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 PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 
 VOL. II NO. 1 
 
 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 BY 
 
 FREDERIC LUDLOW LUQUEER, Ph.D. 
 
 Sometime Fellow in Education in Columbia University 
 
 MACMILLAN & CO 
 66 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 
 
 MAY, 1896 
 Price $1 
 
Columbia University Contributions 
 
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 Philosophy, Psychology and Education 
 
 The Division of Philosophy, Psychology and Education of Columbia University 
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 VOLUME I 
 
 1. Friedrich Heinrich Jacob! : a Study in the Origin of German Realism, 
 by Norman Wilde, Ph. D., Assistant iu Philosjphy at Columbia University (May, 
 1894. Price 60 cents.) 
 
 2. Kant's Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, including a translation of the Dis- 
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 lately Professor of Philosophy and Pedagogy in the University of Colorado. (May, 
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 3. The Ethical System of James Martineau, by Joseph II. Hertz, Ph. D., 
 Lecturer on Rabbinical thought in Syracuse University. (June, 1894. Price, 
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 4. Friedrich Eduard Beneke: the Man and his Philosophy, by Francis 
 Burke Brandt, Ph. D., Instructor in Psychology at the Central High School, 
 Philadelphia, Pa. (June, 1895. Price, $1.00.) 
 
 VOLUME II 
 
 5. Hegel as Educator, by Frederic Ludlow Luqueer, Ph. D., Principal 
 of Public School No. no, Brooklyn, N. Y. (May, 1896. $1.00.) 
 
 6. Hegel's Doctrine of the Will, by John Angus Mac Vannel, Ph. D., As- 
 sistant in Philosophy at Columbia University. (June, 1896. $1.00.) 
 
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HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 TO 
 
 PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 
 
 II No. 1 
 
 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 BY 
 
 FREDERIC LUDLOW LUQUEER, Ph.D. 
 
 Sometime Fellow in Education in Columbia University 
 
 MACMILLAN & CO 
 66 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 
 
 MAY, 1896 
 Price $1 
 
PREFACE 
 
 THE present work would view Hegel from a standpoint 
 perhaps new to English readers. Hegel's philosophy has 
 often been made to seem a wall about Hegel himself. His 
 thought is the man, it has been said. An outline, therefore, 
 of his system often serves as biography. But in fact Hegel's 
 life is full of interest apart from his philosophy. 
 
 This is especially true of him as student and teacher. 
 Part First would show Hegel mainly in these relationships. 
 
 Part Second contains the chief of Hegel's thoughts on 
 education. 1 They enrich the concept of education. Their 
 value is apparent. They may serve, too, as an introduction 
 to Hegel as philosopher his essential character. 
 
 It is hoped that the two parts, taken together, will help to 
 make clear, at least some aspects of a true educational ideal. 
 
 1 Translated mainly from Thaulow : Hegel's Ansichten uber Erziehung. 
 
 (v) 
 
 OF THE 
 IVERSITY) 
 Of yS 
 
FAG I 
 
 WNITERSITT 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PART I 
 
 LIFE 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 Hegel's education home, school and university 1 1 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 Hegel as tutor in Bern and Frankfurt 18 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 Hegel as university lecturer in Jena 34 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 Hegel as schoolmaster at Nurnberg gymnasium 48 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 Hegel as professor of philosophy in Heidelberg 66 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 Hegel in Berlin : Professor of philosophy and rector .... 78 
 
 (vii) 
 
v iii CONTENTS 
 
 PART II 
 HEGEL'S VIEW OF EDUCATION 
 
 PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTION 103 
 
 TRANSLATIONS, grouped as follows : 
 
 I. GENERAL NOTION OF EDUCATION 107 
 
 1. Definition of education 107 
 
 2. Education should lead to reflective self-consciousness . 108 
 
 3. Education should make free 108 
 
 4. Education should lead to unselfish interest in what is 
 
 actual and true 109 
 
 5. Education gives individuality and power, and conscious- 
 
 ness of these in 
 
 6. The culture of the race must be absorbed by the indi- 
 
 vidual 112 
 
 7. Mankind a unity in their rationality \ but this does not 
 
 mean unattached cosmopolitanism for the individual. 113 
 
 8. The individual will to be brought into accord with the 
 
 social good 113 
 
 9. Belief. Religious education 114 
 
 10. Religious teaching 116 
 
 11. Ethical ideas are understood by the child; and should 
 
 be taught 117 
 
 12. Moral education the common work of parent and 
 
 teacher 118 
 
 II. HUMAN NATURE, WITH REFERENCE TO EDUCATION . Il8 
 
 13. The ages of man 118 
 
 14. Body, soul, spirit 128 
 
 15. Temperament and character 131 
 
 1 6. The human spirit a unity. Head and heart, intelligence 
 
 and will inseparable . 134 
 
 17. Memory. Mnemonics 135 
 
 18. Habit 136 
 
CONTENTS i x 
 
 PAGE 
 
 III. WHAT THE. PUPIL MUST BRING TO HIS EDUCATION . 138 
 
 19. Precocity not the promise of eminence 138 
 
 20. Energy and promptness 138 
 
 21. Attention 138 
 
 22. Obedience the condition of obtaining independence . 139 
 
 23. Silence and docility required of a learner ... . . . 140 
 
 24. Self- forgetful interest in affairs 141 
 
 25. Intuition the beginning but only the beginning of 
 
 complete knowledge 142 
 
 26. Reflection . 143 
 
 27. Self-activity implied in learning 244 
 
 IV. THE EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL, IN RELATION TO 
 
 THE FAMILY AND TO SOCIETY 145 
 
 28. The importance of a good education, and the right of 
 
 children thereto 145 
 
 29. The mother's influence 145 
 
 30. The right of compulsory education 146 
 
 31. Education a serious work 146 
 
 32. School life a preparation for after life 147 
 
 33. Educational building should be solid 147 
 
 34. The pupil not to be educated in solitude (Rousseau's 
 
 Emil) ; nor, on the other hand, amid all the distrac- 
 tions of society 148 
 
 35. School government and discipline 149 
 
 36. One phase of the poetry of youth .150 
 
 37. Friendship 151 
 
 38. The Sturm und Drang period of youth 151 
 
 39. The necessity and value of a vocation 152 
 
 V. CULTURE VALUES OF VARIOUS SUBJECTS 153 
 
 40. Military drill 153 
 
 41. Arithmetic 154 
 
 42. Grammar , 155 
 
 43. The voice. Declamation. Reading 156 
 
 44. Culture essential to sound and noble speech 156 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 45. The classics, an introduction to literature and to phil- 
 
 osophy 157 
 
 46. Logic 158 
 
 47. The requisites for philosophic study 160 
 
 48. The gymnasial study of philosophy 160 
 
 49. The philosophical propaedeutic 172 
 
 50. Ethics and philosophy 183 
 
PART I 
 
 LIKK 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 HEGEL'S EDUCATION HOME, SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY 
 
 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL was born in Stutt- 
 gart, the capital of Wiirtemberg, on August 27, 1770. His 
 father held a government position. Of his mother we know 
 little, save that -she taught her boy before his school days 
 the elements of Latin ; that she died when he was fourteen 
 years of age, and that on the 2Oth of September, 1825, some 
 forty years afterwards, Hegel wrote his sister, " To-day is 
 the anniversary of mother's death, which I never forget." 
 
 Hegel's boyhood passed quietly and happily. In the 
 home, ruled simple burgher comfort and order " einfach 
 biirgerliche Wohlhabenheit und Ordnung," says Rosenkranz. 1 
 The town-life of Stuttgart was varied, and the surrounding 
 country was threaded with fine ways and walks. Stuttgart 
 lay in a valley, but this was not walled in narrowly by the 
 hills. There was peace and beauty, and yet outlook. A 
 symbol, we might say, of Hegel himself. 
 
 In his fifth year Hegel was sent to a so-called Latin 
 'school, and in his seventh to the gymnasium of his city. In 
 this latter, one Loffler seems to have been his favorite 
 teacher. Hegel apparently was not brought up on children's 
 
 1 Rosenkranz, Hegel^s Leben, the main source of Hegelian biography, 
 n] II 
 
! 2 
 
 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 
 
 stories. When eight years of age he was presented by 
 Loffler with Wieland's translation of Shakspere, with the 
 words, "You cannot understand this now; but soon you 
 will learn to understand it." 
 
 In his fourteenth year he began a diary, and persevered in 
 his self- history for a year or more. This was written partly 
 in German and partly in Latin. A complete picture of 
 Hegel's soul must not be sought in this diary. It seems to 
 have been more a self-imposed task for bettering his Latin 
 composition than the confidante of his youthful dreams. 
 Indeed, this former purpose is stated in so many words. In 
 entry "III. Id. Febr., 1786," after quite a break, he says: 
 " Redeamus jam ad prisca haec nostra stylo exercendo in- 
 stituta, intermissa longo intervallo temporis, cum sit hodie 
 Serenissimi Domini nostri Duds natalis LIXtus. Let us 
 resume, after a long interval, this work of exercising our 
 style, since, etc." In such a book we need expect little but 
 ordinary observations, and we are not to argue from its lack 
 of record of romantic or of moral struggles, that such were 
 lacking in Hegel himself that Hegel's soul was merely dull 
 and passive. 1 But the journal gives a good indication of the 
 studious side of Hegel as a boy. A prominent feature of it, 
 as Rosenkranz points out, is Hegel's repeated reference to 
 history. He praises Schrockh's compendium, because it is 
 not a mere list of names and dates, does not mention merely 
 battles, but also has an eye to culture-interests. 
 
 Hegel's early training was under the light of the Illumina- 
 tion. " A little Solon of the Aufklarung" Caird calls him. 
 But the content of his training was classical. Greek and 
 Latin were chief in the gymnasium. He tranlates Longinus 
 On the Sublime. He studies and careful lists of the hard 
 words are preserved the battle songs of Tyrtaeus. There 
 are records, too, of his progress with the Iliad, with Cicero's 
 
 1 A conclusion hinted by Prof. Royce. But see p. 40, Note. 
 
I 3 ] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR l 3 
 
 Letters, with Euripides, the Ethics of Aristotle and Oedipus 
 of Sophocles. These, with Epictetus, Sophocles' Antigone, 
 Thucydides and Tacitus, all give tone and color to his mind. 
 
 Hegel was a careful reader. He made long extracts from 
 the standard books of his time. He wanted to know what 
 men thought and wrote. He sought to comprehend them 
 from their own point of view. His mind was sympathetic. 
 He could enter into the moods and processes of others, and 
 issue thence, equipped for original elaboration and interpre- 
 tation. But this latter is for after years. 
 
 At the end of his gymnasial course, in the fall of 1788, 
 Hegel delivered a valedictory before the teachers and pupils. 
 It is boyish and bookish enough. There are many rounded 
 periods, and no lack of almost fulsome praise for the benefits 
 bestowed by the school. The deferential yet full-minded 
 manner of the later Hegel is here foreshadowed. He puts 
 himself, thus early, at the standpoint of the teacher, and 
 voices the official consciousness rather than that of a lad 
 freed from school tasks. He pictures the benefits to the 
 state of a good system of education, and then continues : 
 " Such a mighty influence has education upon the entire 
 well-being of the state. How strikingly is its neglect seen 
 in the Turkish nation. If we regard ihe natural capability 
 of the Turk, and then see how barbarous he is because un- 
 schooled, and how little he advances knowledge, we can then 
 rightly value our own high fortune. Providence has given 
 us life in a state whose Prince, aware of the importance of 
 education and of the uses of general and wide-spread knowl- 
 edge, has made these the special objects of his care, founding 
 institutions which will be lasting monuments to his glory, and 
 which even later generations will wonder at and bless. Of 
 his noble sentiments and zeal for the Fatherland, the greatest 
 proof and one touching us most nearly is the foundation 
 of this institute, which has for its great purpose the education 
 of good and useful citizens for the state.", 
 
 OF THE 
 UNIVERSIT 
 
1 4 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR [ 1 4 
 
 Hegel's parents intended him for the church. The next 
 step therefore was to gain a theological training. For this 
 he entered the seminary at Tubingen. The pupils of the 
 seminary, or Stift as it was called, wore a special garb, and 
 the discipline seems to have been rather narrow and petty. 
 Students' positions in class were fixed by examination. 
 " In no land save China,'' says Rosenkranz, " was there so 
 much examining and placing." The place was the measure 
 of the man. Hegel began as third, but later, partly because 
 of his independent lines of study, he was rated fourth. This 
 degradation was a blow. But it only made him work the 
 harder. 
 
 In 1790, Schelling, then only fifteen years of age, entered 
 the seminary. He was mature beyond his years : a praecox 
 ingenium, his father said. He was five years younger than 
 Hegel, who was already a Master of Philosophy. It is pleas- 
 ant to think of Hegel as quick to recognize the bright mind 
 and enthusiastic heart of Schelling, and to love him without 
 any assumption of superiority on account of greater age. 
 
 The story of these days, gathered years later from hearsay, 
 is half mythical. In common with all the student youth, 
 Hegel was filled with the ideas of the French revolution. 
 There was a political club among the students of the Stift. 
 It is said that Hegel was one of its leading spirits. The 
 story is told of his going one bright spring morning, with 
 Schelling and other friends, to a field near Tubingen and 
 there planting a liberty tree. The sympathies of Hegel's 
 father were aristocratic. The son was one with the liberal 
 ideas of the time, and eagerly upheld these in debate with 
 his father. Rousseau charmed the young Hegel, as he had 
 the elder Kant. Years, however, brought discriminating 
 judgment. 
 
 At Tubingen, the sober side of Hegel gained him the 
 name of " the old man." But this was playful and affection- 
 
! 5 ] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR ! 5 
 
 ate rather than opprobrious. He was merry enough on 
 occasion. And there are hints of jolly times at the baker's, 
 whose cheer was none the less pleasant for the presence 
 sometimes of a certain fair Augustina. One of his comrades 
 wrote to him, under date of September 7, 1791 : "Mon cher 
 ami, voici quelques jours, que nous avons deja fait beaucoup 
 de sottises en amour. J'espere, que tu te souviendras 
 toujours avec plaisir des soirees, que nous avons passees 
 ensemble chez le boulanger, en buvant du vin de quatre batz 
 et en mangeant des Butter-Brezel." In the album of an- 
 other comrade Hegel wrote in 1790, this popular verse: 
 
 Gliicklich, wer auf seinem Pfad 
 Einen Freund zur Seite hat; 
 Dreimal gliicklich aber 1st, 
 Wen sein Madchen feurig kiisst. 
 
 On the next page, a year later, he wrote : 
 
 Schon schloss sich der letzte Sommer, schoner der itzige ! 
 Der Motto von jenem war : Wein, von diesem : Liebe. 
 yt Octbr, '91. 
 V. A. ! ! ! 
 
 But Hegel's nature was not emotional. It was not turbu- 
 lent. His mind was gradually growing to be the quiet 
 meeting place of thoughts that entered from every quarter. 
 He would learn of everything. He invited contending and 
 mutually repellent ideas, and stood himself apart, as it were, 
 allowing the clearest and best to gain the field. 
 
 Yet this was not all. Underneath the main lines drawn 
 by his biographer, we may discover the earlier lines of his 
 youthful character. To read Hegel's mature works, to 
 puzzle over much of their obscure meaning, to picture the 
 writer merely as a thinker, is apt to give us somber glasses 
 for looking at his youth. The truth seems to be that Hegel 
 was ardent, often mystical, often poetical. He was essen- 
 
! g HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR [ 1 5 
 
 tially unselfish, able to put himself completely at another's 
 standpoint. So he had the joy of wide sympathies. I think 
 we misjudge him if we do not think of these early years as 
 having much of intellectual delight. To be sure, he later 
 looked back upon the instruction received at Tubingen as- 
 unsatisfactory. There was a cloister-like air, a separateness 
 and theological pedantry, that depressed rather than inspired. 
 His repugnance to this doubtless had effect upon his stand- 
 ing there. At the conclusion of his course, Hegel, it is said, 
 was given a certificate which stated that he was a man of 
 some gifts and industry, but that he had paid no serious at- 
 tention to philosophy. But it must be remembered that the 
 German idea of "serious attention" makes it a very special- 
 izing act. Not ready perhaps, as yet, to devote himself to 
 abstract philosophy, he was wisely gathering up those stores 
 of wide learning that would give rich content to his later 
 philosophical generalizations. Still, his mind was that of a 
 philosopher. It was merely for the most part at the recep- 
 tive stage. He was none the less, however, interested in the 
 theoretical aspect of things. The young Schelling was his 
 friend in philosophy or rather, in the sweet border land of 
 philosophy, where everything is new and questionable. 
 Holderlin was his friend in poetry. Life presented entranc- 
 ing problems, large and full, unworded; and with the eager- 
 ness and good courage of youth, the students sought to 
 grasp and answer them. Then, too, the beauty of literature 
 was felt. Holderlin and Hegel were one in their love for the 
 classics. Thucydides in history and Sophocles in the drama 
 were Hegel's admiration. His appreciation of the Antigone 
 reveals a fine trait of his character. He was never, as 
 Haym would imply, a mere time-server and a flatterer of 
 those who might smooth his way. His moral trend was as 
 straight upward as that of Antigone. It had greater content 
 and wisdom, that was all. 
 
i;] HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR l y 
 
 On the 1 2th of February, 1791, Holderlin wrote in Hegel's 
 album the words of Goethe : " Lust tmd Liebe sind die Fittige 
 zu grossen Thaten Joy and love are the wings to great 
 deeds." The great deeds of both these students for some 
 time to come were to be deeds of thought-conquest, without 
 much dust of battle or shouting of applause. Holderlin, 
 soon leaving Tubingen, went to Jena, where he became an 
 enthusiastic hearer of Fichte ; and Hegel became a private 
 tutor in Bern, Switzerland. Correspondence, however, be- 
 tween the two was kept up. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 HEGEL AS TUTOR IN BERN AND FRANKFURT 
 
 HEGEL began work in Switzerland in his twenty-fourth 
 year. A note from Bern speaks of him as, gouverneur des 
 enfants de notre cher et fcal citoyen Steiguer de Tschougg. 
 "Tschugg," says Wallace, "was the summer residence of the 
 family, near Erlach on the lake of Biel ; in winter they lived 
 in Bern. Hegel had a few acquaintances in Bern ; but, on 
 the whole, he lived in isolation." The number and ages of 
 the children for whom he had to care can only be conjec- 
 tured. 
 
 It is interesting to remember that Kant, Fichte and Her- 
 bart, as well as Hegel, were family tutors. The experience 
 was useful for them all. As Rosenkranz says, if such a posi- 
 tion admits of opportunity for self-development, it may be 
 well fitted for the further ripening of genius, since it neces- 
 sitates a thorough working over of the foundations of knowl- 
 edge. It forms, too, a simple and animated style of speech, 
 without the rhetorical elaboration of the lecture-room. 
 Thaulow thinks that he who studies Hegel's views on educa- 
 tion will find many, and these the finest, which must have been 
 gained from his experience as family tutor. These passages, 
 however, can only be inferred. Hegel never spoke much 
 about himself. The particular cases of his experience he 
 soon brought under general categories. He is more philo- 
 sophical than circumstantial. These three years in Switzer- 
 land and the three subsequent years in Frankfurt are spoken 
 of as the birth-years of his philosophical system. He was 
 18 [18 
 
1 9] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR l g 
 
 in the transition period between youth and manhood. His 
 subsequent career was uncertain. His thought was feeling 
 its way. Perhaps he experienced at times the sadness and 
 hypochondria which he later speaks of as incidental to this 
 time of life. "The form of the ideal," he says, " inspires the 
 youth's aspiration. So he dreams that he is called and is 
 fitted to make the world over, or, at least, to turn it back to 
 its right course. The young man's eye does not see that the 
 substantial universal contained in his ideal is already being 
 evolved and realized in the world. . . . Accordingly he feels 
 the world misunderstands both his ideal and himself. Thus 
 the peace, in which the child lived with the world, is broken 
 by the youth." But with Hegel, such breaking was but 
 temporary. 
 
 Stages of character, of development, are not like strata in 
 rock beds. Touches and lines of manhood extend down into 
 youth, and the feelings of youth stretch up and wind them- 
 selves in and out through the stuff old age is made of. So 
 we are not to think of this Sturm und Drang period of 
 Hegel's life as a very stormy period. The duties of his posi- 
 tion, and the intellectual habits he had formed, kept him too 
 busy. It was during this time, too, that he was much ab- 
 sorbed in his Life of Christ. No matter if that work be the 
 fruit of the Illumination, if it be "rationalistic" or not, the 
 influence of such a study whatever be the philosophical ex- 
 planation evolved could be nothing but good. 
 
 At nearly the end of his stay in Switzerland, Hegel with 
 three other tutors made a foot journey among the Alps. 
 Rosenkranz says that it is clear he undertook the trip in the 
 expectation of being greatly moved by the giant mountain 
 peaks. But the masses of rock and ice drew no exclamation 
 [none recorded at least] of wonder from him. They appeared 
 to him dead, sad, without any quickening touch for fancy. 
 " It is so," and that was all that could be said. But the cas- 
 
20 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [ 2 O 
 
 cades with their living play of movement, of light and spray, 
 and rainbow kiss of sun, were quite other over these he 
 grew enthusiastic. His note-book is characteristic, showing 
 as it does the all-sidedness of his interest. Says his biog- 
 rapher: " Not only nature, which here was most prominent, 
 caught his eye, for all her forms from the giant glacier to the 
 chance crystal, from the forests to the grass and flowers, from 
 the sea to the mountain rill, but also man in his struggle with 
 nature, in his varied ways and doings." 
 
 As has been said, the acquaintance of Hegel and Schelling 
 began at Tubingen. When Hegel left the university town in 
 1793, it seemed at first that the friendship might fade to a 
 mere memory. But at Bern, Hegel happened upon an article 
 written by Schelling, and this prompted him to send a letter. 
 It was written Christmas Eve, 1794. He says, in effect: " I 
 have been wanting for a long time to renew the pleasant re- 
 lation in which we used to stand to each other. The paper 
 by you in the Memorabilien of Paulus, which I have just been 
 reading, gives me the opportunity. I see you are at your 
 old work of letting light in upon hard theological questions. 
 I sympathize with you. I believe the time has come in which 
 men should speak more freely. . . . But my distance from 
 the theatre of literary activity cuts me off from hearing all 
 about matters that interest me so. You would please me 
 much were you from time to time to tell me about them, and 
 about your own work. I am longing for a place not in 
 Tubingen where I might carry out what I have neglected. 
 I am not altogether idle, but my too heterogeneous and 
 broken-up activity lets me do nothing as I should like. 
 
 ". . . What is Renz doing? Has he buried his pound? 
 I hope not. It would be well to encourage him to bring 
 together his thorough-going and important researches. How 
 are things at Tubingen? Until a Reinhold or a Fichte has 
 a chair there, nothing great will result. . . . 
 
2 i ] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 2 I 
 
 "Have you learned that Car has been guillotined? 
 
 Do you still read the French papers? If I remember rightly, 
 I was told that they had been shut out from Wurtemberg. . . 
 
 "A thousand good wishes to Susskind and Kapf. 
 
 " Thy friend." 
 
 In response to Schelling's answer, Hegel writes in 1795 : 
 " I need not use many words in telling you how glad I was 
 to receive your letter. Other than your true thought of your 
 friend, nothing could more interest me than your intellectual 
 work. We were never estranged as friends. And still less 
 can we differ in regard to what is the chief interest of every 
 rational man, and which he seeks to further and broaden by 
 every means he can. 
 
 " For some time I have busied myself again with the 
 Kantian philosophy. . . ." 
 
 The letter goes on to speak of the theologico-philosophical 
 discussions of the time. Questions of ethics, of moral faith, 
 of the idea of God, are touched upon. Hegel shows that he 
 is thinking. He would like, he says and we think it desecra- 
 tion to alter the German of such an aspiration if he had time 
 to try : " es naher zu bestimmen, wei weit wir, nach Befesti- 
 gung des moralischen Glaubens, die legitimirte Idee von Gott 
 jetzt riickwarts brauchen, z. B. in Erklarung der Zweckbe- 
 ziehung, u. s. w., sie von der Ethikotheologie gar jetzt zur 
 Physikotheologie mitnehmen und da jetzt mit ihr walten 
 durften." . . . 
 
 Then he passes to items of news. " Holderlin," he says, 
 "writes me sometimes from Jena. . . He is hearing Fichte, 
 and speaks enthusiastically of him as a Titan who is battling 
 for humanity, and whose influence will surely spread beyond 
 the walls of the lecture room. 
 
 "As to his not writing you, you must not lay that to 
 cooling friendship. That certainly is not true of him ; and 
 his interest in world-wide in weltb^rgerliche ideas is as 
 
22 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [ 2 2 
 
 ardent, it seems to me, as ever. May the kingdom of God 
 come, and our hands not be found idle in our laps. . . 
 " Answer soon. Greet my friends. H." 
 
 In a letter of April, 1795, Hegel writes Schelling in part 
 as follows : 
 
 " . . . Another cause of my delay in answering your letter, 
 was that I wished to send you a thoughtful judgment of your 
 article sent me at least to tell you that I had grasped your 
 ideas. But I have not had time for a thorough study. In 
 so far as I have caught the main ideas, I see in them a 
 furtherance of science that will have most fruitful results. I 
 see therein the work of one of whose friendship I may well 
 be proud, who will have the greatest influence upon the 
 revolution of thought in Germany. . . 
 
 " From the Kantian system and from its further develop- 
 ment I look for a revolution in Germany, which will proceed 
 from principles already present, and only needing general 
 unfolding to be applied to all previous knowledge. There 
 will always be a sort of esoteric philosophy ; the idea of God 
 as the absolute Ego belongs to it. By a study of the postu^ 
 lates of the practical reason, I had had glimpses of what you 
 clearly set forth in your letter, and what the Grundlage der 
 Wissenschaftslehre by Fichte will fully disclose. People's 
 heads will whirl on these heights. But why have we been 
 so late in valuing the worth of man, in recognizing his power 
 of freedom, which places him in the rank of spirit? I believe 
 there is no better sign of the times than this : that humanity 
 is being pictured to itself as worthy of highest honor. 1 . . 
 
 " I, am ever calling to myself from the Lebenslciufen : 
 ' Struggle towards the sun, friends, that men may be the 
 quicker saved. What of hindering leaves and boughs? 
 
 T Cf. AraiePs Journal, p. 163: "The benefactors of Humanity are those who 
 have thought great thoughts about her." 
 
23] HE GEL A S ED UCA TOR 23 
 
 Strike through toward the sun ! If wearied, good. So much 
 the better will be rest at the end.' . . . 
 
 " It occurs to me that this summer is your last at Tubingen. 
 If you write a disputation I should much like you to send it 
 me as soon as possible. . . . 
 
 " I take Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre to study this summer, 
 when I shall have somewhat more leisure. . . . The first 
 number of Schiller's Horen has pleased me. The letter " On 
 the aesthetic education of mankind," is a masterpiece. 
 
 "Holderlin often writes me from Jena. He is quite in- 
 spired by Fichte. . . . How good it must be to Kant to see 
 the fruits of his work in so worthy followers. The harvest 
 will be glorious sometime. I thank Siisskind for the kind 
 trouble he has taken for me. What is Renz doing? . . . ' 
 
 The next letter of Hegel to Schelling, dated August 30, 
 1795, gladly acknowledges receipt of some of the latter's 
 writing. Hegel says, however, that Schelling must not ex- 
 pect criticism from him. " I am here," he writes, " only a 
 pupil. I am studying Fichte's Grundlagen. But allow me 
 one remark that occurs to me, so that you may see that I 
 should like to satisfy you as regards criticism. In 12 you 
 apply the attributes of the one substance to the ego. But if 
 substance and accident are correlative terms the one im- 
 plying the other it seems to me that the concept of sub- 
 stance should not be applied to the absolute ego ; though it 
 may be so applied to the empirical ego as given in con- 
 sciousness." 
 
 But here translation not to say the thought grows diffi- 
 cult. The letter speaks next of Fichte and of Schiller, and 
 of Niethammer's Journal. Then it passes to matters of 
 friendship : " Holderlin has been, I hear, at Tubingen. You 
 two must have had delightful hours together. How I wish 
 I might have made a third. 
 
 " Of my work it is not worth the trouble to speak. Per- 
 
24 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [24 
 
 haps after a while I shall send you the plan of something I 
 am thinking to work out. 
 
 " Now that you are going to leave Tubingen soon, be so 
 good as to tell me what you have in mind, and the place of 
 your future stay, as well as about all your happenings. Be- 
 fore everything else, for your friends' sake, spare your health. 
 Do not be too niggardly with the time you spend for recrea- 
 tion. Give my friends my best greetings. . . . Answer me 
 soon. You cannot think how good it seems in my loneli- 
 ness to hear now and again from you and other friends. 
 
 "Your HEGEL." 
 
 In these letters to Schelling, Hegel, as has been seen, fre- 
 quently mentions correspondence with Holderlin. When the 
 latter went to Frankfurt a. M., as family tutor, he found there 
 a like position for Hegel, and wrote him accordingly. Hegel, 
 in accepting, wrote in part as follows : " Dearest Holderlin. 
 So I have had again the joy of hearing from^ou. From 
 every line of your letter speaks the same old, unchanging 
 friendship. I cannot tell you how glad it has made me, and 
 still more the hope of soon seeing and embracing you." 
 
 The letter goes on to speak of details of the journey ; and 
 asks for further information as to his tutorial duty. It con- 
 tinues : " I am sorry that I cannot set out immediately. But 
 I cannot be in Frankfort before the middle of January. . . . 
 How much influence the longing to see you has had on my 
 quick decision, how the scene keeps coming before me of 
 our Wiedersehen, of the happy future with you of this 
 nothing farewell Your HEGEL." 
 
 But, as Rosenkranz says, this picture was so inspiring that 
 it moved him to address a poem to his friend. It is an ex- 
 pression of mystical yearning, mingled with glad anticipation 
 of greeting Holderlin again ; and looked at from another 
 side, it expresses spiritual trust and well-being. It was 
 
nani 
 
 25] HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR 2 5 
 
 written August, 1796. I translate a few lines of it, with little 
 success, however, at keeping its peculiar meter. 
 
 ELEUSIS 
 
 TO HOELDERLIN 
 
 Around me, within, is quietness. The ceaseless 
 
 Cares of busy men do sleep ; and I have liberty. 
 
 Thanks to thee, O Night, who freest me. 
 
 The moon lights up the mist-folds on the uncertain 
 
 Summits of the distant hills; 
 
 And friendly is the bright gleam 
 
 Of the sea. 
 
 The tedious noise of day fades in the memory, 
 
 As if years lay between the day and now. 
 
 Thy face, dear friend, and joys of other times 
 
 Rise up before me. 
 
 The poem then touches upon the delights of meeting 
 
 the joy of certainty 
 
 To find the old bond truer, firmer than before 
 The bond that needs no pledge, but that endures, 
 In those who live to the free truth alone. 
 
 There is then an address to Ceres, " thou who hadst thy 
 throne in Eleusis." The concluding lines are : 
 
 And this night I've felt thee, holy Godhead, thee. 
 
 Thou art known, too, in thy children's life 
 
 The soul of all their deeds thou seemest to me ! 
 
 Thou art the exalted mind, the truest trust, 
 
 The one Godhead that, mid general shock, stands firm. 
 
 The mixture of imagery, yearning, trust, mysticism, in 
 this poem we have chosen but a few lines of the " good and 
 sensible" part of it is quite characteristic of youthful work, 
 which, to be sure, drives the chariot of the sun, but does so 
 in rather hap-hazard fashion. " The imagination of a boy," 
 says Keats, in the preface of his Endymion " the imagina- 
 tion of a boy is healthy, and the mature imagination of a 
 
2 6 HE GEL A S ED UCA TOR [ 2 6 
 
 man is healthy ; but there is a space of life between, in 
 which the soul is in a ferment, the character undecided, the 
 way of life uncertain, the ambition thick sighted." * This per- 
 iod in Hegel was probably short. I am glad that we have 
 perhaps a trace of it in the poetic tribute to Holderlin, and 
 a stronger trace, too, in the friendship that existed between 
 them ; Holderlin, perhaps, never outliving this stage of 
 youthhood. 
 
 Hegel had been wishing for greater leisure, for better 
 library facilities, for opportunity of meeting with like-minded 
 friends ; and all these were to be gained in Frankfort. He 
 taught in the family of a merchant named Gogel. And 
 here surroundings were not unpleasant. The record of the 
 satisfaction of one of his friends is preserved satisfaction at 
 knowing that Hegel was so very comfortably off. We may 
 infer, too, that Hegel had more time^ at his own disposal, 
 from the important philosophical work he here accom- 
 plished. "That city," says Rosenkranz, " which was the 
 cradle of Goethe's poetry, was to be also the real birth-place 
 of Hegel's system of philosophy." 
 
 Professor Caird beautifully outlines the nature of the 
 change that took place in Hegel's thought at this time. 
 Sometimes a change of residence will bring out at once into 
 flower things that before were but germinal. Says Professor 
 Caird : " The transition ... to a higher point of view seems 
 to have taken place in the beginning of Hegel's residence at 
 Frankfort, and in connection with a remarkable change of 
 language which we find in his papers written about that time. 
 In Switzerland he had used the words ' life' and ' love' to ex- 
 press the highest kind of social unity ; now he substitutes 
 the word ' spirit.' This is no mere verbal change. The word 
 ' life' suggests the idea of an organic unity, and the word 
 
 1 Quoted by Hamilton Mabie. 
 
27] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 2? 
 
 ' love' implies that the members of that unity are conscious 
 beings conscious of the social organism in which they 
 merge their separate existence, and conscious also of them- 
 selves, were it only in the moment of self-surrender by which 
 they give themselves up to that organism. In these terms, 
 therefore, Hegel found a means of expressing that social 
 unity of which the Greek state was to him a type a unity 
 of individuals who regarded themselves not as isolated per- 
 sons, but simply as citizens whose life was in the State, and 
 who had no personality apart from it. In such a social 
 unity the idea of self is involved, but it is not emphasized ; 
 the division of self-conscious individuals disappears like the 
 separateness of notes in a harmony. 
 
 " Love took up the harp of life, and smote on all the chords with might, 
 Smote the chord of self, which, trembling, passed in music out of sight." 
 
 " But the term ' spirit,' or ' spiritual unity/ seems to convey 
 and in Hegel's language always conveys the idea of antag- 
 onism overcome, contradiction reconciled, unity reached 
 through the struggle and conflict of elements which, in the 
 first aspect cf them, are opposed to each other. It was, 
 therefore, the appropriate expression for a unity between the 
 mind and the object which is contrasted with it between 
 mind and matter, or between different self-conscious sub- 
 jects, each of whom has a complete consciousness of his own 
 independent rights and personality. Such a unity can never 
 be, in Hegel's language, immediate, i. e., can never be ready- 
 made from the first, but always involves a process by which 
 difference is overcome and opposition transformed into agree- 
 ment. Nor can this be a merely natural process, i. e., a pro- 
 cess in which the opposition melts away without being heard 
 of. Rather it is a process which begins with a distinct con- 
 sciousness of independence to be removed, of opposition to 
 be overcome, and which involves, therefore, an explicit sur- 
 
2 g HEGEL AS EDUCA7^OR % [ 2 g 
 
 render of independence, a conscious reconciliation of the 
 opposition." J 
 
 We may spend a moment in suggesting the parallel be- 
 tween the change of Hegel's written philosophical thought 
 and the change in his experience. 
 
 In Switzerland Hegel speaks of his loneliness. His heart 
 goes out toward his friends at Tubingen and at Jena. His 
 mind is busy working over the fruit of his student years. 
 The historical and literary studies, in the absence of exciting 
 social life, all tend to the creation of ideal pictures of the past 
 some fair Greek republic, tinged with living interest be- 
 cause it may be and is in the youth's mind the prophecy 
 of some possible though distant Utopia. " Love " and 
 " Life " forces apprehended almost pictorially, so to speak, 
 may easily sum up the relations of this ideal world. 
 
 But with the change of residence, the coming into a new 
 social atmosphere, the meeting of friends who think, but 
 whose thoughts are different from one's own all this tends 
 to put the idealization of the past into the background. It 
 is there as the palette from which we take colors to paint a 
 new picture, but a picture with features having modern and 
 immediate meaning. In Frankfurt, Hegel met others. He 
 won new ideas from living speech. He felt the difficulties of 
 inter-communion of expressing one's self, so that what one 
 means is fully grasped. There must be social consideration, 
 adaptation of lips that speak to ears that hear. Even stronger 
 oppositions were to be met. And the meeting these, turn- 
 ing them aside, using them, winning them over, or opposing 
 with brave-spirited but generous will these were the activi- 
 ties that made him conscious of " spirit " of the self-directed 
 renunciation of the smaller self in order to participate in the 
 larger social life which is felt as but a beginning of the 
 spiritually possible. 
 
 1 Caird, Hegel, p. 35. 
 
29] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 2 $ 
 
 Frankfurt not only gave him opportunity to begin to for- 
 mulate his deeper speculative ideas, but opened up to him a 
 social world. Holderlin, Sinclair, Zwilling, Muhrbeck, Ber- 
 ger, Erichson and Erhard are mentioned as his companions. 
 Poetry, romantic idealism, Fichte's idealism and Schelling's, 
 the idealism of independent youthhood all were repre- 
 sented. They formed a ferment, working toward some 
 wider, more inclusive, more logical, more wisely spiritual 
 statement of reality ; and it was in Hegel, chiefly, that they 
 worked to make that statement. 
 
 In Frankfurt, Hegel, inspired by the example of Holderlin 
 and Sinclair, attempted some further versification. We 
 have already noted his elegiac address to Holderlin, just be- 
 fore coming to Frankfurt. Here he wrote, among other 
 matters, a peculiar, grimly humorous, almost tyrannical 
 poem, to his dog, on the meaning of authority. Its last line 
 is: "You whine at the blows: then obey the command of 
 your master." 
 
 There is a poem, too, on Spring. If not musical, it is at 
 least manly. We quote the first stanza : 
 
 Der Fruhling droht ! Es drangt dem aussern Leben, 
 
 Wie ihm die Knosp' entgegenschwillt, 
 Den Menschen auch, sich preiszugeben. 
 
 Die Sonne wachst und laut und wild 
 Hinans geht aller Sinne Streben ! 
 
 Da stellst du noch in uns ein Bild 
 Hinein, ein hoheres, als der Natur Gestalten, 
 Das Inn're, das entflieh'n will, fest zu halten. 
 
 Who has not felt the incomings of spring and, if a 
 youthful poet, not returned them with effusive interest? The 
 riches of unfolding nature seem so satisfying, that one is 
 tempted to let go his grip on inner treasure of character 
 and purpose. The world then seems not so much a theatre 
 for heroic action, as a thing of beauty for easy receptivity. 
 
