UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 AT LOS ANGELES
 
 ^x, 
 
 '//^
 
 IN KOREA 
 
 WITH 
 
 MARQUIS ITO
 
 IN KOREA 
 
 WITH 
 
 MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Part I 
 A NARRATIVE OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCES 
 
 Part II 
 A CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY 
 
 BY 
 
 GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD, LL.D. 
 
 LONGMANS, Ci R K K N & CO. 
 LONDON :: :: :: :: :: :: :: : : 190S
 
 Ccipyrii;ht, iqok, by Charles Scribner's Suns, for the 
 I'uited States of Anierii a 
 
 Printeii liy the Svril>iier Press 
 New Yurk, V. S. A.
 
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 TO THE 
 
 DEAR COMPANION 
 
 OF ITS EXPERIENCES AND THE 
 
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 ^ THIS BOOK IS GRATEFULLY 
 
 (c\ AND AFFECTIONATELY 
 
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 DEDICATED 
 
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 PREFACE 
 
 The contents and purposes of this volume may be con- 
 veniently classified under three heads; for here are statements 
 of fact, expressions of opinion, and certain ventures into the 
 realm of conjecture. The statements of fact are, almost 
 without exception, made on grounds of personal observation, 
 or on the authority of the most competent and trustworthy 
 first-hand witnesses. For the earlier periods of the history 
 of the relations, friendly or hostile, between Japan and 
 Korea, these authorities are indeed no longer living, and they 
 cannot be subjected to cross-questioning. But the choice 
 between the truth they told and the mistakes and falsehoods 
 of a contradictory character is in most cases not difficult to 
 make. For events of the present generation the reader will 
 find the statements of the witnesses quoted, and of the docu- 
 ments cited, to be in general unimpeachable. I believe, 
 then, that what is claimed to be truth of fact in this book is 
 as nearly exact and worthy of implicit confidence as it is 
 ordinarily given to human beings to be in matters pertaining 
 to the history of human affairs. 
 
 In expressing my own opinions as to the truth or untruth 
 of certain contentions, and as to the merit or demerit of cer- 
 tain transactions, I have uniformly tried to base these opin- 
 ions upon the fullest obtainable knowledge of the facts. In 
 some cases the judgments at which I have been compelled 
 to arrive contradict those which have been and still are widely 
 current ; in some cases they can scarcely fail to be interpreted 
 as an impeachment of other writers who have had either a
 
 viii PREFACE 
 
 narrator's interest only in the same events or even a more 
 substantial concernment. I have no wish to deny the apol- 
 ogetic character of this book. But at every point the charge 
 of being swerved from the truth by prejudice may be met 
 with these replies: First, very unusual opportunities were 
 afforded the author for ascertaining the truth; and, second, 
 in almost every case where the evidence brought forward 
 seems insufficient there is much more of the same sort of 
 evidence alreafly in his possession, and still more to be had 
 for the asking. But in these days one must limit the size of 
 such undertakings. Few readers wish to wade through a 
 long stretch of shoals in order to reach the firm ground of 
 historical verity. 
 
 As to the ventures at conjecture which are sparingly put 
 forth, let them be rated at their seeming worth, after the facts 
 have been carefully studied and the opinions weighed, which 
 have called out these ventures. They are confessedly only 
 entitled to a claim for a certain degree, higher or lower, of 
 probability. The status of all things in the Far East and 
 for the matter of that, all over the civilized world is just 
 now so unstable and loaded wdth uncertainties that no human 
 insight can penetrate to the centre of the forces at w'ork, and 
 no human foresight can look far into the future. 
 
 The division of the book into two parts may seem at first 
 sight to injure its unity. Such a division has for its result, as 
 a matter of course, a somewhat abrupt change in the char- 
 acter of the material employed and in the style of its handling. 
 The First Part is a narrative of personal obser^'ations and 
 experiences. It gives the results, however, of a serious study 
 of a complicated situation; and it pronounces more or less 
 confident judgments upon a number of subordinate questions 
 involved in the general problem of establishing satisfactory 
 relations between two nations which are inseparably bound 
 together physically, socially, politically whether for the
 
 PREFACE ix 
 
 weal or for the woe of both. In the Second Part the attempt 
 is made to submit these judgments to the tests of history. 
 But what is history? Of no other civihzed country than 
 Korea is the truth of the cynical saying more obvious that 
 much of what has been written as history is lies, and that most 
 of real history is unwritten. All of which has tended to make 
 the writer duly appreciate the unspeakable advantage of 
 having access to authentic information which, for diplomatic 
 and other sufficient reasons, has not hitherto been made 
 public. 
 
 The underlying literary and logical unity which binds to- 
 gether the two seemingly diverse Parts of the one book is 
 made clear by stating in general terms the problem upon 
 which it aims to throw light. This problem concerns the 
 relations to be established between Japan and Korea a 
 question which has for centuries been proposed in various 
 imperative and even affective ways to both these nations. 
 It is also a question which has several times disturbed greatly 
 the entire Orient, and the recent phases of which have come 
 near to upsetting the expectations and more deliberate plans 
 of the entire civilized world. To lay the foundations, under 
 greatlv and suddenly changed conditions, of a satisfactory 
 and permanent peace, one of the greatest statesmen of the 
 Orient is giving with all his mind and heart the later 
 years of his eventful hfe. I hope that this book may make 
 its readers know somewhat better what the problem has 
 been and is; and what Prince Ito, as Japanese Resident- 
 General in Korea, is trying to accomplish for its solution. 
 
 It remains for the Preface only to acknowledge the author's 
 obligations. These are so special to one person namely, 
 Mr. D. W. Stevens, who has been for some time official 
 "Adviser to the Korean Council of State and Counsellor to 
 the Resident-General" that without his generous and })ains- 
 taking assistance in varied ways the Second Part of the book
 
 X PREFACE 
 
 could never have appeared in its present form. Tt is hoped 
 that this general acknowledgment will serve to cover many 
 cases where Mr. Stevens' name is not especially mentioned 
 in connection with the text. Grateful acknowledgment is 
 also made to Mr. Furuya, the private secretary of the Resi- 
 dent-General, for his painstaking translation from the orig- 
 inal Japanese or Chinese ofhcial documents; to Mr. M. 
 Zumoto, editor of the Seoul Press, for varied information on 
 many subjects; and to Dr. George Heber Jones for facts and 
 suggestions imparted in conversation and emljodied in writ- 
 ings of his. My obligations to the Resident-General himself, 
 for the perfectly untrammelled and unprejudiced opportunity, 
 with its complete freedom to ask all manner of questions, 
 which his invitation afforded, are, I trust, sufficiently empha- 
 sized in the title of the book. Other debts to writers upon 
 any part of the field are acknowledged in their proper con- 
 nections. 
 
 George Trumbull Ladd. 
 
 Hayama, Japan, 
 
 September, 1907.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CONTENTS OF PART I 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I. The Invitation ... - i 
 
 II. First Glimpses of Korea 15 
 
 III. Life in Seoul 37 
 
 IV. Life in Seoul {Continued) 65 
 
 V. The Visit to Pyeng-yang 90 
 
 VI. Chemulpo and Other Places 112 
 
 VII. The Departure 139 
 
 VIII. Personal Reminiscences and Impressions 148 
 
 CONTENTS OF PART II 
 
 IX. The Problem: Historical 179 
 
 X. The Problem: Historical {Continued) . .222 
 
 XL The Compact 252 
 
 XII. Rulers and People 280 
 
 XIII. Resources and Finance 300
 
 CONTEXTS 
 
 CHAPTER PACE 
 
 XIV. Education and the Public Justice . . 326 
 
 XV. Foreigners and Foreign Relations . . 352 
 
 XVI. Wrongs: Real and Fancied 367 
 
 XVII. Missions and Missionaries 388 
 
 XVIII. July, 1907, and After 414 
 
 XIX. The Solution of the Problem .... 444
 
 ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Portrait of Marquis Ito Frontispiece 
 
 TO FACE PAGE 
 
 Bird's-Eye View of the Capital City 22 
 
 Going to the Lecture at Independence Hall 52 
 
 Water-Gate at Pyeng-yang 100 
 
 West Gate or "Gate of Generous Righteousness" . . . 132 
 
 Peony Point at Pyeng-yang ... 184 
 
 The Tong-Kwan Tai-Kwol Palace 206 
 
 The Ex-Emperor and Present Emperor 284 
 
 The Hall of Congratulations 306 
 
 Street Scene in Seoul 330 
 
 The Stone -Turtle Monument 384 
 
 Funeral Procession in Seoul 408
 
 PART I 
 
 A NARRATIVE OF PERSONAL 
 EXPERIENCES
 
 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 PART I 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE INVITATION 
 
 It was in early August of 1906 that I left New Haven for a 
 third visit to Japan. Travelling by the way of the Great 
 Lakes through Duluth and St. Paul, after a stay of two weeks 
 in Seattle, we took the Japanese ship Aki Maru for Yoko- 
 hama, where we arrived just before the port was closed for 
 the night of September 20. Since this ship was making its 
 first trip after being released from transport service in con- 
 veying the Japanese troops home from Manchuria, and was 
 manned by officers who had personal experiences of the war 
 to narrate, the voyage was one of uncommon interest. Cap- 
 tain Yagi had l)cen in command of the transport ship Kinshu 
 Maru when it was sunk by the Russians, off the northeastern 
 coast of Korea. He had then been carried to Vladivostok, 
 and subsequently to Russia, where he remained in prison 
 until the end of the war. Among tlie various narratives to 
 which I listened with interest were the two following; they 
 are repeated here because they illustrate the code of honor 
 whose spirit so generally pervaded the army and navy of 
 Japan during their contest with their formidable enemy. It 
 is in reliance on the triumph of this code that those who know 
 the nation best are hopeful of its al^ility to overcome the diffi-
 
 2 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 cultics which are being encountered in the effort to establish 
 a condition favorable to safety, peace, and prosperity by a 
 Japanese Protectorate over Korea. 
 
 At Vladivostok the American Consul pressed u])on Captain 
 Vagi a sum of money sufficient to j)ro\ide a more suitable 
 su])ply of food during his journey ])y rail to Russia. This 
 kindly offer was resi)ect fully declined on tlie sentimental 
 ground that, as an officer of Japan, he could not lionorably re- 
 ceive from a stranger a loan wliich it was altogether likely he 
 would never be able to repay. But when still further urged, 
 although he continued to decline the money, he 1)egged only 
 the Consul's card, "lest he miglit himself forget the name or 
 die," and so his Government woukl be unable to acknowledge 
 the kindness shown to one of its officers. The card was given, 
 sent to Tokyo, and as the Captain supposed the Consul 
 was "thanked ofTicially." The first of^cer, an Englishman, 
 who had been in the service of Japan on the Aki Mam, while 
 it was used for transporting troops to ^Manchuria and j)rison- 
 ers on its return, told this equally significant story. His shij) 
 had brought to Japan as prisoner the Russian officer second 
 in command at the battle of Nan-san. Having been wounded 
 in the foot, the Russian was, after his cai)ture, carried for a 
 long distance by Japanese soldiers, to whom, when they 
 reached the hospital tent, he offered a S2o gold-piece. But 
 they all refused to receive money from a wounded foe. " If it 
 had been Russian sokliers," said this officer of his own coun- 
 trymen, "they would not only have taken this money but 
 would have gone through my pockets besides." 
 
 Before leaving home only two official invitations had l)ecn 
 received, namely, to lecture on Education before the teachers 
 in the Tokyo branch of the Imperial Educational Society; and 
 to give a course in the Imperial University of Kyoto, on a 
 topic which it ^vas afterward decided should be the "Philoso- 
 phy of Religion." This university was to open in the fol-
 
 THE INVITATION 3 
 
 lowing autumn a Department of Philosophy (such a forward 
 movement having been delayed by the war with Russia). 
 Almost immediately on our arrival, a multitude of requests 
 for courses of lectures and public addresses came to the com- 
 mittee in charge of the arrangements, with the result that the 
 six months from October i, 1906, to April i, 1907, were 
 crowded full of interesting and enjoyable work. In the inter- 
 vals of work, however, there was opportunity left for much 
 valuable social intercourse and for meeting with men like 
 Togo, Oyama, Noghi, and others in military and business, as 
 well as educational circles, whose names and deeds are well 
 known all over the civilized world. But it is not the narrative 
 of these six months which is before us at the present time, al- 
 though doubtless they had a somewhat important influence in 
 securing the opportunity and providing the preparation for 
 the subsequent visit to Korea. 
 
 The thought of seeing something of the "Hermit King- 
 dom" (a title, by the way, which is no longer appropriate) 
 had been in our minds before leaving x\merica, only as a some- 
 what remote possibility. Not long after our arrival in Japan 
 the hint was several times given by an intimate friend, who is 
 also in the confidence of Marquis Ito, that the latter intended, 
 on his return in mid-winter from Seoul, to invite us to be his 
 guests in his Korean residence. It was not, however, until 
 the afternoon of December 5 that the invitation was first re- 
 ceived. This was . at the garden-party gi\-en by Marquis 
 Nabeshima on his sixty-first birthday. It should be explained 
 that every Japanese is born under one of the twelve signs 
 corresponding to our signs of the Zodiac. When live of these 
 periods have been completed the total of sixty years corre- 
 sponds with the end of six periods of ten years each a reck- 
 oning which is, I Ijelieve, of Chinese origin. The fortunate 
 man, therefore, may be said to begin life over again; and 
 presents such as are ordinarily appropriate only to childhood
 
 4 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 arc entirely in order on sucli a festal occasion. While wallc- 
 ing in the beautiful garden, which is of Japanese style but 
 much modified by Italian ideals, the private secretary of Mar- 
 quis Ito, Mr. Furuya, came to us and announced that his 
 chief, who had recently returned from Seoul to Japan, was 
 near and wished to see me. After an exchange of friendly 
 greetings almost immediately the Manpiis said: "I am ex- 
 pecting to see you in my own land, wliich is now Korea"; 
 and when I jestingly asked, "But is it safe to be in Korea?" 
 (implying some fear of a Russian invasion under his ])rotec- 
 torate) he shook his fist ])layfully in the air and answered : 
 "But I will protect you." To this he added, ])ointing to his 
 sword: "You see, I am half-military now." The significance 
 of the last remark will be the better understood when it is re- 
 membered that from the days of his young manhood to the 
 present hour, Ito has always stood for the peaceful policy and 
 the cultivation of friendly relations between Japan and all the 
 rest of the world. For this reason he has never been the fa- 
 vorite of the military party; and he is to-day opposed in his 
 administration of Korean affairs by those who would apply 
 to them the mailed hand of punishment and suppression rather 
 than hold out the friendly but firm hand of guidance and help. 
 Even after this interview the real purpose of the invitation 
 to visit Korea was not evident. A week later, however, it 
 was disclosed by a visit from ]Mr. Yamada of the Japan 
 Times, who came from Marquis Ito to j^resent his re([uest 
 more fully and to arrange for a subse(|uent extended con- 
 ference upon the subject. I was then informed, in a general 
 way, how it was thought by the Resident-General 1 miglit 
 be of help to him and to Japan in solving the ditficult ])robk'm 
 of furthering for the Koreans themselves the benefits which 
 the existing relations of the two countries made it desiraljle 
 for both to secure. Complaints of various sorts were con- 
 stantly being made, not only against individual Japanese,
 
 THE INVITATION 5 
 
 but also against the Japanese administration, as unjust and 
 oppressive to the Koreans, and as selfish and exclusive toward 
 other foreigners than its own countrymen. Especially had 
 such complaints of late been propagated by American mis- 
 sionaries, either directly by letters and newspaper articles, 
 or more indirectly by tales told to travellers who, since they 
 were only passing a few days in Korea, had neither desire 
 nor opportunity to investigate their accuracy. In this way, 
 exaggerations and falsehoods were spread abroad as freely 
 as one-sided or half-truths. In the office of Resident-General 
 the ]Marc|uis greatly desired to be absolutely just and fair, 
 and to prevent the mistakes, so harmful both to Korea and 
 to Japan, which followed the Japanese occupation of Korea 
 at the close of the Chino- Japan war. But it was difficult, 
 and in most cases impossible, for him even to find out what 
 the complaints were; they came to the public ear in x\merica 
 and England before he was able to get any indication of 
 their existence even. And when his attention was called to 
 them in this roundabout fashion, further difficulties, a^^most 
 insuperable, intervened between him and the authors of 
 these complaints; for in most cases it turned out that the 
 foreign plaintift's had no first-hand information regarding the 
 truth of the Korean stories. They would not themselves 
 take the pains to investigate the complaints, much less would 
 they go to the trouble to bring the attention of the Resident- 
 General to the matters complained of in order that he might 
 use his magisterial authority to remedy them. In respect to 
 these, and certain other difficulties, Alarquis Ito thought that 
 I might assist his administration if I would spend some time 
 upon the ground as his guest. 
 
 The nature of this invitation put upon me the responsibility 
 of answering two (juestions which were by no means alto- 
 gether easy of solution; and on which it was, from their very 
 nature, im})ossible to get much trustworthy advice. The
 
 6 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 first of these concerned my own fitness for so delicate and 
 difficult but altogether unaccustomed work. The second 
 raised the doubt whether I could in this way be more useful 
 to Japan and to humanity than by carrying out the original 
 plan of spending the spring months lecturing in Kiushu. 
 After consulting with the few friends to whom 1 could i)rop- 
 erly mention the subject, and rellecting tliat the judgment of 
 His Imperial Alajesty, with whom Manjuis Ito would doubt- 
 less confer, as well as of the Resident-General himself, might 
 fairly be considered conclusive, I accepted the invitation; 
 but it was with mingled feelings of pleasure and of some- 
 what painful hesitation as to how I should be able to succeed. 
 
 The illness of ]Marquis Ito which, though not serious, com- 
 pelled him to retire from the exciting life of the capital city 
 to the seaside, and then to the hills, prevented my meeting 
 him before I left Tokyo for Kyoto to fulfil my engagements 
 in the latter city. But, by correspondence with a friend, I 
 was kept informed of the Marquis' plans for his return to 
 Korea, and thus could govern my engagements so as to be 
 in the vicinity of some point on his route thither, at which 
 the meeting with him might take place. 
 
