REESE LIBRARY 
 I 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 Received ^^ ^^i^^?^Z>C^ , i8S 
 
 Accessions No.-^ ^y^B Shelf No. 
 
 Jb 
 
EXAMINATION 
 
 EDWARDS ON THE WILL, 
 
c/ 
 
 AN EXAMINATION 
 
 PRESIDENT EDWARDS' INaUIRY 
 
 INTO THE 
 
 FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 
 
 BY 
 
 ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE. 
 
 "Man, as the ipinister and interpreter of nature, does and un- 
 derstands as much alB his, observations on the order of nature, either 
 with regard to things or the mind, permit him, and neither knows 
 more, nor is capable of more." — Novum Organum. 
 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 
 H. HOOKER, 16 SOUTH SEVENTH STREET. 
 
 1845. 
 

 ^ 
 
 ■ Entered, according to act of Congress, in the year 1845, by H. 
 HOOKER, in the clerk's office of the District Court for the Eastern 
 District of Pennsylvania. 
 
 ^Z^f 
 
 King & Baird, Printers, 9 George St. 
 
TO 
 THE REV. WILLIAM SPARROW, D. D. 
 
 AS A TOKEN 
 
 OF ADMIRATION FOR HIS GENIUS, 
 
 AKD 
 
 AFFECTIONATE REGARD FOR HIS VIRTUES, 
 
 €||t0 UttU Voiumt 
 
 IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED, 
 BY THE AUTHOR. 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2008 with funding from 
 
 IVIicrosoft Corporation 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/examinationofpreOObledrich 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 Introductory Remarks ----- 9 
 
 SECTION I. 
 Of the point in controversy - - - - 16 
 
 SECTION II. 
 Of Edwards' use of the term cause - - 22 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 The Inquiry involved in a vicious circle - - 36 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Volition not an effect ----- 47 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 Of the consequences of regarding volition as an 
 
 effect -------55 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 Of the maxim that every effect must have a 
 
 cause -------65 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 Of the application of the maxim that every ef- 
 fect must have a cause - - - - 76 
 
8 CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 SECTION VIII. 
 Of the relation between the feelings and the 
 
 WILL 87 
 
 SECTION IX. 
 
 Of the LIBERTY OF INDIFFERENCE - - - - 103 
 
 SECTION X. 
 
 Of ACTION AND PASSION - - - - - 112 
 
 SECTION XI. 
 
 Of the ARGUMENT FROM THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GoD 131 
 
 SECTION XII. 
 
 Of Edwards' use of the term necessity - - 156 
 
 SECTION XIII. 
 Of natural and moral necessity - - - 175 
 
 SECTION XIV. 
 Of Edwards' idea of liberty - - - - 184 
 
 SECTION XV. 
 Of Edwards' idea of virtue - - - - 195 
 
 SECTION XVT. 
 
 Of the SELF-DETERMINING POWER - - - 206 
 
 SECTION XVII. 
 
 Of THE DEFINITION OF A FREE-AGENT - - - 216 
 
 SECTION XVIII. 
 
 Of the TESTIMONY OF CONSCIOUSNESS - - - 224 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 
 
 I ENTERED upon an examination of the " Inquiry" of 
 President Edwards, not with a view to find any fallacy 
 therein, but simply with a desire to ascertain the truth 
 for myself. If I have come to the conclusion, that the 
 whole scheme of moral necessity which Edwards has 
 laboured to establish, is founded m error and delusion ; 
 this has not been because I came to the examination of his 
 work with any preconceived opinion. In coming to this 
 conclusion I have disputed every inch of the ground with 
 myself, as firmly and as resolutely as I could have done 
 with an adversary. The result has been, that the views 
 which I now entertain, in regard to the philosophy of the 
 will, are widely difierent from those usually held by the 
 opponents of moral necessity, as well as from those which 
 are maintained by its advocates. 
 
 The formation of these views, whether they be correct 
 or not, has been no light task. Long have I struggled 
 under the stupendous difficulties of the subject. Long has 
 darkness, a deep and perplexing darkness, seemed to rest 
 upon it. Faint glimmerings of light have alternately ap- 
 peared and disappeared. Some of these have returned at 
 intervals, while others have vanished for ever. Some have 
 returned, and become less wavering, and led on the mind 
 to other regions of mingled obscurity and light. Gladly 
 and joyfully have I followed. By patient thought, and 
 sustained attention, these faint glimmerings have, in more 
 2 
 
10 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 
 
 instances than one, been made to open out into what has 
 appeared to be the clear and steady hght of truth. If these 
 are not mere fond illusions, the true intellectual system of 
 the world is far different from that which has been con- 
 structed by the logic of President Edwards. 
 
 If his system be false, why, it may be asked, has the 
 Inquiry so often appeared to be unanswerable? Why 
 has it been supposed, even by some of the advocates of 
 free agency, that logic is in favour of his system, while 
 consciousness only is in favour of ours ? One reason of 
 this opinion is, that it has been taken for granted, that 
 either the scheme of President Edwards or that of his 
 opponents must be true ; and hence, his system has ap- 
 peared to stand upon immoveable ground, in so far^ as 
 logic is concerned, only because he has, with such irre- 
 sistible power and skill, demolished and trampled into 
 ruins that of his adversaries. Reason has been supposed 
 to be on his side, because he has so clearly shown that it 
 is not on the side of his opponents. But the scheme of 
 the motive-determining power, does not necessarily arise 
 out of the ruins of the self-determining power ; it is only 
 to the imagination that it appears to do so. Because the 
 one system is false, it does not follow that the other is 
 true. 
 
 There is another and still more powerful reason for the 
 idea in question. The advocates of free agency have 
 granted too much. The great foundation principles of the 
 scheme of moral necessity have been incautiously admit- 
 ted by its adversaries. These principles have appeared so 
 obvious at first view, that their correctness has not been 
 doubted ; and hence they have been assumed by the one 
 side and conceded by the other. Yet, if I am not greatly 
 mistaken, they have been derived, not from the true ora- 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 11 
 
 cles of nature, but from what Bacon quaintly calls the 
 "idols of the tribe." If this be the case, as I think it will 
 hereafter appear to be ; then in order to secure a complete 
 triumph over the scheme of moral necessity, even on the 
 arena of logic, we must not only know how to reason, 
 but also how to doubt. 
 
 I fully concur with the younger Edwards, that " Clarke, 
 Johnson, Price, and Reid have granted too much ;" and 
 while I try to show this, I shall also endeavour to show 
 that President Edwards has assumed too much, not for 
 the good of the cause in which he is engaged, but for the 
 attainment of truth. 
 
 If his system had not been founded upon certain natural 
 illusions, by which the true secrets of nature are concealed 
 from our view, it could never have been the boast of its 
 admirers, " that a reluctant world has been constrained 
 to bow in homage to its truth." If we would try the 
 strength of this system then, we must bend a searching 
 and scrutinizing eye upon the premises and assumptions 
 upon which it is based ; we must put aside every 
 preconceived notion, even the most plausible and com- 
 monly received opinions, and lay our minds open to 
 the steady and unbiased contemplation of nature, just 
 as it has been created by the Almighty Architect ; we 
 must view the intellectual system of the world, not as it 
 is seen through our hasty and careless conceptions, but as 
 it is revealed to us in the light of consciousness and severe 
 meditation. This will be no light task, I am aware ; but 
 whosoever would seek the truth on such a subject, must 
 not expect to find it by light and trifling efforts ; he must 
 go after it in all the loving energy of his soul. Let this 
 course be pursued, honestly and perseveringly pursued, 
 and I am persuaded, that a system of truth will be re- 
 
12 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 
 
 vealed to the mind, to which it will not be constrained to 
 render " a reluctant homage," but which, by harmonizing 
 the deductions of logic with the dictates of nature, will 
 secure to itself the most pleasing and delightful homage of 
 which the human mind is susceptible. 
 
 Those false conceptions which are common to the 
 human mind, those " idols of the tribe," of which Bacon 
 speaks, have bejgfh, as it is well known, the sources of some 
 of the most obstinate errors, both in science and in reli- 
 gion, that have ever infested the world. And it is evident, 
 that while the assumptions from which any system, how- 
 ever false, legitimately results, are conceded, it will stand, 
 like a wall of adamant, against the most powerful artillery 
 of logic. It will remain triumphant in spite of all opposi- 
 tion. It may be contrary to our natural convictions, and 
 consequently liable to our suspicions ; but it cannot be 
 refuted by argument. Its advocates may reason correctly, 
 and its adversaries may appeal to opposite truths ; but 
 neither can ever arrive at the truth, and the whole truth. 
 This has appeared to me to be the case, with respect to 
 the long controverted question of liberty and necessity. 
 
 The above causes, conspiring with some instances of 
 false logic, which have been overlooked amid so much that 
 is really conclusive, and also with a number of unsound, 
 yet plausible, devices to reconcile the scheme of moral 
 necessity with the reality of virtue and free-agency, have, 
 in the minds of many, rendered the work of President 
 Edwards both an acceptable and an unanswerable produc- 
 tion. Such, at least, is the conclusion to which I have 
 been constrained to come ; but whether this conclusion be 
 correct or not, it is not for me to determine. Time alone 
 can show, whether the foundation of his system, like that 
 of truth, is immutable, or whether, like many which have 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 13 
 
 been laid by the master spirits of other ages, it is destined 
 to pass away, though not to be forgotten. 
 
 In the above enumeration of causes I have not alluded 
 to those of a theological nature ; because they have been 
 but partial in their operation. And besides, I have not 
 wished to refer to this subject at all, except in so far as 
 is necessary to indicate wherein I conceive the errors of 
 the Inquiry to consist, and thereby to point out the course 
 which I intend to pursue in the following discussion. 
 
 2» 
 
^^ 
 
 ^NIVKRRT 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 OF THE POINT IN CONTROVERSY. 
 
 It is worse than a waste of time, it is a grievous offence 
 against the cause of truth, to undertake to refute an author 
 without having taken pains to understand exactly what he 
 teaches. In every discussion, the first thing to be settled 
 is the point in dispute ; and if this be omitted, the contro- 
 versy must needs degenerate into a mere idle logomachy. 
 It seldom happens that any thing affords so much satis- 
 faction, or throws so much light on a controversy, as to 
 have the point at issue clearly made up, and constantly 
 borne in mind. 
 
 What then, is the precise doctrine of the Inquiry which 
 I intend to oppose ? The great question is, says Edwards, 
 what determines the will. It is taken for granted, on all 
 sides, that the will is determined ; and the only point is, 
 or rather has been, as to what determines it. It is deter- 
 mined by the strongest motive, says one ; it is not deter- 
 mined by the strongest motive, says another. But although 
 the issue is thus made up in general terms, it is very far 
 from being settled with any tolerable degree of clearness 
 and precision ; ample room is still left for all that loose 
 and declamatory kind of warfare in which so many con- 
 troversiahsts delight to indulge. 
 
 The question still remains to be settled, what is meant 
 by determining the will? In regard to this point, the 
 
16 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 necessitarian does not seem to have a very clear and defi- 
 nite idea. " The object of our Inquiry," says President 
 Day, " is not to learn whether the mind acts at all. This 
 no one can doubt. Nor is it to determine why we will 
 at all. The very nature of the faculty of the will implies 
 that we put forth volitions. But the real point of inquiry 
 is, why we will one way rather than another ; why we 
 choose one thing rather than its oppositei'^ p. 42. One 
 would suppose from this statement, that we have nothing 
 to do with the question, why we put forth volitions, but 
 exclusively with the question, why we will one way 
 rather than another. Here the author's meaning seems 
 to be plain, and we may imagine that we know exactly 
 where to find him ; but, in the very next sentence, he de- 
 clares that the object of our inquiry is, " what is it that 
 determines not only that there shall be volitions, but 
 what they shall be ?" p. 42. In one breath we are told, 
 that we have nothing to do with the question, why our 
 volitions are put forth or come into existence ; these are 
 admitted to be implied in the " very nature of the faculty 
 of the will ;" but, in the very next, we are informed that 
 we have to inquire into this point also. One moment, only 
 one of these points is in dispute, and the next, both are 
 put in controversy. Surely, this does not indicate any 
 very clear and definite idea, on the part of President Day, 
 as to the point at issue. 
 
 The notion of President Edwards, on this subject, ap- 
 pears to be equally unsteady and vacillating. " Thus," 
 says he, " by determinimg the will, if the phrase be used 
 with any meaning, must he intended, causing that 
 the act of the tvill should be thus, and not otherivise: 
 and the will is said to be determined, when, in consequence 
 of some action, or influence, its choice is directed to, and 
 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 17 
 
 fixed upon a particular object. As when we speak of the 
 determination of motion, we mean causing the motion of 
 the body to be in such a direction, rather than another," 
 p. 18. 
 
 Now, are we to understand from this, that the determi- 
 nation of the will can only refer to the question, why it is 
 directed to and fixed upon a particular object, and not to 
 the question, how it comes to put forth a volition at all ? 
 One would certainly suppose so ; and that, according to 
 Edwards, we have nothing to do with the question, 
 " How a spirit comes to act," but with the question, 
 " why its action has such and such a particular direction 
 and determination." But this supposition would be very 
 far from the truth. For he informs us, that " the question 
 is not so much, How a spirit endowed with activity comes 
 to act, as why it exerts such an act, and not another ; or 
 why it acts with such a particular determination?" This 
 clearly implies, that although the question, " How a spirit 
 comes to act," is not chiefly concerned in the present 
 controversy ; yet it is partly concerned in it. This ques- 
 tion is concerned in it, though not so much as the other 
 question, why the act of the mind is as it is, rather than 
 otherwise. 
 
 This is not all. When Edwards attacks the doctrine 
 of his adversaries, in regard to the determining of the 
 will, he never seems to dream of the idea, which, accord- 
 ing to himself, if the phrase mean any thing, must be 
 attached to it. He treats it as a settled point, that by de- 
 termining the will must be intended, not causing volition 
 to be one way rather than another, but causing it to come 
 into existence. He could take this expression to mean 
 the one thing or the other, just as it suited his purpose. 
 
 Are these two questions really distinct ? Can there be 
 
18 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 one cause of volition, and another cause of its particular 
 direction ? I answer, there cannot. No such distinction 
 can be shown to exist by a reference to the cause of mo- 
 tion. Force is the cause of motion. One force may put 
 a body in motion ; and, afterwards, another force may 
 change the direction of its motion. Upon a superficial 
 observation, this may seem to illustrate the distinction in 
 question ; but, upon more mature reflection, it will not ap- 
 pear to do so. For the force which sets a body in motion 
 necessarily causes it to move in one particular direction, 
 and not another ; because it is impossible for a body to 
 move without moving in a particular direction. After one 
 force has put a body in motion, another force, it is true, 
 may change its directiop ; but in such a case, it is not cor- 
 rect to say, that one force caused its motion and another 
 the direction of that motion. For, in reality, both the 
 motion of the body and its direction, result from the joint 
 action of the two forces ; or, in other words, each force 
 contributes to the motion, and each to its direction. Both 
 the motion and its direction are caused by what is techni- 
 cally called, in mechanical philosophy, the " resultant'* of 
 the two forces ; and the case is really not different, so far 
 as the distinction in question is concerned, from the case 
 of motion produced by the action of a single force. The 
 absurdity of this distinction consists, in supposing that a 
 body may be put in motion without moving in a particular 
 direction ; and that something else beside the cause of its 
 motion, is necessary to account for the direction of that 
 motion. The illustration, therefore, drawn from the phe- 
 nomena of motion, fails to answer the purpose for which 
 President Edwards has produced it. 
 
 The same absurdity is involved in the supposition, that 
 one thing may cause volition to exist, and another may 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 19 
 
 cause it to be directed to and fixed upon a particular 
 object. No man can conceive of a choice as existing, 
 which has not some particular object. It is of the very 
 nature and essence of a choice to have some particular 
 direction and determination. If a choice exists at all, it 
 must be a choice of some particular thing. Hence, what- 
 ever causes a volition to exist, must cause it to have a 
 particular direction and determination. Let any one show 
 a choice, which is not the preference of one thing rather 
 than another, and then we may admit that there is some 
 reason for the distinction in question ; but until then, we 
 must be permitted to regard it as having no foundation in 
 the nature of things. If it were necessary, this matter 
 might be fully and unanswerably illustrated ; but a bare 
 statement of it is sufficient to render it perfectly clear. 
 
 We shall hereafter see, that the reason why President 
 Edwards supposed that there is some foundation for such 
 a distinction is, that he did not sufficiently distinguish be- 
 tween the cause of a thing and its condition. Although we 
 may suppose that the " activity of the soul" is the cause 
 of its acting ; yet motive may be the indispensable condi- 
 tion of its acting ; and, in this sense, may be the reason 
 why a volition is one way rather than another. But it is 
 denied that there can be two causes in the case ; one to 
 produce volition, and another to determine its object. We 
 have seen that such a supposition is absurd ; and we shall 
 hereafter see, that Edwards was led to make it, by con- 
 founding the condition with the cause of volition. 
 
 After all, it may be said, that Edwards himself did not 
 really consider these two things as distinct, but only as 
 different aspects of the same thing. If so, it will follow, 
 that when he undertook to estabhsh his own scheme, he 
 represented motive as the cause of volition ; and yet when 
 
20 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 he was reminded, that the activity of the nature of the 
 soul is the cause of its actions, he repHed, that akhough 
 this may be very true, yet this activity of nature is 
 not the " cause why its acts are thus and thus Umited, 
 directed and determined." He repUed that the question 
 is not so muchf " How a spirit comes to act," as why it 
 acts thus, and not otherwise. That is to say, it will follow, 
 that he chose to build up his scheme under one aspect of 
 it, and to defend it under another aspect thereof; that as 
 the architect of his system, he chose to assume and occupy 
 the position, that motive is the cause of volition itself; yet 
 as the defender of it, he sometimes preferred to present 
 this same position under the far milder aspect, that although 
 " the activity of spirit, may be the cause why it acts," 
 yet motive is the cause why its acts are thus and thus 
 limited, &;c. In other words, it will follow, that his doc- 
 trine possesses two faces ; and that with the one it looks 
 sternly on the scheme of necessity, whilst, with the other, 
 it seems to smile oa. its adversaries. 
 
 The truth is, the great question which President' Ed- 
 wards discusses throughout the Inquiry, as we shall see, 
 is " How a spirit comes to act ;" and the other question, 
 " why its action is thus and thus limited," &;c., which, on 
 occasion, swells out into such immense importance, as to 
 seem to cover the whole field of vision, generally shrinks 
 down into comparative insignificance. As a general thing, 
 he goes along in the even tenor of his way, to prove that 
 no event can begin to be without a cause of its existence ; 
 and, in particular, that no volition can come into existence 
 without being caused to do so by motive ; and it is only 
 when it is urged upon him, that "a spirit endowed with 
 activity" may give rise to its own acts, that he takes a 
 sudden turn and reminds us, that the question is not so 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 21 
 
 much " how a spirit comes to act ?" as " why its acts are 
 thus and thus limited ?" 
 
 From the supposition made by Edwards, that "if 
 activity of nature be the cause why a spirit acts," it has 
 been concluded that he regarded the soul of man as the 
 efficient cause of its volitions, and motive as merely the 
 occasion on which they are put forth or exerted. But 
 surely, those who have so understood the Inquiry, have 
 done so very unadvisedly, and have but little reason to 
 complain, as they are prone to do, that his opponents do 
 not understand him. If Edwards makes mind the effi- 
 cient cause of vohtion, what becomes of his famous argu- 
 ment against the self-determining power, by which he 
 reduces it to the absurdity of an infinite series of volitions ? 
 " If the mind causes its volition," says he, " it can do so 
 only by a preceding volition ; and so on ad infinitum,'''' 
 Is not all this true, on the supposition that the mind is 
 the efficient cause of volition ? And if so, how can any 
 reader of Edwards, who does not wish to make either his 
 author or himself appear ridiculous, seriously contend that 
 he holds mind to be the efficient, or producing cause of 
 volition? There be pretended followers and blind ad- 
 mirers of President Edwards, who, knowing but little of 
 his work themselves, are ever ready to defend him, 
 whensoever attacked, even by those who have devoted 
 years to the study of the Inquiry, by most ignorantly and 
 ffippantly declaring that they do not understand him. 
 These pseudo-disciples will not listen to the charge, that 
 Edwards makes the strongest motive the producing cause 
 of volition ; but whether this charge be true or not, we 
 shall see in the following section. 
 3 
 
22 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 OF Edwards' use of the term cause. 
 
 We have already seen that Edwards must be under- 
 stood as holding motive to be the cause of volition ; but 
 still we cannot make up the issue with him, until we have 
 ascertained in what sense he employs the term cause. It 
 has been contended, by high authority, that he did not 
 regard motive as the efficient, or producing cause of voli- 
 tion, but only as the occasion or condition on which voli- 
 tion is produced. Hence, it becomes necessary to examine 
 this point, and to settle the meaning 'of the author, in order 
 that I may not be supposed to misrepresent him, and to 
 dispute with him only about words. 
 
 The above notion is based on the following passage : 
 " I would explain," says President Edwards, " how I 
 would be understood when I use the word cause in this 
 discourse ; since, for want of a better word, I shall have 
 occasion to use it in a sense which is more extensive, 
 than that in which it is sometimes used. The word is 
 often used in so restrained a sense as to signify only that 
 which has a positive efficiency or influence to prociuce a 
 thing, or bring it to pass. But there are many things 
 whicli have no such positive productive influence ; which 
 yet are causes in this respect, that they have truly the 
 nature of a reason why some things are, rather than others ; 
 or why they are thus rather than otherwise." ....*' I 
 sometimes use the word Cause, in this Inquiry, to signify 
 any antecedent, either natural or moral,.. .upon which an 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 23 
 
 event so depends, that it is the ground or reason, either in 
 whole or in part, why it is, rather than not ; or why it is 
 as it is, rather than otherwise ; or, in other words, any 
 antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, 
 that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition 
 which affirms that event, is true ; whether it has any posi- 
 tive influence, or not. And, agreeably to this, I some- 
 times use the term effect for the consequence of another 
 thing, which is perhaps rather an occasion than cause, 
 most properly speaking." And he tells us, that "I am 
 the more careful thus to explain my meaning, that I may 
 cut off occasion, from any that might seek occasion to 
 cavil and object against some things which I may say 
 concerning the dependence of all things which come to 
 pass, on some cause, and their connection with their 
 cause," p. 50-1. 
 
 This is the portion of the Inquiry on which the 
 younger Edwards founds his conclusion, that his father 
 did not regard motive as the efficient cause of volition, but 
 only as the occasion, or condition, or antecedent of voli- 
 tion. He finds this language in the Essays of Dr. West ; 
 " We cannot agree with Mr. Edwards in his assertion, 
 that motive is the cause of voUtion;" and he replies, 
 " Mr. Edwards has very particularly informed us in what 
 sense he uses the term cause ;^^ and, in proof of this, he 
 proceeds to quote a portion of the above extracts from the 
 Inquiry. Having done this, he triumphantly demands, 
 " Now, does Dr. West deny, that motive is an antecedent, 
 on which volition, either in whole or in part depends ? or 
 that it is a ground or reason, either in whole or in part, 
 either by positive influence or not, why it is rather than 
 not ? Surely, he cannot with consistency deny this, since 
 he says, * By motive we understand the occasion, end or 
 
24 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 design, which an agent has in view when he acts.' So 
 that, however desirous Dr. West maybe to be thought to 
 differ, in this point, from President Edwards, it appears 
 that he most exactly agrees with him," p. 65. 
 
 Now, if Edwards really believed that motive is merely 
 the occasion on which the mind acts, agreeing herein most 
 perfectly with Dr. West, why did he not say so ? Why 
 adhere to the term cause, which can only obscure such 
 an idea, instead of adopting the word occasion, or condi- 
 tion, or antecedent, which would have clearly expressed 
 it ? Surely, if Edwards maintained the doctrine ascribed 
 to him, he has been most unfortunate in his manner of 
 setting it forth ; it is a great pity he did not give it a more 
 conspicuous place in his system. It is to be regretted, 
 that he has not once told us that such was his doctrine, in 
 order that we might see for ourselves his agreement with 
 Dr. West in this respect, instead of leaving it to the ini- 
 tiated few to enhghten us on this subject. 
 
 He has, we are told, " very particularly informed us in 
 what sense he uses the word cause," p. 64. Now is this 
 so ? Has he informed us that by cause he means occa- 
 sion? He has done no such thing, and his language 
 admits of no such construction. He merely tells us, that 
 he sometimes uses the term cause to signify an occasion 
 only ; but when and where he so employs it, he has not 
 explained at all. He has not once said, that when he 
 appHes it to motive he uses it in the sense of an occasion, 
 or antecedent ; and, if he had said so, it would not have 
 been true. The truth is, that he has used the word in 
 question with no httle vagueness and indistinctness of 
 meaning ; for he sometimes employs it to signify merely 
 an occasion, which exerts no positive influence, and some- 
 times to signify a producing cause. This is the manner 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WELL. 25 
 
 in which he uses it, when he applies it to motive. In his 
 definition of motive, as the younger Edwards truly says, 
 he includes " every cause or occasion of volition ;" every 
 thing which has a "tendency to voHtion;" &c., p. 104. 
 Thus, according to the younger Edwards himself, the 
 elder Edwards has, in his definition of motive, included 
 every conceivable cause of volition ; and yet, when Dr. 
 West objects that he makes motive the producing cause 
 of volition, the very same writer repHes that he has done 
 no such thing : that he has " very particularly explained 
 in what sense he uses the word cause" when applied to 
 motive, and that he means " by cause, no other than occa- 
 sion, reason, or previous circumstance necessary for 
 volition; and that in this Dr. West entirely agrees with 
 him," p. 65. If we may believe the younger Edwards, 
 then, when the author of the Inquiry says, that motive is 
 the cause of volition, he means that it is no other than 
 the occasion or previous circumstance necessary to voli- 
 tion, and not that it is the cause thereof in the proper 
 sense of the word ; and yet that it is the cause thereof in 
 every conceivable sense of the word ! Now, he agrees 
 with Dr. West himself; and again, he teaches precisely 
 the opposite doctrine ! Let those who so fondly imagine 
 that they are the only men who understand the Inquiry, 
 and that the most elaborate replies to it may be sufficiently 
 refuted by raising the cry of " misconstruction ;" let them, 
 I say, take some little pains to understand the work for 
 themselves, instead of merely giving echo to the blunders 
 of the younger Edwards. 
 
 President Edwards says, that the term cause is often 
 
 used in so restrained a sense as to signify that which has 
 
 " a positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing, or 
 
 bring it to pass." It is in this restrained sense that I use 
 
 3* 
 
26 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 the word, when I say that President Edwards regarded 
 motive as the cause of volition ; and it is in this sense that 
 I intend to make the charge good. I intend to show that 
 he regarded motive, not merely as the occasion or condi- 
 tion of volition, but as that which produces it. This posi- 
 tion, as we have seen, has bepn denied by high authority ; 
 and therefore it becomes necessary to establish it, in order 
 that I may not be charged with disputing only about 
 words ; and that although I may be exceedingly " desirous 
 of being thought to differ with President Edwards" on this 
 subject, yet I do " most exactly agree with him." 
 
 To begin then ; — if motive is merely the condition on 
 which the mind acts, and exerts no influence in the pro- 
 duction of volition, it is certainly improper to say, that it 
 gives rise to volition. This clearly implies that it is 
 the efiicient, or producing cause of volition. On this point, 
 let the younger Edwards himself be the judge. " That 
 self-determination gives rise to volition," is an expression 
 which he quotes from Dr. Chauncey, and italicizes the 
 words " gives rise to," as showing that the author of them 
 regarded the mind as the efficient cause of volition. Now, 
 President Edwards says, that the " strongest motive ex- 
 cites the mind to volition ;" and he adds, that " the notion 
 of exciting, is exerting influence to cause the effect to 
 arise and come forth into existence,^ p. 96. Surely, if 
 to give rise to a thing, is efficiently to cause it, no less can 
 be said of exerting influence *' to cause it to arise and 
 come forth into existence^ And if so, then, according 
 to the younger Edwards himself, the author of the Inquiry 
 regarded motive as the efficient cause of vohtion ; and yet, 
 on p. 66 he declares, that President Edwards did not hold 
 "motive to be the efficient cause of volition ;" and that if 
 he has dropped any expression which implies such a doc- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 27 
 
 trine, it must have been an inadvertency. I intend to 
 show, before I have done, that there are many such in- 
 advertencies in his work ; the younger Edwards himself 
 being the judge. 
 
 Now, it will not be denied, that that which produces a 
 thing, is its efficient cause. The younger Edwards him- 
 self has spoken of an " efficient^ producing cause," in 
 such a manner as to show that he regarded them as con- 
 vertible terms, p. 46. He being judge, then, that which 
 produces a thing, is its efficient cause. I might easily 
 show, if it were necessary, that he himself frequently 
 speaks of motive as the efficient, or producing cause of 
 volition ; but, at present, I am only concerned with the 
 doctrine of President Edwards. " It is true," says Pre- 
 sident Edwards, " I find myself possessed of my volitions 
 before I can see the effectual power of any cause to pro^ 
 duce them, for the power and efficacy of the cause is not 
 seen but by the effect," p. 277. Here, from the volition, 
 from the effect, he infers the operation of the cause or 
 power which produces it. Now this cause is motive, the 
 strongest motive ; for this is that which operates to induce 
 a choice. Motive, then, produces volition, according to 
 the Inquiry ; it is not merely the condition on which it is 
 produced. ^ 
 
 The younger Edwards declares, that President Edwards 
 did not regard " motive as the efficient cause of volition," 
 p. 66, but only as the " occasion or previous circum- 
 stances necessary to volition ;" in this respect " most 
 exactly agreeing with Dr. West" himself; and yet he 
 tells us, in another place, that " every cause of volition is 
 included in President Edwards' definition of motive," p. 
 104. Now, does not every cause of volition include the 
 efficient cause thereof? Does not this expression include 
 
28 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 that which is the cause of volition in the real, in the only- 
 proper, sense of the word ? 
 
 To save the consistency of the author, will it be said, 
 that " every cause" does not include the efficient cause in 
 his estimation, since in his opinion there is no such 
 cause ? If this should be said, it would not be true ; for 
 the younger Edwards did, as it is well known, regard the 
 influence of the Divine Being as the efficient cause of voli- 
 tion. He regarded the Deity as the sole fountain of all 
 efficiency in heaven and in earth. Hence, if the definition 
 of President Edwards included " every cause" of volition ; 
 it must have included this divine influence, this efficient 
 cause. Indeed, the younger Edwards expressly asserts, 
 l)iat this " divine influence" is included in President Ed- 
 wards' "explanation of his idea of motive," p. 104. He 
 tells us, then, that President Edwards regards motive as 
 merely the occasion of volition ; and yet that he considered 
 motive as including the efficient cause of volition ! At one 
 time, motive is merely the antecedent, which exerts no 
 influence ; at another, it embraces the efficient cause ! At 
 one time, the author of the Inquiry " most exacdy agrees" 
 with the libertarian in regard to this all-important 
 point ; and, at another, he most perfectly disagrees with 
 him ! It is to be hoped, that President Edwards is not 
 quite so glaringly inconsistent with himself, on this sub- 
 ject, as he is represented to be by his distinguished son. 
 
 Again. President Edwards has written a section to 
 prove, that " volitions are necessarily connected with the 
 influence of motives ;" which clearly implies that they are 
 brought to pass by the influence of motives. In this sec- 
 tion, he says, " Motives do nothing, as motives or induce- 
 ments, but by their influence. And so much as is done by 
 their influence is the effect of them. For that is the 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 29 
 
 notion of an effect, something that is brought to pass by 
 the influence of something else." Here motives are said 
 to be the causes of vohtions, and to bring them to pass 
 by their influence. Is this to make motive merely the 
 condition on which the mind acts ? Is this to consider it 
 as merely an antecedent to volition, which exerts no in- 
 fluence ? On the contrary, does it not strongly remind 
 one of that " restrained sense of the word cause," in which 
 it signifies, that which " has an influence to produce a 
 thing, or bring it to pass ?" 
 
 Once more. In relation to the acts of the will, he 
 adopts the following language to show that they are ne- 
 cessarily dependent on the influence of motives : " For an 
 event to have a cause and ground of its existence, and yet 
 not be connected with its cause, is an inconsistency. For 
 if the event be not connected with the cause, it is not de- 
 pendent on its cause ; its existence is as it were loose from 
 its influence ; and it may attend it, or it may not ; its 
 being a mere contingency, whether it follows or attends 
 the influence of the cause, or not ; and that is the same 
 thing as not to be dependent on it. And to say the event 
 is not dependent on its cause, is absurd; it is the same 
 thing as to say, it is not its cause, nor the event the effect 
 of it ; for dependence on the influence of a cause is the 
 very notion of an effect. If there be no such relation 
 between one thing and another, consisting in the connexion 
 and dependence of one thing on the influence of another, 
 then it is certain there is no such relation between them 
 as is signified by the relation of cause and effect," p. 77-8. 
 Now, here we are told, that it is the very notion of an 
 effect, that it owes its existence to the influence of its 
 cause ; and that it is absurd to speak of an effect which 
 is loose from the influence of its cause. It is this influ- 
 
30 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 ence, " which causes vohtion to arise and come forth into 
 existence." Any other notion of cause and effect is ab- 
 surd and unmeaning. And yet, President Edwards informs 
 us, that he sometimes uses the term cause to signify any 
 antecedent, though it may exert no influence; and that he 
 so employs it, in order to prevent caviUing and objecting. 
 Now, what is all this taken together, but to inform us, 
 that he sometimes uses the word in question very absurdly^ 
 in order to keep us from finding fault with him 1 The 
 truth is, that whatever apparent concession President 
 Edwards may have made, he does habitually bring down 
 the term cause to its narrow and restrained sense, to its 
 strict and proper meaning, when he says, that motive is 
 the cause of volition. He loses sight entirely of the idea, 
 that it is only the occasion on which the mind acts. 
 !■ I might multiply extracts to the same effect almost 
 without end ; but it is not necessary. It must be evident 
 to every impartial reader of the Inquiry, that even if the 
 author really meant by the above extracts, that motive is 
 merely the antecedent to volition ; this was only a mo- 
 mentary concession made to his opponents, with the vague 
 and ill-defined hope, perhaps, that it would render his 
 system less obnoxious to them. It had no abiding place 
 in his mind. It was no sooner uttered than it was re- 
 pelled and driven away by the whole tenor of his system. 
 We soon hear him, as if no such thing had ever been 
 dreamed of in his philosophy, asking the question, and 
 that too, in relation to motives, " What can be meant by 
 a cause, but something that is the ground and reason of a 
 thing by its influence, an influence that is prevalent 
 AND EFFECTUAL," p. 97. Will it be pretended, that this 
 does not come up to his definition of an eflScient cause, as 
 that which brmgs something to pass by " a positive influ- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 31 
 
 ence ?" Such a pretext would amount to nothing ; for 
 Edwards has said, that " motives excite voUtion ;" and 
 " to excite, 15 to be a cause in the most proper sense, not 
 merely a negative occasion, but a ground of existence 
 by positive influence,''^ p. 96. 
 
 An efficient cause is properly defined by the Edwardses 
 themselves. " Does not the man talk absurdly and in- 
 consistently," says the younger Edwards, " who asserts, 
 that a man is the efl5cient cause of his own volitions, yet 
 puts forth no exertion in order to cause it ? If any other 
 way of efficiently causing an efiect, be possible or con- 
 ceivable, let it be pointed out," p. 49. President Edwards 
 evidently entertained the same idea; for he repeatedly 
 says, that if the mind be the cause of its own volitions, it 
 must cause them by a preceding act of the mind. The 
 objection which he urges against the self-determining 
 power, is founded on this idea of a cause. It is what he 
 means, when he says, that the term cause is " often used 
 in so restrained a sense as to signify only that which has 
 2l positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing, or 
 bring it to pass^ 
 
 That President Edwards regarded motive as the efiicient 
 or producing cause of volition, according to his own notion 
 of it, is clear not only from numerous passages of the 
 Inquiry ; it is also wrought into the very substance and 
 structure of his whole argument. It is involved in his 
 very definition of the strongest motive. The strongest 
 motive, says he, is the whole of that which " operates to 
 induce a particular choice." Now, to say that one thing 
 operates to induce another, or bring it into existence, is, 
 according to the definition of the younger Edwards him- 
 self, to say that it is the efiicient cause of the thing so pro- 
 duced. If there be any meaning in words, or any truth in 
 
32 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 the definition of the Edwardses, then to say that one thing 
 operates to produce another, is to say that it is its efficient 
 cause. President Edwards, as we have seen, holds that 
 motive is " the eflfectual power and efficacy" which pro- 
 duces volition." 
 
 Again. Edwards frequendy says, that " if this great 
 principle of common sense, that every effect must have a 
 cause, be given up, then there will be no such thing as 
 reasoning from effect to cause. We cannot even prove the 
 existence of Deity. If any thing can begin to be without 
 a cause of its existence, then we cannot know that there 
 is a God." Now, the sense in which this maxim is here 
 used is perfectly obvious; for nothing can begin to be 
 without an efficient cause, by which it is brought into ex- 
 istence. When we reason from those things which begin 
 to be up to God, we clearly reason from effects to their 
 efficient causes. Hence, when this maxim is applied by 
 Edwards to volitions, he evidently refers to the efficient 
 causes of them. If he does not, his maxim is misapplied ; 
 for it is established in one sense, and applied in another. 
 If it proves any thing, it proves that volition must have an 
 efficient cause ; and when motive is taken to be that cause, 
 it is taken to be the efficient cause of volition. 
 
 This is not all. Edwards undertakes to point out the 
 difference between natural and moral necessity. In the 
 case of moral necessity, says he, " the cause with which 
 the effect is connected is of a particular kind: viz., that 
 which is of a moral nature ; either some previous habitual 
 disposition, or some motive presented to the understanding. 
 And the effect is also of a particular kind, being likewise 
 of a moral nature ; consisting in some inclination or voli- 
 tion of the soul, or voluntary action." But the difference, 
 says he, " does not lie so much in the nature of the 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 33 
 
 connection, as in the two terms connected." Now, let 
 us suppose that any effect, the creation of the world, for 
 example, is produced by the power of God. In this case, 
 the connection between the effect produced, the creation 
 of the world, and the act of the divine omnipotence by 
 which it is created, is certainly the connection between an 
 effect and its efficient cause. The two terms are here 
 connected by a natural necessity. But we are most ex- 
 plicitly informed, that the connection between motives and 
 volitions, differs from this in the nature of the two terms 
 connected, rather than in the nature of the connection. 
 How could language more clearly or precisely convey the 
 meaning of an author? To say that President Edwards 
 does not make motive the efficient cause of volition, is, in- 
 deed, not so much to interpret, as it is to new-model, his 
 philosophy of the will. 
 
 The connection between the strongest motive, he de- 
 clares, and the corresponding volition, is "absolute," just 
 as absolute as any connection in the world. If the strongest 
 motive exists, the volition is sure to follow ; it necessarily 
 follows ; it is absurd to suppose, that it may attend its 
 cause or not. To say that it may follow the influence of 
 its cause, or may not, is to say that it is not dependent 
 on that influence, that it is not the effect of it. In other 
 words, it is to say that a volition is the effect of the 
 strongest motive, and yet that it is not the effect of it ; 
 which is a plain contradiction. Such, as we have seen, 
 is the clear and unequivocal teaching of the Inquiry. 
 
 In conclusion, if Edwards really held, that motive does 
 not produce volition, but is merely the occasion on which 
 it is put forth, where shall we find his doctrine ? Where 
 shall we look for it ? We hear him charged with destroy- 
 ing man's free-agency, by making motive the producing 
 4 
 
34 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 cause of volition ; and we see him labouring to repel this 
 charge. Truly, if he held the doctrine ascribed to him, 
 we might have expected to find some allusion to it in his 
 attempts to refute such a charge. If such had been his 
 doctrine, with what ease might he have repelled the 
 charge in question, and shown its utter futility, by simply 
 alleging that, according to his system, motive is the occa- 
 sion, and not the producing cause, of volition ? Instead of 
 the many pages through which he has so laboriously 
 struggled, in order to bring our ideas of free-agency and 
 virtue into harmony with his scheme ; with what infinite 
 ease might a single word have brought his scheme into har- 
 mony with the common sentiments of mankind in regard 
 to free-agency and virtue ! Indeed, if Edwards really 
 believed that motive is merely the condition on which the 
 mind acts, nothing can be more wonderful than his pro- 
 found silence in regard to it on such an occasion ; except 
 the great pains which, on all occasions, he has taken to 
 keep it entirely in the back-ground. If the younger Ed- 
 wards is not mistaken as to the true import of his father's 
 doctrine, then, instead of setting it forth in a clear light, 
 so that it may be read of all men, the author of the Inquiry 
 has, indeed, enveloped it in such a flood of darkness, that 
 it is no wonder those who have been so fortunate as to 
 find it out, should be so frequently called upon to com- 
 plain that his opponents do not understand bira. Indeed, 
 if such be the doctrine of the Inquiry, I do not see how 
 any man can possibly understand it, unless he has in- 
 herited some peculiar power, unknown to the rest of man- 
 kind, by which its occult meaning may be discerned, not- 
 withstanding all the outward appearances by which it is 
 contradicted and obscured. 
 
 The plain truth is, as we have seen, that President Ed- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 35 
 
 wards holds motive to be the producing cause of vohtion. 
 According to his scheme, " Vohtions are necessarily con- 
 nected with the influence of motives ;'* they " are brought 
 to pa€s by the prevaiUng and effectual. influence" of, mo- 
 tives. Motive is " the effectual power and efl[icacy" bjP 
 which they are " produced." They are not merely caused 
 to" be thus, and not otherwise, by motive ; they are " caused 
 to arise and come forth into existence." This is the great 
 doctrine for which Ed\Yards contends ; and this ^s pre- 
 cisely the doctrine which I deny. / contend against no 
 other kind of necessity but this moral necessity, just 
 as it is explained by Edwards himself. 
 
 Here the issue with President Edwards is joined ; and 
 I intend to hold him steadily to it. No ambiguity of words 
 shall, for a moment, divert my mind from it. If his argu- 
 ments, when thoroughly sifted and scrutinized, establish 
 this doctrine ; then shall I lay down my arms and sur- 
 render at discretion. But if his assumptions are unsound, 
 or his deductions false, I shall hold them for naught. If 
 he reconciles his scheme of moral necessity with the 
 reahty of virtue, with the moral agency and accountability 
 of man, and with the purity of God ; then I shall lay aside 
 my objections ; but if, in reality, he only reconciles it with 
 the semblance of these things, whilst he denies their sub- 
 stance, I shall not be diverted from an opposition to so 
 monstrous a system, by the fair appearances it may be 
 made to wear to the outward eye. 
 
