf, and fometimes thofe around him kept 
 copies. 
 
 Some few of his letters were preferved by 
 him as a fort of private proteft and record of 
 his opinions, when on queftions of impor- 
 tance he had the misfortune, (fuch he always 
 fmcerely felt it to be) of diflenting from thofe 
 with whom he generally acted. He was, 
 from conviction, a party-man ; but he ever 
 thought that party mould be fubfervient to 
 
 principle,
 
 ( vii ) 
 
 principle, not principle to party. His princi- 
 ples are now, unhappily for his country and 
 the world, become mere matter of hiftory, 
 and whatever can elucidate them is due to 
 the inftruction of the pubiick. 
 
 His other letters, which paffed in the un- 
 referved freedom of confidential intercourfe, 
 can only be obtained from the liberality of 
 the friends to whom they were addreiTed, 
 many of whom have kindly promifed their 
 contributions, and all of whom are re/peel: - 
 fully defired to tranfmit to Meffrs. Riving- 
 tons whatever they may have in that kind, 
 which they may judge not unfit for the pub- 
 lick eye. There is very little indeed of his 
 correfpondence (and no man wrote more) 
 which does not contain fome portion of a 
 great body of ethicks and politicks, from 
 which mankind may grow wifer and better. 
 
 All thefe, and other fuch productions of his 
 pen, as it may be thought right to print fepa- 
 rately, will be given with all convenient fpeed 
 in the octavo fize, which he himfelf in his 
 life- time chofe for the firft editions of hi* 
 
 Speeches
 
 ( viii ) 
 
 Speeches and Tracts. They will afterwards 
 be formed, with many other original pieces of 
 a lefs temporary nature, into quarto volumes ; 
 and to the whole will be prefixed a Life of 
 the Author, accompanied with various letters 
 and papers of a more early date, fome of 
 which were pointed out by himfelf as " do- 
 *' cuments for the hiftory, not of his own 
 " life," he obferved, " but of his times," 
 
 It has been frequently fuppofed, that he was 
 himfelf employed in writing fuch a hiftory. 
 But they who fuppofed this knew little of 
 him. He bore too large a mare, much be- 
 yond what is commonly known, in the lite- 
 rature and politicks of the age, to be himfelf 
 the hiflorian. Though not without a jufl 
 fenfe of his own merits, he truly loved and 
 praclifed that humility, which he has fo beau- 
 tifully called, " the low, but deep and firm 
 *' foundation of all real virtue." On princi- 
 ple, he would never have confented to under- 
 take a tafk, in performing which, to have 
 done juftice to himfelf he muft have rifked 
 the imputation of vanity; a vice which he 
 abhorred to a degree, that by fuch as were 
 
 not
 
 not intimately acquainted with his heart, might 
 have been fometimes miftaken for vanity itfelf. 
 He has left in manufcript fome biographical 
 (ketches both of his foil and his brother ; 
 none of himfelf. None are oftentatioufly in- 
 troduced in any of his works. Cicero feems 
 to have written fome of his books almoft for 
 the purpofe of putting his own praifes into 
 the mouths of others, and of fcuttering 
 around thofe numberlefs little intimations, 
 which at this difhnce of time we gather up 
 with ib much delight, of his childhood, his 
 education, his ftudies, his amufements, his 
 manners, his relations, his friends, his houfes 
 and pleafure- grounds, the gallery of Tufcu- 
 lum, and the oak ofArpinum; but what- 
 ever of that kind has fallen from Mr. Burke 
 is only to be found incidentally interfperfed, 
 where to have fuppreffed it would have been 
 to betray his own fair reputation, in which 
 his family, friends, and country, had an in- 
 rereft as well as himfelf : it is to be found 
 in his public or private anfwers to thofe who 
 had brought charges againft him, and who 
 were of a dignity to make a vindication of 
 himfelf decorous, if not neceflary. The reft 
 b mufl
 
 muft be fupplied by the diligence and judg- 
 ment of others, partly from memory and 
 partly from information, which, it is hoped, 
 all who in any part of his life have been in- 
 timate with him will be fo obliging to com- 
 municate ; but principally from the different 
 fources already mentioned above, and the rich 
 ftore of detached hints, loofe notes, and un- 
 finilhed fragments which remain in his hand- 
 writing, relative to all the more momentous 
 bufinefs in which he was engaged. His 
 pen was always in his hand. He feldom 
 thought or read without it. 
 
 In the mean time, fome important parts of 
 his conduit and character will receive light 
 from this, and the fucceeding publications. 
 It will at once be feen, whether the fenti- 
 ments recently exprefled by him were indeed 
 the genuine conclufions of an early fagacity, 
 anticipating calamities to come with a certainty 
 that almoft approached to infpired prediction, 
 or nothing more than the falfe pretences of a 
 tardy wifdom too late inftructed by the event. 
 
 Thefc
 
 Thefe papers will contain his inmoft doc- 
 trines. His countrymen have heard him in 
 the Senate; they have read him in hisdeme- 
 gorick writings defigned for popular effect; 
 they will now attend him, as it were, into 
 the Cabinet. 
 
 The year i 79 i was highly critical in the 
 developement of the French Revolution. 
 Mr. Neckar and his colleagues had been 
 driven with ignominy from their ports and 
 the country. A new miniftry had been 
 patched up from the accomplices and crea- 
 tures of the original leaders in the National 
 Aflfembly. Thofe leaders, to fecure the power 
 which they had obtained, (hewed a difpoiition 
 to put a flop tothofeconfufions, which they had 
 themfelves excited or promoted. In their 
 turn, they were ttamfelves attacked by a new 
 fet of bolder, more ferocious, but more con- 
 fiflent demagogues. The Priefts were de- 
 claredly perfecuted ; the Nobles plundered 
 and hunted into emigration. Civil authority 
 there was none. The army and navy were 
 corrupted, and all difcipline deftroved. The 
 King and Queen, after a fhort and infeeure 
 b 2 interval
 
 interval of comparative tranquillity, were 
 again repeatedly infulted, and their lives open- 
 ly endangered. 
 
 In this Situation of things, Mr. Burke was 
 of opinion, that our AmbafTador ought not 
 to be an idle fpeclator of iuch icenes at the 
 Court of a Monarch, who was in erFel a 
 prifoner; that he ought to be recalled, or to 
 interpofe the good-offices of onr Court be- 
 tween Louis theXVIth and his feditious fub- 
 jecls, agreeably to our duty under the gene- 
 ral. law of nations, and the fpirit of onr pofi- 
 tive treaties. On this plan he drew up 
 " Hints for a Memorial to be delivered toM. 
 Montmorin," by Lord Gower. 
 
 Whether thefe Hints were ever actually 
 feen by the King's Minifters, there is no trace 
 among his papers to (hew, neither can thofe 
 friends, from whom he was accuftomed to 
 conceal nothing, undertake to fay from their 
 recollection. It is probable, that they were 
 not feen, as at that period hje had no diret 
 intercourfe with Government, and events 
 foon enfued in Franc*, which left no room 
 
 for
 
 for fuch a mediation. The paper, however, 
 will be printed at the end of this Preface: it 
 was difcovered too late to be infertecl, where 
 it ought to have flood in the body of this 
 publication. It will bear a itrong, but not 
 the only, teftimony to the Author's real prac- 
 tical views, which have been fo malignantly 
 mifreprefented, with regard to the French 
 Revolution. However much he difapproved 
 and contemned the falfe and treacherous prin- 
 ciples, (ince renounced even by themfelves, 
 in which it glorified itfelf at it's outfet ; how- 
 ever early he warned his own country of 
 their pernicious tendency, and the fteady and 
 uniform march of their operation tobreak down 
 a flouriming Monarchy into a hideous barba- 
 rifm; however feelingly his nature detefted 
 the cruelties and atrocities of all kinds, with 
 which their progrefs was fyflematically ac- 
 companied, for the purpofe of cruming all 
 oppofition under the dominion of terrour ; 
 yet while there appeared to him a chance of 
 any quiet termination to thefe miferies and 
 horrours, his counfels were moderate, conci- 
 liatory, and healing. The very bafts of any 
 agreement which the King of Great Britain, 
 
 as
 
 ss the King of a people " perfe&ly andfolicUy, 
 becaufe foberly^ rationally and legally free," 
 could undertake to negociate, was to be the 
 fettlement, and, if required, the guarantee of 
 a free couftitution in France, but under an 
 efficient Monarchy ; both their government 
 and their freedom being eftablifhed " upon 
 *' principles of moderation, as the only means 
 " of fecuring permanence to both thefe blef- 
 44 fmgs, as well as internal and external tran- 
 " quillity to the kingdom of France, and to 
 ** all Europe." It will hereafter appear from 
 his letters that, at a later period in the fame 
 year, he held a very fimilar language to the 
 exiled French Princes and their agents, when 
 they were preparing to aiTert their rights by 
 the fword. We mufh now pafs to the three 
 Memorials, which form the immediate con- 
 tents of this pamphlet. 
 
 The King of France in the April of that 
 year was prevented by the populace, with 
 every kind of menace and outrage, from going 
 to his Palace at St. Cloud. He complained 
 to the National Aflembly. The refult was 
 that he was compelled to fanclion a circular 
 
 letter,
 
 letter, which was Soon after fent by 3\L 
 Montmorin to all foreign Courts, announcing 
 the new ConfHtution of France, it's nature, 
 and principles. This was followed by new 
 indignities and encreafed licentioufnefs, by the 
 flight to Montmedi, the actual cuftody of the 
 Royal Family, the mockery of reviling the 
 Constitution, and the final acceptance of it by 
 the King, which was notified in another cir- 
 cular letter from M. Montmorin. By thele 
 two official communications, unprecedented 
 in diplomacy, the right of confidering the in- 
 ternal Constitution of France was not only 
 given to other States, if they had no fuch 
 right before, but their attention was directly 
 called to the Subject. Nor was the purpofe 
 of the communications concealed. It was 
 profeffedly to lead to Similar Revolutions in 
 other countries. When the firStof thele ex- 
 traordinary difpatches was originally Submit- 
 ted to the ASTembly, long before any concert 
 of Princes againSt France, it was enthuSiafU- 
 cally applauded as " a Splendid example of a 
 " great King proclaiming afar the liberty of 
 " all people." It was, in fact, a general defi- 
 ance to all the old Governments of Europe. 
 
 Mr.
 
 ( xvi ) 
 
 Mr. Burke had particular means of know- 
 ing the difpofitions of the continental Powers. 
 His fon during that fummer was at Coblentz, 
 though not at the expence, nor with the for- 
 mal authority, yet with the knowledge and 
 approbation of Government. He was early 
 convinced that the Declaration figned at Pil- 
 nitz by the Emperor and the King of Pruffia 
 was in a manner extorted by the Count d'Ar- 
 tois, and was never defigned to be carried into 
 ferious effect. The King of Pruffia refufed 
 to ftir, till the Emperor mould have put him- 
 felf in motion; and the Emperor hefitated 
 to move from a real or pretended diftruft of 
 this country. In general, the neighbouring 
 Potentates feemed for a long time blind to 
 the peril of their fituation, and when the au- 
 dacity of BrifTot's faction, as foon as he had 
 eftablimed his afcendency in the' fecond Af- 
 fembly, made them reluctantly open their 
 eyes, they were flruck with a fudden dread, 
 from which they fought refuge in fubmif- 
 iion. 
 
 At home Mr. Burke found as little agree- 
 ment with his views. Thofe leaders of 
 
 Opposition
 
 ( xvii ) 
 
 Oppofition, who in reality did not differ much 
 from him, naturally wifhed to avoid as long 
 as they could, any quefKon that might preci- 
 pitate a direcl: breach with fome others of the 
 fame party, who from a long connexion flood 
 high in their confidence, and were dear tp 
 their affections. Between Minifters and him- 
 felf he believed there was a more efTential 
 difference. He underftood them to think (as 
 he afterwards told one of them) " that the 
 * c new principles might be encouraged ; that 
 " they might triumph over every interior and 
 " exterior refinance, and even overturn other 
 " States, as they had that of France, without 
 ** any fort of hazard, that they would extend 
 " in their confequences to this kingdom.'- His 
 own opinion thus early was, that there never 
 exifted a crifis fo important to the world ; 
 that the power of France, which the preced- 
 ing year had feen in a manner annihilated by. 
 her internal anarchy, now appeared more for- 
 midable than ever ; that all hope of a quiet 
 fettlement to the diforders of that diffracted 
 country was gone; that the more furious 
 part of the Jacobin faction, who from the 
 firft had been eager to difturb the peace of all 
 c Europe,
 
 ( xviii ) 
 
 Europe, was daily encreafing in ftrength and 
 folidity ; and as France had not then re-efta- 
 blimed her army after it's diflblution by de- 
 crees and intrigues, while the northern powers 
 had not yet begun to difband their forces after 
 the Turkifh war, that every thing was to be 
 gained to the former, every thing loft to the? 
 Jatter by delay. 
 
 Under thefe impreflions he wrote the Me- 
 morial of December 1 791. It was fent to fome 
 of the leaders of Oppofition, and to the Mini- 
 fters, by one of whom it was communicated to 
 the King. The ftyle and the topicks are thofe 
 of a ftatefman addreffing ftatefmen. It takes it's 
 rife fromM. Montmorin's two letters. It points 
 out the features and character which diflinguiih 
 this Revolution from moft others of ancient or 
 modern times : it delineates with a mafterly 
 hand the political map of Europe, and marks 
 with wonderful precifion the track which the 
 new principles were likely to purfue in their 
 progrefs : it combats the fuppofition that the 
 Revolution would fall by it's own weak- 
 nefs, by internal force, or the difcredit of 
 it's paper money : it confiders the difpo- 
 
 fitions
 
 fit ions of the neighbouring powers, who 
 were moft interefted in flopping the courfe 
 of the mifchief, and the general leaning of all 
 Kings, AmbafTadors, and Ministers of State 
 in thefe days ; but it modeftly profefTes only 
 to make a cafe without offering advice, to 
 fhew the nature of the evil, without fuggefr.- 
 ing a remedy. His country, the world, and 
 pofterity, will now be able to judge how far 
 his fpeculations on this great queftion of poli- 
 ticks were juft: " the paper," he conceived 
 at the time, " did not meet the ideas of Mi- 
 " nifters." 
 
 The invafion of France by the Duke of 
 Brunfvvick in 1792, after the French had 
 declared war, and been repulfed in an attack 
 on the Netherlands, excited the moft fanguine 
 hopes of many. Mr. Burke, it is known to 
 thofe who converfed with him, and will ap- 
 pear-by fome of his letters, always difr.ruft.ed 
 the event. Befides the incalculable difference 
 which time had made, he faw a radical error 
 in not giving more importance and lead to the 
 exiled Princes and Nobility of France. He had 
 from the firft a fettled conviction that neither 
 c 2 infurrections
 
 infurre&ions of the Royalifts within, nor a 
 foreign force from without, could feparately 
 avail. There was no found hope, in his judg- 
 ment, but from a well-combined, and cordial 
 co-operation of both. On the difaftrous and ig- 
 nominious retreat of the Duke of Brunfwick, 
 he haflily threw down his thoughts in an 
 unformal manner, and fubmitted them to the 
 confederation of thofe who had feen the for- 
 mer paper. He now proceeded further, and 
 intimated in general terms, what he thought 
 fhould be done for the fafety of Europe. 
 Upon all maxims of ancient policy, upon all 
 views of the actual circumftances, he Was 
 decided in his opinion, that England fhould 
 interpofe as the proteclirefs of the balance of 
 power. It was effential, he thought, that me 
 fhould be the prefiding foul of that concert, 
 which feemed to be now in difpen fable; that 
 fhe fhould govern it's counfels, and direcl: it's 
 efforts; fhe fhould negociate and confederate, 
 exhort on one fide, and remonftrate on the 
 other ; file fhould not precipitate a war, but 
 riik it, and firmly meet it, for the fafety of 
 Europe. But before this paper had been com- 
 municated to thofc for whole ufe it was in- 
 tended^
 
 xx 
 
 tended, the French Convention ventured on 
 decrees and acts directly flriking at this coun- 
 try, and her old ally Holland. A fort of un- 
 official negociation enfued, which ended in a 
 declaration of war by the French Republick 
 
 ao-ainft Great Britain and Holland. Thus 
 
 o 
 
 forced feparately into open hoftility, Miniftera 
 were under the neceffity of joining the Powers 
 already in arms, on their own conditions* 
 They could not take that lead which, Mr, 
 Burke believed, might have been conceded to 
 them as the price of their voluntary interpo- 
 fition. 
 
 After the firft fuccefles of 1 793, Mr. Burke 
 was curforily informed in a converfation with 
 one of the King's Minifters, that they pur- 
 pofed to iflue a declaration of the motives,- 
 objecls, and end of the war. Sometime in 
 the fubfequent autumn, he heard again of 
 the fame defign. He doubted the prudence 
 and expediency of the meafure, cfpecially at 
 that time, juft after our retreat from Dunkirk. 
 He fought, but was not able to obtain, a con- 
 ference on the fubjecl:. 
 
 He
 
 He had recourfe, therefore, to his pen, 
 This was the origin of the third memorial. 
 Accordingly at the head of one of the co- 
 pies found in his pofTeilion, it was called, 
 44 Thoughts refpeftfully fubmitted on the 
 " propofed Manifeflo ;" though it was en- 
 dorfed with the prefent title. He had not* 
 however, proceeded far before he learnt that 
 the Declaration was to be immediately iiTued; 
 He deiired it might be delayed a (ingle day, 
 that he might have an opportunity of previ- 
 oufly ftating his doubts ; but was told that 
 no alteration could be admitted, as the paper 
 had been approved by the allied Courts. 
 
 The Memorial in confequence lay for fome 
 time unfinished. But fome agents of the 
 Royalifts of Britanny and Poitou having about 
 that period prevailed on Mr. Burke to fecond 
 their reprefentations to Government with his 
 influence, and the furrender of Toulon having 
 made an opening in their favour, he re- 
 fumed what he had laid afide, and completed 
 it upon a more comprehenfive plan. It ieems 
 in if & ftyle and fpirit to approach more near-
 
 ( xxiii ) 
 
 ]y, than either of the other two Memorials, to 
 the animation and decifion of his own former 
 publications. It begins by flating the time 
 to be that of calamity and defeat. When it 
 proceeds to the main consideration, it paints 
 with a firm but rapid pencil the miferable 
 fltuation of France under the reign of Roberf- 
 pierre and terrour, the full efje&s of which 
 Mr. Burke confeffes himfelf not to have fore- 
 feen. The whole nation was divided into 
 the oppreflbrs and the oppreffed. He then 
 argues that the very fuccefs of the Allies on 
 their own plan would not reflore France to a 
 condition fafe for herfelf and for Europe, and 
 he ultimately ventures to give his own ad- 
 vice. Perhaps, if there is any paflage in it 
 more efpecially deferving of attention than 
 another, it is the noble fcheme of awful, but 
 difcriminating jnftice, tempered with enlight- 
 ened mercy, which he recommends and en- 
 forces, in the event of the Monarchy, and 
 ancient orders of the State being once more 
 reftored in France. The Memorial concludes 
 with an emphatick proteftagainft what he al- 
 ways confidered as the great, fruitful fource 
 
 of
 
 ( xxiv ) 
 
 of every mifcarriage, the great leading miff 
 take, that of conducting the war, by prece- 
 dent, as a common war againft a common 
 enemy, for the ufual objects of ordinary ap- 
 peals to arms, and fearching hiffory for lef- 
 fons of civil prudence, to be derived from 
 former Revolutions, which refembled this 
 portent of our times in nothing but the name. 
 
 In every one of thefe three Memorials 
 reference is made to the writers on the law 
 of nations; and in one or two places Vattel is 
 cxprefsly named. It has been thought pro- 
 per, therefore, to fulpjoin an Appendix, con- 
 lifting of pafTages from that eminent publicift, 
 which were found among Mr. Butke's pa- 
 pers, drawn out for his private ufe under dif- 
 tin& heads, as they are here printed, and il- 
 luftrated in his hand-writing with marginal 
 
 o o 
 
 comments and fhojft notes, which are here 
 preierved. Some few notes have been added 
 to complete his plan. Even thefe are not 
 wholly without his authority. They are the 
 taint vertices of much difcourfe had with him 
 at different times on the effeft and application 
 
 of
 
 ( XXV ) 
 
 of the extracts. A genius like his, rich in b 
 much natural and acquired wealth, might be 
 fuppofed to have been confident in itfelf. Yet 
 this was the laborious and accurate method 
 which to the end of his life he was habitu- 
 ated to purfue, in collecting and digefting the 
 heft information upon every fubject that oc- 
 cupied his mind ; working upon all, and ever 
 mingling up with it fomething of his own. 
 
 In explaining and connecting the hiftory 
 of the three Memorials, nothing, it is hoped, 
 has been faid, which can be conftrued to im- 
 ply a cenfure on thofe who direct the affairs 
 of this kingdom. They may have formed to 
 themfelves a wifer fyftem of action, and been 
 defeated in it by accidents, which could nei- 
 ther be forefeen nor controuled ; they may 
 have unwillingly compromifed in their coun* 
 fels with the irrefiftible force of circum- 
 ftancqs, and been compelled to adopt a fyftem 
 which they knew to be imperfect ; they may 
 even, by attempting Icfs, have actually done 
 more. Thefe are queilions too extenfive and 
 important for this place. All that it feems 
 (1 proper
 
 ( xxvi ) 
 
 proper to fay here, is (imply, that whatever 
 may have been their fyfiem, and the merits 
 of that fyftem, it was not that of Mr. Burke. 
 And thus much is due to his memory, and to 
 truth. Whatever has been the failure of the 
 war, it is in no manner to be afcribed to him : 
 the time and mode of beginning it were not 
 his choice : the plan of operations for con- 
 du&ing it was not his fuggeftion : and the 
 declaration of principles, on which it has 
 been juftified, was not made by his advice, 
 nor with his concurrence. Neither did he 
 flatter thofe in power by a (ilent acquicfcencc 
 in a courfe of policy which he did not ap- 
 prove. According to his practice, in more in- 
 ftances than one, during his opposition to 
 Lord North's Adminiftration, " he chofe ra- 
 ther," as he has faid, " refpe&fully to ftate a 
 " doubt to Minifters whilft a meafure was 
 " depending, than to reproach them after- 
 *' wards with it's confequences." 
 
 In truth, he who never ufed any felicita- 
 tion to advance his own perfonal interefts, 
 was indefatigable in foliciting fupport to that 
 
 caufe,
 
 ( xxvii ) 
 
 caufe, which he confidered as the common 
 intereft of mankind. There was no perfon 
 of rank or eminence in Europe with whom 
 he had any oecafion of coi i eipondence, that 
 he did not endeavour to conciliate, confirm, 
 or animate on the fi<!e of religion, morals, 
 and focial order, connected with moderated 
 liberty. He applied to each the feveral to- 
 picks which were befl fuited to his circum- 
 flances, his condition, his prejudices, or his 
 wants, but all centered in one point. If to 
 the people he again and again recommended, 
 and inculcated, and enforced, with all the 
 varied beauty and energy of his fafcinating elo- 
 quence, a principle of obedience, fubmiffion, 
 and refpedr, to their lawful Rulers of every 
 denomination ; to Princes and to all men in 
 the exercife of authority he did not fpare to 
 recount, in the calmer tone of more argu- 
 mentative difcuffion, the faults and errors to 
 which their ftations render them peculiarly 
 liable, to imprefs upon them the neceffity 
 of that union between Mercy and Juflice, 
 without which one degenerates into weaknefs, 
 and the other into cruelty ; and to admoniih 
 dz them
 
 them, for their own tranquillity and happi- 
 nefs, to protect, not opprefs, their people, to 
 improve, not impair, the legal fecurity of the 
 i'ubject in his perfon and property, according 
 to the true nature of their refpeftive govern- 
 ments, for the great end of all government. 
 Founding, as he always did, his political on 
 his moral philoiophy, he told the different 
 clafTes of fociety, not of their extreme rights, 
 but of their duties, the root of which is in 
 the rights of others. He ardently loved his 
 country and wimed her profperity : yet he has 
 not fcrupled to fay, that " he dreaded our 
 *' own power and our own ambition ; he 
 " dreaded our being too much dreaded.'* He 
 conflantly profefled a jealoufy of France as 
 the natural rival and enemy of England ; yet 
 he was not lefs alarmed at her weakneis, 
 when, in the moment of the Monarchy being 
 diflblved, fhe feemed to leave a chafm in the 
 map of Europe, than afterwards at her terrific 
 power, when the monftrous republic of Brif- 
 fot and Roberfpierre grew too big for her an* 
 cient limits ; nor was he without his fears of 
 her being again reduced too low, if the Allies 
 
 had
 
 ( xxix ) 
 
 had fucceedcd in what he believed to be their- 
 fyftem of difmembering her. In general, men 
 fee that fide only, which is neareft to them, 
 in the order of things, by which they are 
 furrounded, and in which they are carried 
 along ; but the clear and penetrating fight of 
 his mind comprehended in one view all the 
 parts of the immenfe whole, which varying 
 from moment to moment, yet continuing 
 through centuries efTentiaily the fame, ex- 
 tends around and above to every civilized peo- 
 ple in every age, and unites and incorporates 
 the prefent with the generations which are 
 paft. To preferve that whole unbroken to a 
 late poflerity, he knew no other way than by 
 refifting all mad or wicked attempts to de- 
 ftroy any of the great prominent parts. Not 
 that he was the enemy of reformations. 
 Quite the reverfe. But he would allow the 
 honour of that name to no changes which 
 affected the very fubftance of the thing : thofe 
 he approved, thofe he called true reforma- 
 tions, which patiently feeking the degree of 
 perfection alone attainable by man, and or- 
 dained to be only the flow refult of long ex- 
 perience
 
 ( XXX } 
 
 perience and much meditation, put the hap 
 pinefs of none to the hazard, while they bet- 
 ter the condition of all. If, like the early 
 fages of Greece, he were to be characterized 
 by fome peculiar fentiment, it mould be that 
 to which he defired to give the currency of a. 
 proverb to innovate is not to reform. 
 
 This Preface has been drawn by degrees 
 into an unexpected length. Much of Mr. 
 Burke's character may have been here antici- 
 pated, which might have come with more 
 propriety and force, hereafter. But on the 
 fpot where every objecl, to which the eye 
 can be directed, is full of his image, it was 
 impcffible that many little remembrances of 
 his opinions and habits, which muil involun- 
 tarily ariie in the bofom, mould not run over 
 on the paper. They will not be the leaft in- 
 terefting part to thofe who enjoyed the blef- 
 fing of an intimacy with him; and when the 
 name of a deceafed friend has been already 
 forged to a defpicable libel againft him, when 
 intelligence has been received, even while 
 this Preface has been paffing under the prefs, 
 
 of
 
 ( xxxi ) 
 
 of new artifices, which have been pra&ifed 
 through the country, to folicit a party-fup- 
 port to an infidious attack upon his fame, that 
 fome correct notion of fuch a man mould be 
 early given, feemed to be of moment to the 
 cauie of public virtue, 
 
 Bea cornfield, Sept, 1, 17 97. 
 
 HINTS
 
 HINTS 
 
 A MEMORIAL 
 
 TO BE DELIVERED TO 
 
 MONSIEUR DE M. M. 
 
 [WRITTEN IN THE EARLY PART OF 1791.] 
 
 THE King my Mafter, from his fincere defire 
 of keeping up a good correfpondence with 
 his Moft Chriftian Majefty, and the French na- 
 tion, has for fomc time beheld with concern, the 
 condition into which that fovereign and nation 
 have fallen. 
 
 Notwithftanding the reality and the warmth of 
 thofe fentiments, his Britannick Majefty has hither- 
 to forborne in any manner to take a part in their 
 affairs; in hopes, that the common intcrcft of 
 King and fubjecls would render all parties fenfible 
 of the neceffity of fettling, their government and 
 their freedom, upon principles of moderation ; as 
 the only means of fecuring permanence to both 
 e thefe
 
 thefe blefTmgs, as well as internal and external 
 tranquillity,, to the Kingdom of France, and to all 
 Europe. 
 
 His Britannick Majefty finds, to his great re- 
 gret, that his hopes have not been realized. He 
 finds, that 'conmfions and diibrders have rather 
 increafed than diminifhed, and that they now 
 threaten to proceed to dangerous extremities. 
 
 In this fituation of things, the fame regard to a 
 neighbouring Sovereign living in friendfhip with 
 Great Britain, the fame fpir.it of good-will to the 
 Kingdom of France, the fame regard to the gene- 
 ral tranquillity, which have caufed him to view 
 with concern, the growth and continuance ofihe 
 _prefent diibrders, have induced the King of Great 
 Britain to intcrpofe his good- offices towards a re- 
 concilement of thofe unhappy differences. This 
 his Majefty does with the moft cordial regard to 
 the good of all descriptions concerned, and with 
 the moil perfect fincerity, wholly removing from 
 his Royal mind, all memory of every circumltance 
 .which might impede him in the execution of a 
 plan of benevolence which he has To much at 
 hear'. 
 
 His Majefty, having r.Iways thought it his great- 
 ,eft glory, that he rules over a people, perfectly 
 
 and
 
 ( *3. > 
 
 and folidly, bccaufe foberly, rationally, aaa<i fegalTy 
 free, can never be fuppofed to proceed in offering 
 thus his Royal mediation, but with an unaffected 
 defire and full resolution, to confider the fettlement 
 of a free confiitution in France, as the very bail* 
 of any agreement between the Sovereign. and tho& 
 of his fubjects who are unhappily at variance with 
 him ; to guarantee it to them, if it fhould be de- 
 fired, in the moft folemn and authentick manner, 
 and to do all that in him lies to procure the like 
 guarantee from other powers. 
 
 His Britannick Majefty, in the fame imnner, 
 afTures the moil Chriftian King, that he knows too 
 well, and values too highly, what is due to the 
 dignity and rights of crowned Heads, and to the 
 implied faith of treaties which have always been 
 made with the Crown of France, ever to liften to 
 any proportion by which that Monarchy fhall be 
 defpoiled of all its rights, fo eflential for the fup- 
 port of the confederation of the Prince, and the 
 concord and welfare of the people. 
 
 If unfortunately, a due attention fhould not be 
 paid to thefe his Majefty 's benevolent and neigh- 
 bourly offers, or, if any circumftances fhoujd pre- 
 vent the Moft Chriftian King from acceding, (as 
 his Majefty has no doubt he is well difpofed to do) 
 to this healing mediation in favour of himfelf and 
 
 all
 
 all his fubjects, his Majefty has commanded me 
 to take leave of this Court, as not conceiving it to 
 be fuitable to the dignity of his Crown, and to 
 what he owes to his faithful people, any longer to 
 keep a publick Minifter at the Court of a Sove- 
 reign who is not in pofieftion of his own liberty. 
 
 THOUGHTS
 
 THOUGHTS 
 
 ON 
 
 FRENCH AFFAIRS, 
 
 &c. &c. 
 
 WRITTEN IX DECEMBER, 179 1 * 
 
 IN all our tranfactions with France, and at all 
 periods, we have treated with that State on the 
 footing of a Monarchy. Monarchy was confidered 
 in all the external relations of that kingdom with 
 every Power in Europe as it's legal and conflitu- 
 tional Government, and that in which aione it's 
 federal capacity was veiled. 
 
 It is not yet a year fince Monfieur de Mont- 
 morin, formally, and with as little refpecl as can 
 be imagined, to the King, and to all crowned 
 heads, announced a total revolution in that coun- 
 try. He has informed the Britim Miniftry that it's 
 frame of Government is wholly altered ; that he is 
 one of the Miniiters of the new fyftem ; and in ef- 
 fect, that the King is no longer his matter (nor 
 does he even call him fuc-hj but the " frft of the 
 Minifters" in the new lyilem. 
 
 B The
 
 f ec ond notification was that of the King's 
 
 of the Con- 
 
 ftirmion ra- acceptance of the new Conftitution ; accompanied 
 with fanfaronades in the modern ftyle of the 
 French bureaus, things which have much more 
 the air and character of the fancy declamations of 
 their clubs, than the tone of regular office. 
 
 It has not been very ufual to notify to foreign 
 Courts, any thing concerning the internal arrange- 
 ments of any State. In the prefent cafe, the cir- 
 cumftance of thefe tvro notifications, with the ob 
 fervations with which they arc attended, does not 
 leave it in the choice of the Sovereigns of Chrif- 
 tendom to appear ignorant either of this French 
 Revolution, or (what is more important) of it's 
 principles. 
 
 We know that very foon after this Manifefto of 
 Monficur de Montmorin, the King of France, in 
 whofe name it was made, found himfelf obliged to 
 fly, with his whole family ; leaving behind him a 
 Declaration, in which he difavows and annuls that 
 Conftitution, as having been the effect of force on 
 his perfon and u/urpation on his authority. It is 
 equally notorious that this unfortunate Prince was, 
 with many circumftances of infult and outrage, 
 brought back prifoner, by a deputation of the pre- 
 tended National Aflembly, and aftenvards fufpend- 
 ed by their authority, frpm hi* Government. Un- 
 der
 
 f 3 ) 
 
 der equally notorious conftraint, and under me- 
 naces of total dcpofition, he has been compelled to 
 accept what they call a Conftitution, and to agree 
 to whatever elfe the ufurped power which holds 
 him in confinement, thinks proper to impofe. 
 
 His next brother, who had fled with him, and 
 his third brother, who had fled before him, all the 
 Princes of his blood, who remained faithful to him, 
 and the flower of his Magiftracy, his Clergy, and 
 his Nobility, continue in foreign countries, pro- 
 tefling againfl all acts done by him in his prefent 
 fituation, on the grounds upon which he had him- 
 felf protcfted againfl them at the time of his flight ; 
 with this addition, that they deny his very com- 
 petence, (as on good grounds they may) to abro- 
 gate the Royalty, or the ancient conititutional 
 Orders of the Kingdom. In this proteft they are 
 joined by three hundred of the late AtTembly it- 
 fclf, and in effect, by a great part of the French 
 Nation. The new Government (fo far as thd 
 people dare to difclofe their fentiments) is difdain- 
 ed, I am perfuaded. by the greater number ; who 
 as M. de la Fayette complains, and as the truth is, 
 have declined to tae any (hare in the new elec- 
 tions to the National Aflembly, either as candi- 
 dates or electors. 
 
 B2 Iii
 
 In this ftate of things (that is in the cafe of a 
 divided kingdom) by * the law of nations, Great 
 Britain, like every other Power, is free to take any 
 part (he pleafes. She may decline, with more or 
 lefs formality, according to her difcretion, to ac- 
 knowledge this new lyftem ; or (he may recognize 
 it as a Government de fafto, fctting afide all dif- 
 cuffion of it's original legality, and confidering the 
 ancient Monarchy as at an end. The law of na- 
 tions leaves our Court open to it's choice. We 
 have no direction but what is found in the well- 
 umlerftood policy of the King and kingdom. 
 
 This Declaration of a newfyccies of Government, 
 on new principles (fuch it profeffes itfelf to be) is 
 a real crifis in the politicks of Europe. The con- 
 dn<5l which prudence ought to diclate to Great- 
 Britain, will not depend (as hitherto our connexion 
 or quarrel with other States has for fome time de- 
 pended) upon merely external relations ; but, in a 
 great meafure alfo upon the lyftem which we may 
 think it right to adopt for the internal government 
 of our own country. 
 
 If it be our policy to aflimilate our Govern- 
 ment to that of Fran"., we ought to prepare for 
 this change, by encou.r, p;ing the fchcmes of au- 
 thority eftablifhed there. We ought to wink at 
 
 * See Vattel, b. ii. c. 4. feft. 56. and b. iii. c 18. feet. 296* 
 
 the
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 the captivity and deposition of a Prince, with 
 whom, if not in clofc alliance, we were in friend- 
 fhip. We ought to fall in with the ideas of Monf. 
 Montmoriri's circular Manifefto ; and to do bufi- 
 nefs of courfe with the functionaries who act under 
 the new power, by which that King to whom his 
 Majeny's Minifter has been fent to relide, has been 
 depofed and imprifoned. On that idea we ought 
 allb to with -hold all forts of direct or indirect 
 countenance from thofe who are treating in Ger- 
 many for the re-eftablidimcnt of the French Mo- 
 narchy and the ancient Orders of that State. This 
 conduct is fuitable to this policy. 
 
 The queftion is, whether this policy be fuitabie 
 to the interefls of the Crown and fubjects of Great 
 Britain. Let us therefore a little conlider the true 
 nature and probable effects of the Revolution 
 which, in fuch a very unufual manner, has been 
 twice diplomatically announced to his Majefty. 
 
 There have been many internal revolutions in Difference 
 the Government of countries, both as to perfons Revolution 
 and forms, in which the neighbouring States have 
 had little or no concern. Whatever the Govern- 
 ment might be with refpect to thofe perfons and 
 thofe forms, the ftationary iriterclis of the nation 
 concerned, have molt commonly influenced the 
 new Governments in the fame manner in which 
 
 they
 
 ( 6 ) 
 
 they influenced the old ; and the Revolution, 
 turning on matter of local grievance or of local 
 accommodation , did not extend beyond it's ter- 
 ritory. 
 
 Nature of The prefent Revolution in France feems to me 
 
 the French l 
 
 Revolution, to be quite of another characlcr and defcription ; 
 and to bear little relemhlance or analogy to any of 
 thofe which have been brought about in Europe, 
 upon principles merely political. // is a Revolu- 
 tion of dotlrme and tkeoretick dogma. It has a much 
 greater refemblance to thofe changes which have 
 been made upon religious grounds, in which a Ipi- 
 rit of profelytifm makes an eflential part. 
 
 The laft Revolution of doctrine and theory 
 which has happened in Europe, is the Reformation. 
 It is not for my pnrpofe to take any notice here of 
 the merits of that Revolution, but to ftate one only 
 of it's effects. 
 
 i:*sefch. _.-' That effect was to introduce other inter efts into 
 I all countries., than thofe -which arofe from their loca- 
 lity and natural circumftances. The principle of the 
 "Reformation was fuch, as by it's effence, could not 
 be local or confined to the country in which it had 
 it's origin. For inftance, the doclrine of " Jufti- 
 fication by Faith or by Works/' which was the ori- 
 ginal balis of the Reformation, could not have one 
 
 of
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 of it's alternatives tru? as to Germany, and falie 
 as to every other country. Neither are queftions 
 of theoretick truth and falfehood governed by cir- 
 cumftances any more than by places. On that 
 occafion, therefore, the fpirit of profelytifm ex- 
 panded itfelf with great elafticity upon all fides ; 
 and great divilions were every where the refult. 
 