 The .expected conference followed immediately after our 
 return from one of the most delightful of the many gratifying 
 experiences which came to iis during our year in Japan. We 
 had taken a trip to the village of Hiro ]\Iura, where formerly 
 lived Hamaguchi Goryo, the benevolent patron of his village, 
 whose act of self-sacrifice in burning his rice straw in order 
 to guide the bewildered villagers to a place of safety when 
 they were being overwhelmed by a tidal wave in the darkness 
 of midnight, has been made the theme of one of Lafcadio 
 Hearn's interesting tales. Mr. Hearn, it appears, had never 
 visited the locality; and, indeed, we were assured that we 
 W'Cre the first foreigners who had ever been seen in the \'illage 
 streets. A former pupil of mine is at the head of a flourishing
 
 THE INVITATION 7 
 
 school patronized by the Hamaguchi family; and having 
 accepted his invitation, in the name of the entire region, to 
 visit them and speak to the school and to the teachers of the 
 Prefecture, the cordial greeting, hospitable entertainment, 
 and the surpassingly beautiful scenery, afforded a rich reward 
 for the three or four days of time required. For, as to the 
 scener)% not the drive around the Bay of Na])lcs or along the 
 Bosphorus excels in natural beauty tlie jinrikisha ride that 
 surmounts the cliffs, or clings to their sides, above the bay of 
 Shimidzu ("Clear Water"); while for a certain })icturesque- 
 ness of human interest it surpasses them both. On the way 
 back to Wakayama for Hiro ]Mura is more than twenty 
 miles, from the nearest railway station three men to each 
 jinrikisha, running with scarcely a pause and at a rate that 
 would have gained credit for any horse as a fairly good 
 roadster, brought us to the well-situated tea-house at Waka- 
 no-ura. For centuries the most celeljrated of Japanese poets 
 have sung the ])raises of the scenery of this region the boats 
 with the women gathering seaweed at k)w tide, the fishermen 
 in the offing, the storks standing on one leg in the water or 
 flying above the rushes of the salt marsh. Here we were met 
 for tiffin by the Governor of the Prefecture and the mayor of 
 the city, and immediately after escorted to the city hall of 
 Wakayama, where an audience of some eight hundred, 
 officials and teachers, had already assembled. While in tlie 
 waiting-room of this hall, a telegram from ^Ir. Yokoi was 
 handed to me, announcing that ^Manpiis Ito liad already 
 left Oiso and would reach Kyoto that very evening and 
 arrange to see me the next day. 
 
 It was now necessary to change the plan of sight-seeing in 
 the interesting castle-town of Wakayama for an immediate 
 return to Kyoto. Thus we were taken directly from the 
 Hall to the railway station and, on reaching Osaka, hurried 
 across the citv in time to catch an evenintr train; an hour
 
 8 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 later we found our boys wailing, with their jinrikishas, at 
 the station in Kyoto. From the hotel in Kyoto I sent word 
 at once to Marcjuis I to of our arrival and placed myself at his 
 command for the long-deferred interview. The messenger 
 brought back an invitation for luncheon at one o'clock of the 
 next day. 
 
 When we reached the " Kyoto Hotel," at the time ap])ointed 
 we were ushered into the room where Mar(|uis Ito, his aide- 
 de-camp, General Murata, his attending j)hysician, his 
 secretary, and four guests besides ourselves, were already 
 gathered. After leaving the luncheon table, we had scarcely 
 entered the parlor when the JManjuis' secretary said : "The 
 Marquis would like to see you in his room." I followed to 
 the private parlor, from which the two servants, who were 
 laughing and chatting before the oj)cn fire, were dismissed by 
 a wave of the hand, and pointing me to a chair and seating 
 himself, the INIarquis began immediately upon the matters for 
 conference about which the interview had been arranged. 
 
 His Excellency spoke very slowly but with great distinctness 
 and earnestness; this is, indeed, his habitual manner of speech 
 whether using English or his native language. The manner 
 of speech is characteristic of the mental haljit, and the 
 established principles of action. In the very first i)lace he 
 wished it to be made clear that he had no detailed directions, 
 'or even suggestions, to offer. I was to feel f[uite independent 
 as to my plans and movements in co-operating with him to 
 raise out of their present, and indeed historical, low condition 
 the unfortunate Koreans. In all matters affecting the home 
 policy of his government as Resident-General, he was now a 
 Korean himself; he was primarily interested in the welfare, 
 educationally and economically, of these thirteen or fourteen 
 millions of wretched people who had been so long and so 
 badly misgoverned. In their wish to remain independent he 
 sympathized with them. The wish was natural and proper;
 
 THE INVITATION 9 
 
 indeed, one would be compelled to think less highly of them, 
 if they did not have and show this wish. As to foreign 
 relations, and as to those Koreans who were plotting with 
 foreigners against the Japanese, his attitude was of necessity 
 entirely different. He was against these selfish intrigues; he 
 was pledged to this attitude of opposition by loyalty to his 
 own Emperor, to his own country, and, indeed, to the best 
 good fortune for Korea itself. Japan was henceforth bound 
 to protect herself and the Koreans against the evil influence 
 and domination of foreign nations who cared only to exploit 
 the country in their own selfish interests or to the injury of 
 the Japanese. When his own countrymen took part in such 
 selfish schemes, he was against them, too. ^ 
 
 Again and again did the Resident-General affirm that the 
 helping of Korea was on his conscience and on his heart; 
 that he cared nothing for criticism or opposition, if only he 
 could bring about this desirable result of good to the Koreans 
 themselves. He then went on to say that diplomatic negotia- 
 tions between Japan and both Russia and France were so 
 far advanced that a virtual entente cordiale had already been 
 reached. Treaties, formally concluded, would soon, he 
 hoped and believed, secure definite terms for the continuance 
 of peaceful relations. Japan had already received from 
 Russia proposals for such a permanent arrangement; the 
 reply of Japan was so near a rapprochement to the proposals of 
 Russia as to encourage the judgment that actual agreement 
 on the terms of a treaty could not be far away. The situation, 
 indeed, was now such that Russia had invited Japan to make 
 counter proposals. The present Foreign Minister of Russia 
 the Marquis regarded as one of his most trusted friends; 
 the Russian Minister was ready, in the name of the Czar, to 
 affirm his Government's willingness to almndon the aggressive 
 policy toward Korea and JManchuria, in case Japan would, 
 on her part, pledge herself to be content with her present
 
 lo IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 possessions. The s/afus quo was, then, lo be the l)asis of the 
 new treaties. Great Britain, as Japan's ally, was not only 
 ready for this, but was a])proaeliing Russia with a \'iew to a 
 settlement of the questions in controN-ersy Ijetween the two 
 nations, in regard to Persia, Afglianistan, and elsewhere, 
 where they had eommon interests. France would, as a nation 
 on good terms with both Great Britain and Russia, and as 
 herself the friend of peace, gladly agree. He was, then, 
 hopeful that in the near 'future a ])ermanent basis of jjcace 
 for the whole Orient might be secured by concurrence of the 
 four great nations most immediately interested. 
 
 To these disclosures of his plans and hojx'S, so frankly and 
 fully made as to excite my surprise, Marquis Ito then added 
 the wish that I should at this time, or subsequently wdiile on 
 the ground, ask of him any (juestions whatever, information 
 on w'hich might guide in forming a correct judgment as 
 to the situation there, or assist in the effort toward the 
 improvement educationally, industrially, or morall}-, of the 
 Koreans themselves. In reply I expressed my satisfaction 
 at the confidences which His Excellency had given me, and 
 my hearty sympathy with his plans for the peaceful develop- 
 ment of Korea. Nothing, it seemed to me, could be more 
 important in the interests of humanity than to have the strife 
 of foreign nations for a selfish supremacy in the Far East 
 come to a speedy end. But the perfect freedom of inquiry and 
 action allowed to me was in some sort an embarrassment. 
 It would have been easier to have had a definite work assigned, 
 and a definite method prescribed. However, I should do the 
 best that my inexperience in such matters made jjossible, in 
 order to justify his favorable judgment. 
 
 It was my intention at first to ])repare for the work in Korea 
 by much reading of books. But the professional and social 
 demands made upon both time and strength, to the very 
 last hour of our stay in Japan, pre\ented the carrying out of
 
 THE INVITATION ii 
 
 this intention. When, later on, it became possible to read 
 what had previously been published, I discovered that the 
 deprivation was no hindrance, but perhaps a positive ad- 
 vantage, to the end of success in my task. A story of recent 
 experiences of Korean intrigue which had already been 
 reported to me in detail was of more practical value than the 
 reading of many learned treatises. The story was as follows: 
 Among the several representatives of American Christian and 
 benevolent enterprises who have recently visited that country, 
 for the size of his audiences and the warmth of his greeting, 
 one had been particularly distinguished. At his first public 
 address, some four thousand persons, men and boys (for 
 the Korean women are never seen at such gatherings) had 
 attempted to crowd into "Independence Hall." Of these, 
 however, nine-tenths came with the vague feeling that it is 
 somehow for the political interest of Koreans to seem friendly 
 to citizens of foreign Christian countries especially of the 
 United States in order to secure helj) for themselves in an 
 appeal to interfere with the Japanese administration. In this 
 case the speaker was at first supposed to have great political 
 influence. But the audience, seeing that the subjects of 
 address were religious rather than political, fell off greatly 
 on the second occasion. Meanwhile, some of the Korean 
 officials, in order to win credit for themselves for procuring 
 the audience, had falsely reported that the Korean Emperor 
 -ci'ished to see this distinguished representative from America. 
 But when they learned that application for the audience had 
 been duly made, through the proper Japanese official, they 
 came around again and, with many salaams and circuitous 
 approaches, expressed the regrets of His Alajesty that, being in- 
 disposed, he was unable to grant the audience which had been 
 applied for. At the very time of this second falsehood, the 
 proper official was in the act of making out the permit to enter 
 the palace. The audience came off. And while the Amer-
 
 12 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 ican guest was in the waiting-room, the Minister of the 
 Household, watching his chance to escai)e observation, with 
 his hand upon his heart, appealed to the distinguished 
 American for his nation's sympathy against the oppression 
 of the Jajjanese, During the two months of my own ex- 
 perience with the ways of the Koreans, all this, and much 
 m.ore of the same sort, was abundantly and fre((uently illus- 
 trated. And, indeed, no small portion of the recent mo\e- 
 ment toward Christianity is more a political than a religious 
 affair. But of this I shall speak in detail later on. 
 
 It was the understanding with Marcjuis Ito at the interview 
 in Kyoto that he should have me informed at Nagasaki, at 
 some time between March 20th and 24th, when he desired 
 us to come to Seoul; and that arrangements should then be 
 made for meeting our Japanese escort at Shimonoseki. 
 On returning to the hotel parlor the Marc^uis apologized to 
 Mrs. Ladd for keeping her husband away so long, and re- 
 marked, playfully, that the diplomatic part of the conference 
 was not to be communicated even to her, until its expectations 
 had become matters of history. 
 
 Three days later we started for Nagasaki, where I was to 
 spend somewhat more than a week lecturing to the teachers 
 of the Prefecture, and to the pupils of the Higher Commercial 
 School. As we crossed the straits to Moji, the sun rose 
 gloriously over the mountains and set the sea, the shore, and 
 the ships in the two harbors aglow with its vitalizing fire. 
 The police officer assigned to guard his country's guests, 
 pointed out to us the battleship waiting to take the Resident- 
 General to his difficult and unappreciated work in Korea; 
 and nearer the other side of the channel we noted with pleas- 
 ure the Aki Maru, on which six months before v/e had crossed 
 the Northern Pacific. 
 
 It had been in my plans, even before reaching Japan, to 
 spend a month or two in Kiushu, a part of the Empire which
 
 THE INVITATION 13 
 
 is in some respects most interesting, and which I had never 
 visited before. And, indeed, in rehance on a telegram from 
 Tokyo which read: "Fix your own date, telegraph Zumoto" 
 (the gentleman who was to accompany us from Shimonoseki), 
 "Seoul," arrangements had already been completed for 
 lectures at Fukuoka, and had been begun for a short course 
 also at Kumamoto. But the very next day after these in- 
 structions had been followed, a telegram came from INIr. 
 Zumoto himself, who was already waiting at Shimonoseki 
 to accompany us to Seoul, inquiring when we could start, 
 and adding that "the Marquis hoped it would be at once." 
 All engagements besides the one at Nagasaki were therefore 
 promptly cancelled. On the evening of March 24th, Mr. 
 Akai, who had been our kindly escort in behalf of the friends 
 at Nagasaki, put us into the hands of our escort to Korea, 
 at the station in Moji. 
 
 Since the steamer for Fusan did not start until the following 
 evening, we had the daylight hours to renew our acquaintance 
 with Shimonoseki. The historical connections which this 
 region has had with our distinguished host made the time here 
 all the more vividly interesting. At this place, as an obscure 
 young man, Ito had risked his life in the interests of progress 
 by way of peace; and here, too, as the Commissioner of his 
 Emperor, the now celebrated Marc|uis had concluded the 
 treaty with China through her Commissioner, Li Hung 
 Chang. But what need be said about the story of these 
 enterprises belongs more properly with the biography of the 
 man. At about 8.30 o'clock in the evening of March 25th the 
 harbor launch, with the chief of the harbor police in charge, 
 conveyed the party to the ship Iki Maru. The evening was 
 lovely; bright moonlight, mild breeze, and moderate tempera- 
 ture. After tea, at about eleven, we "turned in" to i)ass a 
 comfortable night in a well-warmed and well-ventilated 
 cabin.
 
 14 IN KOREA WITH AIARQUIS ITO 
 
 I have dwelt with what might otherwise seem unnecessary 
 detail upon my invitation to Korea, because it throws needed 
 light upon the nature and opportunity of this visit, as well as 
 u])on the character of the man who gave the invitation, and of 
 the administration of which he is the guiding mind and the in- 
 spiring spirit. I was to be entirely inflependent, absolutely 
 free from all orders or even suggestions, to form an oj)inion 
 as to the sincerity and wisdom of the present Japanese ad- 
 ministration, as to the character and needs of the Korean 
 public, and as to the Korean Court. The fullest confidential 
 information on all points was to be freely ])ut at my disj)osal; 
 but the purpose of the visit was to be in full accord with that 
 of the Residency-General namely, to hel{) the Koreans, and 
 to convince all reasonal^le foreigners of the intention to deal 
 justly with them. Suggestions as to any possible improve- 
 ments WTre earnestly requested. For I hesitate to say that 
 His Excellency, with a sincerity which could not be doubted, 
 asked that I should advise him whenever I thought best. So 
 far as this understanding properly extends, the unmerited 
 title of "Unofficial Adviser to the Resident-General," be- 
 stowed by some of the foreign and native papers, was not 
 wholly misplaced. But the term is more creditable to the 
 sincerity of ^Marquis Ito than to my own fitness for any such 
 title. "Adviser," in any strictly official or political meaning 
 of the term, is a word altogether inappropriate to describe 
 our relations at any time.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 FIRST GLIMPSES OF KOREA 
 
 It was soon after seven on the morning of Tuesday, March 
 26, 1907, that we had our first sight of Chosen, "The Land of 
 Morning Calm." The day was superb, fully bearing out the 
 high praise which is almost universally bestowed upon the 
 Korean weather in Spring the sunshine bright and genial, 
 the air clear and stimulating like wine. Tsushima, the island 
 which for centuries has acted as a sort of bridge between the 
 two countries, was fading in the distance on our port stern. 
 The wardens of Tsushima, under the Tokugawa Shogunate 
 and, as well, much earlier, had a sort of monopoly of the 
 trade with southern Korea. From Tsushima, several centuries 
 ago, came the trees which make conspicuous the one thickly 
 wooded hill in Fusan, now the only public park in the whole 
 country. In front rose the coast; its mountains denuded of 
 trees and rather unsightly when seen nearer at hand, but at 
 a distance, under such a sky, strikingly beautiful for their 
 varied richness of strong coloring. The town of Fusan, as 
 we approached it, had a comfortable look, with its Japanese 
 buildings, many of them obviously new, nestled about the 
 pine-covered hill which has already been noticed as its public 
 park. 
 
 From the steamer's deck our companion pointed out the 
 eminence on which, according to the narrati\e written by a 
 contemporary in Chinese (the book has never been trans- 
 lated and copies of the original are rare), the Korean Governor
 
 i6 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 of the District, when hunting in the early morning more than 
 three centuries ago, looked out to sea and to his amazement 
 saw myriads of foreign-looking boats filled with armed men 
 approaching the bay. It. was the army sent by Hideyoshi for 
 the invasion of the peninsula. The Korean magistrate hastened 
 to his. official residence in the town, but scarcely had he 
 arrived when the Japanese fortes were upon him and had 
 taken possession of everything. In twenty-one days the in- 
 vaders were in. Seoul. But according to the uni\ersal custom 
 of the country when invaded, from whatever quarter and by 
 whomsoever, the cowardly court a motley horde of king, 
 concubines, eunuchs, sorcerers, and idle officials had fled; 
 then a Korean mob burned and sacked the deserted palace 
 and did what well could be done toward desolating the city. 
 For seven years the Japanese held Southern Korea, even 
 after their navy had been destroyed, so as to make it impossi- 
 ble to transport reinforcements sufficient to meet the com- 
 bined forces of the Chinese and the Koreans. It was the 
 fear of a similar experience which, centuries later, made them 
 so careful first to incapacitate the Russian navy as a matter 
 of supreme importance. On another low hill to the right, 
 our attention was directed to the remnants of one of the forts 
 built at the time by the invading Japanese; and further in- 
 land, the train ran near to traces of the wall which they 
 erected for the defence of their last hold upon the conquered 
 country. Even then "the people hated them with a hatred 
 which is the legacy of centuries; but could not allege any- 
 thing against them, admitting that they paid for all they got, 
 molested no one, and were seldom seen outside the yamen 
 gates." 
 
 On the wharf at Fusan there were w^aiting to welcome us 
 the local Resident, the manager of the Fusan-Seoul Railway, 
 and other Japanese officials all fine-looking men with an alert 
 air and gentlemanly bearing. The official launch conveyed
 
 FIRST GLIMPSES OF KOREA 17 
 
 us to the landing near the railway station, which is now 
 some distance up the bay, but which will soon be brought 
 down to the new wharf that is in process of building, in such 
 good time that we had an hour and a half to spend before 
 leaving for Seoul. Most of this time was. improved in visiting 
 a Korean school on the hillside just above. We were not, 
 however, to see this educational institution at work, but only 
 the empty school-rooms and several of the Korean and 
 Japanese -teachers. For the one hundred and seventy chil- 
 dren of this school, clothed in holiday garments of various 
 shades in green, pink, carmine, purple, yellow, and a few in 
 white or black, were just starting for the station to give a 
 "send-off" to Prince Eui Wha. This Prince is the second 
 living son of the Korean Emperor and, in the event of the 
 death or declared incapacity of the Crown Prince, the legiti- 
 mate heir to the throne. There was much blowing of small 
 trumpets and many unsuccessful attempts on the part of the 
 teachers to get and keep the hne in order, as the brilliantly 
 colored procession moved down the hill. 
 
 The teachers who remained behind showed me courteously 
 over the school-rooms and interpreted the "curriculum" of 
 the school which had been posted for my benefit in one of the 
 rooms. I give it below as a good example of the kind of in- 
 struction which is afforded in the best of the primary grades 
 of the Korean school system as fostered by the Japanese: 
 
 1st Class Ages, 7-9 years, inclusive: 
 
 Chinese classics; morals; penmanship; gymnastics. 
 2d Class Ages, lo-ii years, inclusive: 
 
 Chinese classics; national literature; penmanship; 
 Korean history; gymnastics. 
 T,d Class^Agc?,, 12-13 years, inclusive: 
 
 Chinese classics; arithmetic; composition; national 
 and universal history; gymnastics,
 
 i8 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 4IJ1 Class Ages, 14-15 years, inclusive: 
 
 Chinese classics; arithmetic; comi)osition; Japanese 
 language; universal history; gymnastics. 
 5//^ Class Ages, 16 years and over: 
 
 English; Jaj)anese; geogra])hy; national and uni- 
 versal history; Korean law; international law. 
 