36 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 THE INQUIRY INVOLVED IN A VICIOUS CIRCLE. 
 
 The great doctrine of the Inquiry seems to go round in 
 a vicious circle, to run into an insignificant truism. This 
 is a grave charge, I am aware, and I have ventured to 
 make it only after the most mature reflection : and the 
 justness of it may be shown by a variety of considera- 
 tions. 
 
 In the first place, when we ask, "" what determines the 
 will?" the author replies, "it is the strongest motive;" 
 and yet, according to his definition, the strongest motive 
 is that which determines the will. Thus, says Edwards, 
 " when I speak of the strongest motive, I have respect to 
 the whole that operates to induce a particular act of voli- 
 tion, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of 
 many together." If we ask, then, what produces any 
 particular act of volition, we are told, it is the strongest 
 motive ; and if we inquire what is the strongest motive, 
 we are informed, it is the whole of that which operated 
 to produce that particular act of volition. What is this 
 but to inform us, that an act of volition is produced by that 
 which produces it? 
 
 It is taken for granted by President Edwards, that voli- 
 tion is an effect, and consequently has a cause. The great 
 question, according to his work, is, what is this cause ? 
 He says it is the strongest motive ; in the definition of 
 which he includes every thing that in any way contributes 
 to the production of voUtion ; in other words, the strongest 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 87 
 
 motive is made to embrace every thing that acts as a cause 
 of volition. This is the way in which he explains him- 
 self, as well as the manner in which he is understood by 
 others. Thus, says the younger Edwards, " in his expla- 
 nation of his idea of motive, he mentions all agreeable 
 objects and views, all reasons and arguments, and all in- 
 ternal biases and tempers, which have a tendency to voli- 
 tion ; i. e. every cause or occasion of volition," p. 104. 
 Every reader of President Edwards must be satisfied that 
 this is a correct account of his definition of motive ; and 
 this being the case, the whole amounts to just this propo- 
 sition, that volition is caused by that which causes it ! 
 He admits that it would be hard, if not impossible, to enu- 
 merate all those things and circumstances which aid in 
 the production of vohtion ; but still he is quite sure, that 
 the whole of that which operates to produce a volition 
 does actually produce it ! Though he may have failed 
 to show wherein consists the strength of motives ; yet he 
 contends that the strongest motive, or the cause of voli- 
 tion, is really and unquestionably the cause of volition ! 
 Such is the great doctrine of the Inquiry. 
 
 If this is what the Inquiry means to establish, surely it 
 rests upon unassailable ground. Well may President Day 
 assert, that " to say a weaker motive prevails against a 
 stronger one is to say, that that which has the least influ- 
 ence has the greatest influence," p. 66. Now who would 
 deny this position of the learned president ? Who would 
 say, that that which has the greatest influence has not the 
 greatest influence ? Surely, this great doctrine is to the 
 full as certain as the newly discovered axiom of professor 
 Villant, that " a thing is equal to itself." 
 
 President Day, following in the footsteps of Edwards, 
 informs us that the will is determined by the strongest 
 4* 
 
38 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 motive ; but how shall we know what is the strongest 
 motive ? " The strength of a motive," says he, " is not 
 its prevailing, but the power by which it prevails. Yet 
 we may very properly measure this power by the actual 
 result 1'^ Thus are we gravely informed that the will is 
 determined by that which determines it. 
 
 Again. If we suppose there is a real strength in mo- 
 tives, that they exert a positive influence in the production 
 of volitions, then we concede every thing to President 
 Edwards. For, if motives are so many forces acting upon 
 the will, to say that the strongest Avill prevail, is simply 
 to say that it is the strongest. But if motives exert no 
 positive influence, then when we say that one is stronger 
 than another, we must be understood to use this expres- 
 sion in a metaphorical sense ; we must refer to some 
 property of motives which we figuratively call their 
 strength, and of which we suppose one motive to possess 
 a greater degree than another. If this be so, what is 
 this common property of motives, which we call their 
 strength ? If they do not possess a real strength, if they 
 do not exert an efficient influence ; but are merely said, 
 metaphorically speaking, to possess such power and to 
 exert such influence ; then what becomes of the self-evi- 
 dence which President Edwards claims for his funda- 
 mental proposition ? 'If motives exert a real force, of 
 course the strongest must prevail; but if they only have 
 something else about them, \vhich we call their strength, 
 it is not self-evident that the motive which possesses this 
 something else in the highest degree must necessarily 
 prevail. Hence, the great doctrine of President Edwards 
 is either a proposition whose truth arises out of the very 
 definition of the terms in which it is expressed, or it is 
 utterly destitute of that axiomatical certainty which he 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 39 
 
 claims for it. In other words, he has settled his great 
 doctrine of the will by the mere force of a definition ; or 
 he has left its foundations quite unsettled. 
 
 Motives, as they are called, are different from each 
 other in nature and in kind ; and hence, it were absurd to 
 compare them in degree. " The strongest motive," there- 
 fore, is a mode of expression which can have no intelligi- 
 ble meaning, unless it be used with reference to the influ- 
 ence which motives are supposed to exert over the mind. 
 This is the sense in which it clearly seems to be used by 
 Edwards. The distinguishing property of a motive, ac- 
 cording to his definition, is nothing in the nature of the 
 motive itself; it consists in its adaptedness "to move or 
 excite the mind to volition;" nor indeed could he find any 
 other way of measuring or determinmg what he calls the 
 strength of motives, since they are so diverse in their own 
 nature from each other. He could not have given any 
 plausible definition of the strength of motives, if he had 
 looked at them as they are in themselves ; and hence, he 
 was under the necessity of defining it, by a reference to 
 the " degree of tendency or advantage they have to move 
 or excite the will." Thus, according to the Inquiry, the 
 will is determined by the strongest motive ; and yet we 
 can form no intelligible idea of what is meant by the 
 strongest motive, unless we conceive it to be that which 
 determines the will. The matter will not be mended, by 
 alleging that the strongest motive is not defined to be that 
 which actually determines the will, but that which has the 
 greatest degree of previous tendency or advantage, to ex- 
 cite or move it ; for we cannot know what motive has this 
 greatest degree of previous tendency or advantage, except 
 by observing what motive actually does determine the 
 
 wm. 
 
40 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 This leads us to another view of the same subject. 
 The strength of a motive, as President Edwards properly 
 remarks, depends upon the state of the mind to which it 
 is addressed. Hence, in a great majority of cases, we 
 can know nothing about the relative strength of motives, 
 except from the actual influence which they exert over the 
 mind of the individual upon whom they are brought to bear. 
 This shows that the universal proposition, that the will is 
 always determined by the strongest motive, can be known 
 to be true, only by assuming that the strongest motive is 
 that by which the will is determined. 
 
 The same thing may be made to appear from another 
 point of view. It has been well said by the philosopher 
 of Malmsbury, " that experience concludeth nothing uni- 
 versally." From experience we can pronounce only in 
 so far as we have observed, and no farther. But the pro- 
 position, that the will is always determined by the strongest 
 motive, is a universal proposition ; and hence, if true at all, 
 its truth could not have been learnt from observation and 
 experience. It must depend upon the very definition of 
 the terms in which it is expressed. We cannot say that 
 the will is in all cases determined by the strongest motive, 
 unless we include in the very idea and definition of the 
 strongest motive, that it is such that it determines the will. 
 President Edwards not only does, but he must necessarily, 
 go around in this circle, in order to give any degree of 
 clearness and certainty to his doctrine. 
 
 That President Edwards goes around in this vicious 
 circle, may be shown in another way. " It appears from 
 these things," says he, "that in some sense, the will 
 always follows the last dictate of the understanding. 
 But then the understanding must be taken in a large 
 sense, as including the whole faculty of perception or ap- 
 
^ EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 41 
 
 prehension, and not merely what is called reason or judg- 
 ment. IF by the last dictate of the understanding is meant 
 what reason declares to be best, or most for the person's 
 happiness, taking in the whole of its duration, it is not 
 true, that the will always follows the last dictate of the 
 understanding," p. 25. In this place. President Edwards 
 gives no distinct idea of what he means by the last dic- 
 tate of the understanding, which the will is said to follow 
 in all cases. But in the eighth volume of his works, that 
 dictate of the understanding which the will is said to fol- 
 low, is called the " practical judgment ;" and this is de- 
 fined to be, "that judgment which men make of things 
 that prevail, so as to determine their actions and govern 
 their practice." Here again are we informed, that the will 
 always follows the practical judgment, and that the prac- 
 tical judgment is that which men make of things that pre- 
 vail, so as to determine the will. 
 
 The Inquiry itself furnishes abundant evidence, that I 
 have done its author no injustice. " I have chosen," says 
 he, " rather to express myself thus, that the will always 
 is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears 
 most agreeable, than to say the will is determined by the 
 greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable ; 
 because an appearing most agreeable to the mind, and the 
 mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict pro- 
 priety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be 
 said, that the voluntary action, which is the immediate 
 consequence of the mind's choice, is determined by that 
 which appears most agreeable, than the choice itself.'* 
 After all, then, it seems that choice itself, or volition, is 
 not determined by that which appears the most agreeable ; 
 because, in reality, the sense of the most agreeable and 
 volition are one and the same thing. But surely, if we 
 
42 EXAMINATION OF ^ 
 
 cannot distinguish between choice and the sense of the 
 most agreeable, then to say that the one always is as the 
 other, is only to say that a thing is always as it is. Ed- 
 wards saw the absurdity of saying that a thing is deter- 
 mined by itself; but he does not seem to have seen, how 
 insignificant is the proposition, that a thing is always as 
 it is, and not otherwise ; and hence this is the form in 
 which he has chosen to present the great leading idea of 
 his work on the will. And henceforth we are to under- 
 stand, that the preference of the mind is always as that 
 which appears most agreeable to the mind ; or, in other 
 words, that the preference or choice of the mind is always 
 as the choice of the mind. 
 
 • This is not all. President Edwards himself has fre- 
 quently reduced the fundamental doctrine of the Inquiry 
 to an identical proposition. It is well known, that " to be 
 determined by the strongest motive," " to follow the 
 greatest apparent good," " to do what is most agreeable," 
 or " what pleases most," are all different modes of ex- 
 pression employed by him to set forth the same funda- 
 mental doctrine. In speaking of this doctrine, he says : 
 " There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate 
 of the sense and experience of mankind, than that, when 
 men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they 
 do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to 
 them. To say, that they do what pleases them, but yet 
 not what is agreeable to them, is the same thing as to say, 
 they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure ; 
 and that is to say, that they do what they please, and yet 
 do not what they please." Most assuredly, if to deny the 
 leading proposition of the Inquiry, is to deny that men do 
 what they please when they do what they please ; then 
 to affirm it, is only to advance the insignificant truism. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 4S 
 
 that men do what they please when they do what they 
 please. It seems to me, that after President Edwards had 
 reduced his fundamental proposition to such a truism, he 
 might very well have spared himself the three hundred 
 pages that follow. 
 
 Again, he says : " It is manifest that no acts of the will 
 are contingent, in such sense as to be without all neces- 
 sity, or so as not to be necessary with a necessity of con- 
 sequence and connection ; because every act of the will is 
 some way connected with the understanding, and is as the 
 greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has already 
 been explained ; namely, that the soul always wills or 
 chooses that, which in the present view of the mind, con- 
 sidered in the whole of that view, and all that belongs to 
 it, appears most agreeable. Because, as we observed 
 before, nothing is more evident than that, when men act 
 voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what 
 appears most agreeable to them ; and to say otherwise 
 would be as much as to affirm, that men do not choose 
 what appears to suit them best, or what seems most 
 pleasing to them ; or that they do not choose what they 
 prefer, which brings the matter to a contradiction.''^ 
 
 Thus, the great fundamental doctrine of the Inquiry is 
 reduced by Edwards himself to the barren truism, that 
 men do actually choose what they choose ; a proposition 
 which the boldest advocate of free-agency would hardly 
 dare to call in question. After labouring through a whole 
 section to establish this position, the author concludes by 
 saying, " These things may serve, I hope, in some mea- 
 sure to illustrate and confirm the position laid down in 
 the beginning of this section : viz. That the will is always 
 determined by the strongest motive, or by the view of the 
 mind which has the greatest previous tendency to excite 
 
44 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 volition. But whether I have been so happy as rightly 
 to explain the thing wherein consists the strength of mo- 
 tives, or not, yet my failing in this will not overthrow the 
 position itself ; which carries much ofitsoivn evidence 
 along with it^and is a point of chief importance to the 
 purpose of the ensuing discourse : and the truth of it I 
 hope will appear with great clearness, before I have 
 finished what I have to say on the subject of human 
 liberty." Truly the position in question, as it is explained 
 by the author himself, carries not only much, but all, of 
 its own evidence along with it. Who can deny that a man 
 always does what he pleases, when he does what he 
 pleases ? This truth appears witli just as great clearness 
 at the beginning, as it does at the conclusjon, of the cele- 
 brated Inquiry of the author. It is invested in a flood of 
 light, which can neither be increased by argument, nor 
 obscured by sophistry. 
 
 From the foregoing remarks, it appears, I think, that 
 the fundamental doctrine of the Inquiry is a barren truism, 
 or a vicious circle. If Edwards understood the import of 
 his own doctrine, when he reduced it to the form that a 
 man does what he pleases when he does what he pleases, 
 it is certainly a truism ; and if this is all his famous doc- 
 tine amounts to, it can have no bearing whatever upon the 
 question as to the cause of volition ; for whether the mind 
 be the cause of its own volitions, or whether the strongest 
 motive always causes them, or whether they have no 
 causes at all, it is equally and unalterably true, that every 
 man does what he pleases when he does what he pleases. 
 There is no possible form of the doctrine of free-agency 
 or contingency, however wild, which is at all inconsistent 
 with such a truism. 
 
 Edwards is not always consistent with himself. He 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 45 
 
 sometimes represents the greatest apparent good, or sense 
 of the most agreeable, as the cause of volition ; and then 
 his doctrine assumes the form, that the will is determined 
 by the strongest motive, or the greatest apparent good. 
 And yet he sometimes identifies a sense of the most agree- 
 able with the choice itself; and then his doctrine assumes 
 the form that the choice of the mind is always as the 
 choice of the mind ; and to deny it is a plain contradiction 
 in terms. 
 
 From the fact that Edwards has gone round in a circle, 
 it has been concluded that he has begged the question ; 
 but how, or wherein he has begged it, is a point which 
 has not been sufficiently noticed. The very authors who 
 have uttered this complaint, have granted him the very thing 
 for which he has begged. If volition is an efftct^ if it 
 has a cause, then most unquestionably the cause of voli- 
 tion is the cause of volition. Admit that voUtion is an 
 efiect, as so many libertarians have done, and then his 
 definition of motive, which includes every cause of voli- 
 tion, places his doctrine upon an immutable foundation. 
 We might as well heave at the everlasting mountams as 
 to try to shake it. 
 
 Admit that volition is an effect, and what can we say ? 
 Can we say, that the strongest motive may exist, and yet 
 no vohtion may follow from it? To this the necessitarian 
 would instantly reply, that if any thing exists, and no 
 volition follows thereupon, it is evidently not the cause of 
 volition, and consequently is not the strongest motive ; for 
 this, according to the definition, includes every cause of 
 volition : it is indeed absurd, to suppose that an effect 
 should not proceed from its cause. This is the ground 
 taken both by President Edwards and President Day. It 
 is absHrd, says the latter, to suppose that a weaker mo- 
 5 
 
 k 
 
46 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 tive, or any thing else, can prevail over the stronger — and 
 why ? Because the strongest motive is that which pre- 
 vails. " If it be said," he continues, " that something 
 else gives the weaker motive a superiority over the 
 stronger ; then this something else is itself a m,otive, 
 and the united influence of the two is greater than that of 
 the third," p. 66. Thus, say what we will, we can 
 never escape this admirable net of words, that the will is 
 determined by that which determines it. 
 
 I do not intend, then, to engage in the hopeless task, of 
 admitting volition to be an effect, and yet striving to ex- 
 tricate it from " the mechanism of cause and efliect." This 
 ground has long since been occupied by much abler per- 
 sons than myself; and if they have failed,of success, fall- 
 ing into innumerable inconsistencies, it is because, on such 
 ground, success is impossible ; and that notwithstanding 
 their transcendant abilities, they have been fated to contra- 
 dict themselves. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 47 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 VOLITION NOT AN EFFECT. 
 
 The argument of the Inquiry, as I have shown, as- 
 sumes that a volition is an effect in the proper sense of 
 the word ; that it is the correlative of an efficient cause. 
 If it were necessary, this point might be established by a 
 great variety of additional considerations ; but, I presume 
 that every candid reader of the Inquiry is fully satisfied 
 in relation to it. 
 
 If we mean by an effect, every thing that comes to 
 pass, of course a volition is an effect ; for no one can 
 deny that it comes to pass. Or, if we include in the 
 definition of the term, every thing which has a sufficient 
 reason and ground of its existence, we cannot deny that 
 it embraces the idea of a volition. For, under certain 
 circumstances, the free mind will furnish a sufficient 
 reason and ground of the existence of a volition. All 
 that I deny is, that a volition does proceed from the mind, 
 or from motive, or from anything else, in the same man- 
 ner that an effect, properly so called, proceeds from its 
 efficient cause. 
 
 This is a point on which I desire to be distinctly un- 
 derstood. I put forth a volition to move my hand. The 
 motion of the hand follows. Now, here I observe the 
 action of the mind, and also the motion of the hand. 
 The effect exists in the body, in that which is by nature 
 passive ; the cause in that which is active, in the mind. 
 The effect produced in the body, in the hand, is the 
 
 k 
 
48 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 passive result of the prior direct action of the mind. It 
 is in this restricted sense, that I use the term in question, 
 when I deny that a volition is an effect. I do not deny- 
 that it depends for its production upon certain circum- 
 stances, as the conditions of action, and upon the powers 
 of the mind, by which it is capable of acting in view of 
 such circumstances. All that I deny is, that volition re- 
 sults from the prior action of mind, or of circumstances, 
 or of any thing else, in the same manner that the motion 
 of body results from the prior action of mind. Or, in 
 other words, I contend that action is the invariable ante- 
 cedent of bodily motion, but not of volition ; that what- 
 ever may be its relations to other things, a volition does 
 not sustain the same relation to anything in theunivferse, 
 that an effect sustains to its efficient cause, that a passive 
 result sustains to the direct prior action by which it is 
 produced. I hope I maybe always so understood, when 
 I affirm that a volition is not an effect. 
 
 It is in this narrow and restricted sense that Edwards 
 assumes a volition to be an effect. He does not say, in 
 fio many words, that the mind cannot put forth a volition, 
 except in the way of producing it by a preceding volition 
 or act of the will ; but he first assumes a volition to be 
 an effect ; and then he asserts, that the mind can be the 
 cause of no effect^ (italicising the term effect,) except by 
 the prior action of the mind. Thus, having assumed a 
 volition to be an effect, he takes it for granted that it 
 cannot proceed from the mind in any way, except that 
 in which any effect in the outer world proceeds from the 
 mind ; that is to say, except it be produced by the direct 
 prior action of the mind, by a preceding volition. Thus 
 he brings the idea of a volition under the above narrow 
 and restricted notion of an effect ; and thereby confounds 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 49 
 
 the relation which subsists between mind and its voli- 
 tions, with the relation which subsists between mind and 
 its external effects in body. In other words, on the sup- 
 position that our volitions proceed from the mind, he 
 takes it for granted that they must be produced by the 
 preceding action of the mind; just as an effect, in the 
 limited sense of the term, is produced by the prior ac- 
 tion of its cause. It is in this assumption, that Edwards 
 lays the foundation of the logic, by which he reduces 
 the self-determining power of the mind to the absurdity 
 of an infinite series of volitions. 
 
 It is evident that such is the course pursued by Ed- 
 wards ; for he not only calls a volition an effect, but he 
 also says, that the mind can " bring no effects to pass, 
 but what are consequent upon its acting," p. 56. And 
 again he says, *' The will determines which way the 
 hands and feet shall move, by an act of choice; and 
 there is no other way of the will's determining, direct- 
 ing, or commanding any thing at all." This is very true, 
 if a volition is such an effect as requires the prior action 
 of something else to account for its production, just as 
 the motion of the "hands and feet" requires the action 
 of the mind to account for its production ; but it is not 
 true, if a volition is such an effect, that its existence may 
 be accounted for by the presence of certain circumstances 
 or motives, as the conditions of action, in conjunction 
 with a mind capable of acting in view of such motives. 
 In other words, his assertion is true, if we allow him to 
 assume, as he does, that a volition is an effect, in the 
 above restricted meaning of the term ; but it is not true, 
 if we consider a volition as an effect in a larger sense of 
 the word. Hence, the whole strength of Edwards' po- 
 5* 
 
50 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 sition lies in the sense which he arbitrarily attaches to 
 the term effect,, when he says that a volition is an effect. 
 
 Now, is a volition an effect in such a sense of the 
 word? Is it brought into existence, like the motion of 
 body, by the prior action of any thing else ? We an- 
 swer, No. But how shall this point be decided ? The 
 necessitarian says, a moment before the volition did not 
 exist, now it does exist; and hence, it necessarily 
 follows, that there must have been a cause by which 
 it was brought into existence. That is to say, it must 
 be an effect. True, it must be an effect, if you please ; 
 but in what sense of the word ? Is volition an effect, in 
 the same sense that the motion of the body is an effect ? 
 This is the question. 
 
 And this question, I contend, is not to be decided by 
 abstract considerations, nor yet by the laying of words 
 together, and drawing conclusions from them. It is a 
 question, not of logic, but of psychology. By whatever 
 name you may please to call it, the true nature of a voli- 
 tion is not to be determined by reference to abstractions, 
 nor by the power of words ; but hy simply looking at it 
 and seeing what it is. If we would really understand 
 its nature, we must not undertake to reason it out ; we 
 must open our eyes, and look^ and see. The former 
 course would do very well, no doubt, if the object were 
 to construct a world for ourselves; but if we would be- 
 hold the glory of that which God has constructed for 
 us, and in us, we must lay aside the proud syllogistic 
 method of the schools, and betake ourselves to the 
 humble task of observation — of patient, severe, and scru- 
 tinizing observation. There is no other condition on 
 which we can " enter into the kingdom of man, which is 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 61 
 
 founded in the sciences." There is no other course 
 marked out for us by the immortal Bacon: and if we 
 pursue any other we may wander in the dazzling light 
 of a thousand abstractions, and behold whatever fleeting 
 images of grandeur and of beauty we may be pleased to 
 conjure up for ourselves ; but the pure light of nature 
 and of truth will be hid from us. 
 
 What then is a volition just as it is revealed to us in 
 the light of consciousness ? Does it result from the prior 
 action of mind, or of motive, or of any thing else ? In 
 other words, is it an effect^ as the motion of body is an 
 efl'ect ! 
 
 We always conceive of the subject in which such an 
 eflect resides, as being wholly passive. President Ed- 
 wards himself has repeatedly said, that it is the very 
 notion of an effect, that it results from the action or in- 
 fluence of its cause; and that nothing is any further an 
 effect, than as it proceeds from that action or influence. 
 The subject in which it is produced, is always passive 
 as to its production ; and just in so far as it is itself 
 active, it is not the subject of an effect, but the author of 
 an action. Such is the idea of an effect in the true and 
 proper sense of the word. 
 
 Now does our idea of a volition correspond with this 
 idea of an effect ? Is it produced in the mind, and is the 
 mind passive as to its production? Is it, like the mo- 
 tion of a body, the passive result of the action of some- 
 thing else? No. It is not the result of action; it is 
 action itself. The mind is not passive as to its produc- 
 tion ; it is in and of itself an action of the mind. It is 
 not determined ^ it is a determination. It is not a pro- 
 duced effect, like the motion of body ; it is itself an ori- 
 ginal producing cause. It does seem to me, that if any 
 
52 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 man will only reflect on this subject, he must see that 
 there is a clear and manifest difference between an act 
 and an effect. 
 
 Although the scheme of Edwards identifies these two 
 things, and his argument assumes them to be one and 
 the same ; yet his language, it appears to me, frequently 
 betrays the fact, that his consciousness did not work in 
 harmony with his theory. While speaking of the acts 
 of the will as effects, he frequently says, that it is the 
 very idea of an effect that it results from, and is necessa- 
 rily connected with, the action of its cause, and that it is 
 absurd to suppose that it is free or loose from the influ- 
 ence of its cause. 
 
 And yet, in reference to volitions, he often uses the 
 expression, ^^ this sort of effects," as if.it did not ex- 
 actly correspond with the *' very idea of an effect,'* 
 from which it is absurd to depart in our conceptions. 
 When he gives fair play to consciousness, he speaks of 
 different kinds of effects ; and yet, when he returns to 
 his theory and his reasoning, all this seems to vanish; 
 and there remains but one clear, fixed, and definite idea 
 of an effect, and to speak of any thing else as such is 
 absurd. He now and then pays a passing tribute to the 
 power of consciousness, by admitting that the soul exerts 
 its own volitions, that the soul itself acts ; but he no 
 sooner comes to the work of argument and refutation, 
 than it is motive that *' causes them to be put forth or 
 exerted," p. 96. Ever and anon, he seems to catch a 
 whisper from the voice of consciousness ; and he con- 
 cedes that he sometimes uses the term cause to designate 
 that which has not a positive or productive influence, 
 p. 50-1. But this is not when he is engaged in the 
 energy of debate. Let Mr. Chubb cross his path ; let 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 53 
 
 him hear the voice of opposition giving utterance to the 
 sentiment, that ** in motive there is no causality in the 
 production of action;" and that moment the voice of 
 consciousness is hushed in the most profound silence. 
 He rises, like a giant, in the defence of his system, and 
 he declares, that "to excite," as motives do, "is posi- 
 tively to do something," and "certainly that which does 
 something, is the cause of the thing done by it." Yea, 
 " to excite, is to cause in the most proper sense, not 
 merely a negative occasion, but a ground of existence 
 by positive influence,''^ p. 96. 
 
 These passages, which are scattered up and down 
 through the Inquiry, in which the doctrine of liberty 
 seems to be conceded, I cannot but regard as highly im- 
 portant concessions. They have been used to show that 
 we misconceive the scheme of Edwards, when we ascribe 
 to him the doctrine of fate. But when they are thus 
 adduced, to show that we misrepresent his doctrine, I 
 beg it may be remembered that such evidence can prove 
 only one of two things ; either that we do not understand 
 what he teaches, or that he is not always consistent with 
 himself. 
 
 If he really held the doctrine of fatalism, we ought not 
 to be surprised that he has furnished such evidence 
 against himself. It is not in the nature of the human 
 mind to keep itself always deaf to the voice of conscious- 
 ness. It is not in the power of any system always to 
 counteract the spontaneous workings of nature. Though 
 the mind should be surrounded by those deep-seated, 
 all-pervading, and obstinate illusions, by which the 
 scheme of fatalism is made to wear ihe appearance of 
 self-evident truth ; yet when it loses sight of that system, 
 it will, at times, speak out in accordance with the dic- 
 tates of nature. The stern and unrelenting features of 
 
54 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 fatalism cannot always be so intimately present to the 
 mind, as entirely to exclude it from the contemplation of 
 a milder and more captivating system of philosophy. 
 Notwithstanding the influence of system, how rigid 
 soever may be its demands, the human mind will, in its 
 moments of relaxation, recognize in its feelings and in 
 its utterance, those great truths which are inseparable 
 from its very nature. 
 
 Let it be borne in mind, then, that there is more than 
 one process in the universe. Some things are produced, 
 it is most true, by the prior action of other things ; and 
 herein we behold the relation of cause and effect, pro- 
 perly so called ; but it does not follow, that? all things are 
 embraced by this one relation. This appears to be so 
 only to the mind of the necessitarian ; from which one 
 fixed idea has shut out the light of observation. He no 
 longer sees the rich variety, the boundless diversity, 
 there is in the works of God ; all things and all modes and 
 all processes of the awe-inspiring universe, are made to 
 conform to the narrow and contracted methods of his own 
 mind. Look where he will, he sees not the *' free and 
 flowing outline" of nature's true lineaments ; he every 
 where beholds the image of the one fixed idea in his 
 mind, projected outwardly upon the universe of God ; 
 behind which the true secrets and operations of nature 
 are concealed from his vision. Even when he contem- 
 plates that living source of action, that bubbling fountain 
 of volitions, the immortal mind of man itself, he only be- 
 holds a thing, which is made to act by the action of 
 something else upon it; just as a body is made to 
 move by the action of force upon it. His philosophy is, 
 therefore, an essentially shallow and superficial philoso- 
 phy. The great name of Edwards cannot shield it from 
 such condemnation. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 66 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REGARDING VOLITION AS AN 
 EFFECT. 
 
 It has been frequently conceded that a volition is an 
 effect; but to make this concession, without explanation 
 or qualification, is to surrender the whole cause of free 
 agency into the hand of the enemy. For if a volition is 
 an effect, properly speaking, the only question is as to 
 its efficient cause : it is necessarily produced by its 
 cause. 
 
 To make this matter clear, let us consider what is pre- 
 cisely meant by the term cause when it is thus used ? 
 An effect is necessarily connected, not with the thing 
 which is sometimes called its cause, but with the action 
 or positive influence of that thing. Thus, the mind, or 
 the power of the mind, is sometimes said to be the cause 
 of motion in the body ; but this is not to speak with phi- 
 losophical precision. No motion of the body is neces- 
 sarily connected, either with the mind itself, or with the 
 power of the mind. In other words, if these should lie 
 dormant, or fail to act, they would produce no bodily 
 motion. But let the mind act, or will a particular mo- 
 tion, and the body will necessarily move in consequence 
 of that action. Hence, it is neither with the mind, nor 
 with the power of the mind, that bodily motion, as an 
 effect, is necessarily connected ; it is with an act of the 
 mind or volition that this necessary connection subsists. 
 
56 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 A cause is said to imply its effect: it is not the mind, but 
 an act of the mind, that implies motion in the body. 
 
 'JThis is evidently the idea of Edwards, when he says, 
 as he frequently does, that an effect is necessarily con- 
 nected with the influence or action of its cause. The 
 term cause is ambiguous ; and when he says, that an 
 effect is necessarily connected with its cause, he should 
 be understood to mean, in accordance with his own doc- 
 trine, that the cause referred to is the influence or action 
 by which it is produced, and not the thing which exerts 
 that inHuence or action. Thus, although motives are 
 said to be causes of action, he contends, they can do 
 nothing except by their influence ; and so much as results 
 from their influence is the effect of that influence, and is 
 necessarily connected with it. 
 
 Now, if a volition is an effect, if it has an efficient 
 cause, what is that cause ? By the action of what is it 
 produced? It cannot be by the act of the mind, says 
 Edwards, because the mind can produce an effect only 
 by another act. Thus, on the supposition in question, 
 we cannot ascribe a volition to the mind as its cause, 
 without being compelled to admit that it results from a 
 preceding act of the mind. But that preceding act, on 
 the same supposition, will require still another preceding 
 act to account forits production ; and soon adinjiniium. 
 Such is the absurdity which Edwards delighted to urge 
 against the self-determining power of the mind. It is 
 triumphantly based on the concession that a volition is 
 an effect; that as such the iprior action of something else 
 is necessary to account for its existence. And if we sup- 
 pose, in accordance with the truth, that a volition is 
 merely a state of the mind, which does not sustain the 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 57 
 
 same relation to the mind that an effect does to its effi- 
 cient cause, this absurdity will vanish. The doctrine of 
 liberty will no longer be encumbered with it. 
 
 Now, proceeding on the same supposition, let us con- 
 ceive of a volition as resulting from the influence ex- 
 erted by motive. If an act of the mind is an effect, 
 surely we may say, that the act or productive influence 
 of motive, or of any thing else, is likewise an effect ; 
 and consequently must have a cause to account for its 
 existence ; and so on ad infinitum. Hence, the very 
 absurdity which Edwards charges upon our system, really 
 attaches to his own. 
 
 Will it be said that this ad infinitum absurdity does 
 not result from the supposition in question, but from the 
 fact that the mind can do nothing except by its action or 
 influence ? It is very true, as Edwards repeatedly de- 
 clares, that the mind can be the cause of no effect, except 
 by a preceding act of the mind. The truth of this pro- 
 position is involved in the very idea which he attaches 
 to the term effect, and it is based upon this idea alone. 
 And we may say, with equal propriety, that motive can 
 be the cause of no effect, except by its action or produc- 
 tive influence. Indeed, Edwards himself expressly says, 
 that motives can do nothing, except by an exertion of 
 their influence, or by operating to produce effects. Thus, 
 the two cases are rendered perfectly parallel ; and afford 
 the same foundation on which to erect an infinite series 
 of causes. 
 
 To evade this, can it be pretended, that motive just 
 
 exerts this influence of itself ? May we not with equal, 
 
 nay, with infinitely greater propriety, contend that mind 
 
 just exerts its own positive influence of itself ? Or, will 
 
 6 
 
58 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 it be said, that it is a mistake, to suppose that Edwards 
 ascribed any real, productive, or causal influence to mo- 
 tives ; that he regarded them as the occasions on which 
 the mind acts, and not properly as the causes of its ac- 
 tion ? If so, then the whole scheme of moral necessity 
 is abandoned, and the doctrine of liberty is left to stand 
 upon its own foundation, in the undisputed evidence of 
 consciousness. 
 
 The truth is, if we take it for granted, that a volition 
 is an effect, properly so called, and as such must proceed 
 from the prior action of something else, we cannot escape 
 the ad infinitum absurdity of the Inquiry. If we rise 
 from this platform, we cannot possibly ascend in any 
 direction, without entering upon an infinite series of 
 causes. Whether we ascend through the self-determining 
 power of the mind, or through the determining power of 
 motives, or through the joint action of both, we can save 
 ourselves from such an absurd consequence only by a 
 glaring act of inconsistency. Hence, we are forced back 
 upon the conclusion that action may, and actually does 
 arise in the world of mind, without any efficient or pro- 
 ducing cause of its existence, without resulting from the 
 prior action of any thing whatever. Any other hypothesis 
 is involved in absurdity. 
 
 Let it be assumed, that a volition is, properly speak- 
 ing, an effect, and every thing is conceded. On this 
 vantage ground, the scheme of necessity may be erected 
 beyond the possibility of an overthrow. For, even if 
 we " suppose that action is determined by the will and 
 free choice," this " is as much as to say, that it must be 
 necessary, being dependent upon, and determined by 
 something foregoing ; namely, a foregoing act of choice," 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 59 
 
 p. 199. Let the above position be conceded, and there 
 is no escape from this conclusion. Nay, the conclusion 
 itself is but another mode of stating the position assumed. 
 
 It is evident, then, that action must take its rise some- 
 where in the world, without being caused by prior 
 action ; or else there must be an infinite series of acts. 
 I say it takes its rise in the mind, in that which is essen- 
 tially active, and not in matter. Edwards does not say, 
 that it takes its rise in matter ; and hence, there is no dis- 
 pute on this point. It is very remarkable, that this 
 objection to his scheme, that it runs into an infinite 
 series, seems never to have occurred to President Ed- 
 wards. He seems to have endeavoured to anticipate and 
 reply to all possible objections to his system; and yet 
 this, which has occurred to so many others, appears not 
 to have occurred to himself, for he has not noticed it. 
 
 The younger Edwards has attempted to reply to it. 
 Let us see his reply. " We maintain," says he, " that 
 action may be the effect of a divine influence ; or that it 
 may be the effect of one or more second causes, the first 
 of which is immediately produced by the Deity. Here 
 then is not an infinite series of causes, but a very short 
 series, wTiich terminates in the Deity or first cause," p. 
 121. Thus, according to the younger Edwards, the in- 
 finite series of causes is cut short, terminating in the 
 volition of Deity. What ! does the volition of God come 
 into existence without a cause of its existence? What 
 then becomes of '* that great principle of common sense," 
 so often applied to volition, that no event can begin to be 
 without a cause of its existence ? Is this great principle 
 given up ? Has it become obsolete ? 
 
 It may be contended, that although human volition is 
 an effect, and so must have a cause ; yet the divine voli- 
 
60 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 tion is not an effect. The elder Edwards could not have 
 taken this ground ; for he contends, that the volition of 
 Deity is just as necessarily connected with the strongest 
 motive, or the greatest apparent good, as is the volition 
 of man. According to the Inquiry, all volitions, both 
 human and divine, are necessarily connected with the 
 greatest apparent good, and in precisely the same man- 
 ner. The above pretext, therefore, could not have been 
 set up by him. 
 
 This ground, however, is taken by the younger Ed- 
 wards. *'It is granted," says he, *' that volition in the 
 Deity is not an effect," p. 122 ; it has no cause, and 
 here terminates the series. But how is this ? Can some 
 event, after all, begin to be without having a cause of its 
 existence ? without being an effect? By no means. How 
 is it then? Why, says the learned author, the volitions 
 of the Deity have existed from all eternity ! They have 
 no causes ; because they have never begun to be ! 
 
 *' I deny," says he, " that the operations and energies 
 of the Deity begin in time, though the effects of those 
 operations do. They no more begin in time than the 
 divine existence does ; but human volitions all begin in 
 time," p. 123. This makes all the difference imagina- 
 ble ; for as the divine acts have existed from all eternity, 
 so they cannot be caused. 
 
 But there is an objection to this view. *' If it should 
 be said," he continues, " that on this supposition the 
 effects take place not till long after the acts, by which 
 they are produced, I answer, they do so in our view, but 
 not in the view of God. With him there is no time, no 
 before nor after with respect to time," p. 124. 
 
 Now, it will not be denied, that things appear to God 
 just as they are in themselves ; and hence, if his volitions, 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 61 
 
 which are said to exist long before their effects, even 
 from all eternity, appear to him not to exist long before 
 them ; then they do not in reality exist long before them. 
 But if the divine volitions do not really exist long before 
 their effects, but just before them, as other causes do 
 before their effects, why should they not have causes as 
 well as any other volitions ? If they really exist just 
 before their effects in time, and not long before them, 
 why do they not exist in time just as much as any other 
 volitions ? and why do they not as much require causes to 
 account for their existence ? If they only seem to us to 
 exist long before their effects, even from all eternity, how 
 can this mere seeming make any real difference in the 
 case ? There is a very short series, we are told, the 
 volition of Deity constituting the first link. Has not this 
 first link, this volition of the Deity, a cause ? No. And 
 why ? Because it has existed from all eternity ; and so 
 nothing could go before it to produce it. Did it not exist 
 long before the effect then, which it produces in time ? 
 No. And why ? Because in the view of God and in 
 reality, it existed just before its effect, as all causes do, 
 and therefore there is no real severance of cause and 
 effect in the case ! It really comes just before its effect 
 in time, and therefore there is no severance of cause and 
 effect; and yet it really existed before all time, even 
 from all eternity, and therefore it cannot have a cause ! 
 Now is this logic, or is it legerdemain ? 
 
 There is no time with God, says the author; then 
 there is no time in reality ; it is all an illusion arising 
 from the succession of our own thoughts. If this be so, 
 then all things do really come to pass simultaneously ; 
 and if there were a very long series, even an infinite 
 6*^ 
 
62 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 sdfies of causes and effects, yet would they all come to 
 pass in the same instant. Indeed, there is very great 
 uncertainty about the speculations of philosophers in re- 
 gard to time and space ; and we hardly know what to 
 make of them, except we cannot very well understand 
 them ; but one thing is abundantly certain ; and that is, 
 that it is not good logic, to assert that a particular cause 
 cannot be produced, because it has existed long before 
 its effect, even from all eternity; and yet repel objections 
 to this assertion, by alleging that they only seem to do 
 so, while in reality there is no such thing. This is to 
 turn from the illusion to the reality, and from the reality 
 to the illusion, just as it suits the exigency of the mo- 
 ment. Such are the poor shifts and shallow devices, to 
 which even gifted minds are reduced, when they refuse 
 to admit that action, that volition, may take its rise in the 
 world, spontaneously proceeding from mind itself, with- 
 out being made to do so by the action of any thing 
 upon it. 
 
 Let us suppose, that a man should tell us, that a pro- 
 ducing cause existed long before its effect; that there 
 was nothing to prevent it from bringing its effect to pass ; 
 and yet, long after it had existed, its effect sprang up and 
 came into existence ; what should we think ? Should 
 we not see that it is absurd, in the highest degree, to say 
 that an unimpeded causative act existed yesterday, and 
 even from all eternity, unchanged and unchangeable ; 
 and yet its effect did not come to pass until to-day ? 
 Surely, no man in his right mind can be made to believe 
 this, unless it be forced upon him by the desperate ne- 
 cessities of a false system ; and if any person were told, 
 that although. such a thing may seem absurd to us, inas- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 68 
 
 much as the cause seems to exist in full operation long 
 before its effect, yet it is not so in the view of God, with 
 whom there is no time, should he not be pardoned if he 
 doubted the infallibility of his informant ? 
 
 The truth is, we must reason about cause and effect 
 as they appear to us ; and whether time be an illusion or 
 not, we must, in all our reasonings, conceive of cause 
 and effect as conjoined in what we call time, or we can- 
 not reason at all. According to the younger Edwards, 
 the act of creation, not the mere purpose to create, but 
 the real causative act of creation, existed in the divine 
 mind from all eternity. Why then did the world spring 
 up and come into existence at one point of time rather 
 than another? How happened it, that so many ages 
 rolled away, and this mighty causative act produced no 
 effect? In view of such a case, how could the author 
 have said, as he frequently does, that a cause necessarily 
 implies its effect? How can this be, if a causative act 
 of the Almighty may exist, and yet, for millions of ages, 
 its omnipotent energy produce no effect? Indeed, such 
 a doctrine destroys all our notions of cause and effect ; it 
 overthrows "the great principle of common sense" that 
 cause and effect necessarily imply each other ; and in- 
 volves all our reasoning from cause to effect, and vice 
 versa, in the utmost perplexity and confusion. It throws 
 clouds and darkness over the whole field of inquiry. 
 
 Since the time of Dr. Samuel Clarke, it has been 
 frequently objected to the scheme of moral necessity, 
 that it is involved in the great absurdity of an infinite 
 series of causes. President Edwards urged this objec- 
 tion against the doctrine of the self-determining power ; 
 he did not perceive that it lay against his own scheme 
 
64 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 of the motive-determining power ; and hence, he has 
 not even attempted to answer it. This was reserved for 
 the younger Edwards ; and aUhough he has deservedly- 
 ranked high as a logician, I cannot but regard his at- 
 tempt to answer the objection in question, as one of the 
 most remarkable abortions in the history of philosophy. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 65 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 OF THE MAXIM THAT EVERY EFFECT MUST HAVE A 
 CAUSE. 
 
