UC-NRLF

B 3 IIM flc^5

THE DEVELOPMENT
OF NAVIES

CAPTAIN S. EARDLEY WILMOT, RN.

THE LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA

The Development of Navies

0.2

THE DEVELOPiMENT
OF NAVIES

DURING rHE last: HALF-CENrURT

CAPTAIN S. EARDLEY-WILMOT, R.N,

]Vit/L jnmiy Illustyatioiis

LONDON

SEELEY AND CO., LIMIT!,!)

ESSEX STRKKT, STRAND

1S92.

GIFT

EZ7

HER MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY

QUEEN VICTORIA

IN WHOSE REIGN

THE CHANGES HEREIN DESCRIBED

HAVE TAKEN PLACE

THIS BOOK

IS, BY PERMISSION,

DEDICATED

207

PREFACE

It has been said that nations, Hke incHvicluals, have
their times for self-examination, when they pause,
survey their positions, glance back upon the past,
study the lessons of experience, and gird them-
selves up for the future.

The present year, memorable for the opening
of an Exhibition devoted to a display of objects
connected with the Naval Service, and signalised
by the launch of t\v(j noble warships b\- Her
Majesty on the same da}', seems a fitting period
when we may review the changes which halt
a century has produced in the llecHs ot the
world, and strive to draw some lesson for future
guidance.

In tracing the development of modern ships

viil Preface.

of war, and their equipment, it was natural to
me to describe mainly what has been done in
this country ; but the progress abroad is also
dealt with, as showing the great advance made
by other nations. The principal operations in
which squadrons and single ships have engaged
during this period are briefly described, to de-
monstrate certain phases of naval warfare con-
nected with modern armaments.

It was difficult to compress such a vast
subject into a single volume of moderate dimen-
sions, and I am conscious of many defects in
the accomplishment of the task, for which in-
dulgence is pleaded. No effort has been made
to give minute technical details, but rather to
place before the reader a general review of the
whole subject.

I have received cordial assistance from many
quarters. For the chapter on steam propulsion I
am indebted to Mr R. C. Oldknow, late Fleet
Engineer, Royal Navy, whose ability to deal with
the subject will be fully recognised. In this

Preface. ix

portion Messrs Maiidslay, Sons & Field afforded
valuable information, with drawings of past and
present marine engines.

To Lord Brassey my thanks are due for
permitting me to reproduce some of the illustra-
tions in Volume I. of his British Navy. Sir
William Armstrong, Mitchell & Co. placed at
my disposal several interesting pictures connected
with the vessels and armament constructed at
Elswick.

I desire also to thank the Proprietors of the
Engineer for allowing me to utilise matter which
has appeared in the pages of that journal.

Messrs Thornycroft, Yarrow, J. & G. Tliom-
son, and Mr Mackrow of the Thames Iron Works
and Shipbuilding Company, have most liberally
aided my efforts.

Many of the illustrations are from photographs
taken by Mr West of Southsea, whose skill in
marine photography is well known.

In dealing with th(t navy prior to the general
adoption of steam pr()[nilsion, I have received

X Preface.

valuable assistance from distinguished officers
who were serving at that period, and to whom
my best thanks are now tendered.

S. EARDLEY-WILMOT.

2 J Cranley Gardens, S.W.
October 1891.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE NAVY IN 1840

Reduction in Naval Estimates after 18^2 — Change in Construction of Ships by Sir W.
Symonds — The 'Vernon,' 'Pique,' and 'Vanguard' — Ordnance afloat at that
Period — Defective System of manning Ships — Steamers then in the Navy— Bom-
bardment of Acre — Advantages of Numerous Guns and Rapidity of Fire
attacking Fortifications, ........ i

CHAPTER II

CREATION OF A STEAM FLEET

Changes in Ship Construction after 1840 — Reluctance to recognise Advantages of Screw
Propulsion — Gradual Conversion of Sailing Fleet to Steam — Armament practically
remains unaltered — The Crimean War — Operations in Black Sea and Baltic- --Xssist-
ance rendered by the Navy — Expedition to Sea of Azof, . .23

C H A P 7' E R III

B.ROADSIDE IRONCLADS

Prejudice against Iron in Shipbuilding— First Ironclads built in France and England —
Increase in si.-:e of Ships— .-Vdvance in Ordnance— Commencement of Struggle
between Guns and Armour— Action betwreii ' AlaKima' .tihI ' Kearsage,' >-howing
advantages of .\rmour, ........ 4.5

xii Contents.

CHAPTER IV

EARLY TURRET SHIPS

Introduction of the ' Monitor '—Claims of Ericsson and Captain Cowper Coles—' Merri-
mac' and 'Monitor' in America— ' Royal Sovereign' converted in England —
Further development of the Turret System — ' Devastation ' to ' Inflexible,' . 71

CHAPTER V

BARBETTE SYSTEM COMBINED WITH BROADSIDE

Battle of Lissa — Lessons to be derived from this Action — Introduction of the Barbette
System of Mounting Guns — First applied in the ' Temeraire ' — The ' Admiral '
Class — Increase in dimensions of Battle Ships to 14,000 tons — New Vessels, ' Royal
Sovereign,' 'Empress of India,' ' Ramillies,' 'Repulse,' 'Resolution,' and 'Royal
Oak' — Disadvantages of Monster Ships, . . . . .93

CHAPTER VI

COAST DEFENCE THE RAM

Coast Defence Vessels— Such Constructions of Modern Growth— Erroneous Ideas of
Defence — The ' Glatton ' and other Coast Service Vessels — Russian Circular
Ironclads — Development of the Ram as a Weapon — The ' Rupert ' and ' Poly-
phemus ' — Disadvantages of a Vessel for ramming only — Examples of difficulty in
ramming, . . . . .115

CHAPTER VII

ARMOUR— LATER TURRET SHIPS

Early Iron Plates — Increased Thickness— Competition of Guns and Armour — Steel and
Compound Plates supersede Iron — Deck and Coal Protection — Progress of Turret
Ships 'Nile,' 'Trafalgar' and 'Hood,' 'Victoria' and 'Sanspareil' — Second-
Class Battle Ships — Early Types — Latest Development — 'Centurion' and
' Barfleur,' . . . . . . . . 136

CHAPTER VIII

CRUISERS

Frigates in Old Time — Speed an Essential — Early Steam Cruisers — ' Inconstant ' and
others — Action between ' Shah' and ' Huascar' — Armoured Cruisers — ' Imperieuse'

and ' Warspite' — Development of Internally Protected Vessels — ' Blake' and
' Blenheim'— 'Royal Arthur' Class— Smaller Types— Scouting Duties— Necessity
for High Speed, ......... 148

CHAPTER IX

ORDNANCE

Old Smooth Bore Guns and their Manipulation — Mr Lancaster's System — Introduction
of Rifled Guns — Early Inventors — Breech-Loaders introduced and discarded —
Woolwich Muzzle-Loaders — Growth of Ordnance to 80-ton Guns — Breech-Loaders
again introduced — Increase of Length and Power — Advance to iio-ton Guns —
Ammunition — Quick-Firing Guns, ..... . 166

CHAPTER X

'1' O R P E D O W A R F A R E

Early Application of the Torpedo in America — The Fish Torpedo — Development by Mr
Whitehead — Introduction of Torpedo Boats, and their Progress — Submarine Boats
— Protection against Torpedoes — Nets — Electric Search Lights — Torpedo Boat
Destroyers — Sinking of ' Blanco Encalada,' . . . . .193

CHAPTER XI

STEAM PROPULSION

Steam Navy in 1840 — Machinery at that Date — Paddle-Wheel Frigates and Sloops —
Horse Power, Nominal and Indicated — Voyage of 'Inflexible' — 'Banshee' —
Introduction of the Screw Propeller — ' Fairy' — ' Duke of Wellington' — ' Victoria '
— Substitution of Iron for Wood — 'Warrior' and 'Black Prince' — 'Octavia,'
'Arethusa,' and 'Constance' — Progress made up to 1865— Compound Engines —
'Pallas'— Increase of Boiler Pressure— Twin Screws—' Inconstant '—Loss of the
'Captain' — 'Iris' and 'Mercury' — Steel Protective Deck.s — 'Polyphemus' —
Forced Draught — 'Lightning' — Yarrow's Boats — 'Rattlesnake' — Triple Expan-
sion — 'Barham' and 'Bellona' — Decrease in Weight of Machinery — Difl'erence
between Men-of-War and Merchant Ships — 'Blake' and 'Blenheim' — Large
Number of Auxiliary Engines — Supply of Fresh Water — Evaporators — The
'Varj'an' — (irowth of Steam in the Navy — Personnel — Probable Approach of
Finality in Marine Engineering, . . . . .211

xiv Contents.

CHA PTER XII

FOREIGN NAVIES — EUROPE

Condition of French Navy in 1840 — Progress after Franco-German War — Broadside and
Barbette Construction — Cruisers — Tlie Russian Fleet — Influence of the ' Monitor'
— New Departure — Black Sea and Baltic Squadrons — Belted Cruisers— Italy —
Creation of a New Fleet after 1870 — Monster Ironclads — Cruisers — Germany —
Late development of Navy — New Battle Ships and Cruisers — Austria, Spain,
Greece, and Turkey, ........ 248

CHAPTER XIII

FOREIGN NAVIES — UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AMERICA

Condition of United States Navy before and after Civil War— Apathy in Naval Matters
— Change of Feeling in 1880 — New Cruisers constructed — Battle Ships decided on
and commenced — Special Fast Cruiser — Torpedoes — The Howell Torpedo —
Dynamite Gun — Development of Navies of South American States — Chili —
Capture of 'Huascar' by ' Blanco Encalada' and ' Almirante Cochrane ' — Peru—
The Argentine Republic — Brazil, ...... 270

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

THE BALTIC FLEET, 1854,
MODEL OF THE 'VANGUARD,'
MODELS OF THE ' VERNON ' AND ' ST JEAN
'LA GLOIRE,' ....

THE 'warrior's' ARMOUR, .
IIIE ' WARRIOR,' ....
THE 'AGINCOURT,'
ARMOUR OF THE ' RELLEROPHON ' AND 'H
THE BATTERIES OF THE 'ALEXANDRA,'
CAPTAIN COWPER COLES' GUN RAFT AND C
ERICSSON'S TURRET,
THE ' ROYAL SOVEREIGN,'
THE 'DEVASTATION,' .
THE ' INFLEXIBLE,'
TURRET OF THE 'INFLEXIBLE,' .
THE 'TEMERAIRE,'
MODEL OF THE ' RA.MILLIES,'
THE 'GLATTON,' ....
THE DECK OF THE ' NOVCIOROD,"
THE 'CONQUEROR,'

THE 'victoria' firinc;,

THE 'VOLAGE' under SAIL,

THE ' I M PER I FUSE,'

THE 'ALACKirv' DESPAICH VESSEL,

NAVAL f;UNNERV IN 184O. .

.\v

D ACRE, .

UPOLA SHIP

PAGE

Froiifispiece
6
24
49
51
53
57
62

65
11
77
79
82

85
86
104
no
121
125
130
144

150

155
162
167

XYl

List of Ilkistrations.

67-TON GUNS, MOUNTED EN BARBETTE,

THE 'RODNEY' STEAMING AND FIRING,

TURRET OF THE 'VICTORIA,' WITH IIO-TON GUNS,

6-IN. QUICK-FIRING GUN,

TORPEDO BOAT, BUILT FOR THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMEN
TORPEDO BOAT, 'ARIETE,' BUILT FOR THE SPANISH GOV

MENT,

SIDE-LEVER ENGINES,

ENGINES OF THE 'BLACK EA(;LK,'

ENGINES OF THE 'IRIS,' ....

ENGINES OF THE ' Bl.AKE,' ....

THE 'ADMIRAL DUPERRE,' ....

GUN WITH SHIELD ON THE ' REDOUTABLE,"

THE 'ITALIA' AND ' LEPANTO,' .

THE ' PIEMONTE,' ITALIAN CRUISER, .

THE 'CHARLESTOWN,' UNITED STATES CRUISER,

THE ' INDIANA,' UNITED STATES COAST LINE BATTLE SH

H',

180
184
188
190
200

204
212
214

242

256
261
264

275

The Development of Navies

CHAPTER I

THE NAVY IN 1840

Jveduction in Naval Estimates after 1832 — Change in Construction of
Ships by Sir W. Symonds — The 'Vernon,' 'Pique,' and 'Van-
guard ' — Ordnance afloat at that Period — Defective System of man-
ning Ships — Steamers then in the Navy — Bombardment of Acre
— Advantages of Numerous Guns and Rapidity of Fire in attacking
Fortifications.

After Trafalgar the British navy was at the zenith of
its fame, for we had estabhshed a complete supremacy
on the ocean, and swept from the sea all hostile fleets.
Every project of Napoleon for distant conquest had been
frustrated by our fleet, and in after years, at St Helena, he
frankly recognised the fact. ' You,' he said to O'Meara,
in one of those many interesting conversations recorded
by the latter, 'are superior in maritime force to all the
\\(M-l(l united, and while you confine )'()urself to that arm
you will al\va)'s be dreaded.' On anc^ther occasion he
remarked : ' Your soldiers arc brave, nobody can deny it ;
but it was bad policy to enc(niragc the militar\' mania
instead (;f sticking to yoiu' marine, which is the real

2 Tilt Xai'x in 1840.

force of \-our country, and one which, while you preserve
it. will always render \ou powerful.' The Peninsular
War and th? bat<-Ir of :Wat:erloo, however, diverted the
mind of the country fioni the navy, and for many years
after tne conclusion of peace, in 1S15, we were content
to rest upon the glories we had achieved, exhausted by
that long continued struggle. Our maritime strength
CTaduallv declined, but it was not until the Reform Bill
of 1832 was passed that the navy suffered materially
from the desire for economy in State expenditure which
then prevailed. At that time the naval estimates for the
effective service were about ^^4,2 50,000. In 1834 this
was reduced to £"3,000,000, and in i S3 5-36 to ;£"2,750,ooo.
Our squadrons maintained abroad gradually dwindled
in numbers, and it seemed as if a perpetual peace was
expected. Not content, however, with reductions in the
number of ships employed, the complements of individual
vessels were reduced to what was termed a peace
establishment, and we even went so far as to send
vessels abroad without some of t±ieir guns. I believe it
is a fact that a line-of-battle ship about this time was
sent as flagship to a station without her lower deck
guns, in order to give more room for the admiral's staff.
During the first half of the century- few changes had
been made in naval architecture or armaments. Fleets
still consisted of sailing line-of-battle ships, frigates, and
smaller vessels. Officers were discussing the value of
square or round sterns, the latter introduced by Sir
Robert Seppings, then Surveyor of the Na\y. The
square stern was const.^uctively weak, and the guns it

The Navy in 1840. 3

carried could not be directed on a certain bearing
termed the point of impunity. This had been observed
in previous actions, when ships lost their masts and were
not under command. The navy was reluctant to give
up the square stern, as it afforded more cabin accom-
modation. But, as one of the most experienced officers
of the day said : ' In peace time the circular stern will
not be popular, but in the event of a change to hostilities
its utility will find innumerable advocates.'

A considerable modification in the form of ships was,
however, made when Captain — afterwards Sir William —
Symonds was appointed Surveyor of the Navy in 1832.
Being a naval officer, there was considerable opposition
to this appointment, w^hich had hitherto been held by
a member of the School of Naval Architecture. This
school had been established in 1806 for the education of
a more skilful class of trained shipwrights. There had
been many complaints in the old wars that our ships
were inferior in design to the French. Charnock
observes that ' when the French captured an English
ship they either put her on a lower rating or threw
her aside. Their foundered or wTCcked ships were
invariabl}' British built. When we were in chase, the
French prizes of the scjuadron took the lead, and cver\'
officer desired to command them.' It was only the
splendid handling of any class by our officers which
overcame the defects of our designs. Moreox-er, captured
vessels became the models from which we built. luen
as late as 1850, out of 150 ships on the Navy List,
upwards of fifty were from foreign models. Nor were

4 The Navy in 1840.

the Spanish types considered unworthy of this honour.
Many of them are said to have been the production of
an Irishman named Mullens, who went over to Spain
and offered his improved plans to that Government
after having failed with the English Admiralty. The
' San Josef and ' San Nicolas/ taken by Nelson in Lord
St Vincent's action, were both handsome vessels.

The principle of Sir William Symonds was to give
greater beam at the water line and sharpness below.
The old school were in favour of less beam. The aver-
age length had hitherto been 1.6 to 3.9 times the
breadth. In Sir William Symonds's ships it ran from
3.1 to 3.3 times. He adopted the same principle for
great and small, so that one would fit inside another
like a series of trays. The ' Vernon ' was the first large
vessel built from his designs. She was a 50-gun frigate,
183 ft. long, with a beam of 53 ft. Hitherto Surveyors of
the Navy had been limited in the proportion of guns to
tonnage, but Captain Symonds refused to have his hands
tied in this respect, and no limitation was enforced on
him. He therefore built the ' Vernon ' of 2080 tons,
a considerable increase over the tonnage of existing
frigates. A great success was the result. The 'Vernon'
sailed remarkably well, and is still up Portsmouth
Harbour, having served for many years as the torpedo
school ship.

The ' Pique,' another frigate of his design, of thirty-
six guns, launched in 1834, was rendered famous in
1835, when, under the command of Captain the Hon.
H, Rous, she came across the Atlantic without a rudder.

The N'ary in i <S4o. 5

She had previously grounded at the mouth of the St
Lawrence, and sustained severe damage, but was got off,
and her captain determined to proceed to England.
Three daj's after starting she lost her rudder. This
was a severe demand even upon the seamanship of those
days, but a jury rudder was rigged up by whi-ch the
ship was steered the rest of the way home. When
Captain Rous afterwards stood for Westminster he was
met at the hustings with the usual cry, ' Who are you ?'
He answered, * Captain Rous of the " Pique," who brought
her across the Atlantic without a rudder.' * Bravo
Rous !' shouted everyone, and 'Bravo Rous' became for
a time the common cry in London.

Owing to the economical principles then in vogue, it
was not until 1835 that the first line-of-battle ship on
the designs of Captain Symonds was launched. This
was the ' Vanguard,' of 2610 tons and eighty guns. Her
dimensions were, length 190 ft, and breadth 57 ft. She
was the broadest ship in the navy. Her principal
characteristics were speed and handiness under canvas,
with great space between decks. A great improvement
effected by Captain Symonds in 1836 was in reducing
the different lists of ships' stores, which had gradually
accumulated to the number of cight\'-sevcn, owing to
there being so many classes of vessels in the na\\'. It
is recorded that when Nelson was off Cadiz he had no
less than seven classes of 74-gun ships c.ich rccjuiring
different spars, so that if one had ])ecn disal)letl the
others could not have supplied her wants.

In 1839 the ' Queen,' a three-decker, and the largest

6 The Navy in 1840.

ship built by Sir William Symonds — he was knighted in
1836 — was launched at Portsmouth. Her dimensions
were, size 3100 tons, length 204 ft., and beam 61 ft.
The armament consisted of a hundred 32-pounders and
ten 68-pounders. Her total cost was i^i 15,000. The
shape of the stern was elliptical, an improvement on
Seppings's round stern. The ' Queen ' was justly con-
sidered a remarkably fine vessel, and formed the model
on which many future designs were based. Up to
1830 the want of precision in our ideas as to the best
types of line-of-battle ships to adopt had been very
apparent. But after that date we discontinued building
small three-deckers, and converted some into two-decked
ships of eighty guns. In the same way small two-deckers
were cut down to 50-gun frigates. These were termed
Razees. A certain lot of vessels were known as Jackass
frisfates, because it was said thev could neither fight nor
run, while a batch of small two-deckers were called the
* forty thieves.' The general outcome of the old wars
had brought home to the minds of all who studied the
question that neither the very great nor the very small
in ship construction was desirable. Num.ber, not size,
was our great requirement, and moderate dimensions
had sufficed to maintain the sea against all comers.
The next great war will probably lead to the same
result in modern naval architecture.

Turning to the armaments of ships of war at that
period, we find little advance since the beginning of the
century. Cast-iron smooth bore ordnance was univers-
ally employed, with spherical projectiles. In 1838 the

The Navy in 1840. 7

heaviest solid shotgun was a 32-pounder, 9 ft. 6 in. long,
and weighing 56 cwt. A 42-poundcr had been used
in tlic old wars, but was now discarded as having no
advantages over the lighter piece. But guns for throw-
ing hollow shot and shell had recently been designed,
though not at first regarded with great favour. The
principle on which guns were constructed in those days
was exceedingly simple. The rule of Mr Monk, who
then designed ordnance, was to have if cwt. of metal in
the gun to each pound in weight of shot. A great advance,
however, was made about 1840 by the introduction of a
gun weighing 95 cwt., which threw a solid shot of sixty-
eight pounds. It was at first intended as a pivot gun for
steamers, but afterwards was almost universally carried
by all ships, and remained for many years our heaviest
piece of ordnance afl^oat. Carronades, short guns of
large calibre, also formed part of a ship's armament.
They were formidable at close range, but no match for
long guns at any distance. Consequently only a certain
number of these guns were carried, because if the wind
failed at a critical moment, before close quarters could
be reached, an enemy with a single long gun might do
great damage, without her adversary having any power
of reply. Instances of this had occurred during the old
wars. Loading guns with double shot was still in force,
but owing to the inaccuracy of this mode of firing it was
only used at very close quarters. As rcgartls penetra-
tion of wooden sides, some curious results were obtained,
at Gavre in France, about the )'ear 1838. A 32-pouncler
with double shot was fired against timber, and it was

8 The Navy in 1 840.

found that the shot nearest the charge penetrated 29 in.,
while the one furthest from the charge penetrated 42 in.
There were three types of mortars then in the sea service,
the 13 in. of 100 cwt. and 81 cwt, and the 10 in. of
52 cwt. They had a range of about 4000 yards, with an
elevation of 45°, and their object was, in a bombardment,
to crush buildings and penetrate magazines. Their
transport by sea was not difficult or costly, and it was
considered that a fleet should be provided with vessels
for this service. The introduction of shells was slow.
The old prejudice in favour of solid shot was not easily
overcome. The latter were said to be more accurate,
and to have greater range and penetration than hollow
shell. Objections were also raised to putting too many
shell guns in ships, on account of the danger of acci-
dental explosions.

Another argument used against the introduction of
these projectiles was their cost. Sir Howard Douglas,
in his work on Naval Gunnery, says : * The expense of
shell equipment is enormous. The cost of every 8-inch
shell in box is lis. 6d. Each one fired costs 17s. 4|d.'
The 17s. 4fd. included the powder, the amount of which
was 10 lbs. What would Sir Howard have said if told
that fifty years later the cost of a single round from
guns mounted in battle ships would range from ^^150 to
i^20o? How insignificant seems the 68-pound shot,
propelled by 16 lbs. of powder, beside the i8oo-lb.
projectile of to-day. But as regards shell, it required
the incident of Sinope a few years later to demonstrate
the terrible effect of shell fire upon wooden ships, and

llic N'avy in i 840. 9

the necessity of a change in naval architecture. In other
matters connected with ordnance we were also very
conservative. Our guns were still fired with flint locks,
which had replaced the priming horn and match in 1780.
The French had already adopted the percussion lock.
In a letter from Commander Milne — now Sir Alexander
Milne — to the Surveyor of the Navy, dated May 5th,
1839, when the former was in command of the 'Snake/
at Bermuda, he says : ' The French Squadron have left
Vera Cruz. We were nearly three months lying together
at that place, and had an opportunity of seeing their
new improvements. The chief one was the invariable
use of detonating locks, acting on the principle of a
hammer falling down on the vent hole, in which a tube
is placed of the same material as ours, the top alone
being of detonating powder. They say they answer
most completely, and never miss fire.' We did not
introduce the hammer and percussion tube until 1842.
Our powder was enclosed in paper cartridges, but in a
few years flannel was substituted, and continued in use
until a comparatively recent period.

In gunnery training, however, our seamen had not
been neglected. The 'h^xccllent' had been established
at l^ortsmouth in 1830, by Lord Melville, for training
seamen in gunnery. This establishment was extended
by Sir James Graham in 1832, and placed under Caj^tain
Sir Thomas Hastings. TIhm'c it has remained until the
present time, turning out an admirable corps of naval
gunners, which may be trul}^ considered the backbone of
the fleet as far as its seamen are concerned. Previously

TO The Navy in 1840.

to this there had been no systematic gunnery in the
navy, and proficiency in this respect much depended on
individual captains. Not long after the ' Excellent ' was
established at Portsmouth, the ' Edinburgh,' a 58-gun
ship, was stationed at Plymouth for the same purpose,
and placed under the * Excellent' It is now better
known as the ' Cambridge,' where equally good work
is carried out, and efficiency is ensured by the healthy
rivalry maintained between the two depots.

At the time under review there is no doubt that the
great defect of our naval system was in the manning
of the ships, and the difficulty of procuring seamen
without great delay. Ships sometimes had to wait
months before the crew was complete. Officers had
to visit all the well-known haunts of seamen, and use
every sort of persuasion to get men to enter their ships.
According to the custom then, men only joined a
ship for a commission, and on paying off — if no other
ship was being brought forward for commission — a
number of men were thus thrown on their own resources.
The result was that hundreds of splendid men were lost
to the navy, many going over to America, or taking up
other avocations. The time required for manning a
ship depended much on the captain's reputation in the
service. Placards in the seaport of fitting out such as
the following were resorted to : — ' Wanted active seamen
for the " Powerful " — Captain Napier. The " Powerful "
is a fine ship, and in the event of a war will be able to
take her own part' ' Wanted seamen for the " Superb."
A superb ship, a superb captain, and a superb crew.'

The Navy in 1 840. 1 1

This difficulty of obtaining men was not experienced to
the same extent when war was anticipated, because the
attraction of prize money was a powerful inducement to
join, and there is always the natural love of adventure
in the British race. Hence on an emergency the radical
defects of our system were not so apparent. In France,
on the other hand, where, since Colbert established the
Maritime Inscription, all seamen are bound to serve in
the navy for a few years, and then pass into the reserve,
there has at times been a difficulty in getting them back
promptly when required. On one occasion, some years
ago, additional ships were ordered to be equipped in
France, which necessitated calling out a portion of the
naval reserves. These consisted chiefly of coast fisher-
men, and a number tried to put to sea in their boats
to evade the order. Some succeeded, and others were
arrested before they could get away. Another example
may be cited. When the Crimean War broke out we
were far from being prepared, yet the manning of the
fleet was comparatively expeditious. Lord Malmesbury
records in his memoirs, on February 9th, 1854 : * Sailors
are coming in very fast. The rapidity with which our
ships are equipped excites the astonishment of the
French.' Again, on March loth, he says: 'The Queen
reviewed the fleet at Spithead. The French fleet is not
ready, neither are their transport for the troops.' The
result was that our sc^uadron was in the l^altic a cc^i-
siderablc time before it was joined by our allies.

When we passed from the old irregular method of
manning the fleet, and adopted the continuous service

12 The Navy in 1840.

system (under which seamen enter for ten }'ears, with
the option of continuing at its expiration for a further
similar period, followed by a pension), coupled with the
entry and training of boys, a complete revolution was
effected in this portion of the naval service. The
delays of manning in peace time disappeared, and all
uncertainty in the matter, when hostilities are appre-
hended, is removed. For a reserve in time of war we
rely on 20,000 merchant seamen, who, though they
have never served on board a man-of-war, are annually
drilled to guns and small arms at various depots round
the coast. How far the comparatively small number
of highly trained seamen we maintain, together with
this somewhat uncertain reserve, would supply the re-
quirements of a protracted maritime war it is difficult
to say. The w^aste, from many causes, would be very
great if the struggle were severe, but seeing the number
of men this country possesses who are, or have been,
connected in some way with the sea, and who would be
of great assistance when acting with trained seamen, I
do not think that in this respect our resources will prove
inadequate.

A review of the composition of navies half a century
ago would be incomplete without a reference to steam
propulsion, because the paddle-wheel steamer was then
in existence, and a certain number of vessels of this
description were in the fleet. Of course, the great step at
this period w^as the introduction of the screw propeller,
but of this it is proposed to treat in a subsequent chapter.

Previous to the year 1830 our Government only

The Navy in 1840. 13

possessed a few small steamers, principally employed
for the purpose of towing ships in and out of harbour,
or for coast service, with an occasional trip to Malta or
Gibraltar. They were all paddle-wheel vessels. There
does not appear to have been at this time any general
idea that the new motive power was about to supersede
the propulsion of war ships by sails. Even the most
advanced and talented of naval officers could not con-
template steam vessels otherwise than as an auxiliary —
more or less important — to the larger fighting vessels of
the past. Thus, writing to the Secretary of the Admi-
ralty, in 1827, Captain Charles Napier says: ' In another
war steam will become to the navy what cavalry is to
the army. It will be the post of honour.' By another
distinguised officer it is compared to the horses which
draw the artillery in the field. The usefulness of steam
was to be found in scouting, in towing the regular
fighting ships into action, and afterwards falling upon
any of the enemy which might be disabled. Calms
would no longer prevent our ships from closing, or light
airs enable a faster sailing ship to escape. Hitherto
there had been no other way of giving progress to a
sailing ship in a calm than by getting the boats out to
tow her, a very slow and tedious operation. But it was
thought at this time that paddle-wheels might be
utilised even though not worked by steam power.
Hence the 'Active,' a 46-gun frigate, was fitted with
paddles worked by the capstan. A speed of from two
to three knots was obtained, but the plan involved so
much labour on the part (jf the crew that it was given

14 The Navy in 1840.

up. When, however, Captain Napier, who was then a
man of great energy and enterprise, commissioned the
' Galatea,' a 42-gun frigate, in 1829, he was allowed to
fit her with paddles actuated by winches inboard.
About two-thirds of the crew were required to work
them efficiently, and a speed of three knots in a calm
could be obtained. It was, of course, hard work for the
men, but as the, captain said, they did not mind it
if they were thus enabled to get into harbour when the
wind failed, instead of remaining outside waiting for a
breeze. But as we advanced in the application of steam
power all such rude mechanical appliances were given
up, and in 1830 it was determined to add steam paddle-
wheel vessels to the fleet. Five — the * Dec,' ' Phoenix,'
* Salamander,' ' Rhadamanthus,' and * Medea' — were then
laid down. Taking the ' Medea ' as a specimen, her
dimensions were : —

Exlienic length, ...... 206 ft.

Breadth, outside paddles, ..... 155 ,,

,, inside, „ 46 ,,

Burthen, 830 tons.

Horse power, ....... 220.

Coal carried, ....... 300 tons.

Speed according to draught, . . . . 8 to 10 knots.

They had three masts, and carried sails. With the
paddles disconnected, and allowed to revolve freely, they
sailed fairly well. They were called steam sloops, and
had a few guns on the upper deck for hollow shot and
shell. Later on the 68 -pounder was employed as a
pivot gun at their extremities. A larger class were
called steam frigates, and had guns on the main deck.

The Navy in 1 840. 1 5

They varied in size from 1200 to 1800 tons. The
amount of coal carried in proportion to their size was
large, owing to the great consumption with those early
engines. Thus the ' Sidon,' one of these frigates, could
stow 600 tons of coal. The general armament for this
class consisted of fourteen 32-pounders on the main
deck and four 68-pounders on the upper deck. One
of this type, the 'Terrible,' of 1830 tons, was considered
a very fine vessel, and performed efficient service in the
Black Sea during the Crimean War. Paddle - wheel
steamers were, moreover, represented in our navy until
quite recent years. All the Royal yachts are even
now paddle-wheel, as this application of steam power
allows of such excellent accommodation and comfort.
Another advantage is that it enables a comparatively
large vessel to be constructed on a light draught of
water.

This review of fleets half a century ago may fitly
conclude with a brief notice of an operation carried out
by a British naval squadron composed of sailing ships
supplemented by paddle steamers. This was the bom-
bardment of Acre in the year 1840. Steam played an
unimportant part in the action, and the incident is
chiefly valuable as showing the power of the old ships
and their armaments when opposed to forts which could
be attacked from the sea.

Such an attack must be considered hazardous or
the reverse, according to the circumstances of the case.
When to Lord Kxmouth was entrusted the service of
reducing the stronghold of Algiers, in the year 1816,

1 6 The Navy in 1840.

people in England were surprised at the smallness of
the force with which he entered upon the task. But his
plans were based upon certain information by which he
was convinced that the batteries could be destroyed by
a squadron of moderate dimensions. The result entirely
justified his views, and he gained the greater credit in
consequence. In considering the attack of fortifications
by the vessels then employed, and the success which
attended such operations at Algiers and Acre, the
number of guns carried by line-of-battlc ships and the
rapidity of their fire are important points. As regards
the first point, take the armament of one of the largest
ships of that day, the 'Nelson.' She carried 120 guns,
sixty on each side. Of course, in attacking forts a ship
of this type could usually only engage one broadside,
but this consisted of sixty guns, and the weight of metal
thrown by them was 2750 lbs. When we add to this
the rapidity of fire which then prevailed, say a round a
minute, which was usually exceeded, an idea can be
formed of the overwhelming cannonade to which a
dozen line-of-battle ships could subject fortifications
mounting probably far fewer guns. The height of the
land defences from the sea, also, was material in affecting
the result. Batteries placed nearly on a level with the
water are far more subject to the fire of ships, and much
less formidable to them, than batteries elevated some-
what above the surface of the sea. A practical illustra-
tion of this was given in the Crimean War, when our
ships attacked the forts on the north side of Sebastopol.
To this I shall refer again later on. Let us now see

The Navy in 1 840. 17

how some of these remarks on the attack of fortresses
are borne out in the bombardment of Acre.

On July 15th, 1840, a convention was concluded
between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia and
Turkey, whereby the four powers agreed to support the
Ottoman Empire against Mehemet Ali, the Pacha of
Egypt. In the previous year a strong squadron, sent
by the Sultan to act against the Egyptian forces, had
deserted to the enemy without striking a blow. This
squadron was now in Alexandria, watched by a detach-
ment of our Mediterranean fleet, while the remainder,
in conjunction with a Turkish and Austrian Squadron,
were operating against Northern Syria, then in the
possession of Mehemet Ali. The operations proving
successful, the attack on Acre was decided on. The
fortifications of this town were considered most formid-
able, and had been kept in good order since the time
when Acre, under Sir Sidney Smith, had resisted the
efforts of Napoleon. Mehemet Ali appears to have con-
siderably strengthened the defences on the land side,
but not to have done much to the fortifications on the
sea front. Nevertheless, the walls were of considerable
height and solidity, mounting about 200 smooth bore
guns of different dimensions. The garrison consisted
of about 5000 men, who had been well trained by the
commander of the place. This was a Poh'sli officer,
Colonel Schultz, who had taken service with the
Egyptians, and by his exertions had brought the troops
under his command into a high state of efficicnc}-.

The feasibility of attacking Acre h.ul Ijccn discussed

I 8 The Navy in 1 840.

soiiie time previously, and two of our frigates, the ' Pique/
Captain Boxer, and the ' Talbot,' Captain Codrington,
had been employed in surveying the water approaches.
This work was admirably carried out ; the positions of
the shoals were ascertained, and buoys placed to mark
their positions. No impediment was offered by the
garrison to this proceeding, and apparently the officer
in command treated such preparations with contempt.
But it was not so in reality, for he had the distances to
the buoys carefully measured, and detailed the guns so
that the vicinity of each buoy was commanded by a
portion of the defence. Fortunately the ships, as it
happened, did not take up the prearranged positions,
and the casualties on our side were much reduced in
consequence. The force about to attack Acre consisted
of seven line-of-battle ships, the ' Princess Charlotte,'
'Powerful,' 'Bcllerophon,' 'Revenge,' 'Thunderer,' 'Edin-
burgh,' and 'Benbow'; four frigates, the 'Castor,' 'Pique,'
' Carysfort,' and ' Talbot ' ; two sloops, the ' Wasp ' and
' Hazard ' ; and four paddle steamers, the ' Gorgon,'
' Stromboli,' ' Phoenix,' and ' Vesuvius.' Admiral the
Hon. Sir Robert Stopford was Commander-in-Chief,
and flew his flag in the ' Princess Charlotte,' and
Commodore Charles Napier, in the ' Powerful,' was
second in command. There were also three Austrian
ships and the Turkish flagship co-operating in the
attack. Admiral Stopford was an officer of long and
meritorious service. He had entered the navy in 1780,
and as captain of the ' Aquilon ' participated in Lord
Howe's action on the ist of June 1794. In 1804, when

The Navy in 1840. 19

in command of the ' Spencer,' he accompanied Lord
Nelson in his chase of the French and Spanish fleet to
the West Indies, but did not take part in the battle of
Trafalgar, having been detached a few days previously
to proceed with a squadron under Rear-Admiral Louis
to Gibraltar for provisions. He had also been engaged
in numerous other actions, and his record was such as
to leave no doubt that any operation undertaken by him
would be well performed. Commodore Napier also had
seen much service in all parts of the world, and gained
considerable reputation for his exploits when in com-
mand of the Portuguese fleet some few years previously.
He had lately been employed in Northern Syria, in
land operations against the forces of Mehemet Ali, and
displayed special aptitude for such irregular warfare.
His energy was remarkable, but confidence in his own
powers tended to make him impatient of control, and
hence the position of second in command was not
altogether congenial to him. This characteristic led
to a misunderstanding as regards the method of attack-
ing Acre, which not only produced unpleasantness
between the two chiefs, but also nearly brought about
a failure in the intended attack.

The squadron anchored on November 2d, barely
out of range of the guns of the fortress, and the plan
of attack for the next day was then discussed. Acre
stands on an acute angle of the coast, jutting out into
the sea. It therefore presented two faces, one run-
ning nearly north and south, and facing west, while the
other side ran nearly east and west, facing south. Both

20 The Navy in 1840.

sides were well defended, though the batteries on the
western face were more powerful, but i^w of the guns
were much above the level of the sea. On each side
shoals prevented large ships from coming close in.
It was decided to divide the squadron into two detach-
ments, the ' Edinburgh,' ' Benbow,' the small ships and
foreign vessels were to attack the south side, and the
remainder would engage the west face. The steamers
were to lay off and use their shell fire to best advantage.
At one time it was proposed that they should tow the
other vessels to their positions, but there not being
enough steam vessels to do this simultaneously, the
plan was abandoned. The decision come to was that
the vessels should take up their positions under sail,
the ' Powerful ' to lead, until opposite the further or
southern end of the west face, followed by the others,
then all to anchor together in their assigned places,
according to which each portion of that side would
have a ship opposite to it.

The next morning, therefore, when a fair but light
breeze sprang up, the ships weighed and sailed down
to Acre. Napier, however, anchored before arriving
at the extremity of the west face. He for some reason
misunderstood the plan, and apparently expected the
other ships to pass ahead of him. The result was that
a portion of the west face was not covered by an
opposing force. Fortunately the ' Revenge ' had not
anchored, and she was directed by the admiral to fill
the gap ahead of the ' Powerful' This she did. The
force to act against the southern side was some-

The Navy in 1840. 21

what put out by these movements, but Captain
Stewart, in the ' Benbow,' asked permission to pro-
ceed to his station, and went on, followed by the
* Edinburgh.' As the ' Benbow ' approached, Captain
Stewart found deeper water than he expected, and was
thus enabled to pass inside the buoys and get nearer
the town. The ' Edinburgh ' did the same. Up to this
time no sign of life had come from the fortress, and
the guns were screened. They had, however, been laid
on the buoys, and the instant the ships anchored flags
were hoisted on shore, and a heavy fire opened. Owing
to the altered positions of the ships on both sides it was
not nearly so deadly as it would otherwise have been.
On the south side the shot just passed over the ships,
and the water beyond was a sheet of foam. It would
have been unsafe to hold a hand up above the bulwarks.
On the north side, also, the shot struck the water where
the buoys had been placed, but as the ships anchored
in other positions they escaped much of the fire. The
ships began the bombardment about the same time, and
for two hours it was returned from the shore with
gradually decreasing energy. Then an event took place
which decided the fate of Acre. A large magazine
blew up, having been ignited by a shell from one of the
ships, and destroyed a great portion of the town and
defences, and killed over looo of the defenders. From
this moment the fire of the batteries on shore slackened,
and half-an-liour after had virtually ceased. It being
now sunset, the ships also discontiiuicd the action, but
made preparations to renew the combat next day as

2 2 The Navy in 1840.

no indications of submission were apparent. The place,
however, was evacuated in the night, and we took posses-
sion of it next morning. On our side the casualties
were not numerous, consisting of eighteen killed and
forty-one wounded. The damage sustained by the ships
was not serious, and soon repaired. The number of the
enemy killed and wounded was never ascertained, but
it could not have been less than from 2000 to 3000.
About the same number were taken prisoners, or gave
themselves up when our force landed the following day.
Among them was Colonel Schultz, who had been
wounded. He said it was impossible to withstand such
an incessant stream of fire as was poured from our guns.
Even the bravest troops would have been demoralised.
The result was due to a heavy cannonade at close
quarters, kept up unremittingly from a great number
of guns. At the same time the ships had certain for-
tuitous advantages which might not be conceded on
another occasion. The action did not prove that our
wooden walls could at all times attack forts with
impunity, and indeed the contrary was demonstrated
fourteen years later in the Black Sea. But the bom-
bardment of Acre showed in a striking manner the
terms upon which the old ships could contend success-
fully with land defences which at first sight seemed
almost impregnable.

CHAPTER II

CREATION OF A STEAM FLEET

Changes in Ship Construction after 1840 — Reluctance to recognise Advant-
ages of Screw Propulsion — Gradual Conversion of Sailing P'lect to
Steam — Armament practically remains unaltered — The Crimean
War — Operations in Black Sea and Baltic — Assistance rendered
by the Navy — Expedition to Sea of Azof.

The discovery that steam could be profitably utilised
for the propulsion of ships, and the tardy adoption of
the screw, did not for many years materially affect the
construction of war vessels. There was a strong pre-
judice to overcome in the minds of those who retained a
vivid recollection of the glories accomplished in the past
under sail, and who had a natural love for the art in
which we excelled. Sir William S)'monds, to whom I
have alluded as effecting considerable improvement in
the qualities of our sailing ships, had, as his biographer
states, no love for steamers in any shape. The\' were
an order of vessels which forbade the a])[)lication of his
favourite principles of construction. When Sir John
Franklin left England, in May 1845, ^^^' ^'""^ Arctic, the
' Erebus' and 'Terror' were each fitted with a screw. It
is stated that .Sir William s[)oke plainl}' of the risk to Sir
George Cockburn, First Na\al Lord of the Admiralt}-,
and foretold their fate. In a letter to Lord .Auckland

24 Creation of a Steam Fleet.

about this time he states : ' I consider steamers of every
description in the greatest peril when it is necessary to
use broadside guns in close action ; not alone from
their liability to be disabled from shot striking their
steam chest, steam pipe, machinery, etc., but great pro-
bability of explosion owing to sparks from funnel.'
These view^s were shared by others ; but circumstances
were too strong, and slowly we began to convert our
sailing navy into a steam fleet. In other respects, while
retaining the two and three-decker as the embodiment
of naval force, an advance was made by giving them
an increased length. Whereas, in 1840, the * Queen ' was
204 ft. long, the ' How^e,' launched in i860 as a screw
three-decker, w^as given a length of 260 ft. This fine
specimen and her sister ship the ' Victoria ' were the
last of that race of noble structures which we recall with
regret. The first two-decker designed for the screws was
the 'Agamemnon,' launched in 1852. Her length was
230 ft, while the 'Albion,' launched in 1842, was but
204 ft. long. We see the same modification in the
frigates of i860. From the ' Vernon 'of 176 ft., in 1832,
we passed to the ' Emerald ' of 237 ft., in 1856. The latter
was the first ship I served in, and a prettier model it
would be hard to find. She was one of a class largely
represented in the service as 50-gun screw frigates, and
built of wood. We were, however, impelled to a further
advance in this type by the action of the United States.
That country had lately been producing frigates of large
dimensions, and the appearance of the 'Niagara' in
the Thames during 1857 created quite a sensation

iHBJUi*

Crcalioii of a Steam Fleet. 2 5

in England. Her dimensions were, length 335 ft.,
breadth 54 ft, and burthen 4750 tons.

This led to the construction over here of the
* Orlando ' and ' Mersey/ the largest frigates built en-
tirely of wood, and launched in 1858. Their length was
300 ft, beam 52 ft, and burthen 3750 tons. They
were, however, structurally weak, and did not last long.
The 68-pounder was still the heaviest gun carried, for
we had not yet arrived at rifle guns. Shell equipment
was now universally provided, for Sinope had convinced
even the strongest adherents of solid shot that what-
ever might be the advantages of the latter against stone
walls in their smashing effect, shell for the attack of
ships must prevail. Appliances for the use of red-hot
shot were still supplied. These projectiles were for-
midable to wooden ships. Nelson considered fire the
greatest danger of a naval battle. Before going into
action it was the custom, as far as possible, to remove
everything below which might feed a fire. But there
was danger also to the ship using red-hot shot. Guns
occasionally burst owing to the expansion of the pro-
jectile, for which provision had to be made in the
diameter of the bore. There might also be a premature
discharge by the ignition of the powder. To prevent
this, thick junk wads were supplied for use with hot
shot, to be well soaked in water and then rammed down
after the powder, thus interposing a screen between the
charge and shot.

Rockets were another species of weapon much
favoured then, but which have recently ceased to form

26 Creation of a Steam Fleet,

part of our ships' equipment. They were also for in-
cendiary purposes, and proved very effective against
savage races and bodies of men. They were first intro-
duced, early in the century, by Sir William Congrevc.
Their flight was produced by the escape of the gas to
the rear, generated by the ignited explosive, and steadi-
ness was imparted by attaching a wooden rod to the
case. The use of the rod was dispensed with by the
invention of Mr Hale, who caused the rocket to rotate
in its flight. This was effected by the gas in its escape
impinging on short iron wings at the end of the case,
thus imparting rotatory motion. Rockets, however, for
war purposes were not to be depended on, especially
after being kept for some time, and occasionally they
gave rise to serious accidents.

Before passing on to the great change which the
adoption of iron as a material for ship building and as a
means of protection produced in our fleet, it seems desir-
able to review briefly the operations in the Black Sea
and Baltic during the Crimean War, when we had for
the last time sailing ships combined with screw and
paddle steamers. These operations afford an example
of the effect of a powerful navy in rendering possible
military operations in distant lands, and aiding them in
many ways. Our success at Acre is not repeated in a
bombardment of land batteries under different conditions
in one locality, whereas it is shown elsewhere that if
special plant is provided such an operation can be
undertaken without great risk. This war, from a naval
point of view, has many striking features. It is difficult

Creation of a Steam Fleet. 27

to realise now how little prepared we were in 1853 for
war with a powerful continental nation, and for such an
operation as the invasion of its territory. Though the
Naval Department has generally been assumed to have
emerged from that war with more credit as regards its
organisation than the War Office, the term ' mobilisa-
tion,' and its meaning, was entirely unknown in reference
to any possible naval operation. If success has come in
the past, it has been in spite of our system, not in conse-
quence of it.

For instance, previously to the Crimean War there
had been a Transport Department at the Admiralty, but
a regard for economy had led to its suppression. Never-
theless, when it was reorganised, energy and ability sup-
plied the want of experience. Its operations were on a
large scale, for we conveyed to the east 70,000 officers
and men, 5600 horses, and 85,000 tons of stores. To
the Baltic, also, we transported 13,000 officers and men,
with about 10,000 tons of stores. It must be remem-
bered that our allies looked to us in a great measure
for transport. Though steam propulsion was in its
infancy, we employed over 100 steam transports, and
a slightly greater number of sailing ships. Sir Stafford
Northcotc, in a letter to Mr Disraeli, dated April 19th,
1862, and printed in his life, says: 'We showed in the
Crimean War both our weakness and our strength.
Our strength consisted in the clasticit)' of oiu" resources,
the temper of our people, the length of our purse, and
the power of our endurance. Our weakness was shown
in the confusion of our arrangements and the absence of

28 Crcafion of a Sfciu/i Fleet.

niilitai-}' skill.' Init he niii;ht have added that the ehief
evidence of our strength was to be found in our mari-
time supremacy, which made such an expedition possible.
History has not adecjuately recorded the part played by
the nav\' on this occasion, because there were no tlcets
to overcome, and it did not repeat the success at Acre ;
but in other wa)s the assistance it rendered was of the
utmost importance.

