ECTURES ON PATROLS, 
 
 ADVANCE GUARDS, 
 
 AND OUTPOSTS 
 
 BY 
 
 MAJOR JOHN F. MORRISON, 
 
 GENERAL STAFF 
 
 Fort Leavenworth, Kari 
 
 & rbtce 
 
 1917 
 
LECTURES ON PATROLS, 
 
 ADVANCE GUARDS, 
 
 AND OUTPOSTS 
 
 BY 
 
 MAJOR JOHN F. MORRISON, 
 
 i/ 
 
 GENERAL STAFF 
 
 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 
 
 >e armp Serbtce Schools 
 
 1917 
 
*7 
 
Introduction 
 
 AST May at Camp Douglas, Wisconsin, was held 
 *- J a convention of the officers of the National 
 Guard of that state. 
 
 During the winter in their correspondence school, 
 they had studied patrolling, advance guards, and 
 outposts. At their convention it was proposed to go 
 over these subjects again and clear up misunder- 
 standings. 
 
 General Boardman, who organized the whole 
 scheme of instruction, asked me to come up and 
 help. 
 
 The idea was for me to make a short talk on 
 each subject and then on the ground explain fully 
 each point, after which a map problem was given out 
 for solution. 
 
 Of course there was no set lecture; my notes 
 were very brief; it was largely conversational, ask- 
 ing questions and answering more of them. Ground 
 was selected that illustrated the different points. 
 My work was in no way a substitute for Security 
 and Information and the Field Service Regulations, 
 but was supplemental thereto. 
 
 I have since been asked to write out these lec- 
 tures or talks. In trying to put them in such shape 
 that the ideas will be clear to one reading them, I 
 find many difficulties. They were intended for a 
 different use. 
 
 JOHN F. MORRISON, 
 
 Major, General Staff, Senior Instructor, 
 Department of Military Art. 
 
 THE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS 
 
 Fort Leavemvorth, Kansas, 
 
 November 1, 1909. 
 
 3 
 
 348666 
 
Patrolling 
 
 " A commander may be excused for being 
 defeated, but never for being surprised." 
 
 T N talking on this important subject, it is not deemed 
 
 necessary to repeat what is in the manuals in 
 unmistakable terms, but merely to add something in 
 the way of explanation and interpretation. 
 
 The importance of this part of our work has 
 greatly increased in late years. 
 
 As an example, take our outposts. Under pres- 
 ent conditions we no longer contemplate, except in 
 very rare cases, an unbroken line of sentinels, but 
 rather a great deal of patrolling and fewer sentinels. 
 This is less exhausting to our men and more effective. 
 
 While on the march, whether forward or in re- 
 treat, we must have information that can be obtained 
 only by patrolling. 
 
 We must have information of our enemy before 
 a combat. Fifty years ago such information could 
 be more easily obtained; ranges were shorter. 
 
 Today much of success depends on keeping the 
 enemy in ignorance of our movements and location, 
 and still more in knowing his every move. 
 
 With the present tendency in the color of uni- 
 forms and the enemy's efforts to keep us in the 
 dark as to his location and movements, how are we 
 to gain this information, how prevent the enemy 
 from gaining more than is avoidable? Primarily by 
 patrols, more or less backed up by larger bodies. 
 Much of this work must and will be done by the 
 cavalry. It will do patrolling at a distance and until 
 armies come into close contact. 
 5 
 
But after the armies are in contact the infantry 
 patrols will have to be numerous and industrious. 
 
 Patrols may be sent out to gain information of 
 the enemy, or to prevent the enemy from gaining 
 information, or it may be a combination of the two. 
 Besides there are many occasions for sending a patrol 
 on a special mission of some kind. The leading and 
 conduct of the patrol must vary with the conditions 
 of the problem. There can be no fixed form, no 
 hard and fast rules to be learned that will make us 
 efficient patrol leaders. 
 
 Let us look at the problem of the commander 
 who sends out the patrol. 
 
 Patrols should be used freely. This does not 
 mean sending out patrols that can be of no value. It 
 is much better to use patrols to gain information 
 than to butt in with a larger force and have it butch- 
 ered. A good patrol can with less risk get you in- 
 formation without which you may sacrifice a large 
 part of your command. 
 
 In determining the number of men to be sent in 
 any given patrol, you should bear in mind that the 
 smaller it is the better, provided it is strong enough 
 to carry out its mission. 
 
 The work is often hard and dangerous and such 
 work should never be required unnecessarily. The 
 smaller the party the more easily it can be concealed 
 when necessary. On the other hand, it must be large 
 enough to accomplish its mission. If messages are 
 likely to be sent back before the patrol finishes, 
 enough men must be in the party so that after de- 
 ducting these messengers, there will still be enough 
 left to finish the work. If it be only to gain some 
 point, look around, and return with no idea of fight- 
 ing, two men will probably answer better than more. 
 If the patrol is to drive back, or resist hostile patrols if 
 met, more men must be sent. 
 
rr 
 
 Before sending out a patrol, have clearly in your 
 mind what you expect of it, what it will probably 
 have to do; then determine the minimum number of 
 men necessary for such work and assign that number. 
 
 Less than two men should never be sent. 
 
 Next, select the man to lead the patrol. 
 
 Patrols differ greatly in their importance and in 
 the difficulty of leading them. On outposts, much of 
 the patrolling between groups and along parts of the 
 line is simple in its nature, and leaders can practically 
 be taken from a roster. Any average soldier should 
 be able to act as such leader. The same is true of 
 many of the patrols sent from an advance or rear 
 guard. But sometimes the flanking patrol in an 
 advance guard will have a task of greater difficulty. 
 The leader will have to cover considerable space 
 with few men; the correct leading will require an 
 eye for ground, judging as to what features are 
 necessary to be examined, and ability to read "indi- 
 cations/' He will generally need good judgment, 
 courage, endurance and tactical ability in handling 
 his patrol. 
 
 Again a patrol is pushed out on a road simply to 
 watch and give warning. No great ability is re- 
 quired for this, nor very special training. But a 
 patrol is sent out to gain information. It must push 
 far from support, in country where the enemy is 
 close; it may be just before a battle. The leader 
 must be able to estimate the strength of hostile com- 
 mands (often not easy), to judge of dispositions, to 
 read indications of various kinds, and be accurate 
 and reliable. He must also possess judgment, cour- 
 age, and endurance. Such patrol leaders can not be 
 detailed by ' 'roster. " 
 
 In giving your orders to the patrol leader, make 
 them clear and full enough so that he can fully 
 grasp the situation, know what he is to do, and know 
 
8 
 
 all that is known of the enemy so far as it affects his 
 problem. 
 
 The occasions when patrols will be detailed are 
 too many to be all given. Their use with the cover- 
 ing detachments (advance and rear guards and out- 
 posts) are known to you all. In' combat of small 
 isolated commands, if the exact location of the enemy 
 is unknown, and you are in doubt as to the lay of the 
 ground, reconnaissance must be made before attack- 
 ing. This will often call for patrols. During such a 
 combat patrols should cover your flanks both in the 
 offense and defense. As in large commands cavalry 
 or detachments of some strength are posted so as to 
 guard against flanking movements by the enemy, so 
 in small commands you must do the same, but with 
 patrols varying from two or three men to a squad or 
 section. 
 
 When armies remain in contact that is, with' 
 their outposts close, as often happened in our Civil 
 War much patrolling of a different kind will be re- 
 quired. Each side will endeavor to learn everything 
 possible about the other, as much as possible of 
 his movements, and early information of his in- 
 tentions. Cavalry will be working to the flanks and 
 rear, but it will be infantry along the line. 
 
 As to patrol leaders: 
 
 You are all familiar with the elements of patrol 
 leading; but there are some points which, though 
 you know them, have not made the impression on 
 your mind that they Should. They are among the 
 things you vaguely know, but don't apply. 
 
 The first thing I want to call to your attention is 
 this whenever you have to lead a patrol, know 
 positively your " mission/' You receive an order to 
 go somewhere for some purpose. 
 
 This may, or may not be sufficient. Be sure you 
 
9 
 
 fully understand the situation exactly what is ex- 
 pected and wanted. Remember that a patrol is often 
 very much in the same situation as a detached force 
 whose commander must act on his own initiative for 
 the general object. You cannot in general wait to 
 receive more definite instruction; you must determine 
 whether your mission calls upon you to go ahead or 
 back out when an unexpected great risk presents 
 itself, or, in fact, how to act in many emergencies. 
 
 Bear in mind that, as a general rule, patrols are 
 sent out to gain information not to fight. Little 
 combats between individuals, or patrols, can have 
 no real effect on the greater issue; so as a rule you 
 should avoid fighting. But don't apply this rule too 
 generally; it has numerous exceptions. In all these 
 cases, if you have fully grasped your mission, you 
 can promptly answer for yourself, when you meet a 
 hostile patrol, "Shall I shoot it up or let it go by?" 
 
 Another point to consider in connection with 
 patrols is the message to be sent back. 
 
 We all recognize the fact that the sooner infor- 
 mation reaches headquarters, as a rule, the more 
 valuable it is. But this only applies to information 
 that has value. If in doubt as to whether informa- 
 tion would be valuable or otherwise, give headquarters 
 the benefit of the doubt and send it in. If you have 
 fully grasped your mission, you can generally tell 
 whether the information you have gained should be 
 reported or kept until the patrol returns. 
 