 Thefe divifions however, in appearance merely 
 tlogmatick, foon became mixed with the political ; 
 and, their effects were rendered much more intenfe 
 from this combination. Europe was for a long 
 time divided into two great factions, under the 
 name of Catholidk and Proteftant, which not only 
 often alienated State from State, but alfo divided 
 almoft every State within itfelf. The warm parties 
 in each State were more affectionately attached to 
 thofe of their own doctrinal intereft in fome other 
 country than to their fellow citizens, or to their 
 natural Government, when they or either of them 
 happened to be of a different perfuafion. Thefe 
 factions, wherever they prevailed, if they did not 
 abfolutely deftroy, at leaft weakened and difiracted 
 the locality of patriotifm. The publick affections 
 'came to have other motives and other ties. 
 
 It would be to repeat the hiftory of the two laft 
 centuries to exemplify the effects of this Revo- 
 lution. 
 
 Although
 
 Although the principles to which it gave rife, 
 did not operate with a perfect regularity and con- 
 ftancy, they never wholly ceafed to operate. Few 
 wars were made, and few treaties were entered 
 into in which they did not come in for fome part. 
 They gave a colour, a character, and direction to 
 all the politicks of Europe. 
 
 Thcfe principles of internal, as well as externaf 
 divifion and coalition, are but juft now cxtin- 
 guifhed. But they who will examine into the true 
 character and genius of fome late events, muft be 
 latisfied thafc other fources of faction, combining 
 parties among the inhabitants of different coun- 
 tries into one connexion, are opened, and that 
 from thcfe fources are likely to arifc effects full as 
 important as thofe which had formerly arifen from 
 the jarring interefls of the religious fects. The 
 intention of the feveral actors in the change in 
 France, is not a matter of doubt. It is very 
 openly profcflcd. 
 
 In the modern world, before this time, there has 
 been no inltance of this fpirit of general political 
 faction, feparatcd from religion, pervading feveral 
 countries, and forming a principle of union be- 
 tween the partizans in each. But the thing is not 
 lefg in human nature. The antient world has fur- 
 
 niftied
 
 ( ) 
 
 nifhed a itrong and flriking inftance of fuch a 
 ground for fa6lion, full as powerful and full as mif- 
 chievous as our i'pirit of religious fyftem had ever 
 been, exciting in all the States of Greece (Euro- 
 pean and Afiatick) the inoft violent animofitics, and 
 the mofl cruel and bloody perfections and pro- 
 fcriptions. Thefe ancient faclions in each com- 
 monwealth of Greece, connected themfelves with 
 thofeof the fame defcription in fome other States 5 
 and fecret cabals and publick alliances were carried 
 on and made, not upon a conformity of general po- 
 litical intercfts, but for the fupport and aggran- 
 dizement of the two leading States which headed 
 the Ariftocratick and Democratick Faclions. For, 
 as in later times, the King of Spain was at the head 
 of a Catholick, and the King of Sweden of a Protcf- 
 tant intereft,Francc,(though Catholick, acting fub- 
 ordinately to the latter,) in the like manner the 
 Lacedemonians were every where at the head of 
 the Ariftocratick interefts, and the Athenians of 
 the Democratick. The two leading Powers kept 
 alive a conftant cabal and confpiracy in every State, 
 and the political dogmas concerning the confutu- 
 tion of a Republick. were the great inftruments by 
 which thefe leading States chofe to aggrandize 
 themfelves. Their choice was not unwile ; be- 
 caufe the intereft in opinions (merely as opinions, 
 and without any experimental reference to their 
 effects) when once they take ftrong hold of the 
 C mind,
 
 mind, become the moft operative of all interefts, 
 and indeed very often iupercede every other. 
 
 . I might farther exemplify the poflibility of a 
 political fentiment running through various (rates 
 and combining factions in them, from the hiltory 
 of the middle ages in the Guelfs and Ghibellines. 
 Thefe were political factions originally in favour of 
 the Emperor and the Pope, with no mixture of re- 
 ligious dogmas; or ii any thing religioufly doc- 
 trinal they had in them originally, it. very foon dil- 
 appeared; as the : r firft political objects difappeared 
 alfo, though the ipirit remained. They became 
 no more than names to diitinguifh faclions; but 
 they were not the lefs powerful in their operation, 
 when they had no direct: point of doctrine, either 
 religious or civil, to aficrt. For a long-time, how- 
 ever, thofc faclions gave no fmall degree of influ- 
 ence to the foreign Chiefs in every commonwealth 
 in which they exifted. I do not mean to purfue 
 further the track of thcfe parties. I allude to this 
 part of hiftory only, as it furnifhes an initancc of 
 that fpccics of faction which broke the locality of 
 publick affections, and united defcriptions of citi- 
 zens more with itrangcrs than with their country- 
 men of different opinions. 
 
 The political dogma, which upon the new 
 French fyftem, is to unite the faclions of different 
 
 nations,
 
 ( 11 ) 
 
 nations, turns is this, " That the majority told, by 
 " the head, of the taxable people in every country, 
 (< is the perpetual, natural, uneeafing, indefeafible 
 " fovcreign ; that this majority is perfectly mailer 
 " of the form, as well as the adminiftration of the 
 " flate, and that the magistrates, under whatever 
 " names they are called, are only functionaries to 
 " obey the orders, (general as laws or particular as 
 " decrees) which that majority may make ; that 
 " this is the only natural government ; that all 
 " others are tyranny and ufurpation." 
 
 In order to reduce this dogma into practice, the 
 Republicans in France, and their afibciates in other 
 countries, make it always their buiinefs, and often 
 their publick profefiion, to deftroy all traces of an- 
 tient eftablilliments, and to form a new common- 
 wealth in each country, upon the bafis of the 
 French Rights of Men. On the principle of thefe 
 rights, they mean to inftitute in every country, 
 and as it were, the germe of the whole, parochial 
 governments, for the purpofe of what they call 
 equal reprefentation. From them is to grow, by 
 fome media, a general council and rcprefentative of 
 all the parochial governments. In thatreprefentative 
 is to be vefted the whole national power ; totally 
 aboliiliing hereditary name and office, levelling all 
 conditions of men, (except where money miift make 
 a difference) breaking all connexion between ter- 
 C 2 ritory
 
 ritory and dignity, and abolifhing every fpecies of 
 nobility, gentry, and church eftablifhinents; all 
 their priefts, and all their magiftrates being only 
 creatures of election, and pensioners at will. 
 
 Knowing how oppofite a permanent landed 5n- 
 tereft is to that fchcme, they have refolved, and it 
 is the great drift of all their regulations, to reduce 
 jhat delcription of men to a mere peafantry, for the 
 fuftcnance of the towns, and to place the true effec- 
 tive government in cities, among the tradefmen, 
 bankers, and voluntary clubs of bold, prcfuming 
 young perfons ; advocates, attornies, notaries, 
 managers of newfpapers, and thofe cabals of lite- 
 rary men, called academies. Their Republick is to 
 have a firft functionary, (as they call him) under 
 the name of King, or not, as they think fit. This 
 officer, when fuch an officer is permitted, is how- 
 ever, neither in fact nor name, to be confidered as 
 fovereign, nor the people as his fubjccts. The very 
 life of thcfe appellations is offeniive to their ears. 
 
 Tirtiz-ms of This lyftem, as it has firft been realized, dogma- 
 fyitem. tically as well as practically, in France, makes 
 France the natural head of all factions formed on a 
 fimilar principle, wherever they may prevail, as 
 much as Athens was the head and fettled ally of 
 all democratick factions, wherever they exifted. 
 The other fyftem has no head. 
 
 This
 
 ( 13 ) 
 
 This fyftem has very many partisans in every 
 country in Europe, but particularly in England, 
 where they arc already formed into a body, com- 
 prehending moil of the diilenters of the three lead- 
 ing denominations ; to thcfe are readily aggre- 
 gated all who are dificnters in character, temper, 
 and clifpofition, though not belonging to any of 
 their congregations that is, all the reftlefs people 
 who refemble them, of all ranks and all parties 
 Whigs, and even Tories the whole race of half- 
 bred fpeculators ; all the Athcifts, Deills, and So- 
 cinians ; all thofe who hate the Clergy, and envy 
 the Nobility, a good many among the monied 
 people ; the Eaft Indians almoft to a man, who 
 cannot bear to find that their prefent importance 
 does not bear a proportion to their wealth. Thefe 
 latter have united thcmfelves into one great, and 
 in my opinion, formidable Club*, which, though 
 now quiet, may be brought into action with conii- 
 dcrable unanimity and force. 
 
 Formerly few, except the ambitious great, or the 
 defperate and indigent, were to be feared as inftru- 
 ments in revolutions. What has happened in 
 France teaches us, with many other things, that 
 there are more caufcs than have commonly been 
 
 * Originally called the Bengal Club, but (ince opened to per- 
 fons from th other Prefuiencies, for the purpofc of confolidaN 
 ing the whole Indian intcreil. 
 
 taken
 
 taken into our confederation, by which Govern- 
 ment may be fubverted. The monied men. mer- 
 chants, principal tradefmen, and men of letters 
 (hitherto generally thought the peaceable and even 
 timid part of fociety) are the chief actors in the 
 French Revolution. Bift the fact is, that as money 
 increafes and circulates, and as the circulation of 
 news, in politicks and letters, becomes more and 
 more diffufed, the perfons who diffufe this money, 
 and this intelligence, become more and more im- 
 portant. This was not long undiscovered. Views 
 of ambition were in France, for the firft time, pre- 
 fented to thefe claries of men. Objects in the 
 State, in the Army, in the fyftem of civil offices 
 of every kind. Their eyes were dazzled with this 
 new profpect. They were, as it were, electrified 
 and made to lofe the natural fpirit of their fitua- 
 tion. A bribe, great without example in the hif- 
 tory of the world, was held out to them the whole 
 government of a very large kingdom. 
 
 There are feveral who are perfuaded that the 
 fame thing cannot happen in England, becaufe 
 here, (they fay) the occupations of merchants, 
 tradefmen,and manufacturers, are not held as de- 
 grading fituations. I once thought that the low 
 efiimation in which commerce was held in France, 
 might be reckoned among the caufes of the late 
 revolution ; and I am ftill of opinion, that the ex- 
 
 clufive
 
 ( 15 ) 
 
 clufive fpirit of the French nobility, did irritate the 
 wealthy of other clafhs. But I found long mice, 
 that pcrfons in trade and buimefs were by no 
 means defpifcd in France in the manner I had been 
 taught to believe. As to men of letters, they were 
 fo far from being defpifed or neglected, that there 
 was no country perhaps in the univcrfe, in which 
 they were fo highly efleemed, courted, carciied, 
 and even feared ; tradefmen naturally were not fo 
 much fought in fociety (as not furniming fo largely 
 to the fund of convcrfation as they do to the reve- 
 nues of the ftate) but the latter defcription got for- 
 ward every day. M. Bailly, who made himfelf the -Literary in- 
 popular Mayor on the rebellion of the Baftile, and 
 is a principal actor in the revolt, before the change 
 poileffed a penlion or office under the Crown, of 
 fix hundred pound Englifh, a year, for that coun- 
 try, no contemptible provifion : And this he ob- 
 tained folely as a man of letters, and on no other 
 title. As to the monied men whilft the Monar- Moniedir.- 
 chy continued, there is no doubt, that merely as 
 fuch, they did not enjoy the privileges of nobility, 
 but nobility was of fo eafy an acquifition, that it 
 was the fault or neglect of all of that defcription, 
 who did not obtain it's privileges, for their lives at 
 leaft, in virtue of office. It attached under the 
 royal government to an innumerable multitude of 
 places, real and nominal, that were vendible ; and 
 fuch nobility were as capable of every thing as 
 
 their
 
 their degree of influence or intereft could make 
 them, that is, as nobility of no confiderable rank 
 or confequence. M. Necker, fo far from being a 
 French gentleman, was not fo much as a French- 
 man born, and yet we all know the rank in which 
 he flood on the day of the meeting of the States. 
 
 As to the mere matter of eftimation of the mer- 
 cantile or any other clafs, this is regulated by opi- 
 nion and prejudice. In England a fecurity againft 
 the envy of men in thele clafles, is not fo very 
 complete as xve may imagine. We muft not im- 
 pofe upon ourfelves. What inftitutions and man- 
 ners together had done in France, manners alone 
 do here. It is the natural operation of things 
 where there exifts a Crown, a Court, fplendid Or- 
 ders of Knighthood, and an Hereditary Nobility; 
 where there exifts a fixed, permanent, landed Gen- 
 try, continued in greatnefs and opulence by the 
 law of primogeniture, and by a protection given 
 to family fettlements; where there exifts a (land- 
 ing Army and Navy; where there exifts a Church 
 Eftablilliment, which beftows on learning and 
 parts an intereft combined with that of Religion 
 and the State ; in a country where fuch things 
 exift, wealth, new in it's acquifition, and precarious 
 in it's duration, can never rank firlt, or even near 
 the firft; though wealth has it's natural weight, 
 further, than as it is balanced and even preponde- 
 rated
 
 ( 17 ) 
 
 rated amongft us as amongft other nations, by ar- 
 tificial institutions and opinions growing out of 
 them. At no period in the hiftory of England 
 have fo few Peers been taken out of trade or from 
 families newly created by commerce. In no pe- 
 riod has fb fmall a number of noble families en- 
 tered into the counting-houfe. I can call to mind 
 but one in all England, and his is of near fifty 
 years Handing. Be that as it may, it appears plain 
 to me from my befr obfcrvation, that envy and 
 ambition may by art, management and difpoiition, 
 be as much excited amongft thefe defcriptions of 
 men in England, as in any other country ; and 
 that they are juft as capable of acting a part in any 
 great change. 
 
 What direction the French fpirit of profelytifm 
 
 f the French 
 
 is likely to take, and in what order it is likely to Spirit. it's 
 
 T - courfe. 
 
 prevail in the fevcral parts of Europe, it is not 
 eafy to determine. The feeds are fown almoft 
 every where, chiefly by newfpaper circulations, 
 infinitely more efficacious and extend ve than ever 
 they were. And they are a more important in- 
 ftrument than generally is imagined. They are a 
 part of the reading of all, they are the whole of 
 the reading of the far greater number. There are 
 thirty of them in Paris alone. The language dif- 
 fufes them more widely than the Englifh, though 
 the Englim too are much read. The writers of 
 D thefe
 
 ( 13 ) 
 
 thefe papers indeed, for the greater part, are either 
 unknown or in contempt, but they are like a bat- 
 tery in which the ftroke of any one ball produces 
 no great efrecl, but the amount of continual repe- 
 tition is decifive. Let us only fufrer any perfon to 
 tell us his llory, morning and evening, but for one 
 twelvemonth, and he will become our mafter. 
 
 All thofe countries in which feveral States are 
 comprehended under lome general geographical 
 defcription, and loofely united by fome federal con- 
 ftitution ; countries of which the members are 
 fmall, and greatly cliverfified in their forms of go- 
 vernment, and in the titles by which they are held 
 thefe countries, as it might be well expecled, are 
 the principal objects of their hopes and machina- 
 tions. Of thefe, the chief are Germany and Swit- 
 zerland : after them, Italy has it's place as in cir- 
 cumitanccs fomewhat fimilar. 
 
 As to Germany (in which from their relation to 
 the Emperor, I comprehend the Belgick provinces) 
 it appears to me to be from feveral circumftances, 
 internal and external, in a very critical fituation, 
 and the laws and liberties of the Empire are by no 
 means ierure from the contagion of the French 
 doclrines and the effe6l of French intrigues; or 
 from the ufe which two of the greater German 
 powers may make of a general derangement, to 
 
 the
 
 ( 19 ) 
 
 the general detriment. I do not fay that the 
 French" do not mean to beftow on thcfe German 
 States, liberties and laws too, after their mode ; 
 but thofe are not what have hitherto been under- 
 flood as the laws and liberties of the Empire. 
 Thcfe exift and have always exifted under the prin- 
 ciples of feodal tenure and fucceflion, under Im- 
 perial conftitntions, grants and conceffions of So- 
 vereigns, family compacts and publick treaties, 
 made under the fanclion, and fome of them gua- 
 ranteed by the Sovereign Powers of other nations, 
 and particularly the old Government of France, 
 the author and natural fupport of the treaty of 
 Wcilphalia, 
 
 In fhort, the Germanick body is a vaft mafs of 
 heterogeneous States, held together by that hete- 
 rogeneous body of old principles which formed the 
 publick law pofitive and doctrinal. The modern 
 laws and liberties which the new power in France 
 propofcs to introduce into Germany., and to fup- 
 port with all it's force, of intrigue and of arms, is of 
 a very different nature, utterly irreconcileable with 
 the firll, and indeed fundamentally the reverie of 
 it: I mean the Rights and Liberties of tne Man, the 
 Droit de fHomme. That this doclrine has made 
 an amazing progrefs in Germany, there cannot be 
 .n. fhadow of doubt. They are infecled by it along 
 the whole courfe of the Rhine, the Maefe, the 
 D 2 Mofelle.
 
 Mofeile, and in the greater part of Suabia and 
 Franconia. It is particularly prevalent amongil 
 all the lower people, churchmen and laity, in the 
 dominions of the Ecclefialiical Electors. It is not 
 eafy to find or to conceive Governments more 
 mild and indulgent than thcfe Church Sovereign- 
 ties; but good government is as nothing when the 
 Rights of Man take pofleffion of the mind. In- 
 deed the loofe rein held over the people in thefe 
 provinces, muft be confidered as one caufe of the 
 facility with which they lend thcmfelves to any 
 fchemes of innovation, by inducing them to think 
 lightly of their governments, and to judge of 
 grievances not by feeling, but by imagination. 
 
 It is in thefe Electorates that the firft imprcf- 
 (ions of France are likely to be made, and if they 
 fucceed, it is over with the Germanick body as it 
 Hands at prefent. A great revolution is preparing 
 in Germany ; and a revolution, in my opinion, 
 likely to be more decifive upon the general fate of 
 nations than that of France itfelf ; other than as 
 in France is to be found the firft fource of all the 
 principles which are in any way likely to diftin- 
 guifh the troubles and convulfions of our age. If 
 Europe docs not conceive the independence, and 
 the equilibrium of the Empire to be in the very 
 eflence of the fyftem of balanced power in Europe, 
 and if the fcheme of publick law, or mafs of laws 
 
 upon
 
 upon which that independence and equilibrium 
 are founded, be of no leading confequence as they 
 are preferved or deftroyed, all the politicks of Eu- 
 rope for more tlian two centuries have been mi- 
 ferably erroneous. 
 
 If the two great leading Powers of Germany do Pruffia a 
 not regard this danger (as apparently they do not) 
 in the light in which it prefents itfelf fo naturally, 
 it is becaufe they are powers too great to have a 
 focial intereft. That fort of intereil belongs only 
 to thofe, whofe ftate of weaknefs or mediocrity is 
 fuch, as to give them greater caufe of apprehenfion 
 from what may deftroy them, than of hope from 
 any thing by which they may be aggrandized. 
 
 As long as thofe two Princes are at variance, fo 
 long the liberties of Germany are fafe. But if 
 ever they fhould fo far underfiand one another as 
 to be perfuaded that they have a more ctirecl and 
 more certainly defined intereft in a proportioned 
 mutual aggrandizement than in a reciprocal reduc- 
 tion, that is, if they come to think that they are 
 more likely to be enriched by a divifion of fpoil, 
 than to be rendered fecure by keeping to the old 
 policy of preventing others from being fpoiled by 
 either of them, from that moment the liberties of 
 Germany are no more. 
 
 That
 
 ( 22 ) 
 
 That -a junction of two in fuch a fcheme is nei- 
 ther impofliblc nor improbable, is evident from the 
 partition of Poland in 1 773, which was effected by 
 fuch a junction as made the interpofition of other 
 nations to prevent it, not eafy. Their circumftances 
 at that time hindered any other three States, or in- 
 deed any two, from taking mea lures in common 
 to prevent it, though France was at that time an 
 exiting power, and had not yet learned to act 
 upon a (yllem of politicks of her own invention. 
 The geographical pofition of Poland was a great 
 obitacle to any movements of France in oppoli- 
 tion to this, at that time unparalleled league. 
 To my certain knowledge, if Great Britain had at 
 that time been willing to concur in preventing the 
 execution of a project fo dangerous in the exam- 
 ple, even cxhaufted as France then was by the 
 preceding war, and under a lazy and unenterpriz- 
 ing Prince, fhe would have at every rifque taken 
 an active part in this bufinefs. But a languor 
 with regard to fo remote an intereft, and the prin- 
 ciples and paffions which were then ftrongly at 
 work at home, were the caufes why Great Britain 
 would not give France any encouragement in fuch 
 an enterprize. At that time, however, and with 
 regard to that object., in my opinion. Great Britain 
 and France had a common interefr. 
 
 But
 
 But the portion of Germany is not like that of Poffibicpro- 
 
 jedt of the 
 
 Poland, with regard to France, either for good or Emperor and 
 for evil. If a conjunction between Pruffia and the fu. 
 Emperor fhould be formed for the purpofe of fecu- 
 larifing and rendering hereditary the Ecclefiaftical 
 Electorates and the Bifhoprick of Munfter, for 
 fettling two of them on the children of the Em- 
 peror, and uniting Cologne and Munfter to the 
 dominions of the King of Pruffia on the Rhine, 
 or if any other project of mutual aggrandizement 
 fhould be in profpect, and that to facilitate fuch a 
 fcheme, the modern French Ihould be permitted 
 and encouraged to fhake the internal and external 
 fecurity of thefe Ecclefiaftical Electorates, Great 
 Britain is fo fituated that fhe could not with any 
 effect fet herfelf in oppofition to fuch a defign. 
 Her principal arm, her marine, could here be of 
 no fort of ufe. 
 
 France, the author of the treaty of Weftphalia, TO be refill- 
 is the natural guardian of the independence and France, 
 balance of Germany. Great Britain (to fay no- 
 thing of the King's concern as one of that auguft 
 body) has a fcrious intereft in preferving it; but, 
 except through the power of France, offing upon 
 the common old principles of State policy, in the 
 cafe we have fuppofed, (he has no fort of means 
 of fupporting that intereft. It is always the inte- 
 reft of Great Britain that the power of France 
 
 fhould
 
 ( 24 ) 
 
 fhould be kept within the bounds of moderation. 
 It is not her intereft that that power fhould be 
 wholly annihilated in the iyftem of Europe. 
 Though at one time through France the indepen- 
 dence of Europe was endangered, it is and ever 
 was through her alone that the common liberty of 
 Germany can be fecured againft the fingle or the 
 combined ambition of any other power. In truth, 
 within this century the aggrandizement of other 
 Sovereign Houfes has been fiich that there has 
 been a great change in the whole ftate of Europe, 
 and other nations as well as France may become 
 objects of jealoufy and apprehcniion. 
 
 Newprincj. In this ftate of things, a new principle of alli- 
 ance, ances and wars is opened. The treaty of Weft- 
 phalia is, with France, an antiquated fable. The 
 rights and liberties fhe was bound to maintain are 
 now a lyftem of wrong and tyranny which fhe is 
 bound to deuroy. Her good and ill difpolitions 
 are fhewn by the fame means. To communicate 
 feacealfy the rights of men is the true mode of 
 her (hewing her friend/hip; to force Sovereigns to 
 fulmit to thofe rights is her mode of hqftilily. So 
 that either as friend or foe her whole fcheine has 
 been and is, to throw the Empire into confufion : 
 and thofe Statefmen, who follow the old routine 
 of politicks, may fee in this general confufion, and 
 in the danger of the leffer Princes, an occaiion as 
 
 protectors
 
 proteclors or enemies,, of connecting their territo- 
 ries to one or the other of the two great German, 
 Powers. They do not take into confideration that 
 the means which they encourage, as leading to the 
 event they defire, will with certainty not only ravage 
 and deftroy the Empire, but if they {hould for a 
 moment feem to aggrandize the two great houfes, 
 will alfo eftablifh principles, and confirm tempers 
 amongft the people, which will preclude the two 
 Sovereigns from the poffibility of holding what 
 they acquire, or even the dominions which they 
 have inherited. It is on the fide of the Ecclefiafti- 
 cal Electorates that the dykes, railed to fupport 
 the German liberty, firfl will give way. 
 
 The French have begun their general operations 
 by feizing upon thofe territories of the Pope, the 
 fituation of which was the moft inviting to the 
 enterprize. Their method of doing it was by excit- 
 ing fedition and fpreading maflacre and defolation 
 thro' thcfe unfortunate places, and then under an 
 idea of kindnefs and protection, bringing forward an 
 antiquated title of the Crown of France and an- 
 nexing Avignon and the two cities of the Comtat 
 with their territory to the French Republick. They' 
 have made an attempt on Geneva, m which they Geneva."' 
 very narrowly failed of fuccefs. It is known that 
 they hold out from time to time the idea of unit- 
 ing all the other provinces of which Gaul was an- 
 E tisntly
 
 ( 26 ) 
 
 tiently compofed, including Savoy on the other fide, 
 and on this fide bounding themfelves by the Rhine. 
 
 As to Switzerland, it is a country whofe long 
 union rather than it's poffible divifion, is the mat- 
 ter of wonder. Here I know they entertain very 
 fanguine hopes. The aggregation to France of 
 the Democratick Swifs Republicks appears to them 
 to be a work half done by their very form; and it 
 might feem to them rather an encreafe of impor- 
 tance to thefe little Commonwealths., than a dero- 
 gation from their independency, or a change in 
 the manner of their Government. Upon any 
 quarrel amongil the Cantons nothing is more like- 
 ly than fuch an event. As to the Ariftocratick Re- 
 publicks, the general clamour and hatred which 
 the French excite againft the very name, (and with 
 more facility and fuccefs than againft Monarchs) 
 and the utter impoflibility of their Government 
 making any fort of refinance againft an infurrec- 
 tion, where they have no troops, and the people 
 are all armed and trained, render their hopes 
 in that quarter, far indeed from unfounded. It is 
 certain that the Republick of Berne thinks itfelf 
 obliged to a vigilance next to hoftile, and to impri- 
 fon or expel all the French whom they find in their 
 territories. But indeed thofe Ariftocracies which 
 comprehend whatever is confiderable, wealthy, and 
 valuable in Switzerland, do now fo wholly depend 
 
 upon
 
 ( 27 ) 
 upon opinion, and the humour of their multitude, ow. French 
 
 ' maxims the 
 
 that the lierhteft puff of wind is fufficient to blow furit y of 
 
 1 its indepen- 
 
 them down. If France, under it's antient regimen, <* 
 and upon the antient principles of policy, was the 
 fupport of the Germanick Conftitution, it was 
 much more fo of that of Switzerland, which al- 
 moft from the very origin of that confederacy reft- 
 ed tfpon the clofenefs of it's connexion with 
 France, on which the Swifs Cantons wholly re- 
 pofed themfelves for the prefervation of the parts 
 of their body in their refpective rights and perma- 
 nent forms, as well as for the maintenance of all 
 in their general independency. 
 
 Switzerland and Germany arc the firft objects 
 of the new French politicians. When I contem- 
 plate what they have done at home, which is in 
 effect little lefs than an amazing conqueft wrought 
 by a change of opinion, in a great part (to be fure 
 far from altogether) very fudden, I cannot help 
 letting my thoughts run along with their defigns, 
 and without attending to geographical order, to 
 confider the other States of Europe fo far as they 
 may be any way affected by this aftonifhing Re- 
 volution. If early fteps are not taken in fome way 
 or other to prevent the fpreading of this influence, 
 I fcarcely think any of them perfectly fecure, 
 
 Italy is divided, as Germany and Switzerland to'y- 
 are, into many fmaller States, and with fomc con- 
 E 2 fiderable
 
 fiderable diverfity as to forms of Government; but 
 as thefe divifions and varieties in Italy are not fo 
 confiderable, fo neither do I think the danger al- 
 together fo imminent there as in Germany and 
 Switzerland. Savoy I know that the French con- 
 lider as in a very hopeful way, and I believe not at 
 all without reafon. They view it as an old mem- 
 ber of the Kingdom of France which may be eafily 
 re-united in the manner, and on the principles of 
 the re-union of Avignon. This country commu- 
 nicates with Piedmont ; and as the King of Sardi- 
 nia's dominions were long the key of Italy, and as 
 fuch long regarded by France, whiltt France acted 
 on her old maxims, and with views on Italy; fo in 
 this new French empire of fedition, if once fhe 
 gets that key into her hands, fhe can eafily lay 
 open the barrier which hinders the entrance of 
 her prefent politicks into that inviting region. 
 Milan, I arn fure, nourifhcs great difquiets and if 
 Milan fhould ftir, no part of Lombardy is fecure 
 to the prefent poffeflbrs whether the Venetian or 
 the Auflrian. Genoa is clofely connected with 
 France. 
 
 The firft Prince of the Hcufe of Bourbon has 
 been obliged to give himfelf up entirely to the 
 new fyftem, and to pretend even to propagate it 
 with all zeal ; at lead that Club of intriguers who 
 affemble at the Feuillans, and whofe cabinet 
 
 meets
 
 meets at Madame Stahl's, and makes and directs 
 all the Minifters, is the real Executive Government 
 of France. The Emperor is perfectly in concert, 
 and they will not long fuffer any Prince of the 
 Houfe of Bourbon, to keep by force the French 
 emjlTaries out of their dominions; nor whilft 
 France has a commerce with them, efpecially thro* 
 Marfeilles, (the hotteft focus of fedition in France) 
 xvill it be long poffible to prevent the intercourfo 
 or the effects. 
 
 Naples has an old inveterate difpofition to Re- 
 publicanifm, and (however for fome time pait 
 quiet) is as liable to explofion as it's own Vefuvius. 
 Sicily I think has thefe difpofitions in full as ftrong 
 a degree. In neither of thefe countries exifis any 
 thing which very well deferves the name of Go- 
 vernment or exact police. 
 
 In the Eftates of the Church, notwithstanding Ecciefiafti. 
 their ftrictnefs in banifhing the French out of that 
 country, there are not wanting the feeds of a re- 
 volution. The fpirit of Nepotifm prevails there 
 nearly as ftrong as ever. Every Pope of courfe 
 is to give origin or restoration to a great family, 
 by the means of large donations. The foreign reve- 
 nues have long been gradually on the decline, and 
 feem now in a manner dried up. To fupply this 
 defect the refource of vexatious and impolitick 
 
 jobbing
 
 ( 30 ) 
 
 jobbing at home, if any thing, is rather encreafed 
 than lefTened. Various, well intended but ill un- 
 derftood practices, fome of them exifting, in their 
 fpirit at leaft, from the time of the old Roman 
 empire, ftill prevail ; and that Government is as 
 blindly attached to old abufive cuftoms, as others 
 are wildly difpofed to all forts of innovations and 
 experiments. Thefe abufes were lefs felt whilfi; 
 the Pontificate drew riches from abroad, which in 
 fome meafure counterbalanced the evils of their 
 remifs and iobbifh Government at home. But 
 now it can fubfift only on the reiburces of clomellick 
 management; and abufes in that management of 
 courle will be more intimately and more feverely 
 felt, 
 
 In the, midft of the apparently torpid languor of 
 the Ecclefiaftical State, thofe who have had oppor- 
 tunity of a near obfervation, have feen a little rip~ 
 pling m that fmooth water, which indicates fome- 
 thing alive under it. There is in the Ecclefiafti- 
 cal State, a perfonage who feems capable of acling 
 (but with more force and Iteadinefs) the part of 
 the Tribune Rienzi. The people once inflamed 
 will not be deftitute of a leader. They have fuch 
 an one already in the Cardinal or Archbiihop Buon 
 Camfagna. He is, of all men, if I am not ill in- 
 formed, the moft turbulent, feditious, intriguing, 
 bold, and defperate. He is not at all made for a 
 
 Roman
 
 ( 31 ) 
 
 Roman of the prefent day. I think he lately held 
 the firft office of their State, that of Great Cham- 
 berlain, which is equivalent to High Treafurer. 
 At prefent he is out of employment, and in dif- 
 grace. If he fhould be elected Pope, or even 
 come to have any weight with a new Pope, he will 
 infallibly conjure up a democratick fpirit in that 
 country. He may indeed be able to effe6t it 
 without thefe advantages. The next interreg- 
 num will probably mew more of him. There 
 may be others of the fame character, who have not 
 come to my knowledge. This much is certain, 
 that the Roman people, if once the blind reverence 
 they bear to the fanctity of the Pope, which is 
 their only bridle, fhould relax, are naturally tur- 
 bulent, ferocious, and headlong, whilft the police 
 is defective, and the Government feeble and re- 
 fourcelefs beyond all imagination. 
 
 As to Spain, it is a nervelefs country. It does Spain, 
 not poffefs the ufe, it only fuffers the abufe of a 
 nobility. For fome time, and even before the fet- 
 tlement of the Bourbon Dynafty, that body has 
 been fyftematically lowered, and rendered incapa- 
 ble by exclufion, and for incapacity excluded from 
 affairs. In this circle the body is in a manner 
 annihilated and fo little means have they of any 
 weighty exertion either to controul or to fupport 
 the Crown, that if they at all interfere, it is only 
 
 by
 
 (32) 
 
 by abetting defperate and mobbifli infurrection?, 
 like that at Madrid which drove Squillace from his 
 place. Florida Blanca is a creature of office, and has 
 Jittle connexion, and no fympathy with that body. 
 
 As to the Clergy, they are the only thing in 
 Spain that looks like an independent order, and 
 they are kept in fome refpect by the Inquifi- 
 tion, the fole but unhappy refource of publick 
 tranquillity and order now remaining in Spain. 
 As in Venice, it is become moftly an engine of 
 State,which indeed to a degree it has always been in 
 Spain. It wars no longer with Jews and Hereticks : 
 It has no fuch war to carry on. It's great object 
 is to keep atheiftick and republican doctrines from 
 making their way in that kingdom. No French 
 book upon any fubjcct can enter there which does 
 not contain fuch matter. In Spain, the clergy are 
 of moment from their influence, but at the fame 
 time with the envy and jealoufy that attend great 
 riches and power. Though the Crown has by ma- 
 nagement with the Pope got a very great fhare of 
 the ecclefiaiiical revenues into it's own hands, much 
 ftill remains to them. There will always be about 
 that Court thofe who look out to a farther divifion 
 of the Church property as a refource, and to be 
 obtained by (horter methods than thofe of negotia- 
 tions with the Clergy and their Chief. But at pre- 
 fent I think it likely that they will flop, left the 
 
 bulinef*
 
 bufmefs fhould be taken out of their hands ; and 
 left that body in which remains the only life that 
 exifts in Spain, and is not a fever, may with their 
 property lofe all the influence neceflary to prefcrve 
 the Monarchy, or being poor and defperate, may 
 employ whatever influence remains to them as ac^ 
 tive agents in it's deftruclion. 
 
 The Caflilians have ftill remaining a good deal Caftiiedif- 
 
 terent trom 
 
 of their old character, their Gravidad, Leal J fid, c^cma * 
 
 Anapn, 
 
 and il Timor de Dios- but that character neither is, 
 or ever was exactly -true, except of the Caftilians 
 onlv. The feveral kingdoms which compofe Spain, 
 have perhaps fome features which run through the 
 whole ; but they are in many particulars as diffe- 
 rent as nations who go by different names; the Ca- 
 talans, for inftance, and the Arragonians too, in a 
 good meafure have the fpirit of the Miquelcts, and 
 much more of republicanism than of an attach- 
 ment to royalty. They are more in the way of 
 trade and intercourfe with France ; and upon the 
 leafl internal movement, wjll diiclolc and probably 
 let loofe a fpirit that may throw the whole Spanifh 
 Monarchy into convuifions. 
 
 It is a melancholy rcflcclion that the fpirit of 
 
 melioration which has been going on in that part 
 
 of Europe, more or lefs during this century, and 
 
 the various fchemes very lately on foot for further 
 
 F advance*
 
 ( 34 ) 
 
 advancement are all put a flop to at once. Refor- 
 mation certainly is nearly Connected with innovation 
 and where that latter comes in for too large a 
 fhare, thole who undertake to improve their coun- 
 try may rifque their own fafety. In times where 
 the correction, which includes the confeffion of an 
 abufe, is turned to criminate the authority which 
 has long mffered it, rather than to honour thofc 
 who would amend it (which is the fpirit of this 
 malignant French diftemper) every ftep out of the 
 common courfe becomes critical, and renders it a 
 tafk full of peril for Princes of moderate talents to 
 engage in great undertakings. At prefent the only 
 fafety of Spain is the old national hatred to the 
 French. How far that can be depended upon, if 
 any great ferments fhould be excited, it is impof- 
 fible to fav. 
 
 As to Portugal, ilie is out of the high road of 
 thcfe politicks I (hall, therefore, not divert my 
 thoughts that way ; but return again to the North 
 of Europe, which at prefent feems the part moft in- 
 terefted, and there it appears to me that the French 
 fpeculation on the northern countries, may be 
 valued in the following, or fome fuch manner. 
 
 Denmark and Norway do not nppear to fiirnifli 
 any of ilic materials of a democratick revolution, or 
 the difpolitions to it. Denmark can only be cot:- 
 
 fequential/y
 
 ( 35 ) 
 
 fiquentlally affected by any thing done in France ; 
 but of Sweden I think quite otherwife. The. pre- 
 lent power in Sweden is too new a fyftcm, and too 
 green and too fore from it's late Revolution, to be 
 confidered as perfectly affurcd. The King by his 
 aftonifhing activity, his boldnefs, his dccifion, his 
 ready verfatility, and by rouzing and employing 
 the old military fpirit of Sweden, keeps up the top 
 with continual agitation and laftiing. The mo- 
 ment it ceafes to fpin, the Royalty is a dead bit of 
 box. Whenever Sweden is quiet externally for 
 fome time, there is great danger that all the repub- 
 lican elements fhe contains will be animated by 
 the new French fpirit, and of this I believe the 
 King is very fenfible. 
 
 The Ruffian Government is of all others the 
 moft liable to be fubvertedby military feditions. by 
 Court confpiracies, and fometimcs by headlong re- 
 bellions of the people, fuch as the turbinating move- 
 ment of Pugatchef. It is not quite fo probable 
 that in any of thefe changes the fpirit of fyftem 
 may mingle in the manner it has done in France. 
 The Mufcovites are no great fpeculators But I 
 fhould not much rely on their uninquifitive difpo- 
 fition. if any of their ordinary motives to fedition 
 fhould arife. The little catechifm of the Rights of 
 Men is loon learned; and the inferences are in the 
 paffions. 
 