In command o{ the Mediterranean Squadron at that
time was Admiral Deans Dundas. lie was an oflicer
who had seen much service, but had now reached the
age of sixty-eight, and owing to a former wound could
not sustain great exertion. When he was appointed to
this command, it was not anticipated that we should
shortly be invoKxxl in war. As second in command of
the squadron we had in Sir Kdmund L}-ons a man of
great ability and energ\-. His early career had been
a distinguished one, but in 1S35 he was appointed
Minister at Athens, a post he filled for several )'ears,
so that in 1854 his capacit)' for naval affairs was not
well known in the t1eet. Detailed b\- Admiral Dundas
to organise arrangements for transporting the army
from Varna to the Crimea, he at once gave proof of
his capabilit)'. All difficulties disappeared before his
energy and gift for organisation. Vet it was no easy
task to shift the base of operations from Turke\- to
Russia. To forward 60.000 troops from England and
France had taxed the resources of those countries, but
to tranship them on the barren shores of the Black Sea
entailed a greater call on those entrusted with the opera-

Creation of a Steam Fleet. 29

tion. Much had to be created on the spot; yet ahhough
the order to invade the Crimea only reached Lord
Raglan on July 6th, 1854, the combined armies, with
their necessary equipment, embarked on August 24th.
Circumstances delayed their sailing till September 7th,
when they set forth for the enemy's country. What
a splendid sight it must have been, over 150 vessels
conveying the troops, guarded and convoyed by a British
squadron of ten sail of the line and fifteen smaller vessels.
The French men-of-war were filled with troops owing to
insufficiency of transports. What a time for an enter-
prising enemy to make a dash at this armada ! Inside
the harbour of Sebastopol there was a powerful flotilla,
consisting of thirteen sail of the line and sixteen smaller
vessels. A determined attack might have scattered that
cloud of transports, and, taking into consideration the
time of year, indefinitely postponed the expedition.
]jut the opportunity was lost, and 63,000 men, with
128 guns, were landed without opposition, as if for some
peaceful autumn manoeuvres. As an operation of war
it was hazardous. A night assault on our force after
landing might have been disastrous. None took place,
and the battle of the Alma strengthened our position in
the occupied territory. It was then decided to invest
the south side of Sebastopol, while the navy were to
occupy the port of Balaclava as a base of operations for
the army. From a naval point of view this harbour
was well suited to the purpose. Though not of great
extent, it contained deep water, and had facilities for
landing stores. Moreover, the anchorage was well

30 Creation of a Steam Fleet.

sheltered from all winds, and as at this time it was
not considered that the siege would prove a lengthy
operation, I am unable to see that the choice of Bala-
clava was a bad one.^

The arrival of the army at the head of Balaclava
Harbour and the entry of our ships took place simul-
taneously on the 26th of September. To this no
resistance was offered by the enemy, and the siege train
was landed next day. ]^y the act of the Russians in
sinking most of their largest ships across the entrance to
Sebastopol our naval force was freed from any thought
of having to meet the enemy at sea. What a blow to
those gallant Russian sailors, who afterwards took such

' Sir Edward Hamley, in his interesting volume The War in the
Crimea^ states that the choice of Balaclava as a base brought untold
miseries upon the army, and speaks strongly of the influence Sir Edmund
Lyons had with Lord Raglan. But the point the admiral had to consider
was, whether Balaclava was suitable to receive transports and store ships,
and whether the harbour offered facilities for discharging cargo ? lie could
assure the general that no delay should take place in these respects. The
proof of this lies in the fact that the siege train was landed the day after
the harbour was entered. As to the distance of the harbour from our camp,
that was a matter which the general would weigh in deciding whether to
accept or reject the admiral's recommendation. It did not affect the
suitability of the port for getting the stores on shore ; their prompt trans-
port to the camp rested with the Military Department. If the land transport
arrangements were faulty, and want of men prevented good roads from the
base to the camp being made until after the battle of Inkerman, the diffi-
culties that resulted are not attributable to any deficiency of Balaclava as
a naval port. I regret that the gallant author of this work should speak of
Sir Edmund Lyons as Lord Raglan's evil genius. The mind of the
admiral was wholly absorbed by the desire to render every assistance to
his comrades on shore, and he brought to this work an energy, ability, and
single-mindedness which, hardly realised in the past, will some day, I am
sure, receive ample recognition.

Crcatioi of a Steam F/ccL 31

a distinguished part in the siep^e, to see a fleet it had
taken years to construct setthng down in the water
without a combat. Though the foe was a combination
of the two most powerful maritime nations of Europe,
they were ready for the fray, and the disappointment
could not be otherwise than bitter. England had
experienced such a day of humiliation two centuries
before when she scuttled her own vessels to bar the
passage of the Dutch up the Medway, and then vainly
turned to forts as a substitute for an efficient fieet.

But our squadron in the Black Sea was able to afford
material assistance in other ways towards the object
aimed at, the capture of Sebastopol. Over sixty guns
were landed from the ships, and a naval brigade formed
of 2000 officers and men. This greatly augmented the
resources of the allied armies in preparing for the first
bombardment of the Russian works defending the
southern side of the town. This took place on the 17th
of October, and in order to assist the operation the
admirals of the English and French Squadrons were
requested to attack simultaneously the sea defences.
When I use the word ' requested,' it is perhaps hardly
applicable to the French naval commander. He was
under the orders of the general in command, and hence
to such a direction could onl)- demur on strong grounds.
In our case the admiral was acting independently, and
though he would naturally afford the general the fullest
co-operation, he was at liberty to withhold his consent
to any course o^ action as regards the licet which might
to him seem undesirable. Admiral Duiulas was reluctant

32 Creation of a Steam Fleet,

to expose his ships to damage in an attack which,
according to his judgment, would have no direct influ-
ence upon the assault by land. It must be remembered,
moreover, that he had willingly denuded his vessels of a
portion of their armament, and reduced their crews by
a considerable number ; and he might have insisted
that a sea attack should only be undertaken with ships
fully equipped. But when his French colleague in-
formed him of his intention to carry out the desire of
his general, with or without our assistance, Admiral
Dundas felt compelled to join in the attack.

The forts which the combined squadrons were about
to bombard defended the approach to the harbour of
Sebastopol. On the north side, to which our ships were
allotted, they were especially strong. At the entrance
was Fort Constantine, a massive stone structure mount-
ing lOO guns. But still more formidable to ships were
the batteries on the high ground above, which, though
not armed with numerous guns, could sweep the sea
beneath with comparative impunity. The southern side
was defended by a battery at the mouth of Quarantine
Bay, and Fort Alexander further in. The French
Squadron was to attack on this side, and with our
vessels form a continuous line in front of the harbour.
It had been arranged that fire on land and sea should be
opened early in the morning ; but at the last moment
this was altered as regards the ships, and they did not
commence until after one o'clock. By this time all
idea of a land assault had been given up owing to the
discomfiture of the French batteries on shore. More

Creation of a Sfcani Fleet, ^Z

than one explosion had taken place in their lines, and
they were not prepared to join us in the intended move-
ment which was to follow a vigorous cannonade. The
ships, however, proceeded to carry out their part of the
day's work. Sir Edmund Lyons, in the * Agamemnon,'
with the ' Sanspareil,' ' London,' ' Albion,' and ' Are-
thusa,' formed an inshore squadron, and anchored with-
in 800 yards of the northern batteries, while the rest
of our ships were further off, prolonging the French line.
Fire was then opened on both sides. Considerable im-
pression was made on Fort Constantine, but the
batteries on the cliff, when they got the range of
our ships, subjected them to an effective fire to which
little return could be made. The * Rodney,' ' Queen,'
and ' Bellerophon ' then closed to reinforce the hardly
pressed inshore squadron, and the cannonade was con-
tinued. Owing to the fact that most of the ships had
landed their upper deck guns, and that this portion
was comparatively clear of men, our casualties were
not so numerous as they otherwise would have been.
The Russians used chiefly time fuses with their shell,
numbers of which burst over the upper decks, cut-
ting them up like a ploughed field. But, nevertheless,
at the close of day, when our vessels withdrew from
their positions, we had lost over forty killed, and 250
men wounded. The French had an easier task, and did
not suffer so severely. The gain was not commensurate
with such a loss, and in fact the whole proceeding was
unwise. If the object was to facilitate the assault and
entry of our troops on the south side, it is difficult to

34 Creation of a Steam Fleet.

see what benefit would accrue from shelling batteries in
another quarter. When this assault was postponed, there
was clearly no reason to attempt the destruction of works
intended to resist entry by sea, and which could have
little influence upon an army taking the city in rear.

From a naval point of view, however, the principal
lesson taught by this episode is the strength exhibited by
a few guns on high ground even when opposed by a
powerful squadron. Fort Constantine must have suc-
cumbed in time, even as the forts at Acre were unable to
withstand the heavy and rapid fire of our ships. But a
single elevated battery is difficult to silence, and ma}'
defy the efforts of a fleet. This was perfectly well
understood in the old wars, but the lesson had been for-
gotten, until it was once more brought home to us on
this memorable occasion. Another point demonstrated
was the disadvantage attached to joint enterprises under
dual command. Of this we had not much previous ex-
perience, because in most of our struggles at sea we had
fought single-handed. But the Franco-Spanish alliance,
which was punished at Trafalgar, is an example of the
doubtful strength of such combinations. How bitterly
Villeneuve complained of his Spanish colleagues. No
plans could be formed that were not liable to be dis-
turbed by their different methods of business and
organisation. One supreme chief is necessary to success,
and should we ever engage in any maritime alliance
again, there must be one head, recognised by both States,
and invested with full authority over the whole force.
A more profitable service rendered by the navy in the

Creation of a Steam Fleet. 35

Crimea was in cutting off communications with Scbas-
topol by the Sea of Azof. In February 1855, about six
weeks after Sir Edmund Lyons assumed chief command
of the Black Sea fleet, Admiral Dundas having gone
home, the Admiralty called his attention to the im-
portance of occupying as soon as possible the Sea of
Azof, as the Russian army in the Crimea drew largely
both reinforcements of men and supplies of provisions
conveyed by water between Rostof and Taganrog and
the shores of the Crimea bordering on the Sea of Azof.
Such an enterprise accorded with the energetic spirit of
the admiral, and in conjunction with our allies an ex-
pedition was organised for this service. The entrance to
this inland sea is commanded by the powerful fort of
Kertch, and to take this in rear a strong landing force
was provided. This consisted of 7000 French, 3000
English, and 5000 Turkish troops. They were conveyed
in nine sail of the line and forty smaller vessels. The
expedition started on the 22d of May, and arrixcd in
the vicinity of Kertch the next day. A bay within ten
miles of this town was selected, and disembarkation
was effected without delay or obstruction. l-?aron
Wrangel, the Russian general in command of this por-
tion of the peninsula, did not oppose the landing. In
fact, he could not tell where it might take place, and
was unable to move troops as fast as ours could be
conveyed by sea. Fearing to be cut off from Sebas-
topoljie destro)'ed several batteries on the coast and re-
tired. As Kinglake eloquently sa)-s of the incident : 'lie
(Baron Wrangel) succumbed to the power (of which the

36 Creation of a Steam Fleet.

world will learn much in times to come) an armada can
wield when not only carrying on board a force designed
for land service, but enabled to move swiftly, whether
this way or that, at the will of the chief.' Kcrtch
was occupied on the 24th of May, and Sir Edmund
Lyons, hoisting his flag on board the * Miranda,' entered
the Sea of Azof. He then placed a squadron of light
draught vessels under the orders of his son, Captain
E. M. Lyons, consisting of fourteen sloops and gun
vessels, with five French steamers. Holding commands
in this squadron were some of the ablest men our navy
possessed. Such names as Commcrcll, Sherard Osborn,
Cowper Coles, Hewett, M'Killop, Burgoyne, and others,
were a guarantee that activity in this quarter, at least,
would prevail. Events succeeded each other rapidly.
On May 26th the squadron appeared off Berdiansk,
where the enemy burnt four war steamers of his own
and large depots of corn. On the 27th Arabat was
bombarded, and in three days 106 merchant vessels
were destroyed. The same activity continued until the
operations closed in November by reason of approach-
ing winter. A volume might be written of the work
done in this region by the navy. It has never been
adequately recorded, but the cutting off and destruction
of all the sources of supply to the Russian army from
the Sea of Azof contributed in no small or unimportant
degree to the fall of Sebastopol.

Although, as I have endeavoured to show, the naval
operations in the Black Sea afforded invaluable assist-
ance to the Crimean expedition, it was to the Baltic

^ -J---..J^J'.. ■

Creation of a St emu Fleet. 37

squadron that the nation looked for the greatest
triumphs on the sea. These expectations were not
destined to be realised by any great feat of arms.
For this there were many reasons, the principal one
being that the means were not adapted to the end, and
that there was no clear conception as to what the fleet
could be reasonably expected to perform.

When, in the early part of February 1854, it was seen
that war could not be avoided, every exertion was made
to fit out a formidable Baltic Squadron. Of the ships
detailed to form this squadron some were at Lisbon,
while others were laid up in the various home ports.
It had been usual to offer a bounty to seamen to ship
afloat when required on an emergency, but in this case
it was not done, and all sorts and conditions of men
were entered to complete the complements of the ships.
By this means a squadron was collected with what was
considered at that time creditable expedition. Admiral
Sir Charles Napier was selected for the command,
whose reputation in the country was still high, though
he was now sixty-eight years of age. The squadron,
having assembled at Portsmouth, left on the 12th of
March, Her Majesty leading it to sea in her screw
yacht the ' Fairy.' On that day the force consisted of
eiglit ships of the line, four frigates, and three paddle
steamers. Other ships not yet complete with crews had
to be left behind, and joined afterwards. Bound for the
Baltic, where the water all round the coast is very
shallow, ves.sels of light draught for certain operations
were an essential adjunct to such a force ; but no gun-

38 Creation of a Steam Fleet.

boats had been provided. This omission strongly influ-
enced the course of events.

On March 27th the fleet anchored in what was then
the Danish port of Kiel. Our first object was to confine
the enemy's vessels to the Baltic, so that their power of
offensive action against our coasts and commerce might
be neutralised. A blockade was therefore essential. A
trial of strength between the two fleets was also de-
sirable, as success in such an action would secure the
same end more effectually. Attack on strong fortresses
was deprecated as likely to damage the fleet without an
adequate return. The nation, however, expected an
attack on Cronstadt, no doubt with the recollection of
Acre in its mind. But the conditions were very dif-
ferent. Not that the sea defences of Cronstadt at the
declaration of war were of the formidable nature attri-
buted to them, but because the neighbouring water
was so shallow that the approach of large ships was a
difficult matter. The want of gunboats capable of
taking up advantageous positions within range of the
forts was the reason given by Sir Charles Napier for
abstaining from an attack on Cronstadt. He was
unwilling to risk injury to his own squadron by such
an operation while the Russian fleet was intact. It was
no secret at Acre that he opposed the bombardment
as most hazardous, but orders from England were
imperative on that occasion. In the Baltic many of the
ships were most indifferently manned, and kept the sea
with difficulty. We were unable to prevent a junction
between the Russian Squadrons at Sveaborg and

Crcaticn of a Stcaiii Fleet. 39

Cronstadt, the former getting out when a gale of wind
had driven our squadron of observation from the port*
But a younger and more energetic commander would
probably not have been so much impressed with tb.e
risks incurred ; and Nelson in his daring exploit at
Copenhagen undertook a task of equal magnitude with-
out hesitation.

Sir Charles Napier having set his face against a
direct attack on Cronstadt or Sveaborg — another
place where powerful land batteries guarded the sea
approaches — turned his attention to Bomarsund, the
stronghold of the Aland Islands. It was guarded by
forts mounting numerous heavy guns, with a garrison of
2500 men. No reinforcement was possible while our
ships commanded the water intervening between these
islands and the mainland. Hence the safest and most
certain form of attack was to land a sufficient force at a
convenient spot and take the forts in rear. This was
decided upon, and the British admiral desired to effect
it with the resources of the combined squadron alone,
but the French commander considered them insuffi-
cient, and a body of 9000 French troops was sent out
arriving early in August. When all was ready, guns
and men were landed without opposition. Besides
the regular troops, a large contingent of sailors and a
battery of 32-poundcrs from the ships tormcd part of
the force. Works were then thrown up within range of
the forts, and between the 13th and 15th the forts were
bombarded. One after another surrendered, until the
whole of rxtiiiarsutid was ours. In default of relief Irom

40 Creation of a Steam Fleet.

the sea, capitulation was inevitable. This incident is an
excellent example of the power conferred by command
of the sea when at the same time there is a sufficient
land force judiciously employed.

No other operation of any magnitude was attempted
that year, and when the Baltic Squadron returned to
England for the winter it was not considered to have
put forth its full strength. There was much criticism on
the decision not to attack Sveaborg, so a new com-
mander-in-chief, Rear-Admiral the Hon. R. Dundas,
with a stronger squadron, was sent up the following
year. By this time gunboats and mortar vessels had
been prepared, and the crews of the squadron had much
improved, so that the new admiral started under fair
auspices. Her Majesty again leading the squadron to
sea and wishing it success. In the beginning of August
the whole flotilla approached Sveaborg. The gun
vessels and mortar boats were to perform the principal
part in the bombardment. The fortress consisted of
five islands, on which were batteries with numerous
heavy guns. On the 9th of August the attack took
place. Carefully assigned positions were taken up
by our small vessels — the remainder of the fleet
being in rear — and a heavy fire opened on the
defences. The gun and mortar boats offered
so small a mark and were at such a range that
the return fire from the shore did comparatively little
damage. After some hours our shells blew up more
than one magazine and set fire to several buildings. At
sunset the gunboats were withdrawn, but the place was

Creation of a Steam Fleet. 41

plied with rockets durin^^ the night. During the next
day the attack was continued. The whole place now
seemed a sheet of flame, and on the morning of the i ith,
the enemy's batteries having ceased to reply to our
guns, the action was discontinued. On our side only a
few men were wounded, but the Russians lost consider-
ably. Though the fortress was much knocked about, a
few days would have put it in a condition to sustain
another bombardment ; and whether it surrendered or
not, we were unable to land a sufficient force for its
occupation. We had, however, shown that a powerful
fortress could be attacked from the sea, and without
great loss, if undertaken with plant adapted to the pur-
pose. It was simply a question of providing sufficient
material, and keeping up the supply until the object was
attained. vSuccess would rest with that side which pos-
sessed the longest purse and the greater resources.
With an absolute command of the sea, the impregnability
of a fortress becomes a comparative term, and another
year of war would doubtless have seen a similar attack
on Cronstadt. But Sebastopol now fell, and peace was
made.

This war produced no naval actions or single com-
bats between ships, but maritime strength had in other
ways brought about a result even greater than could
have been secured by a great naval victory. The
voluntary sinking of a large portion of the enemy's fleet,
the inaction of another part, the invasion of territory,
the reduction of some fortresses, and the total stoj^page
of sea commerce, were directly or indirectl}' owing to

42 Creation of a Steam Fleet.

naval supremacy tacitly acknowledged. Steam bad
materially assisted the attack, while it conferred no
advantage on the defence. As Kinglake eloquently says
of the result of the Kertch expedition : ' The simple
truth is that, in regions where land and sea much in-
tertwine, an armada having on board it no more than
a iQ.yN thousand troops, and propelled by steam power,
can use its amphibious strength with a wondrously
cogent effect.'

CHAPTER III

BROADSIDE IRONCLADS

Prejudice against Iron in Shipbuilding — First Ironclads built in France and
England — Increase in Size of Ships — Advance in Ordnance — Com-
mencement of Struggle between Guns and Armour — Action between
' Alabama ' and ' Kearsage,' showing advantages of Armour.

The same reasons which operated on the minds of tlie
naval officers in respect to the appHcation of steam
propulsion retarded the use of iron for the construction
of war vessels. That material was first employed for
canal boats about the year 1812, and afterwards for
steamers of the mercantile marine. About 1834 the
Admiralty were urged to institute experiments to
ascertain whether iron might not be utilised for ships
of war, but they moved so slowly that the first iron war
steamer built in this country was the ' Birkenhead,' by
Messrs Laird, in 1845. For reasons to be mentioned
presently she was turned into a troopship. She was
lost in 1852 at the Cape, under the circumstances well
known from the heroic conduct of the soldiers and sea-
men on the occasion. To test the behaviour of iron
under the effects of shot, and to compare it with wood,
some experiments were carried out at Portsmouth from
1849 to 1 85 1. Iron plates, '^ in. thick, pklced 35 ft.
apart, to represent a section of the ' Simoom,' a vessel

44 Broadside Ironclads,

then under construction, were fired at from a 32-pounder.
The effect was most ominous. Not only were the iron
spHnters produced by the shot passing through the side
of a destructive nature, but it was found that the shot
broke up in perforating the plate, and became an ad-
ditional cloud of splinters too numerous to be counted.
The experiment was repeated with the addition that
the iron was backed with 5 in. of oak. A similar
result ensued, but wooden splinters mingled with the
iron. When wood alone was tried, the splinters were
trifling as compared with those from the iron. Other
experiments were then carried out to see if these effects
could be mitigated, but without success. The deduc-
tion was that the destructive effects of shot on iron
ships could not be prevented. If the iron sides were
of the thickness required to give adequate strength to
the ship — as f or, at least, half-an-inch — the shot was
broken up. If the plates were thinner, the ships would
be deficient in strength, and though the shot might pass
through without breaking up, the disc of iron driven
in was broken into numerous small pieces.

These results created a great sensation. A verdict was
given that iron vessels, however convenient and advan-
tageous in other respects, were utterly unfit for purposes
of war, and a committee of naval and military officers,
which had been directed to report how far it might be
possible to arm vessels of the packet service in case of
war, rejected all constructed of iron. Many years were to
elapse before this material was taken into favour again.
It was even a question then whether iron steamers were

Broadside Ironclads. 45

fit to be employed as transports for the conveyance of
troops and stores during war. However, the Admiralty
decided to employ those which were being built as troop
ships. In one or two others which were completed the
armament was removed from the main deck, and timber
substituted for iron in the upper works, behind which a
few light guns were placed. Considering the present
almost universal adoption of iron and steel for naval
architecture, the foregoing events appear to me to have
no little interest. I have not dwelt upon the defects of
the substances employed, such as cast-iron shot, and
probably the inferior nature of the plates. No doubt
both had an important bearing on the results ob-
tained, but I will pass on to the revival of iron for
warship construction. As practically in England this
occurred simultaneously wdth the introduction of armour,
I shall deal with them together in reference to the
creation of our modern navy. With many inventions it
is difficult to assign to any country or individual either
actual discovery or practical application. In most cases
the two operations are distinct, and separated by a
considerable interval of time. This is ccrtainl)' true
as regards both the idea of protecting ships with an
external casting of iron and its actual use. The first
idea is, I think, due to Colonel Paixhans, the L^rcnch
officer who was mainl)- instrunicntal in substituting
horizontal shell fire in place of shot. In 1825 he ex-
pressed an opini(jn that line-of-battle ships might be
cuirassed against cannon shot by sacrificing a tier of
guns, and that seven or eight inches of iron would effect

46 Broadside Ironclads.

it. In this we see a complete foreshadowing of what
was to come thirty years later. He recognised at once
the revolution his own invention would effect in naval
armaments, and that provision must be made against it
Though no sailor or naval architect, he saw that his new
idea was incompatible with the lofty sides of the old
liner ; but still more strangely, considering the date of his
opinion, he indicated an amount of protectiou which
was not reached for some years after the introduction of
armour, as though he had an inkling of the later develop-
ment of ordnance now so familiar to us.

But this conception of the future battle ship re-
mained unheeded until the Crimean War, when the
Emperor Napoleon, who in matters of war material
often showed considerable ability, proposed the con-
struction of floating batteries, or ships protected on
the exterior by thick plates of iron, and shortly after
five such batteries were commenced in France. All
were of the same dimensions, 172 ft. long and 44 ft.
broad. The side above the water line, which was only
a few feet high, had a covering of 4 J in. of iron, a
thickness determined after experiments with existing
guns and projectiles. Behind the armour was a back-
ing of 17 in. of timber. This added to the protection,
besides being useful for supporting the heavy weight of
iron with bolts. The first was launched in March 1855,
and the others in July. VVe followed suit with three
similar vessels, the * Thunderbolt,' ' Erebus,' and ' Terror.'
They were at first intended for an attack on Cronstadt,
but this idea being abandoned, they were sent to the

Broadside Ironclads. 47

Black Sea, and arrived in October 1855. Three of the
French batteries had been previously despatched to
the same locaHty, and took part in the bombardment
of Kinburn. Our vessels were armed with thirty
60-pounders, the largest piece of ordnance then in use.
Having a flat bottom, they only drew 9 ft. of water.
They were, in fact, ships from which a thick slice had
been removed from their hulls above and below the
water. They were well suited, from their light draught,
for the shallow waters of the Baltic, and with their
powerful armament could have attacked the forts at
Cronstadt with advantage, because these w^ere all low
down, and not of the formidable nature asserted at the
time.

The defence of Kinburn in the Black Sea consisted
of a strong casemated fort armed wMth over sixty guns,
and supported by earthworks with a few additional guns.
These batteries were on a narrow spit of land at the
entrance to the River Boug, about fort}' miles east of
Odessa. A combined English and French force was sent
to attack them early in October 1855. It consisted of
ships of the line, steamers, gunboats, mortar vessels, and
the three T^rench floating batteries lately arrived. On
the 17th the assault took place. The mortar boats first
opened fire, and then the floating batteries. Curiosity was
excited as to the behaviour of the new constructions, and
it was soon evident, after the forts comnicnced returning
the fire, that the iron plates afforded efficient protection.
The floating batteries were re[)eatedly struck by shot,
which hardly indented the sides, and the shells burst

48 Broadside Jronclads.

harmlessly against them. Damage, of course, they re-
ceived as, having numerous port holes, all the projectiles
and pieces of shell could not be excluded, but the injuries
received were small in comparison to what they would
have been had the sides been without the armour. To
have been completely effectual there should have been
at least a dozen of these batteries. The number of guns
three could bring into action was relatively small. After
a two hours' cannonade the line-of-battle and other ships
advanced and poured in a heavy fire. In less than half-
an-hour the batteries were silenced, and the appearance
of a white flag showed that all resistance was at an end.
The success attending the employment of these
floating batteries in the Black Sea indicated that in
some such direction was to be found the solution of a
problem now exercising men's minds, namely, how to
resist the destructive effects of shell. In England we
were disposed to rely on what had in former years
admirably answered the purpose, and given us a
supremacy on the sea by which the security of the
country was ensured. Had our fleet suffered defeat, we
might have been more ready to adopt new inventions,
indeed, to initiate them, rather than wait until their
utility was proved by others. But the weapons to hand
not having failed, the natural tendency was to let them
go with reluctance. In France, on the other hand, no
such sentiment prevailed ; and the skill she had always
shown in naval construction was at once displayed
when an entirely new departure for the designs of
battle ships was taken. She had, moreover, in the head

Broadside Ironclads.

of the naval constructive department at that time, a
man of genius and originaHty. M. Dupuy dc Lome
had ah'eady given proof of both these quaUties, and now
he determined to boldly transform a wooden line-of-
battle ship into an armour-clad which should be a sea-
worthy as well as a formidable fighting structure. To
this end he took the * Napoleon,' a fine two-decker,
removed the upper portion, lengthened her by 24 ft.,
and placed 5-in. armour plates on the side, with 26 in.
of wood backing. This work was commenced in 1857,
but not completed till the autumn of 1859. The
vessel thus changed was renamed ' La Gloire,' and
is now historically famous as the first seagoing iron-
clad. Her armament was placed along the main deck,

' LA GLOIRE.'

as in a frigate. With a length of 235 ft., and breadth
of 55 ft., she had a displacement of 5000 tons, and her
speed under steam was about 12 knots. Her comple-
tion created even more excitement than the appearance
of the * Niagara' but two years previousl)'.

In the meantime we had been watching with curiosit)-
the experiment of our neighbours, unable to recognise
that the day had arrived when a new s\'stem of naval
architecture for war purposes must be adopted. Ikit
public opinion was roused, and the Admiralty saw that

50 Broadside Ironclads.

change could not be resisted. Designs were invited from
various quarters, but the plan prepared by the Chief Con-
structor of the Navy, Mr Isaac Watts, in conjunction
with the eminent naval architect Mr Scott Russell, was
decided upon. This produced the ' Warrior,' ordered
in 1859, and completed in 1861. She embodied some
remarkable characteristics. In the first place, her hull
was of iron, and considering what had taken place ten
years previously, the boldness of this step can be appre-
ciated. But as any project of adding iron to the lofty
sides of a line -of- battle ship was impracticable, the
necessity of limiting the principal armament to one deck
was apparent. To compensate for such a reduction, the
single deck should carry a number of the most powerful
guns then in use, with greater space between them than
had usually been accorded, so as to reduce the injury
that the entrance of a shell would inflict. Though the
sides might be impregnable, the port holes were so many
weak points which must not be lost sight of. In 'La
Gloire ' they were very close together, and hence much
of the value of the armour was lost. Such considera-
tions involved a length of ship which previous experi-
ence with the ' Mersey ' and ' Orlando ' had shown to be
impossible in vessels built of wood and carrying power-
ful machinery. Another point urged was that iron
would be less subject to fire than wood, so the former
material was adopted. The result was an iron frigate
382 ft. long at the water line, which was increased to
420 ft. over all when the old graceful form of bow was
added. All former associations could not be given up

Broadside Ironclads. 51

at a swoop, and as the ram was not then considered an
important weapon, it only received partial recognition.
This was effected by the stem at the water line being
made to project slightly in the form of a spur, but the
bow added to the upper part hid the ram thus disposed
and gave the * Warrior ' the appearance forward of a

11 n \

THE ' WARRIOR.'

sailing clipper. In the event of ramming, the overhang-
ing portion would be knocked away, and the spur be
brought in contact. On the ship's side, for a length of
212 ft, plates of iron 4-i- in. thick were secured to teak
backing 18 in. thick. This wood is durable, and had
other advantages for such service. The side armour left
off a little over 80 ft. from bow and stern, as it was not
considered desirable to load the ends of the ship with
such weights.

The main armament consisted of thirty - eight
68-pounders. Of these thirty-six were on the main
deck, eighteen on each side, forming a battery extend-
ing nearly the whole length of the ship, but only
thirteen on each side were behind the armour. Two
68-pounders were placed on the u[)per deck, one forward
and the other aft. As these guns weighed 95 cwt., only
a few hitherto had been mounted in battle ships, in
conjunction with numerous 8-in. and 32-poundcr guns.
The princi[)lc of concentrating the armament in a

52 Broadside Ironclads.

small number of heavy guns was thus introduced, and
we had sprung from a three-decked ship 260 ft. long to
an armoured frigate of 4CX) ft. As regards speed, the
dimensions of the ' Warrior,' and the machinery given
her, enabled her to steam over 14 knots an hour, an
advance of more than 2 knots over her rival * La Gloire '
and the wooden screw ships of that day. I have heard
officers express an opinion that ' La Gloire ' was the
better conception, because she was armoured from stem
to stern. In an important locality the 'Warrior' was
undoubtedly weak. The rudder head and steering
apparatus were neither below the water nor behind
armour, and consequently the directive power was liable
to be disabled early in an action. This defect was
aggravated by the ship having a large aperture in the
stern, which enabled the screw to be raised, when re-
quired, out of the water. This operation was only
carried out when the vessel was under sail, to add to her
capability in this respect, and prevent the screw dragging
in the water. When, even now, many question the
expediency of relying only on steam, it can be under-
stood that thirty years ago a seagoing battle ship with-
out masts and yards could find no favour. Yet such
a radical view had been put forward. In a work by the
late Lord Dunsany — Our Naval Positw?i and Policy,
published in 1859, he says: 'Old sailors will laugh at
the idea of ships without masts, but we shall surely see
them. As steamers themselves and railways were at
first scoffed at, so will be the idea of mastless ships. In
runs across the Atlantic the masts are mere encum-

Broadside Ironclads. 55

brances, as in action they arc sources of great danger.'
Two years previously the First Lord of the Admiralty
had defended the sending of troops to India in sailing
ships, on the ground that if the screw ships ran short of
fuel they would be helpless.

The 'Warrior' was thus given extensive sail power,
and to all appearance she was a long, graceful frigate.
The transition was thereby rendered more palatable to
the old navy, whereas if we had gone at once to those
structures irreverently — but not inaptly — termed 'flat-
irons,' now so familiar in the later turret ships, the
exasperated feelings of the ancient mariners would have
been pitiable to contemplate.

The 'Warrior' was built at the Thames Iron Works,
and a proof of the excellence of her construction is to be
found in the fact that after an interval of thirty years her
hull is as sound as the day on which she was launched.
That day was a memorable occasion. All the world had
been interested in the 'bold experiment,' as Sir John
Pakington truly described it on her trial trip. No ship
ever had so many visitors from all parts during her con-
struction. In France, though first in the field, they had
simply cut down a wooden ship and plated her with iron.
It was a great advance on the floating batteries, but in
England an entirely new departure had been taken, and
in my opinion there is no question as to whicli was the
best fighting ship. I shoukl infinitely have preferred to
command the ' Warrior,' taking into consideration her
higher speed and greater dispersion of armament. The
gun ports were 15 ft. apart, in 'La Gloire' they were

56 Broadside Ironclads.

much closer. Hence shell entering the battery of the
latter would have taken much greater effect.

It is not my intention to detail at length the changes
made in successive designs after the ' Warrior.' Already
rifled ordnance was imposing a fresh advance, and the
struggle between guns and armour had begun. The
'Warrior' had one sister, the 'Black Prince'; and that
the second-class battle ship, corresponding to the two-
decker, should be represented under the new order, two
smaller armour-clads, the ' Defence ' and ' Resistance,'
were begun. The disposition of their armour was
similar to that of the 'Warrior,' but they were only
280 ft. long, and the displacement 6150 tons. The
' Hector ' and ' Valiant ' were two other ships of the
same type, with slight modifications. In the next
designs it was determined to remedy the defect already
alluded to, namely, the unprotected ends. This was
first done in the ' Achilles.' Her length was the same
as that of the ' Warrior,' but she was 600 tons larger, to
allow of the armour being carried completely to the
ends. This ship may be considered the first example
of the armoured belt, with gun battery in the centre,
though this battery before long became even more
contracted.

We come now to three more ships of the ' Warrior '
type, the ' Minotaur,' ' Northumberland,' and ' Agincourt.'
To have the advantages of their model, without the
defects, the length was increased to 400 ft., and the
armour taken completely round. Its thickness was
increased to 5^ in., but secured to only 9 in. of wood

S''>

Broadside Ironclads, 59

backing. This was not found to have greater resisting
power against shot than the 4i-in. plates and i8-in.
backing. The armament of this class was improved by
the introduction of rifled guns of greater weight than
the 68-pounder. Such modifications involved a larger
vessel, and the ' Minotaur ' and her sisters reached
10,600 tons, a considerable advance on the 'Warrior.'
While the weight of the ' Warrior's ' armour and back-
ing amounted to 1350 tons, the ' Minotaur's ' protection
weighed 2100 tons. As sail power was still considered
necessary, these vessels were given five masts. Thus
equipped they presented a curious appearance, and
puzzled the nautical world. It is related that a
merchant vessel on one occasion approached incon-
veniently near one of the * Minotaur ' class at night,
her great length and the five masts leading those in
charge of the other to believe that there were two
ships, and that their own might pass between !

It may be imagined that the change from wood
to iron in construction did not find us — in our dock
yards, at least — with a body of men accustomed to
work with the new material, and when it was decided
to build an iron ship of the 'Warrior' type at
Chatham it had to be carried out by shipwrights
whose previous experience had been limited to wooden
shipbuilding. I have heard it said thc\' used the same
tools for the harder substance, but whether so or not
the ship was completed in less time than the others,
and the workmanship was excellent. All the previous
vessels had been built in private )'ards.

6o Broadside Ironclads.

Though we had thus by 1862 made a good start
with armoured ships, the fleet contained a great many
wooden ships at that time, either completed or build-
ing. It was then determined to convert several of
them into ironclads. A certain number were selected
for this purpose, cut down, lengthened, and armoured
similarly to the iron ships with 4^-in. plates secured to
30 in. of teak backing. These measures produced
the * Prince Consort,' ' Ocean,' ' Caledonia,' * Royal
Alfred,' and ' Royal Oak.' In the two last the armour
was 6 in. thick. Two others, the ' Lord Clyde ' and
' Lord Warden,' were also built of wood and armoured.
Iron was still considered to have disadvantages, which
are expressed in a memorandum by Sir Spencer Robin-
son, then Controller of the Navy, and dated March 2d,
1863. These were, liability of the bottom to injury
and to becoming coated with marine growth ; small
quantity of good iron in the market and uncertainty of
quality ; greater cost of iron ships. If they were more
durable, there was the probability of their becoming
obsolete, and thus a cheaper and less durable vessel
might prove best in the end. For some such reasons
the French preferred wood. There is good sense in
these arguments, though much might be said on the
other side. The danger of durable ships is the tempta-
tion to resist building new ones, and to be content with
patching up what has rendered good service. Ten
years ago we were under this influence, and our naval
strength was thereby impaired. The recent Naval
Defence Act broke the spell.

Broadside Ironclads, 6i

I must, however, now pass on to a change which
took place when the present Sir E. Reed was appointed
Chief Constructor of the Navy. He was an advocate
for iron, shorter ships, complete armour belts, and the
concentration of the armament into a smaller num-
ber of heavier guns in a central battery or citadel.
In 1752 a French naval architect had written : 'II
est certain que ce sont toujours les gros canons qui
sont les plus avantageux dans un combat, et ainsi il
est preferable de mettre sur un vaisseau un petit nombre
de gros canons qu'un grand nombre de petits,' and yet
in the old w^ars we had found number not size most
influential in deciding a combat. This was owing to
the fact that the issue depended more on the disablement
of the crew than of the ship itself Injury to the masts
assisted this result, because it enabled the other ship to
attain a position from which the opposing crew could be
decimated with impunity. The greater the number of
guns (provided their projectiles could penetrate the
sides of the enemy's ships) the more chances of dis-
abling men and guns, until submission followed inabilit\-
to resist. Ships were seldom sunk in action. Such an
incident was a matter for regret, because, though
diminishing the force of the enemy, it added nothing to
your own, whereas a capture counted, to use a parlia-
mentary phrase, two on a division. The prize under
another flag was speedily utilised b}' the conqueror.
Of late years sinking appears to be the object aimed at
in action, and greater care is taken to avert tliis than to
protect the crew.

Broadside Ironclads.

The ideas of Mr Reed in reference to construction
were adopted, and in one respect it could not be other-
wise. The size and power of guns were being increased
to overcome the resistance of armour, and this necessi-
tated a smaller number, unless ships were to be much
larger. At this time, however, a displacement of 10,000
tons was considered an outside limit. The ' Bellerophon,'
begun in 1863, was the first vessel under the new regime.

THE 'BELLEROPHON.

With a length of 300 ft., and a displacement of 7500
tons, she carried a 6-in. belt of armour, which in the
centre was carried up to form a central battery to con-
tain ten guns, each weighing 12 tons. Two more guns
were placed forward to give bow fire.

It was soon seen that a further advance must be
made to meet the growing power of the gun. This led
to the design of the ' Hercules,' in which the displace-
ment was increased to 8700 tons, the armoured belt to

THE * HERCULES.'

9 in., and the principal armament to 18-ton guns. To
add to the fire right ahead and astern the ends of the

Broadside Ironclads. 63

battery at the sides were recessed. This enabled two
of the battery guns to point ahead and two astern.
The length of the ship did not exceed 325 ft.

From this brief description it is evident how rapid
had been the advance in most of the fighting elements
of the new warship. Speed alone had not increased,
but this had been maintained with a shorter and handier
ship. The great length of the 'Warrior' and 'Minotaur'
was inconvenient, to say the least of it, owing to the space
they required to turn in. The ' Hercules ' was univers-
ally recognised as a splendid specimen of construction,
and remains to this day a great favourite with naval
officers. She w^as, however, eclipsed by the ' Alexandra,'
launched a few years after — the last representative of
the broadside system. Her length was the same as
that of the ' Hercules,' but the displacement was
increased to 9500 tons, by which she was enabled
to carry armour 12 in. thick at the water line
opposite the machinery, and tapering to 6 in. at
the bow and stern. The importance of protecting
the motive power more completely than other portions
of the hull had for some time been recognised, and,
moreover, the extremities would be overburdened with
such heavy weights as 12-in. plates. The disposi-
tion of the armament differed somewhat from that of
the ' Hercules.' There was the same central batter}-,
containing ten 18-ton guns, but above this was another
battery, in which was placed two 25-ton guns. Both
batteries had recessed pcjrts, by which a pcnverful bow
fire was obtained. It may be observed here that the

64 Bi'oadside Ironclads.

mounting and working of such heavy guns on the
broadside was only possible from their comparative
shortness, so that when required they could be with-
drawn or housed inside the ship. Guns of the present
day, and of the same diameter of bore, are twice the
length. We had already adopted the twin screw, and
the ' Alexandra' was so fitted. This, added to improved
machinery, gave her a speed of 15 knots. The climax
in broadside ironclads had now been reached. Few
were found to dispute the merits of our latest production
as an engine of war. Though never )'ct opposed to a
hostile vessel, the ' Alexandra ' took part in the bombard-
ment of the Egyptian forts at Alexandria in 1882, and
rendered good service on that occasion. She was struck
about thirty times, but sustained no serious injur)-.

Space has not permitted me to allude to a number
of other vessels built between the production of the
' Warrior ' and * Alexandra.' They partook more or
less of the character of those described, though varying
in size. The second-class ironclad was well represented
by several of moderate dimensions, so that the old
gradation of two and three-deckers was preserved in
the new fleet. Moreover, the Suez Canal was completed,
and its depth was such that the heaviest ironclads could
not pass through. It was desirable that some of our
battle ships should be able to utilise this route to the
East, instead of taking the longer passage by the Cape
of Good Hope. We should never neglect this considera-
tion whatever the temptation to add to the dimensions
of warships.

Broadside Ironclads. 67

In this brief review of progress between 1861 and
1877 I have confined myself to the development of the
broadside system of armoured vessels, and, looking back,
how wonderful that progress seems. The * Warrior '
carried only 1350 tons weight of iron and wood for
protection out of a total 9000 tons displacement. The
* Alexandra,' only 500 tons larger, is enabled to sustain
2300 tons employed for protection, and is a knot faster.
Rolling iron plates of any thickness was practically a
new industry in i860 ; but in sixteen years, commencing
with 4i-in. plates, the demand for a thickness of 12 in.
had been as promiptly met.

While we, in common with other nations, were thus
encasing our ships in coats of mail, the advantage con-
ferred by this system was to my mind strikingly illus-
trated by an episode in the American Civil War. After
a cruise of two years the celebrated * Alabama ' put into
Cherbourg to be docked and repaired. Her commander.
Captain Semmes, in his interesting account of her career,
says of this period : ' The poor old " Alabama " was not
now what she had been. She was like the wearied fox-
hound limping back after a long chase, footsore, and
longing for quiet and repose. Her commander, like her-
self, was well-nigh worn down.' Three days after her
arrival the United States sloop ' Kearsage ' turned up off
the port, and Semmes sent a message to her commander
that if he w(juld wait until the '.Alabama' had completed
with coal he would come out to meet him. The two
vessels were not unequally matched in dimensions and
armament. The ' Kearsage,' Captain Winsluw, was a

68 Broadside Ironclads.

wooden sloop of 1030 tons. She carried two 11 -in.
smooth bore guns, four 32-pounders, and one rifled
30-pounder. Her crew numbered 160. The 'Alabama'
was also a wooden vessel of 1040 tons. Her armament
consisted of one 8-in. smooth bore, one 7-in. rifled gun,
and six 32-pounders. She carried 150 men. Beyond
stowing away her top hamper and making the prepara-
tions for action common to rigged vessels she took no
special precautions. The ' Kearsage,' on the other hand,
had suspended her spare chain cables up and down the
side, opposite the boilers and machincr}-, thus giving
armour protection to that important locality and a large
portion of the hull at the water line. The chain was
covered over with a thin casing of wood, which effectu-
ally concealed what was beneath. This method of add-
ing to the defence of wooden ships had been first
adopted by Admiral Farragut when passing hostile
forts in the Mississippi the same year. As against the
guns and projectiles of that time, and especially as a
preventive to the penetration of shells, by causing them
to burst outside, the plan was ingenious and effectual.
The same procedure was open to Captain Semmes, but
for some reason he did not adopt it, nor does he appear
to have been aware of this move of his opponent. Though
Semmes afterwards sneered at an enemy ' who went out
chivalrously armoured to encounter a ship whose wooden
sides were entirely without protection,' such utilisation
of the resources of a ship to improve her defensive
capability was not only perfectly justifiable but the
plain duty of a commander desirous of ensuring the

Broadside Ironclads. 69

victory with as little injury as possible to his own
vessel.

On the morning of June 19th, 1864, the 'Alabama'
steamed out of Cherbourg Harbour, and steered for
the * Kearsage/ then awaiting her about six miles off
the port. When the distance between them had been
reduced to a mile, the ' Alabama ' opened fire, but it was
not returned until the two ships were 900 yards from
each other. The ' Kearsage ' then steered to close with
her antagonist, but the 'Alabama' kept on at full speed,
and the two ships steamed round in a circle at a distance
from each other of about 800 yards. The firing now
became very hot. The ' Alabama ' was hulled several
times, and a number of men were disabled. Her own
fire, on the other hand, had little effect on the ' Kearsage,'
the chain cables affording protection to the hull, and
her principal damage was aloft. After an hour's action
a shell from one of the 11 -in. guns of the 'Kearsage'
struck the 'Alabama' near the water line and burst,
making a large hole, through which the water poured
into the ship. Semmes turned his vessel towards the
French shore, and endeavoured to reach it under sail and
steam. ]^ut the 'Alabama' was filling fast, and further
effort being useless, her flag was hauled down. She
sank soon afterwards, the officers and crew being picked
up by boats from an English \'acht, a h^"cnch pik)t
vessel, and the ' Kearsage.' Semmes complained that
his adversary was dilal(>r\' in this matter, but after an
action boats are not often in a condition to be despatched
at a moment's notice, and the captain of the ' Kearsage'

70 Broadside Ironclads.

was not a man to disregard the claims of humanity.
The casualties to the crew of the ' Alabama ' were nine
killed and twenty-one wounded, while the ' Kearsage '
had only three wounded. This vessel was struck thirty
times, of which thirteen only were in the hull. The fir-
ing of the ' Alabama ' was wild, but she suffered under
another great disadvantage, that she had previously
little shot or shell practice against a target, being
unable to replenish her ammunition. Mere drill with
guns unloaded can never render men efficient in action.
Frequent target practice is essential to give confidence
and proficiency before the enemy. Lack of this and
the improvised armour of her antagonist told against
the ' Alabama,' and two valuable lessons were thus
afforded by this action. They should not be forgotten
at a time when the principle of protecting ships with
armoured decks only is being so much extended, and
when there is a tendency to curtail practice with full
charges of powder owing to their effect upon the guns.

CHAPTER IV

EARLY TURRET SHIPS

Introduction of the * Monitor ' — Claims of Ericsson and Captain Cowper
Coles — ' Merrimac ' and * Monitor ' in America — ' Royal Sovereign '
converted in England — Further development of the Turret
System — ' Devastation ' to ' Inflexible.'

