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Eul^rs of Inibia 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 SIR WILLIAM WILSON HUNTER, K.C.S.I., CLE. 
 
 M.A. (Oxford) : LL.D. (Cambridgi.) 
 
 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
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Bonbon 
 
 HENRY FROWDE 
 
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 Prepared lor Sir William \«lsr>u Hunters 
 
 IMPERIAL GAZETTEER OF INDIA 
 
 
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UNIVERSITY 
 
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UNIVERSITY 
 
RULERS OF INDIA 
 
 Cl^be anb Stvatbnairn 
 
 By Maj.-Grnl. Sir OWEN TUDOR BURNE, K.C.S.I. 
 
 SOMETIME MILITARY SECRETARY TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 
 IN INT>TA 
 
 THIRD THOUSAND 
 
 AT THE CLARENDON PRESS: 1892 
 
■y 
 
 ^ 
 
 O;cfotb 
 
 PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
 
 BY HORACE HART. PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY 
 
PREFACE 
 
 I\ writing the following account of the Indian 
 Mutiny operations, I have not attempted to discuss 
 political measures whiclpi ^h'a^ already been dealt 
 with by more practised writers than myself, but 
 have merely endeavoured to verif}^, and in some 
 cases to correct, the militar}^ narrative by my own 
 personal recollections, and to present it to the public 
 in an abridged and readable form. The helpful 
 revision of the manuscript by Mr. Stephen Wheeler 
 and the editor is entitled to my sincere acknow- 
 ledgments. 
 
 0. T. B. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAP. PAGES 
 
 I. Introduction 9-18 
 
 II. The Outbreak 19-32 
 
 III. The Situation 33-43 
 
 IV. The Northern Operations to the Relief op 
 
 LucKNOW 44-70 
 
 V. The Northern Operations {continued) to the 
 
 Reduction of Oudh 7T-89 
 
 VI. The Southern Operations to the Fall of Jhansi 90-125 
 
 VII. The Southern Operations {continued) to the 
 
 Recapture of Gwalior .... 126-154 
 
 VIII. Reconstruction i55--78 
 
 IX. Conclusion 179-183 
 
 Index 185-194 
 
 NOTE 
 
 The orthography of proper names follows the system adopted by the 
 Indian Govermnent for the Imperial Gazetteer of India. That system, 
 while adhering to the popular spelling of very well-known places, such 
 as Punjab, Lucknow, &c., employs in all other cases the vowels with 
 the following uniform sounds : — 
 
 a, as in woman : a, as in fathers : i, as in police : /, as in intrigue : 
 o, as in cold : w, as in huW : u, as in sare : e, as in grey. 
 
CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 THE SUPPRESSION OF THE 
 GREAT REVOLT 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 Introduction 
 
 The thrilling incidents and heroic deeds of the 
 Indian Mutiny have already been so graphically 
 recounted by historians and biographers that it is 
 difficult to invest the subject with new interest, or to 
 compress the narrative within reasonable limits. An 
 attempt will be made, however, in the present volume 
 to describe in general terms the military operations 
 rendered necessary for the suppression of the revolt ; 
 indicating, as briefly as practicable, ihe causes of the 
 outbreak, and the sequence of events during the 
 anxious months of 1857, when British rule seemed 
 for a moment to tremble in the balance. 
 
 To realise the position of affairs in that year, and 
 the magnitude of the danger, it must be borne in 
 mind that India is not a united country containing a 
 homogeneous population, but a congeries of countries 
 inhabited by races who in number (287,000,000) 
 
lO CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 are double the population of the Roman Empire at 
 the time of its greatest extent, who speak a variety 
 of languages, hold many creeds, observe widely dif- 
 ferent customs, and present every t^pe and degree 
 of civilisation. 
 
 We are dealing, too, with immense areas. The 
 single Lieutenant-Governorship of Lower Bengal is 
 as large as France ; Madras exceeds Great Britain 
 and Ireland ; Bombay equals Germany ; the North- 
 Western Provinces and Oudh cover as much space as 
 Great Britain, Belgium, and Holland ; the size of the 
 PuDJab is that of Italy ; while the Native States put 
 together have an area equal to that of Great Britain 
 and Ireland, Germany, and France combined. 
 
 Bearing these facts in mind it will be seen that the 
 suppression of an outbreak of upwards of 100,000 
 trained Sepoys ^ was no easy task ; while to have 
 held the country during the earlier stages of the 
 revolt, with a mere handful of British troops^ was 
 an achievement to which Englishmen may ever point 
 with becoming pride. 
 
 The bulk of the population of India may for the 
 purposes of this volume be regarded as divisible into 
 Hindus and Muhammadans, inasmuch as these two 
 classes inhabit in greater or less numbers every one 
 of its provinces, and figure almost exclusively in 
 the events of the Mutiny. Speaking generally, the 
 
 ^ Out of seventy-four regular regiments of the Bengal Native 
 Infantry forty-five mutinied, twenty were disarmed, and three 
 were disbanded. Only six remained true to their salt. 
 
INTRODUCTION II 
 
 typical Hindu is quiet, industrious, and tolerant 
 in religious matters unless provoked to excitement. 
 As a soldier he is obedient and patient, although 
 warped by those caste prejudices which have always 
 given the Brahmans special control over comrades 
 and subordinates. These qualities were strongly 
 marked in the mutinous Sepoys. The Muhammadan, 
 on his part, is by nature restless, fanatical, and ready 
 for any adventure that may come to hand. In 
 Northern India he is, as a rule, a born soldier, and 
 even in the South he still retains in some measure 
 the martial instincts which inspired his forefathers. 
 
 Such, briefly, were the characteristics of the people 
 with whom the British Government and its adminis- 
 trators in the India of thirty-four years ago had 
 to deal. They laboured under the disadvantage of 
 being separated from those people by blood, religion, 
 and character, and had therefore to contend with the 
 almost insuperable difficulty of ignorance as to the 
 undercurrents of public feeling. To obtain trust- 
 worthy information from the natives was in fact all 
 but impossible, while the motives of the governing 
 power were as constantly liable to be misunderstood 
 and misrepresented by conquered races. 
 
 It cannot be said that the storm burst without 
 warning. Months before the actual outbreak of the 
 mutinous Sepoys, an idea had taken hold of a large 
 number of persons within range of Hindu and Mu- 
 hammadan influence that a crisis in the world's history 
 was near at hand, that great events were impending, 
 
12 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 and that the British Government was bent on de- 
 parting from its ancient principles of non-interference 
 with the customs, traditions, and religions of its Indian 
 subjects. Englishmen were warned by native friends 
 to be on their guard ; and written prophecies ^ were 
 spread broadcast throughout the land, foretelling 
 the downfall of British power after the centenary of 
 Plassey. Notwithstanding these indications, however, 
 of ill-feeling and imminent disaster, the attitude of 
 the people of India generally, during this eventful 
 period, was one of neutrality. When once the out- 
 break became a fact, the only landholder who rebelled 
 among the hundreds of Behar (one of the most dis- 
 turbed districts in Bengal) was Koer Singh, a man 
 whom pecuniary embarrassments had rendered notori- 
 ously desperate. Bengal, as a whole, remained tranquil. 
 The Sikhs of the Punjab aided us. In the North- 
 West Provinces the Hindus of Eohilkhand, forced for 
 a time to submit to the rule of a rebel Muhammadan, 
 
 ^ The following is a free translation of one of such prophecies : — 
 The clan of Sikhs will exercise over Muhammadans great tyranny 
 and oppression. For forty y^ars the tyranny and the heresy will 
 remain ; after this the whole empire will be seized by the Nazarene 
 (i. e. EnglishX For the space of loo years their sovereignty %vill 
 remain in Hindustan, when in their time heresy and tyranny 
 shall become general. Then, the King from the West shall appear. 
 Between these two will be fought desperate battles. The King from 
 the West shall be victorious. Then, without doubt, the followers of 
 the clan of Jesias will be broken, discomfited, and dispersed. For 
 forty years the Musalman power shall be triumphant, and after this 
 period Anti-Christ shall be born in Ispahan. Hear what I am going 
 to say about the destruction of the followers of Anti-Christ. For 
 this purpose Jesus and the last Apostles will appear.' 
 
INTRODUCTION 13 
 
 welcomed with joy the ultimate restoration of British 
 government. Moreover, the Native States remained 
 staunch. It is true that certain minor Chiefs joined 
 the rebellion, but the leading Princes of India were 
 steadfast in their allegiance to the British Crown. 
 Thus the principal assistance given to the rebel Sepoys 
 came from a small number of disaffected nobles and 
 deposed officials, who in their turn found support 
 only from the lawless and restless spirits of their 
 neighbourhoods, no longer restrained by a powerful 
 government. 
 
 The Mutiny was thus primarily a military rising, 
 aided and abetted to a limited extent by a proportion 
 of the hereditary criminal classes. It was a rising, 
 moreover, confined in great measure to the Sepoys of 
 the Bengal Regular Army. For many years prior to 
 the outbreak these men had shown a bad spirit, to 
 be attributed in part to discontent at changes affect- 
 ing the condition of their service, and in part to 
 pampering and lax discipline. The discipline of this 
 Army had in fact been weakened by an encourage- 
 ment to Sepoys to make frivolous complaints to 
 head-quarters, and to think lightly of the authority 
 of those over them. At the same time there had 
 been a marked deterioration in the character of their 
 regimental officers, while the inefficiency of not a few 
 officers of higher rank in command of divisions 
 and districts completed the evil. At this particular 
 juncture, moreover, the proportion of British to Native 
 troops in India was dangerously small. The warnings 
 
14 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 given by Lord Dalhousie had been neglected ; and 
 owing to the paucity of European troops the principal 
 arsenals and military posts of India, notably that 
 of Delhi, were garrisoned by disaffected Sepoys ^. 
 
 Under such conditions only a touch was needed to 
 change insubordination into revolt. It was heed- 
 lessly applied. The adoption of the Enfield Eifle for 
 use in the Native Army seemed an innocent measure ; 
 but a cry of 'greased cartridges' was raised, and 
 the long-suppressed agitation burst into active life. 
 Greased cartridges were no novelty. They had been 
 sent out to India some years before the Mutiny, they 
 had been subsequently manufactured by native hands 
 in local arsenals, and had been issued without objec- 
 tion to certain Sepoy troops. But this time it was 
 reported, and not without foundation, that the grease 
 was made of hog's lard or cow's fat (a contamination 
 to Hindus and Muhammadans alike), and the clamour 
 spread far and wide. Everywhere it was proclaimed 
 that the Native Army was thus to be forced into the 
 Christian faith. The agitators hailed the grievance 
 with delight. The Government made weak explana- 
 tions. The mischief was done. 
 
 ^ The number of European troops in the Bengal Presidency 
 ■was at this time unusually small. Two cavalry regiments had 
 been withdrawn for service in the Crimea and not replaced ; 
 and four infantry regiments were absent with the Persian expe- 
 ditionary force. The bulk of the remainder were quartered in 
 the Punjab. Oudh was guarded by only one weak British regi- 
 ment ; while Delhi with its vast magazine was, as above said, 
 entrusted entirely to Bengal Sepoys. 
 
INTRODUCTION 15 
 
 The Mutiny now became a fact, notwithstanding 
 the indignant protestations of officers who sacrificed 
 their lives to the mistaken conviction that their men 
 were faithful. Leaders were soon forthcoming in 
 the persons of Bahadur Shah (the titular King of 
 Delhi) and others who had long watched for an 
 opportunity ; and many parts of India were quickly 
 plunged into a chaos of confusion and bloodshed. 
 Little need be said in regard to the leaders. There 
 were only three of any note. The titular King of 
 Delhi resided with his family in the old palace of the 
 Mughals at Delhi, whence his sons had travelled freely 
 for many years throughout the country, stirring up 
 hopes of a revived Muhammadan Empire. The Rani 
 of Jhansi, Ganga Bai, had become a bitter enemy of 
 the English on account of the annexation of the 
 principality after the death of her husband without an 
 heir. The Nana Sahib, Dundhu Panth, an adopted 
 son of a deposed Maratha Peshwa, although permitted 
 to inherit his adoptive father's personal property, in- 
 cluding the estate of Bithiir near Cawnpur, had been 
 refused a lapsed pension, and he now became one of 
 the most infamous and active leaders of the rebellion ^. 
 
 ^ In connection with this subject, it may not be out of place to 
 quote the opinion of Sir Hugh Rose who, writing home in October, 
 1857, said, before the more careful subsequent enquiries : — 
 
 ' The more events unroll themselves the 3nore they seem to show 
 that the revolt in India was not 'purely a military one, but that the 
 origin of the trouble was in some degree an outcome of a political 
 conspiracy, at the head of which were the King of Delhi, the King 
 of Oudh, and Nana Sahib, all three candidates for kingdoms.' 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose's view, expressed in the heat of the operations, 
 
l6 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 With the Nana Sahib was associated the only military 
 commander of any distinction on the rebel side, 
 Tantia Topi had been brought up in the household 
 of the deposed Peshwa, and regarded the Nana, the 
 Peshwa's adopted son, as a master whose cause he was 
 bound to champion. He had all the qualities of a 
 general except daring ; for although he led his troops 
 well more than once, he was chiefly remarkable for his 
 retreat after the capture of Gwalior, in June 1858, 
 when for the space of nine months he eluded the 
 vigilance of the forces sent to capture him, covering 
 as much as 3000 miles in his flight. 
 
 It may be of interest to the general reader to call 
 to mind certain views expressed by one of the most 
 eminent contemporary authorities on the events of 
 this period. 
 
 'The annexation of Oudh,' said Lord Lawrence, 
 speaking at Glasgow in i860, 'had nothing to do 
 with the Mutiny in the first place, though that 
 measure certainly did add to the number of our 
 enemies after the Mutiny commenced. The old 
 government of Oudh was extremely obnoxious to the 
 mass of our native soldiers of the regular army, who 
 came from Oudh and the adjacent province of Behar, 
 and with whom the Mutiny originated. These men 
 were the sons and kinsmen of the Hindu yeomen of 
 the country, all of whom benefited more or less by 
 annexation ; while Oudh was ruled by a Muhammadan 
 
 should, however, be corrected by Lord Lawrence's deliberate and 
 authoritative decision, after considering the whole evidence. 
 
INTRODUCTION VJ 
 
 family which had never identified itself with the 
 people, and whose government was extremely oppres- 
 sive to all classes except its immediate creatures and 
 
 . followers. But when the introduction of the greased 
 V 
 cartridges had excited the Native Army to revolt, 
 
 when the mutineers saw nothing before them short of 
 escape on the one hand or destruction on the other, 
 they, and all who sympathised with them, were 
 driven to the most desperate measures. All who 
 could be influenced by love or fear rallied round 
 them. All who had little or nothing to lose joined 
 their ranks. All that dangerous class of religious 
 fanatics and devotees who abound in India, all the 
 political intriguers, who in peaceful times can do no 
 mischief, swelled the numbers of the enemy, and gave 
 spirit and direction to their measures. India is full 
 of races of men, who, from time immemorial, have 
 lived by service or by plunder, and who are ready to 
 join in any disturbance which may promise them em- 
 ployment. Oudh was full of disbanded soldiers who 
 had not had time to settle down. Our gaols furnished 
 thousands of desperate men let loose on society. The 
 cry throughout the country as cantonment after can- 
 tonment became the scene of triumphant mutiny was, 
 " The English rule is at an end. Let us plunder and 
 enjoy ourselves." The industrious classes throughout 
 India were on our side, but for a long time feared to 
 act. On the one side they saw the few English in the 
 country shot down or flying for their lives, or at the 
 best standing on the defensive, sorely pressed; on 
 
 B 
 
1 8 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 the other side they saw summary punishment, in the 
 shape of the plunder and destruction of their houses, 
 dealt out to those who aided us. But when we 
 evinced signs of vigour, when we began to assume 
 the offensive and vindicate our authority, many of 
 these people came forward and identified themselves 
 with our cause.' 
 
 No clearer outline could be given of the causes 
 and eflfects of the Mutiny. The shock was a terrible 
 one, but it left British power in India more firmly 
 established than ever. Foes and friends rose up 
 where their appearance was least expected. And 
 one lesson will ever be indelibly engraved on the 
 pages of its history, namely, that while the Native 
 Princes of India whom we mistrusted brought their 
 armies and influence to our aid, the Sepoy troops on 
 whom we relied turned against us. From the day 
 when this experience was taken to heart dates the 
 consolidation of our Indian Empire as it now exists. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 The Outbreak 
 
 When Lord Dalhousie gave up his post in the early 
 part of 1856, he publicly warned the English in India 
 that ' cruel violence might be suddenly committed by 
 men who up to the last moment had been regarded as 
 harmless, even by those who knew them best.' Lord 
 Canning, at a farewell banquet given to him by the 
 Court of Directors, when he was leaving for Calcutta 
 as the new Governor-General, also said : ' I wish for a 
 peaceful term of office. Eut I cannot forget that in 
 the sky of India, serene as it is, a small cloud may 
 arise no larger than a man's hand, but which growing 
 larger and larger may at last threaten to burst and 
 overwhelm us with ruin.' Warnings to Government 
 had not been wanting, moreover, from experienced 
 observers who had watched for some time the growth 
 of discontent in the Bengal Sepoy Army. At length 
 the storm burst. And if the fearful disasters, the 
 touching incidents, and the memorable exploits which 
 belonor to the first few months of the outbreak are 
 too briefly summed up in this chapter, it is because 
 the object of the volume admits only of such passing 
 reference to them as may carry on the reader intelli- 
 
 B 2 
 
20 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 gently to the military operations connected with the 
 final suppression of the revolt by Sir Colin Campbell 
 and Sir Hugh Rose. 
 
 Preceded in various parts of India, as already seen, 
 by indications of a mutinous spirit in the Native 
 Army, a spirit of disaffection that grew stronger as it 
 was met with increasing indecision, the first important 
 outbreak of the Sepoys took place on May loth, 1857, 
 at Meerut. The Native troops at that place rose in 
 open rebellion; and although there were only about 
 2700 Sepoys with 1700 Europeans to control them, 
 the mutineers, without check or hindrance, released a 
 number of desperate prisoners from the jail, set fire 
 to the cantonments, and hurried away unmolested 
 to Delhi. There, amid fearful scenes of murder and 
 carnage, the titular King of Delhi was set up as 
 Sovereign Lord of Hindustan. Within a few short 
 hours not a vestige remained in the city of British 
 authority except the Arsenal ; and this building, 
 after being defended for a time by a small and 
 devoted band of Englishmen ^ who watched in 
 vain for succour from Meerut, had at length to be 
 blown up to prevent its falling into the hands of the 
 enemy. The first great step in the Mutiny was thus 
 accomplished in a few hours. ' Onwards to Delhi' was 
 now the cry, and the old Mughal capital became the 
 
 ^ Lieutenant George Willoughljy of the Bengal Artillery, Lieu- 
 tenants Forest and Kaynor, Conductors Buckley, Shaw, and Kelly, 
 Sub-Conductor Crow, and Sergeants Edwards and Stuart, were the 
 nine heroes of the Delhi arsenal. Of these, three only lived to teli 
 the tale. 
 
THE OUTBREAK 21 
 
 political centre of the rebellion. On our part every- 
 thing depended on energy and resolution. ' Where have 
 we failed,' wrote John Lawrence to the Commander- 
 in-Chief, ' when we have acted vigorously ? Where 
 have we succeeded when guided by timid counsels? 
 Clive with his 1200 men fought at Plassey in op- 
 position to the advice of his leading officers, beat 
 40,000 men and conquered Bengal. Monson retreated 
 from the Chambal, and before he gained Agra, his 
 army was disorganised and partially annihilated.' A 
 picked force from Meerut and Ambala, acting with 
 vigour and operating from both sides of the Jumna, 
 would in all probability have recovered the possession 
 of the city by a coup de main. But it was not so to 
 be. A few days of inactivity allowed the flame to 
 blaze up beyond possibility of immediate extinction. 
 The unchallenged occupation of the Mughal capital by 
 rebel sepoys and badmashes was followed by risings 
 and massacres in almost every station within range of 
 the example ; and from Firozpur, Bareilly, Moradabad, 
 Shahjahanpur, Cawnpur, and numerous other places 
 came harrowing tales of massacre, suffering, and 
 heroism. 
 
 When this terrible news reached army head- 
 quarters, it was received with a perhaps natural in- 
 credulity. Nevertheless, a force was hastily assembled 
 at Ambala; and with the troops thus mobilised, 
 General Anson, then Commander-in-Chief, made pre- 
 parations to march against the renowned city of the 
 Mughal. The little force had hardly started, however, 
 
22 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 when its leader died of cholera (May 27th). It was 
 not until the ist of June that General Barnard, who 
 had succeeded temporarily to the chief command, 
 advanced in earnest against the now jubilant rebels. 
 Meanwhile, a small body of troops under Brigadier 
 Archdale Wilson marched out from Meerut, after a 
 disastrous delay ; and the combined force, amounting 
 to about 3000 Europeans and one battalion of Gur- 
 khas, fought its way onwards till it reached the oat- 
 skirts of the city on the 8th of June, 1857. 
 
 We may now refer to the three great points —Delhi, 
 Cawnpur, and Lucknow, round which the Mutiny 
 was, so to speak, centred during the earlier period 
 of the revolt ; namely, from May 1857, till the arrival 
 in India of Sir Colin Campbell in August of that year. 
 
 The modern city of Delhi was founded by the Em- 
 peror Shah Jehan in 163 1. Situated on the right bank 
 of a branch of the Jumna river it was, as it still is, 
 surrounded by a high wall some seven miles in extent, 
 strengthened by bastions and by a capacious dry ditch. 
 The British force held the elevated ground known as 
 the Ridge, which extends two miles along the northern 
 and western faces of the city — a position taken up 
 some centuries before by Timur Shah and his Tar- 
 tar hordes when advancing to attack old Delhi. At 
 intervals along the Ridge stood the Flagstaff Tower, 
 the Observatory, a large mansion called Hindu Rao's 
 house, and other defensible buildings. The space 
 between the city and the Ridge was thickly planted, 
 for the most part with trees and shrubs ; in the midst 
 
THE OUTBREAK 23 
 
 of which might be seen numerous mosques and large 
 houses, and the ruins of older buildings. It soon 
 became evident that the position held by the British 
 force on the Ridge was a false one ; and the question 
 arose whether the city might not be taken by a (^oup 
 de main, seeing that it was impossible either to in- 
 vest it or to attempt a regular siege with any chance of 
 success. A plan of assault, to be carried out on the 
 12th of June, was drawn up by a young Engineer 
 officer and sanctioned. Had this assault been de- 
 livered the city would in all likelihood have been 
 taken and held. For there were not more than about 
 7000 Sepoys within the walls, while the available 
 British troops numbered 2000 ; and since the nu- 
 merical discrepancy between the contending forces 
 was no less in proportion when the stronghold was 
 finally captured, we may not unfairly assume that 
 the columns detailed for the contemplated operations 
 of the 12th of June might have succeeded as well 
 as those which made the actual assault three months 
 later. But owing to a series of accidents, the plan 
 fell through — a miscarriage the more to be regretted 
 because the early recapture of the city would in 
 all human probability have put a stop to further 
 outbreaks. 
 
 As matters stood, however, the gallant little force 
 before Delhi could barely hold its own. It was an 
 army of observation perpetually harassed by an active 
 enemy. As time went on, therefore, the question of 
 raising the siege in favour of a movement towards 
 
24 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 Agra was more than once seriously discussed, but 
 was fortunately abandoned. On July 5th, 1857, 
 General Barnard died, worn out with fatigue and 
 anxiety. He was succeeded in command by General 
 Archdale Wilson, an officer who, possessing no special 
 force of character, did little more than secure the 
 safe defence of the position until the arrival of 
 Brigadier Nicholson from the Punjab, August 14th, 
 1857 \ with a moveable column of 2500 men, Euro- 
 pean and Sikhs. And here we may leave Delhi for 
 the moment, deferring till later any further details of 
 the siege. 
 
 The city of Cawnpur, situated on the south bank 
 of the river Ganges, forty-two miles south-west of 
 Lucknow and 270 miles from Delhi, lies about a mile 
 from the river in a large sandy plain. On the strip 
 of land between the river and the town, a space 
 broken by ravines, stretched the Civil Station and 
 cantonments. A more difficult position to hold in 
 an extremity cannot well be conceived, occupied as 
 it was by four disaffected Sepoy regiments with but 
 sixty European artillerymen to overawe them. There 
 was, moreover, an incompetent commander. Realis- 
 ing after the disasters at Meerut and Delhi that his 
 native garrison was not to be trusted. Sir Hugh 
 Wheeler threw up a make-shift entrenchment close 
 to the Sepoy lines. Commanded on all sides, it was 
 
 ^ Sir Colin Campbell had arrived at Calcutta from England on 
 the previous day. 
 
THE OUTBREAK 25 
 
 totally unfitted to stand a siege. But a worse mistake 
 was to follow. Alarmed as time went on at his growing 
 difficulties, Sir Hugh Wheeler at length asked the 
 notorious Nana Sahib, who lived a few miles off at 
 Bithur, to assist him with troops to guard the 
 Treasury. For some months previously this arch- 
 traitor's emissaries had been spreading discontent 
 throughout India, but he himself had taken care to 
 remain on good terms with his European neighbours. 
 He now saw his opportunity. Cawnpur, delivered 
 into his hands by the misplaced confidence of its 
 defenders, was virtually in his keeping. Of European 
 succour there was no immediate hope. The place 
 was doomed. The crash came three days before 
 General Barnard's force reached Delhi. With the 
 exception of a few devoted natives who remained 
 faithful to their salt, the whole Sepoy force on the 
 5th of June rose in revolt, opened the doors of the 
 jail, robbed the treasury, and made themselves masters 
 of the magazine. The Nana cast aside all further 
 pretence of friendship and, joined by the mutinous 
 troops, laid siege to the entrenchment abeady men- 
 tioned, which with culpable military ignorance had 
 been thrown up in one of the worst positions that 
 could have been chosen. 
 
 The besieging army numbered some 3000 men. 
 The besieged could only muster about 400 English 
 soldiers, more than 70 of which number were in- 
 valids. For twenty-one days the little garrison 
 suffered untold horrors from starvation, heat, and the 
 
26 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 onslauo^lits of the rebels ; until the General in com- 
 mand listened to overtures for surrender, and the 
 garrison marched out on the 27th of June, to the 
 number of about 450 souls, provided with a pro- 
 mise of safeguard from the Nana, who would allow 
 them, as they thought, to embark in country boats 
 for Allahabad. Tantia Topi, who afterwards be- 
 came notorious in Central India, superintended the 
 embarkation. No sooner, however, were the Euro- 
 peans placed in the boats, in apparent safety, than a 
 battery of guns concealed on the river banks opened 
 fire, while at the same time a deadly fusillade 
 of musketry was poured on the luckless refugees. 
 The Nana at length ordered the massacre to cease. 
 He celebrated what he called his glorious victory by 
 proclaiming himself Peshwa or Maratha Sovereign, 
 and by rewarding his troops for their 'splendid 
 achievements,' while the wretched survivors of his 
 treachery, numbering about 5 men and 206 women 
 and children, were taken back to Cawnpur and con- 
 fined in a small buildinor for further veno-eance and 
 insult. 
 
 On the 15th of July came the last act of this 
 tragedy. The Nana, having sufiered a crushing de- 
 feat at the hands of Brigadier Havelock's force within 
 a day's march of Cawnpur, as will presently be re- 
 corded, put the whole of his prisoners to death. The 
 men were brought out and killed in his presence, 
 while the women and children were hacked to pieces 
 by Muhammadan butchers and others in their prison. 
 
THE OUTBREAK 27 
 
 Their bodies were thrown into what is now known 
 as the ' Cawupur Well.' 
 
 Lucknow, at the time of the Mutiny, was in popu- 
 lation, in extent, and in the number and importance 
 of its principal buildings, one of the foremost cities 
 of India. Situated on the river Gumti, its beau- 
 tiful palaces, mosques and public buildings, many 
 of which soon became famous, rose in stately array 
 from a maze of long narrow streets. The Residency 
 stood on a hill gently sloping towards the river, and 
 was an imposing edifice of three stories. Near it 
 were the iron and stone bridges over the river. The 
 southern and eastern quarters of the city were bounded 
 by a canal Avhich crossed the road leading to Cawn- 
 pur, and finally reached the Gumti. 
 
 At the outbreak of the Mutiny the Sepoy regiments 
 were stationed in various localities within the city ; 
 while the 32ndf Foot, the only European regiment on 
 the spot, was quartered in a barrack about a mile or 
 so from the Residency. As was the case elsewhere, 
 so it happened at Lucknow. While the population 
 and native garrison were seething with sedition, the 
 British authorities were hampered by ignorance of 
 popular feeling, by the want of European troops, and 
 by divided counsels. So, by the end of May, 1857, 
 the rebellion in Oudh became an accomplished fact, 
 although matters went on with comparative smooth- 
 ness in Lucknow itself. At length, after a serious 
 disaster at Chinhat, the British garrison was forced 
 
28 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 to withdraw to the Residency and its adjacent build- 
 ings ; and on the ist of July commenced the famous 
 investment of this position by the rebel forces. 
 
 The position was ill adapted for defence ; for the 
 lofty windows of the Residency itself not only al- 
 lowed free access to the enemy's missiles, but its roof 
 was wholly exposed. On the opposite side of the 
 street, leading from the Bailey Guard Gate, was the 
 house of the Residency Surgeon ^, Dr. (now Sir Joseph) 
 Fayrer. It was a large but not lofty building with 
 a flat roof which, protected by sand bags, afforded 
 a good cover for our riflemen, and with a tyekhana, 
 or underground story that afforded good shelter for the 
 women and children. But as a whole, the defences 
 of the Residency were more formidable in name than 
 in reality, and were greatly weakened by the prox- 
 imity of high buildings from which the rebels without 
 danger to themselves poured an unceasing fire. 
 
 The siege had an ominous commencement. On 
 July 4th the much-beloved Sir Henry Lawrence, 
 the Resident, died of a wound received two days 
 before from an enemy's shell that had fallen into 
 his room. Brigadier Inglis succeeded him in com- 
 mand; and for three months the heroic garrison of 
 about 1700 souls held their weak position, amid in- 
 conceivable hardships and dangers, against thousands 
 of the rebels who were constantly reinforced by fresh 
 
 ^ It is impossible to speak too highly of the services of this dis- 
 tinguished officer then and since. His name is a household word 
 in India. 
 
THE OUTBREAK 29 
 
 levies. It was well said in a general order by Lord 
 Canning that there could not be found in the annals 
 of war an achievement more heroic than this defence, 
 which had exhibited in the highest degree a noble 
 and sustained courage, which against enormous odds 
 and fearful disadvantages, against hope deferred and 
 through unceasing toil and wear of body and mind, 
 still held on day after day and triumphed. 
 
 Having thus glanced at the more prominent features 
 and centres of the Mutiny, between May and August, 
 1857, some reference must be made to Brigadier 
 Havelock's first campaign of June and July of that 
 eventful year. At the outbreak of the revolt few 
 soldiers in India had seen more active service than 
 Henry Havelock. 'He was the man of greatest mili- 
 tary culture then in India. He was a veteran of war, 
 very few of whose contemporaries had seen so much 
 fighting. In Burma he had been in the field from 
 Rangoon to Pagan. He had taken part in hill war- 
 fare in the passes of Khurd Kabul, and Jugdulluk. 
 He had graduated in sortie-leading and defence work 
 as a prominent member of the illustrious garrison of 
 Jalalabad. At Maharajpur he had helped to beat a 
 Maratha army ; at Mudki, Firozshah, and Sobraon 
 he had fought against the old battalions of the Khalsa 
 in the full flush of warlike pride. The dust of his 
 Persian campaign was still in the crevices of his 
 sword hilt^' His religious enthusiasm was bound- 
 
 ^ Havelock, by Archibald Forbes. 
 
30 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 less ; and although reserved and unbending in manner, 
 he was respected by all who served under him. If 
 he had a human passion it was to command a force in 
 the field. 
 
 On arriving at Bombay in the latter part of 
 May, 1857, from the Persian expedition, he heard 
 the astounding news of the disasters at Meerut and 
 Delhi. Unable to start for Delhi by the land route, 
 he proceeded to Calcutta by sea, and shortly after his 
 arrival in Bengal received the command he so much 
 desired. Eight da^'s later, he left Calcutta, charged 
 with the relief of Cawnpur and Lucknow. 'After 
 quelling all disturbances at Allahabad,' his orders 
 said, 'he should lose not a moment in supporting 
 Sir Henr}^ Lawrence at Lucknow and Sir Hugh 
 Wheeler at Cawnpur, and he should take prompt 
 measures for dispersing all mutineers and insur- 
 gents.' 
 
 On June 30th, or three days after the massacre of 
 the Cawnpur garrison at the Ghats, he reached Allah- 
 abad, where Colonel Neill had been employed in 
 organising the preparations for an advance on Cawn- 
 pur. Leaving Allahabad on the 7th of July at the 
 head of about 1500 European troops, he reached Fateh- 
 pur by forced marches, defeating a large body of the 
 enemy there and capturing eleven guns without 
 the loss of a single British soldier. On July i6th 
 he arrived at the outskirts of Cawnpur, turned the 
 enemy's flank by a clever and rapid movement, and 
 obtained virtual possession of the town after hard 
 
THE OUTBREAK 31 
 
 fighting; only to find, as already narrated, that the 
 Nana on the previous day had butchered in cold blood 
 all his helpless prisoners. To add to his sorrows the 
 news reached him, on the day he entered Caw^npur, 
 of the death of Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow. 
 
 By this time, the difficulties that beset Havelock's 
 advance on Lucknow were becoming insuperable. The 
 British ranks had been thinned not only in fight but 
 by sickness ; and it was plain that the task assigned 
 to him was one of unforeseen magnitude. The first 
 attempt was a complete failure ; but five days after- 
 wards (July 20th), Neill arrived from Allahabad, and 
 Havelock made a fresh endeavour to advance on 
 Lucknow. Crossing the Ganges into Oudh, he suc- 
 cessfully encountered the enemy at Unao ; but 
 although within thirty-eight miles of his destination, 
 cholera, fatigue, and exposure had made such inroads 
 on his sadly reduced force that he was compelled once 
 more to fall back on Cawnpur. Twice again did the 
 gallant little force advance, but on each occasion had 
 to fall back ; and thus terminated Havelock 's first 
 campaign for the relief of Lucknow. He had fought 
 five actions against an enemy greatly superior in 
 numbers, only to find that although he could gain 
 victories he could not follow them up. 
 
 And now his wearied and exhausted troops enjoyed 
 a month's rest at Cawnpur, full of disappointment 
 at the result ; while further preparations were made 
 for the next move in relief of the beleagured garrison 
 of the Lucknow Residency. 
 
32 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 Writing some years afterwards (November 30th, 
 i860), Sir Hugh Rose said : — 
 
 *I am now with the camp on the march to Luck- 
 now, and going over the scene of Sir H. Havelock's 
 successive advances from Cawnpur to Lucknow. It 
 is very interesting, and the more so because I have 
 an officer with me who was with him. Too much 
 praise cannot be given to him. He had the greatest 
 difficulties to contend with, the rain came down in 
 torrents, the country was flooded so that he could 
 scarcely move his artillery off the roads. And besides 
 his losses from the enemy, his men were carried off 
 by dysentery and cholera, in consequence of their 
 having no tents and being exposed to all the incle- 
 mency of the weather, with insufficient food and 
 very hard work.* 
 
CHAPTER ni 
 
 The Situation 
 
 We have endeavoured in the previous pages to indi- 
 cate the progress of affairs in the North -West of India 
 from the first outbreak of the Mutiny up to the date of 
 Sir Colin Campbell's arrival at Calcutta (August 13th, 
 1857). So unforeseen was the storm, that for a time 
 few realised its import and extent. In fact, as late as 
 June 23rd, 1857 (the centenary of Plassey), the perfect 
 serenity of the Indian sky formed the subject of 
 general comment in London, both in leading journals 
 and at political meetings ; although at that very 
 moment, unknown to the British public, Delhi was in 
 the hands of rebels, Oudh was in mutiny, and British 
 power in the North- West was only represented within 
 the range of the guns and rifles of scattered detach- 
 ments of troops. But when England at last awoke to 
 the facts, the nation made one of those characteristic 
 efforts which have so often marked her progress. 
 Within a few weeks, 30,000 men of all arms were on 
 the high-road to India. 
 
 In that country itself anarchy and confusion pre- 
 
34 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 vailed in its most vulnerable parts. The besieging 
 force before Delhi could do little more than hold its 
 own. The small band of heroes defending the Resi- 
 dency at Lucknow was closely invested and sore beset ; 
 while, harassed by sickness amongst his troops and 
 by losses in the field. Havelock had been compelled 
 to abandon for the moment all hope of relieving 
 the place. Communications throughout the country 
 were interrupted. The action of the responsible 
 authorities, at one time vacillating and at another 
 distinguished by attempts to preserve some show 
 of authority, was more or less futile. Agra was 
 invested by mutineers from Nimach. Allahabad 
 was in danger. Cawnpur was lost and regained by 
 turns. And in the North- West Provinces generally 
 there was little else to record than local risings, 
 murders of refugees^, and general disorder. In Bengal 
 Proper, the Province of Behar was chiefly infected. 
 Its districts were overrun by the rebel landholder, 
 Koer Singh ; while some of its principal towns were 
 the scenes of massacre and plunder, only relieved by 
 glorious achievements of British courage. 
 
 Three Sepoy regiments, for instance, quartered at 
 Dinapur, a place situated about 220 miles from Calcutta, 
 mutinied and surrounded the civil station of Arrah, 
 to the south-west of it. For a whole week (July, 
 1857) Arrah was held by two civilians, Messrs. Wake 
 and Boyle, with a small band of Sikhs and English 
 refugees. Besieged in an open bungalow, they fought 
 against upwards of 3000 rebels, until on August 2nd, 
 
THE SITUATION 35 
 
 Major (afterwards Sir) Vincent Eyre effected their 
 relief with a force of 200 men ; an exploit which, 
 like the defence, will bear comparison with the finest 
 achievements of the time. ' The rout of the rebels 
 was complete, and the road to Arrah w^as left as clear 
 as though there had been no mutiny at Dinapur, no 
 revolt in Behar.' 
 
 Notwithstanding such exceptional episodes, there 
 was little to relieve the prevailing gloom in Bengal ; 
 for the districts immediately in the neighbourhood of 
 Calcutta, and even the Presidency town itself, had 
 not only been subject to serious panics but had 
 witnessed instances of w^eakness and indecision on 
 our part which may well be left uni-ecorded. 
 
 In Madras matters remained comparatively quiet. 
 When the outbreak occurred, the military resources of 
 the Southern Presidency were seriously reduced by the 
 absence on service in Persia of the greater part of its 
 European regiments, although the previous proportion 
 of European to Native troops was smaller than it had 
 been since the beginning of the century. There were 
 barely five European infantry and one cavalry corps, 
 distributed by wings at various places, to protect this 
 large and important part of India. Considerations of 
 a political nature increased the anxiety caused by 
 military weakness. In Nagpur, only lately annexed, 
 there were many persons of influence who were dis- 
 afiected. Haidarabad was a source of grave anxiety; 
 while within British territory the Muhammadans of 
 Karnul,Cuddapah,and Malabar w^ere greatly ex cited by 
 
36 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 the proclamation of a Muhammadan Empire at Delhi. 
 From many quarters came rumours of plots and trea- 
 sonable preparations. Seditious emissaries and Sepoy 
 deserters entered the Presidency in large numbers, with 
 the object of tampering with the army and of exciting 
 disloyalty towards the Government. But it is satis- 
 factory to record that their evil purpose was not 
 fulfilled. With one solitary exception, the conduct of 
 the Madras Native Army furnished an example of 
 loyalty and fidelity, during this time of trial, which 
 did it infinite honour. While, therefore, a considerable 
 portion of these troops were employed in the thick of 
 the fight in Oudh, in Bengal, and in Central India, it 
 was nowhere necessary to call, within the limits of the 
 Madras Presidency, for their active services. 
 