 In a former section, I referred to some of the false as- 
 sumptions which have been incautiously conceded to the 
 necessitarian, and in which he has laid the foundations 
 of his system ; but I have not, as yet, alluded to the argu- 
 ment or deduction in which he is accustomed to triumph. 
 This argument, strange as it may seem, is a deduction, 
 not from any principle or general fact which has been 
 ascertained by observation or experience, but from a self- 
 evident and universal truth. 
 
 That every effect must have a cause, is the maxim 
 upon which the necessitarian takes his stand, and from 
 which he delights to draw his favourite conclusion. It 
 may be well, therefore, to examine the argument which 
 has been so frequently erected upon the maxim in question. 
 Although from various considerations, it has been very 
 justly concluded, that there is somewhere a lurking fal- 
 lacy in the argument, yet it has not been precisely shown 
 where the fallacy lies. Suspicion has been thrown over 
 it: nay, abundant reason has been shown why it should 
 be rejected ; but yet the fallacy of it should be dragged 
 from the place of its concealment, and laid open in a 
 clear light, so as to render it apparent to every eye. If 
 it is a sophism, it certainly can be exposed, and it should 
 be done. 
 
 In order to do this, it will be necessary to consider the 
 
 L 
 
66 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 nature and use of the maxim, that every -effect must have 
 a cause. I am aware, that no necessitarian of the pre- 
 sent day, would choose to express this maxim as I have 
 expressed it ; for in such a form Mr. Hume has shown 
 that it contains no information, and is indeed a most in- 
 significant proposition. And, in truth, what does it 
 amount to ? Cause and effect are correlative terms ; and 
 when we speak of an effect, we mean something that is 
 produced by a cause ; and hence, the famous proposition, 
 that every effect has a cause, amounts only to this, that 
 every effect is an effect ! 
 
 After Mr. Hume had caused the subject to be viewed 
 in this light, the usual mode of expression was dropped ; 
 and it has now become the common practice to say, that 
 there is no change in nature without a cause. But I do 
 not see how this mends the matter in the least: it may 
 disguise, but it does not alter the nature or real import 
 of the maxim in question. For when it is said that every 
 change has a cause, it is evident that a change is con- 
 ceived of under the idea of an effect. It is supposed to 
 be produced by a cause, and therefore it must be consi- 
 dered as an effect ; and if the idea remains precisely the 
 same, I do not see that giving it a new name, can pos- 
 sibly make any difference in the meaning of the proposi- 
 tion. 
 
 The maxim, that every effect must have a cause, is a 
 self-evident and universal proposition. Its truth is in- 
 volved in the very definition of the terms of which it is 
 composed. In this respect it is like the axioms of 
 geometry. When it is said, for example, that "the 
 whole is equal to the sum of the parts," we at once per- 
 ceive the truth of the axiom ; because the *' whole" is 
 merely another name for " the sum of the parts." It is 
 
[ 
 
 EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 67 
 
 intuitively certain that they are equal, because they are 
 but different expressions of the same thing. So, like- 
 wise, when it is affirmed, that every effect or every 
 change in nature has a cause, we instantly perceive the 
 truth of the proposition; inasmuch as an effect is that 
 which is produced by a cause. The very idea of an 
 effect implies its relation to a cause ; and to say, that it 
 has one, is only to say, that an effect is an effect. For 
 if it were not produced by a cause, it would not be an 
 effect. 
 
 The maxim under consideration is as unquestionably 
 true as any axiom in Euclid. It does not depend for 
 the evidence of its truth upon observation, or experience, 
 or reasoning; it carries its own evidence along with it. 
 No sooner are the terms in which it is expressed under- 
 stood, than it rivets irresistible conviction on the mind. 
 It is a fundamental law of belief; and it is impossible for 
 the imagination of man to conceive, that an effect, or that 
 which is produced by a cause, should be without a cause. 
 And it were just as idle an employment of one's time, to 
 undertake to prove such a proposition, as it would be to 
 attempt to refute it. 
 
 Now, one of the fallacies of the argument of the neces- 
 sitarian is, that it is an attempt to draw a conclusion 
 from the axiomatical truth above referred to, as from the 
 major of a syllogism. Every such attempt must neces- 
 sarily be vain and fruitless. " Axioms," justly remarks 
 Mr. Locke, *' are not the foundations on which any of the 
 sciences are built." And again, "It was not the influ- 
 ence of those maxims which are taken for principles in 
 mathematics, that hath led the masters of that science 
 into the wonderful discoveries they have made. Let a 
 man of good parts know all the maxims generally made 
 
68 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 use of in mathematics never so perfectly, and contem- 
 plate their extent and consequences as much as he 
 pleases, he will, by th^ir assistance, I suppose, scarce 
 ever come to know, that < the square of the hypothe- 
 nuse in a right-angled triangle, is equal to the squares 
 of the two other sides.' The knowledge that * the 
 whole is equal to the parts,' and, 'if you take equals 
 from equals, the remainder will be equal,' helped him 
 not, I presume, to this demonstration. And a man 
 may, I think, pore long enough on those axioms, 
 without ever seeing one jot the more of mathematical 
 truths." 
 
 The same doctrine is still more distinctly stated by 
 Dugald Stewart. " If by the first principles of a science," 
 says he, *'be meant those fundamental propositions from 
 which its remoter truths are derived, the axioms cannot, 
 with any consistency, be called the first principles of 
 mathematics. They have not, (it will be admitted,) the 
 most distant analogy to what are called the first princi- 
 ples of natural philosophy : — to those general facts, for 
 example, of the gravity and elasticity of the air, from 
 which may be deduced, as consequences, the suspension 
 of the mercury in the Torricellian tube, and its fall when 
 carried up to an eminence. According to this meaning 
 of the word, the first principles of mathematical science 
 are, not the axioms but the definitiona ; which defini- 
 tions hold, in mathematics, precisely the same place that 
 is held in natural philosophy by such general facts as 
 have now been referred to." 
 
 But the doctrine in question rests upon a firmer basis 
 than that of human authority. Let any man examine 
 the demonstrations in geometry, and attentively consider 
 the principles from which the conclusions of that science 
 

 EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 
 
 are deduced, and lie will find that they are definitions, 
 and not axioms. He will find, that the properties of the 
 triangle are derived from the definition of a triangle, and 
 those of a circle from the definition of a circle. And then 
 let him try his own skill upon the axioms of that science ; 
 let him arrange them and combine them in all possible 
 ways; let him compare them together as long as he 
 pleases, and determine for himself, whether they can be 
 made to yield a single logical inference. If the question 
 is thus brought to the test of an actual experience, I 
 think it is not difficult to foresee, that the decision must 
 be in favour of the doctrine of Stewart, and that it will be 
 seen, that no such proposition as that whatever is, is, can 
 even constitute the postulate, or first principle, in any 
 sound argument ; and that it is only from general facts, 
 such as are ascertained by observation and experience, 
 that we can derive logical consequences of any kind 
 whatever, either in relation to matter or to mind. 
 
 If there is any truth in the foregoing remarks, or cor- 
 rectness in the position of Locke and Stewart, it is cer- 
 tainly one of the capital errors of Edwards, as well as of 
 other necessitarians, that he has undertaken to deduce his 
 doctrine from a metaphysical axiom, or identical propo- 
 sition. ^. 
 
 Supposing this to be the case, how has it happened, it 
 may be asked, that the argument of the necessitarian has 
 appeared so conclusive to himself, as well as unanswer- 
 able to others ? The reason is plain. Having set out 
 with a proposition, which is barren of all consequences, 
 as the basis of his argument, it became necessary, in 
 order to arrive at the destined conclusion, to assume, 
 somewhere and somehow, in the course of his reasoning, 
 the very point which he had undertaken to prove. Ac- 
 7 
 
70 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 cordingly, this has been done ; and the tacit assumption 
 of the point in dispute seems not to have been suspected 
 by him. 
 
 The justice of this remark may be shown, by a refer- 
 ence to the argument of the necessitarian. When this 
 is reduced to the form of a syllogism, it stands thus : 
 Every effect has a cause ; a volition is an effect; and, 
 therefore, a volition has a cause. In the middle term, 
 which assumes that a volition is an effect, the point in 
 dispute is taken for granted, the whole question is com- 
 pletely begged. 
 
 If we take the words in any sense, yet as they are 
 correlative terms, the maxim that every effect must have 
 a cause is self-evident ; and hence, no conclusion can be 
 drawn from it, unless the conclusion intended to be 
 drawn is assumed in the middle term of the syllogism. 
 It either begs the question, or it decides nothing to the 
 purpose. It is true, that every change in nature must 
 have a cause ; that is to say, it is in some sense of the 
 word an effect, and consequently must have a correspond- 
 ing cause ; but in what sense does every act of the mind 
 come under the idea and definition of an effect ? This 
 is the question. Is it brought to pass by the prior action 
 of motive? Is it necessitated ? Upon this precise ques- 
 tion, the maxim that every change must have a cause 
 can throw no light; it only seems to refer to this point, 
 by means of the very convenient ambiguity of the terms 
 in which it is expressed. The necessitarian never fails 
 to avail himself of this ambiguity. He seems both to 
 himself and to the spectator to be carrying on a *' great 
 demonstration ;" and this is one reason, perhaps, why 
 the mind is diverted from the sophistical tricks, the meta- 
 physical jugglery, by which both are deceived. Let us 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 71 
 
 look a little more narrowly at this pretended demonstra- 
 tion. 
 
 The maxim in question is applied to volition ; every 
 change in nature, even the voluntary acts of the mind, 
 must have a cause. Now according to Edwards' expla- 
 nation of the term, this is a proposition which, I will 
 venture to say, no man in his right mind ever ventured 
 to deny. It is true, that President Edwards tells us of 
 those, who " imagine that a volition has no cause, or 
 that it produces itself ;^^ and he has very well compared 
 this to the absurdity of supposing, *' that I gave myself 
 my own being, or that I came into being without a 
 cause," p. 277. But who ever held such a doctrine ? 
 Did any man, in his right mind, ever contend that ** a 
 volition could produce itself," can arise out of nothing, 
 and bring itself into existence ? If so, they were cer- 
 tainly beyond the reach of logic ; they stood in need of 
 the physician. I have never been so unfortunate as to 
 meet with any advocate of free-agency, either in actual 
 life or in history, who supposed that a volition arose out 
 of nothing, without any cause of its existence, or that it 
 produced itself. They have all maintained, with one 
 consent, that the mind is the cause of volition. Is the 
 mind nothing ? If a man should say, as so many have 
 said, that the mind produces its own volitions, is that 
 equivalent to saying, that nothing produces it; that it 
 comes " into being accidentally, without any cause of its 
 being?" Such is the broad caricature of their doctrine, 
 which is repeatedly given by President Edwards. 
 
 It is freely admitted, and the advocates of free-agency 
 have always admitted, that volition has a cause, as that 
 word is frequently used by Edwards. He tells us, that 
 by cause he sometimes means any antecedent, whether it 
 
72 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 exerts any positive influence or no. Now, in this sense, 
 it is conceded by the advocates of free-agency, that mo- 
 tive itself is the cause of vohtion. This is the question : 
 Is motive the efficient, or producing cause of volition ? 
 This is the question, I say; but Edwards frequently 
 loses sight of it in a mist of ambiguities ; and he lays 
 around him in the dark, with such prodigious strength, 
 that if his adversaries were not altogether imaginary be- 
 ings, and therefore impassible to his ponderous blows, I 
 have no doubt he would have slain more of them than 
 ever Samson did of the Philistines. 
 
 The manner in which the necessitarian speak; j of 
 cause in his maxims, and reasonings, and pretended 
 demonstrations, is of very great service to him. It in- 
 cludes, as we are told, every condition or cause of voli- 
 tion ; (what a heterogeneous mass !) every thing without 
 which volition could not come to pass. Yea, it is used 
 in this sense, when it is said that motive is the cause of 
 volition. What shall we do, then, with this broad, this 
 most ambiguous proposition ? Shall we deny it ? If so, 
 then we deny that volition has any cause of its existence, 
 and fall into the great absurdity of supposing ** volition 
 to produce itself." Shall we assent to it, then ? If so, 
 we really admit that motive is the efficient cause of voli- 
 tion ; and thus, by denying, we are made to reject our 
 own doctrine, while, by affirming, we are made to re- 
 ceive that of our opponents. This way of proposing 
 the doctrine of necessity very strongly reminds one of a 
 certain trick in legislation, by which such things are 
 forced into a bill, that in voting upon it, you must either 
 reject what you most earnestly desire, or else sanction 
 and support what you most earnestly detest. We should, 
 therefore, neither affirm nor deny the whole proposition 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 73 
 
 as it is set forth by the necessitarian ; we should touch it 
 with the dissecting knife, and cure it of its manifold in- 
 firmities. 
 
 The ambiguity of the term cause is, indeed, one of the 
 most powerful weapons, both of attack and defence, in 
 the whole armory of the necessitarian. Do you affirm 
 the mind to be the cause of volition ? Then, forthwith, 
 as if the word could have only one meaning, it is alleged, 
 that if the mind is the cause of volition, it can cause it 
 only by a preceding volition ; and so on ad infinitum. 
 Hence, your doctrine must needs be absurd ; because the 
 word is understood, yea, and will be understood, in its 
 most restrained and narrow sense. But do you deny mo- 
 tive to be the cause of volition ? Then, how absurd are you 
 again ; you are no longer understood to use the word in 
 the same sense ; you now mean, not only that motive is 
 not the producing cause of volition, but that there is ab- 
 solutely nothing upon which it depends for its existence, 
 and that " it produces itself." Does Edwards affirm that 
 motive is the cause of volition; that motive causes voli- 
 tion to arise and come forth into existence ; that it is not 
 merely " the negative occasion" thereof, but the cause in 
 the most proper sense of the word ; that it is " the effectual 
 power which produces volition?" What then? Dare 
 you assert, in the face of such teaching, that motive is 
 not the cause of volition ? If so, then you are a most 
 obstinate and perverse caviller ; and you are silenced by 
 the information that he sometimes uses the word cause 
 to signify any antecedent, whether it has any positive 
 influence or no. Yea, he gives this information, he 
 declares, to " cut off occasion from any that might seek 
 occasion to cavil and object against his doctrine," p. 
 51. These, and many other things of the same kind, 
 7* 
 
74 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 are to be found in the writings of Day, and Edwards, 
 and Collins, and Hobbes ; and whosoever may be pleased 
 to follow them, through all the doublings and windings 
 of their logic, may do so at his leisure. It is sufficient 
 for my present purpose to remark, that Edwards has in- 
 cluded a number' of different ideas in his definition of 
 cause ; and that he turns from the one to the other of 
 these ideas, just as it suits the exigencies of his argument. 
 It is in this way, as we have seen, that the famous maxim, 
 that every change in nature must have a cause, has been 
 made to serve his purpose. 
 
 He did not look at a volition and an effect, so as to 
 mark their differences narrowly, and to proceed in his 
 reasonings according to them ; he set out with the great 
 and universal truth, that every change in the universe 
 must have a cause ; from which lofty position the differ- 
 ences of things in this nether world were invisible. 
 Having secured this position to his entire satisfaction, 
 being firmly persuaded in his own mind, that ** nonentity 
 could not bring forth," he supposed he had gained a 
 strong foothold ; and from thence he proceeded to reason 
 downward to what actually takes place in this lower 
 world ! 
 
 We are but " the humble servants and interpreters of 
 nature," and we " can understand her operations only in 
 so far as we have observed them." The necessitarian 
 takes higher ground than this. He disdains the humble 
 and patient task of observation. He plants his foot upon 
 an eternal and immutable axiom ; and, turning away 
 from the study of what is, he magisterially pronounces 
 what 7nust be. 
 
 It is easy to see how he constructs his system. Every 
 change in nature must have a cause, says he ; this is very 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 75 
 
 true ; there is no truth in the world more certain, accord- 
 ing to the sense in which he frequently understands it. 
 If he means to assert, that nothing, whether it be an entity, 
 or an attribute, or a mode, can bring itself into existence, 
 no one disputes his doctrine. It is most true, that there 
 can be no choice without a mind that chooses, or an object 
 in view of which it chooses ; a mind, an object, and a 
 desire, (if you please,) are the indispensable prerequi- 
 sites, the invariable antecedents, to volition ; but there is 
 an immense chasm between this position and the doc- 
 trine, that the mind cannot put forth a volition, unless it 
 is made to do so by the action of something else upon it. 
 This immense chasm, the necessitarian can cross only 
 by stepping over from one branch of his ambiguous pro- 
 position to another ; he either does this, or he does not 
 reach the point in controversy at all. 
 
76 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 OF THE APPLICATION OF THE MAXIM THAT EVERY EFFECT 
 MUST HAVE A CAUSE. 
 
 In the last section I considered the application of the 
 maxim, " that every effect must have a cause," to the 
 question of necessity. This maxim figures so largely in 
 every scheme of necessity, and it is relied upon with so 
 much confidence, that I shall present some further views 
 respecting its true nature and application. The neces- 
 sitarian may see the truth of this maxim clearly, but he 
 applies it vaguely. 
 
 He is always saying, " that if we give up this great 
 principle of common sense, then there is no reasoning 
 from effect to cause; and we cannot prove the'existence 
 of a God." Now I propose to show that we need not 
 give up " this great principle of common sense ;" that we 
 may continue to reason from effect to cause, and so reach 
 the conclusion that there is a God, by one of the most 
 incontrovertible of all our mental processes ; and yet we 
 may, with perfect consistency, refuse to apply the maxim 
 in question to human actions or volitions. In other 
 words, that we may freely admit the principle in ques- 
 tion, and yet reject the application which the necessi- 
 tarian is accustomed to make of it. 
 
 In order to do this in a perspicuous and satisfactory 
 manner, let us consider the occasion on which we first 
 became acquainted with the truth of the principle, that 
 every effect must have a cause. Let us consider the cir- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. ^^7 
 
 cumstances under which it is first suggested to the mind. 
 Whence, then, do we derive the ideas of cause and effect, 
 and of the necessary connection between them? 
 
 Locke, it is well known, supposed that we might de- 
 rive the idea of causation by reflecting on the changes 
 which take place in the external world. The fallacy of 
 this supposition has been fully shown by Hume, and 
 Brown, and Consin. In the refutation of Locke's no- 
 tion, these celebrated philosophers were undoubtedly 
 right ; but the two first were wrong in the conclusion 
 that we have no idea of power at all. Because the ideas 
 of power and causation are not suggested by the changes 
 of the material world, it does not follow that we have no 
 such ideas in reality ; that the only notion we have of 
 causation is that of an invariable antecedence. 
 
 The only way in which the mind ever comes to be 
 furnished with the ideas of cause and effect at all is this : 
 we are conscious that we will a certain motion in the 
 body, and we discover that the motion follows the voli- 
 tion. It is this act of the mind, this exertion of the will, 
 that gives us the idea of a cause ; and the change which 
 it produces in the body, is that from which we derive 
 the idea of an effect. If we had never experienced a 
 volition, we should never have formed the idea of causa- 
 tion. The idea of positive efficiency, or active power, 
 would never have entered into our minds. 
 
 The two terms of the sequence, with which we are 
 thus furnished by an actual experience, is an act of the 
 mind, or a volition, on the one hand, which we call an 
 efficient cause ; and a modification or change in inert, 
 passive matter, on the other, which we call an effect. 
 It is easy to see how we rise from this single experience 
 to the universal maxim in question. We are so made 
 
78 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 and constituted, by the Author of our nature, that we 
 eannot help believing in the uniformity of nature's laws, 
 or sequences. Hence, whenever we see either term of 
 the above sequence, we are necessarily compelled, by a 
 fundamental law of belief, to infer the existence of the 
 other. 
 
 This fundamental law of belief, by which we repose 
 the most implicit confidence in the uniformity of nature's 
 sequences, has been recognized by many distinguished 
 writers in modern times. It is well stated and illustrated 
 by Dr. Chalmers. " The doctrine of innate ideas in the 
 mind," says he, "is wholly different from the doctrine 
 of innate tendencies in the mind — which tendencies may 
 lie undeveloped till the excitement of some occasion 
 have manifested or brought them forth. In a newly- 
 formed mind, there is no idea of nature, or of a single 
 object in nature ; yet, no sooner is an object presented, 
 or is an event observed to happen, than there is elicited 
 the tendency of the mind to presume on the constancy of 
 nature. At least as far back as our observation extends, 
 the law of the mind is in full operation. Let an infant, 
 for the first time in his life, strike on the table with a 
 spoon; and, pleased with the noise, it will repeat that 
 stroke with every appearance of a confident expectation 
 that the noise will be repeated also. It counts on the 
 invariableness wherewith the same consequent will fol- 
 low the same antecedent. In the language of Dr. Tho- 
 mas Brown, these two terms make up a sequence, and 
 there seems to exist in the spirit of man not an underived, 
 but an aboriginal faith in the uniformity of nature's se- 
 quences." — Nat. Theo. p. 121. 
 
 Now, the two terms which we find connected in the 
 case before us, is an act of the mind, and a change or 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 79 
 
 modification of the body. The volition is the antecedent, 
 and the motion of body is the consequent. And these 
 two, by virtue of the law of belief above stated, we shall 
 always expect to find conjoined. Wherever we dis- 
 cover a change or modification, for example, in the cor- 
 poreal system of any other person, similar to that which 
 results from our own volitions, we shall necessarily 
 infer the existence of a prior act by which it was pro- 
 duced. 
 
 Hence, when we witness a change in the world oj 
 matter, we are authorized to apply the maxim we have 
 derived in the manner above explained. We have really 
 no idea of an efficient cause, except that which we have 
 derived from the phenomena of action. Hence, if we 
 would not suflfer ourselves to be imposed upon by words 
 without meaning, when we see any change or effect in 
 the material world, we should conclude that it proceeds 
 from an action of spirit. When we see the same conse- 
 quent, we should infer the existence of the same ante- 
 cedent; and not suffer our minds to be confused and 
 misled by the manifold ambiguities of language, as well 
 as by the innumerable illusions of the fancy. Wherever 
 we see a change in matter, we should infer an act by 
 which it is produced ; and thus, through all the changes 
 and modifications of the material universe, we shall be- 
 hold the sublime manifestations of an ever-present and 
 all-pervading agency of spirit. 
 
 By a similar process, we are made acquainted with 
 the existence of an intelligent and designing First Cause, 
 We learn the connection between the adaptation of means 
 to an end, and the operations of a designing mind, by 
 reflecting on what passes within ourselves when we plan 
 and execute a work of skill and contrivance. And, as 
 
80 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 we are so made as to rely with implicit confidence on 
 the uniformity of nature's sequences ; so, without further 
 experience or induction, it is impossible for us to con- 
 ceive of any contrivance whatever, without conceiving 
 of it as proceeding from the hand of a contriver. Thus, 
 we necessarily rise from the innumerable and wonderful 
 contrivances in nature, to a belief in the existence of an 
 intelligent and designing mind. In like manner may we 
 establish the other attributes of God. 
 
 But to return to our maxim. We can only infer, from 
 a change or modification in matter, the existence of an 
 act by which it is produced. The former is the only 
 idea we have of an eflfect ; the latter is the only idea we 
 have of an efficient cause. Hence, in reasoning from 
 effect to cause, we can only reason from a change or 
 modification in matter, or in that what is passive, to the 
 act of some active power. This lays a sufficient foun- 
 dation on which to rest the proof of the existence of God, 
 as well as the existence of other minds. 
 
 But the case is very different when we turn from the 
 contemplation of a passive result to consider an efficient 
 caw5C— -when we turn from the motion of body to con- 
 sider the activity of mind. In such a case, the conse- 
 quent ceases to be the same ; and hence we have no 
 right to infer that the antecedent is the same. We are 
 conscious of an act ; we perceive that it is followed by a 
 change in the outward world ; and henceforth, whenever 
 we observe another change in the outward world, we are 
 compelled to ascribe it, also, to a similar cause. This 
 conviction results from the constitution of our minds — 
 from a fundamental law of belief. But when we con- 
 template, not a change in the outward world, in that 
 which is passive, but an act of the mind itself, the case 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 81 
 
 is entirely different. We have some experience that 
 certain changes in matter are the results of certain acts; 
 and hence, whenever we observe similar phenomena, 
 we are under a necessity of our nature to refer them to 
 similar causes. We merely rely upon our veritable be- 
 lief in the uniformity of nature's sequences, without a 
 reliance upon which there can be no such thing as rea- 
 soning, when we ascend from the changes in the out- 
 ward world to a belief in the agency of an efficient 
 Cause. But we have no experience that an act of the 
 mind is produced by a preceding act of the mind, or by 
 the prior action of any thing else. President Edwards 
 himself admits that our experience is silent on this sub- 
 ject. And hence, when we witness an act of the mind, 
 or when we are conscious of a volition, our instinctive 
 belief in the uniformity of nature's sequences does not 
 require us to believe that it has an efficient cause ; or, in 
 other words, that it is produced by the prior action of 
 something else, as the motion of body is produced by a 
 prior act of mind. A change in body necessarily im- 
 plies the prior action of something else by which it is 
 produced ; an act of mind only implies the existence of 
 an agent that is capable of acting. Wherever an act 
 exists, we must believe that there is a soul, or mind, or 
 agent, that is capable of acting. We need not suppose 
 that, like a change in body, it is brought to pass by a 
 prior act. In other words, a change in that which is by 
 nature passive, necessarily implies an act by which it is 
 produced. But an act of the mind itself, which is not 
 passive, does not likewise imply a preceding act by 
 which it is produced. // only implies the existence of 
 an agent that is capable of acting, and the circum- 
 8 
 
82 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 stances necessary to action as conditions, not as 
 causes. 
 
 Herein, then, lies the error of the necessitarian. He 
 discovers from experience the connection between an act 
 and a corresponding motion ; and his instinctive belief 
 in the uniformity of nature's sequences authorizes him 
 to extend this connection to all sequences where the two 
 terms are the same. That is to say, wherever he disco- 
 vers a change in body, he is authorized to infer the ex- 
 istence of a prior act by which it was produced. But 
 he does not confine himself to this sequence alone. He 
 does not rest satisfied with the universal principle, that 
 every change in body, or in that which is passive, must 
 proceed from the prior action of something else. He 
 makes a most unwarrantable extension of this principle. 
 He supposes, not only that every change in body, but 
 also that every act of mind, must proceed from the prior 
 action of something else. Thus he confounds passion 
 and action. He takes it for granted that a volition is an 
 (effect — an effect in such a sense that it cannot proceed 
 from the mind, unless it be produced by the prior act 
 thereof. He asserts that " the mind cannot be the cause 
 of such an effect," of a volition, " except by the pre- 
 ceding action of the mind." Thus, in rising from a 
 single experience to a universal maxim, by virtue of our 
 belief in the uniformity of nature's laws, he does not 
 confine himself to the observed sequences ; he does not 
 keep his attention steadily fixed on a change in body 
 as the consequent, and on an act as the invariable ante- 
 cedent. On the contrary, from the exceedingly abstruse 
 and subtle nature of the subject, as well as from the am- 
 biguity of language, he treats a volition as a consequent, 
 which implies the same kind of antecedent as does a 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 88 
 
 change in body. Thus, by this unwarrantable extension 
 or application of his principle, he confounds the motion 
 of body with the action of spirit ; than which there 
 could hardly be a more unphilosophical confusion of 
 ideas. 
 
 From the foregoing remarks, it will be perceived, as 
 I have already said, that the question is not, whether 
 every effect must have a cause. This is conceded. We 
 do not give up '* this great principle of common sense." 
 We insist upon it as firmly as do our adversaries ; and 
 hence, we have as strong a foundation whereon to rest 
 our belief in the being of a God. But the question is, 
 ivhether every cause is an effect ? Or, in other words, 
 whether an act of mind can exist without being produced 
 by the prior action of something else ; just as the motion 
 of body is produced by the prior action of mind? We 
 say that it can exist without any such producing cause. 
 
 If it were otherwise, if every cause were an effect in 
 the sense in which a volition is assumed to be an effect 
 by the necessitarian, what would be the consequence ? 
 It is evident, that each and every cause in the universe 
 must itself have a cause — must itself result from the pre- 
 ceding action of something else ; and thus we should be 
 involved in the great absurdity of an infinite series of 
 causes, as well as in the iron scheme of an all-pervading 
 necessity. But, happily, there is nothing in our expe- 
 rience, nor in any law of our nature, nor in both toge- 
 ther, which requires us to believe that a volition is an 
 eflfect in any such sense of the word. Call it an effect, 
 if you please ; but then it must be conceded that it is 
 not, like the motion of body, such a consequent as ne- 
 cessarily requires the prior action of something else for 
 its production. 
 
84 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 Every effect must have a cause, it is true; but it is 
 purely a gratuitous assumption — a mere petitio prin- 
 cipii, to take it for granted that a volition is an effect in 
 the sense in which the word should always be under- 
 stood in this celebrated maxim. This maxim is un- 
 doubtedly true, as we have seen, when applied to the 
 changes of that which cannot act: it is in reference to 
 such effects, or consequents, that the conviction of its 
 truth is first suggested ; and we cannot doubt of the pro- 
 priety of its application to all such effects, unless we can 
 doubt of the uniformity of nature's sequences. But when 
 we go over from the region of inert, passive matter, into 
 that which is full af spiritual vigour and unceasing ac- 
 tivity, and apply this maxim here in all its rigour, we do 
 make a most unwarrantable extension of it. We per- 
 vert it from its true meaning alrf import ; we identify 
 volition with local 'motion ; we involve ourselves in the 
 greatest of all absurdities, as well as in the most ruinous 
 of all doctrines. 
 
 As we have already said, then, we do not give up the 
 great principle of common sense, that every effect must 
 have a cause. We recognize this principle when we 
 reason from effect to cause — when we ascend from the 
 creation up to the Creator. We deny that volition is an 
 effect; and what then ? If volition be not an effect, are 
 there no effects in the universe? Are we sunk in utter 
 darkness ? Have we no platform left whereon to stand, 
 and to behold the glory of God, our Creator and Pre- 
 server ? Surely we have. Every change throughout 
 inanimate nature bespeaks the agency of Him, who " sits 
 concealed behind his own creation," but is everywhere 
 manifested by his omnipresent energy. The human 
 body is an effect, teeming with evidences of the most 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 85 
 
 wonderful skill of its Great Cause and Contriver. The 
 soul itself is an effect, — the soul, with all its complicated 
 and wonder-working powers, is an effect ; and clearly 
 proclaims the wisdom, and the goodness, and the holiness 
 of its Maker. The heavens above us, with all its shining 
 hosts and admirable mechanism, proclaims the glory of 
 God; and the whole universe of created intelligences 
 shout for joy, as they respond in their eternal anthems 
 to the ** music of the spheres." And is not this enough ? 
 Is the whole psaltery of heaven and earth marred, and 
 all its sweet harmony turned into harsh discord, if we 
 only dare to assert that an act is not an effect ? No, no : 
 this too proclaims the glory of God ; for, however great 
 may be the mystery, it only shows that the Almighty 
 has called into existence innumerable creatures, bearing 
 the impress of his own glorious image, and that, in con- 
 sequence thereof, they are capable of acting without 
 being compelled to act. 
 
 It is the position of Edwards, and not ours, that would 
 disprove the existence of a God. We believe in action 
 which is uncaused by any prior action ; and hence, we 
 can reason from effects up to Cause, and there find a 
 resting-place. We do not look beyond that which is 
 uncaused. We believe there is action somewhere, un- 
 caused by preceding action ; and if we did not believe 
 this, we should be constrained to adopt the doctrine of 
 Edwards, that action itself must be caused " by the ac- 
 tion of something else," p. 203 ; which necessarily lands 
 ns in an infinite series of causes ; the very ground occu- 
 pied by Atheists in all ages of the world. It is well, 
 therefore, to hold on to " this great principle of common 
 sense, that every effect must have a cause," in order that 
 we may rise from the world and its innumerable wonders 
 8* 
 
86 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 to the contemplation of the infinite wisdom and goodness 
 of God : it is also well that we should hold it with a dis- 
 tinction, and not apply it to action, in order that we may 
 not be forced beyond the Great First Cause — the central 
 light of the Universe, into the " outer darkness" of the 
 old atheistic scheme of an infinite series of causes. If 
 we give up this principle, we cannot prove the existence 
 of a God, it is most true ; but yet, if we apply this prin- 
 ciple as Edwards applies it, we are irresistibly launched 
 upon an infinite series of causes, and compelled to shoot 
 entirely beyond the belief of a God. "We quarrel not, 
 therefore, with his great principle ; but we utterly reject 
 his application of it, as leading directly to Atheism. 
 
"^ r "" EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 87 
 
 D^' 
 
 SECTION VIII. 
 
 OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE FEELINGS AND THE 
 WILL. 
 
 It is well known that Edwards confounds the sensi- 
 tive part of our nature with the will, the susceptibility 
 by which the mind feels with the power by which it 
 acts. He expressly declares, that '* the affections and 
 the will are not two faculties of the soul ;" and it is upon 
 this confusion of things that much of his argument de- 
 pends for its coherency. 
 
 But although he thus expressly confounds them ; yet 
 he frequently speaks of them, in the course of his argu- 
 ment, as if they were two different faculties of the soul. 
 Thus, he frequently asserts that the will is determined 
 by "the strongest appetite," by "the strongest disposi- 
 tion," by "the strongest inclination." Now, in these 
 expressions, he evidently means to distinguish appetite, 
 inclination, and disposition, from the will ; and if he does 
 not, then he asserts, that the will is determined by itself, 
 a doctrine which he utterly repudiates. 
 
 The soundness of much of his argument depends, as 
 I have said, upon the confusion or the identification of 
 these two properties of the mind ; the soundness of much 
 of it also depends upon the fact that they are not identi- 
 cal, but distinct. From a great number of similar pas- 
 sages, we may select the following, as an illustration of 
 the justness of this remark: "Moral necessity," says 
 he, " may be as absolute, as natural necessity. That is, 
 
S8 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 the effect may be as powerfully connected with its moral 
 cause, as a natural necessary effect is with its natural 
 cause. Whether the will in every case is necessarily 
 determined by the strongest motive, or whether the will 
 ever makes any resistance to such a motive, or can ever 
 oppose the strongest present inclination, or not ; if that 
 matter should be controverted, yet I suppose none will 
 deny, but that, in some cases, a previous bias, or incli 
 nation, or the motive presented, may be so powerful, 
 
 THAT THE ACT OF THE WILL MAY BE CERTAINLY AND IN- 
 DISSOLUBLY CONNECTED THEREWITH. When mOtivCS OF 
 
 previous bias are very strong, all will allow that there is 
 some difficulty in going against them. And if they were 
 yet stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And, 
 therefore, if more be still added to their strength, to a 
 certain degree, it would make the difficulty so great, that 
 it would be wholly Impossible to surmount it ; for this 
 plain reason, because whatever power men may be sup- 
 posed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is 
 not infinite ; and so goes not beyond certain limits. If a 
 man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind 
 with twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of 
 strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty ; yet if the 
 difficulty be increased to thirty, or an hundred, or a thou- 
 sand degrees, and his strength not also increased, his 
 strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the dif- 
 ficulty. As, therefore, it must be allowed, that there 
 may be such a thing as a sure and perfect connexion 
 between moral causes and effects ; so this only is what I 
 call by the name of moral necessity,''^ 
 
 Now he here speaks of inclination and previous bias, 
 as elsewhere of appetite and disposition, as distinct from 
 volition. In this he is right ; even the necessitarian will 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 89 
 
 not, at the present day, deny that our desires, affections, 
 &c., are different from volition. "Between motive 
 and volition," says President Day, '* there must inter- 
 vene an apprehension of the object, and consequent feel' 
 ing excited in the mind.'*'' Thus, according to Presi- 
 dent Day, feeling is not volition; it intervenes between 
 the external object and volition. But although Edwards 
 is right in this ; there is one thing in which he is wrong. 
 He is wrong in supposing that our feelings possess a real 
 strength, by which they act upon and control the will. 
 
 It is obvious that the coherency and force of the above 
 passage depends on the idea, that there is a real power 
 in the strongest inclination or desire of the mind, which 
 renders it difficult to be surmounted or overcome. For 
 if we suppose, that our inclinations or desires are merely 
 the occasions on which we act, and that they themselves 
 exert no influence or efficiency in the production of our 
 volitions, it would be absurd to speak of the difficulty of 
 overcoming them, as well as to speak of this difficulty as 
 increasing with the increasing strength of the inclination, 
 or desire. Take away this idea, show that there is no 
 real strength in motives, or desires and inclinations, and 
 the above extract will lose all its force ; it will fall to 
 pieces of itself. 
 
 Indeed, the idea or supposition in question, is one of 
 the strongholds of the necessitarian. External objects 
 are regarded as the efficient causes of desire ; desire as 
 the efficient cause of volition ; and in this way, the whole 
 question seems to be settled. The same result would 
 follow, if we should suppose that desire is awakened not 
 exclusively by external objects, but partly by that which 
 is external, and partly by that which is internal. On this 
 supposition, as well as on the former, the will would seem 
 
90 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 to be under the dominion of the strongest desire or incli- 
 nation of the soul. 
 
 The assumption, that there is a real efficiency exerted 
 by the desires and inclinations of the soul, has been, so 
 far as I know, universally conceded to the necessitarian. 
 He seems to have been left in the undisputed possession of 
 this stronghold ; and yet, upon mature reflection, I think 
 we may find some reason to call it in question. If I am 
 not greatly mistaken, we may see that the necessitarian 
 has some reason to abate the loftiness of his tone, when 
 he asserts, that " we know that the feelings do exert an 
 influence in the production of volition." This may ap- 
 pear very evident to his mind ; nay, at first view, it may 
 appear very evident to all minds ; and yet, after all, it 
 may be only an " idol of the tribe." 
 
 It is a commonly received opinion, among philoso- 
 phers, that the passions, desires, &c., do really exert an 
 influence to produce volition. This was evidently the 
 idea of Burlamaqui. He draws a distinction between 
 voluntary actions and free actions ; and as an instance of 
 a voluntary action which is not free, he cites the case of 
 a man who, as he supposes, is constrained to act from 
 fear. He supposes that such an action, though volun- 
 tary, is not free, because it is brought about by the irre- 
 sistible influence of the passion of fear. 
 
 It is believed, also, by the disciples of Butler, that 
 there is a real strength possessed by what are called the 
 " active powers" of the mind. " This distinction," says 
 Dr. Chalmers, *' made by the sagacious Butler between 
 the power of a principle and its authority, enables us in 
 the midst of all the actual anomalies and disorders of our 
 state, to form a precise estimate of the place which con- 
 science naturally and rightly holds in man's constitution. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 91 
 
 The desire of acting virtuously, which is a desire conse- 
 quent on our sense of right and wrong, may not be of 
 equal strength with the desire of some criminal indul- 
 gence, and so, practically, the evil may predominate over 
 the good. And thus it is that the system of the inner 
 man, from the weakness of that which claims to be the 
 ascendant principle of our nature, may be thrown into a 
 state of turbulence and disorder."— Nat. The. p. 313. 
 
 Such was the idea of Butler himself. He frequently 
 speaks of the supremacy of conscience, in terms such as 
 the following : " That principle by which we survey, 
 and either approve or disapprove, our heart, temper, and 
 actions, is not only to be considered as what in its turn 
 is to have some influence, which may be said of every 
 passion, of the basest appetite ; but likewise as being 
 superior ; as from its very nature manifestly claiming 
 superiority over all others ; insomuch that you cannot 
 form a notion of this faculty conscience, without taking 
 in judgment, direction, and superintendency. This is a 
 constituent part of the idea, that is of the faculty itself; 
 and to preside and govern, from the very economy and 
 constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it might, as it 
 has right ; had it power y as it has manifest authority ; it 
 would absolutely govern the world." 
 
 This language, it should be observed, is not used in a 
 metaphorical sense ; it occurs in the statement of a philo- 
 sophical theory of human nature. Similar language is 
 frequently to be found in the writings of the most en- 
 lightened advocates of free-agency. Thus, says Jouffroy, 
 even while he is contending against the doctrine of neces- 
 sity : " There are two kinds of moving powers acting 
 upon us ; first, the impulses of instinct, or passion ; and, 
 secondly, the conceptions of reason That these 
 
03 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 two kinds of moving powers can and do act efficiently 
 upon our volitions, there can be no doubt," p. 102. If it 
 were necessary, it might be shown, by hundreds of ex- 
 tracts from their writings, that the great advocates of 
 free-agency have held, that the emotions, desires, and 
 passions, do really act on the will, and tend to produce 
 volitions. 
 
 But why dwell upon particular instances? If any 
 advocate of free-agency had really believed, that the pas- 
 sions, desires, affections, &;c., exert no influence over 
 the will, is it not certain that he would have availed hinj- 
 self of this principle ? If the principle that no desire, or 
 affection, or passion, is possessed of any power or causal 
 influence, had been adopted by the advocates of free- 
 agency, its bearing in favour of their cause would have 
 been too obvious and too important to have been over- 
 looked. The necessitarian might have supposed, if he 
 had pleased, that our desires and affections are produced 
 by the action of external objects ; and yet, on the suppo- 
 sition that these exerted no positive or causal influence, 
 the doctrine of liberty might have been most successfully 
 maintained. For, after all, the desires and affections 
 thus produced in the mind, would not, on the supposi- 
 tion in question, be the causes of our volitions. They 
 would merely be the occasions on which we act. There 
 would be no necessary connexion between what are 
 called motives and their corresponding actions. Our 
 desires or emotions might be under the influence and 
 dominion of external causes, or of causes that are partly 
 external and partly internal ; but yet our volitions would 
 be perfectly free from all preceding influences whatever. 
 Our volitions might depend on certain conditions, it is 
 true, such as the possession of certain desires or affec- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 9S 
 
 tions ; but they would not result from the influence or 
 action of them. They would be absolutely free and un- 
 controlled. The reason why this principle has not been 
 employed by the advocates of free-agency is, I humbly 
 conceive, because it has not been entertained by them. 
 
 In short, if the advocates of free-agency had shaken off 
 the common illusion that there is a real efficiency, or 
 causal influence, exerted by the desires of the soul, they 
 would have made it known in the most explicit and une- 
 quivocal terms. Instead of resorting to the expedients 
 they have adopted, in order to surmount the difficulties 
 by which they have been surrounded, they would, every 
 where and on all occasions, have reminded their adver- 
 saries that those difficulties arise merely from ascribing 
 a literal signification to language, which is only true in 
 a metaphorical sense ; and we should have had pages, not 
 to say volumes, concerning this use of language, where 
 we have not had a syllable. 
 
 If the illusion in question has been as general as I 
 have supposed, it is not difficult to account for its preva- 
 lence. The fact that a desire, or affection is the indis- 
 pensable condition, the invariable antecedent, of an act 
 of the will, is of itself sufficient to account for the preva- 
 lence of such a notion. Nothing is more common than 
 for men to mistake an invariable antecedent for an effi- 
 cient cause. This source of error, it is well known, has 
 given rise to some of the most obstinate delusions that 
 have ever infested and enslaved the human mind. 
 