 F 2 Poland,
 
 ( 36 ) 
 
 Poland, from one cnufc or another, is always un- 
 quiet. The newConftitution only fervcs to fupply 
 that reftlefs people .with new means, at leaft new 
 modes, of chcrifhing their turbulent difpofition. 
 The bottom of the character is the fame. It is 
 a great queftion, whether the joining that Crown 
 with the Electorate of Saxony, will contribute moft 
 to ftrcngthen the Royal authority of Poland, or to 
 fhake the Ducal in Saxony. The Elector is a Ca- 
 tholick ; the people of Saxony are, fix fevenths at 
 the very leaft, Proteftants. He mnjl continue a Ca- 
 tholick according to the Polifh law, if he accepts 
 that Crown. The pride of the Saxons, formerly 
 flattered by having a Crown in the Houfe of their 
 Prince, though an honour which coft them dear ; 
 the German probity, fidelity and loyalty; the weight 
 of the Conftitution of the Empire under the Treaty 
 of Weftphalia ; the good temper and good nature 
 of the Princes of the Iloufe of Saxony; had for- 
 merly removed from the people all apprehenfion 
 with regard to their religion, and kept them per- 
 fectly quiet, obedient, and even affectionate. The 
 feven years war made fome change in the minds of 
 the Saxons. They did not, I believe, regret the lofs 
 of what might be conlidcred alrnoft as the fuccef- 
 fion to the Crown of Poland, the pofleffion of 
 which, by annexing them to a foreign interefi, had 
 often obliged them to act an arduous part, towards 
 tbc fupport of which that foreign intcreft a Horded' 
 
 no
 
 ( 37 ) 
 
 no proportionable ftrcngth. In this very delicate 
 lituation of their political intcrefts, the fpeculations 
 of the French and German (Economi/ls, and the ca- 
 bals, and the lecrct^ as well as public doctrines of 
 the lllummatenorden* and Free Mafons y have made 
 a coniiderable progrefs in that country ; and a tur- 
 bulent fpirit under qolour of religion, but in reality 
 arifmg from the French Rights of Man, has al- 
 ready fhewn itfelf, and is ready on every occafion 
 to blaze out. 
 
 The prefent Elector is a Prince of a fafe and 
 quiet temper, of great prudence, and goodnefs. 
 He knows that in the actual ftate of things, not 
 the power and refpect belonging to Sovereigns, but 
 their very cxiftence depends on a reafonable fruga- 
 lity. It is very certain that not one Sovereign in 
 Europe can either promife for the continuance of 
 his authority in a ftate of indigence and infolvency, 
 or dares to venture on a new impofition to relieve 
 himfelf. Without abandoning wholly the ancient 
 magnificence of his Court, the Elector has con- 
 ducted his affairs with infinitely more ceconomy 
 than any of his predecefTors, fo as to reftore his 
 finances beyond what was thought poffible from the 
 ftate in which the feven years war had left Saxony. 
 Saxony during the whole of that dreadful period 
 having been in the hands of an exafperatcd enemy, 
 rigorous by refentment, by nature and by necef- 
 
 fity, 
 
 CD130G
 
 ITty, was obliged to bear in a manner the whole 
 burthen of the war; in the intervals when their al- 
 lies prevailed, the inhabitants of that country were 
 not better treated. 
 
 The moderation and prudence of the prefent 
 Elector, in my opinion, rather perhaps refpites the 
 troubles than lecures the peace of the Electorate. 
 The offer of the fucceffion to the Crown of Poland 
 is truly critical, whether he accepts, or whether he 
 declines it. If the States will confent to his ac- 
 ceptance, it will add to the difficulties, already 
 great, of his fituation between the King of Pruifia 
 and the Emperor. But thefe thoughts lead me too 
 far, when I mean to fpeak only of the interior con- 
 dition of thefe Princes. It has always however fome 
 ncccflary connexion with their foreign politicks. 
 
 With regard to Holland and the ruling party 
 there, I do not think it at all tainted, or likely to 
 be fo except by fair; or that it is likely to be mil- 
 led unlefs indirectly and circuitoufly. But the pre- 
 dominant party in Holland is not Holland. The 
 fuppreflcd faction, though fupprefled, exiits. Un- 
 der the afhes, the embers of the late commotions 
 are {"till warm. This Anti-Orange party has from 
 the day of it's origin been French, though alienated 
 in fomc degree for fomc time, through the pride 
 and folly of Louis the Fourteenth. It will ever 
 
 hanker
 
 hanker after a French connexion ; and now that 
 the internal Government in France has been afii- 
 milated in fo confiderable a degree to that which 
 the immoderate Republicans began fo very lately 
 to introduce into Holland, their connexion, as ftill 
 more natural, will be more defired. I do not well 
 junderltand the prefent exterior politicks of the 
 Stadtholder, nor the Treaty into which the news- 
 papers fay he has entered for the States with the 
 Emperor. But the Emperor's own politicks with 
 regard to the Netherlands feem to me to be exactly 
 calculated to anfwer the purpofe of the French Re- 
 volutionifh. He endeavours to crufh the Arifto- 
 cratick party and to nourifh one in avowed con- 
 nexion with the moft furious Democrats in 
 France. 
 
 Thefe Provinces in which the French game is fo 
 well played, they coniider as part of the Old French 
 Empire : certainly they were amongft the oldeft 
 parts of it. Thefe they think very well iituatcd, 
 as their party is well-difpofed to a re-union. As to 
 the greater nations, they do not aim at making a 
 direct conqueft of them, but by difturbing them 
 through a propagation of their principles, they 
 liope to weaken, as they will weaken them, and to 
 /keep them in perpetual alarm and agitation, and 
 thus render all their efforts againft them utterly 
 
 impracticable,
 
 ( 40 ) 
 
 impracticable, whilft they extend the dominion of 
 their fovereign anarchy on all fides. 
 
 As to England, there may be fome apprehenfion 
 from vicinity, from conflant communication, and 
 from the very name of Liberty, which, as it ought to 
 be very dear to us, in it's worn: abufcs carries fome- 
 thing feduclive. It is the abufe of the firft and beft 
 of the objects which we cherim. I know that many 
 who fufficiently diflike the fyflem of France, have 
 yet no apprehenfions of it's prevalence here. I fay 
 nothing to the ground of this fecurity in the at- 
 tachment of the people to their Conltitution, and 
 their fatisfa&ion in the difcrcet portion of liberty 
 which it mealures out to them. Upon this I have 
 faid all I have to fay, in the Appeal I have pub- 
 lifhed. That fecurity is fomething, and not in- 
 conliderable. But if a ftorm arifcs I fhould not 
 much rely upon it. 
 
 There are other views of things which may bo 
 ufed to give us a perfecl (though in my opinion a 
 delufive) affurancc of our own fecurity. The firft 
 of thefe is from the weaknefs and ricketty nature 
 of the new fvftem in the place of it's iirfl formation. 
 It is thought that the monfler of a Commonwealth 
 cannot poffibly live that at any rate the ill con- 
 trivance of their fabrick will make it fall in pieces 
 
 Qf
 
 ( 41 ) 
 
 of itfelf that the Aflembly muft be bankrupt, and 
 that this bankruptcy will totally deftroy that fyf- 
 tem, from the contagion of which apprehenfions 
 are entertained. 
 
 For my part I have long thought that one great 
 caufe of the liability of this wretched fchenie of 
 things in France was an opinion that it could not 
 Hand ; and, therefore, that all external mcafures 
 to deftroy it were wholly ufelefs. 
 
 As to the bankruptcy, that event has happened Bankruptcy. 
 long ago, as much as it is ever likely to happen. 
 So foon as a nation compels a creditor to take 
 paper currency in difcharge of his debt, there is a 
 bankruptcy. The compulfory paper has in fome 
 degree anfwered ; not becaufe there was a furplus 
 from Church lands, but becaufe faith has not been 
 kept with the Clergy. As to the hqjders of the 
 old fundSj to them the payments will be dilatory, 
 but they will be made, and whatever may be the 
 difcount on paper, whilil paper is taken, paper 
 will be iifued. 
 
 As to the reft, they have fhot out three branches Refurc. 
 of revenue to fupply all thofe which they have de- 
 ftroyed, that is, the Unherfal Regifter of all Tranf- 
 aflions, the heavy and univcrfal Stamp Duty, and 
 the new Territorial Lnpoft, levied chiefly on the 
 G reduced
 
 reduced eftatcs of the gentlemen. Thefe branches 
 of the revenue, efpecially as they take affignats in 
 payment, anfwer their purpofe in a confiderable 
 degree, and keep up the credit of their paper; for 
 as they receive it in their treafury, it is in reality 
 funded upon all their taxes and future refourccs 
 of all kinds, as well as upon the church eftates. As 
 this paper is become in a manner the only vifible 
 maintenance of the whole people, the dread of a 
 bankruptcy is more apparently connected with the 
 delay of a counter-revolution, than with the du- 
 ration of this Republick ; becaufe the interefl of 
 the new Republick manifcftly leans upon it ; and 
 in my opinion, the counter-revolution cannot exift 
 along with it. The above three projects ruined fome 
 Minifters under the old Government, merely for 
 having conceived them. They are the falvation 
 of the prefent Rulers. 
 
 As the Ailembly has laid a moft unfparing and 
 cruel hand on all men who have lived by the 
 bounty, the juftice, or the abufes of the old Go- 
 vernment, they have leflened many expences. 
 The royal eftablifhment, though cxccfTively and 
 ridiculously great for their fcheme of things, is re- 
 duced at leaft one half; the eflates of the King's 
 Brothers, which under the ancient Government had 
 been in truth royal revenues, go to the general 
 Hock of the confifcation ; and as to the crown 
 
 lands,
 
 ( 43 ) 
 
 lands, though under the Monarchy they never 
 yielded two hundred and fifty thoufand a year, by * 
 many they are thought at leaft worth three times 
 as much. 
 
 As to the ecclefiaftical charge, whether as a 
 cornpenfation for lofTes, or a proviflon for religion, 
 of which they made at firft a great parade, and 
 entered into a folemn engagement in favour of it, 
 it was eflimated at a much larger fum than they 
 could expect from the church property, moveable 
 or immoveable : they are completely bankrupt as 
 to that article. It is juil what they with ; and it 
 is not productive of any ferious inconvenience. 
 The non-payment produces difcontent and occa- 
 iional fedition ; but is only by fits and fpafms, 
 and amongfl the country people who are of no 
 confequcnce. Thefc feditions furnilh new pre- 
 texts for non-payment to the church eftablifhment, 
 and help the AfFembly wholly to get rid of the 
 Clergy, and indeed of any form of religion, which 
 is not only their real, but avowed object. 
 
 They are embarraflcd indeed in the higheil de- Want of 
 grec, but not wholly refourcelcfs. They are with- fu PP iied. 
 out the fpecies of money. Circulation of money 
 is a great convenience, but a fubflitute for it may 
 be found. Whilft the great objects of production 
 and confumption, corn, cattle,, wine, and the like, 
 G 2 exift
 
 C 44 ) 
 
 exift in a country, the means of giving them cir- 
 culation with more or lefs convenience, cannot be 
 wholly wanting. The great confiscation of the 
 church and of the crown lands, and of the ap- 
 penages of the princes, for the purchafe of all 
 which their paper is always received at par, gives 
 means of continually deftroying and continually 
 creating, and this perpetual deftruclion and reno- 
 vation feeds the fpcculative market, and prevents, 
 and will prevent, till that fund of conftfcation be- 
 gins to fail, a total depreciation. 
 
 But all confederation of public credit in France 
 is of little avail at prefent. The action indeed 
 of the monied intereft was of abfolute neccffity 
 'at the beginning of this Revolution; but the 
 French Republicks can ftand without any aflift- 
 ancc from that defcription of men, which, as things 
 are now circumftanced, rather frauds in need of 
 afliftance itfelf from the power which alone fub- 
 ftantially exifts in France ; I mean the feveral 
 diftricts and municipal republicks, and the feveral 
 clubs which direct all their affairs and appoint all 
 their magiftrates. This is the power now para- 
 mount to every thing, even to the Aflembly itfelf 
 called National, and that to which tribunals, 
 priefthood, laws, finances, and both defcriptions of 
 military power, are wholly fubfervient, fo far as 
 the military power of either defcription yields obe- 
 dience to any name of authority. 
 
 The
 
 The world of contingency and political combi- 
 nation is much larger than we are apt to imngijic. 
 We never can fay what may, or may not happen, 
 without a view to all the actual circumftances. 
 Experience upon other data than thofe, is of all 
 things the mofl delufive. Prudence in new cafes 
 can do nothing on grounds of retrofpect. A con- 
 iTant vigilance and attention to the train of things 
 as they fucceffively emerge., and to act on what 
 they direct, arc the only fure courfes. The phy- 
 fician that let blood, and by blood-letting cured 
 one kind of plague, in the next added to it's ra- 
 vages. That power goes with property is not imi- 
 vcrfally true, and the idea that the operation of it 
 is certain and invariable, may miflead us very fa- 
 tally. 
 
 Whoever will take an accurate view of the ft ate P..WT fcj- 
 of thofe Republicks, and of the competition of the property. 
 prefcnt Aflembly deputed by them (in which Af- 
 fcmbly there are not quite fifty perfons poftefled 
 of an income amounting to lOOl. fieri ing yearly) 
 muit difcern clearly, tlmt the political and civil 
 power of France is ivJiolly feparated from it's property 
 of every Btfcnption\ and of courfe that neither the 
 landed nor the monied intereft pofiefles the 
 fmallefi weight or confideration in the direction 
 of any publick concern. The whole kingdom is 
 directed by the refufe of ifs chicane, with tiie aid 
 
 of
 
 ( 46 ) 
 
 of the buftling, prefumpUious young clerks of 
 count! ng-houfes and {hops, and fome intermix- 
 ture of ^oung gentlemen of the fame character in 
 the feveral towns. The rich peafants are bribed 
 with church lands ; and the poorer of that defcrip- 
 tion are, and can be, counted for nothing. They 
 may rife in ferocious, ill-directed tumults but 
 they can only difgrace themfelves and lignalize 
 the triumph of their adverfarics. 
 
 The truly active citizens, that is, the above dc- 
 fcriptions, arc all concerned in intrigue reflecting 
 the various objects in their local or their general 
 government. The rota which the French have 
 eftablifhed for their National Afiembly, holds out 
 the higheft objects of ambition to fuch van: mul- 
 titudes as, in an unexampled meafure, to widen 
 the bottom of a new fpecies of intereft merely po- 
 litical, and wholly unconnected with birth or pro- 
 perty. This Icheme of a rota, though it enfeebles 
 the Hate, confidered as one folid body, and indeed 
 wholly difables it from acting as fuch, give? a 
 great, an equal, and a diffufive itrcngth to the de- 
 mocratick fcheme. Seven hundred and fifty peo- 
 ple, every two years raifcd to the fupreme power, 
 has already produced at leaft fifteen hundred bold, 
 acting politicians; a great number for even fo 
 great a country as France. Thcfe men never 
 will quietly fettle in ordinary occupations, nor 
 
 fubmit
 
 ( 4; ) 
 
 fubmit to any fcheinc which mufl reduce them to 
 an entirely private condition, or to the cxercife of 
 a fteady, peaceful, but obfcure and unimportant 
 induftry. Whilft they fit in the Aflembly they 
 are denied offices of trufl and profit but their 
 fhort duration makes this no reflraint during 
 their probation and apprenticefhip they are all 
 falaried with an income to the greateft part of 
 them immenfe ; and after they have pafTed the 
 novitiate, thofe who take any fort of lead are 
 placed in very lucrative offices, according to their 
 influence and credit, or appoint thofe who divide 
 their profits with them. 
 
 This fupply of recruits to the corps of the highefl 
 civil ambition, goes on with a regular progreffion. 
 In very few years it muft amount to many thoufands. 
 Thefe, however, will be as nothing in comparifon 
 to the multitude of municipal officers, and officers 
 of diftrict and department, of all forts, who have 
 tafted of power and profit, and who hunger for the 
 periodical return of the meaL To thefe needy 
 agitators, the glory of the ftate, the general wealth 
 and profperity of the nation, and the rife or fall of 
 publick credit, are as dreams; nor have arguments 
 deduced from thefe topicks any fort of weight with 
 them. The indifference with which the Aflembly 
 regards the liate of their Colonies, the only valu- 
 able part of the French commerce, is a full proof 
 
 how
 
 how little they are likely to be affected by any- 
 thing but the lelfifh game of their own ambition, 
 now univerfally diffuled. 
 
 It is true, amidft all thefe turbulent means of 
 fecurity to their fyftem, very great difcontents 
 evcrv where prevail. But they only produce mi- 
 fery to thofe who nurfe them at home, or exile, 
 beggary, and in the end, confifcation, to thofe who 
 are fo impatient as to remove from them. Each 
 Municipal Republick has a Committee, or fome- 
 thing in the nature of a Committee of Refearck. In 
 thefe petty Republicks the tyranny is fo near it's 
 object, that it becomes inftantly acquainted with 
 every act of every man. It ftifles confpiracy in 
 it's very firft movements. Their power is abfolute 
 and uncontroulable. No ftand can be made againft 
 it. Thefe Rcpublieks are beiiclcs fo difconnected, 
 that very little intelligence of what happens in 
 them is to be obtained, beyond their own bounds, 
 except by the means of their clubs, who keep up 
 a conltant corrcfpondence, and who give what co- 
 lour they plcafe to fuch facts as they choofe to 
 communicate out of the track of their correfpon- 
 dence. They all have fome fort of communica- 
 tion, juft as much or as little as they pleafe, with 
 the center. By this confinement of all commu- 
 nication to the ruling faction, any combination 
 grounded on the abufes and difeontents in one. 
 
 fcarcely
 
 ( 49 ) 
 
 fcarcely can reach the other. There is not one 
 man, in any one place, to head them. The old 
 Government had fo much abftracled the Nobility 
 from the cultivation of provincial intereft, that no 
 man in France exifts, whofe power, credit or con- 
 fequence extends to two diftricts, or who is capa- 
 ble of uniting them in any defign, even if any 
 man could aflemble ten men together, without be- 
 ing fure of a fpeedy lodging in a prifon. One 
 muft not judge of the ftate of France by what has 
 been obferved elfewhere. It does not in the leaft 
 referable any other country. Analogical reafoning 
 from hiftory or from recent experience in other 
 places is wholly delufive. 
 
 In my opinion there never was feen fo ftrong 
 a government internally as that of the French 
 Municipalities. If ever any rebellion can arife 
 againft the prefent fyftem, it muft begin, where 
 the Revolution which gave birth to it did, at the 
 Capital. Paris is the only place in which there is 
 the leaft freedom of intercourfe. But even there, 
 fo many fervants as any man has, fo many ipies, 
 and irreconcileable domeftick enemies. 
 
 But that place being the chief feat of the power Gentlemen 
 and intelligence of the ruling faction, and the tiv s . 
 place of occanonal refort for their fierceft fpirit3, 
 H even
 
 ( 50 ) 
 
 even there a revolution is not likely to have-any 
 thing to feed it. The leaders of the ariftocratick 
 party have been drawn out of the kingdom by 
 Order of the Princes, on the hopes held out by the 
 Emperor and the King of Pruffia at Pilnitz ; and 
 as to the democratick factions in Paris, amongft 
 them there are no leaders pofTefied of an influence 
 for any other purpofe but that of maintaining the 
 prefent ftate of things. The moment they are feen 
 to warp, they .are reduced to nothing. They 
 have no attached army no party that is at all 
 perfonal. 
 
 It is not to be imagined becaufe a political fyf- 
 tem is, under certain afpecls, very unwife in it's 
 contrivance, and very mifchievous in it's effects, 
 that it therefore can have no long duration. It's 
 very defects may tend to it's liability, becaufe they 
 are agreeable to it's nature. The very faults in the 
 conftitution of Poland made it laft; the veto which 
 deflroyed all it's energy preferved it's life. What 
 can be conceived fo monitrous as the Rcpublick of 
 Algiers ? and that no lefs ItrangeRepublick of the 
 Mammalukes in Egypt ? They are of the word 
 form imaginable, and exercifcd in the worft man- 
 ner, yet they have exilled as a nuifance on the 
 earth for fcveral hundred years. 
 
 From
 
 ( 51 ) 
 
 From all thefe confederations, and many more, 
 that croud upon me, three concluiions have long 
 lince arifen in my mind 
 
 Firft, that no counter-revolution is to be ex- 
 pected in France from internal caufes folely. 
 
 Secondly, that the longer the prefent fyftem ex- 
 ifts, the greater will be it's flrength ; the greater 
 it's power to deftroy difcontents at home, and to 
 refill all foreign attempts in favour of thefe dif- 
 contents. 
 
 Thirdly, that as long as it exifts in France, it 
 will be the intereft of the managers there, and it is 
 in the very eflence of their plan, to difturb and 
 diflracl all other governments, and their endlefs 
 fucceffion of reftlefs politicians will continually 
 flimulate them to new attempts. 
 
 Princes are generally fenfible that this is their preceding 
 common caufe ; and two of them have made a DtfcR&t 
 publick declaration of their opinion to this effect. 
 Againft this common danger, fome of them, fuch 
 as the King of Spain, the King of Sardinia, and the 
 Republick of Berne, are very diligent in ufing de- 
 fenfive meafures. 
 
 H2 If
 
 ( 52 ) 
 
 If they were to guard againft an invafion from 
 France, the merits of this plan of a merely defen- 
 live refiftance might be fupported by plaufible to- 
 picks ; but as the attack does not operate againft 
 thefe countries externally, but by an internal cor- 
 ruption (a fort of dry rot) ; they who purfue this 
 merely defenfive plan, againft a danger which the 
 plan itfclf fuppofes to be fenous, cannot poflibly 
 cfcape it. For it is in the nature of nil defenfive. 
 meafures to be fharp and vigorous under the im- 
 preflions of the firft alarm, and to relax by de- 
 grees ; until at length the danger, by not operat- 
 ing inftantly, comes to appear as a falfc alarm ; ib 
 much fo that the next menacing appearance will 
 look lefs formidable, and will be lefs provided 
 againft. But to thofe who are on the offenfive it 
 is not neceflary to be always alert. Poffiblv .it is 
 more their intercft not to be fo. For their unfore- 
 feen attacks contribute to their fuccefs. 
 
 The French In the mean time a fvftem of French confpiracy 
 
 Party how ... . . 
 
 compofed. is gaining ground in every country. This fyitem 
 happening to be founded on principles the moft 
 delufive indeed, but the moft flattering to the na- 
 tural pro pen fi ties of the unthinking multitude, 
 and to the (peculations of all thofe who think, 
 without thinking very profoundly, muft daily ex- 
 tend it's influence. A predominant inclination 
 
 towards
 
 ( 53 ) 
 
 towards it appears in all thofe who have no reli- 
 gion, when othenvife their difpofition leads them 
 to be advocates even for defpotifm. Hence 
 Hume, though I cannot lay that he does not 
 throw out fome expreffions of difapprobation on 
 the proceedings of the levellers in the reign of 
 Richard the Second, yet affirms that the doctrines 
 of John Ball were "conformable to the ideas of 
 primitive equality, which are engraven in the hearts 
 of oil men." 
 
 Boldnefs formerly was not the character of 
 Athcifts as fuch. They were even of a character 
 nearly the reverfe ; they were formerly like the 
 old Epicureans, rather an unenterprizing race. But 
 of late they arc grown active, defigning, turbulent 
 and feditious. They arc fworn enemies to Kings, 
 Nobility and Priefthood. We have feen all the 
 Academicians at Paris, with Condorcet, the friend 
 and correfpondent of Pricttley, at their head, the 
 moil furious of the extravagant Republicans. 
 
 The late Affembly, after the laft captivity of the 
 King, had actually chofcn this Condorcet by a ma- 
 jority on the ballot, for Preceptor to the Dauphin, 
 who was to be taken out of the hands and direction 
 of his parents, and to be delivered over to this fana- 
 tick Atheift, and furious democratick Republican. 
 His untraclability to thefe leaders, and his figure 
 
 in
 
 ( 54 ) 
 
 in the Club of Jacobins, which at that time they 
 wifhed to bring under, alone prevented that part 
 of the arrangement, and others in the fame ftyle, 
 from being carried into execution. Whilft he was 
 candidate for this office, he produced his title to it 
 by promulgating the following ideas of the title of 
 his royal pupil to the crown. In a paper written 
 by him, and publifhed with his name, againft the 
 re-eftablifhment, even of the appearance of monar- 
 chy under any qualifications, He fays, " Jufqu'a 
 " ce moment ils [I'AfTemblee Nationale] n'ont 
 " rien prejuge encore. En fe refervant de noin- 
 " mcr un Gouverneur au Dauphin, ils n'ont pas 
 of " prononce que cet enfant dut regner ; mais feulc- 
 = Trench. mcnt ^ ^- f ^fa ^ j a Conftitution 1'y def- 
 
 <f limit ; ils ont voulu que 1'education, effacjant 
 " tout ce que les prefixes du Trone ont pu lui in- 
 '* fpirer de prejugcs fur les droits pretendus de fa 
 " naiilance,qu'clle lui fit connoitre de bonne heure, 
 " et lEgalite naturelle dcs Homines, et la Soui'e- 
 *' ramete du penple\ qu'clle lui apprit a ne pas ou- 
 (( blier que c'efl du peuple qu'il tiendra le titre de 
 " Roi, et que le peuple iia pas meme h dr&it de re- 
 " noncer a celui de T en deixnull&r. 
 
 i 
 
 " Ils ont voulu que cette education le rendit 
 " cgalement digne, par fes lumieres, et fes vertus, 
 " de rccevoir avec refignation, le fardeau dangereu^ 
 " d'une couronne, ou de la depofcr avecjoie entre les 
 
 <c mains
 
 ( 55 ) 
 
 " mains de ces freres, qu'il fentit quc Ic devoir, et 
 <e la gloire du Roi d'un peuple Iibre 7 eft de hater le 
 " moment de n'etre plus qu'un citoyen ordinaire. 
 
 " Us out voulu que Tinutilite cTiui Roi, la ndcef- 
 " lite de chercher lesmoyensde vcmp&aGCfunjMUvm* 
 
 " fondefur les illiifions, tut unc des premieres veri- 
 " tes offertes a fa railbn ; / 'obligation d*y concourir 
 " lui mfrne un des premieres devoirs de fa morale; et 
 i( le dejir, de rietre plus affranchi du joug de la /e/, 
 " par une injurieuje inviolabilite, le premier fentiment 
 tf dejon cceur. Us n'ignorent pas que dans ce mo- 
 * f ment il s'agit bien moins de former un Roi que 
 ff de lui apprendre a ftrvoir, a vwdoir m plus Te- 
 " Ire."* 
 
 Such 
 
 * Until now, they (the National Aflembly) have prejudged 
 nothing. Referving to themfelves a right to appoint a Precep- 
 tor to the Dauphin, they did not declare that this child was to 
 reign ; but only that poffibly the Conftitution might ileftine him 
 to it : they willed that while education (hould efface from his 
 mind all the prejudices arifing from the Jelufant of the throne re- 
 fpefting his pretended birth-right, it (honld alfo teach him not 
 to forget, that it is/row the people he is to receive the title of King, 
 and that toe people do not even poffefs the right of giving up their 
 power to take it from him, 
 
 They willed that this education fhould render him worthy by 
 his knowledge, and by his virtues, both to receive -~itbfiibmij- 
 Jim the dangerous burden of a crown, and to rejign it i\:hh plea- 
 fure into the hands of his brethren ; that he fliould be confcious 
 that the haftening of that moment when he is to be only a com- 
 mon
 
 ( 56 ) 
 
 Such are the ientiments of the man who has oo 
 cafionally' filled the chair of the National AfTembly, 
 who is their perpetual fecretary, their only ftanding 
 officer, and the moft important by far. He leads 
 them to peace or war. He is the great theme of 
 the Republican faclion in England. Thefe ideas of 
 M. Condorcet, are the principles of thofe to whom 
 Kings are to entruft their fucceffors, and the inte- 
 refts of their fucceflion. This man would be ready- 
 to plunge the poignard in the heart of his pupil, or 
 to whet the axe for his neck. Of all men, the moft 
 dangerous is a warm, hot-headed, zealous Atheift. 
 This fort of man aims at dominion, and his means 
 are, the words he always has in his mouth, " L'e- 
 " galite naturelle des Homines, et la Souverainte 
 " du Peuple." 
 
 All former attempts grounded on thefe Rights of 
 Men, had proved unfortunate. The fucccfs of this 
 
 mon citizen, conftitutes the duty and the glory of a King of 
 a free people. 
 
 They willed that the ufelrfsncfs of a King, the neceffity of feek- 
 ing means to eftablifh fomething in lieu of a power founded on. 
 illnfans, fliould be one of the firft truths offered to his reafon ; 
 tie obligation of conforming bimfelf to this, the firft of bis moral du- 
 ties; aiul the dejire of no longer being freed from the yoke of the la-x, 
 ty an injurious invidability, tbefirjl and chief Jentiment of hi* heart. 
 They are not ignorant that in the prefent moment the object is 
 lefs to form a King than to teach him that le Jhwld kna-w bma 
 to wi/b no Unger to bejuch. 
 
 laft
 
 ( 57 ) 
 
 laft makes a mighty difference in the effect of the 
 doctrine. Here is a principle of a nature, to the 
 multitude, the moft feductive, always exifting be, 
 fore their eyes, as a thing feafible in practice. After 
 fo many failures, fuch an enterprize previous to the 
 French experiment, carried ruin to the contrivers, 
 on the face of it ; and if any enthufiaft was fo wild 
 as to wifh to engage in a fchsme of that nature, it 
 was not eafy for him to find followers : Now there 
 is a party almoft in all countries, ready made, ani- 
 mated with fuccefs, with a fure Ally in the very 
 center of Europe. There is no cabal fo obfciire in 
 any place, that they do not protect, cherifh, fofter, 
 and endeavour to raife it into importance at home 
 and abroad. From the loweft, this intrigue will 
 creep up to the highelt. Ambition, as well as 
 enthufiafm, may find it's account in the party and 
 in the principle. 
 
 The Minifters of other Kings, like thofe of the charafler 
 
 to ' Mir.ifters. 
 
 King of France (not one of whom was perfectly 
 free from this guilt, and fomc of whom were very 
 deep in it) may themfelves be the perfons to foment 
 fuch a difpofition and fuch a faction, Hertzberg, 
 the King of Pruffia's late Minifter, is fo much of 
 what is called a philolbpher, that he was of a fac- 
 tion with that fort of politicians in every thing, and 
 in every place. Even when he defends himlelf 
 from the imputation of giving extravagantly into 
 ' I thcfe
 
 ( 53 ) 
 
 thefe principled, he ftill confiders the revolutiort- 
 of France as a great publick good, by giving credit 
 to their fraudulent declaration of their univerfal be- 
 nevolence, and love of peace. Nor are his Pruf- 
 iian Majefty's prefent minifters at all difinclined 
 to the famefyftem. Their oftentatious preamble 
 to certain late edicts, demonftrates (if their actions 
 had not been fu-fficiently explanatory of their caft 
 of mind) that they are deeply infected with the 
 fame diftemper of dangerous, becaufe plaufiblc, 
 though trivial, and fhallow fpeculation. 
 
 Minifters turning their backs on the reputation 
 which properly belongs to them, afpire at the 
 glory of being ipeculative writers. The duties of 
 thefe two fituations arc, in general, directly oppo- 
 fite to each other. Speculators ought to be neu- 
 tral. A Minifter cannot be fo. He is to fupport 
 the intereft of the publick as connected with that 
 of his mailer. He is his mailer's truilee, advocate, 
 attorney, and fteward and he is not to indulge 
 in any fpeculation which contradicts that charac- 
 ter or even detracts from its efficacy. Necker had 
 an extreme thiril for this fort of glory ; fo had 
 others ; and this purfuit of a mifplaced and mif- 
 underftood reputation, was one of the caufcs of the 
 ruin of thefe minifters, and of their unhappy mal- 
 ter. The Pruffian minifters in foreign courts, have 
 (at lealt not long fince) talked the moil democra- 
 tic*
 
 tick language with regard to France, and in the 
 moft unmanaged terms. 
 
 The whole corps diplomatique, with very few Corps dipio- 
 exceptions, leans that way. What caufe produces 
 in them a turn of mind, which at firft one would 
 think unnatural to their fituation, it is not impoffi- 
 ble to explain. The difcuffion would however be 
 fomewhat long and fomewhat invidious. The 
 fact itfelf is indifputable, however they may dif- 
 guife it to their feveral courts. This difpofition is 
 gone to fo very great a length in that corps, in it- 
 felf ib important, and fo important as furnijhmg the 
 intelligence which (ways all cabinets, that if Princes 
 and States do not very fpeedily attend with a vi- 
 gorous controul to that fource of direction and in- 
 formation, very ferious evils are likely tobefal them. 
 
 But indeed Kings arc to guard againft the. fame sowreigne- 
 
 ' * their difpofi- 
 
 fort of difpoiitions in themfelves. They are very "ons. 
 eafily alienated from all the higher orders of their 
 fubjectsj whether civil or military, laick or eccle- 
 fiaftical. It is with pcrfons of condition that Sove- 
 reigns chiefly come into contact. It is from them 
 that they generally experience oppoiition to their 
 will. It is with their pride and impracticability, 
 that Princes are molt hurt; it is with their fertility 
 and bafenefs, that they arc molt commonly difguft- 
 cd ; it is from their humours and cabals, that they 
 J 2 find
 
 ( 60 ) 
 
 find their affairs moft frequently troubled and dif- 
 tracled. But of the common people in pure mo- 
 narchical governments, Kings know little or no- 
 thing; and therefore being unacquainted with their 
 faults (which are as many as thofe of the great, 
 and much more decifive in their effects when ac- 
 companied with power) Kings generally regard 
 them with tendernefs and favour, and turn their 
 eyes towards that defcription of their fubjecls, par- 
 ticularly when hurt by oppofltion from the higher 
 orders. It was thus that the King of France (a 
 perpetual example to all fovereSgns) was ruined. I 
 have it from very fure information (and it was in- 
 deed obvious enough from the meafurcs which 
 were taken previous to the aflembly of the States 
 and afterwards) that the King's counfellors had 
 filled him with a ftrong diflike to his nobility, his 
 clergy, and the corps of his magiftracy. They re- 
 prefented to him, that he had tried them all feve- 
 rally, in feveral ways, and found them all untracK 
 able. That he had twice called an Affcmbly (the 
 Notables) compofed of the firft men of the clergy, 
 the nobility, and the magiftratcs ; that he had him- 
 felf named every one member in thofe affemblies, 
 and that though fo picked out, he had not, in this 
 their collective ftate, found them more difpofed to 
 a compliance with his will than they had been fe- 
 parately. That there remained for him. with the leaft 
 profpecl: of advantage to his authority in the States 
 
 General,
 
 General,, which were to be compofed of the fame 
 forts of men, but not chofen by him, only the Tiers 
 Etat. In this alone he could repofe any hope of 
 extricating himfelf from his difficulties,, and of fet- 
 tling him in a clear and permanent authority. They 
 reprefented (thefe are the words of one of my in- 
 formants) " That the Royal Authority comprcfted 
 " with the weight of thefe ariftocratick bodies, full 
 " of ambition, and of faction, when once unloaded, 
 " would rife of itfelf, and occupy it's natural place 
 " without difturbance or controul :" That the com- 
 mon people would protect, cherifh, and fupport, in- 
 ftead of crufhing it. " The people," (it was faid) 
 " could entertain no objects of ambition ;" they 
 were out of the road of intrigue and cabal; and 
 could poffibly have no other view than the fupport 
 of the mild and parental authority by which they 
 were inverted, for the firit time colleelivcly with 
 real importance in the State, and protected in 
 their peaceable and ufeful employments. 
 
 This unfortunate King (not without a large fhare King O f 
 of blame to himfelf) was deluded to his ruin by a 
 defire to humble and reduce his Nobility, Clergy, 
 and his corporate Magiftracy ; not that I fuppofc 
 he meant wholly to eradicate thefe bodies, in the 
 manner iince effected by the Democratick power : 
 J rather believe that even Necker's deligns did not 
 go to that extent. With his own hand, however, 
 
 Louis
 
 'Louis the XVIth pulled down the pillars which up-* 
 held his throne; and this he did, becaufe he could 
 not bear the inconveniences which are attached 
 to every thing human ; becaufe he found himfelf 
 cooped up, and in durance by thofe limits which 
 pature prefcribes to dcfire and imagination ; and 
 was taught to confider as low and degrading, that 
 mutual dependance which Providence has ordain- 
 ed that all men fhould have on one another. He 
 is not at this minute perhaps cured of the dread 
 of the power and credit like to be acquired by 
 thofe who would fave and refcue him. He leaves 
 thofe who fuffer in his caufc to their fate; and 
 hopes by various mean delufive intrigues in which 
 I am afraid he is encouraged from abroad, to re- 
 gain, among Traitors ai:d Regicides, the power he 
 has joined to take from his own family, whom he 
 quietly fees proferibed before his eyes, and called 
 to anlwer to the lowelt of his rebels^ as the vileft 
 of all criminals. 
 
 It is to be hoped that the Emperor may be 
 taught better things by this fatal example. But 
 it is fure that he has advifers who endeavour to fill 
 him with the ideas which have brought his bro- 
 ther-in-law to his prefent iituation. Jofcph the 
 Second was far gone in this philofophy, and fome, 
 if not moil who ferve the Emperor, would kindly 
 initiate him into all the mvileries of this free-mas 
 
 fonry.
 
 fonry. They would perfuade him to look on the 
 National Aflembly not with the hatred of an ene- 
 my, but the jealoufy of a rival. They would make 
 him dcfirous of doing, in his own dominions, by a 
 Royal defpotifm. what has been done in France 
 by a Democratic k. Rather than abandon fuch 
 enterprifes, they would perfuade him to a ftrange 
 alliance between thofe extremes. Their grand 
 object being now, as in his brother's time, at any 
 rate to deftroy the higher orders, they think he 
 cannot compafs this end, as certainly he cannot, 
 without elevating the lower. By deprefling the 
 one and by railing the other, they hope in the 
 firft place to encreafe his treafures and his army ; 
 and with thefc common inftruments of Royal 
 Power they flatter him that the Democracy which 
 they help, in his name, to create, will give him 
 but little trouble. In defiance of the frefhert ex- 
 perience, which might (hew him that old impof- 
 libilities are become modern probabilities, and 
 that the extent to which evil principles may go, 
 when left to their own operation, is beyond the 
 jpower of calculation, they will endeavour to per- 
 fuade him that fuch a Democracy is a thing which 
 cannot fubfift by itfelf; that in whofever hands 
 the military command is placed, he muft be in 
 the neceflary courfe of affairs, fooner or later the 
 mafter; and that being the mafter of various un- 
 connected countries, he may keep them all in or- 
 der
 
 ( 64 ) 
 
 clcr bv employing a military force, which to each 
 of them is foreign. This maxim too, however 
 formerly plaufible, will not now hold water. This 
 fcheme is full of intricacy, and may caufe him 
 every where to lofe the hearts of his people. Thefe 
 Counfellors forget that a corrupted army was the 
 very caufe of the ruin of his brother-in-law; and 
 that he is himfelf far from fecure from a fimilar 
 corruption. 
 
