UC-NRLF 
 
 B 3 IIM flc^5 
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT 
 OF NAVIES 
 
 CAPTAIN S. EARDLEY WILMOT, RN. 
 
^ 
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 i 
 
The Development of Navies 
 
go 
 
 0.2 
 
 
 
THE DEVELOPiMENT 
 OF NAVIES 
 
 DURING rHE last: HALF-CENrURT 
 
 BY 
 
 CAPTAIN S. EARDLEY-WILMOT, R.N, 
 
 ]Vit/L jnmiy Illustyatioiis 
 
 LONDON 
 
 SEELEY AND CO., LIMIT!,!) 
 
 ESSEX STRKKT, STRAND 
 
 1S92. 
 
GIFT 
 
EZ7 
 
 TO 
 
 HER MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY 
 
 QUEEN VICTORIA 
 
 IN WHOSE REIGN 
 
 THE CHANGES HEREIN DESCRIBED 
 
 HAVE TAKEN PLACE 
 
 THIS BOOK 
 
 IS, BY PERMISSION, 
 
 DEDICATED 
 
 207 
 
PREFACE 
 
 It has been said that nations, Hke incHvicluals, have 
 their times for self-examination, when they pause, 
 survey their positions, glance back upon the past, 
 study the lessons of experience, and gird them- 
 selves up for the future. 
 
 The present year, memorable for the opening 
 of an Exhibition devoted to a display of objects 
 connected with the Naval Service, and signalised 
 by the launch of t\v(j noble warships b\- Her 
 Majesty on the same da}', seems a fitting period 
 when we may review the changes which halt 
 a century has produced in the llecHs ot the 
 world, and strive to draw some lesson for future 
 guidance. 
 
 In tracing the development of modern ships 
 
viil Preface. 
 
 of war, and their equipment, it was natural to 
 me to describe mainly what has been done in 
 this country ; but the progress abroad is also 
 dealt with, as showing the great advance made 
 by other nations. The principal operations in 
 which squadrons and single ships have engaged 
 during this period are briefly described, to de- 
 monstrate certain phases of naval warfare con- 
 nected with modern armaments. 
 
 It was difficult to compress such a vast 
 subject into a single volume of moderate dimen- 
 sions, and I am conscious of many defects in 
 the accomplishment of the task, for which in- 
 dulgence is pleaded. No effort has been made 
 to give minute technical details, but rather to 
 place before the reader a general review of the 
 whole subject. 
 
 I have received cordial assistance from many 
 quarters. For the chapter on steam propulsion I 
 am indebted to Mr R. C. Oldknow, late Fleet 
 Engineer, Royal Navy, whose ability to deal with 
 the subject will be fully recognised. In this 
 
Preface. ix 
 
 portion Messrs Maiidslay, Sons & Field afforded 
 valuable information, with drawings of past and 
 present marine engines. 
 
 To Lord Brassey my thanks are due for 
 permitting me to reproduce some of the illustra- 
 tions in Volume I. of his British Navy. Sir 
 William Armstrong, Mitchell & Co. placed at 
 my disposal several interesting pictures connected 
 with the vessels and armament constructed at 
 Elswick. 
 
 I desire also to thank the Proprietors of the 
 Engineer for allowing me to utilise matter which 
 has appeared in the pages of that journal. 
 
 Messrs Thornycroft, Yarrow, J. & G. Tliom- 
 son, and Mr Mackrow of the Thames Iron Works 
 and Shipbuilding Company, have most liberally 
 aided my efforts. 
 
 Many of the illustrations are from photographs 
 taken by Mr West of Southsea, whose skill in 
 marine photography is well known. 
 
 In dealing with th(t navy prior to the general 
 adoption of steam pr()[nilsion, I have received 
 
X Preface. 
 
 valuable assistance from distinguished officers 
 who were serving at that period, and to whom 
 my best thanks are now tendered. 
 
 S. EARDLEY-WILMOT. 
 
 2 J Cranley Gardens, S.W. 
 October 1891. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE NAVY IN 1840 
 
 Reduction in Naval Estimates after 18^2 — Change in Construction of Ships by Sir W. 
 Symonds — The 'Vernon,' 'Pique,' and 'Vanguard' — Ordnance afloat at that 
 Period — Defective System of manning Ships — Steamers then in the Navy— Bom- 
 bardment of Acre — Advantages of Numerous Guns and Rapidity of Fire 
 attacking Fortifications, ........ i 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 CREATION OF A STEAM FLEET 
 
 Changes in Ship Construction after 1840 — Reluctance to recognise Advantages of Screw 
 Propulsion — Gradual Conversion of Sailing Fleet to Steam — Armament practically 
 remains unaltered — The Crimean War — Operations in Black Sea and Baltic- --Xssist- 
 ance rendered by the Navy — Expedition to Sea of Azof, . .23 
 
 C H A P 7' E R III 
 
 B.ROADSIDE IRONCLADS 
 
 Prejudice against Iron in Shipbuilding— First Ironclads built in France and England — 
 Increase in si.-:e of Ships— .-Vdvance in Ordnance— Commencement of Struggle 
 between Guns and Armour— Action betwreii ' AlaKima' .tihI ' Kearsage,' >-howing 
 advantages of .\rmour, ........ 4.5 
 
 xi 
 
xii Contents. 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 EARLY TURRET SHIPS 
 
 Introduction of the ' Monitor '—Claims of Ericsson and Captain Cowper Coles—' Merri- 
 mac' and 'Monitor' in America— ' Royal Sovereign' converted in England — 
 Further development of the Turret System — ' Devastation ' to ' Inflexible,' . 71 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 BARBETTE SYSTEM COMBINED WITH BROADSIDE 
 
 Battle of Lissa — Lessons to be derived from this Action — Introduction of the Barbette 
 System of Mounting Guns — First applied in the ' Temeraire ' — The ' Admiral ' 
 Class — Increase in dimensions of Battle Ships to 14,000 tons — New Vessels, ' Royal 
 Sovereign,' 'Empress of India,' ' Ramillies,' 'Repulse,' 'Resolution,' and 'Royal 
 Oak' — Disadvantages of Monster Ships, . . . . .93 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 COAST DEFENCE THE RAM 
 
 Coast Defence Vessels— Such Constructions of Modern Growth— Erroneous Ideas of 
 Defence — The ' Glatton ' and other Coast Service Vessels — Russian Circular 
 Ironclads — Development of the Ram as a Weapon — The ' Rupert ' and ' Poly- 
 phemus ' — Disadvantages of a Vessel for ramming only — Examples of difficulty in 
 ramming, . . . . .115 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 ARMOUR— LATER TURRET SHIPS 
 
 Early Iron Plates — Increased Thickness— Competition of Guns and Armour — Steel and 
 Compound Plates supersede Iron — Deck and Coal Protection — Progress of Turret 
 Ships 'Nile,' 'Trafalgar' and 'Hood,' 'Victoria' and 'Sanspareil' — Second- 
 Class Battle Ships — Early Types — Latest Development — 'Centurion' and 
 ' Barfleur,' . . . . . . . . 136 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 CRUISERS 
 
 Frigates in Old Time — Speed an Essential — Early Steam Cruisers — ' Inconstant ' and 
 others — Action between ' Shah' and ' Huascar' — Armoured Cruisers — ' Imperieuse' 
 
and ' Warspite' — Development of Internally Protected Vessels — ' Blake' and 
 ' Blenheim'— 'Royal Arthur' Class— Smaller Types— Scouting Duties— Necessity 
 for High Speed, ......... 148 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 ORDNANCE 
 
 Old Smooth Bore Guns and their Manipulation — Mr Lancaster's System — Introduction 
 of Rifled Guns — Early Inventors — Breech-Loaders introduced and discarded — 
 Woolwich Muzzle-Loaders — Growth of Ordnance to 80-ton Guns — Breech-Loaders 
 again introduced — Increase of Length and Power — Advance to iio-ton Guns — 
 Ammunition — Quick-Firing Guns, ..... . 166 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 '1' O R P E D O W A R F A R E 
 
 Early Application of the Torpedo in America — The Fish Torpedo — Development by Mr 
 Whitehead — Introduction of Torpedo Boats, and their Progress — Submarine Boats 
 — Protection against Torpedoes — Nets — Electric Search Lights — Torpedo Boat 
 Destroyers — Sinking of ' Blanco Encalada,' . . . . .193 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 STEAM PROPULSION 
 
 Steam Navy in 1840 — Machinery at that Date — Paddle-Wheel Frigates and Sloops — 
 Horse Power, Nominal and Indicated — Voyage of 'Inflexible' — 'Banshee' — 
 Introduction of the Screw Propeller — ' Fairy' — ' Duke of Wellington' — ' Victoria ' 
 — Substitution of Iron for Wood — 'Warrior' and 'Black Prince' — 'Octavia,' 
 'Arethusa,' and 'Constance' — Progress made up to 1865— Compound Engines — 
 'Pallas'— Increase of Boiler Pressure— Twin Screws—' Inconstant '—Loss of the 
 'Captain' — 'Iris' and 'Mercury' — Steel Protective Deck.s — 'Polyphemus' — 
 Forced Draught — 'Lightning' — Yarrow's Boats — 'Rattlesnake' — Triple Expan- 
 sion — 'Barham' and 'Bellona' — Decrease in Weight of Machinery — Difl'erence 
 between Men-of-War and Merchant Ships — 'Blake' and 'Blenheim' — Large 
 Number of Auxiliary Engines — Supply of Fresh Water — Evaporators — The 
 'Varj'an' — (irowth of Steam in the Navy — Personnel — Probable Approach of 
 Finality in Marine Engineering, . . . . .211 
 
xiv Contents. 
 
 CHA PTER XII 
 
 FOREIGN NAVIES — EUROPE 
 
 Condition of French Navy in 1840 — Progress after Franco-German War — Broadside and 
 Barbette Construction — Cruisers — Tlie Russian Fleet — Influence of the ' Monitor' 
 — New Departure — Black Sea and Baltic Squadrons — Belted Cruisers— Italy — 
 Creation of a New Fleet after 1870 — Monster Ironclads — Cruisers — Germany — 
 Late development of Navy — New Battle Ships and Cruisers — Austria, Spain, 
 Greece, and Turkey, ........ 248 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 FOREIGN NAVIES — UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 Condition of United States Navy before and after Civil War— Apathy in Naval Matters 
 — Change of Feeling in 1880 — New Cruisers constructed — Battle Ships decided on 
 and commenced — Special Fast Cruiser — Torpedoes — The Howell Torpedo — 
 Dynamite Gun — Development of Navies of South American States — Chili — 
 Capture of 'Huascar' by ' Blanco Encalada' and ' Almirante Cochrane ' — Peru— 
 The Argentine Republic — Brazil, ...... 270 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 THE BALTIC FLEET, 1854, 
 MODEL OF THE 'VANGUARD,' 
 MODELS OF THE ' VERNON ' AND ' ST JEAN 
 'LA GLOIRE,' .... 
 
 THE 'warrior's' ARMOUR, . 
 IIIE ' WARRIOR,' .... 
 THE 'AGINCOURT,' 
 ARMOUR OF THE ' RELLEROPHON ' AND 'H 
 THE BATTERIES OF THE 'ALEXANDRA,' 
 CAPTAIN COWPER COLES' GUN RAFT AND C 
 ERICSSON'S TURRET, 
 THE ' ROYAL SOVEREIGN,' 
 THE 'DEVASTATION,' . 
 THE ' INFLEXIBLE,' 
 TURRET OF THE 'INFLEXIBLE,' . 
 THE 'TEMERAIRE,' 
 MODEL OF THE ' RA.MILLIES,' 
 THE 'GLATTON,' .... 
 THE DECK OF THE ' NOVCIOROD," 
 THE 'CONQUEROR,' 
 
 THE 'victoria' firinc;, 
 
 THE 'VOLAGE' under SAIL, 
 
 THE ' I M PER I FUSE,' 
 
 THE 'ALACKirv' DESPAICH VESSEL, 
 
 NAVAL f;UNNERV IN 184O. . 
 
 .\v 
 
 D ACRE, . 
 
 UPOLA SHIP 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Froiifispiece 
 6 
 24 
 49 
 51 
 53 
 57 
 62 
 
 65 
 11 
 77 
 79 
 82 
 
 85 
 86 
 104 
 no 
 121 
 125 
 130 
 144 
 
 150 
 
 155 
 162 
 167 
 
XYl 
 
 List of Ilkistrations. 
 
 67-TON GUNS, MOUNTED EN BARBETTE, 
 
 THE 'RODNEY' STEAMING AND FIRING, 
 
 TURRET OF THE 'VICTORIA,' WITH IIO-TON GUNS, 
 
 6-IN. QUICK-FIRING GUN, 
 
 TORPEDO BOAT, BUILT FOR THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMEN 
 TORPEDO BOAT, 'ARIETE,' BUILT FOR THE SPANISH GOV 
 
 MENT, 
 
 SIDE-LEVER ENGINES, 
 
 ENGINES OF THE 'BLACK EA(;LK,' 
 
 ENGINES OF THE 'IRIS,' .... 
 
 ENGINES OF THE ' Bl.AKE,' .... 
 
 THE 'ADMIRAL DUPERRE,' .... 
 
 GUN WITH SHIELD ON THE ' REDOUTABLE," 
 
 THE 'ITALIA' AND ' LEPANTO,' . 
 
 THE ' PIEMONTE,' ITALIAN CRUISER, . 
 
 THE 'CHARLESTOWN,' UNITED STATES CRUISER, 
 
 THE ' INDIANA,' UNITED STATES COAST LINE BATTLE SH 
 
 H', 
 
 180 
 184 
 188 
 190 
 200 
 
 204 
 212 
 214 
 
 242 
 
 256 
 261 
 264 
 
 275 
 
The Development of Navies 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE NAVY IN 1840 
 
 Jveduction in Naval Estimates after 1832 — Change in Construction of 
 Ships by Sir W. Symonds — The 'Vernon,' 'Pique,' and 'Van- 
 guard ' — Ordnance afloat at that Period — Defective System of man- 
 ning Ships — Steamers then in the Navy — Bombardment of Acre 
 — Advantages of Numerous Guns and Rapidity of Fire in attacking 
 Fortifications. 
 
 After Trafalgar the British navy was at the zenith of 
 its fame, for we had estabhshed a complete supremacy 
 on the ocean, and swept from the sea all hostile fleets. 
 Every project of Napoleon for distant conquest had been 
 frustrated by our fleet, and in after years, at St Helena, he 
 frankly recognised the fact. ' You,' he said to O'Meara, 
 in one of those many interesting conversations recorded 
 by the latter, 'are superior in maritime force to all the 
 \\(M-l(l united, and while you confine )'()urself to that arm 
 you will al\va)'s be dreaded.' On anc^ther occasion he 
 remarked : ' Your soldiers arc brave, nobody can deny it ; 
 but it was bad policy to enc(niragc the militar\' mania 
 instead (;f sticking to yoiu' marine, which is the real 
 
 A 
 
2 Tilt Xai'x in 1840. 
 
 force of \-our country, and one which, while you preserve 
 it. will always render \ou powerful.' The Peninsular 
 War and th? bat<-Ir of :Wat:erloo, however, diverted the 
 mind of the country fioni the navy, and for many years 
 after tne conclusion of peace, in 1S15, we were content 
 to rest upon the glories we had achieved, exhausted by 
 that long continued struggle. Our maritime strength 
 CTaduallv declined, but it was not until the Reform Bill 
 of 1832 was passed that the navy suffered materially 
 from the desire for economy in State expenditure which 
 then prevailed. At that time the naval estimates for the 
 effective service were about ^^4,2 50,000. In 1834 this 
 was reduced to £"3,000,000, and in i S3 5-36 to ;£"2,750,ooo. 
 Our squadrons maintained abroad gradually dwindled 
 in numbers, and it seemed as if a perpetual peace was 
 expected. Not content, however, with reductions in the 
 number of ships employed, the complements of individual 
 vessels were reduced to what was termed a peace 
 establishment, and we even went so far as to send 
 vessels abroad without some of t±ieir guns. I believe it 
 is a fact that a line-of-battle ship about this time was 
 sent as flagship to a station without her lower deck 
 guns, in order to give more room for the admiral's staff. 
 During the first half of the century- few changes had 
 been made in naval architecture or armaments. Fleets 
 still consisted of sailing line-of-battle ships, frigates, and 
 smaller vessels. Officers were discussing the value of 
 square or round sterns, the latter introduced by Sir 
 Robert Seppings, then Surveyor of the Na\y. The 
 square stern was const.^uctively weak, and the guns it 
 
The Navy in 1840. 3 
 
 carried could not be directed on a certain bearing 
 termed the point of impunity. This had been observed 
 in previous actions, when ships lost their masts and were 
 not under command. The navy was reluctant to give 
 up the square stern, as it afforded more cabin accom- 
 modation. But, as one of the most experienced officers 
 of the day said : ' In peace time the circular stern will 
 not be popular, but in the event of a change to hostilities 
 its utility will find innumerable advocates.' 
 
 A considerable modification in the form of ships was, 
 however, made when Captain — afterwards Sir William — 
 Symonds was appointed Surveyor of the Navy in 1832. 
 Being a naval officer, there was considerable opposition 
 to this appointment, w^hich had hitherto been held by 
 a member of the School of Naval Architecture. This 
 school had been established in 1806 for the education of 
 a more skilful class of trained shipwrights. There had 
 been many complaints in the old wars that our ships 
 were inferior in design to the French. Charnock 
 observes that ' when the French captured an English 
 ship they either put her on a lower rating or threw 
 her aside. Their foundered or wTCcked ships were 
 invariabl}' British built. When we were in chase, the 
 French prizes of the scjuadron took the lead, and cver\' 
 officer desired to command them.' It was only the 
 splendid handling of any class by our officers which 
 overcame the defects of our designs. Moreox-er, captured 
 vessels became the models from which we built. luen 
 as late as 1850, out of 150 ships on the Navy List, 
 upwards of fifty were from foreign models. Nor were 
 
4 The Navy in 1840. 
 
 the Spanish types considered unworthy of this honour. 
 Many of them are said to have been the production of 
 an Irishman named Mullens, who went over to Spain 
 and offered his improved plans to that Government 
 after having failed with the English Admiralty. The 
 ' San Josef and ' San Nicolas/ taken by Nelson in Lord 
 St Vincent's action, were both handsome vessels. 
 
 The principle of Sir William Symonds was to give 
 greater beam at the water line and sharpness below. 
 The old school were in favour of less beam. The aver- 
 age length had hitherto been 1.6 to 3.9 times the 
 breadth. In Sir William Symonds's ships it ran from 
 3.1 to 3.3 times. He adopted the same principle for 
 great and small, so that one would fit inside another 
 like a series of trays. The ' Vernon ' was the first large 
 vessel built from his designs. She was a 50-gun frigate, 
 183 ft. long, with a beam of 53 ft. Hitherto Surveyors of 
 the Navy had been limited in the proportion of guns to 
 tonnage, but Captain Symonds refused to have his hands 
 tied in this respect, and no limitation was enforced on 
 him. He therefore built the ' Vernon ' of 2080 tons, 
 a considerable increase over the tonnage of existing 
 frigates. A great success was the result. The 'Vernon' 
 sailed remarkably well, and is still up Portsmouth 
 Harbour, having served for many years as the torpedo 
 school ship. 
 
 The ' Pique,' another frigate of his design, of thirty- 
 six guns, launched in 1834, was rendered famous in 
 1835, when, under the command of Captain the Hon. 
 H, Rous, she came across the Atlantic without a rudder. 
 
The N'ary in i <S4o. 5 
 
 She had previously grounded at the mouth of the St 
 Lawrence, and sustained severe damage, but was got off, 
 and her captain determined to proceed to England. 
 Three daj's after starting she lost her rudder. This 
 was a severe demand even upon the seamanship of those 
 days, but a jury rudder was rigged up by whi-ch the 
 ship was steered the rest of the way home. When 
 Captain Rous afterwards stood for Westminster he was 
 met at the hustings with the usual cry, ' Who are you ?' 
 He answered, * Captain Rous of the " Pique," who brought 
 her across the Atlantic without a rudder.' * Bravo 
 Rous !' shouted everyone, and 'Bravo Rous' became for 
 a time the common cry in London. 
 
 Owing to the economical principles then in vogue, it 
 was not until 1835 that the first line-of-battle ship on 
 the designs of Captain Symonds was launched. This 
 was the ' Vanguard,' of 2610 tons and eighty guns. Her 
 dimensions were, length 190 ft, and breadth 57 ft. She 
 was the broadest ship in the navy. Her principal 
 characteristics were speed and handiness under canvas, 
 with great space between decks. A great improvement 
 effected by Captain Symonds in 1836 was in reducing 
 the different lists of ships' stores, which had gradually 
 accumulated to the number of cight\'-sevcn, owing to 
 there being so many classes of vessels in the na\\'. It 
 is recorded that when Nelson was off Cadiz he had no 
 less than seven classes of 74-gun ships c.ich rccjuiring 
 different spars, so that if one had ])ecn disal)letl the 
 others could not have supplied her wants. 
 
 In 1839 the ' Queen,' a three-decker, and the largest 
 
6 The Navy in 1840. 
 
 ship built by Sir William Symonds — he was knighted in 
 1836 — was launched at Portsmouth. Her dimensions 
 were, size 3100 tons, length 204 ft., and beam 61 ft. 
 The armament consisted of a hundred 32-pounders and 
 ten 68-pounders. Her total cost was i^i 15,000. The 
 shape of the stern was elliptical, an improvement on 
 Seppings's round stern. The ' Queen ' was justly con- 
 sidered a remarkably fine vessel, and formed the model 
 on which many future designs were based. Up to 
 1830 the want of precision in our ideas as to the best 
 types of line-of-battle ships to adopt had been very 
 apparent. But after that date we discontinued building 
 small three-deckers, and converted some into two-decked 
 ships of eighty guns. In the same way small two-deckers 
 were cut down to 50-gun frigates. These were termed 
 Razees. A certain lot of vessels were known as Jackass 
 frisfates, because it was said thev could neither fight nor 
 run, while a batch of small two-deckers were called the 
 * forty thieves.' The general outcome of the old wars 
 had brought home to the minds of all who studied the 
 question that neither the very great nor the very small 
 in ship construction was desirable. Num.ber, not size, 
 was our great requirement, and moderate dimensions 
 had sufficed to maintain the sea against all comers. 
 The next great war will probably lead to the same 
 result in modern naval architecture. 
 
 Turning to the armaments of ships of war at that 
 period, we find little advance since the beginning of the 
 century. Cast-iron smooth bore ordnance was univers- 
 ally employed, with spherical projectiles. In 1838 the 
 
The Navy in 1840. 7 
 
 heaviest solid shotgun was a 32-pounder, 9 ft. 6 in. long, 
 and weighing 56 cwt. A 42-poundcr had been used 
 in tlic old wars, but was now discarded as having no 
 advantages over the lighter piece. But guns for throw- 
 ing hollow shot and shell had recently been designed, 
 though not at first regarded with great favour. The 
 principle on which guns were constructed in those days 
 was exceedingly simple. The rule of Mr Monk, who 
 then designed ordnance, was to have if cwt. of metal in 
 the gun to each pound in weight of shot. A great advance, 
 however, was made about 1840 by the introduction of a 
 gun weighing 95 cwt., which threw a solid shot of sixty- 
 eight pounds. It was at first intended as a pivot gun for 
 steamers, but afterwards was almost universally carried 
 by all ships, and remained for many years our heaviest 
 piece of ordnance afl^oat. Carronades, short guns of 
 large calibre, also formed part of a ship's armament. 
 They were formidable at close range, but no match for 
 long guns at any distance. Consequently only a certain 
 number of these guns were carried, because if the wind 
 failed at a critical moment, before close quarters could 
 be reached, an enemy with a single long gun might do 
 great damage, without her adversary having any power 
 of reply. Instances of this had occurred during the old 
 wars. Loading guns with double shot was still in force, 
 but owing to the inaccuracy of this mode of firing it was 
 only used at very close quarters. As rcgartls penetra- 
 tion of wooden sides, some curious results were obtained, 
 at Gavre in France, about the )'ear 1838. A 32-pouncler 
 with double shot was fired against timber, and it was 
 
8 The Navy in 1 840. 
 
 found that the shot nearest the charge penetrated 29 in., 
 while the one furthest from the charge penetrated 42 in. 
 There were three types of mortars then in the sea service, 
 the 13 in. of 100 cwt. and 81 cwt, and the 10 in. of 
 52 cwt. They had a range of about 4000 yards, with an 
 elevation of 45°, and their object was, in a bombardment, 
 to crush buildings and penetrate magazines. Their 
 transport by sea was not difficult or costly, and it was 
 considered that a fleet should be provided with vessels 
 for this service. The introduction of shells was slow. 
 The old prejudice in favour of solid shot was not easily 
 overcome. The latter were said to be more accurate, 
 and to have greater range and penetration than hollow 
 shell. Objections were also raised to putting too many 
 shell guns in ships, on account of the danger of acci- 
 dental explosions. 
 
 Another argument used against the introduction of 
 these projectiles was their cost. Sir Howard Douglas, 
 in his work on Naval Gunnery, says : * The expense of 
 shell equipment is enormous. The cost of every 8-inch 
 shell in box is lis. 6d. Each one fired costs 17s. 4|d.' 
 The 17s. 4fd. included the powder, the amount of which 
 was 10 lbs. What would Sir Howard have said if told 
 that fifty years later the cost of a single round from 
 guns mounted in battle ships would range from ^^150 to 
 i^20o? How insignificant seems the 68-pound shot, 
 propelled by 16 lbs. of powder, beside the i8oo-lb. 
 projectile of to-day. But as regards shell, it required 
 the incident of Sinope a few years later to demonstrate 
 the terrible effect of shell fire upon wooden ships, and 
 
llic N'avy in i 840. 9 
 
 the necessity of a change in naval architecture. In other 
 matters connected with ordnance we were also very 
 conservative. Our guns were still fired with flint locks, 
 which had replaced the priming horn and match in 1780. 
 The French had already adopted the percussion lock. 
 In a letter from Commander Milne — now Sir Alexander 
 Milne — to the Surveyor of the Navy, dated May 5th, 
 1839, when the former was in command of the 'Snake/ 
 at Bermuda, he says : ' The French Squadron have left 
 Vera Cruz. We were nearly three months lying together 
 at that place, and had an opportunity of seeing their 
 new improvements. The chief one was the invariable 
 use of detonating locks, acting on the principle of a 
 hammer falling down on the vent hole, in which a tube 
 is placed of the same material as ours, the top alone 
 being of detonating powder. They say they answer 
 most completely, and never miss fire.' We did not 
 introduce the hammer and percussion tube until 1842. 
 Our powder was enclosed in paper cartridges, but in a 
 few years flannel was substituted, and continued in use 
 until a comparatively recent period. 
 
 In gunnery training, however, our seamen had not 
 been neglected. The 'h^xccllent' had been established 
 at l^ortsmouth in 1830, by Lord Melville, for training 
 seamen in gunnery. This establishment was extended 
 by Sir James Graham in 1832, and placed under Caj^tain 
 Sir Thomas Hastings. TIhm'c it has remained until the 
 present time, turning out an admirable corps of naval 
 gunners, which may be trul}^ considered the backbone of 
 the fleet as far as its seamen are concerned. Previously 
 
TO The Navy in 1840. 
 
 to this there had been no systematic gunnery in the 
 navy, and proficiency in this respect much depended on 
 individual captains. Not long after the ' Excellent ' was 
 established at Portsmouth, the ' Edinburgh,' a 58-gun 
 ship, was stationed at Plymouth for the same purpose, 
 and placed under the * Excellent' It is now better 
 known as the ' Cambridge,' where equally good work 
 is carried out, and efficiency is ensured by the healthy 
 rivalry maintained between the two depots. 
 
 At the time under review there is no doubt that the 
 great defect of our naval system was in the manning 
 of the ships, and the difficulty of procuring seamen 
 without great delay. Ships sometimes had to wait 
 months before the crew was complete. Officers had 
 to visit all the well-known haunts of seamen, and use 
 every sort of persuasion to get men to enter their ships. 
 According to the custom then, men only joined a 
 ship for a commission, and on paying off — if no other 
 ship was being brought forward for commission — a 
 number of men were thus thrown on their own resources. 
 The result was that hundreds of splendid men were lost 
 to the navy, many going over to America, or taking up 
 other avocations. The time required for manning a 
 ship depended much on the captain's reputation in the 
 service. Placards in the seaport of fitting out such as 
 the following were resorted to : — ' Wanted active seamen 
 for the " Powerful " — Captain Napier. The " Powerful " 
 is a fine ship, and in the event of a war will be able to 
 take her own part' ' Wanted seamen for the " Superb." 
 A superb ship, a superb captain, and a superb crew.' 
 
The Navy in 1 840. 1 1 
 
 This difficulty of obtaining men was not experienced to 
 the same extent when war was anticipated, because the 
 attraction of prize money was a powerful inducement to 
 join, and there is always the natural love of adventure 
 in the British race. Hence on an emergency the radical 
 defects of our system were not so apparent. In France, 
 on the other hand, where, since Colbert established the 
 Maritime Inscription, all seamen are bound to serve in 
 the navy for a few years, and then pass into the reserve, 
 there has at times been a difficulty in getting them back 
 promptly when required. On one occasion, some years 
 ago, additional ships were ordered to be equipped in 
 France, which necessitated calling out a portion of the 
 naval reserves. These consisted chiefly of coast fisher- 
 men, and a number tried to put to sea in their boats 
 to evade the order. Some succeeded, and others were 
 arrested before they could get away. Another example 
 may be cited. When the Crimean War broke out we 
 were far from being prepared, yet the manning of the 
 fleet was comparatively expeditious. Lord Malmesbury 
 records in his memoirs, on February 9th, 1854 : * Sailors 
 are coming in very fast. The rapidity with which our 
 ships are equipped excites the astonishment of the 
 French.' Again, on March loth, he says: 'The Queen 
 reviewed the fleet at Spithead. The French fleet is not 
 ready, neither are their transport for the troops.' The 
 result was that our sc^uadron was in the l^altic a cc^i- 
 siderablc time before it was joined by our allies. 
 
 When we passed from the old irregular method of 
 manning the fleet, and adopted the continuous service 
 
12 The Navy in 1840. 
 
 system (under which seamen enter for ten }'ears, with 
 the option of continuing at its expiration for a further 
 similar period, followed by a pension), coupled with the 
 entry and training of boys, a complete revolution was 
 effected in this portion of the naval service. The 
 delays of manning in peace time disappeared, and all 
 uncertainty in the matter, when hostilities are appre- 
 hended, is removed. For a reserve in time of war we 
 rely on 20,000 merchant seamen, who, though they 
 have never served on board a man-of-war, are annually 
 drilled to guns and small arms at various depots round 
 the coast. How far the comparatively small number 
 of highly trained seamen we maintain, together with 
 this somewhat uncertain reserve, would supply the re- 
 quirements of a protracted maritime war it is difficult 
 to say. The w^aste, from many causes, would be very 
 great if the struggle were severe, but seeing the number 
 of men this country possesses who are, or have been, 
 connected in some way with the sea, and who would be 
 of great assistance when acting with trained seamen, I 
 do not think that in this respect our resources will prove 
 inadequate. 
 
 A review of the composition of navies half a century 
 ago would be incomplete without a reference to steam 
 propulsion, because the paddle-wheel steamer was then 
 in existence, and a certain number of vessels of this 
 description were in the fleet. Of course, the great step at 
 this period w^as the introduction of the screw propeller, 
 but of this it is proposed to treat in a subsequent chapter. 
 
 Previous to the year 1830 our Government only 
 
The Navy in 1840. 13 
 
 possessed a few small steamers, principally employed 
 for the purpose of towing ships in and out of harbour, 
 or for coast service, with an occasional trip to Malta or 
 Gibraltar. They were all paddle-wheel vessels. There 
 does not appear to have been at this time any general 
 idea that the new motive power was about to supersede 
 the propulsion of war ships by sails. Even the most 
 advanced and talented of naval officers could not con- 
 template steam vessels otherwise than as an auxiliary — 
 more or less important — to the larger fighting vessels of 
 the past. Thus, writing to the Secretary of the Admi- 
 ralty, in 1827, Captain Charles Napier says: ' In another 
 war steam will become to the navy what cavalry is to 
 the army. It will be the post of honour.' By another 
 distinguised officer it is compared to the horses which 
 draw the artillery in the field. The usefulness of steam 
 was to be found in scouting, in towing the regular 
 fighting ships into action, and afterwards falling upon 
 any of the enemy which might be disabled. Calms 
 would no longer prevent our ships from closing, or light 
 airs enable a faster sailing ship to escape. Hitherto 
 there had been no other way of giving progress to a 
 sailing ship in a calm than by getting the boats out to 
 tow her, a very slow and tedious operation. But it was 
 thought at this time that paddle-wheels might be 
 utilised even though not worked by steam power. 
 Hence the 'Active,' a 46-gun frigate, was fitted with 
 paddles worked by the capstan. A speed of from two 
 to three knots was obtained, but the plan involved so 
 much labour on the part (jf the crew that it was given 
 
14 The Navy in 1840. 
 
 up. When, however, Captain Napier, who was then a 
 man of great energy and enterprise, commissioned the 
 ' Galatea,' a 42-gun frigate, in 1829, he was allowed to 
 fit her with paddles actuated by winches inboard. 
 About two-thirds of the crew were required to work 
 them efficiently, and a speed of three knots in a calm 
 could be obtained. It was, of course, hard work for the 
 men, but as the, captain said, they did not mind it 
 if they were thus enabled to get into harbour when the 
 wind failed, instead of remaining outside waiting for a 
 breeze. But as we advanced in the application of steam 
 power all such rude mechanical appliances were given 
 up, and in 1830 it was determined to add steam paddle- 
 wheel vessels to the fleet. Five — the * Dec,' ' Phoenix,' 
 * Salamander,' ' Rhadamanthus,' and * Medea' — were then 
 laid down. Taking the ' Medea ' as a specimen, her 
 dimensions were : — 
 
 Exlienic length, ...... 206 ft. 
 
 Breadth, outside paddles, ..... 155 ,, 
 
 ,, inside, „ 46 ,, 
 
 Burthen, 830 tons. 
 
 Horse power, ....... 220. 
 
 Coal carried, ....... 300 tons. 
 
 Speed according to draught, . . . . 8 to 10 knots. 
 
 They had three masts, and carried sails. With the 
 paddles disconnected, and allowed to revolve freely, they 
 sailed fairly well. They were called steam sloops, and 
 had a few guns on the upper deck for hollow shot and 
 shell. Later on the 68 -pounder was employed as a 
 pivot gun at their extremities. A larger class were 
 called steam frigates, and had guns on the main deck. 
 
The Navy in 1 840. 1 5 
 
 They varied in size from 1200 to 1800 tons. The 
 amount of coal carried in proportion to their size was 
 large, owing to the great consumption with those early 
 engines. Thus the ' Sidon,' one of these frigates, could 
 stow 600 tons of coal. The general armament for this 
 class consisted of fourteen 32-pounders on the main 
 deck and four 68-pounders on the upper deck. One 
 of this type, the 'Terrible,' of 1830 tons, was considered 
 a very fine vessel, and performed efficient service in the 
 Black Sea during the Crimean War. Paddle - wheel 
 steamers were, moreover, represented in our navy until 
 quite recent years. All the Royal yachts are even 
 now paddle-wheel, as this application of steam power 
 allows of such excellent accommodation and comfort. 
 Another advantage is that it enables a comparatively 
 large vessel to be constructed on a light draught of 
 water. 
 
 This review of fleets half a century ago may fitly 
 conclude with a brief notice of an operation carried out 
 by a British naval squadron composed of sailing ships 
 supplemented by paddle steamers. This was the bom- 
 bardment of Acre in the year 1840. Steam played an 
 unimportant part in the action, and the incident is 
 chiefly valuable as showing the power of the old ships 
 and their armaments when opposed to forts which could 
 be attacked from the sea. 
 
 Such an attack must be considered hazardous or 
 the reverse, according to the circumstances of the case. 
 When to Lord Kxmouth was entrusted the service of 
 reducing the stronghold of Algiers, in the year 1816, 
 
1 6 The Navy in 1840. 
 
 people in England were surprised at the smallness of 
 the force with which he entered upon the task. But his 
 plans were based upon certain information by which he 
 was convinced that the batteries could be destroyed by 
 a squadron of moderate dimensions. The result entirely 
 justified his views, and he gained the greater credit in 
 consequence. In considering the attack of fortifications 
 by the vessels then employed, and the success which 
 attended such operations at Algiers and Acre, the 
 number of guns carried by line-of-battlc ships and the 
 rapidity of their fire are important points. As regards 
 the first point, take the armament of one of the largest 
 ships of that day, the 'Nelson.' She carried 120 guns, 
 sixty on each side. Of course, in attacking forts a ship 
 of this type could usually only engage one broadside, 
 but this consisted of sixty guns, and the weight of metal 
 thrown by them was 2750 lbs. When we add to this 
 the rapidity of fire which then prevailed, say a round a 
 minute, which was usually exceeded, an idea can be 
 formed of the overwhelming cannonade to which a 
 dozen line-of-battle ships could subject fortifications 
 mounting probably far fewer guns. The height of the 
 land defences from the sea, also, was material in affecting 
 the result. Batteries placed nearly on a level with the 
 water are far more subject to the fire of ships, and much 
 less formidable to them, than batteries elevated some- 
 what above the surface of the sea. A practical illustra- 
 tion of this was given in the Crimean War, when our 
 ships attacked the forts on the north side of Sebastopol. 
 To this I shall refer again later on. Let us now see 
 
The Navy in 1 840. 17 
 
 how some of these remarks on the attack of fortresses 
 are borne out in the bombardment of Acre. 
 
 On July 15th, 1840, a convention was concluded 
 between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia and 
 Turkey, whereby the four powers agreed to support the 
 Ottoman Empire against Mehemet Ali, the Pacha of 
 Egypt. In the previous year a strong squadron, sent 
 by the Sultan to act against the Egyptian forces, had 
 deserted to the enemy without striking a blow. This 
 squadron was now in Alexandria, watched by a detach- 
 ment of our Mediterranean fleet, while the remainder, 
 in conjunction with a Turkish and Austrian Squadron, 
 were operating against Northern Syria, then in the 
 possession of Mehemet Ali. The operations proving 
 successful, the attack on Acre was decided on. The 
 fortifications of this town were considered most formid- 
 able, and had been kept in good order since the time 
 when Acre, under Sir Sidney Smith, had resisted the 
 efforts of Napoleon. Mehemet Ali appears to have con- 
 siderably strengthened the defences on the land side, 
 but not to have done much to the fortifications on the 
 sea front. Nevertheless, the walls were of considerable 
 height and solidity, mounting about 200 smooth bore 
 guns of different dimensions. The garrison consisted 
 of about 5000 men, who had been well trained by the 
 commander of the place. This was a Poh'sli officer, 
 Colonel Schultz, who had taken service with the 
 Egyptians, and by his exertions had brought the troops 
 under his command into a high state of efficicnc}-. 
 
 The feasibility of attacking Acre h.ul Ijccn discussed 
 
 B 
 
I 8 The Navy in 1 840. 
 
 soiiie time previously, and two of our frigates, the ' Pique/ 
 Captain Boxer, and the ' Talbot,' Captain Codrington, 
 had been employed in surveying the water approaches. 
 This work was admirably carried out ; the positions of 
 the shoals were ascertained, and buoys placed to mark 
 their positions. No impediment was offered by the 
 garrison to this proceeding, and apparently the officer 
 in command treated such preparations with contempt. 
 But it was not so in reality, for he had the distances to 
 the buoys carefully measured, and detailed the guns so 
 that the vicinity of each buoy was commanded by a 
 portion of the defence. Fortunately the ships, as it 
 happened, did not take up the prearranged positions, 
 and the casualties on our side were much reduced in 
 consequence. The force about to attack Acre consisted 
 of seven line-of-battle ships, the ' Princess Charlotte,' 
 'Powerful,' 'Bcllerophon,' 'Revenge,' 'Thunderer,' 'Edin- 
 burgh,' and 'Benbow'; four frigates, the 'Castor,' 'Pique,' 
 ' Carysfort,' and ' Talbot ' ; two sloops, the ' Wasp ' and 
 ' Hazard ' ; and four paddle steamers, the ' Gorgon,' 
 ' Stromboli,' ' Phoenix,' and ' Vesuvius.' Admiral the 
 Hon. Sir Robert Stopford was Commander-in-Chief, 
 and flew his flag in the ' Princess Charlotte,' and 
 Commodore Charles Napier, in the ' Powerful,' was 
 second in command. There were also three Austrian 
 ships and the Turkish flagship co-operating in the 
 attack. Admiral Stopford was an officer of long and 
 meritorious service. He had entered the navy in 1780, 
 and as captain of the ' Aquilon ' participated in Lord 
 Howe's action on the ist of June 1794. In 1804, when 
 
The Navy in 1840. 19 
 
 in command of the ' Spencer,' he accompanied Lord 
 Nelson in his chase of the French and Spanish fleet to 
 the West Indies, but did not take part in the battle of 
 Trafalgar, having been detached a few days previously 
 to proceed with a squadron under Rear-Admiral Louis 
 to Gibraltar for provisions. He had also been engaged 
 in numerous other actions, and his record was such as 
 to leave no doubt that any operation undertaken by him 
 would be well performed. Commodore Napier also had 
 seen much service in all parts of the world, and gained 
 considerable reputation for his exploits when in com- 
 mand of the Portuguese fleet some few years previously. 
 He had lately been employed in Northern Syria, in 
 land operations against the forces of Mehemet Ali, and 
 displayed special aptitude for such irregular warfare. 
 His energy was remarkable, but confidence in his own 
 powers tended to make him impatient of control, and 
 hence the position of second in command was not 
 altogether congenial to him. This characteristic led 
 to a misunderstanding as regards the method of attack- 
 ing Acre, which not only produced unpleasantness 
 between the two chiefs, but also nearly brought about 
 a failure in the intended attack. 
 
 The squadron anchored on November 2d, barely 
 out of range of the guns of the fortress, and the plan 
 of attack for the next day was then discussed. Acre 
 stands on an acute angle of the coast, jutting out into 
 the sea. It therefore presented two faces, one run- 
 ning nearly north and south, and facing west, while the 
 other side ran nearly east and west, facing south. Both 
 
20 The Navy in 1840. 
 
 sides were well defended, though the batteries on the 
 western face were more powerful, but i^w of the guns 
 were much above the level of the sea. On each side 
 shoals prevented large ships from coming close in. 
 It was decided to divide the squadron into two detach- 
 ments, the ' Edinburgh,' ' Benbow,' the small ships and 
 foreign vessels were to attack the south side, and the 
 remainder would engage the west face. The steamers 
 were to lay off and use their shell fire to best advantage. 
 At one time it was proposed that they should tow the 
 other vessels to their positions, but there not being 
 enough steam vessels to do this simultaneously, the 
 plan was abandoned. The decision come to was that 
 the vessels should take up their positions under sail, 
 the ' Powerful ' to lead, until opposite the further or 
 southern end of the west face, followed by the others, 
 then all to anchor together in their assigned places, 
 according to which each portion of that side would 
 have a ship opposite to it. 
 
 The next morning, therefore, when a fair but light 
 breeze sprang up, the ships weighed and sailed down 
 to Acre. Napier, however, anchored before arriving 
 at the extremity of the west face. He for some reason 
 misunderstood the plan, and apparently expected the 
 other ships to pass ahead of him. The result was that 
 a portion of the west face was not covered by an 
 opposing force. Fortunately the ' Revenge ' had not 
 anchored, and she was directed by the admiral to fill 
 the gap ahead of the ' Powerful' This she did. The 
 force to act against the southern side was some- 
 
The Navy in 1840. 21 
 
 what put out by these movements, but Captain 
 Stewart, in the ' Benbow,' asked permission to pro- 
 ceed to his station, and went on, followed by the 
 * Edinburgh.' As the ' Benbow ' approached, Captain 
 Stewart found deeper water than he expected, and was 
 thus enabled to pass inside the buoys and get nearer 
 the town. The ' Edinburgh ' did the same. Up to this 
 time no sign of life had come from the fortress, and 
 the guns were screened. They had, however, been laid 
 on the buoys, and the instant the ships anchored flags 
 were hoisted on shore, and a heavy fire opened. Owing 
 to the altered positions of the ships on both sides it was 
 not nearly so deadly as it would otherwise have been. 
 On the south side the shot just passed over the ships, 
 and the water beyond was a sheet of foam. It would 
 have been unsafe to hold a hand up above the bulwarks. 
 On the north side, also, the shot struck the water where 
 the buoys had been placed, but as the ships anchored 
 in other positions they escaped much of the fire. The 
 ships began the bombardment about the same time, and 
 for two hours it was returned from the shore with 
 gradually decreasing energy. Then an event took place 
 which decided the fate of Acre. A large magazine 
 blew up, having been ignited by a shell from one of the 
 ships, and destroyed a great portion of the town and 
 defences, and killed over looo of the defenders. From 
 this moment the fire of the batteries on shore slackened, 
 and half-an-liour after had virtually ceased. It being 
 now sunset, the ships also discontiiuicd the action, but 
 made preparations to renew the combat next day as 
 
2 2 The Navy in 1840. 
 
 no indications of submission were apparent. The place, 
 however, was evacuated in the night, and we took posses- 
 sion of it next morning. On our side the casualties 
 were not numerous, consisting of eighteen killed and 
 forty-one wounded. The damage sustained by the ships 
 was not serious, and soon repaired. The number of the 
 enemy killed and wounded was never ascertained, but 
 it could not have been less than from 2000 to 3000. 
 About the same number were taken prisoners, or gave 
 themselves up when our force landed the following day. 
 Among them was Colonel Schultz, who had been 
 wounded. He said it was impossible to withstand such 
 an incessant stream of fire as was poured from our guns. 
 Even the bravest troops would have been demoralised. 
 The result was due to a heavy cannonade at close 
 quarters, kept up unremittingly from a great number 
 of guns. At the same time the ships had certain for- 
 tuitous advantages which might not be conceded on 
 another occasion. The action did not prove that our 
 wooden walls could at all times attack forts with 
 impunity, and indeed the contrary was demonstrated 
 fourteen years later in the Black Sea. But the bom- 
 bardment of Acre showed in a striking manner the 
 terms upon which the old ships could contend success- 
 fully with land defences which at first sight seemed 
 almost impregnable. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 CREATION OF A STEAM FLEET 
 
 Changes in Ship Construction after 1840 — Reluctance to recognise Advant- 
 ages of Screw Propulsion — Gradual Conversion of Sailing P'lect to 
 Steam — Armament practically remains unaltered — The Crimean 
 War — Operations in Black Sea and Baltic — Assistance rendered 
 by the Navy — Expedition to Sea of Azof. 
 
 The discovery that steam could be profitably utilised 
 for the propulsion of ships, and the tardy adoption of 
 the screw, did not for many years materially affect the 
 construction of war vessels. There was a strong pre- 
 judice to overcome in the minds of those who retained a 
 vivid recollection of the glories accomplished in the past 
 under sail, and who had a natural love for the art in 
 which we excelled. Sir William S)'monds, to whom I 
 have alluded as effecting considerable improvement in 
 the qualities of our sailing ships, had, as his biographer 
 states, no love for steamers in any shape. The\' were 
 an order of vessels which forbade the a])[)lication of his 
 favourite principles of construction. When Sir John 
 Franklin left England, in May 1845, ^^^' ^'""^ Arctic, the 
 ' Erebus' and 'Terror' were each fitted with a screw. It 
 is stated that .Sir William s[)oke plainl}' of the risk to Sir 
 George Cockburn, First Na\al Lord of the Admiralt}-, 
 and foretold their fate. In a letter to Lord .Auckland 
 
24 Creation of a Steam Fleet. 
 
 about this time he states : ' I consider steamers of every 
 description in the greatest peril when it is necessary to 
 use broadside guns in close action ; not alone from 
 their liability to be disabled from shot striking their 
 steam chest, steam pipe, machinery, etc., but great pro- 
 bability of explosion owing to sparks from funnel.' 
 These view^s were shared by others ; but circumstances 
 were too strong, and slowly we began to convert our 
 sailing navy into a steam fleet. In other respects, while 
 retaining the two and three-decker as the embodiment 
 of naval force, an advance was made by giving them 
 an increased length. Whereas, in 1840, the * Queen ' was 
 204 ft. long, the ' How^e,' launched in i860 as a screw 
 three-decker, w^as given a length of 260 ft. This fine 
 specimen and her sister ship the ' Victoria ' were the 
 last of that race of noble structures which we recall with 
 regret. The first two-decker designed for the screws was 
 the 'Agamemnon,' launched in 1852. Her length was 
 230 ft, while the 'Albion,' launched in 1842, was but 
 204 ft. long. We see the same modification in the 
 frigates of i860. From the ' Vernon 'of 176 ft., in 1832, 
 we passed to the ' Emerald ' of 237 ft., in 1856. The latter 
 was the first ship I served in, and a prettier model it 
 would be hard to find. She was one of a class largely 
 represented in the service as 50-gun screw frigates, and 
 built of wood. We were, however, impelled to a further 
 advance in this type by the action of the United States. 
 That country had lately been producing frigates of large 
 dimensions, and the appearance of the 'Niagara' in 
 the Thames during 1857 created quite a sensation 
 
ET 
 
 iHBJUi* 
 

Crcalioii of a Steam Fleet. 2 5 
 
 in England. Her dimensions were, length 335 ft., 
 breadth 54 ft, and burthen 4750 tons. 
 
 This led to the construction over here of the 
 * Orlando ' and ' Mersey/ the largest frigates built en- 
 tirely of wood, and launched in 1858. Their length was 
 300 ft, beam 52 ft, and burthen 3750 tons. They 
 were, however, structurally weak, and did not last long. 
 The 68-pounder was still the heaviest gun carried, for 
 we had not yet arrived at rifle guns. Shell equipment 
 was now universally provided, for Sinope had convinced 
 even the strongest adherents of solid shot that what- 
 ever might be the advantages of the latter against stone 
 walls in their smashing effect, shell for the attack of 
 ships must prevail. Appliances for the use of red-hot 
 shot were still supplied. These projectiles were for- 
 midable to wooden ships. Nelson considered fire the 
 greatest danger of a naval battle. Before going into 
 action it was the custom, as far as possible, to remove 
 everything below which might feed a fire. But there 
 was danger also to the ship using red-hot shot. Guns 
 occasionally burst owing to the expansion of the pro- 
 jectile, for which provision had to be made in the 
 diameter of the bore. There might also be a premature 
 discharge by the ignition of the powder. To prevent 
 this, thick junk wads were supplied for use with hot 
 shot, to be well soaked in water and then rammed down 
 after the powder, thus interposing a screen between the 
 charge and shot. 
 
 Rockets were another species of weapon much 
 favoured then, but which have recently ceased to form 
 
26 Creation of a Steam Fleet, 
 
 part of our ships' equipment. They were also for in- 
 cendiary purposes, and proved very effective against 
 savage races and bodies of men. They were first intro- 
 duced, early in the century, by Sir William Congrevc. 
 Their flight was produced by the escape of the gas to 
 the rear, generated by the ignited explosive, and steadi- 
 ness was imparted by attaching a wooden rod to the 
 case. The use of the rod was dispensed with by the 
 invention of Mr Hale, who caused the rocket to rotate 
 in its flight. This was effected by the gas in its escape 
 impinging on short iron wings at the end of the case, 
 thus imparting rotatory motion. Rockets, however, for 
 war purposes were not to be depended on, especially 
 after being kept for some time, and occasionally they 
 gave rise to serious accidents. 
 
 Before passing on to the great change which the 
 adoption of iron as a material for ship building and as a 
 means of protection produced in our fleet, it seems desir- 
 able to review briefly the operations in the Black Sea 
 and Baltic during the Crimean War, when we had for 
 the last time sailing ships combined with screw and 
 paddle steamers. These operations afford an example 
 of the effect of a powerful navy in rendering possible 
 military operations in distant lands, and aiding them in 
 many ways. Our success at Acre is not repeated in a 
 bombardment of land batteries under different conditions 
 in one locality, whereas it is shown elsewhere that if 
 special plant is provided such an operation can be 
 undertaken without great risk. This war, from a naval 
 point of view, has many striking features. It is difficult 
 
Creation of a Steam Fleet. 27 
 
 to realise now how little prepared we were in 1853 for 
 war with a powerful continental nation, and for such an 
 operation as the invasion of its territory. Though the 
 Naval Department has generally been assumed to have 
 emerged from that war with more credit as regards its 
 organisation than the War Office, the term ' mobilisa- 
 tion,' and its meaning, was entirely unknown in reference 
 to any possible naval operation. If success has come in 
 the past, it has been in spite of our system, not in conse- 
 quence of it. 
 
 For instance, previously to the Crimean War there 
 had been a Transport Department at the Admiralty, but 
 a regard for economy had led to its suppression. Never- 
 theless, when it was reorganised, energy and ability sup- 
 plied the want of experience. Its operations were on a 
 large scale, for we conveyed to the east 70,000 officers 
 and men, 5600 horses, and 85,000 tons of stores. To 
 the Baltic, also, we transported 13,000 officers and men, 
 with about 10,000 tons of stores. It must be remem- 
 bered that our allies looked to us in a great measure 
 for transport. Though steam propulsion was in its 
 infancy, we employed over 100 steam transports, and 
 a slightly greater number of sailing ships. Sir Stafford 
 Northcotc, in a letter to Mr Disraeli, dated April 19th, 
 1862, and printed in his life, says: 'We showed in the 
 Crimean War both our weakness and our strength. 
 Our strength consisted in the clasticit)' of oiu" resources, 
 the temper of our people, the length of our purse, and 
 the power of our endurance. Our weakness was shown 
 in the confusion of our arrangements and the absence of 
 
28 Crcafion of a Sfciu/i Fleet. 
 
 niilitai-}' skill.' Init he niii;ht have added that the ehief 
 evidence of our strength was to be found in our mari- 
 time supremacy, which made such an expedition possible. 
 History has not adecjuately recorded the part played by 
 the nav\' on this occasion, because there were no tlcets 
 to overcome, and it did not repeat the success at Acre ; 
 but in other wa)s the assistance it rendered was of the 
 utmost importance. 
 
