GUSTAV POLLAK 
 
 Published by The New York Evening Post Co.
 
 ELLA KITIQ ADAIUS
 
 Compliments of 
 
 
 New York, July 16, 1917
 
 

 
 The House of Hohenzollern 
 
 and 
 
 The Hapsburg Monarchy 
 
 Originally published in 
 
 The New York Evening Post and 
 The New York Nation 
 
 By 
 GUSTAV POLLAK 
 
 Published by 
 The New York Evening Post Co.
 
 Copyright 1917, New York Evening Post Co.
 
 SRLF 
 URL 
 
 P. 
 
 515 
 
 hn 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 Pi>ge 
 
 The House of Hohenzollern . . . . 5 
 Bismarck's Neglected Policies ... 23 
 The Vision of a Central Europe . . 33 
 
 Austria's Opportunity 59 
 
 The Future of Bohemia 67 
 
 Hungary and the Fall of Tisza . . .81 
 The Poles of Austria . 95
 
 The House of Hohenzollern 
 
 [From The New York Nation, March 22, 1917.] 
 
 T N all discussions of the fate of Ger- 
 -* many in case of her ultimate defeat, 
 the question of the attachment of the 
 people to the Hohenzollern dynasty plays 
 an important part. That Prussian loyalty 
 will be equal to almost any test admits 
 scarcely of doubt, but the question natur- 
 ally suggests itself, Will other subjects 
 of the Empire, notably South Germans, 
 remain unshaken in their devotion to a 
 dynasty that is responsible, as all Germans 
 must eventually recognize, for the most 
 disastrous war in history? It is difficult to 
 make predictions at the present time, with 
 the fortunes of war still trembling in the 
 balance. One may safely say, however, 
 that from the establishment of the present 
 Empire to the outbreak of the war, every 
 non-Prussian has been, first of all, a 
 Saxon, Bavarian, Wiirttemberger, etc., 
 and only secondarily a German. We have 
 on this point the highly instructive cor-
 
 roboration of so excellent an authority as 
 Prince Bismarck. He says, in the thir- 
 teenth chapter of his "Recollections": 
 
 Never, not even at Frankfort, did I 
 doubt that the key to German politics was 
 to be found in princes and dynasties, not 
 in publicists, whether in parliament and 
 the press or on the barricades. 
 
 In order that German patriotism be 
 active and effective, it needs dependence 
 on a dynasty. Independent of dynasty, 
 patriotism, as a practical matter, rarely 
 reaches its full height. . . . It is as 
 a Prussian, a Hanoverian, a Wurttem- 
 berger, a Bavarian, or Hessian, rather 
 than as a German, that he is disposed to 
 give unequivocal proof of patriotism. 
 The German love of the Fatherland has 
 need of a prince on whom it can concen- 
 trate its attachment. Suppose that all the 
 German dynasties were suddenly deposed ; 
 there would then be no likelihood that the 
 German national sentiment would suffice 
 to hold all Germans together, from the 
 point of view of international law, amid 
 the friction of European politics, even in 
 the form of federated Hanse towns and 
 imperial rural communes ( "Reichsdorf- 
 er"). The Germans would fall a prey to
 
 nations more closely welded together if 
 they once lost the tie which rests in the 
 sense of the common importance of their 
 princes. 
 
 Bismarck was never under any illusions 
 as to the feeling of non-Prussian Germans 
 towards the Hohenzollern dynasty. After 
 the war of 1866 he labored hard to con- 
 vince King William that it would be a 
 serious mistake to punish Bavaria by 
 forcing her to give up Anspach and Bay- 
 reuth to Prussia, just as it would be to 
 compel Austria to give up part of her 
 possessions. "I gauged," he wrote, "the 
 proposed acquisitions from Austria and 
 Bavaria by asking myself whether the in- 
 habitants, in case of future war, would 
 remain faithful to the King of Prussia 
 after the withdrawal of the Prussian of- 
 ficials and troops and continue to accept 
 commands from him; and I had not the 
 impression that the population of these 
 districts, which had become habituated to 
 Bavarian and Austrian conditions, would 
 be disposed to meet Hohenzollern predi- 
 lections."
 
 All this is well known. South-German 
 dislike of Prussian ways is as old as the 
 history of the Electors of Brandenburg 
 and as recent as the present war, with its 
 acknowledged friction between Prussian 
 and non-Prussian commanders of the 
 Central armies. The Hohenzollerns have 
 ever ruled with a heavy hand, in peace as 
 in war, and they do not go out of their 
 way to enlist the sympathies of non-Prus- 
 sians. Nor is it in politics and in warfare 
 only that the antagonism between the 
 Prussians and the people of other parts 
 of Germany has found expression. Ger- 
 man literature gives abundant proof that 
 the Hohenzollern dynasty and the liberal 
 sentiment of Germany have ever been far 
 apart. None of the rulers of the house of 
 Hohenzollern befriended German poets, 
 with the single exception of the ill-starred 
 Frederick III (while still Crown Prince) , 
 unless their verses glorified Prussian 
 deeds. The greatest of Prussian rulers 
 ignored contemptuously the greatest of 
 German poets, and Lessing and Heine had 
 as little cause to look kindly upon Berlin 
 
 8
 
 as Goethe. Goethe visited the Prussian 
 capital with Karl August of Weimar in 
 May, 1778, and his impressions of Berlin 
 life and of the surroundings of the King 
 were far from favorable. "I have got 
 quite close to old Fritz," he wrote, "having 
 seen his gold, his silver, his statues, his 
 apes, his parrots, and heard his own curs 
 twaddle about the great man." The King 
 and the poet had nothing in common. 
 Frederick's judgment of Goethe's "Gotz 
 von Berlichingen" was as follows: "Voila 
 un Goetz de Berlichingen qui parait sur 
 la scene, imitation detestable de ces mau- 
 vaises pieces anglaises, et le parterre ap- 
 plaudit et demande avec enthousiasme la 
 repetition de ces "degoutantes platitudes." 
 Frederick the Great cared only for French 
 savants; he made one President of the 
 Academy of Sciences, another Librarian. 
 Goethe was not at all in sympathy with 
 Frederick's plan of putting the federation 
 of German sovereigns on a strong military 
 basis. He feared not so much Prussia as 
 the Prussian King, who had no considera- 
 tion for small states like Saxe- Weimar.
 
 In the summer of 1780 he spoke in the 
 Aristophanic little play "Die Vogel," of 
 "the Black Eagle with his ever-ready 
 claws." 
 
 Under Frederick's successors the state 
 of affairs in Prussia was even less to 
 Goethe's liking. Frederick William II 
 discouraged the development of science 
 and free speech by every means in his 
 power. Kant barely escaped being de- 
 prived of his professorship. The next 
 King, Frederick William III, and his 
 Queen, ostentationsly ignored Goethe on 
 their visits to Weimar. 
 
 Schiller did not fare so ill in his rela- 
 tions with the Hohenzollerns, but he was 
 not spared by the Berlin bureaucracy. In 
 the last year of his life he wished for a 
 wider sphere of activity than was afforded 
 him in Weimar and Jena. He visited 
 Berlin in May, 1804, and Queen Luise 
 was seemingly anxious to have him settle 
 there. On his return to Weimar he wrote 
 to the royal Cabinet Counsellor Beyme 
 that, while he found himself unable to 
 leave Weimar permanently, he should be 
 
 10
 
 willing, under certain conditions, to spend 
 a few months every year in Berlin, but 
 no answer to his letter was vouchsafed him. 
 Lesjsing had at various times gone to 
 Berlin in the hope of finding there some 
 suitable position. At one time, in 1765, 
 he seemed to have some prospect of get- 
 ting the royal librarianship. He was pro- 
 posed to the King by one of his French 
 favorites, Colonel Guichard, but Freder- 
 ick, who had become prejudiced against 
 Lessing through Voltaire's version of a 
 previous quarrel between the two, refused 
 to consider the suggestion. The position 
 was offered to Winckelmann, but he de- 
 clined it on account of the low salary, and 
 Lessing's name was once more brought 
 forward by Guichard. Frederick there- 
 upon declared with vehemence that a 
 Frenchman would get the place, and so a 
 Frenchman did. Lessing felt the disap- 
 pointment keenly. He wrote to his father 
 later on: "I left Berlin after the only 
 thing that I had so long hoped for and 
 that had long been held out to me was 
 denied me." It is safe to say, however, 
 11
 
 that Frederick would never have found in 
 Lessing a pliant employee, such as he liked 
 to have near him. Lessing had previously, 
 in 1764, declined the offer of a professor- 
 ship of rhetoric in the University of 
 Konigsberg because of the condition that 
 he was to deliver annually a eulogy of 
 the King. 
 
 It is interesting to contrast with these 
 experiences of Lessing in Prussia the at- 
 titude of the Austrian authorities towards 
 contemporaneous men of letters. Lessing 
 wrote to Nicolai: "Let some one dare to 
 write in Berlin as freely as Sonnen- 
 fels is writing in Vienna." As early 
 as 1711 Emperor Charles VI had made 
 Leibnitz an Aulic Councillor and a baron 
 of the Empire, and when the philosopher 
 came to Vienna in 1713 and submitted to 
 the Emperor a draft of the Peace of 
 Utrecht, he received an annual pension of 
 2,000 florins, which Charles offered to 
 double if Leibnitz agreed to settle in the 
 Austrian capital. 
 
 The list of literary men who suffered 
 from Prussian reactionism is a long one. 
 
 12
 
 Borne, Herwegh, and Hoffmann von 
 Fallersleben, among others, showed that 
 there was mutual dislike, but no one em- 
 bodied his hatred of Prussia in such flam- 
 ing words as Heine ; witness the preface to 
 his "Franzosische Zustande." After speak- 
 ing of Metternich's cynical but open de- 
 fiance of liberalism and the mulish con- 
 sistency of the Emperor Francis, he pro- 
 ceeded : 
 
 As regards Prussia we may speak in a 
 different tone. Here at least we are not 
 restrained by respect for the sacredness of 
 the head of the German Empire. The 
 learned minions on the banks of the Spree 
 may dream of a great Emperor of the 
 house of Borussia and proclaim Prussian 
 hegemony, with all its glorious lordliness, 
 but thus far the long fingers of the Hohen- 
 zollern have not yet succeeded in grasping 
 the crown of Charlemagne and dump- 
 ing it into the same bag with so many 
 Polish and Saxon jewels. . . . 
 
 It is true that recently many friends of 
 the Fatherland have desired the enlarge- 
 ment of Prussia and hoped to see in the 
 kings the masters of a united Germany. 
 
 13
 
 They have held out a bait to patriots and 
 talked of Prussian liberalism, and the 
 friends of liberty have begun to look con- 
 fidingly towards the Linden of Berlin, 
 but as for me, I have never shared their 
 confidence. On the contrary, I watched 
 with anxiety the Prussian eagle, and while 
 others spoke with so much warmth of how 
 this bold eagle turned his eye toward the 
 sun, I watched all the more carefully his 
 claws. I did not trust this Prussian, this 
 tall and canting white-gaitered hero, with 
 his wide mouth and his rapacious stomach 
 and his corporal's stick, which he first 
 dipped in holy water before laying it on. 
 I disliked this philosophic military despot- 
 ism, its mixture of small beer, lies, and 
 sand. Repulsive beyond expression was to 
 me this Prussia, this stiff, hypocritical 
 Prussia, this Tartuffe among the nations. 
 Heine allowed himself in his verse to 
 go even further in denouncing Prussia 
 and the house of Hohenzollern, but 
 though as a poet and as a wit he abused 
 his double license, he but over-emphasized 
 the grievances of liberal Germany. There 
 is perhaps in all literature no similar in- 
 
 14
 
 stance of a dynasty incurring such fierce 
 hatred on the part of one of the greatest 
 writers of the nation. 
 
 Whatever concessions any ruler of the 
 house of Hohenzollern, since the days of 
 Frederick the Great, made to liberal ideas 
 were wrung from him by bitter political 
 necessity. The humiliating peace of Til- 
 sit forced Frederick William III to adopt 
 the reform plans of Stein and Harden- 
 berg, but the stifling period of reaction 
 that followed the War of Liberation, in 
 the latter reign of the King and that of his 
 successors, Frederick William IV and the 
 Prince Regent (afterwards William I), 
 was unrelieved, down to the Revolution 
 of 1848, by any breath of freedom. Prus- 
 sia was ready for Bismarck. From the 
 outset there was no thought in his mind 
 of making Prussia great in order to make 
 her free. He sounded the keynote of his 
 future policy in a speech in the Prussian 
 Diet on December 3, 1850, when he said: 
 "According to my conviction, Prussian 
 honor does not consist in Prussia's play- 
 is
 
 ing the Don Quixote all over Germany 
 for the benefit of mortified parliamentary 
 celebrities, who consider their local con- 
 stitution in danger. I look for Prussian 
 honor in Prussia's abstinence before all 
 things from every shameful union with 
 democracy." Bismarck's ideal was a 
 great Prussia and only incidentally a 
 great Germany; a liberal Prussia or a 
 liberal Germany was never a part of his 
 programme. In 1863, shortly after his 
 accession to the Prussian Ministry of 
 State, he wrote to Count von der Goltz, 
 his successor as Ambassador to France: 
 "The pursuit of the phantom of popular- 
 ity in Germany, which we have been car- 
 rying on for the last forty years, has cost 
 us our position in Germany and in 
 Europe, and we shall not win it back by 
 allowing ourselves to be carried away by 
 the stream, persuaded that we are direct- 
 ing its course, but only by standing firmly 
 upon our legs, and being first of all a 
 Great Power and a German Federal 
 State afterwards." 
 
