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 MEMORIAL 
 
 ADDRESSED TO THE 
 
 HONOURABLE COURT OF DIRECTORS 
 
 BY 
 
 LORD WILLIAM CAVENDISH ^BENTINCK, 
 
 CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF 
 
 THE MUTINY AT VELLORE, 
 
 WITH THE 
 
 CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THAT EVENT, 
 
 FEBRUARY 1809. 
 
 LONDON: 
 PRINTED FOR JOHN BOOTH, DUKE-STREET, PORTLAND-PLACE. 
 
 1810.
 
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 A D V E R T I 8 E MEN 1\ 
 
 THE following Memorial was presented to the Court of 
 Directors on the 7th of February, 1809. It was in fact an appeal to them 
 from their own former sentence, pronounced in the year 1806, against the 
 Madras Government, of which I was at that time President. In consequence 
 of this appeal and applications of a similar nature from other quarters, the 
 Court entered into a review of the transactions connected with the Mutiny at 
 Vellore ; and finally, on the 25th of July last, came to a Resolution on the 
 respective merits of the various parties implicated in those transactions. With 
 many of the sentiments expressed in the Resolution relating to my conduct, I 
 had reason to be satisfied ; and to the spirit of courtesy and conciliation in 
 which the M'hole of it was drawn up, I am far from insensible. But it did 
 not, in my view, render me that full measure of justice to which I thought my- 
 self entitled. Under this impression I am induced to make the Memorial public. 
 The important political considerations involved in the question of the Vellore 
 Mutiny, have indeed given to that question much of a public character. Yet 
 I am aware that these sheets will probably intei-est few persons imcoiuiected 
 with India. I shoidd, however, think it unjust both to myself and my friends, 
 if I neglected to place within the reach of every enquii-er, the means of form- 
 ing a correct judgment on the circumstances of that event. It will, at least, 
 be satisfactory to me to know that, if the subject should again excite discussion, 
 cither private or public, there will not be wanting an authentic testimony of 
 the part which I acted on that occasion ; of the principles by which I was 
 guided, and of the manner in which my measures influenced the general course 
 and result of affairs. 

 
 IV 
 
 In discharo-ina' this dutv, it is with no small effort that I have submitted 
 to the necessity under which 1 found myself placed of publishing somewhat 
 plain animadversions on the conduct of many honourable men, whose names 
 I would not willingly have mentioned except with unmixed praise. Of those 
 gentlemen however, and particularly of Sir John Cradock, to whom such fre- 
 quent reference is made in the following pages, I have, as tar as related to 
 general character, always thought with respect ; and if, in the defensive step 
 which I am reduced to take, I run the risk of wounding their feelings, I can 
 sincerely say that it is at the expence of my own.
 
 TO THE 
 
 HONOURABLE THE COURT OF DIRECTORS. 
 
 Gentlemen, 
 
 I BEG leave to submit to your attention the following 
 Memorial. The reasons which induce me to trouble you in this manner may 
 be explained in a few words. — 
 
 During the course of four years, I had the honour of enjoying your confidence 
 as Governor of Madras. At length it was determined in your Honourable Court 
 that I had forfeited that confidence, and I was removed from my situation. My 
 removal was effected in a manner calculated to make it peculiarly mortifying and 
 disgraceful. It had been a courtesy usually practised on such occasions, to allow 
 the superseded Governor at least the nominal possession of his office till the arrival 
 of his successor, or till he could meet with an opportunity of embarking for 
 England. 
 
 'e>' 
 
 In my case a different course was pursued. It was ordered that I should 
 immediately cease to be Governor ; no measures were taken for my return home ; 
 and had it not been for the voluntary kindness of Sir Edward Pellew, I should 
 have been obliged to remain in India, stripped of all authority, till the departure
 
 Vl 
 
 of the homeward-bound Fleet had afforded me a passage. These circumstances 
 are not trivial, because they would produce an impression unfavourable to my 
 character, both on the public at home, and on the people over whom I had 
 presided. 
 
 In the Dispatch which announced my removal, these words are used : 
 
 " Thouo-h the zeal and integrity of our present Governor of Madras, Lord 
 " William Bentinck, are deserving of our approbation, yet, being of opinion 
 " that circumstances, which have recently come under our consideration, render 
 " it expedient for the interest of our service that a new arrangement of our 
 " Government of Fort St. George should take place without delay, we have 
 " felt ourselves under the necessity of determining that his Lordship should be 
 " removed." 
 
 I was of course anxious to discover the circumstances here alluded to, and 
 thought it no more than justice that I should receive the fullest information 
 upon the subject. Under this impression I addressed a Letter to the Chairman, 
 requesting a sjjecitic enumeration of the circumstances which entered into the 
 contemplation of the Court at the period of their writing the words which have 
 been quoted. The Chairman, however, declined a compliance with my request. 
 
 But it was not difficult to conjecture what would have been his reply, had 
 he entered into the subject. The univel^sal opinion, both in India and Eng- 
 land, coincided with the most authentic private information, in representing 
 the Mutiny at Vellore, with the subsequent commotions, as the real cause of my 
 removal. 
 
 Such is the treatment which I have received, and such is its cause. 
 
 It is for you to judge, after a perusal of what I have to offer in my defence, 
 whether that was a just cause, and consequently, whether I deserved such treat-
 
 vu 
 
 inent. If I have succeeded in the attempt to prove that I was in no degree responsible 
 for the Mutiny at Vellore and the subsequent disturbances ; that I luiifornily acted 
 in the very spirit of your repeated orders and instructions to your Servants in India ; 
 that, by a system of concihation and tenderness towards the Native Prejudices, I 
 allayed the tumults which I have been accused of injudiciously encouraging: I do 
 presume to think that you will acknowledge the reasonableness of my complaints : and 
 if they are reasonable, I am confident that your sense of justice will lead you to re- 
 dress the injuries which I have suffered. What satisfaction may be due for injuries so 
 deeply affecting my character and reputation, it will rest with you to determine. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Gentlejien, 
 
 Your obedient humble Servunt, 
 
 WILLIAM CAVENDISH RENTINCK. 
 
 London, Feb. 7, 1809.
 
 MEMORIAL, 
 
 Sfc. §-c. 
 
 TO THE HONOURABLE THE COURT OF DIRECTORS, &c. 
 
 GENTLEMEN, 
 
 1_/N the first intelligence of the Mutiny at Vellore, the Court of 
 Directors determined upon my removal from the Government of Madras. The sen- 
 tence, however, was suspended till the arrival of further information ; and the accounts 
 of tiie later disturbances finally determined its instant execution. I was accordingly 
 n called ; and was thus, of course, publicly declared, in a greater or less degree, 
 responsible for the unfortunate occurrences which were known to have suggested the 
 measure of my dismissal. It is the object of the following remarks to enquire whe- 
 ther the responsibility so fastened upon me had really been incurred ; or, in other 
 words, whether my recal was just. 
 
 The inquiry naturally resolves itself into three distinct considerations. It may 
 have been thought expedient to dismiss me, either, in the first place, because I was 
 concerned in the measures which unmediately occasioned the Mutiny ; or, secondly, 
 because the general measures of the Government, over which I had the honour to 
 preside, paved the way for that event; or, thirdly, because the measures which I 
 advised in consequence of the Mutiny were unwise, and calculated rather to keep up 
 than to allay the irritation of the public mind. 
 
 Each of these questions shall be separately examined. 
 
 In the prosecution of the first of these points of inquiry, it may be observed, 
 that whatever difference of opinion the dispute respecting the more remote or primary 
 causes of the Mutiny may have occasioned, there has always prevailed but one senti- 
 ment respecting the immediate causes of that event. These are, on all hands, 
 admitted to have been certain military regulations, then recently introduced into the 
 Madras armj. 
 
 B
 
 2 
 
 On this part of the subject, therefore, I shall, in the first place, state, briefly and 
 simply, the nature of those regulations, and the effects which they produced down 
 to the period of their final abolition. 
 
 In the second place, I shall examine how far I was myself implicated in the in- 
 troduction or continuance of those regulations. 
 
 I. The military regulations alluded to have been introduced since the arrival of 
 Sir J. Cradock at Madras ; and the substance of them may be comprised in these 
 particulars : 
 
 In ordering the Sepoys to appear on parade with their chins clean shaved, and 
 the hair on the upper lip cut after the same pattern ; and never to wear the distinguish- 
 ing marks of cast, or ear-rings, when in uniform ; — 
 
 In ordering, for the use of the Sepoys, a Turban of a new pattern ; — 
 
 And in making them wear black stocks and white undress jackets.* 
 
 The alterations thus instituted seemed for a time to be received by the Sepoys 
 with submission. The first symjotoms of a contrary spirit betrayed themselves in the 
 Second Battalion 4th Regiment N. I., which then composed part of the garrison of 
 Vellore. On the 6th and 7th of May, 1806, the conduct of that Battalion, on occa- 
 sion of their being ordered to wear the new Turban, was most disoi'derly, and even 
 mutinous. It was only by severe measures that their Commander, Lieutenant-Co- 
 lonel Darley, at last reduced them to obedience. The Commander in Chief imme- 
 diately directed a Court of Inquiry to be held, " to examine into and report upon the 
 " causes which led to certain acts of insubordination in the Second Battalion 4th 
 " Regiment N. I." He at the same time addressed, through the oflicial channel of 
 the Adjutant-General, a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Fancourt, the Commanding Of- 
 ficer at Vellore. 
 
 This letter (a) is conceived in the highest tone of military authority. After 
 stating the measures that had been taken to convey nineteen soldiers, who had been 
 confined by Lieutenant-Colonel Darley as ringleaders in the Mutiny, to Madras, for 
 the purpose of their being there tried, the Commander in Chief directs that the Non- 
 commissioned Officers who had refused to wear the Turban should be reduced to the 
 Ranks ; and peremptorily msists on the immediate adoption of the new Turban by 
 the disorderly Battalion. The concluding paragraphs are as follow : 
 
 " You will further, through Lieutenant-Colonel Darley, direct the Native 
 " Commissioned Officers of the Second Battalion of the 4th Regiment N. I., imme- 
 " diately to make up and wear Turbans of the prescribed pattern. 
 
 " Disobedience or hesitation on their part will be instantly followed by dismission 
 " from the service, in public orders, on your report. 
 
 * A Mis-statement. See page 5i,
 
 " Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy has orders, should you require it, to march the 
 " 19th Dragoons to Vellore, to assist in enforcing obedience. 
 
 " It is the intention of the Commander in Chief immediately to relieve the Se- 
 " cond Battalion 4th Regiment N. I. ; but, though he thinks proper to remove this 
 " Corps from Vellore, he will not admit of hesitation to the orders he has given." 
 
 The Court of Inquiry, which, as I have already staled, had been appointed by 
 the Commander in Chief to examine into the causes of the insubordination mani- 
 fested by the disorderly Battalion, decidedly attributed, in their Report, the origin of 
 the misconduct of the Battalion to " the jealous and lively prejudices of the Natives, 
 " in any matter respecting dress (which, they observe, in this country is intimately 
 " connected with Cast and Religion), acting uj)on the weak minds of illiterate and 
 " uninformed men." 
 
 In order to ascertain how far, according to the opinions of the strictest followers 
 of the Native religious persuasions, the opposition to the Turban was sanctioned by 
 the habits of thinking peculiar to the country, the Court proceeded to examine two 
 persons of high Cast, the one a 3Ialabar, and the other a Seid, particularly with 
 respect to the Turban. The testimony (b) of these men pointedly went to discoun- 
 tenance the idea, that wearing the Tui'ban was in itself inconsistent with the religious 
 principles of the Natives, or could have any discernible tendency to shock their feehngs. 
 That the members of the Court themselves also regarded the Turban as in no wise in- 
 terfering with the Religion or prejudices of the Natives, is clearly intimated in their 
 Report; and more directly asserted in a private paper, presented by them to the 
 Commander in Chief, and expressly treating on this particular point. 
 
 The nineteen men, who had been put under arrest by Lieutenant-Colonel Darley, 
 were tried by a CJeneral Court Martial, consisting entirely of Native Officers, and 
 were condemned to receive severe corporal punishment, and to be dismissed the Com- 
 pany's service. The greater part, however, of these offenders shewing strong signs 
 of contrition, were forgiven by the Government, and the two ringleaders only received 
 punishment. The words in which the sentence of the Court is expressed are parti- 
 cularly strong, and deserve to be inserted : 
 
 " The Court doth therefore adjudge the said prisoners to receive nine hundred 
 " lashes each, with a cat-of-nine-tails, on their bare backs, at such time and places 
 " as his Excellency the Commander in Chief shall be pleased to direct ; and further- 
 " more, to he discharged from the Honourable Company's service, as titrhalent and 
 " ztnjvorthi/ suhjects." 
 
 In this trial, two Native Officers of the highest Cast, both Hindoo and Mussul- 
 man, were examined with regard to the Turban ; and their evidence (c) was no less 
 decisive and satisfactory in its favour, than that which has been recently mentioned as 
 given before the Committee of Inquir}'.
 
 The Proceedings of the respective Courts were submitted to Government, and 
 accompanied by a letter from the Commander in Chief, and another from the Adju- 
 tant-General. These letters are alluded to in this place, only because they shew the 
 impression made on the minds of the writers, by the late events, to have been, that 
 the opposition to the Turban had no ivarrant in the general religious notions of the 
 people ; and that it was merely a momentary effort of insubordination, which a just 
 degree of rigour was adequate to quell, and had in fact completely suppressed. 
 
 This impression corresponded with the general opinion, and was confirmed by 
 many circumstances. The mutinous Battalion had arrived at Madras, had submitted 
 to wear the new Turban, and was reported by its Commanding Officer to be " in as 
 " perfect and complete a state of subordination and good discipline as any other Corps 
 " on the Madras establishment." The sentence which, as has already been said, the 
 Court Martial had passed against the more obnoxious of the ringleaders in the late 
 irregular proceedings of that Battalion, was executed in front of the garrison. 
 
 On the 4th of July, a letter (d) was received by the Governor in Council, from 
 Sir J. Cradock, desiring the advice of Government on the expediency of revoking the 
 order respecting the Turban. The Commander in Chief, in this communication, re- 
 presented his embarrassment with regard to the point in reference. He alluded to the 
 many advantages, as to lightness and convenience, which the new Turban possessed over 
 the old ; but observed, that he had " the strongest reasons to suppose almost universal 
 " objection arose against the Turban ;" that severity, if unsuccessful, might produce 
 bad consequences ; that, though deeply impressed with the general principle of en- 
 forcing obedience instead of yielding to opposition, he yet hesitated to apply that 
 principle to so peculiar a people as the Natives of India; that, by intelligence from 
 Seringapatam, and by a private letter from Colonel Brunton, he understood that both 
 the Sepoys and Native Officers apprehended a design of converting them by force to 
 Christianity ; that " still it was his wish, and the best judgment he could apply to this 
 " untoward subject, to persevere and conquer prejudice, as perhaps the least evil ;" 
 but that he was not satisfied in his own mind to persevere to the full extent " without 
 " recurrence to the advice and sanction of Government." 
 
 In return (d) to this application, the Governor in Council stated, that he was 
 induced, by the difficulty attending the proposed alteration in dress, to regret the 
 first adoption of that measure ; but the measure having been already adopted, he 
 agreed with the Commander in Chief in thinking that its revocation might tend to 
 compromise the authority by which it had been publicly put in force. He observed, 
 that if the use of the new Turban militated against the religious principles of the 
 Natives, there could be no hesitation as to the necessity of abandoning it: but that 
 this, from the evidence taken in the late trials, appeared not to be the case. With 
 a view, at the same time, of pacifying unreasonable apprehensions, he proposed the
 
 publication, under the authority of Government, of a General Order to the Native 
 Troops, containing the most positive assurances that no intention existed of " intro- 
 " ducing any change incompatible with the laws or usages of their Religion." This 
 step, it was conceived, might reconcile the soldiery to that plan of perseverance in 
 the use of the Turban, which a regard to military discipline seemed to require. 
 
 Previously to the circulation of the proposed Order, a copy (e) of it was trans- 
 mitted to the Commander in Chief for his approval. 
 
 The Commander in Chief, in reply (/'), expressed his warmest approbation of 
 " the spirit and terms of the Order, as every way calculated to preserve just authoritv, 
 " and still to allay any prejudices that might exist upon the imputed disregard to the 
 " right attached to Cast or antient custom." He gave it as his opinion, however,, 
 that the publication of the Order was no longer called for, and, from having heard 
 nothing more since his last communication, was led to hope that " the disinclination 
 " to the Turban was become more feeble, or perhaps that tlie reports had been ex- 
 " aggerated." Under this view he thought that " it might be judicious to postpone 
 " the publication of the Order, as the interposition of Government was no longer 
 " required." 
 
 The Order accordingly was never published. 
 
 It should be noticed, that at this crisis the Government of Fort St. George was 
 unapprised of tlie existence of any of the recent Regulations relating to Dress, ex- 
 cepting the Order for the new Turban. 
 
 On the 10th July, while Sir J. Cradock's last letter was on the road, the Mutiny 
 at Vellore took place. 
 
 A few days after that event, the President stated (g) to the Board, that he had 
 been very lately informed of some recent changes in the Dress of the Sepoys, distinct 
 from the new Turban ; and that the knowledge of this fact, united with the advices 
 from Vellore, induced him to propose a resolution directing the immediate susj^en- 
 sion of the late orders respecting the Turban, the marks of Cast, and ornaments of 
 Dress. The resolution was passed, and transmitted to the Commander in Chief at 
 Vellore : and a circular letter to the same tenor was in consequence addressed by him 
 to the Conjmanding Officers of Divisions and the Commanders of the subsidiary Forces 
 at Hydrabad and IVavancore. In this circular letter, however, the Commander in 
 Chief ordered the i-estoration of the old Turban only conditionally ; leaving the Na- 
 tive Officers and Men the option of wearing the new one. To this clause the PresiT 
 dent objected (h), on many grounds ; and it was unanimously agreed in Council, that 
 the order for the restoration of the former Turban should be unqualified. The Com- 
 mander in Chief acquiesced in this determination. 
 
 On the first intelligence of the Mutiny at Vellore, Government appointed a 
 Commission for the purpose of investigating the causes of that event (/). The
 
 6 
 
 members of the Commission were selected with pecuHar care from the civil and military 
 departments, and were directed to proceed inmiediately to Vellore. On the gth of 
 August they presented their Report (j) : the result of their investigation was, that the 
 Orders respecting the Turban and the distinguishing marks of Cast had excited much 
 alarm and dissatisfaction ; and that the emissaries of the Princes at Vellore had taken 
 advantage of the temporary ferment to practise on the minds of the soldiery, and to se- 
 duce them from their allegiance. "The dissatisfaction," it is observed by the Com- 
 mission (h), " arose out of a religious prejudice, and was therefore the readier con- 
 " verted into a common cause." 
 
 I am aware that this opinion materially differs from the sentiments expressed by a 
 Military Committee of Inquiry, which had been appointed at Vellore by the Com- 
 mander in Chief, on occasion of the Mutiny, and with a view of ascertaining its causes. 
 Tlie difference, however, as it does not relate to the hnmediute causes of the Mutiny, 
 is not of sucli a kind as at all to affect that branch of the inquiry which is under present 
 consideration. The existence of general apprehension in the Native Army on account 
 of the late military arrangements, and the intrigues, more or less systematic, of the 
 Moorish emissaries, are recognized in both the Reports ; but which of these was the 
 primary, and w hich the second cause, is the point at issue between the two Com- 
 mittees. 
 
 Leavingundisturbedforthepresent the question relating to thecomparativeinfluence 
 of the two circumstances just stated, it may be enough to repeat, that the late altera- 
 tions in the uniform of the Army are universally acknowledged to have been at least the 
 immediate occasion of the affair at Vellore. 
 
 II. Having now given a rapid view of the effects produced by those alterations, it 
 remains to be inquired, in the second place, how far I am personally responsible for 
 
 them. 
 
 In a slight degree, this question has been unavoidably anticipated in the foregoing 
 paces ; but it requires to be fully and expressly considered. The plainest mode of pro- 
 ceedin"- will be, to examine separately each of the alterations that have been specified, 
 and to give its history. 
 
 The Regulation relating to the marks of Cast, and the ear-rings and whiskers of the 
 soldiers, perhaps claims the precedence. It is at least the only one that was regularly 
 enacted by a military code. 
 
 Sir J. Cradock, on his arrival at Madras, found that there was no general code of 
 nsilitarv regulations for the army of that Presidency. In March 1S05, he submitted 
 a proposal to the Governor in Council, for the purpose of supplying this defect ; and the 
 Deputy-Adjutant-General, Major Pierce, was, in consequence, appointed to reduce 
 into a system the detached and floating orders by which the various regiments had, till
 
 hat time, been governed. The Code, thus prepared, was, after receiving the appro- 
 bation of the Commander in Chief, presented to the Board in January l8o6", and 
 finally published on the 13th of March of the same year. 
 
 It was the tenth paragraph of the 1 1th section of this Code, that ordained the im- 
 portant innovation now under review. It ran thus : 
 
 " It is ordered by the Regidations, that a Native soldier shall not mark his face 
 " to denote his Cast, or wear ear-rings when dressed in uniform ; and it is further di- 
 " rected, that at all parades, and upon all duties, every soldier of the battalion shall 
 " be clean shaved on the chin. It is directed also, that uniformity shall, as far as it is 
 " practicable, be preserved in regard to the quantity and shape of the hair upon the 
 " upper lip." 
 
 At first sight, it may seem that Government, in permitting such a paragraph as 
 the preceding to appear in a Code published under its eye, was culpable : but the fact 
 is, that, though it be true (as stated by the Commander in Chief) that the Code of 
 Military Regulations was published under the sanction of Government, it is equally true, 
 that, till the explosion at ^"ellore, neither the Governor, nor any one of the Civil Mem- 
 bers of Council, was aware (I) of the existence of that paragraph. The plain tale is 
 this. — 
 
 Sir J. Cradock, in his proposal (in) for the formation of the Code, used these 
 words : 
 
 " The Commander in Chief has it only in contemplation to reduce into one view 
 " the several Orders in force, and which are already sanctioned by Government ; 
 " but should any slight alteration appear obviously necessary, or it be found requisite 
 " to introduce a few circumstances of discipline or interior ceconomy of the later prac- 
 " tice in England, such new matter ivill he distinguished in the nuinuscript that will 
 " be submitted for the final approbation of Government." 
 
 In the minute which accompanied the Code when presented to Government, Sir 
 J. Cradock says, " The whole is comprised in twenty-seven sections alphabetically 
 " arranged ; and the additional Orders, to which /request the attention oj' the Board, 
 " as requiring the sanction of Government, are as follow." 
 
 An enumeration of the additional Orders then succeeded. 
 
 The Orders comprised in this enumeration obviously formed the only part of the 
 new Code to which it was the duty of Government to attend ; and this duty I con- 
 scientiously discharged. For it will not be contended, that we lay under an}' obligation 
 to wade through the details of nearly one hundred and fifty folio sheets, consisting of 
 Regimental Orders respecting Drill, Discipline, and Dress ; Orders too, already in 
 force, already sanctioned by Government ; recently revised by professional judges ; and 
 corrected, as far as they might need correction, bythose very supplementary Regulations, 
 \o which my exclusive attention had been required and given.
 
 8 
 
 The tenth paragraph, however, though in reahty appearing now for the first time in 
 any mihtarv Code, was inserted among the old Orders, which were represented in the 
 gross as having ah-eady received every necessary ratification ; and, of course, it had no 
 place in the list of those additional Orders, to wliich, as requiring the sanction of Go' 
 vernment, the attention of the Board was requested by the Commander in Chief. 
 
 This omission was not perceived till the effects of the paragraph in question were 
 felt ; and Government was then accused of having sanctioned an Order, of the veiy 
 existence of wliich it was iijnorant. 
 
 The CoRunander in Chief, when apprized of the omission of the tenth paragraph in 
 the list of New Orders, referred (n) for an explanation of the circumstances to Major 
 Pierce, to whom the task of arranging the New Orders in a separate class had been 
 officially assigned. That oflicer's justification of himself may be found in the Ap- 
 pendix (n) ; but the fact is clear. The bare statement of it is, I presume to think, a 
 complete exculpation of myself and my colleagues. 
 
 Let us now proceed to the other alterations which Sir J. Cradock thought it neces- 
 sary to introduce into the Army. 
 
 As the Turban in common use among the Native Troops was, in a military point 
 of view, liable to many solid objections, it was determined by the Commander in Chief, 
 in November 1805, to adopt one of a new and improved pattern. The necessary orders 
 were issued; and in the month of April or May lSo6", the new Turban arrived at 
 Vellore. 
 
 Towards the close of the year 1805 also, it was ordered by the Commander in 
 Chief, that the Sepoys should wear black stocks and white undress jackets. 
 
 It is almost superfluous to say, that in the introduction of these alterations I was 
 in no degree implicated, (iovernment was not in the slightest degree concerned in the 
 Orders by which they were introduced ; nor consulted on the subject ; nor even aware 
 of their being in contemplation. In truth, it was not the duty of the Commander in 
 Chief to consult Government upon the petty details of his own department. 
 
 So fiir all is clear ; but, with respect to the Turban in particular, there is some- 
 thing further. 
 
 1 am aware of a chai'ge which may be brought against me, namely, that on occa- 
 sion of the Commander in Chiefs secret reference, on the subject of the new Turban, 
 I did not advise the revocation of the Order enforcing its use. 
 
 The fact, which is the ground-work of this charge, is admitted. To set it, how- 
 ever, in its true light, a few words of comment will be necessary; nor am I aware, 
 that, in offering them, I shall be guilty of any digression from that particular path of 
 inquiry which 1 have, in this place, proposed to myself. In estimating the weight of 
 the remarks which I am about to submit to you, I have to demand of you one piece of 
 justice : it is, that you will exclude from consideration any circumstances which, though
 
 they may have since come to light, could not possibly have entered into human con- 
 templation at the period to which the charge refers ; and that my conduct may be 
 tried only on tho^e principles by which alone it could be regulated. 
 
 Let it be recollected, that at that time Government was ignorant of the existence 
 of any new Regulations on Dress, excepting the Order respecting the Turban ; and to 
 this alone did the reference of the Commander in Chief allude. Now, with respect to 
 this Order, both Government and the Commander in Chief were in fact committed, by 
 the severe measures adopted towards the Mutineers of the 7th of May, and by the high 
 tone publicly assumed on that occasion by the Commander in Chief, as set forth in the 
 extracts from his Letters and Orders which I have before noticed. To recede from a 
 lofty position, is at all times a dangerous compromise of authority ; and no principle can 
 be clearer than this, that a concession extorted by the mutinous efforts of an armed 
 soldiery is generally fatal to military discipline. The Commander in Chief too, from 
 the tenor of his letter, unequivocally leaned to the plan of persevering in the ( )rder, and 
 felt that his authority over the army might be impaired by a contrary resolution. 
 
 Whatever, therefore, might have been the opinion of Government on the simple 
 question of the revocation, there was something beyond that question involved in the 
 discussion of it at the moment. They were to decide, with a reference both to the 
 troops to whom the Order had been issued, and w ho were at that time in a disposition 
 to insubordination ; and also to their Commander, who had issued the Order, and 
 whose military authority was represented by himself as essentially implicated in its fate. 
 These considerations, it must be allowed, militated against the idea of a revocation; 
 nor could they be overlooked, unless a case were made out ou the opposite side strong 
 enouEfh to overbalance their weight. 
 
 In order to make out such a case, it was necessary to prove, either that, on the 
 principles of the native Religions, the Turban was in itself calculated to excite dissatis- 
 faction, or that the dissatisfaction stated to exist was general. Neither of these propo- 
 sitions, however, was proved ; or, to speak more correctly, both of them were dis- 
 proved. 
 
 As to the Turban, four Natives of the highest casts had solemnly deposed, that, in 
 a religious view, it was completely unobjectionable. The opinion of the Native (leneral 
 Court Martial strongly corroborated that deposition. 
 
 As to the existence of general dissatisfaction, the authorities referred to by the 
 Commander in Chief in his letter, were those of Lieutenant-Colonel Brunton, and 
 another officer at Seringapatam. The name of the latter was not given. It was com- 
 petent to Government to consider the weight to be attached to these authorities ; and 
 •there was sufficient ground for regarding them both with distrust. 
 
 On the Report of Colonel Brunton we could lay no stress. We knew, that, till 
 the 17th of the month in which he wrote, he had spent his life in a civil department at 
 
 r:
 
 10 
 
 the Presidency, and could therefore have no direct knowledge of the feelings of the 
 Sepoys. We knew, also, that he had been for a long time in a deplorable state of 
 health ; and that when he left the Presidency, his life was despaired of, and his mind 
 and nerves were suffering under the greatest despondency. Sir J. Cradock, from being 
 at that time in Mysore, could not have been aware of this material circumstance. 
 
 The intelligence from the officer at Seringapatam, whatever confidence the Com- 
 mander in Chief might place in it, did not seem to us conclusive enough to decide an 
 important point of conduct. In the first place, it was anonymous ; in the next, it 
 stood almost alone ; and in the third, it was opposed by strong presumptive evidence. 
 It was reasonable to conclude, that this intelligence could not have come from General 
 Macdowell, the commanding officer in Mysore, because he would have communicated 
 it, as it was his duty to do, officially, both to the Commander in Chief and to the Go- 
 vernor in Council. His silence therefore, which, under the circumstances supposed, 
 would have been evidently culpable, threw a doubt over the whole representation. To 
 this was added, the silence of the Resident at Mysore ; and Mysore, it should be re- 
 membered, was the very province in which the discontents were stated to exist to so 
 alarming a degree. These presumptions were much strengthened by the general tran- 
 quillity which prevailed in the army. The Adjutant-General, who was left at the Pre- 
 sidency (luring the Commander in Chief's absence, for the express purpose of more im- 
 mediately communicating with Government in all matters of importance, had received 
 no intimation of dissatisfaction from any quarter, excepting that which has been men- 
 tioned. It was an important fact too, that the Turban was peaceably worn by one of the 
 corps in Fort St. George, as well as by troops in other places. 
 
 The authorities, let it be observed, relied upon by the Commander in Chief, stated 
 the existence of a general dissatisfaction, both in Mysore and in the country at large. 
 I am now contending, not that there might not have been such dissatisfaction, but that 
 there was no proof of it, nor even such an approach to proof as could have justified 
 Government in acting upon the idea. I contend further, that the reasons against that 
 idea were so strong, as to justify Government in refusing to act upon it ; and it is re- 
 markable, that the impressions of Government on this subject afterwards received con- 
 firmation from the Commander in Chief himself, and from Lieutenant-(ieneral Mac- 
 dowell, commanding in Mysore. 
 
 Lieutenant-General Macdowell, in a letter which was laid before Council by Sir J. 
 Cradock, on the 20th of July, ten days after the mutiny at Vellore, reports the perfect 
 tranquillity of the troops at Seringapatam, and expresses his belief that the dissaffection 
 at Vellore was merely partial and local. It should be remarked, that the troops at Se- 
 ringapatam were, at the date of that letter, still ignorant of the final abolition by Go- 
 Ternment of the Orders respecting the Turban and marks of Cast.
 
 11 
 
 The Commander inChiePs opinion to the same point is tiear iVoni one simple fact, 
 which has been ah-eadj' recited ; a fact which sliows how comjjletely he liad changed his 
 ideas, both as to the cause and extent of the supposed dissatisfaction, and how little 
 reliance he subsequently placed on the authorities by which those ideas had been sug- 
 gested. 
 
 This fact is, his declining to publish the conciliatory Order proposed by Government 
 in reply to his secret reference ; and declining it on the express ground, that the state 
 of the pubhc mind was such as no longer to require any such interposition on the part of 
 Government. 
 
 The result of these observations is, that there was no clear ground made out for 
 the propriety of the revocation, especially in the face of those considerations which have 
 been described as oj)posing that measure. The two positions, relating to the Turban 
 and the general dissatisfaction, which could alone have warranted the revocation, were 
 not established. The Turban was proved to be unobjectionable. The hesitation of 
 Government to rely implicitly on the statements of general dissatisfaction, was justified 
 at the time by strong reasons and the current of opposite testimony ; and completely 
 justified afterwards by the recorded declarations and the conduct of the Commander in 
 Chief and Lieutenant-General Macdowell. 
 
 In addition to this, let it be kept in mind, that Government did not think proper 
 to continue the Order respecting the Turban, without guarding it by a specific explana- 
 tion to the Natives, that " no intention existed of introducing any change incompatible 
 " with the laws or usages of their Religion." 
 
 It may be added further, that when these discussions took place, there was very 
 little suspicion of the contingencies involved in their issue. The wildest dreamer in po- 
 litics could hardly have imagined that the question lay between the revocation and the 
 mutiny. Experience has now unfortunately familiarized us with the notion of this al- 
 ternative ; but to have acted at that time on the possibility of its occurrence, would, to 
 say the least, have been thought unreasonable and preposterous. 
 
 The defence of Government indeed might have been safely rested on the single 
 circumstance that the Commander in Chief desired their advice on this subject. Had 
 the case been as clear then as events have since rendered it, he would most assuredly 
 have made no such reference. Had the dissatisfiiction, and its cause, been so proved 
 as to leave no doubt on his mind, it may be presumed that he would not have scrupled 
 to exercise what was strictly his right, and to revoke by his own authority what by his 
 x)wn authority he had established.
 
 12 
 
 THE second of the questions into which the subject divided itself now 
 claims your attention : — 
 
 How far may any pohtical measures, adopted by the Madras Government, be 
 supposed to have been instrumental in preparing the way for the insurrection at 
 Vellore ? 
 
 The insinuations under this head, whether public or private, which have been 
 made against my character, turn, as far as I am able to collect, on the following 
 points : 
 
 1. On some local arrangements at Vellore. 
 
 2. On some general regulations referring to the provinces of the Presidency 
 at large. 
 
 With relation to each of these points, I shall beg leave, Gentlemen, to submit a 
 few remarks ; and I indulge the hope, that it may be in my power (without immo- 
 derately trespassing on your time and attention) to offer somewhat more than a justi- 
 fication of my conduct. 
 
 I. With the selection of Vellore, as a place of residence for the family of Tippoo 
 Sultaun, I had no concern : it was the act of the preceding Government, and imme- 
 diately followed the capture of Seringapatam. It was an act, however, in which I 
 acquiesced, because I considered it as perfectly unobjectionable. As long as the 
 Princes remained on the Peninsula, it was of little consequence in what precise part 
 of that territory they might be placed. The power, whatever it may have been, 
 which they possessed to injure the British authority, depended on other circumstances 
 than that of local situation, and might have been exercised with nearly the same ease 
 and success at Fort St. (ieorge, or on the Nerbudda, as at Vellore. They must, in 
 every case, have formed the rallying point for the followers of their Religion. If we 
 may suppose their designs to have been originally and systematically mischievous, any 
 situation within certain limits would have afforded the same materials and capabilities 
 for carrying them into execution. If, on the other hand, as I must believe, they 
 remained in passive submission, till roused by extraordinary and unexpected occur- 
 rences, it is equally obvious that the vicinity of jMysore was in no degree connected 
 with the cause or the effect of the Mutiny.
 
 13 
 
 As for the other points of censure, — for the improper indulgence with which t!ie 
 Princes are said to have been treated, for the splendour of tlieir ostabhshment, the 
 number of their retainers, the confluence of Mahomedans to Vellore, and the rapid 
 increase of population in that town; — here also I hold myself to be responsible, 
 because, although these arrangements were made previously to my arrival in Madras, 
 I certainl}' approved of the principles upon which they were estabhshed, and gave a 
 proof of mv a})proval by persisting in the same system. 
 
 This question, however, is mere matter of opinion, or, rather, it is a question of 
 degrees. With regard to the Princes, the British Government had other objects to 
 pursue^ than that of simply crippling their power — an object which would best have 
 been attained by at once taking their lives. It was further necessary to sustain that 
 high character for lenity and forbearance which the Conq^any has gained, and in 
 w^hich, indeed, no less than its reputation for vigour and military prowess, its ultimate 
 safety is essentially involved. An offence against humanity would have been an offence 
 both against our fame and our interests. 
 
 If the Government of Fort St. George failed of attaining that happy medium, 
 that conduct at once vigilant and humane, which the circumstances of the case 
 enjoined, its proceedings were then as much ojien to observation as they are at the 
 present hour ; and the objection made to them, I need hardly say, would have been 
 better timed had it preceded instead of awaiting the event. In this, indeed, as in 
 every other particular, I should be justified in deprecating all ex post facto criticisms 
 on my measures. But, waving the exercise of this right, I am even now by no 
 means aware that the public arrangements relating to the Princes, gave to them, in 
 any essential respect, more than was strictly due both to their birth and misfortunes, 
 and to the spirit of the agreement under which they originally surrendered them- 
 selves : nor, to say the truth, can I divine on what principles any arrangements ma- 
 terially different could have been vindicated. That a more rigorous treatment of 
 them, irritating as it must have been both to themselves and to their well-wishers, 
 would in any degree have diminished the chances of a Moorish conspiracy, appears to 
 me matter of serious doubt. 
 
 In whatever joart of the Peninsula the Princes might have been placed, they 
 would, as I have observed, have naturally attracted around them a considerable num- 
 ber of their former subjects and adherents. If the size of the common household 
 establishment of an Eastern Nobleman be considered, it will not appear extraordinary 
 that the establishments of so many Princes, including their respective zenanas and 
 attendants, together with the zenanas of Hyder and Tippoo, should very sensibly atiect 
 the population of Vellore. 
 
 This consequence was foreseen, and precautions were carefully taken to guard 
 against its possible dangers ; but it could not have been ])revented without recourse to 
 violence and cruelty. To have thinned, in any great degree, the personil retinue of
 
 14 
 
 tlie Princes, would have been, according to the scale of Eastern manners, to punish 
 them with solitary confinement. 
 
 It should not be overlooked, that, at the time of the Mutiny, the family of 
 Tippoo had resided in Vellore for more than six years ; and, during that period, not 
 even an attempt had been made to debauch the minds of the soldiery. The fidelity of 
 the Sepoys has been too well proved to be lightly shaken or impeached ; and the same 
 causes, totally independent of the dethroned family, would in any quarter of the 
 world have produced the same efliects as at Vellore. 
 
 After all that has been attributed to the influence of the Princes in that unfortu- 
 nate transaction, it is curious to remark the little connection which it really had with 
 any of the Sultaun's family. Of twelve sons, of many sons-in-law, uncles, and old 
 ministers, and servants of the family, together with many hundred women, it has 
 been ascertained that two alone of the Princes were in any degree concerned with the 
 Mutiny. Of these two, it is ascertained that only one, with his dependents, was 
 active in fomenting the discontents previously to the 9th of July: the other was cer- 
 tainly privy to the plot ; but it does not appear that he actively interfered till it broke 
 out. The rest had no knowledge of the designs of Rebellion, nor any participation in 
 their progress. Their interest, indeed, would have sufficiently warned them to oppose 
 any such project ; for, in case of its success, they would unquestionably have fallen the 
 first victims to the ambition of the victorious Prince. Of the certainty of this fate 
 they must have been fully aware. 
 
 It must also be observed of the ringleader, that his general character was that of 
 a weak, foolish young man, destitute of talents and respectability : he possessed, con- 
 sequently, no influence over the rest of his family. That the plan of a Revolution 
 should be committed to such hands, sufliciently proves its hopelessness and ab- 
 surdity. 
 
 INIuch influence has been ascribed to the division of command at Vellore. The 
 Command of the Fort was entrusted to one Officer, the Police of the Pettah to 
 another, and the Paymastership of Stipends, or the immediate care of the families, to a 
 third. The responsibility, it has been supposed, by being thus distributed, was weak- 
 ened ; and the task of sounding the alarm being affixed to no definite quarter, was left 
 to chance. 
 
 The arrangement in question I always thought, in some respects, objectionable, 
 because it seemed to me that the personal charge of the Princes, and the controul over 
 their servants who lived in the Pettah, ought natm-ally to be vested in the same Officer. 
 In order, however, to attain this object, it would have been necessary to make Vellore 
 an exception to the general rule ; and to commit the charge of the Police, not, as was 
 the usual system, to the Civil Magistrate, but to the Paymaster of Stipends. An 
 alteration of this nature could be effected only by a judicial Regulation ; such a Regu-
 
 15 
 
 lation had, in fact, been framed and enacted by the Madras Government before the 
 Mutiny, and was, at the very period of the occurrence of that event, actually under 
 reference to Bengal for the sanction of the Supreme Authority. So far, then, I may 
 admit the system not to have been unexceptionable ; but whether, in the particular 
 instance before us, it was productive of any practical inconvenience, is a distinct con- 
 sideration. I can honestly say, that I believe it was not. There were three distinct 
 departments : the functions of the Officers respectively at the head of each, were defi- 
 nite, and clearly ascertained. A division of commands, let it be recollected, does 
 not necessarily imply a confusion of commands ; and yet, without such an implica- 
 tion, how does an animadversion on that circumstance bear upon the present subject ? 
 If, indeed, the several Commanding Officers were so foolishly and criminally delicate 
 as to neglect their respective provinces, from the dread of trespassing on those of their 
 neighbours, the responsibility rests with them personally, and not with the system 
 which they perverted. But it is satisfactory to find, that from every such charge they 
 liave been acquitted by the Court of Inquiry held at Vellore. Insisting strongly on 
 these considerations, I must also assert, that I adopted the arrangement in question, 
 not because it was abstractedly the best, but because it was the best of which cir- 
 cumstances would admit. My reasons were simply these : 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Marriott had, from the Hrst formation of the establishment, 
 been Deputy-Paymaster of Stipends. In that situation he had given great satisfaction 
 both to my predecessor and to myself. For this delicate charge he was peculiarly 
 qualified by his skill in the Native languages, by his popularity with the Natives in 
 general, and especially by the regard which all the members of the Sultaun's family, 
 with an unanimity the more remarkable because observed on no other occasion, felt 
 and testified towards his person. He had now succeeded to the rank of Lieutenant- 
 Colonel, which was considered as incompatible to be held with the inferior appoint- 
 ment. I therefore determined, upon occasion of a vacancy in the command, to sepa- 
 rate the diflferent duties, which had been for some time jiast in fact, though not in 
 theory, distinctly executed. In consequence, I recommended that the military duties 
 of the Fort should be entrusted to the Commanding Officer, and the civil and poli- 
 tical duties to the Paymaster of Stipends. 
 
 It is also essentia! to remark, that the Bengal Government, informing the arrange- 
 ments respecting the confinement of the Princes at Calcutta, separated the Command 
 of the Fort from the Paymastership of Stipends. Thus did that (iovernment volun- 
 tarily adopt the very principle of a division of commands, which is now discovered 
 to have been so f\\tal at Vellore ; and adopt it, too, even after the evils which were 
 attributed to its influence had occurred. It is enough to mention this fact. 
 
 I cannot quit this part of the subject, without adverting to another topic — 
 namely, tlie want of vigilance which the ignorance of the conspiracy is supposed to
 
 16 
 
 argue on tlie part of Government. Nothing is so easy as to bring forward charges of 
 this kind after the occurrence of the event gives them some colour ; and nothing, 
 at the same time, is more unjust. I must here, therefore, once more insist on 
 the right of being judged on those grounds only on which alone I could pos-, 
 sibly act. 
 
 The whole charge amounts to this, that Government was not suspicious, where 
 they had no reason to suspect. The nature of the discontents which issued in the 
 conspiracy was such, as to close all the oi'dinary channels of communication ; for, on 
 a question of Religion, secrecy is a matter of conscience with every Native. Govern- 
 ment also, as it has been shewn, knew nothing of the publication of the most objec- 
 tionable among the Military Orders, and therefore could not possibly apprehend any 
 consequent dissatisfaction in the public mind. The Order respecting the Turban, in- 
 deed, was the only one of whose existence it was apprised ; and, on the tendency of 
 that Order, every inquiry had been made which could satisfy the most rigid and 
 timorous prudence. No evidence could be more decisive on this subject than that 
 which was given before the Military Commission assembled at Vellore in May 180&, 
 by two Native Officers of high Rank and Cast. The opinion of Kurrupah, Havildar 
 Major, and a Malabar, is couched in these words : " There is no objection at all to 
 " the Turban ; nor will the wearing of it, to the best of my opinion, degrade a man 
 " of the highest Cast, nor will it affect the prejudices of Cast." JMeer Cxholaum Ally, 
 Jemadar and Native Adjutant, is no less decided : " I think that any Cast man might 
 " wear it without degradation, and that there is nothing about it to prejudice the Cast 
 " of any one." A Native General Court Martial also examined two Native Officers : 
 Subadar Sheik Emaum declared there was nothing in the Turban to affect the most 
 strict prejudices of Religion. The Jemadar Chaing Sing, who was a Brahmin, in 
 reply to the question, " Whether, in his opinion, there was any thing about the new 
 " Turban, either in shape or materials, that could affect the prejudices of the highest 
 " and most tenacious Cast ?" answered, " No ; any Cast might wear it." 
 
 I here quote this evidence, to which I have referred on a former occasion, 
 merely to shew how completely it was calculated to satisfy all alarms respecting 
 popular discontent on the only point on which Government could possibly suspect 
 such discontent might exist : for, in all other respects, the circumstances and 
 disposition of the people under the Madras Government had recently experienced a 
 sensible and most gratifying change ; and the advancement of order, loyalty, and 
 happiness, throughout those territories, had been emphatically remarked in a late 
 dispatch from the Supreme Government. It is difficult for those who have not resided 
 in India, to conceive the unbounded confidence which Europeans of all descriptions 
 are accustomed to repose in their native dependants. This is, indeed, no reason for 
 carelessness; but it certainly is a reason against lightly admitting suspicions^ being
 
 17 
 
 always on the watch to discover alarming symptoms before they exist, and thus pro- 
 ducing the very dangers which it was intended to avert. 
 
 I have never heard that the ignorance of the Administration of this Coinitry 
 respecting the Mutiny of the Fleet in 1797, was charged upon them as a crime, 
 though party dissentions were at that period at the greatest height. 
 
 The conspiracy at Vellore bore some analogy to that which has been just men- 
 tioned in several particulars, but in none more strikingly than the impenetrable 
 secrecy in which it was muffled up till the moment of explosion. None of the Offi- 
 cers of the Sepoy Battalions, on the spot, were aware of its existence ; it could 
 scarcely then be exjjected to have reached the knowledge of Government, at the dis- 
 tance of eighty miles. The acquisition of such intelligence may indeed be pronounced 
 to have been morally impossible; because it is evident, that, from the peculiar cir- 
 cumstances of the case, every channel of information, whether European or Native, 
 was entirely closed. 
 
 II. From these inferior arrangements it is now time to turn to others of a more 
 public and important nature. Some Regulations, passed by the Madras (Government 
 during the time of my Administration, have been charged with the effect of exciting 
 discontent among the people at large. The principal document in which these accu- 
 sations are recorded, is a Minute of the Commander in Chief, dated the 2^1 st of Sep- 
 tember, 1806 (0). To that Minute, therefore, and particularly to the remarks on 
 the state of the country with which it concludes, I must request your attention. 
 
 You will observe. Gentlemen, that, in the very commencement of these remarks, 
 the Commander in Chief declares, that " as a stranger, he cannot feel himself com- 
 " petent to deliver opinions from himself;" and professes only to state the prevailing 
 sentiments of others, " the most moderate and most experienced in the society of the 
 " Presidency." 
 
 It hence appears, that the remarks, on which I am about to comment, cannot 
 be considered as bearing the full authority of that respectable name, under the sanc- 
 tion of which they are thus circulated. The censures which they insinuate, and the 
 political views which they suggest on Indian affairs, are avowedly derived from persons 
 that remain anonymous. Of this circumstance, however, I do not purpose to avail 
 myself in the reflections which I shall offer. 
 
 But I must be allowed to regret, that the Commander in Chief was not more 
 fortunate in the choice of his authorities, or more attentive to correct the palpable 
 misrepresentations with which, I am compelled to observe, they abused his confidence. 
 This is strong language ; but to prove that it is strictly warranted, it is only neces- 
 sary to ask, what would be the impression of statements like the following on the 
 mind of an uninformed reader? — 
 
 D
 
 18 
 
 He is tokl, that " the condition of the people is not so happy as it was ;" that 
 " their own arrangements, and their own institutions, pleased them better than our 
 " Reo^ulations ;" that " the introduction of all our systems alarms and annoys them, 
 " and they view them only as preparatory to greater innovation, which may extend to 
 " every circumstance that surrounds them ;" that " the treasures of the State are ex- 
 " pended on judicial establishments throughout countries, without distinction, where 
 " even military force at times is unable to preserve subjection." It is added, that " the 
 " inhabitants of this country do not comprehend the convulsion at present before their 
 "eyes/' that, "within their shortest remembrance, military establishment and con- 
 " troul attracted all their attention ;" that " at present, in the place of the old expe- 
 « rienced Officer, to whom they have long looked up with respect, they see his 
 " power and ascendancy passed away, and the youthful inexperienced Judge, or boyish 
 " Collector, occupy all and more than his former place." It is further observed, that, 
 though such institutions are suited to England, in India " it is visionary to order all 
 " things to be the same ;" and lastly, that " the people of India must be left to find 
 " happiness in their own way, and our attention directed to the security of our own 
 " singular situation, and the general advantage of the State." 
 
 These representations might almost seem to warrant the notion, that we had stu- 
 diously violated all the prejudices and customs of the Natives ; that we had forced upon 
 them the whole of our municipal code ; that they were at this moment borne down by 
 the weight of past and the dread of future innovations ; that, till a late period, the 
 Peninsula was almost wholly governed by martial law; and, finally, that the secret of 
 a people finding happiness in their own way, consisted in having the laws administered 
 at the point of the bayonet. 
 
 So far as I have been able to learn, both from the hints in the Minute alluded to, 
 and also from the conversation of military men, it seems clear that the passages in 
 question chiefly bear upon the introduction of the Judicial system into the Peninsula. 
 The fate of any invectives on this subject I might safely leave to the judgment and in- 
 formation of those whom I have the honour to address ; but such an accusation is too 
 flattering to be lightly dismissed. Allow me, therefore, to retrace, in your jjresence, 
 some (p) of the measures which have been thus severely censured ; and to indulge my- 
 self with a recollection of the part, however humble, which I acted towards the ex- 
 tension of that system of justice which seciures the rights and happiness of your Eastern 
 subjects. 
 
 It should be remembered, that, with regard to the fundamental laws of our Indian 
 territories, no alteration has at any time been even attempted. In all essential particu- 
 lars, they remain precisely as we found them. At the j)eriod of our arrival in India, 
 the Hindoos, in Civil matters, were judged by the Shaster, and the Mahomedans by 
 the Koran ; and in criminal cases, the Mahomedan Code formed the sole standard of
 
 19 
 
 judgment both for Hindoos and Mussulnicn. In tins arrangement we liave more than 
 acquiesced ; we have ensured its continuance by specific Regulations. In the Criminal 
 department, indeed, some inferior alterations have been found necessary, particularly 
 with respect to the palliations and punishment of murder ; but these were absolutely 
 indispensable, and are so few as not at all to affect the general correctness of this state- 
 njent. 
 
 But these alterations, and the arrangements with which they are connected, are 
 perfectly independent of what is called the Judicial system. I'hat system neither ap- 
 plies, nor was meant to apply, to tlie laws themselves, but respects exclusively their 
 administration and efficacy. 
 
 It is well known that the year IJ93 forms a memorable a?ra in the annals of 
 Bengal. It matured and carried into effect the Regulations which have rendered the 
 name of Lord Cornwallis no less dear to the Natives, than his victories and virtues have 
 made it sacred and formidable. Those Regulations affected chiefly the collection of 
 the revenues, and the administration of justice ; two branches of public service, which, 
 though separated by clear and radical distinctions, have, under despotic governments, 
 been invariably united, not to say identified. On our arrival in India, we found them 
 thus identified, and thus we long allowed them to remain, because it was not our object 
 to interfere with the internal ceconomy of the country. In process of time, however, 
 the course of events carried us almost insensibly to assume a more active cognizance 
 over the domestic polity of our oppressed and wretched subjects ; but, as the gradations 
 by which we arrived at that point were, to ourselves at least, imperceptible, the idea of 
 a radical change, the only possible corrective for the existing evils, was at no one 
 period fairly suggested to our consideration. The principle, therefore, of combining 
 the financial and judicial functions, was passively admitted into all our plans, and com- 
 pletely succeeded in thwarting their efficacy. In vain did the Company, through a 
 series of years, exhaust its invention in attempts to niodif}' the system, and to alleviate 
 the miseries of the people : the original error was still retained ; the peoj^le were still 
 miserable, and new methods were yet to be tried. 
 
 Of these,the system wliich was adopted in 1772 subsisted, with some improvements, 
 till the period of Lord Cornwallis's administration. This system, however, though in 
 many respects superior to those that preceded it, was yet liable to the same incurable 
 objection. The Company assumed the dcwanny functions ; tiiat is, took upon itself, 
 by the immediate agency of its servants, the care and collection of the revenues. The 
 Governor in Council was at once invested with legislative, judicial, and executive 
 powers ; and the same trij)le character seems to have flowed down through all the in- 
 ferior agents. Th.e Collector of the Revenues of a province was also the .Magistrate of 
 that province, and the Superintendant of the provincial Criminal Court, and Judge of 
 tlie Civil Court for the trial of Revenue causes. The amount of the taxes was not fixed.
 
 20 
 
 An animal assessment was formed, founded on actual investigations into the extent of 
 cultivation, and the value of the crops ; investigations very imjjerfectly made, and 
 therefore generally leading to results extremely unequal and unjust. The oppressions, 
 vexations, and cruelties, which must have attended this inquisitorial process, may be 
 conceived. Nor were the Revenues more easily realized than justly assessed : there 
 was always a large balance, and the actual collections were not made without violence, 
 and in frequent instances not without torture. 
 
 Under these horrors, the landholder or inferior tenant had no resource ; and even 
 the attempt to obtain redress was harassing in the extreme. The proper Revenue Court 
 always accompanying the person of the Collector, not only could not be stationary, 
 but had not even any fixed law of movement. Supposing, however, the plaintiff so 
 fortunate as to reach it, he found that his oppressor, or the patron of his oppressor, was 
 his judge. If, in spite of the delay and distance and expence, he chose to appeal from 
 this to a higher jurisdiction, he then encountered the superintendance of the Board of 
 Revenue, who might well be supposed not completely disinterested. If, after all his 
 perils, he retained sufficient perseverance and hardihood to address the Supreme Tri- 
 bunal, there his final sentence was to be pronounced by the ultimate defendant in all 
 this process, the Governor in Council. Such were the great and complicated impedi- 
 ments that attended the administration of Civil justice. 
 
 It is not necessary to follow the various shiftings and changes of the Criminal courts 
 during this period ; suffice it to say, that they were in general in the hands of Natives, 
 subject to English controul ; and that the Presidency of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
 was vested in the Nabob, who delegated the exercise of his functions to a Mussulman 
 representative. This officer, who was in fact Supreme Judge, filled the inferior courts 
 with his creatures ; and thus was this most important of all public departments made an 
 engine of mischief, and rendered infamous, in every stage, for the grossest corruption, 
 tyranny, and injustice. 
 
 At length Lord Cornwallis arrived, and another order of things began. The ce- 
 lebrated Regulations appeared in I793, and by their influence the administration of jus- 
 tice, through all its channels, was purified. They severed the judicial from the finan- 
 cial department. The Collector was no longer a Judge, and his Court was abolished. 
 The Nabob resigned to the British the long-abused prerogative of presiding in the Su- 
 preme Court of Criminal Judicature. A new series of Courts was established ; Courts 
 legitimately organized, judiciously distributed through the country, with a view to 
 promptitude either of redress or punishment, and leading, by simple degrees, to the 
 tribunals of ultimate appeal. Civil causes were referred in the first instance to the 
 Courts respectively stationed in the several districts ; in the second, to the provincial 
 Courts of Appeal ; and lastly, to the Supreme Court established in Calcutta. In Cri- 
 minal affairs, an appeal was open from the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in each dis-
 
 21 
 
 trict to the Courts of Circuit, and thence to the Supreme Criminal Court, also estab- 
 lished in Calcutta. The two Siijjreme Courts were composed of covenanted Civil ser- 
 vants of tlie Company, of lonp^ standing and experience *. The Judges in the inferior 
 Courts also were covenanted Civil servants, exclusively devoted to this duty, and iilaced 
 above the reach of temptation to abuse their trust. The amount of the revenues was 
 at the same time ascertained according to an irrevocable assessment, and the inhuman 
 practices before resorted to for their collection were banished for ever. In order to 
 secure these great objects of humanity and wisdom, the cognizance of the C'ourts of 
 Justice was extended to the conduct of the Revenue OtHcers, even in their official ca- 
 pacity, and Government was no longer allowed to arrogate a vigour beyond the law. 
 
 This system has realized the warmest hopes of its authors. Its blessings have been* 
 successively diffused over a larger sphere of action by Lord Teignmouth and Lord Wel- 
 lesley ; and the latter of these distinguished personages has recorded his opinion of its 
 nature and efi'ects in the following eulogy : 
 
 " Subject to the common imperfection of every human institution, this system of 
 " laws is approved by practical experience (the surest test of human legislation), and 
 " contains an active principle of continual revision, which affords the best security for 
 " progressive amendment. It is not the eflusion of vain theory, issuing from specu- 
 " lative principles, and directed to visionary objects of impracticable perfection ; but 
 " the solid work of plain, deliberate, practical benevolence, the legitimate offspring of 
 " genuine wisdom and pure virtue. The excellence of the general spirit of these laws 
 " is attested by the noblest proof of just, wise, and honest government ; by the restora- 
 " tion of happiness, tranquillity, and security, to an oppressed and suffering people ; 
 " and by the revival of agriculture, commerce, manufacture, and general opulence, in 
 " a declining and impoverished country." 
 
 The advantages of this system were, however, previously to the year lS02, con- 
 fined to one Presidency ; and the exposition which has been given of the former state 
 of Bengal was still applicable to the territories immediately subject to the Presidency of 
 Fort St. George. Here, the same causes produced the same evils ; 1"he same confusion, 
 of functions — the same o])pression — the same uncertainty — the same wretchedness. 
 A sufficient judi^ment of tb.t general condition of the country may be formed from the 
 instance of Tanjore, which in the year lS04 offered a striking picture of the universal 
 peculations and oppressions carried on by the servants of the Collectors. The Court 
 of Directors were so impressed with the enormity of these evils, that they instantly 
 ordered the establishment of the Courts of Justice in that province. 
 
 Under the government of my immediate predecessor, the Courts had, in the Pe- 
 ninsula, been introduced into a few provinces which had been permanently settled ; 
 that is, in which the revenues were fixed by an unchangeable assessment. Into the 
 
 * According to the original plan, the two Supreme Courts were composed of the Governcr and Council 
 The pi-esent arrangement was introduced by Lord VVellesley. 
 
 D3
 
 22 
 
 rest of the country, which v'vas not yet settled, it \\as not intended to introduce the 
 Judicial system, till the permanent settlement should have taken place. This delay 
 appeared to me unnecessary, and I had the merit (if it be any merit to folloiv a good 
 example) of obtaining the consent of the Supreme Government to the immediate and 
 general introduction of the system in question. It fell to my lot, accordingly, to be 
 the instrument of extending the influence of those Regulations, the principal features 
 of which 1 have already traced ; and their effects in the Madras territories, as far as 
 they have been tried, might be described exactly in the language which Lord Wellesley 
 has applied to their operation in Bengal. 
 
 But the people, it is said, are better pleased with their own arrangements and insti- 
 tutions, than with our Regulations. 
 
 To what arrangements and institutions of that people this assertion alludes, it 
 may be curious to inquire. Is it to the arrangements established by the Mahomedan 
 Government prior to our conquests, or to those established by our Government prior 
 to 1802 ? It is scarcely possible to conceive that the former can be intended ; for no 
 man ever dreamed for a moment of instituting a comparison between the most de- 
 jjraved exertions of our authority, and the proverbial rapacity and corruption of 
 Mahomedan administration. If, on the other hand, the successive institutions of the 
 English be alluded to; in the first place, it is not easy to guess by what figure of 
 speech the people of India can be complimented with any more property in them than 
 in the late Regulations; and in the next, it will not be denied ihat the late Regula- 
 tions are better calculated than any of their predecessors of British introduction, to 
 attain all the legitimate ends of Government. How, under these circumstances, the 
 Indians can feel the preference which is attributed to them, I am at a loss to divine. 
 
 The most plausible objection, however, which has been brought forward against 
 these Regulations, is, that " in India, where nothing is alike, it seems visionary to 
 " order every thing to be the same." 
 
 These words must of course refer to the Native population of India ; and if the 
 Regulations had in the slightest degree touched the Manners, the Habits, Casts, Re- 
 ligious Prejudices, or even the Dress and Ornaments of the Natives, if they had at- 
 tempted to establish uniformity of any kind among our various subjects, the objection 
 would have been just; but if any thing be incontrovertible, it is, that they have left 
 these points totally unmolested. With the domestic or internal relations of the ])eoi)le, 
 they have no direct connection. 
 