 Messages must be carefully expressed; be sure 
 that they are accurate. This does not mean that 
 something told you should not be reported, but it 
 should be reported, not as a fact, but as it is a state- 
 ment by somebody else. It is well to add any in- 
 formation about your informant, such as his credi- 
 bility, the probability of his having correct inf orma- 
 
lo- 
 tion, etc. This sometimes helps at headquarters in 
 determining the probability of the report. 
 
 Observe everything and remember that even 
 apparent trifles may be of great value. The finding 
 of a shoulder strap showing a man's regiment may 
 enable the chief of staff to determine that the enemy 
 has been reinforced, etc. 
 
 We find plenty of instructions as to what a 
 patrol leader must carry, but not enough stress is 
 laid on the things he must not carry. Nothing must 
 be carried which, in case you fall into the hands of 
 the enemy, either dead or alive, will give him valu- 
 able information. Among the prohibited articles 
 should be orders giving dispositions or other infor- 
 mation that would be valuable; maps that the enemy 
 may not have of the country, and especially such 
 maps as have the location of troops marked thereon. 
 The Japanese even remove all insignia from the uni- 
 forms of the men. 
 
 Another thing, a patrol for important work in 
 close proximity to the enemy should be carefully se- 
 lected and instructed not to give information to the 
 enemy if captured. 
 
 Prisoners taken in battle can generally give 
 little information of importance to the enemy the 
 final clash clears up doubt; but a patrol taken before 
 a battle, while so much is still dark, may give in- 
 formation of vital importance. 
 
 Let us try to illustrate some of these points. 
 
 See the two-inch map of Fort Leavenworth and 
 vicinity. 
 
 A Northern army is at Atchison, thirty miles 
 north of Leavenworth; a Southern army at Kansas 
 City, thirty miles southeast of Leavenworth. All 
 the country shown on the map is Northern territory. 
 
 The Southern army commander has sent out a 
 regiment of infantry to seize and hold Weston, his 
 
11 
 
 latest information being that there are no hostile 
 troops south of Atchison. The northern commander 
 has sent two battalions of infantry to Weston ; to 
 hold the place. He knew of no movement of troops 
 from the south. 
 
 The Northern detachment reached Weston Octo- 
 ber 1st. The Southern detachment reached Platte 
 City the same evening. 
 
 On the morning of October 2d the Southern 
 regiment resumed its march on Weston, in ignorance 
 of the proximity of hostile troops. As the head of 
 the advance guard reaches 27, hostile patrols are 
 seen to the front, and on both flanks, withdrawing 
 in the general direction of Weston, The colonel de- 
 termines to halt until, by means of patrols, he can 
 find out something of what is in his front. He calls 
 up Lieutenant B and gives him the following order: 
 
 "Hostile infantry patrols have been seen on 
 both of our flanks and to our front. You know that 
 the inhabitants are hostile. I do not care to advance 
 beyond this ridge until I know more about what 
 hostile troops are in the vicinity. I am sending a 
 patrol well to the south of the road, another well to 
 the north. You will take eight men from the 1st 
 battalion and follow the general direction of the 
 road as far as Weston if possible. Major A has been 
 ordered to furnish you with the men." 
 
 Lieutenant B assembles his patrol and inspects 
 it to see that they have what they should carry, that 
 they have nothing they should not carry and that 
 the men are all in good physical condition. At the 
 same time he determines his mission. 
 
 He is to gain information. That is plain. Hos- 
 tile troops must be near by for infantry patrols do 
 not extend very far. These hostile patrols have 
 probably been watching the Southern troops. The 
 inhabitants are hostile to the South and friendly to 
 
12 
 
 the North; and from the patrols and inhabitants, the 
 Northern troops probably know all about the South- 
 ern force. There is little object in the patrol's trying 
 to prevent them from gaining information. The 
 regimental commander knows hostile troops are 
 near; there is no need to inform him of that fact. 
 What he does want to know is where they are, how 
 many there are and what they propose to do. 
 
 Lieutenant B then studies the ground, and selects 
 his route so as to follow generally the road, but in 
 such a way 'to give him concealment when desired. 
 He then starts out. 
 
 Near 29, Lieutenant B sees a hostile patrol about 
 600 yards to his right front. He watches it from 
 concealment for some time and determines that there 
 are only four men in the party; that they are mov- 
 ing towards the Southern main column. 
 
 Two questions now present themselves to Lieut. 
 B. First, should he attack these men? He answers 
 in the negative, for these reasons: the noise will at- 
 tract attention to him and decrease the chances of 
 his gaining the desired information; this hostile 
 patrol, even if it sees the Southern regiment, will 
 gain no valuable information other than what they 
 already have; the chance of his getting a prisoner is 
 not sure enough to warrant such a move at this 
 stage; there remains no other reason then for an 
 attack except to kill or wound that many of the 
 enemy, and, in the meantime, he may have some of 
 his own men hit. These small combats, of themselves, 
 do no good. Second, should he send back word to 
 the regimental commander that he has seen this 
 patrol? He answers this also in the negative. The 
 colonel knows there are patrols about; this should be 
 reported when he returns, of course, but men should 
 not be detached to hurry back with the information. 
 
 Now let us assume that Lieutenant B later gets 
 
13 
 
 a view of the road leading northeast from 31, and 
 sees what he estimates as a battalion of infantry 
 marching northeast thereon. What should he do? 
 Does he go back with the news, or send word back 
 and continue on? He must not quit yet, he must 
 make sure there are no more troops, and he must 
 find out also where these are going. But this much 
 news is important, so he promptly writes a message 
 stating what he has seen and sends it back to the 
 colonel by two men. He then proceeds on toward 
 Weston. Another question arises at this point. He 
 knows of that road turning north at 35. Is this 
 battalion which he has seen moving towards 37 to 
 get on the flank of the Southern main body, or it it 
 going north, probably retreating via 35? He knows 
 that there was another patrol sent to the north that 
 should see and report this. But its importance is so 
 vital, and accidents to patrols are so liable to happen, 
 that Lieutenant B should take no chances. He, there- 
 fore, detaches the corporal and one man with orders 
 to conceal themselves where they can see 35 and 
 watch; and as soon as they determine which route 
 the battalion is taking, to hurry back and report the 
 same to the colonel. 
 
 With the remainder of the patrol he wpuld push 
 on to Weston and try to determine whether there 
 were more troops in the vicinity and if so, their 
 number and location. 
 
 Let us suppose a different outcome, and that 
 Lieutenant B did not see any troops before reaching 
 Weston, except the patrol. 
 
 He approaches Weston and with his glass care- 
 fully searches the village for signs of hostile occu- 
 pation. He sees none. He then sends two or three 
 men in, and as nothing develops, he follows and 
 carefully examines the place. No enemy is found, 
 but a boy tells him that there are a lot of soldiers 
 
14 
 
 camped on the road leading to the northwest, about 
 one mile from the village. What does Lieutenant B 
 do now? His orders were to go as far as Weston; 
 he has done so. Should he now return? If he thor- 
 oughly appreciates his mission, he will not. He was 
 to find out about the enemy. All he knows is what 
 the boy tells him. Not very satisfactory. If he 
 goes a short distance farther he may get positive in- 
 formation. 
 
 Lieutenant B decides to go on. He first writes 
 a report of what he has seen and heard and sends it 
 back by two men. In his report he gives his source 
 of information, and might add whether he believes 
 the boy to be truthful, judging by the boy's manner, 
 etc. 
 
 Lieutenant B now goes on, not directly, but se- 
 lects a route that will give him an unobserved ap- 
 proach if possible and which would tend to mislead 
 the inhabitants in the village. 
 
 Suppose he reaches a point from which he can 
 see the hostile camp. Now comes in his ability to 
 estimate the strength of the force, the arm or arms 
 of which it is composed, whether apparently indiffer- 
 ent to our presence or evidently preparing for some 
 movement, etc. 
 
 If he determines the force to be greatly superior 
 to ours then he should withdraw at once and report 
 in person to the colonel what he has seen; for an at- 
 tack on the camp will be improbable and the colonel 
 will want his detachments in so that he can with- 
 draw. On the other hand if he finds the hostile force 
 to be only a battalion or two at the most, what then? 
 Lieutenant B would at once send this information by 
 two of his men, stating in his report that he is re- 
 maining for the present in observation. 
 
 Why this action? The colonel should know at 
 the earliest moment the strength and location of the 
 
15 
 
 enemy, so no time must be lost in getting the word 
 to him. 
 
 But the hostile force is so much inferior to ours 
 and knowing the colonel's mission, Lieutenant B 
 can foresee an attack. This will require more in- 
 formation and Lieutenant B tries to get it. The ter- 
 rain should be studied to enable the colonel to plan 
 his attack, the outpost line should be determined, 
 where the enemy's position would probably be if 
 attacked, etc. 
 
 Lieutenant B, here having accomplished all that 
 he can, starts back. He avoids the route he came, 
 especially the village of Weston. 
 
 Here note one thing: the enemy was reported 
 only about one mile distant. Had this distance been 
 two or three miles, Lieutenant B would hardly have 
 been justified in going on. The distance would have 
 been too great for an infantry patrol, though a cav- 
 alry patrol would have pushed on. 
 