 And besides, when such an error or illusion prevails, 
 
 its hold upon the mind is confirmed and rendered almost 
 
 invincible by the circumstance, that it is interwoven into 
 
 the structure of all our language. In this case in par- 
 
 9 
 
94 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 ticular, we never cease to speak of " the active princi- 
 ples," of " the ruling passion," of *' ungovernable de- 
 sire," of" the dominion of lust," of being *' enslaved to 
 a vicious propensity ;" — in a thousand ways, the idea that 
 there is a real efficiency in the desires and affections of 
 the soul, is wrought into the structure of our language ; 
 and hence, there is no wonder that it has gained such an 
 ascendency over our thoughts. It has met us at every 
 turn ; it has presented itself to us in a thousand shapes ; 
 it has become so familiar, that we have not even stopped 
 to inquire into its true nature. Its dominion has become 
 complete and secure, just because its truth has never 
 been doubted. 
 
 The illusion in question, if it be one, has derived an 
 accession of strength from another source. It is a fact, 
 that whenever we feel intensely, we do, as a general 
 thing, act with a proportioned degree of energy ; and vice 
 versa. Hence, we naturally derive the impression, that 
 the determinations of the will are produced by the strength 
 of our feelings. If the passion or desire is languid, (since 
 we must use a metaphor,) the action is in general feeble ; 
 and if it is intense, the act is usually powerful and ener- 
 getic. Hence, we are prone to conclude, that the mind 
 is moved to act by the influence of passion or desire ; 
 and that the energy of the action corresponds with the 
 strength of the motive, or moving principle. 
 
 Though the principle in question has been so com- 
 monly received, I think we should be led to question it 
 in consequence of the conclusions which have been de- 
 duced from it. If our desires, affections, &c., operate 
 to influence the will, how can it be free in putting forth 
 volitions? How does Mr. Locke meet this difficulty? 
 
EDWARDJ3 ON THE WILL. 95 
 
 Does he tell us, that it arises solely from our mistaking 
 a metaphorical for a literal mode of expression ? Far 
 from it. 
 
 He does not place liberty on the broad ground, that 
 the desires by which volitions are supposed to be deter- 
 mined, are in reality nothing more than the conditions or 
 occasions on which the mind acts ; and that they them- 
 selves can exert no positive influence or efliciency. The 
 liberty of the soul consists, according to him, not in the 
 circumstance that its desires do not operate, but in its 
 power to arrest the operation of its desires. He admits 
 that they operate, that they tend to produce volition ; but 
 the mind is nevertheless free, because it can suspend the 
 operation of desire, and prevent the tendency thereof from 
 passing into effect. "There being," says he, "in us a 
 great many uneasinesses always soliciting and ready to 
 determine the will, it is natural, as I have said, that the 
 greatest or most pressing should determine the will to the 
 next action ; and so it does for the most part, but not 
 always. For the mind having in most cases, as is evi- 
 dent in experience, a power to suspend the execution and 
 satisfaction of its desires, and so all, one after another, 
 examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. 
 In this lies the hberty man has." 
 
 7'hus we are supposed to be free, because we have a 
 power to resist, in some cases at least, the influence of 
 desire. But this is not always the case. Our desires 
 may be so strong as entirely to overcome us — and what 
 then ? Why we cease to be free agents ; and it is only 
 when the storm of passion subs^es, that we are restored 
 to the rank of accountable beings. " Sometimes a bois- 
 terous passion hurries away our thoughts," says Locke, 
 " as a hurricane does our bodies, without leaving us the 
 
96 EXAMINATION OP 
 
 liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather 
 choose. But as soon as the mind regains the power to 
 stop or continue, begin or forbear, any of these motives of 
 the body without, or thoughts within, according as it 
 thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then consider the 
 man as a free-agent again." This language is employed 
 by Mr. Locke, while attempting to define the idea of 
 liberty or free-agency ; and he evidently supposed, as ap- 
 pears from the above passage, as well as from some others, 
 that we frequently cease to be free-agents, in consequence 
 of the irresistible power of our desires or passions. 
 
 Dr. Reid set out from the same position, and he arrived 
 at the same conclusion. He frequently speaks of the ap- 
 petites and passions as so many forces, whose action is 
 " directly upon the will." " They draw a man towards 
 a certain object, without any further view, by a sort of 
 violence." — Essays,' p. 18. " When a man is acted upon 
 by motives of this kind, he finds it easy to yield to the 
 strongest. They are like two forces pushsng him in con- 
 trary directions. To yield to the strongest, he need only 
 be passive," p. 237. " In actions that proceed from appe- 
 tite and passion, we are passive in part and only in part 
 active. They are therefore in part imputed to the pas- 
 sion ; and if it is supposed to be irresistible, we do not 
 impute them to the man at all. Even an American savage 
 judges in this way ; when in a fit of drunkenness he kills 
 his friend ; as soon as he comes to himself, he is very sorry 
 for what he has done, but pleads that drink, and not he, 
 was the cause," p. 14, 15. Such is the dreadful conse- 
 quence, which Dr. Reid boldly deduces from the princi- 
 ple, that the appetites and passions do really act upon the 
 will. Though he was an advocate of free-agency ; yet, 
 holding this principle, he could speak of actions that are 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 97 
 
 • 
 
 partly passive ; and that in so far as they are passive, he 
 maintained they should not be imputed to the man whose 
 actions they are, but to the passions by which they are 
 produced. This may appear to be strange doctrine for 
 an advocate of free-agency - and accountability; but it 
 seems to be the natural and inevitable consequence of the 
 commonly received notion with respect to the relation 
 which subsists between the passions and the will. 
 
 The principle that our appetites, desires, <fec., do exert 
 a real influence in the production of volition, was common 
 to Edwards, Locke, and Reid : indeed, so far as I know, 
 it has been universally received. In the opinion of Ed- 
 wards, this influence becomes " so powerful" at times as 
 to establish a moral necessity beyond all question ; and 
 in that of Locke and Reid, it is sometimes so great as to 
 destroy free-agency and accountability. Is not this infer- 
 ence well drawn ? It seems to me that it is ; and this 
 constitutes one reason, why I deny the principle from 
 which it is deduced. 
 
 Is it true, then, that any power or efficacy belongs to 
 the sensitive or emotive part of our nature ? Reflection 
 must show us, I think, that it is absurd to suppose that 
 any desire, affection, or disposition of the mind, can really 
 and truly exert any positive or productive influence. 
 When we speak of the appetites, desires, affections, (fee, 
 as the " active principles" of our nature, we must needs 
 understand this as a purely metaphorical mode of expres- 
 sion. 
 
 Edwards himself has shown the impropriety of regard- 
 ing similar modes of speech as a literal expression of the 
 truth. " To talk of liberty," says he, "or the contrary, 
 as belonging to the very will itself, is not to speak good 
 sense ; if we judge of sense, and nonsense, by the original 
 9* 
 
98 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 and proper signification of words. For the will itself is 
 not an agent that has a will : the power of choosing, itself, 
 has not a power of choosing. That which has the power 
 of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the power of 
 volition itself. To be free is the property of an agent, 
 who is possessed of powers and faculties, as much as to 
 be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these 
 qualities are the properties of persons, and not the pro- 
 perties of properties.''^ This remark, no doubt, is per- 
 fectly just, as well as highly important. And it may be 
 applied with equal force and propriety, to the practice of 
 speaking of the strength of motives, or inclinations, or 
 desires ; for power is a " property of the person, or the 
 soul ; and not the property of a property." 
 
 It appeared exceedingly absurd to the author of the 
 " Inquiry," to speak of " the free acts of the will," as 
 being determined by the will itself; because the will is 
 not an agent, and " actions are to be ascribed to agents, 
 and not properly to the powers and properties of agents." 
 But he seemed to perceive no absurdity, in speaking of 
 " the free acts of the will," as being caused by the strongest 
 motives, by the dispositions and appetites of the soul. 
 Now, are the strongest motives, as they are called, are the 
 strongest dispositions and desires of the soul, agents, or 
 are they merely the properties of agents ? Let the neces- 
 sitarian answer this question, and then determine whether 
 his logic is consistent with itself. 
 
 Mr. Locke, also, has well said, that it is absurd to in- 
 quire whether "the will be free or no; inasmuch as 
 liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, 
 and cannot be an attribute or modification of will, which 
 is also but a power." Though Mr. Locke applied this 
 remark to the usual form of speech, by which freedom is 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 99 
 
 ascribed to the will, he failed to do so in regard to the 
 language by which power, which is a property of the 
 mind itself, is ascribed to our desires, or passions, or 
 affections, which are likewise properties of the mind. 
 And hence have arisen many of his difficulties in regard 
 to the freedom of human actions. Supposing that our 
 desires exerted some positive influence or efficiency in 
 the production of volitions, his views on the subject of 
 free-agency become vague, inconsistent, fluctuating and 
 unsatisfactory. 
 
 The hypothesis that the desires impel the will to 
 act, is inconsistent with observed facts. If this hypo- 
 thesis were true, the phenomena of volition would be 
 very different from what they are. A man may desire 
 that it should rain, for example ; he may have the most 
 intense feeling on this subject imaginable, and there may 
 be no counteracting desire or feehng whatever ; now if 
 desire ever impelled a man to volition, it would induce 
 him, in such a case, to will that it should rain. But no 
 man, in his senses, ever puts forth a volition to make it 
 rain — and why ? Just because he is a rational creature, 
 and knows that his volition cann6t produce any such 
 effect. In the same manner, a man might wish to fly, or 
 to do a thousand other things which are beyond his power ; 
 and yet not make the least effort to do so, not because he 
 has no power to put forth such eflforts, but because he 
 does not choose to make a fool of himself. This shows 
 that desire, feeling, &c., is merely one of the conditions 
 necessary to volition, and not its producing cause. 
 
 Again. It has been frequently observed, since the time 
 of Butler, that our passive impressions often become 
 weaker and weaker, while our active habits become 
 stronger and stronger. Thus, the feeling of pity, by being 
 
160 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 frequently excited, may become less and less vivid, 
 while the active habit of benevolence, by which it is sup- 
 posed to be induced, becomes more and more energetic. 
 That is to say, while the power, as it is called, or the 
 causal influence, is gradually diminishing, the effect, which 
 is supposed to flow from it, is becoming more and more 
 conspicuous. And again, the feeling of pity is sometimes 
 exceedingly strong ; that is to say, exceedingly vivid and 
 painful, while there is no act attending it. The passive 
 impression or susceptibility is entirely dissociated, in many 
 cases, from the acts of the will. The feeling often exists 
 in all its power, and yet there is no act, and no disposition 
 to act, on the part of the individual who is the subject of 
 it. The cause operates, and yet the effect does not follow 1 
 All that we can say is, that when we see the mind 
 deeply agitated, and, as it were, carried away by a storm 
 of passion, we also 'observe that it frequently acts with 
 great vehemency. But we do not observe, and we do not 
 know, that this increased power of action, is the result of 
 an increased power of feeling. All that we know is, that 
 as a matter of fact, when our feelings are languid, we are 
 apt to act but feebly ; and that when they are intense, we 
 are accustomed to act with energy. Or, in other words, 
 that we do not ordinarily act with so much energy in 
 order to gratify a slight feeling or emotion, as we do to 
 gratify one of greater intensity and painfulness. But it 
 is wrong to conclude from hence, that it is the increased 
 intensity of feeling, which produces the increased energy 
 of the action. No matter how intense the feeling, it is 
 wrong to conclude, that it literally causes us to act, that it 
 ever lays the will under constraint, and thereby destroys, 
 even for a moment, our free-agency. Such an assump- 
 tion is a mere hypothesis, unsupported by observation, 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 101 
 
 inconsistent with the dictates of reason, and irreconcilable 
 with observed facts. 
 
 I repeat it, such an assumption is inconsistent with ob- 
 served facts ; for who that has any energy of will, has not, 
 on many a trying occasion, stood firm amid the fiercest 
 storm of passion ; and, though the elements of discord 
 raged within, remained himself unmoved ; giving not the 
 least sign or manifestation of what was passing in his 
 bosom? Who has not felt, on such an occasion, that 
 although the passions may storm, yet the will alone is 
 power ? 
 
 , It is not uncommon to see this truth indirectly recog- 
 nized by those who absolutely know that some power is 
 exerted by our passions and desires, and that the will is 
 always determined by the strongest. Thus, says Presi- 
 dent Day, "our acts of choice, are always controlled by 
 those emotions which appear to be most vivid. We often 
 find a determined and settled purpose, apparently calm, 
 but unyielding, which carries a man steadily forward, 
 amid all the solicitations of appetite and passion. . , . . 
 The inflexible determination of Howard, gave law to his 
 emotions, and guided his benevolent movements," p. 65. 
 Here, although President Day holds that the will is deter- 
 mined by the strongest desire, passion, or emotion, he 
 unconsciously admits that the will, " the inflexible deter- 
 mination," is independent of them all. 
 
 Let it be supposed, that no one means so absurd a 
 thing as to say, that the affections themselves act upon the 
 will, but that the mind in the exercise of its affections 
 acts upon it, and thereby exerts a power over its determi- 
 nations ; let us suppose, that this is the manner in which 
 a real force is supposed to bear upon the will ; and what 
 will be the consequence ? Why, if the will is not distin- 
 
 S€« j^amaXol 
 
103 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 guished from the affections, we shall have the will acting 
 upon itself; a doctrine to which the necessitarian will not 
 listen for a moment. And if they are distinguished from 
 the will, we shall have two powers of action, two forces 
 in the mind, each contending for the mastery. But what 
 do we mean by a will, if it is not the faculty by which the 
 mind acts, by which it exerts a real force ? And if this 
 be the idea and definition of a will, we cannot distinguish 
 the will from the affections, and say that the latter exerts 
 a real force, without making two wills. This seems to be 
 the inevitable consequence of the commonly received 
 notion, that the mind, in the exercise of its affections, does 
 really act upon the will with an impelling force. Indeed, 
 there seems to have been no little perplexity and confu- 
 sion of conception on this subject, arising from the extreme 
 subtlety of our mental processes, as well as from the 
 ambiguities of language. 
 
 The truth is, that in feeling the mind is passive ; and 
 it is absurd to make a passive impression, the active 
 cause of any thing. The sensibility does not act, it 
 merely suffers. The appetites and passions, which have 
 always been called the "active powers," the "moving 
 principles," and so forth, should be called the passive 
 susceptibilities. Unless this truth be clearly and fully 
 recognized, and the commonly received notion respecting 
 the relation which the appetites and passions sustain to 
 the will, to the active power, be discarded, it seems to 
 me, that the great doctrine of the liberty of the will, must 
 continue to be involved in the sadest perplexity, the most 
 distressing darkness. 
 
& 
 
 EDWARDS ON THE WILL. lOS 
 
 SECTION IX. 
 
 OF THE LIBERTY OF INDIFFERENCE. 
 
 If, as I have endeavoured to show, the appetites and 
 passions exert no positive influence in the production 
 of volition, if they do not sustain the relation of cause to 
 the acts of the will ; then is the doctrine of the liberty of 
 indiflerence placed in a clear and strong light. Having 
 admitted that the sensitive part of our nature always 
 tends to produce volition, and in some cases irresistibly 
 produces it, the advocates of free agency have not been 
 able to maintain the doctrine of a perfect liberty in re- 
 gard to all human actions. They liave been compelled 
 to retire from the broad and open field of the controverted 
 territory, and to take their stand in a dark corner, in or- 
 der to contend for that perfect liberty, without which 
 there cannot be a perfect and unclouded accountability. 
 Hence, it has been no uncommon thing, even for those 
 who have been the most disposed to sympathize with 
 them, to feel a dissatisfaction in reading what they have 
 written on the subject of a liberty of indifference. 
 This they have placed in a perfect freedom to choose 
 between a few insignificant things, in regard to which 
 we have no feeling ; while, in regard to the great objects 
 which relate to our eternal destiny, we have been sup- 
 posed to enjoy no such freedom. 
 
 The true liberty of indifference does not consist, as I 
 have endeavoured to show, in a power to resist the in- 
 fluence of the appetites and passions struggling to pro- 
 
104 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 duce volition; because there is no such influence in 
 existence. This notion is encumbered with insuperable 
 difficulties ; it supposes two powers struggling for the 
 mastery — the desires on the one hand, and the will on 
 the other; and that when the desires are so strong as to 
 prevail, and bear us away in spite of ourselves, we cease 
 to be free agents. It supposes that at no time we have 
 a perfect liberty, unless we are perfectly destitute of 
 feeling ; and that at some of the most trying, and criti- 
 cal, and awful moments of our existence, we have no 
 liberty at all ; the whole man being passive to the power 
 and dominion of the passions. What a wound is thus 
 given to the cause of free-agency and accountability ! 
 What scope is thus allowed for the sophistry of the pas- 
 sions ! Every man who can persuade himself that his 
 appetites, his desires, or his passions, have been too 
 strong for him, may blind his mind to a sense of his 
 guilt, and lull his conscience into a fatal repose. 
 
 The necessitarian, like a skilful general, is not slow 
 to attack this weak point in the philosophy of free- 
 agency. If our emotions operate to produce volition, 
 says he, then the strongest must prevail; to say other- 
 wise, is to say that it is not the strongest. This is the 
 ground uniformly occupied by President Day. And it 
 is urged by President Edwards, that if a great degree of 
 such influence destroys free agency, as it is supposed to 
 do, then every smaller degree of it must impair free 
 agency; and hence, according to the principles and 
 scheme of its advocates, it cannot be perfect. Is not this 
 inference well drawn? Indeed, it seems to me, that 
 while the notion that our desires possess a real power 
 and efficacy, which are exerted over the will, maintains 
 its hold upon the mind, the great doctrine of liberty can 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 105 
 
 never be seen in the brightness of its full-orbed glory ; 
 and that it must, at times, suffer a total eclipse. 
 
 The liberty which we really possess, then, does not 
 consist in an indifference of the desires and affections, 
 but in that of the will itself. We are perfectly free, 
 says the libertarian, in regard to all those things about 
 which our feelings are in a state of indifference ; such 
 as touching one of two spots, or choosing one of two ob- 
 jects that are perfectly alike. To this the necessitarian 
 replies, what does it signify that a man has a perfect 
 liberty in regard to the choice of " one of two pepper- 
 corns ?'* Are not such things perfectly insignificant, and 
 unworthy "the grave attention of the philosopher," 
 while treating of the great questions of moral good 
 and evil ? 
 
 There is some truth in this reply, and some injustice. 
 It truly signifies nothing, that we are at perfect liberty 
 to choose between two pepper-corns, if we are not so to 
 choose between good and evil, life and death. But in 
 making this attack upon the position of his opponent, 
 when viewed as designed to serve the cause of free- 
 agency, the necessitarian overlooks its bearing upon his 
 own scheme. He contends, that the mind cannot act 
 unless it is made to act by some extraneous influence : 
 this is a universal proposition, extending to all our men- 
 tal acts ; and hence, if it can be shown that, in a single 
 instance, the mind can and does put forth a volition, 
 without being made to do so, his doctrine is subverted 
 from its foundations. If this can be shown, by a refer- 
 ence to the case of *' two pepper-corns," it may be 
 made to serve an important purpose in philosophy, how 
 much soever it may be despised by the philosopher. 
 
 If we keep the distinction between the will and the 
 10 
 
106 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 sensibility in mind, it will throw much light on what has 
 been written in regard to the subject of indifference. If 
 you offer a guinea and a penny to a man's choice, asks 
 President Day, which will he choose ? Will the one 
 exert as great an influence over him as the other? 
 President Day may assert, if he pleases, that the guinea 
 will exert the greater influence over his feelings; but 
 this does not destroy the equilibrium of the will. The 
 feelings and the will are difTerent. By the one we feel, 
 by the other we act ; by the one we suffer, by the other 
 we do. Why, then, will the man be certain to choose 
 the guinea, all other things being equal 1 Not because 
 its influence acts upon the will, either directly or indi- 
 rectly through the passions, and compels him to choose 
 it, but because he has a purpose to accomplish ; and, as 
 a rational being, he sees that the guinea will answer 
 his purpose better than the penny. He is not made to 
 act, therefore, by a blind impulse ; he acts freely in the 
 light of reason. The philosophy of the necessitarian 
 overlooks the slight circumstance, that the will of man 
 is not a ball to be set a-going by external impulse ; but 
 that man is a rational being, made in the image of his 
 Maker, and can act as a designing cause. Hence, when 
 we affirm that the will of man acts without being made 
 to do so by the action of any thing upon the will itself, 
 he imagines that we dethrone the Almighty, and " place 
 chance upon the throne of the moral universe." Day 
 on the Will, p. 195. But I would remind him, once for 
 all, that the act of a free designing cause, no less than 
 that of a necessitated act, proceeding from an efficient 
 cause, (if such a thing can be conceived,) is utterly in- 
 consistent with the idea of accident. Choice in its very 
 nature is opposed to chance. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 107 
 
 The doctrine of the indifference of the will has been 
 subjected to another mode of attack. This doctrine im- 
 plies that we have a power to choose one thing or an- 
 other ; or, as it is sometimes called, a power of choice 
 to the contrary. For, if the will is not controlled by any 
 extraneous influence, it is evident that we may choose a 
 thing, or let it alone — that we may put forth a volition, 
 or refuse to put it forth. This power, which results from 
 the idea of indifference as just explained, is regarded as 
 in the highest degree absurd ; and a torrent of impetuous 
 questions is poured forth to sweep it away. " When 
 Satan, as a roaring lion," asks President Day, ** goeth 
 about, seeking whom he may devour, is he equally in- 
 clined to promote the salvation of mankind ?" &c. <fec. &c. 
 Now, I freely admit, that when Satan is inclined to do 
 evil, and is actually doing it, he is not inclined to the 
 contrary. I freely admit that a thing is not different from 
 itself; and the learned author is welcome to all such tri- 
 umphant positions. 
 
 In the same easy way, President Edwards, as he 
 imagines, demolishes the doctrine of indifference. He 
 supposes that, according to this doctrine, the will does 
 not choose when it does choose ; and, having supposed 
 this, he proceeds to demolish it, as if he were contend- 
 ing with a thousand adversaries ; and yet, I will venture 
 to affirm, that no man in his senses ever maintained such 
 a position. The most contemptible advocate of free- 
 agency that ever lived, has maintained nothing so absurd 
 as that the mind ever chooses without choosing. This 
 is the light in which the doctrine of indifference is fre- 
 quently represented by Edwards, but it is a gross mis- 
 representation. 
 
 "The question is," says Edwards, "whether ever 
 
108 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 the soul of man puts forth an act of will, "while it 
 yet remains in a state of liberty, viz: as implying a 
 state of indifference ; or whether the soul ever exerts an 
 act of preference, while at the very time the will is in a 
 perfect equilibrium, not inclining one way more than 
 another," p. 72. If this be the point in dispute, he may 
 well add, that *' the very putting of the question is suffi- 
 cient to show the absurdity of the affirmative answer ;" 
 and he might have added, the utter futility of the negative 
 reply. " How ridiculous," he continues, *' for any body 
 to insist that the soul chooses one thing before another, 
 when, at the very same instant, it is perfectly indifferent 
 with respect to each ! This is the same thing as to say, 
 we shall prefer one thing to another, at the very same 
 time that it has no preference. Choice and preference 
 can no more be in a state of indifference than motion can 
 be in a state of rest," &c. p. 72. And he repeats it over 
 and over again, that this is to put ** the soul in a state of 
 choice, and in a state of equilibrium at the same time;" 
 " choosing one way, while it remains in a state of per- 
 fect indifference, and has no choice of one way more 
 than the other;" p. 74. " To suppose the will to act at 
 all in a state of indifference, is to assert that the mind 
 chooses without choosing," p. 64; and so in various 
 other places. 
 
 Now, if the doctrine of the indifference of the will, as 
 commonly understood, amounts to this, that the will 
 does not choose when it chooses, then Edwards was 
 certainly right in opposing it ; but how could he have 
 expected to correct such incorrigible blockheads as the 
 authors of such a doctrine must have been, by the force 
 of logic ? 
 
 Edwards has not always, though frequently, mis-stated 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 109 
 
 the doctrine of his adversaries. The liberty of indif- 
 ference, says he, in one place, consists in this, ** that the 
 will, in choosing, is subject to no prevailing m^uencBj^* 
 p. 64. Now this is a fair statement of the doctrine in 
 question. Why did not Edwards, then, combat this 
 idea ? Why transform it into the monstrous absurdity, 
 that "the will chooses without choosing," or exerts an 
 act of choice at the same lime that it exerts no act of 
 choice ; and then proceed to demolish it ? Was it be- 
 cause he did not wish to march up, fairly and squarely, 
 in the face of the enemy, and contend with them in their 
 strongholds and fastnesses ? By no means. There 
 never was a more honest reasoner than Edwards. But 
 his psychology is false ; and hence, he has not only 
 misrepresented the doctrine of his opponents, but also 
 his own. He confounds the sensitive part of our nature 
 with the will, expressly in his definitions, though he fre- 
 quently distinguishes them in his arguments. This is 
 the reason why he sometimes asserts, that the choice of 
 the mind is always as the sense of the most agreeable ; 
 and, at others, throws this fundamental doctrine into the 
 form, as we have seen in our third section, that the choice 
 of the mind is always as the choice of the mind ; and holds 
 that to deny it is a plain contradiction. By reason of 
 the same confusion of things, the doctrine of his oppo- 
 nents, that " the will, in choosing, is subject to no pre- 
 vailing influence," seemed to him to mean that the will, 
 in choosing, does not choose. In both cases, he con- 
 founds the most agreeable impression upon the sensibility 
 with the choice of the mind ; and thus misrepresents 
 both his own doctrine, and that of his opponents, by re- 
 ducing the one to an insignificant truism, and the other 
 to a glaring absurdity. President Day should have 
 10* 
 
110 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 avoided the error of Edwards, in thus misconceiving the 
 doctrine of his opponents ; for he expressly distinguishes 
 the sensibility from the will. But there is this difference 
 between Edwards and Day; the first expressly con- 
 founds these two parts of our nature, and then proceeds 
 to reason, in many cases, as if they were distinct ; while 
 the last most explicitly distinguishes them, and then fre- 
 quently proceeds to reason as if they were one and the 
 same. It is in this way that he also gravely teaches that 
 the mind chooses when it chooses ; and makes his ad- 
 versaries assert that the mind chooses without choosing, 
 or that the will is inclined without being inclined. Start 
 from whatever point he will, the necessitarian never feels 
 so strong, as when he finds himself securely intrenched in 
 the truism, that a thing is always as itself; there manfully 
 contending against those who assert that a thing is dif- 
 ferent from itself. 
 
 The doctrine of the liberty of indifference, as usually 
 held, is this — that the will is not determined by any pre- 
 vailing influence. This is not a perfect liberty, it is 
 true, wherever the will is partially influenced by an 
 extraneous cause ; but it is not equivalent to the gross 
 absurdity of the position, that the will chooses without 
 choosing. Nor can we possibly reduce it to this form, 
 unless we forget that the authors of it did not confound 
 that which is supposed to exert the influence over the will, 
 with the act of the will itself. They contended for a partial 
 indifference of the will only ; and, consequently, they 
 could only contend for a partial, and not a perfect liberty. 
 On the contrary, I think we should contend for a perfect 
 indifference, not in regard to feeling, but in regard to the 
 will. Standing on this high ground, we need not retire 
 from the broad and open field, in order to set up the em- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. Ill 
 
 pire of a perfect liberty in a dark corner, extending to 
 a few insignificant things only : we may establish it over 
 the whole range of human activity, bringing out into a 
 clear and full light, the great fact of man's perfect ac- 
 countability, for all his actions, under all the circum- 
 stances of his life. 
 
112 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 ^ SECTION X. 
 
 OF ACTION AND PASSION. 
 
 There are no two things in nature which are more 
 perfectly distinct than action and passion ; the one neces- 
 sarily excludes the other. Thus, if an effect is produced 
 in any thing, by the action or influence of something 
 else, then is the thing in which the effect is produced 
 wholly passive in regard to it. The effect itself is called 
 passion or passiveness. It is not an act of that in which 
 it is produced ; it is an effect resulting wholly from that 
 which produces it. ' To say that a thing acts then, 
 is to say that it is not passive ; or, in other words, that its 
 act is not produced by the action or influence of any 
 thing else. To suppose that an act is so produced, is to 
 suppose that it is not an act ; the object in which it is said 
 to be caused being wholly passive in regard to it. 
 
 If this statement be correct, it follows that an act of 
 the mind cannot be a produced effect ; that the ideas of 
 action and passion, of cause and effect, are opposite and 
 contrary the one to the other; and hence, it is absurd to 
 assert that the mind may be caused to act, or that a voli- 
 tion can be produced by any thing acting upon the mind. 
 This is a self-evident truth. The younger Edwards calls 
 for proof of it; but the only evidence there is in the 
 case, is that which arises from the nature of the things 
 themselves, as they must appear to every mind which 
 will bestow suitable reflection on the subject. But as 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 113 
 
 he held the affirmative, maintaining that the mind is 
 caused to act, it would have been well for him to have 
 furnished proof himself, before he called for it from the 
 opposite party. 
 
 It may be said, that if it were self-evident that the 
 mind cannot be caused to act, it would appear so to all 
 men, and there could be no doubt on the subject ; that a 
 truth or proposition cannot be said to be self-evident, 
 unless it carries irresistible conviction to every mind to 
 which it is proposed. But this does not follow. Pre- 
 vious to the time of Galileo, it was universally believed 
 by mankind, that if a body were set in motion, it would 
 run down of itself; though it should meet with no re- 
 sistance whatever in its progress. But that great phi- 
 losopher, by reflecting on the nature of matter, very 
 clearly saw, that if a body were put in motion, and met 
 with no resistance, it would continue to move on in a 
 right line forever. As matter is inert, so he saw that it 
 could not put itself in motion ; and if put in motion by 
 the action of any thing upon it, he perceived with equal 
 clearness that it could not check itself in its career. He 
 perceived that it is just as impossible for passive, inert 
 matter, to change its state from motion to rest, as it is for 
 it to change its state from rest to motion. Thus, by sim- 
 ply reflecting upon the nature of matter, as that which 
 cannot act, the mind of Galileo recognized it as a self- 
 evident and unquestionable truth, that if a body be put 
 in motion, and there is nothing to impede its career, it 
 will move on in a right line forever. This great law of 
 motion, first recognized by Galileo, and afterwards 
 adopted by all other philosophers, is called the law of 
 inertia^ because its truth necessarily results from the 
 fact, that matter is essentially inert, or cannot act. 
 
114 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 I am aware it has been contended by Mr. Whewell, 
 in his Bridgewater Treatise, that the law of motion in 
 question is not a necessary or self-evident truth ; and the 
 reason he assigns is, that if it were a truth of this nature, 
 it would have been recognized and believed by all men 
 before the time of Galileo. But this reason is not good. 
 For if it did not appear self-evident to those philosophers 
 who lived before Galileo, it was because they did not be- 
 stow sufficient reflection upon the subject, and not be- 
 cause it was not a self-evident truth. All men had seen 
 bodies moving only in a resisting medium, amid counter- 
 acting influences; and having always seen them run 
 down in such a medium, they very naturally concluded 
 that a body put in motion would run down of itself. 
 Yielding to an illusion of the senses, instead of rising 
 above it by a sustained effort of reason and meditation, 
 they supposed that ,the motion of a body would spend 
 itself in the course of time, and so come to an end with- 
 out any cause of its extinction. This is the reason why 
 they did not see, what must have appeared to be a self- 
 evident truth, if they had bestowed sufficient reflection 
 upon the subject, instead of being swayed by an illusion 
 of the senses. 
 
 Mr. Whewell admits the law in question to be a 
 truth; he only denies that it is a necessary or self- 
 evident truth. Now, if it be not a necessary truth, I 
 should like to know how he has ascertained it to be a 
 truth at all. Has any man ever seen a body put in mo- 
 tion, and continue to move on in a right line forever ? 
 Has any man ever ascertained the truth of this law by 
 observation and experiment ? It is evident, that if it 
 be true at all, it must be a necessary truth. Who that 
 is capable of rising above the associations of sense. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 115 
 
 SO as to view things as they are in themselves, can medi- 
 tate upon this subject, without perceiving that the law of 
 inertia is a self-evident truth, necessarily arising out of 
 the very nature of matter ? 
 
 It does not follow, then, that a truth is not self-evident, 
 because it does not appear so to all men ; for some may 
 be blinded to the truth by an illusion of the senses. This 
 is the case with the necessitarian. He has always seen 
 the motion of body produced by the action of something 
 else ; and hence, confounding the activity of mind with 
 the motion of body, he concludes that volition is produced 
 by the prior action of. something else. All that he needs 
 in order to see the impossibility of such a thing, is severe 
 and sustained meditation. But how can we expect this 
 from him ? Is he not a great reasoner, rather than a great 
 thinker? Does he not display his skill in drawing logi- 
 cal conclusions from the illusions of the senses, and as- 
 sumptions founded thereon ; rather than in laying his 
 foundations and his premises aright, in the immutable 
 depths of meditation and consciousness ? We may ap- 
 peal to his reason, and he will fall to reasoning. We 
 may ask for meditation, and he will give us logic. In- 
 deed, he wants that severe and scrutinizing observation 
 which pierces through all the illusions and associations 
 of the senses, rising to a contemplation of things as they 
 are in themselves ; which is one of the best attributes of 
 the great thinker. 
 
 To show that he does this, I shall begin with Presi- 
 dent Day. No other necessitarian has made so formal 
 and elaborate an attempt to prove, that the mind may be 
 caused to act. He undertakes to answer the objection 
 which has been urged against the scheme of moral neces- 
 sity, that it confounds action and passion. It is alleged. 
 
116 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 that a volition cannot be produced or caused by the action 
 or influence of any thing. To this President Day replies, 
 " these are terms of very convenient ambiguity, with 
 which it is easy to construct a plausible but fallacious ar- 
 gument. The word passive is sometimes used to signify 
 that which is inactive. With this meaning, it must, of 
 course, be the opposite of every thing which is active. 
 To say that that which is in this sense passive, is at the 
 same time active, is to assert that that which is active is 
 not active. But this is not the only signification of the 
 term passive in common use. It is very frequently used 
 to express the relation of an eflTect to its cause," p. 159. 
 
 Now, here is the distinction, but is it not without a dif- 
 ference ? If an effect is produced, is it not passive in 
 relation to its cause ? This is not denied. Is it active 
 then in relation to any thing ? President Day says it is. 
 But is this so ? Is not an effect, which is wholly produced 
 in one thing by the action or influence of another, wholly 
 passive? Is not the thing which, according to the sup- 
 position, is wholly passive to the influence acting upon 
 it, wholly passive ? In other words, is it made to act ? 
 Does it not merely suffer ? If it is endued with an active 
 nature, and really puts forth an act, is not this act clearly 
 different from the passive impression made upon it? 
 
 One would certainly suppose so, but for the logic of 
 the necessitarian. Let us examine this logic. " The 
 term passive," says President Day, *' is sometimes em- 
 ployed to express the relation of an effect to its cause. 
 In this sense, it is so far from being inconsistent with 
 activity, that activity may be the very effect which is 
 produced. A thing may be caused to be active. A can- 
 non shot is said to be passive, with respect to the charge 
 of powder which impels it. But is there no activity 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 117 
 
 given to the ball ? Is not the whirlwind active, when it 
 tears up the forest?" &c. &c., p. 160. 
 
 Now, all these illustrations are brought to show that 
 the mind may be caused to act ; — that it may be passive 
 in relation to the cause of its volition, and active in rela- 
 tion to the effect of its volition. A more striking in- 
 stance could not be adduced to prove the correctness of 
 the assertion already made, that the necessitarian con- 
 founds the motion of body with the action of mind. *' A 
 thing may be caused to act," says President Day. But 
 how does he show this ? By showing that a thing may 
 be caused to move ! " Is no activity given to the ball? 
 Is not the whirlwind active, when it tears up the 
 forest ?" And so he goes on, leaving the light of rea- 
 son and of consciousness ; now rushing into the dark- 
 ness of the whirlwind ; now riding *' on the mountain 
 wave ;" and now plunging into the depths of " volcanic 
 lava ;" — all the time in quest of light respecting the phe- 
 nomena of mind ! We could have wished him to stop 
 awhile, in the impetuous current of rhetoric, and inform 
 us, whether he really considers, *' the motion of a ball" 
 as the same thing with the volition of the mind. If he 
 does, then he may suppose that his illustrations are to 
 the purpose, how great soever may be his mistake ; but 
 if he supposes there is a real difference between them, 
 how can he ever pretend to show that mind may be caused 
 to act, by showing that body may be caused to move ? 
 
 I freely admit, that body may be caused to move. 
 Body is perfectly passive in motion ; and hence, its mo- 
 tion may be caused. But the mind is not passive in 
 volition ; and hence the difference in the two cases. It 
 is an error, as I have already said, pervading the views 
 of the necessitarian, that he confounds the action of mind 
 11 
 
118 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 with the motion of body. Even Mr. Locke, who, in 
 some places, has recognized the essential difference be- 
 tween them, has frequently confounded them in his rea- 
 sonings and illustrations. Hence, it becomes necessary 
 to bear this distinction always in mind, in the examina- 
 tion of their writings. It should be rendered perfectly 
 clear to our minds by meditation; and never permitted 
 to grow dim through forgetfulness. This is indispensa- 
 bly necessary to shut out the illusions of the senses, in 
 order that we may have a clear and unclouded view of 
 the phenomena of nature. 
 
 Is the motion of body, then, one and the same thing 
 with the action of mind ? They are frequently called 
 by the same name. The motion of mind, and the action 
 of body, are very common modes of expression. Body 
 is said to act, when it only moves ; and mind is said to 
 move, when it really acts. These metaphors and sup- 
 posed analogies are intimatel}'' and inseparably inter- 
 woven into the very frame-work of our language ; and 
 hence the necessity of guarding against them in our con- 
 ceptions. They are almost as subtle as the great adver- 
 sary of truth ; and therefore we should be constantly on 
 the watch, lest we should be deceived or misled by 
 them. 
 
 Let us look, then, at these things just as they arQ in 
 themselves. When a body moves, it simply passes from 
 one place to another ; and when the mind acts or chooses, 
 it simply prefers one thing to another. Here, there is 
 no real identity or sameness of nature. The body suf- 
 fers a change ; the mind itself acts. The one is pure 
 passion or passiveness ; the other is pure action — the 
 very opposite of passivity. The one is a sufferings and 
 the other is a doing. There are no two things in the 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 119 
 
 whole range of nature, which are more perfectly and 
 essentially distinct; and he who confounds them in his 
 reasonings, as philosophers have so often done, can never 
 arrive at a clear perception of the truth. 
 
 President Day, if he intended any thing to the pur- 
 pose, undertook to show that an act may be produced in 
 mind, in that which is active, by the action or influence 
 of something else ; and what has he shown ? Why, 
 that body may be caused to move ! Let a case be pro- 
 duced in which the mind, the active soul of man, is 
 made to act : let a case be produced in which a volition 
 is caused to exist in the soul of man, by the action or 
 influence of any thing whatever, and it will be some- 
 thing to the purpose : but what does it signify to tell us, 
 that a body, that that which is wholly and essentially 
 passive in its nature, may be made to move, or suffer a 
 change of place? A more palpable sophism was never 
 perpetrated ; and that such a mind should have recourse 
 to such an argument, only betrays the miserable weak- 
 ness, and the forlorn hopelessness, of the cause in which 
 it is enlisted. 
 
 Indeed, the learned president seems, after all, to be at 
 least half conscious that the analogies of matter can throw 
 no light on the phenomena of mind ; and that what he 
 has so eloquently said, amounts to just nothing at all. 
 For he says, " It may be objected, that these are all ex- 
 amples of inanimate objects ; and that they have no 
 proper application to mental activity," p. 161. Yes, 
 truly, this is the very objection which we should urge 
 against all the fine illustrations of President Day ; and it 
 is a full and complete answer to them. It is the great 
 principle of the inductive study of mind, that its phe- 
 nomena can be understood only in so far as we have 
 
120 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 observed them in the pure light of consciousness, and no 
 farther ; they should never be viewed through the dark- 
 ening and confounding analogies of matter. 
 
 No one, that I know of, has ever denied that a body- 
 may be caused to move ; the only point on which we 
 desire to be enlightened is, whether the mind may be 
 caused to act. To this point President Day next directly 
 comes. Leaving "inanimate objects," he says, "take 
 the case of deep and earnest thinking. Is there no ac- 
 tivity in this ? And is it without a cause ? When reading 
 the orations of Demosthenes, or the demonstrations of 
 Newton, are our minds wholly inactive ; or if they think 
 intensely, have our thoughts no dependence on the book 
 before us?" p. 161. Truly, there is activity in this, in 
 our " deep and earnest thinking" ; but what is the cause 
 of this activity ? Does the book before us cause us to 
 think ? This is the point at which the argument of the 
 author is driving, and to which it should come, if it would 
 be to the purpose, and yet he does not seem to like to 
 speak it out right manfully ; and hence, instead of saying 
 that the book causes us to think, he chooses to say that 
 our thoughts have a dependence on the book. It is true, 
 that no man can read a book, unless he has it to read ; 
 and, consequently, his thoughts in reading the book are 
 absolutely dependent on the possession of it. But still, 
 the possession of a book is the condition, and not the 
 cause, of his reading it. The cause of a thing, and the 
 indispensable condition of it, are perfectly distinct from 
 each other; and the argument of Day, in confounding 
 them, has presented us with another sophism. 
 
 The ideas of a condition and of a cause, though so 
 different in themselves, are always blended together by 
 necessitarians ; and hence the confusion into which they 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 121 
 
 run. Edwards has united them, as we have seen, under 
 the term cause ; and -then employed this term to signify 
 the one or the other at his pleasure. The word " depen- 
 dence," is the favourite of President Day ; and he uses it 
 with fully as much vagueness and vacillation of meaning, 
 as Edwards does the term cause. He has undertaken to 
 show us, that the mind may be caused to act ; and he has 
 shown us, that a particular class of thoughts cannot come 
 to existence, except upon a particular condition ! This 
 is not to reason ; but to slip and to slide from one mean- 
 ing of an ambiguous word to another. 
 