 In Bombay the Government had to deal with some- 
 what more turbulent races, and local risings took 
 place at points within the Presidency. Here, as else- 
 where, however, the Native Princes and States were 
 generally conspicuous for their fidelity. The peace 
 of Kathiawar for instance — a country containing i(S8 
 separate States and as large as Greece— was pre- 
 served without the presence of a single European 
 soldier. Moreover, although the mutinous spirit which 
 infected the Sepoys of Bengal was also exhibited 
 under one form or another in the Western Presi- 
 dency, its progress was promptly checked. To the 
 judgment and resolution of Lord Elphinstone, and to 
 the energy, discretion, and vigilance of his lieutenants, 
 was due the safety of this vital part of India ; so that 
 
THE SITUATION 37 
 
 Bombay was able to afford material assistance to her 
 hard beset neighbours in the north, and yet to take care 
 of herself. It is true that the Bombay Native Army 
 could not rival the fidelity of that of Madras ; for the 
 Bombay Sepoys had been to a certain extent recruited 
 from Oudh and Behar, and were tainted with disaf- 
 fection. Nevertheless, instances of overt mutiny were 
 exceptional, while it is a significant fact that the Pre- 
 sidency authorities had sufficient confidence in their 
 Native Army as to increase its numbers. Moreover, 
 Bombay was able to organise an efficient military 
 transport, and to procure from various places, within 
 a short time, many thousand horses of all kinds for 
 general use in the campaign. Unfortunately for the 
 Western Presidency, the withdrawal of a large por- 
 tion of its army for service in the Persian expedition 
 had necessitated the occupation of certain places 
 within its limits by Bengal Sepoys, whose mutinous 
 conduct disturbed the peace and afforded a dangerous 
 example to their fellows-soldiers. 
 
 Although the Punjab was a comparatively new 
 province of British India, bordered on one side by tribes 
 of wild, fanatical hill-men, and itself inhabited by a 
 warlike people sorely tempted to take advantage of 
 existing difficulties, j^et in the hands of such officers 
 as Lawrence, Montgomery and others, the country 
 west of the Sutlej remained for the most part tran- 
 quil during the progress of the rebellion. Moreover, 
 although about 36,000 Sepoys, recruited from Oudh 
 and Behar, were scattered in various stations through 
 
38 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 this province, there were within its limits fortunately 
 about lOjCoo European troops, besides a trustworthy 
 force of 9000 military police, to overawe them. 
 Happily also, for India, the self-reliance and varied 
 experience of the civil and military officers of the 
 Punjab enabled them to realise, sooner than the 
 authorities in other parts of India, the gravity of 
 the public danger. 
 
 John Lawrence and his lieutenants allowed neither 
 sentiment nor fear of responsibility to stand in the way 
 of instant and resolute activity. Offences touching 
 the public safety were punished summarily with death. 
 Strong parties of police were placed in defensible posi- 
 tions at the principal ferries of the 'Punjab,' or 'five 
 rivers,' which cut off the province from Hindustan. 
 All State treasure was placed in security. A strict 
 censorship was maintained over the press ; and letters 
 to Sepoys ^ were opened at the chief post-offices. The 
 population in the Cis- and Trans-Indus territory was 
 disarmed, and fines were promptly inflicted on villages 
 and townships for local outbreaks. The prisoners 
 in jail were employed in making cartridges, sand- 
 bags, and commissariat gear, for the troops operating 
 before Delhi. In short, everywhere in the Punjab 
 an example was set, which can never be forgotten, 
 
 ^ The seditious papers thus discovered were generally couched 
 in figurative or enigmatical language. They yield ample evidence 
 that the Sepoys and other rebels verily believed that the destruction 
 of their caste and religion was intended by the English, and that 
 the moment for rising was a favourable one. All this was made 
 manifest in letters never intended for European eyes. 
 
THE SITUATION 39 
 
 of courage, energy, and far-sightedness in time of 
 peril. 
 
 The Chiefs of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Kapurthala, 
 and other Sikh States came forward, moreover, with 
 offers of military assistance ; and not only provided 
 guards for English ladies in out-stations, but as- 
 sisted materially in the siege of Delhi and in the 
 subsequent re-occupation of the disturbed territory 
 surrounding that city. Beyond the Punjab border 
 the Amir of Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad, although 
 urged by his advisers to invade India with 2o,coo 
 Afghans, refused to do so, stoutly declaring that he 
 sympathised with the British authorities in their mis- 
 fortunes and would be faithful to his allia>nce. 
 
 There is not the least doubt but that the Hin- 
 dustani troops in the Punjab wanted only means 
 and opportunity to side with their fellow Sepoys 
 in lower India. Serious risings, promptly suppressed, 
 took place at Firozpur, Peshawar, Jalandhar, Jeh- 
 1am, Sialkot, Meean Meer, and other places. Yet, in 
 spite of dangers and anxiety near at hand, the 
 reinforcement of the little army before Delhi was an 
 object of paramount importance with the Punjab 
 authorities. The first body of troops despatched 
 from the province was that which accompanied 
 General Anson in his march towards Delhi. Then 
 further large reinforcements followed. Some 300 ar- 
 tillerymen of the old Sikh army were also enlisted 
 for our service ; and with a newly-raised Sapper and 
 Miner company of Sikhs, 1200 strong, and a body of 
 
40 
 
 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 PuDJabi horse, these men were sent to the same des- 
 tination ; while wagon-trains were organised to convey 
 troops, stores, and material to the besieging force. It 
 was, arranged, moreover, that the contingents of the 
 Maharclja of Patiala, and the Kajas of Jind and 
 Nabha — in all 7000 men — should co-operate with our 
 troops, and that an irregular force numbering about 
 1000 men under General Van Courtland, formerly in 
 Kanjit Singh's service, should clear the western part of 
 the Delhi territory. Subsequently, when only 6000 
 Europeans (half of them locked up in the Peshawar 
 Valley and prostrated by fever), remained behind to 
 keep in check the fierce tribes of the North -West 
 Frontier and the thousands of armed and disarmed 
 Sepoys, the last available white troops were sent to 
 Delhi under Colonel Nicholson, leaving only about 
 4000 European soldiers to hold the province. The 
 die was finally cast. The supreme effort had been 
 made. Thenceforward on the capture of Delhi 
 depended the existence of the Punjab as a British 
 possession. 
 
 The following table shows in chronological order 
 the dates of the principal actions and events which 
 this volume endeavours to describe. 
 
 Date. 
 
 1857- 
 10 May. 
 
 Northern Operations. 
 
 Outbreak at Meerut and 
 seizure of Delhi by the 
 rebels on the 12th idem, 
 followed by risings in the 
 Punjab, Bengal, and else- 
 where. 
 
 Southern Operations. 
 
THE SITUATION 
 
 41 
 
 Date. 
 
 1857- 
 30 May. 
 
 5 June. 
 8 June. 
 
 27 June. 
 
 I Julv. 
 
 15 July. 
 
 29 July 
 to Aug. 
 16. 
 
 2 Aug. 
 17 Aug. 
 
 14 Sept. 
 
 25 Sept. 
 
 27 Oct. 
 16 Nov. 
 
 Northern Operations. 
 
 General Mutiny at Luck- 
 now. 
 
 Mutiny at Cawnpur. 
 
 Arrival of British force be- 
 fore Delhi. 
 
 Massacre by Nana Sahib of 
 the Cawnpur garrison 
 when embarking in boats 
 for Allahabad under pro- 
 mise of safe condvict. 
 
 Sioge of Lucknow Residency 
 by rebels after our re- 
 verse at Chinhat on 29th 
 of June, followed on 4th 
 July by the death of Sir 
 Henry Lawrence. 
 
 Massacre by Nana Sahib of 
 the remainder of Cawnpur 
 garrison and others, viz. 
 5 men and 206 women and 
 children ; their corpses 
 thrown into the 'Cawn- 
 pur Well.' 
 
 Havelock having reached 
 Cawnjjur on i6th of July, 
 moves on to the relief of 
 Lucknow, but after a 
 series of severe actions 
 is obliged to fall back 
 again on Cawnpur. 
 
 Relief of Ai-rah by Eyre. 
 
 Sir Colin Campbell having 
 reached Calcutta on the 
 13th inst. assumes chief 
 command of the army. 
 
 Assault and capture of 
 Delhi, which is completely 
 occupied by British troops 
 on the 20th inst. 
 
 First relief of Lucknow by 
 Havelock, who remained 
 with Residency garrison. 
 
 Sir Colin Campbell leaves 
 Calcutta for the front. 
 
 Second relief of Lucknow 
 by Sir Colin Campbell, 
 followed by withdrawal 
 
 Southern Operations. 
 
42 
 
 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 Date. 
 
 1857. 
 
 1858. 
 16 Jan. 
 
 3 Feb. 
 13 Feb. 
 3 Mar. 
 
 14 Mar. 
 
 30 Mar. 
 3 April. 
 
 19 April. 
 
 6 May. 
 23 May. 
 17 June. 
 
 20 June. 
 2 Aug. 
 
 Northern Operations. 
 
 of garrison from Eesi- 
 dency and death of Sir 
 Henry Havelock at Alam- 
 bagh on 24tli inst. 
 General interregnum till 
 March, 1858. 
 
 Siege and capture of Luck- 
 now, followed by com- 
 plete occupation on 20th 
 inst. after a series of 
 operations dating from 
 8th inst. 
 
 Bareilly re-occupied by Sir 
 Colin Campbell. 
 
 Transfer of East India Com- 
 pany to Crown, followed 
 
 Southern Operations 
 
 Advance of Sir Hugh Rose 
 from Mhow and capture 
 of Rathgarh on 28th inst. 
 
 Relief of Sagar garrison. 
 
 Capture of Garhakota fort. 
 
 Forcing of Muiidinpur Pass 
 and occupation of Bundel- 
 khand, followed by cap- 
 ture of fort of Chandari 
 on 17th inst. 
 
 Taking of Kotah in Raj- 
 putana (by Roberts). 
 
 Storm and capture of Jhansi 
 preceded by action of 
 Betwa on ist inst. against 
 25 ,000 rebels under Tantia 
 Topi. 
 
 Occupation of Banda (Whit- 
 lock). 
 
 Action of Kunch. 
 
 Capture of Kalpi after a 
 series of operations. 
 
 Seizure by rebels of Gwalior, 
 and deposition of Maha- 
 raja Sindhia. 
 
 Recapture of Gwalior by 
 Sir Hugh Rose. Central 
 India Field Force now 
 broken up. 
 
THE SITUATION 
 
 43 
 
 Date, 
 
 Northern Operations. 
 
 Southern Operatiuns. 
 
 1858. 
 
 by Queen's Proclamation 
 on 1st November. 
 
 
 I to 30 
 
 Further operations in Oudh 
 
 
 Nov. 
 
 under Sir Colin Camp- 
 bell. 
 
 
 1859. 
 
 
 
 7 April. 
 
 
 Tantia Topi captured in 
 South-Western India and 
 hanged on i8th April. 
 
 Oct. to 
 
 Final operations against 
 
 
 Dec. 
 
 rebels in Northern Oudh 
 and Nepal, and capture 
 in December of 4000 of 
 Ncina Sahib's adherents 
 by a force (20th Eegt. 
 and detachments) under 
 Brigadier (afterwards Sir 
 Edward) Holdich. 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 The Northeen Oper.vtioxs to the Relief 
 of lucknow 
 
 ' When will you be ready to start ? ' said Lord 
 Panmure to Sir Colin Campbell, as he offered him 
 the chief command in India in succession to General 
 Anson. ' To-morrow,' replied the war-worn veteran; 
 and on the morrow accordingly (July 12th, 1857), he 
 left London, saying that he would get his outfit in 
 Calcutta. Thus started the new Commander-in-Chief 
 at the age of sixty-five, with all the readiness and 
 ardour of a young soldier. 
 
 Colin Macliver, better known as Colin Campbell, 
 was born at Glasgow on the 20th of October, 1792. 
 Entering the army in 1808 as Colin Campbell, which 
 name he took from his mother's family, he served 
 with distinction in the Peninsular War and with the 
 Walcheren expedition. He led a forlorn hope at the 
 storming of San Sebastian, and was greatly dis- 
 tinguished in his earlier, as in his later career, for 
 personal gallantry. ' I hereby certify,' says an official 
 memorandum signed by Lord Lynedoch, ' that Captain 
 Colin Campbell, then Lieutenant of the 9th Foot, under 
 my command, behaved with the utmost gallantry and 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 45 
 
 intrepidity at the storming of the convent-redouht 
 in advance of San Sebastian, and afterwards at the 
 assault of that fortress, on both which occasions he 
 was severely w^ounded ; also in the action near Irun, 
 at the forcing of the enemy from their strong position 
 on the Bidasoa, on the 7th of October, 1813.' In 
 order to take part in the last-named fight, young 
 Campbell had left hospital, his wounds still unhealed, 
 without leave ; for which breach of discipline he was 
 severely reprimanded, being given to understand that 
 the offence would have met with a heavier punish- 
 ment but for his conduct in the field. Some years 
 later, when Sir Charles Napier presented new colours 
 to the 98th Eegiment, he referred in glowing terms to 
 Colin Campbell's exploits in the Peninsula. After 
 reading to the men an account of the storming of San 
 Sebastian he said : — ' There stands Lieutenant Camp- 
 bell ' — who was now a Lieutenant-Colonel — * and well 
 I know that, should need be, the soldiers of the 98th 
 would follow him as boldly as did those gallant men 
 of the glorious 9th who fell fighting around him in 
 the breaches of San Sebastian.' 
 
 Although he had reached the rank of Captain in 
 five years it was nearly thirty before Colin Campbell 
 attained his Colonelcy. During this interval and 
 afterwards he served in the American War of 1814, in 
 the West Indies, in the China War of 1 842 ; and, 
 afterwards, in the second Sikh War of 1 848-49, which 
 latter campaign gained him the honour of a K.C.B., as 
 well as high praise for *' steady coolness and military 
 
46 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 precision.' Referring to the Sikh War, he wrote : ' I 
 had the good fortune to be employed and present 
 in every affair in which there was anything to do 
 during the late campaign, including the pursuit of 
 Dost Muhammad and his Afghans to the Khaibar Pass.' 
 The notification of his promotion to a Knight Com- 
 mandership of the Bath was conveyed to him in a 
 letter from Sir Charles Napier, who said ' no man has 
 won it better.' 
 
 At this period of his career the great wish in Colin 
 Campbell's mind was to return to England and retire 
 from the service, since he was now in a position to 
 ' save his family from privation.' ' I am growing old 
 and only fit for retirement/ he wrote in his journal 
 on October 20th, 1849. 'I neither care,' he said to 
 Sir Hope Grant, ' nor do I desire, for anything else 
 but the little money in the shape of haita to make the 
 road between the camp and the grave a little smoother 
 than I could otherwise make it out of the profession. 
 For I long to have the little time that may remain to 
 me to myself, away from barracks and regimental or 
 professional life, with the duties that belong to it in 
 peace.' Persuaded, however, to remain a few years 
 longer in India, he was employed for a while in the 
 harassing work of a frontier post and in operations 
 against the hill tribes of the Afghan border. He 
 returned tO' England in the early part of 1853 ; but it 
 was not to enjoy the repose to which he had been 
 looking forward so earnestly. 
 
 In 1854, on the outbreak of the Crimean War, Sir 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 47 
 
 Colin Campbell was offered, and accepted, the com- 
 mand of what was afterwards known as the ' Highland 
 Brigade.' It was he, it has been said, who secured 
 the victory of the Alma. Leading his Highlanders 
 against a redoubt which had been retaken by the 
 enemy, after being carried by our Light Division, he 
 succeeded in breaking the last compact columns of 
 the Kussians. * The 42nd continued its advance,' he 
 wrote in a letter to Colonel H. Vincent, ' followed as 
 I had previously ordered, by the other two regiments 
 (93rd and 79th) in echelon, forming in that order as 
 they gained in succession the summit of the left bank 
 of the Alma. On gaining the height, we found the 
 enemy, who had retreated from the redoubt, attempt- 
 ing to form upon two large masses of troops that 
 were advancing over the plateau to meet the attack 
 of the 42nd. The men were too much blown to 
 think of charging, so they opened fire advancing in 
 line, at which they had been practised, and drove 
 with cheers and a terrible loss both masses and 
 the fugitives from the redoubt in confusion before 
 them. . , . The Guards during these operations were 
 away to my right, and quite removed from the scene 
 of this fight which I have described. It was a fight 
 of the Highland Brigade.' When the fight was over 
 and Lord Raglan sent for him, he begged that he 
 might be allowed as a special favour to wear the 
 Highland bonnet, instead of the cocked hat of a 
 general officer, throughout the remainder of the cam- 
 paign ; ' which pleased the men,' he wrote, ^ very much.' 
 
48 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 During the latter part of the Crimean campaign, Sir 
 Colin Campbell, now a Major- General, was placed in 
 charge of the position at Balaclava. His biographer ^ 
 tells us that even ' in the worst times of that weary 
 winter, the experienced old soldier had never taken 
 a desponding view of matters. He was quick to 
 recognise Lord Raglan's difficulties, and to see that 
 the work cut out for him was not rendered the less 
 onerous by the fact of England being embarked on 
 such a serious operation as the invasion of the Crimea 
 after a peace of forty years' duration, wdth her army 
 reduced in numbers, the administrative services calcu- 
 lated for peace and colonial requirements, and a total 
 deficiency of that organisation which can alone 
 ensure success in war. In spite of the murmurs and 
 complaints, which Sir Colin Campbell never suflfered 
 in his hearing without rebuke, he felt confident that 
 ultimate success would crown the endeavours of the 
 Allied Armies. Above all, he had unbounded confidence 
 in Lord Raglan whom he served with single-hearted 
 devotion.' 
 
 Taking leave of the Highlanders just before his 
 final departure for England, after the proclamation 
 of peace, Sir Colin said : — ' I am now old, and shall 
 not be called to serve any more, and nothing will 
 remain to me but the memory of my campaigns 
 and of the enduring, hardy, generous soldiers with 
 whom I have been associated, whose name and glory 
 will long be kept alive in the hearts of our country- 
 
 * Shadwell's Life of Colin Campbell, Lord Chjde. 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 49 
 
 men. . . . Though I shall be gone, the thought of you 
 will go with nie wherever I may be, and cheer my 
 old age with a glorious recollection of dangers con- 
 fronted and hardships endured. A pipe will never 
 sound near me without carrying me back to those 
 bright days when I was at your head, and wore the 
 bonnet which you gained for me, and the honourable 
 decorations on my heart, many of which I owe to 
 your conduct.' 
 
 Sir Colin Campbell was created a G.C.B. in 1855; 
 and two years later, as abeady stated, he was offered 
 the post of Commander-in-Chief in India. ' Never,' he 
 said, ' did a man proceed on a mission of duty with 
 a lighter heart and a feeling of greater humility ; nor 
 yet with a juster sense of the compliments that had 
 been paid to a mere soldier of fortune like myself in 
 being named to the highest command in the gift of 
 the Crown.' We have seen how promptly he started. 
 At Ceylon, he heard of the deaths of Sir Henry Law- 
 rence and Sir Hugh Wheeler. Beaching Calcutta 
 early in August, 1857, he assumed command of the 
 army on the 17th of that month. But instead of 
 proceeding at once up country, he conceived it to be 
 his duty to remain for a time at the Presidency town, 
 where he was joined by Major-General Mansfield 
 (afterwards Lord Sandhurst) for whose services as 
 Chief of the Staff he had made a special request. He 
 learned from Sir Patrick Grant, who up to this time 
 had been in temporary chief command of the army, 
 that until a force could be collected at Allahabad of 
 
50 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 sufficient strength, irrespective of the garrison neces- 
 sary for the security of that place, the Commander-in- 
 Chief would be more usefully employed in superin- 
 tending the reception and despatch to the front of the 
 reinforcements as they arrived from England, and in 
 collecting stores and supplies ^, without which it 
 would be impossible to put an army in the field, than 
 as the chief of an isolated position the communications 
 of which with the capital were cut off. 'However, 
 annoying,' he wrote to a friend, ' here I must remain 
 for the present.' 
 
 This delay at Calcutta was not altogether accept- 
 able to the army at large. It was thought that the 
 Commander-in-Chief would have done better to leave 
 the arrangements at Calcutta to subordinate officials, 
 and to push on to the front himself in order to reani- 
 mate, by his presence, the wearied and harassed troops 
 operating in the North-West. But when Sir Colin 
 Campbell once made up his mind to a fixed course of 
 action he was not easily diverted from it. In other 
 respects his stay in Calcutta was doubtless an advan- 
 tage both to himself and to the Government, insomuch 
 as it facilitated the establishment of cordial relations 
 with the Viceroy, Lord Canning, whose ever ready 
 co-operation and advice in the subsequent movements 
 of the army were of no small value. 
 
 ^ During the Peninsular War, the Duke of Wellington, who was 
 necessarily much occupied with the question of food and supply, 
 used humorously to say that he did not know that he was much of 
 a general, but he prided himself on being a first-rate commissariat 
 officer. 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 51 
 
 With characteristic simplicity, the gallant old 
 Scotchman lamented, at this time, that he found 
 officers of every rank anxious to be at least Divisional 
 Commanders at the head of small columns, inde- 
 pendent of control. This, no doubt, was rank heresy 
 from the Commander-in-Chief's point of view. At 
 the same time, it is a matter for grave doubt whether 
 they were not more in the right to wish it than their 
 Chief was in condemning their ambition. Sir Colin 
 Campbell began, indeed, at this early period to display 
 signs of an excessive prudence and tenacity of au- 
 thority, which became more marked as time went on. 
 His soldiers called him ' Old Khabardar ' (Old Take 
 Care) as the truest expression they could apply to one 
 whom they could not help respecting, even when 
 criticising him. 
 
 Had there been real armies acting under real 
 generals on the rebel side, or had the war been waged 
 anywhere else than in India, few military critics 
 would have found fault with the large forces occa- 
 sionally employed for small operations, or with the 
 delays and combinations which too often characterised 
 the movements of the North-Western army. But the 
 operations of the rebel Sepoys were in truth somewhat 
 of the nature of a guerilla warfare. The mutineers, 
 while formidable behind stone walls, were not so 
 when scattered about the country in disorganised 
 mobs under indifferent leaders. Being fleet of foot 
 and short of courage, they required to be met, beaten, 
 and pursued without hesitation, by lightly equipped 
 
 D 2 
 
5a CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 columns actinoj under energetic and bold leaders, 
 without too close a regard to maps, compasses, or 
 strategical combinations. Moreover, in a climate in 
 which, during a prolonged campaign, more casualties 
 arise from disease and sunstroke than from fights, 
 stormings, or pursuits, it is especially the duty of 
 Commanders, if need be, to risk a loss of life in order 
 to gain momentous objects. When Dundonald asked 
 Nelson, just before a famous naval action, what 
 tactics he should pursue on coming up to the enemy's 
 fleet, he is said to have received the characteristic 
 reply, ' Tactics be hanged, go straight at 'em.' And 
 such considerations naturally occurred to many 
 military men in India, who without desiring to omit 
 proper precautions or to ignore necessary rules of 
 strategy and tactics, nevertheless longed to see active 
 columns under energetic commanders moving about 
 the revolted provinces, while forces of moderate 
 dimensions laid siege to foi'tified positions of import- 
 ance, such as Delhi, Lucknow and Jhansi. 
 
 The Indian Mutiny of thirty-four years ago called 
 for dash and dariug. No real success was ever 
 achieved at that time in the field except by rapid 
 movement and bold attack against heavy numerical 
 odds ; and no failure was possible except from ex- 
 cessive caution, or from a too rigid preference on the 
 part of those in command for cumbersome orders, 
 cumbersome columns, and cumbersome movements. 
 Sir Colin Campbell, as all who served under him were 
 well aware, was not a heaven-born leader, nor was 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS r^'^ 
 
 he gifted with much military genius. But he never- 
 theless possessed sterling abilities, and all those good 
 and bad qualities of temper and habit that endear a 
 general to the rank and file of the army. His very 
 care in controlling the direction of a large number of 
 columns operating over an extensive area indicated 
 by itself a deep sense of responsibility, however 
 much it may have shown a defective appreciation of 
 the exact nature of the forces arrayed against him. 
 
 In calling to mind his true and simple life, we can- 
 not but admire his patience, rectitude, and resolution. 
 As remarked by a faithful historian (Holmes) of the 
 Mutiny : ' He had not the wonderful dash, the power 
 to put everything to the hazard for a great end, the 
 absolute fearlessness of responsibility, which belonged 
 to some other well-known leaders of that time. Yet 
 for any work requiring methodical and precise move- 
 ments, extraordinary care for details and close super- 
 vision of distant operations, few were better fitted. . . . 
 He had fought his life's battle, too, right gallantly. 
 Harassed by poverty for many years, he had wel- 
 comed the tardy accessions to his fortune, mainly 
 because they enabled him to provide better for a 
 dearly loved sister. He had never married ; but his 
 relations with his sister and with his old tried friends 
 show what a power of love he had. No Commander- 
 in-Chief more acceptable to the mass of Anglo-Indian 
 officers could at that moment have been selected. 
 Many of them already knew his appearance well, his 
 strong, spare, soldierly figure, his high rugged fore- 
 
54 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 head, crowned by masses of crisp grey hair, his keen, 
 shrewd, but kindly honest eyes, his firm mouth with 
 its short trim moustache, his expression denoting a 
 temper so excitable yet so exact ; so resolute to en- 
 force obedience yet so genial ; so irascible and so 
 foroi'ivino^.' 
 
 It will be remembered from what has already been 
 said, that between May and August, 1857, in which 
 latter month Sir Colin Campbell arrived at Calcutta 
 and assumed command of the army, almost the whole 
 Bengal Regular Native troops were in open revolt 
 against the Government. All the military contin- 
 gents in the neighbouring Native States of Gwalior, 
 Indore, and Bhopal, and many elsewhere, had more- 
 over joined the mutineers, — the Gwalior Contingent 
 alone amounting to five companies of artillery, with 
 a magazine and siege train, two cavalry and seven 
 infantry regiments. A large mass of police, had- 
 Tnctshes, prisoners escaped from jails, and hereditary 
 tribes of robbers and thieves had from time to time 
 swelled the rebel band. Some idea of the enemy's 
 strength may be gathered from the fact that the 
 regular and irregular troops investing Lucknow were 
 at one period estimated at no fewer than 200,000 men. 
 Lower Bengal, Madras, and Bombay were, as already 
 mentioned, comparatively quiet. The Punjab remained 
 in our hands. But the North- Western Provinces and 
 Oudh, comprising a territory of about 100,000 square 
 miles, with a population of 38,000,000, were for the 
 moment in possession of the rebels ; while we had lost 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS ^^ 
 
 our hold over Bundelkband ^ and the neighbouring 
 districts of the Sagar and Narbada territories. Delhi 
 was as yet uncaptured by the British forces. The 
 little garrison of the Liicknow Residency was hard 
 beset, and the communications between Allahabad and 
 Calcutta were at times interrupted or entirely cut off. 
 Fortunately, Allahabad, with its magazine of warlike 
 stores, situated at the confluence of the Jumna and 
 Ganges, had been successfully held against the enemy, 
 and could be reached from Calcutta by the river (809 
 miles) or by the Grand Trunk Eoad (503 miles). The 
 relief of Lucknow, the re-conquest of Oudh^ and 
 Rohilkhand, and the re-establishment of order in the 
 Gangetic Doab, a large tract of country lying between 
 the Ganges and the Jumna, were achievements yet to 
 be accomplished. It will be seen, therefore, that the 
 situation was full of difiiculties. 
 
 General Sir James Outram, who on his return from 
 the Persian expedition at the age of fifty-four, had 
 been appointed to the combined command of the Cawn- 
 pur and Dinapur divisions, as well as to the Chief 
 
 ^ A high plateau and hill district of about 200 miles in length 
 and 150 in breadth, held by a great number of petty Chiefs under 
 British supremacy ; a roadless country of fastnesses and forts, filled 
 with a turbulent population, the name Bundela having to the 
 Lowland Hindu much the same signification as a cateran in Scot 
 land or a moss trooper on the border. 
 
 ^ Some idea of the military resources of Oudh may be gathered 
 from the return of arms collected up to Augxist, 1859, ^iz. 684 
 cannon, 186,177 firearms, 565,321 swords, 50,311 spears, and 636,683 
 weapons of sorts. During the same period 1569 forts were de- 
 stroyed. 
 
56 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 Commissionership of Oudh, had left Calcutta on the 
 1 6th of August for the upper provinces, in company 
 with Colonel Robert Napier (afterwards Field Marshal 
 Lord Napier) of the Bengal Engineers, as Chief 
 Divisional Staff Officer. Brigadier Havelock was 
 fruitlessly endeavouring, as we have already seen, to 
 push his way to Lucknow, while Brigadier Neill was 
 holding the country in his rear. ' We received in- 
 telligence last night,' Sir Colin wrote on the 17th 
 of August, ' of the decision arrived at by Havelock 
 after his affair with the enemy on the 5th instant 
 at Baseratgauj. It is most distressing to think of 
 the position in which our poor friends are placed at 
 Lucknow, but with the very small force under Have- 
 lock's command, and in the presence of such numbers 
 of troops as he had opposed to him, and the whole 
 population of Oudh arrayed in arms for the defence 
 of their villages, he must have lost his little detach- 
 ment in attempting to force his way through such 
 numbers and difficulties as he had to encounter 
 and surmount before he could reach the walls of 
 Lucknow.' 
 
 In the meantime the new Commander-in-Chief gave 
 earnest attention to the measures which he proposed to 
 adopt for stamping out the revolt. These measures 
 comprised, briefly speaking, three separate movements, 
 so as to combine the advance of two columns from the 
 Madras and Bombay Presidencies respectively, in co- 
 operation with the great central movement which he 
 resolved to lead in person in the direction of Oudh and 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 57 
 
 Rohilkhand ^. After assuming the chief command, 
 he spared no pains to push on reinforcements of 
 British troops up country as they arrived day by day 
 at Calcutta. Some days before he reached Calcutta, 
 H. M. S. Shannon, having on board Lord Elgin in 
 diplomatic charge of the Expedition to China, had 
 sailed up the Hugli, followed by H.M.S. Pearl. On 
 the 20th of August, Captain Peel, R.N., of the Shan- 
 non, with his 500 Eritish sailors and ten 8-inch guns, 
 left for Allahabad, and was followed a few days later 
 by further reinforcements of all arms. Thus the 
 Commander-in-Chief was doing all that lay in his 
 power to support the troops destined for the relief 
 of Lucknow ; while Brigadier Nicholson had fortu- 
 nately reinforced the tired-out little army before 
 Delhi with a welcome contingent of about 3500 men, 
 European and Native, from the Punjab. 
 
 The British army before Delhi now (August) ex- 
 ceeded 6000 men, of whom about one-half were Euro- 
 peans. 'At Delhi,' Sir Colin wrote on the 12th of 
 September, ' things are much as I expected. Whatever 
 might have been our hopes and wishes to the con- 
 trary, it is an incontrovertible fact that hitherto the 
 vso-called besieging force had never been in sufficient 
 strength to attack with a wall, with due reofard to the 
 
 ^ Shadwell states that Colonel Mansfield, when passing through 
 London on his way to India to take up his post as Chief of the 
 Staff, was consulted by the Government, and submitted a plan 
 based on the same principles which underlay that put forward by 
 Sir Colin Campbell. 
 
58 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 safety of the camp and ordinary military considera- 
 tions. I have so little reliable information on the 
 nature of the position, the feeling in the town and 
 the state of health of the troops, that I dare not 
 venture an opinion as to what is, or is not, in the 
 power of Wilson. But I hope to have a good report, 
 and that the last success we have accounts of, since 
 the arrival of his reinforcements under Brigadier 
 General Nicholson, has been followed by increased 
 confidence on our side and an early prospect of de- 
 cided results. More we cannot hope for, and we 
 must make every allowance for the difficulties of the 
 General.' But encouraged by the arrival of the heroic 
 Nicholson, General Wilson was now about to begin 
 the siege in real earnest. What happened may best 
 be re-told almost in the w^ords of a narrative written 
 at the time ^. 
 
 On the morning of the 25th of August, 1857, a 
 strong body of the enemy was observed to issue 
 from the Ajmere Gate and take the road to Bohtak. 
 Lieutenant Hodson, formerly of the Guides (better 
 known afterwards as Hodson, of Hodson's Horse), was 
 despatched with 300 irregular horsemen to watch 
 their movements. Pushing forward a little too in- 
 cautiously, he was surrounded by a superior force, 
 but was speedily rescued from this critical position 
 by a body of the Jind Baja's levies, with whose aid 
 he attacked and routed the enemy. A far more 
 serious contest came off on the same date at Na- 
 
 ^ Allen's Indian Mail, 1857. 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 59 
 
 jafgarh. Nearly 7000 mutineers with eighteen guns 
 quietly proceeded from the city in order to intercept 
 the siege train of heavy guns expected from Fii'oz- 
 pur. No sooner was this known in camp than 
 Nicholson was instructed to march with a moveable 
 column of 1000 Europeans and 2000 natives to over- 
 take the enemy. At five o'clock in the afternoon he 
 came up with them, after a march of twenty miles, 
 and at once advanced to the attack. A sarai (walled 
 enclosure) with four guns in position was carried by 
 a brilliant charge, and four more guns were captured 
 at a bridge a little further on. After destroying the 
 bridge^ the troops bivouacked all night upon the 
 ground, and next day returned to camp with thirteen 
 guns. Their loss, however, had been considerable ; 
 1 20 of their number being killed and wounded, most 
 of whom fell in an attack upon a handful of Sepoys 
 in occupation of a small village. The enemy made 
 another attempt on the outposts on the 26th, but were 
 repulsed by a volley of grape from the centre 
 battery. 
 
 The engineers were now assiduously engaged in 
 clearing the ground for the breaching batteries, and 
 on the 4th of September, 1857, over thirty pieces of 
 heavy ordnance, with ample supplies of ammunition, 
 arrived in camp. From this date until that of the 
 grand assault, reinforcements continually poured in, 
 Europeans, Kashmirians, and Sikhs- following one 
 another in rapid succession, until at last an army 
 of some strength was encamped before the long 
 
6o CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 beleagured city. Strange to say, the enemy made no 
 attempt to disturb the men while constructing the 
 first parallel, nor were they once fired upon until 
 their labours were completed and their guns were in 
 position. It is said, indeed, that the attention of the 
 rebels was diverted by a heavy fire from the Ridge, 
 and that the first intimation they received of the 
 existence of this new battery of ten guns was in the 
 shape of a huge missile. The battery was known as 
 Brind's ; it was only 650 yards from the walls and 
 was mainly instrumental in silencing the formidable 
 Kashmir and Mori bastions. The British batteries 
 were now completed, and on the morning of the nth 
 a cannonade from the first battery, commencing with 
 a salvo of nine twenty -four pounders, brought down 
 large fragments of masonry. The second battery 
 opened soon afterwards, knocking to pieces the cur- 
 tain between the Kashmir and water bastions. Next 
 morning the third battery came into play. And 
 from that moment until the assault, fifty heavy guns 
 and mortars poured an incessant storm of shot and 
 shell upon the walls of the city. The rebels, however, 
 stood bravely by their crumbling walls, keeping up 
 a continuous roll of musketry until the Engineers 
 reported two practicable breaches near the Kashmir 
 and Water bastions, and arrangements were made for 
 an assault at daybreak of the 14th of September. 
 
 The attack was made by four columns, with a fifth 
 held in reserve. The first, commanded by Nicholson, 
 consisted of H.M.'s 75th, the 1st Bengal Fusileers, 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 61 
 
 and 2nd Punjab Infantry. The second included 
 H.M.'s 8th and 6ist Regiments and the 4th Sikh 
 Infantry. The third consisted of H.M.'s 52nfl, the 
 2nd Bengal Fusileers, and ist Punjab Infantry. The 
 fourth was made up of detachments of European regi- 
 ments, the Sirmur battalion of Gurkhas, the Guides 
 Infantry, and the Kashmirian levies. The Reserve 
 was composed of the 60th Rifles, the Kumaun bat- 
 talion of Gurkhas, and the 4th Punjab Infantry. 
 
 The fourth column was the first to advance. It 
 was directed against the Kishenganj and Tahari- 
 pur suburbs, and was intended as a diversion in 
 favour of the real attacks. This, at least, was all it 
 succeeded in doing; for, notwithstanding the gallantry 
 displayed by the commander, his troops failed to dis- 
 lodge the enemy. The other three columns were 
 more successful. Up to the moment of their advance 
 into the open, the batteries kept up a heavy fire, and 
 swept the walls of the city. The Rifles were the first 
 to rush forward, skirmishing along the front. The 
 first column was under orders to storm the breach 
 near the Kashmir Bastion, the second that in the 
 Water Bastion, and the third to assault by the Kash- 
 mir Gate, as soon as it should be blown open. 
 With a fierce exultant shout, the first and second 
 columns dashed onward, scrambled into the ditch, 
 applied their ladders to the scarp of the wall, and 
 swarmed up into the breach under a murderous fire 
 of musketry. 
 
 Nicholson quickly effected a lodgment in the main- 
 
62 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 guard, and swept the ramparts as far as the Mori 
 Bastion. The second column also made good its hold 
 of the Water Bastion, and proceeded to give a hand 
 to the others ; the third column likewise entered the 
 city through the Kashmir Gate. The blowing open 
 of that gate was the most perilous exploit of the day. 
 The explosion party, under Lieutenants Home and 
 Salkeld, R.E., was composed of Sergeant John Smith, 
 Sergeant A. B. Carmichael, and Corporal F. Burgess, 
 all of the Sappers and Miners ; Bugler Hawthorne, of 
 the 52nd Foot, and twenty-four Native Sappers and 
 Miners. As the foremost hastily advanced with the 
 powder bags, the rebels partially opened the wicket, 
 and fired at them from under secure shelter. The 
 bags, nevertheless, were attached to the iron spikes 
 with which the gate was studded. Sergeant Car- 
 michael was the first slain, as he laid the train : 
 Lieutenant Salkeld then stepped forward to fire it, 
 but was shot in the arm and leg, and fell into the 
 ditch. As he was falling, he threw the match to Cor- 
 poral Burgess, who was mortally wounded after he 
 had accomplished the dangerous feat. One of the 
 natives also was killed, and two were wounded. 
 Home then made the bugle sound the advance three 
 times. The column obeyed the call, and, springing 
 forward with a British cheer, rushed through the 
 ruined gateway, over the rebels who had been killed 
 by the explosion. The first spectacle that met their 
 eyes was said to be the dead body of a European 
 chained to a stake, at which he had apparently been 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 63 
 
 roasted. Three other Europeans had been here sacri- 
 ficed, and an English woman, naked and covered 
 with sores, was said to be chained to the bastion, gib- 
 bering and shrieking, a hopeless maniac^. Nothing- 
 could now withstand the fury of the onslaught. The 
 Church, the CoUei^e, and Skinner s house were soon in 
 possession of our troops ; but as they diverged into the 
 narrow streets, their progress was checked by double 
 discharges of grape-shot from pieces of heavy artillery 
 placed to bear upon every avenue. While encouraging 
 his men to make a second rush at a gun, the heroic 
 John Nicholson ^ received a wound which proved to be 
 mortal. That night ' St. George's banner, broad and gay,' 
 waved over the Kashmir Gate, and the headquarters 
 of the army were established in Skinner's house. 
 
 The next day was consumed in making good this 
 position, and in battering the outer wall of the maga- 
 zine, in which a practicable breach was effected before 
 sunset. At dawn of the following morning (September 
 
 ^ Subsequent investigation has shown these stories of murder 
 and outrage to be exaggerated. 
 
 ^ Nicholson was one of those political soldiers of whom India has 
 produced so many distinguished types. He lingered in great agony 
 long enough to catch a glimpse of the accomplishment of that task 
 to which he had so sternly and zealously laboured to contribute, 
 and expired on the 13th of September, in the thirty- fifth year of 
 his age. ' Nicholson is dead,' was the hushed whisper that struck all 
 hearts with grief. His grave now lies, it is said, but little cared 
 for. But 'the hoofs of his war-horse are to be heard ringing at 
 night over the Peshawar valley ' by his superstitious frontier men, 
 who believe that ' until that sound dies away, the rule of the 
 Feringis in the valley will endure.' 
 
64 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 i6th) a detachment of the 6ist regiment suddenly 
 sprang forward with a ringing shout, and the terror- 
 stricken rebel artillerymen threw down their lighted 
 port fires and fled without discharging a single shot ; 
 six heavy guns, loaded with grape, frowned upon the 
 breach. On the 17th the Bank and its extensive 
 gardens, together with the Jama Masjid, fell into the 
 hands of the victors, and guns were placed to bear 
 upon the palace and the bridge of boats. 
 
 Two hundred and six pieces of ordnance, besides a 
 vast supply of ammunition, were the prize of con- 
 quest ; in addition to an immense amount of plunder. 
 It was not, however, until the 20th of September 
 that the city and palace were entirely evacuated 
 by the enemy, and Delhi became the undisputed 
 trophy of British pluck and perseverance. On the 
 following day, General Archdale Wilson and his gal- 
 lant comrades pledged the health of the Queen in 
 the famous Diwan-i-Khas, and loud and prolonged 
 cheering proclaimed the re-establishment at Delhi of 
 British supremacy. The aged monarch and his sons 
 had tied for refuge to Humayun's tomb, where they 
 were discovered and arrested by Hodson, at the head 
 of a handful of troops. The king's hoary head was 
 duly revered, but the princes were shot. Tried after- 
 wards by a military commission, the king was sen- 
 tenced to imprisonment for life, and was transported to 
 Rangoon, where he subsequently died. 
 