 Let us now follow a patrol under Lieutenant A 
 sent out from the force near Weston that morning. 
 The commander at Weston hears early on this morn- 
 ing a rumor to the effect that hostile troops are ap- 
 proaching from the south. He occupies a good posi- 
 tion north of Weston and sends out patrols to look 
 for the enemy. Lieutenant A leads one of them. 
 He first sees a patrol of the enemy; no other troops 
 are in sight. He at once reports this to his com- 
 mander, sending back the message by one of his 
 men. Here are two points of difference from the 
 action of Lieutenant B Lieutenant A sends a mes- 
 sage back reporting the seeing of a patrol and he 
 sends his message by one man. Why this difference? 
 When Lieutenant B saw the patrol his commander 
 already knew that hostile patrols were in the vicinity, 
 but in the case of Lieutenant A, his commander did 
 not know positively that there was an enemy any- 
 
16 
 
 where in the vicinity. This information fixes the 
 fact and it should be communicated at once. He 
 sends only one man with his message, for he feels 
 quite sure that there are none of the enemy between 
 him and his main force; he knows that the inhabi- 
 tants are all friendly and they will help rather than 
 hinder his messenger. How was it with Lieutenant 
 B? Hostile patrols were in the country and the in- 
 habitants were all hostile, therefore, two men were 
 required. 
 
 Lieutenant A now gets a position from which he 
 can seethe column on the road. He determines its 
 composition and direction of march. This informa- 
 tion is then sent back and he proceeds, keeping the 
 column in sight. Finally he sees the column halt 
 and march outposts formed. 
 
 Let us suppose that his orders were to return as 
 soon as he determined the strength of the hostile 
 command. This he did and when near camp, but 
 before it was in sight, he saw a hostile patrol of 
 eight men approaching. His patrol is now reduced 
 to four, and he has not been observed. What should 
 he do? Lieutenant A opens the most effective fire 
 possible on the hostile patrol and 'endeavors to pre- 
 vent its advance. His action, as well as his problem, 
 is very different from that of Lieutenant B when he 
 saw the hostile patrol. Lieutenant A has all the in- 
 formation he can get, the enemy he believes is still 
 in the dark as to the location and strength of the 
 northern force. If this patrol is allowed to proceed 
 it may gain information of great value to the enemy. 
 This he tries to prevent. 
 
 Patrols, sent out to gain some specific and im- 
 portant information, should, as a rule, avoid fighting. 
 The enemy's patrols, however, can not be allowed 
 to roam about without danger, but even so it will 
 generally be better to intrust their intimidation to 
 
17 
 
 others than the special patrols sent out after informa- 
 tion. 
 
 A patrol seeking some special and important in- 
 formation, comes near to a point where, from a cer- 
 tain position, it can see and gain the information de- 
 sired, but the position is found to be occupied by the 
 enemy. Careful reconnaissance leads the patrol 
 leader to believe that he is at least equal to the 
 enemy in this locality. A vigorous attack is justified 
 in order to gain the view. 
 
 A great number of situations can be drawn but 
 it is not necessary. For, after you have had them 
 all presented, it is probable that the first one coming 
 up in the field would be different. But if you have 
 grasped the principles, you can solve it. Practice is 
 the only sure help. Make problems for yourself and 
 reason out what you should do and why, and soon 
 you will acquire facility. Practice on the ground 
 with men is still more valuable. 
 
 One important point I want to impress upon you. 
 Get information back to headquarters if you get any. 
 At many maneuvers I have known patrols to go out, 
 see the enemy and never report the fact until long 
 after. There is no good in a patrol gaining informa- 
 tion if it is not sent in or is sent in after the enemy 
 attacks. 
 
 The necessity and importance of efficient patrol- 
 ling and reconnaissance are taught by the history of 
 war. In the Civil War it was neglected in many 
 cases at heavy cost. 
 
 Such was the case, not alone in this war, but in 
 many others. We have not been the only offenders. 
 
 The problems presented are varied and require 
 for their solution men varying in capacity, from the 
 average private to the best trained staff officer. 
 
 For the higher class of patrol leading the re- 
 quirements can not be learned entirely from books. 
 The leader must be cool, determined and persistent. 
 
18 
 
 He must grasp the situation, understand the signifi- 
 cance of what he sees and hears, must be possessed 
 of good judgment and not afraid to take responsi- 
 bility. 
 
 For the greater part of the many patrols re- 
 quired, only physical strength and good average in- 
 telligence are necessary. 
 
Advance and Rear 
 Guards 
 
 A S IN the case of patrols, I am not here to give 
 * * you a compilation of what is in your manuals, 
 but to bring out and emphasize a few points as far 
 as time permits points not too clearly expressed in 
 the books. 
 
 In our manuals we have, in the case of all the 
 covering detachments, a normal formation, yet, in 
 every case, they prescribe that conditions may change 
 this. My experience has shown that too many offi- 
 cers are prone to adhere to the prescribed formation, 
 even when it results in an absurdity. A normal 
 formation can be of value only as it helps one to 
 understand the tactical principles that underlie the 
 use of covering detachments. They are not models 
 to be blindly followed, and it is questionable if they 
 are not often harmful. 
 
 A much better method than learning a normal 
 formation is to learn the principles, and practice ap- 
 plying them to concrete cases. 
 
 In other words, in every problem determine your 
 own mission clearly i.e., what you are to do and 
 why. Bear in mind certain fundamental principles 
 and use your common sense. 
 
 Now let us try this system in the case of an ad- 
 vance guard. 
 
 What is the object of having an advance guard? 
 
 First. To prevent the main body of our troops 
 from being shot into while in a formation that pre- 
 vents their effectively defending themselves. 
 
 You can all guess at the effect of an unexpected 
 heavy fire at effective range on a column of squads 
 in a road. 
 
 19 
 
20 
 
 Second. Under modern conditions the haphaz- 
 ard throwing of troops into action has every chance 
 of resulting- in a disaster. If you expect to win in a 
 battle you must have an understanding of the situa- 
 tion and must so put in your troops as to best meet 
 conditions; remembering that troops once engaged 
 can only go forward, stay where they are, or retreat. 
 This requires that enough troops be told off for the 
 advance guard to enable it to be the first to strike 
 the enemy and then be strong enough to hold him 
 until the commander can size up the situation, form 
 his plan, and properly deploy his main body to best 
 meet the situation. On the other hand, it should be 
 no larger than necessary, following the rule that all 
 detachments from the main body should be as small 
 as practicable. 
 
 Third. The march of the main body must not 
 be delayed by small bodies of the enemy; these must 
 be brushed aside. Do not allow a skillfully handled 
 patrol to delay the march of a regiment. 
 
 Fourth. Much of the patrolling and marching 
 of flanking detachments across country is exhaust- 
 ing and wears out troops. This should be reduced to 
 the minimum consistent with efficiency not only in 
 advance guards, but everywhere. 
 
 But efficiency requires that patrols be sent 
 wherever information may be obtained or a possible 
 danger lurks. As previously stated, never send a 
 large body of troops to gain information where a 
 patrol can do as well. 
 
 The greatest element in controlling the forma- 
 tion and method of conducting an advance or rear 
 guard is your ' 'mission. " What is the object of the 
 march? What does the commander expect and 
 want of you? How can you best accomplish this? 
 If you use good sense to accomplish your mission, 
 and bear in mind the foregoing principles, you will 
 
21 
 
 be correct, whether it agrees with the normal forma- 
 tion or not. If you blindly follow a normal forma- 
 tion, the chances are you will be wrong. 
 
 - The carrying out of your mission must control 
 the application of the other principles. To illustrate: 
 The enemy is in retreat; you are superior to him; it 
 is important to prevent his escape. It may be as- 
 sumed in such a case that there is little danger of 
 his turning about and attacking you, so that for pro- 
 tection the advance guard would be relatively small. 
 But what is the mission of the advance guard in this 
 case? Evidently to overtake the enemy, then hold 
 him fast until the main body can come up and com- 
 plete his ruin. A relatively weak advance guard 
 would answer for protection, but the enemy could 
 quickly throw it off and continue on his way. Hence, 
 in such a case the advance guard would be strong. 
 
 In determining the size of the advance guard 
 keep clearly in mind your mission and the conditions 
 surrounding your problem. As shown above, in a 
 pursuit it will be relatively large. Racing for the 
 possession of some important point would call for a 
 strong advance guard. Your column is one of a 
 number of parallel columns marching to attack. The 
 advance guard would be relatively very small for 
 the commander of the column should keep his men 
 in his own hand and control their deployment and 
 entry into action. 
 
 If the country through which you are marching 
 is hostile the advance guard must be larger than if 
 the country is friendly. The inhabitants will help 
 you in one case by giving information and will do 
 nothing to injure you. In the other they will not 
 give you much information, will help the enemy as 
 far as possible, and surprises will be much more 
 likely. 
 
 In making the detail for an advance guard avoid 
 
22 
 
 breaking units, i.e., if three companies are found 
 necessary it is generally better to send the whole 
 battalion; where two battalions are needed, let the 
 regiment go. In each problem you must consider 
 carefully your mission in connection with the prin- 
 ciples that govern and thus determine the size of the 
 advance guard. It will vary from one twentieth to 
 one third of the whole force. 
 
 The march of the advance guard: 
 
 Let us first leave out of consideration the flanks 
 and look only to our front. From the principle enu- 
 merated, patrols must seek information where 
 practicable. Our leading element must therefore 
 be a patrol or as generally called, a point. 
 