 In command o{ the Mediterranean Squadron at that 
 time was Admiral Deans Dundas. lie was an oflicer 
 who had seen much service, but had now reached the 
 age of sixty-eight, and owing to a former wound could 
 not sustain great exertion. When he was appointed to 
 this command, it was not anticipated that we should 
 shortly be invoKxxl in war. As second in command of 
 the squadron we had in Sir Kdmund L}-ons a man of 
 great ability and energ\-. His early career had been 
 a distinguished one, but in 1S35 he was appointed 
 Minister at Athens, a post he filled for several )'ears, 
 so that in 1854 his capacit)' for naval affairs was not 
 well known in the t1eet. Detailed b\- Admiral Dundas 
 to organise arrangements for transporting the army 
 from Varna to the Crimea, he at once gave proof of 
 his capabilit)'. All difficulties disappeared before his 
 energy and gift for organisation. Vet it was no easy 
 task to shift the base of operations from Turke\- to 
 Russia. To forward 60.000 troops from England and 
 France had taxed the resources of those countries, but 
 to tranship them on the barren shores of the Black Sea 
 entailed a greater call on those entrusted with the opera- 
 
Creation of a Steam Fleet. 29 
 
 tion. Much had to be created on the spot; yet ahhough 
 the order to invade the Crimea only reached Lord 
 Raglan on July 6th, 1854, the combined armies, with 
 their necessary equipment, embarked on August 24th. 
 Circumstances delayed their sailing till September 7th, 
 when they set forth for the enemy's country. What 
 a splendid sight it must have been, over 150 vessels 
 conveying the troops, guarded and convoyed by a British 
 squadron of ten sail of the line and fifteen smaller vessels. 
 The French men-of-war were filled with troops owing to 
 insufficiency of transports. What a time for an enter- 
 prising enemy to make a dash at this armada ! Inside 
 the harbour of Sebastopol there was a powerful flotilla, 
 consisting of thirteen sail of the line and sixteen smaller 
 vessels. A determined attack might have scattered that 
 cloud of transports, and, taking into consideration the 
 time of year, indefinitely postponed the expedition. 
 ]jut the opportunity was lost, and 63,000 men, with 
 128 guns, were landed without opposition, as if for some 
 peaceful autumn manoeuvres. As an operation of war 
 it was hazardous. A night assault on our force after 
 landing might have been disastrous. None took place, 
 and the battle of the Alma strengthened our position in 
 the occupied territory. It was then decided to invest 
 the south side of Sebastopol, while the navy were to 
 occupy the port of Balaclava as a base of operations for 
 the army. From a naval point of view this harbour 
 was well suited to the purpose. Though not of great 
 extent, it contained deep water, and had facilities for 
 landing stores. Moreover, the anchorage was well 
 
30 Creation of a Steam Fleet. 
 
 sheltered from all winds, and as at this time it was 
 not considered that the siege would prove a lengthy 
 operation, I am unable to see that the choice of Bala- 
 clava was a bad one.^ 
 
 The arrival of the army at the head of Balaclava 
 Harbour and the entry of our ships took place simul- 
 taneously on the 26th of September. To this no 
 resistance was offered by the enemy, and the siege train 
 was landed next day. ]^y the act of the Russians in 
 sinking most of their largest ships across the entrance to 
 Sebastopol our naval force was freed from any thought 
 of having to meet the enemy at sea. What a blow to 
 those gallant Russian sailors, who afterwards took such 
 
 ' Sir Edward Hamley, in his interesting volume The War in the 
 Crimea^ states that the choice of Balaclava as a base brought untold 
 miseries upon the army, and speaks strongly of the influence Sir Edmund 
 Lyons had with Lord Raglan. But the point the admiral had to consider 
 was, whether Balaclava was suitable to receive transports and store ships, 
 and whether the harbour offered facilities for discharging cargo ? lie could 
 assure the general that no delay should take place in these respects. The 
 proof of this lies in the fact that the siege train was landed the day after 
 the harbour was entered. As to the distance of the harbour from our camp, 
 that was a matter which the general would weigh in deciding whether to 
 accept or reject the admiral's recommendation. It did not affect the 
 suitability of the port for getting the stores on shore ; their prompt trans- 
 port to the camp rested with the Military Department. If the land transport 
 arrangements were faulty, and want of men prevented good roads from the 
 base to the camp being made until after the battle of Inkerman, the diffi- 
 culties that resulted are not attributable to any deficiency of Balaclava as 
 a naval port. I regret that the gallant author of this work should speak of 
 Sir Edmund Lyons as Lord Raglan's evil genius. The mind of the 
 admiral was wholly absorbed by the desire to render every assistance to 
 his comrades on shore, and he brought to this work an energy, ability, and 
 single-mindedness which, hardly realised in the past, will some day, I am 
 sure, receive ample recognition. 
 
Crcatioi of a Steam F/ccL 31 
 
 a distinguished part in the siep^e, to see a fleet it had 
 taken years to construct setthng down in the water 
 without a combat. Though the foe was a combination 
 of the two most powerful maritime nations of Europe, 
 they were ready for the fray, and the disappointment 
 could not be otherwise than bitter. England had 
 experienced such a day of humiliation two centuries 
 before when she scuttled her own vessels to bar the 
 passage of the Dutch up the Medway, and then vainly 
 turned to forts as a substitute for an efficient fieet. 
 
 But our squadron in the Black Sea was able to afford 
 material assistance in other ways towards the object 
 aimed at, the capture of Sebastopol. Over sixty guns 
 were landed from the ships, and a naval brigade formed 
 of 2000 officers and men. This greatly augmented the 
 resources of the allied armies in preparing for the first 
 bombardment of the Russian works defending the 
 southern side of the town. This took place on the 17th 
 of October, and in order to assist the operation the 
 admirals of the English and French Squadrons were 
 requested to attack simultaneously the sea defences. 
 When I use the word ' requested,' it is perhaps hardly 
 applicable to the French naval commander. He was 
 under the orders of the general in command, and hence 
 to such a direction could onl)- demur on strong grounds. 
 In our case the admiral was acting independently, and 
 though he would naturally afford the general the fullest 
 co-operation, he was at liberty to withhold his consent 
 to any course o^ action as regards the licet which might 
 to him seem undesirable. Admiral Duiulas was reluctant 
 
32 Creation of a Steam Fleet, 
 
 to expose his ships to damage in an attack which, 
 according to his judgment, would have no direct influ- 
 ence upon the assault by land. It must be remembered, 
 moreover, that he had willingly denuded his vessels of a 
 portion of their armament, and reduced their crews by 
 a considerable number ; and he might have insisted 
 that a sea attack should only be undertaken with ships 
 fully equipped. But when his French colleague in- 
 formed him of his intention to carry out the desire of 
 his general, with or without our assistance, Admiral 
 Dundas felt compelled to join in the attack. 
 
 The forts which the combined squadrons were about 
 to bombard defended the approach to the harbour of 
 Sebastopol. On the north side, to which our ships were 
 allotted, they were especially strong. At the entrance 
 was Fort Constantine, a massive stone structure mount- 
 ing lOO guns. But still more formidable to ships were 
 the batteries on the high ground above, which, though 
 not armed with numerous guns, could sweep the sea 
 beneath with comparative impunity. The southern side 
 was defended by a battery at the mouth of Quarantine 
 Bay, and Fort Alexander further in. The French 
 Squadron was to attack on this side, and with our 
 vessels form a continuous line in front of the harbour. 
 It had been arranged that fire on land and sea should be 
 opened early in the morning ; but at the last moment 
 this was altered as regards the ships, and they did not 
 commence until after one o'clock. By this time all 
 idea of a land assault had been given up owing to the 
 discomfiture of the French batteries on shore. More 
 
Creation of a Sfcani Fleet, ^Z 
 
 than one explosion had taken place in their lines, and 
 they were not prepared to join us in the intended move- 
 ment which was to follow a vigorous cannonade. The 
 ships, however, proceeded to carry out their part of the 
 day's work. Sir Edmund Lyons, in the * Agamemnon,' 
 with the ' Sanspareil,' ' London,' ' Albion,' and ' Are- 
 thusa,' formed an inshore squadron, and anchored with- 
 in 800 yards of the northern batteries, while the rest 
 of our ships were further off, prolonging the French line. 
 Fire was then opened on both sides. Considerable im- 
 pression was made on Fort Constantine, but the 
 batteries on the cliff, when they got the range of 
 our ships, subjected them to an effective fire to which 
 little return could be made. The * Rodney,' ' Queen,' 
 and ' Bellerophon ' then closed to reinforce the hardly 
 pressed inshore squadron, and the cannonade was con- 
 tinued. Owing to the fact that most of the ships had 
 landed their upper deck guns, and that this portion 
 was comparatively clear of men, our casualties were 
 not so numerous as they otherwise would have been. 
 The Russians used chiefly time fuses with their shell, 
 numbers of which burst over the upper decks, cut- 
 ting them up like a ploughed field. But, nevertheless, 
 at the close of day, when our vessels withdrew from 
 their positions, we had lost over forty killed, and 250 
 men wounded. The French had an easier task, and did 
 not suffer so severely. The gain was not commensurate 
 with such a loss, and in fact the whole proceeding was 
 unwise. If the object was to facilitate the assault and 
 entry of our troops on the south side, it is difficult to 
 
 C 
 
34 Creation of a Steam Fleet. 
 
 see what benefit would accrue from shelling batteries in 
 another quarter. When this assault was postponed, there 
 was clearly no reason to attempt the destruction of works 
 intended to resist entry by sea, and which could have 
 little influence upon an army taking the city in rear. 
 
 From a naval point of view, however, the principal 
 lesson taught by this episode is the strength exhibited by 
 a few guns on high ground even when opposed by a 
 powerful squadron. Fort Constantine must have suc- 
 cumbed in time, even as the forts at Acre were unable to 
 withstand the heavy and rapid fire of our ships. But a 
 single elevated battery is difficult to silence, and ma}' 
 defy the efforts of a fleet. This was perfectly well 
 understood in the old wars, but the lesson had been for- 
 gotten, until it was once more brought home to us on 
 this memorable occasion. Another point demonstrated 
 was the disadvantage attached to joint enterprises under 
 dual command. Of this we had not much previous ex- 
 perience, because in most of our struggles at sea we had 
 fought single-handed. But the Franco-Spanish alliance, 
 which was punished at Trafalgar, is an example of the 
 doubtful strength of such combinations. How bitterly 
 Villeneuve complained of his Spanish colleagues. No 
 plans could be formed that were not liable to be dis- 
 turbed by their different methods of business and 
 organisation. One supreme chief is necessary to success, 
 and should we ever engage in any maritime alliance 
 again, there must be one head, recognised by both States, 
 and invested with full authority over the whole force. 
 A more profitable service rendered by the navy in the 
 
Creation of a Steam Fleet. 35 
 
 Crimea was in cutting off communications with Scbas- 
 topol by the Sea of Azof. In February 1855, about six 
 weeks after Sir Edmund Lyons assumed chief command 
 of the Black Sea fleet, Admiral Dundas having gone 
 home, the Admiralty called his attention to the im- 
 portance of occupying as soon as possible the Sea of 
 Azof, as the Russian army in the Crimea drew largely 
 both reinforcements of men and supplies of provisions 
 conveyed by water between Rostof and Taganrog and 
 the shores of the Crimea bordering on the Sea of Azof. 
 Such an enterprise accorded with the energetic spirit of 
 the admiral, and in conjunction with our allies an ex- 
 pedition was organised for this service. The entrance to 
 this inland sea is commanded by the powerful fort of 
 Kertch, and to take this in rear a strong landing force 
 was provided. This consisted of 7000 French, 3000 
 English, and 5000 Turkish troops. They were conveyed 
 in nine sail of the line and forty smaller vessels. The 
 expedition started on the 22d of May, and arrixcd in 
 the vicinity of Kertch the next day. A bay within ten 
 miles of this town was selected, and disembarkation 
 was effected without delay or obstruction. l-?aron 
 Wrangel, the Russian general in command of this por- 
 tion of the peninsula, did not oppose the landing. In 
 fact, he could not tell where it might take place, and 
 was unable to move troops as fast as ours could be 
 conveyed by sea. Fearing to be cut off from Sebas- 
 topoljie destro)'ed several batteries on the coast and re- 
 tired. As Kinglake eloquently sa)-s of the incident : 'lie 
 (Baron Wrangel) succumbed to the power (of which the 
 
36 Creation of a Steam Fleet. 
 
 world will learn much in times to come) an armada can 
 wield when not only carrying on board a force designed 
 for land service, but enabled to move swiftly, whether 
 this way or that, at the will of the chief.' Kcrtch 
 was occupied on the 24th of May, and Sir Edmund 
 Lyons, hoisting his flag on board the * Miranda,' entered 
 the Sea of Azof. He then placed a squadron of light 
 draught vessels under the orders of his son, Captain 
 E. M. Lyons, consisting of fourteen sloops and gun 
 vessels, with five French steamers. Holding commands 
 in this squadron were some of the ablest men our navy 
 possessed. Such names as Commcrcll, Sherard Osborn, 
 Cowper Coles, Hewett, M'Killop, Burgoyne, and others, 
 were a guarantee that activity in this quarter, at least, 
 would prevail. Events succeeded each other rapidly. 
 On May 26th the squadron appeared off Berdiansk, 
 where the enemy burnt four war steamers of his own 
 and large depots of corn. On the 27th Arabat was 
 bombarded, and in three days 106 merchant vessels 
 were destroyed. The same activity continued until the 
 operations closed in November by reason of approach- 
 ing winter. A volume might be written of the work 
 done in this region by the navy. It has never been 
 adequately recorded, but the cutting off and destruction 
 of all the sources of supply to the Russian army from 
 the Sea of Azof contributed in no small or unimportant 
 degree to the fall of Sebastopol. 
 
 Although, as I have endeavoured to show, the naval 
 operations in the Black Sea afforded invaluable assist- 
 ance to the Crimean expedition, it was to the Baltic 
 
^ -J---..J^J'.. ■ 
 
 Creation of a St emu Fleet. 37 
 
 squadron that the nation looked for the greatest 
 triumphs on the sea. These expectations were not 
 destined to be realised by any great feat of arms. 
 For this there were many reasons, the principal one 
 being that the means were not adapted to the end, and 
 that there was no clear conception as to what the fleet 
 could be reasonably expected to perform. 
 
 When, in the early part of February 1854, it was seen 
 that war could not be avoided, every exertion was made 
 to fit out a formidable Baltic Squadron. Of the ships 
 detailed to form this squadron some were at Lisbon, 
 while others were laid up in the various home ports. 
 It had been usual to offer a bounty to seamen to ship 
 afloat when required on an emergency, but in this case 
 it was not done, and all sorts and conditions of men 
 were entered to complete the complements of the ships. 
 By this means a squadron was collected with what was 
 considered at that time creditable expedition. Admiral 
 Sir Charles Napier was selected for the command, 
 whose reputation in the country was still high, though 
 he was now sixty-eight years of age. The squadron, 
 having assembled at Portsmouth, left on the 12th of 
 March, Her Majesty leading it to sea in her screw 
 yacht the ' Fairy.' On that day the force consisted of 
 eiglit ships of the line, four frigates, and three paddle 
 steamers. Other ships not yet complete with crews had 
 to be left behind, and joined afterwards. Bound for the 
 Baltic, where the water all round the coast is very 
 shallow, ves.sels of light draught for certain operations 
 were an essential adjunct to such a force ; but no gun- 
 
38 Creation of a Steam Fleet. 
 
 boats had been provided. This omission strongly influ- 
 enced the course of events. 
 
 On March 27th the fleet anchored in what was then 
 the Danish port of Kiel. Our first object was to confine 
 the enemy's vessels to the Baltic, so that their power of 
 offensive action against our coasts and commerce might 
 be neutralised. A blockade was therefore essential. A 
 trial of strength between the two fleets was also de- 
 sirable, as success in such an action would secure the 
 same end more effectually. Attack on strong fortresses 
 was deprecated as likely to damage the fleet without an 
 adequate return. The nation, however, expected an 
 attack on Cronstadt, no doubt with the recollection of 
 Acre in its mind. But the conditions were very dif- 
 ferent. Not that the sea defences of Cronstadt at the 
 declaration of war were of the formidable nature attri- 
 buted to them, but because the neighbouring water 
 was so shallow that the approach of large ships was a 
 difficult matter. The want of gunboats capable of 
 taking up advantageous positions within range of the 
 forts was the reason given by Sir Charles Napier for 
 abstaining from an attack on Cronstadt. He was 
 unwilling to risk injury to his own squadron by such 
 an operation while the Russian fleet was intact. It was 
 no secret at Acre that he opposed the bombardment 
 as most hazardous, but orders from England were 
 imperative on that occasion. In the Baltic many of the 
 ships were most indifferently manned, and kept the sea 
 with difficulty. We were unable to prevent a junction 
 between the Russian Squadrons at Sveaborg and 
 
Crcaticn of a Stcaiii Fleet. 39 
 
 Cronstadt, the former getting out when a gale of wind 
 had driven our squadron of observation from the port* 
 But a younger and more energetic commander would 
 probably not have been so much impressed with tb.e 
 risks incurred ; and Nelson in his daring exploit at 
 Copenhagen undertook a task of equal magnitude with- 
 out hesitation. 
 
 Sir Charles Napier having set his face against a 
 direct attack on Cronstadt or Sveaborg — another 
 place where powerful land batteries guarded the sea 
 approaches — turned his attention to Bomarsund, the 
 stronghold of the Aland Islands. It was guarded by 
 forts mounting numerous heavy guns, with a garrison of 
 2500 men. No reinforcement was possible while our 
 ships commanded the water intervening between these 
 islands and the mainland. Hence the safest and most 
 certain form of attack was to land a sufficient force at a 
 convenient spot and take the forts in rear. This was 
 decided upon, and the British admiral desired to effect 
 it with the resources of the combined squadron alone, 
 but the French commander considered them insuffi- 
 cient, and a body of 9000 French troops was sent out 
 arriving early in August. When all was ready, guns 
 and men were landed without opposition. Besides 
 the regular troops, a large contingent of sailors and a 
 battery of 32-poundcrs from the ships tormcd part of 
 the force. Works were then thrown up within range of 
 the forts, and between the 13th and 15th the forts were 
 bombarded. One after another surrendered, until the 
 whole of rxtiiiarsutid was ours. In default of relief Irom 
 
40 Creation of a Steam Fleet. 
 
 the sea, capitulation was inevitable. This incident is an 
 excellent example of the power conferred by command 
 of the sea when at the same time there is a sufficient 
 land force judiciously employed. 
 
 No other operation of any magnitude was attempted 
 that year, and when the Baltic Squadron returned to 
 England for the winter it was not considered to have 
 put forth its full strength. There was much criticism on 
 the decision not to attack Sveaborg, so a new com- 
 mander-in-chief, Rear-Admiral the Hon. R. Dundas, 
 with a stronger squadron, was sent up the following 
 year. By this time gunboats and mortar vessels had 
 been prepared, and the crews of the squadron had much 
 improved, so that the new admiral started under fair 
 auspices. Her Majesty again leading the squadron to 
 sea and wishing it success. In the beginning of August 
 the whole flotilla approached Sveaborg. The gun 
 vessels and mortar boats were to perform the principal 
 part in the bombardment. The fortress consisted of 
 five islands, on which were batteries with numerous 
 heavy guns. On the 9th of August the attack took 
 place. Carefully assigned positions were taken up 
 by our small vessels — the remainder of the fleet 
 being in rear — and a heavy fire opened on the 
 defences. The gun and mortar boats offered 
 so small a mark and were at such a range that 
 the return fire from the shore did comparatively little 
 damage. After some hours our shells blew up more 
 than one magazine and set fire to several buildings. At 
 sunset the gunboats were withdrawn, but the place was 
 
Creation of a Steam Fleet. 41 
 
 plied with rockets durin^^ the night. During the next 
 day the attack was continued. The whole place now 
 seemed a sheet of flame, and on the morning of the i ith, 
 the enemy's batteries having ceased to reply to our 
 guns, the action was discontinued. On our side only a 
 few men were wounded, but the Russians lost consider- 
 ably. Though the fortress was much knocked about, a 
 few days would have put it in a condition to sustain 
 another bombardment ; and whether it surrendered or 
 not, we were unable to land a sufficient force for its 
 occupation. We had, however, shown that a powerful 
 fortress could be attacked from the sea, and without 
 great loss, if undertaken with plant adapted to the pur- 
 pose. It was simply a question of providing sufficient 
 material, and keeping up the supply until the object was 
 attained. vSuccess would rest with that side which pos- 
 sessed the longest purse and the greater resources. 
 With an absolute command of the sea, the impregnability 
 of a fortress becomes a comparative term, and another 
 year of war would doubtless have seen a similar attack 
 on Cronstadt. But Sebastopol now fell, and peace was 
 made. 
 
 This war produced no naval actions or single com- 
 bats between ships, but maritime strength had in other 
 ways brought about a result even greater than could 
 have been secured by a great naval victory. The 
 voluntary sinking of a large portion of the enemy's fleet, 
 the inaction of another part, the invasion of territory, 
 the reduction of some fortresses, and the total stoj^page 
 of sea commerce, were directly or indirectl}' owing to 
 
42 Creation of a Steam Fleet. 
 
 naval supremacy tacitly acknowledged. Steam bad 
 materially assisted the attack, while it conferred no 
 advantage on the defence. As Kinglake eloquently says 
 of the result of the Kertch expedition : ' The simple 
 truth is that, in regions where land and sea much in- 
 tertwine, an armada having on board it no more than 
 a iQ.yN thousand troops, and propelled by steam power, 
 can use its amphibious strength with a wondrously 
 cogent effect.' 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 BROADSIDE IRONCLADS 
 
 Prejudice against Iron in Shipbuilding — First Ironclads built in France and 
 England — Increase in Size of Ships — Advance in Ordnance — Com- 
 mencement of Struggle between Guns and Armour — Action between 
 ' Alabama ' and ' Kearsage,' showing advantages of Armour. 
 
 The same reasons which operated on the minds of tlie 
 naval officers in respect to the appHcation of steam 
 propulsion retarded the use of iron for the construction 
 of war vessels. That material was first employed for 
 canal boats about the year 1812, and afterwards for 
 steamers of the mercantile marine. About 1834 the 
 Admiralty were urged to institute experiments to 
 ascertain whether iron might not be utilised for ships 
 of war, but they moved so slowly that the first iron war 
 steamer built in this country was the ' Birkenhead,' by 
 Messrs Laird, in 1845. For reasons to be mentioned 
 presently she was turned into a troopship. She was 
 lost in 1852 at the Cape, under the circumstances well 
 known from the heroic conduct of the soldiers and sea- 
 men on the occasion. To test the behaviour of iron 
 under the effects of shot, and to compare it with wood, 
 some experiments were carried out at Portsmouth from 
 1849 to 1 85 1. Iron plates, '^ in. thick, pklced 35 ft. 
 apart, to represent a section of the ' Simoom,' a vessel 
 
44 Broadside Ironclads, 
 
 then under construction, were fired at from a 32-pounder. 
 The effect was most ominous. Not only were the iron 
 spHnters produced by the shot passing through the side 
 of a destructive nature, but it was found that the shot 
 broke up in perforating the plate, and became an ad- 
 ditional cloud of splinters too numerous to be counted. 
 The experiment was repeated with the addition that 
 the iron was backed with 5 in. of oak. A similar 
 result ensued, but wooden splinters mingled with the 
 iron. When wood alone was tried, the splinters were 
 trifling as compared with those from the iron. Other 
 experiments were then carried out to see if these effects 
 could be mitigated, but without success. The deduc- 
 tion was that the destructive effects of shot on iron 
 ships could not be prevented. If the iron sides were 
 of the thickness required to give adequate strength to 
 the ship — as f or, at least, half-an-inch — the shot was 
 broken up. If the plates were thinner, the ships would 
 be deficient in strength, and though the shot might pass 
 through without breaking up, the disc of iron driven 
 in was broken into numerous small pieces. 
 
 These results created a great sensation. A verdict was 
 given that iron vessels, however convenient and advan- 
 tageous in other respects, were utterly unfit for purposes 
 of war, and a committee of naval and military officers, 
 which had been directed to report how far it might be 
 possible to arm vessels of the packet service in case of 
 war, rejected all constructed of iron. Many years were to 
 elapse before this material was taken into favour again. 
 It was even a question then whether iron steamers were 
 
Broadside Ironclads. 45 
 
 fit to be employed as transports for the conveyance of 
 troops and stores during war. However, the Admiralty 
 decided to employ those which were being built as troop 
 ships. In one or two others which were completed the 
 armament was removed from the main deck, and timber 
 substituted for iron in the upper works, behind which a 
 few light guns were placed. Considering the present 
 almost universal adoption of iron and steel for naval 
 architecture, the foregoing events appear to me to have 
 no little interest. I have not dwelt upon the defects of 
 the substances employed, such as cast-iron shot, and 
 probably the inferior nature of the plates. No doubt 
 both had an important bearing on the results ob- 
 tained, but I will pass on to the revival of iron for 
 warship construction. As practically in England this 
 occurred simultaneously wdth the introduction of armour, 
 I shall deal with them together in reference to the 
 creation of our modern navy. With many inventions it 
 is difficult to assign to any country or individual either 
 actual discovery or practical application. In most cases 
 the two operations are distinct, and separated by a 
 considerable interval of time. This is ccrtainl)' true 
 as regards both the idea of protecting ships with an 
 external casting of iron and its actual use. The first 
 idea is, I think, due to Colonel Paixhans, the L^rcnch 
 officer who was mainl)- instrunicntal in substituting 
 horizontal shell fire in place of shot. In 1825 he ex- 
 pressed an opini(jn that line-of-battle ships might be 
 cuirassed against cannon shot by sacrificing a tier of 
 guns, and that seven or eight inches of iron would effect 
 
46 Broadside Ironclads. 
 
 it. In this we see a complete foreshadowing of what 
 was to come thirty years later. He recognised at once 
 the revolution his own invention would effect in naval 
 armaments, and that provision must be made against it 
 Though no sailor or naval architect, he saw that his new 
 idea was incompatible with the lofty sides of the old 
 liner ; but still more strangely, considering the date of his 
 opinion, he indicated an amount of protectiou which 
 was not reached for some years after the introduction of 
 armour, as though he had an inkling of the later develop- 
 ment of ordnance now so familiar to us. 
 
 But this conception of the future battle ship re- 
 mained unheeded until the Crimean War, when the 
 Emperor Napoleon, who in matters of war material 
 often showed considerable ability, proposed the con- 
 struction of floating batteries, or ships protected on 
 the exterior by thick plates of iron, and shortly after 
 five such batteries were commenced in France. All 
 were of the same dimensions, 172 ft. long and 44 ft. 
 broad. The side above the water line, which was only 
 a few feet high, had a covering of 4 J in. of iron, a 
 thickness determined after experiments with existing 
 guns and projectiles. Behind the armour was a back- 
 ing of 17 in. of timber. This added to the protection, 
 besides being useful for supporting the heavy weight of 
 iron with bolts. The first was launched in March 1855, 
 and the others in July. VVe followed suit with three 
 similar vessels, the * Thunderbolt,' ' Erebus,' and ' Terror.' 
 They were at first intended for an attack on Cronstadt, 
 but this idea being abandoned, they were sent to the 
 
Broadside Ironclads. 47 
 
 Black Sea, and arrived in October 1855. Three of the 
 French batteries had been previously despatched to 
 the same locaHty, and took part in the bombardment 
 of Kinburn. Our vessels were armed with thirty 
 60-pounders, the largest piece of ordnance then in use. 
 Having a flat bottom, they only drew 9 ft. of water. 
 They were, in fact, ships from which a thick slice had 
 been removed from their hulls above and below the 
 water. They were well suited, from their light draught, 
 for the shallow waters of the Baltic, and with their 
 powerful armament could have attacked the forts at 
 Cronstadt with advantage, because these w^ere all low 
 down, and not of the formidable nature asserted at the 
 time. 
 
 The defence of Kinburn in the Black Sea consisted 
 of a strong casemated fort armed wMth over sixty guns, 
 and supported by earthworks with a few additional guns. 
 These batteries were on a narrow spit of land at the 
 entrance to the River Boug, about fort}' miles east of 
 Odessa. A combined English and French force was sent 
 to attack them early in October 1855. It consisted of 
 ships of the line, steamers, gunboats, mortar vessels, and 
 the three T^rench floating batteries lately arrived. On 
 the 17th the assault took place. The mortar boats first 
 opened fire, and then the floating batteries. Curiosity was 
 excited as to the behaviour of the new constructions, and 
 it was soon evident, after the forts comnicnced returning 
 the fire, that the iron plates afforded efficient protection. 
 The floating batteries were re[)eatedly struck by shot, 
 which hardly indented the sides, and the shells burst 
 
48 Broadside Jronclads. 
 
 harmlessly against them. Damage, of course, they re- 
 ceived as, having numerous port holes, all the projectiles 
 and pieces of shell could not be excluded, but the injuries 
 received were small in comparison to what they would 
 have been had the sides been without the armour. To 
 have been completely effectual there should have been 
 at least a dozen of these batteries. The number of guns 
 three could bring into action was relatively small. After 
 a two hours' cannonade the line-of-battle and other ships 
 advanced and poured in a heavy fire. In less than half- 
 an-hour the batteries were silenced, and the appearance 
 of a white flag showed that all resistance was at an end. 
 The success attending the employment of these 
 floating batteries in the Black Sea indicated that in 
 some such direction was to be found the solution of a 
 problem now exercising men's minds, namely, how to 
 resist the destructive effects of shell. In England we 
 were disposed to rely on what had in former years 
 admirably answered the purpose, and given us a 
 supremacy on the sea by which the security of the 
 country was ensured. Had our fleet suffered defeat, we 
 might have been more ready to adopt new inventions, 
 indeed, to initiate them, rather than wait until their 
 utility was proved by others. But the weapons to hand 
 not having failed, the natural tendency was to let them 
 go with reluctance. In France, on the other hand, no 
 such sentiment prevailed ; and the skill she had always 
 shown in naval construction was at once displayed 
 when an entirely new departure for the designs of 
 battle ships was taken. She had, moreover, in the head 
 
Broadside Ironclads. 
 
 49 
 
 of the naval constructive department at that time, a 
 man of genius and originaHty. M. Dupuy dc Lome 
 had ah'eady given proof of both these quaUties, and now 
 he determined to boldly transform a wooden line-of- 
 battle ship into an armour-clad which should be a sea- 
 worthy as well as a formidable fighting structure. To 
 this end he took the * Napoleon,' a fine two-decker, 
 removed the upper portion, lengthened her by 24 ft., 
 and placed 5-in. armour plates on the side, with 26 in. 
 of wood backing. This work was commenced in 1857, 
 but not completed till the autumn of 1859. The 
 vessel thus changed was renamed ' La Gloire,' and 
 is now historically famous as the first seagoing iron- 
 clad. Her armament was placed along the main deck, 
 
 ' LA GLOIRE.' 
 
 as in a frigate. With a length of 235 ft., and breadth 
 of 55 ft., she had a displacement of 5000 tons, and her 
 speed under steam was about 12 knots. Her comple- 
 tion created even more excitement than the appearance 
 of the * Niagara' but two years previousl)'. 
 
 In the meantime we had been watching with curiosit)- 
 the experiment of our neighbours, unable to recognise 
 that the day had arrived when a new s\'stem of naval 
 architecture for war purposes must be adopted. Ikit 
 public opinion was roused, and the Admiralty saw that 
 
 D 
 
50 Broadside Ironclads. 
 
 change could not be resisted. Designs were invited from 
 various quarters, but the plan prepared by the Chief Con- 
 structor of the Navy, Mr Isaac Watts, in conjunction 
 with the eminent naval architect Mr Scott Russell, was 
 decided upon. This produced the ' Warrior,' ordered 
 in 1859, and completed in 1861. She embodied some 
 remarkable characteristics. In the first place, her hull 
 was of iron, and considering what had taken place ten 
 years previously, the boldness of this step can be appre- 
 ciated. But as any project of adding iron to the lofty 
 sides of a line -of- battle ship was impracticable, the 
 necessity of limiting the principal armament to one deck 
 was apparent. To compensate for such a reduction, the 
 single deck should carry a number of the most powerful 
 guns then in use, with greater space between them than 
 had usually been accorded, so as to reduce the injury 
 that the entrance of a shell would inflict. Though the 
 sides might be impregnable, the port holes were so many 
 weak points which must not be lost sight of. In 'La 
 Gloire ' they were very close together, and hence much 
 of the value of the armour was lost. Such considera- 
 tions involved a length of ship which previous experi- 
 ence with the ' Mersey ' and ' Orlando ' had shown to be 
 impossible in vessels built of wood and carrying power- 
 ful machinery. Another point urged was that iron 
 would be less subject to fire than wood, so the former 
 material was adopted. The result was an iron frigate 
 382 ft. long at the water line, which was increased to 
 420 ft. over all when the old graceful form of bow was 
 added. All former associations could not be given up 
 
Broadside Ironclads. 51 
 
 at a swoop, and as the ram was not then considered an 
 important weapon, it only received partial recognition. 
 This was effected by the stem at the water line being 
 made to project slightly in the form of a spur, but the 
 bow added to the upper part hid the ram thus disposed 
 and gave the * Warrior ' the appearance forward of a 
 
 11 n \ 
 
 THE ' WARRIOR.' 
 
 sailing clipper. In the event of ramming, the overhang- 
 ing portion would be knocked away, and the spur be 
 brought in contact. On the ship's side, for a length of 
 212 ft, plates of iron 4-i- in. thick were secured to teak 
 backing 18 in. thick. This wood is durable, and had 
 other advantages for such service. The side armour left 
 off a little over 80 ft. from bow and stern, as it was not 
 considered desirable to load the ends of the ship with 
 such weights. 
 
 The main armament consisted of thirty - eight 
 68-pounders. Of these thirty-six were on the main 
 deck, eighteen on each side, forming a battery extend- 
 ing nearly the whole length of the ship, but only 
 thirteen on each side were behind the armour. Two 
 68-pounders were placed on the u[)per deck, one forward 
 and the other aft. As these guns weighed 95 cwt., only 
 a few hitherto had been mounted in battle ships, in 
 conjunction with numerous 8-in. and 32-poundcr guns. 
 The princi[)lc of concentrating the armament in a 
 
52 Broadside Ironclads. 
 
 small number of heavy guns was thus introduced, and 
 we had sprung from a three-decked ship 260 ft. long to 
 an armoured frigate of 4CX) ft. As regards speed, the 
 dimensions of the ' Warrior,' and the machinery given 
 her, enabled her to steam over 14 knots an hour, an 
 advance of more than 2 knots over her rival * La Gloire ' 
 and the wooden screw ships of that day. I have heard 
 officers express an opinion that ' La Gloire ' was the 
 better conception, because she was armoured from stem 
 to stern. In an important locality the 'Warrior' was 
 undoubtedly weak. The rudder head and steering 
 apparatus were neither below the water nor behind 
 armour, and consequently the directive power was liable 
 to be disabled early in an action. This defect was 
 aggravated by the ship having a large aperture in the 
 stern, which enabled the screw to be raised, when re- 
 quired, out of the water. This operation was only 
 carried out when the vessel was under sail, to add to her 
 capability in this respect, and prevent the screw dragging 
 in the water. When, even now, many question the 
 expediency of relying only on steam, it can be under- 
 stood that thirty years ago a seagoing battle ship with- 
 out masts and yards could find no favour. Yet such 
 a radical view had been put forward. In a work by the 
 late Lord Dunsany — Our Naval Positw?i and Policy, 
 published in 1859, he says: 'Old sailors will laugh at 
 the idea of ships without masts, but we shall surely see 
 them. As steamers themselves and railways were at 
 first scoffed at, so will be the idea of mastless ships. In 
 runs across the Atlantic the masts are mere encum- 
 
Broadside Ironclads. 55 
 
 brances, as in action they arc sources of great danger.' 
 Two years previously the First Lord of the Admiralty 
 had defended the sending of troops to India in sailing 
 ships, on the ground that if the screw ships ran short of 
 fuel they would be helpless. 
 
 The 'Warrior' was thus given extensive sail power, 
 and to all appearance she was a long, graceful frigate. 
 The transition was thereby rendered more palatable to 
 the old navy, whereas if we had gone at once to those 
 structures irreverently — but not inaptly — termed 'flat- 
 irons,' now so familiar in the later turret ships, the 
 exasperated feelings of the ancient mariners would have 
 been pitiable to contemplate. 
 
 The 'Warrior' was built at the Thames Iron Works, 
 and a proof of the excellence of her construction is to be 
 found in the fact that after an interval of thirty years her 
 hull is as sound as the day on which she was launched. 
 That day was a memorable occasion. All the world had 
 been interested in the 'bold experiment,' as Sir John 
 Pakington truly described it on her trial trip. No ship 
 ever had so many visitors from all parts during her con- 
 struction. In France, though first in the field, they had 
 simply cut down a wooden ship and plated her with iron. 
 It was a great advance on the floating batteries, but in 
 England an entirely new departure had been taken, and 
 in my opinion there is no question as to whicli was the 
 best fighting ship. I shoukl infinitely have preferred to 
 command the ' Warrior,' taking into consideration her 
 higher speed and greater dispersion of armament. The 
 gun ports were 15 ft. apart, in 'La Gloire' they were 
 
56 Broadside Ironclads. 
 
 much closer. Hence shell entering the battery of the 
 latter would have taken much greater effect. 
 
 It is not my intention to detail at length the changes 
 made in successive designs after the ' Warrior.' Already 
 rifled ordnance was imposing a fresh advance, and the 
 struggle between guns and armour had begun. The 
 'Warrior' had one sister, the 'Black Prince'; and that 
 the second-class battle ship, corresponding to the two- 
 decker, should be represented under the new order, two 
 smaller armour-clads, the ' Defence ' and ' Resistance,' 
 were begun. The disposition of their armour was 
 similar to that of the 'Warrior,' but they were only 
 280 ft. long, and the displacement 6150 tons. The 
 ' Hector ' and ' Valiant ' were two other ships of the 
 same type, with slight modifications. In the next 
 designs it was determined to remedy the defect already 
 alluded to, namely, the unprotected ends. This was 
 first done in the ' Achilles.' Her length was the same 
 as that of the ' Warrior,' but she was 600 tons larger, to 
 allow of the armour being carried completely to the 
 ends. This ship may be considered the first example 
 of the armoured belt, with gun battery in the centre, 
 though this battery before long became even more 
 contracted. 
 
 We come now to three more ships of the ' Warrior ' 
 type, the ' Minotaur,' ' Northumberland,' and ' Agincourt.' 
 To have the advantages of their model, without the 
 defects, the length was increased to 400 ft., and the 
 armour taken completely round. Its thickness was 
 increased to 5^ in., but secured to only 9 in. of wood 
 
S''> 
 
Broadside Ironclads, 59 
 
 backing. This was not found to have greater resisting 
 power against shot than the 4i-in. plates and i8-in. 
 backing. The armament of this class was improved by 
 the introduction of rifled guns of greater weight than 
 the 68-pounder. Such modifications involved a larger 
 vessel, and the ' Minotaur ' and her sisters reached 
 10,600 tons, a considerable advance on the 'Warrior.' 
 While the weight of the ' Warrior's ' armour and back- 
 ing amounted to 1350 tons, the ' Minotaur's ' protection 
 weighed 2100 tons. As sail power was still considered 
 necessary, these vessels were given five masts. Thus 
 equipped they presented a curious appearance, and 
 puzzled the nautical world. It is related that a 
 merchant vessel on one occasion approached incon- 
 veniently near one of the * Minotaur ' class at night, 
 her great length and the five masts leading those in 
 charge of the other to believe that there were two 
 ships, and that their own might pass between ! 
 
 It may be imagined that the change from wood 
 to iron in construction did not find us — in our dock 
 yards, at least — with a body of men accustomed to 
 work with the new material, and when it was decided 
 to build an iron ship of the 'Warrior' type at 
 Chatham it had to be carried out by shipwrights 
 whose previous experience had been limited to wooden 
 shipbuilding. I have heard it said thc\' used the same 
 tools for the harder substance, but whether so or not 
 the ship was completed in less time than the others, 
 and the workmanship was excellent. All the previous 
 vessels had been built in private )'ards. 
 
6o Broadside Ironclads. 
 
 Though we had thus by 1862 made a good start 
 with armoured ships, the fleet contained a great many 
 wooden ships at that time, either completed or build- 
 ing. It was then determined to convert several of 
 them into ironclads. A certain number were selected 
 for this purpose, cut down, lengthened, and armoured 
 similarly to the iron ships with 4^-in. plates secured to 
 30 in. of teak backing. These measures produced 
 the * Prince Consort,' ' Ocean,' ' Caledonia,' * Royal 
 Alfred,' and ' Royal Oak.' In the two last the armour 
 was 6 in. thick. Two others, the ' Lord Clyde ' and 
 ' Lord Warden,' were also built of wood and armoured. 
 Iron was still considered to have disadvantages, which 
 are expressed in a memorandum by Sir Spencer Robin- 
 son, then Controller of the Navy, and dated March 2d, 
 1863. These were, liability of the bottom to injury 
 and to becoming coated with marine growth ; small 
 quantity of good iron in the market and uncertainty of 
 quality ; greater cost of iron ships. If they were more 
 durable, there was the probability of their becoming 
 obsolete, and thus a cheaper and less durable vessel 
 might prove best in the end. For some such reasons 
 the French preferred wood. There is good sense in 
 these arguments, though much might be said on the 
 other side. The danger of durable ships is the tempta- 
 tion to resist building new ones, and to be content with 
 patching up what has rendered good service. Ten 
 years ago we were under this influence, and our naval 
 strength was thereby impaired. The recent Naval 
 Defence Act broke the spell. 
 
Broadside Ironclads, 6i 
 
 I must, however, now pass on to a change which 
 took place when the present Sir E. Reed was appointed 
 Chief Constructor of the Navy. He was an advocate 
 for iron, shorter ships, complete armour belts, and the 
 concentration of the armament into a smaller num- 
 ber of heavier guns in a central battery or citadel. 
 In 1752 a French naval architect had written : 'II 
 est certain que ce sont toujours les gros canons qui 
 sont les plus avantageux dans un combat, et ainsi il 
 est preferable de mettre sur un vaisseau un petit nombre 
 de gros canons qu'un grand nombre de petits,' and yet 
 in the old w^ars we had found number not size most 
 influential in deciding a combat. This was owing to 
 the fact that the issue depended more on the disablement 
 of the crew than of the ship itself Injury to the masts 
 assisted this result, because it enabled the other ship to 
 attain a position from which the opposing crew could be 
 decimated with impunity. The greater the number of 
 guns (provided their projectiles could penetrate the 
 sides of the enemy's ships) the more chances of dis- 
 abling men and guns, until submission followed inabilit\- 
 to resist. Ships were seldom sunk in action. Such an 
 incident was a matter for regret, because, though 
 diminishing the force of the enemy, it added nothing to 
 your own, whereas a capture counted, to use a parlia- 
 mentary phrase, two on a division. The prize under 
 another flag was speedily utilised b}' the conqueror. 
 Of late years sinking appears to be the object aimed at 
 in action, and greater care is taken to avert tliis than to 
 protect the crew. 
 
62 
 
 Broadside Ironclads. 
 
 The ideas of Mr Reed in reference to construction 
 were adopted, and in one respect it could not be other- 
 wise. The size and power of guns were being increased 
 to overcome the resistance of armour, and this necessi- 
 tated a smaller number, unless ships were to be much 
 larger. At this time, however, a displacement of 10,000 
 tons was considered an outside limit. The ' Bellerophon,' 
 begun in 1863, was the first vessel under the new regime. 
 
 THE 'BELLEROPHON. 
 
 With a length of 300 ft., and a displacement of 7500 
 tons, she carried a 6-in. belt of armour, which in the 
 centre was carried up to form a central battery to con- 
 tain ten guns, each weighing 12 tons. Two more guns 
 were placed forward to give bow fire. 
 
 It was soon seen that a further advance must be 
 made to meet the growing power of the gun. This led 
 to the design of the ' Hercules,' in which the displace- 
 ment was increased to 8700 tons, the armoured belt to 
 
 THE * HERCULES.' 
 
 9 in., and the principal armament to 18-ton guns. To 
 add to the fire right ahead and astern the ends of the 
 
Broadside Ironclads. 63 
 
 battery at the sides were recessed. This enabled two 
 of the battery guns to point ahead and two astern. 
 The length of the ship did not exceed 325 ft. 
 
 From this brief description it is evident how rapid 
 had been the advance in most of the fighting elements 
 of the new warship. Speed alone had not increased, 
 but this had been maintained with a shorter and handier 
 ship. The great length of the 'Warrior' and 'Minotaur' 
 was inconvenient, to say the least of it, owing to the space 
 they required to turn in. The ' Hercules ' was univers- 
 ally recognised as a splendid specimen of construction, 
 and remains to this day a great favourite with naval 
 officers. She w^as, however, eclipsed by the ' Alexandra,' 
 launched a few years after — the last representative of 
 the broadside system. Her length was the same as 
 that of the ' Hercules,' but the displacement was 
 increased to 9500 tons, by which she was enabled 
 to carry armour 12 in. thick at the water line 
 opposite the machinery, and tapering to 6 in. at 
 the bow and stern. The importance of protecting 
 the motive power more completely than other portions 
 of the hull had for some time been recognised, and, 
 moreover, the extremities would be overburdened with 
 such heavy weights as 12-in. plates. The disposi- 
 tion of the armament differed somewhat from that of 
 the ' Hercules.' There was the same central batter}-, 
 containing ten 18-ton guns, but above this was another 
 battery, in which was placed two 25-ton guns. Both 
 batteries had recessed pcjrts, by which a pcnverful bow 
 fire was obtained. It may be observed here that the 
 
64 Bi'oadside Ironclads. 
 
 mounting and working of such heavy guns on the 
 broadside was only possible from their comparative 
 shortness, so that when required they could be with- 
 drawn or housed inside the ship. Guns of the present 
 day, and of the same diameter of bore, are twice the 
 length. We had already adopted the twin screw, and 
 the ' Alexandra' was so fitted. This, added to improved 
 machinery, gave her a speed of 15 knots. The climax 
 in broadside ironclads had now been reached. Few 
 were found to dispute the merits of our latest production 
 as an engine of war. Though never )'ct opposed to a 
 hostile vessel, the ' Alexandra ' took part in the bombard- 
 ment of the Egyptian forts at Alexandria in 1882, and 
 rendered good service on that occasion. She was struck 
 about thirty times, but sustained no serious injur)-. 
 
 Space has not permitted me to allude to a number 
 of other vessels built between the production of the 
 ' Warrior ' and * Alexandra.' They partook more or 
 less of the character of those described, though varying 
 in size. The second-class ironclad was well represented 
 by several of moderate dimensions, so that the old 
 gradation of two and three-deckers was preserved in 
 the new fleet. Moreover, the Suez Canal was completed, 
 and its depth was such that the heaviest ironclads could 
 not pass through. It was desirable that some of our 
 battle ships should be able to utilise this route to the 
 East, instead of taking the longer passage by the Cape 
 of Good Hope. We should never neglect this considera- 
 tion whatever the temptation to add to the dimensions 
 of warships. 
 
Broadside Ironclads. 67 
 
 In this brief review of progress between 1861 and 
 1877 I have confined myself to the development of the 
 broadside system of armoured vessels, and, looking back, 
 how wonderful that progress seems. The * Warrior ' 
 carried only 1350 tons weight of iron and wood for 
 protection out of a total 9000 tons displacement. The 
 * Alexandra,' only 500 tons larger, is enabled to sustain 
 2300 tons employed for protection, and is a knot faster. 
 Rolling iron plates of any thickness was practically a 
 new industry in i860 ; but in sixteen years, commencing 
 with 4i-in. plates, the demand for a thickness of 12 in. 
 had been as promiptly met. 
 
 While we, in common with other nations, were thus 
 encasing our ships in coats of mail, the advantage con- 
 ferred by this system was to my mind strikingly illus- 
 trated by an episode in the American Civil War. After 
 a cruise of two years the celebrated * Alabama ' put into 
 Cherbourg to be docked and repaired. Her commander. 
 Captain Semmes, in his interesting account of her career, 
 says of this period : ' The poor old " Alabama " was not 
 now what she had been. She was like the wearied fox- 
 hound limping back after a long chase, footsore, and 
 longing for quiet and repose. Her commander, like her- 
 self, was well-nigh worn down.' Three days after her 
 arrival the United States sloop ' Kearsage ' turned up off 
 the port, and Semmes sent a message to her commander 
 that if he w(juld wait until the '.Alabama' had completed 
 with coal he would come out to meet him. The two 
 vessels were not unequally matched in dimensions and 
 armament. The ' Kearsage,' Captain Winsluw, was a 
 
68 Broadside Ironclads. 
 
 wooden sloop of 1030 tons. She carried two 11 -in. 
 smooth bore guns, four 32-pounders, and one rifled 
 30-pounder. Her crew numbered 160. The 'Alabama' 
 was also a wooden vessel of 1040 tons. Her armament 
 consisted of one 8-in. smooth bore, one 7-in. rifled gun, 
 and six 32-pounders. She carried 150 men. Beyond 
 stowing away her top hamper and making the prepara- 
 tions for action common to rigged vessels she took no 
 special precautions. The ' Kearsage,' on the other hand, 
 had suspended her spare chain cables up and down the 
 side, opposite the boilers and machincr}-, thus giving 
 armour protection to that important locality and a large 
 portion of the hull at the water line. The chain was 
 covered over with a thin casing of wood, which effectu- 
 ally concealed what was beneath. This method of add- 
 ing to the defence of wooden ships had been first 
 adopted by Admiral Farragut when passing hostile 
 forts in the Mississippi the same year. As against the 
 guns and projectiles of that time, and especially as a 
 preventive to the penetration of shells, by causing them 
 to burst outside, the plan was ingenious and effectual. 
 The same procedure was open to Captain Semmes, but 
 for some reason he did not adopt it, nor does he appear 
 to have been aware of this move of his opponent. Though 
 Semmes afterwards sneered at an enemy ' who went out 
 chivalrously armoured to encounter a ship whose wooden 
 sides were entirely without protection,' such utilisation 
 of the resources of a ship to improve her defensive 
 capability was not only perfectly justifiable but the 
 plain duty of a commander desirous of ensuring the 
 
Broadside Ironclads. 69 
 
 victory with as little injury as possible to his own 
 vessel. 
 
 On the morning of June 19th, 1864, the 'Alabama' 
 steamed out of Cherbourg Harbour, and steered for 
 the * Kearsage/ then awaiting her about six miles off 
 the port. When the distance between them had been 
 reduced to a mile, the ' Alabama ' opened fire, but it was 
 not returned until the two ships were 900 yards from 
 each other. The ' Kearsage ' then steered to close with 
 her antagonist, but the 'Alabama' kept on at full speed, 
 and the two ships steamed round in a circle at a distance 
 from each other of about 800 yards. The firing now 
 became very hot. The ' Alabama ' was hulled several 
 times, and a number of men were disabled. Her own 
 fire, on the other hand, had little effect on the ' Kearsage,' 
 the chain cables affording protection to the hull, and 
 her principal damage was aloft. After an hour's action 
 a shell from one of the 11 -in. guns of the 'Kearsage' 
 struck the 'Alabama' near the water line and burst, 
 making a large hole, through which the water poured 
 into the ship. Semmes turned his vessel towards the 
 French shore, and endeavoured to reach it under sail and 
 steam. ]^ut the 'Alabama' was filling fast, and further 
 effort being useless, her flag was hauled down. She 
 sank soon afterwards, the officers and crew being picked 
 up by boats from an English \'acht, a h^"cnch pik)t 
 vessel, and the ' Kearsage.' Semmes complained that 
 his adversary was dilal(>r\' in this matter, but after an 
 action boats are not often in a condition to be despatched 
 at a moment's notice, and the captain of the ' Kearsage' 
 
70 Broadside Ironclads. 
 
 was not a man to disregard the claims of humanity. 
 The casualties to the crew of the ' Alabama ' were nine 
 killed and twenty-one wounded, while the ' Kearsage ' 
 had only three wounded. This vessel was struck thirty 
 times, of which thirteen only were in the hull. The fir- 
 ing of the ' Alabama ' was wild, but she suffered under 
 another great disadvantage, that she had previously 
 little shot or shell practice against a target, being 
 unable to replenish her ammunition. Mere drill with 
 guns unloaded can never render men efficient in action. 
 Frequent target practice is essential to give confidence 
 and proficiency before the enemy. Lack of this and 
 the improvised armour of her antagonist told against 
 the ' Alabama,' and two valuable lessons were thus 
 afforded by this action. They should not be forgotten 
 at a time when the principle of protecting ships with 
 armoured decks only is being so much extended, and 
 when there is a tendency to curtail practice with full 
 charges of powder owing to their effect upon the guns. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 EARLY TURRET SHIPS 
 
 Introduction of the * Monitor ' — Claims of Ericsson and Captain Cowper 
 Coles — ' Merrimac ' and * Monitor ' in America — ' Royal Sovereign ' 
 converted in England — Further development of the Turret 
 System — ' Devastation ' to ' Inflexible.' 
 