 It will appear that this scheme of education is based upon 
 a Chinese model, largely modified -to meet modern refjuire- 
 ments and, in the upper classes, designed to fit those who 
 arc able to continue in school for the lower grades of the 
 Korean oflicial appointments. 
 
 On returning to the station we found the children in line 
 on one side of the road and on the oth-cr a row of Korean men, 
 some in clean and some in dirty-white clothing, waiting for the 
 coming of the Prince. The difference between the mildly 
 disorderly and unenthusiastic behavior of the Korean crowd 
 and the precise and alert enthusiasm of the Japanese on 
 similar occasions was significant. The Japanese policemen 
 treated all the people, especially the children, witli con- 
 spicuous gentleness. The Prince, who arrived at last in a 
 jinrikisha and took the reserved carriage just back of the 
 one reserved for us, had a languid and somewhat blase air; 
 but he bowed politely and removed his hat for an instant as 
 he passed by. 
 
 Before the train left the station a number of the principal 
 civil officers of Japanese Fusan appeared to bid us a good 
 journey; and so we entered Korea as we had left Japan, 
 reminded that we were among friends and should feel at 
 home. Indeed, at every important station the cards of the 
 leading officials, who had been informed of the arrival of his 
 guests from the office of the Resident-General at Seoul, were 
 handed in; and this was followed by hand-shaking and the 
 interchange of salutations.
 
 FIRST GLIMPSES OF KOREA 19 
 
 The country through which the train passed during the 
 entire day was very monotonous or perhaps "repetitious" 
 is the better descriptive word. Each mile, while in itself in- 
 teresting and possessed of a certain beauty due to the rich 
 coloring of the denuded rock of the mountains and of the 
 sand of the valleys, which are deprived of their natural green 
 covering by the neglect to bar out the summer floods, was 
 very like every other of the nearly three hundred miles be- 
 tween Fusan and Seoul. Here, as everywhere in Korea, 
 there was an almost complete absence of any special interests, 
 either natural or human, such as crowd the hills and N'alleys 
 of Japan. Of roads there appeared to be nothing worthy 
 of the name only rough and tortuous paths, in parts 
 difficult for the Korean pony or even for the pedestrian to 
 traverse. No considerable evidences of any other industry 
 than the unenlightened and unimproved native forms of 
 agriculture were visible on purely Korean territory. But at 
 Taiden about 170 miles from Fusan and 106 from Seoul 
 where the car of the Prince was switched off, and where he 
 remained overnight in order that he might arrive at the 
 Capital in the daylight, something better appeared. This 
 city is situated on a mountainous plateau and is surrounded 
 by extensive rice-fields, some of which, we were told, belong 
 to the son of Marquis Nabeshima, to Count Kabayama, and 
 to other Japanese. In spots, the number of which is in- 
 creasing, all over Southern Korea, Japanese small farmers 
 are giving object-lessons in improved agriculture; and 
 grouped around all the stations of the railway, the neat 
 houses and tidy gardens of the same immigrants are teaching 
 the natives to aspire after better homes. Our escort believes 
 that the process of amalgamation, which has already begun, 
 will in time settle all race differences, at least in this part of 
 the country. 
 
 i\t ten o'clock our train arrived at the South-Gate station
 
 20 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 of Seoul, where we were met by General Miirata, Marf|uis 
 Ito's aide-de-camp, Mr. Miura, the Seoul Resident, Mr. 
 Ichihara, manager of the Jai)anese banks established in 
 Korea, a friend of years' stan(h'ng, and others, both gentle- 
 men and ladies. The dimly lighted streets through whieh 
 the jinrikishas ])assed afforded no glimpses, even, into the 
 character of the city where were to be spent somewhat more 
 than two exceedingly interesting and rather exciting months. 
 But less than an hour later we were lodged in comfortable 
 quarters at Miss Sontag's house, and were liaving a hrst ex- 
 perience of the almost alarming stillness of a Korean niglit. 
 Even in the midst of a multitude of more than two hundred 
 thousand souls, the occasional bark of a dog and the un- 
 ceasing rat-tat of the ironing-sticks of some diligent house- 
 wife, getting her lord's clothing of a dazzling whiteness for 
 next day's parade, are the only sounds that arc sure to strike 
 the ear and soothe to sleep brains which must be pre\'ented 
 from working on things inward, if they sleep soundly at all. 
 But this is the place to speak in well-merited praise of the 
 unwearied kindness and generosity of our hostess. Aliss 
 Sontag not only makes the physical comforts of those visiting 
 Seoul, who are fortunate enough to be her guests, far different 
 from what they could be without her friendly help, but is also 
 able to afford much insight into Korean customs, of which 
 her experience has been most intimate and intelligently 
 derived. 
 
 With the morning light of ]\Iarch 2']\.\\ l^egan first obser- 
 vations of the physical conditions and more obvious social 
 peculiarities of Seoul the place wliich has been fitly staled 
 "an encyclopaedia of most of the features of Korean so-called 
 city life." It is impossible to describe Seoul, however, in any 
 such fashion as to satisfy the conflicting opinions of all 
 whether transient foreign observer or old-time resident. 
 The former will base his estim.ate upon the particular aspects
 
 FIRST GLIMPSES OF KOREA 21 
 
 or incidents concerning which his missionary or diplomatic 
 friend has given him presumably, but by no means ahva}'s 
 actually, trustworthy information; or upon what his own 
 uninstructed eye and untrained ear may happen to see and 
 hear; while the more permanent indweller in Seoul is 
 pretty sure to conceive of it, and of its inhabitants, according 
 to the success or the failure of his schemes for promoting his 
 own commicrcial, political, or religious interests. This differ- 
 ence is apt to become emphatic, whenever any of the patent 
 relations of the two peoples chiefly interested, the Koreans 
 and the Japanese, are directly or even more remotely con- 
 cerned. The point of view taken for comparison also de- 
 termines much. Approached from Peking or from any one 
 of scores of places in China, Seoul seems no filthier than the 
 visitor's accustomed surroundings have been. But he who 
 comes from Old or New England, or from Japan, will observe 
 many things, greatly to his disgust. The missionary who 
 compares his own method in conducting a prayer-meeting 
 with that pursued by the guard in clearing the ^^'ay at the 
 railway station, or with that to which the policeman or the 
 jinrikisha-runner on the street is compelled by the crowd 
 of idle and stately stepping pedestrians, will doubtless com- 
 plain of the rudeness shown to the Koreans by the in\'ading 
 Japanese. And if he is disposed to overlook the conduct of 
 the roughs in San Francisco, or to minimize the accounts of 
 the behavior of American soldiers in the Philippines, or has 
 forgotten his own experiences at the Brooklyn Bridge, he may 
 send home letters deprecating the inferior civilization of the 
 Far East. On the other liand, he who knows the ])ractice of 
 Korean robbers, official and unofficial, toward their own 
 countrymen, or who recalls the siglit of a Korean mol) tearing 
 their victim limlj from liml), or who credits tlie re])orts of the 
 unutterable cruelties that have for centuries gone on beliind 
 the palace walls, will, of course, take a widely di\ergent point
 
 22 IN KOREA WITH xMARQUIS ITO 
 
 of view. But let us laying aside prejudice glance at the 
 externals of the capital city of Korea, as they appeared during 
 the months of April and May, 1907, 
 
 The word Seoul/ coined by the Shilla Kingdom in South- 
 eastern Korea and originally ])ronounced So-ra-pid, means 
 "national capital"; and Hanyang ("Sun of the Han"), the 
 real name of the present capital, is only one of a succession 
 of "Seouls," of which Song-do and Pyeng-yang were the most 
 notable. To the imagination of the ignorant populace of 
 Korea, who can have no concej)tion of what real civic beauty 
 and decency arc in these modern days, and who are accus- 
 tomed to express themselves with Oriental hyberbole, Han- 
 yang is the "Observation of all Nations," "the King's city in 
 the clouds," "a city that spirits regard and ghosts conceal"; 
 and to be hailed as the "Coiled Dragon and the Crouching 
 Tiger." When the town came down from the mountain 
 retreat of Puk Han (to be described later) and spread over the 
 plain in order to utilize the Han River, it took the river's 
 name; but it was only some five hundred and twenty years 
 ago made "Seoul" by the founder of the present dynasty 
 selecting it as his capital city. 
 
 The situation of the chief city of modern Korea becomes 
 more and more impressive and, in every important respect, 
 satisfactory, the greater the frequency of one's rellective 
 observation from any one of numerous favorable points of 
 view. There is no natural reason why, under the govern- 
 mental reforms and material improvements which are now 
 being put into effect, Seoul should not become as healthy, 
 prosi)erous, and beautiful a place of residence as can be shown 
 anywhere in the Far East. While its lower level is only some 
 120 feet above tide-water, and within easy reach of the sea by 
 
 ' For the followinj^ description of Seoul, besides my own observations, 
 I am chiefly indebted to a scries of articles published during our stay 
 there by Dr. G. Heber Jones in the Seoul Press.
 
 FIRST GLIMPSES OF KOREA 23 
 
 the river, the city is, with the exception of the side which 
 opens toward and stretches down to this waterway, com- 
 pletely surrounded by mountains. On the north these 
 guardian peaks rise to the height of 2,500 feet, from the tops 
 of which magnificent views can be obtained, not only of the 
 town nestled at their feet but of the surrounding land and of 
 the ocean, far away. It is not necessary, however, to climb 
 so high in order to discover tlie geographical peculiarities of 
 Seoul. "To secure the best view of the city and its surround- 
 ings," says Dr. Jones, "one should ascend the lower slopes 
 of Nam-san" (a mountain almost wholly within the walls) 
 "on a bright sunny day in Spring. Taking a position on one 
 of the many spurs jutting out from this mountain a really 
 notable scene greets the eye. The stone screen of mountains 
 enclosing the city begins at the left, with Signal Peak dis- 
 tinguished by a lone pine-tree on its top. In former years 
 there was a beacon fire-station here, which formed one of the 
 termini of the long line of fire-stations that in pre-telegraph 
 days signalled to the authorities the weal or woe of the 
 people." 
 
 y\ttention should again be called at least for all lo^'ers of 
 natural beauty to the intensity and changeable character of 
 the colors of the surrounding mountains and hills, and of the 
 city enclosed by them in its plain, or in places where a few 
 houses, mostly foreign, climb their sides. These colors are 
 often very intense; but tliey change in a rcmarkaljle way, ac- 
 cording to the brilliancy and direction of the sunlight, and 
 the varying mixtures of sunshine and shadow. From such 
 a point of view, the city itself, which is for the most part mean 
 and nithy when seen from the streets, a])pears as a sort of 
 grayish carpet, with dark-green s{)ots made by tlie jM'nes, 
 for the plain beneath one's feet. As lias alrcad}- been in- 
 dicated, the hillsides, both within and around the walls, are 
 'uninhabited. Thev are dexoted and thus wasted to the
 
 24 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 mounds that cover tlic long-forgotten dead. By calculation, 
 upon a l)asis of counting, it is estimated that one of these Inirial 
 grounds in tlie vicinity of Seoul has no fewer than 750,000 of 
 these graves. It is neitlier reverence nor any other worthv 
 feeling, however, which is the chief factor in fostering a 
 custom so expensive of comfort to the living; it is supersti- 
 tious fear, akin to that s])irit-worship, which is largely devil- 
 worship, and which is really tlie only effective religion of the 
 non-Christian Korean peo[)le. Foreign residents upon the 
 hillsides find it difficult to keep their Korean servants during 
 the night, so dominated are they by their fear. In this 
 respect, as well as others, there is an imi)ortant difference 
 between so-called ancestor-worship, as in Korea, and ancestor- 
 worship in Jai)an. 
 
 The most obvious thing of interest in Seoul is the city wall. 
 Its construction was begun early in 1396, four years after the 
 present dynasty came to the throne; it was finished in about 
 nine months by the forced labor of men aggregating in number 
 198,000. x^ccording to the legendary account, tlie course of 
 the wall was marked out by a Buddhist monk, who had the 
 help of a miraculous fall of snow that indicated the line which 
 should be taken in order to avoid a dangerous mixture of the 
 "tiger" influence and the "dragon" influence. To this day 
 the Koreans, like the Chinese, whose pernicious domination 
 they have followed in this as in many other respects, are firm 
 believers in geomancy. The fact is, however, that the wall 
 surrounding Seoul wanders, without any assignable reason, 
 some twelve miles, as recent surveys have settled the long 
 dispute about its length, over hills and along valleys, enclosing 
 a vast amount of uninhabitaljle as well as inhabited space. 
 It is built of partially dressed stone, with large blocks laid 
 lengthwise at the base, and the superstructure formed of 
 layers of smaller stone the whole surmounted by battlements 
 about five feet high and pierced with loop-holes for archery
 
 FIRST GLIMPSES OF KOREA 25 
 
 adapted to the varying distances of an approaching foe. In 
 height it ranges from twenty to forty feet; it is banked by an 
 embankment of earth from tweh'e to fifteen feet thick. 
 Various attempts have been made at patching up this decay- 
 ing structure, but it can never have had the sohdity and im- 
 pregnabihty against attack by the methods of mediaeval war- 
 fare which were given to fortifications of the same era in 
 Japan. Moreover, the Korean defenders of the wall cus- 
 tomarily ran away as the foe approached; and this the 
 Japanese seldom or never did. Thus Seoul was easily 
 captured by the warriors of Hideyoshi in 1592, and nearly a 
 half century later by a Alanchu invading army. The wall is, 
 of course, useless for purposes of defence against modern war- 
 fare; and its .continuance in existence, at least in large part, 
 depends upon the length of time during which the sentiment 
 of pride triumphs over more utilitarian considerations. 
 
 It is the Gates of Seoul which emphasize the visitoris 
 interest in the city wall and which gi\'e most of character to 
 its picturesque features. In themselves, they are mere 
 "tunnels pierced in the wall"; but they are rendered archi- 
 tecturally interesting by the wide-spreading eaves and graceful 
 curvature and, in some cases, striking ornamentation of their 
 roofs. They are, in all, eight in number, one of which is the 
 "concealed." They bear the names of the points of the 
 compass South, Little We-st, West, Northwest, East, Little 
 East, and East Water; this is not, howe\er, because they 
 face true to these points, but because in the main they form 
 the principal avenues of communication between the inside of 
 the wall and the outlying regions situated in tliese general 
 directions. Each of the gates has, besides, another name ciiar- 
 acterized by the customary Korean hyberl)ole. There are, for 
 example, the "Gate of Exalted Ceremony," the "Gate of Eft'ul- 
 gent Righteousness" (or, in two other cases, different kinds 
 of righteousness), the "Gate of Brilliant Splendor," etc. But
 
 26 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 in and out of these gates, for onc-lialf of a thousand years, far 
 more of corruption, crueUy, and darkness, lias cvv\A, or trailed, 
 or strutted, than of the ([ualities filly called 1)}' their hi<j^h- 
 sounding names. It was o\er them tliat the late "lamente<l 
 Cjueen" festooned more than a score of heads freshly taken 
 from her political enemies in order to signify to the Tai-won- 
 kun that she retained control of His Majesty, in spite of the 
 fact that his father had obtained ])ermission to re-enter the 
 city through that same gateway. But why disturb our ad- 
 miration of a ])oint of structural interest by recalling one of 
 the long list of doings in and around Seoul, no less distincti\e 
 of the character of its government ? In those older days, 
 when the Great Bell of the city rang the curfew, the gates 
 were at once locked for the night; and any inquirer may 
 hear from missionaries and travellers how they have climbed 
 the wall in order not to sleep outside thus incurring the 
 death penalty, which was not, however, at all likely to be 
 enforced upon the ])rotected foreigner. The gates them- 
 selves, and the devices for locking them, are very similar to 
 those so frequently met with as the relics of media'\al lAiroi)e. 
 But the clay manikins (or Son-o-goug) which sit astride the 
 ridges of the roof, are designed to warn and ward off all e\il 
 spirits that may attempt to enter the city. The old-fashioned 
 guards, with their dreadful array of big kni\es and swords, 
 have now given place to the modern policeman, whose princi- 
 pal duty is to keep the gateway clear for trafhc. This service 
 is needed, for it is said that no fewer than 20,000 foot-passen- 
 gers, besides a stream of laden ponies and bullocks, and a 
 tolerably frecjuent schedule of electric cars, sometimes ])ass 
 through the South Gate in a single day. And the Koreans in 
 the streets are a slow-moving, stubborn, and stupid crowd. 
 
 To the ordinary traveller, after the first strangeness of its 
 more obvious aspects is over, not much remains of particular 
 interest in the capital city of Korea. Of fme Ijuildings, of
 
 FIRST GLIMPSES OF KOREA 27 
 
 museums, picture-galleries, temples, tlieatres, parks, and 
 public gardens, there is little or nothing to comi)are with any 
 European or Japanese city of the same size. There is, how- 
 ever, here as everywhere in the peninsula, no little of antiqua- 
 rian and historical interest which awaits the researches of those 
 trained and enthusiastic in such pursuits. Of those sights 
 which the city of Seoul within the walls can show, there are 
 three principal classes the so-called palaces, the shrines, and 
 the monuments. Even these are interesting, not for their 
 intrinsic grandeur or beauty, but chiefly for their connection 
 with the legends or historical incidents of the country. 
 
 To quote again from the articles of Dr. Jones: "The 
 Koreans apply the term Kung or palace to all residences of 
 royalty, and to them Seoul is a city of palaces, for there are 
 eighteen Kung of varying sizes and degrees of importance in 
 and about the city." Among the eighteen, however, "there 
 are several which are to-day a name and nothing more." 
 Of these minor palaces the most interesting is that called the 
 "Special South Palace," which was erected nearly five hun- 
 dred years ago by one of the kings for his fa^'orite daughter 
 and her consort. But the latter made it such a "veritable 
 den of infamy" that it was abandoned as a house haunted 
 by evil spirits and unsafe for habitation. The mixture of 
 fawning malice and hypocritical servility characteristic of 
 Korean offlcialdom was at one time humorous!}- exhibited 
 in a way to deceive even the Chinese; for when the ]\ lings 
 were overthrown by the Alanchus, the hated en\oys of the 
 latter were assigned to this House, "for their entertainment 
 and as a covert derogation to their dignity." Thus, too, with 
 the so-called "Alulberry Palace," known by the Koreans as 
 the "Palace of Splendid Happiness." It was erected by the 
 tyrant Lord Kwanghai who was here dctlironcd, and from 
 here sent into exile, where he died a jjrisoncr. From it also 
 his successor was driven out by the usurping "Tliree Days,
 
 28 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 King." It was in this palace, also, that the King Suk-jong, 
 having sur])risc(l his favorite concubine in practising magic 
 rites to accom])lish the death of the Queen whom she had 
 already caused to he (Hvorced and banished, turned upon 
 the concubine herself, sentenced her to drink poison, and 
 when she in revenge mutilated the Crown J^rince, had her 
 lorn in pieces. Its ])resent name is derived from one of the 
 many fruitless experiments which the present Government 
 of Korea, left to itself, is constantly making. The "mul- 
 berry" plantation remains only as a name to adorn, or de- 
 grade, the ruins of the palace. But if any visitor to Seoul 
 thinks that such violence, lust, and thriftlessness, must of 
 necessity belong to the ancient history of Korea, let him 
 learn his mistake. Were the firm, strong hand of the Japan- 
 ese Resident-General withdrawn, there is not one of these 
 horrid deeds which might not be reproduced at any hour. 
 
