1 
 
 arc 
 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 AT LOS ANGELES
 
 RETROSPECTIVE VIEW 
 
 A K D 
 
 CONSIDERATION 
 
 INDIA AFFAIRS; 
 
 PARTICULARLY OF THE 
 
 TRANSACTIONS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 M 1 1 A R A T T A W A K* 
 
 FROM ITS 
 
 COMMENCEMENT 
 
 TO THE 
 
 MONTH Of OCTOBER, 178-!, 
 
 LONDON; 
 
 PRINTED ion J. DKBPE-T, OPPOSITE BERLIN G T O N'-I! L : 
 PICCADILLY, AND J. bEWELL, COICiHlLL, 
 
 r:DCCi.xs\j/5
 

 
 4-7 3 
 
 7V3 
 
 ( ) 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 X HE .writer Qf the following meets, in fub- 
 mitting them to the consideration of the public, 
 feels himfelf more influenced by zeal for the 
 community, than by any views of a private or 
 perfonal nature. He is therefore little folicitous 
 of literary rewards, or interefled in the reputa- 
 tion he is likely to obtain as an author, farther 
 than as fuch a wifh may be connected with that 
 Uriel: regard to truth and juftice, which is the 
 chief object of his ambition, and the only quali- 
 fication eflentiall' rcquifite to conftitute the cha- 
 racter to which he afpires. 
 
 If the impartial relation of circumftances to 
 which h has adhered mould fortunately refcue 
 one fact from the mill of falihood, with which 
 the arts of defigning and interefled men have la- 
 boured to difguife it, or affift in doing juftice to 
 the conduct of one individual, who might other- 
 wife fall a victim to the fee ret fhafts of envy, and 
 the malicious rancour of party, he will enjoy a 
 confeious and heart-felt pleafure, fuperior to eve- 
 ry other poffible gratification, and confider fuch a 
 <j\ recompenfe as fully proportioned to the amduity 
 and anxious trouble with which he has collected, 
 
 com-
 
 ( i* ) 
 
 compared and arranged the feveral materials of 
 which the prefent narrative is compofed. 
 
 His fatisfaction will be perfect, and his reward 
 complete, if by an early and candid exposition 
 of the date of affairs in India, and of the feveral 
 political tranfactions which have led thereto, he 
 lhould be fo happy as to furnifh any information 
 of the fmalleft public utility, and tending to point 
 out the means of either remedying pair, evils, or 
 preventing a repetion of fimilar difafters hereafter. 
 
 It is with this animating hope that he pre- 
 fumes to addrefs the Honourable Court of Di- 
 rectors of the United 'Eaft-India Company upon 
 the prefent occafion, and to fubmit the following 
 production to their particular attention and con- 
 fideration, convinced that the watchful care and 
 ardent zeal, with which they are accuflomed to 
 fuperintend and promote the important interests 
 committed to their management and direction, 
 will make them gladly and favourably liften to 
 whatever bears an appearance of contributing to 
 advance the fame deferable object, and that at all 
 events, their well-known candour and generality 
 of fentiment, will make every indulgent and libe- 
 ral allowance, and pardon any defect in the per- 
 formance itfelf, in consideration of the motives 
 from which it originated, 
 
 A RE.
 
 A 
 
 RETROSPECTIVE VIEW 
 
 AND 
 
 CONSIDERATION 
 o F 
 
 INDIA AFFAIRS. 
 
 A 
 
 FAITHFUL account of the Mharatta war, 
 including every material tran fact ion of a military as 
 well as political nature, that has occurred in India for 
 above eight years paft, muft at this juncture prove a 
 plealing and interefting fubject, and be of infinite uie to 
 throw a juil light upon thole important points, which 
 are at prefent the objects of public enquiry and difcuf- 
 fion, and in obtaining a certain knowledge of which, 
 national juilice, no lels than that due to many indivi- 
 duals of character and ftation in the Company's fervice, 
 is fo effentially concerned. 
 
 The magnitude and difficulty of the tafk, though it 
 excites my apprehenfion, cannot deter me from the 
 attempt ; becaufe, however defective my narrative, may 
 be found in the exterior ornaments of ilyle and grace 
 ot compofition, it will (I am confeious) be dictated by 
 the warmefl and moil zealous willies for the intereits 
 
 B of
 
 ( 2 ) 
 
 of my country, by a mind totally diverted of all pnju 
 dice or partiality whatever, and by an actual knowledge 
 ot moft: of the important facts that are related, whish 
 is derived either from perfonal obfervation, or from fuch 
 authentic papers and vouchers, as are pofitive and incon- 
 trovertible. 
 
 To the encouragement this confideration gives me, 
 is added another motive ftill more animating, when I 
 \j reflect that this narrative is expreffly intended for the 
 perufal of the Company's reprefentatives at home, and 
 upon a fubject which they have deemed deferving of 
 the moft particular and careful attention, and will, on 
 that account, no lefs than from their acknowledged 
 candor and liberality, receive, with flattering fatisfaction, 
 every information regarding it, that bears evident marks 
 of truth and moderation of temper. 
 
 I mall not take up' more time in the dull formality 
 of a preface, but after explaining in few words the 
 nature and extent of the prefent work, enter immedi- 
 ately into a detail of circumftances, avoiding as much 
 as poflible any impertinent or unneceflary intrufion upon 
 the patience of the public, as well as every attempt to 
 bias or influence their judgments, either by offering 
 opinions which are obvious and felf evident, or by put- 
 ting fuch interpretation and glofs upon facts, as might 
 difguife their true colour, and befl ferve any particular 
 and partial purpofe. 
 
 It is to a clear and exact, though not circumftantial, 
 relation of facts I mean to confine mylelf. I mall en- 
 deavour to fliew the confequences of every military and 
 political effort, and the advantages and difappointments 
 refpectively produced by them, without minutely de- 
 ferring the operations of the campaign, or the in- 
 trigues of the cabinet, farther than may be necefTary 
 
 to
 
 C 3 ) 
 
 to point out the errors of the particular fyftems from 
 which the latter may have originated, and to prove the 
 misfortunes that have ultimately flowed from them. 
 
 A more extenfive plan might encreafe and embel- 
 lifh the fubjec~t, but would not anfwer any ufeful pur- 
 pofe of information, which is the fole end I have in 
 view, and with the hope of which alone I am animated. 
 to enter upon the prefent tafk with zeal and chearful- 
 nefs. 
 
 The frequent occafion I mail have in the courfe of this 
 narrative to mention the Mharattas, their great power 
 as a nation, and indeed the circumftance of its being en- 
 tirely owing to the fyftem originally adopted by the 
 Company's fervants in India regarding them, that their 
 affairs are at prefent fo critically and alarmingly fituated, 
 renders fome account of their government in this place 
 highly proper and requifite. 
 
 The origin and foundation of their empire is a fub- 
 je6t, rather of curiofity and amufxng fpeculation than of 
 ufeful enquiry ; it cannot therefore properly belong to 
 this place : and were I even difpofed to difplay my ta- 
 lents for hiftorical investigation, and the induftry with 
 which I have exerted them, I fhould on this occafion 
 decline fuch an attempt, and acknowledge it anticipated 
 by a production which I have lately feen, published by 
 an officer of the Bombay efiablifhment, and containing 
 the mo ft reafonable, and (I believe) genuine account of 
 the original formation and fubfequent rife of the Mha- 
 ratta power, which has yet been obtained by the Euro- 
 pean enquirer. I ihall therefore only touch upon the 
 fubjedt, and in the moft general terms. 
 
 The mode of government eftablifhed by its fir ft great 
 
 founder, Sahou or Sewajie, proved to be of no long 
 
 duration, for although the name of fovereignty ftill 
 
 B 2 remains
 
 / 
 
 I 4 
 
 remains with the Rajah, and each fucceeding Pclfliwa 
 receives the inveftiture of that office from his hands,' 
 according to the ceremonious forms originally prac- 
 t i fed ; this mark of fuperiority and attention is almcfl: 
 the onlv one at prefent ohfefved ; and the real power 
 of the ftafe, together with the entire control and ma- 
 nagement of affairs, is exercfed and conducted - hy, 
 and under the exprefs authority of, the Peifhwa, who 
 keeps his court at Poonah. This place is at prefent con- 
 fidered as the capital of the ivlharatta empire, fince 
 the Rajah, who conflantly refides at Settara, a flrong 
 and almoff. inacceffible fortrefs about fixty miles dif- 
 tant, is never permitted to ftir out of the latter, but 
 like the bird in its gilded cage, is dazzled and amufed 
 by the falfe glare of external ceremony and refpecfr, 
 which only ferves to make the gloom and wretchednefs 
 of his prifon more confpicuouily fplendid. 
 
 There is perhaps fcarce any family in the hiftory of 
 mankind, which has produced an equal number of il- 
 luftrious and able characters to that of the prefent 
 reigning Peifhwa. It was to the addrefs and influence of 
 its founder, Ballajee Pundit, that Rajah Sahou was 
 indebted for the eftablifhment as well as growth of bis 
 empire, and gratitude at fir ft made him repofe a confi- 
 dence in his benefactor, which habits of indolence 
 towards the latter part of his h f e, and the ability and 
 talents of the other, improved into a total relaxation 
 from the care and fatigue of bufmefs on his own part, 
 and a delegation of his authority to the Peifhwa. The 
 fuccefTors of the latter treading in his fooiflep^ have 
 transferred this authority to themfelves as matter of 
 right, and a precedent to eflablifil the fovereign power 
 at prefent excrcifed by them, 
 
 An
 
 ( 5 ; 
 
 An adminiflration formed and conduced by men of 
 the character above mentioned, and which, to other 
 engines of a defpotic and uncontrolable will, unites 
 that of religion, the moll powerful of all, mull; ne- 
 ceiTarily act with decifion and vigour, and by its wife 
 and cautious policy, continue to preferve the wide-ex- 
 tended empire it has acquired, no lefs from the fatal 
 confequences of domeftic diffentions than from the ef- 
 forts of foreign enemies. 
 
 The truth of this obfervarion Is proved by our own 
 dear-bought experience, and the difappointment given 
 to the hopes we have long cherifhed, and even yet un- 
 fortunately too much encourage, of creating a divifion 
 of intereft among the leaders, and in particular of 
 feparating Mahadjec Scindia from the miniiler Nana 
 Furnefe. 
 
 It is certain a combination of very extraordinary and 
 unforefeen events had, at one period, opened to us a 
 reafonable profpecr. of obtaining that influence at the 
 court of Poonah which good policy had long fince 
 fuggefled to the Company at home, and induced them 
 to recommend to theii fervants in India, as a conflant 
 and leading object, in order to exclude and defeat the 
 intrigue* of the French nation. 
 
 It is almoft unneceffary to add, that the period to 
 which I allude mull; have been that favourable crifis, 
 when Ragonaut Row, brother to the Pei/hwa Ballajee 
 Badjerow, after having adied as regent during the mi- 
 norities of his two nephew?, Madhurow and Narrain 
 Row, and upon the demife of the latter, having en- 
 enjoyed the dignity and exerciftd the functions of Peifli- 
 wa himfelf, was compelled to fiv from the machina- 
 tions of that very party which now governs the Mha- 
 
 jatta 
 
 V 
 
 A
 
 C 6 ) 
 
 rntta ftate, and to implore the protection and aid of 
 the Englifh to reftore him to his native rights. 
 
 It is at that period I propofe to commence my nar- 
 rative, becaufe it was then that our affairs became fo 
 intimately blended with Mharatta politics, as to form 
 a leading object in all our future councils and meafures, 
 and it is to the line of conduct then adopted by the 
 government of Bengal, that we may afcribe the pre- 
 sent war with that nation, and of courfe the multiplied 
 misfortunes and ruin with which, in its confequences, 
 it has already overwhelmed the Britifji interefls in 
 India. 
 
 ^ Had the Governor General and Council, when they 
 
 received a clear, and, as it afterwards appeared, unex- 
 aggerated account of the ftate of the war, (wifely, and 
 in conformity to the wifhes of the Company, entered 
 into by the government of Bombay in fupport of Ra- 
 
 l v gonaut Row) chofe to avail tliemfelves of the favoura- 
 ble opportunity, which their own unimpaired ftrength, 
 and the comparative weaknefs of the acting adminifira- 
 tion at Poonah, fo fortunately offered them, and inftead 
 of putting an immediate flop to hoftilitics, had they 
 
 J ihewed the fmallefl determination of fupporting the 
 claims of the unhappy exile, there cannot remain a 
 doubt in the breaft of any unprejudiced perfon, who 
 has read and confulered attentively the public records 
 of that period, but that Ragonaut Row, in conjunction 
 . with us, would have fhortly been enabled to dictate 
 terms of fubmimon to his opponents, and that with 
 the re-eftablifhment of his authority, all oar political 
 objects and wiflies in the Mharatta flate would have 
 been completed. 
 
 In proof of this aflertion, it is only neceflary to men- 
 . tion the following undoubted fact, " that when the 
 
 " treaty
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 * treaty with Ragoba was concluded by the Bombay 
 " government, and their troops had joined him in the 
 <l field, the minifters were fo exceedingly alarmed, 
 " that they fent a vakeel to Bombay to folicit peace, 
 " on terms the moft advantageous both to Ragoba and 
 "the Company; but before they had delivered their 
 " commiflion, which they were prevented fome days 
 " from doing, on account of the Governor's being in- 
 " difpofed, letters arrived from the Bengal government, 
 ' difavowing the war, and profefling a determination 
 ' to make peace ; in confequence of which, the vakeel 
 li changed his tone, haughtily demanding the reflitu- 
 " tion of Salfette, and the other places of which we 
 " had taken pofTeflion, and the furrender of Ragonaut 
 " Row into their hands.'* 
 
 It is farther worthy of obfervation, that at the time 
 of our withdrawing the Bombay troops from Ragonaut 
 Row's fupport, his own force confifled of between 
 thirty and forty thoufand men, the greater! confidence 
 and alacrity prevailed throughout the army, in confe- 
 rence of the fuperiority recently obtained over the 
 miniilerial leader, Hurry Punt Forkea, and many of 
 the principal chiefs of the oppofition had given proofs 
 of an inclination to eipoufe the interefts of Ragonaut 
 Row, which they would mofi: allured! y have followed, 
 if we had difcovered any intention of profecuting the 
 advantages already obtained by our arms, and encou- 
 raged them to take fuch a flep, by affording a fafe and 
 certain afylum againft the dangerous coniequences that 
 might otherwile attend it. 
 
 lnitead of this, a line of conduct totally different, 
 
 was unfortunately adopted, and the ientiments of a 
 
 majority, equally remarkable for the rectitude and in- \ 
 
 fegrity of the principles which dictated all their xnea- 
 
 2 lures,
 
 ( 8 ) 
 
 fures, as for the impolitic and fatal tendency of many 
 of the meafures themfelves, prevailed in Bengal againft 
 every argument of a jufl and wife policy, derived from 
 the long experience and obfervation of the gentlemen 
 who at that time conflituted the minority, and who in 
 the inftance now alluded to, were certainly directed by 
 a perfect knowledge of, and regard to, the interefts of 
 the Company and their country. 
 
 The confequence of thefe meafures was fuch as might 
 naturally have been expected. The Mharatta admini- 
 ftration, taking advantage of the eager and anxious 
 defire we difcovered for peace, dictated one, upon con- 
 ditions in every refpect difproportioned to the fuccefs 
 of our arms, and to the fuperior condition we were in 
 at that time to profecute the war. 
 
 Inadequate and imperfect as they were, we however 
 acceded to them, and the impatience of the Bengal 
 government to obtain a treaty, did not fuffer them to 
 difcern, that the one concluded by Colonel Upton at 
 Poorunda, March ifl, 1776, was of fo ambiguous and 
 ^determinate a nature, as to give entire fecurity and 
 fatisfaction to neither party, and to put it in the power 
 of both to renew the war, whenever it might fuit either 
 their intereft or inclination. 
 
 The Mharattas in the mean time reaped the moft 
 folid benefits from this treaty. Sunk confiderably as a 
 itate in that confequence, which before the famous 
 battle of Panniput * they held among the ftates of 
 
 Hindoflan, 
 
 * In this remarkable battle, fought little more than twenty 
 years ago, the principal jVlahommcdan chiefs in Hindoflan, 
 ranged under the banners of the conquering Abdal'ah Duranncc, 
 fhuggled for fupcrioiity with the Hindoo powers led on by the 
 
 Mharattas,
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 Trlirtdoftan, and which, under the fhort but vigorous 
 sdminiflration of Madhurow, elder brother to Narrain 
 Row, they were juft: beginning to recover, when his 
 death, and the diflentions that enfued, joined to the 
 fuccefsful interpofition of our arms, plunged them once 
 more into weak nets and diftrefs, they required a fhort 
 peaceful recefs, not only to deliver them from the dan- 
 gers immediately impending, but to recruit their ex- 
 haufted ftrength, and prepare for future contefts. 
 
 Such a refpite was peculiarly feafonable to the party 
 'which then directed the government, in oppofition to 
 the claims of RagdnaUt Row, becaufe it afforded the 
 leaders of it an opportunity of exerting all their arts to 
 blacken his character and effectually ruin his caufe ; 
 and it is to the good ufe they made of this opportunity, 
 that we may attribute the total difaffecTion which af- 
 terwards prevailed again ft Ragoba thrdughoUt the De- 
 caa, and rendered every future effort in his favour in- 
 adequate and unfuCcefsful ; for by delaV, always dan- 
 gerous, and commonly fatal in do'meftic jontefls, the 
 threats and prcmifes of the miniiler, joined to the li- 
 berality he found it necefTafy to practife on many oc- 
 oafidns, had leifure to operate in their full extent; and 
 thofe men who entered into the original afTociatioa 
 
 Mharattas, and, after a fevcrc and bloody conflict, proved vic- 
 torious. Soujah ul Dowla diftinguiflied himfelf greatly on this 
 occafion ; and on the fide of the Mhrattas, befides many leaders 
 of note, and above twenty-five thoufand men, the famous Su- 
 Jcba, brother to the reign' ng Pciflnva, Bailajec Pundit, and his 
 'Id (t fon, VifTnaut Row, svere unfortunately (lain- This mc- 
 lancholy event made fo de:p an irnpretfion on the mind of tlu 
 father, a<= to fhortcn his days, and for a confidcrable period be- 
 fore his dilTolution, lie was conftantly repeating the name of bis 
 ' vi In, and holding imaginary converfatioiu with fc:m. 
 
 C againft
 
 
 
 { 10 ) 
 
 againfi: Ragoba, were not only confirmed in their owrt 
 enmity, but confcious of the refentment and jealoufy 
 which mull: continue to animate him, ihould he expe- 
 rience any favourable change of fortune, they felt it 
 impolTible to place the fmalleft confidence in his pro- 
 feffions of favour, and promifTes of forgivenefs, and 
 therefore confidered their own deftrudtion as the ne- 
 cellary confecjuence of his elevation to power. 
 
 The chara&er of the man greatly encouraged fuch 
 an idea, and the apprehenfion of his vindi6tive fpirit 
 was fo great, that even thofe who were originally well- 
 affe<5ted to his interests, and had never taken any adtive 
 part againft him, but who had peaceably acquiefced, 
 or perhaps continued to hold appointments under the 
 new adminiftration, thought it dangerous to rifque a 
 change, which muft expofe them to the efFedts of his 
 jealoufy and fufpicion, and became therefore interefted 
 in the fupport and fuccefs of his adverfaries. 
 
 Thus the impolitic and unfeafonable treaty, con- 
 cluded with the Mharattas in March 1776, deprived 
 us of the advantages which were then certainly within 
 our grafp ; arid by the ruin it brought upon the caufe 
 of Ragonaut Row, rendered a future war an object of 
 the greateft difficulty and hazard, and not to be under- 
 taken but upon grounds of expedient and indifpenfable 
 neceffity. 
 
 To the misfortune of the Company, their ruling fer- 
 vants in India were not contented with reprefenting 
 merely the difappointment occafioned by this treaty, 
 but they drew fuch a flattering picture of the unfettled 
 and diftradied fiate of the Mharatta government, and 
 fuggelted in fuch lively colours the advantages which 
 we might Hill be able to reap from their divifions, that, 
 as the " Delenda eft Carthago" of the wile Cato was 
 
 formerly
 
 ( ) 
 
 formerly the favourite and popular maxim with the 
 ambitious Romans, to pave their way to univerfal em-, 
 pi re, in like manner, the fettlement of the Mharatta 
 flate became a fixed and primary object with our lead- 
 ing politicians, both at home and abroad, in order to 
 fecure an unrivalled dominion in India. 
 
 From this circumitance it happened, that the Court ^ 
 of Directors, deceived by falfe and exaggerated repre- 
 fentations, did not give that decifive and falutary check 
 to the clifpofition of their prefidencies in India, which 
 alone could have prevented a renewal of hoftilities : 
 on the contrary, they contented themfelves with fimply 
 declaring their pofitive intention of ftrictly adhering to 
 the terms of the treaty made by Colonel Upton, which 
 they, however, acknowledge is not upon the whole fo 
 agreeable to them as they could wifh, and feel them- 
 felves at the fame time compelled, by motives of ho- y 
 nour, humanity, and juftice, to authorife a breach of 
 it, by agreeing to the protection given to Ragoba, in 
 direct contradiction to an exprefs article (and no doubt, 
 in the opinion of the Mharatta mini Iter, the moll in- 
 terefling and important one) of the treaty. /V 
 
 It was, in fact, impoflible for the Company to have 
 adopted a different line. To have furrendered Rago- 
 naut Row into the hands of his inveterate, his perfonal 
 enemies, would have entailed an indelible Main upon 
 the honour and good faith of the nation, and have been 
 jutlly conhdered as a bafe and pufillanimous action, 
 which no profpect of future advantage could in any 
 refpect warrant. To perfift in affording him protec- 
 tion was an actual breach of treaty, and violation of 
 the public faith folemnly pledged for its performance. 
 The alternative appeared at fir it fight equal, and was 
 certainly a hard one, which required the mofl jud'.- 
 C 2 cioui
 
 w >. 
 
 cious deliberation, but when maturely weighed, the 
 difficulty of choice foon vanished. 
 
 By the former we mufl have rendered ourfelves in- 
 famous in the eyes of Hindoflan and the world, whilft 
 bj the latter, we rifqued'little more than offending the 
 Mharattas, and incurring their juil refentment and fuf- 
 picion of our hoflile intentions. 
 
 It is even more than a reafonable fuppofition, that 
 by addrefs and proper management, influenced by a 
 Ulcere wifh on our part to preferve the peace, we might 
 ljave been able to fatisfy the minifler, and reconcile 
 him to a meafure, which it was furely our bufinefs to 
 Convince him originated folely from a regard to our 
 character and dignity as a nation, and not from any 
 views of a nature calculated to ferve our own fecret 
 purpofes hereafter, or to prejudice and deftroy his au- 
 thority in the ftate. 
 
 Jnflead of this, the whole of our conduct had evi- 
 dently a quite oppofite tendency. We infilled, with 
 the moll minute and ftudied exactnefs, upon the ftridt 
 performance of points in themfelves trifling and unim- 
 portant, but which, by making the fubjec~ts of difcuf- 
 fion, we forced into political confequence, in order 
 to irritate as much as poflible the minds of the Mha- 
 rattas. We difputed about the true meaning of a cou- 
 ple of Peril an words, which, if interpreted to our wifh, 
 would have added to the Company's annual revenue, 
 the enormous fum of about ten thoufand pounds ller- 
 ling more than the minifler propofed to give, in con- 
 formity to the fenfe in which he underftood tliern. 
 We alfo peremptorily demanded the difmifllcn oi a 
 per Ion belonging to the French nation from the court 
 of Poonah, who, with whatever intentions deputed 
 there, it is evident, and has been fmce fully proved, 
 
 d;d
 
 ( *3 ) 
 
 did not enter into any formal engagements with the 
 minifler, although the latter would have been fully 
 juftified by our conduct relative to Ragoba, and the 
 unfriendly difpofition we fo ftrikingly manifefted, if 
 he had even folicited the alliance and fupport of the 
 French, as a fecurity againfl our future, hoftile at- 
 tempts. 
 