 Thus Delhi fell, although not without a loss to our- 
 selves of about 60 oificers and 1085 men killed and 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 65 
 
 wounded^. By courage and endurance the gallant 
 little army had restored British supremacy in the very 
 focus of the revolt, and so made the first real step, 
 unaided by the presence or assistance of the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, towards the suppression of the 
 Mutiny. To sum up the position of affairs briefly, 
 it may be said that till the capture of Delhi the 
 prestige of British supremacy was still trembling in 
 the balance. Had the storming failed, all might have 
 gone. It was a struggle feebly begun but nobly 
 ended, and its record will ever find a foremost place 
 in the history of the Mutiny. 
 
 The news of the fall of Delhi reached Calcutta on 
 September 26th. Writing to General Wilson three 
 days afterwards^, the Commander-in-Chief said: — 
 'Pray accept my congratulations on your brilliant 
 success. The determined character of the resistance 
 you have encountered in the town is an unmistakable 
 answer to the unprofessional authorities who would 
 have tried to hurry you on to a rash attack before 
 your military judgment was satisfied of the sufiiciency 
 of your means.' 
 
 From the moment that Delhi fell, Lucknow became 
 the centre of interest to which all eyes were turned ; 
 more especially since, about this time, afifairs to the 
 southward w^ere complicated by the revolt, as we 
 have seen, on the 22nd of September of the famous 
 
 ^ The loss of the Delhi Field Force in killed, wounded, and 
 missing, from May 30 to Sept. 20, 1857, amounted to 2151 Europeans 
 and 1686 natives. 
 
 E 
 
66 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 Gwalior State Contingent, which from that date 
 played so prominent a part at Cawnpur and in 
 Central India. There were now about 14.000 troops 
 in Bengal, the North- West Provinces and Oudh at 
 Sir Colin Campbell's disposal, while the bulk of the 
 reinforcements from England were still pouring in. 
 General Outram reached Cawnpur on the i6th of 
 September, 1857, with sufficient reinforcements to 
 raise the force available for the relief of Lucknow 
 to about 3179 men. By virtue of his rank and ap- 
 pointment, Outram unwillingly superseded Brigadier 
 Havelock. ' But to you,' he wrote to that distin- 
 guished officer, ' shall be left the glory of relieving 
 Lucknow, for which you have already struggled so 
 much. I shall accompany you only in my civil 
 capacity as Commissioner, placing my military ser- 
 vice at your disposal should you please, and serving 
 under you as a volunteer.' And here we find the 
 key to the whole career of the ' Bayard of India.' 
 ' Outram,' said the Commander-in-Chief, ' has behaved 
 very handsomely.' He was indeed one of India's most 
 famous political soldiers. Calm in action, chivabous 
 in conduct, simple in character, he had passed suc- 
 cessfully through the ordeal of a long and varied 
 career, and now ended that career, so far as active 
 duty in the field was concerned, by a noble act of 
 self-abnegation, followed by service as arduous as 
 ever fell to the lot of a military officer. 
 
 On the 19th and 20th of September, 1857, Have- 
 lock's little army of 3000 men again crossed the 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 6'j 
 
 Ganges for Lucknow, with better chances of success 
 than before ; and, pushing on in the teeth of vigorous 
 opposition, occupied the Alanibagh, four miles from 
 the city, three days later. Here was received, with 
 great rejoicing by the force, the news of the fall of 
 Delhi ; while ' the guns of the defenders of the Resi- 
 dency, answering those of the besiegers, made it known 
 that all was still well with them.' Leaving the sick 
 and wounded in the Alambagh under a strong guard, 
 the force moved on Lucknow on the morning of the 
 25th of September in two brigades, the first under 
 Outram and the second under Havelock. It was 
 decided to cross the Charbagh bridge, then to go east- 
 ward along a lane skirting the canal, and, finally, north- 
 wards to the east side of the Residency. The bridge 
 was found to be strongly defended by guns, while a 
 sharp musketry fire was poured from the adjoining 
 houses. But the position was gallantly taken by the 
 Madras Fusileers^ serving in the brigade under Neill, 
 and Lucknow was entered ^. 
 
 At length, amid an incessant storm of shot, in 
 which the gallant Neill fell mortally wounded, the 
 troops reached the Residency and entered the en- 
 trenchment, after a series of operations which were 
 as difiicult as they were creditable to all concerned. 
 
 ^ For a detailed, and graphic description, see Malleson, vol. i. pp. 
 536 et seq. In all these and other operations, ' Billy ' (now Sir 
 William) Olpherts, took a distinguished part. * Believe me, my 
 dear heroic Olpherts,' wrote Outram to him on the 28th of March, 
 1858, 'bravery is a poor and insufficient term to apply to a valour 
 such as yours.' 
 
 E 2 
 
 /^^ liwaT?; 
 
68 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 On the morning of September 27th, when the rear- 
 guard was brought into the Residency, there was 
 a serious and deplorable misadventure. Certain 
 * doolis ' carrying wounded men were taken by mis- 
 take into a courtyard occupied by the enemy, after- 
 wards known as ' Dooli Square,' and some forty 
 wounded men were ruthlessly murdered by the rebels. 
 The total loss sustained by the relieving force on the 
 march to Lucknow, and in fighting its way into the 
 Residency, amounted to not less than 31 officers 
 and 540 men killed, wounded, and missing. 
 
 Once fairly in the Residency enclosure, the long 
 pent-up feelings of anxiety and suspense endured by 
 the garrison are said by an eye-witness to have burst 
 forth in a succession of deafening cheers. It was a 
 moment never to be forgotten. The delight of the 
 gallant Highlanders (the 78th) who had fought twelve 
 actions to enjoy that supreme moment of ecstasy, and 
 who in the last few days had lost a third of their 
 numbers, knew no bounds. As Outram and Have- 
 lock entered Fayrer's house, the 'rough -bearded war- 
 riors shook the ladies by the hand and took the 
 children up in their arms ; anxious questions were 
 asked, actions were fought over again, news were 
 retailed from one to another, and satisfaction and 
 joy filled all hearts.' 
 
 With the arrival of Havelock's relieving force, the 
 siege of the Lucknow Residency, properly so called, 
 terminated. The two generals had entered the en- 
 trenchment with the determination of withdrawing 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 69 
 
 the garrison to a place of safety. But the difficulties 
 in the way were so insuperable that they resolved, 
 after much anxious deliberation, to remain there until 
 the Commander-in-Chief could come to the rescue. 
 The relieving force had now indeed to share with the 
 original garrison the perils and hardships of an in- 
 vestment. It was virtually a blockade. But the 
 position, extended by the seizure of certain palaces 
 on the banks of the river, was successfully held in 
 communication with the small force at the Alambagh 
 during the many anxious days which intervened 
 between the 25th of September and the long delayed 
 relief by the Commander-in-Chief on the 27th of 
 November following. The original garrison of the 
 Residency was 1692 strong, of whom 937 were Euro- 
 peans and 765 natives. It lost in killed 350 Euro- 
 peans and 133 natives, while of the latter 230 deserted, 
 making a total loss of 713. There remained of the 
 original garrison, when relieved by Havelock, a total 
 number of 979, of whom 577 were Europeans and 402 
 natives. 
 
 The following quotation from a despatch by Sir 
 James Outram gives some idea of the nature and 
 extent of the operations carried on during the second 
 siege of Lucknow : — ' I am aware of no parallel to 
 our series of mines in modern war ; twenty-one shafts, 
 aggregating 200 feet in depth, and 3291 feet of gallery, 
 have been executed. The enemy advanced twenty 
 mines against the palaces and outposts ; of these they 
 exploded three which caused us loss of life, and three 
 
70 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 which did no injury ; seven had been blown in ; and 
 out of seven others the enemy had been driven and 
 the galleries taken possession of by our miners — 
 results of which the engineer department may well 
 be proud.' 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 The Northern Operations (continued) 
 TO THE Reduction of Oudh 
 
 On the 28th of September, 1857, three days after 
 Havelock had entered Lucknow, Sir Colin Campbell 
 informed General Outram of his intention to ' proceed 
 shortly to Cawnpur, in order to be at the centre of 
 operations.' ' No advance will take place without 
 me,' he added with characteristic tenacity and caution, 
 ' even if it be made with a single regiment. ... It is 
 absolutely necessary for me to get into the right place 
 for directing the movements of the army and restore 
 something like ensemble to them.' Nevertheless the 
 Commander-in-Chief still tarried at Calcutta for the 
 arrival of further reinforcements, while Havelock and 
 Outram were blockaded in Lucknow. On the 26th of 
 October, Colonel Greathed's flying column from Delhi, 
 in all 1800 Infantry, 600 Cavahy and 16 guns, after 
 a series of successful engagements with detached 
 bodies of the rebels, reached Cawnpur, and its arrival 
 was most opportune. Both Cavalry and Field 
 Artillery were sorely needed, and Colonel Greathed's 
 force gave the Commander-in-Chief the elements 
 requisite for the organisation of an army in the field 
 
72 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 strong enough, in his opinion, to justify the com- 
 mencement of operations under his personal super- 
 vision. He therefore started from Calcutta for the 
 front on the 27th of October, 1857, his stay at the 
 Presidency town having lasted since the 14th of 
 August, or upwards of two months. He reached 
 Cawnpur on the 3rd of November. Keinforcements 
 soon swelled the number of his force to 5000 men 
 with 39 guns and howitzers, besides moi-tars and 
 rocket tubes. Writing to the Duke of Cambridge, 
 just before he left Calcutta, he had said : — ' I have 
 made up my mind not to hazard an. attack which 
 would compromise my small force. A road must be 
 opened by heavy guns, and the desperate street fight- 
 ing so gallantly conducted by Sir James Outram and 
 General Havelock — the only course open to them — 
 must if possible be avoided in future. Short as the 
 time is, there must be no undue haste on my part.' 
 
 On the 9th of November, 1857, the Commander-in- 
 Chief moved forward into Oudh with a month's 
 supply for all hands. On the next day he was joined 
 by Mr. Kavanagh of the Uncovenanted Civil Service, 
 who, disguised as a native, made his way out of the 
 Residency to the British camp to act as guide ^. 
 Sir Colin Campbell's communications were now not 
 a little threatened by the Gwalior Contingent and 
 other rebel forces at or near Kalpi ; but he left 
 General Wyndham in command at Cawnpur, with 
 
 ^ The Victoria Cross was conferred on Mr. Kavanagh for his 
 gallantry. 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 73 
 
 orders to strengthen the defences and to show the 
 best front he could to the rebels, but not to move 
 out to attack unless compelled to do so by a threat 
 of bombardment. The Cawnpur garrison consisted of 
 500 British soldiers and 550 Madras Infantry and 
 Gunners ; and further detachments were expected and 
 arrived within the week. 
 
 On November i6th, after some preliminary skirmish- 
 ing in the outskirts of Lucknow, the Commander- 
 in-Chief, who had divided his force into three Brigades 
 under Adrian Hope, Greathed, and Russell, began his 
 advance on the city by the line of the right bank of 
 the Gumti where the ground favoured an approach 
 to the Secundra Bagh, a large brick building some 
 450 feet square with strong loop-holed walls. When 
 the attack on this building had gone on for about an 
 hour and a half, it was determined to take it by 
 storm. Gallantly rushing onwards, the 93rd, 53rd, 
 and 4th Punjab Rifles forced their entrance through 
 the breaches, gateway and windows ; and no less 
 than 2000 of the enemy, who fought with the courage 
 of despair, were slain in the building. This done, the 
 next point of attack was the Shah Najaf, a domed 
 mosque with a garden around it, enclosed by a 
 high loop-holed wall. The position was defended by 
 the rebels with great resolution against a heavy 
 cannonade which lasted three hours. 
 
 Of Sir Colin' s Staff the two brothers Alison ^ were 
 
 ^ One is now General Sir Archibald Alison, whose distinguished 
 career is well known. 
 
74 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 wounded ; and many of the mounted officers had 
 their horses shot under them. Indeed at one time 
 the enemy clearly had the advantage. But Captain 
 PeeP, commanding the Naval Brigade, brought 
 up his heavy guns 'as if he had been laying the 
 Shannon alongside an enemy's frigate ; ' while Adrian 
 Hope with a party of fifty men crept through the sur- 
 rounding jungle and brushwood, and entering the enclo- 
 sure one by one through a fissure in the wall, found 
 the rebels in full retreat. The enemy had lost heart, 
 and abruptly abandoned a position in which the wearied 
 troops were only too glad to rest during the night. 
 
 There was now no doubt but that Sir Colin 
 Campbell's operations had so far been crowned with 
 success. On the morning of November 17th the 
 struggle re-opened with a heavy cannonade on the 
 Mess House, which, after some six hours firing, was 
 carried with a rush by a company of the 90th, led by 
 Captain Wolseley^, and a detachment of the 53rd. 
 Only one building (the Moti Mahal) now intervened 
 before Outram's position was reached. The enemy 
 oflfered but slight resistance so that Hope Grant was 
 able to meet Outram, Havelock, his son (now Sir 
 Henry Havelock), Colonel Robert Napier, Major Eyre 
 
 1 This gallant officer was afterwards wounded at the final capture 
 of Lucknow, in March, 1858, and died at Cawnpur on the 27th of 
 April of small pox. 
 
 2 Now General Viscount Wolseley. He was well known in the 
 Mutiny for dash and activity. He had a brother in the 20th Eegi- 
 ment, who served in the Crimea and elsewhere, and was never 
 content unless he found himself in the thick of the fight. 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 75 
 
 and others. In a few moments more, under a sharp 
 fire, Havelock and Outram joined Sir Colin Campbell 
 and were able to congi-atulate him upon the successful 
 accomplishment of the second relief of Lucknow. 
 
 Great was the feeling of satisfaction among the 
 garrison, only to be followed by something like con- 
 sternation when it was announced that within twenty- 
 four hours, and against the advice of Havelock and 
 Outram, the Residency position was to be altogether 
 abandoned. The Commander-in-Chief had decided 
 on this step because in his opinion the position was a 
 false one, and could not be reached afterwards by a 
 relieving army without incurring severe loss. There 
 was much to be said for and against this view. On 
 the one hand it was argued that the enemy, if attacked, 
 would be quite ready to abandon the key of their 
 position, the Kaisar Bagh ; and that when they had 
 done so, the capture of the rest of the city would not 
 be difficult, while our prestige would undoubtedly be 
 injured by withdrawal. On the other hand it was 
 said that the force then at Lucknow could hardly 
 have maintained its position without neglecting 
 military operations of greater importance elsewhere, 
 besides which, the mutineers of the city could be held 
 in check by a force stationed at the Alambagh. 
 General Outram was of opinion that an attack should 
 be made on the Kaisar Bagh, after which two Bri- 
 gades, he thought, of 600 men would suffice to hold 
 the city. Sir Colin Campbell was convinced that 
 four Brigades would be necessary for this duty. He 
 
76 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 held moreover that to lock up another garrison in 
 the city would be only repeating a military error. 
 The only proper way of holding Lucknow, in the Com- 
 mander-in-Chiefs opinion, was to have a strong move- 
 able column, in a good military position outside the 
 city. Writing on December 1 2th, Lord Canning agreed 
 with the Commander-in-Chief. By this time, however, 
 the withdrawal from Lucknow had been effected. 
 
 On the whole it must be admitted that the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief had some grounds for preferring 
 a retrograde movement, although in India retreat is 
 generally followed by disaster, and in this particular 
 instance it appeared to many to prolong unnecessarily 
 the difficult operations of the Mutiny. Be this as it 
 may, General Wyndham's unfortunate and unexpected 
 failure at Cawnpur strengthened the arguments in 
 favour of the withdrawal ; while viewed merely as a 
 military operation, whether rightly or wrongly con- 
 ceived, that withdrawal did credit to all concerned. 
 For every member of the garrison, European and na- 
 tive, including the women and children, was brought 
 away from the Residency without the loss of a 
 single life, and ' little was left to the enemy but the 
 bare walls of the Residency buildings.' In the words 
 of the Commander-in-Chief, who had charged Outram 
 with the execution of this measure, ' the movement 
 of the retreat was admirably executed and was a 
 perfect lesson in such combinations.' The whole force 
 was withdrawn at night, and reached the Dilkusha 
 at daylight on the morning of November 23rd. 1857. 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 77 
 
 Here a great sorrow overshadowed the success of the 
 operation. At 9.30 a.m. on November 24, Sir Henry 
 Havelock, who had been gradually sinking since his 
 arrival at the Dilkusha, expired, at the age of 62. He 
 had lived just long enough to see the accomplishment 
 of that for which he had so nobly fought, and to hear 
 that his services had been appreciated by his Queen 
 and country. He had the satisfaction, moreover, of 
 being tended during his last moments by a beloved 
 son^. But far higher consolations than these the 
 warrior had, for he had lived a Christian and he died 
 a hero. His remains were conveyed to the Alambagh 
 and there interred with marked demonstrations of 
 respect and sorrow on the part of the troops. 
 
 On November 27th, 1857, leaving Outram in occupa- 
 tion of the Alambagh until he himself should be able 
 to return and finally expel the rebels from Lucknow, 
 Sir Colin Campbell started with the relieved garrison 
 and a force of some 3000 men for Cawnpur. Here he 
 found that the rebels, led by Tantia Topi, had ad- 
 vanced from Kalpi, forty-six miles distant, and had not 
 only occupied all the salient positions between that 
 place and the Ganges, but had closed in upon General 
 Wyndham and had compelled him to fall back to a 
 weak position near the town with the loss of both 
 camp and baggage. Nothing could be done till the 
 
 ^ The present Sir Henry Havelock-Allan, V.C. He was at that 
 time suffering from a severe woimd. A gallant soldier and a good 
 son ; his is a record of service of which any one might be proud 
 even in a period of ' heroic deeds.' 
 
78 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 Cominander-in-Chief had provided for the safety of 
 the women and wounded whom he had brought from 
 Lucknow ; but quickly getting the convoy across the 
 Ganges, en route for Allahabad, he attacked the rebel 
 forces, and without difficulty drove them back again 
 to Kalpi. 
 
 It would be tedious as well as inconsistent with 
 the scope of this volume to relate in detail the further 
 events of that period. It may be said, however, that 
 after successful operations directed against Fatehgarh, 
 a question arose as to whether the subjection of Oudh 
 or an immediate advance into Rohilkhand should be 
 the next move. Lord Canning advocated the former 
 course, and Sir Colin Campbell the latter. The views 
 of the Governor- General prevailed, and were loyally 
 carried out by the Commander-in-Chief. But the 
 progress made was slow and became very trying to the 
 army. From one cause or another valuable time was 
 lost, and the few precious months of the cold weather 
 were allowed to slip away almost unawares. There 
 was still a tendency, from causes which no one could 
 fathom, but from which all caught a certain contagion, 
 to assemble large bodies of troops^ and to move about 
 unwieldy brigades, charged with orders to risk 
 nothing and to act ' according to the rules of war.' 
 
 The mutineers took advantage of these tactics to 
 spread themselves over the country and defy the 
 * bull-dogs who were unable to catch jackals,' while 
 all this time the rebels left unmolested in Lucknow 
 had ample leisure to devote their energies to the task 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 79 
 
 of strengthening their position. This they did by- 
 defending it with three strong ramparts, mounted with 
 about 1 30 guns and mortars, besides erecting bastions, 
 barricades and loop-holed walls to command the 
 streets. The first line of defence consisted of a 
 battery of heavy guns and other formidable works ; the 
 second of bastioned ramparts and parapets, while the 
 third or inner line covered the front of the Kaisar 
 Bagh. Fortunately the rebel garrison neglected to 
 provide for the defence of the northern side of the 
 position, and of this neglect Sir Colin Campbell 
 took full advantage when he finally captured the 
 city. 
 
 In a letter to Sir Hugh Rose, dated Cawnpur, Feb. 
 28th, 1858, after congratulating him on the success 
 that had attended his operations in Central India, the 
 Commander-in-Chief said : — ' I have been detained 
 here, by desire of the Governor-General, very much 
 longer than was convenient with reference to the 
 service we are about to commence, to enable Jang 
 Bahadur to join and take part in the siege of Luck- 
 now. . . My siege train will be collected by to-morrow 
 at Bantira, about six miles from Alambagh, my own 
 troops will be assembled in that neighbourhood on 
 the 1 st proximo, and if Brigadier Franks should make 
 his appearance about the 4th, I hope to begin to break 
 ground the same night or following day. The place 
 has been gTeatly strengthened since I was there in 
 November, but I hope to reduce it speedily ; for the 
 weather is getting hot, and the heat will destroy and 
 
8o CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 render ineffective more men than even the fire of the 
 enemy. Until the place falls I cannot give you any 
 assistance in troops. I am told the 71st Highlanders 
 are on their way from Bombay by bullock train to 
 Mhow. If they should be required to march through 
 Central India after arrival at Mhow they will lose 
 many men. The mutineers at Kalpi are threatening 
 to cross the Jumna into this Doab the moment I 
 advance towards Lucknow. I cannot afford to leave 
 the force that would be sufficient for the protection of 
 the Doab_, and it must therefore take its chance, as 
 well as Cawnpur, which may be again occupied by the 
 enemy, until I have disposed of Lucknow.' 
 
 Lucknow was at length captured in March, 1858. 
 Early in the month the Commander-in-Chief with a 
 force amounting in the aggregate to some 31,000 men 
 and 180 guns moved on the Dilkiisha, which he 
 occupied with but slight opposition. The task of 
 operating separately from the left or northern bank 
 of the Giimti had been confided to Outram, who 
 crossed the river and took up a position three miles 
 to the north of the city. Under the orders of the 
 Commander-in-Chief, Outram was to take the rebel 
 position in reverse, enfilading it with a heavy fire 
 from the left bank of the river, while Sir Colin Camp- 
 bell was to move directly on the city. On March nth 
 our Nepalese ally, Jang Bahadur, after long delays, 
 joined the British force with about 9000 men and 24 
 guns. On the same day the Begam's Palace was 
 captured with but slight loss to the besieging force, 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 8i 
 
 although all mourned the fiery Hodson ^, who here 
 fell mortally wounded, shot by an unseen foe, whilst 
 he and others were searching in the Palace for lurking 
 rebels. On this day also the Secundra Bagh, the 
 Shah Najaf, and other strongholds of the enemy, fell 
 into our hands. At length on March 14th, 1858, when 
 the Engineers under the gallant Napier had completed 
 their dangerous work of sapping through the houses 
 in the line of the enemy's fire. General Franks was 
 ordered to attack the Kaisar Bagh and Imambara. 
 These buildings were rightly considered to be the 
 keystones of the enemy's position, and they were 
 stormed with such vigour and success that before 
 night Lucknow had virtually fallen into our hands. 
 
 In this operation the 20th Regiment, now the Lan- 
 cashire Fusileers (supported by some companies of 
 the 38th Regiment), bore an honourable part. In a 
 desperate hand to hand struggle a strong position 
 called the Engine-house was taken by these gallant 
 men under Major (now Sir Pollexfen) Radcliffe, with 
 a loss to the enemy of some 350 men. The fact 
 deserves special mention, since for some unaccountable 
 reason this and other services were left unnoticed in 
 public despatches, and some surprise was felt in the 
 army at the omission ^. The 20th Regiment had the 
 
 ^ 'The whole army,' Sir Colin wrote to Hodson's widow, 
 'which admired his talents, his bravery, and his military skill, 
 deplored his loss, and sympathised with her in her irreparable 
 bereavement.' 
 
 ^ It was characteristic of Sir Colin Campbell that here and 
 elsewhere, while drawing special attention to the service of High- 
 
 F 
 
So, CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 satisfaction of remembering that it had previously 
 marched up country as a part of General Franks's 
 force, which in thirteen days had covered a long 
 distance, beaten a superior enemy in four actions, and 
 taken 34 guns. It performed admirable service after 
 the siege in various parts of Oudh in frequent opera- 
 tions against the rebels up to November, 1859. 
 
 By March 21st, 1858, the city of Lucknow itself, 
 after a series of desultory fights, was completely in 
 our hands. ' It was late in the evening,' wrote Dr. 
 Kussell, the Times correspondent, ' when we returned 
 to camp through roads thronged with at least 20,000 
 camp followers all staggering under loads of plunder — 
 the most extraordinary and indescribable spectacle 
 I ever beheld. Coolies, Syces, Kitmutgars, Dooli 
 bearers. Grass-cutters, a flood of men covered with 
 clothing not their own, carrying on head and shoulders 
 looking-glasses, mirrors, pictures, brass pots, swords, 
 firelocks, rich shawls, scarves, embroidered dresses, 
 all the loot of ransacked palaces. The noise, the 
 dust, the shouting, the excitement, were almost 
 beyond endurance. Lucknow was borne away piece- 
 meal to camp, and the wild Gurkhas and Sikhs, with 
 open mouths and glaring eyes, burning with haste 
 to get rich, were contending fiercely against the current 
 as they sought to get to the sources of such unexpected 
 wealth.' 
 
 land regiments, he left others, which did equally good work, 
 unnoticed. Few, however, grudged the honour done to the High- 
 landers, for they always behaved splendidly. 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 83 
 
 Amidst all this excitement and jubilation much 
 regret was felt at the escape of the greater part of the 
 rebels across the river Gumti. That Outram desired 
 to cross over the river from the northern to the 
 southern bank by the famous Iron Bridge on March 
 14th, to complete the effect of the capture of the Kaisar 
 Bagh by a crushing rear attack on the rebels in 
 the city, is a matter of history. But this move was 
 not permitted, for General Outram was forbidden to 
 act if he thought that by so doing he would ' lose a 
 single man ; ' and thus a great chance was thrown 
 away. This lost opportunity, followed by failure a 
 few days later on the part of the cavalry in the pur- 
 suit of further bands of the flying enemy, prevented 
 the fall of Lucknow from proving the final and crush- 
 ing blow to the rebels that it ought to have been. 
 
 Instead of securing the virtual pacification of Oudh 
 at one stroke, 'it left the province swarming with 
 armed rebels still capable of resistance ; ' although 
 after the preparations, delays, and large number of 
 troops employed, every one expected, with some show 
 of reason, the annihilation of the enemy as an armed 
 and organised body. As it turned out, the rebels who 
 escaped on the 14th and again on the 21st of March 
 were the very men who fell back on the forts and 
 strongholds of Oudh and Rohilkhand, there to renew 
 the resistance which had so hopelessly broken down 
 in the capital. The ' saving of life,' however well 
 intended on Sir Colin Campbell's part, did not always 
 fulfil his anticipations, and proved the cause, both now 
 
 F 2 
 
84 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 and at other times, of unnecessary and prolonged 
 operations, and too often of losses to worn-out troops 
 from exposure and disease. 
 
 Such was the termination of the series of operations 
 before Lucknow, which lasted about twenty days, with 
 a loss of 19 officers and 608 men killed, wounded, and 
 missing. By the end of March the British army was 
 broken up, and a complete redistribution was effected. 
 It had been intended by the Viceroy that the re- 
 conquest of Rohilkhand should follow the re-taking 
 of Lucknow, and the hoped-for capture of its rebel 
 garrison ; but the plan of the campaign was now neces- 
 sarily changed. Immediate action of some kind was 
 requisite on account of the escape of the rebels. The 
 Commander-in-Chief was anxious to restrict operations 
 for the moment to the clearing of the country around 
 Lucknow. He desired to postpone an advance into 
 Rohilkhand till the autumn. But Lord Canning 
 would not hear of this ; and indeed it seemed impos- 
 sible to remain thus inactive without considerable risk. 
 
 Immediate action, both in Rohilkhand and in Oudh, 
 was therefore resolved on ; and as the rapid movements 
 of Sir Hugh Rose in Central India during the period 
 culminating in the capture of Jhansi, in April, had 
 freed the Commander-in-Chief from any special 
 anxiety in that direction, he was enabled to turn his 
 individual attention to those two provinces. Though 
 disorganised, and to some extent demoralised, the 
 rebels were resolved not to surrender at discretion, 
 and it became imperative that no time should be lost 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 85 
 
 in following them up. By insisting that this 
 should be done Lord Canning once more displayed 
 a military knowledge and instinct of which few at 
 that time were aware. Three columns, under Bri- 
 gadiers Walpole, Penny, and Jones, were ordered to 
 penetrate Bohilkhand from different points, supported 
 by a fourth column under Colonel Seaton, who had 
 been protecting the country around Fatehgarh. All 
 four columns were to converge upon Bareilly, where, 
 it was hoped, the main body of the rebels under 
 Khan Bahadur Khan would be met, defeated, and 
 captured. 
 
 Leaving Oudh for the moment to take care of itself, 
 the Commander-in-Chief quitted Lucknow, April 7th, 
 1858, four days after Sir Hugh Kose had stormed 
 and taken Jhansi. Joining Walpole's brigade, which 
 (with the exception of an unfortunate reverse at 
 Ruyah, when Adrian Hope was killed) had done well, 
 the Commander-in-Chief pushed on with a force 
 amounting to about 7500 men and 19 guns to Ba- 
 reilly. On May the 4th he was close to the place. 
 Khan Bahadur Khan, alive to his danger, determined 
 to show a bold front. Between the town and the 
 Commander-in-Chief's force ran a stream, which the 
 rebel leader crossed with the first line of his troops, 
 leaving the second line to defend the cantonments 
 and the town. Early the next morning Sir Colin 
 Campbell moved forward, and after an action which 
 lasted six hours, under a hot sun, practically gained 
 possession of this position. With his usual solicitude 
 
 
86 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 for his wearied troops he allowed them to halt in the 
 hope of completing his victory on the next day. 
 But during the night Khan Bahadur Khan evacuated 
 the town with the greater part of his army. 
 
 Thus that portion of the rebel garrison which 
 had escaped from Lucknow into Bohilkhand got back 
 again into Oudh; and in this way the termination of 
 the Kohilkhand campaign was not more satisfactory 
 than the result of the operations in Oudh. Once 
 more this latter province claimed the attention of 
 the military authorities, and for many months to come 
 it was the scene of extended movements . under the 
 supervision of the Commander-in-Chief himself Beach- 
 ing Fatehgarh on May 25th, 1858, Sir Colin Campbell 
 remained there till June 5th, while Brigadier Lugard 
 and others had meanwhile been eno-ao-ed under his 
 orders in clearing Behar of rebel bands ; the opera- 
 tions resulting in the death of Koer Singh, one of 
 the ablest of their leaders^ and the gradual pacifica- 
 tion of the province. A notable incident in these 
 operations was the relief of Azamgarh, on the 6th 
 April, 1858, by Colonel (now General) Lord Mark 
 Kerr, who, with the headquarters of the 13th Light 
 Infantry, a troop of cavalry, and two guns, forced 
 his way through, and defeated, an ambuscade of 
 many thousand Sepoys under Koer Singh. 
 
 Sir Colin Campbell now considered that the British 
 troops in Oudh should remain on the defensive until 
 the return of the cold weather ; but being continually 
 harassed by small bands of rebels they were kept in 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 87 
 
 incessant movement. What was done in Rohilkhand 
 with two brigades required, in the Commander-in- 
 Chiefs opinion, six brigades in Oudh, independent of 
 the garrison of Lucknow. A large force, moreover, 
 of military police was raised to assist the troops ; 
 w^hile ari-angements were made to move the various 
 detachments on a general plan and with one common 
 object. This object was an advance into Oudh from 
 two points simultaneously ; that is to sa}^, from the 
 frontier of Rohilkhand in order to drive the rebels 
 in a north-east direction towards the Rapti river, 
 and at the same time from the south-east agfainst 
 the districts situated south of Lucknow between the 
 Ganges and the Gogra. 
 
 By the end of October, 1858, the two columns had 
 reached their respective positions, and were enabled 
 to establish the civil power as they advanced, while 
 pushing the rebels northwards into Nepal. Thus the 
 Commander-in-Chief moved northwards from Lucknow 
 with a force acting in concert with the troops under 
 Hope Grant. The Nana and his brother Bala Rao, 
 flying from the pursuit, escaped eventually into Nepal 
 with many thousand Sepoys. Sir Hope Grant was then 
 left in Oudh with instructions to watch matters on 
 this frontier, while Sir Colin Campbell, glad of rest, 
 rejoined the Governor-General at Simla. 
 
 The series of petty although harassing operations 
 which were carried on in Oudh and Rohilkhand at 
 this period, although very creditably performed by our 
 troops, need only be lightly touched upon. To trace 
 
88 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 in detail the work of the detached columns ^ would be 
 tiresome and superfluous. Nevertheless the duty was 
 most arduous and trying. The courage of the officers 
 and the endurance of the men were more severely 
 tested in these minor operations than in the greater 
 achievements of the campaign. The march of each 
 column and the commencement of each attack was 
 guided from headquarters, and watched with vigi- 
 lance and solicitude. As the different commanders 
 depended one upon another their movements were 
 ordered and arranged accordingly, so that while the 
 number of small affairs was considerable, on no 
 occasion was a particular Commander under the 
 necessity of fighting against odds which he could not 
 easily overcome. Sometimes, however, during this 
 anxious period, in which the behaviour of the troops, 
 both British and native, was all that could be desired, 
 the various columns halted, occasionally for weeks, 
 while the enemy escaped or reformed in new positions. 
 Nor was it until November, 1 859, that the last body of 
 rebels in Northern Oudh, to the number of about 4000 
 men, surrendered to a force mainly composed of the 
 20th Eegiment under Brigadier (now Sir Edward) 
 Holdich. One of the more prominent leaders here 
 taken was Jawala Parshad (the Nana's principal 
 adviser at the Cawnpur massacre), who, before being 
 
 * Brigadier Evelegli's column was specially noted at the time 
 for its rapid and successful movements, and for the able manner 
 in which the Brigadier directed its operations and taught selected 
 men of the column to act as mounted infantry and to become 
 practised artillery men. 
 
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS 89 
 
 executed, named to the writer of this volume the place 
 where the Nana was hiding in Nepal. 
 
 With this brief sketch of the operations in 
 Northern India we leave Sir Colin Campbell and his 
 gallant troops in order to review those movements 
 which had been carried out, during some part of the 
 same period, southwards in Central India. It only- 
 remains to say that Sir Colin Campbell, after staying 
 in India long enough to see the embers of the great 
 Sepoy revolt smoulder away, left Calcutta on June 
 4th, i860. He had been raised to the peerage for his 
 services in India, and as Field-Marshal Lord Clyde 
 died at Chatham on August 14th, 1863, generally 
 beloved and regretted. On the stone that marks the 
 spot where he lies in Westminster Abbey he is 
 worthily named as one 'who by his own deserts 
 through fifty years of arduous service, from the earliest 
 battles of the Peninsular War to the pacification of 
 India in 1858, rose to the rank of Field-Marshal and 
 the peerage. He died lamented by the Queen, the 
 Army, and the people, on the 14th of August, 1863, 
 in the 71st year of his age.' 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 The Southekn Operations to the Fall of 
 Jhansi 
 
 'In five months, the Central India Field Force 
 traversed 1085 miles, crossed numerous large rivers, 
 took upwards of 150 pieces of artillery, one en- 
 trenched camp, two fortified cities and two fortresses 
 all strongly defended, fought sixteen actions, captured 
 twenty forts ; and never sustained a check against 
 the most warlike and determined enemy, led by most 
 capable commanders then to be found in any part of 
 India 1/ 
 
 Were it possible to follow the example of Gibbon, 
 who summarised in half a dozen lines a campaign 
 that extended from Gaul to Constantinople, the above 
 sentence would be a sufficient record of the operations 
 in Central or Southern India under Sir Hugh Rose. 
 But a somewhat fuller account, taken in great part 
 from Sir Hugh Rosens own correspondence, will be 
 more in consonance with the object of the present 
 volume, and may not be without interest for the 
 general reader, even though the story has ah-eady 
 
 ^ Earl of Derby's speech, House of Lords, April 19th, 1859. 
 
^\ % 
 
 / » '^- t C^ \/^.<^1.jt. 
 
UNIVERSITY 
 
 ■} 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 91 
 
 been graphically told by Colonel Malleson and other 
 writers. 
 
 Hugh Henry Kose was born at Berlin on the 6th 
 of April, 1801. He was a son of Sii* George Rose, 
 G.C.B., then Minister Plenipotentiary at the Prussian 
 Court; and it was at Berlin that he acquired the 
 rudiments of a military education. Entering the 
 British Army in 1820, he quickly rose in his pro- 
 fession ; obtaining his majority within a few years, in 
 recognition of the tact and intelligence with which he 
 performed responsible duties in Ireland during the 
 Ribbon and Tithe disturbances. At a later period, 
 when at Malta, in command of the 92nd Highlanders, 
 he gained high praise from his superior officers, not 
 only for his military qualifications, but also for 
 courage and humanity during an outbreak of cholera 
 among the troops. He had visited every man of his 
 regiment who fell ill, and encouraged all around him 
 by his activity and cheerfulness. 
 
 In 1 84 1, when serving on special duty with Omar 
 Pasha''s Brigade in Syria, during the operations 
 against Mehemet Ali and the Egyptian Army, he 
 greatly distinguished himself in the field. On one 
 occasion, during a reconnaissance in the neighbour- 
 hood of Ascalon, he put himself at the head of a 
 regiment of Arab cavalry, successfully routed the 
 Egyptian advanced guard, and thus saved Omar 
 Pasha from a surprise which might have entailed 
 heavy loss. For this and other services, besides re- 
 ceiving a sword of honour and the Nialian Iftihar 
 
92 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 from the Sultan, he was made a Companion of the 
 Bath. He was also allowed to accept the Cross of 
 St. John of Jerusalem, which Frederick William of 
 Prussia presented to his ' former young friend ' for his 
 gallant conduct. 
 
 Soon after these events, Colonel Rose was appointed 
 British Consul-General in Syria. The position of 
 affaii's in the Lebanon was exceedingly complicated. 
 The French and Egyptians still remembered that 
 Syria had once been theirs ; the Christian Maronites 
 and Muhammadan Druses were still divided by their 
 hereditary feuds. Local disturbance culminated in 
 civil war ; and during these troubles Colonel Rose 
 displayed his accustomed coolness and indifference to 
 personal danger. On one occasion, in 1841, when he 
 found the Maronites and Druses drawn up in two 
 lines, and firing at each other, he rode between them, 
 at imminent risk to his life, and by the sheer force of 
 a stronger will stopped the conflict. At another time 
 he proceeded by himself — after all the consular 
 officers of the other Powers had declined to move — to a 
 district where civil war was actually raging ; and by 
 his personal influence saved the lives of some 700 
 Christians, whom he conducted in safety, after a long 
 and arduous journey, to Beyrout ; lending his own 
 horse to the way-worn women while he himself went 
 on foot. 
 
 At a subsequent period during which cholera raged 
 with great fury in Beyrout, when, to use the words of 
 an address presented to him by grateful eye-witnesses. 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 93 
 
 'the terror-stricken Christian population abandoned 
 their houses and tied to the country ' — he alone of all 
 the Europeans, with the exception of one medical 
 otficer and some sisters of charity, remained behind 
 to visit the huts of the diseased and dying, 'Language 
 faintly conveys,' says the address, 'the impression 
 created by conduct so generous and humane ; but the 
 remembrance of it will never be effaced from the 
 hearts of those who were the objects of such kindness, 
 nor will such devotion easily be forgotten by those 
 who witnessed it.' 
 
 In recognition of his services in Syria, Lord Pal- 
 merston appointed Colonel Kose in January, 1851, 
 to be Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople. Two 
 years afterwards, when acting as Charge cV Affaires 
 in Lord Stratford de RedclifFe's absence, he completely 
 baffled the intrigues of the Russian envoy, Prince 
 Menschikoff. 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose's own account of the incident was 
 as follows. Early one morning he received an urgent 
 message from the Turkish Minister for Foreio-n 
 Aflfairs, requesting his immediate attendance at the 
 Porte on a matter of importance. On meeting the 
 Minister and the Grand Vizier he learnt that they 
 had just received a demand from Prince Menschikoff, 
 requiring that the Sultan should sign a Secret Treaty, 
 vesting in Russia the protection of all Christians in 
 Turkey. Such a demand, the Grand Vizier said, was 
 completely subversive of the sovereign rights of the 
 Porte, and totally opposed to the policy to which 
 
94 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 England and the other five Powers, including Russia 
 herself, were pledged, — they having signed treaties 
 guaranteeing the Sultan's independence and the 
 integrity of his dominions. In these circumstances, 
 the Grand Vizier wished to know what Colonel Rose 
 was prepared to do, as agent for Her Majesty's 
 Government, to assist the Porte. He replied that 
 it was for the Porte to specify the assistance re- 
 quired, but that he would immediately send off an 
 express message to Belgrade or Vienna, or a steamer 
 to Malta, with the intelligence to Her Majesty's 
 Government. 
 