 Ericsson is generally credited with the first idea of 
 mounting a gun in a revolving turret and placing it in 
 a low iron-plated vessel, as practically applied in his 
 celebrated ' Monitor ' of the American Civil War. But 
 Captain Cowper Coles, some years before, had been 
 urging the adoption of the same system, and many of 
 his original ideas are to be seen embodied in the ships 
 of to-day. The plan with him seems to have originated 
 in 1855, when during the Crimean War he mounted a 
 32-pounder on a raft, for service in the shallow waters 
 of the Sea of Azof. This proving useful, he next thought 
 of protecting the gun, and proposed an improved raft, 
 formed of empty casks planked over, to carry a 6S- 
 poundcr, pointing through an apcrtin-c in a hemispherical 
 iron shield placed over it. He proposed a number of 
 these rafts for an attack on Cronstadt. A committee of 
 naval officers serving in the Black Sea reported favour- 
 ably on the scheme, and Captain Coles was ordered 
 
72 Early Turret Ships. 
 
 home to lay his plans before the Admiralty. Peace, 
 however, intervened, and nothing further was done. 
 Captain Coles continued working out his ideas, and in 
 June i860 read a paper at the United Service Institution, 
 in which he proposed a low freeboard vessel, on which 
 were to be a number of cupolas or turrets, such as he 
 had devised for the improved raft, each containing two 
 guns ; the space required for a pair of guns being little 
 more than that necessary for a single piece. But now 
 follows the principal feature of his system. Hitherto 
 changing the direction of a gun was effected roughl}' and 
 laboriously by tackles and handspikes. Captain Coles' 
 proposal is thus described in his own words : * The 
 horizontal motion or training is effected by turning the 
 shield itself, with the gun, crew, and the platform on 
 which they stand. The whole apparatus thus becomes, 
 as it were, the gun carriage, and being placed on a 
 common turntable, can be revolved to the greatest 
 nicety of adjustment by means of a winch.' The idea 
 of a turntable he no doubt took from the arrangement 
 of the railway system. As all heavy guns are now 
 mounted on turntables, and revolve either with the 
 shield, as in case of turrets, or independently, as in the 
 case of ship barbettes, we must recognise the claim of 
 Captain Coles to be the inventor of the modern system. 
 The ' Monitor' was not built until two years afterwards. 
 Our Government, however, had decided upon the 
 ' Warrior ' type, and were not disposed to try an 
 experiment in quite a different direction. Nor were 
 the continental powers so inclined. The broadsid 
 
-f^I 
 
 [^ 
 
Early Turret Ships, 75 
 
 armour-clad for sea service, and the broadside floating 
 battery for coast defence, had been generally adopted. 
 But the Civil War in America broke out, and certain 
 naval operations had an immense influence on the 
 course of naval construction. The Southern Con- 
 federacy was the first to appreciate the value of armour- 
 clad vessels. In July 1861 it was decided to raise and 
 convert into an ironclad the wooden frigate ' Merri- 
 mac,' of 3400 tons and forty guns, which had been sunk 
 at the Norfolk navy yard when it was abandoned two 
 months previously. When raised, the upper portion 
 of the vessel was cut down to within 2 ft. of the 
 water line, and on this reduced hull was constructed a 
 casemate with slanting sides. Two layers of railway 
 iron formed the protection of this casemate, in which 
 the guns were placed, and worked in ports on the broad- 
 side system. Dearth of plant in the South for such 
 work, at the beginning of hostilities, caused considerable 
 delay, so that it was not until March 8th, 1862, that she 
 proceeded to Hampton Roads, where the Federal fleet 
 was at anchor. This consisted of wooden vessels. 
 Among them were the * Cumberland,' of thirty guns, 
 and the * Congress,' of fifty guns. No attack appears 
 to have been anticipated, and presumably no informa- 
 tion of the ' Merrimac's ' completion had reached the 
 Northern commander. Though fire was opened on 
 the ' Merrimac,' it had no effect ow her protected sides. 
 She made straight for the ' Cumberland,' and struck 
 her forward on the starboard side. The ' Cumberland ' 
 sank shortly after. The ' Congress ' in the meantime 
 
76 Early T^irret Ships. 
 
 had slipped her anchor and got into shallow water, 
 where the ' Merrimac,' owing to her deeper draught, 
 could not follow. Her guns could reach, however, and 
 the ' Congress ' was set on fire, when she hauled her flag 
 down. The ' Merrimac ' then withdrew, intending to 
 return the next day and destroy the rest of the 
 squadron. 
 
 There was great consternation in the North at this 
 event, but the means were at hand to arrest the Southern 
 vessel in her triumphant career. 
 
 In August 1861 the Northern States had determined 
 to obtain ironclad steam vessels, and at the end of that 
 month Ericsson offered to construct in a few months a 
 vessel which would destroy the rebel squadron. A board 
 of officers was appointed to consider plans proposed, 
 and in September it recommended that a vessel on 
 Ericsson's design should be built. She was commenced 
 in October, launched on January 30th, 1862, and com- 
 pleted on February 15th, 1862. The design provided 
 for a hull not more than 2 ft. above the water, and with 
 a flat bottom, that the draught might not exceed 10 ft. 
 The sides, to a short distance below the water line, were 
 protected with 4-in. plates. In the centre of the deck 
 was built a circular turret, revolving on a central spindle, 
 and protected with 8 in. of iron. Inside the turret were 
 mounted two ii-in. smooth bore guns, pointing through 
 port holes. They could thus fire in any direction with- 
 out turning the vessel, an obvious advantage not only 
 on the open sea but especially in narrow waters, for 
 which she was more intended. Such was the famous 
 
Early Turi^et Ships. 
 
 11 
 
 ' Monitor,' a name given by Ericsson to his creation to 
 admonish the leaders of the Southern Rebellion, and to 
 be also a monitor to the Lords of the Admiralty in 
 England, suggesting to them doubts as to the propriety 
 of their building four broadside ironclads at three and 
 
 KKICSSON S TURRIC'l'. 
 
 a halt million dollars each. Such were the reasons m'ven 
 
 o 
 
 by Ericsson himself for the clioice of this name. He 
 had not forg(jtten his unsuccessful attempts to favour- 
 abl}^ impress their lordships with his screw propeller 
 twenty-four years previousl}-. 
 
 We have seen that on March 8th, 1862, the 'Merrimac ' 
 had sunk the 'Cumberland.' On March 2d the ' Moni- 
 
y^ Early Turret Ships, 
 
 tor' left New York under the command of Lieutenant 
 Worden, and after a somewhat stormy passage she 
 arrived at Hampton Roads on the evening of the 8th. 
 The next morning when the 'Merrimac' appeared again, 
 bent on destruction, those on board descried a strange- 
 looking object, an iron tower, apparently, on the surface 
 of the water. Then the low hull was made out, and a 
 dash made for this new opponent. The battle then 
 began, but it was soon apparent that the ' Merrimac's ' 
 ordnance could make no impression on the turret of the 
 ' Monitor,' and there was little else to hit. The case- 
 mate of the * Merrimac,' however, offered a good mark, 
 and almost every shot of the other took effect some- 
 where. After two hours' pounding the * Merrimac ' 
 hauled out of action, having sustained considerable 
 injury, and, owing to orders previously given, the * Moni- 
 tor' allowed her to depart. But the principal object 
 had been gained, and the ' Merrimac ' gave no further 
 trouble. The ' Monitor ' was struck twenty times, of 
 which nine hits were on the turret, but the injury done 
 was trifling. Great rejoicings took place throughout 
 the North at this event, and it was believed this new 
 method of naval construction would supersede all others. 
 It certainly exercised a powerful influence in more than 
 one country. 
 
 But an essential quality was lacking in the 
 * Monitor,' — seaworthiness. Steaming against a moder- 
 ate wind and sea, the water swept over her like a 
 deluge, and found its way down the funnels and any 
 aperture leading to the interior. A few months after 
 
Early T2i7^ret Ships. 79 
 
 her encounter with the ' Merrimac ' she foundered in a 
 gale off Cape Hatteras. In England it was evident 
 that a type of vessel unfit for distant service could not 
 serve as a model for general adoption. But as coast 
 defence was then prominently before the country, owing 
 to the views expressed by Lord Palmerston when pro- 
 posing in i860 a large outlay on sea forts, it was decided 
 to construct two turret ships on Captain Coles' plans. 
 A wooden three-decker, the ' Royal Sovereign,' was 
 accordingly cut down and armoured with 5i-in. iron 
 
 THE ' ROYAL SOVEREIGN.' 
 
 plates. She carried four turrets, the foremost one con- 
 taining two guns, and the others a single gun each. To 
 give more freeboard at sea there were hinged light iron 
 bulwarks, 3 ft. 6 in. high, which were thrown down when 
 it was desired to fight the guns. The turrets, instead of 
 revolving on a central spindle as in the 'Monitor,' ro- 
 tated on rollers fixed on the lower circumference of the 
 turret, thus giving greater rigidity to resist impact of 
 shot. A similar vessel, the * Prince Albert,' was spcciall)' 
 built of iron by Messrs Samuda for the same cciuipment. 
 The 'Royal Sovereign' was completed in 1864, and 
 underwent successful trials. Having a low freeboard, 
 and being without masts, she was W(A considered a ship 
 capable of service on foreign stations. 
 
8o Early Turret Ships. 
 
 Captain Coles, however, considered that a seagoing 
 turret ship was perfectly feasible, and persistently advo- 
 cated the principle. As he was supported by the press, 
 the Admiralty decided to build a masted turret ship, and 
 the ' Monarch ' was commenced. As she did not embody 
 the views of Captain Coles, he was at length permitted 
 to build a vessel of his own design, and he entrusted 
 the work to Messrs Laird of Liverpool. Guns having 
 increased so much in weight it became necessary to limit 
 the number of turrets to a pair placed on the centre line 
 of the ship, 120 ft. apart, each containing a pair of 
 guns. There were three masts, on the tripod principle, 
 by which the necessity for rigging is dispensed with, and 
 she was given full sail power. It is unnecessary to go 
 into further details, because this unfortunate vessel, which 
 was named the ' Captain,' was lost, with nearly all hands, 
 on September 6th, 1870. She capsized in a heavy squall 
 off Cape Finistcrre when under sail. Captain Burgoyne 
 was in command of her, while Captain Coles was his 
 guest, desirous of observing the behaviour of his design 
 at sea. The loss of two such men, with the remaining 
 officers and crew, was a national disaster not likely to 
 be forgotten. Errors of construction caused the cata- 
 strophe, combined with the great leverage exerted by 
 the sails when struck by a heavy squall. 
 
 Loss of the ' Captain ' and the principal advocate of 
 masted turret ships led the Admiralty to abandon this 
 type, but the ' Monarch ' was completed, and remains the 
 solitary specimen in our navy. She was similar in 
 general design to the ' Captain,' but in many important 
 
Early Turret Skips. .S i 
 
 respects the two ships differed widely. The sides of the 
 * Monarch ' were 14 ft. above the water, whereas in the 
 ' Captain ' they were only 6 ft. In the original design of 
 the latter they were to have been 8 ft., but additional 
 weights placed in the ship reduced this by 2 ft. The 
 two turrets of the * Monarch ' were closer together, the 
 lower portion of them being protected by the side 
 armour above the belt, which was carried up for this 
 purpose. The thickness here was 7 in., while the turrets 
 were given 10 in. of armour. In each was mounted a 
 pair of 25-ton guns, the largest ordnance then in use. 
 As the masts obstructed the right ahead and astern fire 
 smaller guns were placed at the ends of the vessel. All 
 this was accomplished on a displacement of 8350 tons, 
 and produced a powerful fighting machine, but the sail- 
 ing capacity was indifferent. In fact it w^as becoming 
 recognised that the gain in one respect was a loss in 
 another, and that the turret system suffered if combined 
 with a large spread of canvas. The advantage of 
 turrets was the large arc of training they enabled guns 
 to cover on either side of the ship, and that the whole 
 of the armament was brought into play instead of only 
 half, as in the case of a broadside ship. But if masts and 
 their rigging were given to such ships, as in the case of 
 the ' Monarch,' this arc was much circumscribed, and 
 the full benefit of the system was not reaiKxl. 
 
 It was therefore determined to build turret ships 
 for extended sea service without this objectionable 
 feature. Locomotion was to dei)end wholly on steam 
 and two screws with separate engines gave a double 
 
 F 
 
82 Early Turret Skips. 
 
 chance against a total breakdown. To make up for the 
 absence of sail power, the supply of fuel must be in- 
 creased. This led to the design of the ' Devastation,' 
 and as she was the first mastless seagoing turret ship we 
 built, her construction excited considerable interest. 
 The leading features were a low freeboard hull, carrj'ing 
 two turrets, on the middle line of the ship. To protect 
 the base of the turrets an armoured breastwork or citadel 
 was built round them. This did not extend ricrht across 
 
 I 
 
 'TS- 
 
 THE 'DEVASTATION. 
 
 the vessel, so that there was a space between the walls 
 of the breastwork and the ship's side. At the instance 
 of a committee appointed after the loss of the ' Captain ' 
 to consider designs, this space was enclosed by carrj'ing 
 up the side of the vessel to the height of the breast- 
 work and extending the deck over the latter to meet 
 the raised portion. This addition to the side, though 
 not armoured, increased the freeboard of the ship in the 
 central portion to over lO ft., while right aft it was 
 only 4 ft., and forward there was a low forecastle 8 ft. 
 above the water. The armour on the side extended 
 right round, and was 12 in. thick amidships, tapering 
 to 10 in. at bow and stern. On the turrets it was 
 14 in. It was at first intended to mount in these 
 
Early Turret Ships. 8 
 
 four 25-ton guns similar to those of the 'Monarch,' 
 but we had now reached ordnance of 35 tons, and a 
 pair of these 'infants,' as they had been ironically termed, 
 were allotted to each of the * Devastation's ' turrets. She 
 was given twin screws, worked by separate engines, and a 
 coal stowage provided for 1300 tons. This capacity was 
 largely in excess of that of all previous ships, and forms 
 one of the most valuable features of this class. When 
 it is considered what was done with dimensions — 9350 
 tons — ^just under those of the ' Alexandra,' that the total 
 weight of protection carried was 2950 tons of iron and 
 wood, or an increase of 600 tons over the broadside ship, 
 and that she could present on either side a concentrated 
 fire of four 35-ton guns, while the range ahead or astern 
 was covered by two such pieces, all efficient!)' pro- 
 tected, it may be conceded that the success of the turret 
 system had been proved. But what a change from the 
 three-decker of 120 guns to the 'Warrior' of forty, and 
 thence to the ' Devastation,' with onl)- four heav}' guns. 
 Could the principle of concentration of armament be 
 extended further ? The limits were not }'et reached. 
 The 'Devastation' was completed in 1873, and an\- 
 doubts that may have been felt as to her scaworth}' 
 qualities were speedily set at rest. She proved able 
 to encounter severe weather, and wonderful h' slcath' 
 in a heav)' sea. The sea washed oxxt her like a lialf- 
 tide rock, but with a[)crtures closed it could not find 
 its way belcnv. There was, of course, discomfort to the 
 crew, who were dependent on artificial ventilatic)n, but 
 for service in the MediterraiiecUi, where bad weather is 
 
84 Early Tier ret Ships. 
 
 of short duration, this class of ship has proved well 
 suited. 
 
 The * Dreadnought ' was the next improvement. A 
 slight increase in the thickness of the armour and weight 
 of the armament involved an additional displacement of 
 1500 tons. There were also structural differences of 
 some importance, which entailed extra weight. The 
 armoured breastwork extended right across the ship, and 
 was 186 ft. long, instead of 154 ft. in the 'Devastation.' 
 A higher freeboard throughout was also given. She 
 had four 38-ton guns, which, owing to improvements in 
 ammunition, were considerably more effective than the 
 35-ton guns. With these modifications the 'Dread- 
 nought ' was, and is to this day, regarded as an excellent 
 type of fighting ship. After a departure of some years, 
 we again returned to the general principle of her con- 
 struction in the ' Nile ' and 'Trafalgar,' to which allusion 
 will be made later on. 
 
 Though we had, without unduly increasing the size 
 of the battle ship, passed from 4^ in. to 14 in. of pro- 
 tective armour, the power of the gun had more than kept 
 pace, and it was evident that if armour capable of resist- 
 ing the heaviest ordnance was applied to a ship the 
 area covered by it must be contracted, or we should be 
 compelled to resort to enormous ships. At that time it 
 was considered undesirable to exceed 12,000 tons. Not 
 only had the resistance of the structure to hostile shot 
 to be considered, but the power to strike heavy blows 
 in return was even more important. Artillerists were, 
 with improved plant, constructing heavier guns than 
 
Early Turret Skips. 85 
 
 the 38-ton, and we were not prepared to view with 
 equanimity foreign vessels with an advantage over ours 
 in this respect. The outcome of such views was the 
 ' Inflexible,' designed by Mr Barnaby, then Chief Con- 
 structor of the Navy. In her the armour at the side 
 only extended for a length of 1 10 ft., in the centre of the 
 vessel, so that the complete armoured belt was aban- 
 doned. This was the principal innovation, which led to 
 
 / 
 
 rm rrm-ri o mn- a 
 
 
 „> 
 
 THE ' INFLEXIBLE. 
 
 much controversy at the time. There was a breastwork 
 or citadel, as in the ' Dreadnought,' the whole breadth of 
 the ship, which was increased to 74 ft., a remarkable 
 amount of beam for a length of 320 ft. In the ' Monarch ' 
 the proportions were 330 by 58. 15y thus contracting 
 the citadel of the 'Inflexible' to iio ft. it was possible 
 to protect the sides with 24 in. of iron, disposed in two 
 thicknesses of 12 in. each, with a la}-cr of wood backing 
 between. Diagonally across the citadel, and within its 
 walls, were placed two turrets, each armed with a pair 
 of 80-ton guns, such a bound had ordnance made since 
 
86 
 
 Early Turret Ships. 
 
 the days of the ' infants.' This arrangement of the 
 turrets was to allow all four guns to point directly ahead 
 or astern, whereas if placed on the fore and aft line, as 
 in previous ships, only half the armament could be so 
 utilised. The turrets were protected with i6 in. of 
 armour, consisting of a wrought-iron plate of 7 in., and 
 
 SECTION THROUGH TURRET OF THE ' INFLEXHU.E 
 
 outside that what is termed a ' compound ' plate of 9 in. 
 This was simply a plate of wrought-iron of 5^ in. thick, 
 to which a hard steel face, 3^ in. thick, had been 
 added and the two plates welded together. Wrought- 
 iron was too soft, and allowed the projectiles to pene- 
 trate, but the hard steel face broke them up. Hence a 
 reduced thickness of the new material could be used 
 with a corresponding saving of weight. 
 
Early Titnxt Ships. (S7 
 
 When turrets were first introduced steam was em- 
 ployed to rotate them, and also, as the guns increased 
 in weight, for many of the operations connected with 
 their manipulation. But steam has the disadvantage 
 of condensation in pipes when transmitted, and for 
 such a delicate manoeuvre as keeping the sights of a 
 gun on a mark, which was effected by small movements 
 of the turret, steam power has defects. Hydraulic 
 power was therefore devised by Sir William Arm- 
 strong and Mr G. Rendel, of the Elswick firm, to 
 perform all these operations, and applied in the ' In- 
 flexible ' with great success. The heavy turrets could 
 be rapidly swung round or rotated with almost im- 
 perceptible motion, and stopped dead at any required 
 moment. 
 
 From the day on which we had begun to construct 
 warships of iron it became necessary to guard against 
 injury in the event of such a vessel striking the ground 
 or rock. A wooden ship might do this and suffer 
 little damage or danger of foimdering, as the material, 
 being more elastic, had a tendency to close in over 
 the fractured part, and swell as it became sodden with 
 water. Iron did not pcjssess this advantage, and, more- 
 over, to give the requisite buo^'anc)' the submerged 
 portion of the hull must ncccssaril)- be thin, so that 
 injury was easil\' inllicted in this part. h>\'cn at the 
 slowest speed the momentum of a weight of 9000 touii 
 coming in contact with a rock' would crush in the 
 fragile shell like matchwood. To meet this the double 
 bottom was dc\ised, which consisted in having an 
 
88 Early Tzirret Ships. 
 
 inner iron skin a short distance from the outer bottom. 
 In case of the latter being punctured, the inner skin 
 would prevent an influx of water to the interior of the 
 ship. This was first carried out in the ' Warrior,' but 
 the dual portion only extended 1 1 ft. on each side of 
 the keel. In succeeding ships this principle was de- 
 veloped, and the inner skin became a veritable second 
 hull under water, the space between the two being 
 increased and sub-divided into a number of cells. 
 This cellular sub-division was adopted with the view 
 not only of giving strength in case of striking the 
 ground, but also of reducing the effect of a torpedo 
 explosion under water. As it was impossible to place 
 armour here, the double bottom was a substitute, the 
 hope being that the inner skin would be intact after 
 the outer hull had been driven in by the explosion. 
 As against the blow delivered by a ram such a protec- 
 tion would be insufficient. The only safeguard is to 
 divide the interior of the vessel into watertight com- 
 partments, so as to confine the water which would rush 
 in when both skins were fractured to that particular 
 locality. This principle had been carried out in greater 
 degree with succeeding ships, so that the ' Inflexible ' 
 had 137 of these compartments. Each is provided 
 with a watertight door, to allow free access to all parts 
 at ordinary times, and these, of course, must be a 
 source of weakness to the principle. They may not 
 be closed at the proper time, and are liable to get 
 out of order unless continually worked. 
 
 Although the difference in weight between four 38-ton 
 
Early Turret Ships. 89 
 
 guns and the same number of 80-ton guns, including 
 the carriages on which they are mounted, does not 
 exceed 200 or 300 tons, it is in the ammunition that a 
 heavier armament makes so much difference. We had 
 arrived at projectiles weighing nearly a ton each, with 
 a charge of some hundreds of pounds of powder. To 
 provide, therefore, say a hundred rounds for each gun, or 
 even a smaller number, involved a great addition of 
 weight. Hence the dimensions of the 'Inflexible' and 
 her equipment increased the displacement to 1 1,600 tons 
 — the largest warship we had constructed. The design 
 was not to pass unchallenged. Grave doubts were 
 expressed by a high authority as to the wisdom of 
 leaving the ends unprotected, and as to the stability of 
 the vessel when these had been subjected to a heavy 
 shell fire. The extremities were guarded only by an 
 armoured deck 3 in. thick just below the water line, and 
 at the sides by spaces filled with cork, to give buoyancy 
 when this part was perforated by shot and water gained 
 admittance. A committee, however, of distinguished men 
 appointed to investigate the design did not consider 
 that the ship would be specially liable to such a disaster. 
 The question really hinged upon the amount of fire a 
 ship is likely to receive in action in any particular part, 
 and experience teaches us that, under such conditions, 
 no one portion is more liable than another. The ' In- 
 flexible,' therefore, was coniplctcd, and in 1882 assisted 
 in the bombardment of the Egyptian forts with the 
 'Alexandra,' each representing a system and its de- 
 velopment in twcnt}' )'ears. i\ brief review of this 
 
90 Early Titi'rct Ships, 
 
 important operation as the first serious bombardment 
 by an ironclad squadron may be of interest. 
 
 There has been rather a tendency to depreciate this 
 engagement by dwelling on the weakness of the defence. 
 Much is made of the fact that no submarine mines were 
 used to keep the ships at a distance, that the guns on 
 shore were weak and badly served, and that under totally 
 different conditions the fleet could not have succeeded. 
 It seems unnecessary to discuss what might have been, 
 or we could reply that no special arrangements had been 
 made on the side of the attack, no mortars provided, and 
 the ships that took part were not all the most powerful 
 we possessed. The fact, however, remains that the 
 batteries were silenced, and the guns deserted, showing 
 that the admiral in command had accurately estimated 
 the force necessary to produce this result. But these 
 batteries may well have been considered as formidable. 
 About twelve in number, thc}' were distributed along the 
 coast commanding the approach to Alexandria Harbour. 
 They mounted over 200 guns, of which about forty were 
 rifled, while the remainder were smooth bores. Except 
 for the penetration of armour, the latter were capable of 
 inflicting heavy damage on the assailants. 
 
 The attack was to be made by eight armoured ships, 
 carrying less than 100 guns so arranged that in many 
 cases only one side could be brought to bear at a time. 
 That some of the guns threw projectiles infinitely larger 
 than could be returned from the shore did not give a 
 corresponding advantage to the ships, because it has 
 usually been found that number, rapidity of fire, and 
 
Early Turret Ships. 91 
 
 moderate size tells most against fortifications. Every 
 hole and cranny is then found out, to the discomfiture 
 of the garrison. 
 
 The ships opened fire early on the morning of 
 July nth, 1882, at ranges varying from 1500 to 4000 
 yards. The fire was returned from the forts, but the 
 ships being mostly under weigh were difficult to hit. 
 This also affected the accuracy of their own fire, so 
 that eventually they anchored and continued a heavy 
 cannonade upon such forts as were still working their 
 guns. Some were silenced about half-past ten, and this 
 released some of the ships to devote their fire to other 
 forts. At three o'clock fire had ceased from the shore. 
 No great damage had been inflicted on the ships. The 
 'Alexandra' had suffered most. She was hit about 
 thirty times, but mostly by round shot. About forty 
 more hits were distributed among the remaining ships, 
 and the total number of casualties was six killed and 
 twenty-five wounded. The casualties on shore could 
 not be ascertained, but they were probably hcav)'. The 
 fire of the ships was accurate on the whole, but the fuses 
 being defective, many of the shell did not burst. Several 
 of the guns on shore were dismounted or disabled, but 
 the works bchiiul which the\' fought were not grcatl\- 
 damaged. This was (jwing to the small number of guns 
 that ccjuld be opposed to them. '\\\v. guns were silenced 
 chicfl)' b)- projectiles entering the embrasures, in such 
 operations vessels carr)'ing a large number of moderate 
 sized guns will be more effective than shi[)s carr}ing 
 monster ordnance few in number. l'\)r the attack of 
 
92 Early Turret Ships. 
 
 forts high angle fire from mortars and howitzers is very 
 effective, but no provision for vessels so equipped is 
 made in our fleet. To do the same work with direct 
 fire would necessitate a numerical superiority in guns, 
 such as existed in the days of lOO-gun ships. 
 
chaptf:r V 
 
 BARBETTE SYSTEM COMBINED WITH BROADSIDE 
 
 Battle of Lissa — Lessons to be derived from this Action — Introduction 
 of the Barbette System of Mounting Guns — First applied in the 
 ' Temeraire '— The 'Admiral' Class — Increase in Dimensions of 
 Battle Ships to 14,000 tons — New Vessels, ' Royal Sovereign,' 
 * Empress of India,' ' Ramillies,' ' Repulse,' ' Resolution,' and 
 ' Royal Oak ' — Disadvantages of Monster Ships. 
 
 Having thus detailed the changes by which the stately 
 three-decker of 1850 was transformed into the massive 
 ironclad structure of twenty years later, it is desirable 
 here to give an account of the first action between two 
 fleets containing this new type of battle ship. In the 
 short but decisive war between the combined forces of 
 Prussia and Italy against Austria, in 1866, the issue 
 could not depend upon any naval operations that might 
 be undertaken, and the decisive victory of Sadowa over- 
 shadowed to a great extent the sea fight off Lissa and 
 the many lessons to be derived from it. Even in naval 
 circles there was not that keen scrutiny into cause and 
 effect which might have been anticipated when con- 
 structions based largely upon theoretical considerations 
 had thus been brought to the test of actual conflict. 
 Yet no naval incident of such importance had occurred 
 since the battle of Trafals/ar. The American Civil War 
 
94 Barbette System combined with Broadside. 
 
 had been signalised by gallant encounters between 
 single ships, and interesting as well as instructive 
 assaults upon land defences. The Crimean War had 
 shown that even when denied the opportunity of meet- 
 ing an enemy at sea a powerful nav)' can enable opera- 
 tions on land to be undertaken and sustained which 
 otherwise were impracticable. But since 1805 '"^o 
 hostile fleets had met, and when we consider the nature 
 of the naval forces engaged at Lissa, the strateg)- dis- 
 played, and the tactics adopted, this action is worthy of 
 the closest attention. I shall deal very briefly with the 
 composition of the forces engaged. Nearly all nations 
 had followed the example of l^^rance and this countr\- in 
 reconstituting their fleets, so that in 1866 Italy was able 
 to muster twelve ironclads, varying in size from 5800 
 tons to 2000 tons. According to dimensions, they were 
 protected with 5^, 4^, or 4-in. iron plates. The arma- 
 ment was in most cases a combination of rifled and 
 smooth bore ordnance, mounted on the broadside 
 s)\stem. Besides these ironclads there were several 
 wooden frigates and smaller vessels. In c(jmmand was 
 Admiral Persano, a man who had seen much service, 
 though without war experience. 
 
 The Austrian fleet was less powerful in ironclads, of 
 which there were onl)- seven, varying from 5 200 tons to 
 3000 tons. Their armour ranged from 4I to 5-in. 
 plates. The guns of this squadron were decidedly 
 inferior to their opponents, consisting for the most part 
 of smooth bore 48-pounders, though five of the iron- 
 clads had rifled ordnance in addition. Besides these 
 
Barbette System couihined zuitk Broadside. 95 
 
 there was a wooden screw Hnc-of-battlc ship, the 
 ' Kaiser,' with several other wooden frigates and smaller 
 vessels. In command was Admiral Tegethoff, an 
 officer of distinction, who had commanded an Austrian 
 Squadron in the Danish War of 1864, and taken part in 
 an action off Heligoland, between two small squadrons, 
 which was without decisive result. 
 
 The following is a list of the vessels that were to 
 meet in the Adriatic : — 
 
 Italian. 
 
 Austrian. 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Tonnage. 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Tonnage. 
 
 Aruwured. 
 
 
 Arvioitred. 
 
 
 ' Re d'ltalia,' . . . 
 
 5800 
 
 ' Ferdinand Max,' . . 
 
 5200 
 
 ' Re di I'ortos^allo 
 ' Maria Pia,' 
 
 
 5600 
 4300 
 
 'Hapsburg,' . . 
 ' Don Juan d 'Austria,' 
 
 5200 
 3600 
 
 ' Castelfidardo,' 
 
 
 4300 
 
 ' Kaiser Max,' . . . 
 
 3600 
 
 ' Ancona,' . 
 'San Marlino,' 
 
 
 4200 
 4200 
 
 ' i'rinz Eugen,' . . . 
 'Drachc,' .... 
 
 3600 
 3000 
 
 ' Affondatore,' . 
 
 
 •4000 
 
 'Salamander,' . . . 
 
 3000 
 
 ' Carignano,' 
 ' I'\)rmi(lal)ilc,' . 
 
 
 4000 
 2800 
 
 
 
 'Terribile,' . . 
 
 
 2800 
 
 Unarmoiircd. 
 
 
 ' X'arcse,' . . 
 ' I'alestro,'. . . 
 
 12 
 
 2000 
 2000 
 
 'Kaiser,' 
 
 5000 
 
 
 
 18 Frigates and 
 
 
 ( 'nan/ioiircd. 
 
 
 smaller Vessels. 
 
 
 22 Frigates and 
 
 
 
 
 smaller Vessels. 
 
 
 
 
 When hostilities commenced, Tegethoff made a 
 demonstration on the Italian coast, but was unable to 
 meet any portion of the Italian fleet, and returned to 
 
96 Barbette System combined with Broadside. 
 
 Fasano. This appears to have caused considerable ex- 
 citement in Italy. The navy recently created was held 
 in great esteem, and known to be, both in the number 
 and equipment of its vessels, superior to that of the 
 enemy. It was doubted whether an Austrian Squadron 
 would venture to encounter it at sea under such dis- 
 advantages. This only can account, to my mind, for the 
 course taken. Persano was urged to some striking feat 
 of arms, and the attack on Lissa was organised. What 
 can be thought of such strategy? No indication had 
 been given that he had such a command of the sea as 
 to permit him to take no account of the enemy's 
 squadron. Proof had been afforded that the Austrian 
 commander was a man who would be troublesome if not 
 disposed of. His force must be sought out and fought, 
 or blockaded. Pcrsano's first duty was to follow the 
 Austrian fleet. Such was his numerical superiority that 
 he might have detailed a portion of his force for this duty 
 while the remainder carried out some other operation. 
 But he disregarded all the experience which has shown 
 that naval supremacy must first be obtained before terri- 
 torial attack is justifiable, and he embarked upon an 
 undertaking which only added one more lesson to the 
 many history affords on this head. 
 
 Persano left Ancona, on the i6th of July 1866, with 
 nearly thirty vessels, of which eleven were ironclads, and 
 steered for the small island of Lissa on the Austrian 
 coast. The principal port was San Giorgio, where fairly 
 strong batteries skilfully handled might be expected to 
 give hostile ships a warm reception. A short distance 
 
Barbel tc Syslcui cojibiucd with Broadside. 97 
 
 off was another harbour, Carobcrt, and on the other side 
 of the island were the bay and town of Comissa. Neither 
 of these places had any defences to speak of The 
 plan of Admiral Persano was to attack the batteries of 
 San Giorgio, and when these had been silenced to land 
 a body of troops sufficient to overcome the garrison and 
 occupy the island. An alternative plan would have 
 been to land his own force at any convenient place, under 
 cover of his ships, and take San Giorgio in rear — as we 
 had done at Bomarsund — keeping his squadron ready 
 and uninjured to meet the enemy at sea. But he started 
 without his troops, which were to follow the next day, 
 convoyed by an ironclad and three wooden vessels — 
 another error, as they were thus liable to be cut off by 
 an Austrian Squadron before reaching their destination. 
 Arriving at San Giorgio, on the morning of the i8th, the 
 ships shortly after opened a heavy fire on the batteries, 
 which was returned, and the action continued through- 
 out that day. Night brought about a cessation of the 
 cannonade, but the land defence was not overcome. 
 The next day the troops arrived to the number of about 
 2000, and preparations to land were then made. The 
 disembarkation was to be at Carobert. Two ironclads 
 were sent to make a diversion at Comissa, four others 
 were to endeavour to enter the harbour of San Gioigio 
 while the remaining ships covered the landing. This 
 was on the 19th. Puit the iiawil attack on San Giorgio 
 did not succeed, and the detachment detailed for it with- 
 drew, having sustained considerable injury and loss. The 
 disembarkation was postponed for that da}'. 
 
 G 
 
98 Barbette System combined zvit/i Broadside. 
 
 In the meantime where was Tegethoff? He had 
 heard of the intended attack on Lissa while at Fasano, 
 but distrusted its reality until, on the 19th, he received 
 news which cleared away his doubt on the matter. He 
 therefore sailed with his whole squadron that afternoon, 
 bent on attacking the enemy and frustrating his purpose. 
 Whether Persano heard that night of his departure I do 
 not know, but on the morning of the 20th he prepared 
 to renew the attack and land his troops, as if deeming 
 no interference possible. At eight A.M., however, one of 
 his look-out vessels signalled ' suspicious fleet in sight.' 
 And what a condition he was in to meet even a less 
 powerful squadron than his own. He had materially 
 contributed to put the two fleets on an equality. One 
 of his ironclads had been so knocked about the day 
 before that she was practically useless, two others were 
 out of reach, making a diversion elsewhere, and his un- 
 armoured vessels were encumbered with the landing 
 appliances, and unable to cope effectively with the 
 Austrian vessels of the same nature. Persano hastily 
 collected his uninjured ironclads and advanced to meet 
 Tegethoff, whose squadron was now plainly visible. 
 The fighting formation he adopted was single line ahead, 
 so that his squadron presented a long line extending 
 over 2 miles. The Austrian squadron bore down in 
 three divisions, each forming an obtuse angle and com- 
 posed of seven ships. The divisions were about 1000 
 yards astern of each other. Tegethoff led in the 
 ' Ferdinand Max.' This formation was more compact 
 than the single line, but one difficult to maintain when 
 
Jhirbctte System combined luitJi Broadside. 99 
 
 the opposing- forces came in contact. To bring this 
 about, however, was the first aim of the leader, and 
 after that the result must mainly depend on his 
 subordinates. At about half-past ten Persano, who was 
 in the ' Re d' Italia,' stopped her and went on board 
 the ' Affondatore.' To do this at such a moment 
 indicates a sudden decision not made known to his 
 followers. The ' Re d'ltalia' was fourth ship in the line, 
 consequently those in rear had to reduce speed, thus 
 increasing the distance between them and the three 
 leading ships. Tegethoff's order to his squadron was 
 to rush at and sink the enemy. He was then bearing 
 down on the port bow of the Italian line. When about 
 1000 yards distant the leading vessels of the Italian 
 Squadron opened fire, which was not returned until 
 Tegethoffs leading division had arrived within about 
 300 yards ; but little damage was done on either side. 
 Whether smoke now obscured both squadrons or an 
 alteration of course was inadvisable at the last moment 
 is uncertain, but it happened that the whole of the 
 Austrian vessels passed through the gap between the 
 third and fourth ships of the Italian line without contact. 
 The fight now became a viclcc. The iAustrian dix-ision 
 of wooden ships bore down to attack the Italian un- 
 armoured vessels that had remained behind, but was 
 intercepted and engaged by the rear Italian ironclads. 
 The 'Kaiser' was attacked by the ' ^Affondatore,' who 
 tried to ram, but failed. Then another ironclad, the 
 * Portogallo,' made for the ' Kaiser,' whose captain, to 
 cover his smaller wooden consorts, decided to ram the 
 
loo Barbette System combined ivith Broadside. 
 
 newcomer. He succeeded in striking her on the port 
 side, sustaining severe injury to his own ship without 
 greatly damaging the ' Portogallo.' Being now almost 
 disabled, the ' Kaiser,' followed by most of the Austrian 
 wooden ships, made for San Giorgio. Though all had 
 suffered more or less severely, they had held their own 
 against a portion of the Italian ironclads, leaving the 
 remainder to be dealt with by their own, 
 
 Tegethoff had meanwhile attacked the Italian centre, 
 and a hot engagement ensued. The * Re d'ltalia' had 
 her rudder damaged, and being observed by Tegethoff 
 in this condition, he directed the 'Ferdinand Max' to 
 be steered at her. The 'Re d'ltalia' endeavoured to 
 avoid the assault, but did an unwise thing by first going 
 ahead and then astern. She thus had little movement 
 at the instant the ' Ferdinand Max ' struck her on the 
 port side at full speed. The shock was tremendous on 
 board the ' Max,' but by going astern with the engines 
 she extricated her stem from the hole made in the ill- 
 fated ' Re d'ltalia.' That vessel had heeled over to the 
 blow, then rolled to port, and almost immediately sank, 
 taking down most of her crew. Another Italian iron- 
 clad, the ' Palestro,' had been set on fire by a shell, and 
 blew up afterwards. Several single fights had taken 
 place between other ships, but without decisive result. 
 One is struck by the opportunities for ramming this 
 action afforded, the many instances in which it was 
 attempted, and the number of failures to strike that took 
 place. The battle was practically over soon after noon. 
 The Italian Squadron withdrew, and Tegethoff went 
 
Barbette System eombined with Broadside, i o i 
 
 into San Giorgio, which he had thus saved. The number 
 of killed and wounded in his ships was about 200, while 
 the Italians lost over 700 men, principally by the sinking 
 of the 'Re d'ltalia.' Besides this vessel they had lost 
 another ironclad, the ' Palestro,' while the Austrian 
 Squadron was intact. The 'Kaiser' was most injured, 
 but forty-eight hours sufficed to put her in a sea- 
 worthy condition. Whatever errors he may have com- 
 mitted previously, when once the action began, Persano 
 fought gallantly. His ship, the ' Affondatore,' was in 
 the thickest of the fight, though he failed to ram any 
 of his opponents. Even when his squadron was much 
 scattered, Persano signalled to attack again, and made 
 for the Austrian vessels. But his ships were in some 
 cases too distant to join in time, the opportunity passed 
 away, and the attack was not made. Though his force 
 was reduced by two ironclads, he was still superior in 
 numbers. The preceding attack on Lissa, coupled with 
 this action at sea, had so told on the crews that the 
 Italian commander molested his adversary no further. 
 Tegethoff having gained his object was not likely to 
 assume the offensive. 
 
 On the .Austrian side only the wooden vessels 
 suffered to any considerable extent frcfi: lire 'enormous 
 quantity of shell and shot discharged ^during-Oxit .day. 
 Tliis was due to inaccur;ic\-, in the first place; (Uid, 
 secondl)', to the protection of 4.j-in. iron plating. The 
 Italian fire was exceeding!}- wild; broadsides at close 
 quarters missed tlieir object, and I have heard it stated 
 that often guns were lired without [jrojectiles. This 
 
I02 Barbette System combined with Broadside. 
 
 showed a most inefficient control of the fire on the part 
 of the officers, and it is a matter which should receive 
 the greatest attention in all navies. Much is written 
 about the fire discipline of armies in the field, but no 
 less important is this supervision in a naval action. 
 
 One thing is wanting to complete the valuable experi- 
 ence gained on that day and make it applicable to the 
 present time. No locomotive torpedoes were used, this 
 arm as a naval weapon not having been then introduced. 
 Whether, after the line was broken and the ships were 
 all mixed up together, it would not have been as 
 dangerous to friend as to foe may well be questioned ; 
 but small vessels specially armed in this way would 
 have had good opportunities of gliding in under cover 
 of the smoke and dealing deadly blows to partially dis- 
 abled ships. Time was everything to Tegethoff, and 
 hence it is difficult to say what effect torpedoes would 
 have had upon his tactics. We can only deal with 
 matters as they were ; and we have sufficient material 
 for reflection both in the strategy preceding the action 
 and the manner in which two modern fleets first met in 
 war. 
 
 . Whilq wc were thus developing side by side the 
 brpadside ar.d mrret systems of mounting guns behind 
 a.Tn-jjr our neighbours the French had proceeded on 
 somewhat different lines. At first, like ourselves, they 
 had adopted the broadside s}-stem, and then the central 
 battery, but with the latter and above it they usually 
 placed a few guns en barbette on each side. This prin- 
 
Barbette System coiubined with Broadside, to 
 
 J 
 
 ciple was continued as guns increased in weight until 
 the combination became impossible. Then, rejecting 
 the turret except for coast defence vessels, they mounted 
 all the heavy guns e7i barbette. Even now considerable 
 difference of opinion exists as to the relative advantages 
 of the two systems, as may be observed from the fact 
 that one of the new 14,000-ton battle ships we are build- 
 ing is a turret vessel. This is one of the problems that 
 only such a practical test as w^ar can solve. The barbette 
 system consists of a thick inclined wall of armour, usually 
 pear-shaped, built into the ship, enclosing a turntable, 
 which carries the gun, and is high enough to permit the 
 latter to fire freely over the wall in any direction as 
 the turntable revolves. Therefore only the apparatus 
 for manipulating the gun is protected, and the piece 
 itself is exposed throughout its length to hostile fire. 
 With the revolving turret protection is afforded to a 
 greater portion of the gun, because the height of the 
 w^all is greater, and the gun points through an embrasure. 
 With short ordnance there w^as little exposed even at 
 the moment of firing, and after discharge rotation of 
 the turret took the guns out of danger. It was this 
 peculiarity of the turret system which gave the 'Monitor' 
 such an advantage over the ' Merrimac' As the officers 
 of the latter said, the ' Monitor's ' guns were fired and the 
 turret revolved scj (juickly that they had not a chance ( f 
 getting a fair shot at them, l^ut when guns were given 
 great length, and slender muzzles which might be 
 disabled by small projectiles, the advantage in this 
 respect was lessened. Moreover, the turret invoked 
 
I04 
 
 Barbette System combined with Broadside. 
 
 additional weight, while the barbette permitted a higher 
 position for the gun, which at sea is a considerable 
 advantage. When a gun is not many feet above the 
 water there is a liability of projectiles striking crests of 
 waves near the ship and being deflected from the path 
 required. This has been observed at target practice 
 from some of our turret ships in rough weather. 
 
 Though circumstances inclined us to the turret, we 
 tentatively gave one ship — the ' Temeraire ' — a barbette 
 at each end. These were pear-shaped redoubts, but 
 differed from those now constructed, because their 
 dimensions were such as to allow the gun mounted 
 within to recoil down after firing behind the walls, and 
 thus disappear during the process of reloading. This 
 
 THE 'temeraire. 
 
 necessitated a larger enclosure, and the gain was con- 
 sidered so small as against the extra weight entailed 
 that this disappearing principle has not been repeated in 
 ships, though it is coming into greater favour for land 
 defences. 
 
 But a further consideration brought about a modifi- 
 cation not only in the method of carr>nng the heavy 
 
 guns which 
 
 the 
 
 and enthusiasm of artil- 
 
Barbette System eonibincd 7vitli llroadside. 105 
 
 lerists had pressed^ upon us, but also in the com- 
 position of the armament itself. The inevitable result 
 of contracting the thickest armour to a comparatively 
 small area on the side of a ship was that the remainder 
 of a hull could be effectually penetrated by less 
 powerful ordnance. Much damage could be done by 
 light shells to the unprotected parts. It might be more 
 profitable to disregard the 24-in. armour of the ' Inflexible ' 
 and endeavour to disable the ship by attacking the 
 much larger portion without protection. Numerous 
 light guns would be useful for this purpose, and the 
 French for some time had been in the habit of associat- 
 ing with the heaviest guns an auxiliary armament of 
 lighter ordnance, mounted on the broadside. The latest 
 phase was to be a combination of the barbette and 
 broadside systems. A series of vessels were constructed, 
 now well known as the ' Admiral ' class, because each 
 bears the name of a distinguished British admiral, 
 which varied in size from 9200 to io,000 tons. All are 
 constructed with a pear-shaped barbette at each end, for 
 one or two heavy guns, and between the barbettes a 
 broadside battery of 6-in. guns. The armour at the 
 water line is 18 in. extreme thickness, and of compound 
 manufacture. This armour does not extend to the ends, 
 which are protected with a steel deck. The absence of 
 a C(jmplete belt gives an opportiinil}- for critics to den}- 
 that such vessels arc efficient as battle ships. On the 
 other hand, their speed is higher considerabl}- — 17 knots 
 — than ail)' previous vessels, and the\' carry a hirgc sup- 
 pl\- of c(jal. They differ chiefi}- in the heav}' arma- 
 
io6 Barbette System combined with Broadside. 
 
 ment. The smallest, the ' Collingwood,' carries four 
 45-ton guns, the ' Howe ' four 67-ton, and the * Benbow ' 
 two iio-ton guns. Probably naval opinion would incline 
 to the * Collingwood's ' armament for all ships of this 
 size, with perhaps an addition to the auxiliary ordnance. 
 There might also be a preference for a reduction in 
 thickness of armour, and a corresponding increase in the 
 extent of water line covered by it. But of vessels that 
 can steam fast and hit hard it is easy to be hypercritical. 
 Another inducement to supplement the necessarily 
 few heavy guns with an auxiliary armament had 
 gradually been assuming great importance, and that 
 was the necessity of meeting the attack of torpedo boats. 
 It was evident that neither an 80-ton nor a 6-in. gun 
 would be the best weapon to stop the advance of a 
 small craft capable of covering a mile of water in three 
 minutes. One round from a heavy gun at such a mark 
 was as much as could be anticipated, while under cover 
 of the cloud of smoke the boat, if intact, had an excel- 
 lent opportunity for effecting her purpose. Numerous 
 guns of just sufficient power to penetrate the boiler, or 
 smash the machinery of a torpedo boat, would therefore 
 be most effectual in neutralising such an attack. Hence 
 the development of machine and quick-firing guns 
 throwing projectiles of from i to 6 lbs. The arma- 
 ment, therefore, of the modern ship is composed of 
 a few heavy guns, a secondary battery of ordnance of 
 moderate calibre, and numerous machine and quick- 
 firing guns. All this entails a great weight of ammuni- 
 tion, so that if required to be combined with extensive 
 
Barbette System eoinbined ivitJi Broadside. 107 
 
 armour protection, great speed, and a large coal supply, 
 we are forced into a ship of huge dimensions. Con- 
 fining our attention at present to the barbette system, 
 let us see the latest development of this type of battle 
 ship, though there was an interval when we returned to 
 our early love the turret. 
 
 In the ' Benbow ' we have a ship of 10,600 tons, 
 in which the principal armament is a single gun of iio 
 tons at each end, and ten guns of 5 tons on the broad- 
 side. She has 18 in. of compound armour covering the 
 central portion of the water line, but the broadside guns, 
 as well as the ends of the vessel, are unprotected with 
 armour on the side. It was freely asserted that for this 
 reason such vessels were liable to be disabled by vessels 
 with numerous light guns before perhaps their own 
 ponderous ordnance could neutralise the attack. The 
 explosion of a number of even small shell at the water 
 line would, it was urged, admit sufficient water to im- 
 pair the speed and manoeuvring qualities of the ship, 
 though not necessarily to overcome her buo}-anc)'. 
 Again, all nations were seeking some more powerful 
 explosive than powder as a bursting charge for shells. 
 To get these projectiles through iron without breaking, 
 their walls must be thick. Conscquentl)' the interior 
 capacity is reduced, and the amcnnit of powder such 
 shells can contain is onl\- sufficient to just o[)en the 
 iron case, or may not even do lliat. W'c want, howexer, 
 the shell to be fractured with violence into numercnis 
 pieces, each acting as a separate projectile, and for 
 this a more energetic explosive is rc(iuired. Man\- exist. 
 
io8 Barbette System combined zvith Broadside, 
 
 but the difficulty hitherto has been to obtain one which 
 with great power, will combine safety in handling and 
 withstand the great concussion of the enormous powder 
 charges now fired in guns. Experiments in different 
 countries seem to show that this difficulty can be over- 
 come, and that such shells arc terribly destructive when 
 exploded inside a ship. Thus the old idea of protecting 
 crews from such effects again came to the front. All 
 these moderate sized guns and their workers must fight 
 behind armour of some sort, and not be left entirely 
 unprotected. There was also a demand for more of such 
 guns to supplement the principal armament. Nothing 
 was to be given up, but a good deal more was asked for. 
 The naval architect was willing to provide it, but said 
 that all this could not be done under a displacement of 
 14,000 tons. Thus when a large increase to the navy 
 was sanctioned in 1889, and it was decided to at once 
 lay down ten battle ships, of which eight were to be of 
 the first class, it was perhaps not unnatural that we 
 should endeavour to embody in these all the varied 
 demands for powerful armament, extended protection, 
 great speed, and prolonged endurance at sea, only to be 
 given in mastless ships by a large coal supply. As 
 regards the first item, a feeling that we had exceeded 
 the limit of usefulness in guns of such weight as 1 10 tons, 
 and the restriction thereby imposed as to number, led to 
 a more moderate calibre being adopted for the principal 
 armament. The 67-ton gun had been tried, and found 
 satisfactory in some ships of the 'Admiral' class, so it was 
 selected for the new vessels. All of them are to have 
 
Barbette System eouibined 7inth Ih^oaciside. 109 
 
 four of these guns, mounted in pairs, at each end of the 
 ship. In seven out of eight of these first-class battle 
 ships, to be named the 'Royal Sovereign,' 'Empress of 
 India,' 'Ramillies,' 'Repulse,' 'Resolution,' 'Revenge,' and 
 'Royal Oak,' this part of the armament is to be en barbette. 
 This system would therefore appear, according to present 
 opinion, to offer the greatest number of advantages. 
 The two barbettes form separate protected positions, so 
 that no injury to one could affect the other. Where 
 two such stations are placed in a single central citadel, 
 and hence necessarily in somewhat close proximity to 
 each other, there must be a risk of both being disabled 
 at the same time. 
 
 The auxiliary or secondary armament is to consist 
 of ten 6-in. guns, five on each side, in a central battery 
 between the barbettes. To obtain greater distribution 
 of these guns, and so reduce the effect of hostile fire in 
 this part of the ship, they will be mounted on two decks, 
 one above the other. As to protect them by external 
 armour on the side of the ship would involve great 
 additional weight, steel shields only will be provided for 
 these guns, those between decks having side screens as 
 well, also of steel. A number of machine and other 
 smaller guns will be disposed where convenient. As 
 regards armour, these vessels will carry a belt of com- 
 pound armour for two-thirds of the length, Si- ft. broad 
 and 18 in. thick, in the central portion. Above this, for 
 a length of 145 ft., the broadside is to be protected with 
 5-in. steel plates to a height of i)\ ft. above the water. 
 The barbettes will have compound armour, 18 in. thick, 
 
1 1 o Barbette System combined with Broadside. 
 
 for protecting the machinery employed in the manipula- 
 tion of the heavy guns. The ends of the vessel have no 
 external armour, but a steel deck will confine any water 
 that may enter, from this portion being penetrated by 
 projectiles, and prevent it from flooding the ship. Even 
 if the spaces at each end were so filled, the trim of the 
 vessel would be little affected. 
 
 To drive a floating weight of 14,000 tons through the 
 waters obviously requires powerful machinery, and as it 
 was considered desirable that these vessels should have a 
 speed of 16 knots without pressing the engines, and under 
 ordinary atmospheric draught for the fires, while with 
 forced or artificial draught the speed should be capable 
 of being increased to 175 knots, boilers and engines 
 are being provided equal to the development under the 
 latter condition of 13,000 horse power. As there will 
 be two sets of engines for revolving twin screws, each 
 set will be of 6500 horse power. When we remember 
 that the 'Warrior' had a single engine of 5000 horse 
 power, which propelled her at 14 knots, it can be realised 
 what a vast increase of power is required to obtain the 
 additional 3^ knots, notwithstanding the great improve- 
 ments in steam propulsion since that time. In the 
 * Collingwood,' a vessel of the same displacement as the 
 'Warrior,' to pass from 14 knots to 17 knots required 
 practically the horse power to be doubled. At moderate 
 speeds modern marine engines are economical in coal 
 consumption, but beyond a certain rate the fuel rapidly 
 disappears. A large supply is therefore essential, and 
 in the new battle ships the amount is fixed at 900 tons. 
 
Barbette System cornbined with Irroadside. i i i 
 
 It is considered that this will enable them to cover 
 5000 nautical miles at a speed of 10 knots an hour. 
 One matter must be taken into account, and that is the 
 drain on the coal for work unconnected with propelling 
 the ship. Numerous small engines are continually going 
 for driving electric light apparatus, ventilating fans, 
 pumping machinery, and other services, so that practi- 
 cally one boiler is always in use. Coal used in cooking 
 and distilling water swells the total expended in this 
 way, so that even when lying at anchor the stock 
 diminishes at no inconsiderable rate. In time of war, 
 when high speed will have to be maintained, the question 
 of fuel must be a constant anxiety, and I should prefer 
 an addition in this respect at a sacrifice of a few hundred 
 tons of armour in vessels of such dimensions. Neverthe- 
 less these eight new first-class battle ships are noble 
 designs, worked out with the ability which has character- 
 ised all that has emanated from the brain of Mr White, 
 the present Chief Constructor of the Navy. They will 
 form, as he has said, a squadron of identical character 
 and qualities, capable of proceeding and manoeuvring 
 together. As a single group they constitute a naval 
 force which the entire fleets of few other States can 
 equal. 
 