 Now the formation of the advance guard is in 
 two principal bodies; a vanguard and a reserve. The 
 first is subdivided into the advance party which 
 throws out the patrol or point and the support. 
 
 With small bodies of troops, however, there is 
 no necessity for a reserve; in fact it is better to dis- 
 pense with it. The object of the formation is to pre- 
 vent any body of troops being fired into at close 
 range before it has had timely warning to prepare. 
 The time necessarily depends on the size of the body. 
 
 Our leading element is a patrol. It is in open 
 order and is always in proper formation and it will 
 be the first to strike the enemy. Following it is the 
 advance party only a section or so and for it to 
 deploy is a question of but an instant. The support is 
 larger and so on to the rear until we encounter the 
 main body. Each body in front must afford the one 
 next in rear time to prepare. 
 
 The terrain must then exercise a great influence 
 on the distances separating the detachments. In 
 very broken or rolling country they naturally could 
 be much less than on an open plain. The size of the 
 command makes a great difference. A company or 
 
23 
 
 less deploys very quickly, there is little of plan 
 necessary. In a large mixed command a regular plan 
 of action should be formed, and the larger the body 
 the more time it takes. 
 
 In night marches, if in the close vicinity of the 
 enemy and an attack is contemplated should the 
 enemy be met, it will generally be found that dis- 
 tances should be shorter. Of course, such marches 
 are made with great caution and should have been 
 carefully planned. Ordinarily, on such marches, 
 you will not run into the enemy unless you intended 
 in that case to push him vigorously. If this is what 
 your mission calls for, you must be prepared to do it. 
 
 Night firing is comparatively ineffective and the 
 attackers best chance of success is generally to rush 
 the enemy vigorously. In such a case, then, dis- 
 tances would be reduced considerably from what 
 they would be in daylight. Another precaution well 
 to take, is to have the leading elements march with 
 bayonets fixed. 
 
 One can conceive of a night march in the vicinity 
 of the enemy where he is nevertheless not expected 
 to be encountered and if so met the commander in- 
 tends to fall back and avoid an action. The advance 
 guard commander's mission is very different from 
 that in the previous case. He must arrange his 
 force very differently. Distances will be increased 
 and care taken by means of connecting groups to 
 keep his whole command in touch. 
 
 No rule can be given. Know what you are to 
 do and why. Study the best way to do it; use com- 
 mon sense. 
 
 Now let us look to our flanks. 
 
 Here is where a normal formation finds its least 
 application. 
 
 The object of flanking groups is to protect your 
 column from a surprise attack from a flank. To at- 
 
24 
 
 tain this object you must have timely warning of the 
 enemy's presence near your flank. In this connec- 
 tion, bear in mind that in small commands, you can 
 generally form line of battle from a column in less 
 time to the flank than you can to the front, and 
 that fire across a column is not so dangerous as fire 
 in prolongation of the direction of march. How are 
 we to get this needed protection? By so observing 
 the country that if the enemy is where he can attack 
 us in flank we will know it in time. 
 
 In this connection we must remember that mod- 
 ern artillery may be considered as effective up to 
 3500 yards and its fire will reach very much farther 
 than this, and that infantry fire is effective to at 
 least 1200 yards, though this is not its extreme 
 range. 
 
 The measures to be taken to gain protection 
 from this fire will be very varied. Many condi- 
 tions enter into the problem. 
 
 With very large mixed commands, as a division 
 or more, there will be troops marching on parallel 
 roads with cavalry well to the front carefully recon- 
 noitering the country so that no enemy dangerous to 
 this command could well escape attention. Protec- 
 tion for a division is not gained by searching the 
 country 150 yards on each flank but it must be had 
 for several miles. 
 
 It takes much time to deploy a division and this 
 should be done before the enemy 's artillery is within 
 effective range, or even within long range. 
 
 With smaller mixed commands, as about a 
 brigade of infantry, with some cavalry and artillery, 
 the distances on the road and the formation of the 
 infantry of the advance guard should be as previously 
 shown, Scouting to the flanks will generally be 
 done by the cavalry. This reconnaissance must 
 generally extend to over two miles, at least, if the 
 
25 
 
 country on the flanks is at all favorable to an attack 
 from that direction and the general situation is such 
 as to make it fairly possible that the enemy could be 
 there. 
 
 Where if the enemy is met he will probably be 
 in force and have artillery, and you have no mounted 
 troops your problem is a hard one. The reconnais- 
 sance must be made. Infantry can make it but 
 slowly. Cavalry is almost indispensable in such 
 work. 
 
 Where the situation is such as to make an at- 
 tack from a flank probable, as where you know he is 
 on a road approximately at right angles to that fol- 
 lowed by yourself, a flank guard is generally the 
 solution, provided there is a suitable road for it not 
 over a mile away. This, while not called a part of 
 the advance guard serves the same purpose. In com- 
 mands not greater than a brigade these detachments 
 are justified only by necessity. A brigade of in- 
 fantry without cavalry will find much more necessity 
 for them than where cavalry can do proper recon- 
 naissance. 
 
 Even a small force of efficient cavalry can, in 
 most cases, obviate the necessity for flank guards of 
 any size. 
 
 But it is not of armies or even of divisions that I 
 wish to talk today, but of small commands. 
 
 The general principles are the same. But with- 
 out artillery and having only a small force, your pro- 
 tection to a flank does not have to extend so far. 
 
 In most cases your danger will be from about 
 equal forces. If you meet a large force with artil- 
 lery, you probably can do nothing but get away as 
 best you can. 
 
 As commander of a small force, say a battalion 
 or a regiment of infantry, you must, if in the vicinity 
 of an enemy, protect yourself from flank surprise 
 
26 
 
 attacks. The distance and manner will vary accord- 
 ing to the terrain. 
 
 Take a march, first along a ridge road with a 
 valley close to one side as shown in cross section. 
 
 Abroad. 
 
 Distance from A, across valley, a mile or more. 
 Suppose the valley to be open field, affording little or 
 no cover from view. 
 
 Would you send a patrol to the right? Evidently 
 not, for you can see as much from the road as 150 
 yards away from it. 
 
 But how about the left? You cannot see far 
 enough in that direction from the road. Patrols 
 must be sent out to a distance great enough to secure 
 you from surprise. 
 
 Suppose that on the right, while the valley is 
 generally open, there are some features that would 
 conceal a considerable force of the enemy. Patrols 
 must be sent there in ample time to make sure you 
 do not meet an unpleasant surprise. But to have a 
 patrol march along parallel to the column would be 
 unnecessary. It would be exhausting to the men 
 and probably delay your march. Even on the left 
 there might be a hill, or some point, from which a 
 clear view of the country on that side could be 
 observed. Sending a patrol there with field glasses 
 will often render unnecessary a flanking detach- 
 
27 
 
 ment. The frequent sending of patrols to prom- 
 inent points to the flanks will often answer 
 every purpose. They should hurry out from near 
 the head of the column and rejoin at the tail. 
 
 Again, the march may be through country that 
 affords cover in every direction for an enemy. There 
 will be cases in which the best solution will be a line 
 of men at intervals of from 20 to 50 yards, or even 
 more, marching ahead of the command. This last 
 case would be rare. 
 
 There will be cases, as for instance a road in the 
 bottom of a narrow valley, where flanking groups 
 will probably have to march parallel with the column. 
 In such cases it is well to relieve them often or your 
 march will be delayed. 
 
 As this is only a short talk and not a book on the 
 subject, more examples are not necessary. I want 
 only to illustrate the principle that you must adapt 
 your measures to the problem presented; do not 
 follow a fixed formation. 
 
 As to the size of these flanking detachments, 
 they will vary from two men to a considerable force. 
 If the patrol remains practically in sight of the 
 command, two men will probably answer as well as 
 more. But if the flanking group is to be at some 
 distance with, say an obstacle of some kind inter- 
 vening, it should be much larger. For instance, if 
 your road runs nearly parallel with a railroad, about 
 600 yards distant with some thick country between 
 them, it would be well to send a party varying from 
 a squad up, according to size of command, to march 
 along the railroad. 
 
 A problem worked out at one of our maneuvers 
 illustrates the point. A regiment of infantry was 
 sent along a road which led through a defile about 
 3,000 yards long. The west side was nearly precipi- 
 tous and the road was from 20 to 40 feet below the 
 
28 
 
 plateau on this side. The problem was solved on 
 different days by different regiments. 
 
 The first marched through in the normal forma- 
 tion with a battalion in advance guard and flanking 
 patrols out about 150 yards. 
 
 The enemy, a squadron of cavalry, had dis- 
 mounted and held position on the edge of the plateau 
 looking down into the defile about its middle. The 
 cavalry had out its combat patrol to its left which 
 promptly captured the flankers of the infantry. The 
 enemy then waited until the main body was opposite 
 to them and then poured in a rapid fire at very short 
 range. 
 
 A Wisconsin regiment solved it differently. In- 
 stead of a patrol of three men they sent a company 
 to the right and much farther out. The combat 
 patrol of the cavalry was captured and the company 
 gained the left rear of the squadron and threatened 
 the led horses. The cavalry now had other work cut 
 out for it than shooting up the column. Another 
 precaution taken by this regiment is worthy of note. 
 The advance guard marched with much greater dis- 
 tances than the normal and there was a distance of 
 several hundred yards between the second and third 
 battalions. If attacked in flank by a small force, not 
 more than one battalion would be involved and either 
 the leading battalion (advance guard) would be 
 emerging and able to take in flank the attacking 
 force, or the last one not yet in the defile could take 
 the same action on the other flank. 
 