 They affect chiefly what may be termed the international policies of Britain and 
 India. They are calculated to controul rather the governors than the subjects, and 
 strike upon the latter })rincipally through the improved conduct and corrected prin- 
 ciples ot the former. They create neither new rights nor new duties, but enforce the' 
 practice of acknowledged duties, and provide against the abuse of existing rights. 
 Ihey inculcate on the superiors the uniform practice of justice; and from the inferiors'
 
 they require, what it seems no tyranny to require, allegiance, and a fixed and rea- 
 sonable contribution to the public expenditure. Tliese surely are rights and duties 
 applicable to all places, all times, all customs, and all degrees of civilization. 
 
 If, by certain hints that have been thrown out, it be meant to imply that this 
 pacific process is insufficient for the purpose of realizing the public revenue, let it be 
 proved that a defalcation of the Revenue has, in point of fact, been the consequence 
 of its adoption. But, even if this were the case, and if it were found impossible to 
 collect the taxes without an armed force, that resource, let it be remembered, is not 
 finally cut off by a previous resort to the unarmed authority of the law ; and I am 
 not aware that any advantage is lost by making the appeal to the bayonet in the last 
 instance rather than in the first. 
 
 Whatever, therefore, may be thought of " ordering all tilings to be the same" 
 among the Natives, it may be hoped that the project of enforcing on the Company's 
 servants an uniformity of just, mild, and conciliatory conduct, will not appear alto- 
 gether " visionary." We acquire no right to rule oppressively, by ruling those whom 
 we choose to style uncivilized ; nor does it follow, that because the subjects are Bar- 
 barians, the Government should be barbarous. There is, indeed, no engine of civili- 
 zation more powerful than the equitable administration of wise laws. To defer the 
 employment of it, then, till the people are happy and civilized enough for its recep- 
 tion, is something like adjourning the application of a remedy till the disease shall 
 have cured itself. 
 
 The subject of ]Military interference recals to my attention a particular passage in 
 the Commander in Chief's Minute : 
 
 " The nihabitants of this Country understood and felt its origin (the origin of 
 " Military establishment and controul) as congenial to their own notion of authority. 
 " At present, they view a difl^erent order of things ; and, in the place of the old ex- 
 " perienced Otficer, to whom they have long looked up with respect, they see his 
 " power and ascendancy passed away, and the youthful and inexperienced Judge, or 
 " boyish Collector, occupy all and more than his former place." 
 
 It is probable that the Commander in Chief alludes, in this place, to the eftect 
 of the Judicial system, in making the Sepoys amenable for crimes and misdemeanours 
 committed as subjects, to the regularly constituted Civil and Criminal Courts. Before 
 this change, they were amenable to no tribunal but that of their Officers. The bare 
 mention of such an arrangement is surely suflicient to expose its radical evils, and at 
 the same time perhaps to account for the outcry which has been raised against its 
 supercession. Precisely the same outcry was excited in Bengal, when Lord Cornwallis 
 put an end, in the army of that Presidenc^^ to the same pernicious system. 
 
 From the tenor of the passage, however, which has been quoted, it could not fail 
 to be imagined, that by the former system the old and experienced Officer was, iri
 
 24 
 
 some manner, concerned in the Civil or Judicial department in general ; find, that, 
 according to the present, he has been supplanted by the Judge and the Collector. 
 But the direct reverse of this representation was notoriously the case. With the ex- 
 ception of that jurisdiction already mentioned, which they were allowed over the 
 Sepoys, Officers holding Military Commands were, as a general rule, excluded from 
 all jjolitical authority. The Civil power was exclusively lodged in tlie Collector. In 
 what sense, then, was the situation of Military men affected by the change of system? 
 This question can admit only of one solution. 
 
 Though the Officers were not invested with the Civil or Judicial functions, they 
 frequently assumed to themselves the privilege of exercising an illegal, and therefore 
 often oppressive, authority over the Natives. The Records of (iovernment abundantly 
 prove this fact. In the midst of a people inured to slavery, habitually conscious of 
 British superiority, and constitutionally timid, it was not difficult to convert the 
 natural ascendancy of Military power into something like an organized despotism. 
 Tliere can, I believe, be no doubt, that in some cases the Military Commanders levied 
 taxes, interfered with private property, and ordered summary trials and punishments 
 upon persons unconnected with the camp or cantonment. It is justly observed, that 
 this conduct was well understood. Nothing, in truth, could be more intelhgible : 
 nothing better calculated to excite that species of respect which we vulgarly call by 
 the name of Fear. It was owing partly to the effect of this feeling, partly to the 
 distance of the seat of Government, and partly to the habits of the Natives, that few 
 complaints reached the Presidency. The Collectors connived at these proceedings, 
 because they also, in their turn, stood in need of connivance. A sympathy of in- 
 terests taught the Civil and Military authorities the necessity of mutual indulgence ; 
 and, under shelter of this confederacy, the most questionable transactions escaped 
 detection. 
 
 To such practices the new Regulations gave a fatal blow ; but to complain of this 
 circumstance as a hardship upon the Army, conveys a sort of compliment which I 
 should certainly never have thought of paying to that distinguished class of my coun- 
 trymen. I am convinced, that as to legitimate influence, as to honest ascendancy of 
 profession or conduct, the Officers of the Army have lost nothing. In these particu- 
 lars, on the contrary, they are gainers, both by being led individually to look for re- 
 spect where alone it ought to be found, and by being elevated with the general eleva- 
 tion of the British character. 
 
 Independently, however, of the merits of the system, another charge has been 
 brought forward, respecting the youth and inexperience of those who were entrusted 
 with the management of it. I have no hesitation to acknowledge, that many who 
 were selected fur that purpose were not so mature as I could have wished ; and I 
 always regretted this defect, not from any personal objections on the ground of
 
 25 
 
 inexperienre to those who were chosen, but merely upon {>eneral principles. But It 
 was a matter of necessity. In consequence of particular circumstances, wliicli are 
 detailed in the Appendix, the field of choice was extremely limited. It was no les.s 
 my interest than my <luty to ensure, by the appointment of proper agents, the success 
 of a plan, fm' the intro<1uction of which I was responsible ; and I can truly affirn), 
 that on no one occasion in my life have I acted with greater deliberation or a more reso- 
 lute impartiality. I patiently collected the opinions of the best judges ; I cbtuincd 
 five or six lists of the most eligible members of the establishment; and upon these 
 data I formed my final judgment. It is no more than justice to the Gentlemen who 
 were appointed to add, that, as fiir as they have been tried, their conduct has in ge- 
 neral given satisfaction to the Supreme Court. 
 
 In short, in order to substantiate this charge, one of the two following positions 
 must be proved; and I pledge myself that they are both incajjable of proof : — it must 
 be proved, either that I did not nrake the best choice, which, under existing cir- 
 cumstances, I might have made ; or that the new system, under whatever disadvan- 
 tages, has not j)ractically been more beneficial than that which it succeeded. 
 
 I cannot conclude this branch of the subject without observing, that the objec- 
 tions which have been made against the introduction of the Judicial system into the 
 Peninsula, might, with equal justice, have o])posed its original establishment and 
 subsequent extension in Bengal. It might, with as much plausibility, have been 
 urged, that this was a frightful convulsion ; that the Natives preferred their own Insti- 
 tutions to our Regulations ; that the civilization and felicity of India were not ade- 
 quate to the reception of such blessings ; that in such an immense territory of unequal 
 civilization, it was visionary to order all things to be the same ; that the old resjiect- 
 able Military Officer was superseded by striplings; and, in a word, that we should 
 let our subjects take care of themselves, and look only at our own singular situation. 
 
 If such suggestions had been made, or eftectually made, at that period, what 
 would have been the present state of India ? 
 
 But if, after all, this were a matter of doubtful issue, and a question not of rea- 
 son and experiment, but of mere authority, it might, I think, be settled for ever, by 
 an aj)peal to the great names with which it is associated, to many eminent private oj)i- 
 nions, to the recorded approbation of successive Councils in Madras and Bengal, and 
 to the public sanction of the Court of Directors. 
 
 Having thus, as I trust, proved that the Judicial Regulations were not calculateil 
 to excite any apprehension or discontent, I am yet bound to admit the statement of 
 a general disadection, not only among the soldiery, but also among the people at 
 large. 
 
 That this disaffection was occasioned by the Regulations which I have just de- 
 tailed, I take upon myself to deny ; because there is no reason whatever for such an 
 
 E
 
 26 
 
 opinion, and there are many reasons for the contrary supposition, I rather attribute 
 its origin to alarms of a rehgious nature. However absurd it might be in the Natives 
 of India, I will not say to achnit the idea that their Religion was in danger (for the 
 Military Orders certainly afforded but too just a foundation for many serious fears), 
 but to indulge it for anv length of time, there can be no doubt that such an idea had 
 obtained possession of the public mind. This fact being ascertained, the whole mys- 
 tery is unravelled, and all research into the cause of the late commotions at an end. 
 Those whom a residence in India has qualified to judge of the subject, will perceive 
 in this circumstance more than an adequate explanation of all that has happened. To 
 those who have not had that advantage, it would scarcely be possible for any language 
 to convey a sufficient conception of the sensibilities of the Natives on the subject of 
 Religion.
 
 27 
 
 THE third branch of our inquiry relates to the policy of the measures 
 which were adopted by (loverntnent in consequence of the Mutiny at \^ellore. The 
 effect of those measures, it is asserted, was to keep up the spirit of discontent and re- 
 belHon, which it required only a strict execution of justice completely to suppress. 
 
 In order to facilitate the examination of this question, it will be necessary to lay 
 before you a brief detail of some transactions which followed the Mutiny. Such a 
 detail will afford a full illustration of the conduct of Government. 
 
 It will be proper to begin with observing, that although, from the time of the 
 Mutiny, the causes of that event were universally admitted to have been the recent 
 Military Regulations, and the intrigues of the Moorish emissaries ; yet, with respect 
 to the order and degree in which those causes opei-ated, there always prevailed both in 
 Council and among the jniblic two opposite opinions. 
 
 It was maintained, on the one side, that the military innovations, as they certainly 
 formed the immediate, formed also the primary and essential cause of the Insurrection. 
 The Mussulmen at ^'^elIore could not, it is true, be supposed to regard with indiffer- 
 ence the reverse of fortune which they had experienced. Their wishes and regrets, no 
 doubt, constantly recurred to their former greatness, among the ruins of which they 
 were now leading a humbled and irksome life. A feeling, therefore, existed among 
 them, which might indeed be ready to come into action when incited by a favourable 
 crisis, but which, if prudently managed, and allowed no opportunity to break out, 
 might also in process of time he worn away, or even extinguished. To that feeling 
 the discontents of the army unfortunately supplied at the same time the oj)portunity 
 and the incentive of exertion. Then, and not till then, did the emissaries of the 
 Moorish interest at Vellore enter into intrigues with the soldiery, and thus foment the 
 Mutiny. The issue of that attempt rather served to revive than extinguish hope ; be- 
 cause, as is usual in such cases, the malcontents were more encouraged by its having 
 so nearly succeeded, than depressed by its having ultimately failed. It might perhaps 
 be allowed, that, from this period, the Mussulmen in different divisions of the army 
 were led, in a greater or less degree, by the same events, to indulge in the same 
 criminal practices. But these, it was asserted, were occurrences of a partial and local 
 nature, the result, not of a regular and preconcerted system, but solely of a fortuitous 
 concurrence of circumstances.
 
 28 
 
 Such were the sentiments of the majority both of the Members of Council and of 
 the inhabitants of India ; and in these sentiments I was led by the fullest conviction 
 of their justice to coincide. 
 
 On the odier hand, however, it was maintained, that the Mussulmen had 
 formed, previously to any suspicions on our part, a deep and widely extended Con- 
 spiracy, with the express object of re-establishing the dominion of the Moors on the 
 ruins of the British power; that this Conspiracy was rapidly maturing, when the 
 temporary irritation in the Army offered to the Conspirators an occasion of hastening 
 tiie explosion, which must at any rate have soon taken place ; that, after the massacre, 
 the same projects were pursued with increased ardour and assiduity ; and that plots 
 the most dangerous and desperate extended, by a regular chain of communication, 
 from one end of the Peninsula to the other. 
 
 Tliis opinion was strenuously supported by the Commander in Chief, and by a 
 considerable part of the Army. 
 
 It is obvious, that a difterence so complete as that which has been just stated, on 
 a point of so fundamental a nature, could not fail to produce important practical effects. 
 There could hardly be any compromise, either between the two opposite opinions, or 
 between the measures to which they respectively led. 
 
 If tlie Mutiny originated in the honest, though misguided, workings of religious 
 zeal, alarmed into action by some particular and detached measure on the part of the 
 ruling power, that measure might be immediately abandoned, and the alarm might 
 be expected to subside of course. The exercise of clemency would then become safe 
 for us ; and it would be our wisest policy, as well as our bounden duty, to soothe and 
 to forgive. 
 
 If, on the other hand, the impatience of the Moors under the revolutions which 
 had humbled their Native Princes, formed the ground-work of the Rebellion, measures 
 of indulgence were probably ill calculated to meet the crisis. A feeling, rooted so 
 deep in human nature, not excited by causes occasional and instantly removable, but 
 resulting from a deliberate view of a fixed situation of things, would hardly yield to 
 any influence but those of time and long habit, and certainly could not be expected 
 to die away so long as the British interest in India was <laily gaining fresh advantages 
 over the Mussulman. Immediate conciliation was out of the question : the only con- 
 cession that would prove satisfactory could not be made, and every indulgence short 
 of it woukl serve but to embolden hostility. Although, therefore, all indiscriminate 
 or passionate severity was, on every account, to be shunned, still such an emergence 
 demanded the display rather of rigour than of lenitj'^, of justice than of mercy. No- 
 thing but a decisive present triumph would enable us to be generous in future ; no- 
 thing but force would lay open the ground for the gradual establishment of a dominion 
 founded on benevolence. These considerations, which the strongest reason in its
 
 29 
 
 calmest state must have deemed applicable to the supposed case, were not likely to 
 strike less forcibly iniads that had realized the case to themselves, that felt all the 
 anxieties of an intimate concern in the scene, and were impressed with a strong con- 
 viction of imminent danger. 
 
 The dispute, therefore, ultimately turned on the adojjtion of a system of concilia- 
 tion or a system of coercion . 
 
 This remark naturally connects itself with the great question, so much canvassed 
 in Council, relating to the fate of the Mutineers at ^^ellore. — What was the state of 
 that question at tlie period of which we are speaking, shall be now described. 
 
 Many of the insurgents were, of course, destroyed during the contest at \^ellore. 
 Many, as it might have been expected, fell victims to the impetuosity of the soldiers, 
 even when they had abandoned their arms, and were endeavouring to make their 
 escape. A considerable number too were taken prisoners ; and these, innnediatelv on 
 the recapture of the Fortress, were executed in a body. In the course of a few days, 
 many stragglers, who had escaped from Vellore, were discovered lurking in various 
 parts of the country, and put under confinement. 
 
 The Commander in Chief appointed, without delay, a Native General Court Mar- 
 tial, for the purjiose of trying those among the prisoners thus collected, whom there 
 was manifestly sufficient evidence to prove deserving of death. The remainder, 
 amounting nearly to six hundred men, though unquestionably implicated in a greater 
 or less degree in the late transactions, no evidence had yet been discovered to convict 
 before a Court Martial ; they were accordingly imjirisoned at the posts in the neigh- 
 bourhood of which they had been seized ; and in what manner they were to be dis- 
 posed of, it was referred to the discretion of Government to consider. 
 
 On the 17th of July, the President recommended in Council (q) the suspension 
 of all judicial proceedings on these delinquents, till the Court of Inquiry, then sitting 
 at Vellore, should have presented its Report. The example of severity (as he observed 
 in his Minute) had been complete. The retribution, indeed, was not more prompt 
 and severe than just. The object of intimidation being thus attained, he thought it due 
 to the dignity of our own character, and to the feelings of our Native subjects, that in 
 so delicate a process we should guard against all appearance of precipitancy. Nothing 
 was more to be dreaded than the imputation of having acted from motives of revenge 
 and jiassion. 
 
 A Resolution corresponding with this recommendation was passed in Council. 
 
 Such was, at this time, the situation of affairs. The Court of Inquiry appointed 
 by Government was still pursuing its investigations ; the trials before the Native (jene- 
 ral Court Martial still continued ; and the fate of the six hundred prisoners still hung 
 in suspense.
 
 so 
 
 Shortly after the transactions at "Vellore, a very serious agitation took place in the 
 subsidiary force at Hydrabad. The Turban, and the Orders respecting the marks of 
 Cast, ear-rings, and whiskers, threw the whole of that force, amounting to ten thou- 
 sand men, into the utmost disorder. 
 
 They resolved not to submit to tlie new Regulation ; and so general was this reso- 
 lution, that Colonel Montresor, the Commanding Officer, stated to the Resident, that 
 there was not a single Native corps on which he could, in case of emergency, place any 
 contidence. Every thing was ripening for an open revolt, when the Commanding 
 Officer, with the concurrence of Captain Sydenham, the Resident, took upon himself 
 the responsibility of revoking the Orders in question. 
 
 By this judicious and spirited conduct, the tumult was instantly allayed, and the 
 troops resumed their obedience. The revocation of the Orders by Colonel Monti^esor is 
 dated the 2 1st of July. 
 
 On the 2.9th of the same month, a similar alarm, though upon less solid grounds, 
 prevailed at Wallo-jahbad. Colonel Lang, who was in the command of that cantonment, 
 conceiving that the troops under his orders had formed the intention of massacring 
 their European Officers, took nnmediate measures of defence. He detached the most 
 suspected Battalion (the First of the 23d), and callevi upon Colonel Gillespie, com- 
 manding the Cavalry at Arcot, for assistance, which was afforded with the promptitude 
 characteristic of that Officer. On this occasion, Sir J. Cradock proceeded in person to 
 Wallajahbad ; and the result of his investigation, as stated in his Letter to the Governor 
 in Council, proved that the idea of any thing like " a concerted plan of disaffection 
 " and evil design," was totally unsupported by evidence. He remarked, as a striking 
 fact that " the suspected Battalion marched out of camp and returned with the most 
 " exact obedience and alacrity, though in possession of their ball cartridges." " No- 
 " thino-," he added, " has appeared against them beyond the irregular tumults at the 
 «' Barracks, and the loose expressions of individuals, and something of a general mys- 
 *' terious conduct.'' 
 
 These commotions, however, though local, and soon appeased, attracted the se- 
 rious attention of Government. It was now thouglit expedient to depart from the 
 resolution which h^d been taken respecting the prisoners, and to bring them to imme- 
 diate trial. At the same time, a communi<!ation was made to the Supreme Govern- 
 ment, proposing the detention of the 19th and 94th Regiments, then on the Coast, 
 and under orders of embarkation for Europe. The crisis seemed to require measures 
 of precaution. 
 
 The conviction of the necessity of such measures was strengthened by the purport 
 «f a Minute (rj presented on the 3d of August to Council by the Commander in Chief. 
 The intelligence which it conveyed was obtained from the confession of a principal 
 ^conspirator, and the voluntary communication of a Subidar of distinguished character
 
 31 
 
 and services in the Native cavalry ; and no intelligence could have been more unex- 
 pected or more alarming. It appeared that the Native cavalry, of whom as yet no sus- 
 picion had been entertained, were no less infected with a spirit of disloyalty than tlie 
 infantry ; that the most vigorous exertions were at that moment in operation for the 
 purpose of corrupting the faith of the troops; and that the object of the conspirators 
 was the establishment of a Mussulman Government. On the receipt of these deposi- 
 tions, which opened a new scene of distrust, in a quarter where we had imagined our- 
 selves least vulnerable, it was determined to send the sons of Tippoo Sultaun instantly 
 to Bengal, and to submit to the Supreme Government a proposal for the augmentation 
 of the European force on the Coast by a supply from that Presidency. 
 
 The Supreme Government (s) sanctioned the intention of removing the Princes ;. 
 but disapproved (t) both of the addition of an English Regiment from Bengal to the 
 Madras Army, and of the plan of detaining the Troops under orders of embarkation. 
 The two latter proposals were rejected, because it was conceived that the adoption of 
 them might betray a want of confidence, and thus lead to fatal consequences. But it 
 would not have been difficult, witii proper management, to obviate any such danger. 
 At any rate, there might be greater dangers on the other side ; and to maintain an 
 appearance of confidence was our duty only so far as it might contribute to our sai'ety. 
 To push the principle beyond that limit, was to sacrifice the end ta the means. An 
 explanation of these sentiments, extracted from a dispatch to the Court of Directors, 
 was sent {ti) to the Bengal Government ; and drew from them, in return, a satisfac- 
 tory' tribute (v) of justice to the principles which had invariably guided the conduct of 
 the Government at Madras. 
 
 On the 2d of September, the Commander iu Chief submitted to the Governor in 
 Council two propositions. 
 
 The first, which was strongly supported by the Commanding Officers of the 
 Southern and Mysore districts, recommended, that the Mutineers condemned to death 
 by the Native General Court Martial should be executed by detachments at the different 
 divisions of the army. To this measure, as unnecessarily indicating a suspicion of 
 every part of the Native force, all the Members of Council refused their assent. 
 
 The second proposition advised the erasure of the guilty regiments (the 1st and 
 23d) from the Army List ; and received the approbation of the majority of Council. 
 The President alone objected to it; and so deeply was he convinced of its inexpedienc)-, 
 that he negatived it upon his own authority. 
 
 He believed («•) that such a step would only serve to refresh for ever recollections 
 which it was our wisdom to extinguish as soon as possible. As many of the Natives re- 
 o-arded the • Mutineers, not as traitors, but as mart3Ts to their faith, he apprehended 
 that this public mark of reproach might excite among their countrymen other feelings 
 than those of terror. The Supreme (iovernment, however, was of a different opi- 
 nion (x), and the erasure took place.
 
 82 
 
 Dui'ing- the course of these discussions, the Princes were removed, under a strong 
 escort, from Vellore to Madras ; where Sir E. Pellew, with his accustomed zeal for the 
 service, had offered his own ship for the conveyance of those personages to Bengal. 
 A proposal was, at this time, made by a Member of Council, that they should be em- 
 barked at Sadras, about thirty miles from Fort St. George. This proposal was over- 
 ruled at the suggestion (?/) of the President, oii the ground that it would betray a dis- 
 trust of the Natives of the ca]iital. The escort of the Princes was, as usual, composed of 
 a mixed force of European and Native troops. The march and embarkation took place 
 without any unpleasant occurrence. 
 
 In the mean time, the disposal of the prisoners continued to be tlie subject of 
 considerable discussion. 
 
 The President had at first proj^osed, that they should be tried by a Special Com- 
 mission of English Gentlemen. This method was certainly the most expeditious ; and 
 he thought it also not likely to give any umbrage among the Natives, because he was 
 then under the belief that most of the prisoners had been taken with arms iu their 
 hands : it seemed, therefore, that little remained except to pronounce sentence on cri- 
 minals whose guilt was proved by the very circumstance of their seizure. It was, how- 
 ever, afterwards ascertained, that the greater part were apprehended unarmed by the 
 villagers and police officers. In tliese more difficult and delicate circumstances, he 
 thought it advisable to sacrifice the obvious advantages of the Special Commission to 
 another mode of trial, which, though less expeditious, was }'et more likely to consult 
 the feelings of the Natives, and ihe reputation of Government. This was a trial by a 
 Native General Court Martial. 
 
 It was clearly eligible, with a view to the effect either of punishment, or of the 
 interposition of Government for the mitigation or remission of punishment, that the 
 trial should be conducted before a regularly constituted Tribunal ; still more, that the 
 Tribunal should be composed of Natives. The difficulties which subsequently prevented 
 the adoption of this arrangement, arising partly from the number of prisoners, and partly 
 from a deficiency of evidence as to their guilt, were then unknown. 
 
 As a preliminary to the trials, the Commander in Chief had early directed Lieu- 
 tinant-Colonel Forbes and Lieutenant Coombes to investigate the comparative delin- 
 <pjency of the j)risoners confined at Vellore, and to classify them under the following 
 heads; — 1st, innocent; 2d, most guilty ; 3d, less guilty; 4th, inarms on tlie 10th 
 of July, but under no specific charges of guilt. 
 
 The Report draw n up by those Ofiicers, in conformity to this direction, was j)re- 
 sented to Council on the jjtli of November, and entirely destroyed all hopes of discri- 
 mination in the treatment of the prisoners. It pronounced them all equally and most 
 deeply implicated in the massacre, but stated it to be highly improbable that they could 
 be convicted before a Court-Martial. The number thus condemned in the gross
 
 33 
 
 amounted to four hundred. At the same time, a Report of exactly the same com- 
 plexion was received from Colonel Campbell. This Officer was in charoe of one hun- 
 dred and fifty of the Mutineers, who had been taken in the Southern Provinces ; and 
 he had been directed to bring the principal ofTenders amongst them to trial at Trit- 
 chinopoly. But he now distinctly stated, that the proposed trial would be far from 
 issuing in the conviction of the prisoners under his charge, because, though the con- 
 duct of all of them, without exception, had been atrocious in the extreme, there was 
 not sufficient evidence to convict any one of them before a Court Martial. 
 
 The question, therefore, was now fairly before Government. Some of the six 
 hundred might possibly be legallj' convicted, but of the mass it seemed equally noto- 
 rious that they were guilty, and that they could not be proved so. What was to be 
 their sentence ? The Commander in Chief pressed the measure of a general banish- 
 ment ; the Bengal Government, that of a general amnesty. The President, objecting 
 to both these plans, to the one as too mild, and to the other as too severe, ventured 
 (s) to recommend the temporary continuance of the imprisonment as an expedient, 
 which, without trespassing on either extreme, left scope for the operation of circum- 
 stances, and did not preclude an ultimate recurrence to either of the other proposals. 
 The idea of an immediate amnesty met with the unanimous opposition of Council. 
 The other two plans divided the members, but that of the President finally prevailed. 
 
 But, besides the delinquents whose fate was thus decided, another class of a more 
 dubious character also claimed the attention of the Board. Among the fugitives who 
 escaped from Vellore after the action, were more than five hundred officers and men 
 belonging to the battalions engaged in the Mutiny, who afterwards voluntarily returned 
 to their regiments, and were allowed to proceed in the usual course of duty. Like 
 the prisoners already described, they were not innocent, and could not be proved 
 guilty. The President therefore thought, that, with the exception of a few ofhcers, 
 whose crimes were notorious, they should be retained in the service. They would 
 probably soon regain their habits of allegiance, and would, at least, be less dangerous 
 in this situation than in any other: for the impossibility of legally establishing their 
 (lelinquency precluded any punishment severer than a dismission from the service ; and 
 it was not easy to calculate the possible consequences of letting loose at such a mo- 
 ment, in a country proverbial for the facilities which it affords to the designs of un- 
 ]3rincipled individuals, so niaiiy hundred men bred to arms, rendered desperate by 
 disgrace, and unprovided with any honest means of subsistence. The Council, the 
 Commander in Chief alone excepted, acknowledged the force of these apprehensions, 
 and acceded to the opinion of the President. 
 
 It may be -proper to remark in this stage of the narrative, that the Officers of the 
 Armv in general agreed with the Conmiander in Chief, both as to the real origin and 
 the proper jjunishment of the Mutinj*. This coincidence might have been expected. 
 Of the greater part of tlif T'luropfau Officers, it was not to be supposed that tliey 
 
 r
 
 sliould be able accurately to appreciate an injury oflered to the religious feelings of the 
 Natives. To estimate the strengtli of those feelings is in all cases difficult; and in the 
 case of Military men, peculiarly so, because it will appear, from an examination of 
 the Regulations of the Indian Army, that in many instances the Customs of the Natives 
 had been changed with impunity. The substitution, for example, of the Military 
 habit of the Sepoy in place of the common Hindoo or Mussulman dress, could not, it 
 may be imagined, have been attempted without implying at least as much contempt 
 for existing usages as that which was charged upon the late Regulations. The policy 
 of that change may, indeed, be doubted ; though it was probably, at the period of 
 its adoption, recommended by strong reasons, and principally perhaps by the ex- 
 pediency, in our Carnatic wars against the French, of making it difficult to distinguish 
 at a distance our Sepoys from our European force ; but, from whatever cause origi- 
 nating, it has been effected. The address and caution which may have been requisite 
 to procure its introduction, are forgotten. All that now appears is, that such an inno- 
 vation was once successfully attempted ; and why a similar attempt should not meet 
 with equal success, is a question rarely asked by a superficial observer. 
 
 A great proportion too of the Military men did not regard the late Regulations re- 
 specting Dress as novelties, and could not therefore ascribe to them the perilous cha- 
 racter of an ex])eriment. They had, it is certain, though never inserted in General 
 Orders, been silently acted upon in several corps ; nor was it apprehended that the 
 mere formal recognition of a practice in actual existence could convert it into a fatal 
 innovation. So little do men advert to the distinction between the supersession and 
 the overthrow of established customs, or reflect that national prejudices are to be car- 
 ried rather by sap than by storm. 
 
 This was, in truth, the error that originally misled the Adjutant and Deputy 
 Adjutant General, who intended nothing less than either to introduce innovations, or 
 to affront the religious sentiments of the Natives. 
 
 The Commander in Chief too, before he acquiesced in the adoption of the Order 
 alluded to, ascertained by every precaution in his power that he was not incurring the 
 responsibility of enacting a new Regulation. I "confess, that the first intelligence on 
 this subject filled me with as much astonishment and regret as it excited in England; 
 but, haying obtained a more accurate knowledge of circumstances, I must be allowed 
 to say, that none of the parties concerned in the formation of the Code deserved the 
 cbloquy to which they have been exposed. In many Corps, the practice in question 
 was undoubtedly established ; and, had it been essential to ensure its universal recep- 
 tion, that point also might have been attained. By judicious management, by con- 
 fidential communications with the Native Officers, which might have satisfied their 
 apprehensions on the score of Religion, and thus secured their co-operation, the 
 change v/ould have been insensibly but permanently effected. The neglect of these
 
 35 
 
 obvious precautions decidedly proves (iffurtlier proof were necessary) in what lio-ht 
 these Orders were regarded by their immediate authors. 
 
 This digression, into which I have been led particularly by anxiety to do justice 
 to the character of a very meritorious Officer, Colonel Agnew, may serve to shew how 
 natural it was for military men to underrate the most prominent cause of the Mutiny. 
 It was also natural for them to follow the opinion of the Commander in Chief, and to 
 give full credit to the existence of a ^Moorish conspiracy. The consequences, however, 
 of this opinion are not easily to be estimated. Till that period, the confidence of the 
 European officers in the affection of their Sepoys had been literally unlimited, and, 
 indeed, found more than its justification in a fidelity which had stood the proof of a 
 series of years, and of a vast variety of fortune. In the midst of this security, a mine 
 was sprung. Tiie Mutiny at Vellore overthrew all reliance on received principles, 
 and produced a violent, though not unnatural, transition from the extreme of confi- 
 dence to that of distrust. The Offi.cers were tortured by the conviction of a general 
 plot; and, from the detached manner in which the Indian troops are cantoned, found 
 themselves left to the mercy of traitors. All was suspense and horror ; and in one 
 instance, the agony of these emotions actually ended in insanity *. 
 
 It must, at the same time, be acknowledged, that the events at Vellore, and the 
 consequent revolution in the feelings of the Officers, were not without effect on the minds 
 of the Soldiery. There prevailed throughout the Native Army a considerable sensation, 
 which may not improbablj^, in some individual instances, have assumed a dangerous 
 character. To some of the discontented Mussulmen, the possibility of establishing a 
 Moorish government may have suggested ideas inconsistent with their allegiance, and 
 opened hopes too flattering to be easily renounced or innocently retained. But tlie 
 tried fidelity of the Moormen in our wars, even against Mahomedan Princes, ft)rbids 
 us to assign any wide range to the operation of such motives. The principal feeling, 
 both among Hindoos and Mussulmen, was clearly solicitude in tiie cause of their re- 
 ligion, heightened perhaps by the impression produced by the existing posture of 
 afiairs. Thev had yet scarcely recovered from that state of stupefaction into which 
 the minds of all men had been thrown by the sudden explosion at Vellore; there still 
 remained the doubt and painful wonder, which attend the first struggles to escape 
 
 * The progress of the alann created by the apprehension of the Popish Plot in the reign of Charles IT. as 
 dc'scribefl by Hume (vol. VI. p. QT-J), corresponds to a dcgi-ee of curious exactness witli the public feeling 
 at Madias. Hume writes, " While in this timorous jcaloas disposition, the cry of a Plut all on a sudden 
 " struck their c.irs. They were wakened from their slumber ; and, hke men affrighted in the dark, took 
 " e\ory shadow for a sjiectie. The terror of earh man became the source of terror to ariothcr. And an 
 " universal panic being dituised, reason and argument, and conniion sense and common liumanity lost all 
 " influence oxer them. From this disposition of meui minds, we are to account fur the progre-s and 
 " credit of the Popish Plot."
 
 36 
 
 from a terrible recollection : and to these might be added, the embarrassment result- 
 ing from a consciousness of being themselves objects of jealousy. That these impres- 
 sions were betrayed by the conduct of the Sepoys in a manner more easily felt than 
 described, may be admitted ; but it must be admitted in return, that there prevailed 
 on the part of too many of the Officers a sort of feverish vigilance, better calculated 
 to create than to detect danger, and more ingenious in discovering conspiracies than 
 wise in preventing them. 
 
 This representation of the state of the Army naturally belongs to the detail in 
 which we are engaged, and its justice may be appreciated by a reference to facts. 
 
 On the l8th of October, the Officer commanding at Nundydroog (where four 
 companies of the second Battalion of the l8th Regiment were stationed) conceived ap- 
 prehensions of an immediate massacre of the Europeans. He and his Officers instantly 
 barricadoed themselves in a house, and sent to Arcot for assistance. The Sepoys, in 
 the mean time, took no steps to interrupt these defensive arrangements, nor molested 
 the retreat of their Officers ; they remained, on the contrary, calm spectators of the 
 scene ; and, after a reasonable interval, all was tranquil. The Commander in Chief 
 and General Macdowell believed that the Commanding Officer was justified in the 
 conduct which he had pursued. 
 
 The Bengal Government, from the accounts transmitted to them, inferred (aa) 
 the existence of a conspiracy at Nundydroog. It is not unimportant to mark this 
 event, and the sera of its occurrence ; because, from a comparison of dates, it is pre- 
 sumable that at this tera, and in consequence of this event, the sentiments of the Su- 
 preme Government respecting the Vellore prisoners experienced the alteration which 
 must soon be specified. The Council at Fort St. George came to no resolution on the 
 subject of this commotion ; but, though they were not authorized to reject the evi- 
 dence brought before them, supported as it was by the opinions of officers on the spot, 
 they were disposed, on subsequent intelligence, to regard the alarm as groundless, 
 and the appearances of danger as insufficient to justify the conduct of the Commanding 
 Officer. In this conclusion they were fortified by the representations of the acting Resi- 
 dent at Mysore, and by the sentiments of Purneah, the Minister of that Government. 
 That able Statesman, equally distinguished by the vigilance of his administration, and 
 the sincerity of his attachment to the British interests, was unable to discover any 
 traces of the pretended conspiracy, or any colour for the supposition that the Sepoys 
 were engaged in intrigues with the people of Mysore. 
 
 The same apprehensions v/ere excited at Bangalore, where the remainder of the 
 Battalion was quartered. An investigation took place, but no adequate proof of dis- 
 satisfaction appeared. At a subsequent period, indeed, the Commanding Officer de- 
 clared his conviction of the loyalty of his detachment. I shall be forgiven, if respect 
 for an exalted character induces me to mention, that, on occasion of these disturban-
 
 ^7 
 
 ces, the integrity and judgment of Purneah were called into exercise by a critical 
 event. Tlie brotlier of that Minister held the principal official situation under the 
 Mysore Government at Bangalore, and was one among the objects who fell under the 
 suspicion of the Euroj>ean Commanding Officer. Purneah made no attempt to screen 
 his relation, but immediately suspended him from office, and requested that his con- 
 duct might be submitted to the examination of a Court composed solely of British 
 Officers. This request was complied with, and the result proved most honourable to 
 the accused. No method was forgotten to repair the insult which had been oflered by 
 these proceedings to the feelings and fame of the Mysore Government. The British 
 Commanding Officer was removed, and a request was made by the Government of 
 Fort St. (xeorge to Purneah, that his brother might be reinstated in office. 
 
 Four months had now elapsed since the Mutiny of Vellore. During that interval, 
 every lenitive had been applied by Government to the irritated feelings of the troops, 
 and of the public in general. All these efforts seemed as yet ineffectual. The irrita- 
 tion not only continued, but gained ground. Every day made the aspect of affairs 
 more ominous. The most injurious reports received universal credit; prophecies, 
 denouncing the fall of the British power, were eagerly circulated ; and religious men- 
 dicants were represented as traversing the country, in order to sow the seeds of disaf- 
 fection. The position of the Army was critical ; a panic prevailed among the Euro- 
 pean Officers ; and the Sepoys, according to many private opinions, were ripe for a 
 revolt. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the situation of the President was peculiarly embar- 
 rassing. His favourite system of conciliation seemed to have deceived his hopes ; its 
 advocates were staggered, and its opponents triumphed. The Commander in Chief 
 ascribed solely to its operation the existing state of affairs, and pronounced that perfect 
 tranquillity would, long since, have followed the adoption of an opposite system. 
 The Supreme Government {hb) abandoned their plan of amnesty, and saw no refuge 
 but in the dreadful resource of a general banishment of the impi-isoned Mutineers. 
 The President, however, thought it his duty to adhere to his former line of conduct. 
 He believed that the existing commotions were but the natural effects of the late vio- 
 lent concussion ; and that the system which, on the maturest deliberation, he had pre- 
 ferred, would still eventually justify his choice. 
 
 At the same time, he did not think himself justified in grounding on this belief a 
 neglect of any rational precaution ; he advised, therefore, an alteration in the distri- 
 bution of the Army, for the purpose of bringing tlie Native and European troops, who 
 were broken into sejiarate and insulated detachments, more into conjunction, and con- 
 sequently more within mutual influence. This proposal, suggested by the same mo- 
 tives which had given being to similar proposals on a former occasion, was, like them, 
 rejected by Council, from a dread of betraying distrust. 
 
 357936
 
 38 
 
 On the recommendation of the President, it was resolved in Council to proclaim 
 Martial Law, the Civil Courts still continuing open. The cognizance of the Military- 
 Courts was intended to be confined to cases of Sedition and Rebellion. A few days 
 leading Government to suspect that the reports which had been made to them had 
 been greatly exaggerated, this resolution was suspended, and not afterwards carried 
 
 into effect. 
 
 The course of events now conducts us to the view of perhaps the most extraordi- 
 nary among that series of singular occurrences, to which the apprehensions of the 
 Officers so easily gave birth. 
 
 The Commanding Officer at Palamcottah took a resolution, on the igth of No- 
 vember, to disarm his whole Corps. He proceeded to separate the Mussulmen from 
 the Hindoos, put arms into the hands of the latter, expelled the former from the 
 Fort, and took possession of it v.ith a handful of Europeans and a few hundred faith- 
 ful Hindoos. From tliis devoted situation he dispatched expresses to the Commander 
 of the Subsidiary Force in Travancore, and to Major-General Maitland, the Governor 
 of Cevlon. 
 
 In his express to General Maitland, he states, that by a miraculous effort he has 
 detected a desperate conspiracy, which had struck its root deep through all the Coast ; 
 that the very existence of the Company's Empire in the East turned on the immediate 
 arrival of European assistance from Ceylon ; that all the Mussulmen were concerned 
 in the plot ; that he and his brave companions had possession of the Fort ; that they 
 relied only on their citadel, a large house; and, finally, that they were determined to 
 sell their lives most dearly. Major-General Maitland supplied, with the utmost 
 promptitude, the required assistance ; and, with no less promptitude, transmitted to 
 England, by a vessel dispatched expressly for tliat purpose, the intelligence which he 
 had received. 
 
 The letter sent to the Officer commanding in Travancore, after mentioning the 
 proceedings at Palamcottah, went on to assure him of the progress of incendiaries 
 among the Troops under his own command, and warned him against confidii^g in ap- 
 pearances. That Officer accordingly, without delay, disarms his whole force, but 
 under the express declaration, that he perceived no cause whatever to suspect their 
 fidelity. 
 
 It is impossible to regard, without surprize, the conduct of any of these Officers. 
 
 It does not appear that the Commanding Officer at Palamcottah was in possession 
 of any information which could warrant the adoption of the measures which he pur- 
 sued ; but, at all events, the invidious distinction between the Hindoos and the Mus- 
 sulmen, the tendency of which, either in a civil or military point of view, was equally 
 fatal, cannot be justified. The Council directed the immediate restoration of their 
 arms to the Mussulmen. The quiet and orderly behaviour of these Troops, under
 
 39 
 
 the most cruel of all insults, shews their fidelity in a very favourable light. They 
 resumed their arms in the same meritorious manner in which they had resigned them; 
 and it is remarkable, that during the interval of their suspension, no desertions had 
 taken place. 
 
 Major-Gen eral Maitland was certainly bound to supply the succours which were 
 demanded at Palamcottah ; but that, having afforded them, he should construe literally 
 every word of a letter (cc) evidently written in a panic*; — that he should think it his 
 duty to transmit the panic, yet warm, and with all its exaggerations, from India to 
 Euro})3; — that he should act thus, without having referred to Fort St. Georo-e for more 
 correct intelligence, which would have occasioned the dela^^ onlv of a few davs ; a delav 
 of no consequence, where the object was not to obtain succour (all hope of which 
 was precluded by the distance), but to give information ; — that, after havn'no- dis- 
 patched the vessel, he should not think it necessary to acquaint the ^Madras Govern- 
 ment vvitli the step he had taken, in a point in which they were so peculiarlv con- 
 cerned ; — but should leave them to receive the first knowledge of his proceedino-s 
 through an accidental channel, and after a long interval of time; — these are circum- 
 stances which may justly excite surprize and regret. 
 
 The President may be allowed to write feelingly on this subject, for he has good 
 reason to know that the measure of his recal, first suggested by the accounts from 
 Vellore, but afterwards suspended till the arrival of further information, was finallv 
 decided by the tenor of General 3Iaitland's dispatches. 
 
 But, whatever may be thought of the proceedings in Palamcottah and Ceylon, the 
 conduct of the Officer commanding the Subsidiary Force, it will be allowed, is not 
 easily explicable on any acknowledged principles of action. It furnishes, perhaps, the 
 first example in histor\^, of an Officer disarming Troops in whose fidelity he avowedly 
 felt the most perfect confidence. Yet, after all, the indiscriminate severity disjjlayed 
 in Travancore was less calculated to be injurious, than the ill-judged discrimination 
 exercised at Palamcottah. The degradation of the Troops in the former case was 
 at least general, and it was also accompanied with the confession that it was unme- 
 rited. 
 
 The Commanding Officer of the District issued Oixlers for restoring to the Sub- 
 sidiary Force the arms of which they had been deprived. A General Order, suitable 
 to the crisis, was published ; the Offisers commanding at Palamcottah and Travancore 
 were removed from their Commands ; and it was resolved to bring them both to a 
 General Court 3lartial. 
 
 * It is not intended to impeach the personal courage of the respectable Officer here alluded to. That 
 is undoubted. The act by wliich the Battalion was disarmed was, imder the feelings which existed, a great 
 firoof of resolution and decision. It only thews more strongly the political panic which prevailed.
 
 40 
 
 The Commander in Chief thought it necessary on this occasion, with the appro- 
 bation of Council, to address confidentially a Circular Letter (dd) to the Commanding 
 Officers of Corps, with a view to press upon them the conduct which it became their 
 duty to follow. An extract from this letter will emphatically display the alarm and 
 despondency which had overspread the army. 
 
 " His Excellency (the Commander in Chief) alludes to the practice, originating 
 " probably from a recent unfortunate event, of too readily entertaining suspicions of 
 " the fidelity of the Troops; of seeking, with indiscreet inquiry, for grounds of such 
 " suspicion ; marking, in conversation and in conduct, an apprehension of latent 
 " treachery ; admitting vague rumours, and the reports of ignorant, timid, or mali- 
 " cious persons, as presumptive, if not positive evidence, of plots and intentions 
 *' which have frequently no shadow of existence but in the alarms of the reporters." 
 
 The Commander in Chief then proceeds to inculcate " the necessity of pre- 
 " serving, in every emergency, an appearance of confidence ; and the imperious 
 ^' duty of maintaining that firmness of conduct, which, while it avoids to show sus- 
 " piciovi, is prepared to meet with manliness any event which may occur, and to 
 *" exert the energy of discipline for the preservation of order and subordination." 
 
 The General Court Martial most honourably acquitted both the Oflicers, a cir-t 
 cumstance which only marks more strongly the general feeling among Military men. 
 The Governor in Council (before whom the Proceedings of the Court Martial were 
 laid), thought it incumbent on him to record (ee), in public Orders, his decided con- 
 viction of the impolicy of the measures pursued at Palamcottah and in Travancore, 
 and to call for the cordial co-operation of all Officers, both Civil and Military, in 
 carrying into effect the principles of confidence, respect, and conciliation towards the 
 Native Troops, which had been recognized by the Government of Fort St. George 
 and the Governor General in Council. 
 
 About the same time, apprehensions of a mutinous disposition were entertained 
 by the Officers in command at Wallahjahbad and Sankerydroog. 
 
 The Ouarter-Master-General, who had been dispatched to Wallahjahbad, re- 
 turned a favourable report of the Troops. A few individuals, who had been guilty of 
 using improper expressions, formed the only exception to the general statement. 
 
 The accounts from Sankerydroog were so very vague, that it was not thought 
 necessary to take any measures in consequence ; and the silence of the Commanding 
 Officer confirmed the first opinion of the groundlessness of the alarm. 
 
 Such was the close of the disturbances which had for nearly six months harassed 
 the Peninsula. After this, the panic wore away ; the Sepoys forgot their fears of an 
 attack upon their Religion ; and the Officers no longer slept with pistols under their 
 pillows.
 
 To crown this favourable reverse of fortune, the discussions respecting the pri- 
 soners were at length brought to a happy issue. 
 
 We have seen that the Council had decided on the temporarj'^ continuance of their 
 confinement ; and that the Supreme Government, after having advised an amnesty, was 
 induced by circumstances to abandon that proposal, and to concur in the project of banish- 
 ment. The dispatches accordingly, from Bengal, in November 1 8o6", contained positive 
 directions for the immediate execution of that measure. On the receipt of these Orders, 
 the President laid before the Board a Minute {Jf) in which he objected to them as impo- 
 litic, and hostile to the interests of Government. He adverted to the principles on which, 
 from the first origin of the present commotions, the Madras Government had made 
 it a system to act ; and which had, for a time at least, been sanctioned bj- the Supreme 
 Authority in Bengal. He pointed out the change of tone which marked the late 
 dispatch from Bengal, and contended that no new symptoms had appeared to warrant 
 the adoption of any new plan of action. He maintained, that the demands of justice 
 had been satisfied ; that our part, for the future, was to be passive, and to avoid any 
 interference with the progress of affairs to that consummation, towards which they 
 were slowly but certainly advancing. The ferment, he gave it as his opinion, would 
 soon spend itself, unless kept alive by our imprudence. He concluded with recom- 
 mending that the remonstrance of the Government be respectfully made to the Gover- 
 nor-General in Council, against the banishment of the prisoners now in confinement. 
 
 The Commander in Chief also presented a Minute (gg) on this occasion, in 
 which he expressed his satisfaction that the "Supreme Government had at length di- 
 rected a recurrence to that system of policy of which the Records amply proved that 
 he had always been the most , strenuous asserter. He declared, that the irresolution 
 and apparent timidity of Government had protracted the disorders which, by a vi- 
 gorous and seasonable exertion of authority, would have been crushed at a blow. 
 The punishments which had been inflicted, he pronounced to be insufficient. He 
 repeated his conviction, that the source of the late troubles was to be sought, not in 
 the military Regulations, but in the general political measures of the Madras Admi- 
 nistrations ; and professed strong doubts as to the flattering prospects of returning 
 quiet and loyalty. He advised, therefore, the utmost expedition in accomplishing the 
 Orders of the Supreme (jovernment. 
 
 The majority of Council agreed with the President. A remonstrance was 
 made to the Governor-General in Council ; who, in reply, signified his resolution to 
 leave the fate of the prisoners entirely to tlie decision of the local authority ; and the 
 critical arrival of Lord Minto, in 1807, at Madras, while on his way to Bengal, gave 
 the last sanction (if any yet were wanting) to the system of conciliation. Mis Lor<l- 
 ship, being requested to assist at the consultation of the Madras Council, concurred 
 with the opinion of the President in regard to the release of the ])risoners. The face
 
 42 
 
 of affairs was, indeed, at this time, such as to leave no room for hesitation on the 
 subject ; and it was decreed, by the unanimous vote (Jih) of Council, that the prisoners 
 should be gradually set at liberty. 
 
 Two Special Commissions (ii) were accordingly appointed for the trial of the 
 prisoners. Their Reports {JJ), together with some remarks upon them (which I 
 finished after my removal from the Government), are to be found in the Appendix. 
 I had the happiness to perceive that my recommendations, on all points connected 
 with this subject, were entirely confirmed by my successor, and adopted by 
 Council (kk). 
 
 The prisoners have been released in succession. They are now at large ; and the 
 society to which they have been restored has never known a period of more profound 
 tranquillity. 
 
 After a perusal of the foregoing Narrative, it will not, I flatter myself, be Tery 
 difficult to resolve our third inquiry : Hew far the measures which I advised, in con- 
 sequence of the Mutiny at Vellore, were deserving of censure. 
 
 The temperate and conciliatory conduct of Government, after that Mutiny, has 
 been virtually arraigned as the cause of the later commotions. 
 
 The whole of this charge, it has been intimated in some of the preceding pages, 
 evidently turns upon this fact, — that we did not choose to act upon the belief of the 
 existence of a regular Moorish conspiracy. To this point, therefore, the following 
 observations shall be principally addressed. 
 
 From the manner in which the existence of a conspiracy has been generally 
 maintained, there seems to have been an intention of implying that the previous and 
 general character of the reigning Government was deeply embarked on the issue of 
 its truth or falsehood. The seeds of dissatisfaction, it is conveyed, must have been 
 sown by the mal-administration of Government. I must begin, therefore, with re- 
 sisting anj^ such implication ; and declare, that, in the question before us, I by no 
 means hold my pubHc character to be committed in the manner supposed. Indeed, 
 the implication, I must be permitted to add, strikes me as equally unfair and prepos- 
 terous. If a conspiracy really existed, it would seem quite as obvious to seek for its 
 source in the embittered feelings of a brave and haughty people, reduced to a state of 
 political vassalage, and in the revengeful purposes of a powerful lamily hurled from a 
 palace into a prison, as in tlie more circumscribed operation of discontents occasioned 
 by the Civil Regulations of a Local Government. That the political situation of the 
 Mussulmen necessarili/ incited them to schemes of Rebellion, I am very far from 
 thinking ; but that, supposing such schemes actually formed, we might find in that 
 situation a full and sufficient explanation of the fact, is perfectly incontestible.
 
 43 
 
 Tins at least will be conceded to me, that the mere naked circumstance of a 
 conspiracy proves, in such a case, nothing at all against the local Government : and 
 that those who, rejecting the obvious and palpable account of that circumstance, dive 
 for some less apparent explanation, are bound to support their theory^ by a detail of 
 specific facts, and a regular deduction of the event from its alledged cause. The spe- 
 cific charges, however, which have been brought against nie, as having by injudicious 
 measures paved the way for the Vellore Mutiny, have already been discussed with a 
 most careful, and, I flatter myself I may add, a most successful minuteness. With 
 respect to the vague and general insinuations now alluded to, their fate may, I trust, 
 be fafely confided to the effect of a general but solemn protest against their injustice. 
 1 sl;all now state the reasons which induced me, immediately after the Mutiny 
 at Vellore, to believe that the Moorish intrigues, though brought into action by the 
 Mutiny, and ministering to it, did not produce it : or, in other words, to discredit the 
 existence of a regular Moorish conspiracy. 
 
 This statement will be followed by an examination, how far the judgment, which 
 I formed at that early crisis of the commotions, has been invalidated or confirmed by 
 subsequent occurrences. 
 
 The supposition of a Moorish conspiracy seemed to me, in the first place, to be 
 completely gratuitous ; and, in the next, to be contradicted both by testimony and 
 by fact. 
 
 It was not countenanced, as far as I could learn, by so much as a single direct 
 proof; nor did it appear, that, excepting the equivocal testimony of one witness, even 
 an indirect proof in its support could without violence be extorted from the evidence 
 collected on that occasion. Its credibility, therefore, rested on the declarations of the 
 Officers who were immediately concerned in the transactions at ^ ellore. It was not 
 indeed unnatural that such an idea should be struck out in the first heat and astonish- 
 ment of those transactions, and that the uncertainty which prevailed as to their real 
 cause, should give it instant currency. By the Commander in Chief, it may be pre- 
 sumed, this explanation was readily admitted. It is no impeachment to the honour 
 of that respectable Officer, to suppose that he was not slow to be persuaded of the 
 truth of a position which removed from him a responsibility that he was far from having 
 intended to incur. 
 
 But all this was loose opinion, and it was opposed by positive allegations ; for, 
 not only in no part of the examinations referred to was a JNIussulinan conspiracy, or 
 rather Mussulman intrigue (for a conspiracy seems never to have entered even into 
 the contemplation of the witnesses), mentioned as the leading cause of the Mutiny, 
 but the direct reverse of this statement was invariably maintained. All the witnesses 
 before the Military Court of Inquiry at Vellore, or before the Commission, concurred, 
 without an exception, in attributing the origin of the unfortunate affair in question
 
 44 
 
 to the Regulations on Dress, and in ascribing to the Mussulmen at Vellore only the 
 seconding of the discontents occasioned by those Regulations. Every conversation 
 that was detailed, every incident that was mentioned, pointed to the Regulations as 
 the first and principal ground of 23rovocation. It was declared by Shaik Cossim, the 
 most credible jierhaps, as the Governor-General remarks, of all the witnesses, that no 
 attempts were made by the people of the Palace to intrigue with the Sepoys till the 
 arrival of the new Turban ; " and this declaration (adds the Governor-General) is cor- 
 " roborated by several other witnesses." 
 
 This being the case, 1 had next to consider whether any thing on the face of the 
 evidence condemned it as absurd or improbable. Was the cause which it assigned so 
 decidedly unequal to the effect, that it became necessary to search for some more powerful 
 agency ? Nothing of this kind could even be pretended. To over-rate the irritability 
 of the Natives on the point of Religion was notoriously impossible ; and who does not 
 know that the energies of such a spirit, once roused to action, are always terrible and 
 sanguinary ? At the same time, that the Mussulmen were ripe for a revolt, or that a 
 ^Mussulman conspiracy was equal to the effects ascribed to it, were circumstances 
 which, even if established, were by no means conclusive against the opinion that I had 
 formed. Nothing short of a body of facts directly substantiating, not only the ex- 
 istence of the pretended plot, but its immediate connection with the Mutiny, could 
 affect for a moment the mass of presumptive and positive evidence in the opposite 
 scale. 
 
 If, however, this mass of proofs yet required the support of an irresistible fact, 
 that fact was su})plied by the occurrences at Hydrabad. The tranquillity which, at 
 that place, instantaneously followed a revocation of the Orders, sufficiently marked 
 the true cause of disaffection. The revocation, as I have been assured by an eye- 
 witness, operated on the Troops with the suddenness and efficacy of a charm. 
 
 This is a sketch of the considerations that induced me, at an early stage of 
 those disturbances, to entertain the opinions and adopt the conduct which have 
 been so much censured. It gave me sincere satisfaction to find that the conclusions 
 at which I had thus arrived, were sanctioned by the authority of the Supreme Go- 
 vernment. In the able and satisfactory Minute {II) of the Governor General on this 
 subject (transmitted to Fort St. George), may be found a complete developement of 
 the various considerations that contributed to this general result. Was any discovery 
 afterwards made, that ought to have shaken the conviction which I entertained, or to 
 have rendered nie more credulous with regard to the existence of a conspiracy? 
 
 By a reference to tiie Narrative, it will be perceived that the tumult at Hydrabad 
 was succeeded by a breathing time of apparent tranquillity. This interval, though it 
 gave birth and currency to many vague rumours, threw no satisfactory light on the 
 question of a Moorish plot. The commotions, however, which followed in various
 
 45 
 
 parts of the Army, seemed, in the judgment of sonie men, to place that question 
 beyond the possibihty of dispute. It was then that invectives against the increduUty 
 and supineness of Government were openly hazarded, and began to borrow some de- 
 gree of plausibiHty from the apprehensions of those to whom they were addressed. 
 The Governor-General himself, as I have stated, was led to change his views, and to 
 admit the reality of the supposed plots. But it may be collected from his expres- 
 sions, that, though he had relinquished his former sentiments, he was far from ac- 
 quiescing in the full extent of those to which he might be considered as, in some 
 measure, a convert. Even this qualified admission of the existence of a conspiracy 
 was not, in my humble judgment, warranted by any substantial reasons. The suc- 
 cessive disturbances at Nundydroog, Wallahjahbad, and other cantonments, did not 
 appear to me to constitute a new case: they only formed a natural, perhaps I might 
 say a necessary, sequel to the preceding movements. 
 
 To imagine that the religious passions of the Natives, however excited, could by 
 any contrivance be instantly thrown asleep, was surely to forget the usual course of 
 the human mind under such circumstances ; in which the first struggle is seldom the 
 only one, but often even produces a second by the mere force of the shock which 
 has been given to the feelings of men. The Mutiny at Vellore opened the way for 
 the Mutiny at Nundydroog. Indeed, the original motives of discontent had not yet 
 ceased their operation ; and, though the Military Orders had been revoked, it was not 
 so easy, by a stroke of the pen, to abolish the terrors which they had inspired. 
 
 But, in the midst of these intrigues, animosities, and factions, was there a 
 symptom of a systematic Moorish conspiracy ? Was there a shadow of evidence, 
 which bore on that point ? In the various investigations which were pursued (in- 
 cluding those of the two Special Commissions finally appointed to try the prisoners), 
 it was ascertained that there prevailed much of petulance and discontent, a good deal 
 of a factious spirit, and somewhat, perhaps, of individual disafiection and desire of 
 change ; but of a regular train of machinations, of an organized plan of revolt, not 
 even the slightest vestige could be tiaced. 
 
 The truth of the conclusions to which these observations irresistibly tend, is fur- 
 ther corroborated by some notorious facts. 
 
 In several of the disturbances that took place, the Hindoos were equally impli- 
 cated with the Mussulmen. At Sankerydroog, the principal was said to be a Hindoo ; 
 and the Minister Purneah gave it as his opinion, that the Hindoos were more alarmed 
 and dissatisfied than the Mussulmen. 
 
 It may, indeed, be pretended, that it was naturally the first object of the con- 
 spirators to weaken our military resources ; that it was, therefore, an obvious piece 
 of policy to corrupt the Hindoos as well as the Mussulmen, and to employ them as 
 instruments to promote a revolution^ of which they were not to enjoy the immedfate
 
 46 
 
 advantages. On this proposition (if it deserve the name), it may be remarked, in 
 the first place, that the explanation which it affords may, indeed, hold in those cases, 
 where the Native force was exclusively Hindoo ; but that in a cantonment, where that 
 force Was mixed of Mahomedans and Hindoos, it is at least extraordinary that the in- 
 strumentality of the latter should be preferred to that of the former ; and, in the second 
 place, that, if it prove any thing, it proves too much. The conduct here attributed 
 to the conspirators, would argue no inconsiderable degree of sagacity and combina- 
 tion ; ahd, from this specimen, it might at least have been expected, that none of 
 their actions should be marked by a glaring deficiency in those qualities. And yet, 
 if a conspiracy did exist, it must be notorious tliat, excepting in the single point of 
 ingenuity at hiding itself, it was, beyond competition, the most clumsy, senseless, 
 and unskilful, of any that ever disgraced the name. It was destitute of concert, of fore- 
 sight, of promptitude to seize a favourable crisis, of presence of mind to redeem lost 
 opportunities. The efforts that it made were partial, desultory, and inconsequent. 
 It shewed only an inverted sort of activity, and seemed eager after nothing but its own 
 discomfiture. 
 
 If •* plot vvas laid, so extensive and systematic, what became of the talents by 
 which it was planned ? or why was it so jjerfect in its structure, and so wretchedly 
 deficient in its operations ? When the Officers at Nundj'droog barricadoed themselves 
 in a house, and left the field open to the conspirators, how did it happen that the 
 latter failed to take advantage of their situation ? If, in that case, they were disabled 
 by surprize at so unexampled a proceeding, why did the same inaction occur in a se- 
 cond and a third instance ? When the prevailing sentiments of the Officers were 
 ascertained, and their sole resource under alarm was understood to rest in the system 
 of fortifying themselves till the arrival of succours; whence was it that no one mem- 
 ber of this great confederation was found, to suggest the simple expedient of at- 
 tempting, at the same instant, a variety of insurrections in different parts of the 
 country ? 
 
 Such are some of the difficulties which encounter the supposition of a regular 
 conspiracy ; and, since these difficulties are not balanced by any opposing evidence of 
 any sort, the conclusion seems sufficiently clear. 
 
 But, though I have thought myself bound to enter into a discussion, which has, 
 perhaps been unnecessarily lengthened, the question itself is comprised in a narrow 
 compass. 
 