 On fuch immaterial and ill-founded points did we 
 infill with the minifler, and call his non-compliance a- %/ 
 breach of treaty, forgetting how many more important 
 and more juft caufes of complaint he had. to exhibit 
 againft us, relative to Ragonaut Row, to the ceflions 
 made by Futty Sing of Chick ley, Verriow, &c. &c. ^v 
 and even to the restitution of Salfette itfejf; which he 
 had been abfolutely taught to expect from the juft ice* 
 and generofity of the Bengal government. 
 
 The apprehenfion (I fhould have faid, the know- 
 ledge) of an intended French alliance, has been po- 
 litically afligned as the principal motive of entering 
 into the war with the Mharattas. The ground* of 
 fuch a belief were, however, altogether fallacious, and 
 I make no fcruple to afTert, that the Mharattas never 
 had a thought of any thing more, than maintaining a. y 
 general good underftanding with the French nation , 
 that they neither wifhed nor attempted to break their 
 alliance with us ; and that the hoflilities which im- 
 mediately followed the facts of which I have been 
 fpeaking, might not only have been prevented by our 
 eifor's, but were confequences originating entirely 
 from our own active meaiures, abfolutely calculated 
 as well as intended to produce a war. 
 
 This aflertion naturally excites curiofity to enquire, 
 fince the war on our part is evidently of choice, and 
 
 not
 
 not of neceflity, by whofe management and counfel the 
 nation became involved in a conteft, which has proved 
 the fruitful fource of innumerable misfortunes, and has 
 brought us to the very brink of a precipice, beyond 
 which, if we advance a fingle ftep, certain and total 
 ruin muft enfue. 
 
 I have already mentioned the diflatisfa6lion with 
 which the treaty of March 1776 was juftly received 
 both at home and abroad, by all thofe who knew the 
 real fituation of affairs at the time it was concluded, 
 and were fenfible of the advantages we facrificed, with- 
 out obtaining any adequate benefit or fecurity, in re- 
 turn. 
 
 Thefe therefore, it is probable, would readily approve 
 of any fyflem they fuppofed to be calculated to recover 
 that fuperiority ; and unfortunately the ruling fervants 
 in India either did not fee themfelves, or chofe not to 
 let their conftituents fee, that the golden opportunity 
 was irrecoverably loft, and that thofe leaders in the 
 Mharatta ftate, who once difcovered an inclination to 
 fupport the interefts of Ragonaut Row, were, for the 
 reafons I have already affigned, become totally averfe 
 from his caufe. 
 
 From their partial and exaggerated accounts it un- 
 fortunately happened that a latitude of action was left 
 them, of which they did not fail to avail themfelves ; y 
 and the ambition of a majority on one fide of India 
 co-operated with avarice on the other, to precipitate a 
 rupture, which, if the wife counfels and able policy of 
 Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler could have prevailed, 
 mufl have been fortunately avoided ; nor would Hyder /\ 
 Ally have fince dared to take advantage of a feeble and 
 corrupt adminiftration, to invade the dominions, and 
 ruin the power ot the Llngiifh in the Carnatic. 
 
 It
 
 ( ?S ) 
 
 It is plain, therefore, that the difpofition and fenti- 
 ments of the Bengal and Bombay prefidencies perfectly 
 correfponded and co-operated on that occafion ; but as 
 the latter uniformly confulted with, and acted by the 
 exprefs orders of the former; and as every part of their 
 conduit was authorifed in the raoft full and direct man- 
 ner ; as the power of prevention alfo remained with the 
 Bengal government, and as they not only did not exert 
 it, but took an active and zealous part to promote hof-- 
 tilities, it may furely be advanced, upon every ground 
 of political reafoning and juftice, that Mr. Haftings 
 was the real and refponfible author of the Mharatta 
 war, and that it remains with him to anfwer to the 
 Company and his country for the countlefs train of 
 evils and misfortunes in, which it has involved them. /\ 
 
 I have thus conducted my narration to the actual 
 breaking out of the war, which I conceive to have been 
 in the early part of the year 1778, when the detach- 
 ment from Bengal commenced its march (at leafr then 
 fo underflood) to Bombay , for under whatever colour 
 the real intent of this meafure was difguifed, or what- 
 ever fpecious arguments were made ufe of at the time 
 to reconcile it to the Mharatta miniiier, and to over- 
 come the folid objections brought againft it by the mi- 
 nority, it is evident that Mr. Haitings forefaw, and 
 was prepared for, the coufequences ; and that, though 
 he affected to exprefs " a reafonable expectation of the 
 " administration at Poonah being alarmed at fo vigo- 
 " rous a meafure, and made to act with more good 
 " faith towards their allies," nothing was farther from 
 his idea, than to prevent hoftilities, which, it plainly 
 appeared from his fubfequent conduct, he was fully 
 bent upon, and determined fliould take place at all 
 events. 
 
 The
 
 7 
 
 Hie iVIhamtis themfelves, well knowing the difpo- 
 Yition of the Boitihay, and, from recent circumftances, 
 Tufpicious of that 6f the Bengal government, could 
 not but behold this prOpofed acceflion of flrength to 
 the former at that particular juncture with the moil 
 jealous and anxious eye. They accordingly difcou- 
 raged the meafure all in their power, without abfolute- 
 ly refufing a paflage through their country, and there- 
 by offending the Englifh, which they iludioufly endea- 
 voured to avoid ; and when, notwithstanding their 
 declared difapprobation, the troops perfifted in their 
 march, the minifter certainly confidered fuch conduct 
 as an undoubted proof of our unfriendly intentions, 
 and equal to the moft Open and violent act of hoftility. 
 
 It was not till the middle of May that the Bengal 
 detachment, confifting of fix battalions of feapoys. a 
 company of native artillery, and about eight hundred 
 horfe, (in ail near five thoiifand men) crolTed the river 
 Jumna at Kalpee, a moit time previous to which a 
 revolution had been effected at Poonah in favour of Mo- 
 raba Furnefe ; and the government of Bombay, who, 
 it fliould be obferved, had neither afTifted in bringing 
 it about, nor exerted themfelves vigorcufly in fupport- 
 ing it after it was accomplished, from a belief of this 
 chiefs attachment to Ragonaut Row, lent directions 
 to the officer commanding the detachment, to halt 
 where their letter might reach him, until he received 
 their father orders. 
 
 This new adminiftration proved, however, of very 
 fhort duration, and Nana Furnefe, by the timely aid 
 and enttrprifing addtefs of Scindea,* icon recovered 
 
 his 
 
 * Nana Turncfc, while in the hantls of Maraba, had artfully 
 difi'uii'cJ his ambitious views unJcr the maik of the molt f-ccLus 
 
 mode-
 
 ( I? ) 
 
 his fuperiority, and refumed the reins of government, 
 which he has ever fince continued to guide, while Mo- 
 raba lingers out a wretched captivity at Ahmednagur, 
 which has been lately made more clofe and rigorous by 
 the difcovery of a plot for his deliverance, to which it 
 is faid the governor of the fortrefs was privy, and has 
 in confequence iuffered death. 
 
 I cannot here avoid a fhort digreffion, to obferve 
 how firmly the power of the minifter, Nana Furnefe, 
 feems to be at prefent eftablifhed. Of all the chiefs 
 heretofore leagued with himfelf and rivals in powei, 
 and of all thofe who have been at any time fufpe&ed 
 by him, as favourers of the caufe of Ragonaut Row, 
 Moraba is the only perfon remaining to excite the mod 
 'diftant jealoufy or aj prehenfjon. All the reft have 
 either died in prifon, or have purchafed their liberty 
 by the payment of a large fum of money, and content- 
 edly fubmitted to poverty and a private condition. 
 
 Hurry Punt Furkea, the general of the flate, is fo!e- 
 ly indebted to the minifter for his prefent elevated rank 
 and confequence. He lives with him on the moil con- 
 fidential footing, and in cafe of his ruin, muft inevi- 
 tably lhare the fame fate, or fink into total obfcurity. 
 
 moderation, and had carried his deep diifimulation Co far, as to 
 declare that he had no other wifli, but to vifit the holy city of 
 Benares, for which purpofc he actually afTumcd a habit of pecu- 
 liar piety and devotion, while at the fame time he was fecretly 
 carrying on a correfpondence with Mahadjec Scindea, and fettling 
 with that chief the precife manner and particular hour for appre- 
 hending Moraba and refcuing himfelf. This fervice Scindea ac- 
 cordingly performed on the 28th of June, at the head of twenty- 
 five thoufand men, and fecured the perfon of Moraba, whilft 
 Nana laughed at the credulity of his rival, and deridingly told 
 him, that he meant to defer his vifit to Benares % little longer. 
 D Scindea,
 
 J 
 
 ( '8 ) 
 
 Scindea, to whom Nana Furnefe may be faid to owd 
 every thing, has reaped and ft 111 enjoys every folid ad- 
 vantage, both with refpect to fortune and ambition, 
 which, as the moll powerful fubject of a great and well- 
 eftablifhed empire, (and to nothing more muft he af- 
 pire) he can poffibly defire or expect. No change of 
 government will prove beneficial to him ; and the de- 
 gree of jealoufy mutually fubfifting betwixt himfelf and 
 Hurry Punt, which Nana, it is probable, fees, and fe- 
 cretly encourages, to render each more immediately 
 dependant upon himfelf, muft at all events prove a 
 {ufficient check and obftacle to their forming any de- 
 signs prejudicial to a peifon, whofe continuance in 
 power they know to be fo ftrictly connected with their 
 own fafety and fuccefs. 
 
 Holkar only remains to be mentioned; and his per- 
 fonal character is an ample fecurity againft any mif- 
 chief which his influence in the ftate, even if prompt- 
 ed by fecret inclination, could poffibly effect ; for he 
 has all along been directed by Scindea in his political 
 conduct ; nor is there any reafon to fuppofe he will 
 venture to embrace a different fyftem. 
 
 From the above remarks, and from the farther con- 
 fideration, that all the other Mharatta chiefs of any 
 weight or confequence are Brahmins, and by their pre- 
 judices againft Ragonaut Row, no lefs than by their in- 
 terefted connection with the minifter, under whom 
 they enjoy confidence and authority, are of courfe 
 firmly devoted to his caufe, it is afluredly a reafonable 
 opinion, as far as human forefight can reach, to pro- 
 nounce the prefent adminiftration of Poonah eftablifhed 
 upon the firmeft and moft durable bafis, and equally 
 A cure from domeftic diffentions and internal treachery, 
 as it is from the efforts of foreign enemies, whofe dan- 
 gerous
 
 ( '9 ) 
 
 ^gerous and enterprifing attacks it has in a late ftriking 
 inftance, by an able, extenfive, and well-concerted 
 fyftem of policy, found means effectually to defeat in 
 the very moment of fuccefs. 
 
 The reftoration of Nana Furnefe's authority made ^ 
 it neceflary for the Bombay government to revert once 
 more to their hoftile fyftem. They accordingly fent ^ 
 orders for the advance of the Bengal troops, and rely- 
 ing upon their fupport, they proceeded to contrive the 
 means of oppofing and removing the acting adminiftra- 
 tion at Poonah, which had been the original object of 
 the formation of the detachment, and indeed of all 
 the meafures which they had been purfuing for. a con- 
 fiderable time before, in concert with the Bengal pre- 
 Cdency. 
 
 The refolution of the Select Committee of Bombay, 
 for adopting a fpecific plan in favour of Ragoba, was j 
 taken the 21 ft of July, and communicated to the ho- 
 nourable Governor General and Council, whofe ap- 
 probation they received the 27th of September follow- 
 ing. A formal treaty was then concluded with that 
 chief, bearing date the 24th of November, 1778, and y 
 the Bombay forces immediately took the field, in order 
 to conduct him to Poonah, and place him in the re- 
 gency, according to the agreements mutually made for 
 that purpofe. 
 
 Thus far no part of the conduct of the Bombay go- 
 vernment appears in any degree rcprehenfible. I do 
 not, however, allude to the particular conditions fet- 
 tled with Ragonaut Row on this occafion. It was, 
 perhaps, in one refpect, fortunate, that the entire fai- 
 lure of the enterprife itfelf prevented them from ever 
 becoming the fubjects of ferious conlideiation or dif- 
 cuflion. I fpeak only, at prefent, to the genera! na- /\ 
 JD 2 ture
 
 ( 20 ) 
 
 ture of the plan, which , it muft be acknowledged, was 
 undertaken with the pofitive fanc~tion, concurrence, 
 and, I may fay, knowledge of the Governor Genera] 
 and Council. 
 
 How ftrange, then, how inconfiftent, and how con- 
 trary to every rule of policy, and even common fcnfe, 
 will the conduct of the latter be judged, when it i 
 known, that they were at the fame time fecretly at- 
 tempting a negotiation with Modajee Bofla, the Rajah 
 of Berar, the real object of which they ftudioufly con- 
 cealed from the knowledge of the Bombay govern- 
 ment ; and by a refinement in political intrigue here- 
 tofore uneflayed, thought to attain a determinate end, 
 by purfuing at one and the fame time two diftinct 
 avenues of action, which pointed to objects diametri- 
 cally oppofite, and which it was abfolutely impoflible 
 could ever unite, or be in the fmalleft degree reconciled 
 to each other. 
 
 In order to explain this bufinefs fully, it is neceffary 
 to recur to the period almoft immediately fubfequent 
 to the revolution at Poonah in favour of Nana Fur- 
 ncfe, when by the vigilance and zeal, of the gentle- 
 men who compofed the Secret Committee for managing 
 the Company's affairs in Europe, certain intelligence of 
 a French war was communicated with a fecrecy and 
 difpatch that can fcarcely be credited. 
 
 This intelligence did Mr. Haftings make the bafis 
 of his propofal for a plan he had long meditated of an 
 alliance with the Rajah of Berar, the grand object of 
 which involved the fuccefs of a project the mod wild 
 and impracticable that ever entered the mind of a po- 
 litician. It v/as in fact altogether chimerical, and in 
 no fhape to be reconciled to the known abilities and 
 political difcernment of him who cheriflied, and has 
 
 fince
 
 ( ) 
 
 fince continued to indulge it, to fuch a height of ex- 
 travagant and infatuated belief, as not to allow the evi- 
 dence of pofitive fa&s which carried conviction to all 
 the world befides, to diminifh the confidence he placed 
 in the friendly difpofition of the Berar prince, or even 
 totally deftroy the hopes he ft ill maintained of railing 
 him to the fovereignty of the Mharatta empire. 
 
 The delufion at firft imbibed has continued to ope- 
 rate to our prejudice during the whole of the war; 
 and I cannot but confider the propofals for a treaty 
 with the Mharatta adminiftration, tranfmitted through 
 the channel of Modajee Bofla, in October, 1780, and 
 the late appointment of Mr. Chapman to the court of 
 Naigpore, poffeffing at the fame time authority to ne- 
 gociate with the Mharatta flare, as two meafures equal- 
 ly weak, impolitic, and deflructive of the true interefts 
 of the Company, as well as fruftrating their ardent de- 
 fire for peace. But the juftice of this remark will be 
 more fully proved in the detail of fubfequent tranfac- 
 tions. It is fuflicient for the prefent purpofe to ob- 
 ferve, that even at the period of which I am now 
 fpeaking, and previous to the full difcovcry which the 
 government of Bengal might have made of Modajee's 
 real intentions, from the correfpondence of Mr. Wa- 
 therfton, who was deputed in December, 1778, to the 
 court of Naigpore by General Goddard, and particu- 
 larly from a letter addrelTed to them by the General him- 
 felf, dated at Burhanpore, February 5, 1779, where, 
 after mentioning the advices he had juft received from 
 the Rajah, of the total overthrow of the Bombay forces 
 at Telli igong, the uncertain, contradictory, and at the 
 fame time alarming, nature of the difpatches arrived 
 both from the Bombav Committee and their army in 
 the field, and the determination he had formed in con- 
 
 fcquence, 
 
 (
 
 C 22 ) 
 
 fequencc, of proceeding immediately towards Surar, 
 he gives his opinion of Modajee's averfion to the fu- 
 ture profecution of the propofed project in the follow- 
 ing clear and pointed words : " I am induced to be- 
 " lieve, he (Modajee) would objet to my continuing 
 ** in his dominions, becaufe, with the account he has 
 " written me of the tranfaclions at Poonah, he has 
 propofed my returning to Calcutta by fuch road as 
 '. I fhall find mod convenient and eligible, without 
 " making any reference to your expected replies to 
 ',' his letters, or to their confequence in favour of his 
 *' views, in concert with your government." 
 
 I fay, exclufive of the lights derived from the above 
 fource, a cool and impartial confideration of the na- 
 ture of the plan itfelf would have ferved to convince 
 any unprejudiced perfon of its extravagance, and have 
 fuggefled the impoflibility of prevailing upon a wife 
 and difcerning court, like that of the then government 
 of Naigpore, to hazard and endanger its future exif- 
 tencc as a powerful flate, in purfuit of a chimerical 
 fcheme of aggrandizement, which, upon every prin- 
 ciple of political reafoning and judgment, was fur- 
 rounded by fuch great and innumerable difficulties, as 
 to be juftly pronounced impracticable. 
 
 "What excufe, then, can be brought for the Bengal 
 government's wifhing to adopt fuch a fcheme, and not 
 only ferioufly endeavouring to effect it, but doing fo at 
 a time when they had reafon to believe the presidency 
 of Bombay had actually entered upon the execution 
 of another, under their exprefs fanction and authority, 
 and depended for its fuccefs upon the fupport of the 
 Bengal detachment, fuppofed to be then on its march 
 to their alTillance ? 
 
 That 
 l
 
 That this, however, was the cafe, it is only necelTaty 
 to obferve, that the approbation given by the Bengal 
 government to their propofed plan in favour of Rago- 
 naut Row was dated in Auguft, 1778, and the inftruc- 
 tions given to General Goddard, upon the grounds of 
 thofe formerly furnifhed Mr. Elliott, in the November 
 following. That in the preceding month of July, they 
 had briefly communicated Mr, Elliott's million to the 
 Bombay Council, but had concealed the particular ob- 
 ject of it, relative to an offenfive alliance with Modajee, 
 and his eftablifhment in the Rauge of Settara. That 
 it is true, they then ufed the precaution, in order, as 
 they fay, to prevent any iteps of a contrary tendency 
 on the part of the Bombay prefidency, to requeft iC that 
 u they would refrain from forming any engagements 
 ' of a nature hoftile to the adminiftration at Poonah, 
 * f excepting fuch as might appear abfolutely neceflary 
 " for the defence of their own pofleflions j" and that 
 even this precaution, vague and inconclufive as it muft 
 appear, was intirely neglected in the letter of approba- 
 tion above alluded to, which contained only a reftriction 
 *' from entering into any engagements with Ragoba 
 il of a tendency hoftile to the government of Berar, 
 " or contrary to fuch as Mr. Elliott might have ap- 
 <( prized them of his having concluded with Alodajee 
 " Bofla." 
 
 Thus, then, it plainly appears, that the government 
 of Bombay, through the whole of the tran fact ions 
 which followed Colonel Upton's treaty in March, 1776, 
 to the formation of the engagements made with Ra- 
 goba in November, 1778, were encouraged, fupportcd, 
 and fully authorised by the Governor General and 
 Council, who neverthelefs molt unaccountably, I had 
 almoft faid treacheroufly, defcrted their plan at the 
 
 very
 
 ( 2 4 } 
 
 very moment it became ripe for execution, and fecrei- 
 ly adopted a new and diftindt project, the purfuit of 
 which could not fail, in its confequences, effectually to 
 defeat the fuccefs of the enterprife in favour of Ra- 
 goba ; nor was it till the month of March, 1779, and 
 after the arrival of General Goddard at Bombay, that 
 a copy of Mr. Elliott's original inftru&ions was re- 
 ceived by the Prefident and Select Committee, and the 
 nature of the propofed alliance with Modajee Bofla 
 fully explained to them. 
 
 Another circumftance deferves mentioning, as it 
 tends farther to difplay the inconfiflency and duplicity 
 of the Bengal government throughout this bufinefs in 
 the moll finking colours; which is, that on the 15th 
 of October, 1778, they wrote to the prefidency of 
 Bombay, generally advifing them of the friendly dif- 
 pofition of the Beiar Rajah, but acquainting them, 
 that as Mr. Elliott was dead, they propofed to wait for 
 advices from the Rajah before they appointed any other 
 perfon to fucceed him. They at the fame time autho- 
 rife the gentlemen of Bombay to " give orders to the 
 " officer commanding the Bengal detachment, to pro- 
 ' ceed forwards in fupport of the plan for reinstating 
 " Ragoba in the regency, if they think fuch a ftep 
 " neceflary." 
 
 The unfortunate iflue of the expedition from Bom- 
 bay to accomplifli that object is too well known to re- 
 quire a defcription in this place. The malicious exer- 
 tions of party have operated in fecret, and the im- 
 predions made by a generous fenfe of national difgrace 
 and lofs, have publicly and powerfully united to load 
 the unhappy actors in that diflrefsful fcene with every 
 fpecies cf reproach and infamy, and even to plunge 
 them into irremediable ruin. 
 
 It
 
 C s ) 
 
 It is not the intention of the author of thefe meets 
 to join in the popular cry, or to wipe off the odiurri 
 which has afperfed their characters. It is a fubjett he 
 does not mean to difcufs. But juftice as well as huma- 
 nity generally claims the impartial teftimony of his peri 
 o'n this bccafion ; and the enquiring eye of unpreju- 
 diced truth will trace the failure of the enterprize to 
 a fource far different from the fuppofed mifcondudl: of 
 thofe men, who had the immediate management and 
 direction of it; 
 
 It will difcover the certain feeds of difappointment 
 in a diftruft and jealoufy which early took place be- 
 tween the two prefidencies, which deftroyed every 
 ground of mutual confidence, and which, by produ- 
 cing open neglect, on the one part, and fecret refent- 
 ment on the other, ultimately defeated the views of 
 both, and ended in the moll fatal and ruinous confe- 
 rences to the public. 
 
 It will fee the Governor General and Council of 
 Bengal prefering a favourite fcheme projected by them- 
 felves, yetfc as if confcious of its extravagance and ab- 
 furdity, afraid of openly avowing that preference, and 
 at the fame time purfujng fuch unaccountable means, 
 and ifluing orders of fo contradictory a nature, as to 
 perplex, embarrafs, and totally overturn the very plan 
 they were bound by their own inftruclions and pofitive 
 promifes to fupport. 
 
 It will alfo fee the prefidency of Bombay in their 
 turn, aware of this unlucky predilection, which inter- 
 fered with their views, ingenioufly contriving to de- 
 ceive themfelves as well as others into a belief of the 
 ftrength and fufficiency of their caufe, and without 
 encouragement from any partizahs of Ragoba, or wait- 
 ing for the fupport of the Bengal detachment, (which 
 
 E though
 
 ( 26 ) 
 
 though delayed, rauft, they might have been confident,, 
 at lad arrive) precipitately plunging into a conteft to 
 which they were unequal, and facrificing the interefts 
 of their country to the feelings of refentment and thr 
 dictates of a felfifh and jealous 2mbition. 
 
 Thefe will be the latent caufes and fats difcernable 
 by the keen and fearching eye of truth, and their rea- 
 lity will be confirmed, by oblerving the line of conduct 
 afterwards purfued by both parties. No crimination 
 or enquiry into the behaviour of individuals, but an 
 afFecled moderation on the part of the Bengal prefi- 
 dency, which in notorious cafes of public delinquency 
 is furely moft unpardonable, and no accufation of, or 
 reflection upon, the particular meafures of the Bombay 
 government,, in order to account for,, and explain the 
 caufes of the late mifcarriage, which was certainly due 
 to public juftice, and abfolutely neceflary for their own 
 vindication. 
 
 In {hort, a mutual confeioufnefs of the large fhare 
 each had contributed to the public misfortunes, made 
 neither party defirous of too minute an enquiry into 
 the tranfa&ions which led to them, and they judged it 
 for the common intercft to adopt a fyflem of forbear- 
 ance and moderation, whicli they have fince maintain- 
 ed towards each other whh a tolerable degree of tem- 
 per, but from which it is probable they will now very 
 (hortly depart. 
 