 With this unstinted commendation I must at the 
 same time express my preference for a greater number 
 of vessels of smaller size. This is a difficult question, 
 but it has been somewhat obscured by the extreme 
 views of those who advocate vessels of 2000 or 3000 
 tons for battle ships as a limit. It has been even 
 
I 1 2 Barbette System combined zuitli Broadside. 
 
 advanced that a vast number of gunboats is a more 
 advantageous force than a few very large vessels. 
 Those, however, who have practical experience of the sea, 
 and who have endeavoured to benefit by the history of 
 the past, will at once reject such a doctrine. Looking 
 back, I observe in the old days that though four-deckers 
 were to be found in the fleets of our adversaries, we 
 abstained from adding them to our own ; that at one 
 time, as a result of war experience, we converted three- 
 deckers into two-deckers ; and that this type of vessel 
 was then most largely represented in our fleet. It could 
 cope with the bigger vessel, and if assisted by a com- 
 panion, with success. On the other hand, it is argued 
 that two frigates never took a line-of-battlc shin, and 
 hence one big vessel is better than two small ones; but the 
 argument is fallacious, because frigates were not battle 
 ships, and as a rule did not attempt to attack them. 
 Examples of their doing so and being sunk by a single 
 broadside are to be found in naval history. In the same 
 way we may say now that two cruisers cannot take the 
 place of a battle ship in a sea fight. Yet as actions then 
 were entirely decided by the gun, it might be thought 
 that the greater number of these weapons carried the 
 more efficient the vessel, and such an increase was only 
 effected by adding to the number of decks. Still, we 
 did not do it. And now we have ram and torpedo to 
 contend with, weapons which attack the most vulnerable 
 part of the ship, and which no increase in her dimensions 
 can enable her to withstand. Though a vessel of 
 20,000 tons could be constructed with armour impervi- 
 
Barbette System conibineel with Broaeisiele. i i 3 
 
 oils to the i^un, her hull under water could not be made 
 strong enough to resist tb,e shock of a swift ram or the 
 explosion of 200 lbs. of gun cotton, which the latest 
 torpedo carries. 
 
 The great argument in favour of the very big ship 
 is that it represents the principle of concentration, 
 and that tactically a small number can be more 
 efficiently handled than a force numerically superior 
 but composed individually of weaker ships. This is 
 true in a general sense, but the principle may be carried 
 too far, and take us on to the 20,000-ton ship alluded 
 to. Admiral Sir Geoffrey Hornby, while endorsing the 
 concentrated strength principle, has also said : ' I think 
 it better that we should have ships of medium size.' 
 Docs he look upon 14,000 tons as 'medium size'? My 
 friend Mr White, if he ever reads this work, will pro- 
 bably say here: 'What is the limit you would impose?' 
 and be ready to show that it precludes some important 
 qualification. To this my reply would be that I am 
 prepared to sacrifice some protection, and to risk being 
 struck by the heaviest projectiles, as long as my ship 
 will exclude the remainder. Rapidit)- of m()\-emcnt 
 and an overwhelming fire from your own guns will 
 probably prove the best defence. There seems to me 
 no reason why a good speed, large supph' of coal, and a 
 [jowerful armament cannot be obtained within a displace- 
 ment of 10,000 tons. In eight vessels of 14,200 tons we 
 have an aggregate of 1 13,600 tons of material employed. 
 If we distribute this among twelve vessels, the\- can be 
 ap[)roximatel\- C)f 9,500 tons. I have asked admirals 
 
 II 
 
1 1 4 Barbette System combined with Broadside. 
 
 which of two such squadrons, if pitted one against the 
 other, they would prefer to command. The selection 
 has usually been with the greatest number, for a squadron 
 of twelve ships can be controlled and directed as effec- 
 tively as one of eight. There are many other points 
 which might be brought forward against the bigger 
 vessel, such as difficulty in harbour accommodation, 
 depth of water, passage through the Suez Canal, indi- 
 vidual cost, and time required for completion, but space 
 will not permit my dwelling on them. I am content 
 to rest the argument on the increase of strength given 
 by the additional ram and torpedo power of the numeri- 
 cally superior squadron. These views will not, probably, 
 influence warship construction in the slightest degree. 
 Whether they are sound or not can only be demonstrated 
 by the searching test of war, and all we can say is, that 
 hitherto our experience has been in favour of moderate 
 dimensions for ships and their armament. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 COAST DEFENCE— THE RAM 
 
 Coast Defence Vessels — Such Constructions of Modern Growth — Erroneous 
 Ideas of Defence — The ' Glatton ' and other Coast Service Vessels — 
 Russian Circular Ironclads — Development of the Ram as a Weapon 
 — The ' Rupert ' and ' Polyphemus ' — Disadvantages of a Vessel fur 
 ramming only — Examples of difficulty in ramming. 
 
 The term ' coast defence vessel,' as applied to an}- craft 
 larger than a gunboat, is, as far as this country is 
 concerned, of modern growth. The principle of building 
 special ships for operations confined to the coast found 
 no favour with our ancestors, taught by the experience 
 of long w^ars that a seagoing fleet is the best defence 
 against any attempt on the part of an enem)- to 
 approach our shores. When, in 1804, Pitt brought 
 forward a motion in the House of Commons condemna- 
 tor}' of the Government's naval polic}', — a portion of his 
 indictment was the inadequate provision of gun vessels 
 to act in shallow water against an invading flotilla. Sir 
 Edward Pellew — afterwards Lord l^xmouth — then in 
 Parliament, clearl)' formulated on this (Kcasion the 
 true policy to be })in-stied. lie said: ' I do not rcall\- 
 sec in the arrangement of oin* na\al dcf ncc an\thing to 
 excite the apprehensions of even the most timid among 
 
1 1 6 Coast Defence — the Ram, 
 
 us. I see a triple naval bulwark, composed of one fleet 
 acting on the enemy's coast ; of another, consisting of 
 heavier ships, stationed in the Downs, and ready to act 
 at a moment's notice ; and a third, close to the beach, 
 capable of destroying any part of the enemy's flotilla 
 that should escape the vigilance of the other two branches 
 of our defence. As to these gunboats, which have been 
 so strongly recommended, this mosquito fleet, they are 
 the most contemptible force that can be employed. I 
 have lately seen half-a-dozen of them lying wrecked on 
 the rocks. As to the probability of the enemy being 
 able, in a narrow sea, to pass through our blockading 
 squadrons with all that secrecy and dexterity, and by 
 those hidden means that some worthy people expect, 
 I really, from anything I have seen in the course of my 
 professional career, am not disposed to concur in it.' 
 Lord St Vincent was equally emphatic that preparation 
 should be rather directed to kee[)ing the enemy as far 
 from our coasts as possible, and attacking them the 
 moment they come out of their ports, than to awaiting 
 them at home. 
 
 It is only when the fleet has been suffered to 
 decline from motives of economy that misdirected at- 
 tention is turned to some such substitute as elaborate 
 land defences or coast defence ironclads. Such a 
 period was that following the Reform Bill of 1832, 
 until in 1847 ^'^ alarm was raised that we were 
 liable to invasion, which, it was stated, had been ren- 
 dered easy by the introduction of steam. The Duke 
 of Wellington pointed out the defencelessness of the 
 
Coast Defence — the Ram. ii*j 
 
 country, and a Royal Commission, in 1859, recom- 
 mended an expenditure of ;^ 10,000,000 on the fixed 
 defences of our naval arsenals. There seemed no 
 one to urge that, if the state of navy was such as 
 to render an attack on any of these places other 
 than a desperate undertaking, the first step should be 
 to strengthen the fleet. But the naval voice was 
 silent, or nearly so. The military element in the 
 country had become predominant, while the words of 
 St Vincent and Pellew were forgotten. We had almost 
 accepted the situation of an inferior naval power. How 
 far we had wandered from the principles that guided 
 us in 1804 can be estimated on reading the debate 
 in the House of Commons, in i860, on the motion 
 to fortify the ports. Lord Palmerston said on this 
 occasion : ' I am not surprised that the gallant admiral 
 should undervalue the strength of fortifications ; but, 
 nevertheless, I think the history of war shows that 
 they do enable an inferior force to hold out for a 
 certain time against a superior force.' The 'gallant 
 admiral ' was Sir Charles Napier, who had said that 
 * the only sure way to prevent invasion was to have 
 always at hand a superior fleet to the French or any 
 other nation.' He quoted the saying of Mr Tierncy, 
 ' give mc a well-manned fleet and a full Exchcciucr 
 and I will defy the world/ Ikit it was of no avail, and 
 we embarked upon a system of elaborate fortification, 
 based upon the assumed defeat, absence, or inferiority 
 of the only line of defence which could not be neglected 
 with inipunit}-. 
 
1 1 8 Coast Dejence — the Ra^n. 
 
 Tacit acquiescence in a view which apparently 
 contemplates an enemy roaming over the seas without 
 et or hindrance, and his appearance in force without 
 warning on any part of our coast, seems to have led 
 to the construction of vessels with a restricted radius 
 of operation and incapable of service in distant waters. 
 The desire to have within sight, as it were, a portion 
 of the fleet becomes at times exceedingly strong. Each 
 locality demands a squadron for its special protection, 
 and failing to obtain it, urges extensive fortification. 
 The Admiralty, on the other hand, has always had a 
 strong objection to the localisation of any portion of 
 its force. During the Crimean War some uneasiness 
 was felt on the coast of the United Kingdom and 
 India at the absence of British ships. It was then 
 pointed out by the naval authorities that more efficient 
 protection was afforded to this country b}' confining 
 Russian ships to their own ports than by distributing 
 the British fleet along the east coast of England and 
 Scotland. A similar explanation demonstrated that 
 India was more efficiently protected by our squadron 
 acting in the Chinese Seas than by stationing British 
 ships in the Bay of Bengal. Periodically the same 
 demand is made for local defence, and when ships are 
 denied, an alternative is found in forts and submarine 
 mines, whose principal merit is that they cannot be 
 removed. 
 
 It has been asserted that ships being no longer 
 dependent on the wind for propulsion there is an 
 advantage to the side that contemplates attack. Lord 
 
Coast Defc7ice — the Ram. 119 
 
 Palmcrston, in i860, said: 'The adoption of steam as 
 a motive power afloat has totally altered the character 
 of naval warfare, and deprived us of much of the 
 advantages of our insular position.' He quoted the 
 opinion of Sir Robert Peel, ' that steam had bridged 
 the Channel, and, for the purposes of aggression, had 
 almost made this country cease to be an island/ It 
 is not difficult to show that such views are entirely 
 erroneous. No change in weapons or method of pro- 
 pulsion can alter the general principles of naval warfare. 
 But this may be fairly advanced, that increased rapidity 
 of movement, improved communications with distant 
 stations, and augmented resources in war material, all 
 tell in the favour of the stronger navy, whether for 
 attack or defence. Squadrons thousands of miles away 
 can now be concentrated at any point, reinforced if 
 threatened, or recalled home, in so many days, while 
 formerly as many months were required. If steam has 
 bridged the Channel, in one sense, it has equally re- 
 moved the space which intervened between one part 
 of the United Kingdom and another, and has rendered 
 a collection of vessels at an)- point threatened a matter 
 of a few hours, whereas in former times a contrar\' 
 wind might delay succour until it was too late. On 
 the whole, therefore, it appears to nie that steam would 
 on])' tell against us i!i the ex'ent of our l)cing coniplclcl)' 
 overmastered at sea, a contingency it seems unnecessar)- 
 to dwell upon. 
 
 In thus dealing generall)- with the c[uestion I b\' no 
 means preclude the p(jssibilit)' of raids b)- single vessels 
 
1 20 Coast Defence — the Ram. 
 
 that might escape the most complete system of blockade. 
 At no time has it been possible to prevent such attacks 
 by an enterprising enemy, and there is perhaps greater 
 opportunity for them with steam than before. Under 
 such conditions special vessels for coast service have 
 some justification, and confidence is maintained wherever 
 the rest of the fleet is employed. The weak point of the 
 principle is that the best coast defence vessel is a first- 
 class battle ship, especially for an island subject at most 
 periods of the year to weather that is not favourable to 
 any but the most seaworthy craft. 
 
 For these reasons the coast defence ironclad, which 
 is largely represented in other navies, is only found to 
 a very limited extent in our own. The first of its kind, 
 built about 1870, was designed with the idea that a type 
 could be produced which might be equally useful for 
 attack within a moderate distance from our shores and 
 for defence in home waters. This was the ' Glatton,' 
 a single - turreted monitor of 5000 tons. Her sides, 
 which are very low, are protected with 12 in. of 
 iron, and a similar thickness was placed on the turret. 
 This is 38 ft. in diameter, and contains two muzzle load- 
 ing 25-ton guns. When completed in 1872 an experi- 
 ment was made to test the behaviour of the turret when 
 struck by heavy projectiles. The ' Hotspur,' another 
 vessel with a 2 5 -ton gun, was moored at a convenient 
 distance from the ' Glatton,' and a 600-lb. projectile fired 
 at the turret of the latter. It failed to penetrate within 
 or injure the rotating arrangements, the turret being 
 found afterwards to revolve freely, and the guns it con- 
 
w 
 
Coast Defence — the Ranu 123 
 
 taincd worked in the most perfect manner. Thoiif^h a 
 powerful ship in armament and armour, the ' Glatton,' in 
 consequence of her low freeboard, has never been looked 
 upon as capable of more than coast service. Her 
 draught of water, 22 ft., detracts also in some measure 
 from her value in this respect, and consequently in the 
 next vessels designed all considerations but those of 
 pure defence were abandoned. The 'Cyclops,' 'Gorgon,' 
 ' Hecate,' and ' Hydra ' were constructed to operate in 
 shallow waters. The displacement was reduced to 
 3500 tons, armour to 8 in., and draught of water to 
 15 ft. As some compensation they were given two 
 turrets each, containing a pair of 18-ton guns. The 
 amount of coal carried was 120 tons, while the 'Glatton ' 
 stows twice that amount. These vessels, owing to their 
 low freeboard and limited dimensions, were originally 
 unsuited to contend with rough weather, and therefore 
 their seagoing qualities have been improved by build- 
 ing up the sides in the middle portion. This does not 
 diminish the fighting capabilities in the slightest degree, 
 but adds considerably to their seaworthiness. 
 
 These vessels were built ncarl}- twcnt}- \-ears ago, 
 and that the principle of their construction is considered 
 erroneous is e\ident from the fact that no others have 
 been constructed for such special work in this counti'\-. 
 Three of somewhat larger dimensions, the ' Cerberus,' 
 * Magdala,' and ' Abyssiiu'a,' were built here f(M- our 
 colonies. They are also double-turreted vessels, and a 
 useful t\-pe for keeping off stra\' hostile cruisers which 
 might reach our distant p(xssessions with a view t(; 
 
124 Coast Deferice — the Ram. 
 
 requisitions under threat of bombardment. In the 
 'Scorpion' and ' Wyvern ' we have two small turret 
 vessels of 2500 tons, built by Messrs Laird of Liverpool. 
 They were ordered by the Confederate States during 
 the American Civil War, but were seized by our Govern- 
 ment before completion and purchased. They were 
 designed on the ideas of Cowper Coles, and Ericsson, 
 and an interesting account of the history of these vessels 
 until they passed into our hands is contained in a 
 work called TJie Secret Service of tJie Confederate 
 States in Europe, by James D. Bulloch, their represent- 
 ative over here. Had they crossed the Atlantic under 
 his orders naval events might have run differently. 
 Skilfully handled, they should have made short work 
 of the Northern monitors, to which in all points of 
 construction they were greatly superior. 
 
 But if we rightly do not spend money in producing 
 vessels that are unable to accompany a fleet, and take 
 part in any operation it may be required to undertake, 
 other nations have always devoted a considerable por- 
 tion of their naval estimates to .ships for coast defence. 
 In France vessels built under this head have so 
 increased in size that they are quite capable of coping 
 with our battle ships, and hence all comparisons of 
 relative strength are inaccurate which do not take this 
 into account. 
 
 Russia was so much impressed with the power dis- 
 played by the American monitor that for many years 
 her ironclad navy was principally recruited by similar 
 vessels. With the Crimean War fresh in her memory, 
 
Coast Defence — the Ram. 125 
 
 the idea that powerful squadrons could be kept at a 
 distance by small coast defence monitors was no doubt 
 hard to resist, however fallacious, and hence the recon- 
 struction of Russia's seagoing ironclad navy is barely 
 the growth of a decade. Absorbed in this view of a 
 coast defence which might combine a fort and ship in 
 one, the head of the Russian navy in 1870, Admiral 
 Popoff, designed a vessel of which the breadth was 
 
 [5!^^'''' TIIF. DECK OI- 'IHK ' NOVOOROD,' CIRCULAR IRONCI.AD. 
 
 nearly equal to the length. These structures were after- 
 wards more familiarly known as Popoffkas or circular 
 ironclads. Two were constructed, called ihe 'No\gorod' 
 
126 Coast Defe7ice — the Ram. 
 
 and ' Admiral Popoff.' The latter was the largest. Her 
 dimensions were, length 120 ft., breadth 96 ft., and 
 displacement 3550 tons. Being flat under water she 
 only drew 14 ft. The circular form enabled thick 
 armour to be carried on a comparatively small vessel. 
 On the sides at the water line it was 18 in., and on the 
 deck 2\ in. On the upper deck were two 40-ton guns, 
 mounted en barbette. To propel the vessel are four 
 screws side by side, but the speed in favourable weather 
 does not exceed 6 knots. The chief defect is difficulty 
 of keeping them on a straight course. We have found 
 the same in some of our vessels which have great beam 
 in proportion to length, but with the Popoff kas the 
 tendency is to revolve like a saucer on the water. On 
 occasions all directive control over them disappears. 
 As ships, therefore, they were soon discredited, and 
 undiscriminating censure passed on their designer. But 
 they should be regarded as sea forts with the power of 
 shifting their position rather than as portions of the 
 seagoing fleet. A fort rising out of the water, as we 
 see at Spithead, may be regarded as a ship at anchor. 
 It cannot advance to attack, or pursue if passed. 
 Beyond the range of its guns the smallest hostile 
 cruiser may harass with impunity the approaching 
 merchant vessels if opposing war vessels are not 
 at hand. Not possessing the power of concentra- 
 tion at any point threatened, want of mobility in 
 forts must be compensated for by an increase of 
 numbers, until every avenue of approach is covered. If 
 protection is sought by such means against an attack 
 
Coast Defence — the Ram. 127 
 
 by a powerful ironclad squadron, 500 guns on land arc 
 soon absorbed, involving very large garrisons. We may 
 then consider whether the same or better protection 
 could not be afforded by a flotilla. The question is too 
 big to be argued here, and it is only alluded to as some 
 justification for the Russian circular ironclads. Their 
 defective steering could no doubt be improved by 
 building on light ends, so as to give them more resist- 
 ance to side movement when the rudder is put over, and 
 an armament of two 40-ton guns renders such a type 
 formidable to a battle ship of larger dimensions for 
 ordinary seagoing purposes. Unfortunately, the value 
 of these floating forts was not tested during the Russo- 
 Turkish War. Turkey, though most powerful at sea, 
 abstained from coast attacks, and the circular ironclads 
 were kept in their own waters. They are one of the 
 abnormal growths of peace, and interesting as indicating 
 to what lengths the theory may be carried ; but as one 
 ship after another is cast aside, as these vessels have 
 been, we only see more clearly that the vessel which 
 is most efficient for all purposes best answers special 
 requirements 
 
 In former days when wooden ships met in combat 
 at sea there was no desire to bring vessels in contact 
 with each other except for the purposes of boarding. 
 However close the action, collision was axoidcd, as such 
 an incident might cause the loss of masts and \'ards, 
 placing the vessel at the mercy of her cncm}', or allowing 
 the latter to escape if so minded. When two fleets got 
 so mixed up that nuuKL-in'ring was im[)ossible, the 
 
128 Coast Defence — the Ram. 
 
 simplest plan was to fall alongside the nearest vessel 
 and secure the two together until one was subdued. 
 At such a time communication from an admiral to his 
 subordinates was impossible, but everyone knew what 
 had to be done. When Nelson had broken the line of 
 the combined fleets at Trafalgar he ran alongside the 
 nearest ship, with the result we all know. He did not 
 attempt to run down any of his opponents, nor can 
 we recall a single incident of one wooden ship deliber- 
 ately ramming — as we now term it — another. The risk 
 was too great of loss of spars, and the wooden bows 
 were not suited for such an operation. When iron was 
 substituted for wood the latter objection passed away, 
 but the use of the ram as a weapon was chiefly brought 
 about by the same cause that brought the torpedo into 
 prominence. This was the fact that, while every effort 
 had been made to protect ships above water from shot 
 and shell, the most vulnerable part, that below the water 
 line, was more open to attack than ever. Hence the 
 old idea of subduing the fire of ships, and obtaining their 
 surrender by such a disablement of the crew that they 
 were unable any longer to fight their guns, gave place 
 to the modern desire to effect their destruction in a 
 more speedy manner by a blow under water. Should a 
 ship be sunk immediately in this manner, no addition is 
 made to the fleet of the victor, but that of the enemy is 
 effectually reduced. Several incidents have shown this 
 in a striking manner since the introduction of the iron- 
 clad. To these allusion will be made later. Hence, 
 from the ' Warrior ' to the latest phase of battle ship, the 
 
Coast Defence — tJie Ram. 129 
 
 ram has been continually developed in the bows of ships 
 with a view to its use in future actions. In the 'Warrior ' 
 this was carried out in an imperfect manner ; the stem 
 formed an obtuse angle of large dimensions with the 
 apex or spur, such as it was, at the water line. When 
 the power of the ram had been demonstrated in America, 
 and afterwards at Lissa, we frankly recognised that this 
 weapon was of great importance. All the later vessels 
 had bows which terminated under water in a sharp spur, 
 forming a powerful ram, securely fastened to the ship, 
 and weighing several tons. 
 
 While all who were concerned in the construction 
 of vessels in which iron was so largely employed, and 
 those who had to manoeuvre them when completed, 
 were soon convinced that the momentum of such a 
 weight brought in contact with another ship must 
 prove irresistible, a few were such enthusiastic champions 
 of the ram as to desire that ships should be constructed 
 specially for this purpose. They went so far as to 
 say that to give guns in addition would diminish the 
 efficiency of the ram by perhaps enshrouding the 
 vessel in smoke at the critical moment. But in France 
 and in England this conception has not been favourably 
 received. Across the Channel small coast defence iron- 
 clads were constructed soon after the American Civil 
 War in which the gun equipment was limited to a 
 single turret in the fore part of the ship, and a strong 
 ram added to the bow. The idea was to disconcert 
 an enemy with heavy projectiles just previous to the 
 charge. We carried out the same principle with two 
 
 I 
 
130 
 
 Coast Defence — the Ram, 
 
 vessels, the ' Hotspur ' and ' Rupert/ two small but 
 serviceable ironclads, the former completed in 1871, 
 and the latter in 1874. The dimensions of the 'Rupert,' 
 3200 tons, were such as to ensure handiness in turning, 
 while the vital portions were protected with 1 2 in. of 
 iron. The gun power was only moderate, consisting of 
 two 1 8-ton guns in the turret, and two other smaller 
 pieces in the after portion of the ship. It was on the 
 ram that principal reliance was placed. 
 
 There being much to commend itself in the ' Rupert' 
 to naval officers, an extension of the same principle was 
 carried out a few years afterwards in the ' Conqueror ' 
 
 V — ^3 
 
 n 
 
 a 
 
 "^ 
 
 THE 'conqueror. 
 
 and * Hero.' In order to accommodate more powerful 
 ordnance, and obtain an increased speed, it was necessary 
 to increase the displacement to 6200 tons. This enabled 
 two 43-ton guns to be carried in her single turret^ and 
 
Coast Defence — the Ram. 1 3 1 
 
 unproved machincr}' increased the speed to 15 knots. 
 The defect of such vessels is the absence of stern fire, 
 and with 6000 tons a second turret aft seems desirable. 
 
 But strong pressure was all the time being put on 
 the Admiralty to build a vessel in which guns should 
 have no place, and the most persistent advocate was 
 Admiral Sir George Sartorius, who appears to have 
 formed an exaggerated view of the ram as a weapon. 
 The result was the construction of the ' Polyphemus.' 
 The leading features of her design were a low hull, 
 exposing but a small mark to an enemy's fire, the por- 
 tion above water being shaped like a turtle's back, and 
 covered with thin armour to deflect any projectile that 
 might strike it ; great speed, by the adoption of special 
 machinery, a powerful ram, and a torpedo equipment. 
 The only ordnance was to consist of a few light guns 
 for repelling boat or torpedo attack. These are mounted 
 on a superstructure necessary for carr)'ing the boats 
 and working the ship at sea. A special point in her 
 desi":n was the formation of the keel as a rectancrular 
 groove, in which are placed lengths of cast-iron ballast. 
 This extra weight, amounting to about 300 tons, is not 
 permanently fixed, but can be dropped when required, 
 so as to lighten the vessel if an}^ injury is recei\'ed re- 
 ducing the buoyanc)'. All or portions of it can be 
 released from the conning station. While the vessel 
 is intact the ballast assists in keeping the greater por- 
 tion of the hull immersed, making a difference of 
 about 12 in. in the draught. Thcnigh the * Pol\-- 
 plicMiius' was commenced in 1S7S, difficulties with the 
 
132 Coast Defence — the Ram. 
 
 boilers delayed her completion till 1882, and several 
 alterations were then made to improve her qualities as 
 a sea-keeping vessel, the original intention being that 
 she should be capable of accompanying a fleet. She 
 has been for some years attached to the Mediterranean 
 Squadron, and though no opportunity has occurred to 
 test her as an engine of war, she has proved quite 
 capable of such service if required. Up to the present 
 she has been without a duplicate in our own or any 
 foreign navy, but the United States are about to con- 
 struct a vessel on the same principles. It is called a 
 harbour defence ram, and is to be of the following 
 dimensions, — length 250 ft, beam 43 ft., size 2100 tons, 
 and speed 17 knots. The 'Polyphemus' is 2500 tons, 
 and speed 18 knots. The American ram cannot there- 
 fore be considered any material advance in this type. 
 I venture to think, moreover, the principle is a mistake, 
 for the following reasons. 
 
 When guns were the only weapons to contend 
 with there was some reason to construct a vessel 
 impervious to projectiles and relying solely on the 
 ram. The torpedo alters this condition, as before the 
 ram can be applied such a vessel must come within 
 the radius of the torpedo's range, and though above 
 water she may be invulnerable, below the water line 
 she is as open to attack as any other craft. Then I fail 
 to see the advantage of denying a vessel guns on the 
 plea that their smoke would be an encumbrance when 
 ramming. A captain has the power of withholding his 
 fire at all times, and presumably such an order would be 
 
Coast Defence — tJie Ram. i 33 
 
 obeyed. Lastly, a vessel without guns disabled in her 
 machinery is at the mercy of any antagonist who can 
 lay off beyond the range of torpedoes, if the ram has 
 these weapons, and use his guns without fear of reply. 
 It appears to me that such an advantage should 
 never be conceded ; and for these principal reasons I 
 think the gunless ram is a phase of construction based 
 on erroneous assumptions which have a temporary hold 
 on the imagination, but which disappear under practical 
 consideration of the probabilities in war. 
 
 It is, moreover, fallacious to suppose that to ram a 
 vessel under any circumstances is an easy operation 
 even with a superiority of speed. Accidental collisions 
 with disastrous results have, we know, not been unfre- 
 qucnt. The sinking of the 'Vanguard' off the Irish 
 coast by the ' Iron Duke,' and the loss of the ' Grosser 
 Kurfurst' off Folkestone, from being accidentally 
 rammed by a companion, are instances of this and 
 examples of the power of the ram. To strike a ship at 
 anchor as the ' Cumberland ' was struck by the * I\Ier- 
 rimac' does not call forth any great exercise of skill. 
 When we examine, however, instances in which it has 
 been desired to ram a ship in movement one is struck b\' 
 the failures to attain this object which history records. 
 In May i<S79, during the war between Chili and Peru, 
 the ' Iluascar,' a small turret ship then belonging to the 
 latter power, engaged the Chilian wooden corvette 
 * Esmeralda.' The latter was, of course, quite over- 
 matched, though it required fort}- shots from the Tluascar' 
 before her adversary was disabled. The ' 1 luascar ' then 
 
134 Coast Defe7ice — the Ram. 
 
 attempted to ram. It was an unnecessary display of 
 power, as the ' Esmeralda ' could not escape, and was lying 
 motionless on the water. But these nations are with- 
 out mercy when at war. Twice the ' Huascar ' struck 
 the ' Esmeralda ' with her stern, but failed to do serious 
 injury, the captain having stopped the engines too 
 soon. The third attempt was more successful. The 
 ' Esmeralda ' was struck on the beam and sunk. Two 
 other ships, the ' Independencia' and ' Covadonga,' were 
 also engaged in the same action, when the former 
 made three ineffective efforts to ram the ' Covadonga,' 
 but failed. At the last attempt she ran ashore and 
 became a wreck. 
 
 In the action between the 'Huascar' and the 
 Chilian ironclads 'Blanco Encalada' and ' Almirante 
 Cochrane' several attempts were made to ram the 
 Peruvian vessel, which she evaded, but eventually 
 succumbed to the overwhelming fire of her two 
 opponents. At the battle of Lissa, in 1866, between 
 the Austrian and Italian fleets, there were numerous 
 occasions when ships failed to ram each other. On 
 the other hand, the fact remains that the 'Red'Italia' 
 was sunk by the * Ferdinand Max,' though this was 
 facilitated by injury to the Italian vessel's rudder. 
 A wooden ship, the ' Kaiser,' also rammed the ironclad 
 * Portogallo,' but sustained more injury' herself than 
 she inflicted. In another instance the attempt ended 
 in a graze, the two vessels passing so close to each 
 other that the rammers to the guns could not be used. 
 From such experience we may conclude, and it is 
 
Coast Defence — the Ram. i 35 
 
 capable of mathematical demonstration, that with two 
 ships well handled and free from injury it is only a 
 slight difference of time and movement whether one 
 rams the other or herself sustains the shock ; that to 
 bring the stem advantageously in contact with another 
 vessel requires, under any circumstances, considerable 
 skill, but that opportunities may occur in a general 
 action which should be promptly seized. Experience, 
 however, is far from showing that entire reliance should 
 be placed on the ram, to the exclusion of weapons 
 well tried in the past, and which have a much greater 
 radius of action. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 ARMOUR — LATER TURRET SHIPS 
 
 Early Iron Plates — Increased Thickness — Competition of Guns and Armour 
 — Steel and Compound Plates supersede Iron — Deck and Coal Pro- 
 tection — Progress of Turret Ships ' Nile,' ' Trafalgar ' and ' Hood,' 
 'Victoria' and * Sanspareil' — Second-Class Battle Ships — Early 
 Types — Latest Development — • Centurion ' and ' Barfleur.' 
 
 In describing the * Inflexible ' I have stated that her 
 turrets were protected with compound armour instead 
 of the wrought-iron plates which up to that time had 
 been employed. As the struggle between steel and 
 compound plates has for some years been almost as 
 keen as that between guns and armour, a brief history 
 of this portion of our subject seems here desirable. 
 
 I have read that about thirty years ago the present 
 Sir John Brown happened to be at Toulon and saw 
 the new French ironclad ' La Gloire.' Her plates were 
 5 ft. long, 2 ft. wide, and 4^ in. thick. They had been 
 hammered to these dimensions, as were all the plates 
 of the early American monitors. Mr Brown — as he 
 then was — came to the conclusion that such plates could 
 be rolled, and on his return to England instituted a 
 series of experiments which fully bore out this view. 
 When it was decided to put 4J in. of iron on the 
 * Warrior,' rolled plates of this thickness were manu- 
 
Armour — Later Turret Ships. 137 
 
 factured without difficulty. In 1861 a target represent- 
 ing a section of the ' Warrior,' and consisting of a A,\-\x\. 
 iron plate, with 18 in. of teak backing, and an inner iron 
 skin I in. thick, was fired at with a Whitworth rifled 
 gun throwing a flat-headed steel bolt of 80 lbs. The 
 target was indented and cracked, but not perforated. 
 
 In 1862 Mr Brown was able to roll at his works at 
 Sheffield, in the presence of Lord Palmerston, an iron 
 plate 18 ft. long, 4 ft. wide, and 5 J in. thick. The fol- 
 lowing year, when the Lords of the Admiralty visited 
 his works, at the opening of a new rolling mill, the 
 energetic manufacturer showed that plates up to a 
 thickness of 12 in. could be produced. 
 
 From that time there was no difficulty in supplying 
 the increased protection demanded for the new ironclad 
 navy, till in the 'Dreadnought' we placed on the hull 
 and turrets plates 14 in. thick. Though the water line 
 amidships of the ' Inflexible' has 24 in. of iron, it is not 
 in one but two plates, each 12 in. thick, with a laj-er of 
 wood between them. 
 
 But already there were indications that no increase in 
 the thickness of wrought-iron plates would suffice to 
 resist the growing energy of the gun. As early as 1869 
 a Krupp gun of 11 in. calibre had perforated 12 in. of 
 iron and 36 in. of wood. Our own 38-ton gun pierced 
 19 in. of iron in 1876, and the following year the 80-ton 
 gun sent its projectile through three 8-in. iron plates. 
 In the meantime Mr Schneider had been developing at 
 Creusot, in France, the manufacture of steel plates, and 
 some experiments at Spcz/ia, in Ital}-, showed the soft- 
 
138 Armour — Later Turret Ships. 
 
 ness of wrought-iron as compared with steel. The latter 
 resisted penetration to a much greater extent, though it 
 had a tendency to break up when attacked b\' numerous 
 comparatively light projectiles. From this moment 
 plates composed entirely of wrought-iron were doomed. 
 The manufacturers of them in this country — Messrs 
 Brown and Messrs Cammcll — then proposed compound 
 armour. In Cammcll's method — which is according to 
 Wilson's patent — a wrought iron plate is put into a box, 
 placed in a \crtical position, and liquid steel poured in 
 between one side of the plate and the side of the box. 
 The composite plate thus made is then rolled, by which 
 process the steel face is hardened and made to adhere 
 rigidly to the wrought-iron foundation. In Brown's 
 method — which is according to Ellis's patent — instead 
 of a box, a thin steel plate is placed at the required 
 distance from the iron plate and the melted steel 
 poured in between the two, making the whole a solid 
 mass. It is then reheated and passed through the roll- 
 ing mill. In both systems the steel face is about one- 
 third the total thickness. In 1877 experiments with 
 compound armour plates showed their superiority to 
 wrought-iron, and consequently it was decided to place 
 them on the * Inflexible's ' turrets. In 1880 a com- 
 pound plate made by Messrs Cammell, in which the 
 steel face was 5 in. and the wrought-iron back 13 in, 
 thick, was fired at by the 38-ton gun, with a Palliser 
 chilled shot, the result being that the projectile broke 
 up on impact with the plate, and effected no damage 
 beyond slight indentation and surface cracking. It was 
 
Armour — Later Titrret Ships. 139 
 
 then evident that steel projectiles would henceforth be 
 necessary to attack hard armour. 
 
 From that time up to the present the competition 
 has been between the compound plates and all-steel 
 plates. The latter resist perforation better, while the 
 harder surface of the former is more effective in break- 
 ing projectiles, and causing them to glance off if struck 
 at an angle.^ For very thick armour we have therefore 
 adhered to compound plates, employing steel plates where 
 only a few inches are required. France has hitherto pro- 
 duced the best all-steel plates, but a demand for such an 
 article could no doubt be met by our own manufacturers. 
 Already Messrs Vickers have made steel plates which 
 have behaved most satisfactorily under severe tests. Steel 
 is continually being improved, and its resistance to per- 
 foration increased by the admixture of small quantities 
 of nickel, manganese, or other substance. The original 
 object of armour being to keep out projectiles, I believe 
 we shall soon adopt that material which shows a marked 
 superiority in this respect, and steel plates appear to me 
 to be winning the day. If the projectiles hold together 
 — and those of modern steel make appear to stand 
 impact well — it stands to reason that the medium they 
 have to pass through should, from front to rear, offer 
 a strenuous resistance. When the face of a compound 
 plate is pierced, the remainder is no great obstacle to 
 
 ^ In the compound plate, owing to the support airordtd by the iron 
 back, a harder steel can be used for the face. Unsupported in this way, a 
 steel plate of the same manufacture would be liable to break up under 
 heavy blows, and hence steel armour is made of somewhat softer — or less 
 brittle — though tougher mate-rial. 
 
140 Arnwtir — Later Turret Skips. 
 
 an uninjured projectile having a considerable amount of 
 unexpended energy. 
 
 Twenty years ago we commenced experiments against 
 iron plates i^ in. thick on 6 in. of wood. The target 
 thus formed was placed at a small angle from the hori- 
 zontal, and fired at with a 9-inch projectile. The 
 protection was insufficient, but succeeding experiments 
 have led to decks of steel 3 in. thick being placed over 
 the submerged portions of vessels. The sides of this 
 armoured deck usually slope down to a short distance 
 below the water line, and are given an additional thick- 
 ness. This portion of the armoured deck of the * Blake ' 
 and * Blenheim ' is 6 in. thick. Advocates of internal 
 armour urge that, for a given weight, more complete 
 protection can be afforded if disposed in this way than 
 if placed externally on the hull. 
 
 Later on experiments were instituted to ascertain 
 what effect masses of coal would ha\c in stopping pro- 
 jectiles, and if it could be ignited by shell. It was found 
 that 20 ft. of coal would stop a 6-in. shot at a short 
 range, and 30 ft. an 8-in. shot, but this would hardly 
 hold good with later guns and steel projectiles. The 
 explosion of common shell did not set the coal on 
 fire. 
 
 But this latter result only applies to coal in confined 
 spaces. If placed between decks, it will be more readily 
 ignited. I believe at the battle of Lissa the ' Palestro ' 
 was destroyed in this way. Her captain, impressed with 
 the necessity of not running short of fuel, had placed a 
 quantity of coal outside the battery. During the action 
 
Arniour — Later Turret Ships. 141 
 
 with the Austrian Squadron a shell exploded in the heap 
 and set it on fire. The occurrence appears to have been 
 unheeded at the time, or the crew were too busy with 
 their guns to be called off. When they did endeavour 
 to extinguish the fire, it had gone too far, and while they 
 were thus employed the ship blew up. Few of the crew 
 escaped, but I have been told by an officer, who took 
 part in the action in another ship, that this mass of coal 
 was over a magazine, and it is believed that the inter- 
 vening deck was burnt through until suddenly a flaming 
 mass of coal fell into the magazine. This seems a 
 reasonable explanation, as the explosion was unexpected, 
 or preparation would have been made to abandon the 
 ship. This occurrence shows the danger of carrying 
 extra coal about the decks. It appears to me unwise, 
 also, to place reliance on protection from coal when 
 stowed in its proper place. If it is not to be used, why 
 employ it in preference to armour? When consumed 
 in the legitimate way, which circumstances may render 
 necessary, a vulnerable part of the ship may be exposed 
 to an enemy whom this fuel has assisted the ship to 
 overtake, or from whom it has not sufficed to make 
 escape possible. 
 
 The disposition of armour and armament adopted 
 in the 'Inflexible' w^as follow^ed in only four other 
 vessels, the * Ajax,' ' Agamemnon,' ' Colossus,' and 
 ' Edinburgh.' It was considered that smaller battle 
 ships on the same design would be useful additions to 
 the fleet. The first two named have a displacement 
 of 8700 tons, and carry in each turret two 38-ton guns. 
 
142 Armour — Later Turret Skips. 
 
 while the maximum thickness of their armour is 18 in. 
 Being only 280 ft. long, with a beam of 66 ft., their 
 speed is moderate, and for a long time difficulty was 
 experienced in steering them. The * Colossus ' and 
 
 * Edinburgh ' were great improvements. By increasing 
 the length to 325 ft., and the displacement to 9500 tons, 
 a speed of over 15 knots was obtained. Their turrets 
 are armed with 45-ton breech-loaders instead of the 
 old guns, and steel instead of iron is mostly used in the 
 construction of the ships. 
 
 But naval officers did not approve the departure 
 from the ' Dreadnought ' type. The advantages of plac- 
 ing the turrets en ccJicloti were more fanciful than real, 
 and consequently, when after a lapse of some years 
 there was a return to double-turret ships, an improved 
 
 * Dreadnought ' design was decided upon. The ' Tra- 
 falgar' and 'Nile' represent this reaction, and as they 
 have not long been completed it is evident the interval 
 was considerable. 
 
 These ships are approximately the same size as the 
 'Inflexible,' viz., 12,000 tons at load draught. They 
 have a central citadel, containing the two turrets, placed 
 on the middle line, as in the ' Dreadnought' Each turret 
 contains two 67-ton guns. Between the turrets, and 
 above the citadel, are mounted eight 45-pounder guns 
 in a battery, thus giving an auxiliary armament which 
 had not been provided in the earlier turret ships. The 
 length of the ' Nile ' and ' Trafalgar ' is 340 ft., of which 
 230 ft. is protected at the water line with compound 
 armour, varying in thickness from 16 to 20 in. The 
 
Armour — Later Turret Ships. 143 
 
 turrets are covered with similar armour, 18 in. thick. 
 Machinery of 12.000 horse power gives these vessels a 
 speed of 16 knots. Compared with the ' Inflexible,' 
 they represent a considerable advance in every detail, 
 and are powerful fighting ship.s. Their only defect, to 
 my mind — independent of the size and cost — is that the 
 guns are not carried sufficiently high above the water, 
 and for this reason I have always preferred the barbette 
 system. The turret ship ' Hood,' now building, is more 
 than 2000 tons larger than the ' Trafalgar,' and repre- 
 sents what appears to be the final development of this 
 system, which originated in the cupola ship of Captain 
 Coles. The ' Hood ' is of similar dimensions to the 
 seven first-class barbette ships of the 'Royal Sovereign' 
 type, and only differs in having her heavy guns mounted 
 in turrets instead of en barbette. It remains to be seen 
 which of the two plans will be followed in future designs. 
 Though the general opinion in the navy has been 
 always in favour of double turrets, especially in vessels 
 of large dimensions, sufficient success in the produc- 
 tion of single-turreted ironclads, as exemplified in the 
 ' Rupert ' and * Conqueror,' led to a further extension of 
 this principle in two later ironclads, the ' Victoria ' and 
 ' Sanspareil,' now complete. The former was built by 
 Sir William Armstrong's firm at Elswick, and perhaps 
 is the only instance of a first-class battle ship being sup- 
 plied with the whole of her equipment from a pri\-alc 
 yard. She has a length of 340 ft., a breadth of 70 ft., 
 and displaces 10,500 tons. In a single turret forward, 
 protected with 18 in. of compound armour, she carries 
 
144 Arinour — Later Turret Ships, 
 
 two iio-ton guns. In order to supply the deficiency of 
 stern fire, which the single turret forward entails, the 
 ' Victoria ' and her sister have a 29-ton gun mounted aft, 
 working behind a barbette shield. The protection 
 afforded by this arrangement is not great, but considera- 
 tions of weight doubtless prevented more being done in 
 this respect. To make up for this restriction of the 
 principal armament to three heavy guns, she carries 
 amidships a battery of twelve 6-in. guns and numerous 
 machine guns. Machinery of 14,000 horse power gives 
 these vessels a speed of 16 knots, so that in every re- 
 spect they show a marked superiority to the * Con- 
 queror ' and ' Hero.' They are the only British ships 
 in which a pair of i lo-ton guns are mounted side by 
 side; in the ' Benbow' one of these monsters is placed 
 at each end. The first-class battle ships of to-day thus 
 indicate a variety of ideas concerning offensive and de- 
 fensive capacity, and a conflict of opinions as to the best 
 disposition of armour and armament. We seem, how- 
 ever, to be approaching the time when experience with 
 these divergent types will enable us to select the best 
 points in each, and combine them in some type which 
 shall finally fill the place of the old three-decker. 
 Whether it will prove equally durable, he who deals 
 with the development of navies half a century hence 
 can alone record. 
 
 The two-decker also had her counterpart in the 
 small ironclads built or converted between i860 and 
 1870. Those of about 6000 tons and under were usu- 
 ally termed second class. For a country which has im- 
 
Aruwitr — Later Turret Ships. 145 
 
 portant interests in every part of the world, useful service 
 can always be found for vessels of these dimensions. 
 
 There were six ships of the same type which for 
 many years carried our flag in the China and Pacific 
 seas. These were the ' Audacious,' ' Invincible,' * Iron 
 Duke,' 'Swiftsure,' 'Triumph,' and 'Vanguard.' The 
 career of the latter was cut short by sinking, after 
 collision with a consort, in the Irish Channel. None 
 of them exceeded 6500 tons displacement, but they 
 carried a powerful battery of guns and 8 in. of armour 
 at the water line. They were, besides, roomy and com- 
 fortable vessels, so that, until left behind by the won- 
 derful advance in engines and armament after their 
 completion, they proved admirably adapted for foreign 
 service. They were succeeded by the armoured cruiser 
 in this duty, and therefore the demand for ironclad 
 battle ships of moderate size diminished. 
 
 But under the Naval Defence Act two so-called 
 battle ships of the second class are being constructed, 
 to be named ' Centurion ' and ' Barfleur.' The length to 
 which we have gone in adding to the size of all classes 
 is strikingly illustrated in this pair. Their displacement 
 is to be no less than 10,600 tons, which will enable them 
 to combine four 29-ton guns — a pair 01 barhcttc at each 
 end — ten 45-p()undcr (juick firers, side armour 12 in. 
 thick, and a speed of 18 knots. A certain number of 
 torpedo tubes will also be provided. The 29- ton gun 
 is one that can be worked without the aid of machincr\', 
 and hence is not so easily disabled as the larger patterns 
 dependent on hydraulic loading. Its power is about 
 
 K 
 
146 A rmou r — L ater Tu rret Sli ips. 
 
 double that of the old 38-ton muzzle-loader, which at 
 one time we considered such an effective weapon. The 
 45 -pounders are to be on the broadside in two tiers, for 
 greater distribution, and to prevent a single shell from 
 disabling two or three of these guns. They will further- 
 more be screened by stout steel shields. Many are 
 disposed to think that high speed, though essential for 
 a cruiser, is not so requisite in a battle ship. But as 
 vessels like the 'Centurion' and 'Barfleur' will probably 
 take the place, and do the duty, of armoured cruisers, 
 they would be of little value if unable to proceed rapidly 
 from point to point, or to compete in speed with vessels 
 of their own class. Vox home waters, including the 
 Mediterranean, a moderate speed that can be sustained 
 will suffice. 
 
 After dealing with so man\' ships clad in mail 18 in. 
 thick it may seem that a protection limited to 12 in. is 
 insufficient, but that amount of hard armour will ex- 
 clude all but the heaviest projectiles, and something 
 must be left to chance, \\1icn wrought-iron was suc- 
 ceeded by a less easily perforated substance ^^■e might 
 well have retraced some of the steps which culminated 
 in 2 ft. of armour. I should be disposed to say that 
 we should never exceed a maximum thickness of 12 or 
 14 in., but should offer a high premium on improve- 
 ments in quality by which greater resistance to pro- 
 jectiles may be attained. 
 
 In the 'Centurion' and 'Barfleur' we have a type 
 which will, I believe, be highly commended by naval 
 officers. All the attributes necessary for an efficient 
 
Aniiour — Later Turret Ships. 147 
 
 fighting ship arc present, and the instrument is in due 
 proportion to the human faculty which has to wield it. 
 There must be a point at which this ratio is disturbed. 
 Mechanical science, pushed on by the exertions and 
 talents of a few, may outstrip the capacity of ordinary 
 intelligence, and what is successful experimentall)^ when 
 no disturbing element comes into play may fail under 
 the more searching conditions of war. We, in common 
 \\ith all nations, appear to have gone too far in the 
 production of monster ships and guns, and I trust the 
 reaction that must alwa}\s follow^ such excesses will 
 lead to a great increase in the numbers of what, for 
 the moment, we term second-class battle ships. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 CRUISERS 
 
 Frigates in Old Time — Speed an Essential — Early Steam Cruisers — ' In- 
 constant' and others — Action between 'Shah' and ' Iluascar ' — 
 Armoured Cruisers — ' Imperieuse ' and ' Warspite ' — Development 
 of Internally Protected Vessels — ' Blake ' and ' Blenheim ' — ' Royal 
 Arthur ' Class — Smaller Types — Scouting Duties — Necessity for 
 High Speed. 
 
 In addition to the large vessels which, by tlie number of 
 their guns, disposed in two, three, or even four tiers, were 
 capable of taking their place in the line of battle, fleets 
 have from very early days contained a number of smaller 
 craft for the duties of scouting, conveying information, 
 and the protection of commerce. We had frigates, cor- 
 vettes, sloops, and brigs for such work, supplemented 
 by privateers to whom letters of marque were granted. 
 Pepys tells us the first frigate built in England was 
 modelled from a French frigate which Pett the ship- 
 wright had seen in the Thames. Attached to a squadron, 
 frigates were relied on to obtain information of an 
 enemy's movements, and being more nimble under sail 
 than the heavier battle ships, could hover round them 
 until their destination seem assured, when they would 
 make off with the intelligence to their own squadron. 
 They were often used also for convoying merchant- 
 
Cruisers. 1 49 
 
 ships. The demand for them, therefore, was enormous, 
 and admirals in command could not always obtain an 
 adequate number. Nelson at a critical moment said 
 the want of frigates would be found stamped on his 
 heart, and we shall no doubt suffer from the same 
 deficiency at some future time. 
 
 A frigate by itself hardly ever ventured to attack a 
 two-decker except in expectation of the aid of a friendly 
 battle ship, when it would endeavour to delay the enemy 
 until its bigger consort came up. Cases have occurred 
 of a frigate being sunk by a single broadside from a line- 
 of-battle ship. Its most valuable quality was superiority 
 in speed over the more powerful vessel, and as long as 
 the wind remained the only motive power this char- 
 acteristic was preserved. It even endured for some 
 years after the introduction of steam, but then came a 
 time when, having freely abandoned sail power in battle 
 ships, we endeavoured to combine it with steam in 
 cruisers, the result being that as a rule our small craft 
 were of little value for war purposes. If they met a 
 battle ship at sea they would have been overtaken in 
 flight, while their steam speed was inferior to that of any 
 merchant steamer converted into a commerce destroyer. 
 This dangerous condition of affairs has now passed away. 
 We have frankly recognised that a high speed under 
 steam is the first essential for vessels which have to 
 perform the duties I have mentioned, and it has been 
 secured in those which we have recently built. 
 
 There have been fitful periods, however, when we 
 produced steam frigates of high speed. inspired by 
 
1 50 Cruisers, 
 
 the example of the United States, which after the 
 Civil War constructed some fast frigates, we built the 
 'Inconstant' in 1866, a vessel of nearly 6000 tons, 
 in which the high speed of 16 knots under steam 
 was obtained. She also sailed remarkably well. As 
 the 'Warrior,' the first ironclad, had a speed of 14 
 knots, it may be considered that the extra 2 knots 
 of the 'Inconstant' fairly maintained the old relative 
 superiority of the class to which she belonged. But 
 this vessel was too large and costly in maintenance 
 to be adopted as a type ; so two others, the ' Active ' 
 and 'Volage,' of just over 3000 tons and 15 knots speed, 
 were built. We then reverted to the big ship idea, and 
 produced the ' Shah,' of 6200 tons, by which 16 knots 
 were again obtained. Like the ' Inconstant,' she was 
 built of iron cased with wood and coppered. The 
 armament consisted of two 12-ton guns, sixteen 6i-ton 
 guns, and six 64-pounders. Thus the modern frigate, 
 like the battle ship, carried few guns, but of greater 
 power than had hitherto been mounted in this class of 
 ship. 
 
 If any supposed that unarmoured frigates of this 
 size could compete with and overcome even the 
 smallest ironclad, the idea was dispelled when the 
 ' Shah ' fought and failed to subdue the small Peruvian 
 monitor ' Huascar.' As corroborating my previous re- 
 marks on the relative strength of the frigate and the 
 line-of-battle ship, a brief account of this action may 
 here be given. 
 
 In the early part of May 1877, during one of the 
 
Cruisers. 1 5 1 
 
 periodical internal disturbances in Peru, the 'Huascar' 
 was seized by a party of the disaffected, headed by 
 Don Nicolas Pierola. The ship was taken out of 
 Callao Harbour, and proceeded on a cruise to the south- 
 ward. As she had committed an act of piracy in forcibly 
 removing coal without payment from a British barque, 
 Admiral de Horsey, then flying his flag in the ' Shah,' 
 as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Squadron, deter- 
 mined to seize the ' Huascar.' In company with the 
 
 * Amethyst,' a corvette of 2000 tons, armed with 
 64-pounders, the admiral proceeded in chase. On 
 the 29th of May the two ships met the ' Huascar,' and 
 a boat was sent on board demanding her delivery, 
 refusal to be followed by fire being opened upon her 
 by the British vessels. The monitor was only a 
 little over 2000 tons, and her armament consisted of 
 
 , two i2|-ton muzzle-loading guns, in a single turret, and 
 two 40-pounders. But on the water line the ship was 
 protected by 4i-in. iron plates, and the turret by S^-in. 
 Against this the guns of the 'Amethyst' were of little 
 use, but those of the ' Shah ' could, at close quarters 
 and hitting direct, penetrate any portion. On the other 
 hand, the guns of the ' Huascar,' loaded with common 
 shell, would, if they hit, inflict great damage on the 
 
 * Shah's ' entirely unprotected sides. 
 
 With a scratch crew, and against such odds, Pierola 
 might have surrendered his h'ttlc \'cssel without any 
 great loss of honour. He i)referred to fight, and at 
 three P.M. the action began. A series of broadsides 
 were fired from the ' Shah,' some of which struck the 
 
1 5 2 Cruisers. 
 
 * Huascar,' but without causing serious damage. The 
 conditions of a sea fight and firing at an armour plate 
 on shore to gauge penetration of projectiles differ widely. 
 A direct blow on the armour of a ship in motion is the 
 exception not the rule, consequently the ' Huascar' was 
 able to endure a severe pounding from the ' Shah ' 
 without sustaining fatal injury. On the other hand, her 
 own fire was so slow and inaccurate that the ' Shah ' 
 was not struck once. The 'Amethyst' also kept up a 
 smart fire, but without result. The ' Huascar,' except 
 in her gunnery, was well handled, and once or twice 
 tried to ram the * Shah,' which the superior speed of 
 the latter enabled her to avoid. After a fight of nearl)^ 
 three hours darkness came on and firing ceased. Dur- 
 ing the night the ' Huascar ' got away, and was given 
 up next day by her commander to the Peruvian fleet. 
 She was then uninjured in any vital part, and the 
 water line had not been penetrated although the ship 
 was struck (it was estimated) by about sixty or seventy 
 projectiles. This showed the advantage of even thin 
 armour against guns of moderate power, and tends to 
 confute the opinion that unprotected vessels can under 
 any circumstances take the place of battle ships. 
 