Ericsson is generally credited with the first idea of
mounting a gun in a revolving turret and placing it in
a low iron-plated vessel, as practically applied in his
celebrated ' Monitor ' of the American Civil War. But
Captain Cowper Coles, some years before, had been
urging the adoption of the same system, and many of
his original ideas are to be seen embodied in the ships
of to-day. The plan with him seems to have originated
in 1855, when during the Crimean War he mounted a
32-pounder on a raft, for service in the shallow waters
of the Sea of Azof. This proving useful, he next thought
of protecting the gun, and proposed an improved raft,
formed of empty casks planked over, to carry a 6S-
poundcr, pointing through an apcrtin-c in a hemispherical
iron shield placed over it. He proposed a number of
these rafts for an attack on Cronstadt. A committee of
naval officers serving in the Black Sea reported favour-
ably on the scheme, and Captain Coles was ordered

72 Early Turret Ships.

home to lay his plans before the Admiralty. Peace,
however, intervened, and nothing further was done.
Captain Coles continued working out his ideas, and in
June i860 read a paper at the United Service Institution,
in which he proposed a low freeboard vessel, on which
were to be a number of cupolas or turrets, such as he
had devised for the improved raft, each containing two
guns ; the space required for a pair of guns being little
more than that necessary for a single piece. But now
follows the principal feature of his system. Hitherto
changing the direction of a gun was effected roughl}' and
laboriously by tackles and handspikes. Captain Coles'
proposal is thus described in his own words : * The
horizontal motion or training is effected by turning the
shield itself, with the gun, crew, and the platform on
which they stand. The whole apparatus thus becomes,
as it were, the gun carriage, and being placed on a
common turntable, can be revolved to the greatest
nicety of adjustment by means of a winch.' The idea
of a turntable he no doubt took from the arrangement
of the railway system. As all heavy guns are now
mounted on turntables, and revolve either with the
shield, as in case of turrets, or independently, as in the
case of ship barbettes, we must recognise the claim of
Captain Coles to be the inventor of the modern system.
The ' Monitor' was not built until two years afterwards.
Our Government, however, had decided upon the
' Warrior ' type, and were not disposed to try an
experiment in quite a different direction. Nor were
the continental powers so inclined. The broadsid

-f^I

Early Turret Ships, 75

armour-clad for sea service, and the broadside floating
battery for coast defence, had been generally adopted.
But the Civil War in America broke out, and certain
naval operations had an immense influence on the
course of naval construction. The Southern Con-
federacy was the first to appreciate the value of armour-
clad vessels. In July 1861 it was decided to raise and
convert into an ironclad the wooden frigate ' Merri-
mac,' of 3400 tons and forty guns, which had been sunk
at the Norfolk navy yard when it was abandoned two
months previously. When raised, the upper portion
of the vessel was cut down to within 2 ft. of the
water line, and on this reduced hull was constructed a
casemate with slanting sides. Two layers of railway
iron formed the protection of this casemate, in which
the guns were placed, and worked in ports on the broad-
side system. Dearth of plant in the South for such
work, at the beginning of hostilities, caused considerable
delay, so that it was not until March 8th, 1862, that she
proceeded to Hampton Roads, where the Federal fleet
was at anchor. This consisted of wooden vessels.
Among them were the * Cumberland,' of thirty guns,
and the * Congress,' of fifty guns. No attack appears
to have been anticipated, and presumably no informa-
tion of the ' Merrimac's ' completion had reached the
Northern commander. Though fire was opened on
the ' Merrimac,' it had no effect ow her protected sides.
She made straight for the ' Cumberland,' and struck
her forward on the starboard side. The ' Cumberland '
sank shortly after. The ' Congress ' in the meantime

76 Early T^irret Ships.

had slipped her anchor and got into shallow water,
where the ' Merrimac,' owing to her deeper draught,
could not follow. Her guns could reach, however, and
the ' Congress ' was set on fire, when she hauled her flag
down. The ' Merrimac ' then withdrew, intending to
return the next day and destroy the rest of the
squadron.

There was great consternation in the North at this
event, but the means were at hand to arrest the Southern
vessel in her triumphant career.

In August 1861 the Northern States had determined
to obtain ironclad steam vessels, and at the end of that
month Ericsson offered to construct in a few months a
vessel which would destroy the rebel squadron. A board
of officers was appointed to consider plans proposed,
and in September it recommended that a vessel on
Ericsson's design should be built. She was commenced
in October, launched on January 30th, 1862, and com-
pleted on February 15th, 1862. The design provided
for a hull not more than 2 ft. above the water, and with
a flat bottom, that the draught might not exceed 10 ft.
The sides, to a short distance below the water line, were
protected with 4-in. plates. In the centre of the deck
was built a circular turret, revolving on a central spindle,
and protected with 8 in. of iron. Inside the turret were
mounted two ii-in. smooth bore guns, pointing through
port holes. They could thus fire in any direction with-
out turning the vessel, an obvious advantage not only
on the open sea but especially in narrow waters, for
which she was more intended. Such was the famous

Early Turi^et Ships.

' Monitor,' a name given by Ericsson to his creation to
admonish the leaders of the Southern Rebellion, and to
be also a monitor to the Lords of the Admiralty in
England, suggesting to them doubts as to the propriety
of their building four broadside ironclads at three and

KKICSSON S TURRIC'l'.

a halt million dollars each. Such were the reasons m'ven

by Ericsson himself for the clioice of this name. He
had not forg(jtten his unsuccessful attempts to favour-
abl}^ impress their lordships with his screw propeller
twenty-four years previousl}-.

We have seen that on March 8th, 1862, the 'Merrimac '
had sunk the 'Cumberland.' On March 2d the ' Moni-

y^ Early Turret Ships,

tor' left New York under the command of Lieutenant
Worden, and after a somewhat stormy passage she
arrived at Hampton Roads on the evening of the 8th.
The next morning when the 'Merrimac' appeared again,
bent on destruction, those on board descried a strange-
looking object, an iron tower, apparently, on the surface
of the water. Then the low hull was made out, and a
dash made for this new opponent. The battle then
began, but it was soon apparent that the ' Merrimac's '
ordnance could make no impression on the turret of the
' Monitor,' and there was little else to hit. The case-
mate of the * Merrimac,' however, offered a good mark,
and almost every shot of the other took effect some-
where. After two hours' pounding the * Merrimac '
hauled out of action, having sustained considerable
injury, and, owing to orders previously given, the * Moni-
tor' allowed her to depart. But the principal object
had been gained, and the ' Merrimac ' gave no further
trouble. The ' Monitor ' was struck twenty times, of
which nine hits were on the turret, but the injury done
was trifling. Great rejoicings took place throughout
the North at this event, and it was believed this new
method of naval construction would supersede all others.
It certainly exercised a powerful influence in more than
one country.

But an essential quality was lacking in the
* Monitor,' — seaworthiness. Steaming against a moder-
ate wind and sea, the water swept over her like a
deluge, and found its way down the funnels and any
aperture leading to the interior. A few months after

Early T2i7^ret Ships. 79

her encounter with the ' Merrimac ' she foundered in a
gale off Cape Hatteras. In England it was evident
that a type of vessel unfit for distant service could not
serve as a model for general adoption. But as coast
defence was then prominently before the country, owing
to the views expressed by Lord Palmerston when pro-
posing in i860 a large outlay on sea forts, it was decided
to construct two turret ships on Captain Coles' plans.
A wooden three-decker, the ' Royal Sovereign,' was
accordingly cut down and armoured with 5i-in. iron

THE ' ROYAL SOVEREIGN.'

plates. She carried four turrets, the foremost one con-
taining two guns, and the others a single gun each. To
give more freeboard at sea there were hinged light iron
bulwarks, 3 ft. 6 in. high, which were thrown down when
it was desired to fight the guns. The turrets, instead of
revolving on a central spindle as in the 'Monitor,' ro-
tated on rollers fixed on the lower circumference of the
turret, thus giving greater rigidity to resist impact of
shot. A similar vessel, the * Prince Albert,' was spcciall)'
built of iron by Messrs Samuda for the same cciuipment.
The 'Royal Sovereign' was completed in 1864, and
underwent successful trials. Having a low freeboard,
and being without masts, she was W(A considered a ship
capable of service on foreign stations.

8o Early Turret Ships.

Captain Coles, however, considered that a seagoing
turret ship was perfectly feasible, and persistently advo-
cated the principle. As he was supported by the press,
the Admiralty decided to build a masted turret ship, and
the ' Monarch ' was commenced. As she did not embody
the views of Captain Coles, he was at length permitted
to build a vessel of his own design, and he entrusted
the work to Messrs Laird of Liverpool. Guns having
increased so much in weight it became necessary to limit
the number of turrets to a pair placed on the centre line
of the ship, 120 ft. apart, each containing a pair of
guns. There were three masts, on the tripod principle,
by which the necessity for rigging is dispensed with, and
she was given full sail power. It is unnecessary to go
into further details, because this unfortunate vessel, which
was named the ' Captain,' was lost, with nearly all hands,
on September 6th, 1870. She capsized in a heavy squall
off Cape Finistcrre when under sail. Captain Burgoyne
was in command of her, while Captain Coles was his
guest, desirous of observing the behaviour of his design
at sea. The loss of two such men, with the remaining
officers and crew, was a national disaster not likely to
be forgotten. Errors of construction caused the cata-
strophe, combined with the great leverage exerted by
the sails when struck by a heavy squall.

Loss of the ' Captain ' and the principal advocate of
masted turret ships led the Admiralty to abandon this
type, but the ' Monarch ' was completed, and remains the
solitary specimen in our navy. She was similar in
general design to the ' Captain,' but in many important

Early Turret Skips. .S i

respects the two ships differed widely. The sides of the
* Monarch ' were 14 ft. above the water, whereas in the
' Captain ' they were only 6 ft. In the original design of
the latter they were to have been 8 ft., but additional
weights placed in the ship reduced this by 2 ft. The
two turrets of the * Monarch ' were closer together, the
lower portion of them being protected by the side
armour above the belt, which was carried up for this
purpose. The thickness here was 7 in., while the turrets
were given 10 in. of armour. In each was mounted a
pair of 25-ton guns, the largest ordnance then in use.
As the masts obstructed the right ahead and astern fire
smaller guns were placed at the ends of the vessel. All
this was accomplished on a displacement of 8350 tons,
and produced a powerful fighting machine, but the sail-
ing capacity was indifferent. In fact it w^as becoming
recognised that the gain in one respect was a loss in
another, and that the turret system suffered if combined
with a large spread of canvas. The advantage of
turrets was the large arc of training they enabled guns
to cover on either side of the ship, and that the whole
of the armament was brought into play instead of only
half, as in the case of a broadside ship. But if masts and
their rigging were given to such ships, as in the case of
the ' Monarch,' this arc was much circumscribed, and
the full benefit of the system was not reaiKxl.

It was therefore determined to build turret ships
for extended sea service without this objectionable
feature. Locomotion was to dei)end wholly on steam
and two screws with separate engines gave a double

82 Early Turret Skips.

chance against a total breakdown. To make up for the
absence of sail power, the supply of fuel must be in-
creased. This led to the design of the ' Devastation,'
and as she was the first mastless seagoing turret ship we
built, her construction excited considerable interest.
The leading features were a low freeboard hull, carrj'ing
two turrets, on the middle line of the ship. To protect
the base of the turrets an armoured breastwork or citadel
was built round them. This did not extend ricrht across

'TS-

THE 'DEVASTATION.

the vessel, so that there was a space between the walls
of the breastwork and the ship's side. At the instance
of a committee appointed after the loss of the ' Captain '
to consider designs, this space was enclosed by carrj'ing
up the side of the vessel to the height of the breast-
work and extending the deck over the latter to meet
the raised portion. This addition to the side, though
not armoured, increased the freeboard of the ship in the
central portion to over lO ft., while right aft it was
only 4 ft., and forward there was a low forecastle 8 ft.
above the water. The armour on the side extended
right round, and was 12 in. thick amidships, tapering
to 10 in. at bow and stern. On the turrets it was
14 in. It was at first intended to mount in these

Early Turret Ships. 8

four 25-ton guns similar to those of the 'Monarch,'
but we had now reached ordnance of 35 tons, and a
pair of these 'infants,' as they had been ironically termed,
were allotted to each of the * Devastation's ' turrets. She
was given twin screws, worked by separate engines, and a
coal stowage provided for 1300 tons. This capacity was
largely in excess of that of all previous ships, and forms
one of the most valuable features of this class. When
it is considered what was done with dimensions — 9350
tons — ^just under those of the ' Alexandra,' that the total
weight of protection carried was 2950 tons of iron and
wood, or an increase of 600 tons over the broadside ship,
and that she could present on either side a concentrated
fire of four 35-ton guns, while the range ahead or astern
was covered by two such pieces, all efficient!)' pro-
tected, it may be conceded that the success of the turret
system had been proved. But what a change from the
three-decker of 120 guns to the 'Warrior' of forty, and
thence to the ' Devastation,' with onl)- four heav}' guns.
Could the principle of concentration of armament be
extended further ? The limits were not }'et reached.
The 'Devastation' was completed in 1873, and an\-
doubts that may have been felt as to her scaworth}'
qualities were speedily set at rest. She proved able
to encounter severe weather, and wonderful h' slcath'
in a heav)' sea. The sea washed oxxt her like a lialf-
tide rock, but with a[)crtures closed it could not find
its way belcnv. There was, of course, discomfort to the
crew, who were dependent on artificial ventilatic)n, but
for service in the MediterraiiecUi, where bad weather is

84 Early Tier ret Ships.

of short duration, this class of ship has proved well
suited.

The * Dreadnought ' was the next improvement. A
slight increase in the thickness of the armour and weight
of the armament involved an additional displacement of
1500 tons. There were also structural differences of
some importance, which entailed extra weight. The
armoured breastwork extended right across the ship, and
was 186 ft. long, instead of 154 ft. in the 'Devastation.'
A higher freeboard throughout was also given. She
had four 38-ton guns, which, owing to improvements in
ammunition, were considerably more effective than the
35-ton guns. With these modifications the 'Dread-
nought ' was, and is to this day, regarded as an excellent
type of fighting ship. After a departure of some years,
we again returned to the general principle of her con-
struction in the ' Nile ' and 'Trafalgar,' to which allusion
will be made later on.

Though we had, without unduly increasing the size
of the battle ship, passed from 4^ in. to 14 in. of pro-
tective armour, the power of the gun had more than kept
pace, and it was evident that if armour capable of resist-
ing the heaviest ordnance was applied to a ship the
area covered by it must be contracted, or we should be
compelled to resort to enormous ships. At that time it
was considered undesirable to exceed 12,000 tons. Not
only had the resistance of the structure to hostile shot
to be considered, but the power to strike heavy blows
in return was even more important. Artillerists were,
with improved plant, constructing heavier guns than

Early Turret Skips. 85

the 38-ton, and we were not prepared to view with
equanimity foreign vessels with an advantage over ours
in this respect. The outcome of such views was the
' Inflexible,' designed by Mr Barnaby, then Chief Con-
structor of the Navy. In her the armour at the side
only extended for a length of 1 10 ft., in the centre of the
vessel, so that the complete armoured belt was aban-
doned. This was the principal innovation, which led to

rm rrm-ri o mn- a

„>

THE ' INFLEXIBLE.

much controversy at the time. There was a breastwork
or citadel, as in the ' Dreadnought,' the whole breadth of
the ship, which was increased to 74 ft., a remarkable
amount of beam for a length of 320 ft. In the ' Monarch '
the proportions were 330 by 58. 15y thus contracting
the citadel of the 'Inflexible' to iio ft. it was possible
to protect the sides with 24 in. of iron, disposed in two
thicknesses of 12 in. each, with a la}-cr of wood backing
between. Diagonally across the citadel, and within its
walls, were placed two turrets, each armed with a pair
of 80-ton guns, such a bound had ordnance made since

Early Turret Ships.

the days of the ' infants.' This arrangement of the
turrets was to allow all four guns to point directly ahead
or astern, whereas if placed on the fore and aft line, as
in previous ships, only half the armament could be so
utilised. The turrets were protected with i6 in. of
armour, consisting of a wrought-iron plate of 7 in., and

SECTION THROUGH TURRET OF THE ' INFLEXHU.E

outside that what is termed a ' compound ' plate of 9 in.
This was simply a plate of wrought-iron of 5^ in. thick,
to which a hard steel face, 3^ in. thick, had been
added and the two plates welded together. Wrought-
iron was too soft, and allowed the projectiles to pene-
trate, but the hard steel face broke them up. Hence a
reduced thickness of the new material could be used
with a corresponding saving of weight.

Early Titnxt Ships. (S7

When turrets were first introduced steam was em-
ployed to rotate them, and also, as the guns increased
in weight, for many of the operations connected with
their manipulation. But steam has the disadvantage
of condensation in pipes when transmitted, and for
such a delicate manoeuvre as keeping the sights of a
gun on a mark, which was effected by small movements
of the turret, steam power has defects. Hydraulic
power was therefore devised by Sir William Arm-
strong and Mr G. Rendel, of the Elswick firm, to
perform all these operations, and applied in the ' In-
flexible ' with great success. The heavy turrets could
be rapidly swung round or rotated with almost im-
perceptible motion, and stopped dead at any required
moment.

From the day on which we had begun to construct
warships of iron it became necessary to guard against
injury in the event of such a vessel striking the ground
or rock. A wooden ship might do this and suffer
little damage or danger of foimdering, as the material,
being more elastic, had a tendency to close in over
the fractured part, and swell as it became sodden with
water. Iron did not pcjssess this advantage, and, more-
over, to give the requisite buo^'anc)' the submerged
portion of the hull must ncccssaril)- be thin, so that
injury was easil\' inllicted in this part. h>\'cn at the
slowest speed the momentum of a weight of 9000 touii
coming in contact with a rock' would crush in the
fragile shell like matchwood. To meet this the double
bottom was dc\ised, which consisted in having an

88 Early Tzirret Ships.

inner iron skin a short distance from the outer bottom.
In case of the latter being punctured, the inner skin
would prevent an influx of water to the interior of the
ship. This was first carried out in the ' Warrior,' but
the dual portion only extended 1 1 ft. on each side of
the keel. In succeeding ships this principle was de-
veloped, and the inner skin became a veritable second
hull under water, the space between the two being
increased and sub-divided into a number of cells.
This cellular sub-division was adopted with the view
not only of giving strength in case of striking the
ground, but also of reducing the effect of a torpedo
explosion under water. As it was impossible to place
armour here, the double bottom was a substitute, the
hope being that the inner skin would be intact after
the outer hull had been driven in by the explosion.
As against the blow delivered by a ram such a protec-
tion would be insufficient. The only safeguard is to
divide the interior of the vessel into watertight com-
partments, so as to confine the water which would rush
in when both skins were fractured to that particular
locality. This principle had been carried out in greater
degree with succeeding ships, so that the ' Inflexible '
had 137 of these compartments. Each is provided
with a watertight door, to allow free access to all parts
at ordinary times, and these, of course, must be a
source of weakness to the principle. They may not
be closed at the proper time, and are liable to get
out of order unless continually worked.

Although the difference in weight between four 38-ton

Early Turret Ships. 89

guns and the same number of 80-ton guns, including
the carriages on which they are mounted, does not
exceed 200 or 300 tons, it is in the ammunition that a
heavier armament makes so much difference. We had
arrived at projectiles weighing nearly a ton each, with
a charge of some hundreds of pounds of powder. To
provide, therefore, say a hundred rounds for each gun, or
even a smaller number, involved a great addition of
weight. Hence the dimensions of the 'Inflexible' and
her equipment increased the displacement to 1 1,600 tons
— the largest warship we had constructed. The design
was not to pass unchallenged. Grave doubts were
expressed by a high authority as to the wisdom of
leaving the ends unprotected, and as to the stability of
the vessel when these had been subjected to a heavy
shell fire. The extremities were guarded only by an
armoured deck 3 in. thick just below the water line, and
at the sides by spaces filled with cork, to give buoyancy
when this part was perforated by shot and water gained
admittance. A committee, however, of distinguished men
appointed to investigate the design did not consider
that the ship would be specially liable to such a disaster.
The question really hinged upon the amount of fire a
ship is likely to receive in action in any particular part,
and experience teaches us that, under such conditions,
no one portion is more liable than another. The ' In-
flexible,' therefore, was coniplctcd, and in 1882 assisted
in the bombardment of the Egyptian forts with the
'Alexandra,' each representing a system and its de-
velopment in twcnt}' )'ears. i\ brief review of this

90 Early Titi'rct Ships,

important operation as the first serious bombardment
by an ironclad squadron may be of interest.

There has been rather a tendency to depreciate this
engagement by dwelling on the weakness of the defence.
Much is made of the fact that no submarine mines were
used to keep the ships at a distance, that the guns on
shore were weak and badly served, and that under totally
different conditions the fleet could not have succeeded.
It seems unnecessary to discuss what might have been,
or we could reply that no special arrangements had been
made on the side of the attack, no mortars provided, and
the ships that took part were not all the most powerful
we possessed. The fact, however, remains that the
batteries were silenced, and the guns deserted, showing
that the admiral in command had accurately estimated
the force necessary to produce this result. But these
batteries may well have been considered as formidable.
About twelve in number, thc}' were distributed along the
coast commanding the approach to Alexandria Harbour.
They mounted over 200 guns, of which about forty were
rifled, while the remainder were smooth bores. Except
for the penetration of armour, the latter were capable of
inflicting heavy damage on the assailants.

The attack was to be made by eight armoured ships,
carrying less than 100 guns so arranged that in many
cases only one side could be brought to bear at a time.
That some of the guns threw projectiles infinitely larger
than could be returned from the shore did not give a
corresponding advantage to the ships, because it has
usually been found that number, rapidity of fire, and

Early Turret Ships. 91

moderate size tells most against fortifications. Every
hole and cranny is then found out, to the discomfiture
of the garrison.

The ships opened fire early on the morning of
July nth, 1882, at ranges varying from 1500 to 4000
yards. The fire was returned from the forts, but the
ships being mostly under weigh were difficult to hit.
This also affected the accuracy of their own fire, so
that eventually they anchored and continued a heavy
cannonade upon such forts as were still working their
guns. Some were silenced about half-past ten, and this
released some of the ships to devote their fire to other
forts. At three o'clock fire had ceased from the shore.
No great damage had been inflicted on the ships. The
'Alexandra' had suffered most. She was hit about
thirty times, but mostly by round shot. About forty
more hits were distributed among the remaining ships,
and the total number of casualties was six killed and
twenty-five wounded. The casualties on shore could
not be ascertained, but they were probably hcav)'. The
fire of the ships was accurate on the whole, but the fuses
being defective, many of the shell did not burst. Several
of the guns on shore were dismounted or disabled, but
the works bchiiul which the\' fought were not grcatl\-
damaged. This was (jwing to the small number of guns
that ccjuld be opposed to them. '\\\v. guns were silenced
chicfl)' b)- projectiles entering the embrasures, in such
operations vessels carr)'ing a large number of moderate
sized guns will be more effective than shi[)s carr}ing
monster ordnance few in number. l'\)r the attack of

92 Early Turret Ships.

forts high angle fire from mortars and howitzers is very
effective, but no provision for vessels so equipped is
made in our fleet. To do the same work with direct
fire would necessitate a numerical superiority in guns,
such as existed in the days of lOO-gun ships.

chaptf:r V

BARBETTE SYSTEM COMBINED WITH BROADSIDE

Battle of Lissa — Lessons to be derived from this Action — Introduction
of the Barbette System of Mounting Guns — First applied in the
' Temeraire '— The 'Admiral' Class — Increase in Dimensions of
Battle Ships to 14,000 tons — New Vessels, ' Royal Sovereign,'
* Empress of India,' ' Ramillies,' ' Repulse,' ' Resolution,' and
' Royal Oak ' — Disadvantages of Monster Ships.

Having thus detailed the changes by which the stately
three-decker of 1850 was transformed into the massive
ironclad structure of twenty years later, it is desirable
here to give an account of the first action between two
fleets containing this new type of battle ship. In the
short but decisive war between the combined forces of
Prussia and Italy against Austria, in 1866, the issue
could not depend upon any naval operations that might
be undertaken, and the decisive victory of Sadowa over-
shadowed to a great extent the sea fight off Lissa and
the many lessons to be derived from it. Even in naval
circles there was not that keen scrutiny into cause and
effect which might have been anticipated when con-
structions based largely upon theoretical considerations
had thus been brought to the test of actual conflict.
Yet no naval incident of such importance had occurred
since the battle of Trafals/ar. The American Civil War

94 Barbette System combined with Broadside.

had been signalised by gallant encounters between
single ships, and interesting as well as instructive
assaults upon land defences. The Crimean War had
shown that even when denied the opportunity of meet-
ing an enemy at sea a powerful nav)' can enable opera-
tions on land to be undertaken and sustained which
otherwise were impracticable. But since 1805 '"^o
hostile fleets had met, and when we consider the nature
of the naval forces engaged at Lissa, the strateg)- dis-
played, and the tactics adopted, this action is worthy of
the closest attention. I shall deal very briefly with the
composition of the forces engaged. Nearly all nations
had followed the example of l^^rance and this countr\- in
reconstituting their fleets, so that in 1866 Italy was able
to muster twelve ironclads, varying in size from 5800
tons to 2000 tons. According to dimensions, they were
protected with 5^, 4^, or 4-in. iron plates. The arma-
ment was in most cases a combination of rifled and
smooth bore ordnance, mounted on the broadside
s)\stem. Besides these ironclads there were several
wooden frigates and smaller vessels. In c(jmmand was
Admiral Persano, a man who had seen much service,
though without war experience.

The Austrian fleet was less powerful in ironclads, of
which there were onl)- seven, varying from 5 200 tons to
3000 tons. Their armour ranged from 4I to 5-in.
plates. The guns of this squadron were decidedly
inferior to their opponents, consisting for the most part
of smooth bore 48-pounders, though five of the iron-
clads had rifled ordnance in addition. Besides these

Barbette System couihined zuitk Broadside. 95

there was a wooden screw Hnc-of-battlc ship, the
' Kaiser,' with several other wooden frigates and smaller
vessels. In command was Admiral Tegethoff, an
officer of distinction, who had commanded an Austrian
Squadron in the Danish War of 1864, and taken part in
an action off Heligoland, between two small squadrons,
which was without decisive result.

The following is a list of the vessels that were to
meet in the Adriatic : —

Italian.

Austrian.

Ships.

Tonnage.

Ships.

Tonnage.

Aruwured.

Arvioitred.

' Re d'ltalia,' . . .

5800

' Ferdinand Max,' . .

5200

' Re di I'ortos^allo
' Maria Pia,'

5600
4300

'Hapsburg,' . .
' Don Juan d 'Austria,'

5200
3600

' Castelfidardo,'

4300

' Kaiser Max,' . . .

3600

' Ancona,' .
'San Marlino,'

4200
4200

' i'rinz Eugen,' . . .
'Drachc,' ....

3600
3000

' Affondatore,' .

•4000

'Salamander,' . . .

3000

' Carignano,'
' I'\)rmi(lal)ilc,' .

4000
2800

'Terribile,' . .

2800

Unarmoiircd.

' X'arcse,' . .
' I'alestro,'. . .

2000
2000

'Kaiser,'

5000

18 Frigates and

( 'nan/ioiircd.

smaller Vessels.

22 Frigates and

smaller Vessels.

When hostilities commenced, Tegethoff made a
demonstration on the Italian coast, but was unable to
meet any portion of the Italian fleet, and returned to

96 Barbette System combined with Broadside.

Fasano. This appears to have caused considerable ex-
citement in Italy. The navy recently created was held
in great esteem, and known to be, both in the number
and equipment of its vessels, superior to that of the
enemy. It was doubted whether an Austrian Squadron
would venture to encounter it at sea under such dis-
advantages. This only can account, to my mind, for the
course taken. Persano was urged to some striking feat
of arms, and the attack on Lissa was organised. What
can be thought of such strategy? No indication had
been given that he had such a command of the sea as
to permit him to take no account of the enemy's
squadron. Proof had been afforded that the Austrian
commander was a man who would be troublesome if not
disposed of. His force must be sought out and fought,
or blockaded. Pcrsano's first duty was to follow the
Austrian fleet. Such was his numerical superiority that
he might have detailed a portion of his force for this duty
while the remainder carried out some other operation.
But he disregarded all the experience which has shown
that naval supremacy must first be obtained before terri-
torial attack is justifiable, and he embarked upon an
undertaking which only added one more lesson to the
many history affords on this head.

Persano left Ancona, on the i6th of July 1866, with
nearly thirty vessels, of which eleven were ironclads, and
steered for the small island of Lissa on the Austrian
coast. The principal port was San Giorgio, where fairly
strong batteries skilfully handled might be expected to
give hostile ships a warm reception. A short distance

Barbel tc Syslcui cojibiucd with Broadside. 97

off was another harbour, Carobcrt, and on the other side
of the island were the bay and town of Comissa. Neither
of these places had any defences to speak of The
plan of Admiral Persano was to attack the batteries of
San Giorgio, and when these had been silenced to land
a body of troops sufficient to overcome the garrison and
occupy the island. An alternative plan would have
been to land his own force at any convenient place, under
cover of his ships, and take San Giorgio in rear — as we
had done at Bomarsund — keeping his squadron ready
and uninjured to meet the enemy at sea. But he started
without his troops, which were to follow the next day,
convoyed by an ironclad and three wooden vessels —
another error, as they were thus liable to be cut off by
an Austrian Squadron before reaching their destination.
Arriving at San Giorgio, on the morning of the i8th, the
ships shortly after opened a heavy fire on the batteries,
which was returned, and the action continued through-
out that day. Night brought about a cessation of the
cannonade, but the land defence was not overcome.
The next day the troops arrived to the number of about
2000, and preparations to land were then made. The
disembarkation was to be at Carobert. Two ironclads
were sent to make a diversion at Comissa, four others
were to endeavour to enter the harbour of San Gioigio
while the remaining ships covered the landing. This
was on the 19th. Puit the iiawil attack on San Giorgio
did not succeed, and the detachment detailed for it with-
drew, having sustained considerable injury and loss. The
disembarkation was postponed for that da}'.

98 Barbette System combined zvit/i Broadside.

In the meantime where was Tegethoff? He had
heard of the intended attack on Lissa while at Fasano,
but distrusted its reality until, on the 19th, he received
news which cleared away his doubt on the matter. He
therefore sailed with his whole squadron that afternoon,
bent on attacking the enemy and frustrating his purpose.
Whether Persano heard that night of his departure I do
not know, but on the morning of the 20th he prepared
to renew the attack and land his troops, as if deeming
no interference possible. At eight A.M., however, one of
his look-out vessels signalled ' suspicious fleet in sight.'
And what a condition he was in to meet even a less
powerful squadron than his own. He had materially
contributed to put the two fleets on an equality. One
of his ironclads had been so knocked about the day
before that she was practically useless, two others were
out of reach, making a diversion elsewhere, and his un-
armoured vessels were encumbered with the landing
appliances, and unable to cope effectively with the
Austrian vessels of the same nature. Persano hastily
collected his uninjured ironclads and advanced to meet
Tegethoff, whose squadron was now plainly visible.
The fighting formation he adopted was single line ahead,
so that his squadron presented a long line extending
over 2 miles. The Austrian squadron bore down in
three divisions, each forming an obtuse angle and com-
posed of seven ships. The divisions were about 1000
yards astern of each other. Tegethoff led in the
' Ferdinand Max.' This formation was more compact
than the single line, but one difficult to maintain when

Jhirbctte System combined luitJi Broadside. 99

the opposing- forces came in contact. To bring this
about, however, was the first aim of the leader, and
after that the result must mainly depend on his
subordinates. At about half-past ten Persano, who was
in the ' Re d' Italia,' stopped her and went on board
the ' Affondatore.' To do this at such a moment
indicates a sudden decision not made known to his
followers. The ' Re d'ltalia' was fourth ship in the line,
consequently those in rear had to reduce speed, thus
increasing the distance between them and the three
leading ships. Tegethoff's order to his squadron was
to rush at and sink the enemy. He was then bearing
down on the port bow of the Italian line. When about
1000 yards distant the leading vessels of the Italian
Squadron opened fire, which was not returned until
Tegethoffs leading division had arrived within about
300 yards ; but little damage was done on either side.
Whether smoke now obscured both squadrons or an
alteration of course was inadvisable at the last moment
is uncertain, but it happened that the whole of the
Austrian vessels passed through the gap between the
third and fourth ships of the Italian line without contact.
The fight now became a viclcc. The iAustrian dix-ision
of wooden ships bore down to attack the Italian un-
armoured vessels that had remained behind, but was
intercepted and engaged by the rear Italian ironclads.
The 'Kaiser' was attacked by the ' ^Affondatore,' who
tried to ram, but failed. Then another ironclad, the
* Portogallo,' made for the ' Kaiser,' whose captain, to
cover his smaller wooden consorts, decided to ram the

loo Barbette System combined ivith Broadside.

newcomer. He succeeded in striking her on the port
side, sustaining severe injury to his own ship without
greatly damaging the ' Portogallo.' Being now almost
disabled, the ' Kaiser,' followed by most of the Austrian
wooden ships, made for San Giorgio. Though all had
suffered more or less severely, they had held their own
against a portion of the Italian ironclads, leaving the
remainder to be dealt with by their own,

Tegethoff had meanwhile attacked the Italian centre,
and a hot engagement ensued. The * Re d'ltalia' had
her rudder damaged, and being observed by Tegethoff
in this condition, he directed the 'Ferdinand Max' to
be steered at her. The 'Re d'ltalia' endeavoured to
avoid the assault, but did an unwise thing by first going
ahead and then astern. She thus had little movement
at the instant the ' Ferdinand Max ' struck her on the
port side at full speed. The shock was tremendous on
board the ' Max,' but by going astern with the engines
she extricated her stem from the hole made in the ill-
fated ' Re d'ltalia.' That vessel had heeled over to the
blow, then rolled to port, and almost immediately sank,
taking down most of her crew. Another Italian iron-
clad, the ' Palestro,' had been set on fire by a shell, and
blew up afterwards. Several single fights had taken
place between other ships, but without decisive result.
One is struck by the opportunities for ramming this
action afforded, the many instances in which it was
attempted, and the number of failures to strike that took
place. The battle was practically over soon after noon.
The Italian Squadron withdrew, and Tegethoff went

Barbette System eombined with Broadside, i o i

into San Giorgio, which he had thus saved. The number
of killed and wounded in his ships was about 200, while
the Italians lost over 700 men, principally by the sinking
of the 'Re d'ltalia.' Besides this vessel they had lost
another ironclad, the ' Palestro,' while the Austrian
Squadron was intact. The 'Kaiser' was most injured,
but forty-eight hours sufficed to put her in a sea-
worthy condition. Whatever errors he may have com-
mitted previously, when once the action began, Persano
fought gallantly. His ship, the ' Affondatore,' was in
the thickest of the fight, though he failed to ram any
of his opponents. Even when his squadron was much
scattered, Persano signalled to attack again, and made
for the Austrian vessels. But his ships were in some
cases too distant to join in time, the opportunity passed
away, and the attack was not made. Though his force
was reduced by two ironclads, he was still superior in
numbers. The preceding attack on Lissa, coupled with
this action at sea, had so told on the crews that the
Italian commander molested his adversary no further.
Tegethoff having gained his object was not likely to
assume the offensive.

On the .Austrian side only the wooden vessels
suffered to any considerable extent frcfi: lire 'enormous
quantity of shell and shot discharged ^during-Oxit .day.
Tliis was due to inaccur;ic\-, in the first place; (Uid,
secondl)', to the protection of 4.j-in. iron plating. The
Italian fire was exceeding!}- wild; broadsides at close
quarters missed tlieir object, and I have heard it stated
that often guns were lired without [jrojectiles. This

I02 Barbette System combined with Broadside.

showed a most inefficient control of the fire on the part
of the officers, and it is a matter which should receive
the greatest attention in all navies. Much is written
about the fire discipline of armies in the field, but no
less important is this supervision in a naval action.

One thing is wanting to complete the valuable experi-
ence gained on that day and make it applicable to the
present time. No locomotive torpedoes were used, this
arm as a naval weapon not having been then introduced.
Whether, after the line was broken and the ships were
all mixed up together, it would not have been as
dangerous to friend as to foe may well be questioned ;
but small vessels specially armed in this way would
have had good opportunities of gliding in under cover
of the smoke and dealing deadly blows to partially dis-
abled ships. Time was everything to Tegethoff, and
hence it is difficult to say what effect torpedoes would
have had upon his tactics. We can only deal with
matters as they were ; and we have sufficient material
for reflection both in the strategy preceding the action
and the manner in which two modern fleets first met in
war.

. Whilq wc were thus developing side by side the
brpadside ar.d mrret systems of mounting guns behind
a.Tn-jjr our neighbours the French had proceeded on
somewhat different lines. At first, like ourselves, they
had adopted the broadside s}-stem, and then the central
battery, but with the latter and above it they usually
placed a few guns en barbette on each side. This prin-

Barbette System coiubined with Broadside, to

ciple was continued as guns increased in weight until
the combination became impossible. Then, rejecting
the turret except for coast defence vessels, they mounted
all the heavy guns e7i barbette. Even now considerable
difference of opinion exists as to the relative advantages
of the two systems, as may be observed from the fact
that one of the new 14,000-ton battle ships we are build-
ing is a turret vessel. This is one of the problems that
only such a practical test as w^ar can solve. The barbette
system consists of a thick inclined wall of armour, usually
pear-shaped, built into the ship, enclosing a turntable,
which carries the gun, and is high enough to permit the
latter to fire freely over the wall in any direction as
the turntable revolves. Therefore only the apparatus
for manipulating the gun is protected, and the piece
itself is exposed throughout its length to hostile fire.
With the revolving turret protection is afforded to a
greater portion of the gun, because the height of the
w^all is greater, and the gun points through an embrasure.
With short ordnance there w^as little exposed even at
the moment of firing, and after discharge rotation of
the turret took the guns out of danger. It was this
peculiarity of the turret system which gave the 'Monitor'
such an advantage over the ' Merrimac' As the officers
of the latter said, the ' Monitor's ' guns were fired and the
turret revolved scj (juickly that they had not a chance ( f
getting a fair shot at them, l^ut when guns were given
great length, and slender muzzles which might be
disabled by small projectiles, the advantage in this
respect was lessened. Moreover, the turret invoked

I04

Barbette System combined with Broadside.

additional weight, while the barbette permitted a higher
position for the gun, which at sea is a considerable
advantage. When a gun is not many feet above the
water there is a liability of projectiles striking crests of
waves near the ship and being deflected from the path
required. This has been observed at target practice
from some of our turret ships in rough weather.

Though circumstances inclined us to the turret, we
tentatively gave one ship — the ' Temeraire ' — a barbette
at each end. These were pear-shaped redoubts, but
differed from those now constructed, because their
dimensions were such as to allow the gun mounted
within to recoil down after firing behind the walls, and
thus disappear during the process of reloading. This

THE 'temeraire.

necessitated a larger enclosure, and the gain was con-
sidered so small as against the extra weight entailed
that this disappearing principle has not been repeated in
ships, though it is coming into greater favour for land
defences.

But a further consideration brought about a modifi-
cation not only in the method of carr>nng the heavy

guns which

the

and enthusiasm of artil-

Barbette System eonibincd 7vitli llroadside. 105

lerists had pressed^ upon us, but also in the com-
position of the armament itself. The inevitable result
of contracting the thickest armour to a comparatively
small area on the side of a ship was that the remainder
of a hull could be effectually penetrated by less
powerful ordnance. Much damage could be done by
light shells to the unprotected parts. It might be more
profitable to disregard the 24-in. armour of the ' Inflexible '
and endeavour to disable the ship by attacking the
much larger portion without protection. Numerous
light guns would be useful for this purpose, and the
French for some time had been in the habit of associat-
ing with the heaviest guns an auxiliary armament of
lighter ordnance, mounted on the broadside. The latest
phase was to be a combination of the barbette and
broadside systems. A series of vessels were constructed,
now well known as the ' Admiral ' class, because each
bears the name of a distinguished British admiral,
which varied in size from 9200 to io,000 tons. All are
constructed with a pear-shaped barbette at each end, for
one or two heavy guns, and between the barbettes a
broadside battery of 6-in. guns. The armour at the
water line is 18 in. extreme thickness, and of compound
manufacture. This armour does not extend to the ends,
which are protected with a steel deck. The absence of
a C(jmplete belt gives an opportiinil}- for critics to den}-
that such vessels arc efficient as battle ships. On the
other hand, their speed is higher considerabl}- — 17 knots
— than ail)' previous vessels, and the\' carry a hirgc sup-
pl\- of c(jal. They differ chiefi}- in the heav}' arma-

io6 Barbette System combined with Broadside.

ment. The smallest, the ' Collingwood,' carries four
45-ton guns, the ' Howe ' four 67-ton, and the * Benbow '
two iio-ton guns. Probably naval opinion would incline
to the * Collingwood's ' armament for all ships of this
size, with perhaps an addition to the auxiliary ordnance.
There might also be a preference for a reduction in
thickness of armour, and a corresponding increase in the
extent of water line covered by it. But of vessels that
can steam fast and hit hard it is easy to be hypercritical.
Another inducement to supplement the necessarily
few heavy guns with an auxiliary armament had
gradually been assuming great importance, and that
was the necessity of meeting the attack of torpedo boats.
It was evident that neither an 80-ton nor a 6-in. gun
would be the best weapon to stop the advance of a
small craft capable of covering a mile of water in three
minutes. One round from a heavy gun at such a mark
was as much as could be anticipated, while under cover
of the cloud of smoke the boat, if intact, had an excel-
lent opportunity for effecting her purpose. Numerous
guns of just sufficient power to penetrate the boiler, or
smash the machinery of a torpedo boat, would therefore
be most effectual in neutralising such an attack. Hence
the development of machine and quick-firing guns
throwing projectiles of from i to 6 lbs. The arma-
ment, therefore, of the modern ship is composed of
a few heavy guns, a secondary battery of ordnance of
moderate calibre, and numerous machine and quick-
firing guns. All this entails a great weight of ammuni-
tion, so that if required to be combined with extensive

Barbette System eoinbined ivitJi Broadside. 107

armour protection, great speed, and a large coal supply,
we are forced into a ship of huge dimensions. Con-
fining our attention at present to the barbette system,
let us see the latest development of this type of battle
ship, though there was an interval when we returned to
our early love the turret.

In the ' Benbow ' we have a ship of 10,600 tons,
in which the principal armament is a single gun of iio
tons at each end, and ten guns of 5 tons on the broad-
side. She has 18 in. of compound armour covering the
central portion of the water line, but the broadside guns,
as well as the ends of the vessel, are unprotected with
armour on the side. It was freely asserted that for this
reason such vessels were liable to be disabled by vessels
with numerous light guns before perhaps their own
ponderous ordnance could neutralise the attack. The
explosion of a number of even small shell at the water
line would, it was urged, admit sufficient water to im-
pair the speed and manoeuvring qualities of the ship,
though not necessarily to overcome her buo}-anc)'.
Again, all nations were seeking some more powerful
explosive than powder as a bursting charge for shells.
To get these projectiles through iron without breaking,
their walls must be thick. Conscquentl)' the interior
capacity is reduced, and the amcnnit of powder such
shells can contain is onl\- sufficient to just o[)en the
iron case, or may not even do lliat. W'c want, howexer,
the shell to be fractured with violence into numercnis
pieces, each acting as a separate projectile, and for
this a more energetic explosive is rc(iuired. Man\- exist.

io8 Barbette System combined zvith Broadside,

but the difficulty hitherto has been to obtain one which
with great power, will combine safety in handling and
withstand the great concussion of the enormous powder
charges now fired in guns. Experiments in different
countries seem to show that this difficulty can be over-
come, and that such shells arc terribly destructive when
exploded inside a ship. Thus the old idea of protecting
crews from such effects again came to the front. All
these moderate sized guns and their workers must fight
behind armour of some sort, and not be left entirely
unprotected. There was also a demand for more of such
guns to supplement the principal armament. Nothing
was to be given up, but a good deal more was asked for.
The naval architect was willing to provide it, but said
that all this could not be done under a displacement of
14,000 tons. Thus when a large increase to the navy
was sanctioned in 1889, and it was decided to at once
lay down ten battle ships, of which eight were to be of
the first class, it was perhaps not unnatural that we
should endeavour to embody in these all the varied
demands for powerful armament, extended protection,
great speed, and prolonged endurance at sea, only to be
given in mastless ships by a large coal supply. As
regards the first item, a feeling that we had exceeded
the limit of usefulness in guns of such weight as 1 10 tons,
and the restriction thereby imposed as to number, led to
a more moderate calibre being adopted for the principal
armament. The 67-ton gun had been tried, and found
satisfactory in some ships of the 'Admiral' class, so it was
selected for the new vessels. All of them are to have

Barbette System eouibined 7inth Ih^oaciside. 109

four of these guns, mounted in pairs, at each end of the
ship. In seven out of eight of these first-class battle
ships, to be named the 'Royal Sovereign,' 'Empress of
India,' 'Ramillies,' 'Repulse,' 'Resolution,' 'Revenge,' and
'Royal Oak,' this part of the armament is to be en barbette.
This system would therefore appear, according to present
opinion, to offer the greatest number of advantages.
The two barbettes form separate protected positions, so
that no injury to one could affect the other. Where
two such stations are placed in a single central citadel,
and hence necessarily in somewhat close proximity to
each other, there must be a risk of both being disabled
at the same time.

The auxiliary or secondary armament is to consist
of ten 6-in. guns, five on each side, in a central battery
between the barbettes. To obtain greater distribution
of these guns, and so reduce the effect of hostile fire in
this part of the ship, they will be mounted on two decks,
one above the other. As to protect them by external
armour on the side of the ship would involve great
additional weight, steel shields only will be provided for
these guns, those between decks having side screens as
well, also of steel. A number of machine and other
smaller guns will be disposed where convenient. As
regards armour, these vessels will carry a belt of com-
pound armour for two-thirds of the length, Si- ft. broad
and 18 in. thick, in the central portion. Above this, for
a length of 145 ft., the broadside is to be protected with
5-in. steel plates to a height of i)\ ft. above the water.
The barbettes will have compound armour, 18 in. thick,

1 1 o Barbette System combined with Broadside.

for protecting the machinery employed in the manipula-
tion of the heavy guns. The ends of the vessel have no
external armour, but a steel deck will confine any water
that may enter, from this portion being penetrated by
projectiles, and prevent it from flooding the ship. Even
if the spaces at each end were so filled, the trim of the
vessel would be little affected.

To drive a floating weight of 14,000 tons through the
waters obviously requires powerful machinery, and as it
was considered desirable that these vessels should have a
speed of 16 knots without pressing the engines, and under
ordinary atmospheric draught for the fires, while with
forced or artificial draught the speed should be capable
of being increased to 175 knots, boilers and engines
are being provided equal to the development under the
latter condition of 13,000 horse power. As there will
be two sets of engines for revolving twin screws, each
set will be of 6500 horse power. When we remember
that the 'Warrior' had a single engine of 5000 horse
power, which propelled her at 14 knots, it can be realised
what a vast increase of power is required to obtain the
additional 3^ knots, notwithstanding the great improve-
ments in steam propulsion since that time. In the
* Collingwood,' a vessel of the same displacement as the
'Warrior,' to pass from 14 knots to 17 knots required
practically the horse power to be doubled. At moderate
speeds modern marine engines are economical in coal
consumption, but beyond a certain rate the fuel rapidly
disappears. A large supply is therefore essential, and
in the new battle ships the amount is fixed at 900 tons.

Barbette System cornbined with Irroadside. i i i

It is considered that this will enable them to cover
5000 nautical miles at a speed of 10 knots an hour.
One matter must be taken into account, and that is the
drain on the coal for work unconnected with propelling
the ship. Numerous small engines are continually going
for driving electric light apparatus, ventilating fans,
pumping machinery, and other services, so that practi-
cally one boiler is always in use. Coal used in cooking
and distilling water swells the total expended in this
way, so that even when lying at anchor the stock
diminishes at no inconsiderable rate. In time of war,
when high speed will have to be maintained, the question
of fuel must be a constant anxiety, and I should prefer
an addition in this respect at a sacrifice of a few hundred
tons of armour in vessels of such dimensions. Neverthe-
less these eight new first-class battle ships are noble
designs, worked out with the ability which has character-
ised all that has emanated from the brain of Mr White,
the present Chief Constructor of the Navy. They will
form, as he has said, a squadron of identical character
and qualities, capable of proceeding and manoeuvring
together. As a single group they constitute a naval
force which the entire fleets of few other States can
equal.