 After the return of the Bombay army from Tillia- 
 ,gong, and the arrival of the Bengal detachment at Su- 
 ra', on the 25th of February, 1779, an event that, ex- 
 clufive of any merit denved from it in a political light, 
 reflected equal honour upon the courage and difcipline 
 of the troops, and the military flcill and abilities of 
 the officer who commanded and conducted them acrofs 
 
 the
 
 < 27 ) 
 
 the peninfula, the firft material circumftance that oc- 
 xurred, was the receipt of a letter from the Governor 
 General and Council, dated the 5th of the fame month, 
 appointing General Goddard their minifter at the Mha- 
 ratta court. 
 
 The inftru&ions that accompanied, were prepared 
 under a probable belief of the enterprife in favour of 
 Ragonaut Row having fucceeded, and were calculated 
 for entering upon a negociation with that .chief. 
 
 A fituation of affairs in the Mharatta empire, fo 
 widely different from what the Bengal government ex- 
 pected when they drew up the inftructions, had of 
 courfe rendered them entirely ufelefs and inapplicable 
 when they arrived, and accordingly the General wrote 
 to Bengal, that he mould defer making known to the 
 administration at Poonah the commiilion with which 
 .he was intruded, until he could receive farther instruc- 
 tions. 
 
 I muft, however, give a fhort extract from the Ben- 
 gal Council's letter here, as it marks fo ftrongly their 
 difappointment at the fuppofed fuccefs of a meafure, 
 which, though not of their own formation, they are 
 forced to acknowledge was authorised by them ; and, 
 indeed, the tendency of the letter altogether was fuch, 
 and exprefled fo pointedly their determination of pro- 
 iecuting the plan in favour of Modajee at a future op- 
 portunity, that I make no doubt, had even Ragoba 
 been raifed to the government, another revolution muft 
 fhortly have been attempted. 
 
 After acknowledging the receipt of General God- 
 dard's letters from Houflungabad, of the 4th and 6th 
 of January, communicating the failure of his negocia- 
 tion with the Berar Rajah, they proceed as follows : 
 " We are very much concerned that Modajee Boiia 
 E 2 mould
 
 ( =8 ) 
 
 ,, mould have fo f; r diftrufted the powers with which 
 you were inverted, as to fuppofe that any engagc- 
 ments formed by the Prefident and Council of Bom- 
 " bay, could preclude the accomplishment of a treaty 
 with him, if fuch had been concluded, and therc- 
 " fore } that he declined to enter into the propofed ne- 
 (f gociation. If a treaty had been executed by you on 
 " the prefcribed terms, it would have been our duty 
 " to enforce it in preference to any made at Bombay, 
 " and to have taken care, that no conditions in which 
 '* that prefidency might have bound itfelf, fhould have 
 (t operated to the prejudice of our engagements. But 
 *' in the prefent fituation of things, we approve and 
 * c applaud the prudence and active zeal for the inre- 
 " refts of the Company which you have fhewn, in the 
 V refolution fo immediately taken on receipt of the 
 " requifition from the Prefident and Select Committee 
 " of Bombay, to relinquifh the profecution of the 
 " commiflion which had been efpecially entrufted to 
 " you, and to proceed with the detachment under your 
 c< command to fupport the meafures, in which that pre- 
 " fidency was actually engaged, and in which they had 
 *' fo far committed the fafety and profperity of their 
 " own government, and perhaps the general welfare 
 " of the Company, as to require every aid that could 
 <c poflibly be given to them. 
 
 ** As the treaty concluded by the Prefident and Se- 
 c lcc~t Committee of Bombay with Ragonaut Row was 
 " declared to be made under our fanction and authc- 
 lc rity, and as we actually did grant our confent to 
 " fuch a treaty on the 17th of Auguft, 1778, we are 
 " determined to abide by and fupport it, notwith- 
 ftanding the total change which has fince takeu 
 ' place in the circumftances under which it was pro- 
 
 pole a
 
 ( *9 ) 
 
 (t pofed to us, and the new meafures which we have 
 " ourfelves adopted on the fuppofed failure of thofe- 
 planned by the prefidency of Bombay." 
 
 Speaking of the alliance with Modajee, they ufe the 
 following expreffive words. " However we may be 
 ** restrained by motives of policy from profecuting 
 " this meafure, under the circumltances which have 
 <c caufed the fufpenfion of it, we are by no means pre- 
 eluded by the terms of the treaty with Ragoba ; the 
 " pretenfion of Bofla to the Rauge or fovereign autho- 
 " rity of the Mharatta ftate, exifting independently of 
 " any connections betwixt the Engliih Eaft-India Com- 
 " pany and Ragoba, and being perfectly reconcileable 
 with them." 
 
 On the 5th of the fucceeding April, the Governor 
 General and Council having then received authentic ac- 
 counts of the defeat of the Bombay army, and of the 
 difgraceful convention made at Worgaum with the mi- 
 nifterial leaders for its fafe and unmolefted return, toge- 
 ther with the feveral tranfactions fubfequent to that un- 
 fortunate event, thought proper to furnifh * General 
 Goddard with frefh credentials, as their minifter at the 
 court of Poonah, and to empower him to negociate a 
 treaty, the exprefs objet of which was " to renew or 
 f* confirm that formerly concluded by Colonel Upton, 
 11 provided the Mharattas would previoufly agree to 
 " recede from the pretenfions they had acquired by the 
 " late engagements of Meflrs. Carnac and Egerton, 
 il and agree not to admit any French forces into their 
 1* dominions, or allow that nation to form eftablifh- 
 " ments on the Mharatta coait.*' 
 
 * It was at this time he was alfo advanced from the rank o 
 Colonel to that of Brigadier-general, with every flattering enco- 
 mium and mark of diftinttion. 
 
 Under 
 
 4
 
 ( 3 ) 
 
 Under thefe reftri&ions, and with this latitude of 
 action, excepting that authority was farther granted to 
 relax in fome trifling points relative to Colonel Upton's 
 treaty, which, it is curious to obfenre, were once deem- 
 ed of fo grent importance, as to conflitute the declared 
 ground of a rupture betwixt the two States, a negociation 
 was opened by General Goddard at Surat, and carried 
 on with the moft unremitting afliduity and zeal during 
 the months of Auguft, September, and October, 1779; 
 at the expiration of which period, a pofitive anfwer 
 was received from Poonah to the propofals tranfmitted 
 by the General, for the minhter's confuieration and ac- 
 ceptance, and in confequence of the determined fpirit 
 of hoftility which di&ated it, all farther negociation 
 was immediately broke off, and the Mharatta vakeels 
 returned to their matter. 
 
 It has been ill-naturedly fggefted, and continues to 
 be the malicious endeavour of thofe, who, upon the 
 illiberal principles of a miflaken policy, think they are 
 rendering a fervice to the Bombay administration, by 
 fixing a large fhare of blame upon the Governor Gene- 
 ral and Council, becaufe the latter neceffarily took 
 upon themfelves the care and refponfibility, to attri- 
 bute the failure of General Goddard's negociation to 
 an unreafonable obftinacy and feverity in the demands 
 he was inftru&ed to make, and to a wanton and ftu- 
 died wifh on his part to involve the Company in a war, 
 the management of which would be left to him. 
 
 This fufpicion, however, mud be proved to be as 
 falfe as it is ungenerous, when circumstances come to 
 be explained ; and candour will not only fimply acquit, 
 but in juftice acknowledge, that every proper effort 
 was ufed to bring about a peace, and that the failure 
 of the negociation, and fubfequent renewal of hoftili- 
 
 ties,
 
 t 3* ) 
 
 ties, \ras occafioned by the influence of the fentiments 
 which then prevailed in the Mharatta councils, and 
 which determined the minifter to reject all overtures 
 for an accommodation, and to put n& farther trull in a ^ 
 power, whofe late perfidious breach of faith had proved 
 it to be totally undeferving of a generous confidence, 
 and incapable of a friendly alliance, unlefs where it 
 perfectly fuited with particular views of convenience, 
 or was dictated by neceflity. 
 
 In this latter point of view he certainly considered 
 our advances, and was therefore the more eafily led to 
 prefume, upon his late fuccefs at Telliagong, to hope 
 that the Peiihwa's arms would once more triumph, and 
 prove fupetior to our military exertions. 
 
 Add to this, the refentment the minifter muft natu- ^ 
 rally feel at being fo egregioufly duped by a (ham con- 
 vention on our part, and at the ungrateful return we 
 made for his moderation and mercy, together with the 
 determined enmity we difcovered towards him, in con- 
 tinuing to afford protection to Ragonaut Row, and we 
 {hall then find the true caufe which prolonged the 
 Mharatta war, and which drove Nana Furnefe into an 
 unnatural alliance and confederacy with Hyder Ally. y\ 
 This confederacy, to which Nizam Ally and Modajee 
 Bofla acceded, was formed fo early as the period I am 
 now fpeaking of, and General Goddard gave intelli- 
 gence of it to the Governor General and Council in> 
 the month of September, 1779. 
 
 I fhall difmifs the fubject of this ncgociation by ge- 
 nerally obferving, that the foirit of the Bengal go- 
 vernment's inflructions was certainly calculated to pro- \/ 
 mote a juft and honourable peace, and that the actual 
 ftate of circumflanccs at that time would not have jul- 
 tiEed their agreeing to one of a different nature. 
 
 It
 
 ( 32 ) 
 
 It -would not, however, be doing juflice to Gener z\ 
 Goddard, to be totally filent regarding the exertions he 
 ufed to render them effectual, and therefore I fhall 
 give a brief abftract of his, conduct. 
 
 The vakeels from the Poonah court did not arrive at 
 Surat till the middle of Auguft, previous to which, he 
 had, by every means his fituation afforded, endeavour- 
 ed to imprefs the minifters with an idea of his pacific 
 and friendly intentions, in protecting and encouraging 
 the fubjects of the Mharatta ftate. 
 
 This conduct he perfifted in after the arrival of the 
 vakeels.* In explaining the feveral points of the ne- 
 gociation, he invariably expreffed himfelf in a language 
 the molt moderate, though firm, and in terms which 
 fully proved a fincere defire to become the inftrument 
 of a perfect reconciliation betwixt the two ftates* 
 He wrote to the minifter, accompanying the propofals 
 for peace, that as foon as he had communicated his ap- 
 probation of them, in order to prevent every avoidable 
 delay, he (the General) would immediately fet out 
 for Poonah ; and a confiderable time elapfmg without 
 any explicit anfwer being received to the propofitions 
 which had been tranfmitted, he difpatched Lala Nehal 
 
 * The following extract from the Governor General and 
 Council's letter, dated Sept. 16, 1779, proves the political ad- 
 ^refs and moderation of his conduct : " We obferve with fome 
 " degree of plcafure, the notice taken by the Mharatta govern- 
 " ment, in their letters to you, of the liberal attention which 
 " you had Uicwn to the interefts of that ftate, in the protection 
 " given to their aumils in Guzarat againft the irregularities of 
 *' Ragoba's dependants, and we recommend a coat. nation of 
 " the fame kindnefj and moderation in all your conduct; to 
 *' wards them." 
 
 Chuad,
 
 ( 33 f 
 
 Chuni one of the two Mharatta agents, fully iuftru<5l- 
 ed, and properly encouraged, to his matter . 
 
 This man carried the propoied conditions in Writing; 
 nor was it till his return to Surat, with the following 
 pofitive declaration on the part of the minifter, viz. 
 " That he cAuld rtot make peace with the Englifh, un- 
 " lefs they delivered up Ragonaut Row into his hands, 
 '* and made immediate reftitution of the ifland of Sal- 
 " fette," that the General, in obedience to the orders 
 he had received from Bengal, broke off the negocia- 
 tion, arid difmifled the vakeels. 
 
 All hopes of peace being thus deftroyed, it became 
 iiecefTary to prepare for hoftilities, and the General ac- 
 cordingly proceeded to carry into execution, a plan of 
 military operations which he had formed, with the 
 concurrence and approbation of the Select Committee 
 of Bombay ; who, in addition to the powers he had 
 received from Bengal, thought proper alfo to delegate 
 to him the authority of their government, and to ap- 
 point him their minifter with Futty Sing Row Guico- 
 war, and fuch other chiefs in the Guzerat, as it might 
 be neceflary to engage in our interests for the more 
 fucceisful profecution of the war. 
 
 It is proper here to obferve, that the general con- 
 duct of the war, both in the formation of plans, and 
 in the execution of them, was left to the choice and V 
 direction of General Goddard, guided by the advice 
 and information of the Bombay Presidency ; and as it 
 marks the cordial union which at one period tubfified 
 betwixt them, and the delicacy and moderation which 
 diftinguifhed the General's conduct, under circum- 
 ilances fo invidious and difgufting, it may not be amifs 
 to tranfcribe the following extract of a letter from the 
 honourable Governor General and Council, dated the \ 
 
 F 14th 
 
 y 
 
 s\
 
 / 
 
 ( 44 ) 
 
 *4*h of June, 17^9. " We obferve with the highefr. 
 *' fatisfadtion the approbation which the Select Com- 
 ** mittee of Bombay exprefs at your conduct, and the 
 " ready difpofition which you have fhewn to aflift in 
 " the execution of tlieir defigns. It is with pleafure 
 *' that we have refolved to join with them in recom- 
 " mending you to the Court of Directors, for the ap-* 
 " pointment of commander in chief at that Presidency, 
 *' whenever there may be a vacancy," &c. 
 
 Although by the efcape of Ragonaut Row from the 
 hands of their enemies in June 1779, and his arrival in 
 the Engltfh camp, where General Goddard had judged 1 
 it for the honour and intereft of the Company to grant 
 him -and his family an afyhuri, and to promife him per- 
 ianal protection in the name and with the fubfequent 
 intire approbation of the Bengal government : I fay, al- 
 though from this circurnftance, matters had reverted to 
 the fame ftate in which they were previous to the Tef- 
 liagong expedition, it was not, however, found expe- 
 dient to extend our connection with that unfortunate 
 and unfriended chief beyond the mere afTurance of 
 perfonal fafety, or to renew in any fhape the engage- 
 ments which had been formerly entered into with him 
 by the Bombay government. 
 
 Fatal experience had already convinced us of the- 
 rooted averfion and enmity which prevailed againft him. 
 throughout the Mharatta ftate; and that therefore we 
 mould little grace or ftrengthen our caufe, by uniting 
 it with the affertion of his unpopular and otherwifc 
 unfupported claims. 
 
 His prefence in the cafe of a rupture with the Poo- 
 nah adminiftration, which had in fpite of every effort 
 proved unavoidable, was certainly of very beneficial 
 conference, in augmenting the fears of onr enemies, 
 
 and
 
 ( 3S ) 
 and arming us with the means of injuring them more 
 efTentially if we proved fuccefsful, or of accommoda- 
 ting our difference with the greater eafe and advantage* 
 fhould we at any time wifh to bring the war to a ter- 
 mination. 
 
 From all thefe considerations, it was left to time and 
 future circumftances to determine the extent of our 
 benefits to Ragonaut Row ; and in the intermediate 
 lpace, we entered upon the war avowedly as principals, 
 compelled to it by the refuCal of the Mharatta minrfter 
 lo accept of the juft and reafonable conditions of peace 
 we had propoied to him, which rendered hoftilities on 
 our part an act of felf- preservation and defence. 
 
 The inferior eftimation in which the caufe of Rago- 
 ba was necefl'arily held, and the little influence it had 
 upon the future operations of the war, might almoft 
 render an apology requifite for having fufFered it to en- 
 gage fo much prefent attention : but the beft excufeto 
 be made is, that I Shall here take leave of him, and 
 that molt probably his name will not once occur during 
 the remainder of this narrative. 
 
 On the firft of January, 1780, the army under Ge- y 
 neral Goddard, reinforced by a fmall detachment of 
 Bombay troops, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel 
 Hartley, croffed the river Tappy, on its route to Gu- 
 i'erat. 
 
 It had been refolved to commence the campaign with 
 the fettlement of that province, and the General loft 
 ;io time in accomplishing an object, which, befidesthe 
 great importance of it to the general fuccefs of the 
 war, it was particularly necefTary ihould be finally ad- 
 jufled previous to the arrival of the Mharatta forces in 
 the neighbourhood, left their prelencc Should intimj- 
 F 2 dat<%
 
 ( 36 ) 
 
 date, and fix decidedly in the Peifhwa's intereft, Futty 
 ing Guicowar, whofe inclination at the heft could 
 only be fuppofed to he wavering ; and we fhould by 
 that means be constrained to confine our operations to 
 the oppofition of their united ftrength, under every 
 poffible difadvantage, and without any acquifition of? 
 revenue or improvement of resource whatever. 
 
 I have already premifed, that it is not my intention 
 to fwell this narrative, by a minute defcription and de- 
 tail of military operations , but it is with no fmall 
 reluctance and regret that I muft on the prefent occa- 
 sion decline a talk, which, from the various^ proofs it 
 affords of fkilful conduit in the commander, and of 
 disciplined valour in the troops, would fo pleafingly 
 gratify my private feelings, and allow fuch ample fcope 
 to animated language, and all the force of nervous 
 eloquence: juftice, however, requires that T fhonld ge- 
 nerally bear teftimony to a merit fo diftingui/hed ; and 
 while I mention the many and ftriking advantages de- 
 rived to the Company by the operations of this cam- 
 paign, I cannot help celebrating the able exertions and 
 gallant fpirit of thofe, by whofe united labours and 
 perfeverance they were acquired. 
 
 The province of Guzerat could only be fettled by 
 the two following modes, either by a union of intereits 
 with Futty Sing, or by forcibly wrefting it out of hi? 
 hands. 
 
 Every idea of reafon and good policy dictated the 
 former, if it could pofTibly be effected. Upon the eve 
 of engaging in a war with the moft powerful (late in 
 Hindoftan, and unfupported by any friend or ally, nay, 
 even fufpicious of the defigns of thofe princes who 
 then profeffed a neutrality, it furely was a point of the 
 
 fir ft:
 
 ( 37 ) 
 
 flrfl: confideration, to conciliate and attach Futty-5ing 
 to our caufe, fince by fo doing we fecured toourfelves 
 the immediate poiTeffion of a confiderable track of 
 country, and, as it has fince proved, the unmolefted 
 poffefllon of its revenue ; an object at that time abso- 
 lutely eiTential for enabling us to enter upon hoftilities 
 with vigour and effect ; whereas, if Futty Sing had 
 continued inimical to us, no prefent provifion could 
 poffibly have been made for the future profecution of 
 the war ; the province of Guzerat muft have been to- 
 tally defolated and deftroyed, and even fuch parts of it 
 as we might have been able to pofTefs ourfelves of 
 muft have been expofed to the conftant inroads and ra- 
 vages of a depredatory enemy. Under the full con- 
 viction of thefe felf-evident truths, the General was 
 himfelf exceedingly defirous, and had it in charge from 
 the Select Committee of Bombay, to adjuft amicably 
 with Futty Sing the fettlement of the country, and to 
 render him, if poffible, a ferviceable ally to the Com- 
 pany. 
 
 The general character of the man, and the very 
 ftrong prejudices entertained againft him by fome in- 
 dividuals at Bombay, who, by a ftrange abufe and per- 
 verfion of juftice, chofe to ftigmatize him with the 
 perfidious ftains which, in reafon ought to have fullied 
 the Englifh name, for their treacherous conduct towards 
 him on a former occafion, naturally excited in the mind /\ 
 of the General the ftrongenVdoubts and apprehensions, 
 of the little confidence that could be placed in any 
 promifes or declarations, however fpecious and friendly 
 in appearance, which the Rajah might be induced to 
 make, in order to preferve himfelf from the ruin which 
 then threatened to overwhelm him. 
 
 The
 
 V 
 
 A 
 
 ( 3 5 
 
 The fears of meeting with a treatment fimilar ri 
 Vrhat he had before experienced, * might alfo make 
 Fiitty Sing on his part douhtful and fufpicious of our 
 proffered friendfhip ; and thefe confederations, joined 
 to the dread of the Mharatta power, and of the pu- 
 nifhment their vengeance would certainly inflict, feern- 
 ed to create innumerable difficulties and obftacles to 
 the attainment of a friendly, fincere, and permanent 
 connection betwixt the Company and that chief. 
 
 Thefe unpromifmg circumftances, however, only 
 ferved to encreafe the General's folicitude and ardour 
 to accomplish an object of fucb. importance, a.nd fo ef- 
 fential to the fuccefsful profecution of the war. He 
 applied himfelf, therefore, to it with an earneft afliduL 
 ty and zeal, that fully proved the difinterefled fpiri.t 
 which governed his actions, and taught him to prefer 
 the conlcious fatisfaction of procuring a folid and cer- 
 tain benefit to the public, to the falfe glare of a narro\y 
 private ambition, or the feducing charms of a rapacious 
 avarice, both of which, the exclufive conqueft of Gut 
 zerat and the ruin of Futty Sing would have gratified 
 in their fullefi: extent. 
 
 Senfible of the good effects which the rapid move- 
 ments and approach of the army would produce upon 
 
 * In the year 1775, when the Bombay forces were in the 
 field, in fupport of Ragonaut Row's prctenfions, Futty Sing, 
 after a long ncgociation through the mediation of the Engliih 
 commander, and under the faith of the Companv, was prevailed 
 upon to rifquc an interview, when he was forcibly made prifoncr 
 bv Rigoba, compelled to agree to the payment of a large fum of 
 money, and not f'lffcred to return to his capital of Baroda, until 
 he had fent for his daughter, a child of fix or feven years of age, 
 and delivered ht-rnpas a fecurity for the performance of the en- 
 
 g:!<;crr.' nts viclt.-u'.y extorted from him. 
 
 Futty
 
 ( 39 ) 
 fcutty Sing's counfels, the General left the banks of 
 the river Tappy on the 5th of January, and on the / 
 15th croiTed the Nerbuddah at Bovvapone-Gaut, where 
 lie was joined by fome battering cannon and ftores from 
 Baroche, a place of confiderable ftrength and com- 
 merce, upon the northern bank of the fame river, and 
 governed by a chief and council under the Bombay 
 Prefidency. On the 19th the army reached Dubhoy, 
 a confiderable walled town belonging to the Mharattas, 
 which the garrifon abandoned the night after the troop* 
 arrived before it. 
 
 The negotiation with Futty Sing had been carried 
 on, without interrupting the progrefs of the march, 
 through the means of vakeel* on his part, that pafled 
 to and from the camp ; and by the influence of a mo- 
 deration that does the General infinite honour, joined 
 to the greatelr. perfeverance and addrefs, the Rajah was 
 at length won over to our views, and agreed to an al- v/ 
 
 liance with the Company upon the terms propofed to 
 fcim. 
 
 The treaty was finally concluded on the 26th of 
 January, at a village called Condeala, about four or 
 five miles from Baroda, Futty Sing's capital, and halt* 
 way betwixt the latter and our encampment. 
 
 By this treaty, the peaceand tranquillity of Guzerat 
 was fecured upon the molt, firm and folid baiis, an im- 
 mediate refource of revenue was provided, and that in 
 a manner the leaft expenfive and hazardous to the 
 Company ; and the certain ajid lpeedy fettlement of the 
 province, gave us leifure to turn our arms to new and 
 more neceiTary, though, perhaps, lei's beneficial cou- 
 quefts. 
 
 It was with the utmoit viiible and natural reluctance, 
 that Futty jiing wa^ prevailed upon tw accept of th* 
 
 country
 
 ./ 
 
 ( 4 ) 
 
 country to be conquered from the Mharattas, north of 
 rhe river Myhie, in exchange for an equal proportion of 
 lands to the fouthward , nor is this uhwiliingnefs on his 
 part to be wondered at, fmce, although by uniting his 
 polTeflions inone regular and connected chain, he would 
 be a fimilar gainer with ourfelves, and although there- 
 V venues of the country to be mutually exchanged, dif- 
 fered very little in their amount, the real and intrinfic 
 Value of the lands could bear no manner of compan- 
 ion ; and in lieu of a territory, fertile, well cultivated, 
 and to be collected at little or no expence, we put him 
 'in pofTemon of a track, it is true, more extenfive, but 
 wild and without culture, inhabited by a fierce and un- 
 ruly people, and conftantly expofed to the ravages of a 
 plundering banditti, which rendered the maintenance 
 of a confidesable military force at all times requifite, 
 to prefrve the tranquillity of the country, and to en- 
 /\ force the collections. 
 