 ' Oh,' replied the Grand Vizier, ' special messengers 
 and steamers are too late. We must sign the Secret 
 Treaty by sunset this evening, or Prince Menschikoff 
 will demand his passports. We wish to see the 
 British Fleet in Turkish waters.' 
 
 Colonel Rose rejoined that as Charge cV Affaires he 
 had no right to demand the appearance of Admiral 
 Dundas and his Fleet in Turkish waters ; his powers 
 only allowed him to point out to the Admiral, as 
 quickly as possible, the gravity of the situation at 
 Constantinople, and the serious responsibility which 
 would devolve on him were he to decline to appear, 
 as requested, with the Fleet. The Grand Vizier ob- 
 served that the Sultan's Ministers would be quite 
 satisfied if Colonel Rose wrote a letter to the Admiral 
 in that sense, and to this the Charge cT Affaires as- 
 sented ^. 
 
 ^ The letter was dated March 8th, 1853, Admiral Dundas, on the 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 95 
 
 Not long after sunset, the Porte's chief Dragoman 
 came to Colonel Rose at Therapia to inform him that 
 Prince MenschikofF had presented his demand for 
 their signature of the treaty, and that they had 
 refused it. The despatch sent to Admiral Dundas, 
 though not acted on, had gained its object. 
 
 On the outbreak of the war with Russia in the 
 following year Colonel Rose was appointed Queen's 
 Commissioner at the headquarters of the French 
 Army, with the local rank of Brigadier-General. 
 
 During the progress of the campaign he was 
 repeatedly thanked by the French commanders, and 
 was recommended by Marshal Canrobert for the 
 Victoria Cross, for conspicuous gallantry on three 
 occasions during the siege of Sebastopol. He had 
 
 14th idem, replied to the eifect that he did not feel justified in 
 sending the Fleet up to Vourla without directions from home. 
 Suppoi-ted by the opinion of Lord Stratford de Eedcliffe, then on 
 leave in England, Her Majesty's Government, believing that Colonel 
 Eose had acted hastily, approved of Admiral Dundas's refusal. 
 Lord Stratford himself seems to have laboured under the erroneous 
 impression that no one knew how to act at Constantinople except 
 himself. He had his own way ; and hastily returning to that 
 place on April 5th, he commenced a series of futile negotiations 
 which ended in his being himself compelled to summon the Fleet, 
 on October 20th ; too late by seven months for any practical 
 purpose, and too late, alas, to prevent the unfortunate Crimean 
 War, which had then become inevitable. As Kinglake has justly 
 said (^Crimea, vol. i, p. 99), ' Colonel Rose being a firm, able man, 
 was not afraid of responsibility, and was therefore not afraid to go 
 beyond the range of common duty.* Although disavowed by the 
 Government at home, his mere consent to call up the Fleet allayed 
 the panic and intrigue which at that moment was endangering 
 the very life of the Ottoman Empire ; and it is as certain that had 
 his wishes been attended to, there would have been no war. 
 
g6 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 distinguished himself both at the Alma and at In- 
 kerman. In 1885 Sir Kobert Morier, now Her 
 Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, told the 
 present writer that he had recently met the officer 
 who had commanded the Russian pickets along the 
 Inkerman heights. This officer mentioned, as one 
 of the most remarkable incidents of the day, that he 
 had seen through the mist a tall, gaunt figure riding 
 leisurely down the Tchernaya road under a withering 
 fire from the whole line of pickets. The horseman 
 turned neither to the right nor to the left, nor could 
 the Russians hit him. Suddenly they saw him fall 
 headlong with his horse. After a few minutes, paying 
 no attention to the firing, the mysterious horseman 
 got up, shook himself, patted his horse, and led the 
 animal leisurely back up the road. The Russians 
 were so awe-struck, that an order was sent along the 
 line to cease firing on the man, who we ' afterwards 
 learnt/ said the Russian officer, ' was Colonel Rose.' 
 
 Lord Clarendon warmly commended 'the way in 
 which Colonel Rose maintained the best relations 
 with the French Commander-in-Chief and his Staff", 
 and the advice he had tendered at different times 
 in a highly becoming tone and spirit, in conformity 
 with the wishes and opinions of Her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment.' For his services in the Crimea he was promoted 
 to be a Major- General, was made a Knight of the 
 Bath, and a Commander of the Legion of Honour. 
 
 Such were the antecedents of the man whose work 
 in India we have now to record. Ever at the post of 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 97 
 
 danger, he never spared himself or others. What 
 he did was always done courageously and thoroughly. 
 His whole career was an example of earnestness amid 
 which certain weaknesses of temper and disposition 
 may well be forgotten. If at times he seemed to 
 show too little consideration for those immediately 
 around him, he was nevertheless devoted to the army 
 generally. Any scheme for the benefit of the soldiers 
 invariably received support from his pen and purse. 
 A strict military disciplinarian, he was just and 
 unflinching. Never was there an army equal to 
 the Central India Field Force, either for fighting 
 powers or discipline, when engaged in the field ; and 
 never was the army in India in such order as when 
 he commanded in chief ^. 
 
 In the field, the rebel Sepoys of the Mutiny could 
 make nothing of the general Avho routed and de- 
 stroyed them. His rapid marches and indomitable 
 energy struck terror into their hearts. Who could 
 withstand a leader who — ignoring all traditions of 
 ordinary tactics, and spite of cautions and reproofs 
 — regarded himself and his troops as bullet and heat- 
 proof ? He surprised both friend and foe by grasping 
 instinctively, with the genius of a born soldier, the 
 great principle of Indian warfare, ' When your enemy 
 is in the open, go straight at him, and keep him 
 moving ; and when behind ramparts, still go at him. 
 and cut ofi" chances of retreat, when possible ; pursue 
 
 ^ For fuller details see an article on Lord Strathnairn by Sir 
 Owen Burne, in the Asiatic Quarterly Review, of January, 1886. 
 
 G 
 
98 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 him if escaping or escaped.' To his mind simplicity 
 was the first condition of sound strategy, more 
 especially in operations against the armed mobs of 
 the Indian Mutiny. Complex combinations were 
 rejected by him because he found, as others found, 
 that they were unsuitable to this peculiar warfare. 
 
 His whole career exemplified the truth of Napoleon's 
 favourite maxim — that a General is the head and 
 soul of his army. It was Caesar, not the Roman 
 legion, who conquered Gaul. It was Hannibal, not 
 the Carthaginians, who carried terror to the gates 
 of Rome. It was Alexander, not the Macedonian 
 phalanx, who found a way to the Indus. It was 
 Turenne, and not the French, who reached the Weser 
 and the Inn. It was Frederick the Great, not 
 the Prussian army, who defended Prussia during 
 seven years against the three chief Powers of Europe. 
 In all that Sir Hugh Rose did, in or out of the field 
 in India, he inspired officers and men under him to 
 be like himself. Every man of his force was a hero ; 
 and his troops in Central India fought their way to 
 victory with a courage and devotion that threw many 
 other operations of the Mutiny comparatively into 
 the shade. And like Outram and Nicholson, Sir 
 Hugh Rose showed that military talent may, after all, 
 be sometimes preserved under the black coat of the 
 diplomatist, and that peaceful avocations do not 
 necessarily rust the faculties of a true soldier ^. 
 
 ' Speaking of Sir Hugh Rose two years afterwards, in the House 
 of Lords, the Duke of Cambridge, who accorded him a generous 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 99 
 
 But it is time to consider the part he took in the 
 Indian Mutiny Campaign. After the Crimean War, 
 being desirous of serving in India, Major-General Sir 
 Hugh Rose was given by the Duke of Cambridge 
 a division in the Bombay Presidency. Reaching 
 Bombay on September 19th, 1857, ^^ ^^^ shortly 
 afterwards placed in command of a field force, with 
 orders to march through Central India to Kalpi and 
 ' to give a hand,' as it were, to Sir Colin Campbell's 
 army, then operating on the lines of the Jumna and 
 Ganges. At this time the whole of the difficult 
 country to the north of the Narbada was in the 
 hands of the rebels. The Gwalior Continocent held 
 Kalpi ; the redoubtable Rani of Jhansi was in undis- 
 puted possession of the large tract of country sur- 
 rounding her fortress ; while Tantia Topi and the 
 revolted Gwalior Contingent were close at hand to 
 assist her in opposing the advance of Sir Hugh Rose's 
 little force. In all that part of India the mass of the 
 population had been able for nearly twelve months to 
 
 encouragement and support in his operations in the field, said : 
 ' Certainly if any officer ever performed acts of the greatest valour, 
 daring, and determination, those acts were performed by Sir Hugh 
 Rose. I personally had an opportunity in the Crimea of seeing 
 what manner of man my gallant friend was, and of what stuff he 
 was made ; and I was satisfied at the time that if ever the right 
 occasion presented itself, he would be found to distinguish himself 
 in the extraordinary manner which he has lately done. Permit 
 me to say that he was at the head of a very small European force, 
 and that a very large proportion of the troops under his command 
 were natives, regular Sepoys ; and I have reason to believe that 
 these troops on all occasions conducted themselves with a valour 
 and bearing equal to that displayed by the Europeans.' 
 
 G 2 
 
100 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 do, without let or hindrance, whatsoever was right in 
 their own eyes. After the second relief of Lucknow, 
 in November, 1857, ^^1 were encouraged to still 
 greater boldness by the lull in the movements of the 
 Northern army, and by the knowledge that while mili- 
 tary operations in that direction had been conducted 
 in an open country, those undertaken in Central India, 
 on the contrary, would have to be carried on in the 
 jungles, ravines, and broken ground of the Vindhya 
 range and Bundelkhand, where the people, secure in 
 their mountain fastnesses and strong forts, had defied 
 the efforts of Muhammadan Emperors to subdue them, 
 and had not yet settled down under British rule. 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose's force was composed of two bri- 
 gades ; the first under Brigadier Stuart, of the Bombay 
 army; the second under Brigadier Steuart, of the 14th 
 Light Dragoons, the whole amounting to about 4500 
 men, of whom four regiments were native. He had 
 many difficulties to contend with on assuming com- 
 mand. Supplies were, and would be, scarce ; and 
 there was very little carriage. None of the batteries 
 of artillery were complete, either in men or horses ; 
 while the siege artillery was altogether inadequate for 
 the work before it. In fact, there was much to be 
 done to fit the force for the field ; but the General 
 was not a man to brook delay. Everj'thing was 
 ready in an incredibly short space ; and those who 
 had called him a griff soon had to confess that ' griffs' 
 were sometimes the very best leaders. 
 
 Having taken severe measures, with the approval 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS loi 
 
 of Government, to punish revolt and restore order in 
 the State of Indore, Sir Hugh Rose, early in January, 
 marched to the relief of Sagar. This duty had 
 been assigned to the Madras Column under Bri- 
 gradier Whitlock ; but the Madras Column was hope- 
 lessly in the rear, and could not reach its objective 
 under two months, while on the other hand the 
 situation at Sagar was extremely critical. The 
 garrison of the fort was composed of one weak 
 company of European Artillery and about forty officers 
 of the covenanted and uncovenanted services. To 
 this handful of men was entrusted the protection of 
 a large arsenal and the lives of some 170 European 
 women and children. In the cantonments were 1000 
 Bengal Sepoys and about 100 irregular cavalry. 
 Though mistrusted by the authorities and not allowed 
 to take up any duties inside the fort, the Sepoys had 
 so far behaved well. But a large body of mutineers 
 were moving towards the cantonment with a view 
 of attacking it, and unless help should arrive quickly 
 a disaster was inevitable. In response, therefore, to 
 the urgent appeals of the civil and military authorities 
 of the district, Sir Hugh Rose moved rapidly forward 
 with a portion of his force and reached Sagar from 
 Indore in 34 days, after taking the Fort of Rathgarh 
 on the way. 
 
 The Fort of Rathgarh, 24 miles from Sagar, was 
 garrisoned by Valaitis (Afghan mercenaries) and 
 Pathans, as warlike as they were desperate. It 
 was hardly less formidable than the famed strong- 
 
I02 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 hold of Miiltan. The east and south faces were 
 almost perpendicular, the rock being scarped and 
 strengthened by a deep, rapid river, running close 
 beneath the walls from east to west ^. Here for 
 four days, without a relief of guards, the British 
 troops defended their camp against a numerous enemy 
 on their flanks and rear ; while they attacked the 
 fortress in their front. On the night before the pro- 
 jected assault, the rebel garrison, dispirited by the 
 loss of Muhammad Fazl Khan and other leaders of 
 note, evacuated the place by an ancient sally-port. 
 They were hotly pursued, and a considerable number 
 were taken prisoners. 
 
 About 15 miles or so from Kathgarh was Barodia, a 
 strong village surrounded by dense jungle. Here the 
 rebels concentrated under the Raja of Banpur, one 
 of the most determined leaders of the Mutiny. It 
 was necessary to attack him at once, and this opera- 
 tion was successfully carried out on January 30th 
 after a forced march. The enemy made a determined 
 resistance and lost some 500 men. The loss on the 
 British side included both officers and men killed 
 and wounded. Among the officers killed was Captain 
 Neville ^, R.E., who was hit by a round shot as he 
 was speaking to the General. 
 
 1 In 1810, the Maharaja Sindhia, -with a force at least four times 
 as strong as that under Sir Hugh Kose, only took Rathgarh after a 
 siege of seven months. 
 
 ^ This officer had been seventy times in the trenches before 
 Sebastopol without being touched. He had passed the previous 
 night in writing a letter to his mother expressing the certainty he 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 103 
 
 The immediate result of these successes was the 
 relief of Sagar on February 3rd, 1858, after the place 
 had been invested by the rebels for upwards of seven 
 months. One of the besieged garrison, writing on that 
 day, said — ' Sagar was relieved this morning by the 
 force under Sir Hugh Rose. Who can imagine the 
 gladness that then filled the hearts of the Europeans, 
 shut up for eight weary and anxious months ? For 
 many a month and week during this period we heard 
 of relief being near, till we grew sick with expecting 
 and watching for its realisation. It was about eight 
 days ago that we knew Sir Hugh Rose's force had 
 arrived in the district. It heralded its approach by 
 the bombardment of Rathgarh, one of the strono-est 
 forts in Bundelkhand. This bombardment continued 
 for four days and nights unintermittingly. During 
 the last three da^^s it was sharp and quick, and the 
 guns seemed to have been replaced by those of heavier 
 calibre. The rebels inside the fort, among whom 
 were some of the most daring and troublesome leaders, 
 could not have had a wink of sleep from this constant 
 booming, which was distinctly heard at Sagar. But to 
 us it brought sweet slumbers and a happy sense of ap- 
 proaching security. At last to our joy it was reported 
 that the fort had been taken, and that Sir Hugh 
 Rose was close at hand. . . . His troops marched 
 right through the city of Sagar in a long line, and 
 you can imagine the impression their number made 
 
 felt of death in the coining action ; yet he pressed Sir Hugh Rose 
 with much earnestness to let him act as his A.D.C. at Barodia. 
 
 '<0- 
 
I04 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 on the natives of the place. Such a thing as a 
 European regiment had never been seen in Sagar, 
 and we certainly never expected to see Her Majesty's 
 14th Dragoons. These men, and the large siege-guns 
 dragged by elephants, were a source of much curiosity 
 and awe to the natives. You can hardly realise 
 our feelings after eight months of anxiety and im- 
 prisonment.' 
 
 Having thus opened the roads to and from the 
 West and North, Sir Hugh Rose set himself to clear 
 the way towards the East. This entailed the capture 
 of the Fort of Garhakota, about 25 miles east of Sagar, 
 where the mutinous 51st and 52nd Bengal Regiments, 
 with other large bodies of rebels, had established 
 themselves, and were devastating the country around. 
 The fort was a strong one, built by French engineers ; 
 so strong, indeed, that in 181 8 a British force of 
 1 1,000 men with 28 siege-guns only gained possession 
 of it, after a long investment, by allowing the garrison 
 to march out with the honours of war. 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose occupied the fort on the 13th 
 February, 1858^ after a trying march through dense 
 jungle, under a hot sun, with the enemy keeping up a 
 running fight all the way. Within was found a large 
 quantity of supplies and war material, pointing to the 
 belief that the rebels had intended to make Garhakota 
 a central rendezvous. 
 
 The GeneraVs next object, after the capture of 
 Garhakota, was to reach Jhansi as quickly as possible. 
 The capture of Jhansi was considered of so much 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 105 
 
 importance by Sir Colin Campbell that his chief of 
 the staft' had written on January 24th, 1858: 'Sir 
 Colin will be glad to learn if Jhansi is to be fairly 
 tackled during your present campaign. To us it is all 
 important. Until it takes place, Sir Colin^s rear will 
 always be inconvenienced, and he will be constantly 
 obliged to look back over his shoulder as when he 
 relieved Lucknow. The stiff neck this gives to the 
 Commander-in-Chief and the increased difficulty of 
 his operations in consequence you will understand.' 
 
 But it was no easy task. Writing to Lord El- 
 phinstone from Sagar on February 29th, 1858, Sir 
 Hugh said : ' I am unfortunately detained here by 
 want of supplies and carriage, to the great disad- 
 vantage of the public service : I have lost nine pre- 
 cious days, doubly precious not only on account of 
 lost time at a season when every hot day endangers 
 the health and lives of the European soldiers, but 
 because every day has allowed the rebels to recover 
 the "morale they had lost by my operations, which 
 I had made as rapidly and efficiently as possible, 
 knowing that any success with Orientals produces 
 twice as good a result if one acts promptly and follows 
 up one success with another. Nothing requires 
 system so much as transport. Laying in supplies, as 
 it is called, is perfectly easy in a fertile and peaceful 
 country, but this will not do in my case, where a 
 country has been devastated or is in the hands of the 
 enemy. Then appears all the risk of a civil or 
 occasional system of supply. Why don't you put 
 
lo6 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 yourself at the head of the great question of Indian 
 military transport? You would do your country 
 more good than all your generals put together/ 
 
 The rebels took advantage of this enforced delay to 
 occupy certain forts and difficult passes in the moun- 
 tainous ridges which separate Bundelkhand from the 
 Sagar district. The passes were three in number — 
 Narut, Mundinpur, and Dhamoni. Sir Hugh Rose 
 resolved to force them without loss of time ; more 
 especially as it was necessary to unite his first and 
 second brigades for the attack on Jhansi. He had 
 accordingly sent orders to his First Brigade to march 
 by the trunk road towards Jhansi, and by this turning 
 movement to clear his left flank, while he himself 
 moved direct towards the fortress. On the way he 
 heard heavy firing to his left. This was the First 
 Brigade taking the Fort of Chandari on March 1 7th. 
 The enemy here offered a desperate resistance ; but 
 the fort was carried by storm, with a less on our side 
 of 2 officers and 27 men. 
 
 The Pass of Narut was by far the most difficult of 
 the three just named; and the enemy, under the im- 
 pression that Sir Hugh Hose must move through it, 
 increased its natural difficulties by barricading the 
 road with alattis and parapets of boulders. The 
 Raja of Banpur superintended the defence. The 
 next most difficult pass was Dhamoni. Very little 
 was known about Mundinpur, the third pass, which 
 was about twenty miles from that of Narut ; but a 
 reconnaissance forcee induced Sir Hugh Rose to 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 107 
 
 select this as the point of attack. Although found to 
 be the least inaccessible of the three passes, it was 
 still difficult ; and was defended by the Sepoys of the 
 50th Native Infantry, as well as by a large number of 
 picked Eundelas. 
 
 In order to deceive the enemy as to his intention, 
 and to prevent the Raja of Banpur coming to the 
 assistance of the Raja of Shahgarh, who defended 
 Mundinpur, Sir Hugh Rose ordered a feint to be made 
 against Narut ; whilst he himself attacked Mundinpur. 
 He even marched some miles towards Narut, with his 
 whole force ; and then counter-marching, fell unex- 
 pectedly on Mundinpur. The fight was precipitated 
 by the ardour of an artillery officer, who galloped his 
 guns to the right front, to drive the enemy from the 
 heights. Just as he came into action the 50th Native 
 Infantry, showing merely their caps, opened a heavy 
 fire on the battery. 
 
 This brought matters to a speedy conclusion ; for it 
 was now necessary to make a rapid advance. The 
 fire was extremely hot, ''as rapid and hot a fire as 
 ever I saw,^ wrote Sir Hugh Rose to Sir Colin Camp- 
 bell. The casualties were numerous. The General 
 himself had a spur shot off, and his best horse 
 wounded. But the infantry of the Haidarabad Con- 
 tingent dashed down the glen with a cheer, and 
 completely routed the surprised enemy. Driven with 
 loss from their position, the rebels endeavoured to 
 join another large body of their comrades who oc- 
 cupied the hills on the left of the road. Before they 
 
Io8 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 could do this, however, Sir Hugh Rose ordered the 
 heights to be stormed, under cover of two guns of the 
 Haidarabad Contingent; and the enemy was driven 
 successively from all the hills commanding the pass. 
 Thus repulsed in flank and front, the rebels retreated 
 through the jungle to the Fort of Sarai, and were 
 pursued for a considerable distance. 
 
 The results of this success were most satisfactory. 
 The next day the Fort of Sarai fell into Sir Hugh 
 Rose's hands ; and the day after that, the Fort of 
 Marowra. So complete was the discomfiture of the 
 rebels that Sir Robert Hamilton, who had accompanied 
 the force as Agent to the Governor-General for Central 
 India, annexed the whole district to our Indian pos- 
 sessions under a royal salute, the British flag being 
 hoisted on the Fort of Sarai for the first time. 
 
 Writing to Sir Cohn Campbell on March 9th, 
 1858, Sir Hugh Rose said: 'The great thing with 
 these Indians is not to stay at long distances firing ; 
 but after they have been cannonaded, to close with 
 them. They cannot stand. By forcing the Pass of 
 Mundinpur I have taken the whole line of the enemy's 
 defences in rear, and an extraordinary panic has 
 seized them. I hope I am not over-sanguine, but I 
 think that matters as far as we have gone look well. 
 All in our rear is really police work ; and all I want 
 is a reserve to occupy the country I take, and prevent 
 my flanks and rear being turned as I advance. A 
 military police, organised on the Irish Constabulary 
 system, is what is needed here, and in India generally.' 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 109 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose now continued his march to Jhansi, 
 which lay 125 miles north of Sagar. Great import- 
 ance was attached by the British authorities to the 
 fall of this fortress and city. It was looked on as the 
 stronghold of the mutineers in Central India. The 
 rebel garrison included 10,000 Valaitis (Afghan mer- 
 cenaries), and Bundelas (as the people of Bundel- 
 khand are called); besides 1500 mutinous Sepoys, 
 of whom 400 were cavalry. The number of guns in 
 the city and fort was estimated at from thirty to 
 forty pieces. 
 
 Nowhere in India had the people displayed a more 
 intense hostility to the English. In June, 1857, after 
 the overthrow of British authority at Delhi, 67 
 Englishmen and women were murdered at Jhansi in 
 the most deliberate way. The principal inhabitants 
 and leading tradesmen, headed by ulemias and fanatics, 
 marched with theii* victims in solemn procession to 
 the place of execution, singing verses of the Kuran, 
 and in particular the ruthless text, ' No mercy to 
 Giaours.' The English prisoners, amongst them the 
 Resident, Captain Skene, and other functionaries, with 
 their wives and children, were marshalled in regular 
 order; and on reaching the ruins of an old mosque 
 were halted, carefully separated, the men from the 
 women and children, and hacked to pieces by the 
 butchers of the city. 
 
 But anxious as were Lord Canning and the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief that Jhansi should speedily fall, they 
 were so impressed with its strength, and with the 
 
no CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 inadequacy of the force for its attack, that Sir Hugh 
 Rose was given the option of masking it and continu- 
 ing his march to Kalpi. But rather than leave such 
 an important stronghold in his rear, he determined to 
 take it at all risks. This decision is a matter of 
 some historical interest. Much as Sir Colin Campbell 
 might desire to be relieved of ' the stiff neck ' caused 
 by having so constantly to look over his shoulder at 
 Jhansi, he began to doubt Sir Hugh Rose's ability to 
 take the place with a comparatively small force ; 
 while he foresaw that a check before so strong a 
 fortress would be little short of disastrous. The Com- 
 mander-in-Chief had accordingly authorised Sir Hugh 
 Rose^ to pass by Jhansi if, after weighing all the 
 circumstances of the case, he considered that the siege 
 could not prudently be undertaken ; and to march 
 instead, in two divisions, one on Kalpi through 
 Charkhari, and the other on Banda. Lord Canning 
 wrote on the same day to Sir Robert Hamilton, ex- 
 pressing a wish that, as Sir Hugh Rose was too weak 
 in European infantiy to run any risks, he ' should 
 not consider himself under any obligation to attempt 
 the reduction of Jhansi against the possibility of 
 success.' 
 
 But the General in command had no doubt on the 
 subject, and resolved to carry out his original instruc- 
 tions at all risks, seeing how fatal it would be to leave 
 a garrison of some i i,ooo desperate men, under one of 
 the most capable leaders of the Mutiny, to harass his 
 1 Feb. nth, 1858. 
 
THE SOUTHERX OPERATIONS in 
 
 march onwards, and thus effectually prevent the paci- 
 fication of Bundelkhand. A month later, being alarmed 
 at the perilous position of the lo^^al Chiefs of Panna 
 and Charkhari, the Government of India sent orders 
 to General Whitlock to march to their relief, and 
 directed Sir Hugh Rose (March 7th and T3th, 1858) 
 to co-operate in this duty. ' It is the Governor- 
 Generals wish,' wrote the Government Secretary 
 to Sii* Robert Hamilton, ' that this object should 
 for the present be considered paramount to the 
 operations befoi-e Jhansi, and that Sir Hugh Rose 
 should take such steps as may most effectually con- 
 tribute to its accomplishment.' On receiving these 
 instructions. Sir Hugh Rose and Sir Robert Hamilton 
 both informed the Government of India that the 
 military commander desired to conform with them, 
 but after and not before the siege of Jhansi. 
 
 'To relieve Charkhari,' said Sir Robert Hamilton 
 (March 13th, 1858), 'by this force would involve 
 refusing Jhansi, and the suspension of the plans of 
 operations towards Kalpi ; both of which operations 
 form the ground-work of Sir Hugh Rose's instruc- 
 tions. However anxious, therefore, the desire to aid 
 the Raja of Charkhari, Sii* Hugh Rose is compelled 
 to consider the movement of his force, or of any part 
 of it, in the direction of Charkhari at present im- 
 possible. The advance of this force on Jhansi, in the 
 opinion of Sir Hugh Rose, is calculated to draw the 
 rebels to assist in its defence ; whilst the fall of this 
 fortress and its possession by us will break up the 
 
112 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 confederacy, take away its rallying point, and destroy 
 the power and influence of the Rani, whose name 
 is prominently used to incite rebellion.' 
 
 Following up this letter. Sir Hugh Rose wrote him- 
 self to the Government of India on March 19th, 1858, 
 expressing his wish to obey their instructions at a 
 fitting time, as they completed a plan of operations 
 which he and Sn Robert Hamilton had on the previous 
 day agreed it would be advantageous to carry out 
 ' after the reduction of Jhansi.' He also wrote on the 
 same day to General Whitlock informing him of his 
 intention to attack Jhansi at once and to co-operate 
 with him afterwards. On the following day, March 
 20th, 1858, — Sir Hugh Rose himself being engaged 
 from sunrise to sunset at the outposts in reconnoitring 
 duty and in placing in position the siege batteries, — Sir 
 Robert Hamilton again addressed the Government of 
 India, recapitulating the reasons why the General 
 considered it important to attack Jhansi ^ Sir Hugh 
 
 ^ It is expedient to give these facts at some length since Sir 
 Kobert Hamilton, in a memorandum written four years afterwards 
 (March 20th, 1862) averred that Sir Hugh Rose hesitated to disobey 
 the orders received, and that he (Sir E. Hamilton") took on himself 
 the responsibility of ^proceeding with the operations against Jhansi.' 
 As this assertion has obtained for him the credit of having saved 
 the campaign, it is right to state that it has no foundation, and 
 was evidently made from memory. It is hardly likely, to say the 
 least of it, that the military commander would have allowed the 
 political officer to supersede his authority in so momentous a 
 military decision ; although it must be acknowledged that Sir 
 Robert Hamilton did good service in agreeing with that decision, 
 inasmuch as an opposite course would manifestly have increased 
 the difficulties of the moment. Sir Hugh Rose never thought it 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 113 
 
 Rose's decision was generously and frankly approved 
 (March 30th, ICS58) by Lord Canning. 
 
 Not haviug been able to obtain any plan of the city 
 and fortress, and being provided only with an old 
 and erroneous map of the country round, Sir Hugh 
 Rose had to reconnoitre all the positions and defences 
 about Jhansi, to a considerable distance. ' We arrived 
 before the city at 7 a.m. on the morning of March 
 20th,' says a writer already quoted. ' The General 
 and his staff rode off to reconnoitre. We were short 
 of water, firewood, and grass ; there was not a tree to 
 give shade to the troops, and we remained out in 
 the open till the return of the General at 6 p.m.' 
 
 The fortress of Jhansi stood on a high rock, over- 
 looking a wdde plain, and with its numerous outworks 
 of masonry presented a very imposing appearance. 
 The walls of granite, from 16 to 20 feet thick, were 
 protected by extensive and elaborate works of the 
 same solid construction, all within the walls, with 
 front and flanking embrasures for artillery fire, and 
 loopholes, some of five tiers, for musketry. Guns 
 placed on the high towers of the fort commanded 
 the country all around. One tower, called the 
 
 worth while to challenge a statement contradicted by the corre- 
 spondence which passed. He merely wrote on the following year 
 (June 26th, 1863) in a public despatch: 'I had always foreseen 
 the difficulties of besieging Jhansi with my inadequate force, which 
 led the Viceroy and Lord Clyde to give me the option of not attack- 
 ing it, but it was impossible to obey my orders to march to Kalpi, 
 by Charkhari, and leave such a stronghold as Jhansi untaken in 
 my rear.* And there he left the matter. 
 
 H 
 
114 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 'White Turret,' had been raised in height by the 
 rebels, and was armed with heavy ordnance for the 
 defence. 
 
 The fort was suiToimded by the city on all sides, 
 except on the west and part of the south faces. The 
 precipitous steepness of the rock protected the west 
 side of the fort ; while to the south, the city wall, 
 with bastions springing from the centre, ended in a 
 high mound or mam el on, which protected by a flank- 
 inof fire the south face of the fort. This mamelon was 
 fortified by a strong circular bastion for five guns, 
 round part of which was a ditch, 12 feet deep 
 and 15 feet broad, of solid masonry. Swarms of men 
 were always at work on the mamelon. The city 
 itself, 4^ miles in circumference, was surrounded by a 
 fortified and massive wall, from 6 to 1 2 feet thick, and 
 from 1 8 to 30 feet in height^ with numerous flanking 
 bastions, armed as batteries, and with loopholes in 
 the banquette for infantry. Outside the wall to the 
 east was a picturesque lake and the palace of the 
 former rajas. On the south side of the wall, and 
 outside it, were the ruined cantonments and residences 
 of the English ofiicials and troops, burnt by the rebels 
 in June, 1857. There were also, on this side, temples 
 and gardens. 
 
 The First Brigade under Brigadier Stuart having 
 now joined Sir Hugh Eose, the force was much 
 strengthened in all arms, although still only an 
 incomplete division seemingly inadequate for the task 
 before it. Here again, as on other occasions, Sir 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 115 
 
 Hugh Kose showed his capacity as a commander by- 
 disregarding fixed rules of war, when to observe them 
 would be mere pedantry. Had his example been 
 followed more generally in other parts of India much 
 time and many lives might have been saved. He had 
 recourse to a mode of attack which under ordinary 
 circumstances would not have been justifiable. In 
 order to enfilade the city wall, he disconnected and 
 separated his two attacks ; while to make up for 
 deficiencies in siege artillery, he brought up nine 
 and six-pounder guns to fire on the enemy's defences. 
 At the same time, wishing to invest the place as com- 
 pletely as possible with his small force, he established 
 seven flying camps of cavalry and horse artillery, 
 posting native artillery and infantry at the principal 
 camps. These flying camps sent out patrols to a 
 considerable distance in every direction, in order to 
 prevent the rebels either leaving or entering the 
 beleaguered city. Abattis and deep trenches were 
 dug across the roads and tracks. Each camp, on any 
 attempt being made to force its line, had orders to call 
 to its aid the neighbouring camps. An observatory ^ 
 and telegraph-post, in charge of an ofiicer and two 
 non-commissioned ofiicers, was established ; and from 
 here, with the aid of a telescope — the best that could 
 be got — the besiegers could see right into the interior 
 of the city. 
 
 1 It was fortunate this precaution was taken. On the evening of 
 March 31st, flags were flying from it, indicating that Tantia Topi was 
 coming in great force from the north to relieve the city. 
 
 H 2, 
 
Il6 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 Day and night a heavy fire was kept up on the 
 fort and mamelon. Day and night the rebels served 
 their guns, and repaired their defences. Some 
 batteries returned shot for shot. The native women 
 were seen working on the walls, and carrying ammu- 
 nition; and often the Rani of Jhansi and her ladies, 
 in rich attire, visited the ' Black Tower ' in the cool of 
 the evening to see how the fight went. A bombardier 
 in charge of one of the breaching guns reported to Sir 
 Hugh Eose, on one occasion, that 'he had covered 
 the Queen and her ladies with his gun,' and asked 
 permission to fire on them ; but he was told that that 
 kind of warfare was not approved. 
 
 So well were the besieging batteries served, that by 
 March 30th — the eighth day of the investment — Sir 
 Hugh Rose's gunners had dismantled the defences of 
 the fort and city, or disabled the enemy's guns ; and 
 the General, to save further expense of ammunition, of 
 which he was running short, made arrangement for 
 the storming of Jhansi on the next day. The advance, 
 however, of the so-called army of the Peshwa — which 
 to the number of 20,000 men crossed the Betwa under 
 Tantia Topi with reinforcements of heavy guns, 
 engineering obstacles, and all the material of war — 
 caused the assault to be deferred. At sunset on 
 March 31st the enemy lit an immense bonfire on a 
 rising ground on the Jhansi side of the river Betwa, 
 as a signal to the town of their arrival. It was 
 answered by salvos from all the batteries of the fort 
 and city, and by shouts of joy from the defenders 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 117 
 
 There was now no doubt that Tantia Topi sought 
 battle with the besieging force. The reason of his 
 self-confidence presently appeared from statements 
 made by prisoners. Tantia Topi, they said, had been 
 informed by his spies that nearly all the English 
 force was scattered in the siege and investment, and 
 that he could easily destroy the few who guarded the 
 camp. 
 
 A more anxious moment than this seldom came to 
 an officer in command. Sir Hugh Rose grasped the 
 situation as coolly as if he had to deal with a parcel 
 of school-boys out for a holiday. His military 
 capacity was indeed to be tested by no mean ordeal ; 
 but he was equal to the occasion. Relying on him- 
 self and on the spirit of the troops he understood so 
 well, he resolved to fight a general action with the 
 new enemy, while not relaxing either the siege or 
 the investment. 
 
 During the course of the evening, he moved all the 
 available men who could be spared, and drew them 
 up in two lines. Friend and foe bivouacked under 
 arms opposite to each other. At midnight a report 
 was brought in that several thousand of the enemy 
 were crossing the Betwa by a ford some little way off, 
 with the evident intention of turning the left of the 
 little British force and of relieving Jhansi from the 
 north. The General was at once compelled to send 
 his second line to oppose this flank movement, so that 
 he himself was left with a force which, all arms 
 included, did not amount to more than 900 men. He 
 
Il8 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 intended to open battle at daybreak ; notwithstand- 
 ing this disparity of numbers, to pour into the rebels 
 the fire of all his guns ; and then to turn and double 
 up their left flank. But before this plan could be 
 carried out, Tantia Topi vigorously attacked him 
 with all the elan of a foe certain of victory. 
 
 A decisive movement was therefore necessary, and 
 this was boldly and successfully carried out by the 
 infantry advancing against the enemy's centre, while 
 his flanks were attacked with horse artillery and 
 cavalry. To use Sir Hugh Rose's own words, ' the 
 enemy poured a heavy fusillade into the cavalry ; the 
 Valaitis jumped up in hundreds on high rocks and 
 boulders to load and fire, but before they could reload 
 their matchlocks. Captain Need, leading his troop in 
 advance, penetrated into the midst of them, and for a 
 time was so hotly engaged that his uniform was cut 
 to pieces, although, singular to say, he only received a 
 slight wound himself. The attack on the enemy's 
 right by the fire of Captain Lightfoot's battery and 
 the charge of the 14th Light Dragoons were equally 
 successful ; and the enemy broke and retired in 
 confusion.' 
 
 A general advance, straight against the enemy's 
 centre, turned the retreat of the rebels into a complete 
 rout. The whole of the artillery and cavalry were 
 now sent forward in pursuit. The fugitives — singly 
 or standing back to back — availed themselves of any 
 shelter they could find. Maddened with hhang, they 
 fought desperately ; springing on the pursuers, match- 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 119 
 
 lock and tuhvar in hand, or lying down and cutting 
 at them. The jungle, too, was set on fire by the 
 fugitives ; but nothing could check the ardour of the 
 pursuit, for the British saw within their reach Tantia 
 Topi's heavy artillery. 
 
 The four guns of the Eagle Troop and the Field 
 Battery under Captain Lightfoot galloped with Sir 
 Hugh Rose through the blazing jungle until they 
 reached the banks of the Betwa, after capturing a 
 horse battery. The gunners then opened fire on the 
 enemy, who were recrossing the Betwa in wild con- 
 fusion ; supported by their second line, which had 
 not yet come into action, and which now opposed 
 the pursuing troops with artillery and musketry 
 fire. But resistance was useless, and the pursuit 
 was continued till dark for some 16 miles. Tantia 
 Topi's loss in this extraordinary action was 1500 
 men, besides stores, siege guns, camp equipage, and 
 materials of war; welcome booty to the victors. 
 Tantia Topi himself fled to Kalpi, and the whole of 
 the Peshwa's army — which by threatening Bundel- 
 khand and taking Charkhari had so alarmed the 
 Governor-General and his advisers as- to induce them 
 to think that its defeat should be paramount to the 
 siege of Jhansi — was dispersed and broken. Whit- 
 lock was able to march on Banda. Charkhari was 
 already an aflfair of the past. And all this was 
 effected by a handful of disciplined men led by a 
 determined and skilful General. 
 
 Nor while thus subduing a district with one hand, 
 
 /0\ 
 
 UBRA/c?v 
 
120 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 would Sir Hugh Eose allow the siege operations to be 
 for an instant relaxed with the other. Anxious to 
 profit by the discouragement caused among the be- 
 sieged and the fresh energy infused into the besiegers, 
 the General resolved to strike at once. He gave his 
 men no rest and they themselves did not expect it. 
 Breach or no breach he determined that Jhansi should 
 be taken on the 3rd of April. And it was taken. For 
 the men under his command, although well-nigh tu^ed 
 out, were no less confident and resolute. 
 
 The front and enfilading fire on the breach was so 
 heavy that except from the fort the enemy made but 
 little resistance at this point ; but at the rocket battery 
 on the left^ which was taken by escalade, and also along 
 the defence works on the left, likewise taken by 
 escalade, they made a desperate resistance ; fii'st with 
 artillery fire, rockets, stink-pots, &c., and then in a 
 hand-to-hand fight with spears and swords. 
 