 Let the truth or fallacy of my judgment respecting a Moorish conspiracy be de- 
 cided by events. 
 
 The system of conciliation adopted by Government avowedly rested on the disbe- 
 lief of a conspiracy, and would, on the contrary supposition, have been perilous in the 
 extreme. From the nature of the remedy, it is fair to argue to that of the disease.
 
 47 
 
 Wlien I advised that line of conduct, I knew the responsibihty which I incurred. 
 When I adhei-ed to it, in sj)ite of much opposition and many alarming appearances • 
 when I was, in consequence, charged with obstinacy, incredulity, and irresolution ; I 
 still looked forward for my justification to the final issue. When the Commander in 
 Chief, even at so late a jK-riod as .lanuary 1S07, observed, in a Minute, that " it ap- 
 " peared to him a reasonable conclusion, that [according] as success or failure marked 
 " the progress of the measures pursued, he might, in justice, determine their wisdom 
 " or unfitness," I willingly accepted the challenge, and now revert to it with peculiar 
 satisfaction. The character of the measures pursued, my own character, and that also 
 of the Go\crnment, were all staked ujjon the result of those measures ; and what has 
 been that result ? Success, complete, unequivocal, and lasting. 
 
 The pacific plan* terminated, at length, in the liberation of nearly 600 prisoners : 
 whose guilt, on the supposition of a conspiracy, admitted neither of denial nor of pal- 
 
 * It may now be considered jjeculiarly fortunate that the system of severity did not finally prevail. 
 U'hat would have been thought of Biitiah .lustice, if in the case of Vellore the Natives had been punished 
 en masse, while to the Europeans engaged in the recent Mutiny at Madras, with the exception of a few ex- 
 amples, general forgiveness has been granted. In reference to the latter most unfortunate calamity, the 
 Writer will venture to express his anxious hope that the Government and the Legislature wiU not rest 
 satisfied witli the opinion, that a spirit of casual insubordination (arising according to prevailing doctiines 
 frouj improltable and inadequate Causes) has alone produced this crisis, and that nothing now remains but 
 to give a strong support to the Government abroad. Undoubtedly the Punishment of Guilt and the Main- 
 tenance of public Authority are objects of the highest importance and of the first care ; but these do not 
 necessarily exclude an entjuiiy into the causes of connnotion, or a deliberate and impartial review of all the 
 jjast transactions, as relating either to the interests of the Public or of Individuals. 
 
 In every^ view of the late e\cnts, it is impossible to contemplate them without surprise and sorrow, or to 
 anticipate the future without serious apprehension. But it would be a most fatal erroi' to supijosc that the 
 cause is of yesterday. Let enquiry be made of those who have filled the highest Civil and Military situations 
 and «ho have practically observed the working of the whole machine abroad. If sueli persons are desired 
 to state what causes have in their judgment led to, although they certainly have not produced (the innne- " 
 mediate cause is a totally distinct consideration), this melancholy residt, their answers will probalily be 
 uniform in tracing the defect of the public Agency abroad to the inefficiency of the dire<:tin"-and con- 
 trouUng Authority at home — to a formation and distribution of power in lingland, which in its effects is 
 as fatal to confidence between the Authorities at home and abroad, as it is destructive of harmony and 
 fiibordination in India. 
 
 c. 4
 
 48 
 
 Jiation. The phantom of a conspiracy silently disappeared. After a few natural 
 struggles all discontent and danger died away ; and the latest accounts ascertain the 
 continuance of a perfect calm in every part of the Peninsula. This is the issue which 
 finally settles the question of a Moorish conspiracy, and completely justifies my opi- 
 nions and my conduct. 
 
 An attentive examination of the Stnicture of the Home Governinent, and of the improvements (as they 
 certainly were) which were adopted in 1783, will lead to the decided conviction, that it did not possess 
 the principles either of vigorous management or of active and powerful controul ; and experience has 
 proved, that with the exception of a part of the period of tlie able, upright, and efficient administration of 
 Indian Affairs by Lord Melville, the system has not practically answered. For, notwithstanding the eEForts, 
 though perpetually counteracted, of those who, in the direction of the foreign Govermnents, have laboured 
 to establish just piinciples of public conduct, were successfid for a time in producing among the subor- 
 <linate agents as much probity and public virtue as exists under any Government on earth, still, effort is 
 tcmporaiy in its nature. These did not grow out of the system, but were opposed to it. They endeavoured 
 without avail to avert its effects, and the period seems lapidly approaching when the influence of these 
 efforts shall be utterly extinguished. It must be manifest that all attempts at a permanent and systematic 
 reformation abroad must necessarily continue to be worse than nugatory, when the Authority from which 
 they ostensibly emanate is itself the object «liich most urgently calls for reform. 
 
 To these remarks upon the system at large, it may also be added, not indeed in justification of the 
 conduct of the Army, but for the purpose of rendering more efficient one of the great features of our Na- 
 tional strength^ that the Company's Army have not bee» always treated with the consideration which till 
 very lately they had so justly merited. It seems indispensible that the Nati\e Army should be taken under 
 the immediate protection of the Cfowu, and that an union of the King's and the Company's Troops should 
 be made upon principles of equality, fairness, and liberality. It would fiu-ther be desirable, if it be practi- 
 cable, not to exclude totally from the Officers of the Indian Army the honours, advantages, and improve- 
 ment of the general Military Service of their Country,, provided that the Native remains a local Army, and 
 that the requisite qualifications of Officers for that Sen ice arc secured not by general injunctions to the Au- 
 thorities at home or abroad, which might possibly be evaded, but by positive legislative enactments^ which 
 no Authority can dare to disobey. 
 
 London^ May 24, 1810.
 
 47* 
 
 It may now be proj^er briefly to recapitulate the principal jioints which I have 
 endeavoured to establish in the pi-eceding pages. 
 
 I have, in the first place, adverted to the Military Orders, which certainly formed, 
 at least, the immediate occasion of the 3Iutiny. 
 
 It has been shewn, that I was not ccncerned in the issuing of those Oi'ders ; nor 
 had any knowledge of their existence, till after their publication ; nor even, exceptin"- 
 as to one of them, till they had done their worst ; that, when a reference was made 
 to Government on the expediency of revoking the Order respecting the Turban, it 
 was accompanied with a representation, on the part of the Commander in Chief, of 
 the evils to be apprehended from an immediate revocation of that Order, which was 
 stated to involve the very existence of his military authority and controul ; that, at 
 the same time, there was no sufficient ground made out for the revocation ; and that, 
 consequently, however unwise in my opinion the publication of that Order might have 
 been, its revocation, under such circumstances, could only have beeu justified by a 
 well-founiled apprehension of events still more dreadful, if any such, in. their conse- 
 quences can well be imagined, than the relaxation of military discipline^ 
 
 I have, in the next place, directed your attention to the consideration of certain 
 political measures, which have been assigned as the remoter causes of the Mutiny., 
 Of the local arrangements at V^ellore, I have proved, that, on the scale of the East^ 
 the establishment of the family of Tippoo was not extravagant ; that the division 
 of commands which has been complained of, was justified by existing circumstan- 
 ces ; and that, in point of fact, as to the Mutiny, those arrangements, in general, 
 have been acquitted, by the Court of Inquny at Vellore, of any mischievous in- 
 fluence.
 
 48* 
 
 T have considered, next, the Judicial system which I had, in part, the honour 
 of introducing into the territories subject to the Madras Government ; and, since its 
 introduction has been severely censured, as calculated to excite discontent and disaf- 
 fection, I have been led to enlarge on its nature and objects ; to recount the steps by 
 which it has been perfected ; the great names by which it has been sanctioned ; the in- 
 trinsic excellencies which form its most powerful recommendation ; and, finally, the 
 order, happiness, and public prosperity, which have invariably followed its establish- 
 ment, both in Bengal and in Madras. 
 
 In connexion with these tt>pics, I have been called, in the third part of this In- 
 quiry, to the view of the subject of a less general, though not less interesting nature ; 
 I mean, the effect which the conduct of Government is accused of having produced, 
 in unnecessarily keeping alive the irritation that could not fail to be occasioned by the 
 disturbance at Vellore. 
 
 The whole of this charge hinges on this fact, that Government, refusing to believe 
 the existence of a Moorish conspiracy, adopted a system of conciliation in preference 
 to one of severity. As I was individually responsible for that preference, it became 
 me to give the reasons by which it was warranted. 
 
 More clearly to elucidate the point in discussion, I have thought it advisable to 
 present you with a sketch of the events that succeeded the first Mutiny. 1 have de- 
 tailed the jjrogress, decline, and extinction of discontent in the army ; the opinions 
 that divided Council : the struggles between the two plans of conciliation and severity, 
 with the share which I had in them ; the adoption of the former by Government; 
 its apparent failure for a time; the consequent clamour and invective — and its ulti- 
 mate succe:<s ; the discussions relatmg. to the prisoners taken at Vellore — their issue . 
 the sanction given by Lord Minto to the line of conduct which I had conscientiously 
 pursued; and the happy close, under the operation of that conduct, of the whole se- 
 ries of commotions. 
 
 In a recurrence to this detail, as directly bearing upon the question, w hether the 
 mismanagement of Government contributed to prolong the continuance of disorders 
 which prudence and vigour might have immediately extinguished, I have been com- 
 pelled to enter into the inquiry respecting the existence of a Moorish conspiracy, be- 
 cause the system of conduct which I adopted was avowedly founded on the disbelief of 
 such a conspiracy, and has been arraigned expressly on that ground.
 
 49 
 
 Having, therefore, expressed my conviction that the late military Regulations 
 formed not only the immediate, but also the primar}'- cause of the Mutiny, and that 
 the Moorish intrigues acted only an auxiliary part in the affray, I have exposed, ajt 
 some length, the idea of a regular and preconcerted Moorish conspiracy, as one sup- 
 ported by no proofs of any kind, and opposed by a host both of probabilities and of 
 facts. 
 
 After all, however, I have referred the decisive adjustment of the point in dis- 
 pute to the issue of events. 
 
 If the measures that yvere puimied hsve been effectual, little further argument 
 can be needed to prove that they were suitable to the exigency. This appeal to the 
 verdict of facts has borne me out in all my conclusions, and enabled me to rest my 
 final justification on the present state of the Peninsula. 
 
 There are occasions, Gentlemen, on which egotism is not vanity. I have a right 
 to state my services, however humbly I may think of their deserts, when they seem 
 to me undervalued or neglected ; and peculiarly so, when they are slighted in a quarter 
 where I had presumed to hope they would be best appreciated. The Mutiny at Vel- 
 lore cannot be attributed to me directly or indirectly ; but I do assume to myself the 
 merit, by a resolute adherence to a wise principle, an adherence in the face of obloquy 
 and opposition, of having re-established order and confidence ; of having thus averted 
 the numerous calamities which the adoption of an opposite system of policy would 
 have entailed on India, and ultimately on Great Britain ; and, above all, of having 
 saved the national character from disgrace. And what has been my recompence ? I have 
 been removed from my situation, and condemned as an accomplice in measures with 
 which I had no further concern than to obviate their ill consequences. My dismissal 
 was eftected in a manner harsh and mortifying; and the forms which custom has pre- 
 scribed, to soften the severity of a misfortune at all events sufficiently severe, were, 
 on this single occasion, violated, as if for the express purpose of deepening my dis- 
 grace. Whatever have been my errors, they surely have not merited a punishment, 
 than which a heavier could hardly have been awarded to the most wretched incapacity, 
 or the most criminal negligence. 
 
 Ihider these circumstances, I present myself to your notice. I take it for granted 
 that the Court of Directors have been misinformed ; and that, to place the question 
 before them in its true hght, is to obtain redress. My claims are not extravagant : I 
 state them, and I trust modestly. I have been severely injured in my character and 
 feelings : for these injuries I ask reparation ; if, indeed, any reparation can atone for 
 feelings so deeply aggrieved, and a character so unjustly compromised in the eyes of 
 the world. 
 
 H
 
 50 
 
 In complying vnth my demands, you will discharge, if I may venture to say so, 
 what is due no less to your own honour than to mine ; and I am confident, that, in 
 affording you an opportunity of performing an act of justice, I pay you the most gra- 
 tifying mark of respect which it is in my power to offer. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Gentlemen, 
 Your most obedient Servant, 
 
 WILLIAM CAVENDISH BENTINCK. 
 
 London, Feb. 7, 1809.
 
 51 
 
 Rurlhigtoii House, Xuv. 21, iSo/). . 
 SIR, ,,,,..; 
 
 IIAVINCi comimmicated to Sir John Cradock my MeiTiorial addressed 
 to the Court of Directors, under date the 7th of February last, he has pointed out to 
 me two passages, wherein the same fact has been incorrectly stated: It is said in i)age 
 2, and repeated in a following page, that Sir John Cradock had issued an Order, directin<i- 
 the Sepoys to wear black stocks, and white jackets. No such order was issued by Sir 
 John Cradock. 
 
 It is unnecessary for me to explain to the Court the accident which led to the in- 
 troduction of this error. But it is not less due to Sir John Cradock than to the Court, 
 and not less to my own character, that the en-or, as soon as made known to me, should 
 be mentioned to the Court. I feel particular regret at this circumstance, as I learn it to 
 be Sir John Cradock's opinion that the assertion may have operated very much to liis 
 injury, on the minds of the Court of Directors. 
 
 I confess. Sir, it would be most satisfactory to me to receive your assurance, either 
 that this unfavourable impression had not been produced^ or, if existing, that it has 
 been removed by the present explanation. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 With the greatest respect, 
 SIR, 
 
 Your most obedient servant, 
 
 W. BENTINCK. 
 
 To the Chairman of the Court of Directors. 
 
 At a COURT of DIRECTORS, held on Wednesday, 29 Nov. 1809; 
 Resolved, unanimously, 
 
 THAT the Chairman be desired to inform Lord William Bentinck, that the 
 order imputed to Sir John Cradock, and, as it now appears, erroneously imputed, en- 
 joining the Sepoys to wear white jackets and black stocks, was not of consequence in 
 
 H S
 
 52 
 
 determining the proceeding of the Court towards that honourable Officer; and that, in 
 a resolution passed by the Court on the 25th of July last, containing their final judg- 
 ment on his conduct, it had no weight,and was wholly out of their contemplation, the said 
 resolution having indeed acquitted him of having at all in intention or act violated the 
 Castes of the Natives. The Court, however, cannot but applaud the feeling which has 
 induced Lord William Bentinck to make the communication now addressed to them ; 
 and they are persuaded it must prove satisfactory to the honourable mind of Sir John 
 Cradock.
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 TO THE 
 
 MEMORIAL 
 
 ADDRESSED 
 
 TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS 
 
 BY 
 
 LORD WILLIAM CAVENDISH BENTINCK.
 
 63 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 (a) LETTER from the Adjutant-General to Lieutenant-Colonel Fancourt, commanding the Garrison 
 
 of VeUore ; dated Fort St. George, 7th May, 180G 55 
 
 (b) E.xtracts from Evidence of Witnesses examined as to the objectionable nature of the Turband, 
 
 by the Military Court held at VeUore 55 
 
 (c) Evidence given before the Native General Court Martial held at Madras 5fi 
 
 (d) Letter from Sir John Cradock to tlie Governor in Council, dated Nundydroog, June 29th, 180C, 
 
 stating his embanassnient uj)on the subject of the Tinbands, and asking the advice of Coun- 
 cil thereupon. Answer of the Governor in Council, dated Fort St. George, July 4th, 1806 .... 57 
 
 (e) Proposed General Order by Government, transmitted in the preceding Answer to the Commander 
 
 in Chief, previously to publication / 58 
 
 (f) Reply of Sir John Cradock to the Governor in CouncU, dated Nundydroog, July 7th, 1806 59 
 
 (g) President's Minute, dated July 15th, 1806, explaining the reasons which induced him to change 
 
 his opinion upon the expediency of revoking the Orders respecting the 'I'uiband. — Resolution 
 of Council upon the foregoing .Minute, together with a Letter containing the draft of a Gene- 
 ral Order addressed to the Commander in Chief, dated July 14th, 1806 60 
 
 (h) Minutes of the different Members of Council upon an Order of the Commander in Chief, allowing 
 
 those Corps who preferred it, to wear the Turband ; with Resolutions of Council, July ^3d, 1806. . 62 
 
 (i) Appointment of a Commission to investigate the causes of the late events at Vellore. — Instiiic- 
 
 tions, dated July 12th, 1806 66 
 
 (j) Report of the Commission, dated Vellore, August 9th, 1806 67 
 
 (k) President's Minute upon the Report of the Commission 71 
 
 (1) President's Minute, disclauning all knowledge of the objectionable Orders, to which the assent of 
 the Governor in Council was asserted by tine Commander in Chief to have been given, dated 
 July 25th, 1806 72 
 
 (m) Minutes of Messrs. Petrie and Strange upon tlie same subject 73 
 
 (n) Correspondence between the Commander in Chief and the Deputy Adjutant-GenersJ concerning 
 
 the new Regulations 74 
 
 (o) Minute of the Commander in Chief, recording tlie copy of a Statement of tlie Mutiny at Vellore, 
 
 sent to his superior Autliorities in England, dated Madras, October 25tli, 1806 75 
 
 (p) .(Vnswer of the President to the foregoing Minute, dated Fort St. George, Feb. 27th, 1807 90 
 
 (q) Minute of the President, establishing the principles by which the conduct of the Government 
 
 should be regulated immediately after the Mutiny, dated July 17th, 1806 lUO 
 
 (r) Minute of the Commander in Chief, submitting infomialion of very great importance to the Go- 
 vernor in Council, dated Madras, August 2d, 1806 101 
 
 (s) Letter from the Governor Generil in Council to the Governor in Council at Fort St. George, in- 
 closing a Minute of the Governor General upon the subject of the Mutiny at \'ellore ; dated 
 Fort William, August Uth, 1806 ' 107
 
 54 
 
 Page, 
 (t) Letter from the same to tlie same, not coinciding in the opinion of the latter, that it would be 
 advisable to increase tlie European Force, and to retain the 19tli Diagoons and 94th Foot, 
 belonging to tlie Establishment of Fort St. George, about to be embarked for England; 
 dated Fort William, August 23d, 1806 110 
 
 (u) Extract of a Dispatch from the Governor in Coimcil at Fort St. George to the Court of Directors 
 in explanation of their sentiments, which seemed not to have been understood by the Governor 
 General in Council from tlie purport of the preceding Letter 112 
 
 (v) Extract of a Letter fiom the Go\ernor General in Council to the Governor in Council at Fort St. 
 George, expressing their entire concunence in the justice of the Statement contained in the 
 preceding Dispatch to the Court of Directors ; dated November 29th, 1806 114 
 
 (w) Minute of the President respecting the erasure of the 1st and 23d Regiments from the Army 
 
 List ; dated September 1 1th, 1806 115 
 
 (x) Extract of a Letter from the Governor General in Council to the Governor in Council at Fort St. 
 George, iij)on the subjects of the erasure of the Regiments from the List of the Army, and of 
 the discharge of the Piisoners ; dated Fort William, November 29th, 1806 116 
 
 (y) Minute of the President, upon a suggestion to embark the Princes at Sadras instead of Fort St. 
 
 George 117 
 
 (z) Minute of the President regarding the disposal of the Prisoners 118 
 
 (a a) Letter from the Governor General in Council to the Governor in Council at Fort St. George ; 
 
 dated Fort William, December 4th, 1806 120 
 
 (b b) Extract of a Letter from the Governor General in Council to the Governor in Council at Fort 
 
 St. George, directing the banishment of the Prisoners 123 
 
 (c c) From the Commanding Officer at Palamcottah to the Governor at Ceylon, stating that by a mi- 
 
 laciiloub etlbrt a IMutmy at that place had been discovered and quelled 124 
 
 (dd) Proposed Circular Letter from the Commander in Chief to Officers commanding Corps ; dated 
 
 December 2, 1806 125 
 
 (e e) Minute of the President proposing a General Order in consequence of the Sentence of a General 
 Court Martial held ujion the Officers commanding at Palamcottah and in Travancore ; Com- 
 mander in Chief's Minute upon the same; dated March 21, 180/ 126 
 
 (f f ) Minute of the President recommending that a Remonstrance should be made to the Governor 
 
 General in Council, against the Banishment of the Prisoners as directed in (b b) 128 
 
 (gg) Minute of the Commander in Chief upon the same subject, but differing in opinion 136 
 
 (hh) Minute of the President upon the mode of disposing of the Prisoners, in consequence of the 
 ;ms\ver of the Go\crn()r (ieneral in Council to the Remonstrance (ff) in which the Order of 
 Banishment is not enforced, and the ultimate decision is left with the Governor in Council at 
 Fort St. George .■.•.•.•.■..■.■..•.•.-...■.•.. , 141 
 
 (i i) Minute of Council upon the case of the Prisoners, I»rd Minto the Governor General being present 143 
 
 (j j) Mip.ute of Lord William Bentinck (whose removal from Council, while preparing this paper, had 
 taken ])lace by an order of the Court of Diiectors, directed to be carried into immediate effect) 
 upon tiic re])orts of the two Special Commissions appointed for the Trial of the Prisoners at 
 Vellijrc and Madias 143 
 
 (kk) Minute of Mr. Petrie (now President) confirming Lord WUliam Bentinck's recommendation con- 
 tained in the foregoing Minute 146 
 
 (1 1) Extract of ;i !\Iinute of the Go\ernor General commenting upon the various Evidence respecting 
 the Mutiny, and giving an opinion of the causes of that event, and of the extent to wluch the 
 Princes were implicated ; dated Fort William, September 24, 1806 , . 146
 
 5.' 
 
 ■?* 
 
 EXTRACT 
 
 FROM THE 
 
 MINUTES OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS, 25th JULY, 1809. 
 
 Resolved, That under tlie impressions universally entertained, both in 
 India and Europe, at the breaking out of the Vellore Mutiny, that it was occasioned 
 by the wanton or needless violations of the religious usages of the Natives — an opinion 
 considerably sanctioned by the Supreme Government of Bengal, and even counte- 
 nanced by the first dispatches of the Fort St. George Presidency ; and under the 
 impressions, then also general, of the dangers to which the Company's interests were 
 exposed, and of the necessity of a change in the chief offices of Civil and Military 
 Command, as well to vindicate the national respect for the religious usages of our 
 Native subjects, as to make a sacrifice to their violated rights, to restore public confi- 
 dence, and to relieve the Executive Body of the Company, with whom so much respon- 
 sibility rested, from the anxiety and apprehensions occasioned by so unexampled and 
 alarming a calamity, it became natural and expedient for them to remove Lord Willirm 
 Bentinck from the Government, and Sir John Cradock from the Command of the 
 Army of Fort St. George. And although from the explanations that have since been 
 given by those personages respectively, and from the further evidences which have 
 come before the Court, it appears that the Orders in question were far from being 
 intended by the Members of the Madras Government, to trench in the least upon the 
 religious tenets of the Natives, and did not in reality infringe them, although the unin- 
 formed Sepoys were led at length to believe that they did ; yet the effects produced 
 having been so disastrous, and associated in the Native mind with the administration 
 of the then Governor and Commander-in-Chief, and those Officers besides having in 
 the judgment of the Court been defective, in not examining with greater caution and 
 care into the real sentiments and dispositions of the Sepoys, before they proceeded to 
 
 H 3 inforce
 
 54* 
 
 inforce the Orders for tlie Tiuban ; the Court must still lament^ that as, in proceeding 
 to a change in the Madras Government, they yielded with regret to imperious circum- 
 stances, so, though they have the pleasure to find the charges originally advanced 
 against the conduct of the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief, respecting the 
 violations of Cast, to have been, in the, sense then attached to them, misapplied and 
 defective, also in general vigilance and intelligence ; yet that, as the misfortunes 
 which happened in their Administration, placed their fate under the government of 
 public events and opinions, which the Court could not controul, so it is not now in 
 their power to alter the effects of them.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 (a) 
 
 TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL FANCOURT, 
 
 Commanding Vellore. 
 
 Fort St. George, 1th May, 1806. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 I HAVE received by express of yesterday's date your letter, and have sub- 
 mitted it to the Commander in Chief. 
 
 Whilst the Commander in Chief regrets the cause which requires such measures, he feels 
 it to be his dut}' to check, by the most decided measures, the symptoms of insubordination 
 which you have reported, in the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment of Native Infantry. 
 
 His Excellency has therefore ordered to Vellore a detachment of His Majesty's 19th Light 
 Dragoons, who will receive and escort to the Presidency the nineteen men confined by Lieut.- 
 Colonel Darley, for trial before the General Court Martial now sitting, against whom he will 
 prefer charges, and prepare to support the same by requisite evidence. 
 
 You will also direct the Non-commissioned OlEcers of the Grenadier Company (the two 
 who did not refuse the Turban, in the first instance, excepted) to be reduced to the ranks, — The 
 Commander in Chief deeming a man who hesitates a moment to obey an order, unfit to bear the 
 character of a Non-commissioned Officer. 
 
 You will further, through Lieut.-Colonel Darley, direct the Native Commissioned Officers 
 of the 2d Battalion of the 4th Regiment of Native Infantry, immediattly to make up, and wear 
 Turbans of the prescribed pattern. Disobedience or hesitation on their part will be instantly 
 followed by dismission from the service in public orders on your report. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy has orders, should you require it, to march the 19th Dra- 
 goons to Vellore to assist in enforcing obedience. 
 
 It is the intention of the Commander in Chief immediately to relieve the 2d Battalion of 
 the 4th Regiment ; but, though he thinks proper to remove that Corps from Vellore, he will 
 not admit of hesitation to the Orders he has given. 
 
 (Signed) P. A. AGNEW, 
 
 Adjutant-General of the Army. 
 
 Extracts from Evidence of Witnesses exaviined as to the objectionable nature of the Turban, bij the 
 
 Military Court held at Vellore. 
 Kurupah Havildar, Major, 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment. 
 Q. Do you think that by wearing the Turban of the new muster any man of the highest 
 Cast would suft'er degradation ? or is there any thing abqut the Turban which would affect the 
 prejudices of Cast ?
 
 56 
 
 A. There is no objection at all to the Turban ; nor will the wearing of it, to the best of 
 my opinion, degrade a "man of the highest Cast, nor will it affect the prejudices of Cast. 
 Q. Of what Cast are you ? 
 A. I am a Malabar. 
 
 Jemidar Salam Ally, Adjutant of 2nd Battalion of 4th Regiment. 
 
 Q. You are a Seid *, it appears. The first question put to the preceding is repeated to- 
 the present Witness. 
 
 A. I think that any Cast man might wear it without suffering degradation, and that there 
 is nothing about it to prejudice the Cast of any one. 
 
 (O 
 
 Evidence before the Native General Court Martial. 
 
 Subidar Sheik Eraaum, 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment. 
 
 Q. What Cast are you ? 
 
 A. Sheich. 
 
 Q. Do you think that a man of the highest Class would be degraded by wearing the new 
 Tnrban ? or is there any thing about it that would at all affect the most strict prejudices of their 
 Religion ? 
 
 A. No. 
 
 Q. Did you, the Jemidar and Native Adjutant, remonstrate with the prisoners on the im- 
 propriety of their refusing to wear the Turban, and say that you were men of very high Cast, 
 and had no objection to wear it ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. Were the prisoners made particularly to understand that they were acting in direct 
 disobedience of Orders ? 
 
 A. Yes, frequently. 
 
 Jemidar Chaing Sing, 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment, N. I. 
 
 Q. Did the Subidar, yourself and Native Adjutant, remonstrate with the prisoners, and 
 tell them that you, who were men of very high Cast, had no objection to wear the Turban, 
 and that their Cast would not be in the least injured by it ? 
 
 A. Yes ; and in reply they both observed, that we were Officers, and might agree to wear 
 it if we pleased, but they never would. 
 
 Q. At that time were any Sepoys standing by, who had agreed to wear the Turban ? 
 
 A. Yes ; several. 
 
 Q. Were these Sepoys pointed out to the prisoners as examples of obedience ? 
 
 A. Yes, they were ; and the Non-commissioned Officers also, not only by the Colonel, 
 but likewise by the Suljidarand Native Adjutant. 
 
 Q. What Cast are you ? 
 
 A. A Brahmin. 
 
 Q. In your opinion is there any thing about the Turban, either in §hape or materials, than 
 •could arl'ect the prejudices of the highest and most tenacious Cast ? 
 
 A. No ; any Cast might wear it. 
 
 * The hiifhcst of the Mussulmen Sects.
 
 57 
 
 FROM SIR J. CRADOCK TO THE R. HON. THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL. 
 
 Numlydroog, June 29th, 1806. 
 MY LORD, 
 
 I MUST have recourse to your Lortlsiiip's judgment, and that of Council, 
 to reheve me from great anxiety and embarrassment upon tlie subject of the Turbans, the full 
 particulars of whicli are so well known, to your Lordship, and upon the proceedings, from my 
 absence, I have already requested your Lordship's direction. 
 
 The construction of tlie Turban originated from the advice and under the supcrintendance 
 of Colonel Agnew, the Adjutant-General, and Major Pierce, the Deputy Adjutant-General; 
 and as an alteration from the former one appeared wanting, I thought I cuuld not confide so 
 simple a matter to better hands, or officers of more local e.xperience. 
 
 I iiave the strongest reasons to suppose that almost universal objection arises against the 
 Turban ; and though force and punishment may overcome individual opposition, yet the firm 
 dislike does not abate, and the frequent recurrence of severity may produce, though it may be 
 remote, bad consequences. 
 
 I am as aware, as the human mind can possess the sentiment, that opposition to military- 
 and just authority cannot be yielded to, aud that the attempt must be crushed in its earliest 
 stage. 
 
 This is the sole reasoning towards a British soldier; and, were it purely a British case, I 
 should neither feel embarrassment, nor should I thus trouble your Lordship in Council. 
 
 But upon the prejudices of India, the force of Cast, which in its various shapes no Eu- 
 ropean ma}' perfectly comprehend, it is allowable even in a soldier's mind to pause, and solicit 
 the advice of the Head and his companions in the Government. 
 
 The question is not confined to the judgment of the ignorant Soldier}-, it is the subject of 
 conversation among the best-informed Officers; and my intelligence from Seringapatam, where 
 there is a numerous garrison, is, that it is the common cry, that the next attempt will be to 
 make the Sepoys Christians. 
 
 I lay before your Lordship, in confidence, a private letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Brun- 
 toK ; and the same sentiment prevails with many other moderate and discreet officers. 
 
 Still it is my wish, and the best judgment I can apply to this untoward subject, to persevere 
 and conquer prejudice, as perhaps the least evil ; but where consequences may ensue of a 
 disadvantaseous nature, and even tiie source of our recruitinsr at stake, so difficult at all times 
 with due selection and eft'ect, I am not satislied in my own mind to persevere to the full e.xtent, 
 without recurrence to your Lordship's advice, and the sanction of Government. 
 
 (Signed) .1. F. CRADOCK, 
 
 Lieutenant- General. 
 
 (Answer.) 
 FROM THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL TO THE CO.MMANDER IN CHIEF. 
 
 Fort St. George, Julij 4, 1806. 
 SIR, 
 
 WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of 
 the 2Dth ult". 
 
 We beg to assure you that we entertain a just sense of the motives nndcr which your Ex- 
 cellency has referred for our consideration the difficulty which has occurred in carrying into 
 efiect the late alteration in the Dress of the Native Corps of this Establishment. 
 
 I
 
 58 
 
 From the difficulty with which that measure has been attended, we are led to thinl?, that 
 u 'uight have been desirable to have avoided the adoption of it ; but we concur in the sentiments 
 which your Excellency appears to entertain with respect to the probable injury ol receding trom 
 an act which has received the eonfirmation of public authority. 
 
 If there had been reason to suppose that the late change of Dress was liable to the objection 
 of militating against the Ketigions Frmciplesof the Inhabitants of this (Country, we should have 
 had 110 hesitation in immediately recommending to your Excellency the relinquishment of the 
 intention to establish the proposed change. But as it appears from the evidence taken in the 
 late Enquiry at Vellore, that no objection of this nature exists, we certaiuly deem it advisable 
 that the alternative of yielding to the clamour arising from an unfounded prejudice should, if 
 possible, be avoided. 
 
 It will at the same time be desirable to avoid, if possible, the disagreeable consequences 
 attending measures of severity ; and for that purpose we beg leave to propose for your consi- 
 deration, the expediency of issuing, under the authority of the Government, a General Order 
 to the Native Troops of this Establishment, conveying to these Troops a general assurance of 
 there being no intention to introduce any changes incompatible with the Laws or Usages of their 
 Religion. 
 
 As much of the difficulty which has been experienced appears from the information con- 
 veyed in your Excellency's Letter to be founded on the apprehension of further changes, we 
 are willing to hope that a General Order of the nature which we have proposed will be calcu- 
 lated to tranquillize the minds of the Native Troops, and at the same time to avert the in- 
 jurious consequences which might be occasioned to military discipline by the relinquishment of 
 a public measure. 
 
 We have the honour to transmit to your Excellency a General Order, in the form which 
 we have stated ; and, in the event of your concurring in its adoption, we beg to request that 
 your Excellency will direct its circulation, in such mode as may in your Excellency's judgment 
 appear best calculated for the attainment of the proposed object. 
 
 We have the honour to add, that the Order will not be circulated at the Presidency until 
 we shall have received the communication of your Excellency's sentiments respecting its pub- 
 lication. 
 
 (Signed) W. BENTINCK. 
 
 W. PETRI E. 
 ■J. STRANGE. 
 
 (O 
 G. O. BY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 (Transmitted to the Conmiander in Chief, previously to publication.) 
 
 Fort St. George, Jidij 4, 1 306, 
 
 THE Right Honourable the Governor in Council, having been informed by His Excel- 
 lency the Commander in Chief of the opposition which has been in some instances experienced 
 in establishing an alteration which it was deemed expedient to adopt in the form of the Tur- 
 bands in use amongst the Native Corps of this Establishment, his Lordship in Council is led 
 to express his extreme regret that any part of the Native Army, whose merits have been so 
 frequently extolled and rewarded by this Government, should have suffered itself to be deluded 
 by an unfounded clamour. 
 
 It will be in every instance the wish of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to 
 evince a sacred regard for the Religious Principles of the Native Troops, as well as of all other 
 inhabitants of this country ; but in the present case it appears, after the strictest enquiry, and
 
 59 
 
 according to the testimony of Natives of the highest Cast, that tlic opposition which has heen 
 experienced in tiie late cliange of Turbans is destitute of any foundation in either the Laws or 
 Usages of tiic Mahommedan or Hindoo Ilehgions ; and any persons who may persevere in that 
 opposition cannot in consequence fail to be subjected to the severest penalties of Military' 
 Discipline. 
 
 His Lordship in Council is however willing to hope, that the salutary examples which 
 have already taken place in the punishment of the chief Instigators of the opposition, will be 
 sufficient to excite in the minds of the Native Corps of this Establishment a correct sense of 
 their duty; for, while his Lordship in Council repeats his determination to use every practi- 
 cable means, in conjunction with His Excellency the Conjmander in Chief, to suppress all 
 marks of insubordination and groundless discontent, it is not less the determination of his 
 Lordship in Council, or of the Commander in Chief, to aft'ord every just protection to the 
 Native Troops in the exercise of their Religious Rites and the observance of their Established 
 Usages. 
 
 By Order of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, 
 
 (Signed) G. BUCHAN, 
 
 Chief Secretary to Government. 
 
 (/) 
 FROM SIR J. CRADOCK TO THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL. 
 
 Nundydroog, July 7, 1806. 
 
 MY LORD, 
 
 I HAVE been much honoured this morning by the receipt of the letter from 
 }-our Lordship in Council upon the subject of the Turban, and feel myself peculiarly gratified 
 by the transmission of the proposed Order by Govermnent previous to circulation. 
 
 I take the liberty to express my entire concurrence with the spirit and terms of the 
 Order, as every way calculated to preserve just authority, and still to allay any prejudices 
 that may exist upon the imputed disregard to the rights attached to Cast or antient custom. 
 The point was of infinite embarrassment; and if any act was to be resorted to beyond the im- 
 mediate and constant vindication of violated discipline as it might arise, I conceive that an 
 Order from Government of this nature would seem to promise the best effect. 
 
 I will confess, that by the present communication with Government I have gained the 
 object I had in view, which was to receive from them an unreserved opinion as to the pro- 
 prietv of full coercion, should it prove necessary, but which, situated as this country is, bu- 
 ried in the absm-dities of Cast and prejudice, dear to them as existence, I was fearful to take 
 a step of any doubt without explicit knowledge and the sanction of Government. 
 
 Since \ hail last the honour to address your Lordship in Council, I have heard nothing 
 ino'e ; which silence leads me to hope that the disinclination to^he Turban has become more 
 feeble, or perhaps that the reports have been exaggerated. Under that view it may be judi- 
 cious to postpone the publication of the Order, eitlicr to let the subject fall to the ground, as 
 no longer the interposition (jf Government is required, or to re-us&ume the issue, as your 
 ii-ordship in Council may determine by future event. 
 
 (Signed) J. F. CRADOCK, 
 
 Lieut. -Gen,
 
 60 
 
 PRESIDENT'S MINUTE. 
 
 IT appears to me necessary, in order to do away a possible charge of inconsist- 
 encv, of pusillanimity, or of unnecessary concession, tliat I should distinctly explain the 
 grounds of my former opinion respecting the Turbands, as well as the reasons which have in- 
 duced me entirely to change that opinion. 
 
 When the reference was made by the Commander in Chief for the opinion of Council, 
 whether it might be expedient to enforce or revoke the Order for the new Turbands, it must 
 be recollected that a Mutiny had broken out in tiie 1st Battalion of the 4th Regiment; that 
 the Rino-Jeaders had been tried by a Court Martial consisting of Native Officers; that it had 
 been proved on the Trial, by the Evidence of a Seyd and of a Bramin, that the Turbands con- 
 tained nothing contrary to their Casts ; that these prisoners had been found guilty, and had 
 been punished, upon satisfactory and undoubted evidence to the absence of all just cause of 
 complaint. I considered that the Order could not be retracted without giving encouragement 
 to that dis[)osition to turbulence and clamour, which must exist in all large bodies of men, and 
 without therefore hazarding the discipline anil subordination of the Army. It appeared to 
 me in consequence proper, that the authority of the Government should be interposed in aid 
 and in support of the Orders of the Commander in Chief, at the same time professing the ut- 
 most respect for the Religious opinions and Customs of the Natives, and disclaiming all in- 
 tention of cncroathing upon tiiem. '-.Vitb these feelings the General Order of the 4th July 
 was written. The Commander in Chief did not publish it, from not considering it necessary, 
 according to the discretionary instructions which accompanied that document; and it is fortu- 
 nate that it was not published. 
 
 I'pon the occasion of that reference the Turban stood as the single cause of dissatisfac- 
 tion ; but it has since come to my knowledge, that other Orders have been issued in the Code 
 of Regimental Standing Orders, which would appear positively and directly to do away one of 
 the most sacred and universal of the Hindoo Customs — I mean an Order which prohibits tiie 
 Sepoys from wearing the Marks of Cast upon their foreheads while on Duty. Another, per- 
 haps not equally important, relates to the Whiskers ; and a third, to the wearing of ornaments. 
 All these customs of the Natives arc dear to them, and consistent with the most perfect mili- 
 tary discipline; and no interference in my opinion should be had with them. Placing n)yself 
 in the situation of a Sepoy, I should certainly feel prodigious distrust and doubt of the inten- 
 tion of these Orders. It would be natural for more enlightened people than the Sepoys to rea- 
 son in this manner: " They first take away the external marks of our Casts and Religious 
 " distinctions; tlicy then desire to change our Dress, and to assimilate our Turbans to the 
 " Caps of the Portuguese Drummers. They mean next to make us Christians!" This 1 be- 
 lieve to be the general reasoning of the Army, ami the cause of great dissatisfaction. I con- 
 fess that I think there is just ground for the alarm and feeling of the Sepoys; and justice, as 
 well as policy, requires that complete satisfaction should be given to ihem. In proportion as 
 I should have been inclined to persevere with unshaken determination in resistance to un- 
 founded clamour, in the same degree do I feel ready to give up, what I aui convinced was 
 wrong for us to ask and for them to give. 
 
 For these reasons I recommended, that a General Order suspending the late Instructions 
 respecting the Dress of the Sepoys should be j)ublished, cither by the Commander in Chief, 
 or direct by the Governor in Council, as might appear most advisable to the Board. 
 
 (Signed) 
 Fort St. George, Ju/j/ Ij, IS06. W. BENTINCK.
 
 61 
 
 Extract from a Code of Military Regulations established in the Army of Fort St. George. 
 
 " IT is ordered by the Regulations that a Native Soldier shall not mark his 
 " face to denote his Cast, or wear Ear-rings wiien dressed in his Uniform ; and it is farther 
 " directed, that at all Parades, and upon all Duties, every Soldier of the Battalion shall be 
 " clean-shaved on the chin. It is directed also that uniformity shall, as far as is practicable, 
 " be preserved in regard to the quantity and shape of the hair upon the upper lip." 
 
 (5-) 
 IN SECRET CONSULTATION, \UkJulj/, 1806. 
 
 AFTER mature consideration of the circumstances which have come to the 
 knowledge of the Board regarding the late Mutiny at Vellore, and regarding the discontent 
 which appears to have been excited by the late changes in the Uress of the Native Troops, 
 it is resolved, that the following Letter and Draft of a General Order be dispatched to th6 
 Commander in Chief. 
 
 TO HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUT.-GEN. SIR J. CRADOCK, K. B. 
 Commander in Chiet^ »kc. &c. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK has had the honour to receive this forenoon 
 a Letter from your Excellenc}', informing him of your intention to proceed to Vellore, in 
 consequence of the distressing events which have occurred at that place. 
 
 We are in consequence induced to take the earliest opportunity. of informing your Excel- 
 lenc}', that concurring accounts which have been receivetl IVom v;inous qiiariers having agreed 
 in ascribing the late discontent which has been mauifesteil in diH'erent Native Corps of this 
 Establishment, to the chatvge which has been adopted in the Dress of the Sepoys, it is our 
 particular wish that the subject may obtain your Excellency's early attention. 
 
 As the causes which may have immediately operated in producing the late dreadful com- 
 motion at Vellore remain yet to be developed, it would not be proper to ascribe that event to 
 the circumstance to which we have alluded. But we can have no hesitation, from the ac- 
 counts which we have received, in now stating our belief that very injurious effects have re- 
 sulted from it. 
 
 The Letter which we addressed to your Excellency on the 4th instant, will have made 
 you sufficiently acquainted with our sense of the strong objection which exists against now re- 
 voking the Order which was issued respecting the Dress of tiie Native Corps ; and we should 
 be happy if the measure could be avoided ; but we confess to your Excellency that the spirit 
 of dissatisfaction has shown itself to a greater extent than we had supposed, and we have now 
 great doubts whether any other measure than the entire revocation of the Order would be 
 eifectual towards allaying the ferment which appears to have been excited. 
 
 We beg leave, therefore, to refer the subject to your consideration, and to solicit your 
 Excellency's early sentiments regarding it. From the opinion communicated in your Excel- 
 lency's letter of the 29th ultimo, we are satisfied of your disposition to adopt any mea- 
 sure calculated to restore harmony in the Native Army of this Presidency, that may be com- 
 patible with the preservation of discipline. If, therefore, your Excellency should concur in
 
 62 
 
 die opinion which we have expressed, it will remain to be determined whether the Order for 
 restoring the Dress of the Native Corps to its former footing shall be issued under your Ex- 
 cellency's authority, or under the authority of the Government ; and on that point we shall 
 be desirous to hear your opinion as soon as may be practicable, in order that any measure 
 which may be determined on may he immediately adopted. 
 
 We beg leave to transmit to you the Draft ef a General Order, which we consider appli- 
 cable to the occasion ; and in the event of your Excellency deciding to publish the Order 
 which we have suggested under your own authority, it may be advisable that it should be 
 published without further reference to the Presidency. 
 
 Your Excellency will have been informed of the intention to assemble a Commission at 
 Vellore, for the purpose of enquiring into the circumstances of the late Mutiny ; and the 
 Members of the Commission have been directed to meet at that place without delay. 
 
 We have the honour to be, 
 (Signed) &c. 
 
 W. BENTINCK, 
 Fort St. George, Ju/j/ litfi, 1806. &c. &c. Council. 
 
 P. S. We have thought it proper to transmit this Letter by express to your Excellencj^, 
 and we shall be happy to receive your reply in the same mode. 
 
 G. O. BY 
 
 IT having been represented to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, 
 that considerable misunderstanding lias occurred amongst some of the Native Corps of this 
 Establishment with respect to a late alteration in the Dress of the Native Corps ; and it being 
 in all cases the desire of His Lordship in Council, and of the Commander in Chief, to show 
 every just degree of attention to the Usages of the Native Troops, it has been in consequence 
 resolved, that the Orders which have been considered liable to the objection of affecting those 
 Usages, shall be rescinded. 
 
 N. B. If the Order should be published by the Commander in Chief, it will be altered 
 accordingly. 
 
 (A) 
 
 IN SECRET CONSULTATIONS, 2$dJulj/, 1806. 
 
 Extract from the Minutes of Council, dated 2Zd July, 1806. 
 
 THE Commander in Chief having arrived at the Presidency, and having taken 
 his seat at the Board, their consideration is directed to the Instructions issued under the 
 Orders of His Excellency, on the 17th instant, with respect to the discontinuance of the new 
 Turbans.
 
 63 
 
 The following Minutes are recorded on that subject by the President, by Mr. Petrie, 
 and Mr. Strange. 
 
 I SUBMIT to the Board, a Copy of a Circular Letter addressed by the Commander in 
 Chief to the Officers commanding Divisions, the Subsidiary Force at Hydrabad, and Travan- 
 core. It lias been transmitteil to the Town Major of Von St. Georgt-, lor ihc purpose of 
 being communicated, with my permission, to the Corps in Garrison. 
 
 It will be observed that the second paragraph contains an Order to be given to all Corps 
 to make up the Turbans on the formerly established pattern, " imless the Mativc Officers and 
 " Men should desire to xvear that which it was intended to adopt, in xvkich case they may he per- 
 " milled to do so." 
 
 I should wish to be entirely silent with respect to this Order, but I am, by my situation, 
 unavoidably made a party to it, and my sanction to its publication might hereafter be con- 
 strued into an approval of its purport. I have deemed it therefore expedient to submit my 
 doubts to Council, and to consult their sentiments upon them. 
 
 It appears to me to be impolitic to revive the agitation of a question (the Turban) whicby 
 to say the least of it, has been made one of the pretexts of all the dissatisfaction which has 
 arisen. To the Order itself, without consideration of the circumstances under which it is 
 issued, and the persons to whom it is addressed, no particular objection can be made. It 
 may perhaps be a matter of doubt, whether the opinions of Soldiers should be at any time 
 so directly consulted. But upon a point of Religious Prejudice the same objection might 
 not be considered so strongly to stand ; but in these cases a more intlirect communication 
 would seem preferable. However, the reference to the consent of the individuals themselves 
 appears to be a secure mode at least of avoiding any dissatisfaction in carrying this parti- 
 cular object. 
 
 I am apprehensive, however, that its continuance may be attended with much future 
 inconvenience. It is, I think, possible that Commanding Officers, seeing that a degree of 
 importance is still attached by their Commander in Chief to this Turban, may use an impro- 
 per degree of influence in can-ying its adoption. It is possible that in many Corps, composed 
 as they all are of various Casts, the agitation of this question by men of dilTerent religions 
 and prejudices may produce much disunion and ill-blood. It is possible further, that in the 
 event of its being partially adopted by some Corps, that dissentions of a more serious nature 
 may take place in the Army at large. 
 
 These are, as- shortly as I can state them, the doubts which I feel of the propriety of 
 this Order. Past occurrences, and the feelings of irritation produced by them, cannot be 
 too soon obliterated. Points of greater military consecjuence might wisely be sacrificed to 
 this object. But to permit the existence of any token (and in itself a trifle) which shall con- 
 tinually revive the memory of these scenes, does not seem to be prudent. 
 
 (Signed) VV. BENTINCK. 
 
 Fort St. George, July 22d, 1 S06. 
 
 Copy of a Circular Letter addressed to the Officers commanding the Divisions of the Army, 
 and to those in Command of the Subsidiary Forces at Hydrabad and Truvancore. 
 
 TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 THE result of various investigations into the transactions which lately occurred 
 at Vellore, has proved to the Commander in Chief that designing persons have attempted 
 to persuade the Native Troops, that the Turban lately ordered in lieu of that which they 
 formerly wore, was intended to degrade tliem, and as an innovation on their Religious Tenets.
 
 64 
 
 Groundless as this insinuation is, the Commander in Chief is determined to show that 
 no such object was in conteinijlation, by an immediate recall of his Orders respecting Tur- 
 bans ; and you will immediately give C3rders to the Officers commanding Corps in the Divi- 
 sion under your command, to cause the Turbans to be made up on the formerly established 
 pattern, unless the Native Officers and Men should desire to wear that which it was intended 
 to adopt : in which case they may be permitted to do so. 
 
 The Commander in Chief also directs that you (by Letter to Officers commanding Corps 
 and Stations) convey his Orders to cancel the 10th Paragraph of the 11th Section of the 
 Standing Orders for Battalions of Native Infantiy, dated the 13th March last, lest the direc- 
 tions it contains, although conformable to the long established practice of most Corps in the 
 Army, should also be represented as a novel innovation on the customs of Cast. 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 P. A. AGNEW, 
 Adjutant-General of the Army. 
 
 Head 2uarters, Vellore, July \llh, 1806. 
 
 TO THE TOWN MAJOR OF FORT ST. GEORGE. 
 SIR, 
 
 I INCLOSE a copy of a Letter I have addressed, by order of the Comman- 
 der in Chief, to the Officers commanding Divisions of the Army ; countermanding condi- 
 tionally the directed alteration in the form of the Turbans of the Infantry Corps of the Army, 
 and a Paragraph of Orders. 
 
 The Commander in Chief has directed me to transmit the inclosed to you, that with the 
 Right Honourable the Governor's permission, to whose inspection he requests ) on will submit 
 it, you may make those communications to the Officers commanding Corps in the Garrison 
 of Fort St. George, which he has directly made to the other Corps of the Army. 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 P. A. AGNEW, 
 
 Vellore, July ISth, 1806. 
 
 Adjutant- General of the Army. 
 
 MR. PETRIE'S MINUTE. 
 
 SINCE the discussion which took place in Council to-day, I have read the 
 Minute of the Right Honourable the President upon the effects which may be produced by 
 the Circular Instructions to Officers commanding Stations, relative to the new Turban ; and 
 although I admit, as I did in the short Minute which I wrote in Council, that the Instructions 
 are obnoxious to the observations of the Right Honourable the President, yet I am still of 
 opinion that nothing should have been recorded on this subject until we had a personal com- 
 munication with the Commander in Chief, who may be expected at the Presidency in the 
 course of to-morrow. I beg leave to repeat what I said in the short Minute before alluded to 
 (withdrawn as no longer applicable), that I highly approved of the candid and delicate manner 
 in which the Right Honourable the President opened the subject to the Council. 
 
 July 22ml, IS06. (Signed) WM. PETRIE.
 
 65 
 
 MR. STRANGE'S MINUTE. 
 
 HAVING perused the Minute of tlie Right Honouiublc the President, together 
 with that of Mr. I'etrie of this date, on the subject of the Circuhir Letter addressed by the 
 Commander in Chief to the Officers commanding Divisions, it is impossible for me not to 
 concur in the general sentiment expressed by both, as to the questionable tendency of the 
 second paragraph of tliat Letter. I feel also, in connnon with Mr. Petrie, the dcsireableness 
 of a personal communication with his Excellency upon every point that can occur, resulting 
 from the late unhappy events, upon which our dehberations are at present principally em- 
 ployed, and upon the one in question in particular. But, consistently with the opinion I en- 
 tertain of highly probable and dangerous consequences, as distinctly specified by the Right 
 Honourable the President, I do not think I can justify referring the effect of it beyond to- 
 morrow, in the e.xpectation of the arrival of the Commander in Chief at the Presidency. 
 
 Fort St. George, 
 
 Julj/ 22nd, laoe. (Signed) JAMES STRANGE. 
 
 COMMANDER IN CHIEF'S MINUTE. 
 
 I FIND that the Right Honourable the President, with the concurrence of 
 Council, conceive that the late Order published upon the Subject of Turbans does not com- 
 pletely do away their adoption, but by leaving it to the free choice of a Sepoy Battalion to 
 make them up or not, may tend to revive discussions or even ill feeling on the point. I con- 
 fess I think the Order, as expressed, ought to gratify their feelings, if they have any of a 
 direct nature upon the circumstance, more than any other; but the argument one way or 
 the other is so trifling, according to my best consideration, that, with the greatest pleasure 
 I am ready to alter to any terms more approved, and which it may be supposed will carry 
 with them the best eflfect. 
 
 However, I can never quit this subject, brought forward in any shape, without expres- 
 sing my persuasion that the Turban, unconnected with artifice or machination, weighs not a 
 straw in the scale of the present agitation, and that our chief attention should be directed to the 
 dissolution of the foundations of imputed danger. 
 
 (Signed) J. F. CRADOCK, 
 
 3Iadras, Jidj/ 23(1, ISOG. Lieutenant-Genera!, 
 
 IT being unanimously agreed (under the reservation stated in the Minute of 
 the Commander in Chief) that it will be advisable that the revocation of the Order on the 
 subject of the Turbans should be rendered unqualified, it is resolved, that the Commander in 
 Chief be requested to give the necessary Orders for that purpose.
 
 66 
 
 (O 
 IN COUNCIL. 
 
 THE President recommends the immediate appointment of a Commission for 
 the purpose of investigating the causes of the late events at Vellore, and proposes that it 
 shall consist of the following Members : 
 
 President, 
 Major-Gen. PaTEK. 
 
 Lieut.-Col. DoDSWORTH. I^^l j N. Webbf, Esq. 
 Major Dowse. j | i J. H. D. Ogilvie, Esq. 
 
 Approved and resolved accordingly. 
 
 TO MAJOR-GENERAL PATER AND MEMBERS. 
 
 GENTLEMEN, 
 
 IN consequence of the recent distressing event which has occurred in the 
 Fortress of Vellore, The Right Honourable the Governor in Council deems it essentially ne- 
 cessary that an immediate and strict Inquiry should be instituted for the purpose of ascer*- 
 taining the cause to which this extraordinary occurrence is imputable. 
 
 2. His Lordship in Council has therefore been pleased to appoint you to a Commission 
 for the purpose of conducting this Investigation ; and it is his Lordship's desire that you will 
 accordingly proceed to Vellore, and take immediate means for ascertaining the circumstances 
 which led to the Mutiny of the Troops in that Garrison on the night of the 9th instant. 
 
 3. As his Lordship in Council attaches much importance to this Inquiry, his Lordship is 
 desirous that you will lose as little time as may be practicable, consistently with the accuracy 
 of your proceedings, in the completion of it ; and in order that you may have such insight as 
 is at present possessed by his Lordship in Council, relative to the subject, I am directed t» 
 inclose for your information the accompanj'ing Copies of Official Reports which have been 
 received from the Officers whose situations at Vellore may be supposed to have afi'orded them. 
 the means of giving an accurate account of the circumstances which occurred. 
 
 4. The Judge Advocate General will assist in conducting the proceedings of the 
 Commission. 
 
 5. The Commission are authorized to administer an Oath to such witnesses as thej' may 
 judge necessary, 
 
 I have the honour to be, Gentlemen, 
 
 (Signed) GEORGE BUCHAN, 
 
 Chief Secretary to Government. 
 Fort St. George, Jidj/ \2th, 1806.
 
 «r 
 
 (y) 
 
 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 MY LORD, 
 
 IN conformity to the Orders of your Lordship in Council, appointing- us a Com- 
 mission for the pui-pose of ascertaining tiie circumstances wiiich led to the Mutiny of tlie 
 Troops in the Garrison of Vellorc on the night of the 9th July, we repaired to that Station, 
 and on the 21st commenced our Enquiries, which we have contiiuicd down to this day. 
 
 We were naturally led to conuuence our investigations with an Inqtiiry into the general 
 state of the Garrison at the time of the Mutiny. We find that the G;irrison was composed 
 of Two Battalions of Sepoys (the 1st of the 1st, and the 2nd of the 23rd*) and a Detachment 
 from His Majesty's 6Litli Regiment of about S70 Rank and File. 
 
 Tiic only material occurrence which had recently taken j)lace in regard to the Troops, 
 was the issue of a new Turband to the Army, and a General Order by the Commander in 
 Chief of the 13th of March last. The Order for the Turband had been notified to the Troops 
 in Garrison about the Months of April or May last. The 2nd Battalion of the 4th Reoiment, 
 N. Infantr}-, were then composing part of the Garrison, and appear to have indicated great 
 dissatisfaction at the fashion of the Turband, as too nearly resembhng, in their apprehension, 
 a European Hat. This Battalion had been removed some weeks previous to the Mutiny, 
 and replaced by the 2nd of ihe 23rd. 
 
 In our examination of the Officers commanding these two Corps, we could not find tliat 
 any dissatisfaction had been expressed to them by their Sepoys, against the receipt of the 
 Turbaud, which, though not actually issued, was making up for both Corps. 
 
 It is sufficiently evident, however, from the testimony of various witnesses, that the 
 Turband was highly offensive to the prejudices of the Sepoys, however much they may have 
 concealed their feelings in that respect from their Officers. It does not appear that there 
 was any thing in the materials of which the Turband was composed particularly objectionable, 
 it being made, as formerly, of Broad-cloth, covering an Iron Frame, with the exception of 
 a Cotton Tuft, made to resemble a Feather, and a leather Cockade. This last article ap- 
 pears indeed to have been disliked by the Sepoys ; but the material and leading objection 
 respected the shape, which, as before stated, they compared to that of a Tupee, or European 
 Hat. It is sufficiently evitlent that the shape of the Turband cannot l)e said to bear any 
 resemblance to a Hat, although it does indeed to the leather Caps lately introduced into His 
 Majesty's European Regiments. 
 
 It appears that diilerent alterations in Dress had lately been introduced in the Sepoy- 
 Corps ; such as Slocks and Waistcoats. By a late Order of his Excellency the Commander 
 in Cnief, of the I3th March 1806, Section XI. paragraph 10 — " It is ortlered by the Regu- 
 " lation.s, that a Native Soldier shall not mark his face to denote his Cast, nor wear Ear- 
 " rings, when dressed in his Uniform ; and it is further directed, that at all Parades, and 
 " upon all Duties, every Soldier of the Battalion shall be clean shaved on the chin. It is 
 " directed also, that uniformity shall be preserved in regard to the quantity and shape of the 
 " iiair upon the upper li]), as far as may be practicable." 
 
 This Order had been received by the two Corps at V^ellore ; but the particular paragraph 
 had not been communicated officially to then;. One of the Officers then in conmiand of one 
 of the Battalions (the late Lieut.- Col. M'Kerras, who was killed in the Mutiny) had resolved 
 not to conuiuinicate it to his Sepoys, as he was convinced that it would be the cause of great 
 dissatisfaction. This information we obtained from his Adjutant, Lieut. Coomhe. The men, 
 however, seem to have got some intelligence of what was intended ; for we find that flu- 
 
 "» With p.\coptioD of 460 on command.
 
 6*8 
 
 apprehension of their Whiskers being cut oft', was one of the causes whicli led to the Mutiny^ 
 as assigned by them ; and we have no reason to doubt of the repugnancy which they must 
 have felt at such a measure. 
 
 But however genuine the disUke to the Turband may have been amongst the Troops, 
 there is reason to beheve that this circumstance was caught at by others to sow dissatisfaction 
 against our Government. 
 
 The families of the late Tippoo Sultan appear to have been removed to the Fortress of 
 Vellore, as a place of security and strength, soon after the fall of Seringapatam, and a nu- 
 merous train of attendants (cljiefly, we believe, Mussulmen) had followed the fortune of the 
 Princes, and were settled in the Pettah and vicinity of the Fort. 
 
 The casual dissatisfaction among the Troops appears to have furnished to the Princes the 
 idea of turning that circumstance to their own advantage. The dissatisfaction arose out of 
 a Relin-iouE Prejudice, and was therefore the readier converted into a common cause. 
 
 Many circumstances favour the belief of the intention of the Mutiny being known, for 
 some time before it took place, to some of the people of the Palace, and in particular to the 
 Prince Mouez u Deen. 
 
 One evidence (Baba Saib, Sepoy) speaks of the intention of a general insurrection 
 havino- been communicated to him previous to the Mutiny by one of the Prince's people. 
 Connected with this point, we must notice the deposition of Meerza Cheerudmund, a native 
 of Delhi, one admitted into the presence of Mouez u Deen, and related to him by family 
 connexion, who told him, about ten days before the Mutiny took place, that " he should 
 " be out in a few days." We do not find, on enquiry of Lieutenant-Colonel Marriott, that 
 any exception attaches to the character of this Witness ; and are therefore inclined to give 
 great weight to what he says ; nor is this diminished from its being but a hint which the 
 Prince dropped. The observation conveyed to the Witness, he says, the idea of some mis- 
 chief being in view. 
 