 When it is said that the mind cannot be caused to act. 
 President Day must have known in what sense the term 
 cause is used in this proposition. He must have known, 
 that no one meant to assert, that there are no conditions 
 or antecedents^ on which the action of the mind depends. 
 There is not an advocate of free-agency in the universe, 
 who will contend, that the mind can choose a thing, unless 
 there is a thing to be chosen ; or, to take his own illus- 
 tration, can read a book, unless there is a book to be 
 read. The question is not, whether there are conditions^ 
 without the existence of which the mind cannot act ; this 
 no one denies ; but whether there is, or can be, a real and 
 efficient cause of the mind's action. The point in dispute, 
 relates not to mere fact of dependence, but to the nature 
 of that dependence. The question is, can the mind he 
 efficiently caused to act ? This being the question, what 
 does it signify to tell us, that it cannot read a book, unless 
 it has a book to read ? Or what does it signify to tell us, 
 that a body may be caused to move ? These are mere 
 irrelevancies ; they fall short of the point in dispute ; and 
 they only seem to reach it by means of a very " convenient 
 ambiguity" of words. 
 
 11* 
 
122 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 But Still it may be said, that although a body is passive 
 in motion, it may act upon other bodies, and thereby com- 
 municate motion to them. This is the ground taken by 
 President Day. " The very same thing," says he, " may 
 be both cause and effect. The mountain wave, which is 
 the effect of the wind, may be the cause which buries the 
 ship in the ocean," p. 160. I am aware, that one body 
 is frequently said to act upon another ; but this word 
 action, as President Day has well said, is a term " of 
 very|convenient ambiguity, with which it is easy to con- 
 struct a plausible but fallacious argument," p. 159. The 
 only cause in every case of motion, is that force, what- 
 ever it may be, which acts upon the body moved, and puts 
 it in motion. All the rest is pure passion or passiveness. 
 The motion of the body is not action ; it is the most pure 
 passion of which the mind can form a conception. If a 
 body in motion is said to act upon another, this is but a 
 metaphor ; there is no real action in the case. Indeed, if 
 a body be put in motion, and meets with no resistance, it 
 will move on in a right Une forever — and why ? just be- 
 cause of its inertia, of its inherent destitution of a power 
 to act. As a mathematician. President Day certainly 
 knew all this ; but he seems to have forgotten it all, in his 
 eagerness to support the cause of moral necessity. 
 
 He saw that motion is frequently called action ; he saw 
 that one body is sometimes said to act upon another ; and 
 this was sufficient for his purpose. He did not reflect 
 upon the natures of motion and of volition, as they are 
 in themselves ; he views them through the medium of an 
 ambiguous phraseology. Nor did he reflect, that if motion 
 is communicated from one body to another, this is not 
 because one body really acts upon another, but because 
 it is impossible for two bodies to occupy the same place 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 123 
 
 at one and the same time. He did not reflect, that if 
 motion is communicated from one body to another, this 
 does not arise from the activity, but from the impenetra- 
 bihty of matter. In short, he did not reflect, that there 
 is no state or phenomena of matter, whatever may be its 
 name, that at all resembles the state of mind which we call 
 action or volition ; or else he would have seen, that all 
 his illustrations drawn from material objects can throw no 
 light on the point in controversy. 
 
 We find the same confusion of things in the works of the 
 Edwardses. We do not at all confound action and pas- 
 sion, President Edwards contends, by supposing that acts 
 of the soul are effects, wherein the soul is the object of 
 something acting upon and influencing it, p. 203. And 
 again, " It is no more a contradiction to suppose that ac- 
 tion may be the eflTect of some other cause beside the 
 agent, or being that acts, than to suppose that life may be 
 the efl^ect of some other cause beside the being that lives," 
 p. 203. The younger Edwards also asserts, that " to say 
 that an agent that is acted upon cannot act, is as ground- 
 less, as to say, that a body acted upon cannot move," p. 
 181. We might adduce many similar passages ; but these 
 are sufloicient. What do they prove ? If they are any 
 thing to the purpose, they are only so by confounding 
 motion with volition,* passion with action. 
 
 No one would pretend to deny, that the mind may be, 
 and is, caused to exist, or that the agent may be caused to 
 live. In regard to our being and living we are perfectly 
 passive ; and hence we admit that we may be caused to 
 exist and to live. Living and being are not acting. 
 We are not passive in regard to volition ; this is an act of 
 the mind itself. The above assertions only overlook the 
 slight circumstance that being and doing are two diflferent 
 
124 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 things ; that motion is not volition, that passion is not ac- 
 tion. This strange confusion of things is very common 
 in the writings of the Edwardses, as well as in those of all 
 other necessitarians. 
 
 Edwards held volition to be a produced effect. This 
 identifies a passive impression made upon the mind, with 
 an act of the mind itself. In order to escape this diffi- 
 culty, Edwards was bound to show that action and pas- 
 sion are not opposite in their natures. " Action, when 
 properly set in opposition to passion or passiveness," says 
 he, " is no real existence ; it is not the same with a7i ac- 
 tion, but is a mere relation." And again, " Action and 
 passion are not two contrary natures ;" when placed in 
 opposition they are only contrary relations. The same 
 ground is taken by President Day. " Are not cause and 
 effect," says he, " opposite in their natures ? They are 
 opposite relations, but not always opposite things." They 
 contend, that an object may be passive in relation to one 
 thing, and active in relation to another ; that a volition 
 may be passive in relation to its producing cause, and yet 
 active in relation to its produced effect. 
 
 Now, this is not true. An act is opposite in its na- 
 ture to a passive impression made upon the mind. This 
 every man may clearly see by suitable reflection, if he will 
 not blind himself to the truth, as the necessitarian always 
 does, by false analogies drawn from the world of matter, 
 and the phenomena of motion. We have seen how Pre- 
 sident Day has attempted to show, that an object may be 
 passive in relation to one thing, and yet active in relation 
 to another; and that in all these attempts he has con- 
 founded the motion of body with the action or choice of 
 mind. We have seen that all the illustrations adduced to 
 throw light on this subject are fallacious. Let this subject 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 125 
 
 be studied in the light of consciousness, not through the 
 darkening and confounding medium of false analogies, and 
 we may safely anticipate a verdict in our favour. For 
 who that will closely and steadily reflect upon an action 
 of the mind, does not perceive that it is different, in nature 
 and in kind, from a passive impression made upon the 
 mind from without ? I do not say action, which Presi- 
 dent Edwards seems to thmk does not signify any thing 
 positive, such as an action, when it is set in opposition 
 to passion ; but I say that an action itself is opposite in 
 its nature to passion, to a produced effect. 
 
 President Edwards cannot escape the absurdity of his 
 doctrine by alleging, that when action and passion are set 
 in opposition, they do not signify opposite natures, but 
 only opposite relations. For he has confounded an act 
 of the mind with a passive impression made thereon ; 
 and these things are opposite in their natures, whether he 
 is pleased to say that action and passion are opposite na* 
 tures or not. 
 
 This position may be easily established. " I hai ' dly ^ 
 conceive," says he, " that the affections of the soul are 
 not properly distinguished from the will, as though they 
 were two faculties in the soul." . . . . " The affections 
 are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises 
 of the inclination and will of the soul." These passages 
 are referred to by President Day to prove, that Edwards 
 regarded our " emotions or affections as acts of the will," 
 p. 39. Having confounded the will and the sensibility, it 
 became exceedingly easy for Edwards to show that a voli- 
 tion may be produced or caused : all that he had to do 
 was to show, that an emotion may be produced, which is 
 the same thing with an act of the will or a volition. It is 
 upon this confusion of things, that his whole system rests ; 
 
 ^>^ MA<^ 
 
126 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 for if the sensibility is different from the will, as most 
 persons, at the present day, will admit it is ; then to ex- 
 cite an emotion, or to make a passive impression upon the 
 sensibility, is very different from producing a volition. 
 
 Edwards has taken great pains with the superstructure 
 of his system, while he has left its foundations without 
 support. He has not shown, nor can any man show, that 
 the sensibiUty and the will are one and the same faculty of 
 the soul. He assumes that an emotion is an act of the 
 will , and then proceeds to build upon it, and to argue from 
 it, as if it were a clear and unquestionable truth. Thus, 
 he repeatedly says, that whatever pleases us most, or ex- 
 cites the most agreeable sensation, is that which " ope- 
 rates to induce a volition*," and to say otherwise, is to 
 assert that that which pleases us most, does not please us 
 most. Such assertions, (and I have already had occasion 
 to adduce many sucl},) clearly identify a sense of the most 
 agreeable, or the most pleasing emotion, with an act of 
 the will. His definition, as we have already seen, laid 
 the foundation for this, and his arguments are based upon 
 it. The passive impression, or the sensation produced, is, 
 according to Edwards, a volition ! No wonder, then, that 
 he could conceive of an action of the mind as being pro- 
 duced. The wonder is, how he could conceive of it as 
 being an action at all. 
 
 Let us suppose, now, that a feehng or an emotion is 
 produced by an object in view of the mind. It will follow, 
 that the mind is passive in feeling, or in experiencing emo- 
 tion. We are conscious of such feeling or emotion ; and 
 hence we infer, that we are susceptible of feeling or emo- 
 tion. This susceptibility we call the sensibility, the heart, 
 the affections, &lc. But there is another phenomenon of 
 our nature, which is perfectly distinct in nature and in 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. * 127 
 
 kind from an emotion or a feeling. We are conscious of 
 a volition or choice ; and hence we infer that we have a 
 power of acting, or putting forth volitions. This power 
 we call the will. 
 
 Now, the phenomena exhibited by these two faculties 
 of the soul, the sensibility and the will, are entirely dif- 
 ferent from each other ; and there is not the least shadow 
 of evidence going to show that the faculties themselves 
 are one and the same. On the contrary, we are compelled 
 by a fundamental law of belief, to regard the susceptibility 
 of our nature, by which we feel, as different from that 
 power of the soul, by which we act or put forth volitions. 
 The only reason we have for saying that matter is dif- 
 ferent from mind, is that its manifestations or phenomena 
 are diiferent ; and we have a similar reason for asserting, 
 that the emotive part of our nature, or the sensibility, is 
 distinct from the will. And yet, in the face of all this. 
 President Edwards has expressly denied that there is any 
 difference between these two faculties of the soul. It is 
 in this confusion of things, in this false psychology, that 
 he has laid the foundation of his system. 
 
 If President Edwards be right, it is no wonder that the 
 younger Edwards should so often assert, that it is no more 
 absurd to say, that vohtion may be caused, than it is to 
 say, that feeling or emotion may be caused. For, if the 
 doctrine in question be true, a volition is an emotion or 
 feeling ; and to produce the one is to produce the other. 
 How short and easy has the path of the necessitarian been 
 made, by a convenient definition ! 
 
 If we only bear the distinction between the sensibility 
 and the will in mind, it will be exceedingly easy to see 
 through the cloudy sophistications of the necessitarian. 
 " How does it appear to be a fact^ asks President Day, 
 
128 • EXAMINATION OF 
 
 " that the will cannot act when it is acted upon ?" I reply- 
 that the will is not acted upon at all ; that passive impres- 
 sions are made upon the sensibility, and not upon the will. 
 This is a fact which the necessitarian always overlooks. 
 
 Again ; the same object may be both passive and active ; 
 passive with respect to one thing, and active with respect 
 to another. Thus, says President Day, " The axe is pas- 
 sive, with respect to the hand which moves it ; but active, 
 with respect to the object which it strikes. The cricket 
 club is passive in receiving motion from the hand of the 
 player; it is active in commwmc«/in^ motion to the ball." 
 The fallacy of all such illustrations, in confounding motion 
 and action, I have already noticed, and I intend to say 
 nothing more in relation to this point. But there is ano- 
 ther less palpable fallacy in them. 
 
 How are such illustrations intended to be applied to the 
 phenomena of volition ? Is it meant, that volition itself 
 is passive in relation to one thing, and active in relation to 
 another ? If so, I reply it is absurd to affirm, that volition, 
 or an act, is passive in relation to any thing ? Is it meant, 
 that not volition itself, but the will, is passive to that which 
 acts upon it, while it is active in relation to its effect ? If 
 so, I contend that the will is not acted upon at all ; that the 
 passive impression is made upon the sensibility, and not 
 upon the will. Is it supposed, that it is neither the voli- 
 tion nor the will, which is both active and passive at the 
 same time ; but that it is the mind ? This may be very 
 true. The mind may be passive, if you please, in relation 
 to that which acts upon its sensibility, while it is active 
 in volition ; but how does this prove the doctrine, that an 
 act may be produced by something else acting upon the 
 will ? How does this show, that action and passion are 
 not confounded, in supposing that an act is caused? The 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 129 
 
 passive impression, the state of the sensibility is produced ; 
 but this is not a volition. The passive impression exists 
 in the sensibihty ; the vohtion exists in the will. The first 
 is a produced effect ; the last is an act of the mind. And 
 the only way in which this act of the mind itself has been 
 linked with that which acts upon the mind, as an effect is 
 linked with its cause, has been by confounding the sensi- 
 bility with the will; and the light of this distinction is no 
 sooner held up, than we see that a very important link is 
 wanting in the chain of the necessitarian's logic. Let this 
 light be carried around through all the dark corners of his 
 system, and through all its dark labyrinths of words ; and 
 many a lurking sophism will be detected and brought out 
 from its unsuspected hiding place. 
 
 When it is said, that the same thing may be active and 
 passive, this remark should be understood with reference 
 to the mind itself. The language of the necessitarian, I 
 am aware, sometimes points to the volition itself, and 
 sometimes to the will ; but we should always understand 
 him as referring to the mind. He may not have so under- 
 stood himself; but he must be so understood. For it is 
 not the will that acts ; it is the mind. This is conceded 
 by the necessitarian. Hence, when he says, that the same 
 thing may be both active and passive, he must be under- 
 stood as applying this proposition to the mind itself; and 
 not to the will or to volition. It is the mind that acts ; 
 and hence the mind must be also passive ; or we cannot 
 say that the same thing may be both active and passive. 
 
 The mind then, it may be said, is both active and pas 
 sive at the same time. But it is passive in regard to its 
 emotions and feelings ; and hence, if you please, these may 
 be produced. It is active in regard to its volitions, or 
 rather in its volitions ; and hence these cannot be pro- 
 12 
 
130 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 duced by the action of any thing upon the mind. To 
 show that they can, the necessitarian, as we have seen, 
 has confounded a passive impression with an active voli- 
 tion. If these be distinct, as they most clearly are, the 
 necessitarian can make his point good, only by showing 
 that the passive impression made upon the mind, is con- 
 nected with the volition of the mind, as a producing cause 
 is connected with its effect. But this he has not shown ; 
 and hence his whole system rests upon gratuitous and un- 
 founded assumptions. I say his whole system ; for if the 
 mind cannot be caused to act, if it is absurd to speak of a 
 produced action, it is not true, that an action or volition 
 does or can result from the necessitating action, or influ- 
 ence of motives. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 131 
 
 SECTION XI. 
 
 OF THE ARGUMENT FROM THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD. 
 
 The argument from the foreknowledge of God, is one 
 on which the necessitarian relies with great confidence. 
 Nor is this at all surprising ; since to so many minds, even 
 among distinguished philosophers, the prescience of Deity 
 and the free-agency of man have appeared to be irrecon- 
 cilable. 
 
 Thus, says Mr. Stewart, " I have mentioned the attempt 
 of Clarke and others to show that no valid argument 
 against the scheme of free-will can be deduced from the 
 prescience of God, even supposing that to extend to all 
 the actions of voluntary beings. On this point I must 
 decline offering any opinion of my own, because I con- 
 ceive it as placed far beyond the reach of our faculties." 
 Dr. Campbell also says, " To reconcile the divine pre- 
 science with the freedom, and even contingency, and con- 
 sequently with the good or ill desert of human actions, is 
 what I have never yet seen achieved by any, and indeed 
 despair of seeing." And Mr. Locke declares, " I cannot 
 make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and 
 omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of 
 both as of any truth I most firmly assent to ; and there- 
 fore I have long since given off the consideration of that 
 subject, resolving all into this short conclusion, that if it 
 is possible for God to make a free-agent, then man is 
 free, though I see not the way of it." 
 
 Sentiments Hke these, which are so often met with in 
 
132 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 the writings of eminent philosophers, have repeatedly led 
 me to reconsider the conclusion at which I have arrived 
 on this subject; but I have been able to discover no reason 
 why it should be abandoned. Indeed, if authority were 
 a sufficient reason why the great difficulty in question 
 should be regarded as incapable of being solved, I should 
 abandon it in despair, and leave the necessitarian to make 
 the most of his argument ; but it has only induced me to 
 proceed with the greater caution; and this, instead of 
 having shaken my convictions, has settled them with the 
 greater firmness and clearness in my mind. Whether I 
 am in the right, or whether I labour under a hallucina- 
 tion, satisfactory only to myself, and perplexing to all 
 others, I must submit to the candid consideration of the 
 reader 
 
 Why should it be thought impossible to reconcile the 
 free-agency of man with the foreknowledge of God ? No 
 one pretends that there is any disagreement between the 
 things themselves, as they really exist ; if there is any 
 discrepancy in the case, it must exist only between our 
 ideas of foreknowledge and free-agency. Indeed, we can- 
 not think of the things themselves, or compare them, ex- 
 cept by means of the ideas we have formed of them ; and 
 if our ideas of them are really irreconcilable, it is because 
 they have not been correctly formed, and do not corre- 
 spond with the things themselves. What shall we do 
 then ? Shall we set to work to reform our ideas ? Shall 
 we explain away the free-agency of man, or deny the 
 foreknowledge of God ? No. We may retain both. 
 
 Edwards contends, that volitions are brought to pass by 
 the influence of motives, and that it is impossible in any 
 case, that a volition should depart from the influence of 
 the strongest motive. This is the great doctrine of moral 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 133 
 
 necessity, which it is the object of President Edwards to 
 establish. Now, if his celebrated argument, or " demon- 
 stration," as it is called, proves this point, then it is to be 
 held as true and valid ; but if it only proves some other thing 
 which is called by the name of necessity, it is not to the 
 purpose. And if it can be shown, that his argument does 
 not prove any thing at all in relation to the causation of 
 choice, it will appear that it has no relevancy to the point 
 at issue. 
 
 The foreknowledge of God, I admit, infers the neces- 
 sity of all human actions, in one sense of the word ; but 
 not that kind of necessity for which any necessitarian 
 pleads, or against which any libertarian is at all concerned 
 to contend. The fallacy of the argument in question is, 
 that it shows all human actions to be necessary in a sense 
 in which it is not opposed to any scheme of liberty what- 
 ever, and assumes them to be necessary in another and 
 quite different sense ; and thus the great doctrine of free- 
 will, otherwise so clear and unquestionable, is oversha- 
 dowed and obscured by an imperfect and ambiguous 
 phraseology, rather than by the inherent difficulties of the 
 subject. This is the position which I shall endeavour to 
 establish. 
 
 The first argument of President Edwards is as follows. 
 When the existence of a thing is infaUibly and indissolubly 
 connected with something else, which has already had 
 existence, then its existence is necessary ; but the future 
 volitions of moral agents, are infalUbly and indissolubly 
 connected with the foreknowledge of God ; and therefore 
 they are necessary, p. 114-15. Now this argument is 
 perfectly sound ; the conclusion is really contained in the 
 premise, or definition of necessity, and it is fairly deduced 
 from it. It is as perfect as any syllogism in Euclid— 
 12* 
 
134 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 hut what does it prove ? It proves that all human ac- 
 tions are necessary — but in what sense ? Does it prove 
 that they are necessary with a moral necessity ? Does 
 it prove that they are brought to pass by the influence of 
 moral causes? No such thing is even pretended. "I 
 allow what Dr. Whitby says to be true," says Edwards, 
 " that mere foreknowledge does not affect the thing known, 
 to make it more certain or future," p. 122. He admits 
 that foreknowledge exerts " no influence on the thing 
 known to make it necessary." He does not even pre- 
 tend that there is any moral necessity shown to exist by 
 this argument ; and hence his conclusion has no connexion 
 with the great doctrine of the Inquiry, or the point in dis- 
 pute. It aims at the word, but not at the thing. The in- 
 fallible connexion it shows to exist, is admitted to be 
 entirely difierent from the infallible connexion between 
 moral causes and volitions ; that is to say, it is admitted 
 that it does not prove any thing to the purpose. 
 
 But is the indissoluble connexion, or necessity, estab- 
 lished by this argument, at all inconsistent with human 
 liberty 1 If it is not, and if our scheme of liberty is per- 
 fectly consistent and reconcilable with it ; then it infers 
 nothing, and is nothing, that is opposed to what we hold. 
 
 This question admits of an easy solution. The fore- 
 knowledge of a future event proves it to be necessary in 
 precisely the same manner that the knowledge of a pre- 
 sent event shows it to be necessary. This is conceded by 
 Edwards. " All certain knowledge," says he, " whether 
 it be foreknowledge, or after knowledge, or concomitant 
 knowledge, proves the thing known now to be necessary, 
 by some means or other; or proves that it is impos- 
 sible it should now be otherwise than true^"* p. 121. 
 And again, " All certain knowledge proves the necessity 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 135 
 
 of the truth known ; whether it be before^ or after y or at 
 the same time,^^ p. 124 ; and so in other places. 
 
 In what sense then, let us inquire, does the knowledge 
 of a present event prove it to be necessary ? It is neces- 
 sary, says Edwards, because it is indissolubly connected 
 with the knowledge of it. In other words, it could not 
 possibly be known to exist, unless it did exist ; and hence, 
 its existence is said to be indissolubly connected with the 
 knowledge of its existence, or, in other words, it is said 
 to be necessary. This is all true ; but is this indissoluble 
 connexion, or necessity, at all inconsistent with the con- 
 tingency of the event known ? This is the question ; 
 and let us not lose sight of it in a mist of words. Let it 
 be distinctly borne in mind, and it will be easily settled. 
 
 For this purpose, let us suppose, to adopt the language 
 of President Edwards, " that nonentity is about to bring 
 forth ;" and that an event comes into being without any 
 cause of its existence. This event then exists ; it is seen, 
 and it is known to exist. Now, even on this wild sup- 
 position, there is an infallible and indissoluble connexion 
 between the existence of the event and the knowledge of 
 it ; and hence it is necessary, in the sense above explained. 
 But what has this necessary connexion to do with the 
 cause of its existence ? This indissoluble connexion, this 
 dire necessity, is perfectly consistent, as we have seen, 
 with the supposition that the event had no cause at all of 
 its existence. How can it conflict, then, with any scheme 
 of free-agency that ever was dreamed of by man ? 
 
 If this argument proves any thing in regard to human 
 actions, it only proves that a volition has an efliect, and not 
 that it has a cause. Indeed, it has been said, that the 
 knowledge of an event is the effect of its existence ; and 
 the same remark has been extended to the foreknowledge 
 
136 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 of God with respect to the future voHtions of human 
 beings. This position is not denied by Edwards ; he 
 considers, in fact, that it strengthens, rather than weakens, 
 his argument. " Because it shows the existence of the 
 event to be so settled and firm, that it is as if it had 
 already been; inasmuch as in effect it actually exists 
 already ;" and much more to the same purpose, p. 122-3. 
 " It is as strong arguing," says he, " from the effect to the 
 cause, as from the cause to the effect." 
 
 This is all true; it is as strong arguing from effect 
 to cause, as it is from cause to effect. But do the 
 arguments prove the same thing ? Let us see. I know 
 a thing to exist ; and therefore it does exist. This is to 
 reason from effect to cause. The conclusion is inevita- 
 ble ; but what does it prove ? Why, it proves that the 
 thing does exist — it proves the bare fact of existence. 
 The indissoluble connexion, or the necessity, in this 
 case, exists between the knowledge and the event 
 known ; and it has no relation to the question how the 
 event came to exist. This argument, then, in regard to 
 human volitions, only proves that they are indissolubly 
 connected with their effects, and are necessarily im- 
 plied by them; just as every cause is implied by its 
 effects : but no libertarian in the world has ever ques- 
 tioned such a position. For all that such an argument 
 proves, all the volitions of moral agents may come into 
 existence, without having the least shadow of reason or 
 ground of their existence. We admit that volitions are 
 efficient causes ; and that they have effects, with which 
 they are indissolubly connected. Edwards undertook to 
 show, that volitions are necessary, because they are in- 
 fallibly and indissolubly connected with their causes; 
 and he has shown that they are necessary, because they 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 137 
 
 are infallibly and indissolubly connected with their ef- 
 fects ! This is one branch of his great argument. 
 
 There is another sense, in which the knowledge of an 
 event, whether it be /ore, or after, or concomitant, 
 knowledge, proves it to be necessary. This sense is not 
 clearly distinguished from the former by Edwards. He 
 recognizes them both, however, although he blends them 
 together, and frequently turns from the one to the other 
 in the course of his argument. It is highly important, 
 and affords no little satisfaction, to keep them clearly 
 distinct in our minds. 
 
 A thing is said to be necessary, as we have seen, be- 
 cause it is connected with the knowledge of it ; and, if a 
 thing does exist, or is certainly and infallibly known to 
 exist, it may be said to be necessary, on the principle 
 that it is impossible it should exist and not exist at one 
 and the same time. These two things are evidently dif- 
 ferent ; and, for the sake of distinctness in our language, 
 as well as in our thoughts, I shall call the first a logical, 
 and the last an axiomatical necessity. A thing, then, 
 which does exist, is said to be necessary with an ax- 
 iomatical necessity ; because it is impossible for it not 
 to exist while it does exist : and it is said to be neces- 
 sary, with a logical necessity, because it is indissolubly 
 connected with the knowledge of it. The former kind 
 of necessity is frequently presented in this form of ex- 
 pression, that if a thing does exist, it is impossible it 
 should be otherwise than true that it does exist. In this 
 form of expression, it is frequently resorted to by Ed- 
 wards. 
 
 Thus, says he, " I observed before, in explaining the 
 nature of necessity, that in things which are past, their 
 past existence is now necessary ; having alreadj- made 
 
138 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 sure of existence, it is now impossible that it should 
 be otherwise than true, that the thing has existed,''^ p. 
 114-15. Just so we may say in relation to things 
 which now exist ; for, having already made sure of ex- 
 istence, it is impossible it should be otherwise than true, 
 that they do now exist ; or, in other words, it is impos- 
 sible they should not exist while they do exist. In like 
 manner, if the future existence of any thing is fore- 
 known, "it is impossible it should be otherwise than 
 true," that it should exist, or come to pass : that is to 
 say, if it will exist, it will be impossible for it not to ex- 
 ist at the time of its existence. 
 
 Foreknowledge, I admit, infers this kind of necessity ; 
 but is this any thing to the purpose ? The conclusion 
 is the same, whether it be deduced from foreknowledge, 
 or concomitant knowledge. Let us suppose, then, for 
 the sake of clearness and convenience, that a thing is 
 now known to exist. It follows from hence, by a logi- 
 cal necessity, that it does exist ; for it could not possibly 
 be known to exist, unless it did exist. And, as it does 
 exist, " it is impossible that it should be otherwise than 
 true that it does exist;" or, in other words, it is impossi- 
 ble for it not to exist now, while it does exist. This is 
 all there is in this part of the argument. 
 
 And what does it amount to ? It is a simple declara- 
 tion of what no body ever denied^that if a thing exists, 
 or is to exist, or has existed, it is impossible to conceive 
 of it as not existing at the time of its existence. All this 
 is perfectly true, without the least reference to the ques- 
 tion, how it came to exist, or how it will come to ex- 
 ist ? It is wholly irrelevant to the point at issue. It 
 controverts no position, held by any sane man that now 
 lives, or that ever has lived. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 139 
 
 In Other words, if a thing is known to exist, certainly 
 and infallibly, then it does exist ; and if it does exist, 
 then ** it is impossible it should be otherwise than true" 
 that it does exist ; and hence its existence is said to be 
 necessary with an axiomatical necessity. But this does 
 not prove that it is necessarily produced. For, sup- 
 posing it to exist, its existence would be necessary in the 
 above sense, even if it had no cause of its existence. 
 The necessity here referred to, is a necessity in the or- 
 der of our ideas, and not in the course of events. It 
 arises from the impossibility of a thing's not existing at 
 the time it does exist ; and it has no reference whatever 
 to the causation of any thing : it is a fundamental law of 
 belief, and not a causal necessity. These three things, 
 an axiomatical, a logical, and a causal necessity, are 
 most strangely confounded in the argument of President 
 Edwards. 
 
 Will it be said, that in this argument, it was not the 
 object of Edwards, to prove that there is a moral neces- 
 sity in regard to our volitions ; but only that they are 
 " not without all necessity ?" Suppose this to be the 
 case, with whom has he any controversy, or to what 
 purpose has he argued? No one has ever held that 
 human volitions are " without all necessity," according 
 to Edwards' use of that term ; and no one can hold it. 
 No one can deny, that there is an indissoluble connexion 
 between the existence of a thing, and the certain and in- 
 fallible knowledge of its existence ; or between the effect 
 of a thing and the thing itself; or that it is impossible 
 for a thing not to exist while it does exist. In these 
 senses of the word, all rational creatures are bound to 
 acknowledge that human volitions are necessary. The 
 most strenuous advocate of free-agency has not one word 
 
140 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 to say against them ; and such being the meaning of Ed- 
 wards, we must all heartily concur with him, when he 
 says, " that there is no geometrical theorem or proposi- 
 tion whatever more capable of strict demonstration, 
 than that God's certain prescience of the volition of mo- 
 ral agents is inconsistent with such a contingency of 
 these events, as is without all necessity," p. 125-6. 
 
 If it can be truly said, that a thing is foreknown, it 
 follows that it will come to pass, or the proposition 
 which affirms the future existence of it, is necessarily 
 true. In other words, it is self-contradictory and absurd, 
 to assert that a thing is foreknown, and yet that it may 
 not come to pass; just as it is to assert that a thing is 
 known to exist and yet at the same time does not exist. 
 Hence, it is frequently alleged by Edwards, that to 
 deny his conclusions, drawn from foreknowledge, is self- 
 contradictory and' absurd; unless we deny foreknow- 
 ledge itself. To admit this, says he, and yet contend 
 that the thing foreknown may possibly not be, is to fall 
 into a plain contradiction, and " to suppose God's fore- 
 knowledge to be inconsistent with itself," p. 117. Is it 
 not strange, that it did not occur to Edwards, that if to 
 deny his position is to deny that God foreknows what 
 he foreknows ; then to affirm it, is only to affirm that he 
 foreknows what he foreknows ? Indeed, all those rea- 
 sonings in which he represents the denial of his position 
 as self-contradictory and absurd, should have convinced 
 him that he could prove nothing to the purpose, by ar- 
 guing from the foreknowledge of God, or else he must 
 assume the very thing in dispute, by taking it for granted 
 that it is future ; or, which is the same thing in effect, 
 that it is foreknown. For in admitting any premise, we 
 admit no more than is contained in it; and if we only 
 
yUKIVEiibiXI 
 
 *^ 
 
 CAUFf '' 
 
 EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 141 
 
 deny what is not contained in our admission, we are not 
 involved in a self-contradiction, or absurdity. In alleging 
 that we have done this, therefore, in the present case ; 
 — in alleging that we contradict ourselves by admitting 
 the foreknowledge of God, and in denying necessity, he 
 takes it for granted that the very thing in dispute is in- 
 cluded in that foreknowledge. In other words, if Ed- 
 wards does not mean to say, that the point in dispute is 
 included in the foreknowledge of God ; then he cannot 
 say, that we contradict ourselves by admitting that divine 
 prescience ; and if he does mean to say, that the thing 
 which we deny is included in the foreknowledge of God, 
 then he begs the question. 
 
 It is freely conceded, that whatever God foreknows 
 will most certainly and infallibly come to pass. He fore- 
 sees all human volitions; and, therefore, they will most 
 certainly and infallibly come to pass, in some manner or 
 other: the bare fact of their future existence is clearly 
 established^by God's foreknowledge of them. And if all 
 human volitions will be brought to pass, by the operation 
 of moral causes ; then this manner of their existence is 
 foreknown to God, and will all come to pass in this way ; 
 but to take this for granted, is to beg the question. We 
 have just as much right to suppose, that God foreknows 
 that the volitions of moral agents are not necessitated, as 
 the necessitarian has to suppose that He foreknows the 
 contrary ; and then it would follow that our volitions are 
 necessarily free, or without any producing causes. If 
 God foreknows that our actions will come to pass in the 
 way we call freely, (and we have as much right to this 
 supposition as our opponents have to the contrary,) then, 
 as foreknowledge infers necessity, our actions are neces- 
 sarily free. And surely, if the necessity which is in- 
 13 
 
142 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 ferred from foreknowledge, is predicable of freedom 
 itself, it cannot be inconsistent with it. 
 
 In other words, if the necessity of human volitions, ac- 
 cording to the scheme of Edwards, be a fact, then it was 
 foreknown to God that such is the fact ; and, if we please, 
 we may infer the fact from his foreknowledge, after 
 having inferred his foreknowledge from the fact. On 
 the other hand, if the scheme of necessity be a mere 
 hypothesis, having no corresponding reality in the uni- 
 verse ; then God never foreknew that it is according to 
 such scheme that all human actions are brought to pass ; 
 unless he foreknew things to be necessitated which in 
 reality are not necessitated. Hence, we can prove no- 
 thing by reasoning from the foreknowledge of God; 
 except what we first assume to be true, and consequently 
 foreknown to Him ; and, if we choose to resort to this 
 pitiful way of begging the question, we may prove our 
 hypothesis just as well as any other. 
 
 The foreknowledge of an event, as I have already said, 
 proves nothing more nor less than the hare certainty of 
 its future existence ; it decides nothing as to the manner 
 of its coming into existence. The necessitarian may ring 
 the changes upon this subject as long as he pleases, and 
 all he can possibly make out of it is, that if God fore- 
 knows a thing, it will certainly be, and to suppose other- 
 wise, is a contradiction. Thus, says Edwards, " To 
 suppose the future volitions of mor^l agents not to be 
 necessary events ; or, which is the same thing, events 
 which it is not possible but that they may come to pass ; 
 and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, 
 and knows all things, is to suppose God's knowledge to 
 be inconsistent with itself. For to say that God cer- 
 tainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 143 
 
 infallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so 
 contingent that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his 
 knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one thing he 
 knows is utterly inconsistent with another thing he 
 knows. It is the same as to say, he now knows a pro- 
 position to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows 
 to be of contingent uncertain truth. If a future volition 
 is so without all necessity, that nothing hinders but it 
 may not be, then the proposition which asserts its future 
 existence is so uncertain, that nothing hinders but that 
 the truth of it may entirely fail. And if God knows all 
 things, he knows this proposition to be thus uncertain ; 
 and that is inconsistent with his knowing it to be infalli- 
 bly true ; and so inconsistent with his knowing that it 
 is true." p. 117. Now all this going around and around 
 amounts to just this, that if God certainly and infallibly 
 foreknows a thing, he certainly and infallibly foreknows 
 it, or that if it will certainly come to pass, it will cer- 
 tainly come to pass. 
 
 We admit that the certainty of aU future events is 
 implied in God's foreknowledge of them. Does the ar- 
 gument in question prove any more than the bare fact of 
 the certainty of the events foreknown ? The argument, 
 so far as we have yet followed it, clearly does not. It 
 merely proves the bare fact of the certainty of existence. 
 Indeed, Edwards himself says, that " metaphysical or 
 philosophical necessity," (and this is the necessity for 
 which he here contends,) " is nothing different from their 
 certainty." p. 28. And the younger Edwards frequently 
 says, "If a proposition asserting some future event, be 
 a real and absolute truth, there is an absolute certainty of 
 the event ; such absolute certainty is all that is implied 
 in the divine foreknowledge ; and all the moral neces- 
 
144 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 sity for which we pleads p. 160. Now, if these writers 
 merely mean that a thing is certain, when they say it is 
 necessary, it is to be regretted that they did not use the 
 right word. It would have saved their works from no 
 little confusion. 
 
 But the truth is, that the moral necessity for which 
 they contend consists sometimes in the certainty of an 
 event, and sometimes in the ground of that certainty. 
 Volitions are said to be morally necessitory in their defi- 
 nition, and in their system, because they are made cer- 
 tain by the influence of moral causes. But in their ar- 
 guments, and the defence of their system, the hare ab- 
 solute certainty J without any reference to the ground of 
 it, is frequently all that is meant by moral necessity. 
 Thus, they build upon one idea of necessity, while they 
 attack and defend themselves upon another idea thereof. 
 
 This is our present starting point then, agreed upon 
 by all sides, that the foreknowledge of God infers the 
 certainty of all future realities. Now, how can we con- 
 clude from hence, that the volitions of moral agents are, 
 not only certain, but rendered certain by the influence of 
 moral causes ? It may be said, that it is sufficient that 
 the foreknowledge of God proves that human volitions 
 will certainly come to pass in some way or other ; for if 
 they will certainly come to pass in any way, we know 
 that they must have some cause of their existence ; and 
 it is just as absurd to suppose that a voHtion can come 
 into being without any cause of its existence, as it is to 
 suppose that a world can come into being of itself. If 
 this ground should be taken, (and it certainly will be,) 
 the reply is obvious. It would show that the divine pre_ 
 science can only prove the certainty of future events . 
 while it is left to the old maxim, that every effect mus 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 145 
 
 have a cause, in order to make out the doctrine of moral 
 necessity, or the point in disputfe ! It would show, that 
 after all the parade made with the divine prescience, it 
 leaves the whole argument to rest upon ground which 
 has already been occupied by one side, and fully con- 
 sidered by the other ! It would only show, that a great 
 pretence of demonstration had been made from the fore- 
 knowledge of God ; whereas, in fact, it proves nothing 
 to the purpose, unless " its most impotent and lame con- 
 clusion" be helped out by something else ! 
 
 Another attempt is made to link the conclusion drawn 
 from the foreknowledge of God, with the point to be es- 
 tablished by the necessitarian. It is said, that God could 
 not foreknow all future events, unless he views them as 
 connected with known causes. This ground is taken by 
 many eminent necessitarians. Thus, says Dr. John 
 Dick, '* Future events cannot be foreseen, unless they 
 are certain ; they cannot be certain, unless God have de- 
 termined to bring them to pass." 
 
 The same position is assumed by President Edwards, 
 ** There must be a certainty in things themselves," says 
 he, *' before they are certainly foreknown." . . . "There 
 must be a certainty in things to be a ground of certainty 
 of knowledge, and render things capable of being known 
 to be certain." p. 122. Now, what is this certainty in 
 things themselves, or in human volitions, without which 
 they are incapable of being foreknown ? The answer 
 is obvious ; for Edwards every where contends, that un- 
 less volitions are brought to pass by the influence of 
 moral causes — that unless they are necessarily produced 
 by an "effectual power and efficacy" — they are alto- 
 gether uncertain and contingent, and connected with no- 
 thing that can render them certain. Hence, he clearly 
 13* 
 
146 EXAMINATION OP 
 
 maintains, that unless human volitions are necessarily 
 brought to pass by the influence of motives, they are not 
 certain in themselves, and hence are incapable of being 
 foreknown. And besides, he has a laboured argument 
 to prove, that God could not foreknow the future voli- 
 tions of moral agents, unless he views them as *• neces- 
 sarily connected with something else that is evident." pp. 
 115 — 117. This something else is not foreknowledge 
 itself; for it is the ground of foreknowledge, it is the 
 necessary influence of motives, or moral causes. But 
 we need not dwell upon this point, as this is so evidently 
 his meaning ; and if it is not, then it is nothing to the 
 purpose. 
 
 If Edwards means that a thing cannot be foreknown 
 unless it has a sufficient ground and reason for its 
 existence, and does not of itself come forth out of no- 
 thing, we are not at all concerned to deny his position. 
 Every advocate of free-agency contends, that volition 
 proceeds from the mind, acting in view of motives ; and 
 therefore is not destitute of a sufficient ground and reason 
 of its existence. He denies that volition is necessarily 
 brought to pass by the operation of motives. Hence, if 
 Edwards merely means that God could not foreknow a 
 human volition, unless he foreknew all the circumstances 
 in view of the mind when it is to act, as well as the na- 
 ture and all the circumstances of the mind from which 
 the act is to proceed ; no advocate of free-agency is at 
 all concerned to deny his position. It may be true, or 
 it may be false ; but it establishes nothing which may 
 not be consistently admitted by the advocates of free- 
 agency. If he means any thing to the purpose, he must 
 mean, that God could not foresee human volitions, unless 
 they are necessarily connected with causes, according to 
 
* EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 147 
 
 his scheme of moral necessity ; that is, unless they are 
 necessarily produced by " the action or influence" of mo- 
 tives, or moral causes. If this is his meaning, then indeed 
 it is something to the purpose ; but what unbounded 
 presumption is it, on the part of a poor blind worm of 
 the dust, thus to set bounds and limits to the modes of 
 knowledge possesssd by an infinite, all-knowing God ! It 
 is true, that " no understanding, created or uncreated, can 
 see evidence where there is none" ; but what kind of evi- 
 dence that is, by which all things are rendered perfectly 
 clear to the eye of Omniscience, it is surely not for us to 
 determine. That all things are known to God, is freely 
 admitted ; but that they can be known, only by reason of 
 their resulting from the necessitating influence of known 
 causes, which are themselves necessitated, is more than 
 any finite mind should presume to affirm. It were, indeed, 
 to make our shallow, limited, and feeble intellects, the 
 measure of all possible modes of knowledge. It were to 
 make God like one of ourselves. Yet this position the 
 necessitarian has been compelled to assume. After all his 
 pretended demonstrations from the foreknowledge of God, 
 his argument can reach the point in dispute, only by 
 means of this tremendous flight of presumption. 
 
 Let the necessitarian show, that God cannot foresee 
 future events, unless he "have determined to bring them 
 to pass," or unless they are brought to pass by a chain of 
 producing causes, ultimately connected with his own will ; 
 and he will prove something to the purpose. But let him 
 not talk so boastfully about demonstrations, while there is 
 this exceedingly weak link in the chain of his argument. 
 If God were so like one of ourselves, thai he could not 
 foresee future volitions, unless they are brought to pass 
 by the operation of known causes ; then, I admit, that his 
 
148 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 foreknowledge would infer the moral necessity for which 
 Edwards contends, provided he really possesses that 
 knowledge ; but if he were so imperfect a being, I should 
 be compelled to believe, that there are some things which 
 he could not foreknow. ^ 
 
 This assumption comes with a peculiarly ill grace from 
 the necessitarian. He should be the last man to con- 
 tend, that God cannot foresee future events unless they 
 are involved in known producing causes ; just as all that 
 we know of the future is ascertained by reasoning from 
 known causes to effects. For he contends that with God, 
 " there is no time" ; but that to His view all things are 
 seen as if they were present. His knowledge is without 
 succession, and there is no before nor after with him ; all 
 things are intimately present to his mind from all eternity. 
 Such is the doctrine of both the Edwardses ; and Dr. 
 Dick believes, that ** God sees all things at a glance." 
 