30 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [30 
 
 We grow less like Fichte, and more like Schelling. In this 
 stanza of Hegel we have a hint of the brave mid-point or 
 rather focal point of the two, taken by his future system. 
 Nature was to be comprehended not a bud or leaf, not a 
 word whispered by earth or man, were to be omitted ; but at 
 the same time the higher developments within were to be 
 held fast and asserted, not as blotting out the value of the 
 nature forms, but as giving them meaning and interpretation 
 in a wider world of spiritual unity. 
 
 It may be regretted that we know so little of Hegel's 
 methods with his pupils. But a teacher's interests outside 
 of the school-room give us, perhaps, the best means of judg- 
 ing of his influence as a teacher. Hegel's interest in politics, 
 in art and literature, in thought, in society, made him a stim- 
 ulating power. He was so fully if not noisily alive that 
 he imparted much more than instruction, namely, the wish 
 for wider experience and knowledge. He was as far as pos- 
 sible from having the "pedagogical cramp," as Dr. Harris 
 calls it. His interests, however, were not without aim. We 
 might use Mr. Mabie's characterization of Rossetti, crowding 
 it even fuller of meaning, and apply it to Hegel: " He had 
 none of that unfruitful and essentially unintellectual curiosity 
 which leads people to ransack all literatures and philosophies, 
 not in the spirit of eager search for principles, but from a 
 desire to discover some new thing a desire especially to 
 come upon some esoteric knowledge, and thus, by a single 
 brilliant advance, possess themselves of the secret of the 
 universe." Hegel was preeminently a seeker for principles 
 for the principle which, as a silken cord, might be seen to 
 connect things apparently forever sundered. But this prin- 
 ciple was to be discovered, not arbitrarily made. He wanted 
 wide experience as the laboratory of discovery. He sought 
 to include within himself his surroundings to appreciate, 
 co-operate with, become conscious of as a part of his social 
 
3 i ] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 3 ! 
 
 self, the activity and progress of the world. But perhaps 
 "world" is too vague a word here. Hegel's unselfish inter- 
 ests had a deeper tinge than the pale color of mere cosmo- 
 politanism. His nation, unorganized though it was, was 
 peculiarly his own. It was in this that he was to find his 
 place and his duty. The categorical imperative which pro- 
 nounces the "ought" that seal, according to Kant, of 
 man's freedom this imperative was to find content and 
 direction in the ideal toward which the state was developing. 
 The individual man was to read his duty in social require- 
 ments. 
 
 Hegel was a student of history before he was a philoso- 
 pher; and his philosophy from one point of view is his 
 effort to put in words the significance of history. His early 
 reading gave him broad outlook. After that, including as it 
 did a study of the Greek states, Hegel could be no shallow 
 egoist. He could sympathetically imagine the life of other 
 times and places. But such study, in order to be practical, 
 must be used not as an incitement to empty altruistic emo- 
 tion, but as a means to awaken an intelligent interest in one's 
 own people, in their and so my institutional life. Thus, in 
 this Frankfurt period, we find Hegel making political studies. 
 From Bern, which Rosenkranz characterizes as a city of 
 family aristocracy, he had come to Frankfurt, a mercantile 
 city of moneyed aristocracy. The very contrast must have set 
 his mind questioning. What were the grounds of this mer- 
 cantile system? What do property rights imply? And 
 characteristically enough he seeks to answer these problems, 
 suggested probably by the near at hand, by a study of the 
 remote. England especially interested him. He studied the 
 relations in that country of inheritance and property rights. 
 He followed poor law legislation. He made a commentary 
 to the German translation of Stewart's political economy. 
 In this commentary he concentrated what he had to say on 
 
32 HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR [3 2 
 
 government, on labor and capital, on social classes, on pau- 
 perism, on taxes, and the like. Prompted by a study of 
 Kant, he sought to define the inter-relation of church and 
 state. Kant's opinion he thus summarized: " Both, state 
 and church, should leave each other alone and go their sep- 
 arate ways." But such a statement of separation, to Hegel 
 was a challenge to find some principle of unity back of such 
 seeming lack of connection. 1 
 
 We are apt to say that all this is the work of a student 
 rather than that of a teacher. But should not every teacher 
 while in this life at any rate be more of a student than 
 teacher? It is perhaps the student's attitude that is the 
 only rational attitude for a mind that can grow. It is one 
 of the fine traits of Hege^ 1 , this power of patiently learning. 
 He does not hurry his system in its slow maturing. It was 
 " the foster-child of silence and slow time." It might be 
 said of Hegel, as it was said of Walter Pater : " In him we 
 feel the power of an insight which grows and is not hurried." 
 He did not produce much as did Berkeley, Hume, Schell- 
 ing, Guyau before he was thirty. And, indeed, it was only 
 when he was thirty-six that the manuscript of his great in- 
 troductory work was complete. Later we shall find him 
 emphasizing, perhaps from the depth of his life-experience, 
 the need of silence and docility in the learner. "One must 
 begin," he says, "by striving to comprehend the thoughts of 
 others. Willingness to yield one's own ideas is the first 
 necessity for a learner. . . . The inner nature of a man is 
 
 1 The motto of FroebeFs Song of the Bridge, expresses HegePs, as well as the 
 child's Trieb the " Getrenntes zu verbinden " : 
 
 Auch Getrenntes zu verbinden, 
 
 Lass das kind im Spiele finden; 
 
 Und dass wohl die Menschenkraft 
 
 Da auch die VerknOpfung schafft, 
 
 Wo die Trennung scheinbar unbezwinglich, 
 
 Wo die Ein'gung unerschwinglich. 
 
33] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 33 
 
 broadened by culture, and given him as a possession through 
 self-restraint. Thought is enriched and the mind vitalized 
 by silence." 
 
 During this Frankfurt period, one of Hegel's hardest 
 worked pupils was himself. Rosenkranz tells us of book- 
 dealers' bills of this time that happened to have been pre- 
 served. These are mainly for Schelling's works and for 
 the Greek classics in best and most recent editions. He 
 must have studied particularly Plato and Sextus Empiricus. 
 And here, be it said in passing, it is a pleasure to know that 
 Hegel went pretty thoroughly through Sextus Empiricus 
 that old skeptic, and had but the larger faith afterward. 
 History, politics, religion, and philosophy furnished him the 
 subject matter of his investigations. But investigation is 
 only a half. There must be expression of results. Thus 
 Hegel sought to improve his style of writing. He made a 
 careful study of the sentence period. He analyzed and 
 criticised the prose of Schiller's History of the Thirty Years' 
 War. He sought to think clearly and write clearly. But his 
 words are not for those who run. Gray said of Shakspere, 
 every word in him is a picture. It may be said of Hegel, 
 every word of his is a Begriff, a concept, which will surren- 
 der its meaning to nothing save the most strenuous attention. 
 And even that, sometimes, seems to find itself staring at a 
 blank wall. But what yields itself to first sight is the pledge 
 of more. We get glimpses of the strong, true, wide meaning 
 of the man. We know his habits of study, his conscientious 
 effort to say his thought ; so it needs but little faith to believe 
 that, in the parts not as yet understood, riches are hidden 
 which will repay search. The parts comprehended are but 
 messengers telling of the sleeping princess that lies within, 
 waiting for the kiss of him who loves and dares aright. The 
 strange words and break-brain passages are but the thorny 
 hedge and rough entrance ways to the beauty, which here as 
 elsewhere answers but to the brave. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 HEGEL AS UNIVERSITY LECTURER IN JENA 
 
 IN 1799, Hegel came into possession of a small patrimony. 
 In the fall of the next year he made a trip to Mainz. The 
 passport given him entitles him " Master of Arts," and de- 
 scribes him as : " aged 30 years, height 5 feet 2 inches, hair 
 and eyebrows brown, eyes gray, nose medium, mouth 
 medium, chin round, forehead mediocre, face oval." Rosen- 
 kranz remarks that we ^hould be badly off, if we depended 
 upon the passports for the stature of Hegel. The one 
 quoted gives the inches over five feet as 2, while another 
 gives 8, and still another 10! 
 
 We are now at the main turning-point in Hegel's early 
 career. The Lehrjahre have come to an end, the Wander- 
 jahre are to begin. Though it is well to remember that 
 Hegel never " finished " his learning ; and as for his wander- 
 ings, they had already begun far back in youth. Tubingen, 
 Bern, the Alps, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Mainz had all given 
 him their lively and diversified message. And in the future 
 he is to live successively in Jena, Bamberg, Niirnberg, 
 Heidelberg, and Berlin. 
 
 This is a suggestive contrast to Kant, who never resided 
 elsewhere than in Kcnigsberg scarcely ever journeyed from 
 it. We are not arguing that Kant should have traveled. 
 His was not the mind to say, 
 
 " Romae Tibur amem ventosus, Tibure Romam." 
 
 He was more like the Greeks, who stayed at home and 
 34 [34 
 
35] 
 
 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 
 
 made their own country famous. And who can tell what 
 visions he saw when he gave his imagination rein, as he 
 sat fixing his eye on the distant spire, which seemed to be 
 the one material speck needed for the precipitation of his 
 thoughts. 
 
 And yet for a man who is to deal with thought content as 
 well as thought forms who is to try to sum up man and 
 nature, and their meaning, we should be glad for him to 
 have wide experience of men and places. Such experience 
 was Hegel's. 
 
 But to return to Frankfurt. Hegel's patrimony allows 
 him to think of devoting his whole time to the development 
 of the system that has been taking shape during his years of 
 tutoring. He would go to Jena, the philosophical Mecca. 
 But first he would make short stay in a quieter place. He 
 writes to ask Schelling's advice. Schelling had already won 
 distinction. He had passed his docentship, and had been 
 appointed professor extraordinarius. 
 
 Hegel writes, under date of November 2, 1800, in part as 
 follows : " My request would obtain from you some addresses 
 in Bamberg, where I should like to stay awhile. Now that 
 I am at last enabled to break old connections, I have decided 
 to stay some time in a place where I can be independent and 
 devote myself to work that has been begun. Before tasting 
 the strong drink of literary life in Jena, I would strengthen 
 myself by a preparatory stay somewhere else. I the more 
 chose Bamberg, because I hoped to meet you there. But I 
 hear you are back in Jena. ... If from what you know of 
 places you think some other would be better Erfurt, Eisen- 
 ach please advise me. ... In my scientific studies, 
 though dealing at first with the lower needs of humanity, I 
 have been driven on to philosophy. The ideal of youthful 
 days has been made reflective, and is shaping itself into a 
 system. I ask myself now, while busy with it, what way of 
 
36 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [36 
 
 entrance is there for me to play my full part amid the life 
 of men?" * 
 
 Schelling's answer does not seem to have been preserved. 
 But we may infer its purport, for in January, 1801, Hegel 
 goes to Jena. 
 
 Rosenkranz has drawn a picture of the inner life of the 
 city at this time. Fichte had gone to Berlin, with a blind 
 charge of atheism at his back. Schlegel's " piquante" (Ros- 
 enkranz calls it) journal which had made the public used to 
 paradoxes had come to a stop. The romanticists had scat- 
 tered. Novalis had died, leaving behind him, as one has 
 said, little but a rare and exquisite perfume. Tieck had 
 quitted Jena Tieck, who wrote these lines which have been 
 called the " manifesto of romanticism:" 
 
 Magical moonlit night, 
 Holding the senses fettered, 
 Wonderful fairy world, 
 Arise in thy glory. 
 
 And Schelling, finally, had at least ceased to be a novelty. 
 
 But Jena drew a great number of young men who hoped 
 to make philosophy a life work and a paying one, too, if 
 possible. This is not said to give color to Schopenhauer's 
 rather surly remark about the philosophers who disagreed 
 with him, namely, that their motto seemed to be primum 
 
 1 Prof. Caird translates this last sentence : ' Now, while I am still employed 
 with this task, I begin to ask myself where I can find a point of contact to bring 
 my thoughts to bear upon human life? ' It seems to me that the meaning is not 
 quite this. Hegel himself wants to enter into life, that his still growing thought 
 may be enriched. It is not that he has discovered a panacea, and is only waiting 
 for opportunity to apply it to poor, hitherto ignorant, humanity. He is still a 
 learner. He would become acquainted with the subject matter of his thought 
 namely, human life by participating therein. In a way thoroughly his own, he 
 believed with Faust, 
 
 ' Wenn ihr's nicht fuhlt, ihr werdet's nicht erjagen. If you do not feel it, you'll 
 never have the power of expressing it.' 
 
37] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 37 
 
 vivere, deinde philosophari. But then the brilliant careers of 
 Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, fired enthusiasm for philosophy, 
 with a flame that did not consume the hope of livelihood. 
 And young aspirants were many. It is said that the lecture 
 programs of the University of Jena " dripped" of philos- 
 phy. All points of view were represented, " from the dogma- 
 tism of Wolf to the romantic improvisations of the nature 
 philosophy." Most of the Weltanschauungen were inter- 
 preted by docents men who had the privilege of delivering 
 courses of lectures, if perchance students could be found 
 willing to hear. " In the University," says Rosenkranz, 
 " private docents came and went, as doves fly in and out a 
 dove-cote." 
 
 It was amidst these conditions that Hegel came to Jena. 
 His first work must be, if he is to gain foothold, the an- 
 nouncement of his powers " a measuring of strength, very 
 courteous but decisive," as Emerson puts it. His first writ- 
 ing, accordingly, was upon " The difference between the sys- 
 tems of Fichte and Schelling." This was to introduce him 
 to the philosophical world at large. Next must be written 
 an " Habilitations-dissertation," and an " Habilitations-dispu- 
 tation," to obtain the right to deliver lectures as private 
 docent at the university. The dissertation dealt with the 
 courses of the planets. Without going into the merits of 
 this writing, it will be enough, here, to let it serve but as 
 another hint of the many-sidedness of Hegel. 1 Like Kant, 
 Hegel was interested in mathematics, mechanics and astron- 
 omy. Much earlier than this he had made extracts from 
 Newton and Kepler. He wrote the dissertation first in Ger- 
 man ; and then more tersely in Latin. Rosenkranz says : 
 
 1 Hegel might have said with Stevenson though more sedately, perhaps, than 
 the poet and novelist 
 
 " The world is so full of a number of things 
 I'm sure we should all be as happy as kings." 
 
38 . // GEL A S ED UCA TOR [38 
 
 " These manuscripts, together with a wilderness of computa- 
 tions connected with them, are still preserved." 
 
 Admitted as decent, Hegel lectured several hours a week. 
 He did not have the attractive delivery and manner of 
 Schelling. There was lacking a certain poetical nimbus of 
 word and activity which surrounded the younger teacher. 
 He seemed more as one standing before some great truth, 
 the wording of which needed the greatest care. He was 
 thinking as he spoke. His lectures were a growth an 
 emerging into clearness. They were addressed to abstract 
 thought rather than to imagination. They demanded much 
 of the hearer a demand that made them stimulating. 
 
 In the winter of 1801, Hegel announced a course in logic 
 and metaphysics. Eleven hearers responded. In 1803, he 
 announced lectures under the title of: System of Specula- 
 tive Philosophy, with the subheads (a) Logicen et Metaphy- 
 sicen sive Idealismum transcendentalem ; (b) philosophiam 
 naturos ; (c) mentis. 
 
 In 1804 his hearers numbered thirty. 
 
 In 1805 he became professor extraordinarius, and lectured 
 for the first time on the history of philosophy. 
 
 In 1806 he lectured on the philosophy, of nature and of 
 spirit. 
 
 In a letter to Voss, dated Jena, 1805, Hegel says: " How 
 far I shall be able to do anything here, I cannot say. Each 
 man must approve what he is by his deeds by his effect 
 upon others. I can only point to fragmentary work." 
 Heidelberg, even at this time, seemed to Hegel to offer 
 greater opportunities in science and literature than did Jena. 
 And in this letter he expresses the wish that he might be 
 summoned thither a wish which was to be fulfilled some 
 ten years later. 
 
 During the first year or two of the Jena period, Hegel was 
 in almost complete accord with Schelling. Together they 
 
39] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 39 
 
 carried on a philosophical journal. The contributions of 
 one, it is said, cannot in many cases be distinguished from 
 those of the other. But Schelling left Jena in 1803. Hegel 
 now develops independently not that he sets aside or 
 refutes the old views, but that he has absorbed them, and 
 seeing their one-sidedness, presses on to a higher standpoint. 
 This is based both upon the old and upon the new, which 
 latter seems almost to unfold itself putting on as it does 
 form and body as suggested by the negative, complementary 
 implications of the old. 
 
 Schelling, too or rather, perhaps, his followers seem to 
 have diverged from the common ground taken at first. 
 Tendencies to theosophy and mysticism were developing 
 " wayward and fanciful constructions," says Prof. Caird, 
 " hybrids between poetry and philosophy, with the distinct- 
 ive merits of neither." 
 
 Hegel, though capable of mystical and poetical feeling, 
 thought philosophy to have higher uses than the expression 
 of this. Philosophy was to express " mit durren Worten," 
 the clear, crystalline outlines of thought the cool judgment 
 of the spirit. Philosophy was not to ignore feeling, emotion, 
 passion. Every phase of truth and being was to have due 
 evaluation. But that evaluation itself was to be as unperturbed, 
 and as universal in meaning and impartiality, as any alge- 
 braic x or y. 
 
 Divergence of opinion was followed, unfortunately, by 
 estrangement of friendship. But it is folly to put the blame 
 of such estrangement wholly upon Hegel ; and it seems un- 
 fair, to say the very least, to make such charge add point to 
 the assertion that Hegel used men as long as he wished, and 
 then cast them off. Says Prof. Royce : " In his dealings 
 with his friends, as for instance with Schelling, he was wily 
 and masterful, using men for his advantage so long as 
 
40 HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR [ 40 
 
 he needed them, and turning upon them without scruple 
 when they could no longer serve his ends." 1 
 
 In a note, Prof. Royce says of this passage, and its con- 
 text: "The expert reader will easily detect the influence 
 of Haym's and of Dr. Hutchinson Stirling's estimates of 
 Hegel's personality in what follows." But no reason is 
 assigned for choosing these estimates rather than those, for 
 instance, of Rosenkranz, of Thaulow, of Kostlin, of Michelet, 
 of Erdmann, of Hotho. 
 
 Stirling's book the first part of it is almost a tragical 
 drama the story of a soul's conquest of Hegel. It is viva- 
 cious, too. Having once found the " Secret of Hegel," the 
 writer seems almost to play with the philosopher, as a boy 
 with a ball. The only trouble is, that the playing sometimes 
 seerns careless ; and what wonder that Hegel falls as would 
 any ball i' the mud. For instance, touching again upon 
 the relations of Schelling and Hegel, take this passage from 
 Stirling. It refers to Hegel's writing to Schelling, just before 
 going to Jena. 2 " Hegel was by four years and five months 
 the senior of Schelling: as yet, nevertheless, he has done 
 nothing ; he was but an obscure tutor, and his existence was 
 to be wholly ignored. Schelling, on the contrary, though so 
 much his junior, was already an old celebrity, a placed pro- 
 fessor, an established author, a philosopher, the rival of 
 Fichte, the rival of Kant. To Hegel, unknown, obscure, of 
 
 1 In several instances I have had to express disagreement with Prof. Royce's 
 estimate of Hegel's character, given in The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. This 
 book of Prof. Royce has been so much to me, that I am sure he will pardon, if he 
 ever sees, this disagreement, motioning the criticism away as a mother brushes a 
 fly from her child. In Prof. Royce's book, the sketch of Fichte precedes that 
 of Hegel; and it seems to me that it was artistic requirement, rather than candid 
 judgment, which pictures Hegel dark in order to offset the brilliant beauty of 
 Fichte's character. It would appear that the facts of the case would lend them- 
 selves to a much fairer portraiture. 
 
 2 Stirling, The Secret of He%el, Vol. I., p. 25. 
 
4 1 J HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 4 ! 
 
 no account, nothing, but who would rank precisely among 
 these highest of the high who would, in fact, as the paper 
 in his desk prophesied to him, be all the immense advan- 
 tages that would lie in Schelling's introduction, in Schelling's 
 association of him with himself as philosophical teacher, as 
 literary writer, could not be hid. Why, it would be the sav- 
 ing to him of whole years of labor, perhaps a whole world 
 of heart-breaks. There is, quite accordingly, a peculiar tone, 
 a peculiar batedness of breath in the letter of Hegel : admi- 
 ration of Schelling's career, almost amounting to awe, is 
 hinted ; he looks to Scheliing with full confidence for a 
 recognition of his disinterested labor (the paper in his desk), 
 even though its sphere be lower," . . . etc., etc. 1 
 
 But before we take this judgment too seriously, we should 
 refer to a subsequent statement of Stirling a statement 
 which is perhaps meant to extract the sting, even as far back 
 as page 25. On page 1 16 he says, " the objections and vitu- 
 perations which occur in this chapter are not judgments : 
 they are but the student's travail-cries." 
 
 As regards the estimate of Haym, reference might best 
 be made to the answer of Rosenkranz. 2 Haym's dislike 
 seems to have originated in difference of political creed. He 
 was a liberal ; and the doctrines of Hegel lent themselves to 
 reactionaries. Hinc lacrymae illae and enmity, also an 
 enmity which, as Rosenkranz says, extends not alone to the 
 system but to the man. 
 
 A man's life is checkered. It needs but a little malice to 
 piece the black squares together in one's description ; and 
 evil fame is the result. George Eliot once pictured a little 
 
 1 The early letters of Hegel to Scheliing when still at Tubingen show a like 
 friendly appreciation. The " peculiar tone " and " batedness of breath " perceived 
 in this later letter would seem somewhat subjective phenomena incident to adverse 
 criticism. 
 
 2 Haym's Hegel und seine Zeit was published in 1857. In 1858 Rosenkranz 
 met this with his Apologie Hegel's gegen Dr. R. Haym (pp. 55). 
 
42 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [42 
 
 girl as trotting along, " stepping always, by a peculiar gift, 
 in the muddiest places." The same may be said of some 
 critics. Rosenkranz makes that charge of Haym. " He 
 has," he says, "a preference for all the lacks and weaknesses 
 of Hegel. . . . He delights in bringing out his imperfections. 
 . . . He has the talent for belittling all the greatness of this 
 man, for making his merits seem doubtful." 
 
 To clear the air after this bit of polemic, it may be well to 
 give this short whiff of kindlier appreciation. Burt, in his 
 History of Modern Philosophy, says: Hegel's "domestic and 
 social relations seem to have been only felicitous." And 
 this they never could have been, had his dealings with his 
 friends been merely "wily and masterful." 
 
 There is preserved a note of Goethe to Hegel, in which 
 Goethe calls him "mein lieber Herr Doctor." He asks 
 Hegel " to regard what I enclose as a proof that I am still 
 quietly working for you. I wish I had more to promise you, 
 but, in such cases, often much is gained for the future when 
 once a beginning has been made." 1 
 
 Hegel was intimate with Paulus, and saw through the 
 press for him the French translation of his edition of Spinoza. 
 With Knebel and his wife he spent pleasant hours, enjoying 
 especially the latter's singing. His closest friendship, how- 
 ever, was with Niethammer a friendship that lasted with 
 their lives. 
 
 In these years at Jena, Hegel was busy with what was to 
 be his first great publication, The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
 The work has been called the Alpha and Omega of Hegel, 
 
 1 Mention may be made of a side light upon Goethe's activity given by one of 
 Hegel's letters. In a letter to Schelling, November 16, 1803, Goethe is described 
 as being devoted to " the real and to apparatus." He has had arranged a botani- 
 cal cabinet; a physiological cabinet was under construction; and an order was 
 out for a plan of some galvanic apparatus. The same letter speaks of Schiller 
 working on Wilhelm Tell. The items of news in this letter are another indica- 
 tion of Hegel's friendly interests. 
 
43] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 43 
 
 his later writings being only extracts from it. This may be 
 going too far, says Wallace, "yet here the Pegasus of mind 
 soars free through untrodden fields of air, and tastes the joys 
 of first love and the pride of fresh discovery in the quest for 
 truth. The fire of young enthusiasm has not yet been forced 
 to hide itself and smoulder away in apparent calm. The 
 mood is Olympian far above the turmoil and bitterness of 
 lower earth, free from the bursts of temper which emerge 
 later, when the thinker has to mingle in the fray and endure 
 the shafts of controversy." 
 
 The Phenomenology is Hegel's voyage of discovery, not 
 undertaken, however, in the spirit of romantic adventure. 
 The spirit of wonder, of worship before mystery, is to be 
 laid aside for a little. The priests will leave the temple for 
 a moment, and an appraiser of its stones and furnishings will 
 enter. The love of wisdom is to become a knowledge of wis- 
 dom. A science of the spirit is to be constructed. 1 
 
 During the Jena period, Hegel's influence did not reach 
 the mass of students at the university. He was still com- 
 paratively unknown. But there was an inner circle that 
 clung to him, whose devotion and admiration steadily in- 
 creased. Youth has the power of coloring the most abstract 
 of terms with roseate hue. In efforts to conceive the abso- 
 lute, there was all the glow of religion added to the bracing 
 air of dawning intellect. Hegel himself has expressed the 
 feeling in one of the aphorisms he wrote at this time : "We 
 are lifted up by the words eternal, holy, absolute, infinite. 
 They give light and warmth. They are forces swaying us to 
 and fro, and the seal of their power is, that in them one feels 
 himself." And Hegel, too, in his own reserved way, was 
 enthusiastic. There is an emotional tone in his very logic. 
 
 1 " Daran mitzuarbeiten, das die Philosophic der Form der Wissenschaft naher 
 komme dem Ziele, ihren Namen der Litbe zum IVissen ablegen zu seyn ist es, 
 was ich mir vorgesetzt." Phanomenologie, Vorrede. 
 
44 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [44 
 
 He is uniting old conflicting views, massing these for on- 
 slaught against strongly held positions. There is a sense of 
 conflict and victory. His parting words in 1806, after the 
 course of lectures, are almost a bugle call. " This, gentle- 
 men, is speculative philosophy, as far as I have been able to 
 unfold it. You must regard it as but a beginning of philo- 
 sophizing, which you must carry on. We are living in a 
 momentous time a time of upheaval in which the spirit has 
 put off its old form and won a new. The entire mass of 
 former ideas, conceptions, the bonds of the world, are 
 loosened and fall away as a dream. A new advance of the 
 spirit is at hand. It is the philosopher chiefly who has to 
 greet this advance, to recognize it ; while others, vainly striv- 
 ing against it, cling to the past; and the majority, though 
 making up the mass of its progress, do so unwittingly. But 
 it is philosophy which, recognizing its eternal aspect, gives 
 it honor. 
 
 " Hoping to dwell pleasantly in your thoughts, I wish you 
 a happy vacation." 1 
 
 ' It was indeed a time of upheaval. Things were being 
 overturned not merely by logic, but by shot and shell. 
 Napoleon and the Napoleonic army were making Europe 
 their own. Now it was Jena's fate to be a stepping-stone of 
 their progress. 
 
 While the French soldiers were burning and plundering 
 the town, Hegel remained for some time in his house. He 
 gave the soldiers to eat and drink what he had. He was 
 threatened with rough usage by a party of them. But see- 
 ing one of their number wearing the cross of the Legion of 
 Honor, he appealed to him, saying that he, a simple German 
 scholar, might expect honorable treatment at his hands. 
 ''Whereupon," says Rosenkranz, "the soldiers somewhat 
 
 1 Rosenkranz, HegeVs Leben, p. 214. 
 
45] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 45 
 
 quieted down and contented themselves with a bottle of wine." 
 The storm of fire increasing, Hegel put in his pocket the last 
 pages of the Phenomenology ', and sought refuge in the house 
 of Gabler, the pro-rector. This house was protected by a 
 French officer of high rank, who had taken up his quarters 
 there. 
 
 After the battle, Hegel found his household effects in the 
 utmost confusion. He was without a penny. But Nietham- 
 mer, who was in Bamberg, supplied his immediate needs. 
 And Goethe wrote Knebel, if Hegel were in want of money, 
 to give him some. 
 
 There is a letter of Hegel to Niethammer, dated : " Jena, 
 Monday the I3th of October, 1806, the day on which the 
 French have taken Jena, and the emperor Napoleon entered 
 its walls." In this he says : " I saw the emperor that 
 world-soul ride through the city reconnoitering. It is 
 indeed a memorable experience to see such an individual, 
 who, seated here on horseback, as from a center overlooks 
 the world and rules it." 
 
 It must be remembered that Hegel was a Suabian, not a 
 Prussian. The taking of Jena did not seem to him a calam- 
 ity befalling his own country. Indeed, there was no great 
 nation of Germany at that time. There was little national 
 spirit. The foremost German thinkers seemed to be citizens 
 of the world. Their kingdom was untouched by the rise or 
 fall of merely national governments. Taking into account this 
 general condition of things in Germany, recognizing that the 
 time was not yet ripe for the nationalizing of the country, we 
 shall not be so quick as are some, to condemn as unpatriotic 
 and pusillanimous Hegel's admiration of the foreign invader. 
 Did not Hegel suffer as much as many? It is only a proof, 
 then, of the magnaminity of the man that he could find worth 
 in his conqueror. And then, too, there are various orders of 
 men. The division of men into workers, soldiers, statesmen 
 
46 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 or philosophers, is not merely Plato's division ; to some ex- 
 tent, it is Nature's. Hegel was more philosophical than sol- 
 dierly. Yet was he not courageous? He met what came 
 unflinchingly, and up to the very firing of Jena persevered 
 in his literary work the duty which life had put upon him. 
 Where is it that, finally, he met his end? Cholera is raging 
 in Berlin. But Hegel is there, too, at his place in the lecture 
 room. And when the disease strikes him, there is no cring- 
 ing. Not so dramatic perhaps as the death-stroke of Fichte, 
 gotten while caring for the wounded soldiers. And yet, with- 
 out losing one whit of admiration for Fichte, may we not see 
 something great also in Hegel? 
 
 In January, 1807, Hegel wrote, 1 in reply to a letter from 
 one of his older students : " Nothing could show more 
 plainly than do the events of these days, that the trained and 
 cultured must be victors over the rude, that spirit must con- 
 quer spiritless understanding and scheming," This was in 
 praise of the French. But then follows : " Science, knowl- 
 edge, is alone the Theodicy the justifier of God to man. 
 It must, therefore, not stand in brutish amazement before 
 events. Nor must it count them the result of a chance 
 moment, or of the talent of an individual. It must see that 
 the fates are not dependent upon the possession or non- 
 possession of a hill. It must not complain as if wrong had 
 conquered and right fallen." The letter then says that the 
 French nation, by the baptism of its revolution, had freed 
 itself from many burdensome fears that oppressed others. 
 Its individuals, too, had left behind them the fear of death, 
 and had broken loose from mere habit life. " This gives her 
 the great might she approves before others. Others, stupid 
 and without energy, pay the penalty. But these, perhaps, 
 forced at length to rouse themselves from indifference to 
 
 1 K6stlin, Hegel in philosophischer politischer und nationaler Beziehung, fur 
 das dei4tsche Volk dargestellt, p. 180. 
 
47] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 47 
 
 realities, will come out into the real. It may well be that in 
 the future they will, while dealing with the external, still 
 keep their inner depth, and so will surpass their teachers." 
 This is a prophecy of 1870; and Hegel had his part in the 
 developing of the German national spirit. Patriotism and 
 true citizenship were no mere side-issues of his philosophy. 
 " In the spirit of a people each citizen has his spiritual sub- 
 stance. It is not alone the maintenance of the individuals 
 which is dependent upon this living whole ; but this latter 
 constitutes the general nature or essence of each as an indi- 
 vidual. The maintenance of the whole, therefore, is more 
 important than the life of individuals as such ; and all citi- 
 zens should have this conviction." 1 This is what Hegel be- 
 lieved, and what he later taught his boys in Niirnbeg. 
 
 1 Philosophische Proptideutik, XVIII, Part I, 55. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 HEGEL AS SCHOOLMASTER IN NURNBERG 
 
 HEGEL'S versatility was to be tested now at a new point. 
 Not gaining foothold at Heidelberg, he becomes the editor 
 of a Bamberg newspaper. It was Niethammer who made 
 the proposition. In accepting, Hegel wrote : " The work 
 itself will interest me ; for, as you know, I eagerly follow the 
 world-happenings. ... I hope quickly to find myself at 
 home in their recording." 
 
 Busied with the newspaper, he nevertheless found time to 
 carry on work upon a critique of the political condition of 
 Germany. This remained in manuscript. Still it is import- 
 ant as indicating Hegel's breadth of activity. Though 
 political, such a work has educational significance. The 
 school exists as the introducer of the individual into the 
 larger social life of citizenship. A first necessity, then, of 
 the educator is to have some sort of conception of the state, 
 its history, its present problems, the ideal towards which it 
 may grow. The development of such a conception was one 
 of Hegel's life-tasks. It is true, perhaps, that Hegel did not 
 undertake that task as an educator, primarily. But the 
 scientific spirit in which he undertook it his self-devotement 
 to the main human problems, illustrated thereby is one 
 high characteristic of the true educator. 
 
 Work on the newspaper, however, is but a tide-over. And 
 
 before two years are gone, again through the kindly offices 
 
 of Niethammer, Hegel is in a position in closer touch with 
 
 the educational world. He becomes rector of the classical 
 
 48 [48 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 49 
 
 school the Aegidien Gymnasium in Nurnberg. Besides 
 having the administrative duties of the rectorate, he has to 
 lecture on philosophy. This will be his work for eight years. 
 These years, in one sense, are still years of preparation. 
 They bring forth, it is true, Hegel's second great work, the 
 Logic ; but they also train Hegel for his future as university 
 lecturer and rector. 
 
 In 1807, Niethammer became the minister of instruction 
 for Bavaria. His was a work of reconstruction. Indeed, that 
 was peculiarly the work of all German educators at this time. 
 In 1809, for instance, the Prussian minister of instruction 
 wrote as follows, to some teachers who had been sent to learn 
 Pestalozzi's principles and methods : " The section of public 
 instruction begs you to believe, and to assure Mr. Pestalozzi, 
 that the cause is the interest of the government, and of his 
 majesty, the king, personally, who are convinced that libera- 
 tion from extraordinary calamities is only to be effected by 
 a thorough improvement of the people's education." 1 
 
 When Niethammer entered upon his office, there were tw6 
 rival educational tendencies in Bavaria, one whose principle 
 was monastic scholasticism, and one whose principle was 
 utilitarianism. These represented the extreme medieval and 
 modern tendencies those of the monastery and those of the 
 Illumination. 2 The advance was to be made on the mid-way 
 between them. Niethammer was the leader of the advance. 
 Bavaria would furnish steps from the common school to the 
 universities by establishing scientific and classical schools. 
 At Nurnberg, a scientific school was founded, and the classi- 
 cal school was re-organized. At the head cf the scientific 
 school was the good Schubert, from whose pen we have, as 
 we shall see later, a pleasing picture of Hegel. The rector 
 
 1 Barnard, National Education in Europe, p. 84. 
 
 2 Rosenkranz, Hegel's Leben> p. 246. 
 
50 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [50 
 
 of the classical school was ever to be a philosopher, and was 
 to instruct in philosophy and in religion. 
 
 While seeking for some one to fill such a rectorate, Niet- 
 hammer felt some hesitancy in offering the place to Hegel. 
 It might seem a degradation. Having lectured at Jena, and 
 published his Phanomenologie des Geistes, and with aspirations 
 still for a university chair, would he be content to take charge 
 of a school of boys? 
 
 But Hegel willingly accepted. The newspaper had been 
 a need-shift " a stop-gap and pot-boiler," Wallace calls it. 
 He welcomed the return to more scientific, studious work. 
 The anticipation was so pleasing, says Rosenkranz, that 
 Hegel could hardly believe in the reality of his new position, 
 until actually in Nitrnberg. 
 
 Hegel must have felt the need of a vocation. "A voca- 
 tion," he has said, " is something universal and necessary, 
 and is part of a complete human life." He was no free lance, 
 seeking single combat, and strange battle-fields. Rather 
 would he choose a well-trod path. He would share in some 
 broadly human work, which would bring him into many- 
 sided relation with his fellows. Herein is much of Hegel's 
 inspiration for ordinary people. He walked in common 
 ways ; and afterwards the stones under foot spoke a new 
 meaning. 
 
 It is true that Hegel during all this time was looking out 
 for a university position ; but he does so with no complaint, 
 or shirking of present duty. " He gave himself," says his 
 biographer, " he gave himself to his office with entire devo- 
 tion, with unwearied zeal." In a letter to Van Ghert, Am- 
 sterdam, dated Niirnberg, December i6th, 1809, he says: " I 
 have been now for a year rector, and professor of the philo- 
 sophical sciences in the gymnasium of this place, with a sal- 
 ary of about lioo Fl. So you see my immediate economic 
 necessities are met. I had the hope that the recent political 
 
5 i J HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 5 r 
 
 changes would bring some offer of a chair in a university; 
 but I have no near prospect of it. From your sympathy in 
 what concerns me, you will be glad to know by this letter 
 that things have not turned out as badly as you had feared. 
 My office has, it is true, a heterogeneous aspect; but it is 
 nevertheless very close to my chief interest, that of philoso- 
 phy in the strict sense of the word, and, in part, is one with it." 
 
 To another friend, the poet Sinclair, Hegel wrote in 1810, 
 in part as follows : " I thank you most heartily for your 
 letter that brought with it the offer of a position in your 
 neighborhood. But at the gymnasium here, I am professor 
 of philosophical propaedeutics and rector, and have the 
 hope moreover of being called in time to a university. Here, 
 then, I have a settled course a thing which suits me most 
 and have besides official duties closely connected with my 
 studies. Were I to throw away. these advantages, or to give 
 them up for apparantly greater, there would be a break in 
 my outer doings that would set me back considerably. It 
 would be pleasant indeed could we live near each other, re- 
 viewing everything together, and sharing new ventures in 
 common. Bnt come and visit our old Nurnberg. You can 
 make the excursion much more easily than I .... I am 
 on the lookout for your philosophical work. You have made 
 a proper beginning in your former role as poet, with three 
 tragedies ; so as a philosopher, with three volumes. I am 
 eager to see whether or not you are still a stiff-necked 
 Fichtian Finally, I send you a sample of my begin- 
 ning which I started some years back. See yourself what 
 you can make out of it. It is a concrete side of the spirit 
 that is dealt with therein ; the science itself is yet to be form- 
 ulated. I wonder how, your free not to say, anarchic na- 
 ture will like the Spanish boots in which I have the spirit 
 walk. 
 