 We find from the testimony of several Witnesses, that an Oath had been taken by a 
 great number of the Sepoys of both Battalions, and a considerable proportion of tiie Native 
 Officers, to Three Points: — First, Secrecy; Second, the Rejection of the Turband; and, 
 Thirdly, the Re-establishment of the Mussulman Government in the family of the late Tip- 
 poo Sultan. — It appears from the evitlence of Shaik Nutter, Sepoy of the First Battalion 
 of the First Regiment, that it was Jemaul u Deen, the foster-brother of Mouez u Deen, 
 M-lio first made the Palace people acquainted with the intention of the Sepoys to mutiny, 
 artd that he held forth to them a promise of an increase of pay from the Prince Mouez u 
 Deen, and jiariicular advantages to Subidar Shaik Adam — that the Prince expected imme- 
 diate assistance of four or five hundred men from tlie Pettah, and after-assistance from dif- 
 ferent parts of the Country. 
 
 The above is the only material information we have been able to procure of any actual 
 communications with the Palace previous to the Mutiny, nor could even this be procured but 
 nndcr peculiar circumstances. The Witness had, on his first examination on a former day, 
 July Sytli, declared that he did not know of his own knowledge that any of the Palace people 
 were acquainted with the Mutiny ; but on further exauiination (on the yth August) it being 
 explained to him that the pardon promised him was conditional only on his making a full dis- 
 covery of all circumstances, within his knowledge, comiected with the Mutiny, and out 
 doubts of his having made a full conmiunication on his first examination, he then made the 
 declarations above quoted. 
 
 Jemaul u Deen and Fakeer Mahomed were questioned, under an offer of pardon, as to 
 the truth of what Siiaik Nutter had discovered, but they both denied all knowledge of the 
 circumstances. 
 
 Shaik Nutter, it is to be observed, identified the person of Jemaul u Deen from 
 amongst upwards of twentj' persons who- were produced, to prove that he distinctly knew 
 the man he alluded to. 
 
 Carrying on our remarks on the occurrences previous to the Mutiny, we find from -the 
 evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Marriott, that on the days of the 8th or 9tb July, the Prince
 
 69 
 
 Mouez u Dccn particularly desired that he iiiiglu he allowed to have a Murdanah, or the 
 •women excluded from his public rooms, and his male servants allowed to remain with him 
 durinj^ the nigiit — an indidgencc which is allowed to them only during the Mohnrrem Feast, 
 when they fast all day, and are obliged to eat at night. lie also requested jjennission for 
 IJyder Ilussain Cawn, his lirst-cousin, to be allowed to pass the night at his iiouse. Colonel 
 Marriott refused him both these requests, as being irregular, and as ihey would lead to form a 
 precedent for himself and the other Princes to make similar re(piests. Another reason for his 
 suspicions of Rlouei; u Deeii was, the earnest manner in which he requested to be allowed to 
 purchase a horse, which Lieutenant-Colonel Marriott also refused, on account of the heavy 
 debts he had already incurred. I'inding that Colonel Marriott would not listen to him, he ur- 
 gently requested that he might be allowed to see and try the horse, and he was brou"ht into 
 the Fort accordingly for that purpose ; and this, Colonel Marriott adds, was the same horse 
 that was found ready saddled on the arrival of the Dragoons at Mouez u Deen's door. 
 
 It apjjcared that the night of the 9th July had been set a])art for celebrating the nuptials 
 of one of the Princesses, Noor ul Nissam Begum, daughter of the late Tippoo Sultan by 
 
 and sister to the Prince Mohea u Deen, with a person of the name of Syed 
 
 Nizam u Deen, a Native of Mysore, who had lately come from the Country of Cuddapah for 
 that purpose — and that a great concourse of people had assembled from different quarters of 
 the Country on the occasion. 
 
 We shall not think it necessary to retrace the circumstances of the Massacre which took 
 place during that night (the particulars of which have already been pretty accurately reported 
 to your Lordship in Council by different Officers) further than noticing the share which the 
 people of the Palace appeared to have taken in the transactioii. 
 
 Different Witnesses have borne testimony to the activity of the followers of the Palace 
 during the time of the Miuiny, by assisting in getting out the guns ; in la3ing them ; in en- 
 couraging the Sepoys to destroy the Europeans, and in actually doing so themselves in some 
 instances. The tlag of the late Tippoo Sultan was hoisted upon the Garrison flag-stafl' by the 
 Sepoys in conjunction with the followers of the Palace. The Princes Mohea u Deen and his 
 brother Mouez u Deen presented themselves to the Sepoys ; ordered refreshments of beetle, 
 &.C. to be given them ; and Mouez u Deen is said to have presented the .Son of the late Com- 
 mandant Syed Goffoor with a sword, ordering him at the same time to go anti take possession 
 of the Hill Fort of Vellore. The encouragement given to the Sepoys by the above Princes 
 appears to us to be sufficiently confirmed by the general result of t!ie evidence, although not 
 very distinctly spoken to by many of the Witnesses. 
 
 It is material to ob^erve, that Mouez u Deen acknowledged to Colonel Marriott that the 
 flag had come out of his house, but that the Sepoys had plundered it with many other things. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Marriott enquired how he came to have such a thing, and he said he bou<>lit 
 it of Nowragee, the Persee merchant, during Colonel Doveton's command. The tlag is said 
 to have been purchased at the Sales subsequent to the fall of Seringapatam. It was produced 
 before us, and a|)pears to be an old one, bearing the late Sultan's insignia, a sun in the cen- 
 ire, with green tyger-stripes on a red held. 0\\ our examination of Nowragee, the Persee 
 merchant, he denied that he had ever sold cither a flag to the Princes, or cloth of the same 
 kind of which it was made. 
 
 The eagerness with which the Sepoys and men of the Palace betook themselves to plun- 
 der the elfects of the Otlicers, and to escape out of the Fort with their bootv, tended in our 
 opinion to weaken the general etVect of the Insurrection, and to prevent, happily, much of 
 the consequences to have been apprehended. This defection of the Mutineers, joined to the 
 early assistance given by the l^th Dragoons and 7th Regiment, and details of Native Cavalry 
 by Colonel Gillespie (under circumstances too brilliant ever to be forgotten), prevented the 
 I'ort from falling entirely into their possession. 
 
 It appeared to us proper to give the four elder Princes an opportunity of offering any ex- 
 planation of their conduct which they might be able or willing to afford ; and we accordingly 
 went over to their different houses for that purpose. Wc stated to Mouez u Deen and iMohea 
 u Deen, that they were implicated in the trunisactions of the 10th ; but to the other two, we
 
 only observed, that we were ready to receive any information they were disposed to offer re- 
 garding that atFair. They all four denied any previous iinowiedge of, or participation in, the 
 transaction. 
 
 The Son of Syed Goflfoor, who was so repeatedly charged bj' different witnesses of having 
 taken an active part in the transactions of that night, was called before us, and distinctly ques- 
 tioned as to the several allegations against him, all of which he denied. 
 
 It did not seem to us necessary to enter into a particular investigation of the guilt imputed 
 to the different followers of the Princes, by questioning the several individuals themselves, as 
 the purpose of our Mission was not to convict particular persons, which could only be done by 
 a regular trial, but to ascertain the general facts and circumstances of the transaction ; so far 
 as regards the followers of the Palace having many of them taken an active part in the Mutiny, 
 the facts are too broad and strong to be mistaken ; the particular share individuals may have 
 taken is a matter for future discrimination. 
 
 ^V'e had the honour to suggest to your Lordship in Council, the proprietj- of offering a 
 pecuniary- Reward for a full discovery of the cause or causes which originally- led to the Mutiny ; 
 but, as your Lordship in Council seemed to feel that the measure was objectionable, we have 
 not as yet availed ourselves of the discretion allowed us, of proposing such Rewards as may 
 appear likely to lead to any useful discover}-. We have been the rather inclined to 
 this, because we understand the Officer commanding the Garrison is vested with powers to 
 that effect, who would, of course, communicate to your Lordship, or to us, any information 
 he might receive ; and because we are aware that rnany jjersons would repair to an individual 
 for that purpose, who would not venture to come before a Commission (the object of whose 
 meetings is more generally known) to give evidence, in the present state of tlie public mind. 
 
 We received from the Officer coumianding the Garrison a Paper of private intelligence, 
 being the confession of certain persons now under sentence of death. We did not, however, 
 think that the evidence given under such circumstances, was of a nature proper to be recorded 
 on the Proceedings of a Commission ordered to examine Witnesses on oath, however important 
 in itself, and adapted to Political purposes : and as the Paper is already before Government, 
 we see many reasons why we should neither remark on it, nor balance our own proceedings 
 by it. 
 
 The object of our Mission is " to ascertain the cause to which the Mutiny is imputable." 
 It is not easy to calculate upon the motives which may have actuated a large body of men, 
 composed of different Casts, Religions, and Countries, and acting for a period of time suffi- 
 cient to admit of new feelings and interest, calculated to divert the original impression to a 
 different object. 
 
 There are, however, two principal causes which appear to us to have led to the Mutiny : 
 the late innovations in the Dress and appearance of the Sepoys, and the Residence of the P'a- 
 mily of the late Tippoo Sultan at Vellore. We shall beg leave to submit our reasons on each 
 of these heads ; and tirst in regard to the Dress. 
 
 The article of Dress is, both with the Hindoos and the Mahommedans, an indication of 
 their Cast, and a badge of their respective distinctions and places in society ; and when it is 
 recollected how obstinately the Indians of all descriptions adhere to their Customs, and with 
 what difficulty the Natives were brought to adopi many parts of their present Military Dress, 
 it will not aj)j)ear surprising that some of the late innovations in that respect were oifensive to 
 their feelings. 
 
 The Sepoys appear to have felt, that the wearing of the new Tarband wouldmake them 
 come to be considered as Europeans, and would have removed them from the society and in- 
 tercourse of their own Casts. 
 
 We did not think it material to ascertain how far every article of Dress which they have 
 complained of was repugnant to their religious tenets, or unreasonable in itself — prejudices 
 would cease to be so- coidd they be regulated by reason. 
 
 We shall not dwell particularly upon that part of the Order which respected the efl^acing 
 from the forehead the Marks of Cast, as it has nut been specified to us as a cause of grievance, 
 tiio'.'gh one of the Battalions appears to have previously carried it into execution ; we may be
 
 71 
 
 allowed, however, to supposse tliat it was not wiiliout its effect upon the minds of individuals ; 
 in the same Corps the Turband was not complained of, yet we know tiiat it led to the Mutiny. 
 
 These distinctions of Cast add to the personal importance of the individual with socielj-, 
 and create a sense of honour whicii operates more strongly than the fear of punishment in the 
 prevention of crimes. 
 
 In this Country the prejudices of the conquered have always triumphed over the arms of 
 the conqueror ; and have subsisted amidst all the revolutions and shocks to which the Empire 
 has been subjected ; any innovation therefore in that respect must be calculated to call forth 
 their feelings, and the more trivial the object required to be sacrificed, the stronger, in our 
 opinion, woidtl the reluctance be to make it. Nothing could appear more trivial to the Pnl)lic 
 Interests than the length of the hair on the upper lip of a Sepoy ; yet to the individual himself 
 the shape and fashion of the Whisker is a badge of his Cast,, and an article of his lleligion ; 
 and the sanctity in which this article is held lias occasioned Revolutions in <lifferent Eastern 
 Nations rather than suffer it to be violated. 
 
 VV'e shall now remark on the second cause assigned, viz. the Residence of the Families 
 of the late Tippoo Sultan at Vellore. 
 
 Accommodations were here provided for them, nearly resembling a palace in maornifi- 
 cence, and an establishment allowed them on a very extensive scale of liberality : their fol- 
 lowers had emigrated in great numbers to Vellore ; and husbands for the Princesses were al- 
 lowed to come from different quarters of the Country. These persons naturally brought alono- 
 with them their former attachments and prejudices ; and the interests of Seringapatam were 
 transplanted with its inhabitants to the Carnatic : speaking the same language, and foilovvino- 
 the same religion, connections were easily formed ; and amongst men who were not much 
 occupied with the engagements of trade or business, schemes of power and ambition would 
 naturally occur to those who had been born to enjoy them. 
 
 Under other circumstances, the Turband, &,c. might have proved offensive to the Se- 
 poys ; but when we look to some former Insurrections amongst the Troops, and remember 
 (and it falls within the jiersonal knowledge of some of us) the civility with which the men dis- 
 tinguish their Officers, and the point of honour which they seemed to feel in doing so, we 
 cannot but think that the outrages on the late occasion were of foreig.n growth, and could only 
 have been inspired by a barbarous Enemy. 
 
 On the whole, we draw from the Evidence now before us, the following conclusions : 
 
 That the late Innovation as to the Dress and Appearance of the Sepoys was the leading 
 cause of the Mutiny : and the other was, the Residence of the Family of the late I'ippoo 
 Sultan at Vellore. 
 
 All of which is humbly submitted by, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 &c. &c. 
 (Signed) J. PATER, President, 
 
 Vellore, 9th August, 1806. &.c. Members of Commission. 
 
 PRESIDENT'S MINUTE, 
 
 IT being expedient that the Gentlemen composing the Commission held at 
 Vellore should repair to their stations without loss of time, I recommend that the Commission 
 be dissolved.
 
 72 
 
 As the Report of the Commission as to the Causes of the Mutiny has the entire concurrence 
 of my opinion, and as the Court of Directors will naturally require our sentiments upon this 
 important subject, I beg leave to move, that it be resolved to confirm the opinion of the Com- 
 mission, anil to approve of the manner in which the Report has been drawn up. 
 
 (Signed) W. BENTINCK, 
 
 Fort St. George, lith August, 1806. 
 
 A Resolution was passed agreeably to this Minute, 
 
 (O 
 
 PRESIDENT'S MINUTE. 
 
 ALTHOUGH some parts of the Letters and Inclosures of the Commander in 
 Chief under date the 20th July, seem to require remarks and explanation from me, I deem it 
 notwithstanding more advisable, under all the circumstances, to observe silence, and to re- 
 serve such opinions as it may be absolutely incumbent upon me to give, till the Report of the 
 Committee shall have been received ; there is, however, one subject in that Letter relative to 
 a Note annexed by the Commander in Chief to Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes's Answers to certain 
 Queries put to him by Sir John Cradock, which, as it is about to be transmitted to Bengal, 
 does not admit of being entirely passed over. 
 
 The Note is to the following purjoort : 
 
 " Whatever Regulations were adopted for the Army were submitted to Government, and 
 " remained many weeks in their possession for examination, and were returned approved. 
 
 (Signed) J. F. CRADOCK." 
 
 Messrs. Petrie and Strange, as well as myself, being conscious of our entire ignorance of 
 the existence of the particular Order in question, and feeling also that the specific manner in 
 which the reference had been made, relieved us from all responsibility attaching to it ; we 
 conceived that the Commander in Chief would prefer the omission of the Note, rather than the 
 transmission of it, accompanied by our comments. Under this idea, our Letter dated the 1 9th 
 July was written to the Commander iiia Chief. Sir J. Cradock, in reply, has stated, " Ih 
 " respect to the Note at the bottom of Colonel Forbes's Letter, I cannot consent tiiat it should 
 " not appear before the Supreme Government. In all cases, the exact display is best, and 
 " the due inferences are better drawn." 
 
 The fact, as stated by the Commander in Chief, " That the Regulations were submitted 
 " to the Government ; that they were many weeks in the ]3ossession of the Government ; and 
 " were finally returned approved ;" is perfectly true : and the conclusion from this statement 
 unaccompanied by explanation would unite the Governor in Council with the Commander in 
 Chief in a full participation of the responsibility which may attach to those Orders. 
 
 On the ground of responsibility, I must state my confidence that the affairs of this Pre- 
 sidency, and indeed of the Empire at large, have not suff"ered by any timidity of action on 
 the part of this Government, nor by any considerations of a personal nature. I hope it will 
 appear that the general welfare has always been our main object, and that we even have made 
 ourselves accountable when the strict line of our duty would have authorized inaction : on the 
 other hand, I cannot ])ermit myself to consent to share either the merit or demerit of trans- 
 actions in which I cannot feel that I have been a party. 
 
 It will be necessary to go somewhat back, in order to place in a distinct view the feelings 
 entertained by the Governor in Council upon this particular point. 
 
 It may be recollected, that so early as March 180.5, the Commander in Chief sttbmitted 
 to the Board, his opinion of the indispensable necessity of bringing into a general view, tJie 
 several Orders and Regulations that comprehend the Military System. It is stated, " The
 
 73 
 
 " Commander in Chief has it only in contemplation to reduce into one view the several 
 " Orilers in Force, and which &re alreadj/ sanctioned hy Government : but should any slight al- 
 " teration appear obviously necessary, or it be found requisite to introduce a few circumstances 
 " of Discipline or interior Economy of the later practice m England, such «(W Mcittt-y will lie 
 " distinguished in the Manuscript that will be submitted for the linal approbation of Govern- 
 -" ment." 
 
 This compilation was accordingly prepared, and presented to the Board in JaniTary 1806, 
 together with a iNIinute from the Conniiandcr in Chief, in which Sir John Craiiock oi)serves, 
 " In this compilation the existing Orders have been considered, as far as is consistent with a 
 " due preservation of their spirit and meaning ; and to them I have added such others as I 
 " consider calculated to improve the service, &c." 
 
 " The whole is comprised in 27 Sections, alphabetically arranged ; and the additional 
 " Orders to which I request the attention of the Board, as requiring the sancti.isn of Govern- 
 '* ment, are as follow." 
 
 Upon reference to the enumeration of these additional Orders, it will be found that the 
 paragraph 10 of Section XI. which has since been revoked, is not included. 
 
 The Government passed a Resolution approving of the compilation, and expressing a 
 favourable opinion of the mode in which this laborious work had been completed by the De- 
 puty Adjut int-Gencral, to whom it had been ofHcially intrusteti. 
 
 The Detail here given would seem to ]jreciude the necessity of any observation. The 
 assurance of the exact nature of the compilation from the Otiicer officially charged by our 
 superior Authorities with the superintendence of these details, was entitled to our entire be- 
 lief; and the perusal of near (3ne Hundred and Fifty Folio Sheets of Regimental Orders, 
 about Drill, Discipline, and Dress, already asserted to be in usage, and sanctioned, could not 
 have been required of me, and formed no part of my diitv. 
 
 What I was really called upon to do, I conscientiously performed, by examining that 
 part of the Orders said to be New, to which the Commander in Chief drew the attention of 
 the Board, and required its sanction. To those additional Orders alone could our approval 
 be reasonably understood to have been given : to those was our approbation asked ; to those 
 alone was it given. They, as well as I recollect, were for the most part of a financial nature, 
 and could not be carried into effect without the sanction of Council. The remainder consisted 
 of Military Details actually under execution by the authority of the Commander in Chief. 
 The Governor in Council did their duty in revoking the Order when it came to their know- 
 ledge. 
 
 As we have seen the great importance of the Dress of the Soldiers in this Countrv, 
 and of the dangerous consequences which may follow any innovation upon it, I would 
 beg leave to recommend that a Resolution be passed, that no alteration whatever in the 
 Dress of the Soldier, or in the external marks and fashions of his Cast, shoidd take place 
 without the previous sanction of Government. I would recommend that this Resolution should 
 be transmitted to the Commander in Chief, in order that it may form a Record of the Adju- 
 tant-General's Office. 
 
 (Signed) W. BENTINCK. 
 
 Fort Si. George, July 25lh, 1806. 
 
 ( ^n ) 
 
 Extract from Mr. Pclrie's Minute, dated July 20t[i, 1S06. 
 
 <' IN conciuTinn' with the Right Honourable the President in his Minute of 
 the 25th Instant, and in disclaiming all previous knowledge of the Orders tor introducing cer- 
 tain alterations in the Dress and distinguishing Marks of the Sepoys, I beg leave to explain 
 
 L
 
 74 
 
 that I do not thereby, in the most remote degree, mean to impute blame to the Commander 
 ill Chief, whose vigilance in command stands altogether unimpeached, under every circum- 
 stance of the late unhappy events." 
 
 Extract from Mr. Strange' s Minnie, dated Juli/ 31, 1806. 
 
 " AS an individual Member of Council, I deem it sufficient for me to aver, 
 " in concurrence with Mr. Petrie, and for the reasons detailed by the Right Honourable the 
 " President, that in sanctioning the General Code, we remained unapprised of the particular 
 " Orders." 
 
 (n) 
 
 TO MAJOR PIERCE, &c. &c. &c. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 IN addition to what I addressed to you the other day, in respect to explanatioir 
 
 concerning Orders that have been much adverted to — 
 
 I ;ini now oliliged to press the subject further, from a communication I have received from 
 his Lordship in Council, wherein it is stated that the attention of Government was not drawn to 
 that paragraph, because I had promised that whenever there was the slightest alteration from 
 the former Orders, such difference should appear distinguished ; and that " this Order was- 
 " not noted." 
 
 The remark from Government is very just ; and I am required to ask from you the state- 
 ment of the case, for it must be in perfect recollection that my instructions to you were, " to 
 " mark in red-ink" every deviation from the last Book of Regulations. 
 
 (Signed) J. F. CRADOCK, 
 
 Jidi/ 16, 1806. Lieuteuant-General. 
 
 TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, &c. &c. &c. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 I HAVE the honour of replying to your Excellency's Letter of to-day's date, 
 by stating, to the best of my recollection, what occurred on the subject of revising the Regu- 
 lations of the Service. 
 
 When your Excellency was pleased to express to me your intention, that the Regulations 
 then considered those of the Service, though mostly obsolete, should be revised, you accom- 
 panied it by instructions that the Regulations to be framed should, as far as might be practi- 
 cable, be assimilated to the customs and usages of His Majesty's Service ; your Excellency 
 observing, that you would assign to the Government your motive for adopting such as were in 
 force in His Majesty's Service, in preference to what might hitherto have been the practice 
 of this Service, in every instance that required the confirmation of Government. 
 
 I regret that I cannot call to my remembrance your Excellency's particular injunction td 
 note every deviation and addition in red ink, but merely in general terms, that they should 
 be brought to the notice of Govermnent ; and such as were not founded upon existing Orders, 
 and appeared to me to require the confirmation of Goverimient, were accordingly pointed out 
 in your Excellency's Minute, that accompanied the proposed compilation when submitted to 
 the Council.
 
 
 • Under the generally-adopted opinion in this Service, that the Commander in (^liief is 
 vested with tlie power of regulating tiie Discipline and Detail of the Army, in which 1 had 
 ever supposed to he included us Diess as well as Us Appearance, from having invariably ob- 
 served that all Orders on those subjects proceeded from that v^uthority, I did not understand 
 it to be expected that the paragraph in question, as relating solely to a point of etiqrette con- 
 nected witli the Military Appearance of a Soldier, should be brought to the notice of Govern- 
 ment; and doing so, it was consecjucntly omitted. 
 
 In corroboration of what I have now stated, I beg leave to refer to the first paragraph of 
 your Excellency's Mniute, that was laid before Goveriuiient, with the revised Code, which, 
 as gc'neral Regulations for a Service at large, necessarily comprised Orders emanating from 
 dilferent Authorities. 
 
 I have the honour to be, ike. 
 
 ' (Signed) FRED. PIERCE, 
 
 Madi-as, July 26, 1806. Dep. Adj. -Gen. 
 
 MINUTE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF. 
 
 I HAVE viewed with extreme concern some Papers lately transmitted from 
 T;he Supreme Government upon the subject of the Mutiny at Vellore, as they contain senti- 
 ments of a very opposite nature from those I entertain, and have expressed; and if I am to 
 yield to their reasoning and force, I cannot but feel that ail the opinions I have given, and 
 the measures I advised, are subject to disapprobation. 
 
 Wliile I am aware it is the acknowledged duty of this Government, and all its Members, 
 to pay implicit obedience to the orders of the Supreme Authority, and not to hesitate upon 
 any act enjoined ; yet I trust it will not be considered that I overstep the bounds of inferior 
 station, as a Member of this Council, if I still express my doubt " upon opinions," though 
 they proceed from the highest and most respected source. The events of the present hour 
 are not alone considered, but futurity may' demand the reti'ospect of past proceedings and 
 delivered sentiments. 
 
 Under this impression, I take the liberty to record the copy of a Statement I thought it 
 my duty to send to the Authorities in England, of the Mutiny at Vellore, which, arising in 
 an Army entrusted to my command, cannot fail to give me perpetual solicitude. 
 
 I rest m}' judgment upon the variety and extent of evidence I have seen, the advantage 
 of much local information, and the concurrent testimony of the Army, not unsupported by 
 the public voice. 
 
 The Report I submit is the issue of direct evidence and official document. It is not lia- 
 ble to disproof. 
 
 The whole question is now before the Publick. 
 
 It comprehends but Two points. Was the introduction of the Turband the original 
 cause of all mischief ? ^V^as it just, or otherwise, to remove the Mysore Family from Vel- 
 lore .' The first is in all the warmth of argument, and perhaps must await, for proof, the 
 lapse of time ; but the other, " that presses upon the character of this Government," is easier 
 answered, without depending for support upon the acclamation that urged the measure of 
 removal (for a wise Administration must often withstand popular impulse) : I would give as 
 my reply", " That I believe every man in India, a friend to the British Government, would 
 " object to their return." 
 
 (Signed) J. F. CRADOCK, 
 
 Madras, October 2 Sth, 1806. Lieutenant-General.
 
 76 
 
 Vide Colonel 
 A^nt\v's, and 
 Major Pierce's 
 Letters. 
 
 A. Syed, and 
 Rajahpoot. 
 
 Court of In- 
 quirj', 14th 
 May, 180G— 
 Vellore. 
 
 Court of In- 
 quiry. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel 
 I'orbes'a Evi- 
 dence. 
 
 THE late unhappy event at Vellore has led to wide diversity of opinions ; and 
 arguments may have been so conducted, as perhaps rather to disguise truth, than convey 
 information. 
 
 The object of the following Statement is therefore to recur to original circumstances, to 
 tix a date prior to the fatal catastrophe on the 10th July, and to give a plain narrative of 
 transactions, each step of which is accompanied by official documents. 
 
 The explanation so much involves the acts of the Commander in Chief at Madras, that 
 it is necessary a great part of the detail should proceed in his name. 
 
 It is stated, and to a certain degree believed, that the introduction of a new Turband in 
 the Native Army, an Order to prohibit the Marks of Cast on the forehead of the Sepoys on 
 parade, with innoyations upon their former Dress, in the obligation to wear stocks, white 
 waistcoats, feathers, pantaloons, &c. had created so much disnfi'ection in their minds, as pro- 
 duced the Massacre at Vellore. But the question chiefly rests on the Turband ; the other 
 circumstances are only accounted auxiliaries; for though the restriction upon the Marks might 
 naturally be thought the prevailing point, yet through the long course of examination it 
 scarcely appears in operation. 
 
 From great variety in the Turband of the Arm3', and the one generally in use being ill- 
 suited to convenience, and very heavy ; upon the representation of the Adjutant-General 
 and the Deputy, it came into contemplation to direct a common pattern for the whole service, 
 and ihe arrangement was left to these officers, of whose experience and local knowledge the 
 Commander in Chief could entertain no doubt. At length, Turbands made up under their 
 direction were presented to him upon the heads of Sepoys introduced for that purpose, and 
 they seemed entitled to commendation. 
 
 The business of making them up proceeded universally, and without remark, till atten- 
 tion was excited by a spirit of opposition in the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment at Vellore, 
 who declared that the Turbands were offensive, and infringed upon their Casts. 
 
 As circumstances of extreme insubordination marked the conduct of the corps at that 
 period, and there appeared nothing that could justify the supposition that any real objection 
 did exist, it seemed required that measures to support discipline should be immediately 
 adopted ; and some of the ringleaders were confined, and sent to Madras for trial. 
 
 At that moment, too fully illustrated by subsequent acts, the conduct of the Native 
 Commissioned Officers was most suspicious ; not one appeared active in his duty, they all 
 seemed to enjo)- the rising discontents; and at the same time, to strengthen evil circumstance 
 and ignorance, ihey all declared the Turband free from objection, and persisted in the same 
 avowal upon the subsequent Court of Inquiry at Vellore. 
 
 It is in evidence that the first opposition to the introduction of the Turband, by the 2nd 
 Battalion of the 4th Regiment at Vellore, was manifested before they had ever seen it; and 
 that an agreement had been made between the 1st Battalion of the 1st Regiment, qiiartei'ed 
 also in Vellore, and the 2iid Battalion of the same Corps, marching past, not to wear it. 
 though in equal ignorance of its appearance, formation, or materials. 
 
 To perfect tlie view that the revolt was not a resistance to an article of Dress, that in the 
 wound it gave to Casts or prejudices might in this country give birth to acts the most extrava- 
 gant — that it was not an explosion of injured feelings, that might destroy every jirincipje of 
 allegiance or humanity, but that silent secret treason was the object ; the chief Conspirator, 
 Shaik Cossim Jemidar, in the 1st Regiment, a few days previous to the insurrection, upon 
 being questioned by his Commanding Officer if any dissatisfaction existed, offered, " in the 
 " presence of the other Native Officers," to place the Koran on his head, (the most solemn 
 appeal to truth,) and swear that there was none, and that the whole Corps were forward to 
 wear the Turband. 
 
 The Court of Inquiry established by the Commander in Chief at Vellore as he proceeded 
 to Mysore, consisted of Lieutenant-Colonel M'Kerras, Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes, and 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Marriott, the two former commanding Battalions, and the latter the Pay- 
 master to Tippoo's family — officers distinguished for their knowledge of the languao-e and the 
 Native customs; and the proceedings will fully evince that no objection to the Turband was
 
 77 
 
 then discoveraljle, and the private opinion those Officers were requested to give upon the subject 
 
 to the Coinniaiider in Cliiet'; a preference to the i'ornier I'lirband in many particulars appears, 
 
 and a declaration that in no shape it inlerlered with Cast or prejudice. Attention is only R,'.port"%'t*i 
 
 directed to the aUeration oC some tajje, and trifles of that nature. May, I'soe. 
 
 The Commander in (,"liicf then proceeded to Mysore, and gave directions for the Trial of 
 the Prisoners l)ei"ore a Native Court iXlartial at ttie Presidency. 
 
 At each Trial evidence was produced from persons of the highest Cast, that the Turband Vide the 
 was free from any objection whatsoever. The Prisoners were found guihy, and sentenced *^''"''*- 
 to corporal punishment. 
 
 The C^ommander in Chief, being anxious that Government should be acquainted with 
 every circumstance, and feeling that his absence from the Presidency might lead to ignorance 
 of tne real state of the case, directed the Adjutant-General to lay ail the Proceedings of the Vide Order to 
 Trials before the Right Honourable the Governor, and follow such measures as the Council Gmeri\^\l'x'h 
 might please to direct. Tlie result-was, that two of the Ivingleaders of the 2nd Battalion of and zutli June, 
 the 4th Regiment were punished, and the rest, upon their apparent contrition, pardoned. 
 
 No further intelligence reached the Commander in Chief at Nundydroog till tlie latter 
 end of June, when he received a very impressive representation from an experienced and 
 able Otiicer, that the Turband had occasioned great discontent in the Army, and earnestly 
 reconmiended a repeal of the Order. 
 
 The Commander in Chief at once adopted the resolution of confiding his embarrassment 
 to the Government, and submitted the following secret reference to tlie Rigiit Honourable 
 the Governor in Council. 
 
 " (Secret.) 
 
 " Nundi/drocg, June 29//:, 180G. 
 
 " MY LORD, 
 
 " I MUST have recourse to your Lordship's judgment, and that of the Coun- 
 " cil, to relieve me from great anxiety and embarrassment upon the sul)ject of the Turbands, 
 " the full particulars of which case are so well known to your Lordship, and upon the pro- 
 " ceetliiigs, from my absence, I have already requested your Lordship's personal direction. 
 
 " The introduction of this Turband originated from the advice and under the superin- 
 " tendance of Colonel Agnew, the Adjutant-General, and Major Pierce, the Deputy Adju- 
 " tant-General ; and as an alteration Irom the former one appeared wanting, I thonolu I 
 " could not confide so simple a matter to better hands, or Officers of more local exjierience. 
 
 " I have the strongest reasons to suppose, that almost universal objection arises atrainst 
 " the Turband ; and though force and punishment may overcome individual opposition, yet 
 " the firm dislike does not abate, and the frequent recurrence of severity may produce, 
 " thouorh it may be remote, bad consequences. 
 
 " 1 am as aware as the human mind can possess the sentiment, that opposition to Mili- 
 " tary and just authority cannot be yielded to, and that the attempt must be crushed in its 
 " earliest stage. Tliis is the sole reasoning towards a Briiish Soldier; and, were it purely- a 
 " British case, I should neitlier feel embarrassment, or should 1 thus trouble your Lordship 
 " in Council. 
 
 " But upon the prejudices of India, tlie force of Cast, which in its various shape no 
 " European may jjcrfectly comprehend, it is allowable even in a Soldier's mind to pause, 
 •' and solicit the advice of the Head and his companions in the Government. 
 
 " The question is not confined to the ignorant Soldiery, it is the subject of conversation 
 " amono- the best-informed Officers ; and my intelligence from Seringapatam, where there is 
 "" a numerous garrison, is, that it is the common cry, t/iat the next attempt will be to viake 
 " the Sepoys Christians. 
 
 " I lay before your Lordship, in confidence, a ]irivate Letter from Colonel Brunton ;. 
 " and the same sentiment prevails with many other moderate and discreet Officers.
 
 78 
 
 " Still it is my wish, and the best judgment I can apply to the untoward subject, to pef- 
 •' severe and conquer prejudice, as perhaps the least evil ; but where consequences may en- 
 " sue of a disadvantageous nature, and even tlie source of our recruiting at stake, so difficult 
 " at all times, with due selection and effect, I am not satisfied in my own mind to persevere 
 " to the full extent, without recurrence to your Lordship's advice, and the sanction of 
 " Government. 
 
 (Signed) "J. F. CRADOCK, 
 
 Lieutenant- General." 
 
 The Commander in Chief thus endeavoured to unite Military principles with the strictest 
 caution, and was prepared to follow such steps as the best i^iformation, and the sanction of 
 the highest aulhorily, should dictate. 
 
 The Government honoured him with an answer, and proposed the issue of an Order to 
 the Army. The determination was expressed to enforce the Turband, as the opposition arose 
 from " ignorant clamour, unfounded on any principk ;" but, at the same time, to respect the 
 Usages and Customs of the Native Troops on all occasions. 
 
 Both ai)peareti to the Commander in Chief highly proper, and calculated to produce the 
 best remedy in a case of extreme embarrassment. The Order was not issued, as Govern- 
 ment, with whom the decision remained, on account of the Commander in Chief's absence 
 from Madras, did not deem it necessary. The following are the most material Extracts from 
 .this Correspondence. 
 
 PUBLIC LETTER TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF. 
 
 " July 4t/i, 1S06. 
 " (Secret Department.) 
 
 "IF there had been reason to sup|)ose that the late change of Dress was liable 
 to the objection of militating against the Religious Principles of the inhabitants of this 
 Country, we should hare hud no hesitation in immediately recommending to ^ our Excellency 
 the relinquishment of the intention to establish the proposed change ; but as it appears 
 from the evidence taken in the late Enquiry at Vellore, that no objection of this nature 
 exists, we certainly deem it advisable that the alternative of yielding to the clamour arising 
 from an unfounded 2:>rejudice, should, if possible, be avoided. 
 
 (Signed) " W. BENTINCK." 
 
 GENERAL ORDER BY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 " Ju/y 4-//I, 1806. 
 
 " THE Right Honourable the Governor in Council having been informed by 
 " his Excellency the Commander in Chief of the opposition which has, in some instances, 
 " been experienced in establishing an alteration which it was deemed expedient to ad«>pt in 
 " the form of the Turband in use among the Nali\c Corps of this Establishment, bis Lord- 
 " ship in Council is Jed to express his extreme regret tliat any part of the Native Army, 
 " whose merits have been so frequently extolled and rewarded by this Govcninient, could 
 " have suffered itself to be deluded by an unfounded clamour. , 
 
 " It will be in every instance the wish of the Right Honourable the Governor in Coun- 
 " cil, to evince a sacred regard for the Religious Principles of the Native Troops, as well a^ 
 " of all other inhal)itants of this Country; but in the [)rtsent case it appears, after the 
 " strictest enquiry, and according to the testiaiony of Natives of the highest Cast, that die
 
 79 
 
 *' opposition which has been experienced in the late change of Turbands is destitute of any 
 " fouiidation ill either the I.aw or usage of tiie Mahomcdan or Hindoo Religions; and any 
 " persons who may persevere in that opposition cannot, in consequence, fail to be sub- 
 " jected to tlie severest penalties of military discipline." 
 
 " (Secret.) 
 
 " JVimdi/droog, Jufj/ 9//i, 1806.. 
 " MY LORD, 
 
 " I HAVE been much honoured this morning by tlie receipt of the Letter 
 " from your Lordship in Council, upon the subject of the Turbands, and feel myself pecu- 
 " liarly gratified by the transmission of the proposed Order by Government previous to its 
 " circulation. 
 
 " I take the liberty to express my entire concurrence with the spirit and terms of the 
 " Order, as every way. calculated to preserve just authority, and to alia}' any prejudices that 
 " may exist upon the imputed disregard to the righ's attached to Cast, or ancient Custom. 
 " The point was of infinite embarrassment; and if any act was to be resorted to bevond the 
 " immediate and constant vindication of violated discipline, as it might arise, I conceive that 
 " an Order from Government of this nature \vould seem to promise the best eifect. 
 
 " 1 will confess, thai by the present communication with Government, I have gained 
 " the object I had in view, which was, to receive from them an unresen'ed opinion as to the 
 " propriety of full coercion, should it prove necessary, but which, situated as this Country 
 " is, buried in the absurdities of Cast or prejudice, dear to them as existence, I was fejrful 
 " to take a step of any doubt, without ex|)licit knowledge and the sanction <)f Government. 
 
 " Since I last had the honour to address your Lordship in Council, I have heard nothing 
 " more, which silence leads me to hope that the disinclination to the Turband has b.^come 
 " more feeble, or, perliaps, that reports have been exaggerated. Under this view, it may 
 " be judicious to postpone the pidilication of the Order, either to let the subject fall to the 
 ground, as no longer the interposition of Government is retjuired, or to reassume the issue, 
 as your Lordship in Council may determine by future event. 
 
 (Signed) " J. F. CRADOCK, 
 
 Lieutenant- General." 
 
 b 
 
 The Commander in Chief has thus explicitly detailed all circumstances relative to the. 
 Turband, anterior to the loth of .July, that the public mind may form its judgment according 
 to first principles, and not suffer undue impression from any course of event The appella- 
 tion of obnoxious Order ma}' now be attached to the measure, but the public act of the 
 Council, that declared the Turband free from objection, that imputed the opposition to 
 " unfounded clamour^'' and " groiindlfss discontent,''' and the private act of the Right Honour- 
 able the Governor, who after deliberate enquiry, and at a late period, expressed his desire 
 that his Cor]js of Fencibles should wear it, will surely have weight to recal the unmerited; 
 epithet, and re-instate original sentiment. 
 
 It is unnecessary to go through the painful recital of the atrocious Revolt and Massacre 
 on the 10th of July at Vellore ; tlie fatal occurrences are within universal information. They 
 comprehend every case of disloyalty, treachery, and horror. The whole was planned with 
 unequalled secrecy and concealment. The object was to destroy every Luropean, ami place 
 a sou of Tippoo at the liead of a Moorish Government. \i ith this view, letters were ready, 
 or even were dispatched to the Mahrattas and to disaffected Chieftains at Cuddapah, in the MUit.in- Court 
 Ceded Districts, and Vancatigherry, in the Carnatic, to excite a general hostility. Indiscri- of Inquiry, 
 minaie fury and slaughter raged for many hours, and wretches were seen tottering from the 
 Hospital to partake m the bloody scene ; whilst the British soldiers were dragged from the
 
 80 
 
 ■ieut.-Colonel 
 "orbes's Ru- 
 ort. 
 
 Viile Proclama- 
 tion of the 
 CummaiidtT in 
 CiiicC-Vi'Uore, 
 14 July; ami 
 other Papers 
 addressed to 
 IJoyernineut. 
 
 same asylum, and devoted to a deliberate death. Fatal in&truction extended so far, that even 
 the Sepoy boys armed themselves with their carbines of exercise, and lent their aid to the ge- 
 neral destruction. 
 
 To what extent the calamity may have reached, it is impossible to say : most happily a 
 body of Cavalry arrived from Arcot under the intrepid Colonel Gillespie, performed a mili- 
 tary wonder, and regained possession of the Fortress, rescued the brave survivors of the 69th 
 Ren-iment reduced to the last extremity, and closed this scene of cruelty and cowardice. 
 
 Upon the arrival of the Commander in Chief at Vellore, on the 3d morning s'.tter the 
 dreadful event, it appeared to be the leading principle to conciliate and restore confidence, 
 to banish apprehension or suspicions of every natme, and jjin-sue the paths ot justice and 
 spirit ; — while innocence was to be discovered from tlie mass of apparent crime, and protected 
 with ardent zeal, the firm punishment of the guilty seemed equally necessary ; and the 
 unparalleled outrage against the British name and existence was to be vindicated in the sio-nal, 
 chastisement of the savage perpetrators. Against them alone was punishment to direct its 
 just reprisal. Towards all others, polic)^, good principles, and judgments, seemed to dictate 
 the full exertion of every former feeling of confidence and cordiality. The Indian Ciiaracter 
 would understand this distinction, and not confound the operation of generosity with appre- 
 hension. 
 
 The whole dispensation seemed to require the earliest pj-acticable termination, that the 
 progress of oblivion migiit commence. 
 
 Tiiese principles actuated the Commander in Chief from the beginning, while at Vellore, 
 and still direct his conduct. 
 
 Before the active causes of the insurrection at Vellore are entered upon, it appears ne- 
 cessary that the Order to prohibit the Marks of Cast on Parade, and the wearing Ear-rings, 
 &.C. should be adverted to, and explanation given on this subject. The Commander in Chief 
 lias already delivered his opinions on this subject ; and what belongs to a Statement of this 
 nature is only to mark circumstances as they really are, and not to condemn or extenuate the 
 alleged Usage of the Service, which does prevail on the Madras Establishment, and, it is 
 stated, the Bengal also. 
 
 Captain Sydenham, the Resident at Hyderabad, writes in these terms : 
 " Many Corps on the Madras Establishment, and almost all the Corps in Bengal, which 
 are composed of Hindoos of the highest Cast, never use their distinguishing Marks on 
 Duty. The Orders did not apply to the Mussulmans, who certainly were the most active 
 " both in receiving and exciting the unfavourable impressions which led to discontent." 
 
 It hatl been found necessary to collect into one Code the several Regulations of the Mi- 
 litary Service ; and the work was allotted, by the Order of Government, to the Deputy Ad- 
 jutant-General of the Army, Major I'ierce, an Officer of 25 years' experience in India, and 
 who seemed in every respect most qualified for the task. 
 
 As a general instruction, the Commander in Chief directed Major Pierce to note with 
 red ink all matter in the least diiferent from former practice or usage ; that, when the Book 
 was snbmitteil to Government for their saiu:tion, attention might be attracted to any alteration. 
 When the Deputy Adjutant-Gciieral reported the work prepared, the Commander in 
 Chief assemided the Adjutant-General Lieutenant-Colonel Agnevv, 'the Ciuarter-Master-Ge- 
 iieral Lieutenant-Colonel Orr, and the Deputy Adjutant-General Major Pierce ; and the Re- 
 gulations were read by himself on many successive days, and discussed paragraph by para- 
 graph. When tiie Order in question, to prohibit the Marks of Cast, &c. under arms, ap- 
 peared in its turn, it immediately attracted the Couunander in Chief's attention, as impolitic 
 interference with the Customs and Prejudices of the Inhabitants. 
 
 The Adjutant-General and the Peputy (on this daj' the Quarter-Master-General hap^ 
 pened to be absent) assured the Commander in Chief, that it was the invariable practice of the 
 Service, that in no well-regulated Corps was it ever pcrmittetl ; and appealed to the Commander 
 in Chief's personal observation among the Battalions he had inspected, wheth.er he had re- 
 marked such distinctions. The Commander in Chief, as a stranger, and with an oj)mion only 
 funned from books, could not oppose such arguments ; and, anxious to leave undisturbed the 

 
 81 
 
 usual course of a Sepoj' Battalion, and instead of introducing, to resist innovation, he snfTered 
 the insertion of the Order. A few extracts of the Correspondence that has taken place, on 
 this part of the subject, will place the question in the true point of view. 
 
 a 
 
 LETTER FROM SIR J. F. CRADOCK TO COLONEL AGNEW, 
 
 Julj/ 15, 1806. 
 
 " BUT upon the other points, the Abolition of the Marks of Cast from the 
 forehead of the Sepoys, and the measurement of the Mustaches to a Military pattern, &.c. as 
 expressed in the Order, as the rumour now stands, and I may say accredited by 
 Government and others, I do feel the greatest inquietude, that it is in the power of possi- 
 bility, that infringements of the rights and prejudices of the Natives, dear to them as life, 
 should originate with me, who, I will say, as much as any man in India, respect those im- 
 memorial usages. I therefore, my dear Sir, must call upon you, and Major Pierce, who 
 compded the Orders, to give eveiy explanation on this particular point, whether any inno- 
 vation has been introduced, or is it only a continuance of the long practice in the Army ? 
 
 " As such I understood it from you, when the Orders to be published were read by me, 
 in the presence of yourself. Major Pierce, and Colonel Orr, expressly that I might derive 
 information from sucii lengthened experience as those Officers possessed upon local points ; 
 and I recollect adverting to the Order in question, when I was assured that it was the es- 
 tablished Military Custom ; and had I not sanctioned its common course, I must have 
 conceived, I was induced by self-sentiment to overthrow the usual established Rule of a 
 Sepoy Regiment. 
 
 (Signed) J. F. CRADOCK." 
 
 THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL COLONEL AGNEW'S REPLY TO 
 SIR JOHN CRADOCK. 
 
 " Vellore, 1 S Jid^, 1 806. 
 
 " I NOW reply to the second part of your Excellency's enquiry ; and trust 
 *' this statement will fully shew, that nothing was further from your Excellency's intentions 
 " than any interference with the Customs of Cast. 
 
 " The total want in many of the Native Corps of any Standing Orders for the ordinary 
 " routine of Regimental Duty and interior Arrangement, and the glaring deficiencies in those 
 " which existed in other Corps, had been brought to public notice in the course of the iiispec- 
 " tion of Corps. The Deputy Adjutant-General, then employed by appointment of Govern- 
 *' ment in revising the existing Code of Regulations, undertook to prepare a body of Standing 
 " Orders for a Battalion of Native Infantry, by which the whole Army should in future be 
 " guided ; a;ul he referred to a former approved system of this kind while preparing that which 
 was submitted to your Excellency for approval." 
 
 The I 0th paragraph of the Xlth of these Orders is as follows : 
 
 " It is ordered by the Regulations, that a Native Soldier shall 7tot mark his face to denote 
 " his Cast, or wear Ear-rings, when dressed in his uniform ; and it is further directed, that 
 " at all Parades, and upon all Duties, every Soldier of the Battalion shall be clean shaved on 
 " the Chin. It is directed also, that Uniformity shall, as far as practicable, be preserved in 
 " regard to the Quantity and Shape of the Hair upon the upper Lip." 
 
 " This paragraph, when read by Major Pierce, I coubidei-ed as the mere recital of what 
 " had been long practised in well-regulated Corps under the received Custom of the Senice, 
 " although, like many other Customs, not especially directed by any formal Order, or always 
 
 M
 
 82 
 
 " rigidly enforced ; an opinion 1 joined in expressing when your Excellency stated your dislike 
 " to touch in any shape on the Custom of Cast, certainly not conceiving it to be a novel ijino- 
 " vation, but what Custom, if not remote Regulations, had long established. 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 P. A. AGNEW." 
 
 SIR JOHN CRADOCK TO MAJOR PIERCE, DEPUTY ADJUTANT-GENERAL 
 
 TO THE ARMY. 
 
 *' Julj/ 24, 1S06. 
 
 " BUT I view the Clause to abolish the Distinction of Cast, &c. in the 
 <' gravest light, and such, both as to sense and National Interest in India, as to call for unre- 
 " served proceeding, and to fix the error (if not to be done awa}') wh. re it should lie. 
 
 " You will recollect, that previous to the submission to Government of the Body of Stand- 
 " ing Orders, I employed many days in reading over all the Orders that you had taken the 
 •' trouble to collect ; and which work was entrusted to you by Government, not only as the 
 *' Deputy Adjutant-General, but an Otiicer of long military exptrience in this Country. To 
 *' prevent, as far as the most reflective precaution could reach, the possibility of local error in 
 *' respect to the usage of the Indian Army, I summoned the Adjutant-General, the Quarter- 
 Master-General ; and each paragraph was discussed. The one in question caused my notice,' 
 " and 1 was assured it was not only unobjectionable, but the invariable course of every Regi- 
 *' ment. As a stranger, and in the hands of the principal Start" Olficers of the Honourable Com- • 
 " pany's Army, could I oppose to their experience my single sentunent, and direct the over-' 
 " throw of an established custom ? 
 
 " It may appear that I have too much sensibility on the point, but that is impossible 
 " when the character of discretion and even common sense is at stake. 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 J. F. CRADOCK." 
 
 << 
 
 THE DEPUTY ADJUTANT-GENERAL MAJOR PIERCE TO 
 
 SIR J. CRADOCK. 
 
 " THIS compilation was principally formed upon Standing Orders estah- 
 " lished by the late Sir John Braithwaite, as Colonel of the '2d Battalion of European In- 
 " fantry, for that Corps, with the requisite deviations to render it applicable to Native Troops, 
 *' and in reference to some of the most approved Regulations formerly in use in Native Bat-- 
 " talions. 
 
 " It was read aloud by your Excellency; and when the 10th paragraph of the Xlth' 
 " Section particularly attracted your notice, and your Excellency asked whether it would in- 
 '• terfere with the Prejudice of the Natives, I answered under the same impression that had 
 " induced me to insert it, as did the Adjutant-General to the same elFect, that it would not, ■ 
 " and that it was not the Custom in well-regulated Corps for Native Soldiers to appear in the 
 " manner forbid by the paragraph. 
 
 " In inserting the above-mentioned paragraph I considered that I was merely recordino- 
 " what had always appeared to me to be a Regulation in the well-conducted part of the 
 " Service. 
 
 " It was my good fortune to act for a series of years as public Staff-Oflicer of a station 
 *' under an Ofhcer (General Braithwaite) who, at the same time that he paid the most unre- 
 " mitted attention to the comfort and real prejudices of the Soldier, enforced Discipline 
 " throughout every Rank under his command in a degree that I have not seen since equalled ;• 
 ** and I declare upon my honour, that I do not recollect to have ever seen, during that period,
 
 m 
 
 " a Native Soldier on Duty with his Face marked, or with large Rings in his Ears; and further, 
 " that 1 am certain, if any man lud appeared so bedecked on any Parade, lie would have been 
 " turned off from it. I was afterwards stationed as Major of Brigade at Vcllore, where it never 
 " occurred, &c." 
 
 " The Regiments of (.'avalry have in their ranks men of the highest Cast, of all Sects and 
 " Religions, &c. Reference can be made to the old Officers of those Corps for information, 
 " whether it has at any period been customary for their Soldiers to appear on Duty with Marks 
 " on their Faces, or with large Ear-rings. 
 
 " The proof adduced with respect to the Turband, added to what I have had the honour 
 " to slat'; in regard co the Prohiljition of Marks, &c. will I hope enable your Exc ellency to fl.v 
 " the error where it should lie, and that it will be traced to that implacable hostile spirit 
 *' against European dominion, that could transform a Soldier's Turnscrew into the IIolij Cross, 
 " that could excite the Artificers at Wallajabad to refuse to work after the arrival there of 
 " the news that Tippoo's sons vrere in possession of the Fort at Vcllore, and that could occa- 
 " sion the sticking up of Placards in the Mosques about Madras, calling upon the People to 
 " rally in defence of the true Faith — a spirit which from report appears to have been parti- 
 " cularly instilled into the minds of the Native troops at Vellore. 
 
 (Signed) FRED. PIERCE, 
 
 Dep. Adj.- Gen." 
 
 The Commander in Chief cannot be surprized that the public mind should receive a 
 strong impression upon these Orders, when he recollects his own emotion upon the perusal 
 before mentioned ; but on examination it will be found, that such has been the silent common 
 course of practice in almost every Battalion of the Service ; that the Orders, in direct words, yj^g Order* 
 exist in many Orderly Books, and are understood to prevail, though not expressed in all. ii Jan. uo5, 
 The Commander in Chief does not say universally, because there may be an exception ; but J^jr^""'"'" 
 he is not aware of the instance. It is the Stranger's ear w hich receives alarm on the subject ; Major-Gen. 
 the Officer of long standing and years' experience in the Country, knows the real case, and Campbell com- 
 yiews it with indifference. ArmJ;"°"** 
 
 Is it possible that an Officer of the long experience of Colonel Agnew, the Adjutant- 
 General, inferior to no Officer on any Staff", and superior to most in ability and intelligence, 
 could propose such an Order, were it contrary to the Usage of the Ser\ ice, or an Innovation } 
 
 The Commander in Chief abstains from present remark on the Policy, or inquiry of the 
 Principle; but Justice to Individuals, as well as the cause of Truth, demands the statement. 
 
 The followins Extracts of Letters will assure its foundation : 
 
 o 
 
 FROM MAJOR-GENERAL DUGALD CAMPBELL. 
 
 " Bellary, Sept. 13, 1806. 
 
 " SINCE the General Orders issued about eight years ago the Marks of Cast 
 have been generally discontinued throughout the Army ; anil I am confidently assured that 
 many instances liave occurred of Native Officers of their own accord chastising Sepoys for 
 appearing in the Ranks so distinguished."
 
 84 
 
 FROM LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CHALMERS, 
 
 1st Battalion, 2tl Regiment. 
 
 " Jugu.H 28, 180G. 
 " SIR, 
 
 " 1 HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of the 26th 
 " instant, in reply to which I heg leave to inform your Excellency, that so far back as the 
 ■" year 1777, Colonel Edinglon, one of the best Officers in the Service, to whose Battalion, 
 *' the 4th, I then belongeil, prohibited the wearing of Ear-rings when on Duty, or Marks of 
 " Cast. It was complied with without a word being said, as it was no degradation to them 
 " ill regard to the Cast, they having it in their option to wear both Ear-rings and Marks the 
 " moment they were off Parade. The large Ear-rings are not a necessary Mark of Cast. 
 " The Ears being bored is quite sufficient, nor is it a crime in a Hindoo being without a 
 " Mark for any number of days. The leavmg off' the large Ear-rings and Marks was such an 
 " improvemeivt to the Native Soldier's appearance, that a well-regulated Corps never allowed 
 " either. 
 
 " I have served in seven different Corps, and was Adjutant to two, and I declare that I 
 never saw either large Ear-rings, or conspicuous Marks of Cast, on a Sepo}-, when on 
 Duty, since the period above mentioned ; nor is it at this moment adopted in the Corps I 
 command. Those Officers with whom I have had any conversation on the above subject, 
 are of my opinion, that the Order respecting the Wearing of the Ear-rings, or Maj-ks of 
 Cast on the Forehead, does not militate against the highest Cast of the Native Soldiers. It 
 has been the practice so generally, for these 29 years back, that an Order had never beea 
 thought necessary to be published on the subject. 
 
 (Signed) J. H. CHALMERS." 
 
 MAJOR BRUCE, 20th Reg. 
 SIR, 
 
 "Madras, Sept. 4, 1806. 
 
 I HAVE had the honour to receive your letter of yesterday, and have to 
 inform your Excellency, that I have always considered it a Standing Regulation of the Nar- 
 tive Service (and, to the best of my recollection, it was invariably practised in the different 
 Battalions I served in since the year 1783), namely, that when Sepoys were paraded for 
 general or regimental Duty, they always appeared clean shaved on the chin, without the 
 Marks of Cast on the Forehead, or Ear-rings. 
 
 " At Exercise of a Morning, and at Evening Parade, I have not nnfrequently seen Se- 
 poys permitted to fall in, with the different Marks to denote their Cast, on the suppositiorj 
 that they had in the course of the day attended some Rtdigions Ceremony; but I have 
 ever had the idea that in the majority of Native Corps the indulgence was not permitted. 
 
 (Signed) D. BRUCE." 
 
 The terms " Innovations, obnoxious Orders" have still further extent : they may reach 
 the entire Dress of the Sepoy, for the v.holc is alteration or innovation. Twenty years ago 
 tlie Sepoy was not better dressed or equipped than the present Lascar at this day. The Na- 
 tive Soldier, except in a Turband (which in nothing resembles a real Turband, and, as any 
 ether the production of fancy, may be called a hat, with equal aptitude, as the objected one),
 
 85 
 
 and the black complexion, which cannot be altered, is scarcely to be distinguished from tho 
 European. It is llie prevailing- wish in the Coast Army to assimilate tiic appearance in every 
 thing practicable ; and each successive Corps raised goes beyond the former, in further sin)ili- 
 tude; and the last formed, the Madras Fencibles, are distmguished by Feathers and Panta- 
 loons. In tliis ardour of iniroduction the Commander in Chief found this Army, and nothing 
 has he added to it. He is as anxious as any person for the fair Inquiry, if the practice is judi- 
 cious P if in improved Appearance, or supposed foundations of Disciplme, the affections of 
 the Army may not have suffered injury ; and while gaining a shadow we may not have weak- 
 ened a real substance ^ 
 
 The Commander in Chief can easily account for the feelings of the Officer's mind in 
 India upon the inconvenience of Casts, and tiie anxiety to discard tiieir appearance under 
 arms. While they prevail. Military rank and subordmation almost cease. The Private of 
 high Cast will not permit his Officer of inferior to sit down before him. In the Coast Army 
 all Orders and Casts are admitted, and the Pariah or Chuckler stands in the ranks close to the 
 Syed or Rajahpoot. 
 
 The functions of duty are also impeded, and the Native Soldier though under arms, if Major Smith's 
 Casts have all their force, must refuse numerous Ordeis. It is said that the JNlahrattas (Hin- """'^ ' i'^"»??I 
 doos too) are the best Native Soldiers in India, because in the tield they are prevailed upon to ratta Service, 
 abandon the more injuj'ious effects of Casts. 
 
 The event at Vellore may now stand examination, and the question fairly resolved, whe- 
 ther the insurrection of the two Native Corps that composed the Garrison arose from a mind 
 alienated from the Service by the introduction of a Turband, and other Orders termed " ob- 
 " noxious i^' or whether the act, with all its attendant horrors, was not the fruit of deep-laid 
 artifice, perhaps of foreign as well as tlomestic growth, to destroy the' British power, arrd 
 raise up that Moorish government which, in hereditary haired, pursued the overthrow of the 
 English dominion and existence. 
 
 To appreciate fairly the case, it is necessary to examine all the evidence that has been 
 collected from different quarters. What has been produced goes far beyond the information 
 admitted by the Commission at Vellore, and, when considered, must estaiilish stronger and 
 different conclusions than result from their defective Report. If the testimony has wantecJ 
 the formality of an oath, every man who knows India will disregard that point; for the oath 
 in no view is to l)e depended upon, but truth is alone to be sought through variety of evidence 
 and circumstance, and the exercise of sagacity and judgment. The nature and extent of the 
 oath of the Conspirators, with the most important facts that have come to knowledge, ^..nd 
 •' admitted" as the best foundations to rest the truth upon, will be found in the chief Con- 
 spirator's (Shaik Cossim) evidence, not received by the Commission. 
 
 It will be admitted that opposition to the Turband first ap|)eared at Vellore, that at no- 
 other Station of the Army where it was jireparing was any dissatisfaction or any discontent to 
 be observed. To this hour, throughout the extended quarter of India, the Soutiieni Division, 
 the Northern, the Ceiled Districts, and Mysore, no discontent has been discovered, and many 
 Regiments, since the Report, have petitioned to wear this Turband. Wherever agitation has 
 shewn itself, it was among the few Corps who had connection with Vellore, from late resi- 
 dence, or it was in a situation (at Hyderabad) where the same spirit, though under different 
 agency, was calculated to produce similar effect. 
 
 It was necessary to remove the mutinous Battalion (the 2d of the -Uh) from Vellore; and 
 another from the South vras marched to its relief This Corps (the 2d of the 23d) fitally com- 
 posed of Poligars, and the relations of those who had fallen by the Sword, or Civil Power, i.i 
 late contests in these Provinces, were the chief perpetrators of the bloody acts that ensued; 
 and proved that Vellore early matured their hostde .sentiments. 
 
 It is in Evidence from Lieut -Col. Forbes, commanding the 1st Battalion of the 1st Re- vide Examin.-i- 
 giment, the other Corps in Garrison, that for a length of time the Descendants of Tippoo's tion lefure th» 
 Family had incessantly laboured to instil into the minds of the Sepoys, that every part of their "■"'"'s^'*'"- 
 Dress was objectionable, and that many articles were direct attempts to introduce Christianity.
 
 86 
 
 No circumstance escaped their remarks : the Turnscrew at the Soldier's breast was converted 
 
 into the Cross. 
 