 16
 
 Bismarck remained true to his policy 
 throughout his rule, yet when all its fruits 
 had been garnered in, and he was surveying 
 the past from his retreats at Friedrichsruh 
 and Varzin, a gnawing doubt as to the 
 permanency of the structure he had erect- 
 ed overcame him. "History shows," he 
 wrote, "that in Germany it is the Prussian 
 stock whose individual character is most 
 strongly marked, and yet no one could 
 decisively answer the question whether, 
 supposing the Hohenzollern dynasty and 
 all its rightful successors to have passed 
 away, the political cohesion of Prussia 
 would survive. Is it quite certain that 
 the eastern and western divisions, that the 
 Pomeranians and Hanoverians, the na- 
 tives of Holstein and Silesia, of Aachen 
 and Konigsberg, would then continue as 
 they now are, armed together in the indis- 
 soluble unity of the Prussian state?" 
 
 Many a German student of history who 
 ponders at the present time the doubt as 
 to the stability of the Hohenzollern dy- 
 nasty expressed by Bismarck will recall 
 the voice of a far-sighted German, the his- 
 17
 
 torian Gervinus, who, when the unifica- 
 tion of Germany was an accomplished 
 fact, wrote an open letter to the Prussian 
 King, "An das Preussische Konigshaus" 
 (published posthumously in 1872), in 
 which he impressively argued that the an- 
 nexation of German lands by Prussia 
 after the war of 1866 had disgraced the 
 house of Hohenzollern, and that it car- 
 ried the seeds of future evil with it. All the 
 glories of the war of 1870 did not blind 
 Gervinus to the dangers threatening a 
 Germany founded on militarism and not 
 on justice and fair dealing. He foresaw 
 with dread the creation of a military state 
 such as the world had not seen even when 
 Napoleon was at the height of his power. 
 "We have," he wrote, "as regards power 
 taken the place of France, but we shall 
 draw upon ourselves all the hatred that 
 France incurred." The following words 
 have acquired an added impressiveness 
 through the events of the past two years: 
 "Is it not a fact that, at the time of the 
 Luxemburg complications, when the 
 secret treaties of alliance between Prussia 
 
 18
 
 and the South German states were made 
 public, the anger and suspicion of all Gov- 
 ernments were aroused when it was shown 
 that one day before the Peace of Prague 
 a principal article of the Treaty had been 
 violated? Can we ignore the fact that the 
 new doctrine, 'Might before right,' sur- 
 rounded as it is by all the halo of a bril- 
 liant statesmanship, has greatly under- 
 mined the hitherto prevailing principle of 
 non-intervention among English states- 
 men of the old type?" 
 
 Developments within the German Em- 
 pire since 1871 have justified the appre- 
 hensions of those who, like Gervinus, saw 
 in the overshadowing importance of Prus- 
 sia an ominous menace to the smaller Ger- 
 man states. Their privileges as compon- 
 ent parts of the German Empire have be- 
 come a mere mockery under a Constitu- 
 tion which vests the Imperial succession in 
 the house of Hohenzollern, with its heredi- 
 tary right in the Presidency of the Feder- 
 ation, the casting vote of Prussia in case 
 of a tie in the Federal Council, a perma- 
 nent Prussian majority in the Reichstag, 
 
 19
 
 and the prerogative of the King of Prus- 
 sia as German Emperor in calling, ad- 
 journing, and proroguing the Reichstag. 
 Parliamentary government in the real 
 sense of the word has become impossible 
 under a system which leaves the Imperial 
 Ministers independent of the will of the 
 Reichstag and relegates the Chancellors 
 of the Empire to the position of mere tools 
 of a Hohenzollern King. A further ex- 
 pansion of Prussia could only take place 
 with a corresponding loss of prestige on 
 the part of the smaller states. What, 
 these states must have asked themselves 
 more than once since the outbreak of the 
 war, will be our gain if Prussian general- 
 ship triumphs? It is not too early to 
 raise the question as to what will be their 
 portion if Prussian supremacy ends in 
 military disaster. 
 
 In any case, the day cannot be far dis- 
 tant when the intrinsic rights of Prussia 
 to the part within the Empire she has 
 arrogated to herself will be seriously ques- 
 tioned by descendants of those German 
 stocks which contributed so largely to the 
 
 20
 
 power of the old Germanic Empire during 
 the thousand years of its existence. 
 Franconians, Saxons, Luxemburgs, 
 Hohenstaufen, as well as Hapsburgs, fur- 
 nished the great rulers of the Holy Roman 
 Empire long before a Hohenzollern was 
 dreamed of as a possible Emperor. In 
 these days of dynastic upheavals in other 
 countries the experience of Germany as an 
 hereditary monarchy within less than fifty 
 years cannot be thrown into the scales as 
 against the history of an elective Empire 
 of a thousand years. 
 
 Prussia's supremacy as the German 
 Kulturstaat par excellence has been too 
 long assumed by militarists and Junkers, 
 and too easily acquiesced in by the rest 
 of Germany. Even in a purely military 
 sense, Prussia, according to Bismarck 
 himself, has long ceased to be as produc- 
 tive of great talents as was the case in the 
 time of Frederick the Great. "Our most 
 successful commanders," he wrote in his 
 Memoirs, "Bliicher, Gneisenau, Moltke, 
 Goeben, were not Prussians originally, 
 nor, in the civil administration, were Stein, 
 
 21
 
 Hardenberg, Motz, and Grolman." The 
 list of great Germans in other fields who 
 were not Prussians by birth is endless. The 
 names of Leibnitz, Liebig, Bopp, Grimm, 
 Hegel, Gauss, Ehrenberg, Bach, Wag- 
 ner, of Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, and 
 many others of similar eminence, leap to 
 the mind at once. And Durer and Hol- 
 bein, the South Germans, marked the 
 climax of all German art long before the 
 Mark Brandenburg had become the King- 
 dom of Prussia. 
 
 Bismarck's doctrines and Hohenzol- 
 lern principles are now being tried in the 
 furnace of a world war. Not all that can 
 be said, and must justly be said, of Prus- 
 sian leadership in the intellectual and ma- 
 terial development of Germany can ob- 
 scure the patent failure of the Hohenzol- 
 lern dynasty. Prussian hegemony may 
 have fed the German mind and body, but it 
 has starved the German soul. 
 
 22
 
 Bismarck's Neglected 
 Policies 
 
 [From The New York Evening Post, April 14, 1917.] 
 
 OINCE the outbreak of the war the 
 ^ question has often been asked, What 
 would Germany's policy in 1914 have been 
 if Bismarck had been alive? Would there 
 have been any war at all? In the first 
 flush of victory the German people in- 
 voked the name of Bismarck as that of a 
 patron saint blessing their arms and re- 
 joicing in the fruits of his wisdom. Later 
 on less was heard of Bismarck's share in 
 preparing Germany for this war, and to- 
 day his achievements are beginning to be 
 viewed in a different light. History is 
 not only being made but rewritten. His- 
 toriographers ask themselves. Can the 
 fame of the man who brought about Ger- 
 man unity after three successful wars sur- 
 vive unscathed the prodigiously unsuccess- 
 ful one that was their result? 
 
 23
 
 The thought of a powerful military at- 
 tack on Germany often haunted Bis- 
 marck in his retirement. The forestalling 
 of a coalition against Germany was to be 
 the crowning work of his diplomacy. Any 
 means to that end seemed proper to him. 
 He brought about the Triple Alliance, not 
 because he considered Austria-Hungary 
 and Italy natural or particularly desirable 
 allies of Germany, but because he felt that, 
 with any two strong military countries 
 backing Germany, she could withstand a 
 possible coalition of any other two of the 
 great Powers against her. Much as he 
 had disliked and distrusted Austria all his 
 life, he preferred her, on the whole, to 
 Russia as an ally against France. But be- 
 fore definitely concluding the Triple Al- 
 liance, he carefully weighed in the balance 
 all the possible combinations against Ger- 
 many. Austria's help being assured, he 
 felt reasonably safe against an attack by 
 both France and Russia. "I should not 
 consider," he reasoned, "a simultaneous 
 attack by our two great neighbor Em- 
 pires, even though Italy were not the third 
 
 24
 
 in the alliance, as a matter of life and 
 death," but the situation appeared to him 
 much more serious if Italy were to threaten 
 Austria's possessions on the Adriatic. 
 "In that case," he wrote, "the struggle, 
 the possibility of which I anticipate, 
 would be unequal." And imagining 
 France and Austria in a league with 
 Russia, "no words," he said, "are needed 
 to show how greatly aggravated would be 
 the peril of Germany." In other words, 
 he could conceive of an attack on Ger- 
 many by three Powers as being literally 
 a matter of life and death. And reason- 
 ing thus, he made sure, as he thought, of 
 the friendship of both Austria and Italy. 
 Events have proved not so much Bis- 
 marck's wisdom as the folly of his suc- 
 cessors. It would never have entered his 
 mind to create a situation like that which 
 confronts Germany to-day, with fourteen 
 countries, including the United States, ar- 
 rayed against her. He certainly did not 
 foresee the possibility of Germany and 
 Austria jointly declaring war on Russia 
 and France and bringing England into 
 25
 
 the conflict, while forcing Italy to break 
 with her partners in the Triple Alliance. 
 Bismarck presupposed that Germany 
 and Austria would cultivate peace with 
 Russia, and judged that their alliance 
 "would not lack the support of England." 
 In concluding the alliance with Austria- 
 Hungary, Bismarck was under no illusion 
 as to the difficulties inherent in such a 
 partnership. Official statements nowa- 
 days overflow with assurances of the most 
 complete harmony between the two em- 
 pires. Bismarck did not take such an 
 idyllic view of an alliance promoted by 
 him solely as the result of cold-blooded 
 calculation. 
 
 In point of material force he wrote in 
 his Memoirs.^1 held a union with Russia 
 to have the advantage. I had also been 
 used to regard it as safer, because I placed 
 more reliance on traditional dynastic 
 friendship, on community of conservative 
 monarchical instincts, on the absence of 
 indigenous political divisions, than on the 
 fits and starts of public opinion among the 
 Hungarian, Slav, and Catholic popula- 
 tion of the monarchy of the Hapsburgs. 
 
 26
 
 Complete reliance could be placed upon 
 the durability of neither union, whether 
 one estimated the strength of the dynastic 
 bond with Russia, or of the German sym- 
 pathies of the Hungarian populace. If 
 the balance of opinion in Hungary were 
 always determined by sober political cal- 
 culation, this brave and independent peo- 
 ple, isolated in the broad ocean of Slav 
 population, and comparatively insignifi- 
 cant in numbers, would remain constant to 
 the conviction that its position can only be 
 secured by the support of the German ele- 
 ment in Austria and Germany. But the 
 Kossuth episode, and the suppression in 
 Hungary itself of the German elements 
 that remained loyal to the Empire, and 
 other symptoms showed that among Hun- 
 garian hussars and lawyers self-confidence 
 is apt in critical moments to get the better 
 of political calculation and self-control. 
 Even in quiet times many a Magyar will 
 get the gypsies to play to him the song 
 "Der Deutsche ist ein Hundsfott" ("The 
 German is a blackguard"). 
 
 Germany, as Bismarck was well aware, 
 was not loved either in Russia or in 
 Austria-Hungary. "Could anti-German 
 rancor," he asked, "acquire in Russia a 
 
 27
 
 keener edge than it has among the Czechs 
 in Bohemia and Moravia, the Slovenes of 
 the provinces comprised within the earlier 
 German Confederation, and the Poles in 
 Galicia?" Nor did Bismarck consider the 
 stability of the Austro-Hungarian mon- 
 archy as assured beyond doubt. "The 
 factors which must be taken into account," 
 he wrote, "are as manifold as is the mix- 
 ture of her populations, and to their cor- 
 rosive and occasionally disruptive force 
 must be added the incalculable influence 
 that the religious element may from time 
 to time, as the power of Rome wakes or 
 wanes, exert upon the directing personal- 
 ities." He foresaw that not only Pan- 
 Slavism and the Bulgarian, Bosnian, Ser- 
 vian, Rumanian, the Czech, and the Polish 
 questions, but also the Italian question in 
 the Trentino, in Trieste, and on the Dal- 
 matian coast, might become dangerous not 
 merely as affecting Austria, but as pre- 
 cipitating a European crisis. What has 
 been so often asserted and as often official- 
 ly denied, as to the friction between the 
 German- Austrians and the Czech soldiery, 
 
 28
 
 is clearly foretold in Bismarck's state- 
 ment: "In Bohemia the antagonism be- 
 tween Germans and Czechs has in some 
 places penetrated so deeply into the army 
 that the officers of the two nationalities in 
 certain regiments hold aloof from one an- 
 other, even to the degree that they will not 
 meet at mess." 
 