 Only a few frigates approaching the dimensions and 
 speed of the * Shah ' were added to the fleet, and then 
 we fell back on a smaller class called corvettes, with less 
 speed but full sail power. For ordinary work in peace 
 time they were well suited, but could not during hos- 
 tilities have afforded much protection to commerce or 
 been of great service to a squadron seeking intelligence. 
 
Cruiser's. 153 
 
 The same defect characterised our steam sloops and gun 
 vessels which were distributed in all parts of the world. 
 They were constructed to keep the sea under sail, rely- 
 ing only upon steam when the wind failed. The result 
 was that as sea boats they were admirable, but steam- 
 ing against a moderate sea they were easily passed by 
 the 8-knot steam collier plodding steadily on for the 
 Suez Canal. But still in a tentative sort of way we 
 recognised the necessity for swift vessels, and while pro- 
 viding those above enumerated, built two vessels, between 
 1870 and 1880, with a steam speed of 18 knots. These 
 were the ' Iris ' and ' Mercury,' remarkable also for being 
 the first vessels built wholly of steel. The hull was not 
 cased in wood and coppered, but simply coated with 
 a composition to prevent fouling and preserve the steel 
 from the action of sea water. Having twin screws, only a 
 light rig was provided, and the armament consisted of ten 
 64-pounders. The ' Mercury,' attaining on trial a speed 
 of i8-|- knots, was the fastest of the two. These ships 
 were called despatch vessels, and for such service are 
 admirably suited. Speed had been made the first con- 
 sideration, and beyond subdivision of the hull no attempt 
 was made to afford protection, which involved carr}-ing 
 additional weight. The success of the ' Iris ' and ' Mer- 
 cury ' led to the construction of others, in which some 
 speed was sacrificed to give a steel deck over the 
 machinery and vital parts, to exclude fragments of shell 
 which might explode within the ship. The displace- 
 ment was the same, 3750 tons, as also the length, 300 ft., 
 but the armament was made heavier, and hence thcv 
 
1 54 Cruisers. 
 
 were regarded as cruisers. The old subdivision into 
 frigates, corvettes, sloops, and gun vessels was now to 
 pass away and give place to a general nomenclature. 
 The term cruiser covers nearly all classes at the present 
 time, as great and small are built much on the same 
 lines, carrying a heavy gun at the bow and stern, and 
 lighter pieces on the broadside. 
 
 A more powerful type has also sprung up called 
 the armoured cruiser. The earliest vessels thus known 
 were the 'Nelson,' 'Northampton,' and 'Shannon,' 
 built between 1870 and 1880. They were of moderate 
 dimensions, well armed, and carried a good supply of 
 coal. Their function in war, as stated by the Con- 
 troller of the Navy, was not to take their place in the 
 line of battle, but to roam over the seas and drive off 
 any future 'Alabama' acting against our commerce. 
 Unfortunately they failed in the first essential for such 
 work. In none of these ships did the speed exceed 
 14 knots, and hence they would be quite incapable of 
 overhauling a moderately fast merchant steamer. This 
 defect was remedied in two later vessels, the 'Imperieuse' 
 and 'Warspite,' which combine a speed of 16 knots 
 with a powerful armament and a partial belt of 
 armour 10 in. thick. They carry 900 tons of coal, so 
 are suitable for service in distant seas, and could cope, 
 if occasion required, with any of the smaller ironclads 
 of foreign powers. 
 
 To the non-professional mind it may seem that 
 such vessels might also fairly be classed as battle 
 ships of the second or third class, as they carry four 
 
i 
 
Cruisers, 157 
 
 22-ton guns and thicker armour than any of the early 
 ironclads. It is more the service on which they are to 
 be employed than any special form of construction 
 which has put them in the cruiser category. No more 
 ships of this type have been built. In this country 
 the further development of the cruiser has been in the 
 direction of giving up external armour, and devoting 
 all weight we can give to protection to a steel deck 
 for the whole length of the ship, varying in thickness 
 according to her size. The extreme of this principle 
 is seen in the ' Blake ' and * Blenheim/ our two latest 
 and largest cruisers, each of 9000 tons displacement. 
 The interior is roofed over so as to cover the machinery, 
 magazines, etc., with a steel deck 3 in. thick. The 
 sides of this deck slope down to about 6 ft. below the 
 water line, till they meet the hull, the thickness being 
 double that of the horizontal portion. This disposition of 
 armour does not attempt to exclude hostile shells, but, 
 it is assumed, will prevent their explosion from impair- 
 ing either the buoyancy or motive power of the vessel. 
 Opinions as to the comparative merit of external and 
 internal armour arc divergent, and I offer none of my 
 own. It is one of the many questions which actual 
 conflict can alone decide. But if in the ' Imperieuse ' and 
 * Warspite ' we marked a considerable increase of speed 
 over the early armoured cruisers, this (juality is de- 
 veloped to a still greater extent in the ' ]-ilakc ' and 
 *]^lenheim.' They are to be provided with machinery of 
 sufficient power to drive them in smooth water at the 
 rate of 22 knots an hour, when pushed to the utmost 
 
15^ Cruisers. 
 
 extent with forced draught. Their ordinary full speed 
 will be 20 knots. Several merchant steamers traverse 
 the ocean at this rate, and in the event of any being 
 converted into hostile cruisers we must have war ships 
 not inferior in this respect. In all our unarmoured 
 vessels, up to a recent date, the deficiency in speed was 
 in great measure due to their insufficient length. The 
 least sea stopped their progress, while the merchant 
 steamer, being much longer in proportion to beam, was 
 only retarded in the same weather to a \ery small 
 extent. We have now frankly admitted that length is 
 indispensable for an efficient cruiser. Thus, while the 
 'Nelson' was 280 and *Imperieuse' 315 ft. long, the 
 extreme length of the 'Blake' and 'Blenheim' will be 
 400 ft. As their displacement is to be 9000 tons, a 
 powerful armament can be carried. It consists of a 
 22-ton gun at bow and stern, three 6-in. guns on each 
 side, and a number of machine guns. They will also 
 be fitted to discharge torpedoes from above and below 
 water. 
 
 Besides these two, eight others are building, under 
 the Naval Defence Act, of about 7500 tons, in which 
 length and speed are to be somewhat less than in the 
 ' Blake ' and ' Blenheim.' The first of these, the ' Royal 
 Arthur,' which was launched by Her Majesty early in 
 the year, is rapidly approaching completion. Her 
 construction is in most respects similar to that of the 
 ' Blake,' but in lieu of a 22-ton gun forward she 
 will carry two additional 6-in. guns further aft, but 
 with command of fire right ahead. 
 
Criiiscrs. .159 
 
 It has always been customary to place a heavier 
 gun than that carried on the broadside as a bow 
 chaser, but the principle is exaggerated when guns of 
 14 tons and upwards, aggregating with carriage, etc., 
 20 tons, are placed in the fine bows of vessels not 
 larger than the old frigates. Yet in the Mersey, Severn, 
 Thames, and Forth, modern cruisers of 4000 tons, an 
 8-in. 14-ton gun has been placed in the bow and stern, 
 the former of which must, with all its appurtenances, 
 be a terrible weight to carry against a head wind or 
 sea. How can we expect speed to be maintained 
 when the vessel is thus handicapped ? Such considera- 
 tions have no doubt led us in the latest cruisers of 
 similar dimensions, of which there are several now 
 building, to limit the guns at the bow and stern to a 
 calibre of 6-in. and a weight of 5 tons. Constructed 
 of the length now necessary to obtain the full energy 
 derived from improved powders, they have a long range 
 for such a gun, and throw a shell capable of dealing 
 terrible havoc to any unarmoured structure. No more 
 need be demanded of vessels not primarily designed to 
 fight ironclads. 
 
 The smallest type of cruisers, termed third class, is 
 represented in the 'Medea,' 'Medusa,' 'Marathon,' and 
 ' Melpomene.' Their principal armament consists of six 
 6-in. guns. They were designed to ha\e an extreme 
 speed of 20 knots, but a sustained sj)ced of about 
 16 knots an hour on the ocean is pn^babl)- the most that 
 can be attained. A lighter armament would probably 
 render these vessels more efficient as cruisers. There is 
 
1 60 Cruisers. 
 
 no doubt, however, that we are in a better condition for 
 protecting our vast commerce at the present time than 
 we have been during any portion of the last half- 
 century, independent of the aid we should receive from 
 the conversion of some of the fastest merchant steamers 
 into auxiliary cruisers. That other countries contem- 
 plate, in the event of war, an attack on our sea-borne 
 trade has been clearly foreshadowed in the writings 
 which have been published abroad, and received with 
 favour by the nations to whom they were addressed. 
 They will not be deterred from this action by the 
 knowledge that the issue of a war cannot depend upon 
 any success obtained in this way unless accompanied 
 by a mastery, more or less complete, over the sea forces 
 of the enemy. We may be harassed but not subdued 
 in this fashion. Knowing the danger, it behoves us, 
 however, to take adequate steps to guard against it, and 
 this we are doing by at last adding to our fleet cruisers 
 from which the modern * Alabama ' will find it difficult 
 to escape. The career of this vessel has often been cited 
 to show the damage that could be inflicted by a single 
 vessel. But considering she was practically unmolested 
 for eighteen months, it is no matter for surprise that the 
 commerce under the stars and stripes, then carried 
 chiefly in sailing ships, should suffer. The number of 
 her captures during this period was under sixty, and 
 only one was a steamer. Semmes was astonished at the 
 absence of method displayed by the North in his pursuit. 
 In his account of the cruise of the ' Alabama,' Semmes, 
 referring to the Secretary of the Navy, said : * The old 
 
Cruisers. 1 6 i 
 
 gentleman docs not seem once to have thought of so 
 simple a policy as stationing a ship anywhere.' Vessels 
 were certainly despatched in pursuit of the ' Alabama,' 
 but generally arrived in one sea as she was leaving it for 
 another, her commander calculating pretty accurately 
 how long he could count on undisturbed possession. 
 But her success was of little assistance to the South in 
 delaying its final subjugation. 
 
 Vessels for the protection of commerce must not 
 only be swift to run but also long to endure ; that is 
 to say, they should carry a large supply of fuel, or much 
 of their time will be taken up in replenishing their stock 
 of coal. I am of opinion that we should make an 
 addition to the proportion of weight now allotted to 
 this important item. Vessels attached to a squadron 
 for scouting or despatch duties need not carry such an 
 amount, or be of such large dimensions. If, as I am 
 inclined to believe, no vessel under 3000 tons can be 
 an efficient cruiser under modern conditions, I think 
 2000 tons will be sufficient for a despatch vessel or 
 sea scout. A few years ago Messrs Palmer of Jarrow- 
 on-Tyne built for the navy two excellent little ships of 
 1600 tons, called the 'Surprise' and 'Alacrity,' for this 
 service. They have since done good work in China and 
 the Mediterranean. Their speed is 16 knots, and they 
 carry an armament of four 5-in. guns. For some reason 
 we have built no more vessels like them, l)ut b)' improv- 
 ing on their design, and increasing the displacement to 
 2000 tons, an additional ocean speed of 2 knots could 
 be secured. There is a class of vessel, represented l)y 
 
 L 
 
i62 Cruisers. 
 
 the ' Archer ' and a few others, of which the unfortunate 
 'Serpent' was one, of nearly 1800 tons, which, though 
 designated third-class cruisers, are more suitable for act- 
 ing with a squadron. They are hampered, however, by 
 carrying six 6-in. guns, too heavy an armament for such 
 craft. Their speed and seaworthiness would be improved 
 by substituting lighter ordnance. We have carried this 
 out in a later class. The ' Barham ' and ' Bellona,' of 
 1830 tons, have a speed of 19 knots and an armament 
 of six 45-pounder quick-firing guns. The projectile of 
 the 6-in. gun weighs 100 lbs. 
 
 It will probably strike most people who remember 
 our wooden steam frigates and corvettes how low in the 
 water appear the steel cruisers of to-day. The demand 
 on the naval architect for guns and ammunition, which 
 exceed all former experience, the plea for torpedoes and 
 other new weapons of naval warfare, the advantages of 
 electric lights, the absolute necessity for torpedo nets, 
 all these are impressed upon the constructor by the 
 experts with resistless cogency, so that the vessel be- 
 comes like the stage soldier, overladen with weapons. 
 Something must be given up, or dimensions in every 
 class largely increased. A Plimsoll's mark for war 
 vessels is not desirable, but I can conceive that it may 
 become necessary, unless naval officers moderate their 
 demands. Blame is often cast on the naval architect 
 because ships after completion do not realise original 
 expectations. In most cases it should more properly 
 be laid on those who, during construction, have success- 
 fully pleaded for a heavier gun, extra torpedoes, and 
 
mm 
 
 M - 
 
 .M^'^' 
 
Cruisers. 163 
 
 more numerous crew than the original design contained. 
 This usually accounts for the vessel drawing more water 
 than was intended. 
 
 If in a war with a powerful maritime state the patrol 
 of the seas must require a large number of cruisers, the 
 demand for swift vessels for other services will be equally 
 pressing. Endeavours have been made from time to 
 time to lay down the proportion that should exist 
 between such craft and a battle squadron of given 
 strength. Such calculations are futile, because no com- 
 mander is likely to be satisfied when the time comes 
 with the number allotted to him, in view of demands 
 from all sides which cannot be neglected. Moreover, 
 sufficiency will depend on the work to be done more 
 than on the number of battle ships. But if hostile 
 fleets are to be watched, as they often were of old, by a 
 squadron of frigates, while the main force was out of 
 sight but within speedy communication, the number of 
 vessels required for this work in future will be ver\' 
 great. The coaling question then comes in. Formerly 
 only shortness of fresh water drove ships into port. 
 Their supply was usually sufficient to last for three 
 months. To have some convenient localit}' where ships 
 could water was an important matter in the okl bk)ck- 
 ading days. Distillation of salt water now renders us 
 independent of this consideration, but it is another 
 demand on the coal supj)ly, which is the measure of a 
 steamer's capacity to remain at sea at the present time. 
 It is difficult to estimate this endurance under the var}- 
 ing conditions of blockade. If position is maintained 
 
1 64 Cruisers. 
 
 ordinarily under easy steam, there must be capability of 
 passing to a high rate of speed at short notice, which 
 will be not only a severe trial to the machinery but 
 consume the stock of coal at a rapid rate. Moveable 
 coal depots as close to the scene of operations as possible 
 will be a necessity in cases where no Imperial coaling 
 station is comparatively near, but probably only the 
 experience of a war of some duration can demonstrate 
 the best system for coaling a large fleet operating in all 
 parts of the world. 
 
 It is only of late years that the value of scouts to a 
 squadron of battle ships has been recognised, and the 
 method of utilising their services considered. For this 
 and other invaluable experience wc arc indebted to our 
 annual naval manoeuvres. The ubiquit)- which steam 
 confers in searching the ocean is an advantage which 
 Nelson could not command, but which must in future 
 relieve an admiral from all the anxiety of a foul wind 
 when seeking information of an enemy which has 
 escaped his vigilance. To have in addition one or two 
 fast despatch vessels to warn detached squadrons of 
 such movements, or return home with important intelli- 
 gence — as Nelson sent a vessel home when he was 
 satisfied that Villeneuve had left the West Indies — will 
 be no less essential on some future occasion. They 
 must be ready to run the gauntlet of the enemy's 
 cruisers, and hence swiftness will be their chief security. 
 They must not stop to fight unless brought to bay, and 
 their armament should be of the lightest description. 
 Up to the present time the development of this type 
 
Cruiser's, 165 
 
 of vessel is incomplete. It took centuries to produce 
 the subdivision — or differentiation, as Admiral Colomb 
 terms it in his Naval Warfare — of sailing ships into 
 the several classes suited for the work then imposed on 
 them. We cannot expect that, without the experience 
 of conflict, the immense changes which the last half- 
 century has seen in the composition of fleets will be 
 found to have resulted in a series of types suited in 
 all respects to the novel conditions of the next great 
 naval war. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 ORDNANCE 
 
 Old Smooth Bore Ouns and their Manipulation — Mr Lancaster's System — 
 Introduction of Rifled Guns —Early Inventors — Breech- Loaders 
 introduced and discarded — Woolwich Muzzle-Loaders — Growth of 
 Ordnance to 8o-toa Guns— Breech-Loaders again introduced — 
 Increase of Length and Power — Advance to iio-ton Guns — 
 Ammunition— Quick-Firing Guns. 
 
 I HAVE indicated, in the first chapter, the description of 
 ordnance used in the navy in 1840. Cast iron guns, with 
 a smooth bore for throwing spherical projectiles, were 
 then employed. Mounted on wooden carriages, with 
 four low, solid wheels — called trucks — of the same 
 material, they were worked by tackles and wooden 
 handspikes. The recoil on discharge was controlled 
 by a stout piece of rope — called a breeching — which 
 passed through a ring at the rear of the gun, the two 
 ends being secured to the side of the ship. Sufficient 
 slack was allowed, so that on discharge the gun would 
 recoil far enough to bring the muzzle just inside the port, 
 where it was in the most con\'enient position for entering 
 a fresh charge. The decks of a line-of-battle ship were 
 a fine sight when gun drill was taking place. To fire 
 three rounds at an imaginary passing vessel as she 
 quickly shifted her bearing was an exercise calling forth 
 
Ordnance. 1 69 
 
 both skill and physical capacity, in which our sailors ex- 
 celled. The comparative lightness of the gun, and the 
 simplicity of its mounting, permitted of great variety in 
 the exercise. If a carriage was disabled, the gun could 
 be dismounted without delay. A frequent evolution 
 was to transport a gun from one end of the ship to the 
 other. The sailing trim of a vessel w^as often altered in 
 this way. The method of giving elevation to the gun 
 was exceedingly crude. Wooden inclined planes called 
 quoins were pushed under the breech, by which the 
 muzzle w^as elevated or depressed. They were marked 
 in degrees, but w^ere exceedingly likely to be displaced 
 by the movement of the gun. The marking usually 
 took place after the ship was commissioned, and was not 
 unfrequently delayed for a considerable period. It de- 
 pended on the zeal of the gunner. This recalls to my 
 mind a certain captain, well known for his great faculty of 
 exaggeration, who sent for his gunner some time after 
 commissioning a ship, and said to him : ' Mr Bluelights, 
 are all the quoins marked ? ' * Yes, sir,' promptly replied 
 the other. The captain, having good reason to know 
 tliat this was not the case, merely said, ' I will just go 
 round the gun deck.' Not a single quoin was marked. 
 Turning to his subordinate, he quietly observed, ' Mr 
 Bluelights, you arc the biggest liar in this ship.' The 
 (jther siinply looked at him and rclorUHl, no less calml)% 
 ' No, sir, 1 am n(;l,' w ilh a slight cni[)]iasis on the pro- 
 noun. 
 
 These guns were naturally \er}" inaccin"ate, and cotild 
 not be otherwise, independent]}- of the rude methods 
 
T 70 Ordnance. 
 
 for directinij^ their fire. In the first place, the bore was 
 considerably larger than the shot, to facilitate loading 
 and the use of red-hot shot. This difference of diameter 
 was called 'windage,' and varied from one-fifth to one- 
 third of an inch. It allowed, therefore, a considerable 
 portion of the gunpowder gas to escape past the pro- 
 jectile, and wasted so much energy. Then, for reasons 
 which would require too technical an explanation for 
 this work, the round shot was subject to special inac- 
 curacies in its flight. These defects were not so manifest 
 at close quarters in action, which officers in command 
 usually sought to attain, and the charge of powder, 
 howe\'er reduced in energy b}- windage, retained sufficient 
 power to penetrate wooden ships. But for some \-ears 
 previous to the substitution of ironclads for the old 
 types of ships the Admiralt\' of this country had 
 been impressed with the ad\antages of having the 
 armament of the navy of greatly increased power and 
 weight. This \iew was confirmed by the introduction 
 of the 68-pounder, which proved a powerful and effec- 
 tive weapon. But when it had been ascertained that 
 this gun was powerless against 4-5-in. plates, it was at 
 once evident that some new system of gun construction 
 must be devised. A long series of experiments proved 
 that the old ordnance was exceedingly dcfecti\e ; that 
 every gun, great or small, should be rifled, in order to 
 give long range and precision to the projectile ; and 
 that to have the required strength guns must be made 
 of wrought-iron or steel. 
 
 The object of a rifled gun is to give to a cylindrical 
 
Ordnance. 
 
 171 
 
 projectile rotation or spin on its Ioniser axis. The rota- 
 tory motion keeps the shot steady during fli.ght, and 
 prevents its bein^^ subject to the special influence which 
 caused the inaccuracy of smooth bore guns. A cylin- 
 drical projectile is heavier than the round shot of 
 similar diameter. Thus the old 32-poundcr was of 
 6-in. diameter, but the modern 6-in. rifled gun throws 
 a projectile of 100 lbs. weight. 
 
 There are other advantages, on which it is unneces- 
 sary to dwell, but for many years artillerists had been 
 seeking a satisfactory method of giving rotation to the 
 projectile. One of the earliest inventors in this country 
 was Mr Lancaster, who conceived the idea of making 
 the bore of a gun slightly elliptical or oval, with a twist, 
 so that a projectile of the same shape received a spin 
 during its passage through the bore. Fairly successful 
 experiments resulted in the construction of some ol 
 these guns and their employment in the siege of Se- 
 bastopol. But they were not reliable, and more than 
 one burst. In the meantime a rifle had been adopted 
 for the army in place of the old smooth bore musket, 
 and it was only a c}ucstion of working out the principle 
 for larger guns. 
 
 In 1846 Major Cavalli, of the Sardinian arm\', and 
 Baron Wahrendorff, a Swedish noble, had each brought 
 forward a l)rccch-loading rifled gun throwing c)-lindrical 
 projectiles with pointed heads. Cawilli's gun was of 
 6^-in. calibre, and had two grooves cut si)irally along 
 the bore. The ])r()jcctiles had two winged projections 
 whicli travelled in the irrooves aiul caused rotation. The 
 
1 7 2 Ordnance, 
 
 breech was closed by an iron wedge entered from the 
 top of the gun. With the usual interval for improve- 
 ments, experiments were carried out in Italy with this 
 gun, which showed considerable advance in accuracy 
 over the smooth bores. 
 
 Wahrendorffs gun was similar in principle, though 
 the details were different. Trials took place at Shoe- 
 buryness in 1850 with both the Wahrendorff and Cavalli 
 gun, but the breech mechanism was defective, and neither 
 was adopted. So matters rested until after the Crimean 
 War, when the question was seriously taken up in this 
 country. Able inventors turned their attention to rifled 
 ordnance, and among the foremost were Messrs Arm- 
 strong and Whit worth. In fact Mr Armstrong had 
 made a small rifled gun in 1855, and the principle on 
 which this was constructed was eventually adopted. 
 The first had a steel barrel strengthened externally by 
 wrought-iron, applied in a twisted or spiral form as in a 
 fowling piece. This gives the strength due to the fibre 
 of the material being disposed at right angles to the bore. 
 The gun was rifled with numerous small grooves. The 
 projectiles were cylindrical, of cast-iron, and coated with 
 lead, to take the grooves and so receive rotation. Being 
 pushed in from the rear or breech, allowance for windage 
 was unnecessary, as the projectile was only inserted suffi- 
 ciently far for the lead coating to abut against the 
 beginning of the rifling, and the action of the powder 
 forced the projectile to take the grooves. 
 
 Satisfactory results were obtained, and a larger gun 
 was constructed. The steel barrel was abandoned as 
 
Ordnance. i 7 3 
 
 bcinL,^ untrustworthy, and difficult to manufaclurc sound. 
 Coiled wrouL^ht-iron was used entirely. The breech- 
 closing arrangement was the same as before. This was 
 arranged as follows. The rear of the gun had a hole 
 through it, forming a prolongation of the bore, and by 
 this aperture powder and shot were entered. Then 
 the bore was closed by an iron plug inserted through 
 an opening on the top of the gun. To press it firmly 
 against the end of the barrel, it was tightened in its 
 place by a screw working in the loading aperture. The 
 Government so highly approved of this gun that Mr 
 Armstrong was knighted and given an official ap- 
 pointment at Woolwich. It was certainly a great 
 improvement both in range and accuracy over any pre- 
 ceding weapon. With one of these guns a range of 
 9000 yards was obtained. 
 
 Between i860 and 1861 we commenced suppl}-ing 
 the navy with 20, 40 and lOO-pounder Armstrong 
 guns. My first experience of the sea was leaving 
 England in a 50-gun frigate, towards the close of 1861, 
 with several of these guns for distribution among the 
 ships of the North American Squadron. The arrest of 
 Messrs Slidell and Mason had lately occurred, and 
 relations with the United States were rather strained, 
 l^ut tlie new guns did not reach their destination, for we 
 encountered a tremendous gale of wind off the banks of 
 Newfoundland, and sustained such damage as to neces- 
 sitate our return t(; England. Our cargo assisted the 
 elements in our discomfiture, making the ship roll so 
 heavil}-, and she had this propcnsit}- in a less degree at 
 
1 74 Ordnance, 
 
 all times, that much of the damage resulted from this 
 cause. We were not sorry, therefore, to see the guns 
 transferred to another vessel, while we went into dock 
 with all the appearance of having taken part in a severe 
 action. 
 
 These Armstrong breech-loaders did not, however, 
 remain long in use in the navy. There was an absence 
 of simplicity for which, coming directly after the old 
 smooth bores, the na\y was not yet prepared. The ad- 
 vantages of charging at the breech were not sufficiently 
 apparent. It was formerly difficult to make a mistake in 
 handling a gun, but now more care had to be taken. In 
 one of our periodical small wars, which occurred at that 
 time in Japan, some cases occurred of vent pieces being 
 blown out on firing these guns. This was owing, no doubt, 
 to the plugs not being screwed up tightly, but it created 
 a prejudice against a system in \\hich this might occur. 
 Another objection was that the lead coating on the 
 projectile occasionally stripped off when being forced 
 through the grooves. This affected the land service, as 
 such artillery firing over the heads of troops might give 
 them a leaden shower. Anyhow the fiat was issued that 
 a new gun must be devised which should be rifled and 
 load at the muzzle. Was this a retrogade step taken 
 less that thirty years ago, and at a time when other 
 nations had adopted the breech-loading system ? I do 
 not think so. At that time all guns were short, and load- 
 ing at the muzzle was not inconvenient. Their handling 
 was equally expeditious, and simplicity was on the side 
 of the muzzle-loader. This advantage would have been 
 
Ordnance. 1 7 5 
 
 more apparent in war. Our fault was not in reverting 
 to muzzle loading, but in retaining the system after the 
 introduction of slower burning powder, which required a 
 long gun to utilise all its energy. The new combination 
 gave increased velocity, range, and penetration. As is 
 well known, the path of a shot in the air is a curve, 
 owing to the action of gravity. The quicker it is in 
 travelling the less time there is for gravity to act, and 
 consequently the more nearly does the projectile travel 
 in a horizontal line. One of the great objects in 
 gunnery is to have this path — or trajectory, as it is 
 technically termed — as flat as possible. I have men- 
 tioned Mr Whitworth as being early in the field as a 
 designer of rifled guns. His system differed from Mr 
 Armstrong's in important respects. It will be sufficient 
 to allude to his method of rifling and the form of his 
 projectiles. The former consisted of a hexagonal bore 
 with a sharp twist. The projectile had six bearing 
 surfaces and accurately fitted the bore. Mr Whitworth 
 advocated flat-headed steel shot for attacking armour ; 
 but a pointed head is less impeded b}' the wind and 
 better suited for penetrating armour. 
 
 Captain Blakeley also put forward rifled guns which 
 did not materiall)^ differ from Whitworth's construction. 
 Captain Palliscr had alrcad}' turned his attention to 
 utilising cnu' okl smooth bores, by inserting an interior 
 barrel of coiled wrought-iron, the gun being i)re\iousl\- 
 bored out for its reception, it was then rilled, and a few- 
 heavy rounds fired, whicli expanded the inner barrel to 
 a tight fit with its cast-iron exterior. A ^S-pounder was 
 
176 Ordnance. 
 
 so converted into a 9-in. muzzle-loading rifled gun and 
 subjected to severe tests in 1863. With a charge of 
 16 lbs. of powder projectiles up to 680 lbs. weight were 
 fired from it. The recoil was naturally violent under 
 such conditions. It smashed carriages, and then the 
 gun was suspended in iron slings. It broke these, how- 
 ever, and flung itself out of them on to the ground, but 
 did not burst. This eventually occurred with 32 lbs. of 
 powder and a 200-lb. shot. The evidence of increased 
 strength given by a coiled iron barrel led to a number 
 of smooth bores being converted in this way and employed 
 until comparatively rcccnth- in the navy. A steel barrel 
 was subsequently used. 
 
 When it was decided to revert to muzzle-loading for 
 new guns the Woolwich system was adopted. This 
 consisted of a steel barrel with a series of wrought-iron 
 coils shrunk over it by being put on when heated. 
 They thus tightly gripped the inner tube, and enabled 
 it to sustain the explosion of a heavy charge without 
 rupture. The strength of the gun was considered to 
 lie in the outer coils ; the steel tube gave a hard surface 
 to the bore and a homogeneous material for the rifling 
 process. This tube was made from a solid ingot of 
 steel, turned and then bored out to the required diameter. 
 It was thus the most costly part of the gun, while the 
 boring and rifling processes required considerable time 
 before the rest of the parts could be added. 
 
 In 1865 we began equipping our ships with guns of 
 this construction. As an advance on the 68-pounder 
 a gun of 7-in. calibre and 6\ tons weight was pro- 
 
Ordnance, 177 
 
 duced. Its projectile was 115 lbs. weight, while the 
 charge was 30 lbs. of powder. The charge of the old 
 68-pounder was 16 lbs. At 1000 yards there was 
 sufficient energy to penetrate 7 in. of iron. Had 
 armour not increased in thickness, we might have 
 been satisfied with such a capability. But much 
 stouter plates were now being rolled, and the gun 
 had to grow likewise. Ordnance of 9, 12 and 18 tons, 
 all on the principle described, were successively de- 
 signed and put afloat. The largest of these was 
 charged with yo lbs. of powder and a projectile weigh- 
 ing 400 lbs. The 9-in. armour of the ' Hercules ' had 
 defied the efforts of a 300-pounder, and Sir William 
 Armstrong, in a letter to the Times of June 26th, 1865, 
 said, speaking of a 600-pounder which had then been 
 tried : ' Powerful as this 600-pounder has proved itself 
 to be, I confess I have great doubts of its obtaining the 
 mastery over the " Hercules " target unless the enormous 
 charges already used with that gun be still further 
 increased.' He doubted the possibility of constructing 
 a gun of sufficient strength to penetrate the ' Hercules ' 
 target. But hardly had these words been written when 
 heavier guns began to be produced, and we passed on to 
 ordnance of 25 and 35 tons. This was the struggle 
 between guns and armour. 
 
 It is not to be supposed that guns of this weight 
 could be carried on b();ird ship without an entire 
 reconstruction of the methods of mounting thcin. To 
 Captain Scott's iron gun-carriages is due a facilit}' in 
 working these guns which had not in sonic respects 
 
 M 
 
178 Ordnance. 
 
 been obtained with the much lighter smooth bore. 
 The same rapidity of loading could not be expected, 
 but a gun could be directed on its object much more 
 expeditiously with cogged wheels and winches than 
 with the old rough method of handspikes and tackles. 
 The gun recoiled up a slide, the extent of the recoil 
 being regulated by friction between carriage and slide. 
 The projectiles, instead of being passed from hand to 
 hand, as in the case of the 32-pounder, were wheeled 
 up in iron trucks to the muzzle and then hoisted by 
 a tackle for insertion. There was still room for the 
 display of strength and activity. We had not arrived 
 at working a lever — as at a railway siding — to actuate 
 a hydraulic ram which would bring up the ammuni- 
 tion, while the movement of another handle ejected a 
 rammer which forced all into its place. By the improved 
 method of mounting already described, and mechanical 
 arrangement for controlling the recoil, we were enabled 
 to work guns weighing 25 tons on the broadside with 
 celerity and safety. Though heavy, such guns were 
 necessarily short. Thus the 12-in. 25-ton gun had a 
 bore only 12 calibres long — the calibre of a piece 
 being the diameter of its bore. As we are now employ- 
 ing ordnance of 25, 30, and 35 calibres, the advance in 
 this respect since 1870 can be realised. But after that 
 date longer and heavier guns were constructed. With 
 the same calibre, 12-in., we proceeded to a 35-ton gun 
 of greater length for the ' Devastation's ' turrets. Then 
 a slower burning powder being produced, we found that 
 a 38-ton gun could be made nearly 16 calibres long of 
 
Ordnance. 179 
 
 \2\-\x\. bore, which would speed an 800 lb. projectile 
 with an initial velocity of 1 540 ft. per second, an increase 
 of 200 ft. per second over the 2 5 -ton gun, while the 
 charge of powder had advanced from 85 to 200 
 lbs. 
 
 The 38-ton gun was justly considered a great step, 
 but its projectile, weighing 800 lbs. had passed beyond 
 manipulation by hand or tackle. Then the ingenuity 
 of the great Elswick firm provided us with that 
 admirable system by which all the operations of load- 
 ing, elevating, and training heavy guns are performed 
 by hydraulic machinery. To describe these in detail 
 would require a volume in itself. It will be sufficient 
 to state that, on the principle of the ' Bramah ' press, 
 power is transmitted from an engine by water pressure 
 through a small pipe actuating hydraulic rams. Water 
 is contained in a tank and pumped by a steam engine 
 into pressure pipes, by which it passes to the different 
 hydraulic machines and then returns to the tank. One 
 of the ad\'antages of this system is that fewer men are 
 required round the gun. To work a turret by hand 
 originally took fifty men, now it is effected by a third 
 of the number. Then there is no such danger as the 
 bursting of a steam pipe would involve. The gun does 
 not require a high carriage, but rests in a block on 
 the slide. The recoil is controlled by a solid ram fixed 
 to this block, which on discharge of the gun travels in 
 a c}'lindcr full of water. The [)rcssurc of the ram or 
 piston forces the water through a number of weighted 
 valves, the resistance of which gradually brings the gun 
 
1 80 Ordnance. 
 
 to rest. Then forcing water into the cylinder pushes 
 the piston or ram and the gun out again. The same 
 principle is employed to raise the breech and extract 
 the breech piece when too cumbrous to be withdrawn 
 by hand. Objection has been raised that the system is 
 too complex, and that the gun may be disabled by the 
 rupture of a small pipe. This is true, but the same 
 result may ensue through the destruction of some por- 
 tion of hand-worked ordnance. It is impossible to 
 have simplicity with any modern gun. It is legitimate, 
 however, to argue that guns should not be mounted 
 afloat which, in the event of anything happening to 
 the hydraulic machinery, cannot be worked by hand. 
 
 The 38-ton gun thus loaded and controlled gave 
 great satisfaction. Several of our turret ships are 
 still armed with it, but in time a breech-loading gun 
 will take its place. In 1873 the struggle between guns 
 and armour produced what was then considered likely 
 to prove the climax in each. To equip the * Inflexible,' 
 carrying 24 in. of armour, with equally powerful ord- 
 nance, guns of 80 tons weight were designed. They 
 were originally intended to be of 144-in. calibre, but 
 were finally bored to 16 in. This gun was given a 
 length of 1 8 calibres ; the charge of powder was 450 lbs. 
 and the projectile weighed 1700 lbs. At 1000 yards 
 it could penetrate 23 in. of wrought-iron, and its initial 
 velocity was 1600 ft. per second. 
 
 The following table gives a general idea of the 
 advance made in the size of guns from the time we 
 discarded the 68-pounder smooth bore to the mount- 
 
I 5 
 
Ordnance 
 
 8i 
 
 ing- of 8o-ton muzzle-loading nflcd ordnance in the 
 ' Inflexible' : — 
 
 Diameter of Weight of I Charge of 
 Bore ! Gun. j Powder. 
 
 Ins. 
 
 7 
 8 
 
 9 
 
 lO 
 
 II 
 
 12 
 12-5 
 
 i6 
 
 Tons. 
 
 9 
 
 12 
 
 i8 
 
 25 
 
 35 
 38 
 80 
 
 Lbs. 
 30 
 
 35 
 50 
 70 
 
 35 
 140 
 200 
 450 
 
 Weight of 
 Projectile. 
 
 Velocity at 
 Muzzle. 
 
 Penetration 
 of Iron at 
 1000 Yards. 
 
 L..S 
 
 Ft. per Sec. 
 
 no 
 
 1500 
 
 180 
 
 1400 
 
 250 
 
 1400 
 
 400 
 
 1380 
 
 540 
 
 1320 
 
 700 
 
 1400 
 
 800 
 
 1550 
 
 700 
 
 1600 
 
 7 
 8 
 10 
 12 
 13 
 15 
 17 
 23 
 
 A ^cw words must now be said about the ammuni- 
 tion. Experiments had shown that against armour 
 ca.st-iron shot broke up like a snowball, while forged 
 wrought-iron projectiles flattened, as if made of lead, 
 against the hard or comparatively hard surface. In both 
 cases the iron plates suffered little, because the cncrL:\- 
 was exijcnded in breaking or distorting the nu'ssile. 
 In this dilemma Captain Palliser came to the rescue 
 with his ingenious de\ ice of hardening the front por- 
 tion of a sh(;t In- chiHing. The bed)- is cast in an 
 earthen mould, but the head is formed in- a metal 
 mould, which rapidly extracting the heat in this por- 
 tion gives great hardness to the material. The result is 
 
I«2 
 
 Ordnance. 
 
 that chilled shot of this nature are able to penetrate 
 wrought-iron plates without breaking up or distortion. 
 They are of cylindrical shape, with a pointed head, 
 which against armour acts like a punch, forced into the 
 plate by the energy of the other portion of the shot 
 behind it. All are cast with a hollow core, which can 
 be utilised for a bursting charge, but the space is so 
 limited that such an addition is of little value. A great 
 merit of these projectiles is their cheapness as compared 
 with those now made of steel, so that they are still 
 largely used for practice, and would be efficient against 
 thinly armoured ships, though unable to cope with the 
 thick steel or compound armour which has superseded 
 wrought-iron for protection. 
 
 Other kinds of missiles are common shell and 
 shrapnel shell. The former being required to contain a 
 large bursting charge, have not sufficient strength to pass 
 intact through armour, but are most destructive against 
 any unarmoured portion of a ship. Shrapnel are iron 
 cases containing a great number of small round shot, 
 the case being fractured by a small burster at the 
 required moment. The small shot then spread with the 
 impetus previously acquired in flight. Against boats or 
 bodies of men on shore they are very effective. 
 
 It has been mentioned that an improvement in the 
 velocity obtained with the later muzzle-loading guns 
 resulted from modifications in the powder employed. 
 Not in the ingredients, because they had remained un- 
 altered for centuries, and the same may be said of the 
 proportions of the mixture, but by making each indi- 
 
Ordnance. 183 
 
 vidual ij^rain or pellet lar^^^er the whole charge took 
 longer to consume. Hence, as the shot travelled down 
 the bore continual increments of gas were gene rated 
 imparting an augmenting velocity to the projectile, 
 which should reach tlic muzzle when this was at maxi- 
 mum. If the gun was too short, a large portion of the 
 pow^der would be blown out unconsumed, and result in 
 wasted energy. Even with considerable addition to the 
 length this occurs in a minor degree, as can be seen by 
 an instantaneous photograph of a gun at the moment of 
 discharge. As guns grew in size so did the grains of 
 explosive composing the charge, first to what was 
 termed pebble powder, and then to cubes of much 
 larger dimensions. At a short distance from the gun 
 unconsumed portions of these are a veritable hail of 
 small projectiles. 
 
 In 1880 we appeared to have reached some finality 
 in ordnance. We had advanced from 7 to 80 tons, and 
 found no difficulty in manipulating on board ship the 
 heaviest guns. There had been few accidents of a 
 serious nature. The bursting of a 38-ton gun in the 
 'Thunderer' owing to the insertion of a double charge 
 was a notable exception. The gun had actuall}- nn'ssed 
 fire the previous roiuul without the crew being aware 
 of it. It was then loaded again, and burst with great 
 vi(jlence on being discharged. Being one of a pair in 
 a turret, the discharge of the other gun had decei\ed 
 the crew into a belief that both had gone off l^ven 
 spectators watching the target stated that the\' saw two 
 shot strike the water. Such illusions are not uncom- 
 
1 84 Ordnance. 
 
 mon. When two or more guns are fired at the same 
 instant, and close together, especially if after recoil the 
 gun automatically returns to its place, a single report 
 may cause a doubt as to the discharge of both. This 
 is the converse of the 'Thunderer's' case, but it may 
 apply either way. One thing certainly was evident — 
 such an accident could not occur with a breech- 
 loading gun, because a second charge could not be 
 inserted. 
 
 But other causes were at work to bring about once 
 more a complete revolution in our armaments. Foreign 
 powers had in most cases adopted breech-loading guns, 
 and by giving increased length were obtaining higher 
 velocities. This meant increased penetration, in which 
 respect we were being left behind. It became neces- 
 sary for us to adopt the same principle, because we 
 had arrived at the maximum of length in muzzle- 
 loading ordnance for use in ships. We were un- 
 doubtedly slow to appreciate the necessity. There had 
 been no loud demand from the navy for the change, 
 and all ordnance coming to us from Woolwich, which 
 is under the control of another department of the 
 Government, there was naturally no great eagerness 
 in that quarter for a move which would involve an 
 entire change of pattern and construction. This matter 
 belongs to the past, and I am willing to apportion 
 blame to both sides. But when the great Elswick firm 
 produced a 6-in breech-loader, throwing an 80-lb. pro- 
 jectile with a velocity of 1800 ft. per second, it was evident 
 that we must at once discard all idea of adhering to our 
 
Ordnance. 185 
 
 old guns. The Woolwich gun factory, under the able 
 superintendence of Colonel Maitland, promptly grappled 
 with the problem, and from that day we have gradu- 
 ally been overtaking the lost ground. There has been 
 delay, of course, but to entirely rearm the British fleet 
 with a weapon essentially different to all that had gone 
 before in our experience was a stupendous task, and 
 this should be recognised. Mistakes must necessarily 
 occur, and one important change we did not at first 
 make. We adhered to the principle of an inner steel 
 barrel surrounded by wrought-iron coils. There was 
 a distrust of steel, which it took some years to eradicate, 
 though Krupp had always used this material entirely 
 in the construction of his guns. A 6-in. gun on the 
 wrought-iron coil system lately burst with great violence 
 in the ' Cordelia' from some unknown cause. 
 
 Since guns of this pattern were made we have dis- 
 carded the wrought-iron coils, and now strengthen the 
 steel barrel with hoops of the same material. In again 
 taking up breech-loading guns an important matter to 
 decide was the method of closing the breech after in- 
 sertion of the charge. We could follow the plan adopted 
 by Krup)), of a wedge inserted at the side or a screw 
 plug at the rear, as used in France. The latter was 
 adopted, and with it the ingenious device for saving 
 time of an interrupted screw. The plug is a solid steel 
 block with a screw tlircad on outer surface. This is 
 divided longitudinally into a certain lunuber of ec^ual 
 parts, and then the screw threads entirely removed from 
 alternate portions. in the screw thread of the gun 
 
1 86 07'dnance. 
 
 similar portions are taken away, those remaining being 
 opposite the blank spaces on the block. Consequently 
 the latter can be pushed straight into the gun, and a 
 portion of a turn engages the screw threads on each, so 
 locking the breech without the loss of time involved 
 by screwing the block in the ordinary way. As the 
 cap or tube which ignites the charge is placed in this 
 plug, which has a channel through the centre to allow 
 the flame to pass into the chamber of the gun, there 
 is a mechanical arrangement for preventing the tube 
 being inserted until the breech piece — as this plug is 
 termed — is thus locked. To prevent escape of gas to 
 the rear it is necessary to effectually seal the end of the 
 powder chamber. This is done by securing to the inner 
 end of the breech piece either a thin steel cup, which on 
 discharge of the gun is expanded against the inner sides 
 of the chamber, or a pad of asbestos, which under 
 pressure of the powder gas performs the same function. 
 This, in technical language, is the obturator, and when 
 we consider that the ignited gas exerts a pressure of 
 some 15 tons to the square inch the importance of con- 
 fining its energy to the base of the projectile may be 
 understood. 
 
 As regards method of ignition, we have for some 
 years utilised electricity for this purpose. On an 
 unstable platform, such as a ship presents, it may be 
 readily conceived that any delay in discharging a gun 
 when it bears on an object must result in a miss. The 
 remedy our ancestors had for this was to attain such 
 close proximit)' to their object that a certain proportion 
 
Ordnance. 187 
 
 of their projectiles could not fail to hit somewhere. Ikit 
 as close range is not always attainable, and may not be 
 desirable, the delay in igniting the charge by means of a 
 falling hammer or pulling a string should be eliminated. 
 Electricity, being instantaneous, corrects this defect, the 
 only motion required being to press a button. Its 
 advantages are even more apparent when several guns 
 are fired simultaneously and it is desired to lodge their 
 projectiles in one spot. The apparatus simply consists 
 of a galvanic battery, with wires leading to the guns 
 and terminating in a fine filament of platinum silver 
 wire, enclosed in a tube and surrounded by a small 
 quantity of gunpowder. The current, when allowed to 
 pass, heats the filament sufficiently to ignite the powder, 
 and the flame passes on to the charge of the gun. 
 
 Having once recognised the advantage of a breech- 
 loader, w^e proceeded with the design and construction of 
 different patterns suitable for large and small ships. 
 They grew, in fact, similarly to the old muzzle-loaders. 
 We mounted in succession 14, 22, 29, 45 and 67-ton 
 guns, with a length of bore varying from 25 to 30 
 calibres. By augmenting the powder charges \elocitics 
 were increased to 2100 ft. per second, the projectiles 
 being over half a ton in weight. No difficulty was ex- 
 perienced by our officers and seamen in becoming 
 proficient with such weapons, though it inxoKcd an 
 cntircl)' new jMoccdure in their manipulation. Ha\ing 
 been accustomed for )-cars to insert powder first, one can 
 imagine that to re\crsc the process docs not come 
 intuiti\cl)-. Yet of man)- changes this is perhaps the 
 
i88 Ordnance. 
 
 simplest. The inevitable was cheerfully accepted. But 
 when these new guns made a jump from 67 to in tons, 
 and the number carried by a single ship fell from four 
 to a pair, the policy of thus relying upon such a limited 
 heavy armament, though reinforced by a number of 
 smaller guns, began to be questioned. The case in 
 favour of monster guns is that they represent concen- 
 trated power and the ability to do immense mischief if 
 successfully applied. A single projectile from such 
 a piece could disable the stoutest battle ship or penetrate 
 the thickest armour carried. Nor, with the assistance of 
 hydraulic apparatus, is their manipulation more compli- 
 cated than with guns of half their weight. Though 
 themselves offering a large mark, their very bulk is a 
 protection against light projectiles. As against these 
 points in their favour, three main objections may be 
 stated. First, that the portion of a ship covered by 
 the extremely thick armour is so small that hitting it 
 under the varying conditions of a sea fight must be a 
 chance. Second, it therefore becomes more profitable 
 to attack the larger unarmoured area, or at any rate 
 that area will be struck by the greater number of pro- 
 jectiles. For such work moderate sized guns are 
 sufficient and superior to those throwing enormous bolts, 
 which would pass through thin armour without impedi- 
 ment. Thirdly, there is the risk of half your principal 
 armament being disabled by an accident or by a single 
 lucky shot from your enemy. On the whole, therefore, 
 I think the balance is in favour of smaller guns, and 
 I view monster ordnance as one of the abnormal growths 
 
Ordjiaucc. 1 89 
 
 of peace which the rough test of war will sweep away. 
 I have not dwelt on the element of time required for 
 construction or cost. They should, however, be taken 
 into consideration. 
 
 The projectiles used with our new guns are much 
 the same in shape as before. For receiving rotation 
 they have a copper band, which acts much in the same 
 way as the lead coating in the first breech-loaders with- 
 out the defect of stripping. Steel shot are, however, 
 necessary to overcome the resistance of steel or com- 
 pound armour, and to get satisfactory projectiles of 
 this material has long been a difficult matter. France 
 was before us in this respect, but our steel makers 
 when called on rose to the occasion and now produce 
 an efficient article. 
 
 Powder has gone through several phases. The 
 ordinary black substance in cubes was replaced by 
 prisms of brown material known as cocoa powder. 
 Then came a demand for something which would give 
 us energy without smoke, and all nations are seeking 
 such an explosive. A propelling agent with this char- 
 acteristic has been produced in this country by Pro- 
 fessor Abel, known as cordite, from its resemblance 
 when manufactured to a grey cord. It is more power- 
 ful than ordinary powder, without subjecting guns to 
 an increased pressure, and is comparatively smokeless. 
 One of the chief points to ascertain is whether, under 
 the varying conditions of climate which our vessels 
 experience in all parts of the world, this cx[)losive 
 will remain unaltered after a considerable lapse 
 
1 90 Ordnance. 
 
 of time. We must have satisfactory tests in this 
 respect before we can confidently admit it into our 
 ships. 
 
 No review of the progress of ordnance would be 
 complete without notice of the great development of 
 what are now called quick-firing guns. They have 
 grown out of the mitrailleuse, first used in the Franco- 
 German War, which consisted in a cluster of rifle barrels 
 automatically fed with cartridges and fired by turning 
 a handle, as sound is produced from a barrel-organ. At 
 first discredited by defective mechanism, which caused 
 stoppage of the action at critical moments, they have 
 since been greatly improved in the systems of Gatling, 
 Gardner, Nordenfelt, and Maxim. The last named has 
 brought to considerable perfection a gun in which the 
 energy of recoil is utilised to perform all the operations 
 of extracting the fired cartridge, reloading, and firing 
 without human interference. Set to operate in this 
 way the gun will continue to fire until its ammunition 
 is exhausted. Against bodies of men the machine rifle 
 — as it might be more fitly termed — can work great 
 execution, but to stop torpedo boats requires a heavier 
 projectile, so that Mr Hotchkiss and Mr Nordenfelt de- 
 signed a machine gun of larger calibre. In that of the 
 former the barrels revolve, while in Mr Nordenfelt's gun 
 they are stationary. Both are effective weapons. Then 
 came a demand for a single-barrel gun which could throw 
 shot of about 6 lbs. weight and fire several rounds a 
 a minute. The ammunition was to be made up like 
 a rifle cartridge instead of, as formerly with small guns, 
 
Ordnance. 1 9 1 
 
 having powder and projectile separate.^ Messrs Ilotcli- 
 kiss and Nordenfelt both compHed with the demand, 
 and these were termed quick-firing guns. They are 
 now largely represented in all our ships. An important 
 feature was aiming and firing from the shoulder by 
 means of a wooden shoulder piece attached to the gun, 
 which being accurately balanced could thus be freely 
 moved, horizontally and vertically, with little exertion 
 of the body. The movement of an object could thus 
 be followed almost as easily as the flight of a bird with 
 a fowling piece. These guns have considerable range 
 and penetration ; and would be effective against the un- 
 armoured parts of a ship, while the 3-pounder, a smaller 
 piece on the same principle, is specially adapted to meet 
 a torpedo attack. 
 
 Observing the success of small quick-firing guns, Sir 
 William Armstrong's firm were not long in extending 
 it to larger ordnance. An increase in the rapidity of 
 fire of all guns is an advantage which every sea fight 
 has endorsed, so a gun having a calibre of 47 in. and 
 throwing a projectile of 45 lbs. was designed. The 
 projectile is separate from the powder cartridge, as 
 being more convenient to handle. Very satisfactory 
 results have been obtained with this gun, from which 
 about ten aimed shots a minute can be fired. 
 
 Tlic principle, h()we\-cr, has not attained fiiiah'l)-, he- 
 cause a 6-in. quick-firing gun has since been constructed, 
 and proved successful. In this gun, also, the projec- 
 tile is separate from the powder, as it weighs 100 lbs., 
 
 ' Tliis is llic jirincipal cause of ()l)lniniii}j; grcnlcr rapidity of tire. 
 
192 Ordnance. 
 
 and is inserted previous to the cartridge containing the 
 explosive and cap. The case of this is made of brass, 
 and though the construction of this portion is expensive 
 the cartridge cases can be used over again when fired. 
 The rapidity of aimed fire from this gun is about eight 
 rounds a minute. Cordite has been tried with this gun, 
 and it is found that 17 lbs. of this explosive will give the 
 same energy to the projectile as 50 lbs. of ordinary 
 powder, without increased pressure in the chamber. 
 
 It is difficult to say what will be the further develop- 
 ment of quick-firing guns. One thing seems to me 
 probable, that all charges will be contained in copper 
 cylinders, instead of being enveloped in silk cloth, by 
 which moisture will be excluded, and the explosive 
 guarded against rough usage.^ Greater rapidity of fire 
 with heavy ordnance then becomes more dependent 
 upon improved training and practice than small details 
 of mechanism in the guns. 
 
 ^ Mr Elmore's ingenious process of copper deposition and hardening 
 seems likely to answer this requirement. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 TORPEDO W A R F A R E. 
 
 Early Application of the Torpedo in America — The Fish Torpedo — 
 Development by Mr Whitehead — Introduction of Torpedo Boats, and 
 their Progress — Submarine Boats — Protection against Torpedoes — 
 Nets — Electric Search Lights — Torpedo Boat Destroyers — Sinking 
 of ' Blanco Encalada.' 
 
 The torpedo as a weapon of practical utility first came 
 prominently into notice during the American Civil War. 
 To disable a vessel by exploding underneath her a large 
 mass of gunpowder, contained in a water-tight case, had 
 long been a project of enthusiasts, but the difficulty of 
 obtaining an efficient mechanical arrangement for igni- 
 tion, and keeping the whole apparatus in order when 
 immersed for any length of time, had, up to the period 
 mentioned, prevented any striking success being achicxcd 
 by this means. Small sul^niarinc mines, with a chemical 
 fuse or some clockwork apparatus for their ignition, 
 were laid dcnvn in the Baltic during the Russian War, 
 but were in mcjst cases fished up b\' oiu" ships without 
 exploding. One, however, did explode on the poop 
 of the flagship, after much liandling to ascertain the 
 method of ignition ; btit as the charge was small few 
 of the spectators were injin'ed. When the Southern 
 Confederacy seceded from the I'nited States in iS6[, 
 
 N 
 
194 Torpedo Warfaj^e. 
 
 one of the first steps of its naval department was 
 to form a torpedo section to protect approaches to 
 places liable to attack by the Northern fleet. Such 
 energy and ingenuity was shown by this branch of the 
 department, and so little was at first understood of this 
 new mode of warfare by the enemy, that a number of 
 his vessels were sunk by submarine mines. From hence- 
 forth it was evident this weapon could not be despised 
 with impunity. 
 