With this unstinted commendation I must at the
same time express my preference for a greater number
of vessels of smaller size. This is a difficult question,
but it has been somewhat obscured by the extreme
views of those who advocate vessels of 2000 or 3000
tons for battle ships as a limit. It has been even

I 1 2 Barbette System combined zuitli Broadside.

advanced that a vast number of gunboats is a more
advantageous force than a few very large vessels.
Those, however, who have practical experience of the sea,
and who have endeavoured to benefit by the history of
the past, will at once reject such a doctrine. Looking
back, I observe in the old days that though four-deckers
were to be found in the fleets of our adversaries, we
abstained from adding them to our own ; that at one
time, as a result of war experience, we converted three-
deckers into two-deckers ; and that this type of vessel
was then most largely represented in our fleet. It could
cope with the bigger vessel, and if assisted by a com-
panion, with success. On the other hand, it is argued
that two frigates never took a line-of-battlc shin, and
hence one big vessel is better than two small ones; but the
argument is fallacious, because frigates were not battle
ships, and as a rule did not attempt to attack them.
Examples of their doing so and being sunk by a single
broadside are to be found in naval history. In the same
way we may say now that two cruisers cannot take the
place of a battle ship in a sea fight. Yet as actions then
were entirely decided by the gun, it might be thought
that the greater number of these weapons carried the
more efficient the vessel, and such an increase was only
effected by adding to the number of decks. Still, we
did not do it. And now we have ram and torpedo to
contend with, weapons which attack the most vulnerable
part of the ship, and which no increase in her dimensions
can enable her to withstand. Though a vessel of
20,000 tons could be constructed with armour impervi-

Barbette System conibineel with Broaeisiele. i i 3

oils to the i^un, her hull under water could not be made
strong enough to resist tb,e shock of a swift ram or the
explosion of 200 lbs. of gun cotton, which the latest
torpedo carries.

The great argument in favour of the very big ship
is that it represents the principle of concentration,
and that tactically a small number can be more
efficiently handled than a force numerically superior
but composed individually of weaker ships. This is
true in a general sense, but the principle may be carried
too far, and take us on to the 20,000-ton ship alluded
to. Admiral Sir Geoffrey Hornby, while endorsing the
concentrated strength principle, has also said : ' I think
it better that we should have ships of medium size.'
Docs he look upon 14,000 tons as 'medium size'? My
friend Mr White, if he ever reads this work, will pro-
bably say here: 'What is the limit you would impose?'
and be ready to show that it precludes some important
qualification. To this my reply would be that I am
prepared to sacrifice some protection, and to risk being
struck by the heaviest projectiles, as long as my ship
will exclude the remainder. Rapidit)- of m()\-emcnt
and an overwhelming fire from your own guns will
probably prove the best defence. There seems to me
no reason why a good speed, large supph' of coal, and a
[jowerful armament cannot be obtained within a displace-
ment of 10,000 tons. In eight vessels of 14,200 tons we
have an aggregate of 1 13,600 tons of material employed.
If we distribute this among twelve vessels, the\- can be
ap[)roximatel\- C)f 9,500 tons. I have asked admirals

1 1 4 Barbette System combined with Broadside.

which of two such squadrons, if pitted one against the
other, they would prefer to command. The selection
has usually been with the greatest number, for a squadron
of twelve ships can be controlled and directed as effec-
tively as one of eight. There are many other points
which might be brought forward against the bigger
vessel, such as difficulty in harbour accommodation,
depth of water, passage through the Suez Canal, indi-
vidual cost, and time required for completion, but space
will not permit my dwelling on them. I am content
to rest the argument on the increase of strength given
by the additional ram and torpedo power of the numeri-
cally superior squadron. These views will not, probably,
influence warship construction in the slightest degree.
Whether they are sound or not can only be demonstrated
by the searching test of war, and all we can say is, that
hitherto our experience has been in favour of moderate
dimensions for ships and their armament.

CHAPTER VI

COAST DEFENCE— THE RAM

Coast Defence Vessels — Such Constructions of Modern Growth — Erroneous
Ideas of Defence — The ' Glatton ' and other Coast Service Vessels —
Russian Circular Ironclads — Development of the Ram as a Weapon
— The ' Rupert ' and ' Polyphemus ' — Disadvantages of a Vessel fur
ramming only — Examples of difficulty in ramming.

The term ' coast defence vessel,' as applied to an}- craft
larger than a gunboat, is, as far as this country is
concerned, of modern growth. The principle of building
special ships for operations confined to the coast found
no favour with our ancestors, taught by the experience
of long w^ars that a seagoing fleet is the best defence
against any attempt on the part of an enem)- to
approach our shores. When, in 1804, Pitt brought
forward a motion in the House of Commons condemna-
tor}' of the Government's naval polic}', — a portion of his
indictment was the inadequate provision of gun vessels
to act in shallow water against an invading flotilla. Sir
Edward Pellew — afterwards Lord l^xmouth — then in
Parliament, clearl)' formulated on this (Kcasion the
true policy to be })in-stied. lie said: ' I do not rcall\-
sec in the arrangement of oin* na\al dcf ncc an\thing to
excite the apprehensions of even the most timid among

1 1 6 Coast Defence — the Ram,

us. I see a triple naval bulwark, composed of one fleet
acting on the enemy's coast ; of another, consisting of
heavier ships, stationed in the Downs, and ready to act
at a moment's notice ; and a third, close to the beach,
capable of destroying any part of the enemy's flotilla
that should escape the vigilance of the other two branches
of our defence. As to these gunboats, which have been
so strongly recommended, this mosquito fleet, they are
the most contemptible force that can be employed. I
have lately seen half-a-dozen of them lying wrecked on
the rocks. As to the probability of the enemy being
able, in a narrow sea, to pass through our blockading
squadrons with all that secrecy and dexterity, and by
those hidden means that some worthy people expect,
I really, from anything I have seen in the course of my
professional career, am not disposed to concur in it.'
Lord St Vincent was equally emphatic that preparation
should be rather directed to kee[)ing the enemy as far
from our coasts as possible, and attacking them the
moment they come out of their ports, than to awaiting
them at home.

It is only when the fleet has been suffered to
decline from motives of economy that misdirected at-
tention is turned to some such substitute as elaborate
land defences or coast defence ironclads. Such a
period was that following the Reform Bill of 1832,
until in 1847 ^'^ alarm was raised that we were
liable to invasion, which, it was stated, had been ren-
dered easy by the introduction of steam. The Duke
of Wellington pointed out the defencelessness of the

Coast Defence — the Ram. ii*j

country, and a Royal Commission, in 1859, recom-
mended an expenditure of ;^ 10,000,000 on the fixed
defences of our naval arsenals. There seemed no
one to urge that, if the state of navy was such as
to render an attack on any of these places other
than a desperate undertaking, the first step should be
to strengthen the fleet. But the naval voice was
silent, or nearly so. The military element in the
country had become predominant, while the words of
St Vincent and Pellew were forgotten. We had almost
accepted the situation of an inferior naval power. How
far we had wandered from the principles that guided
us in 1804 can be estimated on reading the debate
in the House of Commons, in i860, on the motion
to fortify the ports. Lord Palmerston said on this
occasion : ' I am not surprised that the gallant admiral
should undervalue the strength of fortifications ; but,
nevertheless, I think the history of war shows that
they do enable an inferior force to hold out for a
certain time against a superior force.' The 'gallant
admiral ' was Sir Charles Napier, who had said that
* the only sure way to prevent invasion was to have
always at hand a superior fleet to the French or any
other nation.' He quoted the saying of Mr Tierncy,
' give mc a well-manned fleet and a full Exchcciucr
and I will defy the world/ Ikit it was of no avail, and
we embarked upon a system of elaborate fortification,
based upon the assumed defeat, absence, or inferiority
of the only line of defence which could not be neglected
with inipunit}-.

1 1 8 Coast Dejence — the Ra^n.

Tacit acquiescence in a view which apparently
contemplates an enemy roaming over the seas without
et or hindrance, and his appearance in force without
warning on any part of our coast, seems to have led
to the construction of vessels with a restricted radius
of operation and incapable of service in distant waters.
The desire to have within sight, as it were, a portion
of the fleet becomes at times exceedingly strong. Each
locality demands a squadron for its special protection,
and failing to obtain it, urges extensive fortification.
The Admiralty, on the other hand, has always had a
strong objection to the localisation of any portion of
its force. During the Crimean War some uneasiness
was felt on the coast of the United Kingdom and
India at the absence of British ships. It was then
pointed out by the naval authorities that more efficient
protection was afforded to this country b}' confining
Russian ships to their own ports than by distributing
the British fleet along the east coast of England and
Scotland. A similar explanation demonstrated that
India was more efficiently protected by our squadron
acting in the Chinese Seas than by stationing British
ships in the Bay of Bengal. Periodically the same
demand is made for local defence, and when ships are
denied, an alternative is found in forts and submarine
mines, whose principal merit is that they cannot be
removed.

It has been asserted that ships being no longer
dependent on the wind for propulsion there is an
advantage to the side that contemplates attack. Lord

Coast Defc7ice — the Ram. 119

Palmcrston, in i860, said: 'The adoption of steam as
a motive power afloat has totally altered the character
of naval warfare, and deprived us of much of the
advantages of our insular position.' He quoted the
opinion of Sir Robert Peel, ' that steam had bridged
the Channel, and, for the purposes of aggression, had
almost made this country cease to be an island/ It
is not difficult to show that such views are entirely
erroneous. No change in weapons or method of pro-
pulsion can alter the general principles of naval warfare.
But this may be fairly advanced, that increased rapidity
of movement, improved communications with distant
stations, and augmented resources in war material, all
tell in the favour of the stronger navy, whether for
attack or defence. Squadrons thousands of miles away
can now be concentrated at any point, reinforced if
threatened, or recalled home, in so many days, while
formerly as many months were required. If steam has
bridged the Channel, in one sense, it has equally re-
moved the space which intervened between one part
of the United Kingdom and another, and has rendered
a collection of vessels at an)- point threatened a matter
of a few hours, whereas in former times a contrar\'
wind might delay succour until it was too late. On
the whole, therefore, it appears to nie that steam would
on])' tell against us i!i the ex'ent of our l)cing coniplclcl)'
overmastered at sea, a contingency it seems unnecessar)-
to dwell upon.

In thus dealing generall)- with the c[uestion I b\' no
means preclude the p(jssibilit)' of raids b)- single vessels

1 20 Coast Defence — the Ram.

that might escape the most complete system of blockade.
At no time has it been possible to prevent such attacks
by an enterprising enemy, and there is perhaps greater
opportunity for them with steam than before. Under
such conditions special vessels for coast service have
some justification, and confidence is maintained wherever
the rest of the fleet is employed. The weak point of the
principle is that the best coast defence vessel is a first-
class battle ship, especially for an island subject at most
periods of the year to weather that is not favourable to
any but the most seaworthy craft.

For these reasons the coast defence ironclad, which
is largely represented in other navies, is only found to
a very limited extent in our own. The first of its kind,
built about 1870, was designed with the idea that a type
could be produced which might be equally useful for
attack within a moderate distance from our shores and
for defence in home waters. This was the ' Glatton,'
a single - turreted monitor of 5000 tons. Her sides,
which are very low, are protected with 12 in. of
iron, and a similar thickness was placed on the turret.
This is 38 ft. in diameter, and contains two muzzle load-
ing 25-ton guns. When completed in 1872 an experi-
ment was made to test the behaviour of the turret when
struck by heavy projectiles. The ' Hotspur,' another
vessel with a 2 5 -ton gun, was moored at a convenient
distance from the ' Glatton,' and a 600-lb. projectile fired
at the turret of the latter. It failed to penetrate within
or injure the rotating arrangements, the turret being
found afterwards to revolve freely, and the guns it con-

Coast Defence — the Ranu 123

taincd worked in the most perfect manner. Thoiif^h a
powerful ship in armament and armour, the ' Glatton,' in
consequence of her low freeboard, has never been looked
upon as capable of more than coast service. Her
draught of water, 22 ft., detracts also in some measure
from her value in this respect, and consequently in the
next vessels designed all considerations but those of
pure defence were abandoned. The 'Cyclops,' 'Gorgon,'
' Hecate,' and ' Hydra ' were constructed to operate in
shallow waters. The displacement was reduced to
3500 tons, armour to 8 in., and draught of water to
15 ft. As some compensation they were given two
turrets each, containing a pair of 18-ton guns. The
amount of coal carried was 120 tons, while the 'Glatton '
stows twice that amount. These vessels, owing to their
low freeboard and limited dimensions, were originally
unsuited to contend with rough weather, and therefore
their seagoing qualities have been improved by build-
ing up the sides in the middle portion. This does not
diminish the fighting capabilities in the slightest degree,
but adds considerably to their seaworthiness.

These vessels were built ncarl}- twcnt}- \-ears ago,
and that the principle of their construction is considered
erroneous is e\ident from the fact that no others have
been constructed for such special work in this counti'\-.
Three of somewhat larger dimensions, the ' Cerberus,'
* Magdala,' and ' Abyssiiu'a,' were built here f(M- our
colonies. They are also double-turreted vessels, and a
useful t\-pe for keeping off stra\' hostile cruisers which
might reach our distant p(xssessions with a view t(;

124 Coast Deferice — the Ram.

requisitions under threat of bombardment. In the
'Scorpion' and ' Wyvern ' we have two small turret
vessels of 2500 tons, built by Messrs Laird of Liverpool.
They were ordered by the Confederate States during
the American Civil War, but were seized by our Govern-
ment before completion and purchased. They were
designed on the ideas of Cowper Coles, and Ericsson,
and an interesting account of the history of these vessels
until they passed into our hands is contained in a
work called TJie Secret Service of tJie Confederate
States in Europe, by James D. Bulloch, their represent-
ative over here. Had they crossed the Atlantic under
his orders naval events might have run differently.
Skilfully handled, they should have made short work
of the Northern monitors, to which in all points of
construction they were greatly superior.

But if we rightly do not spend money in producing
vessels that are unable to accompany a fleet, and take
part in any operation it may be required to undertake,
other nations have always devoted a considerable por-
tion of their naval estimates to .ships for coast defence.
In France vessels built under this head have so
increased in size that they are quite capable of coping
with our battle ships, and hence all comparisons of
relative strength are inaccurate which do not take this
into account.

Russia was so much impressed with the power dis-
played by the American monitor that for many years
her ironclad navy was principally recruited by similar
vessels. With the Crimean War fresh in her memory,

Coast Defence — the Ram. 125

the idea that powerful squadrons could be kept at a
distance by small coast defence monitors was no doubt
hard to resist, however fallacious, and hence the recon-
struction of Russia's seagoing ironclad navy is barely
the growth of a decade. Absorbed in this view of a
coast defence which might combine a fort and ship in
one, the head of the Russian navy in 1870, Admiral
Popoff, designed a vessel of which the breadth was

[5!^^'''' TIIF. DECK OI- 'IHK ' NOVOOROD,' CIRCULAR IRONCI.AD.

nearly equal to the length. These structures were after-
wards more familiarly known as Popoffkas or circular
ironclads. Two were constructed, called ihe 'No\gorod'

126 Coast Defe7ice — the Ram.

and ' Admiral Popoff.' The latter was the largest. Her
dimensions were, length 120 ft., breadth 96 ft., and
displacement 3550 tons. Being flat under water she
only drew 14 ft. The circular form enabled thick
armour to be carried on a comparatively small vessel.
On the sides at the water line it was 18 in., and on the
deck 2\ in. On the upper deck were two 40-ton guns,
mounted en barbette. To propel the vessel are four
screws side by side, but the speed in favourable weather
does not exceed 6 knots. The chief defect is difficulty
of keeping them on a straight course. We have found
the same in some of our vessels which have great beam
in proportion to length, but with the Popoff kas the
tendency is to revolve like a saucer on the water. On
occasions all directive control over them disappears.
As ships, therefore, they were soon discredited, and
undiscriminating censure passed on their designer. But
they should be regarded as sea forts with the power of
shifting their position rather than as portions of the
seagoing fleet. A fort rising out of the water, as we
see at Spithead, may be regarded as a ship at anchor.
It cannot advance to attack, or pursue if passed.
Beyond the range of its guns the smallest hostile
cruiser may harass with impunity the approaching
merchant vessels if opposing war vessels are not
at hand. Not possessing the power of concentra-
tion at any point threatened, want of mobility in
forts must be compensated for by an increase of
numbers, until every avenue of approach is covered. If
protection is sought by such means against an attack

Coast Defence — the Ram. 127

by a powerful ironclad squadron, 500 guns on land arc
soon absorbed, involving very large garrisons. We may
then consider whether the same or better protection
could not be afforded by a flotilla. The question is too
big to be argued here, and it is only alluded to as some
justification for the Russian circular ironclads. Their
defective steering could no doubt be improved by
building on light ends, so as to give them more resist-
ance to side movement when the rudder is put over, and
an armament of two 40-ton guns renders such a type
formidable to a battle ship of larger dimensions for
ordinary seagoing purposes. Unfortunately, the value
of these floating forts was not tested during the Russo-
Turkish War. Turkey, though most powerful at sea,
abstained from coast attacks, and the circular ironclads
were kept in their own waters. They are one of the
abnormal growths of peace, and interesting as indicating
to what lengths the theory may be carried ; but as one
ship after another is cast aside, as these vessels have
been, we only see more clearly that the vessel which
is most efficient for all purposes best answers special
requirements

In former days when wooden ships met in combat
at sea there was no desire to bring vessels in contact
with each other except for the purposes of boarding.
However close the action, collision was axoidcd, as such
an incident might cause the loss of masts and \'ards,
placing the vessel at the mercy of her cncm}', or allowing
the latter to escape if so minded. When two fleets got
so mixed up that nuuKL-in'ring was im[)ossible, the

128 Coast Defence — the Ram.

simplest plan was to fall alongside the nearest vessel
and secure the two together until one was subdued.
At such a time communication from an admiral to his
subordinates was impossible, but everyone knew what
had to be done. When Nelson had broken the line of
the combined fleets at Trafalgar he ran alongside the
nearest ship, with the result we all know. He did not
attempt to run down any of his opponents, nor can
we recall a single incident of one wooden ship deliber-
ately ramming — as we now term it — another. The risk
was too great of loss of spars, and the wooden bows
were not suited for such an operation. When iron was
substituted for wood the latter objection passed away,
but the use of the ram as a weapon was chiefly brought
about by the same cause that brought the torpedo into
prominence. This was the fact that, while every effort
had been made to protect ships above water from shot
and shell, the most vulnerable part, that below the water
line, was more open to attack than ever. Hence the
old idea of subduing the fire of ships, and obtaining their
surrender by such a disablement of the crew that they
were unable any longer to fight their guns, gave place
to the modern desire to effect their destruction in a
more speedy manner by a blow under water. Should a
ship be sunk immediately in this manner, no addition is
made to the fleet of the victor, but that of the enemy is
effectually reduced. Several incidents have shown this
in a striking manner since the introduction of the iron-
clad. To these allusion will be made later. Hence,
from the ' Warrior ' to the latest phase of battle ship, the

Coast Defence — tJie Ram. 129

ram has been continually developed in the bows of ships
with a view to its use in future actions. In the 'Warrior '
this was carried out in an imperfect manner ; the stem
formed an obtuse angle of large dimensions with the
apex or spur, such as it was, at the water line. When
the power of the ram had been demonstrated in America,
and afterwards at Lissa, we frankly recognised that this
weapon was of great importance. All the later vessels
had bows which terminated under water in a sharp spur,
forming a powerful ram, securely fastened to the ship,
and weighing several tons.

While all who were concerned in the construction
of vessels in which iron was so largely employed, and
those who had to manoeuvre them when completed,
were soon convinced that the momentum of such a
weight brought in contact with another ship must
prove irresistible, a few were such enthusiastic champions
of the ram as to desire that ships should be constructed
specially for this purpose. They went so far as to
say that to give guns in addition would diminish the
efficiency of the ram by perhaps enshrouding the
vessel in smoke at the critical moment. But in France
and in England this conception has not been favourably
received. Across the Channel small coast defence iron-
clads were constructed soon after the American Civil
War in which the gun equipment was limited to a
single turret in the fore part of the ship, and a strong
ram added to the bow. The idea was to disconcert
an enemy with heavy projectiles just previous to the
charge. We carried out the same principle with two

130

Coast Defence — the Ram,

vessels, the ' Hotspur ' and ' Rupert/ two small but
serviceable ironclads, the former completed in 1871,
and the latter in 1874. The dimensions of the 'Rupert,'
3200 tons, were such as to ensure handiness in turning,
while the vital portions were protected with 1 2 in. of
iron. The gun power was only moderate, consisting of
two 1 8-ton guns in the turret, and two other smaller
pieces in the after portion of the ship. It was on the
ram that principal reliance was placed.

There being much to commend itself in the ' Rupert'
to naval officers, an extension of the same principle was
carried out a few years afterwards in the ' Conqueror '

V — ^3

THE 'conqueror.

and * Hero.' In order to accommodate more powerful
ordnance, and obtain an increased speed, it was necessary
to increase the displacement to 6200 tons. This enabled
two 43-ton guns to be carried in her single turret^ and

Coast Defence — the Ram. 1 3 1

unproved machincr}' increased the speed to 15 knots.
The defect of such vessels is the absence of stern fire,
and with 6000 tons a second turret aft seems desirable.

But strong pressure was all the time being put on
the Admiralty to build a vessel in which guns should
have no place, and the most persistent advocate was
Admiral Sir George Sartorius, who appears to have
formed an exaggerated view of the ram as a weapon.
The result was the construction of the ' Polyphemus.'
The leading features of her design were a low hull,
exposing but a small mark to an enemy's fire, the por-
tion above water being shaped like a turtle's back, and
covered with thin armour to deflect any projectile that
might strike it ; great speed, by the adoption of special
machinery, a powerful ram, and a torpedo equipment.
The only ordnance was to consist of a few light guns
for repelling boat or torpedo attack. These are mounted
on a superstructure necessary for carr)'ing the boats
and working the ship at sea. A special point in her
desi":n was the formation of the keel as a rectancrular
groove, in which are placed lengths of cast-iron ballast.
This extra weight, amounting to about 300 tons, is not
permanently fixed, but can be dropped when required,
so as to lighten the vessel if an}^ injury is recei\'ed re-
ducing the buoyanc)'. All or portions of it can be
released from the conning station. While the vessel
is intact the ballast assists in keeping the greater por-
tion of the hull immersed, making a difference of
about 12 in. in the draught. Thcnigh the * Pol\--
plicMiius' was commenced in 1S7S, difficulties with the

132 Coast Defence — the Ram.

boilers delayed her completion till 1882, and several
alterations were then made to improve her qualities as
a sea-keeping vessel, the original intention being that
she should be capable of accompanying a fleet. She
has been for some years attached to the Mediterranean
Squadron, and though no opportunity has occurred to
test her as an engine of war, she has proved quite
capable of such service if required. Up to the present
she has been without a duplicate in our own or any
foreign navy, but the United States are about to con-
struct a vessel on the same principles. It is called a
harbour defence ram, and is to be of the following
dimensions, — length 250 ft, beam 43 ft., size 2100 tons,
and speed 17 knots. The 'Polyphemus' is 2500 tons,
and speed 18 knots. The American ram cannot there-
fore be considered any material advance in this type.
I venture to think, moreover, the principle is a mistake,
for the following reasons.

When guns were the only weapons to contend
with there was some reason to construct a vessel
impervious to projectiles and relying solely on the
ram. The torpedo alters this condition, as before the
ram can be applied such a vessel must come within
the radius of the torpedo's range, and though above
water she may be invulnerable, below the water line
she is as open to attack as any other craft. Then I fail
to see the advantage of denying a vessel guns on the
plea that their smoke would be an encumbrance when
ramming. A captain has the power of withholding his
fire at all times, and presumably such an order would be

Coast Defence — tJie Ram. i 33

obeyed. Lastly, a vessel without guns disabled in her
machinery is at the mercy of any antagonist who can
lay off beyond the range of torpedoes, if the ram has
these weapons, and use his guns without fear of reply.
It appears to me that such an advantage should
never be conceded ; and for these principal reasons I
think the gunless ram is a phase of construction based
on erroneous assumptions which have a temporary hold
on the imagination, but which disappear under practical
consideration of the probabilities in war.

It is, moreover, fallacious to suppose that to ram a
vessel under any circumstances is an easy operation
even with a superiority of speed. Accidental collisions
with disastrous results have, we know, not been unfre-
qucnt. The sinking of the 'Vanguard' off the Irish
coast by the ' Iron Duke,' and the loss of the ' Grosser
Kurfurst' off Folkestone, from being accidentally
rammed by a companion, are instances of this and
examples of the power of the ram. To strike a ship at
anchor as the ' Cumberland ' was struck by the * I\Ier-
rimac' does not call forth any great exercise of skill.
When we examine, however, instances in which it has
been desired to ram a ship in movement one is struck b\'
the failures to attain this object which history records.
In May i<S79, during the war between Chili and Peru,
the ' Iluascar,' a small turret ship then belonging to the
latter power, engaged the Chilian wooden corvette
* Esmeralda.' The latter was, of course, quite over-
matched, though it required fort}- shots from the Tluascar'
before her adversary was disabled. The ' 1 luascar ' then

134 Coast Defe7ice — the Ram.

attempted to ram. It was an unnecessary display of
power, as the ' Esmeralda ' could not escape, and was lying
motionless on the water. But these nations are with-
out mercy when at war. Twice the ' Huascar ' struck
the ' Esmeralda ' with her stern, but failed to do serious
injury, the captain having stopped the engines too
soon. The third attempt was more successful. The
' Esmeralda ' was struck on the beam and sunk. Two
other ships, the ' Independencia' and ' Covadonga,' were
also engaged in the same action, when the former
made three ineffective efforts to ram the ' Covadonga,'
but failed. At the last attempt she ran ashore and
became a wreck.

In the action between the 'Huascar' and the
Chilian ironclads 'Blanco Encalada' and ' Almirante
Cochrane' several attempts were made to ram the
Peruvian vessel, which she evaded, but eventually
succumbed to the overwhelming fire of her two
opponents. At the battle of Lissa, in 1866, between
the Austrian and Italian fleets, there were numerous
occasions when ships failed to ram each other. On
the other hand, the fact remains that the 'Red'Italia'
was sunk by the * Ferdinand Max,' though this was
facilitated by injury to the Italian vessel's rudder.
A wooden ship, the ' Kaiser,' also rammed the ironclad
* Portogallo,' but sustained more injury' herself than
she inflicted. In another instance the attempt ended
in a graze, the two vessels passing so close to each
other that the rammers to the guns could not be used.
From such experience we may conclude, and it is

Coast Defence — the Ram. i 35

capable of mathematical demonstration, that with two
ships well handled and free from injury it is only a
slight difference of time and movement whether one
rams the other or herself sustains the shock ; that to
bring the stem advantageously in contact with another
vessel requires, under any circumstances, considerable
skill, but that opportunities may occur in a general
action which should be promptly seized. Experience,
however, is far from showing that entire reliance should
be placed on the ram, to the exclusion of weapons
well tried in the past, and which have a much greater
radius of action.

CHAPTER VII

ARMOUR — LATER TURRET SHIPS

Early Iron Plates — Increased Thickness — Competition of Guns and Armour
— Steel and Compound Plates supersede Iron — Deck and Coal Pro-
tection — Progress of Turret Ships ' Nile,' ' Trafalgar ' and ' Hood,'
'Victoria' and * Sanspareil' — Second-Class Battle Ships — Early
Types — Latest Development — • Centurion ' and ' Barfleur.'

In describing the * Inflexible ' I have stated that her
turrets were protected with compound armour instead
of the wrought-iron plates which up to that time had
been employed. As the struggle between steel and
compound plates has for some years been almost as
keen as that between guns and armour, a brief history
of this portion of our subject seems here desirable.

I have read that about thirty years ago the present
Sir John Brown happened to be at Toulon and saw
the new French ironclad ' La Gloire.' Her plates were
5 ft. long, 2 ft. wide, and 4^ in. thick. They had been
hammered to these dimensions, as were all the plates
of the early American monitors. Mr Brown — as he
then was — came to the conclusion that such plates could
be rolled, and on his return to England instituted a
series of experiments which fully bore out this view.
When it was decided to put 4J in. of iron on the
* Warrior,' rolled plates of this thickness were manu-

Armour — Later Turret Ships. 137

factured without difficulty. In 1861 a target represent-
ing a section of the ' Warrior,' and consisting of a A,\-\x\.
iron plate, with 18 in. of teak backing, and an inner iron
skin I in. thick, was fired at with a Whitworth rifled
gun throwing a flat-headed steel bolt of 80 lbs. The
target was indented and cracked, but not perforated.

In 1862 Mr Brown was able to roll at his works at
Sheffield, in the presence of Lord Palmerston, an iron
plate 18 ft. long, 4 ft. wide, and 5 J in. thick. The fol-
lowing year, when the Lords of the Admiralty visited
his works, at the opening of a new rolling mill, the
energetic manufacturer showed that plates up to a
thickness of 12 in. could be produced.

From that time there was no difficulty in supplying
the increased protection demanded for the new ironclad
navy, till in the 'Dreadnought' we placed on the hull
and turrets plates 14 in. thick. Though the water line
amidships of the ' Inflexible' has 24 in. of iron, it is not
in one but two plates, each 12 in. thick, with a laj-er of
wood between them.

But already there were indications that no increase in
the thickness of wrought-iron plates would suffice to
resist the growing energy of the gun. As early as 1869
a Krupp gun of 11 in. calibre had perforated 12 in. of
iron and 36 in. of wood. Our own 38-ton gun pierced
19 in. of iron in 1876, and the following year the 80-ton
gun sent its projectile through three 8-in. iron plates.
In the meantime Mr Schneider had been developing at
Creusot, in France, the manufacture of steel plates, and
some experiments at Spcz/ia, in Ital}-, showed the soft-

138 Armour — Later Turret Ships.

ness of wrought-iron as compared with steel. The latter
resisted penetration to a much greater extent, though it
had a tendency to break up when attacked b\' numerous
comparatively light projectiles. From this moment
plates composed entirely of wrought-iron were doomed.
The manufacturers of them in this country — Messrs
Brown and Messrs Cammcll — then proposed compound
armour. In Cammcll's method — which is according to
Wilson's patent — a wrought iron plate is put into a box,
placed in a \crtical position, and liquid steel poured in
between one side of the plate and the side of the box.
The composite plate thus made is then rolled, by which
process the steel face is hardened and made to adhere
rigidly to the wrought-iron foundation. In Brown's
method — which is according to Ellis's patent — instead
of a box, a thin steel plate is placed at the required
distance from the iron plate and the melted steel
poured in between the two, making the whole a solid
mass. It is then reheated and passed through the roll-
ing mill. In both systems the steel face is about one-
third the total thickness. In 1877 experiments with
compound armour plates showed their superiority to
wrought-iron, and consequently it was decided to place
them on the * Inflexible's ' turrets. In 1880 a com-
pound plate made by Messrs Cammell, in which the
steel face was 5 in. and the wrought-iron back 13 in,
thick, was fired at by the 38-ton gun, with a Palliser
chilled shot, the result being that the projectile broke
up on impact with the plate, and effected no damage
beyond slight indentation and surface cracking. It was

Armour — Later Titrret Ships. 139

then evident that steel projectiles would henceforth be
necessary to attack hard armour.

From that time up to the present the competition
has been between the compound plates and all-steel
plates. The latter resist perforation better, while the
harder surface of the former is more effective in break-
ing projectiles, and causing them to glance off if struck
at an angle.^ For very thick armour we have therefore
adhered to compound plates, employing steel plates where
only a few inches are required. France has hitherto pro-
duced the best all-steel plates, but a demand for such an
article could no doubt be met by our own manufacturers.
Already Messrs Vickers have made steel plates which
have behaved most satisfactorily under severe tests. Steel
is continually being improved, and its resistance to per-
foration increased by the admixture of small quantities
of nickel, manganese, or other substance. The original
object of armour being to keep out projectiles, I believe
we shall soon adopt that material which shows a marked
superiority in this respect, and steel plates appear to me
to be winning the day. If the projectiles hold together
— and those of modern steel make appear to stand
impact well — it stands to reason that the medium they
have to pass through should, from front to rear, offer
a strenuous resistance. When the face of a compound
plate is pierced, the remainder is no great obstacle to

^ In the compound plate, owing to the support airordtd by the iron
back, a harder steel can be used for the face. Unsupported in this way, a
steel plate of the same manufacture would be liable to break up under
heavy blows, and hence steel armour is made of somewhat softer — or less
brittle — though tougher mate-rial.

140 Arnwtir — Later Turret Skips.

an uninjured projectile having a considerable amount of
unexpended energy.

Twenty years ago we commenced experiments against
iron plates i^ in. thick on 6 in. of wood. The target
thus formed was placed at a small angle from the hori-
zontal, and fired at with a 9-inch projectile. The
protection was insufficient, but succeeding experiments
have led to decks of steel 3 in. thick being placed over
the submerged portions of vessels. The sides of this
armoured deck usually slope down to a short distance
below the water line, and are given an additional thick-
ness. This portion of the armoured deck of the * Blake '
and * Blenheim ' is 6 in. thick. Advocates of internal
armour urge that, for a given weight, more complete
protection can be afforded if disposed in this way than
if placed externally on the hull.

Later on experiments were instituted to ascertain
what effect masses of coal would ha\c in stopping pro-
jectiles, and if it could be ignited by shell. It was found
that 20 ft. of coal would stop a 6-in. shot at a short
range, and 30 ft. an 8-in. shot, but this would hardly
hold good with later guns and steel projectiles. The
explosion of common shell did not set the coal on
fire.

But this latter result only applies to coal in confined
spaces. If placed between decks, it will be more readily
ignited. I believe at the battle of Lissa the ' Palestro '
was destroyed in this way. Her captain, impressed with
the necessity of not running short of fuel, had placed a
quantity of coal outside the battery. During the action

Arniour — Later Turret Ships. 141

with the Austrian Squadron a shell exploded in the heap
and set it on fire. The occurrence appears to have been
unheeded at the time, or the crew were too busy with
their guns to be called off. When they did endeavour
to extinguish the fire, it had gone too far, and while they
were thus employed the ship blew up. Few of the crew
escaped, but I have been told by an officer, who took
part in the action in another ship, that this mass of coal
was over a magazine, and it is believed that the inter-
vening deck was burnt through until suddenly a flaming
mass of coal fell into the magazine. This seems a
reasonable explanation, as the explosion was unexpected,
or preparation would have been made to abandon the
ship. This occurrence shows the danger of carrying
extra coal about the decks. It appears to me unwise,
also, to place reliance on protection from coal when
stowed in its proper place. If it is not to be used, why
employ it in preference to armour? When consumed
in the legitimate way, which circumstances may render
necessary, a vulnerable part of the ship may be exposed
to an enemy whom this fuel has assisted the ship to
overtake, or from whom it has not sufficed to make
escape possible.

The disposition of armour and armament adopted
in the 'Inflexible' w^as follow^ed in only four other
vessels, the * Ajax,' ' Agamemnon,' ' Colossus,' and
' Edinburgh.' It was considered that smaller battle
ships on the same design would be useful additions to
the fleet. The first two named have a displacement
of 8700 tons, and carry in each turret two 38-ton guns.

142 Armour — Later Turret Skips.

while the maximum thickness of their armour is 18 in.
Being only 280 ft. long, with a beam of 66 ft., their
speed is moderate, and for a long time difficulty was
experienced in steering them. The * Colossus ' and

* Edinburgh ' were great improvements. By increasing
the length to 325 ft., and the displacement to 9500 tons,
a speed of over 15 knots was obtained. Their turrets
are armed with 45-ton breech-loaders instead of the
old guns, and steel instead of iron is mostly used in the
construction of the ships.

But naval officers did not approve the departure
from the ' Dreadnought ' type. The advantages of plac-
ing the turrets en ccJicloti were more fanciful than real,
and consequently, when after a lapse of some years
there was a return to double-turret ships, an improved

* Dreadnought ' design was decided upon. The ' Tra-
falgar' and 'Nile' represent this reaction, and as they
have not long been completed it is evident the interval
was considerable.

These ships are approximately the same size as the
'Inflexible,' viz., 12,000 tons at load draught. They
have a central citadel, containing the two turrets, placed
on the middle line, as in the ' Dreadnought' Each turret
contains two 67-ton guns. Between the turrets, and
above the citadel, are mounted eight 45-pounder guns
in a battery, thus giving an auxiliary armament which
had not been provided in the earlier turret ships. The
length of the ' Nile ' and ' Trafalgar ' is 340 ft., of which
230 ft. is protected at the water line with compound
armour, varying in thickness from 16 to 20 in. The

Armour — Later Turret Ships. 143

turrets are covered with similar armour, 18 in. thick.
Machinery of 12.000 horse power gives these vessels a
speed of 16 knots. Compared with the ' Inflexible,'
they represent a considerable advance in every detail,
and are powerful fighting ship.s. Their only defect, to
my mind — independent of the size and cost — is that the
guns are not carried sufficiently high above the water,
and for this reason I have always preferred the barbette
system. The turret ship ' Hood,' now building, is more
than 2000 tons larger than the ' Trafalgar,' and repre-
sents what appears to be the final development of this
system, which originated in the cupola ship of Captain
Coles. The ' Hood ' is of similar dimensions to the
seven first-class barbette ships of the 'Royal Sovereign'
type, and only differs in having her heavy guns mounted
in turrets instead of en barbette. It remains to be seen
which of the two plans will be followed in future designs.
Though the general opinion in the navy has been
always in favour of double turrets, especially in vessels
of large dimensions, sufficient success in the produc-
tion of single-turreted ironclads, as exemplified in the
' Rupert ' and * Conqueror,' led to a further extension of
this principle in two later ironclads, the ' Victoria ' and
' Sanspareil,' now complete. The former was built by
Sir William Armstrong's firm at Elswick, and perhaps
is the only instance of a first-class battle ship being sup-
plied with the whole of her equipment from a pri\-alc
yard. She has a length of 340 ft., a breadth of 70 ft.,
and displaces 10,500 tons. In a single turret forward,
protected with 18 in. of compound armour, she carries

144 Arinour — Later Turret Ships,

two iio-ton guns. In order to supply the deficiency of
stern fire, which the single turret forward entails, the
' Victoria ' and her sister have a 29-ton gun mounted aft,
working behind a barbette shield. The protection
afforded by this arrangement is not great, but considera-
tions of weight doubtless prevented more being done in
this respect. To make up for this restriction of the
principal armament to three heavy guns, she carries
amidships a battery of twelve 6-in. guns and numerous
machine guns. Machinery of 14,000 horse power gives
these vessels a speed of 16 knots, so that in every re-
spect they show a marked superiority to the * Con-
queror ' and ' Hero.' They are the only British ships
in which a pair of i lo-ton guns are mounted side by
side; in the ' Benbow' one of these monsters is placed
at each end. The first-class battle ships of to-day thus
indicate a variety of ideas concerning offensive and de-
fensive capacity, and a conflict of opinions as to the best
disposition of armour and armament. We seem, how-
ever, to be approaching the time when experience with
these divergent types will enable us to select the best
points in each, and combine them in some type which
shall finally fill the place of the old three-decker.
Whether it will prove equally durable, he who deals
with the development of navies half a century hence
can alone record.

The two-decker also had her counterpart in the
small ironclads built or converted between i860 and
1870. Those of about 6000 tons and under were usu-
ally termed second class. For a country which has im-

Aruwitr — Later Turret Ships. 145

portant interests in every part of the world, useful service
can always be found for vessels of these dimensions.

There were six ships of the same type which for
many years carried our flag in the China and Pacific
seas. These were the ' Audacious,' ' Invincible,' * Iron
Duke,' 'Swiftsure,' 'Triumph,' and 'Vanguard.' The
career of the latter was cut short by sinking, after
collision with a consort, in the Irish Channel. None
of them exceeded 6500 tons displacement, but they
carried a powerful battery of guns and 8 in. of armour
at the water line. They were, besides, roomy and com-
fortable vessels, so that, until left behind by the won-
derful advance in engines and armament after their
completion, they proved admirably adapted for foreign
service. They were succeeded by the armoured cruiser
in this duty, and therefore the demand for ironclad
battle ships of moderate size diminished.

But under the Naval Defence Act two so-called
battle ships of the second class are being constructed,
to be named ' Centurion ' and ' Barfleur.' The length to
which we have gone in adding to the size of all classes
is strikingly illustrated in this pair. Their displacement
is to be no less than 10,600 tons, which will enable them
to combine four 29-ton guns — a pair 01 barhcttc at each
end — ten 45-p()undcr (juick firers, side armour 12 in.
thick, and a speed of 18 knots. A certain number of
torpedo tubes will also be provided. The 29- ton gun
is one that can be worked without the aid of machincr\',
and hence is not so easily disabled as the larger patterns
dependent on hydraulic loading. Its power is about

146 A rmou r — L ater Tu rret Sli ips.

double that of the old 38-ton muzzle-loader, which at
one time we considered such an effective weapon. The
45 -pounders are to be on the broadside in two tiers, for
greater distribution, and to prevent a single shell from
disabling two or three of these guns. They will further-
more be screened by stout steel shields. Many are
disposed to think that high speed, though essential for
a cruiser, is not so requisite in a battle ship. But as
vessels like the 'Centurion' and 'Barfleur' will probably
take the place, and do the duty, of armoured cruisers,
they would be of little value if unable to proceed rapidly
from point to point, or to compete in speed with vessels
of their own class. Vox home waters, including the
Mediterranean, a moderate speed that can be sustained
will suffice.

After dealing with so man\' ships clad in mail 18 in.
thick it may seem that a protection limited to 12 in. is
insufficient, but that amount of hard armour will ex-
clude all but the heaviest projectiles, and something
must be left to chance, \\1icn wrought-iron was suc-
ceeded by a less easily perforated substance ^^■e might
well have retraced some of the steps which culminated
in 2 ft. of armour. I should be disposed to say that
we should never exceed a maximum thickness of 12 or
14 in., but should offer a high premium on improve-
ments in quality by which greater resistance to pro-
jectiles may be attained.

In the 'Centurion' and 'Barfleur' we have a type
which will, I believe, be highly commended by naval
officers. All the attributes necessary for an efficient

Aniiour — Later Turret Ships. 147

fighting ship arc present, and the instrument is in due
proportion to the human faculty which has to wield it.
There must be a point at which this ratio is disturbed.
Mechanical science, pushed on by the exertions and
talents of a few, may outstrip the capacity of ordinary
intelligence, and what is successful experimentall)^ when
no disturbing element comes into play may fail under
the more searching conditions of war. We, in common
\\ith all nations, appear to have gone too far in the
production of monster ships and guns, and I trust the
reaction that must alwa}\s follow^ such excesses will
lead to a great increase in the numbers of what, for
the moment, we term second-class battle ships.

CHAPTER VIII

CRUISERS

Frigates in Old Time — Speed an Essential — Early Steam Cruisers — ' In-
constant' and others — Action between 'Shah' and ' Iluascar ' —
Armoured Cruisers — ' Imperieuse ' and ' Warspite ' — Development
of Internally Protected Vessels — ' Blake ' and ' Blenheim ' — ' Royal
Arthur ' Class — Smaller Types — Scouting Duties — Necessity for
High Speed.

In addition to the large vessels which, by tlie number of
their guns, disposed in two, three, or even four tiers, were
capable of taking their place in the line of battle, fleets
have from very early days contained a number of smaller
craft for the duties of scouting, conveying information,
and the protection of commerce. We had frigates, cor-
vettes, sloops, and brigs for such work, supplemented
by privateers to whom letters of marque were granted.
Pepys tells us the first frigate built in England was
modelled from a French frigate which Pett the ship-
wright had seen in the Thames. Attached to a squadron,
frigates were relied on to obtain information of an
enemy's movements, and being more nimble under sail
than the heavier battle ships, could hover round them
until their destination seem assured, when they would
make off with the intelligence to their own squadron.
They were often used also for convoying merchant-

Cruisers. 1 49

ships. The demand for them, therefore, was enormous,
and admirals in command could not always obtain an
adequate number. Nelson at a critical moment said
the want of frigates would be found stamped on his
heart, and we shall no doubt suffer from the same
deficiency at some future time.

A frigate by itself hardly ever ventured to attack a
two-decker except in expectation of the aid of a friendly
battle ship, when it would endeavour to delay the enemy
until its bigger consort came up. Cases have occurred
of a frigate being sunk by a single broadside from a line-
of-battle ship. Its most valuable quality was superiority
in speed over the more powerful vessel, and as long as
the wind remained the only motive power this char-
acteristic was preserved. It even endured for some
years after the introduction of steam, but then came a
time when, having freely abandoned sail power in battle
ships, we endeavoured to combine it with steam in
cruisers, the result being that as a rule our small craft
were of little value for war purposes. If they met a
battle ship at sea they would have been overtaken in
flight, while their steam speed was inferior to that of any
merchant steamer converted into a commerce destroyer.
This dangerous condition of affairs has now passed away.
We have frankly recognised that a high speed under
steam is the first essential for vessels which have to
perform the duties I have mentioned, and it has been
secured in those which we have recently built.

There have been fitful periods, however, when we
produced steam frigates of high speed. inspired by

1 50 Cruisers,

the example of the United States, which after the
Civil War constructed some fast frigates, we built the
'Inconstant' in 1866, a vessel of nearly 6000 tons,
in which the high speed of 16 knots under steam
was obtained. She also sailed remarkably well. As
the 'Warrior,' the first ironclad, had a speed of 14
knots, it may be considered that the extra 2 knots
of the 'Inconstant' fairly maintained the old relative
superiority of the class to which she belonged. But
this vessel was too large and costly in maintenance
to be adopted as a type ; so two others, the ' Active '
and 'Volage,' of just over 3000 tons and 15 knots speed,
were built. We then reverted to the big ship idea, and
produced the ' Shah,' of 6200 tons, by which 16 knots
were again obtained. Like the ' Inconstant,' she was
built of iron cased with wood and coppered. The
armament consisted of two 12-ton guns, sixteen 6i-ton
guns, and six 64-pounders. Thus the modern frigate,
like the battle ship, carried few guns, but of greater
power than had hitherto been mounted in this class of
ship.

If any supposed that unarmoured frigates of this
size could compete with and overcome even the
smallest ironclad, the idea was dispelled when the
' Shah ' fought and failed to subdue the small Peruvian
monitor ' Huascar.' As corroborating my previous re-
marks on the relative strength of the frigate and the
line-of-battle ship, a brief account of this action may
here be given.

In the early part of May 1877, during one of the

Cruisers. 1 5 1

periodical internal disturbances in Peru, the 'Huascar'
was seized by a party of the disaffected, headed by
Don Nicolas Pierola. The ship was taken out of
Callao Harbour, and proceeded on a cruise to the south-
ward. As she had committed an act of piracy in forcibly
removing coal without payment from a British barque,
Admiral de Horsey, then flying his flag in the ' Shah,'
as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Squadron, deter-
mined to seize the ' Huascar.' In company with the

* Amethyst,' a corvette of 2000 tons, armed with
64-pounders, the admiral proceeded in chase. On
the 29th of May the two ships met the ' Huascar,' and
a boat was sent on board demanding her delivery,
refusal to be followed by fire being opened upon her
by the British vessels. The monitor was only a
little over 2000 tons, and her armament consisted of

, two i2|-ton muzzle-loading guns, in a single turret, and
two 40-pounders. But on the water line the ship was
protected by 4i-in. iron plates, and the turret by S^-in.
Against this the guns of the 'Amethyst' were of little
use, but those of the ' Shah ' could, at close quarters
and hitting direct, penetrate any portion. On the other
hand, the guns of the ' Huascar,' loaded with common
shell, would, if they hit, inflict great damage on the

* Shah's ' entirely unprotected sides.

With a scratch crew, and against such odds, Pierola
might have surrendered his h'ttlc \'cssel without any
great loss of honour. He i)referred to fight, and at
three P.M. the action began. A series of broadsides
were fired from the ' Shah,' some of which struck the

1 5 2 Cruisers.