 The first solution followed a form, the second 
 tried to adapt means to the end desired. Which is 
 the better? 
 
 In war nearly every time you get command of 
 the advance guard, your problem will present new 
 phases, new conditions to be met. 
 
 In every case ask yourself the questions: Can 
 
29 
 
 the enemy make a surprise attack on me? Are my 
 arrangements such as to unnecessarily exhaust my 
 men? Have I scattered my command too much (by 
 flank movements, etc.)? If you can give a satisfac- 
 tory answer to these questions your dispositions are 
 correct. 
 
 Remember large bodies of troops are hard to 
 hide in ordinary terrain. 
 
 Patrols sent to the flanks from small infantry 
 columns are apt to delay the march and be less 
 effective than cavalry. But if you have no cavalry, 
 infantry must be used. 
 
 One course is possibly open to the infantry. To 
 each regiment of infantry is now attached 20 
 mounted orderlies. The battalion staff officers are 
 mounted. Cannot these men be trained so that when 
 the regiment is operating alone they can be utilized 
 for this work? All of them are certainly not neces- 
 sary for orderlies at such a time. 
 
 Rear Guards 
 
 These are often described as an advance guard 
 reversed. As far as formation and distribution are 
 concerned this is nearly correct. Most of what I 
 have already said applies. 
 
 There are a few special points I wish to call to 
 your attention that pertain to rear guards and not to 
 advance. 
 
 Your mission is generally very different. You 
 are not seeking a combat, but are trying to avoid one 
 for the main body. 
 
 The great danger of a retreat is that it may 
 become a rout. This the rear guard must prevent. 
 It must not allow the main body to be crowded. 
 Particularly is this the case after a lost battle. The 
 pursuer must push his success to the utmost if 
 he is to reap the full fruit of his victory. The de- 
 
30 
 
 feated command is more or less disorganized and in 
 confusion. If it can gain time to get in shape un- 
 molested it cannot be run over, but it is practically 
 helpless at first. The rear guard must gain the 
 necessary time. 
 
 Another case suppose the retreat is not the 
 result of a defeat, but rather because the command 
 is so weak that a fight must result in a defeat. This 
 retreat, if long and crowded, will generally de- 
 generate into a rout, and cause great injury to the 
 command. The enemy wants, of course, to force a 
 fight. 
 
 The rear guard must so delay the enemy in both 
 cases as to fully serve his own command. 
 
 The troops selected for this duty should be the 
 best available. Cavalry and artillery are very essen- 
 tial in large commands. 
 
 The manuals give all these points, and all that I 
 have said as to the applicabilities of the normal 
 formation in the case of the advance guard applies 
 equally here. 
 
 There is one point that is essential to keep in 
 mind: You do not fight from choice, but from 
 necessity to gain time and thus fulfill your mission. 
 
 In selecting a position in which to fight a delay- 
 ing action, one requirement must be considered not 
 ordinarily entering into the problem when an advance 
 guard combat is entered into, and that is, ease of 
 getting away. 
 
 A strong defensive position must be selected as 
 explained in the books. But you are going to retreat 
 from it; you are not going to fight to a finish. This 
 involves a new consideration. 
 
 If you become closely engaged you can only 
 break off with great difficulty unless the ground is 
 favorable. Such ground should be selected where 
 practicable. For example, in rolling country you can 
 
31 
 
 often find a ridge where you can remain until vhe 
 enemy is within a few hundred yards and as soon as 
 you drop to the rear you will be concealed until he 
 gets to where you were, and even then you may be 
 under cover from that position. 
 
 Now a word to the officer who makes the detail 
 of an advance or rear guard. Give your order so 
 that the advance or rear guard commander can in- 
 telligently carry it out. If he knows the situation 
 fully he can determine his mission and know what 
 to do. 
 
 You can generally do no better than follow the 
 rules given in the Field Service Regulations as to 
 general form. 
 
 First. Tell him what is known of the enemy 
 and of other bodies of our own troops. 
 
 Second. Your plan or intentions in a general 
 way, but fully enough that he can appreciate his 
 mission. 
 
 Third. Details as to the march i.e., route, 
 distance from main body, and directions as to special 
 reconnaissance you want him to make. In this 
 latter, do not encroach too much on his liberty of 
 action. 
 
 When to relieve the advance guard? The gen- 
 eral rule in small commands is in the morning; that 
 is, the advance guard of today will furnish the 
 outpost tonight and stand relieved when the new 
 advance guard marches through the outpost line 
 next morning. This does not put excessive labor on 
 the advance guard. The reserve, or support if you 
 have no reserve, has not had any harder time on the 
 march, probably, than the main body; at night they 
 take all the sentry work and patrolling, the leading 
 troops during the day being the reserve of the out- 
 post at night. 
 
 The reason for this is they are thoroughly fa- 
 
32 
 
 miliar with the situation and have seen the country 
 farther forward and it avoids a countermarch for 
 them when relieved. 
 
 In a retreat you generally make the relief at 
 night. A new outpost is detailed, the rear guard 
 providing protection until it is in place. The rear 
 guard then marches through to the rear and stands 
 . relieved; The outpost is the rear guard next day, if 
 the retreat is continued. The reason being the same 
 in principle as in the above case. 
 
 In large commands as a division, the covering 
 detachment is not relieved daily, often remaining 
 out for a week or ten days. 
 
 Let us now take the two-inch map of Fort Leav- 
 en worth and vicinity and try a simple problem. 
 
 Problem 
 
 General Situation: 
 
 The Missouri river forms the boundary between 
 two hostile states whose main armies are operating 
 about thirty miles south of Leavenworth. 
 
 The Western Army occupies Leavenworth, with 
 a garrison of two or three thousand troops, and is 
 sending small parties into nearby eastern territory 
 seizing supplies and horses. 
 
 The Eastern Army has ordered a force to Platte 
 City to clear this country of hostile raiders. This 
 force, October 1st, is marching north on the east side 
 of the Platte. 
 
 Special Situation: 
 
 On the hill south of 76 the commander of the 
 Eastern force learns that there are about seventy- 
 five hostile troops east of the Missouri river and that 
 they are somewhere between Tracy and Farley. He 
 thereupon orders Company A, 1st Infantry, to cross 
 the Platte on the bridge at 72 and defeat and drive 
 
33 
 
 away this hostile company and rejoin at Platte City. 
 
 Let us briefly state a method of conducting this 
 company's march and then examine it more closely. 
 We will assume our company of full war strength 
 with four squads in the first section. 
 
 From the hill south of 76 and from the map a 
 good idea of the country is formed by all the officers 
 of the company. 
 
 The company quits the column at 76 and here 
 halts while the captain details the leading section as 
 the advance guard and gives its commander his 
 orders. 
 
 The advance guard then moves out as follows: 
 
 In the lead are four men and the corporal of the 
 first squad, two hundred yards behind them remain- 
 ing three men of the first squad, two hundreds yards 
 further back the front rank of the second squad, two 
 hundred and fifty yards further the remainder of the 
 advance guard, and six hundred yards in rear, the 
 main body. It is recommended to the reader to 
 make a sketch of the formation. 
 
 The column moves directly to Farley, and no 
 enemy is found. When the leading patrol reaches 
 Farley the place is examined to see if any of the 
 enemy are there. Then one man moves west until 
 he can see along the road 4232. Nothing being 
 seen, he signals back to the patrol at Farley and all 
 five of the men go up on the bluff and proceed north 
 across country, really becoming a left flank patrol. 
 
 The second group and column would halt while 
 Farley was being examined and until the patrol 
 moves to the bluff. The leading patrol having gained 
 the bluff, the march is resumed. The second patrol 
 now being the point, would move from 44 to 46 and 
 would there turn off to the right and become a right 
 flank patrol, and the third group would now become 
 the point and would proceed along the 4850 road. 
 
34 
 
 The other parts of the column following in the same 
 order as before. 
 
 Let us now follow our left patrol. 
 
 The corporal and his four men having reached 
 the high ground near 975 and having examined the 
 ground there, proceed north on the ridge in open 
 formation until they reach the knoll unmarked. Here 
 they divide. The corporal sends two men to hill 960 
 thence to proceed north to Cannon 900 hill Mayo 
 to west of hill 900 near 50. With the two other men 
 he goes to 1000 860 the high ground north follow- 
 ing along near the ridge to 930, north to 950, to hill 
 960 east of Alexander on the 1450 road. These 
 patrols see nothing of the enemy thus far, but shortly 
 after passing the points designated, the point on the 
 road is fired into, and a few minutes later the com- 
 pany is seen to be attacking a force of the enemy 
 near Baldwin. 
 
 The corporal now assembles his men and disposes 
 them so as to cover the company's left flank and de- 
 tect any movement of the enemy in that direction. 
 
 The second patrol after turning east at 46 would 
 increase its pace, follow the road for about three 
 hundred yards, and then to hill 930, along the bluff, 
 past Peter's to 48, on the way observing carefully 
 the country north of the road 4860, and then rejoin 
 the column. Just before reaching 48, two men would 
 be hurried forward (fast walk) to leave the road be- 
 tween Robket and Baker and to go to the edge of 
 the bluff and follow along the ravine back to the road 
 and join the column. After crossing the ravine near 
 Baker no right flank patrol would be necessary until 
 near 50; but here the enemy is struck and the com- 
 bat ensues. 
 