 Bismarck did not shrink from war if it 
 suited his purpose of aggrandizing Ger- 
 many and, above all, Prussia, but he never 
 sought war needlessly. "During the time 
 that I was in office," he wrote, "I advised 
 three wars, the Danish, the Bohemian, and 
 the French; but every time I first made 
 clear to myself whether the war, if suc- 
 cessful, would bring a prize worth the 
 sacrifices which every war requires, and 
 which are now so much greater than in the 
 last century." He considered Germany 
 as perhaps the single great Power in 
 Europe which had nothing to gain by pro- 
 voking war. "We ought to do all we 
 can," he said, "to counteract the ill-feeling 
 which has been called out through our 
 
 29
 
 growth to the position of a really great 
 Power, by honorable and peaceful use of 
 our influence, and by convincing the 
 world that a German hegemony in 
 Europe is more useful and less partisan 
 and also less harmful to the freedom of 
 others than that of France, Russia, or 
 England." He stated emphatically that 
 Germany required no increase of contigu- 
 ous territory, and that her only object 
 should be to convince other nations of her 
 peaceful intentions. "I have followed my 
 own prescription," he remarked, "not 
 without some personal reluctance, in my 
 course towards Spain in the question of 
 the Caroline Islands and towards the 
 United States in that of Samoa." 
 
 How was it possible, it will be asked, 
 that German statesmen of to-day, know- 
 ing all about Bismarck's misgivings as to 
 the sincerity of the friendship between 
 Austria and Germany, and about his 
 dread of embroiling the two countries in 
 a useless war against France and Russia, 
 could enter so light-heartedly upon their 
 stupendous venture? The answer is to 
 
 30
 
 be sought not only in their natural ignor- 
 ance of their own limitations, but in the 
 example of unscrupulous selfishness and, 
 if need be, cynical brutality set them by 
 their great protagonist during the entire 
 course of his career. Lacking his intel- 
 lectual force and his unrivalled resource- 
 fulness, they thought themselves safe in 
 adopting his tactics and improving upon 
 them. Was it not Bismarck's principle 
 that all contracts between great states 
 cease to be unconditionally binding as soon 
 as they are tested by the struggle for ex- 
 istence, and that no great nation will ever 
 be induced to sacrifice itself on the altar 
 of fidelity to contract? Starting with this 
 premise, what could be more logical than 
 the invasion of Belgium, with all that fol- 
 lowed? 
 
 Bismarck had no diplomatic scruples of 
 any kind, but he knew how to guard his 
 diplomatic secrets. His occasional sincer- 
 ity in disclosing the past was his best asset 
 in making future deceit possible. It is 
 quite clear that he never foresaw the pos- 
 sibility of a war between the United States 
 
 31
 
 and Germany, but had he foreseen it he 
 never would have resorted to such devices 
 as were employed by his successors, the 
 agile Billow and the ponderous Bethmann- 
 Hollweg. Billow was puerile enough to 
 imagine that a Deutsch-Amerikanischer 
 Nationalbund would forever solidify the 
 sentiment of German- Americans against 
 their adopted country, and Bethmann- 
 Hollweg allowed the ingenious Zimmer- 
 mann to concoct his little Mexican-Jap- 
 anese scheme. Not such, with all its ter- 
 giversations, was Bismarck's foreign 
 policy. Woe to the German people that 
 they have chosen to disregard its strength 
 and to cling to its weakness! 
 
 32
 
 The Vision of a Central 
 Europe 
 
 [From The New York Nation, December 14, 1916.] 
 
 E W polemical books written during the 
 present war have called for serious 
 criticism. When passion shrieks, reason can 
 only be silent. Friedrich Naumann's 
 "Mitteleuropa" (Central Europe. Trans- 
 lated by Christabel M. Meredith, Lon- 
 don: P. S. King & Son), however, stands 
 in some respects in a class by itself. A 
 fervent economic plea for Germany's 
 future expansion, it is but indirectly con- 
 cerned with the present clash of arms and 
 ignores international hatreds. The book, 
 which has had an extraordinary vogue 
 throughout Germany and Austria-Hun- 
 gary, is now obtainable in an English 
 translation (faithful, though by no means 
 flawless) to which Prof. W. J. Ashley has 
 written an introduction. He speaks of it 
 as "far and away the most important book 
 that has appeared in Germany since the 
 
 33
 
 world-conflict began." Such a success 
 challenges thought, even aside from the in- 
 trinsic merits of the work. It will there- 
 fore not be superfluous to examine in de- 
 tail the arguments that have made so 
 powerful an appeal to German and Aus- 
 tro-Hungarian readers. 
 
 Herr Naumann is a member of the 
 Reichstag and author of a number of 
 books. His career shows strange muta- 
 tions of principle religious, political, and 
 economic. Originally a Lutheran pastor 
 and Socialistic evangelist, he abandoned 
 the pulpit for journalism and politics. He 
 founded Die Hilfe, and through this 
 journal and his book on "Demokratie und 
 Kaisertum" attempted to reconcile the 
 tenets of Social-Democracy with the pre- 
 vailing furore for naval and colonial ex- 
 pansion. The National- Socialist party 
 being unable to obtain representation in 
 the Reichstag, Herr Naumann allied him- 
 self with the Volkspartei, which derived 
 its strength mainly from the middle-class 
 radicals of southern Germany. As an 
 ardent free-trader and advocate of certain 
 
 34
 
 definite legislative measures, he succeeded 
 in gaining a seat in the Reichstag, where 
 he attempted to fuse several minor radical 
 groups into a wing of the Liberal party. 
 In a book written at that time, his "Neu- 
 deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik," he predicted 
 the political and social regeneration of 
 Germany through unrestricted intercourse 
 with other countries. Such was Herr 
 Naumann's past political philosophy ; what 
 is his present creed? 
 
 Briefly speaking, Naumann advocates, 
 one may say he foretells, as in a prophetic 
 vision, a combination it is nowhere di- 
 rectly called an alliance between the Ger- 
 man Empire and the Hapsburg Mon- 
 archy, offensive and defensive, economic 
 and military, into which as many neutral 
 states as possible may and should, as a mat- 
 ter of self-interest, eventually enter. The 
 adhesion of Turkey and the Balkan states 
 is taken for granted. The advantages of 
 such a superstate to the neutral countries 
 which are to join their maritime front to 
 the territory of the Central Powers, spe- 
 cifically to Holland, Greece, Rumania, 
 
 35
 
 and the Scandinavian countries, are but 
 vaguely alluded to for prudential rea- 
 sons dictated by the war. The main pur- 
 pose of the formation of this "Central 
 Europe" is, as frankly admitted by the 
 author, the greater good of the two prin- 
 cipal countries, Germany and Austria- 
 Hungary. Without committing himself 
 to any definite plan for the organization of 
 this vast state, Herr Naumann tentatively 
 puts forth a programme which he says 
 statesmen of the future may modify at 
 their pleasure. This includes common re- 
 cruiting laws, mutual military inspection, 
 a joint committee for foreign affairs, joint 
 boards for the control of railways and of 
 river navigation, common coins and meas- 
 ures, common banking and commercial 
 laws, common military expenditures, mu- 
 tual liability for national debts, equality of 
 customs tariffs, joint collection of customs, 
 equal laws for the protection of labor, 
 equal laws of association and trust laws, 
 etc. There may or may not be eventually 
 free trade between Germany and the 
 group of states that are to join her, but 
 
 36
 
 the bond of cohesion between them will 
 primarily be a political one. Economic 
 considerations will adjust themselves to 
 their common political interests. 
 
 In the programme thus outlined the 
 need of permanent preparedness for war is 
 repeatedly emphasized. Hence regulation 
 of the storage of grain becomes a matter 
 of paramount importance. This and similar 
 measures Herr Naumann would entrust to 
 several commissions, which he proposes to 
 locate as follows: Budapest is to be the 
 grain centre, Prague the centre for all 
 treaty matters, Hamburg the centre of the 
 maritime trade, Berlin the exchange cen- 
 tre, and Vienna the legal centre. But it 
 is only after peace has been declared that 
 it will be possible to formulate a definite 
 programme, and the gist of such a pro- 
 gramme can, in Herr Naumann's opinion, 
 be summed up in two words: "better or- 
 ganization." It was Prussian organiza- 
 tion that paved the way for the successes of 
 this war, and if, says he, the opponents of 
 Germany like to label the intrinsic con- 
 nection between the works of peace and 
 
 37
 
 those of war as "German militarism," they 
 are welcome to it. The wholesome effect 
 of Prussian military discipline pervades, 
 in his view, the whole of Germany from 
 top to bottom. 
 
 Enthusiastic to the point of rhapsody as 
 Herr Naumann is over his project, he does 
 not wholly ignore the difficulties of its exe- 
 cution. He realizes that the Government 
 of Austria-Hungary may have to be 
 argued and cajoled into a partnership in 
 which that country is bound to be the 
 weaker member. Germany will have to 
 make it clear that there is no thought of 
 interfering with the internal affairs of the 
 Hapsburg Monarchy, and that the deli- 
 cate questions of race and language which 
 have so long agitated that country would 
 be let alone by the Germany of Central 
 Europe. 
 
 What is to be the geographical extent 
 of this powerful congeries of states? It 
 is Herr Naumann's ambition to see Cen- 
 tral Europe comprise about 5,000,000 
 square miles, that is to say, one-tenth of 
 the inhabited surface of the globe. He 
 
 38
 
 arrives at his estimate by a series of daring 
 steps. Starting with the 450,000 square 
 miles of Germany and Austria-Hungary, 
 he adds, first, the 900,000 square miles of 
 "a number of neighboring European 
 states," and then "claims" all of European 
 and Asiatic Turkey, thereby swelling the 
 figures to 2,500,000 square miles. Add 
 the colonies of the German Empire and 
 you have 4,000,000 square miles, and "if 
 we venture to count in the overseas pos- 
 sessions of neighboring states which have 
 not yet joined us, we may arrive at ap- 
 proximately 5,000,000 square miles" a 
 figure which he admits is "somewhat arbi- 
 trary." The population of this Central 
 Europe, beginning with the 116,000,000 
 inhabitants of the German Empire and 
 Austria-Hungary, will, in the manner de- 
 scribed, mount up to about 200,000,000, 
 or, roughly, one-eighth of the population 
 of the globe. 
 
 Fantastic as this programme seems to 
 be, it is undeniable that Herr Naumann's 
 teachings are spreading, and will have 
 to be reckoned with in the future. 
 
 39
 
 Already Austrian and German trade 
 unions have given their adhesion to the 
 plan, and even councils of German and 
 Austrian Socialists have approved of it. 
 So conservative a German economist as 
 Professor von Schmoller is arguing that 
 the present time urgently calls for close 
 tariff arrangements with Austria-Hun- 
 gary, and that "the leading men of nearly 
 all classes and parties are gradually meet- 
 ing under this flag." Naumann himself 
 foresees certain objections within Ger- 
 many itself. He fears that his scheme 
 will be viewed with suspicion by Prussian 
 nobles, the conservative, powerful, and 
 domineering (herrschaftsstarke) Old 
 Prussian, as well as the "Liberal capital- 
 ist," who, though for opposite reasons, 
 equally distrusts Austria-Hungary. To 
 these two types must be added the "Great- 
 er-Germans," whose ideal is a purely Ger- 
 manic state, and who are already groaning 
 under the burden of the Poles, Danes, and 
 French Alsatians of the Empire. 
 
 Herr Naumann, furthermore, realizes 
 that the Magyars are not in love with the 
 
 40
 
 Germans, but he relies on their keen desire 
 to retain their supremacy over the Slavs, 
 and reasons that they will grasp at any- 
 thing 1 Germany may offer them to attain 
 their ends. From a purely economic point 
 of view, Austria-Hungary and the other 
 members of the Central European com- 
 bination are to be won over by a system of 
 mutual tariff preferences which shall pro- 
 tect the industrially weaker countries. 
 
 Herr Naumann, it must be admitted, 
 presents his case with considerable skill. 
 He writes picturesquely and, in the main, 
 clearly and forcibly. His occasional senti- 
 mental outbursts, and the studied vague- 
 ness to which German writers are so prone, 
 but enhance the interest of the book in 
 German eyes. He is careful not to burden 
 his readers needlessly with statistics. These 
 and certain dry historical facts are relegat- 
 ed to a separate chapter at the conclusion 
 of the book. 
 
 While Naumann's thesis is apparently a 
 simple one, he finds it necessary to bolster 
 it up with assertions and prophecies of 
 various kinds. We meet at the outset with 
 
 41
 
 the statement that there is no room, at the 
 present time, for France in the new Cen- 
 tral Europe. Having chosen to ally her- 
 self with England, she will, unfortunately 
 for her, "in the near future become a 
 greater and better Portugal." Yet 
 even for her Heir Naumann would 
 leave a door open, perhaps only in a 
 distant future, for, like so many 
 Germans, he professes to harbor no 
 ill-feelings towards France. Italy, too, he 
 does not consider, for all time to come, nec- 
 essarily ineligible to partnership in Central 
 Europe, though he cautiously adds, "the 
 armies on the Isonzo have the first word." 
 Germany's present ally, Turkey, being 
 "antiquated" and separated from Central 
 Europe, both geographically and national- 
 ly, is not hailed with delight as a future 
 partner. But Central Europe will eventu- 
 ally determine the conditions of its own 
 existence. Though Herr Naumann care- 
 fully refrains throughout his book from 
 speaking harshly of any of the belligerent 
 nations, there is an unmistakable Bis- 
 marckian flavor in some of his arguments. 
 