 Though the 3rd Europeans under Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Liddell did their duty bravely, the attack by 
 escalade on the right failed ^, on account of the short- 
 
 ^ Here there were several casualties. Amongst the killed were 
 two gallant young officers, Lieutenants Meicklejohn and Dick, both 
 of the Bombay Engineers. Lieutenant Meicklejohn, leading the 
 storming party up the ladders, had reached the topmost rung, 
 when he was wounded, dragged from the ladder by the Valaitis, 
 and hacked to pieces on the wall, where his body was found by 
 Colonel Louth's column. He had spent the previous night in 
 making his will and writing to his mother, wife of the Presbji;erian 
 clergyman at Hopetoun. In his letter he said that he felt certain 
 he would be killed in the next day's storm, and that Sir Hugh 
 Rose would do his best to obtain his vacancy for a younger brother. 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 121 
 
 ness of one of the ladders, the breaking down of others, 
 and the fierceness of the defence. But the attack on 
 the breach and the escalade on the left proved suc- 
 cessful. To quote from Sir Hugh Rose's own notes : 
 *The left attack, ably and gallantly conducted by 
 Brigadier Stuart, succeeded perfectly ; its right column 
 passing without loss or difficulty through the breach. 
 The escalade on the left of the breach was, at the same 
 time, gallantly led by Lieutenant (now Major-General) 
 Webber, E-.E., a first-rate officer, and the capture of the 
 Rocket Bastion was effected after an obstinate re- 
 sistance. It was only finally taken after a severe 
 struggle inside the bastion. Colonel Louth, com- 
 manding Her Majesty's 86th Regiment, acted with 
 
 On the General's application, the vacancy was filled according to 
 the dead man's wish. Lieutenant Dick, some days before the 
 assault, had committed an error of judgment in screening, with 
 the best intentions, a sergeant of Sappers, who had been looting 
 in spite of the General's most positive orders. Such an example 
 was so fatal to discipline that Lieutenant Dick rendered himself 
 liable to a Court Martial. Sir Hugh Kose sent for the young officer 
 and told him of the penalty he had incurred, adding : ' But I have 
 heard of your high promise and good qualities, and I cannot 
 subject you to a punishment which would be ruinous to your 
 career, and deprive you of the honour of the assault. I therefore 
 pardon you and I know you will do your duty to-morrow.' On 
 putting his foot on the step of the scaling-ladder Lieutenant Dick 
 said to a brother-officer, '■ I never can be sufficiently obliged to Sir 
 Hugh Rose : tell him how I have done my duty.' He ran up 
 the ladder, received several shots, and fell mortally wounded to 
 the ground. Sir Hugh Rose had also to deplore the death of 
 Colonel Turnbull, commanding the Artillery, who had given re- 
 markable proof of ability and intrepidity throughout the campaign, 
 and who now fell mortally wounded by a shot from one of the 
 rebel lascars. 
 
122 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 the same cool judgment which he had shown at 
 Chandari. The regiment carried the breach with 
 little loss, and bringing their shoulders forward, 
 swept round in rear of the wall, which in most 
 instances caused the precipitate retreat of its de- 
 fenders.' 
 
 The General himself^ entering the breach with the 
 troops, moved on with some companies of the 86th 
 Regiment to take the palace. Hurrying across a 
 large open space under fire from the fort — a fire 
 which it was impossible to return — they fought their 
 way through the streets to the palace gates. An 
 entrance was soon forced, and then the conflict waxed 
 fiercer than ever. Driven from room to room, the 
 enemy defended themselves with the fury of despair, 
 setting light to trains of powder on the floor, and 
 even to the ammunition in their pouches. 
 
 The right and left attacking parties were now con- 
 centrated in the palace. The next thing to be done 
 was to clear the city of the numerous armed rebels, 
 who remained in the houses and were firing on the 
 troops. Part of this task was accomplished that same 
 day, April 3rd, not without many desperate hand-to- 
 hand combats. In particular there was a terrible 
 fight in the palace stables^, between some men of 
 Her Majesty's 86th Regiment; and thirty or forty 
 Valaiti troopers of the Rani's bodyguard. The 86th 
 Regiment here captured over thirty standards and 
 an English Union Jack, which had been given by 
 Lord William Bentinck to a former ruler of Jhansi, 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 123 
 
 with permission to have it carried before him as a 
 reward for his fidelity. 
 
 Toward sunset, the signalling party telegraphed 
 from the observatory that the enemy were again 
 approaching from the east ; and the troops, well-nigh 
 spent, one would have thought, after their thirteen 
 hours' fiofhtins: under a fierce sun, were nevertheless 
 ready to begin again with as much spirit as if they 
 were fresh from the parade ground. The alarm 
 happily proved, however, to be a false one ; troops 
 arriving from Tehri having been mistaken for the 
 enemy. 
 
 The next day, April 4th, the remainder of the city 
 was captured and occupied. In the evening, the 
 Rani, accompanied by 300 Valaitis and 25 troopers, 
 left the fort and fled towards Kalpi. It was afterwards 
 discovered that her horse had been brought into the 
 fort ditch, with the connivance of a native contingent 
 serving with Sir Hugh Rose, and that after being let 
 down from a window in the turret she was placed in 
 the saddle, with her stepson in her lap, and thus 
 escaped. Next morning, April 5th, Sir Hugh Rose 
 occupied the fortress without meeting further resist- 
 ance. 
 
 Thus ended the siege of Jhansi. The Central India 
 Field Force had been contending against an enemy 
 more than double their number, and posted behind 
 formidable fortifications ; an enemy who at the assault 
 and afterwards defended themselves most stubbornly. 
 For seventeen days and nights the men had never 
 
124 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 taken off their clothes, nor unsaddled the horses of 
 the cavalry and artillery pickets. To this constant 
 strain was added exposure under a burning sun, and 
 there were several fatal cases of sunstroke. But the 
 discipline and spirit of the troops enabled them to 
 overcome difficulties and opposition of every kind, 
 and finally to take by storm the strongest fortress in 
 Central India, with a loss to the rebels of some 5000 
 killed alone. The casualties in the Central India 
 Field Force in the operations before Jhansi and the 
 fight at the Betwa were '>fi officers and 307 men killed 
 and wounded, besides those who died of sunstroke 
 and fatigue. The victors treated the enemy's women 
 and children with humanity. ' Neither the desperate 
 resistance of the rebels nor the recollection of the 
 revolting and wholesale murders perpetrated the 
 preceding year at that place,' said Sir Hugh Rose, 
 * could make them foro-et that, in an Enoiish soldier's 
 eyes, the women and children are always spared. So 
 far from hurting, the troops were seen sharing their 
 rations with them.' 
 
 The satisfaction of the authorities at the fall of this 
 city fortress was of course great. The Duke of Cam- 
 bridge wrote to Sir Hugh Rose: 'This operation is 
 highly satisfactory, and it only proves how much can 
 be done with a small force, such as the one under 
 your command, if it is but ably handled. I had 
 always the greatest confidence in your talent and 
 judgment.' 
 
 Sir Colin Campbell also congratulated the General 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 125 
 
 very heartily on all he had accomplished. ' Your 
 operations,' he said, ' have been conducted with much 
 skill, and I have reason to thank you for the manner 
 in which you have executed the difficult tasks 
 assigned to you by the Government of India.' 
 
 Sir George Whitlock also sent a message from 
 Banda : ' Really your motto seems to be Fern, Yidi^ 
 Vici, whilst my Second Brigade, with their snail's 
 pace, has prevented me leaving this place.' 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 The Southern Operations {continued) 
 TO THE Recapture of Gwalior 
 
 Leaving a small portion of his Second Brigade to 
 garrison Jhansi, Sir Hugh Rose marched on April 25th, 
 1858, with his First Brigade for Kalpi, 102 miles to 
 the north-east. He had hardly started when infor- 
 mation came that the Sepoy garrison of Kalpi, 
 reinforced by Valaitis under the Rani of Jhansi, 
 and by Tantia Topi with the Gwalior Contingent, 
 and other rebels, had occupied Kunch (42 miles from 
 Kalpi and between it and Jhansi). Kunch was a 
 difficult place to attack owing to the woods, gardens, 
 and temple enclosures lying round it ; and the enemy 
 had strongly fortified the western quarter and the 
 Jhansi gate. 
 
 Acting on his usual principle, that nothing was so 
 likely to disconcert the rebels as turning their flank 
 and threatening their rear, Sir Hugh Rose resolved 
 to mask the fortified front on the Jhansi road and 
 to attack Kunch in flank. In accordance with these 
 tactics, as well as to avoid a protracted engage- 
 ment in the fierce heat of the sun, he made a 
 long night march to the left flank, and shortly 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS T27 
 
 after daybreak arrived opposite the west side of 
 Kunch, in rear of the fort and town ; thus turning 
 the strong defences of the Jhansi gate. After the 
 troops had rested, the artillery opened fire, and the 
 infantry prepared to storm the fort. A wing of 
 the 86th Regiment and the 25th Bombay Native 
 Infantry were thrown into skirmishing order, sup- 
 ported on the flank by detachments of artillery and 
 cavalry ; the remainder of the attacking force being 
 formed into a second line. The skirmishers of the 
 Native Infantry, under cover of the guns, cleared 
 the woods, temples, and walled gardens ; whilst the 
 British regiment, led by Major Stuart, made a circuit 
 to the left, taking all the obstacles in their front, and 
 cutting the enemy's line in two ; thereby. Sir Hugh 
 Rose wrote in his despatch, adding ' another claim to 
 the obligations I owe this regiment for their very 
 distinsjuished conduct at all times in the field.' 
 
 The enemy, seeing their defence thus broken down, 
 and their right completely turned, retii'ed in masses 
 from Kunch to the extensive plains stretching to- 
 wards Kalpi, forming a long, irregular line, covered 
 by skirmishers at close intervals. So keen, however, 
 was the pursuit, that they soon became a helpless 
 mob of runaways, losing in the retreat some 600 men 
 besides 15 guns. 
 
 During the operations before Kiinch the men of 
 the 71st Highlanders (who had recently joined the 
 force by bullock-train from Bombay) and of the 
 3rd Europeans dropped down in numbers on the 
 
128 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 field from sunstroke. In fact, the sun was a far 
 more deadly enemy than the rebels, for there was 
 no cover. Dooli after dooli was brought into tlie 
 field hospital, with officers and men suffering from 
 sunstroke, some dead, some prostrate, others laughing 
 or sobbing in delirium. The General himself had 
 fallen three times from sunstroke, but each time 
 forced himself to rally until the victory was won. 
 When the men moved off towards the encamping 
 ground on the Kalpi side of Kunch, they were com- 
 pletely worn out ; the action having lasted from 
 daybreak till 9 o'clock at night, in a heat which 
 was 110° in the shade. 
 
 Before marching on to Kalpi, Sir Hugh Rose 
 detached Major Gall with a small force to attack 
 and take the strong fort of Lohari, held by Valaitis, 
 six or seven miles on his left flank. This was done 
 with great gallantry. The fort was too strong to 
 batter with field artillery, and the only entrance was 
 a difficult one, built on the old Maratha plan of a 
 double gate with a small postern in an angle. Here 
 the 3rd Europeans particularly distinguished them- 
 selves. A desperate struggle took place when they 
 got into the first gate. Two officers were severely 
 wounded, and several men killed. A soldier named 
 Whirlpool^ received no less than nineteen wounds. 
 
 * He had been mentioned in despatches for saving the lives of 
 two comrades who had fallen wounded from the broken ladders at 
 the siege of Jhansi. He himself lived to receive the Victoria Cross 
 and sixpence a day beyond his usual pension. Sir Hugh Rose 
 always thought that the name of Whirlpool was assumed, and 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 129 
 
 ^Take care, lads,' he said, as they put him into the 
 dooli, 'and don't shake my head, or else it will 
 come off.' 
 
 Writing of the action of Kunch, three days after- 
 wards, Sir HughKose said : 'We should have destroyed 
 the enemy, had not the dreadful heat paralysed 
 the men. Eleven poor fellows were killed outright 
 by the sun, and many more were struck down. I 
 was obliged four times to get off my horse by 
 excessive debility. The doctor poured cold water 
 over me, and gave restoratives, which enabled me to 
 go on again. I do not think I shall stay in India to 
 pass such another torment as 110° in the shade. I have 
 succeeded militarily better than I could have expected, 
 and that is all I wanted.' He also wrote to a 
 relative : ' I took Kiinch from the rebels in a heat 
 which cannot be told — 110° in the shade. Owing to 
 God's great mercy to me, I have had thirteen fights, 
 and always won the day — never one check. Your 
 old regiment, the 71st Highlanders, had twelve men 
 struck down in the ranks. Afterwards, near Kalpi, 
 it was II 9° in the shade, and 200 men out of less than 
 400 of the 25th Native Infantry fell out of the ranks, 
 stricken by the sun. I delight in the 71st,' he added, 
 'and I have such a splendid regiment in the 86th. 
 They go at anything.' 
 
 afterwards learnt that the man was a son of Mr. Conker, the 
 postmaster of Dundalk. When the General was in command in 
 Ireland the parents came to thank him for his kindness to their 
 son, who was then in New South Wales. 
 
130 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 An urgent message now arrived from the Civil 
 Officer at Kunch, saying that unless Sir Hugh Rose 
 marched at once to the right bank of the Jumna, 
 Tantia Topi and the Rani at Kalpi, with the Nawab of 
 Banda at Nowgong, twenty miles to the south-west 
 of Kalpi, would cut him off, and so prevent him 
 ' giving a hand,' as desired by the Government of 
 India, to Sir Colin Campbell. He accordingly made 
 forced marches towards Kalpi, leaving a small detach- 
 ment ^ to strike the tents at Kunch, and to join him as 
 quickly as they could at Gulauli on the Jumna, seven 
 miles from Kalpi. 
 
 The troops had now to contend, not only against 
 the rebel army, fighting with all the advantages of 
 superior numbers and knowledge of the ground, but 
 with an Indian sun at its maximum of summer heat. 
 The number of officers and men on the sick list 
 increased daily, and added to the difficulties of trans- 
 port. There was a scarcity both of water and forage. 
 But obstacles were things that had to be overcome. 
 A check, or worse still, a defeat before Kalpi, in the 
 advanced state of the hot season and with the rains 
 close at hand, while resuscitating rebellion throughout 
 
 ^ At one of the halting-places, the General found a party of sick 
 and wounded lying on the ground in their great coats, with their 
 knapsacks under their heads for a pillow. He asked if they had 
 any complaints, * Complaints, sir,' said the siirgeon in charge, 
 ' they haven't a single thing which they would have in an English 
 hospital in camp, at home, or in the field ; but,' he added, ' they 
 have no complaints except one, and that is, they cannot march 
 with you to-morrow against the enemy.' The men, raising their 
 heads from their knapsacks, smiled in assent. 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 13 1 
 
 India, would have compromised the safety of Cawn- 
 pur, and have exposed the extensive line of operations 
 conducted by the Commander-in-Chief to an attack 
 in flank. 
 
 For the protection of Kalpi the rebels had con- 
 structed elaborate defence works on the main road 
 from Kunch. Finding it impossible to bring an 
 adequate force against these defences, Sir Hugh Rose 
 determined to break off to the right and to join 
 hands with Brigadier (now Sir George) Maxwell's 
 small force^ which had been sent by the Commander- 
 in-Chief to the left bank of the river to co-operate 
 with him. To mislead the enemy, and mask this 
 movement, he directed his Second Brigade to follow 
 up the high road to Kalpi, although its movements 
 were unfortunately paralysed by sickness. Notwith- 
 standing these difficulties, two pontoon rafts, brought 
 with great trouble from Poona_, were thrown over the 
 Jumna, and the actual junction with Sir Colin 
 Campbell's army was effected on May 15, 1858. 
 The next few days were spent in skirmishes with the 
 enemy and in preparing for the attack on Kalpi. 
 
 By this time sickness had made fearful inroads on 
 the strength of Sir Hugh Rose's column. The super- 
 intending surgeon, Dr. Arnott, reported in an official 
 letter that the greater part of the force, officers as well 
 as men, from the General and his staff downwards, 
 were ill from sunstroke ; and he declared that if 
 the operations were to be protracted for more than a 
 few days, the entire column would be absolutely 
 
 I a 
 
1^2 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 prostrated ^. Lord Canning was so alarmed at these 
 dismal forebodings that he wished to send his Body- 
 guard to the assistance of the Central India Force ; 
 but before this and other contemplated reinforcements 
 could be despatched, and before the expiry of the 
 term specified by Dr. Arnott, Kalpi was taken. 
 
 So admirable was the conduct of the men under 
 these trials that their Commander wrote of them in 
 his official despatch: 'These noble soldiers, whose 
 successes were never chequered by a reverse, with a 
 discipline which was as enduring as their courage, 
 never proffered one complaint. They fell in their 
 ranks, struck down by the sun^ and exhausted by 
 
 ^ Writing on May 19th, 1858, Dr. Arnott said : — 'In the action 
 before Kunch of the 7th instant, one regiment, about 420 strong, 
 lost seven men by sunstroke, and on the march to Banda lost five 
 men and admitted 35 into hospital ; and whenever it has been 
 exposed it has suffered very severely. Though the rest of the 
 troops have borne exposure better, their losses have been heavy 
 and their admissions into the hospital very numerous, from the 
 overwhelming effects of a temperature ranging from 109° to 117° 
 in tents, and seldom falling under 100° at night. But to illustrate 
 better the state of health of all ranks, I may mention that we have 
 now 310 Europeans in hosj)ital, having lost in the week 21 by sun- 
 stroke ; and there is scarcely an officer of the Staff fit for duty. 
 The Quartermaster-General, Clergyman, the Adjutant-General, 
 the Commissariat Officer, the Baggage Master, the Brigade Major 
 and Quartermaster-General and Brigadier of the 2nd Brigade, 
 are all sick. Several of these and many other officers will have to 
 go to Europe, and others will have to go elsewhere for change of 
 climate. Thus paralysed as the force already is, and with the rest 
 enfeebled and worn out by this long and arduous campaign, I 
 cannot refrain from mentioning my apprehensions that should 
 the operations before Kalpi be protracted and the exposure great, 
 the force will be completely prostrated.' 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 133 
 
 fatigue ; but they would not increase the anxieties of 
 their General or belie their devotion by complaint. 
 No matter how great their exhaustion or how deep 
 their short sleep^ they always sprung to my call to 
 arms with the heartiest good-will. To think of 
 yielding or retreating would have been ignominy. 
 All felt that physical strength might fail, but that the 
 spirit and discipline never could. They were often 
 too ill to march, but their devotion made them fight. 
 It is almost superfluous to add that troops animated 
 by so high a sense of duty were sober, orderly, and 
 very respectful to their ofiicers. There was less crime 
 in my camp than in garrison.' 
 
 Kalpi is situated on a high rock rising from the 
 Jumna, and is surrounded by miles of deep ravines. 
 Sallying out from their almost impregnable ambuscade, 
 the rebels unceasingly hampered the troops on the 
 left of Sir Hugh E-ose's position ; while opposite his 
 right was the army of the Nawab of Banda, who, 
 after his defeat by Whitlock (19th April, 1858), joined 
 the rebels at Kalpi, with a serviceable body of cavahy. 
 
 Acting upon information that the enemy intended 
 to make a determined attack upon his right, on the 
 morning of May 22nd, Sir Hugh Rose at once 
 strengthened his position there ; and at the same time 
 asked Brigadier Maxwell to send him the Camel Corps, 
 two companies of the 88th Regiment, and some Sikh 
 infantry. Placing himself in the centre of his line, 
 with the Camel Corps under Major (now Lieutenant- 
 General Sir John) Ross, he was ready, on the eventful 
 
134 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 day, to meet any emergency ; that is to say, to rein- 
 force the right or left as required. Shortly afterwards, 
 an orderly came from Brigadier Stuart, who was 
 commanding on the right, begging him to come up 
 immediately with reinforcements, as the rebels were 
 debouching from the ravines and were advancing in 
 strength. The General at once started himself with 
 the Camel Corps ; sending orders to the 25th Native 
 Infantry to join him immediately. Dismounting the 
 Camel Sowars, and forming them into line, he took 
 them at the double up the rising ground, from the 
 top of which they saw Brigadier Stuart, sword in 
 hand, protecting his battery of mortars, with the help 
 of his infantry escort. Their strength had been so re- 
 duced and weakened by casualties, that there were 
 only seven or eight artillerymen to both mortars ^ 
 
 A charge of the Camel Corps soon relieved the 
 position from immediate danger. But the enemy 
 still swarmed out from the ravines, and became 
 closely engaged with the 86th Regiment. The Gwa- 
 
 ^ In his graphic account of these operations Colonel Malleson 
 quotes a letter addressed to him by an eye-witness, who wrote : 
 'Well do I remember that day. Nearly 400 of my regiment— the 
 86th — were lnors de combat. The native regiment — the 25th Bengal 
 Native Infantry — were not much better, and thousands of yelling 
 savages were pressing on while we had a river in our rear. We were 
 well nigh beaten when the Camel Corps came up ; and about 150 
 fresh troops soon turned the tide, and sent the bhang-fortified enemy 
 to the rightabout again. It was the Camel Corps that virtually saved 
 Sir Hugh Eose's division. The enemy were within twenty yards 
 of our battery and outpost tents, the latter full of men down with 
 sunstroke. Another quarter of an hour and there would have 
 been a massacre.* 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 135 
 
 lior ScpojT^s — fine stalwart men in red jackets and 
 white turbans, with white trousers di'awn up to the 
 thigh — looked like demons as they advanced, uttering 
 imprecations against the English. 
 
 The European troops were hampered by defective 
 ammunition ; while their great exertions, and the 
 gi'eat heat of the sun, caused numerous sunstrokes. 
 Sir Hugh Rose here received his fifth. Before this 
 happened, however, he had seen at a glance that their 
 defective ammunition rendered the men useless as 
 skirmishers, and that it was no longer profitable to 
 employ them as such. Closing his men, therefore, 
 in double time on their centre, he ordered them to 
 charge the enemy, who, unable to withstand the 
 shock, fell back in confusion to their ravines, sufiering 
 heavy losses as they fled. 
 
 In the meantime Sir Hugh Rose heard that his left 
 had completely succeeded in driving back into Kalpi 
 the force under the Rani of Jhansi and Rao Sahib. 
 The battle was won, and he might attack Kalpi itself 
 the next morning before daybreak. 
 
 But the enemy, whose Tiiorale was shattered by 
 their defeat, had already begun to evacuate the place. 
 In fact Kalpi had been won ^ by the general action on 
 the banks of the Jumna, and was next day occupied 
 without further fighting. Vast quantities of stores, 
 ammunition, guns, &c., were found in the fort, which 
 
 * In justice to a gallant officer it must here be said that to the 
 efficient co-operation of Brigadier Maxwell, Sir Hugh Rose owed 
 much of his success in the difficult operations before Kalpi. 
 
136 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 was a central depot for the rebel troops stationed 
 south of the Jumna, and between that river and the 
 Ganges. 
 
 When explaining to the Commander-in-Chief his 
 reasons for calling on Brigadier Maxwell to assist 
 him, for which he had been censured, Sir Hugh Rose 
 stated (May 26, 1858) that he was influenced by the 
 wish to effect the rapid capture of Kalpi. He had no 
 plan of the fort and only a faulty Ordnance map to 
 consult. ' When I came near Kalpi,' he wrote, ' I found 
 that it was surrounded by a belt of ravines about two 
 miles in breadth, as difficult ground as could be seen, 
 and that to attack the fort I must force the ravines, 
 of which the enemy had entrenched the entrance, 
 and afterwards the town which surrounds the fort. 
 I always thought and hoped that I should have one 
 good fight with the rebels for Kalpi ; and that if they 
 lost it, they would evacuate the town and fort. After 
 being beaten at Kunch, they would have evacuated 
 Kalpi had not the Nawab of Banda reinforced them 
 with a large body of troops and induced them to stay. 
 But whether the attack of Kalpi was to be deter- 
 mined by one or by many days operations^ I felt the 
 conviction that I required reinforcements on account 
 of the sickly state of my force^ and the great strength 
 of the ground defended by entrenchments. All the 
 old Indian officers of my force say that they never 
 felt, not even in Sind, so bad a heat as that of the 
 Jumna. The men affected by it had apoplexy, 
 violent crying fits, and lost their heads and sight. 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 137 
 
 Brigadier Stuart and all his staff were on the sick 
 list. Out of '^6 men of the 14th Light Dragoons who 
 went from Gulauli to reinforce a party escorting 
 supplies and threatened by the enemy, 17, after being 
 out only three hours, came home in doolis. Out of 
 less than 400 men of the 25th Bombay Native 
 Infantry whom I took to reinforce the Second Bri- 
 gade, 200 fell out of the number after two hours/ 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose added : ' The Sepoys having sworn 
 by the Jumna, and full of opium, made a fierce attack 
 on my camp. The first on May 20th was only on 
 our right. It was of course beaten back ; but I did 
 not advance because I knew the enemy's tactics were 
 to expose us as much as possible to the sun, and I 
 had made arrangements with Maxwell to attack Kalpi 
 on the 22nd after he had shelled the enemy^s defences 
 in and in advance of the town. The second attack 
 was on May 22nd. It was a general one and by their 
 whole force. They made a real and violent attack on 
 our right, and a strong feint against our centre and 
 left. Hearing a heavy fire on our right, I sent to ask 
 Brigadier Stuart if I should send him any of the 
 Camel Corps. He asked for 1 00. I went myself with 
 200 to his support. I found him with very few men, 
 half of whose rifles would not go off on account of 
 bad ammunition ^ ; and 40 men were lying close to 
 
 ^ It was a proof of the inadequacy of musketry instruction at 
 that time that the troops, having been trained to fire at so short 
 a distance, fired generally with a bad aim and too high. The 
 enemy's casualties were consequently few, and those chiefly from 
 the bayonet. The men had not, moreover, been trained either 
 
138 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 him struck down by the sun. The enemy were close 
 up to his two nine-pounder guns ; and Brigadier Stuart 
 was so hard pressed that he was on the point of 
 ordering the Artillerymen to draw their swords and 
 defend their guns. I ordered the Rifles and 8cth to 
 charge with their bayonets, which young Ross did 
 most gallantly and effectually, driving the enemy 
 back for half a mile. The w^hole line then advanced ; 
 and they ran in every direction, pursued and cut up 
 by the infantry, cavalry, and artillery. . . . The rebels 
 are completely down and discouraged. In the pursuit 
 they threw away their arms and made no resistance. 
 Among other guns we took ten horse-artillery guns 
 of which they are so proud. We found a subterranean 
 magazine of ammunition in the fort, two or three 
 excellent foundries and gun manufactories. The 
 quantity of powder and ordnance stores in the maga- 
 zine is extraordinary.' 
 
 In a general order to the force, thanking them for 
 their devotion and discipline. Sir Hugh Rose said 
 amongst other things : ' When you first marched I 
 told you, as British soldiers, you had more than 
 enough of the courage for the work which was before 
 
 to fire at an enemy on a high elevation, nor at an enemy on a 
 bank across broad ravines. A defect in the ammunition supplied 
 to the force also made itself felt. From the mistake of not con- 
 centrating the whole strength of the powder in the charge by a 
 round ring at the bottom, which gave expansion to the leaden 
 bullet, the cone was only blown off by the explosion ; and the 
 shell of the bullet stuck in the rifle. This happened to all the 
 skirmishers, to the distraction and danger of the men. 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 139 
 
 you, but that courage without discipline was of no 
 avail ; and I exhorted you to let discipline be your 
 watchword. You have attended to my orders. In 
 hardships, in temptations, and in dangers, you have 
 obeyed your General and have never left your ranks. 
 You have fought against the strong, and you have 
 protected the rights of the weak and defenceless, of 
 foes as well as of friends. I have seen you in the 
 heat of the combat preserve and place children out 
 of harm's way. This is the discipline of Christian 
 soldiers, and this it is which has brought you 
 triumphant from the shores of Western India to the 
 waters of the Jumna.' 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose himself was prostrated with sickness. 
 He had had three attacks of the sun at Kunch, a 
 fourth in an intermediate reconnaissance, and a fifth 
 in the general action before Kalpi. As the remedies 
 administered to enable him to rise again, ride, and 
 retain command in the field were necessarily strong, 
 whilst his duties became more onerous from all his 
 stafif being sick or ailing, he became quite overborne 
 with fatigue and anxiety. The condition of the force 
 was described by an eye-witness (Dr. Lowe), who 
 wrote : ' The General was very ill ; his chief of the stafiT, 
 General Wetherall, was in a raging fever ; his Quarter- 
 master-General, Captain Macdonald, worn out ; the 
 Chaplain of the Force had lost his reason, and was 
 apparently sinking fast.'' 
 
 The capture of Kalpi completed the plan of the 
 campaign, which the Government of India had drawn 
 
I40 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 Tip for the Central Indian Force. Marching from 
 Mhow in January, 1858, that force in five months 
 had traversed Central India, had beaten the enemy in 
 thirteen general actions and sieges, and had captured 
 some of the strono^est forts in India. Lord Canning 
 telegraphed to Sir Hugh Rose on May 24th, 1858 : 
 ' Your capture of Kalpi has crowned a series of 
 brilliant and uninterrupted successes. I thank you 
 and your brave soldiers v^ith all my heart.' 
 
 Sir Colin Campbell had decided that after the fall 
 of Kalpi the Central India Field Force was to be 
 broken up, and to be distributed at Gwalior and 
 Jhansi. The necessary arrangements were taken in 
 hand ; and Sir Hugh Rose, worn out with fatigue and 
 sunstroke, was advised by his medical officer to 
 return at once to Bombay. But before he could 
 start, intelligence came which upset all his plans and 
 created a sensation throughout India hardly inferior 
 to that caused by the first mutinies. The rebel army 
 under Tantia Topi and the Rani of Jhansi, the report 
 said, whilst retreating across the Chambal river, had 
 changed their route, and had attacked the Maharaja 
 Sindhia at Bahadurpur, nine miles from Gwalior; 
 whereupon his Highness' troops of all arms, with 
 the exception of a few of his bodyguard, had treach- 
 erously gone over en r)iasse to the enemy. 
 
 The Maharaja, it seems, had called out his troops 
 to co-operate with Lord Clyde's army against the 
 rebels who were retreating into Rohilkhand ; but 
 when he paraded them in order to march, they 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 141 
 
 mutinied to a man. After a brave endeavour to 
 assert his authority, he was forced by the fire of his 
 own artillery and the combined attacks of his troops 
 and of the rebel army to fly to Agra, which place he 
 reached with difficulty, accompanied by only one or 
 two attendants. The rebels had meanwhile entered 
 Gwalior and looted the treasury and jewels ; amongst 
 these latter being a famous pearl necklace taken 
 from the Portuguese regalia. The garrison of the 
 fort at the same time opened its gate to the rebels ; 
 and from 50 to 60 fine guns (comprising horse, field, 
 and siege artillery), as well as an arsenal with abund- 
 ance of warlike stores, fell into the enemy's hands. 
 Thus the rebels who had fled a disorderly and help- 
 less mob from Kalpi, now found themselves provided 
 with abundance of money, with a serviceable park of 
 artillery, with iniaUriel of war, and with Sindhia's 
 army as their allies. To render the situation still 
 more embarrassing, Gwalior fell into rebel hands at 
 the most unfavourable time of the year for military 
 operations ; on the eve, that is, of the great rains, and 
 when the heat of summer was at its maximum. 
 
 This serious news reached Sir Hugh Hose just 
 after his leave had been granted. A few days' rest 
 had revived him and he at once telegraphed to the 
 Governor- General to say that he would be glad to 
 take command of the force ordered to recapture the 
 city and fortress. Lord Canning thanked him warmly 
 for this generous devotion to the public service, and ac- 
 cepted the offer. At the same time, Brigadier-General 
 
142 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 (the late Field-Marshal Lord) Napier, who had been 
 appointed to succeed Sir Hugh Eose on his departure 
 to Bombay, now with the generosity which always 
 characterised him, told Lord Canning that he would 
 be delighted to serve as second in command ; and Sir 
 Hugh Eose was glad to have so able an officer to 
 assist him in the operations. 
 
 Starting on June 5th, Sir Hugh reached Bahadur- 
 pur, the scene of Sindhia's defeat, on June i6th. The 
 march was attended with considerable difficulties on 
 account of the absence of roads, the want of maps, 
 rivers difficult to be crossed, and heat so intense that 
 the thermometer on one occasion stood at 130° when 
 it broke. Sir Hugh Eose's plan of operations was to 
 invest Gwalior as closely as its great extent would 
 allow, and then to attack on the weakest side ; the 
 investing troops cutting off the escape of the rebels. 
 He hoped that the defeat of the enemy, outside and 
 inside the city, would be followed, as at Kalpi, by 
 the easy capture of the fortress. A scientific siege of 
 the fortress would have prolonged the operations far 
 into the rainy season. With great trouble he had 
 ascertained that the weakest side of Gwalior, and con- 
 sequently the best suited for an attack, was the east, 
 where the city was commanded by high hills. Here, 
 too, Gwalior might be captured almost out of range 
 of the guns in the fort. 
 
 Placing the Haidarabad Contingent in a position to 
 cut off the retreat of the rebels to the South, and 
 directing Brigadier Smith with the Eajputana Field 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 143 
 
 Force to move from Sipri to Kotah-ki-Sarai, about 
 seven miles to the east of Gwalior, Sir Hugh Rose, on 
 June 1 6th, marched with Brigadier Stuart's column 
 and the small force he had brought from Kalpi 
 against the Morar cantonments. These cantonments, 
 which lay about five miles from Gwalior, were re- 
 ported to be in the enemy's possession. 
 
 A close reconnaissance showed that the side of the 
 cantonments fronting his force was occupied by strong 
 bodies of cavalry, and that with them were guns and 
 a considerable number of infantry. Feeling certain 
 that his men would be reinvigorated rather than 
 fatigued by an immediate action, and that the morale 
 of the enemy would be damped by his attacking them 
 unexpectedly after a long night's march, — for he had 
 only reached Bahadurpur at 6 a.m. on June 16th and 
 marched against Morar the same day, — he resolved to 
 strike at once, and placed the troops in order of 
 battle. 
 
 The advance, covered by the Haidarabad cavalry, 
 was made in two lines in echelon from the right. 
 The first line, under the General himself, consisted of 
 a field battery and siege guns in the centre, the 86th 
 Regiment on the right, the 25th Bombay Native In- 
 fantry on the left, and the 14th Light Dragoons on 
 each flank. The second line, under Brigadier-General 
 Napier, was placed in echelon on his left; the left was 
 ' refused,' as the ravines in this direction were full of 
 ambuscaded troops and such a formation would enable 
 the whole force to wheel rapidly to the left if necessary. 
 
144 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 Patrols of cavalry were at the same time sent to searcli 
 the hills on the left and rear. 
 
 As the troops advanced, the enemy in the ravines 
 were forced to show themselves by Brigadier- General 
 Napier, and a sharp action took place between them 
 and the 71st Highlanders, who behaved admirably, 
 routing the enemy with great slaughter. In Sir 
 Hugh Rose's own words, ' the commander of the 
 second line merited my warmest thanks for his skilful 
 management of it.' On this occasion, Lieutenant 
 Neave, of the 71st Highlanders, who led a charge 
 against the enemy and fell mortally wounded, par- 
 ticularly distinguished himself; and a sergeant and 
 private of the regiment obtained the Victoria Cross 
 for personal bravery. The success was completed by 
 an admirable pursuit of the rebels by a wing of the 
 14th Light Dragoons. 
 
 The capture of the Morar cantonments had good 
 results. It was the first defeat which the combined 
 forces of the Kalpi and Gwalior rebels had sustained ; 
 and it enabled Sir Hugh Rose to at once open up 
 communications with Brigadier Smith at Kotah-ki- 
 Sarai, seven miles to the east, and to reconnoitre 
 Gwalior from that side. 
 
 In the meantime, Er'gadier Smith had a sharp en- 
 counter with the enemy and was able partially to 
 occupy the heights to the east of Gwalior, in spite of 
 determined opposition. In resisting a gallant charge 
 of a squadron of the 8th Hussars under Captain 
 Heneage, — when the Hussars passed right through 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 145 
 
 the enemy's camp, carrying everything before them — 
 the Rani of Jhansi received her death wound; and 
 the spot ^Yas afterwards shown where her body was 
 burnt with great ceremony ^. Thus fell ' the bravest 
 and best military leader of the rebels ' at the early 
 age of twenty years. 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose's reconnaissance of Gwalior satisfied 
 him that the information on which he had decided to 
 attack was trustworthy. He could not leave Morar, 
 however, without adequate protection. Brigadier- 
 General Napier was accordingly posted at the canton- 
 ments to guard the position, with instructions to 
 pursue the enemy when they retreated; while Sir 
 Hugh himself, in order to complete his communi- 
 cations with Brigadier Smith and to attack Gwalior 
 from the east, marched on the afternoon of June 
 1 8th towards Kotah-ki-Sarai. The march was very 
 harassing, 100 men of the 86th Regiment alone being 
 compelled by the sun to fall out and go into doolis. 
 There was clearly no time to lose, and the enemy had 
 to be attacked at once. A deep ditch surrounded the 
 high hills which overlooked Gwalior ; but notwith- 
 standing this obstacle, the troops quickly gained 
 possession of the heights to the east of the town, and 
 came in full view of it. A large party of the rebels, 
 
 * This Indian Joan of Arc was dressed in a red jacket and 
 trousers and white turban. She wore Sindhia's celebrated pearl 
 necklace which she had taken from his treasury. As she lay 
 mortally wounded in her tent, she ordered these ornaments to 
 be distributed among her troops. The whole rebel army mourned 
 her loss. 
 
 E 
 
146 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 some 10,000 men, were seen drawn up on the parade 
 square, with numerous cavalry and two i8-pounders, 
 besides other guns. 
 
 Brigadier Smith having come up in the mean- 
 time and turned the enemy's left, Sir Hugh Rose 
 sent Cornet (now Major-General) Goldsworthy, 8th 
 Hussars, a 'gallant and intelligent officer,' for the 
 Field Battery and Horse Artillery. The gunners 
 soon opened a successful fire, which killed and disabled 
 a large number of the enemy and put the rest to 
 flight. 
 
 The troops now entered the town without difficulty ; 
 and, marching up the main street, took possession 
 of Sindhia's palace ^, with the intention of capturing 
 the fort in the morning. Brigadier Smith co-operated 
 with good efiect on the left near the palace of Phiil 
 Bagh, which he took, killing numbers of the enemy 
 and capturing several guns. 
 
 ^ This was effected without bloodshed through the useful inter- 
 position of Captain (now Sir Kichard) Meade. He happened to 
 be well known to the Gwalior men, and gallantly volunteered to 
 go forward alone to the palace court-yard, which was full of armed 
 and excited soldiery, to persuade them to submit peaceably, and 
 to give up the palace. They fortunately recognised him, and after 
 some delay, acted on his advice. Captain Meade came back unhurt 
 to the General and reported that the force could move forward. 
 The next day Sindhia returned, overjoyed and overcome, to his 
 capital, and insisted upon giving Sir Hugh Rose a dinner in his 
 palace, attended by his old servants, who seemed overwhelmed 
 with pleasure. He was afterwards anxious to present a medal 
 with his device, a serpent, to all the officers and men of the 
 Central India Field Foi'ce, together with six months' batta. Lord 
 Canning approved the presentation of the medal, but permission 
 was refused by the Home Government. 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 1 47 
 
 In the early morning (June 19th) Sir Hugh Rose 
 moved with General Stuart's Brigade to the left of 
 the Gwalior Rock, where it was not precipitate; 
 covering the movement by sending the 25th Native 
 Infantry, well supported, round the same sort of 
 ground on the right, whence they could scramble up 
 the rock above the gateway of the fort. Here Lieu- 
 tenant Rose, son of Rose of Kilravock, commanding 
 the advanced skirmishers, caught sight of a depression 
 of the ground where the second gate into the fort was 
 situated. Collecting his skirmishers into line, he 
 stormed it, effecting a capture as successful as it was 
 bold ; but paying for his gallantry with his life. 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose now sent an order to Brigadier- 
 General Napier to pursue the enemy as far and as 
 closely as he could. This Napier did most effectually^. 
 
 ^ Brigadier Napier wrote to Sir Hugh Eose as follows : — ' Camp 
 Jaora-Alipur. I trust you have received my letters dated 21st, 
 informing you of our having attacked and dispelled the enemy 
 and captured 25 guns. An elephant and some carts and tents 
 were also taken, and a Government postbag full of letters for 
 your force, I moved yesterday by Sirauda, intending to have 
 followed the enemy's traces to Sabulgarh ; but I found that, 
 from all accounts I could gather, their dispersion was more 
 complete even than I had believed, whilst the leading fugitives 
 had already passed Sabulgarh. I found the greatest diffi- 
 culty in getting supplies, the natives of the force having been 
 without ^ta for several days ; the banyas had deserted their 
 villages, and very small quantities were procurable from the best 
 disposed villages : I have no doubt I could have found more, but of 
 course tried to avoid embroiling Sindhia with his subjects by any 
 coercive measures. Under these difficulties, and with the troops 
 knocking up much from the intense heat, I have thought it useless 
 to advance further and have brought back my column to Jaora- 
 
 K 2 
 
148 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 Twenty-five pieces of artillery were the fruits of his 
 pursuit, as well as the total dispersion of the enemy. 
 