* Huascar,' but without causing serious damage. The
conditions of a sea fight and firing at an armour plate
on shore to gauge penetration of projectiles differ widely.
A direct blow on the armour of a ship in motion is the
exception not the rule, consequently the ' Huascar' was
able to endure a severe pounding from the ' Shah '
without sustaining fatal injury. On the other hand, her
own fire was so slow and inaccurate that the ' Shah '
was not struck once. The 'Amethyst' also kept up a
smart fire, but without result. The ' Huascar,' except
in her gunnery, was well handled, and once or twice
tried to ram the * Shah,' which the superior speed of
the latter enabled her to avoid. After a fight of nearl)^
three hours darkness came on and firing ceased. Dur-
ing the night the ' Huascar ' got away, and was given
up next day by her commander to the Peruvian fleet.
She was then uninjured in any vital part, and the
water line had not been penetrated although the ship
was struck (it was estimated) by about sixty or seventy
projectiles. This showed the advantage of even thin
armour against guns of moderate power, and tends to
confute the opinion that unprotected vessels can under
any circumstances take the place of battle ships.

Only a few frigates approaching the dimensions and
speed of the * Shah ' were added to the fleet, and then
we fell back on a smaller class called corvettes, with less
speed but full sail power. For ordinary work in peace
time they were well suited, but could not during hos-
tilities have afforded much protection to commerce or
been of great service to a squadron seeking intelligence.

Cruiser's. 153

The same defect characterised our steam sloops and gun
vessels which were distributed in all parts of the world.
They were constructed to keep the sea under sail, rely-
ing only upon steam when the wind failed. The result
was that as sea boats they were admirable, but steam-
ing against a moderate sea they were easily passed by
the 8-knot steam collier plodding steadily on for the
Suez Canal. But still in a tentative sort of way we
recognised the necessity for swift vessels, and while pro-
viding those above enumerated, built two vessels, between
1870 and 1880, with a steam speed of 18 knots. These
were the ' Iris ' and ' Mercury,' remarkable also for being
the first vessels built wholly of steel. The hull was not
cased in wood and coppered, but simply coated with
a composition to prevent fouling and preserve the steel
from the action of sea water. Having twin screws, only a
light rig was provided, and the armament consisted of ten
64-pounders. The ' Mercury,' attaining on trial a speed
of i8-|- knots, was the fastest of the two. These ships
were called despatch vessels, and for such service are
admirably suited. Speed had been made the first con-
sideration, and beyond subdivision of the hull no attempt
was made to afford protection, which involved carr}-ing
additional weight. The success of the ' Iris ' and ' Mer-
cury ' led to the construction of others, in which some
speed was sacrificed to give a steel deck over the
machinery and vital parts, to exclude fragments of shell
which might explode within the ship. The displace-
ment was the same, 3750 tons, as also the length, 300 ft.,
but the armament was made heavier, and hence thcv

1 54 Cruisers.

were regarded as cruisers. The old subdivision into
frigates, corvettes, sloops, and gun vessels was now to
pass away and give place to a general nomenclature.
The term cruiser covers nearly all classes at the present
time, as great and small are built much on the same
lines, carrying a heavy gun at the bow and stern, and
lighter pieces on the broadside.

A more powerful type has also sprung up called
the armoured cruiser. The earliest vessels thus known
were the 'Nelson,' 'Northampton,' and 'Shannon,'
built between 1870 and 1880. They were of moderate
dimensions, well armed, and carried a good supply of
coal. Their function in war, as stated by the Con-
troller of the Navy, was not to take their place in the
line of battle, but to roam over the seas and drive off
any future 'Alabama' acting against our commerce.
Unfortunately they failed in the first essential for such
work. In none of these ships did the speed exceed
14 knots, and hence they would be quite incapable of
overhauling a moderately fast merchant steamer. This
defect was remedied in two later vessels, the 'Imperieuse'
and 'Warspite,' which combine a speed of 16 knots
with a powerful armament and a partial belt of
armour 10 in. thick. They carry 900 tons of coal, so
are suitable for service in distant seas, and could cope,
if occasion required, with any of the smaller ironclads
of foreign powers.

To the non-professional mind it may seem that
such vessels might also fairly be classed as battle
ships of the second or third class, as they carry four

Cruisers, 157

22-ton guns and thicker armour than any of the early
ironclads. It is more the service on which they are to
be employed than any special form of construction
which has put them in the cruiser category. No more
ships of this type have been built. In this country
the further development of the cruiser has been in the
direction of giving up external armour, and devoting
all weight we can give to protection to a steel deck
for the whole length of the ship, varying in thickness
according to her size. The extreme of this principle
is seen in the ' Blake ' and * Blenheim/ our two latest
and largest cruisers, each of 9000 tons displacement.
The interior is roofed over so as to cover the machinery,
magazines, etc., with a steel deck 3 in. thick. The
sides of this deck slope down to about 6 ft. below the
water line, till they meet the hull, the thickness being
double that of the horizontal portion. This disposition of
armour does not attempt to exclude hostile shells, but,
it is assumed, will prevent their explosion from impair-
ing either the buoyancy or motive power of the vessel.
Opinions as to the comparative merit of external and
internal armour arc divergent, and I offer none of my
own. It is one of the many questions which actual
conflict can alone decide. But if in the ' Imperieuse ' and
* Warspite ' we marked a considerable increase of speed
over the early armoured cruisers, this (juality is de-
veloped to a still greater extent in the ' ]-ilakc ' and
*]^lenheim.' They are to be provided with machinery of
sufficient power to drive them in smooth water at the
rate of 22 knots an hour, when pushed to the utmost

15^ Cruisers.

extent with forced draught. Their ordinary full speed
will be 20 knots. Several merchant steamers traverse
the ocean at this rate, and in the event of any being
converted into hostile cruisers we must have war ships
not inferior in this respect. In all our unarmoured
vessels, up to a recent date, the deficiency in speed was
in great measure due to their insufficient length. The
least sea stopped their progress, while the merchant
steamer, being much longer in proportion to beam, was
only retarded in the same weather to a \ery small
extent. We have now frankly admitted that length is
indispensable for an efficient cruiser. Thus, while the
'Nelson' was 280 and *Imperieuse' 315 ft. long, the
extreme length of the 'Blake' and 'Blenheim' will be
400 ft. As their displacement is to be 9000 tons, a
powerful armament can be carried. It consists of a
22-ton gun at bow and stern, three 6-in. guns on each
side, and a number of machine guns. They will also
be fitted to discharge torpedoes from above and below
water.

Besides these two, eight others are building, under
the Naval Defence Act, of about 7500 tons, in which
length and speed are to be somewhat less than in the
' Blake ' and ' Blenheim.' The first of these, the ' Royal
Arthur,' which was launched by Her Majesty early in
the year, is rapidly approaching completion. Her
construction is in most respects similar to that of the
' Blake,' but in lieu of a 22-ton gun forward she
will carry two additional 6-in. guns further aft, but
with command of fire right ahead.

Criiiscrs. .159

It has always been customary to place a heavier
gun than that carried on the broadside as a bow
chaser, but the principle is exaggerated when guns of
14 tons and upwards, aggregating with carriage, etc.,
20 tons, are placed in the fine bows of vessels not
larger than the old frigates. Yet in the Mersey, Severn,
Thames, and Forth, modern cruisers of 4000 tons, an
8-in. 14-ton gun has been placed in the bow and stern,
the former of which must, with all its appurtenances,
be a terrible weight to carry against a head wind or
sea. How can we expect speed to be maintained
when the vessel is thus handicapped ? Such considera-
tions have no doubt led us in the latest cruisers of
similar dimensions, of which there are several now
building, to limit the guns at the bow and stern to a
calibre of 6-in. and a weight of 5 tons. Constructed
of the length now necessary to obtain the full energy
derived from improved powders, they have a long range
for such a gun, and throw a shell capable of dealing
terrible havoc to any unarmoured structure. No more
need be demanded of vessels not primarily designed to
fight ironclads.

The smallest type of cruisers, termed third class, is
represented in the 'Medea,' 'Medusa,' 'Marathon,' and
' Melpomene.' Their principal armament consists of six
6-in. guns. They were designed to ha\e an extreme
speed of 20 knots, but a sustained sj)ced of about
16 knots an hour on the ocean is pn^babl)- the most that
can be attained. A lighter armament would probably
render these vessels more efficient as cruisers. There is

1 60 Cruisers.

no doubt, however, that we are in a better condition for
protecting our vast commerce at the present time than
we have been during any portion of the last half-
century, independent of the aid we should receive from
the conversion of some of the fastest merchant steamers
into auxiliary cruisers. That other countries contem-
plate, in the event of war, an attack on our sea-borne
trade has been clearly foreshadowed in the writings
which have been published abroad, and received with
favour by the nations to whom they were addressed.
They will not be deterred from this action by the
knowledge that the issue of a war cannot depend upon
any success obtained in this way unless accompanied
by a mastery, more or less complete, over the sea forces
of the enemy. We may be harassed but not subdued
in this fashion. Knowing the danger, it behoves us,
however, to take adequate steps to guard against it, and
this we are doing by at last adding to our fleet cruisers
from which the modern * Alabama ' will find it difficult
to escape. The career of this vessel has often been cited
to show the damage that could be inflicted by a single
vessel. But considering she was practically unmolested
for eighteen months, it is no matter for surprise that the
commerce under the stars and stripes, then carried
chiefly in sailing ships, should suffer. The number of
her captures during this period was under sixty, and
only one was a steamer. Semmes was astonished at the
absence of method displayed by the North in his pursuit.
In his account of the cruise of the ' Alabama,' Semmes,
referring to the Secretary of the Navy, said : * The old

Cruisers. 1 6 i

gentleman docs not seem once to have thought of so
simple a policy as stationing a ship anywhere.' Vessels
were certainly despatched in pursuit of the ' Alabama,'
but generally arrived in one sea as she was leaving it for
another, her commander calculating pretty accurately
how long he could count on undisturbed possession.
But her success was of little assistance to the South in
delaying its final subjugation.

Vessels for the protection of commerce must not
only be swift to run but also long to endure ; that is
to say, they should carry a large supply of fuel, or much
of their time will be taken up in replenishing their stock
of coal. I am of opinion that we should make an
addition to the proportion of weight now allotted to
this important item. Vessels attached to a squadron
for scouting or despatch duties need not carry such an
amount, or be of such large dimensions. If, as I am
inclined to believe, no vessel under 3000 tons can be
an efficient cruiser under modern conditions, I think
2000 tons will be sufficient for a despatch vessel or
sea scout. A few years ago Messrs Palmer of Jarrow-
on-Tyne built for the navy two excellent little ships of
1600 tons, called the 'Surprise' and 'Alacrity,' for this
service. They have since done good work in China and
the Mediterranean. Their speed is 16 knots, and they
carry an armament of four 5-in. guns. For some reason
we have built no more vessels like them, l)ut b)' improv-
ing on their design, and increasing the displacement to
2000 tons, an additional ocean speed of 2 knots could
be secured. There is a class of vessel, represented l)y

i62 Cruisers.

the ' Archer ' and a few others, of which the unfortunate
'Serpent' was one, of nearly 1800 tons, which, though
designated third-class cruisers, are more suitable for act-
ing with a squadron. They are hampered, however, by
carrying six 6-in. guns, too heavy an armament for such
craft. Their speed and seaworthiness would be improved
by substituting lighter ordnance. We have carried this
out in a later class. The ' Barham ' and ' Bellona,' of
1830 tons, have a speed of 19 knots and an armament
of six 45-pounder quick-firing guns. The projectile of
the 6-in. gun weighs 100 lbs.

It will probably strike most people who remember
our wooden steam frigates and corvettes how low in the
water appear the steel cruisers of to-day. The demand
on the naval architect for guns and ammunition, which
exceed all former experience, the plea for torpedoes and
other new weapons of naval warfare, the advantages of
electric lights, the absolute necessity for torpedo nets,
all these are impressed upon the constructor by the
experts with resistless cogency, so that the vessel be-
comes like the stage soldier, overladen with weapons.
Something must be given up, or dimensions in every
class largely increased. A Plimsoll's mark for war
vessels is not desirable, but I can conceive that it may
become necessary, unless naval officers moderate their
demands. Blame is often cast on the naval architect
because ships after completion do not realise original
expectations. In most cases it should more properly
be laid on those who, during construction, have success-
fully pleaded for a heavier gun, extra torpedoes, and

M -

.M^'^'

Cruisers. 163

more numerous crew than the original design contained.
This usually accounts for the vessel drawing more water
than was intended.

If in a war with a powerful maritime state the patrol
of the seas must require a large number of cruisers, the
demand for swift vessels for other services will be equally
pressing. Endeavours have been made from time to
time to lay down the proportion that should exist
between such craft and a battle squadron of given
strength. Such calculations are futile, because no com-
mander is likely to be satisfied when the time comes
with the number allotted to him, in view of demands
from all sides which cannot be neglected. Moreover,
sufficiency will depend on the work to be done more
than on the number of battle ships. But if hostile
fleets are to be watched, as they often were of old, by a
squadron of frigates, while the main force was out of
sight but within speedy communication, the number of
vessels required for this work in future will be ver\'
great. The coaling question then comes in. Formerly
only shortness of fresh water drove ships into port.
Their supply was usually sufficient to last for three
months. To have some convenient localit}' where ships
could water was an important matter in the okl bk)ck-
ading days. Distillation of salt water now renders us
independent of this consideration, but it is another
demand on the coal supj)ly, which is the measure of a
steamer's capacity to remain at sea at the present time.
It is difficult to estimate this endurance under the var}-
ing conditions of blockade. If position is maintained

1 64 Cruisers.

ordinarily under easy steam, there must be capability of
passing to a high rate of speed at short notice, which
will be not only a severe trial to the machinery but
consume the stock of coal at a rapid rate. Moveable
coal depots as close to the scene of operations as possible
will be a necessity in cases where no Imperial coaling
station is comparatively near, but probably only the
experience of a war of some duration can demonstrate
the best system for coaling a large fleet operating in all
parts of the world.

It is only of late years that the value of scouts to a
squadron of battle ships has been recognised, and the
method of utilising their services considered. For this
and other invaluable experience wc arc indebted to our
annual naval manoeuvres. The ubiquit)- which steam
confers in searching the ocean is an advantage which
Nelson could not command, but which must in future
relieve an admiral from all the anxiety of a foul wind
when seeking information of an enemy which has
escaped his vigilance. To have in addition one or two
fast despatch vessels to warn detached squadrons of
such movements, or return home with important intelli-
gence — as Nelson sent a vessel home when he was
satisfied that Villeneuve had left the West Indies — will
be no less essential on some future occasion. They
must be ready to run the gauntlet of the enemy's
cruisers, and hence swiftness will be their chief security.
They must not stop to fight unless brought to bay, and
their armament should be of the lightest description.
Up to the present time the development of this type

Cruiser's, 165

of vessel is incomplete. It took centuries to produce
the subdivision — or differentiation, as Admiral Colomb
terms it in his Naval Warfare — of sailing ships into
the several classes suited for the work then imposed on
them. We cannot expect that, without the experience
of conflict, the immense changes which the last half-
century has seen in the composition of fleets will be
found to have resulted in a series of types suited in
all respects to the novel conditions of the next great
naval war.

CHAPTER IX

ORDNANCE

Old Smooth Bore Ouns and their Manipulation — Mr Lancaster's System —
Introduction of Rifled Guns —Early Inventors — Breech- Loaders
introduced and discarded — Woolwich Muzzle-Loaders — Growth of
Ordnance to 8o-toa Guns— Breech-Loaders again introduced —
Increase of Length and Power — Advance to iio-ton Guns —
Ammunition— Quick-Firing Guns.

I HAVE indicated, in the first chapter, the description of
ordnance used in the navy in 1840. Cast iron guns, with
a smooth bore for throwing spherical projectiles, were
then employed. Mounted on wooden carriages, with
four low, solid wheels — called trucks — of the same
material, they were worked by tackles and wooden
handspikes. The recoil on discharge was controlled
by a stout piece of rope — called a breeching — which
passed through a ring at the rear of the gun, the two
ends being secured to the side of the ship. Sufficient
slack was allowed, so that on discharge the gun would
recoil far enough to bring the muzzle just inside the port,
where it was in the most con\'enient position for entering
a fresh charge. The decks of a line-of-battle ship were
a fine sight when gun drill was taking place. To fire
three rounds at an imaginary passing vessel as she
quickly shifted her bearing was an exercise calling forth

Ordnance. 1 69

both skill and physical capacity, in which our sailors ex-
celled. The comparative lightness of the gun, and the
simplicity of its mounting, permitted of great variety in
the exercise. If a carriage was disabled, the gun could
be dismounted without delay. A frequent evolution
was to transport a gun from one end of the ship to the
other. The sailing trim of a vessel w^as often altered in
this way. The method of giving elevation to the gun
was exceedingly crude. Wooden inclined planes called
quoins were pushed under the breech, by which the
muzzle w^as elevated or depressed. They were marked
in degrees, but w^ere exceedingly likely to be displaced
by the movement of the gun. The marking usually
took place after the ship was commissioned, and was not
unfrequently delayed for a considerable period. It de-
pended on the zeal of the gunner. This recalls to my
mind a certain captain, well known for his great faculty of
exaggeration, who sent for his gunner some time after
commissioning a ship, and said to him : ' Mr Bluelights,
are all the quoins marked ? ' * Yes, sir,' promptly replied
the other. The captain, having good reason to know
tliat this was not the case, merely said, ' I will just go
round the gun deck.' Not a single quoin was marked.
Turning to his subordinate, he quietly observed, ' Mr
Bluelights, you arc the biggest liar in this ship.' The
(jther siinply looked at him and rclorUHl, no less calml)%
' No, sir, 1 am n(;l,' w ilh a slight cni[)]iasis on the pro-
noun.

These guns were naturally \er}" inaccin"ate, and cotild
not be otherwise, independent]}- of the rude methods

T 70 Ordnance.

for directinij^ their fire. In the first place, the bore was
considerably larger than the shot, to facilitate loading
and the use of red-hot shot. This difference of diameter
was called 'windage,' and varied from one-fifth to one-
third of an inch. It allowed, therefore, a considerable
portion of the gunpowder gas to escape past the pro-
jectile, and wasted so much energy. Then, for reasons
which would require too technical an explanation for
this work, the round shot was subject to special inac-
curacies in its flight. These defects were not so manifest
at close quarters in action, which officers in command
usually sought to attain, and the charge of powder,
howe\'er reduced in energy b}- windage, retained sufficient
power to penetrate wooden ships. But for some \-ears
previous to the substitution of ironclads for the old
types of ships the Admiralt\' of this country had
been impressed with the ad\antages of having the
armament of the navy of greatly increased power and
weight. This \iew was confirmed by the introduction
of the 68-pounder, which proved a powerful and effec-
tive weapon. But when it had been ascertained that
this gun was powerless against 4-5-in. plates, it was at
once evident that some new system of gun construction
must be devised. A long series of experiments proved
that the old ordnance was exceedingly dcfecti\e ; that
every gun, great or small, should be rifled, in order to
give long range and precision to the projectile ; and
that to have the required strength guns must be made
of wrought-iron or steel.

The object of a rifled gun is to give to a cylindrical

Ordnance.

171

projectile rotation or spin on its Ioniser axis. The rota-
tory motion keeps the shot steady during fli.ght, and
prevents its bein^^ subject to the special influence which
caused the inaccuracy of smooth bore guns. A cylin-
drical projectile is heavier than the round shot of
similar diameter. Thus the old 32-poundcr was of
6-in. diameter, but the modern 6-in. rifled gun throws
a projectile of 100 lbs. weight.

There are other advantages, on which it is unneces-
sary to dwell, but for many years artillerists had been
seeking a satisfactory method of giving rotation to the
projectile. One of the earliest inventors in this country
was Mr Lancaster, who conceived the idea of making
the bore of a gun slightly elliptical or oval, with a twist,
so that a projectile of the same shape received a spin
during its passage through the bore. Fairly successful
experiments resulted in the construction of some ol
these guns and their employment in the siege of Se-
bastopol. But they were not reliable, and more than
one burst. In the meantime a rifle had been adopted
for the army in place of the old smooth bore musket,
and it was only a c}ucstion of working out the principle
for larger guns.

In 1846 Major Cavalli, of the Sardinian arm\', and
Baron Wahrendorff, a Swedish noble, had each brought
forward a l)rccch-loading rifled gun throwing c)-lindrical
projectiles with pointed heads. Cawilli's gun was of
6^-in. calibre, and had two grooves cut si)irally along
the bore. The ])r()jcctiles had two winged projections
whicli travelled in the irrooves aiul caused rotation. The

1 7 2 Ordnance,

breech was closed by an iron wedge entered from the
top of the gun. With the usual interval for improve-
ments, experiments were carried out in Italy with this
gun, which showed considerable advance in accuracy
over the smooth bores.

Wahrendorffs gun was similar in principle, though
the details were different. Trials took place at Shoe-
buryness in 1850 with both the Wahrendorff and Cavalli
gun, but the breech mechanism was defective, and neither
was adopted. So matters rested until after the Crimean
War, when the question was seriously taken up in this
country. Able inventors turned their attention to rifled
ordnance, and among the foremost were Messrs Arm-
strong and Whit worth. In fact Mr Armstrong had
made a small rifled gun in 1855, and the principle on
which this was constructed was eventually adopted.
The first had a steel barrel strengthened externally by
wrought-iron, applied in a twisted or spiral form as in a
fowling piece. This gives the strength due to the fibre
of the material being disposed at right angles to the bore.
The gun was rifled with numerous small grooves. The
projectiles were cylindrical, of cast-iron, and coated with
lead, to take the grooves and so receive rotation. Being
pushed in from the rear or breech, allowance for windage
was unnecessary, as the projectile was only inserted suffi-
ciently far for the lead coating to abut against the
beginning of the rifling, and the action of the powder
forced the projectile to take the grooves.

Satisfactory results were obtained, and a larger gun
was constructed. The steel barrel was abandoned as

Ordnance. i 7 3

bcinL,^ untrustworthy, and difficult to manufaclurc sound.
Coiled wrouL^ht-iron was used entirely. The breech-
closing arrangement was the same as before. This was
arranged as follows. The rear of the gun had a hole
through it, forming a prolongation of the bore, and by
this aperture powder and shot were entered. Then
the bore was closed by an iron plug inserted through
an opening on the top of the gun. To press it firmly
against the end of the barrel, it was tightened in its
place by a screw working in the loading aperture. The
Government so highly approved of this gun that Mr
Armstrong was knighted and given an official ap-
pointment at Woolwich. It was certainly a great
improvement both in range and accuracy over any pre-
ceding weapon. With one of these guns a range of
9000 yards was obtained.

Between i860 and 1861 we commenced suppl}-ing
the navy with 20, 40 and lOO-pounder Armstrong
guns. My first experience of the sea was leaving
England in a 50-gun frigate, towards the close of 1861,
with several of these guns for distribution among the
ships of the North American Squadron. The arrest of
Messrs Slidell and Mason had lately occurred, and
relations with the United States were rather strained,
l^ut tlie new guns did not reach their destination, for we
encountered a tremendous gale of wind off the banks of
Newfoundland, and sustained such damage as to neces-
sitate our return t(; England. Our cargo assisted the
elements in our discomfiture, making the ship roll so
heavil}-, and she had this propcnsit}- in a less degree at

1 74 Ordnance,

all times, that much of the damage resulted from this
cause. We were not sorry, therefore, to see the guns
transferred to another vessel, while we went into dock
with all the appearance of having taken part in a severe
action.

These Armstrong breech-loaders did not, however,
remain long in use in the navy. There was an absence
of simplicity for which, coming directly after the old
smooth bores, the na\y was not yet prepared. The ad-
vantages of charging at the breech were not sufficiently
apparent. It was formerly difficult to make a mistake in
handling a gun, but now more care had to be taken. In
one of our periodical small wars, which occurred at that
time in Japan, some cases occurred of vent pieces being
blown out on firing these guns. This was owing, no doubt,
to the plugs not being screwed up tightly, but it created
a prejudice against a system in \\hich this might occur.
Another objection was that the lead coating on the
projectile occasionally stripped off when being forced
through the grooves. This affected the land service, as
such artillery firing over the heads of troops might give
them a leaden shower. Anyhow the fiat was issued that
a new gun must be devised which should be rifled and
load at the muzzle. Was this a retrogade step taken
less that thirty years ago, and at a time when other
nations had adopted the breech-loading system ? I do
not think so. At that time all guns were short, and load-
ing at the muzzle was not inconvenient. Their handling
was equally expeditious, and simplicity was on the side
of the muzzle-loader. This advantage would have been

Ordnance. 1 7 5

more apparent in war. Our fault was not in reverting
to muzzle loading, but in retaining the system after the
introduction of slower burning powder, which required a
long gun to utilise all its energy. The new combination
gave increased velocity, range, and penetration. As is
well known, the path of a shot in the air is a curve,
owing to the action of gravity. The quicker it is in
travelling the less time there is for gravity to act, and
consequently the more nearly does the projectile travel
in a horizontal line. One of the great objects in
gunnery is to have this path — or trajectory, as it is
technically termed — as flat as possible. I have men-
tioned Mr Whitworth as being early in the field as a
designer of rifled guns. His system differed from Mr
Armstrong's in important respects. It will be sufficient
to allude to his method of rifling and the form of his
projectiles. The former consisted of a hexagonal bore
with a sharp twist. The projectile had six bearing
surfaces and accurately fitted the bore. Mr Whitworth
advocated flat-headed steel shot for attacking armour ;
but a pointed head is less impeded b}' the wind and
better suited for penetrating armour.

Captain Blakeley also put forward rifled guns which
did not materiall)^ differ from Whitworth's construction.
Captain Palliscr had alrcad}' turned his attention to
utilising cnu' okl smooth bores, by inserting an interior
barrel of coiled wrought-iron, the gun being i)re\iousl\-
bored out for its reception, it was then rilled, and a few-
heavy rounds fired, whicli expanded the inner barrel to
a tight fit with its cast-iron exterior. A ^S-pounder was

176 Ordnance.

so converted into a 9-in. muzzle-loading rifled gun and
subjected to severe tests in 1863. With a charge of
16 lbs. of powder projectiles up to 680 lbs. weight were
fired from it. The recoil was naturally violent under
such conditions. It smashed carriages, and then the
gun was suspended in iron slings. It broke these, how-
ever, and flung itself out of them on to the ground, but
did not burst. This eventually occurred with 32 lbs. of
powder and a 200-lb. shot. The evidence of increased
strength given by a coiled iron barrel led to a number
of smooth bores being converted in this way and employed
until comparatively rcccnth- in the navy. A steel barrel
was subsequently used.

When it was decided to revert to muzzle-loading for
new guns the Woolwich system was adopted. This
consisted of a steel barrel with a series of wrought-iron
coils shrunk over it by being put on when heated.
They thus tightly gripped the inner tube, and enabled
it to sustain the explosion of a heavy charge without
rupture. The strength of the gun was considered to
lie in the outer coils ; the steel tube gave a hard surface
to the bore and a homogeneous material for the rifling
process. This tube was made from a solid ingot of
steel, turned and then bored out to the required diameter.
It was thus the most costly part of the gun, while the
boring and rifling processes required considerable time
before the rest of the parts could be added.

In 1865 we began equipping our ships with guns of
this construction. As an advance on the 68-pounder
a gun of 7-in. calibre and 6\ tons weight was pro-

Ordnance, 177

duced. Its projectile was 115 lbs. weight, while the
charge was 30 lbs. of powder. The charge of the old
68-pounder was 16 lbs. At 1000 yards there was
sufficient energy to penetrate 7 in. of iron. Had
armour not increased in thickness, we might have
been satisfied with such a capability. But much
stouter plates were now being rolled, and the gun
had to grow likewise. Ordnance of 9, 12 and 18 tons,
all on the principle described, were successively de-
signed and put afloat. The largest of these was
charged with yo lbs. of powder and a projectile weigh-
ing 400 lbs. The 9-in. armour of the ' Hercules ' had
defied the efforts of a 300-pounder, and Sir William
Armstrong, in a letter to the Times of June 26th, 1865,
said, speaking of a 600-pounder which had then been
tried : ' Powerful as this 600-pounder has proved itself
to be, I confess I have great doubts of its obtaining the
mastery over the " Hercules " target unless the enormous
charges already used with that gun be still further
increased.' He doubted the possibility of constructing
a gun of sufficient strength to penetrate the ' Hercules '
target. But hardly had these words been written when
heavier guns began to be produced, and we passed on to
ordnance of 25 and 35 tons. This was the struggle
between guns and armour.

It is not to be supposed that guns of this weight
could be carried on b();ird ship without an entire
reconstruction of the methods of mounting thcin. To
Captain Scott's iron gun-carriages is due a facilit}' in
working these guns which had not in sonic respects

178 Ordnance.

been obtained with the much lighter smooth bore.
The same rapidity of loading could not be expected,
but a gun could be directed on its object much more
expeditiously with cogged wheels and winches than
with the old rough method of handspikes and tackles.
The gun recoiled up a slide, the extent of the recoil
being regulated by friction between carriage and slide.
The projectiles, instead of being passed from hand to
hand, as in the case of the 32-pounder, were wheeled
up in iron trucks to the muzzle and then hoisted by
a tackle for insertion. There was still room for the
display of strength and activity. We had not arrived
at working a lever — as at a railway siding — to actuate
a hydraulic ram which would bring up the ammuni-
tion, while the movement of another handle ejected a
rammer which forced all into its place. By the improved
method of mounting already described, and mechanical
arrangement for controlling the recoil, we were enabled
to work guns weighing 25 tons on the broadside with
celerity and safety. Though heavy, such guns were
necessarily short. Thus the 12-in. 25-ton gun had a
bore only 12 calibres long — the calibre of a piece
being the diameter of its bore. As we are now employ-
ing ordnance of 25, 30, and 35 calibres, the advance in
this respect since 1870 can be realised. But after that
date longer and heavier guns were constructed. With
the same calibre, 12-in., we proceeded to a 35-ton gun
of greater length for the ' Devastation's ' turrets. Then
a slower burning powder being produced, we found that
a 38-ton gun could be made nearly 16 calibres long of

Ordnance. 179

\2\-\x\. bore, which would speed an 800 lb. projectile
with an initial velocity of 1 540 ft. per second, an increase
of 200 ft. per second over the 2 5 -ton gun, while the
charge of powder had advanced from 85 to 200
lbs.

The 38-ton gun was justly considered a great step,
but its projectile, weighing 800 lbs. had passed beyond
manipulation by hand or tackle. Then the ingenuity
of the great Elswick firm provided us with that
admirable system by which all the operations of load-
ing, elevating, and training heavy guns are performed
by hydraulic machinery. To describe these in detail
would require a volume in itself. It will be sufficient
to state that, on the principle of the ' Bramah ' press,
power is transmitted from an engine by water pressure
through a small pipe actuating hydraulic rams. Water
is contained in a tank and pumped by a steam engine
into pressure pipes, by which it passes to the different
hydraulic machines and then returns to the tank. One
of the ad\'antages of this system is that fewer men are
required round the gun. To work a turret by hand
originally took fifty men, now it is effected by a third
of the number. Then there is no such danger as the
bursting of a steam pipe would involve. The gun does
not require a high carriage, but rests in a block on
the slide. The recoil is controlled by a solid ram fixed
to this block, which on discharge of the gun travels in
a c}'lindcr full of water. The [)rcssurc of the ram or
piston forces the water through a number of weighted
valves, the resistance of which gradually brings the gun

1 80 Ordnance.

to rest. Then forcing water into the cylinder pushes
the piston or ram and the gun out again. The same
principle is employed to raise the breech and extract
the breech piece when too cumbrous to be withdrawn
by hand. Objection has been raised that the system is
too complex, and that the gun may be disabled by the
rupture of a small pipe. This is true, but the same
result may ensue through the destruction of some por-
tion of hand-worked ordnance. It is impossible to
have simplicity with any modern gun. It is legitimate,
however, to argue that guns should not be mounted
afloat which, in the event of anything happening to
the hydraulic machinery, cannot be worked by hand.

The 38-ton gun thus loaded and controlled gave
great satisfaction. Several of our turret ships are
still armed with it, but in time a breech-loading gun
will take its place. In 1873 the struggle between guns
and armour produced what was then considered likely
to prove the climax in each. To equip the * Inflexible,'
carrying 24 in. of armour, with equally powerful ord-
nance, guns of 80 tons weight were designed. They
were originally intended to be of 144-in. calibre, but
were finally bored to 16 in. This gun was given a
length of 1 8 calibres ; the charge of powder was 450 lbs.
and the projectile weighed 1700 lbs. At 1000 yards
it could penetrate 23 in. of wrought-iron, and its initial
velocity was 1600 ft. per second.

The following table gives a general idea of the
advance made in the size of guns from the time we
discarded the 68-pounder smooth bore to the mount-

I 5

Ordnance

ing- of 8o-ton muzzle-loading nflcd ordnance in the
' Inflexible' : —

Diameter of Weight of I Charge of
Bore ! Gun. j Powder.

Ins.

7
8

12
12-5

Tons.

35
38
80

Lbs.
30

35
50
70

35
140
200
450

Weight of
Projectile.

Velocity at
Muzzle.

Penetration
of Iron at
1000 Yards.

L..S

Ft. per Sec.

1500

180

1400

250

1400

400

1380

540

1320

700

1400

800

1550

700

1600

7
8
10
12
13
15
17
23

A ^cw words must now be said about the ammuni-
tion. Experiments had shown that against armour
ca.st-iron shot broke up like a snowball, while forged
wrought-iron projectiles flattened, as if made of lead,
against the hard or comparatively hard surface. In both
cases the iron plates suffered little, because the cncrL:\-
was exijcnded in breaking or distorting the nu'ssile.
In this dilemma Captain Palliser came to the rescue
with his ingenious de\ ice of hardening the front por-
tion of a sh(;t In- chiHing. The bed)- is cast in an
earthen mould, but the head is formed in- a metal
mould, which rapidly extracting the heat in this por-
tion gives great hardness to the material. The result is

I«2

Ordnance.

that chilled shot of this nature are able to penetrate
wrought-iron plates without breaking up or distortion.
They are of cylindrical shape, with a pointed head,
which against armour acts like a punch, forced into the
plate by the energy of the other portion of the shot
behind it. All are cast with a hollow core, which can
be utilised for a bursting charge, but the space is so
limited that such an addition is of little value. A great
merit of these projectiles is their cheapness as compared
with those now made of steel, so that they are still
largely used for practice, and would be efficient against
thinly armoured ships, though unable to cope with the
thick steel or compound armour which has superseded
wrought-iron for protection.

Other kinds of missiles are common shell and
shrapnel shell. The former being required to contain a
large bursting charge, have not sufficient strength to pass
intact through armour, but are most destructive against
any unarmoured portion of a ship. Shrapnel are iron
cases containing a great number of small round shot,
the case being fractured by a small burster at the
required moment. The small shot then spread with the
impetus previously acquired in flight. Against boats or
bodies of men on shore they are very effective.

It has been mentioned that an improvement in the
velocity obtained with the later muzzle-loading guns
resulted from modifications in the powder employed.
Not in the ingredients, because they had remained un-
altered for centuries, and the same may be said of the
proportions of the mixture, but by making each indi-

Ordnance. 183

vidual ij^rain or pellet lar^^^er the whole charge took
longer to consume. Hence, as the shot travelled down
the bore continual increments of gas were gene rated
imparting an augmenting velocity to the projectile,
which should reach tlic muzzle when this was at maxi-
mum. If the gun was too short, a large portion of the
pow^der would be blown out unconsumed, and result in
wasted energy. Even with considerable addition to the
length this occurs in a minor degree, as can be seen by
an instantaneous photograph of a gun at the moment of
discharge. As guns grew in size so did the grains of
explosive composing the charge, first to what was
termed pebble powder, and then to cubes of much
larger dimensions. At a short distance from the gun
unconsumed portions of these are a veritable hail of
small projectiles.

In 1880 we appeared to have reached some finality
in ordnance. We had advanced from 7 to 80 tons, and
found no difficulty in manipulating on board ship the
heaviest guns. There had been few accidents of a
serious nature. The bursting of a 38-ton gun in the
'Thunderer' owing to the insertion of a double charge
was a notable exception. The gun had actuall}- nn'ssed
fire the previous roiuul without the crew being aware
of it. It was then loaded again, and burst with great
vi(jlence on being discharged. Being one of a pair in
a turret, the discharge of the other gun had decei\ed
the crew into a belief that both had gone off l^ven
spectators watching the target stated that the\' saw two
shot strike the water. Such illusions are not uncom-

1 84 Ordnance.

mon. When two or more guns are fired at the same
instant, and close together, especially if after recoil the
gun automatically returns to its place, a single report
may cause a doubt as to the discharge of both. This
is the converse of the 'Thunderer's' case, but it may
apply either way. One thing certainly was evident —
such an accident could not occur with a breech-
loading gun, because a second charge could not be
inserted.

But other causes were at work to bring about once
more a complete revolution in our armaments. Foreign
powers had in most cases adopted breech-loading guns,
and by giving increased length were obtaining higher
velocities. This meant increased penetration, in which
respect we were being left behind. It became neces-
sary for us to adopt the same principle, because we
had arrived at the maximum of length in muzzle-
loading ordnance for use in ships. We were un-
doubtedly slow to appreciate the necessity. There had
been no loud demand from the navy for the change,
and all ordnance coming to us from Woolwich, which
is under the control of another department of the
Government, there was naturally no great eagerness
in that quarter for a move which would involve an
entire change of pattern and construction. This matter
belongs to the past, and I am willing to apportion
blame to both sides. But when the great Elswick firm
produced a 6-in breech-loader, throwing an 80-lb. pro-
jectile with a velocity of 1800 ft. per second, it was evident
that we must at once discard all idea of adhering to our

Ordnance. 185

old guns. The Woolwich gun factory, under the able
superintendence of Colonel Maitland, promptly grappled
with the problem, and from that day we have gradu-
ally been overtaking the lost ground. There has been
delay, of course, but to entirely rearm the British fleet
with a weapon essentially different to all that had gone
before in our experience was a stupendous task, and
this should be recognised. Mistakes must necessarily
occur, and one important change we did not at first
make. We adhered to the principle of an inner steel
barrel surrounded by wrought-iron coils. There was
a distrust of steel, which it took some years to eradicate,
though Krupp had always used this material entirely
in the construction of his guns. A 6-in. gun on the
wrought-iron coil system lately burst with great violence
in the ' Cordelia' from some unknown cause.

Since guns of this pattern were made we have dis-
carded the wrought-iron coils, and now strengthen the
steel barrel with hoops of the same material. In again
taking up breech-loading guns an important matter to
decide was the method of closing the breech after in-
sertion of the charge. We could follow the plan adopted
by Krup)), of a wedge inserted at the side or a screw
plug at the rear, as used in France. The latter was
adopted, and with it the ingenious device for saving
time of an interrupted screw. The plug is a solid steel
block with a screw tlircad on outer surface. This is
divided longitudinally into a certain lunuber of ec^ual
parts, and then the screw threads entirely removed from
alternate portions. in the screw thread of the gun

1 86 07'dnance.

similar portions are taken away, those remaining being
opposite the blank spaces on the block. Consequently
the latter can be pushed straight into the gun, and a
portion of a turn engages the screw threads on each, so
locking the breech without the loss of time involved
by screwing the block in the ordinary way. As the
cap or tube which ignites the charge is placed in this
plug, which has a channel through the centre to allow
the flame to pass into the chamber of the gun, there
is a mechanical arrangement for preventing the tube
being inserted until the breech piece — as this plug is
termed — is thus locked. To prevent escape of gas to
the rear it is necessary to effectually seal the end of the
powder chamber. This is done by securing to the inner
end of the breech piece either a thin steel cup, which on
discharge of the gun is expanded against the inner sides
of the chamber, or a pad of asbestos, which under
pressure of the powder gas performs the same function.
This, in technical language, is the obturator, and when
we consider that the ignited gas exerts a pressure of
some 15 tons to the square inch the importance of con-
fining its energy to the base of the projectile may be
understood.

As regards method of ignition, we have for some
years utilised electricity for this purpose. On an
unstable platform, such as a ship presents, it may be
readily conceived that any delay in discharging a gun
when it bears on an object must result in a miss. The
remedy our ancestors had for this was to attain such
close proximit)' to their object that a certain proportion

Ordnance. 187

of their projectiles could not fail to hit somewhere. Ikit
as close range is not always attainable, and may not be
desirable, the delay in igniting the charge by means of a
falling hammer or pulling a string should be eliminated.
Electricity, being instantaneous, corrects this defect, the
only motion required being to press a button. Its
advantages are even more apparent when several guns
are fired simultaneously and it is desired to lodge their
projectiles in one spot. The apparatus simply consists
of a galvanic battery, with wires leading to the guns
and terminating in a fine filament of platinum silver
wire, enclosed in a tube and surrounded by a small
quantity of gunpowder. The current, when allowed to
pass, heats the filament sufficiently to ignite the powder,
and the flame passes on to the charge of the gun.

Having once recognised the advantage of a breech-
loader, w^e proceeded with the design and construction of
different patterns suitable for large and small ships.
They grew, in fact, similarly to the old muzzle-loaders.
We mounted in succession 14, 22, 29, 45 and 67-ton
guns, with a length of bore varying from 25 to 30
calibres. By augmenting the powder charges \elocitics
were increased to 2100 ft. per second, the projectiles
being over half a ton in weight. No difficulty was ex-
perienced by our officers and seamen in becoming
proficient with such weapons, though it inxoKcd an
cntircl)' new jMoccdure in their manipulation. Ha\ing
been accustomed for )-cars to insert powder first, one can
imagine that to re\crsc the process docs not come
intuiti\cl)-. Yet of man)- changes this is perhaps the

i88 Ordnance.

simplest. The inevitable was cheerfully accepted. But
when these new guns made a jump from 67 to in tons,
and the number carried by a single ship fell from four
to a pair, the policy of thus relying upon such a limited
heavy armament, though reinforced by a number of
smaller guns, began to be questioned. The case in
favour of monster guns is that they represent concen-
trated power and the ability to do immense mischief if
successfully applied. A single projectile from such
a piece could disable the stoutest battle ship or penetrate
the thickest armour carried. Nor, with the assistance of
hydraulic apparatus, is their manipulation more compli-
cated than with guns of half their weight. Though
themselves offering a large mark, their very bulk is a
protection against light projectiles. As against these
points in their favour, three main objections may be
stated. First, that the portion of a ship covered by
the extremely thick armour is so small that hitting it
under the varying conditions of a sea fight must be a
chance. Second, it therefore becomes more profitable
to attack the larger unarmoured area, or at any rate
that area will be struck by the greater number of pro-
jectiles. For such work moderate sized guns are
sufficient and superior to those throwing enormous bolts,
which would pass through thin armour without impedi-
ment. Thirdly, there is the risk of half your principal
armament being disabled by an accident or by a single
lucky shot from your enemy. On the whole, therefore,
I think the balance is in favour of smaller guns, and
I view monster ordnance as one of the abnormal growths

Ordjiaucc. 1 89

of peace which the rough test of war will sweep away.
I have not dwelt on the element of time required for
construction or cost. They should, however, be taken
into consideration.

The projectiles used with our new guns are much
the same in shape as before. For receiving rotation
they have a copper band, which acts much in the same
way as the lead coating in the first breech-loaders with-
out the defect of stripping. Steel shot are, however,
necessary to overcome the resistance of steel or com-
pound armour, and to get satisfactory projectiles of
this material has long been a difficult matter. France
was before us in this respect, but our steel makers
when called on rose to the occasion and now produce
an efficient article.

Powder has gone through several phases. The
ordinary black substance in cubes was replaced by
prisms of brown material known as cocoa powder.
Then came a demand for something which would give
us energy without smoke, and all nations are seeking
such an explosive. A propelling agent with this char-
acteristic has been produced in this country by Pro-
fessor Abel, known as cordite, from its resemblance
when manufactured to a grey cord. It is more power-
ful than ordinary powder, without subjecting guns to
an increased pressure, and is comparatively smokeless.
One of the chief points to ascertain is whether, under
the varying conditions of climate which our vessels
experience in all parts of the world, this cx[)losive
will remain unaltered after a considerable lapse

1 90 Ordnance.

of time. We must have satisfactory tests in this
respect before we can confidently admit it into our
ships.

No review of the progress of ordnance would be
complete without notice of the great development of
what are now called quick-firing guns. They have
grown out of the mitrailleuse, first used in the Franco-
German War, which consisted in a cluster of rifle barrels
automatically fed with cartridges and fired by turning
a handle, as sound is produced from a barrel-organ. At
first discredited by defective mechanism, which caused
stoppage of the action at critical moments, they have
since been greatly improved in the systems of Gatling,
Gardner, Nordenfelt, and Maxim. The last named has
brought to considerable perfection a gun in which the
energy of recoil is utilised to perform all the operations
of extracting the fired cartridge, reloading, and firing
without human interference. Set to operate in this
way the gun will continue to fire until its ammunition
is exhausted. Against bodies of men the machine rifle
— as it might be more fitly termed — can work great
execution, but to stop torpedo boats requires a heavier
projectile, so that Mr Hotchkiss and Mr Nordenfelt de-
signed a machine gun of larger calibre. In that of the
former the barrels revolve, while in Mr Nordenfelt's gun
they are stationary. Both are effective weapons. Then
came a demand for a single-barrel gun which could throw
shot of about 6 lbs. weight and fire several rounds a
a minute. The ammunition was to be made up like
a rifle cartridge instead of, as formerly with small guns,

Ordnance. 1 9 1

having powder and projectile separate.^ Messrs Ilotcli-
kiss and Nordenfelt both compHed with the demand,
and these were termed quick-firing guns. They are
now largely represented in all our ships. An important
feature was aiming and firing from the shoulder by
means of a wooden shoulder piece attached to the gun,
which being accurately balanced could thus be freely
moved, horizontally and vertically, with little exertion
of the body. The movement of an object could thus
be followed almost as easily as the flight of a bird with
a fowling piece. These guns have considerable range
and penetration ; and would be effective against the un-
armoured parts of a ship, while the 3-pounder, a smaller
piece on the same principle, is specially adapted to meet
a torpedo attack.

Observing the success of small quick-firing guns, Sir
William Armstrong's firm were not long in extending
it to larger ordnance. An increase in the rapidity of
fire of all guns is an advantage which every sea fight
has endorsed, so a gun having a calibre of 47 in. and
throwing a projectile of 45 lbs. was designed. The
projectile is separate from the powder cartridge, as
being more convenient to handle. Very satisfactory
results have been obtained with this gun, from which
about ten aimed shots a minute can be fired.

Tlic principle, h()we\-cr, has not attained fiiiah'l)-, he-
cause a 6-in. quick-firing gun has since been constructed,
and proved successful. In this gun, also, the projec-
tile is separate from the powder, as it weighs 100 lbs.,

' Tliis is llic jirincipal cause of ()l)lniniii}j; grcnlcr rapidity of tire.

192 Ordnance.

and is inserted previous to the cartridge containing the
explosive and cap. The case of this is made of brass,
and though the construction of this portion is expensive
the cartridge cases can be used over again when fired.
The rapidity of aimed fire from this gun is about eight
rounds a minute. Cordite has been tried with this gun,
and it is found that 17 lbs. of this explosive will give the
same energy to the projectile as 50 lbs. of ordinary
powder, without increased pressure in the chamber.

It is difficult to say what will be the further develop-
ment of quick-firing guns. One thing seems to me
probable, that all charges will be contained in copper
cylinders, instead of being enveloped in silk cloth, by
which moisture will be excluded, and the explosive
guarded against rough usage.^ Greater rapidity of fire
with heavy ordnance then becomes more dependent
upon improved training and practice than small details
of mechanism in the guns.

^ Mr Elmore's ingenious process of copper deposition and hardening
seems likely to answer this requirement.

CHAPTER X.

TORPEDO W A R F A R E.

Early Application of the Torpedo in America — The Fish Torpedo —
Development by Mr Whitehead — Introduction of Torpedo Boats, and
their Progress — Submarine Boats — Protection against Torpedoes —
Nets — Electric Search Lights — Torpedo Boat Destroyers — Sinking
of ' Blanco Encalada.'