 These are not, however, the "Major Palaces," through 
 which the foreign visitor is usually conducted, after having 
 obtained a permit from the proper authorities. The palace, 
 known to the Koreans as the Kyung-pok, or "Palace of 
 Beautiful Blessing," and to foreigners as the "Summer 
 Palace," dates from 1394, and was occupied by the" present 
 Emperor until 1896. Nowhere else have I seen so large a 
 space (it is estimated that the principal enclosure containing 
 only the buildings deemed necessary for his Korean ]Maj- 
 esty's comfort, contains one hundred acres, besides which 
 there are other enclosures running up the slopes of the 
 mountains and designed for defence) strewn over with 
 desolated and half-ruined barbaric splendor. The main 
 Gatew'ay, through whose central arch no other person than 
 His Majesty and his bearers may pass, is an impressi\'e 
 structure and is still in fairly good repair. It is guarded by 
 stone effigies of the Hai-tai, or mythical sea-monsters, who 
 are prepared to spout water against the mysterious influences
 
 FIRST GLIMPSES OF KOREA 29 
 
 stored in the "fire mountain," some ten miles away to the 
 southward. They are therefore called "Fire Dogs." Once 
 inside the enclosure, one is presented with a melancholy 
 picture of neglect, swiftly oncoming decay, and advancing 
 ruin. All this is the more melancholy, because the present 
 palace buildings are only about fifty years old, were erected 
 by the Prince-parent of the present Emperor, almost to the 
 hnancial ruin of the country, and were abandoned only after 
 the assassination of the Queen, October 8, 1895. 
 
 Amidst this crowded waste where formerly three thousand 
 persons lived in attendance upon the separate establishments 
 for the King, Queen, Crown Prince, and the Dowagers, there 
 are only two buildings which, architecturally considered, are 
 worthy of note. One of these is the old "Audience Hall." 
 Its columns, although many are cracked for a considerable 
 part of their length, and none of them ever possessed any- 
 thing like the beauty or finish of the noble wooden pillars 
 of the Nishi Hongwanji in Kyoto (which, however, they re- 
 semble in style and effect), seem to have been made of entire 
 stately trees. There are really no galleries, but the appear- 
 ance is that of a two-galleried hall. The strong colors of red, 
 black, green, and blue, with which the car\ed and panelled 
 ceiling is decorated, in a manner similar to that of the caslles 
 in the Tokugawa period in Japan, seem to And their wa}' 
 through one's upturned eyes to the? base of the brain. In 
 some of its structural features this Audience Hall resembles 
 the audience halls of the Aluhammadan monarchs in North- 
 ern India more than anything to be found in Japan. This 
 is especially true of the high platform on which the throne 
 was placed. The decoration central over it, and that central 
 in the ceiling of the whole hall, is golden dragons, with clouds 
 and flames, in bas-reliefs; it is in an excellent state of 
 preservation. 
 
 The other really fme building in the entire collection is the
 
 30 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 so-called "Hall of Congratulations," whose upper iloor is 
 supported by forty-eight granite monoliths six rows of eight 
 each in a row. These j)illars are about sixteen feet high and 
 three feet S(|uare. The lotus pond surrounding the building 
 is oblong and faced witli masonr}'; while miniature islands 
 rise here and there abo\e the surface of the- water. This 
 Hall was intended for state social functions of the out-of- 
 door character. 
 
 By going still further back of the sleeping apartments of the 
 King, which consisted of nine rooms arranged in a scjuare, 
 so that the eight surrounding the central room could guard it 
 from intrusion or attack, we come in front of the wall behind 
 whose screen are the apartments in one of which the brilliant 
 and attractive but cruel Queen met her own most tragic and 
 cruel death. All are now forbidden to enter there. But 
 some twelve years before, our escort had seen the dark blood- 
 stains on the floor perhaps hers, j)crhaps those of lier cham- 
 berlain who met his death in trying to i)rotect his fjueen. 
 And one has only to look a little way over to the right in order 
 to see the ngw peaceful pine-gro\'e where her body was 
 dragged and burned. Such was the deed which terminated 
 the royal habitation of another, and this the most splendid, of 
 the palaces of Seoul! 
 
 It is the grounds, ratlier than the buildings, of the East 
 Palace, especially when the azaleas and cherry bushes and 
 apricot-trees are in full bloom, which constitute its beauty. 
 Here the diplomatic corps and the other invited guests of the 
 Emperor are accustomed to have ])icnics and afternoon 
 teas. The apartments, which were united into one so-called 
 palace in the reign of Suk-jong (1694-17 20) appear to be 
 most distinctively Korean and are unlike any other buildings 
 which I have ever seen. The rooms are small and rambling; 
 and the screens between them are decorated with those geo- 
 metrical patterns which are so ancient and so nearly universal
 
 FIRST GLIMPSES OF KOREA 31 
 
 wherever architecture has reached a certain stage of develop- 
 ment. The ceihngs are low and devoid of decoration, but 
 are made pleasing by being everywhere "beamed-over." 
 This palace, too, has not escaped its history of violence and 
 its bath of blood. Here it was that, in 1884, the party of 
 Progressives, headed by Mr. Kim Ok-kiun, tried to enforce 
 reforms by capturing the person of the King. But the con- 
 servative party of Koreans, helped by eight hundred Chinese 
 soldiers under the leadership of the ^lajor Yuan, who after- 
 ward became Li Hung Chang's successor, and is even to-day 
 cutting an important figure in the complicated politics of 
 China, finally drove out the Progressives and the one hundred 
 and forty Japanese who were defending them. 
 
 Little else of the mildly exciting "sights" of Seoul remains 
 besides the Great Bell and the Alarble Pagoda. The former 
 bears witness to an art in which the Koreans once excelled, 
 but which is now, like all the other arts, either lost or neg- 
 lected. At Nikko, it will be remembered, there is a Korean 
 bell which was presented to one of the Japanese Shoguns. 
 Setting aside all legends as to the time and incidents of its 
 manufacture and hanging, a recently deciphered inscription 
 on its own side tells the date as 1469 and gives the names of 
 the prominent men connected with the undertaking. The 
 report of a Chinese envoy of 1489, who says of the bell, "It 
 calls all men to rest, to rise, to work, to play," taken in 
 conjunction with the fact that, to avoid the troubles of faction 
 and violence, men were forbidden on the streets after dark, 
 probably gave rise to the report that women only were allowed 
 to go abroad at night. And this is believed by natives and 
 travellers until the present hour. But the bell, which once 
 rung to open and close the massive city gates, now rings only 
 to tell of midnight and mid-day. And, although it is about 
 eight feet in diameter and ten feet high, it is no great sight 
 as looked at by peeking through the bars of its surrounding
 
 32 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 cage. It docs, however, like many other things else in Seoul, 
 bear witness to the life of the i)ast and the changes of the 
 present. 
 
 The marble pagoda is at the same time the most notable 
 existing monument of Buddhism in Korea and the most in- 
 teresting art-object in Seoul. It came, however, from abroad ; 
 tradition connects its gift with a ]\Iongol princess who, after 
 the death of Kublai Khan, came to Korea in 1310 to become 
 the queen-consort of King Chung-sun. It was brought in 
 a junk from China and at first erected in the grounds of a 
 temple in the little town of Hanyang the predecessor of 
 Seoul on the same site; for the ca])ital of the present dynasty 
 was not then built. The temple grounds were beautified in 
 its honor; roads were constructed leading to it; and a 
 bridge was built over a stream running near by. But the 
 Korean inevitable happened to it the fate meted out to all 
 that shows signs of order, industry, or art, when not of im- 
 mediate selfish interest to the rulers of Korea. The roads, 
 encroached upon by surrounding hovels, became foul and 
 narrow alleys; a squatter built his straw-thatched hut about 
 it; and the stream became the main sewer of the city, which 
 is cleaned only by the downpour of the summer rains. Thus, 
 as says our chronicler: "The gift to Korea of one of the 
 mighty Mongol Khans, whose arms had literally shaken the 
 world, became the impedimenta of a Korean coolie's back- 
 yard, sixteen by twenty feet square!" What wonder, how- 
 ever, in a land where court officials and palace hangers-on 
 do not hesitate to-day to steal the screens, and other ])resents 
 from foreign monarchs and plutocrats, out from under His 
 Majesty's very eyes ! * 
 
 ' This may seem incredible, but it is a fact that, as late as the spring 
 of 1907, even a basket of fniit could not be sent to the Emj)eror 
 with the confidence that the eunuchs and palace servants would not 
 steal it all. At everj^ garden-party the dishes and even the chairs had 
 to be carefully watched.
 
 FIRST GLIMPSES OF KOREA 33 
 
 The pagoda itself, which has now been cleared from the 
 clutter of huts and made the central object in Seoul's first 
 attempt at the beginnings of a pubhc park, deserves a brief 
 description. It is of white marble, much stained by time, 
 war, and neglect, and was originally thirteen stories in height; 
 although only ten of these are now standing, w^hile the upper 
 three have been removed and rest beside it on the ground. 
 The base and first six stories have twenty sides; the remainder 
 are squares. Each story is symmetrically diminished in 
 size; some have galleries with curved eaves and upturned 
 corners. The ornamentation is exceedingly comphcated and 
 abstruse in its symbolism and suggestiveness. There are 
 sculptured upon the flat surfaces processions of tigers, 
 dragons, men on foot and on horseback, teachers discoursing 
 in groves, pictures taken from the traditional life of Buddha, 
 and various bas-reliefs of different Buddhas. The lower 
 stories are composed of several blocks of carved stone, but 
 the smaller and upper stories are monoliths. 
 
 Near the pagoda stands the Tortoise Tablet, a very an- 
 cient structure; the tablet is said originally to have been 
 brought from the Southern Kingdom of Scilla, and erected 
 upon the ledge of granite which outcropped in this place, 
 after the rock had itself been carved into the shape of a 
 tortoise. It was designed to memorialize the building of a 
 temple which dates back to the eleventh century A. D. The 
 tablet is probably more than one thousand years old. 
 
 Within the small enclosure surrounding these relics, Mr. 
 Megata, the Japanese financial adviser to the Korean Gov- 
 ernment, is trying to encourage the public spirit of the 
 natives and entertain the resident foreigners by providing 
 band concerts on Saturday afternoons. Thus this spot also 
 offers a study in epitome of the history, present changes, and 
 future prospects of the capital city of Korea. 
 
 Of the few shrines which the royal prohibition of Buddhism
 
 34 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 and the low and decaying interest in all religious conce])tions 
 rising above the level of si)irit-\vorshi[) and this mostly devil- 
 worship have allowed to remain in Seoul, the only ones of 
 any particular importance are the Imperial Ancestral Shrines 
 and the so-called "Temjjle to Heaven." But even the guests 
 of jMarcjuis Ito did not think it wise to ask for permission 
 to visit these shrines, or to exhibit any more curiosity respect- 
 ing them than to glance by the guard, through the open doors 
 of the gateway, while ])assing along the street. As to the New 
 Palace, which is a stone building of modified Doric archi- 
 tecture, and is so far finished externally that it can be seen to 
 have decided claims to beauty, if only the superstitions of the 
 monarch and of his counsellors among the blind-men and the 
 sorcerers had permitted it to be well placed this was ever 
 before our eyes from the windows of Miss Sontag's house. 
 And what was seen of the buildings occuj)ied at the time of 
 our visit by His Majesty and the Court, so far as it is worth 
 a word, will be described in another place. 
 
 The Seoul seen from the surrounding mountain-sides, and 
 the Seoul of so-called palaces, is not the city in which the people 
 live. Apart from a few of its inhabitants such as the mission- 
 aries, certain foreign business men and diplomatic agents, 
 together with a small number of native officials who have ac- 
 quired a taste for foreign ways the Seoul of the people is 
 disgustingly filthy and abjectly squalid. It is, indeed, not so 
 filthy and miserable, and lacking in all the comforts and 
 decencies of respectable Western life, as it was a generation, 
 or even a few years ago. Several of the streets have now 
 been not only occasionally when the King was going a 
 "processioning" through them, but habitually and to the 
 benefit of the populace cleared of their encroachments of 
 squatter hovels, huts, and booths. The gutters along the 
 sides of these streets do not quite so much as formerly disturb 
 the eyes and nostrils of the pedestrian, especially if he walks
 
 FIRST GLIMPSES OF KOREA 35 
 
 in the middle of the thoroughfare; their use for vile purposes 
 is not so much in evidence as was the case before any of the 
 natives had even a glimmering sense of decency about such 
 matters. In spite of the increased business activity of the 
 city there is not to-day quite the same stream of white-robed 
 saunterers, stately in gait but low in character, to give a semi- 
 holiday aspect to the "Broadways" of Seoul; for electric cars 
 transport the multitudes back and forth in several directions. 
 Besides, there is the neat, attractive Japanese quarter. Here, 
 according to my observation, the Koreans themselves were 
 doing more sight-seeing and more trading than in their own 
 quarters; for here the cheaper products of the new^ and 
 hitherto unknown world are skilfully displayed. But other- 
 wise and elsewhere in the city, the same unsanitary conditions 
 and indecent habits, in all respects, prevail. The narrow, 
 winding alleys are flanked with shallow, open ditches, that 
 are not only the drains and sewers but the latrines of the 
 dwellers in the low earth-walled houses on either side. 
 Cowardly and lean dogs, naked children, and rows of men 
 squatting and sucking their long pipes or lying flat upon the 
 ground, crowd and obstruct these alleys. And from them 
 the wide-spreading Korean roofs cut off the purifying and 
 enlivening sunlight. Many of the most wretched and 
 unsanitary of these hovels squat under the shadow of the 
 stately city wall. May its stones sometime be used to build 
 a better and healthier city ! 
 
 There are, however, yet more notable changes and im- 
 provements than those already accomplished, which seem 
 destined surely and speedily to follow. A water-supply, for 
 which the surveys and contracts have already been completed 
 and for which, during our visit, the pipes were beginning to 
 be laid, will not only diminish the dangers that lurk in the 
 cans of the professional water-carriers and in the private 
 wells, but will assist the summer rains in their formidable
 
 36 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 task of washing clean the oj)en sewers. More of these foul, 
 winding alleys, and huddles of hovels, will be abolished. 
 The increase in the interests of life, and the enjoyment of the 
 rewards of protected industry, will diminish the drunken- 
 ness and gluttony, varied by enforced j)eriods of starvation, 
 which now distress the people. The new hos])ital and medical 
 school the former of which will immediately relieve much 
 suffering and the latter of which will perform the yet more 
 important service of educating a native medical class are 
 among the most cherished projects of the Resident-General. 
 And when to these more essential matters there is added the 
 cultivation of the native love of nature and taste for flowers, 
 it is not an extravagant hope to picture Seoul as becoming, 
 in many respects, a not undesirable place for residence, before 
 many years are past. Even now, with the spring covering 
 of bloom from plum, apricot, apple, and cherry, and with 
 the profusion of flowering shrubs which adorns the valleys 
 and the mountain-sides, one feels inclined to overlook, at 
 least for the months of April and ^lay, the foul sights of the 
 gutters and the surrounding hovels. But all this was, as it 
 were, only background and theatre for the work I wished to 
 do and the observations I wished to make.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 
 
 After accepting Marquis Ito's formal invitation to 
 attempt a special kind of service in Korea, the first problem 
 to be solved concerned the choice of ways for approaching 
 that service. Its solution was by no means obvious. In 
 Japan there were more of urgent requests for public addresses 
 and lectures of various kinds than could possibly be accepted. 
 And everywhere that the speaker went, influential and large 
 organizations of an educational and public character, to 
 whose support the governors, of the Kens and the mayors of 
 the cities were officially committed, could be relied upon to 
 make all necessary arrangements and to carry the arrange- 
 ments through effectively. More important still, there was 
 the most eager interest in the subjects upon which the pros- 
 pective audiences wished to be addressed, and the attitude 
 of an open mind and even of warm personal attachment 
 toward "the friend of Japan." In Korea, however, all the 
 influences would be of precisely the opposite character 
 indifference, deficiencies, hindrances, if not active opposition, 
 so far as the native attitude was concerned. In Korea there 
 were no educational associations; and, outside of a \'ery small 
 circle in a few cities, there was little or no interest in educa- 
 tion. The local magistrates were, almost without exception, 
 devoted to "squeezes" rather than to the increase of intelli- 
 gence and the moral improvement of their districts. The 
 teachers of the few existing schools were, in general, without 
 
 37
 
 38 IN KOREA WITH iMARQUIS ITO 
 
 any modern culture; tliey were even without the most rudi- 
 mentary ideas on tlie sul^jects of i)e(higogy, ethics, and 
 rehgion. Only in a small number of i)laces were there any 
 halls that could accommodate an audience, should one be 
 gathered by an appeal to curiosity and to the Korean thirst 
 for "look-see"; while to be known as a "frienrl of Ja{)an" 
 and a guest of Maniuis Tto was to erect an almost insu])erable 
 obstacle in the way of reaching the ears of the Korean upper 
 and middle classes, to say nothing of convincing their minds 
 or touching their hearts. Addressing the lower classes on 
 any scholastic topic was impossible. Through what organ, 
 then, could a stranger helj) the Resident-General in his be- 
 nevolent plans for the welfare of the people of Korea? 
 
 Reflection upon this problem of a means of ap])roach to 
 the Koreans ended in the fortunate choice of the Young 
 Men's Christian Association at Seoul. To be sure, the direct 
 influence of this association is at present wisely limited to the 
 capital city. The illicit organization of branch associations, 
 which was undertaken for political purposes by the Koreans 
 themselves, has made it necessary to check, rather tlian en- 
 courage, all efforts to multiply Y. M. C. A. societies in places 
 beyond the immediate and unceasingly watchful control of 
 the foreign secretaries. The same hypocritical and unscru- 
 pulous use of the name of religion for purposes of political 
 intrigue compelled the Methodist Mission in Korea to break 
 up the "Epworth League." A letter to a friend in Tokyo, 
 explaining my purposes and my embarrassrhcnt, resulted in 
 the following telegram, which was received in Shimonoseki 
 late in the evening of the day before sailing for Fusan: 
 
 Secretary Seoul telegraphs Seoul Association platform gladly 
 open. Indications other cities will extend same courtesy, espe- 
 cially after tenth. 
 