 Now, present things are not known to exist, because 
 they are implied by known causes, but because they are 
 present and seen. And hence, if God sees all things as 
 present, there is not the shadow of a foundation whereon 
 to rest the proof of " moral necessity" from his fore- 
 knowledge. It is all taken away by their own doctrine, 
 and their argument is left without the least support from it. 
 
 Indeed, there is no need of lugging the foreknowledge 
 of God into the present controversy, except it be to 
 deceive the mind. For all future events will certainly and 
 infallibly come to pass, whether they are foreknown or 
 not; and foreknowledge cannot make the matter any 
 more certain than it is without it. We may say that God 
 foreknows all things, and we may mix this up with all 
 possible propositions ; but this will never help the con- 
 clusion, that " all future things will certainly and infallibly 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 149 
 
 come to pass." If God should cease to foreknow all 
 future volitions, or if he had never foreknown them, they 
 would, nevertheless, just as certainly and infallibly come 
 to pass, as if he had foreknown them from all eternity. 
 The bare naked fact, that they are future infers all that is 
 implied in God's foreknowledge of them ; and it is just 
 as much a contradiction in terms, to say that what is 
 future will not come to pass, as it is to say, that what 
 God foreknows will never take place. Hence, by bring- 
 ing in the prescience of Deity, we do not really strengthen 
 or add to the conclusion in favour of necessity. It only 
 furnishes a very convenient and plausible method of beg- 
 ging the question, or of seeming to prove something by 
 hiding our sophisms in the blaze of the divine attributes. 
 It only serves as a veil, behind which is concealed those 
 sophistical tricks, by which both the performer and the 
 spectator are deceived. This whole argument from the 
 foreknowledge of God, is, indeed, a grand specimen of 
 undesigned metaphysical jugglery, by which the mind is 
 called off in one direction, whilst it is deceived, perplexed, 
 and confounded, by not seeing what takes place in another. 
 It appears from these things, that those persons who 
 have endeavoured to clear up this matter, by supposing 
 that some things are not foreknown to God ; have only 
 got rid of. one of the divine attributes, and not of their 
 difficulty. It appears also, that Edwards might have 
 made his argument far more simple and direct, by leaving 
 out the long section in which he proves that God really 
 foreknows all future things ; and confining himself to 
 the simple proposition, " that all future events will cer- 
 tainly and infallibly come to pass ;" that " it is a contra- 
 diction in terms to say that a thing is future and yet that 
 it will not come to pass" ; or, in other words, " if a thing 
 
150 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 is future, it is impossible it should be otherwise than 
 true,^^ that it will come to pass. And how unreasonable 
 are those, who have imagined that we are free-agents, 
 because God has chosen not to foresee our free actions ; 
 as if the supposition that he might have foreseen them, 
 does not infer necessity just as much as the fact that he 
 does foresee them. Indeed, these reasoners seem to have 
 expected to see one truth, by shutting their eyes upon 
 another ! 
 
 Mr. Hobbes has an argument to prove necessity, pre- 
 cisely like that of Edwards, except that its nakedness is 
 not covered ,up with the foreknowledge of God. " Let 
 the case be put," says he, " of the weather : 'tis neces- 
 sary that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain. If, therefore, 
 it be not necessary that it shall rain, it is necessary it shall 
 not rain ; otherwise there is no necessity that the propo- 
 sition, it shall rain or not rain, should be true." This 
 sophism confounds the axiomatical necessity referred 
 to in the premise, that it must rain or not rain, with the 
 causal necessity intended to be deduced from it in the 
 conclusion. This poor sophism has been adopted by Mr. 
 Locke, and seriously employed to prove that human voli- 
 tions " cannot be free." Thus, says he, " It is unavoidably 
 necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action 
 in a man's power, which is once proposed to a man's 
 thoughts. The act of volition or preferring one of the 
 two, being that, which he cannot avoid, a man in respect 
 of that act of willing is under necessity." Here we have 
 precisely the same confusion of an axiomatical with a 
 causal necessity, that occurs in the argument of Mr. 
 Hobbes. And yet, the younger Edwards has deemed 
 this argument of Mr. Locke as worthy of his special 
 notice and commendation ; and President Day falls in 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 151 
 
 with the same idea, alleging that " we will because we 
 cannot avoid willing," because we must either choose or 
 refuse. Is it not wonderful, that these philosophers 
 should have imagined, that they had any controversy with 
 any one, in contending so manfully that the mind, under 
 certain circumstances, must either choose or refuse ? or 
 that they could infer any thing from this, in favour of a 
 causal necessity — the only questibn in dispute ? With 
 what clearness ! with what force ! would President Ed- 
 wards have dashed this poor flimsy sophism into a thou- 
 sand atoms, if he had come across it in the atheism of 
 Hobbes ! But, unfortunately, he came across it in a dif- 
 ferent direction ; and hence, he has rescued it from the 
 loathsome dunghill of atheistical trash, invested it with 
 dignity, seeming to clothe it in the solemn sanction of 
 religion, by covering it up in the ample folds of the divine 
 Omniscience. 
 
 This, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter. The 
 prescience of God does not make our volitions necessary ; 
 it only proves them to be certain. This is conceded by 
 Edwards. It proves them to be certain, just as present 
 knowledge proves them to be certain. This also is 
 admitted by Edwards. But present knowledge proves 
 an act of the mind to be certain, because it is infallibly 
 connected with that knowledge, and not because it is 
 necessitated by the influence of a cause. It proves it to 
 be certain, because it is impossible for a volition, or any 
 thing else, not to exist at the time of its existence, and 
 not because it is impossible for it to come to pass without 
 being necessitated. In short, it proves an axiomatical 
 and a logical necessity, but not a causal necessity ; that 
 is to say, it proves nothing to the point in dispute. 
 
 The necessitarian can connect his conclusion with the 
 
152 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 thing he has undertaken to prove, in only one of two 
 ways : he may say, that if an event is certain, it cannot 
 come into existence without a producing cause ; or he 
 may allege, that God cannot foresee them, unless he is 
 determined to bring them to pass. If he takes the former 
 position, he really discards the argument from foreknow- 
 ledge, and returns for support to the old argument, that 
 every effect must have a cause. And if he assumes the 
 latter, maintaining that God cannot foreknow future events 
 unless he reasons from producing causes to effects, he 
 builds his argument, not upon foreknowledge alone, but 
 upon this in connection with a most unwarrantable flight 
 of presumption, without which the argument from pre- 
 science is good for nothing. 
 
 And besides, the bringing in of the divine prescience, 
 only serves to blind, and not to illuminate. For God 
 foreknows only what is future ; and all future things will 
 come to pass just as infallibly, without being foreknown, 
 as they will with it. If we assume them to be future, it 
 is just as much a contradiction to deny that they will come 
 to pass ; as it is to assume that they are foreknown and 
 yet deny it. Nothing can be proved in this way, except 
 what is assumed or taken for granted ; and the foreknow- 
 ledge of God is only a plausible way of begging the ques- 
 tion, or concealing a sophism. 
 
 In conclusion, the necessitarian takes the wrong course 
 in his inquiries, and lays his premises in the dark. To 
 illustrate this point : — I know that I act ; and hence, I con- 
 clude that God foreknew that I would act. And again, I 
 know that my act is not necessitated, that it does neces- 
 sarily proceed from the action or influence of causes; 
 and hence, I conclude that God foreknew that I would 
 thus act freely, in precisely this manner, and not other- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 153 
 
 wise. Thus, I reason from what I know to what I do 
 not know, from my knowledge of the actual world as it 
 is, up to God's foreknowledge respecting it. 
 
 The necessitarian pursues the opposite course. He 
 reasons from what he does not know, that is, from the 
 particulars of the divine foreknowledge, about which he 
 absolutely knows nothing a priori, down to the facts of 
 the actual world. Thus, quitting the light which shines 
 so brightly within us and around us, he seeks for light in 
 the midst of impenetrable darkness. He endeavours to 
 determine the phenomena of the world, not by looking at 
 them and seeing what they are ; but by deducing con- 
 clusions from God's infinite foreknowledge respecting 
 them ! 
 
 In doing this, a grand illusion is practised, by his merely 
 supposing that the voHtions themselves are foreknown, 
 without taking into the supposition the whole of the case, 
 and recollecting that God not only foresees all our actions, 
 but also all about them. For if this were done, if it were 
 remembered that He not only foresees that our volitions 
 will come to pass, but also how they will come to pass ; 
 the necessitarian would see, that nothing could be proved 
 in this way except what is first tacitly assumed. The 
 grand illusion would vanish, and it would be clearly seen, 
 that if the argument from foreknowledge proves any thing, 
 it just as well proves the necessity of freedom, as any 
 thing else. 
 
 Indeed, it does seem to me, that it is one of the most 
 wonderful phenomena in the history of the human mind, 
 that, in reasoning about facts in relation to which the most 
 direct and palpable sources of evidence are open before 
 us, so many of its brightest ornaments should so long 
 have endeavoured to draw conclusions from " the dark 
 14 
 
154 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 unknown" of God's foreknowledge ; without perceiving 
 that this is to reject the true method, to invert the true 
 order of inquiry, and to involve the inquirer in all th© 
 darkness and confusion inseparable therefrom: without 
 perceiving that no powers, however great, that no genius, 
 however exalted, can possibly extort from such a method 
 any thing but the dark, and confused, and perplexing 
 exhibitions of an ingenious logomachy. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 155 
 
 SECTION xir. 
 
 OF EDWARDS* USE OF THE TERM NECESSITY. 
 
 In the controversy concerning the will, nothing is of 
 more importance, it will readily be admitted, than to 
 guard against the influence of the ambiguity of words. 
 Yet, it may be shown, that President Edwards has used 
 the principal terms in this controversy in an exceedingly 
 loose and indeterminate manner. This he has done espe- 
 cially in regard to the term necessity. His very defini- 
 tion prepares the way for such an abuse of language. 
 
 " Philosophical necessity,^'' says he, " is really nothing 
 else than the full and fixed connexion between the 
 
 THINGS signified BY THE SUBJECT AND PREDICATE OF A 
 
 PROPOSITION, which affirms something to be true. When 
 there is such a connexion, then the thing affirmed in the 
 proposition is necessary, in a philosophical sense, whether 
 any opposition or contrary effiDrt be supposed or no. 
 When the subject and predicate of the proposition, which 
 affirms the existence of any thing, either substance, 
 quality, act, or circumstance, have a full and certain 
 CONNEXION, then the existence or being of that thing is 
 said to be necessary in a metaphysical sense. And in 
 this sense I use the word Necessity, in the following dis- 
 course, when I endeavour to prove that Necessity is not 
 inconsistent with Liberty. 
 
 "The subject and predicate of a proposition, which 
 affirms existence of something, may have a full, fixed, and 
 certain connexion several ways." 
 
156 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 " 1. They may have a full and perfect connexion in 
 and of themselves ; because it may imply a contradic- 
 tion, or gross absurdity, to suppose them not connected. 
 Thus many things are necessary in their own nature. So 
 the eternal existence of being, generally considered, is ne- 
 cessary i7i itself^ because it would be in itself the greatest 
 absurdity, to deny the existence of being in general, or to 
 say there was absolute and universal nothing ; and as it 
 were the sum of all contradictions ; as might be shown, 
 if this were the proper place for it. So God's infinity, 
 and other attributes are necessary. So it is necessary in 
 its own nature, that two and two should be four ; and it 
 is necessary, that all right lines drawn from the centre to 
 the circumference should be equal. It is necessary, fit, 
 and suitable, that men should do to others, as they would 
 that they should do to them. So innumerable metaphysi- 
 cal and mathematical truths are necessary in themselves >• 
 the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms 
 them, are perfectly connected of themselves. ^^ 
 
 " 2. The connexion of the subject and predicate of a 
 proposition, which aflfirms the existence of something, 
 may be fixed and made certain, because the existence of 
 that thing is already come to pass ; and either now is, or 
 has been ; and so has, as it were, made sure of existence. 
 And therefore, the proposition which aflirms present or 
 past existence of it, may by this means, be made certain, 
 and necessarily and unalterably true ; the past event has 
 fixed and decided the matter, as to its existence ; and has 
 made it impossible but that existence should be truly 
 predicated of it. Thus the existence of whatever is 
 already come to pass, is now become necessary ; it is 
 become impossible it should be otherwise than true, that 
 such a thing has been." 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 157 
 
 " 3. The subject and predicate of a proposition which 
 affirms something to be, may have a real and certain con- 
 nexion consequentially ; and so the existence of the thing 
 may be consequentially necessary, as it may be surely and 
 firmly connected with something else, that is necessary in 
 one of the former respects. As it is either fully and tho- 
 roughly connected with that which is absolutely neces- 
 sary in its own nature ; or with something which has 
 already made sure of its existence. This necessity lies 
 in, and may be explained by, the connexion between two 
 or more propositions, one with another. Things which 
 are perfectly connected with other things that are neces- 
 sary, are necessary themselves, by a necessity of conse- 
 quence." 
 
 After having defined what he means by philosophical 
 or metaphysical necessity, he tells us, that this is the 
 sense in which he uses the word, when he endeavours to 
 show that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty. And 
 yet under " this sense," how many totally distinct ideas 
 are embraced ! The eternal existence of being in general j 
 the attributes of God ; the proposition that two and two 
 are four ; the equality of the radii of a circle ; the moral 
 duty that we should do as we would be done by ; the ex- 
 istence of a thing which has already come to pass ; the 
 existence of things, that are connected with that which is 
 absolutely necessary in itself, or with something that has 
 already made sure of its existence ; the connexion of two 
 or more propositions with each other — all these things are 
 included in his definition of philosophical necessity ! And 
 yet he tells us, that he uses the term in this sense (in what 
 sense ?) when he undertakes to reconcile liberty with ne- 
 cessity ! When he says, that he employs the word in 
 this sense, one would suppose that, as a great metaphy- 
 14* 
 
158 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 sician, he referred to some one of its precise and definite 
 significations ; but no such thing. He merely refers to its 
 philosophical sense, which, according to his own explana- 
 tion, embraces a multitude of different ideas. Hence, 
 although he may keep close to this philosophical sense 
 of the word, " in the ensuing discourse ;" yet he may, be- 
 fore the discourse is concluded, shift his position a thou- 
 sand times from one of these ideas to another. And he 
 may always seem, to superficial observers, to speak of the 
 same thing ; because although the things spoken of are 
 really different, they are all drawn together under one 
 definition, and called by one name. He not only may 
 have done this ; he actually has done it. And if he had 
 formed the express design to envelope the whole subject 
 in a cloud of sophistry, he could not have taken a better 
 course to accomplish his object. 
 
 It was the design of the Inquiry to establish the doc- 
 trine of moral necessity ; and hence it was incumbent on 
 President Edwards to reconcile this kind of necessity, and 
 not philosophical necessity, with the free-agency of man. 
 He contends that there is a necessary connexion between 
 the influence of motives and volitions. This he calls 
 moral necessity. It differs from natural necessity, says 
 he, it differs from the necessary connexion between cause 
 and effect ; but yet, he expressly tells us, that this differ- 
 ence " does not lie so much in the nature of the con- 
 nexionj as in the terms connected" In both cases, he 
 maintains, the connexion is necessary and absolute. The 
 two terms connected are different ; but the kind and nature 
 of the connexion is the same. This is the kind of neces- 
 sity for which he pleads ; and we can never be satisfied 
 with his scheme, until the term shall be used in this pre- 
 cise and definite sense, and the doctrine it expresses shall 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 
 
 ISJd 
 
 be shown to be consistent with the true idea and feeling 
 of liberty in the human breast. It will not, it cannot satisfy 
 the mind, that any other kind of necessity is reconcilable 
 with liberty ; while it remains to be shown that moral ne- 
 cessity, as it is defined and explained in the Inquiry, is 
 consistent with the free-agency of man. 
 
 There is one sense of the term in question, says he, 
 " which especially belongs to the controversy about acts 
 of the will," p. 30. It is what he calls " a necessity of 
 consequence." This would be very true, if he merely 
 meant by a necessity of consequence, to refer to the ne- 
 cessary connexion between cause and effect. But this is 
 not his meaning ; for he expressly says, that " a necessity 
 of consequence" " lies zn, and may be explained hy, the 
 connexion of two or more propositions one with another." 
 Now what has the connexion between any two or all the 
 propositions in the universe, to do with the controversy 
 about acts of the will ? Is it not evident, that it is the con- 
 nexion which subsists between effects and their producing 
 causes, and which is supposed to subsist between motives 
 and actions, that has to do with the controversy in ques- 
 tion ; and that the connexion which subsists between two 
 or more propositions is entirely foreign to the subject? 
 
 It may be said, that by " a necessity of consequence," 
 Edwards referred not only to the connexion between two 
 or more propositions, but also to the connexion between 
 cause and effect. This is undoubtedly true ; for he speaks 
 of effects as coming to pass by this kind of necessity. But 
 then it is to be lamented that two ideas, which are so per- 
 fectly distinct, should have been couched under the same 
 mode of expression, and treated as if they were identically 
 the same. Such a confounding of different ideas, has led 
 
160 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 to no little confusion and error in the reasoning of Presi- 
 dent Edwards. 
 
 The subject of the last section furnishes a striking 
 illustration of the justness of this remark. From the pro- 
 position that a volition is certainly and infallibly fore- 
 known, it follows, by a necessity of consequence, that it 
 will come to pass. This is an instance of the necessary 
 connexion between two ideas or propositions ; between 
 the idea or proposition, that a certain volition is fore- 
 known, and the idea that it will come to pass ; between 
 the proposition which affirms that it is foreknown, 
 and the idea that it will come to pass. In other words, 
 the proposition which affirms that it is foreknown, ne- 
 cessarily assumes that it will com.e to pass ; and to deny 
 this assumption, at the same time that we make it, is 
 surely to be guilty of a contradiction in terms. To sup- 
 pose that a volition will not come to pass, is inconsistent 
 with the proposition that it is certainly and infallibly 
 foreknown. Edwards himself has frequently declared 
 that this is the kind of necessity which is inferred from 
 foreknowledge. 
 
 In truth, the necessary connexion which exists be- 
 tween the idea that a thing is foreknown, and the truth 
 of the proposition which predicates future existence of 
 it, is perfectly distinct from the necessary connexion 
 between cause and effect. They are as widely different, 
 as the connexion between any two propositions in Euclid 
 is from the connexion between the motion of a ball and 
 the force by which it is put in motion. Hence, the kind 
 of necessity which is involved in the idea of foreknow- 
 ledge, has nothing to do with the controversy about acts 
 of the will. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 161 
 
 '^here is, in like manner, a necessary connexion be- 
 tween the idea that a volition is now certainly and infal- 
 libly known to exist, and the truth of the proposition 
 which affirms present existence of it; and hence, its pre- 
 sent existence is necessary, by *'a necessity of conse- 
 quence," according to the definition of President Ed- 
 wards. But all this has no relevancy to the question, 
 as to how that volition came to pass. Its present exist- 
 ence is necessarily connected with the idea that it is 
 certainly known to exist ; but this is ** a necessity of 
 consequence" which " lies in, and may be explained by, 
 the connexion between two or more propositions." It is 
 not " a necessity of consequence" that lies in, or can be 
 explained hy, the connexion between cause and effect. 
 The two things are entirely different, and it is strange, 
 that they should always have been confounded by Presi- 
 dent Edwards. I do most certainly and infallibly know, 
 for example, that I am now willing to write ; and from 
 this knowledge, it necessarily follows, that I am now 
 willing to write. But if any one should infer from 
 hence, that I am necessitated to write, by the operation 
 of some cause, we should certainly think his inference 
 very badly drawn. Yet this is precisely the way in 
 which the necessitarian proceeds, when he infers the 
 necessity of human actions from the foreknowledge of 
 God. He confounds the necessary connexion between 
 two propositions, with the necessary connexion between 
 cause and effect. This single ambiguity has been a mighty 
 instrument in the building up of that portentous scheme 
 of necessity, which has seemed to overshadow the glory 
 and beauty of man's nature as a free and accountable being. 
 This is not the only ambiguity of the term in question 
 which has been turned to account by the necessitarian. 
 
162 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 In opposition to the scheme of moral necessity, or the 
 necessary connexion between volitions and the influence 
 of motives, it has been said, that volitions are produced 
 neither by motives, nor by preceding acts of choice. 
 This is a direct denial of the doctrine of moral necessity, 
 of the only thing which we are at all concerned to deny. 
 We may thus attempt to escape from the thing, but the 
 name still pursues us. 
 
 For, to this view of the subject. President Edwards 
 replies as follows : *' If any shall see cause to deny this, 
 and say they hold no such thing as that every action is 
 chosen or determined by a foregoing choice ; but that the 
 very first exertion of will only, undetermined by any pre- 
 ceding act, is properly called action ; then I say, such a 
 man's notion of action implies necessity ; for what the 
 mind is the subject of, without the determination of its 
 own previous choice, it is the subject of necessarily, as 
 to any hand that free choice has in the affair ; and with- 
 out any ability the mind has to prevent it, by any will or 
 election of its own ; because by the supposition it pre- 
 cludes all previous acts of the will or choice in the case, 
 which might prevent it. So that it is again, in this other 
 way, implied in the notion of an act, that it is both ne- 
 cessary and not necessary," p. 199. It is in this man- 
 ner, that President Edwards disposes of this important 
 view of the subject of free-agency. Let us examine his 
 logic. 
 
 In the first place, the argument is not sound. It pro- 
 ceeds on the supposition, that unless a volition is pro- 
 duced, it cannot be prevented, by a preceding act of voli- 
 tion. This is a false supposition. I choose, for example, 
 to go out at one of the doors of my room. This choice 
 is not produced by any preceding act of choice. And yet 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 16S 
 
 I can certainly prevent it, by choosing to go out at the 
 other door of the room, or by choosing to sit still. Thus 
 one act of choice may, from the very nature of things, 
 necessarily exclude or prevent another act of choice ; 
 although it could not possibly have produced that other 
 act of choice. 
 
 But suppose the argument to be sound, what does it 
 prove ? It proves our actions to be necessary ; but in 
 what sense? Does it show them to be subject to that 
 moral necessity, for which Edwards contends, and against 
 which we protest? This is the question, let me repeat, 
 which we have undertaken to discuss ; and if we would 
 not wander in an eternal maze of words, we must keep 
 to it ; it is the talisman which is to conduct us out of all 
 our difficulties and perplexities. It is the first point, and 
 the second point, and the third point in logic, to keep to 
 the issue, steadily, constantly, and without the least 
 shadow of turning. Otherwise we shall lose ourselves 
 in a labyrinth of words, in darkness and confusion inter- 
 minable. 
 
 In what sense, then, does the above argument, sup- 
 posing it to be sound, prove our actions to be necessary ? 
 Does it prove them to be necessary with a moral neces- 
 sity ? It does not. According to the argument in question, 
 volitions are necessary, ^^ as to any hand free choice has 
 in the affair ; because by the supposition it precludes 
 all previous acts of the will or choice in the case, which 
 might prevent them^ That is to say, volitions are 
 necessary as to previous acts of choice; because by the 
 supposition ^xevious acts of choice do not produce them, 
 and consequently cannot prevent them. This is the 
 argument. 
 
 Now, it is very true, that this is not an unheard of use 
 
164 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 of the term in question. We say a thing is necessary, 
 when it is dependent upon no cause for its existence. 
 Thus the existence of the Supreme Being is* said to be 
 necessary, because he is the uncaused Cause of all things. 
 As he owes his existence to nothing, so there is nothing 
 capable of destroying it. He is independent of all 
 causes ; and hence, his existence is said to be necessary. 
 
 In like manner, a thing may be said to be necessary as 
 to any other particular thing, upon which it does not de- 
 pend for its existence. As the Supreme Being is said to 
 be necessary as to all things, because his existence depends 
 upon nothing ; so any created object may be said to be 
 necessary, as to the influence of any other object, to which 
 it does not owe its existence, and upon which its exist- 
 ence does not depend. It is in this sense that our volitions 
 are shown to be necessary by the above argument of Pre- 
 sident Edwards. A volition " is necessary as to any hand 
 free choice has in the affair ; because by the supposition 
 it precludes,- all previous acts of the will or choice in tlie 
 case, which might prevent it." That is to say, it is ne- 
 cessary as to preceding acts of choice ; because, by the 
 supposition, it is wholly independent of preceding acts of 
 choice for its existence. 
 
 Now, in so far as the doctrine of moral necessity is 
 concerned, this argument amounts to just exactly nothing. 
 For although a vohtion may be necessary as to one par- 
 ticular cause, in consequence of its being wholly indepen- 
 dent of that cause ; it does not follow that it is necessarily 
 produced by another cause. Because it does not result 
 from any preceding act of volition, and consequently is 
 necessary as to any hand that preceding act of volition 
 had in the affair, it does not follow, that the " strongest 
 motive" produces it. Supposing a volition to be inde- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 165 
 
 pendent of all causes, as well as of preceding acts of choice ; 
 and then it would be necessary, in the same sense, as to 
 all causes, as well as to preceding acts of choice. But 
 how infinitely absurd would it be to conclude, that because 
 a volition is independent of the influence of all causes, it 
 is therefore necessarily connected with the influence of a 
 particular cause ! 
 
 We only deny that volitions are necessarily connected 
 with the " power," or " influence," or " action," of motives 
 or moral causes. This is the only kind of necessity 
 against which, as the advocates of free-agency, we are at 
 all concerned to contend. And it is worse than idle for 
 the necessitarian to endeavour to establish any other kind 
 of necessity beside this. Let him come directly to the 
 point, and keep to it, if he would hope to accomplish any 
 thing. This shifting backwards and forwards from one 
 meaning of an ambiguous term to another ; this showing 
 a vohtion to be necessary in one sense, and then tacitly 
 assuming it to be necessary in another sense ; is not the wa^ 
 to silence and refute the adversaries of the doctrine of moral 
 necessity. It may show, (supposing the argument to b^ 
 sound,) that a volition is necessary as to a particular 
 cause, on the supposition that it is not produced by that 
 cause ; and in the same manner, it might be shown, that a 
 volition is necessary as to all causes, on the supposition 
 that it is produced by no cause. But the necessity which 
 results from such a supposition, would be directly arrayed 
 against the necessity for which President Edwards con- 
 tends. In the same sense, volitions " are necessary as to any 
 hand motives have in the afliair," on the supposition that 
 they do not result from the influence of motives; but 
 instead of building on this kind of necessity, one would 
 15 
 
166 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 have supposed that President Edwards was somewhat 
 concerned in its destruction. 
 
 In short, the case stands thus : a thing is said to be ne- 
 cessary, on the supposition that it has no cause of its 
 existence ; or necessary as to another thing, on the suppo- 
 sition that it does not depend on that other thing for its 
 existence. Again, a thing is said to be necessary, on the 
 supposition that it proceeds from the operation of a cause. 
 These ideas are perfecdy distinct. The difference between 
 them is as clear as noon-day. It is true, they have the 
 same name ; but to reason from the one to the other, is 
 about as wild an abuse of language as could be made. Pre- 
 sident Edwards is required to show that a volition is ne- 
 cessary, in the sense of its having a moral cause ; he 
 has shown that it is necessary in the sense of its not 
 having a cause. This is his argument. 
 
 Let us view this subject in another light. If we say 
 that a volition proceeds from a prior act of choice, we 
 certainly hold the doctrine of necessity. President Ed- 
 wards speaks out from the Inquiry and convicts us of this 
 doctrine. " Their notion of action," says he, " implies 
 necessity, and supposes that it is necessary, and cannot 
 be contingent. For they suppose, that whatever is pro- 
 perly called action, must be determined by the will and 
 free choice ; and this is as much as to say, that it must 
 be necessary, being dependent upon, and determined by 
 something foregoing ; namely, a foregoing act of choice," 
 p. 199. Thus, if we say that a volition is produced by a 
 preceding act of volition, we are clearly convicted of the 
 doctrine of necessity. 
 
 Now let us endeavour to escape from this accusation. 
 For this purpose, let us assume the directly opposite posi- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 167 
 
 tion : let us deny that our volitions are produced by pre- 
 ceding acts of choice — and what then ? Are we out of 
 danger? Far from it. We are still convicted of the 
 dreaded doctrine of necessity. On the very supposition 
 we have made, diametrically opposite as it is to the for- 
 mer, we are still convicted of the same doctrine of neces- 
 sity. We cannot escape from it. It pursues us, like a 
 ghost, through the dark and ill-defined shadows of an 
 ambiguous phraseology, and lays its cold hand upon us. 
 Turn wheresoever we may, it is sure to meet us in some 
 shape or other. 
 
 This is not all. We are also convicted of a contra- 
 diction in terms. It is shown, that we hold an act to be 
 " both necessary and not necessary." This may appear 
 to be an exceedingly grave charge ; and yet I think we 
 may venture to put in the plea of " guilty." We do 
 hold an act to be necessary, as to the strongest motive, as 
 well as to any preceding act of choice, by which we 
 contend it is not produced, and by which it cannot be 
 prevented. We likewise most freely admit, that many 
 vohtions are necessary in other senses of the word, as 
 explained by President Edwards. We cannot deny this, 
 so long as we retain our senses ; for " a thing is said to 
 be necessary, according to him, "when it has already 
 come to pass, and so made sure of its existence; and 
 it is likewise said to be necessary, when its present 
 existence, is certainly and infaUibly known, as well as 
 when its future existence is certainly and infallibly fore- 
 known. But yet we deny, that an act of volition is neces- 
 sary, m the sense that it is produced by the operation of 
 the strongest motive, as it is called. That is to say, we 
 admit an act of choice to be necessary, in some senses of 
 the word ; and, in another sense of it, we deny it to be 
 
168 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 necessary. Is there any thing very contradictory in all 
 this ? Any thing to shock the common sense and reason 
 of mankind ? 
 
 It may be said, that Edwards does not always endea- 
 vour to establish the doctrine of moral necessity ; that he 
 frequently aims merely to show, that our actions are " not 
 without all necessity." This is unquestionably true. He 
 frequently arrives at this conclusion; and he seems to 
 think that he has done something, whenever he has shown 
 our actions to be necessary in any sense of the word as 
 defined by himself. But it is difficult to conceive with 
 whom he could have had any controversy. For certainly 
 no one in his right mind, could pretend to deny that 
 human actions are necessary in any sense, as the word is 
 explained and used in the Inquiry. When it is said, for 
 example, that the truth of the proposition which affirms 
 the future existence of an event, is necessarily connected 
 with the idea that that event is certainly and infallibly 
 foreknown ; no one, in his right mind, can deny the posi- 
 tion. Such a denial, as Edwards says, involves a con- 
 tradiction in terms. Hence, this notion of necessity 
 only requires to be stated and understood, in order to 
 rivet irresistible conviction on the mind of every rational 
 bemg. No light has been thrown upon it, by the pages 
 which President Edwards has devoted to the subject; 
 nor could a thousand volumes render it one whit clearer 
 than it is in itself. Hence, the author of the Inquiry 
 should have seen, that if there was any controversy with 
 him on this point, it was not because there was any 
 diversity of opinion ; but because there was a misconcep- 
 tion of his proposition. And no doubt he would have 
 seen this, if the meaning of his own language had been 
 clearly defined in his own mind : if he had marked out 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 169 
 
 and circumscribed, as with a sunbeam, the precise Hmita- 
 tion within which his own propositions are true, and 
 beyond which they are false. 
 
 If he had done this, he would have seen that there 
 was, and that there could have been, but one real point of 
 difference between himself and his adversaries. He 
 would have seen, that, aside from the ambiguities of lan- 
 guage, there was but one real point in dispute. He would 
 have seen, that it was affirmed, on the one side, that the 
 strongest motive operates to produce a choice ; and that 
 this was denied on the other. And hence, he would have 
 put forth his whole strength to establish this single point, 
 to fortify this single doctrine of moral necessity. He 
 would not have crowded so many different ideas into the 
 definition of the term necessity ; and then imagined that 
 he was overwhelming and confounding his adversaries, 
 when he was only showing that human " actions are not 
 without all necessity." And when they said, that " a 
 necessary action is a contradiction," he would have seen 
 how they used the term necessary ; and he would not 
 have concluded, as he has done, that this " notion of 
 action implies contingence, and excludes all necessity,^* 
 p. 199. He would have seen, that the idea of an action, 
 in our view, is inconsistent with necessity, in one sense of 
 the word ; and yet not inconsistent with every thing that 
 has been called necessity. 
 
 In the definition of President Edwards, there is an 
 inherent and radical defect, which I have not as yet no- 
 ticed ; and which is, indeed, the source of all his vacillat- 
 ing on this subject. It proceeds from a very common 
 error, which has been well explained and illustrated by 
 Mr. Stewart in his Essay on the Beautiful. 
 
 The various theories, which ingenious men have framed 
 15* 
 
170 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 in relation to the beautiful, says Mr. Stewart, " have ori- 
 ginated in a prejudice, which has descended to modern 
 times from the scholastic ages ; that when a word admits 
 of a variety of significations, these different significations 
 must all be species of the same genus ; and must conse- 
 quently include some essential idea common to every 
 individual to which the generic term can be applied." 
 
 The question of Aristippas, " how can beauty differ from 
 beauty," says Mr. Stewart, " plainly proceeded on a total 
 misconception of the nature of the circumstances,' which, 
 in the history of language, attach different meanings to 
 the same word ; and which by slow and insensible grada- 
 tions, remove them to such a distance from their primitive 
 or radical sense, that no ingenuity can trace the successive 
 steps of their progress. The variety of these circum- 
 stances is, in fact, so great, that it is impossible to attempt 
 a complete enumeration of them ; and I shall, therefore, 
 select a few of the cases, in which the principle now in 
 question appears most obviously and indisputably to fail." 
 
 " I shall begin with supposing, that the letters A, B, C, 
 D, E, denote a series of objects ; that A possesses some 
 quality in common with B ; B a quality in common with 
 C ; C a quality in common with D ; D a quality in com- 
 mon with E ; — while at the same time, no quality can be 
 found which belongs in common to any three objects in 
 the series. Is it not conceivable, that the affinity between 
 A and B may produce a transference of the name of the 
 first to the second ; and that, in consequence of the other 
 affinities which connect the remaining objects together, the 
 same name may pass in succession from B to C ; from 
 C to D ; and from D to E ?" 
 
 This idea, and the reasoning which Mr. Stewart has 
 founded upon it, are at once obvious, original and pro- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 17 1 
 
 found. It shows that the most gifted philosophers, have 
 not been able to frame a satisfactory theory of the beauti- 
 ful, because they have proceeded on the false supposition, 
 that all those objects which are called beautiful have some 
 common property, merely because they have a common 
 appellation, by which they are distinguished from other 
 objects ; and that m endeavouring to point out and define 
 this common property, they have engaged in an impracti- 
 cable attempt ; and hence they have succeeded to their 
 own satisfaction, only by doing violence to the nature of 
 things. 
 
 This is a fruitful idea. It admits of many illustrations. 
 I shall select only a few. Philosophers and jurists have 
 frequently attempted to define executive power; but they 
 have proceeded on the supposition, that all those powers 
 called executive, have a common and distinguishing pro- 
 perty, because they have a common name. Hence, they 
 have necessarily failed ; because the supposition on which 
 they have proceeded is false. Executive power, properly 
 so called, is that which sees to the execution of the laws ; 
 and other powers are called executive, not because they 
 partake of the nature of such powers, but simply because 
 they have been conferred upon the chief executive magis- 
 trate. 
 
 The same remark may be made, in relation to the 
 attempts of ingenious men, to define the nature of law in 
 general. If we analyze all those things which have been 
 called laws, we shall find that they have no element or 
 property in common : the only thing they have in common 
 is the name. Hence, when we undertake to define law 
 in general, or to point out the common property by which 
 laws are distinguished from other things, we must neces- 
 sarily fail. We may frame a definition in words, as others 
 
172 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 have done ; but, however carefully this may be con- 
 structed, it can be applied to different kinds of laws, only 
 by giving totally different meanings to the words of which 
 it is composed. Thus, for example, a law is said to be 
 " a rule of conduct," given by a superior to an inferior, 
 and " which the inferior is bound to obey." Now, who 
 does not see, that the words conduct and obedience, must 
 have totally distinct meanings, when they are applied to 
 inanimate objects and when they are applied to the actions 
 of moral and accountable beings ? And who does not 
 see, that human beings are bound to do their duty, in an 
 entirely different sense, from that in which matter can be 
 said to be under an obligation ? The same remark may 
 be extended to all the definitions which have been given 
 of law in general. And whoever understands the phi- 
 losophy of definitions, will easily perceive that every 
 attempt to draw thyigs, so wholly unlike each other, under 
 one and the same mode of expression, is not really to 
 define, but to hide, the true nature of things under the 
 ambiguities of language. 
 
 Of this common fault. President Edwards has been 
 guilty. Instead of defining the various senses of the term 
 necessity, and always using it witli precision and without 
 confusion; he has undertaken to show wherein those 
 things called necessary really agree in some common pro- 
 perty. He looked for a common nature, where there is 
 only a common name. As Aristippas could not conceive, 
 " how beauty could differ from beauty ;" so, if we may 
 judge from his argument, it was a great difficulty with 
 him, to conceive how necessity can differ from necessity. 
 Hence, when he proves an action to be necessary in any 
 one of the various senses which are included under his 
 definition of philosophical necessity, he imagines that his 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 173 
 
 work is done ; and when his adversary denies that an 
 action is necessary in any one of those senses, he con- 
 cludes that he denies " all necessity !" In all this, we 
 see the question as plainly as if it had been expressly 
 written down, " how can philosophical necessity differ 
 from philosophical necessity ?'* To which I would sim- 
 ply reply, that a thing cannot differ from itself, it is true ; 
 but the same word may have very different meanings ; and 
 that it is " a prejudice which has descended to modern 
 times from the scholastic ages," to suppose that things 
 have a common nature, merely because they have a com- 
 mon name. 
 
 No better illustration of the fallacy of this prejudice 
 could be furnished, than that which Edwards has given 
 in his definition of philosophical or metaphysical neces- 
 sity. Under this definition, as we have seen, he has 
 included the being of a God, which is said to be neces- 
 sary, because he has existed from all eternity, unmade 
 and uncaused ; and also the existence of an effect, which 
 is said to be necessary, because it necessarily results from 
 the operation of a cause. Now, these two ideas stand in 
 direct opposition to each other ; and the only thing they 
 have in common is the name. And yet President Ed- 
 wards reasons from the one to the other ! If he can, in 
 any way, reach the name, this seems to satisfy him. The 
 thing in dispute is entirely overlooked. If we say that 
 choice is produced by choice, then he contends it is an 
 effect, and consequently necessary. If we deny that 
 choice is produced by choice, then it is necessary any 
 how ; not because it is produced by a cause, but because 
 it is independent of a cause, being neither produced nor 
 prevented by it. It makes no difference with this great 
 champion of necessity, whether choice is said to be pro- 
 
174 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 (luced by choice or not ; for, on either of these opposite 
 suppositions, he can show that our vohtions are necessary. 
 The absence of the very circumstance which makes it 
 necessary in the one case, is that which makes it necessary 
 in the other. Is choice produced by choice ? Then this 
 dependence of choice upon choice, shows it to be neces- 
 sary. Is choice not produced by choice ? Then this 
 independence of choice upon choice is the very thing 
 which shows it to be necessary ! Thus this great cham- 
 pion of necessity, just passes from one meaning of the 
 term to another, without the least regard to the point in 
 dispute, or to the logical coherency of his argument. 
 Surely, if " a reluctant world has bowed in homage" to 
 his logic, it must have been because the world has been 
 too indolent to pry into the sophisms with which it 
 swarms. It is only in his onsets upon error, that the 
 might of his resistless logic is felt ; in the defence of his 
 own system, he does not reason at all, he merely ram- 
 bles. Indeed, with all his gigantic power, he was com- 
 pelled to reel and stagger under the burden of such a 
 cause. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 175 
 
 SECTION XIII. 
 
 OF NATURAL AND MORAL NECESSITY. 
 
 I HAVE already said many things bearing upon the 
 famous distinction between natural and moral necessity; 
 but this distinction is regarded as so important by its 
 advocates, that it deserves a separate notice. This I shall 
 proceed to give it. 
 
 The distinction in question is treated with no great 
 reverence by the advocates of free-agency. It is de- 
 nounced by them as a distinction without a difference ; 
 and, though this may be true in the main, yet this is not 
 the way to settle any thing. There is, indeed, a real 
 difference between natural and moral necessity, as they 
 are held and described by necessitarians ; and if we pay 
 no attention to it, our declarations about its futility will 
 be apt to produce more heat than light. I fully recog- 
 nize the justness of the demand made by Dr. Edwards, 
 that those who insist that natural and moral necessity are 
 the same, should tell us in what respects they are so. 
 "We have informed them," says he, "in what respects 
 we hold them to be different. We wish them to be 
 equally explicit and candid," p. 19. I intend to be 
 equally explicit and candid. 
 
 I admit, then, that there is a real difference between 
 natural and moral necessity ; they differ, as the Ed- 
 wardses say, in the nature of the terms connected. In 
 the one case, there is a natural cause and its effect, such 
 as force and the motion produced by it, connected toge- 
 
176 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 ther ; and iu the other, there is a motive and a volition. 
 In this respect, I believe that there is a greater difference 
 between them than does the necessitarian himself; for ht* 
 considers volition to be of the same nature with an effect, 
 whereas I regard it as essentially different in nature and 
 in kind from an effect. 
 
 There is another difference between natural and moral 
 necessity. Natural necessity admits of an opposition of 
 the will ; whereas it is absurd to suppose any such oppo- 
 sition in the case of moral necessity. A man may be so 
 bound that his utmost efforts to move may prove una- 
 vailing : in such a case, he is said to labour under a na- 
 tural necessity. This always implies and presupposes 
 an opposition of will. But not so in regard to moral 
 necessity. It is absurd to suppose, that our wills can 
 ever be in opposition to moral necessity ; for this would 
 be to suppose that we are made willing by the influence 
 of motives, and yet are not willing. 
 
 Now, I fully recognize these differences between na- 
 tural and moral necessity, as they are viewed by the ne- 
 cessitarian. Whether they are not inconsistent with their 
 ideas of moral necessity, is another question. But as I 
 am not concerned with that question at present, I am 
 willing to take these differences without the least abate- 
 ment. Admitting, then, that these distinctions are well- 
 founded, and that they are perfectly consistent with the 
 idea of moral necessity, let us see in what respects there 
 is an agreement between the things under consideration. 
 The difference does not lie, says Edwards, so much in 
 the nature of the connexion, as in the two terms con- 
 nected. Moral necessity is '* a sure and perfect connexion 
 between moral causes and effects." It is " as absolute 
 as natural necessity.'* The influence of motives is not 
 
EDWARDS ON THE ^ WILL. 177 
 
 a condition of volition, which the will may or may not 
 follow ; it is the cause thereof; and it is absurd to sup- 
 pose that the effect, the volition, can be loose from the 
 influence of its cause, p. 77-8. Yes, volition is just 
 as absolutely and unconditionally controlled by motive, 
 as the inanimate objects of nature are controlled by the 
 power of the Almighty. The connexion, the necessary 
 connexion, which subsists between motion and the force 
 by which it is produced, is the same in nature and in kind 
 as that which subsists between the " action or influence 
 of motive*' and volition. Herein, then, is the agreement, 
 that in moral necessity, as well as in natural, the effect 
 is produced by the influence of its cause. The nature of 
 the connexion is the same in both; and in both it is 
 equally absolute. 
 