 More decided means had been adopted to secure the minds of the Native Commissioned 
 
 Officers; and thus all chance was removed to enlighten the ignorant Sepoys, or avert the evil 
 
 effect of their destructive macliinations. 
 ColontlMon- At this period, when " so much is knoxi'n" upon the painful subject of the Native Offi- 
 
 Capuini-tviien- cers, the truth of their total disaffection and disloyalty in the two Corps that composed the 
 iiaiu's Commu- Garrison at \'ellure caiuiot be doubted. It maj- be traced from the earliest period connected 
 iiuatiom from ^^j|.jj j^| gygm . ^,(1 their active obstinacy in assertion, that the Turband was free from obiec- 
 
 tiou, or created no dissatistaction, was in the truest spirit ot Conspiracy, and its only object 
 
 the dire event they had long meditated. 
 
 No common pains can have produced such a change in the minds of persons bred and 
 
 elevated to distinction in the Service ; and the enlightened and patriotic iiuiuircr will nut rest 
 
 satisfied with indolent answer, that it was a Turband against which not one was found to 
 ... , „ e.\ijress disapprobation, or Orders that had existed for years in effect, that could in so 
 
 Vide Commit- ' i i • i i i? i i • i 
 
 iiioation from snort a period drive men to the complicated charge or guilt and treachery in which they 
 
 Hyderabad. now Stand. 
 
 Court of In- Tlicy were the Native Officers of the two Battnlions of the 1st Regiment that met 
 
 Tor'^^*^^^ on the Glacis of Vellore, and determined on the opposition to the Turband, before they 
 had seen it; and it was a Subidar of the 4th Regiment to the latest moment declared the 
 Forbcs's Evi- Corps free from discontent on the subject of the Turband, and thus kept their Officers 
 deuce. without information. 
 
 Evidence of It appears unnecessary to detail the extensive evidence, that the Family of Tippoo took 
 
 Jusnuaul an opcu and i'.ctive part in the fatal scene; that the most con (idential persons in the Palace 
 
 Brother of'^ " '^'"^^ bccn employed in negotiation and direct hostility. The guilt of two Sons is established. 
 Prince Mooz u and their murderous intentions left without a doubt. The plot had nearly succeeded to its 
 '^'^'^"- full extent, and it appears, in a species of wild Asiatic arrangement, that only the body of 
 
 Military Court LicuteiKint- Colonel Marriott, the Paymaster to the Family, who in unaccountable mystery 
 
 of Immiry. , ,!■ i ■ i i t'" • i i i ■ ,- -^ . •' 
 
 was to be suiiorea to exist the last European, was wanting to be produced, to issue from the 
 Palace and display his persfjn. 
 
 The concealment of all this Plot may be deemed wonderful. An Oath was administered 
 to hundreds. The terms were singular in their nature. Secrecy, " a determination not to 
 " wear the Turband," and to destroy all Europeans, and re-establish the Mussulman Govern- 
 ment. Tlie first and last articles are perfectly understood in fatal connection ; but tlie intro- 
 duction of the other only proves the wicked ingenuity of the Projectors ; for while Secrecy 
 prevailed, and objection to the Turband lay dormant, how could its adoption be counter- 
 manded. 
 
 It will scarcely be credited at a future time, that but one person, the faithful Sepoy 
 
 Mustapha Bey, whom the Native Officers represented to the Commanding Officer as insane, 
 
 should be found to give information ; and that none of the Authorities that ruled over Vellore 
 
 or its Peltah, " the Commandant, the Paymaster of Stipends, or the Collector" (for by late 
 
 Regulations all had joint, where for security perhaps there should have been but one sway), 
 
 Shaick Cos- *^'"^' '^ single faithful adlierent to watch the designs, or report the meetings, of the Con- 
 
 sim's Deposi- spirators. It is even stated in evidence, amid the numerous bands of the Family of Tip- 
 
 tion. poo, collected from all parts of the country, and resident in the Pettah, there were 500 
 
 Military Court jjersons in regular pay. Thus the extraordinary liberality and munificence of the British 
 
 of inquiry. Government, with indulgence to the same extent, became instruments towards their own 
 
 destruction. 
 
 An agitation that arose at Wallajabad, subsequent to the Mutiny at Vellore, demands 
 the next attention. Accounts of a very alarming, but still a general nature, were received 
 Irom Lieut.-Col. Lang, who commanded a force of three Battalions assembled at that Station 
 tor exercise. The Commander in Chief thought it necessary to repair to that quarter, that 
 the promptest measures might be effected, or the requisite investigation pursued.
 
 It would only increase unnecessarily tlie Icnpili of the account to descrilie the detail of 
 transaction or enquiry that took place. It appears lo tlic Commander in Cliicf thit real 
 causes of alarm hatl never existed ; tliat under tlie unfavomahle impression that prevailed, ap- 
 prehension was very natural ; but that representations had been much exaggerated, and that 
 casual expressions i'rom individuals of the Corjis of a seditions tendency, or suspicious import, 
 might have been overheard, but could not be substantiated by any proof. 
 
 Justice, and the spirit of conciliation and confidence, required that some irregular pro- 
 ceedings in one of the Battalions should be passed over ; and be}ond the sep.iration of the 
 Corps, it did not seem necessary, or indeed practicable, to extend punishment. The occur- 
 rence at VVallajabad is no farther remarkable than that the three Corps that composed the 
 force had secret connection at VcUore ; and the other two, the 1st Battalion of the 23d and 
 the 2d of the 1st Regiments, were Battalions of the saiue Regiments that formed the late Prociedings 
 unhappy Garrison. It cannot be omitted, that upon the investigations which were; pursued at bcfcn' Go- 
 Wallajabad, the same iiiditlerence, inaction, and the same silence prevailed on tiie part of the ^'^''"""="*- 
 Native Officers ; and that if no information could be obtained, it arose from their apparent 
 and decided resolution to withhold all intelliirencc. 
 
 Information was given here b}- an old Subidar of Cavalrv, that disaffection had crept Vide Exf.mi- 
 into the Cavalry, and he named some Regiments as liable to great suspicion. Those that hs'.d p^l^r*^!""^* 
 been quartered at Arcot, and near the scene of general seduction at Veliore, were chiefly Mumo. 
 mentioned. Such communication appeared to the Commander in Chief of the bight st 
 interest, and he laid the account before Government in a Minute (to which he begs to refer), idAu-aist. 
 in a secret manner so delicate a concern demanded. An extraordinary endiarrassment 
 attended the Evidence at the time this Subidar Secundar Klian, a man of most respectable 
 appearance and pretension, gave the inteUigence. Information was transmitted from Colonel 
 Montresor at Hyderabad, that he was a man of the most dangerous character and known dis- 
 ]o3-alty, and that ail his actions should be watched. His information respecting the Cavalry 
 has by no means been confirmed ; but still there were alarming points in his intelligence that 
 are known to be truth, and correspond entirely with the confession of the chief Conspirator 
 at Veliore, Shaick Cossim. It is possible that the man, conscious of his guilt, and even ap- 
 prehending the information against his own character, became informer to screen himself. 
 Since that period he has become reserved and silent, and seems to wish to weaken his own 
 intelligence. 
 
 Whatever related to the Cavalry, or the general name of jMoorman, from the earliest 
 moment, gave the Commander in Chief the greatest inquietude; for, while it was the com- 
 mon conversation that it was a Moorish Plot to restore the Mussulman Government, it could ^^"J"J,*^ ^'"^" 
 not escape reflection that the Regiments of Cavalry are nearly all of that description ; and VLllDie, July' 
 the apprehension of imprudence on tiiis point became so strong, that the Commander in Chiet 19, laoti. 
 pri\ately addressed the General and Commanding Officers, to suppress, as much as possible, 
 such danaerous lanajuage. 
 
 Uneasy sensations were experienced at the Presidencv, and suspicions entertained upon 
 the conduct and dispositions of the Corps that formed the Garrison of Fort St. George. The , 
 Commander in Chief cannot determine whether the apprehensions, which proceeded to great 
 extent, wore founled or otherwise, as he was absent; but if just, they must be imputetl to 
 <he poison of Veliore, for the Battalions had been stationed in that quarter within the last six 
 months, and without doubt exposed to all the artifices of that place. Except J'eUorc, Wal- 
 Itjabdd, and the Presidency, universal good order and satisfaction prevailed throughout the 
 whole of the Territory of Fort St. George, in the Army ; and the Turband, and " obnoxious 
 " Orders," never were mentioned. 
 
 The remaining instance is the imputed design of the Subsidiary Force, at Hyderabad, in 
 Foreign Dominion, to have acted the same dreadful scene as took place at Veliore. 
 
 To the latest period the Commander in Ci]ief received the most favourable reports from 
 Colonel Montresor, the Conmianding Officer, of the discipline, the subordination, and the 
 liarmony, that prevailed. Nothing led to the most distant suspicion that any dissatisfaction
 
 88 
 
 existed. At once, as su1)sequent reports confirm, the most mutinous spirit broke fortii ; 
 
 and accident, or judicious measures, seem to have averted the calamity of Veliore. Proof 
 
 may yet be wanting to estabhsh tlie connection that subsisted ; but coincidences are too 
 
 slrong in dates and circumstances, in every fair reasoning upon the subjet, to admit the 
 
 doubt, but that similar artifices had been practised ; and though the exact object might be 
 
 different from Veliore, yet the general end was the same, to overturn the British, and restore 
 
 the Mussulman (Government. Details of circumstances are not required : they must be pur- 
 
 Toionel Mon- sued through all the documents, that again run over all the case of Turbaud, Orders, &c. ; 
 
 tiesoi's ami but at HjaLjrabad, as at Veliore, the same machinations appear, the same inflammations, the 
 
 ham's Corre-"' ^ame attempts (the ground-work of all delusion) to persuade that Christianity was at hand, 
 
 spondence. and the Sepovs to be made the first Converts. The extraordinary appearance of the Chief 
 
 Sirdars from the Ciiy every where in the Camp, unusual intercourse of the most dangerous 
 
 characters with the Battalions attempted, all prove that some general object was in agitation ; 
 
 and at this moment the extent of design or danger, then frustrated, is not known, but still 
 
 requires the most active and cautious investigation. 
 
 Col. Afontre- At Hyderab.d, the painful point of the Native Officers comes forward in a shape, and 
 
 sni's Letter, ^.■^^\^ ^ force, that truly demands the most interesting attention. The Commanding Officer, 
 
 1 'J Sept. IBOb. ,-, ,», , •' ■ .,, ii. •■! 1 I 1 ■• 1 1 
 
 Colonel Montresor, has invariably stated his opinion, that the alarms and agitations that have 
 so recently distracted the Subsidiary Force, have been instigated by these persons; and 
 though he failed to obtain required proofs, in conjunction with the opinion of the Resident, 
 he had been obliged to scnil away to Masulipatam, in confinement, three Native Officers, of 
 whose complicated guilt no doubt existed, and that iheir influence and disloyalty was so 
 great, that their immediate removal was necessary to the security and tranquillity of the 
 Force. 
 Sept. 20, isoc. The Commander in Chief has lately laid before Government a Letter transmitted to him 
 
 by Colonel Montresor (the authenticity of which he does not seem to doubt) from the princi- 
 pal of these Native (Officers, addressed to the Nizam, winch, if true, communicates disaf- 
 fection, and the most sanguinary design on the part ol tlic Native Officers ot that Force, to 
 an extent most alarming, and carries with it other reflections tliat excite apprehension in a 
 different quarter. 
 
 In se\eral Minutes the Commander in Chief has expressed his p.^rsuasion that in the late 
 Commotion the object of our Enemies has been to eorru])t the Native Officers ; and by 
 securing their co-operation they well knew tiiat die ignorant multitude would be deluded 
 into any belief. 
 
 It remains yet to be discovered what have been the exact sources of the general misre- 
 presentation that is abroad, whether tliev are of domestic <>r foreign origin, or perhaps an 
 united effort; but a revival of the Mussulman power seems to be the object, and with this in 
 view, it has been a wise but fatal policy, to seduce tiie Native Officers, the great majority of 
 whom it has long been the practice of this Army to select from that Faith, and their seduc- 
 tion on that account the easier to be accomplisiied. 
 
 Since the event at Veliore the subject of the punishment of the guilty persons has often 
 come under consideration ; and the Commander in Chief lias recorded his sentiments in seve- 
 ral Minutes, to which he requests attention. 
 
 It will be found that his first object was to discover and protect innocence, but that he 
 
 never lost sight of the necessary vindication of crimes, that equally outraged humanity, and 
 
 Licut.-Col. violated every principle of fidelity and discipline. Such is the undistinguished mass of wuilt, 
 
 Forbes's Re- that were an amnesty to take eflect, it will hring back into the ranks wretches covered with 
 
 ''" ■ blood, who must look those surviving Officers in the face they attempted but could not 
 
 destroy. 
 lAtterfronithe Innocency has not been discoverable except in a few solitary instances ; the Prisoners 
 
 A.lloeate'i'o''' ^""^ chiefly those who only ceased their murder and plunder at the moment of flight, and the 
 (ol. ii;nv..urt, Native General Court- Martial now engaged upon the Trials are the most forward to express 
 Sept. iau«. their sense of the general guilt, and to press for banishment. Such was the general senti-
 
 89 
 
 inent at Hrst, and from the hour tlie intention was altered, difficult}' has increased upon everv 
 deliberation. 
 
 l"o the proposed confinement llie Commander in Cliief dissents, in the most solemn 
 manner: even impunity, with all its risk, is preferable. V^ Idle it contmues, martial malevo- 
 lence will never cease; the European and the Sepoy never can be Friends : it will supply a 
 perpetual theme of fatal conversation, and Termination and Oblivion, terms so highly prized 
 and in the front of all proceedings, can never have existence. 
 
 The Commander in Chief has now detailed, with as much ijrevity as the case would 
 j)ermit, the several circumstances that constitute the object of the present Dispatch to Eng- 
 land. It appears to arise out of the subject, that some general opinions should be annexed 
 upon the state of the Country, that our Rulers at home may know how far real improvement 
 has taken place, and whether the order of things in this part of India is amended by the 
 variety of late Regulations. 
 
 As a stranger, the Commander in Chief cannot feel himself competent to deliver opi- 
 nions from himself, but in his zeal for the public advantage he may be permitted to state the 
 prevailing sentiments of others, the most moderate and most experienced in the society of 
 this Presidency. 
 
 The general belief is, (it may not yet have reached the Government,) that the condition 
 of the People « wo/* so happj- as it was — that their own arrangements, their own institu- 
 tions, pleased them better than our Regulations. It is reasoned with apparent force, that, 
 :>laK.es as they are to their own customs and habits, in every tride of their lives, the introduc- 
 tion of all our systems (which it is in vain to make them comprehenti) alarms and annoys 
 thein, and they view them only as prejiaratory to greater imiovations, which may extend to 
 every circumstance that suri'ounds them. It is said, while the treasures of the State are ex- 
 pended on Judicial Establishments throughout Countries without distinction, where even 
 Military Force, at times, is unable to preserve subjection, it would be better to enquire 
 into the state of the inhabitants, and regulate the means of subsistence, that the nu- 
 merous dependants on former power and antieiit establishments, the crowds of Moormen in 
 the ditierent Provinces unemployed, may not remain in distress, anil continue to excite 
 discontent. ' 
 
 The inhabitants of this Country do not com[)rehend the convulsion at present before 
 their eyes: Within their shortest remembrance MUitary establishment and controul attracted 
 all their attention ; they understood and felt its origin, as congenial to their own notions of 
 authority ; at present they view a different order of things, and in the place of the old and 
 experienced Officer to whom they have long looked up with respect, they see his power and 
 ascendancy passed away, and the youthful inexperienced Judge or Boyish Collector supply 
 all and more than his former place. In England such institutions are right, are suited to the 
 civilization and felicity of that incomparable Land ; but in India, where nothing is alike, it 
 seems visionary to order all things to be tlie same, and it is feared will only prove the good- 
 ness of the intention. 
 
 The people of India must be left to find happiness in their own way, and our attention 
 directed to the security of our own singular situation, and the general advantage of the 
 State. 
 
 In the range of desired improvement. Philanthropy and Religion cannot fail to make a 
 person wish to see Christianity extended ; but what danger will not follow from this ardour? 
 Apprehension of the design universally prevails, however difficult to account for it ; and if 
 the pursuit be continued, or the suspicion sulTered to gain i'urther ground, our existence in 
 the C<;nntry is at stake. 
 
 A Paper of this nature cannot well close without some general remark on the situation ot 
 the .'Vrmy on this Establishment. In the Minutes the Commander in Chief has occasionally 2d Jan. i8U(j. 
 laid before the Government in dilTerent shapes, he has given ojiinions on detects that ap- 
 peared, and proposetl measures of improvement. Before his dej)arture it will be his duly to 
 enlarge upon the subject to the utmo.'t of his ability. 
 
 .\ 
 
 .■501'.. Nov. I go.";.
 
 90 
 
 fide Commander in Chief's Letter to the Adjutant-General, What seenis to require immecfiato attention is the 
 
 June 16, 180b. .,,,.• , » Augmentation of the nu.nber ol' Em-opean OfHceis to 
 
 " I cannot close this sub)ect nithovit givuig; vent to an o . i i- i i i ■ i 
 
 « opinion I have long formed, that it is the prevailing practice the Native Corps, to estabhsh by the more powertul 
 " of this Service to withhold that respect and intercourse from incentive than the ciouhtful effect of a common Order, 
 
 " the Native Commissioned Oflicers, to which their situation , ,, ■ .• , ■ . „ i „t ^ , 
 
 " and common opinion, as attached to the appellation of Offi- a Ijclter conununication and more inteicoiii be between 
 " cer, entitles them ; and thus outcast from confidence, or the European Otficcr and the Native Soldicr, to pro- 
 •' even friendly communication, it will in vain be expected ,^Q^g jj^g attainment of the Native Languages by every 
 
 " that at moments of difficultv or pressure these men wul proffer , , , j ii i 
 
 " that rapid and energetic assistancewhichaffection.oridentity encouragement and reward, and to Consider well the 
 " of feeling and interest, will alone inspire. I am so impressed situation of the Native Officer in Our Service, whether, 
 
 ;; with this sentiment from concurring jnoofs every day that I , j j ; certainly not in his own Corps in the 
 
 shall lose no time in comniiinic.tting it to the head oi tue I ^ _ ' j 1 
 
 " Army, in the manner most likely to alter the present system, enjoyment of that Vesi)ect and Confitleiice due tO tlie 
 
 " and produce an opposite effect of the highest importance tu appellation or rank of Officer (and without hope of 
 
 '' the Service. r . , . , ^n u- ■ j ^ 
 
 (Signed) J. F. CRADOCK." further elevation or emolument), his mind may not 
 
 naturally become discontented, try to secure an un- 
 due influence over the Sepoys, and rest his thoughts on other subjects than fidelity, or the 
 advantage of our cause. 
 
 These considerations, or rather their execution, may require time : but the Augmentation- 
 of the Establishment of Officers (in effect not one-third of his Majesty's Service) and the full 
 supply of Vacancies (for there has not been an Ensign for some years) can be no question, and 
 press for immediate adoption. 
 
 The last and most important point, the loss of Regimental Officers of rank and erpe- 
 rience called $way from their Corps to fill the numerous Staff situations, and other employ- 
 ments. Every Officer of talent or consideration bends his mind to this attainment, and gene- 
 rally succeeds. His place cannot be supplied either in ability or real efficiency (for he cannot 
 be placed oti Half-pay, as would be the case in his Majesty's Service), and the Kegiment and 
 all the conduct of it must suft'erin proportion. 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 J. F. CRADOCK, 
 
 Septrmber 2\, ISOC. Lieut.-General. 
 
 m SECRET CONSULTATION, iZSth Feb. 1807. 
 The President records the followins Minute. 
 
 I RETURN with feelings of extreme reluctance to the discussion which has 
 arisen out of the Vellore Mutiny. The statement however of the Commander in Chief, recorded 
 on the 25th of October, has accidentally remained unanswered. That Paper contains many- 
 matters of fact, and many more of opinion, which cannot receive my assent. The o-reater 
 part of these have in our subsequent Proceedings been fully discussed, or refuted by the test 
 of experience, and by the better information which time has given of the actual circumstances 
 and causes of the disaffection of the Native Troops. 
 
 I should have been well satisfied if this Paper bad never appeared upon the Records. It 
 was written by the Commander in Chief, before the departure of the October Dispatch, in 
 justification of his own conduct, and was sent to our Supciiois at home, and circulated here, 
 for the purpose of removing impressions which had gone abroad, attributing to the Military 
 Departments the cause of the Mutiny. The Commander m Chief very candidly offered to my 
 perusal this document, intended to be a Defence of himself, which, in its course, reflected 
 upon the conduct of the Government, and had the efl'cct of transferring to Council, in the 
 opinion of its readers, a portion of that responsibility, to which 1 do not consider ourselves 
 liable. Finding, however, that this Statement .was not intended for the Records, I declined
 
 91 
 
 tlie penisal ot it, until the Public Dispatch was fmishcJ. The case, as far as regarded iny si- 
 tuation with those by whom alone I was to be ofllcially jmlgecl, flcpcnded upon the Records. 
 I was not to be judged by this separate non-official Statement. I could not reply to it in the 
 form in which it was presented to me. 1 knew I could not agree to its contents, ironi the I'un- 
 damental dili'ercnce of opinion that existed between the Council and the Commander in Chief. 
 I was satisfied with the correctness of my own conduct, and lieartily harassed as I had been 
 with the most unpleasant subject, I was happy in an excuse to avoid occasion of further division 
 of sentiment. 
 
 When the Dispatch was finished, I read the Statement, and did not regret my not having 
 sooner seen it. 
 
 The Commander in Chief recorded it at a later period, by way of a Minute, upon a Letter 
 of the Supreme Government, containing Statements entirely at variance with the reasoning of 
 the Commander in Chief Through the interference of one of the Members of Council, I had 
 hoped that the Conniiander in Chief would have been induced to have withdrawn the State- 
 ment, as not at that time called for or necessary, and which, if permitted to stand, would 
 involve the Board in further dissension. It was impossible for me to pass unnoticed certain 
 parts of the Statement. I could not do so, either in justice to myself, or consistently with 
 my duty, which forbids me from allowing the Court of Directors to be either alarmed or misled 
 by opinions which I may consider erroneous. As long as these sentiments did not appear 
 upon the Records, I was not obliged to suppose them known to the Court, nor in any way 
 responsible for the impression made by them. 1 had understood that this Paper would have 
 been withdrawn. I remained in that belief until I perceived, in the Draft of the Dispatch 
 transmitted to England, on the 12th of last Month, reference made to this Paper as being 
 on the Record. I had then only time to enter on the Dispatch itself, an hasty Protest to the 
 most important opinions which I recollected. I have considered it necessary to say so much, 
 in order to explain the cause of my return, at this late period, to this unfortunate subject. 
 
 It is my intention to confine my observations to Two points only in the Statement. 
 
 First ; To that part of the Narrative which relates to the comnnniication between the 
 Commander in Chief and Government, when Sir John Cradock, from Nundydroog, submitted 
 the question of revoking the Order of establishing the Turband. 
 
 Secondly : To some general opinions, stated to be " the prevailing sentiments of others, 
 " the most moderate and most experienced in the Society of this Presidency," upon this most 
 important question ; viz. " Whether the order of things in this part of India is amended by 
 *' the variety of late Regulations r" 
 
 I shall note in the margin the particular Extracts from the Commander in Chief's Minute, 
 upon which I have to remark. 
 
 cOMMANDEit I.N CHIEF'S MINUTE. The inference that is apparently oftered to the 
 "No further intelligence of the reader is this : The Commander in Chief perceived 
 dissatisfaction reached the Commander the danger; if his warning had been taken, the Tur- 
 in Chief at Nundydroog till the latter band would have been recalled : CJovernnient are an- 
 end of June, when he received a very swerable for the consequences which may have arisen 
 impressive representation from an ex- from its coiitlmiance. 
 
 perienccd and able Officer, Lieute- I must beg leave to retrace very shortly the 
 
 nant Colonel Brunton, that the Tur- source of such transactions as relate to the Turband. 
 
 band had occasioned great discontent It is material to stale, that the first alteration of the 
 
 m the Army, and earnestly recom- Turband took place without any conununication with 
 
 mended a repeal of the Order. the Goverimient. !t will be recollectetl that the first 
 
 " The Commander in Chief atonce ajjpcarance of dissatisfaction was manifested at V'ellore 
 
 adopted the resolution of confiding by the 2d of the 4th, in a manner little short of mu- 
 
 liis embarrassment to the Government, tiny. That it was deemed necessary to suppress these 
 
 and submitted the following secret re- acts of insubordination by the most decided conduct, 
 
 ference to the Right Honourable the The principal Mutineers were in consequence sent 
 
 Governor in Council : down under an escort of Cavalrv to the Presidency, to
 
 92 
 
 rniiimaniler in Oiiefs Minute- 
 
 " (Secret.) 
 " Nundj/droog, June 29, IHQS. 
 
 " MY LORD, 
 
 " I MUST have recourse to your 
 Lorilsliip's jiulgment and that of the 
 Couticil to relieve me from great an- 
 xiety and eiiibarassmeiit u|)on the sub- 
 ject of the Turbaiids, the full particu- 
 lars of wliich case are so well known 
 to your Lordship, and upon the pro- 
 ceedings, from my absence, 1 have 
 already i-equested your Lordship's di- 
 rection. 
 
 " The construction of the Turband 
 originated from the advice and under 
 the siiperintendaiice of Colonel Ag- 
 newthe Adintint-Gcneral, and Major 
 Pierce the Dtputy Adjnlant-Gener.il ; 
 and as an alter.ition from the former 
 one appeared wanting, I thougiit I 
 could not confide so simple a matter 
 to better hands, or Officers of more 
 local experience. 
 
 " I have the strongest reasons to 
 suppose that almost universal objection 
 arises against the Turband ; and though 
 force and punishment niiiy overcome 
 individual opposition, yet the firm 
 (.lislike does not abate, and the fre- 
 quent recurrence of severity may pro- 
 duce, though it may be remote, bad 
 consequences. 
 
 " I am as aware as the human mind 
 can possess the sentiment, that oppo- 
 sition to military and just authority 
 cannot be yielded to, and that the at- 
 tempt must be crushed in its earliest 
 stage. 
 
 "'I'his is the sole reasoning towards 
 a British soldier, and were it purely a 
 British case, I sliould neither feel 
 embarassment, or should I thus ti'ou- 
 ble your Lordship in Council. 
 
 " But upon the prejudices of India, 
 the force of Cast, which in its various 
 sliape no European may perfectly 
 comprehend, it is allowable even in 
 a Soldier's mind to pause, and solicit 
 the advice of the Head, and his com- 
 panions in the Government. 
 
 " The question is not confined to 
 the judgment of the ignorant Soldiery, 
 it is the sul)ject of conversation among 
 
 Presiihiit's Minute. 
 
 take their trial before a Native General Court MartiaL 
 Thev were tiied, and sentenced to receive corporal 
 punishment. Of several Prisoners who were found 
 guilty, the greater part having shewn signs of contri- 
 tion were pardoned; and two only, whose conduct 
 was particularly insolent, were punished. I cannot 
 convey a more just inipress:on of the necessity 
 enterlained by the Commander in Chief of supporting 
 with the most decisive language and measures his 
 authority, than by the following Order, which was 
 published under Sir John Cradock's auUiority at 
 Vellorc. 
 
 "TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FANCOURT;, 
 
 Commanding Vellore. 
 
 " Fort ,9/. George, 
 7 Ji/iiy 1806. 
 
 " Silt, 
 
 " 1 have received by Express of yesterday's date 
 your Letter, and have submitted it to the Connnander 
 in Chief. 
 
 " Whilst the Commander in Chief regrets the cause 
 wliich requires such measures, he feels it to be hia 
 duty to check, by the most decided resolutions, the 
 symptoms of insubordination which you have reported 
 in the lid Battalion of the 4th Regiment of Native In- 
 fantry. 
 
 " His Excellency has therefore ordered to Vellore 
 a detachment of His Majesty's 19th Light Dragoons, 
 who will receive and escort to the Presidency the 
 nineteen men confined by Lieutenant-Colonel Darley 
 for trial before tlie General Court Martial now setting, 
 aganist whom he will prefer charges, and prepare to 
 support the same by requisite evidence. 
 
 " You will also direct the Non-commissioned Offi- 
 cers of the Grenadier Company (the two who did not 
 refuse the Turband in the first instance excepted) to 
 be reduced to the Ranks : the Commander in Chief 
 deeming a man who hesitates a monient to obe^' an 
 Ordi^r, unfit to bear the character of a Nou-commis- 
 sioned Officer. 
 
 " You will further, through Lieutenant- Colonel 
 Darley, direct the Native Commissioned Officers of 
 the 2d Battalion of the 4th Regiment of Native In- 
 fantry immediately to make up and wear Turbands of 
 the prescribed pattern. Disobedience or hesitation 
 on their part will be instantly followed by dismission 
 from the Service in Public Orders on your Report. 
 
 " Lieutenant- Colonel Kennedy has orders (should 
 you require it) to march the lyth Dragoons to Vellore- 
 to assist in enforciiiLr obedience.
 
 93 
 
 Com»>a>i(hr in Chief's A/inute. 
 
 the best-informed Officers ; and my 
 intelligence from Seringap;itam, \\ here 
 there is a numerous Garrison, is, 
 ' that it is the common cry that the 
 next attempt will be to make the Se- 
 poys Christians.' 
 
 " I lay before your l.ordsliip, in 
 confidence, a private Letter from 
 LieutenaiU-CJolonel Brunton ; and the 
 same sentiment prevails with man}' 
 other moderate and discreet Officers. 
 
 " Still it is my wish, and the best 
 judgment I can apply to this unto- 
 ward subject, to persevere, and con- 
 quer prejudice, as perhaps the least 
 evii ; but when consequences ma}- en- 
 sue of a disadvantageous nature, antl 
 even the source of Dur Recruiting at 
 stake, so difficult at all times with due 
 selection and etVect, I am not satisfied 
 in my own mind to persevere to the 
 full extent, without recurrence to yoin- 
 Lordship's advice, and the sanction 
 of Government. 
 (Signed) 
 
 J. F. CCADOCK, 
 
 Lieut.-Gen." 
 
 " The Commander in Chief thus 
 endeavoured to unite military princi- 
 ples with the strictest caution, and was 
 prepared to follo^v such steps as the 
 best information and the sanction of 
 the highest Authority should dictate. 
 
 " The Government honoured him 
 with an Answer, and proposed the is- 
 sue of an (Jrder to the Army. 
 
 "The determination was expressed 
 to enforce the Turbands, as the op- 
 position arose from ignorant clamour, 
 unfounded on any principle, but at 
 the same time to respect the usages 
 and customs of the Native Troops on 
 all occasions. 
 
 " Both appeared to the Com- 
 mander in Chief highly proper, and 
 calculated to produce the best re- 
 medy in a case of extreme embarrass- 
 ment. The Ori-lcr was not issued, as 
 Government, with whom the decision 
 remained, on account of the Com- 
 mander in Chief's absence from Ma- 
 dras, did not think it necessary." 
 
 Ptcsulent's MintiU. 
 
 " It is the intention of the Commander in Chief 
 immediately to relieve the 2d Battalion of the 4tli 
 Regiment of Native lid'antry, but though he thinks 
 proper to remove that Corps from Vellore, he will 
 not admit of hesitation to the Orders he has given. 
 (Signed) P. A. AGNKW, 
 
 Adj. Gen. of the Army." 
 
 It will be perceived that Military Command never 
 was expressed in higher or more imperious language. 
 From resolutions so strongly marked it vvoidd be im- 
 possible to recede without hazarding the very founda- 
 tions of i\Iditary l)i4;ci|)liue. It was with such senti- 
 ments that 1 receivetl the reference of the Connnander 
 in Chief. 
 
 The conduct of Government in their decision upon 
 this reference is placed upon the most delicate grounds 
 of res[)onsibiliiy ; for I am prepared to state my opi- 
 nion that if the Orders had been then revoked, the 
 Mutiny and Massacre at Vellore would not have hap- 
 pened. I do not wish to shrink from the question. 
 
 It will, I think, be admitted by all JNlilitary men, 
 that after the very high tone in which the first oppo- 
 sition to the Turband had been suppressed by the 
 authority of the Connnander in Chief, we could not 
 retract without committing the Discipline of the xVrmv : 
 and that under this^opinion, no consideration but the 
 positive information of general dissatisfaction, and the 
 consequent apprehension of eH'ects more dangerous 
 than the relaxation of discipline, would authorize a 
 departure from a command so positive. This questioiv 
 will turn upon t!ie point whether we were in possession 
 of that evidence which did not admit of doubt as to 
 the matter of fact, viz. of general dissatisfaction. 
 
 It seems that the reference of the Commander in 
 Chief was founded upon a communication from Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Brunton, and upon one to the same 
 jjurport from Seriugapatam. The name of the Officer 
 from whom the latter information was received did not 
 appear in the Commander in Chief's Letter. With 
 regard to the opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Brunton, 
 it coubl have no weight with us, front the state of 
 health in wliicb he bad been for a length of time : 
 upon leaving the Presidency on the 17tli of the same 
 month, his life was despaired of, and his mind and 
 nerves were suffering under the most melancholy de- 
 spondency. It was natural to conclude that the know- 
 ledge of the fact luiiiht not have been known to the 
 Commander in Chief At any rate, however, Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Brunton had been all his life-time at 
 the Presidency in a Civil Department, and could have 
 no direct knowledge of the feelings of the Sepoys upon 
 this subject.
 
 94 
 
 Commander in Oiie/'s Mimite. 
 
 " The following are the most ma- 
 terial Extracts from the Correspond- 
 ence : 
 
 " Public Letter to the Commander in 
 Chief. 
 
 " Jidt/ A, 1806. 
 " (Secret Department.) 
 " If there had been reason to 
 suppose that the late change of Dress 
 was liable to the objection of mili- 
 tating against the Religions Principles 
 of the inhabitants of this Country, 
 we. sliould have no hesitation in 
 immediately recommending to your 
 Excellency the relinquishment of the 
 intention to establish the proposed 
 change ; but as it appears from the 
 evidence taken in the late Enquiry at 
 Vellore, that no objection of this 
 nature exists, we certainly deem it 
 advisable that the alternative of yield- 
 ing to the clamour arisinsr from an un- 
 founded prejudice, should, if possi- 
 ble, be avoided. 
 
 (Signed) " W. Bf.ntinck, 
 
 and Council." 
 
 " General Order by Government, 
 July '\th, 1806. 
 
 " Thr Rigiit Honourable the Go- 
 vernor in Council having been in- 
 formed by his E.xcellency the Com- 
 mander in Chief of the opposition 
 which has, in some instances, been 
 experienced in establishing an altera- 
 tion which it was deemed expedient 
 to adojit in the form of the Turband 
 in use among the Native Corps of 
 this Establishment, his Lordship in 
 Council is led to express his extreme 
 regret, that any part of the Native 
 Army, whose merits have been so 
 frequently extolled and rewarded by 
 this Government, coukl have suffered 
 itseif to be deluded by an unfounded 
 clamour. 
 
 " It will be in every instance the 
 wish of tiie Right Honourable the 
 Governor in Council, to evince a sa- 
 cred regard for the Religious Princi- 
 ples of the Native I'roops, as well as 
 of xxVi other inhabitants of this Coun- 
 try; bat in the present case it ap- 
 
 P7-esident's Minute, 
 
 The other authorit}' was not known to us, but it 
 was reasonable to suppose that it was not the Com- 
 manding Officer of Mysore*, whose opinion would 
 have been considered official, and entitled to atten- 
 tion. The Adjutant-General at the Presidency had 
 received no intimation of dissatisfaction elsewhere. 
 The Turband was worn by one of the Corps at Fort 
 St. George without any expressions of discontent 
 coming to my knowledge. 
 
 It was therefore the opinion of Council, that cause 
 did not appear ior the revocation of die Orders ; but 
 we did not think it right to neglect the satisfaction of 
 the feelings, howsoever groundless, which had been 
 made known to us. 
 
 We determined in consequence to issue an Order 
 which, while it supported Military Discipline, and 
 expressed the determination not to give way to 
 clamour, recalled to the recollection of the Sepoys 
 the respect which had been always paid to their 
 I'eligious prejudices, and repeated the same as- 
 surances. 
 
 This Order was transmitted to the Commander in 
 Chief on the 4th July, and would reach him on the 
 6tli. The Commander in Chief, in his answer dated 
 the 9th July (the day before the Mutiny) observed, 
 " I take the liberty to express my entire concurrence 
 with the spirit and terms of the Order, as every way 
 calculated to restore just authority, and to allay anv 
 prejudices that may exist upon the imputed disregard 
 to the rights attached to Cast or ancient Custom." 
 
 The same regret will be entertained that the Com- 
 mander in Chief did not publish this Order which he 
 considered fit for its purpose, as that tiie Governor in 
 Council did not advise the revocation of the Orders 
 upon the Connnander in Chief's reference : but in 
 fact a subsequent passage from the same Letter ex- 
 culpates both the Commander in Chief and the Go- 
 vernment. 
 
 " Since I last had the honour to address your Lord- 
 ship in Council, I have heard nothing more, which 
 silence leads me to hope that the disinclination to the 
 Turband has become more feeble, or perhaps that re- 
 ports have been exaggerated. Under this view it 
 may be judicious to postpone the publication of the 
 Order, either to let the subject fall to the ground, as 
 no longer the interposition of Government is required, 
 or to re-assume the issue, as your Lordship in Coun- 
 cil may determine by future events." 
 
 * On the 20th July, ten days after the Mutiny, Sir J. Cradock 
 laid hcl'ore Council a Letter from General Macdowall, com- 
 manding in Misore, statinij the perferl lraiK|uillity oflheTroops 
 at Seiingapafam, and expressing his helief that the disafteclicB 
 at Vellore was merely partial and local.
 
 95 
 
 Conimainlcr in Chief's Mimite. 
 
 pears, after the strictest enquiry, and 
 according to the testimony of Natives 
 of the highest Cast, that tlie opposi- 
 tion which has been experienced in 
 the late change of Turbands is desti- 
 tute of an\' foundation in either the 
 Law or usage of the IMaiiomedan or 
 Hindoo Religions ; and any persons 
 who may persevere in that opposi- 
 tion cannot, in consequence, fail to 
 be subjected to the severest penalties 
 of military discipline." 
 
 " (Secret.) 
 " Nundi/droog, July 9, 1806. 
 
 " My Loud, 
 
 " I HAVE been much honoured 
 this morning by the receipt of the 
 Letter from your Lordship in Council, 
 upon the subject of the Turbauds, 
 and feel myself peculiarly gratified 
 by the transmission of the proposed 
 Order by Government previous to its 
 circulation. 
 
 " I take the liberty to express my 
 entire concurrence with the spirit and 
 terms of the Order, as every way cal- 
 culated to preserve just authority, 
 and to allay any prejudices that may 
 exist upon the imputed disregard to 
 the rights attached to Cast, or an- 
 cient Custom. The point was of in- 
 finite embarrassment ; and if any act 
 was to be resorted to beyond the im- 
 mediate and constant vindication of 
 violated discipline, as it might arise, I 
 conceive that an Order from Govern- 
 ment of this nature would seem to 
 promise the best effect. 
 
 " I will confess, that by the pre- 
 sent communication with Govern- 
 ment, I have gained the object I had 
 in view, which was, to receive from 
 them an unreserved opinion as to the 
 propriety of full coercion, should it 
 prove necessarv, but which, situatetl as 
 this Country is, buried in the absurdi- 
 ties of Cast or prejudice, dear to them 
 as existence, I was fearful to take a 
 step of any doubt, without explicit 
 knowledge and the sanction of Go- 
 vernment. 
 
 " Since I last had the honour to 
 
 Piesident's Minute. 
 
 In this paragraph the Commander in Chief fairly 
 states, that his doubt of the state of the Sepoy mind 
 were much shaken, and is of opinion that even a mea- 
 sure attended with none of those objections to which 
 the question he suggested to us was liable, was not 
 at that moment necessary. 
 
 I certainlj- regret that the Order was not pid)iished, 
 because it could not have adde<l to, and might liave 
 prevented, the Mutiny. The Commander in Chief 
 acted to the best of his judgment upon the informa- 
 tion which he possessed, and cannot therefore be 
 condemned. If the Chief Military Authority charged 
 with the supcrintendance of the Army was ignorant 
 of its sentiments, the Governor in Council, depending 
 officially upon this source for information, may surely 
 be excused for not taking measures which alone 
 could have been justified by the most entire convic- 
 tion of tiie truth of the facts upon vvhi. ii they were 
 called to determine. If the Commander in Chief's 
 first reference had not been embarrassed by his own 
 preceding conduct, if it had been supported upon 
 better authorit}-, if the Commander in Chief had con- 
 tinued to enforce his reference by subsequent com- 
 munications confirming the conviction of his mind as 
 to the truth of his statement, if this reference had 
 been confirmed from other quarters, the reflection 
 that the IVIutiny had grown out of our neglect of such 
 apparently solid evidence, would weigh heavy on my 
 mind. But th.e subsequent Letter of Sir John Cra- 
 dock has entirely relieved us from this state of uncer- 
 tainty. He in tliis acknowledges his own information 
 to be so defective, and upon tiie whole so favourable, 
 as not to warrant any act being founded upon it. Indeed 
 if the information had been positive, the Commander 
 in Chief would have at once revoked an Order which 
 issued from his authority only, and with which the 
 Governor in Council had been in no way concerned. 
 
 The Commander in Chief asked our advice. Whe- 
 ther he should revoke it or not? We told him in 
 answer, That we thought after the strong measures 
 he had taken, this could not be done without risk. 
 Nobody suspected that Mutiny was so near at hand : 
 indeed, the experience of half a century would have 
 forbidden belief to the assertion, if it had been made. 
 The unexampled fidelity of the Sepoy Army, the pas- 
 siveness and mildness of the Indian character, did not 
 suo-oest for a moment to any mind, I believe, the pos- 
 sibility of such an explosion. In fact, no knowledge 
 and no suspicion of such events existed any where; it 
 would therefore not have been unreasonable, even if 
 the cause of dissatisfaction had been in some degree 
 founded, and if the evidence of that dissatisfaction had 
 been less uncertain, to have concluded that delay
 
 96 
 
 CummamUr in Chiefs Iffiiiute. 
 
 address your Lordship in Council, I 
 hare heard nothing more ; which si- 
 lence leads me to hope that the dis- 
 inclination to the Turband has be- 
 come more feeble, or, perhaps, that 
 reports have been exaggerated. Un- 
 der this view, it may be judicious to 
 postpone the pnbhcation of the Or- 
 der, either to let the subject fall to 
 the groLUid, as no longer the interpo- 
 sition of Government is required, or 
 to reassunie the issue, as your Lord- 
 ship in Council may determine by 
 future events. 
 
 (Signed) " J. F. CRiDOCK, 
 
 Lieutenant- General." 
 
 ^' Tlio Conuuander in Chief has 
 now detailed, with as Uiuch brevity as 
 the case would admit, the several cir- 
 cumstances that constitute the object 
 of the present Dispatch to England : 
 it appears to arise out of the subject 
 that some general opinions should be 
 annexed upon the state of the Coun- 
 try, that our Rulers at home may 
 know how far real improvement has 
 taken place, and whether the order of 
 things in this part of India is amend- 
 ed by the varitny of late Regula- 
 tions. 
 
 " As a stranger, the Commander 
 in Chief caiuiot feel himself compe- 
 tent to deliver opmions from himself; 
 but in his zeal for the public advan- 
 tage he may be permitted to state the 
 prevailing sentiments of others, the 
 most moderate and most experiencetl 
 in the society of this Presidency. 
 
 " The general belief is, (it may not 
 yet have reached the Government,) 
 that the condition of the pi-ople is not 
 as happy as it was — that their own 
 Arrangements and their own Institu- 
 tions pleased them better than our 
 Regulations. It is reasoned with ap- 
 parent force, that, slaves as they are 
 lo their own customs and habits in 
 every trifle of ihc-ir lives, the intro- 
 duction of all our .systems (which it is 
 vain to make them comprehend) alarms 
 and annoys them, and they view them 
 
 President's Mnute. 
 
 could not have been attended with the least danger. 
 It was natural to suppose that the assurances of Go- 
 vernn,ieiit and the explanation of their Oflicers, and 
 tiie real harmlessness of the Turband in regard to all 
 Cast, would convince the Sepoys of their error and 
 groundless alarm. If these attempts proved ineffec- 
 tual, it would then be time to revoke the (Jrder. 
 
 Such was my reasoning when I first received the 
 reference of the Commander in Chief, and while I 
 imagined that the 1 iirband was the sole cause of dis- 
 satisfaction. When I afterwards discovered that 
 other Orders had been issued, really interfering, in 
 my judgment, with their Religious Prejudices, my 
 ojjinion then changed, and I no longer d.jubted the 
 necessity of revoking all Orders having that tendency. 
 In ex]ilanation of my sentiments I beg leave to refer 
 to my Minute of the 15th July. 
 
 The opinions and assertions contained in these pa- 
 ragraphs are so vague, indefinite, and obscure, that 
 1 find it difficult to understand their meaning. The 
 Commander in Chief confesses, that as a stranger he 
 is not competent to deliver opinions upon such topics. 
 I cannot refuse my praise to any effort towards the 
 discovery of truth upon points of such vast political 
 importance and delicacy. But I must say that such 
 discussions would have been better suited to our Se- 
 cret ConsultLiiions, than introduced into a Statement 
 intended for public perusal. If doubts existed in 
 the Commander in Ciiief's mind upon the policy of 
 any part of our Civil Government, he would most 
 properly have submitted the question to the consi- 
 deration of Government. He would first, however, 
 have convinced himself by the best infoiuiation that 
 oral or written evi.lence could give of their reality, 
 hi' would have done this in ^ireierence to the hasty 
 adoption of the opinions oi ollur persons, howi;ver 
 respectable m ciii.racter, whose knowledge of the 
 slate of affairs must, IrSm th'.; suppression of all pub- 
 lic information, be extremely limited, and who were 
 in no respect responsible for the correctness or con- 
 sequences of their opinions. This caution was due 
 to justice, and to the respect which ought to be paid 
 to the recorded decisions of the talents and wisdom 
 of successive Councils in Bengal, followed by those 
 of Madras. Distant as our Superior Authorities are 
 |)laced, nothing is more to be deprecated than the 
 suggestion of doubts without very great consideration, 
 teniling to shake confidence and satisfaction in the 
 established principles of our Civil Governmeiit. 
 
 Is is said to be generally believed, " That the 
 condition of the peojjle is not as happy as it was; 
 lliat tlieir own Arrangements and Institutions pleased
 
 97 
 
 Commander in Ou^s Afmute, 
 only as preparatory to greater innova- 
 tions, which niav extend to eve ry cir- 
 cujiistance tliat surrounds them. It 
 is said, while the treasures of the 
 State are expended on Judicial Esta- 
 blishments tlironguout countries with- 
 out Jistint tio'i, wiiere even Military 
 Force, at times, is unable to preserve 
 subjection — it would be betlL-r to en- 
 quire into the state of the inhabitants, 
 and regulate the means ot' subsistence, 
 that the numerous dependants on for- 
 mer power and antient estabhsh- 
 ments, the crowds of Moormen in the 
 ditferent provinces unemployed, may 
 not remain in ilistress, and continue 
 to excite disco'.iteiit. 
 
 " The inhabitants of this country 
 do not comprehend the convulsion at 
 present before their eyes ; within 
 their shortest reiiu;mbrance Military 
 Establishment and Controul attracted 
 ail their attention ; they understood 
 and felt its origin, as congenial to their 
 own notion of authority ; at present 
 they view a different order of tilings, 
 and in the place of the old and expe- 
 rienced Officer, to whom they have 
 long looked up with respect, they see 
 his power and ascendancy passed 
 awa}-, and the youthful inexperienced 
 Judge, or bo\ ish Collector, occupy 
 all and more than his former place. 
 In England such institutions are 
 rightlj' suited to the civilization and 
 felicity of that incomparable land ; 
 but in India, where nothing is alike, 
 it seems visionary to order #11 things 
 to be the same, and it is feared will 
 only prove the goodness of the inten- 
 tion. 
 
 " The ])copIe of India must be left 
 to find iiappiness in their own way, 
 and our attention directed to the se- 
 curity of our own singular situation, 
 and the general advantage of the 
 St.te. 
 
 " In tho range of desired improve- 
 ment, Philanthrophy and lldigion 
 cannot iad to make a person wish to 
 see Christianity extended ; but what 
 danger will not follow from this 
 ardour? Apprehension of the de- 
 
 Presidenl's Miiiutf. 
 
 them belter than our Regulations ; that, slaves to 
 their own customs and habits, our own Institutions 
 alarm tiiem ; and they view them only as pre)>uraiory 
 to greater innovations " The Commander in Chief 
 acknowledging his entire ignorance of these subjects, 
 I cannot inquire of him to what arrangements and 
 institutions of the Natives allusion is here inti nded, 
 whether to those existing anterior to our concjuests, 
 or to those which may have been subsequently intro- 
 duced by us. It cannot surely be intended to assert, 
 that the Mahommedun Government which prevailed 
 in all the countries lateiv annexed to our territories, 
 was more generally agneablr.- to the Natives of India 
 than the British Government.'' Without thinking very 
 favourably or partiallv of the System which obtained 
 prior U) the esiablislinient of the Judicial System, I 
 cannot for one moment admit a comparison between 
 this System, impcricct as it was, and the proverbial 
 oppression anci rapacity of all Asiatic Mahommedaii 
 Governments IVo.n Constantino[)le to the Malay Em- 
 pire, 'fhese points will, I trust, not be contested by 
 any one. W hat then are these Institutions ? From 
 what I have heard by report of the opinions of certain 
 Military Officers, I rather imagine that it is intended 
 to attribute this innovation to the Judicial System, 
 which is supposed to have made a revolution of all 
 former Arrangements and Institutions, which we had 
 previously Ldo|ned, as we found them, from our pre- 
 decessors in power. 
 
 If I have construed rightly the opinion which is 
 here given to the moderate and experienced pare of 
 the society, I must confess that I learn with astonish- 
 ment that there exists a man of even slender informa- 
 tion, not acquainted with the fact, that preservation 
 entire to the Natives of India, of their Customs and 
 Institutions, has formed the fundamental principle of 
 all Legislation for India, as well by all the King's 
 Charters and Acts in England as by all the local Go- 
 vernments. The great object of our Regnlations has 
 been to secure to both Alahommetlans and Hindoos 
 the benefit and protection of their own Laws, of uhicli 
 private and public oppression hud depri\ed them. 
 The onlv modifications introtinced by us have been 
 to remedy unjust distinction, introduced by the Ma- 
 hommedans in their own favour to the prejudice of 
 the Hindoos. But these alterations were trifling, in- 
 dispensable with equal justice, and in no respect af- 
 fecting the principle of the Established Laws. Eng- 
 lish Law has been introduced to the Presidencies 
 alone, with certain exceptions where the Laus of the 
 Natives are still in force. This is not i!ie proper oc- 
 casion of inquiry, whether the King's Courts in India, 
 under their present constitution, have been beneficial 
 o
 
 98 
 
 Commander in Clihf's Mmitte. President's Minute. 
 
 sign universally prevails, however dif- or injurious to the interest of the Empire. Wherever 
 ficult to account for it ; and if the the British Government has extended, these priiici- 
 pursuit be continued, or the suspi- pies have formed the basis of all nistructions to their 
 cion suffered to gain further ground, Executive Officers. The Religious Establishments of 
 our existence in the Country is at the Natives have been everywhere niaintamed and 
 stake." sujjported ; Justice has been administered according 
 
 to their own Laws ; and Taxation has so iar been 
 changed, as to be defined, limited, and freed from 
 oppression and torture. I can safely assert that the 
 local Institutions have been reformed, not subverted, 
 by the change of Go\ernment. Our merit is, that 
 there has been no innovation. 
 I know that it is believed tliat the Judicial S3'stem has introduced new Laws, new Cus- 
 toms, new Powers, and an entirely new order of things. It will be found, however, that the 
 only novelty is, in the process of administering the same intention, and the same Orders and 
 Regulations. 7'he Revenues have been collected, and Justice always ordered to be admini- 
 stered. Before the introduction of the Courts, the process was different ; the same man was 
 Collector, Judge, and Magistrate. These duties are now divided ; one collects the Reve- 
 nues, another administers Justice. The Laws are the same, though the process is different. 
 In the former arrangement, the Collector did or did not open his Court, as his disposition or 
 other duties might determine ; the whole proceedings of his Court were summary. His Judi- 
 cial business was entirely secondary to his Revenue duties, to mention nothing of the injustice 
 anil oppression which may arise from the union of such powers in the hand of one individual. 
 Now every part of the duty, both of the Judge and the Collector, is defined by rules, which 
 neither the one nor the other can transgress without making himself liable to punishment. 
 The inhabitants before had no fixed place where they could find redress. The Collector was 
 in constant motion. Their principal opj^ressors would also be his own servants. Now the re- 
 .sidence of the Court is established, and always open ; redress can be had from an indepen- 
 dent audiority, whether the grievance proceed from private injury, or the abuse of public 
 authority. Will it be pretended that before these Courts were established, security of person 
 and property was known in India? If this be the fact, which I think cannot be denied, is it 
 consistent with reason to believe that sucli a system should be viewed with alarm, as prepara- 
 tory to greater innovation ? The opinion is inconsistent with common sense and with expe- 
 rience. This JudiciaJ Establishment,^ introduced by Lord Cornwallis, had been tried in 
 Bengal for above twelve years. 1 he result is most ably and satisfactorily described in the 
 Letter of the Supreme Government, under date the lyth July 1804. The Marquis Wellesley 
 observed of these Regulations — 
 
 " Subject to the common imperfection of every human insf tution, this System of Laws 
 " is approved by practical experience (the surest test of human legislation), and contains an 
 '• active principle of continual revision, which affords the best security for progressive amend- 
 " ment. It is not ilie effusion of vain theory, issuing from speculative jH-inciples, and di- 
 " reeled to visionary objects of impracticable"^perfection, but the solid work of plain, deUbe- 
 " rate, practical benevolence, the legitimate offspring of genuine wisdom and pure virtue. 
 " The excellence of the general spirit of these Laws is attested by the noblest proof of just, 
 " wise, and honest Government, by the restoration of happiness, tranquillity, and security to 
 " an oppressed and suffering people ; and by the revival of agriculture, commerce, manufac- 
 " ture, and general opulence in a declining and impoverished Country." 
 
 In our own Provinces the experiment of the .System has been short. It had, till within 
 these few months, been only introduced into the Circars. The Zillahs in the Circars were 
 established in 1S02, and the good effects have been made apparent in the increasing value of 
 property, the decrease of the rate of interest, and the general tranquillity. 
 
 In consequence of the non-administration of Criminal Justice, in the countries over which 
 we liave lately obtained the dominion, the crimes of robbery and murder have generally pre-
 
 99 
 
 vailed. In the six last circuits during the years of 1803, 180t, and 180.5, nine hundred aiid 
 seventy-six persons iiave been tried tor capital olYences, of whom 'iSi hii\e suffered death, 
 104 liave been transported, 370 released, and 32 sentenced to hard labour; all the capital 
 punishments iiave been for the cruiie of murder. I annex for the information of the Board, 
 Extracts from the Reports of the Judges on Circuit, in elucidation of the good efiects of this 
 part of the system. 
 
 It is to be lamented that the Executive Officers of .Justice have not more experience. 
 It is desirable that appointments of such high inijjortance should be filled by older men. The 
 Laws would no doubt be better administered. But it is improvement, not perfection, that 
 we have been endeavouring to attain. Blame can only attach to me, with whom the recom- 
 mendations originated, if in the selection 1 have not chosi-n the most deserving, and the best 
 qualified. I never did any act with more caution and consideration, and never met with 
 greater embarrassment. I did not trust to my own judgment alone. 1 obtained from five or 
 six of those persons, of whose knowledge of the servants and impartiality of ciioice I most 
 resjjected, lists of those best calculated for the Stations. I can truly yssert, that I had "rent 
 interest in the success of the Institution, and none in the promution of intlividuals with wliom 
 1 was unacquainted. Wy choice was limited by circumstances not within my controul ; — by 
 the Civil Establishment having undergone no increase corresponding with the extension of 
 the Territories, by a complete chasm in the appointment of \\'riiers from 1783 to 1789; — 
 from tlisqualification, arising in ignorance of tlie languages, tlie acquirement of later years, 
 and from the necessity of not taking from the supeniUendance of the Revenues, at the im- 
 portant moment of forming the Permanent Settlement, those officers best suited to the Judi- 
 cial Offices. It is sufficient that the best which circumstances would admit of, was done. It 
 is but justice, however, to these Gentlemen to say, that as Car as their conduct has been tried, 
 they have in general given satisl'action to the Suddcr Court. Whatever may be the extent of 
 their fitness or nnlitness for the high offices they now fill, I think they must be excused from 
 taking upon themselves any portion of the resijonsibility attaching to the Mutiny at Vellore. 
 
 W'lien I read that " the inhabitants of this country do not comprehend the convulsion at 
 *' present before their eyes ; within their shortest remembrance Military Establishment and 
 " controul attracted all their attention ; they understood and felt its origin, as congenial to 
 " their own notion of authority ; at j^resent they view a diilcrent order of things, and in the 
 *' place of the old and experienced Officer, to whom they luive long looked up with respect, 
 ■" the}- see his power and ascendancy passed away, and the youtlilul inexperienced Judge, or 
 " boyish Collector, occupy all and more than his former place :" It struck me that the Com- 
 mander in CJiief intended to convey that before the introduction of the Judicial System, the 
 Civil and Judicial Authority was vested in IMilitary Officers ; and that the Natives preferred the 
 Military Government aiul Military Law. This evidently appears to be the meaning of these 
 remarks. It will be sufficient in answer to say, that Officers hokling Military Command never 
 have been vested (except inriarticular cases, not coming within the General Regulations and 
 practice) with eitiier the Civil or Judicial Authorities. — All Ci\il Power has been in the 
 Collector. 
 
 At the same time I am inclined to believe that Military Officers holding Commands, and 
 all Military Officers in every station, have been in the habit of exercising authority, and in 
 many instances very undue authority, to the oppression of the people, and to the discredit of 
 the British character. The Records bear ample testimony to this opinion. 
 
 It is easy to understand, under the former System, in what manner iinproiK'r practices 
 escaped observation. Extended as our territories are, and impressed as the inhabitants have 
 always been with awe for the European character, and with subjection to the ruling Power, 
 complaint ilid not easily reach the seat of Government. It was the interest of the Civil to 
 keep on good terms with the Military Officer. In times when our territories were not in their 
 present statt; of tranc^uillity and obedience, the co-operation of the .Military l-orce was indis- 
 pensable to the Collection of the Revenues ; the administration of justice, the security of per- 
 son and property, were not then considered primary duties. Irregularity of conduct, and 
 improper pecuniary transactions, were either suppressed by considerations of amlual interest,
 
 100 
 
 or by that worst sort of compassion, which is tremhlingly alive to the feeUngs of a fellow-servant, 
 and perfectly callous to those of thousands of his fellow-creatures. 
 
 The Judicial system has, I trust in God, elVectually put an end to all delinquency of 
 this kind. The Regulations have defined every man's right, and in so doing have placed ef- 
 fectual restriction upon the conduct of those by whom these rights might be abused. No Mi- 
 litary Officer now, be his rank what it may, can assume any authority beyond that which he 
 possesses by virtue of his Commission, which is sufficient to the performance of the duties 
 assigned to him, and is considered adequate in all other parts of the world. He can levy no 
 taxes, cannot touch any man's property, and cannot order summary trials and punishment 
 upon persons not soldiers or followers of his camp or cantoiunent. But surely these powers, 
 which I believe to have been exercised, were never delegated to Military Officers. The Go- 
 vernment never intended that any part of the administration of its affairs should be so con- 
 ducted : the arbitrary and violent exercise of authority by every Military Officer throughout 
 India, might, as in Egypt and Turkey, by keeping the lower orders in continual fear, esta- 
 blish a state of more perfect slavery. However, such are not the principles upon which we 
 govern. But, in fact, though the loss of personal power will deprive an Officer of the follow- 
 ing and submission which may be gratifying to his feelings, yet I am not aware that the Mili- 
 tary Force becomes on that account less efficient instruments in the hands of the State. The 
 impression arising from the fear of a particular individual, not concerned in the general ma- 
 nagemeut of the other duties of a District or Province, can scarcely reach beyond the place or 
 cantonment in which he resides. It is the discipline, the energy, the promptness, the suc- 
 cess of the Army at large, that impresses with fear and respect the minds of our subjects, and 
 makes the Government formidable and efficient. I have often heard the question asked, whe- 
 ther Battalions, or Zillah Courts, were most conducive to tranquillity ? My opinion has al- 
 ways been, that the one was as necessary as the other. There cannot be a more powerful arm 
 than Law justly administei'ed. Its effects are universal and omnipotent; every one is re- 
 strained while he is also protected by it. Every one fears and loves it. While order and 
 liappiness a:e introduced in private society, respect and gratitude to the Government by 
 whom these benefits are granted, are at the same time established. 
 
 The Bayonet will produce tranquillity — the Law alone will confirm and preserve it. 
 