 42
 
 All participants in the Great War must 
 feel that neither now nor in the future can 
 small or even moderate-sized countries 
 have any voice in world politics. "Our 
 conceptions of size have entirely changed, 
 only very large states can assert their in- 
 dividuality, all the little ones live by profit- 
 ing from the quarrels of the great, and 
 must first ask their permission if they 
 would make an unusual move." The world 
 thinks, as Cecil Rhodes says, "in contin- 
 ents." A generation, Herr Naumann sur- 
 mises, will be required for the task of es- 
 tablishing Central Europe, even if peace, 
 declared on the basis of victory of the Ger- 
 man-Austrian arms, seals the permanent 
 solidarity of the Hapsburgs and Hohen- 
 zollerns. A shade of doubt as to this soli- 
 darity hardly as to the victory itself 
 enters even Herr Naumann's mind. "The 
 question will arise : Are the Ambassadors 
 from Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest going 
 to leave the hall of the National Peace 
 Congress as open and honest friends or as 
 secret opponents?" If peace is only to 
 pave the way for future misunderstand- 
 
 43
 
 ings, Europe will face another Vienna 
 Congress of 1815. "In that case, for what 
 shall we have sacrificed our sons and the 
 mutilated Hungarians their limbs?" A 
 perplexing question, indeed! As danger- 
 ous as the admission that after the conclu- 
 sion of peace "we all shall be more careful 
 than hitherto to suppress frivolous pretexts 
 for war and to strive for a mutual under- 
 standing between nations." 
 
 For Herr Naumann, as for every Ger- 
 man and Austro-Hungarian, the war be- 
 gan "purely as a defensive one," though in 
 the same breath he tells us that "in the 
 German Empire two ideas had always been 
 present in the minds of the people and the 
 Government: that sooner or later a break 
 with the Czar was bound to come, and that 
 some time there would have to be a fight 
 with England for the control of the seas. 
 The only unexpected thing was that all 
 came together with a rush the war in 
 France, the war in the East, and the naval 
 war." 
 
 Leaving aside Herr Naumann's specula- 
 tions as to the origin of the war, it is w r orth 
 
 44
 
 while to raise some doubts as to the feasi- 
 bility of his plans after its conclusion. 
 Economic considerations are certainly 
 powerful factors in the development of 
 modern nations, but all statesmen must 
 reckon with the facts of human nature. 
 Nations and races will go on with their in- 
 born or cultivated likes and dislikes after 
 the war as before. It becomes necessary 
 to remind those who so glibly assume Aus- 
 tria-Hungary willingness to listen to 
 Germany's siren voice after the war 
 that the mutual jealousies of Austria and 
 Prussia are of very long standing, and 
 have not been wholly interrupted by the 
 present war. It was Frederick II who in- 
 augurated the systematic policy of weaken- 
 ing Austria in order to strengthen Prussia. 
 Conversely, Joseph II sought to recover 
 Austria's prestige by isolating Prussia and 
 regaining new territory, whether in the 
 East or in the West. Thenceforth there 
 was mutual distrust between the two coun- 
 tries, though Joseph II, immediately after 
 Frederick's death, thought for a moment 
 of burying old animosities and founding 
 45
 
 an Austro-Prussian alliance which would 
 guarantee the peace of Europe. Prussia, 
 however, soon emphasized her antagon- 
 ism to Austria by her machinations with- 
 in the German Empire, at Mainz and 
 Worms, while Joseph II turned to Russia 
 as the natural friend of Austria. Under 
 Metternich's regime the mutual jealousies 
 were accentuated. He rejected contempt- 
 uously Stein's plan of dividing the over- 
 lordship of Austria and Prussia in Ger- 
 many along the lines of the Main. Met- 
 ternich was shortsighted enough to think, 
 even after the disappearance of the Holy 
 Roman Empire, that Austria might guide 
 the destinies of both Germany and Italy, 
 and he called the Congress of Vienna to- 
 gether with this end in view. Prussia never 
 ceased to watch her opportunities, and 
 knew how to bide her time. 
 
 Bismarck, who is generally credited 
 with the authorship of the plan for a Cen- 
 tral Europe, tells us in his "Gedanken und 
 Erinnerungen" that he never thought, in 
 the days of the German Bund, while advo- 
 cating the union of all Germany on a 
 
 46
 
 dualistic basis, of anything but Prussian 
 hegemony. He frankly told Count 
 Karolyi, the Austrian Ambassador, in 
 1862: "Our relations must either improve 
 or grow worse. You will learn to deal with 
 us (Prussia) as a European Power." 
 Throughout his career Bismarck never lost 
 his contempt for Austria, though after the 
 war of 1866, foreseeing the Franco-Ger- 
 man War of 1870, he shrewdly insisted on 
 treating Austria leniently in order to se- 
 cure at least her passive attitude towards 
 Germany later on. Austrians still remem- 
 ber Silesia and Sadowa, and they have not 
 grown fonder of Prussia during the pres- 
 ent war. Both Austrians and Hungarians 
 complain, as Herr Naumann admits, of 
 the German, and especially the Prussian, 
 want of consideration, of their overbearing 
 manners, etc. "Modern Germans," he 
 says, "are almost everywhere bad German- 
 izers." "Why is it," he naively asks, "that 
 we Germans of the Empire are during this 
 war so little liked by the rest of the world?" 
 The question which he leaves unan- 
 swered was discussed at some length dur- 
 
 47
 
 ing the Franco-Prussian War in an edi- 
 torial article in the Nation (Oct. 20, 1870: 
 "Popular Notions of Prussia.") at a time 
 when the Nation, like the rest of the most 
 thoughtful organs of public opinion 
 throughout the United States, was strong- 
 ly on the side of Germany. Its remarks 
 are pertinent at the present time : 
 
 As to Prussia's habitual want of popu- 
 larity, it is one of the most curious phe- 
 nomena in modern history. Prussia has 
 invariably been disliked, not only by her 
 enemies, but by her very friends and allies. 
 The Poles, of course, hate her (and who 
 would blame them for that?) , but even the 
 Russians dislike her, notwithstanding the 
 intimacy and relationship of the two sov- 
 ereigns. So do the Austrians, so did the 
 Bavarians and Wurttembergers, the 
 Dutch and the Danes, the English and the 
 Italians, and their dislike seems to have 
 nothing to do with political jealousies or 
 grievances. Nor do the French form an 
 exception to the rule, although it is but 
 fair to say that before the war at least 
 there was nothing personal even in their 
 chauvinism. There must, of course, be 
 some real and tangible reason for all this. 
 It is natural enough that, when once a 
 
 48
 
 prejudice exists against a country, the 
 stranger who visits or traverses it can 
 rarely be in a proper condition of mind for 
 steering clear of difficulties and scrapes, 
 and these difficulties will enhance rather 
 than correct his prejudices. But we can 
 hardly call prejudice a natural aversion to 
 what must appear forbidding and ungenial 
 to everybody not rendered callous by life- 
 long habit. The bureaucratic hardness of 
 Prussian officials, and the rigid compulsory 
 method with which Prussia enforces the 
 acceptance of her gifts and her protection, 
 as well as of her burdens, are certainly not 
 calculated to beget good will, and we can 
 hardly wonder if Prussia enjoys the 
 strange distinction of being disliked by a 
 good many of her own people, who would 
 willingly allow themselves to be educated, 
 vaccinated, taxed, and drilled, but who 
 either object to the official modus operandi 
 or are anxious to sell their obedience for a 
 fair measure of constitutional rights. 
 
 Herr Naumann quotes the experience 
 of the North-German Confederation, be- 
 fore 1870, in its dealings with South Ger- 
 many, as an example of how easy it was 
 to overcome the scruples of Bavaria, 
 Wiirttemberg, Baden, etc., concerning a 
 
 49
 
 closer union with Prussia; but he has to 
 admit that they had maintained before the 
 Franco- German War an attitude of dis- 
 trust towards Prussia which even now has 
 not wholly disappeared. "The Berliner 
 was in their eyes long an alien, and is 
 so in part even to-day." If Germany is 
 defeated, Prussia will be less an object of 
 veneration in South German eyes than 
 ever before; but even if she is victorious, 
 will the feeling between South Germans 
 and Prussians be all that may be desired? 
 Will there be unmixed mutual respect and 
 due appreciation of what each has accom- 
 plished to bring about victory? Prussia's 
 preponderance in Central Europe will be 
 far greater than her present dominance in 
 Germany. What will Bavaria, Wurttem- 
 berg, and Baden have gained to compen- 
 sate them for sinking into positions of re- 
 latively greater inferiority than they had 
 been chafing under before the war? Herr 
 Naumann sees only a benign thought in 
 the "controlling concept ( Oberbegriff ) of 
 a Central Europe dominating over Ger- 
 mans, French, Danes, and Poles in the 
 
 50
 
 German Empire, over the Magyars, Ger- 
 mans, Rumans, Slovaks, Croats, and Serbs 
 in Hungary, over Germans, Czechs, Slo- 
 vaks, Poles and Southern Slavs in Aus- 
 tria." All these will "of their own accord 
 (von selbst)" speak German as though 
 Naumann had never heard of bloody riots 
 in Bohemia over the question of using the 
 dual languages in schools, in law courts, 
 etc., and as though Prussia had not, ac- 
 cording to Prince Biilow, failed utterly in 
 her attempts to impose the German lan- 
 guage with an iron hand on the recalci- 
 trant school children of Posen. Nothing, 
 however, appears difficult to the senti- 
 mentalist in politics. In Herr Naumann's 
 eyes it is the easiest thing in the world 
 for Vienna and Berlin to supplement each 
 other, with great advantage to both. 
 "We," he says, addressing himself to Aus- 
 trians, "have more horsepower, and you 
 more music. We think more in terms of 
 quantity, the best of you rather in terms 
 of quality. If we can fuse our respective 
 abilities, then and for the first time what 
 is harsh in modern German civilization will 
 
 51
 
 acquire through your assistance the touch 
 of charm which will make it tolerable to 
 the outside world." How simple a process 
 this fusion ( "zusammengiessen" ) appears 
 to be in the delightful vagueness of Herr 
 Naumann's pages ! 
 
 And even if Austrians and Germans al- 
 low themselves to be carried away by such 
 glittering phrases, the sober-minded Hun- 
 garians may in due time be trusted to look 
 at the situation after the war with a keen 
 eye to their own interests. The Magyars 
 have never fully relished the union with 
 Austria, and, no matter what their present 
 attitude may be, they will never allow the 
 Dual Monarchy to enter into any scheme 
 that may threaten to interfere with their 
 future freedom of action. Herr Naumann 
 assumes that under German influence the 
 plains of Hungary will become much 
 more productive. They may, indeed, but 
 how will that influence be exerted without 
 wounding the susceptibilities of the proud 
 Magyars? Already we hear of fierce pro- 
 tests in the Hungarian Diet against the in- 
 
 52
 
 sclent interference of German purchasers 
 of Hungarian farms. Will the Hun- 
 garian peasantry be less resentful after the 
 war? Count Szechenyi, "the greatest 
 Magyar," as he is sometimes called by his 
 countrymen, said in the Diet of 1843: 
 "How does a nation come to possess the 
 force and virtue necessary for its political 
 action? If the majority of the individuals 
 composing it are to fulfil humanely and 
 honorably their appointed task, they must 
 acquire, above all, the art of pleasing, the 
 faculty of attracting and absorbing the 
 neighboring elements. Is it likely that a 
 people will possess this faculty who will 
 not respect in others that which it insists 
 on having respected in itself? It is a great 
 art to know how to win men's hearts." 
 Unless the Prussians of Central Europe 
 shall draw the Magyars to their hearts 
 more easily than they have drawn to them- 
 selves their South-German brothers, the 
 future of Central Europe must remain du- 
 bious. 
 
 A mere hint at the numberless problems 
 which would confront the Slavs of Hun- 
 
 53
 
 gary and Cisleithania under the scheme of 
 a Central Europe must suffice. A 
 strengthening of German influence, in 
 whatever shape, and however disguised, 
 must inevitably entail a weakening of 
 Slavic power, and such a scheme will there- 
 fore arouse suspicion and resentment 
 among the Slavs within Central Europe. 
 The mutual relations of other nationalities 
 that will be asked to join Germany, Heir 
 Naumann conveniently ignores. Rumania, 
 for instance, may or may not disappear 
 from the map of Europe as a consequence 
 of the war; in either case, will the Rumans 
 of Hungary be better satisfied to remain 
 under Magyar rule, with German over- 
 lordship, than they have been hitherto? 
 Will the Magyars themselves be more 
 kindly disposed towards them? Will the 
 Ruthenes of Galicia dislike the Poles 
 less, and love the Teutons more, in a new 
 superstate? But everything seems to fit 
 into Herr Naumann's scheme. Yet, 
 though Bulgarians and Serbs may be only 
 Slavs to him, and therefore destined to be 
 thrown into a common melting-pot, their 
 
 54
 
 national characteristics and differences will 
 outlast the war. The Bulgarians are a 
 practical and energetic people, not given 
 to boasting of their ancestry, like the 
 Serbs. They may, or may not, have made 
 a mistake in casting in their lot with the 
 Teutons, but their future still lies largely 
 in their own hands. They may desert 
 Germany, as they have deserted Russia. 
 What will be the feeling of the Serbs of 
 Hungary towards Germany? Each Bal- 
 kan race will survive the war at least to 
 the extent of being able to plague its 
 neighbors. And who can foretell whither, 
 in the readjustment of Europe after the 
 peace, the force of a former Pan-Slavism 
 will tend? Will Poles, Serbs, and Bui- 
 gars fraternize under the common eegis 
 of a Central Europe? A stroke of the 
 pen has resuscitated the ancient Kingdom 
 of Poland with the status of Galicia and 
 Posen still undefined but the fortunes 
 of war may wipe it off the scrap of paper 
 on which the two Emperors signed their 
 edict. 
 