 Now we have seen the differences, and we have also 
 seen the points of agreement ; and the question is, not 
 whether this famous distinction be well-founded, but 
 whether it will serve the purpose for which it is em- 
 ployed. In the full light, and in the perfect recognition 
 of this distinction, we deny that it will serve the purpose 
 of the necessitarian. 
 
 It is supposed, that natural .necessity alone interferes 
 with the free-agency of man, while moral necessity is 
 perfectly consistent with it. But, in reality, moral ne- 
 cessity is more utterly subversive of all free-agency and 
 accountability than natural necessity itself. Think not 
 that this is a mere hasty and idle assertion. Let us look 
 at it, and see if it is not true. 
 
 We have already seen, that a caused volition is no vo- 
 lition at all ; — that a necessary agent is a contradiction in 
 terms. In other words, a power to act must itself act, 
 and not be made to act by the action of any other power, 
 16 
 
178 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 or else it does not act at all. And if it must be caused to 
 act, before it can act, then, as we have already seen, there 
 must be an infinite series of acts. These things have 
 been fully illustrated, and defended against the false ana- 
 logies, by which they have been assailed ; and they are 
 here mentioned only for the sake of greater clearness 
 and distinctness. 
 
 If the scheme of moral tfecessity be true, then, ac- 
 cording to which our volitions are absolutely caused by 
 the "action or influence of motive," it is idle to talk 
 about free acts of the will ; for there are no acts of the 
 will at all. If our wills are caused to put forth volitions, 
 and are turned to one side or the other, by the controlling 
 influence of motives, it is idle to talk about a free-will ; 
 for we have no will at all. I know full well, that Pre- 
 sident Edwards admits that we have a will, and that the 
 will does really act; but this admission is contradicted 
 by bringing the will and all its exercises under the domi- 
 nation and absolute control of motives. He obliterates 
 the distinction between cause and effect, between action 
 and passion, between mental activity and bodily motion ; 
 and thereby draws the phenomena of will, the volitions 
 of all intelligent creatures, under the iron scheme of 
 necessity. We are eternally reminded that Edwards 
 believes in tlie existence of a will, and in the reality 
 of its acts. We know it; but let us not be accused 
 of misrepresenting him, unless it can be shown that 
 one part of his system does not contradict another, — 
 unless it can be shown, not by false analogies and an 
 abuse of words, but by valid evidence, that an act of the 
 mind may be necessarily caused. This never has been 
 shown ; and the attempts of the necessitarian to show it, 
 as we have seen, are among the most signal failures in 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 179 
 
 the whole range of human philosophy. Until this be 
 shown, we must contend that there is nothing in the 
 universe so diametrically opposed to all free-agency— to 
 all liberty of the will, as the scheme of moral necessity ; 
 which so clearly overthrows and demolishes the very 
 idea of a will and all its volitions. 
 
 Indeed, what is called natural necessity does not pro- 
 perly interfere with the liberty of the will at all ; it 
 merely restrains the freedom of motion. It is moral 
 necessity that reaches the seat of the mind, and takes 
 away all the freedom thereof; even denying to us the 
 possession of a will itself. When my hand is bound, I 
 may strive to move it in vain ; in this case, my will is 
 free, because I may strive, or I may not ; but the hand 
 is not free, because it cannot move. But if motives cause 
 the mind to follow their influence, so that it may not 
 possibly depart or be loose from that influence ; then 
 we have no will at all ; and it is idle and a mockery to 
 talk about freedom of the will. And yet, although Ed- 
 wards would have us to believe that no system is con- 
 sistent with free-agency but his own ; he occupies the 
 position, that it is absurd to suppose, that a volition 
 may possibly be loose from the influence of motive ; 
 that this is to suppose that it is the effect of motive, and 
 at the same time that it is not the eflfect of motive ! 
 
 "All agree," says Day, "that a necessity which is 
 opposed to our choice, is inconsistent with liberty," p. 
 91. That is to say, a necessity which cuts off" or pre- 
 vents the external consequence of our choice, is incon- 
 sistent with liberty of the will ; but that which takes 
 away one choice, and sets up another, is perfectly con- 
 sistent with it! If the arm is held, so that the free 
 choice cannot move it, then is the liberty of the will 
 
ISO EXAMINATION OF 
 
 interfered with; but, though the will may be absolutely- 
 swayed and controlled, by the influence of motives, or 
 by the sovereign power of God himself, yet is it per- 
 fectly free ! If such be the liberty of the will, what is it 
 worth ? 
 
 There are many things, which it is beyond the power 
 of the human mind to accomplish. Even in such cases, 
 the natural necessity under which we are said to labour, 
 does not interfere with the liberty of the will. If we 
 cannot do such things, it is not because our will is not 
 free in regard to them, but because its power is limited. 
 We might very well attempt them, and put forth voli- 
 tions in order to accomplish them, as in our ignorance 
 we often do ; and if we abstain from so doing in other 
 cases, wherein we might wish to act, it is because we 
 know they are beyond our power, and, as rational crea- 
 tures, do not choose to make fools of ourselves. To say 
 that we are under a natural necessity, then, is only to say 
 that our power is limited, and not that it is not free. It 
 is reserved for moral necessity — shall I say to enslave ? 
 — no, but to annihilate the will. 
 
 It is true, if we will to do a thing, and are restrained 
 from doing it by a superior force, we are not to blame 
 for not doing it; or if we refuse to do it, and are con- 
 strained to do it, we are equally blameless. In such 
 cases, natural necessity, although it does not reach the 
 will, is an excuse for external conduct. If the question 
 were, is a man accountable for his external actions ? for 
 the movements of his body ? then we might talk about 
 natural necessity. But as the question, in the present 
 controversy, is, whether a man is accountable for his 
 internal acts, for the volitions of his mind ? to talk about 
 natural necessity is wholly irrelevant. It has nothing 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 181 
 
 to do with such a controversy ; and hence, Edwards is 
 entirely mistaken when he supposes that it is natural 
 necessity, and that alone, which is opposed to the free- 
 dom of the will. It is in fact opposed to nothing but the 
 freedom of the body ; and by lugging it into the present 
 controversy, it can only serve to make confusion the 
 worse confounded. 
 
 It is the general sentiment of mankind, that moral ne- 
 cessity is inconsistent with free-agency and accounta- 
 bility. Edwards has taken great pains to explain this 
 fact. His great reason for it is, that men are in the habit 
 of excusing themselves for their outward conduct, on the 
 ground of natural necessity. In this way, by early and 
 constant association, the idea of blamelessness becomes 
 firmly attached to the term necessity, as well as those 
 terms, such as must, cannot, &c., in which the same 
 thing is implied. Hence, we naturally suppose that we 
 are excusable for those things which are necessary with 
 a moral necessity. Thus, the fact that men generally 
 regard moral necessity and free-agency as incompatible 
 with each other, is supposed by Edwards to arise from 
 the ambiguity of language; and that if we will only shake 
 off this influence, we shall see a perfect agreement and 
 harmony between them. 
 
 But is this so ? Let any man fix his mind upon the 
 very idea of moral necessity itself, and then answer this 
 question. Let him lay aside the term necessity, and all 
 kindred words ; let him simply and abstractedly consider 
 a volition as being produced by the " action or influence 
 of motives;" and then ask himself, if the subject in 
 which this eflJect is produced is accountable for it ? If it 
 can be his virtue or his vice ? Let him conceive of a 
 volition, or any thing else, as being produced in the hu- 
 16* 
 
182 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 man mind, by an extraneous cause ; and then ask him- 
 self if the mind in which it is thus produced can be to 
 praise or to blame for it ? Let any man do this, and I 
 think he will see a better reason for the common senti- 
 ment of mankind than any which Edwards has assigned 
 for it; he will see that men have generally regarded 
 moral necessity as incompatible with free-agency and ac- 
 countability, just because it is utterly irreconcilable with 
 them. 
 
 Indeed, however liable "the common people," and 
 philosophers too, may be to be deceived and misled by 
 the ambiguities of language, there is no such deception in 
 the present case. The common people, as they are 
 called, do not always say, my actions are " necessary," 
 "I cannot help them," and therefore I am not accounta- 
 ble for them. They as frequently say, that if my actions, 
 if my volitions, are brought to pass by the strength and 
 influence of motives, I am not responsible for them. 
 This common sentiment and conviction of mankind, 
 therefore, does not blindly aim merely at the name, while 
 it misses the thing ; it does indeed bear with all its force 
 directly upon the scheme of moral necessity itself. And 
 its power is sought to be evaded, as we have seen, and 
 as we shall still further see, not by explaining the ambi- 
 guities of language, so as to enlighten mankind, but by 
 confounding the most opposite natures, such as action 
 and passion, volition and local motion, through the am- 
 biguities of language. It is the necessitarian, who is al- 
 ways talkii'Jg about the ambiguities of language, that is 
 continually building upon them. Indeed, it is hard to 
 conceive why he has so often been supposed to use lan- 
 guage with such wonderful precision, if it be not because 
 he is eternally complaining of the want of it in others. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. I8t 
 
 Just let the common people, or those of them who 
 may desire an opiate for their consciences, see the scheme 
 of moral necessity as it is in itself, stripped of all the dis- 
 guises of an ambiguous phraseology, and it will satisfy 
 them. It will be the one thing needful to their craving 
 and hungering appetites. Let them be made to believe 
 that all our volitions are produced by the action and in- 
 fluence of motives, so that they may not be otherwise 
 than they are ; and a sense of moral obligation and re- 
 sponsibility will be extinguished in their breasts, unless 
 nature should prove too strong for sophistry. Indeed, 
 if we may believe the most authentic accounts, this doc- 
 trine has done its strange and fearful work among the 
 common people, both in this country and in Europe. It 
 is a philosophy which is within the reach of the most 
 ordinary minds, as well as the most agreeable to the most 
 abandoned hearts ; and hence its awfully desolating power. 
 And if its ravages and devastations have not extended 
 wider and deeper than they have, it is because they have 
 been checked by the combined powers of nature and of 
 religion, rather than by logic ; by the happy inconsist- 
 ency, rather than by the superior metaphysical acumen, 
 of its advocates and admirers. 
 
184 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 SECTION XIV. 
 
 It was not the design of Edwards, as it is well 
 known, to interfere with the moral agency of man. He 
 honestly believed that the scheme of necessity, as held 
 by himself, was perfectly consistent with the doctrine of 
 liberty ; and he retorted upon his adversaries that it was 
 their system, and not his, which struck at the foundation 
 of moral agency and accountability. But however up- 
 right may have been his intentions, he has merely left us 
 the name of liberty, while he has in reality denied to us 
 its nature and its essence. 
 
 According to his view of the subject, " The plain and 
 obvious meaning of the words freedom and liberty, in 
 common speech, is the power, opportunity, or advan- 
 tage that any one has to do as he pleases. Or, in other 
 words, his being free from hindrance or impediment in 
 the way of doing, or conducting in any respect as h^ 
 wills. And the contrary to liberty, whatever name we 
 call that by, is a person's being hindered, or unable to 
 conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do other- 
 wise." 
 
 This is the kind of liberty for which he contends. And 
 he says, "There are two things contrary to what is 
 called liberty in common speech. One is constraint, 
 otherwise called/orce, compulsion, and co-action, which 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 185 
 
 is a person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary to 
 his will. The other is restraint ; which is his being 
 hindered, and not having power to do according to his 
 will. But that which has no will cannot be the subject 
 of these things." 
 
 This notion of liberty, as Edwards says, presupposes 
 the existence of a will. In fact, it presupposes more 
 than this ; it presupposes the existence of a determina- 
 tion of the will. For, unless one is determined not to 
 do a thing, he cannot be constrained to do it, contrary to 
 his will ; and, unless he is determined to do a thing, he 
 cannot be restrained from doing it according to his will. 
 This kind of liberty, then, as it presupposes the exist- 
 ence of a determination of the will, has nothing to do 
 with the manner in which that determination is brought 
 to pass. If the determination of the mind or will were 
 brought to pass, so to speak, by an absolutely irresistible 
 force ; just as any other effect is brought to pass by its effi- 
 cient cause ; yet this kind of liberty might exist in its ut- 
 most perfection. For it only requires that after the will is 
 determined in this manner, or in any other, that it should 
 be left free from constraint or restraint, to flow on just 
 as it has been determined to do. It is no other liberty 
 than that which is possessed by a current of water, when 
 it is said to flow freely , because it is not opposed in its 
 course by any material obstruction. 
 
 That the liberty for which Edwards contends, has 
 nothing to do with the manner in which our actions or 
 volitions come to pass ; or, more properly speaking, with 
 the kind of relation between motives and actions, we have 
 his own express acknowledgment. *' What is vulgarly 
 called liberty," says he, "namely, that power and op- 
 portunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or accord- 
 
186 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 ing to his choice, is all that is meant by it ; without taking 
 into the meaning of the word any thing of the cause of 
 that choice; or at all considering how the person came 
 to have such a volition ; whether it was caused by some 
 external motive, or internal habitual bias ; whether it 
 was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or 
 whether it happened without a cause ; whether it was 
 necessarily connected with something foregoing, or 
 not connected. Let the person come by his choice any 
 HOW, yet if he is able, and there is nothing in the way 
 to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man 
 is perfectly free, according to the primary and common 
 notion of freedom." 
 
 This notion of liberty, it is easy to see, is consistent 
 with the most absolute scheme of fatality of which it is 
 possible to conceive. For, according to this idea of it, 
 if we should come by our choice ** any how," even by 
 the most irresistible influence of external circumstances, 
 yet we might be *' perfectly free." Hence it is no won- 
 der that we find the same definition of liberty in the 
 writings of the most absolute fatalists. 
 
 It is remarkable that Edwards has taken great pains to 
 define his idea of philosophical necessity, and to distin- 
 guish it from the common sense of the word ; and yet 
 he supposes that the notion of liberty, about which the 
 same dispute is conversant, is that which is referred to 
 " in common speech," or that " which is vulgarly called 
 liberty." He contends for a philosophical necessity, 
 and especially for a necessary connexion between the in- 
 fluence of motives and volitions ; but the philosophical 
 liberty which stands opposed to his scheme, which de- 
 nies any suc\i necessary connexion, he has not deemed 
 it worth his while to notice ! 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 187 
 
 Liberty, according to Edwards' sense of the term, has 
 nothing to do with the controversy respecting free-agency 
 and necessity. It is as consistent with fatalism as could 
 be desired by the most extravagant supporters of that 
 odious system. Hence, when the doctrine of necessity 
 is denied, and that of liberty or moral agency is asserted, 
 something more than this is intended. The idea of liber- 
 ty, as it stands connected with the controversy in ques- 
 tion, has reference to the manner in which our volitions 
 come to pass, to the relation which subsists between mo- 
 tives and their corresponding actions. When we say 
 that the will is free, we mean " that it is not necessarily 
 determined by the influence of motives ;" we mean to 
 deny the doctrine of moral necessity, or that the relation 
 which subsists between a motive and its corresponding 
 act, is not that which subsists between an efficient cause 
 and it^effect. We mean to contend for a philosophical 
 liberty, as President Edwards contends for a philosophi- 
 cal necessity, and not for that " which is vulgarly called 
 liberty." 
 
 There is an inconsistency, I am aware, in supposing a 
 choice to be induced by the force of external circumstances, 
 or by the force of motives, whether external or internal ; 
 but this inconsistency belongs to the scheme of necessity ; 
 and if I have indulged in the supposition for a moment, it 
 was only to meet the necessitarian, and argue with him 
 on his own ground. As I have already said, a will that 
 is determined^ instead of determining, is no will at all. 
 And the liberty of the will for which we contend, is im- 
 plied by the power of the mind to act. It does not de- 
 pend upon the presence or the absence of any external 
 obstruction. It is no such occasional, or accidental thing ; 
 it is an inherent and essential attribute and power of the 
 
188 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 mind. No power in the universe, but that of creation, 
 can produce it, and no chains on earth can bind it. 
 
 The idea of Uberty, as contended for by President Ed- 
 wards, is no other than that entertained by Mr. Locke. 
 Thus, says the latter, "there may be thought, there 
 may be will, there may be volition, where there is no 
 liberty. ^^ In illustration of this position he says, "A 
 man falling into water, (a bridge breaking under him,) 
 has not herein liberty, is not a free-agent. For though 
 he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to 
 falling, yet the forbearance of that motion not being in 
 his power, the stop or cessation of that motion follows not 
 upon his volition ; and therefore therein he is not free." 
 
 It is true, he is not therein free, in one of the most 
 common senses of the term ; but it is wrong to conclude 
 from hence, that there is in such a case, " no liberty, ^^ 
 For if the volition^ of which he is said to be posi^ssed, 
 did not result from the action of any thing, if it was 
 simply an act of the mind, which was not necessarily 
 produced by another act, then he possessed freedom in 
 the philosophical sense of the term. He was free in the 
 act of willing, in the possession of his volition, although 
 the consequence of that volition was cut off and prevented 
 by an over-ruling necessity, which had no conceivable 
 relation to the manner in which he came by his volition. 
 Wherever there is a volition, there is this kind qf liberty ; 
 for a volition is not, and cannot be, produced by any 
 coercive force. 
 
 The foregoing illustration might have been very con- 
 sistently offered by President Edwards, who considered 
 a volition and a preference of the mind as identically the 
 same ; but it comes not with so good a grace from Mr. 
 Locke. He considered an act of the will as different from 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 189 
 
 a preference. According to his doctrine, a man might pre- 
 fer not to fall, in such a case as that put by himself, and 
 yet not will not to fall. And he illustrates the difference 
 by saying, " a man would prefer flying to walking, yet 
 who can say he ever wills it?" Now, if a man cannot 
 will to fly, it is very difficult to see how he can will not 
 to fall, in case he were dropped from the air. 
 
 The illustration of Mr. Locke is fallacious. It does 
 not show, and I humbly conceive it cannot be shown, 
 that there can be a volition anywhere in the universe 
 where there is not freedom. The very idea of a volition, 
 or an act of the mind, necessarily impUes that kind of phi- 
 losophical liberty for which we contend. 
 
 The above notion of liberty, which Mr. Locke borrowed 
 from Hobbes, and Edwards from Locke, evidendy con- 
 founds the motion of the body, (which they frequently 
 call action,) with volition or action of the mind. Thus, no 
 matter how a volition comes to pass, or is caused to exist, 
 if there is nothing to prevent the motion of the body from 
 following its influence, we are said to be perfectly free. 
 This kind of liberty, therefore, refers to the motion of the 
 body, and not to the action of the mind. It has no refer- 
 ence whatever to the question. Is the mind free in the act 
 of willing? This is the question in dispute ; and hence, 
 if the necessitarian would say any thing to the purpose, 
 he must show that his scheme is reconcilable with the 
 freedom of the mind in willing. This Edwards has not 
 attempted to do. He has, in fact, as we have seen, only 
 given us the name, while he has taken from us the sub- 
 stance of liberty. 
 
 The idea of liberty, for which Edwards contends, may 
 be illustrated by an unobstructed fall of water. Indeed, 
 this is the very thing by which Mr. Hobbes has chosen to 
 17 
 
190 PXAMINATION OF 
 
 illustrate and explain it. *' I conceive liberty to be rightly 
 defined in this manner," says he ; " liberty is the absence 
 of all the impediments to action, (motion ?) that are not 
 contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent, 
 as for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to 
 have liberty to descend by the channel of the river, be- 
 cause there is no impediment that way, but not across, 
 because the banks are impediments, and though the water 
 cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the liberty to 
 ascend, but the faculty or power, because the impediment 
 is in the nature of the water, and intrinsical." Mr. Hobbes 
 encountered no more difficulty in reconciling this notion 
 of liberty with the scheme of fatality for which he con- 
 tended, than President Edwards found in reconciling it 
 with the same scheme in disguise. 
 
 According to the Inquiry, then, we have no other liberty 
 than that which may be ascribed to the winds and the 
 waves of the sea, as they are carried onward in their 
 courses by the power of the Almighty. Edwards looks 
 for liberty, and he finds it, not in the will, but in the mo- 
 tions of the body, which is universally admitted to be pas- 
 sive to the action of the will. He looks for liberty, and 
 he finds it, where, by universal consent, an absolute ne- 
 cessity reigns ; thus seeking and finding the living among 
 the dead. It is no wonder, that he could reconcile such 
 a liberty with the scheme of necessity. 
 
 Even President Day is not satisfied with this account 
 of liberty. " On the subject of liberty or freedom," says 
 he, " which occupies a portion of the fifth section of Ed- 
 wards' first book, he has been less particular than was 
 to be expected, considering that this is the great object of 
 inquiry in his work." How could Edwards have been 
 more particular ? He has repeatedly and most explicitly 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 191 
 
 informed us, that liberty consists in a power, or opportu- 
 nity, to do as we choose ; without considering how wc 
 come by our choice. If we can only do as we choose, 
 though our choice should be produced by the most abso- 
 lute and irresistible power in the universe, yet are wc 
 perfecdy free in the highest conceivable sense of the word. 
 " If any imagine they desire, and that they conceive of a 
 higher liberty than this," says he, " they are deceived, and 
 delude themselves with confused ambiguous words instead 
 of ideas." President Day complains that all this is not 
 sufficiently particular ; but although he may not have been 
 aware of it, I apprehend that he has been dissatisfied with 
 the dreadful particularity and precision with which the 
 doctrine of the Inquiry has been exhibited. It is precisely 
 the doctrine of liberty which has been held by the most 
 absolute and unqualified fatalists the world has ever seen ; 
 and it is set forth, too, with a bold precision and clearness, 
 which would have done honour to the stern consistency 
 of Hobbes himself. It is no wonder, that President Day 
 should have felt a desire to see such a doctrine softened 
 down by the author of the Inquiry. 
 
 "The professed object of his book," says President 
 Day, " according to the title-page, is an inquiry con- 
 cerning the freedom of the will ; — not the freedom of ex- 
 ternal conduct. We naturally look for his meaning of 
 this internal liberty. What he has said, in this section, 
 respecting freedom of the will, has rather the appearance 
 of evading such a definition of it as might be considered 
 his own." Yes, it is in this section that we naturally look 
 for his idea of the liberty of the will ; but we do not find 
 it. We must turn to the tide-page, if we wish to see any 
 thing about the liberty of the will. " What he has said, 
 in this section, respecting freedom of the will," does not, 
 
192 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 (President Day himself being judge,) relate to the freedom 
 of the will at all ; it only relates to the freedom of the 
 body, which has no freedom at all ; but which is wholly 
 passive to the action of the will. President Day is not 
 satisfied with all this ; and hence, he proceeds to tell us, 
 what Edwards would have said in this section, if he had 
 not thus evaded his own definition of internal liberty. 
 Let us see, then, what he would have said. 
 
 From a letter to a minister of the Church of Scotland, 
 President Day finds that in the phrase conducting as a 
 man pleases, the author of the Inquiry means to include 
 the idea of choosing as he pleases. Now, this is all true ; 
 and this is the internal liberty, which President Day has 
 extracted from the aforesaid letter. Then, according to 
 Edwards, we have two kinds of liberty; the one is a 
 liberty to move the body as we please, or as we choose ; 
 and the other is, to choose as we please, or as we choose. 
 In the vocabulary, and according to the psychology of 
 President Edwards, as we have frequently seen, and as 
 we here see, our pleasing and our choosing are one and 
 the same thing. Hence, to move our bodies according to 
 our pleasure, is to move it according to our choice ; and 
 to choose as we please, is to choose as we choose. Pre- 
 sident Day need not have gone to the letter in question, 
 in order to find this doctrine; for it is repeatedly set 
 forth In the Inquiry. President Edwards, as we have 
 seen, frequently contends in the Inquiry, that we always 
 choose as we choose ; and as frequently makes his adver- 
 saries assert, that we can "choose without choosing;'* 
 which is just as absurd, he truly declares, as to say that 
 a body can move while it is in a state of rest. 
 
 Now, to place liberty in this " choosing as we choose," 
 without regard to the cause or origin of our choice, is just 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 193 
 
 about as rational as it would be to place it in the axioms 
 of geometry. Suppose a man is made to choose, by an 
 absolute and uncontrollable power; it is nevertheless 
 true, that he chooses as he does choose. This cannot 
 be otherwise than true ; it is a self-evident and necessary 
 truth ; for nothing can be different from itself, can be 
 what it is, and yet not what it is, at one and the same 
 time. To speak of a power of choosing as we choose, as 
 Edwards and Day both do, is just about as reasonable as 
 it were to speak of a power to make two and two equal 
 to four. Supposing the Almighty should cause us to 
 choose, it is not in his power to prevent us from choosing 
 as we do choose ; for he cannot work contradictions. 
 
 Whether President Edwards speaks of our moving as 
 we please, or of our choosing as we please ; whether he 
 speaks of an external liberty, or of this internal liberty ; he 
 is always careful to remind us, that it has no reference to 
 the question, how we come by our pleasure or choice. 
 In the letter referred to, wherein he admits that a man's 
 liberty of conducting as he pleases or chooses, includes 
 *' a liberty of choosing as he pleases," he instantly adds, 
 but " without determining how he came by that plea- 
 sure." Yes, no matter how we come by our choice, 
 though it be wrought into us by the most uncontrollable 
 power in the universe, yet are we free in the highest 
 conceivable sense of the word, if we can only " conduct 
 according to our choice." This, instead of being the 
 greatest liberty, is indeed the greatest mockery, of which 
 it is possible for the imagination of man to conceive. 
 The liberty of fate itself, is, in all respects, to the full as 
 desirable as such a liberty as this. Is it not wonderful, 
 to behold the great and good author of the Inquiry, thus 
 planting himself upon the very ground of atheistical 
 17* 
 
194 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 fatalism ; and from thence, in sober, serious earnestness, 
 holding out to us, as a great and glorious reality, the 
 mere name and shadow and fiction of liberty ? the very 
 phantom which atheists, in mockery and derision, have 
 been pleased to confer upon mankind, as upon poor 
 blind fools, who merely dream of liberty, and fondly 
 dote upon the empty name thereof, whilst they are igno- 
 rant of the chains which bind them fast in fate. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 195 
 
 
 SECTION XV. 
 
 OF EDWARDS* IDEA OF VIRTUE. 
 
 In order to reconcile his scheme of necessity with the 
 existence and reality of virtue, it appears that Ed- 
 wards has adopted a false notion of virtue. This is the 
 course he has taken, as I have already shown, in regard 
 to the doctrine of liberty or free-agency, in order to recon- 
 cile it with necessity ; and if I mistake not, it may be 
 shown, that he has been able to reconcile necessity and 
 virtue only by transforming the nature of virtue to make 
 it suit his system. 
 
 I do not intend, at present, to enter into a full discus- 
 sion of the author's views in relation to the nature of 
 virtue. I shall content myself with a brief considera- 
 tion of his notion of virtue, as it stands more imme- 
 diately and directly connected with the subject of the 
 Inquiry. 
 
 It is a fundamental principle with him, that ** the es- 
 sence of the virtue and viciousness of dispositions of the 
 heart, and acts of the will, lies not in their cause, but 
 their nature." In what precise sense the author would 
 have us to understand this proposition, I shall not now 
 stop to inquire. It is sufficient for my present purpose, 
 that he attaches such a sense to it, as to make the idea of 
 virtue it is intended to define, to agree not only with his 
 doctrine of necessity, but also with any other kind of ne- 
 
196 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 cessity or fatality whatever. For he maintains, that as 
 the essence of virtue does not consist in its cause, but in 
 its nature, so a man by the mere act of creation may, in 
 the proper sense of the word, be endowed with virtuous 
 and holy dispositions. It is true, the man himself has 
 had no share in the production of his dispositions, they 
 are exclusively the work of his Creator; but yet they 
 are virtuous, they are the objects of moral approbation, 
 because the virtuousness of dispositions has nothing at 
 all to do with their cause or origin. It depends wholly 
 on their nature, and having this nature, (as he supposes 
 they may have by creation alone,) he concludes that they 
 are properly and truly virtuous, although the person in 
 whom they exist has in no manner whatever contributed 
 to their production ; neither in whole nor in part, neither 
 exclusively nor concurrently with his Maker. Now, it 
 is evident, I think,- that if virtue may be made to exist 
 in this way, by a power wholly extraneous to the being 
 in whom it exists, and wholly independent of all his own 
 thoughts and reflections and doings, then it may be easily 
 reconciled with the rtiost absolute scheme of fatality that 
 has ever been advocated. For it may exist without any 
 agency or concurrence or consent on the part of the per- 
 son in whom it exists ; and hence, there would be no 
 difficulty in reconciling it with any scheme of necessity 
 that any fatalist may be pleased to advance. 
 
 To show that I have not misrepresented the author, I 
 shall select from many passages of similar import, the 
 following from his work on ♦' Original Sin :" — " Human 
 nature must be created with some dispositions ; a dispo- 
 sition to relish some things as good and amiable, and to 
 be averse to other things as odious and disagreeable : 
 otherwise it must be without any such thing as inclina- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 197 
 
 tion or will, perfectly indifferent, without preference, 
 without choice or aversion towards any thing as agreea- 
 ble or disagreeable. But if it had any concreated dispo- 
 sitions at all, they must be either right or wrong, either 
 agreeable or disagreeable to the nature of things. If man 
 had at first the highest relish of things excellent and beau- 
 tiful, a disposition to have the quickest and highest delight 
 in those things which are most worthy of it, then his dis- 
 positions were morally right and amiable, and never can 
 be excellent in a higher sense. But if he had a dispo- 
 sition to love most those things that were inferior and less 
 worthy, then his dispositions were vicious. And it is 
 evident there can be no medium between these." 
 
 Now, this principle, that a man may be to praise or to 
 ^ame, that he may be esteemed virtuous or vicious, on 
 account of what he has wholly and exclusively received 
 from another, appears to me to be utterly irreconcilable 
 with one of the clearest and most unequivocal dictates of 
 reason and conscience. 
 
 According to the above passage, there can be no me- 
 dium between virtuous and vicious dispositions. This 
 sentiment is still more explicitly declared in the following 
 words ; *' In a moral agent, subject to moral obligations, 
 it is the same thing to be perfectly innocent^ as to be per- 
 fectly righteous. It must be the same, because there 
 can no more be any medium between sin and righteous- 
 ness, or between being right and being wrong, in a moral 
 sense, than there can be between being straight and 
 crooked, in a natural sense." Now, all this is very true, 
 in regard to a moral being who has been called upon to 
 act ; for he must either live up to the rule of duty, or he 
 must fall short of it. If he does the former, he becomes 
 righteous in the true and proper sense of the term ; and 
 
198 
 
 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 if he does the latter, he loses his original innocence, and 
 becomes a transgressor. But before he has any oppor- 
 tunity of acting, at the instant of his creation, I humbly 
 conceive that no moral agent is either to be praised or 
 blamed for any disposition with which he may have been 
 endowed by his Maker. He is neither virtuous nor 
 vicious, neither righteous nor sinful. This was the con- 
 dition of Adam, as it very clearly appears to me, at the 
 instant of his creation. He was in a state of perfect inno- 
 cency ; having neither transgressed the law of God, nor 
 attained to true holiness. And if this be the case, then 
 in regard to such a moral agent, before he has an oppor- 
 tunity to act, or to think, or to feel, it is not " the same 
 thing to be perfectly innocent, as to be perfectly righte- 
 ous ;" nor the same thing to be destitute of true righte- 
 ousness, as to be sinful. 
 
 It strikes my mind with the force of a self-evident 
 truth, that nothing can be our virtue, unless we are in 
 some sense the author of it; and to affirm that a man 
 may be justly praised or blamed, that he may be es- 
 teemed virtuous or vicious, on account of what he has 
 wholly and exclusively received from another, appears 
 to me to contradict one of the clearest and most une- 
 quivocal dictates of reason, one of the most universal and 
 irreversible laws of human belief. 
 
 Though the Almighty endowed Adam with all that is 
 lovely in human nature, the recipient of such noble 
 qualities certainly deserved no credit for them, as he 
 had no agency in their production. All the praise and 
 glory belonged to God. Such dispositions are no doubt 
 the objects of our admiration and love, but they are no 
 more the objects of our 7noral approbation than is the 
 beauty of a flower. Both are the work of the same ere- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. " '— 199 
 
 alive energy which hath diffused so much of loveliness 
 and beauty over every part of the creation. 
 
 Hence, I deny that Adam was " created or brought 
 into existence righteous." I am willing to admit, that 
 he *' was brought into existence capable of acting imme- 
 diately as a moral agent; and, therefore, he was imme- 
 diately under a rule of ri^ht action. He was obliged as 
 soon as he existed, to act right.'*'' But I deny that 
 until he did begin to act, he could possess the character 
 of true holiness or virtue. That President Edwards 
 thought otherwise, is evident, not only from the passage 
 already quoted, but also from many others, as well as ^ 
 from the fact, that he argues if Adam had not possessed 
 virtuous dispositions before he began to act, — if he had 
 not derived them directly from his Creator, then the 
 existence of virtue would have been impossible. 
 
 On this subject, his argument is ingenious and plausi- 
 ble. It is as follows : " It is agreeable to the sense of 
 men, in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or 
 effect of a good choice is virtuous, but that the good 
 choice itself from whence that effect proceeds, is so ; 
 yea, also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or af- 
 fection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, 
 is virtuous. This is the general notion — not that princi- 
 ples derive their goodness from actions, but — that actions 
 derive their goodness from the principles whence they 
 proceed ; so that the act of choosing what is good, is no 
 further virtuous, than it proceeds from a good principle, 
 or virtuous disposition of mind. Which supposes that a 
 virtuous disposition of mind, may be before a virtuous 
 act of choice ; and that, therefore, it is not necessary 
 there should first be thought, reflection, and choice, be- 
 fore there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice 
 
200 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 be first, before the existence of a good disposition of 
 heart, what is the character of that choice ? There can, 
 according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice 
 which proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from 
 mere self-love, ambition, or some animal appetite : 
 therefore, a virtuous temper of mind may be before a 
 good act of choice, as a tree may be before the fruit, 
 and the fountain before the stream which proceeds from 
 it," p. 407. 
 
 It is true, that actions derive their good or evil quality, 
 as the case may be, from the principles whence they 
 proceed. This accords, as the author truly says, with 
 the universal sentiment of mankind. But this proposi- 
 tion, plain and simple as it appears to be at first sight, 
 may be misunderstood. The term " principle" is am- 
 biguous ; and, according to the idea attached to it, the 
 above proposition may be true or false. When it is said, 
 for example, that a vicious or sinful action derives its 
 evil quality from the principle or motive whence it pro- 
 ceeds, I apprehend that no one pretends to fix the brand 
 of condemnation on the implanted principle, or the natu- 
 ral spring of action, from which it is supposed to pro- 
 ceed. To take the very case in question ; our first parents, 
 in eating the forbidden fruit, acted partly from a desire of 
 food and partly from a desire of knowledge. Now, this 
 was a sinful action, because forbidden, and consequently, 
 according to the sense of men in all ages and nations, it 
 must have proceeded from a sinful inclination or princi- 
 ple. But yet no one, I presume, will contend that either 
 the desire of food or the desire of knowledge, from which 
 it is supposed to have proceeded, is in itself sinful. They 
 were implanted in our nature by the finger of God, for 
 wise and beneficent purposes ; and to assert that they 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 201 
 
 are sinful, is to make God the author of sin. Our first 
 parents were not to blame because they were endowed 
 with these principles. Hence, when it is said, that a 
 sinful action must proceed from a sinful principle, we 
 are not to understand the proposition as meaning that the 
 inherent constitutional principle of action from which it 
 is supposed to proceed is sinful. Our first parents sinned, 
 not in possessing an appetite for food, or a desire for know- 
 ledge, but in indulging these contrary to the will of God. 
 It was their intention and design to do that which God 
 had commanded them not to do, and which they knew it 
 was wrong for them to do. It was this intention and 
 design, which was certainly not an implanted principle, 
 or any part of the work of the Creator, which consti- 
 tuted their sin ; and it is this intention and design that is 
 pointed at, when it is said, that the principle or motive 
 from which their transgression proceeded, was a sinful 
 principle or motive. And hence, we very clearly per- 
 ceive, that a sinful action may result from those princi- 
 ples of our constitution, which are in themselves neither 
 virtuous nor vicious, which are wholly destitute of any 
 moral character whatever. So, in like manner, a vir- 
 tuous action may result from a principle of our nature, 
 implanted in the human breast by the Author of our 
 being, although such principle may not, properly speak- 
 ing, be called a virtuous principle, or an object of moral 
 approbation. 
 
 The fallacy of the author's argument, I conceive, has 
 arisen from the ambiguity of the term principle. As 
 it is truly said, that a holy action can proceed only from 
 a holy principle or disposition, he concluded, that if man 
 had not been created with a principle of virtue or holi- 
 ness in his heart, then no such thing as virtue or holiness 
 18 
 
202 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 could ever have found its way into the world. Sup- 
 posing, all the time, that it is universally considered that 
 a virtuous act could proceed only from an implanted 
 principle of virtue, of which God alone is the author ; 
 whereas, in fact, the virtuous principle from which the 
 virtuous act is supposed to derive its character, is not an 
 implanted principle at all, but the design, or intention, 
 or motive with which the act is done ; and of which the 
 created agent is himself the author. 
 
 There is one thing well worthy of remark in this con- 
 nexion. President Edwards contends, as we have seen, 
 that Adam must have been created with a principle of 
 virtue, of which his Maker was the sole author, or else 
 the existence of virtue would have been impossible. And 
 yet, he contends that Adam was created perfectly free 
 from sin ; — that as he came from the hand of his Maker, 
 he was perfectly pure and holy, without the least stain 
 or blemish of any wrong or vicious principle upon his 
 nature. Is it not wonderful, that it did not occur to so 
 acute a reasoner as the author of the *' Inquiry," that if 
 his own argument was sound, it would, according to his 
 own principle, prove the introduction of sin into the 
 world to be utterly impossible? That he did not see, 
 if it is impossible to account for the existence of holi- 
 ness, except on the supposition that man was created or 
 brought into the world with a principle of holiness 
 implanted in his heart; so, for the same reason, it is 
 equally impossible to account for the existence of sin, 
 except on the supposition that a sinful principle was 
 implanted in the breast of man by the hand of his Maker ? 
 
 The above extract, by which Edwards endeavours to 
 prove that Adam could not have performed a virtuous 
 act, unless a virtuous principle had been planted in his 
 
EDWARDS QN THE WILL. 208 
 
 nature by the Creator, would be just as correct and con- 
 clusive, if we were to read vicious instead of virtuous. 
 By the very same argument, we might prove that he 
 could not have sinned, and so sin would have been 
 impossible, unless God had planted a sinful principle or 
 disposition in his nature. 
 
 It is sufficiently evident, that President Edwards' 
 idea of the essence of virtue, was not altogether correct, 
 and that he was led to adopt it by the necessities of a 
 false system. For if we admit that the essence of vir- 
 tue or of sin consists in its nature, and not in its cause 
 or origin, it must be conceded, on the other hand, 
 that the nature of those principles, or dispositions, 
 or volitions, or habits, (call them what we may,) 
 which are termed virtuous or vicious, depend in a very 
 important sense upon their cause or origin. It must be 
 conceded, that no disposition or principle whatever 
 which has derived its origin wholly from any cause or 
 power extraneous to the moral agent in which it exists, 
 can be properly denominated virtuous or vicious. It 
 cannot partake of the nature of virtue or of vice, unless 
 it owes its origin to the agent whose virtue or whose 
 vice it is supposed to be. If it proceeds wholly from the 
 *' power, influence, or action," of motives, or from the 
 hand of the Creator, it is not the act of the agent in whom 
 it exists, and consequently he is not accountable for it. 
 Or, in other words, the nature of virtue and vice is such, 
 that thpy cannot possibly be produced by any " cause, 
 or power, or influence," which is wholly extraneous to 
 the mind in which they exist. Virtue and vice, in the 
 strict and proper sense of the words, must have the con- 
 currence and consent of the mind in which they exist, 
 or they cannot possibly exist at all. To speak of virtue, 
 
204 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 —of that which deserves our moral approbation, as being 
 wholly derived from another- — as being exclusively the 
 work of God in the soul, is to be guilty of a contradic- 
 tion, as plain and palpable as the light of heaven. It is 
 to be regretted, it is to be deeply lamented, that Edwards 
 did not try to bring his doctrine of the will into harmony 
 with the common sentiments of mankind with respect to 
 the nature of virtue and free-agency, instead of exerting 
 his matchless powers to make virtue and free-agency 
 agree with his scheme of necessity, by explaining away 
 and transforming their natures. It is to be lamented ; 
 because in attempting to uphold and support the dis- 
 tinctive peculiarities of his own system of theology, he 
 has unintentionally struck a deadly blow at the vital and 
 fundamental principles of all religion, both natural and 
 revealed. The infidel and the atheist are much indebted 
 to him for such an pxertion of his immortal powers. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. SOS 
 
 SECTION XVI. 
 
 OF THE SELF-DETERMINING POWER. 
 
 The advocates of free-agency have contended that the 
 will is determined by itself, and not by the strongest mo- 
 tive. This is the ground which, so far as I know, has 
 always been taken against the doctrine of necessity ; but it 
 may be questioned whether it is tenable, and whether the 
 friends of moral agency might not have made far greater 
 headway against their adversaries if they had not as- 
 sumed such a position. It appears to be involved in 
 several inevitable contradictions ; in the exposure of 
 which the necessitarian has been accustomed to tri- 
 umph. 
 
 The leading argument of Edwards against the self- 
 determining power may be substantially stated in a few 
 words. The will can be the cause of no effect, says he, 
 except by acting or putting forth a volition to cause it ; 
 and hence, if we assert that the will causes its own voli- 
 tions, we must suppose it causes them by preceding 
 volitions. It can cause a volition only by a prior voli- 
 tion, which, in its turn, can be caused only by another 
 volition prior to it; and so on ad infinitum. Thus, 
 according to Edwards, the self-determining power of the 
 will necessarily runs out into the absurdity of an infinite 
 series of volitions. 
 
 If this reasoning is just, the doctrine in question must 
 
 be abandoned ; for no sound doctrine can lead to such 
 
 a conclusion. But is it just? Does such an absurdity 
 
 really flow from the self-determining power of the will ? 
 