 "But I see that you, also, blame the lack of method in 
 
5 2 HEGhL AS ED UCA TOR 
 
 the would-be philosophical writings that are rife or used to 
 be so. I am a schoolman who have to teach philosophy; 
 and perhaps it is on that account that I hold that philos- 
 ophy, just as geometry, should have a regular structure 
 which may be taught. An acquaintance with mathematics 
 and with philosophy is one thing ; quite another is the talent 
 which discovers or produces the new in the field of mathe- 
 matics or of philosophy. It is my work to discover a 
 [teachable] scientific form, or at least to contribute to its 
 discovery." 
 
 As stated in this letter, Hegel had to give instruction in 
 philosophy. He did this in accord with the Bavarian pro- 
 gram. Modifications, however, prompted by pedagogical 
 insight, were introduced. Rosenkranz, fortunately, gives the 
 paragraphs of this Bavarian program, or Normativ, as it was 
 called, which relate to the teaching of philosophy. They 
 are substantially as follows : 
 
 Philosophical Instruction for the Gymnasium 
 
 In this the main point of view to be constantly in mind, is 
 that the chief object of this part of gymnasial study is to 
 conduct the pupils to speculative thinking. The pupils are 
 accordingly, by graded exercises, to be made ripe for the 
 systematic study of philosophy which is begun in the uni- 
 versity. 
 
 1. In the lowest class a beginning may be made with the 
 formal part of philosophy that is, with logic. Here atten- 
 tion is mainly to be paid to the logical technique and to the 
 laws of logical reasoning. This will give, on the one side 
 (formal), opportunity enough to exercise the sharp-minded- 
 ness of the pupils; and on the other side (material), techni- 
 cal readiness in scientific logic is attained, which is presup- 
 posed by the other sciences. 
 
 2. For the lower middle class, cosmology (retaining the 
 
53] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR $ $ 
 
 old division of philosophy) may be taken as the first means 
 of speculative discipline, in order now to lead the pupil, in 
 his speculative thought, out from himself to philosophizing 
 about the world. And since natural theology is connected 
 in many ways with the foregoing, the same course of study 
 will treat of both. The Kantian critiques of the cosmological 
 and physico-theological proofs of the existence of God are 
 here to be used. 
 
 3. In the upper middle class, the youth in his philos- 
 ophizing may be led back to self; and, as a second means of 
 speculative discipline, psychology may be taken. Then 
 naturally follows the ethical and legal concepts ; and the 
 course of study embraces these also. For the first part of 
 this course, the psychological writings of Carus are to be 
 mainly used ; and for the second, Kant's writings. 
 
 4. In the highest class of the gymnasium, finally, the pre- 
 viously studied subjects of speculative discipline may be 
 brought together in one philosophical encyclopedia, or con- 
 nected outline of the whole. 
 
 Hegel much doubted the practicability of such a plan 
 for the gymnasium. He would prefer making an intelligent 
 study of the Greek and Roman classics the doorway to phil- 
 osophy. Hegel was not one to hurry boys into specula- 
 tive thinking. In his actual teaching he rightly avoided 
 this. He began with practical philosophy, because the ma- 
 terial dealt with by this lay nearer to the boy's experience. 
 The principles of law, morality and religion were to come 
 first; then logic and the more abstruse philosophy. A 
 letter of Hegel to Niethammer is preserved, on the teaching 
 of philosophy in the gymnasium. 1 He also drew up an out- 
 line of his own instruction, which has since been published 
 as the 1 8th volume of his works. 2 This, as Caird says, not- 
 
 1 See among the Translations, No. 48. 
 
 2 See among the Translations, No. 49. 
 
54 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [54 
 
 withstanding " all the rector's explanation, must have puz- 
 zled the clever boys at Niirnberg." Nevertheless, Hegel 
 did his best to help their understanding an effort that had 
 the best of results in his own subsequent thinking and writ- 
 ing. The manuscript of the outline of these introductory 
 lessons was a difficult one to edit. Full of erasures, trans- 
 positions, red-ink insertions, rewritings, modifications it 
 was a clear indication of the conscientious work of the 
 teacher. Every word had to be chosen with a reference to 
 carrying a difficult subject into untrained minds. He sought 
 gradually to accustom his pupils to deal with general con- 
 ceptions of the understanding a process which he jokingly 
 described as an act of abstraction, in which the youth had 
 to learn to do without eyes and ears. 
 
 He gave instruction in philosophy to all classes. In each 
 he altered the mode of teaching, suiting it as far as he could 
 to the age of his pupils, with a care, too, for the individual. 
 He dictated paragraphs, giving explanation and illustration. 
 He did not read off what he said, though he had his manu- 
 script before him. The pupils had to copy neatly their dicta- 
 tion. The verbal explanation, too, was to be written from 
 memory as well as might be. From time to time Hegel 
 would call upon one and another to read their notes, the call 
 serving to keep the attention and to stimulate correct work. 
 At the beginning of each hour, one of the class had to give 
 a summary of last hour's exercise. The scholars were quite 
 at liberty to ask questions. " In his kindliness," says 
 Rosenkranz, " Hegel allowed his lecturing to be broken in 
 upon, and often a good part of the hour was taken up with 
 the points suggested in the questions, though Hegel knew 
 how to bring these particulars into the general point of view, 
 and into close bearing upon the main subject." At times, 
 too, the philosophical lessons gave the subject matter for 
 Latin exercises an early example of the correlation of 
 studies. 
 
55] HE GEL A S ED UCA TOR 5 5 
 
 The philosophical instruction in the gymnasium was to be 
 a propaedeutic a preparation for the university study of 
 philosophy. In the letter to Niethammer, Hegel sketches 
 the province of the gymnasial work. In a letter * written 
 while still at Nurnberg to Prof. F. v. Raumer, he writes of the 
 university study. In this, after speaking of the unsystematic 
 way in which philosophy had been taught, he says : " This, 
 I think, can be rightly maintained, that the teaching of phil- 
 osophy at the university can only then effect its purpose 
 the giving of a definite kind of knowledge when it pursues 
 that end in a definite, methodical way, comprehending and 
 co-ordinating the various details. In this systematic form 
 alone is the science of philosophy, like any other science, 
 capable of being learned. And even if the teacher does not 
 like this word " learn," he still must be conscious that it ex- 
 presses the aim of teaching. It has become a prejudice, not 
 in philosophy alone, but also in pedagogy and here the 
 prejudice is strongest that the power of original thought 
 should be developed and given rein, and that, for this, ma- 
 terial or content is not the thing of first consideration. There 
 is a notion that learning is opposed to original thought; 
 whereas, in fact, it is only with the material got by learning 
 that thought can deal. ... It is a common error to fancy 
 that a thought can have the stamp of originality [of essen- 
 tially belonging to one's self] only when it departs from the 
 thoughts of other men. But against this we might use the 
 word : the new is untrue, and the true is not new. . . . 
 
 " A scientifically developed philosophy does full justice to 
 definite thought and to fundamental knowledge; and its 
 content, the universally true of spiritual and natural relation- 
 ships, has to do immediately with the positive sciences, 
 which show this content in more concrete form, in greater 
 detail and application. So true is this, that the study of 
 
 1 Hegel's Werke, XVII., 349-356. 
 
5 6 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [56 
 
 these sciences is necessary as a basis for true insight into 
 philosophy. . . . 
 
 "Edification is often expected of philosophy. To my 
 mind philosophy, even when presented to youth, is not 
 meant to be edifying. 1 But it has to satisfy a need akin to 
 edification, which I shall touch upon briefly. The more 
 strong the recently renewed demand for worthy material, 
 for higher ideas and religion, so much the less adequate than 
 ever is the form of feeling, fantasy, vague imagination. To 
 give just insight into what has reality and content, to compre- 
 hend this in definite thought, and to guard it against hazy 
 instability such is the work of philosophy. . . . 
 
 " Philosophy includes these sciences : logic, embracing 
 the quite abstract and general, with all of this character for- 
 merly treated by metaphysics. The concrete is dealt with 
 (i) in natural philosophy, and (2) in the philosophy of 
 spirit, to which latter belong psychology, anthropology, 
 ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and history of phil- 
 osophy." 
 
 Five commencement-day addresses given by Hegel have 
 been preserved. 2 Upon prize-day, or commencement, it was 
 customary for the rector of the gymnasium to give an ad- 
 dress touching upon the history of the school during the 
 preceding year, and upon matters of general interest to the 
 pupils and their friends. Many of Hegel's important educa- 
 tional views are given in these addresses. A number of pas- 
 sages from them are included among the translations, in the 
 
 1 Cf. Mackenzie, Social Philosophy, p. 4 : " . . . There is a special danger in 
 any attempt to work at what may be called the edifying side of philosophic study, 
 before the more purely theoretical parts of the subject have been placed on a 
 secure foundation. Questions in which our sympathies and hopes are directly 
 concerned can scarcely be treated without bias; and there is a risk that if we 
 begin with these, our whole subsequent speculations may take their color from 
 our personal aims and wishes." 
 
 2 In Werke, Vol. XVI. 
 
57] HEGEL AS EDUCA TOR 5 7 
 
 second part of this volume. Here it may be well to give the 
 substance of a portion of the first address, which lays down 
 as it were the educational platform of the school. " The 
 spirit and purpose," says Hegel, "of our institution is to 
 give a preparation for more advanced scholarship a prep- 
 aration based upon Greek and Roman foundations. For a 
 thousand years this has been the ground upon which all 
 culture has stood." * But this study of the ancients is to be 
 carried on in a modern spirit. Latin and Greek authors are 
 to be read in the original so as to get nearest to their mean- 
 ing, to the content of the life portrayed. Translations are 
 like artificial roses, which in form, color, even perfume, may 
 resemble the real, but which lack the exquisite loveliness of 
 life. Formal training is not to be divorced from learning of 
 content. The noblest food in the noblest form is contained 
 in the works of the ancients. They are golden apples in 
 baskets of silver. 
 
 The process of education, says Hegel in this first address, 
 is not to be looked upon as the mere adding, link by link, to 
 a chain the later links joined to the earlier it is true, but 
 with no re-working of the old into higher forms. But edu- 
 cation must have material and substance already present, 
 upon which it works, enriching it and forming it anew. We 
 need to win for ourselves the world of the ancients, not for 
 the mere possession, but for substance to work upon. "Un- 
 happy he who is estranged from his immediate world of feel- 
 ing; for this is nothing else than that the bonds of faith, love 
 and trust, which holily unite mind and heart with life, are 
 broken ! This moral pain, this heart sorrow, is not de- 
 manded by the estrangement which is essential to theoretic 
 
 1 It must not be thought that the Nurnberg school was merely a classical school. 
 Religion, introductory philosophy, mathematics, natural history and physics, 
 French, Hebrew (for intending theological students), and the mother tongue, 
 with its literature all were taught. 
 
5 8 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 5 g 
 
 culture. This demands the slighter tension and pain of the 
 intellect, incident to the effort which copes with things not 
 immediate, with the foreign, with things of memory and of 
 thought. This demand for separation is so necessary, that it 
 expresses itself in us as a general and well known tendency. 
 The strange, the distant, has enticing interest." Youth pic- 
 tures it as good fortune to get away from the home land and 
 to dwell with Crusoe on a remote isle. It is a necessary 
 illusion, to expect to find what is most worthy in things 
 farthest. " This centrifugal tendency of the soul causes the 
 young spirit to separate itself from its natural life and con- 
 ditions, and to put itself in a far and strange world." In 
 education, the means for bringing about this separation are 
 given by the world and speech of the ancients. But this 
 ancient world, which separates us from ourselves, contains, 
 at the same time, the starting points and Ariadne threads of 
 return to ourselves, to a new friendship and recovery of self 
 a self now instinct with the true and universal spirit. 1 
 
 Hegel's was a friendly and mild disposition. This won 
 the confidence of his pupils. But there was no lack of firm- 
 ness, with, perhaps, sometimes a trace of grim Suabian. 
 humor that was not unlike sarcasm. He believed in having 
 order in his school. Life was a serious thing, and the school 
 had to fit for life. The pupils were tc be brought under 
 general law. Many things in themselves innocent might not 
 be done by any, because disorder would result if attempted 
 by all. " Yet," says Caird, " in insisting upon strict order 
 and method, Hegel seems to have avoided the extreme of 
 petty interference, and to have tolerated the frolic and license 
 of his school boys, even beyond the point which is now con- 
 sidered desirable." 
 
 Stories of school days, recounted in after years, are apt to 
 be somewhat more pointedly than broadly descriptive. They 
 
 1 Cf. what Rosenkranz says on Estrangement, Philosophy of Education, 24. 
 
59] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 59 
 
 are a species of abstraction chosen by wit rather than reason. 
 With this in mind, while reading the following anecdote, we 
 shall be saved from thinking Hegel another Dr. Busby, or 
 James Boyer of Elian fame. Caird gives this story as told 
 by one of Hegel's Niirnberg pupils : " I remember that in 
 1812 a dancing master came to Niirnberg, and, with Hegel's 
 permission, opened a course of lessons at the gymnasium, 
 for which the members were requested to put down their 
 names. Naturally almost every one subscribed. After a 
 time, however, some of us became discontented. The danc- 
 ing master, skillful enough in his art, was, as is not unusual, 
 a coxcomb ; the wearisome exercises in mannerly deport- 
 ment, the standing in stocks to turn the toes outwards, etc., 
 were not liked. ... In short, some of the scholars planned 
 how to withdraw from their engagement. But that was im- 
 possible without Hegel's consent, and I and another were 
 sent to lay our grievances before him. But what a reception 
 we got ! I scarcely know how we got down the stairs. He 
 would not see the dancing-master lose the fees guaranteed to 
 him, and, in short, we were obliged to dance, stand in stocks, 
 and make our salutations till the end of summer." A fact, 
 we may add, which, thanks to Hegel, doubtless resulted in 
 much ease and pleasure amid later social functions. 
 
 But now we must turn to a new aspect of Hegel. We 
 have seen him, a man of about forty, scrupulously neat in 
 appearance, with plenty of white linen, formal, but genial 
 withal in demeanor, deeply thoughtful, yet sympathetically 
 trying to make his boys so too. A dull, colorless picture, 
 perhaps. But is it so? Are there not gentle but effective 
 tints therein? It may be that praise is too apt to go to the 
 showy, the flaring. But just as in pictorial art, the taste 
 nowadays prefers the subdued, the grays and browns that 
 often clothe the richer imagination, so in taste for character, 
 the every-day person if so be he have some spiritual signifi- 
 
6O HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 cance is becoming the profoundly interesting person. So we 
 may perhaps dilute the dye of Prof. Royce's brilliant black- 
 ening of Hegel : " He was no patriot," he says, " like Fichte ; 
 no romantic dreamer like Novalis ; no poetic seer of splendid 
 metaphysical visions like Schelling. His career is absolutely 
 devoid of romance." T 
 
 Well, the romantic novel is perhaps not the highest type 
 of literature. Nor is "romantic" the crowning epithet of 
 worth. And in Hegel, if romance were absent, there were 
 nevertheless present hope, trust, patience, brave undertaking 
 of duty, friendship and love. The life was deep, though 
 having but little swirl and foam. 
 
 Settled at his school work, Hegel falls in love or ripens 
 into the lover, we perhaps had better say, inasmuch as he 
 does nothing whatever "romantic," save to write two short 
 poems though these have as happy a glow as one could 
 wish. "We even have," says Prof. Royce, "one or two of 
 his love letters. They are awkward and dreary beyond 
 measure." Others have not found them so. Nor did Marie 
 von Tucher, the young and beautiful maiden to whom they 
 were addressed. She was but nineteen years of age, not 
 rich but talented. The veriest romancer might take her for 
 his heroine drawing upon our sympathies, too, if he wished 
 to pervert history by making her seem an earlier Dorothea 
 united to a Mr. Casaubon, of Middlemarch. But alas for the 
 romancer ! The marriage was a happy one, and would 
 furnish no plot either for Middlemarch or for the Sorrows of 
 Werther? 
 
 1 We might quote Lowell here : " But it is one of the schoolboy blunders in 
 criticism to deny one kind of perfection because it is not another." Essay on Gray. 
 
 2 Cf. the elder Titbottom and his young wife, in Prue and I : 
 
 " He was much older than she, without doubt. But age, as he used to say 
 with a smile of immortal youth, is a matter of feeling, not of years. 
 
 " And if sometimes, as she sat by his side on the piazza, her fancy looked 
 through her eyes upon that summer sea, and saw a younger lover, perhaps some 
 
6lJ HEGEL AS EDUCATOR fa 
 
 Ten years afterwards, when two sons had been added to 
 the family group, Hegel, while traveling, writes home : " I am 
 traveling, on the whole, out of a sense of duty and because I 
 must. I should be a hundred times more contented could I 
 divide my time between my studies and you." This perhaps 
 will give a hint of the unromantic it may be, but affectionate 
 domesticity of Hegel. A lady acquainted with him in Ber- 
 lin describes him, with a little feminine hyperbole, as "wor- 
 shiped by his children and adored by his wife, who, younger 
 by twenty-two years, hung upon him, not alone with the ten- 
 derness of a wife, but with a child's reverence." 
 
 A similar picture in more detail is given by Schubert in 
 his autobiography : " In the first months after my coming 
 to Niirnberg, I became acquainted with several men whose 
 influence remained with me even in later life. First of all 
 there was G. W. Fr. Hegel, who afterwards was to become 
 the most famous of my contemporaries. As rector of the 
 gymnasium his place was similar to mine, and our official 
 relations were many. I can only repeat what everybody 
 knows of him. I had previously, in Jena, learned to respect 
 him highly as a teacher. His Phenomenology of the Spirit 
 was at that time one of the most talked-of writings in phil- 
 osophy. He had extraordinarily broad and deep knowledge. 
 He was a man of firm, honorable character, careful in his 
 speech, just and right towards others, a man of preeminent 
 power, but ready, when need was, to extend his hand to 
 others. Not indeed on account of age, for he was but ten 
 years my elder, but because of his mental and spiritual ma- 
 turity, Hegel might have been my father ; and, especially in 
 the wise, competent way in which he fulfilled his office, my 
 
 one of those graceful and glowing heroes who occupy the foreground of all 
 young maidens' visions by the sea, yet she could not find one more generous and 
 gracious, nor fancy one more worthy and loving. . ." And we might write simi- 
 larly of Hegel, had we Curtis' way of saying things. 
 
62 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [ 2 
 
 pattern and example. As to his scholars at this time in 
 Niirnberg, he quickened their understanding and gave them 
 the proper use of their spiritual powers, a use turned to fine 
 and right account by many of them. He who has seen and 
 known Hegel only in the lecture room or by his printed 
 books, does not know the charm of his personal intercourse, 
 his tender sympathy as husband and father. His good sense 
 even in every-day affairs was educative, and his genial wit 
 made common things the brighter." I 
 
 In one of Hegel's letters to Niethammer, he says : " Wenn 
 man ein Amt und ein Weib, das man liebt, gefunden so ist 
 man eigentlich mit dem Leben fertig. When a man has a 
 place and a wife that he loves, life begins to be complete." 
 But not his life's work. Hegel had written but his Phenom- 
 enology had made but his voyage of discovery. Now there 
 was to be the serious labor of putting in general, logical form 
 the results of that voyage. The quiet years from 1812 to 
 1816 give him the opportunity. His great Logic is the out- 
 come " the one work," says Caird, " which the modern 
 world has to to put beside the Metaphysic of Aristotle." 
 
 Writing the Logic, Hegel was not neglecting his work as 
 schoolman. Indeed the Logic was to be the standing ground 
 of his soul, while he moved his world of home and school. 
 It was the nov OTU of Archimedes, which every true worker 
 seeks to find, and most of all the teacher. " One's vocation," 
 said Hegel, " is a many-sided thing." We may be sure that 
 one of its sides has a doorway leading out to the world-and- 
 spirit questions of philosophy. And dealing with these, 
 Hegel was but fulfilling his duty as educator and man. 
 
 From two of Hegel's correspondents we have interesting 
 glimpses from without of the Phenomenology and of the Logic 
 glimpses, too, which indicate something of Hegel's growth 
 
 1 Quoted by Kostlin, Hegel in philosophischer politischer und nationaler Bezie- 
 hung, fi'ir das deutsche Volk dargestellt, p. 127. 
 
63] HE C 'EL A S ED UCA TOR 5 3 
 
 between the writing of the two works. In 1810, Windisch- 
 mann, a physician, somewhat fanciful and with a touch, too, of 
 pietism, wrote to Hegel. He had been greatly moved by 
 the Phenomenology. " The study," he says, " of your system 
 of knowledge, has convinced me that this work, when it 
 has come to be understood, will be looked upon as the first 
 book of humanity's liberation, as the key to the new gospel, 
 which Lessing has foretold. You understand, of course, 
 what I would say by this. But I should like you to know 
 what the work has been to me, and that there are few who 
 have been stirred by it so deeply." Windischmann later 
 became Professor at Bonn. Fifteen years after writing the 
 letter above quoted, he closes a letter to Hegel with these 
 words : " May I tell you, that I think of you daily in my 
 prayers? It is indeed the best that one can do for another. 
 Give me also a place in the inner chamber of your heart, 
 which, hid from many, is still not unknown to me." 
 
 Quite an other character we have in Thaden, who found 
 Hegel's Logic to be " the book of books." This difference of 
 character is significant. It indicates the wide variety of read- 
 ers that found help in Hegel; and the contrast serves also to 
 bring out Hegel's character more clearly, Thaden being per- 
 haps the same type of man as Hegel. We follow Rosenkranz's 
 portrayal. Instead of Winclischmann's tendency to lose him- 
 self in mystical obscurity and to take the bliss of ecstatic 
 revery as the highest insight, we find in Thaden a clarity of 
 thought tending rather to mere abstract rationality. Instead 
 of Romish Churchism we find the self-reliance of Protestant- 
 ism, which cannot believe without knowing what and why it 
 believes. Instead of the passive armor of prayer, there is 
 capableness and readiness to act. In the place of the ten- 
 dency to ecclesiasticize social relationships, and to be sub- 
 servient to priestly control, there is a tendency to political 
 self-direction, and to a manly independence conscious of itself. 
 
64 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [4 
 
 Finally, instead of the preference for symbolical and mystical 
 expression, there is an effort to make science known to as 
 many people as possible an effort for clear and understand- 
 able expression. 
 
 It was this Thaden who wrote to Hegel, in 1815 : "Your 
 Logic is the book of books, a finished masterpiece of the 
 human spirit. It yet, as it seems, is little known, and is not 
 valued at its true worth by a single writer." But it was early 
 for competent judgment to express itself. The style of its 
 writing was difficult. Hegel was as aware of this as were 
 others. In December 1812, he wrote to Van Ghert, in Hol- 
 land : " It is due to your interest, most of all, that my work 
 is attracting attention in Holland. I am very sorry that 
 complaint is made of the difficulties in the expression. The 
 nature of such an abstract subject precludes its being given 
 the ease and lightness of an ordinary reading book. Nor 
 can truly speculative philosophy have the dress and style 
 either of Locke's or of the ordinary French philosophy. To 
 the uninitiated its contents must appear as a world turned up- 
 side down as contradicting the usual conceptions of so- 
 called common sense." 1 
 
 Nevertheless there has been gain in presentation since the 
 days of the Phenomenology. Erdmann thinks this gain is 
 due, in part at least, to his efforts as teacher. And Hegel 
 himself, when it was said that perhaps his years of absence 
 from a university chair had unfitted him to lecture again at 
 a university, speaks of his experience with the gymnasial 
 students, as having done more for his delivery and expres- 
 sion than could a chair at the university itself. In the 
 Logic, the reader is kept more constantly in the mind of the 
 writer, and is not distressed by mirage-like allusions. That 
 this was a gain consciously striven for, may, be shown by a 
 letter of Hegel to Voss, written in 1805 : " Luther made the 
 
 1 Hegel's Werke, XVII., Briefe. 
 
65] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 65 
 
 Bible speak in German ; you have done the same for Homer, 
 the greatest boon that could be given a people. For a 
 people is barbaric, and cannot look upon the greatest works 
 as its own, until it knows them in its own tongue. And if 
 you will forget these two instances, I will say of my own 
 efforts, that I am trying to make philosophy speak in Ger- 
 man. If I succeed, it will be much harder to make shallow 
 thought seem deep." In another writing Hegel says : " This 
 strange terminology becomes a great evil, in that therein 
 conceptions grow fast and fixed. Then the life and spirit 
 of things disappear, and philosophy sinks to an empty form- 
 alism. There is nothing easier than to learn this, and to 
 prate with it, because it permits one, under the veil of wis- 
 dom, to say all sorts of foolish and trivial things ; if so be 
 that one is not ashamed to talk to people in a speech they 
 do not understand." 
 
 Still it must be said that the beginner and if we believe 
 the records, the older student, too finds the combination of 
 Hegel's thought and style to be hard and rugged. We are 
 tempted to say what Coventry Patmore said, in another 
 connection : 
 
 " How foreign is the garb he wears, 
 
 And how his great devotion mocks 
 Our poor propriety, and scares 
 The undevout with paradox ! " 
 
 But then Dante speaks a word, that brings us back to our 
 allegiance : " If [he] delight thee not, thy heart must err." 
 And coming back to a not too deep or prolonged study, we 
 feel that if charm and flattering ease are wanting, there is 
 nevertheless the calm, far vision of the mountain tops. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 HEGEL AS PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HEIDELBERG 
 
 EIGHT years Hegel served the Niirnberg gymnasium. 
 His influence however had spread. All at once, in July, 
 1816, he received calls to the chairs of philosophy at Er- 
 langen, at Heidelberg and at Berlin. The call to Erlangen 
 was somewhat conditional ; and while Hegel was consider- 
 ing it, there came an urgent invitation to Heidelberg. Daub, 
 the rector of the university, wrote Hegel to the following 
 effect: " By a note from Karlsruhe received yesterday, I am 
 under the pleasant commission of having to ask you if you 
 will accept the position of professor of philosophy in the 
 university here. The salary consists of 1300 gulders, 6 
 matters of corn, and 6 makers of spelt. That is indeed little. 
 I am sorry that more cannot be promised at first. And I 
 should have small hope of an affirmative answer were I not 
 warranted in saying, from the long experience of my col- 
 leagues and of myself, that if professors work with diligence 
 and have any success, their remuneration is increased from 
 time to time. Now, in you, if you will accept this call, 
 Heidelberg for the first time (Spinoza was once called here, 
 but in vain) since its founding will have a philosopher." 
 The letter proceeds most cordially to press the acceptance, 
 and concludes: " If I may see you belonging to Heidelberg 
 University, which I love, and will love while I live, then clear 
 and refreshing light will have come into my life. 
 "With sincere regards, 
 
 " Yours most obediently, 
 
 " DAUB." 
 
 66 [66 
 
67] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 67 
 
 Hegel had some doubt as to the sufficiency of " 1300 
 gulders, 6 makers of corn, and 6 malters of spelt," for the 
 needs of his family. But these fears were set at rest by a 
 better offer from the university, and Hegel then gladly ac- 
 cepted the call. 
 
 In October, 1816, Hegel came to Heidelberg. His 
 countryman, Professor Eschenmayer, gave most friendly help 
 in the work of home-making in a new city. Paulus, too, 
 with wife and daughter, gave him hearty welcome. Frau 
 Paulus was of bright and joyous disposition. A mingling of 
 merriment and good sense was hers. Hegel gladly spent 
 social evenings at her home. 
 
 But at first the philosopher was more or less lonely. His 
 wife and children had been left for a time at Niirnberg. 
 Hegel wrote them almost daily, with full expression of long- 
 ing for their presence the unromantic man ! In one of 
 those letters Hegel said it seemed to be the motto of Heidel- 
 berg society: Each for himself, and God for us all. There 
 was little public stir, in the form of great meetings and the 
 like ; but instead there was a quiet " liebes Leben." 
 
 Hegel was somewhat disappointed in the number of stu- 
 dents who first came to hear him. On October 29th, he 
 wrote : " I began my lectures yesterday. As regards listeners, 
 things are not so glowing as were the accounts. If not at a 
 loss and displeased, I at least wondered to find it otherwise 
 than I had been led to expect. In one course I had but four 
 hearers. But Paulus comforted me; he, too, he said, had 
 lectured to but four or five." But this was only at the be- 
 ginning. In a few days he had in one of his courses, the en- 
 cyclopedic, some twenty auditors ; and in the other, the his- 
 tory of philosophy, some thirty, when, as Rosenkranz says, 
 he comforted himself: " In the first half year, at the beginning 
 of one's work, one must sometimes be content if he can but 
 hold his own. The students must be warmed up to him." 
 
68 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [68 
 
 And Hegel was warmth-giving, and attractive, notwithstand- 
 ing a certain dryness and hesitancy of manner. His enthus- 
 iasm does not flare and sparkle ; but there is an intense glow 
 about it all the more admirable because of its self-repression. 
 Philosophy was the temple, and even its altar fires must be 
 restrained by the sacredness of the place. 
 
 Hegel's closing words of a course of lectures at Jena have 
 been given some pages back. Their hope and courage were 
 pointed out. The same spirit breathes in the opening ad- 
 dress of his Heidelberg lectures. In the world, calm had 
 come after the Napoleonic storm. And Hegel's voice speaks 
 in the calm ; but calls to a new effort that was to be as 
 strenuous, though on other fields, as battle. We quote, from 
 Caird, part of this introductory address : " ' While the spirit of 
 the world was so much occupied with real interests, it could 
 not turn inwards, or gather itself together in itself ; but now 
 that the stream of events, on which we were carried along so 
 rapidly, has been checked now that the German nation has 
 redeemed itself by the sword from the worst of tyrannies, 
 and regained its nationality, that foundation of all higher 
 life we may hope that besides the kingdom of this world, 
 on which all thoughts and efforts have been hitherto concen- 
 trated, the kingdom of God may also be thought of; in other 
 words, that besides political and other worldly interests, 
 science and philosophy, the free interests of intelligence, may 
 also rise to newness of life.' This hope is the more reason- 
 able, Hegel declares, as philosophy is the peculiar vocation 
 of the German nation. ' History shows us that even when 
 all but the name of philosophy was lost in other lands, it has 
 maintained itself as the peculiar possession of the German 
 nation. We have received from nature the high calling to be 
 guardians of this sacred fire, as in earlier times the world- 
 spirit maintained the highest consciousness in the Jewish 
 nation, that from them it might rise again as a new spiritual 
 
69] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR ftg 
 
 force in the world. . . . Let us greet together the dawn of a 
 better time, when the spirit, that has hitherto been driven 
 out of itself, may return to itself again, and win room and 
 space wherein to found a kingdom of its own.' " 
 
 Hegel was charmed with the beauty of nature about Hei- 
 delberg. He writes home that his wife, when she joins him, 
 will then first know what walks can be. Hegel lived at al- 
 most the outskirts of the town. He was often seen at his 
 windows, looking out, in Socratic meditation, toward the 
 forest stretches and the haze-softened hills beyond. Some 
 of the students therefore concluded he was not particularly 
 busy. 
 
 We are told that, during the summer of 1817, he was often 
 so lost in thought that he was quite oblivious to outer hap- 
 penings. Once, it is said, he was walking to the university 
 building over a miry piece of ground. One shoe remained 
 sticking in the mud. Hegel went on his way without notic- 
 ing the loss. 
 
 But perhaps, in the absence of definite information, we 
 may believe the shoe was a loose over-shoe ; then the ab- 
 straction might not have been so deep as the story implies. 
 
 Among the students closest to Hegel, was a young Rus- 
 sian, Baron Boris d'Yxkull. He had taken part in the Rus- 
 sian campaign against France ; and now would refresh him- 
 self after field-work by university study. Without having 
 read anything of Hegel, he nevertheless had the idea that he 
 might from him gain the quintessence of human knowledge. 
 He came to Heidelberg early in 1817. He gives the follow- 
 ing account of his aims, and of Hegel's way of satisfying 
 them : " After looking around somewhat, the first thing I did 
 was to call upon the man of whom I had sketched almost ex- 
 travagant pictures to myself. With well-studied phrases, for 
 I was quite aware of my general ignorance, and outwardly 
 composed, though somewhat afraid within, I went to the Pro- 
 
70 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [70 
 
 fessor; and found, to my no little surprise, a perfectly plain 
 and simple man, who spoke with some hesitation, and uttered 
 nothing very marvelous after all. Unsatisfied with this im- 
 pression, though secretly attracted by Hegel's friendly recep- 
 tion, and a certain air of good-hearted, but a little ironical, cour- 
 tesy, I went after the Professor's lecture to the nearest book 
 store, bought all the works of Hegel that had been printed, and 
 in the evening settled myself comfortably in rny sofa-corner 
 to read them. But the more I read, and the more attention 
 I tried to fasten on the reading, the less I understood of it ; so 
 that after struggling for two hours with a proposition without 
 nearing its comprehension, I laid aside the book. But out 
 of curiosity I kept on attending the lectures. I must confess, 
 however, that I did not understand my own notes, and that I 
 was lacking in needed prefatory knowledge for this science. 
 So in my need, I went again to Hegel; who, after he had 
 patiently heard me, advised that a beginning be made with 
 some other studies, Latin, rudiments of algebra, natural 
 science, and geography. This I did for a half year, as hard 
 as it was for one twenty-six years old. For the third 
 time, then, I presented myself to Hegel, who could not 
 help smiling as I told him of my propaedeutic endeavors. 
 His advice now was quite definite, his sympathy strong ; and I 
 took his course with some profit. A seminar or conversa- 
 torium of Dr. Hinrichs was helpful. This was attended by 
 disputationists from all the four faculties. The general 
 theme was the exposition of the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
 Sometimes in the two following semesters Hegel called upon 
 me. I was often with him, and accompanied him on his 
 walks. He often said to me, that our over-wise time needed 
 method most of all ; it was only by it that the thoughts could 
 be kept in rein, and so could make real progress. Religion, 
 he said, was anticipatory philosophy ; and philosophy noth- 
 ing but religion conscious of itself, Both sought, though by 
 
7 1 ] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR j j 
 
 different ways, the same object, God. I was never to trust a 
 philosophy that was either immoral or irreligious." x 
 
 After this stay at Heidelberg, d'Yxkull traveled far and 
 wide ; now amid the ruins of Ephesus, now on the snow- 
 fields of Sweden, now in Paris, next in Rome. Everywhere, 
 like Alexander with his Iliad, he took with him Hegel's 
 Logic. Correspondence was maintained. It seems that the 
 young Russian had a tinge of melancholy in his disposition 
 a sense that outer conditions and inner ideals are clashing, 
 and that one's arm is weak amid the on-rush of events. 
 Hegel writes cheeringly. He wisely seeks to turn the eyes 
 outward, to point the man to his work as a citizen. In 
 November, 1821, he wrote: "You are happy in having a 
 fatherland that has played so great part in the world's his- 
 tory, and that without doubt will have a still more exalted 
 destiny. Other modern states might seem as if they had 
 reached, or nearly reached, the end of their development; 
 perhaps some of them already have back of them their cul- 
 mination, and have now become static. Russia, on the 
 other hand, even now perhaps the mightiest power among 
 the others, gives promise of wondrous development. You 
 are personally favored by your birth and fortune, by your 
 talents and knowledge, by services already rendered ; so 
 that you may expect to fill in this colossal building a no un- 
 important place." 
 
 Another of the students intimate with Hegel was Hinrichs. 
 He at first studied law. He attended a course of Hegel's 
 lectures on natural rights. Attracted at first rather out of 
 curiosity, he gradually became deeply interested ; and fin- 
 ally entered upon a thorough and absorbing study of Hegel's 
 works. In the summer of 1818, Hegel set as the subject for 
 a prize dissertation, "A Comparison of the Platonic Idea 
 
 1 Rosenkranz, Hegel" 1 s Leben, p. 302. 
 
]2 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 and the Aristotelian Entelechy." Hinrichs presented a 
 paper. This occasioned a personal acquaintance with 
 Hegel. In 1820 Hinrichs habilitated at Heidelberg as 
 private docent in philosophy. Soon afterwards he sent to 
 Hegel, who meanwhile had gone to Berlin, the manuscript 
 of a work for which he desired Hegel to write an introduc- 
 tion. Hegel's reply, fortunately, is preserved. It gives fine 
 hint as to Hegel's kindly way of treating younger men just 
 entering the path on which he himself was far ahead. He 
 begins: "It has been a real pleasure, dear friend, to run 
 through the manuscript you sent me, though I had not the 
 time to read every word of it. [What a frank editorial ad- 
 mission!] I shall be heartily glad to meet your wish by 
 writing for it an introduction to the public. While your 
 pages are being printed there will be time. I am lecturing 
 this summer on the philosophy of religion ; and so already 
 have had my thoughts turned in the same direction as your 
 book." Then follow wise suggestions as to improvement of 
 the style. "It might be well," he says, "to introduce para- 
 graphs in which the reader may rest. The argument is too 
 long sustained. There should be pauses, in which the 
 threads are gathered up and neatly put in summary state- 
 ment. Paragraphing should be attended to, with easy transi- 
 tions ; for your writing is meant to have readers, as well as 
 to be a proof of your donum docendi. Explanation and 
 illustration are not to be forgotten. You write for a public 
 that reads and studies rather more reads than studies and 
 this public demands introductions and reflections ; and 
 rightly too sees therein the teaching power as such." And 
 so the letter goes on with helpful particularity, and not mere 
 general captiousness. It closes : " Keep on in your work of 
 writing and lecturing; and be always assured of my hearty 
 sympathy. Yours, HEGEL." 
 
 Hegel seems to have had little of the spirit of aloofness ; 
 
73] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 73 
 
 though he did once say there was nothing in which one was 
 so lonely, as in philosophy. His was a dignity that might 
 be touched without crumpling. His walks, shared now and 
 again by a student, amid the beautiful surroundings of Heid- 
 elberg, show us a pleasant side of the professor. We have 
 had a word or two said of this, by d'Yxkull ; and later it will 
 be touched upon again in the account of Hotho, one of 
 Hegel's students in Berlin. 
 
 In 1817-8 Victor Cousin, then about twenty-five years of 
 age, visited Germany. Spending a few weeks at Heidelberg, 
 he made the acquaintance of Hegel. This was the begin- 
 ning of a long friendship. 1 
 
 Cousin, though an eclectic, regarded Hegel in many ways 
 as his teacher. As a hint of this regard we may quote a 
 sentence from a letter of 1826 : " Je veux me former, Hegel ; 
 j'ai done besoin tant pour ma conduite, que pour ma publi- 
 cation d'avis austere, et je 1'attends de Vous. Sous ce rap- 
 port Vous me devez de temps en temps une lettre serieuse." 2 
 
 Of his visit to Germany and of the meeting with Hegel, 
 Cousin in 1833 gave the following account: ". . . . The 
 great name of Schelling was heard in all the schools, here 
 with approbation, there with almost malediction, everywhere 
 
 1 The correspondence between Hegel and Cousin is given pretty fully in Janet, 
 Victor Cousin et son ceuvre ; Ch. IX., Cousin et Hegel. 
 