 Before I purfue my narrative, it may not be improper 
 to give a brief account of the Guzerat province, and an 
 hiftoricai account of the Guicowar family, who pofTefs 
 thegreateft part of it, from their original founder, Pil- 
 lajee. This man was grandfather to the prefent reign- 
 ing prince, and being a very warlike and able chief, 
 attended Sahoo, Rajah of Setterah, in his wars, and 
 obtained, as a reward for his fervices, the province of 
 Guzerat, the greateft part of which he had himfelf 
 conquered from the Mahommedan princes, who at that 
 time governed it in the name of the Mogul emperors. 
 
 This rich and extenfive kingdom, for as fuch it has 
 ever been diflinguifhed in the hiftories of the eaft, was 
 conferred upon Pillajee in jaghire, but by a more full 
 and independent tenure than is ufually granted to the 
 jaghire officers among fl the Mharattas. 
 
 After
 
 ( 41 J 
 
 After his death, his foil Damajee fucceeded, and 
 upon fome differences he had with the Mharatta go- 
 vernment, was prevailed upon to repair to Poonah, in 
 order to accommodate them, when he was treacheroufly 
 made prifoner, and compelled to agree to a partition 
 of country with the Peiihwa, and to enter into fuchi 
 engagements as we're dictated to him, before he could 
 obtain his releafe. 
 
 From that period, the admin iftration at Poonah 
 found means to interfere more immediately in the fet- 
 tlement and government of the province, and the Mha- 
 ratta forces, under Ragonaut Row, in conjunction with 
 thole of Damajee, laid fiege, but without fuccefs, to 
 the capital Ahmedabad ; nor was it wrefted from the 
 poffeflion of the MufTelmans fo much by fuperior fo- 
 reign force, as it was at laft betrayed into the hands of 
 the confederates by domeftic treafon and treachery. 
 
 After the demife of Damajee, Futty Sing fucceeded, 
 in preference to his elder brother Seaje'e, who, being 
 difordered in his intellects, was judged incapable of 
 governing-. This unfortunate chief refides contentedly 
 at Soan G'hur, a fort belonging to the family, where 
 he is treated with every mark of attention, and has 
 liberty to amufe him'felf in thofe innocent purfuits, 
 which his infanity, perfectly inoffenfive in its nature, 
 confiitutes the only objects and employment of his 
 life. 
 
 Gouind Row, another fon of Damajee, but by a 
 different mother, though younger than Futty Sing, lays 
 claim to the fucceffion, under pretext of the preferable 
 right which the offspring of the lawful wife poffeffes 
 over that of the favourite concubine. This diflindtion, 
 however, is contrary to nature, and the eftabliihed 
 cuftoms of the eaft, and Futty Sing has been formally 
 G acknow-
 
 ( 42 ) 
 
 acknowledged by the Poonah durbar, and received the: 
 inveftiture of his authority from the nominal Rajah of 
 Setterah. 
 
 Until the time of Aurungzebe, a^id while the Mo- 
 gul empire continued to flouriih, Guzerat was efteem- 
 ed one of the moft opulent provinces dependant upon 
 it. It is difficult to conceive a more intire revolution 
 than what has fince taken place. The imbecility of 
 fucceedrng monarchs, confpiracies and civil wars in 
 tht centre of the empire, and a total relaxation, and 
 decay of vigour, through all the remote and extended 
 provinces of it, univerfally encouraged the viceroys 
 tb affert an independence in their refpe&ive govern- 
 ments, nor was the Soubah of Guzerat more difpofed 
 tb give proofs of attachment and loyalty than the 
 rtft. 
 
 This feparation and difmemberment of the empire, 
 proved moft favourable to invaders, who attacked, and 
 with eafe poflerTed themfelves of the divided provinces; 
 and it was about this time that the Mharattas broke 
 forth from the mountains of the Decan, and, fpreading 
 Daughter and defolation wherever they directed their 
 deftrudtive fteps, terrified and fubdued the effeminate 
 and degenerated defcendants of thofe Mahommedan 
 conquerors, who had themfelves fo courageoufly efta- 
 Mifhed their empire in Hindoftan, by the edge of the 
 fword, and the terror of their arms. 
 
 Some of them, unable to ftem the torrent, abandon- 
 ed every thing to its rage ; and others, fatisfied with a 
 temporary relief, and the indulgence of prefent eafr, 
 attempted to divert its courfe, by the payment of large 
 furns of money, or ceflions of territory. 
 
 The province of Guzerat, as has been already ob 
 ferved, foon fell into their hands. With the Iofs of 
 
 the
 
 , ( 43 ) 
 
 tfie capital Ahmedabad, the Mogul authority .became 
 totally annihilated, and the defcendants of the Nawab 
 Cummaul ul dien, the family which was then difpof- 
 fcffed of government, now refide in obfcurity upon a 
 fraall jaghire, allowed them in the neighbourhood of 
 Puttan, under the protection and jealous vigilance of 
 Futty Sing. 
 
 The only veftigesof the MufTelman dominion which v 
 now remain, are Surat and Cambait, the former fitu- 
 ated towards the mouth of the river Tappy, and thp 
 latter on that of the Myhie. Thefe places are pof- 
 fefTed by their refpe&ive Mahommedan governors, or, 
 as they flile themfelves, Nawahs, but their authority 
 is confined within the walls, and even the fcanty re- 
 venue of this circumfcrihed extent, they fhare with the 
 Mharattas, who receive a fixed and very considerable '/ 
 proportion. 
 
 Befides the two large rivers above mentioned, this 
 province is alfo watered by a third, the Nerbuddah, / 
 which riles in the hills of Boghilhund, and, after run- 
 ning a weftern courfe of about one thoufand mites, 
 through the rich provinces of Malwa, Chandeiih, and 
 Guzerat, empties itfelf into the gulph of Cambait, a 
 little below the town of Baroche, which was conquer- 
 ed by the Englifh from its Navab a few years ago. 
 
 A fituation fo favourable for commerce could not 
 poflibly be overlooked, and we accordingly find, tha.t 
 this province, and efpecially the town of Surat, has 
 always carried on a moft extenfive and advantageous 
 trade, and was formerly confidered as the grand em- 
 porium of the Mogul's dominions, fupplying the moft 
 interiour and remote corners of them with every uleful 
 commodity* nay, even with every fupcrfluity and luxury 
 
 Q 2 J of
 
 J 
 
 \ 
 
 ( 44 ) * 
 of life, which the hand of foreign invention or induflry 
 could contrive or produce. 
 
 Its own fertility, arifing from the nature and fitua- 
 tion of the foil, being a low flat land, and interfered 
 with many fmaller ftreams, befides thofe large rivers 
 already mentioned, enabled it to export great quantities 
 pf cotton, indigo, wheat and other grains ; and the 
 improved ftate of its manufactures amply fupplied arti- 
 cles for foreign markets, in exchange for the valuable 
 productions purchafed from them. 
 
 I fhall finilh this digreflion with a fliort account of 
 the city of Ahmedabad, which has long been efleemed 
 as the capital of the province. It is fltuated upon the 
 eaft bank of the Sabremetty Nuddy, a pleafant, whole- 
 v fome, and conftant, though fmall ftream, that runs in- 
 to the Myhie, and it was originally founded by Shaw 
 Ahmed, King of Guzerat, who flouriihed near four 
 centuries ago. The walls, which ftill remain, are 
 y about fix miles in circumference, and there is a very 
 wide and deep ditch carried all round. Befides this 
 ditch, new works have been /ince conftructed, where 
 the original defences, either from decay or iituation, 
 were judged infufBcient ; and upon the whole, it may 
 be pronounced a very ftrong and formidable place, ef- 
 pecially when garrifoned, as it was at the time wherj 
 General Goddard befieged it, by about fix thoufand 
 Arab and Sindy foot and two thoufand horfe. 
 
 There are twelve gateways, by which you pafs in 
 and out of the city ; and the extenfive circuit of the 
 walls, particularly at thefe gateways, appears to have 
 been ornamented, at regular diftances, with towers 
 bnd cupolas, which in the days of its fplendour, mud 
 have equally contributed to the magnificence and 
 irrength of the place. Within the city, and upon the 
 
 bank
 
 ( 44 ) 
 
 bank of the river, is an extenfive enclofure, called the 
 Budder, which was formerly the royal refidence : it has 
 been ftrongly fortified, and entirely commands the 
 principal bazars, courts of juftice, and ftreets where 
 the palaces of the chief nobles were fituated. At pre- 
 fent, fo much is this city decayed, and fallen from its 
 Original flouriming condition, that not more than a / 
 quarter of the fpace within the walls is inhabited, 
 whereas, from infallible veftiges, and ruins regularly to 
 be traced, the fuburbs rauft formerly have extended be- / 
 yond them to the diftance of three miles round. 
 
 Ahmedabad is the jVIahommedan capital of Guzerat, 
 the work of Ahmed and his fucceflbrs, who enlarged 
 and beautjfied it out of the ruins of the ancient Hin- 
 doo cities Narwalla and Chappaneer. Baroche and Put- 
 fan, the latter of which is, I believe, a more rrfodern 
 name for Narwalla, are alfo of great antiquity ; but of 
 all thefe, little more than the name exifls at prefent ; 
 and the Guicowar capital is called Baroda, recently 
 founded upon the banks of the Bifwamuntry Nuddy, 
 and fituated betwixt the Myhie and Nerbuddah, about 
 twelve miles fouth cf the former. 
 
 In Ahmedabad is {till to be feen the mofque and 
 tomb of Ahmed, its founder, built entirely of ftone 
 and marble. Great tafte, (kill, and expence, mull have 
 been exerted on thefe ftruc"tures, which are curious and 
 magnificent, and remain perfect and uninjured by the 
 ruthlefs hand of all-deftroying time. 
 
 Many fuperb ruins, both within and without the 
 walls, merit a particular description ; but I have alrea- 
 dy digrefled fufHciently, and mail now return to the 
 fubjecl: of my narrative, after obfcrving, that Guzerat, 
 continued to be governed by a fucceflion of its own 
 kings, until the reign of Acbar, when it was finally 
 
 fubiecled,
 
 ( 46 ) 
 
 fybjeted, and made a province of the \Jogul empire, 
 the wretched fate of which it afterward fhared, as has 
 been already defcribed. 
 
 In conformity to the engagements made with Futty 
 Sing, for putting him in immediate pofleflion of the 
 IMharatta (hare of the country, north of the Myhie, 
 the army marched from the neighbourhood of Baroda, 
 and arriving before Ahmedabad the 10th of February, 
 upon a refufal of the governor, on the part of the 
 \J Peifhwa, to furrender, befieged andftormed it the 15th 
 in the morning. It was carried after a gallant and def 
 perate refinance, and abou. t four hundred of the enemy 
 were killed in the aflault. Mofl of thefe fell in the 
 ditch and one of the gateways, where, endeavouring to 
 efcape into the tpwrj as pur grenadiers advanced, they 
 were flopped by the narrownefs pf the paffage and 
 wicket, and falling one uppn another, crowded toge- 
 ther in a heap, their ammunition blowing up in their, 
 cartouch boxes, and every man periling before, relief; 
 could he given. 
 
 The troops diftinguiHied themfelves by every proof 
 ofdifcipline and humanity, injuring no perfon they 
 found in the place unarmed, and in the fury of attack, 
 fparing even many who laid down their arms and fub-_ 
 mitted. The piifoners, amongft whom were fome 
 Arab Jemedars, were treated with the greatefr. clemen-- 
 cy, and thofe that were wounded, received into our 
 hofpital, humanely taken care of, and afterwards re^ 
 leafed *. 
 
 On. 
 
 A clrcumftance fimilar to the Following, muft give more 
 heartfelt plcafure to a humane and liberal mind, than the moft 
 lV\ndul triumphs of viftory ; " an officer of the Bombay cfo- 
 
 klifhment,
 
 v/ 
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
 Ort the 26tfi of February, Fatty Sing was formally 
 put in poffefllon of Ahmedabad, and the fettlement of 
 the Guzerat perfected, and its future tranquillity ef- 
 fectually fecured, in left than two months from put- 
 ting the troops in motion. 
 
 This acquifition was by no means of the value or 
 importance to Futty Sing, which, from the reputation 
 of its being the capital, one would be led to fuppofe. 
 A confiderable part of its revenue, the whole of which 
 did not exceed three lacks, had been before received 
 by him, and of the collections of the country, north of 
 the Myhie, more than two-thirds had always belonged 
 to the Guicowar ; fo that, in farft, we did little elfe 
 than put him in poflemon of his own country, and this 
 he was to maintain and defend in future, at the ex- 
 pence of a garrifon which had before been paid by the 
 Peiihwa. The attainment of Ahmedabad was, belides, 
 not the objedt of Futty Sing's wifli : on the contrary, 
 he was totally averfe to it, and to the whole of the 
 propofed partition of territory, which included that 
 city in his (hare. /^ 
 
 It became, therefore, an object of political confede- 
 ration, to gild the pill we had thus forced him to fwal- 
 low, and make it as palatable as poffible ; accordingly, 
 General Goddard exerted himfelf, to render the real as 
 well as ideal value of the place as important in Futty 
 Sing's eyes as he could. For the reafons already men- 
 
 blifhment, who belonged to a fmall party of fcpoys, which was 
 employed, foon after the ftorm of Ahmedabad, in the Concur, 
 and had been defeated, fell into the hands of the Mlurattas, and 
 by the influence of an Arab Jemcdar, who declared his motive 
 for interceding was, in grat fal acknowledgement of the humane 
 treatment his countrymen had met with from General Goddard 
 obtained his liberty, and returned to Bom'.iv ' 
 
 tioned,
 
 I 43 ) 
 
 tioned, he found it as irrpoflible to* ive up the city t<$ 
 plunder, as it would have been unjuft and impolitic to 
 inuft upon the Rajah's ranfoming it, by the payment of 
 a fum of money to the troops ; and he therefore ufed 
 every precaution to prevent a general pillage, in which 
 tlxeir good condudt and discipline fortunately enabled 
 him to fueceed ; but his regard for their interelts, and 
 defireof rewarding their valour, muft have made him 
 afterwards not forry to learn, that a partial prize had 
 fallen to their ihare; and to this circuraftance he found 
 means to reconcile Futty Sing^ although many, and 
 wo doubt exaggerated complaints, were daily made ; 
 and one merchant in the city eitimated his own lofs at 
 above fifty thoufand rupees. It is proper here to men~ 
 ticn, that the greateft part of the property belonging 
 to the inhabitants had been conveyed away to places of 
 fecurity previous to the liege,- and almoft the whole of 
 the little that remained, was the property of people 
 connected with or immediately dependent upon the 
 Guicowar. 
 
 Previous to, and during the fiege of Ahm'edabad, 
 accounts were daily brought of the great military pre- 
 parations making at Poonah, and it was fooh known 
 (hat Scindra and Holka'r had defcende.d the gaHts with 
 a large army, and advanced towards Baroda, Futty 
 Sing's capital. General GocVbrd put the troops in 
 motion as expeditioufly aspoflible, and leaving Ahmeda- 
 bad the 2d of March, croffed the Myhie the 6th, 
 and encamped about two miles from Baroda, on the 
 Bifwamuntry Nuddy the 8th. 
 
 Scindia and Holkar, with their whole force, had 
 moved off to the eaftward, about twelve or fourteen 
 inij> from Baroda, and about the fame diftance from 
 
 Powaa.
 
 t 49 ) 
 
 Powan Ghur, * a very ftrorig fortrefs belonging to 
 Scindia, fituated upon an Exceeding high and almoli 
 Inacceflible mountain, and feparating the two provinces 
 of Malwa and Guzerat. Their united force confifted 
 of at leaft forty thoufand men, rhoft of which were 
 horfe, and they had with them a few light pieces of 
 Cannon only, having lent away all of a larger fize, as 
 well as every fpec'ies of heavy baggage which could 
 encumber of retard the celerity of their motions. 
 
 On the 9th, Meffrs. Farmer and Stewart, who had 
 been left with Mahadjee Scindia, as hoftages for the 
 faithful performance of the convention of Worgaum, 
 arrived in camp with letters from that chief and Hol- 
 kar, gerieralty expreiitve of their friendly fentiments, 
 and of the inclination of the Mharattas to live uport 
 terms of amity with the Englifh ; as a proof of which, 
 they had given the above gentlemen their difmiffion, 
 and inftru<5ted f them, in conjunction with Abajee Sha- 
 bajee, to make a full reprefentation of matters to Ge- 
 neral Goddard. 
 
 A conduct fo promifihg and friendly in appearance, 
 excited the moll fanguine expectations of foon effect- 
 ing a peace with the Mha'ratta State, or, at leaft, of 
 bringing about fome feparate agreement with Mahadjee 
 Scindia, which might be productive of the moft im- 
 portant benefits to the Company, in the final fettle- 
 ment of their difputes with that nation. It was, there- 
 fore, matter 1 of the greateft concern to the General, 
 to fee his hopes ultimately difappointed, and all his 
 efforts for that defirable end unluckily defeated. 
 
 * The ancient city of Chappaneer ftood at the foot of this 
 mountain, and a fmall town ftill cxifls, under the fame name, 
 and upon the fame fpot, which is fubjec~t to Scindia* 
 
 H He
 
 ( 5^ > 
 
 He endeavoured, by every aflurance and argument 
 in his power, to imprefs the mind of Scindia with .1 
 belief of the fincere wifti of the Englifti for peace, and 
 of the particular fentiments of regard they entertained 
 for himfelf, of which they were ready to give the moil 
 ftrong and convincing proofs. 
 
 Hefuggeftedfome conditions mutually beneficial, on 
 which they were defirous of uniting with him, in fet- 
 tling the adminiflration of the empire upon a proper 
 ind folid balls, and failing in this attempt of feparating 
 Scindia from the minifter Nana Furnefe, for which 
 every -opening was given, healfo pointed out fuch terms 
 in an alliance with the prefent government, as the Eng- 
 lish had a right, founded both in juftice and reafon, to 
 expe<5t, and were ready to accede to. 
 
 A very few days* however, fully convinced the Ge- 
 v/ neral of the inemcacy of his own endeavours, and o 
 the infmcerity of Scindia' s profemoiis. Abajee Shaba- 
 jee returned with propofals from his matter, which 
 pofitively proved his intimate connection with Nana 
 Furnefe, and were, indeed, of a nature, if poflible r 
 more difgraceful than thofe before made by the mini!"-, 
 ter himfelf, requiring the furrender of Ragoba's per- 
 fon into his hands, and alfo of his fon Badjerow, the 
 former of whom was to refide at Jancy, upon the al- 
 lowance Scindia had before fettled for his fubfillence, 
 and to relinquifh all /hare in the adminiftration, which 
 was in future to be conduced by Scindia, in the name 
 of Badjerow, upon whom the appointment of Dewan 
 to the Peiftiwa Madhurow Narain mould be conferred. 
 No exprefs advantage was propofed to be ftipulated for 
 the Englifli in return for thefe concemons : on the con- 
 trary, Scindia meant to have it underflood, that they 
 were to adhere to the engagements made at Worgaum. 
 
 Upotf
 
 ( $1 ) 
 
 Upon the whole, it plainly appeared, that Scindia 
 was not in reality fo amicably difpofed, as his behaviour 
 refpecting MefTrs. Farmer and Stewart gave room to 
 conjecture ; or that, if he was defirous of peace, there 
 did not exift any reafonable hope of his intention to 
 conclude a treaty, but upon terms that were judged 
 difhonourable previous to the campaign, and which in 
 the midft of our prefent fuccefs would have been deem- 
 ed highly inadequate and difgraceful. 
 
 Thus ended the negociation with Scindia, and though 
 the General, towards the clofe of the campaign, and af- 
 ter the fuperiority of our arms over the Mharattas had 
 been repeatedly aflerted, availed himfelf of an oppor- 
 tunity of fome indirect overtures made by Scindia 
 through Futty Sing, to renew the negociation, this 
 fecond attempt proved equally unfuccefsful with the 
 former. 
 
 The military operations, after the return of the army 
 from Ahmedabad, were confined, on the part of Scin- 
 dia, to a determined fyftem of avoiding an engagement* 
 and on that of the Englifh, to every poffible exertion -J 
 to induce him to alter his refolution. 
 
 For this purpofe, the General twice advanced with 
 the whole army, and encamped upon the ground which 
 Scindia had occupied, and from which he had precipi- 
 tately retired as we advanced. A third time, with a 
 part of the army only, viz. two hundred European in- 
 fantry, ten companies of grenadier fepoys, two Bengal 
 and one Bombay battalion, two twelve and ten fix- 
 pounder pieces of artillery, and about feven or eight 
 hundred horfe, he formed and attempted a plan of fur- 
 prizing the enemy's camp. Their vigilance and excef- 
 five caution, however, prevented his advancing undis- 
 covered beyond their grand guard of fix thoufand men, 
 H 2 which
 
 ( 5* ) 
 
 which was near two miles from the main army ; and 
 when he reached the encampment after day-light, hq 
 found the whole drawn up ready for action. 
 
 This appearance encouraged a hope, that the im- 
 portant moment at laft arrived, when the enemy, pre- 
 fuming upon their numbers, would avail themfelves of 
 the opportunity which offered, of contending with only 
 a part of our force, and ftand the decifion of a battle j 
 but this hope proved fallacious, and after a few brifk 
 though partial fkirmifhes, the Mharattas entirely 
 abandoned the field to the conquerors, who remained 
 upon it about two hours, and then returned without 
 lofs, to their own camp. 
 
 Thefe fignal triumphs moft ftrikingly evinced the fu- 
 periority of our arms, and wiped off the ftain they had 
 contracted from the late unlucky difafter at Worgaum. 
 They were, befides, the only fucceffes to be gained 
 over an enemy who would not fight, and who, it is 
 probable, wiftied for nothing more than to draw us on 
 beyond the proper line of our policy, and the defence 
 of our new conquefts, to an unprofitable purfuit of his 
 army into the Malwa province ; which, befides expofing 
 our valuable acquifitions in Guzerat, would alfo have 
 endangered the fafety of the prefidency of Bombay 
 itfelf, at this tithe threatened with an attack from the 
 ^rench ; and even admitting our endeavours to have 
 been fo far fuccefsful, as that our arms had penetrated 
 to Ugein Scindia's capital, they could not poffibly 
 have produced any benefit at all proportioned to the 
 rifque, or uecifive towards terminating the war. 
 
 The two armies continued on the confines of Malwa 
 and Guzerat until the month of May, when they fe- 
 parated, on account of the approaching monfoon, Scin- 
 
 di*
 
 ( 53 J 
 <lia marching off to Ugein, and the Englifh returning 
 to Surat, where they arrived the beginning of June. 
 
 It would be unjuft not to mention the particular Cer- 
 vices of Major John Forbes and Captain John Camp- 
 bell, the former of whom furprifed and defeated a con- 
 fiderable party of the enemy under one of their princi- 
 pal leaders ; and the latter, who commanded two bat- 
 talions of Bengal fepoys upon a foraging party, being 
 attacked at the diftance of at leaft ten miles from camp, 
 by near fifteen thoufand of Scindia's beft horfe, after 
 killing a confiderable number, forced the reft to retire, 
 and faved not only his party, but brought the forage 
 he had collected fafe to camp. 
 
 I fhall conclude this general fketch of the Guzerat 
 campaign, with a fhort tefiimony to the merit and gal- 
 lantry of Lieutenant Welfli, who commanded a corps 
 of three hundred Mogul cavalry, and was detached 
 with that corps, and one battalion of fepoys, to fur- 
 prife and beat up the quarters of Gunnele Punt, one 
 of the rninifterial chiefs, who with about fix thoufand 
 men infefted the neighbourhood of Surat. 
 
 The diftance was about fifty miles, and Lieutenant 
 Welfli had moved with fuch fecrefy and rapidity, that 
 Cjunnefe Punt was unapprised of his approach. He 
 contrived fo as to reach the encampment early in the 
 morning ; but perceiving the day would foon break, he 
 ordered the infantry and guns to follow as expeditiouily 
 as poflible, and putting himfelf at the head of the ca- 
 valry only, rufhed forward into the midft of the ene- 
 my, who, terrified by the impetuoiity of an affault Cq 
 fudden and unexpected, fled on all fides, and left their 
 guns and baggage a prize to the victors. 
 