 55
 
 So far the war has settled nothing, 
 though what the rule of blood and iron 
 can accomplish, Germany under Prussian 
 rule has accomplished. Prussian generals 
 have won new glory for Prussian military 
 efficiency. But in proportion as they have 
 succeeded, they have sown the seeds of 
 envy and dislike in the rest of Germany 
 and in Austria-Hungary. Political prog- 
 nostications of writers and statesmen and 
 even Imperial rescripts have turned out 
 poor prophecies before this. Naumann 
 sees in the Germany of to-day a "half- 
 fmished product," but Central Europe is 
 to develop somehow the fairest flower of 
 modern civilization "a type of man in- 
 termediate between Frenchmen, Italians, 
 Turks, Russians, Scandinavians, and 
 Englishmen" and all this is to "grow 
 around Teutonism." Such is the fabric of 
 his dream. 
 
 At bottom, stripped of all its fine 
 phrases, Herr Naumann's gospel of the 
 great transformation is the old familiar 
 one of coercion friendly coercion, by open 
 flattery and half -veiled insinuation, but still 
 
 56
 
 coercion. He admits that for Austria- 
 Hungary to enter the Central European 
 combination will involve "a certain sacri- 
 fice not to be regarded lightly of econo- 
 mic independence and of her rights as a 
 free state" (her "staatsrechtliche Unge- 
 bundenheit" ) , but, he finally says in cold 
 blood, "the transaction is necessary, ac- 
 cording to all teaching of history, to the 
 further continuance of the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Dual Monarchy." 
 
 And the continuance of the Hapsburg 
 Monarchy is in doubt because in the chain 
 of his reasoning the continuance of wars 
 is impliedly assumed as axiomatic. Free 
 as he is from the chauvinism of a Bern- 
 hardi or a Reventlow, there is no proof, in 
 his plea for a Central Europe, that he be- 
 lieves in the march of political progress, 
 in the humanizing and liberalizing in- 
 fluences that are already at work in other 
 countries to make further wars impossible, 
 or at least more difficult than hitherto. He 
 no more reads the thought of the best ele- 
 ments of Germany than he understands the 
 inmost feelings of Austria-Hungary not 
 
 57
 
 to speak of England, France, and 
 America. But though the mind of Prussia 
 may remain unchanged after the war, 
 must we assume that the soul of German- 
 Austrians, Magyars, and Slavs is bound 
 to undergo a complete transformation? 
 
 58
 
 Austria's Opportunity 
 
 [From The New York Evening Post, March 31, 1917.] 
 
 XT EVER before in the troubled history 
 *-^ of the Monarchy have the perplexi- 
 ties of the Hapsburg rulers been so great 
 as now. Internally and externally, Aus- 
 tria-Hungary is beset by apparently in- 
 soluble problems. In all parts of the Em- 
 pire there is distress, dissatisfaction, 
 divided council. To cap the climax, the 
 question of a break with the United States 
 now looms up portentously. In Cisleith- 
 ania the subject is being approached with 
 the caution imposed by the censor ; in Hun- 
 gary, however, there is greater freedom 
 of speech. Magyar papers have repeated- 
 ly pointed out the folly of antagonizing a 
 country which plays so large a part in 
 Hungary's economic life. In thousands of 
 Hungarian homes the only means of sus- 
 tenance comes from the United States. 
 It is safe to say that more than fifty mil- 
 lion dollars is sent annually by Austro- 
 Hungarian subjects and naturalized 
 
 59
 
 Americans of Austro-Hungarian birth to 
 relatives in the Empire, twenty-five mil- 
 lions alone coming from Slovak miners in 
 Pennsylvania and elsewhere. How can 
 Austria under present conditions face the 
 cessation of such a revenue? And this 
 question opens up the larger one of the 
 origin and the issue of the war. 
 
 More and more frequently, in Austria 
 as in Hungary, people are asking, what 
 have we to gain by continuing the war? 
 The promises held out by the Hohenzol- 
 lern to the Hapsburg before the fatal ulti- 
 matum to Servia, have long since lost their 
 potency. The new Emperor and his ad- 
 visers are disillusioned, the people weary 
 and half -starved. The political outlook in 
 all the Austrian crown lands, with the 
 possible exception of Galicia, is dreary 
 in the extreme. Every semblance of 
 constitutional government has disap- 
 peared in the Austrian half of the 
 Empire. The Vienna Reichsrat has 
 not been convoked in three years. The 
 Czechs, whom the Emperor had hoped 
 to conciliate by the appointment of Count 
 
 60
 
 Clam-Martinitz as Austrian Premier, 
 branded the Minister as a renegade; in 
 Hungary the opposition to the pro-Ger- 
 man policy of Tisza is becoming more and 
 more pronounced. The Hungarian Pre- 
 mier is held responsible, jointly with the 
 German Chancellor, for the disastrous 
 failure of the German peace proposal. 
 Count Andrassy, the leader of the Consti- 
 tutionalists ; Counts Apponyi and Karolyi, 
 the leaders of the two Independence par- 
 ties ; ex-Premier, Dr. Alexander Wekerle, 
 and other influential men some in the 
 ranks of the Democratic party are un- 
 dermining the position of the formerly all- 
 powerful Tisza, and with his fall Hohen- 
 zollern influence in the councils of the 
 Hapsburg monarchy will have received a 
 deadly blow. 
 
 Throughout the war Germany's efforts 
 to Teutonize Hungary have been keenly 
 resented by the proud Magyars. In the 
 Diet the insolence of German purchasers 
 of Hungarian estates has provoked bitter 
 discussion and the propagandist visits of 
 two leading German politicians, Herr 
 61
 
 Bassermann and Count Westarp, to the 
 Hungarian capital, have been sarcastical- 
 ly commented upon by the Budapest press. 
 Thus the Nepszava said: "German Kul- 
 tur is sufficiently well represented in Hun- 
 gary to make it unnecessary to found 
 any fresh associations for its dissemina- 
 tion." Conversely, German newspapers 
 have complained of the intolerant attitude 
 of the Hungarians. The Munich Neueste 
 Nachrichten deplores the inability of the 
 Magyars to appreciate the purely cultural 
 efforts of Germany, and revives the old 
 charge of Magyar oppression of other 
 nationalities. 
 
 The fact is, the Hungarians are, as they 
 have always been, an intensely practical 
 people, and they will not compromise their 
 future for the sake of pleasing either 
 Hohenzollern or Hapsburg. The bait of 
 becoming the guardians of the grain em- 
 porium in the post-bellum Central Eu- 
 rope has been spurned by clear-sighted 
 Magyar statesmen, and though Hungary 
 has gone far enough in following German 
 
 62
 
 leadership, there are indications that she 
 will not go the full length of Hohenzollern 
 desires. 
 
 Least of all will the Germans of Cis- 
 leithania be entrapped into approval of the 
 last mad scheme of Hohenzollern states- 
 manship open defiance of the United 
 States. During the fifty years that have 
 elapsed since the Compromise with Hun- 
 gary the balance of power within Cis- 
 leithania has inclined, now to the German 
 elements liberal or conservative now to 
 the Czechs or Poles; but through it all 
 Vienna has remained the centre of the Em- 
 pire. German- Austria still rules the rul- 
 ers, if not the Monarchy. The new Em- 
 peror reflects, like Francis Joseph, the 
 feeling of Vienna, and this is, and ever has 
 been, antagonistic to Berlin. Vienna, 
 even before the war, retained much of its 
 old dislike of Prussian ways, and Berlin 
 reciprocated this feeling. What an acute 
 student of Kulturgeschichte, Wilhelm 
 Heinrich Riehl, wrote half a century ago 
 concerning the relations of Vienna and 
 Berlin is still largely true: 
 
 63
 
 "As regards mutual depreciation and 
 lack of understanding, North and South 
 Germans stand on the same level. There 
 are enough educated people in the North, 
 travellers in many lands, who almost glory 
 in the fact that they have never seen Vi- 
 enna; just as there are such in the South 
 who are proud of having always avoided 
 going to the capital on the Spree." 
 
 In German literature, down to compara- 
 tively recent days, depreciation of Aus- 
 trian writers was the rule rather than the 
 exception. "Grillparzer," wrote a North 
 German critic, "is an Austrian poet who 
 happens not to have written in the Magyar 
 or Czech tongue, but in German. His 
 works cannot be considered as manifesta- 
 tions of the German spirit." In a sense 
 this was true enough, for Grillparzer was 
 an Austrian in every fibre, and disliked 
 Prussian arrogance and pedantry intense- 
 ly. Nor was the dramatist the only Ger- 
 man-Austrian writer thoroughly repre- 
 sentative of the Austrian spirit as dis- 
 tinguished from the Prussian. Lenau, 
 Raimund, Rosegger, and Anzenzruber 
 
 64
 
 are notable instances of this in literature, 
 as were Mozart, Schubert, Haydn, and 
 Johann Strauss in music, and Schwind in 
 art. 
 
 Vienna and Berlin, though ostensibly 
 united, are in reality far apart. Austria 
 has not forgotten the series of humiliations 
 suffered for a century and more at the 
 hands of the Hohenzollerns. Bismarck's 
 policy, from the beginning to the end of 
 his career, was one long, carefully 
 wrought-out plan for destroying Austrian 
 influence, first in the German Federation, 
 and then in all Europe. A hundred frank- 
 ly cynical pages in his Memoirs bear this 
 out. And only two years ago one of Bis- 
 marck's successors labored hard to barter 
 away some of Austria's fairest provinces 
 for Italy's promise to keep out of the war. 
 
 As was Austria, so were Bavaria, 
 Saxony, and other German states but 
 pawns in Prussia's game. Bismarck had 
 them all in mind when he wrote, in 1859, 
 to Minister von Schleinitz of that "infirm- 
 ity of Prussia's" which could only be 
 healed ferro et igni. Fire and sword are 
 65
 
 once more the motto of Prussian states- 
 manship, but Prussia, now the arbiter of 
 the fate of all Germany, has still to reckon 
 with her "faithful ally." Austria stands 
 at the parting of the ways. Her alliance 
 with the Hohenzollern, forced upon her 
 by fancied political necessity, is not based 
 on inner kinship in thought and feeling, 
 not on ancient historical tradition, nor on 
 community of future interests. It is a hol- 
 low pretence, rife with the seeds of future 
 dissension. When the break between 
 Hohenzollern and Hapsburg will come, it 
 would be rash to predict, but that the pres- 
 ent union will not outlast the war is cer- 
 tain. The tone of the last Austrian note 
 to our Government portends unmistakably 
 a change in the relations between the Teu- 
 tonic Powers. Whatever Germany may 
 decide upon in her delusion, Austria can- 
 not risk the severance of her relations with 
 the United States. 
 
 66
 
 The Future of Bohemia 
 
 [From The New York Evening Post, May 16, 1917.] 
 
 Bohemia is declared to be in a state of 
 siege. What does the news portend for 
 the future of the kingdom and the entire 
 Hapsburg monarchy? Are the prospects 
 of peace brought nearer by this emphatic 
 evidence of civic strife in the most import- 
 ant crownland of Cisleithania? A possible 
 answer to such questions concerning the 
 future may be sought in a retrospect of 
 the past. 
 
 "Whoever is master of Bohemia is mas- 
 ter of Europe," said Bismarck. He had 
 in mind, not the nominal rulership, but 
 the mastery of problems which from the 
 time of the fall of the great Moravian em- 
 pire, about the year 900, have never ceased 
 to trouble Europe. Throughout her per- 
 turbations Bohemia has within the past 
 century grown economically to a com- 
 manding position in Austria and Europe. 
 Agriculturally and industrially highly 
 productive, with enormously rich coal de- 
 
 67
 
 posits and the most famous mineral 
 springs in the world, Bohemia, "the pearl 
 in the crown of St. Wenceslas," enjoys in- 
 deed a proud preeminence. For centuries, 
 too, Bohemia has been prominent in the 
 arts of peace. The Czech nation gave 
 Comenius (Komensky) to the world, and 
 in more recent times Bohemia has been 
 one of the artistic centres of Europe. 
 Gluck conducted his first operas in Prague 
 and Mozart's Don Juan first saw there the 
 light. 
 