 18* 
 
206 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 It has been objected to the argument of Edwards, that 
 it is based on a false assumption. The position of 
 Edwards, *' that if the will determines itself, it must 
 determine itself by an act of choice," is, it has been 
 contended, clearly an assumption unsupported, and inca- 
 pable of being supported. The reason assigned for this 
 objection is, that we do not know how any cause exerts 
 itself in the production of phenomena ; and consequently 
 we have no right to assume that the will can cause its 
 volitions only by volitions. In other words, as we do 
 not know how any cause produces its effects, so it is 
 wholly a gratuitous assumption to say, that if the will 
 causes its volitions, it must cause them in this particular 
 manner, that is, by preceding acts of volition. 
 
 This objection does not seem to be well taken. When 
 we say, that the will is the cause of any thing, we do 
 not really mean that the will itself is the cause of it ; for 
 the will itself does not act : it is not an agent, it is merely 
 the power of an agent. It is that power by which the 
 mind acts. Hence, when the will is said to cause a 
 thing, the language must either have no intelligible 
 meaning, or it must be understood to mean, that the 
 mind causes it by an exercise of its power of willing. 
 But to say that the mind causes a thing by an exercise 
 of its power of willing, is to say that it causes it by an 
 act of the will or a volition; which brings us to the as- 
 sumption of Edwards. Hence, if the language that " the 
 will causes its own volitions" means any thing, it must 
 mean what Edwards supposes it does. That is, if the 
 will causes its volitions, or rather, if the mind in the act 
 of willing causes them, then they must be caused by voli- 
 tions or acts of the will. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 2i)7 
 
 It is said, that *' we do not know how any cause 
 acts.'* This is very true, when properly understood ; 
 but in the true sense of this maxim, Edwards has not 
 undertaken to explain how a cause acts; nor has he 
 made any assumption as to how it acts. The term 
 cause has a variety of meanings; and it is frequently 
 applied with extreme vagueness and want of precision. 
 What is the cause of an effect? — of the motion of the 
 hand, for example ? It is the mind, says one ; it is the 
 will, says another; it is a volition, replies a third. Now 
 here are three distinct things, — the mind, the will, and 
 the volition ; and yet each is said to be the cause of the 
 same identical effect. This diversity of expression 
 may do very well in popular discourse, but it must 
 be laid aside whenever philosophical precision is re- 
 quired. 
 
 What is then, really and properly speaking, the cause 
 of the motion in question ? It is neither the mind, nor 
 the will ; for these might both exist, and yet no such 
 effect result from them. A mind, or a will, that lies still 
 and does not act, is the cause of no effect. If we would 
 speak with philosophical precision, then, we should say 
 that the act of the mind is the cause of the effect in ques- 
 tion. The idea of a cause, in the strict and proper sense 
 of the term, is that from which the effect immediately 
 and necessarily flows. Now the motion of the hand is 
 not necessarily connected with the mind itself; for if the 
 mind were to lie still and not act, no such effect would 
 follow. It is with the act of the mind that the effect in 
 question is connected as with its efficient cause. It is 
 the act of the mind which implies the motion of the hand, 
 and that is implied by it; and hence, it is the act of the 
 mind, or the volition, that is properly said to be the 
 
208 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 cause of such motion. For cause and effect are said to 
 imply each other. 
 
 Now Edwards has not pretended to say how a volition 
 acts upon the external part of our being ; if he had done 
 so, he would have been justly obnoxious to the charge 
 of presuming to know how a cause acts, in the proper 
 sense of the word; but he has done no such thing. The 
 connexion between cause and effect, in the proper sense 
 of the terras, he has left enveloped in profound mystery. 
 He has not presumed to say how an act, or cause, pro- 
 perly so called, produces its corresponding effect. 
 
 He does not assume to know how a cause acts ; but 
 how what is sometimes called a cause really becomes 
 such. The will may be called a cause, if you please ; 
 but, in reality, unless it acts, it is the cause of no effect ; 
 and even then, properly speaking, the act is the cause. 
 He clearly saw that a will which lies still and does no- 
 thing, is the cause of no effect ; and hence he slated the 
 simple fact, that it must act in order to become a cause, 
 or, which is the same thing, in order to produce an effect. 
 And is not this perfectly self-evident? We do not know 
 how the will acts, nor how its act produces a change in 
 the external part of our being ; but yet do we not cer- 
 tainly know, that a dormant will can do nothing, and that 
 it must act in order to produce an effect. If this be to 
 explain how a cause acts, I humbly conceive that we 
 may do so with perfect propriety. 
 
 Indeed, all that is assumed by Edwards, has been con- 
 ceded to him by most of his adversaries. Thus says 
 Dr. West, as quoted by Edwards the younger, " No 
 being can become a cause, i. e. an efficient, or that which 
 produces an effect, but by first operating, acting, or ener- 
 gizing." Here we are told, not how a cause acts, but 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 208 
 
 how the mind becomes a cause, or the author of effects. 
 This is all that Edwards takes for granted ; and, for 
 aught that I can see, he has done so with perfect pro- 
 priety. 
 
 The same thing is conceded by Dr. Reid. "The 
 change," says he, " whether it be of thought, of will, 
 or of motion, is the effect. Active power, therefore, is 
 a quality in the cause, which enables it to produce the 
 effect. And the exertion of that active power in pro- 
 ducing the effect, is called action, agency, efficiency. 
 In order to the production of any effect, there must be in 
 the cause, not only power, hut the exertion of that 
 power.''^ — Essays on the Active Powers, p. 259. Here 
 it is declared by Dr. Reid, that active power or the will 
 must act, in order to produce an effect, whether the effect 
 be in the mind itself, or out of the mind, whether it be 
 " of thought, of will, or of motion." This is all that 
 Edwards assumes as the basis of his argument. 
 
 But the question is not so much what has been con- 
 ceded, as what is true. Is it true, then, that if the will 
 causes its own volitions, it can cause them only by pre- 
 ceding volitions? It is, as we have already seen, ac- 
 cording to the common acceptation of the terms ; for 
 a dormant cause can produce no effect ; it must act in 
 order to produce effects. Edwards has truly said, that 
 "if the will be determined, there is a determiner. This 
 must be supposed to be intended even by those that 
 say the will determines itself. If it be so, the will is 
 both determiner and determined ; it is a cause that acts 
 and produces effects upon itself, and is the object of its 
 own influence and action." p. 19. Now, whatever may 
 be the meaning of those who choose to affirm that the 
 will determines itself, admitting that it is both deter- 
 
210 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 mined and determiner; the conclusion of Edwards 
 seems to be fairly drawn from the language in which 
 their doctrine is expressed. To say the least, he fairly 
 reduces the obvious meaning of their language to the 
 absurdity of an infinite series of volitions. 
 
 If the phrase, that the will is determined by itself, has 
 any meaning, it must mean, either that the will is made 
 to act by a preceding act of the will, or that the will 
 simply acts. If the meaning be, that the act or choice 
 of the will is produced by a preceding act of the will, 
 then is the inference of Edwards well drawn, and the 
 self-determining power is involved in the aforesaid ad 
 infinitum absurdity. But if the meaning be, that the 
 will simply acts, why not present the idea in this its true 
 and unambiguous form ? 
 
 It is evident, that while the will remains inactive, it 
 can produce no effect ; it must act, in order to become 
 the author of effects. The effect caused, and the causa- 
 tive act, are clearly distinct ; the one produces the other. 
 If the causative act is a volition, then we have an infi- 
 nite series of volitions. And if it be not a volition, but 
 some other effort of the mind, the same difficulty arises ; 
 for if it be necessary to suppose a preceding effort of the 
 mind in order to account for a volition, it will be equally 
 necessary to suppose the existence of another effort to 
 account for that ; and so on ad infinitum. And an infi- 
 nite series of efforts is just as great an absurdity as an 
 infinite series of volitions. 
 
 Now let us suppose that, in order to escape these dif- 
 ficulties, an advocate of the self-determining power 
 should deny that there is any causative act of volition ; 
 but that volition is itself an act uncaused by any pre- 
 ceding act. According to this view, what does the self- 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 211 
 
 determining power amount to ? It amounts to just this, 
 that the will itself acts, — a position which is as freely- 
 recognized by Edwards as it could possibly be by the 
 warmest advocate of the self-determining power. If this 
 be all that is meant by self-determination, why not state 
 the simple fact that the will itself acts, in plain English, 
 instead of going about to envelope it in a mist of words ? 
 If this be all that is meant, why not state the thing so 
 that it may be acquiesced in by the necessitarian, instead 
 of keeping up such a war of words ? Indeed, it appears 
 plain to me, that the assertion that the will is determined 
 by itself, is either false doctrine, or else the language in 
 which it is couched is not a clear and distint expression 
 of its own meaning. On either supposition, this mode 
 of expression should be abandoned. 
 
 I have long been impressed with the conviction, that 
 the self-determining power, as it is generally understood, 
 is full of inconsistencies. While we hold this doctrine, 
 we cannot with a good grace contend that the motive- 
 determining power is involved in the absurdity of an 
 infinite series of causes ; for we ourselves are involved 
 in it. Nor can we very well maintain that ** a necessary 
 agent is no agent at all ;" for the necessitarian will reply, 
 as he always does, that according to our own scheme, 
 our actions are caused ; and hence, if it be absurd to 
 speak of a caused action, this is equally true, whether 
 the cause be intrinsic or extrinsic. Moreover, if we 
 should complain that, according to the necessitarian, the 
 phenomena of the will are involved in the "mechanism 
 of cause and effect," he will be sure to reply, that the 
 same thing is true according to our own scheme, inas- 
 much as we admit volition to be an effect, and place it 
 under the dominion of an internal cause. These diffi- 
 
212 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 culties, as well as. some others, have always encumbered 
 the cause of free and accountable agency ; just because 
 it has been supposed to consist in the self-determining 
 power of the will. We should, therefore, abandon this 
 doctrine. If Clarke, and Price, and Reid, and West, 
 have not been able to maintain it without running into 
 such inconsistencies, it is high time it should be laid 
 aside forever. 
 
 It has always been taken for granted that the will is 
 determined. The use of this word clearly implies 
 that the will is acted upon, either by the will itself, 
 or by something else. It has been conceded, on all 
 sides, that it is determined ; and the only controversy 
 has been, as to what is the determiner. It is deter- 
 mined by the strongest motive, says one; it is deter- 
 mined by itself, says another; and upon these two 
 positions the combatants have arranged themselves. But 
 behind all this controversy, there is a question which 
 has not been agitated; and that is, whether the will is 
 determined at all ? For my part, I am firmly and fully 
 persuaded that it is not, but that it simply determines. It 
 is the "determiner," but not the ** determined." It is 
 never the object of its own determination. It acts, but 
 there is no causative act, by which it is made to act. 
 This position, I trust, has been made good in the pre- 
 ceding pages. 
 
 If we say that the will is determined by itself, this 
 implies that it is determined in the passive voice, at the 
 same time that it determines in the active voice ; whereas, 
 in reality, it is simply active, and not passive to the ac- 
 tion of any thing, in its determinations. We should not 
 say, then, that the mind is self-determined, but simply 
 that it is self-active. On this ground we may securely 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 213 
 
 rest in our opposition to the scheme of necessity. It 
 can never be shown that it is involved in the absurdity 
 of an endless series of causes ; it will remain for the ne- 
 cessitarian alone to extricate himself from that absurdity. 
 That the mind is self-active, I have already shown, by 
 showing that it is absurd to suppose that an act of the 
 mind is produced by the action of any thing upon it. It 
 is right here, then, upon the self-activity of the human 
 mind, that we take our stand, in order to plant the lever 
 which shall heave the scheme of moral necessity from 
 its foundations. It is right here that we find our strong- 
 hold ; that we erect the bulwark and the fortifications of 
 man's free-agency, against which, as against a wall of 
 adamant, all the shafts of the necessitarian will fall 
 blunted to the earth, or else recoil with destructive force 
 upon himself. 
 
 But why fight against the doctrine of those who have 
 laboured in the same great cause with myself? Truly, 
 most truly, not because it is a grateful task, but because 
 it is a deep and earnest conviction, wrought into my mind 
 by the meditation of years, that the great and glorious 
 cause of free-agency has been retarded by some of the 
 errors of its friends, more than by all the truths of its ene- 
 mies. This has appeared to be the case especially in 
 regard to the self-determining power of the will. It 
 seems to have retained its hold upon the mind of its 
 friends, not so much by its intrinsic merits, as by its de- 
 nial of moral necessity, and the idea that it is the only 
 mode of such denial. As the scheme of moral necessity 
 has triumphed in the weakness of the self-determining 
 power, so has the self-determining power resisted the 
 siege of centuries, in the unconquerable energy of its 
 opposition to the determining and controlling power of 
 19 
 
214 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 motives. And if both have stood together, each deriving 
 strength from the weakness of the other, is it not possi- 
 ble that both may fall together, and that a more complete 
 and satisfactory scheme of moral agency may arise out 
 of the common ruins ? 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 215 
 
 SECTION XVII. 
 
 OF THE DEFINITION OF A FREE AGENT. 
 
 Having shown, as I trust, that there is no influence 
 whatever operating upon the mind to produce volition, I 
 am now prepared to declare the true idea of a free- 
 agent. 
 
 A free-agent, then, is one who acts without being 
 caused to act. Here the question arises. Is such a thing 
 possible ? Can any being act, without being caused to 
 act? The answer to this question, depends upon the 
 meaning which is attached to the very ambiguous term 
 cause. If it means an efficient cause, or that which pro- 
 duces a thing by prior action or influence, it is possible 
 for a spirit to act without being caused to do so ; and, 
 as we have already seen, if there can be no action with- 
 out such a cause of its existence, then there must be an 
 infinite series of actions or causes. But if the question 
 be. Can an act arise and come into being, without a suf- 
 ficient " ground and reason*' of its existence ? I answer, 
 No. It is very necessary to separate the different ques- 
 tions included in the general one, Is not a volition 
 caused ? or has it not a cause ? and to pass upon them 
 separately. 
 
 There is, I admit, a "sufficient ground and reason" 
 for our actions ; but not an efficient cause of them. This 
 is the all-important distinction which has been over- 
 looked in the present controversy. Edwards frequently 
 asks, if a volition is without a cause ? Now we call for a 
 
216 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 division of this question. Has volition an efficient 
 cause ? I answer, No. Has it a " sufficient ground and 
 reason" of its existence ? I answer, Yes. No one ever 
 imagined that there are no indispensable antecedents to 
 choice, without which it could not take place ; but Ed- 
 wards has framed this question in such a manner, that 
 we cannot give a categorical answer to it, without either 
 denying our own doctrine, or else subscribing to his. 
 Unless there were a mind, there could be no act of the 
 mind ; and unless the mind possessed a power of act- 
 ing, it could not put forth volitions. The mind, then, 
 and the power of the mind called will, constitute the 
 ground of action or volition. 
 
 But a power to act, it will be said, is not a sufficient 
 reason to account for the existence of action. This is 
 true. The reason is to come. The sufficient reason, 
 however, is not an efficient cause ; for there is some dif- 
 ference between a blind impulse or force, and rationality. 
 The mind is endowed with various appetites, passions, 
 and desires, — with noble affections, and, above all, with 
 a feeling of moral approbation and disapprobation. These 
 are not the " active principles," or the " motive powers," 
 as they have been called ; they are the ends of our act- 
 ing: we simply act in order to gratify them. They 
 exert no influence over the will, much less is the will 
 controlled by them ; and hence, we are perfectly free, to 
 gratify the one or the other of them ; — to act in obedience 
 to the dictates of conscience, or in order to gratify the 
 lowest appetites of our nature. We see that certain 
 means must be used, in order to gratify the passion, de- 
 sire, affection, or feeling, which we intend to gratify ; 
 and we act accordingly. In all this, we form our de- 
 signs or intentions free from all influence whatever: 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 217 
 
 nothing acts upon the will : we fix upon the end, and 
 we choose the means to accomplish it. We adapt the 
 means to our end ; because there is a fitness in them to 
 accomplish that end or design ; and because, as rational 
 creatures, we perceive that fitness. Thus, we act ac- 
 cording to reason, but not from the influence of reason. 
 We act with a view to our desires, but not from the 
 influence of our desires ; and our volition is virtuous or vi- 
 cious according to the intention with which it is put forth, 
 •—according to the design with which it is directed. 
 Passion is not " the gale," it is " the card." Reason is 
 not the force, it is the law. All the power resides in the 
 free, untrammelled will. He who overlooks this, and 
 blindly seeks for something to " move the mind to voli- 
 tion," loses sight of the grand and distinctive peculiarity 
 of man's nature, and brings it down to the dust, subject- 
 ing it to the laws of matter and to bondage. 
 
 We do not allow Mr. Hobbes to declare our idea of a 
 free-agent, as ** one that, when all the circumstances 
 necessary to produce action are present, can neverthe- 
 less not act ;^' nor do we accept of the amendment of 
 another, " that a free-agent is one who, when all the cir- 
 cumstances necessary to produce action are present, can 
 act." For if all the circumstances necessary to produce 
 action are present, then they would produce it ; and no- 
 thing would be left for the will to do, except to receive 
 the producing influence. In other words, if volition is 
 produced by circumstances, then it is a passive impres- 
 sion made upon the will, and not an act at all. 
 
 It is contended by Edwards, that it is just as absurd to 
 
 say, that a volition can come into existence without a 
 
 cause, as it is that a world should do so. It is true, that 
 
 a world cannot arise out of nothing, and come into exist- 
 
 19* 
 
218 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 ence of itself ; and this is also equally true of a volition. 
 But is the mind nothing? Is the will nothing? Is a 
 free, intelligent, designing cause nothing? 
 
 The mind is something ; and it is capable of acting in 
 order to fulfil its own designs, though it be not impelled 
 to act. Is this idea absurd ? Is it self-contradictory ? 
 Is it any thing like the assertion, that an effect has no 
 cause ? It is not. It implies no contradiction ; — it is a 
 possible idea. How does it act, then ? I do not know. 
 This is a mystery. Indeed, every ultimate fact in man's 
 nature, and every simple exercise of his intellectual 
 powers, is a mystery. An exercise of the power of con- 
 ception, by which the past is called up, and made to pass 
 in review before us ; an exercise of the imagination, by 
 which the world is made to teem with wonders of our 
 own creation ; and an exercise of the will, by which we 
 produce changes in the external world ; are all myste- 
 ries ? Now, shall we fly from these mysteries ? Shall 
 we strive to make the matter plain, in a single instance, 
 by assigning an efficient cause to an act of the will? If 
 so, whether we escape the mystery or not, we shall cer- 
 tainly plunge into absurdity. We shall embrace a 
 doctrine, which denies the nature of action, and which 
 is necessarily involved in the great absurdity of an infi- 
 nite series of causes. For my part, I prefer a simple 
 statement of the fact of volition, with its attendant cir- 
 cumstances, how much soever of mystery it may seem 
 to leave around the subject, to any explanation which 
 involves it in absurdity. 
 
 The philosophers of all ages have sought for the 
 efficient cause of volition ; but who has found it ? Is it 
 in the will ? The necessitarian has shown the absurdities 
 of this hypothesis. Is it in the power of motive ? This 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 219 
 
 hypothesis is fraught with the very same absurdities. Is 
 it in the uncaused volition of Deity? The younger Ed- 
 wards could do nothing with this hypothesis. In truth, 
 the efficient cause of volition is nowhere. It has never 
 been found, because it does not exist ; and it never will 
 be found, so long as an action of mind continues to be 
 what it is. 
 
 This, then, is th« true idea of a free-agent: it is one 
 who, in view of circumstances, both external and inter- 
 nal, can act, without being efficiently caused to do so. 
 This is the idea of a free-agent which God has realized 
 by the creation of the soul of man. It may be a mys- 
 tery ; but it is not a contradiction. It may be a mystery ; 
 but then it solves a thousand difficulties which we have 
 unnecessarily created to ourselves. It may be a mys- 
 tery ; but then it is the only safe retreat from self-contra- 
 diction, absurdity, and atheism. 
 
 It is no reason for disbelieving a thing, that we cannot 
 conceive how it is. This will be readily admitted ; but 
 this principle, like every other, may be misapplied and 
 abused. If any thing is possible in itself considered, 
 that is, if it implies no contradiction, we should not re- 
 fuse to believe it, because we cannot conceive how it is. 
 When confined within these limits, the principle or 
 maxim in question is one of immense importance ; and 
 to disregard it betrays one of the greatest weaknesses to 
 which the human mind is exposed. If we do not adhere 
 to it, there is no resting-place for us this side of the most 
 unqualified atheism : we shall be compelled to renounce, 
 not only the stupendous facts and mysteries of revela- 
 tion, but also all the great truths of natural religion. The 
 very being and attributes of God can find no place in our 
 minds, if we expunge this principle from them ; and in- 
 
220 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 sist upon seeing how every iftiing is, before we consent 
 to receive it as an object of belief. 
 
 We should find no difficulty, therefore, in believing 
 that the mind of man acts, without being efficiently 
 caused to act. This implies no contradiction; and 
 hence the creative power of God can produce such a 
 being — a being that acts freely, without labouring under 
 any necessity, either natural or moral, in its accountable 
 and moral agency. A being, the end of whose action is 
 found in the sensibility ; the intention, the design, and 
 the plan of whose action is formed in the intelligence ; 
 and the power by which this intention is executed, and 
 this plan accomplished, is in the will alone. It is in 
 this tri-unity of the sensibility, the intelligence, and the 
 will, that the glory of man's nature, as a free and ac- 
 countable being, consists. The relation between them is 
 most intimate, — is inconceivably intimate; but the rela- 
 tion is not the same in nature and kind as that which sub- 
 sists between an effect and its efficient, or producing 
 cause. The only relation of this kind, which is to be 
 found in the case, is that which subsists between the 
 action of the will, or the volition, and the corre- 
 sponding change which it produces in the external part 
 of our being. I say, we can very easily believe all jlhis, 
 as it implies no contradiction ; and yet not feel ourselves 
 bound, by a regard for consistency, to believe that a 
 world may rise up out of nothing, and come into being 
 of itself, without any cause of its existence. These 
 things are blended together, in the philosophy of the ne- 
 cessitarian, by a most convenient use of an ambiguous 
 phraseology ; but they are, indeed, as widely different 
 from each other as mystery is from absurdity, — as light 
 IS from darkness. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 221 
 
 But the above maxim, as I have already said, may be 
 grievously misappUed ; and thus the garb of intellectual 
 humility may be thrown over the greatest absurdities. 
 We may be told, for example, that the same body may 
 be wholly in one place, and wholly in a far distant place, 
 at one and the same time ; and, if we object to this doc- 
 trine, thelnurmurings of reason are sought to be silenced, 
 by reminding us, that it is exceedingly weak and pre- 
 sumptuous for poor blind creatures like ourselves, to 
 reject a truth because we cannot conceive how it is. In 
 like manner, we are informed that a volition, or an act 
 of the will, may be produced in the mind, may be ne- 
 cessitated, by the action of an extraneous cause, or, if 
 you please, of an intrinsic cause ; and if we ask how this 
 can be, without interfering with our free-agency, it is 
 frequently replied, that we cannot tell ; but that it is ex- 
 ceedingly absurd and presumptuous to disbelieve a thing 
 because we cannot conceive how it is. That God 
 operates upon the mind, not to rectify and elevate 
 its powers, but to produce a volition in it ; not to cleanse 
 and purify the whole stream and current of our natures, 
 but merely to throw up a bubble upon the surface thereof, 
 for which effect he holds us accountable : that he does this, 
 we are told, is a great mystery, which we should not pre- 
 sume to call in question. For my part, I had rather be- 
 lieve the doctrine of transubstantiation itself, than such a 
 mystery as this. 
 
 There is some difference, I have supposed, between 
 disbelieving a thing because we cannot see how it is, and 
 disbelieving it, because we very clearly see that it cannot 
 possibly be any how at all. It is upon this distinction 
 that I stand, when I receive the great mysteries of the 
 Godhead, and reject the absurdities of transubstantiation. 
 
222 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 And it is upon the same ground, that I most freely and 
 fully recognize and embrace the great mysteries of our 
 being, whilst I reject the absurdities of an efficiently 
 caused and accountable agency. 
 
 Is not this distinction properly applied ? If the action 
 or influence of any thing produces an effect upon the 
 mind, is not that effect merely a passive impression ? Is 
 it not absurd to suppose, that it is a passive impression, 
 produced by the action of something else, and yet that it 
 is an action of the mind itself? If so, and so I think it 
 has been made to appear, then we not only should, but 
 must, reject it. We must reject it, unless we suffer our- 
 selves to be blinded by false analogies, and verbal ambi- 
 guities. 
 
 This is not to deny the divine influence, as has been 
 so often imagined. The regeneration, the new creation, 
 of the soul, by the power of God, is no more inconsistent 
 with free and accountable agency, than was the original 
 creation of it with all its powers ; but this cannot be said 
 of the production of our acts or volitions by a divine in- 
 fluence. Those must take an exceedingly narrow and 
 superficial view of the great work of regeneration, who 
 suppose that it is altogether denied, unless we admit that 
 the Spirit produces our volitions ; who suppose that the 
 divine agency can in no way cleanse and purify our 
 powers, unless it can superinduce a volition, or an act, 
 upon our depraved natures. How many persons have 
 laboured in vain, to reconcile the free-agency of man with 
 the reality of a divine influence ; just because they have 
 laboured under the superficial notion, the grand illusion, 
 that the Spirit of God cannot act upon the mind at all, 
 unless it acts to produce a volition ! It is no wonder 
 that they have laboured in vain, and abandoned the task 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 323 
 
 in despair ; because what they have taken for a seeming 
 difficulty, is, when narrowly inspected, seen to be a real 
 absurdity. Lay this aside, and there will be a mystery 
 in the case, it is true ; but there will not be even a seem- 
 ing contradiction. 
 
 But I do not intend to enter upon the subject of the- 
 ology. This is entirely beside the purpose of the present 
 work ; and if I have touched upon it for a moment, it 
 was only to show, by a passing glance, how very easy 
 it were for any one, if he were so disposed, to draw 
 false conclusions with respect to theology, from the 
 views which have been advanced in regard to the philo- 
 sophy of the will. True philosophy and religion will 
 always perfectly harmonize ; but then he is very apt to 
 be a poor philosopher, who derives his philosophy from 
 his religion ; and he a miserable theologian, who de- 
 rives his religion from his philosophy. It was in that 
 way, that Edwards became a necessitarian ; it is in this, 
 that many a necessitarian has become an infidel or an 
 atheist. 
 
224 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 SECTION XVIII. 
 
 OF THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 Whether our volitions come to pass in the manner 
 we call freely, or are brought to pass by the operation of 
 necessary causes, is a question of fact, which should be 
 referred to the tribunal of consciousness. If we ever 
 hope to settle this question, we must occasionally turn 
 from the arena of dialectics, and unite our efforts in the 
 cultivation of the much-neglected field of observation. We 
 must turn from the dust and smoke of mere logical con- 
 tention, and consult the living oracle within ; we must 
 behold the pure light that ever burns behind the dark- 
 ened veil of disputation. 
 
 This appeal is not declined by the necessitarian. He 
 consents to the appeal ; and the dispute is, as to the 
 true interpretation of the decision of the tribunal in ques- 
 tion. We contend that the testimony of consciousness 
 is clearly and unequivocally in favour of the doctrine of 
 liberty, while our opponents allege the same evidence in 
 their own favour. Now, what is the real import of this 
 testimony? 
 
 It is to be regretted that President Edwards has said 
 so little on this subject. He has disposed of it in one 
 brief note ; as if the nature of our mental operations were 
 to be determined by abstract and universal propositions, 
 or truisms, and observation consulted only to confirm our 
 preconceived opinions. What little he has said on this 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 225 
 
 subject, however, is sufficient to show with what faint 
 hope of success the necessitarian can venture to submit 
 his cause to the tribunal of consciousness. 
 
 The testimony of consciousness, I have no doubt, 
 might have been made much stronger in our favour, if 
 the wrong question had not been submitted to it. All the ad- 
 vocates of free-agency, so far as I remember, have said 
 that we are conscious of freedom ; that we are conscious 
 of a power of contrary phoice. Or, in other words, that 
 when we put forth a volition, we are conscious that we 
 might forbear to do so. But this does not seem to be 
 the case. We are not conscious of what does not take 
 place in our minds ; and hence, we are only conscious 
 of the volition which we put forth. We are not even 
 conscious of our power to act ; this is necessarily infer- 
 red from the acts of which we are conscious. As we 
 do not then, according to the supposition, put forth the 
 contrary choice, we cannot be conscious of it, nor of the 
 power to put it forth. By referring this, therefore, to 
 the tribunal of consciousness, it seems to me that most 
 advocates of free-agency have rendered a dis-service 
 to the cause which they have so ably supported in 
 other respects. For the necessitarian sees, that the 
 doctrine of liberty, or the power of choice to the con- 
 trary, cannot be established by the direct testimony of 
 consciousness alone ; and hence he strengthens himself in 
 his own convictions, by picking flaws in our evidence. 
 He sees that we are not borne out by the testimony of 
 consciousness, in regard to the point which we submit to 
 it; and hence, he readily concludes that we are wrong 
 in the whole matter. It is well, it is exceedingly impor- 
 tant, to observe what are the strong points of our cause, 
 upon which we can rest with unshaken confidence, and to 
 20 
 
226 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 take our stand upon them ; giving up all untenable posi- 
 tions. 
 
 By consciousness, then, we discover the existence of 
 an act. We see no cause by which it is produced. If 
 it were produced by the act or operation of any thing 
 else, it would be a passive impression, and not an act of 
 the mind itself. The mind would be wholly passive in 
 relation to it, and it would not be an act at all. Whether 
 it is produced by a preceding act of the mind, or by the 
 action of any thing else, the mind would be passive as 
 to the effect produced. But we see, in the clear and 
 unquestionable light of consciousness, that instead of 
 being passive, the mind is active in its volitions. — 
 Hence, it follows by an inference as clear as noonday, 
 and as irresistible as fate, that the action of the mind is 
 not a produced effect. It is not a passive impression ; 
 and hence it does not, it cannot, result from the action of 
 any thing else. To say that it is produced by the action 
 of something else upon the mind, is to say that it is a 
 passive impression, and to deny that it is an act. We 
 are simply conscious of an act then, and the irresistible 
 inference which results from this fact, stands out in direct 
 and eternal opposition to the doctrine of necessity. 
 
 When we reflect upon the operation of the will, or of 
 the mind in the act of willing, we simply find ourselves 
 in possession of a volition. We do not see how we 
 come by this volition ; how we come to exist in this state 
 of activity. On this point, I am happy to find that the 
 consciousness of President Edwards agreed with ray 
 own. " It is true," says he, " I find myself possessed 
 of my volitions before I can see the effectual power of 
 any cause to produce them, for the power and eflicacy 
 of the cause is seen but by the effect, and this, for aught 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 227 
 
 I know, may make some imagine that volition has no 
 cause, or that it produces itself." 
 
 Our consciousness is precisely the same ; but just ob- 
 serve how he interprets it. He finds himself possessed 
 of a volition; but does he look at this volition to see 
 what it is ? Does he ask himself whether it is the same 
 in nature and in kind with a produced effect? He does 
 not. It is most unquestionably a produced effect ; this 
 is beyond all doubt, and it is taken for granted. He sees 
 no effectual power by which this volition is produced ; 
 but he knows it is a produced effect, and therefore he 
 knows it must have a producing cause. The oracle is 
 not consulted on this point at all. It would be an insult 
 to reason to consult the great oracle of nature on so plain 
 a point as this. This has been decided long ago, and the 
 ear is deaf to any response that might possibly contra- 
 vene so clear a decision. Thus it is that the necessita- 
 rian goes to the true oracle within, and delivers oracles 
 himself. 
 
 He reasons not from the observed, but from the as- 
 sumed, nature of a volition. It must be an effect, says 
 he, and though I do not see "the effectual power by 
 which it is produced ;" yet there must be such a power. 
 Yes, it is just as absurd to suppose that it can exist, with- 
 out being produced by the effectual power of something 
 operating upon the mind, as it is to suppose that a world 
 can create itself! 
 
 But as we appeal to consciousness, let us pay some 
 little attention to its teaching. We find ourselves, then, 
 possessed of a volition ; we find our minds in a state of 
 acting. This is all we discover by the light of conscious- 
 ness. We see "not the effectual power of any cause" 
 operating to produce it. What shall we conclude then ? 
 
228 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 Shall we conclude that there must be some cause to pro- 
 duce it? This were not to study nature, as '* the hum- 
 ble servants and interpreters thereof;" but to approach 
 it in the attitude of dictators. 
 
 If we draw such an inference at all, it must be from 
 the fact, it seems, that volition is a produced effect. But 
 is it such an effect? "What says consciousness upon this 
 point? We have already repeatedly seen, what every 
 man may see, that a volition is not the passive result 
 of any prior action ; it is action itself. It is not a pro- 
 duced effect ; it is a producing cause. It is not deter- 
 mined at all ; it is simply a determination. As it stands 
 out in the light of consciousness, it is as perfectly distinct 
 from the idea of an effect, as any one thing can possibly 
 be from another ; and if it has not so appeared to every 
 reflecting mind, it is because it has not been simply looked 
 at, and beheld as it is in itself, but has been viewed through 
 the medium of a certain fixed notion, a certain precon- 
 ceived form of thought, a certain grand illusion, by which 
 he witchery of the senses has blinded the eye of con- 
 sciousness. Every change in the external world requires 
 a producing cause ; who then can possibly conceive of a 
 volition as existing upon any other terms or conditions ! 
 It is this fallacy, this begging of the question, this per- 
 petual declaration that it is self-evident, that has, through 
 a natural illusion of the senses, spread the scheme of ne- 
 cessity far and wide over the minds of men. It is this 
 grand illusion of the senses, or, if you please, of the 
 mind, that has brought " the dictates of reason," as they 
 have been called, into conflict with the testimony of 
 consciousness. 
 
 The doctrine of liberty is as inevitably connected with 
 the observed nature of a volition, as that of necessity is 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 229 
 
 connected with its assumed nature. I would not say- 
 that we are conscious of liberty ; for that would not be 
 correct ; but I will say, that we are conscious of that 
 which necessarily leads to the conviction that we are free, 
 that we have a power of contrary choice. I would not 
 say with Dr. Clarke, that liberty consists in a power to 
 act ; but I will say, that it necessarily results from it. I 
 would not say, that we are conscious of the existence of 
 no producing cause of our volitions ; for we cannot be 
 conscious of that which does not exist. But I will say, 
 that as we are conscious of the existence of an act, so 
 we see and do know that this is not a passive impression, 
 or a produced effect. And as we are not compelled to act, 
 so we know that we may act or may not act, so we know 
 that our actions are not necessitated, but may be put forth 
 or withheld. This is liberty, this is '« a power of contrary 
 choice." This idea of liberty, I say, follows from the 
 fact of consciousness that we do act, by an inference as 
 clear as noonday ; by an inference so natural, so direct, 
 and so inconceivably rapid, that it has often been supposed 
 to be included in the testimony of consciousness itself. 
 No man could help the conclusion, if he would only 
 allow his reason to speak for itself. 
 
 Is this doctrine any the less certain, because it is a 
 matter of inference? It will be conceded that it is 
 not. The most unquestionable facts in the universe are 
 made known by the same kind of evidence. It is some- 
 times said, that we are conscious of our own existence ; 
 but this is not to use language with philosophical pre- 
 cision. We are merely conscious of the existence of 
 thought, of feeling, of voHtion ; and we are so made, 
 that we are compelled to believe that there is something 
 which thinks, and feels, and wills. It is thus, by what 
 
230 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 has been called a fundamental law of belief, that we arrive 
 at the knowledge of the existence of our minds. In 
 like manner, from the fact of consciousness that we do 
 act, or put forth volitions, we are forced, by a funda- 
 mental law of belief, to yield to the conviction that we 
 are free. This inference as necessarily results from the 
 observed phenomena of the mind, as the existence of 
 the mind itself results from the same phenomena. And 
 if the doctrine of the necessitarian were true, that vo- 
 lition is a produced effect, we should never infer from it 
 that we have a power of acting at all ; we should simply 
 infer that we are susceptible of passive impressions. 
 
 I have said, that we are not conscious that there is no 
 producing cause of volition. No man can be conscious 
 of that which does not exist. Hence, it is highly absurd 
 to require us, to furnish the evidence of consciousness 
 that there is no such, cause of volition. It cannot testify 
 to any such universal negative ; and one might as well 
 require a mathematical demonstration of the point in dis- 
 pute, as to demand such evidence from us. And yet, 
 President Edwards declares, that by experience he 
 knows nothing like the doctrine, that "any volition 
 arises in his mind contingently;" that is to say, he was 
 not conscious that a volition has no producing cause of 
 its existence. Did he expect that we should prove the 
 non-existence of a thing by the direct evidence of con- 
 sciousness ? All that he could reasonably expect in such 
 a case is, that we should not be conscious of any such 
 influence; and this President Edwards himself admits. 
 He admits, that we do not see the " effectual power of any 
 cause," or feel its influence, operating to produce a voli- 
 tion : he merely infers this from the assumption that vo- 
 lition is a produced effect. 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 231 
 
 He also says, I find " that the acts of my Will are my 
 own ; i. e. that they are acts of my will — the volitions of 
 my own mind ; or, in other words, that what I will, I 
 will ; which, I suppose, is the sum of what others expe- 
 rience in this affair." Surely, no one was ever so silly 
 as to deny that what a man wills, he wills ; and if this is 
 all that consciousness teaches on the subject, its informa- 
 tion can throw no light upon this or upon any other 
 controversy. This proposition, that a man wills what he 
 wills, is independent of all experience and all conscious- 
 ness. It is an identical proposition, which experience 
 can neither shake nor confirm. We may see, nay, we 
 must see, that each and every thing in the universe is 
 what it is, without any reference to consciousness or 
 experience. 
 
 Indeed, it is as absurd to appeal to experience or con- 
 sciousness for the truth of such a universal and self- 
 evident axiom, as it is to appeal to universal and self- 
 evident axioms, to ascertain and determine the nature of 
 our mental phenomena, — of the states and processes of 
 the mind. Edwards has done both : he has deduced the 
 truth of the proposition, that a man wills what he wills, 
 from the evidence of consciousness or experience, as the 
 sum of all its teaching ; and he has established the fact, 
 that a volition is produced by the operation of an effectual 
 power, by an appeal to a universal axiom. He has sub- 
 mitted a truism, which declines every test of its truth, 
 to the tribunal of consciousness ; and he has determined 
 the nature of a volition, as well as the manner of its pro- 
 duction, by the application of a similar truism, which 
 contains no conceivable information respecting the nature 
 of any thing in the universe. 
 
232 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 Edwards says, " I find myself possessed of my voli- 
 tions." He was conscious of his own acts. This is a 
 sufficient foundation for the doctrine of liberty ; for such 
 a consciousness is utterly irreconcilable with the suppo- 
 sition that those acts are produced by the operation of 
 efficient causes. To say that they are *' my acts," and 
 yet to say that they are produced by the action of some- 
 thing else, is, as we have repeatedly seen, to say that 
 they are my acts, and at the same time to say that they 
 are not my actSt but effects produced upon my mind. 
 This very admission, therefore, lays the foundation of 
 the doctrine of liberty. And hence, it has been sup- 
 posed that Edwards himself was an advocate of this 
 doctrine ; because he has spoken of the soul as exerting 
 its own voUtions. From such an admission, it has been 
 concluded by some of his admirers, that he really re- 
 garded the mind as the ** efficient cause of its own acts," 
 and "motives as inerely the occasions on which it 
 acts." But such an admission only proves, that his 
 consciousness cannot be reconciled with his theory. 
 His consciousness lays the foundation of liberty; but 
 he does not build thereon. On the contrary, he lays the 
 foundation of his system in universal abstractions, and 
 not in observed facts ; and hence, as it is not derived 
 from an observation of nature, so it can never be brought 
 into harmony with the dictates and operations of nature. 
 It is altogether a thing of definitions and words ; and as 
 such it must pass away, when men shall cease to con- 
 struct for themselves, and come forward as •* the hum- 
 ble servants and interpreters of nature," to study the 
 world of mind upon the true principles of the inductive 
 method. 
 Edwards did not observe the intellectual world just as 
 
EDWARDS ON THE WILL. 233 
 
 it has been constructed by the Almighty, and narrowly 
 watch it in its workings ; he only reasoned about it and 
 about it ; and hence, he was necessarily devoted to blind- 
 ness. With all his gigantic power, he was necessarily 
 compelled to go around, eternally, upon the treadmill of 
 a merely dialectical philosophy, which of itself can yield 
 no fruit, instead of going forth to the harvest upon the 
 rich and boundless field of discovery. Why should the 
 failure of other times, resulting from such a course, in- 
 spire us with despair ? We hope for better results, not 
 from better minds, but from better methods. Socrates 
 dissuaded the men of his time from the study of nature, 
 alleging that " the wonderful art" wherewith the heavens 
 had been constructed, was concealed from their eyes ; and 
 that it was displeasing to the gods, that men should so 
 vainly strive to pry into mysteries which are so far above 
 their reach. Faint-hearted sage! Though Bacon had 
 beheld the genius and labour of two thousand years after 
 Socrates had been laid in the dust, wasted upon the same 
 great problem, yet did not the unconquerable ardour of 
 his hope droop for a moment. Rising aloft, even from 
 the wild waste which men had made of their powers in 
 all times past, he poured down the floods of his indigna- 
 tion upon those who are thus ready and willing to devote 
 mankind to darkness and despair. Inspired by his phi- 
 losophy, and pursuing his method, the more than immor- 
 tal Newton did not fear, cautiously yet boldly, humbly 
 yet hopefully, to pry into " the wonderful art" where- 
 with the Almighty has constructed the heavens ; and the 
 great problem which Socrates had so timidly, yet so 
 rashly, pronounced to lie beyond the reach of man, did 
 this humble student of nature most triumphantly solve ; 
 showing, to the admiration of the world and the glory 
 21 
 
234 EXAMINATION OF 
 
 of God, that that wonderful art is infinitely more wonder- 
 ful than any thing which had ever been dreamed of in 
 the philosophy of antiquity. How great soever, then, 
 the failure of times past may have been, we should not 
 despair. Nor should we listen, for a moment, to those 
 who are ever ready to declare, that the great problem of 
 the intellectual system of the universe is not within the 
 reach of the human faculties. 
 
 Nole, — The edition of Edwards' works quoted in this volume, 
 is that by G. & C.& H. Carvill, New York, 1830. 
 
 S^ or THE ^' . 
 
 TTNivEi^rrX 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Page 101, line 16, instead of" are always," read are not always. 
 125, 20, « hardly" read humbly. 
 
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