 Inftead of reconciling himfelf heartily and bona, 
 fide according to the moft obvious rules of policy 
 to the States of Brabant as they are co-nftiPuted, and 
 who in \h prefent ftate of th'mgs Hand on the fame 
 foundation with the Monarchy itfelf, and who 
 might have been gained with the greateft facility, 
 they have advifed him to the moft nnkingly pro- 
 ceeding which, either in a good or in a bad light, 
 has ever been attempted. Under a pretext taken 
 from the fpirit of the loweft chicane, they have 
 counfelled him wholly to break the publick faith, 
 to annul the amnefty, as well as the other condi- 
 tions through which he obtained an entrance into 
 the Provinces of the Netherlands, under the guar- 
 rantee of Great Britain and Prullia. He is made 
 to declare his adherence to the indemnity in a cri- 
 minal fcnfe, but he is to keep alive in his own 
 name, and to encourage in others a ch'd proccfs in 
 the nature of an action of damages for what has 
 
 been
 
 ( 65 ) 
 
 been fuffered during the troubles. Whillt he 
 keeps up this hopeful la\v-fuit in view of the da- 
 mages he may recover againtt individuals, he lofes 
 the hearts of a. whole people, and the vaft fubti- 
 dies which his ancestors had been ufed to receive 
 from them. 
 
 This defigil once admitted, unriddles the rnvf- Fmpcror' 
 
 /- I i r /" i T ' i\"/r- ctm^uft 
 
 ten* or the whole conduct ot the Jsmperor s mi- wkh reg 
 miters with regard to France. As loon as they 
 law the life of the King and Queen of France no 
 longer as they thought in danger, they entirely 
 changed their plan with regard to the French na- 
 tion. I believe that the chiefs of the Revolution 
 (thole who led the Conftituting Affembly) have 
 tontrived as far as they can do it, to give the Em- 
 peror fatisfaclion on this head. He keeps a con- 
 tinual tone and pofture of menace to fecure this 
 hi? only point. But it muft be obferved, that he 
 all along grounds his departure from the engage- 
 ment at Pilnitz to the Princes, on the will and ac- 
 tions of the King and the majority of the people, 
 without any regard to the natural and conftitu- 
 lional orders of the State, or to the opinions of the 
 whole Houfe of Bourbon. Though it is manifeftly 
 under the constraint of imprifonment and the fear 
 of death, that this unhappy man has been guilty of 
 ull thole humilities which have aftonifhed mankind, 
 the advilcrs of the Emperor will confider nothing 
 K but
 
 but the phyfical perfon of Louis, which, even in his 
 prefent degraded and infamous ftate, they regard 
 as of Sufficient authority to give a compleat ianc- 
 tion to the perfccution and utter ruin of all his fa- 
 niilv, and of every perfon who has fhcwn any de- 
 gree of attachment or fidelity to him, or to his 
 caufe ; as well as competent to deftroy the whole 
 antient conftitution and frame of the French mo- 
 narchy. 
 
 The prefent policy therefore of the Auftrian po- 
 liticians, is to recover dcfpotifrn through demo- 
 cracy ; or at leaft, at any expence, every where to 
 ruin the defcription of men who are every where 
 the objects of their fettled and fyflematick avcrfion, 
 but more especially in the Netherlands. Compare 
 this with the Emperour's refuting at firft all inter- 
 courfe with the prefent powers in France, with his 
 endeavouring to excite all Europe againft them,., 
 and then his not only withdrawing all affifiance 
 and all countenance from the fugitives who had 
 been drawn by his declarations from their houfe?, 
 iituations, and military commifiions, many even 
 from the means of their very exiftcnce, but treat- 
 ing them with every fpecies of infult and outrage. 
 
 Combining this unexampled conduct in the Em- 
 peror's advifers, with the timidity (operating as per- 
 iidy) of the King of France, a fatal example is held 
 
 out
 
 ( 67 ) 
 
 out to all fubjects, tending to (hew what little fup- 
 port, or evea countenance they are to expect from 
 thofe for whom their principle of fidelity may in- 
 duce them to rifque life and fortune. The Em- 
 peror's advifers would not for the world rcfcind 
 one of the acts of this or of the late French AlFem- 
 bly ; nor do they wifh any thing better at prefent 
 for their matter's brother of France, than that he 
 fhould really be, as he is nominally, at the head of 
 the fyftem of perfecution of religion and good or- 
 der, and of all defcriptions of dignity, natural and 
 inftitutcd ; they only wifh all this done with a little 
 more refpecl to the King's perlbn, mid with more 
 appearance of confideration for his new fubordi- 
 natc office ; in hopes that yielding himfelf for the 
 prefent, to the perfons who have effected thefe 
 changes, he may be able to game for the reft here- 
 after. On no other principles than thefe, can the 
 conducl of the Court of Vienna be accounted for. 
 The fubordinate Court of BrufTcls talks the lan- 
 guage of a ckib of Fcuillans and Jacobins, 
 
 In this ftate of general rottennefs among fub- Moderate 
 jecls, and of dclufion and falfe politicks in Princes, 
 comes a new experiment. The King of France is in 
 the hands of the Chiefs of the Regicide Faclion, the 
 Barnvacs, Lameths, Fayettes, Perigords, Duports, 
 Robefpierre's, Camus's, &c. &c. &c. They who 
 had imprifoned, fufpendcd, and conditionally de- 
 K 2 pofed
 
 pofed him, are his confidential counicliors. The 
 next defpcratc of the dcfperate rebels,, call than- 
 ielves the Moderate Party. They are the Chiefs of 
 the fir't Afieznblyj who are confederated to fupport 
 their power during their fufpeniion from the pre- 
 ient, and to govern the exiftent bodv with as fove- 
 reign a fway as they had done the laft. They have, 
 for the greater part, fueccedcd ; and they have 
 many advantages towards procuring their fuccefi 
 in future. Juii before the dole of their regular 
 power, they bellowed foine appearance of preroga- 
 tives on the King, which in their firft plans they 
 had refilled to him ; particularly the mifchicvous, 
 and in his Situation, dreadful prerogative of a Veto. 
 This prerogative (which they hold as their bit in 
 the mouth of the National AfFembly for the time 
 being) without the direct aili llance of their Club, it 
 was impoffible for the King to Shew even the defire 
 of exerting with the fmallclt effect, or even with 
 lafety tp his perfon. However, bv playing through 
 this J^clo, the Aflemblv againtt the King, arid the 
 Kingagainft the Aflemblv, they have made them- 
 felvcs maftcrs of both. In this lituation, having 
 deftroyed the old Government by their ledition, 
 they would preferve as much of order as is neccf- 
 fary for the fupport of their own usurpation. 
 
 French Am- It is believed that this, bv far the worft party of 
 the mifcreants of France, has received direct en- 
 couragement from the cpuufellors who betray the 
 
 Emperor,
 
 Emperor. Thus ftrengthened by the pofitfiion of 
 the captive King (now captive in his mind as well 
 as in body) and by a good hope of the Emperor, 
 they intend to fend their Minilters to every Court 
 in Europe ; having fent before them inch a de- 
 nunciation of terror and fuperiority to every na- 
 tion without exception, as has no example in the 
 diplomatick world. Hitherto the Mini fters to fo- 
 reign Courts had been of the appointment of 
 the Sovereign of France previous to llie Revolu- 
 tion \ and either from inclhial ion, duty or decorum, 
 molt of them were contented with a merely paf- 
 iive obedience to the new power. At prefent the 
 King being entirely in the hands of his jailors, and 
 his mind broken to his lituation, can fend none but 
 the enthulialts of the fyfiem men framed by the 
 fecret Committee of the Fcuillans, who meet in the 
 houfe of Madame de Stahl, Mr. Necker's daugh- 
 ter. Such is every man whom they have talked of 
 fending hither. Thcfe Minifters will be fo mar.y 
 fpies and incendiaries ; fo many active cmiiiaries 
 of Democracy. Their houfes will become places 
 of rendezvous here, as every where elfe, and cen- 
 ters of cabal for whatever is mifchievous and ma- 
 lignant in this country, particularly among thofe 
 of rank and fafhion. As the Minifter of the Na- 
 tional Afiembly will be admitted at this Court, at 
 lea ft with his ufual rank, and as entertainments 
 Yvi]l be naturally given and received by the King's 
 
 own
 
 ( 70 ) 
 
 own Minifters, any attempt to difcoimtencmce the 
 refort of other people to that Minifter would be 
 ineffectual, and indeed abfurd, and full of con- 
 tradiction. The women who come with theie 
 AmbafThdors will affiit in fomenting factions 
 "nongft ours, which cannot fail of extending the 
 evil. Some of them I hear aro already arrived. 
 There is no doubt they will do as much mifchief 
 as they can. 
 
 Whilft the publick Miuiriers are received under 
 the general law of the communication between na- 
 tions, the correfpondences between the factious 
 clubs in France and ours, will be, as they now are, 
 kept up : but this pretended embafly will be a 
 clofer, more ftea<ly and more effectual link be- 
 tween* the partizans of the new fyftem on both 
 fides of the water. I do not mean that thefe 
 Anglo- Gallick clubs in London, Manchester, Sec. 
 arc not dangerous in a high degree. The ap- 
 pointment of feftive anniverfaries has ever in the 
 fenfe of mankind been held the beft method of 
 keeping alive the fpirit of any institution. We 
 have one fettled in London ; and at the lait of 
 them, that of the 14th of July, the itrong difcoun- 
 tenance of Government, the unfavourable time of 
 the year, and the then uncertaintv of the difpoii- 
 tion of foreign Powers, did not hinder the meeting 
 of at leaft nine hundred people, with good coats on 
 * their
 
 ( 71 ) 
 
 their backs, who could afford to pay half a guinea 
 a head to Ihew their 7.eal for the new principles. 
 They were with great difficulty, and all poffiblc 
 addrcfs, hindered from inviting the French Am- 
 haffador. His real indifpolition, besides the fear 
 of offending anv party, fent him out of town. But 
 when our Court ihail have recognized a Govern-* 
 inent in France,, founded on the principles an- 
 nounced in Montmorin's Letter, how can the 
 French Ambaflador be frowned upon for an atten- 
 dance on thole meetings wherein the eftablifhment 
 of the Government he represents is celebrated ? 
 An event happened a few days ago, which in many 
 particulars was very ridiculous ; yet even from the 
 ridicule and abfnrdity of the proceedings, it marks 
 the more ikongly the fpirit of the French Aflem- 
 bly. I mean the reception they have given to the 
 Frith -Street Alliance. This, though the delirium 
 of a low, drunken alehoufe-club, they have pub- 
 licly announced as a formal alliance with the people 
 of England, as fuch ordered it to be prelented to 
 their King, and to be publiflied in every province 
 in France. This leads more directly and with 
 much greater force than any proceeding with a 
 regular and rational appearance, to two very ma-- 
 terial eorifulerations. Firit, it {hews that they are 
 of opinion that the current opinions of the Englifli 
 have the greatetl influence on the minds of the 
 people in France, and indeed of all the people in, 
 
 Europe*
 
 ( n ) 
 
 Europe, mice they catch with fuch aftonifhing 
 eagernefs at every the moft trifling fhew of fuch 
 opinions in their favour. Next, and what appeal's 
 to me to be full as important, it fhcws that they 
 arc willing publickly to countenance and even to 
 adopt every factious confpiracy that can be formed 
 in this nation, however low and bale in itfelf^ in 
 order to excite in the moft mifcrable wretches here, 
 an idea of their own fovcrcign importance, and to 
 encourage them to Jook up to France, whenever 
 they mav be matured into fomething of more force, 
 for affi fiance in the fubvcrfion of their domcltick, 
 Government. This addrefs of the alehoufe club 
 was actually propofed and accepted by the Aflem- 
 bly as an alliance. The procedure was in my opi- 
 nion a high mifdemeanor in thole who acled thus 
 in England, if they were not fo very low and fo 
 very bale, that no acls of theirs can be called high, 
 even as a description of criminality ; and the Af- 
 fembly in accepting, proclaiming and publishing 
 this forged alliance, has been guilty of a plain ag- 
 greflion, which would jultify our Court in demand- 
 ing a direct difavowal, if our policy fhouhl not lead 
 us to wink at it. 
 
 Whilft I look over this paper to have it copied. 
 I fee a Manifefto of the Aflembly, as a preliminary 
 to a declaration of war againft the German Princes 
 on the Rhine. This Manifefto contains the whole 
 
 fub fiance
 
 ( 73 ) 
 
 fubftanceof the French politicks with regard to fo- 
 reign States. They have ordered it to be circu- 
 lated amongft the people in every country of Eu- 
 rope even previoufly to it's acceptance by the 
 King and his new Privy Council, the club of the 
 Feuillans. Therefore, as a fummary of their po- 
 licy avowed by themfelves, let us conikler fome of 
 the circumftanccs attending that piece, as well as 
 the fpirit and temper of the piece itfelf. 
 
 It was preceded by a fpeech from Briflbt, full of 
 unexampled infolence towards all the Sovereign Em ? eror 
 States of Germany, if not of Europe. The Aflem- 
 bly, to exprefs their fatisfaction in the fentiments 
 which it contained, ordered it to be printed. This 
 Briflbt had been in the loweft and bafeft employ 
 under the depofed Monarchy ; a fort of thief- 
 taker, or fpy of police, in which character he acled 
 alter the manner of perfons in that defcription. He- 
 had been employed by his mavter, the Lieutenant 
 de Police, for a considerable time in London, in 
 the fame or fome fuch honourable occupation. 
 The Revolution which has brought forward all 
 merit of that kind, railed him, with others of a 
 iimiiar clafs and difpofition, to fame and eminence. 
 On the Revolution he became a publifher of an 
 infamous newfpaper, which he flill continues. He 
 is charged, and I believe juflly, as the firft 'mover 
 of the troubles in Hifpaniola. There is no wick- 
 L ednefs,
 
 ( 74 ) 
 
 ednefs, if I am rightly informed, in which he is not 
 verfed, and of which he is not perfectly capable. 
 His quality of news-writer, now an employment of 
 the firft dignity in France, and his practices and 
 principles, procured his election into the AfTembly, 
 where he is one of the leading members. Mr. 
 Condorret produced on the fame day a draft of a 
 Declaration to the King, which the Aflembly pub- 
 lifhed before it was prefentcd. 
 
 Condorcct (though no Marquis, as he ftyled 
 himfelf before the Revolution) is a man of arother 
 fort of birth, failiion, and occupation from Briflot; 
 but in every principle, and in every difpoiition to 
 the loweft as well as the higheft and moft deter- 
 mined villainies, fully his equal. He feconds Brif- 
 fot in the Aflembly, and is at once his coadjutor 
 and his rival in a newfpapcr, which in his own 
 name and as fucceflbr to Mr. Garat, a Member 
 alfo of the Aflembly, he has juft fet up in that 
 Empire of Gazettes. Condorcet was chofen to 
 draw the rirft Declaration prefentcd by the Aflem- 
 bly to the King, as a threat to the Elector of 
 Treves, and the other Princes on the Rhine. In 
 that piece, in which both Feuillans and Jacobins 
 concurred, they declared publickly, and molt 
 proudly and inlolently, the principle on which they 
 xnci'.n 'O proceed in their future difputcs with any 
 pf the Sovereigns of Europe, for they fay, " That
 
 ( 75 ) 
 
 " it is not with fire and fword they mean to attack 
 " their territories, but by what will be mure dread- 
 " fid to them, the introduction of liberty." I 
 have not the paper by me to give the exact words 
 but I believe they are nearly as I llaie thenii 
 Dreadful indeed will be their hoftility, if they 
 fliould be able to carry it on according to the ex- 
 ample of their modes of introducing liberty. They 
 have (hewn a perfect model of their whole deiign, 
 very complete, though in little. This gang of 
 murderers and favages have wholly laid wafte and 
 utterly ruined the beautiful and happy country of 
 the Comtat Venaiffin and the city of Avignon. 
 This cruel and treacherous outrage the Sovereigns 
 of Europe, in mj opinion, with a great miftake of 
 their honour and intereft, have permitted even 
 without a remonftrance to be carried to the defired 
 point, on the principles on which they are now 
 themfclves threatened in their own States; and this, 
 becaufe, according to the poor and narrow fpirit now 
 in fafhion, their brother Sovereign, whofe fubjecls 
 have been thus traitcroufly and inhumanly treated 
 in violation of the law of nature and of nations, 
 has a name ibmcvvhat different from theirs, and 
 inftead of being ftyled King or Duke, or Land- 
 grave, is ufually called Pope. 
 
 The Electors of Trcves and Mentz were fright- Jj^-jj*" 
 cned with the menace of a fimilar mode of wan 
 L 2 The
 
 ( 76 ) 
 
 The Affembly, however, not thinking that the 
 Electors of Treves and Mentz had done enough 
 under their firft terror, have again brought forward 
 Condorcet, preceded by Briflbt, as I have jufl flat- 
 ed. The Declaration which they have ordered now 
 to be circulated in all countries, is in fubftance the 
 fame as the firft, but ftill more infolent, becaufe^ 
 more full of detail. There they have the impu- 
 dence to ftate that they aim at no conqueft ; rnfi- 
 nuating that all the old lawful Powers of the World 
 Lad each made a conftant open profeffibn of a de- 
 fign of fubcluing his neighbours. They add, that 
 if they are provoked, their war will be directed only 
 againft thofe who aimmc to be Mttjlers. But to 
 the People they will bring peace, law, liberty, &c. 
 &c. There is not the Icafl hint that they conlider 
 thofe whom they call perfons " ajjuming to be 
 Mafters" to be the lawful Government of their 
 country, or perfons to be treated with the leaft ma- 
 nagement or refpect. They regard them as uftirp- 
 ers and enflavers of the people. If I do not mif- 
 take they arc defcribed by the name of tyrants 
 in Condorcct's firft draft. I am fure they are fo 
 in Briflbt's fpecch, ordered by the Aflembly to be 
 printed at the lame time and for the fame purpofes. 
 The whole is in the fame ftrain, full of fiilfe philo- 
 fophy and fa lie rhctorick, both however calculated 
 to captivate and influence the vulgar mind, and to 
 excite fedition in the countries in which it is or- 
 dered
 
 ( 77 ) 
 
 dered to be circulated. Indeed it is fuch, that if* 
 any of the lawful acknowledged Sovereigns of Eu- 
 rope had publickly ordered fuch a manifefto to be 
 circulated in the dominions of another, the Am- 
 baffador of that power would inftantly be ordered 
 to quit every Court without an audience. 
 
 The powers of Europe have a pretext for con- Effia of 
 cealing their fears, by faying that this language is sovereign 
 not ufed by the King; though they well know that 
 there is in effect no fuch pcrfon, that the Af- 
 fembly is in reality, and by that King is acknow- 
 ledged to be the Majlcr, that what he does is but 
 matter of formality, and that he can neither caufe' 
 nor hinder, accelerate or retard any meafure what-- 
 foever, nor add to or foften the manifefto which 
 the Aflembly has directed to be publifhed, with the 
 declared purpofe of exciting mutiny and rebellion 
 in the feveral countries governed by thefe power-. 
 By the generality alfo of the menaces contained in 
 this paper (though infinitely aggravating the out- 
 rage) they hope to remove from each power fepa-- 
 rately the idea of a diftint affront. The perfons 
 firfl pointed at by the menace are certainly the 
 Princes of Germany, who harbour the periecuted 
 houfe of Bourbon and the Nobility of France; the 
 declaration, however, is general, and goes to every 
 ftate with which they may have a caufe of quarrel. 
 But the terror of France has fallen upon all nations. 
 A few months fmce all Sovereigns feemed difpofed 
 
 to
 
 ( 78 ) 
 
 to unite againft her, at prefent they all feem to 
 combine in her favour. At no period has the power 
 of France ever appeared with fo formidable an 
 afpecl:. In particular the liberties of the Empire can 
 have nothing more than an exigence the moft tot- 
 tering and precarious, whilft France exifts with a 
 great power of fomenting rebellion, and the grcateft 
 in the \veakeil ; but with neither power nor difpo- 
 iition to fupport the fmaller ftates in their indepen- 
 dence againft the attempts of the more powerful. 
 
 I wind up all in a full conviclion within my own 
 brcair, and the fubftance of which I mult repeat 
 over and over again, that the ftate of France is the 
 firft confederation in the politicks of Europe, and 
 of each flatc, externally as well as internally con- 
 fidercd. 
 
 Moft of the topicks I have ufed are drawn from 
 fear and apprehenfion. Topicks derived from fear 
 or addrcflcd to it, are, I well know, of doubtful 
 appearance. To be fare, hope is in general the 
 incitement to action. Alarm fome men -vou do 
 not drive them to provide for their fccurity ; you 
 put them to a ftand ; you induce them not to take 
 meafures to prevent the approach of danger, but 
 to remove fo unpleafant an idea from their minds ; 
 you perfuade them to remain as thev are, from a 
 new fear that their activity may bring on the ap- 
 prehended luifchief before it's time. I confefs 
 
 freely
 
 ( 79 ) 
 
 freely that this evil fometimes happens from au 
 overdone precaution ; but it is when the meafures 
 are rafh, ill chofen, or ill combined,, and the ef- 
 fects rather of blind terror than of enlightened 
 forcfight. But the few to whom I wifh to fubmit 
 my thoughts, are of a character which will enable 
 them to fee danger without aftonifhment, and to 
 provide agaiuft it without perplexity. 
 
 To what lengths this method of circulating 
 mutinous manifeftos, and of keeping emiflaries of 
 fcdition in every Court under the name of Am- 
 bafladors, to propagate the fame principles and 
 to follow the practices, will- go, and how foon they 
 will operate, it is hard to fay but go on it will 
 more or lefs rapidly, according to events, and to 
 the humour of the time. The Princes menaced 
 with the revolt of their" fubjects, at the fame time, 
 that they have obfequioufly obeyed the fovcreign 
 mandate of the new Roman Senate, have received 
 with diftinction, in a publick character, Ambafia- 
 dors from thofe who in the fame act had circulated 
 the manifefto of fcdition in their dominions. This 
 was the only thing wanting to the degradation 
 and difgracc of the Gcrmanick Body. 
 
 The Ambafiadors from the Rights of Man, and 
 their admiflion into the diplomatic^ lyilem, I hold 
 to be a new aera in this bulincls. It will be the 
 moft important Hep yet taken to affect the exiit- 
 
 cnce
 
 ( SO ) 
 
 cnce of Sovereigns, and the higher clafics of lite 
 I do not mean to exclude it's effects upon all 
 clafics but the firft blow is aimed at the more 
 prominent parts in the ancient order of things. 
 
 What is to be done ? 
 
 It would be prefumption in me to do more than 
 to make a cafe. Many things occur. But as 
 they, like all political meafures, depend on difpofi- 
 tions, tempers, means, and external circumftances, 
 for all their effect, not being well afTured of thefe, 
 I do not know how to let looie any fpcculations 
 of mine on the fubject. The evil is ftated in my 
 opinion as it exifts. The remedy muft be where 
 power, wifdom and information, I hope are more 
 united with good intentions than they can be with 
 me. I have done with this fubjecl, I believe for 
 ever. It has given me many anxious moments for 
 the two laft years. If a great change is to be made 
 in human affairs, the minds of men will be iitted 
 to it ; the general opinions and feelings will draw 
 that way. Every fear, every hope, will forward it; 
 and then they who perfift in oppofing this mighty 
 current in human affairs, will appear rather to re- 
 fift the decrees of Providence ittelf, than the mere 
 dc ' ^ of men. They will not be refolute and 
 firm., buc perverfe and obftinatc.
 
 HEADS 
 
 FOR 
 
 CONSIDERATION 
 
 ON THE 
 
 PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 
 
 WRITTEN IX NOVEMBER, 
 
 M
 
 HEADS 
 
 FOR 
 
 CONSIDERATION, 
 
 WRITTEN IN NOVEMBER, 
 
 THAT France, by it's mere geographical po- 
 lition, independently of every other cir- 
 cumftance, muft affect every State of Europe; 
 Ibme of them immediately, all of them through 
 mediums not very remote. 
 
 That the Handing policy of this kingdom ever 
 has been to watch over the external proceedings of 
 France (whatever form the inter lour Government 
 of that kingdom might take) and to prevent the 
 extenfion of it's dominion or it's ruling influence, 
 over other States. 
 
 That, there is nothing in the prefent internal 
 ftate of things in France, which alters the na- 
 tional policy with regard to the exteriour relations 
 of that country. 
 
 That there are, on the contrary, many things in 
 
 the internal circumilances of France (and perhaps 
 
 M2 of
 
 ( 84 ) 
 
 of this country too) which tend to fortify the prin- 
 ciples of that fundamental policy; and which ren- 
 der the active affertion of thofe principles more 
 prefling at this, than at any former time. 
 
 That, by a change effected in about three weeks, 
 :France has been able to penetrate into the heart 
 of Germany; to make an abfolute conquer! of 
 Savoy; to menace an immediate invasion of the 
 Netherlands ; and to awe and overbear the whole 
 Helvetick Body, which is in a moft perilous fitua- 
 tion. The great Ariftccratick Cantons having, 
 perhaps, as much or more to dread from their own 
 people whom they arm, but do not chufc or dare 
 to employ, as from the foreign enemy, which 
 againf! all publick faith has butchered their troops, 
 ferving by treaty in France. To this picture, it is 
 hardly necdlary to add, the means by which 
 France has been enabled to effect all this, namely 
 the apparently entire deftruction of one of the. 
 larger!, and certainly the higheft difciplincd, and 
 beft appointed army ever feen, headed by the firft 
 military Sovereign in Europe, with a Captain un- 
 der him of the greater! rcnoWn ; and tb.it without 
 a blow given or received on any fide. This it ate 
 of things feems to me, even if it went no further, 
 truly ferious. 
 
 Circumftances
 
 ( 85 ) 
 
 - Circumftances have enabled France to do all 
 /this by land. On the other element (he has begun 
 to exert herfelf; and {he muft fucceed in her de- 
 figns, if enemies very different from thofe (lie has 
 hitherto had to encounter, do not refill her. 
 
 
 
 ' She has fitted out a naval force, now actually 
 at fea, by which flic is enabled to give law to the 
 whole Mediterranean. It is known as a fact (and 
 if not fo known, it is in the nature of things highly 
 probable) that (he propofes the ravage of the Ec- 
 clcfiaftical State, and the pillage of Rome, as her 
 firfl object ; that next (lie means to bombard Na- 
 ples; to awe, to humble, and thus to command 
 all Italy to force it to a nominal neutrality, but 
 to a real dependence to compel the Italian Prin- 
 ces and Republicks to admit the free entrance of 
 the French commerce, an open intercourfe, and 
 the fure concomitant of that intercourfe, the affili- 
 ated focieties, in a manner fimilar to thofe (lie has 
 ellablifhed at Avignon, the Corn tat, Chamberry, 
 London, Manchefter, 8cc. &c. which are fo many 
 colonies planted in all thefe countries, for extend- 
 ing the influence, and fecuring the dominion of 
 the French Republick. 
 
 That there never has been hitherto a period in 
 which this kingdom would have fufFered a French 
 fleet to domineer in the Mediterranean, and to 
 
 force
 
 ( 86 ) 
 
 force ITALY to fubmit to fuch terms as France 
 would think fit to impofe to fay nothing of what 
 has been done upon land in fupport of the fame 
 fyftem. The great object for which we preferred 
 Minorca, whilft we could keep it, and for which 
 we flill retain Gibraltar, both at a great expence, 
 was, and is, to prevent the predominance of France 
 over the Mediterranean. 
 
 Thus far as to the certain and immediate cfFect 
 of that armament upon the Italian States. The 
 probable effect which that armament, and the other 
 armaments preparing at Toulon, and other ports 
 may have upon SPAIN, on the fide of the Medi- 
 terranean, is worthy of the fcrious attention of the 
 Britifh councils. 
 
 That it is moft probable, we may fay, in a man- 
 ner certain, that if there fhould be a rupture be- 
 tween France and Spain, France will not confine 
 her oftenfive piratical operations againft Spain, to 
 her efforts in the Mediterranean ; on which fide, 
 however, flie may grievoufly affect Spain, efpecially 
 if fhe excites Morocco and Algiers, which un- 
 doubtedly fhe will, to fall upon that power. 
 
 //That flic will fit out armaments upon the ocean, 
 hy which the flota itfelf may be intercepted, and 
 tli us the treafures of all Europe, as well as the 
 
 largefl
 
 ( 87 ) 
 
 largeft and fureft refources of the Spanifh monar- 
 chy, may be conveyed into France, and become 
 powerful innruments for the annoyance of all her 
 neighbours. 
 
 That fhe makes no fecret of her defigns. 
 
 That, if the inward and outward bound flota 
 fhouldefcape,ftill France has moreand better means 
 of diffevering many of the provinces in the Weft 
 and Eaft Indies, from the ftate of Spain, than Hol- 
 land had when fhe fucceeded in the fame attempt. 
 The French marine refembles not a little the old ar- 
 maments of the Flibuftriers, which about a century 
 back, in conjunction with pirates of our nation, 
 brought fuch calamities upon the Spanish colonies. 
 They differ only in this, that the prelent piratical 
 force is, out of all meafure and comparifon, greater; 
 one hundred and fifty mips of the line, and frigates 
 being ready built, moft of them in a manner new, 
 and all applicable in different ways to that fervice. 
 Privateers and Mooriih corfaires poilefs not the 
 beft fearnonfhip, and very little difcipline, and in- 
 deed can make no figure in regular fervice, but in 
 defperate adventures, and animated with a lufl of 
 plunder, they are truly formidable. 
 
 That the 'and forces of France are well adapted 
 to concur with their marine in conjunct expeditions 
 
 of
 
 ( 83 ) 
 
 of this nature. In fuch expeditions, enterprize fup- 
 plies the want of difcipline, and perhaps more than 
 fupplies it. Both for this, and for other fervice 
 (however contemptible their military is, in other re- 
 fpecls) one arm is extremely good, the Engineer- 
 ing and Artillery branch. The old officer corps 
 in both being compofed for the greater part of thofe 
 who were not gentlemen, or gentlemen newly fuch, 
 few have abandoned the fervice, and the men are 
 veterans well enough difciplined, and very expert. 
 In this piratical way they muft make war with good 
 advantage. They muft do fo, even on the fide of 
 Flanders, either offenfively or defenfively. This 
 fhews the difference between the policy of Louis 
 the XlVth. who built a wall of brafs about his 
 kingdom ; and that of Jofeph the Second, who 
 premeditatedly uncovered his whole frontier. 
 
 That Spain from the actual and expected preva- 
 lence of French power, is in a moft perilous fitua- 
 tion; perfectly dependent on the mercy of that 
 Republick. If Auftria is broken, or even hum- 
 bled, fhe will not dare to difpute it's mandates. 
 
 In the prefent ftatc of things, we have nothing at 
 all to dread from the power of Spain by fea, or by 
 land, or from any rivalry in commerce. 
 
 That
 
 That we have much to dread from the con- 
 nexions into which Spain may be forced. 
 
 From the circumftances of her territorial poflefr 
 fions, of her refourccs,and the whole of her civil and 
 political ftate, we may be authorized fafely, and 
 with undoubted confidence to affirm, that 
 
 Spain is not afubftanti've Power: 
 
 That fhe muft lean on France, or on England, 
 
 That it is as much for the intereft of Great Britain \ 
 to prevent the predominancy of a French intereft 
 in that kingdom, as if Spain were a province of the 
 Crown of Great Britain, or a State actually depen- 
 dent on it; full as much fo as ever Portugal was 
 reputed to be. This is a dependency of much 
 greater value : and it's definition, or it's being 
 carried to any other dependency, of much more 
 Icrious misfortune, 
 
 One of thefe two things muft happen, Either 
 Spain muft fubmit to circumftances, and take fuch 
 conditions as France will impofe ; or fhe muft en- 
 gage in hoftilities along with the Emperor,, ^n4 
 the King of Sardinia. 
 
 N If
 
 ( 90 ) 
 
 If Spain fhould be forced or awed into a treaty 
 with the Republick of France, fhe muft open her 
 ports and her commerce, as well as the land com^ 
 munication for the French labourers,' who were ac- 
 cuftomed annually to gather in the harveil in 
 Spain. Indeed fhe "muft grant a free communica- 
 tion for travellers and traders through her whole 
 country. In that cafe it is not conjectural, it is 
 certain, the Clubs will give law in the Provinces ; 
 Bourgoing, or fome fuch mifcreant, will give law 
 at Madrid. 
 
 In this England may acquiefce if Hie pleafes ; 
 and France will conclude a triumphant peace, 
 with Spain under her abfolute dependence, with a 
 broad highway into that, and into every State of 
 Europe. She actually invites Great Britain to di- 
 vide with her the fpoils of the new world, and to 
 make a partition of the Spanifh Monarchy. Clearly 
 it is better to do fo, than to fuffer France to poilefs 
 thofe fpoils, and that territory alone ; which, with- 
 out doubt, unrefifted by us, fhe is altogether as 
 able, as fhe is willing to do. 
 
 Thi? plan is propofcd by the French, in the way 
 
 in which they prnpofc all their plans ; and in the 
 
 only way in which indeed they can propofc them, 
 
 where there is no regular communication between 
 
 Tajeftyand their Repiiblick. 
 
 What
 
 ( 91 ) 
 
 What they propofe is a flan. It is a plan alfo 
 to refift their predatory project. To remain quiet, 
 and to differ them to make their own ufe of a na- 
 val power before our face, fo as to awe and bully 
 Spain, into a fubmiffive peace, or to drive them into 
 a ruinous war, without any nieafure on our part, I 
 fear is no plan at all. 
 
 However, if the plan of co-operation which 
 France defires, and which her affiliated focieties 
 here ardently wifh and are conftantly writing up, 
 fhould not be adopted, and the war between the 
 Emperor and France fhould continue, I think it 
 not at all likely that Spain fhould not be drawn 
 into the quarrel. In that cafe, the neutrality of 
 England will be a thing abfolutely impoffible. 
 The time is only the fubject of deliberation. 
 
 Then the queftion will be, whether we are to de- 
 fer putting ourfelvcs into a pofture for the common 
 defence, either by armament, or negotiation, or 
 both, until Spain is actually attacked ; that is, 
 whether our Court will take a decided part for 
 Spain, whilit Spain on her fide, is yet in a condi- 
 tion to act with whatever degree of vigour fhe may 
 have 5 whilit that vigour is yet unexhaulted ; or 
 whether we fhall connect ourfelves with her broken 
 fortunes ; after fhe fhall have received material 
 blows, and when we fhall have the whole flow 
 N 2 length
 
 length of that always unwieldy, and ill conftructed, 
 and then wounded and crippled body, to drag af- 
 ter us, rather than to aid us. Whilft our difpoli- 
 tion is uncertain, Spain will not dare to put herfelf 
 in fuch a ftate of defence as will make her hofti- 
 lity formidable, or her neutrality refpeclable. 
 
 If the decifion is fuch as the folution of this 
 queftion (I take it to be the true queftion) con- 
 cludls to no time is to be loft. But the meafures 
 though prompt, ought not to be rafh and indi- 
 gefted. They ought to be well chofen, well com- 
 bined, and well purfued. The fyftem muft be ge- 
 neral ; but it muft be executed, not fucceffively, 
 or with interruption, but all together, unofatu, in 
 one melting, and one mould. 
 
 For this purpofe, we muft put Europe before 
 us, which plainly is, juft now, in all it's parts, in a 
 flate of difmay, derangement and confufion ; and 
 very poffibly amongft all it's Sovereigns, full of fe- 
 cret heart-burning, diftrufl, and mutual accufation. 
 Perhaps it may labour under worfe evils. There is 
 no vigour any where, except the diltempered vi- 
 gour and energy of France. That country has 
 but too much life in it, when every thing around is 
 fo difpofcd to tamenefs and languor. The very 
 vices of the French fyftem at home tend to give 
 force to foreign exertions. The Generals muft join 
 
 the
 
 ( 03 ) 
 
 the armies. They mufl lead them to enterprize, 
 or they are likely to perifh by their hands. Thus 
 without law or government of her own, France 
 gives law to all the Governments in Europe. 
 
 This great mafs of political matter muft, have 
 been always under the view of thinkers for the pub- 
 lick, whether they act in office or not. Amongft 
 events, even the late calamitous events were in the 
 book of contingency. Of courfe, they muft have 
 been in delign, at leaft, provided for. A plan 
 which takes in as many as poilible of the States 
 concerned, will rather facilitate and fimplify a ra- 
 tional fcheme for preferving Spain, (if that were our 
 fole, as I think it ought to be our principal object) 
 than to delay and perplex it. 
 
 If we fhould think that a provident policy (per- 
 haps now more than provident, urgent and nccel- 
 fary) mould lead us to act, we cannot take mea- 
 fures as if nothing had been done. We muft fee 
 the faults, if any, which have conducted to the. 
 prefent misfortunes; not for the fake of criticifm, 
 military or political, or from the common motives 
 of blaming perfons and counfels which have not 
 been fuccefsful ; but in order, if we can, to admi- 
 nifter fome remedy to thefe difafters, by the adop- 
 tion of plans, more bottomed in principle, and 
 
 built
 
 ( 94 ) 
 
 built on with more difcretion. Miftakes may be 
 kflbns. 
 
 There feem indeed to have been feveral miftakes 
 in the political principles on which the War was en- 
 tered into, as well as in the plans upon which it was 
 conducted; fome of them very fundamental, and 
 not only vilibly, but I may fay, palpably erroneous ; 
 and I think him to have lefs than the difcernment 
 of a very ordinary Statefman, who could not fore- 
 fee from the very beginning, unpleafant confe^ 
 quences from thofe plans, though not the unparal- 
 leled difgraces and difafters which really did attend 
 them : for they were, both principles and mea- 
 fures, wholly new and out of the common courfe, 
 without any thing apparently very grand in the 
 conception, to juftify this total departure from all 
 rule. 
 
 For, in the firft place, the united Sovereigns 
 very much injured their caufe by admitting, that 
 they had nothing to do with the interiour arrange- 
 ments of France ; in contradiction to the whole 
 tenour of the publick Law of Europe, and to the 
 correfpondent practice of all it's States, from the 
 time we have any hiftory of them. In this parti- 
 cular, the two German Courts feem to have as 
 little confulted the Publicifts of Germany, as 
 
 their
 
 ( Q3 ) 
 
 their own true interefts, and thofe of all the Sove- 
 reigns of Germany and Europe. This adrniffion 
 of a falfe principle in the Law of Nations, brought 
 them into an apparent contradiction, when they 
 inlifted on the re-eftablifhment of the Royal Au- 
 thority in France. But this confufed and contra- 
 dictory proceeding gave rife to a practical error of 
 worfe confequence. It was derived from one and 
 the fame root; namely, that the perfon of the Mo- 
 narch of France was every thing ; and the Mo- 
 narchy, and the intermediate orders of the State, 
 by which the Monarchy was upheld, were nothing. 
 So that, if the united Potentates had fucceeded fo 
 far, as to re-eftablifh the authority of that King, 
 and that he fhould be fo ill-advifed as to confirm 
 all the confifcations, and to recognize as a lawful 
 body, and to clafs himfelf with, that rabble of mur- 
 derers (and there wanted not perfons who would 
 Ib have advifed him) there was nothing in the 
 principle, or in the proceeding of the United 
 Powers, to prevent fuch an arrangement. 
 