 Thus ended on June 20th, 1858, the taking of 
 Gwalior. The operations were briefly summed up by 
 Sir Hugh Rose in a despatch to the Government of 
 India, dated October 13th, 1858, in which the General 
 wrote : — ' As the commander of the troops engaged, 
 it is my duty to say that although a most arduous 
 campaign had impaired the health and strength of 
 my force, their discipline, devotion, and courage re- 
 mained unvarying and unshaken ; enabling them to 
 make a very rapid march in summer-heat to Gwalior; 
 fight and gain two actions on the road, one at Morar 
 Cantonments, the other at Kotah-ki-Sarai ; arrive, 
 from great distances and by bad roads, at their posts 
 before Gwalior on the day appointed, the 19th of 
 June ; and on that same day carry by assault all the 
 enemy's positions on strong heights and in most 
 difiicult ground ; taking one battery after another, 
 27 pieces of artillery in the action, %^ in the pursuit, 
 besides the guns in the fort, the old city, the new city, 
 and finally the rock of Gwalior, held to be one of the 
 most important and strongest fortresses in India. I 
 
 Alipur. Captain Eoss's detachment is here in charge of the guns 
 captured. I send in an express for your further orders. I believe 
 about 300 of the enemy have been killed ; the country people say 
 about 500 ; but the rebels dispersed over the whole face of the 
 country, throwing away their arms and accoutrements. I had 20 
 cases of sunstroke more or less severe, yesterday, in the Horse 
 Artillery. I never felt anything like the heat. Sindhia's faithful 
 Sowars have just made their appearance, and I employ them to 
 have a relay between this and Gwalior for your answer.' 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 149 
 
 marched on June 9th from Kalpi, and on the 19th of 
 the same month the Gwalior State was restored to 
 their prince.' 
 
 The Government of India was more than satisfied 
 at the result; and immediate steps were taken to 
 make known its approval. A telegram from the 
 President in Council was sent to all stations, at 
 Lord Canning's desire, requesting that * the news 
 may be spread through every part of the Deccan, 
 and all Southern and Eastern India, and that the 
 restoration of our brave and faithful ally Sindhia 
 through British arms may be loudly proclaimed.' 
 At the same time, a public notification was issued 
 at Calcutta, ordering a ' royal salute ' to be fired at 
 every large town in India to celebrate the event. 
 
 The feeling amongst Anglo-Indians generally was 
 fairly reflected in a letter written by a correspondent 
 at Gwalior to the public press in June, 1858. After 
 mentioning that Sir Hugh Rose was about to leave 
 for Bombay, to take command of the Poona Division, 
 the writer said : ' His career has been a glorious one, 
 and is worthily crowned by the capture of Gwalior 
 and the utter defeat of the rebels here. His position 
 is the proudest that any General has occupied in this 
 country for many a long day.' 
 
 Nor were his services forgotten at home. He was 
 created a G.C.B. and appointed to the Colonelcy of the 
 45th Regiment. His name was also mentioned in the 
 vote of thanks, passed in both Houses of Parliament, to 
 the troops engaged in the Mutiny Campaign ; on which 
 
150 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 occasion high praise was bestowed on his skill and 
 gallantry by the Earl of Derby, the Duke of Cambridge, 
 Lord Palmerston, and other distinguished statesmen. 
 
 It is impossible, however, to overlook the keen 
 disappointment that was felt in the Service when the 
 troops of the Central India Field Force were not 
 only forbidden to accept the silver star which the 
 Maharaja Sindhia desired to give them, but received 
 no hatta^ and no decoration, for a series of brilliant 
 successes untarnished by a defeat or retreat^, except the 
 general clasp that was given promiscuously to all the 
 troops in Central India, some of whom had done 
 little or nothing. To crown all, the Central India 
 Field Force was debarred, by a special pleading, 
 founded on some Admiralty ruling respecting the 
 blockade of ports by ships of war, from participating 
 in the prize-money found at Banda and Kirwi ; al- 
 though the right of the Force to receive a share 
 had been frankly acknowledged by the Government 
 of India, by the Commander-in-Chief in India, and 
 by the military authorities and head of the Govern- 
 ment at home. Sir Hugh Rose himself never asked 
 for and never received any pension ; and, his means 
 at that time being small, the loss of some £30,000 as 
 his own personal share in the coveted prize-money was 
 a serious one. 
 
 In bringing to a close the story of the Southern 
 operations, it may not be improper to quote the remarks 
 of an impartial critic ^, who writes : ' It seldom happens 
 ^ Prichard's 'India.* 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 151 
 
 that a great war or a serious political crisis fails in 
 bringing forward the man of the time, whose genius 
 lacked only the opportunity of development. The 
 campaign in India of 1857-58 was no exception to 
 the rule. Far in advance of any of the other com- 
 manders in genius, tact, judgment, energy, and that 
 unflinching determination which has won for England 
 so many victories by sea and land, the character of 
 Sir Hugh Rose, to any one who studies the military 
 history of those times, stands out prominently. If 
 his services have been barely rewarded, they have 
 never been appreciated, because not thoroughly under- 
 stood in England. In India it is generally believed 
 some official jealousy threw into the shade what was 
 undoubtedly one of the most brilliant achievements 
 that the military history of any country in ancient or 
 modern times has recorded. Important as were the 
 operations under Lord Clyde in Oudh and Rohilkhand, 
 they would have been profitless, so far as putting an 
 end to the war is concerned, had it not been for the 
 vigour, determination, and skill of his lieutenant ; and 
 fortunate it was for us that the tremendous task of 
 recovering Central India, from the borders of the 
 Western Presidency up to the Ganges, had been en- 
 trusted to a commander of Sir Hugh Rose's stamp. 
 Had it been made over to a less able man, the result 
 would have been the transference of the seat of war 
 from Oudh and Rohilkhand to Central India ; where 
 in a most difficult country, surrounded by independent 
 States only half inclined to side with us, the campaign, 
 
152 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 iDstead of being closed in 1859, would have probably 
 gone on two years longer. Had all Sir Hugh Rose's 
 previous service been passed in India, had he made 
 the country and the character of its inhabitants his 
 study for years, he could not have shown greater 
 knowledge of the most effective method of dealing 
 with the rebellion. With a small but well-appointed 
 force, a tithe of that with which Lord Clyde confronted 
 an enemy scarcely less formidable, he marched in one 
 career of conquest from the Western Presidency right 
 up to Kalpi on the Jumna, captured fortresses and 
 walled towns, driving the enemy before him, fighting 
 battles against enormous odds with one hand, while, 
 with the other, he kept open his communications, or, 
 as at Jhansi, maintained a siege. He understood the 
 immense importance in Asiatic warfare of keeping 
 the ball rolling. He allowed the enemy no breathing 
 time. The consequence was that^ formidable as they 
 were in numbers, in character, in desperation, in re- 
 sources, in position, and in the sympathy of the 
 population, they disappeared before the British troops 
 as a row of houses built up with a pack of cards falls 
 at the touch of the hand. Such an unchecked career 
 of conquest resembles that of the Israelitish invaders 
 of Palestine. It was an achievement scarcely less 
 glorious than the Retreat of the Ten Thousand.' 
 
 Having made over the command of the Central 
 India Field Force to Brigadier-General Napier, Sir 
 Hugh Rose bade farewell to his troops and set out on 
 June 29, 1858, to rejoin his command at Poona, where 
 
THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS 153 
 
 he rapidly regained his health. On all sides he re- 
 ceived kindnesses and congratulations. ' People of all 
 classes,' he wrote August 18, 1858, 'continue to give 
 me all sorts of ovations, but public favour is a very 
 fitful thing and may change in a contrary direction 
 at any moment. I am all ready however, thank God, 
 for another campaign, although from all accounts I 
 think there will not be one.' 
 
 Only two anxieties, at this period, weighed on his 
 mind. One was owing to the delay in the submission 
 of his reports and despatches ; which delay not only 
 elicited a reproof from Government, but also helped 
 to postpone a proper appreciation of the value of his 
 campaign. The other anxiety was the escape to 
 Southern India and the vain and continued pursuit 
 of the ubiquitous Tantia Topi. The delay of the 
 despatches was much to be regretted, and was almost 
 unaccountable. Judging from the correspondence 
 which passed at the time, it arose partly from the 
 labour which it cost to place on record an accurate 
 account of the rapid events that had taken place ; 
 and partly from the fact that during the campaign he 
 had no plans of forts or positions, and was therefore 
 unable to undertake any operation without reconnoit- 
 ring localities himself, being often — one might almost 
 say daily — fourteen and fifteen hours in the saddle on 
 that kind of duty. As regards Tantia Topi, it was not 
 until the spring of 1 859 that his hiding-place was be- 
 trayed by an associate, and he was captured by Meade 
 and hanged at Sipri on April 1 8th of that year. 
 
154 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 On March 29th, 1859, Sir Hugh Rose was ap- 
 pointed to the Command-in- Chief of the Bombay 
 Army. At the end of a few months he was trans- 
 ferred (June 4th, i860), on the departure of Lord 
 Clyde for England, to the Commander-in-Chiefship 
 of India. This appointment greatly pleased him, 
 and he wrote (Sept. 19th, i860): 'As a proof of con- 
 fidence and approval, my being made Commander-in 
 Chief is more gratifying than a peerage, especially 
 when the Indian Army has to be reorganised. I will 
 endeavour to bear v/ith humility my elevation, which 
 I am convinced I owe more to the signal mercy of 
 God than to my own merits. I feel that with His 
 blessing I can do an immense amount of good ; but I 
 shall fail in doing what I ought to do, if I give way 
 to anything like feelings of pride.' 
 
 After holding this command for five years Sir 
 Hugh Eose returned to England, was raised to the 
 peerage with the title of Baron Strathnairn of Strath- 
 nairn and Jliansi, and was subsequently promoted 
 to the rank of Field-Marshal. He died suddenly at 
 Paris on the 16th of October, 1885, at the age of 
 eighty-four, and now lies in the family graveyard of 
 the Priory Church of Christchurch, Hants. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Reconstruction 
 
 As may readily be imagined, even by readers who 
 are unfamiliar with the details of military administra- 
 tion in India, it was impossible that the defeat of the 
 rebels in the field should be followed by a tranquil 
 restoration of the status quo ante. Bloodshed and 
 disorder had given way to peace and to measures 
 of reorganisation, but it required all the wisdom of 
 the conquerors to reconstruct institutions which had 
 been shaken and discredited ; besides dealing with a 
 local European army which, after splendid service in 
 the field, tarnished the glory of its success by a 
 so-called 'white' mutiny, and with a disbanded 
 Sepoy force which was alike despised and detested. 
 Everything was more or less in a state of transition. 
 Men of Indian experience vied with each other in 
 efforts to change everything, to replace everything ; 
 nor is it extraordinary that the improved systems 
 and new organisations, eventually adopted, were often 
 found to be of doubtful utility. 
 
 The reformers of one great school contended that to 
 be ready for offence was the only way to avoid being 
 
IS6 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 attacked; and that if the peace of India was to be 
 safeguarded from internal commotion and foreign 
 aggression, the army must be made strong enough to 
 overawe enemies either within or without its boun- 
 daries. They accordingly advocated large increases in 
 the permanent British Ai'my stationed in the country ; 
 the formation of a powerful Navy ; a wholesale 
 reduction of the Native Army, which was best fitted, 
 they argued, for police duties ; an entire rearmament 
 of batteries, forts, and fortified positions ; and a 
 complete remodelling of all civil and military institu- 
 tions. 
 
 Another school of experts would have none of these 
 things. We should hold India, they contended, not 
 by the sword, but by winning the love and affection 
 of conquered races, and by inviting all classes to take 
 a larger share in the civil and military government of 
 the country. There was much to be said ih favour of 
 both schools. The arguments of each were submitted 
 to the verdict of public opinion with considerable 
 abiKty and earnestness ; and were in due course 
 recorded in those ponderous Blue Books and volumi- 
 nous reports which are the delight of Governments 
 and Royal Commissions of the present century. 
 
 To make a proper use of the opportunity was more 
 difficult than to win the battle. For there was an 
 East India Company to dispose of ; a Company which 
 boldly asserted that, as a governing body, it was ' not 
 onty one of the purest in intention, but one of the 
 most beneficent in act ever known among mankind.' 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 157 
 
 There were, moreover, the officers of a disbanded 
 army whose interests had to be studied, albeit their 
 ignorance of the men they commanded, and their un- 
 fitness for ordinary military command, in too many 
 cases, had precipitated the disaster which had left them 
 without regiments. And not to speak of the varied 
 questions of moment that arose in connection with 
 the European portion of the Company's forces, there 
 was above all the necessity of forming a new Native 
 Army on the ruins of an old one whose traditions, 
 after all, had been honourable, whose service up to 
 the date of the Mutiny had been invaluable, and whose 
 place it was not easy to fill. 
 
 On Lord Canning principally devolved the irksome 
 duty of reconciling incompatible opinion, and of 
 reorganising: the defences of India. The Governor- 
 General had borne with calmness the brunt of the 
 Mutiny. He was fearless of responsibility, he had a 
 considerable insight into character, and he had 
 attained, during the time of trial, an unusual degree 
 of military prescience and instinct, which made itself 
 felt on occasions when he had to control with his 
 intelligence and judgment the barrack-yard know- 
 ledge of some of the barrack-yard soldiers who carried 
 out his orders. 
 
 India was still feeling the shock from which it had 
 barely recovered; and Lord Canning, therefore, felt 
 that while he could aftbrd to be pacific, he could not 
 afford to be weak. We had originally fought our way 
 to power in the East ; and it was now for us to show 
 
158 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 ourselves capable of retaining the great position that 
 had been recommitted, as it were, into our hands by 
 Providence. The time was coming when it would 
 be our duty to think less of ruling by the sword, and 
 more of securing the goodwill and affection of the 
 people. But that time had not yet arrived, and the 
 Indian Government had therefore to pay almost 
 exclusive attention, for several years after the Mutiny, 
 to military measures and military precautions. 
 
 The general population and educated classes in 
 the British provinces had stood aloof from the revolt, 
 and the closer incorporation of their interests with 
 the Buling Power formed part of the scheme. But 
 territories that for a thousand years had been held 
 by the sword, and the great kingdoms of Oudh and 
 Haidarabad, the Maratha States, and the Punjab, 
 which had been established since the rise of British 
 power, must still, it was rightly considered, be held 
 by a sword firmly grasped. These were the senti- 
 ments that actuated the minds of Indian adminis- 
 trators during the eventful years of change and recon- 
 struction which followed the suppression of the Mutiny.. 
 
 They were years of destruction as well as of 
 construction. The first institution to be abolished 
 was the East India Company itself. However useful 
 in earlier generations, a dual government had resulted 
 disastrously in divided responsibilities ; and there was 
 no other alternative open but to replace the Company's 
 depreciated authority by the sceptre of the Queen. 
 Accordingly, after an existence of some two and a 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 159 
 
 half centuries, the East India Company was buried 
 decently and in order in the autumn of 1858; and 
 the Queen's Government assumed control of the 
 administration. The change was formally accom- 
 plished by the Act for the better government of India, 
 passed on August 2, 1858 ; and on November i, it 
 was announced in a noble and heart- stirring procla- 
 mation addressed by the Sovereign to her Indian 
 subjects. 
 
 After calling upon all subjects to bear true allegiance 
 to the Crown, and nominating Lord Canning to be 
 first Viceroy and Governor-General, the Royal Pro- 
 clamation said : ' We hereby announce to the Native 
 Princes of India that all treaties and engagements 
 made with them by or under the authority of the 
 Honorable East India Company are by Us accepted 
 and will be scrupulously maintained, and We look for 
 a like observance on their part. We desire no exten- 
 sions of Our present territorial possessions ; and, 
 while We will permit no aggression upon Our 
 dominions or Our rights to be attempted with 
 impunity, We shall sanction no encroachment on 
 those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, 
 and honour of Native Princes as Our own ; and we 
 desii^e that they, as well as Our own subjects, should 
 enjoy prosperity, and that social advancement which 
 can only be secured by internal peace and good 
 government. We hold ourselves bound to the 
 natives of Our Indian territories by the same ob- 
 ligations of duty which bind us to all Our other 
 
l6o CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 subjects ; and those obligations, by the blessing of 
 God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil. 
 Firmly relying Ourselves on the truth of Christianity 
 and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of 
 religion, We disclaim alike the right and the desire 
 to impose Our convictions on any of Our subjects. 
 We declare it to be Our Royal will and pleasure that 
 none be in any wise favoured, none molested or 
 disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or 
 observances ; but that all shall alike enjoy the equal 
 and impartial protection of law ; and We do strictly 
 charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority 
 under Us that they abstain from all interference with 
 the religious belief or worship of any of Our subjects 
 on pain of Our highest displeasure. And it is Our 
 further will that, so far as may be. Our subjects of 
 whatever race or creed be freely or impartially ad- 
 mitted to offices in Our service, the duties of which 
 they may be qualified by their education, ability, and 
 integrity duly to discharge. We know and respect 
 the feelings of attachment with which the natives of 
 India regard the lands inherited by them from their 
 ancestors, and We desire to protect them in all rights 
 connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands 
 of the State ; and We will that, generally, in framing 
 and administering the law, due regard be paid to the 
 ancient rights, ways, and customs of India. We 
 deeply lament the evils and misery which have been 
 brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men who 
 have deceived their countrymen by false reports, and 
 
RECONS TR UCTION 1 6 1 
 
 led them into open rebellion. Our power has been 
 shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the 
 field ; We desire to show our mercy by pardoning 
 the ofiences of those who have been thus misled, but 
 who desire to return to the path of duty.' 
 
 We now come to the measures of military re- 
 organisation undertaken after the Mutiny. Masses 
 of Reports so dear to Indian administrators were 
 collected in India ; while a Royal Commission was 
 issued in England, to decide, for good or for evil^ 
 the future destiny of the Indian Army. This Com- 
 mission recommended the abolition of the local 
 European Army, and its amalgamation with the so- 
 called ' Queen's Army.' Their proposals were accepted, 
 and the European troops of the Company's forces, 
 numbering about 14,000 officers and men, ceased 
 to have a separate existence. The Artillery became 
 Royal Artillery, the Cavalry became the 19th, 20th, 
 and 21 st Hussars, and the Infantry were formed 
 into regiments of the Line numbered from loi to 
 109. 
 
 This transference of the Company's Europeans was 
 not unattended with disturbance. Many regretted^ 
 and still regret, the change. The European soldiers, 
 led astray by evil advisers, and resenting what 
 they regarded as a breach of faith on the part of 
 Government, displayed a spirit of insubordination 
 which, weakly dealt with in its birth-throes by the 
 military authorities, grew into the so-called ' white 
 mutiny.' The measures taken for its suppression 
 
 L 
 
l62 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 were effective ; nor could the movement arrest the 
 progress of reform. 
 
 Changes rapidly followed one upon another. The 
 European officers of the old Native Army and those of 
 the Company's European troops who did not accept 
 service in the new Jloyal Regiments, formed with 
 freshly recruited Native soldiers the new Indian 
 Army. This army was enlisted for general service, 
 and reconstructed on what is known as the irregular 
 system ; a system somewhat severely applied and with 
 doubtful results to the Native cavalry and infantry 
 of all the three Presidencies. The levies which had 
 been raised during the Mutiny were formed into Line 
 regiments or disbanded, and, as we shall see presently, 
 the Native Army was largely reduced. 
 
 The necessity for providing for the large number 
 of officers whose regiments no longer existed gave 
 the military authorities much concern during this 
 anxious period. The interests of the officers conflicted 
 in some measure with those of the public service ; 
 and a not altogether successful compromise was 
 arrived at which resulted, in 1861, in the formation 
 of the Indian Staff Corps. The principle on which 
 the old Company's army was officered had no doubt 
 been faulty, inasmuch as it led to the practice of 
 detaching from regiments the best officers to spend 
 the rest of their service in civil duties unconnected 
 with a military career. But the new system was 
 equally faulty, inasmuch as it enabled young officers 
 to abandon a military career almost at the outset 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 163 
 
 for civil emploj^ment, and yet to rise under the Staff 
 Corps rules at fixed periods of years to the higher 
 military ranks, without the slightest pretence of 
 military service, and to retire eventually on ' Colonel's 
 allowances/ which represented a pension even in excess 
 of that given to any Civil servant. In fact the whole 
 system of the Staff Corps was unsound. The event 
 proved that the Eoyal Commissioners would have 
 acted more wisely had they listened, in 1859, to the 
 advice of the Duke of Cambridge, who, foreseeing the 
 evils of the Staff Corps system, strongly urged the estab- 
 lishment of a general list for the promotion of officers. 
 Amid all these varied changes and complications 
 the veteran Lord Clyde took a well-earned rest ; and 
 bending his steps homeward,, handed over the chief 
 military command in India, on June 4, i860, to 
 Sir Hugh Kose. There could not have been a better 
 selection on the part of the Queen's Government 
 for so difficult a post ; and no one rejoiced in it more 
 sincerely than Lord Clyde himself, although it did not 
 altogether accord at the moment with his own per- 
 sonal views. One of the first duties which Sir Huofh 
 Rose set before himself, after taking over the chief 
 cpmmand, was to improve the discipline of the 
 English Army in India, which, from the effects of 
 the Mutiny and the long campaign consequent on it, 
 was in a lax condition. This evil was especially 
 apparent amongst the Company's old regiments 
 known as ' European,' in contradistinction to the 
 ' Royal ' army. The prevailing discontent at length 
 
 L 2 
 
1 64 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 culminated in open mutinous conduct on the part 
 of a European regiment at Dinapur ; and Sir Hugh 
 Rose, finding it impossible to allay by ordinary 
 methods this spirit of insubordination, was forced 
 to warn the army at large that he intended to take 
 serious notice of the next case that came before him. 
 
 Such a case occurred in the 5th European Regiment. 
 Private Johnson disobeyed a superior officer, and 
 for this was found guilty and sentenced to be shot. 
 The Commander-in-Chief resolved, much against his 
 own personal feeling of compassion, to enforce the 
 sentence. In doing so he wrote in a General Order 
 (November 8th, i860): 'His Excellency's regret that 
 he is compelled to enforce the sentence is most sincere. 
 But that regret is diminished when he reflects that 
 the present example is necessary for the good of 
 the State, that it is an act of mercy to all misguided 
 soldiers who may be tempted to follow the fatal 
 example of the 5th Regiment, which has caused sorrow 
 and indignation throughout the army.' The execution 
 of the sentence was followed by the disbandment 
 cf the regiment. 
 
 Another matter which Sir Hugh Rose saw to be of 
 vital importance to the European soldier in India, 
 was the provision of some employment for him in 
 the weary hours of cantonment life. With this object, 
 and with the coi-dial support of the supreme Govern- 
 ment, he made arrangements for the maintenance of 
 workshops, regimental institutions, and soldiers' gar- 
 dens, which, after fail- trial, proved extremely beneficial, 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 165 
 
 and were soon afterwards adopted at all places gar- 
 risoned by the British Army at home and abroad. 
 
 While paying attention to the British portion 
 of the army in India, Sir Hugh Rose did not forget 
 the Native regiments ; some of which, and particularly 
 the Native Irregular Cavalry, are now second to no 
 troops in the world for discipline, eflSciency, and good 
 conduct. It was his constant endeavour to make the 
 army of India not only effective as a fighting machine, 
 but perfect in interior economy and discipline. 
 
 In April, 1865, after five years' tenure of the post. 
 Sir Hugh Rose relinquished the chief command, 
 amidst much regret and many valued expressions of 
 goodwill on the part both of officers and men. One 
 of the most gratifying tokens of this feeling was given 
 at a farewell entertainment at Simla, on September 
 27th, 1864, when Sir Robert Napier (the late Lord 
 Napier of Magdala), for whom Sir Hugh had a warm 
 admiration and regard, said : ' Never has the army of 
 India had a chief more earnestly solicitous to ensure 
 its efficiency than Sir Hugh Rose ; never, I believe, 
 has the army of India been in a more efficient condition 
 than it is at the present moment ; never has the army 
 of India had a chief whom it would have followed to 
 the field, against a foe worthy of it, with fuller con- 
 fidence of success than this army would feel under its 
 present Commander-in-Chief.' 
 
 On his arrival in England, Sir Hugh Rose was ap- 
 pointed by the Duke of Cambridge to be Commander of 
 the forces in Ireland. The Times of the day (May 22, 
 
1 66 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 1 865), welcomed the veteran home, ' after a career which 
 would have entitled a Roman general to a triumph.' 
 
 Having given this somewhat imperfect sketch of 
 the changes in the Indian Army directly brought 
 about by the events of the Mutiny, it may not be out 
 of place to carry our thoughts backwards, by tracing 
 briefly the rise of the military forces of the three 
 Presidencies, in order that the difference between our 
 military position under the Company and under the 
 Queen may be clearly appreciated. It must be re- 
 membered that, for military and administrative pur- 
 poses, British India has up to the present time been 
 divided into three great political sections — Bengal, 
 Madras, and Bombay ; and that the Native Army of 
 India has always consisted of three portions corres- 
 ponding to the three Presidencies. This separation 
 into three distinct armies was the natural consequence 
 of the original foundation of separate settlements and 
 factories in India ; each of which retains to the present 
 day its own separate history and traditions. 
 
 Of the three Presidencies, Madras is the oldest. 
 The fii'st armed force in this Presidency was the little 
 garrison of Armagon on the Coromandel Coast, con- 
 sisting of 12 guns and 28 soldiers. In 1644 Fort St. 
 George was built and garrisoned by ico soldiers, and 
 in 1653 Madras became a Presidency. In 1748 the 
 various independent companies of factory guards at 
 settlements on the coast were consolidated into the 
 Madras European Regiment. In the following year 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 167 
 
 Clive, with only 200 soldiers and 300 Sepoys, seized 
 and held Arcot, the capital of the Karnatik, and on 
 three several occasions defeated the troops of the 
 Nawab and their French auxiliaries. 
 
 From this period we may date the first military 
 power of Madras. In 1754, a Royal regiment, the 
 39th Foot, was sent out to Madras for the first time, 
 to be followed, four years afterwards, by three other 
 Royal regiments. In 1784 the number of the Native 
 troops in Madras had risen to 34,000. 
 
 In regard to Bengal, it appears that in 1650 the 
 English traders in that part of India were restricted 
 to a militar}^ establishment of an ensign and 90 men. 
 Shortly afterwards, this little corps was reinforced 
 from Madi'as by ' a corporal of approved fidelity and 
 20 soldiers.' At the battle of Plassey a century later 
 (June 23, 1757), the force under Clive consisted of the 
 39th Foot and some 3000 Madras Sepoys ; the defeated 
 army numbering about 70,000 men. 
 
 The island of Bombay, as is well known, formed part 
 of the marriage portion received by Charles II with the 
 Infanta of Portugal, and in 1662 the Bombay regiment 
 of Europeans was raised to defend the place. In 1668 
 the island was granted to the East India Company ; 
 and in 1 708 Bombay became a Presidency. By 1 794, in 
 consequence of the struggles with the Maratha power, 
 the native troops had been increased to 24,000 men. 
 
 In 1796 a general reorganisation of the Indian 
 armies took place. The officers in each Presidency, 
 hitherto borne on general lists according to the 
 
l68 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 branches of the service to which they belonged, were 
 formed into cadres of regiments, and at the same time 
 an establishment of general officers was created. 
 This was followed by augmentations in numerical 
 strength till, in 1808, the total military force in British 
 India amounted to 24,000 Europeans and 154,000 
 Natives. The first half of the present century 
 witnessed a series of wars and annexations, which 
 necessitated further increases in the military force. 
 Horse artillery was formed ; and the artillery service 
 generally was placed on a strong footing. Regiments 
 of irregular cavalry were added to the establishment, 
 while local corps and contingents were raised, some 
 of which (such as the Punjab Irregular Force and the 
 Haidarabad Contingent) soon became formidable. 
 
 The officering and recruiting of the three armies 
 was at the time of the Mutiny in essentials alike 
 in each Presidency. The officers were mainly supplied 
 by the Company's Military College at Addiscombe 
 (established in 1809) ; direct appointments being made 
 by the Court of Directors. The Bengal Army was 
 recruited from Hindustan, the infantry being chiefly 
 drawn from Oudh and Behar. The soldiers were 
 usually high caste Hindus, but a sixth of them were 
 Muhammadans recruited from Rohilkhand and the 
 Gangetic Doab. The only other elements in the 
 Bengal Army were the four Gurkha regiments en- 
 listed from Nepal and the local Punjab Irregular 
 Force. The Madras Army was chiefly recruited from 
 that Presidency or from the Native States adjoining it, 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 169 
 
 and consisted of Muhammadans, Brahmans, Marathas, 
 Telingas, and Tamils. The Bombay Army was re- 
 cruited mainly from its own Presidency, but contained 
 some Hindustanis. Most of the Bombay Sepoys were 
 Marathas and Muhammadans ; but the Bombay Light 
 Cavalry were brought for the most part from Hin- 
 dustan proper. 
 
 In the year preceding the Mutiny the Indian Army 
 had reached its highest strength ; amounting in 
 numbers to no fewer than 39,000 Europeans of all arms, 
 with 276 field guns and about 330,000 Native troops 
 (including local and ii-regular forces), with 248 field 
 guns ; truly a magnificent establishment : ' outwardly 
 worthy of the great Empire which England had 
 created for herself in the East, but inwardly unsound 
 and on the very eve of crumbling to pieces.' 
 
 We are now in a position to rightly appreciate the 
 military reforms carried out subsequent to the Mutiny. 
 The new organisation to which reference has already 
 been made was promulgated in 1863. It ^entailed 
 changes both in the recruitment and composition of the 
 Indian Army. The Bengal Army is now chiefly com- 
 posed of Muhammadans, Hindus, Rajputs, Punjabis, 
 and Pathans ; and while some regiments are entirely of 
 one race, such as the Gurkhas and a few Sikh corps, 
 in others different races are mixed by companies or 
 otherwise. There are no official restrictions on caste or 
 race, but care is taken to prevent an undue prepon- 
 derance of any one class. Enlistment remains purely 
 voluntary. In the Bengal, as in the Madras and Bombay 
 
3 70 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 armies, the native officers are appointed from the non- 
 commissioned ranks, with the exception of a very few 
 natives of rank and position, who obtain direct com- 
 missions. The British officers in all three Native 
 armies are obtained through the medium of the Staff 
 Corps already referred to. This Staff Corps is re- 
 cruited by commissioned volunteers from the British 
 Army, and now supplies the native armies of India 
 with regimental officers. 
 
 The Madras Native Army is composed of a limited 
 number of Christians and Muhammadans, and a large 
 proportion of Telingas, or Gentus and Tamils. The 
 cavalry are mostly Arcot Musalmans, descendants of 
 the soldiers of the old Nawabs of the Karnatik. The 
 army is recruited as in Bengal, but it has a peculiar 
 institution of its own, namely, the 'recruit and pen- 
 sion boys ' (sons of soldiers and pensioners) attached to 
 each regiment and transferred to the ranks when they 
 attain a proper standard of age and efficiency ; — a valu- 
 able institution, which affords a powerful hold upon the 
 fidelity of the men. The Bombay Army resembles that of 
 Bengal in its recruiting, organisation, and equipments. 
 It is composed of a few Christians, some Brahmans, 
 Rajputs, and other Hindu castes ; but mainly Marathas 
 and Purwaris, with a few Punjabis and Pathans. 
 
 It is no easy task to draw comparisons between 
 native soldiers recruited from so many different parts 
 of the Empire. It is generally acknowledged, how- 
 ever, that the most warlike are the inhabitants of 
 Sind, the Punjab, and Trans-Indus territory. Next 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 1 7 1 
 
 to these come the men of Rohilkhand and Oudh, and 
 the Marathas. All these races possess a keener 
 aptitude for military training and are usually of a 
 better physique than the general population of the 
 Peninsula. Of the actual value of Native troops, it is 
 still more difficult to form a correct estimate ; but it 
 has been truly said by a distinguished military writer 
 that the natives of India, both as friends and foes, have 
 proved themselves gallant soldiers, not unworthy of 
 being matched with Europeans. The ordinary Sepoy 
 under the guidance of British officers has furnished 
 many instances of heroism and devotion. A Bengal 
 regiment successfully stood the brunt of a charge by 
 the French at the battle of Porto Novo in ]78i. The 
 devoted courage of Olive's Sepoys at Arcot and 
 Plassey has passed into a proverb. At the siege of 
 Delhi, in 1857, Native regiments sustained losses 
 which few European troops could have borne ; while 
 many of the men then in hospital, with wounds only 
 partly healed, volunteered to join in the final assault. 
 Our present military position in India affords abun- 
 dant evidence of the strenuous and successful efforts 
 of Anglo- Indian administrators and commanders to 
 bring the army and its establishments to the highest 
 degree of efficiency attainable. With a view to 
 protection of the country, both against commotions 
 within and aggressive attacks from without, there 
 have been in recent years many important modifica- 
 tions and developments of the reorganisation rendered 
 necessary after the suppression of the Mutiny. 
 
172 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 The education of the army generally is now much 
 more carefully attended to than in the old days. 
 Instruction in musketry, g3^mnastics, and garrison 
 duties is provided ; and stricter tests are imposed 
 on all candidates for Staff employ or for promotion. 
 Armed camps of exercise have been instituted, where 
 large bodies of troops are assembled, and opportunities 
 are afforded for higher tactical training. The Com- 
 missariat department has been improved and enlarged ; 
 the military accounts branch has been remodelled; 
 and the supply and manufacture of nfiateriel of war 
 now leaves little ground for criticism. The new regu- 
 lations for the relief of troops have greatly shortened 
 the British soldier's term of Indian service. For his 
 benefit, too, large barracks have been built on approved 
 principles in the plains, and sanitaria constructed 
 to hold about lo.coo British troops in the hills 
 during the hot weather. By all these and similar 
 measures, and by a liberal expenditure of money on 
 sanitary requirements, the death-rate of the British 
 Army in India has been reduced to one-half what 
 it was in former years. 
 
 Other great questions still remain to be dealt with. 
 The conditions which led to the formation and growth 
 of three Presidency armies are materially altered by 
 the development of intercommunication between the 
 various provinces of India ; and the system is unlikely 
 to be much longer retained. The expedient of a Staff 
 Corps has been found cumbrous, and its abolition is 
 becoming only a matter of time. 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 173 
 
 It should be added that the military position of 
 India has been further strengthened by the enrolment 
 of about 20,000 European volunteers, that a reserve of 
 Native soldiers has been organised, and that by re- 
 ductions on the one hand and improved organisation 
 on the other, carried out under the supervision of ex- 
 perienced British officers, a large number of troops in 
 the pay of our Chiefs and Feudatories have been made 
 effective for service in a second line of defence. 
 Contingents furnished by Native States have already 
 proved in many campaigns that they are valuable 
 auxiliaries. 
 
 The contrast between the state of things now and 
 the situation in 1 857 is indeed a striking one. At the 
 outbreak of the Mutiny the army in India, as already 
 said, was composed of about 39,000 British and 225,000 
 Native troops, including men in contingents paid by 
 and serving in Native States. Natives manned more 
 than half the guns ; and to a great extent held 
 our arsenals, magazines, and fortifications. At the 
 present time the Army consists of 72,000 British 
 and about 157,000 Native soldiers, including all the 
 reojular contingents on the Indian establishment serving 
 in Native States, besides some 170,000 regular police. 
 Out of 103 batteries of artillery, 88 are manned by 
 Europeans. Guns and rifles of the newest pattern 
 have been supplied to the troops. The rapid con- 
 struction of railways (288 miles of railway were 
 open in 1857-58, there are now 16,000 miles, an exten- 
 sion entailing a cost of two hundred millions sterling) 
 
174 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 has facilitated a centralisation of authority, and per- 
 mits of a rapid concentration of troops at any point 
 either within Indian limits or on the frontier. The 
 improvement of roads and other communications, of 
 frontier defences, barracks, transport services, and field 
 establishments, should also be taken into account ; and 
 a fair survey of the situation must compel even the 
 pessimist observer to admit that, at vast labour and 
 expense, the military position of India is, on the whole, 
 satisfactory, and is being still strengthened, day by 
 day, under the eyes of an ever vigilant Government, 
 aided by experienced military commanders. 
 
 Should the question be asked as to the resistance 
 which India could offer, in the event of an attack 
 from without; it ma}^ be stated with some confidence 
 that the Government, at the present moment, could 
 put into the field with comparative ease two strong 
 army corps, fully equipped ; while for purposes of a 
 reserve, and on what may be called the lines of in- 
 terior defence, it would not be difficult to employ, in 
 addition to the number of regular soldiers left behind, a 
 considerable portion of the 33,000 Europeans and the 
 800,000 native Christians resident in India : not to 
 mention the assistance which could be obtained from 
 the native population (including about 50,000 Indian 
 Portuguese and Parsis), who might be largely em- 
 ployed, for temporarily holding strategic centres 
 during operations on or beyond the frontier. 
 
 It would be undesirable here to enter upon a dis- 
 cussion of various minor details of military organisa- 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 175 
 
 tion whicli occupy the attention of those responsible 
 for the safety of our Indian Empire. There are one 
 or two points, however, on which something further 
 may be said. The tendency of every economical or 
 popularity-hunting Government is to cheapen or re- 
 duce its army. Such reductions are comparatively 
 easy ; for they are certain to be defended and approved 
 by people who have had no military training and no 
 military experience. In the case of India, there has 
 been a tendency on the part of English financiers 
 to view with favour any proposal for a reduction of 
 European troops in that country, and even to speak 
 of a withdrawal of a portion of them in the event of 
 European complications. 
 
 Very difierent was the view taken by one of the 
 most far-seeing statesmen that ever ruled in India, 
 the late Earl of Mayo. He thought it wrong, indeed, 
 to compel the people of India to contribute one farth- 
 ing more to military expenditure than the safety and 
 defence of the country absolutely demanded. He de- 
 clared that a large reduction of the Madras Army 
 was necessary, inasmuch as it was impossible to tax 
 India for the support of a force which had been de- 
 clared by the highest authorities in the Presidency to 
 be far beyond local requirements, and which from its 
 composition was unreasonably expensive. At the 
 same time he wrote (September 9, 1869): ' One thing 
 I implore may not be done, and that is the removal of 
 a single British bayonet or sabre from India. We can, 
 I believe, reduce our military expenditure by a million 
 
176 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 without giving up one of the little white-faced men 
 in red. It is in the numher of officers and regiments, 
 and in a prudent reduction of tlie weakest or least 
 efficient portion of our Native Army, that a safe dimi- 
 nution of cost can be obtained ; and this I am prepared 
 to recommend regardless of frowns or forebodings.' 
 And again he wrote (December 11, 1870) : ' I have this 
 year, without any suggestion from any quarter, pressed 
 upon her Majesty's Government the necessity that 
 exists for immediately arming every European soldier 
 and volunteer in India with a Snider rifle. I have 
 ever since the beginning of 1869 pointed out the de- 
 fective state of our artillery force, and recommended 
 the immediate adoption of rifled guns. I never, there- 
 fore, let economic considerations interfere in cases of 
 necessity. I have never suggested a reduction which 
 is, in my opinion, calculated to diminish our military 
 strength. But I do desire to reduce military ex- 
 penditure by a very large amount. I fii'mly believe 
 that there are forces in India which we should do 
 better without, and that it is better to keep only 
 those Native regiments in arms that would be use- 
 ful in war. I think it is not desirable to keep a large 
 number of batteries of artillery in an undermanned 
 state, and I believe that if we have a really sufficient 
 number of guns, fully manned and equipped, in ample 
 proportions to a force of 60,000 to 70,000 men which 
 can be put into the field at a moment's notice, we have 
 a force more than sufficient to overwhelm anything 
 that can be brought against us without very long 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 177 
 
 notice. In view of possible war, I should be more 
 anxious to make the reductions I have suggested than 
 I am now ; because if any augmentations are required, 
 they should only be made in certain directions, and 
 if we are disembarrassed of comparatively useless 
 corps we can add to the strength of the warlike 
 poition of our army without difficulty.' 
 
 Lord Mayo was equally confident, it may be added, 
 that great economy would be effected by constructing 
 all kinds of military stores in India. 'One cap 
 manufactory,' he said (April 17, 1869), 'one gun- 
 carriage manufactory, one gun foundry, &c., ought to 
 suffice for all India. We ought to have the best gun 
 that science can produce without a moment's delay. 
 Above all, our general policy should be to manufacture 
 everything in India, so as to be as independent as 
 possible of England in time of trouble.' 
 
 What Lord Mayo wrote, on the necessity of main- 
 taining the strength of the European force in India 
 unimpaired, may well be taken to heart. Fewer bat- 
 teries, but all fully manned ; and fewer regiments, but 
 all completed to not less than 1000 rank and file, in 
 lieu of half-manned batteries and regiments far short 
 of their complement, would not only admit of economy 
 in the pay of officers and establishments, but would 
 increase the efficiency of the army. And if to 
 this could be added the restoration, in part, of a 
 European force specially enlisted for India, the train- 
 ing of a company of every Infantry Regiment to ride 
 as Mounted Infantry and to take their place, if need 
 
 M 
 
178 CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 be, in batteries of Artillery, the manufacture of guns 
 and ammunition in India itself, and the establishment 
 of an Indian Navy on a proper footing, there would 
 be but few defects in the defence of India for criticism 
 or attack by friend or foe. 
 