The torpedo as a weapon of practical utility first came
prominently into notice during the American Civil War.
To disable a vessel by exploding underneath her a large
mass of gunpowder, contained in a water-tight case, had
long been a project of enthusiasts, but the difficulty of
obtaining an efficient mechanical arrangement for igni-
tion, and keeping the whole apparatus in order when
immersed for any length of time, had, up to the period
mentioned, prevented any striking success being achicxcd
by this means. Small sul^niarinc mines, with a chemical
fuse or some clockwork apparatus for their ignition,
were laid dcnvn in the Baltic during the Russian War,
but were in mcjst cases fished up b\' oiu" ships without
exploding. One, however, did explode on the poop
of the flagship, after much liandling to ascertain the
method of ignition ; btit as the charge was small few
of the spectators were injin'ed. When the Southern
Confederacy seceded from the I'nited States in iS6[,

194 Torpedo Warfaj^e.

one of the first steps of its naval department was
to form a torpedo section to protect approaches to
places liable to attack by the Northern fleet. Such
energy and ingenuity was shown by this branch of the
department, and so little was at first understood of this
new mode of warfare by the enemy, that a number of
his vessels were sunk by submarine mines. From hence-
forth it was evident this weapon could not be despised
with impunity.

Of course, these mines, being moored or placed on
the bottom, only acted if the ship came into their
vicinity ; and if not covered by guns bearing on the
area they protected, could be fished for or destroyed
by boats before the vessels advanced. A further de-
velopment, therefore, was made in taking the mine to
the hostile ship by means of a boat. A charge of
powder was placed at the end of a long pole, carried in
the bows of the boat, which under cover of darkness
then sought its victim. On arriving alongside the ship
the pole and charge were immersed and the explosive
ignited by an electric wire when in contact with the
bottom of the vessel. In the confusion that followed
the assailant had a fair chance of escape. A most
daring, gallant, and successful attack was thus made on
the Confederate ship ' Albemarle,' by an officer of the
Northern navy named Gushing, in a small steamboat.
At the moment of the explosion his own craft sank, but
he escaped by swimming, and returned unhurt with the
news.

This method of attack then came into favour, but so

Torpedo Warfare. 195

great was the risk of discovery when close, and the
consequent danger of being sunk by the fire of the ship
attacked, that ideas turned in the direction of a torpedo
which could be discharged at a vessel from a moderate
distance. This resulted in the fish torpedo. The
original conception was that of a small sort of boat pro-
pelled along the surface and carrying a charge of gun-
powder in the bow. An Austrian officer broached this
idea to Mr Whitehead, an English civil engineer settled
in that country. From this crude proposal he developed
the wonderful piece of mechanism now universally
known as the Whitehead torpedo. First, he had to fix
upon his mode of propulsion. He selected compressed
air, working a small engine and a screw in the tail of
his fish, as in an ordinary vessel. Steam would condense,
and had other disadvantages ; gunpowder gas could not
be controlled ; electricity was not applicable. The result
has shown that his choice was a good one. Then he
determined that his torpedo should travel under water.
An explosion on the surface and against the water
line of a ship would have little effect, because most
of the gas generated would escape into the air. Im-
mersed, the surrounding water confines the gas and
compels it to exert all its energy against the bottom
of the ship. If the charge is large enough, this pent-up
energy is irresistible. It was desirable, therefore, that
tlie torpedo should strike a ship a certain distance below
the water line, keeping this depth during its passage.
Now, any vessel containing compressed air has an ap-
preciable weight added to it, but as the air is allowed tu

196 Torpedo Warfare.

escape the vessel is lightened to a corresponding extent.
Consequently a torpedo propelled by this motive power
would, as the air escaped after doing its work, be con-
tinually getting lighter, and if started 10 ft. under water
would soon come to the surface and finish its course in
this position. This had to be corrected and provided
for by special machinery. The torpedo must travel
throughout its run in the same horizontal plane. The
method by which Mr Whitehead obtains this effectually
is the most ingenious part of his invention. It was long
kept a secret, but has recently been made public. The
general principle is to utilise the pressures due to dif-
ferent depths of water to actuate horizontal rudders, so
that the torpedo is steered upwards or downwards as its
tendency is to sink or rise.

In the foremost end of the torpedo the explosive is
carried, originally gunpowder but now gun cotton, as
being so much more powerful, its ignition being effected
by the impact of the nose of the torpedo on any hard
substance, which forces a pointed striker against a
detonating cap.

So constructed, we have an iron or steel fish-shaped
body, propelled by air highly compressed, which can be
regulated to give a high speed for a short distance or a
greater range at a lower rate. By mechanical contriv-
ances the torpedo could be set to run any required dis-
tance, and then come to the surface or sink. The firing
arrangement was not operative until it had proceeded
some way on its course, but for exercise it was neces-
sary that this should be in a condition of safety when

Torpedo Warfare. 197

the run was finished. As may be imagined, all this
required a long period of anxious thought and a series
of experiments, but eventually Mr Whitehead brought
to the notice of the world what had not often been
seen before, an entirely new invention perfect in every
detail. Its efficiency was demonstrated on trial, and
the weapon adopted by nearly every maritime state.
What limited its usefulness was the comparatively low
speed, which at first was about 8 knots. Hence, if dis-
charged at a vessel half a mile off, it took a considerable
time to traverse the distance, so that any little inaccuracy
in its course, currents, or alteration of direction in the
vessel aimed at would result in a miss. A great advance
was therefore made when the speed was increased to
18 knots by the use of Mr Brotherhood's well-known
three-cylinder air engine, a model of compactness,
simplicity, and efficiency. When gun cotton was used
a less amount of explosive was required for the same
result with gunpowder, and hence a smaller torpedo
could be employed. The improved weapon was 14 ft.
long, with a diameter in its largest part of 14 in. Com-
plete it weighed about 500 lbs. Plant for the manu-
facture of these torpedoes having been established at
Woolwich, a healthy competition arose between our
officers and Mr Whitehead's staff, for having started
a factory at T'iume in Austria he was now suppl}'ing
other Governments with torpedoes. Succeeding im-
pro\emcnts brought the speed up to 27 knots an hour
for a distance of 600 yards. This was the range selected
as that at wliich the tor[)ed() should be discharged at a

198 Torpedo Warfare.

ship, a maximum distance beyond which the chances of
hitting rapidly diminished, while at closer ranges they
were increased. In the earlier patterns the head of the
torpedo had been made exceedingly sharp, under the
idea that this form would give increased speed. But the
late Mr Froude's experiments with submerged bodies
showed this to be erroneous, and that a better result can
be obtained with a bluff head. A further advantage of
such a form is that a considerable increase of explosive
can be carried without adding to the length of the tor-
pedo. With this modification the later patterns have a
charge of 60 lbs. of gun cotton, equivalent, it may be
considered approximately, to 200 lbs. of gunpowder.
Exploded in contact with the bottom of a ship, the effect
must be either to sink or disable, according to the pre-
cise locality struck.

This new weapon, directed at the most vulnerable
part of a ship, had to be met, and it led to the extension
of the double-bottom system. There was an idea that
the torpedo might expend its energy on the outer skin,
leaving the inner hull intact, and thus save the ship
from fatal injur)-. But as Sir Nathaniel Barnaby truly
remarked fifteen years ago : ' I say it is idle to attempt
to form the bottom of a ship strong enough to resist a
fair blow from a powerful torpedo. The utmost that
can be done is to keep the disabled ship afloat after she
has received such a blow. It would be possible to pro-
tect the bottoms of ships with armour to withstand the
present charges of the Whitehead torpedoes. When
this was done, it would only be necessary to increase the

forpcdo W'arjarc. 199

charges of the torpedoes and the armour we had ap[)Hed
would become vuhierable.' No more accurate forecast
could have been made. The latest development of the
Whitehead is a torpedo 18 in. in diameter, w^ith a speed
of 30 knots, and carrying 200 lbs. of gun cotton. No
modification in construction could render the explosion
of such a mass beneath a ship other than irresistible.
Should it be otherwise, an addition of 2 in. to the
diameter of the torpedo would probably allow the
charge to be increased to 500 lbs., and I am quite
unable to see how this could be counteracted.

In the successful application of the Whitehead
torpedo much depends on the method by which it is
launched from the ship or boat. It is now usually
discharged, like a projectile from a gun, by means
of a small charge of gunpowder, or compressed air,
from a tube which it accurately fits. In most cases
the tube is a few feet above the water line, and the
torpedo is launched at any given moment. But it
has always been considered that if it could be pro-
jected under water from a ship the apparatus would
not be exposed to an enem}''s fire, and the torpedo
would start under more advantageous circumstances.
The preliminary plunge from above water has always
been trying to the mechanism contained in the
interior. The difficult)' under water is to get the
torpedo clear (jf the ship when the latter is [)roceeding
at high speed. An elongatcel Ixjd}' thrust out of a hole
into water rushing past at a rate of iS knots is naturally
subjected to sc\cre strains, it nuist be supported until

20O Torpedo Warfare.

the tail is outside, and then the propellers take it onward.
After years of research and experiment this has been
accomplished, and large ships are now fitted to discharge
their torpedoes under water.

When the Whitehead torpedo was introduced it was
at once seen that for boat attack it had enormous
advantages over the old method of carrying a tin of
explosive at the end of a pole. The ship need not be
approached within 600 yards, and thus the operation
was not one of such great hazard. But any chance of
success and escape afterwards would be much increased
if it were possible to command in the boat very high
speed, so as to reduce the time during which the boat
would be under fire in its approach or retreat. Such a
consideration led to the development of the high speed
torpedo boats which we now see in the hands of nearly
every nation. At first it was thought a boat about 80 ft.
long w^ould answer all requirements, and Russia in 1877
constructed a hundred boats 75 ft. long and 10 ft. beam.
The size was such that they could be transported from
the Baltic to the Black Sea by rail. Mr Yarrow, the
eminent torpedo boat builder on the Thames, supplied
some sets of machinery and drawings from which other
sets could be made in Russia. The first of these boats
tried on the Neva had a speed of 18 knots. This was a
great advance in a boat of such dimensions.

In the meantime Messrs Thornycroft, at Chiswick,
had constructed for us the first torpedo boat, which was
about 15 ft. longer than the Russian type, and her
speed, 19 knots, was considered so remarkable that we

Torpedo Warfare. 201

named her the ' Lightning.' Others were then obtained
from both Thornycroft and Yarrow of this type, and in
one of the latter's construction a speed of 21 knots was
obtained. To attain such a result the best material and
workmanship must be combined. Each firm has its
special features of construction, and if either is superior
in some particular point the other surpasses in another
direction.

Having thus a boat of high speed, the equipment was
completed by placing a tube in the bow from which a
Whitehead torpedo could be ejected. In our boats the
tube revolved so as to point on either side as well as
ahead. Thus, in attacking a ship the boat could run
rapidly past her, and without checking speed discharge
the torpedo when in the most convenient position.
Other nations fixed the tube in the stem of the boat,
so that the torpedo can only be discharged when the
bow of the boat is pointed directly to the object.
This method is the simplest, as the torpedo is not de-
flected as on the broadside, for which a special calcula-
tion is required. But the disadvantage is that the boat
is approaching the enemy, and will continue to do so
after discharging her missile until she can turn and
retreat. She is thus under fire longer. These boats
are from 80 to 90 ft. in length, and in moderate weather
are capable of operating a short distance from the coast.
Then it was considered they might perform a more
ambitious function in keeping the sea independently, or
working with a s(iuadron. For this a larger structure
was reciuired, and l\Ir ^'anow ])r()\i(k'(l lor Russia a boat

202 Torpedo Warfare.

lOO ft. long, which steamed out to the Black Sea by her-
self. This craft was followed by others, for different
countries. Some of these, no ft. long, crossed the
Atlantic under sail temporarily provided.

As demands came for higher speed, so did the length
of the boat increase. We ordered a further batch, 125 ft.
long, to carry five torpedo tubes, one in the stem and
two on each broadside. Then Messrs Thornycroft built
two boats for the Spanish and one for the French Govern-
ment, which, with a length of 147 ft., gave a speed of
26 knots on the measured mile. These boats carry two
torpedo tubes fixed in the stem.

Notwithstanding this notable increase of size, it has
not been found that these boats can keep the sea for
any length of time. The continual motion is so wear-
ing to the crews that in rough weather their physical
energy becomes exhausted, and inability to sleep is one
of the most trying conditions of such an existence.
When attached to a squadron, their presence at sea is
a constant source of anxiety, and hence I think it must
be recognised that for a craft able to keep the sea much
larger dimensions are necessary. The proper function
of torpedo boats is to operate from fixed bases on land,
to guard the coast, and harass the squadrons or single
ships of an enemy that may venture on aggressive
action. A blockading fleet would have to be continu-
ally on the alert against night attacks by these wasps
of the sea.

It has been sometimes asserted that blockade has
been rendered impossible by the introduction of steam

l^orpcdo Warfare. 203

and the torpedo boat. I am unable to agree to this.
There never was a time when blockades were not
broken through over and over again. Steam will now
enable vessels to remain in positions which dependence
on wind in former times prevented them from keeping
with certainty. The torpedo boat is a new danger to
blockading squadrons, but it can be met by a line of
other small craft whose special mission it would be to
paralyse the attack before the boats could reach the
main body. It has been shown recently that a special
vessel of 600 or 800 tons, suitably armed with numerous
light guns, forms the most efficient protection to a battle
ship, grappling and subduing the small assailants before
they can effectually launch their torpedoes. A striking
feature of the fleet of 1900 will probably be the great
increase in the number of its satellites, as this view
receives further confirmation.

Although by adding to the length and displacement
of torpedo boats better seagoing qualities have been
secured, they have thereby become more conspicuous
objects by night or day, whereas formerly, being
small, they were not easily seen or hit. The diffi-
culty of getting within range without detection has
once more led people to seek a solution in subniarine
navigation. The idea of travelling under water in an
hermetically sealed boat has engaged the attention of
many enthusiasts, but hitherto without much practical
success. When a submarine boat is in such a state of
e(iuilibriLnn as to freely rise or sink when its buo)'ancy
is increased or diminished, this ctiuilibrium is easily dis-

204 Torpedo Warfare.

turbed, and the tendency is then rather to go to the
bottom than rise to the surface. At least this appears
to have been the habit with most submarine boats since
the first tried by Drebell, in the reign of James I., up to
the present time. In France and Spain boats capable
of acting under water are now under experiment, but
in my opinion the chief advantage of a submarine boat
is to travel on the surface partially submerged, so that,
while the crew can see, the boat itself is almost invisible.

The best protection against torpedoes was at first
thought to be in subdividing the ship into numerous
small compartments. But it was soon evident that this
was not sufficient, and then the system of surrounding
a ship with wire netting was devised in order to stop
the torpedo before it could come in contact with the
hull. The nets are suspended from long booms pro-
jecting from the ship's side, and, with the vessel
stationary, hang vertically in the water. At sea, or
when moving, the nets do not retain this position, and
are an awkward appendage not favourably regarded by
sailors, who strongly object to anything that may foul
the screw. Moreover, torpedoes are now provided with
an apparatus in the nose which enables them to cut
their way through the netting, and travel on uninjured
to the vessel now unguarded. It is probable, therefore,
that in the immediate future nets secured to the ships
will be discarded, and the torpedo frustrated in some
other manner.

Another branch of defence against this attack at
night is a powerful light thrown on the advancing

Torpedo Warfare. 205

object, by which the guns may be directed with ac-
curacy. Among the many uses to which electricity is
now apph'ed on board ships of war not the least im-
portant is its conversion into a strong beam of light
which, when directed from the vessel, illuminates objects
within a certain distance. This is universally termed
an electric search light. The apparatus consists of a
dynamo-electric machine for producing the electricity,
a conducting cable for conveying the electricity to the
lamp, where it is converted into light by means of two
carbon rods, and the rays then concentrated into an
intense beam by a reflector.

On a small scale this has been done before, and I
believe a search light produced by a voltaic battery
and a parabolic reflector was used in the Crimean War.
This was little more than a toy, but the dynamo-electric
machine, since introduced and perfected, has enabled
great advances to be made, w^hile the spherical reflecting
mirror, devised by Colonel Mangin, is no less important
in utilising the light thus produced. This reflector is of
glass, ground so that the circumference is thicker than the
central portion. This mirror collects and concentrates all
the rays which impinge on it from the carbons in front,
and then projects them forward in an intense beam of
light. In clear weather small objects can be clearly dis-
cerned at upwards of a mile, when the ra\' is thrown on
them, but in fog or mist the light has no penetrative
power. There appears to be a deficienc)- of red ra}'s,
which arc not absorbed by a(iueous \ap()ur to the same
extent as llie ra}-s of other colour in white light. As

2o6 Torpedo Warfare.

also, when these h'ghts are used from a ship, the rest of
the horizon is made to seem darker than before, the
opinion as to their value is conflicting. They are most
efficient when external to the point sought to be pro-
tected, and placed so as to illuminate the space that
must be traversed before the ships can be reached. I
can conceive that, as it is desirable to have special ships
to destroy torpedo boats when discovered, other craft
might be equally advantageously fitted with powerful
lights for this special dut}', while the main force remained
in darkness.

The electric light detects one colour much better
than another. White is most easily distinguished, while
a black boat can approach much nearer without being
discovered. Steam escaping shows up at a great dis-
tance. Torpedo boats, whose period of action is during
the hours of darkness, should show as little white as
possible.

The want of success which has attended the efforts
of those who hoped that torpedo boats could keep the
sea led to the demand for a t)'pe which is now being
largely constructed. This is a vessel of from 400 to 800
tons, which can accompany a squadron and during a
naval action dart in under cover of smoke and launch
torpedoes at the enemy when he exhibits signs of con-
fusion. The French were the first to carry this idea
into practical execution by building the ' Bombe ' class,
of about 340 tons. They are useful little vessels in some
respects, but too small for efficient service in rough
weather. We followed with the 'Rattlesnake,' of 550

Torpedo Warfare. 207

tons, wliich has proved an excellent sea boat. But our
latest development in this type is a number of vessels of
735 tons. Their armament consists of one 4.7-inch gun
at each end and several torpedo tubes. They thus com-
bine a gun and torpedo vessel, which does not appear
to me advantageous. A gun of this weight may be
useful in the stern if a bigger vessel is pursuing ; in the
bow it probably reduces her steaming capability against
a moderate sea. In the chapter on foreign navies will be
found a brief account of what is being done elsewhere in
this direction.

It now only remains to consider what the torpedo
has done, and whether it is likely to influence still
further the course of naval architecture. So far it can-
not boast a large score of successes. But when com-
plaint is made that torpedoes do not run straight, and
sometimes disappear, it is forgotten how many projectiles
lie at the bottom of the sea that never went near the
mark aimed at, or how many were fired before such a
puny antagonist as the 'Huascar' could be brought to
submission. The number of shot and shell fired at
Lissa would, if placed against the damage done, afford
an instructive lesson. Too much is expected of the
torpedo, still only in its infancy. At the same time
I would not claim for it equal rank with the gun. W'c
may say, however, that if successfully applied it has the
power of doing infinitely greater mischief \\\ instance
of this is to be found in the sinking of the * Blanco
Encalada' in Chili from injuries inflicted by a torpedo,
of which the followinj^ is a brief account.

2o8 Torpedo Warfai'e.

When the revolution against the authority of Presi-
dent Balmaceda broke out, the whole of the fleet present
joined the insurgents. The latter thus had a free hand
on the sea until the arrival at Valparaiso of two swift
torpedo vessels, the ' Almirante Lynch' and ' Almirante
CondelL' They were built in England, by Messrs Laird,
for the Chilian Government, and are of the sharpshooter
class. Their dimensions are, length 240 ft., displacement
750 tons, speed 20 knots. The armament consists of
two 14-pounder and two 3-pounder quick-firing guns
and four torpedo tubes. Having given their adherence
to the President, the officers and crew of the two ships
were ready for any service against the other side. They
were accordingly despatched to attack the enemy's
squadron, then lying at Caldera, about 5C0 miles north
of Valparaiso. They arrived off this port just before
dawn on April 23d, and observing the ' Blanco En-
calada ' at anchor, determined to attack at once. The
ironclad was taken apparently completely by surprise.
If those on board knew of the arrival of the torpedo
vessels in Chilian waters, they had not counted on such
speedy offensive operations. The ship seems to have
been without any net protection. No guard boats
patrolled outside the harbour, a portion of the crew
was on shore ; and it would be impossible to imagine a
condition of affairs more favourable to a torpedo attack.
It was made with a courage and determination which
has always signalised the fierce struggles in this part of
the world. Met by a confused and ineffective fire
from such guns as could I e got into action, the two

Torpedo Warfare, 209

assailants approached within about 300 yards uninjured,
and each discharged two torpedoes, none of which struck
the ship. The ' Lynch ' then turned, and again passing
the ' Encalada ' within about 50 yards, discharged a
torpedo, which struck the ironclad abreast the engine-
room. A tremendous shock was felt on board her. A
great many men were killed in the engine-room by
fragments of machinery flying in all directions, others
on the deck above were thrown down and injured by
the concussion. The ship heeled over on being struck,
then rolled back, and the water pouring into the interior
by the large gap made in her double bottom, she sank
in about five minutes. Some of the crew plunged
into the sea and escaped to the shore, but a consider-
able number went down with the vessel. On board the
' Lynch ' and ' Condell ' the casualties were not numerous
or serious. The former vessel suffered most when she
passed so close to the * Encalada,' but both were able to
retreat when a large ship was observed approaching the
harbour, which was supposed to be the ' Esmeralda,' a
cruiser of the enemy, but turned out to be our flagship
the ' Warspitc.'

It may be observed that the torpedo used on this
occasion was one of the latest pattern, of small size,
and carrying a charge of about 60 lbs. of gun cotton.
From the effect produced some idea may be formed
of what 200 lbs. could accomplish. Tlie blow woukl
be resistless in that portion of a ship containing the
machincr)'. The opponent of torpedoes may lay stress
on the fact that fi\'c had to be fired at close range

2IO Torpedo Wa^^fare.

before one took effect; but the fact remains that a
vessel of 3500 tons was sunk in less than half-an-hour
by two craft of 750 tons each, and that both were intact
after the operation. We have no parallel to this in
past naval warfare. It was not possible when the gun
alone decided all combats, but now, while we have gone
on adding to the dimensions, cost, and power of resisting
artillery in our ships of war above the water line, the
addition of a few pounds of explosive renders them
liable below to the same fate as overtook the ' Blanco
Encalada' in Caldera Hay.

CHAPTER XI

STEAM PROPULSION

Steam Navy in 1840 — Machinery at that Date — Paddle-Wheel Frigates
and Sloops — Horse Power, Nominal and Indicated — Voyage of
' Inflexible ' — ' Banshee ' — Introduction of the Screw Propeller —
' Fairy' — ' Duke of Wellington ' — ' Victoria' — Substitution of Iron
for Wood — ' Warrior ' and ' Black Prince ' — ' Octavia,' ' Arethusa,'
and ' Constance ' — Progress made up to 1865 — Compound Engines
— ' Pallas ' — Increase of Boiler Pressure — Twin Screws — ' Incon-
stant ' — Loss of the ' Captain ' — ' Iris ' and ' Mercury ' — Steel Pro-
tective Decks — 'Polyphemus' — Forced Draught— ' Lightning' —
Yarrow's Boats — ' Rattlesnake ' — Triple Expansion — 'Barham ' and
' Bellona ' — Decrease in Weight of Machinery — Difference between
Men-of-War and Merchant Ships — ' Blake ' and ' Blenheim ' — Large
Number of Auxiliary Engines — Supply of Fresh Water — Evaporators
— The ' Yar}7an ' — Growth of Steam in the Navy — Personnel — Pro-
bable Approach of Finality in Marine Engineering.

In the year 1840 steam had already made considerable
progress in the Royal Navy since, nineteen years pre-
viously, the ' Comet ' had made her delmt at Portsmouth.
Fifty years ago there were no less than twenty-nine
steam vessels whose names appear in the official Navy
List. Of these the most important were the ' Cyclops,'
300 horse power, 1195 tons; the 'Gorgon,' 320 horse
power, 1108 tons; and the 'Salamander,' 220 horse
power, 818 tons. The first two of these ships were
engaged at the bombardment of Acre, and the ' Sala-
mander' was employed on the coast of Spain during
the Carlist War,

212

Steam Propidsio7i.

At this period all but three of the steam vessels of
the navy were fitted with what were then known as
' side-lever' engines. This type was the first ever em-
ployed for marine purposes, and it had certain solid
advantages which enabled it for a long time to remain
the favourite and to resist innovation. So much was it
considered to ho. par excellence the engine for ships that,

SIDE LEVER ENGINE.

surmounted by a crown, it formed the device for the uni-
form buttons of the engineers in the Royal Navy; in the
merchant service it was similarly worn, but without the
crown ; and, with a lion over it, the East India Com-
pany's engineers adopted it as a distinguishing badge of
their class. But in the side-lever engine lightness and
compactness were sacrificed to solidity and length of

Steam Propulsion. 2 i 3

connecting-rod, and as the use of steam gradually
spread in the navy, and it became apparent that for
every ton saved in the weight of and space occupied by
the machinery valuable increase could be effected in the
armament and coal capacity of the ship, it was inevit-
able that the ingenuity of the first engineering country
in the world should be directed to the necessity for im-
provement in marine motive power. Hence we find in
1840 the 'Cyclops,' 'Gorgon,' and 'Prometheus' had
been fitted with direct-acting engines ^ by Messrs Sea-
ward, and the total weight of machinery was in their
case reduced by about two-fifths. The ' Gorgon ' was
the first example of the new type of engine, and finished
her trials in October 1837, and direct-acting engines soon
came into general use in the Royal Navy, although the
particular form introduced by Messrs Seaward was by
no means that most generally approved or adopted. Still,
to them belongs the credit of having been the first in the
field.

The year 1843 ^^'^s a remarkable one as regards the
development of steam propulsion in the Royal Navy,
for then it was that the * Penelope,' the first man-of-war
supplied with tubular boilers, and the ' Black Eagle,' the
first vessel ordered by the Admiralty to be fitted with
oscillating cylinders, were added to the list of Queen's
ships. The importance at that date of these two
enormous strides in marine engineering cannot be over-

' 'The (Hstinguishiny feature of all direcl aclini; engines consists in the
connecting-rod Ijcing led at once from the head of the piston-rod to the
crank without the intervention of side-levers.' But this is very ancient

history.

214

Steam Propulsion,

estimated. Tubular boilers at once became universal
in all ships built for the service, and to this day nobody
would dream of applying any but oscillating engines
to the driving of paddles. The ' Black Eagle ' had side-

ENGINES OF THE * BLACK EAGLE.'

lever engines in the first instance, but these were removed
and replaced by oscillating ones by Messrs Penn.

In 1846 was commissioned, by Captain William
Ramsay, the 'Terrible,' the most powerful steam fighting
ship in the world at that date. She was of 1847 tons
burthen, carried an armament of twenty-one guns of
various calibres, and was fitted with double-cylinder
direct-acting engines of 800 horse power by Messrs
Maudslay. And here it may be well to digress for
a moment to point out to the reader that when speak-
ing of the horse power of the earlier engines ' nominal '

Steam Propulsion. 2 1 5

is meant.^ The ' indicated ' power developed, that is,
the real effective power, varied from about two and a
half times the nominal in the case of the ' Gorgon,' in
1837, till it reached more than seven times the nominal
in the ' Inconstant,' in 1869. The absurdity and in-
convenience of expressing the power of ships' engines
by a system of notation absolutely without meaning
became so evident that in 1872 the indicated power
was ordered to be given in the official Auivj List.

Exactly contemporaneous with the * Terrible' was
the ' Inflexible,' the first steamship in the navy to
make a voyage round the world. No better example
can be given of the difference between steam naviga-
tion in the Royal Navy at that date and the present
than the performance of the ' Inflexible,' which was
then considered highly creditable, as indeed it was,
to Captain John C. Hoseason, who commanded her
and furnished an interesting account of it. She was
what in those days was called a sloop, of 11 22 tons
burthen — not to be confounded with displacement- —

^ ' Nominal ' horse power was a standard adopted by James Watt for
commercial purposes, in which the efieclive pressure and speed of piston
were assumed to be constant quantities in all engines. The rule was well
enouf^h when first devised, but the extraordinary thing is that it should
have remained in force so long under such entirely different conditions.

- 'Tons burthen,' or old measurement as it is often called, was, like
'nominal' horse power, a purely commercial expression. It was ol)iainL'(l
by multiplying the 'length for tonnage' — which was found l)y deducting
three-fifths the l)rcadtii of tlie ship from the length, taken at the water line
-by the whole breadth and by the half breadtli and dividing the product
by ninety-four. Displacement tonnage, now in universal use, moans the
number of tons weiglU of sea water displaced by a ship floating at her load
draurrht.

2 1 6 Steam Propulsion.

and fitted with direct-acting engines by Fawcett capable
of working up to 378 nominal horse power. We have
no available record of what her real horse power was,
but she probably at her best indicated nearly three
times her nominal. Her boilers were loaded to what
was then considered the ample pressure of 8 lbs. on
the square inch. She was in commission from the
9th of August 1846 to the 28th of September 1849.
During this time she steamed 64,477 nautical miles,
and got over 4392 under sail alone. Her average daily
steaming was 186.62 knots, and her fires were alight
during 483 days. Her total consumption of coal was
8 12 1 tons, her average distance steamed per ton of coal
7.9 knots, and her average consumption per hour
19.5 cwt. After service in India and China she re-
turned to England by Cape Horn, thus making the
circuit of the globe and establishing a ' record ' for
herself.

A vessel which must not be passed over among the
celebrated paddlcrs is the ' Banshee,' engined by Messrs
Penn, which managed to steam from Holyhead to
Kingstown, a distance of 55 nautical miles, in three
and a half hours on several occasions, this being at
the rate of 15.7 knots, then unprecedented. She was
afterwards deprived of half her boiler power, to increase
her coal carrying capacity, and sent to the Mediter-
ranean to do duty as a despatch vessel, for which ser-
vice she could always be relied upon as a 12-knot
steamer.

Paddle-wheel men-of-war were at one lime the most

Steam Prop7ilsion. 2 1 7

important factor in our navy — the manufacture of their
engines called forth the utmost skill in design, ingenuity
of detail, and accuracy of workmanship that were in
those days available — but their end was near, and they
were soon to become as obsolete and forgotten as though
they had never been. Their defects and disadvantages
had all along been sufficiently obvious, but nothing
better was to hand. Huge outside cumbrous wheels,
liable to be utterly disabled by the explosion of a lucky
shell, the position of the engines themselves with their
most vital parts well above the water line, and the
enormous weight of the machinery in proportion to
tonnage and horse power, all these objectionable char-
acteristics made it certain that when an alternative
method of propulsion was proposed by which these evils
would be abrogated, or even sensibly mitigated, it would
be welcomed with enthusiasm and eagerly adopted.
The enthusiasm and the eagerness were not quite as
much to the front as might have been expected, but the
conservatism of the navy even now, much more then,
may almost be termed bigotry. The screw propeller,
however, had in itself such intrinsic merits that, if it did
not at first dazzle like a display of fireworks, it soon
became as much a national necessity as the brcadstuffs
it is the instrument of bringing in such quantities to us
who would perish without them.

As has so frequently been the case with other inven-
tions, it is not by any means certain to whom the credit
of first discovering the screw as a propeller for marine
purposes ought to be ascribed, but the matter is not o{

2 1 8 Steam Propulsion.

much importance. As far as the British navy is con-
cerned, Mr F. P. Smith, who succeeded in rousing the
Government to action after that splendid inventor
Captain Ericsson had failed, is indisputably the father
of screw propulsion. Mr Smith brought out with
success in 1840 the ' Archimedes,' a vessel of 232 tons
and 80 horse power. The Admiralty thereupon ordered
the 'Rattler' to be built on the same lines as the
paddle-wheel steamer * Alecto,' with screw engines of
the same nominal horse power by Messrs Maudslay,
and very soon several more men-of-war were ordered
to be fitted with screws. An early example of a suc-
cessful screw vessel was the Royal yacht ' Fairy,' built
of iron in 1845, ^"<^ engined by Messrs Penn. She had
oscillating cylinders driving a cogged wheel geared into
a pinion on the screw shaft, so that the screw made five
revolutions for every one of the engines. She was kept
running for many years between Portsmouth and Cowes,
till at last her plating was worn so thin that a bluejacket
alongside sent his boathook right through it. She was
then replaced by the ' Alberta.'

The ' Duke of Wellington,' Sir Charles Napier's flag-
ship in the Baltic during the Russian War, was probably
the last screw ship in the Royal Navy fitted with geared
engines. For it was about this time that a change
came over the design of machinery for the propulsion
of war vessels, so complete and radical as to mark a
distinct epoch in its history. When once the fact had
been grasped that all men-of-war for the future would
be propelled by the screw, the immense advantage

Steam Propulsion. 2 i 9

realised by the low position of the main shaft, far below
the water line, became apparent, as the engines, being
horizontal, would be in a great measure protected from
the enemy's fire, instead of being, as in paddle-wheel
ships, dangerously and unavoidably exposed to it. It
was also soon seen what great benefit would be derived
if the engines were coupled directly to the main shaft,
without the intervention of cofjfTed wheels, to obtain
the required number of revolutions of the screw. To
ensure this result much higher speed of crank-
shaft was necessary, but the engineering skill of the
country proved quite equal to the occasion. Messrs
Maudslay & Field, and Messrs Penn & Son, now
began to almost monopolise the Government orders,
as I find that of twenty-six sets of screw engines
completed for the Admiralty between the years 1852
and i860 twenty-one are credited to these tw^o firms.
The workmanship of both was admirable, but at that
time Messrs Maudslay erred, if anything, rather on the
side of strength, and Messrs Penn on that of lightness.
The number ' twenty-six ' given above is exclusive of a
large fleet of high-pressure steam gunboats that were
built and engined with unexampled rapidity at the
beginning of the Russian War. Iligh-pressure steam
was first tried in the navy in September 1853, on board
the corvette ' Malacca.' vShe was fitted with engines
working with steam at 60 lbs. pressure by Messrs Penn,
but she was not a success ; engineers had not yet been
educated up to so vast an innowition.

In i860 was completed for sea a shi]) remarkable

2 20 Steam Propulsion.

from a historical point of view as the last three-decker
in commission on active service in the British navy.
This was the 'Victoria,' of 120 guns and 4403 indicated
horse power. She was fitted by Messrs Maudslay with
horizontal double piston-rod return connecting-rod
engines, a type they had made peculiarly their own,
and from which for a great many years they never
varied.

The ' Victoria ' relieved the ' Marlborough,' a ship of
a similar kind, but of only 3054 horse power, as flag-
ship of the Commander-in-Chief on the Mediterranean
station. Her engine-room, as compared with the
cramped chambers of modern vessels, was of palatial
dimensions. The pressure of steam in the boilers was
22 lbs., and at full power the ship attained a speed of
over 12 knots. With sail set on her enormous yards,
and her progress perhaps helped by her screw, she was
a magnificent sight as she made her way in or out of the
harbours of Malta or Corfu. But her day had come ;
she was the last of her race, for it was recognised that in
combat with even an ironclad of her day she could have
been nothing but a floating shambles. She is, however,
worthy of mention here as being probably the finest
specimen of a wooden steam man-of-war the world has
ever seen. She had but that one commission, and is now
for sale to be broken up.

Various causes were now combining to bring about
the substitution of iron for wood, but there is no doubt
the necessity of providing against the vibration of the
screw in high-powered vessels had a great deal to do

Steam P^'opulsiofi. 2 2 1

with it. Iron had been used to a limited extent in the
navy, but had not been at all generally approved of.
The frigate 'Vulcan' was completed in 1849, and the
troopships 'Megaera' and 'Simoom' in the following
year, but it was not till June 1859 that the 'Warrior'
was ordered as a counterblast to the French * La
Gloire,' then on the point of completion by M. Dupiiy
de Lome.

Although this constituted so distinct a landmark in
the history of the British navy, it had little or no influence
on engineering practice. Engines were made bigger as
higher speeds were demanded, but, except in the matter
of size, the engines of the ' Warrior ' and the ' Agin-
court ' differed but little from those of the ' Arrogant '
and the * Cossack.' It is true the pressure of steam in
the boilers had gradually crept up to 25 lbs. on the square
inch, some improvements in detail had also, as was
natural, been introduced, but the general principle and
arrangement remained unaltered. The engines of the
'Warrior,' however, when she was first commissioned,
were considered to involve so vast a responsibility and
to require such effective supervision that it was decided
to take the unprecedented step of appointing two chief
engineers to her, whereas to-day the post would un-
hesitatingly be given to the junior Chief iMiginccr of the
Fleet, if it happened to be vacant and he to be unem-
ployed. Messrs Penn & Son obtained the contract for
these engines, as also for those of the sister ship ' Black
Prince.' And here a most curious fact ma\' be men-
tioned which excited a good deal of speculation at the

222 Steam Propulsion.

time. The designs for the two ironclads were got out
at the Admiralty by Mr Watts, Chief Constructor of the
Navy, in consultation with Mr Scott Russell, and iden-
tical drawings were sent to the contractors, the Thames
Iron Shipbuilding Company and Messrs R. Napier
& Sons, of Glasgow, for their information and guidance.
The engines were in every way duplicates, of course.
And yet the * Warrior ' was, and is to this day, appreci-
ably superior, both in steaming and sailing, to the ' Black
Prince.' Many ingenious explanations for this differ-
ence were proposed, but none that could in any way
be called convincing.

At the latter end of i860 the Admiralty, being per-
turbed in their minds at the large amount of the national
coal bill, gave carte blaticJie to three eminent engineer-
ing firms to construct machinery for three crack sailing
frigates of nearly similar tonnage and lines, with the
sole view of combining reasonable speed with economy
of fuel. The selected frigates were the ' Octavia, ' Are-
thusa,' and ' Constance,' which were assigned to Messrs
Maudslay, Penn, and Randolph & Elder respectively,
with no restrictions as to pattern or, it was said, price.
Messrs Maudslay elected to supply a three-cylinder
engine, working expansively in the ordinary way, with
an initial pressure of 30 lbs., which they afterwards
reproduced on a larger scale in the ' Lord Warden ' ;
Messrs Penn fitted an exceptionally well executed
specimen of their trunk engine, but about neither of
these designs was there any decided novelty. The
Scotch firm, however, flew at higher game. They had

Steam Propulsion. 223

six cylinders to their engines, each triplet consisting of
a high-pressure between two low-pressure ones. The
initial pressure in the boilers was 60 lbs.; steam was cut
off in the middle cylinder of each group at about half-
stroke, and exhausted thence into the other two. This
deserves notice as being the first instance of the use of
the compound engine in the navy, though it was not
long after the trials of the ' Constance ' that Messrs
Humphrys & Tennant employed a simpler form of the
same principle in the ' Tallas.' The three ships were
sent for a cruise in company to Madeira and back, but
no very grand results were obtained. The ' Octavia '
became commodore's ship during the Abyssinian War,
the 'Constance' went to the West Indies, and the
'Arethusa' to the Mediterranean. After one com-
mission they were never employed again ; they were
admitted to be failures, and their hulls have long
since gone to the shipbreaker, their engines to the
scrap heap.

Let us look, then, at the state of steam navigation in
the Royal Navy in 1865, the year that marks the close
of the first half of the fifty }ears that this book deals
with, and great as the progress made, and radical as the
changes introduced in this quarter of a ccntur\' may
seem, they certainly did not surpass in importance
either the progress or the changes of the next. In
1865 the paddle-wheel as a mode of proi)ulsioii for
fighting ships had become entirely obsolete, its place
having been taken by the screw. '1 he pressure of the
steam in the boilers had increased from 7 lbs. in the

224 Steam Propulsion.

* Rattler' to 30 lbs. in the 'Vestal,' which of itself
shows what an advance must have taken place in the
art of boiler construction, and every boiler afloat was
on the tubular principle. The interposition of gearing
between the crank and main shafts had long been
abolished, and the number of revolutions of the engines
had risen from, say, fourteen to fifty-six. The question
of coal consumption was beginning to awaken attention,
and as a consequence compound engines and surface
condensers were being toyed with tentatively to that
end. The 'Warrior,' though completed in 1861, was
still the fastest ship we had, with her speed of 14.3
knots, and it was not then considered likely that this
speed would be much exceeded in the future except
by a few enthusiasts ; but the gift of prophecy is rare,
and it is possible that a quarter of a century hence
the engines of the 'Blake' will be considered as
antiquated as those of the ' Warrior ' are now. The
engine builders of 1865, however, enjoyed advantages
of which their successors of to-day may well be envious.
The girders of ironclads, the solid oak beams of frigates
or converted line-of-battle ships furnished such sound
foundations for the bed-plates of the engines, and,
above all, the restrictions in the matter of weight were
so comparatively benign, that delightful smoothness of
working was the rule, and serious accidents were all
but unknown.

We now enter on a new era of naval marine engineer-
ing. In 1866 was completed the * Pallas,' a small iron-
clad designed by Sir E. Reed, and remarkable for having

Steam Propulsion. 225

been the first ship successfully fitted with compound
engines for the Royal Navy ; for though the ' Constance '
preceded her, that ship's machinery was a constant
source of extreme worry and anxiety to those respon-
sible for the charge of it, while the ' Pallas ' in this
respect never gave any trouble at all. The ' Pallas '
had only two cylinders, instead of six, of unequal
volume, one being four times the size of the other.
The steam was admitted at high pressure, 60 lbs., into
the small cylinder, and thence passed into the larger one,
which it of course filled by its expansion. This is the
whole principle of compound engines. She had surface
condensers, and there is no doubt, for the horse power
produced, she was very economical in fuel. The boilers
were fitted with superheaters, a series of tubes at the
base of the funnel through which the steam passed with
the object of drying it and surcharging it with heat — a
contrivance that was always looked upon with distrust
by naval engineers and has long ago passed into oblivion.
Her speed was 13.4 knots, and she was a handy and
essentially comfortable little ship.

The compound principle, as introduced by Messrs
Ilumphrys & Tennant for the 'Pallas,' was, but at an
interval, adopted for most of the new ships in the navy,
until superseded by triple-expansion, to a consideration
of which wc shall come b)'-and-b)'. With compound
engines came as a natural consccjuencc surface con-
densers, and the general use of steam of not less than
60 lbs. pressure. This latter innovation brought about
an entire revolution in the shape of ships' boilers.

2 26 Steam Propulsion.

What was known as the square or ' box ' type, that had
been in use nearly fifty years, had to be discarded, in
view of this increase of pressure, for a circular form,
resembling a Gloucester cheese set on edge, with the
furnaces on the flat side of it. The thickness of plates
had to be greatly increased, the excellence of the metal
to be more rigidly insisted on, while the difficulty of
manufacture was considerably enhanced. Machines
that had been devised for punching out the rivet holes
became of no value, as thick plates suffered in strength
by the process, and the operation of drilling had to be
substituted for it. This was, of course, more expensive,
but amply repaid its cost in the long run.

The 'Penelope,' completed in i S6S, was the first
important ironclad fitted with twin screws, and is note-
worthy as having been the forerunner of a long line of
twin-screw battleships. When the 'Audacious' class
came to be built, immediately following on the ' Pene-
lope,' the twin screw system was not so generally ac-
cepted, as two ships of the same type, the ' Swiftsure '
and 'Triumph,' were only allowed one screw apiece.
Nowadays all \essels we build of an}' size above second-
class gunboats are fitted with two sets of engines. Of
the advantages of the plan there can be no doubt, but
in this place, where the aim is to be rather historical
than critical, any disquisition on the subject would be
impertinent — in the original sense of the word.

In August 1869 was commissioned a single-screw
frigate that for speed and other good qualities excelled
everything the world had hitherto seen, and indeed she

Steam Propulsion. 227

has never been beaten in her own Wnc. This was a
period of experiment and invention, and the ' Incon-
stant ' was in many ways an example of success in both.
She was the first iron ship to be encased in a sheathing
of wood, in order that she might be coppered, and so
avoid the inconveniences of the fouHng which, in spite
of so many compositions and nostrums, is still the hcte
noire of all iron and steel hulls. Her engines were
supplied by Messrs Penn, and were nominally of 1000
horse power, but when the ship was tried on the
measured mile at Stokes Bay they indicated 7360 horse
power, and gave the ship, when all her ten boilers were
used, a speed of 16.51 knots, which had never hitherto
been approached by a fighting ship. With half-boiler
power a speed of 13 knots was easily attained, but the
' Inconstant's ' weak point was her limited coal endur-
ance. Her supply of fuel was only sufficient for two
and a quarter days' steaming at full power, and for nine
days at 10 knots an hour. This, of course, is a serious
defect, but nevertheless she was a splendid ship in her
day. She was remarkable for her speed and handincss
under sail alone, and when the squadron was sailing
showed herself superior to the ' Bristol,' a wooden
frigate of no mean reputation.

l^ut a time came when she \vas asked to show her
speed under circumstances so sad and melancholy as to
fill the whole kingdom with grief and mourning. On
the night of the r)th of September 1S70 the Channel
Squadron, under the command of Sir Thomas S\-monds,
was crm'sing off C"ai)e JMnisterre. The weather after

2 28 Steam P7'opulsion.

leaving Gibraltar, had been remarkably fine, and the
admiral had taken advantage of the smooth water to
launch his boat from the ' Minotaur ' flagship and
inspect the ' Captain.' He did not approve of her,
although at that time, because she had made one or two
cruises without capsizing, she was supposed to have
settled the question beyond dispute as to what should
be the type of the British war vessel in the future.
There was no particularly bad weather that night ; the
sea was certainly not exceptionally heavy, nor the wind
anything like a real gale, but in an ordinary squall the
' Captain ' turned slowly over and 500 precious lives
were lost. The ' Inconstant' was the next ship to her,
and remarked the disappearance of her lights, but owing
to the squall the squadron was more or less scattered,
and but little attention was paid to the circumstance.
When daylight came next morning the sea was smooth,
but there were no signs of the * Captain,' and at first no
alarm was felt about her. The admiral, however, made
a general signal, ' Spread in search of " Captain," ' and it
was not long before one of her boats was picked up ;
still nobody suspected the dreadful truth. But later in
the day a table known to have formed part of Captain
Burgoyne's cabin furniture was found floating, and then
there was no room for doubt. Nothing but the capsiz-
ing of the ' Captain ' could have caused that table to be
floating in the Bay of Biscay. A signal was then made
for the ' Inconstant ' to get up steam for full speed and
proceed to England with the terrible news. She had a
light fair wind, and from a point just off Corcubion to

Steam Propulsion. 229

Plymouth she averaged 15J knots, with one boiler out
of her ten held in reserve. This was a fine performance
in those days, but she never had the chance of repeating
it, for the scare caused by the loss of the ' Captain ' re-
sulted in some 300 tons of extra ballast being stowed in
her hold, which had the effect of completely ruining
her exceptional qualities for speed, whether under steam
or sail. She has been employed on various services
since then, but is now quite obsolete.

By 1873 t^"^c engineer department at the Admiralty
finally made up its mind that compound engines were
as likely to be profitably employed on board the Queen's
ships as they long had been in the mercantile marine.
The usual pressure of steam in the boilers of men-of-war
had now settled at 60 lbs. on the square inch. Every
ship as she was built was being fitted with compound
engines, but there was a restless, uneasy feeling among
the men who constructed them that they were very far
from the end of the journey on which they had started
when they first left the 'sweet simplicity' of simple
engines and 30 lbs. pressure behind them. They little
knew what was in store for them in the future.

Before that time arrived, however, two ships were
added to the navy sufficiently remarkable both for hulls
and machinery to demand particular notice. These
were the 'Iris' and 'Mercury.' ICntirel)' without de-
fensive armour, these ships were intended to rcl}' for
safety on their exceptional speed. The 'his 'was the
first ship built in ICngland in which soft steel was
enii)loyecl, and the first vessel C)r the Royal Navy wholl}-

230 Steam Propulsion.

built of steel. It may be added that she was also the
first vessel wherein the construction of her machinery
was much hampered by considerations of weight, and as
a consequence in her engines were introduced, for the
first time, hollow compressed steel shafts, invented by
the Whitworth firm. The engines, by Messrs Maudslay,
were indeed of a type entirely new to the navy. The
firm had obtained considerable credit and renown by
the extraordinarily fast passages made by the ' Germanic '
and ' Britannic,' Atlantic mail steamers engined by
them for the White Star line. The compound engines
of the ' Iris ' are exactl)' on the same principle, but
horizontal instead of vertical. There are two distinct
sets, driving twin screws, and each set has four cylinders,
two high-pressure at the back of the two low-pressure
ones, arranged in what is known as ' tandem ' fashion.
' The narrow beam of the ship, in proportion to the size
and power of the engines, rendered it necessary to place
the starboard engine in front of the port engine, so that
the whole body of the ship is filled with machinery.'
So says Lord Brassey, but what was considered an
exceptional case in 1876 is now the universal order of
things.