 An expedition to free a brother Sovereign from 
 priibn, was undoubtedly a generous and chival- 
 rous undertaking. But the fpirit "and generofity 
 would not have been lefs, if the policy had been 
 more profound, and more comprehenfive ; that is, 
 if it had taken in thofe confiderations, and thofe 
 perfons, by whom, and, in fome meafure, for 
 
 whom.
 
 ( 96 ) 
 
 ; whom, Monarchy exilts. This would become a 
 bottom for a fyftem of folid and permanent policy, 
 and of operations conformable to that fyftem. 
 
 The fame fruitful error was the caufe why no- 
 thing was done to imprcfs the people of France (fo 
 far as we can at all confider the inhabitants of 
 France as a people) with an idea that the Govern- 
 ment was ever to be really French, or indeed any 
 thing elfethan the nominal government of a Mo- 
 narch, a Monarch abfolute as over them, but 
 whofe fole fupport was to arifc from foreign Poten- 
 tates, and who was to be kept on his Throne by 
 German forces ; in fhort, that the King of France 
 was to be a Viceroy to the Emperor and the King 
 ofPruffia. 
 
 It was the firft time that foreign Powers inter- 
 fering in the concerns of a nation divided into par- 
 tics, have thought proper to thruil wholly out or 
 their councils, to poftpone, to difcountcnance, tQ 
 reject, and in a manner to difgrace the party whom 
 thofe Powers came to fupport. The fmgle perfon 
 of a King cannot be a party. Woe to the King 
 who is himfelf his party ! The Royal party with 
 ihc King or his Reprefentatives at it's head, is the 
 Riyal caufe. Foreign Powers have hitherto chofen 
 to give to fuch wars as this, the appearance of a 
 civil conteft, and not that of an hoftile invafion. 
 
 When
 
 ( 97 ) 
 
 When the Spaniards, in thefixteenth century, fent 
 aids to the chiefs of the League, they appeared as 
 Allies to that League, and to the imprilbned King 
 (the Cardinal de Bourbon) which that League had 
 let up. When the Germans came to the aid of 
 the Proteftant Princes, in the fame feries of civil 
 wars, they came as Allies. When the Englifh 
 came to the aid of Henry the Fourth, they appear- 
 ed as Allies to that Prince. So did the French 
 always when they intermeddled in the affairs of 
 Germany. They came to aid a party there. 
 When the Englifh and Dutch intermeddled in the 
 fucceffion of Spain, they appeared as Allies to 
 the Emperor Charles the Sixth. In fhort, the po- 
 licy has been as uniform as it's principles were ob- 
 vious to an ordinary eye. 
 
 According to all the old principles of law and 
 policy, a regency ought to have been appointed by 
 the French Princes of the Blood, Nobles, and Par- 
 liaments, and then recognized by the combined 
 Powers. Fundamental law and antient ufage, as 
 well as the clear reafon of the thing, have always 
 ordained it during an imprifonment of the King of 
 France; as in the cafe of John, and of Francis the 
 Firft. A Monarchy ought not to be left a mo- 
 ment without a Reprcfentative, having an intereft 
 in the fucceffion. The orders of the State, ought 
 glfo to have been recognized in thofe amongil 
 O whom
 
 ( 93 ) 
 
 \vhom alone they exifted in freedom, that is, in 
 the Emigrants. 
 
 Thus laying down a firm foundation on the re- 
 cognition of the authorities of the Kingdom o 
 France, according to nature and to it's fundamen- 
 tal laws, and not according to the novel and incon- 
 liderate principles of the ufurpation which the 
 United Powers were come to extirpate. The 
 King of Pruffia and the Emperor, as Allies of the 
 antient Kingdom of France, would have proceeded 
 with dignity, firft, to free the Monarch, if poffible : 
 if not, to fecure the Monarchy as principal 
 In the defign - r and in order to avoid all rifques 
 to that great object (the object of other ages than- 
 the prefer) t, and of other countries than that 
 of France) they would ofcourfe avoid proceeding 
 with more hade, or in a different manner than 
 what the nature of fuch an object required. 
 
 Adopting this, the only rational fyftem. the ra- 
 tional mode of proceeding upon it, was to com- 
 mence with an effective fiege of Lifle, which the 
 French Generals mnil have icenttiken before their 
 faces, or be forced to fight. A plentiful country 
 of friends, from whence to draw fupplies, would 
 have been behind them ; a plentiful countvv of 
 enemies, from whence to force i applies, would 
 have- been before them. Good towns were always 
 
 within
 
 < 99 ) 
 
 within reach to depofit their hofpitals and maga- 
 zines. The March from Lifle to Paris, is through 
 a lefs defenfible country, and the diitance is hardly 
 fo great as from Longwy to Paris. 
 
 f If the old politick and military ideas had govern- 
 ed, the advanced guard would have been formed 
 of thofe who beft knew the country, and had forne 
 intereft in it, fupported by fome of the beft light 
 troops and light artillery, whilft the grand folid body 
 of an army difciplined to perfection, proceeded lei- 
 furely, and in clofe connexion with all it's ftorcs, 
 provisions, and heavy cannon, to lupport the ex- 
 pedite body in cafe of mifadventiirc, or to improve 
 and complcat it's fuccefs. 
 
 The direct, contrarv of all this was put in prac- 
 tice. In confequence of the original fin of this 
 project, the army of the French Princes was every 
 where thrown into the rear, and no part of it 
 brought forward to the lalt moment, the time of 
 the commencement of the fecret negotiation. This 
 naturally made an ill impreffion on the people, 
 and furnifhcd an occafion for the rebels at Paris to 
 give out that the faithful fubjecls of the King were 
 diiirultcd, dcfpifed, and abhorred by his allies. 
 The march was directed through a Ikirt of Lor- 
 raine, and thence into a part of Champagne, the 
 Duke of Brunfwick leaving all the ftrongeft places 
 O 2 behind
 
 behind him ; leaving alfo behind him, the ftrength 
 of his artillery ; and by this means giving a lu- 
 periority to the French, in the only way in which 
 the prefent France is able to oppofe a German 
 force. 
 
 In confequence of the adoption of thofc falle 
 politicks, which turned every thing on the King's 
 fole and finglc pcribn, the whole plan of the war 
 was reduced to nothing but a coup de mam, in or- 
 der to fet that Prince at liberty. If that failed, 
 every thing was to be given up. 
 
 The fchcmeof a coup de main., might (under fa- 
 vourable circumftances) be very fit for a partizan 
 at the head of a light corps, by whofe failure no- 
 thing material would be deranged. But for a 
 royal army of eighty thoufand men, headed by a 
 King in perfon, who was to march an hundred and 
 fifty miles through an enemy's country furely 
 this was a plan unheard of. 
 
 Although this plan was not well chofcn, and 
 proceeded upon principles altogether ill judged 
 and impoliticly the fupcricritv of the militarv force, 
 might in a great degree have mpplicd the defects, 
 and furnifhed a corrective to the miftakes. The 
 greater probability was that the Duke of Brunfwick 
 would make his way to Paris, over the bellies of the \ 
 
 rabble
 
 rabble of drunkards,, robbers,, afTaffins, rioters, mu- 
 tineers, and half-grown boys, under the ill-obeyed 
 command of a theatrical, vapouring, reduced Cap- 
 tain of cavalry, who oppoled that great Comman- 
 der and great army. But Diis aliter I'lfum He 
 began to treat, the winds blew, and the rains beat, 
 the houfe fell becaufe it was built upon fand 
 and great was the fall thereof. This march was 
 not an exact copy of either of the txvo marches 
 made by the Duke of Parma into France. 
 
 There is fome fecret. Sicknefs and weather 
 may defeat an army purfuing a wrong plan ; not 
 that I believe the licknefs to have been fo great as 
 it has been reported ; but there is a great deal of 
 fuperfluous humiliation in this bufinefs, a perfect 
 prodigality of difgracc. Some advantage, real or 
 imaginary, muft compcnfate to a great Sovereign, 
 and to a great General, for fo immenfe a lofs of 
 reputation. Longwy, fituated as it is, might (one 
 iliould think) be evacuated without a capitulation 
 with a Republick juft proclaimed by the King 
 of Pruffia as an ufurping and rebellious body. 
 He was not far from Luxembourg. He might 
 have taken away the obnoxious French in his 
 flight. It does not appear to have been necef- 
 fary that thofe Magiflrates who declared for their 
 own King, on the faith, and under the immediate 
 protection of the King of Pruffia, (hould be deli- 
 vered over to the gallows. It was not neceflary that 
 
 the
 
 ( 102 ) 
 
 the emigrant Nobility and Gentry who ferved with 
 the King of Pruffia's army, under his immediate 
 command, fhould be excluded from the cartel, and 
 given up to be hanged as rebels. Never was fo 
 grofs, and fo cruel a breach of the public faith, not 
 with an enemy, but with a friend. Dumouricr, 
 has dropped very iingular hints. Cuftine,has fpoken 
 out more broadly. Thcfe accounts have never been 
 contradicted. They tend to make an eternal rup- 
 ture between the Powers. The French have given 
 out, that the Duke of Brunfwick endeavoured to 
 negotiate fome name and place for the captive 
 King, amongft the murderers and profcribers of 
 thofe who have, loft their all for his caufe. Even 
 this has not been denied. 
 
 It is fingular, and indeed, a thing, under all it's 
 circumftanccS, inconceivable, that every thing 
 fhould bv the Emperor be abandoned to the King 
 of Pruflia. That Monarch was confidirc.d as prin- 
 cipal. In the nature of things, as well as in his 
 potition with regard to the war, he was only an 
 ally ; and a new ally, with eroding interefts in 
 many particulars, and of a policy rather uncertain. 
 At belt, and fuppofiug him to acl with the greateh; 
 fidelitv, the Emperor, and the Empire, to him muft 
 be but fccondary objects. Countries out of Ger- 
 many, mull affect him in a ftill more remote man-- 
 ner. France, other than from the fc:ir of it's doc- 
 trinal
 
 ( 103 - ) 
 
 trinal principles, cau to him be no object at nil. 
 Accordingly, the Rhine, Sardinia, and the Swifs, 
 arc left to their fate. The King of Pruffia has no 
 direQ and immediate concern with PYailce ; confe- 
 quentialJy, to be fure, a great deal ; but the Empe- 
 ror touches France d'n'etfly in many parts : he is ;i 
 near neighbour to Sardinia, by his Milanefc terri- 
 tories ; he borders on Switzerland ; Cologne, pof- 
 fefled by his uncle, is between Mentz and Treves, 
 the King of Pruffia's territories on the Lowef 
 Rhine. The Emperor is the natural guardian of 
 Italy and Germany ; the natural balance again ft 
 the ambition of France, whether Republican or 
 Monarchical. His Minifters and his Generals, 
 therefore, ought to have had their full fhare in every 
 material confutation, which I fufpect they had not. 
 If he has no Miniiter capable of plans of policy, 
 which comprehend the fuperintendancy of a war, 
 or no General with the leaft of a political head^ 
 things have been as they muft be. However, in 
 all the parts of this ilrange proceeding, there muft- 
 be a fecret. 
 
 It is probably known to Minilters. I do not 
 mean to penetrate into it. My fpeculatioris on this 
 head muft be only conjectural. If the King of 
 Pruffia, under the pretext, or on the reality of 
 fome information relative to ill practice on the part 
 of the Court of Vienna, takes advantage of his 
 
 being
 
 ( 104 ) 
 
 being admitted into the heart of the Emperor s do- 
 minions in the characler of an ally, afterwards to 
 join the common enemy, and to enable France to 
 feize the Netherlands, and to reduce and humble 
 the Empire, I cannot conceive, upon every prin- 
 ciple, any thing more alarming for this country, fe- 
 parately, and as a part of the general fyftem. After 
 all, we may be looking in vain in the regions of po- 
 liticks, for what is only the operation of temper and 
 characler upon accidental circumftances But I 
 never knew accidents to decide the whole of any 
 great buiincfs ; and I never knew temper to acl, 
 but that fome fyftem of politicks, agreeable to it's 
 peculiar fpirit, was blended with it, ftrengthened 
 it, and got flrength from it. Therefore the poli- 
 ticks can hardly be put out of the queftion. 
 
 Great miftakes have been committed ; at lealt I 
 hope fo. If there have been none, the cafe in fu- 
 ture is defperate. I have endeavoured to point out 
 fome of thofe which have occurred to me, and molt 
 of them very early. 
 
 Whatever may be the caufe of the prefent ft ate 
 of things, on a full and mature view and compa- 
 rifon of the hiftorical matter, of the tfanfaclions 
 that have pafTed before our eyes^ and of the future 
 profpe6l, I think I am authorized to form an opi- 
 nion without the Icaft hefitation. 
 
 That
 
 ( 105 ) 
 
 That there never was, nor is, rior ever will be, or 
 ever can be, the leafl rational hope of making an 
 impreffion on France by any Continental Powers, , 
 if England is not a part, is not the directing part, 
 is not the foul, of the whole confederacy again ft it. 
 
 This, fo far as it is an anticipation of future, is 
 grounded on the whole tenour of former hiftory 
 In fpeculation it is to be accounted for on two 
 plain principles. 
 
 Firft, That Great Britain is likely to take a more ; 
 fair and equal part in the alliance, than the other I 
 Powers, as having lefs of croffing intereft, or per- ' 
 plexed difcuffion with any of them. 
 
 Secondly, Becaufe France cannot have to deal 
 with any of thefe continental Sovereigns, without 
 their feeling that nation, as a maritime Power, 
 greatly fuperiour to them all put together ; a force 
 which is only to be kept in check by England. 
 
 England, exceptduringthe excentrick aberration 
 of Charles the Second, has always confidered it as 
 her duty and intereft, to take her place in fuch a 
 confederacy. Her chief difputes mufl ever be 
 with France, and if England (hews herfelf indiffe- 
 rent and unconcerned when thefe Powers are com- 
 P bined
 
 bined againft the cnterprizcs of France, '{he ijj to 
 1 look with certainty for the fame indifference on the 
 part of thefe Powers, when flic may be at war with 
 that nation* This will tend totally to difconnect 
 this kingdom from the fyftem of Europe, in which, 
 if fhe ought not ramly to meddle, flie ought never 
 wholly -to withdraw herfelf from it. 
 
 If then England is put in motion, whether by a 
 conlideration of the general fafety, or of the influ- 
 ence of France upon Spain, or by the probable 
 operations of this new fyftem on the Netherlands, 
 it muft embrace in it's project the whole as much 
 as poflible, and the part it takes ought to be as 
 much as poflible a leading and prefiding part. 
 
 I therefore beg leave to fuggeft, 
 
 Firft, That a Minifter fhould. forthwith be fent 
 to Spain, to encourage that Court to perfevere in 
 the meafures they have adopted againft France ; 
 to make a clofe alliance and guarantee of pofTef- 
 lions, as againft France, with that power, and whilft 
 the formality of the treaty is pending, to arlure 
 them of our protection, poftponing any leffer dif- 
 putes to another occafion. 
 
 Secondly, To afftire the Court of Vienna, of our 
 defire to enter into our anticnt connexions with 
 
 her,
 
 ( 107 ) 
 
 1 her, and to fupport her effectually in the war which 
 France has declared againfi her. 
 
 Thirdly, To animate the Swifs, and the King of 
 Sardinia, to take a part, as the latter once did on 
 the principles of the Grand Alliance. 
 
 Fourthly, To put an end to onr disputes with 
 Ruffia, and mutually to forget the paft. I believe if 
 fhe is fatisfied of this oblivion, fhe will return to her 
 old fentiments, with regard to this Court, and will 
 take a more forward part in this bufinefs than any 
 other Power. 
 
 Fifthly,, If what has happened to the King of 
 Pi-uffia is only in confeqnenee of a fort of panick or 
 of levity, and an indifpofition to perfevere long in 
 one defign the fupport and concurrence of Ruffia 
 will tend to ileady him, and to give him resolution. 
 If he be ill difpofed, with that power on his back, 
 and without one ally in Europe, I conceive he will 
 not be eafily led to derange the plan. 
 
 Sixthly, To ufe the joint influence of our Court, 
 aiid of our then Allied Powers, with Holland, to 
 arm as fully as fhe can by fea a and to make fome ad- 
 dition by land. 
 
 P 2 Seventhly,
 
 ( 108 ) 
 
 Seventhly, To acknowledge the King of France's 
 next brother (affifted by fuch a Council and fuch 
 Reprefentatives of the Kingdom of France, asfhall 
 be thought proper) Regent of France, and to lend 
 that Prince a fmall fupply of money, arms, cloath- 
 ing and artillery. 
 
 Eighthly, To give force to thefe negociations, an 
 inftant naval armament ought to be adopted ; one 
 fquadron for the Mediterranean ; another for the 
 Channel. The feafon is convenient, moft of our 
 trade being, as I take it, at home. 
 
 After fpeaking of a plan formed upon the an- 
 tient policy and practice of Great Britain, and of 
 Europe; to which this is exadlly conformable in 
 every refpecl:, with no deviation whatfoever, and 
 which is, I conceive much more lirongly called 
 for by the prefent circumflances, than by any 
 former, I muft take notice of another which I 
 hear, but cannot perfuade myfelf to believe, is in 
 agitation. This plan is grounded upon the very 
 fame view of things which is here ftated, namely, 
 the danger to all Sovereigns, and old Republicks, 
 from the prevalence of French power and influ- 
 ence. 
 
 It
 
 It is to form a Congrefs of all the European 
 powers, for the purpofe of a general defenfive alli- 
 ance, the objects of which fhould be, 
 
 Firlt, The recognition of this new Republick 
 (which they well know is fonned on the princi- 
 ples, and for the declared purpofe of the deftruc- 
 tion of all Kings), and whenever the heads of this 
 new Republick fhall corifent to releafe the Royal 
 Captives, to make Peace with them. 
 
 Secondly, To defend thcmfelves with their joint 
 forces againft the open aggreffions or the fecret 
 practices, intrigues and writings, which are ufed 
 to propagate the French principles. 
 
 It is eafy to difcovcr from whofe fhop this com- 
 modity comes. It is fo perfectly abfurd, that if 
 that, or any thing like it, meets with a ferious 
 entertainment in any Cabinet, I fhould think it 
 the effect of what is called a judicial blindnefs, the 
 certain forerunner of the deftrucliori of all Crowns 
 and Kingdoms. 
 
 An offenfive alliance, in which union is pre- 
 ferred, by common efforts in common dangers, 
 againft a common active enemy, may prcferve it's 
 confiftcncy, and may produce for a given time, 
 
 fome
 
 fomc confidcrable effect ; though this is not cafv, 
 and for any very long period, can hardly be ex- 
 pected. But a defenjvve alliance, formed of long. 
 clifcordant interefts, with innumerable clifcuffions, 
 exifling, having no one pointed objc6t to which it 
 is directed, which is to be held together with an \ 
 unrcmittcd vigilance, as watchful in peace as in i 
 war, fa fo evidently impoffible, is fuch a chimera, is 
 fb contrary to human nature, and the courfe of 
 human affairs, . that I am perfuaded no perfon in 
 his fenfes, except thofe whofe Country'', Religion 
 and Sovereign, are depofited in the French funds, 
 could dream of it. There is not the flighted petty 
 boundary fuit, no difference between a family ar- 
 rangement, no fort of mifunderftanding, or crofs, 
 purpofe between the pride and etiquette of Courts, 
 that would not entirely disjoint this fort of alli- 
 ance, and render it as futile in it's eftecls, as it is 
 feeble in it's principle. But when we comider that 
 the main drift of that dcfenfive alliance mull be 
 to prevent the operation of intrigue, mifchievous 
 doctrine and evil example, in the fuccefs of un- 
 provoked rebellion, regicide, and iyftematick ai- 
 faffination and maflacre, the abfurdity of fuch a 
 fchemc becomes quite lamentable. Open the 
 communication with France, and the reft follows 
 of coin-fe- 
 llow
 
 ( 111 ) 
 
 How fail the interio'ur circumft'ances of this coun- 
 try fupport what is laid \vith regard to it's foreign 
 politicks, muft be left to better judgments. I am 
 fure the French faction here is infinitely ftrength- 
 ened by the faccefs of the aflailins on the other 
 fide of the water. This evil in the heart of Europe \ 
 muft be extirpated from that center, or no part of ) 
 the circumference can be free from the mifchicf 
 which radiates from k, and which will fpread 
 circle beyond circle, in fpite of all the little I 
 defcnfive precautions which can be employed ]/ 
 againft it. 
 
 I do not put my name to thefe hints fubmitted 
 to the confideration of reflecting men. It is of too 
 little importance to mppofe the name of the writer 
 could add any weight to the ftate of things con- 
 tained in this paper. That ftate of things prefles 
 irrefiftibly on my judgment, and it lies, and has 
 long lain, with an heavy weight upon my mind. I 
 cannot think that what is done in France, is bene- 
 ficial to the human race. If it were, the Englifli 
 Conftitution ought no more to ftand againft it 
 than the antient Conftitution of the kingdom in 
 which the new fyftcm prevails. I thought it the 
 duty of a man, not unconcerned for the publick, 
 and who is a faithful fubjecl to the King, reipect- 
 fully to fubmit this ftate of facts at this new ftep 
 
 in
 
 in the pro.cjefs of the French arms and politicks, 
 to his Majefty, to his confidential fcrvants, and to 
 thofe perfons who, though not in office, by their 
 birth, their rank, their fortune, their character and 
 their reputation for wifdom, feem to me to have a 
 large flake in the {lability of the antient order of 
 things. 
 
 November 5, 37Q2.
 
 POLICY OF THE ALLIES 
 
 RESPECT TO FRANCE. 
 
 BEGUN IN OCTOBER, 1793.

 
 REMARKS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 POLICY OF THE ALLIES, 
 BEGUN IN OCTOBER, 1793. 
 
 AS the propofed manifefto is, I underftand, to 
 promulgate to the world the general idea of a 
 -plan for the regulation of a great kingdom, and 
 through the regulation of that kingdom probably to 
 decide the fate of Europe for ever, nothing requires a 
 more ferious deliberation with regard to the time 
 of making it, the circumftanc"es of thofe to whom 
 it is addreffed, and the matter it is to contain. 
 
 As to the time, (with the due diffidence in my 
 own opinion) I have fome doubts whether it is not 
 rather unfavourable to the iffuing any Manifefto, 
 with regard to the intended government of France ; 
 and for this reafon, that it is, (upon the principal 
 Q^2 point
 
 point of our attack) a time of calamity and defeat. 
 Manifeftoes of this nature are commonly made 
 when the army of ibme Sovereign enters into the 
 enemy's country in grear force, and under the im- 
 pofing authority of that force employs menaces 
 towards thofe whom he defires to awe ; and makes 
 promifes to thofe whom he wifhes to engage in his 
 favour. 
 
 As to a party, what has been done at Toulon 
 leaves no doubt, that the party for which we de- 
 clare muft be that which fubftantially declares for 
 Royalty as the bafis of the government. 
 
 As to menaces Nothing, in my opinion, can 
 contribute more effectually to lower any Sovereign 
 in the publick eftimation, and to turn his defeats 
 into difgraces, than to threaten in a moment of im- 
 potence. The fccond Manifefto of the Duke of 
 Brunfwick appeared therefore to the world to be 
 extremely ill-timed. However, if his menaces in 
 that Manifefto had been feafonable, they were not 
 without an object. Great crimes then appre- 
 hended, and great evils then impending, were to 
 be prevented. At this time, every act, which 
 .early menaces might poffibly have prevented, is 
 done. Punifhment and vengeance alone remain, 
 and God forbid that they fhould ever be forgotten. 
 But the punilhment of enormous offenders, will 
 
 not
 
 ( "7 ) 
 
 not be the lefs fevere, or the lefs exemplary when 
 it is not threatened at a moment when we have it 
 not in our pov/er to execute our threats. On the 
 other fide, to pafs by proceedings of fuch a nefa- 
 rious nature, in all kinds, as have been carried on 
 in France, without any fignification of refentmenr, 
 would be in effect to ratify them ; and thus to 
 become acceffaries after the fact, in all thofe enor- 
 mities which it is impoffible to repeat, or think of 
 without horror. An abfolute filence appears to 
 me to be at this time the only fafe courfe. 
 
 The fccond ufual matter of Manifeiloes is com- 
 pofed of promifes to thofe who co-operate with our 
 defigns. Thefe promiies depend in a great mea- 
 fure, if not wholly, on the apparent power of the 
 perfon who makes them to fulfil his engagements. 
 A time of difafter on the part of the promifer, 
 feems not to add much to the dignity of his per- 
 fon, or to the effect of his offers. One would 
 hardly wifh to feduce any unhappy perfons to give 
 the laft provocation to a mercilefs tyranny, without 
 very effectual means of protecting them. 
 
 The time therefore fee ms (aslfaid)not favourable 
 to a general Manifefto, on account of the unplea- 
 fant fituation of our affairs. However, I write in 
 a changing fcene, when a meaiure very imprudent 
 to day, may be very proper to-morrow. Some 
 4 great
 
 great victory may alter the whole ftate of the quef- 
 tion, fo far as it regards our power of fulfilling any 
 engagement we may think fit to make. 
 
 But there is another confideration of far greater 
 importance for all the purpoies of this Manifefto. 
 The publick, and the parties concerned, will look 
 fbmewhat to the difpofition of the promifer indi- 
 cated by his conduct, as well as to his power of 
 fulfilling his engagements. 
 
 Speaking of this nation as part of a general com- 
 bination of powers, are we quite fure, that others 
 can believe us to be fincere, or that we can be 
 even fully affured of our own fincerity in the pro- 
 tection of thofe who mail rifque their lives for the 
 reftoration of Monarchy in France, when the world 
 fees, that thofe who are the natural, legal, confti- 
 tutional reprefentatives of that Monarchy, if it ha* 
 any, have not had their names fo much as men- 
 tioned in any one publick act; that in no way 
 ' whatever are their perfons brought forward, thafc 
 their rights have not been exprefsly or implicitly 
 allowed, and that they have not been in the leaft 
 confulted on the important interefts they have at 
 ftake. On the contrary, they are kept in a ftate 
 of obfcurity and contempt, and in a degree of in- 
 digence at times bordering on beggary. They 
 are in fact, little lels prifoners in the village of 
 
 Hanau,
 
 ( "9 ) 
 
 Hanau, than the Royal captives who are locked 
 up in the tower of the Temple. What is this, 
 according to the common indications which guide 
 the judgment of mankind, but, under the pretext 
 of protecting the crown of France, in reality to 
 ufurp it ? 
 
 I am alfo very apprehenfive, that there are other 
 circumftances which muft tend to weaken the force 
 of our declarations. No partiality to the allied 
 powers, can prevent great doubts on the fairnefs 
 of our intentions as fupporters of the Crown of 
 France, or of the true principles of legitimate 
 Government in oppofition to Jacobinifm, when it 
 is vifible that the two leading orders of the State 
 of France, who are now the victims, and who 
 muft always be the true and fole fupports of Mo- 
 narchy in that country, are, at beft, in fome of 
 their defcriptions, confidered only as objects of 
 charity, and others are, when employed, employed 
 only as mercenary foldiers; that they are thrown 
 back out of all reputable fervice, are in a manner 
 difowned, confidered as nothing in their own caule, 
 and never once confulted in the concerns of their 
 King, their country, their laws, their religion, 
 and their property ! We even affect to be afhamed 
 of them. In all our proceedings we carefully 
 avoid the appearance of being of a party with 
 them. In all our ideas of Treaty we do not regard 
 
 them
 
 ( 120 ) 
 
 them as what they are, the two leading orders of 
 the kingdom. If we do not confider them in that 
 Jight, we muft recognize the iavages by whom they 
 have been ruined, and who have declared war 
 upon Europe, whilft they difgrace and perfecutc 
 human nature, and openly defy the God that made 
 them, as real proprietors of France. 
 
 I am much afraid, too, that we mall fcarcely 
 .be believed fair fupporters of lawful Monarchy 
 againft Jacobinilm, fo long as we continue to make 
 and to obferve cartels with the Jacobins, and on 
 fair terms exchange prifoners with them, whilft the 
 Royalifts, invited to our ftandard, and employed 
 under our publick faith, againft the Jacobins, if 
 taken by that favage faction, are given up to the 
 executioner without the leaft attempt whatfoever 
 at reprifal. For this, we are to look at the King 
 of Prufiia's conduct, compared with his Mani- 
 feftoes about a twelvemonth ago. For this we 
 are to look at the capitulations of Mentz and Va- 
 lenciennes, made in the courfe of the prefent cam- 
 paign. By thefe two capitulations, the Chriftian 
 -Royalifts were excluded from any participation in 
 the caufe of the combined powers. They were 
 confidered as the outlaws of Europe. Two armies 
 were in effect fent againft them. One of thofe 
 armies (that which furrendered Mentz) was very 
 near overpowering the Chriftians of Poitou, and 
 
 the
 
 [{* 1 
 
 the other (that which furrendered at Valenciennes) 
 has actually crufhed the people whom oppreffion 
 and defpair had driven to reliftance at Lyons, has 
 maffacred feveral thousands of them in cold blood, 
 pillaged the whole fubftance of the place, and pur- 
 fued their rage to the very houfes, condemning 
 that noble city to defolation, in the unheard of 
 manner we have feen it devoted. 
 
 It is then plain by a conduct which overturns a. 
 thoufand declarations, that we take the Royalifts 
 of France only as an inftrument of fome conve- 
 nience in a temporary hoftilicy with the Jacobins, 
 but that we regard thofe athciftick and murderous 
 barbarians as the bona fide pofTeflbrs of the foil o 
 France. It appears at leaft, that we confider them 
 as a fair Government de faffo, if not de jure ; a 
 refiftance to which in favour of the King of France, 
 by any man who happened to be born within that 
 country, might equitably be confidered by other 
 nations, as the crime of treafon. 
 
 For my part, I would fooner put my hand into 
 the fire than fign an invitation to opprefled men to 
 fight under my ftandard, and then on every fmifler 
 event of war, cruelly give them up to be punifhed 
 as the bafeft of traitors, as long as I had one of the 
 common enemy in my hands to be put to death in 
 order to fecure thofe under my protection, and to 
 R vindi-
 
 I I" ] 
 
 vindicate the common honour of Sovereigns. \Ve 
 hear nothing of this kind of fecurity in favour of 
 thofe whom we invite to the fupport of our caufe. 
 Without it, I am not a little apprehenfive that the 
 proclamations of the combined powers might 
 (contrary to their intention no doubt) be looked 
 upon as frauds, and cruel traps laid for their lives. 
 
 So far as to the correfpondence between OUT 
 declarations and our conduct, let the declaration 
 be worded as it will, the conduct is the practical 
 comment by which, and which alone it can be un- 
 derftood. This conduct acting on the declara- 
 tion, leaves a Monarchy without a Monarch ; and 
 without any repreientative or truftee for the Mo- 
 narch, and the Monarchy. It fuppofes a kingdom 
 without flates and orders ; a territory without pro- 
 prietors ,- and faithful fubjects, who are to be left 
 to the fate of rebels and traitors. 
 
 The affair of the eftablimmcnt of a Govern- 
 ment is a very difficult undertaking for foreign 
 powers to act in as principals ; though as auxiliaries 
 and mediators, it has been not at all unufual, and 
 may be a meafure full of policy and humanity, and 
 true dignity. 
 
 The firft thing we ought to do, fuppofing us 
 not giving the law as conquerors, but acting as 
 
 friendly
 
 t "3 1 
 
 friendly powers applied to for counfel and afilftancc 
 in the fettiement of a diftracted country, is well 
 to confider the compofition, nature, and temper 
 of its objects, and particularly of thofe who 
 actually do, or who ought to exerciie power in 
 that ftate. It is material to know who they are, 
 and how conftituted, whom we confider as the 
 people cf France? 
 
 The next confide ration is, through whom our 
 arrangements are to be made, and on what princi- 
 ples the Government we propofe is to be efta- 
 bliihed. 
 
 The firft queflion on the people is this, Whether 
 we are to confider the individuals now aftually in v 
 France ', numerically taken and arranged into Jaccbin I 
 Clubs, as the body politick, conflicting the nation 
 of France ? or, Whether we confider the original 
 individual proprietors of lands, expelled fince the 
 Revolution, and the dates and the bodies politick, 
 fuch as the colleges of juftice called parliaments, 
 the corporations noble and not noble of balliages, 
 and towns, and cities, the bifhops and the clergy, 
 as the true conftituent parts of the nation, and 
 forming tne legally organized parts of the people 
 of France ? 
 
 R 2 In
 
 [ "4 ] 
 
 In this ferious concern it is very neceflary that 
 we fhould have the moft diftinct ideas annexed to 
 the terms we employ ; becaufe it is evident, that 
 an abufe of the term people, has been the original 
 fundamental caufe of thofe evils, the pure of 
 which, by war and policy, is the prefent object of 
 all the Hates of Europe. 
 
 If we confider the acting power in France in any 
 legal conduction of publick law, as the people, 
 the queftion is decided in favour of the Republick 
 one and indivifible. But we have decided for 
 Monarchy. If fo, we have a King and Subjects j 
 and that King and Subjects have rights and privi- 
 leges which ought to be fupported at home ; for I 
 do not fuppofe that the Government of that king- 
 dom can, or ought to be regulated, by the arbi- 
 trary Mandate of a foreign Confederacy. 
 
 As to the faflion exercifing power, to fuppofe 
 that Monarchy can be fupported by principled 
 Regicides, Religion by prcfefled Atheifls, Order 
 by Clubs of Jacobins, Property by Committees 
 of Profcription, and Jurilbrudence by Revolu- 
 tionary Tribunals, is to be fanguine in a degree of 
 which I am incapable. On them I decide, for 
 jnyfelf, that thefe perfons are not the legal Corpo- 
 ration of France, and that it is not with them we 
 can (if we would) fettle the Government of 
 france. 
 
 Since,
 
 t s 1 
 
 Since, then, we have decided for Monarchy in 
 that kingdom, we ought allb to fettle who is to be 
 the Monarch, who is to be the Guardian of a 
 Minor, and how the Monarch and Monarchy is to 
 be modified and fupported ? If the Monarch is to 
 be elected, who the Electors are to be : if heredi- 
 tary, what order is efrablilhed correfponding with 
 an hereditary Monarchy, and fitted to maintain it ? 
 Who are to modify it in its exercife ? Who are 
 to reftrain its powers where they ought to be 
 limited, to ftrengthen them where they are to be 
 fupp'Tted, or to enlarge them, where the ob- 
 ject, the time, and the circumftances, may de- 
 mand their excenfion ? Thefe are things which, in 
 the outline, ought to be made diftinct and clear; 
 for if they are not (efpecially with regard to thofe 
 great points, who are the proprietors of the foil, 
 and what is the corporation of the kingdom) there 
 is nothing to hinder the compleat eftablimment of 
 a Jacobin Repubiick, (fuchas that formed in 1790 
 and .791) under the name of a Democracie 
 Royale. Jacobinifm does not confift in the having 
 or not having, a certain Pageant under the name 
 of a King, but in taking the people as equal 
 individuals, without any corporate name or de- 
 fcription, without attention to property, without 
 .divifion of powers, and forming the government 
 of delegates from a number of men fo conftituted, 
 
 in
 
 [ 126 ] 
 
 in deftroying or confifcating property, and bribing 
 the publick creditors, or the poor, with the fpoils, 
 now of one part of the community, now of ano- 
 ther, without regard to prefcription or poflefiion." 
 I hope no one can be fo very blind as to ima- 
 gine that Monarchy can be acknowledged and 
 fupported in France upon any other bafis than 
 that of its property, corporate and individual, or 
 that it can enjoy a moment's permanence or fecu- 
 rity upon any fcheme of things, which fets afide 
 all the antient corporate capacities and diftinctions 
 of the kingdom, and fubverts the whole fabrick of 
 its antient laws and ufages, political, civil and re- 
 ligious, to introduce a fyftem founded on the fup- 
 pofed Rights cf the Man 3 and the abfoliUe equality 
 of the human race. Unlefs, therefore, we declare 
 clearly and diftinclly in favour of the reftoration on 
 property, and confide to the hereditary property 
 of the kingdom, the limitation and qualifications 
 of its hereditary Monarchy, the blood and treafurc 
 of Europe is wafted for the eftablifhment of 
 Jacobinifm in France. There is no doubt that 
 Danton and Robefpiere, Chaumette and Barrere, 
 that Condcrcet, that Thomas Paine, that LaFayette, 
 and the Exbiftiop of Autun, the Abbe Gregoire, 
 with all the gang of die Syeyes's, the Henriots, 
 and the Santerres, if they could fecure themfelves 
 in the fruits of their rebellion and robbery, would 
 be perfectly indifferent, whether the moil unhappy 
 
 of
 
 of all infants, whom by the leflbns of the fhoe- 
 maker, his governour and guardian, they are train- 
 ing up ftudiouily and methodically to be an idiot, 
 or what is worfe, the moft wicked and bafe of 
 mankind, continues to receive his civic education 
 in the Temple or the Thuilleries, whilft they, and 
 fuch as they, really govern the kingdom. 
 
 It cannot be too often and too ftrongly incul- 
 cated, that Monarchy and property muft, in I 
 France, go together j or neither can exift. To 
 think of the poflibility of the exiftence of a per- 
 manent and hereditary Royalty, where nothing elje 
 is hereditary or permanent in -point either of perfonal / 
 or corporate dignity., is a ruinous chimera -worthy 
 of the Abbe Syeycs and thofe wicked Fools his 
 Aflbciates, who ufurped Power* by the Murders of 
 the 1 9th of July, and the 6th of October 1789, 
 and who brought forth the Monfter which they 
 called Democracie Royale, or the Conftitution. 
 
 I believe that moft thinking men, would prefer 
 infinitely fome fober and fenfible form of a Re- 
 publick, in which there was no mention at all of a 
 King, but which held out fome reafonable fecurity 
 to property, life, and perfonal freedom, to a fcheme 
 of things like this Democracie Royale, founded 
 on impiety, immorality, fraudulent currencies, the 
 confifcation of innocent individuals, and the pre- 
 tended Rights of Man ; and which, in effect, 
 excluding the whole body of the nobility, clergy, 
 
 and
 
 and landed property of a great nation, threw every 
 thing into the hands of a delperate fet of obfcurc 
 adventurers who led to every mifchief, a blind and 
 bloody band of Sans-Culottes. At the head, or 
 rather at the tail of this fyflem, was a miferable 
 pageant as its oftenfible inftrument, who was to be 
 treated with every fpecies of indignity, till the 
 moment, when he was conveyed from the Palace 
 of Contempt to the Dungeon of Horrour, and 
 thence led by a Brewer of his Capital through the 
 applaufes of an hired, frantick, drunken multitude, 
 to lofe his head upon a fcaffold. 
 