 Of course, these mines, being moored or placed on 
 the bottom, only acted if the ship came into their 
 vicinity ; and if not covered by guns bearing on the 
 area they protected, could be fished for or destroyed 
 by boats before the vessels advanced. A further de- 
 velopment, therefore, was made in taking the mine to 
 the hostile ship by means of a boat. A charge of 
 powder was placed at the end of a long pole, carried in 
 the bows of the boat, which under cover of darkness 
 then sought its victim. On arriving alongside the ship 
 the pole and charge were immersed and the explosive 
 ignited by an electric wire when in contact with the 
 bottom of the vessel. In the confusion that followed 
 the assailant had a fair chance of escape. A most 
 daring, gallant, and successful attack was thus made on 
 the Confederate ship ' Albemarle,' by an officer of the 
 Northern navy named Gushing, in a small steamboat. 
 At the moment of the explosion his own craft sank, but 
 he escaped by swimming, and returned unhurt with the 
 news. 
 
 This method of attack then came into favour, but so 
 
Torpedo Warfare. 195 
 
 great was the risk of discovery when close, and the 
 consequent danger of being sunk by the fire of the ship 
 attacked, that ideas turned in the direction of a torpedo 
 which could be discharged at a vessel from a moderate 
 distance. This resulted in the fish torpedo. The 
 original conception was that of a small sort of boat pro- 
 pelled along the surface and carrying a charge of gun- 
 powder in the bow. An Austrian officer broached this 
 idea to Mr Whitehead, an English civil engineer settled 
 in that country. From this crude proposal he developed 
 the wonderful piece of mechanism now universally 
 known as the Whitehead torpedo. First, he had to fix 
 upon his mode of propulsion. He selected compressed 
 air, working a small engine and a screw in the tail of 
 his fish, as in an ordinary vessel. Steam would condense, 
 and had other disadvantages ; gunpowder gas could not 
 be controlled ; electricity was not applicable. The result 
 has shown that his choice was a good one. Then he 
 determined that his torpedo should travel under water. 
 An explosion on the surface and against the water 
 line of a ship would have little effect, because most 
 of the gas generated would escape into the air. Im- 
 mersed, the surrounding water confines the gas and 
 compels it to exert all its energy against the bottom 
 of the ship. If the charge is large enough, this pent-up 
 energy is irresistible. It was desirable, therefore, that 
 tlie torpedo should strike a ship a certain distance below 
 the water line, keeping this depth during its passage. 
 Now, any vessel containing compressed air has an ap- 
 preciable weight added to it, but as the air is allowed tu 
 
196 Torpedo Warfare. 
 
 escape the vessel is lightened to a corresponding extent. 
 Consequently a torpedo propelled by this motive power 
 would, as the air escaped after doing its work, be con- 
 tinually getting lighter, and if started 10 ft. under water 
 would soon come to the surface and finish its course in 
 this position. This had to be corrected and provided 
 for by special machinery. The torpedo must travel 
 throughout its run in the same horizontal plane. The 
 method by which Mr Whitehead obtains this effectually 
 is the most ingenious part of his invention. It was long 
 kept a secret, but has recently been made public. The 
 general principle is to utilise the pressures due to dif- 
 ferent depths of water to actuate horizontal rudders, so 
 that the torpedo is steered upwards or downwards as its 
 tendency is to sink or rise. 
 
 In the foremost end of the torpedo the explosive is 
 carried, originally gunpowder but now gun cotton, as 
 being so much more powerful, its ignition being effected 
 by the impact of the nose of the torpedo on any hard 
 substance, which forces a pointed striker against a 
 detonating cap. 
 
 So constructed, we have an iron or steel fish-shaped 
 body, propelled by air highly compressed, which can be 
 regulated to give a high speed for a short distance or a 
 greater range at a lower rate. By mechanical contriv- 
 ances the torpedo could be set to run any required dis- 
 tance, and then come to the surface or sink. The firing 
 arrangement was not operative until it had proceeded 
 some way on its course, but for exercise it was neces- 
 sary that this should be in a condition of safety when 
 
 I 
 
Torpedo Warfare. 197 
 
 the run was finished. As may be imagined, all this 
 required a long period of anxious thought and a series 
 of experiments, but eventually Mr Whitehead brought 
 to the notice of the world what had not often been 
 seen before, an entirely new invention perfect in every 
 detail. Its efficiency was demonstrated on trial, and 
 the weapon adopted by nearly every maritime state. 
 What limited its usefulness was the comparatively low 
 speed, which at first was about 8 knots. Hence, if dis- 
 charged at a vessel half a mile off, it took a considerable 
 time to traverse the distance, so that any little inaccuracy 
 in its course, currents, or alteration of direction in the 
 vessel aimed at would result in a miss. A great advance 
 was therefore made when the speed was increased to 
 18 knots by the use of Mr Brotherhood's well-known 
 three-cylinder air engine, a model of compactness, 
 simplicity, and efficiency. When gun cotton was used 
 a less amount of explosive was required for the same 
 result with gunpowder, and hence a smaller torpedo 
 could be employed. The improved weapon was 14 ft. 
 long, with a diameter in its largest part of 14 in. Com- 
 plete it weighed about 500 lbs. Plant for the manu- 
 facture of these torpedoes having been established at 
 Woolwich, a healthy competition arose between our 
 officers and Mr Whitehead's staff, for having started 
 a factory at T'iume in Austria he was now suppl}'ing 
 other Governments with torpedoes. Succeeding im- 
 pro\emcnts brought the speed up to 27 knots an hour 
 for a distance of 600 yards. This was the range selected 
 as that at wliich the tor[)ed() should be discharged at a 
 
198 Torpedo Warfare. 
 
 ship, a maximum distance beyond which the chances of 
 hitting rapidly diminished, while at closer ranges they 
 were increased. In the earlier patterns the head of the 
 torpedo had been made exceedingly sharp, under the 
 idea that this form would give increased speed. But the 
 late Mr Froude's experiments with submerged bodies 
 showed this to be erroneous, and that a better result can 
 be obtained with a bluff head. A further advantage of 
 such a form is that a considerable increase of explosive 
 can be carried without adding to the length of the tor- 
 pedo. With this modification the later patterns have a 
 charge of 60 lbs. of gun cotton, equivalent, it may be 
 considered approximately, to 200 lbs. of gunpowder. 
 Exploded in contact with the bottom of a ship, the effect 
 must be either to sink or disable, according to the pre- 
 cise locality struck. 
 
 This new weapon, directed at the most vulnerable 
 part of a ship, had to be met, and it led to the extension 
 of the double-bottom system. There was an idea that 
 the torpedo might expend its energy on the outer skin, 
 leaving the inner hull intact, and thus save the ship 
 from fatal injur)-. But as Sir Nathaniel Barnaby truly 
 remarked fifteen years ago : ' I say it is idle to attempt 
 to form the bottom of a ship strong enough to resist a 
 fair blow from a powerful torpedo. The utmost that 
 can be done is to keep the disabled ship afloat after she 
 has received such a blow. It would be possible to pro- 
 tect the bottoms of ships with armour to withstand the 
 present charges of the Whitehead torpedoes. When 
 this was done, it would only be necessary to increase the 
 
forpcdo W'arjarc. 199 
 
 charges of the torpedoes and the armour we had ap[)Hed 
 would become vuhierable.' No more accurate forecast 
 could have been made. The latest development of the 
 Whitehead is a torpedo 18 in. in diameter, w^ith a speed 
 of 30 knots, and carrying 200 lbs. of gun cotton. No 
 modification in construction could render the explosion 
 of such a mass beneath a ship other than irresistible. 
 Should it be otherwise, an addition of 2 in. to the 
 diameter of the torpedo would probably allow the 
 charge to be increased to 500 lbs., and I am quite 
 unable to see how this could be counteracted. 
 
 In the successful application of the Whitehead 
 torpedo much depends on the method by which it is 
 launched from the ship or boat. It is now usually 
 discharged, like a projectile from a gun, by means 
 of a small charge of gunpowder, or compressed air, 
 from a tube which it accurately fits. In most cases 
 the tube is a few feet above the water line, and the 
 torpedo is launched at any given moment. But it 
 has always been considered that if it could be pro- 
 jected under water from a ship the apparatus would 
 not be exposed to an enem}''s fire, and the torpedo 
 would start under more advantageous circumstances. 
 The preliminary plunge from above water has always 
 been trying to the mechanism contained in the 
 interior. The difficult)' under water is to get the 
 torpedo clear (jf the ship when the latter is [)roceeding 
 at high speed. An elongatcel Ixjd}' thrust out of a hole 
 into water rushing past at a rate of iS knots is naturally 
 subjected to sc\cre strains, it nuist be supported until 
 
20O Torpedo Warfare. 
 
 the tail is outside, and then the propellers take it onward. 
 After years of research and experiment this has been 
 accomplished, and large ships are now fitted to discharge 
 their torpedoes under water. 
 
 When the Whitehead torpedo was introduced it was 
 at once seen that for boat attack it had enormous 
 advantages over the old method of carrying a tin of 
 explosive at the end of a pole. The ship need not be 
 approached within 600 yards, and thus the operation 
 was not one of such great hazard. But any chance of 
 success and escape afterwards would be much increased 
 if it were possible to command in the boat very high 
 speed, so as to reduce the time during which the boat 
 would be under fire in its approach or retreat. Such a 
 consideration led to the development of the high speed 
 torpedo boats which we now see in the hands of nearly 
 every nation. At first it was thought a boat about 80 ft. 
 long w^ould answer all requirements, and Russia in 1877 
 constructed a hundred boats 75 ft. long and 10 ft. beam. 
 The size was such that they could be transported from 
 the Baltic to the Black Sea by rail. Mr Yarrow, the 
 eminent torpedo boat builder on the Thames, supplied 
 some sets of machinery and drawings from which other 
 sets could be made in Russia. The first of these boats 
 tried on the Neva had a speed of 18 knots. This was a 
 great advance in a boat of such dimensions. 
 
 In the meantime Messrs Thornycroft, at Chiswick, 
 had constructed for us the first torpedo boat, which was 
 about 15 ft. longer than the Russian type, and her 
 speed, 19 knots, was considered so remarkable that we 
 
Torpedo Warfare. 201 
 
 named her the ' Lightning.' Others were then obtained 
 from both Thornycroft and Yarrow of this type, and in 
 one of the latter's construction a speed of 21 knots was 
 obtained. To attain such a result the best material and 
 workmanship must be combined. Each firm has its 
 special features of construction, and if either is superior 
 in some particular point the other surpasses in another 
 direction. 
 
 Having thus a boat of high speed, the equipment was 
 completed by placing a tube in the bow from which a 
 Whitehead torpedo could be ejected. In our boats the 
 tube revolved so as to point on either side as well as 
 ahead. Thus, in attacking a ship the boat could run 
 rapidly past her, and without checking speed discharge 
 the torpedo when in the most convenient position. 
 Other nations fixed the tube in the stem of the boat, 
 so that the torpedo can only be discharged when the 
 bow of the boat is pointed directly to the object. 
 This method is the simplest, as the torpedo is not de- 
 flected as on the broadside, for which a special calcula- 
 tion is required. But the disadvantage is that the boat 
 is approaching the enemy, and will continue to do so 
 after discharging her missile until she can turn and 
 retreat. She is thus under fire longer. These boats 
 are from 80 to 90 ft. in length, and in moderate weather 
 are capable of operating a short distance from the coast. 
 Then it was considered they might perform a more 
 ambitious function in keeping the sea independently, or 
 working with a s(iuadron. For this a larger structure 
 was reciuired, and l\Ir ^'anow ])r()\i(k'(l lor Russia a boat 
 
202 Torpedo Warfare. 
 
 lOO ft. long, which steamed out to the Black Sea by her- 
 self. This craft was followed by others, for different 
 countries. Some of these, no ft. long, crossed the 
 Atlantic under sail temporarily provided. 
 
 As demands came for higher speed, so did the length 
 of the boat increase. We ordered a further batch, 125 ft. 
 long, to carry five torpedo tubes, one in the stem and 
 two on each broadside. Then Messrs Thornycroft built 
 two boats for the Spanish and one for the French Govern- 
 ment, which, with a length of 147 ft., gave a speed of 
 26 knots on the measured mile. These boats carry two 
 torpedo tubes fixed in the stem. 
 
 Notwithstanding this notable increase of size, it has 
 not been found that these boats can keep the sea for 
 any length of time. The continual motion is so wear- 
 ing to the crews that in rough weather their physical 
 energy becomes exhausted, and inability to sleep is one 
 of the most trying conditions of such an existence. 
 When attached to a squadron, their presence at sea is 
 a constant source of anxiety, and hence I think it must 
 be recognised that for a craft able to keep the sea much 
 larger dimensions are necessary. The proper function 
 of torpedo boats is to operate from fixed bases on land, 
 to guard the coast, and harass the squadrons or single 
 ships of an enemy that may venture on aggressive 
 action. A blockading fleet would have to be continu- 
 ally on the alert against night attacks by these wasps 
 of the sea. 
 
 It has been sometimes asserted that blockade has 
 been rendered impossible by the introduction of steam 
 
l^orpcdo Warfare. 203 
 
 and the torpedo boat. I am unable to agree to this. 
 There never was a time when blockades were not 
 broken through over and over again. Steam will now 
 enable vessels to remain in positions which dependence 
 on wind in former times prevented them from keeping 
 with certainty. The torpedo boat is a new danger to 
 blockading squadrons, but it can be met by a line of 
 other small craft whose special mission it would be to 
 paralyse the attack before the boats could reach the 
 main body. It has been shown recently that a special 
 vessel of 600 or 800 tons, suitably armed with numerous 
 light guns, forms the most efficient protection to a battle 
 ship, grappling and subduing the small assailants before 
 they can effectually launch their torpedoes. A striking 
 feature of the fleet of 1900 will probably be the great 
 increase in the number of its satellites, as this view 
 receives further confirmation. 
 
 Although by adding to the length and displacement 
 of torpedo boats better seagoing qualities have been 
 secured, they have thereby become more conspicuous 
 objects by night or day, whereas formerly, being 
 small, they were not easily seen or hit. The diffi- 
 culty of getting within range without detection has 
 once more led people to seek a solution in subniarine 
 navigation. The idea of travelling under water in an 
 hermetically sealed boat has engaged the attention of 
 many enthusiasts, but hitherto without much practical 
 success. When a submarine boat is in such a state of 
 e(iuilibriLnn as to freely rise or sink when its buo)'ancy 
 is increased or diminished, this ctiuilibrium is easily dis- 
 
204 Torpedo Warfare. 
 
 turbed, and the tendency is then rather to go to the 
 bottom than rise to the surface. At least this appears 
 to have been the habit with most submarine boats since 
 the first tried by Drebell, in the reign of James I., up to 
 the present time. In France and Spain boats capable 
 of acting under water are now under experiment, but 
 in my opinion the chief advantage of a submarine boat 
 is to travel on the surface partially submerged, so that, 
 while the crew can see, the boat itself is almost invisible. 
 
 The best protection against torpedoes was at first 
 thought to be in subdividing the ship into numerous 
 small compartments. But it was soon evident that this 
 was not sufficient, and then the system of surrounding 
 a ship with wire netting was devised in order to stop 
 the torpedo before it could come in contact with the 
 hull. The nets are suspended from long booms pro- 
 jecting from the ship's side, and, with the vessel 
 stationary, hang vertically in the water. At sea, or 
 when moving, the nets do not retain this position, and 
 are an awkward appendage not favourably regarded by 
 sailors, who strongly object to anything that may foul 
 the screw. Moreover, torpedoes are now provided with 
 an apparatus in the nose which enables them to cut 
 their way through the netting, and travel on uninjured 
 to the vessel now unguarded. It is probable, therefore, 
 that in the immediate future nets secured to the ships 
 will be discarded, and the torpedo frustrated in some 
 other manner. 
 
 Another branch of defence against this attack at 
 night is a powerful light thrown on the advancing 
 
Torpedo Warfare. 205 
 
 object, by which the guns may be directed with ac- 
 curacy. Among the many uses to which electricity is 
 now apph'ed on board ships of war not the least im- 
 portant is its conversion into a strong beam of light 
 which, when directed from the vessel, illuminates objects 
 within a certain distance. This is universally termed 
 an electric search light. The apparatus consists of a 
 dynamo-electric machine for producing the electricity, 
 a conducting cable for conveying the electricity to the 
 lamp, where it is converted into light by means of two 
 carbon rods, and the rays then concentrated into an 
 intense beam by a reflector. 
 
 On a small scale this has been done before, and I 
 believe a search light produced by a voltaic battery 
 and a parabolic reflector was used in the Crimean War. 
 This was little more than a toy, but the dynamo-electric 
 machine, since introduced and perfected, has enabled 
 great advances to be made, w^hile the spherical reflecting 
 mirror, devised by Colonel Mangin, is no less important 
 in utilising the light thus produced. This reflector is of 
 glass, ground so that the circumference is thicker than the 
 central portion. This mirror collects and concentrates all 
 the rays which impinge on it from the carbons in front, 
 and then projects them forward in an intense beam of 
 light. In clear weather small objects can be clearly dis- 
 cerned at upwards of a mile, when the ra\' is thrown on 
 them, but in fog or mist the light has no penetrative 
 power. There appears to be a deficienc)- of red ra}'s, 
 which arc not absorbed by a(iueous \ap()ur to the same 
 extent as llie ra}-s of other colour in white light. As 
 
2o6 Torpedo Warfare. 
 
 also, when these h'ghts are used from a ship, the rest of 
 the horizon is made to seem darker than before, the 
 opinion as to their value is conflicting. They are most 
 efficient when external to the point sought to be pro- 
 tected, and placed so as to illuminate the space that 
 must be traversed before the ships can be reached. I 
 can conceive that, as it is desirable to have special ships 
 to destroy torpedo boats when discovered, other craft 
 might be equally advantageously fitted with powerful 
 lights for this special dut}', while the main force remained 
 in darkness. 
 
 The electric light detects one colour much better 
 than another. White is most easily distinguished, while 
 a black boat can approach much nearer without being 
 discovered. Steam escaping shows up at a great dis- 
 tance. Torpedo boats, whose period of action is during 
 the hours of darkness, should show as little white as 
 possible. 
 
 The want of success which has attended the efforts 
 of those who hoped that torpedo boats could keep the 
 sea led to the demand for a t)'pe which is now being 
 largely constructed. This is a vessel of from 400 to 800 
 tons, which can accompany a squadron and during a 
 naval action dart in under cover of smoke and launch 
 torpedoes at the enemy when he exhibits signs of con- 
 fusion. The French were the first to carry this idea 
 into practical execution by building the ' Bombe ' class, 
 of about 340 tons. They are useful little vessels in some 
 respects, but too small for efficient service in rough 
 weather. We followed with the 'Rattlesnake,' of 550 
 
Torpedo Warfare. 207 
 
 tons, wliich has proved an excellent sea boat. But our 
 latest development in this type is a number of vessels of 
 735 tons. Their armament consists of one 4.7-inch gun 
 at each end and several torpedo tubes. They thus com- 
 bine a gun and torpedo vessel, which does not appear 
 to me advantageous. A gun of this weight may be 
 useful in the stern if a bigger vessel is pursuing ; in the 
 bow it probably reduces her steaming capability against 
 a moderate sea. In the chapter on foreign navies will be 
 found a brief account of what is being done elsewhere in 
 this direction. 
 
 It now only remains to consider what the torpedo 
 has done, and whether it is likely to influence still 
 further the course of naval architecture. So far it can- 
 not boast a large score of successes. But when com- 
 plaint is made that torpedoes do not run straight, and 
 sometimes disappear, it is forgotten how many projectiles 
 lie at the bottom of the sea that never went near the 
 mark aimed at, or how many were fired before such a 
 puny antagonist as the 'Huascar' could be brought to 
 submission. The number of shot and shell fired at 
 Lissa would, if placed against the damage done, afford 
 an instructive lesson. Too much is expected of the 
 torpedo, still only in its infancy. At the same time 
 I would not claim for it equal rank with the gun. W'c 
 may say, however, that if successfully applied it has the 
 power of doing infinitely greater mischief \\\ instance 
 of this is to be found in the sinking of the * Blanco 
 Encalada' in Chili from injuries inflicted by a torpedo, 
 of which the followinj^ is a brief account. 
 
2o8 Torpedo Warfai'e. 
 
 When the revolution against the authority of Presi- 
 dent Balmaceda broke out, the whole of the fleet present 
 joined the insurgents. The latter thus had a free hand 
 on the sea until the arrival at Valparaiso of two swift 
 torpedo vessels, the ' Almirante Lynch' and ' Almirante 
 CondelL' They were built in England, by Messrs Laird, 
 for the Chilian Government, and are of the sharpshooter 
 class. Their dimensions are, length 240 ft., displacement 
 750 tons, speed 20 knots. The armament consists of 
 two 14-pounder and two 3-pounder quick-firing guns 
 and four torpedo tubes. Having given their adherence 
 to the President, the officers and crew of the two ships 
 were ready for any service against the other side. They 
 were accordingly despatched to attack the enemy's 
 squadron, then lying at Caldera, about 5C0 miles north 
 of Valparaiso. They arrived off this port just before 
 dawn on April 23d, and observing the ' Blanco En- 
 calada ' at anchor, determined to attack at once. The 
 ironclad was taken apparently completely by surprise. 
 If those on board knew of the arrival of the torpedo 
 vessels in Chilian waters, they had not counted on such 
 speedy offensive operations. The ship seems to have 
 been without any net protection. No guard boats 
 patrolled outside the harbour, a portion of the crew 
 was on shore ; and it would be impossible to imagine a 
 condition of affairs more favourable to a torpedo attack. 
 It was made with a courage and determination which 
 has always signalised the fierce struggles in this part of 
 the world. Met by a confused and ineffective fire 
 from such guns as could I e got into action, the two 
 
Torpedo Warfare, 209 
 
 assailants approached within about 300 yards uninjured, 
 and each discharged two torpedoes, none of which struck 
 the ship. The ' Lynch ' then turned, and again passing 
 the ' Encalada ' within about 50 yards, discharged a 
 torpedo, which struck the ironclad abreast the engine- 
 room. A tremendous shock was felt on board her. A 
 great many men were killed in the engine-room by 
 fragments of machinery flying in all directions, others 
 on the deck above were thrown down and injured by 
 the concussion. The ship heeled over on being struck, 
 then rolled back, and the water pouring into the interior 
 by the large gap made in her double bottom, she sank 
 in about five minutes. Some of the crew plunged 
 into the sea and escaped to the shore, but a consider- 
 able number went down with the vessel. On board the 
 ' Lynch ' and ' Condell ' the casualties were not numerous 
 or serious. The former vessel suffered most when she 
 passed so close to the * Encalada,' but both were able to 
 retreat when a large ship was observed approaching the 
 harbour, which was supposed to be the ' Esmeralda,' a 
 cruiser of the enemy, but turned out to be our flagship 
 the ' Warspitc.' 
 
 It may be observed that the torpedo used on this 
 occasion was one of the latest pattern, of small size, 
 and carrying a charge of about 60 lbs. of gun cotton. 
 From the effect produced some idea may be formed 
 of what 200 lbs. could accomplish. Tlie blow woukl 
 be resistless in that portion of a ship containing the 
 machincr)'. The opponent of torpedoes may lay stress 
 on the fact that fi\'c had to be fired at close range 
 
 (J 
 
2IO Torpedo Wa^^fare. 
 
 before one took effect; but the fact remains that a 
 vessel of 3500 tons was sunk in less than half-an-hour 
 by two craft of 750 tons each, and that both were intact 
 after the operation. We have no parallel to this in 
 past naval warfare. It was not possible when the gun 
 alone decided all combats, but now, while we have gone 
 on adding to the dimensions, cost, and power of resisting 
 artillery in our ships of war above the water line, the 
 addition of a few pounds of explosive renders them 
 liable below to the same fate as overtook the ' Blanco 
 Encalada' in Caldera Hay. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 STEAM PROPULSION 
 
 Steam Navy in 1840 — Machinery at that Date — Paddle-Wheel Frigates 
 and Sloops — Horse Power, Nominal and Indicated — Voyage of 
 ' Inflexible ' — ' Banshee ' — Introduction of the Screw Propeller — 
 ' Fairy' — ' Duke of Wellington ' — ' Victoria' — Substitution of Iron 
 for Wood — ' Warrior ' and ' Black Prince ' — ' Octavia,' ' Arethusa,' 
 and ' Constance ' — Progress made up to 1865 — Compound Engines 
 — ' Pallas ' — Increase of Boiler Pressure — Twin Screws — ' Incon- 
 stant ' — Loss of the ' Captain ' — ' Iris ' and ' Mercury ' — Steel Pro- 
 tective Decks — 'Polyphemus' — Forced Draught— ' Lightning' — 
 Yarrow's Boats — ' Rattlesnake ' — Triple Expansion — 'Barham ' and 
 ' Bellona ' — Decrease in Weight of Machinery — Difference between 
 Men-of-War and Merchant Ships — ' Blake ' and ' Blenheim ' — Large 
 Number of Auxiliary Engines — Supply of Fresh Water — Evaporators 
 — The ' Yar}7an ' — Growth of Steam in the Navy — Personnel — Pro- 
 bable Approach of Finality in Marine Engineering. 
 
 In the year 1840 steam had already made considerable 
 progress in the Royal Navy since, nineteen years pre- 
 viously, the ' Comet ' had made her delmt at Portsmouth. 
 Fifty years ago there were no less than twenty-nine 
 steam vessels whose names appear in the official Navy 
 List. Of these the most important were the ' Cyclops,' 
 300 horse power, 1195 tons; the 'Gorgon,' 320 horse 
 power, 1108 tons; and the 'Salamander,' 220 horse 
 power, 818 tons. The first two of these ships were 
 engaged at the bombardment of Acre, and the ' Sala- 
 mander' was employed on the coast of Spain during 
 the Carlist War, 
 
212 
 
 Steam Propidsio7i. 
 
 At this period all but three of the steam vessels of 
 the navy were fitted with what were then known as 
 ' side-lever' engines. This type was the first ever em- 
 ployed for marine purposes, and it had certain solid 
 advantages which enabled it for a long time to remain 
 the favourite and to resist innovation. So much was it 
 considered to ho. par excellence the engine for ships that, 
 
 SIDE LEVER ENGINE. 
 
 surmounted by a crown, it formed the device for the uni- 
 form buttons of the engineers in the Royal Navy; in the 
 merchant service it was similarly worn, but without the 
 crown ; and, with a lion over it, the East India Com- 
 pany's engineers adopted it as a distinguishing badge of 
 their class. But in the side-lever engine lightness and 
 compactness were sacrificed to solidity and length of 
 
Steam Propulsion. 2 i 3 
 
 connecting-rod, and as the use of steam gradually 
 spread in the navy, and it became apparent that for 
 every ton saved in the weight of and space occupied by 
 the machinery valuable increase could be effected in the 
 armament and coal capacity of the ship, it was inevit- 
 able that the ingenuity of the first engineering country 
 in the world should be directed to the necessity for im- 
 provement in marine motive power. Hence we find in 
 1840 the 'Cyclops,' 'Gorgon,' and 'Prometheus' had 
 been fitted with direct-acting engines ^ by Messrs Sea- 
 ward, and the total weight of machinery was in their 
 case reduced by about two-fifths. The ' Gorgon ' was 
 the first example of the new type of engine, and finished 
 her trials in October 1837, and direct-acting engines soon 
 came into general use in the Royal Navy, although the 
 particular form introduced by Messrs Seaward was by 
 no means that most generally approved or adopted. Still, 
 to them belongs the credit of having been the first in the 
 field. 
 
 The year 1843 ^^'^s a remarkable one as regards the 
 development of steam propulsion in the Royal Navy, 
 for then it was that the * Penelope,' the first man-of-war 
 supplied with tubular boilers, and the ' Black Eagle,' the 
 first vessel ordered by the Admiralty to be fitted with 
 oscillating cylinders, were added to the list of Queen's 
 ships. The importance at that date of these two 
 enormous strides in marine engineering cannot be over- 
 
 ' 'The (Hstinguishiny feature of all direcl aclini; engines consists in the 
 connecting-rod Ijcing led at once from the head of the piston-rod to the 
 crank without the intervention of side-levers.' But this is very ancient 
 
 history. 
 
214 
 
 Steam Propulsion, 
 
 estimated. Tubular boilers at once became universal 
 in all ships built for the service, and to this day nobody 
 would dream of applying any but oscillating engines 
 to the driving of paddles. The ' Black Eagle ' had side- 
 
 ENGINES OF THE * BLACK EAGLE.' 
 
 lever engines in the first instance, but these were removed 
 and replaced by oscillating ones by Messrs Penn. 
 
 In 1846 was commissioned, by Captain William 
 Ramsay, the 'Terrible,' the most powerful steam fighting 
 ship in the world at that date. She was of 1847 tons 
 burthen, carried an armament of twenty-one guns of 
 various calibres, and was fitted with double-cylinder 
 direct-acting engines of 800 horse power by Messrs 
 Maudslay. And here it may be well to digress for 
 a moment to point out to the reader that when speak- 
 ing of the horse power of the earlier engines ' nominal ' 
 
Steam Propulsion. 2 1 5 
 
 is meant.^ The ' indicated ' power developed, that is, 
 the real effective power, varied from about two and a 
 half times the nominal in the case of the ' Gorgon,' in 
 1837, till it reached more than seven times the nominal 
 in the ' Inconstant,' in 1869. The absurdity and in- 
 convenience of expressing the power of ships' engines 
 by a system of notation absolutely without meaning 
 became so evident that in 1872 the indicated power 
 was ordered to be given in the official Auivj List. 
 
 Exactly contemporaneous with the * Terrible' was 
 the ' Inflexible,' the first steamship in the navy to 
 make a voyage round the world. No better example 
 can be given of the difference between steam naviga- 
 tion in the Royal Navy at that date and the present 
 than the performance of the ' Inflexible,' which was 
 then considered highly creditable, as indeed it was, 
 to Captain John C. Hoseason, who commanded her 
 and furnished an interesting account of it. She was 
 what in those days was called a sloop, of 11 22 tons 
 burthen — not to be confounded with displacement- — 
 
 ^ ' Nominal ' horse power was a standard adopted by James Watt for 
 commercial purposes, in which the efieclive pressure and speed of piston 
 were assumed to be constant quantities in all engines. The rule was well 
 enouf^h when first devised, but the extraordinary thing is that it should 
 have remained in force so long under such entirely different conditions. 
 
 - 'Tons burthen,' or old measurement as it is often called, was, like 
 'nominal' horse power, a purely commercial expression. It was ol)iainL'(l 
 by multiplying the 'length for tonnage' — which was found l)y deducting 
 three-fifths the l)rcadtii of tlie ship from the length, taken at the water line 
 -by the whole breadth and by the half breadtli and dividing the product 
 by ninety-four. Displacement tonnage, now in universal use, moans the 
 number of tons weiglU of sea water displaced by a ship floating at her load 
 draurrht. 
 
2 1 6 Steam Propulsion. 
 
 and fitted with direct-acting engines by Fawcett capable 
 of working up to 378 nominal horse power. We have 
 no available record of what her real horse power was, 
 but she probably at her best indicated nearly three 
 times her nominal. Her boilers were loaded to what 
 was then considered the ample pressure of 8 lbs. on 
 the square inch. She was in commission from the 
 9th of August 1846 to the 28th of September 1849. 
 During this time she steamed 64,477 nautical miles, 
 and got over 4392 under sail alone. Her average daily 
 steaming was 186.62 knots, and her fires were alight 
 during 483 days. Her total consumption of coal was 
 8 12 1 tons, her average distance steamed per ton of coal 
 7.9 knots, and her average consumption per hour 
 19.5 cwt. After service in India and China she re- 
 turned to England by Cape Horn, thus making the 
 circuit of the globe and establishing a ' record ' for 
 herself. 
 
 A vessel which must not be passed over among the 
 celebrated paddlcrs is the ' Banshee,' engined by Messrs 
 Penn, which managed to steam from Holyhead to 
 Kingstown, a distance of 55 nautical miles, in three 
 and a half hours on several occasions, this being at 
 the rate of 15.7 knots, then unprecedented. She was 
 afterwards deprived of half her boiler power, to increase 
 her coal carrying capacity, and sent to the Mediter- 
 ranean to do duty as a despatch vessel, for which ser- 
 vice she could always be relied upon as a 12-knot 
 steamer. 
 
 Paddle-wheel men-of-war were at one lime the most 
 
Steam Prop7ilsion. 2 1 7 
 
 important factor in our navy — the manufacture of their 
 engines called forth the utmost skill in design, ingenuity 
 of detail, and accuracy of workmanship that were in 
 those days available — but their end was near, and they 
 were soon to become as obsolete and forgotten as though 
 they had never been. Their defects and disadvantages 
 had all along been sufficiently obvious, but nothing 
 better was to hand. Huge outside cumbrous wheels, 
 liable to be utterly disabled by the explosion of a lucky 
 shell, the position of the engines themselves with their 
 most vital parts well above the water line, and the 
 enormous weight of the machinery in proportion to 
 tonnage and horse power, all these objectionable char- 
 acteristics made it certain that when an alternative 
 method of propulsion was proposed by which these evils 
 would be abrogated, or even sensibly mitigated, it would 
 be welcomed with enthusiasm and eagerly adopted. 
 The enthusiasm and the eagerness were not quite as 
 much to the front as might have been expected, but the 
 conservatism of the navy even now, much more then, 
 may almost be termed bigotry. The screw propeller, 
 however, had in itself such intrinsic merits that, if it did 
 not at first dazzle like a display of fireworks, it soon 
 became as much a national necessity as the brcadstuffs 
 it is the instrument of bringing in such quantities to us 
 who would perish without them. 
 
 As has so frequently been the case with other inven- 
 tions, it is not by any means certain to whom the credit 
 of first discovering the screw as a propeller for marine 
 purposes ought to be ascribed, but the matter is not o{ 
 
2 1 8 Steam Propulsion. 
 
 much importance. As far as the British navy is con- 
 cerned, Mr F. P. Smith, who succeeded in rousing the 
 Government to action after that splendid inventor 
 Captain Ericsson had failed, is indisputably the father 
 of screw propulsion. Mr Smith brought out with 
 success in 1840 the ' Archimedes,' a vessel of 232 tons 
 and 80 horse power. The Admiralty thereupon ordered 
 the 'Rattler' to be built on the same lines as the 
 paddle-wheel steamer * Alecto,' with screw engines of 
 the same nominal horse power by Messrs Maudslay, 
 and very soon several more men-of-war were ordered 
 to be fitted with screws. An early example of a suc- 
 cessful screw vessel was the Royal yacht ' Fairy,' built 
 of iron in 1845, ^"<^ engined by Messrs Penn. She had 
 oscillating cylinders driving a cogged wheel geared into 
 a pinion on the screw shaft, so that the screw made five 
 revolutions for every one of the engines. She was kept 
 running for many years between Portsmouth and Cowes, 
 till at last her plating was worn so thin that a bluejacket 
 alongside sent his boathook right through it. She was 
 then replaced by the ' Alberta.' 
 
 The ' Duke of Wellington,' Sir Charles Napier's flag- 
 ship in the Baltic during the Russian War, was probably 
 the last screw ship in the Royal Navy fitted with geared 
 engines. For it was about this time that a change 
 came over the design of machinery for the propulsion 
 of war vessels, so complete and radical as to mark a 
 distinct epoch in its history. When once the fact had 
 been grasped that all men-of-war for the future would 
 be propelled by the screw, the immense advantage 
 
Steam Propulsion. 2 i 9 
 
 realised by the low position of the main shaft, far below 
 the water line, became apparent, as the engines, being 
 horizontal, would be in a great measure protected from 
 the enemy's fire, instead of being, as in paddle-wheel 
 ships, dangerously and unavoidably exposed to it. It 
 was also soon seen what great benefit would be derived 
 if the engines were coupled directly to the main shaft, 
 without the intervention of cofjfTed wheels, to obtain 
 the required number of revolutions of the screw. To 
 ensure this result much higher speed of crank- 
 shaft was necessary, but the engineering skill of the 
 country proved quite equal to the occasion. Messrs 
 Maudslay & Field, and Messrs Penn & Son, now 
 began to almost monopolise the Government orders, 
 as I find that of twenty-six sets of screw engines 
 completed for the Admiralty between the years 1852 
 and i860 twenty-one are credited to these tw^o firms. 
 The workmanship of both was admirable, but at that 
 time Messrs Maudslay erred, if anything, rather on the 
 side of strength, and Messrs Penn on that of lightness. 
 The number ' twenty-six ' given above is exclusive of a 
 large fleet of high-pressure steam gunboats that were 
 built and engined with unexampled rapidity at the 
 beginning of the Russian War. Iligh-pressure steam 
 was first tried in the navy in September 1853, on board 
 the corvette ' Malacca.' vShe was fitted with engines 
 working with steam at 60 lbs. pressure by Messrs Penn, 
 but she was not a success ; engineers had not yet been 
 educated up to so vast an innowition. 
 
 In i860 was completed for sea a shi]) remarkable 
 
2 20 Steam Propulsion. 
 
 from a historical point of view as the last three-decker 
 in commission on active service in the British navy. 
 This was the 'Victoria,' of 120 guns and 4403 indicated 
 horse power. She was fitted by Messrs Maudslay with 
 horizontal double piston-rod return connecting-rod 
 engines, a type they had made peculiarly their own, 
 and from which for a great many years they never 
 varied. 
 
 The ' Victoria ' relieved the ' Marlborough,' a ship of 
 a similar kind, but of only 3054 horse power, as flag- 
 ship of the Commander-in-Chief on the Mediterranean 
 station. Her engine-room, as compared with the 
 cramped chambers of modern vessels, was of palatial 
 dimensions. The pressure of steam in the boilers was 
 22 lbs., and at full power the ship attained a speed of 
 over 12 knots. With sail set on her enormous yards, 
 and her progress perhaps helped by her screw, she was 
 a magnificent sight as she made her way in or out of the 
 harbours of Malta or Corfu. But her day had come ; 
 she was the last of her race, for it was recognised that in 
 combat with even an ironclad of her day she could have 
 been nothing but a floating shambles. She is, however, 
 worthy of mention here as being probably the finest 
 specimen of a wooden steam man-of-war the world has 
 ever seen. She had but that one commission, and is now 
 for sale to be broken up. 
 
 Various causes were now combining to bring about 
 the substitution of iron for wood, but there is no doubt 
 the necessity of providing against the vibration of the 
 screw in high-powered vessels had a great deal to do 
 
Steam P^'opulsiofi. 2 2 1 
 
 with it. Iron had been used to a limited extent in the 
 navy, but had not been at all generally approved of. 
 The frigate 'Vulcan' was completed in 1849, and the 
 troopships 'Megaera' and 'Simoom' in the following 
 year, but it was not till June 1859 that the 'Warrior' 
 was ordered as a counterblast to the French * La 
 Gloire,' then on the point of completion by M. Dupiiy 
 de Lome. 
 
 Although this constituted so distinct a landmark in 
 the history of the British navy, it had little or no influence 
 on engineering practice. Engines were made bigger as 
 higher speeds were demanded, but, except in the matter 
 of size, the engines of the ' Warrior ' and the ' Agin- 
 court ' differed but little from those of the ' Arrogant ' 
 and the * Cossack.' It is true the pressure of steam in 
 the boilers had gradually crept up to 25 lbs. on the square 
 inch, some improvements in detail had also, as was 
 natural, been introduced, but the general principle and 
 arrangement remained unaltered. The engines of the 
 'Warrior,' however, when she was first commissioned, 
 were considered to involve so vast a responsibility and 
 to require such effective supervision that it was decided 
 to take the unprecedented step of appointing two chief 
 engineers to her, whereas to-day the post would un- 
 hesitatingly be given to the junior Chief iMiginccr of the 
 Fleet, if it happened to be vacant and he to be unem- 
 ployed. Messrs Penn & Son obtained the contract for 
 these engines, as also for those of the sister ship ' Black 
 Prince.' And here a most curious fact ma\' be men- 
 tioned which excited a good deal of speculation at the 
 
222 Steam Propulsion. 
 
 time. The designs for the two ironclads were got out 
 at the Admiralty by Mr Watts, Chief Constructor of the 
 Navy, in consultation with Mr Scott Russell, and iden- 
 tical drawings were sent to the contractors, the Thames 
 Iron Shipbuilding Company and Messrs R. Napier 
 & Sons, of Glasgow, for their information and guidance. 
 The engines were in every way duplicates, of course. 
 And yet the * Warrior ' was, and is to this day, appreci- 
 ably superior, both in steaming and sailing, to the ' Black 
 Prince.' Many ingenious explanations for this differ- 
 ence were proposed, but none that could in any way 
 be called convincing. 
 
 At the latter end of i860 the Admiralty, being per- 
 turbed in their minds at the large amount of the national 
 coal bill, gave carte blaticJie to three eminent engineer- 
 ing firms to construct machinery for three crack sailing 
 frigates of nearly similar tonnage and lines, with the 
 sole view of combining reasonable speed with economy 
 of fuel. The selected frigates were the ' Octavia, ' Are- 
 thusa,' and ' Constance,' which were assigned to Messrs 
 Maudslay, Penn, and Randolph & Elder respectively, 
 with no restrictions as to pattern or, it was said, price. 
 Messrs Maudslay elected to supply a three-cylinder 
 engine, working expansively in the ordinary way, with 
 an initial pressure of 30 lbs., which they afterwards 
 reproduced on a larger scale in the ' Lord Warden ' ; 
 Messrs Penn fitted an exceptionally well executed 
 specimen of their trunk engine, but about neither of 
 these designs was there any decided novelty. The 
 Scotch firm, however, flew at higher game. They had 
 
Steam Propulsion. 223 
 
 six cylinders to their engines, each triplet consisting of 
 a high-pressure between two low-pressure ones. The 
 initial pressure in the boilers was 60 lbs.; steam was cut 
 off in the middle cylinder of each group at about half- 
 stroke, and exhausted thence into the other two. This 
 deserves notice as being the first instance of the use of 
 the compound engine in the navy, though it was not 
 long after the trials of the ' Constance ' that Messrs 
 Humphrys & Tennant employed a simpler form of the 
 same principle in the ' Tallas.' The three ships were 
 sent for a cruise in company to Madeira and back, but 
 no very grand results were obtained. The ' Octavia ' 
 became commodore's ship during the Abyssinian War, 
 the 'Constance' went to the West Indies, and the 
 'Arethusa' to the Mediterranean. After one com- 
 mission they were never employed again ; they were 
 admitted to be failures, and their hulls have long 
 since gone to the shipbreaker, their engines to the 
 scrap heap. 
 
 Let us look, then, at the state of steam navigation in 
 the Royal Navy in 1865, the year that marks the close 
 of the first half of the fifty }ears that this book deals 
 with, and great as the progress made, and radical as the 
 changes introduced in this quarter of a ccntur\' may 
 seem, they certainly did not surpass in importance 
 either the progress or the changes of the next. In 
 1865 the paddle-wheel as a mode of proi)ulsioii for 
 fighting ships had become entirely obsolete, its place 
 having been taken by the screw. '1 he pressure of the 
 steam in the boilers had increased from 7 lbs. in the 
 
224 Steam Propulsion. 
 
 * Rattler' to 30 lbs. in the 'Vestal,' which of itself 
 shows what an advance must have taken place in the 
 art of boiler construction, and every boiler afloat was 
 on the tubular principle. The interposition of gearing 
 between the crank and main shafts had long been 
 abolished, and the number of revolutions of the engines 
 had risen from, say, fourteen to fifty-six. The question 
 of coal consumption was beginning to awaken attention, 
 and as a consequence compound engines and surface 
 condensers were being toyed with tentatively to that 
 end. The 'Warrior,' though completed in 1861, was 
 still the fastest ship we had, with her speed of 14.3 
 knots, and it was not then considered likely that this 
 speed would be much exceeded in the future except 
 by a few enthusiasts ; but the gift of prophecy is rare, 
 and it is possible that a quarter of a century hence 
 the engines of the 'Blake' will be considered as 
 antiquated as those of the ' Warrior ' are now. The 
 engine builders of 1865, however, enjoyed advantages 
 of which their successors of to-day may well be envious. 
 The girders of ironclads, the solid oak beams of frigates 
 or converted line-of-battle ships furnished such sound 
 foundations for the bed-plates of the engines, and, 
 above all, the restrictions in the matter of weight were 
 so comparatively benign, that delightful smoothness of 
 working was the rule, and serious accidents were all 
 but unknown. 
 
 We now enter on a new era of naval marine engineer- 
 ing. In 1866 was completed the * Pallas,' a small iron- 
 clad designed by Sir E. Reed, and remarkable for having 
 
Steam Propulsion. 225 
 
 been the first ship successfully fitted with compound 
 engines for the Royal Navy ; for though the ' Constance ' 
 preceded her, that ship's machinery was a constant 
 source of extreme worry and anxiety to those respon- 
 sible for the charge of it, while the ' Pallas ' in this 
 respect never gave any trouble at all. The ' Pallas ' 
 had only two cylinders, instead of six, of unequal 
 volume, one being four times the size of the other. 
 The steam was admitted at high pressure, 60 lbs., into 
 the small cylinder, and thence passed into the larger one, 
 which it of course filled by its expansion. This is the 
 whole principle of compound engines. She had surface 
 condensers, and there is no doubt, for the horse power 
 produced, she was very economical in fuel. The boilers 
 were fitted with superheaters, a series of tubes at the 
 base of the funnel through which the steam passed with 
 the object of drying it and surcharging it with heat — a 
 contrivance that was always looked upon with distrust 
 by naval engineers and has long ago passed into oblivion. 
 Her speed was 13.4 knots, and she was a handy and 
 essentially comfortable little ship. 
 
 The compound principle, as introduced by Messrs 
 Ilumphrys & Tennant for the 'Pallas,' was, but at an 
 interval, adopted for most of the new ships in the navy, 
 until superseded by triple-expansion, to a consideration 
 of which wc shall come b)'-and-b)'. With compound 
 engines came as a natural consccjuencc surface con- 
 densers, and the general use of steam of not less than 
 60 lbs. pressure. This latter innovation brought about 
 an entire revolution in the shape of ships' boilers. 
 
 r 
 
2 26 Steam Propulsion. 
 
 What was known as the square or ' box ' type, that had 
 been in use nearly fifty years, had to be discarded, in 
 view of this increase of pressure, for a circular form, 
 resembling a Gloucester cheese set on edge, with the 
 furnaces on the flat side of it. The thickness of plates 
 had to be greatly increased, the excellence of the metal 
 to be more rigidly insisted on, while the difficulty of 
 manufacture was considerably enhanced. Machines 
 that had been devised for punching out the rivet holes 
 became of no value, as thick plates suffered in strength 
 by the process, and the operation of drilling had to be 
 substituted for it. This was, of course, more expensive, 
 but amply repaid its cost in the long run. 
 
 The 'Penelope,' completed in i S6S, was the first 
 important ironclad fitted with twin screws, and is note- 
 worthy as having been the forerunner of a long line of 
 twin-screw battleships. When the 'Audacious' class 
 came to be built, immediately following on the ' Pene- 
 lope,' the twin screw system was not so generally ac- 
 cepted, as two ships of the same type, the ' Swiftsure ' 
 and 'Triumph,' were only allowed one screw apiece. 
 Nowadays all \essels we build of an}' size above second- 
 class gunboats are fitted with two sets of engines. Of 
 the advantages of the plan there can be no doubt, but 
 in this place, where the aim is to be rather historical 
 than critical, any disquisition on the subject would be 
 impertinent — in the original sense of the word. 
 
 In August 1869 was commissioned a single-screw 
 frigate that for speed and other good qualities excelled 
 everything the world had hitherto seen, and indeed she 
 
Steam Propulsion. 227 
 
 has never been beaten in her own Wnc. This was a 
 period of experiment and invention, and the ' Incon- 
 stant ' was in many ways an example of success in both. 
 She was the first iron ship to be encased in a sheathing 
 of wood, in order that she might be coppered, and so 
 avoid the inconveniences of the fouHng which, in spite 
 of so many compositions and nostrums, is still the hcte 
 noire of all iron and steel hulls. Her engines were 
 supplied by Messrs Penn, and were nominally of 1000 
 horse power, but when the ship was tried on the 
 measured mile at Stokes Bay they indicated 7360 horse 
 power, and gave the ship, when all her ten boilers were 
 used, a speed of 16.51 knots, which had never hitherto 
 been approached by a fighting ship. With half-boiler 
 power a speed of 13 knots was easily attained, but the 
 ' Inconstant's ' weak point was her limited coal endur- 
 ance. Her supply of fuel was only sufficient for two 
 and a quarter days' steaming at full power, and for nine 
 days at 10 knots an hour. This, of course, is a serious 
 defect, but nevertheless she was a splendid ship in her 
 day. She was remarkable for her speed and handincss 
 under sail alone, and when the squadron was sailing 
 showed herself superior to the ' Bristol,' a wooden 
 frigate of no mean reputation. 
 
 l^ut a time came when she \vas asked to show her 
 speed under circumstances so sad and melancholy as to 
 fill the whole kingdom with grief and mourning. On 
 the night of the r)th of September 1S70 the Channel 
 Squadron, under the command of Sir Thomas S\-monds, 
 was crm'sing off C"ai)e JMnisterre. The weather after 
 
2 28 Steam P7'opulsion. 
 
 leaving Gibraltar, had been remarkably fine, and the 
 admiral had taken advantage of the smooth water to 
 launch his boat from the ' Minotaur ' flagship and 
 inspect the ' Captain.' He did not approve of her, 
 although at that time, because she had made one or two 
 cruises without capsizing, she was supposed to have 
 settled the question beyond dispute as to what should 
 be the type of the British war vessel in the future. 
 There was no particularly bad weather that night ; the 
 sea was certainly not exceptionally heavy, nor the wind 
 anything like a real gale, but in an ordinary squall the 
 ' Captain ' turned slowly over and 500 precious lives 
 were lost. The ' Inconstant' was the next ship to her, 
 and remarked the disappearance of her lights, but owing 
 to the squall the squadron was more or less scattered, 
 and but little attention was paid to the circumstance. 
 When daylight came next morning the sea was smooth, 
 but there were no signs of the * Captain,' and at first no 
 alarm was felt about her. The admiral, however, made 
 a general signal, ' Spread in search of " Captain," ' and it 
 was not long before one of her boats was picked up ; 
 still nobody suspected the dreadful truth. But later in 
 the day a table known to have formed part of Captain 
 Burgoyne's cabin furniture was found floating, and then 
 there was no room for doubt. Nothing but the capsiz- 
 ing of the ' Captain ' could have caused that table to be 
 floating in the Bay of Biscay. A signal was then made 
 for the ' Inconstant ' to get up steam for full speed and 
 proceed to England with the terrible news. She had a 
 light fair wind, and from a point just off Corcubion to 
 
Steam Propulsion. 229 
 
 Plymouth she averaged 15J knots, with one boiler out 
 of her ten held in reserve. This was a fine performance 
 in those days, but she never had the chance of repeating 
 it, for the scare caused by the loss of the ' Captain ' re- 
 sulted in some 300 tons of extra ballast being stowed in 
 her hold, which had the effect of completely ruining 
 her exceptional qualities for speed, whether under steam 
 or sail. She has been employed on various services 
 since then, but is now quite obsolete. 
 
 By 1873 t^"^c engineer department at the Admiralty 
 finally made up its mind that compound engines were 
 as likely to be profitably employed on board the Queen's 
 ships as they long had been in the mercantile marine. 
 The usual pressure of steam in the boilers of men-of-war 
 had now settled at 60 lbs. on the square inch. Every 
 ship as she was built was being fitted with compound 
 engines, but there was a restless, uneasy feeling among 
 the men who constructed them that they were very far 
 from the end of the journey on which they had started 
 when they first left the 'sweet simplicity' of simple 
 engines and 30 lbs. pressure behind them. They little 
 knew what was in store for them in the future. 
 
 Before that time arrived, however, two ships were 
 added to the navy sufficiently remarkable both for hulls 
 and machinery to demand particular notice. These 
 were the 'Iris' and 'Mercury.' ICntirel)' without de- 
 fensive armour, these ships were intended to rcl}' for 
 safety on their exceptional speed. The 'his 'was the 
 first ship built in ICngland in which soft steel was 
 enii)loyecl, and the first vessel C)r the Royal Navy wholl}- 
 
230 Steam Propulsion. 
 
 built of steel. It may be added that she was also the 
 first vessel wherein the construction of her machinery 
 was much hampered by considerations of weight, and as 
 a consequence in her engines were introduced, for the 
 first time, hollow compressed steel shafts, invented by 
 the Whitworth firm. The engines, by Messrs Maudslay, 
 were indeed of a type entirely new to the navy. The 
 firm had obtained considerable credit and renown by 
 the extraordinarily fast passages made by the ' Germanic ' 
 and ' Britannic,' Atlantic mail steamers engined by 
 them for the White Star line. The compound engines 
 of the ' Iris ' are exactl)' on the same principle, but 
 horizontal instead of vertical. There are two distinct 
 sets, driving twin screws, and each set has four cylinders, 
 two high-pressure at the back of the two low-pressure 
 ones, arranged in what is known as ' tandem ' fashion. 
 ' The narrow beam of the ship, in proportion to the size 
 and power of the engines, rendered it necessary to place 
 the starboard engine in front of the port engine, so that 
 the whole body of the ship is filled with machinery.' 
 So says Lord Brassey, but what was considered an 
 exceptional case in 1876 is now the universal order of 
 things. 
 