 2 Stirling gives an interesting anecdote, with his own setting : " Fancy the smile 
 into which the iron of Hegel broke when the never-doubting M. Cousin requested 
 a succinct statement of the system ! ' Monsieur,' said he, ' ces choses ne se disent 
 pas succinctement, surtout en Francais ! ' " Unfortunately, Stirling's memory 
 fastened this story on the wrong man. It should not be taken to add sound to 
 the little slap at Cousin, in the " never-doubting." It was another Frenchman, 
 Baron de Reiffenberg, who made that request of Hegel. I say this, assuming 
 that Rosenkranz's statement is the original : " Es lag in Hegel eine durch seine 
 ganze Jugendgeschichte vermittelte Sympathie fiir das Franzosische, wenn er auch 
 in Liittich einem Franzosen, dem Baron de Reiffenberg, welcher eine ' explica- 
 tion succincte de son systeme ' verlangt, sehr naiv antwortete : ' Monsieur, cela ne 
 s'explique pas, surtout en Franftzis? " 
 
74 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [74 
 
 exciting that passionate interest, that mingling of ardent 
 praise and violent attack, which we call fame. At this time 
 I did not see Schelling, but, instead, happened to meet 
 Hegel at Heidelberg. I began with him, and it was with him 
 also that I finished my work in Germany. 
 
 " Hegel was not then the celebrated man he was when I 
 .saw him again at Berlin, with all eyes upon him, and at the 
 head of a numerous and enthusiastic school. Hegel had as 
 yet no reputation other than that of a distinguished disciple 
 of Schelling. He had published books read by few; his 
 lecturing was hardly beginning to make them better 
 known. . . . z 
 
 " Hegel did not know much more French than I knew 
 German ; and immersed in his studies, uncertain of himself 
 and of his renown, he saw almost no one, and to say truth, 
 did not seem particularly amiable. I do not know how a 
 young man so obscure as myself came to interest him, but 
 at the end of an hour we were at one with each other ; and 
 to the last our friendship, tested more than once, was firm. 
 From this first conversation I divined his greatness, I knew 
 his power, I felt myself in the presence of a superior man ; 
 and from Heidelberg going on through Germany, I spoke of 
 him everywhere, I prophesied of him, in some sort ; and on 
 returning to France, I said to my friends, Sirs, I have seen 
 a man of genius. 
 
 " The impression left upon me by Hegel was profound 
 but confused. In the following year I sought out in Munich 
 the originator of the system, Schelling. There could hardly 
 be less resemblance than between master and disciple. 2 
 Hegel uttered with difficulty words rare and profound, almost 
 enigmatical ; his diction was powerful but embarrassed, his 
 
 1 Rosenkranz rather demurs at some of these confident measurements of Cousin. 
 
 2 Master and disciple are hardly the proper terms for Schelling and Hegel, after 
 at least the early years at Jena. 
 
75] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 75 
 
 countenance unmoved, his brow clouded the image of 
 thought turned back upon itself. Schelling, on the contrary, 
 was thought easily unfolding itself; his speech, as his appear- 
 ance, full of sparkle and life .... Hegel has borrowed much 
 from Schelling ; and I, far feebler than either, have borrowed 
 
 from both It is more than twelve years ago that in 
 
 dedicating to Schelling and to Hegel my edition of the Com- 
 mentary of Proclus on Parmenides, I publicly named both as 
 ' my friends and my masters, the leaders of our time in 
 philosophy amicis et magistris, philosophise praesentis 
 ducibus.' " ' 
 
 It may be said, perhaps, that Cousin had an apprehension 
 but not a comprehension of Hegel. At Heidelberg, Hegel 
 was surer of his course than the account of Cousin would in- 
 dicate. Heidelberg, in fact, saw the completion at least in 
 outline of the entire circle of Hegel's system. There were 
 to be rewritings and further development of special phases ; 
 but the whole was mapped out in his Encyclopedia of the 
 philosophical sciences. The basis of this work had already 
 been laid in his Propcedeutic for the gymnasium. 2 His efforts 
 to make this latter clear and understandable stood him in 
 good stead now. In the preface he speaks against writing 
 for show. His work, too, is constructive ; he declares against 
 the poverty of thought and shallowness of mere skepticism. 
 There is to be knowledge beyond the mere immediacy of 
 feeling; and the book is dedicated to seekers after such 
 knowlege. 
 
 " In the first edition of the Encyclopedia" says Rosenkranz, 
 " there is everywhere the creative breath of fresh produc- 
 tion." And that phrase is descriptive, too, of Hegel's man- 
 ner in the lecture room. His lectures seem not to have been 
 
 1 Victor Cousin, Fragment Philosopkiques (ed. 1833), p. xxxvii. 
 
 2 For part translation and outline of the Propadeutic, see Translations, Selec- 
 tion 49. 
 
76 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [76 
 
 finished products. They had a scheme, of course there 
 was an ideal which he wanted them to reach ; and this, like 
 an Aristotle's entelechy, governed the delivery. But the 
 lecture itself was a thing of travail. He was not so much re- 
 peating something he had learned by heart, as creating then 
 and there a new order out of the rich chaos of ideas at his 
 disposal. Thaulow tells us that Hegel took only a sketch of 
 his lecture to his chair, little scraps with notes, and spoke 
 from these. 
 
 He held it essential that the students should have at hand 
 a statement of the main conceptions of the subject matter of 
 his courses. 1 He therefore published his Encyclopedia, as 
 well as his Philosophy of Rights. This fact will account for 
 the form, at least of the early editions. They take for 
 granted the exposition and illustration of the teacher in the 
 class-room. 
 
 In Heidelberg, Hegel was not discontented. But with the 
 resumption of academic activity, his horizon had widened 
 and he could not but think of the possibility of a growing 
 recognition of his philosophy; and for this, Heidelberg did 
 not promise most. The glorious country about Heidelberg 
 seems to have been more enticing to the pleasure-loving dis- 
 position of the students, than provocative of research and 
 reflection ; and, if they were not unindustrious, their interest 
 chose the positive sciences and professional study, rather 
 than philosophy. 
 
 The authorities at Berlin had not forgotten Hegel. Their 
 call of a year or so before, tendered him while at the gymna- 
 sium, had been somewhat hesitating. They thought that his 
 long absence from a university had, perhaps, unfitted him 
 
 1 " Das Bediirfniss, meinen Zuhorern einen Leitfaden zu meinen philosophischen 
 Vorlesungen in die Hande zu geben, ist die nachste Veranlassung, dass ich diese 
 Uebersicht des gesammten Umfanges der Philosophic friiher ans Licht treten 
 lasse, als mein Gedanke gewesen ware." Preface to first edition of Encyclopedia. 
 
77] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 77 
 
 for lecturing to mature students. But these doubts seem 
 now to have been quite set at rest by Hegel's success at 
 Heidelberg; and on the 26th of December, 1817, Altenstein, 
 the minister of instruction, wrote Hegel, again offering him 
 the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin. Hegel 
 accepted. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 HEGEL IN BERLIN : PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND RECTOR 
 
 HEGEL is now forty-seven years of age, but he has the 
 energy and joyous confidence of a younger man. The 
 letters that he writes at this time from Berlin are full of ap- 
 preciation of his new surroundings and opportunities. He 
 puts everything in the best light. Altenstein is firm in 
 friendship and in support. Outer circumstances are com- 
 fortable. So he enters upon this new and broadest stadium 
 of his career with the brightest hopes. But he is not in a 
 flurry, nor does he make a noise. Solger, in November, 
 1818, wrote to Tieck: "I was curious to see what impres- 
 sion the good Hegel would make here. No one talks of 
 him, for he is quiet and busy." 
 
 In October, 1818, Hegel opened his lectures in Berlin 
 with an introduction similar to that of his Heidelberg course. 
 There is the same enthusiasm, the same belief in the high 
 function of philosophy in culture, the same exultant pointing 
 to Germany as the chosen land of philosophic thought, the 
 same faith that here and now, in* this lecture-room, a further 
 progress of the spirit is at hand. 
 
 Philosophy was not to be merely critical. Kant's word 
 that antithesis, contradiction, was the outcome of rational 
 thought, was not to be the final word of philosophy. The 
 infinite and divine were to be something more than the 
 positings of a merely practical theory ; they were somehow 
 to be grasped by thought as its most real possession. 
 Hegel called to youth who were still " free from the negating 
 78 [78 
 
79 ] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 79 
 
 spirit, from the emptiness of a merely critical effort. A 
 heart that is healthy still has the courage to ask for truth. 
 It is the realm of truth which is the home of philosophy; 
 which she builds, and to which she leads us through her 
 study. Whatever in life is true, great and divine, is so 
 through the Idea. The aim of philosophy is to comprehend 
 this Idea in its truth and universality." 
 
 In 1820, Hegel was appointed on the government board 
 of examiners for the Province of Brandenburg. In this ca- 
 pacity he had to examine in philosophy candidates for 
 school positions. He had also to pass upon the German 
 essays submitted by the gymnasial graduates, the Abituri- 
 enten, seeking entrance to the university. In his judgment 
 of the pupils, says Rosenkranz, Hegel was lenient. He did 
 not think that original work should be demanded of youth, 
 but rather a clear, appreciative reproduction of what had 
 been studied in the gymnasial course. 
 
 But Hegel, interested though he was in the whole course 
 of education, wished to concentrate his energy upon the 
 teaching and developing of a philosophical system. Upon 
 his request he was relieved of his duties as examiner. This 
 was in 1822. His attention, however, was called now and 
 again to gymnasial matters. In 1823, he writes a letter to 
 the ministry of instruction on the teaching of philosophy in 
 the gymnasium. 1 In this Hegel says, in part: " From many 
 sides the complaint is heard that students come to the uni- 
 versities without a fit preparation for the study of philoso- 
 phy. 2 I have been asked to state my opinion as to how this 
 state of things might be properly met in the gymnasium. 
 
 1 Hegel's Werke, XVII., 357-367. Cf. this letter with that to Niethammer: 
 Translations, Selection 48. 
 
 - Rosenkranz, in his introduction to Hegel's Propaedeutic, says that the naive 
 philosophical confession of many Arbiturienten and we might add, of the world 
 in general might be expressed as follows : " Man is a being who has body and 
 
go HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [g o 
 
 "But it is to be said, first, that the courses of the gymna- 
 sium will affect only those who attend the gymnasium; 
 whereas, as a matter of fact, the entrance requirements of 
 universities are so slack that many untrained and unprepared 
 students are in attendance. As professor in the university 
 here in Berlin, I cannot but look with apprehension upon 
 the presence of university students lacking all information 
 and culture. For the object of the teaching at a university 
 is not merely to give equipment for bread-winning, but to 
 culture the mind and spirit." 
 
 Hegel then recommends that university officers should 
 advise all students seeking to enter the university, but who 
 are yet unprepared, to fill up the lack elsewhere. He then 
 passes to the main subject of his letter, the preparation in 
 the gymnasium for speculative thinking and for the study of 
 philosophy. There are two sides, he says, of such prepara- 
 tion, a material and a formal. To the material side belongs 
 the gymnasium study of the classics. The disposition and 
 imagination of the youth are informed by the great histori- 
 cal and artistic views of individuals and nations, from whose 
 deeds and destinies moral and religious principles may be 
 derived. But the study of the classic literature can be fruit- 
 ful for the mind and for its higher activities, only as in the 
 upper classes of the gymnasium the formal language work is 
 
 soul. The soul is a simple thing, which, however, possesses various faculties. 
 Among these are the desires and impulses a desire after knowledge, for instance. 
 Unusual ideas arise from fancy. If one or more faculties of the soul are out of 
 order, soul-sickness, or diseased mind, is the result. Such a condition is very 
 dangerous. When a man sleeps he can also dream. After death, the soul is 
 immortal. Knowledge is the having ideas of objects which impress us. These 
 ideas we call conceptions. We distinguish these by marks more or less distinct, 
 and arrange them in kinds and classes as best we may. Thought has certain 
 rules or laws with which it must accord, else it will go lame. The judgment is a 
 combination of different conceptions. A syllogism has three members, and can 
 prove anything true. An orderly arrangement of all knowledge is called a 
 system." 
 
8 1 ] HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR g I 
 
 looked upon more as a means, while the content is the chief 
 end in view philology being kept for the more special work 
 of the university. 
 
 Besides the classics, there should be taught the dogmatic 
 content of religion. This should be treated in its true, ob- 
 jective aspect. Deep reverence for it should be instilled. 
 There should not be merely theistic generalities, moralizing, 
 or appeals to subjective feeling. In this case, capricious 
 opinion is apt to be fostered and put in opposition to specu- 
 lative thinking ; the arbitrary and befogged understanding is 
 made supreme, which either is indifferent to philosophy or 
 lends itself to sophistry. 
 
 These studies the classics and the truths of objective, 
 dogmatic religion are to give the pupil the taste for the 
 higher philosophical work of the university. The material 
 they furnish is, in the university, to be given philosophical 
 system and form. 
 
 But there is an intermediate step, which must be taken by 
 the gymnasium. General ideas and the thought-forms must 
 be dealt with. Acquaintance and familiarity with formal 
 thought must be regarded as the essential preparative for 
 the university study of philosophy. 
 
 The history of philosophy, says Hegel, is not to be re- 
 garded as a fit preparative. Without the speculative idea, 
 as a norm and touch-stone, such a history is apt to be a tale 
 of chance, insignificant opinions, and easily leads to a con- 
 temptuous prejudice against philosophy. On the other 
 hand, Hegel names the following as elements of an adequate 
 propaedeutic : 
 
 i. The so-called empirical psychology. This deals with 
 the sensations, the imagination, memory and other powers 
 of the mind. The field here is so wide that mere summary 
 treatment is apt to be but trivial and pedantic. But such a 
 study properly dealt with may introduce things necessary 
 and interesting, and form a direct introduction to logic. 
 
82 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR p$ 2 
 
 2. The chief part of the propaedeutic should be the prin- 
 ciples of logic. Omitting the speculative signification and 
 treatment, the instruction as heretofore may be directed to 
 the concept, the judgments, the syllogism in the various 
 figures, to division, definition, and the methods of scientific 
 proof. As a most important subjective result of this study 
 it is to be noted that the attention of the students has been 
 turned to the fact that there is a realm of thought by itself, 
 and that formal thought may itself be an object of investiga- 
 tion. "That this," says Hegel, "is not beyond the power of 
 gymnasial pupils, I have learned by several year's experience 
 as professor of philosophical propaedeutics and as rector in 
 a gymnasium. And then, too, in my own case, it was in my 
 twelfth year that, on account of being destined for the theo- 
 logical school, I learned the Wolfian definitions of the so- 
 called Idea clara ; and in my fourteenth year all the rules 
 and figures of the syllogism. And if it were not so counter 
 to the predilection nowadays for original thinking and ac- 
 tivity, 1 should be inclined the more to advise this kind of 
 study, for this reason : in order to possess knowledge be it 
 what it may, even the highest one must have it in his 
 memory ; and if it be in memory early, one has just so much 
 the more freedom and opportunity to use it in independent 
 thought." 
 
 3. Metaphysics, properly speaking, should be excluded 
 from the gymnasium. But there may be one phase of it 
 that may enter, namely, that part of natural theology which 
 treats of the proofs of the existence of God. 
 
 4. Rights, law, ethics, should be included. Definite 
 ethical ideas of the nature of the will, of freedom, of law, of 
 duty, should be given in the gymnasium. "And in our 
 times," says Hegel, "there would appear to be most need, 
 too, of imparting right notions concerning the duties of men 
 
83] 2IEGRL AS EDUCATOR 83 
 
 So much for this letter. A fuller treatment of gymnasial 
 propaedeutics is given in the letter to Niethammer, included 
 among the translations. 
 
 Hegel's first great literary work of the Berlin period deals 
 with the concepts of rights and of the state. This work, like 
 Plato's Reptiblic, treats incidentally of education. The state 
 itself is the outgrowth of nature and of culture, whose true 
 end is to give freest development to all its citizens a de- 
 velopment never to be attained outside the institutional 
 social life constituting the state. 
 
 At this time in Germany there was beating a new national 
 life. The aims and ideals of this life were vague. The pan- 
 orama of Napoleonic change had passed ; but it had left 
 brilliant memories, it had suggested fanciful possibilities, it 
 had given aspirations after " new things," as Caesar would 
 say. This vague, yet warm and glowing feeling after nation- 
 ality was strongest among the patriotic bands of students. 
 The Burschenschaft dreamed, and sang, and made political 
 speeches. So far, harmless. Then it killed Kotzebue. 
 Stern governmental repression was the result. 
 
 Hegel was a man of moderation. His enthusiasm was 
 gently constructive ; his patriotism reflective, civilizing. He 
 was, however, neither cold nor pedantic. This may be 
 shown by the fact that, while opposing the more sentimental, 
 passionate, ill-advised movements of youth, he still had a 
 loyal following among the young. 
 
 Many young men, says Rosenkranz, after the beginning 
 of the repressive measures against the Burschenschaft, had 
 come to Berlin. They became Hegel's hearers, and thank- 
 fully attributed to him a truly new life. They formed the 
 kernel of a gradually growing constituency. "Very many 
 names of brave men now in high regard might here be men- 
 tioned who stood in this relationship to Hegel, and for whom 
 he was unweariedly active with fatherly affection and self- 
 
84 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [84 
 
 sacrifice." 1 Sometimes his good-will led him into adventure. 
 One example may be given : One of his hearers was impris- 
 oned for some political charge. The prison overlooked the 
 Spree. His friends, wishing to show their sympathy, betook 
 themselves to boat and rowed beneath his window to speak 
 with him. One attempt was unsuccessful. The friends, also 
 hearers of Hegel, induced him to accompany them on a 
 second visit. A bullet from the watch might have put an 
 end to the undertaking. It appears that on the water Hegel 
 felt some misgivings. When the boat came beneath the 
 window conversation was to begin, and in Latin for safety's 
 sake. Hegel confined himself to some innocent common- 
 places ; asking, for instance, of the prisoner : " Num me 
 vides ?" As the window was but an arm's length away, this 
 question gave rise to no little merriment. We may be glad 
 to know that the fun did not have a bad sequel ; for, upon 
 trial, the student was acquitted. 
 
 Goethe, in a letter of 1820 to Hegel, writes appreciatively 
 of the latter's influence as educator of young men. He 
 says, " I am glad to hear from many sources that your efforts 
 to educate young men are bearing the best of fruits. It is 
 well indeed that in these wondrous times there is a teaching 
 spreading out from some center by which, both theoretically 
 and practically, one's life may be shaped." 2 
 
 1 Rosenkranz, Hegel's Leben, p. 338. 
 
 ' 2 Given in Hegel's Werke, XVII, p. 502. Hegel and Goethe were friends. In 
 one of Hegel's letters to his wife there is a pleasant account of a visit to the poet. 
 Hegel's interest, too, in Goethe's color experiments is but another facet of his 
 many-sidedness. In the summer of 1821, Goethe sent Hegel a drinking-glass 
 with this dedication : 
 
 " Dem Absoluten 
 empfiehlt sich 
 
 schonstens 
 zu freundlicher Aufnahme 
 
 das Urphanomen. 
 To the absolute, hoping that he will accept this with best wishes, from the primal phenomenon." 
 
85] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 85 
 
 By opponents Hegel was looked upon as a quietist in 
 politics as the government philosopher. His great credo'' 
 when properly understood a very bulwark of soul strength 
 that what is is reasonable, seemed, when taken on the 
 surface, but a weakling's shrug at efforts for reform. But 
 Hegel's "is" is more than momentary. It stretches to that 
 far off, divine event, standing at the end of which one might 
 look back and say : " All has been well, for it has led to this." 
 That end is held as present in Hegel's " is." And such an 
 "is" does not lead to quiescence, though it gives peace. 
 The en/1, if that word may be used of timeless matters, is 
 seen to be the result of contest, conflict, triumph ; its essence 
 is active. It is never-dying enmity without rancor, because 
 on the winning side against the dark, ignorant, cruel evil ; 
 and so it is not mere momentary, empty being, but is per- 
 manent, and is filled with the joy of overcoming. 2 
 
 But Hegel was human ; and we find him sometimes charg- 
 ing as most unreasonable those men who differed with him 
 as to the meaning of rationality. They were dreamers, they 
 were shallow, their patriotism a "slopping over" of senti- 
 ment. Fries was a leader of blockheads a " Heerfukrer 
 alter Seichtigkeit" Quite an unpleasant picture might be 
 drawn in this light. But it is aside from our purpose. A 
 stroke of it has been brought in to save this sketch from be- 
 ing merely eulogism. And even this black stroke might be 
 softened by the remark, that Hegel's polemic was not so 
 much personal as doctrinal. Then, too, from the times of 
 
 1 " Was wirklich 1st, ist vernunftig; was verniinftig 1st, 1st wirklich." 
 2 Noble things might be said of Hegel as reformer. He is an example of the 
 high type outlined in Emerson's essay, Man as Reformer. " The mediator be- 
 tween the spiritual and actual world should have great prospective prudence," 
 says Emerson; and such had Hegel. 
 
 What Grimm says of Goethe might be said of Hegel also: "Goethe hat 
 aufgebaut. Goethe hat niemals fur augenblickliche Zwecke eine 'Partei' bilden 
 wollen. , . Goethe wirkte sanft und unmerklich wie die Natur selber." 
 
86 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 Paul and Silas to those of Milton and of the Post, castigatory 
 epithets, mixed with a little high-souled venom, have not 
 been uncommon. Nor, upon the whole, are they unkind; 
 they generously give one's opponent opportunity for keenest 
 counter-thrust, and, when the antagonists are noble, lead to 
 reconciliation and honorable amends. Witness Hegel and 
 Schleiermacher. 
 
 Hegel was responsive to his environment. Ever a lover 
 of men and of cities, seeing in the state the supreme out- 
 come of nature and of mind, and in the art works made pos- 
 sible by society the purest expression of the human spirit, 
 Hegel was at home in Berlin a treasure city of art and 
 science, and the capital of a growing state. Eagerly and 
 delightedly he attended concert, theater, picture-gallery and 
 exhibition. "It is laughable," says his biographer, " now 
 and then to find Hegel described as a philosopher who 
 hardened into a dreary, abstruse logician, without apprecia- 
 tion for works of the imagination. This is utterly untrue. 
 In fact, of those philosophers who have founded systems, 
 Hegel stands pre-eminent for having put the whole realm of 
 art to philosophic scrutiny. Other nations, in their judg- 
 ment on this point, have been more just than the Germans. 
 Benard, the French translator of Hegel's Aesthetik, says in 
 his preface : ' Nous le dirons sans craindre, qu'on nous 
 accuse, de nous laisser entrainer a 1'exageration par un faux 
 enthousiasme : nul philosophic n'a developpe avec autant de 
 profondeur et d'etendue 1'idee de 1'art; nul n'a determine et 
 caracterise les principales epoques de son histoire avec le 
 meme precision ; nul enfin n'a presente une classification et 
 une theorie des arts, qui soit plus capable de satisfaire 1'esprit 
 philosophique de notre siecle. D'ailleurs, le systeme mis a 
 part, on trouvera en abondance dans ce livre des vues origin- 
 ales, des aper^us nouveaux, des appreciations justes, des 
 
87] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR g/ 
 
 jugements d'une haute portee."' 1 And an American expos- 
 itor says : " The Aesthetics of Hegel is a voluminous treatise, 
 and more easy of comprehension than any other of his 
 works. Its appearance began a new era in art criticism, 
 and it has been the mine from which many subsequent 
 writers have drawn their treasures. To read it intelligently 
 will open new vistas and make possible new enjoyment for 
 any cultured reader." * 
 
 But Hegel saw and described and philosophized about life 
 and art, not alone for the public, but for the home circle 
 as well. His letters indicate this. Those now to be men- 
 tioned are especially interesting in this connection. 
 
 In 1822, Hegel made a trip of a few weeks to Holland; in 
 1824 to Vienna, and in 1827 to Paris. We have a full record 
 of these journeys, in the letters to his wife, These letters 
 give many pleasant views of Hegel. He was the most con- 
 scientious of travelers, seeing everything he could ; and yet 
 he did not forget his home. These letters take up ninety 
 printed pages. 3 We translate but a few lines from several 
 of them, for their life and color. 
 
 During the trip to Holland, 1822 
 
 Sept. 15, 1822. 
 
 Good morning, dear Mary, from the sunshine of Mary's- 
 burg, for this is Magdeburg, the Magd [Maid] being the V. 
 
 Mary, to whom the cathedral here was dedicated 
 
 Yesterday I saw what was to be seen here the celebrated 
 cathedral, among other things. It may be famous because 
 it is a cathedral; but, architecturally, it is not so well con- 
 ceived as our gothic churches of Niirnberg 
 
 1 Rosenkranz, HegeVs Leben, p. 348. 
 
 2 Kedney, Hegel's Aesthetics: A Critical Exposition. Preface. 
 s Werke, XVII, 544-624. 
 
88 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [88 
 
 KASSEL, 18 Sept. 
 
 The night was beautiful, the stars shone gloriously, the 
 morning star more lovely than all. When it was day we 
 saw quite another face of nature. No longer the flat fields, 
 but fine oak forests and hills, the soft slopes of which were 
 covered with fruit, while at their feet spread the meadows 
 in short, Nature in her homelike aspect. I enjoyed my 
 Englishman [a fellow traveler]. He is a young man of 25 or 
 26, a fine-looking man, good natured, and well informed. . . . 
 
 KOBLENZ, 24 Sept. 
 
 Here I am seated, Dear, by a window overlooking the 
 Rhine my favorite to think of you all, and to write to 
 
 thee 
 
 BRUSSELS, 3 Oct. 
 
 After I had attended service in the cathedral, and had 
 taken leave of the good people who had been my kind enter- 
 tainers, started out in the afternoon for Aachen. I had the 
 good company of an oldish German who had become an 
 Englishman, and of an advocate from Kohr, who always 
 carries Goethe's Faust with him as a Bible. . . . [Hegel then 
 writes of his visits to the picture galleries. "What loveli- 
 ness ! What beauty ! " he exclaims. Then he continues 
 the description :] A woman and child, attributed by some 
 to Michael Angelo, is a wonderful painting. But the Night 
 of Correggio ! as I call the Dresden picture, the Day of 
 Correggio, so this, the true Night what a picture ! The 
 light radiates from the child. Mary seems to me lovelier 
 here than in the Dresden picture ; she, as well as the very 
 surroundings, is smiling. There is a joyous seriousness 
 about it. The luminous darkness as in Correggio's pictures 
 at Sanssouci, his later mode is magnificent. . . . 
 
 BREDA, 9 Oct. 
 
 My curiosity- has gotten the better of me, and instead of 
 going straight on, I have tarried to see a monument that was 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR . 89 
 
 finished by Michael Angelo. By Michael Angelo ! Where 
 in all Germany is there to be seen a work by this master? . . 
 From Aachen to Liittich the road is full of beggars. 
 Here we have not met one. The village people are all well- 
 clothed the children playing merrily, and none in rags, 
 none without shoes and stockings. . . . 
 
 HAAG, 10 Oct. 
 
 One must see the churches of Ghent and of Antwerp if he 
 wishes to see fine, rich, catholic churches vast, gothic, sub- 
 lime with painted windows (the most splendid I have ever 
 seen are in Brussels). Quite high on the columns are life- 
 sized marble statues scores of them, and below them paint- 
 ings of Rubens, Van Dyck, and their pupils great and 
 splendid canvases, some thirty, more or less, in a church. . . 
 
 AMSTERDAM, 12 Oct. 
 
 The first thing : I am happier than words can say that to- 
 day I found your and dear Karl's letter at the post such 
 glad and joyous news from you. Well, Gottlob! The relief 
 is great. So now, with a light heart, to give an account of 
 myself. . . . 
 
 To and from Vienna, 1824. 
 
 PRAG, 14 Sept. 
 
 .... Then I went to the theater, but to describe the 
 play to you would take more time, paper, and memory than 
 are mine. . . . 
 
 WlEN, 21 Sept. 
 
 .... In the Italian opera piece from Mercadante. 
 What men's voices ! Two tenors, Rubini and Donzelli 
 what voices, what manner, charm, richness, strength, reso- 
 nance. But one would have to hear them. . . . 
 
 25 Sept. 
 
 I have again been seeing and hearing much. So to give 
 faithful report as heretofore. Thursday morning I saw the 
 
90 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 zoological collections, rich and very finely located. ... In 
 the afternoon, another two hours in the Belvedere, and then 
 to the Figaro of Rossini. Lablache, what a Figaro ! Mad. 
 Fodore, what a Rosine ! Her singing is perfect. Such 
 beauty, charm, art, freedom, taste in expression ! And La- 
 blache, a glorious bass ! and how joyous and merry, with 
 nothing low or common anywhere. . . . 
 
 3 Oct. 
 
 On the way back through the promenade, I hoped to gain 
 opportunity for describing the elegance of the ladies here ; 
 but I saw none of the aristocracy. . . . 
 
 PRAG. 
 
 .... It has often troubled me to think that I am enjoy- 
 ing so much that is beautiful and am living in Utopia is it 
 well with my Marie, too? Then I should be easy. But you 
 have been without much pleasure that I have had alone, 
 without you. If only I could bring to you all the lovely 
 things that I have seen and heard. . . . 
 
 From Paris, 1827 
 
 PARIS, 3 Sept., 1827. 
 
 .... It goes without saying that Cousin 1 and I are in- 
 happy cordiality together. We did not linger long at table,, 
 for il a a veiller aux intents de Mde. Hegel ; that is to say,, 
 to see that this letter is mailed to-day, and that before two 
 o'clock. . . . 
 
 19 Sept. 
 
 .... Yesterday I saw the English company render 
 Shakespeare's Othello. Kemble, a celebrated English actor, 
 was Othello, and Miss Smithson, Desdemona. It was a very 
 peculiar affair, quite different from ours. . . . Such passion 
 and ranting declamation would not be dreamed of by a Ger- 
 
 1 Victor Cousin. 
 
g I J HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 9 1 
 
 man actor or his audience. ... I understood most all of it, 
 for I read in the libretto word for word while they spoke. . . 
 
 20 Sept. 
 It is beautiful about Paris a rich and varied landscape. 
 
 No wonder that much time is spent in the country. 
 
 This evening I am going to the opera to hear the Pisaroni ; 
 and soon to the gallery in the Louvre. 
 
 About the ladies' costumes worn here, I have not yet 
 written you. I can tell of no striking differences from those 
 of Berlin, though to be sure I have not seen as yet the haute 
 societc, though in the theater prominent people enough. 
 The hats . . . etc. 
 
 21 Sept. 
 
 .... Last evening I saw Romeo and Juliet by the Eng- 
 lish troupe. . . . Kemble in the first four acts, quite mild 
 and tame ; in the last act, however, terrible, maddened. 
 Now I have seen the English raging in all its glory. It is 
 wonderful how they spoil Shakespeare. In the last act Juliet 
 awakes and Romeo is still alive, but having drunk the poison. 
 Here are scenes in which they get beside themselves, and 
 rage horribly. . . . 
 
 30 Sept. 
 
 [After an account of the world of things to do and see in 
 Paris, he says] : In short, one must be six months in Paris 
 to see but once round all that is so deeply interesting. 
 Cousin has often laughed as I visited and found noteworthy 
 this, that and the other thing, which my conscience as a 
 traveler and the Manuel des Etrangers bade me examine. . 
 
 In the winter of 1822 Hegel began his lectures upon the 
 philosophy of history. This course of lectures he repeated 
 five times. Such a work would seem the logical necessity 
 of the man. Early interested in history, as a vast panorama 
 of far-off and magnificent happenings, then by following that 
 
92 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [92 
 
 very interest led into a new study of the society about him, 
 he turns again to view philosophically the course of events 
 from the distant to the near. His mind now has new cate- 
 gories and deeper insight. He will now not merely feel the 
 significance of history, he will interpret it. 
 
 In a letter of 1822, Hegel says: " My lectures on the 
 philosophy of history give me a great deal to do. ... It is 
 very pleasant to make the peoples of the world pass in re- 
 view." He is conscious, however, of the vastness of his 
 task. In the midst of it, after treating of eastern nations* he 
 says : " I do not well see how I shall struggle through with 
 it, when I come to our modern times, in the western world." 
 
 It is tempting here to stray into philosophical fields, even 
 though one's step be uncertain. But there is an educational 
 not that that is complete without the philosophical 
 aspect of these lectures. Indeed, the whole historic drama 
 is but a great school in which the spirit teaches its world 
 its alter ego the great lesson of conscious freedom. Pro- 
 fessor Giddings thus summarizes the Pliilosophy of History : 
 "In Hegel's philosophy of history human development is 
 conceived as a process of self-realization. Step by step, 
 man comes to knowledge of himself as a self-conscious and 
 self-determining being, and as a constituent in the universe 
 which is an organic whole. But this progress is not intel- 
 lectual only. The sphere of man's freedom also is widened. 
 His activity finds an ever larger realm. History, therefore, 
 has been a progress in the consciousness of freedom. It be- 
 gan when spiritual consciousness and aspiration dawned upon 
 man. At first freedom was thought as abstract and univer- 
 sal, and it was therefore conceived as existing only in one 
 person. That one was God in heaven or the monarch upon 
 earth. This stage of history was worked out in the oriental 
 world. In the Grecian world an advance was made. Free- 
 dom was 'no longer ascribed solely to one. Some were free, 
 
93] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 93 
 
 many could be free, but not all. The slave remained. 
 Rome carried the work of Greece somewhat further, em- 
 bodying the substance of freedom in the formal law of per- 
 sonal rights. ' Finally, with the Germanic world, and under 
 the inspiration of Christianity, we come to the age of full 
 maturity, whose mission is to comprehend and carry out the 
 truth that freedom is the birthright of all men.' " J 
 
 Hegel's fame as a teacher grew more and more. It be- 
 came the fashion to attend his lectures. Men of all ranks 
 listened to him. Students from all parts of Germany, from 
 all European nations, came to sit at his feet. Notwithstand- 
 ing the halting delivery, the depth of content filled his 
 hearers with the purest enthusiasm. 
 
 Self-seeking, of course, led some to attend. Hegelianism 
 was becoming " the thing." What might not'open up to one 
 fitted to teach it? 
 
 But men like Hotho found in the teaching something 
 strong and satisfactory something that gave value to even 
 the discouragements and perplexities of life. A pure breath 
 of the spirit moved in the hearts of many. An ethical force 
 centered in his room. The cool blade of his logic was hilted 
 with rubies. The very intellect grew emotional. 
 
 There is a music of thought joined with fancy and aspira- 
 tion. Under its influence things common are often seen to 
 have a meaning as lofty as Jacob's ladder down which came 
 the angels of God. Sometimes Hegel touched notes of such 
 meaning. Then he was 
 
 Not harsh, and crabbed, as dull fools suppose, 
 But musical as is Apollo's lute. 
 
 We shall let Heinrich Hotho. one of Hegel's most dis- 
 tinguished hearers, echo this side of his teacher. This is his 
 
 1 Giddings, Principles of Sociology, p. 302. 
 
94 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [94 
 
 account: 1 " . . . Inwardly lived out and died out, without 
 faith and without hope, I at last threw myself into the arms 
 of philosophy. The precise steps thereafter I can no longer 
 re-tell. But the full days of learning and of effort, the dawn- 
 ing brightness of the first comprehension, the wide horizon 
 that opened, the guiding hand reached out to me, the riches 
 without stint that daily streamed in, until I had the unex- 
 pected joy of feeling that a key had been found which might 
 open every secret of God's world the memory of this joy 
 yet endures, ever with the afterglow of a peace in .the soul 
 such as despairing ones may experience, when forgetting 
 every earthly woe they feel themselves endlessly uplifted to 
 the pure activity of heaven. Hardly a year passed before I 
 found myself a new creature." Thus, and for a page or so 
 more, he tells of his inner pilgrimage, led by Hegel, to new 
 faith and insight to eternal truths that still might be grasped 
 here and now. " But," he continues, " this is not the place 
 to say more of the wonderful and powerful teaching which 
 wrought this change. You will get some further hint of it, 
 however, from the following description of the man whom I 
 thank for it : 
 
 " It was at the beginning of my student years that one 
 morning, with a mingled feeling of fear and confidence, I 
 entered Hegel's room for the first time. He sat before a 
 broad writing table, and was searching hurriedly among the 
 mass of books and papers that lay upon it. The figure had 
 changed early; it was not erect, but full of original vigor and 
 strength. He wore a yellow-gray dressing gown, easy and 
 long enough to reach to the ground. He was not of impos- 
 ing stature, nor was there any especially attractive charm 
 about him. What struck one was his air of old-world, hon- 
 est frankness. I shall never forget my first impression of 
 his face. The features were faded but reposeful, without a 
 
 1 Hotho, Vorstudien fur Leben und Kunst, p. 381 seq. 
 
HE GEL AS ED UCA 7 'OR 95 
 
 trace of passionate disturbance. They seemed to reflect an 
 infinity of silent thought. The battle of doubt, the storm of 
 an increasing ferment of thought during forty years of seek- 
 ing and of rinding, did not seem to have conquered, nor even 
 to have left a scar. There was only the untiring effort to 
 unfold the early-found germ of truth into ever richer and 
 deeper, ever firmer and more inevitable forms only this 
 effort had put furrows in brow and cheeks and mouth. 
 When the intellect was not aroused the features seemed 
 aged and withered. But when it awoke there was seen the 
 deep earnestness of a thought which had been the outgrowth 
 of years of patient study. How full of dignity the head, 
 how noble the nose, the high though somewhat retreating 
 brow, the reposeful chin. Good faith and rectitude in mat- 
 ters great and small, the clear consciousness of having with 
 his best powers sought to be satisfied with the truth alone, 
 were nobly expressed in his face. I had expected some 
 examination, or some inspiring word about philosophy, and 
 was surprised enough at something very different. Having 
 but just returned from a trip to the Netherlands, 1 he could 
 talk of nothing but the cleanliness of the cities, the charm 
 and hard-won fertility of the country, of the green, wide- 
 stretching meadows, the flocks, the canals, the tower-like 
 mills and easy roadways, of the art treasures, of the staid 
 and proper citizens so that at the end of a half hour I felt 
 myself at home both in Holland and with himself. 
 