 Down to the close of the eighteenth 
 century Europe was but little concerned 
 in the destinies of Bohemia. Since then 
 the awakened national aspirations of the 
 Czechs, amid the general revival of Slav- 
 dom, have drawn the attention of foreign 
 observers to a long-neglected subject. And 
 now the note of the Entente Powers, with 
 its implied promise of the restoration of 
 the realm of Bohemia, which came to an 
 end in 1620, fixes the gaze of all the world 
 upon the Austrian province seemingly 
 destined to play an important part in the 
 final settlement of the war. "A great em- 
 
 68
 
 pire, like a great cake," says Franklin, 
 "is most easily diminished at the edges." 
 Naturally enough, certain Czech pa- 
 triots and agitators have sought by every 
 means at their command to use the pres- 
 ent opportunity to undermine the hold of 
 the Hapsburgs on their North Slavic do- 
 minions. The realm of St. Wenceslas is 
 to be restored, but how is the dream to be 
 realized? The advocates of the plan 
 picture to themselves a country consisting 
 of Bohemia proper, Moravia, and Silesia, 
 plus the Slovak districts of northern Hun- 
 gary, the whole to comprise about 50,000 
 square miles, and to contain about 12,- 
 000,000 inhabitants. The English trans- 
 lation of the Entente note spoke of the lib- 
 eration of the "Czecho- Slovaks," instead 
 of the "Czechs and Slovaks" (as the 
 French original had it), but the resusci- 
 tation of Bohemia as an independent na- 
 tion, with "Slovakia" as an integral part, 
 has not in any quarter been clearly form- 
 ulated. In a matter of such importance 
 the details are everything. "Slovakia" 
 has had no political existence since the 
 
 69
 
 tenth century, and its present limits, hav- 
 ing reference only to the regions of Hun- 
 gary where Slovaks predominate, are not 
 easily defined. It is admitted by those 
 who favor the incorporation of Slovakia 
 that not all her children in Hungary can 
 return to the fold. The fate of the Slo- 
 vaks in other parts of Hungary than those 
 which are to be merged in the new Bo- 
 hemia is left in doubt; nor do we get the 
 slightest hint as to the status of the Mag- 
 yars who will find themselves incorporated 
 in the new state, together with the Slovaks. 
 The forced consent of the Hungarian 
 nation to the cession of their northern ter- 
 ritory is, of course, assumed, just as is the 
 consent of the Government of Cisleithania 
 to the liberation of all Bohemia. What 
 is to be the form of government to be 
 adopted for the new state? On the 
 whole, a monarchy seems to be preferred, 
 though some advocates of total separation 
 from Austria incline to a republican form 
 of government. 
 
 Prof. T. G. Masaryk, formerly of the 
 University of Prague, and now an exile 
 
 70
 
 in London, passes lightly over the ques- 
 tion of the constitution of the new Bo- 
 hemia. Writing in the New Europe, 
 shortly before the establishment of the 
 present Government of Russia, he says : 
 
 The dynastic question is left to the de- 
 cision of the Allies, who might perhaps 
 give one of their own princes. There 
 might be a personal union between Servia 
 and Bohemia, if the Serbs and Bohemians 
 were to be neighboring countries. A per- 
 sonal union with Russia or with Poland, 
 if the latter were to be quite independent, 
 has also been suggested. (German and 
 Austrian princes must co ipso be ex- 
 cluded.) The Bohemian people are thor- 
 oughly Slavophile. A Russian dynasty, in 
 whatever form, would be most popular, 
 and, in any case, Bohemian politicians de- 
 sire the establishment of the kingdom of 
 Bohemia in complete accord with Russia. 
 
 This is equalled in vagueness only by 
 the suggestion that "so far as the Ger- 
 man minority is concerned, I should not 
 be opposed to a rectification of the politi- 
 cal frontier; parts of Bohemia and Mo- 
 ravia, where there are only a few Czechs, 
 might be ceded to German Austria." We 
 
 71
 
 must remember that in present Bohemia 
 the proportion of Germans to Czechs is 
 as thirty-seven to sixty-three, and that 
 the German minority, so nonchalantly to 
 be disposed of, contains most of the me- 
 chanical and technological skill, enterprise, 
 and wealth, that Bohemia boasts. More- 
 over, there is nothing in the history of the 
 kingdom, remote or recent, to warrant the 
 assumption of future harmony between the 
 common people and the aristocracy a 
 very important consideration in the case 
 of a country where noble families have per- 
 haps greater power and influence than has 
 any other aristocracy in Europe. The 
 feudal nobility of Bohemia has never 
 identified itself with the people German 
 or Czech as has the Magyar aristocracy 
 with the masses of Hungary. The Princes 
 Schwarzenberg own one-thirteenth of the 
 land; the Lobkowitzes, Clam-Martinitzes, 
 and many other noblemen ranged on the 
 side of the feudalists are scarcely less in- 
 fluential than the Schwarzenbergs. Gen- 
 erally opposed to the feudalists in political 
 matters involving the equality of the 
 
 72
 
 Czech and German languages, but equally 
 aloof from the masses, are the Princes 
 Auersperg and other German-speaking 
 landed proprietors, whom the new Bo- 
 hemia will find it anything but easy to 
 dispossess or expatriate. And not only 
 Bohemian noblemen of both nationalities 
 have hitherto been attached to the house 
 of Hapsburg, but the bulk of the Czech 
 people have been distinctly loyal on vari- 
 ous critical occasions. That a cataclysm 
 like the present war has led to something 
 like revolt, both in the army and in civil 
 life, is explainable enough on purely 
 economic grounds. Up to the outbreak 
 of the war the most fervent of Czech 
 nationalists have acquiesced in the over- 
 lordship of the Hapsburgs, and clamored 
 only for an autonomy of Bohemia like 
 that which Hungary enjoys, within the 
 monarchy. That the Hapsburg regime, 
 with rare exceptions, has on the whole 
 consistently opposed the political and 
 literary aspirations of Czech leaders has 
 not disturbed the vision of those among 
 them clear-sighted enough to recognize 
 
 73
 
 that an independent state of Bohemia 
 would mean a Bohemia exposed to the 
 ambitions of neighboring states and the 
 entanglements of European politics. 
 
 The principal spokesman for Czech 
 aspirations in the last century, the his- 
 torian, Francis Palacky, a patriot of great 
 renown, is credited with the authorship 
 of the dictum that "if Austria did not 
 exist it would have to be invented." 
 Palacky wrote as late as 1865: "To pre- 
 tend that the resources of so vast an Em- 
 pire are to be devoted entirely to the 
 service of one or two favorite peoples, 
 while the others who contribute equally to 
 the might of the whole estate are to be 
 content with what may be allowed them, 
 is equal to saying: 'We are the masters 
 and you are the servants.' ' It is true, 
 Palacky's argument was directed against 
 the Germans of Bohemia, but he was too 
 good a logician not to know that his 
 reasoning could be turned both ways. 
 "The Slavs," he declared, "desire the 
 prosperity of the monarchy, on condition 
 that they are given guarantees for their 
 
 74
 
 normal development." He feared not 
 hoped that the Dualism established in 
 1867 portended the eventual dismember- 
 ment of the monarchy. 
 
 Another fallacy in the reasoning of those 
 who would identify Pan- Slavic aims with 
 present Czech aspirations is the assump- 
 tion that Bohemians have always been 
 wishing to throw in their lot with the 
 kindred races of Austria and other 
 countries. The truth is that the Czechs 
 of Bohemia have had but a tempered 
 sympathy with the aspirations of other 
 Slavic peoples. The idea of a Pan-Slavic 
 union occurred to Kollar, generally con- 
 sidered the father of the movement, mainly 
 for literary purposes. He first advanced 
 the plan in 1831, and, of course, from 
 that the step to a furtherance of political 
 aims was a natural one. During the revo- 
 lution of 1848 the Bohemians, while tak- 
 ing the leadership in the Slavic movement 
 which then seemed to promise success, 
 were far apart from several of their Slavic 
 brethren. The general Slavic congress 
 convoked by Palacky at Prague resulted 
 
 75
 
 in a split into two camps. The Czechs de- 
 clared in favor of the Austrian Govern- 
 ment, as did the South-Slavic Croats and 
 Serbs. The Poles, who had learned to 
 see in the Russians their natural oppres- 
 sors, espoused the cause of Hungary. 
 Pan- Slavism is to day as little of a practi- 
 cal fact as it was during the revolution of 
 1848. 
 
 It never entered Palacky's mind that the 
 revival of the Czech language meant the 
 creation of a Czecho- Slovak state. Up to 
 about 1850 he and a few scholars like 
 Schafarik represented all that there was 
 in Czech literature, in the creation of which 
 he was chiefly interested. It is told of 
 him that when he and a small number of 
 his friends gathered at his house on one 
 occasion he remarked jestingly: "If the 
 roof should now fall, the whole of Czech 
 literature would be buried in its ruins." 
 Nevertheless, the stimulus given to Czech 
 aims by the present war is not surprising, 
 and, properly expressed and led into prac- 
 tical channels, it may lead to important 
 results. Austria is on the verge of ex- 
 
 76
 
 haustion, and after laying her heavy hand 
 on Czech "rebels" like Dr. Kramarsch, the 
 Government may even before the conclu- 
 sion of peace be forced to gentler measures 
 in dealing with her recalcitrant subjects 
 in Bohemia. Possibly the leaders of the 
 present movement among the Czechs, as 
 well as the European statesmen eventually 
 charged with peace negotiations, may 
 come to the conclusion that an autonomous 
 Bohemia within the Empire may be a 
 stronger guarantee of future peace to all 
 concerned than a nominally free Bohemia 
 without. One thing, at all events, is cer- 
 tain. The Czechs of Bohemia will never 
 lend a willing ear to Pan-German bland- 
 ishments. They may make peace, in their 
 own interest, with the Hapsburgs but they 
 will never cease to distrust the Hohenzol- 
 lerns. They still feel towards German 
 chauvinism as they did in the day when 
 Ladislas Rieger, Palacky's son-in-law and 
 the most eloquent spokesman of his peo- 
 ple, said in a famous discourse: "You al- 
 ways talk of German science and civiliza- 
 tion. How often have these idols been held 
 
 77
 
 up to us for our admiration! One never 
 hears any one talk of French science and 
 civilization, but 'Deutsche Wissenschaft' is 
 such a mouth-filling morsel!" 
 
 It is to be hoped that at the conclusion 
 of peace the Czechs, like the Poles, may 
 be masters of their destinies, but it is pre- 
 mature to forecast their decision. Austria 
 in her strength and her weakness her di- 
 versified German and non-German ma- 
 terial and intellectual interests, as well as 
 her hopeless internal dissensions is to-day 
 the greatest stumbling block in the path of 
 Germany's single-minded ruthlessness. 
 Pan-Germanism, always confined in 
 Lower Austria to a handful of noisy dema- 
 gogues, has made no converts since the 
 war. Vienna is not yet ready to sink to 
 the level of a lesser Berlin. And all Aus- 
 tria will long remember that Prussia lured 
 her into the present war and, when hos- 
 tilities were scarcely begun, brought every 
 pressure to bear upon her to make her 
 relinquish some of her fairest provinces 
 for the sake of keeping Italy from joining 
 the Allies. - Such an alliance in arms has 
 
 78
 
 taught Austria what to expect in a future 
 partnership in "Central Europe." It will 
 be the task of wise statesmanship among 
 the Allies to reconcile the claims of the 
 Czechs with the position of Austria as an 
 important factor in eventual combinations 
 that shall bring about peace and save the 
 world from future aggression on the part 
 of Germany. 
 
 79
 
 Hungary and the Fall of 
 Tisza 
 
 [From The New York Nation, May 31, 1917.] 
 
 HP HE resignation of the Tisza Ministry 
 is an event the significance of which 
 will be felt on all the battlefields of En- 
 rope. Exactly fifty years after the re- 
 gained autonomy of Hungary was sealed 
 by the coronation of Francis Joseph at 
 Budapest, his successor to the crown of 
 St. Stephen parts with the services of the 
 Premier who has been the most powerful 
 advocate of the alliance between the 
 Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs. Count 
 Tisza had staked his fate on the unshaken 
 continuance of that alliance, and he has 
 fallen. Ostensibly he resigned because the 
 Emperor Charles refused to approve of 
 his attitude concerning the reform of the 
 franchise in the Hungarian kingdom, and 
 it may well be that the voice of the various 
 nationalities who are clamoring for a juster 
 share in the Government than the Magyars 
 
 81
 
 have hitherto accorded them can no longer 
 be suppressed; but more serious problems 
 are confronting both halves of the mon- 
 archy to-day than even the question of uni- 
 versal manhood suffrage in Hungary. 
 
 Public opinion in Hungary is divided 
 on the question of continuing the war. 
 We have heard of Count Karolyi, the 
 leader of a branch of the Independence 
 party, strongly urging the need of peace 
 and repudiating all ideas of conquest ; and 
 of such influential papers as the Pesti 
 Hirlap and the Pesti Naplo (once famous 
 as the organ of Francis Deak) ranging 
 themselves on the side of the opposition to 
 Tisza. Finally, there came the cable news 
 of a bitter attack of the Pesti Naplo on 
 Count Reventlow and of the Socialist 
 organ, Nepszava., on Tirpitz, while three 
 members of the Chamber of Deputies were 
 quoted as condemning the present subma- 
 rine warfare. 
 