 The ' Iris ' carries 500 tons of coal in the ordinary 
 bunkers, and 250 tons additional in the reserve bunkers. 
 The total weight of the machinery, with water in the 
 boilers and condensers, is about 1000 tons, and the 
 contract price was ;^93,ooo. From the Times account of 
 her trials we learn that she proved to be not only the 
 quickest ship in the navy but the quickest ship afloat 
 
\ £ 
 
Steam Propulsion, 233 
 
 having surpassed the highest spcad attained by the 
 * Lightning,' the first torpedo boat suppHed to the 
 service — of which craft more by-and-by. There was 
 nothing resembling her in the navy with reference to 
 the proportion of midship section to length, the extreme 
 fineness of her entrance and run, and the ratio of her 
 enormous horse power to displacement. It is doubtful 
 if any trials have been more fraught with valuable 
 instruction to marine engineers than those of the ' Iris.' 
 At first she was a great disappointment to all who had 
 in any way been connected with her. It had been 
 calculated that with 7000 horse power she ought to 
 realise something like a speed of 17.5 knots, but with 
 7500 horse power she only managed 16.6 knots, the 
 revolutions of the engines being ninety-one. 
 
 Space does not permit of any detailed description 
 of the numerous experiments which followed, but it is 
 sufficient to say that the screw propellers were found 
 to be vastly too large in diameter, and their friction in 
 the water was thus excessive, that r_ their pitch was 
 increased, and that the 'Iris,' with 7735 horse power, 
 attained a mean speed of 18.572 knots, fully a knot 
 more than the constructive department at the Admiralty 
 ever expected to get out of her. The ' Mercury,' her 
 sister ship, built on the same lines, under an adjoining- 
 shed at the same dockyard, and engincd by the same 
 firm, was even more successful, attaining a mean speed 
 of 18.87 knots per hour, and this in 1879. It is hardly 
 to be wondered at that the fame of such unparalleled 
 achievements spread all over Europe and excited the 
 
2 34 SleaiJi Propulsion. 
 
 emulation of foreign powers, but at that time they had 
 neither engineers nor shipwrights w^ho could pretend 
 to rival ours. 
 
 It has been thought desirable to dwell at some 
 length on the ' Iris ' and ' Mercury,' because they un- 
 doubtedly indicate an epoch in the history of engineering 
 in the navy and arc still very valuable vessels. Thc\- 
 have, however, two grave defects, which have prevented 
 any reproduction of their type. They are entirely un- 
 protected, and their coal endurance is ver}- small. More 
 or less provision was made in them to compensate 
 for the absence of armour by water-tight subdivision 
 and by coal protection : still they had to run the risk 
 of being penetrated in a vital part and sent to the 
 bottom by the explosion of a single successful shell. 
 
 And here came in one of the most important inven- 
 tions, suggestions — call it what you will — of the quarter 
 century we are discussing. That was the adoj^tion in 
 otherwise light cruisers of a steel protective deck, which 
 has permitted the grand and beneficial substitution of 
 vertical engines for horizontal ones. And for this idea 
 Rear-Admiral Robert Scott deserves all the credit. The 
 part of a fighting ship that it is most essential to guard 
 from an enemy's fire is the engine-room. In the early 
 days of steam this was natural!}- accomplished by keeping 
 all the machinery below the water line, but when the idea 
 of a horizontal armoured deck took root engineers were 
 quick to see that they would be comparatively safe 
 under its shelter, and that projectiles would glance off 
 it instead of dropping through to their destruction. 
 
Steam Propulsion. 235 
 
 Hence vertical engines, whose height is only limited 
 by that of the protective deck. Every engineer knows 
 that the normal position of a cylinder and piston is 
 perpendicular ; circumstances alone have forced him 
 sometimes to be content with the horizontal. At the 
 present time every war vessel of size above a gunboat 
 is supplied with vertical engines. The ' Shannon ' and 
 ' Dreadnought,' both built at Pembroke, and the ' Nelson ' 
 and ' Northampton, both hailing from Messrs Elder, 
 of Glasgow, were the first important ships to be so 
 fitted. These four ships were all completed between 
 1875 and 1878. 
 
 In 1 88 1 was launched the ' Polyphemus,' a most re- 
 markable ship, but noteworthy more for her hull, which 
 is fully described elsewhere, than for her machinery. 
 She has twin screws, driven by two pairs of compound 
 horizontal engines constructed by Messrs Humphry's 
 & Tennant, of Deptford, who, it may here be remarked, 
 have latterly built and are building some of the most 
 important engines in the navy. The boilers of the 
 ' Polyphemus,' originally of the locomotive type, gave 
 a great deal of trouble, and new ones were substituted 
 for them with good results. The pressure of steam is 
 1 10 lbs. per square inch. It will be observed with what 
 leaps and bounds the prcssiu'e of steam ach'anced in 
 the course of comparativel}- few }'cars. A (juitc usual 
 pressure now is 155 lbs., and this will probal)l\- be vcr\' 
 considerably increased before long. 
 
 With the extended ai)plicatio!i of high - pressure 
 steam came, as a natural corolhu')-, a desire to utilise 
 
236 Steam Propulsion. 
 
 its advantages to the utmost. To this laudable ambi- 
 tion we owe the introduction of forced draught and 
 triple expansion. The former device, which, for the 
 benefit of lay readers, may be defined as the increase 
 of air pressure in the stokeholds by artificial means, 
 causing the fires to burn more fiercely and to consume 
 more fuel in a given time on the same surface of grate, 
 was, like other new things, only generally adopted in 
 our service after considerable hesitation, and when it had 
 been proved by the French to possess certain advant- 
 ages too weighty to be overlooked. It may be well 
 here to observe that this is probably the first and only 
 instance of British marine engineers owing anything to 
 any foreign source. Other nations have invariably been 
 content to follow where we led from the very earliest 
 days of steam navigation. In the future it is possible 
 that the restless ingenuity of American mechanicians 
 may produce ideas that we cannot afford to neglect, but 
 at present it may safely be said that the history of 
 English engineering includes all that the rest of the 
 world has hitherto accomplished in that direction. 
 
 Forced draught was first employed in the British 
 navy in the ' Lightning,' our earliest torpedo boat, con- 
 structed by Messrs Thorneycroft, of Chiswick, in 1877. 
 The system was adopted, primarily if not solely, with 
 the view of obtaining a much greater power with a given 
 weight of boilers than could be obtained with natural 
 draught. Economy of fuel was not the object sought ; 
 if it had been, it would not have been found. The 
 'Lightning,' a boat only 84 ft. long, of 10 ft. 10. in. 
 
Steam Propulsion. 237 
 
 beam, and ^2 tons displacement, attained a mean speed 
 of over 18 knots. Her engines, supplied by her builders, 
 were compound, driving a single screw. The high- 
 pressure cylinder was I2f in, in diameter, the low- 
 pressure 21 in., their stroke was 12 in. She had a 
 steel boiler of the modified locomotive pattern, working 
 at 120 lbs. pressure. Her surface condenser was made 
 of thin sheet copper, and was supplied with a separate 
 engine and centrifugal pump. The machinery of this 
 vessel was very light, steel being largely used, and the 
 workmanship was of the highest class. She was, in 
 her day, a complete novelty, both as regards hull and 
 machinery, and was equally a complete success. She 
 is interesting as the pioneer of a very numerous and 
 important flotilla. By May 1887 Messrs Yarrow, of 
 Poplar, who have always been friendly rivals of Messrs 
 Thorneycroft, had supplied our navy with a torpedo 
 boat, known as ' No. 80,' which illustrates the strides that 
 had been made by both firms in a decade. This vessel 
 has a length of 135 ft., beam of 14 ft., and displacement 
 of about 130 tons. Her triple-expansion engines work 
 up to 1700 indicated horse power, and the trial speed 
 for three hours was 23 knots. She can steam a distance 
 of 2000 knots at 1 1 knots speed. There is only one 
 locomotive boiler, and it is probable the boilers of this 
 type of boat are the largest ever built on the locomotive 
 principle, but the firm has as yet had no failures with 
 them. Higher sjjccds with more powerful machinery 
 have been attained in boats built since 'No. 80' by both 
 firms for foreign powers. Messrs Yarrow have recently 
 
238 Steam Propulsion. 
 
 employed quadruple-expansion engines, with a boiler 
 pressure of 200 lbs., in a boat for the Argentine Govern- 
 ment, with the happiest results. 
 
 It has been stated that ' No. 80 ' was supplied with 
 triple-expansion engines, but she was not the first vessel 
 to be so fitted. Here it may be well to mention that 
 whereas in simple engines the whole process of ex- 
 pansion of the steam is carried out in one cylinder, and 
 in compound engines in two, in triple-expansion engines 
 the steam passes through three cylinders, diminishing 
 in pressure at each step before it reaches the condenser. 
 More work is thus got out of the steam for the same 
 expenditure of fuel, and consequently what is known as 
 the *coal endurance' of ships is considerably increased. 
 
 In September 1886 was launched the 'Rattlesnake,' 
 built and engined by Messrs Laird, of Birkenhead, the 
 forerunner of a t\-pc of vessel considered by many 
 good judges to be of even more importance in modern 
 naval warfare than the torpedo boats. That the 
 authorities themselves are of this opinion may be 
 seen by the fact that at the present moment there are 
 twenty-two of these vessels, now known as 'sharp- 
 shooters,' either completed or in progress. 'In engining 
 these ships the paramount object has been to reduce all 
 weights to a minimum consistent with efficiency,' and 
 in no similar instance has praisew^orthy intention been 
 so carried to an extreme as nearly to approach a crime. 
 The propelling machinery of the ' Rattlesnake,' con- 
 sisting of two sets of vertical triple-expansion three- 
 crank engines, of 2700 horse power at 310 revolutions, 
 
S/eam Propn/sion. 239 
 
 was the first of its kind supplied to the navy. The 
 framing is entirely composed of steel, which has also 
 been largely employed in the construction of the 
 machinery throughout. The crank and other shafts 
 are made of Whitworth special steel, and are all hollow. 
 She attained a mean speed of 18.779 knots on the 
 measured mile under unfavourable circumstances as 
 regards weather, and has since then frequently achieved 
 19 knots on actual ser\icc. She has taken an active part 
 in all naval manoeuvres of late years, and has been the 
 terror of her imaginary foes, mainly because her engines 
 liave never broken down. This is no doubt owing to 
 the fact that the stipulated weight of the machincr)' 
 was exceeded. 
 
 The great difficulty in obtaining and maintaining 
 high speeds in the navy has been the incapacity of 
 boilers to withstand the strain put upon them. For 
 this contracted dimensions have been mainly, and 
 forced draught excessively and injudiciously applied, 
 partly responsible. Forced draught is by no means to 
 be wholly condemned. It is not, as ^Admiral I\Ia}-ne 
 called it, purely 'an invention of the Evil One.' Ikit 
 it requires to be used with care and judgment, when it 
 will probably prove as valuable an auxiliar}' to the 
 steaming power of our warships as it lias inidoubtedlx' 
 shown itself to be in the mercantile marine. The 
 ' l^arham ' and the ' Ikllona,' sister ships, deserve a few 
 words as to their machiner}', which is ver\- //;/ ^/r sicc/c. 
 l^hc\- have each two sets of vertical triple-expansion 
 engines, driving twin screws. The cylinders are 27 in., 
 
240 Steam Propulsion. 
 
 40 in., and 60 in. in diameter, with a stroke of 2 ft. 
 3 in. The natural draught trial of the ' Bellona ' took 
 place in November 1890 in the North Sea, off the mouth 
 of the Tyne, and in a run of six hours she attained a 
 mean speed of 19.46 knots. The mean indicated horse 
 power was 3557. Why could the ' Barham,' fitted with 
 precisely similar engines, only keep up a speed on 
 active service of 2 knots less? In all likelihood it was 
 the human clement that came into play and caused the 
 difference. The stokers were not good enough for their 
 work. 
 
 Here it may not be inappropriate to call attention to 
 the rapidly diminishing weight of steam machinery for 
 warships in proportion to the power demanded from it. 
 In the year 1853 the 'The Duke of Wellington' was 
 looked upon with pride by the whole country as a 
 magnificent specimen of a steam line-of-battle ship. 
 Her engines were of 1999 indicated horse power; they 
 weighed 400 tons, so that each ton of engines gave 
 5 horse power, and each horse power was produced by 
 448 lbs. of machinery. In the ' Bellona ' the horse power 
 is 6000 — estimated — and the weight of machinery only 
 270 tons, which gives approximately 100 lb. per horse- 
 power. In torpedo boats the proportion is very much 
 less than this, which all marine engineers have agreed 
 to consider as extravagantly small. ' In the merchant 
 service our tonnage laws encourage the shipowner to 
 build roomy engine-rooms, and consequently the engines 
 are not limited as to space occupied ; hence a better de- 
 sign is possible than obtains in the navy. In our mail 
 
Sfcani Propulsion. 241 
 
 steamers on the Atlantic the weight of machinery per 
 indicated horse power is about 280 lbs.' This shows, 
 says the Liverpool Journal of Covnnerce, how impossible 
 it is to institute comparisons between a merchant vessel 
 and a warship. The question is constantly asked by 
 outsiders why it is that the ships of the Royal Navy 
 cannot make passages equal to those achieved every day 
 by the Atlantic ' greyhounds.' The answer is that they 
 are not built for it. In, say, the 'Teutonic' the propel- 
 ling machinery is made the great consideration. Every- 
 thing is, and can be without harm, sacrificed to it. But 
 it is far different in a man-of-war. As was long ago 
 remarked, a fighting ship must always be a compromise. 
 There are three great requisites : offensive power, meaning 
 guns and torpedoes ; defensive power, meaning armour, 
 whether applied to sides, turrets, barbettes, or decks ; 
 and speed, meaning the most powerful engines, combined 
 with the greatest coal endurance, that it is possible to 
 get a ship of given tonnage to carry. If the tonnage is 
 a fixed quantity, every attempt at extension in the 
 direction of any of these three qualities can onl}- be 
 made at the expense of the other two. Hence the craze 
 for inordinate lightness of machiner}\ 
 
 As the very latest development of extreme steam 
 power, with the view of giving to a warship unpre- 
 cedented speed, attention must be called to the as }'ct 
 uncompleted cruisers ' Blake ' and ' Blenheim,' cngincd 
 respectively b}' Messrs Maudslay and Messrs IIumphr\'s. 
 It is probable that there will be but little difference 
 between them, as far as steaming capabilities aie con- 
 
242 Steam Propulsion. 
 
 cerned, and so the account, taken from TJie Tijnes, 
 of the ' Blake's ' machinery may answer for both vessels, 
 which are, from many points of view, the most im- 
 portant that have been ordered for the Admiralty for 
 many years. The ' Blake ' " will be propelled by twin 
 screws, driven by four sets of triple-expansion engines 
 of the inverted vertical cylinder type. Messrs IMaudslay, 
 Sons & Field are the makers of these engines and 
 boilers. The collective power they guarantee is 13,000 
 horse power for twelve hours' steaming at natural 
 draught, and 20,000 horse power for four hours with 
 forced draught ; the corresponding maximum speeds 
 are estimated at 20 knots for natural draught and 
 22 knots for forced draught, when the vessel is run in 
 smooth water with everything at its best. On actual 
 service, judging from past experience, with ordinar}^ 
 conditions of coal and stoking, the engines may be 
 expected to develop about 9000 to 10,000 horse power 
 for long periods of continuous steaming, which would 
 probably give the vessel a continuous speed of 18 to 
 
 1 8-^ knots in smooth water Everyone knows, 
 
 what recent manoeuvres have illustrated afresh, that in 
 cruisers of moderate dimensions, capable of attaining 
 high speed in smooth-water trials, the working speeds 
 at sea are limited by other considerations than the 
 
 power available for propulsion Sailors generally 
 
 will be sure to welcome the greater length and size of 
 the ' Blake ' and ' Blenheim,' because of their capa- 
 bility of maintaining speed in rough water ; and their 
 enormous engine power and very high trial speeds give 
 
$W rudL' 
 
 
 §rn« 
 
 eLdii 
 
Steaiu Propulsion, 
 
 O 1 ') 
 
 *-4o 
 
 them a grand working margin as compared with other 
 cruisers." So far TJic Times, but we do not yet know 
 exactly how these two ships will turn out. Their 
 machinery is, however, our latest and most ambitious 
 effort in the way of naval marine engineering, and forms 
 a remarkable contrast to the engines of fifty years ago. 
 
 Perhaps in nothing has the advance of the use of 
 steam on board warships been so extraordinary as in 
 the number of auxiliary engines now considered neces- 
 sary. And this is a source of danger. The ' Sans 
 Pareil,' for example, has in addition to her main engines 
 no fewer than fifty-eight auxiliary steam engines on 
 board. Some of these are only used occasionally for 
 special purposes, but an enumeration of them will show 
 that many must be constantly in use. They are as 
 follows : — 
 
 Main circulating engines, 
 Auxiliary condenser do., , 
 Main fire engines, . 
 Auxiliary do.. 
 Bilge engines, . 
 Turning engines, . . 
 Reversing engines, 
 Distilled water. 
 Drain lank, .... 
 Evaporator feed, . 
 Ventilation supply. 
 
 Ventilation exhaust, 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Forced draught. 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 Main feed, . . . 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 Auxiliary feed, . . 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 Air compressing, 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 Dynamo, .... 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 Capstan, .... 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 Hydraulic puni[iing. 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Auxiliary do., 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 Friedman's eject(jrs. 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 When the ship is at sea it is clear that these engines, 
 many of which are constant!)- at work, and all of which 
 must be ready to work on an emergency, will consiune 
 an appreciable proportion of the coal assumed in the 
 
244 Steam Propulsion. 
 
 official tables to be available for the purpose of con- 
 tinuous steaming at lo-knot speed, as the consumption 
 for auxiliary purposes varies from about 5 to 8 tons 
 a day. 
 
 It will readily be understood that the supply and 
 economy of coal on board a fighting ship are matters of 
 the very utmost importance, and any contrivances tend- 
 ing to facilitate them are of great value, but it is probably 
 less well known that the health and efficiency of modern 
 marine boilers depend very largely on there being no 
 stint in the supply of fresh water for them. Such, how- 
 ever, is the case. Any appreciable admixture of raw 
 sea water is fatal to the delicate constitutions of boilers 
 working at a pressure of 155 lbs. on the square inch. 
 Hence special arrangements have to be fitted for 
 making up the necessary waste of fresh water that 
 must occur during a voyage of very moderate length. 
 Theoretically, if machines were perfect, the fresh water 
 taken in from the shore, converted into steam in the 
 boilers, and reconverted into fresh water by the surface 
 condensers, would not diminish in quantity and might 
 go back to the boilers from week's end to week's end on 
 its round of profitable employment. But, in practice, 
 what with unavoidable leaky joints and occasional 
 escapes of steam at the safety valves, it is found that 
 there is a deficit of hundreds of gallons of water every 
 day, which has to be made up. To this end all ships 
 are now fitted with distilling apparatus, or ' evaporators ' 
 as they are generally called, for the purpose of convert- 
 ing salt water into fresh, not only for the use of the 
 
Steam Propulsion. 245 
 
 boilers but also for the use of the crew. The newest of 
 these, and apparently by a long way the most efficient, 
 is the Yaryan, of American origin, the main principle 
 of which is that the sea water before being evaporated 
 and condensed is pulverised into spray. Professor 
 Lewes, of the Royal Naval College, speaking of most of 
 the other varieties, averred with good reason that the 
 trouble of deposit in the boilers was only transferred to 
 the distillery apparatus ; in the Yaryan there has been 
 no trouble at all, because there has been no deposit. 
 
 Looking back, then, on the past half century, we 
 find that the whole aspect of marine engineering has 
 changed. And nowhere is this revolution more dis- 
 tinctly marked than in the Royal Navy, where it has 
 produced its most startling effects. In the early days 
 the steam engine was seldom used, and occupied a very 
 minor position in the internal arrangement of a ship, 
 but now it is absolutely requisite for every purpose for 
 which the modern man-of-war exists. Steam machinery 
 now fulfils every function of the latter-day ironclad. Its 
 very air and light, its steering and anchoring, the train- 
 ing and loading of its guns, the motive power of its 
 torpedoes, all these, and many other things, without 
 steam could not be. As a matter of course, as steam 
 machinery became of more and more importance in the 
 navy, so did the position of the officers in charge of it 
 advance. Before 1S47 all engineers were wan-ant 
 officers, but junior of that rank, so that, the chief 
 engineer of a paddle-wheel frigate was then, ofiicially, 
 of less account than the carf^cntcr. 1 Ic is now, as far 
 
246 Steam Propulsioii. 
 
 as rank goes, on the same level as the medical and 
 accountant officers, but his pay is considerably less than 
 theirs, which is a constant occasion of complaint. With 
 regard to the rank and file of the engine-room, the 
 introduction of a class of skilled artificers, which took 
 place in 1869, has proved of very great benefit to the 
 navy, by rendering it possible to reduce very largely the 
 number of highly trained engineer officers, which re- 
 duction has, however, been carried too far. The entry 
 and training of stokers — firemen as the}' are called in the 
 mercantile marine — are in anything but a satisfactory 
 state. As the necessity for increased intelligence among 
 these men becomes more manifest, on account of the 
 number of small yet anything but simple engines that 
 have to be confided to their care, it will probably be 
 found advisable to train them up from boys for their 
 particular duties, in the same way as has long been the 
 practice with seamen. What the future of engineering 
 in the navy may be he would be a bold man who would 
 attempt to prophesy. It is, however, unlikely that in 
 the next decade anything like the same progress will be 
 made as in the past one. There must be a point beyond 
 which, except in matters of detail, improvement of the 
 marine steam engine cannot go. That point has pro- 
 bably very nearly been attained. To the ambitious and 
 sceptical it may be called to mind that, with every in- 
 ducement to inventors, no substantial difference exists 
 to-day between the best example of a railway locomotive 
 and one of thirty years ago. If any startling revolution 
 in the economy of marine steam propulsion does take 
 
Steam Propulsion. 247 
 
 place durini; the lives of the present generation it may 
 possibly be in the direction of the substitution of liquid 
 fuel for coal. But of this there does not seem to be at 
 present any noticeable sign. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 FOREIGN NAVIES — EUROPE 
 
 Conditiun of French Navy in 1840— Progress after Franco-Cerman War- 
 Broadside and Barbette Construction— Cruisers— The Russian Flee 
 — Influence of the '.Monitor '—New Departure— Black Sea and 
 Baltic Squadrons— Belted Cruisers— Italy— Creation of a New Fleet 
 after 1870— Monster Ironclads— Cruisers— Germany— Late develop- 
 ment of Navy— New Battle Ships and Cruisers— Austria, Spain, 
 Greece, and Turkey. 
 
 Notwithstanding the signal defeats inflicted upon 
 the navy of France at the beginning of this century, 
 she has regained her position as a maritime power, and 
 now possesses a fleet only second to our own. Though 
 in the interval the country has passed through various 
 political phases, involving changes from a monarchy to 
 a republic, the long and glorious traditions of a navy, 
 founded by Richelieu and consolidated by Colbert, have 
 survived, and are the mainspring of that efficiency which 
 we see to-day. Fleets may disappear but traditions 
 survive, and in reconstruction play an important part. 
 How notable this has been in the case of France. 
 Stunned by the blows inflicted on her at sea in all parts 
 of the world, she for some years after the peace of 
 181 5 made no attempt to resuscitate her navy. But 
 in 1820 the country was roused when the Minister of 
 Marine suggested ' to abandon the institution to save 
 
Foreign Navies — Ettrope. 249 
 
 the expense, or to increase the expenses to save 
 the institution.' A sum of ;^20,ooopoo sterHng was 
 granted, the expenditure of which was to be spread over 
 eleven years. Such progress was made that in 1840, 
 when relations between France and England were 
 strained over the Syrian question, and our fleet had 
 been suffered to fall below its proper strength, eminent 
 French naval officers considered their country fully 
 equal to coping with us at sea. They had in the Medi- 
 terranean at this time in Admiral Lalande an officer 
 of great ability and energy, who, it is said, asked permis- 
 sion to attack the British Squadron. But more peaceful 
 counsels prevailed, and we, profiting by the lesson, sent 
 out reinforcements to our undermanned ships. At this 
 time the equipment of French vessels was superior to 
 ours, and their crews were in a high state of efficiency. 
 
 When, however, steam superseded sails the position 
 we at once assumed in the construction of steam 
 machinery gave us an advantage, which was apparent 
 at the outbreak of the Crimean War. We had a 
 greater number of steamers, and provided transports to 
 convey French troops for the attack on Bomarsund. 
 France undoubtedly was the first to construct sea- 
 going ironclads, a policy we at first thought foll}- 
 and then were constrained to follow. Their carl)- 
 ironclads were of the t\'pc I have alrcadx' mentioned, 
 but the expense of such vessels and the time 
 reciuired for their construction pre\cnts the forma- 
 tion of modern fleets in a few )-ears. During the 
 Crimean War a wooden line of-battle ship had been 
 
250 Foreign Navies — Europe. 
 
 built, equipped, and sent to sea in ninety days. Under 
 the new system a nation cannot thus rapidly reinforce 
 its fleet ; and when war broke out in 1870 between 
 France and Germany the fleet of the former was unable 
 to effect any serious diversion in the Baltic. There had 
 been some idea at first of landing a French force in that 
 locality under cover of the fleet, but there was no 
 organisation for such an expedition. The opportunity 
 passed, and the squadron despatched to the Baltic could 
 do little more than blockade the coast until recalled 
 home. The crews then assisted in the defence of Paris, 
 and the naval contingent performed excellent service 
 during the siege. 
 
 After this war France steadily set to work to aug- 
 ment her fleet. Between 1872 and 1886 several pro- 
 grammes of shipbuilding were drawn up, and no less 
 than i^ 1 8,000,000 were devoted to new construction. 
 Practically the P^rench fleet of to-day is the creation of 
 the last twenty years, for nearly all the ships launched 
 previously to 1870 have been removed from the list. 
 Unlike ourselves, the P^rcnch up to that period adhered 
 to wooden hulls, whose life is limited. One or two 
 remain, and among them the ' Marengo,' which as flag- 
 ship of the Northern Squadron lately visited our shores. 
 
 In 1872 was commenced the first large battle ship 
 built after the war. This was the ' Redoutable.' She 
 was built of iron, with a displacement of 9200 tons. 
 Then followed the ' Devastation ' and ' Courbet,' of 
 10,100 and 9700 tons. The armament in all was 
 disposed in the same way : a central battery, with a 
 
Foreign. Navies — Europe. 253 
 
 few heavy guns mounted over it en barbette. As with 
 ourselves, guns in France had risen in size to 40 tons 
 weight, and the armour in thickness to 14 in. Then 
 after these ships a new departure was taken — the central 
 battery for the heavy ordnance was abandoned, but 
 instead of adopting the turret, as wc had, the barbette 
 system was extended. This was carried out in the 
 'Admiral Duperre,' ^ begun at the end of 1876. In this 
 vessel the displacement was increased to 11,000 tons, 
 and the armament consisted of four 48-ton guns, placed 
 singly in barbettes, with a number of smaller guns for 
 auxiliary purposes. The complete armour belt had 
 from the first been a special feature of French ships, 
 and in the * Duperre ' it is 21 in. thick at the central 
 portion. A further advance was made in the design 
 of the ' Admiral Baudin ' and ' Formidable,' commenced 
 eleven years ago, and now forming part of the 
 Mediterranean Squadron. Their displacement is the 
 greatest yet in the French navy, 11,500 tons. They 
 are armed with three 75-ton guns, mounted in separate 
 barbettes, and have as an auxiliary armament twelve 
 5.3-in. guns. The armour is similar to that of the 
 ' Duperre.' A special feature in these ships is their 
 lofty freeboard and the height above the water at 
 which the guns are carried. In rough weather this 
 is a great advantage, but of course the target offered 
 to hostile fire is considerable. These two ships are 
 fine s})ecimens of naval architecture. 
 
 ^ French ironclads no lon^^er carry yards and sails. Tlie illustration 
 shows the ' Dupcrrc' as orii;inally completed. 
 
2 54 Foreign Navies — Ejirope. 
 
 It will be observed that, whereas we usually mount 
 our heavy guns in pairs, our neighbours prefer to place 
 them singly. By this they gain an additional position 
 at the sacrifice of one gun. The balance between the 
 two systems appears to be equal. Then, from the first, 
 the French have adhered to the complete armour belt, 
 leaving a large area of the side above unprotected. The 
 weak point of this is that shells exploding beneath the 
 platforms on which the heavy guns are mounted would 
 probably put them out of action. 
 
 The satisfactory reports of the ' Admiral Baudin ' 
 and 'Formidable' have led to three others of similar 
 construction being commenced. They are to be of 
 12,000 tons displacement, and hence the largest vessels 
 yet designed in France. Whether they will be exceeded 
 remains to be seen. Their names arc to be ' Lazare 
 Carnot,' 'Charles Martel,' and ' Jaurcguiberry.' Of 
 similar type, but smaller, are the ' Magenta,' ' Marceau/ 
 and 'Neptune.' They carry four 52-ton guns, in 
 separate barbettes. 
 
 But though France has been steadily adding to 
 the number and power of her battle ships proper she 
 has been no less assiduous in augmenting the class 
 designed for coast defence. While for such craft we 
 had stopped, in the ' Glatton,' at dimensions within 
 4000 tons, the French completed several between the 
 years i860 and 1880 varying from 4000 to 6000 tons. 
 Then came the ' Caiman,' ' Indomptable,' ' Requin,' and 
 ' Terrible,' of 7300 tons, in which the principal armament 
 is a 75-ton gun at each end, and the protection by 
 
Foreign Navies — Europe. 
 
 -:)0 
 
 armour has a maximum thickness on the belt of \'j\ in. 
 Such vessels are battle ships to all intents and purposes, 
 though perhaps not suitable for service in distant waters. 
 Three others, of 6600 tons, the ' Trchouart,' 'Jemmapes,' 
 and ' Valmy ' are building. These are to have a 50-ton 
 gun in a turret at each end. We thus see that France 
 has abstained from following the example first set by 
 Italy of building ships of extreme size and equipping 
 them with monster ordnance. The 75-ton gun is the 
 largest she has afloat. 
 
 While we had been hampered in the production of 
 fast steam cruisers by the endeavour to give them good 
 sailing qualities as well, the French clearly recognised, 
 twenty years ago, that sail power must be sacrificed and 
 longer vessels built to give speed under steam. This 
 was carried out in two vessels, the ' Sane' and * Seignelay,' 
 launched respectively in 1870 and 1874, where with a 
 displacement of 1900 tons a speed of 15 knots was 
 obtained. The steam speed of our cruisers of that size 
 rarely exceeded 13 knots. 
 
 But after 1880 a great impetus was given to the con- 
 struction of fast cruisers in France when Admiral Aube 
 was Minister of Marine. He had previously advocated 
 raids on territory and commerce by light forces when at 
 war with a powerful maritime nation whose battle ships 
 were too numerous to cope with. A great number of 
 unarmoured ships were then laid down, several of w hich 
 are now complete. The ' Tage,' of 7000 tons, is the 
 largest. Her armament consists of sixteen guns, and 
 her speed is 19 knots. The 'Cccille' is another line 
 
256 Foreign Navies — Europe. 
 
 vessel, of 5700 tons, with a similar equipment. Neither 
 has external armour, but both have horizontal protec- 
 tion in a steel deck over the machinery and fore and aft 
 the vessel. Then experiments with melinite, an explo- 
 sive of great power used as the bursting charge of shells, 
 caused ideas to revert to the old system of complete 
 external armour to keep out some of these projectiles, 
 their very destructive effect being clearly demonstrated. 
 The ' Dupuy de Lome,' named after the eminent naval 
 architect, embodies this principle. Of only 6400 tons, 
 she is coated externally with 4-in. steel plates. This 
 will keep out all small projectiles. A number of other 
 vessels between 2000 and 5000 tons are approaching 
 completion. In all high speed has been considered the 
 chief essential. The armament is usually lighter than 
 that which we give to vessels of similar dimensions, but 
 many of our officers think that in this respect we have 
 gone to an extreme in several instances. 
 
 For scouting duties with a fleet France has produced 
 an excellent class of vessel of 19 knots speed and 
 1850 tons, as in the * Forbin,' 'Surcouf,' and four others. 
 In the special type of small vessel for counter-attacking 
 torpedo boats that country was first with the ' Bombe ' 
 class, of 350 tons. An increased size has, however, been 
 found desirable. 
 
 As regards torpedo boats, France possesses a large 
 number, and is steadily adding to it. Their special 
 function is coast defence, and all nations now recognise 
 that squadrons are only impeded if torpedo boats are 
 attached to them. As for the idea that torpedo boats 
 
I 
 
Foreign Navies — Europe. 257 
 
 can be employed in the attack on commerce, this may 
 be dismissed. These craft cannot remain at sea for any 
 time, and their nests will be as well known as the resorts 
 of Jean Bart and Duguay Trouin were in the old corsair 
 days. 
 
 The Crimean War found Russia but little advanced 
 in the substitution of steam for sailing ships in her navy, 
 and she was not prepared to meet at sea either the 
 Baltic or Black Sea Squadrons of the allies. At the 
 close of that war efforts were made to recover her old 
 position among the maritime states, and several screw 
 vessels were built. Then when France and England 
 began to produce seagoing ironclads, two Russian 
 wooden ships then building, the * Sebastopol ' and 
 ' Petropaulowski,' were converted into armoured frigates, 
 with 4i-in. iron plates. About this time, however, the 
 naval events of the Civil War in America brought the 
 * Monitor ' type prominently into favour in Russia. Ten 
 monitors, on Ericsson's plans, w^ere ordered in 1863, 
 when Europe seemed inclined to intervene on behalf of 
 Poland. These monitors were built in the Baltic. 
 Then came the Franco-German War and the declara- 
 tion of Russia in reference to shipbuilding in the Black 
 Sea, but it was some years before Russia was in a 
 position to carry out the construction of battle ships in 
 the southern ports. Moreover, the influence of the 
 monitor was still paramount, and the licet consisted 
 chiefly of coast defence vessels. Under this influence 
 the circular ironclads, which I have already alluded to, 
 
 K 
 
258 Fo7'eign Navies — Europe. 
 
 were built. When, therefore, war broke out with Turkey 
 the ironclads of the latter power held a command of 
 the Black Sea which Russia was not in a position to 
 dispute. But in 1880 it was decided to re-create the 
 battle fleet of Russia. A programme was drawn up 
 for a course of shipbuilding in all classes, which was 
 to extend over a period of twenty years. After un- 
 avoidable delays a start was made in 1882. As a result 
 we now find in the Black Sea three powerful iron- 
 clads completed, named the ' Tchcsmc,' * Sinope,' and 
 * Catherine II.' They each carry six 50-ton guns, and are 
 fairly well protected with armour ; the principle favoured 
 in France of a complete water line belt being adopted. 
 Other battle ships are in course of construction. As 
 Turkey has allowed her former fine fleet to fall into 
 decay, and has added to it no powerful ships, it is 
 evident that as between these two powers command of 
 the Black Sea rests with Russia to-day. This should 
 be clearly recognised, for the condition has now reverted 
 to what it was just previously to Sinope. 
 
 In the Baltic several useful types of battle ships 
 have been completed, such as the "Alexander II.' and 
 ' Nicholas I.,' of 8500 tons, a displacement adapted to 
 the shallow waters of the north. But it is in the con- 
 struction of cruisers that Russia has shown the greatest 
 ability and energy. The special type favoured is the 
 belted cruiser of between 6000 and 8000 tons for distant 
 stations. Of these there are three, the ' Vladimir- 
 Monomakh,' ' Dimitri-Donskoi,' and ' Admiral Nachi- 
 moff,' with a speed of between 15 and 16 knots, of which 
 
Foreign Navies — Eiirope 259 
 
 our ' Imperieusc ' and ' VVarspitc ' may be considered the 
 rivals. The latest completed is the ' Pamyat Azova/ 
 of 6000 tons, with a 6-in. belt and a speed of 18 knots. 
 Under construction is a very large vessel of 10,500 tons, 
 to be called the * Rurik,' with a lo-in. belt, powerful 
 armament, high speed, and large coal supply. Now, 
 when cruisers are built of these dimensions, and carrying 
 such an amount of offensive and defensive equipment, it 
 is evident they are not far removed from battle ships. 
 Our 'Admiral ' class, of similar tonnage, may be equally 
 employed as cruisers, and thus the tendency is to 
 jumble all up together until a war demonstrates how 
 the classes should be differentiated — a word I should 
 like to dispense with but cannot find a substitute. It is 
 curious to observe the fidelity with which Russia has 
 adhered to external armour instead of relying upon 
 protective decks, as we have done in the * Blake ' and 
 ' Blenheim.' Of smaller cruisers few lately have been 
 added to her fleet. It is no doubt considered that 
 more effect can be produced by a few vessels of great 
 power than by distributing the force among a larger 
 number of inferior ships. 
 
 Russia was one of the earliest states to perceive the 
 valuable assistance that torpedo boats could afford when 
 the coast is menaced by a hostile squadron. In their 
 war against Turkey little was done in this respect, 
 because the Russian torpedo boats were small and in- 
 efficiently equipped. As a result of this experience 
 they obtained a boat from Mr Yarrow which w as the 
 pioneer of a larger type. This boat, the ' l^atoum/ 
 
26o Foreign Navies — Eic7Vpe. 
 
 lOO ft. long, steamed out to the Black Sea in 1880 by 
 herself. She has been followed by others of slightly 
 larger dimensions. 
 
 In viewing the development of their navies by the 
 different maritime states it is curious to observe how 
 cheir relative positions have been altered since the 
 beginning of the century. In some instances less than 
 half a century has sufficed to place a country in the 
 foremost rank. Such an example wc have in Italy. 
 No country has shown such boldness, originality, and 
 energy in the creation of her fleet. The lesson at Lissa 
 was only an incentive to renewed exertion, and to-day 
 she can justly boast of being able to place in the line 
 of battle a squadron which only two nations of the 
 world can surpass. Yet this has been the work of only 
 twenty years. The earlier ironclads of Italy were those 
 I have enumerated as taking part in the action off Lissa. 
 Then after 1870 two were commenced, the ' Duilio ' and 
 * Dandolo,' similar in design to our ' Inflexible,' They 
 were the first to carry afloat guns of 100 tons, two of 
 which were placed in each of the turrets. They were 
 muzzle-loaders, and made by Armstrong's firm at 
 Elswick. One of these vessels was designed to carry 
 a torpedo boat in a compartment of the stern to which 
 the sea had access. It was a floating boathouse from 
 which the parasite could emerge when desired, and be 
 received back into it when her mission was accomplished. 
 The idea was original but not practical, and it was soon 
 found that at sea getting the boat in and out safely was 
 
Foreign Navies — Eztrope. 26 
 
 J 
 
 extremely difficult. Eventually the aperture was closed 
 up, and the incident is mentioned as showing that in 
 Italy novel ideas have a chance of being tested. 
 
 But in the 'Duilio' and ' Dandolo ' Italy did not 
 consider she had reached the maximum of useful effi- 
 ciency. There was a strong party in favour of indivi- 
 dual ships of great power, and their arguments carried 
 the day. The result was an increase to a displace- 
 ment of 13,800 tons, in two vessels called the 'Italia' 
 and ' Lepanto,' and an entire change in their design. 
 External armour was abandoned, and it was all placed 
 inside the vessel, in a stout deck, round the bases of the 
 funnels, and in a breastwork enclosing the heavy guns. 
 These consisted of four 100-ton breech-loaders, placed 
 in an elongated barbette or redoubt built across the 
 ship, and supported by bulkheads. This structure, with 
 armament, weighs about 2500 tons, and therefore we see 
 a ship not ironclad carrying on her hull the equivalent 
 weight of a cruiser. Machinery of enormous power 
 drives these huge structures at a speed of 18 knots, and 
 they are capable of stowing 1600 tons of coal, which 
 at a speed of 10 knots an hour would enable them to 
 cover about 8000 nautical miles. They are magnificent 
 specimens of naval architecture, but have, in my opinion, 
 a serious defect. This is the absence of external armour, 
 which renders them liable to receive serious damage 
 underneath the structure carrying the heavy guns. The 
 stability of this structure might be compromised by the 
 fire of numerous light guns. Next to these two in 
 size are three vessels of 13,200 tons, the 'Re Umberto,' 
 
264 Foreign Navies — Europe. 
 
 * Sardegna/ and ' Sicilia,' which in arrangement are more 
 like our new first-class battle ships. They carry four 
 67-ton guns, placed in pairs in a barbette at each end of 
 the ship, but the principle of omitting all thick external 
 armour is still adopted. Then there are three others, 
 the 'Andrea Doria,' * Ruggiero di Lauria,' and 'Fran- 
 cesco Morosini,' of 11,000 tons, somewhat similar to 
 the'Duilio' and ' Dandolo,' but carrying four 105-ton 
 breech-loading guns in a central redoubt instead of in 
 turrets. Thus Italy possesses ten ironclads of 1 1,000 tons 
 and upwards, of which all but two are equipped with the 
 most modern artillery and machinery. 
 
 She has been equally enterprising with cruisers and 
 smaller vessels. In the ' Picmonte,' built by Sir William 
 Armstrong's firm, she acquired, with the moderate dimen- 
 sions of 2500 tons, a vessel capable of steaming 20 knots 
 in smooth water without unduly pressing the machinery. 
 This also was associated with a very powerful arma- 
 ment of quick-firing guns. There has been a tendency 
 to overload such vessels with guns, and in the case of 
 the 'Piemonte' my impression on seeing her was that 
 a lighter armament would be more suitable to her 
 dimensions. 
 
 Of torpedo-catchers Italy has several of 750 tons 
 and a speed of 20 knots. In this type the experiment 
 was tried of employing three screws to obtain greater 
 speed, for which the 'Tripoli' was selected. But the 
 result was not favourable. It is possible that in a vessel 
 of large size a screw in the centre and one on each side 
 of the stern may answer, but in a small ship they must 
 
Foreign Navies — Europe. 265 
 
 be so close together that the centre propeller has pro- 
 bably no solid water to work in. 
 
 Naturally with such an extent of coast line Italy has 
 a great number of torpedo boats, and the organisation 
 for their use in time of war is very complete. Italy may 
 be justly proud of the navy she has created in tw^enty 
 years, and her naval officers display a proficiency in 
 handling this materiel which is the result of unremitting 
 zeal and industry. 
 
 Thirty years ago the navy of the kingdom of Prussia 
 was numerically inferior to that of Austria, but the 
 German Empire is now fast becoming a prominent 
 maritime power. In 1889 a German squadron of iron- 
 clads came to England which, though not composed of 
 vessels of large dimensions or latest design, showed in 
 its organisation and the method in which it was handled 
 that the same attention had been given to detail in naval 
 matters as characterises its military department. Up to 
 the present time the largest ironclad is the ' Konig 
 Wilhelm,' of 9600 tons, of the belt and central battery 
 type, like the ' Hercules ' in the British navy. She was 
 launched as far back as 1868, when that system was 
 prominently in favour. Contemporary with this ship 
 are the 'Kaiser' and * Deutschland,' of 7700 tons, and 
 a few others of smaller dimensions. A later class, com- 
 posed of the * Baden,' ' Bayern,' ' Sachsen,' and * Wurttem- 
 berg,' launched between 1S77 and 1880, arc of 7400 tons, 
 with a central citadel and armament of six 18-ton Krupp 
 euns. The armour on the side onU' covers the central 
 
2 66 Foreign Navies — Europe. 
 
 portion, wherein are located the machinery and heavy 
 guns, but it is i6 in. thick. 
 
 For some years after the completion of these vessels 
 no more ironclads were laid down, until the activity of 
 other nations in adding to their fleets spurred Germany 
 to further effort. She could not view with indifference 
 the steps taken by Russia to create a powerful Baltic 
 Squadron. Accordingly, three years ago, a programme 
 of construction was framed, the most important part of 
 which was the completion of four new ironclads of 
 10,000 tons each. The design selected is somewhat 
 similar to that adopted in late French battle ships — 
 a complete armour belt and three barbettes on the 
 middle line, each containing a pair of 11 -in. guns. 
 Between the foremost and middle barbette is the 
 auxiliary broadside battery of light guns. The maxi- 
 mum thickness of belt is 16 in., and it tapers to 11 in. 
 at the ends. These vessels are to have a speed of 
 16 knots, and all are being built in Germany. Their 
 weak point appears to be the absence of any protec- 
 tion above the belt on the side ; but the best distribu- 
 tion of a given weight of armour is a matter about 
 which all experts differ. The distribution of heavy 
 guns in three independent positions seems an excel- 
 lent one, and provision is made for a high freeboard 
 forward, so that the foremost barbette will have a 
 commanding position. The largest gun mounted 
 afloat in Germany weighs 35 tons, and this pattern 
 is only placed in armoured gunboats. It is con- 
 sidered that for battle ships ordnance of about 25 
 
Foreign Navies — Europe. 267 
 
 tons is sufficiently powerful and can be most con- 
 veniently handled. 
 
 Under the new programme a number of fast cruisers 
 are building, and a few have been completed. The 
 largest type are to be 5500 tons, with a 9-in. bow and 
 stern chaser gun, and eight 6-in. guns on the broadside. 
 They will have a steel protective deck and a speed of 
 20 knots. The ' Irene,' the first fast cruiser completed, 
 is of 4300 tons, armed with fourteen 6-in. guns, and has 
 a speed of 18 knots. Others are in course of construc- 
 tion. Germany has paid much attention to the organisa- 
 tion of an efficient defence by torpedo boats, and carries 
 out continuous exercise with them in the Baltic and 
 North Sea. 
 
 After the Franco-German War two generals in suc- 
 cession were charged with the administration and re- 
 organisation of the German Navy. It was desired that 
 as far as possible the regulations should be assimilated 
 to those of the army, with special regard to the mobilisa- 
 tion of land and sea forces when required. General 
 von Stosch was first selected for Chief of the Admiralty, 
 and on his resignation General von Caprivi was ap- 
 pointed to the post. Both were well known as able 
 organisers, and the result is that all the arrangements 
 for naval mobilisation are as complete as those for the 
 army, and at a word the fleet can be placed on a war 
 footing, ready to perform any service assigned to it. .An 
 admiral is now at the head of the Naval Department. 
 
 The great advance made by Germany and ItaK' in 
 
2 68 Foreign Navies — Europe. 
 
 maritime strength has overshadowed the more modest 
 progress in this direction made by Austria. The army- 
 has the first claim upon the national purse, and but a 
 small amount can be spared for the fleet. It speaks 
 highly of the management of her naval affairs that, 
 with an annual expenditure of barely ;^2,ooo,ooo 
 sterling, Austria can show a small but efficient naval 
 force. Her largest ironclad is the * Tegethoff,' of 7500 
 tons, launched in 1878. She is of the ' Hercules ' type — 
 a broadside battery ship, with recessed sides to give 
 fore and aft fire. Austria has seven others of smaller 
 size, of which the most powerful is the * Crown Prince 
 Rudolph,' of 7000 tons, launched in 1887, and armed 
 with three 48-ton guns and six ^\-\\\. guns. The 
 ' Princess Stephanie,' of 5000 tons, also launched in 
 1887, is similar in design, but less powerfully armed. 
 The largest cruisers are three of 4000 tons of the deck 
 protected type. Two torpedo cruisers, the ' Leopard ' 
 and 'Panther,' of 1550 tons, were built for Austria by 
 Sir William Armstrong's firm. They have a speed of 
 18 knots. 
 
 The torpedo flotilla consists of some thirty boats, of 
 which the greater number are of about 80 tons dis- 
 placement. 
 
 Spain, once the great maritime state of Europe, has 
 within recent years begun to rehabilitate her fleet. 
 
 In addition to one ironclad — the ' Pelayo,' of 10,000 
 tons — she has six others building of 7000 tons, and one 
 or two fast cruisers. 
 
Foreio^n Navies — Eni'opc. 269 
 
 Even Greece has been unable to withstand the 
 desire to rank as a naval power, and has lately had 
 three ironclads built in France of about 5000 tons 
 displacement. 
 
 Turkey alone seems indifferent to the advantages 
 conferred by an efficient naval force. Under the rule of 
 Abdul Aziz a powerful fleet guarded the Bosphorus and 
 Dardanelles. When invaded by Russia, a supremacy 
 in the Black Sea prevented any transport of troops 
 by that route. But the present Sultan appears to 
 have a greater belief in fixed defences, and his ships 
 lie idly at their moorings, disuse making sad havoc in 
 equipment and machinery. The Black Sea will in 
 future be closed to a Turkish Squadron if hostilities 
 again arise between the two countries, while it is doubt- 
 ful whether at sea Turkey could now meet Greece. 
 There is, however, still time to do a great deal towards 
 preserving some of the old efficiency — not by tinkering 
 at and altering the older ironclads, as Turkey is ill- 
 advisedly doing, but by keeping what she has got in 
 thorough order, and devoting a small sum annually 
 towards new construction. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 FOREIGN NAVIES — UNITED STATES AND SOUTH 
 AMERICA 
 
 Condition of United States Navy before and after Civil War — Apathy in 
 Naval Matters— Change of Feeling in 1880 — New Cruisers con- 
 structed — Battle Ships decided on and commenced — Special Fast 
 Cruiser — Torpedoes — The Howell Torpedo — Dynamite Gun — De- 
 velopment of Navies of South American States — Chili — Capture 
 of ' Huascar ' by 'Blanco Encalada' and 'Almiranie Cochrane' — 
 Peru — The Argentine Republic — Brazil. 
 
 If several of the navies of European states exhibit 
 great progress during the last half century, in the west 
 we observe a fleet practically created in little more than 
 a decade. After a strange apathy of many years, the 
 United States is now fully alive to the necessity of 
 having a fleet commensurate with her position. A few 
 years ago her navy consisted of a number of obsolete 
 monitors and wooden cruisers equally ancient. Such 
 a condition was humiliating, and might be dangerous, 
 seeing that insignificant neighbouring states were in 
 the possession of modern ironclads and swift powerful 
 cruisers. No nation with a long sea frontier and im- 
 portant interests abroad should be without the means 
 of protecting both, and for this an adequate naval force 
 is essential. For the United States this dangerous 
 
Foreign- N'avics — United Stales^ etc. 271 
 
 condition no longer exists. Stirring appeals by succes- 
 sive Secretaries of the Navy have at last roused the 
 nation to action. With a marvellous energy, of which 
 an example was afforded in the last Civil War, America 
 has developed during the last few years everything 
 necessary for the construction and equipment of a 
 modern fleet. 
 
 There was no seeking abroad for those appliances 
 which their own country had not hitherto, from want 
 of a demand, produced. The latest ordnance, the best 
 steel armour plates, and marine engines of the most 
 recent design, each requiring special plant for its 
 manufacture were produced on the spot, and warships 
 built which will bear comparison with those of any 
 European state. When we recall the period that has 
 elapsed since we passed from wood to iron in naval 
 construction, and from smooth bore to rifled guns, with 
 the successive phases of improvement in each, none can 
 withhold a tribute of admiration at the manner in which 
 all difficulties in the United States have been surmounted. 
 Defects here and there must occur, but the nation has 
 just cause for pride in the vessels which the Government 
 and private shipbuilding yards have turned out without 
 any abnormal delay in completion. 
 
 J5ut brief space need be accorded to a dcscri[)tion 
 of the navy previous to and during the Civil War. ;\t 
 the commencement of that struggle America possessed 
 several fine wooden steam frigates of about 3000 tons, 
 and a number of smaller vessels, but the sinking of the 
 Cumberland ' b)^ the ' Mcrrimac ' showed that such craft 
 
272 Foreign Navies — United States, etc. 
 
 had no chance when opposed to the smallest ironclad. 
 This conclusion was strengthened by the success of the 
 ' Monitor/ and led to a number of similar vessels being 
 constructed with great rapidity. For service in the 
 numerous rivers and inlets of the coast, they had to 
 draw little water. The late Mr Eads designed and 
 constructed several for the Government which only drew 
 6 ft. Some were propelled by paddle-wheels, and were 
 more like locomotive rafts on which guns were mounted 
 and housed in with iron plates — Captain Cowper Coles's 
 original idea, in fact, carried into practical execution. 
 Then a larger type of monitor was designed by Erics- 
 son as a seagoing ship, and one called the 'Dictator' 
 was completed. Work on another, the ' Puritan,' was 
 suspended in consequence of some error having been 
 made in the calculation of her weights. After a lapse of 
 many years, she is to be now completed with a modern 
 equipment. 
 
 At the end of the war it was decided to construct 
 four seagoing turret ships, the * Miantonomoh,' ' Mon- 
 adnock,' ' Terror,' and * Amphitrite.' Only the first 
 named was completed and crossed the Atlantic. She 
 was about 4000 tons and had two turrets. She was 
 of low freeboard, and in a moderate sea her upper 
 deck was swept by the waves. 
 
 When the war ceased, retrenchment was the order of 
 the day ; the monitors were laid up, where they gradu- 
 ally fell into decay, and only a few wooden ships were 
 annually kept in commission to carry the flag on 
 foreign stations. Though obsolete they were not re- 
 
Forcio-n Navies — United States, etc. 2^^ 
 
 placed as lonc^ as they were able to perform the ordinary 
 duties of a war vessel in peace time. An effort was 
 made in 1863 to build fast cruisers, and some of 
 4000 tons and 340 ft. long were designed. But, as we 
 found with the ' Mersey ' and ' Orlando,' such dimen- 
 sions and powerful machinery were incompatible with a 
 wooden hull. The American vessels similarly failed to 
 fulfil expectations, and their existence was a short one. In 
 1870 Congress decided that the fleet should consist of ten 
 ships, rated first class, of 3500 tons, and twenty of the 
 second class, of 2000 tons. But this abstract resolution was 
 not made concrete by voting the necessary money to carry 
 it into eft'ect, and little was done beyond selling some old 
 vessels. Money received from this source, and a small 
 amount granted by Congress, enabled the naval depart- 
 ment to build a few vessels during the next few years 
 which kept the navy going; but in 1876 a fine vessel 
 called the ' Trenton ' was launched. Though just under 
 4000 tons, she had the moderate length of 260 ft., with 
 45 ft. beam. There was no attempt at high speed, but 
 at full power she could steam 14 knots, and had besides 
 considerable sail area. The armament was composed 
 of eleven 8-in. rifled guns. She was a fine vessel, well 
 suited for cruising in distant seas, but unfortunately was 
 wrecked at Samoa in the hurricane from which the 
 ' Calliope ' alone escaped without injury. 
 