 "A few days afterwards, when I saw him in the lecture 
 room, it was hard at first to get used either to his mode of 
 delivery or to the sequence of his thought. Relaxed, grimly 
 almost, he sat with head bent, turning over and over the 
 pages of his manuscript, while he spoke. A constant hack- 
 ing and coughing broke the flow of his speech ; every sen- 
 tence stood alone, thrust out, as it were, brokenly ; every 
 
 1 Hegel made this journey in 1822. 
 
96 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 word, every syllable was let go unwillingly, as if each were 
 the most important and deserved especial emphasis. But 
 the whole effect was to deepen my respect, to impress me 
 with his worth. By his very earnestness, despite his peculi- 
 arities and my little comprehension of what was said, I felt 
 myself irresistibly drawn to him. Soon by zealous attend- 
 ance I grew used to the externalties of his delivery. And 
 then the meaning of what he said became vivid, and I saw 
 it as a whole and so could judge its worth. 
 
 " A smooth flowing eloquence presupposes a free and easy 
 acquaintance with the subject, and a certain formal readiness 
 can send even platitudes from the tongue trippingly and 
 pleasantly. But Hegel's task was to bring out the mightiest 
 thoughts from the foundations of things, and to give them 
 living force; they must, therefore, even though they had 
 been dealt with for years, be brought forth ever anew in the 
 living present. A more striking picture of this difficult pro- 
 cess than that given by Hegel lecturing, could not be con- 
 ceived. Like the oldest prophets who struggle to make 
 speech compressed, so as more tersely to tell the thought 
 within, which struggles but half victoriously for utterance, so 
 Hegel fought and conquered, though being hard pressed. 
 Wholly giving himself to the subject, he seemed to develop 
 it out of itself, and for its own sake, and hardly for the 
 hearer. And yet it sprang from him alone ; and an almost 
 paternal care for clearness tempered the iron earnestness 
 which otherwise might have repelled one from taking in 
 ideas so recalcitrant. Ke began haltingly, struggled on, be- 
 gan once more, paused, spoke, reflected the fitting word 
 seemed ever lacking, but in a moment was given unerringly ; 
 it seemed too common, but was inimitably adequate. . . . 
 Now one had seized the clear meaning of a proposition, and 
 hoped for a further step in vain. The thought, instead of 
 proceeding, circled with similar wording about the same 
 
97] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR gy 
 
 point. But if the attention strayed for a moment and was 
 then duteously turned back, it was punished by seeing that 
 it had lost the connection. For imperceptibly almost, pro- 
 ceeding by apparently insignificant steps, the full thought 
 had been shown to be limited, to be one-sided ; its differences 
 had been developed into contradictions, the victorious solu- 
 tion of which was seen only in the final re-unitement [recon- 
 ciliation on nobler terms] of what before had been opposed. 
 And so, ever carefully taking up the preceding, in order to 
 unfold its implicate antitheses and then to blend them in 
 richer harmony, the wonderful thought-stream pressed and 
 fought its way along, now dividing, now uniting, hesitating 
 sometimes, then leaping on, and always advancing. But he 
 who could follow with complete understanding, without 
 swerving right or left, felt himself thrilled with adventurous 
 excitement. To what depths were his thoughts taken ever 
 at the point of losing all that had been won, the toil all in 
 vain, the utmost might of the intellect forced to halt. But 
 in just these depths that powerful spirit moved and worked 
 with calm confidence. Then only did the voice raise itself, 
 the eye sent a gleam over what had been gathered together, 
 and glowed with the still fire of assurance, while with never 
 lacking words he touched all the heights and depths of the 
 soul. His speech in these moments was so clear and full, so 
 simply truthful, that every one who could grasp it felt as if 
 he himself had been discovering the thought it unfolded. 
 
 " A few years afterwards I had the good fortune to be 
 counted in the inner circle of his younger acquaintances and 
 friends. As I look back, what stands out prominently was his 
 thoroughly consistent character. His sentiments were one 
 with his philosophy ; his inner feeling was in closest harmony 
 with his thinking, his personal will was one with his philo- 
 sophic conviction. . . . With the greatest independence, he 
 
98 
 
 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 was still most reverential. In religious matters he fought with 
 the sharpest weapons for the enlightened freedom of thought, 
 while he went beyond most in his acceptance of orthodox 
 doctrines. In politics he inclined to the main features of 
 the English constitutional government. The privileges of 
 primogeniture and of rank he defended. . . . He was bitter 
 against the demagogues who were ever seeking " new things " 
 in statecraft. Against the caprice of personal opinion, sub- 
 jective fancy, arbitrary passion, he set himself, seeking to do 
 away with these from youth up, and to put in their place 
 to do away by putting in their place a just appreciation of 
 the real, the lawful, the substantial. The senses, sentiments, 
 impulses, wishes and will were to be brought into free har- 
 mony with the necessary and rational, and their accord made 
 habitual. . . . 
 
 " From early youth, Hegel had given himself devotedly to 
 every sort of scientific study. For some years, like Schiller, 
 he had lived in almost monastic seclusion, but had felt the 
 longing for active life. When he came from out the silence, 
 life put him in a hard school. He was in the midst of diffi- 
 culties. Though he clearly saw the need of a thorough 
 working over and reform of philosophic theory, he was far 
 at that time from feeling in himself the might for such an 
 undertaking. He was one of those strong natures that only 
 in manhood reveal their depth ; but then the more complete 
 and broad is their unfolding. When I learned to know him, 
 his chief works had been published, his fame was estab- 
 lished, and outwardly, too, he was in happy circumstances. 
 Thus at peace within and without, his whole demeanor 
 when unfretted by bodily pain had the utmost kindness. 
 How gladly I accompanied him on his daily walks. He 
 seemed to move almost wearily, but really he was more 
 energetic and strong than we younger men. He was ready 
 for every pleasure party; indeed, recreation, as he grew 
 
99] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 99 
 
 older, was the more sought. At such times, who would have 
 thought him the deepest spirit of his age? He liked gossipy 
 talk, and though not refusing conversation on scientific mat- 
 ters, seemed rather to avoid than to invite it. Talk of the 
 day and of the town was agreeable to him ; political happen- 
 ings, occurrences in the art world, were unfailing topics. 
 As such were his play and pastime, he often defended what 
 more seriously he had opposed, and bantered me with my 
 judicial sobriety and matter-of-factness. How vivacious he 
 became in these hours. If he were walking with one, he 
 would stop every moment, speak, gesticulate, or let ring out 
 a hearty laugh. And whatever he affirmed, even if to after- 
 thought it seemed untenable, one felt constrained to accept, 
 so clearly and forcibly expressed was every word, every 
 opinion, every sentiment. He was glad to go to concerts 
 and theaters ; merry, quick to applaud, fond of a joke, con- 
 tent with the commonplaces of social intercourse. He had 
 his favorites among singers, actresses and poets. 
 
 " In business matters his discriminating mind was so exact 
 in weighing, before action, pros and cons, that men of quick 
 decision were in despair with him. But his resolution when 
 formed was final. 
 
 "When he was in the midst of friends, his genial comrade- 
 ship distinguished him. Not a master, perhaps, of the lighter 
 ban mots of society, he had that ceremonious but easy ap- 
 proachability, united with humor when it was the time for 
 jest, with seriousness when such was required, and always 
 with such a general benevolence that those about him in- 
 stinctively met him on like ground. He was fond of the 
 company of ladies, and, if on intimate terms, the fairest was 
 sure of an attention which had the sportiveness of youth 
 softened by the fatherly courtesy of approaching age. The 
 more recluse had been his earlier laborious years, the more 
 did he enjoy in these later years the social circle ; and as if 
 
HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR [" j oo 
 
 his own depth needed the contrast of the superficiality of 
 others, the meeting with people of the most ordinary minds 
 was pleasant to him; indeed, he even seemed to have for 
 these a sort of good-hearted preference. With what unos- 
 tentatious dignity and unfeigned earnestness did he act when 
 public occasion demanded. How many hours of advice, of 
 examination, of encouragement, did he give those who sought 
 him for these. And as Plato in his Banquet glories over the 
 self-possession and endurance of Socrates in efforts that ex- 
 hausted others, so was Hegel of all those whom I have ever 
 seen the one who most has impressed me as a man capable 
 and full of joyous energy." 
 
 In 1826 Hegel's friends celebrated his birthday. Young 
 and old gathered about him. His family, however, were 
 absent at Niirnberg. But Hegel wrote them about the kind- 
 ness which had been shown him. " ... In the morning, 
 various congratulations given by dear, true souls and friends ; 
 and several letters and poems, too. ..." And so the letter 
 goes on describing, with never an eye to the public, the fes- 
 tivities of the day. "You can't think," it says, "what hearty, 
 deep-felt assurances of confidence, of love, of regard, I got 
 from dear friends, young and old. It was a day to repay 
 one for the labors of life." 
 
 In 1830 Hegel was chosen rector of the university. We 
 have the Latin speech he delivered upon taking office. It is 
 the swan note before the end. " It is not ours," he says, " to 
 contend against human malignity, nor to fight the diseases 
 which threaten our bodies, nor other ills that weigh upon 
 human frailty. Our dwelling place has not yet been dis- 
 turbed ; we are in a haven not yet visited by storm. . . . Our 
 work is with youth ; our care : letters, arts, science of things 
 divine and human. Contemplation is ours, and the educat- 
 ing and preparing lives for the toils and trials of the future 
 
I0 l] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR IO I 
 
 occupati sumus contemplando, docendo, praeparandis ani- 
 mis ad pericula et labores futures." 
 
 But in the next year the storm beat upon that haven. 
 Pestilence entered many homes. Hegel was taken. " He 
 had begun his winter lectures," says Caird, " with a fire and 
 energy of expression which surprised his hearers. . . . But 
 on Sunday [November 13] he was suddenly seized by cholera 
 in its most virulent form, and the next day passed away in a 
 quiet sleep without ever having felt an apprehension of dan- 
 ger. . . . ' His death,' wrote Varnhagen von Ense, ' was as 
 fortunate as death can ever be. With unweakened spirit, in 
 vigorous activity, at the height of his fame and influence, 
 surrounded by the proofs of his success, content with his 
 position, taking a lively share in the social pleasures and 
 showing a friendly sympathy in all the life of the capital, he 
 passed away from all these interests without regret or pain, 
 for the nature and name of his illness remained unknown to 
 him, and he might fall asleep with dream of recovery. But 
 for us, what an awful void ! he was the corner-stone of our 
 university.' " 
 
 We have thus followed the outward, temporary occur- 
 rences of Hegel's career. We have seen that though 
 marked by little that is romantic or adventurous, they are 
 nevertheless surcharged with life and meaning. Hegel may 
 not be the Hero as philosopher. Hegel's spirit was not 
 Promethean. Why should it be? it was one with the 
 divine decrees. Hegel was not pessimistic, like Schopen- 
 hauer, nor optimistic almost too easily like Emerson. 
 He was not a defiant reformer like Rousseau or Voltaire. 
 Hegel could indeed say, " Ich bin der Geist der stets ver- 
 neint." But his denial was directed against the partial, the 
 skeptical, the material, the animal it was denial of the pri- 
 
102 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [ IO 2 
 
 macy of these in order to affirm the whole, the assertory, 
 the free, the spiritual. If Hegel was not like the sea-surf 
 dashing in high, white splendor against the cliffs, he had 
 something adamantine, solid, steadfast about him, like the 
 cliffs themselves, without which the surf would not be. 
 
 As teacher, we have felt his temporary influence through 
 the accounts of d'Yxkull, Hinrichs and Hotho, Cousin and 
 Goethe. But Hegel has permanent influence. Rosenkranz 
 writes of him as "Nationalphilosoph ;" Michelet as "un- 
 widerlegter Weltphilosoph." Vera writes : " Nous n'hesitons 
 pas a proclamer Hegel comme un des plus puissant penseurs, 
 le plus puissant peut-etre, qui ait jamais existe." Dr. Harris 
 speaks of Hegel in terms Dante might have used, had the 
 inspiring power of Vergil and of Beatrice been united in one 
 person. 
 
 Hegel is indeed an educator of men beyond their school 
 days. His words concerning the school itself have therefore 
 an added value. It is to these that the reader is now invited. 
 
PART II 
 
 VIEW OK EDUCATION 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 HEGEL did not live to write a Science of pedagogics. The 
 seed thoughts of such a work, however, are contained in his 
 writings. Rosenkranz, perhaps the man most after Hegel's 
 mind, has developed these in his Philosophy of education. 
 Still it is important to go back to the seed thoughts. Those 
 of Hegel, like maple seed, are winged, and not all fell upon 
 Rosenkranz. Some are still but seeds, and capable of fruit- 
 ing upon any fit soil. 
 
 II 
 
 What of Hegel's relation to Herbart? In 1809, while 
 Hegel was schoolmaster in Niirnberg, Herbart was called to 
 Konigsberg to the chair of philosophy made famous by 
 Kant. The holders of this chair had to give lectures on 
 education. In connection with his course of lectures, Her- 
 bart established a model school afld training class. This 
 was the beginning of the influence which later was to be 
 dominant. Herbart's work as an inspirer of educators was 
 to be greater than his work as philosopher. His meta- 
 physics seem now to have been left to one side ; while the 
 half-loaf of his educational theory would, by some, be dis- 
 tributed to feed every sort of soul hunger. It may be better 
 103] 103 
 
j 04 HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR r j 04 
 
 truly to regard it as partial, and to look elsewhere perhaps 
 to Hegel for the wider philosophical views into which it 
 may fit as a not inharmonious fragment. 
 
 To the question, Was Hegel influenced by Herbart? only 
 a negative answer can be given. Rosenkranz says: 1 " Her- 
 bart's philosophy was little attended to at that time. His 
 local isolation in Konigsberg, and the late publication of 
 his greater systematic works, were two of the causes of this. 
 Despite Hegel's great interest in every occurrence of the 
 literary and scientific worlds, it cannot be learned from any 
 of his papers that he ever read a book of Herbart." 
 
 Hegel and Herbart would agree in their conception of the 
 worth of a many-sided interest. 
 
 But Herbart regards the interest rather as a flame set on 
 fire from without, while with Hegel it is the spontaneous, 
 self-determined act of the mind. Herbart regards the child's 
 mind more as the creature of a well-arranged plan of in- 
 pourings, while Hegel would lead the mind to go out and 
 conquer what it wishes its wishes being made rational by 
 education. 
 
 Herbart sees in the mind a power, indeed, but merely of 
 infinite receptivity, and of reaction thereupon. Logically, 
 perhaps, resignation is Herbart's last word ; though his own 
 spirit and trend carry him to a freer conviction. 
 
 Hegel sees in the child-mind the potentiality of becoming 
 one with the universal mind, which is free and self-deter- 
 mined, which embraces and shapes all change. His last 
 word is freedom. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Hegel's freedom is not license. When perfect, it knows 
 and wills the universal. Becoming perfect, it is rationally 
 active. It swims, not merely floats, in the tide of affairs. It 
 
 1 HegePs Leben, p. 268. 
 
1 05 ] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 1 05 
 
 has the good will, part of which ever strives to know the 
 right will. It is not merely formal; it has content. It 
 studies history, art, sociology, philosophy. It has an ideal 
 of the state, and seeks to actualize it by adding force to 
 whatever tends toward it. It is social. It says, not I, but 
 We. Individually, this freedom is to be won. Universally, 
 it is a state always existent. The individual may participate 
 in it, if he will ; if not, he is but one of the nature-things, to 
 be used as other will determines. 
 
 IV 
 
 Hegel's freedom is not isolation. It is not a prize for 
 Crusoe. Nor is it for mere static society a society without 
 ideals. It is for a growing state. It perhaps would imply 
 a world-state ; for no individual is quite free while sympa- 
 thetically he feels the chains of another. This is not to say 
 that it implies a world-government, though there is nothing 
 but the slow years to hinder that. 
 
 But to the present. The child is to become a citizen. 
 His individuality is to have many facets, reflecting many re- 
 lationships. Individually he must limit himself; choose this 
 vocation, do this task, read that book, speak thus. " Omnis 
 determinatio est limitatio." But the substance which he 
 shapes thus and so may be just as rich and intense as the 
 civilization out of which it is taken. Hegel would make it 
 the individual's duty to see to it that he participated in the 
 substance of his civilization. 
 
 V 
 
 But individuals and states pass away. What is the endur- 
 ing? Religion gives the first answer. -The second, not 
 annulling, but comprehending the essential spirit of the first, 
 is given by philosophy. The institutionalized man must 
 become self-conscious spirit. His thought must ripen into 
 that comprehension which becomes transformed into being. 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 
! 06 HE GEL A S ED UCA TOR [ 1 06 
 
 Religiously: "We shall be like Him, for we shall see Him 
 as He is." Philosophically: In so far as one knows the 
 absolute, he is it. 
 
 VI 
 
 Education is the process of all this. The schools, as part 
 of this process, are so lifted into a high scheme of things. 
 Their work is real and significant. Hegel helps to make 
 this clear. Herein lies his value for us. He may not tell of 
 many methods of instruction for the class-room, but he 
 gives some insight as to what instruction and discipline are 
 for ; and such insight is perhaps what is needed most of alL 
 
TRANSLATIONS 
 I. GENERAL NOTION OF EDUCATION 
 
 i. Definition of Education 
 
 EDUCATION is the art of making men moral. 1 It regards 
 man as natural, and points out how he may be born anew 
 how his first nature may be changed to a second, spiritual 
 nature. 2 
 
 Education may be defined as the visible, progressive 
 transcending of the negative or subjective. For, the child, 
 as the form of the potentiality of a moral individual, is a sub- 
 jective or negative. His becoming a man is the outgrowing 
 this form ; and his education is the discipline or process by 
 which this is done. To gain his positive and essential char- 
 acter, he must be nourished at the breast of the universally 
 moral ; he first must live as a stranger in the absolute in- 
 tuition of that morality ; he must make more and more of it 
 his own, and finally pass over into the universal spirit. It is 
 evident from this that the effort to be virtuous, to obtain 
 absolute morality through education, is not at all a striving 
 after an individual and separate morality. Indeed, such an 
 effort after a positive morality peculiarly one's own, would 
 be vain and in itself impossible. Regarding morality, the 
 wisest men of old said truly : To be moral, is to live in accord 
 
 1 [Cf : " The one and the whole work of education may be summed up in the 
 concept Morality." Herbart.~\ 
 
 2 Hegel's Werke, VIII, 218. 
 
 107] 107 
 
1 08 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR [ i O 8 
 
 with one's country ; * and in regard to education, the 
 answer of a Pythagorean to the question, What is the best 
 education for my son? That which makes him a citizen 
 amid a great and good people. 2 
 
 The spirit must be brought to lay aside its separateness, 
 it must be brought to know and to will the universal. It 
 must learn to live and have its being in the world -culture. 
 This reforming of the soul this alone is education^ 
 
 2. Education should lead to reflective self-consciousness 
 The child, as man in general, is a reasonable being. But 
 
 the reason of the child as such is at first only an inner, that 
 is, is present only as potency, faculty, etc. ; and this inner at 
 the same time has for the child the form only of an outer, 
 apparent in the will of his parents, in the knowledge of his 
 teachers, and in the surrounding world. The education and 
 culture of the child consists then in this : what he is at first 
 in himself, and so, for others (the adults), he must become 
 for himself* 
 
 3 . Education should make free 
 
 Man becomes what a man should be only through cul- 
 ture. 5 
 
 1 [This may often be difficult : one's country may at times contain such con- 
 tending tendencies. Cf. Renan, in his Discourse of May 15, 1886: "Je suis, 
 par essence, un legitimiste; j'etais ne pour servir fidelement, et avec toute 
 1'application dont je suis capable, une dynaste ou une Constitution tenues pour 
 autorite incontestee. Les revolutions m'ont rendu la tache difficile . . . Or, 
 j'ai soixante-trois ans; vous voyez combien mon cas est etrange; les legitimistes 
 a ma facon se preparent en notre siecle de cruels embarras, car il faudrait aussi 
 que les gouvernements fussent fideles a eux-memes, et Us ne le sont guere, il 
 faut 1'avouer." 
 
 However, this may be the case only with the vertu politique ; it may be other- 
 wise with the vertus morales et chretiennes, as Montesquieu distinguishes them.] 
 
 2 1, 399- 3 VIIb, 82. 4 VI, 278. 
 
 5 Thaulow, Hegel's Ansichten, p. 14. 
 
1 09 ] HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR ! 09 
 
 Culture in its absolute signification is freedom, and the 
 work of attaining the higher freedom. It is the absolute 
 transition to the unlimited subjective substantiality of moral- 
 ity, raised to the form of the universal. It is no longer 
 immediate, natural; but is spiritual. This freedom is won 
 for the subject through the stern strife against the naive sub- 
 jectivity of life, against the immediateness of arbitrary desire 
 and passion. This stern strife makes many turn back. But 
 it is only through this battle that culture is attained. It is 
 through this that the subjective will wins in itself its ob- 
 jectivity, by which alone it becomes worthy and fitted to be 
 the realization of the Idea. 
 
 This form of universality, to which the individual has been 
 transformed, has this significance, that the individual be- 
 comes a true being-for-himself. While recognizing the con- 
 tent and the unlimited self-determination of the universal, 
 yet, in the moral realm, the individual knows himself to be a 
 free subject, infinitely existent for himself. This is the 
 standpoint from which culture is seen to be the absolute's 
 essential mode of progress, and to be of infinite worth. 1 
 
 4. Education should lead to unselfish interest in what is 
 actual and true 
 
 To theoretic culture belongs the sense for objects in them- 
 selves, independently of any subjective interest. This is 
 born of a many-sided knowledge. It possesses a universality 
 of standpoint from which things may be judged. Thereby 
 man rises from a particular knowledge of insignificant things 
 to a general knowledge. Sharing in general interests, he 
 meets other men in a community of knowledge. In going 
 beyond his immediate knowledge and experience, a man 
 learns that there are better ways than his own. He tran- 
 scends himself, and can discriminate the essential from the 
 non-essential. 
 
 252. 
 
1 10 HEGEL AS EDUCA TOR [ I i o 
 
 Distinct knowledge has to do with the essential character- 
 istics of objects under all circumstances. To culture belongs 
 the judgment of the objects and the relations of actuality. 
 This requires that a man know the origin, the nature, and 
 purpose of a thing, and its relations to other things. These 
 are not immediately given in intuition, but are gained by ex- 
 haustive study and reflection. The uneducated man stops 
 at immediate intuition. He has no open eye. He has only 
 a subjective seeing and comprehension. He does not see 
 the whole thing. He only knows some of its characteristics, 
 and these not completely. It is only the knowledge of the 
 general standpoint that enables one to see what is essential. 
 This standpoint is the main point of the thing studied. It 
 contains the most important categories ; in which, so to 
 speak, all that one has to do is to place the .object or event, 
 which is thus easily and correctly comprehended. 
 
 The opposite fault to that of not knowing how to judge, is 
 that of too quick judgment without understanding. Such 
 hasty judgment arises from a man's having, to be sure, a 
 standpoint, but one looking one way only. So he does not 
 gain the full notion of the thing. An educated man knows 
 the limits of his ability to judge. 
 
 Thus the sense for the objective in its independence be- 
 longs to culture. I am not to seek my particular subjec- 
 tivity in objects about me. I must regard them as they are 
 in and for themselves in their independency, and not be- 
 cause of use to me. 
 
 This is the unselfish interest in science for its own sake. 
 A self-seeking interest in nature is destructive of the sciences. 
 Unselfish study places things in their living independence, 
 cleansing them of the spots and rubbish put upon them from 
 without. 1 
 
 a Cf. Comte, quoted by Fiske, Cosmical Evolution, I, 252: "The most import- 
 ant practical results continually flow from theories formed purely with scientific 
 
I I I J HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR x i i 
 
 The objective has the form of universality, without wilful- 
 ness, whim, or caprice, and freed from partiality and the 
 like. The objective is the aim of him who with single eye 
 seeks the truth in its wholeness. 1 
 
 5. Education gives individuality and power, and conscious- 
 ness of these 2 
 
 It is through culture that the individual is given his actu- 
 ality and counts for something. His true original nature 
 and substance is the spirit of estrangement from his natural 
 being. This externalizing himself, so to speak, is his aim, 
 and makes up his existence. It is the process of transition 
 both of the ideal substance into actuality and, conversely, of 
 the determined individuality into essentiality. This indi- 
 viduality attains what it truly is by culture. Only so has it 
 actual existence. So much culture, so much actuality and 
 power. 
 
 The things of nature are immediate and singular. But 
 man, as spirit, duplicates himself; since at first he is but one 
 of the things of nature ; and then, just as truly, exists for 
 himself, beholds himself, pictures himself, thinks, and is a 
 spirit only through this active being-for-himself. 
 
 This consciousness of self is attained in two ways. First, 
 
 intent, and which have sometimes been pursued for ages without any practical 
 result. A remarkable example is furnished by the beautiful researches of the 
 Greek geometers upon conic sections, which, after a long series of generations, 
 have renovated the science of astronomy, and thus brought the art of navigation 
 to a pitch of perfection which it could never have reached but for the purely 
 theoretic inquiries of Archimedes and Apollonios. As Condorcet well observes, 
 the sailor, whom an exact calculation of longitude preserves from shipwreck, owes 
 his life to a theory conceived, two thousand years ago, by men of genius who 
 were thinking of nothing but lines and angles." 
 
 1 XVIII, 61. 
 
 2 II, 369. [The reader is advised to hasten through the obscurity of this 
 passage.] 
 
1 1 2 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR [ l j 2 
 
 introspectively, in so far as he himself, looking within, must 
 bring himself to consciousness must be conscious of what 
 moves in his breast, of his impulses and passions. Secondly, 
 through practical activity a man becomes an object for him- 
 self, since he has the impulse himself to produce what is 
 given him as present and immediate, and so to know him- 
 self, to measure himself by his achievement. He does this 
 by altering outer things ; he puts upon them the stamp of 
 the inner, finding in them again his own character. The first 
 impulses of the child have this tendency to alter outer things. 
 The boy throws a stone in the stream and is pleased with 
 the circles made in the water. Thereby he becomes aware 
 of his own activity. This tendency expresses itself most 
 variously. And it is not only with outer things that man 
 acts in this way, but also with himself. He does not leave 
 his own nature as he found it, but alters it to his purpose. 
 Forms, manners, every kind of outer expression, may be 
 changed by spiritual culture. 1 
 
 6. The culture of the race must be absorbed by the individual 
 The individual must traverse the stages of culture already 
 traversed by the universal spirit. 2 Doing this, he must yet 
 be aware that the spirit has outgrown these older forms. He 
 must pass through them as over a well-traveled and even way. 
 Thus we see knowledges which in early times taxed the 
 maturest minds of men, now become the property, or means 
 
 * [Herbert Spencer says : " The education of the child must accord both in 
 mode and arrangement with the education of mankind as considered historically; 
 or in other words, the genesis of knowledge in the individual must follow the 
 same course as the genesis of knowledge in the race. To M. Comte, we believe, 
 society owes the enunciation of this doctrine. . . ." 
 
 Yet Hegel was Comfce's forerunner, and Rein, in his Outlines of Pedagogics, 
 mentions some twenty-four great men who have enunciated the same principle. 
 In Lange's Apperception (trans, edited by De Garmo, p. no et seq.), there is a 
 criticism of the crude application of this principle in school practice.] 
 
113] HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR 1 l $ 
 
 for exercise and even play, of school children. This past 
 existence now belongs to the universal spirit, which, consti- 
 tuting as it does the substance of the individual and his non- 
 organic nature, appears to him as something outer. In this 
 aspect, the education of the individual consists in his acquir- 
 ing this which is already at hand, in his absorbing his non- 
 organic nature and winning it as a possession for himself. 
 Regarded from the side of the universal spirit, it is nothing 
 else than this spirit's growth to self-consciousness. It is its 
 becoming, and its reflection thereupon. 1 
 
 7. Mankind a unity in their rationality; but this does not 
 mean unattached cosmopolitanism for the individual 
 
 It belongs to culture, to thought as consciousness of the 
 individual in the form of universality, that the ego should 
 be conceived as the universal person, wherein all persons 
 are identical. So a man counts wherever he is found, not 
 because he is Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian 
 but is man. This consciousness is of infinite importance. 
 It is at fault, however, if it becomes a certain cosmopolitan- 
 ism too broad visioned to enter into the concerns of one's 
 own country. 2 
 
 Man is essentially reasonable. Herein lies the possibility 
 of equality of rights of all men.3 
 
 8. The individual will of the pupil to be brought into ac- 
 cord with the social good 
 
 The peculiarities of men must not be rated too highly. 
 The assertion, that a teacher must carefully adjust himself 
 to the individuality of his pupils so as to develop it this 
 assertion is empty. The teacher has no time for that. The 
 individuality of the children is met in the family. But 
 with the school begins a life in accord with a general order, 
 
 , Vorrcde, 23. 2 VIII, 270. VII b, 
 
H4 
 
 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 after general rules for all. In school the spirit must be 
 brought to lay aside its particularities, it must know and 
 will the universal. 1 
 
 9. Belief. Religious education 
 
 By belief, I understand neither the bare subjective convic- 
 tion, which is limited to the form of certainty, without 
 reference to the content ; nor, on the other hand, only the 
 creed, the confession of faith of the church, which is formu- 
 lated by tongue or pen, and may be taken up by the lips and 
 put in the memory without being identical with the inner, 
 with the knowledge and consciousness of one's self. Accord- 
 ing to the old and the true sense of the word belief, I count 
 it as containing the one idea as much as the other. Though 
 distinguishable, they are bound together into one. A relig- 
 ious society (the church) is in a happy condition when the 
 distinction is merely formal ; when neither the spirit of the 
 people opposes any content of its own to the church's teach- 
 
 1 VII b, 82. [Happily what is of general utility is also best for the develop- 
 ment of personal originality. Under general law energy of will is increased; 
 and this energy will find later its own pathway in the world. Madame Necker 
 says : " Quand les limites de la liberte et du devoir sont effacees, le vague de 
 1'incertitude se repand sur tous les projets et jusque sur les actions; on a toujours 
 regret a la resolution qu'on n'a pas prise; on est toujours tente de revenir sur ses 
 pas. Pour preserver 1'enfant et ensuite Phomme d'un tel tourment, il faut 
 qu'une juste autorite preside au commencement de la vie en faisant une part 
 bien definie a la volonte. Aussi V education publique oil /'on gouverne par des 
 lois immuables, sans surveiller constamment les individus, est-elle la plus favor- 
 able au developpement de Penergie. L? education progressive, I, 56. 
 
 Childish individuality may have streaks that are non-social, and even anti- 
 social. It is these is it not? that Hegel would meet with negating, authorita- 
 tive teaching. It is then perhaps saying too much, to say with Caird : Hegel 
 "was a strict disciplinarian, and altogether opposed to the Pestalozzian ideas of 
 education then in vogue, according to which the teaching must accommodate 
 itself to the individuality of the pupil, and as little as possible exercise any pres- 
 sure upon his natural tendencies." The significant, social personality of his 
 pupil, Hegel, would further, precisely through effecting a willing self-surrender 
 of his perverse, tangental peculiarities.] 
 
! i 5] HEGEL AS EDUCA TOR ! r 5 
 
 ings, nor the church's doctrines have mere external content 
 untouched by the divine spirit. The activity of the church 
 within itself consists chiefly in educating men in the work 
 of making the truth an inner thing, so that a man is taken up 
 and permeated by it, and his self-consciousness finds itself 
 and its essential being only in this truth. That these two 
 sides are neither immediately nor firmly and lastingly united 
 in all their elements, but that there is a separation of the im- 
 mediate self-consciousness from the true content, is apparent 
 in any long educational effort. 
 
 Consciousness of one's self is at first made up of the nat- 
 ural feeling and the natural will, with their idle thoughts and 
 whims. The true content, however, is first presented to the 
 spirit from without by spoken word or writing. Religious 
 education should have this two-fold result : that the feelings 
 which we have immediately from nature lose their dictator- 
 ship, and that what was merely verbal becomes living, per- 
 sonal spirit. This transformation and absorption of what 
 was at first external is met by an enemy. The natural mind 
 is its opponent, and must of necessity be such, because what 
 is to be brought forth is not a natural life, but the free spirit. 
 The natural enemy, however, has been conquered from the 
 beginning, and the free spirit unchained. The battle with the 
 natural is accordingly only a phenomenon of the passing in- 
 dividual. But another enemy opposes the individual an 
 enemy whose basis of attack is not only the merely natural 
 part of man, but rather the supra-sensible in man his thought, 
 the spring of the inner itself, the seal of the divine origin of 
 men. When thought assumes such independence that it be- 
 comes a menace to belief, then takes place a sternet, more 
 stubborn fight than the first battle, in which were engaged 
 only the natural will and the untutored consciousness which 
 had not yet its true object. This thought is what is called 
 human thought, subjective understanding, finite reason. It 
 
j j 6 HEGEL AS EDUCA TOR {\\6 
 
 is rightly distinguished from that thought which, though in 
 men, is still divine ; from the understanding which seeks not 
 its own, but the universal; from the reason which sees, in 
 the infinite and eternal, the alone existent. 1 
 
 10. Religious teaching 
 
 Teachers, who do not know how they should begin to 
 teach religion, hold instruction in it to be unnecessary. But 
 religion has a content which must be brought before the 
 mind in an objective way. There are certain religious ideas 
 that may be taught through words. It is another thing to 
 warm the heart, to stir emotion. But this is not teaching. 
 It is a calling-forth of subjective feeling, occasioned by, 
 perhaps, a preacher's oratory, but it is not teaching. It is 
 true that when a man starts from feeling, positing this as the 
 first source, and then says that religious ideas come from 
 feeling it is true that he is partly right, inasmuch as the 
 original determination lies in the very' nature of the spirit 
 itself. Nevertheless, feeling is so indeterminate that any- 
 thing may arise from it. But the knowledge of what is 
 given in feeling does not belong to the feeling itself, but is 
 given through culture and teaching, which deal with ideas. 
 
 These teachers would have children, and men also, to be 
 content with the subjective emotion of love. But love, to be 
 pure, must rid itself of self-seeking; 2 it must be free. And 
 
 1 XVII, 280. [And this infinite Object of the Reason is not unattractive to Love. 
 Spinoza : " Sed amor erga rem seternam et infinitam sola laetitia pascit animum, 
 ipsaque omnis tristitise est expers; quod valde est desiderandum, totisque viribus 
 quaerendum." De intellect emendatione.~] 
 
 ' 2 [It was Spinoza's grasp of this principle that worked so powerfully upon 
 Goethe. Dichtung und Wahrheit : Nachdem ich rnich namlich in aller Welt 
 um ein Bildungsmittel meines wunderlichen Wesens umgesehen hatte, gerieth ich 
 endlich an die Ethik dieses Mannes. . . . Was mich aber besondere an ihn 
 fesselte, war die granzenlose Uneigenniitzigkeit, die aus jedem Satze hervor- 
 leuchtete. Jenes wunderliche Wort : " Wer Gott recht liebt, muss nicht verlangen, 
 dass Gott ihn wieder liebe," mit alien den Vordersatzen, worauf es ruht, mit alien 
 den Folgen, die daraus entspringen, erfiillte mein ganzes Nachdenken.] 
 
! j j J HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 1 1 7 
 
 only that spirit is free which has come out from its sub- 
 jectivity and looked upon the Substantial as something 
 placed over against the subjective, and higher. Only so 
 does the spirit truly return to itself again. It must have felt 
 the antithesis between itself and the Absolute Might. That 
 is, the fear of God precedes true love of God. What is true 
 in and for itself must be seen by the mind to be independent. 
 The mind then relinquishes its self-seeking, and in recog- 
 nizing tbe true, as such, gains true freedom. 1 [The very 
 recognition, with utter yielding thereto,, lifts the soul to the 
 height of the thing it sees.] 
 
 We have immediate knowledge of God, which is a revela- 
 tion within us. This is a fundamental truth, to which we 
 must hold fast. 1 
 
 If religion be a matter of feeling alone, it flickers down to 
 something idealess. It becomes inoperative, and so loses 
 all determined content. 2 
 
 /i I- Ethical ideas are understood by the child, and should 
 be taught 
 
 It is one of the notions of modern days, that moral 
 maxims and religious teaching are not for children ; since, 
 it is alleged, they do not understand them and can gather 
 from them only words for the memory. But looked at more 
 closely the matter may easily suggest that moral ideas are 
 well understood by the child, by the boy, by the youth, in 
 proportion to their age ; and that our whole life is nothing 
 else than a growing comprehension of their range and signifi- 
 cance. We see them exemplified in ever new cases, and 
 our knowledge of their many-sided meaning develops. In 
 fact, were we to put off the teaching of these moral ideas 
 
 1 Thaulow, Hegers Ausichten, p. 109. ' l Ibid., p. no. 
 
1 1 8 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOP [ I j 3 
 
 until a man is able to grasp their whole meaning, very few 
 persons need be taught, and these not much before the end 
 of life. 1 
 
 12. Moral education the common work of parent and 
 teacher 
 
 It is only by the common and harmonious effort of parents 
 and teachers that anything can be done to counteract grave 
 faults. 2 
 
 Let us, parents and teachers alike, support each other in 
 the work of the moral culture of the young. By uniting we 
 may hope to see crowned with success our efforts to educate 
 them to skillful, capable, moral manhood. 3 
 
 II. HUMAN NATURE, WITH REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 
 
 1 3 . The ages of man 4 
 
 The development of the normal human being is made up 
 of a series of processes. These change in accordance with 
 the changing relation of the individual to the race and to the 
 external world. They form the basis of distinction between 
 childhood, manhood, and old age. These different ages are 
 the manifestations of the alterations in the self-active Notion. 
 
 Childhood is the age of natural harmony, of oneness with 
 self and the world. It is the beginning, just as old age is the 
 end, disturbed by no antithesis between self and not-self. 
 The child lives in innocence, without lasting griefs, in love 
 for his parents, and in the consciousness of their love for him. 
 
 This immediate, and so non-spiritual, merely natural, unity 
 
 1 XVI, 169. Gymnasialrede, Sept. 2, 1811. 
 2 XVI, 158. Gymnasialrede, Sept. 14, 1810. 
 8 XVI, 199. Gytnnasialrede, Aug. 30, 1815. 
 
 * Thaulow says : " Many prominent teachers have thanked me for showing them 
 this passage of Hegel. It is an epitome of the whole of pedagogics." 
 
1 1 9] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 1 1 g 
 
 of the individual with his environment must be broken. The 
 individual must come to the front, and stand over against 
 the universal, which is being-in-and-for-itself, which is per- 
 fect and abiding. He must feel his independent self-hood. 
 