 There is no necessity in following in detail the 
 march of the parts on the road, except to state that 
 whenever a patrol is sent out from a leading element, 
 
35 
 
 men are sent forward to replace them. If the de- 
 taching of the patrol can be foreseen men should be 
 present in ample time or even should be started out 
 with the leading elements. 
 
 Let us now see whether the above outline 
 answers the purpose. 
 
 First will it protect the main body from fire 
 from the front at short range? The ground the com- 
 pany must first cross is open and an enemy at Farley 
 or on the hill nearby would have a clear field of fire 
 for the full range of their rifles. Have we protected 
 against this at the beginning? From the leading 
 patrol to the head of the main body is 1,250 yards 
 and our leading patrol should see the enemy at least 
 a few yards before reaching him. Infantry fire at a 
 range of over thirteen hundred yards at a target of 
 that size would not be very effective in the first few 
 seconds and three sections could deploy quickly. 
 Only patrols, always assumed to be in open order, 
 precede the main body of the advance guard. It is 
 650 yards from the leading patrol to this body, only 
 two and a half squads in strength. It seems, then, 
 that the requirement is fulfilled for this part of our 
 march. 
 
 Turning at Farley toward 46, one patrol less is in 
 front and the distance is only 1,050 yards from 
 leading patrol to main body. But there is a patrol 
 on the bluff and it is fairly certain that no enemy is 
 south of 46 between the bluff and the river. North 
 of 46 the distance is reduced to 850 yards. But the 
 country is broken and rough and that will be ample 
 distance in such terrain. When places occur where 
 the field of fire from the front would be too open and 
 long, the main body could hold back, closing up again 
 on the leading elements where the terrain was of a 
 different character. Delays due to flanking patrols 
 will give opportunity for this without hurrying. 
 
36 
 
 As to the second requirement time is needed to 
 put the main body properly into the fight. In so 
 small a command this condition is generally fulfilled 
 when the first requirement is met. 
 
 Let us look at the flank protection. We have 
 used none until reaching Farley. Was any necessary? 
 
 According to the map the country southwest of 
 the road is flat and open and could be seen from the 
 hill and from the road. To the northeast slightly 
 more cover for an enemy is available, but not much 
 and the enemy would hardly put himself in such a 
 pocket, with our main command to his east and this 
 company making for Farley. He would scarcely be 
 so obliging. 
 
 From Farley north, on the west of the road, the 
 country is covered for about 1,000 yards as efficiently 
 as can be done with so small a force. The distance 
 of 1,000 yards is sufficient for a company's protection, 
 knowing, as they do, the small size of the enemy's 
 force in the neighborhood. Then they are in friendly 
 territory; farmhouses are numerous and information 
 more easily obtained. Had this been hostile country, 
 I would recommend increasing this patrol to a squad 
 so as to have a central group. 
 
 On the other flank we have less patrolling, for 
 we have considered the improbability of an enemy 
 pocketing himself against an unfordable river with 
 the main body of our force able to shoot into him 
 across the river and our company threatening to cut 
 him off from home. We also consider the friendliness 
 of the inhabitants as before. Still the enemy might 
 not know of our main body and might be caught in 
 this bad situation, so those places that would conceal 
 him from view should be examined. This has been 
 done. If the patrols on this flank are properly 
 conducted, our object will be attained. 
 
37 
 
 I think it is clear that we have not used too many 
 for this exhausting work. 
 
 Now suppose that in this problem there was a 
 battalion detached, instead of a company, and the 
 enemy was two or three companies. What changes 
 would you make? 
 
 My answer would be, simply to consider the 
 company already discussed as the advance guard, 
 form it exactly as we have and have the main body 
 (three companies) follow 600 yards in rear as main 
 body. One modification to be made would be to 
 detach another patrol from the main body of the 
 advance guard to follow between the two parts of the 
 first one through the country west of the road. 
 
 Suppose it was a regiment detached against two 
 battalions. Simply have the other two battalions 
 follow the first as main body at from 600 to 800 
 yards. In this case there should be a squad on the 
 left after reaching Farley and another squad follow- 
 ing as second patrol. 
 
 We now have all the parts of an advance guard. 
 The leading company is the vanguard, its first sec- 
 tion the advance party. The other three companies 
 of this battalion the reserve of the advance guard. 
 
 As the size of the command increases more pro- 
 tection, both on the flank and front, is necessary, 
 and this solution provides for it. 
 
 In solving a rear guard problem you apply the 
 same method, remembering that your mission is very 
 different. 
 
 I have not gone into the details as to connecting 
 files and how the patrols are formed and led that is 
 assumed to be done correctly but a study of this 
 problem will show the importance of carefully in- 
 structing our men in patrolling. 
 
 The turning off of the leading patrols, as done in 
 
38 
 
 this case, is of course exceptional in a way. From 
 the hill and the map assumed to be had, it should be 
 foreseen that these patrols would be needed, and 
 using them in this way gave additional security to 
 the march during a critical period and saved delay 
 later. Without them, distance must have been in- 
 creased for this part of our march. Each problem 
 will present its own special features. This same one 
 may never occur to you, but others will. Do not try 
 to follow a normal formation, but adopt the means 
 necessary in the particular case to meet the con- 
 ditions. 
 
 Outposts 
 
 The object of an outpost is to protect a body of 
 troops while in camp or bivouac from surprise, to 
 prevent an attack being delivered against it before 
 it has had time to form up. There is an exceptional 
 case where a command has only one object to re- 
 treat. In that case the outpost must give warning 
 and hold back the enemy until the command can get 
 in march. 
 
 What is the correct formation for an outpost? 
 The answer appears plain. Any formation that se- 
 cures the object aimed at most efficiently with the 
 fewest men, giving unbroken rest to the remainder 
 of the troops. In no part of tactics does a normal 
 formation so little apply as in outposts. 
 
 In determining the outpost strength and dis- 
 positions we must consider, as in all other covering 
 detachments, the nature of the terrain, probable 
 direction of attack, range of weapons, country 
 hostile or friendly supposed proximity of the 
 enemy, etc. 
 
 Let us look at the bearing of some of these 
 conditions on our problem. 
 
 In a country like most of the United States, with 
 
39 
 
 its telephones and telegraph and its loyal and in- 
 telligent population, we can safely count on little 
 valuable information being given hostile troops, and 
 on the other hand we can count on the people report- 
 ing movements of the enemy to friendly troops. 
 
 There will be many cases in which foolish or 
 stupid people will give the enemy valuable informa- 
 tion, and at times information will not be sent to 
 friendly troops, and small detachments can often 
 evade observation. 
 
 Accepting the above we see that we cannot dis- 
 pense with covering detachments, even in friendly 
 territory, but that the danger of surprise is less. 
 
 When the hostile main body is a day's march or 
 more away we can feel certain that only small bodies 
 of infantry and cavalry need be feared. Large 
 bodies of infantry and artillery do not move far in a 
 night, if at all, and concealment is very unlikely. 
 
 The most important consideration, however, is 
 the nature of the enemy. If he has recently been 
 defeated and you are pursuing, you do not require as 
 strong an outpost as when conditions are reversed. 
 With an aggressive, active enemy, your protection 
 must be greater than with an enemy who seems to 
 be strictly on the defensive. 
 
 Of course outpost dispositions must vary with 
 the size of your command. A company or less 
 bivouacking in a state of readiness to form for action 
 does not require an elaborate outpost two or three 
 sentinels and a patrol or two are ample. A brigade 
 or more must have considerable time to form for 
 action. 
 
 The relative strength of the outpost is therefore 
 influenced by many conditions; it will vary within 
 wide limits. One twelfth of the troops at one time 
 may be large; at another, one third may be scarcely 
 enough. 
 
40 
 
 The placing of troops on outpost follows the 
 general rules as given in advance and rear guards. 
 Their distance from the main body must be sufficient 
 to keep the main body from being fired into before it 
 is in proper formation. If the attacker will probably 
 open with artillery, the distance must be greater 
 than if only musketry fire is to be expected. The 
 size of the main body, hence the time required to 
 form, must have an influence. The stronger the 
 outpost and the position it occupies the longer it can 
 probably delay the enemy and keep him from closing 
 in to effective range. 
 
 In this connection, we must consider where we 
 propose to make our stand if attacked. If the de- 
 fense is to be made in the position occupied by the 
 main body, less time and distance will generally be 
 required than if a position forward of that is to be 
 taken. 
 
 When we come to placing our men on outpost we 
 must bear in mind that we must early learn of the 
 approach of the enemy in order that timely warning 
 may be given, and that the enemy may be met by no 
 troops not in formation for such a meeting. As in 
 advance guard formation a patrol or its equivalent 
 must be the first to meet the enemy, and succeeding 
 troops must be able to form before he can reach 
 them. A squad deploys very quickly. 
 
 The time of day and weather conditions must be 
 considered. If the weather is clear, in an open 
 country, movements of the enemy can be seen much 
 farther than when conditions are different. Natur- 
 ally, if you can see for a mile or more from your 
 advanced positions, the latter need not be as far 
 from the main body as when the enemy can approach 
 much closer before being seen. 
 
 When it comes to dividing up the troops on out- 
 post, the terrain is an important element. 
 