The ' Iris ' carries 500 tons of coal in the ordinary
bunkers, and 250 tons additional in the reserve bunkers.
The total weight of the machinery, with water in the
boilers and condensers, is about 1000 tons, and the
contract price was ;^93,ooo. From the Times account of
her trials we learn that she proved to be not only the
quickest ship in the navy but the quickest ship afloat

\ £

Steam Propulsion, 233

having surpassed the highest spcad attained by the
* Lightning,' the first torpedo boat suppHed to the
service — of which craft more by-and-by. There was
nothing resembling her in the navy with reference to
the proportion of midship section to length, the extreme
fineness of her entrance and run, and the ratio of her
enormous horse power to displacement. It is doubtful
if any trials have been more fraught with valuable
instruction to marine engineers than those of the ' Iris.'
At first she was a great disappointment to all who had
in any way been connected with her. It had been
calculated that with 7000 horse power she ought to
realise something like a speed of 17.5 knots, but with
7500 horse power she only managed 16.6 knots, the
revolutions of the engines being ninety-one.

Space does not permit of any detailed description
of the numerous experiments which followed, but it is
sufficient to say that the screw propellers were found
to be vastly too large in diameter, and their friction in
the water was thus excessive, that r_ their pitch was
increased, and that the 'Iris,' with 7735 horse power,
attained a mean speed of 18.572 knots, fully a knot
more than the constructive department at the Admiralty
ever expected to get out of her. The ' Mercury,' her
sister ship, built on the same lines, under an adjoining-
shed at the same dockyard, and engincd by the same
firm, was even more successful, attaining a mean speed
of 18.87 knots per hour, and this in 1879. It is hardly
to be wondered at that the fame of such unparalleled
achievements spread all over Europe and excited the

2 34 SleaiJi Propulsion.

emulation of foreign powers, but at that time they had
neither engineers nor shipwrights w^ho could pretend
to rival ours.

It has been thought desirable to dwell at some
length on the ' Iris ' and ' Mercury,' because they un-
doubtedly indicate an epoch in the history of engineering
in the navy and arc still very valuable vessels. Thc\-
have, however, two grave defects, which have prevented
any reproduction of their type. They are entirely un-
protected, and their coal endurance is ver}- small. More
or less provision was made in them to compensate
for the absence of armour by water-tight subdivision
and by coal protection : still they had to run the risk
of being penetrated in a vital part and sent to the
bottom by the explosion of a single successful shell.

And here came in one of the most important inven-
tions, suggestions — call it what you will — of the quarter
century we are discussing. That was the adoj^tion in
otherwise light cruisers of a steel protective deck, which
has permitted the grand and beneficial substitution of
vertical engines for horizontal ones. And for this idea
Rear-Admiral Robert Scott deserves all the credit. The
part of a fighting ship that it is most essential to guard
from an enemy's fire is the engine-room. In the early
days of steam this was natural!}- accomplished by keeping
all the machinery below the water line, but when the idea
of a horizontal armoured deck took root engineers were
quick to see that they would be comparatively safe
under its shelter, and that projectiles would glance off
it instead of dropping through to their destruction.

Steam Propulsion. 235

Hence vertical engines, whose height is only limited
by that of the protective deck. Every engineer knows
that the normal position of a cylinder and piston is
perpendicular ; circumstances alone have forced him
sometimes to be content with the horizontal. At the
present time every war vessel of size above a gunboat
is supplied with vertical engines. The ' Shannon ' and
' Dreadnought,' both built at Pembroke, and the ' Nelson '
and ' Northampton, both hailing from Messrs Elder,
of Glasgow, were the first important ships to be so
fitted. These four ships were all completed between
1875 and 1878.

In 1 88 1 was launched the ' Polyphemus,' a most re-
markable ship, but noteworthy more for her hull, which
is fully described elsewhere, than for her machinery.
She has twin screws, driven by two pairs of compound
horizontal engines constructed by Messrs Humphry's
& Tennant, of Deptford, who, it may here be remarked,
have latterly built and are building some of the most
important engines in the navy. The boilers of the
' Polyphemus,' originally of the locomotive type, gave
a great deal of trouble, and new ones were substituted
for them with good results. The pressure of steam is
1 10 lbs. per square inch. It will be observed with what
leaps and bounds the prcssiu'e of steam ach'anced in
the course of comparativel}- few }'cars. A (juitc usual
pressure now is 155 lbs., and this will probal)l\- be vcr\'
considerably increased before long.

With the extended ai)plicatio!i of high - pressure
steam came, as a natural corolhu')-, a desire to utilise

236 Steam Propulsion.

its advantages to the utmost. To this laudable ambi-
tion we owe the introduction of forced draught and
triple expansion. The former device, which, for the
benefit of lay readers, may be defined as the increase
of air pressure in the stokeholds by artificial means,
causing the fires to burn more fiercely and to consume
more fuel in a given time on the same surface of grate,
was, like other new things, only generally adopted in
our service after considerable hesitation, and when it had
been proved by the French to possess certain advant-
ages too weighty to be overlooked. It may be well
here to observe that this is probably the first and only
instance of British marine engineers owing anything to
any foreign source. Other nations have invariably been
content to follow where we led from the very earliest
days of steam navigation. In the future it is possible
that the restless ingenuity of American mechanicians
may produce ideas that we cannot afford to neglect, but
at present it may safely be said that the history of
English engineering includes all that the rest of the
world has hitherto accomplished in that direction.

Forced draught was first employed in the British
navy in the ' Lightning,' our earliest torpedo boat, con-
structed by Messrs Thorneycroft, of Chiswick, in 1877.
The system was adopted, primarily if not solely, with
the view of obtaining a much greater power with a given
weight of boilers than could be obtained with natural
draught. Economy of fuel was not the object sought ;
if it had been, it would not have been found. The
'Lightning,' a boat only 84 ft. long, of 10 ft. 10. in.

Steam Propulsion. 237

beam, and ^2 tons displacement, attained a mean speed
of over 18 knots. Her engines, supplied by her builders,
were compound, driving a single screw. The high-
pressure cylinder was I2f in, in diameter, the low-
pressure 21 in., their stroke was 12 in. She had a
steel boiler of the modified locomotive pattern, working
at 120 lbs. pressure. Her surface condenser was made
of thin sheet copper, and was supplied with a separate
engine and centrifugal pump. The machinery of this
vessel was very light, steel being largely used, and the
workmanship was of the highest class. She was, in
her day, a complete novelty, both as regards hull and
machinery, and was equally a complete success. She
is interesting as the pioneer of a very numerous and
important flotilla. By May 1887 Messrs Yarrow, of
Poplar, who have always been friendly rivals of Messrs
Thorneycroft, had supplied our navy with a torpedo
boat, known as ' No. 80,' which illustrates the strides that
had been made by both firms in a decade. This vessel
has a length of 135 ft., beam of 14 ft., and displacement
of about 130 tons. Her triple-expansion engines work
up to 1700 indicated horse power, and the trial speed
for three hours was 23 knots. She can steam a distance
of 2000 knots at 1 1 knots speed. There is only one
locomotive boiler, and it is probable the boilers of this
type of boat are the largest ever built on the locomotive
principle, but the firm has as yet had no failures with
them. Higher sjjccds with more powerful machinery
have been attained in boats built since 'No. 80' by both
firms for foreign powers. Messrs Yarrow have recently

238 Steam Propulsion.

employed quadruple-expansion engines, with a boiler
pressure of 200 lbs., in a boat for the Argentine Govern-
ment, with the happiest results.

It has been stated that ' No. 80 ' was supplied with
triple-expansion engines, but she was not the first vessel
to be so fitted. Here it may be well to mention that
whereas in simple engines the whole process of ex-
pansion of the steam is carried out in one cylinder, and
in compound engines in two, in triple-expansion engines
the steam passes through three cylinders, diminishing
in pressure at each step before it reaches the condenser.
More work is thus got out of the steam for the same
expenditure of fuel, and consequently what is known as
the *coal endurance' of ships is considerably increased.

In September 1886 was launched the 'Rattlesnake,'
built and engined by Messrs Laird, of Birkenhead, the
forerunner of a t\-pc of vessel considered by many
good judges to be of even more importance in modern
naval warfare than the torpedo boats. That the
authorities themselves are of this opinion may be
seen by the fact that at the present moment there are
twenty-two of these vessels, now known as 'sharp-
shooters,' either completed or in progress. 'In engining
these ships the paramount object has been to reduce all
weights to a minimum consistent with efficiency,' and
in no similar instance has praisew^orthy intention been
so carried to an extreme as nearly to approach a crime.
The propelling machinery of the ' Rattlesnake,' con-
sisting of two sets of vertical triple-expansion three-
crank engines, of 2700 horse power at 310 revolutions,

S/eam Propn/sion. 239

was the first of its kind supplied to the navy. The
framing is entirely composed of steel, which has also
been largely employed in the construction of the
machinery throughout. The crank and other shafts
are made of Whitworth special steel, and are all hollow.
She attained a mean speed of 18.779 knots on the
measured mile under unfavourable circumstances as
regards weather, and has since then frequently achieved
19 knots on actual ser\icc. She has taken an active part
in all naval manoeuvres of late years, and has been the
terror of her imaginary foes, mainly because her engines
liave never broken down. This is no doubt owing to
the fact that the stipulated weight of the machincr)'
was exceeded.

The great difficulty in obtaining and maintaining
high speeds in the navy has been the incapacity of
boilers to withstand the strain put upon them. For
this contracted dimensions have been mainly, and
forced draught excessively and injudiciously applied,
partly responsible. Forced draught is by no means to
be wholly condemned. It is not, as ^Admiral I\Ia}-ne
called it, purely 'an invention of the Evil One.' Ikit
it requires to be used with care and judgment, when it
will probably prove as valuable an auxiliar}' to the
steaming power of our warships as it lias inidoubtedlx'
shown itself to be in the mercantile marine. The
' l^arham ' and the ' Ikllona,' sister ships, deserve a few
words as to their machiner}', which is ver\- //;/ ^/r sicc/c.
l^hc\- have each two sets of vertical triple-expansion
engines, driving twin screws. The cylinders are 27 in.,

240 Steam Propulsion.

40 in., and 60 in. in diameter, with a stroke of 2 ft.
3 in. The natural draught trial of the ' Bellona ' took
place in November 1890 in the North Sea, off the mouth
of the Tyne, and in a run of six hours she attained a
mean speed of 19.46 knots. The mean indicated horse
power was 3557. Why could the ' Barham,' fitted with
precisely similar engines, only keep up a speed on
active service of 2 knots less? In all likelihood it was
the human clement that came into play and caused the
difference. The stokers were not good enough for their
work.

Here it may not be inappropriate to call attention to
the rapidly diminishing weight of steam machinery for
warships in proportion to the power demanded from it.
In the year 1853 the 'The Duke of Wellington' was
looked upon with pride by the whole country as a
magnificent specimen of a steam line-of-battle ship.
Her engines were of 1999 indicated horse power; they
weighed 400 tons, so that each ton of engines gave
5 horse power, and each horse power was produced by
448 lbs. of machinery. In the ' Bellona ' the horse power
is 6000 — estimated — and the weight of machinery only
270 tons, which gives approximately 100 lb. per horse-
power. In torpedo boats the proportion is very much
less than this, which all marine engineers have agreed
to consider as extravagantly small. ' In the merchant
service our tonnage laws encourage the shipowner to
build roomy engine-rooms, and consequently the engines
are not limited as to space occupied ; hence a better de-
sign is possible than obtains in the navy. In our mail

Sfcani Propulsion. 241

steamers on the Atlantic the weight of machinery per
indicated horse power is about 280 lbs.' This shows,
says the Liverpool Journal of Covnnerce, how impossible
it is to institute comparisons between a merchant vessel
and a warship. The question is constantly asked by
outsiders why it is that the ships of the Royal Navy
cannot make passages equal to those achieved every day
by the Atlantic ' greyhounds.' The answer is that they
are not built for it. In, say, the 'Teutonic' the propel-
ling machinery is made the great consideration. Every-
thing is, and can be without harm, sacrificed to it. But
it is far different in a man-of-war. As was long ago
remarked, a fighting ship must always be a compromise.
There are three great requisites : offensive power, meaning
guns and torpedoes ; defensive power, meaning armour,
whether applied to sides, turrets, barbettes, or decks ;
and speed, meaning the most powerful engines, combined
with the greatest coal endurance, that it is possible to
get a ship of given tonnage to carry. If the tonnage is
a fixed quantity, every attempt at extension in the
direction of any of these three qualities can onl}- be
made at the expense of the other two. Hence the craze
for inordinate lightness of machiner}\

As the very latest development of extreme steam
power, with the view of giving to a warship unpre-
cedented speed, attention must be called to the as }'ct
uncompleted cruisers ' Blake ' and ' Blenheim,' cngincd
respectively b}' Messrs Maudslay and Messrs IIumphr\'s.
It is probable that there will be but little difference
between them, as far as steaming capabilities aie con-

242 Steam Propulsion.

cerned, and so the account, taken from TJie Tijnes,
of the ' Blake's ' machinery may answer for both vessels,
which are, from many points of view, the most im-
portant that have been ordered for the Admiralty for
many years. The ' Blake ' " will be propelled by twin
screws, driven by four sets of triple-expansion engines
of the inverted vertical cylinder type. Messrs IMaudslay,
Sons & Field are the makers of these engines and
boilers. The collective power they guarantee is 13,000
horse power for twelve hours' steaming at natural
draught, and 20,000 horse power for four hours with
forced draught ; the corresponding maximum speeds
are estimated at 20 knots for natural draught and
22 knots for forced draught, when the vessel is run in
smooth water with everything at its best. On actual
service, judging from past experience, with ordinar}^
conditions of coal and stoking, the engines may be
expected to develop about 9000 to 10,000 horse power
for long periods of continuous steaming, which would
probably give the vessel a continuous speed of 18 to

1 8-^ knots in smooth water Everyone knows,

what recent manoeuvres have illustrated afresh, that in
cruisers of moderate dimensions, capable of attaining
high speed in smooth-water trials, the working speeds
at sea are limited by other considerations than the

power available for propulsion Sailors generally

will be sure to welcome the greater length and size of
the ' Blake ' and ' Blenheim,' because of their capa-
bility of maintaining speed in rough water ; and their
enormous engine power and very high trial speeds give

$W rudL'

§rn«

eLdii

Steaiu Propulsion,

O 1 ')

*-4o

them a grand working margin as compared with other
cruisers." So far TJic Times, but we do not yet know
exactly how these two ships will turn out. Their
machinery is, however, our latest and most ambitious
effort in the way of naval marine engineering, and forms
a remarkable contrast to the engines of fifty years ago.

Perhaps in nothing has the advance of the use of
steam on board warships been so extraordinary as in
the number of auxiliary engines now considered neces-
sary. And this is a source of danger. The ' Sans
Pareil,' for example, has in addition to her main engines
no fewer than fifty-eight auxiliary steam engines on
board. Some of these are only used occasionally for
special purposes, but an enumeration of them will show
that many must be constantly in use. They are as
follows : —

Main circulating engines,
Auxiliary condenser do., ,
Main fire engines, .
Auxiliary do..
Bilge engines, .
Turning engines, . .
Reversing engines,
Distilled water.
Drain lank, ....
Evaporator feed, .
Ventilation supply.

Ventilation exhaust,

Forced draught.

Main feed, . . .

Auxiliary feed, . .

Air compressing,

Dynamo, ....

Capstan, ....

Hydraulic puni[iing.

Auxiliary do.,

Friedman's eject(jrs.

When the ship is at sea it is clear that these engines,
many of which are constant!)- at work, and all of which
must be ready to work on an emergency, will consiune
an appreciable proportion of the coal assumed in the

244 Steam Propulsion.

official tables to be available for the purpose of con-
tinuous steaming at lo-knot speed, as the consumption
for auxiliary purposes varies from about 5 to 8 tons
a day.

It will readily be understood that the supply and
economy of coal on board a fighting ship are matters of
the very utmost importance, and any contrivances tend-
ing to facilitate them are of great value, but it is probably
less well known that the health and efficiency of modern
marine boilers depend very largely on there being no
stint in the supply of fresh water for them. Such, how-
ever, is the case. Any appreciable admixture of raw
sea water is fatal to the delicate constitutions of boilers
working at a pressure of 155 lbs. on the square inch.
Hence special arrangements have to be fitted for
making up the necessary waste of fresh water that
must occur during a voyage of very moderate length.
Theoretically, if machines were perfect, the fresh water
taken in from the shore, converted into steam in the
boilers, and reconverted into fresh water by the surface
condensers, would not diminish in quantity and might
go back to the boilers from week's end to week's end on
its round of profitable employment. But, in practice,
what with unavoidable leaky joints and occasional
escapes of steam at the safety valves, it is found that
there is a deficit of hundreds of gallons of water every
day, which has to be made up. To this end all ships
are now fitted with distilling apparatus, or ' evaporators '
as they are generally called, for the purpose of convert-
ing salt water into fresh, not only for the use of the

Steam Propulsion. 245

boilers but also for the use of the crew. The newest of
these, and apparently by a long way the most efficient,
is the Yaryan, of American origin, the main principle
of which is that the sea water before being evaporated
and condensed is pulverised into spray. Professor
Lewes, of the Royal Naval College, speaking of most of
the other varieties, averred with good reason that the
trouble of deposit in the boilers was only transferred to
the distillery apparatus ; in the Yaryan there has been
no trouble at all, because there has been no deposit.

Looking back, then, on the past half century, we
find that the whole aspect of marine engineering has
changed. And nowhere is this revolution more dis-
tinctly marked than in the Royal Navy, where it has
produced its most startling effects. In the early days
the steam engine was seldom used, and occupied a very
minor position in the internal arrangement of a ship,
but now it is absolutely requisite for every purpose for
which the modern man-of-war exists. Steam machinery
now fulfils every function of the latter-day ironclad. Its
very air and light, its steering and anchoring, the train-
ing and loading of its guns, the motive power of its
torpedoes, all these, and many other things, without
steam could not be. As a matter of course, as steam
machinery became of more and more importance in the
navy, so did the position of the officers in charge of it
advance. Before 1S47 all engineers were wan-ant
officers, but junior of that rank, so that, the chief
engineer of a paddle-wheel frigate was then, ofiicially,
of less account than the carf^cntcr. 1 Ic is now, as far

246 Steam Propulsioii.

as rank goes, on the same level as the medical and
accountant officers, but his pay is considerably less than
theirs, which is a constant occasion of complaint. With
regard to the rank and file of the engine-room, the
introduction of a class of skilled artificers, which took
place in 1869, has proved of very great benefit to the
navy, by rendering it possible to reduce very largely the
number of highly trained engineer officers, which re-
duction has, however, been carried too far. The entry
and training of stokers — firemen as the}' are called in the
mercantile marine — are in anything but a satisfactory
state. As the necessity for increased intelligence among
these men becomes more manifest, on account of the
number of small yet anything but simple engines that
have to be confided to their care, it will probably be
found advisable to train them up from boys for their
particular duties, in the same way as has long been the
practice with seamen. What the future of engineering
in the navy may be he would be a bold man who would
attempt to prophesy. It is, however, unlikely that in
the next decade anything like the same progress will be
made as in the past one. There must be a point beyond
which, except in matters of detail, improvement of the
marine steam engine cannot go. That point has pro-
bably very nearly been attained. To the ambitious and
sceptical it may be called to mind that, with every in-
ducement to inventors, no substantial difference exists
to-day between the best example of a railway locomotive
and one of thirty years ago. If any startling revolution
in the economy of marine steam propulsion does take

Steam Propulsion. 247

place durini; the lives of the present generation it may
possibly be in the direction of the substitution of liquid
fuel for coal. But of this there does not seem to be at
present any noticeable sign.

CHAPTER XII

FOREIGN NAVIES — EUROPE

Conditiun of French Navy in 1840— Progress after Franco-Cerman War-
Broadside and Barbette Construction— Cruisers— The Russian Flee
— Influence of the '.Monitor '—New Departure— Black Sea and
Baltic Squadrons— Belted Cruisers— Italy— Creation of a New Fleet
after 1870— Monster Ironclads— Cruisers— Germany— Late develop-
ment of Navy— New Battle Ships and Cruisers— Austria, Spain,
Greece, and Turkey.

Notwithstanding the signal defeats inflicted upon
the navy of France at the beginning of this century,
she has regained her position as a maritime power, and
now possesses a fleet only second to our own. Though
in the interval the country has passed through various
political phases, involving changes from a monarchy to
a republic, the long and glorious traditions of a navy,
founded by Richelieu and consolidated by Colbert, have
survived, and are the mainspring of that efficiency which
we see to-day. Fleets may disappear but traditions
survive, and in reconstruction play an important part.
How notable this has been in the case of France.
Stunned by the blows inflicted on her at sea in all parts
of the world, she for some years after the peace of
181 5 made no attempt to resuscitate her navy. But
in 1820 the country was roused when the Minister of
Marine suggested ' to abandon the institution to save

Foreign Navies — Ettrope. 249

the expense, or to increase the expenses to save
the institution.' A sum of ;^20,ooopoo sterHng was
granted, the expenditure of which was to be spread over
eleven years. Such progress was made that in 1840,
when relations between France and England were
strained over the Syrian question, and our fleet had
been suffered to fall below its proper strength, eminent
French naval officers considered their country fully
equal to coping with us at sea. They had in the Medi-
terranean at this time in Admiral Lalande an officer
of great ability and energy, who, it is said, asked permis-
sion to attack the British Squadron. But more peaceful
counsels prevailed, and we, profiting by the lesson, sent
out reinforcements to our undermanned ships. At this
time the equipment of French vessels was superior to
ours, and their crews were in a high state of efficiency.

When, however, steam superseded sails the position
we at once assumed in the construction of steam
machinery gave us an advantage, which was apparent
at the outbreak of the Crimean War. We had a
greater number of steamers, and provided transports to
convey French troops for the attack on Bomarsund.
France undoubtedly was the first to construct sea-
going ironclads, a policy we at first thought foll}-
and then were constrained to follow. Their carl)-
ironclads were of the t\'pc I have alrcadx' mentioned,
but the expense of such vessels and the time
reciuired for their construction pre\cnts the forma-
tion of modern fleets in a few )-ears. During the
Crimean War a wooden line of-battle ship had been

250 Foreign Navies — Europe.

built, equipped, and sent to sea in ninety days. Under
the new system a nation cannot thus rapidly reinforce
its fleet ; and when war broke out in 1870 between
France and Germany the fleet of the former was unable
to effect any serious diversion in the Baltic. There had
been some idea at first of landing a French force in that
locality under cover of the fleet, but there was no
organisation for such an expedition. The opportunity
passed, and the squadron despatched to the Baltic could
do little more than blockade the coast until recalled
home. The crews then assisted in the defence of Paris,
and the naval contingent performed excellent service
during the siege.

After this war France steadily set to work to aug-
ment her fleet. Between 1872 and 1886 several pro-
grammes of shipbuilding were drawn up, and no less
than i^ 1 8,000,000 were devoted to new construction.
Practically the P^rench fleet of to-day is the creation of
the last twenty years, for nearly all the ships launched
previously to 1870 have been removed from the list.
Unlike ourselves, the P^rcnch up to that period adhered
to wooden hulls, whose life is limited. One or two
remain, and among them the ' Marengo,' which as flag-
ship of the Northern Squadron lately visited our shores.

In 1872 was commenced the first large battle ship
built after the war. This was the ' Redoutable.' She
was built of iron, with a displacement of 9200 tons.
Then followed the ' Devastation ' and ' Courbet,' of
10,100 and 9700 tons. The armament in all was
disposed in the same way : a central battery, with a

Foreign. Navies — Europe. 253

few heavy guns mounted over it en barbette. As with
ourselves, guns in France had risen in size to 40 tons
weight, and the armour in thickness to 14 in. Then
after these ships a new departure was taken — the central
battery for the heavy ordnance was abandoned, but
instead of adopting the turret, as wc had, the barbette
system was extended. This was carried out in the
'Admiral Duperre,' ^ begun at the end of 1876. In this
vessel the displacement was increased to 11,000 tons,
and the armament consisted of four 48-ton guns, placed
singly in barbettes, with a number of smaller guns for
auxiliary purposes. The complete armour belt had
from the first been a special feature of French ships,
and in the * Duperre ' it is 21 in. thick at the central
portion. A further advance was made in the design
of the ' Admiral Baudin ' and ' Formidable,' commenced
eleven years ago, and now forming part of the
Mediterranean Squadron. Their displacement is the
greatest yet in the French navy, 11,500 tons. They
are armed with three 75-ton guns, mounted in separate
barbettes, and have as an auxiliary armament twelve
5.3-in. guns. The armour is similar to that of the
' Duperre.' A special feature in these ships is their
lofty freeboard and the height above the water at
which the guns are carried. In rough weather this
is a great advantage, but of course the target offered
to hostile fire is considerable. These two ships are
fine s})ecimens of naval architecture.

^ French ironclads no lon^^er carry yards and sails. Tlie illustration
shows the ' Dupcrrc' as orii;inally completed.

2 54 Foreign Navies — Ejirope.

It will be observed that, whereas we usually mount
our heavy guns in pairs, our neighbours prefer to place
them singly. By this they gain an additional position
at the sacrifice of one gun. The balance between the
two systems appears to be equal. Then, from the first,
the French have adhered to the complete armour belt,
leaving a large area of the side above unprotected. The
weak point of this is that shells exploding beneath the
platforms on which the heavy guns are mounted would
probably put them out of action.

The satisfactory reports of the ' Admiral Baudin '
and 'Formidable' have led to three others of similar
construction being commenced. They are to be of
12,000 tons displacement, and hence the largest vessels
yet designed in France. Whether they will be exceeded
remains to be seen. Their names arc to be ' Lazare
Carnot,' 'Charles Martel,' and ' Jaurcguiberry.' Of
similar type, but smaller, are the ' Magenta,' ' Marceau/
and 'Neptune.' They carry four 52-ton guns, in
separate barbettes.

But though France has been steadily adding to
the number and power of her battle ships proper she
has been no less assiduous in augmenting the class
designed for coast defence. While for such craft we
had stopped, in the ' Glatton,' at dimensions within
4000 tons, the French completed several between the
years i860 and 1880 varying from 4000 to 6000 tons.
Then came the ' Caiman,' ' Indomptable,' ' Requin,' and
' Terrible,' of 7300 tons, in which the principal armament
is a 75-ton gun at each end, and the protection by

Foreign Navies — Europe.

-:)0

armour has a maximum thickness on the belt of \'j\ in.
Such vessels are battle ships to all intents and purposes,
though perhaps not suitable for service in distant waters.
Three others, of 6600 tons, the ' Trchouart,' 'Jemmapes,'
and ' Valmy ' are building. These are to have a 50-ton
gun in a turret at each end. We thus see that France
has abstained from following the example first set by
Italy of building ships of extreme size and equipping
them with monster ordnance. The 75-ton gun is the
largest she has afloat.

While we had been hampered in the production of
fast steam cruisers by the endeavour to give them good
sailing qualities as well, the French clearly recognised,
twenty years ago, that sail power must be sacrificed and
longer vessels built to give speed under steam. This
was carried out in two vessels, the ' Sane' and * Seignelay,'
launched respectively in 1870 and 1874, where with a
displacement of 1900 tons a speed of 15 knots was
obtained. The steam speed of our cruisers of that size
rarely exceeded 13 knots.

But after 1880 a great impetus was given to the con-
struction of fast cruisers in France when Admiral Aube
was Minister of Marine. He had previously advocated
raids on territory and commerce by light forces when at
war with a powerful maritime nation whose battle ships
were too numerous to cope with. A great number of
unarmoured ships were then laid down, several of w hich
are now complete. The ' Tage,' of 7000 tons, is the
largest. Her armament consists of sixteen guns, and
her speed is 19 knots. The 'Cccille' is another line

256 Foreign Navies — Europe.

vessel, of 5700 tons, with a similar equipment. Neither
has external armour, but both have horizontal protec-
tion in a steel deck over the machinery and fore and aft
the vessel. Then experiments with melinite, an explo-
sive of great power used as the bursting charge of shells,
caused ideas to revert to the old system of complete
external armour to keep out some of these projectiles,
their very destructive effect being clearly demonstrated.
The ' Dupuy de Lome,' named after the eminent naval
architect, embodies this principle. Of only 6400 tons,
she is coated externally with 4-in. steel plates. This
will keep out all small projectiles. A number of other
vessels between 2000 and 5000 tons are approaching
completion. In all high speed has been considered the
chief essential. The armament is usually lighter than
that which we give to vessels of similar dimensions, but
many of our officers think that in this respect we have
gone to an extreme in several instances.

For scouting duties with a fleet France has produced
an excellent class of vessel of 19 knots speed and
1850 tons, as in the * Forbin,' 'Surcouf,' and four others.
In the special type of small vessel for counter-attacking
torpedo boats that country was first with the ' Bombe '
class, of 350 tons. An increased size has, however, been
found desirable.

As regards torpedo boats, France possesses a large
number, and is steadily adding to it. Their special
function is coast defence, and all nations now recognise
that squadrons are only impeded if torpedo boats are
attached to them. As for the idea that torpedo boats

Foreign Navies — Europe. 257

can be employed in the attack on commerce, this may
be dismissed. These craft cannot remain at sea for any
time, and their nests will be as well known as the resorts
of Jean Bart and Duguay Trouin were in the old corsair
days.

The Crimean War found Russia but little advanced
in the substitution of steam for sailing ships in her navy,
and she was not prepared to meet at sea either the
Baltic or Black Sea Squadrons of the allies. At the
close of that war efforts were made to recover her old
position among the maritime states, and several screw
vessels were built. Then when France and England
began to produce seagoing ironclads, two Russian
wooden ships then building, the * Sebastopol ' and
' Petropaulowski,' were converted into armoured frigates,
with 4i-in. iron plates. About this time, however, the
naval events of the Civil War in America brought the
* Monitor ' type prominently into favour in Russia. Ten
monitors, on Ericsson's plans, w^ere ordered in 1863,
when Europe seemed inclined to intervene on behalf of
Poland. These monitors were built in the Baltic.
Then came the Franco-German War and the declara-
tion of Russia in reference to shipbuilding in the Black
Sea, but it was some years before Russia was in a
position to carry out the construction of battle ships in
the southern ports. Moreover, the influence of the
monitor was still paramount, and the licet consisted
chiefly of coast defence vessels. Under this influence
the circular ironclads, which I have already alluded to,

258 Fo7'eign Navies — Europe.

were built. When, therefore, war broke out with Turkey
the ironclads of the latter power held a command of
the Black Sea which Russia was not in a position to
dispute. But in 1880 it was decided to re-create the
battle fleet of Russia. A programme was drawn up
for a course of shipbuilding in all classes, which was
to extend over a period of twenty years. After un-
avoidable delays a start was made in 1882. As a result
we now find in the Black Sea three powerful iron-
clads completed, named the ' Tchcsmc,' * Sinope,' and
* Catherine II.' They each carry six 50-ton guns, and are
fairly well protected with armour ; the principle favoured
in France of a complete water line belt being adopted.
Other battle ships are in course of construction. As
Turkey has allowed her former fine fleet to fall into
decay, and has added to it no powerful ships, it is
evident that as between these two powers command of
the Black Sea rests with Russia to-day. This should
be clearly recognised, for the condition has now reverted
to what it was just previously to Sinope.

In the Baltic several useful types of battle ships
have been completed, such as the "Alexander II.' and
' Nicholas I.,' of 8500 tons, a displacement adapted to
the shallow waters of the north. But it is in the con-
struction of cruisers that Russia has shown the greatest
ability and energy. The special type favoured is the
belted cruiser of between 6000 and 8000 tons for distant
stations. Of these there are three, the ' Vladimir-
Monomakh,' ' Dimitri-Donskoi,' and ' Admiral Nachi-
moff,' with a speed of between 15 and 16 knots, of which

Foreign Navies — Eiirope 259

our ' Imperieusc ' and ' VVarspitc ' may be considered the
rivals. The latest completed is the ' Pamyat Azova/
of 6000 tons, with a 6-in. belt and a speed of 18 knots.
Under construction is a very large vessel of 10,500 tons,
to be called the * Rurik,' with a lo-in. belt, powerful
armament, high speed, and large coal supply. Now,
when cruisers are built of these dimensions, and carrying
such an amount of offensive and defensive equipment, it
is evident they are not far removed from battle ships.
Our 'Admiral ' class, of similar tonnage, may be equally
employed as cruisers, and thus the tendency is to
jumble all up together until a war demonstrates how
the classes should be differentiated — a word I should
like to dispense with but cannot find a substitute. It is
curious to observe the fidelity with which Russia has
adhered to external armour instead of relying upon
protective decks, as we have done in the * Blake ' and
' Blenheim.' Of smaller cruisers few lately have been
added to her fleet. It is no doubt considered that
more effect can be produced by a few vessels of great
power than by distributing the force among a larger
number of inferior ships.

Russia was one of the earliest states to perceive the
valuable assistance that torpedo boats could afford when
the coast is menaced by a hostile squadron. In their
war against Turkey little was done in this respect,
because the Russian torpedo boats were small and in-
efficiently equipped. As a result of this experience
they obtained a boat from Mr Yarrow which w as the
pioneer of a larger type. This boat, the ' l^atoum/

26o Foreign Navies — Eic7Vpe.

lOO ft. long, steamed out to the Black Sea in 1880 by
herself. She has been followed by others of slightly
larger dimensions.

In viewing the development of their navies by the
different maritime states it is curious to observe how
cheir relative positions have been altered since the
beginning of the century. In some instances less than
half a century has sufficed to place a country in the
foremost rank. Such an example wc have in Italy.
No country has shown such boldness, originality, and
energy in the creation of her fleet. The lesson at Lissa
was only an incentive to renewed exertion, and to-day
she can justly boast of being able to place in the line
of battle a squadron which only two nations of the
world can surpass. Yet this has been the work of only
twenty years. The earlier ironclads of Italy were those
I have enumerated as taking part in the action off Lissa.
Then after 1870 two were commenced, the ' Duilio ' and
* Dandolo,' similar in design to our ' Inflexible,' They
were the first to carry afloat guns of 100 tons, two of
which were placed in each of the turrets. They were
muzzle-loaders, and made by Armstrong's firm at
Elswick. One of these vessels was designed to carry
a torpedo boat in a compartment of the stern to which
the sea had access. It was a floating boathouse from
which the parasite could emerge when desired, and be
received back into it when her mission was accomplished.
The idea was original but not practical, and it was soon
found that at sea getting the boat in and out safely was

Foreign Navies — Eztrope. 26

extremely difficult. Eventually the aperture was closed
up, and the incident is mentioned as showing that in
Italy novel ideas have a chance of being tested.

But in the 'Duilio' and ' Dandolo ' Italy did not
consider she had reached the maximum of useful effi-
ciency. There was a strong party in favour of indivi-
dual ships of great power, and their arguments carried
the day. The result was an increase to a displace-
ment of 13,800 tons, in two vessels called the 'Italia'
and ' Lepanto,' and an entire change in their design.
External armour was abandoned, and it was all placed
inside the vessel, in a stout deck, round the bases of the
funnels, and in a breastwork enclosing the heavy guns.
These consisted of four 100-ton breech-loaders, placed
in an elongated barbette or redoubt built across the
ship, and supported by bulkheads. This structure, with
armament, weighs about 2500 tons, and therefore we see
a ship not ironclad carrying on her hull the equivalent
weight of a cruiser. Machinery of enormous power
drives these huge structures at a speed of 18 knots, and
they are capable of stowing 1600 tons of coal, which
at a speed of 10 knots an hour would enable them to
cover about 8000 nautical miles. They are magnificent
specimens of naval architecture, but have, in my opinion,
a serious defect. This is the absence of external armour,
which renders them liable to receive serious damage
underneath the structure carrying the heavy guns. The
stability of this structure might be compromised by the
fire of numerous light guns. Next to these two in
size are three vessels of 13,200 tons, the 'Re Umberto,'

264 Foreign Navies — Europe.

* Sardegna/ and ' Sicilia,' which in arrangement are more
like our new first-class battle ships. They carry four
67-ton guns, placed in pairs in a barbette at each end of
the ship, but the principle of omitting all thick external
armour is still adopted. Then there are three others,
the 'Andrea Doria,' * Ruggiero di Lauria,' and 'Fran-
cesco Morosini,' of 11,000 tons, somewhat similar to
the'Duilio' and ' Dandolo,' but carrying four 105-ton
breech-loading guns in a central redoubt instead of in
turrets. Thus Italy possesses ten ironclads of 1 1,000 tons
and upwards, of which all but two are equipped with the
most modern artillery and machinery.

She has been equally enterprising with cruisers and
smaller vessels. In the ' Picmonte,' built by Sir William
Armstrong's firm, she acquired, with the moderate dimen-
sions of 2500 tons, a vessel capable of steaming 20 knots
in smooth water without unduly pressing the machinery.
This also was associated with a very powerful arma-
ment of quick-firing guns. There has been a tendency
to overload such vessels with guns, and in the case of
the 'Piemonte' my impression on seeing her was that
a lighter armament would be more suitable to her
dimensions.

Of torpedo-catchers Italy has several of 750 tons
and a speed of 20 knots. In this type the experiment
was tried of employing three screws to obtain greater
speed, for which the 'Tripoli' was selected. But the
result was not favourable. It is possible that in a vessel
of large size a screw in the centre and one on each side
of the stern may answer, but in a small ship they must

Foreign Navies — Europe. 265

be so close together that the centre propeller has pro-
bably no solid water to work in.

Naturally with such an extent of coast line Italy has
a great number of torpedo boats, and the organisation
for their use in time of war is very complete. Italy may
be justly proud of the navy she has created in tw^enty
years, and her naval officers display a proficiency in
handling this materiel which is the result of unremitting
zeal and industry.

Thirty years ago the navy of the kingdom of Prussia
was numerically inferior to that of Austria, but the
German Empire is now fast becoming a prominent
maritime power. In 1889 a German squadron of iron-
clads came to England which, though not composed of
vessels of large dimensions or latest design, showed in
its organisation and the method in which it was handled
that the same attention had been given to detail in naval
matters as characterises its military department. Up to
the present time the largest ironclad is the ' Konig
Wilhelm,' of 9600 tons, of the belt and central battery
type, like the ' Hercules ' in the British navy. She was
launched as far back as 1868, when that system was
prominently in favour. Contemporary with this ship
are the 'Kaiser' and * Deutschland,' of 7700 tons, and
a few others of smaller dimensions. A later class, com-
posed of the * Baden,' ' Bayern,' ' Sachsen,' and * Wurttem-
berg,' launched between 1S77 and 1880, arc of 7400 tons,
with a central citadel and armament of six 18-ton Krupp
euns. The armour on the side onU' covers the central

2 66 Foreign Navies — Europe.

portion, wherein are located the machinery and heavy
guns, but it is i6 in. thick.

For some years after the completion of these vessels
no more ironclads were laid down, until the activity of
other nations in adding to their fleets spurred Germany
to further effort. She could not view with indifference
the steps taken by Russia to create a powerful Baltic
Squadron. Accordingly, three years ago, a programme
of construction was framed, the most important part of
which was the completion of four new ironclads of
10,000 tons each. The design selected is somewhat
similar to that adopted in late French battle ships —
a complete armour belt and three barbettes on the
middle line, each containing a pair of 11 -in. guns.
Between the foremost and middle barbette is the
auxiliary broadside battery of light guns. The maxi-
mum thickness of belt is 16 in., and it tapers to 11 in.
at the ends. These vessels are to have a speed of
16 knots, and all are being built in Germany. Their
weak point appears to be the absence of any protec-
tion above the belt on the side ; but the best distribu-
tion of a given weight of armour is a matter about
which all experts differ. The distribution of heavy
guns in three independent positions seems an excel-
lent one, and provision is made for a high freeboard
forward, so that the foremost barbette will have a
commanding position. The largest gun mounted
afloat in Germany weighs 35 tons, and this pattern
is only placed in armoured gunboats. It is con-
sidered that for battle ships ordnance of about 25

Foreign Navies — Europe. 267

tons is sufficiently powerful and can be most con-
veniently handled.

Under the new programme a number of fast cruisers
are building, and a few have been completed. The
largest type are to be 5500 tons, with a 9-in. bow and
stern chaser gun, and eight 6-in. guns on the broadside.
They will have a steel protective deck and a speed of
20 knots. The ' Irene,' the first fast cruiser completed,
is of 4300 tons, armed with fourteen 6-in. guns, and has
a speed of 18 knots. Others are in course of construc-
tion. Germany has paid much attention to the organisa-
tion of an efficient defence by torpedo boats, and carries
out continuous exercise with them in the Baltic and
North Sea.

After the Franco-German War two generals in suc-
cession were charged with the administration and re-
organisation of the German Navy. It was desired that
as far as possible the regulations should be assimilated
to those of the army, with special regard to the mobilisa-
tion of land and sea forces when required. General
von Stosch was first selected for Chief of the Admiralty,
and on his resignation General von Caprivi was ap-
pointed to the post. Both were well known as able
organisers, and the result is that all the arrangements
for naval mobilisation are as complete as those for the
army, and at a word the fleet can be placed on a war
footing, ready to perform any service assigned to it. .An
admiral is now at the head of the Naval Department.

The great advance made by Germany and ItaK' in

2 68 Foreign Navies — Europe.

maritime strength has overshadowed the more modest
progress in this direction made by Austria. The army-
has the first claim upon the national purse, and but a
small amount can be spared for the fleet. It speaks
highly of the management of her naval affairs that,
with an annual expenditure of barely ;^2,ooo,ooo
sterling, Austria can show a small but efficient naval
force. Her largest ironclad is the * Tegethoff,' of 7500
tons, launched in 1878. She is of the ' Hercules ' type —
a broadside battery ship, with recessed sides to give
fore and aft fire. Austria has seven others of smaller
size, of which the most powerful is the * Crown Prince
Rudolph,' of 7000 tons, launched in 1887, and armed
with three 48-ton guns and six ^\-\\\. guns. The
' Princess Stephanie,' of 5000 tons, also launched in
1887, is similar in design, but less powerfully armed.
The largest cruisers are three of 4000 tons of the deck
protected type. Two torpedo cruisers, the ' Leopard '
and 'Panther,' of 1550 tons, were built for Austria by
Sir William Armstrong's firm. They have a speed of
18 knots.

The torpedo flotilla consists of some thirty boats, of
which the greater number are of about 80 tons dis-
placement.

Spain, once the great maritime state of Europe, has
within recent years begun to rehabilitate her fleet.

In addition to one ironclad — the ' Pelayo,' of 10,000
tons — she has six others building of 7000 tons, and one
or two fast cruisers.

Foreio^n Navies — Eni'opc. 269

Even Greece has been unable to withstand the
desire to rank as a naval power, and has lately had
three ironclads built in France of about 5000 tons
displacement.

Turkey alone seems indifferent to the advantages
conferred by an efficient naval force. Under the rule of
Abdul Aziz a powerful fleet guarded the Bosphorus and
Dardanelles. When invaded by Russia, a supremacy
in the Black Sea prevented any transport of troops
by that route. But the present Sultan appears to
have a greater belief in fixed defences, and his ships
lie idly at their moorings, disuse making sad havoc in
equipment and machinery. The Black Sea will in
future be closed to a Turkish Squadron if hostilities
again arise between the two countries, while it is doubt-
ful whether at sea Turkey could now meet Greece.
There is, however, still time to do a great deal towards
preserving some of the old efficiency — not by tinkering
at and altering the older ironclads, as Turkey is ill-
advisedly doing, but by keeping what she has got in
thorough order, and devoting a small sum annually
towards new construction.

CHAPTER XIII

FOREIGN NAVIES — UNITED STATES AND SOUTH
AMERICA

Condition of United States Navy before and after Civil War — Apathy in
Naval Matters— Change of Feeling in 1880 — New Cruisers con-
structed — Battle Ships decided on and commenced — Special Fast
Cruiser — Torpedoes — The Howell Torpedo — Dynamite Gun — De-
velopment of Navies of South American States — Chili — Capture
of ' Huascar ' by 'Blanco Encalada' and 'Almiranie Cochrane' —
Peru — The Argentine Republic — Brazil.

If several of the navies of European states exhibit
great progress during the last half century, in the west
we observe a fleet practically created in little more than
a decade. After a strange apathy of many years, the
United States is now fully alive to the necessity of
having a fleet commensurate with her position. A few
years ago her navy consisted of a number of obsolete
monitors and wooden cruisers equally ancient. Such
a condition was humiliating, and might be dangerous,
seeing that insignificant neighbouring states were in
the possession of modern ironclads and swift powerful
cruisers. No nation with a long sea frontier and im-
portant interests abroad should be without the means
of protecting both, and for this an adequate naval force
is essential. For the United States this dangerous

Foreign- N'avics — United Stales^ etc. 271

condition no longer exists. Stirring appeals by succes-
sive Secretaries of the Navy have at last roused the
nation to action. With a marvellous energy, of which
an example was afforded in the last Civil War, America
has developed during the last few years everything
necessary for the construction and equipment of a
modern fleet.

There was no seeking abroad for those appliances
which their own country had not hitherto, from want
of a demand, produced. The latest ordnance, the best
steel armour plates, and marine engines of the most
recent design, each requiring special plant for its
manufacture were produced on the spot, and warships
built which will bear comparison with those of any
European state. When we recall the period that has
elapsed since we passed from wood to iron in naval
construction, and from smooth bore to rifled guns, with
the successive phases of improvement in each, none can
withhold a tribute of admiration at the manner in which
all difficulties in the United States have been surmounted.
Defects here and there must occur, but the nation has
just cause for pride in the vessels which the Government
and private shipbuilding yards have turned out without
any abnormal delay in completion.

J5ut brief space need be accorded to a dcscri[)tion
of the navy previous to and during the Civil War. ;\t
the commencement of that struggle America possessed
several fine wooden steam frigates of about 3000 tons,
and a number of smaller vessels, but the sinking of the
Cumberland ' b)^ the ' Mcrrimac ' showed that such craft

272 Foreign Navies — United States, etc.

had no chance when opposed to the smallest ironclad.
This conclusion was strengthened by the success of the
' Monitor/ and led to a number of similar vessels being
constructed with great rapidity. For service in the
numerous rivers and inlets of the coast, they had to
draw little water. The late Mr Eads designed and
constructed several for the Government which only drew
6 ft. Some were propelled by paddle-wheels, and were
more like locomotive rafts on which guns were mounted
and housed in with iron plates — Captain Cowper Coles's
original idea, in fact, carried into practical execution.
Then a larger type of monitor was designed by Erics-
son as a seagoing ship, and one called the 'Dictator'
was completed. Work on another, the ' Puritan,' was
suspended in consequence of some error having been
made in the calculation of her weights. After a lapse of
many years, she is to be now completed with a modern
equipment.

At the end of the war it was decided to construct
four seagoing turret ships, the * Miantonomoh,' ' Mon-
adnock,' ' Terror,' and * Amphitrite.' Only the first
named was completed and crossed the Atlantic. She
was about 4000 tons and had two turrets. She was
of low freeboard, and in a moderate sea her upper
deck was swept by the waves.