 These words illumined to no small degree the prospect of estab- 
 lishing relations favorable to the success of the proposed plans.
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 39 
 
 In this connection it is pertinent to say that I had been 
 advised to seek especially the counsel and assistance of 
 Bishop Turner of the Church of England, and of the Korean, 
 Mr. Yun Chi-ho. The Bishop was the president of the 
 Young Men's Association; and the Korean gentleman is of 
 good family, has a well-merited reputation for honesty, and 
 has been prominent in religious work among his own people. 
 As the history of my experiences will show, I was disappointed 
 with respect to both these sources of information and help. 
 Bishop Turner was either absent or ill during nearly the entire 
 time of my stay in Korea; and Mr. Yun Chi-ho exhibited so 
 persistently and adroitly the qualities which I had heard 
 described as "a pessimistic disposition," and which in the 
 opinion of all who knew him, both natives and foreigners, 
 unfitted him for incurring any of the responsibilities of 
 leadership, as to somewhat hamper rather than assist any 
 efforts in behalf of his own people. It was not, of course, to 
 be expected that a Korean Yang-ban should willingly con- 
 fess the demonstrated incapacity of the Korean nation for 
 self-government; even less, perhaps, that he should himself 
 assist the Japanese in doing for his own people what they 
 never have done, and never could do, for themselves. But 
 that intelligent native Christians should take an attitude of 
 passive opposition to offers of assistance on matters of educa- 
 tion, morality and religion from a friendly foreigner of 
 another nation, simply because that foreigner was the guest 
 of the Japanese Resident-General, sliows how cliaracteristic 
 and deep-seated are the obstacles wliich thefolTicial class are 
 opposing to the redemption of Korea. Ikit I was to witness 
 the manifestation of the extreme form of the same feeling 
 toward the association of those of tlieir own countr}'men who 
 were co-operating with the Japanese in ])lans for reform. 
 
 The morning after our arrival in Seoul, at about 10.30 
 o'clock, Marquis Ito sent "Sir. Zumoto to conduct me to his
 
 40 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 j)rivate office in the Residency Mouse. 'Hie official residence 
 is one of a group of buildings belonging to the Japanese Oov- 
 ernmenl and situated upon a succession of spurs from the 
 mountain Xam-san, in a jjortion of the city wliich lies Ijcx'ond 
 the Japanese (juarters. The surrounding grounds, esi)ecially 
 from points above the house, command fine views of the city, 
 and are being constantly imjjroved and beautified in ac- 
 cordance with Ja})anese taste. So lonely arc the mountain- 
 ous heights above the grounds that numerous wikl-cats ha\e 
 descended upon the chicken-yard of tlie Residency, and 
 more than a dozen of tliese pests have Ix'cn caught in tra])S 
 and are now caged as j)art of a small menagerie or ])rivate 
 "Zoo." There are persons now living in Seoul, not of 
 advanced age, who have encountered tigers of the "man- 
 eating" species, to say nothing of less formidable wild Ijeasts, 
 such as leo])ards and foxes, within the city walls. 
 
 At this morning's interview the Alanpiis was the first to 
 speak, after a few minutes of silence which followed tlie 
 exchange of greetings. But it was only to say that, of course, 
 he could procure me invitations from the Japanese to give 
 public addresses, and even, he i:>resumed, from the Koreans; 
 this, however especially in the latter case would probably 
 embarrass my work, since it would subject it to susjjicion. 
 After these words he paused in a way to suggest an invita- 
 tion for me to speak freely of my plans. I began by sa\ing 
 that I had no training or experience in matters of diplomacy; 
 but I believed that, for me at least, the Ijcst course of action 
 would conform to these two rules: to be entirely frank and 
 good-tempered when you had anything to say; and to know- 
 when and how to hold your tongue if silence seemed the 
 proper policy. At this the ^lanjuis laughed it seemed 
 approvingly. In brief, the plans, as far as formed at present, 
 were as follows. As to Mission: Public: I was here as the 
 guest of Marcjuis Ito, to speak to the Koreans in a sincerely
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 41 
 
 friendly way, on matters of education, morals, and religion, 
 especially as these matters concerned their national welfare; 
 private: to discover what I could which might assist the 
 Resident-General in dealing with his difficult problem and 
 to assure all, whom I could reach, that he sincerely wished 
 to serve the real interests of the Koreans and to secure for 
 them the administration of justice and an increased pros- 
 perity. As to Message: Public : that the real prosperity of 
 the individual and of society can be secured only by develop- 
 ing a character which deserves it; and private, as already 
 defined by the private mission. As to Means: Since there 
 are in Korea no Teachers' Associations, I hoped to work 
 through the Young ]\Ien's Christian Association and through 
 such other connected agencies as they might secure; and 
 especially to get opportunities to address Alissionary Schools 
 and Christian congregations in the churches. I also hoped 
 to form friendly relations with the missionaries and with some 
 of the diplomats and foreign business men in order to learn 
 their views of the situation and to gain from them information 
 and suggestions for its improvement. Especially did it seem 
 to me desirable that the spiritual forces wielded by the mis- 
 sionaries should co-operate for the good of Korea with the 
 political forces wielded by the Resident-General. 
 
 At this first interview, as at all subsequent interviews 
 during my stay in Korea, the Resident-General uniformly 
 replied in the negative to every recniest for criticism of my 
 plans, or even for suggestions as to their improvement. On 
 one particular occasion when I ventured to rei)eat the (pies- 
 tion: "But has the ]Mar([uis no suggstions to make?" the 
 same answer, "No, I have no suggestions to ofi"er," was re- 
 turned. When I afterwards asked the only third person 
 who was ever present at any of these inter\iews whether 
 after my departure some comments had not been made 
 which might assist in deciding upon the l.iest course of action.
 
 42 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 the reply again was an unfiualified negative. And upon sur- 
 j)risc being expressed at this, the remark followed: "It is 
 the custom of the Manjuis, when he trusts any one, to trust 
 him comj)letely." And, indeed, the jjromise to leave me 
 absolutely indej)endent, which had been made in ])rivate 
 and which was soon made public, was, throughout, most 
 strictly kept. 
 
 The same day, after tifhn, one of the under-secretaries of 
 the Y. M. C, A., in the absence of Afr, Gillett, the Chief 
 Secretary, called ui)on me for the discussion of ])lans and 
 topics for the lectures in Korea. It then became evident 
 that the manner of coming would, as had l^een susj)ected. 
 prejudice the Koreans against the speaker and his words. 
 Secretary Brockman, indeed, agreed with me in thinking 
 that a large measure of frankness was desirable. But the 
 Korean olTicers and members of the Association were timid. 
 It apj)eared that the Korean Daily News had already 
 reminded its readers, with a sinister warning, that Professor 
 Ladd did not come from America, but from Tokyo, to Korea. 
 The effect of this, with all it imjjlied, will soon ai)pcar. Any 
 more definite decision as to ways of procedure was, therefore, 
 deferred until further consultation could be had with those 
 chiefly interested in the affairs of the Association and the 
 moral and religious welfare of the Korean jjeople. 
 
 The next morning a committee of three, representing the 
 Association and the two principal Missions doing work in 
 Seoul, called, and two hours of friendly discussion followed 
 over the wisest method of solving this problem: How to 
 employ the American guest of the Japanese Resident-General 
 as a teacher of education, morals, and religion, under existing 
 conditions, to Korean audiences. A complex problem truly! 
 From the first, the lecturer himself insisted upon a continu- 
 ance of the open and frank policy of approach ; any attempt 
 at concealment of his relations to Marquis Ito and of his con-
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 43 
 
 fidence in the Marquis' plans for helping Korea would only 
 result in an increase of prejudice, suspicion, and in other invita- 
 tions to failure. It was during the course of this discussion that 
 one of the missionary members of the committee frankly 
 declared his continued unwillingness, previously expressed, 
 to have anything to do with a plan for "smoothing the way" 
 for the Japanese. In case this was Professor Ladd's pur- 
 pose, "let him go ahead and smooth the way, if he could; for 
 his own part he wished to be counted out." The conference, 
 however, ended in the harmonious agreement that three lectures 
 should be given within the next week, under the auspices of 
 the Young Men's Association. These were to have dates 
 as follows; for the next Saturday evening, upon the subject, 
 "Education and the Social Welfare"; for Sunday afternoon, 
 upon the subject, "Religion and Social Reform"; and for 
 ]Monday evening, upon " Education as Related to the Stability 
 and Progress of the Nation." It was originally intended that 
 the address of Sunday should be given in "Independence 
 Hall," the largest public room in Seoul, which, however, 
 stands outside of the city walls near "Independence Arch" 
 a structure erected to commemorate the formal renunciation of 
 the suzerainty of China. The other lectures were to be given 
 in the Association Hall, a temporary building of bare boards, 
 situated in a more central location. Application, however, 
 for the use of Independence Hall was met by the information 
 that it was already engaged for next Sunday. It was then 
 suspected that this was only an indirect and insincere method 
 of refusal; I am not even now sure as to whether or not the 
 suspicion was correct. 
 
 On the next day a cordial invitation came from the' mis- 
 sionaries of both missions in Pyeng-yang to \isit them and 
 speak there as many times as I miglit be able. The narra- 
 tive of this interesting visit is to be told elsewhere. But the 
 difference between the attitude of the Koreans toward me
 
 44 IX KORKA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 in places outside of the capital, where the corruption, fears, 
 and prejudices of the Yang-bans (or ruling class) are less 
 dominant although some of these ])laces have really suf- 
 fered more from the Japanese tlian has Seoul shows in what 
 motives and interests the anti-Japanese feeling is chielly 
 seated. It is in Seoul, esi)ecially, that many of the mission- 
 aries seem not to have kei)t themsehes altogetlier free from 
 the same unworthy Court inlluences. 
 
 It was on Saturday, ]\Iarch 30, at 3.30 p.m., according 
 to a notice sent the day before, that I was received in audi- 
 ence by the Korean Em})eror. Under the escort of the 
 jMarquis' secretary, ^Ir. Kurachi, and a Korean aide-de-camp, 
 I went in a jinrikisha to the small gate of the palace which 
 is very near to Miss Sontag's house, and dismounting there, 
 passed through rather irregular and intermittent lines of 
 palace guards to the building where the audience was to take 
 place. The rooms used for such functions, while the new 
 palace is still in process of erection, are far enough from 
 anything approaching royal magnificence. The aspect and 
 furnishings of the entrance hall would scarcely rival a third- 
 class hotel in Europe or the United States. The same thing 
 is true of the waiting-room and of the audience-chamber 
 itself. On arrival I was shown into the former apartment, 
 where were already gathered some of the prominent Korean 
 ofTicials, including the Prime Minister, the Master of Cere- 
 monies, and several officers of high rank in the Korean army. 
 The entrance of Marcjuis Ito with his suite soon after filled 
 the small room with men whose gorgeous apparel contrasted 
 strongly with the cheap woodwork, which was painted light- 
 pink and trimmed in light-green; and with its tawdry 
 European furnishings. Almost immediately the little Prince, 
 son of Lady Om, entered, and with an amusing air of boyish 
 dignity, made more effective by the mannish costume of top- 
 knot and crinoline hat with which he had recently been in-
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 
 
 45 
 
 vested, came straight up to me and gravely held out his hand. 
 The young Prince has bright eyes, an intelligent but almost 
 completely full-moon-shaped face, and a protuding abdomen 
 suggestive of over-indulgence in sweets and other fattening 
 foods. At the mature age of eleven years he had just secured 
 the coveted honor of the man's investiture, as described 
 above. And seven maidens of suitable rank and age had 
 already been selected, one of whom would subsequently sus- 
 tain the ordeal of being chosen as his consort and future wife. 
 After the hand-shaking and an interchange of courteous 
 salutations, the boy disappeared. While waiting, I was being 
 introduced to one official, Korean or Japanese, after an- 
 other; but so often as I rose for this purpose, I was politely 
 requested by the Korean aide-de-camp to be seated again. 
 
 The Resident-General and some of his suite went to the 
 audience-room some minutes before I was summoned to 
 follow. It was my conjecture, from what His Majesty sub- 
 sequently said, that he was being told something about me 
 and about the work which I was to attempt in Korea. In a 
 still later interview with Marquis Ito I learned the truth 
 of this conjecture. The Emperor had been assured that the 
 visitor's purposes were not political; but the Resident- 
 General, believing that his lectures on matters educational 
 and ethical had been of service in Japan, had invited him to 
 come to Korea to assist in contributing to the same important 
 interests here. 
 
 On being invited to do so by the Court interpreter, I fol- 
 lowed him to the audience-room, x^ny expectation of being 
 conducted through stately corridors to a splendid throne-room 
 was speedily disappointed. The audience-room was as near the 
 waiting-room as two small rooms can well be. It was itself 
 so small that there was difficulty in making the requisite three 
 bows before standing face to face with His Majesty, separated 
 only by a round table of the most ordinary sort. At his right
 
 46 IN KOREA WITH MARC^UIS IIXJ 
 
 side stood, not the Crown Prince, the son of the late Queen, 
 but the son of Lady Om. Before I had come near enough 
 to take it, and indeed before I had made my third bow, the 
 Em])eror held out his hand. He is in appearance a cjuite 
 ordinary man, of the Korean type; and there was nothing 
 worthy of notice about his plain Korean dress. His face wore 
 the j)leasant smile with which he is said to greet all foreigners 
 (for, as our hostess says: "// est Ires geiilil, Ires aimablc'''); 
 although its :esthetical effect is somewhat hindered by a bad 
 set of teeth. 
 
 His oMajesty expressed the hope that I had a pleasant trip 
 and was very comfortable and enjoying myself. A favorable 
 answer, and especially an expression of j)leasure at Korea's 
 beautiful mountain scenery and delightful climate, elicited 
 the remark he still smiling, while the young Prince looked 
 as solemn as an owl that, "besides the climate and the 
 mountains, there was nothing else of interest in Korea." 
 "I cannot quite agree with Your ]\Iajesty," was the response, 
 "for I fmd the people and the country very interesting and I 
 am sure that my interest will increase the longer I slay." 
 The Emperor then went on to say that he was glad to learn 
 I had come to instruct his people in right ways; that he hoped 
 they would open their minds to enlightenment and to modern 
 ideas; and that my addresses would contribute to their 
 progress. I answered that I should sincerely endeavor, by 
 speaking on the same subjects on which I had been accus- 
 tomed to speak in my own country, in England, India, Japan, 
 and elsewhere, to contribute some little help to the same 
 good cause in Korea. Up to this time, no sign of permission 
 had been given to take my dismissal, and, indeed, once when 
 a movement to withdraw had been made, a half-gesture had 
 prevented it; but now His Majesty held out his hand. After 
 taking it, I bowed and backed out safely over the threshold 
 a, manoeuvre made the easier by the small size of the room.
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 47 
 
 On returning to the waiting-room the question was asked 
 whether the Crown Prince was present with his father; and 
 no httle surprise seemed to be excited by the fact that Lady 
 Om's son had on this occasion taken the place on the Em- 
 peror's right hand customarily occupied by the older half- 
 brother. After the entrance again of the ^larquis Ilo with 
 his suite, and of the Korean officials, to the room for waiting, 
 light refreshments were served; the ceremony was then con- 
 sidered at an end. 
 
 My first experience of lecturing to a Korean audience came 
 on the evening of the same day. While waiting in the small, 
 dingy rooms of the Korean building, then used for offices by 
 the Young Men's Christian Association of Seoul, I was intro- 
 duced to several prominent Korean Christians. The most 
 interesting of these was the pastor of one of the Korean 
 churches, a member of a high-class family and one of the 
 very few of his countrymen who combines a truly manl}- 
 native character with a profession of the foreign faith. This 
 man had been chosen by the Crown Prince to assist at the 
 obsequies of his mother, the murdered Queen. The struggles 
 with his conscience, which forbade him either to take part in 
 heathenish rites, or escape with a lie, by feigning illness, or 
 crawl out of the dilemma by resigning the official position he 
 then held, made an interesting story. This man solved his 
 prol)lem of conscience in truly loyal style. And when tlie 
 Christian pastor told his heathen })rince thai he could not 
 go, and, as well, the reason why, instead of ordering him 
 })unished the latti.T said: "Why did you not let me know 
 beforehand that }'0U are a Cliristian, and then I sliould not 
 have asked you? Go in j)eace." 
 
 The lecture began late. The hall was crowded with some 
 60' Koreans, seated on the floor, standing in the oi)en space 
 about the door, and perched in the windows. Besides the 
 native audience, a few missionaries and three or four Ja])ancse
 
 48 IN KCM^KA WITH iMARQUIS ITO 
 
 friends were the only foreigners present. The arrangements 
 for enforcing order were unusual and interesting. A number 
 of young men, designated by badges, were jiosted near the 
 door or distributed about tlie hall. Their office resembled, 
 apparently, that of the tithing-man in the Puritan churches of 
 a century gone b}'. Boys who became loo restless were ad- 
 monished and sometimes even gently rapped or ])ulled into 
 place; and those who wished to leave the hall were ])revented 
 from doing so unless they could give* peremptory reasons for 
 the wish. It was deemed complimentary to the sjKaker that 
 he did not develop any considerable number of this class of 
 hearers; and, indeed, this jjarticular audience was called 
 attentive. It was, in truth, fairly so; although not after the 
 pattern of the altogether respectful and ([uiet manners of the 
 Japanese audiences. Indeed, there was always considerable 
 restlessness and undoubted evidence of that kind of applause 
 which imitates what the French call claque, in the Korean 
 audiences at Seoul. On the one hand there was a lack of 
 that intelligent and serious interest in the discussion of 
 questions of education, morals, and religion which one meets 
 everywhere in Japan; while, on the other hand, there was 
 response by clapping of hands to any remarks which touched 
 one's hearers on the side of sentiment in an a])peal to their 
 personal or national experiences of injustice, j)ride, and 
 weakness mingled with a certain form of ambition. These 
 different characteristics may safely be interpreted as marking 
 essential differences between the present attitudes and pros- 
 pective developments of the two j)eoples. 
 
 This lecture, as were all the lectures delivered to the 
 Koreans (since they were without exception given under the 
 auspices of either the Y. M. C. A. or of the missionaries), 
 was opened by religious exercises. Dr. Jones introduced the 
 speaker; and Mr. Reynolds, whose reputation for a knowledge 
 of the Korean language has secured him a prominent place
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 
 
 49 
 
 in the work of translating the 'Scriptures, interpreted. The 
 speaker availed himself of the words which the Emperor had 
 that afternoon spoken in commendation of his purpose in visiting 
 the country, to propitiate his first Korean audience. At the 
 end of the two hours the foreigners ])rcsent expressed them- 
 selves as well satisfied with the beginning which had been made. 
 