 I trust it will appear from these remarks that the Convulsion described is entirely ground- 
 less, the invention probably of disappointed ambition. The Military Officer will be exactly 
 placed where the Constitution always placed him. If he never assumed illegal authority, he 
 will find no change; if he did, he will be deprived of it. The Army I know do object to the 
 Judicial System, and their objections are, in my opinion, the strongest proofs, if proofs were 
 wanting, of the necessity of tlie Establishment. 
 
 (Signed) W. BENTINCK. 
 
 Fort St. George, 
 Februarj/ 27th. 1807. 
 
 (9) 
 
 MINUTE OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT. 
 
 Fort St. George, July 1 7, 1 806. 
 
 IT is my determination to refrain from giving any opinion upon the late transactions at 
 Vellore, as well as to suspe:id my belief or disbelief of the various rumours and representa- 
 tions that have since been transmitted, until the Report of the Commission shall have been 
 received : particular care has been taken in the selection of the Members of that Commission, 
 that the GoTernment may be in pgssession of a clear, sensible, and dispassionate Report of
 
 101 
 
 what has passed. Tlie Commission consists of old and respectable Civil and Military Otlicers, 
 unconnected with those iintbtiiuiaie transactions, distant from the scene of action, and as 
 likely as individuals so circumstanced can be, to go to the iMHjniry with coolness and impar- 
 tiality. I have thought it necessary to say thus much, in order to excuse myself for the pre- 
 sent, and to reserve to myself tiie full liberty at a future period of making such remarks upon 
 the Letters of the Commander in Chief, and the reports of others upon which I may not con- 
 cur in opinion, as may appear necessary. 
 
 In the present state of things I would beg leave to recommend, that tlie wisli of Govern- 
 ment may be intimated to the Commander in Chief, that the Court of Inquiry now sitting at 
 Vellore may terminate upon the arrival of the Commission j and furtlier, that all Judicial 
 Process may be suspended until the Report of the Commission is made known. I am induced 
 to offer this opinion, because I think the punishment of the remaining Prisoners requires to 
 be managed with delicacy — Delay cannot be injurious — the exam[)le of Severity has been 
 complete. — It is of importance to avoid precipitation, which may have the appearance of Re- 
 venge. The worst consequence to be apprehended from these sad events, is the existence of 
 distrust and animosity between the Government and its Army ; all pains umst be taken to 
 counteract this feeling ; I would therefore recommend that the Trials should proceed slowly, 
 but with firmness — the Delinquents must be punished — but, as far as we are able, let the pu- 
 nishment ap]jear to proceed from the steady operation of Law and of Justice, rather than from 
 the feelings of Anger and Hatred. 
 
 I beg leave also to recommend that the Commander in Chief maybe requested, when he 
 has made such arrangements for the distribution of the Troops and for the Military Service as 
 he may deem fit, to repair to tlie Presidency, in order that we may be assisted by his advice. 
 The naketl opinion of the Court of Inquirj' has left us without the means of judging of the 
 depth or of the extent of the plot asserted to exist. I confess I am not disposed to be credu- 
 lous to great danger arising from internal intrigues unconnected with our Troops. To the 
 discontent and possible disaffection of our Army, 1 am indeed quite alive ; no evil can be more 
 alarming: but I trust that the measure about to be taken, by removing the causes of dissa- 
 tisfaction, will allay the immediate irritation ; and I feel confidence that by the attention of 
 the Officers, under the zealous and able superintendance of the Commander in Chief, com- 
 plete harmony may be restored. 
 
 (.Signed) W. BENTINCK. 
 
 (r) 
 
 MINUTE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF. 
 
 IN the most secret manner 1 lay before Government two Papers, the one per- 
 haps not of the same serious nature with the other, though in part connected with the second, 
 which, for importance and delicacy of proceeding, may go the extent of our Dominion in this 
 part of India, if not acted upon with promptitude, energy, and judgment. 
 
 The possibility of general disaB'ection in our Native Cavalry, or a considerable portion 
 thereof, is a subject at this moment that demands all the powers of the understanding to reach 
 the truth; and unconnected as it stands with any alleged cause of discontent among the Sepoy 
 Battalion, the real sources of imputed or suspected disloyalty luust be sought, ami every veil 
 that conceals the truth torn away. Let sincerity, and the honest dictate of our best judgment, 
 proceed upon an Inquiry, encompassed with delicacy and the closest reserve. 
 
 I profess I am unwilling to admit the idea ; it may be without just foundation ; but if it be 
 true, can it be imputed to another cause than the attempt to restore the Mussulman G .vern- 
 ment, certainly in the Mysore, perhaps even in the Carnatic ? 
 
 Place all the late circumstances together, bring to view the various artifices eni|)loyed to 
 disgust the People with the European name, the machination to corrupt the Soldiers, and it
 
 102 
 
 luusl result that some design is in agitation in favour of llie antient order of things, and that 
 our best security depeiuis on the earUest persuasion of its existence, and the most obvious 
 means of frustration adopted. 
 
 I think it my duty to implore the Government to undertake the most energetic, though 
 secret measures for information, and at once avow the just suspicions that attach to the De- 
 scendants of Tippoo at Veilore, and its fatal Pettah, and by the dissolution of all that dan- 
 gerous fabric, ])roclaini that tlie hostile design is known, and that we are no longer the dupes 
 uf Secrecy anil Intrigue. In my opinion the first acts will secure and restore our safety, as 
 the ultimate project will at once be rendered hopeless from the distant removal of the Progeny 
 of Tippoo. 
 
 If it be argued, it will be right to await the result of the Commission now sitting at Vei- 
 lore ; without reserve, I reply, I have no I'aith in the talent of that Committee, as a general 
 Body. This is not the moment to conceal opinion, however it may be far from my nature to 
 give personal offence. It is ungracious to name individuals ; but his Lordship in Council, I 
 am persuaded, will acknowledge, at a period of tlie most critical import to the well-being of 
 the State, that the proceedings of that Couimission should be guided by a person of acknow- 
 ledged judgmeiu, and free from the imputation of any prejudice. I speak the language of 
 every person at Madras*. I disclaim the most distant idea of disrespect, and anxiously so- 
 licit his Lordship will forgive this faithful discharge of my duty. 
 
 1 again adjure this Council to direct the most cautious secrecy in the Proceedings of this 
 day. 
 
 (Signed) J. F. CRADOCK, 
 
 Uladyas, August 2d, 180C. Lieutenant-General. 
 
 E.i'tntct of a Letter from Colonel Haiicourt, commanding Vtllore, to Iris Exxcllency the Com- 
 vumdcr in C/iief, under date t/ic 'Mst Julj/, lyOt'i. 
 
 I HAVE now, in support of the opinion that I have formed, to acquaint your 
 Excellency, that Jemidar Shajk Cossini (under the sentence of the Court-Martial) expressed 
 a strong desire to see Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes, wishing, as he stated, to relieve his mind 
 by accjuainting the Lieutenant-Colonel with some circumstances relating to the business of the 
 lutii. Lieuienant-Colonel Forbes accordingly saw the Prisoner, and the outline of his commu- 
 nication is contained in the accompanying Paper, in which I think your Excellency will find 
 .some important intelligence. The Prisoner added that whatever sentence the Court-Martial 
 had passed upon him, he acknowledged the extent of his crimes, and that he felt some atone- 
 ment for his guilt, in the communication of those circumstances which he wished to make, 
 under the most solemn |)roofs of their truth. He added his earnest injunctions to Colonel 
 •^- Furnished Forbes to recomnieiul to me the utmost vigilance, lest the Native Guards f now on duty should 
 irom tlie -ith \yp corrupted, and seemed (as Colonel Forbes thought) to wish it to be understood, that he 
 had strong grounds for this injunction. 
 
 Substance of a Conversation between Major Mv^ao and a Subidar of distinguished Character and 
 
 Services in the Native Caialrj/. 
 
 THE Native Officer stated, that he had been employed in the Company's Ser- 
 vice upwards of thirty years — that he had observed the justice, moderation, and respect for 
 all religions sects, which the British Government had always manifested, and that the obliga- 
 tions of gratitude and duty demanded from him, in the actual circumstances of the Service, a 
 
 * This sort of assertion occurs frcqncnllj in Sir John f railock's Minnies. It is not intended to impiile wilful 
 iniiccuracy to tiie Commander in Cliiet; but it will be obviously extreme!) diffieull for any man placed in high au- 
 tliorily til he correctly informed <if the public sentiment upon a matter of oj.inion which he has already very warmly 
 and decidedly professed, lu such cascsit is usual for prudence lu be sileut, aud for flattery to misrcpreseat.
 
 103 
 
 full disclosure of all that he had been able to discover. He affirmed that those circiimsfances 
 were entirely unprecedented in the Carnatic ; feelings appeared to prevail in t e Coiniiry a;id 
 among the Troops which he had never before observed in the conrse of iiis service, and they 
 would spread with rapidity, unless effectual measures were adopted to put a stop to them. 
 He stated that his own family was one of respectability in the Country ; it en-oyed Ja<>hires and 
 other advantages under the Company's Govermnenl ; and it was his duty to make every re- 
 turn in his power for those benefits. 
 
 The Subidar mentioned that the information which he had received was only of a general 
 nature, but that he had every reason to place unlimited confidence in its truth. He; stated 
 that sentiments of disaffection to the British Government were enteriaincd by the 4th, 5th, 
 and 7th Regiments of Native Cavalry. When the first intelligence of the Insurrection at 
 Vellore arrived at Conatoor, Lieutenant- Colonel Floyer, commanding the 4th Regiment 
 Native Cavalry, detached a Naigue and four Troopers to learn the [)articulars. In the mean 
 time the Regiment was ordered to march : the men debated anion"- themselves rey-ardiiu'' their 
 destination, and whct/uT or not tliei/ would march. Before the march took place the 
 Naigue's party returned, however, with accounts of the success of the British Troops at Vel- 
 lore, when the Regiment, learning this event, marched without any appearance of hesitation. 
 Of the extent of the disartection in the 5th and 7th Resiments, the Subiilar could not "ive an 
 exact account, but he said that no doubt existed of its having made considerable progress in 
 those Corps. 
 
 On enquiring from the Subidar the causes of this disaffection, he said, that it was diffi- 
 cult to state all of them ; but he believed they arose princijmlly from the intrigues of Tippoo's 
 family and their adherents. A number of persons formerly in the Sultaun's service or their 
 relations were now servina: in our Native Reuiments, and were most active instinments of 
 spreading disaflection in them. He said that the Agents or the Friends of the Family were 
 employed all over the Country, that their intrigues extended to every place, and were carried 
 on with activity above the Ghauts. He said that the Country near Cudclalore was as much vairy iTni'ar 
 disaffected as Vellore. I'oiiakiitiu, 
 
 The thanks of the Commander in Chief and Government were returned to the Subidar 
 for his fidelity and zeal. After some conversation it was agreed that he should proceed to 
 Arcot and Vellore, and endeavour to procure the most authentic accounts of the causes of the 
 disaffection, of the names of the persons principally employed in spreading it, of the extent 
 to which it has reached, and of the means most likely to suppress it. The Subidar promiseil 
 to exert the most strenuous endeavours to perform the instructions of the Commander in 
 Chief; he received assurances of the disposition of Government to distinguish his fidelity and 
 zeal by suitable revvards. 
 
 (Signed) J. MUNRO, 
 
 Pcis. Int. 
 
 Tlie station of 
 5th N,itive Ca'* 
 
 The Subidar wishes his name to be concealed for the present, but the greatest reliance 
 may be placed in his fidelity and attachment, for they have been repeatedly manifested under- 
 circumstances of peculiar delicacy and difficulty. 
 
 The Subidar first communicated the foregoing information to the Oflicer commanding 
 his Corps, by whom it was repeated to Colonel Gillespie, and the conversation between Major' 
 Munro and the Subidar took place iu Colonel Gillespie's presence. 
 
 Suhstanceof the Information given hj .Temid.vu Shaik Cossim of the I si Battidion \st Regiment^ 
 before Lieutenant Colonel FoiiBES and Lieutenant CuoMBS. 
 
 Thursday, Julij3\st, 18-06. 
 WHEN the 2d Battalion 1st Regiment passed Vellore, the day that it arrivecK, 
 and the day that it halted, a Meeting took place between tlie Native Commissioned and Non-
 
 104 
 
 Commissionetl of that Corps, and some of the 1st BattaUon 1st Reghnent (amongst whom was 
 .icmuUr, Snd H;i\ iki.ir Suaik, Secuiuler of the Light Company) on the subject of the new Turbancis, at a 
 Batt. istRe^. foiub called Aminpeer. A Mussuhiian Jemidar of the 2(1 of the 1st (wlvohad I'ormerly belonged 
 der'Lf'ht"' to Langley's Battalion) was particularly forward, and declared, that although the whole Bat- 
 Company, talion might wear it, Ae never would. That the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment would look to the 
 1st of the 1st for an example ; and that if the 1st of the 1st wore it, the two Corps would be- 
 come enemies to each other ; but that if the 1st of the 1 st refused it, and any disturbance 
 took place, the 2nd of the 1st would come up and support them. 
 
 Siiaik Nutter of the Grenadiers and Abdul Khaderof Light Company of the 1st of the 1st 
 were both present at the meeting; there were 15 or 16 Native Commissioned and Noii-Com- 
 niissioned of the 2nd of the 1st, and several Sepoys of the 1st of the 1st. 
 
 Alter the 2nd of the 1st had marched, Jemidar Shaik Cossim states, that he went to the 
 ho\ise of Jcniidar Sliaik Bran of tlie 1st of the 1st ; a relation of theirs came out of the house, 
 .Tevniilar shnik and told hini that the two .leniidars (who are related) were disputmg with each other, which of 
 I'';'"' ^'"'.''.'^" the two should die in the cause of resisting the new Turband, each desirmg the other to take 
 iKwan, 1st of care of the children, and each offering to sacrifice his own life for the other. Oncoming 
 1st. away from the house, he met Havildar Syed Esuph going to it, who, on his return, told him 
 
 Hayildar Syc^ ^.j^^^. ^.j^^ ^^^,^ Jeiuidars were still quarrelling on the same subject. 
 
 I'st. ' In consequence of the irregular conduct in the _'d of the 4th, when a Troop of the 19th 
 
 Dragoons arrived frum Arcot, to escort the Prisoners of the2nd-4th to Madras, Jemidar Shaik 
 Cossim was ordered with a Guard of the 1st of the 1st to accompany them, and on the morn- 
 ing before they marched Shaik Cossim says he came into the Fort very early, and was met 
 at the gate by Emaun Khan of the Light Company, who advised him to be cautious or he 
 might be killed, telling him that between tiOO and 700 of the 4th had been ready in the Bar- 
 racks all night, and prepared to mutiny ; that about 200 had also collected on the outside 
 with tlie intention of attacking the Cavalry, and rescuing the Prisoners ; but that the Cote 
 Havildar of the 8th Company 2nd of the 4th, had addressed the men, pointing out the folly 
 of their conduct, and telling them that the guilty only, after trial, would be punished, and 
 reconmicnding to them to be quiet, they listened to iiis advice and broke up. 
 
 At Arcot, on his arrival with the Prisoners, Shaik Cossim states, that the Cavalry 
 Troopers came about and amongst his Sepoys, abused them, spit at them, and made use 
 of taunting expressions, and told them, " that they were Sepoys and black men, as well as 
 " their Prisoners, and that instead of assisting in guarding them, they should have united 
 " with them, and supported their cause." The same conduct was observed by the Troopers 
 on Shaik Cossim's return with his guard to Arcot, after bavins left Madras. 
 
 During the march from Vellore to Madras, Syed Ameed, Naigue of the Grenadiers, and 
 Sepoy Ramdoo, asked and obtained leave to go on in advance to Wallajabad : on rejoining 
 the Guard they told the Jemidar that the 2nd of the 14lh was making up the Turband, and 
 that Major Haslewood had informed his Corjjs, the 2nd of the 1st, that there was a General 
 Order for all Corps to make them up : the Sepoys of the 2nd of the 1st told them that they 
 would wear them if the 1st of the 1st did; that they looked to the 1st of the 1st for an ex- 
 ample, being, as they termed it, xXxr ri«htzviiig nf their Brigade. On Shaik Cossim's return 
 to Vellore from detachment, about three days after he was Officer of the Day, and on going 
 to report to Colonel Forbes, on the way to his house he saw Jemidar Shaik Dewan 'at the 
 jVminpeer, who called him, and inquired the news : Shaik Cossim told him that the first of 
 the 23d at Madras, and the 2nd of the 14th at Wallajabad, were making up the new Turbands, 
 and that they (the 1st of the 1st) must do the same. Jemidar Shaik Dewan replied, " What 
 " is it you say ? We must wear it, N^o. Three or four of us must unite, and consider this 
 " business — Death is better than to wear the Turband ; and three of four of us will kill the rest 
 " if they wear it : and if all the rest wear it, I never will, but will myself kill several, and then 
 " go away from the Battalion." Shaik Cossim replied, " You are a Peer ke murredy and I 
 " am but an ignorant youth ; I shall be guided by your advice." He then left the other and 
 came away, but was called back and desired by the Jemidar never to mention what had 
 passed, adjuring him in the name oi Aminpeer.
 
 105 
 
 Tlie Sepoj-s first shewed sj'mptoms of discontent on the first arrival of the new-pattern 
 Turhand, and the people about the Palace llicn bi'iraii to tamper with the .Sentries posted about 
 the Palace, tolling them, that " if they wore the new Turband they would be soon ordered to 
 " wear hats, that the time was now come to mutiny and be active, that the Sepoys throughout 
 the whole Country wtre all dissatisfied and discontented at the new Turband, and that it they 
 seized that opportunity, ihey might immediately establish the Mogul Government. This 
 conversation was adch-esseil (when the Hircarrachs were not present) to the Sentries about the 
 Palace, by whom it was reported to the otiier Sepoys ; and Shaik Cossim states, that, from, 
 the arrival of the new Turband, this kind of conversation was perpetually carried on in the 
 Barracks by the Non-commissioned and Sepoys, and that it was well known to the Native 
 Oflicers : and that Shaik Ally the Native Adjutant, and Subidar Ilussinan Khan, declined 
 making it known to the Commanding Oilicer, but rather suppressed the complaints they had 
 made to them, and in particular one dav the whole Grenadier Company having shewn much 
 discontent, tiie Subidar intended carrying eight men who had come forward to Colonel Forbes, 
 but Jemidar Shaik Ally prevented him ; from this time frequent meetings and consultations 
 took place, and the people of the Palace, and the people in the Pettah, took every occasion 
 of fomenting the discontent of the Sepoys. 
 
 Alia O Deen, a foster-brother of Moizud Been, was the metlium of intercourse between 
 the Palace and the Sepo^-s. He frequently attemled the meetings and consultations that were 
 held at the house of Subidar Shaik Adam, 2nd of the 23d, and of Ryman Saib, Sepoy of 
 the Light Conipan}- 1st of 1st, and brought them news and advice from the Palace. He told, 
 them that if the 2d of the ith had not gone awav, every thing would have been settled long 
 before this, and the Prince's Government established ; and blamed the 1st of the 1st for not 
 having joined the 2d of the 4th on so good an occasion; and the Jemidar thinks such might 
 have been the case, but for the coolness belween the two Battalions, 1st of 1st and 2nd of 
 4th. He told them that the Prince Moizud Deen wished the Sepoys to take and keep 
 the Fort for eight dut/s only, by which time he would have ten thousand men from Gurni- 
 nieondah; that letters were already written to that Polygar, who was a powerful man and great 
 friend of the Princes ; that letters were also ready for the Vancatygherry and Callastry Poly- 
 gars, and for several Sirdars now in the service of Poorniah, who had formerly been in the 
 service ofTippoo Sultan; and that the Fort and Pettah once gained. Troops would join them 
 from all cjuarters. 
 
 Alia O Deen was present when the Oath was administered, and promised high rank to 
 Subidar Shaik Adam, and said he should be Commandant, and Jemidar Shaik Hussain second, 
 but no other nominations were then made. 
 
 Shaik Cossim says, that Shaik Nutter, Sepoy of the Grenadiers, and Emann Khan, of 
 the Light Coinpany, had both been very active in gaining over many of the Pensioners who 
 understood the management of the guns, and Gun Lascars who lived outside, who all promised 
 to come in and assist us, as soon as they were called upon, and promised to be ready if they 
 would only let them know the day fixed upon. A Jemidar of Pensioners had also promised 
 to be ready, and a great number of the People of the Pettah were also held in readiness to 
 assist, as soon as called upon. 
 
 The day fixed for the Insurrection had been twice before changed. It was once fixed 
 upon to have taken place before the 2nd-23d were admitted into the plot, or made acquainted 
 with it. It was then put off; it was afterwards to have taken place one night after the 2nd-23d 
 had been acquainted with it, when Subidar Shaik Adam and Jemidar Siiaik Cossim were both 
 on guard, and was put off: and it actually took place sooner than was finally decided on. The 
 day determined upon was on the succeeding Mo>iday. Jemidar Shaik Hussain of the 3,'5d, 
 being drunk, occasioned its taking place on the night of the 9th ; about nine o'clock a con- 
 sultation was held at the Barracks, and it was resolveil to commence the Insurrection that night 
 at two o'clock, but the determination having been taken solute, the people of the Pettah were 
 not apprized of the intention, and it was too late for them to come in. Shaik Cossim states 
 it was a resolution suddenly taken, and the Native Officers and people in the Palace were not 
 acquainted with the intention, otherwise the result would have been ilillcrent. He also says 
 
 P
 
 106 
 
 Subidar Sliaik 
 Eniaun. Jemi- 
 darsRungapah, 
 Ramasamy. 
 
 Haviltlar Sliaik 
 Slodun, Gopal- 
 loo, Mostelli- 
 {^00, Apperas, 
 Pickag'orroo. 
 
 No. 1. 
 Subidar Shaik 
 Adam. Jemi- 
 dar Sbaik Hus- 
 sain. Subidar 
 Shaik Homed. 
 Havildar 
 Fakeer Ma- 
 homed. 
 
 No. 2. 
 Subidar Moor 
 iNIahomed. 
 Subidar Sbaik 
 Emaun. Su- 
 bidar Shaik 
 Ahmed. 
 
 that it was a fortunate circumstance that the Sepoys being occupied in plundering the 
 Paymaster's iiouse, and carrying oflF the treasure, their attention was so much engaged that 
 they would not again collect, or the Princes would have come out and headed them, as just 
 before that large bodies had been collected, and the Princes prepared to join them ; and he is 
 convinced rhat but for this circumstance the Princes would have been out. 
 
 Five or six days before the night of the Conspiracy, Ramdeen, Sepoy of the Light Com- 
 pany 1st of 1st, was Sentry at Moluiddcen's Palace; he was posted at two o'clock, and 
 between that time a.\\d four, Mohuddecn came out three times, and enquired of him " if the 
 " Insurrection had not been yet ;" Ramdeen replied, it would presently (this being the night 
 it had been fixed for). Ramdeen was one wlio had taken the Oaths. Sultan Mohuddeen told 
 him, " I am ready with 500 men in my own pay, outside, to assist." On the morning of the 
 Muiiny Sultan Mohuddeen was employed in (listributing beetle and food to the Sepoys, and 
 Havildar Shaik, Secunder of the Light Company 1st of 1st, was on the top of the Palace 
 calling the Sepoys together. 
 
 On the morning of the Mutiny, Prince Moizud Dcen having exchanged beetle with 
 Syed Gaffier's Son, gave him a Sword and a party of Sepoys, and ordered him to go and 
 take possession of the Hill Fort. He also sent to Jemidar Shaik Cossim to know if he 
 should come out and join ; the Jemidar sent word, " No, I am in command of the Troops." 
 Shaik Cossim states that Alla-O-Deen was present when he received the Oath, and it was 
 then resolved that the Mutiny should take place two days after, but that Havildar Fakeer 
 Mahomed persuaded them to postpone it till paj' was issued to the men. 
 
 Shaik Cossim declares that the secret consultations of the Sepoys were well known to 
 every Subidar, Jemidar, and Havildar in the Corps, except those in the margin ; that 300 
 men of the 1st of 1st had received and taken the Oath ; that parties of four and five met 
 too-ether and took it ; and that it was generally so contrived that three or four of those who had 
 taken it vvere put on each guard. 
 
 Shi.ik Cossim states, that with the exception of Subidar Syed Nully, who was killed, 
 and Suhidar RamaliHngum Naig, who was on command, every Native Officer in the 23d well 
 knew of the disafll'ection of the two Corps, and that some plans were in agitation ; but only the 
 Officers in the margin. No. 1, took the Oaths, and two Sepoys who were admitted into the 
 secret, Cawderof the 4th, and Mohuddeen Khan of the 3d Companies ; but that the Officers, 
 No. 'J, in the margin, knew of the secret consultations. Havildar Cawder of the Light Com- 
 pany had volunteered to shoot Colonel Forbes when the Mutiny should take place, and was 
 sent as Orderly on the 9th, and on going away told the Jemidar, " he should be ready to do 
 " his part when the aftair took place." All the Grenadiers of the 1st of 1st were in the secret. 
 Shaik Nutter told the Sepoys at the gate to shoot Colonel Forbes. 
 
 Syed Mohuddean, Sepoy of the 3d Company 1st of 1st, offered, if Moizud Doen would 
 give him the charge of the Pettah, in four days he would collect provisions for ten thousand 
 men. Shaik Cossim states, that when a party of Troopers arrived from Connatoor with a 
 •run or tumbril, and remained outside, Shaik Nutter and Emaun Khan went out to them, and 
 communicated the intentions of the Sepoys to mutiny. The Troopers told them if any thing 
 took place that night they would coiue iif and assist, and if they sent information to them when 
 the Mutiny had begun, they. would get their Regiment to come and join them. 
 
 The Oath administered was — 
 1st. Secrecy. 
 
 2d. Destruction of all the Europeans. 
 3d. Establishment of Moizud Deeii's Government. 
 
 No attempt to corrupt the Sepoys was made till the new Turband arrived, to his know- 
 ledo-e. Einaun Khan was seen by Shaik Cossim in a Mogul's dress after the arrival of the Ca- 
 valry ; and Shaik Cossim says, he is convinced that he must jio-jd either be concealed in 
 the Palace, or put to death, as he was entrusted with the whole secret from the commence- 
 ment, and could have discovered the whole of the Plot and every Individual concerned 
 in it.
 
 107 
 
 (O 
 
 TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD W. C. BENTINCK, 
 GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL, FORT ST. GEORGE. 
 
 MY LORD, 
 
 WE have had the honoui- to receive this day your Lordship's in Council Dis- 
 patch, dated the 31st ultimo, by H. M. ship Rattlesnake. 
 
 2. The important contents of that Dispatch have had our immediate deliberation ; and 
 with a view to conununicate to your Lordship in Council our sentiments upon the subject 
 with the least practicable delay, we have the honour to enclose the copy of a Minute deli- 
 vered by the Governor General on this occasion, in the tenor of which we entirely concur. 
 
 3. Your Lordship in Council will observe, that we approve the measure of dispatching 
 the Sons of Tippoo Sultan to Bengal, but that our apprehension of the dangerous conse- 
 quences of sending a Regiment of Europeans to Fort St. George, induces us to withhold our 
 consent to that measure. 
 
 4. We most earnestly recommend to your Lordship in Council to pursue the course of 
 conduct suggested in the Governor General's Minute. No danger can, in our judgment, 
 be so great and so extensive as the dissolution of the bonds of confidence between Govern- 
 ment and its Native Troops, which must be the consequence of sending a reinforcement 
 of European Troops to Port St. George, and of attending the indications of mistrust and 
 susjncion. 
 
 5. We earnestly call nj)on your Lordship in Council to adopt measures for the speedy 
 conclusion of the Investigations depending at Vellore, and to abstain from the prosecution 
 of them at other Stations. We are anxious that the principles so wisely recommended in 
 Lord William Bentinck's Minute of the 15th ultimo, should govern the proceedings of your 
 Lordship in Council, and that every measure indicating the existence of mistrust and alarm 
 should be cautiously avoided. 
 
 6. The considerations under which we have deemed it to be our duty to withhold our 
 consent to the dispatch of a Regiment of Europeans from Bengal, suggest the expediency 
 of preventing the arrival of any European Troops from Ceylon, if it be now practicable to 
 prevent it. 
 
 7. We entertain a full confidence that the removal of the Pi'inces, combined with the 
 abrogation of the obnoxious Orders, will have the effect of suppressing every symptom of 
 disaffection, unless agitation be supported or revived by the appearance of alarm, and the 
 indication of mistrust and suspicion. 
 
 8. We observe that your Lordship in Council states merely the probability of your dis- 
 patching to Bengal the principal adherents of the Princes. We are of opinion that it would 
 be highly advisable to carry that measure into effect ; and we accordingly request that your 
 Lordship in Council will dispatch the adherents of the Princes also by the earliest opportunity 
 to this Presidency. 
 
 We have the honour to be, 
 &c. &c. 
 (Signed) ' ' G. H. BARLOW. 
 
 Fort William, \lth August, 1806. 
 
 G. UDNY. 
 J. LUMSDEN.
 
 \m 
 
 (O 
 
 GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S MINUTE. 
 
 Fort IVilliam, Wtli August, 1806. 
 
 I DO not think from .any part of the Communication from Fort St. George, 
 contained in the Riglit Honourable the Governor in Council's Lttter of the 31st Jnlj just 
 received, that there is any reason to believe that the late event at Vellorc h;is been the result 
 of a long and deep-laid Conspiracy of the nature described in that Disj>atch: but even ad- 
 mitting that the Princes had been endeavouring during a long period of tjnie to secure a party 
 in their favour throughout the Carnatic and Mysore by means of their emissaries, and that 
 their views had been directed to the object of alienating tlie attachment of the Sepoys, I 
 think that there is no reason to believe that these etforts had made any progress, or would 
 have made any among the Sepoys, but for tlie unfortunate Order respecting the Turbands 
 and Marks of Cast. These Orders afforded a most favourable instrument for the prosecution 
 of such designs. It is evident that the Orders created disaffection independent of any other 
 cause ; nothing therefore could be more obvious or more easy than to misrepresent their 
 intent in a manner to inflame that disaffection. There is no appearance of any general plan 
 of insurrection or confederacy. The Princes concluded that half their oiiject was accom- 
 phshed by the prevalent discontent ; they had only to improve the oppoitunity. Then it 
 was, as appears by the deposition of Shaik Cossim, that they began to seduce the Native 
 Officers and Sepoys at Vellore by employing the instrument offered to their hands, in the 
 Orders regarding the Turband and Dress of the Native Troops. 
 
 I am satisfied in my own mind that these Orders constituted the active and vital prin- 
 ciple of the whole plan. If so, those Orders constituted the real cause of the past and pre- 
 sent danger. 
 
 The Commander in Chief and the Government of Fort St. George appear to deduce a 
 different conclusion from the three facts stated by the Subidar who conversed with Major 
 Munro ; namely, first, " That those circumstances" (an expression which, according to the 
 content, refers to the preceding e.xpression, " the actual circumstances of the Service'''' ) " were 
 " entirely unprecedented in the Carnatic ; that feelings appeared to prevail in the Country 
 " and among the Troops which he had ne\'er beibre observed in the course of his service." 
 Secondly, " That sentiments of disaffection to the British Goverimient were entertained by 
 " the 4th, 5th, and 7th Regiments of Native Cavalry ;" and. Thirdly, " That a number of 
 " persons, formerly in the Sultan's service, or their relations, were now serving in our 
 " Native Regiments, and were most active instruments of spreading disaftection in them; 
 '" and that the agents, or the Friends of the Family, were employed all over the Country ; 
 " that their intrigues extended to every place, and were carried on with acti\ity above the 
 *' Ghauts." 
 
 The first of the above stated facts is nothing more than a description of the disaffection 
 produced by the General Orders, and fomented by the Agents of the Princes : for there is 
 nothing in the whole of the information before Government which warrants a suspicion that 
 the change of sentiment in the Country and among the Troops had taken plape before the 
 jjromulgation of the Orders. 
 
 The Commander in Chief and the Government appear to deduce the inference above 
 .stated iiom the Second of the before-mentioned facts, under the consideration that the 
 change of Turband not extending to the men of the Cavalry, that could not be the cause of 
 their disaftection. This, however, apj)ears to be an erroneous conclusion ; for, in the first 
 place, it is to be supposed that the prohibition of distinctive Marks of Cast, Ear-rings, &c. 
 extended to the Cavalry ; and, secondly, without reference to that circumstance, the conta- 
 gious spirit of bigotry or olfended prejudice, is amply sufficient to account for the men of
 
 109 
 
 the Cavalry making common cause with those of the Infantry on sucli an occasion. To in- 
 vade tiie sacred prejudices of one portion of a Community is to invade the prejudices of the 
 whole. The same observation is applicable to all the Native Inhabitants of the Country, and 
 will account for the feeling which the Subidar states to prevail in the Country, as well as 
 among the Troojjs. 
 
 Tlie Third fact is admitted as a means of animating the discontents arising from the ob- 
 noxious Orders. 
 
 The Government and Commander in Chief of Fort St. George are probably not yet 
 aware of the sudden and violent etTects of the slightest appearance of a violation of sacred 
 prejudices among the Natives of India. They are disposed, therefore, to ascribe to distant 
 and unknown causes that disaffection, of which, to a certam extent at least, they must admit 
 the cause to be proximate and certain. In my judgment the presumptive evidence of the 
 latter position is so strong, that it would be sate to proceed on an assumption of its trutii, and 
 imprudent to act upon a different principle. 
 
 The course of proceeding to be adopted under a supposition that the disaffection of tlie 
 Army has been occasioned by a long-contmued and deep-laid Conspiracy, existing in a state 
 of considerable progress antecedently to the promulgation of the General Orders, and that 
 which should be pursued under the view of the case which I have taken, are different : the 
 former case might require measures of a coercive nature, an active scrutin}-, and a firiimess 
 and decision calculated to overawe the disaffected ; tiie latter case requires the removal of the 
 cause of discontent by the abrogation of the obnoxious Orders, the restoration of confidence 
 to the Troops by shewing them confidence on the part of the Government, and the very 
 reverse of all coercive measures. 
 
 Tlie appearance of coercion in the second case might have the effect of rendering the 
 cause of the Sepoys the cause of Religion ; the desperate danger of such an event need not 
 be pointed out. Prudence seems to require that Government should sedulously guard against 
 its approach. 
 
 Ujjon this ground principally I entertiain considerable apprehension of the consequences 
 of dispatching a Regiment of Europeans from Bengal to Fort St. George. It would be a 
 manifest indication that Government has lost its confidence in the Native Troops, and that 
 the Eiu-opean Troops are introduced to coerce or overawe them. This effect will be aided 
 b^' the extensive investigations which the Government of Fort St. George appears disposed 
 to pursue; the European and Native Troops will be rendered adverse parties; confidence 
 will be destroyed, and it is not perhaps within the compass of human prudence and wisdom 
 to restore it. Imagination can scarcelj' assign a limit to the consequences of such a state of 
 things. But there are other questions to be considered : would the addition of one or two 
 European Regiments enable the Government to coerce the body of Native Troops when thus 
 placed (it may be said) in a state of hostility ? A\^ould the Sepoys in such a case depend 
 upon themselves alone ? Would they not excite the embers of revolt in every District of 
 the Company's Possessions ? Would they not apply for foreign aid ? These appear to bo 
 considerations tiiat should be deliberately weighed before the adoption of a measure which 
 tends to dissolve the bonds of confidence between Government and its Native Troops. 
 
 I am satisfied there is much less danger from the prosecution of an opposite course ; 
 whatever may be the real distrust of the Government of Fort St. George, every endeavour 
 should in my opinion be employed to conceal it. The investigations should, I think, be 
 limited to Vellore ; the greatest caution should be observed in punishing instances of disaf- 
 fection in individuals of the Native Troops at other Stations, which in the course of those 
 invest gations may be substantiated ; even in those which it may be proved that such disaf- 
 fection did nut originate in the promulgation of the General Orders, or was not connected 
 witii tliem ; for the victims of punishment might with little difficulty give a turn to the case, 
 and propagate the dangerous sentiment, that they suffered in the cause of Religion. 
 
 I think that the investigation should be closed, and the agiuuion of the late event be 
 composed as speedilv as possible, that (as originally proposed by Lord William Bentinck) the 
 principal perpetraloVs of the Massacre at Vellore alone should be brought to exemplary pu-
 
 110 
 
 nishment, ami a general amnesty should be extended to the rest. If the agitation is kept up 
 by piotracted and cxtentled investigations until the fair season shall return, advantage may 
 be taken of it by tiiose among the States and Classes of India, whose views of turbulence, 
 rapine, and ambition, might hnd in such a state of things an opportunity of success. 
 
 This course of contluct appears to me to afford the best prospect of restoring order, 
 harmony, and confidence. 
 
 Tilt: removal of the Princes appears highly judicious. Even if their intrigues have had 
 a greater share in the propagation of disaffection than I suppose them to have had, tlieir re- 
 moval will suppress the hopes of the disaffected, and combined with the abrogation of the 
 General Orders, will dispose them to revert to their duty of allegiance, the existence of 
 which can alone produce security. Another great advantage of removing the Princes will be, 
 thai it will tend to produce a general belief that they are, or are considered to be, the sole 
 source of the late transactions at Vellore. 
 
 If so extensive a Conspiracy as the Government of Fort St. George appears to appre- 
 hend really exists, the moment of its active operation will be that of the removal of the 
 Princes from Vellore. The reinforcement from Bengal cannot arrive in time to provide 
 against that exent. The inoinent of danger therefore will be past, or the evil will have occur- 
 red before the arrival of the T rocps : it may be urged that the reinforcement would be parti- 
 cularly requisite under the occurrence of that evil. Our resolutions then must be taken on a 
 comparison of probabilities ; and I think there is no proportion between the hazard of such a 
 general Insurreciion, and the dangers which seem to attach to the measure of sending a Regi- 
 ment from Bengal. 
 
 (Signed) G. H. BARLOW. 
 
 (O 
 
 TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK, 
 GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL, FORT ST. GEORGE. 
 
 MY LORD, 
 
 WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship in Council's 
 Dispatches of the 28th and 2iith ultimo. We have also received the Documents transmitted 
 by direction of your Lordship in Council in your Chief Secretary's Letter of the 29th and 
 oOih ultimo, and \st instant. 
 
 2. The perusal of all these Documents has confirmed the sentiments stated in our Dis- 
 patches of the 1st and lllh instant, relative to the foundation of the discontent which has 
 lately appeared among the Native Troops of the Presidency of Fort St. George. We are 
 unable to trace any evidence of that general disaffection, the supposed existence of which has 
 diminished your Lordship's confidence in the allegiance of the Native Army, exceeding the 
 limits of that which is manifestly connected with an apprehended invasion of the sanctimonious 
 prejudices of the Native Troops. That disaffection, wherever it has appeared, has coincided 
 in point of time with the promulgation and enforcement of the General Orders, respecting 
 the change of Turbands and the prohibition of distinctive Marks of Cast. It appears from 
 tlie indisputable evidence of Jemiilar Shaik Cossim, that the agents of the family of Tippoo 
 Sultan at Vellore did not begin to tamper with the Sepoys until they had shewn signs of dis- 
 content on the arrival of the pattern of the new Turband. Not the slightest symptom of discon- 
 tent and disaffection is imputed to any Corps previously to the promulgation of these Orders; 
 nor does it appear that any other instrument for exciting revolt was employed, than that 
 which was afforded by the obnoxious Orders. Under the confirmed impression of these sen- 
 timents, we remain convinced of the importance of adopting the principle and temper of
 
 Ill 
 
 proceeding recommended in our Dispatch to your Lordship in Council of the I Ith ins/ant ; 
 and your Lordship will ])rol)ahly iiave anticipated from the tenor of that Dispatch our judg- 
 ment upon tiie cpiestion referred to us in your Lordship's Dispatch of the 2yth ul/iino, relative 
 to the detention of His Majesty's 19th Regiment of Light Dragoons and y4th Regiment of 
 Infantry, tinder orders of embarkation for Kurope : not only are the measures of precaution 
 suggested by your Lordship in Council unnecessary, but with reference to the presumed 
 fouiulation of the late chscontent among the Native Troops, are, in our opinion, rather of a 
 dangerous tendency. W'e have already stated the consequences whicii we apprehend from 
 the adoption of those measures. We cannot therefore allbrd our sanction to the detention of 
 the Regiments in question, professedly suggested upon the principle of those precautionary 
 measures. The cases which might justify a deviation from the positive Orders of His Royal 
 Highness the Commander in Chief with regard to the relief of Regiments serving in Iiulia, 
 must be of a nature peculiarly urgent; and your Lordship in Council is apj^rized of the 
 grounds of our opinion, that in the present case a deviation from tiiose Orders is not only 
 unnecessary, but injurious to the interests of the public Service ; but even admitting the 
 principle upon which your Lordship in Council founds the expediency of detaining those 
 Regiments, we apprehend tiiat the iliminution of actual force occasioned by their embarka- 
 tion would be very inconsiderable, as under any circumstances, most of the men would pro- 
 bably be drafted, with their own consent, into other Regiments ; independently of which 
 consideration, your Lordsiiip in Council will be informed by the enclosed Copy of a Letter 
 from the Secret Committee, dated the 1st of April, i-eceived overland, that 2000 men of His 
 Majesty's Army and 500 Recruits were to be embarked for hidia in the China ships appointed 
 to sail about the 2uth or 25th of April, a considerable jiroportion of which we should at all 
 events deem it advisable to assign to the Presidency of Fort St. George. This accession of 
 European Force, wholly unconnected with the late events at Vellore, would alone preclude 
 the necessity of detainmg His Majesty's lyth Regiment of Dragoons and 94th of Infantry ; 
 and we accordingly request that your Lordship m Council will permit the embarkation of 
 those Regiments at the time originally intended. 
 
 We deem it unnectssary to advert to specific points of discussion and proceeding com- 
 municated in the late Dispatches from Fort St. George : The obligation of our public duty 
 under the information which we possess, and with reference to the actual progress of the 
 measures of your Lordship's Government, as they relate to the subject of the late events on 
 the Coast, at the time when this Dispatch may reach Fort St. George, merely requiring the 
 repetition of our earnest recommendation, that your Lordship in Council will regulate your 
 future proceedings by the general principles described in our Dispatches of the 1st and 1 ith 
 instant, the observance of which appears to us to involve not only the immediate interests of 
 the Government of Fort St. George, but the security and prosperity of every branch of the 
 British Empire in India. 
 
 We have the honour to be, 
 tkc. &c. ike. 
 (Signed) G. H. BARLOW. 
 
 LAKE. 
 
 G. UDNY. 
 
 J. LUMSDEN. 
 Fort William, Jugusi 2Z(l, 1806.
 
 112 
 
 («) 
 
 Par. 214. While in this uncertainty, the deposition of the Jeipidar Shaik Cos- 
 sim, and the information furnished by the Subidar of Cavah-y, contained in a preceding part 
 of this Dispatch, were communicated to iis. These papers, in all material respects, tended 
 to confirm each other, and to afford sufhcient evidence, that tlit-. spirit of disaffection was 
 more extensively spread among our troops than we at first apprehended, and that the conta- 
 o-ion had reached the Native Cavalry, which was the part of our Native Army in which we 
 had before placed our chief reliance. 
 
 2 1 5. The disaffection of the Native Cavalry presented a prospect which was particularly 
 alarming, from the circnmstance of the greatest part of tiiat budy of Troops being composed 
 of Moormen, who, under the disposition vviiich they had evinced, might be expected to shew 
 themselves forward in support of the Mussulman interests. Bigotry, ambition, and every 
 passion that most strongly predominates in the minds of persons of that Sect, might be sup- 
 posed to combine in leading to such an event. 
 
 216. We had reason to believe, that the precautions which had been taken would be 
 sufficient to check farther attempts on the part of tlie Princes themselves at Vellore ; but it 
 was impossible to judge how far their machinations might have been already successful, or 
 whether the same hostile spirit might not have pervaded the numerous and disorderly Moor- 
 men who are spread over every part of the Territories under this Government ; and might 
 not have linked the whole or the principal part in a confederacy tending to the object of 
 drawing our troops from their allegiance, and of exciting general commotion. 
 
 217. It would be difficult to convey to your Honourable Committee an adequate im- 
 pression of the wretched state to which most of the Moorish inhabitants in this part of India 
 have been reduced, by the late rapid decline of the Mussulman Power. The conquest of 
 Mysore, the cession of the Ceded Districts by his Highness the Nizam, and, lastl)', the ces- 
 sion of the Carnatic, are events which, however much they may have contributed to the 
 general prosperity of the Country, and the happiness of the greatest part of its population, 
 have necessarily injured and depressed the hopes and fortunes of numerous persons who lived 
 under the influence of the Mussulman Governments, and who must naturally look to the im- 
 provement of their condition by any change. 
 
 2 1 8. There was no longer a question about the Orders which had been found objection- 
 able. The moment when they had been found in fact to be so, the Orders had been re- 
 scinded, and every means had been taken to remove any anxiety which they might be sup- 
 posed to have created in the minds of the Native Troops. The subject therefore had, in the 
 state in which it then appeared, assumed a more extensive range. 
 
 219. We never ceased to hope that, as the discontent of the Army had apparently ori- 
 ginated, in a material degree, in the Orders which had been found objectionable, the effects 
 might in a proportionate degree cease with the cause from which they were supposed to have 
 taken rise. But it was obvious that other causes were, at the time to which we allude, in 
 active operation ; and it was impossible to form any conclusive judgment of the extent of the 
 effect which they might produce. 
 
 220. Several examples of Mutiny and Insubordination had already taken place ; and 
 we had reason to believe, from very strong testimony, that a large portion of the Native Ca- 
 valry, which was situated in the very centre of Mussulman intrigue, had imbibed the poison 
 of tlisaffoction, and would not hesitate to join any leader who might venture to erect the stan- 
 dard of re\olt. We encouraged every hope that a perseverance in those measures of prudence 
 and precaution which we did not fail to adopt, would be successful in averting so serious a 
 mischief; but we felt no certainty whether the storm which was thus evidently impending might 
 dissipate, or where it might next descend ; and in that state of things we should, in our ap- 
 prehension, not have been faithful in the discharge of our duty, if we had blindly committed
 
 113 
 
 ourselves to possible contingencies, which might be governed by innumerable secret spritigs 
 of action, of wliich there were no means at tiiat moment of accurately judging. 
 
 221. We did not apprehend that any intrigue would be successful to the extent of pro- 
 ducing a general alienation of the aflections of our Native Ami}'. Such an extreme state of 
 things would have been contrary to all former experience, and we saw no cause for the anti- 
 cipation of it. We however feared that the disaffection which had already shewn itself mi<^ht 
 extend to other Corps ; and if we had not tiie means of checking the evil, that it might ac- 
 quire accumulated force, and gain strength by the progress of example. 
 
 222. All cause of dissatisfaction had been carefully removed. If, therefore, such An 
 event had occurred, it could only have proceeded from the most treasonable intentions, 
 fostered by the influence and intrigues of persons who from their situation were placed 
 in natural enmity to the British Government ; and in such a case, it would certainly not have 
 appeared to us, that we could hope to avert the evil by shutting our eyes to the view of it, 
 or that it could be met with the expectation of success in any other mode, than by the exer- 
 tion of the utmost determination and vigour. 
 
 223. In this country, above all others, we believe that the most salutary effects may be 
 produced by measures of energy and promptitude. Of that fact a signal example had been 
 exhibited in the recent events at Vellore ; and we are led to think that a similar mode of 
 proceeding could rarely fail, under similar circumstances, of the like success, for numberless 
 instances afforded by the history of this Country justify the conclusion. 
 
 224. One of the chief difficulties which we experienced at that period was from the 
 want of European Troops. The deliciency of the European part of our Establishment had 
 been so frequently represented in the Dispatches of this Government, that the subject does 
 not at pi'esent require particular explanation. We shall only observe, that at this time, not- 
 withstanding the large extension of our territorial acquisitions, the strength of our European 
 Military Force is less, more than by 2000 men, than it was in the year 1800. 
 
 225. It has beexi an invariable principle in the administration of the affairs of this Coun- 
 trj', that our European Force should bear an adequate proportion to the strength of our Na- 
 tive Army ; and that a certain number of European Troops should be placed at the principal 
 Military Stations throughout the Territories of the Company. We do not consider the mea- 
 sure to imply any particular want of confidence in the Native i)art of our Establishment ; but, 
 independently of the actual addition of strength which it affords, we deem it highly important, 
 by aiding in the support of that ascendancy of the European Character which must be essen- 
 tial to the British Power iii this Country. 
 
 22G. At the time of the late agitation in our Arm)-, the usual Complemen^t of the Euro- 
 pean Force at- some of the principal Stations under this Government was deficient in a degree 
 which under any circumstances might be liable to -be attended with much injury, and which 
 at that crisis might have been productive of the worst consequences. 
 
 227. We had no apprehension that the whole of our Native Army would join in any 
 general plan of revolt, but there was sufficient cause to think, that if further agitation shoidd 
 oeciir, we could not implicitly rely on the exertions of our Native Troops for the suppression 
 of it. It was impossible to say which Corps might be well-affected or which otherwise, and 
 if further exertion had become necessary, it might have been imposing on tlie fidelity of the 
 best disposed too severe an order to require them to put forth their strength to punish the 
 misconduct of their associates in arms. 
 
 228. On tiiat grijuiid we represented to the Supreme Government, " that our con- 
 *' fidence in our Native Army was for the present deeply shaken, and that it would be i »dis- 
 " pensable that we should place our chief reliance on the European part of our Military Esta- 
 •' blishment, if further measures of compulsion should be found necessary." 
 
 229. Under the favour of Providence a difterent result has happily followed. Those 
 appearances wiiich at one time threatened in various parts of tlie Country the serious disturb- 
 ance of the public tranquillity have happily ceased. Those persons who had sought to avail 
 themselves of the discord of one part of our Army have been baftled in their hopes, and every
 
 114 
 
 ciicumstance indicates such a iciicwal of those ties of union and confidence as will speedily 
 obliterate every painful recollection. 
 
 230. We trust however that it will not be inferred from this state of things, that we 
 were imprudent or premature in any part of our communications with the Supreme Govern- 
 ment. We have sufficiently shewn, that nothing could be more distant from our ideas, no- 
 thino- that we more studiously guarded against, than a contest regarding points of opiniort. 
 The grounds of such a contest no longer existed ; and if further measures of compulsion had 
 been required, it would only have been in defence of the foundations of our Empire, in oppo- 
 sition to the designs of a hostile power, which would in the nature of tilings have acquired 
 strength, activity, and confidence, in proportion as we should have shewn ourselves disposed 
 to shrink from the danger, or unprepared to encounter and suppress it. 
 
 231. It will be observed, that we exerted the utmost care, while we were taking such 
 precautions as onr public duty apparently demanded, to avoid all indications of alarm. We 
 liad proclaimed to the Army onr beUef, that the disalTection did not extend beyond the limits 
 of the Garrison of Vellore, before we received intelligence of an opposite nature ; and we 
 o-ave no cause to suppose that we had been led to entertain a less favourable impression ; but 
 continued steadily to pursue the course which appeared best calculated to allay the spirit 
 of rancour, which the most inHammatory arts had been successful in exciting. 
 
 232. In laying before the Supreme Government a view of the facts which came to our 
 knowledge, and in submitting an application on the subject of Troops, we observed the most 
 cautious secrecy. It is not now necessary to go into a further explanation of the causes which 
 produced the state of public feeling that those excited. It is sufficient to know that the cir- 
 cumstances which had been produced inclosed consequences of the greatest danger, and it 
 was necessary that our conduct should be at once regulated by the utmost circumspection and 
 energ}'. 
 
 233. We always entertained a sanguine hope that the difficulty would pass over without 
 any further bad eB'ect ; but in the government of human affairs the idea of precaution would 
 be banislied, if probable evil were not foreseen, and seasonable measures adopted for the pre- 
 vention of them. By tiiat principle we were guided in our application to the Honourable the 
 Governor General in Council respecting the augmentation of our Military Force. Having 
 stated that application, it rested with the Supreme Government, in weighing the circum- 
 stances of the question, to comply with the suggestion or otherwise, as might in its wisdom 
 
 . be deemed proper ; but on a careful revision of the facts which we have described we cannot 
 depart from the opinion, that the application was in itself founded on the strongest grounds of 
 public expediency and policy. 
 
 EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL, 
 
 29 NOV. 1806. 
 
 THE first point is an explanation of the grounds on which your Lordship in 
 Council recommended the measure of dispatching from Bengal a reinforcement of Troops to 
 that Presidency, with reference to tlie sentiments expressed on that subject in our Dispatches 
 of the 1 1th and 23d of August. 
 
 We have great satisfaction in expressing our entire concurrence in the justice of the 
 statement contained in your Lordship's Address to the Secret Connnittee, respecting your 
 solicitude to avoid the adoption of measures, founded on a disposition to oppose the Religious 
 Tenets, Opinions, and Prejudices of the Native Troops, and calculated to promote distrust 
 between the European and Native Branches of the Army. Your Lordship in Council has ap- 
 parently misunderstood the motives which induced us to decline a compliance with your appli-
 
 115 
 
 T^tion for a reinforcement of European Troops, and has supposed that we were influenced by 
 an apprehension that your apphcation proceeded from a design to employ the European Force 
 in a contest with the Native Troops, on a question involvinj^ the Tenets of their ReU<'ious 
 Faith. We request 3'our Lordship to be assured, that sucii a design was never impvited to 
 the Government of Fort St. George. We merely intimated that such an impression might be 
 produced on the minds of the .Sepoys ; thiit the augmentation of the Eurojiean Force at that 
 particular period of time would have the a])pearance of a design to coerce and over-awe the 
 Native Troops ; that it would be a manifest indication that the Government had lost its con- 
 fidence in their attachment ; that it would render the F^uropean and Native Force adverse 
 parties, and might have the effect of rendering the cause of the Sepoys (in their opinion) the 
 cause of Religion. Wc understood the motives wliich induced your Lordship in Council to 
 apply for a reinforcement of European Troops, to be such as you have described them in 
 your Dispatch to the Secret Committee ; but, being satisfied that the insurrection at Vellore 
 could not justly be ascribed to the prevalence of a general sentiment of disaffection among the 
 Native Troops, we could not concur in the necessity of a measure calculated, in our decided 
 opi:;ion, to produce the evils above described. Upon these grounds, as well as upon the 
 ground of various of the objections which were stated in the Governor General's Minute of 
 the 1 1th of August, and under a conviction that the removal of the cause which in our jud"-. 
 ment had led to the Mutiny at Vellore, would restore confidence and good order ; we declined 
 a compliance with your Lordship in Council's application for a reinforcement of European 
 Troops. 
 
 MINUTE OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT. 
 
 Fort St. George, Sept. 11, ISOi. 
 
 I THINK the erasure of the 1st and 23d Regiments from the Army List is 
 not in itself either an essential or a necessary part of the example which is to be given to the 
 Ami}-. Ihe Reduction of the Native Officers, and the entire re-organization of the Corps, 
 constitute the essence of the punishment and of the example. The erasure of the Numbers of 
 the Regiments would serve only to heighten the colouring. The fullness of the effect will be 
 complete without this addition, which may be productive of future bad consequences. 
 
 The disad\antage which I foresee consists in the manner in which the Sepoys may reason 
 upon late events. Of the public opinion we are not exactly informed, and, if we were, we 
 should not be able to controul it. We have reason to believe that the greater part of the 
 Army have felt more or less dissatisfaction ; and that the invasion of their prejudices has 
 constituted the principal ground of this dissatisfaction. Are we sure that the Sepoys will be 
 ever divested of the opinion, that the Orders respecting the Turband, and other parts of 
 Dress, were contrary to Cast ? It seems hardly possible that ihey ever should : and if so, is 
 it good policy to permit to exist for ever a striking subject of enquiry and curiosity ? To 
 which the answer may be, " The English invaded tlie prejudices of the Sepoys, and wished 
 *' to make Christians of them. The Sepoys resolved to die, rather than submit. A massacre 
 " ensued. The officers and men were hanged and transported, and the Numbers of the Re- 
 " giments erased from the Army List." Why should we gi\e to our enemies, most ingenious 
 in every art of seduction, this standing argument to corrupt the Sepoy mind f Why should 
 we keep alive by artificial means the everlasting memory ot tiiis event ? 
 
 The Commander in Chief is perfectly right in his reconunendation of this measure. It 
 is in perfect consistency with his opinion of the causes of those events ; ami punishment and 
 example with those ideas cannot be carried too far.
 
 116 
 
 But this Council and the Supreme Government entertain different sentiments. We are 
 of opinion that the sensation cannot too soon subside, that the necessary examples cannot too 
 soon be made, and the whole transaction too soon be forgotten. I am so convmced of the 
 consequence of acting with uniformity, and without deviation from those principles, that I 
 must take upon myself to reject, upon my own authority, this proposition. 
 
 (Signed) W. BENTINCK, 
 
 EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL 
 TO THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL OF FORT ST. GEORGE. 
 
 THE next and most important points to which your Lordship in Council has 
 attracted our attention are, the disposal of the numerous persons who were concerned in the 
 Mutiny at Vellore, your decision regarding the two Native Battalions which were domg duty 
 at that place at the period of the Mutiny, and the proposed measure of expunging from the 
 List of the Army the Names of the Regiments to which those Battalions were attached. 
 
 On a consideration of all the circumstances connected with the Mutiny at Vellore, we 
 are compelled to state our opinion, that the Regiments to which those Battalions were attached 
 should have been struck out of the List of the Army ; and all the Native Officers and Mere 
 not in confinement should have been discharged the service, excepting those Officers and 
 Men who, being absent at the period of the Mutiny, are considered to be free from guilt, or 
 who, being present, took an active part on the side of Duty. That those who had been ab- 
 sent should have been drafted into other Corps ; and those who actively supported their Offi- 
 cers should also have been removed to other Corps, and promoted. 
 
 The measure of expunging the two Regiments from the List of the Army, and discharg- 
 ing the Officers and Men as above described, appears to us to be advisable in two points of 
 view : first, as it tends to maintain in the Army a due sense of Military honour, by perma- 
 nently stigmatizing Corps which had thus disgraced the Military profession ; and, secondly, 
 as a salutary example and a warning to those who on any future occasion might be unwilling 
 to disclose their knowledge of existing machinations and intrigues, although resolved to take 
 no part in them, by indicating that the mere Concealment of intended Treachery is a bread* 
 of Duty in a Soldier, and will expose him to the punishment of a disgraceful discharge from 
 the Service. This opinion also is consistent with the general sentiments of Military men, 
 whose jud;;ment in questions of this nature is certainly entitled to peculiar consideration. 
 
 We deem it therefore extremely advisable this course of proceeding should still be 
 adopted, unless, under the determination of your Lordship in Council to preserve on the List 
 of the Army the 1st and 23d Regiments, and to retain in the service all the men belonging 
 to the Regiments now doing duty, the Government of Fort St. George should have so far 
 pledged itself by subsequent measures to carry that determination into effect as to render it 
 impossible to reverse it. If it should be practicable to adopt the measure now proposed, re- 
 gisters of the names and descriptions of the persons of all who may be discharged the service, 
 should be sent to all the Army Stations, with a view to prevent their being again enlisted. 
 
 We cannot entertain the opinion that the discharge of these men will constitute a source 
 of danger. The observations stated by the Right Honourable Lord William Bentinck, in his 
 Minute of the 13th September, upon the question of discharging the men at present in con- 
 finement, may be considered descriptive of whatever danger could be apprehended from the 
 whole class of men whose discharge we have provisionally recommended. It appears to us 
 that the systematic employment of these men, in disseminating sentiments of revolt and dis- 
 gust, is by no means a necessary consequence of their discharge from the service j nor are we
 
 117 
 
 disposed to attribute any serious eflect to their intrigues, supposing them even so employed. 
 In fact, our security against revolt and disalVoctioa must depeiul not on the means of prevent- 
 ing the efforts of intrigue, which no degree of vigilance and precaution can effectually pre- 
 clude, if by intrigue the turbulent and seditious can hope to gain their ends ; but on the pre- 
 servation of those bonds of connection by which the interests of the People and the Army are 
 idcntiht'd with the interests of the State. If, by the intervention of any predisposing causes, 
 tlie Peo|)le and the Army are susceptible of seduction, numerous instruments of intrigue will 
 ever be found, and that source of danger will be equally active and extensive, aiiliou"-h the 
 men in question should not be discharged. Moreover, in general it may be asserted, men 
 who are in possession of the peculiar benefits of the Military Service will not easily be induced 
 to disregard them, by the persuasion of those who are reduced to distress by the just forfeiture 
 of those benefits. It is rather to be expected, that the distress of their condition will prove a 
 warning to others. 
 
 The apprehension of danger from such a source must have its origin in a distrust of the 
 fidelity of the Native Troops. The prevalence of that distrust is itself a source of consider- 
 able danger. Since it naturally promotes the apprehended evil, it must speedily become reci- 
 procal between the Native Troops and their Officers, and the bonds of connection between 
 the State and its Native Army are thus liable to be weakened. We discern nojust foundation 
 for such distrust on the part of the European Officers ; and it is evidently of the highest im- 
 portance to arrest the progress of sucli a sentiment. We deem it our duty therefore earnestly 
 to recommend this point to the special attention of your Lordship in Council. We entertain 
 no doubt that the means by which the attachment of the Native Army has been established 
 will ever be sufficient to preserve it. That a proper attention to the comfort and ha])piness of 
 the Native Troops, combined with unabated confidence, with the maintenance of due subor- 
 dination and Military Disciplme, with the prompt and exemplary pimishment of misconduct 
 and the reward of merit, will preserve throughout the Army the fidelity, attachment, and 
 efficiency, by which it has in general been distinguished. 
 