 Little has been heard during the war of 
 
 the once powerful Kossuth party. Its 
 
 very name has been merged in that of other 
 
 groups, but that its principles will revive 
 
 82
 
 after the war is as certain as that the spell 
 of that famous leader has not forever lost 
 its potency. How will his teachings com- 
 port with the new order of things in Hun- 
 gary if the Pan-Germanists and advocates 
 of a new Central Europe have their way? 
 Can Magyars ever forget his fierce detes- 
 tation of the Hapsburgs, his glowing ad- 
 miration for Anglo-Saxons? "It is the 
 Anglo-Saxon race alone," he said, in an 
 address in this country on March 6, 1852, 
 "that stands high and erect in its inde- 
 pendence. . . . And inviolability of 
 person and the inviolability of property 
 are English principles. England is the 
 last stronghold of these principles in Eu- 
 rope." And contrast with this his remark 
 about Prussia, on a similar occasion: 
 "What would the petty princes of Ger- 
 many have been in 1848 without Prussia? 
 And what was Prussia, when her capital 
 was in the hands of the people, without 
 the certainty of the Czar's support?" 
 
 Tisza, who returned to power as Premier 
 in 1913, after having been in the Cabinet 
 from 1903 to 1906, has been the subject 
 
 83
 
 of bitter opposition both before and since 
 the outbreak of the war. He resumed 
 office after Prime Minister Lukacs had 
 introduced, in 1912, a franchise bill the 
 provisions of which would have doubled 
 the electorate, but which still left the fa- 
 vored classes with so many privileges that 
 the Radical party and the Socialists raised 
 a fierce outcry against the Government's 
 proposal. Tisza, who was then President 
 of the Chamber, was the principal target 
 of abuse, and after he became Premier he 
 had to face a new Opposition party, or- 
 ganized by Count Andrassy, who was, and 
 has since been, committed to the reform of 
 the franchise. Tisza declared universal 
 suffrage to be a national danger. He not 
 unnaturally feared that the political equal- 
 ity of the various nationalities of Hungary 
 would threaten Magyar hegemony. But 
 the exigencies of war lead to strange 
 avowals and disavowals. Tisza recently 
 seemed to experience a sudden change of 
 heart and professed in Parliament his af- 
 fection for the non-Magyar races. "No- 
 where in the world," he said, "is the prin- 
 
 84
 
 ciple of nationality applied so liberally as 
 in the two states of the Dual Monarchy." 
 These idyllic conditions have not always 
 prevailed either in Cisleithania or in Hun- 
 gary. Few modern Magyar statesmen 
 have consistently adhered to the principles 
 of Deak and Eotvos, who labored honestly 
 for a conciliatory policy towards non- 
 Magyar nationalities and respected their 
 languages and customs. Their enlight- 
 ened views gave way in the seventies to 
 the ruthlessly chauvinistic policy of the 
 elder Tisza, and the Magyarization of the 
 state has since gone on apace. The in- 
 tolerance of the Government towards Par- 
 liamentary representatives of other races 
 may be illustrated by an incident which 
 occurred last February. A well-known 
 Slovak Deputy, Father Juriga, who had 
 suffered imprisonment for his nationalist 
 principles, discussed a bill before the 
 Chamber designed to perpetuate the mem- 
 ory of the heroes who had fallen in battle. 
 In the course of his remarks he requested 
 the House to permit him to read a letter 
 written in the Slovak language by a sol- 
 
 85
 
 dier who had thanked the Minister of Edu- 
 cation for having allowed, during the war, 
 the study of the Slovak language in 
 secondary schools. But after violent in- 
 terruption on the part of the Opposition 
 leaders, the Chamber ruled that not a 
 single Slovak word could be spoken by 
 any Deputy, and Juriga desisted from his 
 purpose with the quiet remark: "I do 
 not wish to create a scandal, and therefor^ 
 content myself with pointing out that in 
 this House quotations may be read in 
 English and French, the languages of the 
 enemy, but not in some of the languages 
 of our own country." 
 
 The Germans within the limits of Hun- 
 gary have on the whole bowed more meek- 
 ly to the rule of the Magyar than the other 
 nationalities. Indeed, their outward trans- 
 formation into Magyars the Saxons of 
 Transylvania alone excepted has in the 
 large towns been rapid, and as they had no 
 separatist aspirations, there has been little 
 political friction between them and the 
 dominant race. German names of places 
 have disappeared from school geographies,
 
 and in many instances German patrony- 
 mics have been gladly exchanged by their 
 bearers for more sonorous Magyar ones. 
 Yet the war has not drawn Magyars and 
 Teutons closer to each other. Officially 
 they may fraternize, organically they do 
 not fuse. Hungarian and Austrian gene- 
 rals bore a distinguished part in the early 
 battles, when German armies came to the 
 rescue of their hard-pressed allies in the 
 Carpathians and elsewhere, but the names 
 of Kovess and Boehm-Ermolli are never 
 mentioned when Germans sing the praises 
 of Hindenburg and Mackensen. Nor 
 have the South Slavs of the monarchy 
 learned during the war to look with friend- 
 lier eyes on Berlin and Vienna than before. 
 With the fate of Servia as a warning ex- 
 ample before them, the loyalty of Serbo- 
 Croats to the Hapsburgs and their wil- 
 lingness to place themselves under the aegis 
 of the Hohenzollerns have been sorely 
 tried. The Croats and Magyars have al- 
 ways been at daggers drawn. It may be 
 taken as axiomatic that what the Magyar 
 desires the Croat opposes. Croatia has 
 
 87
 
 never concealed its bitter discontent with 
 Dualism, and Hungarian politicians have 
 fully reciprocated the feeling of the Croats. 
 Recent utterances of the newspapers of 
 Agram and Fiume that occasionally find 
 their way to this country reflect the dis- 
 satisfaction of the people with prevailing 
 economic conditions a feeling which ex- 
 tends to the political situation as well. 
 
 Tisza had originally not been particu- 
 larly friendly to the German designs on 
 Austria-Hungary, which have found ex- 
 pression in the plan of a "Mitteleuropa." 
 He opposed the economic federation be- 
 tween the Central Powers and those Eu- 
 ropean states which Germany was espe- 
 cially anxious to place under her wings. 
 In truth, he distrusted more than one 
 partner in the future Central Europe, and 
 like all Magyar statesmen of the present 
 day, who seek in every political combina- 
 tion solely the interest of their own race, 
 he thought of the future, while the states- 
 men of Vienna thought chiefly of the pres- 
 ent. Whether his dismissal from office 
 now is due to his own recognition of the 
 88
 
 fact that the alliance between Hapsburgs 
 and Hohenzollerns is tottering, or whether 
 the Emperor Charles wishes to have a free 
 hand in movements which might find in the 
 fiery Hungarian a dangerous opponent, 
 Tisza's fall presages in any case an un- 
 mistakable change in the relations between 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary. The fact 
 is that, though the two countries have been 
 politically united since the outbreak of the 
 war, they have in their military activity 
 since their early common successes been 
 gradually drifting apart. Germany is 
 fighting her battles in France alone, as 
 Austria is fighting hers in the Trentino and 
 the Coast Districts. The fate of the Mon- 
 archy is nearer to the heart of its ruler 
 than the future of his German ally. As 
 for his subjects, they are skeptical, and 
 they were long forced to remain silent. 
 Previous experiences in their history have 
 taught all the peoples of the Empire not 
 to build their hopes too firmly on military 
 victories. In 1866 Austria humbled Italy 
 in the sea-fight at Lissa, and was com- 
 pelled to give up Venetia to her. She was 
 
 89
 
 crushed at Sadowa by Prussia, and Hun- 
 gary gained her autonomy and Cisleithania 
 a liberal Constitution. And to-day, with 
 the fortunes of war still in the balance, 
 Slavs, Humans, and others look expectant- 
 ly to a future that shall bring them, some- 
 how, through some turn of affairs at home 
 or abroad, their coveted self-government. 
 
 Whoever may be Tisza's successor, an 
 element of unrest is now working in the 
 Empire which is certain to influence the 
 course of affairs. Vienna has served notice 
 on Budapest that it intends to become 
 once more the centre of political gravity, 
 but whether the Government, with or with- 
 out the sanction of the representatives of 
 the people it is reported that for the first 
 time in more than three years the Reichs- 
 rat has been convened will be able to 
 strike out into new paths, internally as well 
 as externally, remains to be seen. Too lit- 
 tle is known of the new Emperor to war- 
 rant the assumption that he intends to rule 
 with the help of the liberal Germans of 
 Austria, but he certainly cannot perma- 
 nently ignore them. Though ever since 
 
 90
 
 the fall of the Auersperg Ministry, in 
 1879, they have been out of power, they 
 are a factor to be reckoned with. Their 
 voice is bound to be heard again, and its 
 echoes will reach Berlin. The Austrian 
 Germans will not forever follow whither 
 Prussia shall lead. Once more, as so often 
 in the past, the inherent antagonism be- 
 tween Austrians and Prussians manifests 
 itself. The Germans of Lower and Upper 
 Austria, of Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, 
 the Tyrol, and other Crown lands, who are 
 mostly of purer Teutonic stock than the 
 Prussians, are beginning to ask unpleas- 
 ant questions. They are getting tired of 
 being called Germanic brethren when it 
 suits Prussian advantage to claim them, 
 and to be repudiated when the wind blows 
 from another quarter. As in politics so 
 in literature. For many long years there 
 seemed to be, in Grillparzer's words, a con- 
 spiracy against Austrian writers in Ger- 
 many. She looked askance at the great 
 dramatist himself, though she gradually 
 learned to adopt him and other Austrians, 
 
 91
 
 just as she has adopted Swiss writers like 
 Gottfried Keller and Konrad Ferdinand 
 Meyer. 
 
 It must be said, in all fairness, that 
 since the elder Andrassy's death, no Aus- 
 trian statesman except Tisza has made it 
 his task to promote a genuine alliance be- 
 tween Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns. 
 Count Aehrenthal, the only Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs in recent years who has 
 left his impress on Austrian politics, was 
 concerned purely with the aggrandizement 
 of his own country though in ways that 
 proved disastrous in the end and did not 
 ask for Germany's consent to the annex- 
 ation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But he 
 fashioned his course closely after her ruth- 
 less Realpolitik. Austria has since chosen 
 to identify herself still more completely 
 with Prussia's foreign policy, heedless of 
 the warning given to the Hapsburgs, years 
 ago, by so stanch a defender of Prussian 
 principles as Professor Delbruck. He 
 wrote (Preusmche Jahrbiicher, Vol. 130) : 
 "The conception of nationality has at- 
 tained in the nineteenth century through- 
 
 92
 
 out the world a power which it is abso- 
 lutely useless to contend against. We 
 have seen in the case of Prussia how little 
 even a state of its gigantic strength can 
 accomplish against a few million scattered 
 Poles. The sooner German-Austrians 
 make up their minds to recognize the 
 equality of all nationalities, even the small- 
 est, and the more willing they show them- 
 selves to make all the practical sacrifices 
 inherent in such a recognition, the better 
 it will be for them and for the German 
 cause everywhere. The hope for such a 
 consummation lies in Austria's relations to 
 Hungary and in her foreign policy." 
 
 The task of Tisza's successor in the in- 
 ternal affairs of Hungary is clear enough 
 there can be no retreat from the principle 
 of the equality of her nationalities; as to 
 the future foreign policy of Austria, that, 
 as well as the foreign policy of Germany, 
 will be shaped by the issue of the present 
 war.
 
 The Poles of Austria 
 
 [From The New York Nation, July 5, 1917.] 
 
 Appointment of a stop-gap Ministry 
 gives Emperor Charles a breathing spell 
 before grappling definitely with a serious 
 crisis. Czech Deputies are rebellious, as 
 Czech regiments have long been, and the 
 Poles are clamoring for more emphatic 
 recognition in the government of Austria. 
 All parties in Galicia have been watching 
 events in Russia closely, and the course of 
 the Poles in national affairs will be shaped 
 by international developments. 
 
 On the whole, ever since the ruthless 
 suppression of the peasant rising in 
 Galicia, in 1846, the Austrian Government 
 has shown distinct partiality and a cer- 
 tain skill in its dealings with the Poles, 
 favoring the nobility without actively an- 
 tagonizing the rural population, and 
 granting concessions to the national spirit 
 which were at times galling enough to 
 Germans and Ruthenes. In 1868 Polish 
 became the vehicle of instruction in the 
 
 95
 
 University of Cracow, as it became some- 
 what later in the University of Lemberg, 
 and Polish officials replaced German ones 
 thoroughout Galicia. Von Grocholski en- 
 tered in 1871 the first Austrian Cabinet 
 as Minister for Galicia, and Polish influ- 
 ence has since made itself felt both in the 
 Ministries and in the Reichsrat. Polish 
 patriots have risen to leadership in the 
 Austrian Parliament. Francis Smolka, 
 who had been condemned to death for 
 treason before 1848, became in 1881 Presi- 
 dent of the Lower House of the Vienna 
 Reichsrat, and in more recent times an- 
 other Galician Deputy, the Armenian 
 Abrahamowicz, occupied the same place. 
 Such distinctions, however, were not won 
 without resort to skilful parliamentary 
 tactics, and sometimes to obstinate opposi- 
 tion to the methods of Germanizing poli- 
 ticians. The Compromise of 1867 was at 
 first a sore trial to the Poles. Dualism, 
 with Magyar preponderance, was as little 
 to their liking as Federalism, with Bohe- 
 mian autonomy, would have been. The 
 fifty-seven Polish Deputies, whose votes 
 
 96 '
 
 could decide important parliamentary 
 issues, withdrew from the Reichsrat. As 
 in the case of the Czechs, the policy of 
 abstention proved successful in the long 
 run, and the Poles have to the present day 
 been better able to maintain their ground 
 in the councils of the Empire than any 
 other of the Slavic races of Austria. 
 