 On the afternoon of the next day, which was Sunday, the 
 audience was equally large, and the attention about ec^ually 
 good; although the drizzle of rain which came on during the 
 hours of meeting made some of the Korean men as nervous 
 about the damage threatening their best-wear crinoline hats 
 as American women are wont to be about their bonnets, under 
 similar circumstances, on an Easter Sunday. As we entered 
 the hall. Dr. Avison was leading the audience in singing. 
 The equality of the song was not high, but it was perha])s 
 equal to that attainable in Japan, outside of the Greek 
 Cathedral at the time of my first visit fifteen years ago. 
 The Koreans are probably more fond of music, and more apt 
 at learning, than are the Japanese. Already, under the 
 training of their German teacher. Professor Eckert, a Korean 
 band is giving to Seoul fairly creditable music. This service 
 of song continued for about one-half hour and ended with the 
 performance of a quartette by Korean young men, one of 
 whom is Chamberlain to the Crown Prince and a nephew 
 of the Emperor. This Sunday's audience was almost ex- 
 clusively Christian. 
 
 The next evening's audience was not quite so large as the 
 others had been, but was obviously of much higher intel- 
 lectual quality. More of the prominent men of the otTicial 
 class, apparently attracted by the nature of the theme, were 
 present. They responded with increasing enthusiasm to 
 Dr. Jones' clear and vigorous interpretation of my remarks 
 upon the dangers to the national life which grow out of su- 
 perstition, lawlessness, partisanship, selfish ambition and
 
 50 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS YVO 
 
 avarice, and a frivolous, irreverent spirit. At the close of 
 the lecture the audience rose to their feet and waved toward 
 me their uplifted hands as a greeting, ecjuivalent to llie 
 Japanese banzai~[hus making an encouraging ending to 
 the first series of lectures in Seoul. 
 
 On our return from Pyeng-yang it was arranged that 
 a course of three lectures should be given in the hall of the 
 Young Tvlcn's Association to the teachers, and one or more 
 popular addresses in Independence Hall, if this larger 
 building could be obtained. To secure an audience for the 
 teachers' course, some 400 tickets of invitation were issued 
 and distributed by Korean hcl[)ers. The report of the eager- 
 ness with which these tickets were sought led the secretary 
 of the association to predict that three hundred at least would 
 gather to hear discussed such topics as ihe following: "The 
 Work of the Teacher," "The Prei)aration of the Teacher," 
 "The Ideals of the Teacher." The lecturer himself esti- 
 mated that an audience of as many as fifty would be entirely 
 satisfactory. As a matter of fact, somewhat more than one 
 hundred appeared at the aj)pointed hour. The Korean 
 helpers who had distributed the tickets accounted for the 
 discrepancy between the fact and their anticipations by tlie 
 persistence of the rumor that I had come to Korea to take 
 a permanent official j)osition under the Japanese Government. 
 [Indeed, this was the prevalent o{)inion in Korean official 
 circles and even among some of the foreigners until the 
 date of our leaving the country.] But the same question 
 arose again: Had the Korean Christian helpers really told 
 the truth and had they been faithful to their work; or liad 
 they dealt with their commission treacherously and brought 
 back a false report? In either case it was obvious that the 
 teachers of the public schools had diplomatically refrained 
 from attendance, under circumstances which might indicate 
 a relaxing of their anti- Japanese sentiments. However,
 
 mS ' 
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 51 
 
 certain of the Government officers now promised to send out 
 word that attendance was commanded; and a large increase 
 was expected at the next lecture. Whatever was the real 
 cause of the first disappointment, the audiences were, in fact, 
 about doubled at the following two lectures. They were also 
 officially dignified by the presence of the Vice-Afinister of 
 Education, who, alas! soon afterward was arrested for 
 contributing 1,200 yen to a conspiracy of assassination in- 
 volving his own chief; he confessed to this intensity of his 
 patriotism, underwent, according to current report, the 
 preliminary examination by being beaten \\ ith rods, and was 
 still in prison when we left Korea. As touching the moral 
 efficiency of the lectures, however, it is only fair to say that 
 the evil deed had been done some time previous to the culprit's 
 opportunity for benefiting by their influence. 
 
 At the close of this course on educational topics to the 
 Korean teachers of Seoul, one of the officials in the Depart- 
 ment of Education detained the audience by a long and some- 
 what impassioned address. In this he heartily thanked the 
 lecturer and exhorted the teachers to a better fulfilment of 
 their duties at the same time lamenting bitterly the sad 
 condition of educaiional interests in their native land. Then 
 QJie of the Korean secretaries of the Y, j\I. C. A. compli- 
 .ia|nted the audience on their excellent behavior while in the 
 :1. This conduct of themsehes had been jn accordance 
 'lith their profession as teachers. They had not yawned, or 
 ched, or interrupted the si)eaker by leaving the room 
 ile he was speaking, after the customary l)eha\ior of Korean 
 diences of the uneducated classes. It sliould be said, 
 bowever, that one of the many minor indirect ])enefits to the 
 ^orean people which are largely due to Christian missions 
 ie this: discipline in remaining fairly quiet and attentive 
 while listening to others speaking. The unregencrate native 
 manners in public meetings are most abominable.
 
 52 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Finally, after several (lisap])ointments and reljuffs, Mr. 
 Gillett succeeded in obtaining Independence Hall for Sunday 
 afternoon of April 21st. On our way out to the meeting and 
 back again he revealed the fact that, on account of the op- 
 position to me as the guest of Alarcjuis Ito, he had been 
 unable to get the meeting advertised as widely and effecti\ely 
 as he desired. Whether this was due to the unwillingness 
 and unfaithfuln(;ss of his Korean helpers, or to the determina- 
 tion of the native edition of the Korean Daily News to 
 oppose and traduce everything even remotely connected 
 with Japan, I did not inquire. But I decided, and asked the 
 secretary to communicate my decision to his native helpers, 
 that this should be my last address to the Koreans in Seoul, 
 unless invited by the Koreans themselves. Was there not 
 here, I asked, a small body of leading Christian helpers with 
 courage and manliness enough to set themselves against the 
 prejudices of their countrymen by expressing spontaneously 
 their willingness to hear truths about education, morals, and 
 religion, from one who was the friend of the Japanese as well 
 as their own nation's friend? 
 
 In spite of the insufficient advertising, Independence Hall 
 was fairly well filled. Some 1,500 to 1,600 were present; 
 although perhaps 500 or 600 of the audience were boyfip" 
 some of whom were not more than ten or t\Nelve years of agen 
 Much time was consumed in settling upon the floor in tfee' 
 front part of the hall these school-children as they arri\ed 
 in groups, one after the other; and the exercises began mof-c 
 than an hour later than the time announced. The topic 
 had been advertised as "The Five Conditions of National 
 Prosperity" these being, Industry, Art, Education, Morals,' 
 and Religion. Partly on account of somewhat heated feeling,' 
 and partly on account of cooler judgment as to what are tlie* 
 needs of the hour for Korea, I spoke with audacious ])lainnesiF^^^ 
 and with unaccustomed energy. Dr. Jones, who was acting'-"'
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 53 
 
 as interpreter moved, I think, by somewhat the same 
 emotions quite surpassed himself in vigor and in clearness, 
 in a fine mingling of robustness with felicity of expression. 
 The foreign auditors, including the interpreter himself, were 
 inclined to be enthusiastic over the success of the meeting. 
 For myself, there intervened a considerable period of distrust, 
 both of the Koreans and of my ability to judge them fairly. 
 Of one thing, however, I was becoming reasonably sure: 
 the prophetic voice, exalting righteousness and openly 
 condemning the vices of cowardice, lying, injustice, and 
 cruel prejudice and race-hatred, is needed above all else in 
 speech to the Koreans. I asked myself, and was unable to 
 answer: Are the Christian agencies at work in Korea 
 furnishing that voice, in a manner and measure to meet the 
 need? 
 
 The next morning, on returning from a w^alk with one of 
 the foreign secretaries of the Young ]Men's Association, we 
 stood for some time upon the steps of Aliss Sontag's house 
 discussing the decision of the day before. All the excuses 
 for the Korean attitude toward any endeavors to help them 
 which could, even in the remotest way, be connected with 
 their anti- Japanese prejudices, were admitted; they were 
 indeed "natural" (in the much-abused meaning of the word), 
 but they were neither reasonable nor Christian. Besides, 
 they were rendered particularly unmanly by the fact that 
 these same Koreans were ready enough to profit, individually 
 and collectively, by Japanese money and influence; and 
 they were eager and crafty to use the religious institutions 
 afforded them by Christian money, for the furtliering of 
 heathenish purposes and even criminal designs. The best 
 thing which the "guest of Alarc^uis Ilo" could, therefore, do 
 for the Koreans themselves was to let them know how, in his 
 judgment, they were to be measured by the standards of 
 morals and religion which tliey had professed to adopt. On
 
 54 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 going in to tiffin, somewhat late from this discussion, T found 
 by my plate the cards of fi\e Korean gentlemen, prominent 
 in Christian circles, who had called in ni}' absence. The 
 next day information was received that these gentlemen had 
 come to thank me for my ])revious work in their country's 
 behalf and to suggest their wish to have the work continued. 
 
 As a conse(juence of this im])lied in\ilation, one more i)ub- 
 h'c address was a(l\ertised for a Korean audience in Seoul. 
 It was to be in the Association Hall, and its tojM'c "The 
 Seven Cardinal \'irtues." On the evening of Friday, Alay 
 3d, some four hundred were present, including the Roman 
 Catholic Archbishop, whose accpiaintance I had made only 
 two days before. Either because of the hot weather, or of 
 the character of the address, or of the audience, the interest 
 seemed less than at any of the previous lectures. The time 
 to terminate the series of talks on to])ics so little stimulating 
 and satisfying to the desire for "look-see," and for emotional 
 excitement, had plainly arri\-ed. Probably, eight addresses 
 on such serious topics, with an attendance averaging })erhaps 
 500 to 600 each, ought at the present time in Korea to be 
 gratifying to any speaker. However this may be, the address 
 of May 3d was the last of my experiences with Korean audi- 
 ences in Seoul. 
 
 Meantime, however, other invitations to speak in the cap- 
 ital city of Korea had been received and were waiting for 
 their turn. Soon after our arrival, one of the Japanese 
 pastors called to say that it had been arranged for me, by one 
 of the teachers, to address the patronesses of a school for 
 Korean girls bearing the name, and profiting by the favors, 
 of Lady Om. Although other ])lans had j)reviously been 
 made, in order to save her reputation with the "leading 
 lady" of Korea, a rebuke was sent to this teacher for en- 
 gaging her speaker without first consulting him; but the 
 invitation was accepted. [In justice to the Koreans, it
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 55 
 
 should be said that the person guilty of this indiscretion was 
 a Japanese. Indeed, to i)le(lge the speaker, and even to 
 select his time and topic for him, is a sort of morally doubtful 
 enterprise, out of which even the New Japan has not as yet 
 wholly emerged]. The talk at Lady Om's School was in no 
 respect a success. Although both substance and style were 
 made as simple as possible, the Korean girl who had studied 
 abroad and was, therefore, thought competent to interpret, 
 completely failed in this office. And when the Japanese 
 pastor, who had mediated the invitation, followed with an 
 address in his native language which was to convey the sub- 
 stance of the same thought to the Japanese teachers and 
 patronesses of the school, he delivered so prolonged and 
 brilliant an oration that the speaker whose few simple words 
 served as a text for it all, was obliged to commit a breacli of 
 etiquette by leaving before the customary secjuence of cakes. 
 
 In addressing Japanese audiences in Seoul, as elsewhere 
 in Korea and all over Japan, I felt entirely at home. It was 
 characteristic of them in this foreign land, as it was in the 
 home country at the same time, that they were, above all, 
 desirous to hear the subjects discussed about which I most 
 desired to speak. The day when the nation had expected a full 
 salvation from " science " and military prowess, without morals, 
 has happily gone by. Its leaders, whether in educational 
 circles or in the army and na^y, in civil service, and largely, 
 too, in business, are becoming con\-inced that the "sjjirit" 
 of Japan must be re\-ived, retained, made more com])relien- 
 sive, purified, elevated; if the trium])hs of war are to be fol- 
 lowed by the wislied-for successes in tlie ensuing peace. 
 Thus in Korea, as everywhere from Nagasaki to Saj)p()r(), in 
 primary schools, commercial schools, and in the uni\ crsily, I 
 found the interest of the Jaj)anese in ethical subjects su])reme. 
 
 When, then, an invitation was receix'ed to be present at a 
 banc^uet given by the "Economics Clubf of which Mr.
 
 56 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Ichihara (manager of the Dai-Ichi Ginko or branches of the 
 First Bank of Japan in Seoul) is j)resident, and to s])eak thert', 
 I was glad of the 0])j)ortunity not only to meet friends, 
 but also to express certain cherished thoughts on the relations 
 of ethics and economics. The Manjuis Ito was present at 
 this meeting of the club for the first time. In a lengthy 
 address, spoken with his usual careful "picking of words," 
 the Marquis emphasized the need that the Jaj)anese should 
 set before the Koreans an exam{)le of honesty and fairness 
 in their economic relations. He dwelt upon the thought that 
 the one hundred and seventy who were present, and who 
 represented the princij^al Japanese business interests in 
 Korea, should show how the Japanese national policy is 
 based upon the principle of unselfishness; and how Jajjan has 
 declared for, and means to stand for, "the open door." In 
 welcoming me he repeated, on this public occasion, what he 
 had said in the privacy of the interview at Kyoto, with the 
 following words: "Taking advantage of his visit to Japan, 
 I have invited Professor Ladd, whom I have the honor and 
 the pleasure of considering as a friend of several years stand- 
 ing, to come over here and favor me with his frank and inde- 
 pendent views on the situation. What I want is independent 
 views. I trust he knows this very well. 1 trust his observa- 
 tions will be of great help to me." 
 
 In replying to the address of His Excellency, after apologiz- 
 ing to President Ichihara for criticising the school of econ- 
 omics in which he had been trained (Mr. Ichihara studied 
 this subject in the United States), for failure to empliasize 
 the important and unalterable relations which exist between 
 moral principles and economical policy, I ex])ressed my 
 gratification at the triumph of the newer school whicli Ijuilds 
 on history, psychology, and ethics. I then spoke of the im- 
 portance of regarding moral ])rinciples as fundamental in all 
 practical ways, for the most successful handling of the
 
 LIFE IX SEOUL 57 
 
 delicate political and economical, as well as social interests, 
 of both Japan and Korea. The observations of botli speak- 
 ers to the same effect were seriously listened to and heartily 
 commended by this influential group of Japanese financiers 
 in Korea. Between these gentlemen and the unscrupulous 
 and mischievous rabble of their countrymen, who poured 
 into Korea at the close of the war with Russia, a grave dis- 
 tinction must constantly be made by those who would under- 
 stand the situation there. 
 
 The Japanese ladies in Seoul have formed themselves into 
 se\-eral flourishing societies, tlie most important of which, 
 perhaps, is the ''Ladies' Patriotic Association." This Asso- 
 ciation is not only useful as an organ for benevolent work 
 among the widows and orphans of the Japanese soldiers, 
 and among the soldiers now on service in Korea, but it has 
 already done much to break down the barriers which ex- 
 clude Korean women of the upper classes from similar 
 offices, as well as those which separate the women of the two 
 nationalities. It is, therefore, admirably adapted to further 
 indirectly the purposes of the Resident-General in main- 
 taining the honor and welfare of Japan by promoting the 
 good of Korea. On Wednesday of the week following the 
 address before the Economics Club, I si)oke to some sixty 
 Japanese ladies, and about the same number of gentlemen, 
 under the auspices of this Association. The tlieme was the 
 importance and value of relations of friendship between the 
 two countries, as an a})peal to the patriotism of those who 
 must be relied upon to bring about these relations. A few 
 Korean ladies also were present at this gathering. And 
 when, at a collation which followed in the Japanese Club- 
 House of Seoul, ^Mrs. Ladd made a short address to the 
 ladies, a response in few words was made in Japanese by 
 ]\Irs. Megata, the wife of the Financial Ad\iser to the Korean 
 Government, and a yet longer one, in the same language, by
 
 58 IX KOREA WITH MARQUJS IT(J 
 
 Mrs. \'i Chi-yung, ihr wife of iIk' tlicn acting Korean Minister 
 for Home Affairs. Such incidenls as these ma}- seem tri\ ial, 
 but they are really note\v(jrlh_\- as the beginnings of wliat 
 mav well grow into a satisfaclor}- practical solution of the 
 (lilTicult problem of establisliing a Japanese Protectorate o\er 
 Korea in a way to secure the honor and welfare of both 
 nations. 
 
 The remaining two addresses to Ja])anese audiences in 
 Seoul were not particularly significant as bearing upon the 
 interests I was trying to ser\e. They were, howe\er, sug- 
 gestive as to certain changes going on in Korea which are 
 destined to assist in the redem])tion of the country. These 
 were an address on an educational toj)ic to about sixty teach- 
 ers who met in the fme, large brick school-building which 
 marks consi)icuously the Ja]:)anese ideal in this matter; and 
 a talk on the relation of religion to social reform, given in 
 one of the Japanese churclies to an audience of a union 
 character, representing the Christian work among their own 
 countrymen by i)astors im])orted from Japan. An address 
 at the annual meeting of the Bible Society, an address at a 
 meeting of the Asiatic Society, and one or two other talks, 
 completed my work of this character, so far as the city of Seoul 
 was concerned. 
 
 It will be remembered that the more important work in 
 which the Japanese Resident-General in Korea hoped I 
 might be of some assistance could not be done merely by 
 making public addresses, howe\er well received by the 
 Koreans themselves. It was evident that his ])lans for up- 
 lifting by jmcific measures the economical and educational 
 condition of the Korean people were Ijeing misunderstood 
 and hindered, not only by those foreigners who had selfish 
 interests to promote, but also by some who ought to co- 
 operate in every unselfish way. These "anti- Japanese" 
 foreigners were of several nationalities fso far as the diplo-
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 
 
 59 
 
 mats and business men were concerned); but the mission- 
 aries were, for the most part, my own countrymen. In the 
 complaint of Marquis Ito, there was never at any time the 
 least trace of bitterness, although the fact was obvious that 
 he felt the credit of his nation, as well as of his own adminis- 
 tration, to be deeply concerned. But surely, if both INIarquis 
 Ito and the missionaries were striving to promote what was 
 best for the cause of the Korean nation and of humanity in 
 the Far East, the disclosure of this fact ought to make more 
 easy the adjustment of the delicate relations invol\-ed in the 
 different kinds and methods of their benevolent work. I 
 knew that the Marquis desired this friendly understanding 
 and cordial co-operation. I thought it right that foreign 
 missionaries should be not less moved than was the Resident- 
 General by the same desire. Union and sympathy, rather 
 than opposition or indifference, ought to prevail between the 
 industrial and educational interests and the more definitively 
 moral and religious. 
 