 But there is another point which needs mention. 
 While viewing with satisfaction all the improvements 
 that have been effected in the Native Army of India 
 since the Mutiny, and without overlooking the ad- 
 vantages to be gained by abolishing distinctions 
 between districts or Presidencies, and by enlisting 
 the army for general service, we must also bear in 
 mind that it goes a long way towards the content- 
 ment of native soldiers to confine the circle of their 
 ordinary service to the limits of their own province, 
 and to march them only on an emergency into distant 
 parts of the Empire. We have hitherto tried experi- 
 ments in increased pay and haita which have not 
 been willingly accepted in lieu of exile. It is there- 
 fore worthy of consideration whether more careful 
 attention may not be paid to the fact that nothing 
 can reconcile natives of India to long absence from 
 their homes, and that if we keep regiments ordinarily 
 in a circle near their homes, the service will be ren- 
 dered more economical and more popular. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 The work of this little volume is now brought to 
 a close with a consciousness of many deficiencies in 
 language and description, and with a regret that, for 
 reasons already given, but few of those personal acts 
 of heroism which formed so conspicuous a feature of 
 the Indian Mutiny, and which are so valuable in 
 lighting up bare records of military operations, have 
 found a place in its pages. If, however, the desire to 
 give a brief and simple account of important occur- 
 rences has been in any measure achieved, the object 
 aimed at by the author has been attained. 
 
 A remarkable event which requires exceptional 
 treatment seldom calls for words to enforce its lessons. 
 It needs no efibrt, therefore, to impress on the reader 
 the many lessons of the Mutiny, not the least of which 
 were the unaccountable blindness with which Eng- 
 land almost courted disaster and the splendid effort 
 which she made to repair her error. The cause of the 
 Mutiny was simple ; the outbreak was inevitable ; 
 the situation was terrible ; the struggle was prolonged 
 and fierce ; sons and daughters of our race fell with- 
 out demur at the post of danger ; and amid this scene 
 
 M 2 
 
l8o CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN 
 
 of woe and desolation, devoted soldiers and sailors of 
 a gracious Sovereign, even those of different nation- 
 ality from our own, united in giving up their lives in 
 defence of her rights. If the marvellous defence 
 of Lucknow, the fierce struggle before Delhi, the 
 holding of isolated positions by resolute men and 
 women, and the difficult military operations which at 
 length wrested the Empire from the rebel hand can 
 ever be forgotten by a grateful country, then history 
 is no longer history. These events will assuredly not 
 be forgotten. They still burn brightly in the hearts 
 of our countrymen, and they will ever find a place in 
 the lesson-books of our children ; nay, more than this, 
 they will at all times teach England to value the great 
 possession which she holds, and will inspire her to 
 allow no friend or foe to deprive her of it. But what 
 was the cost % Much in treasure and blood. To com- 
 pare campaigns carried on under such diverse con- 
 ditions as those ruling in the Crimea and in India is 
 an almost impossible task. Yet, if the comparison be 
 allowed, we shall perceive that while our casualties in 
 the Crimean Campaign of 1855-56 amounted to 390 
 officers and 18,058 rank and file, those in the Mutiny 
 Campaign of 1857-58 were not less, so far as can be 
 ascertained, than 195 officers and 10,826 of our gallant 
 British soldiers. In regard to the extent to which the 
 troops suffered in the Mutiny Campaign from casual- 
 ties in the field on the one hand and from delays in 
 the operations on the other, it may be of interest to 
 note that while 86 British officers and 1948 rank and 
 
CONCLUSION l8l 
 
 file (besides 1240 natives) were killed in action or 
 died of wounds, no fewer than 109 British officers 
 and 8878 rank and file (exclusive of natives of whose 
 casualties under this head the author has been unable 
 to obtain an accurate return) died from exposure and 
 sickness ^. These figures speak for themselves, and 
 fill the mind with mixed feelings ; for deeply as 
 we may regret that the apparent advantages of the 
 Crimean Campaign were afterwards wrested from us 
 piecemeal, we must rejoice that by the sacrifices in 
 the Indian operations we regained, against great odds, 
 one of the most valuable possessions of the British 
 Crown. 
 
 What more can we say as to the events so inade- 
 quately recorded in this volume ? Can we think of 
 them for a moment without revering the lives and 
 memories of such men as Henry and John Lawrence, 
 Robert Montgomery, Bartle Frere and others of the 
 Indian Civil Service ; that Service which by its 
 courage, calmness and inestimable qualities of de- 
 cision proved the mainstay of the Empire in the crisis 
 of the Mutiny ? Can we look back to the past without 
 
 ^ The records of the Mutiny period were of necessity some- 
 what imperfectly kept. For arriving at these figures, quantum 
 valeant, the author owes much to the kindness of the Indian 
 military authorities, and to Director-General Sir W. A. Mackinnon, 
 K.C.B. He may be pardoned for adding that Lord Clyde was 
 warmly attached to his friend Mackinnon, who served on his 
 personal staff during the campaign, after a distinguished training 
 in the Crimea. ' Mac ' was well known in the Crimea, India, New 
 Zealand, and Ashanti for his ' combative qualities/ and for his 
 coolness and gallantry in the field. 
 
1 82 CLYDE AND STRATBNAIRN 
 
 a feeling of sorrow that such men as Colin Campbell, 
 Hugh Rose, Nicholson, Outram, Havelock, Napier, 
 Hope Grant, Neill and others — men specially raised 
 up in the Providence of God to quell one of the most 
 formidable risings of the present century — now lie in 
 the grave, soldiers of the past ? And what of Canning, 
 Elphinstone, the many heads of administrations and 
 provinces, and the trained political officers, who by 
 their courage and influence preserved to English rule 
 wide tracts of country and turbulent populations far 
 exceeding in extent and number many Engiands ? 
 What of the loyal Indian Chiefs and Princes ? What 
 of the native troops who, faithful to their salt, fought 
 against their own comrades in rebellion ? What, again, 
 of the British Regimental officers and men, including 
 the devoted medical service, who without reward, and 
 in some cases without thanks, fought and worked 
 nobly for their Queen and Country ? 
 
 They all, indeed, await their reward in the Great 
 Awakening ; and England may truly be grateful when 
 she calls to mind records so brilliant and deeds so 
 honourable, and remembers the glorious part borne by 
 her children in handing down to posterity, notwith- 
 standing shortcomings, failures and errors, one of the 
 most memorable chapters of her memorable history. 
 Still England is aware that her aim is peace, and that 
 while governing the vast Eastern populations com- 
 mitted to her care with firmness and discretion — 
 ready to defend them against a common foe within or 
 without her borders — it were folly to suppose that the 
 
CONCLUSION 183 
 
 authority of a Sovereign can be upheld by the sword 
 without the attachment of a people, or that the attach- 
 ment of a people can be of any avail without the power 
 of the sword. Laying to heart the lessons of the past, 
 we are content to believe that the Rulers of India in 
 the future will use with wisdom the means which God 
 has placed in their hands for inspiring the people of 
 that country with affectionate obedience to the British 
 Crown, and for uniting them against either rebel or 
 invader. 
 
 
INDEX 
 
 Addtscombe, i68. 
 Afghanistan, policy of the Amir, 
 
 39. 46. 
 
 Afghans, 39, 46. 
 
 Agra, 21, 24, 34, 141. 
 
 Alambagh, 42 : occupied by the 
 British, 67, 77. 
 
 Alexander, 98. 
 
 Alison, General Sir Archibald 
 and his brother, 73. 
 
 Allahabad, 26, 30, 31, 34, 41, 
 49, 55 : reinforcements, 57, 78. 
 
 Alma, 96. 
 
 Ambala, 21. 
 
 American War, 45. 
 
 Anson, General, 21-2 : his march 
 to Delhi, 39, 44. 
 
 Argot, 167, 170-1. 
 
 Armagon, 166. 
 
 Army, European, 10, 13, 22: 
 arrival of a moveable column 
 of, at Delhi, 24 : small number 
 at Cawnpur, 24: massacre of, 
 by N^nd, Sahib, 26-7 : at 
 Lucknow, 27 : victory of, at 
 Fatehpur, under Havelock, 30: 
 Arrah, relief of, 34-5 : Madras 
 regiments in Persia, few in 
 India, 35-6 : Bombay army 
 large proportion of, in Persia, 
 37 : great force in the Punjab, 
 38-40 : chronological table of 
 operations, 40-3 : led by Sir 
 C. Campbell, 56-7 : reinforce- 
 ments, 57 : strength before 
 Delhi, 57-8 : Hodson's force 
 
 surrounded, but rescued by the 
 Jind Contingent, 58 : victory at 
 Najafgarh : continual reinforce- 
 ments encamped before Delhi, 
 59 : siege and conquest of Delhi, 
 59-65 : enter Lucknow Resi- 
 dency, 67-8 : arrival of the 
 Commander-in-Chief, 69-70 : 
 strength of garrison before and 
 after siege, 69 : Colonel Greathed 
 arrives at Cawnpur, with in- 
 fantry, cavalry, and artillery, 
 71: Commander-in-Chief follows 
 shortly, 72-3 : at Lucknow, 
 73-6 : attack and final capture 
 of Lucknow, 80-4: actions in 
 Oudh and Rohilkhand, 84-8 : 
 in Central India, 97-9 : march 
 to S%ar, loi : take E-athgarh, 
 101-2 : success at Barodia, 
 102: relief of Sagar, 103-4: 
 capture of Garhakota, 104 : and 
 Chandari, 1 06 : Mundinpur Pass 
 forced, 107: take Sar^i and 
 Marowra Forts, 108 : march to 
 Jh^nsf, 109-13 : attack J hansf, 
 1 14-7: attacked by Tantia Topi, 
 118: his complete rout by, 
 II 8-9: siege of Jliansl con- 
 tinued, 120: breach and occu- 
 pation of, 1 21-5 : at Kunch, 
 126-33: sickness from sun- 
 stroke, 1 30-3 : defective ammu- 
 nition, 135-7, (footnote) 138 : 
 Kalpi, attacked and captured, 
 133-40 : rebels occupy Gwalior, 
 
i86 
 
 INDEX 
 
 141 : Sir Hugh Rose attacks 
 and regains, 143-9 : Sindhia's 
 offer, 146 : Home Government 
 refuse permission, 146 : disap- 
 pointment of, 150: reconstruc- 
 tion of, 155-78. 
 
 Army, French, 95, 167. 
 
 Army, Native, 10: Bengal 
 Regular, 13-4: Bengal Sepoy, 
 19, 20 : rebellion of, 20-33 : 
 loyal Giirkhas, 22 : four dis- 
 affected Sepoy regiments at 
 Cawnpur, 24 : revolt of, 25 : at 
 Lucknow, 27 : Madras, loyalty 
 of the, 35-6 : fidelity of the 
 Bombay, 37 : strength of, in the 
 Punjab, 37-8 : risings quelled 
 there, 39 : Sikh troops des- 
 patched to Delhi and contin- 
 gents of Native Chiefs, 39-40 : 
 table of European operations, 
 40-3 : the Bengal Regular 
 revolt, 54: great strength, 
 54-5 : at Baseratganj, 56 : from 
 the Punjab, 57 : defeat at Najaf- 
 garh, 58-9 : siege and fall of 
 Delhi, 59-65 : Lucknow, 73- 
 84: Oudh and Rohilkhand, 
 84-8 : defeated at Rathgarh, 
 102 : loss at Barodia, 102 : 
 Sagar relieved from, 103 : evacu- 
 ate Garhakota, 104: Mundinpur 
 Pass forced, 107-8 ; yield the 
 forts of Sarai and Marowra, loS : 
 strength at Jhansl, 109: Sir 
 Hugh Rose arrives at, 1 1 2-4 : 
 besieges, 11 5-7 : ro'it of rebels, 
 1 18-9: at Jhansf, 125 : 
 rebels defeated at Kunch, 127 : 
 Tautia Topi and the Rani at 
 Kalpi. 130-5 : taken by the 
 British, 136-40 : rebels hold 
 Gwalior, 140-1 : defeated by 
 Sir Hngh Rose, 142-9 : death 
 of the Rani, 145: reconstruction 
 of armies, 155-78. 
 
 Armies, Company's, European 
 and Native, reconstruction of, 
 155-78: propositions to reor- 
 ganise, 155-7 ■• 6^fl of the rule of 
 the East India Company, 156-9 : 
 
 India under the Crown, 159-83 : 
 Royal Proclamation, 159-61 : 
 amalgamation, 161-3: origin 
 of, 166-71 : education, 172 : 
 volunteers, 173: Native States, 
 173: united strength, 174-5: 
 Lord Mayo, quoted on, 1 75-7 : 
 their equipment, 176: gun 
 manufactories, 177: increase of 
 efficiency, 177: Natives serve 
 best in their own provinces, 178. 
 
 Arnott, Dr., 131, quoted, 132 
 (in footnote). 
 
 Arrah, relieved by Sir V. Eyre, 
 35, 41- 
 
 ASCALON, 91. 
 ASHANTI, 181. 
 
 azamgarh, 86. 
 
 Bahadurpur, 140, 142-3. 
 Bahadur Shah, 15 : set up as 
 
 Sovereign Lord of Hindustan at 
 
 Delhi, 20 : taken prisoner and 
 
 transported to Rangoon, 64 
 Bala Rao, 87. 
 
 Banda, Nawab of, 130, 133, 136. 
 Banda, occupation of, 42, no, 
 
 119, 125, 130, 133, 150. 
 Banpur, Raja of, 102, 106. 
 Bareilly, 21, 42, 85. 
 Barnard, General, 22, death of, 
 
 24, 25. 
 Bartle Frere, 181. 
 Baseratganj, 56. 
 Behar, 16, 34, 86, 168. 
 Belgrade, 94. 
 Bengal, 12, 21, 34-5, 40, 66, 
 
 166-70. 
 Bentinck, Lord William, 122. 
 Berlin, 91. 
 
 Betwa, 42, 116-7, 119, 124. 
 Beyrout, 92. 
 Bhopal, Native State of, joins 
 
 the rebels, 54. 
 Bidasoa, 45. 
 Bithur, 15, 25, 34. 
 Bombay, 10 : peace preserved, 36 : 
 
 assistance given by, 37, 54, 
 
 56, 80, 140, 142, 149, 166-7, 
 
 169-70. 
 Boyle, Mr., 34. 
 
INDEX 
 
 187 
 
 Brahmans, 169-170. 
 Brind's Battery, 60. 
 
 BUNDELAS, 107, 109. 
 
 BuNDELKHAND, British occupy, 
 42 : rebels hold, 54-5 : lOo, 103, 
 106, II 1-9. 
 
 Burgess, Corporal, F., 62. 
 
 Burma. 29. 
 
 BuRNE, Sir Owen, 97 (footnote). 
 
 Caesab, 98. 
 
 Calcutta, 33 : distress in, 35, 41, 
 
 44 : Lord Clyde's arrival, 49 : 
 
 50, 55-6, 65, 71-2, 89, 149. 
 Cambridge, Duke of, 72 : quoted, 
 
 9S-9, 124, 150, 163, 165. 
 Campbell, Sir Colin, 20. See 
 
 Lord Clyde. 
 Canning, Earl of, quoted, 19 : 
 
 29, 50, 7<5, 78. 84-5. 109- 
 II, 113, TI9, 132: quoted, 
 140, 1 41 -2, 146 (footnote), 
 149, 157: First Viceroy, 159: 
 Boyal Proclamation, 159-61, 
 182. 
 
 Canrobert, Marshal, 95. 
 
 Carmichael, Sergeant, A. B., 62. 
 
 Carthaginians, 98. 
 
 Cawnpur, 15, 21 : situation of, 
 24-5 : treachery of N^n^ 
 Sahib, 25 : massacre of the 
 British, 25-7, 34: mutiny in, 
 41 , 55 : General Outram reaches, 
 66 : Colonel Greathed's oppor- 
 tune arrival, 71 : Commander- 
 in-Chief follows, 72-3 : 79, 80, 
 88, 131. 
 
 Ceylon, 49. 
 
 Chambal, 21, 140. 
 
 Chandari Fort, 42 : taken, 106, 
 122. 
 
 Charbagh, bridge, 67. 
 
 Charkhari, iio-i, 113 (foot- 
 note) : 119. 
 
 Charles II, 167. 
 
 Chatham, 89. 
 
 China War, 45 : expedition, 57. 
 
 Chinhat, 27, 41. 
 
 Christchurch, 154. 
 
 Clarendon, Lord, quoted, 96. 
 
 Clive, 21, 167, 171. 
 
 Clyde, Lord, 20 : his arrival at 
 Calcutta, 33 : assumes Chief 
 Command of the army, 41, 42- 
 3 : offer and acceptance of the 
 Chief Command in India, 44 : 
 his birth, 44 : entrance into the 
 army, 44 ; served in Peninsular 
 War and Walcheren Expedition, 
 44 : official notice of his gal- 
 lantry, 44-5 : as Captain, 44 : 
 as Lieutenant-Colonel, 45 ; his 
 services in the American War, 
 West Indies, in the China and 
 Sikh Wars, 45-6 : promoted to 
 K.C.B., 45-6 : his wish to re- 
 tire, 46 : in the Crimean War, 
 46-8 : his account of Alma, 47 : 
 at Balaclava, 48 : his opinion of 
 the Highland Brigade, 48-9 : 
 created G.C.B. and starts for 
 India, 49 : his stay at Calcutta, 
 49-50 : relations with the Vice- 
 roy, 50 : with his men, 51 : 
 description of the enemy, 51-2 : 
 character of, 53-4 : quoted, 56 ; 
 led the army towards Oudh and 
 Rohilkhantl, 57 : his opinion of 
 the Delhi situation, 57-8 : rein- 
 forcements arrive at, 59 : siege 
 of Delhi, 59-65 : congratulates 
 General Wilson, 6f^ : quoted, 
 66: at Calcutta, 71-2: ariival 
 at Cawnpur, 73 : advance on 
 Lucknow, 73 : second relief of, 
 74-6 : drives the rebels back, 
 78 : his loyalty, 78 : letter to 
 Sir Hugh Rose, 79-80 : cap- 
 tures Lucknow, 80-4 : at Ba- 
 reilly, 85-6 : in Oudh and 
 Bohilkhand, 86-8 : created 
 Field Marshal, and raised to the 
 peerage, 89 : death, 89 : 107-10 
 113 (footnote) : quoted, 124-5 
 130-1, 136, 140, 150-2, 154 
 returns to England, 163 : 181, 
 182. 
 
 Constantinople, 90, 94. 
 
 Coromandel Coast, 166, 
 
 Crimean W^ar, 46-8, 95-6, 99, 
 180-1. 
 
 Cuddapah, 35. 
 
i88 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Dalhousie, Marquess of, 14 : 
 quoted, 19. 
 
 Deccan, 149. 
 
 Delhi, 15, 20 : description of, 22- 
 3 : position of the British, 23- 
 4, seized by rebels, 33-5 : aid 
 given by Siiih Chiefs, 39, 40 : 
 British force before, 41, 52, 55, 
 57: besieged, 65, 67, 109, 171, 
 180. 
 
 Derby, Earl of, quoted, 90, 150. 
 
 Dhamoni Pass, 106. 
 
 Dick, Lieutenant, 120, 121 (foot- 
 note). 
 
 Dilkusha, 76, 77, 80. 
 
 DiNAPUR, 34-5, 55» 164. 
 
 DoAB, Gangetic, 55, 168. 
 
 Dost Muhammad, 39-46. 
 
 Druses (Muhammadans), 92-3. 
 
 DuNDAS, Admiral, 94-5. 
 
 Dtjndhu Panth, 15. See N^nd) 
 Sahib. 
 
 DUNDONALD, 52. 
 
 East India Co^rPANT, 42, 156-9, 
 161-3, 166, 168. 
 
 Elgin, Lord, 57. 
 
 Elphinstone, Lord, Bombay re- 
 mains peaceful under, 36-7, 
 105, 182. 
 
 Eyre, Sir Vincent, relief of Arrah 
 by. 34-5. 41. 74- 
 
 Fatehgarh, 78, 85-6. 
 Fatrer, Sir Joseph, 28, 68. 
 FiBOZPUR, 21 : rising suppressed 
 at, 39 » 59- 
 
 FiROZSHAH, 29. 
 
 Forbes, Archibald, quoted, 29. 
 Fort St. George, 166. 
 Franks, General, 79, 81-2. 
 Frederick the Great, 98. 
 Frederick William or Prussia, 
 92. 
 
 Gall, Major, 128. 
 
 Ganga Bai, 15. See K^nf of 
 
 Jhansl. 
 Ganges, The, 24, 31, 55, 67, 78, 
 
 87» 99. i37> 151. 
 
 Garhakota, fort, 42 : captured, 
 104. 
 
 Gaul, 90, 98. 
 
 Gibbon, 90. 
 
 Glasgow, 44. 
 
 GoGRA, 87. 
 
 GoLDSWORTHY, Major -General, 
 146. 
 
 Grant, Sir Hope, 46, 74, 87, 182. 
 
 Grant, Sir Patrick, 49. 
 
 Greathed, Colonel, 71, 73. 
 
 GuLAULi, 130, 137. 
 
 GuMTi, The river, 27, 73, 80, 83. 
 
 Gurkhas, 22, 61, 82, 168-9. 
 
 GwALiOR, 16 : seized by the rebels, 
 and recaptured; 42 : rebels, 54, 
 66: Contingent, 7 2 : holds Kalpi, 
 99, 126, 140: in the hands of 
 the rebels, 141-5 : regained by 
 British, 146-9. 
 
 Haidarabad, 35 : Contingent at 
 Mundinpur, 107-S : 158. 
 
 Hamilton, Sir Eobert, 108, no, 
 III, III (footnote). 
 
 Hannibal, 98. 
 
 Hants, 154. 
 
 Havelock, Sir Henry, defeats 
 N^na Sahib, 26 : his previous 
 career, 29 : arrives at Bombay 
 and Calcutta, 30 : is charged to 
 relieve Cawnpur and Luc know, 
 30 : victory at Fatehpur, 30 : 
 reaches Cawnpur, 30-1 : suc- 
 cessfully encounters the enemy 
 at Unao, 31 : falls back on 
 Cawnpur and rests one month, 
 31, 34: first and second relief 
 of Lucknow, 41 : death of, at 
 Alanibagh, 42 : 56, 66 : occupied 
 Alambagh, 67 : with Outram 
 relieves the Lucknow Presi- 
 dency, 66-8 : rescued by the 
 Commander-in-Chief, 74-5 : his 
 death, 77, 182. 
 
 Havelock-Allan, Sir Henry 
 (present ,77, 
 
 Hawthorn, Bugler, 62. 
 
 ' Highland Brigade,' at Alma, 
 47-9- 
 
INDEX 
 
 189 
 
 Hindus, character of, lo-i : 168- 
 
 70. 
 Hindustan, 168. 
 HoDSON, Lieutenant, 58, 64, 81. 
 HoLDiCH, Sir Edward, 43, 88. 
 Holmes, quoted, 53-4. 
 Home, Lieutenant, 62. 
 Hope, Adrian, 73-4, 85. 
 HuGLi, 57. 
 HumIyun, 64. 
 
 India, comparative area and popu- 
 lation, 9-10 : state of, 33-43 : 
 Sir Colin Campbell's arrival at 
 Calcutta, 33. 
 
 Indoke, Native State, rebels, 54, 
 loi. 
 
 Indus, 98. 
 
 Inglis, Brigadier, 28. 
 
 Inkerman, 96. 
 
 Inn, 98. 
 
 Ireland, 165. 
 
 Irun, 45. 
 
 JalalIbad, 29. 
 
 JAlandhar, 39. 
 
 Jang Bahadur, 79-80. 
 
 JAora-Alipur, 147-8 (footnote). 
 
 Jawala Parshad, 88. 
 
 Jehlam, 39. 
 
 JhInsi, 42, 52, 84, 85, 103, 124, 
 
 126, 152. 
 Jhansi, E^nl of, 15,99, 112, 116, 
 
 122-3, 126, 130, 135, 140, 145. 
 JiND, Raja of, 39 : his contingent, 
 
 40 : rescues Hodson, 58. 
 Johnson, Private, 164. 
 Jones, Brigadier, 85. 
 JUGLULLUK, 29, 
 Jumna, river, 21-2, 55, 80, 99, 
 
 i3o-i,_i33, 135-7. I39» 152- 
 
 Kaisar Bagh, 75, 79, 81, 83. 
 Kalpi, capture of, 42, 72, 78, 80, 
 
 99, iio-i, 119, 126-8, 130-42, 
 
 144, 152. 
 Kapurthala, Chief of, 39. 
 KarnItik, 167, 170. 
 Karnul, 35. 
 Kashmieians, 59, 61. 
 Kathiavvar, fidelity of, 36. 
 
 Kavanagh, Mr., 72. 
 
 Kebu, Lord Mark, 86. 
 
 Khaibar Pass, 46. 
 
 Khalsa, 29. 
 
 Khan Bahadur Khan, 85-6. 
 
 Khurd Kabul, 29. 
 
 KiNGLAKE, quoted, 95 (footnote). 
 
 KiRUR, 150. 
 
 KiSHENGANJ, 61. 
 
 KoER Singh, 12 : ravages by, 34 : 
 death, 86. 
 
 KoTAH, taking of, 42. 
 
 Kotah-Ki-Sarai, 143, 145, 148. 
 
 KuNCH, 42, 126-33, ^1^1 139- 
 
 Lawrence, Lord, quoted, 16-8, 
 21 : his influence felt in the 
 Punjab, 37 : firm dealings of, 
 38-40, 181. 
 
 Lawrence, Sir Henry, death of, 
 28, 29, 30, 31, 41, 48, 181. 
 
 LiDDELL, Lieutenant-Colonel, 120. 
 
 LiGHTFOOT, Captain, 118-9. 
 
 London, 44. 
 
 Louth, Colonel, 121. 
 
 Lowe, Dr., 139. 
 
 Lower Bengal, 10, 54. 
 
 LucKNOW, 24 : state of, at the time 
 of the Mutiny, 27 : situation of, 
 27 : siege of, 28 : Lord Canning's 
 opinion of its defence, 29, 32 : 
 General Mutiny, 41 : first and 
 second relief by Havelock, 41 : 
 occupation of, 42, 52 : strength 
 of enemy at, 54, 56, 57, 65: 
 relief of the Residency by 
 Outram and Havelock, 68-71 : 
 rescue by Sir C. Campbell, 73-6, 
 78: contemplated siege, 79-80: 
 captured, S0-4, 86-7, 180. 
 
 LuGARD, Brigadier, 86. 
 
 Lynedoch, Lord, quoted, 44-5. 
 
 Macdonald, Captain, 139. 
 MACKINNON, Director-General Sir 
 
 W. A., 181 (footnote). 
 Macliver, Colin, 44. See Lord 
 
 Clyde. 
 Madras, 10, 35-6 : 54, 56, loi, 
 
 166-9. 
 Maharajpur, 29. 
 Malabar, 35. 
 
190 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Malleson, Colonel, 67 (footnote), 
 
 91 : 134 (footnote), 
 Malta, 91, 94. 
 Mansfield, Major-General, 49. 
 
 See Lord Sandhurst. 
 MakathA States, 158. 
 Marathas, 29, 169-71. 
 Maronites (Christian), 92-3. 
 Marowra, Fort of, taken, 108. 
 Maxwell, Sir George, 131, 133, 
 
 135 (footnote), 136-7. 
 Mayo, Earl of, quoted, 175-7. 
 Meade, Sir Richard, 146 (foot- 
 note), 153. 
 Meean Meer, rising suppressed 
 
 at, 39. 
 Meerut, outbreak of Mutiny at, 
 
 20-2, 40, 
 Mehemet Alt, 91. 
 Meicklejohn, Lieutenant, 120-1 
 
 (footnote). 
 Menschikoff, Prince, 93-5. 
 Mhow, 42, 80, 140. 
 
 MONSON, 21. 
 
 Montgomery, 37, 181. 
 
 moradabad, 21. 
 
 Morar, 143-5, 148. 
 
 MORIER, Sir Robert, 96. 
 
 MuDKi, 29. 
 
 Muhammad Fazl Khan, 102. 
 
 MuHAMMADANS, character of, 
 lo-i : excitement of the South- 
 ern, 35, 168-70. 
 
 Multan, 102. 
 
 MuNDiNPUR Pass, forced, 42, 
 106-7. 
 
 Mutiny, The, 9 : its origin, 13-4: 
 leaders of, 15-6 : Lord Law- 
 rence's speech on, 16-8 : the 
 outbreak, 19-32 : at Meerut, 
 20: Delhi, the centre of, 20-1 : 
 Cawnpur, 24-7 : treachery of 
 Nana Sahib, 25 : massacre of 
 the British, 25-7 : Lucknow, 
 position, 27 : strength of Euro- 
 pean force, 27 : besieged by the 
 rebel Sepoys, 28 : death of Sir 
 Henry Lawrence, 28 : situation 
 of India at the time of, 33-43 : 
 rise of Sepoys at Arrah, 34 : 
 their rout by Sir Vincent Eyre, 
 
 34-5 : state of Bengal, Madras, 
 NjCgpur, 35 : excitement of 
 Muhammadans in the South, 
 35 : peace preserved in Bombay 
 by Lord Elphinstone, 36 : Bom- 
 bay, assistance given by, 37 : 
 Punjab fairly quiet under Law- 
 nence and Montgomery 37-40: 
 suppression of risings at Firoz- 
 pur, Peshawar, Jalandhar, 
 Jehlam, Sijilkot and Meean 
 Meer, &c., 39 : revolt of the 
 Bengal Regular Native Troops, 
 54 : and of Native States, 
 Gwalior, Indore, and Bhopal, 
 54 : North- Western Provinces 
 and Gudh, 54-5 : difficult situa- 
 tion, 55-6 : siege and fall of 
 Delhi, 57-65 : Lucknow, 66-70 : 
 second relief of Lucknow, 72-6: 
 Tantia Topi leads rebels, 77-8 : 
 advantage taken by,78-9 : Luck- 
 now captured, 80-4: escape of 
 the rebels, 83 : return to Oudh, 
 83-4 : defeat at Bareilly, 85-6 : 
 flight of the Nana, 87; execution 
 of JaAvalti Parshad, 88 : Sir 
 Hugh Rose's principles, 97-8 
 Southern operations, 97-154 
 rebels evacuate Ratbgarh, 102 
 loss at Barodia, 102 
 defeated Sagar, 103 : leave 
 Garhakota, 104 : driven from 
 the Mundinpur Pass, 107-8 : 
 lose the forts Sarai and Ma- 
 rowra, 108 : strength of rebels 
 at Jhansi, 109 : Sir Hugh Rose 
 arrives and inspects, 112-4: 
 attacks, 11 5-8: Tantia Topi 
 signals his arrival, 116-7 • ^^- 
 tacks Sir Hugh Rose, 118: is 
 defeated and routed by, 118-9: 
 siege of Jhjinsi, continued by 
 Sir Hugh Rose, 120: breach 
 effected, 121-3: captured and 
 occupied, 123-5: defeat of rel) els 
 at Kiinch, 127: Tantia Topi 
 and the Rani at Kalpi, 130: 
 defeat before Kalpi, 133-5 • 
 rebels evacuate, 135 : British 
 capture, 136-40 : rebel army 
 
INDEX 
 
 191 
 
 hold Gw.alior, 140-1 : defeated 
 by Sir Hugh Rose who attacked 
 and gained possession, 14 2-9 : 
 death of the Kdnl, 145 r Tjlntia 
 Topi captured and hanj:;ed, 153 : 
 results of Mutiny, 155-78 : cost 
 and lessons of, 1 79-83. 
 
 Nabha, RajjC of, 39, contingent 
 of, 40. 
 
 Nagpur, 35. 
 
 NanA Sahib, reason for his re- 
 bellion 15, treachery of, 25, 
 orders massacre of British, 26 : 
 proclaims himself Peshwa, 26 : 
 defeated by Havelock, 26 : puts 
 his prisoners to death, 26-7 : 
 massacre by, 41 : capture of his 
 followers, 43 : escapes into Ne- 
 piil, 87-8. 
 
 Napiee, Sir Charles, quoted, 4 c;, 
 46. 
 
 Napiek, Lord of Magdala, 56, 74, 
 81,142-8: quoted 147-S (foot- 
 note), 152 : quoted, 165, 182. 
 
 Nakbada, rebellion in territories 
 
 of, 55, 99- 
 
 Narut Pass, 106-7. 
 
 Native States, 10-3 : Princes of, 
 18: Bombay, loyalty of, 36: 
 and the Punjab, 37-40: Gwalior, 
 Indore, and Bhopal rebel, 54 : 
 contingents of, 173, 176, 178. 
 
 Neave, Lieutenant, 144. 
 
 Need, Captain, 118. 
 
 Neill, Brigadier, 31, 5 6, 67, 182. 
 
 Nelson, quoted, 52. 
 
 Nepal, 43, 87, 168. 
 
 Neville, Captain, 102, 102-3 
 (footnote). 
 
 New Zealand, 181. 
 
 Nicholson, Brigadier-General, 
 24> 40j 57» 59, 60-1, 63, 98, 
 182. 
 
 NfMACH, 34. 
 
 North- Western Provinces, 10: 
 disorder in, 34, 54-5, 66. See 
 also Northern Operations. 
 
 NowGONG, 130. 
 
 Olphebts, Sir William, 67. 
 
 Omab Pasha's Brigade, 91. 
 Operations, Northkrn, 44-89 : 
 arrival of Sir Colin Campbell, 
 49 : his stay at Calcutta, 49-50 : 
 the enemy, 51-2 : revolt of 
 Bengal Native Regular Troops 
 and Native States near, 54-5 : 
 state of Lucknow, 56 : Oudh 
 and Rohilkhand attacked by 
 Sir Colin Campbell, 56-7 : at 
 Delhi, 57-8 : victory at Na- 
 jafgarh, 58-9 : growing strength 
 of European, Kashmlrian and 
 Sikhs before Delhi, 59: Delhi 
 besieged, 60-5 : Kishenganj 
 and Taharipur, 61 : General 
 Outram reaches Cawnpur, 66: 
 relief of Lucknow Residency 
 by Outram and Havelock, 66- 
 70 : occupy Alamb%h, 67 : 
 loss sustained, 68 : rescue by 
 the Commander-in-Chief, 69 : 
 Sir James Outram describes the 
 operations, 69-70 : Colonel 
 Greathed and his flying column 
 reached Cawnpur, 71 : arrival of 
 Commander-in-Chief, 72 : ad- 
 advance on and second relief of 
 Lucknow, 72-6 : withdrawal to 
 Dilkdsha, 76-7 : Lucknow 
 captured, 80-4 : in Oudh and 
 Rohilkhand, 84-8. 
 Operations, Southern, 90-154: 
 summarised by the Earl of 
 Derby, 90 : state of country, 
 99-100 : ra-pid march to Sagar, 
 1 01 : the taking of Rathgarh, 
 101-2 : relief of Scigar, 103-4 • 
 capture of Garhakota, 104 : and 
 Chandari, 106 : the Mundinpur 
 Pass forced, 107 : Sarai and 
 Marowra forts taken, 108 : 
 march to Jhansi, 109-1 3 : 
 Jhansi, descriplion of, 114: Sir 
 Hugh Rose's mode of action, 
 115, 117: TcCntia Topi arrives 
 with a large army, 116-7 : 
 attacks Sir Hugh Rose and is 
 beaten, 11 8-9 : siege continued, 
 120-3: breach effected, 122: 
 siege ended, 123-5 : ^i^ Hugh 
 
igz 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Rose marched for Kalpi, the 
 position of the rebels, 126: he 
 attacks Kiinch and puts the 
 rebels to flight, 127 : attacks 
 Loh^ri, 128 ; men paralysed by 
 sunstroke, 129 : again starts for 
 Kalpi, 1 30-1 : joins Sir George 
 Maxwell, 131 : sickness in the 
 force, 131-3: taking of Kdlpi, 
 133-8 '• rebels attack Sindhia, 
 140 : hold Gwalior, 141-3 : 
 defeated by Sir Hugh Rose, 
 144-5 : enter Gwalior, 146-9 : 
 conclusion of operations, 150-4. 
 
 OuDH, 10: annexation of, 16-7: 
 rebellion in, 27, 31, 33, 36-7, 
 43, 54 : military resources of, 
 55, 56, 66 : Sir Colin Campbell 
 moves into, 72, 78, 82-8, 151, 
 158, 168, 171. 
 
 OuTRAM, General Sir James, 55- 
 6 : reaches Cawnpur : part of 
 his letter quoted to Brigadier 
 Havelock, 66 : his character, 
 66 : with Havelock relieves the 
 Residency, 66-70 : quoted in 
 footnote, 6'j : quoted, 69-70 : 
 rescued, 74-6 : occupies the 
 Alambagh, 77 : at Lucknow, 
 80-4, 98, 182. 
 
 Pagan, 29. 
 
 Palestine, 152. 
 
 Palmekston, Lord, 93, 150. 
 
 Panmure, Lord, quoted, 44. 
 
 Panna, Chief of, iii. 
 
 Paris, 154. 
 
 Parsis, 174. 
 
 Pathans, 1 01, 169-70. 
 
 Patiala, Maharaja of, 39: his 
 contingent, 40. 
 
 Peel, Captain, 57, 74. 
 
 Peninsular War, 44-5, 50 (foot- 
 note), 89. 
 
 Penny, Brigadier, 85. 
 
 Persian Expedition, 35, 37, 55. 
 
 Peshawar, rising suppressed, 39. 
 
 PESHAWAli,Valley of, 63(footnote). 
 
 Plassey, 12, 21, 33, 167, 171. 
 
 PooNA, 131, 152. 
 
 Population of India, 9. 
 
 Porto Novo, 171. 
 
 Portugal, Infanta of, 167. 
 
 Portuguese, Indian, 174. 
 
 Pritchard, quoted, 150-2. 
 
 Prussia, 98, 
 
 Prussia, J'rederick William of, 
 92. 
 
 Punjab, 10, 24 : attitude of, 37 : 
 under control of Lawrence and 
 Montgomery, 37-40 : strength 
 of Europeans in, 38 : vigilance 
 of oflBcials, 38-9 : aid given by 
 the Sikh Chiefs, 39 : prompt 
 suppression of all risings, 39-40, 
 54 : reinforcements from. 57 : at 
 Lucknow, 73-4: 158, 170. 
 
 Punjabis, 169-70. 
 
 PuRWARis, 170. 
 
 Queen, The, 77, 89, 158-61, 166, 
 180, 182-3. 
 
 Radcliffe, Sir PoUexfen, 81. 
 
 Raglan, Lord, 47-8. 
 
 Railways, 173-4. 
 
 Rajputs, 169. 
 
 Rangoon, 29, 64. 
 
 Rao Sahib, 135. 
 
 Rapti, River, 87. 
 
 Rathgarh, 42 : taken, loi, 102-3. 
 
 Rifles, 176-7. 
 
 Roberts, Sir Frederick, 42. 
 
 Rohilkhand, 55, 57, 78, 83-7, 
 
 140, 151, 168, 171. 
 Romans, 98. 
 Rome, 98. 
 
 Rose, Lieutenant, 147. 
 Rose, of Kilvarock, 147. 
 Rose, Sir Hugh, quoted, 15. See 
 
 Lord Strathnairn. 
 Ross, Captain, 148 (footnote). 
 Ross, Sir John, 133. 
 Russell, 73. 
 Russell, Dr., quoted, 82. 
 Russia, 93-6. 
 Russians, 47. 
 Ruyah, 85. 
 
 Sabulgaeh, 147 (footnote). 
 Sagae, 55 : march to, 10 1 : relief 
 of, 103-5. 
 
INDEX 
 
 193 
 
 Salkeld, Lieutenant, 62. 
 
 Sandhurst, Lord, 49, 57 (foot- 
 note). 
 
 San Sebastian, 44-5. 
 
 Sarai, Fort of, 108. 
 
 Seaton, Colonel, 85. 
 
 Sebastopol, 95, 102-3 (foot- 
 note). 
 
 Secundra Bagh, 73, 81. 
 
 Sepoy Mutiny. See The Mutiny. 
 
 Shadwell, quoted, 48, 57. 
 
 Shahgarh, R^ja of, 107. 
 
 Shah Jahan, 22. 
 
 Shahjahanpur, 21. 
 