 But soon this feeling of self becomes just as one-sided as 
 the child's entire lack of it. The idea is realizing itself in 
 the world. But the youth attributes to himself the substan- 
 tiality which belongs to the nature of the idea; while, on the 
 other hand, the world seems to him but chance and accident. 
 This false antithesis, however, cannot be maintained. The 
 youth must grow to the insight that, on the contrary, the 
 world is to be regarded as the substantial, while the indi- 
 vidual is but the accidental. He must see that the activity 
 and satisfaction essential to a man are to be found only in 
 that fixed outer world which exists independently of him. 
 He sees he must gain skill ; he must adapt himself to de- 
 mands without. 
 
 Attaining this viewpoint he has become a man. Com- 
 plete in himself, the man looks upon the moral order of the 
 world as something not awaiting his sanction before becom- 
 ing operative, but as already essentially perfect. Thus he 
 acts with, not against, the current of events ; he is interested 
 in advancing, not in retarding it; and so he rises above the 
 one-sided subjectivity of the youth to the standpoint of ob- 
 jective spirituality. 
 
 Old age, on the contrary, is the return to indifference con- 
 cerning affairs. The old man has poured his life into affairs. 
 And so, in the end, his interest in them subsides into a feel- 
 ing of unity. The inner coalesces with the outer. 
 
 We shall now treat of these life-periods more in detail. 
 
 Childhood may be divided into three stages, or, if we count 
 the unborn child, into four. The child before birth has no 
 peculiar individuality, none related in a particular way to 
 particular objects. Its life is like that of a plant. At birth 
 
! 20 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR [ r 2 Q 
 
 it passes from vegetative to animal existence. This is a leap. 
 The child passes from the condition of a germinally synthe- 
 sized life into one of antithesis, of separateness. Light and 
 air are without. He is brought into contact with them, and 
 into ever multiplying relations to particular circumstances. 
 He is nourished by a special act. Breathing is the first 
 activity with which the child begins his individual exist- 
 ence. At birth the child's body is almost completely 
 organized. The main subsequent alteration consists in 
 growing. As regards this alteration, it is scarcely necessary 
 to say that growth of animal life, as opposed to that of vege- 
 table life, is no mere addition or off-shooting of other parts. 
 It is a developing of the organism, and brings about a quan- 
 titative, formal difference, increasing in both bulk and 
 strength. The animal, unlike the plant, has a body with 
 members all interacting. They form one organism. This 
 connection of all the parts with the negative, simple unity of 
 the life, is the basis of the feeling of self. The animal organ- 
 ism attains its most perfect form in man. The most perfect 
 animal has not the finely organized, the infinitely adaptable 
 body that we see even in the young child. 
 
 As regards the spiritual development of the child in this 
 first stage of its life, we may say that this is the time in which 
 the human being learns the most. Now the child is made a 
 confidant of all the senses. The outer world becomes a 
 reality to him. He advances from sensation to perception. 
 At first the child has only a sensation of the light by which 
 .things are visible. This bare sensation leads the child to 
 seize after the distant as well as near. But the sense of 
 touch teaches him better. His eye measures. He projects 
 his world about himself. He learns, too, the resistance 
 .offered by external things. 
 
 The transition stage from infancy to boyhood has the fol- 
 lowing characteristics. The child's activity is directed more 
 
I2 i] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR I2 i 
 
 and more upon the outer world ; and along with his sense 
 of the reality of the outer world he begins to be a real 
 person, and to feel himself as such. This feeling is joined 
 with the practical tendency to make all sorts of experiments 
 upon his surroundings. For this practical activity, the child 
 is fitted by the coming of his teeth, and by his learning to 
 stand, walk and speak. The thing first to be learned is to 
 stand upright. This is peculiar to man, and can be done 
 only by the exercise of will. A man stands so long as he 
 wills to stand. We collapse when we cease willing to stand. 
 Standing is, therefore, an habitual willing to stand. A still 
 freer relation to the outer world is attained by man through 
 his power of walking. By this he does away with the limi- 
 tations of space, finding the place he wants. Speech enables 
 man to conceive things as universals. It leads him to the 
 consciousness of his own universality to the utterance of 
 the I. This grasping of his I-ship is a most important gain 
 in the child's spiritual development. At this point he begins 
 to reflect, and is not all submerged in the outer world. This 
 dawning independence first expresses itself in play with 
 material objects. 
 
 In the passage of the child from play to serious study, he 
 becomes a boy. In this transitional stage, children begin to 
 be full of curiosity. They especially delight in stories. 
 They seek rare and strange ideas. Above all is the awaken- 
 ing feeling that they are not yet what they are to be ; and 
 the ardent wish to become like the grown people about 
 them. Out of this springs the child's desire to imitate. 
 While the feeling of immediate unity with the parents is the 
 spiritual mother-milk upon which the children thrive, still 
 their own wish to be " grown up " has its influence, too. 
 This personal aspiration for full development, is the lever to 
 be grasped by education. But as the boy is still at the 
 standpoint of immediateness, the higher to which he would 
 
122 HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR ^ j 2 2 
 
 attain appears, not in any general or abstract form, but in 
 the shape of some individual, either person, thing, or 
 authority. It is this or that man who is the ideal which the 
 boy strives to understand and to imitate. It is only in this 
 concrete way that the child at this stage becomes acquainted 
 with himself. Accordingly, what the boy is to learn must 
 be set before him by authority and example. He has a feel- 
 ing that what is thus set him is higher than he. In educa- 
 tion this feeling is carefully to be kept uppermost. All 
 play education, therefore, is a mistake. This seeks to teach 
 while degrading earnestness to play. The teacher descends 
 to the childishness of the pupils instead of lifting them up 
 to serious realities. This play education may have through- 
 out the whole life of the pupil the baneful result of making 
 him account everything cheap. An equally bad result may 
 be brought about by the foolish teacher who constantly 
 prods on his pupils to an over-use of their minds. They 
 become wise before their time. Of course the child must be 
 stimulated to original thought. Yet the worthiest things are 
 not to be sacrificed to his unripe understanding. But we 
 pass to what more nearly concerns one side of education, 
 that is, to discipline. The boy is not to be allowed to follow 
 his own whim and fancy. He must learn to obey in order 
 to command. Obedience is the beginning of all wisdom. 
 For by this the boy's will is brought under the reasonable 
 will imposed from without. The boy's will is not yet 
 fledged, not truly independent and free. It has not learned 
 to see the true, the objective, which makes for righteous- 
 ness. If children are permitted to follow their impulses, if 
 their self-will is unwisely yielded to, a most ugly habit of 
 stubborn wilfulness is formed of opposition, of selfishness. 
 This is the root of all evil. By nature the child is neither 
 good nor bad, since it is born with no knowledge of either 
 good or evil. It is shallow to think of this unknowing inno- 
 
1 2 3 ] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR ! 2 3 
 
 cence as an ideal, and to aspire after it. Such innocence is 
 of little worth and of short duration. Soon there appears in 
 the child an evil self-will. This must be broken by disci- 
 pline [i. e,, transmuted into good will, by the instilling of 
 more generous motives]. In regard to the other side of 
 education, instruction, it may be noted that it begins reason- 
 ably with the most abstract elements that the childish mind 
 can grasp. These are the letters of the alphabet. These 
 presuppose an abstraction not yet attained by some nations, 
 e. g., the Chinese. In general, speech is that airy element, 
 that material immateriality by means of which the widening 
 knowledge of the child is lifted more and more above the 
 material and particular to the universal, and, so, to thought. 
 This enabling to think is the chief service of the first educa- 
 tion. As yet, however, the boy has attained only repre- 
 sentative thought; he can but re-present the world in his 
 notions of it. He learns the qualities of things, becomes 
 acquainted with the relations of the natural and spiritual 
 worlds, interests himself in what is going on ; but does not 
 yet know the world in its deeper interconnections. Only as 
 a man does he attain this knowledge. But we cannot keep 
 the boy from gathering an imperfect understanding of the 
 natural and of the spiritual. We must, therefore, hold the 
 following assertions to be wrong: A boy does not under- 
 stand anything of religion or of right ; and so he is not to 
 be instructed regarding them ; in general, ideas on these 
 subjects are not to be pressed upon him his own experi- 
 ences must teach him ; we must be content to let his natural 
 surroundings influence him. We disagree with this. Even 
 the peoples of antiquity did not allow their children to tarry 
 at the material. But the modern spirit is higher above the 
 material it has a deeper insight into its own inner nature 
 than had the ancients. The supra-sensible world must, 
 therefore, early be brought near to the conception of the 
 
j 24 HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR [ ! 24 
 
 boy. This is done by the school in a far higher degree than 
 by the family. In the latter, the child has his place as an 
 immediate part; he is loved, be his behavior good or bad. 
 But in the school, the child, immediately considered, is not 
 accounted of. He is respected only in so far as he is worthy 
 in accordance with his deeds. Here he is not the object 
 of affection merely, but on every side is criticised and 
 directed, and trained by rigid rules. He is subjected to the 
 general order, which forbids many things in themselves in- 
 nocent, simply because it would be impossible for all to do 
 them. So the school forms the intermediary between the 
 family and society at large ; to which latter the boy at first 
 bears only a general relation, his interests being taken up in 
 play and study. 
 
 The boy ripens into the youth when, at puberty, the life 
 of the race begins to stir within him and to seek satisfaction. 
 The youth turns to the substantial universal. His ideal no 
 longer appears to him, as to the boy, in some person, but is 
 held by him as a universal, independent of such individuality. 
 But to the youth this ideal still has a more or less subjective 
 form, be it an ideal of love and friendship, or one of general 
 ambition. In this subjectivity of the substantial contents of 
 such an ideal lies not only its antithesis to the actual world, 
 but also the motive force which strive? by the realization of 
 the ideal to do away with that antithesis. The form of the 
 ideal inspires the youth's energy. So he dreams that he is 
 called and is fitted to make the world over, or, at least, to 
 turn it back to its right course. The young man's aspiring 
 eye does not see that the substantial universal contained in 
 his ideal is already being evolved and realized in the world. 
 What is realized of the universal seems to him far below the 
 ideal. Accordingly he feels that the world misunderstands 
 both his ideal and himself. Thus the peace in which the 
 child lived with the world is broken by the youth. Because 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 12$ 
 
 of this turning to the ideal, the youth seems to have a nobler 
 outlook and greater unselfishness than the man, who is inter- 
 ested in his personal, temporal affairs. But it must be re- 
 membered that the man is not bound up in his personal in- 
 clinations and subjective opinions, nor is he engaged solely 
 in his personal advancement, but is one with the reasonable 
 realities about him, and is active in the world's behalf. 
 
 The youth necessarily reaches this stage. His immediate 
 aim is to cultivate himself so that he may be fitted to realize 
 his ideal. In his efforts for this realization he becomes a 
 man. At first it may seem to him that the passage from 
 ideal life into real life is a sorry entrance into philistinism. 
 But up to this, he has been busy with generalities and with 
 work but for himself ; whereas, in becoming a man and enter- 
 ing upon practical life he should deal with particulars and be 
 active for others. 
 
 Although it lies deep in the nature of things that, if any- 
 thing is to be accomplished, particulars must be dealt with, 
 it still may be that the beginnings of such dealing are pain- 
 ful. The feeling of inability immediately to realize one's 
 ideals may lead to hypochondria. This hypochondria, un- 
 seen though it be in many, is escaped scarcely by any one. 
 The later it is experienced, the worse are its symptoms. 
 Weak natures may suffer it their life long. In this sickly 
 mood, a man will not give up his subjectivity he . cannot 
 conquer his repugnance to the actual ; and so finds himself 
 relatively incapable, and may easily become so altogether. 
 If, then, a man is not to go under, he must recognize the 
 world as essentially independent and complete. He must 
 submit to the conditions it imposes, and win from it, though 
 it seem to say him nay, what he will. Commonly men think 
 they thus adapt themselves out of necessity. But rather 
 must this unity with the world be recognized, not as a rela- 
 tion of necessity, but of reason. The reasonable, the divine, 
 
I2 6 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR [ 12 6 
 
 has absolute power to realize itself. It has run its perfect 
 course from eternity. It is not so powerless that it must 
 wait for some far-off beginning. The world stands as the 
 realization of the divine reason ; only upon the surface rules 
 the play of unintelligent caprice. It, therefore, may be con- 
 sidered complete and independent; at least with as much, 
 and, perhaps, with more, correctness than may the individual 
 just growing into manhood. Thus the man acts with reason 
 in giving up his plan of making the world anew, and in striv- 
 ing instead to work out his personal aims, desires and inter- 
 ests only as a member of the world. Even so there is room 
 for honorable, far-reaching, creative activity. For, although 
 the world must be regarded as complete, still it is no dead 
 thing, nor inert. But, like the life-process in general, it ever 
 renews itself while at the same time it is ever advancing. 
 The man's work is a part of this renewal and advancement. 
 So, while it is true that a man can bring forth only what 
 is already present, it is also true that progress is the result 
 of his activity. But it takes an enormous lever to move the 
 world- A vast number of individuals must labor at it. 
 However, if a man after a half century of work looks back, 
 he will see that there has been progress. Certainty of this, 
 together with the insight into the rationality of the world, 
 does away with grieving over ruined ideals. What was true 
 in these ideals, has lived on in the man's practical activity; 
 only the false and empty abstractions have fallen away. 
 The range and manner of men's work may be very diverse ; 
 but the substantial in all human work is the same, namely, 
 what is right, moral or religious. Accordingly in every 
 sphere of activity men may find contentment and honor, if 
 only, in whatever sphere they belong, either by accident, 
 outer necessity, or free choice, they do what rightly is de- 
 manded of them. For this it is necessary, above all things, 
 that the training of the young man be adequate ; and 
 
NIVEBSITY; 
 
 ! 2 7] // GEL A S ED UCA TOR 1 2 7 
 
 secondly, that he should determine to gain his subsistence in 
 working for others. Training alone does not make him a 
 complete man. He becomes this only through wisely caring 
 for his own temporal interests. In the same way, only then 
 do nations become full-grown when they have made it im- 
 possible for a so-called paternal government to shut them 
 out from the oversight of their own wants, material and 
 spiritual. 
 
 While passing over into practical life, a man may feel that 
 the times are out of joint, and may lose hope of their im- 
 provement. Nevertheless he grows more and more at one 
 with his objective relationships. He becomes accustomed 
 to his work. The matters with which he has to deal are, it 
 is true, single things and changing, and new in their particu- 
 larity. But these particulars have a universal, a rule, some- 
 thing according to law, about them. The longer a man is 
 engaged in his occupation, so much the more clearly does he 
 see this universal. In time he becomes perfectly at home in 
 his calling, and gives himself wholly to it. The essential in 
 all the phases of his business becomes a matter of course. 
 Only the individual, the non-essential, presents to him any 
 novelty. 
 
 It is just because his activity is so perfectly met and satis- 
 fied by his occupation his impulses finding no opposition 
 in their objects it is because of this full development of his 
 activity that the vitality of it begins to ebb. For with the 
 doing away of the antithesis between the subject and its ob- 
 ject, the interest in the latter is lost. Thus a man enters old 
 age not only by the running down of the vitality of his 
 physical organism, but also by the crystallizing of the spirit- 
 ual life into habits. The old man lives without definite 
 interests, since he has given up his early cherished ideals, and 
 the future seems to promise nothing new. He believes 
 rather that he already knows the universal, the essential, of 
 
! 28 HEGEL AS EDUCA TOR [ l 2 g 
 
 whatever may come. So the mind of the aged is turned only 
 to this universal, and to the past, which he thanks as having 
 given him' the knowledge of the universal. While he trfus 
 lives in the remembrance of what is gone, and upon the sub- 
 stantial, he loses his memory for present particulars, and for 
 the arbitrary, as, for instance, for names. But, as we have 
 said, he retains the lessons of experience, accounting himself 
 duty bound to point out the way to the young. This wisdom, 
 however this lifeless, complete passing over of the subject- 
 ive activity into its world leads as surely to second child- 
 hood with its lack of antithesis, as does the processless 
 habitual activity of his physical organism lead to the abstract 
 negation of its individual vitality to death. 
 
 So the course of human life is closed with this last change 
 in the totality of changes, determined by the self-active 
 Notion through the process of the generic with the particular. 1 
 
 14. Body, soul, spirit 
 
 At first the spirit is one with its natural determinants. 
 Out of this immediate and natural unity the spirit rises by 
 opposing and battling with it. This battle is followed by the 
 victory of the spirit over the body. The body is set aside 
 and deposed. It is made but a symbol for the spirit's ex- 
 pression. 2 
 
 The human form is not as is the animal, the body only of 
 the soul, but of the spirit. Spirit and soul are essentially 
 distinct. For the soul is merely this ideal, simple being-for- 
 itself of the body as body ; but the spirit is the being-for- 
 itself of the conscious and self-conscious life with all the im- 
 pressions, ideas and purposes of this conscious existence. 
 With this vast difference between the merely animal life and 
 the spiritual consciousness, it may seem strange that the 
 
 1 VII b, 90-103. 2 VII b, 43. 
 
I2 Q] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR I2 g 
 
 human body nevertheless appears so like the animal. But 
 our wonder at such similarity may be met by our remember- 
 ing that the spirit, in accord with its self-active nature, deter- 
 mines to express itself in life, and so to be at once both soul 
 and nature-existence. As living soul the spirit assumes, 
 through the same self-active notion which belongs to the 
 animal soul, a body. However high the spirit is above what 
 is merely living, it nevertheless makes for itself a body which 
 appears organized on one and the same principle as the 
 animal. But since the spirit is not only an Idea in existence 
 an Idea fulfilled by natural and animal life, but is the Idea, 
 which in its own free inner essence is an Idea for itself 
 since this is so, the spirit works out for itself, beyond the 
 sense world, its own objectivity the knowledge whose 
 reality is coincident with thought itself. 
 
 Moreover, besides thought, and its systematic philosophi- 
 cal activity, the spirit carries on a full life of sensation, de- 
 sire, conception, imagination, and the like, which stands in 
 more or less close relation with its existence as soul and 
 body, and accordingly has the human body as one of its 
 realities. In this reality, which is peculiarly its own, the 
 spirit takes up its life, illumines it, permeates it, and so be- 
 comes visible to others. At this point, then, the human 
 body is no mere nature-existence, but has by its form and 
 structure not only to reveal the sensible and natural being 
 of the spirit, but also, as the expression of something higher 
 within, to differentiate itself from mere animal corporality, 
 however similar it seems thereto. 1 
 
 The mastering of the body is the condition of the soul's 
 becoming free, of its attaining objective consciousness. Of 
 course the individual soul in itself is limited by the body. 
 As a living being I have an organized body, and this is not 
 
 1 Xb, 37 o. 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 foreign to me. It belongs to my Idea, it is the immediate, 
 outward existence of my Notion, it forms my nature-exist- 
 ence. Accordingly, be it said in passing, we must declare 
 empty the conception of those who hold that man properly 
 should have no organized body, because thereby he is bound 
 to care for his physical needs, and so is withdrawn from his 
 purely spiritual life and becomes incapable of true freedom. 
 The reasonably religious man has no such mistaken view. 
 He thinks the satisfaction of his bodily needs a worthy end, 
 and makes it the object of prayer to God, the Eternal Spirit. 
 And the philosopher must see that the spirit exists for itself 
 only by setting over against itself the material partly as its 
 own corporality, partly as the external world in general an 
 antithesis which, however, results in unity by its being 
 recognized and so removed. 
 
 Between the spirit and its own body there naturally is felt 
 a closer union than between the spirit and the remainder of 
 the outer world. Because of the necessary connection be- 
 tween my soul and body, the immediate activity of the former 
 in and through the latter is no finite, no negative activity. 
 This immediate harmony of soul and body must be main- 
 tained. This does not mean that, like athletes and acrobats, 
 I am to make my body an end in itself. But I must give it 
 its due, must spare it, and keep it healthy and strong. I 
 may not despise it and treat it as an enemy. It is just 
 through the lack of care, or perhaps through the misuse of 
 my body, that I am brought into the relation of dependence 
 upon it, and upon outer necessity ; for in this way, notwith- 
 standing its identity with me, I make it a negative to me, and 
 so an enemy. I force it to rise against me and to exact 
 penalty from my spirit. 1 On the other hand, if I act accord- 
 
 1 [" The body must be vigorous to obey the soul; a good servant ought to be 
 robust. The weaker the body, the more it commands; the stronger, the more it 
 obeys." JRousseau.~\ 
 
1 3 i J HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR r 3 i 
 
 ing to the laws of my bodily organism, my soul, in its body, 
 is free. The soul, however, is to rise above this stage of 
 immediate unity with its body. The form of this immediate- 
 ness contradicts the notion of the soul, by which it is deter- 
 mined to be ideality in reference to itself. To become what 
 is implied in its notion, the soul must make its early identity 
 with the body, an identity recognized and sanctioned by the 
 spirit; that is, it must take possession of the body, 
 must form it to an adaptable and easy tool for its activity. 
 The soul must transform it so that it will not stand in the way 
 of the soul's development. It must be made an accident to 
 the substance of the soul, which is freedom. 
 
 The body is the means by which I come in contact with 
 the outer world in general. Do I wish to realize my aims? 
 Then I must make my body capable of transmuting these 
 subjective aims into the outer objective. By nature my 
 body is not skilled for this, it rather does what accords with 
 its animal nature. The mere organic instincts are not yet 
 impulses made perfect by the spirit. To serve the spirit my 
 body must first be educated. With animals, the body obey- 
 ing its instincts carries out perfectly all things necessarily 
 implied in the Idea of the animal. With man, on the con- 
 trary, control of the body must be gained by purposeful 
 effort. At first the body's obedience is awkward. It has no 
 certainty of movement. But by attentive practice and 
 culture it attains an increasing facility of immediately em- 
 bodying the soul's inner desires. Thus is developed a 
 marvelous relationship an immediate control of the spirit 
 over the body. 1 
 
 1 5 . Temperament and character 
 
 The manifold varieties of talent and of genius may be 
 classed in accord with the various subjects upon which they 
 
 1 VII b, 236. 
 
! 3 2 HEGEL AS EDUCA TOR [ I $ 2 
 
 work. The various temperaments, on the other hand, have 
 no such outer reference for convenient classification. It is 
 difficult to say just what the word "temperament" means. 
 It is not applied to the moral nature of actions nor to the 
 talent which reveals itself in an action ; nor, finally, to an 
 emotion of a specific kind. It is best, therefore, to take 
 temperament as meaning the general mode of the individ- 
 ual's activity, of the way in which he objectifies himself in 
 which he deals with actuality. In this sense, it is seen that 
 the temperament has not the importance for the free spirit 
 that was formerly assigned to it. In a time of advanced 
 culture, the manifold and arbitrary modes of behavior and 
 of action are lost, and with them the temperamental differ- 
 ences. The attempted classifications of the temperaments 
 are so indefinite, that we hardly know how to apply them to 
 the individual ; since, in a given individual, we find several of 
 the specified temperaments more or less mingled. 
 
 A fourfold division of the temperaments is usual the 
 choleric, the sanguine, the phlegmatic, and the melancholic. 
 Kant treats of these in detail. The main difference in these 
 temperaments is this : that, on the one hand, a man loses 
 himself in the things which interest him ; while, on the 
 other, he is more self-centered his own personality being 
 of most concern. To the first, belong the sanguine and 
 phlegmatic ; to the latter, the choleric and melancholic. The 
 sanguine man forgets himself in his affairs; and the more 
 so because of his superficial activity, which is engaged with 
 a multitude of things. The phlegmatic man, on the con- 
 trary, persistently pursues one thing. With the choleric and 
 melancholic, as already said, the center of interest is their 
 subjectivity. Men of these two temperaments differ, how- 
 ever, in that the choleric are shifting, while the melancholic 
 are fixed ; so that, in this respect, the choleric corresponds 
 to the sanguine, and the melancholic to the phlegmatic. 
 
! 3 3 ] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR ! 3 3 
 
 We have said that the difference of temperaments loses 
 its importance in a time when the behavior and activity of 
 the individual are prescribed by the general culture. The 
 character, on the contrary, remains the distinguishing mark 
 of men. It is this that gives the individual his fixed de- 
 termination. To character belongs, first of all, the energy 
 with which a man steadily pursues his aims and interests, 
 and guards in all his actions his self-consistency. Without 
 character no man rises from his indeterminateness, or 
 chooses one direction rather than another. The demand is 
 to be made of every one, that he show character. The man 
 of character has weight with others because they know 
 where he stands. To character belongs also, beyond the 
 mere energy, a will of rich content and aims. Only through 
 the carrying out of great purposes does a man reveal a great 
 character, which is as a beacon to others. And his pur- 
 poses must have inner sanction, if his character is to express 
 the absolute unity of the content and of the formal activity 
 of the will, and so to have complete truth. If, on the other 
 hand, the will sticks to mere particulars, without general out- 
 look, it becomes self-will. This has only the form, not the 
 content, of character. Through self-will that parody of 
 character the individuality of men is cut off from com- 
 munity with others. 
 
 Stability of character is not given altogether at birth. It 
 must be developed through the will. It cannot, however, 
 be denied that character has a natural basis, some men 
 being by nature stronger than others. 1 
 
 Not without many-sidedness can the character have living 
 interest. At the same time this fullness must appear in- 
 cluded in one subject. It must not be dissipation, fickleness, 
 and mere excitability. While a man of character must come 
 
 1 VII b, 84. 
 
! 34 HEGEL AS EDUCA TOR [ j 34 
 
 in close touch with the most varied departments of the 
 human mind, yet he must not lose himself; but rather amid 
 this totality of interests, purposes, peculiarities, must guard 
 his own acquired subjectivity. 1 
 
 To act, there is essential need of character. A man of 
 character is a man of understanding, who as such has 
 definite aims in mind, and pursues them steadily. He who 
 would do anything great, must, as Goethe says, know how 
 to limit himself. He, on the contrary, who wills everything, 
 wills truly nothing, and has nothing for a result. 2 
 
 1 6. The hitman spirit a tinity. Heart and head, intelli- 
 gence and will, not to be separated 
 
 From an old-time notion we are still accustomed to sep- 
 arate head and heart, thinking and feeling or however the 
 two are named and to look upon them as almost indepen- 
 dent. Accordingly the influence of instruction upon the 
 character appears remote or casual. But the human spirit 
 is a unity ; it is not a bundle of unrelated natures. 3 
 
 The separation of the intelligence from the will is often 
 made, because they are wrongly conceived as two fixed, 
 independent existences, so that there may be will without 
 intelligence, and intellectual activity without will. But to 
 separate the activities of the spirit is to make it a mere ag- 
 
 'Xa, 305. 2 VI, 148. 
 
 3 XVI, 156. Gymnasialrede, 14 Sept., 1810. [Cf. " A high development of 
 sympathy cannot be secured without a high development of representativeness, 
 so closely inter-related are our intellectual and moral natures." Fiske, Cosmical 
 Evolution, Vol. II., 354.] 
 
 " Goethe expressed Herder's fundamental idea when he said : ' Everything that 
 man undertakes to produce, whether by action, word, or in whatsoever way, 
 ought to spring from the union of all his faculties.' " H. W. Mabie, Essays in 
 Literary Interpretation, p. 59.] 
 
j 35 ] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 1 3 5 
 
 gregate, and to look upon its inter-dependencies as a mere 
 casual collocation. 1 
 
 17. Memory. Mnemonics 
 
 It is not by chance that youth has a better memory than 
 old age. Consciously or unconsciously, it is ever in use. 
 Reflection has not yet weakened its energy. It is busy filling 
 the soul with pure existences of outer space. These are not 
 yet opposed by the subjectivity. Talent is generally accom- 
 panied by a good memory. But these mere empirical facts 
 do not help us in knowing what memory is in itself. It is 
 the most difficult point in any doctrine of mind, in the sys- 
 tematization of the intelligence, to state exactly the place 
 and significance of memory, and its organic connection with 
 thought. 2 
 
 Great men have generally been famous for their good 
 memories. For, what interests a man, that he retains ; and a 
 great man broadens the field of his interests to cover count- 
 less things. Thus the interest in gaining an adequate con- 
 ception of actuality, together with the retention of what has 
 been gained, is a characteristic of the greatest minds. 3 
 
 1 VII b, 302. [The heart and intellect should lay the path over which the will 
 must push its way. Madame Necker writes : " Fortifier la volonte, 1'elever, la 
 maintenir, s'il se peut, a cette hauteur ou elle regne en souveraine sur les pen- 
 chants humains, trouvant dans leur force particuliere, tantot des obstacles et tantot 
 des secours, mais jamais une puissance qui la subjugue. 
 
 Ensuite, comme la volonte, independamment de sa force, doit avoir un carac- 
 tere determine et suivre une marche constante; comme elle ne peut se prononcer 
 en actes sans avoir affaire aux penchants du cceur; comme de plus il est certain 
 que nous la sentons souvent decidee par les divers mobiles qu'elle pourrait gou- 
 verner, 1'education doit en second lieu donner a Peleve les sentiments, les gouts, 
 les habitudes meme, que exerceront la plus salutaire influence sur la volonte, et 
 qui, dans les moments ou elle est le moins capable d'effort, imprimeront encore 
 une heureuse direction a la conduite." Education progressive, I., 48.] 
 
 2 VII b, 352. 3 X a, 362. 
 
1 36 HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR [ j 3 
 
 The ancient mnemonics, which has recently been resusci- 
 tated, but which ought to be forgotten, consists in changing 
 names into pictures, and thus degrades the memory to a 
 power of mere imagery. The mnemonic impressions are 
 not retained by heart, so to speak, as are those of repeated 
 memorizing. When reproduced they are not brought from 
 the inmost, deepest recesses of the self, but are merely read 
 off from the surface of the imagination. 
 
 Mnemonics accords with the prejudice which places the 
 imagination above the memory. But memory does not deal 
 with mere pictures which are taken from the immediate, 
 non- spiritual act of the intelligence in intuition, but with an 
 existence which is the product of the intelligence itself. Its 
 reproductions come from its permanent possessions. 1 
 
 1 8. Habit 
 
 Habit, like memory, is a difficult point in the organization 
 of the spirit. Habit is the mechanism of the feeling of self, 
 as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. The natural 
 qualities and changes of age, of sleeping and waking, are 
 immediately natural. Habit, on the other hand, is a deter- 
 mination which has been made natural, mechanical. Habit 
 is rightly called a second nature nature, because it is an 
 immediate expression of the soul ; a second, for it is an im- 
 mediateness acquired by the soul, which modifies the body 
 as the self directs, through the feelings, the intelligence and 
 the will. 2 
 
 The form of habit embraces all sorts and all stages of the 
 activity of the spirit. The most external, the spatial deter- 
 
 1 VII b, 347. [Hegel's "learning by heart" includes reflection upon what is 
 stored away by repetition, and also its assimilation by the knowledge previously 
 acquired. So we must not quote against him : Sf avoir par cceur n'est pas Sf avoir. 
 Hegel's heart is larger than the lips; it includes the intelligence also.] 
 
 2 VII b, 230. 
 
! 3 7] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR l 3 7 
 
 mination of the individual, namely, his ability to stand up- 
 right, is made a habit by the will. It is an immediate, 
 unconsciously assumed position, that remains the result of a 
 permanent will. So, too, seeing is the concrete habit, which 
 unites immediately in one act many determinations of sensa- 
 tion, of consciousness, of intuition, of understanding, etc. 
 Even freest thought, active with its own pure elements, 
 stands in need of habit, of this form of the immediate, 
 whereby it becomes an untratnmeled and complete possession 
 of my self. Only through this habit of thinking do I exist 
 for myself as a thinker. 
 
 Habit is often spoken of disparagingly, as something life- 
 less, accidental, particular. It is true the form of habit, as 
 any other form, may have any or all content. Still it is 
 most essential to the existence of any mental life in the in- 
 dividual subject. Because of his habits the subject exists as 
 concrete immediateness, as soul in ideality. His habits 
 religious, moral and other constitute him as belonging to 
 this self, to this soul, not merely as an addition, nor as pass- 
 ing sensation or idea, nor as an inner abstraction separated 
 from action and actuality, but in very essence. In scientific 
 studies of the mind and spirit, habit is usually ignored as if 
 beneath consideration, or rather, perhaps, because its deter- 
 mination is so difficult. 1 
 
 1 VII b, 233. [Habit is as important a factor in social groups as in the individ- 
 ual. Cf. the following, quoted by Gumplowicz: Grundriss der Sociologie, S. 
 130: " Geheimnissvoll in ihrem stillen damonischen "Walten ist die Macht der 
 Gewohnheit, wie sie im Handeln und Denken das kleine Leben der Einzelnen 
 und die grosse Geschichte der Menschheit beherrscht. Dieser dunkle Trieb aller 
 irdischen Dinge, im Wechsel zu beharren, der rastlos fluthenden Bewegung ein 
 Moment der Stetigkeit und der Ruhe abzugewinnen, durch die Gleichmassigkeit 
 des Pendelschlages den endlosen Oscillationen den Schein festgefiigter Ordnung 
 entgegenzusetzen, er ist es wesentlich, der aller geistigen Thatigkeit unseres 
 Geschlechts Schwerpunkt und Gleichgewicht verleiht. Erst die natiirliche Neigung 
 zur gleichartigen Wiederholungen derselben Bewegungsacte, dann das Sichbefes- 
 tigen und Sichverkorpern derselben Wiederholungen zu gesetzmassiger Gewoh- 
 
I 3 g HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR [ l 3 g, 
 
 III. WHAT THE PUPIL MUST BRING TO HIS EDUCATION 
 
 19. Precocity not the promise of eminence 
 
 The mental development of many children outruns their 
 bodily development. This is the case particularly with 
 those of artistic talent, and most of all with musicians. But, 
 in general, understanding comes only with years. Precocity 
 of artistic talent is perhaps an advantage. But as a rule the 
 early development of the child's intelligence is not the 
 promise of an eminent mind in manhood. 1 
 
 20. Energy and promptness 
 
 There can be nothing worse than the evil of procrastina- 
 tion, of the putting-off or shirking of work, so that it is not 
 pursued in all earnestness and in an unchangeable order. 
 What is undertaken to be done at a set time should be 
 accomplished as surely as the sun rises. 2 
 
 21. Attention 
 
 Without attention the mind can seize hold of no object. 
 It is through it alone that the mind stands in the presence 
 of things, and obtains, if not complete knowledge of them 
 for complete cognition implies a still more highly developed 
 act of mind still the first steps in knowledge. Attention 
 accordingly lies at the beginning of education. Regarded 
 closely, attention must be seen to be a taking in of content, 
 which is determined both objectively and subjectively ; or, 
 in other words, a content that exists not for me alone, but 
 
 nung, wie viel bewusstes Denken und Wollen gerinnt dadurch [to flow again, 
 however, in new purpose and achievement] allmahlich zur unbewussten Function 
 eines geistlosen Mechanismus ! [which offers, nevertheless, many a lever for the 
 directing hand of self-conscious will] . . . Regel und Ordnung und Sitte und 
 Gesetz, wie sie von Geschlecht zu Geschlecht forterbend die Culturgeschichte 
 tragen, wie waren sie denkbar ohne das unablassige Wirken jener geheimniss- 
 vollen Kraft?"] 
 
 1 VIIb,90. 2 XVI, 153. 
 
1 39 J HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR r 39 
 
 independently also. 1 In attention there is found a successive 
 separation and unification of the subjective and objective. 
 It is an immediate application to the object, and at the same 
 time a reflecting upon self in its relation to that object. 
 Herein it is apparent that the attention is something depend- 
 ent upon my will that I am attentive only when I will to be so. 
 But it must not be thought that to direct the attention is an 
 easy matter. It demands effort when one wishes to grasp 
 one object rather than another, to abstract himself from the 
 thousand things moving through his mind, from his other 
 interests, and even from his own person ; and repressing the 
 tendency to hasty judgment, to give himself up wholly to 
 the object. Thus, attention implies both the suppression of 
 that tendency to make self uppermost, and also self-sur- 
 render to the object two factors essential to a good mind, 
 though they are often deemed unnecessary by the so-called 
 polite education which leaves one with no eager interest in 
 anything. 
 
 Lack of power to fix attention leads back to wildness. 
 The savage is hardly ever attentive. He lets everything 
 pass by him, and fixates scarcely upon anything. Only 
 through mental culture does the attention gain strength and 
 fulness. The botanist, for instance, notices in a plant in- 
 comparably more than a man ignorant of botany. So it is 
 with every kind of knowledge. A man of great and cultured 
 mind sees completely what is before him. With him an 
 impression has the full character of a cognition. 2 
 
 22. Early obedience the condition of obtaining independence 
 
 Obedience is the beginning of all wisdom. 3 
 
 One's own conviction is a different thing than subservience 
 
 1 [The question : " What sayeth the law? How readest thou?" would be a 
 case in point.] 
 
 2 VII b, 312. 8 VII b, 96. 
 
! 40 HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR [ j 40 
 
 to the authority of others. If my acts are to have moral 
 worth, then they must flow from my convictions. The ac- 
 tion must be altogether mine. If I act according to the au- 
 thority of others, the deeds are not entirely my own. They 
 are the result partly of a conviction from without. 
 
 But there are times when morality demands one to act out 
 of obedience to the authority of others. Originally a man 
 follows his natural propensities without second thought, 
 unless it be biased or false reflection, which is itself under 
 the sway of his animal nature. In these circumstances 
 obedience must be learned, because the will is not yet 
 rational. Through obedience the negative has its effect, in 
 that the passions are reined in. Only so does a man attain 
 independence. 1 
 
 23. Silence and docility required of a learner 
 The silence (kx^^' ia ) that Pythagoras required of his 
 pupils during their tutelage, the duty of restraining idle talk, 
 may be considered essential in any scheme of education. 
 One must begin by striving to comprehend the thoughts of 
 others. Willingness to yield one's own ideas is the first 
 necessity for a learner. We often say that the understand- 
 ing is developed by questioning, objecting, responding, etc. 
 But, in truth, the mind is not developed by these ; it is only 
 made superficial. The inner nature of a man is broadened 
 by culture, and given him as a possession through self- 
 restraint. Thonght is enriched, and the mind vitalized, by 
 silence. 2 
 
 Thought, at the beginning, like the will, should be obedient. 3 
 
 The tendency of youth to independent reflection and 
 reasoning is one-sided. It should be indulged in as little as 
 
 1 XVIII, 29. 2 XIII, 230. 3 XVI, 154. 
 
r 4 1 ] HE GEL A S ED UCA TOR 1 4 1 
 
 possible. The pupils of Pythagoras kept silence during their 
 first four years ; that is, they were not to have personal 
 ideas and thoughts, or to express them. For the chief end 
 of education is to do away with these personal ideas, thoughts, 
 reflections of youth, and their utterance. If the tendency 
 toward self-reasoning be unchecked, there is no discipline or 
 order in thought, no coherent and consequent knowledge. 
 