 The larger aspects of the missionary problem in Korea will 
 be briefly treated in another connection. At present it is 
 enough to describe the conclusions on this sul)ject at whicli 
 I was forced to arrive, and to tell something of my personal 
 experiences. There had, doubtless, been much provocation 
 to form a poor opinion of the character and intentions of the 
 Japanese populace which had crowded into the cities of 
 Seoul and Pyeng-yang during and after the war witli I-^ussia. 
 They had cheated and maltreated the Koreans and had 
 brought suspicion and, in some instances, disgrace u])on the 
 fair fame of Ja})an. None of the otlicr foreigners were 
 readier to make accusation of this tlian were the re})uta1jle 
 Japanese to confess and deplore the same tiling. But all the 
 robl^ery and oppression l)y these unfriendly foreigners was 
 as nothing compared with what the Koreans had suffered 
 from their own countrvmen through hundreds of vears.
 
 6o IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Moreover, at this very time, almost without exception, a 
 Korean was to be found back of, or associated with, a Japan- 
 ese in each scheme for swindling and in each act of injustice 
 or o])j)ression. 
 
 On the other hand, the conduct of some of the mission- 
 aries had not been allogetlier judicious or even fair and just. 
 As a body they seemed inclined to be oxer-credulous and easy 
 to deceive by the falsehoods and exaggerations of their own 
 converts. Not unnaturally, but it would seem unwisely, 
 they had been somewhat too extravagant in ])raise of the 
 negative virtues of the Koreans, and somewhat too sparing 
 in demanding the more manly moral (|ualities of sincerity, 
 courage, veracity, and sturdy loyalty to justice and to truth. 
 And to quote expressions heard from the lips of some of the 
 ladies there had been too much talk with foreigners and 
 before the natives, about the "dear Koreans"; and "We 
 do not love the Japanese." That certain letters home in 
 part private and not designed for ])ublication by the writer, 
 and in part written by missionaries themselves for the press, 
 or by chance visitors or newspaper correspondents to make 
 public stories told to them by the missionaries had created 
 strong impressions unfavorable to the success of the Japanese 
 Protectorate, was not a matter of merely private information. 
 Moreover, the connection, both implicit and obvious, be- 
 tween these workers in the moral and religious interests of 
 Korea and the enterprises of Mr. Homer B. Hulbert and his 
 colleagues in the alleged political interests of the Korean 
 Court, could not fail to be interpreted by both foreigners and 
 Koreans as hostile to the policy of the Japanese Government. 
 Even as late as August, 1907, an open letter than which 
 anything more insulting or abusive of the Japanese nation 
 has seldom been published was written by a Church of 
 England missionary. 
 
 Dr. Jones and I had talked over the situation and the policy
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 6i 
 
 of the missionary body, as touching the real and lasting 
 advance of morals and religion in Korea, many times before 
 the hour when the point of turning was reached. I had 
 found him always frank, fair, and sympathetic with the diffi- 
 cult and complicated interests of both peoples. He had 
 assured me that, personally, ^Marquis Ito was steadily gaining 
 in the confidence of all the foreigners, including the mission- 
 aries, and even of the Koreans themselves. But the prejudice 
 and bitterness of feeling toward the Japanese generally re- 
 mained unchanged; and every one seemed to be doubting 
 whether the policy of the Resident-General could win its 
 way. I had steadily maintained the position that, whatever 
 might have been true in the past, the welfare of Korea and the 
 success of missions there, depended upon a positive and 
 hearty co-operation of all the factors common to both forms 
 of good influence. I had previously told ]\Iarquis Ito that, 
 in my judgment, the Christian movement now in progress 
 would be the most important help toward the success of his 
 pohcy in uplifting the Korean people. His Excellency, I 
 had said to Dr. Jones, had held out the hand to the mission- 
 aries; for them, through fear of losing influence among the 
 Koreans, or especially at the Korean Court, to refuse to take 
 this hand, seemed to me not only unwise but in a measure un- 
 christian. Without the success of the powerful influence 
 wielded by the Resident-General for the economical and educa- 
 tional improvement of Korea for developing its industries, 
 founding schools and hospitals, making the conditions of life 
 more comfortable and sanitary, purging the corrupt court, and 
 securing law, order, and the administration of justice in the 
 country magistracies preaching, Bible-teaching, and colpor- 
 teurage, must remain forever relatively unavailing. Moreover, 
 I was becoming convinced that a large proportion of the pres- 
 ent interest of the Koreans in the missionary movement had, 
 either in pure or mixed form, political motives behind it.
 
 62 IX KORKA Wrni MARQUIS ITO 
 
 It was on* Thursday, ^Fay 2(1, tliat tlie Korean Daily 
 Ncii's the j)aper whose most olj\ious purjjose seemed to Ije, 
 in its Enghsh edition, to foster prejudice against the Japanese 
 and to obstruct the pohcy of the Resident-General, and in its 
 native edition to mislead the Koreans and excite them to 
 sedition published tlie following "telegrams about Korea 
 from American papers" as likely to "pro\e of local interest" 
 {sic). [It should be remembered that this date was only 
 some ten days after tlie assassination of the Minister of the 
 Household Department, Mr. Pak \'ong-w]ia, and somewliat 
 more than a month after the attempted assassination of the 
 IMinister of War.] "American missionaries writing from 
 Korea recently tell of a most intoleral)le state of affairs in tlial 
 country where the Japanese have been acting in such a higli- 
 handed manner as to cause even the humble native to revolt. 
 The Emperor is held a prisoner and apjjears to be in daily 
 terror of his life. Xor have the aggressions of the Japanese 
 been confined to the natives of Korea. Americans, engaged 
 chiefly in mining enterprises, had it plainly demonstrated that 
 Korea is no place for them and that tliey would Ijetter mo\e 
 out. A representative of these mining interests" (the true 
 story of this 'mining representati\e' will be told elsewhere) 
 "is now either at or on his way to Washington to see if they 
 cannot obtain redress from their government. This latest 
 development in the Korean situation, the Ijoycot, will doubt- 
 less precipitate matters in Korea." 
 
 These "telegrams," published ?klay 2d in Seoul, bore date 
 of San Francisco, April ist. It so hap])ened that Dr. Jones 
 came to my office on the early morning of the date of this 
 publication. Finding that he had not read the article in the 
 Korean Daily News, I called his attention to it; and I tlien 
 spoke more plainly about the urgent necessity of a cliange of 
 attitude on the part of the missionaries than I had ever 
 spoken before. It was apparent, I urged, that the negative,
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 63 
 
 non-committal position would no longer suffice. Instead of 
 its being justifiable under the plea of not engaging in politics, 
 the very reverse was true. The missionaries in Korea, either 
 unwittingly or half-willingl}', were being used, both in Korea 
 and in the United States, to foster anti- Japanese feeling as 
 supported by exaggerations, falsehoods, and only half-truths. 
 They were thus, I feared, helj^ing to encourage the very worst 
 and most dangerous elements in both countries. There was 
 real danger that, if this course was persisted in, the peaceful 
 policy of Alarquis Ito, with its patient and generous effort to 
 promote the development of the Korean people, might be 
 discouraged. And if the mailed fist were invited, or seemed 
 necessary, to maintain the reasonable and unalterable inten- 
 tion of Japan never again to leave Korea to be a prey to 
 foreign intrigues against herself and to the degradation of 
 its own corrupt government, the cause of Christian mis- 
 sions in Korea surely would not fare better than it easily 
 could by establishing friendly relations of co-operation with 
 the existing Protectorate. The events of October, 1895, 
 and of the following years, ought not to be so easily 
 forgotten. 
 
 Two days later the following, under the heading of "Mar- 
 quis Ito and Christian Alissionaries," appeared in the Seoul 
 Press. "His Excellency ]Mar(|uis Ito received Dr. George 
 Heber Jones and Dr. \V. B. Scranton on Thursday afternoon. 
 The work of the churches in Korea was discussed and the 
 visitors assured His Excellency that the reports, reproduced 
 from American papers, claiming that tlie Clirislian mission- 
 aries were antagonistic to the Resident-General and his 
 policy in Korea, neither represented their personal sentiments 
 nor those of their colleagues; that His Excellency might feel 
 assured of their sincere sympathy and co-o})eration in all 
 measures looking toward the Ijetterment of the Korean people. 
 The missionaries make it a rule to stand aloof from political
 
 64 IX KORKA WITH MARQUIS JTO 
 
 matters, finding in the moral and spiritual uplift of the 
 Korean people full seope for activity." 
 
 "His Excellency assured the visitors that he gave no 
 credence to the reports thus circulated, and that he entertained 
 no suspicion nor doul;t (;f tlie missionaries in Korea. He 
 fully recognized the value of the work tliey were doing for 
 the moral and spiritual betterment of the Koreans, and wished 
 them every success." 
 
 This public announcement of the establishment of friendly 
 relations between the jManjuis Ito and an influential portion 
 of the missionary body in Korea was drawn up in semi- 
 official fashion. The gentlemen who undertook the duty of 
 making the advances toward the Resident-Cjcneral were 
 convicted as is every one who comes into anything aj)- 
 proaching familiar relations with him of the com])lete 
 sincerity of his pur]:)Ose toward the ])eople of Korea, and of 
 his frank and fair-minded policy toward all foreign interests. 
 The Marquis himself, after the interview, recjuested that the 
 substance of it might be made known to the ])uljlic. Eacli 
 party prepared with care the few words which declared this 
 unselfish alliance between the representative of His Im})erial 
 Majesty, the Emperor of Jai)an, in Korea and these represen- 
 tative teachers of religion, in the common effort to promote 
 the industrial, educational, moral, and religious welfare of a 
 hitherto unhappy nation. Such an alliance as we may 
 reasonably hope will contribute to the re})utation for 
 wisdom and unselfishness of both parties to it. At any rate, 
 as soon appeared, the immediate results were in the direction 
 of an enlarged future good.
 
 chaptp:r IV 
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL (cONTIXUEd) 
 
 The winter and spring of 1907 in Korea were, from the point 
 of view of one interested in this kind of pohtics, a ver}' lively 
 period, even for a country traditionally accustomed to similar 
 performances. Four attempts at assassination of the Ministry 
 one of which was successful; daily disclosures of intrigue, 
 plot and counter-plot; revolts against the country magistrates 
 which took the form of refusal to pay taxes, of attacks upon 
 the police, and of highway robbery; plans for plundering the 
 resources of the nation under plausible pretence of schemes 
 for "promoting" the nation's resources; foolish excitements 
 seliishly fostered by writers for the press who had their own 
 interests to secure; and quite as foolish, but less selfish, en- 
 deavors for increase of public welfare, by those benevolently 
 inclined; secret arrangements for the despatch of the un- 
 fortunate delegation to the Hague, accompanied by stealings 
 from the impoverished royal treasury to the extent of several 
 hundred thousand yen; and, finally, a change, not only in 
 the personnel of the ^Ministry but in its very constitution and 
 mode of procedure, which amounted to a bloodless revolution 
 these and other like events were crowded into this one 
 half-year. Meantime, especially after the return of the 
 Resident-General, the foundations of a new industrial and 
 educational development were being laid; and the arrange- 
 ments for a systematic administration of law and justice were 
 quietly made ready. An extensive religious rc\ival was in
 
 66 IX KOREA Wmi :vIARQUIS ITO 
 
 progress with ])hcnomcna corresponding to those famihar to 
 students of such subjects, wlien the moral })o\ver of a higher 
 rehgion first makes itself felt among a })eoj>lc who are ignorant 
 devil- and s])irit- worshi{)pers and are habitually negligent or 
 corrupt in respect of the manliest virtues. All this ferment 
 was both caused, and j)ervaded in its characteristics, by the 
 Korean national hatred of the race that was destined to 
 subdue and, as we hope, redeem them. 
 
 During Marcjuis Ito's absence in Japan those opposed to 
 the workings of the recently established Jaj^anese Protectorate 
 over Korea were indeed busily engaged. Their various enter- 
 prises took the several forms mentioned above. As to assas- 
 sination, one unsuccessful attemj)t had been made some time 
 before the Marquis' return to Korea. A beautiful box of 
 nickel was sent as a present to acting Prime Minister Pak. 
 No one of the Korean Court, being wise in their generation, 
 ventured to examine its contents or even to raise the lid of the 
 box. Subsequently the Resident-General examined it himself. 
 It proved to be an ingenious contrivance by which the turning 
 of the key and lifting the lid would pull the trigger of a pistol 
 and explode the powder with which the box was filled. Both 
 box and pistol were of American manufacture. The inten- 
 tion of the pretended ])resent, which it was douljtless Iioped 
 would be the more eagerly accepted and naively dealt with, 
 since it ostensibly came from so "friendly" a country, needs 
 no investigation. The precise source of the murderous gift 
 will perhaps never be accurately known. 
 
 The day but one before our arrival in Seoul another un- 
 successful attempt at political murder was made this time 
 in daylight and upon one of the princij)al thoroughfares. 
 The object of attack was Mr. Kwon, the Alinister of \\'ar, 
 who was riding in a jinrikisha surrounded by his ofilcial 
 guard. The following account is taken from the Seoul Press 
 of Friday, March 29th:
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 67 
 
 The Korean ^Minister of War had a narrow escape on Monday 
 from a daring attempt on his Hfe. The \vould-l)e assassins 
 there were two or probably more succeeded in getting away from 
 the Japanese policeman in the Korean service, who seems to have 
 had a most desperate struggle with them and some people who 
 came to their assistance (that is, the assistance of the assassins). 
 He, however, succeeded in taking the pistol, which had been 
 fired twice upon the Alinister, happily without any effect. One 
 of the accomplices was shortly after arrested by another Japanese 
 policeman in the Korean service in the vicinity of the ^Minister's 
 residence. According to a statement made by this prisoner, he 
 belongs to a band of eighteen men from South Korea, who are 
 alleged to have recently entered Seoul for the purjjose ( f assassinat- 
 ing the Cabinet Ministers. These men are further alleged to be 
 the remnants of the so-called "volunteer"' insurgents of last year. 
 There seems, however, reason to suspect the truth of this state- 
 ment; it is not unlikely that motives of a political character have 
 been adduced to cover a crime prompted by ])ersonal enmity or 
 rivalry. Such things have constantly occurred in this country in 
 recent years. Rumors are rife as to the true origination of the 
 dastardly attempt on Mr. Kwon's life, but we do not consider it 
 necessary to take any notice of them they are mostly of such an 
 extraordinary character that they will certainly be dismissed as 
 utterly inconceivable by anybody not accustomed to the peculiar 
 ways of politics in Seoul. 
 
 One remark should be added to complete this public 
 account; and one other to enable the observer to read be- 
 tween the lines. There were Korean body-guards and 
 policemen, and citizens at hand; but only one Japanese 
 policeman made any attempt to save the Minister's life or to 
 arrest the assassins. The rumors rife, so inconceivable to 
 "anybody not accustomed" to the "politics" of Seoul, 
 suggested, as usual, that it would be well not to examine too 
 closely into the plot, lest some one might be uncovered who 
 stood "higher up" in the court circles of Korea.
 
 68 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 The third attempt at assassination was Hmited to the dis- 
 covery and immediate fliffht of the intruder as he was trying 
 to cHmb the wall of the enclosure of acting I^rime Minister 
 Pak. But the fourth attempt did not terminate so harm- 
 lessly. In brief, the history of this political murder was as 
 follows (its date was April 21st); 
 
 On Sunday evening, Mr. Pak Yong-hwa, Director of the Audit 
 Bureau of the Imperial Houseliold Department, was assassinated 
 at his house. On that evening Mr. Pak had nearly a dozen visit- 
 ors, and while he was conversing with them shortly after ten 
 o'clock, the card of another visitor, not known to him, was brought 
 in. Mr. Pak saw the man in a separate room, and no sooner had 
 he begun to talk with him than another man rushed into the room 
 through a window and stabbed IMr. Pak in the riglit ijreast, in- 
 flicting a wound four inches deep. Seeing their victim drop 
 mortally wounded, the assassins hurriedly left, discharging a few 
 shots from their revolvers to prevent pursuit. They are said to 
 have been attired in foreign dress, and from their accent it is in- 
 ferred that they are most probably from Keng-Sang-do. 
 
 The unfortunate ^Minister died from his wound while in 
 the palanquin on the way to the Ja})anesc hospital. ^Marcpiis 
 Ito, supposing from the news received by telephone that act- 
 ing Prime Minister Pak was the victim, started at once for 
 the hospital; but learning, before reaching there, of the real 
 name of the victim, and of his death, he returned to the 
 Residency. The next day H. ]M. the Emperor caused a 
 chamberlain to pay a visit of condolence to ]Mr. Pak's resi- 
 dence; but the city of Seoul and the country of Korea went 
 about its business of intrigue or its work of tilling the fields, 
 as though nothing unusual had happened. The distinction 
 between such events here and in Russia should be borne in 
 mind by one trying to estimate their significance. In Korea 
 there is no immediate tangible interest, affecting life, liberty, 
 or property, for the individual, at stake, to justify violence.
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 69 
 
 WTiere the real reasons are not thoroughly selfish and cor- 
 rujit as indeed in most cases they are a misguided patriot- 
 ism, with a large mixture of hypocritical sentimentality, is 
 the motive for the political murders of Korea. The real 
 patriots, if their feehng is intense enough and their courage 
 sufficient, commit suicide; and those of less degree of inten- 
 sity refuse to accept office under a foreign protectorate! 
 
 In general, it had hitherto been only the court officials them- 
 selves who much cared as to what ])ersons were selected by 
 the Emperor for the different higli offices in Seoul itself. 
 They, too, had been chiefly interested in the more serious 
 question as to who it is of these officials that gets himself 
 assassinated. The peasants and pedlers, who are the travel- 
 ling merchants in the country districts, care only about the 
 local magistrates and about the bearable amount of their 
 "squeezes." But under the administration of Marquis Ito 
 assassination of officers whose character and official acts 
 sustain such important relations to the vital interests of both 
 Japan and Korea, cannot now be allowed its traditional 
 impunity. Investigation into the authors and promoters of 
 this plot, therefore, quietly began and was carried as far 
 upward as seemed desirable or necessary. According to the 
 Korean Daily Neu's, the three Koreans La In-yung, Aw 
 Ki-ho, and Kim In-sik who on April ist "went to the 
 Supreme Court in Seoul and gave themselves up, stating 
 that they were the ones who had tried to kill the ^Minister 
 of War," "seem to have been actuated by no selfish im- 
 pulses." The same paper calls attention to the claim that 
 the plan was to kill all the five Cabinet ^Ministers "who 
 signed the last treaty with Japan"; and also to the fact that 
 these same men had been to Ja])an to memorialize the Jai)an- 
 ese Emperor witli reference to the condition of Korea under 
 the protectorate of the em])ire whose head was His Majesty 
 himself. This is as far as the paper cared to go at this time
 
 70 IN KOREA WITH ^lARQUIS ITO 
 
 in apologizing for tlic atlemjil ul wholesale murder; but 
 there is no doubt that the attem})t itself was not at all dis- 
 pleasing to the court officials of tlie other ])arty than the one 
 in power or to the peoi)le generally. 
 