 Sialkot, rising suppressed at, 39. 
 
 Sikhs, loyal aid, 12, 34, 39-40: 
 second Sikh War, 45 : at Delhi, 
 59, 82, 169. 
 
 Simla, 87, 165, 
 
 SiND, 136, 170. 
 
 SiNDHiA, Maharaja, 42, 1 03 (foot- 
 note) : 140-2, 145-7 (foot- 
 notes) : 149, 150, 
 
 SiPRi, 143, 153. 
 
 SiRAUDA, 147 (footnote). 
 
 Skene, Captain, 109. 
 
 Smith, Brigadier, 142, 144-6. 
 
 Smith, Sergeant John, 62. 
 
 SoBRAON, 29. 
 
 Steuart, Brigadier, 100. 
 
 St. Petersburg, 96, 
 
 Stratford de Redcliffe, Lord, 
 95 (footnote). 
 
 Strathnairn, Lord, quoted, 15, 
 20: quoted, 32: advance from 
 Mhow and capture of Eathgarh, 
 42 : letter to, 79-80 : stormed 
 and took Jh^nsl, 84-5, 90 : birth 
 and education, 91 : responsible 
 duties in Ireland, Malta, and 
 Egypt, 91 : made a C.B., and 
 later British Consul in Syria, 
 92 : Secretary of Embassy at 
 Constantinople, 93 : his policy 
 when in a difficult position, 
 93-5 : in the Crimea, 95-6 : 
 at Sebastopol, 95 : Alma and 
 Inkerman, 96 : promotion and 
 honours, 96 : character of, 96-7 : 
 influence over officers and men, 
 98 : serves in India, 99 : incom- 
 
 plete state of the force, 100 : 
 marches to Sigar, loi : takes 
 Rathgarh, 10 i -2 : relieves S^- 
 gar, 103-4: captures Garhd,kota, 
 104 : and Chandari, 106 : forces 
 Mundinpur Pass, 107 : takes 
 Sarili and Marowra, marches to 
 Jh^nsl, 109-13 : mode of action, 
 1 1 5-7: attacked by T^ntia 
 Topi, 118-9: continues siege 
 operations, 120: quoted, 12 1-2: 
 enters Jhansf, 1 22-5: quoted, 
 124: marches for Kalpi, rebels 
 hold Kilnch, 126 : attacks and 
 takes Kiinch, puts them to 
 flight, 127-9: falls from sun- 
 stroke, 128-9: hastens towards 
 K^lpi, 1 30-1 : joins Sir George 
 Maxwell, 131 : sickness of his 
 force, 1 31-3 : victory at K^lpi, 
 135 : rebels evacuate, 135 : 
 letter to the Commander-in- 
 Chief, 136-8 : order to the force, 
 138-9: illness of, 139: leave 
 granted, 141 : offers to com- 
 mand force at Gwalior, 141 : 
 plan of attack, 142 : regains 
 Gwalior, 143- 9: public opinion 
 of, 149: created a G.C.B., &c., 
 149-50 : Pritchard's opinion of 
 151-2 : rejo'ns his force at 
 Poona, 152-3 : appointed Com- 
 mander-in-Chief of Bombay 
 Army and of India, 154 : raised 
 to the peerage, 154: promoted 
 to the rank of i^'ield Marshal 
 and death, 154 : improves dis- 
 cipline, 163-4 • employment for 
 European soldiers, 164-5 : care 
 of the Native regiments, 165 : 
 returns home and is appointed 
 Commander of forces in Ireland, 
 165-6, 182. 
 Stuaet, Brigadier, 100, 114, 121, 
 
 134, 137-8, 143, 147- 
 Sutlej, The, 37. 
 Syria, 91-3. 
 
 Taharipur, 61. 
 Tamils, 169-70. 
 Tantia Topi, 16, 26, 42, 43, 77, 
 
 N 
 
194 
 
 INDEX 
 
 99, 115 (footnote), 116-9, 126, 
 
 130, 140, 153. 
 Tehri, 123. 
 Telingas, 169, 170. 
 Therapia, 95. 
 
 'Times,' The, quoted, 165-6. 
 TiMUR Shah, 22. 
 Trans- Indus Territory, 170. 
 TURENNE, 98. 
 
 Turkey, Grand Vizier of, 93-4. 
 Turkey, Sultan of, 93-4. 
 Tuenbull, Colonel,! 21 (footnote). 
 
 Unao, 31. 
 
 Valaitis, ioi, 109, 118, 122, 126 
 Van Courtland, General, 40. 
 Vienna, 94. 
 
 Vincent, Colonel H., 47. 
 Vindhya, Mountains, 100. 
 Vourla, 95. 
 
 Wake, Mr,, 34. 
 
 Walcheren Expedition, 44. 
 
 Walpole, Brigadier, 85. 
 
 Webber, Major-General, 121. 
 
 Wellington, Duke of, 50 (foot- 
 note). 
 
 Weser, 98. 
 
 West Indies, 45. 
 
 Wetherall, General, 139. 
 
 Wheeler, Sir Hugh, 24-5, 49. 
 
 Whirlpool, 128-9 (and foot- 
 note). 
 
 Whitlock, General Sir George, 
 42, ioi, 112, 119: quoted, 125, 
 
 133- 
 Wilson, Brigadier Archdale, 22, 
 
 24, 58, 64, 65. 
 WoLSELEY, General Viscount, 74. 
 Wyndham, General, 72-3, 76, 77. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 pEUPr 
 
 , t* Of THE ' 
 
RULERS OP INDIA 
 
 THE CLAItENDON PRESS SERIES OF INDIAN 
 HISTORICAL RETROSPECTS 
 Edited by Sir W. W. Hunter, K.C.S.I., CLE. 
 Price 2s. 6d. each 
 The following volumes have been arranged for up to March, 1892 : — 
 I. AS OKA : and the Political Organisation of Ancient India, hy 
 Professor Rhys-Davids, LL.D., Ph.D., Secretary to the 
 Eoyal Asiatic Society, Professor of Pali and Buddhist Litera- 
 ture at University College, London ; Author of The Hihhert 
 Lectures, 1881 ; Buddhism, &c. 
 II. AKBAR : and the Rise of the 3Tur/hal Empire, by Colonel 
 Malleson, C.S.L, Author oi A History of the Indian Matiny; 
 The History of Afghanistan ; Herat, &c. [Published.] Third 
 thousand. 
 
 III. ALBUQUERQUE : and the Early Portuguese Settlements in 
 
 India, by H. Morse Stephens, Esq., M.A., Balliol College, 
 Author of The French Revolution; The Story of Portugal, Sfc 
 
 IV. AUEANGZEB : and the Decay of the Mughal Empire, by 
 
 Sir William Wilson Hunter, K.C.S.L, M.A. 
 V. MADHAVA RAO SINDHIA : and the Hindu Reconquest of 
 India, by H. G. Keene, Esq., M.A., CLE., Author of The 
 Moghul Empire, &c. [Published.] 
 VI. LORD CLIVE: and the Establishment of the English in India, 
 
 by Colonel Malleson, CS.I. 
 VII. DUPLEIX : and the Struggle for India hy the European 
 Nations, by Colonel Malleson, CS.L, Author of The 
 History of the French in India, &c. [Published.] 
 VIII. WARREN HASTINGS: and the Founding of the British 
 Administration, by Captain L. J. Trotter, Author oi India 
 under Victoria, d:c. [Published.] Third thousand. 
 IX. THE MARQUESS OF CORNWALLIS: and the Consolida- 
 tion of British Rule, by W. S. Seton-Karr, Esq., sometime 
 Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Author of 
 Selections from the Calcutta Gazettes, 3 vols, (i 784-1 805). 
 [Published.] 
 X. THE MARQUESS WELLES LEY : and the development of 
 the Company into the supreme Power in India, by the Rev. 
 W. H. Hutton, M.A., Fellow of St. John's College, and Senior 
 Proctor of the University of Oxford. 
 XL THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS : and the final overthrow 
 of the Mardthd Poiver, by Major Ross of Bladensbueg, 
 Grenadier Guards ; F.R.G.S. 
 XII. MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE : and the Making of 
 South- Western India, by J. S. Cotton, Esq., M.A., formerly 
 fellow of Queen's College, Oxford, Author of The Decennial 
 Statemerd of the Moral and Material Progress and Condition 
 of India, presented to Parliament (1885), &c. [Published.] 
 XIII. SIR THOMAS MUNRO : and the British Settlement of 
 Southern India, by John Bradshaw, Esq., M.A., LL.D., 
 H.M.'s Inspector of Schools, Madras. 
 
RuLEBS OF India Series ^continued). 
 
 XIV. LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK: and the Company as a 
 Governing and Non-trading Power, by Demetrius Bodlger, 
 Esq., Author of England and Russia in Central Asia; The 
 History of China, &c. [Immediately.] 
 XY. VISCOUNT HARDIN GE : and the Advance of the British 
 Dominions into the Punjab, by his Son and Private Secretary, 
 the Eight Hon. Viscount Hardinge. [Published.] 
 
 XVI. RAN JIT SINGH: and the Sikh harrier hetween our Growing 
 Empire and Central Asia, by SiR I^epel Griffin, K.C.S.I., 
 Author of The Punjab Chiefs, &c. [Shortly.] 
 
 XVII. THE MARQUESS OF DALHOUSIE : and the Final 
 
 Development of the Company s Rule, by Sir William Wilson 
 Hunter, K.C.S.I., M.A. [Published.] Fourth thousand. 
 
 XVIII. CLIT>^ AND STRATHNAIRN : and the Suppression of 
 
 the Great Revolt, by Major-General Sir Owen Tudor 
 BuRNE, K.C.S.I., sometime Military Secretary to the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief in India. [Published.] Third thousand. 
 XIX. EARL CANNING: and the Transfer of India from the 
 Company to the Crown, by Sir Henry S. Cunningham, 
 K.C.I.E., M.A., Author oi British India and its Rulers, dec. 
 [Published.] 
 
 XX. LORD LAWRENCE : and the reconstruction of India under 
 
 the Crown, by Sir Charles Umfherston Aitchison, K.C.S.I., 
 LL.D., formerly Foreign Secretary to the Government of 
 India, and late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. 
 
 XXI. THE EARL OF MAYO: and the Consolidation of the 
 
 Queen's Rule in India, by Sir William Wilson Hunter, 
 K.C.S.I., M.A. [Published.] 
 
 Oxford University Press Warehouse, Amen Corner, London, 
 AND all Booksellers. Price 2s. 6d. each volume. 
 
 ©pinions of tfie Pre00 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HUNTER'S ^DALHOUSIE.' 
 
 ' An interesting and exceedingly readable volume Sir William 
 
 Hunter has produced a valuable work about an important epoch in 
 English history in India, and he has given us a pleasing insight into 
 the character of a remarkable Englishman. The " Rulers of India" 
 series, which he has initiated, thus makes a successful beginning in his 
 hands with one who ranks among the greatest of the great names which 
 will be associated with the subject.' — The Times. 
 
 ' To no one is the credit for the improved condition of public intelli- 
 gence [regarding India] more due than to Sir William Hunter. From 
 the beginning of his career as an Indian Civilian he has devoted a rare 
 literary faculty to the task of enlightening his countrymen on the subject 
 
OPINIONS OF TEE PRESS ON 'DALHOUSIE' (continued). 
 
 of England's greatest dependency .... By inspiring a small army of 
 fellow-labourers with his own spirit, by inducing them to conform to his 
 own method, and shaping a huge agglomeration of facts into a lucid and 
 intelligible system, !Sir W. Hunter has brought India and its innumer- 
 able interests within the pale of achievable knowledge, and has given 
 definite shape to the truths which its history establishes and the 
 problems which it suggests. . . . Such contributions to literature are apt to 
 be taken as a matter of course, because their highest merit is to conceal 
 the labour, and skill, and knowledge involved in their production ; but 
 they raise the whole level of public intelligence, and generate an 
 atmosphere in which the baleful influences of fully, ignorance, prejudice, 
 and presumption dwindle and disappear. . . . No one we think, who fairly 
 studies Sir W. Hunter's exact and lucid narrative of these transactions, 
 can question the result which he seeks to establish — namely, that Lord 
 Dalhousie merely carried out with moderation and skill a policy 
 deliberately adopted by the Government before his arrival in the country 
 — a policy the strict legality of which cannot be disputed, and which was 
 inspired by the growing sense that sovereigns exist, not for their own 
 enjoyment, but for the happiness of their subjects.' — Saturday Review. 
 
 * Admirably calculated to impart in a concise and agreeableform a clear 
 general outline of the history of our great Indian Empire.' — Economist. 
 
 * A skilful and most attractive picture. . . . The author has made good 
 use of public and private documents, and has enjoyed the privilege of 
 being aided by the deceased statesman's family. His little work is, 
 consequently, a valuable contribution to modern history.' — Academy. 
 
 ' The book should command a wide circle of readers, not only for its 
 author's sake and that of its subject, but partly at least on account of 
 the very attractive way in which it has been published at the moderate 
 price of half-a-crown. But it is, of course, by its intrinsic merits alone 
 that a work of this nature should be judged. And those merits are 
 everywhere conspicuous. ... A writer whose thorough mastery of all 
 Indian subjects has been acquired by years of practical experience and 
 patient research.' — The Athenceum. 
 
 ' Never have we been so much impressed by the great literary abilities 
 of Sir William Hunter as we have been by the perusal of ''The Marquess 
 of Dalhousie." . . . The knowledge displayed by the writer of the motives 
 of Lord Dalhousie's action, of the inner working of his mind, is so com- 
 plete, that Lord Dalhousie himself, were he living, could not state them 
 more clearly. In the next place the argument throughout the book is so 
 lucid, based so entirely upon facts, resting upon official documents and 
 other evidences not to be controverted, that the opponents of Lord 
 Dalhousie's policy will be sorely put to it to make a case against him. 
 . . . Sir William Hunter's style is so clear, his language so vivid, and 
 yet so simple, conveying the impressions he wishes so perspicuously that 
 they cannot but be understood, that the work must have a place in 
 every liljraiy, in every home, we might say indeed every cottage.' — 
 Evening Neics. 
 
 ' Sir William Hunter has written an admirable little volume on 
 " The Marquess of Dalhousie " for his series of the " Rulers of India." 
 It can be read at a sitting, yet its references — expressed or implied — 
 suggest the study and observation of half a life-time.' — The Daily News. 
 
©pinions of tbe Press 
 
 ON 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HUNTER'S 'LORD MAYO.' 
 
 ' Sir William W. Hunter has contributed a brief but admirable 
 biography of the Earl of Mayo to the series entitled " Eulers of India," 
 edited by himself (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press).' — The Times. 
 
 ' In telling this story in the monograph before us. Sir William 
 Hunter h;is combined his well-known literary skill with an earnest 
 sympathy and fullness of knowledge which are worthy of all Commenda- 
 tion. . . . The world is indebted to the author for a fit and attractive 
 record of what was eminently a noble life.' — The Acadeini/. 
 
 'The sketch of The Man is full of interest, drawn as it is with com- 
 plete sympathy, understanding, and appreciation. But more valuable 
 is the account of his administration. No one can show so well and 
 clearly as Sir William Hunter does what the policy of Lord Mayo con- 
 tributed to the making of the Indian Empire of to-day.' — The Scotsman. 
 
 ' Sir William Hunter has given us a monograph in which there is a 
 happy combination of the essay and the biography. We are presented 
 with the main features of Lord Mayo's administration unencumbered 
 with tedious details which would interest none but the most official of 
 Anglo-Indians ; while in the biography the man is brought before us, 
 not analytically, but in a life-like portrait.' — Vanity Fair. 
 
 * The story of his life Sir W. W. Hunter tells in well-chosen language 
 — clear, succinct, and manly. Sir W. W. Hunter is in sympathy with 
 his subject, and does full justice to Mayo's strong, genuine nature. 
 Without exaggei-ation and in a direct, unaffected style, as befits his 
 theme, he brings the man and his work vividly before us.' — The 
 Glasgoiv Herald. 
 
 ' All the knowledge acquired by personal association, familiarity with 
 administrative details of the Indian Government, and a strong grasp of 
 the vast problems to be dealt with, is utilised in this presentation of 
 Lord Mayo's personality and career. Sir W. Hunter, however, never 
 overloads his pages, and the outlines of the sketch are clear and firm.' 
 — The Manchester Express. 
 
 ' This is another of the " Rulers of India " series, and it will be hard 
 to beat. . . . Sir William Hunter's perception and expression are here at 
 their very best.' — The Pall Mall Gazette. 
 
 ' The latest addition to the " Rulers of India " series yields to none of 
 its predecessors in attractiveness, vigour, and artistic portraiture. . . . 
 The final chapter must either be copied verbally and literally — which 
 the space at our disposal will not permit — or be left to the sorrowful 
 perusal of the reader. The man is not to be envied who can read it with 
 dry eyes.' — Allen's Indian Mail. 
 
 ' The little volume which has just been brought out is a study of Lord 
 Mayo's career by one who knew all about it and was in full sympathy 
 with it. . . . Some of these chapters are full of spirit and fire. The 
 closing passages, the picture of the Viceroy's assassination, cannot fail 
 to make any reader hold his breatli. We know what is going to 
 happen, but we are thrilled as if we did not know it, and were still 
 held in suspense. The event itself was so terribly tragic that any 
 ordinary description might seem feeble and laggard. But in this 
 volume we are made to feel as we must have felt if we had been on 
 the spot and seen the murderer " fastened like a tiger " on the back of 
 the Viceroy.' — Daily News, Leading Article. 
 
©pinions of tfte press 
 
 ON 
 
 MR.W.S.SETON-KARIl'S'CORNWALLIS.' 
 
 ' This new volume of the " Rulers of India " series keeps up to the 
 high standard set by the author of " The Marquess of Dalhousie." For 
 dealing with the salient passages in Lord Cornwallis's Indian career no 
 one could have been better qualified than the whilom foreign secretary 
 to Lord Lawrence.' — The AthencBum. 
 
 ' Lord Cornwallis has been very properly included in the list of those 
 "Rulers of India" whose biographies are calculated to illustrate the 
 past growth and present development of the English administration in 
 that country. His name is connected with several great measures, 
 which more, perhaps, than any others have given a special colour to our 
 rule, have influenced the course of subsequent legislation, and have made 
 the Civil Service what it at present is. He completed the administrative 
 fabric of which Warren Hastings, in the midst of unexampled difficulties 
 and vicissitudes, had laid the foundation.' — The Saturday Review. 
 
 ' We hope that the volumes on the " Rulers of India " which are 
 being published by the Clarendon Press are carefully read by a large 
 section of the public. There is a dense wall of ignorance still standing 
 between the average Englishman and the greatest dependency of the 
 Crown, although we can scarcely hope to see it broken down altogether, 
 some of these admirable biographies cannot fail to lower it a little. . . . 
 Mr. Seton-Karr has succeeded in the task, and he has not only pre- 
 sented a large mass of information, but he has brought it together in an 
 attractive form. . . . We strongly recommend the book to all who wish 
 to enlarge the area of their knowledge with reference to India.' — New 
 York Herald. 
 
 ' The ** Rulers of India " series. This outcome of the Clarendon 
 Press grows in value as it proceeds. The account of Cornwallis is from 
 the pen of Mr. W. Seton-Karr, who was formerly Foreign Secretary to 
 the Government of India, and whose acquaintance with Eastern afi'airs 
 has been of obvious service to him in the compilation of this useful 
 manual.' — The Globe. 
 
 ' One might almost say that the history of our great Indian Empire 
 might be read with comparative ease in the excellent " Rulers of India 
 Series," published at the Clarendon Press at Oxford. ... Of Cornwallis 
 it might be said he transformed the East India Company's servants 
 from merchants to administrators, and determined to place them above 
 jobbery, which he despised.' — The Independent. 
 
 ' We have already expressed our sense of the value and timeliness of 
 the series of Indian historical retrospects now issuing, under the editor- 
 ship of Sir W. W. Hunter, from the Clarendon Press. It is somewhat 
 less than fair to say of Mr. Seton-Karr's monograph upon Cornwallis 
 that it reaches the high standard of literary workmanship which that 
 series has maintained. . . . His accurate and lucid summary of the necessi- 
 ties which dictated Cornwallis's policy, and the methods by which he 
 initiated and, to a great extent, effected, the transformation of our rule 
 in India from the lines of an Oriental despotism to those with which we 
 are now familiar, is as attractive as it is instructive.' — The Literary 
 World. 
 
fiDpinions of tfte Press 
 
 COLONEL MALLESON'S *DUPLEIX.' 
 
 * In the character of Dupleix there was the element of greatness 
 that contact with India seems to have generated in so many European 
 minds, French as well as English, and a broad capacity for govern- 
 ment, which, if suffered to have full play, might have ended in giving 
 the whole of Southern India to France. Even as it was, Colonel 
 Malleson shows how narrowly the prize slipped from French grasp. 
 In 1783 the Treaty of Versailles arrived just in time to save the 
 British power from extinction.' — Times. 
 
 ' Colonel Malleson's Life of Dupleix, which has just been published, 
 though his estimate of his hero differs in some respects from Lord 
 Stanhope's and Lord Macaulay's, may be accepted as, on the whole, a 
 fairly faithful portraiture of the prophetic genius to whom the possi- 
 bility of a great Indo-European Empire first revealed itself. Had the 
 French profited by all the advantages they possessed when Clive 
 exchanged the counting-house for the army, the history of India, and 
 perhaps of Europe also, might have been different.' — Standard 
 (leading article). 
 
 * The " Rulers of India " series, edited by Sir W. W. Hunter, and 
 published at the Clarendon Press, Oxford, is one of the very best of 
 the serial collections which are now so popular. All the writers of 
 these little volumes are well-known and acknowledged authorities on 
 the subjects with which they deal. Not the least interesting volume 
 in this particular series is Colonel Malleson's biography of Dupleix . . . 
 It was to Dupleix, and not to Clive, that the idea first occurred of 
 founding a European Empire in India ... It is a stirring story, and 
 full of moral for the administrators of India at this hour.' — Echo. 
 
 ' One of the best of Sir W. Hunter's interesting and valuable series. 
 Colonel Malleson writes out of the fulness of familiarity, moving with 
 ease over a field which he had long ago surveyed in every nook and 
 corner. To do a small book as well as this on Dupleix has been done, 
 will be recognised by competent judges as no small achievement. 
 When one considers the bulk of the material out of which the little 
 volume has been distilled, one can still better appreciate the labour 
 and dexterity involved in the performance.' — Academy. 
 
 * Colonel Malleson has here written a most compact and effective 
 history of the French in India in a little handbook of 180 pages. He 
 gives a brief summary of French enterprise in India from the first, 
 and clearly outlines the grand designs that rose in the fertile brain of 
 Dupleix. Colonel Malleson's chapter on the " Downfall of Dupleix " 
 is as touching as anything we remember to have recently read, and his 
 chapter on Clive and his work may be read with interest and pleasure, 
 even after the glowing and brilliant account of Macaulay.' — NoncoU' 
 
 J'ormist. 
 
 * Well arranged, lucid and eminently readable, an excellent addition 
 to a most useful series.' — Record. 
 
©pinions of ti)z press 
 
 ON 
 
 COLONEL MALLESON'S *AKBAR.' 
 
 ' Colonel Malleson's interesting monograph on Akbar in the "Rulers 
 of India " (Clarendon Press) should more than satisfy the general 
 reader. Colonel Malleson traces the origin and foundation of the 
 Mughal Empire ; and, as an introduction to the history of Muhamma- 
 dan India, the book leaves nothing to be desired.' — St. James's Gazette. 
 
 ' Akbar was certainly a great man. Colonel Malleson has done well 
 to tell his story thus succinctly and sympathetically : hitherto it has been 
 mostly buried from the mass of readers. The book is in our idea a 
 piece of thoroughly well-executed work, which cannot fail to recommend 
 still further a series which has begun right well.' — Nonconformist. 
 
 * The chief interest of the book lies in the later chapters, in which 
 Colonel Malleson presents an interesting and singularly pleasing 
 picture of the great Emperor himself and the principles which governed 
 his enlightened and humane administration.' — Literary World. 
 
 * It is almost superfluous to say that the book is characterised by 
 the narrative vigour and the extensive familiarity with Indian history 
 to which the readers of Colonel Malleson's other works are accus- 
 tomed.' — Glasgoio Herald. 
 
 * This volume will, no doubt, be welcomed, even by experts in 
 Indian history, in the light of a new, clear, and terse rendering of an 
 old, but not worn-out theme. It is a worthy and valuable addition 
 to Sir W. Hunter's promising series.' — Athenceum. 
 
 * Colonel Malleson has broken ground new to the general reader. 
 The story of Akbar is briefly but clearly told, with an account of what 
 he was and what he did, and how he found and how he left India. . . . 
 The native chronicles of the reign are many, and from them it is still 
 possible, as Colonel Malleson has shown, to construct a living portrait 
 of this great and mighty potentate.' — Scots Observer. 
 
 ' Akbar is, after Mohammed himself, the most striking and interest- 
 ing figure in Mussulman history. Few men of any age or country 
 have united in equally successful measure the gifts of the conqueror, 
 the organiser, and the philosophic statesman . . . His personal charac- 
 ter is even more exceptional among Oriental rulers than his intel- 
 lectual brilliance . . . He is the only great Mussulman ruler who 
 showed himself capable of rising out of the narrow bigotry of Islam to 
 a lofty and comprehensive view of religious truth. The life and rule 
 of such a man is a noble theme for a great historian.' — Speaker. 
 
 ' The brilliant historian of the Indian Mutiny has been assigned in 
 this volume of the series an important epoch and a strong personality 
 for critical study, and he has admirably fulfilled his task. A himinous 
 exposition of the invasions of India by Babar, Akbar's grandfather, 
 makes a good introduction to Asiatic history of the sixteenth century. 
 Akbar's own career is full of interest, and to the principles of his in- 
 ternal administration Colonel Malleson devotes in the final chapter more 
 than a quarter of the pages of his book. Alike in dress and style, this 
 volume is a fit companion for its predecessor.' — Manchester Guardian. 
 
Dpinions of tfje Press 
 
 CAPTAIN TROTTER'S < WARREN HASTINGS.' 
 
 ' The publication, recently noticed in this place, of the " Letters, 
 Despatches, and other State Papers preserved in the Foreign Depart- 
 ment of the Government of India, 1772-17S5," has thrown entirely new 
 light from the most authentic sources on the whole history of Warren 
 Hastings and his government of India. Captain L. J. Trotter's 
 Warren Hastings, a volume of the " Rulers of India " series, edited 
 by Sir W. Hunter (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press), is accordingly 
 neither inopportune nor devoid of an adequate raisou cTetre. '' The 
 present volume," says a brief preface, " endeavours to exhibit for the 
 first time the actual woi-k of that great Governor-General, as reviewed 
 from the firm stand-point of the original records now made available to 
 the students of Indian history." Captain Trotter is well known as a 
 competent and attractive writer on Indian history, and this is not the 
 first time that Warren Hastings has supplied him with a theme.' — 
 The Times. 
 
 ' He has put his best work into this memoir . . . Captain Trotter's 
 memoir is more valuable [than Sir A. Lyall's] from a strictly historical 
 point of view. It contains more of the history of the period, and it 
 embraces the very latest information that casts light on Hastings' re- 
 markable career . . . His work too is of distinct literary merit, and is 
 worthy of a theme than which British history presents none nobler. 
 It is a distinct gain to the British race to be enabled, as it now may, 
 to count the great Governor-General among those heroes for whom 
 it need not blush.' — Scotsman. 
 
 ' Captain Trotter has done his work well, and his volume deserves 
 to stand with that on Dalhousie by Sir William Hunter. Higher 
 praise it would be hard to give it.' — Neiv York Serald. 
 
 ' This is an able book, written with candour and discrimination.' — 
 Leeds Mercury. 
 
 ' Captain Trotter has done full justice to the fascinating story of the 
 splendid achievements of a great Englishman.' — Manchester Guardian. 
 
 * This neat little volume contains a brief but admirable biography of 
 the first Governor-General of India. The author has been fortunate in 
 having had access to State papers which cover the period of the 
 entire rule of Warren Hastings.' — The Newcastle Chronicle. 
 
 * In preparing this sketch for " The Eulers of India," Captain 
 Trotter has had the advantage of consulting the " Letters, Despatches, 
 and other State Papers preserved in the Foreign Department of the 
 Government of India, 1772-85," a period which covers the entire 
 administration of Warren Hastings. The present volume, therefore, 
 may truly claim that it " exhibits for the first time the actual work of 
 the great Governor-General, as re\dewed from the firm stand-point of 
 original records." It is a book which all must peruse who desire to 
 be " up to date " on the subject.' — The Globe. 
 
©pinions of tfje ptcss 
 
 VISCOTJlfT HARDIH&E'S 'LOUD HAEDIIGE.' 
 
 * An exception to the rule that biographies ought not to be entrusted 
 to near rehxtives. Lord Hardinge, a scholar and an artist, has given 
 us an accurate record of his father's long and distinguished services. 
 There is no filial exaggeration. The author has dealt with some con- 
 troversial matters with skill, and has managed to combine truth with 
 tact and regard for the feelings of others.' — The Saturday llevieio. 
 
 'This interesting life reveals the first Lord Hardinge as a brave, 
 just, able man, the very soul of honour, admired and trusted equally 
 by friends and political opponents. The biographer . . . has produced a 
 most engaging volume, which is enriched by many private and official 
 documents that have not before seen the light.' — The Anti-Jacohin. 
 
 ' Loi'd Hardinge has accomplished a grateful, no doubt, but, from 
 the abundance of material and delicacy of certain matters, a very 
 difficult task in a woi-kmanlike manner, marked by restraint and 
 lucidity.'— r/ie Fall Mall Gazette. 
 
 * His son and biographer has done his work with a true appreciation 
 of proportion, and has added substantially to our knowledge of the 
 Sutlej Campaign.' — Vanity Fair. 
 
 ' The present Lord Hardinge is in some respects exceptionally well 
 qualified to tell the tale of the eventful four years of his father's 
 Governor-Generalship,' — The Times. 
 
 'It contains a full account of everything of importance in Lord 
 Hardinge's military and political career ; it is aiTanged ... so as to 
 bring into special prominence his government of India ; and it gives a 
 lifelike and striking picture of the man.' — Academy. 
 
 ' The style is clear, the treatment dispassionate, and the total result 
 a manual which does credit to the interesting series in which it figures.' 
 —The Globe. 
 
 ' The concise and vivid account which the son has given of his 
 father's career will interest many readers.' — The Morning Post. 
 
 ' Eminently readable for everybody. The history is given succinctly, 
 and the unpublished letters quoted are of real value.' — The Colonies 
 and India. 
 
 ' Compiled from public documents, family papers, and letters, this 
 brief biography gives the reader a clear idea of what Hardinge was 
 both as a soldier and as an administrator.' — The Manchester Examiner. 
 
 ' An admirable sketch.' — The New Yor/c Herald. 
 
 ' The Memoir is well and concisely written, and is accompanied by 
 an excellent likeness after the portrait by Sir Francis Grant.' — The 
 Queen. 
 
©pinions of ti)t Press 
 
 ON 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL SIR OWEN BURNE'S 
 * CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN.' 
 
 'In " Clyde and Strathnairn," a contribution to Sir William Hunter's 
 excellent " Hulers of India" series (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press), 
 Sir Owen Burne gives a lucid sketch of the military history of the 
 Indian Mutiny and its suppression by the two great soldiers who give 
 their names to his book. The space is limited for so large a theme, but 
 Sir Owen Burne skilfully adjusts his treatment to his limits, and rarely 
 violates the conditions of proportion imposed upon him.' , . , ' Sir Owen 
 Burne does not confine himself exclusively to the military narrative. 
 He gives a brief sketch of the rise and progress of the Mutiny, and 
 devotes a chapter to the Reconstruction whicli followed its suppression.' 
 . . . ' — well written, well proportioned, and eminently worthy of the 
 series to which it belongs.' — The Times. 
 
 'Sir Owen Burne who, by association, experience, and relations with 
 one of these generals, is well qualified for the task, writes with know- 
 ledge, perspicuity, and fairness,' — Saturday Review. 
 
 ' As a brief record of a momentous epoch in India this little book is 
 a remarkable piece of clear, concise, and interesting writing.' — The 
 Colonies and India. 
 
 'In this new volume of the excellent "Rulers of India" series, 
 Major-Gen eral Burne gives in a succinct and readable form an account 
 of the Mutiny, its causes, its nature, and the changes in army organisa- 
 tion and civil administration which followed upon it.' — Glasgow Herald. 
 
 ' Like the rest of the book, this part is not only excellently written, 
 but is excellently reasoned also.' — The National Observer. 
 
 ' Sir Owen Burne, Avho has written the latest volume for Sir William 
 Hunter's "Rulers of India" series, is better qualified than any living 
 person to narrate, from a military standpoint, the story of the suppres- 
 sion of the Indian Mutiny.' — Daily Telegraph. 
 
 'Sir Owen Burne" s book on "Clyde and Strathnairn " is worthy to 
 rank with the best in the admirable series to which it belongs.' — 
 Manchester Examiner. 
 
 ' The book is admirably written ; and there is probably no better 
 sketch, equally brief, of the stirring events with which it deals.' 
 Scotsman. 
 
 ' Sir Owen Burne, from the part he played in the Indian Mutiny, and 
 from his long connexion with the Government of India, and from the 
 fact that he was military secretary of Lord Strathnairn both in India 
 and in Ireland, is well qualified for the task which he has undertaken.'— 
 The Athenaeum. 
 
 'Sir W. W. Hunter acted wisely in commissioning Sir Owen Tudor 
 Burne to write the lives of " Clyde and Strathnairn " for this series 
 (Clarendon Press). Neither of these generals was, strictly speaking, a 
 Ruler of India : still the important period of the Mutiny is so contained 
 in the story of their exploits, that perh;ips it was as well to choose them 
 as the personages round whom might be grouped the history of that 
 stirring period. ... Sir 0. T. Burne's book is well worthy of a place in 
 the most valuable of the many series now issuing from the Press.' — The 
 Header, 
 
aDpinions of tbe lpres0 
 
 ON 
 
 MR, KEEUE'S 'MAMATA RAO SINMIA.' 
 
 ' The life of such a man sliould be interesting to all those who have en- 
 tered, however remotely, into the inheritance of his labours: and Mr. Keene 
 is well qualified, both by his knowledge of Indian history and his literary 
 dexterity in its treatment, to do justice to his subject.' — The Times. 
 
 ' Mr. Keene has the enormous advantage, not enjoyed by every 
 producer of a book, of knowing intimately the topic he has taken up. 
 He has compressed into these 203 pages an immense amount of informa- 
 tion, drawn from the best sources, and presented with much neatness and 
 etfect . . . Such a life was worth tracing in connection with the general 
 history of the times ; and that is the task which Mr. Keene has so well 
 fulfilled in this concise, yet attractive, little volume.' — The Globe. 
 
 ' In this brief monograph Mr. Keene goes over the ground already tra- 
 versed by him in his " Fall of the Moghul Empire." But the particular 
 work which gives Sindhia his place in Indian history ... is here made 
 more clearly manifest,while the book deals almost as much in general his- 
 tory as in biography . . It is valuable as bringing out the originality as well 
 as the greatness of the unacknowledged ruler of Hindustan . . . The book 
 is interesting . . . and forms a valuable addition to the series.' — Scotsman. 
 
 * Mr. Keene tells the story with knowledge and impartiality, and also 
 with sufficient graphic power to make it thoroughly readable. The 
 recognition of Sindhia in the " Rulers " series is just and graceful, 
 and it cannot fail to give satisfaction to the educated classes of our 
 Indian fellow-subjects.'- — North British Daily Mail. 
 
 ' This is probably the most romantic volume in the whole series, and 
 the Sindhia's difference in attitude towards De Boigne and Warren 
 Hastings is very interestingly stated. The history of the foundation of 
 our Indian Empire receives much elucidation from this admirable 
 volume.' —Liverpool Mercury. 
 
 ' Mr. H.G. Keene, CLE., M.A., has added a very acceptable volume to 
 the popular half-crown series of works on former potentates in England's 
 vast Indian dependency . . . From the signal defeat of the Marathas at 
 Panipat, in 176 1, in which engagement Sindhia, after fighting valiantly, 
 very nearly lost his life, until his death in 1 794, his varying fortunes are 
 traced. The important affairs in which he figured so prominently, as also 
 the intrigues and machinations that were directed against him, are re- 
 corded, whilst the desirable effect of his policy in assuaging the fiierce 
 passions and civilising the habits of the people is depicted. The volume 
 bears incontestable proofs of the expenditure of considerable research 
 by the author, and sustains the reputation he had already acquired 
 by his " Sketch of the History of Hindustan."' — Freeman s Journal. 
 
 ' Among the eighteen rulers of India included in the scheme of Sir 
 William Hunter only five are natives of India, and of these the great 
 Madhoji Sindhia is, with the exception of Akbar, the most illustrious. 
 Mr. H. G. Keene, a well-known and skilful WTiter on Indian questions, 
 is fortunate in his subject, for the career of the greatest bearer of the 
 historic name of Sindhia covered the exciting period from the capture 
 of Delhi, the Imperial capital, by the Persian Nadir Shah, to the occu- 
 pation of the same city by Lord Lake. . . . Mr. Keene gives a lucid 
 description of his subsequent policy, especially towards the English 
 when he was brought face to face with Warren Hastings. The conclu- 
 sion of his hostility to us was the real beginning of his own political 
 career in India.' — The Daily GrapJiic, 
 
SDpinions of t&e lg)re0g 
 
 ON 
 
 SIR HENRY CUNNINGHAM'S *EARL 
 
 CANNING.' 
 
 * The life of Earl Canning, the Viceroy of the Indian Mutiny, affords 
 an excellent subject for a biographer who knows his business, and 
 therefore we need hardly say that " Earl Canning," by Sir H. S. 
 Cunningham, K.C.I.E., is an admirable contribution to the series of 
 the "Ptulers of India" edited by Sir W. W. Hunter (Oxford, at the 
 Clarendon Press). Sir Henry Cunningham's rare literary skill and his 
 knowledge of Indian life and affairs are not now displayed for the first 
 time, and he has enjoyed exceptional advantages in dealing with his 
 present subject. Lord Granville, Canning's contemporary at school 
 and colleague in public life and one of his oldest friends, furnished his 
 biographer with notes of his recollections of the early life of his friend. 
 Sir Henry Cunningham has also been allowed access to the Diary of 
 Canning's private secretary, to the Journal of his military secretary, 
 and to an interesting correspondence between the Governor-General 
 and his great lieutenant, Lord Lawrence. Of these exceptional ad- 
 vantages he has made excellent use, and the result is a biography 
 second in interest to none in the series to which it belongs.' — The Times. 
 
 ' Sir Henry Cunningham's " Earl Canning " is a model monograph. 
 The writer knows India, as well as Indian history, well ; and his story 
 has a vividness which none but an Anglo-Indian could so well have 
 imparted to it. It has also the advantage of being founded to a large 
 extent on hitherto unused material.' — The Globe. 
 
 'Sir H. S. Cunningham has succeeded in writing the history of a 
 critical period in so fair and dispassionate a manner as to make it 
 almost a matter of astonishment that the motives which he has so 
 clearly grasped should ever have been misinterpreted, and the results 
 which he indicates so grossly misjudged. Nor is the excellence of his 
 work less conspicuous from the literary than from the political and 
 historical point of view. The style is clear and vivid, the language 
 well chosen and vigorous, the disposition of details and accessories 
 striking and artistic, and, indeed, under whatever aspect the work be 
 considered, it reaches the high standard of workmanship which, from 
 the outset, has been a distinguishing feature of the series.' — Glasgow 
 Herald. 
 
 ' Sir H. S. Cunningham was fortunate, in a literary sense, in the 
 particular Viceroy and period of Indian history allotted to his pen in 
 the important and valuable series of biographical volumes on " Rulers 
 of India," being published at the Clarendon Press, Oxford, under the 
 editorship of Sir William Wilson Hunter. In Earl Canninq, first 
 Viceroy of India, Sir H. S. Cunningham had a subject sufficiently 
 inspiring to all who admire honour, courage, patience, wisdom, all the 
 virtues and qualities which go to the building up of the character of an 
 ideal English gentleman ; while the episode of the Mutiny, culminating 
 in the fall of Lucknow, lends itself to the more picturesque and 
 graphic description. Sir H. S. Cunningham has treated his subject ade- 
 quately. In vivid language he paints his word-pictures, and with calm 
 judicial analysis he also proves himself an able critic of the actualities, 
 causes, and results of the outbreak, also a temperate, just appreciator 
 of the character and policy of Earl Canning.' — The Court Journal. 
 
■smU ' m s i 
 
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