 The relations between the Polish aris- 
 tocracy and the Austrian Government 
 were badly strained in 1908, in conse- 
 quence of the Russian propaganda, carried 
 on among the Ruthene peasantry of Ga- 
 licia. To this Count Szeptycki, the 
 United-Greek Archbishop of Lemberg, 
 who was subsequently taken into Russian 
 captivity, but has since been released by 
 the Provisional Government, lent his will- 
 ing aid. The Poles, as ever opposed to 
 Ukrainophile pretensions, were hostile 
 alike to the efforts of Austria and Russia 
 to strengthen their hold on the Ruthenes 
 the former through agents of the Catholic 
 Church, the latter through those of the 
 Orthodox- Greek. The tension, which led 
 to the assassination of the Governor, 
 
 97
 
 Count Potocki, by a Ruthene student, re- 
 sulted in the appointment, for the first 
 time in the annals of Galicia, of a non- 
 aristocratic Pole, the historian, Dr. Bo- 
 brzynski, to the Governorship. He en- 
 deavored to mediate, not with conspicuous 
 success, between Poles and Ruthenes. The 
 breach between them, in fact, widened 
 when, in March, 1913, the Governor at- 
 tempted to carry through the Galician Diet 
 a bill for electoral reform intended to 
 effect a compromise. He was forced to 
 resign, and through his successor, Von 
 Korytowski, a Polish nobleman, the ruling 
 classes of Galicia were once more brought 
 closer to the Vienna Government. Since 
 then, however, developments in the Aus- 
 tro-German alliance have wrought a 
 change in the attitude of Polish and Ru- 
 thene leaders toward each other and to- 
 ward the Government. The Poles, 
 through their spokesman, Count Stanilas 
 Tarnowski, president of the Cracow 
 Academy of Sciences, had charged the 
 Ukrainists as early as March, 1914, in the 
 Galician Diet, with close affiliation with 
 
 98
 
 the Pan-German Ostmarken-Verein, an 
 association notoriously bent on destroying 
 the Polish nationality. The Ruthenes 
 then plainly showed themselves susceptible 
 to German influence. It was generally 
 believed by them that the Archduke 
 Francis Ferdinand, under instructions 
 from Berlin, favored the establishment of 
 a Ukraine state, to whose rule the children 
 of his morganatic marriage might suc- 
 ceed. The war has ended this dream, 
 though it has not allayed the restlessness 
 and mutual jealousies of Poles and Ru- 
 thenes. 
 
 The question of the resuscitation of the 
 ancient kingdom of Poland, which has 
 now come to the front, has overshadowed 
 the narrower Polish question in Austria. 
 Since the issuing of the proclamation to all 
 the Poles by Grand Duke Nicholas, in 
 August, 1914, there has been constant 
 interchange of thought between the Polish 
 leaders of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. 
 Sienkiewicz, among others, called on his 
 compatriots everywhere to identify them- 
 selves with the cause of the Russian peo- 
 
 99
 
 pie, and Count Wielopolski, the president 
 of the Polish Club of the Duma that 
 assembled at the outbreak of the war, has 
 stood for a compromise between Russians 
 and Poles which was first advocated by his 
 namesake, the Marquis Wielopolski, after 
 the revolution of 1830. 
 
 The occupation of Galicia by the Rus- 
 sians introduced a new element of uncer- 
 tainty into the situation. Attached as 
 many of the prominent Poles were to the 
 house of Hapsburg, and much as they 
 resented the arrogance and brutality of the 
 Russian Governor, Count Bobrinsky, who 
 kept Lemberg under the heel of Russian 
 autocracy, they yet felt their Polish senti- 
 ment enlisted by the liberal stirrings of 
 Warsaw. The fortunes of war have ren- 
 dered the hope of all Poles for a restora- 
 tion of their ancient kingdom not entirely 
 illusory. Apparently, Germany encour- 
 ages the plans of Austria. It has been as- 
 serted that the Archduke Charles Stephen, 
 whose sons-in-law, Prince Radziwill and 
 Prince Czartoryski, bear names famous in 
 the history of Poland, has been selected 
 
 100
 
 for the throne of the restored kingdom; 
 but whatever faith Galician Poles may put 
 in Austrian promises, they will look long 
 before they leap into a Hohenzollern trap. 
 Their position in the Hapsburg dominions 
 during the last fifty years has been by no 
 means intolerable, and it is now more than 
 ever within their power to strengthen their 
 influence. 
 
 The plan of a restored Poland under 
 Hapsburg rule has been mooted before, 
 and even Metternich was not wholly insin- 
 cere in proposing it at a time when an 
 alliance with France and England agaii<st 
 Russia seemed feasible. Napoleon III., 
 too, had his plan for restoring Poland and 
 placing it under the rule of an Austrian 
 archduke. Bismarck took notice, during 
 the Crimean War, of similar ideas of 
 various European diplomatists, but dis- 
 missed them as fantastic. But whatever 
 he thought of Austria as a possible ruler of 
 Poland, he never deceived himself (as lit- 
 tle as did his successor, Prince Biilow) as 
 to the hopelessness of any attempt on the 
 part of Prussia to gain Polish favor. 
 
 101
 
 "The love of the Poles of Galicia for the 
 German Empire," he wrote in his Recol- 
 lections, "is of a fitful and opportunist 
 nature," and he recognized that Austria 
 had at all times a stronger hold on Polish 
 sympathies than Germany. He admon- 
 ished Germans not to look upon Poles in 
 any other light than that of enemies, and 
 remarked that Austria could the more 
 easily come to terms with the Polish move- 
 ment because, notwithstanding the mem- 
 ories of 1846, she still retained more of the 
 sympathy of Polish nobles than either 
 Prussia or Russia. 
 
 The world cataclysm has changed noth- 
 ing in the relations of Prussia toward her 
 Polish subjects, but a new Russia makes 
 a new appeal to hers. At all events, there 
 is no place in a future Poland for Hohen- 
 zollern influence, no matter what the role 
 of the Hapsburgs may be in the nation 
 that is to arise from the ashes of the pres- 
 ent war. 
 
 102
 
 The Nation's Staff of 
 Contributors 
 
 The Nation may well be proud of its 
 Staff of Contributors. Started in 1865 
 by Edwin Lawrence Godkin and Wen- 
 dell Phillips Garrison, who showed re- 
 markable discrimination in selecting 
 writers with special knowledge and 
 with a command of style, this Staff has 
 been perpetuated in the spirit of its 
 founders. Instead of turning to the 
 facile publicist for discussions of out- 
 standing questions, The Nation has 
 found that a thorough knowledge of a 
 given subject such as its experts possess 
 does not prevent the full-hearted utter- 
 ance which these grave times require. 
 
 Some of the topics treated in recent 
 issues are the following: 
 
 The Avatar of the Hun, The Recent 
 Crisis in Spanish Neutrality, The Sub- 
 marine, Peace Without Annexation, 
 Overhauling the Machinery of Empire, 
 
 103
 
 The Aesthetic Idealism of Henry 
 James, The Sham Argument Against 
 Latin, Russian Thought and the Revo- 
 lution, The Weil-Paid College Pro- 
 fessor, The American Tradition and 
 the War, China's Coming of Age, The 
 Intellectual Mobilization of France, 
 The Problem of the New Russia, Italy's 
 War of Emancipation, Nationalist 
 Ireland The Case for Home Rule, 
 Chili and the World War, The Position 
 of Brazil, Why Idealists Quit the 
 Socialist Party, The Virtuous Vic- 
 torian.. 
 
 To give some idea of the great diver- 
 sity of interests embraced by its staff 
 of contributors, The Nation selects from 
 a list of more than three hundred the 
 following names: 
 
 Prof. C. M. Andrews, History, Colonial Period 
 
 to 1765. 
 Prof. Irving Babbitt, Rousseau Literary 
 
 Criticism. 
 
 Prof. Hiram Bingham, South America. 
 Prof. J. H. Breasted, Egypt. 
 Viscount Bryce, South America The Near 
 
 East Asia Minor. 
 Prof. C. J. Bullock, Taxation. 
 
 104
 
 Maj.-Gen. W. H. Carter, Riding Horses 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Prof. G. H. Chase, Greek Art. 
 
 Prof. W. W. Comfort, Mediaeval Literature, 
 France and Spain. 
 
 Prof. A. C. Coolidge, Russia and Siberia. 
 
 Mr. Kenyon Cox, Italian Art. 
 
 Dr. G. W. Crile, Surgery. 
 
 Prof. W. M. Davis, Physical Geography. 
 
 Prof. F. H. Dixon, Railways. 
 
 Prof. J. M. Dixon, Japan. 
 
 Prof. E. Emerton, Church History, 
 
 Prof. W. S. Ferguson, Greek and Roman His- 
 tory. 
 
 Mr. Henry T. Finck, Music. 
 
 Prof. O. W. Firkins, Contemporary Poetry. 
 
 Prof. Warner Fite, Philosophy. 
 
 Mr. W. C. Ford, Early American History. 
 
 Dr. Fabian Franklin, Economic Theory. 
 
 Prof. H. N. Gardiner, Psychology. 
 
 Prof. F. H. Giddings, Sociology. 
 
 Prof. G. L. Goodale, Botany. 
 
 Prof. T. D. Goodell, Metrics. 
 
 Admiral C. F. Goodrich, The Navy. 
 
 Prof. C. H. Grandgent, Romance Languages. 
 
 Dr. L. H. Gray, The Aryan East. 
 
 Prof. A. D. F. Hamlin, Architecture. 
 
 Prof. S. N. Harper, Russian History. 
 
 Prof. C. H. Haskins, Spanish Inquisition 
 Normans P alaeography . 
 
 Prof. F. H. Herrick, Biology. 
 
 Prof. E. W. Hopkins, Sanskirt. 
 
 Prof. W. H. Howell, Physiology. 
 
 Prof. J. A. Jaggar, Geology. 
 
 Prof. Morris Jastrow, Jr., Babylonia and 
 Assyria. 
 
 105
 
 Prof. A. G. Keller, Sociology. 
 
 Prof. J. F. Kemp, Metallurgy. 
 
 Prof. C. J. Keyser, Mathematics. 
 
 Mr. F. E. Leupp, Social and Political Remini- 
 scences. 
 
 Dr. Jacques Loeb, Artificial Production of Life. 
 
 Prof. A. O. Lovejoy, Philosophy Academic 
 Freedom 
 
 Prof. William MacDonald, American Political 
 History. 
 
 Prof. F. J. Mather, Jr., Art. 
 
 Dr. Paul E. More, Literature. 
 
 Prof. W. B. Munro, Government. 
 
 Mr. A. D. Noyes, Finance. 
 
 Prof. G. R. Noyes, Russian Language and Lit- 
 erature. 
 
 Prof. R. M. Pearce, Scientific Features of 
 Modern Medicine. 
 
 Mr. I. R. Pennypacker, Civil War Campaigns. 
 
 Prof. J. B. Pratt, Ethics Religions of Modern 
 India. 
 
 Prof. G. M. Priest, German History and Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 Mrs. G. H. Putnam, French Literature and 
 Life. 
 
 Prof. E. K. Rand, The Classics in Relation to 
 Modern Literature. 
 
 Miss G. M. A. Richter, Archaeology, Greece and 
 Rome. 
 
 Dr. Edward Robinson, Greek Art. 
 
 Prof. F. N. Robinson, Irish and Welsh. 
 
 Dr. George Sarton, History of Science. 
 
 Prof. H. R. Seager, Economics Social Insur- 
 ance. 
 
 Prof. S. P. Sherman, Modern English Litera- 
 ture. 
 
 106
 
 Prof. Paul Shorey, Greek Literature and Phil- 
 osophy 
 
 Prof. Munroe Smith, German History. 
 
 Prof. E. C. Stowell, International Law. 
 
 Dr. E. G. Tabet, Syria Turkey. 
 
 Prof. F. W. Taussig, Economics, Tariff. 
 
 Mr. W. R. Thayer, Italian History. 
 
 Prof. Lynn Thorndike Mediaeval Culture 
 Superstitions. 
 
 Prof. David Todd, Astronomy. 
 
 Prof. A. M. Tozzer, Central and South Ameri- 
 can Archaeology. 
 
 Prof. E. R. Turner, European Political History. 
 
 Prof. A. G. Webster, Electricity General 
 Physics. 
 
 Mr. F. Weitenkampf, Etchings and Prints. 
 
 Prof. J. R. Wheeler, Greek Sculpture. 
 
 Prof. J. H. Wigmore, Criminal Law. 
 
 Lieut.-Col. C. de W. Willcox, The Army. 
 
 Prof. F. W. Williams, China. 
 
 Mr. T. F. Woodlock, Socialism Railways. 
 
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