When the war ceased, retrenchment was the order of
the day ; the monitors were laid up, where they gradu-
ally fell into decay, and only a few wooden ships were
annually kept in commission to carry the flag on
foreign stations. Though obsolete they were not re-

Forcio-n Navies — United States, etc. 2^^

placed as lonc^ as they were able to perform the ordinary
duties of a war vessel in peace time. An effort was
made in 1863 to build fast cruisers, and some of
4000 tons and 340 ft. long were designed. But, as we
found with the ' Mersey ' and ' Orlando,' such dimen-
sions and powerful machinery were incompatible with a
wooden hull. The American vessels similarly failed to
fulfil expectations, and their existence was a short one. In
1870 Congress decided that the fleet should consist of ten
ships, rated first class, of 3500 tons, and twenty of the
second class, of 2000 tons. But this abstract resolution was
not made concrete by voting the necessary money to carry
it into eft'ect, and little was done beyond selling some old
vessels. Money received from this source, and a small
amount granted by Congress, enabled the naval depart-
ment to build a few vessels during the next few years
which kept the navy going; but in 1876 a fine vessel
called the ' Trenton ' was launched. Though just under
4000 tons, she had the moderate length of 260 ft., with
45 ft. beam. There was no attempt at high speed, but
at full power she could steam 14 knots, and had besides
considerable sail area. The armament was composed
of eleven 8-in. rifled guns. She was a fine vessel, well
suited for cruising in distant seas, but unfortunately was
wrecked at Samoa in the hurricane from which the
' Calliope ' alone escaped without injury.

In the meantime no new ironclads had been built,
and when in 1880 the country was ripe for a consider-
able augmentation of the fleet, the first want was seen
to be that of efficient cruisers. As it was determined

2 74 Foreign Navies — United States, ete.

not to go abroad for ships and guns, considerable delay
was inevitable, so it was not till 1883 that four modern
cruisers were commenced, the ' Chicago,' ' Boston,'
' Atlanta,' and ' Dolphin.' The first named is the
largest, 4500 tons, with a speed of 1 5 knots and a
mixed armament of four 8-in., eight 6-in., and two 5-in.,
besides smaller guns. The 8-in. guns are mounted two
on a side in sponsons. I think a lighter and more
homogenous armament would have been better, but the
'Chicago' is undeniably a very powerful vessel. The
* Atlanta ' and ' Boston ' are similar in design, but
smaller, while the ' Dolphin ' is a despatch vessel of
1500 tons. All have been completed, and proved
successful, a matter highly creditable to all concerned.
The country was now willing, and even eager, to
show what could be done in the New World with ship
construction. Five more cruisers, the ' Newark,' * San
Francisco,' 'Charlestown,' * Baltimore,' and 'Philadelphia,'
were commenced in 1887, of approximately the same
size as the ' Chicago,' but with a considerably higher
speed. All have a protective deck, with sloping sides,
on which the armour is 4 in. thick, while on the
horizontal portion it is 2h in. The armament of three
of these ships consists of twelve 6-in. guns, but two,
the ' Charlestown ' and ' Philadelphia,' have a pair of
8-in. and only six 6-in. guns. Their full speed varies
from 18 to 20 knots. The 'Baltimore' steamed from
Copenhagen to Lisbon in just over five days, averag-
ing 17 knots, an excellent performance.

A fleet of cruisers only cannot, however, safeguard

Foreign Navies — United States, etc. 277

all the interests of a great nationality. More powerful
vessels may at any moment be necessary, and the
United States is now wisely constructing battle ships.
The first begun is the ' Texas/ the design of which
originated in this country. With an imposed limitation
of 6000 tons great power of offence and defence cannot
be provided, but the accepted design embodies a partial
belt, 12 in. thick; two turrets, placed diagonally in a
central citadel, each containing a single 12-in. gun ; and
an auxiliary armament of six 6-in. guns. The armour
on the turrets is 12 in. thick, and the ends of the vessel
are protected with a 3-in. steel deck. The 'Texas' is
to have a speed of 16 knots. This design does not
commend itself to me. Too much is aimed at. The
freeboard forward should be higher and lighter guns
mounted. In our service the preference is given to
turrets on the centre line. The position 01 ccJiclon does
not give the advantages it was at first thought to have.

A somewhat larger vessel, also under construction,
the ' Maine,' has likewise two turrets, one on the bow
and the other on the quarter, each containing a pair of
lo-in. guns. She has an auxiliary armament of six
6-in. guns, and also carries a partial belt of armour
1 1 in. thick. The ' Maine ' is termed an armoured
cruiser, and the design included sail p(>wer, but it is
doubtful whether this will be eventually provided.

Towards the close of 1889 it was decided to con-
struct three larger vessels, termed coast line battle ships.
Presumably the name was given to calm any suspicion
that the countr}- was about to embark on an active

278 Foreign Navies — United States, etc.

foreign policy, but it is quite obvious that a vessel
which can only operate in sight of land has but a
limited use. These vessels, the ' Indiana,' ' Massachu-
setts,' and * Oregon ' will, however, be quite capable of
proceeding to any part of the world should the honour
of the country demand this service. They are to have
a displacement of 10,300 tons, and will be 350 ft. long
and 69 ft. broad. Of this length 190 ft. of tJie water
line will be protected by an armour belt having a
maximum thickness of 18 in. There will be a turret
at each end containing a pair of 13-in. guns, four
smaller turrets in addition will each carry two 8-in.
guns, and there will also be four 6-in. guns, besides
machine guns. It is difficult to state any great ad-
vantage attached to such an armament. On the other
hand, the complication of having so many different
kinds of ammunition may prove most inconvenient,
besides demanding great space for its stowage. Sim-
plicity in ordnance as regards the number of sizes for
naval purposes is urgently needed in these days. It
may be essential to supplement the few heavy guns
which a modern battle ship can carry with a number of
lighter pieces, but there is no necessity for an inter-
mediate grade. I even venture to suggest that about
four different calibres would answer all requirements,
and naval officers would welcome such a limitation.
But to return to the American ships. In all other
respects the design seems excellent, and in keeping
within 10,500 tons the temptation to build monster
vessels has been avoided. The view of the naval de-

Fore ion Navies — United States, etc. 279

partmcnt at Washington is that ' the lack of important
naval battles in recent years stands in marked contrast
to the desperate efforts of European powers to equip
extraordinary vessels designed to combine the invulner-
able and the irresistible. A war of moderate duration
between first-class naval powders would prove that a
balance of advantages, unsuspected by many, rests with
that vessel which has comparative simplicity, even
though it be concomitant with a greater exposure of
life, a low^er speed, and reduced powers of offence.'
This seems to me admirably put, but I think the
argument for simplicity applies also to the armament.

Two of these battle ships are to be built by Messrs
Cramp, of Philadelphia, and the third at the Union Iron
Works, San Francisco. At both yards cruisers have
been completed in which the workmanship has proved
to be excellent.

In addition to the cruisers already mentioned, some
others have been, or shortly will be, commenced.
The most powerful is the ' Ncw^ York,' a vessel of about
8000 tons, combining external and internal armour.
The former consists of a 5 -in. belt opposite the
machinery, while the interior of the ship has a pro-
tective deck running the whole length, with sloping sides,
which portion will be 6 in. thick, while the remainder
will be 3 in. There will be a barbette forward and aft,
also on each broadside. Two 8-in. guns will be mounted
in the bow and stern barbettes, and a single gun of
the same calibre in the broadside barbettes. There
will also be an auxiliar}- armament of twelve 4-in.

280 Foreigrn Navies — United States, etc.

',*)

quick-firing guns. Her sea speed is to be 20 knots,
and she will carry sufficient coal to steam 13,000 miles
at 10 knots. Though terming this vessel an armoured
cruiser, she may be equally considered a second-class
battle ship capable of engaging with many ironclads of
foreign powers or vessels of similar design, such as the
' Warspite ' in our own and the 'Admiral Nachimoff'
in the Russian navy.

Perhaps it is the fact that in America there are
few large merchant steamers of great speed — such as
we possess in the ' Teutonic ' and others capable of
being converted into commerce protectors — which has
led that country to design a warship, at present known
as 'No. 12,' of equal speed and greater offensive power
than any merchant vessel, to specially act against the
commerce of a hostile state. Her principal character-
istics are to be: great length, 410 ft., which is 35 ft.
more than the ' Blake ' and ' Blenheim ; ' a speed of 22
knots; great coal capacity, 1500 tons; and a protec-
tive deck with 4 in. armour on slopes and 2\ in. on the
horizontal portion. Her armament will be composed of
one 8-in., two 6-in., and twelve 4-in. guns, in addition to
a number of small rapid fire guns. The design appears
to me well conceived for the object in view, especially
as regards the armament, and restricting the heaviest
gun to a calibre of 8 in. Her success or failure will
depend on whether the expectations as to speed are
realised. A special point in connection with the
machinery is that she is to have three screws. It is
considered that with such a displacement, 7500 tons,

Forcio^n Navies — United Statrs, etc. 281

the extra propeller will give additional power, though in
a small vessel this is not found to be the case. For
the slower speeds, the centre screw alone working should
prove sufficient, while those on each side would be
disconnected and freely revolve with the progress of the
vessel. Time can alone show whether this assumption
is correct.

As regards torpedo boats, up to a very recent date
none existed in America ; but one has now been com-
pleted, 138 ft. long, which attained a speed of 23 knots,
and others no doubt will follow.^

It is curious that up to the present no American
war vessel has carried a locomotive torpedo. The
Whitehead was not adopted when taken up by other
nations, and efforts have for some time been directed to
obtain a torpedo of native origin. Several have been
put forward, but the most promising is one invented by
Captain Howell of the American navy. It is similar
in shape to the Whitehead, but instead of being driven
by compressed air the Howell torpedo is propelled by
two screws actuated by the rapid rotation of a heavy
steel flywheel. This is fixed inside the torpedo, and
spun to a great velocity, before the torpedo is launched,
by an independent motor on board the ship, worked b}'
steam or electricity. The axes of the wheel aie con-
nected to the screw shafts, by which power is trans-
mitted to the propellers. This fl}- wheel also acts as a

^ Fur the jjarlicuhus uf all this modern construclion I .niu much indchlcd
to the excellent paper on the subject read by Mr Miles at the meetiiiL; of
the Society of Naval Architects in the sprint; of 189 1.

282 Foreign Navies — United States, etc.

gyroscope, in keeping the torpedo on a straight course,
so that any deviation and consequent inclination of the
torpedo is at once corrected by the gyroscopic pull in
the opposite direction. Hence the torpedo travels in the
line of projection, and is not deflected by the passing
water when launched from the deck of a vessel pro-
ceeding at any rate of speed. This is the most valu-
able quality of the torpedo, as it obviates the necessity
of calculating deflection due to different speeds of ship,
which with the Whitehead torpedo have to be carefully
verified and collated. On the other hand, the latter has
a considerably higher speed, which, moreover, is uniform
throughout the run, the engines being governed to work
at a set pressure from first to last. But in the Howell
the flywheel, having when spun up the enormous
velocity of 9000 revolutions a minute, has throughout
the run a continually decreasing velocity, diminishing
the speed of the torpedo until it stops altogether. It is
easy to understand that a subaqueous missile which
reaches a vessel with sluggish movement has no chance
of penetrating a net, and is more liable to be diverted
from the object. If this defect can be remedied, and
the speed increased, there is a simplicity about the
Howell torpedo which to me is very attractive. The
absence of an air chamber much reduces the length,
which is important on board ship, and in proportion to
the amount of explosive the total weight of the torpedo
is considerably less than the Whitehead. The present
efficiency of the latter has been the work of some years,
and I understand it is at last to be adopted in America ;

ForcigjL N^avics — United States, etc. 283

but should the Howell exhibit decided improvement
it may eventually take the other's place.

Compressed air is a convenient force, and for pro-
pelling a projectile has the great advantage of not vary-
ing in its action. Two charges of gunpowder of equal
weight may, from variation in manufacture, or a slight
difference in moisture, or climatic influence, throw two
projectiles in succession from the same gun to widely
distant spots. The atmosphere when compressed is not
subject to such influences or variations, and has a less
violent action than gunpowder. These characteristics
have led to its employment to propel large charges of
high explosive from a long tube, more commonly known
as the dynamite gun. This originated in America, where
a successful application of the principle has led to the
construction of a small vessel called the 'Vesuvius' with
three of these guns, from which 500 lbs. of dynamite or
gun cotton can be thrown to the distance of a mile with
great accuracy. The velocity being low, considerable
elevation has to be given, as in mortar fire, and hence
against a moving object a successful shot is most uncer-
tain. But against an object whose position does not
alter, when the range is ascertained, great destruction
could be accomplished with such projectiles.

In the armament of their new licet llu^ Tnited States
has been able to commence at a periotl when the experi-
ence of other nations in breech-loading rilled guns can be
utilised. J)Ut [)lant and machinery for construction had
to be i)rovided as well as the hcav\- steel forgings from
whi(.h the modern jjun is made. Under the cnerc:etic

284 Foreign Navies — U^iited States, etc,

initiative of a most able Bureau of Ordnance all this has
sprung up, and guns are now constructed equal in power
to any produced in Europe. For seagoing purposes it
is not intended to exceed 50 tons in weight. They have
already a lo-inch gun, under 30 tons weight, which throws
a 500-lb. projectile with a velocity of 2000 feet per second.
Taking all things into consideration, I do not think that
a more cumbrous weapon, in fewer numbers, is any
advantage afloat.

It is evident that before the century closes the
United States will probably possess a fleet recalling the
old days when her wooden walls were to be seen in
every sea, easy of recognition by their lofty spars, and
noted for the smartness of their exercises.

A review of foreign navies would be incomplete
without a word on those which have sprung up in South
America. Chili, Peru, and the Argentine Republic, as
well as Brazil, have each come to European shipyards
for this portion of their armed strength. In the
'Esmeralda' Chili purchased one of the swiftest and
most powerful cruisers of moderate dimensions. She
was designed by Mr White and built at Elswick. The
war with Peru added the 'Huascar' to her fleet. A
brief account of this incident will be interesting as the
only conflict between ironclads since Lissa.

The ' Huascar,' already described in the account of
her action with the ' Shah,' had been doing considerable
damage on the Chilian coast, so that it was determined
to put a stop to her depredations. Chili therefore

Foreign Navies — Un ited States, etc. 285

despatched the * Almirante Cochrane ' and ' l^lanco
Encalada' in pursuit. These were small ironclads, of
3500 tons, then armed with muzzle-loading rifled guns,
in a central battery protected by 8 in. of iron, while the
armour belt was 9 in. thick. As the * Huascar ' had
only 5-in. armour, and was 1400 tons smaller, she would
have been overmatched by either of her opponents.
Early one day in October 1879 the two Chilian vessels
sighted the * Huascar,' and giving chase, the ' Cochrane,'
about 9.30 A.M. arrived within 3000 yards of the enemy,
her consort being some 3 or 4 miles astern. The
< Huascar' was the first to open fire, but without result.
The ships continued to close, as the ' Cochrane ' was
slightly the faster of the two, and at 1 500 yards poured
in a hot fire upon the ' Huascar.' Several shell pene-
trated the thin armour of the Peruvian vessel. One
burst inside the conning tower and killed the captain.
Another exploded inside the turret and did considerable
execution, while others disabled the steering gear and
apparatus for working the turret. The ' Huascar's '
return fire had little effect. One of her shots struck the
'Cochrane's' armour and glanced off, another entered
the ship, but did little damage.

In less than three-quarters of an hour it was evident
the 'Huascar' could not avoid capture. She had
fought pluckily, but escape was impossible, because she
had not the speed, and the ' Encalada ' liad now come
up. The latter at once joined the fray, tried to ram
the ' Huascar,' but failed, and nearly collided with her
consort. A shell which about this time passed through

286 Foreign Ahivies — United States, cte.

the 'Cochrane's ' battery, killing two men, is believed to
have been fired from the ' Encalada.' Soon after the
' Huascar's ' turret was again penetrated, and nearly all
those inside were killed. Her flag was hauled down
after a fight of an hour and a half, in which she had
about seventy men killed and wounded out of 220.

Her own fire had been very inaccurate. Out of
about forty shots fired from her guns only two or three
struck the enemy. This shows the danger of limiting
the armament to so few guns, especially when gunners
are unskilful. In the attack of one ship by a pair the
rapid motion which steam gives renders it difficult to
keep clear of each other's ram and projectiles when at
close quarters.

It is noteworthy that the machincr}- of the * Iluascar '
was not materially damaged and that few shots struck
in the vicinity of the water line. There was no danger
of the ship sinking when she surrendered. This was
brought about mainly by the disabling of her armament
and loss of men. A fact to be remembered when we
accumulate armour to protect the vitals and lay bare
other portions of the ship.

Thus Chili added a useful little vessel to her naval
force, but the late civil war has deprived her of the
' Blanco Encalada,' under circumstances lately familiar
to us. Two more cruisers, built in France, the ' Errazuriz '
and ' Pinto,' are on their way out. They are of about
2500 tons, high speed, and moderate armament.

Peru, since her crushing defeat by Chili, has been

Foreio]i Ahivics — United States, ete. 287

practically without any navy, and seems unable to find
funds to recreate one.

The Argentine Republic may take some ])ride in
possessing one of the fastest cruisers in the world.
This vessel, designed by Mr Watts, Chief Constructor
at Elswick, and built by that firm, was sold to the
Argentine Government, and is now known by the
somewhat inconvenient name of '25 de Mayo.' On her
trial she attained a speed of over 22 knots an hour.
Whether in the hands of her present possessors she
will ever again accomplish such a result may well be
doubted.

Brazil has two ironclads of moderate size — late
acquisitions — in the ' Riachuelo,' and ' Aquidaban,' but
no cruisers over 17 knots speed.

From this review it may be gathered that the
number of states which aspire to own a war navy has
very largely increased. In Europe, Belgium alone of
states which have a sea coast is without ships of war.
Even Roumania boasts a cruiser. New navies are
springing up also in the far East. At present, how-
ever, the old balance of power on the sea seems
undisturbed.

INDEX

'Abyssinia,' The, 123.

' Achilles,' The, 56.

Acre, bombardment of, 15-22.

' Active,' The. a frigate fitted with paddles
worked by the capstan, 13

' Active,' The, a steam cruiser, 150.

' Admiral Baudiii,' The, of the French Navy,
253-4-

'Admiral ' class, The, 105, 108, 259.

' Admiral Duperre,' The, of the French Navy,
253-

' Admiral NachimoflT,' The, of the Russian
Navy. 258, 280.

' Agamemnon,' The, first two-decker, designed
for the screw, 24, 33.

'Agamemnon.' The. turret ship, 141.

' Agincourt,' The, 56, 221.

' Ajax,' The, turret ship, 141.

' Alabama,' The. action between ' Kear:5age '
and, 67-70 ; career of, 160- 1.

'Alacrity,' The, 161.

'Albemarle,' The, a Confederate ship, 194.

'Albion,' The, 24, 33.

Alexander, Fort, at Sebastopol, 32.

'Alexander II.,' The, of the Russian Navy,
258.

' Alexandra,' The, 63-4, 67, 89 ; at bombard-
ment of Alexandria, 91.

Alexandria, bombardment of, 90-92.

Algiers, capture of. 15.

' Almirante Cochrane,' The, of the navy of
Chili, captures the ' Huascar,' 285-6.

' Almirante Condell,' The, torpedo vessel, be-
longing to Chili, contest with the ' Encalaila,'
208-9.

' -Mmirante Lynch,' The, torpedo vessel, be-
longing to Chili, sinks the ' Kncalada, 208-9.

'Amethyst,' The, action between ' Huascar'

and, 151-2.
' Amphitrite,' The, of the United Slates Navy,
27--

' Andrea Doria,' The. of the Italian Navy, 264.

' Aquidaban,' The, of tlie I'razilian Navy, 287.

Arabat, bombardment of, 36.

Archer,' The, 162.

' Arethusa,' The, 222-3.

Argentine Republic, The, ship of, 287.

Armaments, 2, 6, 25, 256, 283.

Armstrong, .Sir William, hydraulic power ap-
plied to rotating turrets, 87 ; builds the
' Victoria,' 143 ; Armstrong breech-loader
guns, 172-4, 177 ; hj-draulic machinery for
guns, 179; 6-in. breech-loader, 184; quick-
firing gun, 191; guns of the 'Duilio' and
' Dancolo' made by, 260; ' Piemonte' built by,
264 ; ' Leopard ' and ' Panther built by, 268 ;
' Esmeralda ' built by, 284 ; ' 25 de Mayo '
built by, 287.

' Atlanta,' The. of the United States Navy. 274.

'Audacious,' The. 145, 226.

Austria, navy of, 267-8.

Azof, Sea of, expedition to, 35. 36.

' Badk.v,' The, of the German Navj-, 265.
Pialaclava, operations at, 29, 30.
Baltic Squadron, The, in the Crimean War,
^ II, 37-41-
Baltimore,' The, of the United States Navy.

274.
' Banshee,' The, 216.
Barbette system, The, 102-110.
' Barfleur,' The, 145-6.
' P.arham,' The, 162, 239-40.
Barnaby, Sir Nathaniel, Chief Constructor .->f

the Navy, the 'Inflexible' designed by,

85, 198.
' Batoum,' The, Russian torpedo boat, 259.
Piatteries, 16, 34, 38, 40-1.
' Bayern,' The, of the Cerman Navy, 265.
' Bellerophon.' The, at the bombardment of

Acre, 18.
' Bellenjphon,' The, of 1S63, 62.
' Bcllona,' The, 162, 239-40.
' I'cnbow,' The, at the bombardment of Aero,

18, 20-1,
' Benbow,' The, of the ' Admiralty ' class, 106-7,

144.
Berdiansk, nper.ntions at, 36.
' Birkcnlicad.' The, 43.

'i'

290

Index.

' Black Prince,' The, 56, 221-2.

' Blake,' The, 157-8, 224, 241-3, 259, 280.

Blakeley's, Captain, rifled gun, 175.

' Blanco Encalada,' The, sunk by a torpedo,
207-10; capture of the ' Huascar' by the
' Almirante Cochrane ' and, 285-6.

' Blenheim,' The, 157-8, 241-3. 259, 280.

Blockade, effect of introduction of steam and
torpedoes on, 203.

Bomarsund, bombardment of, 39, 249.

' Boston,' The, of the United States Navy, 274.

Bow chaser, 159.

Brazil, ironclads belonging to, 287.

Brotherhood, Mr, three-cylinder air engine,
197.

Brown, Sir John, rolled plates, 136-7; com-
pound armour, 138.

Burgoyne, Captain, 36 ; lost in the ' Captain,"
80.

'Caledonia, The, 60.

' Cambridge,' The, formerly the ' Edinburgh,'

lO.

Cammell's, Messrs, compound armour, 133.

' Captain,' '1 he, 80-1, 227-9.

Carronades, 7.

Cartridges, paper, 9.

'Carysfort,' The, 18.
Castor," The, 18.

'Catherine 11.,' The, of the Russian Navy,
258.

Cavalli's, Major, breech-loading rifled gun,
171-2.

• Cecille," The, of the French Navy, 255-6.

Cellular sub-division of the double bottom of
ships, 88.

'Centurion,' The, 145-7.

' Cerberus," Tlif, 123.

'Charles ^iartcl,' The, of the French Navy, 254.

' Charlestown," The, of the United States
Navy, 374.

Charnock, upon French and English ships, 3.

' Chicago," The, of the United States Navy,
274.

Chili, The navy of, 284-6.

Coal, power of, to stop projectiles, and danger
of, 140-1 ; question of supplying steamers
with, 163; national bill for, 222. 224; "coal
endurance" of ships, 238; amount used for
auxiliary engines, 243.

Coast defence vessels, 115-27; coast defence
ironclad only found to a vtrj- limited extent
in our navy, 120 ; Popofl'kas or circular iron-
clads of the Russian Navj'. 125-7.

Cockburn. Sir George, First Naval Lord of the
Admiralty, 23.

Coles, Captain Cowper, in the expedition to
the Sea of Azof. 36 ; invention of 'cupola '
or turret ships, 71-2 ; " Royal Sovereign ' and
Prince Albert ' constructed for home service,
from his designs, 79 ; designs the ' Captain.'
and is lost in her, 80 ; ' Scorpion " and
' Wyvern designed on the ideas of, 124, 143,
272.

' CoUingwood," The, 106, no.

'Colossus,' The, 141-2.

Commerell, in the expedition to the Sea of

Azof, 36.
' Congress,' The, engagement with the ' Merri-

mac ' in the American Civil War, 75-6.
Congreve, Sir William, rockets introduced

by, 26.
'Conqueror,' The, 130, 143-4.
' Constance,' The, 222-3, 225
Constantine, Fort, in the harbour of Sebas-

topol, 32. 34.
Cordite, 189, 192.
Corvettes, 152-4.

'Courbet,' The, of the French Navj', 250.
Crimean War, The, manning of the fleet for,

II ; the ' J'crrible" in the, 15 ; bombardment

of batteries in, 16; Transport Department

during, 27 ; operations in the Black Sea,

28-36 ; in the Baltic, 36-42 ; floating batteries

in, 46-48.
Cronstadi, attack on abandoned, 38-9, 46-7.
' Crown Prince Rudolph," The, of the Austrian

Navy, 268.
'Cumberland,' The, sunk by the 'Merrimac'

in the American Civil War, 75, 133, 271.
Cupolas, or turrets, Captain Coles' scheme

for. 72.
'Cyclops,' The, 123.

' Dandolo,' The, of the Italian Navy, 260. 264.

Deck, steel protective, invented by Rear-
Admiral Robert Scott, 234 ; in the French
Navy, 256 ; not adopted in the Russian
Navy, 259 ; in the German Navy, 267.

' Dee," The, 14.

' Defence," The, 56.

' Deutschland.' The, of the German Navy, 265.

' Devastation," The, 82-3, 178.

' Devastation,' The, of the French Navy, 250-1.

' Dictator," The, of the United States Navy,
272.

' Dimitri-Donskoi," The, of the Russian Navy
258.

Distilling apparatus, or evaporators, 244.

' Dolphin," The, of the United States Navj-,
274.

Double bottom, for iron ships, 87-8.

Douglas, Sir Howard, on the expense of
shells, 8.

' Dreadnought," The, 84, 137, 142, 235.

' Duilio," The, of the Italian Navy, 260, 264.

' Duke of Wellington," The, 218, 240.

Dundas, Admiral Deans, in command of the
Mediterranean Squadron in the Crimean
War, 28 ; reluctant to join in the attack on
Sebastopol, 31-2 ; returns home, 35.

Dundas, Rear-Admiral the Hon. R., sent to
the Baltic in the place of Sir Charles Napier,
40-1.

Dunsany, Lord, on mastless ships, 52.

Indx

ex.

291

Dupuy de Lome, M., at the head of the French
naval constructive department, produces the
first seagoing ironclad ' La Gloire,' 49.

' Dupuy de LGme,' The, of the French Navy,
256. .

Dynamite gun. The, originated in America,
283.

' Edinburgh,' The, a turret ship, 141-2.

' Edinburgh,' The, in the bombardment of
Acre, 18-21.

' Edinburgh,' The, now known as the ' Cam-
bridge,' 10.

Electric search light, The, 205-6.

Elmore's, Mr, process, 192, note.

' Emerald,' The, 24.

' Empress of India,' The, 109.

Engines, side-lever, 212 ; direct acting, 213 ;
tubular boilers and oscillating cylinders,
213-14; compound, 223, 225, 229; vertical.
235 ; auxiliary, 243.

' Erebus,' The, an ironclad, 46.

' Erebus,' The, Sir John Franklin's ship, 23

Ericsson's revolving turrets, 71 ; builds the
' Monitor,' 76-7 ; his screw propeller, 77 ;
' Scorpion ' and ' Wyvern ' designed on the
ideas of, 124, 218 ; ten monitors on plans of,
ordered for Russia. 257 ; larger type of
monitor as seagoing ship designed by, 272.

' Esmeralda,' The, of the Chilian Navy, 284.

' Exxellent,' The, 9.

Exmouth, Lord, reduces Algiers, 15-16.

Experiments for testing behaviour 01 iron under
shot, 43-4.

' Ferdinand IVLvx,' The, Austrian ironclad en-
gaged in the battle of Lissa, 95 ; Admiral
Tegethoff leads the attack in her, 98 ; sinks
the ' Re d'ltalia,' 100, 134.

Floating batteries proposed by the Emperor
Napoleon, 46 ; constructed for the Crimean
War and employed in the Black Sea,
46-8 ; Popoffkas, 125-7.

' Forbin,' The, of the French Navy, 256.

Forced draught, 236, 230.

' l''ormidable,' The, of the French Navy, 253-4.

' I'orth,' The, 159.

France, Colbert's RLiritime Inscription, 11 ;
navy of, 248-257.

' Francesco Morosini,' The, of the Italian
Navy, 264.

I''ranklin's, Sir John, expedition to the Arctic,

23-

1' rigates, 2; Jackass, 6; steam, 14; early,
148-9; high spiied, 149-50; relative strength of
line-of-battlc ship and, 150-52; name passed
away, 154.

' Galatea,' The, 14.

Gardner quick-firing gun, The, 190.

Gatling gun. The, 190.

German Empire, navy of the, 265-7 \ four "ew
ironclads ordered, 266.

' Glatton,' The, 120-3, 254.

' Gloire, La,' of the French Navy, first sea-
going ironclad, 49, 50, 52, 55 ; her plates,
136, 221.

'Gorgon,' The, coast defence ironclad, 123.

'Gorgon,' The, paddle steamer employed in
the bombardment of Acre, 18.

Graham, Sir James, the ' Excellent ' established
for training seamen in gunnery, improved
, by, 9.

Greece, navy of, 269.

Guns, 32-pounders used in 1838, 42-pounders
discarded, 68-pounder introduced in 1840, 7
170; 29-ton, 145; rifled, 170, etc.; breech-
loaders, 171, 174 ; Woolwich system muzzle-
loading, 176 ; Captain Scott's iron gun carri-
ages, 177 ; 35-ton, 38-ton, 178-9; 8o"-ton, 180;
bursting of a 38-ton in the 'Thunderer,' 183 ;
6-in. breech-loader, 184; steel barrel with
hoops, the interrupted screw, 185; m-ton,
188 ; objections to monster, 188 ; quick-firing,
190 ; 4.7-in. calibre and 6-in. quick-firing, 191.

H.\le's, Mr, improved rocket, 26.

Hamley, Sir Edward, on Sir Edmund Lyons

in the Crimean War, 30. note.
Hastings, Captain Sir Thomas, placed over

the ' Excellent,' 9.
' Hazard,' The, 18.
' Hecate,' The, 123.
' Hector,' The, 56.
' Hercules,' The, 62-3, 177, 265, 268.
' Hero,' The, 130, 144.
Hewett, in the expedition to the Sea of Azof, 36.

Hood,' The, 143.
Hornby, Sir Geoffrey, on size of ships, 113.
Hotclikiss', Mr, machine gun of large calibre,

190; single-barrel quick-firing gun, 191.
' Hotspur,' The, 120, 130.
' Howe,' The, a screw ihree-decker, 24.
' Howe,' The, of the 'Admiral' class, 106.
Howell torprdo. The, 281-2.
' Huascar,' The, tmret ship belonging to Peru,

sinks the 'Esmeralda' with her ram, 133-4;

engaged by the Hritish ships '.Shah' and

' .\niethyst,' 150-2, 207; captured by Chili,

284-6.
' Hydra,' The, 123.
Hydraulic machinery for guns inxented by the

Elswick firm, 179-80, 18S.

Ignition l)y dec tri( ity, 186-7.
' Iinpericuse,' I'lic, 154-8, 259.

292

Index.

' Inconstant,' The, 150, 227-9.

' Indiana,' The, of the United States Navy,

278.
' Indomptable,' The, of the French, Navy, 254.
'Inflexible,' The, 85-9, 105, 136-8, 141-3, 180-1,

260.
' Inflexible,' The, first steamship of the navy to

circumnavigate the world, 1846-9, 215-16.
' Invincible,' The, 145.
' Irene,' The, of the German Navy, 267.
' Iris,' The, 153, 229-34.
' Iron Duke,' The, 133, 145.
Iron, the use of, for construction of ships,

43, etc.
' Italia,' The, of the Italian Navy,[263.
Italy, navy of, 260-5.

' Jaur6guiberry,' The, of the French Na\y,

254-
' Jenimapes,' The, of the French Navy, 255.

'Kaiser,' The, ironclad of the German Navy,

265.
'Kaiser,' The, wooden screw line-of-battle

ship in the Austrian Navy, 95 ; engaged at

Lissa, 99-101, 134.
'Kearsage,' The, United States sloop, sinks

the 'Alabama,' 67-70.
Kertch,; F'ort of, on the Sea of Azof, captured

in the Crimean War, 35-6.
Kinburn in the Black Sea, bombardment of,

47-8.
Kinglake, on the capture of Kertch, 35, 42.
' Konig^Wilhelm,'rThe, of the German Navy,

265.

Laird, Messrs, the 'Birkenhead' built by,
1845, 43 ; the ' Captain ' built by, 80 ; ' Scor-
pion ' and 'Wyvern,' for the Confederate
States, built by, 124 ; two torpedo vessels, for
Chili, built by, 208 ; ' Rattlesnake ' built by,
238.

Lancaster's, l\Ir, gun, 171.

■ Lazare Carnot,' The, of the French. Navy,
254-

' Leopard,' The, of the Austrian Navy, 268.

' Lepanto,' The, of the Italian Navj-, 263.

' Lightning,' The, 201, 233, 236

Line-of-battle ships, 2.

Lissa, battle of, 93-102, 129, 134, 140, 207, 260.

Locks, flint and percussion, 9.

' Lord Clyde,' The, 60.

* Lord Warden,' The, 60, 222.

Lyons, Captain E. RL, son of Sir Edmund, in
the expedition to the Sea of Azof, 36.

Lyons, Sir Edmund, second in command of the
Mediterranean Squadron at the beginning of
the Crimean War, 28 ; at the bombardment
of Fort Constantine, 33 ; in chief command
of the Black Sea fleet, expedition to the
Sea of Azof, 35, 36; Sir E. Hamley on, 30,
note.

' Magdala,' The, 123.

' Maine,' The, of the United States Navy,

277-
Malmesbury, Lord, on the manning of our

ships for the Crimean War, 11.
Mangin's, Colonel, spherical reflecting mirror,

205.
Manning of ships, The, 10-12.
* Marathon,' The, 159.
Maritime alliance, in, there must be one head,

34- .
Maritime Inscription, established by Colbert,

' Massachusetts,' The, of the United States
Navy, 278.

Maxim gun, Tlie, 190.

' Mayo, 25 de,' The, of the Argentine Re-
public's navy, 287.

' Medea,' The, paddle-wheel vessel, 14.

' Medea,' The, third-class cruiser, 159.

Medium-sized ships, reasons for, 113.

' Medusa,' The, 159.

Mehemet .Ali, operations against, 17.

' Melpomene,' The, 159.

Melville, Lord, established the 'Excellent' for
training seamen in gunnery, 9.

Merchant vessel and a warship, comparison
between, 241.

' Mercury,' The, 153, 229-34.

' Merrimac, The, of the Southern States, ac-
tion with the ' Cumberland ' and ' Con-
gress,' 75-6; with the 'Monitor,' 78, 103,
133, 271.

'Mersey,' Ihe, cruiser of 4000 tons, 159.

' Mersey,' The, wooden frigate launched in
1858, 25, 50, 273.

' Miantonomoh,' The, of the United States
Navy, 272.

Milne, Sir .\lexander, on the percussion
lock, 9.

' Minotaur,' The, 56, 59, 63, 228.

M'Killop, in the expedition to the Sea of Azof,
36.

Models, ships built from foreign, 3.

' Monadnock,' The, of the United States Navy,
272.

' Monarch,' The, 80-1, 83, 85.

' Monitor,' The, designed by Ericsson for the
Northern States, 71, 76-7 ; action with the
' Merrimac,' 77-79, 103, 272.

Monk, Mr, designer of ordnance, 7.

Mortars, 8.

Mullens, an Irishman who drew plans for the
Spanish Government, 4.

Index.

293

Napier, Sir Charles, 10 ; on steam in the navy,
13 ; fits the 'Galatea' with paddles actuated
by winches inboard, 14 ; second in command
at the bombardment of Acre, 18-20 ; in com-
mand in the Baltic during the Crimean War,
37-40; on fleets 7'. fortifications, 117.

Napoleon I. on the English fleet, 1-2.

Napoleon III. proposes floating batteries, 46.

Naval architecture, few changes in during first
half of the centurj', 2 ; School of, 3 ; time for
a new system, 49.

Naval brigade at the siege of Sebastopol, 31.

Naval estimates for 1832 and 1834, 2.

Nelson, Lord, 5.

' Nelson,' The, 16

' Nelson,' The, armoured cruiser, 154, 158, 235.

' Newark,' The, of the United Stales Navy,
274.

' New York,' The, of the United States Navy,
279.

' Niagara,' The, of the United States Navy, 24.

' Nicholas I.,' The, of the Russian Navy, 258.

' Nile,' The, 142.

' No. 12,' of the United States Navy, 280.

' No. 80,' torpedo boat, of the British Na\'y',
237-8.

Nordenfelt's, Mr, machine gun, 190.

' Northampton,' The, 154, 235.

Northcote, Sir Stafford, on the Crimean War,
27.

' Northumberland,' The, 56.

' Novgorod,' The, Russian circular ironclad,
125.

'Obturator,' 186.

' Ocean,' The, 60.

'Octavia,' The, 222-3.

Ordnance, smooth bore universally employed

before 1840, 6, 166; rifled gun, 170, etc
' Oregon,' The, of the United States Navy,

278.
'Orlando,' The, 25, 50, 273.
Osborn, Sherard, in the expedition to the Sea

of Azof, 36.
Oscillating cylinders, 213-14.

1'.

Paddi.k- wiiKKi, Steamer, 12, 13, 14, 214,

216-17, 223.
I'aixhans', Colonel, horizontal shell fire in place

of shot, proposes to armour ships, 1825, 45-6.
' I'alestro,' The, Italian ironclad, 95; blown

up in the battle of Lissa, loo-i, 140-1.
' Pallas,' The, 223-5.
I'alliser's, Captain, gun, 175-6; device for

hardening the front portion of shot.
Palmerston, Lord, on fortifications ?'. fleets,

117, 119.

' Pamyat Azova,' The, of the Uussian Navy

259-

' Panther,' The, of the Austrian Navy, 268.

' Pelayo,' The, of the Spanish Navy, 268.

Pellew, Sir Edward, afterwards Lord Ex-
mouth, on fleets as defence against invasion,

Persano, Admiral, Italian commander in the

battle of Lissa, 94 ; false strategy-, 96 ; attack

on San Giorgio, 96-7 ; the action, 98-101.
' Philadelphia,' The, of the United States Navy,

274.
'Phoenix,' The, 14, 18.
' Piemonte,' The, of the Italian Navy, 264.
' Pique,' The, 4-5, 18.
Plates, wrought-iron, 136; steel, 137, 139;

compound, 138-g.
' Polyphemus,' The, 131-2, 235.
PopotT, Admiral, of the Russian Navy, designs

circular ironclads, 125 ; the 'Admiral Popoff",'

126.
Powder, 182 ; pebble, 183 ; cocoa, 189 ; cordite,

189, 192.
' Powerful,' The, 10, 18, 20.
' Prince Albert,' The, 79.
' Prince Consort,' The, 60.
' Princess Charlotte,' The, 18.
' Princess Stephanie,' The, of the Austrian

Navy, 268.
Prizes, French, always 'took the lead,' 3.
Projectiles, spherical, always employed before

1840, 6, 166; cylindrical, 171.
'Puritan,' The, of the United States Navy, 272.

QuADRUPi.F expansion, engines, 238.
' Queen,' The, 5-6, 24, 33.
Quoins, 169.

Raglan, Lord, 29 ; Sir Kdnuind Lyon's influ-
ence over, 30, note.

Ram, use of the, 128-135.

' Ramillies,' The, 109.

' Rattler,' The, 218, 224.

' Rattlesnake,' The, 206-7, 238.

Razees, two - deckers cut down to 50 - gun
frigates, 6.

'Re dltalia,' The, Italian ironclad in the
battle of Lissa, 95, 99; sunk by the ' Fer-
dinantl Max,' loo-i, 134.

' Redoubtable,' The, of the French Nav^•, 250.

Reed, Sir E., Chief Constructor of the Navy,
61-2.

Rendel, Mr G., hydraulic power for rotating
turrets devised by, 87.

' Repulse," The, 109.

' Rc(^uin,' The, of the Frrnch Navy, 254.

' Resistance," The, 56.

' Resolution," The, 109.

' Re Umberto," 'Ihc, of the Italian Navy, 63.

' Revenge,' The, 109.

294

Index.

' Revenge,' The, in the bombardment of Acre,

1 8, 20.
' Rhadamanthus,' The, 14.
' Riachuelo,' The, of the nav>' of Brazil, 287.
Robinson, Sir Spencer, Controller of the Navy,

60.
Rockets, 25-6.
Rous, Captain the Hon. H., of the 'Pique,'

4-5-
' Royal Alfred,' The, 60.
' Royal Arthur.' The, 158.
' Royal Oak,' The, 109.
' Royal Oak,' The, wooden ship cut down and

armoured, 60.
' Royal Sovereign,' The, barbette ship, 109, 143.
' Royal Sovereign,' The, wooden ship cut down

and armoured, 79.
' Ruggiero di Launa,' The, of the Italian Navy,

264.
' Rupert,' The, 130, 143.
' Rurik,' The, of the Russian Navy, 259.
Russell .Scott, Mr, naval architect, co-designer

of the 'Warrior,' 50, 222.
Russia, nav>' of, ■z<^-]-iyo.

'.Sachsf.n,' The, of the German Navy, 265.

' Salamander,' The, 14.

Sanuida, Messrs, build the ' Prince Albert,' 79.

'Sane,' The, of the French Navy, 255.

'San Francisco,' The, of the United States
Navy, 274.

San Giorgio, port of Lissa, 96 ; attack upon
by the Italian fleet, 97, loo-i.

' San Josef,' The, Spanish ship taken by Lord
Nelson, 4.

'San Nicolas,' The, Spanish ship taken by
Nelson, 4.

' Sanspareil,' The, 143-4, 243.

'Sardegna,' The, of the Italian Navy, 264.

Schneider's, Mr, steel plates, 137.

Schultz, Colonel, Polish officer, defends Acre,
17, 22.

'Scorpion,' The, 124.

Scott's, Captain, iron gun carriages, 177.

Scott's, Rear-Admiral Robert, steel protective
deck, 234.

Scouts, value of, 164.

Screw propeller, 12 ; .Sir W. Symonds on, 23 ;
question of inventor of, 217 ; first employed
in the British navy, 218 ; vibration of caused
substitution of iron for wood, 220 ; paddle-
wheel entirely superseded by, 223 ; twin, 226 ;
three, 264, 280.

Sebastopol, bombardment of, 16, 29-34 ; Mr
Lancaster's guns, employment in siege of,
171.

'Seignelay,' The, of the French Navy, 255.

Semmes, Captain, of the 'Alabama,' action
with the ' Kearsage,' 67-70, 160.

Seppings, Sir Robert, Surveyor of the Navy,

introduces round sterns, 2.
' Serpent,' The, 162.
' Severn,' The, 159.

'Shah,' The, 150; action with the ' Huascar,
151-2.

' Shannon, The, 154, 235.

.Shells, 8; common and shrapnel, 182.

.Shot, double, 7 ; red-hot, 25, 170.

' Sicilia,' The, of the Italian Navy, 264.

' Sidon,' The, 15.

'Simoom,' The, 43. 221.

Sinope, effect of shell on wooden ships, 8, 25.

'Sinope,' The, of the Russian Navy, 258*

•Sloops, steam, 14.

Smith, .Sir Sydney, defence of Acre, 17.

Spain, fleet of, 268.

Steam propulsion, 211-47.

.Sterns, square and round, 2 ; elliptical, 6.

.Stewart, Captain, in the bombardment of Acre,
21.

Stopford, Admiral the Hon. .Sir Robert, com-
mander-in-chief at the bombardment of Acre,
18-22.

Stores, ships', 5.

' Stromboli,' The, 18.

Submarine boats, 203-4.

Suez Canal, 64.

'Surcouf,' The, of the French Navy, 256.

'Surprise,' The, 161.

Sveaborg, 38-9 ; bombardment of, 40-1.

'Swiftsure,' The, 145, 226.

.Symonds, Sir William, Surveyor of the Nav^-,
3 ; improvements, 4 ; designs for the ' Van-
guard,' 5; the 'Queen,' 6; dislike for
steamers, 22.

' Tage,' The, of the French Navy, 255.
'Talbot,' The, i8.

' Tchesmc, The, of the Russian Navy, 258.
Tegethofl", Admiral, Austrian commander in

the battle of Lissa, 95-102.
' Tegethofl",' The, of the Austrian Navy, 268.
'Temeraire,' The, 104.

' Terrible,' The, commissioned in 1846, 214.
'Terrible,' The, of the French Navy, 254.
'Terrible,' The, steam frigate in the Crimean

War, 15.
'Terror,' The, floating battery, 46.
'Terror,' The, of the United States Navy, 272.
' Terror,' The, Sir John Franklin's ship, 23.
' Texas,' The, of the United States Navy, 277.
'Thames,' The, 159.
Thames Iron Works, The, the ' Warrior ' built

at, 55, 222.
Thornycroft, Messrs, 'Lightning' torpedo bjat

built by, 200-1, 236.
'Thunderbolt,' The, 46.
'Thunderer,' The, 18.
Torpedo boats, 200-10 ; French, 256 ; Russian,

259 ; Italian, 265 ; German, 267 ; Austrian,

268 ; American, 281 ; catchers, 264.
Torpedoes, 193-210; Howell, 281.
' Trafalgar,' 'I'he, 142.

Transport department in the Crimean War, 27.
'Trehouart,' The, of the French Navy, 255

Index.

295

' Trenton,' The, of the United .States Navy, 273.

Triple expansion, 236-38.

'Tripoli,' The, of the Italian Na\y, 264.

'Triumph,' The, 145, 226.

Tubular boilers, 213. 224.

Turkey, na\'y of, 269.

United States, navy of, 270-84.

'Valiant,' The, 56.

' Valmy,' The, of the French Navy, 255.

' Vanguard,' The, ironclaJ sunk by the ' Iron

Duke,' 133, 145.
' Vanguard,' The, launched in 1833, 5.
' Vernon,' 'The, 4, 24.
' Vesuvius,' The, i8.
' Vesuvius,' The, American ship with three

dynamite guns, 283.
Vickers', Messrs, steel plates, 139.
' Victoria,' The, ironclad, 143-4.
'Victoria,' The, last three-decker, 24, 220.
' Vladimir-Monomakh,' The, of the Russian

Navy, 258.
'Volage,' The, 150.

Wahrendorff's, Baron, breech-loading rifle

gun, 171-2.
'Warrior,' The, 50-6, 63, 67, 88, no, 128-9,

136-7, 150, 221-2, 224.
' Warspite,' The, 154, 157, 209, 259, 280.
'Wasp,' The, 18.
Watts, Isaac, Chief Constructor of the Navy,

co-designer of the 'Warrior,' 50; and ' Black

Prince,' 222.
White, Mr, Chief Constructor of the Navy,

eight first-class battleships, in, 113.
Whitehead torpedo. The, 195-200, 281-2.
Whitworth's, Mr, rifled gun, 172, 175.
Wire netting round a ship to stop torpedoes,

204.
Woolwich system, The, muzzle-loading guns,

176.
Wrangel, Baron, Russian general in command

at Kertch, 35.
' Wurttemberg,' The, of the German Navy, 265.
'Wyvern,' The, 124.

Yarrow, Mr, torpedo boat builder, boats for
Russia, 200-1 ; ' No. 80' for the British navj-,
237 ; the ' Batoum ' for Russia, 259-60.

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VIOLET DOUGLAS.

CHRISTABEL KINGSCOTE.

HELEN'S DIARY ; or, Thirty Years Ago.

HEIGHTS AND VALLEYS.

LADY ALICE.

MRS MAINWARING'S JOURNAL.

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JUST PUBLISHED.

WINCHESTER MEADS IN THE DAYS OF BISHOP

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' Mrs Marshall has done her work well, and produced an excellent
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' Mrs Marshall has produced another of her pleasant stories of old times.
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UNDER SALISBURY SPIRE. A Tale of the Times of
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A NEW AND CHEAPER EDITION OF

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VIOLET DOUGLAS.

CHRISTABEL KINGSCOTE.

HELEN'S DIARY ; or, Thirty Years Ago.

HEIGHTS AND VALLEYS.

LADY ALICE.

MRS MAINWARING'S JOURNAL.

Other Volumes zu ill follow.

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