 This gallant enterprife was fuceecded by the Surren- 
 der of Parneiro, a fort built upon an high hill, and 
 
 from 
 
 /
 
 J 
 
 ( 54 ) 
 
 irom its fituation, if properly defended, capable pf de- 
 fying the raoft formidable force. The acquifitibn of 
 this, with the fmaller forts in its vicinity, which Lieu- 
 tenant Welfh alfo took, entirely completed the con- 
 queft of the Guzerat province, of which Parneiro may 
 be termed the fouthern limit. 
 
 Previous to his marching againft this place, Lieu- 
 tenant Welfh received a i mall reinforcement of fepoys, 
 
 J with battering cannon and ftores, from Mr. Boddam, 
 chief of Surat, whofe name I mould be unpardonable 
 to mention, without bearing teftimony at the fame 
 time to his zeal for the interefts of the Company, 
 which is ever a6tive, and has confpicuoufly diftinguifh- 
 ed itfelf on various occafions ; nor is he himfelf lefs re- 
 markable for the integrity and difmtereftednefs of his 
 public character, than for his many private virtues and 
 amiable qualifications. 
 
 Thus terminated the firft campaign of the Mharatta 
 war ; and General Goddard, befides the confcious fa- 
 tisfaflion of having uniformly fucceeded in every at- 
 tempt he made againft the enemy, and of having put 
 the Company in poffefTion of a territory yielding an 
 annual revenue of thirty lacks of rupees, had a farther 
 gratification, not the leaft pleafing to a generous mind, 
 of receiving the moft full and flattering teftimonies 
 from the government of Bengal, of their approbation 
 of every part of his conduct, and the high fenfe they 
 entertained of his fervices to the Company. 
 
 w During the monfoon of 1780, nothing material oc- 
 
 curred, except the important conquefl: of Gualior, at- 
 chievedby Major Popham, who carried it in the moft 
 enterpriiing and gallant manner, and by a fkilful and 
 well concerted ftratagem, that does the higheft honour 
 to his military talents and, abilities. 
 
 In
 
 ( & ) 
 
 In the preceding month of November, Major Pop- 
 nam had received the command of twothoufand drafts, 
 intended to reinforce General Goddard's army, but 
 from various caufes, principally from the danger of 
 attempting to crofs the peninfula with fo fmall a force, 
 the defign was dropped, and a new plan adopted by the 
 Governor General, for making a diverfion in favour of 
 the general operations ofc" the war from the country of 
 the Gohud Ranna, which ilxould, in its conftquences, 
 involve a combination of the feveral Hindoo princes, 
 interfperfed through the province of Ajmeer, and to 
 the northward of Malwa. 
 
 An attempt was accordingly made. to negociate with 
 thofe petty chiefs, whi ch unfortunately did not fucceed 
 in any adequate or uferful degree ; and the political as 
 Well as military operations of that quarter, were con- 
 fined to an alliance W'rth the Ranna of Gohud, and the 
 recovery of.his country from the Mharattas. 
 
 It Was in the execution of this fervice that Major 
 Popham fignalized himfelf, and made the Company's* 
 name feared and refpe&ed throughout Hindofhm, by 
 planting the Britifh colours upon the walls of Gualior, 
 k fortrefs which hat f for ages been deemed impreg- 
 nable, and where* as i n a fecure and inaccemble afvlum, 
 the Mogul emperors. , in the days of their magniiicjnee 
 and power, had always confined the vanquiihed rivals 
 of their greatnefs, and other eminent prifoners of ftate. 
 
 No means of reconciliation with the Mharattas could 
 be found during the rainy feafon of the year 1780, and 
 accordingly a renewal of hoftilities became nece'dary. 
 
 After providing foi: the prefervation and fecu rity of 
 our acquifitions in Gozerat, the defence of wbi.ch was 
 committed to a detachment of our own troop 1 ;, and a 
 proportion of horfe to be furnj/hed by our ally , Futty
 
 1/ 
 
 ( J6 ) 
 
 Sing, the army marched from Surat the 16th of Octo- 
 ber, and arrived before Baflein about the middle of 
 November. The battering cannon and flores were?* 
 landed with all expedition, and the fiege carried oh 
 with fuch unremitting vigour and alacrity, that on the 
 ^ i ith of December, a practicable breach being rnade, 
 the garrifon, confifting of at leaft fix thoufand men, 
 Capitulated and laid down their arms. 
 
 Thus by the bravery and good conduit of theft- 
 troops, was the Company, in the very commencement 
 of the fecond campaign, put in poffeffion of a place, 
 which had been long the object, of their ardent wifhcs 
 and mofl eager folicitude, and which, in the treaty 
 made with Ragonaut Row in 1778, by the Bombay go- 
 vernment,- had been deemed of fo great importance, 
 as to conftitute the moft material article ftipulated with 
 him in behalf of the Eriglifh, for inverting him with 
 the regency and entire adminiftration of the Mharatti 
 empire. 
 
 The conqueft of BafTein was foon followed by the 
 furrender of Amoll, a fmall, though from its fituation 
 very tenable fort, upon an itland about one thoufand 
 fix hundred yards di'ftant from that of BaiTein, and 
 whofe pofTeflion is absolutely requifite to fecure the un- 
 fnolefted enjoyment of BaiTein itfe'lf.' The garrifons of 
 Tarrapore, Danou, and other forts, fituated along the 
 fea coaft of the Concan, thought proper to follow the 
 fame example ; and at thc'cnd of the year 1780, the 
 Englifh, to the conqueft of Guzerat, had added that of 
 the largeft and raoft valuable part of the Concan, and 
 were equally mailers of an extent of fea coaft from 
 Cambait to the mouth of tlie Pen river, which empties 
 itfelf into Bombay harbour, of above three hundred 
 
 Thus 
 
 V
 
 ( 57 ) 
 
 Thus far we have conduced the Mharatta war, and 
 from a contemplation of the paft, fo far from difco- 
 vering any caufe of regret for having commenced it, 
 we. mould be led to entertain the mod reafonable and 
 well-grounded expectation, of being fhortly able to 
 bring it to a glorious and fucccfsful termination ; fince 
 befides the conquefts already made, we actually en- 
 joyed, at the period above mentioned, means for its 
 profecution infinitely fuperior to what we originally 
 poflefTed, or could have even hoped to acquire in fo 
 iliort a time from our own fingle and unaflifled efforts. 
 
 Various caufes, however, unfortunately contributed 
 to difappoint this hope, the principal of which I ac- 
 knowledge to have been the breaking out of the war 
 with Hyder Ally Chawn, and the great and unexam- 
 pled fuccefs of his arms in the Carnatic. I muft alio 
 be of opinion, that the meafures adopted for bringing 
 about an accommodation were in their nature of fo im- 
 politic and dangerous a tendency, as to throw obftacles 
 in the way of it, and by the eagernefs and anxiety they 
 betrayed, actually defeated the purpofe they were in- 
 tended to attain, 
 
 I {hall have frequent occafion in the courfe of my 
 narrative to elucidate this latter obfervation. I fhall, 
 therefore, at prefent confine myfelf to a description of 
 the immediate effects of Hyder's unlucky interference, 
 previous to which a fhort digreflion feems neceflary for 
 clearly comprehending the Subject. 
 
 Although the eontroling powers vefted in the Go- 
 vernor General and Council, were certainly intended 
 by the wifdom of the legifhture, to guard againft the 
 deftructive confequenccs, which an oppofition of in- 
 tercfb, and purfuit of feparate views muft unavoid- 
 ably produce, if the different prefidcncics of India were 
 
 I pi"r-
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 permitted to a& independant of each other, (a fyftem 
 that, however confident, or at lead reconcileable with 
 the inferior intereds of a mere commercial body, could 
 not poflibly be applied to the fituation of the Company 
 as a great political power, which they are at prefent 
 univerfally confidered by the dates of Hindodan) the 
 tranfa&ions of the period I am now relating, fully 
 prove, that even this controling power is at prefent of 
 too circumfcribed a nature, and that, in order to give 
 vigour and dability to the Britifh empire in India, the 
 firft dep to which requires a confidency and uniformity 
 in political meafures, it is abfolutely neceflary, that a 
 full and unlimited authority, in all matters relative to 
 peace or war, and in every negociation with foreign 
 dates, be delegated to the Governor General and Coun- 
 cil, and that the prefidencies of Madras and Bombay 
 be directed, not only to give implicit and uncondition- 
 al obedience to their orders, but to confider themfelvcs 
 as immediately and folely refponfible to the Council 
 General for their conduCl in the execution of them. 
 
 If this plan had been originally adopted, we fliould 
 not afterwards have had to contend with the two mod 
 powerful dates in India, the Mharattas and Hyder 
 Allv, united with the combined ftrength of France and 
 Holland ; nor fhould we be now fuing for peace at the 
 feet of a vanquiflied enemy, who is reaping the harveft 
 of wars he does not fight, and recovering in the Car- 
 natic the territories he has, to every effort of his own 
 force, irrecoverably lod in the Guzerat and Concan. 
 
 It is true, the three prefidencies feem in one point 
 to have been mod cordial and unanimous, I mean in 
 their refolution to make Mar , but although perfectly 
 agreeing in the fame general fyitcm, they unfortunate-
 
 ( 59 ) 
 
 ly differed materially in the particular object to which 
 it {hould be directed. 
 
 In Bengal and in Bombay they mutually marked the ** 
 Mharattas as the victims of their fanguinary vengeance, 
 but they attempted their destruction by means totally 
 diffimilar and irreconcileable j and whilft the one party 
 was actually in arms, ftruggling to exalt Ragonaut Row 
 upon the ruins of his country, the other was equally 
 active in oppofing a rival to his greatnefs in the perfon 
 of the Berar prince. * 
 
 In Madras, a conduct (till more extraordinary and 
 impolitic was adopted, and the bufinefs of the Guntoor 
 Sarcar will be a lafting monument of the folly and bad / 
 faith of the nation, as well as a reproach to the per- 
 fons who tranfacted it. In fhort, the records of that 
 government, during the period of which I am now 
 treating, exhibit fcenes of a treacherous policy, weak- 
 nefs and corruption, which are not to be equalled in 
 the annals of almoft any age or country. It would be ^ 
 an endlefs talk, and exceed the intended bounds of this 
 narrative, to enter into a minute defcription of each 
 particular tranfaction. Suffice it to touch upon the 
 fubject generally. 
 
 Notwithftanding the war then exifting with the 
 French and Mharattas, and a knowledge of the refent- 
 ment already harboured by Hyder Ally againft the 
 Englifh, the confequence of which was ever to be ap- 
 prehended from the rooted rancour and animofity which 
 Mahomed Ally and that chief mutually entertained, 
 the government of Madras, fo far from endeavouring 
 to ward off the approaching evil by any temporifing or 
 moderate conduct, at once took a Hep that nut only 
 irritated and offended Hyder beyond any hope of re- 
 conciliation, but threatened in its confequcnccs to draw 
 
 1 i en
 
 ( 6o ) 
 
 on the refentment of Nizam Ally, Soubah of the De-* 
 
 N can ; nor could a rupture with the latter have been 
 
 avoided, but by the wife and well-timed interpofition 
 of the Governor General and Council, who cancelled 
 the engagements made with Bazalut Jung, contrary to 
 the faith of treaties then fubfifting betwixt the Englifh 
 and the Nizam, reftored the Guntoor Sarcar, and by 
 farther political advances and feafonable conceflions, 
 
 /\ feconded by the ability and addrefs of Mr. Holland, 
 who was employed to negociate at the court of Hy- 
 
 v / derabad, preferred the Nizam in his neutrality, and 
 prevented him from giving any fupport to the Mharatta 
 adminiftration, with whom he was, and ftill continues 
 to be, very clofely connected. 
 
 To aggravate Hyder's feelings by every poflible means, 
 in addition to the feizure of the Guntoor Sarcar, and 
 the detaching a force towards Adoni, Bazalut Jung's 
 capital, to defend him againft the refentment of his 
 brother the Nizam and Hyder Ally, that force was di- 
 
 \J reeled to march through the territory of the latter, al- 
 
 though by a fmall circuit, his country might have been 
 entirely avoided. 
 
 This infult, added to former caufes of provocation, 
 and the engagements he had lately formed with the 
 Mharatta miniiter, precipitated Hyder's hoftile prepa- 
 rations, and in the middle of the year 1780 he descend- 
 ed the pafl'es and entered the Carnatic, which, accord- 
 ing to expectation, he found totally unprepared for 
 defence, and unable to oppofe or check his career. 
 
 The rapidity of his conquells and the fatal difafter 
 which b-jfcl our arms near Conjeveram, are facts too 
 well known, and too remarkable in their nature, to ad- 
 mit of being mentioned in this place, or even to re- 
 quire any comment, I mall, therefore, clofc this di- 
 
 g rem op.
 
 gremon by the following general reflection ; that as the 
 mifconduct and imbecility of the Madras government 
 was the caufe of Hyder's immediately overrunning anl 
 deftroying the Carnatic, and poflefling himfelf of many 
 of the principal fortrefles almoft without oppofition, 
 it is alfo to the operation of that original neglect, 
 which rendered the country an intire defart, that we 
 muft afcribe both the fubfequent failure of the efforts of 
 the Governor General and Council, who ftrained every 
 refource to relieve the diftrefs of the Carnatic, and the 
 infufhciency of Sir Eyre Coote's perfonal exertions^ 
 who has, however, acquired immortal glory, for having 
 fo long Hemmed a torrent he was prevented from ma- 
 king effectual head againft ; and it is ultimately in the 
 effects of this neglect, we muft look for the embarrafP- 
 ment in which even our fucceffes againft the Mharattas 
 have involved us, and the difappointment our hopes 
 from them are likely to experience. 
 
 I have thus in fome degree explained the caufes as 
 well as immediate confequences of the war with Hyder, 
 and it now remains to defcribe the manner in which 
 that event operated upon our conteft with the Mha- 
 rattas. 
 
 The firft idea which naturally fuggefted itfelf to the 
 Governor General and Council, after fending a fupply 
 of men and treafure to the coaft, was to endeavour to 
 terminate the Mharatta war, in order to employ their 
 whole collected force in oppofing Hyder, and driving 
 him from the Carnatic. For this puipofe propofals for 
 an accommodation were tranfmitted to the Poonah 
 adminiftration, and copies of them feparately forward- 
 ed to the Prefident and Select Committee of Bombay 
 and General Goddard, foi their information and ob- 
 servation. The letter to th? latter, d tted October 9, 
 
 1780,
 
 ( 62 J 
 
 2780, concludes with the following paragraph : lt And 
 " we hereby pofitively require and command you im- 
 * f mediately to fufpend all hoftilities and military ope- 
 " rations againfl the Mharattas, whenever you may 
 " receive a requifition in writing to that effect from 
 ^ " the Peifhwa, that the like order had been given on 
 " his part to the officer commanding his armies ; but 
 *' in the mean time, and until fuch requifition and no- 
 " tification be received by you, we direct that you pro- 
 f fecute the war with the utmoft vigour, and act in all 
 * c circumftances as if the foregoing information had 
 f( not been fent you." 
 
 In the treaty tranfmitted, we offered to relinquifli 
 
 every conqueft excepting Ahmedabad and Gualior, 
 
 which had been guarantied to Futty Sing, and the 
 
 Ranna of Gohud, upon conditions of the Mharattas 
 
 uniting with us in an offenfive alliance againfl Hyder 
 
 Ally, of whofe dominions a conqueft and mutual divi- 
 
 lion was to be made. Should the Mharattas not accede 
 
 to an offenfive alliance, peace was neverthelefs pro- 
 
 pofed, each party retaining what it had acquired, or 3 
 
 fufpenfion of hoftilities was to take place on both fides 
 
 for one year from the date of the treaty, for the pur- 
 
 pofe of negociating the terms of a future and perpetual 
 
 adjuftment. Some ftipulations fufliciently favourable 
 
 were propofed reflecting Ragonaut Row, and Modajee 
 
 Bofla's offer of mediation and guarantee on this occa- 
 
 fion was declared to be accepted, himfclf permitted to 
 
 x/ become a party, and the treaty in confequence tranf - 
 
 mitted through him to the minifter at the Mharatta 
 
 court. 
 
 Three months having elapfed from the date of the 
 treaty, and no notification received from the Peifhwa, 
 either oi its arrival, or of any refolution he had come 
 
 to
 
 ( *3 1 
 
 to in confequence, the military operations continued to 
 be vigoroufly pufhed, and in the middle of January, 
 1 78 1, the whole of the army affembled at Vifrabuy, a V 
 place about twenty miles inland from BaiTcin, of re- 
 markable fan&ity and religious repute amongft the Hin- 
 doos, and where there are fome hot wells, 'deemed of 
 great medicinal efficacy. 
 
 A part of the army had been encamped in its neigh- 
 bourhood ever fince the 14th of the preceding month, 
 at which time General Goddard arrived himfelf with 
 the grenadiers from before Baffein, to the feafonable 
 relief of a detachment of Bombay troops, which had 
 been employed for a confiderable period before in the 
 fouthern parts of the Concan, protecting the country 
 and collecting the grain. The harveft was then over, 
 and the troops on their march towards Baffein had ad- 
 vanced as far as the neighbourhood of Vifrabuy, where, K/ 
 having fuccefsfully oppofed fmaller parties of the ene- 
 my, they were at length attacked and furrounded by 
 fuperior force, and compelled to take poll in a very 
 flrong and advantageous fituation, from which it would 
 have been equally difficult for the enemy to diflodge 
 them, as it was impoffible for them to advance. This 
 force, at the time of which I am now fpeaking, acted 
 under the feparate and particular orders of the Select 
 Committee at Bombay, but was afterwards put under 
 General Goddard's fole command, and continued fo 
 the remainder of the campaign. 
 
 The Concan is a tract of country extending consider- 
 ably along the fea eoaft, and is feparated from the De- 
 can on the caftward by a chain * of high hills, running 
 
 111 
 
 * This chain extend, itfclf all alon the Mahhar coaft, al- 
 rcijft. j, far to the fouilr.va.rd a. An.-:r and the cnuam 
 
 tic
 
 ( 64 ) 
 
 in a direction from north to fouth, and parallel with 
 the fliore, over which, in fuch places as are mod ac- 
 ceflible, the feveral gauts or pafTes leading into the 
 Mharatta country, which from its great elevation is 
 filled the Balagaut, are fituated. 
 
 At the time the army marched from BafTein, the 
 force of the Mharattas in the Concan and below the 
 gauts, under Hurry Punt Furkea, confifted of at leaft 
 twenty thoufand horfe and foot, with about fifteen 
 guns. Thefe were polled on the road to Bhore Gaut, 
 which is one of the molt eafy and practicable pafTes, and 
 where it was expected by the enemy we meant to af- 
 cend, being the neareft and moil convenient route to 
 Poonah, and having been preferred by the Bombay go- 
 vernment on a former occafion. 
 
 Notwithstanding their numbers, they were too much 
 intimidated to offer any ferious oppofition, and excep- 
 ting a few flight fkinv ifhes, in which we were always 
 fuperior, the army met with little or no refiftance till 
 it reached Campoley, at the entrance of the Bhore 
 Gaut, on the 8th of February. The enemy had pre- 
 vioufly afc ended, and from appearances there was eve- 
 ry reafon to believe they had come to a determination 
 of refolutely difputing the pafTage. This belief was 
 confirmed by the fpies, who gave intelligence, that 
 about four thoufand infantry with guns had taken poll 
 
 the Myforc country, and the whole of Hyder's dominions on the 
 vcftern fide of India, is in like manner rendered difficult and 
 hazardous by fteep and narrow pafTes over them, which muff nc- 
 cefTarily require anv plan of military operations entered into from 
 that quarter to be formed upon a very liberal and therefore ex- 
 penfivc fcale, not only to anfwer any real and adequate purpofc 
 of public advantage, but to guard a jainfl the danger of mifcar- 
 riagc, to which it would be othcrwifc certainly cxpoftd. 
 
 unon
 
 ( 6$ ) 
 
 upon the top of it, that the whole Mhafatta army was 
 encamped at a little diftance, and that Holkar, with 
 about fifteen thoufand men from Malwa, and another 
 chief, called Ragonaut Pundit, with about half that 
 number, had lately arrived in their camp. 
 
 The General ccnfidering that any delay would not 
 only encreafe the confidence of the enemy, but give 
 them an opportunity of conftructing new works, fo as 
 to render the pafs every day more difficult and hazard* 
 ous, refolved upon ftorming it that very night. The 
 grenadiers were accordingly ordered to be in readinefs, 
 under the command of Colonel Parker, and a plan or. v 
 attack formed, which from its own judicioufnefs and 
 excellence, the gallantry and good conduct of the of- 
 ficer who executed it, and the difciplined, fleady valour 
 of the troops under him, proved fuccefsful beyond 
 even the mod fanguine expectation. The party en- 
 tered the fbot of the pafs at midnight, and by five in 
 the morning had gained entire pofTefiion of it, driving 
 the enemy from Condolah, the very fummit of the 
 hill, and four miles diftant from Campoley, mofl of 
 the road winding through narrow defiles, and up a very 
 fleep and rugged afcent. 
 
 Poonah, the Mharatta capital, is not diftant from , 
 Bhore Gaut more than forty-five miles. Such were 
 the terrors impreffed upon the enemy, in confequence 
 of our near approach, and fo ftrong their belief oi our 
 intentions to advance towards it, that they entirely 
 burnt and deftroyed Telliagong, a very considerable 
 town about half way, and had actually made every pre- 
 paration for fetting fire to Poonah itfelf, by filling the 
 houfes with draw, and removing the inhabitants and 
 effecls to the neighbourhood of Scttara. 
 
 K A know-
 
 ( 66 ) 
 
 A knowledge of this circumftance united with many 
 other confulerations to prevent our pufhing forward to 
 the capital, and to confine the remaining operations of 
 the campaign to a defence of the conquefts already 
 made. 
 
 In the firft place, our whole force did not exceed fix 
 thoufand men, and the enemy's could not be lefs than 
 eight times that number ; it was therefore impofhble to 
 make any divifion of our force, or even to leave a de- 
 tachment fufRciently ftrong to defend the poll at Bhore 
 Gaut if we advanced beyond it. Unaflifted by horfe, 
 we could entertain but little hope of being able to col- 
 lect provifion or even procure forage in a country to- 
 tally defolate and ruined, and we mud on that account 
 have carried a very ample fupply of grain with us, 
 which would of courfe have greatly encumbered and 
 endangered our march. 
 
 In addition to thefe confulerations, when we reflect 
 that no adequate or ufeful end could pofTibly be attained 
 by entering the Decan, either towards improving the 
 fuccefs of the war, or bringing it to a termination, that 
 we had not the moll diliant expectation of being joined 
 by any party in the Mharatta ftate, which alone would 
 have juftified our advancing ; and that without any de- 
 terminate object to gratify, or hope of a revolution to 
 excite us, we could only have acquired the empty glory 
 of poflefling the Mharatta capital for a few days, and 
 of effecting a retreat from it at the molt eminent peril 
 and certain hazard : I fay, when thefe matters come to 
 be fully confidered, the impropriety and impolicy of pe- 
 netrating into the Decan, under fuch an accumulation 
 of difcouraging circumitances, will be clear and ob- 
 vious to every one. 
 
 The
 
 ( 67 ) 
 
 The rapid progrefs of our arms had hitherto produced 
 no overture or notification on the part of the Peifliwa, 
 according to the expectations derived from the contents 
 of the Bengal letter $ on the contrary, it appeared that 
 the minifter, from the time of receiving the Bengal 
 propofals, had become more remifs and indifferent in 
 his endeavours to accomplifh a peace, which from our 
 extreme anxiety and folicitude, he faw it was in his 
 power to obtain whenever it might fuit his own incli- 
 nation or convenience, upon terms far fuperiour to his 
 mod fanguine expectations. 
 