 In the meantime no new ironclads had been built, 
 and when in 1880 the country was ripe for a consider- 
 able augmentation of the fleet, the first want was seen 
 to be that of efficient cruisers. As it was determined 
 
 s 
 
2 74 Foreign Navies — United States, ete. 
 
 not to go abroad for ships and guns, considerable delay 
 was inevitable, so it was not till 1883 that four modern 
 cruisers were commenced, the ' Chicago,' ' Boston,' 
 ' Atlanta,' and ' Dolphin.' The first named is the 
 largest, 4500 tons, with a speed of 1 5 knots and a 
 mixed armament of four 8-in., eight 6-in., and two 5-in., 
 besides smaller guns. The 8-in. guns are mounted two 
 on a side in sponsons. I think a lighter and more 
 homogenous armament would have been better, but the 
 'Chicago' is undeniably a very powerful vessel. The 
 * Atlanta ' and ' Boston ' are similar in design, but 
 smaller, while the ' Dolphin ' is a despatch vessel of 
 1500 tons. All have been completed, and proved 
 successful, a matter highly creditable to all concerned. 
 The country was now willing, and even eager, to 
 show what could be done in the New World with ship 
 construction. Five more cruisers, the ' Newark,' * San 
 Francisco,' 'Charlestown,' * Baltimore,' and 'Philadelphia,' 
 were commenced in 1887, of approximately the same 
 size as the ' Chicago,' but with a considerably higher 
 speed. All have a protective deck, with sloping sides, 
 on which the armour is 4 in. thick, while on the 
 horizontal portion it is 2h in. The armament of three 
 of these ships consists of twelve 6-in. guns, but two, 
 the ' Charlestown ' and ' Philadelphia,' have a pair of 
 8-in. and only six 6-in. guns. Their full speed varies 
 from 18 to 20 knots. The 'Baltimore' steamed from 
 Copenhagen to Lisbon in just over five days, averag- 
 ing 17 knots, an excellent performance. 
 
 A fleet of cruisers only cannot, however, safeguard 
 
Foreign Navies — United States, etc. 277 
 
 all the interests of a great nationality. More powerful 
 vessels may at any moment be necessary, and the 
 United States is now wisely constructing battle ships. 
 The first begun is the ' Texas/ the design of which 
 originated in this country. With an imposed limitation 
 of 6000 tons great power of offence and defence cannot 
 be provided, but the accepted design embodies a partial 
 belt, 12 in. thick; two turrets, placed diagonally in a 
 central citadel, each containing a single 12-in. gun ; and 
 an auxiliary armament of six 6-in. guns. The armour 
 on the turrets is 12 in. thick, and the ends of the vessel 
 are protected with a 3-in. steel deck. The 'Texas' is 
 to have a speed of 16 knots. This design does not 
 commend itself to me. Too much is aimed at. The 
 freeboard forward should be higher and lighter guns 
 mounted. In our service the preference is given to 
 turrets on the centre line. The position 01 ccJiclon does 
 not give the advantages it was at first thought to have. 
 
 A somewhat larger vessel, also under construction, 
 the ' Maine,' has likewise two turrets, one on the bow 
 and the other on the quarter, each containing a pair of 
 lo-in. guns. She has an auxiliary armament of six 
 6-in. guns, and also carries a partial belt of armour 
 1 1 in. thick. The ' Maine ' is termed an armoured 
 cruiser, and the design included sail p(>wer, but it is 
 doubtful whether this will be eventually provided. 
 
 Towards the close of 1889 it was decided to con- 
 struct three larger vessels, termed coast line battle ships. 
 Presumably the name was given to calm any suspicion 
 that the countr}- was about to embark on an active 
 
278 Foreign Navies — United States, etc. 
 
 foreign policy, but it is quite obvious that a vessel 
 which can only operate in sight of land has but a 
 limited use. These vessels, the ' Indiana,' ' Massachu- 
 setts,' and * Oregon ' will, however, be quite capable of 
 proceeding to any part of the world should the honour 
 of the country demand this service. They are to have 
 a displacement of 10,300 tons, and will be 350 ft. long 
 and 69 ft. broad. Of this length 190 ft. of tJie water 
 line will be protected by an armour belt having a 
 maximum thickness of 18 in. There will be a turret 
 at each end containing a pair of 13-in. guns, four 
 smaller turrets in addition will each carry two 8-in. 
 guns, and there will also be four 6-in. guns, besides 
 machine guns. It is difficult to state any great ad- 
 vantage attached to such an armament. On the other 
 hand, the complication of having so many different 
 kinds of ammunition may prove most inconvenient, 
 besides demanding great space for its stowage. Sim- 
 plicity in ordnance as regards the number of sizes for 
 naval purposes is urgently needed in these days. It 
 may be essential to supplement the few heavy guns 
 which a modern battle ship can carry with a number of 
 lighter pieces, but there is no necessity for an inter- 
 mediate grade. I even venture to suggest that about 
 four different calibres would answer all requirements, 
 and naval officers would welcome such a limitation. 
 But to return to the American ships. In all other 
 respects the design seems excellent, and in keeping 
 within 10,500 tons the temptation to build monster 
 vessels has been avoided. The view of the naval de- 
 
Fore ion Navies — United States, etc. 279 
 
 partmcnt at Washington is that ' the lack of important 
 naval battles in recent years stands in marked contrast 
 to the desperate efforts of European powers to equip 
 extraordinary vessels designed to combine the invulner- 
 able and the irresistible. A war of moderate duration 
 between first-class naval powders would prove that a 
 balance of advantages, unsuspected by many, rests with 
 that vessel which has comparative simplicity, even 
 though it be concomitant with a greater exposure of 
 life, a low^er speed, and reduced powers of offence.' 
 This seems to me admirably put, but I think the 
 argument for simplicity applies also to the armament. 
 
 Two of these battle ships are to be built by Messrs 
 Cramp, of Philadelphia, and the third at the Union Iron 
 Works, San Francisco. At both yards cruisers have 
 been completed in which the workmanship has proved 
 to be excellent. 
 
 In addition to the cruisers already mentioned, some 
 others have been, or shortly will be, commenced. 
 The most powerful is the ' Ncw^ York,' a vessel of about 
 8000 tons, combining external and internal armour. 
 The former consists of a 5 -in. belt opposite the 
 machinery, while the interior of the ship has a pro- 
 tective deck running the whole length, with sloping sides, 
 which portion will be 6 in. thick, while the remainder 
 will be 3 in. There will be a barbette forward and aft, 
 also on each broadside. Two 8-in. guns will be mounted 
 in the bow and stern barbettes, and a single gun of 
 the same calibre in the broadside barbettes. There 
 will also be an auxiliar}- armament of twelve 4-in. 
 
280 Foreigrn Navies — United States, etc. 
 
 ',*) 
 
 quick-firing guns. Her sea speed is to be 20 knots, 
 and she will carry sufficient coal to steam 13,000 miles 
 at 10 knots. Though terming this vessel an armoured 
 cruiser, she may be equally considered a second-class 
 battle ship capable of engaging with many ironclads of 
 foreign powers or vessels of similar design, such as the 
 ' Warspite ' in our own and the 'Admiral Nachimoff' 
 in the Russian navy. 
 
 Perhaps it is the fact that in America there are 
 few large merchant steamers of great speed — such as 
 we possess in the ' Teutonic ' and others capable of 
 being converted into commerce protectors — which has 
 led that country to design a warship, at present known 
 as 'No. 12,' of equal speed and greater offensive power 
 than any merchant vessel, to specially act against the 
 commerce of a hostile state. Her principal character- 
 istics are to be: great length, 410 ft., which is 35 ft. 
 more than the ' Blake ' and ' Blenheim ; ' a speed of 22 
 knots; great coal capacity, 1500 tons; and a protec- 
 tive deck with 4 in. armour on slopes and 2\ in. on the 
 horizontal portion. Her armament will be composed of 
 one 8-in., two 6-in., and twelve 4-in. guns, in addition to 
 a number of small rapid fire guns. The design appears 
 to me well conceived for the object in view, especially 
 as regards the armament, and restricting the heaviest 
 gun to a calibre of 8 in. Her success or failure will 
 depend on whether the expectations as to speed are 
 realised. A special point in connection with the 
 machinery is that she is to have three screws. It is 
 considered that with such a displacement, 7500 tons, 
 
Forcio^n Navies — United Statrs, etc. 281 
 
 the extra propeller will give additional power, though in 
 a small vessel this is not found to be the case. For 
 the slower speeds, the centre screw alone working should 
 prove sufficient, while those on each side would be 
 disconnected and freely revolve with the progress of the 
 vessel. Time can alone show whether this assumption 
 is correct. 
 
 As regards torpedo boats, up to a very recent date 
 none existed in America ; but one has now been com- 
 pleted, 138 ft. long, which attained a speed of 23 knots, 
 and others no doubt will follow.^ 
 
 It is curious that up to the present no American 
 war vessel has carried a locomotive torpedo. The 
 Whitehead was not adopted when taken up by other 
 nations, and efforts have for some time been directed to 
 obtain a torpedo of native origin. Several have been 
 put forward, but the most promising is one invented by 
 Captain Howell of the American navy. It is similar 
 in shape to the Whitehead, but instead of being driven 
 by compressed air the Howell torpedo is propelled by 
 two screws actuated by the rapid rotation of a heavy 
 steel flywheel. This is fixed inside the torpedo, and 
 spun to a great velocity, before the torpedo is launched, 
 by an independent motor on board the ship, worked b}' 
 steam or electricity. The axes of the wheel aie con- 
 nected to the screw shafts, by which power is trans- 
 mitted to the propellers. This fl}- wheel also acts as a 
 
 ^ Fur the jjarlicuhus uf all this modern construclion I .niu much indchlcd 
 to the excellent paper on the subject read by Mr Miles at the meetiiiL; of 
 the Society of Naval Architects in the sprint; of 189 1. 
 
282 Foreign Navies — United States, etc. 
 
 gyroscope, in keeping the torpedo on a straight course, 
 so that any deviation and consequent inclination of the 
 torpedo is at once corrected by the gyroscopic pull in 
 the opposite direction. Hence the torpedo travels in the 
 line of projection, and is not deflected by the passing 
 water when launched from the deck of a vessel pro- 
 ceeding at any rate of speed. This is the most valu- 
 able quality of the torpedo, as it obviates the necessity 
 of calculating deflection due to different speeds of ship, 
 which with the Whitehead torpedo have to be carefully 
 verified and collated. On the other hand, the latter has 
 a considerably higher speed, which, moreover, is uniform 
 throughout the run, the engines being governed to work 
 at a set pressure from first to last. But in the Howell 
 the flywheel, having when spun up the enormous 
 velocity of 9000 revolutions a minute, has throughout 
 the run a continually decreasing velocity, diminishing 
 the speed of the torpedo until it stops altogether. It is 
 easy to understand that a subaqueous missile which 
 reaches a vessel with sluggish movement has no chance 
 of penetrating a net, and is more liable to be diverted 
 from the object. If this defect can be remedied, and 
 the speed increased, there is a simplicity about the 
 Howell torpedo which to me is very attractive. The 
 absence of an air chamber much reduces the length, 
 which is important on board ship, and in proportion to 
 the amount of explosive the total weight of the torpedo 
 is considerably less than the Whitehead. The present 
 efficiency of the latter has been the work of some years, 
 and I understand it is at last to be adopted in America ; 
 
ForcigjL N^avics — United States, etc. 283 
 
 but should the Howell exhibit decided improvement 
 it may eventually take the other's place. 
 
 Compressed air is a convenient force, and for pro- 
 pelling a projectile has the great advantage of not vary- 
 ing in its action. Two charges of gunpowder of equal 
 weight may, from variation in manufacture, or a slight 
 difference in moisture, or climatic influence, throw two 
 projectiles in succession from the same gun to widely 
 distant spots. The atmosphere when compressed is not 
 subject to such influences or variations, and has a less 
 violent action than gunpowder. These characteristics 
 have led to its employment to propel large charges of 
 high explosive from a long tube, more commonly known 
 as the dynamite gun. This originated in America, where 
 a successful application of the principle has led to the 
 construction of a small vessel called the 'Vesuvius' with 
 three of these guns, from which 500 lbs. of dynamite or 
 gun cotton can be thrown to the distance of a mile with 
 great accuracy. The velocity being low, considerable 
 elevation has to be given, as in mortar fire, and hence 
 against a moving object a successful shot is most uncer- 
 tain. But against an object whose position does not 
 alter, when the range is ascertained, great destruction 
 could be accomplished with such projectiles. 
 
 In the armament of their new licet llu^ Tnited States 
 has been able to commence at a periotl when the experi- 
 ence of other nations in breech-loading rilled guns can be 
 utilised. J)Ut [)lant and machinery for construction had 
 to be i)rovided as well as the hcav\- steel forgings from 
 whi(.h the modern jjun is made. Under the cnerc:etic 
 
284 Foreign Navies — U^iited States, etc, 
 
 initiative of a most able Bureau of Ordnance all this has 
 sprung up, and guns are now constructed equal in power 
 to any produced in Europe. For seagoing purposes it 
 is not intended to exceed 50 tons in weight. They have 
 already a lo-inch gun, under 30 tons weight, which throws 
 a 500-lb. projectile with a velocity of 2000 feet per second. 
 Taking all things into consideration, I do not think that 
 a more cumbrous weapon, in fewer numbers, is any 
 advantage afloat. 
 
 It is evident that before the century closes the 
 United States will probably possess a fleet recalling the 
 old days when her wooden walls were to be seen in 
 every sea, easy of recognition by their lofty spars, and 
 noted for the smartness of their exercises. 
 
 A review of foreign navies would be incomplete 
 without a word on those which have sprung up in South 
 America. Chili, Peru, and the Argentine Republic, as 
 well as Brazil, have each come to European shipyards 
 for this portion of their armed strength. In the 
 'Esmeralda' Chili purchased one of the swiftest and 
 most powerful cruisers of moderate dimensions. She 
 was designed by Mr White and built at Elswick. The 
 war with Peru added the 'Huascar' to her fleet. A 
 brief account of this incident will be interesting as the 
 only conflict between ironclads since Lissa. 
 
 The ' Huascar,' already described in the account of 
 her action with the ' Shah,' had been doing considerable 
 damage on the Chilian coast, so that it was determined 
 to put a stop to her depredations. Chili therefore 
 
Foreign Navies — Un ited States, etc. 285 
 
 despatched the * Almirante Cochrane ' and ' l^lanco 
 Encalada' in pursuit. These were small ironclads, of 
 3500 tons, then armed with muzzle-loading rifled guns, 
 in a central battery protected by 8 in. of iron, while the 
 armour belt was 9 in. thick. As the * Huascar ' had 
 only 5-in. armour, and was 1400 tons smaller, she would 
 have been overmatched by either of her opponents. 
 Early one day in October 1879 the two Chilian vessels 
 sighted the * Huascar,' and giving chase, the ' Cochrane,' 
 about 9.30 A.M. arrived within 3000 yards of the enemy, 
 her consort being some 3 or 4 miles astern. The 
 < Huascar' was the first to open fire, but without result. 
 The ships continued to close, as the ' Cochrane ' was 
 slightly the faster of the two, and at 1 500 yards poured 
 in a hot fire upon the ' Huascar.' Several shell pene- 
 trated the thin armour of the Peruvian vessel. One 
 burst inside the conning tower and killed the captain. 
 Another exploded inside the turret and did considerable 
 execution, while others disabled the steering gear and 
 apparatus for working the turret. The ' Huascar's ' 
 return fire had little effect. One of her shots struck the 
 'Cochrane's' armour and glanced off, another entered 
 the ship, but did little damage. 
 
 In less than three-quarters of an hour it was evident 
 the 'Huascar' could not avoid capture. She had 
 fought pluckily, but escape was impossible, because she 
 had not the speed, and the ' Encalada ' liad now come 
 up. The latter at once joined the fray, tried to ram 
 the ' Huascar,' but failed, and nearly collided with her 
 consort. A shell which about this time passed through 
 
286 Foreign Ahivies — United States, cte. 
 
 the 'Cochrane's ' battery, killing two men, is believed to 
 have been fired from the ' Encalada.' Soon after the 
 ' Huascar's ' turret was again penetrated, and nearly all 
 those inside were killed. Her flag was hauled down 
 after a fight of an hour and a half, in which she had 
 about seventy men killed and wounded out of 220. 
 
 Her own fire had been very inaccurate. Out of 
 about forty shots fired from her guns only two or three 
 struck the enemy. This shows the danger of limiting 
 the armament to so few guns, especially when gunners 
 are unskilful. In the attack of one ship by a pair the 
 rapid motion which steam gives renders it difficult to 
 keep clear of each other's ram and projectiles when at 
 close quarters. 
 
 It is noteworthy that the machincr}- of the * Iluascar ' 
 was not materially damaged and that few shots struck 
 in the vicinity of the water line. There was no danger 
 of the ship sinking when she surrendered. This was 
 brought about mainly by the disabling of her armament 
 and loss of men. A fact to be remembered when we 
 accumulate armour to protect the vitals and lay bare 
 other portions of the ship. 
 
 Thus Chili added a useful little vessel to her naval 
 force, but the late civil war has deprived her of the 
 ' Blanco Encalada,' under circumstances lately familiar 
 to us. Two more cruisers, built in France, the ' Errazuriz ' 
 and ' Pinto,' are on their way out. They are of about 
 2500 tons, high speed, and moderate armament. 
 
 Peru, since her crushing defeat by Chili, has been 
 
Foreio]i Ahivics — United States, ete. 287 
 
 practically without any navy, and seems unable to find 
 funds to recreate one. 
 
 The Argentine Republic may take some ])ride in 
 possessing one of the fastest cruisers in the world. 
 This vessel, designed by Mr Watts, Chief Constructor 
 at Elswick, and built by that firm, was sold to the 
 Argentine Government, and is now known by the 
 somewhat inconvenient name of '25 de Mayo.' On her 
 trial she attained a speed of over 22 knots an hour. 
 Whether in the hands of her present possessors she 
 will ever again accomplish such a result may well be 
 doubted. 
 
 Brazil has two ironclads of moderate size — late 
 acquisitions — in the ' Riachuelo,' and ' Aquidaban,' but 
 no cruisers over 17 knots speed. 
 
 From this review it may be gathered that the 
 number of states which aspire to own a war navy has 
 very largely increased. In Europe, Belgium alone of 
 states which have a sea coast is without ships of war. 
 Even Roumania boasts a cruiser. New navies are 
 springing up also in the far East. At present, how- 
 ever, the old balance of power on the sea seems 
 undisturbed. 
 
INDEX 
 
 A. 
 
 'Abyssinia,' The, 123. 
 
 ' Achilles,' The, 56. 
 
 Acre, bombardment of, 15-22. 
 
 ' Active,' The. a frigate fitted with paddles 
 worked by the capstan, 13 
 
 ' Active,' The, a steam cruiser, 150. 
 
 ' Admiral Baudiii,' The, of the French Navy, 
 253-4- 
 
 'Admiral ' class, The, 105, 108, 259. 
 
 ' Admiral Duperre,' The, of the French Navy, 
 253- 
 
 ' Admiral NachimoflT,' The, of the Russian 
 Navy. 258, 280. 
 
 ' Agamemnon,' The, first two-decker, designed 
 for the screw, 24, 33. 
 
 'Agamemnon.' The. turret ship, 141. 
 
 ' Agincourt,' The, 56, 221. 
 
 ' Ajax,' The, turret ship, 141. 
 
 ' Alabama,' The. action between ' Kear:5age ' 
 and, 67-70 ; career of, 160- 1. 
 
 'Alacrity,' The, 161. 
 
 'Albemarle,' The, a Confederate ship, 194. 
 
 'Albion,' The, 24, 33. 
 
 Alexander, Fort, at Sebastopol, 32. 
 
 'Alexander II.,' The, of the Russian Navy, 
 258. 
 
 ' Alexandra,' The, 63-4, 67, 89 ; at bombard- 
 ment of Alexandria, 91. 
 
 Alexandria, bombardment of, 90-92. 
 
 Algiers, capture of. 15. 
 
 ' Almirante Cochrane,' The, of the navy of 
 Chili, captures the ' Huascar,' 285-6. 
 
 ' Almirante Condell,' The, torpedo vessel, be- 
 longing to Chili, contest with the ' Encalaila,' 
 208-9. 
 
 ' -Mmirante Lynch,' The, torpedo vessel, be- 
 longing to Chili, sinks the ' Kncalada, 208-9. 
 
 'Amethyst,' The, action between ' Huascar' 
 
 and, 151-2. 
 ' Amphitrite,' The, of the United Slates Navy, 
 27-- 
 
 ' Andrea Doria,' The. of the Italian Navy, 264. 
 
 ' Aquidaban,' The, of tlie I'razilian Navy, 287. 
 
 Arabat, bombardment of, 36. 
 
 Archer,' The, 162. 
 
 ' Arethusa,' The, 222-3. 
 
 Argentine Republic, The, ship of, 287. 
 
 Armaments, 2, 6, 25, 256, 283. 
 
 Armstrong, .Sir William, hydraulic power ap- 
 plied to rotating turrets, 87 ; builds the 
 ' Victoria,' 143 ; Armstrong breech-loader 
 guns, 172-4, 177 ; hj-draulic machinery for 
 guns, 179; 6-in. breech-loader, 184; quick- 
 firing gun, 191; guns of the 'Duilio' and 
 ' Dancolo' made by, 260; ' Piemonte' built by, 
 264 ; ' Leopard ' and ' Panther built by, 268 ; 
 ' Esmeralda ' built by, 284 ; ' 25 de Mayo ' 
 built by, 287. 
 
 ' Atlanta,' The. of the United States Navy. 274. 
 
 'Audacious,' The. 145, 226. 
 
 Austria, navy of, 267-8. 
 
 Azof, Sea of, expedition to, 35. 36. 
 
 ' Badk.v,' The, of the German Navj-, 265. 
 Pialaclava, operations at, 29, 30. 
 Baltic Squadron, The, in the Crimean War, 
 ^ II, 37-41- 
 Baltimore,' The, of the United States Navy. 
 
 274. 
 ' Banshee,' The, 216. 
 Barbette system, The, 102-110. 
 ' Barfleur,' The, 145-6. 
 ' P.arham,' The, 162, 239-40. 
 Barnaby, Sir Nathaniel, Chief Constructor .->f 
 
 the Navy, the 'Inflexible' designed by, 
 
 85, 198. 
 ' Batoum,' The, Russian torpedo boat, 259. 
 Piatteries, 16, 34, 38, 40-1. 
 ' Bayern,' The, of the Cerman Navy, 265. 
 ' Bellerophon.' The, at the bombardment of 
 
 Acre, 18. 
 ' Bellenjphon,' The, of 1S63, 62. 
 ' Bcllona,' The, 162, 239-40. 
 ' I'cnbow,' The, at the bombardment of Aero, 
 
 18, 20-1, 
 ' Benbow,' The, of the ' Admiralty ' class, 106-7, 
 
 144. 
 Berdiansk, nper.ntions at, 36. 
 ' Birkcnlicad.' The, 43. 
 
 'i' 
 
290 
 
 Index. 
 
 ' Black Prince,' The, 56, 221-2. 
 
 ' Blake,' The, 157-8, 224, 241-3, 259, 280. 
 
 Blakeley's, Captain, rifled gun, 175. 
 
 ' Blanco Encalada,' The, sunk by a torpedo, 
 207-10; capture of the ' Huascar' by the 
 ' Almirante Cochrane ' and, 285-6. 
 
 ' Blenheim,' The, 157-8, 241-3. 259, 280. 
 
 Blockade, effect of introduction of steam and 
 torpedoes on, 203. 
 
 Bomarsund, bombardment of, 39, 249. 
 
 ' Boston,' The, of the United States Navy, 274. 
 
 Bow chaser, 159. 
 
 Brazil, ironclads belonging to, 287. 
 
 Brotherhood, Mr, three-cylinder air engine, 
 197. 
 
 Brown, Sir John, rolled plates, 136-7; com- 
 pound armour, 138. 
 
 Burgoyne, Captain, 36 ; lost in the ' Captain," 
 80. 
 
 'Caledonia, The, 60. 
 
 ' Cambridge,' The, formerly the ' Edinburgh,' 
 
 lO. 
 
 Cammell's, Messrs, compound armour, 133. 
 
 ' Captain,' '1 he, 80-1, 227-9. 
 
 Carronades, 7. 
 
 Cartridges, paper, 9. 
 
 'Carysfort,' The, 18. 
 Castor," The, 18. 
 
 'Catherine 11.,' The, of the Russian Navy, 
 258. 
 
 Cavalli's, Major, breech-loading rifled gun, 
 171-2. 
 
 • Cecille," The, of the French Navy, 255-6. 
 
 Cellular sub-division of the double bottom of 
 ships, 88. 
 
 'Centurion,' The, 145-7. 
 
 ' Cerberus," Tlif, 123. 
 
 'Charles ^iartcl,' The, of the French Navy, 254. 
 
 ' Charlestown," The, of the United States 
 Navy, 374. 
 
 Charnock, upon French and English ships, 3. 
 
 ' Chicago," The, of the United States Navy, 
 274. 
 
 Chili, The navy of, 284-6. 
 
 Coal, power of, to stop projectiles, and danger 
 of, 140-1 ; question of supplying steamers 
 with, 163; national bill for, 222. 224; "coal 
 endurance" of ships, 238; amount used for 
 auxiliary engines, 243. 
 
 Coast defence vessels, 115-27; coast defence 
 ironclad only found to a vtrj- limited extent 
 in our navy, 120 ; Popofl'kas or circular iron- 
 clads of the Russian Navj'. 125-7. 
 
 Cockburn. Sir George, First Naval Lord of the 
 Admiralty, 23. 
 
 Coles, Captain Cowper, in the expedition to 
 the Sea of Azof. 36 ; invention of 'cupola ' 
 or turret ships, 71-2 ; " Royal Sovereign ' and 
 Prince Albert ' constructed for home service, 
 from his designs, 79 ; designs the ' Captain.' 
 and is lost in her, 80 ; ' Scorpion " and 
 ' Wyvern designed on the ideas of, 124, 143, 
 272. 
 
 ' CoUingwood," The, 106, no. 
 
 'Colossus,' The, 141-2. 
 
 Commerell, in the expedition to the Sea of 
 
 Azof, 36. 
 ' Congress,' The, engagement with the ' Merri- 
 
 mac ' in the American Civil War, 75-6. 
 Congreve, Sir William, rockets introduced 
 
 by, 26. 
 'Conqueror,' The, 130, 143-4. 
 ' Constance,' The, 222-3, 225 
 Constantine, Fort, in the harbour of Sebas- 
 
 topol, 32. 34. 
 Cordite, 189, 192. 
 Corvettes, 152-4. 
 
 'Courbet,' The, of the French Navj', 250. 
 Crimean War, The, manning of the fleet for, 
 
 II ; the ' J'crrible" in the, 15 ; bombardment 
 
 of batteries in, 16; Transport Department 
 
 during, 27 ; operations in the Black Sea, 
 
 28-36 ; in the Baltic, 36-42 ; floating batteries 
 
 in, 46-48. 
 Cronstadi, attack on abandoned, 38-9, 46-7. 
 ' Crown Prince Rudolph," The, of the Austrian 
 
 Navy, 268. 
 'Cumberland,' The, sunk by the 'Merrimac' 
 
 in the American Civil War, 75, 133, 271. 
 Cupolas, or turrets, Captain Coles' scheme 
 
 for. 72. 
 'Cyclops,' The, 123. 
 
 D. 
 
 ' Dandolo,' The, of the Italian Navy, 260. 264. 
 
 Deck, steel protective, invented by Rear- 
 Admiral Robert Scott, 234 ; in the French 
 Navy, 256 ; not adopted in the Russian 
 Navy, 259 ; in the German Navy, 267. 
 
 ' Dee," The, 14. 
 
 ' Defence," The, 56. 
 
 ' Deutschland.' The, of the German Navy, 265. 
 
 ' Devastation," The, 82-3, 178. 
 
 ' Devastation,' The, of the French Navy, 250-1. 
 
 ' Dictator," The, of the United States Navy, 
 272. 
 
 ' Dimitri-Donskoi," The, of the Russian Navy 
 258. 
 
 Distilling apparatus, or evaporators, 244. 
 
 ' Dolphin," The, of the United States Navj-, 
 274. 
 
 Double bottom, for iron ships, 87-8. 
 
 Douglas, Sir Howard, on the expense of 
 shells, 8. 
 
 ' Dreadnought," The, 84, 137, 142, 235. 
 
 ' Duilio," The, of the Italian Navy, 260, 264. 
 
 ' Duke of Wellington," The, 218, 240. 
 
 Dundas, Admiral Deans, in command of the 
 Mediterranean Squadron in the Crimean 
 War, 28 ; reluctant to join in the attack on 
 Sebastopol, 31-2 ; returns home, 35. 
 
 Dundas, Rear-Admiral the Hon. R., sent to 
 the Baltic in the place of Sir Charles Napier, 
 40-1. 
 
 Dunsany, Lord, on mastless ships, 52. 
 
Indx 
 
 ex. 
 
 291 
 
 Dupuy de Lome, M., at the head of the French 
 naval constructive department, produces the 
 first seagoing ironclad ' La Gloire,' 49. 
 
 ' Dupuy de LGme,' The, of the French Navy, 
 256. . 
 
 Dynamite gun. The, originated in America, 
 283. 
 
 ' Edinburgh,' The, a turret ship, 141-2. 
 
 ' Edinburgh,' The, in the bombardment of 
 Acre, 18-21. 
 
 ' Edinburgh,' The, now known as the ' Cam- 
 bridge,' 10. 
 
 Electric search light, The, 205-6. 
 
 Elmore's, Mr, process, 192, note. 
 
 ' Emerald,' The, 24. 
 
 ' Empress of India,' The, 109. 
 
 Engines, side-lever, 212 ; direct acting, 213 ; 
 tubular boilers and oscillating cylinders, 
 213-14; compound, 223, 225, 229; vertical. 
 235 ; auxiliary, 243. 
 
 ' Erebus,' The, an ironclad, 46. 
 
 ' Erebus,' The, Sir John Franklin's ship, 23 
 
 Ericsson's revolving turrets, 71 ; builds the 
 ' Monitor,' 76-7 ; his screw propeller, 77 ; 
 ' Scorpion ' and ' Wyvern ' designed on the 
 ideas of, 124, 218 ; ten monitors on plans of, 
 ordered for Russia. 257 ; larger type of 
 monitor as seagoing ship designed by, 272. 
 
 ' Esmeralda,' The, of the Chilian Navy, 284. 
 
 ' Exxellent,' The, 9. 
 
 Exmouth, Lord, reduces Algiers, 15-16. 
 
 Experiments for testing behaviour 01 iron under 
 shot, 43-4. 
 
 ' Ferdinand IVLvx,' The, Austrian ironclad en- 
 gaged in the battle of Lissa, 95 ; Admiral 
 Tegethoff leads the attack in her, 98 ; sinks 
 the ' Re d'ltalia,' 100, 134. 
 
 Floating batteries proposed by the Emperor 
 Napoleon, 46 ; constructed for the Crimean 
 War and employed in the Black Sea, 
 46-8 ; Popoffkas, 125-7. 
 
 ' Forbin,' The, of the French Navy, 256. 
 
 Forced draught, 236, 230. 
 
 ' l''ormidable,' The, of the French Navy, 253-4. 
 
 ' I'orth,' The, 159. 
 
 France, Colbert's RLiritime Inscription, 11 ; 
 navy of, 248-257. 
 
 ' Francesco Morosini,' The, of the Italian 
 Navy, 264. 
 
 I''ranklin's, Sir John, expedition to the Arctic, 
 
 23- 
 
 1' rigates, 2; Jackass, 6; steam, 14; early, 
 148-9; high spiied, 149-50; relative strength of 
 line-of-battlc ship and, 150-52; name passed 
 away, 154. 
 
 ' Galatea,' The, 14. 
 
 Gardner quick-firing gun, The, 190. 
 
 Gatling gun. The, 190. 
 
 German Empire, navy of the, 265-7 \ four "ew 
 ironclads ordered, 266. 
 
 ' Glatton,' The, 120-3, 254. 
 
 ' Gloire, La,' of the French Navy, first sea- 
 going ironclad, 49, 50, 52, 55 ; her plates, 
 136, 221. 
 
 'Gorgon,' The, coast defence ironclad, 123. 
 
 'Gorgon,' The, paddle steamer employed in 
 the bombardment of Acre, 18. 
 
 Graham, Sir James, the ' Excellent ' established 
 for training seamen in gunnery, improved 
 , by, 9. 
 
 Greece, navy of, 269. 
 
 Guns, 32-pounders used in 1838, 42-pounders 
 discarded, 68-pounder introduced in 1840, 7 
 170; 29-ton, 145; rifled, 170, etc.; breech- 
 loaders, 171, 174 ; Woolwich system muzzle- 
 loading, 176 ; Captain Scott's iron gun carri- 
 ages, 177 ; 35-ton, 38-ton, 178-9; 8o"-ton, 180; 
 bursting of a 38-ton in the 'Thunderer,' 183 ; 
 6-in. breech-loader, 184; steel barrel with 
 hoops, the interrupted screw, 185; m-ton, 
 188 ; objections to monster, 188 ; quick-firing, 
 190 ; 4.7-in. calibre and 6-in. quick-firing, 191. 
 
 H.\le's, Mr, improved rocket, 26. 
 
 Hamley, Sir Edward, on Sir Edmund Lyons 
 
 in the Crimean War, 30. note. 
 Hastings, Captain Sir Thomas, placed over 
 
 the ' Excellent,' 9. 
 ' Hazard,' The, 18. 
 ' Hecate,' The, 123. 
 ' Hector,' The, 56. 
 ' Hercules,' The, 62-3, 177, 265, 268. 
 ' Hero,' The, 130, 144. 
 Hewett, in the expedition to the Sea of Azof, 36. 
 
 Hood,' The, 143. 
 Hornby, Sir Geoffrey, on size of ships, 113. 
 Hotclikiss', Mr, machine gun of large calibre, 
 
 190; single-barrel quick-firing gun, 191. 
 ' Hotspur,' The, 120, 130. 
 ' Howe,' The, a screw ihree-decker, 24. 
 ' Howe,' The, of the 'Admiral' class, 106. 
 Howell torprdo. The, 281-2. 
 ' Huascar,' The, tmret ship belonging to Peru, 
 
 sinks the 'Esmeralda' with her ram, 133-4; 
 
 engaged by the Hritish ships '.Shah' and 
 
 ' .\niethyst,' 150-2, 207; captured by Chili, 
 
 284-6. 
 ' Hydra,' The, 123. 
 Hydraulic machinery for guns inxented by the 
 
 Elswick firm, 179-80, 18S. 
 
 Ignition l)y dec tri( ity, 186-7. 
 ' Iinpericuse,' I'lic, 154-8, 259. 
 
292 
 
 Index. 
 
 ' Inconstant,' The, 150, 227-9. 
 
 ' Indiana,' The, of the United States Navy, 
 
 278. 
 ' Indomptable,' The, of the French, Navy, 254. 
 'Inflexible,' The, 85-9, 105, 136-8, 141-3, 180-1, 
 
 260. 
 ' Inflexible,' The, first steamship of the navy to 
 
 circumnavigate the world, 1846-9, 215-16. 
 ' Invincible,' The, 145. 
 ' Irene,' The, of the German Navy, 267. 
 ' Iris,' The, 153, 229-34. 
 ' Iron Duke,' The, 133, 145. 
 Iron, the use of, for construction of ships, 
 
 43, etc. 
 ' Italia,' The, of the Italian Navy,[263. 
 Italy, navy of, 260-5. 
 
 J. 
 
 ' Jaur6guiberry,' The, of the French Na\y, 
 
 254- 
 ' Jenimapes,' The, of the French Navy, 255. 
 
 K. 
 
 'Kaiser,' The, ironclad of the German Navy, 
 
 265. 
 'Kaiser,' The, wooden screw line-of-battle 
 
 ship in the Austrian Navy, 95 ; engaged at 
 
 Lissa, 99-101, 134. 
 'Kearsage,' The, United States sloop, sinks 
 
 the 'Alabama,' 67-70. 
 Kertch,; F'ort of, on the Sea of Azof, captured 
 
 in the Crimean War, 35-6. 
 Kinburn in the Black Sea, bombardment of, 
 
 47-8. 
 Kinglake, on the capture of Kertch, 35, 42. 
 ' Konig^Wilhelm,'rThe, of the German Navy, 
 
 265. 
 
 Laird, Messrs, the 'Birkenhead' built by, 
 1845, 43 ; the ' Captain ' built by, 80 ; ' Scor- 
 pion ' and 'Wyvern,' for the Confederate 
 States, built by, 124 ; two torpedo vessels, for 
 Chili, built by, 208 ; ' Rattlesnake ' built by, 
 238. 
 
 Lancaster's, l\Ir, gun, 171. 
 
 ■ Lazare Carnot,' The, of the French. Navy, 
 254- 
 
 ' Leopard,' The, of the Austrian Navy, 268. 
 
 ' Lepanto,' The, of the Italian Navj-, 263. 
 
 ' Lightning,' The, 201, 233, 236 
 
 Line-of-battle ships, 2. 
 
 Lissa, battle of, 93-102, 129, 134, 140, 207, 260. 
 
 Locks, flint and percussion, 9. 
 
 ' Lord Clyde,' The, 60. 
 
 * Lord Warden,' The, 60, 222. 
 
 Lyons, Captain E. RL, son of Sir Edmund, in 
 the expedition to the Sea of Azof, 36. 
 
 Lyons, Sir Edmund, second in command of the 
 Mediterranean Squadron at the beginning of 
 the Crimean War, 28 ; at the bombardment 
 of Fort Constantine, 33 ; in chief command 
 of the Black Sea fleet, expedition to the 
 Sea of Azof, 35, 36; Sir E. Hamley on, 30, 
 note. 
 
 M. 
 
 ' Magdala,' The, 123. 
 
 ' Maine,' The, of the United States Navy, 
 
 277- 
 Malmesbury, Lord, on the manning of our 
 
 ships for the Crimean War, 11. 
 Mangin's, Colonel, spherical reflecting mirror, 
 
 205. 
 Manning of ships, The, 10-12. 
 * Marathon,' The, 159. 
 Maritime alliance, in, there must be one head, 
 
 34- . 
 Maritime Inscription, established by Colbert, 
 
 ' Massachusetts,' The, of the United States 
 Navy, 278. 
 
 Maxim gun, Tlie, 190. 
 
 ' Mayo, 25 de,' The, of the Argentine Re- 
 public's navy, 287. 
 
 ' Medea,' The, paddle-wheel vessel, 14. 
 
 ' Medea,' The, third-class cruiser, 159. 
 
 Medium-sized ships, reasons for, 113. 
 
 ' Medusa,' The, 159. 
 
 Mehemet .Ali, operations against, 17. 
 
 ' Melpomene,' The, 159. 
 
 Melville, Lord, established the 'Excellent' for 
 training seamen in gunnery, 9. 
 
 Merchant vessel and a warship, comparison 
 between, 241. 
 
 ' Mercury,' The, 153, 229-34. 
 
 ' Merrimac, The, of the Southern States, ac- 
 tion with the ' Cumberland ' and ' Con- 
 gress,' 75-6; with the 'Monitor,' 78, 103, 
 133, 271. 
 
 'Mersey,' Ihe, cruiser of 4000 tons, 159. 
 
 ' Mersey,' The, wooden frigate launched in 
 1858, 25, 50, 273. 
 
 ' Miantonomoh,' The, of the United States 
 Navy, 272. 
 
 Milne, Sir .\lexander, on the percussion 
 lock, 9. 
 
 ' Minotaur,' The, 56, 59, 63, 228. 
 
 M'Killop, in the expedition to the Sea of Azof, 
 36. 
 
 Models, ships built from foreign, 3. 
 
 ' Monadnock,' The, of the United States Navy, 
 272. 
 
 ' Monarch,' The, 80-1, 83, 85. 
 
 ' Monitor,' The, designed by Ericsson for the 
 Northern States, 71, 76-7 ; action with the 
 ' Merrimac,' 77-79, 103, 272. 
 
 Monk, Mr, designer of ordnance, 7. 
 
 Mortars, 8. 
 
 Mullens, an Irishman who drew plans for the 
 Spanish Government, 4. 
 
Index. 
 
 293 
 
 N. 
 
 Napier, Sir Charles, 10 ; on steam in the navy, 
 13 ; fits the 'Galatea' with paddles actuated 
 by winches inboard, 14 ; second in command 
 at the bombardment of Acre, 18-20 ; in com- 
 mand in the Baltic during the Crimean War, 
 37-40; on fleets 7'. fortifications, 117. 
 
 Napoleon I. on the English fleet, 1-2. 
 
 Napoleon III. proposes floating batteries, 46. 
 
 Naval architecture, few changes in during first 
 half of the centurj', 2 ; School of, 3 ; time for 
 a new system, 49. 
 
 Naval brigade at the siege of Sebastopol, 31. 
 
 Naval estimates for 1832 and 1834, 2. 
 
 Nelson, Lord, 5. 
 
 ' Nelson,' The, 16 
 
 ' Nelson,' The, armoured cruiser, 154, 158, 235. 
 
 ' Newark,' The, of the United Stales Navy, 
 274. 
 
 ' New York,' The, of the United States Navy, 
 279. 
 
 ' Niagara,' The, of the United States Navy, 24. 
 
 ' Nicholas I.,' The, of the Russian Navy, 258. 
 
 ' Nile,' The, 142. 
 
 ' No. 12,' of the United States Navy, 280. 
 
 ' No. 80,' torpedo boat, of the British Na\'y', 
 237-8. 
 
 Nordenfelt's, Mr, machine gun, 190. 
 
 ' Northampton,' The, 154, 235. 
 
 Northcote, Sir Stafford, on the Crimean War, 
 27. 
 
 ' Northumberland,' The, 56. 
 
 ' Novgorod,' The, Russian circular ironclad, 
 125. 
 
 'Obturator,' 186. 
 
 ' Ocean,' The, 60. 
 
 'Octavia,' The, 222-3. 
 
 Ordnance, smooth bore universally employed 
 
 before 1840, 6, 166; rifled gun, 170, etc 
 ' Oregon,' The, of the United States Navy, 
 
 278. 
 'Orlando,' The, 25, 50, 273. 
 Osborn, Sherard, in the expedition to the Sea 
 
 of Azof, 36. 
 Oscillating cylinders, 213-14. 
 
 1'. 
 
 Paddi.k- wiiKKi, Steamer, 12, 13, 14, 214, 
 
 216-17, 223. 
 I'aixhans', Colonel, horizontal shell fire in place 
 
 of shot, proposes to armour ships, 1825, 45-6. 
 ' I'alestro,' The, Italian ironclad, 95; blown 
 
 up in the battle of Lissa, loo-i, 140-1. 
 ' Pallas,' The, 223-5. 
 I'alliser's, Captain, gun, 175-6; device for 
 
 hardening the front portion of shot. 
 Palmerston, Lord, on fortifications ?'. fleets, 
 
 117, 119. 
 
 ' Pamyat Azova,' The, of the Uussian Navy 
 
 259- 
 
 ' Panther,' The, of the Austrian Navy, 268. 
 
 ' Pelayo,' The, of the Spanish Navy, 268. 
 
 Pellew, Sir Edward, afterwards Lord Ex- 
 mouth, on fleets as defence against invasion, 
 
 Persano, Admiral, Italian commander in the 
 
 battle of Lissa, 94 ; false strategy-, 96 ; attack 
 
 on San Giorgio, 96-7 ; the action, 98-101. 
 ' Philadelphia,' The, of the United States Navy, 
 
 274. 
 'Phoenix,' The, 14, 18. 
 ' Piemonte,' The, of the Italian Navy, 264. 
 ' Pique,' The, 4-5, 18. 
 Plates, wrought-iron, 136; steel, 137, 139; 
 
 compound, 138-g. 
 ' Polyphemus,' The, 131-2, 235. 
 PopotT, Admiral, of the Russian Navy, designs 
 
 circular ironclads, 125 ; the 'Admiral Popoff",' 
 
 126. 
 Powder, 182 ; pebble, 183 ; cocoa, 189 ; cordite, 
 
 189, 192. 
 ' Powerful,' The, 10, 18, 20. 
 ' Prince Albert,' The, 79. 
 ' Prince Consort,' The, 60. 
 ' Princess Charlotte,' The, 18. 
 ' Princess Stephanie,' The, of the Austrian 
 
 Navy, 268. 
 Prizes, French, always 'took the lead,' 3. 
 Projectiles, spherical, always employed before 
 
 1840, 6, 166; cylindrical, 171. 
 'Puritan,' The, of the United States Navy, 272. 
 
 Q. 
 
 QuADRUPi.F expansion, engines, 238. 
 ' Queen,' The, 5-6, 24, 33. 
 Quoins, 169. 
 
 K. 
 
 Raglan, Lord, 29 ; Sir Kdnuind Lyon's influ- 
 ence over, 30, note. 
 
 Ram, use of the, 128-135. 
 
 ' Ramillies,' The, 109. 
 
 ' Rattler,' The, 218, 224. 
 
 ' Rattlesnake,' The, 206-7, 238. 
 
 Razees, two - deckers cut down to 50 - gun 
 frigates, 6. 
 
 'Re dltalia,' The, Italian ironclad in the 
 battle of Lissa, 95, 99; sunk by the ' Fer- 
 dinantl Max,' loo-i, 134. 
 
 ' Redoubtable,' The, of the French Nav^•, 250. 
 
 Reed, Sir E., Chief Constructor of the Navy, 
 61-2. 
 
 Rendel, Mr G., hydraulic power for rotating 
 turrets devised by, 87. 
 
 ' Repulse," The, 109. 
 
 ' Rc(^uin,' The, of the Frrnch Navy, 254. 
 
 ' Resistance," The, 56. 
 
 ' Resolution," The, 109. 
 
 ' Re Umberto," 'Ihc, of the Italian Navy, 63. 
 
 ' Revenge,' The, 109. 
 
294 
 
 Index. 
 
 ' Revenge,' The, in the bombardment of Acre, 
 
 1 8, 20. 
 ' Rhadamanthus,' The, 14. 
 ' Riachuelo,' The, of the nav>' of Brazil, 287. 
 Robinson, Sir Spencer, Controller of the Navy, 
 
 60. 
 Rockets, 25-6. 
 Rous, Captain the Hon. H., of the 'Pique,' 
 
 4-5- 
 ' Royal Alfred,' The, 60. 
 ' Royal Arthur.' The, 158. 
 ' Royal Oak,' The, 109. 
 ' Royal Oak,' The, wooden ship cut down and 
 
 armoured, 60. 
 ' Royal Sovereign,' The, barbette ship, 109, 143. 
 ' Royal Sovereign,' The, wooden ship cut down 
 
 and armoured, 79. 
 ' Ruggiero di Launa,' The, of the Italian Navy, 
 
 264. 
 ' Rupert,' The, 130, 143. 
 ' Rurik,' The, of the Russian Navy, 259. 
 Russell .Scott, Mr, naval architect, co-designer 
 
 of the 'Warrior,' 50, 222. 
 Russia, nav>' of, ■z<^-]-iyo. 
 
 S. 
 
 '.Sachsf.n,' The, of the German Navy, 265. 
 
 ' Salamander,' The, 14. 
 
 Sanuida, Messrs, build the ' Prince Albert,' 79. 
 
 'Sane,' The, of the French Navy, 255. 
 
 'San Francisco,' The, of the United States 
 Navy, 274. 
 
 San Giorgio, port of Lissa, 96 ; attack upon 
 by the Italian fleet, 97, loo-i. 
 
 ' San Josef,' The, Spanish ship taken by Lord 
 Nelson, 4. 
 
 'San Nicolas,' The, Spanish ship taken by 
 Nelson, 4. 
 
 ' Sanspareil,' The, 143-4, 243. 
 
 'Sardegna,' The, of the Italian Navy, 264. 
 
 Schneider's, Mr, steel plates, 137. 
 
 Schultz, Colonel, Polish officer, defends Acre, 
 17, 22. 
 
 'Scorpion,' The, 124. 
 
 Scott's, Captain, iron gun carriages, 177. 
 
 Scott's, Rear-Admiral Robert, steel protective 
 deck, 234. 
 
 Scouts, value of, 164. 
 
 Screw propeller, 12 ; .Sir W. Symonds on, 23 ; 
 question of inventor of, 217 ; first employed 
 in the British navy, 218 ; vibration of caused 
 substitution of iron for wood, 220 ; paddle- 
 wheel entirely superseded by, 223 ; twin, 226 ; 
 three, 264, 280. 
 
 Sebastopol, bombardment of, 16, 29-34 ; Mr 
 Lancaster's guns, employment in siege of, 
 171. 
 
 'Seignelay,' The, of the French Navy, 255. 
 
 Semmes, Captain, of the 'Alabama,' action 
 with the ' Kearsage,' 67-70, 160. 
 
 Seppings, Sir Robert, Surveyor of the Navy, 
 
 introduces round sterns, 2. 
 ' Serpent,' The, 162. 
 ' Severn,' The, 159. 
 
 'Shah,' The, 150; action with the ' Huascar, 
 151-2. 
 
 ' Shannon, The, 154, 235. 
 
 .Shells, 8; common and shrapnel, 182. 
 
 .Shot, double, 7 ; red-hot, 25, 170. 
 
 ' Sicilia,' The, of the Italian Navy, 264. 
 
 ' Sidon,' The, 15. 
 
 'Simoom,' The, 43. 221. 
 
 Sinope, effect of shell on wooden ships, 8, 25. 
 
 'Sinope,' The, of the Russian Navy, 258* 
 
 •Sloops, steam, 14. 
 
 Smith, .Sir Sydney, defence of Acre, 17. 
 
 Spain, fleet of, 268. 
 
 Steam propulsion, 211-47. 
 
 .Sterns, square and round, 2 ; elliptical, 6. 
 
 .Stewart, Captain, in the bombardment of Acre, 
 21. 
 
 Stopford, Admiral the Hon. .Sir Robert, com- 
 mander-in-chief at the bombardment of Acre, 
 18-22. 
 
 Stores, ships', 5. 
 
 ' Stromboli,' The, 18. 
 
 Submarine boats, 203-4. 
 
 Suez Canal, 64. 
 
 'Surcouf,' The, of the French Navy, 256. 
 
 'Surprise,' The, 161. 
 
 Sveaborg, 38-9 ; bombardment of, 40-1. 
 
 'Swiftsure,' The, 145, 226. 
 
 .Symonds, Sir William, Surveyor of the Nav^-, 
 3 ; improvements, 4 ; designs for the ' Van- 
 guard,' 5; the 'Queen,' 6; dislike for 
 steamers, 22. 
 
 T. 
 
 ' Tage,' The, of the French Navy, 255. 
 'Talbot,' The, i8. 
 
 ' Tchesmc, The, of the Russian Navy, 258. 
 Tegethofl", Admiral, Austrian commander in 
 
 the battle of Lissa, 95-102. 
 ' Tegethofl",' The, of the Austrian Navy, 268. 
 'Temeraire,' The, 104. 
 
 ' Terrible,' The, commissioned in 1846, 214. 
 'Terrible,' The, of the French Navy, 254. 
 'Terrible,' The, steam frigate in the Crimean 
 
 War, 15. 
 'Terror,' The, floating battery, 46. 
 'Terror,' The, of the United States Navy, 272. 
 ' Terror,' The, Sir John Franklin's ship, 23. 
 ' Texas,' The, of the United States Navy, 277. 
 'Thames,' The, 159. 
 Thames Iron Works, The, the ' Warrior ' built 
 
 at, 55, 222. 
 Thornycroft, Messrs, 'Lightning' torpedo bjat 
 
 built by, 200-1, 236. 
 'Thunderbolt,' The, 46. 
 'Thunderer,' The, 18. 
 Torpedo boats, 200-10 ; French, 256 ; Russian, 
 
 259 ; Italian, 265 ; German, 267 ; Austrian, 
 
 268 ; American, 281 ; catchers, 264. 
 Torpedoes, 193-210; Howell, 281. 
 ' Trafalgar,' 'I'he, 142. 
 
 Transport department in the Crimean War, 27. 
 'Trehouart,' The, of the French Navy, 255 
 
Index. 
 
 295 
 
 ' Trenton,' The, of the United .States Navy, 273. 
 
 Triple expansion, 236-38. 
 
 'Tripoli,' The, of the Italian Na\y, 264. 
 
 'Triumph,' The, 145, 226. 
 
 Tubular boilers, 213. 224. 
 
 Turkey, na\'y of, 269. 
 
 U. 
 
 United States, navy of, 270-84. 
 
 'Valiant,' The, 56. 
 
 ' Valmy,' The, of the French Navy, 255. 
 
 ' Vanguard,' The, ironclaJ sunk by the ' Iron 
 
 Duke,' 133, 145. 
 ' Vanguard,' The, launched in 1833, 5. 
 ' Vernon,' 'The, 4, 24. 
 ' Vesuvius,' The, i8. 
 ' Vesuvius,' The, American ship with three 
 
 dynamite guns, 283. 
 Vickers', Messrs, steel plates, 139. 
 ' Victoria,' The, ironclad, 143-4. 
 'Victoria,' The, last three-decker, 24, 220. 
 ' Vladimir-Monomakh,' The, of the Russian 
 
 Navy, 258. 
 'Volage,' The, 150. 
 
 W. 
 
 Wahrendorff's, Baron, breech-loading rifle 
 
 gun, 171-2. 
 'Warrior,' The, 50-6, 63, 67, 88, no, 128-9, 
 
 136-7, 150, 221-2, 224. 
 ' Warspite,' The, 154, 157, 209, 259, 280. 
 'Wasp,' The, 18. 
 Watts, Isaac, Chief Constructor of the Navy, 
 
 co-designer of the 'Warrior,' 50; and ' Black 
 
 Prince,' 222. 
 White, Mr, Chief Constructor of the Navy, 
 
 eight first-class battleships, in, 113. 
 Whitehead torpedo. The, 195-200, 281-2. 
 Whitworth's, Mr, rifled gun, 172, 175. 
 Wire netting round a ship to stop torpedoes, 
 
 204. 
 Woolwich system, The, muzzle-loading guns, 
 
 176. 
 Wrangel, Baron, Russian general in command 
 
 at Kertch, 35. 
 ' Wurttemberg,' The, of the German Navy, 265. 
 'Wyvern,' The, 124. 
 
 Yarrow, Mr, torpedo boat builder, boats for 
 Russia, 200-1 ; ' No. 80' for the British navj-, 
 237 ; the ' Batoum ' for Russia, 259-60. 
 
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