 We shall conclude this branch of the subject by stating our decided opinion, that none 
 of the extensive evils described in Lord William Bentinck's Minute, above referred to, as 
 liable to flow from the discharge of the men, are within the compass of their power to pro- 
 duce, even supposing, which we consider to be far from probable, that they should generally 
 engage in the prosecution of intrigues, or industriously endeavour to disseminate principle* 
 adverse to the mterest of the State. 
 
 Fort William, A'ovemitr 29, 1806. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT RECORDS THE FOLLOWING MINUTE, 
 
 Fori St. George, Jugust 20, 1806. 
 
 I BEG leave to state in writing the reasons which appear to me to oppose the 
 suggestion to embark the Princes at Sadras, and which I gave verbally in Council. 
 
 In the first place, I see no reason to fear any open attempt at the Presidency to rescue 
 the Princes. I have never heard that they had any connection with the Presidency ; and it 
 is probable that the Moormen here are for the most ])art the followers and adherents ot the 
 Carnatic Family, and would be rather hostile than otherwise to the establishment of a Govern- 
 ment under one of the Sons of Tippoo Sultan. In the second place, if there was any real 
 ground of danger, it wmild be bad polity in my opinion iTot to look it tully in the face. 
 The great care in all our proceedings should be, not to demonstrate any sign of tear or ap- 
 prehension of the stability of our power. For this reason I was originally agamst the removal 
 of the Princes, and taking any measure until the Commission had made llieir report. I was
 
 118 
 
 uftervvanU reUictniulv compclloil. l>v tlic strong oviiU'iioc which was proiUiccil, to depart from 
 this rosoUiiion. Aiui 1 am now sorry, as this might have hoon avouUvi, that it was done. 
 
 Rnt in tlie prtsent case, shciihi any attempt at a rescue be formed, the strength of the 
 Escort will be fulK adci^iiate to resist it But if that spirit of animosity exists to an extent 
 likelv to urodnce a degree of boldness of action unknown in this country, we have as much to 
 fear from it in tiie absence as in the presence of the Princes. If the spirit ui the people is 
 i-eailv worked up to that pitch, the pretext would be immaterial, insiinvi turn luight be justly 
 dreaded. In this case the presence of the Escort wouUl be indispensable, and the divi.sion of 
 
 it our ruui. 
 
 {SignedJ W. BENTINCK. 
 
 MINUTE OF Tin: RIGHT HONOURABLK THE PRESIDENT. 
 
 Fort St. George, September 13, 130S. 
 
 THE expected ReiVMt of Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes, which might class the 
 Velloro prisoners according to their several degrees of guilt, is now laid betore the Board by 
 the Commander in Chief. A similar Report has been transmitted by Colonel Campbell from 
 Trichinopoly with the Mutineers who have been taken up in the Southern provinces. Upon 
 the tormer of these Reports the Government had entertained the hope of being enabled to 
 pass a conclusive and satistactorv decisioc lip mi the general case of the Mutineers. 
 
 L nt'ivrtuuatelv tl.ese Rep >rts have relu\ed us from no pan of our embarrassment. 
 Lieutenam-Colonel Forbes states, that it is impossible to form the several classes, or to make 
 any distribution in estimating tiie guilt of the general mass. Colonel Campbell has given the 
 simie opinion. Tliis Otticer has no douiit of the r being deeply implicated, and of many of them 
 having been principals; but he savs, there is not ev\! -me siilhcieiit to convict them before a 
 Court .Martial. Thus all our hopes of tinding oh . luercy and forgiveness, and of re- 
 
 ducing this heavy list of criminals, have been e....:, . > avi.ippiuuied. It now remains for 
 us to determine upon the disposal of these six hv iv;'t--l j>-isouers. 
 
 There appe;\rs to rne to be three collr^es to :'";i»c>v: 
 
 1. " To punish with Death the most gaiity, who can be convicted by a Court Martial, 
 " aJtd to tninsport the general mas-.." 
 
 2. " To punisli the most guilty witli Death, and to grant an Amnesty to tiie rest," 
 
 3. " To punish with Death the most gui;tv, and to keep the remainder in Confine- 
 '•■ ment." 
 
 I sli.il 1 examine each proposition separately. 
 
 \\'uh regard to the ttrst, or me.isure of general Transjicrtavion, it would be dangerous 
 in policv aud objcctionahle in justice, it is true tiiat tJie greatest pos.sible outrage against dis- 
 cipline, allegiance, humanity, and every feeling of a man or a soldic-r, has been committed, 
 by these prisoners. The criuie cannot be exceeded ; but the origin of the feelings which led 
 to the commi.ssion of these crimes must never be lost sight ot bv this Government in the 
 measures to be taken. NV'e have to consider the eiVect that our conduct may have upon future 
 times. The nice and delicate part of our proceedings is to impress the minds of tlie Army 
 widi die opinion that we are punishing Munler rather than the Resistance to Orders, which 
 were inconsistent with their most sacred ordinances, and whith we have admitted to be so : 
 That we are vindicating the Law and Justice, inuher than gratifying Re\e;ige. To convey 
 these impressions, we must take care to avoid all appt:an\nce of too much severity, all su.spi- 
 cion of iniustice.
 
 119 
 
 The examples must be such, so strikingly necessary, so positively just, that no man can 
 cast a doubt upon them. The punishment with Death of all the Native Officers, and of all 
 actual perpetrators of murder, would receive this acknowledgment. The punishment bv due 
 course of Law in the Civil Courts, of all men found with plunder, would have the same 
 efl'ect. But to go further, and to punish the great mass, not found in arms, as I at first sup- 
 posed, but taken up in the several provinces, with Transportation, a more severe punishment 
 than death itself, would, I think, have very bad effects. Let us recollect who are thejud<res 
 of our actions, and whose conduct by our actions we hope to control. It is the Armv, that 
 Army who have, by far the great majority, been more or less agitated by the same feelings. 
 The horror and detestation which they would feel at any other time against the acts of these 
 Mutineers, will be softened by the sympathy which men originally engaged in the same 
 cause, must ei^tertain for each other. It will appear to the great mass the cause of the Tur- 
 band, the cause of their Cast and Religion. This has been the excuse set up l)y almost all the 
 prisoners who have been examii>ed. It is the best pretext for such conduct, and the pretext 
 that the actually guilty will always give, and the rest of the Army will always give credit to. 
 We have reason to know that the general sentiment among all descriptions of people in our 
 own territories has been, that we meant to convert by force the Sepoys to Christianity; and 
 my opinion is, that a punishment of extraordinary severity, as would be the Exile of 600 
 persons without trial, might excue compassion, might revolt the general sentiments of the 
 •Armv, and would tend to alienate rather than to recal their affections. 
 
 In respect to the justice of general Transportation, some doubt would also occur. There 
 jnust necessarily be various degrees of guilt. It is hardly possible that all should have known 
 it. Some of the Native Officers, upon the best evidence, were wholly unuiformed of the 
 Conspiracy. Many Privates must have been equally ignorant. There might have been a 
 general feeling of discontent, and a general expression of it, without any fixed and determined 
 object and plan. There were some instances of very great kindness on the part of the 
 Sepoys to save the lives of Europeans. Many must have been, no doubt, solely engaged 
 bv plunder ; this probably was the object of the greater part. 15ut in fact this mob was like 
 all other mobs : the passions were inHamed, and a few wicked characters gave tliem the direc- 
 tion of their own abominable wickec-.iess. But malice prepense canugt be supposed to have 
 o-enerally existed. To the eye of the Law all these men would be equally guilty ; but in the 
 eye of Equity, viewing the outrage offered to ail, the improbability of general fore-kr>ow- 
 ledo-e of the intentions of the principals, the possibility of manv, without any participation in 
 crime, having fled through fear, certainly the degrees of moral guilt are various, and a sen- 
 tence of general Transportation would be unjust. The numbers that have already suffered, 
 m.ust not wholly be excluded, when calculating the effects of punishment. 
 
 2dly. To grant a general Amnesfv to the mass. 
 
 This plan of proceeding would evidently be the most desirable, if it could be adopted 
 with safety, if the Mutineers had put any sort of measure to their violence, if they had con- 
 fined their resentment to any panicular Officers b\- whom they might have been ill used ; or 
 if thev had treated with disrespect alone, however great, their Officers, pardon might be 
 granted to them. But when the excessive atrocity of the crime, extending to the Murder of 
 all European Officers, and to the erection of the Standard of a Foreign Power, is considered, 
 hasty forgiveness would be unintelligible to people accustomed till very lately to all the rigour 
 of Asiatic despotism. At no time would it be safe to turn adrift so many hundred men bred up 
 to arms, unaccustomed and unable to obiairv subsistence by any other honest means. But m 
 the present moment their liberty might be greatly injurious to the service, while the late 
 transactions are still fresh in the minds of the people. Hatred to a service from wiiich tliey 
 are deprived of the benefit they have long enjoyed, might induce them to spread in every 
 part of the country a disgust which might impe<.le the Recruiting sertice. Living in povcrty 
 and distress, they might perhaps communicate with other parts of the Army, aad keep alive 
 the dissatisfaction which all our endeavours are directed to allay.
 
 120 
 
 3dly. To keep the general mass in Confinement. 
 
 Tlie principal objections whicii T have opposed to general Transportation, as well as to 
 a general Amnesty, will be obviated by this tiiird course. The Government will be 
 equally free from the charge of too much severity, or of too much lenity. Time will best 
 determine the conduct that it may be both just and politic to pursue with regard to these 
 prisoners. 
 
 The punishment that immediately followed the crime, and the examples that will be 
 made vnider the sentence of the Native Court Martial, will complete all the etlect that may- 
 be hoped from severity of punishment. I caimot say that the time for mercy and lenity is 
 arrived. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the state of the opinion of the Army so to 
 decide. As long as any disposition exists to throw off allegiance, lenity may be taken for 
 weakness. Lenity may hasten returning fidelity, but must not be depended on for creating 
 it in a disaffected soldiery. Until we see our own way more clearly, we had better suspend 
 our opinions. We had better confine ourselves to conduct, the effects of which cannot be 
 doubted. Confinement leaves the Government at liberty as to the measures to be hereafter 
 taken. If we siiould find that the revocation of the Orders is not sufficient, that disaffection 
 still continues, and that a system of greater coercion is necessary, we can pass the sentence 
 of Transportation. 
 
 If on the other hand the sensation shall completely subside, as there is every appearance 
 of its doing, the prisoners may be partially or wholly released, as further enquiry into their 
 actual criminality, or the sincere repentance of their misconduct, may make safe and expe- 
 dient. There is no danger in this course. No man can consider it unjust to confine persons 
 implicated in Murder and Rebellion. 
 
 I therefore recommend that the present General Court Martial shall be dissolved as 
 soon as the Trials of the Prisoners against whom there has been evidence, shall be con- 
 cluded. 
 
 I am of opinion that those of the Mutineers, not Commissioned or Non-commissioned 
 Officers, and not guilty of any particular act of atrocity, who may have been convicted, 
 should not be executed. 
 
 I recommend that all the Prisoners be confined in fortresses having European garrisons. 
 The greater number could, I imagine, be safely lodged in Vellore or Fort St. George. I am 
 of opinion that, as evidence may be procurable against actual perpetrators of Murder, a Na- 
 tive General Court Martial should again assemble. Those Prisoners foand with plunder upon 
 them should be committed to take their trial before the Court of Circuit. 
 
 (Signed) W. BENTINCK. 
 
 ( a a ) 
 
 TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD W. BENTINCK, 
 GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL, FORT ST. GEORGE. 
 
 MY LORD, 
 
 WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship in Coun- 
 cil's dispatch under date the 14th ultimo, containing your report of the late appearance of 
 disaffection in the 2d Battalion 18th Regiment, stationed partly at Bangalore, and partly at 
 NunJydroog. 
 
 2. We are extremely concerned at the tenor of this intelligence, which clearly demon- 
 strates the actual formation of a plot for the destruction of the European Officers at Nundy- 
 droog, and affords just ground to believe that a disposition existed among the Native Troops
 
 121 
 
 at Bangalore, similar to that vvhicli was manifested by tlie Corps in Garrison at the former 
 station. 
 
 3. From the communication contained in your Lordsinp in Council's dispatch, we are 
 apprized of the following material facts : 
 
 First. That the 2d Battalion 18th Regiment was raised in Mysore, and is composed of 
 men formerly in the Military Service of Tippoo Sulian, and actually in arms against us. 
 
 Secondly. That the promulgation of the General Orders respecting the new Turbaad 
 produced the same discontent in that Battalion as that which they occasioned in other Corps 
 of the Army. 
 
 Thirdly. That some adventurers endeavoured to promote disaffection among the Officers 
 and Men of that Battalion. 
 
 4. From these facts, and from the information contained in your Lordship in Council's 
 Dispatch, we deduce the following conclusion : 
 
 First. That a latent and distmct source of disaffection existed in the 2d Battalion 18th 
 Regiment, originating in the peculiar description of men who composed it. 
 
 Secondly. That this pre-existing source of disaffection rendered the Men of the Bat- 
 talion peculiarly susceptible of the influence of malicious intrigues and insinuations, and 
 probably suggested the attempts which have been made to induce them to revolt. 
 
 Thirdly. That these causes of disaffection are sufficient to account for its continjiance 
 after the abrogation of the Orders which had excited a spirit of discontent. 
 
 5. Admitting the accuracy of the Evidence of Cuttory and others, with regard to dates, 
 there is certainly some reason to suspect that, previously to the promulgation of the Orders 
 I'especting the new Turband, persons in the character of mendicants, or adventurers, enter- 
 tained the design of endeavouring to excite a spirit of disaffection among the Troops stationed 
 at Bangalore and Nundydroog. Such a project might (as we have before observed) easily 
 liave been suggested by a consideration of the description of Troops composing the Battalion 
 divided between those Stations ; and, with reference to the existing number of partizans of 
 the late Government of Mysore, the condition of that Country might have been thought 
 more favourable to the purposes of insurrection than any other. The nature of the exhibi- 
 tion also, particularly adverted to on 4.he evidence of Cuttory and Abdul Cawder, was exclu- 
 sively adapted to the notions of men, who, having formerly been in the service of Tippoo 
 Sultan, might have been in the habit of considering the cause of Tippoo Sultan and of the 
 French to be one. Hence we infer that these projects of seduction, supposing tliem actually 
 to have existed antecedently to the promulgation of the Orders respecting the Turband, were 
 of a local nature, and entirely unconnected with a general systematic plan, entertained or 
 pursued by any State or States, or by that class or description of persons constituting what 
 ma)' be deemed the Mussulman Interest, to alienate the attachment of the Native Army. 
 But from the evidence above referred to, it appears that even though the plan of this inflam- 
 matory exhibition might have been suggested previously to the promulgation of the Orders 
 respecting the Turband, it was not called into activity until after those Orders had been j)ub- 
 lished. Cuttory states as follows : " After these Facquiers had been here about a month, 
 " without shewing their puppets, the Subidars and Jemidars consulted in the BaiTacks, and 
 " agreed to send for them to exhibit; but it was also agreed that it was necessary to kce]) the 
 " whole secret, and an Oath was proposed, but having no Koran they only went through the 
 " ceremony by touching their swords and mouths." — According to this evidence, the cir- 
 cumstances of their seeing the exhibition and taking tlie oatli were coincident in jjoint of 
 time ; but, by the evidence of Abdul Cawder, it appears that the oath was taken after the 
 promulgation of the Orders respecting the Turband, as he states that the oaths were taken 
 before the Order doing away the new Turband. The proceedings of the Subidars and .Jemi- 
 dars as above described, therefore, may be referred to a date subsequent to the promulgation 
 of the Orders respecting the Turband. This inference is further confirmed by the date 
 assigned by Cuttory to the exhibition, which took place, by his account, a month after the 
 arrival of the Facquiers ; that is, in the month of April. We are not apprised of the time 
 when those Orders reached Nundydroog ; but it may be inferred that it was in the month of
 
 122 
 
 April, since the commotion in the 2d Battalion 4th Regiment at Vellore, occasioned by those 
 Orders, occurred on the 6th and 7th May. 
 
 6. We have judged it proper to investigate particularly this point of evidence, because 
 it appears principally to have suggested the supposition that a general and systematic project 
 of seduction had been entertained, and pursued with success, independently of the discon- 
 tents occasioned by the Orders respecting the new Turband. For this conclusion we discern 
 no solid grounds in the communications contained in your Lordship in Council's Dispatch. 
 But we have observed, on a former occasion, that in all quarters of India, numbers will ever 
 be found prepared to take advantage of any state of circumstances favourable to the objects 
 of commotion and disorder; and to that active principle we ascribe the insiduous attempts 
 which appear to have been made in Mysore to promote the disaffection of the Native Troops. 
 
 7. Although, under the agitation occasioned by the late events at Vellore, Hydrabad, 
 and Nundydroog, and after the examples thus afforded of actual disaffection among some 
 Corps of the Native Army, it is possible that further efforts may still be made to seduce the 
 minds of the Sepoys ; we entertain a full confidence, that, every cause of discontent 
 having now been removed, such endeavours will produce no effect, and that complete 
 reliance may be reposed in the fidelity and attachment of the general body of the Native 
 Troops. 
 
 8. At the same time we entirely concur in the opinion of your Lordship in Council, 
 that the prompt and vigorous exercise of the public authority, directed to the purpose of 
 affording a just and salutary example of severity, is necessary on the present occasion to pre- 
 clude the recurrence of similar disorders ; and we infer with satisfaction, from the tenor of 
 your Lordship in Council's Dispatch, that it is your intention to adopt this tirm and vigorous 
 course of proceeding. 
 
 9. We are unwilling to embarrass the operation of your Lordship in Council's authority, 
 by prescribing, on the present occasion, the adoption of specific measures ; we deem it our 
 duty, however, to express our opmion, that not only the persons whose active guilt can be 
 fully established should suffer the severest punishment, but that the remaining part of the 
 Battalion should be discharged with disgrace, making exceptions of course in favour of those 
 who have manifested their fidelity. 
 
 10. We deem it proper also to recommend that, in future, great caution should be ob- 
 served in the selection of Recruit*, and that no person known to have been formerly in the 
 service of Tippoo Sultan should be admitted into the service of the British Government. 
 We even recommend to your Lordship in Council's consideration, whether it may not be ex- 
 pedient to avoid all recruiting in Rlysore, and, as far as it may be practicable, to adopt it as 
 a rule to raise and recruit the Native Corps in the territories subject to your inmiediate 
 government, and, if possible, in those territories which have been longest under the govern- 
 inent of the Company. 
 
 11. It is farther our duty to desire, that no measure affecting the constitution and con- 
 dition of the Native Army may be adopted : the mere agitation, indeed, of such measures, 
 in the actual state of affairs, may constitute a source of evil. 
 
 12. We also request that your Lordship in Council will transmit to us instant information 
 of any occurrence, at whatever stage of your information, in any manner connected with the 
 late events. 
 
 13. It is superfluous to express our earnest recommendation, that the utmost prompti- 
 tude and vigour may govern the proceedings of your Lordship in Council on all such oc- 
 casions. 
 
 We have the honour to be, 
 &c. &c. &c. 
 (Signed) G. H. BARLOW. 
 
 LAKE. 
 Fort William, Dec. 4, 1806. G. UDNY.
 
 123 
 
 (6i) 
 
 EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL. 
 
 WITH respect to the persons in confinement, we are of opinion, on a review 
 of all the circumstances ot" the case, tliat, for the benefit of example, a measure of severity 
 is urgently refpiirecl. We are aware of the objections which have been opposed to it, 
 founded on the different degrees of guilt amongst the persons thus to be rendered objects of 
 the same degree of punishment, and on the approximation of the actual guilt of those who 
 are now at liberty, and permitted to do duty, to the guilt of the prisoners. But in all cases 
 of extensive Mutiny or Rebellion, the operations of justice must necessarily be defective: 
 the strict principles of distributive justice are equally violated by suffering any of the guilty to 
 escape, as by involving in the same punishment different degrees of guilt. In such cases, the 
 object of public safety, as connected with a measure of exemplary severity, would be de- 
 feated, if the operation of the latter were to be impeded by the necessity of discriminating 
 the innumerable shades and varieties of individual guilt. That object is promoted by sub- 
 jecting to signal penalty all participators in the general crime whom, at tlie period of com- 
 motion, the hand of authority can reach. The principles of military discipline urgently re- 
 quire the adoption of a course of proceeding calculated by its severity to inspire awe, and to 
 arrest the progress of contagion. It is rendered still more necessary by the late conduct of 
 the Troops at Nundydroog, respecting which we have just received the communications of 
 your Lordship in Council. Considered in this point of view, the exemplary punishment of 
 the general mass of the prisoners concerned in the IMutiny at Vellore is a measure of State 
 necessity, involving the very security of the British Dominions in India, and consecpiently 
 superseding that degree of regard to the regular forms of Law, and the strict principles of 
 distributive justice, uhich would necessarily preclude the benefit of a salutary exertion or 
 vigour, energy, and firmness. 
 
 Tiie indiscriminate punishment of all who may have been seized in the act of Mutiny, 
 or known to have been engaged in it, without entering into a consideration of the guilt ol 
 those who may have escaped, or may have been included in a general amnesty, is peculiarly- 
 calculated to deter others from joining in Riots or Mutinies. In all cases of such extensive 
 commotion a limit nuist be imposed to the cognizance of individual ofl'ences. Punishment 
 may justly be infiicted on those whom the hanil of justice has overtaken, although others 
 equally guilty may fortuitously have escaped notice. By permitting men of the latter descrip- 
 tion to resume their military duties, the Government has precluded itself from inflicting upon 
 them the punishment which may be awarded to the former, who, with reference to the urgent 
 necessity of affording a signal example of severity, should in our decided judgment be selected 
 for that purpose as principals in the atrocious crimes of Mutiny and Murder. 
 
 Under this view of the subject, which we consider to be incontrovertibly just, we con- 
 cur in the expediency of the measure suggested in the Council of Fort St. George, ot con- 
 signing to banishment all amongst the persons now in confinement who shall not be able satis- 
 factorily to prove that they were active in repressing the progress of the Mutiny, or were 
 absent from Vellore at the period of its occurrence. We recommend this measure, there- 
 fore, not from any apprehension of the intrigues and machinations of the persons now iu 
 confinement, if immediately or gradually discharged, or of the possible efi'ects of detaining 
 them in the Country in a state of restraint, but from our conviction of the necessity of pro- 
 ducino- a deep and lasting impression upon the minds of the Army and the inhabitants of the 
 Country, by a severe example of the just resentment of Government among the atrocious 
 perpetratprs of the massacre of Vellore. 
 
 The greater number of these men might be transported to the Cape, the remainder, in 
 proportions, to Prince of Wales's Island, Bencoolen, and Malacca. Thus divided, their
 
 124 
 
 number at each Colony cannot be a subject of apprehension. At those places they should be 
 kept in strict confinement, but not like convicts, transported under a sentence of the Civil 
 Law, condemned to hard labour. The act of their transportation from their Native Territo- 
 ries is that which will produce the desired impression upon the minds of others. Tlie ad- 
 ditional severity of condemning them to labour appears to be unnecessary ; their fate, in a 
 condition of exile, will be unknown to the body of the people. Their removal from their 
 Country and connections will complete the measures of requisite severity, and conse- 
 quently of requisite example. We accordingly request that your Lordship in Council will 
 adopt the necessary measures for carrying this arrangement into effect with the least practi- 
 cable delay ; much of its impression will depend upon the promptitude of its execution. 
 
 (ce) 
 
 TO MAJOR-GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THOMAS MAITLAND,. 
 
 &c. &c. &c. 
 
 HONOURABLE SIR, 
 
 BY a miraculous effort we have discovered and quelled a Mutiny at this 
 place. An express has been sent off to Trichinopoly, but from the nature of a plot un- 
 derstood to be in great forwardness all over the Coast, we think it absolutely necessary ta 
 apply to you for immediate succour by Tutacoryn. A few Companies of Europeans for a 
 rallying point, at this period, may prove the means of saving the Company's Territories all 
 over the Coast (there are no Europeans South of Trichinopoly, and four Native Corps very 
 thinly Officered). We have now quiet possession of the Arms of the Battalion, having turned 
 out 450 Moormen, and confined 20 Native Officers. It may be necessary to inform you 
 briefly that all Miissidmen are concerned in this plot, and that this district abounds in them. 
 A European succour alone can complete the work which under Providence we have so for- 
 tunately begun. 
 
 We are in all about 20 souls to depend on one another, after collecting Civilians, Of- 
 ficers, and Private Europeans, and half Casts together. We will sell our lives most dearly 
 before any force shall conquer us. We have four Ladies in the house with us, and have 
 armed 4 or 500 men whom we hope we may rely on. Col. Dyce commands this district, if 
 alive, and will be here to-morrow. We keep possession of this Fort, but rely only on our 
 
 Citadel, a large House. 
 
 I have the honour to be^ 
 &c. &c. 
 (Signed) J. WELSH, 
 
 Major Commanding 1st Battalion 
 3d Regiment, and Palamcottah.
 
 125 
 
 (dd) . ^ 
 
 PROPOSED CIRCULAR LETTER TO OFFICERS COMMANDING CORPS. 
 
 (Confidential.) 
 
 December 2d, 1 S06. 
 SIR, 
 
 I AM directed by the Commander in Chief to call your attention to a subject 
 of the utmost importance to the public service, which appears, in many instances of recent 
 occurrence, not to have been sufficiently impressed on the minds of the European Officers 
 of this Army. 
 
 His Excellency alludes to the practice, originating probably from a recent unfortunate 
 event, of too readily entertaining suspicions of the fidelity of the Troops ; of seeking, with 
 indiscreet enquiry, for grounds of such suspicion ; marking in conversation, and in conduct, 
 an apprehension and belief of latent treachery ; admitting vague rumours, and the reports of 
 ignorant, timid, or malicious persons, as presumptive, if not positive evidence of plots and 
 intentions which have frequently no shadow of existence but in the alarms of the reporters. 
 
 Such conduct in Officers cannot fail to excite in the minds of the Troops those ideas of 
 which they see themselves .yM5p«'/«/ ; and the dread of imaginary treason, so publicly dis- 
 played, may thus encourage sentiments, which under other circumstances would not have 
 been entertained. 
 
 If those evil designs which have of late been so frequently imputed to the Native 
 Troops had actual existence, and if the bravest and most military class of our Native Army 
 were actually tainted with disaffection, still every consideration of policy would conciu" in 
 prescribing to European Officers the imperious duty of concealing their belief that such was 
 the case, and acting as if influenced by a degree of confidence they did not possess : this 
 conduct then is still more necessary when vague suspicions alone exist. No information 
 should be neglected, no endeavours should be omitted to obtain an accurate knowledge of the 
 habits, conduct, and connexions of the Troops ; but this knowledge should be sought witj» 
 discretion and secrecy, well weighed when obtained, and acted on, if necessaiy onli/, without 
 precipitation. 
 
 The Commander in Chief desires me to convey to you his Orders, that you severally 
 communicate to all your European Officers these his sentiments ; that you caution them par- 
 ticularly to avoid in society all discussion on the events or suspicions in question, as such dis- 
 cussions, when overheard and repeated, produce most extensive mischief. And he expects 
 from you and from them that firnuiess of conduct, which, while it avoids to shew suspicion, 
 is prepared to meet with manliness any event which may occur, and to exert the energy of 
 discipline for the preservation of order and subordination. 
 
 This communication, though official, is entirely confidential to you, and to your European 
 Officers. It is not to be recorded in your books, but his Excellency hopes you will impress 
 it on your minds, and expects that it shall influence your conduct. 
 
 (Signed) P. A. AGNEW, 
 
 Adjutant- Gcneial.
 
 126 
 
 (ee) 
 
 PRESIDENT'S MINUTE. 
 
 UPON the Proceedings of the Court Martial held at the request of Govem- 
 inent upon Lieutenant-Colonel Grant^and Major Welsh, it will be only sufficient for me to 
 express my concern at finding that the sentiments and feelings of that Court are apparently 
 at entire variance with those of this and of the Supreme Gcvornment, as well upon matters 
 of fact as upon questions of policy, in our minds of the utmost consequence. Although I 
 cannot approve either the Proceedings or Sentence of the Court, it is unnecessary for me to 
 offer any comments upon them. The Trials are over. The only thing tor Government to 
 consider is, whether the issue of them is likely to be attended with any ill effects, and whe- 
 ther those effects admit of a remedy. 
 
 Tlie circumstances which led to these Trials are still fresh in our memory. The acts of 
 both these Officers appeared to be pregnant with the greatest political mischief. Major 
 Welsh, according to the opinion of Govermneiif, had, without reason, publicly declared by the 
 most marked act his distrust of the Mussulmen — Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, on the other 
 hand, professing to have no reason for his suspicion, marketl liis distrust to the whole body of 
 Native Troops under nis command — of the two acts the latter was undoubtedly calculated to 
 produce the lesser injury. It was a general insult. Tiie Moorman was not more degraded than 
 the Hindoo; and the greater danger that was apprehended from the alienation of the former, 
 was at least not increased by the unfortunate distinction manifested at Palamcottah. The Go- 
 vernment, aware of the fatal tendency of such want of confidence, immediately directed the 
 restoration to the Sepoys, both Mussulmen and Hindoos, of their arms, and both manifested 
 aiul expressed undiminished reliance in their fidelity ; they took instant means also of marking 
 their displeasure with the authors of these transactions. These measures were approved by 
 the SuiJienie Government; they were, and my conviction still remains the same, most just 
 and politic. A Circular Letter Was also confidentially addressed by the Commander to all the 
 European Officers of the Army, full of the soundest advice, in regard to the danger of ma- 
 nifesting suspicion, whether well or ill grounded. From that time to the present we have 
 pursued the same system of measures towards our Native Troops. 
 
 I have before expressed my opinion, that the greatest evil which we had to encounter 
 was the general distrust prevailing among the European Officers of the Army. No fidelity, 
 however staunch, can withstand the continuance of suspicion. I am sorry to believe that this 
 impression has not yet diminished ; the Sentence of this Court Martial, not qualified by the 
 least consideration for the Native Troops, who were so ignominiously distnisted, strongly 
 confirms, in my judgment, the operation of this feeling. Brought as the whole Political 
 question has been before this Court, it would have been natural, nay, in such times, it be- 
 came an evident obligation of public duty, to have gone, as far as justice could permit, in 
 supporting the principle of confidence which, by the highest authorities in India, has been 
 invariably and uniformly acted upon. However incompetent such a Court may be to the con- 
 sideration of subjects of high Political importance, still the wisdom of the principle in ques- 
 tion, and the impossibility of acting upon any other, without the manifest danger of destruc- 
 tion to our Paiipire, was too apparent to admit of doubt. The only possible inference that 
 can now be drawn from the marked and unqualified terms of acquittal is this, that the Sepoys 
 were justly distrusted and disarmed. If the Native Troops have any feeling upon these 
 Courts Martial, they cannot think otherwise. I see in the Court Martial a conversation with 
 a Native Officer alluded to, in which it is pretended that the Troops were not sensible of any 
 dishonour done to them in this act. VV^e know that every Native will say what is pleasing 
 without considciMtion of truth. The sentiment ascribed is repugnant to reason and to human 
 nature ; every Soldier, in every service in the world, knows that he cannot be more disho- 
 noured than by being deprived of his arms.
 
 12; 
 
 I confess it to be my decided opinion, that the reside of these Trials is likely to have a 
 very injurious tendency; they are calcuhited to encourage distrust on both sides, and to liold 
 out an impression in regard to the Native Troops, whicli may be successfully taken advania'^e 
 of by designing persons. 1 think the Government bound to counteract, liy a publication of 
 its sentiments, these possible effects, I am aware, at the same time, that in the terms of 
 sucii a publication great delicacy is required. In regard to the two individuals in question, 
 though 1 think they do not merit the marked excul[)ation given to them, yet I sliould be 
 sorry to attempt to deprive them of any part of the benefit of such an acciuittal. I am of 
 opinion also, that any strong dissent from the opinion of the Court Martial would operate 
 rather with bad than good effect upon the minds of the Army. It would be advisable rather 
 to confirm the acquittal of the Court, and to approve their Sentences as regarding the Mili- 
 tary Question before iliein. The Political part of the subject (;o\ernment are at liberty to 
 consider within their province alone, and to suppose that the Court did not consider these 
 points within their jurisdiction. In the firm conviction of the mischief that may arise from the 
 confirmation that these fatal opinions may receive from the decision of this Court Martial, it 
 seems our bouuden duty to declare explicitly to all Officers of the Company the opinions 
 and principles which we conceive ought to regulate the conduct of all. It seems necessary to 
 do this, if it were only for the purpose of declaring that such acts as have been done by 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Grant and Major Welsh are not considered meritorious. It is necessary 
 to issue positive instructions upon this subject, in order that those who may be more in- 
 fluenced by a sense of personal danger than by a regard for the interests of the State, may 
 have in tenorem the consequences of disobedience. 
 
 As I can better explain my sentiments by a draft of the proposed publication, it is now 
 submitted, with my recommendation that it may be published in the General Orders of Go- 
 vernment. 
 
 (Signed) W. BENTINCK. 
 
 Fort St. George, March 20, 1807. 
 
 G. O. BY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 THE Commander in Chief has laid before Government the Proceedings of the 
 Court Martial held upon Lieutenant-Colonel Grant and Major Welsh ; and his Lordship in 
 Council has seen with great satisfaction the honourable vindication which the opinion of the 
 Court has afforded to the reputation of Lieutenant-Colonel Grant and Major Welsh. His 
 Lordship in Council is disposed entirely to concur in the purity of intention, and zeal for the 
 public service, by which these Officers were actuated. 
 
 Whde the Court Martial has done justice to the Officers who have been arraigned before 
 them, it is also the peculiar duty of his Lortlship in Council, the guardian alike of the ho- 
 nour of ail, of the Soldier as of the Sepoy, of the European as of the Native Officer, to 
 express his deep concern that the effect both of Lieutenant-Colonel Grant's and Major 
 Welsh's conduct unist necessarily tend to the degradation and distrust of a large portion of a 
 most loyal and faithful branch of our Army. His Lordship in Council, responsible for the 
 public welfare, feels it his duty to make known to the Officers of the Army his decided opi- 
 nion, that such acts are most injurious to the best interests of the State. To involve the in- 
 nocent with the guilty, and mclude, in a sweeping implication of guilt, a numerous body of 
 men, on the gromurof general suspicion or apprehension, is a mode of proceeding which, 
 on the immutable principles of justice, as well as on tiie soundest maxims of established 
 policy, no just Government can tolerate, and which every wise Government must condemn. 
 No fidelity, however staunch, can withstand such marked distrust. His Lordship in Council 
 vherefore, while, with the Court Martial, he gives full credit to the honourable motives of 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Grant and Major Welsh, cannot but deeply lament the inqircssiou which
 
 128 
 
 To estimate the effects of such conduct to the interests of the British Empire is the pecu- 
 liar province of the Governor in Council. The present occasion appears to demand from Go- 
 vernment the declaration of these general principles, wise and salutary in themselves, and 
 most impressively inculcated by the highest Authority in India, in the spirit of which his Lord- 
 ship in Council requires the cordial co-operation of all the Military and Civil Servants of the 
 Company. 
 
 By Order of the Right honourable the Governor in Council, 
 
 Fort St. George, (Signed) GEORGE BUCHAN, 
 
 March 20 1 807. Chief Secretary to the Governor. 
 
 The Board having concurred in the doubt which is entertained regarding the accuracy of 
 the grounds on which the Sentences of the Court Martial are founded, and having agreed in 
 opinion with Lord William Bentinck regarding the propriety of making known the sentiments 
 of Government, with respect to the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Grant and Major Welsh, 
 it is accordingly resolved that the proposed General Order be published. 
 
 COMMANDER IN CHIEF'S MINUTE. 
 
 I HAD intended to issue a General Order at the time of the publication of 
 the Sentences of the General Court Martial upon Lieutenant-Colonel Grant and Major Welsh, 
 which appeared to me correspondent with the sentunent of a Court selected with peculiar care 
 from the highest ranks and the most approved experience, and in fact the simple consequence 
 of their judgment, a Copy of which I submitted to Government. 
 
 The President expressed to me a wish, that I should not give out the Order, as it might 
 embarrass the future operation of Government ; which I thought it my duty to comply with, as 
 His Lordship views these Trials as partaking perhaps more of a State than even a Military 
 nature. 
 
 Under this impression, however I may be under the influence of notions peculiar to the 
 effect of a Court Martial, yet I shall not dissent to any part of the present Order by Go- 
 vernment, as His Lordship in Council conceives, that such a publication will be of advantage 
 to the Interest of the Stale. 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 J. F. CRADOCK, 
 Lieutenant General. 
 
 Madras, March 20tli, 1307. 
 
 The PRESIDENT lays before the Boai-d the following MINUTE. 
 
 AS no opportunity will offer for many weeks of carrying into effect the Orders 
 of the Supreme Government regarding the banishment of the men of the Battalions now in 
 confinement, amounting to hundred persons, 1 feel myself called upon by a paramount 
 
 sense of public duty, to state the reasons why I consider the measure to be impolitic, and hos- 
 tile to the true interests of this Government.
 
 129 
 
 The conduct nf tliis Government in regartl to the Mutiny at Vellore, and upon all the 
 events growing out of it, lias iieen roguhited by one uniform system of I'olicy, from wliich it 
 has never departed. The principles of this system were for the most part entirely approved ba- 
 ttle Go\ernor General in Council. The only dilVerence of opinion consisted in the extent t« 
 which the principle should he carried ; and in this respect the Supreme Government went fur- 
 ther in the application of it, than was considered hy this Governnient to he expedient. The 
 late Dispatch of the Governor General in Council under date the H'Jlh of November, has or- 
 dered a course of proceeding apparently in direct opposition to that which was recommended 
 m the Dispatch of the Governor General in Council, particularly illustrated by the Governor 
 General's Rliiuite under date the 1 1th August. 'I'he opinion which I entertain, and am anxious 
 to enforce, is, that the Instructions laid down in the Governor General's Minute of the 1 1th 
 August, were the just and wise rule of proceeding ; that the sentiments of the Governor Ge- 
 neral contain a true and comprehensive view of the circumstances of the Vellore Ptlutiny ; that 
 subsequent events, though not foreseen by the Governor General, were not unnatural conse- 
 quences of the first causes ; that the state of the case is not materially altered ; that there is 
 no new danger; and finally, therefore, that the general principle should continue the same ; 
 and that his first Judgment should not be reversed. 
 
 It will be necessary to compare what were the Governor General's sentiments expressed 
 in his Minute of the 1 Ith August, with the Orders conveyed in his Dispatch of the 29th No- 
 vember. 
 
 The Governor General's Minute of the 11th August, states the opinion that there is no 
 reason to believe that the late events at Vellore have been the result of any deep-laid conspi- 
 racy. The cause of that Mutiny is ascribed to the Orders regarding the Turband and Dress of 
 the Native Troops. 
 
 The Governor General then observes : " The course of Proceedings to be adopted under 
 " a supposition that the disaffection of the Army has been occasioned by a long-contiuued and 
 " deep-laid conspiracy existing in a state of considerable progress antecedently to the promul- 
 " gation of the General Orders, and that which should be pursued under the view of the case 
 " which I have taken, are ditVerent. The former might require measures of a coercive nature, 
 " an active scrutiny, and a firmness and decision calculated to overcome the disafiected : the 
 " latter case requires the removal of the cause of discontent, by the abrogation of the ob- 
 " noxious Orders, the restoration of confidence to the Troops by shewing them confidence on 
 the part of Government, and the very reverse of all coercive measures. 
 
 " The appearance of coercion in the second case, might have the appearance of rendering 
 " the cause of the Sepovs the cause of Religion." 
 
 The Governor General then deprecates the sending an European Force to Fort St. 
 George, as indicating a want of confidence ; to limit as much as possible ihe investigation ; to 
 observe the greatest caution in punishing instances of disafiection in indiviiuils in other Sta- 
 tions ; to bring to exemplary punishment the perpetrators of the Massacre at Vellore, and to 
 extend a general amnesty to the rest. 
 
 These are the general principles which the Governor General in this wise and able Rli- 
 nulc recommended for the guidance of this Government. 
 
 The spirit of these instructions has already been adopted. The Government, however, 
 did not feel themselves justified in proclaiming a general amnesty. It was considered both 
 impolitic at once to pardon men who had been implicated in Mutiny and murder, and dan- 
 gerous to release such numbers of men, the efl'ect of whose representations when at large it 
 was impossible to calculate. I agree in the opinion of the Supreme Government lately re- 
 ceived, that these men may now be discharged without danger : the ferment is passed. But 
 I must beg leave still to retain my opinion, that in the then disposition of the Army, perhaps 
 more than half balancing in favour of disatfection, the intercourie of so many whose companions 
 have been talked of as marlyrs in the cau.se of Religion, might have had the worst cfiects. It 
 was a precaution from wiiich much good, and no harm could arise. 
 
 The Dispatch of the Supreme "Government, under date the 29th November, has given 
 a judgment with regard to the same men of an entirely dilfereut purport. It is said, " With 
 
 (C
 
 <( 
 
 130 
 
 " respect to the persons in confinement, wc are of opinion, on a review of all the circum- 
 " stances of the case, that for the benefit of example a measure of severity is urgently re- 
 " quired." Again, 
 
 " The Principles of Military Discipline urgently require the adoption of a course of pro- 
 " ceeding calculated by its severity to inspire awe, and to arrest the progress of contagion. 
 " Tt is rendered still more necessary by the late conduct of the Troops at Nundydroog. Con- 
 " sidered in this point of view, the exemplary punishment of the general mass of the Pri- 
 soners concerned in the Mutiny at Vellore, is a measure of State necessity, involving the 
 " very security of the British Dominions in India." 
 
 " The indiscriminate punishment of all who may have been seized in the act of Mutiny, 
 " or known to have been engaged in it, is peculiarly calculated to deter others from joining in 
 " riot, or mutinies." 
 
 And it is afterwards added, 
 
 " We concur in the expediency of the measure suggested in the Council of Fort St. 
 " George of consigning to punishment all, among the persons now in confinement, who shall 
 " not be able satisfactorily to prove that they were active in suppressing the progress of the 
 " Mutiny, or were absent from Vellore at the period of its occurrence. We recommend this 
 " measure therefore not from any apprehension of the intrigues and machinations of the per- 
 " sons now in confinement, if immediately or gradually discharged, or of the possible effects 
 " of detaining them in the Country in a state of restraint, but from our conviction of the ne- 
 " cessity of producing a deep and lasting impression upon the minds of the Army, and the 
 " inhabitants of the Country, by a severe example of the just resentment of Government, 
 •' among the atrocious perpetrators of the Massacre at Vellore." 
 
 The first decision of the Supreme Government had in view principally the cause of 
 the Mutin}'. The immediate effect in the Mutiny itself was not a principal consideration. 
 But the jjrimary objects to which our attention was directed, were the consequences 
 which the invasion of the Religious Prejudices and Customs of India might have upon our 
 Army, and upon all the inhabitants of our territories. To do away the impression of a deter- 
 mined plan to attack the Religion of India, and to convert the Natives to Christianity, an im- 
 pression of not less injurious tendency to the interests of Great Britain in the present than in 
 future times, was our first and highest interest. While this was the leading and main case, 
 other very essential circumstances were not overlooked. All principals in the Mutiny were to 
 be punished, and the great mass forgiven. The second decision of the Sujjreme Government 
 appears to have entirely laid aside the cause, and to have stripped the case of all the im- 
 portant parts which I have just described. Here it is considered by the Supreme Government 
 in the light of a bare Mutiny, which is to be punished with the utmost severity. I wish the 
 Supreme Government had been more explicit in the exact reasons which had induced this 
 difference of opinion. It is said the Nundydroog transactions had confirmed the necessity of 
 severe measures. I should have understood this decision if it had been formed upon the opi- 
 nion that disaftection was still continuing, and that nothing but extraordinary severity could 
 be expected to check it. But the Nundydroog proceedings are stated to confirm an opinion 
 already formed ; and I am not aware that any of the Communications from this Government 
 to Fort William, from the time of the Mutiny to the transaction of the Nundydroog proceed- 
 ings, gave any grounds for the supposition that the Mutiny at Vellore had in its origin or 
 consequences a different appearance from that which was assumed by the Governor General 
 in his Minute of the 1 1th August. 
 
 In order to make my opinion of the state of affairs more fully understood, I shall take 
 the liberty of making a short review of all the leading transactions from the time of the Mu- 
 tiny to the present hour. I shall also venture to conjecture upon the feeling impressed upon 
 the mind of the Governor General in Council which has led to the substitution of alarm, of 
 great precaution, and extraordinary severity, for sanguine expecutions, for the manifestation 
 of entire confidence, and for the belief that the Assembly of an European Force was a pre- 
 caution not necessary, and rather to be avoided than otherwise. 
 
 In the course of these reflections I shall assume what I most conscientiously believe, 
 that the general dissatisfaction of the Native Taoops wholly and solely arose from the General
 
 131 
 
 Or.Iers aliont tlio Turbands and Dress of the Native Troops. That these Extract of a Letter rmm T.ic'if.-roi. 
 OrtliMs iiuliLaied an iiitoniioii wliicli was Kcnc-rallv Lflicvcd, that the Bri- M"nn., iVincipi^i Colie.trr ;., tl>e 
 
 . . „ . , , I ., "^ ^,, ... ,„, Ceded Districts, dated il August, 
 
 tisli CrovcTiimeiit intended to convert the Sepoys to Clinstianity. Fliat Anaiitpnor. 
 
 iroin our Native Troops the whole of our Native Subjects received the " U.WL^tr. strange it may appear ta 
 
 . ^i 1 • ^ i* /■- . rr.1 !• -1 * I' " Eiiro])eans, 1 know that the ^ener^l 
 
 same impresMon as to the objects ot Government. The distribution of .< „yi„i,, of the most imeiiiff^nt \a- 
 the Army thronj;hout all the provinces necessarily made the opinion gc- " fives in this pait of the Counti vis, 
 neral, and a report to which the frelinp-s of all men were alive, circulated !! i'^*'- ''7*' ■■•tended to make the 
 
 11 -1 1 i> 1 1 1 ,- • rr-.I • 1 r I- " SupOVS ChriStl4US. 
 
 like wilil-tire through every class ol society. 1 his general reeling consti- 
 tuted the greatest political danger that could well threaten us. The transactions at Vellore, 
 considered as a Mutiny or as a Massacre, were in point of importance not for a moment to be 
 put in the scale against the consequences of this general sentiment, which might, if it had 
 couliimed, have placed the British Empire in the most imminent hazard. The punishment 
 of the oftenders was made only secondary to the great object of calming the universal alarm 
 for their Religion, of undeceiving the Sepoys and the Publick as to the views of the British 
 Government, and finally of restoring former confidence. For this reason the Orders in ques- 
 tion were revoked; Proclamations declaratory of the respect of the Government for the Sacred 
 Prejudices of the Natives were published ; all j)rccipitation in punishment which might either 
 have the appearance of revenge, or of rendering the cause of the Sepoys the cause of Reli- 
 gion, was studiously avoided. The Supreme Government concurred in all these sentiments, 
 and recommended to our adoption such measures as were calculated to allay the public agi- 
 tation. The recommendation went, after the punishment of the principals, to a general am- 
 nesty to the remainder. 
 
 The Supreme Government were borne out by facts in the truth of almost all the conclu- 
 sions they had formed. If I may presume to differ with the Governor General in any of his 
 opinions, it is in the too sanguine hope that all agitation would immediately cease upon the 
 revocation of the Orders, and that an additional European Force was unnecessary. I so far 
 concurred with the Governor General, in the greater probability of tranquillity than of conti- 
 nued disorder arising from this measure. But still the history of the World told us, that when 
 popular frenzy rises to an extraordinary pitch, whether influenced by religious or political 
 feelings, it is almost impossible exactly to calculate the extent of its range. We know that 
 there must be numberless discontented spirits both in and out of the Army, and the direction 
 that might be given to the public feeling was a just cause of apprehension. An additional 
 European Force would have been the best prevention of, as well as the best check to, this 
 greatest of evils. In the doubtful issue of events, the resolution of this Government was 
 formed upon the opinion, that precaution was not entirely to be sacrificed to theory. 
 
 I am, I confess, doubtful whether the sanguine hopes of the Supreme Government of 
 the cessation of all dissatisfaction, which to them may now appear not to have been entirely 
 realized, or an opinion, that the impression on the public mind, in regard to their Religion, 
 is entirely removed, and need no longer constitute the primary and leading object of our poli- 
 tical measures ; I sav, I am not sure which of these considerations has induced the Governor 
 General in Council to prescribe a directly opposite line of conduct for this Government to that 
 recommended in his former Minute. 
 
 I now come to that part of the subject in which I shall attempt to shew, that the case 
 remains in principle where it was, and that the same wise principles should continue to be ob- 
 served. And I assert this, because I think, and in this consists the essence of the question, 
 that the public mind is still impressed with the belief that this Government did intend to at- 
 tack their Religion. I state this upon the various representations that have been made from 
 different parts of the country, upon which the Governor in Council has deemed it necessary, 
 within these few days, again to repeat a Proclamation, assuring the Natives of its respect for 
 the Religions of the Countr^r. We know that the same report has prevailed at Wallajabad. 
 We have seen from the report of the Officer at Palamcottah, a strong instance of the public 
 opinion. Lieutenant-Colonel Uyce writes, — Palamcottah 
 
 " So fully were the Mussulmen Sepoys persuaded, in spite of all assurances, that such \ov. 27th. 
 " was on V object, and the order of Government, (Conversion to Christianity) that, on hearing
 
 132 
 
 " the ceremonies connected with the administrution of tlie Oath of Allegiance, they positively 
 " believed that the Hindoos had renounced the Faith and Worship of their Forefathers." 
 
 Independent of these and many other facts which might be adduced to illustrate the pub- 
 lic opinion, it would be perfectly contrary to the character of the people whom we govern, 
 that tlit-y sljDuld entertain a different sentiment and feeling. Wh;it inference could they draw 
 from Orders directing the discontinuance among the Sepoys of distinctive Marks of Cast, and 
 of Ornaments, as well as the change of their old Turband for a new Head-dress, appearing to 
 them like the Hat of an Furopean. The Sepoy who has been accustomed to those innovations 
 of manners and customs, whirli, to a certain extent. Military Discipline renders indispensable, 
 might have been supposed not unable to comprehend our real motives. But what could the 
 great mass of the Native population infer from an apparently direct attack upon forms and 
 ceremonies held by them to l)c so sacred ? Setting their blind prejudices aside, could the most 
 enlightened of them attribute to our conduct any legitimate object? Could they fancy that 
 the Sepoy was to be made better or braver } Could they, iu short, imagine to themselves 
 any other reason than that of making the Sepoys more like Europeans; and as the m<-tamor^ 
 phosis of the Black Native into tr.e White European was impossible, the one only inference 
 was drawn that an assimilation of Religious Wor.-hip was intended. 
 
 That this was the general opinion at the time among all classes of people, I know to be 
 the fact. At this time those of the Natives, better informed of our principles, are convinced 
 of the folly of their apprehensions. But the great body of the people, to whom all the acts of 
 Government are only known by their eft'ecls, as touching themselves, must remain in ignorance 
 and distrust. 7"hey believe that the Sepoys at Vellore died in support of their Keligious Faith. 
 They know the cause which led the Sepoys to this act of desperation. They can have but 
 one opinion of the cause itself. They must condemn the Government, and feel compassion 
 for the sufferers. As the whole feeling of the country' seems in great measure devoted to Re- 
 ligious observances, there seldom can have happened a case in which popular sympathy caa 
 have been more strongly excited. 
 
 (.t These impressions time alone can efface. But is it deserving of no consideration in what 
 manner this story shall descend through the present day to posterity ? Shall we send it down 
 blazoned with every possible horror ? Shall it be said ; — 
 
 " The Europeans wanted to convert the Sepoys to Christianity ; — the Sepoys preferred 
 " death ; — a contiict ensued ; — hundreds were killed in the struggle ; — a severe execution of 
 " the prisoners took place on the spot ; — many others were hanged or shot by sentence of 
 " Courts Martial ! Not content with so much bloodshed, many hundred men were banished 
 " from their country and their families for ever !" This is indeed not an exact statement of 
 the fact ; but is it an impossible mode of representation by the ignorant, bigoted, and deluded 
 populace ? 
 
 Our interest is certainly to convince the people that no hostility to their Religion was in- 
 tended. This is our first care. It is this conviction of our regard for their Religious customs, 
 ■on their minds, upon which will depend chiefly " the preservation of those bonds of connec- 
 " tion by which the interests of the People and the Army are identified with the interests of 
 " the State." Is this likely to be eft'ected by a departure from the cluiracteristics of the Bri,- 
 tish Government; mercy, but great tirnmess ; — and by the application of the Asiatic principle 
 of general punishment to the particular case in question ? A system of terror seems little 
 calculated to reclaim mistaken opinions, or to infuse confidence. A system of terror is calcu- 
 lated to overcome actual revolt and mutiny. 
 
 I shall presently examine how far the contagion may be spreading, and may require such 
 violent remedies. , 
 
 I have hitherto considered the question as regarding the transactions at Vellore, and the 
 public opinion consequent to that e\'ent. I shall now examine the various circumstances that 
 have taken place since the Vellore Mutiny, for the j)urpose of shewing how far the original 
 case may or may not be altered by them. 
 
 The first agitation at Wallajabad followed the Vellore Mutiny too close to be considered 
 as a separate transaction. The oidy event that has since occurred where the Sepoys have
 
 133 
 
 shewn disaffection, took place at Niindydroog, where there were four Companies of one of 
 die Battalions of the 18th Itcgimont. 
 
 I have read the Proceediiigs oi' the Committee of Incniiry widi great attention, and I must 
 confess that, considering the great degree of caution with winch Indian tesiimoiiy must be re- 
 ceived, the alarm appears to me to have been greatly exaggerated. Tliere appears to me to 
 be one fact alone which seems perfectly clear, tliat in those Companies there did prevail a 
 disposition very unfavourable to the British interests. I doubt very much the intention of the 
 Sepoys to massacre the European Officers. The departure of the families is a strong circum- 
 stance in favour of the opposite opinion ; but even this fact is not conclusive to my judgment. 
 The existence of dissatisfaction was probably well known to all the families. The example at 
 Vellore had coupled disalfection and massacre together, and it would be probable for women, 
 knowing of the one, to live in apprehension of the other. At such a time a report, circulated 
 by a single individual, that a massacre was to happen, would drive away all the families. It 
 seems extraortiinary that the Committee should not have examined the families themselves as 
 to the fact and cause of their departure. It is sworn in evidence by one of the Sepoys, that 
 he went ta one of the huts at seven o'clock, and found it empty ; at ten the family had re- 
 turned. I cannot think tliere was any conspiracy formed at the time of the murder of the 
 Europeans. Nothing that has since happened confirms the intention, '^['here have been no 
 desertions of the principal conspirators, and no positive information to the point has since 
 been received. The supposed connection with Bangalore, and the actual disaffection of that 
 part of the Battalion stationed there, seems to be extremely doubtful. The Puppet-show, 
 said to be the engine of this Conspiracy, is not very satisfactorily explained. I understand 
 from those who iiave seen these exhibitions, that they as iVeqnently display the rout of one 
 party as of the other. It docs not seem at all extraordinary that actors, whose business it is 
 to suit their representations to the taste and feelings of their audience, having found the 
 British name not in very high esteem, should have chosen for an entertainment the Defeat of 
 the British Troops. I am inclined to ascribe rather more of bad intention to the Native Offi- 
 cers than to the Puppet-show Man. If this latter personage had been really the Agent of a 
 Mussulman Conspiracy, it is, I think, as likely that the IVIussulmen shoukl have been the 
 victors as the French. But, in truth, at Nundydroog, as elsewhere, general alarm and dis- 
 trust prevailed. Every triffing circumstance that usually passes without notice at other times, 
 was magnified into Conspiracy. A Tri-colour(xl Flag is found at Scringapatam : French in- 
 trigue immediately stares us in the face. Any real connection of tliis Tri-coloured Hag and 
 the French interests remains to be made out. I have heard a very reasonable and a very inno- 
 cent explanation given to this various-coloured Ensign. A Paper is found upon the person of 
 a man at Nundydroog, said to come from Mecca, and supj^osed to be intended as a prophetic 
 distribution of future Conquests, in which Moors, Hindoos, and French arc to share, and the 
 British alone to be excluded. An officer who has seen tliis document, and is enabled, by 
 his knowledge of the language, to understand its meaning, states it to be a very innocent 
 game played at by the Natives, and not to have the most remote connection with political in- 
 trigue. 
 
 I shall beg leave here to advert to an opinion taken up at the time of the Vellore Mutin}-, 
 and since adhered to by the Commander in Chief, and several Military Officers, that the 
 Turband had little concern with the general dissatisfaction, and that this feeling was produced 
 by a deep-laid Mussulman Conspiracy. I am far from thinking this to be an unreasonable 
 oj)inion, when the object of the principal Vellore Conspirators was to establish a Government 
 of their own Faith, and the destruction of Europeans. The error seems to have consisted in 
 takino- the eilect for the cause. But however reasonable I may admit this opinion to be, yet 
 I must also say that its adoption was extremely unfortunate lor the interests of tiie Govern- 
 ment, and for the early restitution of confidence. First appearances certainly gave reason to 
 suppose the Mutiny at Vellore to originate with the Mussulmen. These first appearances of 
 what tiie plot was, may without ditiiculty be imagined to correspond very much with what the 
 passions of the (Officers of the Army might wish the plot to ai)|)ear to be to the woild. If the 
 ileligious Prejudices of the Natives had been violated by the practice of the Military Service,
 
 134 
 
 every Officer in the command of a Corps, and indeed every Captain in command of a Com- 
 puny, bcciirie more or less impl.c^ited iii respond. biiiiy. 'Ihc- question became a parly ques- 
 tion, and has unluckily been aituinpaiiiel with iiiiicli of tnai warmth which usually ;,Uends 
 tiie a<;itation of subjects in which tne passions or iiiterists of great bodies of men are warmly, 
 conctn-ned. The very decided opinion of the Comiuaiider in Chief would necessarily give a 
 •sanction and encouragement without any active elforts on his part to the general conclusion. 
 If the agitation had terminated with the Vellore Mutiny, the real cause ot it might possibly 
 stiil have been a matter of speculation. But the etiect of the revocation of the Orders, which 
 pacified at once the alarming ferment at Hyderabad, and which has had the same elTect gene- 
 rally, pioves indubitably tlie real origin of the mischief. 
 
 But allowing the cause to be as here stated, namely, alarm for their Religion ; still it 
 may be said that the Mussulmen have taken the advantage of the feelings, and have conspired 
 to the destruction of the Government. But where does this appear? At Nundydroog Mus- 
 sulmen and Hindoos were equally concerned ; each appear to have had in view, as far as there 
 was any view at all, the aggrandisement of his Class upon the ruins of the British Government.-, 
 Purneab, who ought to be more alive than any other man to the effects of Mussulman in- 
 trigues at Mysore, does not believe in their existence. It was his opinion that the Hindoos 
 had been much more alarmed by the supposed intentions of the British Government than the 
 Mussulmen. The Nundydroog proceedings present one most favourable inference, that 
 though there might be disaffection, there exists no combination of interests, no uniform ob- 
 ject, no appearance of intrigues originating in one common source. At Sankerrydroog the 
 supposed ringleader is an Hindoo Native Officer. At Wallajahbad the Mussulmen Native 
 Officers have appeared active. But the exact nature of that agitation has not appeared, and 
 the Report of the Quarter Master General is very satisfactory to the general fidelity of the 
 suspected Corps. 
 
 It certainly appears that the Mussulmen are the most active Conspirators ; this is a na- 
 tural consequence of their superior boldness, of their ambition, and of the violent character 
 of their Religious Bigotry ; as they are better Soldiers, so would they be better Conspirators 
 than the Hindoos. 
 