 The near approach of the army feemed, however, 
 to roufc him from this fecurity ; and a few days after 
 getting poflefnon of the gauts, a meffage arrived from 
 one Byroo Pundit, propofing to fend an emiffary to the "* 
 camp, to converfe upon the fubject of negociation. 
 
 This Byroo Pundit poffeffed a confiderable fhare o V 
 the private confidence of the minifter, and had entered 
 into a fecret correfpondence with General Goddard fo 
 early as the month of October 1780, to which the lat- 
 ter gave every proper encouragement, in order to avail 
 himfelf of any means it might offer for accomplishing 
 a peace. Nana Furnefe was himfelf privy to the whole 
 tranfaction j and this renewal of correfpondence, after 
 it had been fufpended for above two months, induced 
 the General to form fome hopes favourable to peace. 
 He therefore determined to promote it all in his power, 
 and anfwered Byroo Pundit's letter, by confenting to 
 his propofal of fending an emiffary, who accordingly 
 arrived in camp the 12th of February. 
 
 All expectations of fuccefs, however, from this cir- 
 cumftance foon vanifhed ; and the man, after affirming 
 that < although the minifter wifhed to unite with the 
 <"* Englifh againft Hyder Ally hereafter, it was his pre- 
 
 K 2 " fent
 
 ( 6* ) 
 
 c fent determination to adhere to the engagements he 
 il had made with that chief, and to make no treaty 
 " with the Englifh in which he was not included," re- 
 turned to his mafter, promifing to communicate faith- 
 fully the friendly intentions of the Englifh, and the 
 particular points given to him in charge by the Gene- 
 ral ; in confequence of which, mould the minifter ap- 
 prove, a public vakeel from the Sarcar fhould be imme- 
 diately deputed to negociate, or at all events an anfwer 
 fhould be returned in eight days. The anfwer was 
 written by Byroo Pundit, and repeated the minifter's 
 determination, to make no treaty with the Englifh 
 " in which Hyder Ally was not included as a friend 
 " and ally of the Teifhwa." 
 
 As Byroo Pundit's agent had declared in converfa- 
 tion, that the propofals for peace from Bengal had ne- 
 ver been received by the minifter, the General thought 
 it proper, that he might not have it in his power here* 
 after to plead ignorance of them, as an excufe for con- 
 tinuing the war, and to obtain a decided knowledge of 
 his prefent intentions, to fend him a copy of the pro- 
 pofals, declaring himfelf empowered to conclude an 
 alliance with the Mharattas, and ready to accede to 
 one upon the terms offered by the Governor General 
 and Council. 
 
 The minifter's anfwer, as it was clear and pointed 
 with refpect to his own intentions, and furnifhed an 
 additional proof of the fincere and friendly inclina- 
 tions of the Berar prince, I fhall here tranferibe. 
 <c Before this time, Modajee Bofla wrote to the Sarcar 
 <* as follows : The Governor General and Council of 
 " Calcutta have fent a treaty to me, but as it does not 
 ** meet with my approbation, how can it be approved 
 and conceded to by the Peifhwa ? I have therefore 
 
 jeturncd
 
 ( <*9 ) 
 
 * returned it to Mr. Haftings." The mlnifter pro- 
 ceeds il At prefent that very treaty which you have 
 fent me has been perufed by your friend from begin- 
 " "ning to end, and it is certain that the contents there- 
 * in written are not proper or fit for the approbation 
 of the Sarcar. If you are fincere and fervent in 
 *' your defire of friendfhip, it is incumbent upon you 
 *< to make a treaty that (hall include the propofals of 
 (l th'ofe who are allied to, and connected with the 
 *' counfels of the Sarcar." 
 
 Thus ended all attempts to negociate during this 
 campaign, the particulars of which were faithfully and 
 minutely communicated to the Government of Bengal, 
 as well as to the Select Committee of Bombay, with 
 whofe immediate advice and concurrence they had been 
 conducted. 
 
 The remaining military operations were reftrifted 
 entirely to a plan of defence ; and excepting fame 
 fmart, though partial attacks, made by very confiderable 
 bodies of the enemy, upon the efcorts of provifions 
 coming to the army from Pownwell, in which Colonel 
 George Brown and Major Donald Alackay, of the Ma- 
 dras eftablifhment, who commanded on two feparatc 
 occafions, acquired great honour and credit, the Mha- 
 rattas contented themfelves with now and then advan- 
 cing towards the poll at Condolah, on the top of th<J 
 gauts, with an appearance of rcfolution and vigour, 
 which, however, was fure to fail them whenever any 
 correfponding movements were made on our fide, or 
 after dilcharging a few effectual fiiot amongO; them. 
 
 In repeated letters from Sir Eyre Coote, who was at 
 that time preparing for the important conteit with Hy- 
 der Ally in the Carnatic, the moil earned and prefiing 
 recommendations had been ufed for making a powerful 
 
 divcrfion
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 diverfion in favour of his operations, by an attack upon 
 Hyder's dominions from the Malabar coaft. 
 
 The continuation of the Mharatta war, and the po- 
 sitive refufal of the minifter to accede to an alliance, 
 unfortunately rendered fuch a meafure absolutely im- 
 practicable. The utmoft exertion that could poflibly 
 be made on the weftern fide of India, while engaged 
 in a conteft with the whole Mharatta empire, was to 
 relieve the Madras troops at Tellicherry * by an equal 
 proportion from Bombay, and to fend the former round 
 to the coaft of Coromandel. 
 
 In order to effecl: this as early as poffible, General 
 Goddard found it necefiary to defcend the gauts, and 
 to march towards the fea coaft. He accordingly con- 
 certed his operations with fuch fkill and fecrefy, that 
 the whole of the artillery and heavy ftores reached the 
 foot of the pafs in fafety, and without the fmalleft 
 interruption from the enemy, who, indeed, remained 
 unapprized of his intentions, and were aftonifhed in 
 the morning of the 18th of April, to find that the poft 
 had been deferted during the preceding night. 
 
 The country through which the route of the army 
 lay to the fea coaft, was of a nature remarkably well 
 calculated to refill: any impreflion from large bodies of 
 horfe, being exceedingly full of thick bullies and jun- 
 gles, broken ground and narrow defiles, where it would 
 be impoffible, except in very few places, for cavalry to 
 act together. It was not, however, the lefs dangerous 
 
 * This is a valuable fettlement upon the coaft of Malabar, 
 dependant upon the prefidency of Bombay, which the Madras 
 detachment had garrifoned, after the capture of Mahe from the 
 French, and had defended it againft the attacks of the Nairs, tri-r 
 bmary to Hyder Ally. 
 
 i to
 
 ( p ) 
 
 to the march of our troops, who had a perfect contempt 
 for the mod impetuous charge of the molt numerous 
 army of Mharatta horfe, and could only be efTentially 
 injured by parties of infantry concealed in hollow ways 
 and behind rocks and bufh.es, for which the fituation of 
 the country proved peculiarly favourable. 
 
 This mode of attack was accordingly adopted by the 
 enemy, who defcended into the Concan, under Hurry 
 Punt Furkea, Tuckojee Holkar, and Purrifs Ram Bow, 
 three of their principal chiefs. Their number could 
 not be fhort of fifty thoufand men, of which near ten 
 thoufand were infantry, mofl of them Arabs and Sin- 
 dys, who, excepting the fepoys regularly trained up in 
 the European difcipline, are by far the braveft and moft 
 ferviceable troops in Hindoftan. 
 
 The diftance from the foot of the gauts to the fea 
 was about twenty-four miles, and during the whole of 
 the march, which lafted three days, the enemy exerted 
 their utmoft efforts to harrafs and annoy the line, but 
 without producing any other effect than unfortunately- 
 killing and wounding fome of our people. They fuf- 
 fered very confuierably themfelves, but were unable to 
 obtain the fmalleft partial advantage over the Englifh 
 troops, or even to feize upon any part of the great 
 quantity of neccflary baggage and ftores which attend- 
 ed them : a circumflance that reflects the higheft ho- 
 nour upon the military conduct and fkilful manoeuvres 
 of the commander, and upon the fteady valour and gal- 
 lant perfeverince of the whole army. 
 
 This fevere action of three days continuance, in 
 which Colonel Parker, the fecond in command, gal- 
 lantly loft, his life, and which has been fuccecded by 
 no farther military efforts of any confequence, either 
 on our part or that of the Mharattas, terminated the 
 
 opera-
 
 ( 72 ) 
 
 eperations oi the fecond campaign, as the enemy fhort- 
 ly after afcending the gauts, evacuated the Concan, 
 and the Englifh army prepared to canton at Callian du- 
 ring the approaching winter. 
 
 That I might not interrupt my narrative of the trans- 
 actions on the Malabar coaft, I have not regarded the 
 precife order of time, in communicating what was per- 
 formed during this campaign on the fide of Malawa. 
 
 In the beginning of the feafon, purfuant to the plan 
 before propofed, and which had been mod ftrongly re- 
 commended by General Goddard, in order to employ 
 Scindia and Holkar at a diftance from the fcene of his 
 operations, it had been refolved to augment the force in 
 that quarter j and notwithftanding the preferable claims 
 of Major Popham, from his having already diftinguifh- 
 ed himfelf in the command, he was unjuflly deprived 
 of it, and the conduct of the operations on their pro- 
 pofed extenfive plan committed to another officer, 
 whofe merits, however great they might otherwife be, 
 ought not to have been put in competition with Major 
 Popham's fuperior pretentions on this particular occa- 
 sion. 
 
 Another and more capital error, becaufe attended 
 with injury to the public, was the infufficiency of the 
 exertions themfelves, and the inferiority of the force 
 employed, even after the propofed augmentation had 
 taken place, to anfwer any important purpofe of real 
 or adequate benefit ; by which means it happened, 
 that Scindia, confidering himfelf as fully equal to op- 
 pofe its progrefs, detached Holkar with a confidcrable 
 body of troops to fupport the minifter ; and notwith- 
 withitanding the decreafe of oppofition, the detach- 
 ment itfelf, after advancing as far as Seronge, which is 
 near one hundred miles north of the Nerbuddah, found 
 
 it
 
 ( 73 ) 
 
 It necelTary to retteat towards the country of the Ranna 
 of Gohud-, in effe&ing which, Colonel Gamac, who 
 commanded, planned, and executed with fuccefs a ju- 
 dicious march upon Scindia, furprifing his camp, and 
 taking fome guns and elephants, and by that means 
 profecuted the remainder of his march to the north- 
 ward with lefs moleftation and difficulty. 
 
 I have thus conducted my narrative to the conclufioa 
 of the fecond campaign of the Mharatta war j and 
 here it may be proper to paufe, in order to take a fur- 
 vey of the general ftate of affairs at that period, as an 
 attention to, and knowledge of them, is abfolutely ne- 
 ceflary to form a proper judgment of the meafures af- 
 terwards adopted. 
 
 In addition to the conquefts of the preceding year, 
 BafTein and the country of the Concan, extending along 
 the fea coaft from Bombay to Surat, had been acquired 
 for the Company, which completed every view of ter- 
 ritorial pofieflion their moll fanguine wifhes, encou- 
 raged by the molt fignal and glorious fucceffes, could 
 have ever led them to expect, or even hope for. To /' 
 balance thefe advantages, Hydcr Ally had invaded and 
 overrun the Cirnatic, where he feemed to have efta- 
 blifhed himfelf fo firmly, by poffemng many of the 
 ftrong holds, and laying wafte the whole of the open 
 country, that any adequate exertion from that quarter 
 to drive him out of it was judged abfolutely beyond 
 our ftrength and impracticable. It became, therefore, 
 the chief and primary object of our political considera- 
 tion, to attack Hyder's dominions from the coaft of 
 Malabar ; nor is there any doubt but that this ex- 
 pedient, could it have been vigoroufly and excenfively 
 adopted, mult have fully anfwered every propofed ufe- 
 ful end, and have delivered the Camatic from its dan- 
 
 L gcrous, 
 
 V
 
 ( 74 ) 
 
 gerous, its fatal invader. In effecting this point, hov- 
 ever, the difficulty lay, for it was obvious to the plain- 
 eft fenfe and mod common underftanding, that fome 
 accommodation with the Mharatta ftate was a neceflary 
 prelude to any attack on Hyder from Bombay. Ac- 
 cordingly propofals had been trnnfmitted for that pur- 
 pole to Poonah, through the Rajah of Berar, as has 
 been already feen j and although the enmity naturally 
 fubfifting between thc'Peiihwa and Hyder Ally, and 
 the advantage taken by the latter during the late trou- 
 bles in the Mharatta government, of polTeffing himfelf 
 of an immenfe territory fouth of die river Kriftna, 
 yielding annually near -a crore of rupees, might have 
 encouraged a reafonable hope of the rninifter's eagerly 
 embracing an opportunity to recover fuch valuable pof- 
 feflions, it was unfortunately found, that a refentment 
 of our conduct, a fenfe of obligation to Hyder for his 
 ieafonable interpofition, and a confidence in the im- 
 portant benefits expected from their mutual connec- 
 tion, prevailed over every other confideration, and de- 
 termined him to prefer his late engagements to an ad- 
 vantageous alliance with the Englifli, even though it 
 came recommended to his acceptance by an immediate 
 reftitution of all the conquefts we had made fince the 
 commencement of the war. 
 
 This determination on the part of the minifter to 
 perfevere in hoftilities, rendered any invafion of Ily- 
 tler's territories from the Malabar coaft utterly impoiii- 
 ble, and while it pointed out the neceftity of previously 
 bringing the Mharatta conteft to a determination, fug- 
 gelled a vigorous profecution of hoftilities, as the only 
 eiredlual and fpeedy means of doing fo. 
 
 That thefe were the fentiments of the Government 
 of Bengal, will appear frona the following extract of 
 
 their
 
 ( 75 ) 
 
 their letter to the Select Committee of Bombay, dated 
 May 10, 1 78 1. " We have repeatedly declared, that 
 " we wifh fincerely a peace with the Mharatta ftate. 
 < It is our fixed object, and we fhall deem the accom- 
 f* pliflmient of it on honourable terms a moft deferable 
 * event. One mode of obtaining it has been tried ; 
 " advances have been made, but thefe advances have 
 f not been fuccefsful. A repetition of them would in 
 <* our opinion have no other effect, than to fix an opi- 
 " nion of our weaknefs in the Mharatta government, 
 " and inftead of Shortening, prolong the duration of 
 * i the war.* 
 
 We repeat our firm conviction, that nothing but 
 ' a vigorous and fuccefsful profecution of it, will pro- 
 ** duce an honourable termination to it. Under this im- 
 preffion, our inftructions to General Goddard have 
 ** been framed and continued ; and under the fame in* 
 <c fluence we exprefs to you our wifh, that your aid 
 ' may be afforded to General Goddard's operation." 
 
 Notwithftanding this decided opinion of the Go- 
 vernor General and Council, for a vigorous profecu- 
 tion of the war againft the Mharattas, the mo it urgent 
 and pointed reprefentations of the neceffity of making 
 a powerful diverfion on the fide of Malabar, were con- 
 stantly arriving from the coaft of Coromandel ; and 
 the confequences of neglecting to do fo immediately, 
 were difplayed in the moft lively and alarming colours, 
 without any reference to the actual ftate of circum- 
 stances at Bombay, or to the certain ruin with which 
 
 * How fincerely is it to be lamented, that this obvious and 
 felf-cvidcnt maxim did not always (hike the Governor General 
 and Council in the fame forcible and convincing manner, as it 
 frems to have done on the prefent cccafion. 
 
 L 2 that
 
 ( 7* ) 
 
 that presidency would be menaced from the Mharattas, 
 if the force necefrtry for its protection and fecurity 
 was detached upon any remote or feparate fervice. 
 
 In this exigency, the government of Bombay, in 
 concert with General Goddard, drained every nerve 
 they poflibly could without leaving themfelves entirely 
 defencelefs ; and they certainly had merit in the difin- 
 tereftednefs with which they were willing to relinquifli 
 the rich prize within their grafp, and to facrifice every 
 Jiope of their own future aggrandizement, to their 
 defire of contributing to the immediate relief of the 
 diftrefs of the Carnatic. With this view, they fent the 
 greateft part of the Madras detachment round to the 
 Coromandel coaft, immediately after the return of the 
 army from the gouts, although from every argument 
 of a juft and rational policy, confirmed by the declared 
 opinion of the Governor General and Council, it was 
 fuppofed that the fucceeding campaign rauft be entered 
 upon with energy and vigour, in order to extricate the 
 Company's affairs from the misfortunes that generally 
 threatened their deftruction ; and in the fubfequent No- 
 vember, when it was found their own hands were effec- 
 tually tied up from active operations, as will appear in 
 the fequel, they fent down an additional reinforcement 
 to the garrifon of Tellichery, which enabled Major 
 Abingdon, the officer commanding, to make a gallant, 
 fudden, and well-concerted fally from the place, fur- 
 prize the camp, totally defeat and difperfe the army of 
 the Befiegers, and take Sardar Chawn, Hyder Ally's 
 general, prifoner, who died fhortly after of his wounds. 
 This fuccefs was vigorously purfued by Major Abing- 
 don, and follqwed by the capture of Callicut ; and al- 
 though thefe facts happened many months after the 
 period of which I am now treating, I have introduced 
 
 them
 
 ( 77 ) 
 
 them here, that they may not interrupt the detail of 
 more important tranfattions. 
 
 Before I enter upon the latter, I think it alfo necef- 
 fary to mention a circumftance relative to General 
 .Goddard, whofe appointment * of commander in chief 
 
 at 
 
 * I have been the more particular on this fubjct, becaufc 
 from the manner in which the command of the Bengal troops 
 was continued to General Goddard by the Court of Directors, he 
 certainly was entitled to retain it during their ftay on the Malabar 
 coaft ; and his accepting the ftation of commander in chief at 
 Bombay, was in compliance with the wiflies of the Company, 
 and in obedience to their orders, nor could it in any fhape deftroy 
 his unalienable right to the command of the Bengal detachment. 
 In order to prove this, I fhall tranferibe the orders of the Com- 
 pany, appointing General Goddard, dated April 12, 1780. 
 
 Paragraph 21. Having taken into our particular and moft fc. 
 rious confederation, the ftate of the Company's military force at 
 your fettlcment, we have refolved to appoint an able officer to 
 the command of the troops at Bombay. 
 
 Par. 22. And having the higheft opinion of the zeal, expe- 
 rience, and military abilities of Colonel Thomas Goddard, wc 
 have thought fit to appoint Colonel Goddard commander in 
 chief of the Company's forces at Bombay, and granted him a 
 commiffion of brigadier.general in our fervice. 
 
 Par. 27. It is our order, that Brigadier-general Goddard 
 have a conftant feat as third in our faid Council and Select Com- 
 mittee. 
 
 Par. 28. And as a farther mark of our approbation of the 
 conduct of Brigadier-general Goddard, wc have directed, that 
 the pay and allowances received by him from Bengal, as com- 
 mander in chief of the detachment fent from that fettlcment, be 
 continued to him, and paid by our Governor Genera! and Coun- 
 cil, fo long as thofe troops fhall remain under General Goddard's 
 command on the vveftern fide of India. He mufl receive the pay 
 
 and
 
 ( 78 ) 
 
 at Bombay had been received there in O&ober, 1780, 
 but from the important fervices on which he had ever 
 fince been employed, and his abfence from the prefi- 
 dency, he had not entered upon the immediate and 
 particular difcharge of that truft until the month of 
 June, 1 78 1, when he received a letter from the Go- 
 vernor and Council of Bombay on the fubjecT, an ex- 
 tract of which I fhall here tranferibe. The Select 
 " Committee have acquainted us, that foon after the 
 *' receipt of the Company's orders of the 12th of 
 " April, 1780, they have tranfmitted to you a copy 
 e of fUch parts as related to yourfelf ; in anfwer to 
 * f which you informed them, that you had forwarded 
 * a copy thereof to the Governor General and Coun- 
 " cil, and waited their fentiments thereon. As a con- 
 ' fiderable time has fince elapfed, and you are now 
 tc come to refide here during the monfoon, we requefl 
 " to know whether it is the intention of the Bengal 
 i government and your own wifli to accept of the fta- 
 " tion and appointments which the honourable Com- 
 " pany have conferred on you." 
 
 His reply, chearfully agreeing to enter upoh the im- 
 mediate difcharge of the duties of the chief command, 
 was conveyed in the following very clear and unambi- 
 guous terms. " I beg leave, in anfwer to your requi- 
 4t fition upon the fubjecl: of the orders of the honour- 
 
 and allowance of third of our Council a".d Select Committee at 
 Bombay ; but if our Governor General and Council fhall recall 
 the Bengal detachment, the pay and allowances received by Ge- 
 neral Goddard on that account, muft be difcontinued and ceafc 
 immediately upon the return of the faid detachment, as it will 
 be then no longer under his authority or command ; and after 
 that period, General Goddard muft receive the pav and allow- 
 ances cf cur commander in chief of our troops at Bombay. 
 
 I able
 
 ( 79 ) 
 
 " able Court of Directors of the 12th of April, to 
 *' tranfmit a paragraph of a letter received from the 
 f honourable Governor General and Council, which is 
 " as follows : t We have great pleafure in congratu- 
 lating you on the marks of diftin&ion conferred on 
 you by the honourable the Court of Directors, ia 
 their orders of the 12th of April, as honourable ia 
 themfelves, as they have been defervedly beftowed, 
 in reward and approbation of your fervices and con* 
 
 c dua/ 
 
 " Although the above anf^er contains no pofitivs 
 declaration of the wilhes of the honourable Gover- 
 *< nor General and Council, yet I confider it as tacitly 
 " implying an approbation of, and function to, my ac- 
 < ceptance of the important charge which our ho- 
 W nourable mailers have been pleafed to honour me 
 " with ; and therefore beg leave to acquaint you, that 
 <c fls it appears to me to coincide with the intention of 
 " the Bengal government, fo it is my own wifh to ac- 
 ' cept of the ftation and appointments conferred on 
 4* me by the honourable Company, and I am ready to 
 <* enter upon the discharge of the duties they impofe, 
 " whenever this government fliaii deem my fervicej 
 " requifite. 
 
 t{ I think it proper in this place to mention, that by 
 (t fo doing I by no means intend, nor is it at all a ne- 
 * ceffary confequence I lhould, to depart from the line 
 * l prefcribed for my guidance by the honourable Go- 
 <c vernor General and Council, in the general conduct 
 * f of the Mharatta war, and that in all matters rela- 
 " tive to it, as well as what regards the Bengal de- 
 < tachment under my command, I mutt conGder my- 
 " felf as fubjeel to the exclusive and particular order* 
 
 ' of
 
 ( *o ) 
 
 of that prefidency, in any manner they may think 
 " expedient and neceflary for the fervice." 
 
 I {hall now refume my narrative, which is, indeed, 
 drawing to a conclufion j and it is a painful reflection, 
 that the few facts remaining to be told, will unfortu- 
 nately difcover the fame want of decifion and vigour in 
 the councils, and of prudence and firmnefs in the mea- 
 fures of the Bengal government, which have fo con- 
 fpicuoufly marked the whole of their political tranfac- 
 tions with the Mharatta ftate, without the pleafing de- 
 tail of conquefl and military fuccefs that has hitherto 
 diverfified and enlivened the fubject. 
 
 Imprefled with the firm conviction of the neceflity of 
 terminating the Mharatta war, previous to the poflibi- 
 lity of undertaking any important or adequate enter- 
 prize againft Hyder from the coaft of Malabar, and 
 aflured from pad experience of the determined fpirit 
 of the Poonah Durbar, that an object fo defirable could 
 only be attained by a vigorous and fuccefsful profecu- 
 tion of hoftilities, General Goddard, as early as the 
 month of July, 1781, prepared a plan of operations 
 for the enfuing campaign, and laid it before the Select 
 Committee of Bombay, who concurred in its expe- 
 diency, and immediately tranfmitted it to the govern- 
 ment of Bengal for their approbation and afliftance to 
 carry it into effectual execution. 
 