 But if learning were to be limited to a mere taking in, its 
 results would be little better than writing upon the water, for 
 it is not mere receiving, but the self-activity of grasping, and 
 the power to put in use, that alone make knowledge our 
 possession. 1 
 
 24. Self-forgetful interest in affairs 
 
 The Pythagoreans had a rigid program for the order of the 
 day, in which every hour had its work. In the morning, 
 upon rising, they recalled the events of the previous day, 
 since the duty of to-day springs from that of yesterday. 
 And at evening they had to examine themselves and prove 
 what had been done during the day, whether good or bad. 
 
 But true culture is not furthered by idle self-examination, 
 a turning of the attention too much upon self as an indi- 
 vidual. There is need rather of self-forgetfumess which de- 
 votes itself to affairs and to the universal. This interest in 
 affairs is the essential thing ; while that useless anxiety over 
 self is slavish. 2 
 
 1 XVI, 153. [Schiller: " Seine Kultur wird also darin bestehen; erstlich dem 
 cmpfangenden Vermogen die vielfaltigsten Beriihrungen mit der Welt zu ver- 
 schaffen und auf Seiten des Gefuhls die Passivitat aufs hochste zu treiben, zweitens 
 dem bestimmenden Vermogen die hochste Unabhangigkeit von dem empfangenden 
 zu erwerben und auf Seiten der Vernunft die Aktivitat aufs hochste zu treiben." 
 Ueber die asthetische Erziehun% des Menschen. I3ter Brief.] 
 
 2 XIII, 233. [Cf. Schleiermacher, Monologen, 73 : " Wie kommt dem Menschen 
 die besonnene Weisheit und die reife Erfahrung? . . Ich fiihle, wie ich sie jetzt 
 erwerbe; es ist eben der Jugend treibende Kraft und das frische Leben des 
 Geistes, was sie hervorbringt. Umschauen nach alien Seiten; aufnehmen alles 
 
I4 2 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 25. Intuition the beginning but only the beginning of 
 complete knowledge 
 
 In all branches of knowledge emphasis must be laid upon 
 the necessity for the intuition of their respective subject 
 matters. 1 To give attention means that one deals with the 
 matter in hand with mind, heart and soul in short, in his 
 entirety. He must put himself at its center, and examine it. 
 It is only when the substance of thse object lies open to the 
 intuition and forms the basis of thought that a man can, 
 without error, advance to the study of the particulars rooted 
 in that substance. But if there is no intuition of the object 
 in its wholeness, or if such intuition ceases, then the reflective 
 thought loses itself in its observation of the manifold discon- 
 nected parts and relations of the object. Then the analytic 
 reason, through its one-sided, finite categories of cause and 
 effect, of outer end and means, etc., tears the object in pieces, 
 even though this be a living thing, like plant or animal. 
 And it fails in this way, in spite of its much skill, to under- 
 stand the concrete nature of the object to recognize the 
 vital bond that connects all the particulars. 2 
 
 in den innersten Sinn, besiegen einzelner Gef uhle Gewalt, dass nicht die Thrane, 
 sei's der Freude oder des Rummers, das Auge der Seele triibe und verdunkle 
 seine Bilder; rasch sich von einem zum andern bewegen und, unersattlich im 
 Handeln, auch fremdes Thun noch innerlich nachahmend abbilden : das ist das 
 muntere Leben der Jugend, und eben das ist das Werden der Weisheit und der 
 Erfahrung."] 
 
 1 [" Nothing requires more to be insisted on than that vivid and complete im- 
 pressions are all-essential. No sound fabric of wisdom can be woven out of raw 
 material." Spencer, Education^ 
 
 2 [Goethe also has his hit at this " science." 
 
 " Wer will was Lebendig's erkennen und beschreiben, 
 Sucht erst den Geist hinauszutreiben; 
 Dann hat er die Theile in seiner Hand, 
 Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band." 
 
 This is true not alone in matters of botany, zoology, and the like, but also in 
 regard to history and biography. Lowell's sense of what was fit was much dis- 
 turbed by Masson's voluminously analytic life of Milton. Part of his stricture 
 
! 43 ] HEGEL A S ED UCA TOR r 43 
 
 But the intuition is not the final stage of knowledge. It 
 must be transcended. It is not yet cognitive knowledge, 
 because it has not yet unfolded the implications of the sub- 
 stance of the object, but rather is limited to the apprehen- 
 sion of the substance gazing, as it were, upon the surface, 
 and not discriminating the accessory and accidental. Ac- 
 cordingly, intuition is only the beginning of cognition. This 
 latter demands intelligence. It is, then, an error to think that 
 a man truly knows a thing when he has of it merely an im- 
 mediate intuition. Complete knowledge belongs only to the 
 pure thought of the comprehending reason ; and only he 
 who has risen to this thought has a perfectly clear and true 
 intuition. To him the intuition furnishes merely the ade- 
 quate form, in which his completely developed knowledge 
 gathers itself together. In the immediate intuition, I have, 
 it is true, the whole thing before me. But it is only in the 
 fully developed and assimilated knowledge which resumes 
 the form of simple intuition, that the object in its full and 
 systematic totality is grasped. 
 
 In general it is only the educated man who has an intui- 
 tion which is both freed from the non-essential, and com- 
 plete in its rational content. 1 
 
 26. Even a child's studies call for reflection 
 Reflection is required even of the child. In his exercise, 
 for instance, of combining adjectives and substantives, he 
 must be attentive and must discriminate. He must remem- 
 
 will illustrate Hegel's thought in the above. " Human motives," he writes, 
 " cannot be thus chemically cross-examined, nor do we arrive at any true know- 
 ledge of character by such minute subdivision of its ingredients. Nothing is so 
 essential to a biographer as an eye that can distinguish at a glance between real 
 events that are levers of thought and action, and what Donne calls ' unconcerning 
 things, matters of fact,' between substantial personages, whose contact or even 
 neighborhood is influential, and the supernumeraries that serve first to fill up a 
 stage and afterwards the interstices of a biographical dictionary."] 
 i VII b, 319. 
 
! 44 HEGEL AS EDUCA TOR [ j 44 
 
 her the rule, and must frame his particular case in accord 
 with it. The rule is the general, and the child must keep 
 this in mind in forming the particular. 1 
 
 27. The self-activity implied in learning 
 
 To learn is not to acquire something foreign. It is the 
 progress of the mind upon itself, by which it becomes con- 
 scious of its own essence or being. 2 
 
 It is most important to lead the boy from the state of mere 
 receptivity to that of personal effort. For learning, which is 
 merely taking in and remembering, is a very small part of 
 education^ 
 
 We must not think Plato's idealism to be subjective ideal- 
 ism that crass idealism which is put forth in our modern 
 times as if a man could have no general knowledge, could 
 not have outer determinations, but as if all ideas were evolved 
 from the subject. It is often affirmed that idealism is of this 
 sort, that an individual evolves all his ideas from himself, 
 that he posits everything from within. But this is an unhis- 
 toric and entirely false notion. If this inexact statement be 
 taken for the definition of idealism, then, as a matter of fact, 
 there have been no idealists among the philosophers. The 
 Platonic idealism is quite other than this. 
 
 As regards learning, in particular, Plato states that what 
 is truly universal, the Idea, the Good, the Beautiful, is 
 already present in the mind, and is brought forth out of it 
 alone. [We become conscious of these, however, only in 
 the presence of outer things in our daily experience ; not 
 that the more essential part of our knowledge comes from 
 these outer things, but that they are the occasion of our 
 knowing.] The notion that knowledge comes entirely from 
 
 1 VI, 40. 2 XIV, 203. s XVI, 153. 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 14$ 
 
 without, is held nowadays only by a crude and abstract em- 
 piricism. 1 
 
 IV. THE EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL, IN RELATION TO 
 THE FAMILY AND TO SOCIETY. 
 
 28. The importance of a good education and the right of 
 children thereto 
 
 The importance of a good education has never been so 
 great as now. The inner treasures which parents bestow 
 upon their children by a good education and by the advant- 
 ages of the schools are imperishable. They are the best and 
 surest inheritance that they can give their children. 2 
 
 The rights of a father in his children are equaled by duties 
 toward them ; as the duty of obedience on the part of chil- 
 dren implies their right to be educated into freedom. 3 
 
 The rights of parents to the services of their children are 
 limited by the demands of discipline and education. Noth- 
 ing could be more wicked than the holding of children as 
 slaves. 4 
 
 The duty of parents to children is to care for their main- 
 tenance and education ; that of children, to obey until they 
 are of age, and to honor their parents their life long ; that of 
 brothers and sisters, to act toward one another with consid- 
 erate love. 5 
 
 29. The mother 1 s influence in education 
 
 The mother should be the chief influence in early educa- 
 tion, for morality must be instilled in the child with his ear- 
 liest perceptions. 6 
 
 1 XIV, 215. 2 Rede, 2 Sept., 1813; XVI, 189. 3 VII b, 378. 
 
 * VIII, 236. 6 XVIII, 67. VIII, 238. 
 
1 46 HE GEL A S ED UCA TOR [ 1 46 
 
 It is the mother's love alone which flows with the whole 
 current of the being. Brothers and sisters and the father, 
 though loving his children, have other relationships in which 
 they live. Fathers and brothers have to turn to the world, 
 to the state, property, war. With the mother, on the other 
 hand, love toward her child is no partial thing, no single 
 movement, but is her highest earthly vocation, in which her 
 natural character and her holiest calling are united. 1 
 
 30. The right of compulsory education 
 
 It is difficult to draw the line between the rights of parents 
 and those of the state. As regards education, parents com- 
 monly think they have full liberty, and may follow their own 
 wishes as best they may. All compulsory education is apt 
 to be met by the parents' opposition. They it is who decry 
 the teachers and schools because counter to their notions. 
 Nevertheless the state has the right, in accord with its ap- 
 proved experience, to compel parents to send their children 
 to school. 2 
 
 3 1 . Education a serious work 
 
 A man attains what he should, not by instinct. He must 
 win his true place. On this is based the child's right to be 
 educated. The need or craving for education exists in the 
 child as a feeling of dissatisfaction with himself as he is as 
 an impulse to belong to the world of grown people, which 
 seems so great a thing the wish to be " big." The play 
 education looks upon what is childish as already something 
 of value in itself alone. It meets the children at a low level. 
 It puts both itself and what is serious into a puerile form, for 
 which the children themselves feel contempt. This educa- 
 tion, attempting to make the incompleteness of childhood 
 seem as something complete, and to make the children sat- 
 isfied with it, casts down and tramples upon their own true 
 
 Xc,44. * VIII, 299. 
 
147] HE GEL A s ED UCA TOR 1 47 
 
 better wants. It effects, in part, indifference and stupidity 
 regarding the substantial relationships of the spiritual world, 
 and in part little respect for the men who thus childishly 
 teach. 1 
 
 3 2 . School life a preparation for after life 
 
 School life is dispassionate. It lacks the higher interest 
 and earnestness of real life. It is a secluded, inner prepara- 
 tion. It educates the individual to participate in the world 
 life. The sciences are not enlarged by the school. What 
 has already been found out, is the subject of instruction ; 
 and this in only an elementary way. Its knowledge is old 
 property of the race. 2 The work of the school has not its 
 perfect end in itself. It lays but the foundation for the pos- 
 sibility of other work, that of real performance. Although 
 the subjects that are studied in school have been developed 
 long ago, the individuals who are being educated by this 
 study are not as yet developed. This preparation, this 
 culture, can never be " finished." Only a certain stage of it 
 may be attained. 3 
 
 33. Educational building should be solid 
 Sureness and permanence in the foundations of one's 
 knowledge is of the chief importance, in order that he be 
 
 1 VIII, 236. [Cf. Guyau, Education et Herlditt, p. 19 : " Kant a eu raison de 
 dire : C'est une chose funeste d'habituer 1'enfant a tout regarder comme un jeu 
 ... II est d'une haute importance d'apprendre aux enfants a travailler; 1'homme 
 est le seul animal qui soit dans la necessite de le faire." 
 
 Froebel's Kindergarten is saved from the charge of offering a mere play-educa- 
 tion by its " occupations " which are very real work and by the character of its 
 plays, which point to the social and industrial realities of the older people's world. 
 
 2 [There is danger, perhaps, in regarding school subjects as petrefactions. 
 Progress in the sciences should be watched, and the results embodied in the 
 curriculum.] 
 
 3 XVI, 175 Gymnasialrede, 2 Sept., 1811. 
 
1 48 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR |~ I 4$ 
 
 fitted for the more advanced. One must not hurry into the 
 higher classes. 1 
 
 34. The pupil not to be educated in solitude {Rousseau's 
 Emit) y nor, on the other hand, -amid all the distractions of 
 society 
 
 The experiments of separating a boy from society and of 
 educating him apart in the country (Rousseau's Emil) have 
 failed, because he who is a stranger to the laws of the world, 
 cannot succeed in it. There are no rights for the individual 
 outside of his citizenship in a good state. 2 
 
 In modern education much harm has resulted from the 
 maxim that children are early to be brought out into society 
 
 1 XVI, 178 Gymnasialrede, 2 Sept., 1811. [Such hurry is not uncommon. 
 Mr. Martin writes of the district schools in Massachusetts of some forty or fifty 
 years ago : "'In some schools a few of the more intelligent boys and girls made 
 a real advance in mathematics and science; in many more schools ambitious 
 boys and girls with ambitious teachers usually college undergraduates pushed 
 themselves into algebra and geometry and natural philosophy before they could 
 read intelligently, or perform creditably the simpler operations in arithmetic." 
 Evolution of Mass. Public School System, p. 199. 
 
 And in higher matters, too, haste should be slow. Abstract philosophy should 
 not come before there is a rich content of life. " The Socratic ' pang of philoso- 
 phy,' " writes Professor Jowett, " that is to say, the fascination of abstract ideas, 
 may easily interfere with the growth of the mind in youth or in early manhood. 
 Poetry, language, physical science, mathematics, the works of great writers 
 Greek, Latin, or English are a much better basis [but only basis, be it under- 
 stood] of education than metaphysical philosophy. They are the ' land of 
 health ' in which Plato would have the youth of his city reared : where beauty, 
 * the effluence of fair works, will visit the eye and ear, and insensibly, like a fresh 
 breeze from a purer region, will draw the soul, even in childhood, into harmony 
 with the beauty of reason.' " Preface, p. vii, to Purves' Selections from Plato.'] 
 
 2 VIII., 219. [The question of private versus public instruction has been long 
 discussed. Quintilian treated of it wisely. We cite one passage : " Non fugiendae 
 sint omnino scholae. . . . Ante omnia, futurus orator [nonne dicemus futurus 
 vir?], cui in maxima celebritate, et in media republicae luce vivendum est, assues- 
 cat jam a tenero non reformidare homines, neque ilia solitaria et velut umbratile 
 vita pallescere." Inst. Orat., I. c. i.] 
 
149] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 that they are to have their fill of the pleasures and excite- 
 ments of grown people. Experience refutes this. It shows 
 that men who have laid a prudent inner foundation, and 
 who have been brought up in moral habits, learn quickly 
 enough how to act properly in society. Men of world-wide 
 fame have come from the narrow gate of a monastery ; while, 
 on the contrary, men who have grown up amid all the ex- 
 ternalties of life, unfold little fruit of inner worth. But short 
 reflection will show the necessity of this. In order to be 
 capable and to have true worth, the inner basis of character 
 must be built strong and well. The youth who sees only 
 the glamor of outer life and learns how it is valued by men 
 whom he admires and reveres, holds it to be all important, 
 because he has not learned to know the earnestness with 
 which these very men pursue their work outside of recrea- 
 tion hours. So the youth gets warped notions of the worth 
 of things. He delights in amusements that demand no 
 intense application. He holds cheap what the school re- 
 spects as duty ; and would shirk the work it lays upon him. 1 
 
 3 5 . School government and discipline 
 
 With advancing culture there has been a great change in 
 the conception of what belongs to school discipline and gov- 
 ernment. The right view of education is more and more 
 being held. It must not suppress, but thoroughly encourage 
 growing self-hood and independence. In the family as in 
 the school the notion is disappearing that children must al- 
 ways be impressed with the feeling of submission and de- 
 pendence ; that even in what is indifferent they are always to 
 be made to obey their superiors ; that they must be forced 
 to study so as to learn obedience ; that severity on the part 
 of the teacher must be the motive power rather than the 
 pupil's love and his sense of the worth and dignity of his 
 work ; all this is passing away. 
 
 'XVI, 197. 
 
1 5 O HE GEL A $ E & UCA TOR [ j 5 O 
 
 A school that benefits its scholars must require quietness 
 and attention in hours of study, moral behavior toward 
 teachers and fellow pupils, the performance of set tasks, and 
 obedience. But their actions in things indifferent, which do 
 not affect the order, must be free. An air of serfdom is 
 wholly out of place in the school room. A company of 
 students are not to be thought slaves, nor are they to act as 
 such. Education that leads to independence demands that 
 the pupil be early accustomed to consult his own feeling of 
 propriety and his own understanding. There should be a 
 large sphere of freedom amid his fellow students and his 
 elders, in which he may determine his own behavior. 1 
 
 36. One phase of the poetry of youth 
 
 Particularly in youth do we feel ourselves related and in 
 sympathy with all nature. We, and things about us, seem 
 alive with one soul. We have a feeling of the world-soul, of 
 the oneness of spirit and nature, and of the spirituality of 
 nature. 2 
 
 1 XVI, 172. Gymnasialrede, 2 Sept., 1811. 
 
 2 VII b, 49. [This feeling, almost pantheistic, though it comes again and 
 again, stays but a moment. Immediately there is the wish for its social commu- 
 nication. Wordsworth, Thoreau, Burroughs, write of their oneness with nature, 
 that men may read. Compare what Hegel says in another place : " But the study 
 of nature has but little charm for youth. The interest in nature appears and not 
 unrightly rather as theoretical indolence, in comparison with interest in human 
 and spiritual deeds and forms." Compare, also, Socrates in the Phaidros, when 
 his young companion laughed at him for being like a stranger in the country. 
 2w : " Svyyi-yvuoKe fj.oi, <j apiare. 0f/o,uatf?}- yap / ra /jv ovv %upia KO.I ra 
 devdpa ovfitv fj.' K&i7.i 6iddffKelv t ol ftkv T& O.OTEI avtypurrot.." "You must have 
 patience with me, for I love knowledge; and the trees and fields do not teach 
 me, but the men in the city." And Browning expresses another shade of the 
 same feeling: 
 
 " What matter though my trust were gone 
 From natural things? Henceforth my part 
 Be less with nature than with art ! 
 For art supplants, gives mainly worth 
 To nature; 'tis man stamps the earth." 
 
 Christmas Eve and Easter Day.] 
 
j c; I ] HEGEL AS ED UCA 7^OR l $ r 
 
 37. Friendship 
 
 Friendship like that of Achilles and Patroclus, or like that 
 still closer friendship of Orestes and Pylades, is chiefly the 
 privilege of youth. In youth, individuals live in no fixed 
 relation with externality. They cleave each to another, and 
 have mind, will and activity in common. Every undertaking 
 is a joint affair. In friendship between men this cannot be 
 the case. A man's work must pursue its own path, and 
 cannot be carried out in closest fellowship with another. 
 Men meet and part ; their interests now join and then 
 diverge. The friendship the inner unity of thought, of 
 conviction, of general purpose remains. But it is no longer 
 the youthful friendship, in which one determines and enters 
 upon nothing that is not the immediate object of the other 
 also. It is essential to our deeper life that, upon the whole, 
 each must care for himself, must be capable amid his own 
 particular environment. 1 
 
 38. The Sturm und Drang period of youth 
 
 Young men think they must break through the world's 
 course which is being actualized ; and consider it a misfor- 
 tune that there are such things as families, society, state, 
 laws, trades, etc., because these substantial life-relationships 
 cruelly limit their ideals and oppose their heart's infinite 
 rights. They would cry halt to this order of things, would 
 change the world, better it, or, at least, in spite of it, hew 
 out a heaven on earth. 
 
 This time of tempest lasts, in our modern world, not be- 
 yond the student years. These educate the individual for 
 real life. During them the youth should shed his horns, and 
 adjust himself, with his wishes and plans, to the actual and 
 rational relationships about him. He enters partnership 
 
 J Xb, 186. 
 
I 5 2 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR [ j 5 2 
 
 with the world, and wins for himself therein adequate stand- 
 ing-room. 1 
 
 39. The necessity and value of a vocation 
 
 Oftentimes a man's particular vocation appears to him 
 allotted by fate. Yet this form of an outer necessity is to be 
 transcended. One's calling must be taken hold of freely, 
 and freely carried on. Man, as regards the outer circum- 
 stances of fate, and all that he is immediately, must so act 
 as to make all this his own he must transcend the form of 
 outer necessity. It makes little difference what are the con- 
 ditions of a man's lot, if only what he is, he is rightly ; that 
 is, if only he fulfils his vocation. One's vocation is a many- 
 sided thing. It is stuff or material that must be worked up 
 in all directions, so that it has nothing foreign, unyielding, 
 contradictory. In so far as I have made it mine, I am free 
 in it. If a man is dissatisfied with his calling, the chief 
 reason is that he does not meet all its demands. He is in a 
 position that is not truly his own. Still he is in this position, 
 and cannot give it up. Thus he is out of harmony with 
 himself. 
 
 Faithfulness and obedience in one's calling, as well as 
 resignation and self-forgetfulness, have as a basis the giving 
 up of trifling, of self-will, and self-seeking, in the presence of 
 what is in and for itself necessary. A vocation is something 
 universal and necessary, and is a part of a complete human 
 life. It is a part, too, of the total work of humanity. When 
 a man has a vocation he is a participator in and fellow- 
 worker with the universal. Thereby he becomes objective. 
 
 1 X b, 216. [But ever and again an Omar Khayyam, past the period of youth, 
 will sigh : 
 
 " Ah Love ! could you and I with Him conspire 
 To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire, 
 
 Would not we shatter it to bits and then 
 Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire!" 
 
 Yet the very putting of such a plaint in song is a sort of victory.] 
 
! jj 3 ] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR i 5 3 
 
 The calling, it is true, is a particular and limited sphere. 
 Still it is a necessary part of the whole, and is also in itself 
 a whole. If a man is to be anything, he must know how to 
 limit himself; that is, to make his vocation entirely his own. 
 Then it is no prison for him. He is then at one with him- 
 self, with his environment, with his sphere. He is a uni- 
 versal, a whole. 1 
 
 V. CULTURE VALUES OF VARIOUS SUBJECTS 
 
 40. Military drill 
 
 Instruction in military drill is very important. To per- 
 form the exercise quickly, to be alert, to carry out exactly 
 what is commanded, without debate with one's self, is the 
 most direct way of counteracting a lazy absent-mindedness, 
 which takes its time in comprehending what is heard, and 
 still more time in half performing what it half perceives. 
 
 From another side, too, such exercise appears most bene- 
 ficial. We are too much in the habit of regarding every art 
 and science as a specialty. Those in which we are engaged 
 appear as our natural possession, while others apart from our 
 training and calling appear foreign, and as something in 
 which we could never be at home. But, just as the nihil 
 hiimani a mi alienum puto is, in its moral meaning, a beau- 
 tiful sentiment, so, too, it has significance in reference to 
 men's trades or arts. A really cultured man is not limited 
 by nature to a particular thing, but rather is fitted to enter 
 anything. The necessity for taking up a new art or science 
 does not find him compelled to stand discouraged at the 
 thought of the difficulties and of his unfitness, but ready to 
 take hold of the work and carry it out. Drill in arms is apt 
 to appear far removed from the business of studying. But it 
 is near to the youthful spirit ; and such drill best serves in 
 leveling the partition wall that we build about our callings. 
 
 1 XVIII, 64. 
 
I 54 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR \_l$4 
 
 A higher consideration is that this exercise, while it does 
 not take away the pupils from their first duty, acts as a re- 
 minder that every man whatever his position should be 
 ready to defend his fatherland and his prince a duty that 
 lies in the nature of the case, and which formerly was recog- 
 nized by all citizens as theirs, but which now, by whole 
 classes of the people, is not given a thought. 1 
 
 41. Arithmetic 
 
 Numbers are immaterial objects. And their study and 
 use in their various combinations gives mental exercise apart 
 from the senses. Thereby the mind is held to reflection 
 within itself, and to abstract activity a thing of great, but 
 one-sided importance. For, since numbers have as their 
 basis only an exterior, idealess difference, they demand, in 
 their use, only an idealess and mechanical activity. The 
 effort of the mind mainly consists in grasping something 
 almost empty, and dealing with it in various combinations. 
 The content is the bare unit. But the fitting content of the 
 moral and intellectual life, into which the young are to be 
 educated, is very different from this bare unit. The effect 
 of making mathematical exercises the chief subject of edu- 
 cation is to make the mind empty and dull. Since reckon- 
 ing is such an outer, mechanical exercise, machines have 
 
 1 XVI, 152. Gymnasialrede, 14 Sept., 1810. [Hegel spoke these words in 
 1810. Austerlitz, Jena, and Auerstadt could not have been far from his thoughts. 
 Perhaps there is a note of reconstruction sounded in the above. Education on 
 new and broader lines was to do its part. Hon. W. T. Harris, in referring to his 
 recent visit to Europe, says : " The principal advance has been in public educa- 
 tion. The Franco-Prussian war was a boon in this respect, that it opened the 
 eyes of Europe to the fact that a cultured, well-trained people must necessarily 
 conquer. Since then compulsory education has been the rule in Europe." There 
 is another side, however. Renan writes, in 1879,10 a German friend: "On a 
 fait de vous une nation organisee pour la guerre; comme ces chevaliers du xvi e 
 siecle, bardes de fer, vous etes ecrases par votre armement." Part of this is true. 
 Another part is peculiarly French, in its bitter remembrance of the weight of 
 German arms a decade before.] 
 
I 5 5] HEGEL AS EDUCA TOR r 5 5 
 
 been invented which perform arithmetical operations per- 
 fectly. If, concerning arithmetic, we keep in mind only such 
 a fact as that, we shall be slow in giving it the first place in 
 education. To do that is to put the mind upon a rack in 
 order to evolve a perfect machine. 1 
 
 42. The study of grammar 
 
 The value of grammatical study can scarcely be overesti- 
 mated, for it forms the beginning of logical culture, a fact, 
 however, that appears to be almost overlooked. Grammar 
 has for its subject-matter the categories, the peculiar pro- 
 ducts and determinations of the reason. With its study, 
 therefore, the study of reason itself is begun. These essen- 
 tials of intelligence, which grammar deals with, are easily 
 grasped by a child. The abstractions are simple. They 
 are, as it were, the single letters and vocables of the mind 
 with which we learn to spell it out, so to speak, and then to 
 read and interpret it. The pupil is made to distinguish 
 shades of meaning. And it is most important that these 
 differences be made a subject of study. For since the de- 
 terminations of reason, we being reasoning beings, are in us, 
 and since we understand them immediately, the first work of 
 education is to put them wholly in our possession, that is, to 
 make them objects of consciousness designated by appro- 
 priate names. 2 
 
 The grammatical study of an ancient language has the 
 advantage of calling out the attentive and sustained effort of 
 
 1 III, 251. [Cf. President Eliot : " From one-sixth to one-fourth, or even one- 
 third, of the whole school time of American children is given to the subject of 
 arithmetic a subject which does not train a single one of the four faculties that 
 it should be the fundamental object of education to develop. It has nothing to 
 do with observing correctly, or with recording accurately the results of observa- 
 tion, or with collating facts and drawing just inferences therefrom, or with ex 
 pressing clearly and forcibly logical thought."] 
 
 2 XVI, 143. Gymnasialrede, 29 Sept., 1809. ' 
 
I5 6 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 the understanding. In such study, unlike that of the mother 
 tongue, it is not mere unreflecting habit that can supply the 
 right form of words, but it is necessary to have in mind the 
 proper value of the parts of speech, and to recall the right 
 rule for their use. In this there is a constant subsuming of 
 the particular under the general, and application of the gen- 
 eral to the particular. This is the form of all reasoning. 
 Thus careful grammatical study is one of the most noble and 
 universal means of culture. 1 
 
 43. The Voice. Declamation. Reading 
 
 The voice is the chief revealer of a man's innermost. 
 What he is, is known by his voice. If harsh, we feel the 
 speaker to be rude ; if melodious, we recognize a beautiful 
 soul. 2 
 
 Public declamation is an interesting exercise. And if only 
 instruction in it were more thorough, it would promise much 
 greater results. 
 
 To read justly and sympathetically demands a fine and in- 
 telligent sense and much study. Practice in reading, joined 
 with reflection, is to be valued so highly that perhaps the 
 greatest part of other teaching and explanation in the 
 schools might be spared, and the time thus saved be given 
 up to this form of instruction. We hope to see this study, 
 when worked out properly, become a prime factor in educa- 
 tions 
 
 44. Culture essential to sound and noble speech 
 
 One can use a language correctly enough by rule. But 
 without culture it is impossible to speak well. Culture gives 
 
 1 XVI, 144. Gymnasialrede, 29 Sept., 1809. 
 
 2 VIIb, 131. 
 
 3 XVI, 1 80. Gymnasialrede, 2d Sept., 1811. 
 
157] 
 
 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 
 
 the mind manifold viewpoints. It gives a wealth of categor- 
 ies for an all-sided treatment of a subject. 1 
 
 45 . The value of the classics 
 
 The foundation of the higher study of literature is and 
 must remain, first, the literature of Greece, and then that of 
 Rome. The glory and perfection of their masterpieces must 
 be the spiritual bath, the profane baptism, which gives the 
 soul its earliest and most lasting taste for things of beauty and 
 of knowledge. For this it is not enough to have a mere gen- 
 eral and surface acquaintance with the ancients. We must 
 live with them, imbibing their atmosphere, their ideas and 
 ways, and even, if one will, their errors and prejudices. We 
 must be at home in their world the most beautiful that has 
 ever been. As the first paradise was the paradise of the 
 natural man, so the second, the higher, is the paradise of the 
 spiritual man, who in his beautiful spontaneity, freedom, depth 
 and joyousness stepped forth as a bridegroom from his 
 chamber. The first wild magnificence of his rise in the 
 east is circumscribed by the glory of form, and toned down 
 to beauty. His depth is no longer that of solemn turgidity 
 and confusion, but is open and clear. His joyousness is no 
 mere childish spirits. It has transcended the sadness that 
 sighs over the gloom of fate, and has won poise and freedom. 2 
 
 1 XIV, 12. [Quintilian, in urging that an orator should study the various sciences, 
 geometry, music, etc., says : " Et muta animalia mellis inimitabilem humanae 
 rationi saporem, vario florum ac succorum genere perficiunt. Nos mirabimus, si 
 oratio, qua nihil praestantius homini dedit providentia, pluribus artibus eget; quas, 
 etiam quum se non ostendunt in dicendo, nee proferunt, vim tamen occultam sug- 
 gerent, et tacitse quoque sentiuntur." And Cicero in his oration, Pro Archia 
 Poeta : " Atque hoc eo mihi concedendum est magis, quod ex his studiis haec 
 quoque crescit oratio et facultas, quae, quantacumque in me est, nunquam amicorum 
 periculis defuit."] 
 
 2 [Cf . Schiller. Ueber die dsthetische Erziehung des Memchen 6 8tc Brief : " Die 
 Griechen beschamen uns nicht bloss durch eine Simplicitat, die unserm Zeitalter 
 fremd ist, sie sind zugleich unsre Nebenbuhler, ja oft unsre Muster in den 
 
! 5 8 HEGEL AS EDUCA TOR [ l q 3 
 
 I think it is not saying too much when I say that he who 
 has not known the works of the ancients has not known 
 beauty. 1 
 
 The reading of the ancients is one of the best of prepara- 
 tions for the study of philosophy. By it one gathers a store 
 of abstract ideas, and is practised in thinking. He has the 
 seeds which later ripen in many fields of philosophy. The 
 many contradictions of the old thinkers, especially concern- 
 ing the practical part of world wisdom, have at least lightened 
 the labor of finding the middle way, in which lies the truth. 2 
 
 46. Logic. 
 
 Logic like grammar has two aspects and values. It is one 
 thing for him who is but entering upon its study and upon 
 the study of the other sciences, and quite another thing for 
 him, who after such study, takes up his logic again. In 
 grammar the beginner finds in its laws and forms only dry 
 abstractions, arbitrary rules, and a mass of distinctions, with- 
 out further value or significance. But it is only to him, on 
 the other hand, who is a master of his own language, and 
 knows also other languages, that it is given to feel the spirit 
 and culture of a people in the grammar of their language. 
 For him its rules have content and living worth. Through 
 the grammar he recognizes the general mode of the mind's 
 expression its logic. 
 
 So the beginner in scientific study at first finds in logic an 
 isolated system of abstractions, limited to itself and without 
 reference to other sciences. Compared with the evidently 
 rich content of the other sciences, this science, in its abstract 
 
 namlichen Vorziigen, mit denen wir uns liber die Naturwidrigkeit unsere Sitten 
 zu trosten pflegen. Zugleich voll Form und voll Fulle, zugleich philosophierend 
 und bildend, zugleich zart und energisch, sehen wir sie die Jugend der Phantasie 
 mit der Mannlichkeit der Vernunft in einer herrlichen Menschheit vereinigen."] 
 
 ^VI, 139. Gymnasialrede, 29 Sept., 1809. 
 
 8 Vid. Rosenkranz, Hegel's Leben, p. 27. 
 
I 5 9] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR I 5 9 
 
 form, seems empty and colorless. Its pure and simple dis- 
 tinctions seem very far from making good its claim to be the 
 absolute science, the science which reveals the essential 
 nature of the mind and of the world. First acquaintance 
 with logic thinks its significance limited to itself. Its con- 
 tents seem to embrace only an isolated investigation of 
 thought distinctions. It is only after a deeper study of the 
 other sciences that logic is seen to be not a mere abstract 
 universal, but a universal containing the whole realm of the 
 particular. The same proverb in the mouth of a boy has not 
 the significance and reach that it has for a man of wide ex- 
 perience. So logic is given its due value only when it is 
 seen to be the outcome of the experience of the other 
 sciences. It is the general truth, not as a special knowledge 
 alongside of other matters and realities, but as the essence 
 of these others. Whether or not logic, in the beginning of 
 its study, has this value for the mind, nevertheless the mind 
 receives through it the power which leads it into all truth. 
 The system of logic is a realm of shadows, freed from all 
 materiality. The study of this science, the tarrying and 
 labor in the shadow realm, is the essential culture and discip- 
 line of consciousness. It is an exercise far removed from the 
 aims and intuitions of the senses, from feeling, from the 
 world of mere opinion. Regarded negatively, this exercise 
 consists in the avoidance of capricious and arbitrary judg- 
 ments. But its chief service is to give independency of 
 thought. Thought becomes at home in the abstract, and in 
 the progress of pure concepts. It gains unexpected power 
 to deal with the manifold knowledges and sciences. It strips 
 off the external. It grasps the essential. Thus the empty 
 forms of logic become filled with content. Logic becomes a 
 universal, no longer standing as a particular beside other par- 
 ticulars, but underlying them. It is their essence, their ab- 
 solute truth. 1 
 
 1 HI, 45- 
 
1 60 HE GEL A S ED UCA TOR 
 
 47. The requisites for philosophic study 
 
 Deep earnestness of mind is the true ground of philosophy. 
 Philosophy is the opponent of merely temporal interests and 
 idle opinions. 1 
 
 The courage of truth, faith in the might of spirit, is the 
 first requisite for philosophic study. 2 
 
 48. On the teaching of introductory philosophy in the gym- 
 nasium A letter of Oct., 1812, to Niethammer* 
 
 You have asked me to write what I thought about the 
 teaching of philosophy in the gymnasium. Some time ago 
 I made a first draft of my thoughts ; but have not since 
 found the time to work them over properly. So, not to de- 
 lay too long the sending of something according to your 
 wish, I send the draft about as it stood. As the paper has 
 no other than a private purpose, it may fulfil this as it is. 
 The abruptness of thought, and still more the scattered bits 
 of polemic these be good enough to attribute to the unfin- 
 ished form. The polemics, too, you must take as without 
 any particular aim, the unsuppressed flaring up of zeal in the 
 presence of counter views. 
 
 I am not yet settled in my own mind regarding the whole 
 matter. It may be that no special philosophical instruction 
 is needed in the gymnasium ; that the study of the ancients 
 may be better adapted for the gymnasial youth, and the 
 content of such study the best introduction to philosophy. 
 But how shall I, a professor of preparatory philosophy, take 
 up arms against my place and the thing I teach, casting 
 away my own bread and butter? As a teacher of philosophy 
 and as rector, I had better argue in favor of philosophy be- 
 ing taught, else the professors of that subject in the gymnasia 
 might be declared superfluous and sent elsewhere. Still, I 
 rather incline the other way. . . . 
 
 xxxvii. VI,xl. 3 XVII, 333-348. 
 
! 6 1 ] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR ! 6 1 
 
 But to the task in hand. According to the official pro- 
 gram, the teaching of introductory philosophy in the gym- 
 nasium presents two sides: 
 
 I. The subjects taught. II. The method. 
 
 I. SUBJECTS TAUGHT 
 
 As regards the subjects and their assignment to the three 
 classes, the program requires : 
 
 1 . For the lower class : the elements of religion, law, and 
 ethics. Also a beginning in speculative thought may be 
 made with logic. 
 
 2. For the intermediate class: (a) cosmology and natural 
 theology, in connection with the Kantian Critigues ; (b) 
 psychology. 
 
 3. For the upper class: the philosophical encyclopedia. 
 
 Since in the lower class it was not easy to connect the in- 
 struction in religion, Jaw and ethics with logic, I have thus 
 far had but the first three in the lower class, reserving the 
 logic for the intermediate class. Here it was given with 
 psychology. Then, in the upper class, came the prescribed 
 encyclopedia. 
 
 Were I to give my general judgment upon the program as 
 a whole, as regards the thing itself and my own experience 
 therewith, I could say that I have found it to answer its pur- 
 pose very well. 
 
 To treat the matter in detail. I. The program prescribes, 
 as the first subjects, religion, law and ethics ; and the pre- 
 supposition is that the beginning is to be made with religion. 
 Since, however, there is no compendium of instruction, it 
 rests with the teacher to treat the order and con- 
 nection of these subjects in accord with his own views. For 
 my part, I know no other way than to begin with law, or 
 rights, as the simplest abstract consequence of freedom, to 
 go thence to morals, and, finally, to religion as the highest 
 step. 
 