41 
 
 There are often portions of your front over 
 which the enemy cannot advance, as, for example, a 
 swamp or very thick jungle, etc. There are other 
 portions which, while it is possible for the enemy to 
 cross them, it is extremely unlikely that he will. 
 Such parts of your front should not receive the same 
 attention as the others. Here an occasional patrol 
 will answer every purpose. At night marching 
 troops must generally keep to the roads. A large 
 force cannot move far ^across rough country in the 
 night and be in condition to accomplish much against 
 an alert enemy. In exceptional country it can be 
 done, but generally the roads are the important 
 points to watch, especially when cavalry is to be 
 feared. Portions of your front that the enemy can 
 possibly cross, though he is not likely to do so, must 
 not be neglected; a few men, or often better, .patrols 
 to watch it, should be provided. Apportion your 
 men according to requirements, taking full advantage 
 of the ground to economize strength. 
 
 You have just finished the study of ' 'Security 
 and Information, " therefore no attempt is made to 
 go into details of formation or cover all points, but 
 merely to point out some of the more important fea- 
 tures that are often overlooked. It is so much easier 
 always to follow a normal formation that too many 
 do so, overlooking the fact that the book tells you 
 that circumstances and conditions make variations in 
 the normal form. It may be said that the normal 
 formation is 'decidedly exceptional in practice. 
 
 In solving your problem determine your "mis- 
 sion"; then consider carefully what you know of the 
 enemy; the distance necessary to hold him off; de- 
 termine his probable course of action; then consider 
 the ground in your front; what portions must be 
 strongly held; what portions can be ignored; then if 
 you are to detail an outpost determine the number 
 
necessary and make the detail, breaking tactical 
 units as little as possible. If you are detailed with 
 your company or battalion to form the outpost, after 
 studying the question as before divide your men so 
 as bast to carry out your mission. A reserve of 
 greater or less strength, according to circumstances, 
 should always be held in your own hands. 
 
 After you have decided tentatively on your dis- 
 positions look over the ground carefully and study 
 every avenue of approach for the enemy and ask 
 yourself if your dispositions are such as to get timely 
 information of a hostile advance by any of these and 
 to cause the necessary delay to the enemy, then ex- 
 amine your dispositions and see if you are using no 
 more men than are necessary for sentinels and 
 patrols. If your answers are in the affirmative you 
 have probably solved the problem correctly. 
 
 Outposts can be best studied by considering con- 
 crete cases. 
 
 Let us take the following problem on the two- 
 inch map of Fort Leavenworth and vicinity: 
 
 Problem 
 
 A Northern army is at Omaha, a Southern army 
 at Kansas City. Country shown on map is Southern. 
 The two bridges over the Missouri river near Leav- 
 enworth have been rendered impassable. 
 
 On May 1st the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry, of the 
 Southern army arrived by marching from Kansas 
 City to hold the railroad crossing at Beverly, the re- 
 mainder of the brigade to which this battalion be- 
 longs is to follow next day. These troops are to 
 cover the repair of the bridges and protect the coun- 
 try in the vicinity from raids. 
 
 Major A in command of the 2d Battalion arrives 
 at Beverly at 3 p.m., and here learns from friendly 
 inhabitants and spies that a considerable force of the 
 
43 
 
 enemy was expected to reach Atchison (twenty-seven 
 miles north of Weston) that evening and that small 
 parties of hostile troops are already from ten to twelve 
 miles south of Atchison. 
 Weather clear. 
 
 Required : 
 
 1. Major A's dispositions for the night, and his 
 reasons therefor. 
 
 Let us assume that Major A has marched his 
 battalion with Company E as advance guard, the 
 other companies following in the order F, G, H. 
 
 Major A is at Beverly at the head of his main 
 body. The advance guard having been notified to 
 halt, as this is the end of the march, would promptly 
 have out the necessary march outpost to cover the 
 battalion until the "halt and outpost" order was 
 issued. 
 
 Major A's mission is to hold Beverly until the 
 brigade arrives tomorrow. The information received 
 convinces him that he cannot be attacked during the 
 night by a very large force, but that detachments, 
 probably together, equal to or stronger than his own 
 are within striking distance and may attack. 
 
 He must therefore select his camp and post his 
 outpost in such a way as best to enable him to carry 
 out his mission. 
 
 He sees at once that to protect Beverly he must 
 not camp there. The spur at Spinner about 500 
 yards east of Beverly commands it and the place 
 could not be held with an enemy of about equal 
 strength at Spinner. Conversely, if Major A holds 
 Spinner the enemy can do nothing at Beverly until 
 he first drives away Major A's command. 
 
 This spur also affords a good defensive position 
 against an attack by the enemy. To the west and 
 northwest is an open plain for nearly 1,500 yards; 
 
44 
 
 beyond this the timber is too dense for the successful 
 movement of troops. To the north and northeast 
 the roads are well controlled and a fairly good field 
 of fire is afforded, especially to the east and to the 
 north where the enemy has Bee Creek to cross in 
 plain view at effective range. 
 
 The spur north of this one does not afford as 
 strong a defensive position to an attack from the 
 north and does not so well cover the railroad junc- 
 tion. Other good positions in the neighborhood un- 
 cover Beverly too much. 
 
 As there is water sufficient for his men at the 
 farm and the animals can be watered in the nearby 
 streams, Major A decides to camp at Spinner. He 
 must now decide on his outpost dispositions to secure 
 his camp against surprise. 
 
 He first studies the roads available to the enemy. 
 There is a road and railroad along the river from 
 Weston to G that approaches his position directly 
 from the direction of the enemy. From Weston the 
 enemy has a road from 21 to 49, thence to G or E. 
 From E he can move 600 yards south and follow the 
 railroad to the northwest and approach the position 
 at Spinner. A wider detour to 10 and an attack 
 from the south is possible, but highly improbable; 
 the enemy would thus uncover his own line of retreat, 
 have a long march, and gain little. If the enemy 
 attacks south of the railroad he would undoubtedly 
 turn the ravine west of Ode and not try to force a 
 crossing. 
 
 An advance between the two roads forking at 
 40 is also improbable in the night; the stream has 
 steep banks and constitutes a decided obstacle. The 
 enemy could cross on the bridge south of 49 and then 
 move across country, but would lose time if he at- 
 tempted it in the night. The enemy may turn off at 
 25 by the farm road and move down the spur. From 
 
this spur to the Spinner position is about 1,200 yards; 
 to advance from it would be difficult, and the range 
 is long for decisive effect for infantry fire. 
 
 From his study of the country Major A concludes 
 that if attacked before the arrival of the brigade the 
 enemy will approach by one of the roads above 
 mentioned, and the attack will probably be north of 
 the railroad. Which road or roads will be used it is 
 impossible to foretell. The enemy will not have 
 artillery, so the rifle range is all that need be con- 
 sidered. Much of the line need only be patrolled, 
 but all the roads must be held. There is just enough 
 danger of a wide turning movement to make it ad- 
 visable to keep a watch to the south. He further 
 decides that if attacked he will make his fight for the 
 position at Spinner; he will not reenforce the outpost, 
 but have it fall back when pressed, uncovering the 
 main position. 
 
 The outpost line should therefore extend from 
 the Burlington R. R. north of G around to the south- 
 west to the Rock Island Railroad. The distance to 
 the front of the line of observation need not exceed 
 1,500 to 2,000 yards. As only a few points have to 
 be more than merely observed, * not more than 100 
 men are necessary, but observing the rule not to 
 break unnecessarily a tactical unit, he decides to de- 
 tail a company complete. For reasons explained in 
 the talk on advance guards, he selects Company E, 
 the present advance guard. The troops for a detached 
 post far from the outpost proper are generally taken 
 from the main body, or, in large outposts, from the 
 reserve. Major A decides that a detached post of 
 one squad located just east of the little woods south 
 of Spinner can effectively observe that section, and 
 decides to take one squad from E Company. His 
 reasons for taking it from this company are that the 
 outpost is strong enough without it and that tomorrow 
 
all the men, who on account of extra duty today and 
 tonight should be spared as much as convenient, will 
 belong to one company. The other three will be intact. 
 
 Having arrived at a decision as above, Major A 
 is ready to issue his "halt and outpost" order. 
 This, in so small a command, would usually be verbal 
 and direct to the officers. 
 
 Major A then assembles his company commanders 
 and issues the following orders: 
 
 'Information has been received that small par- 
 ties of the enemy were seen about twelve miles north 
 of here today. 
 
 "Our brigade will reach here tomorrow. 
 
 "This battalion will go into camp near the Spin- 
 ner house yonder. 
 
 "Company E, less one squad, will constitute the 
 outpost and will establish the line from a point about 
 three fourths of a mile north of here on the Burling- 
 ton railroad to near 45, thence southeast to the Rock 
 Island railroad. 
 
 "A detached post will be established by me south 
 of camp. 
 
 "In case of attack we will defend the position 
 near the main camp, which will be intrenched as 
 soon as camp is made. 
 
 "Captain E (Company E) will detach one squad 
 under a sergeant to report to me. 
 
 "I will be with the main body." 
 
 Let us assume that Captain E has studied his 
 map and the ground and when he receives his order 
 is ready to post his men. His course of reasoning 
 and conclusions are practically the same as those of 
 Major A. 
 
 With so small an outpost there would be no re- 
 serve. The squads which constituted the advance 
 party, flankers, etc., during the day will be in the 
 support during the night. 
 