 In the mean time every necefTary and leading ftep 
 was taken on the part of the Bombay government and 
 General Goddard which depended upon, or could be 
 effected by, their own means ; and the latter, not- 
 withftanding the fevere and tempefluous weather which 
 renders the navigation on the Malabar coaft extremely 
 hazardous, and almoft impracticable during the months 
 of June, July, and Auguft, failed for Surat, at which 
 
 place
 
 ( ax ) 
 
 place he arrived the 2d of the latter month. He fhort- N "* 
 ly after erTe&ed an interview with Futty Sing, and ob- 
 tained from that chief a body of five thoufand horfe fqr 
 the fervice of the enfuing campaign, which was two 
 thoufand more than the number he was bound to fur- 
 nifh by treaty. 
 
 This important point being accomplished, and a pro- 
 per provifion and difpofition of the force in Guzerat, 
 both for the defence of that province, and for co-ope- 
 rating with the detachment * ilationed on the northern 
 confines of Malwa, whofe active fervices and future 
 junction conftituted a neceflary part of the intended 
 plan, the General returned to Bombay ; and after the 
 vigorous exertions he had made, and the fanguine ex- 
 pectations he had been led to form of fuccefs, it is eafy 
 to conceive how great muft have been his mortification 
 and difappointment to find that the only benefit to be 
 hoped for from all his zealous endeavours, was the 
 alarm which it could not fail to excite in the mind of 
 the Mharatta minifter, and that he muft be compelled 
 to reftricl: his own future operations to a fyftem of mere 
 defence. 
 
 But before I explain the caufes of this difappoint- 
 ment, it is proper to take notice of fome events which 
 happened in Bengal during the monfoon. On the 1 ith 
 of June, the Governor General and Council renewed 
 the credentials they had before given to General God- 
 
 * After its return to the northward, the command devolved 
 upon Colonel Muir, who in confequcncc of Colonel Cam?.c'3 
 letters from Seronge, had been detached acrofs the Jumna to his 
 alfiftance, and had advanced as far as the Rana of Gohud's coun- 
 try, before the news of Colonel Camac's fucccfsful retreat reached 
 him. 
 
 M dard
 
 ( 8a ) 
 
 dard, impowering him to conclude a treaty with the 
 Mharatta ftate, either in cafe of receiving overtures to 
 that end directly from the Poonah government, or in 
 cafe of the arrival of Dewaghur Pundit,* Modajee 
 Bofla's Dcwan at Poonah, for the purpofe of mediating 
 a peace betwixt the Englifh and Mharatta powers. 
 
 In the inftructions furnifhed at this time, after de- 
 claring the treaty tendered to the Mharatta government 
 in the preceding October, to be the bafis of that pro- 
 pofed to be now concluded, they particularly except 
 the ceflion of the fort and territory of BafFein, which 
 they fay, as the minifter did not choofe to avail himfelf 
 of their former proffer, and confidering the very fa- 
 vourable turn which their affairs have fince taken, they 
 are of opinion that they are warranted in referving, if 
 they can, for the benefit of the Company. 
 
 In a fubfequent paragraph of the fame letter, they 
 recede from the above determination in the following 
 words : " If the minifler fhali refufe to yield up the 
 
 * Here we unfortunately fee the unaccountable predilection in 
 favour of Modajee, the Rajah of Berar, and ill-placed confidence 
 in his friendship, operating with an equal degree of force to what 
 it had done upon fo many preceding occafions, notwithftanding 
 the leffons we might have learnt from his conduct when General 
 Goddard's detachment arrived on the coniines of his country, on 
 its march to Bombay ; from his acceding to the general confede- 
 racy in the middle of 1779, and afterwards detaching a body of 
 troops, under his fon Chimnajcc, towards Bengal ; from the too 
 fuccefsful arts he had pra&ifcd, to retard and obftrucl the early 
 advance of Colonel Camac's detachment to regain Scindia's ca- 
 pital; and from the line of treacherous policy he adopted much 
 about the fame time, with refpeft to the propofals for peace with 
 the Poonah government, tranfmitttd through him in October 
 *7Kc, 
 
 * <* prr-
 
 ( 3 ) 
 
 w pretenfions of the Peifhwa to Baflein, and to accede 
 u to a treaty either of alliance or peace unlefs it be re- 
 ftored, we empower you in fuch cafe to give it up. 
 " This is a point of which, having exprefled our willies 
 ' as far as we can propofe them /or effect, we muft 
 * finally and wholly rely on your discretion, to decide 
 " it in whatever manner you (hall judge bed for attain- 
 " ing the fole end which we have in view, which is 
 " Peace. In all events, an honourable and equal peace, 
 " and if it can be attained, an advantageous one." 
 
 I have been the more particular in tranferibing the 
 above paragraph, becaufe it proves, that the Governor 
 General and Council, at the time of penning thefe in- 
 itru&ions, had not adopted thofe defponding and me- 
 lancholy fentiments which have fince proftrated them 
 at the feet of an infulting, though vanquifhed enemy ; 
 and that General Goddard's opinion, repeatedly urged 
 both to the Government of Bengal and to the Select 
 Committee of Bombay, " that no peace could be ob- 
 " tained with the Mharattas but by a vigorous and 
 " fuccefsful profecution of hoftilities, and that folici- 
 " tude and anxiety on our part would only tend to en- 
 <( creafe the confidence of the minifter, and the info- 
 " lent extravagance of his demands," was, at the pe- 
 riod I am now fpeaking of, countenanced by the de- 
 clared ideas of the Governor General and Council 
 themfelves. 
 
 Their letters concluded with acquainting General 
 Goddard, that it being the Governor General's inten- 
 tion to proceed to Lucknow about the middle of July, 
 he would of courfe take Benares on his way, and pro- 
 bably Modajee's Dewan might lay afide his firft defigrt 
 of a journey to Poonah, and give the Governor Gencr 
 
 M 2 "l
 
 ( 8* ) 
 
 ral a meeting at Benares, # in which cafe, be, the Ge- 
 neral, was to continue his negociation with the Mha- 
 ratfa government, but fufpend the execution of the 
 treaty, and conftantly advife the Governor General of 
 his proceedings, and of every thing material to be 
 known. 
 
 "Whatever effect: might be produced from the intend- 
 ed vifit of Modajee's Dewan to Poonah, it feemed to 
 the General pretty certain, that no overture could rea- 
 sonably be expected dire&ly from the Poonah govern- 
 ment, and that they would continue to be directed by 
 the fame policy as the preceding year, wifely avoiding 
 any advances themfelves, fince they had it in their 
 power to conclude a treaty whenever they might find it 
 convenient, upon fuch conditions as they mould judge 
 moft for their intereft, and confident with the actual 
 itate of circumftances at the time. 
 
 It was for this powerful reafon, and becaufe no ade- 
 quate or ferious attack could poflibly be made upon 
 Hyder's dominions from the coaft of Malabar, until 
 fome previous fettlement either of peace or alliance 
 Ihould take place with the Mharattas, that the Bombay 
 government and General Goddard were defirous of 
 adopting vigorous meafures,f and of making one great 
 and formidable exertion of all the force which they 
 
 could 
 
 * It unfortunately happened that Dcwaghur Pundit, Moda- 
 jee's Dewan, fell fick about this time, and died fhortly after, fo 
 that his intended journey either to Poonah or Benares never took 
 place, and the fincerity of Modajee's friendship luckily efcaped 
 the very feverc and arduous trial it mud otherwife have under- 
 gone. 
 
 f It appears by a minute of General Goddard's, at the Select 
 Committee of Bombay, early in November, that this opinion of 
 
 the
 
 ( 8$ } 
 
 could themfelves colled, generally aided by the Go- 
 vernor General and Council, and particularly fupported 
 by the operations of their detachment under Colonel 
 Muir, in order to imprefs the Poonah miniftcr with 
 that belief of our yet unreduced ftrength, and appre- 
 henfion of his own future lofs and danger, which they 
 were juftly fenfible could alone produce a difpofition 
 favourable to our views of peace, or even procure a 
 timely fufpenfion of hoftilities ; nor was it till the 
 month of November, 1781, that they found them- 
 felves compelled to abandon every idea of acting of- 
 fenfively, and to accommodate themfelves as far as the 
 neceflary attention to their own fafety would permit, 
 to the new fyftem adopted in Bengal, and the meafures 
 lately purfued in confequence of it. I have already 
 hinted Mr. Haftings's intention of proceeding to Luck- 
 now. He accordingly left Calcutta, and arrived at 
 Benares the middle of Auguft, in the neighbourhood 
 of which his journey terminated, for he was compelled 
 to retire into the fortrefs of Chunar, as an afylum from 
 the hoftile vengeance and fpirited refentment of Rajah 
 Cheyt Sing, a Zemindar, who rented the rich city and 
 
 the neccffity of preferving an appearance of vigour was ftrongly 
 fupported by the contents of a letter from Mr. Holland, refident 
 at the court of Hydcxabad, dated Sept. 2, 1 78 1 , where, after 
 acquainting the General that he had a ncgociation on foot with 
 the Nizam for an alliance againft Hyder Ally, he fays-, " I don't 
 " know what your plan of operations may be ; if the cypher 
 " reaches you fafe, I mould be obliged to you for information, 
 " as they may very materially concern my movements in the nc- 
 *' gociation. If an active campaign be not intended, yet the 
 4< giving out a report of fuch intention, and making fome m vc- 
 *' ments to favour it, the Nizam thinks will be of ufc in difpo- 
 " fmg the Mharattas to Men tc term* of accommodation." 
 
 depeu-
 
 ( 86 ) 
 
 dependencies of Benares under the Englifh Company $ 
 and to this place Afluph ul Dowla, Nawab of Oude, 
 arrived in perfon to his relief and enlargement j by 
 which means an opportunity offered of fettling the bu- 
 finefs which carried the Governor General towards 
 Lucknow, without proceeding any farther.* 
 
 It was under the impreffion of the alarm and confu- 
 fion which the tumult at Benares excited, and I am 
 willing to believe, the difppointments given to his 
 hopes of Dewaghur Pundit's vifiting Poonah or Be- 
 nares, that Mr. Haftings authorized the officer in com- 
 mand of the northern detachment, to conclude a fepa- 
 rate treaty with Mahadjee Scindia ; by which it was 
 ftipulated, that the Englifh troops Ihould immediately 
 recrofs the Jumna, and Scindia promifed on his part to 
 endeavour to negociate a treaty of peace betwixt Hy- 
 der Ally and the Englifh, and betwixt the Peifhwa and 
 the Englifh ; in which fhould he not fucceed, he agreed 
 to remain neuter in our future contefls with them. 
 
 Thefe were the only articles of any importance to 
 the general interefts of the Company, and the termi- 
 nation of the Mharatta war. The reft provided for the 
 fecurity of fome of the petty Rajahs who had taken 
 i part with us, but in fuch loofe and indefinite terms, 
 
 * As the particulars are tedious, and unneceflary to a know- 
 ledge of the Mharatta affairs, I have thought it mod proper to 
 avoid a detail of Mr. Haftings' s tranfacYions with the Rajah of Be- 
 nares, as well as of the bufinefs fettled with the Vizier at this meet- 
 ing. It is fufficient here to obferve, that the Governor General's 
 object upon the prefent occafion was to raife a fum of money, in 
 which he materially fucceeded, and that the public neceffitics 
 had in his opinion fully juftified the following maxim upon poli- 
 tical, if not moral principles : " Get money, honcftly if you 
 " can ; but at all events get money," 
 
 that
 
 ( 8 7 > 
 
 that it was plain we had fhamefully facrificed them to 
 our own political views ; as the free and unmolefted 
 enjoyment of their pofleflions was fecured to them only 
 during their own good behaviour, or, in other words, 
 during the pleafure of Mahadjee Scindia.* 
 
 A copy of this treaty was received by General God- 
 dard, at Bombay, in November ; and at the fame time 
 a letter arrived from the Governor General, explaining 
 his views in making a treaty with Mahadjee Scindia, 
 and his expectations of that chief's mediating a peace 
 betwixt the Englifh and the Mharattas, as well as of a 
 ceffation of arms being immediately agreed to for that 
 purpofe. 
 
 This point, however, Scindia feems to have confi- 
 dered himfelf as incompetent to fettle ; and Colonel 
 Muir, in his letter which accompanied the treaty, only 
 fays, that he had promifed Scindia to recommend a 
 ceffation of hoftilities fhould take place as foon as po 
 fible. It is worthy of remark alfo, that Scindia, in the 
 very article which ftipulates an endeavour on his part 
 to negociate a peace betwixt the Englifh and Mharattas, 
 agrees to attempt the fame good oflice betwixt the En- 
 glifh and Hyder j and his promife to remain neuter if 
 unfuccefsful, offers no material advantage to our future 
 
 ope- 
 
 * Tl*e fortrefs of Gualior had been delivered over to the Raima 
 of Gohud fome months previous to the treaty $ and it was ex* 
 prelTly ftipulatcd with Scindia, that he fhould continue to poflcft 
 it, but under the rcftrition above mentioned : accordingly, 
 Scindia Ihortly after, no doubt upon the cleared and moft con- 
 vincing proofs of his guilt, commenced hoftilities againft him, 
 and defolated his country. A ufeful lclTon, amongft many others, 
 to the princes of Hindoftan, how far they repofc a confidence in 
 JLnglifh honour and gencrofity.
 
 operations in the one cafe more than in the other^ fincc 
 his perfonal attendance might eafily be difpenfed with, 
 gnd no diminution of the real ftrength and refources of 
 the Mharatta nation take place ; nor could he, as a 
 fubject of the Peiihwa, detain the revenue or military 
 force of the provinces in his own hands, without ex- 
 ceeding a neutral part, and acting in oppolltion to the 
 eftablifhed authority of the Poonah minifter, which I 
 am perfuaded, and a furvey of his whole conduct will 
 prove the afiertion, it never has been, nor will it in fu- 
 ture be, either his intention or his intercft to do. 
 
 About the time of this treaty's arrival at Bombay, 
 the Select Committee alfo received a letter from Fort 
 St. George, under the fignature of Lord Macartney, 
 Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes, and Mr. Mac- 
 pherfon, one of the members of the Supreme Council 
 of Bengal, to which place he was then on his way 
 from Europe, inclofmg a copy of one which they had 
 jointly addrefled to the Peiihwa, with offers of peace, 
 in the name of the Company, the King and Parliament 
 of Great Britain, and promifes, that the Governor Ge- 
 neral and Council would make a treaty upon the condi- 
 tions wifhed for by the Peiihwa, with which they de- 
 clared themfelves fully acquainted. 
 
 This felf created dictatorial junto, in their letter to 
 Bombay, ufe the following very extraordinary expref- 
 fions : <( It is our meaning, that all hoflilitics do im- 
 -" mediately ceafe on the part of the government of 
 w Bombay, in the fame manner as hoflilities ceafe on 
 " the part of the Mharattas," and conclude by ac- 
 quainting the committee, that they may expect to re- 
 ceive inftructions from Bengal of a fimilar nature as 
 foon as poflible, and that this letter would be forwarded 
 
 to
 
 ( *? ) 
 
 to them through the channel of the Mharattas, to whom 
 they had tranfmitted it for that purpofe.* 
 
 In confequence of the earneft folicitude for peace 
 cxprefTed in the Madras letter, and the effectual bar 
 which that circumftance, as well as the recall of the 
 Malwa detachment, occafioned to every hope of ter- 
 minating the Mharatta war, by a vigorous and fuccefs- 
 ful campaign, General Goddard, in order that he might 
 be immediately enabled to turn the force on the Mala- 
 bar coaft againft Hyder Ally, and confidering a treaty 
 with the Peifhwa as a necelTary leading ftep, propofed 
 to the Selecl: Committee of Bombay, to make overtures V 
 to the Poonah minifter for commencing a negociation. 
 This meafure they highly approved of, and a letter was 
 accordingly difpatched, generally exprefling the friend- 
 ly difpofition and inclinations of the Englifh, and of- 
 fering to depute a confidential perfon to the Peifhwa's 
 court. 
 
 Although the government of Bombay, as well as 
 General Goddard, could not with propriety indulge the 
 hppe of effecting an alliance with the Mharattas, upon 
 
 * As a proof of the unfavourable effet which thefc earned 
 felicitations for peace on our part, and urged in fo extraordinary 
 a ftile, certainly produced in the mind of the minifter, it may nof 
 be amifs to obferve, that the original of the above letter, though 
 received at Poonah, was never forwarded to Bombay ; and that 
 when Captain Watherfton afterwards exprefled his furprife to 
 Nana Fuinefe at his neglecting to do fo, he acknowledged in re- 
 ply, that it appeared to him a matter of too little confequence to 
 deferve any ferious attention. The truth, however, really was, 
 that the cagernefs and anxiety we imprudently difc*>vcrcd, had 
 fully convinced the minifter of our wcaknefs and diftrefs, and 
 that it would always be in his power to chui'e the time, as well a. 
 dictate the terms of a treaty with the Enghih. 
 
 N the
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 the conditions which the Bengal inftruttions to the 
 latter of the nth of June, 1781, authorifed, they juft- 
 ly confidered, that fome overture on their part was re- 
 quifite to convince the minifter, that they poflefled the 
 fame pacific intentions with the other prefidencies ; and 
 they reafonably concluded, that frefh inftru&ions, fub- 
 fequent to the agreement with Scindia, and to the dif- 
 patch of the Fort St. George letter, would have been 
 tranfmitted to General Goddard, at that time publicly 
 invefted with plenipotentiary powers from Bengal at 
 the Mharatta court, and in all probability arrive at Bom- 
 bay before the confidential agent he propofed to depute 
 could fet out for Poonah. 
 
 Had this obvious, this direct line af policy been pur- 
 fued, there is the greateft reafon to believe, that even 
 lefs ample conceflions than thofe which have fince been 
 offered through Scindia, and fimilar arguments perfon- 
 ally urged to the minifter, would have proved fuccefs- 
 ful, and that the united force of the Peifhwa and the 
 Englifh would long ere this have acted offenfively 
 againft Hyder Ally, or, at lead, that by a concerted 
 neutrality on the part of the former, we mould our- 
 felves have been at liberty to make a powerful attack 
 upon his dominions from the Malabar coafl. 
 
 The Mharatta minifter having fignified his ready 
 and chearful acquiefcence to receive a confidential per- 
 fon, the General deputed Captain Watherfton * to 
 Poonah, where he arrived the 14th of January, 1782. 
 
 I mall 
 
 * The deputation of this gentleman to the Mharatta court 
 was peculiarly acceptable to Nana Furnefc the miniitcr, fmcc, 
 though not perfonally known, a correfpondence had commenced 
 betwixt them {0 early as the year 1779, and through the rccom- 
 
 roendarTori
 
 I (hall not here enter into a particular defcription of 
 his negotiation, fince it ultimately failed in producing 
 a treaty. This failure, however, mull not be attributed 
 either to his want of zeatous endeavour, or to difincli- 
 nation on the part of the minifter, but to a new fyfteia 
 unfortunately adopted in Bengal, which deprived Ge- 
 neral Goddard of his plenipotentiary powers at the 
 very i rift ant when they promifed to prove effectual, and 
 placed a confidence in the fuppofed influence and good 
 offices of Scindia, which, even admitting the fincerity 
 of his intentions, they could not in good policy de- 
 fer ve.* 
 
 mentation of Dewaghur Pundit, Modajec Bofla's Dewan, he had V 
 frequently expreffed his ftrong defire, that an interview fhould 
 take place. 
 
 * The following fact clearly points out the impolitic tendency 
 of the various meafures adopted for obtaining peace, and parti- 
 cularly the falacious idea of expecting it through the mediation 
 of any other power, in preference to an immediate application 
 to the minifter himfelf, viz. In order to oifprove the arguments 
 advanced by Captain Watherfton, to prevail upon the Mharatta 
 court to confide in the effects of Mr. Anderfon's ncgociation, 
 r.nd to concur ferioufly and heartily with him in fettling the con- 
 ditions of a treaty, the minifter frankly declared that he could 
 not but entertain the ftrongeft doubts and apprehenfions on the . 
 prefent occafion ; for, fays he, *' You produced credentials ia^* 
 
 * the name of General Goddard, which the government of Ben- 
 
 * gal have fince transferred to Mr. David Anderfon, and," ad- >y, 
 ded he, with an expreffivc fmile, " Modajee Bona now writes 
 
 1 me, that an Englifli gentleman has arrived at the court of 
 1 Naigpore, with full powers from Mr. Haftings to conclude a 
 ' treaty with the Peiftiwa. How do I know, bur that, when I 
 1 have finally fettled matters with the former, the latter may 
 ' produce his credentials, and declare the engagements made by 
 1 Mr. Anderfon to have been illegal and uuauthorifed ?" 
 
 N 2 Captain
 
 / 
 
 ( 9* ) 
 
 Captain Watherfton met with the mod gracious and 
 friendly reception from the minifter ; and although the 
 latter was exceedingly difappointed, that the expected 
 inftructions had not yet arrived from Bengal, and ac- 
 knowledged that he had authorifed Mahadjee Scindia 
 to receive propofals from Mr. Haftings from another 
 channel, he at the fame time declared his fincere hopes, 
 that thefe propofals might be made directly to him 
 through General Goddard ; and even afterwards, when 
 in confequence of the General's letter of the 24th of 
 V January from Bombay, communicating Mr. David An- 
 derfon's appointment to conclude a treaty with the 
 Peifhwa, and the fuperceflion of his own negotiatory 
 powers, Captain Watherfton folicited permiflion to re-* 
 turn to Bombay, the minifter repeatedly exprefled his 
 defire to detain him at Poonah, until the Governor 
 General of Bengal might furnifh him with frefh in- 
 ftructions. Indeed, fo earneft and prefling was he on 
 this head, that Captain Watherfton, notwithftanding 
 the orders he had received to quit the Mharatta court, 
 where his prefence could no longer be ufeful, as he 
 pollened no powers to treat, and the minifter might 
 improve it to his own particular views of advantage, 
 ventured to avail himfclf of the caution given at the 
 fame time of regulating his conduct by an attention to 
 the general wifh of the Bengal government for peace, 
 and to the particular fuccefs of Mr. Anderfon's nego- 
 tiation, and confented to remain at the Mharatta court 
 twenty-five days longer, at the expiration of which pe- 
 riod, the minifter promifed to agree to his departure, 
 fhould he require it. 
 
 This reluctance and unwillingnefs of the Poonah 
 adminiftiation to part with Captain Watherfton, vifibly 
 proceeded from the difappointment given to the hopes 
 
 which
 
 ( 93 ) 
 
 *rhich his arrival had excited in the mind of the minif- 
 ter, of himfelf negociating and concluding any treaty 
 of peace or alliance with the Englifti, inftead of em- 
 ploying and trufting to the agency of another ; a mea- 
 fure to which he had already fhewn himfelf particularly 
 averfe in the cafe of Modajee Bofla, and which it was 
 reasonable to believe, he would, from motives of iea- 
 loufy and fufpicion, view in a light ftill more obnox- 
 ious with regard to Scindia, who, though an immedi- 
 ate fubjec-r. of the Peifhwa, and one of the moft firm 
 fupporters of the minifter, was known to be exceedingly 
 ambitious and enterprifing, and famed even among the 
 Mharattas themfelves for craft and diflimulation. 
 
 The meafure itfelf may alfo be confidered as a great 
 political error, and an irremediable misfortune with re- 
 fpecl to our own interefts ; for exclufive of the minif- 
 ter's entertaining the fentiments above mentioned, an 
 immediate communication with himfelf would cer- 
 tainly have proved moft beneficial, by obtaining an 
 early and decided knowledge of his real intentions, and 
 preventing the effects of thofe artful fubterfuges, and 
 that fyftem of procraftination, which he has fince found 
 means to pra&ife with fuch fuccefs. 
 
 Indeed Mr. Haftings himfelf was fo fenfible of the 
 fuperior political convenience attending this direct, in- 
 tercourfe with the minifter, that in reply to Captain 
 Watherfton's letter of the 15th of January, communi- 
 cating his arrival and friendly reception at the Mharatta 
 court, although a partiality to the mode of negociation . 
 he had recently adopted, or fome other equally power- 
 ful confidcration, would not fuffer him to invefl that 
 gentleman with any authority to treat upon particular 
 points, or even to impart to him the nature of the trea- 
 ty propofed to be concluded through Scindia, " he, 
 
 " however,
 
 ( 94 ) 
 
 n however, dire&ed him to continue at Poonah, td 
 " employ his mod flcilful management and addrefs to 
 '* prevent any prejudice being had to the views of the 
 * Bengal government, from the ftop thu9 put to his 
 *' farther negociation ; and finally to make fuch com- 
 ' munications to Mr. Anderfon, as his obfervations of 
 ** the temper, objedr., and other circumftances of the 
 M Poonah government might fuggeft, and be ufeful to 
 " the fuccefs of the commiffion with which he was 
 " charged." 
 