 But, with all this, there is no trace of a plot — no source from whence these machina- 
 tions sprung. If I am asked, how I can account for an agitation supposed to be so general, 
 I must answer, that the primary cause has not yet ceased to operate. It may be said in re- 
 pl}-. Why then followed a period of three months after the revocation of the Orders, without 
 any apparent sign of discontent ? To this I must say, that the great mass, perhaps all, were 
 in all probability perfectly satisfied for the time by the measure of Government. — Why then 
 did the dissatisfaction revive .' To this I must answer, that all mankind are not perfect, are 
 not endowed with equal reason, and equal goodness of intention. In all assemblies, com- 
 posed as the Military Corps are, there will be a great many individuals impatient of subjec- 
 tion, prone to turbulence and disorder. The passions of these men had been roused, and 
 were easily revived. Another effect of the first cause still might be supposed to continue, 
 the activity of the Emissaries of the principal Conspirators or discontented. These Emissa- 
 ries are not, in my opinion, the commissioned agents of any one man, or of any party. They 
 are self-created, or rather created by the original cause which led all men to unite under the 
 same banners, and made agents of the most enthusiastic in their several Religious Prejudices. 
 These would be joined by all those who had suffered by the difierent changes of Government, 
 and by a still more numerous class, consisting of those who had nothing to lose, and every 
 thing to gain by insurrection and confusion. These men are still hallooing the old cry of 
 Christianity. And there will always be fools and rogues who will become ready proselytes to 
 any preacher either of religion or sedition. The curious report from the Officer in command 
 of Belluny is not inapplicable to the present assertion. This seems to me to be the precise 
 state of the minds of the Army at the present moment. It is to me a matter of surprise that 
 more symptoms of agitation have not followed this great storm. It has always been my 
 opinion that a few imlividuals might possibly suffer, but the Empire at large was safe. I am 
 convinced that disalfection daily more and more subsides. I have perfect reliance in the con-
 
 lo-t 
 
 OO 
 
 tent and allegiance of the very great mass. A few discontented spirits in each Corps, attacked 
 by this return of fever, may occasionally make a sort of movement, which the weakness and 
 distrust of our European Officers have magnified into Mutiny and Massacre. The fact is, that 
 the Army is haunted with this Mussulman Conspiracy. The word is as great a bugbear to 
 the European Officer, as the word Turband has been to the frightened Sepoy ; and the con- 
 spiracies of Sankerrydroog, Palamcottah, and Quilon, have more the appearance of an Insur- 
 rection of the Officers against the Sepoys, than of the latter against the former. 
 
 From the best consideration which I have given to the present state of aOairs, it appears 
 to me that nothing is requisite, but for the Government to pursue its ordinary course with 
 steadiness and firmness. Our policy seems to me to be much the same with tliat which once 
 saved the Roman Empire, in allusion to which, it was said of the author of it, " Umi.< qui 
 " nobis cunctando restituis rcvi." Our policy seems to be to take no measure of extraordinary 
 energy and severity out of the common practice. Having punished the Mutineers with a de- 
 gree of severity seldom surpassed in the history of modern times, offence should cease ; the 
 Government should, in my opinion, now place itself on the most strict defensive. Our sys- 
 tem should be entirely one of precaution, unless indeed new events should arise, and that the 
 subject should assume a new form, diflerent from what it bears at present. We should use 
 every possible endeavour, which I hope has not been neglected, to assure the Army, who have 
 been alarmed for their Religious Prejudices, of our respect for them ; to observe the utmost 
 vigilance in preventing the intrigues of wicked and designing persons ; to instil, by an appeal 
 to their sense and honour, confidence into the breasts of the European Officers ; and, lastly, 
 to make the best disposition of the means within our power to provide for the worst. If I am 
 to say at this moment what I conceive to be the prominent evil and danger of the present day, 
 — it is the mutual distrust between the Officer and Native Troops. 
 
 The banishment of the large body of Sepoys now in confinement, appears to me to be 
 ill calculated to obtain any of these objects. 
 
 With regard to the first cause of the agitation, public compassion must be with those 
 who fell for their Faith. It is every man's cause in this Country, where the Rulers entertain 
 a different persuasion. If that feeling of compassion can be humoured without sacrificing a 
 more important object, it is wise to do it ; at any rate, the less that feeling is offended, the 
 better. Great pity, for one party must engender hatred for the other. We want to recal 
 affection. 
 
 With regard to the Mutiny itself, I agree, that taking it simply by itself, and uncon- 
 nected with any other circumstance, the punishment to be given to it cannot well be too 
 severe. But I must say also that such punishment should be prompt. It was prompt, and 
 it was most severe. To begin again to punish, after five months' consideration, seems to par- 
 take neither of justice nor humanity. 
 
 Such a proceeding would only be warranted by the continuance of a spirit of turbulence. 
 The events which have takenrplace since the Vellore Mutiny do not justify the conclusion. 
 From all the information I can learn, the dissatisfaction is fast dying awa}-, and I am of 
 opinion that nothing but our own imprudence can keep it alive. 
 
 I therefore beg leave to recommend that the remonstrance of this Government be respect- 
 fully made to the Governor General in Council, against the banishment of the prisoners now 
 in confinement. 
 
 (Signed) W. BENTINCK. 
 
 Fort St. George, 
 Januarj/ Si/i, 1807.
 
 13G 
 
 (III Secret Consultation, 9th January, 1807.) 
 
 MINUTE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF. 
 
 I SHALL not at all enter upon the question whether it is proper to oppose the 
 Iiistriiclions from the Supreme Government for the Banishment of the Prisoners at Vellore 
 and Fort St. George, as the point of Right or otherwise will exclusively remain under the 
 responsibility of those who may either suspend or set aside the measure. But as I have 
 viewed the late Orders from Bengal with the highest satisfaction, so I shall express my serious 
 concern that obedience to any part of them is for a moment delayed, as every hour retarded 
 adds to the ill consequences which, in my opinion, has resulted from opposite proceeding. 
 
 As tlie wliole of this Paper is to plead the cause of action, and undervalue the efficacy of 
 simple discussion, I will avoid all argument upon the motives of the Insurrection at Vellore, 
 and, leaving; the decision to the various documents on record, I will hasten to the events that 
 have taken place since that unhappy occurrence, as the unerring description of our present 
 situation, which, if properly viewed, may lead to the adoption of measures that will close the 
 painful scene. 
 
 It has been my misfortune, and the source of much private concern, to entertain a dif- 
 ference of sentiment from the Head of this Government, upon almost every point connected 
 with Vellore, or the agitations that have continued since that period ; and as most of the acts 
 of Government, of importance to the subject, have been contrary to my voice, I have there- 
 fore watched with proportionate anxiety the course of e\ents; and it appeared to me a rea- 
 sonable conclusion, that, as success or failure marked the progress of the measures pursued, 
 I might injustice determine their wisdom or unfitness. 
 
 I conceive that no explanation is required to illustrate the perfect disappointment of every 
 expectation, and that through the long period of six months since tne catastrophe at Vellore, 
 though no event has lieen marked witli blood, it has yet been one unvarying scene at some 
 Station or anotiier (supposed or real) of agitation, seduction, and alarm. As soon as one an- 
 noying communication is disposed of, another arises, and all the succeeding prophecies or 
 promises of cessation by the upholder of the present system, are deferred so long, that the 
 wearied mind rejects all hope of its arrival. The language is now introduced, that the origi- 
 nal agitation could not have subsided sooner, and that were it otherwise it would be surprising ; 
 but it appears to me, that had this patient doctrine been declared six months ago, and that 
 we had l^een told we were in resignation to await that term, beipre the happy effects of the 
 course pursued could be visible, the active mind would have turned away from so submissive 
 a forbearance, and sought a council more m unison with ilie British genius, and the character 
 of the Country. 
 
 It is with solid satisfaction that I now look back to the Records that bear witness to every 
 stage of event, as I can perceive that I have no opinion to wish altered, and that from the 
 commencement I either proposed, or supported those measures, that are at present directed, 
 either from tlicir original propriety, or to amend or alter our existing state. 
 
 It is this view that saves me from much argument at present, and will render my remarks 
 of small comparative bulk ; for as I have no point to gain, either in defence or proposal, it 
 could only be in me a s])irit of contentious controversy, to repeat, or amplify upon, what has 
 already gone through the minutest detail of discussion, and might appear sufficient to satisfy 
 the most obstinate disputant. 
 
 If the main object uiuler consideration seems to require a special notice, I have only to 
 add, that all my original sentiments upon the necessity of the Banishment of the Prisoners 
 (where no innocence could be discovered) are strengthened by the miscarriage of our hopes;
 
 137 
 
 and tliat in proportion as Sedition, Insubordinatiun, and Alarm iias prevailed, or increased, 
 since the rejection of this measure, at one period nnaniniously agreed on by the Council (9th 
 Aujjnst), to tlie same degree I view the wisdom of its imnieiliatc adoption, that the iinines- 
 sion may be dispelleil, that it is apprehension which restrains (rom i'urther punishment ; for, 
 as their guilt is declared to the whole world by their imprisonment for six months, it neither 
 requires the acuteness of an European mind, nor will it escape the perception of the Native, 
 so alive to the feeling, that it is another sentiment than genuine humanity that operates, and 
 that in their respective breasts we have exposed ourselves to the incalculable evil of supposed 
 timiditj-, or the disrepute of Hnctuating councils. 
 
 Tliat Banishment should be the lot of these Prisoners was the recorded reconunendation 
 of every person whose office it was to enquire into their guilt ; it w;vs urged in the most for- 
 mal manner by the Native General Court-Martial, who, instead of any endeavours to conceal 
 or lessen the crime of their Brethren, solicited this general |Hmishment as alone applicable to 
 the nature of their olTence (where distinction or shade in iniqiuty could not be observed), as 
 even mere}' to wretches who by the foulest and most cowardly deeds had forfeited all claim to 
 the character of Men, .Subjects, or Soldiers. 
 
 I recur to an argument already employed — Would the Supporters of Confinement, or 
 the Opposers of Banishment, at this period, have tolerated the notion si\ months ago, that 
 at the present hour we should not have advanced a step towards the settlement of a jioint that 
 seemed of all others to rule the fate of a general restoration, and that the promptitude in pro- 
 ceeding, witii all its attendant offspring of Confidence, Oblivion, Harmony, &c. — expres- 
 sions that directed every pen — should only be found in the well-composed Papers on the 
 Table ; and that having discharged that mental duty, we are careless of the effects of our 
 resolves, and have to undergo the mortification of being roused to activity by the admonitions 
 of the Supreme Government ? If I shall be told that we were on the point of action, I must 
 hesitate in my belief; for, should the Question be carried that Banishment is not to take 
 place (I put perpetual Confinement out of the view, as a measui-e that no one will meditate), 
 I now ask, are we prepared to liberate these Prisoners, and suffer them to range throughout 
 the Country in trium])h, relating their successful deeils of blood, magnilyina, the exploit, and 
 inviting others to follow the example, as opportunity may arise, which may lead to the gain 
 of every thing the mind of the impatient Native may as])ire to, and which will appear, through 
 the conclusive evidence of their own persons, free from ilanger or punishment ? I early fore- 
 told the embarrassment in which we are now placed, and that every hour since we departed 
 from the first resolution would create further diHicnIty. I assure the Council the public eye 
 has been fixed upon the very point under consideration ; that ii has been with them the index to 
 our sentiments and actions ; 1 solemnly declare before Heaven, that, out of the Council, I do 
 not recollect to have heard the voice that was against it, but, on the contrary, that it has been 
 the judgment of the most enlightened and experienced in every branch of the united Service, 
 that had the measure of Banishment been [)ursued with corresponilenl acts of ])rompiitude and 
 vio-our, and had the Government evinced a high and offended s\nr\t suited to the Indian mind, 
 agitation would have disappeared, and tliat the deed of Vellore, though a frightful explosion, 
 would have remained the solitary instance of tlie Disaffection of the .Sepoy. 
 
 To prove that this wise principle has not been neglected, it is stated, " That all Princi- 
 " pals in the Mutiny have been taken and punished :" — again, " i'hat the Mutineers liav- 
 " in"- been punished with a degree of severity seldom surpassitl in modern limes, oU'ence 
 " should cease. — Sensibility is alarmed by the affecting appeal of public compassion for tnose 
 " that died in defence of their Faith — that we shmild consider how the story of punishment 
 " shall descend to posterity — and shall we send it down l)lazoned with every possible horror r" 
 — The application of these sentiments to an event that was intended, under unparalleled cir- 
 cumstances of atrocity, to extirpate every European from liulia, I confess I do not compre- 
 hend ; and this reflection so composes my feelings to the political view of the subject alone, 
 that I am enalffed to consider without weakness those measures that the wisdom and experience 
 of others teach me to be the most likely to avert the recurrence of events, which, if suffered 
 to be viewed under the attraction of iin[)unity, will again revive, and lead to the dcb;vse,nen'> 
 
 r
 
 138 
 
 of the English character and that ascendancy that will allow of no attaint, and which will best 
 preserve our situation in this Country. 
 
 It is presumed that the lives that were lost in the hour of conflict, or of just indignation 
 on the spot, are not to be taken into the account : if not, I know of no more than seventeen 
 persons that have suftered execution ; and when I consider that there were alive sixteen 
 hundred guilty Military persons (the Pettah and the Palace excluded) engaged in the Mas- 
 sacre of the unhappy Garrison, I cannot view the punishment as of the complexion de- 
 scribed ; and when I also know that many of the principal Ringleaders of the Revolt and Mur- 
 der are still at larg-e, and that it was not until six months afterwards a Proclamation was issued 
 for their apprehension (I am not sure it is yet done), I cannot think we are yet arrived at the 
 bounds " that otl'ence, or, in other terms, a just and necessary vindication, should cease." I 
 am to add to this, that I learn that all the Civil Prisoners lately tried by the Civil Commission 
 at Chittoor, though their guilt is acknowledged, are acquitted for want or neglect of evidence, 
 and that no person, in salutary example, can be punished belonging to that hostile Pettah, 
 where for several days before the Massacre was committed (according to the Report I lately 
 laid before the Government), the intention was publicly declared, and we had not a friend, or 
 a faithful active person in employ, to give tiie intelligence. 
 
 At this moment (it will soon be remedied by the late Orders from Bengal to break the 
 guilty Regiments) there are numbers of persons, both as Officers and Privates, under the hea- 
 viest suspicion, still doing duty as if nothing had happened, though it is well known they had 
 an equal share in the execrable deed of the 10th July ; and such is the horror in which their 
 conduct is held by the Loyal Battalion in Garrison (the 20th N. I.), that they will not suffer 
 any communication, or admit them even into their Hospital. What must be the opinion and 
 consequences of such Impunity ? I grant it is Moderation, but I do not view in it that Firm- 
 ness ever annexed in sound, which is necessary to dignify even that amiable quality, and pre- 
 vent its excess from falling into disrepute. It appears that every act of severity is now 
 weighed, and that unless this measure of Banishment, after a confinement of six months, pro- 
 duced through doubt and irresokition, may too much load the scale, it cannot be considered 
 we depart either from Justice or Mercy. 
 
 I feel that it may be said, Why has not the Commander in Chief taken more decisive 
 steps ? Why has he not pursued measures applicable to Mutiny and Revolt, when the au- 
 thority of Courts-Martial rests so much in his hands ? I trust that my advocates will plead, 
 in their knowledge of the Constitution of this State, he can do nothing without the authority 
 of Government, and that if they chuse to interpose, the exercise of every power lies with 
 them. It will appear that I have not withheld the communication of any circumstance, and 
 submitted at the time such recommendations as I thought most suited to the case. Having 
 discharged this necessary duty, as no Special Authority was delegated to me (and I was 
 without encouragement to act independent), I could do no more than take the share of an 
 individual, and my reputation was to rest on the issue of such measures as 1 advised or disap- 
 proved. 
 
 Here the question of the Banishment of the Prisoners might rest; but the Minute of the 
 Right Honourable the President contains so much further observation, that it is impossible to 
 avoid some explanation ; and yet I have great embarrassment to contend with, for as I had 
 resolved not to enter upon the wearying subject of the Origin of the Mutiny at Vellore, I 
 scarcely know how to proceed in answer to remarks that give again a history of that event, 
 and assume every circumstance and fact upon causes far different from those I believe ; and 
 if I attempt to reply at any length, the argument and toil of six months past will be renewed 
 as warmly as ever. 
 
 To avert this, I must again call the attention of the Council to the Records, to review, 
 in their own minds, the successive Papers and Documents that have come before them, and 
 give their evidence (as the Juryman on his Oath) upon what they have seen and heard, and 
 not either upon what they would wish to believe themselves, nor what they would wish the 
 world to believe. It is my opinion that the sooner any person concerned in Government 
 reaches the truth the better, and that it is of no use to disguise or palliate tliose evils, that
 
 139 
 
 eaii only be removed by knowing them, and, from that knowledge, by the application of 
 suitable remedies. 
 
 ]t is said that it would be a most desirable point, were it " exclusively" imagined, thai 
 the adoption of the Turband give rise to, and continued, the present Disorders. 1 imme- 
 diately reply, " That so it would, ])rovided it were true ; but if not true, what object do we 
 gain ? We ma}' impose upon the ignorant, and give them a momentary satisfaction, but how 
 will the enlightened receive this agreeable but deceitful decUiration, that lulls us to false se- 
 curity, and prevents the interposition of those measures that will avert the recurrence of 
 danger? If any person believes that it is the Turband, or rather, Orders that have produced 
 the present Commotion, as those imagined evils are completely removed, he certainly may 
 lay aside anxiety, and pursue his ordinary action ; but if the majority of the world will sus- 
 pect that other causes are at work, and that a Mussulman or domestic Discontent has led to 
 the agitation (again I call the attention of the Council to what they know and hear), I say, 
 that those will not admit the efficacy of a declaration — that it is a Turband Fever, that pro- 
 duces I'its with little intermission, but will demand correspondent remedy, either by the 
 alterations of Systems, which are suspected to be erroneous, or by the employment, or ame- 
 lioration, of that numerous and ardent Class, now in almost universal poverty and ill-humour, 
 where faelings are read in the face of every passing Moorman, who either eyes the European 
 (the picture is acknowledged) in fixed anger, or turns aside in alienation and disgust. 
 
 It is s id, that it must be natural that a Party Question should arise upon the Origin of 
 Se loy discontent. For as the Army had been well, or rather governed to their satisfaction, 
 so must every Officer, to the Captain of a Company, feel a responsibility. This is a delicate 
 position, for it equally applies to the State and its Government; and it may not escape 
 observation, that in the ingenuity which gives the suspicion birth, perhaps, is discovered tire 
 first circumstance of Party or Self-interest. 
 
 It is urged with severe complaint that the European Officers exhibit a want of confi- 
 dence toward the Sepoys that is full of the most dangerous consequences, and the point the 
 most to be resisted. With the deepest concern I agree to and lament the evil ; and far be it 
 from me to enter upon the defence of any Officer who may seem not to have fulfilled the first 
 principles of the military character, by presence of mind and cool deliberation ; and all the 
 records will prove, that I have instilled confidence and banished suspicion on the point of 
 honour and self-devotion, if tiie cause demanded it, rather than risque the evil of a false 
 distrust. But Justice seems to ask the question. What cause can have produced so extraordi- 
 nary an effect .' and that the former reliance upon the Sepoy attachment (it may be said a 
 blind and petulant partiality, that would admit of no argument, a fond and comparative exal- 
 tation of their merit with the European Soldier), should have so suddenly ceased, and given 
 way to sentiments of distrust and alienation ? That such were the feelings of the Commanding 
 Officers of Corps, even of those who now appear the supporters of an opposite opinion, is a 
 fact within universal knowledge ; and that no such suspicion was entertained (exclusive of the 
 contagion at Vellore) till within these three months. 
 
 It has burst through the Army since the publication of the Order of the 24th September, 
 giving by the authority of Government, when it was no longer necessary, and all was already 
 done that could be required, the licence to the Sepoy to think and act as he pleased upon 
 the articles of his Dress, with other concessions (I refer to the Order) ; and howe\er modified 
 was the expression, its nature must ever produce the effect of insubordination. The majority 
 of the Council saw the dangerous tendency, and would have averted tlie issue, as not re- 
 quired by the spirit of the Instruction from Supreme Government. 
 
 I can speak from a knowledge of the universal sentiment, through every species of com- 
 munication from the Army, that this Order is conceived to be the source that has led to 
 insubordination on the part of the Corps, and the consequent alteration in the good opinion 
 of the OfBcers. I early foresaw and expressed it, in my Minute of September on the sub- 
 ject, that language could not be devised in the construction of so pointed an Order, that 
 would not declare to the Sepoy he had hitherto been oppressed, and that his oppressors were 
 hi3 Officers. Both sides are placed in a trying situation j the Sepoy learns that he has been
 
 140 
 
 treated ill, and it must be tine, " for the Government tells him so;" and the Officer regards 
 the Sepoy under the view (what an oppressor either declared or real will ever suspect) that 
 his feehngs, as an injured person, should meditate revenge. 
 
 The language of every Officer is, that the Genius of Discord, in a descent upon our 
 Army, could not have sugg(jsted a measure of more destructive effect to discipline, har- 
 mony, and confidence. Late events have been unexpected, but it is the more required that 
 we shall not lose our presence of mind ; for if, by crouching to either the Sepoy or the Na- 
 tive, we impair that dignity of demeanour which gave us our character in this Country, we 
 cannot go on, and shall have to rebuild, at great risque, that elevation from which we chose 
 to descend. 
 
 It seems fair to listen to, and then appreciate the extenuation that the European Officers 
 (alluded to) plead in their excuse. They ask, Are we not allowed to be judges of what passes 
 under our direct view ? Have we any interest in the falsehood, if we state, that the whole 
 demeanour of the Sepoy is so changed, that we cannot recognize any shade of that former 
 respect and submission that marked his character? Are we to overlook the groups in conver- 
 sation, and the nightly cabals ? What construction are we to put upon their averted looks, 
 or perhaps an overstrained courtesy, than that things are not what they were, and that some 
 design nmst impenti, of which nothing but their fears prevent a perpetration ? These Offi- 
 cers report, that through every pait of the country, itinerants of every descrijttion range, to 
 circulate the most fatal jjoison ; and, under the cloak of sanctity and religion, inflame the 
 mind of the Sepoy ; inculcating the most destructive measures, as praise-worthy, and of 
 sacred reward. They view these wretches amid their lines, and at their barrack gates, un- 
 controuled or unmolested by any police, ready to assail the deluded Sepoy as soon as he is 
 dismissed from his parade ; and the astonished Officer, incapable to apply a remedy, fur he 
 is without power or respect, has only to give vent to his feelings by communication. It 
 would be natural in him to interfere, but in the present order of things I conceive it would 
 be a dangerous enterprize on his part; and all he can now do, not to i-emain in absolute in- 
 activity, is to prefer the complaint of what he sees or hears. We all acknowledge that the 
 most dangerous language is in general circulation ; and yet I do not know of one successful 
 eflbrt of the Magistrates or Police ; and I do not believe that a single disseminator of mis- 
 chief is at this moment in custody. 
 
 The Officer, however high his rank, is at present in India without a shadow of autho- 
 rity ; and, in a country like this, it must follow, without respect. He has no means of 
 information, no power over his Bazar, or cantonment, beyond the exercise of a parade ; and 
 he cannot in any shape, except through simple communication, take a step like vigour or 
 prevention. 
 
 At the time that the general crisis of the world has demanded during the struggle, that 
 the Military energy should be supported and extended in this part of India, we have chosen 
 that moment to drop that character, and rather wish to lower, and degrade it by system. 
 Approved merit in the habit of an Officer loses its value, and we prefer now to trust to the 
 chance intellect of an inexperienced boy. The former safeguard of years and experience 
 are no longer required. All practice at this eventful period gives way to theory. It is re- 
 served for the present times that a Conmianding Officer is to witness the approach of persons 
 upon his parade to seize a supposed offender *, and without communication carry him off. 
 And it is possible that this Sepoy, or Native Officer, may be condemned to labour on the 
 public roads (I speak from facts) without the knowledge of his fate. This is the blind intro- 
 duction of English laws and usages in this country, where no one circumstance can authorize 
 the assimilation. What can the Native think, who has hitherto been used to view the Army 
 with veneration P or what does the Sepoy imagine, who formerly looked up to his Officer with 
 reverence and awe, when he perceives, tliat he is no longer the same personage, and cannot 
 iiow,aflbrd him redress, or even listen to his complaints ? 
 
 * Thi« is contrary to Ilegulalions. But the want of conciliation and common respect too often causes the 
 ueglect.
 
 Ul 
 
 Tlic intentions are most laudable, that the English principles of equality and independ- 
 ence should produce their blessed elVecis equally licre as in F.nglaiul ; liut a little reflection, 
 or intercourse with the experienced Residents in the Country, will correct the error ; for it is 
 eas)' to learn, that if Cipiality is established, of course the chief feature of our ascendancy is 
 surrendered, and the view of respective numbers cannot be withheld (the language now pre- 
 vails), and we shall have to repent, without redemption, those advantages that we dispossessed 
 ourselves of through a wild pliihinthroi)y, that has certainly taken away security, and it is very 
 doubtful if the loss will confer happiness where it is intended. 
 
 But I return to the immediate question of Banishment, and its salutary effect of example. 
 I an\ told that disafi'ection is rapidly subsiding, that it is upon the point to expire. Doubts 
 may be entertained of tliis extent of expectation, from a recent necessity, as appeared to tiie 
 Council, to discharge 7G men, in addition to many others, from the re|)reseiitation of the 
 Conmianding Officer of the 2d Battalion of the Isi Regiment, who officially declared be had 
 no hopes of the good conduct of his Battalion, unless the measure was complied with. But I 
 am sure it will end the sooner if we follow the direction of the Supreme Government ; for 
 insubordination only began to rear its head after the events at Vellore, when it was disco- 
 vered that we had given over the intention of punishment, whether through apprehension or 
 wisdom the i"norant multitude could not determine. 
 
 Instead of delay, I would solicit every expedition ; for while a prisoner remains undis- 
 posed of, either by liberation or banishment, the story of Vellore will never cease. It has 
 been one uniform expression, to extinguish the recollection; yet we have delayed, through 
 an irresolution in proceeding, the very act that comprehends the whole essence of the under- 
 taking. 
 
 The invitation to delay, as introduced in the Latin quotation Unusque nobis amctando 
 vestituis rem applies to the inroad of a foreign enemy ; who, in possession of superior pow- 
 ers, was on the point of overwhelming the Kingdom, and whose course could not be resisted 
 in the open field ; but I think that Fabius would have disclaimed the applause had it been 
 bestowed for protracted proceeding, if in the plenitude of every superiority of real or sup- 
 posed strength, he had suffered a domestic and secret foe to advance, and given to him the 
 chance of establishment, through the neglect of counteraction. 
 
 It is my opinion, that the statue would be better raised to the skilful physician who thus 
 addresses his patient, or the state : Venienti occurrite morbo ; vita mutanda est. Pete salutem 
 vel acerrimis modis, scd morurcs abit dies. 
 
 (Signed) J. F. CRADOCK, 
 
 Madras, Januarys, 1807. Lieut.-Gen. 
 
 ( A A) 
 
 MINUTE OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE PRESIDENT. 
 
 THE Supreme Government having fully left the disposal of the Vellore Mu- 
 tineers now in confinement to the discretion of this Government, I shall now state my senti- 
 ments upon this question. 
 
 It is first necessary for me to observe, that no alteration has taken place in the opinion 
 expressed in my Minute regarding the inexpediency of banishing these men ; namely, that 
 in the present state of the Country, no danger would ensue from their enlargement. 
 
 Adhering to this sentiment, it only remains for me to consider the least objectionable 
 mode of carrying the measure into effect. The decision seems to turn upon the two following 
 points : Whether their sentence shall be at once declared by the direct authority of Govern-
 
 142 
 
 ment; or whether their crimes shall undergo Investigation and Trial before a Tribunal reo-u* 
 larly constituted under Judicial Regulations. 
 
 In many cases since the Mutiny the authority of Government has been summarily exer- 
 cised. These were, however, all of a nature not to admit, without manifest danger, either 
 of escajje from punishment or of delay in the execution of it. Instant example was requisite 
 to arrest the progress of intrigue and disaffection. 
 
 In the present instance none of these considerations exists to urge the same mode of pro- 
 ceeding. Many reasons on the contrary seem to be favourable to a regular judicial investiga- 
 tion, by which the various distinctions of guilt, of murder, of plunder, and of mutiny, will 
 be made manifest, and will be publicly marked witli the Sentence which the Law attaches to 
 each ; such a process is consonant with the principles of justice upon which the Civil Code is 
 founded, and upon which the British Government is jjrofessed to be established. Two neces- 
 sary and important effects can alone be produced by a Trial : the one to shew that no crime 
 shall pass unnoticed ; and the second to heighten, by previous conviction, the value of par- 
 don to those to whom the Government may be pleased to grant it. Every one of the Muti- 
 neers will be found guilty under the Mahommedan Law, and not one of them should, in my 
 judgment, escape punishment, who may appear either to have been active in the Mutiny, or 
 to have committed murder or robber}-. 
 
 This mode of disposal appears the most intelligible, and the least liable to misconstruc- 
 tion. The immediate release of the great body of the prisoners without trial might be attri- 
 buted to fear. An act of grace might possibly encom-age the disaffected or troublesome^ 
 whom dread alone of the punishment might keep in order. It might be ascribed to indif- 
 ference to our best interests, and to a want of vigilance and energy, upon which bad men 
 might presume. By a previous trial, by executing some, by banishing others, by sentencing 
 to hard labour those who have been guilty of plunder, and by forgiving the mass, who pro- 
 bably were really innocent, the measure in all its parts will bear with it its own clear explana- 
 tion. It appears to me the best, because it is both the most just and the most plain to all 
 capacities. 
 
 The delay that may take place in the trial of so many hundred prisoners may appear an 
 objection to this process ; but as there is only evidence against a very small portion of the mass 
 and that the whole acknowledge to have been present at the Mutiny, conviction will be at 
 once pronounced upon their own confession. Some time will be required to collect witnesses 
 to the fact of stolen pro])erty having been found on the persons of some of the prisoners. 
 This will not be the affair of many days. In three weeks or a month all the trials may be 
 concluded. The gradual liberation of the prisoners will be another effect of this way of pro- 
 ceeding, which will obviate much possible inconvenience. 
 
 If this proposition be approved, I shall recommend the formation of two Special Com- 
 missions, as prescribed by the Regulations, to assemble at Vellore and Madras. 
 
 „ , cv ^ . ., (Signed) W. BENTINCK. 
 
 Fort St. George, Jprd l, 1807. 
 
 AS the Board concur in the mode recommended by Lord William Bentinck 
 for the disposal of the Mutineers who are in confinement, his Lordship is requested to state 
 to the Board his opinion respecting the further arrangement which remains to be adopted for 
 the formation of the Special Commissions required for the trial of the prisoners. 
 Jpril2, 1807.
 
 143 
 
 THE Board having met in Council in conformity to the communication con- 
 tained in tne Minute of Lord William Bentinck of the 16th instant, for the purpose of taking 
 into consideration, in communication with Lord Minto, the most expedient moiie of disposing 
 of the numerous Prisoners who were concerned in the Mutiny of Vellore, and whose fate still 
 remains to be determined ; the following general considerations have occurred to the Board 
 as the most advisable course to be observed in the present case. 
 
 The Board entirely agree that it is advisable that as early a termination as may be prac- 
 ticable should be put to the whole of the Vellore question ; and it is deemed advisable that 
 the mode of Trial by a General Court Martial should be avoided. 
 
 The Board will be enabled to go more fully into the subject when the Proceedings of the 
 Commission lately held at Vellore, and which are now under translation, shall have been 
 completed ; but with reference to such parts of the Reports of the Commission assembled at 
 Vellore and at the Presidency, as are now before the Board, it appears as a general principle, 
 the Native Officers who were concerned in the Mutiny, the Native Troops vrho were on the 
 main guard of Vellore on the night of that event, and such other Sepoys as are reported to 
 have been guilty of offences attended with circumstances of peculiar atrocity, should be pu- 
 nished in such manner as the Board may hereafter think expedient ; the Board being at pre- 
 sent inclined to think that it may be advisable to make a distinction in the punishment of these 
 Classes, by banishing the Native Officers and the more atrocious offenders, subjecting the rest 
 to some other punishment within the limits of the Territories under the Presidency. In regard 
 to the remainder of the persons in custodj^, it is the opinion of the Board that they should be 
 released, subject to the disqualification which is already understood to exist against their ever 
 being admitted into the service of the Company. 
 
 It appearing from the Reports now before the Board that a further knowledge has been 
 obtained of persons whose conduct has been meritorious in the course of the Mutiny, the 
 Board are of opinion that it will be proper that some adequate reward should be conferred on 
 such persons when more distinct information shall have been obtained regarding them ; and it 
 is resolved that the Commander in Chief be accordingly requested to express his sentiments 
 more particularly on the several cases of the above nature. 
 
 The Board are of opinion that the above measures should be carried into effect with the 
 least possible delay. The Board understanding from the Commander in Chief that two per- 
 sons out of five men under sentence of death by a General Court Martial for Murder, com- 
 mitted in the Mutiny, are to be executed, are of opinion that the execution of these sentences 
 would furnish the most eligible occasion for carrying into effect the several resolutions described 
 in this Minute. 
 
 Madras, I9th Julj/, ISO! . 
 
 07) 
 
 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK'S MINUTE. 
 
 BY the fortunate occasion of the presence of the Governor-General at Madras, 
 we were enabled with the assistance of his Lordship's advice to form a determination ujion the 
 principle which should regulate the punishment of the Vellore Mutineers still remaining in 
 confinement. I must refer the Governor ia Council to the Minutes of the ) 9th July, 1807.
 
 144 
 
 €C 
 
 a 
 
 The general principles determined upon at that meeting were, " that the Native Officers 
 who were concerned in the Mutiny, the Native Troops who were on the main guard of Vel- 
 lore on the night of that event, and such other Sepoys as are reported to have heen guilty 
 of offences attended with circumstances of peculiar atrocity, should be punished in such 
 manner as the Board may hereafter think expedient ; the Board being inclined at present 
 to think that it may be advisable to make a distinction in the punishment of the Classes, by 
 banishing the Native Officers and tlie more atrocious offenders, subjecting the rest ti some 
 other punishment within the limits of the Territories under the Presidency. In regard to 
 the remainder of the prisoners in confinement, it is the opinion of the Board that they should 
 " be released, subject to the disqualification against their being ever re-admitted into the 
 ♦' Company's Service." 
 
 Having deliberately considered the whole subject, and having carefully examined each 
 separate case, I shall state in reference to the Classes mentioned in the preceding extract, how 
 far the application of those principles may seem expedient or warranted by the circumstances 
 which have appeared in the Report of the two Commissions. 
 
 I shall commence with the Native Officers whose names are inserted in the margin. The 
 number of the deposition is affixed to each name. I will examine them separately. 
 
 No. i. The greatest degree of guilt apparently should attach to this Officer. He was 
 the senior Native Officer on the main guard. The Commission state, after the Massacre of 
 the Europeans he held a conference with the Prince Moizuddeen, and was found inside the 
 Palace. It is presumed by the Commission that this Officer's rank and influence among the Con- 
 spirators must have been great, in consequence of the service supposed to have been assigned to 
 him of commanding the main guard. It is to be remarked on the other hand, that the Mutiny 
 was not intended to have taken place on that night, and that it was the result of accident. 
 This fact is perfectly well known to the Government, though it might not liave been in evi- 
 dence before the Commission, whose inquiry was limited to the guilt of the persons imme- 
 diately before them. The presumption of extraordinary guilt founded upon the principal part 
 assigned to this Officer is false. I have from Major Trotter another circumstance, which might 
 invalidate even the supposition of this prisoner having been very active in the Mutiny. Major 
 Trotter states, that this Officer was at the time so ill as not to be capable of going the rounds. 
 Admitting all the extenuation that may be derived from these facts, there still remains against 
 him his remaining with the guard, his interview with Moizuddeen, and his being found m the 
 Palace. The Snbidar in his defence says, that he did his utmost to prevent the men from 
 firing ; that they abused and threatened him for so doing, and that finding it impossible to 
 suppress the Mutiny, he sought safety within the iron door of the Mahal. Several Sejioys in 
 their depositions support the assertion of the Prisoner, as to his endeavours to prevent the 
 guard from firing upon the Europeans. These depositions are probably false, as well as the 
 story told by the prisoner; but the reverse of the statement does not stand upon either facts 
 or evidence sufficiently satisl'actory to warrant a ver}' severe punishment being passed upon 
 him. From the more recent information that I have been able to collect of t!ie state of the 
 Sepoy mind, and more particularly of the impression created by the extraordinary misery and 
 distress of the Native Officers and Sepoys who have been dismissed the service, I am of opi- 
 nion that no further act of particular severity is necessary. It would be a sufficient punish- 
 ment, in my opinion, that the Subidar were dismissed the service. 
 
 No. 2. The same remarks are applicable also to this case. This Officer was upon the 
 main guard, and was found concealed in the Palace. There is no proof of his activity in the 
 Mutiny. An Evidence Moorteen (Evidence, No. 2.) states, that the prisoner lamented the 
 Mutiny, from whence he wishes it to be inferred that he was not actively engaged, but that 
 notwithstanding he refused to join the witness in his proposition to attempt to suppress it. 
 This Officer should be dismissed the Service. 
 I. jf midar Ramasamy, on duty at No. 3. There seems to be no reason wh}' this Officer should not be dis- 
 
 Ue outergate jcameinto the I-crt. m\sseA the Service. 
 
 nassThird, No. [.outside the Tort. No. 242. Upon the information and evidence given to the Commission, 
 
 42. Jcmidah Junguiniub. this Prisoner should be dismissed the Service.
 
 145 
 
 Against these Officers there is no charge but that of temporary absence, tUssTliird.Xo. 2. officers off duty 
 which seoms natural in the state of fear and alarm that followed the arrival of "^''- Subi.lar Um:>u\ Klimi. 
 the Cavalry. Their immediate return is as much in favour of their iiuioeeHce, 239! J.t^itu-VaXuah.'"**'''''^"' 
 as their departure may i)e considered proof of their guilt, I do not think these 34i. JLiniduh Ran sing. 
 Officers, alter all that has passed, and the degree of suspicion that must attach to their con- 
 duct, should remain in the Senice ; but, if their guilt is not clearly established, it may be 
 matter of doubt if after so long a period of service they should be consigned to beg"-arv. It 
 is submitted whether to each of thein a small pension should not be graiuecL 
 
 The susj)icion against these Officers arises in the circumstance of their haviiiT been on ^^1; Subidar 
 guard upon a former day, wlien the Mutiny was to have taken place. This suspicion is, I 24o!^cmi!iar 
 think very much done away by the fact that when the Mutiny did take place, these OfHceis kulUam Sing. 
 did not join in it, which they would have done iiad they been real Conspirators. I do not see 
 cause why any distinction should be made between these OtHcers and tliose mentioned in the 
 preceding paragraph. 
 
 Having disposed of the Native Officers, " the punishment of the Native Troops who were 
 " on the main guard of Vellore on the night of that event," comes next to be considered. 
 This proposition was originally made by me ; and if further punishment were necessary, the 
 distinction would be calculated to increase the effect of the example on the minds of the 
 Troops, by siievving that not only the Mutineers themselves, but that those whose immeiliaie 
 duty it was to preserve order, were equally deserving of punishment. If, however, it should 
 be thought necessary to act upon this principle of selection, the execution is attended with an 
 embarrassment which I did not foresee. By an examination of the depositions, it will be seen 
 that the greater part of the prisoners came in as they state upon Coiele, by beat of Tom Tom. 
 The Governor in Council may recollect that the Commander m Chief, upon his arrival at Vel- 
 lore, invited by public Proclamation the Sepoys to return. It is true that the Proclamation 
 stated the innocent only, but, as was natural, the Sepoys gave to it the interpretation which 
 such acts of Authority always bear. It was considered by them to be an amnesty, and upon 
 that confidence it seems that they came in. In a Court of Law, and in strict justice, the 
 Proclamation must be construed by its literal meaning, but in Equity, some allowance slioukl 
 be made for the acceptance of it by ignorant men, who, being absent, only received tiie pub- 
 lication at second hand, perhaps in tiie first instance imperfectly translated ; and given out in 
 a moment of general confusion, particular phrases and expressions cannot be nicely weighed ; 
 and I therefore think this Coxcle, taken, as it was done, in the ordinary acceptation of such 
 measures, and as those who issued it ought to have known it would have been taken, should 
 exempt those, who in consequence surrendered themselves, from punishment. This will be 
 found to be the condition of the greater part of those composing the Main Guard. I am the 
 less solicitous on this point, from being of opinion that from the long continuance of submis- 
 sion and tranquillity, as well as from the apparent restoration of confidence between the Eu- 
 ropean Officers and the Native Troops, no additional examples of severity, beyond those that 
 justice indispensably requires, need be inflicted. 
 
 Liberal as I think the character of the Government for the observance of *FirsTckss°"No"i'°* 
 
 faith requires that the construction should be, still the benefit should not be ^3 piu'udcr. 
 
 granted to individuals guilty of acts of particular atrocity. Crimes against No. 2. 4,5. Plunder. 
 
 the State the Government may forgive, but crimes against society, con- 'io3."iio.*Pi'under.' 
 
 demned by every law human and divine, never should pass unpunished. In Vellore Commission, 
 
 this class 1 place Murderers and Plunderers. ,„ ,., J;'''^'., 9f ';/"• '• 
 
 The numbers mentioned in the margin are cases of Plunder. The stolen -g^ gg^ g^^ j05_ lie. ^ ' 
 
 property was immediately taken from them, and they have since experienced No^2. 
 
 a long and distressing confinement. Their crime has, I thinl;, been already "«o7f siB^'a™'*'^ P'"'"''^''- 
 sufficiently punished"; and their confinement should cease with the release of ' xuicd'tiass, No. 1. 
 
 the other Prisoners. i«8' ^''■" -'"' ^la, stti. Piuuder. 
 
 V
 
 146 
 
 There are several cases of Murder stated in the margin. These Prisoners 
 Madras Commission, should be transferred to the Civil Power for the purpose of taking their Trials 
 
 Second Class, No. 1. before the Court of Circuit. 
 
 119. Murder. All the rest of the Prisoners sbould, in my opinion, be liberated. Their 
 
 Vellore Commission, liberation should be gradual. An account should be taken of the Villages in 
 
 First Class, No. 1. vvhich they intend to reside, and information transmitted to the Magistrates in 
 
 .38, 33, 106, 116. Murder. ^j^^ several Districts, in order that the attention of the Police may be drawn 
 
 15^%'-- M d *° '^^"'- ^'^'^ precaution is required, not by any danger of engaging in State 
 
 ' ; ' "'', " intrigues, but lest, deprived of the means of subsistence, they may commit 
 
 ThiH Class, No. 1. depredations upon the Country. It will be necessary that a small sum should 
 
 be "riven to each person to defray the expences of his journey. 
 
 (Signed) W. BENTINCK. 
 
 Fort St. George, Sept. 10th, 1S07. 
 
 The great delay that has taken place in bringing this subject to a close, has been caused 
 by the difficulty of obtaining accurate translations of the very numerous Depositions. 
 
 MR. PETRIE'S MINUTE. 
 
 THE communications with the Right Honourable the Governor General, 
 when his Lordship was at this Presidency, on the most expedient measure to be pursued for 
 disposing of the remaining Prisoners of the Mutineers at Vellore, are in the recollection of 
 Mr. Oakes, who was present at those discussions ; and as the recommendation of our late Right 
 Honourable President is in conformity to the principles we then agreed to proceed upon, I re- 
 commend to Council that the proposition of Lord William Bentinck be immediately carried 
 into effect. His Lordship's Paper of Explanation, and the Documents referred to, are now 
 sent in circulation. I have perused them with attention, and although I think stronger shades 
 of guilt attaches to some of them than is admitted in the Report, 1 am nevertheless of opinion, 
 that, under all circumstances, the measures recommended by the late President should be 
 adopted. 
 
 (Signed) W. PETRIE. 
 
 Madras, September 2\, 1807. 
 
 EXTRACT OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S MINUTE. 
 
 THE Proceedings of the Commission appointed by the Government of Fort 
 St. George, to investigate the origin of the late Insurrection at Vellore, a Copy of which was 
 received on the 1 1th instant, and has now been perused by the Members of the Board, afford 
 additional materials for forming a conclusive judgment regarding the causes of that unhappy 
 disoi;der. These proceedings also elucidate the hitherto obscure, but most important ques- 
 tion, of the degree in which the Family of Tippoo Sultaun was concerned, in producing the 
 Insurrection, or aiding its progress. 
 
 My opinion regarding the origin of the late calamity, formed upon the documents then 
 in our possession, was submitted to the Board in a Minute under date the 1 1th ultimo, and the 
 Board unanimously concurred in that opinion. The justice of it has either been left unim- 
 peached, or has been positively corroborated by every successive dispatch in any manner 
 connected with the subject ; and the proceedings of the Commission instituted at Vellore 
 have conveyed to my mind a conviction of the justice of that original opinion, which can alone 
 be shalen by the evidence of new facts.
 
 147 
 
 As the testimony of every witness who has aflbrtled any information upon the subject, 
 either bof re the Military Court of Iiirjuir}- or the ('jmniissioii jit Vellore, concurs in ascrib- 
 ing the discontent among tiie Sopoys originally to tiic Rcgulaiion regnrJing thfir Dreas and 
 Appearance, and in attributing to tlie Servants or Dejjeudants of tlie Palace merely the en- 
 couragement of that discontent, subsequently lo its manifestation, it appears unnecessary to 
 advert severally to the testimonies upon that point. I deom it proper, however, to state to 
 the Board some remarks coimected witli the subject, which have been suggested to mj- mind 
 by a perusal of the Proceedings of the Counnission. 
 
 It appears to mj^judgment, that the discontent among the Sepoys was produced, not 
 merely and exclusively by the General Orders regarding the Turband, but by the promulga- 
 tion of Regulations respecting the Dress and Appearance of the Sepoys, tendmg to approxi- 
 mate that branch of the Military System to the precision of European Corps, and to produce 
 a considerable degree of similitude between the Dress and Ap])earance of tiie Native and Eu- 
 ropean Troops. It appears from parts of the evidence that the Stocks and Waistcoats, a.s 
 well as the Turband, were a source of apprehension to the Sepoys. The change of the Tur- 
 band, combined with the other innovations in their Dress, constituted, in my judgment, an 
 adequate cause for the disorders which ensued. It does not however appear, that any dis- 
 content was manifested before the introduction of the new Turband. But the appreliension 
 excited by the Turband might naturally be expected to receive considerable corroboration irom 
 the corresponding, though anterior, innovation in the Dress of the Sepoys. 
 
 The precise time at which the Attendants of the Palace first began to foment the discon- 
 tents of the Sepoys cannot be positively ascertained ; but Jeniidar Shaik Cossim (the most 
 credible perhaps of all the evidences) states in the course of his confession, that no attempt ot 
 that nature was made by the people of the Palace until the arrival of the new Turband ; at 
 which time the Sepoys first shewed symptoms of discontent ; and this declaration is corrobo- 
 rated by several other witnesses. One witness however (Shaik Ahmed, a Sepoy of the 1st 
 Battalion 1st Regiment) assigns a date to the discontents, and the instigations of the people 
 of the Palace, anterior to the arrival of the Turband at Vellore, when those discontents were 
 first manifested. He deposed before the Military Court of Inquiry, that, " From the period 
 " of the adoption of the Stocks and white undress Jackets, which was long before the 1st 
 " Battalion of the 22d Regiment marched from Vellore to Madras, which was on the 22d 
 " January, the Attendants, and numerous Moor People iidiabitants of the Pettah, and in the 
 " interest of the Princes, began to poison the minds of the Troops, by observing that sucli 
 " Dress was very bad and improper, and if they wore the Turbands none of their own Cast 
 *' would ever give them water; nor, if they died, would any one bury them. If they should 
 " wish to intermarry-, none would give their daughters to tliem, and they would even not be 
 " allowed to sit down or mix with their own Cast." 
 
 This evidence is not distinct ; for, although it would seem from Shaik Ahmed's declara- 
 tion, that these instigations commenced before the actual arrival of the Turband at Vellore 
 (which, as far as can be collected from the documents before Government, did not happen 
 until the month of April or May), yet the terms in which he describes those instigations to 
 have been employed make particular mention of the Turband. It is true, however, that in- 
 formation regarding the Turband may have reached Vellore at the jjcriod of time specified by 
 the Witness, since the measure of improving the Turband was first adopted in the month of 
 November 1 805 (as appears by a casual passage in one of the disjiatches from Fort St. George). 
 The whole body of the evidence, with the exception of that above cjuoted, is uniform m dating 
 the instigations of the people of the Palace and the Pettah, subsequently to the appearance of 
 discontent among the Sepoys on account of the Turband. 
 
 I am disposed to believe indeed, on grounds which I shall state in a. subsequent poi't ot 
 this Minute, that tlie project of Mutiny was conceived by the Native Officers and Sepoys an- 
 tecedently to any attempts on the part of the People of the Pettah or the Palace to mtlame 
 their discontents ; and the most that can be conceded under the evidence before us is, that 
 the discontents of the Troops and the instigations of the Palace and the Pettah went hand in 
 hand.
 
 148 
 
 In order to prove that the Regulations regarding Dress were not the cause of the discon- 
 tent among the Sepoj-s, one or other ot" the following facts must be established : either that 
 the discontent existed before the promulgation of those Regulations, or that the discontent of 
 the Sepoys was only ostensibly on account of the Regulations, and that they were actuated 
 by motives corresponding with those which are ascribed to the Princes, or (as it has been 
 termed) the Mussulman interest. I have not hitherto been able to discover the slightest 
 ground of belief that either of those facts existed. I have not observed that either of them 
 have been even asserted. 
 
 Let it even be admitted that the Regulations regarding Dress (in which I mean to include 
 particularly the change of Turband) would not have produced discontent, if a malicious con- 
 struction of those Regulations had not been industriously propagated (a conclusion of which 
 however there is every reason to doubt) ; still it is manifest that those Regulations were the 
 immediate efficient cause of all that has happened. 
 
 That the Family of Tippoo Sultaun, that innumerable persons of inferior rank dispersed 
 throughout India, would take advantage of any state of circumstances which might attbrd an 
 opportunity to promote the subversion of the British and the restoration of the Mussulman 
 power, cannot be doubted. Admitting, for the sake of argument, that the Family of Tippoo, 
 with the opportunities they had of intriguing at a distance, may have conceived the project 
 of emancipating and restoring themselves to power, and may have addressed themselves clan- 
 destinely to those individuals, and that description of persons who naturally desire the sub- 
 version of the British empire ; still no other semblance of the efl'ect of such supposed intrigues 
 appeared than the discontent among the Sepoys on account of the change in their Dress. 
 The prescribed change in their Dress therefore, even under the admission above described, 
 furnished the efficient instrument of mischief, and the sole means of carrying the assumed 
 views of the Family into effect, and must consequently be considered the direct cause of the 
 Insurrection at Vellore. 
 
 But the suspicion of what I have admitted for the sake of argument rests exclusively on 
 the mere assertion of the person described as a Subidar of distinguished character and services 
 in the Native Cavalry, in his conversation with Major Munro, " that a number of persons 
 *' formerly in the Sultaun's service, or their Relations, were now strving in our Native Regi- 
 " ments, and were most active instruments of spreading disaffection" — " and that the Agents 
 " or the Friends of the Family were employed all over the Country ; that their mtngues ex- 
 " tended to every place, and were carried on with activity above the Ghauts." I do not 
 mean to intimate any doubt of the fidelity and attachment of this Subidar, but it may justly 
 be supposed that this was merely conjecture on his part. Can it be imagined that the Subidar 
 obtained his information only between the date of the Mutiny and that of his communication 
 (which must have been on or before the 3 1st July) ? If he did, his information must ob- 
 viously be considered to stand upon very doubtful grounds. The term of 20 days would not 
 admit ot his acquiring information relative to a Conspiracy so widely extended, e.xcepting only 
 through the information of others within the sphere of his personal communication ; ni which 
 case the truth of his relation must depend, not upon his own credit, but upon the credit of 
 his informants. If, antecedently to the Mutiny, the Subidar had obtained a knowledge of 
 the existence of those intrigues, having neglected to communicate it, his fidelity and attach- 
 ment may reasonai)ly be doubted. It seems however more reasonable to conclude that he had 
 stated coiijecturally the causes of the Mutiny, and declared wiiat he considered to be the pro- 
 bable cause, in terms which unintentionally indicated a positive knowledge of it. 
 
 His information is unsupported by any collateral evidence or positive fact, which has 
 come within the knowledge of Government ; whereas the cause to which I have ascribed the 
 discontent ot the Sepoys is demonstrated, by every witness who has been examined upon that 
 point, and has been controverted by none. 
 
 The Subidar darkly hints at a general disaffection to the British Government throuo-hout 
 the Country. No traces of it, however, appear in the documents which have been transmit- 
 ted to us ; and it will be in the recollection of the Board, that in a late letter to the Govern^ 
 ment ot Fort St. George we had reason to state our opinion, founded on documents received
 
 149 
 
 from that Presidency in the months of January and February last, that the general attachment 
 of the Natives subject to the Presidency of Fort St. George had undergone a considerable 
 improvement. 
 
 Tiie dissatisfaction nliich has appeared among the Sepoys at Vellore, whetlier excited 
 by the instigation of others or not, is proved and admitted to have been solely on account of 
 the Regulations regarding their Dress. 
 
 We have tiie most positive inl'oimalion from the Resident at Hyderabad, that a dispositioa 
 to Mutiny, on account of the new Turband, prevailed to an alarming extent in the Subsiiliary 
 Force stationed at that Capital. It is true some grounds of suspicion exist, that the discon- 
 tent of tiie Sepoys of that Corps also was inflamed by secret machinations ; but that the change 
 of the Turband was the operating cause, and the sole instrument of those machinations, is 
 establisiied beyond the possibility of doubt ; and the iibrogation of the obnoxious Order imme- 
 diately caliued the impending tumult. That a notion extensively prevailed of a design on 
 the part of Government gradually to convert our Native Troops to Christianity, founded on 
 tiie Regulations regarding their Dress, is further confirmed by a late dispatch from the Resi- 
 dent at Nagpore, who was interrogated by tlie Minister of the Court of Nagpore upon that 
 point. 
 
 The Members of the Commission appointed by the Government of Fort St. George to 
 ascertain the causes of the Mutiny, have observed in their Report, that, " It is not easy to 
 " calculate upon the motives which may have actuated a large body of men composed of dif- 
 " ferent Casts, Religions, and Countries, and acting for a period of time sufficient to admit 
 " of new feelings and interests, calculated to divert the original impression to a different 
 *' object." 
 
 From this observation I infer it to be the opinion of the Commission, that the Regula- 
 tions regarding the Dress of the Sepoys was not an adequate cause of revolt and insurrection. 
 Tliis opinion I consider to be altogether erroneous : all who are conversant with tlie character 
 of the Natives of India well know, that a moi-e powerful motive to insurrection and revolt 
 cannot be conceived, than a measure on the part of Government tending, however remotely, 
 to excite in the minds of its Native Subjects an apprehension of a design to invade the free- 
 dom of their Religious Opinions, Ceremonies, and Prejudices; still more so if they are led 
 to suppose that such a measure is a prelude to the introduction of our own Religion among 
 them. The force of that principle of action must be estimated, not by our conceptions, nor 
 by our intentions, nor yet by the inolTensive nature of the innovations, tried by the test of 
 the IMahommedan or Hindoo Code, but by the jealous prejudices and ignorant fears of the, 
 Natives themselves. Such an apprehension once disseminated constitutes an adequate mo- 
 tive to any degree of mischief that the imagination can conceive : it equally affects all Casts 
 and all Religions existing among our Native Subjects. 
 
 To account for a declared object of the Insurrection at Vellore, that of restoring the Go- 
 vernment of the Family of Tippoo, it is not necessary to suppose that it was originally planned 
 by the Members or Partizans of that Family. Admitting (as is deducible from many of the 
 depositions, and especially from the confession of Shaik Cossim), that the Native Officers 
 and Sepoys, irritated or alarmed by the change of Dress, had determined to revolt, they 
 naturally required a rallying point. The most obvious and proximate instrument of success 
 was the restoration of the Government of Tippoo Sultaun's Family. The views therefore of 
 the Insurgents, and of the ambitious among Tippoo's Sons, or tlie turbulent Partizans of the 
 Famdy, entirely coincided ; and, without ascribing the nuitinous disposition of the Sepoys 
 to any other cause than the Regulations regarding Dress, it is at least as probable that the 
 project of declaring the Government of Moiz-oodeem originated with ilie Insurgents, as that 
 the Prince or liis Adherents projected the accompli.shment of that ambitious project, by ex- 
 citing the Sepoys to revolt. 
 
 I am aware, that in defence of the proposition that the Mutiny at Vellore is ascribable to 
 a cause distinct irom the Discontent on account of the Regulations regarding the Dress of the 
 Sepoys, it may be urged that some of the Native Officers concerned in the Mutiny were sen- 
 sible of the absurdity of the prevalent report respecting the design of Government to effect
 
 150 
 
 their conversion to Christianity; and of the defect of any real grounds of complaint against 
 the Turband, as affecting the Rehgious Tenets of the Natives. That the Native Oflicers in 
 general were free from the prejudice against the Turband entertained by the Sepoys appears 
 by no means substantiated by any part of the evidence before us ; of the contrary indeed 
 there is strong testimony in the confession of Shaik Cossim, and in the deposition of other 
 witnesses. The supposition, however, is in some degree supported by the decl. nation whicli 
 some of them are stated to have made when interrogated upon the subject, that there was no 
 objection to the Turband. But, admitting this supposition to any extent to which its admis- 
 sion can be reasonably required, the real discontent of the Sepoys on account of the Turband 
 still remains uncontroverted, and the effect of the Turband in producing discontent and alarm 
 is unquestionably established by the Reports upon that subject from the President at Hydera- 
 bad. It seems impossible to ascribe to the inventive industry of a few Native Officers the 
 impression of disgust and alarm at the Turband entertained by the Sepoys, not only at Vei- 
 lore, but throughout the Subsidiary Force of Hj'derabad ; nor will the cause of their discon- 
 tent be changed even if it could be established that the notion regarding the Turband, and 
 the supposed views of Government, was instilled into the minds of the Sepoys with a view to 
 excite them to Mutiny. As I have already observed, to prove that the Regulations regarding 
 Dress were not the cause of the disposition among the Sepoys to Mutiny, it is necessary to 
 demonstrate that they were influenced by other motives ; the contrary of which is manifest 
 from every testimony relating to that question. 
 
 It may also be urged in defence of the proposition above stated, that an opportunity was 
 afforded by Colonel forbes, after he had received information of the intended Mutiny on the 
 17th June, to the Sepoys, to make known their grievances, and to obtain redress ; Colonel 
 Forbes having on tlie following morning conversed with Shaik Alii, the Native Adjutant, ap- 
 prizing him of the information he had received, and observing to him that if there was really 
 any dissatisfaction on account of the Turband, it was only necessary for the Sepoys to state it 
 regularly, and the matter would be redressed. But the Native Adjutant assured him there 
 was not the slightest ground for believing the information which the Colonel had received re- 
 lative to the projected Mutiny, and that the Battalion (meaning the 1st Battalion 1st Regi- 
 ment) were all perfectly satisfied with the Turband, and vying who should first get it ready 
 to wear. It may be maintained therefore upon this ground, that if any discontent really 
 existed among the Sepoys on account of the Turband, they would have taken advantage of 
 this opportunity to obtain the prohibition of it, rather than adopt the desperate cause of Mu- 
 tmying. 
 
 This point must be considered under two suppositions : First, that the Native Adjutant 
 was ignorant of the projected Mutiny ; and secondly, that he was a party concerned. Tliat 
 he was not a party concerned, may perhaps be inferred from what Mustapha Beg, Colonel 
 Forbes's informant, staled, viz. that the Mutineers intended to destroy the Native Adjutant 
 also, whom they branded with the name of Haups. But the Native Adjutant professed his 
 ignorance of the intended Mutiny, and asserted that the Sepoys made no objection to the 
 Turband. If so, the Native Adjutant had no occasion to communicate, and it must be sup- 
 posed did not communicate, to the Sepoys this offer of redress. But the Native Adjutant's 
 assertion that no discontent existed, cannot be considered to counterbalance the uniform evi- 
 dence to the contrary. 
 
 It the Native Adjutant was a party concerned, it certainly may be alleged with some 
 foundation that some other motive actuated him and the leaders of Mutiny than merely a 
 grievance on account of the Turband, which Colonel Forbes apprized him would be redressed 
 on a proper represenUtion. In that case, however, it is not probable that the Native Adju- 
 tant would conununicate this oBer of redress to the Sepoys ; there is therefore no ground of 
 belief that the Sepoys were encouraged to expect redress by a proper representation. 
 
 The hope of obtaining it by representation must indeed have been completely repressed 
 by the example of the 2nd Battalion 4th Regiment, upon whom the Turband had been forced, 
 against their avowed disgust, by Military severity. It is possible, that even supposing the Na- 
 tive Adjutant to have been concerned, he may have entertained the same sentiment with regard
 
 151 
 
 to the little probability of obtaining redress. But the operating cause of Mutiny among the 
 body of the Sepoys, demonstrated as it has been by every part of the evidence, still remains 
 the same, whetlier the Native Officers were or were not influenced by it. 
 
 That they, however, were also influenced by it, is supported by many parts of the evi- 
 dence ; and it is remarkable that Mustapha Beg, in communicating to Colonel Forbes the 
 secret conversation which he had overheard between Havildar Dowd Haun and another man, 
 stated his having collected from their conversation, *' that they were discoursing about a new 
 " fashion of Turband, which was about that time proposed to be introdu<i;d into the Army, 
 " which they called a Topee, or Hat," Wherever any testimony is affordcJ of the Secret 
 Consultations where the Native Officers presided, the Turband is invariably mentioned as the 
 subject of their discourse, and the motive to Insurrection ; and it is unnecessary to adduce the 
 numerous proofs which exist of this fact. 
 
 (Signed) 
 Fort William, G. H. BARLOW. 
 
 September i^th, 1806. 
 
 ^B-<«<'«4«-^^^4S>- 
 
 JOHN NICHOLS and SON, Printers, 
 Red Lion Passage, Fleet Street, London.
 
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