47 
 
 Captain D decides to have the support bivouac a 
 little south of the bridge north of G, to which point 
 he marches his support if not already there and then 
 issues his outpost order to his company. 
 
 Order: 
 
 ' 'Small parties of the enemy have been seen to- 
 day about twelve miles north of here. 
 
 "The battalion camps on that hill near the Spin- 
 ner farm house. 
 
 "The support will bivouac here. 
 
 "If attacked the position at Spinner will be held. 
 
 "First Lieutenant A with the first two squads 
 and Sergeant X, move out on the F E road about 
 500 yards beyond the second bend where the railroad 
 diverges from the wagon road. You will constitute 
 Picket No. 1. You will observe the road and railroad 
 to your front and patrol to the head of the ravine to 
 your north. 
 
 "Second Lieutenant B, you will take the next 
 two squads and move out the G 47 road about 300 
 yards beyond 47 and constitute Picket No. 2. You 
 will carefully guard the bridge to your north and 
 patrol east to that ravine running south from Bee 
 Creek. 
 
 "Sergeant Y, with the next two squads, move 
 up the river road to near the next bridge. You will 
 constitute Picket No. 3. Place a cossack post to your 
 right on this hill (pointing) with instructions to care- 
 fully observe the country to the north. You will 
 patrol along the railroad to the north and prevent 
 the enemy moving undetected through the woods 
 along the river. 
 
 "Cooked meals will be sent to the pickets from 
 the support. 
 
 "I will be with the support/' 
 
 As soon as the pickets just detailed are in posi- 
 
48 
 
 tion the temporary or march outguards are relieved 
 and come into the bivouac. 
 
 Captain E then establishes his bivouac. Three 
 men are detailed for guard (3 reliefs of one man each) 
 and a noncommissioned officer. A sentinel must be 
 on duty all the time of the bivouac. 
 
 Men are also detailed for patrol duty; at least 
 one visiting patrol must be out all the time. In this 
 case two men are sufficient for a patrol. Three re- 
 liefs for patrols =6 men. 
 
 The patrol starting from the support would move 
 to Picket No. 1, thence to No. 2, thence to No. 3, 
 and back to the support. The round should be made 
 in less than an hour. 
 
 Having attended to the above Captain E should 
 now inspect his pickets and satisfy himself that his 
 orders have been understood and are being properly 
 executed. He should make any changes he finds 
 necessary. Captain E now makes a report of his 
 final dispositions to the battalion commander. It is 
 advisable to show the dispositions of the troops by 
 means of a single sketch. 
 
 Captain E causes all the men who are to do the 
 patrolling during the night to make at least one round 
 before dark in order to learn the country. 
 
 Let us now see what the picket commanders do. 
 
 Lieutenant A establishes Picket No. 1, 500 yards 
 east of the second bend in the road. At this point 
 the distance between the two roads is about 100 
 yards. He decides to make his bivouac between the 
 two roads, to place one sentinel on the wagon road, 
 one on the railroad, and one between at the picket. 
 Double sentinels are the rule on such posts as these 
 on roads. One double sentinel can not satisfactorily 
 do what is required and two such posts require too 
 many men. In this case all three sentinels are so 
 close together that the middle one may be considered 
 
49 
 
 as the double to each of the others. This requires 
 nine men for sentinels. He must have three patrols 
 of two men each 6 men. Two noncommissioned 
 officers can divide the night in charge of picket. 
 Three would be better but he has only two left, but 
 Lieutenant A can take some of the work himself. 
 He has 17 men besides himself in the picket. 
 
 He decides to have one patrol out all the time. 
 It will move from the picket north of the head of the 
 ravine thence southeast of the knoll near E in the 
 northeast angle of the wagon road, whence both 
 roads can be seen, then back to the picket by the 
 same route. At least once every two hours a patrol 
 will move via the farm road to Picket No. 2. Lieut. 
 A and those to make the patrols during the night go 
 over the route before dark. 
 
 Lieutenant B establishes his picket to the right 
 (east) of the railroad due south of the bridge and 
 posts a double sentinel a few yards from the picket. 
 No other sentinel at the picket is required. Three 
 patrols of two men each are detailed to patrol from 
 the picket east to the ravine. A patrol will move 
 back and forth between these two points. He has 
 so far 6 men for sentinels, 6 men for patrols and 3 
 noncommissioned officers or privates acting as such 
 =15. He has one man left besides himself. He de- 
 cides to have a patrol to Picket No. 1, going by way 
 of 45 and returning via G. This will be made once 
 in two hours without interfering with the patrol to 
 the ravine. It will be made by two men taken from 
 the noncommissioned officers, sentinels not on post 
 and the extra man. Patrols go over the route be- 
 fore dark. 
 
 Sergeant Y establishes his picket in the mouth 
 of the draw east of the little railroad bridge and 
 posts a double sentinel to observe to the northwest 
 along the road and railroad. He detached a corporal 
 
50 
 
 and three men to establish a cossack post about due 
 east of the picket on the ridge. The rest of his men 
 he holds in readiness for patrolling. Frequent patrols 
 will be made well to the front; the cossack post will 
 be visited once an hour. 
 
 During broad daylight the double sentinels may 
 be made single and much of the patrolling omitted, 
 but from sunset to broad daylight the above disposi- 
 tions will be followed. 
 
 This disposition requires for night work, if there 
 is no attack, six squads and two sergeants for the 
 three pickets; one squad for the detached post. The 
 guard and patrols at the support requires nine men 
 and say two noncommissioned officers. A total of 
 eight squads and one man besides four additional 
 noncommissioned officers or a grand total from Com- 
 pany E of 69 men out of the 128, practically one 
 eighth of the force. 
 
 The major would also have from the main body a 
 small camp guard; probably a single sentinel would 
 be sufficient, at most two. This would require 3 or 6 
 privates and 1 or 2 noncommissioned officers. 
 
 This is not excessive, particularly when we con- 
 sider that full work is only required during darkness. 
 
 The next question: Has he economized too much, 
 is there an avenue of approach too open? 
 
 If the enemy comes by the wagon road against 
 the front of Picket No. 1, he is met by two squads; 
 this number of men shooting down a road would be 
 quite an obstacle. It would force a deployment and 
 regular advance and this would take time, particu- 
 larly in the dark; the enemy having deployed would 
 doubtless be able to push back the men of the picket, 
 but by that time the support could be deployed and 
 ready and Picket No. 2 would soon be on their flank. 
 By the time the enemy was oriented and in condition 
 
51 
 
 to handle this force, nearly a company strong, the 
 main body would be adding their fire. 
 
 If he comes by the roads against either of the 
 other pickets the result is practically the same. 
 
 Suppose the enemy attacks moving across country 
 between Picket No. 2 and 49. Crossing the stream 
 with its steep banks will take some time for a force 
 as large as a battalion, and is certain to make con- 
 siderable noise. One or the other of the two patrols 
 will detect it early. After crossing it will take an 
 appreciable time to overcome the disorder and pre- 
 pare to advance to the attack. Pickets Nos. 1 and 2 
 are ready to open a cross fire on them and are strong 
 enough to cause trouble to the enemy and will delay 
 him. The support, as before, deploys and is ready. 
 
 Suppose the enemy moves south of the railroad 
 to turn the position. He would hardly attempt to 
 cross the ravine, but would turn it bringing him in 
 well from the south. The detached post in this 
 vicinity should get early information of it and alarm 
 the main camp. The squad could not cause much 
 delay but could cause some, for the enemy must 
 find out how much is against him. The distance is 
 so great that by the time the enemy was within 
 effective range for night firing our troops could be 
 ready. The outpost company, or part of it, can 
 move against the enemy's right flank during his ad- 
 vance. The enemy would be running such a great 
 risk in such a move unless he were greatly superior 
 to us that he would hardly attempt it. 
 
 We must remember that the force which has to 
 advance in the dark is much more liable to confusion, 
 disorder and mayhap than the troops in position. 
 
 The enemy "may turn south via 25. The cossack 
 post should see him in time to give ample warning. 
 This post could not cause any delay. The southern 
 point of the hill is over 1,200 yards from our main 
 
body, too far to accomplish anything by night firing 
 To get down the steep bank to advance would be con- 
 siderably interfered with by the support and later in 
 their advance would be flanked by Pickets 1 and 2. 
 
 The distance from the main body to the advance 
 elements of Pickets 2 and 3 is nearly 2,000 yards; to 
 Picket No. 1 is only about 1,200 and the detached 
 post about the same. This, I believe, fulfills the re- 
 quirement. Night fire by infantry is effective only 
 at short range, in daylight the enemy would be seen 
 for a considerable distance before he reached the de- 
 tached post or Picket No. 1. 
 
 I do not believe we can dispense with any of the 
 men we have used. To cut out one of our sentinels 
 or patrols from the pickets would leave an opening. 
 
 The patrolling from the support is believed neces- 
 sary. 
 
 This problem is very simple and in solution works 
 out rather normally. The pickets are of equal size. 
 This will not be the rule. To each picket must be 
 assigned men enough to do the work before it. One 
 picket may have two or three double sentinels, an- 
 other only one. In some cases a cossack or sentry 
 squad would be used, and the pickets would vary 
 from two squads to a company. 
 
 You must also bear in mind that generally there 
 is more than one correct solution. Whatever disposi- 
 tion gives necessary security with the minimum of 
 men is absolutely correct. 
 
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