 This is the Confutation, or Democracie Royale; 
 and this is what infallibly would be again fet up 
 in France to run exactly the fame round, if the 
 predominant power mould fo far be forced to fub- 
 mit as to receive the name of a King, leaving it 
 to the Jacobins, (that is, to thofe who have fub- 
 verted Royalty and deftroyed Property) to modify 
 the one, and to diftribute the other as fpoil. By 
 the Jacobins I mean indifcriminatcly the Briflbtins 
 and the Maratifts, knowing no fort of difference 
 between them. As to any other party, none exifts 
 in that unhappy country. The Royalifts (thofe 
 in Poitou excepted) are banimed and extinguimed ; 
 and as to what they call the Conftitutionalifts, or 
 Democrats Rcyaux y they never had an exiftence of the 
 imalleft degree of power, confideration or autho- 
 rity;
 
 rity ; nor, if they differ at all from the reft of the 
 Atheiftick Banditti (which from their actions and 
 principles I have no reafon to think) were they 
 ever other than the temporary tools and inftru- 
 mcnts of the more determined, able, and fyfte- 
 matick Regicides. Several attempts have been 
 made to fupport this chimerical Democracie 
 Royale the firft was by La Fayette the laft by 
 Dumourier : they tended only to mew, that this 
 abfurd project had no party to fupport it. The 
 Girondifts under Wimpfen, and at Bourdeaux, 
 have made fome ftruggle. The Conftitutionalifts 
 never could make any ; and for a very plain rea- 
 fon , they were Leaders in Rebellion. All their 
 principles, and their whole fcheme of government 
 being Republican, they could never excite the 
 fmalleft degree of enthufiafm in favour of the un- 
 happy Monarch, whom they had rendered con- 
 temptible, to make him the Executive Officer in 
 their new Commonwealth. They only appeared 
 as traitors to their own Jacobin caufe, not as faith- 
 ful adherents to the King. 
 
 In an Addrels to France, in an attempt to treat 
 with it, or in confidering any fcheme at all relative 
 to it, it is impoffible we mould mean the geogra- 
 phical, we mud always mean the moral and poli- 
 tical country. I believe we mail be in a great 
 errour if we act upon an idea that there ejxifts in 
 S that
 
 f .jo ) 
 
 country any" organized body 'of men wRo 
 mi^ht be wrlling to treat on equitable terms, for 
 the reiteration of cheir Monarchy; but who are 
 nice in' balancing thofe terms, and who would 
 accept fuch as to them appeared reafonable, but 
 who would quietly fubmit to the predominant 
 power, if they were not gratified in the fafhion of 
 ibme conftitution. which fuited wkh their fancies.. 
 
 I take the ftate of France to be totally different. 
 
 .1 know of no fuch body, and of no fuch party. 
 
 So far from a combination of twenty men (always 
 
 excepting Poitou) I never yet heard, that afmgle 
 
 man could be named of fufficient force or influ- 
 
 . ence to anfwer for another man, much lefs for 
 
 the fmallcit diitrid in the country, or for the 
 
 moft incomplete company of fbldiers in the army. 
 
 We fee every man that the Jacobins- chufe to 
 
 apprehend, taken up in his viHage y or in his houfe, 
 
 .and conveyed to prifon without the leaft fhadow 
 
 of refinance ; and this indifferently, whether he is 
 
 fufpected of Royalifrn or Federalifm, Moderan- 
 
 tifin, Democracy Royal, or any other of the 
 
 .names of faclion which they ftart by the hour. 
 
 What is much more aftonilhing, (and if we did 
 
 not carefully attend to the genius and circum- 
 
 xo indm.-ftances of this Revolution, muft indeed appear 
 
 e^e, "av'ii.incredibk) all their moft accredited military men, 
 
 1Ury ' from a generaliffimo to a corporal, may be arrefted, 
 
 (eacli
 
 (each in the midft of his camp, and covered with 
 the laurels of accumulated victories) tied neck and 
 heels, thrown into a cart, and fen: to Paris to be 
 difpofed of at the pleafure of the Revolutionary 
 Tribunals. 
 
 As no individuals have power and. influence, 'fo NoCorpo- 
 there are no Corporations, whether of Lawyers or juftice, 
 Burghers exifting. The AfTembly called Conili- ?Sw : 
 tuer.t, dellroyed all iuch inftitutions very eariy. 
 The Primary and Secondary Aflemblies, by their 
 original conftitution, were' to be ditfblved when 
 they anfwered the purpofe 'of electing- the Ma- 
 gifbrates ; and were exprefsly difqiialified.from per- 
 forming any corporate act whatfoe-ver: The tran- 
 .fient Magift rates -have been almoft all removed 
 before the expiration of -their -terms, and new have 
 been lately impofed upon the people, without the 
 form or ceremony cf an election : thefc Magiftrates 
 .during: their exiftence are put under, as all the 
 Executive Authorities-. are from firil to laft, the 
 -popular -Societies (called Jacobin Clubs) of the 
 feveral countries, and this by an exprefs ouder of 
 -the National Convention : it is even -made a cafe 
 of death.- to oppofe or attack thofe-Chibs. They 
 <oo have been lately fubjected to an expurgatory 
 fcrutiny, to drive out from them every thing 
 -favouring of what they call the crime of Moderan- 
 .t\f&, of which offence however few were guilty. 
 2 But
 
 But as people began to take refuge from their per- 
 fections amongft themfelves, they have driven 
 them from that laft afylum. 
 
 The State of France is perfectly fimple. It 
 confifts of but two defcriptions The Opprefibr: 
 and the OpiprcfTed. 
 
 The firft have the whole authority of the State 
 in their hands, all the arms, all the revenues of 
 the publick, all the confiscations of individuals and 
 corporations. They have taken the lower fort 
 from their occupations and have put them into 
 pay, that they may form them into a body of 
 Janifaries to overrule and awe property. The 
 heads of thefe wretches they never fuffer to cool. 
 They fupply them with a food for fury varied by 
 the day befides the fcnfuai ftate of intoxication 
 from which they are rarely free. They have made 
 the Priefts and people formally abjure the Divinity ; 
 they have eftranged them from every civil, moral, 
 and foci:il, or even natural and inftin&ive fenti- 
 rnent, habit, and practice, and havs rendered them 
 fyf,ematicaliy lavages, to make it impoflable for 
 them to be the initruments of any fober and vir- 
 tuous arrangement, or to be reconciled to any flare 
 of order, under any name whatsoever. 
 
 The
 
 ( 133 ) 
 
 f The other defcription, the Opprejfed are people 
 of feme property j they are the fmafl reliques of 
 "the perfecuted Landed Intereil; they are the 
 Burghers and the Farmers. By the very circum- 
 ilance of their being of fome property, though 
 numerous in fome points of view, they cannot be 
 very confiderable as a number. In cities the nature 
 of their occupations renders them domeftick and 
 feeble ; in the country it confines them to their 
 farm for fubfiftence. The National Guards are 
 all changed and reformed. Every thing fufpiciou? 
 in the defcription of which they were compofed i$ 
 rigoroufly difarmed. Committees, called of Vigi- 
 lance and Safety, are every where formed -, a mcft 
 fevere and fcrutinizing Inquifition, far more rigid 
 than any thing ever known or imagined. Two 
 perfons cannot meet and confer without hazard to 
 their liberty, and even to their lives. Numbers 
 fcarcely credible have been executed, and their 
 property confifcated. At Paris and in mod other 
 towns, the bread they buy is a daily dole which 
 they cannot obtain without a daily ticket delivered 
 to them by their Mailers. Multitudes of all ages 
 and fexes are actually imprifbned. I have reafon 
 to believe, that in France there are not, for various 
 flare crimes, fo few as twenty thoufand * adually 
 in jail a large portion of people of property in 
 ny State. If a father of a family (hould (hew any 
 
 f Some accounts make them five times as many. 
 
 difpo-
 
 difpofitions to rcfift, or to withdraw himfclf fr: m 
 their power,- his wife and children are cruelly to 
 anfwer for it. It is by means of thefe hoftages, 
 that they keep the troops, which they force by 
 fnafles (as they call it) into the field true .to their 
 colours. 
 
 Another of their refources is not to be forgotten. 
 They have lately found a way of giving a fort 
 of ubiquity to the fupreme Sovereign Authority, 
 which no Monarch has been able yet to give to 
 any reprefentation of his. 
 
 The Commifiioners of the National Convention, 
 who are the Members of the Convention itfelf, 
 and really exercife all its powers, make continual 
 circuits through every province, and vifits to every 
 army. There they fuperfede all the ordinary Au- 
 thorities civil and military, and change arid alter 
 rvery thing at their pleafure. So that in effect no 
 deliberative capacity exifts in any portion of the 
 inhabitants. 
 
 Toulon, republican in principle, having takes 
 its decifion in a moment under the guillotine -, and 
 .before the arrival of thefe Commifiloners, Toulon, 
 being a place regularly fortified, and having in its 
 jbofom a navy in part highly difcontented, has 
 cfc.aped, though by a fort of miracle ; and it would 
 not have efcaped, if two powerful fleets had not 
 
 been
 
 ( '35 ) 
 
 been at the door to give them not only ftrong, but 
 prompt and immediate fuccour, efpecially, as 
 neither this nor any other fea-port town in France 
 can be depended on, from the peculiarly favage 
 difpofitions, manners, and connexions among the 
 lower fort of people in thofe places. This I take 
 to be the true ftate of things in France ; Jo far 
 as it regards any exifting bodies, whether of legal or 
 voluntary affectation, capable of atting or of treathfg 
 in corps. 
 
 As to the opprefled individuals, they are many ; 
 and as difcontented as men muft be under the 
 monftrous and complicated tyranny of all forts, with 
 which they are crufhed. They want no ftimnlus 
 to throw off this dreadful yoke : but they do want 
 (not Manifeftoes, which they have had even to 
 furfeit, but) real protection, force and fuccour. 
 
 The difputes and queftions of men at their cafe, 
 do not at all affect their minds, or ever can occupy 
 the minds of men in their fituation. Thefe theories 
 are long fince gone by ; they have had their day, 
 and have done their mifchief. The queflion is 
 not between the Rabble of Syftems, Fayetteifm, 
 Condorcetifm, Monarchifm, or Democratifm or 
 Federaiifm, on the one fide, and the fundamental 
 Laws of France on the other or between ail thefe 
 fyfteins amongft themfelves. It is a controverfy 
 z (weak
 
 (weak indeed and unequal on the one part) between 
 the proprietor and the robber $ between the 
 prifoner and the jailor > between the neck and the 
 guillotine. Four -fifths of the French inhabitants 
 would thankfully take protection from- the Emperor 
 of Morocco, and would never trouble their heads 
 about the abftract principles of the power by which 
 they were fnatched from imprifoninent, robber)*, 
 and murder. But then theie men can do little or 
 nothing for themfelves. They have no arms, nor 
 magazines, nor chiefs, nor union, nor the pofTi- 
 bility of thefe things within themfelves. On the 
 whole therefore I lay it down as a certainty, that in 
 the Jacobins, no change of mind is to be expected 
 and that no others in the territory of France 
 have an independent and deliberative exiftence. 
 
 The truth is, that France is out of itfelf The 
 moral France is feparated from the geographical. 
 The mafter of the houfe is expelled, and the 
 robbers are in poiTcffion. If we look for the 
 corporate people of France exifting as corporate in 
 the eye and intention of public Law, (that corpo- 
 rate people, I mean, who are free to deliberate 
 and to decide, and who have a capacity to treat 
 and conclude) they are in Flanders, and Germany, 
 in Switzerland, Spain, Italy, and England. There 
 are all the Princes of the Blood, there are all the 
 
 Orders
 
 Orders of the State, there are all the Parliaments 
 of the kingdom. 
 
 This being, as I conceive, the true ftate of 
 France, as it exifts territorially,, and as it exifts 
 morally, the queflion will be, with whom we are 
 to concert our arrangements ; and whom we are to 
 ufe as our inflruments in the reduction, in the 
 pacification, and in the fettlement of France. The 
 work to be done muft indicate the workmen. 
 Suppofing us to have rational objects, we have two 
 principal, and one fecondary. The firft two are 
 fo intimately connected as not to be feparated even 
 in thought; the re-eflablifhment of Royalty, and 
 the re-eflablifhment of Property. One would think 
 it requires not a great deal of argument to prove, 
 that the moft ferious endeavours to reflore Royalty, 
 will be made by Royalifls. Property will be moft 
 energetically reflored by the antient proprietors of 
 that kingdom. 
 
 When I fpeak of Royalifts, I wifh to be under- 
 . flood of thofe who were always iuch from prin- 
 ciple. Every arm lifted up for Royalty from the 
 beginning, was the arm of a man fo principled. 
 I do not think there are ten exceptions. 
 
 The principled Royalifls are certainly not of 
 
 force to effect thefe objects by themfelves. If they 
 
 T were,
 
 C 133 ) 
 
 were, the operations of the prefent great Combi- 
 nation would be wholly unnecefiary. What I con- 
 tend for is, that they fhculd be confulted with, 
 treated v/ith, and employed; and that no Foreigners 
 whatibever are either in intereft fo engaged, or in 
 judgment and local knowledge fo competent, to 
 anfwer ail thefe purpofes as the natural proprietors 
 of the country. 
 
 Their number for an exiled party is alfo con- 
 fiderable. Almoft the whole body of the landed 
 proprietors of France, eeclefiaftical and civil, have 
 been fteadily devoted to the Monarchy. This 
 body does not amount to lefs than feventy thou- 
 fand a very great number in the compofition of 
 the refpeftable clafTes in any fociety. I am hire, 
 that if half that number of the fame defcription 
 were taken out of this country, it would leave 
 hardly any thing that I fhould call the people of 
 England. On the faith of the Emperor and the 
 King of Pruffia, a body of ten tjioufand Nobility 
 on horfeback, with the King's two brothers at their 
 head, ferved with the King of Pruffia in the cam- 
 paign of 1792, and equipped themfelves with the 
 laft milling of their ruined fortunes and exhaufted 
 credit *. It is not now the queftion how that great 
 
 force 
 
 * Before, the Revolution the French Nobleffe were fo re- 
 duced in numbers, that they did not much exceed twenty 
 
 thoufandj
 
 ( '39 ) 
 
 force came to be rendered ufelefs and totally diffi- 
 pated. I ftate it now, only to remark, that a great 
 part of the fame force exifls, and would a<5r. if it 
 were enabled. I am fure every thing has fhewn 
 us that in this war with France, one Frenchman is 
 worth twenty foreigners. La Vendee is a proof of 
 
 If we wim to make an imprelfion on the minds 
 of any perfons in France, or to perfuade them to 
 join our ftandard, it is impoffible that they mould 
 not be more eafily led, and more readily formed 
 and difciplined, (civilly and martially difciplined) 
 by thofe who {peak their language, who are ac- 
 quainted with their manners, who are converfant 
 with their ufages and habits of thinking, and who 
 have a local knowledge of their country, and fome 
 remains of antient credit and confidefation, than 
 with a body congregated from all tongues and 
 tribes. Where none of the refpe&able native 
 interefts are fcen in the tranfaction, it is impoffible 
 that any declarations can convince thofe that are 
 within, or thofe that are without, that any thing 
 
 thoufand, at leaft of full grown men. As they have been 
 very cruelly formed into entire corps of foldiers, it is efti- 
 mated, that by the fword, and diftempers in the field, they 
 have not loit lefs than five thoufand men ; and if this courfe 
 is purfued, it is to be feared, that the whole body of the 
 French nobility may be extinguiihed. Several hundreds have 
 alfo perimed by famine and various accidents. 
 
 T a clfc
 
 ( HO ) 
 
 elfe than fome fort of hoftility in the ftyle of a 
 conqueror is meant. At beft it will appear to fuch 
 wavering perfons, (if fuch there are) whom we 
 mean to fix with us, at bcft a choice whether they 
 are to continue a prey to domeftick banditti, or 
 to be fought for as a carrion carcafs, and picked 
 to the bone by all the crows and vultures of the 
 fky. They may take protection, (and they would 
 1 doubt not) but they can have neither alacrity nor 
 zeal in fuch a caufe. When they fee nothing but 
 bands of Englifh, Spaniards, Neapolitans, Sardi- 
 nians, Prufiians, Auftrians, Hungarians, Bohe- 
 mians, Sclavonians, Croatians, affing as 'principals y 
 it is impofifibie they mould think we come with a 
 beneficent defign. Many of thofe fierce and bar- 
 barous people have already given proofs how little 
 they regard any French party whatfoever. Some 
 of thefe nations the people of France are jealous 
 of i fuch are the Englifh, and the Spaniards others 
 they defpife ; fuch are the Italians others they 
 hate and dread ; fuch are the German and Danu- 
 bian powers. At beft fuch interpofition of 
 antient enemies excites apprehenfion ; but in this 
 cafe, how can 'they fuppofe that we come to main- 
 tain their legitimate Monarchy in a truly paternal 
 French Government, to protect their privileges, 
 their laws, their religion, and their property, when 
 they fee us make ufe of no one perfon who has 
 atoy intereft in them, any knowledge of them, or 
 
 any
 
 any the leaft zeal for them ? On the contrary, 
 they fee, that we do not fufFer any of thofe who 
 have Ihewn a zeal in that caufe, which we feem to 
 make our own, to come freely into any place in 
 which the Allies obtain any footing. 
 
 If we wifh to gain upon any people, it is right 
 to fee what it is they expert. We have had a pro- 
 pofal from the Royalifts of Poitou. They are 
 well intitled, after a bloody war maintained for 
 eight months againft all the powers of anarchy, to 
 fpeak the fentiments of the Royalifts of France. 
 Do they defire us to exclude their Princes, their 
 Clergy, their Nobility ? The direft contrary. 
 They earneftly folicit that men of every one of 
 thefe defcriptions mould be fent to them. They 
 do not call for Englifh, Auftrian, or P ruffian 
 officers. They call for French emigrant officers. 
 They call for the exiled priefts. They have 
 demanded the Comte d'Artois to appear at their 
 head. Thefe are the demands, (quite natural 
 demands) of thofe who are ready to follow the 
 ftandard of Monarchy. 
 
 The great means therefore of reHBing the 
 Monarchy which we have made the main okjeft of 
 the war y is to afiift the dignity, the religion, and 
 the property of France, to repoflefs themfelves 
 of the means of their natural influence. This 
 4 ought
 
 Might to be the primary objec~b of all our politicks* 
 and all our military operations. Otherwife every 
 thing will move in a prepoflerous order, and 
 nothing but confufion and deflruction will folio w* 
 
 I know that misfortune is not made to win ref- 
 pect from ordinary minds. I know that there is 
 a leaning to profperity however obtained, and a 
 prejudice in its favour -, I know there is a difpofition 
 to hope ibmething from the variety and incon- 
 itancy of villany, rather than from the tirefome 
 uniformity of fixed principle. There have been, 
 I admit, fituations in which a guiding perfon or 
 party might be gained over, and through him or 
 them, the whole body of a nation. For the hope 
 of fuch a converfion, and of deriving advantage 
 from enemies, it might be politick for a while to 
 throw your friends into the made. But examples 
 drawn from hiflory in occafions like the preient 
 will be found dangeroufly to miflead us. France 
 has no refemblance to other countries which have 
 undergone troubles and been purified by them. 
 If France, jacobinifed as it has been for four full 
 years, did contain any bodies of authority and 
 difpofition to treat with you, (moft afluredly fhe 
 does not) fuch is the levity of thofe who have 
 expelled every thing refpeclable in their country, 
 fuch their ferocity, their arrogance, their mutinous 
 fpirit, their habits of defying every thing human
 
 ( 143 ) 
 
 and divine, that no engagement would hold with 
 them for three months j nor indeed could they 
 cohere together for any purpofe of civilized fociety, 
 if left as now they are. There muft be a means 
 not only of breaking their ftrength within them- 
 felves, but of civilizing them -, and thefe two 
 things muft go together, before we can poflibly 
 treat with them, not only as a nation, but with 
 any divifion of them. Deferiptions of men of 
 their own race, but better in rank, fuperiour in 
 property and decorum, of honourable, decent and 
 orderly habits, are abfolutely neceflary to bring 
 them to fuch a frame as to qualify them fo much 
 as to come into contact with a civilized nation, 
 A fet of thofe ferocious favages with arms in their 
 hands, left to themfelves in one part of the coun- 
 try, whilft you proceed to another, would break 
 forth into outrages at leaft as bad as their former. 
 They muft, as fail as gained (if ever they are 
 gained) be put under the guide, direction and 
 government of better Frenchmen than themfelves, 
 or they will inftantly relapfe into a fever of aggra- 
 vated Jacobinifm. 
 
 We muft not judge of other parts of France by 
 the temporary fubmiffion of Toulon, with two 
 vaft fleets in its harbour, and a garrifon far more 
 numerous than all the inhabitants able to bear 
 arms. If they were left to themfelves I am quite
 
 ( 144 J 
 
 furc they would not retain their attachment to Mo- 
 narchy of any name, for a fingle week. 
 
 To adminifter the only cure for the unheard of 
 diforders of that undone country, I think it infi- 
 nitely happy for us, that God has given into our 
 hands, more effectual remedies than human con- 
 trivance could point out. We have in our bofom, 
 and in the bofom of other civilized ftates, nearer 
 forty than thirty thoufand perfons, providentially 
 preferved not only from the cruelty and violence, 
 but from the contagion of the horrid practices, 
 fentiments and language of the Jacobins, and even 
 .facredly guarded from the view of fuch abominable 
 fcenes. If we mould obtain in any confiderablc 
 .diftrict, a footing in France, we poflefs an immenfc 
 body of phyficians and magiftrates of the mind, 
 whom we now know to be the moft difcreet, gentle, 
 well tempered, conciliatory, virtuous, and pious 
 perfons, who in any order probably exifted in the 
 world. You will have a mifiioner of peace and 
 order in every parifh. Never was a wifer national 
 ceconomy than in the charity of the Englifli and 
 of other countries. Never was money better ex- j 
 pended than in the maintenance of this body of 
 civil troops for re-cftablilhing order in France, 
 and for thus fecuring its civilization to Europe. 
 This means, if properly ufed, is of value inefti- 
 mable. 
 
 Nor
 
 ( 145 ) 
 
 Nor is this corps of inftruments of civilization 
 confined to the firft order of that ftate, I mean 
 the clergy. The allied powers poffefs alfo, an 
 exceedingly numerous, well informed, fenfible, 
 ingenious, high principled and fpirited body of 
 cavaliers in the expatriated landed intereft of 
 France, as well qualified at lead, as I, (who have 
 been taught by time and experience to moderate 
 my calculation of the expectancy of human abili- 
 ties) ever expected to fee in the body of any 
 landed gentlemen and foldiers by their birth. 
 France is well winnowed and fifted. Its virtuous 
 men are, I believe, amongft the moft virtuous, 
 as its wicked are amongft the moft abandoned 
 upon earth. Whatever in the territory of. France 
 may be found to be in the middle between thefe, 
 muft be attracted to the better part. This will be 
 compafled, when every gentleman, every where 
 being reftored to his landed eftate, each on his 
 patrimonial ground, may join the Clergy in reani- 
 mating the loyalty, fidelity and religion of the 
 people ; that thefe gentlemen proprietors of land, 
 may fort that people according to the truft they 
 feverally merit, that they may arm the honeft and 
 well affected, and difarm and difable the factious 
 and ill difpofed. No foreigner can make this dif- 
 crimination nor thefe arrangements. The antient 
 corporations of Burghers according to their feveral 
 modes mould be reftored ; and placed, (as they 
 U ought
 
 ( 146 ) 
 
 ought to be) in thehands of men of gravity and 
 property in the cities or baillages, according to the 
 proper conftitutions of the commons or third eftate 
 of France. They will reftrain and regulate the 
 feditious rabble there, as the gentlemen will on their 
 own eflates. In this way, and in this way alene, 
 the country (once broken in upon by foreign force 
 well directed) may be gained and fettled. It muft 
 be gained and fettled by itfelf, and through the 
 medium of its own native dignity and property, 
 It is not honeft, it is not decent, ftill lefs is it poli- 
 tick, for foreign powers themfelves to attempt any 
 thing in this minute, internal, local detail, in whidi 
 they could fhew nothing but ignorance, imbecility, 
 confufion and oppreflion. As to the Prince who 
 has a juft claim to exercife the regency of France, 
 like other men he is not without his faults and his 
 defects, But faults or defects (always fuppofing 
 them faults of common human infirmity) are not 
 what in any country deftroy a legal tide to Govern- 
 ment. Thefe princes are kept in a poor obfcure 
 country town of the King of Prufiia's. Their 
 reputation is entirely at the mercy of every calum- 
 niator. They cannot mew themfelves, they can- 
 not explain themfelves, as princes ought to do. 
 After being well informed, as any man here can 
 be, I do not find, that thek blernilhes in this emi- 
 nent perfon, are at all considerable, or that they 
 at all affect a character, which is full of probity, 
 
 honour.
 
 ( H7 ) 
 
 honour, generofity, and real goodncfs. In fome 
 points he has but too much refcmblance to his un- 
 fortunate Brother ; who with all his weaknefles, 
 had a good underflanding and many parts of an 
 excellent man, and a good King. But Monfieur, 
 without fuppofing the other deficient, (as he was 
 not) excells him in general knowledge and in a 
 fharp and keen obfervation, with fomething of a 
 better addrefs, and an happier mode of fpeaking 
 and of writing. His converlation is open, agreeable 
 and informed, his manners gracious and princely. 
 His brother the Comte d'Artois fuftains ftill better 
 the reprefentation of his place. He is eloquent, 
 lively, engaging in die higheft degree, of a deci- 
 ded character, full of energy and activity. In a 
 word he is a brave, honourable, and accomplished 
 cavalier. Their brethren of Royalty, if they 
 were true to their own caufe and intereft, inftead 
 of relegating thefe illuftrious perfons to an obfcure 
 town, would bring them forward in their courts and 
 camps, and exhibit them to, what they would fpee- 
 dily obtain, the efteem, refpect, and affection of 
 mankind. 
 
 As to their knocking at every door, (which . 
 
 . made to the 
 
 feems to give offence) can any thine be more Regent-sen- / 
 
 deavourtoeo 
 
 natural ? Abandoned, defpifcd, rendered in a man- to Spain, 
 ner outlaws by all the powers of Europe, who have 
 treated their unfortunate brethren with all the 
 U 2 giddy
 
 ( 148 ) 
 
 giddy pnde, and improvident infolence of blind 
 unfeeling profperity, who did not even fend them 
 a compliment of condolence on the murder of 
 their brother and filler -, in iiich aftate is it to be 
 wondered at, or blamed, that they tried every 
 way, likely or unlikely, well cr ii] cholen, to get 
 out of the horrible pit into which they are fallen, 
 and that in particular they tried whether the 
 Princes of their own blood, might at length be 
 brought to think the caufe of Kings, and of Kings 
 of their race, wounded in the murder and exile of 
 the branch of France, of as much importance as 
 the killing of a brace of partridges. If they were 
 abfolutely idle, and only eat in iloth their bread of 
 forrow and dependence, they would be forgotten; 
 or at beft thought of as wretches unworthy of their 
 pretenfions which they had done nothing to fup- 
 port. If they err from our interefts, what care has 
 been taken to keep them in thofe interefts ? or 
 what defire has ever been (hewn to employ them 
 in any other v ay. than as inftruments of their own 
 degradation, fhame, and ruin ? 
 
 The Parliament of Paris, by whom the title of 
 the Regent is to be recognized (not made) accord- 
 ing to the laws of the kingdom, is ready to recognize 
 it, and to regifter it, if a place of meeting was given 
 to them, which might be within their own jurifdic- 
 tion, fuppofing that only locality was required for the 
 
 exercife
 
 exercife of their functions : for it is one of the ad- 
 vantages of Monarchy, to have no local feat. It 
 may maintain its rights out of the fphere of its ter- 
 ritorial juriiui<5lion, if other powers will fuffer it. 
 
 I am well apprifetl, that the little intriguers, and 
 whifpcrcrSj and feif-conceited thoughtlefs babblers, 
 worfe than either, run about to depreciate the 
 fa<kn virtue of a great nation. But whilft they 
 talk, we muft make our choice they or the 
 Jacobins. We have no other option. As to. 
 tliofe, who in the pride of a profperity, not ob- 
 tained by their wifdom, valour, or induftry, think 
 fo well of themfe Ives and of their own abilities and 
 virtues, and fo ill of other men ; truth obliges me 
 to fay, that they are not founded in their prefump- 
 tion concerning themfelves, nor in their contempt 
 of the French Princes, Magiftrates, Nobility, 
 and Clergy. Inftead of infpiring me with 
 diflike and difcruft of the unfortunate, engaged 
 with us in a common cauie againft our jacobin 
 enemy, they take away all my efteem for their own 
 charaflers, and all my deference to their judg- 
 ment. 
 
 There are fome few French gentlemen indeed 
 who talk a language not wholly different from this 
 jargon. Thofe whom I have in my eye, I reipe<5l 
 as gallant foldiers, as much as any one can do, but 
 
 on
 
 ( 150 ) 
 
 on their political judgment, and prudence, I have 
 not the flighteft reliance, nor on their knowledge 
 of their own country, or of its laws and conftitu- 
 tion. They are, if not enemies, at lead not 
 friends to the orders of their own ftate ; not to the 
 Princes, the Clergy, or the Nobility; they poffefs 
 only an attachment to the Monarchy, or rather to 
 the perfons of the late King and Queen. In all 
 other refpects their converfation is Jacobin. I am 
 afraid they or fome of them, go into the clofets 
 of Minifters, and tell them that the affairs of France 
 will be better arranged by the allied Powers than 
 by the landed proprietors of the kingdom, or by 
 the Princes who have a right to govern ; and that 
 if any French are at all to be employed in the 
 fettlement of their country, it ought to be only 
 thofe who have never declared any decided opinion 
 or taken any active part in the Revolution *. 
 
 I fufpecl that the authors of this opinion are mere 
 foldiers of fortune, who, though men of integrity 
 and honour, would as gladly receive military rank 
 from Rufiia, or Auftria, or Pruflia, as from the 
 Regent of France. Perhaps their not having as 
 much importance at his court as they could wifh, 
 may incline them to this ftrange imagination. 
 Perhaps having no property in old France, they 
 
 This was the language of the ?viirn,levialifts. 
 
 arc
 
 are more indifferent about its reftoration. Their 
 language is certainly flattering to all Minifters in 
 all courts. We all are men; we 'all love to be 
 told of the extent of our own power and our own 
 faculties. If we love glory, we are jealous of 
 partners, and afraid even of our own inftruments. 
 It is of all modes of flattery the moft effectual to be 
 told, that you can regulate the affairs of another 
 kingdom better than its hereditary proprietors. 
 It is formed to flatter the principle of conquefl fo 
 natural to all men. It is this principle which is 
 now making the partition of Poland. The powers 
 concerned have been told by fome perfidious Poles, 
 and perhaps they believe, that their ufurpation is a 
 great benefit to the people, efpecially to the com- 
 mon people. However this may turn out with 
 regard to Poland, I am quite fure that France 
 could not be fo well under a foreign direction as 
 under that of the reprefentatives of its own King, 
 and its own antient Eftates. 
 
 I think I have myfelf ftudied France, as much as 
 moft of thofe whom the allied courts are likely to 
 employ in fuch a work. I have likewife of myfelf 
 as partial and as vain an opinion as men commonly 
 have of themfelves. But if I could command the 
 whole military arm of Europe, I am fure, that a 
 bribe of the beft province in that kingdom, would 
 not tempt me to intermeddle in their affairs, except 
 3 in
 
 ( 15* ) 
 
 in pcrfe& concurrence and concert with the natural 
 legal interefts of the country, compofed of the 
 Ecclefiaftical, the Military, the feveral Corporate 
 Bodies of Juflice, and of Burgherfhip, making 
 under a Monarch (I repeat it again and again) the 
 French Nation, according to its fundamental Confii- 
 tution. No confiderate Statefmen would undertake 
 to meddle with it upon any other condition. 
 
 The Government of that kingdom is funda- 
 mentally Monarchical. The publick law of Europe 
 has never recognized in it any other form of Go- 
 vernment. The Potentates of Europe have by 
 that law, a right, an intereft, and a duty to know 
 with what government they are to treat, and what 
 they are to admit into the federative Society, or 
 in other words into the diplomatick Republick of 
 Europe. This Right is clear and indifputable. 
 
 What other and further interference they have a 
 right to in the interior of the concerns of another 
 people, is a matter on which, as on every political 
 fubjeb, no very definite or pofitive rule can well 
 be laid down. Our neighbours are men; and who 
 will attempt to dictate the laws, under which it is 
 allowable or forbidden to take a part in the concerns 
 of men, whether they are confidered individually 
 or in a collective capacity, whenever charity to 
 them, or a care of my own fafety, -calls forth my 
 
 activity.
 
 activity. Circumftances perpetually variable, di- 
 recting a moral prudence and difcretion, the gene- 
 ral principles of which never vary, muft alone 
 prcfcribe a conduct fitting on fuch occafions. The 
 lateft cafuifts of public law are rather of a Repub- 
 lican caft, and in my mind, by no means fo averfe 
 as they ought to be to a Right in the people (a 
 word which ill defined is of the moll dangerous 
 lift) to make changes at their pleafure in the fun- 
 damental laws of their country. Thefe writers, 
 however, when a country is divided, leave abun- 
 dant liberty for a neighbour to fupport any of the 
 parties according to his choice *. This interfer- 
 ence mufh indeed always be a Right, whilft the 
 privilege of doing good to others, and of averting 
 from them every fort of evil, is a Right: Circum- 
 ftances may render that Right a Duty. It depends 
 wholly on this, whether it be a bona fide charity to 
 a party, and a prudent precaution with regard to 
 yourfelf, or whether under the pretence of aiding 
 one of the parties in a nation, you ad in fuch a 
 manner as to aggravate its calamities, and accom- 
 plifh its final deftruction. In truth it is not the in- 
 terfering or keeping aloof, but iniquitous inter- 
 meddling, or treacherous inaction which is praifed 
 or blamed by the decifion of an equitable judge. 
 
 * Vattel. 
 
 X It
 
 ( '54 ) 
 
 It will be a juft and irrefifliblc prefumption 
 againfl the fairnefs of the interpofmg power, that 
 he takes with him no party or defcription of men 
 m the divided ftate. It is not probable, that thefe 
 parties mould all, and all alike, be more adverfe 
 to the true interefts of their country, and lefs ca- 
 pable of forming a judgment upon them, than 
 thole who are abfolute ftrangers to their affairs, 
 and to the character of the actors in them, and 
 have but a remote, feeble, and fecondary lympa- 
 thy with their intereft. Sometimes a calm and 
 healing arbiter may be neceffary; but, he is to 
 compofe differences, not to give laws. It is im- 
 poflible that any one mould not feel the full force 
 of that prefumption. Even people, whofe poli- 
 tics for the fuppofed good of their own country 
 lead them to take advantage of the diffentions of a 
 neighbouring nation in order to ruin it, will not 
 directly propofe to exclude the natives, but they 
 will take that mode of confulting and employing 
 them which moft nearly approaches to an exclu- 
 fion. In fome particulars they propofe what 
 amounts to that exclufion, in others they do much 
 worfe. They recommend to Miniftry, " that no 
 Frenchman who has given a decided opinion, or 
 acted a decided part in this great Revolution for or 
 againft it, mould be countenanced, brought for- 
 ward, trufted or employed, even in the ftricteil 
 fubordination to the Miniflers of the allied powers." 
 
 Although
 
 ( 155 ) 
 
 Although one would think that this advice would 
 ftand condemned on the firil propoiition, yet as 
 it has been made popular, and has been proceeded 
 upon practically, I think it right to give it a full 
 confide ration. 
 
 And firft, I have afked myfelf who thefe French- 
 men are, that, in the ftate their own country has 
 been in for thefe laft five years, of all the people 
 of Europe, have alone not been able to form a de- 
 cided opinion, or have been unwilling to act: a de- 
 cided part ? 
 
 Looking over all the names I have heard of in 
 this great Revolution, in all human affairs, I find 
 no man of any diftinction who has remained in that 
 more than ftoical apathy, but the Prince de Conti. 
 This mean, ftupid, felfifh, fwinifh, and cowardly 
 animal, univerfaily known and defpifed as fuch, 
 has indeed, execept in one abortive attempt to 
 elope, been perfectly neutral. However his neu- 
 trality, which it fcems would qualify him for truft, 
 and on a competition muft fet afide the Prince de 
 Conde, can be of no fort of fervice. His modera- 
 tion has not been able to keep him from a jail. 
 The allied powers muft draw him from that jail, 
 before they can have the full advantage of the ex- 
 ertions of this great neutralifl. 
 
 X 2 Except
 
 Except him, I do not recollect a man of rank or 
 talents, who by his fpeeches or his votes, by his pen 
 or by his fword, has not been active on this fcene. 
 The time indeed could admit no neutrality in any 
 perfon worthy of the name of man. There were 
 originally two great divifions in France j the one is 
 that which overturned the whole of the Govern- 
 ment in Church and State, and erected a Republic 
 on the bafis of Atheifm. Their grand engine was 
 the Jacobin Club, a fort of feceflion from which, but 
 exactly on the fame principles, begat another fhort- 
 lived one, called the Club of Eighty Nine*, which 
 was chiefly guided by the Court Rebels, who, in 
 addition to the crimes of which they were guilty in 
 common with the others, had the merit of betray- 
 ing a gracious Matter, and a kind Benefactor. 
 Subdivifions of this faction, which fmce we have 
 feen, do not in the leaft differ from each other in 
 their principles, their difpofitions, or the means 
 they have employed. Their only quarrel has been 
 about power : in that quarrel, like wave fucceeding 
 wave, one faction has got the better and expelled 
 the other. Thus La Fayette for a while got the 
 better of Orleans j and Orleans afterwards prevailed 
 over La Fayette. Briffbt overpower'd Orleans; 
 
 Barrere and Roberfpiere, and their faction, mattered 
 
 * The firft objeft of this Club was the propagation of 
 Jacobin principles. 
 
 them
 
 ( 157 ) 
 
 them both and cut off their heads. All who were 
 not Royalifts have been lifted in fome or other of 
 thefe divifions. If it were of any ufe to fettle a 
 precedence, the Elder ought to have his rank. 
 The firft authors, plotters, and contrivers of this 
 monflrous fcheme, feem to me intitled to the firft 
 place in our diftruft and abhorrence. I have feen 
 fome of thofe who are thought the beft amongft 
 the original Rebels ; and I have not neglected the 
 means of being informed concerning the others. 
 I can very truly fay, that I have not found by ob- 
 feryation or enquiry, that any fenfe of the evils 
 produced by their projects has produced in them, 
 or any one of them, the fmalleft degree of repent- 
 ance. Difappointment and mortification undoubt- 
 edly they feel : but to them, repentance is a thing 
 impoffible. They are Atheifts. This wretched 
 opinion, by which they are porTerTed even to the 
 height of fanaticifm, leading them to exclude from 
 their ideas of a Commonwealth, the vital principle 
 of the phyfical, the moral, and the political world, 
 engages them in a thoufand abfurd contrivances, to 
 fill up this dreadful void. Incapable of innoxious 
 repofe, or honourable action, or wife Speculation, in 
 the lurking holes of a foreign land, into which (in 
 a common ruin) they are driven to hide their heads 
 amongft the innocent victims of their madnefs, they 
 are at this very hour, as bufy in the confection of 
 the dirr-pyes of their imaginary Conftitutions, as if 
 
 they
 
 ( '58 ) 
 
 they had not been quite frefh from deftroying by 
 their impious and defperate vagaries, the fineft 
 country upon earth. 
 