1 62 HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR 
 
 If it is asked : Are these subjects fitted to be the first in- 
 troduction to philosophy? I can only say, Yes. The con- 
 cepts met with in these subjects are simple, and have at the 
 same time a definiteness suited to the age of this class. The 
 subject matter, too, has support [is apperceptionally wel- 
 come, we might say, nowadays] in the natural feeling of 
 the pupils it has a reality for their inner lives, for it consti- 
 tutes the side of inner reality itself. I therefore, for the 
 lower class, much prefer these subjects to logic, because the 
 logic has but abstract content, far removed from that imme- 
 diate reality of the inner life its content is theoretical. 
 Freedom, law, property, and the like, are practical matters 
 with which we are in daily contact, and, besides this imme- 
 diate relationship to us, they have, so to speak, a sanctioned 
 existence and real significance. But the logical determinations 
 of general and particular, etc., are for the mind which is not 
 yet at home in the thought world, only shadows of the real ; 
 to which real it must ever recur before it is enabled to deal 
 with and grasp independently the logical concepts. The 
 common demand made upon introductory philosophy is that 
 a beginning should be made with the actual, and from that 
 point the consciousness should be led on to what is higher 
 to thought. But in the concept of freedom, the actual and 
 immediate are already contained, in a form, however, which 
 is, at the same time, thought. So that in these subjects a be- 
 ginning is truly made with what is desired the true, the 
 spiritual, the real. I have always found in this class a greater 
 interest in these practical questions than in the more theoret- 
 ical discussions I ventured upon. And I was met with even 
 a greater lack of interest when I began at first according to 
 the direction of the program with logic. After that I did 
 not repeat the experiment. 
 
 2. The next stage for the learner is the theoretic-spiritual 
 the logical, metaphysical, psychological. Comparing logic 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 1$$ 
 
 and psychology with each other, we may say on the whole, 
 that logic is the easier because it has simpler abstract 
 'determination for its content. Psychology, on the other 
 hand, deals with a complex concrete consciousness itself 
 being its object. (But psychology may be too easy and 
 trivial if it be taken up as merely empirical psychology, after 
 the manner of Kampe's Psychology for children. The style 
 of Carus unfits his writings for school use. So far as I know 
 them, they are tedious, unedifying, lifeless, spiritless.) 
 
 I divide the teaching of psychology into two parts: (a) 
 of phenomenal mind or spirit; (b) of spirit, as it is in and 
 for itself. In the first, I treat of consciousness as set forth 
 in my Phenomenology of the Spirit, under the three phases of 
 (i) consciousness, (2) self-consciousness, (3) reason. In 
 the second, are dealt with feeling, intuition, conception, im- 
 agination, etc. . . . Since logic is prescribed as the second 
 science for the middle class, it would seem that with this the 
 subject of metaphysics was covered. This, we may say here, 
 is a subject with which people nowadays are apt to be 
 puzzled. Under it, in the program of study, there are pre- 
 scribed the Kantian exposition of the antinomial cosmology 
 and the dialectic-natural theology. As a matter of fact, this 
 is to prescribe not so much metaphysics itself, as its dialectic ; 
 and this part comes within the province of logic. 
 
 As I look at it, logic includes metaphysics. Here I may 
 cite Kant as my forerunner and authority. His critique re- 
 duces metaphysics to a study of the understanding and of 
 the reason. Logic, in the Kantian sense, can be so taken, 
 that besides the usual content of the so-called general logic, 
 there may be connected with it and presupposed the logic 
 called by him transcendental that logic, namely, which 
 treats of the categories, of the concepts of reflection, and of 
 the reason analytic and dialectic. These objective forms 
 of thought constitute an independent content, the part of the 
 
! 64 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR [ ! 64 
 
 Aristotelian Organon de categoriis, or what used to make up 
 Ontology. They are, moreover, independent of a meta- 
 physical system. They are as much present in transcen-' 
 dental idealism as in dogmatism : the latter calls them 
 determinations of entities ; the former, determinations of the 
 understanding. My objective Logic will, as I hope, serve to 
 disentangle the science, and to present it in its true form. 
 In the meantime the Kantian discriminations will do, as giv- 
 ing the essential. 
 
 As regards the Kantian antinomies, their dialectic side 
 will be mentioned later. Their remaining content is partly 
 logical, partly the world in space and time matter. It is 
 with this latter part that logic includes cosmology. But, in 
 fact, that wider content, namely, the world, matter, and the 
 like, is useless luggage a worthless haze of conception. 
 When the Kantian critique touches natural theology the 
 critique may be used, as I have used it, in the teaching of 
 religion. The material it offers is not out of place in the 
 three or four years course of study. It has interest, partly 
 in that it gives a knowledge of the famous proof for the ex- 
 istence of God, partly in that it gives the equally famous 
 criticism of Kant on that proof, and partly as an occasion 
 for criticising this criticism. 
 
 3. The encyclopedia is to embrace the general content of 
 philosophy, namely the fundamental concepts and principles 
 of its particular sciences. Of these I make three main divi- 
 sions : (a) logic; (b) the philosophy of nature; (c) the 
 philosophy of mind or spirit. All the other sciences, though 
 not styled philosophical, are, as regards their principles, to be 
 included in this encyclopedia. Though at first sight it might 
 seem well to give in the gymnasium such a sketch of the 
 elements of the sciences, a deeper view would perhaps regard 
 such a sketch as unnecessary, because two, at least, of the 
 three divisions cursorily treated in the encyclopedia, have 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 before had fuller treatment. Logic, the first science of the 
 encyclopedia, is taken up in the middle class. That we have 
 spoken of. So also the third division, the philosophy of 
 mind, has been dealt with, (i) in the psychology, (2) in the 
 study of law, duty and religion. (Even psychology as such 
 which falls into the two parts of ( I ) the theoretical, and of 
 (2) the practical spirit, or of the intelligence, and of the will 
 may largely forego the treatment of the second part, since 
 the truth of that part has already been brought out in the 
 teaching of law, ethics and religion. For the bare psycho- 
 logical side of this practical teaching, namely the side treat- 
 ing of feeling, desire, instinct, affection, etc., is only formal. 
 What concerns their true content e. g. y the desire for prop- 
 erty or for knowledge, the affection of parents for children, 
 and the like is treated of in the teaching of right or of duty 
 as necessary relationships as duty to acquire competence, 
 limited by principles of equity ; as duty to culture one's self; 
 as duties of parents and children, and the like.) 
 
 To the third division of the encyclopedia belongs also the 
 teaching of religion. But this has been specially prescribed 
 for an earlier course. Accordingly all that remains is the 
 second division of the encyclopedia, namely the philosophy of 
 nature. But (i) the study of nature (Naturbetrachtung) has 
 yet but little charm for youth. Interest in nature is felt to 
 be and not wrongly as a sort of theoretic idleness, as com- 
 pared with interest in human and spiritual deeds and forms. 
 (2) The study of nature is more difficult; for the mind in 
 grasping nature has to transform what is opposed to the 
 concept, into the concept das Gegentheil ties Begriffes in 
 den Begriff zu verwandeln a task of which only trained 
 thought is capable. (3) The philosophy of nature, as 
 speculative physics, -presupposes acquaintance with natural 
 phenomena, with empirical physics an acquaintance which 
 here is lacking. 
 
1 66 HE GEL A S ED UCA TOR [166 
 
 In the fourth year of the life of the gymnasium, I had 
 pupils who had studied the three courses of philosophy in 
 the lower and middle classes. These, I saw, were already 
 acquainted with the circle of philosophical sciences. I 
 accordingly dispensed with the greater part of the encyclo- 
 pedia, spending most of the time on the nature philosophy. 
 On the other hand, I felt that it would be well, could one 
 side of the philosophy of mind, namely, that relating to the 
 beautiful, be given more attention. ^Esthetics should be 
 included in the circle of the sciences. It would seem par- 
 ticularly fitted to be a gymnasial study. Instruction in this 
 might be given in the upper class by the professor of clas- 
 sical literature. But he already has enough to do with 
 the classical literature ; nor should the hours devoted to 
 that subject be lessened. It would be most beneficial were 
 the gymnasiasts to gain, besides a better notion of meter, 
 also clearer conceptions of the nature of the epic, the 
 tragedy, the comedy, etc. Teaching in aesthetics should 
 give the latest and best views regarding the nature and pur- 
 pose of art. This should not be an empty talk about art ; 
 but should, as was said, introduce the various forms of poetry, 
 ancient and modern modes, characteristics of the greatest 
 poets of different times and nations all to be illustrated by 
 examples from the works dealt with. This would be both a 
 pleasant and an instructive course of study. It contains 
 matter most suited to the gymnasium. It is a real lack that 
 this science is not made a subject for teaching by any gym- 
 nasial program. 
 
 In this way, all the subjects of the encyclopedia, save 
 nature philosophy, would have special courses in the gym- 
 nasium. There would be wanting perhaps a philosohical 
 view of history. But this may be partly dispensed with, and 
 in part may be treated in connection with the teaching of 
 religion, with that part especially which discusses Provi- 
 
l6j~] 
 
 HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 dence. There is oft occasion, too, in the special courses, 
 for mentioning the general divisions of the whole field of 
 philosophy pure thought, nature, and spirit. 
 
 II. METHOD 
 
 A. It is common to distinguish a philosophical system 
 with its content of the special sciences from philosophizing 
 itself. According to the modern wish, especially that o'f 
 pedagogy, a pupil is to be educated not so much in the con- 
 tent of philosophy, as in the power to philosophize without 
 content. That is about as much as to say, one must travel 
 and keep traveling without learning to know cities, rivers, 
 countries, peoples, etc. 
 
 But, first, when one learns to know a city, and then comes 
 to a river and to other cities, he is learning at the same time 
 how to travel not only is learning it, but is actually travel- 
 ing. And it may be that the only end of traveling is just 
 this learning to know these towns, streams, etc. the content. 
 
 Secondly, philosophy contains the highest thoughts of 
 reason concerning things most essential ; it contains what is 
 general and true about them. It is of great importance to 
 be acquainted with this content, and to get these thoughts in 
 the head. The dreary, merely formal activity, the perennial 
 empty feeling and beating the air, unsystematic reasoning or 
 speculating these result in empty and thoughtless minds 
 that effect nothing. Law, ethics, religion, embrace most im- 
 portant content. Logic, too, is a science rich in content. 
 Objective logic (Kant: transcendental) contains the basic 
 conceptions of being, existence, force, substance, cause, etc. ; 
 the other, formal logic, concepts, judgments, syllogisms, etc., 
 conceptions as fundamental as those of the former. Psy- 
 chology deals with feeling, intuition, etc. The philosophical 
 encyclopedia, finally, embraces the entire circle. The Wolf- 
 ian sciences, logic, ontology, cosmology, etc., natural rights, 
 
1 68 HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR 
 
 morals, etc., have more or less disappeared. But philosophy 
 is none the less a systematic complex of sciences full of con- 
 tent. Moreover, the knowledge of the absolute Absolute is 
 possible only through a knowledge of the totality of these 
 sciences. This knowledge is of a system of which the vari- 
 ous sciences form stages or departments, each science having 
 as its aim the knowledge of its subject matter in its absolute 
 truth. Shyness of system would demand a statue of a god, 
 but would stipulate that it have no form. Unsystematic 
 philosophizing is but hap-hazard and fragmentary thinking. 
 Thirdly. The act of becoming acquainted with a philoso- 
 phy rich in content, is nothing else but learning that philoso- 
 phy. Philosophy must be taught and learned just as any 
 other science. The unfortunate haste to educate to inde- 
 pendent thought and original productivity has hid this truth 
 in shadows. As if when I were thinking about substance, 
 cause, or the like, I myself were not thinking; as if these de- 
 terminations were not being produced by myself in thought, 
 but were as stones thrown in ; as if, once more, while seeking 
 their truth, the proofs of their synthetic relations or of their 
 dialectic process, I myself had not this insight, were not my- 
 self convinced of these truths. When I know the Pytha- 
 gorean proposition and its proof, is it not myself who know 
 the proposition and its proof? In so far as in and by itself 
 philosophic study is self-active, so far is it study the learn- 
 ing of an already formulated, developed science. This is a 
 .treasure of acquired, enriched and transformed content. 
 This inheritance that has come to us must be won by the in- 
 dividal ; that is, it must be learned. The teacher possesses 
 it. He thinks it before the pupil. The pupil thinks it over 
 after him. The philosophical sciences contain the univer- 
 sally true thought of their respective subject matters. They 
 are the result of the work of the thinking genius of all time. 
 These true thoughts are incomparably beyond what an un- 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 informed youth can bring out of his thinking. The original 
 thoughts of youth concerning the most important matters 
 are in part quite poor and empty, and the much larger por- 
 tion of the remainder are mere opinions or illusions which 
 are partial, biased, and vague. Through study, truth comes 
 to take the place of these scant opinions. Not until the 
 mind is rilled with thought has it the power to make know- 
 ledge advance, and itself gain a true possession therein. 
 The school is not concerned with the advancement as such. 
 Its study of philosophy is essentially to be directed to this 
 end : that thereby something be learned, that vagueness and 
 uncertainty be banished, that empty minds be filled with 
 thought and with content, and that the natural, unrational- 
 ized peculiarity of thought namely, whimsicality, caprice, 
 self-will, opinionativeness give place to wisdom. 
 
 B. The content of philosophy has in its method and soul 
 three aspects. It is (i) abstract, (2) dialectic, (3) specula- 
 tive. It is abstract in so far as it is chiefly concerned with 
 the elements of thought. When purely abstract, as opposed 
 to the dialectic and speculative, it is the so-called rational 
 ( Verstandige) form which treats of the various determina- 
 tions as fixed. The dialectic is the shifting and transforma- 
 tion of these fixed determinations the work of the negating 
 reason. The speculative form is the work of the positive, 
 affirmatory reason. It is the spiritual, the truly philosophical. 
 
 As regards the teaching of philosophy in the gymnasium, 
 the abstract form claims first attention. The pupil must 
 learn to do without his eyes and ears. He must be with- 
 drawn from concrete ideas and be led into the inner night of 
 the soul. He must take his stand here and learn to distin- 
 guish and grasp abstract determinations. 
 
 Further, one learns to think abstractly through abstract 
 thinking. A teacher may begin from the sensible and con- 
 crete and lead from these by analysis to the abstract, and so 
 
IJQ HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 as it appears take the natural way, from the easier to 
 the more difficult. Or, he may begin with the abstract. 
 He may take the abstract in and by itself, may teach it and 
 make it plain. Comparing both ways, we may say, first, the 
 former is indeed more natural, but it is not the scientific way. 
 Although, for instance, in cutting a disk from a piece of 
 wood, it may be more natural to cut away the corners, until 
 gradually the piece appears rounded, the geometer does not 
 so ; he makes at once with a compass or with free hand an 
 exact abstract circle. It is a just method, then, inasmuch 
 as the pure, the higher, the true, is natura prius to begin 
 with that in science. Secondly, it is wrong to consider as 
 the easier the way which starts from the concrete sensible to- 
 attain to thought. On the contrary, it is the more difficult ; 
 as it is easier to pronounce and read the elements of speech, 
 the single letters, than whole words. Since the abstract is 
 the simpler, it is the easier to grasp. The concrete, palpable 
 addendum is in the end to be cut away. It is unnecessary 
 then to start with it, since it must be cast off; and it dis- 
 tracts the attention. The abstract as such is comprehensible 
 enough. True understanding beyond this can only come 
 through philosophy. The aim is to get thought of the uni- 
 verse into the head. But thought in general is abstract. 
 Formal, contentless ratiocination is, it is true, also abstract 
 enough. But it has been assumed that we have content, and 
 the right content. Empty formalism, contentless abstrac- 
 tion, is best displaced by what has been argued for above,, 
 namely by the teaching of a definite content. 
 
 Holding, now, by a merely abstract form of philosophical 
 content, we have what may be called a rational philosophy. 
 And since the gymnasium has to provide an introduction to, 
 and materal for, philosophic thought, it would seem that 
 this rational content, this system of abstract, contentful con- 
 ceptions giving as it does both introduction and material 
 
j 7 1 ] HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR z y r 
 
 should constitute the main part of philosophical instruction 
 in the gymnasium. This would make up the first stage. 
 
 The second stage as regards form is the dialectic. This is 
 both more difficult than the abstract, and to the youth eager 
 for something more tangible, less interesting. The program 
 prescribes the Kantian antinomies, with a reference to cos- 
 mology. The antinomies contain what is deeply funda- 
 mental in the nature of the reason ; but these foundations 
 lie too hidden, their truth is covered up, they are, so to 
 speak, too unthinkable. And, besides, they are a very bad 
 dialectic ; they are nothing but bald antitheses. I have, I 
 think, shown the truth of this criticism in my Logic. In- 
 finitely better is the dialectic of the old Eleatics even in the 
 examples of it that have been preserved. In a systematic 
 whole each new concept properly arises through the dialectic 
 of the preceding. The teacher familiar with this mode of 
 philosophizing should have the liberty to attempt the 
 dialectic at every step he can, and where he cannot, to pro- 
 ceed to the next concept without it. 
 
 The third stage is the truly speculative, that is, the knowl- 
 edge of unity in things opposed ; or, the insight that things 
 antithetical imply a higher unity which is their truth. 
 This speculative thought belongs essentially to philosophy. 
 Naturally it is the most difficult; it is the truth. This ap- 
 pears in two stages: (i) In the common conceptions, ap- 
 prehensions, imaginations of mind and heart; for instance, 
 when one speaks of the universal, self-moving, and endlessly 
 varied life of nature of pantheism and the like when one 
 speaks of the eternal love of God, who creates in order to 
 love, in order to behold himself in his eternal Son. . . . 
 Right, self-consciousness, the practical, moral, in general, 
 already contain in and by themselves the principles or be- 
 ginnings thereof. And, indeed, no word other than specu- 
 lative can be spoken of the spirit or of the spiritual. For 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 the spiritual is the unity of another with itself; it is the 
 unity of reciprocal relationships. Otherwise one speaks, in 
 using the words soul, spirit, God, only of stocks and stones. 
 . . . But even here the thought is more or less pictorial or 
 representative. 
 
 There is the second stage, of the notion, or Idea. And 
 this is the speculative thought resulting from the dialectic. 
 This alone is philosophy in the form of universal and neces- 
 sary idea. This can rarely be touched upon in gymnasial 
 instruction ; it is grasped by but few, and it is hard to tell 
 whether even they have it or not. To learn to think specu- 
 latively, which is stated by the program as the object of the 
 teaching of introductory philosophy, accordingly is to be 
 looked upon as the necessary goal. The introduction 
 thereto is abstract thinking, then dialectic, and further the 
 acquisition of conceptions of speculative content. Such, 
 then, should be the preparatory work in philosophy for the 
 gymnasium. 
 
 49. Philosophical Propcedeutic 
 
 [The Philosophical Propcedeutic of Hegel forms the 1 8th 
 volume (205 pages) of his works. It is the outline of his 
 philosophical courses given in the gymnasium in Niirnberg. 
 It was first published by Rosenkranz in 1840. Dr. Harris 
 has translated almost all of the Propaedeutic* Below are the 
 writer's translations of passages bearing most directly upon 
 education, and a statement of the general scope of the work.] 
 
 FIRST COURSE 
 
 LOWER CLASS 
 LAW, DUTY, RELIGION 
 
 Introduction 
 I. 2 The subject of this instruction is the human will, from 
 
 1 Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vols. III. and IV. 
 
 2 These paragraph numbers correspond to the original. 
 
T 73 ] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR l 73 
 
 the standpoint of the relation of the particular will to the 
 general will. . . . 
 
 2. Consciousness in general is the reference of an object 
 to the ego. . . . Our knowledge deals with objects which 
 are known by sense perception, and also with objects which 
 have their ground in the spirit itself. The former consti- 
 tute the sensible world ; the latter, the intelligible. The 
 concepts of law, of ethics, and of religion belong to the latter. 
 
 5. The inner determinations of the practical conscious- 
 ness are either those of instinct or impulse, or those of will, 
 properly speaking. The instinct, or impulse, is a natural 
 self-determination, having its origin in limited feelings and 
 having a limited object or aim beyond which it does not go. 
 It is the unfree, immediately determined, lower power of de- 
 sire, impelled by which man acts as a nature-creature. By 
 reflection he transcends impulse and its limits. He thinks 
 not alone of the impulse and its immediate realization, but 
 compares it with other impulses and the ends of his being; 
 and then after reflection decides whether to follow his im- 
 pulse, or to restrain it and give it up. 
 
 7. The abstract freedom of the will consists in that non- 
 determinateness or identity of the ego with itself, in which 
 there is determination only in so far as the will makes the 
 determination, and is one with it ; and at the same time is so 
 self-possessed that it can withdraw from that determination. 
 There can indeed be brought to bear upon the will from 
 without all sorts of enticements, motives, rules ; but when a 
 man follows these, he does so only as his will makes the 
 motives its own and resolves to act upon them. 
 
 8. Responsibility.. 
 
 9. The act or deed. 
 
 10. The free will as free is not limited by the determina- 
 tions and particularities by which one individual is distin- 
 guished from another ; but it is a general, a universal will ; 
 
1 74 
 
 HE GEL AS ED UCA TOR 
 
 and the individual becomes through this pure will a univer- 
 sal being. 
 
 Explanation and illustration of the' introduction. 
 
 i. This defines: Abstract, Concrete ; Sense-perception, 
 Experience ; the Probable, the Credible. 
 
 2. ... Feeling, generally, is shifting and changeable. 
 It has one aspect now, another a moment hence. Feeling 
 in general is something subjective. The content of feeling 
 is mine as a particular individual. When I say: I feel 
 something to be so ; I thereby state what exists for me. I 
 do not affirm what is for others. The objective, on the 
 other hand, is the universally true. It is rational. 
 
 3-13. Imagination and thought. Abstraction. The 
 forms of thought. These the spirit projects from itself; 
 they nevertheless are also determinations of the existent. . . . 
 Action, a uniting of the inner and the outer. Instinctive 
 actions Actions after reflection. 
 
 14. Freedom of the will is the general type of freedom, 
 and all other kinds of freedom are merely participants of 
 this. When one says : freedom of the will, it is not meant 
 that outside of the will there is still some power, property, 
 force, that likewise is free. Just as, when one speaks of the 
 omnipotence of God, it is not meant that there are other 
 beings who are omnipotent ....... 
 
 15. We often say: Our will is determined by these 
 motives, circumstances, inducements. This would seem to 
 imply that in such determination we are passive. But in 
 reality we are then not merely passive ; we are essentially 
 active, in that our will accepts these circumstances as 
 motives. The causal relationship is not illustrated here. 
 The circumstances are not causes working upon my will and 
 making it mere resulting effect. In such a relationship what 
 lies in the cause would have necessary outcome. But by 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR l j$ 
 
 reflection I can transcend this determination imposed by the 
 circumstance. To the extent that a man fancies himself 
 under the lead of circumstances, allurements, etc., he will 
 forego action, degrading himself to an unfree or mere nature- 
 existence ; although even here his action will always be his 
 own, not that of another, nor of anything without. The 
 circumstances or inducements have only so much power 
 over a man as he himself allows them. 
 
 1 8 Freedom consists in the determination of the 
 
 will by itself. The will is not determined as the order of 
 nature is determined. The will in itself is a universal will. 
 The particularity or individuality of men is no obstruction 
 to the universality of the will, but is subordinate to it. An 
 action that is right or moral or admirable, is indeed done by 
 an individual; but all applaud it. Therein they recognize 
 themselves, or their own will. It is the same with works of 
 art. People who are unable to do the art work, nevertheless 
 see their own nature expressed by it. 
 
 20. The absolutely free will is distinguished from the 
 relatively free, from the arbitrary, in that the absolute has 
 but itself for object, while the relative is fixed on something 
 limited. The relative will, e. g., desire, cares for nothing but 
 its object. The absolute will is distinguished, too, from self- 
 will. This latter has something in common with the absolute 
 will, since it wants not so much the object, as to have its own 
 way, as will to have its will respected. There is a differ- 
 ence, however. The self-willed man sticks to his will merely 
 because it is his will, without any rational ground ; that is, 
 without his will having a universal reference. 
 
 21. . . . The aim of education is to make man an inde- 
 pendent being ; that is, a being whose will is free. To this end 
 many checks are put upon the desires of children. They must 
 
1 76 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR [ j 75 
 
 learn obedience, so that their self-will and their dependence 
 upon the impulses and desires of sense be done away with, 
 and thus their will made free. 
 
 22-25. Definition and illustrations of Law, Morality, 
 Duty. 
 
 PART I 
 
 CH. I. RIGHTS. LAW 
 
 2. Rights originate in a community wherein individuals 
 mutually respect and treat one another as free beings. . . . 
 
 4. In so far as the freedom of the individual is realized 
 is he a person. 
 
 5-2 1 . Property. Slavery. Vengeance, Punishment, etc. 
 
 CH. II. THE STATE 
 
 22. Rights, law apart from individual caprice have 
 actualization only in the state. 
 23. The family. 
 
 24. The merely natural stage of human society is the 
 stage of savagery, force, injustice. Men must be led from 
 this to statehood, because only in the state can right be 
 realized. 
 
 26. 'Law is the abstract expression of the general will in 
 and for itself. 
 
 27. Government is the individuality of the general will" 
 in and for itself. It is the power which asserts, maintains, 
 executes the law. 
 
 28. The legislative, administrative, financial, judicial 
 functions of government. The police. The army. 
 
 29. To the state the citizens as individuals are subordi- 
 nate. But the content and purpose of the state is the realiz- 
 ing of the natural, that is, the absolute rights of the citizens,, 
 who as members of the state do not relinquish these rights,. 
 
! 77] HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR ! 77 
 
 but rather through citizenship alone have hope of enjoying 
 and developing them. 
 
 PART II 
 
 DUTY. ETHICS 
 
 33. Law does not extend to the sentiments. Morality, 
 on the other hand, is essentially connected with the sentiment 
 and disposition. It demands that one act with respect to 
 duty. This is the subjective side. 
 
 40. Four classes of duty: (i) toward self; (2) to the 
 family; (3) to the state; (4) toward others in general. 
 
 I 
 
 41. Duty to one's self: (i) physical maintenance; (2) 
 to develop one's individual existence into his universal 
 nature, to educate himself. 
 
 42. To theoretic culture belongs besides a many sided 
 and definite knowledge and general points of view from which 
 to judge of things the sense for objects in their indepen- 
 dency, without a subjective bias. 1 
 
 43. Practical culture makes a man reasonable and tem- 
 perate in the satisfaction of his natural needs and instincts. 
 He must (T) transcend the natural: he must be free. (2) 
 He must give himself to his vocation the essential thing. 
 (3) In the satisfaction of his natural necessities he not only 
 must not go beyond the necessary, but must be willing to 
 give this up upon call of higher duty. 
 
 44,45. One's vocation. [For translation of these para- 
 graphs see Selection 39.] 
 
 II 
 51. Marriage is not a merely natural, animal union, nor a 
 
 1 For fuller translation of this paragraph, see Selection 4. 
 
1,78 HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR [ 1 78 
 
 mere civil contract ; but a moral union of sentiment in mutual 
 love and confidence. 
 
 52. The duty of parents to children is: to care for their 
 maintenance and education. That of children : to obey 
 their parents, until independence is attained, and to honor 
 them their life long. That of brothers and sisters : to act 
 toward one another with consideration and love. 
 
 Ill 
 
 55. In the spirit of a people each citizen has his spiritual 
 substance. It is not alone the maintenance of the individuals 
 which is dependent upon this living whole ; but this latter 
 constitutes the general nature or essence of each as an indi- 
 vidual. The maintenance of the whole, therefore, is more 
 important than the life of individuals as such ; and all citi- 
 zens should have this conviction. 
 
 57. A sentiment of obedience toward the commands of 
 the government, loyalty to the person of the prince and to 
 the constitution, and the feeling of national honor, are the 
 virtues of the citizen of every well-ordered state. 
 
 IV 
 
 59-7 ' A feeling of the rights of others. Justice. 
 Truthfulness in-word and deed. Helpfulness. Friendliness. 
 Prudence. Politeness. True courtesy. 
 
 PART III 
 
 RELIGION 
 
 71. The moral law within is the law of eternal reason. 
 We recognize it as something higher than we, as existing 
 independently, absolutely. 
 
 72. This absolute is present in our pure consciousness, 
 and reveals itself to us therein. 
 
 73. Knowledge of the absolute is itself an absolute and 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 
 non-mediated knowledge, and can have nothing finite as its 
 positive ground, or be proved by anything other than itself. 
 
 74. This knowledge must grow definite, and not remain 
 merely inner feeling, or faith in an indeterminate Being in, 
 general ; but must become cognitive. The cognition of God 
 is not beyond the reason, for this is nothing but the reflec- 
 tion of God, and is essentially the knowledge of the absolute. 
 This cognition is beyond the power not of the reason but of 
 the understanding, which knows but the finite and relative. 
 
 75. Religion itself consists in the turning of the feeling 
 and of the thought upon the absolute Being, and in the 
 dwelling with the idea of Him as present. While thus lifted 
 up one forgets his separateness from the Absolute, and all 
 his acts are done with reference to His will. 
 
 SECOND COURSE 
 
 MIDDLE CLASS 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, AND LOGIC 
 
 PART I 
 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, OR THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 Introduction 
 
 1-9. Object and subject. Realism,, idealism. Three 
 stages of consciousness : (i) Consciousness ii> general; (2)^ 
 self-consciousness; (3) reason. 
 
 I. CONSCIOUSNESS IN GENERAL. IO-2I. 
 
 Three phases: (a) sensational; (b) perceptional; (c) 
 rational. 
 
 (a) In simple sensation the consciousness is immediately 
 aware of an outer object. 
 
 (b) Perception has no longer the sensible, in so far as 
 that is merely immediate, for its object, but in so far as at 
 
I go HEGEL AS ED UCA TOR 
 
 the same time it is a general. . . . The object of perception, 
 accordingly, is the thing with its properties. These are 
 defined partly by reference to other things they have a 
 general content. 
 
 (c) The rational consciousness {der Verstand the under- 
 standing) deals with the essential and permanent in phe- 
 nomena, with their inner truth, with forces of which they 
 are the expression. The understanding formulates law. 
 Here the rational consciousness is one with its object. The 
 inner being of things is the thought or notion of those 
 things. 
 
 II. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 22-39. 
 
 Self-consciousness has the ego for its object. Its pure 
 formula is, I = I, or I am I. 
 
 This formula of self-consciousness defines no content. 
 The impulse, trend, of self-consciousness consists in the 
 effort to realize its notion, and in everything presented to it 
 to attain to the consciousness of itself. Accordingly it is 
 active: it tries (i) to do away with the strangeness, the 
 " otherness " of objects, and to comprehend them as part of 
 self; (2) to express itself and so attain objectivity, and 
 existence-for-others an existence which other people may 
 reckon with. Both these trends are phases of one activity. 
 
 In the culture or advance of self-consciousness there are 
 three stages: (i) desire, which feels itself as lacking and as 
 wishing for things without; (2) a relation of superiority or 
 ,of inferiority, of rule or of servitude, to other things or per- 
 sons; (3) a general, social self-consciousness which recog- 
 nizes one's self as being in the self-consciousness of others 
 as their equal or associate. [Cf. the "consciousness of 
 kind " which Professor Giddings makes the essential charac- 
 teristic of social phenomena.] 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR j8l 
 
 III. THE REASON. 40-42. 
 
 40. The reason is the highest unity of the consciousness 
 and of the self-consciousness, or of the knowlenge of an 
 object and of the knowledge of self. It is assured that its 
 own determinations are as much objective, that they are 
 determinations of existent things, as that they are our own 
 thoughts. It is also the certainty of itself. It fuses the sub- 
 jective and objective in one and the same thought. 
 
 41. Or, what we see through the reason, is a content 
 (i) that is filled not with our mere imagination, but with 
 existences in and for themselves with objective realities ; 
 and (2) that is no strange thing to the I nothing that is 
 merely given, but that is permeated by the reason, made its 
 own, and even produced by it. 
 
 42. The knowledge possessed by reason, accordingly, 
 is not a subjective conviction ; but it is truth, since truth 
 consists in the harmony, or rather in the unity, of inner cer- 
 tainty and of being [of existent objectivity], 
 
 PART II 
 LOGIC 
 
 1-6. The sphere of logic. Thought in general. Three 
 classes of thought: (i) the categories; (2) the determina- 
 tions of reflection; (3) notions, concepts (die Begriffi). 
 
 i 
 
 Being, 7-32 
 (a) Quality, (b) quantity, (c) mass, measure. 
 
 2 
 
 Existence or essence, 33-55 
 
 i. The determinations of essence in itself. 2. The phe- 
 nomenon: (a) the thing; (b) the appearance (phenom- 
 enon) ; (c) the relation. 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR 
 3 
 
 Reality, 56-68 
 
 (a) Substance; (b) cause; (c) inter-relation, reciprocity 
 of cause and effect. 
 
 Then follows a discussion of the Kantian antinomies, 
 69-87. 
 
 PART III 
 
 THE NOTION (Der Begriff) 
 
 I. The notion. 2. The end, or teleological notion. 3. 
 The Idea. 
 
 THIRD COURSE 
 
 UPPER CLASS. 
 
 I DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION, AS SUBJECTIVE LOGIC. II PHILOSOPHICAL 
 
 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
 
 I 
 
 A. Doctrine of the Notion {Comprehension) 
 I. The notion. 2. Judgment (qualitative, quantitative, 
 modal, etc.). 3. Syllogism (Conclusion). 
 
 B. The realization of the notion 
 
 I. Subjective purpose. 2. The passing over into ob- 
 jectivity. 3. The realized purpose. 
 
 C. Doctrine of Ideas 
 I. Idea of life. 2. Idea of knowledge, and of good, 
 
 II 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA. 
 I. Logic. 2. Science of nature. 3. Science of spirit. 
 
 I. Logic. 
 Tnis is a short restatement of course in preceding class. 
 
j83] HEGEL AS EDUCATOR ^3 
 
 2. Science of Nature 
 
 (a) Mathematics. 
 
 (b) Physics, organic and inorganic. 
 
 3 . Science of Spirit 
 
 (a) Psychology: feeling, perception, memory, imagina- 
 tion, thinking, understanding, judgment, reason. 
 
 (b) The practical spirit: rights, morality, the state. 
 
 (c) The spirit in its pure expression : art, religion, 
 science. Science is the comprehensive knowledge of the 
 absolute spirit. Since it is grasped notionally, there is in 
 knowledge nothing foreign to reason. This knowledge has 
 content identical with the knowledge itself. It is the notion 
 which has itself for content and is self-comprehensive. 
 
 50. Ethics and philosophy 
 
 Morality, in principle, is the freeing of the soul from the 
 alien and material, its rising to the plane on which it is de- 
 termined by pure reason. A like purification of the soul is 
 the prerequisite for philosophy. The moral and intellectual 
 aspects of all things are in so far one and the same. Ethics 
 and philosophy alike depend upon the pure, and so universal, 
 reason. The truly moral outlook upon nature is, accord- 
 ingly, the truly intellectual, and vice versa. The moral 
 regard which excludes the intellectual, is no longer moral. 
 Both are one in principle, neither is before the other, al- 
 though it may seem so, empirically. Regarded from our 
 becoming in time, the moral [practical, action that is willed] 
 is the first. It is through the moral that we enter into the 
 intellectual world, and recognize ourselves therein. 1 Innate 
 knowledge is only a crystallization of the infinite, and uni- 
 versal in the particularity of our nature. The moral impera- 
 tive comes not from particularity ; it proceeds from the pure 
 
 1 [According to the principle : Do, and ye shall know.] 
 
x 84 HE GEL A s ED UCA TOR [184 
 
 universal, the essential, the infinite. But this difference be- 
 tween the moral and the intellectual exists only in temporal 
 knowing and doing. True knowledge turns away from the 
 mere finite reflection of the infinite, to the being in itself, to 
 first knowledge, And in this aspect its particulars are under 
 the sway of the universal ; that is, there is present moral 
 purity of soul. 
 
 On the other hand, true, not merely negative, morality 
 implies that the soul is at home in the world of ideas, and is 
 master of it. Morality apart from the intellect must needs be 
 empty, for it is from the intellect that it gains fit material for 
 its activity. 
 
 Accordingly he who has not this first knowledge cannot 
 attain to moral perfection. The pure, the universal, is for 
 him something external. He is on the plane of the non- 
 pure, and a prisoner of the particular and empirical. 
 " Cleansing the soul," says Plato, " consists in separating it 
 as completely as possible from the body, and in accustoming 
 it to withdraw within itself, from every point of contact with 
 the body, and so to dwell as much as may be with itself. . . . 
 Death is such a separation of the soul from the body. The 
 true philosopher more than any other strives for this libera- 
 tion." Ethics and philosophy unite in this effort for purifi- 
 cation. But the way to it is not by the mere negative con- 
 cept of the finite, namely that it is a limitation of the soul. 
 There is need of a positive concept, and of an adequate in- 
 tuition of being in itself. For he who knows that it is only 
 in appearance that the natural is separated from the divine 
 that it is only in imperfect cognition that the body is distinct 
 from the soul, while in reality it is one with her will most of 
 all practice himself in dying that death, praised by Socrates, 
 which is the entrance to eternal freedom and true life. 
 
 The true triumph and final freeing of the soul lies alone in 
 absolute idealism, in the absolute death of the real as such. 
 
HEGEL AS EDUCATOR ^5 
 
 Those who deny the ethical principle of philosophy know 
 neither the aims nor the progress of the soul, by which it is 
 purified. The beginning of the progress is a yearning; for 
 the immortal soul in entering the body feels it to be, as it 
 were, the grave of its perfection. Aware of having lost the 
 chief good, it hastens, like Ceres, to kindle its torch at the 
 flaming mount, to explore depths and heights in vain, until 
 wearied out it comes to Eleusis. 1 This is the second stage. 
 But here the all-seeing sun reveals Hades to be only the 
 threshold to all good. The soul that accepts this revelation 
 gains the deepest knowledge. It then seeks rest in naught 
 but the eternal Father. 2 
 
 1 [" Verite ou chimere, le reve de Pinfini nous attirera toujours, et, comme ce 
 heros d'un conte celtique qui, ayant vu en songe une beaute ravissante, court le 
 monde toute sa vie pour la trouver, 1'homme qui, un moment s'est assis pour re- 
 flechir sur sa destinee porte au cceur une fleche qu'il ne s'arrache plus." Renan, 
 Discours et Conferences, p. 40. 
 
 Novalis : " Philosophy is, properly speaking, homesickness, a desire to be 
 everywhere at home."] 
 
 2 1, 317. [This passage is from one of Hegel's earliest writings. Its mysticism 
 may be noted. But mysticism is the indefinite, emotional recognition of great 
 facts. In this passage the mystical expression is artistic, in that it may suggest to 
 each reader the highest truth of which he himself is able to conceive. Hegel 
 opens windows for soul-flight. And if, issuing thence, we find but an olive leaf 
 in a new world, happy we; and grateful should we be to Hegel.] 
 
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