 A considerable time before the receipt of thefe or- 
 ders from the Governor General, Captain Watherfton 
 had left the Mharatta capital, and returned to Bombay, 
 trhere he arrived, after an abfence of two months and 
 a half, the 18th of March, 1782, accompanied by Cap- 
 tain Banks of the Madras eftablifhment, and Mr. Shaw, 
 two gentlemen who had languimed fince December 
 1 779, under a long and fevere captivity at Poonah, 
 and whofe releafe Captain Watherfton warmly folicit- 
 ed, and had at length the heartfelt fatisfa&ion to ob- 
 tain from the minifter previous to his departure, with- 
 out ranfom or any condition whatever, and as a de- 
 clared teltimony of perfonal friendfhip and efteem.* 
 
 How. 
 
 * As the whole of Captain Watherfton's public correfpon- 
 dence during his refidence at Poonah, and particularly his addrefs 
 to the Governor General, dated Jan. 23d, 1781, will have been 
 tranfmitted to the honourable the Court of Directors, any partial 
 extracts from his letters mud be unnecefTary. I fhall therefore 
 at prefent finifh the fubjecr. of his embafly, by tranferibing his 
 own words fiom the concluding letter of his correfpondencc with 
 Mr. Haftings, dated Poonah, March 9th, i?Sz, which de- 
 feribes in very juft and impartial colours the nature and effects 
 of his negociation. " In the fevcral letters which I have had
 
 ( 95 ) 
 
 However mortifying and unjuft this fuperceffion of >/ 
 the powers delegated to General Goddard, and at the 
 
 " the honour to addrefs you from this place, every circumftance 
 " has been reprefented in as minute and clear a manner as I pof- 
 " fibly could ; and nothing at prefent occurs to me, as before 
 " omitted, the communication of which is neceflary to lay open 
 *' the fentiments and defigns of this court with the greater cer- 
 ** tainty and precifion, than what my correfpondence may have 
 " already effected. 
 
 " If I have failed in accomplishing the important objects of 
 4 * my deputation, or in rendering fuch effential fervice to the 
 ** Company's interefts, as might have been expe&ed from my 
 " fituation, the former muft be attributed to circumftances which, 
 " could not be forefeen or avoided, and the latter I may lament 
 " as a misfortune, but cannot help entertaining a hope it will 
 ** never be imputed as a fault, being confeious in my own breaft 
 " of having been actuated by the moil zealous and unprejudiced 
 " wifhes for the public good, and of having exerted all my cn- 
 " deavours ftrenuoufly and folely to that end ; and although the 
 41 fanguine expectations formed by General Goddard, when he 
 " deputed me to Poonah, of fulfilling your defire of an allianco 
 " with the Mharatta ftate, have been difappointed, he has Hill 
 " the happy confolation to reflect, that my prefence with the 
 " minifter at this time has been productive of fome benefit to the 
 " public caufc, and afiifted in laying the foundation of future 
 " friendfhip, by an early difcovery of the fecret defigns of the 
 " Mharatta government, and the policy which influences their 
 " conduct, by rendering the arts of concealment and procrafti- 
 " nation on their part lefs eafy to be practifed hereafter, by efta- 
 
 " blifhine a more free and unrefei ved communication of fenti- 
 
 -J 
 tl ment on both fides, and by removing every doubt and fufpt- 
 
 " cion from the mind of the minifter, relative to your intentions 
 
 * in deputing Mr. Andcrfon, of whofe exclufivc and fupcriour 
 
 ' powers to treat, he has at laft declared himfelf to be, perfectly 
 
 fatisfied." 
 
 i very
 
 A 
 
 ( * ) 
 
 very inftant of his commencing a negociation, mud 
 have reafonably appeared to him, it is evident from 
 his initructions to Captain Watherfton, and from the 
 whole of his fubfequent conduct, that he did not al- 
 low his own private feelings on this occafion to operate 
 to the prejudice of the public intereft, or relax in the 
 fmalleft degree in his zealous and unwearied endea- 
 vours to forward the future views of the Bengal go- 
 vernment, to whom, in his addrefs of the 16th of Fe- 
 bruary, acknowledging the receipt of the Governor Ge- 
 neral's letter, which had revoked his plenipotentiary ap- 
 pointment, he exprefled himfelf in the mod temperate 
 though fpirited terms j and in the language of unbiafTed 
 truth and candid fenfibility, while he declared his fixed 
 determination of ftrenuoufly and invariably exerting 
 himfelf to promote the fuccefsful accomplifhment of 
 Mr. Anderfon's treaty, he only added a fincere and fer- 
 vent hope, " that the meafures then adopted, and the 
 " change which had taken place in the channel of ne- 
 " gociation, might not prove in the mod diftant de -. 
 <c gree of proportion fo prejudicial to the Company's 
 " interefts, as he was compelled to feel and declare 
 u them injurious to himfelf."* 
 
 Imme- 
 
 * It is worthy of remark, that though the Governor General 
 and Council, in their letter to General Goddard of the 24th of 
 Dec. 1 78 1, ufe the following words, ** The Governor General 
 u will explain to you, that the appointment of Mr. Anderfon, 
 " as miniftcr to Poonah, was a meafure of local neceffity, and 
 " not dictated by any difapprobatiou of your conduct in the pie- 
 n nipotentiary character with which you were inverted," Mr. 
 Hauings contented himfelf with an explanation far lefs fatisfac- 
 tory than fuch a liberal declaration on the part of the Bengal 
 government gave reafon to expeft, and rcftrittec it to a fimple 
 
 and
 
 ( 97 
 
 Immediately after Captain Watherfton's. return from 
 Poonah, and the eonfequent ceffatjon of hoflilities with 
 the Mharattas, which, though not formally agreed to, 
 had then actually taken place, by a confent mutually 
 implied, though not declared, the government of Bom- 
 bay, in concert with General Goddard, meditated an 
 attack upon Hyder's dominions from the coaft of Ma- 
 labar j and however averfe they were to' any inferior 
 attempt, which they were fenfihle muft only produce 
 an augmentation of expence, and be attended with im- 
 minent hazard, without any adequate acquifition in 
 profpeft, and without any hope of ferioufly alarming 
 Hyder with fears for the fafety of his kingdom, and 
 thereby compelling him to relinquifh the Carnatic, they 
 planned an expedition againil Magalore, and would 
 certainly have entered upon its execution, had not the 
 latenefs of the feafon, and the very dangerous naviga- 
 tion upon the Malabar coaft, rendered fuch an enter- 
 prife utterly impracticable previous to the commence- 
 ment of the monfoon. 
 
 Difappointed in their wiflies of making an immediate 
 diverfion, they were under the necefhty of contenting 
 themfelves for the prefent with palling a refolution to 
 attack Hyder Ally as foon after the breaking up of the 
 rainy feafon as circumftances would poflibly admit, and 
 they entertained the ftrongeft hopes of receiving fuck 
 effectual fupport and afliftance from the Governor Ge- 
 
 and unqualified intimation, ** that he had thought proper to in* 
 ** veft'Mr. Andcrfon with plenipotentiary authority to conclude a 
 *' treaty of peace and alliance with the minifters of the Mha- 
 ' ratta government at Poonah, and that he would firft repair to 
 " Mahadjce Scindia, who had offered to be a mediator with the 
 '* Mharatta adminiM.ation, in order to concert with him the 
 *' meant moil likely to produce a fafc and honourable peace." 
 
 Q ncral
 
 ( 9* ) 
 
 neral and Council during the intervening period, as 
 might enable them to enter his dominions in force, an4 
 with preparations correfponding to the important ad* 
 vantages expected from, and only to be obtained by, a 
 powerful and formidable invafipn. 
 
 For this purpofe a plan of operations was prepared by 
 General Goddard, and delivered into the Select Commit* 
 tee of Bombay the middle of April, 1782, in which he 
 itated the number and quality of the troops it would be 
 abfolutely neceflary to employ upon a fervice of fuch 
 moment and magnitude, the expence in which its ef- 
 fectual execution would finally involve the Company, 
 and the fum of money immediately requifite to fet fuch 
 an enterprize on foot. 
 
 His plan, though directed to fo grand and extenfive 
 an object, was confefiedly calculated upon fuch mode- 
 rate and limited principles, in the means propofed for 
 jts attainment, that nothing but the raoft prefllng and 
 urgent neceflity of affairs, together with a merited con- 
 fidence in the known character, experience, and mili- 
 tary abilities of the officer by whom it was to be con- 
 duced, could have juftified the approbation and con- 
 ^ currence it met with. The Bombay government tranf- 
 rnitted a copy of it round to Bengal, defcribing at the 
 fame time their own total want of refources, and the 
 dependance they mull necefTarily place upon the Go- 
 vernor General and Council's afliflance for the means 
 of accomplifhing it with effect ; nor were they without 
 fome grounds of hope, from the very flattering and fa- 
 vourable accounts they were continually receiving of 
 the progrefs and ftate of Mr* Anderfon's negociation, 
 that the endeavours of that gentleman to conclude a 
 treaty of peace or alliance with the Mharattas, through 
 the mediation of Mahadjee Scindia, might be attended 
 
 with
 
 ( 99 ) 
 
 with fuccefs> and that they might enter upon a plan of 
 hoftilities againft Hyder, not only without any appre- 
 henfion of an attack upon theif own fettlements from 
 the Mharattas, but even fupported by them as a power- 
 ful and ufeful ally. 
 
 I have thus conducted my narrative to the commence- 
 ment of the rainy monfoon of the year 1782 ; and here 
 I mull neceflarily bring it to a conclufion, being unin- 
 formed of fuch material occurrences as may have hap- 
 pened in India, fubfcquent to the following month of 
 October, when the monfoon clofed, and the feafon of 
 action commenced. 
 
 At that period the ftate of the war on the Coroman- 
 del coaft, as far as the land-operations extended, wore 
 an afpeft far from unfavourable, and even encouraged 
 fome hopes of a fuccefsful termination, if either our 
 naval efforts fhould fortunately prove equal to drive the 
 French fleet from the Cororrrandel coaft, which there 
 was great reafon to expect the fuperiority occafioned by 
 the junction of Sir Richard Bickerton's fquadron, that 
 left Bombay about the middle of September, would 
 certainly enable us to effect ; or if any adequate diver- 
 fion could be made in its favour by a ferious and power- 
 ful attack upon Hyder's dominions from the fide of Ma- 
 labar. 
 
 This latter point, however, feemed to depend en- 
 tirely upon the two following circumftances, viz. " the 
 ' refult of Mr. Anderfon's negociation with Mahadjee 
 fl Scindia," and " the refolution of the Governor Gc- 
 * neral and Council fubfequent to their receipt of the 
 *' plan of military operations propofed by General 
 Goddard." 
 
 Refpcdting the former of thefe, although as early 33 
 
 the 17th of May, 1785, a treaty had been fettled and 
 
 O 2 con-
 
 ( lOO ) - 
 
 concluded upon terms, the molt humlliatirig and de- 
 rogatory on our part that could poflibly be exacted by z 
 vi&orious enemy i and although, befides the reftitution- 
 or our late conquefts, we had confented to reHnquifh 
 whatever had been ceded to us by the Poorunda treaty, 
 as well as to abandon entirely the interefts and caufe of 
 Ragonaut Row, the Poonali adminiftration had fuffered 
 a period of five months to elapfe without finally ap- 
 proving and ratifying the conditions of the treaty; and 
 it appeared moft probable, that the minifter, fenfible of 
 the little danger he had to apprehend, and of the un- 
 prepared ftate to which we had reduced ourfelves of 
 acting offenfively againft the Peifhwa, would avail him- 
 felf of the advantage he derived from the mode of ne- 
 gociation we had adopted, to protract the final adjust- 
 ment of matters with us, until he had completely ma- 
 tured his own political fchemes, and might find it in 
 every refpect convenient and perfectly agreeable to 
 himfelf, to take a pofitive and decided part either for 
 or againft our inteiefts.* 
 
 * I have chofe to avoid entering more fully into the fubje& of 
 this treaty at prefent for the two following rcafons. Firft, Be- 
 caufe the treaty itfelf until ratified does not in reality exift ; and 
 fecondly, Becaufe however inconclufive and inadequate to the 
 facrifices we have offered, fuch articles as relate to Hyder Ally, 
 may appear in their prefent ftate, they may poflibly lead to, and 
 form a bafts of future engagements of the moft important nature, 
 which it was neccflary fhould for fome time remain fecrct, or be 
 the fubjet of a feparate argument. The following circumftance, 
 however, defcrves to be particularly noticed in this peace, that 
 Modajec ofla, Rajah of Bcrar, in the prefent treaty is permitted 
 to aflume his proper political character and ftation, and is included 
 together with Nizam Ally Chawn and Hyder Ally Chawn, as a 
 friend and ally of the Mharatta ftate. 
 
 Regarding
 
 Regarding the (econd circttmftance above alluded to, 
 vir. <( the refolution of the Bengal government upon 
 '* considering' rhe plan tranfmitted from Bombay for* 
 " their approbation," the advices received from Cal- 
 cutta were not only the moft unfavourable and difcou- 
 raging, but totally deftroyed every hope of equipping' 
 an armament of fufficient force to make any ferious* or 
 ufeful attack upon Hyder's dominions frOm the Malabar 
 coaft, fmce the Governor General and Council declared 
 themfelves unable to furnifh the fmalleft affiftance ; 
 and in confequence of this declaration, the Select Com- 
 mittee of Bombay, fo late as the beginning of October 
 TJ%2, were compelled to acknowledge that their utmoft 
 exertions during the approaching feafon of a&ion could 
 not poffibly extend beyond the reduction of Mangalore, 
 or fome of Hydei^s fortrefles upon the fea coaft ; and 
 even to operations of a nature fo circumfcribed and fo 
 inadequate to the important objects which in policy 
 prompted an invafion, and which alone could juftify 
 the facrifices offered to the Mharattas, in order to be 
 in a condition to undertake it, the means pofTefTed by 
 the government of Bombay feemed exceedingly doubt- 
 ful and difproportioned. 
 
 I (hall here clofe my narrative, nor is it, I hope, ne- 
 ceflary to recapitulate the feveral facls contained in it, 
 to prove the juftnefs and propriety of the following 
 ideas, which are at lead founded upon an impartial 
 confideration and candid comparison of them. 
 
 In the firft place, I conceive it will be apparent to all 
 unprejudiced and unbiafled minds, that the Mharatta 
 war in 1778 originated with the governments of Ben- 
 gal and Bombay, and was a matter of choice, not of 
 political neceffity. 
 
 I Second,
 
 V 
 
 Second, That let the circumftances under which it 
 commenced have been ever fo favourable, the total 
 want of confidence and unanimity which marked the 
 fubfequent counfcls and condut, of the two prefiden- 
 cies, muft have afiaredly defeated every hope, and de- 
 ftroyed even the pofiibility of fuccefs. 
 
 Third, That the failure of the negociation for peace 
 in 1 779, and the fubfequent renewal of hoflilities, was 
 altogether unavoidable, and a meafure founded upon, 
 principles of felf prefervation and defence. 
 
 Fourth, That the fuccefs which afterwards attended 
 our military operations, would in all reafonable expec- 
 tation have fhortly terminated the war to our honour 
 and advantage, had not our own mifcondut, and the 
 misfortunes of our arms on the coaft of Coromandel, 
 unfeafonably interpofed and prevented. 
 
 Fifth, That in order to make any ufeful or adequate 
 diverfion from the fide of Malabar, and draw Hyder 
 Ally out of the Carnatic, no partial or inferior opera- 
 tion could have availed, and that therefore it was ne- 
 ceflary to enter his dominions in force fufficient to alarm 
 him with fears for their fafety, as well as to contend 
 with the formidable oppofition which the troops em- 
 ployed on fo important a fervice muft in fuch cafe ex- 
 pect to encounter. 
 
 Sixth, That the means of doing this mufl entirely, 
 depend upon, and could only be fupplied by the Go- 
 Yernor General and Council of Bengal. 
 
 Seventh, That previous to any enterprize, it was 
 abfolutely necefTary to conclude a treaty with the Mha- 
 rattas, or at lead to agree to a ceuation of hoflilities. 
 
 Eighth, That the moft certain and effectual mode of 
 producing a difpofition in the Poonah minifter, favour- 
 able
 
 ( i3 ) 
 
 able to our views of peace, wa9 by a vigorous and fuc- 
 cefsful profecution of the war ; and 
 
 Laftly, That, when after the repeated proofs we had 
 experienced of the inefficacy of every folic itation and 
 overture on our part, the Governor General and Coun- 
 cil were ftill determined to adhere to the fame humi- 
 liating fyftem, and to facrifice every thing to the at- 
 tainment of a peace^ it would have been more confiftent 
 with a wife and prudent policy, and in all probability 
 have fucceeded better, efpecially as Captain Wather- 
 fton's deputation to Poonah had put matters in fo fair 
 and favourable a train, if General Goddard had been 
 authorized to make thofe propofals directly to the mi- 
 nifter himfelf, which were unfortunately tranfmitted to 
 him by Mr. David Andcrfon, through Mahadjce Scin- 
 dia, and which by the arts of procraftination the Mha- 
 ratta court has already pra&ifed, and the opportunity 
 ^hereby loft to us of improving the feafon of action to 
 the greateft advantage, his acceding to hereafter can 
 x^ot poflibly render an object of political benefit, or 
 anfwer the ufeful purpofe originally intended, and 
 jnuft therefore be deemed, on oar part, a moft unwar* 
 jrantable, profitlefs, and deftructive facrifice. 
 
 yv 
 
 post-
 
 i
 
 ( i0 5 ) 
 
 JPOSTSCftlPf; 
 
 J. HE very important intelligence which has been re- 
 ceived from India, fince the above meets were fent to 
 the prefs, renders it neceflary for the author to fay a 
 fbw words in addition. It is, however, fuperfluous to 
 expatiate, or enter very fully into particulars, fince the 
 difcerning public will at once perceive the nature and 
 real value of the advantages above alluded to, as well 
 as 1 the caufe by which they have been produced. 
 
 The ratification and exchange of the Mharatta treaty, 
 arid the fiiccefsful expedition upon the coaft of Mala- 
 bar, are the two points that defervedly attract the pre- 
 fent attention of the nation ; fince the former is an 
 event which has long been eagerly defired and expect- 
 ed, and the latter promifes to be followed, by the moft 
 favourable confequences, relative to the Operations o 
 the war in the Carnatic. 
 
 A perfect knowledge of cireumftances, and an exa- 
 mination of the means by which thefe two points were 
 effected, will, however, be fuilicient to convince every 
 candid and unprejudiced perfon, that both thefe inci- 
 dents have been confequences of the death of Hyder 
 Ally Chawn, whieh preceded them ; and it is there- 
 fore upon an event fo providential and feafonablc to the 
 Britiih iutercfts in India, as the exit of that extraordi- 
 nary man- from the bufy fcene of life at this critical. 
 P juncture.
 
 C *>6 } 
 
 juncture, that the author feels a fmcere and patriotic 
 pleafure in congratulating the public. 
 
 He cannot avoid mingling a considerable {hare of re- 
 gret with his fetisfaclion, when he reflects upon thr 
 wilucky caufes of delay which intervened to prevent 
 the eonclufion of a treaty, until the period of fuccefsful 
 fortune above mentioned ; a period that juftified the 
 moft fanguine hopes of an honourable termination to 
 Our Indian contefts,. and muft in its progref* have in- 
 fallibly procured for us conditions of peace with the 
 Mharatta ftate, proportioned in fome meafure to the 
 conquefts we had made from it- 
 
 The preceding narrative clearly explains what is. 
 meant; by the caufes of delay above referred to j and a 
 perufal of the treaty itfelf will beft point out to the- in- 
 telligent reader, the motive of the author's regret for 
 the great and unprofitable Sacrifices which have been 
 made to obtain it.' 
 
 The prefidency of Bombay, deprived of every po-" 
 Ktical confequence it had acquired during the late 
 fuccefsful ftruggle with the Mharattas, muft now fink 
 into an obfcurity, from which it will be alrnoft impof- 
 fible ever again to emerge -, and inftead of indulging 
 the flattering profpect. of an extended commerce or en- 
 creafed revenue,, muft be contented to move in a line 
 the moft humiliating and circumfcribed, pofleiTing no 
 power or refource whatever, receiving- no refpect or 
 confideration from any of the neighbouring dates, and 
 burdening the Company with a heavy and conftant 
 expence, without even - the moft diftant hope of relief 
 at any future period, or by any probable turn of for- 
 tune whatever. 
 
 That this picture is by no means too highly coloured- 
 
 or overcharged, a comparifon of the treaty concluded- 
 
 2 ' bv
 
 ( *7 ) 
 
 by Colonel Upton in March 1776 with that now made 
 public, will at once difcover. 
 
 It is, indeed;, but too evident, that had Hyder Ally 
 ftill lived to infult the Camatic, the ftipulations of the 
 prefent treaty offer no adequate benefit, or profpect of 
 advantage, proportioned to the important facrifices 
 made in it : but when we reflect, that by his death tho 
 whole fcene has been reverfed, and a new fet of actors 
 introduced upon the ftage ; that a change of intereft^ 
 and political connections has confequently taken place j 
 and alfo, that the chiefs who reluctantly fubmitted to 
 the father, are with difficulty restrained within the 
 bounds of obedience to the fon,* how fincerely and 
 how ferioufly is it to be lamented, either that a treaty 
 could not have been concluded with the Mharattas at a 
 time when their alliance might have been of ufe to re- 
 trieve our affairs, or that we did not poflefs a fufficient 
 (hare of political wifdom and forefight, to have left our- 
 felves the freedom of deliberation and choice, when- 
 ever a fortunate opportunity might prefent itfelf of ex- 
 pecting and demanding honourable, if not advantageous 
 terms, 
 
 I will even venture to go a flep farther, and I am 
 perfuaded, the impartial part of mankind will not think 
 I hazard too much in affirming, that the conditions to 
 which we have fubmitted are of fo ruinous and difgrace- 
 ful a nature, that nothing but fome fecret agreement, to 
 
 * This fpirit of rebellion has already manifefted itfelf in tlie* 
 fortunate defection which put us in pofie'Iion of the Bidcnoir 
 country, and promifes to produce effects Mill more important and 
 beneficial, (hould the projected revolution at Scringapatnam, iu 
 favour of the d'.^hroned family cf My fore, be attended with 
 fuccef*. 
 
 which
 
 ( 8 ) 
 
 which we arc at prefent (hangers, and an equal parti- 
 tion of the whole of Hyder Ally's territories betwixt 
 the Englifli and Mharattas, can poffibly juftify, or evert 
 excufe coir acceding to them; 
 
 With this remark I fliall now difiriifs the fiibjed"t, 
 and defer its farther confederation until recent advices 
 from India fhall admit of our properly eftimating the 
 lofs we at prefent fuftain, and of comparing it with the 
 extent of future benefit, which it may be intended to 
 produce. 
 
 That Providence may fortunately continue to inter- 
 pofe, aad prevent the misfortunes with which a tiain 
 of political errors has long threatened to Overwhelm 
 the Britifh interefts in Hindoftan, is furely a wifh irr 
 which every real lover of his country will warmly and 
 heartily concur ; and the author feels himfelf at the 
 I fame time infpired with the mofl lively and confident 
 hope, of feeing the wifdom and power of the legiflature 
 foon and effectually exerted to eftablifh a new, liberal^ 
 and uniform fyftem of adminiftration in India, to unite 
 the divided and diflant prefidencies under one fovereign 
 authority and control, and by directing their atten- 
 tions and endeavours to the fame determinate objects of 
 political purfuit, to render our valuable and extenfive 
 empire in the eaft, equally folid, beneficial, and per- 
 manent* 
 
 T M e end.
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 
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