 It is however, out of thefe, or of fuch as thefe, 
 guilty and impenitent, defpifmg the experience of 
 others, and their own, that fome people talk of 
 chufing their Negotiators with thofe Jacobins, who 
 they fuppofe may be recovered to a founder mind. 
 They flatter themfelves, it feems, that the friendly 
 habits formed during their original partnerfhip of 
 iniquity, a fimilarity of character, and a con- 
 formity in the ground-work of their principles, 
 might facilitate their converfion, and gain them 
 over to fome recognition of Royalty. But furely 
 this is to read human nature very ill. The feveral 
 Sectaries in this fchifm of the Jacobins, are the very 
 laft men in the world to truft each other. Fellow- 
 fhip in Treafon, is a bad ground of confidence. 
 The laft quarrels are the foreft; and the injuries 
 received or offered by your own aflbciates, are ever 
 the moft bitterly refented. The people of France 
 of every name and defcription, would a thoufand 
 times fooner liften to the Prince de Conde, or to 
 the Archbifhop of Aix, or the Bifhop of St. Pol, 
 or to Monfieur De Cazales, than to La Fayette, or 
 Dumourier, or the Vicomte De Noailles, or the 
 Bifhop of Autun, or Necker, or his Difciple Lally 
 Tolendal. Againft the firft defcription they have 
 i not
 
 ( 159 ) 
 
 not the fmalleft animofity beyond that of a merely 
 political dififention. The others they regard as 
 Traitors. 
 
 The firft defcription is that of the Chriftian 
 Royalifts, men who as earneftly wifhed for refor- 
 mation, as they oppofed innovation in the funda- 
 mental parts of their Church and State. Their 
 part has been very decided. Accordingly they are 
 to be fet afide in the reftoration of Church and 
 State. It is an odd kind of difqualification where 
 the reftoration of Religion and Monarchy is the 
 queftion. If England mould (God forbid it fliould) 
 fall into the fame misfortune with France, and that 
 the Court of Vienna fliould undertake the reftora- 
 tion of our Monarchy, I think it would be extraor- 
 dinary to object to the admifiion of Mr. Pitt, or 
 Lord Grenville, or Mr. Dundas into any mare in 
 the management of that bufmefs, becaufe in a day 
 of trial they have ftood up firmly and manfully, as 
 I truft they always will do, and with diftinguimed 
 powers, for the Monarchy and the legitimate Con- 
 flitution of their country. I am fure if I were to 
 fuppofe myfelf at Vienna at fuch a time, I mould, as 
 a Man, as an Englifhman, and as a Royalift, proteil: 
 in that cafe, as I do in this, againft a weak and ruin- 
 ous principle of proceeding, which can have no other 
 tendency, than to make thofe who wifh to fupport 
 the Crown, meditate too profoundly on the confe- 
 
 quences
 
 ( 160 ) 
 
 quences of the part they take and confider whe- 
 ther for their open and fonvard zeal in the Royal 
 Caufe, they may not be thruft out from any fort of 
 confidence and employment, where the interell of 
 crowned heads is concerned. 
 
 Thcfe are the Parties. I have faid, and laid 
 truly, that I know of no neutrals. But as a general 
 obfervation on this general principle of chufmg 
 neutrals on fuch occafions as the prelent, I have this 
 to fay that it amounts to neither more nor lefsthan 
 this mocking propofition that we ought to ex- 
 clude men of honour and ability from ferving theirs 
 and our caufe ; and to put the deareft interefts of 
 ourfelves and our pofterity into the hands of men 
 of no decided character, without judgment to 
 chufe, and without courage to profefs any prin- 
 ciple whatfoever. 
 
 Such men can fcrve no caufe, for this plain rea- 
 fon they have no caufe at heart. They can at 
 beft work only as mere mercenaries. They have 
 not been guilty of great crimes ; but it is only bc- 
 caufe they have not energy of mind to rife to any 
 height of wickednefs. They are not hawks or 
 kites ; they are only miferable fowls whofe flight is 
 not above their dunghill or henrooft. But they 
 tremble before the authors of thefe horrors. They 
 admire them at a fafe and refpectful diftance. 
 
 There
 
 There never was a mean and abjedl mind that did 
 not admire an intrepid and dexterous villain. In 
 the bottom of their hearts they believe fuch hardy 
 mifcreants to be the only men qualified for great 
 affairs : if you fet them to tranfact with fuch per- 
 fons, they are inftantly fubdued. They dare not 
 fo much as look their antagonifl in the facCi They 
 are made to be their iiibjedts, not to be their 
 arbiters or controllers. 
 
 Thefe men to be fure can look at atrocious 
 acts without indignation, and can behold furrering 
 virtue without lympathy. Therefore they are 
 confidered .as fober difpaflionate men But they 
 have their paffions, though of another kind, and 
 Xvhich are infinitely more likely to carry them out 
 of the path of their duty. They are of a tame, 
 timid, languid, inert temper wherever the welfare 
 of others is concerned. In fuch caulesj as they 
 have no motives to action, they never poiTefs any 
 real ability, and are totally deftitute of all refource. 
 
 Believe a man who has feen much, and obferved 
 fomething. I have feen in the courfe of my life a 
 great many of that family of men. They are 
 generally chofen, becaufe they have no opinion of 
 their own ; and as far as they can be got in good 
 earneft to embrace any opinion, it is that of who- 
 ever happens to employ them (neither longer or 
 y (hotter,
 
 fhorter, narrower or broader) with whom they have 
 no difcuffion or confultation. The only thing 
 which occurs to fuch a man when lie has got a 
 bufinefs for others into his hands, is how to make 
 his own fortune out of it. The perfon he is to 
 treat with, is not, with him, an adverfary over 
 whom he is to prevail, but a new friend he is to gain : 
 therefore he always fyftematically betrays fome 
 part of his truft'. Inftead of thinking how he mail 
 defend his ground to the laft,' and if forced to re- 
 treat, how little he lhal] give up, this kind .of man 
 confiders how much of the interefl of his employer 
 he is to facrifice to his adverfary. Having nothing 
 but himfelf in view, he knows, that in ferving his 
 principal with zeal, he muft probably incur fome 
 refentrnent from the cppofite party. His object is 
 to obtain the good will of the perfon with v;hom he 
 contends, that when an agreement is maJe, he may 
 join in rewarding him. I would not take one of 
 thefe as my arbitrator in a depute for ib much as a 
 fifh-pond for if he referred the mud to me, he 
 would be fare to give the water that fed the pool, 
 to my adverfary. In a great caufe I mould cer- 
 tainly with, that my agent mould pofiefs conciliat- 
 ing qualities ; that he fhould be of a frank, open, 
 and candid difpofition^ loft in his nature, and of a 
 temper to fpften anirnofities and to win confidence. 
 He ought not to be a man odious to the perfon he 
 treats with, by perfonal injury, by violence, or by 
 
 deceit,
 
 deceit, or, above all, by the dereliction of his caufe 
 in any former tranfadtions. But I would be fure 
 that my Negotiator mould be mine, that he ihould 
 be as earncii: in the caufe as myfelf, and known to 
 be fo ; that he Ihould not be looked upon as a 
 ilipendiary advocate, but as a principled partizan. 
 In all treaty it is a great point that all idea of 
 gaining your agent is hopelefs. I would not truft 
 the caufe of Royalty with a man, who, profefimg 
 neutrality, is half a Republican. The Enemy has 
 already a great part of his fuit without a ftruggle 
 and he contends with advantage for all the 
 red. The common principle allowed between 
 your adverfary and your agent, gives your adverfary 
 the advantage in every difcufiion. 
 
 Before I fhut up this Difcourfe about neutral 
 Agency (which I conceive is not to be found, or 
 if found, ought not to be ufed) I have a few other 
 remarks to make on the caufe, which I conceive 
 gives rife to it. 
 
 In all that we do, whether in the ftruggle or after 
 it, it is neceflary that we mould conftantiy have in 
 our eye, the nature and character of the enemy we 
 have to contend with. The Jacobin Revolution 
 is carried on by men of no rank, of no confidera- 
 tion, of wild favage minds, full of levity, arrogance 
 and prefumption, without morals, without probity, 
 Y 2 without
 
 without prudence. What have they then to fupply 
 their innumerable defects, and to make them terri- 
 ble even to the firmeil minds? One thing, and one 
 thin nly but that one thing is worth a thoufand 
 they have energy. In France, all things being 
 put into an univerfal ferment, in the decornpofition 
 of focjety, no man comes forward bur by his fpirit 
 of enterprize and the vigour of his mind. If we 
 meet this dreadful and portentous energy, retrained 
 by no confideration of God or man, that is always 
 vigilant, always on the attack, that allows itfelf no 
 repofe, and fufFers none to reft an hour with impu- 
 nity ; if we meet this energy with poor common r 
 place proceeding, with trivial maxims, paltry old 
 faws, with doubts, fears and fufpicions, with a 
 languid, uncertain hefitation, with a formal, official 
 fpirit, which is turned afide by every obflacle from 
 its purpofe, and which never fees a difficulty but to 
 yield to it, or at beft to evade it; down we go to 
 the bottom of the abyfs and nothing fhort of 
 Omnipotence can fave us. We muft meet a vi- 
 cious and diftempered energy with a manly and 
 rational vigour. As virtue is limited in its refources 
 Jj| we are doubly bound to ufe all that, in the circle 
 
 drawn about us by our morals, we are able to 
 command. 
 
 , 
 
 I do not contend againft the advantages of dif- 
 truft. In the world we live in it is but too necef-
 
 far) r . Some of old called it the very finews of 
 difcretion. But what fignify common-places, that 
 always run parallel and equal ? Diftruft is good or 
 it is bad, according to our pofition and our pur- 
 pofe. Diitruft is a defenfive principle. They 
 who have much to lofe have much to fear. But 
 in France we hold nothing. We are to break in 
 upon a power in pofleflion ; we are to carry every 
 thing by ftorm, or by furprize, or by intelligence, 
 or by all. Adventure therefore, and not caution, 
 is our policy. Here to be too pr^efuming is the 
 better error. 
 
 The world will judge of the fpirit of our pro- 
 ceeding in thofe places of France which may fall 
 into our power, by our conduct in thofe that are 
 already in our hands. Our wifdom mould not be 
 vulgar. Other times, perhaps other meafures : But 
 in this awful hour our politicks ought to be made 
 up of nothing but courage, decifion, manlinefs, and 
 rectitude. We mould have all the magnanimity of 
 good faith. This is a royal and commanding po- 
 licy ; and as lone: as we are true to it we may give 
 the law. Never can we aflame this command if 
 we will not rifque the confequences. For which 
 reafon we ought to be bottomed enough in prin- 
 ciple not to be carried away upon the firft profpect 
 of any fmifter advantage. For depend upon it ? 
 that if we once give way to a fmifter dealing, we 
 
 mall
 
 mall teach others the game, and v/e lhall be out- 
 witted and overborne: the Spaniards, the Pruflians, 
 God knows who, will put us under contribution at 
 their pleafure ; and inflead or* being the head of a 
 great confederacy, and the arbiters of Europe, we 
 mall, by our miftakes, break up a great defign 
 into a thoufand little felfiih quarrels ; the enemy 
 will triumph, and we Ihall fit down under the 
 terms of unfafe and dependent peace, weakened, 
 mortified, and difgraced, whilft all Europe, Eng- 
 land included, is left open and defencelefs on every 
 part, to jacobin principles, intrigues, and arms. 
 In the cafe of the King of France, declared to be 
 our friend and ally, we will flill be confidering 
 ourfelves in the contradictory character of an ene- 
 my. This contradiction, I am afraid, will, in 
 Jpite of us, give a colour of fraud to all our tranf- 
 actions, or at leaft will fo complicate our politicks, 
 that we mail ourfelves be inextricably entangled in 
 them. 
 
 I have Toulon in my eye. It was with infinite 
 ibrrow I heard that in taking the king of France's 
 fleet in truft, we inflantly unrigged and difmafled 
 the mips, inflead of keeping them in a condition to 
 cfcape in cafe of difafter, and in order to fulfil our 
 truft, that is, to hold them for the ufe of the 
 owner, and, in the mean time, to employ them 
 for our common fervice. Thefe mips are now fo 
 
 circumftanced,
 
 circumftanced, that if we are forced to evacuate 
 Toukin, they muft fall into the hands of the enemy,, 
 or be burnt by ourfelves. I know this is by Ibme 
 confldcrtd as a fine thing for us. But the Athenians 
 ought noi <-.: be better than the Englifh, or Mr. 
 Pitt lefs virtuous than Ariitides. 
 
 Are \ve then fo poor in refources that we can do 
 no better with eighteen or twenty (hips of the line 
 than tc burn them ? Had .we fent for French Royalift 
 naval officers, of which fome hundreds are to be 
 load, and made them felect fuch feamen as they 
 could trufr, and rolled the reft with our ovn and 
 Mediterranean feamen, vhich are all over Italy to 
 be had by thcufands, and put them under judicious 
 Englifn commanders in chief, and with a judicious 
 mixture of our own fubordinates, the Weft Indies 
 would at this day have been ours. It may be faid 
 that thefe French officers would take them for the 
 King of France, and that they would not be in our 
 power. Be it fo. The iflands would not'be ours, 
 but they would not be jacobinized. This is how- 
 ever a thing impoiTible. They muft in effect and 
 fubfrance be ours. But all is upon that falfe prin- 
 ciple of diftruft, which, not confiding ir; flrength, 
 can nc\ er have the full ufe of it. They that pay, 
 and feed, and equip, muft direct. But I muft 
 (peak j.lc-in upon this fubject The French ifkrJ.s, 
 -re all our own, ought not to be all kept. 
 
 A fair
 
 A fair partition only ought to be made of thofe 
 territories. This is a iubjeft of policy very ferious, 
 which has many relations and afpecls. Juft here 
 I only hint at it as anfwering an objection, whilft I 
 ftate the mifchievous confequences which fuffer us 
 to be furprized into a virtual breach of faith, by 
 confounding our ally with our enemy, becaufe they 
 both belong to the fame geographical territory. 
 
 My clear opinion is, that Toulon ought to be 
 made, what we fet out with, a royal French city. 
 By the neceflity of the cafe, it muft be under the 
 influence, civil and military, of the allies. But 
 the only way of keeping that jealous and difcordant 
 mafs from tearing its component parts to pieces, 
 and hazarding the lofs of the whole, is to put the 
 place into the nominal government of the regent, 
 his officers being approved by us. This, I fay, is 
 abfolutely neceflary for a poife amongft ourfelves. 
 Qtherwifc: is it to be believed that the Spaniards, 
 who hold that place with us in a fort of part- 
 nerfhip contrary to our mutual intercfr, will fee 
 us abfolute matters of the Mediterranean, with 
 Gibraltar on one fide, and Toulon on the other, 
 with a quiet and compofed mind, whilft we do little 
 lefs than declare that we are to take the whole Weft 
 Indies into our hands, leaving the vaft, unwieldy, 
 and feeble body of the Spanifh dominions in that 
 part of the world, abfolutely at our mercy, without 
 5 an 7
 
 any power to balance us in the fmalleft degree. 
 Nothing is fo fatal to a nation as an extreme ot 
 felf-partiality, and the total want of confideration 
 of what others will naturally hope or fear. Spain 
 mutt think ihe fees, that we are taking advantage 
 of the confufions which reign in France, to difable 
 that country, and of courfe every country from, 
 affording her protection, and in the end to turn 
 the Spanim Monarchy into a province. If fhe 
 faw things in a proper point of light, to be fure, 
 Hie would not confider any other, plan of politicks 
 as of the lead moment in comparifon of the ex- 
 tinction of jacobinifm. But her minifters (to fay 
 the bejft of them) are vulgar politicians. It is no 
 wonder that they mould poftpone this great point, 
 or balance it, by confiderations of the common 
 politicks, that is, the queftions of power between 
 ftate and Jlatc. If we manifeftly endeavour to de- 
 ftroy the balance, efpecially the maritime and 
 commercial balance, both in Europe and the We% 
 Indies, (the latter their fore and vulnerable party 
 from fear of what France may do for Spain here- 
 after, is it to be wondered, that Spain, infinitely 
 weaker than we are, (weaker indeed that fuch a 
 mafs of empire ever was,) mould feel the fame 
 fears from our uncontroled power, that we give 
 way to ourfelves from a fuppofcd refurrefuon of 
 the antient power of France under a Monarchy ? 
 It fignifies nothing whether we are wrong or right 
 Z in
 
 ( '70 ) 
 
 fn the abftract -, but in refpecl to our relation t'O 
 .Spain, with fuch principles followed up in practice^ 
 -it is abfolutely impoflible that any cordial alliance 
 can fubfift between the two nations. If Spain 
 goes, Naples will fpeedily follow. Pruflia is quite 
 certain, and thinks of nothing but making a market 
 of the prefent confufions. Italy is broken and 
 divided j Switzerland is jacobinized, I am afraid., 
 completely. I have long feen with pain the pro- 
 grefs of French principles in that country. Things 
 cannot go on upon the prefent bottom. The 
 -pofiefilon- of Toulon, which, well managed, might 
 be of the greateft advantage, will be the greateft 
 misfortune that ever happened to this nation. The 
 ariore we multiply troops there, the more we mall 
 anultiply caufes and means of quarrel amongft our- 
 -felves. I know but one way of avoiding it, which 
 is to give a greater degree of fimplicity to our 
 politicks. Our fituation does neceflarily render 
 them a good deal involved. And, to this evil, in- 
 ftead of increafing it, we ought to apply ail the 
 remedies in our power. 
 
 See what is, in that place, the confcqucnce 
 (to fay nothing of every other) of this complexity. 
 Toulon has, as it were, two gates, an Enghlh, and 
 a Spaniili. The Englifh gate is, by our policy, 
 fill barred againft the entrance of any Royalifts. 
 The Spaniards open theirs, I fear, upon no fixed 
 principle, and with very little judgment. By 
 
 means,
 
 c i7i r 
 
 means, however, of this foolim, mean, and jeaious 
 policy on our fide, ail the Royalifts whom the 
 Englim might felect as mod practicable, and mofl 
 fubfervient to honeft views, are totally excluded." 
 Of thofe admitted., the Spaniards are mailers. As 
 to the inhabitants they are a neft of Jacobins which 
 is delivered into our hands, not from principle, 
 but from fear. The inhabitants of Toulon may 
 be defcribed in few words. It is differ turn nautis; 
 cauponibtts atque malignis. The reft of the feaports 
 are of the fame defcription. 
 
 Another thing which I cannot account for is, the 
 fending for the Bifhop of Toulon, and afterwards 
 forbidding his entrance. This is as directly con- 
 trary to the declaration, as it is to the practice of 
 the allied powers. The King df Pruffia did better. 
 When he took Verdun, he actually re-inftated the 
 Bifhop and his Chapter. When he thought he 
 fhould be the mafter of Chalons, he called the 
 bifliop from Flanders, to put him into pofieflion. 
 The Auftrians have reftored the clergy wherever 
 they obtained poffelfion. We have propofed to 
 reftore Religion as well as Monarchy j and in 
 Toulon we have reftored neither the one nor the 
 other. It is very likely that the Jacobin Sans- 
 Culottes, orfome of them, objected to this nieafure, 
 who rather chufe to have the atheiftick buffoons of 
 clergy they have got to fport with, till they are 
 Z 2 ready
 
 ( '7* ) 
 
 ready to come forward, with the reft of their 
 worthy brethren, in Paris and other places, to de- 
 clare that they are a let of importers, that they 
 never believed in God, and never will preach any 
 fort of religion. If we give way to our Jacobins 
 in this point, it is fully and fairly putting the go- 
 vernment, civil and ecclefiaftical, not in the King 
 of France, to whom, as the protector and go- 
 vernor, and in fubftance the head of the Gallican 
 Church,. the nomination to the bimopricks" belonged, 
 and who made the bifhop of Toulon ; it docs not 
 leave it with him, or even in the hands of the King 
 of England, or the King of Spain j but in the 
 bafeft Jacobins of a low lea-port, to exercife, fro 
 tern-pore, the fovereignty. If this point of religion is 
 thus given up, the grand inftrument for reclaiming 
 France is abandoned. We cannot, if we would, 
 delude ourielves about the true ilate of this dread- 
 ful conteft. // is a religious war. It includes in 
 its object undoubtedly every other jntereil of fo- 
 ciety as well as this ; but this is the principal and 
 leading feature. It is through this deftructjon of 
 religion that our enemies propofe the accomplifh--- 
 ment of all their other views. The French Reyo- 
 lution, impious at once and fanatical, had no other 
 plan for dorneftick poyvcr and foreign empire. Look 
 at all the proceedings of the National Affembly 
 from the firft day of declaring itielf fuch in the 
 year 1789, to this very hour, and you will find full 
 
 half
 
 C 173 ) 
 
 half of their bufmefs to be direcHy on this fubjech 
 In fad: it is the fpirit of the whole. The religious 
 fyftem, called the Conftitutional Church, was on 
 the face cf the whole proceeding fet up only as a 
 mere temporary amufement to the people, and fo 
 conftantiy ftated in all their converfations, till the 
 time ihould come, when they might with fafety caft 
 off the very appearance of all religion whatfoever, 
 and perfecute chriftianity throughout Europe with 
 fire and fword. The Conftitutional Clergy are not 
 the Minifters of any religion : they are the agents and 
 inftruments of this horrible confpiracy againft all 
 morals. It was from a fenfe of this, that in the 
 jEnglifh Addition to the Articles propofed at St. 
 Pomingo, tolerating all Religions, we very wifely 
 jefufed to fuffer that kind of traitors and buffoons. 
 
 This religious war is not a, controverfy between 
 feel: and feel: as formerly, but a war againft all fects 
 and all religions. The queftion is not whether 
 you are to overturn the catholick, to fet up the 
 proteftant. Such an idea in the prelent ftate of 
 the world is too contemptible. Our bufmefs is to 
 leave to the fchools the difcufTion of the contro- 
 verted points, abating as much as we can the 
 acrimony of difputants on all fides. It is for chriftian 
 Statefmen, as the world is now circumftanced, to 
 fecure their common Bafis, and not to rifque the 
 fubverfion. of the whole Fabrick by purfuing thefe 
 
 diftinclions
 
 (174 ) 
 
 di"ftincYins with an ill-timed zeal. We have in 
 the prefent grand Alliance, all modes of Govern- 
 ment as well as all modes of religion. In Govern- 
 ment, we mean to reftore that which, notwithftand- 
 ing our diverfity of forms we are all agreed in, as 
 fundamental in Government. The fame principle 
 ought to guide us in the religious part ; conforming 
 the mode, not to our particular ideas (for in that 
 point we have no ideas in common) but to 
 what will beft promote the great general ends 
 of the Alliance. As Statefmen we are to fee 
 which of thofe modes beft fuits with the interefts 
 of fuch a Commonwealth as we wifh to fecwre 
 and promote. There can be no doubt, but that 
 the catholick religion, which is fundamentally the 
 religion of France, muft go with the Monarchy 
 of France ; we know that the Monarchy did not 
 furvive the Hierarchy, no not even in appearance, 
 for many months j in fubftance, not for a fingle 
 hour. As little can it exift in future, if that pillar 
 is taken away, or even mattered and impaired. 
 
 If it mould pleafe God to give to the Allies the 
 means of reftoring peace and order in that focus 
 of war and confufion, I would, as I faid in the 
 beginning of this Memorial, firft replace the whole 
 of the old Clergy : becaufe we have proof more 
 than fufHcient, that whether they err or not in the 
 fcholaftick difputes with us, they are not tainted 
 
 with
 
 ( -75 ) 
 
 -with atheifm, the great political evil .of the time. 
 I hope I need not apologize for this phrafe, as if 
 I thought religion nothing but policy ; it is far from 
 my thoughts ; and I hope it is not to be inferred 
 .from my expreflions. But in the light of policy 
 alone I am here confidering the queftion. I fpeak 
 of policy too in a large light ; in which large light, 
 policy too is a facred thing. 
 
 There are many, perhaps half a million or more, 
 calling themfelves proteftants, in the fouth of 
 France, and in other of the provinces. Some 
 raife them to a much greater number, but I think 
 this nearer to the mark. I am forry to fay, that 
 they have behaved mockingly fmce the very be- 
 ginning of this rebellion, and have been uniformly 
 concerned in its worft and mofl atrocious acts. 
 Their Clergy are juft the fame atheifts with thofe 
 of the Conftitutional catholicks ; but ftill more 
 wicked and daring. Three of their number have 
 met, from their Republican aflbciates, the reward 
 of their crimes. 
 
 As the antient catholick religion is to be reftored 
 for the body of France, the antient calviniftick 
 religion ought to be reftored for the proteflants 
 with every kind of protection and privilege. But 
 not one Miniiler concerned in this rebellion ought 
 to be fufrered arnongft them. If they have not- 
 
 Clergy
 
 C 7 > 
 
 Clergy of their own, men well recommended as 
 untainted with Jacobinifm, by the fynods of thofe 
 places where calvinifm prevails and French is 
 fpoken, ought to be fought. Many fuch there are. 
 The prefbyterian difcipline ought, in my opinion,' 
 to be eftablilhed in its vigour, and the people pro- ] 
 felling it ought to be bound to its maintenance. 
 No man, under the falfe and hypocritical pretence 
 of liberty of conference, ought to be fuffered to 
 have no confcience at all. The King's com- ] 
 mifiioner ought alfo to fit in their fynods as before 
 the revocation of the Edict of Nantz. I am con- 
 fcious, that this difcipline difpofcs men to Repub- 
 licanifm : but it is ftill a difcipline, and it is a cure, 
 (fuch as it is) for the perverfe and undifciplined 
 habits which for fome time have prevailed. Re- ' 
 publicanifm repreffed may have its ufe in the com- 
 polition of a State. Inipe&ton may be practicable, 
 and reiponfibility in the teachers and elders may be 
 eftabliihed in fuch an Hierarchy as the prefbyterian. 
 For a time like ours, it is a great point gained, 
 that people fhould be taught to meet, to combine, 
 and to be clail.ed and arrayed in fome other way 
 than in Clubs of Jacobins. If it be not the bcft 
 mode of proteftantifm under a Monarchy, it is 
 flill an orderly chriflian church, orthodox in the 
 fundamentals, and what is to our point, capable 
 enough of rendering men uleful citizens. It was 
 the impolitick Abolition of their difcipiine which 
 
 expofed
 
 ( '77 ) 
 
 cxpofed them to the wild opinions and conduct, 
 that have prevailed amongft the Hugonots. The 
 toleration in 1787 was owing to the good dilpo- 
 fition of the late King ; but it was modified by the 
 profligate folly of his atheiftick Miniiter the Cardinal 
 de Lomenie. This mifchievous Minifter did not 
 follow, in the Edi<5t of toleration, the wifdom of 
 the Edict of Nantz. But his toleration was granted 
 to Non-Catbolicks a dangerous word, which might 
 fignify any thing, and was but too exprefllve of a 
 fatal indifference with regard to all piety. I fpeak 
 for myfelf : I do not wilh any man to be converted 
 from his feet. The diftinctions which we have 
 reformed from animofity to emulation, may be 
 even ufeful to the caufe of religion. By fome 
 moderate contention they keep alive zeal. Whereas 
 people who change, except under ftrong convic- 
 tion (a thing now rather rare) the religion of their 
 early prejudices, efpeciaily if the converfion is 
 brought about by any political machine, are very 
 apt to degenerate into indifference, laxity, and 
 often downright atheifm. 
 
 Another political queftion arifes about the mode 
 of Government which ought to be eftablifhed. 
 I think the proclamation (which I read before I 
 had proceeded far in this Memorial,) puts it on 
 the beft footing, by poflponing that arrangement 
 to a time of peace. 
 
 A a When
 
 When our politicks lead us to entcrprizc a great, 
 nd almoft total political revolution in Europe, we 
 ought to look ferioufly into the confequences of 
 what we are about to do. Some eminent peribns 
 difcover an apprehenfion that the Monarchy, if 
 refrored in France, may be reftored in too great 
 ftrength for the liberty and happinefs of the natives, 
 and for the tranquillity of other States. They are 
 therefore of opinion that terms ought to be made 
 for the modification of that Monarchy. They are 
 perfons too configurable from the powers of their 
 mind, and from their fituation, as well as from the 
 real refpect I have for them, who feem to entertain 
 thefe apprehenfions, to let me pafs them by un- 
 noticed. 
 
 As to the power of France, as a State, and in 
 its exteriour relations, I confefs my frars are on the 
 part of its extreme reduction. There is un- 
 doubtedly fomething in the vicinity of France, 
 which makes it naturally and properly an objedl of 
 our watchfulnefs and jealoufy, whatever form its 
 Government may take. But the difference is great 
 between a plan for our own fecurity, and a fcheme 
 for the utter deftruction of France. If there were 
 no other countries in the political map but thefe 
 two, I admit that policy might juftify a wifh to 
 lower our neighbour to a ftandard which would 
 even render her in fonie meafure, if not wholly, 
 
 our
 
 i 179 ) 
 
 our dependent. But the iyftem of Europe is- ex* 
 tenfive and extremely complex. However formi- 
 dable to us as taken in this one relation, France is 
 not equally dreadful to all other States. On the 
 contrary, my clear opinion is, that the Liberties 
 of Europe cannot pofllbly be preferved, but by 
 her remaining a very great and preponderating 
 power. The defign at prefent evidently purfued 
 by the combined Potentates, or of the two who 
 lead, is totally to deftroy her as fuch a Power. 
 For Great Britain refolves that ihe fhall have no 
 Colonies, no Commerce, and no Marine. Auftria 
 means to take away the whole frontier from the 
 borders of Switzerland, to Dunkirk. It is their 
 plan alfo to render the interiour Government lax and 
 feeble, by prefcribing by force of the arms of rival 
 and jealous nations, and without confulting the 
 natural interefts of the kingdom; fuch arrange- 
 ments as in the aftual ftate of Jacobinifm in France, 
 and the unfettled ftate in which property muft re- 
 main for a long time, will inevitably produce fuch 
 diftra&ion and debility in Government, as to reduce 
 it to nothing, or to throw it back into its old con- 
 fufion. One cannot conceive fo frightful a ftate 
 of a Nation. A maritime country, without a ma- 
 rine, and without commerce $ a continental country 
 without a frontier, and for a thoufand miles iur- 
 rounded with powerful, warlike, and ambitious 
 neighbours ! It is pofiible, that fhe might fubmic 
 A a 2 to
 
 ( xo ) 
 
 to lofc her commerce and her colonies ; her 
 fecurity me never can abandon. If, contrary to 
 all expectations, under fuch a difgraced and im- 
 potent Government, any energy mould remain in 
 that country, me will make every effort to recover 
 her fecurity, which will involve Europe for a cen- 
 tury in war and blood. What has it coft to France 
 to make that frontier ? What will it coft to re- 
 cover it ? Auftria thinks that without a Frontier 
 me cannot fecure the Netherlands. But without 
 her Frontier France cannot fecure berfelf. Auftria 
 has been however fecure for an hundred years in 
 thofe very Netherlands, and has never been difpof- 
 fefied of them by the chance of war, without a 
 moral certainty of receiving them again on the 
 reftoration of peace. Her late dangers have arifcn 
 not from the power or ambition of the King of 
 France. They arofe from her own ill policy, 
 which difmantled all her towns, and difcontented 
 all her fubjects by Jacobinical innovations. She 
 difmantles her own towns, and then fays, Give 
 me the Frontier of France. But let us depend 
 upon it, whatever tends, under the name of fear- 
 rity, to aggrandize Auftria, will difcontent and 
 alarm Prufiia. Such a length of Frontier on the 
 fide of France, fcparated from itfelf, and fepa-, 
 rated from the mafs of the Auftrian country, will 
 be weak, unlefs connected at the expence of the 
 Rleftor of Bavaria (the Elector Palatine) and 
 
 othej 1
 
 other lefler Princes, or by fuch exchanges as will 
 again convulfe the Empire. 
 
 Take it the other way, and let us fuppofe that 
 France fo broken in fpirit as to be content to re- 
 main naked and defencelefs by fea and by land, 
 is fuch a country no prey ? Have other Nations 
 no views ? Is Poland the only country of which 
 it is worth while to make a partition ? We cannot 
 be fo childifh as to imagine, that ambition is local, 
 and that no others can be infected with it but thole 
 who rule within certain parallels of latitude and 
 longitude ? In this way I hold war equally certain. 
 But I can conceive that both thefe principles may 
 operate, ambition on the part of Auftria, to cut 
 more and more from France, and French impa- 
 tience under her degraded and unfafe condition. 
 In fuch a Conteft will the other Powers ftand by ? 
 Will not Pruffia call for indemnity as well as Auftria 
 and England ? Is me fatisfied with her gains in 
 Poland ? By no means. Germany mud pay; or 
 we mail infallibly fee Pruffia leagued with France 
 and Spain, and poflibly with other Powers for the 
 reduction of Auftria ; and fuch may be the fitua- 
 rion of things, that it will not be fo eafy to decide 
 what part England may take in fuch a Conteft. 
 
 I am well aware how invidious a tafk it is to 
 
 c-ppofe any thing which tends to the apparent 
 
 4 aggrandize-
 
 ( 182 ) 
 
 aggrandizement of our own country. But I think 
 no country can be aggrandized whilft France is 
 Jacobinifed. This poll removed, it will be a 
 ferious queftion how far her further reduction will 
 contribute to the general fafety which 1 always con- 
 fider as included. Among precautions againfl am- 
 bition, it may not be amifs to take one precaution 
 againft our o^n. I muft fairly fay, I dread our 
 own power and pur own ambition; I dread our 
 being too much dreaded. It is ridiculous to fay 
 we are not men ; and that, as men, we mall never 
 wim to aggrandize ourfelves in fome way or other. 
 Can we fay, that even at this very hour we are not 
 invidioufly aggrandized ? We are already in pof- 
 feffion of almoft all the commerce of the world. 
 Our Empire in India is an awful thing. If we 
 mould come to be in a condition not only to have 
 all this afcendant in commerce, but to be abfo- 
 lutely able, without the lead controul> to hold the 
 commerce of all other Nations totally dependent 
 upon our good pleafure, we may fay that we mall 
 not abufe this aftonifhing, and hitherto unheard 
 of power. But every other Nation will think we 
 mall abufe it. It is impoflible but that fooner or 
 later, this ftate of things muft produce a com- 
 bination againft us which may end in our ruin. 
 
 As to France, I muft obferve that for a long 
 time flie has been ftationary. She has, during this 
 
 whole 

 
 whole century, obtained far lefs by conqueft or 
 negotiation than any of the three grear continental 
 Powers. Some part of Lorraine excepted, I re- 
 collect nothing fhe has gained -, no not a village. 
 In truth, this Lorraine acquifition does little more 
 than fccure her Barrier. In effect and fubftance it 
 was her own before. 
 
 However that may be, I confider thefe things at 
 prefent chiefly in one point of view, as obstructions 
 to the war on Jacobinifm, which mufl Hand as long 
 as the Powers think its extirpation but zjecondary 
 object, and think of taking advantage under the 
 name of indemnity andfecurify to make war upon 
 the whole Nation of France Royal, and Jacobin, 
 for the aggrandizement of the Allies on the ordi- 
 nary principles of intereft, as if no Jacobinifm 
 exifted in the world. 
 
 So far is France from being formidable to its 
 neighbours for its domeftick ftrength, that I conceive 
 it will be as much as all its neighbours can do by a 
 fceady guarantee, to keep that Monarchy at all 
 jpon its bafis. It will be their bufinefs to nnrfe 
 France, not to exhauft it. France, fuch as it is, 
 s indeed highly formidable. Not formidable, 
 however, as a great Republick ; but as the moft 
 dreadful gang of robbers and murderers that ever 
 was embodied. But this diftempered ftrength of 
 
 France,
 
 ( '84 ) 
 
 France, will be the caufe of proportionable weak- 
 nefs on its recovery. Never was a country fo com- 
 pletely ruined j and they who calculate the refur- 
 reftion of her power by former examples, have not 
 fufficiently confidered what is the prefent ftate 
 of things. Without detailing the inventory of 
 what organs of Government have been deftroyed, 
 together with the very materials of which alone 
 they can be recompofed, I wifh it to be confidered 
 what an operofe affair the whole fyftem of taxa-r 
 tion is in the old ftates of Europe. It is fuch as 
 never could be made but in a long courfe of years. 
 In France, all taxes are abolilhed. The prefent 
 powers refort to the capital ; and to the capital in 
 kind. But a favage undifcipljned people fuffer a 
 robbery with more patience than an iwpoft. The 
 former is in their habits and their difpofitions. 
 They confider it as tranfient, and as what, in their 
 turn, they may exercife. But the terrours of the 
 prefent power are fuch as no regular Government 
 can pofiibly employ. They who enter into France 
 do not fucceed to their refources. They have not 
 a fyftem to reform, but a fyftem to begin. The 
 whole eftate of Government is to be re-acquired. 
 
 What difficulties this will meet with in a coun- 
 try exhaufted by the taking of the capital, and 
 among a people, in a manner new principled, 
 trained, and actually difciplined to anarchy, rebel- 
 lion,
 
 lion, diforder, and impiety, may be conceived by 
 thofe who know what Jacobin France is, and who 
 may have occupied themfelves by revolving in 
 their thoughts, what they were to do if it fell to 
 their lot to rc-eftablifh the affairs of France. 
 What fupport, or what limitations the reftored 
 Monarchy muft have, may be a doubt, or how i: 
 will pitch and fettle at laft : But one thing I con- 
 ceive to be far beyond a doubt : that the fettle- 
 ment cannot be immediate -, but that it muft be 
 preceded by fome fort of power, equal at leafl in 
 vigour, vigilance, promptitude and decifion to a 
 military Government. For fuch a preparatory 
 Government, no flow-paced, methodical, formal, 
 Lawyer-like fyilem, ftill lefs that of a fhewy, 
 fuperfkial,trifling, intriguing Court, guided by cabals 
 of ladies, or of men like ladies ; leaft of all, a philo- 
 fophic, theoretic, difputatious fchool of fophiftry. 
 None of thefe ever will, or ever can lay the foun- 
 dations of an order that can laft. Whoever claims 
 a right by birth to govern there, muft find in his 
 breaft, or muft conjure up in it, an energy not to 
 be expected, perhaps not always to be wifhed for, 
 in well ordered States. The lawful Prince muft 
 have, in every thing but crime, the character of 
 an ufurper. He is gone, if he imagines himfelf 
 the quiet pofiefibr of a throne. He is to contend 
 for it as much after an apparent conqueft as before. 
 His talk is to win it 5 he muft leave poftcrity to 
 B b enjoy
 
 enjoy and to adorn it. No velvet cufhions for 
 him. He is to be always (I fpeak nearly to the 
 letter) on horlcback. This opinion is the refult 
 of much patient thinking on the fubject, which I 
 conceive no event is likely to alrer. 
 
 A valuable friend of mine, who I hope will con- 
 duct thefe afrairs fo far as they fall to his fhare, 
 with great ability, aiked me what I thought of acts 
 of general indemnity and oblivion, as a means of 
 fettling France, and reconciling it to Monarchy. 
 Before I venture upon any opinion of my own in 
 this matter, I totally difclaim the interference of 
 foreign powers in a buunefs that properly be- 
 longs to the Government which we have declared 
 legal. That Government is likely to be the bed 
 
 .judge of what is to be done towards the fecurity 
 of that kingdom, which it is their duty and their 
 intereft to provide for by fuch meafures of juftice 
 or of lenity, as- at the time they mould find beft. 
 But if we weaken it, not only by arbitrary limita- 
 tions of our own, but prelerve fuch peribns in it 
 as are difpofcd to difturb its future peace, as they 
 
 - have its paft, I do not know how a mere direct 
 
 ' declaration can be made of a difpofition to per- 
 petual hoftility againft a Government. The per- 
 
 ; ions Caved from the juftice of the native Magii- 
 trate, by foreign authority, will owe nothing to his 
 
 , clemency. He will, and muft, look to thole .to 
 3 whom
 
 ( 1*7 ) 
 
 whom he is indebted for the power he has of dif- 
 penfing it. A Jacobin faction, conftantly fettered 
 with the nourifhment of foreign protection, will be 
 kept alive. 
 
 This defire of fecuring the fafety of the actors 
 in the prefent fccne is owing to more laudable 
 motives. Minifters have been made to confider 
 the brothers of the late merciful King, and the 
 Nobility of France, who have been faithful to 
 their honor and duty, as a fet of inexorable and 
 remorfeleis tyrants. How this notion has been 
 infufed into them, I cannot be quite certain. I am 
 fure it is not juftified by any thing they have done. 
 Never were the two Princes guilty, in the day of 
 their power, of a fingle hard or ill-natured act. 
 No one inftance of cruelty on the part of the Gen- 
 tlemen ever came to my ears. It is true that the 
 Englijh Jacobins, (the natives have not thought of 
 it) as an excufe for their infernal fyftem of mur- 
 der, have lo reprefented them. It is on this prin.- 
 ciple that the maflacres in the month of Sep- 
 tember 1792 were juftified by a writer in the 
 Morning Chronicle. He fays, indeed, that " the 
 whole French nation is to be given up to the hands 
 of an irritated and revengeful Noblefie :" and 
 judging of others by himfeif and his brethren, lie 
 fays, "Whoever fucceeds in a civil war, will be 
 cruel. But here -the emigrants flying to revenge 
 B b 2 in
 
 in the cars of military victory, will almoft infatiAbhr 
 call for their victims and their booty ; and a body 
 of emigrant traitors were attending the King of 
 Pruflla, and the Duke of Brunfwick, to fuggeft 
 the moft fanguinary counfels." So fays this wicked 
 Jacobin ; but fo cannot fay the King of Prultia nor 
 the Duke of Brunfwick, who never did receive 
 any fanguinary council ; nor did the King's bro- 
 thers, or that great body of Gentlemen who at- 
 tended thofe Princes, commit one fmgle cruel ac- 
 tion, or hurt the perfon or property of one indi- 
 vidual. It would be right to quote the inftance. 
 It is like the military luxury attributed to thefc 
 unfortunate fuffeirers in our common caufe. 
 
 If thefe Princes had Ihewn a tyrannic difpofition^ 
 it would be much to be lamented. We have no 
 others to govern France. If we fcreened the body 
 of murderers from their juftice, we mould only 
 leave the innocent in future to the mercy of men 
 cf fierce and fanguinary difpofitions, of which in 
 fpite of all our intermeddling in their Conftitution, 
 v/e could not prevent the effects. But as we have 
 much more reafon to fear their feeble lenity than 
 any blameable rigour, we ought, in my opinion, to 
 leave the matter to themfelves. 
 
 If however I were afked to give an advice 
 merely as fuch here are my ideas. I am not for 
 
 a total
 
 a total indemnity, nor a general punifhrr.ent. And 
 firft, the body and mafs of the people never ought 
 to be treated as criminal. They may become an 
 object of more or lefs conftant watchfulnefs and 
 fufpicion, as their prefervation may beft require, 
 but they can never become an object of punifh- 
 ment. This is one of the few fundamental and 
 unalterable principles of politicks. 
 
 To punifli them capitally would be to make 
 maflacres. MafTacres only increafe the ferocity 
 of men, and teach them to regard their own lives 
 and thofe of others as of little value ; whereas the 
 great policy of Government is to teach the people 
 to think both of great importance in the eyes of 
 God and the State, and never to be facrificed or 
 even hazarded to gratify their pafiions, or for any 
 thing but the duties prefcribed by the rules of 
 morality, and under the direction of public law 
 and public authority. To punilh them with letter 
 penalties would be to debilitate the commonwealth, 
 and make the nation miferable, which it is the 
 bufmefs of Government to render happy and flou- 
 riftiing. 
 
 As to crimes too, I would draw a flrong line of 
 limitation. For no one offence, politically an offence 
 cf rebellion, by council, contrivance, perfuafion 
 or compulfion, for none properly a military offence of 
 
 rebellion^
 
 rebellion, or any thing done by open hoftility in 
 the field, fhould any man at all be called in quef- 
 lionj becaufc fuch feems to be the proper and 
 natural death of civil difientions. The offences 
 of war are obliterated by peace. 
 
 . Another clafs will of courfe be included in the 
 indemnity, namely, all thofe who by their activity 
 in reftoring lawful Government fhall obliterate 
 their offences. The offence previoufly known, 
 the acceptance of fervice is a pardon for crimes. 
 I fear that this clafs of men will not be very nu- 
 merous. 
 
 So far as to indemnity. But where are the 
 objects of juftice, and of example, and of future 
 fecurity to the public peace ? They are naturally 
 pointed out, not by their having outraged political 
 and civil laws, nor their having rebelled againft 
 the ftate, as a State, but by their having rebelled 
 againft the law of nature, and outraged man, 
 as man. In this lift, all the regicides in general, 
 all thofe who laid facriiegious hands on the King, 
 who without any thing in their own rebellious 
 million to the convention to juftify them, brought 
 him to his trial and unanimoufly voted him guilty ; 
 all thofe who had a (hare in the cruel murder of 
 the Queen, and the deteftable proceedings with 
 regard to the young King, and the unhappy Prin- 
 ce fie s
 
 cefles ; all thofe who committed cold-blooded 
 murder any where, and particularly in their revo- 
 lutionary tribunals, where every idea of natural 
 juftice and of their own declared Rights of Man, 
 have been trod under foot with the moft infolent 
 mockery , all men concerned in the burning and 
 demolition of houfes or churches, with audacious 
 and marked acts of facrilege and fcorns offered to 
 religion ; in general, all the leaders of Jacobin 
 Clubs j not one of thefe mould efcape a punifh- 
 ment fuitable to the nature, quality and degree of 
 their offence, by a fteady but a meafured juftice. 
 
 In the firft place, no man ought to be fubjecl to 
 any penalty, from the higheft to the loweil, but 
 by a trial according to the courfe of law, carried 
 on with all that caution and deliberation which has 
 been ufed in the beft times and precedents of the 
 French jurifprudence, the criminal law of which 
 country, faulty to be lure in fome particulars, was 
 highly laudable and tender of the lives of men. 
 In reftoring order and juftice, every thing like re- 
 taliation, ought to be religioufly avoided ; and an 
 example ought to be fet of a total alienation from 
 the Jacobin proceedings in their accurfed revolu- 
 tionary tribunals. Every thing like lumping men in 
 maiTes, and of forming tables, of profcription 
 eught to be avoided.
 
 : 
 
 ( '9* ) 
 
 In all thefe punilhments, any thing which can 
 be alledged in mitigation of the offence fhould 
 be fully confidcred. Mercy is not a thing oppofed 
 to juftice. It is an erTential part of it , as neceffary 
 in criminal cafes, as in civil affairs equity is to law. 
 It is only for the Jacobins never to pardon. They 
 have not done it in a fmgle inftance. A council 
 of mercy ought therefore to be appointed, with 
 powers to report on each cafe, to foften the 
 penalty, or entirely to remit it, according to cir- 
 cumftances. 
 
 With thefe precautions, the very firft founda- 
 tion of fettlement muft be to call to a ftricl: 
 account thofe bloody and mercilefs offenders. With- 
 out it Government cannot frand a year. People 
 little confider the utter impofiibility of getting thofc 
 who having emerged from very low, feme from the 
 loweft claflfes, of fociety, have exercifed a power fo 
 high, and with fuch unrelenting and bloody a rage, 
 quietly to fall back into their old ranks, and be- 
 come humble, peaceable, laborious and ufeful 
 members of fociety. It never can be. On the 
 other hand is it to be believed, that any worthy 
 and virtuous fubjecl, reftored to the ruins of his 
 houfe, will with patience fee the cold-blooded 
 murderer of his.father, mother, wife, or children, 
 or perhaps all of the/e relations (fuch things have 
 been) nofc him in his own village, and infult him 
 
 with
 
 ( '93 ) 
 
 with the riches acquired from the plunder of his 
 goods, ready again to head a Jacobin Faction 
 to attack his life ? He is unworthy of the name of 
 man who would fuffcr it. It is unworthy of the 
 name of a Government, which taking juftice out 
 of the private hand, will not exercife it for the 
 injured by the public arm. 
 
 I know it founds plaufible, and is readily adopted 
 by thofe who have little fympathy with the fuffer- 
 ings of others, to wifli to jumble the innocent and 
 guilty into one mafs, by a general indemnity. 
 This cruel indifference dignities itfelf with the. 
 name of humanity. 
 
 It is extraordinary that as the wicked arts of this 
 regicide and tyrannous faction increafe in number, 
 variety, and atrocity, the defire of punifhing them 
 becomes more and more faint, and the talk of a/i 
 indemnity towards them, every day flronger and 
 flronger. Our ideas of juftice appear to be fairly 
 conquered and overpowered by guilt when it is 
 grown gigantick. It is not the point of view in 
 which we are in the habit of viewing guilt. The 
 crimes we every day puni'h are really below the 
 penalties we inflict. The criminals are obfcure 
 and feeble. This is the view in which we lee or- 
 dinary crimes and criminals. But wh:n guilt is 
 feen, though but for a time, to be furnimed with 
 C c the
 
 C '94 ) 
 
 the arms and to be invefted with the robes of 
 power, it feems to aflume another nature, and to 
 get, as it were, out of our jurifdidtion. This I 
 fear is the cafe with many. But there is another 
 caufe full as powerful towards this fecurity to enor- 
 mous guilt, the defire which poficffes people who 
 have once obtained power, to enjoy it at their eafe. 
 It is not humanity, but lazinefs and inertnefs of 
 mind which produces the defire of this kind of in- 
 demnities. This defcription of men love general 
 and fhort methods. If they punifh, they make a 
 promifcuous maffacre ; If they fpare, they make a 
 general act of oblivion. This is a want of difpofi- 
 tion to proceed laborioufly according to the cafes, 
 and according to the rules and principles of juftice 
 on each cafe ; a want of difpofition to aflbrt criminals, 
 to difcriminate the degrees and modes of guilt, to 
 feparate accomplices from principals, leaders from 
 followers, feducers from the fcduced, and then by 
 following the fame principles in the fame detail, to 
 clafs punifhments, and to fit them to the nature 
 and kind of the delinquency. If that were once 
 attempted, \ve fLould tbow fee that the talk was 
 i.cither infinite, nor the execution cruel. There 
 would be deaths, but for the number of criminals, 
 and the extent of France, not many. There would 
 be cafes of iranfportation -, cafes of labour to re - 
 ilore what has been wickedly deflroyed ; caies of 
 JmpriibnHient, and cafes of mere exile. But be 
 6 this
 
 this as it may, I am fure that if juftice is not done 
 there, there can be neither peace or juftice there, 
 nor in any part of Europe. 
 
 Hiftory is reforted to for other acts of indem- 
 nity in other times. The Princes are delired 
 to look back to Henry the Fourth. We are 
 defired to look to the Reiteration of King 
 Charles. Thefe things, in my opinion, have 
 no refemblance whatsoever. They were cafes of 
 a civil war; in France more ferocious, in Eng- 
 land more moderate than common. In neither 
 country were the orders of fociety fubvertcd; 
 religion and morality deftroyed on principle, or 
 property totally annihilated. In England the Go- 
 vernment of Cromwell was to be fure fomewhat 
 rigid, but for a new power, no favage tyranny. 
 The country was nearly as well in his hands 
 as in thofe of Charles the Second, and in fome 
 points much better. The laws in general had 
 their' courfe, and were admirably administered. 
 The King did not in reality grant an aft of in- 
 demnity ; the prevailing power, then in a manner 
 the nation, in effect granted an indemnity to him. 
 The idea of a preceding Rebellion was-'not at all 
 admitted in that convention and that -parliament. 
 The Regicides were a common enemy, and as 
 fuch given up. 
 
 C c 2 Among
 
 Among the ornaments of their place which emi- 
 nently diftinguifh them,, few people are better 
 acquainted with the hi (lory cf their own country 
 than the illuftrious Princes, now in exile: but I 
 caution them not to be led into errour by that which 
 has been fuppofed to be the guide of life. I would 
 give the fame caution to all Princes. Not that I 
 derogate from the ufe of hiflory. It is a great im- 
 prover of the underftaruiing, by fhewing both men 
 and affairs in a great variety of views. From this 
 fource much political wifdom may be learned; that 
 is, may be learned as habit, not as precept ; and as 
 an exercife to ftrengthen the mind, as furniming 
 materials to enlarge and enrich it, not as a repertory 
 of cafes and precedents for a lawyer : if it were, a 
 thoufand times better would it be that a Statefman 
 had never learned to read vellem mjctrent lit eras. 
 This method turns their underftanding from the 
 object before them, and from the prefent exigencies 
 of the world, to companions with former times, of 
 which after all, we can know very little and very 
 imperfectly ; and our guides, the hiflorians, who are 
 to give ::: iheir true interpretation, are often preju- 
 diced, often ignorant, often fonder of fyftem than of 
 truth. Whereas if a man with reafonable good 
 parts and natural fagacity, and not in the leading- 
 firings of any m after, will look fleadily on the 
 bufmefs before him, without being diverted by 
 retrofped and comparifon, he may be capable of 
 
 forming
 
 ( '97 ) 
 
 forming a reafonable good judgment of what is to 
 be done. There are fome fundamental points in 
 which nature never changes but they are few and 
 obvious, and belong rather to morals than to poli- 
 ticks. But fo far as regards political matter, the 
 human mind and human affairs are fufceptible of 
 infinite modifications, and of combinations wholly 
 new and unlooked for. Very few, for inftance, 
 could have imagined that property, which has been 
 taken for natural dominion, mould, through the 
 whole of a vaft kingdom, lofe all its importance 
 and even its influence. This is what hiftory or 
 books of fpeculation could hardly have taught us. 
 How many could have thought, that the molt com- 
 plete and formidable Revolution in a great empire 
 Ihould be made by men of letters, not as fubordi- 
 nate inftruments and trumpeters of fedition, but as 
 the chief contrivers and managers, and in a fhort 
 time as the open adminiftrators and ibvereign 
 Rulers ? Who could have imagined that Atheifm 
 could produce one of the moft violently operative 
 principles of fanaticifm ? Who could have ima- 
 gined that, in a Commonwealth in a manner 
 cradled in war, and in an extern! ve and dreadful 
 war, military commanders mould be of little or no 
 account ? That the Convention ihould not contain 
 one military man of name ? That administrative 
 bodies in a flate of the utmoft confufion, and of 
 but a momentary duration, and compofed of men 
 
 with
 
 with not one impofing part of character, ihould be 
 able to govern the country and its armies, with an 
 authority which the moll fettled Senates, and the 
 moft refpecled Monarchs fcarcely ever had in the 
 lame degree ? This, for one, I confefs I did not 
 forefee, though all the reft was prefent to rne very 
 early, and not out of my apprehenfion even for 
 leveral years. 
 
 I believe very few were able to enter into the 
 effects of mere terrour, as a principle not only for 
 the fupport of power in given hands or forms, but 
 in thofe things in which the foundeft political Spe- 
 culators were of opinion, that the leaft appearance 
 of force would be totally deftrucliive, fuch is the 
 the market, whether of money, provifion, or com- 
 modities of any kind. Yet for four years we have 
 ieen loans made, treafuries fupplied, and armies 
 levied and maintained, more numerous than France 
 ever fhewed in the field, by the effetts of fear alone. 
 
 Here is a ftate of things of which, in its totality, 
 if hiftory furnifhes any examples at all, they are very 
 remote and feeble. I therefore am not fo ready as 
 fome are, to tax with folly or cowardice, thofe who 
 were not prepared to meet an evil of this nature. 
 Even now, after the events, all the caufes may be 
 fbmewhat difficult to afcertain. Very many are 
 however traceable. But thefe things hiftory and 
 
 books
 
 ( '99 ) 
 
 books of {peculation (as I have already faid) did 
 not teach men to forefce, and of courfe to refill. 
 Now that they are no longer a matter of fagacity, 
 but of experience, of recent experience, of our 
 own experience, it would be unjuftifiable to go 
 back to the records of other times, to inftruft us 
 to manage what they never enabled us to forelee. 
 
 APPENDIX.
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 EXTRACTS from VATFEL\ LAW of NATIONS. 
 
 [The Titles, marginal Abftracls and Notes, are by Mr. BURKE, 
 excepting fuch of the Notes as are here diftinguifhed.] - 
 
 CASES OF INTERFERENCE WITH INDE- 
 PENDENT POWERS. 
 
 BOOK II. CHAP. IV. 53. 
 
 IF then there is any where a Nation of a rejilefs and 
 mrfchitvous difpofition, always ready to injure others^ 
 to traverfe their defigns, and to raife dome/lie troubles *, 
 .it is not to be doubted, that all have a right to join in 
 order to reprefi) chajiife, and put it ever after out of its 
 power to injure them. Such ihould be the juft fruits of 
 the policy which Machiavel praifes in Caefar Borgia. 
 The conduit followed by Philip II. king of Spain, was 
 adapted to unite all Europe again/I him ; and it was from 
 juft reafons that Henry the Great formed the defign of 
 humbling a power, formidable by its forces^ and pernicious 
 ly its maxims. 
 
 70. Let us apply to the unjuft, what we have faid 
 above ( 53), of a mifchievous, or maleficent Nation. 
 If there be any that makes an open profeffion of trampling 
 'Jujlice under foot^ pf defyifing and violating the right of 
 
 * This the cafe of France Semonville at Turin Jacobin clubs 
 ~Liegois meeting Flemiih meeting La Fayette's aniwer Cloot's's 
 embaily Avignoiv, 
 
 D d 'others,
 
 atktn *, whenever it finds an opportunity, tbi iniercft of 
 human fociety will authorize all others to unite, in order ia 
 humble and cbajtife it. We do not here forget the maxim 
 ettabliihed in our preliminaries, that it docs not belong to 
 nations to uiurp the power of being judges of each other. 
 In particular cafes, liable to the lea'lt doubt, it ought to 
 be iuppofed, that each of the parties may have fome right : 
 and the injuilice of that, which has committed the injury, 
 may proceed from error, and not from a general contempt 
 of juilice. But if, by conjlant maxims, and ly a continued 
 conlut.l, one Nations {hews, that it has evidently this per- 
 nidous"di{pdfitioh, and that it cbnfiders no right as ("acred, 
 the fafety of the human Race requires that it mould be 
 fuppreflcd. To form and fupport an unjuft pretenfion, is 
 to do ah injury not only to hbn ivJ-o is Interefted in this 
 prcttnfion, but to mock at jujlice in general, and to injure 
 all Nations. 
 
 To fuccour 56. If the Prince, attacking the fundamental laws, 
 gainft gives his fubjecb a legal right to refift. him ; if Ty- 
 iyrny. ra nny, becoming infuppirtalk, obliges the Nation to rife 
 in their defence ; every foreign power has a right tf 
 fuccour an oppreikd people whp implore their afliftance. 
 The Englifh ' juftly complained of James the Second. 
 Cafe of The .fch'dity, and the nioj: dijYinguified Patriots, refolved 
 ts!i!li Re- to put a check on his enterprises, which manifeiily tended 
 voiucion. to overthrow the Conititution, and to deftroy the liberties ^ 
 and the religion of the people; and therefore applied tor 
 ajjyian^ to 'the United Provinces. The authority of the 
 jr/nnce of Orange had, doubtlels, an influence on the de- 
 liberations of the States-General-, but it did not make, 
 them commit injultice ; for when a people, from eood 
 reafons, take up arms againft an Oppreilbr, jaftite anj 
 gcnerofity require, that brave men Jhould he ajjijted in the 
 Cife of defence of their libf nits.. Whene\ r er, theretore, a civil 
 Civil War. war i s kj,^!^ ] n a fa^ foreign powers may.afliit that 
 party which appears to them to have juitice on their fide. 
 Aft baious He ic bo afiiji; an odisus Tyrant ; be iubo declares FOR AN". 
 
 Rebellious UNJUST AND REBELMOUi PEOPLE, offends againft his 
 
 people. duty. When the bajids of the political fociety are broken, 
 
 * The French acknowledge no power not direftiy enj^^ti 
 the ptcj.k.
 
 ATP END IX. 
 
 or at leaft fufpcnded between the Sovereign and his people, 
 they may then he considered as two diftmcl powers ; and * ' 
 fmce each is independent of all foreign authority, nobody ^en' 
 has a right to judge them. Either may be in the right ; diftirx9t 
 and each of thole who grant their afliirance may believe P ^' crt - 
 that he fupports a good caufe. It follows then, in virtue 
 of the voluntary Law of Nations, (fee Prelim. 2,1) that 
 the two parties may act as having an equal right, and 
 behave accordingly, till the decifion of the aftair. 
 
 But we ought not to abufe this maxim for authorizing ^etto .b* 
 odious proceedings againit the tranquility of {rates. It is purfued to 
 a violation of the Law of Nations to perfuade tbofefubjefts extreme. 
 to revolt ivbo aRnally obey their Sovereign, though they ioJ^t^l^ 
 complain of his Government, tw'p&i* to 
 
 The practice of Nations is conformable to our maxims. riVoic .- 
 When the German Proteftants came to the afuftance of 
 the reformed in France, the Court never undertook, to 
 treat them otherwife than as common enemies, and accord T 
 ing to the Laws of War. France at the fame time 
 afnfted the Netherlands, which took up arms againit 
 Spain, and did not pretend that her troops ihould be cun- 
 fidered upon any other footing than as auxiliaries in a 
 regular war. But no power avoids complaining of an Attempt ** 
 atrocious injury, if any one attempts by his em'rjfari'es to e *cit fb- 
 txdtc his fitfy'cl* to revolt. . . ^ to re ' 
 
 As to thofe Monfters who, under the title of Sovereigns, Tyrants, 
 render themfelves the Icourges and horror of the human 
 race; thefe are favage Beaits, from which every brave 
 man may juftly purge the Earth. All afitiquity kis praifed 
 Hercules for delivering the world from an Antzu?, 4 
 Bufiris, and a J>romedes. 
 
 Book 4. Chap. 2. 14. After ftating, that nations 
 have HO right to interfere in domeftick concerns, he pro- 
 ceeds " But this rule does not preclude them from 
 efpoufing the quarrel of a dethroned King, and afliiting 
 him, if he appears to have juilice on his fide. They 
 then declare themfelves enemies to the Nation who has 
 acknowledged his rival, as when two different Nations 
 are at war they are at liberty to alTilt that whole quarrcj 
 they think has the faireft appearance." 
 
 D d 2
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 CASE OF ALLIANCES. 
 
 BOOK II. CHAP. XII. 196. 
 
 IT is afked if that Alliance fubfifts with the King and 
 the Royal Family, when by fome Revolution they are 
 deprived of their Crown ? We have lately remarked, 
 ( 194) that a perfonal alliance expires with the reign 
 of him who contracted it : but that is to be underftood 
 of an alliance with the flate, limited as to its duration, 
 to the reign of the contracting King. This, of which 
 we are here fpeaking, is of another nature. For though 
 it binds the {late, iince it is bound by all the public acts 
 of its Sovereign, it is made directly in favour of the King 
 and his Family ; it would therefore be abfurd for it to 
 prefe'rve a" terminate at the moment when they have need of //, and 
 King takes a t an event agalnjl which it was made. Befide?, the King 
 KhT' does ^ Oes not 'J ^ n * s qu^ity merely by the lofs of his king- 
 not lofe his dom. * If he is gripped of it imjuftly by an Ufurper^ or 
 quality by by Rtbeli^ he preferves his' rights^ in the number of wrrfck 
 h^ kin* - f are ^' s a ^i ances - 
 
 * By the feventh Article of the Treaty of TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 
 between France, England, and Holland, figned at the Hague, in the 
 year 1717, it is ftipuicted, '' that if the kingdoms, countries, or 
 " provinces, of auy of the Allies, are diftxirbrd by inteitine quar- 
 ' rels, cr by rebellions, en account of the fa'id fuccej/ions, [the Pro- 
 ' tefbr.t fuccefi'on to the throne of Great Brita in, and the fucceflion 
 ' to the throne cf France, as fettled by the Treaty of Utrecht] 
 ' or under any other pretext -i^bc-ie'ver, the Ally thus in trouble 
 ' fhall have nil! right to demand cf his Allies the fuccours above - 
 ' mentioned ;" that is to fay, the fame fuccours as in the cafe of 
 an invafion from any foreign Power; 8000 foot and 2000 horfe to he 
 ftirnifhed by France or Ergjand, and 4.000 foot and icoo hprfe by 
 the States Genera!. 
 
 By the fourthArticIe of the Treaty of QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE, 
 between England, Frar.ce, Holland, and the Emperor of Germany, 
 fjgnfd in the Year TVI?, the contracting powers " pvomife and 
 41 oblige rhemtelves that thty will and ought to maintain, guarantee, 
 " and defend the right and fuccelfion to the kingdom of France, 
 " according to the tenor <;(' the Treaties made at Utrecht the jith 
 ' day of April, 171 } ; and this they fhall perform awi/'ft a'l ftr- 
 " fons T.-fratjbever tctc mny prffutne to tiiJJurb tbe order of tke Jatd 
 " fuccejjicn, in contradiiflion to the previous Ac~ts and Treaties fub- 
 f fequent thereon." 
 
 The al-ove Treaties have been revived and confirmed by every 
 fub.equent Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and France. 
 
 EDIT. 
 
 But
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 But who {hall judge, if the King be dethroned lawfully 
 or K- violence? An independent Nation acknowledges 
 no judge. If the Body of the Nation declares the King 
 deprived of hi^ rights by the abufe he has made of them, 
 and depofes him, it may juftly do it when its grievances 
 are well founded, and no other power has a right to cen- 
 fure it. The peribnal Ally of this King, ought not then 
 to afiift him againft the Nation that has made ufe of its 
 right in depofmg him : if he attempts it, he injures that 
 Nation. England declared war againft Louis the XlVth, 
 in the year 1688, for fupporting the intereft of James the 
 Second, who was depofed in form by the Nation. The 
 fame country declared war againft him a fecond time, at 
 the beginning of the prefent century, becaufe that Prince 
 acknowledged the fon of the depofed James, under the 
 name of James the Third. In doubtful cafes, and when Csfe 
 the Body of the Nation has not pronounced^ or HAS NOT wherein wd 
 PRONOUNCED FREELY, a Sovereign may naturally fup- m ''>' bc 
 port and defend an Ally, and it is then that the voluntary deAofed * 
 Law of Nations fubfifts between different ftates. The King, 
 party that has driven out the King, pretends to have right 
 on its fide : this unhappy King and his Ally, flatter them- 
 felves with having the fame advantage, and as they have 
 no common judge upon earth, they have no other method 
 
 to take but to apply to arms to terminate the difpute : 
 i_ i r ir -'.,-. * 
 
 they therefore engage in a formal war. 
 
 In fhort, when the foreign Prince has faithfully fulfilled 
 his engagements towards an unfortunate Monarch, when Not obliged 
 he has done in his defence, or to procure his reftoration, f ? P urfue 
 all he was obliged to perform, in virtue of the alliance ; yond'^a cer" 
 if his efforts are ineffectual, the dethroned Prince cannot tain point, 
 require him to fupport an endiefs war in his favour, or 
 expert that he will eternally remain the Enemy of the 
 Nation, or of the Sovereign who has deprived him of the 
 Throne. He muft think of peace, abandon the Ally, 
 and con/ider him as having himfelf abandoned his right, 
 through neceffity. Thus Louis XIV. was obliged to 
 abandon James the Second, rnd to acknowledge K. Wil- 
 liam, though he had at firft treated him as an Ufurper. 
 
 The fame queftion p relents itfelf in real alliances, and 
 in general, in all alliances made with the ftate, and not 
 in particular with a King for the defence of his perfon. 
 
 An
 
 fenc? 
 
 againft fub 
 
 APPEN'DIX. 
 
 de- -An Ally ought, doubtlefs, to be defended againft everv 
 invafion, againft every foreign violence, and even againft 
 his rebellious fubjetts \ in the fame manner a Republick 
 ought to be defended agamjl the enterprises, of one who at" 
 tt'mpts to deftroy the public liberty. But it ought to be re- 
 membered, that an Ally of the State, or the Nation, is 
 not its Judge. If the Nation has depofed its King in 
 form ; if the people of a Republick have driven out their 
 Magiftrates, and fet themfelves at liberty, or acknow- 
 ledged the authority of an Ufurper, either exprelsly or 
 tacitly; to oppofe thefe domeltick regulations, by dif- 
 puting their juilice or validity, would : e to interfere in 
 the Government of the Nation, and to do it an injury, 
 (fee 54, and following of this book). The Ally re- 
 mains the Ally of the State, notwithstanding the change 
 Caft where that has happened in it. However, when this change 
 real a*B- renders the alliance ufeufs, dangerous or difagreeablc, it 
 may renounce it : for it may fay, upon a good fcyrfl.ntnn, 
 that it would not have entered into an alliance with that 
 Nation, had it been under the prefent form of Government. 
 We may fay here, what we 'have laid on a perfonal 
 alliance: however juft the caufe of that King may be, 
 who is driven from the throne, either by his lubjccts or 
 by a foreign ufurper; his Allies are not obliged to fupport 
 an eternal ^var in his favour. After having made in- 
 effectual eflorts to reftore him, they muft at length give 
 peace to their people, and come to an accommodation 
 with the Ufurper, and for that purpofe treat with him as 
 with a lawful Sovereign. Louis XIV. exhaufted by a 
 bloody and unfuccefsful war, offered at Gertruidenburg to 
 abandon his grandfon, whom he had placed on the throne 
 of Spain : and when affairs had changed their appearance, 
 Charles of Auftria, the rival of Philip, law himfelf, in 
 his turn, abandoned by his Allies. They grew weary of 
 exhaufting their ftates, in order to give him the poffeffion 
 of a Crown, which they believed to be his due, but 
 which, to all appearance, they Ihould never be able to 
 procure for him, 
 
 ances may 
 fee re- 
 
 nounced. 
 
 Not an 
 
 DANGER-
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 DANGEROUS POWER. 
 
 BOOK, III. CHAP. III. 45. 
 
 IT is ft ill calier to prove, that (hould this formidable AH ntx> 
 Power betray any unjuft and ambitious difpofitions, by ma y X"*- 
 doing the leaft injuftice to another,, every Nation may 
 ayaJl themfelves of the occafion, and join their forces to 
 thoie of the party injured, in order to reduce that ambi- 
 tious Power, and dilable it from fo eaiily opprefling its 
 neighbours, or keeping them in continual awe and fear. 
 For an injury gives a Nation a right to provide for its 
 future fafety, by taking away from the violator the means 
 of oppreiTion. It is lawful, and even praife-worthy, to 
 aiftft thole who are oppreiTed, or unjuftly attacked. 
 
 SYSTEM OF EUROPE. 
 
 47. Europe forms a political fjftem, a body, whertf 
 the whole is connected by the relations and different in- 
 terefts of Nations inhabiting this part of the workl. It 
 is not, as anciently, a confufed heap of detached pieces, 
 each of which thought itfelf very little concerned in the 
 fate of others, and feldom regarded things which did im- 
 mediately relate to it. The continual attention of Sove- 
 reigns to what is on the carpet, the cpnftant reiidence of 
 minilters, and the perpetual, negotiations, make Europe a. Europe 
 kind of a Republic k i the members of which,, though in ^^ f ^ 
 pendent^ unitf, through the ties of common "intersjly 'for the..* t T e *f 
 maintenance of order and liberty. Hence- arofe that famous liberty, 
 icheme of the political equilibrium, or bajtrnqe of power i . 
 by which is underftood luch a difpofition of things, as no 
 power is able abiblutely to predominate, or to prelcriie 
 laws to others. 
 
 49. Confederacies would be A fure way of prefer.ving 
 the equilibrium, and fupporting the liberty of Nations* 
 did all Princes thoroughly underftand their true interefts, 
 and regulate all thw fej^s.-fer the good pf. the ftate. 
 
 CON.
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE ENEMY'S 
 COUNTRY. 
 
 BOOK III. CHAP. IX. 165. 
 
 INSTEAD of the pillage of the country, and defence- 
 lefs places, a cuftom has been fubftituted more humane 
 and more advantageous to the Sovereign making war : I 
 mean that of contributions. Whoever carries on a jttft 
 war *, has a right of making the enemy's country contribute' 
 to the fuppart of the army^ and towards defraying all the 
 charges of the war. Thus he obtains a part of what is 
 due to him, and the fubjects of the enemy, on fubmitting 
 to this impofition, are fecured from pillage, and the 
 country is preferved : but a general who would not fully 
 his reputation, is to moderate his contributions, and pro- 
 portion them to thofe on whom they are impoied. An 
 excels in this point, is not without the reproach of cruelty 
 and inhumanity : if it {hews lefs ferocity than ravage and 
 deduction, it glares with avarice. 
 
 ASYLUM. 
 
 BOOK I. CHAP. XIX. 232. 
 
 IF an exile or banilhed man is driven from his country 
 for any crime, it does not belong to the nation in whLh he 
 has taken refuge to punifh him for a fault committed in a 
 foreign country. For nature gives to mankind and to 
 nations the right of punifhing only for their defence and 
 fafety ; whence it follows that he can only be punifhed by 
 thofe whom he has offended. 
 
 . 233. But this reafon {hews, that if the juftice of 
 each nation ought in general to be confined to the punifh- 
 ment of crimes committed within its own territories, we 
 ought to except "from this rule the villains who, by the 
 quality and habitual" frequency of their crimes, violate all 
 
 * Contributions railed by the Duke of Bmnfwick in France. 
 Compare theie with the Contributions railed by the French in the 
 Netherlands. EDIT. 
 
 publick
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 public fecurity, and declare themfelves the enemies of tha 
 human race. Poifoners, affaflins, and incendiaries by pro- 
 feiEou, may be exterminated wherever they are feized ; for 
 they attack and injure all nations, by trampling under foot 
 the foundations of the common lafety. Thus pirates are 
 brought to the gibbet, by the firft into whofe hands they 
 fall. If the Sovereign of the country where thofe crimes 
 have been committed reclaims the authors of them, in order 
 to bring them to punifhment, they ought to be reftored to 
 him, as one who is principally interefted in punifhing them 
 in an exemplary manner : and it being proper to convict the 
 guilty, and to try them according to fome form of law ; this 
 is a fecond [not fole] reafon, why malefactors are ufually 
 delivered up at the defire of the ftate where their crimes 
 have been committed. 
 
 Ibid. 230. Every nation has a right of refufmg to 
 admit a Granger into the country, when he cannot enter 
 into it without putting it into evident danger, or without 
 doing it a remarkable prejudice *. 
 
 FOREIGN MINISTERS. 
 
 BOOK. IV. CHAP. 5. 66. 
 
 THE obligation does not go fo far as to fuffer at all 
 times, perpetual Minifters, who 'are deiirous of reiiding 
 with a Sovereign, though they have nothing to negociate. 
 It is natural, indeed, and very agreeable to the fentiments 
 which nations owe to each other, that thefe refident Mi- 
 nifters, when there is nothing to be feared from their flay, 
 {hould be friendly received : but if there be any folid reaion 
 againft this, what is for the good of the State ought un- 
 queftionably to be preferred ; and the foreign Sovereign 
 cannot take it amifs if his Minifter, who has concluded the 
 affairs of his commifTion, and has no other affairs to nego- 
 tiate, be defired to depart f. The cuftom of keeping every 
 
 * The third Article of the Treaty of TRIPLE ALLIANCE, and 
 the latter part of the fourth Article of the Treaty of QUADRUPLE 
 ALLIANCE ftipulate, that no kind of refuge or protection fhall be 
 givep to rebellious fubjeiSts of the contracting powers. EDIT. 
 
 f Difmiffion of Mr. Chauvelin. EDIT. 
 
 E e where
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 where Minifters continually refident, is now fo ftrongly 
 eftablifhed, that the refufal of a conformity to it would, 
 without very good reafons, give offence. Theie reafons 
 may arife from particular conjun&ures ; but there are alfo 
 common reafons always fubfifting, and fuch as relate to the 
 conftitution of a Government, and the Jlate cf a Nation. 
 The Republicks have often very good reafons of the latter 
 kind, to excufe themfelves from continually fuffering 
 Foreign Minifters, who corrupt the Citizens, in order to 
 gain them over to their Majiers, to the great prejudice of the 
 Republic, and fomenting of the Parties, &c. And fhould 
 they only diffule among a Nation, formerly plain, frugal, 
 ^.nd virtuous, a tafte for luxury, avidity tor money ^ and 
 the manners of courts, thefe would be more than fuificient 
 for wife ^nd provident Rulers to difmifs them. 
 
 FINIS, 
 
 a ess
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES 
 rue- ii- -cT, S j T Y LIB 
 
 OJOVERSITY OF CAUFORJU* 
 
 AT 
 
 IS ANGELA 
 f .TOR A BY
 
 A 000000290 7