 The truer story is as follows: The searchings of the police 
 after those who attempted the assassination of the Minister of 
 War resulted in picking u\) a number of them from various 
 quarters. These rascals were cross-cpiestioned and one of 
 them confessed and implicated as back of the plot fmancially, 
 no less important a personage than the ex-]\Iinister of the 
 Imperial Household, Yi Yong-tai. This is the man who 
 was once prevented by foreign intluence, on account of his 
 thoroughly evil reputation, from going to Washington as 
 Minister from Korea. He is known as a past-master in all 
 kinds of craft and corruption, thoroughly untrustworthy; 
 although he had formerly been ele\ated by the Emperor to 
 the position of ^Minister of the Interior. Now, it so happened 
 that at the very time of the examination of the assassins, 
 this same gentleman was in an adjoining room where he and 
 those with him could easily hear everything said in answer 
 to the cross-questioning. It is no wonder, then, that Mr. 
 Yi Yong-tai confessed that he himself was indeed one of the 
 band of patriots who had attempted the gallant measure of 
 paying hired assassins to make way with their political rivals 
 as I have already said, a recognized, legitimate j)olitical 
 measure throughout Korean history. 
 
 The progress and result of the investigations into this plot 
 of assassination are so significant that this summary account 
 from the Seoul Press is well worthy of reflective considera- 
 tion: 
 
 The authors of the late unsuccessful attempt on the life of Mr. 
 Kwon, the War Minister, have at last Ijeen established. The plot 
 is of much greater magnitude than originally supposed, and more 
 than thirty men are now under arrest. The leaders of the con-
 
 LIFE IX SEOUL 71 
 
 spiracy are two South Chul-ki-do men, La Tn-yung and Aw Ki-ho 
 by name. It is stated that they are men of learning and command 
 some respect among their neighbors. Some days ago they sur- 
 rendered themselves to the Supreme Court and confessed all that 
 had happened. From their own statements it appears that the 
 events which led them to the dastardly attem])t are rather his- 
 torical than temporary. Since the days of the Japan-China war 
 they have been imbued with the idea that the peace of Korea 
 could be preserved only through the sci)arate independence of 
 Japan, China, and Korea. Guided by this idea they did all 
 things in their power to prevent Russia from gaining ascendancy in 
 this country after that war; and on the outljreak of the Russo- 
 Japanese war they prayed, so they say, for the victory of Japan, 
 as her Imperial declaration of war made reference to the main- 
 tenance of the territorial integrity of the peninsula. In June, 
 1905, the two men, with one Yi, a school teacher, went over to 
 Tokyo and made representations to the Household Department 
 and Cabinet ^linisters, petitioning for Korea's independence. 
 On learning from the Japanese press that the conclusion of a 
 treaty was on the tapis between Japan and Korea, which would 
 transfer the conduct of Korean foreign affairs into the hands of 
 the former, they immediately wired to Mr. Pak, the Premier, 
 requesting him not to sign the Convention, even if his life were 
 threatened. The Convention, however, soon became an accom- 
 plished fact in November, 1905, and the three left Tokyo for 
 home in the next month. But they soon found it impossible to 
 enjoy tranquillity at home. Jaj)an began steadily to perform that 
 which the Convention of November, 1905, provided for, and they 
 again crossed to Japan, in April, 1906. They vainly attempted 
 to persuade some Japanese politicians to start a movement for 
 the realization of their cherished ideal. Discouraged by another 
 failure, they once more returned to Seoul, and on the initiative 
 of La In-yung, they came to the terri])le decision that the Premier 
 and four Ministers of State, who were res})()nsible for the conclu- 
 sion of the Convention, should be assassinated in order to admit 
 of the jjresent Government being replaced l)y a new administra- 
 tion, composed of men of greater ability and capable of forcing
 
 72 IX KOREA W ITH AIARQUIS ITO 
 
 J;i{)an to restore to Korea tlie conduct of lier (nvn affairs. They 
 were thus awailinj^ the advent of a good opportunitN'. 
 
 On the other hand, a sur\i\'or of the Chi Ik-hxun rehelhon, 
 named Pak Tai-ha, with Kim Tong-j)!!, arrested on 'J'uesday, 
 and a few others discontented with the present ;vi;/^r, were con- 
 spiring here to raise another rebellion; and La and Aw, happen- 
 ing to come in contact with these men, a special friend>hi[) was 
 soon contracted between them. Pak and his associates were 
 prevailed upon by La and Aw to abandon their own ])lan and 
 join the plot against the (lovernment in ])ower. Here stei)ped in 
 another person, by name Kim In-sik, hailing from North Chul- 
 la-do. Having many accjuaintances among the officials of the 
 Government, especially among those now out of power, Kim was 
 asked to raise a fund necessary for the achievement of their com- 
 mon cause; and he succeeded in drawing a sufficient sum from 
 the discontents. Yi Yong-tai, cx-^L"nister of the Imperial House- 
 hold, now^ under arrest, headed the subscription list by contribut- 
 ing 1,700 yen, and this was followed by 1,200 yen by Min Hyung- 
 sik, Vice-AIinister of Education, who was arrested on Thursdav 
 night, through the medium of Chi Ik-chin, Chief of the Accounts 
 Section of the Imperial Guards Bureau in the Household Depart- 
 ment, who, in turn, was also arrested on Thursday night. A few 
 minor contributions were made by ex-officials, making a total of 
 3,400 yen. 
 
 The date originally fi.xed for the assassination of the five Min- 
 isters was the ist of the first moon, when all the high dignitaries 
 proceed to the Palace to offer their congratulations to the Km- 
 peror. They hired a number of men in Chul-la-do and Kvcing- 
 sang-do for the purpose; but the plan miscarried owing to the 
 belated arrival of these men. The 25th of Mav was then chosen. 
 Some fifty men came up to town in time from the a])ove two prov- 
 inces, and five bands, each under the command of a leader, were 
 posted along the roads leading to the Palace from tlie res])ective 
 residences of the Premier, Ministers of the Interior, War, Educa- 
 tion and Justice, and ]\Ir. Yi Kun-tak. Tlie comjoany com- 
 manded by Aw Ki-ho, which was to do away with ]Mr. Pak, failed 
 through the hesitation of the hired men; but Yi Hong-tai's com-
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 73 
 
 pany, charged with the killing of the War Minister, had courage 
 enough to make an attempt. Their efforts, however, proved 
 abortive, and led to the detection of the plot. 
 
 An analysis of this group of Korean officials and common- 
 ers, bent on wholesale political murder of their own country- 
 men in office, because the latter were avowedly committed to 
 a reform of the economical and judicial condition of Korea, 
 without distinction as to the ill success, or even, in certain 
 particular cases, the unfaithfulness of these "reformers " shows 
 it to have been composed of three classes of persons. There 
 wTre, first, the high-class officials who, with one exception, 
 were themselves at the time among the party of the "outs"; 
 and who undoubtedly found in this fact the chief crime of 
 the Japanese administration against themselves. There 
 were, second, the misguided patriots who, beginning with 
 an honorable but vain unwillingness to admit the incapacity 
 of their country to manage its own affairs, had sunken to the 
 condition of prejudice and hatred which made them plan to 
 murder their own cabinet ministers, because the latter had, 
 however reluctantly, admitted this incapacity and acted ac- 
 -^.ordingly. And there was, third, that basest of all criminals, 
 the cold-blooded, unprincipled, hired assassin. 
 
 The administration of justice in an even-handed manner 
 is peculiarly difficult in Korea; and, indeed, until recently no 
 serious attempt at such a thing has ever been made. In the 
 case of this complicated plot for assassinating the entire 
 Korean Cabinet, it shoukl be borne in mind that several of 
 its chief promoters were very highly connected; they were, 
 indeed, connected well up towards His Imperial Majesty on 
 his throne. Considering this fact, the issue when reached 
 showed a marked improvement already estal^lished in judicial 
 affairs. It was indeed rumored and perhaps correct!}- 
 that Air. Alin Hyung-sik, the Vice-AIinister of Education,
 
 74 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 underwent j)rtliminan- examination, in llie old-fasliioned 
 Korean st}le, ])y Ijeing cruell}- beaten. And the anti-Japanese 
 I)ress tried to make it count against Manjuis Ro's measures 
 for judicial reform tliat lie had not prevented the traditional 
 Korean mode of torturing suspects! But tliis way of examin- 
 ing criminals was still legal in Korea. It was also said that 
 Mr. Yi Yon-yung, chief of the Suj)reme Court, sent in liis 
 resignation, on the ground that, as his younger brother was 
 one of the five ministers who were doomed to deatli by the 
 assassins, it would not be fair for him to try the case. 
 
 At the time of our leaving Seoul the trial of these con- 
 spirators was not fmishcd. But on Wednesday, July 3(1, at 
 4 p. M., the Su])remc Court returned judgment upon twenty- 
 nine persons who had been tried and convicted of connection 
 with the plot to assassinate those Korean officials who took 
 part in the Japanese-Korean Convention of November, 1905. 
 Three of the hired murderers who, besides this crime, were 
 found to have been previously guilty of armed robbery, were 
 sentenced to death. The others received sentences of exile 
 (a penalty feared more than death by many Korean officials), 
 for periods of from five to ten years. Among those to whom 
 the longest sentence of exile was measured out, were the 
 notable names of Yi Yong-tai, ex-]\rinister of the Imperial 
 Household; Soh Chang-sik, ex-AIinister Resident, and my 
 auditor at the lectures on education, Alin Hyung-sik, Vice- 
 ]Minister of Education. 
 
 Even while the examination of this group of assassins was 
 going on, and after the change in the Ministry had been 
 effected, another i)lot against the lives of the same men was 
 discovered. This cons})iracy was, however, less important as 
 respects the rank of the persons involved and less extensi\e in 
 the number of those participating. jMost of the ten Koreans 
 thought to be concerned in it belonged to the Yang-ban class, 
 or the "gentry," and all were followers of Confucianism.
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 75 
 
 The opinion prevailed that the motive of these conspirators 
 was scarcely to any degree patriotic; but that their principal 
 object was to collect money from the disappointed political 
 groups of the capital. At all events, seven of the criminals 
 were arrested, the plot broken up thoroughly, and another 
 lesson given to Korean officialdom that assassination is no 
 longer to be so sure a path to official promotion and Imperial 
 influence as it has too often been in the past history of the 
 country. 
 
 An amusing but significant incident illustrative of Korean 
 official procedure came under my own observation. Prince 
 Tokugawa, who had been staying somewhat more than a 
 week at Miss Sontag's, before leaving Korea, gave an "at 
 home" to about one hundred and fifty invited guests. Soon 
 after the company had assembled, and while the ladies were 
 in the drawing-room and the gentlemen in the large outer, 
 enclosed verandah, suddenly the electric lights went out and 
 the company were left in total darkness. The gentleman 
 with whom I was conversing at the moment and I looked 
 through the glass doors of the verandah and observed that 
 the electric lights outside were still burning. At this dis- 
 covery my companion, who had had some experience in the 
 ways of Seoul diplomacy, became somewhat disturbed, and 
 remarked: "Such things sometimes ha})pen by previous ar- 
 rangement." Almost immediately after the sudden darkness 
 came on, a servant emerged from the dining-liall with a 
 lighted taper, and crossing to the drawing-room proceeded to 
 light the numerous candelabra. At the heels of the servant 
 followed Prince Eui Wha, pale with friglit, on liis way 
 from the verandah to the drawing-room, wlicre he slii)])ed 
 behind a barricade of ladies and planted himself against the 
 wall. It should be remembered in explanation of so singular 
 behavior that this Prince, although he is the Emperor's son 
 by a concubine, is hated by no fewer than three different
 
 76 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 parties; these are the Min family, who favor the succession 
 of the son of the Queen, the party of Lady Om, who woukl 
 gladly see her young son come to the throne, and the violently 
 anti- Japanese crowd who believe that Prince Eui Wha is too 
 much under Japanese intluences. It had been rumored 
 previously that a letter had threatened him with assassination. 
 However this may be, the jjresent was not the exj)ected oc- 
 casion; for examination showed that the burning-out of a 
 fuse was the real cause of the sudden darkness: and a ser\ant 
 repaired the connection so that, just as a workman hastily 
 summoned from the electric plant, entered the front door, the 
 lights as suddenly came on again. 
 
 The plots for assassination undoubtedly contributed to the 
 causes which had already for some time been at work to 
 make necessary a change in the Ministry. In spite of the 
 enmity which the existing Cabinet had excited on account 
 of its unwilling part in the Convention of November, 1905, 
 it had held together for a remarkably long period of time. 
 Not all its members, however, were ecjually sincere or efficient 
 in carrying out the reforms to which they had pledged them- 
 selves; at least one of its members had been accused of a 
 notable attempt at the old-time manner of corrupt adminis- 
 tration of office. The II Chin-hoi people, or members of 
 a numerous so-called "Independence Society," had been 
 "heckling the Cabinet Ministers" by accusing them of 
 venality and incapacity. In a memorial forwarded to the 
 Government by its committee, the beginning read: "We 
 herewith write you and enumerate your faults"; the memorial 
 ended with the amusingly frank declaration: "The only thing 
 for you Cabinet Ministers to do is to resign your posts and 
 retire into private life. Your armed body-guards are entirely 
 useless. If you do your duties assiduously and honestly, 
 every one will love you; but if you pursue idle and vicious 
 courses, every man's hand will be against you." Moreover,
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 
 
 77 
 
 the acting Prime IMinister Pak, although of good intentions, 
 had not developed the ability to lead and control his colleagues, 
 and he was probably acting wisely w^hen he insisted on having 
 his resignation accepted. The resignation of their chief 
 involved the resignations of all and the formation of a new 
 Ministry although not necessarily of a Ministry composed 
 wholly of new members. 
 
 On returning to "jMaison Sontag" about ten o'clock 
 (Wednesday, May 2 2d) from dining out we found our hostess 
 rather worn in body and mentally disturbed; she had herself 
 just reached home after some seven hours of continuous 
 service in the Palace. Mademoiselle also appeared anxious 
 about the comfort and health of the jMarquis Ito, who had 
 himself been there during a similar long period, and who had 
 eaten aAd drunk nothing except a sandwich and a glass of 
 claret sent in by her to His Excellency. The resignation of 
 Premier Pak had been tendered on the Alonday pre\-ious. 
 The next morning but one, the Seoul Press, published the fol- 
 lowincr announcement:. 
 
 Marquis Ito's audience with the Emperor of Korea on Wednes- 
 day was a protracted one, it being nearly ten o'clock in the evening 
 before His Excellency left the palace. During the five hours ihat 
 he was with His ^Majesty, the old cabinet was dismissed and a new 
 one called into existence. The n'ew ^Ministry thus formed is com- 
 posed as follows: 
 
 Prime Minister . 
 
 JNIinister of Justice . 
 
 Minister of Finance 
 Minister of the Interior 
 ]\Iinister of War . . 
 iSIinister of Education 
 
 Yi Wan-yong. 
 Yi Ha-yong. 
 ]Slin Yong-ki. 
 In Sun-jun. 
 Yi Pyong-mu. 
 Yi Chai-kon. 
 
 As the same paper suljscfpiently remarked, this cliangc of 
 government, which had lakrn place witli a (piite unecpialled
 
 yS IX KOREA WITIl .MARQUIS ITO 
 
 promptiludc and quiet, followed uj)on a conversation in which 
 the "Resident-General spoke to the Emperor on the general 
 situation in a remarkably frank and outspoken mann' r." 
 
 The substance of this conversation between Alarquis Ito 
 and the Korean Emjjeror in this memorable intcr^-iew was 
 probably somewhat as follows: His Majesty was reminded 
 of the ]\rarquis' regret that a change of Ministry had become 
 necessary; for under existing circumstances it was desiraljle 
 to avoid as much as possil^le the friction likely to accompany 
 such a change. But Minister Pak insisted on resigning and 
 the others, of course, must follow his e.\am])le. Xow the 
 history of the country showed, as the Emperor well knew, that 
 changes in the Cabinet were a signal for all manner of con 
 fusion in the Government, caused by the intrigue of parties 
 contending for the control. Promptness of action would 
 alone prevent this. His Excellency wished to remain in the 
 palace until the new Alinistry was constituted. Under 
 existing circumstances it was most desirable that the new 
 Prime Minister should be a man who could be trusted; and 
 that, in order to secure internal harmony and freedom from 
 intrigue within the Cabinet itself, he should have a choice 
 in the selection of his colleagues. Pie should also have a 
 policy, should explain it to the others, and thus secure their 
 intelligent and hearty co-operation and support. In His 
 Excellency's opinion, ]\Ir. Yi Wan-yong, the then acting 
 Minister of Education, was the n,c i, of all others, most 
 suitable for the position of Premier. This advice accom- 
 panied, as it doubtless was, by words of jjlain but friendly 
 warning as to the consequences of continuing the old-time 
 policy of intrigue, deceit, and submission to the counsels of 
 base-born and unscrupulous fellows, who were alwa}s 
 planning to deceive and rob the Emperor in order to j)rofit 
 themselves was finally followed. 
 
 The ^Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and- Industry,
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 79 
 
 which for practical importance stood next to that of the Prime 
 Minister, and which had been rather unworthily filled by its 
 ;^reviorii occupant, was for the time being combined with the 
 Prime Minister's. Soon after, the ^linister of Justice and 
 the Minister of Finance of the new Cabinet insisted upon 
 resigning, and ]Mr. Cho Chung-yung and ]\Ir. Ko Yong-hui 
 were appointed to the vacant positions. At the same time 
 the vacant portfolio which had been temporarily left in the 
 hands of the Prime Minister was given to ]\Ir. Song Pyong- 
 chun. With these changes and this additional appointment 
 a new Cabinet was arranged in the briefest possible time, 
 without popular excitement, and without opportunity for 
 
 .Tupt intrigue. 
 
 xA.n analysis of the personnel of the new ^linistry shows that 
 it was composed of comparatively young men and of men who 
 had, on the whole, previously sustained a fair reputation. 
 It also was much more obviously a reform Cabinet; its 
 material was both more mouldable and more homogeneous. 
 The Home ^Minister had been the President of "Song-kyun 
 College" (a Confucian institution); the War ^Minister, who 
 was speedily made a ]Major-General, had received a thorough 
 military ecfucation in Japan and had been director of the 
 Korean ^Military Academy. The new ^Minister of Education 
 had at one time been Vice-Minister in the same department. 
 
 Almost immediately the new Cabinet, in accordance with 
 the significant decision tj hold a Council every Tuesday at 
 the official residence of the Resident-General, met to shape 
 a more definite public policy. A full report of the speech 
 made to them on this occasion by ^larcpiis Ito, and of the 
 response made by Premier Yi, was publislied for Korea, 
 Japan, and all the world to read. In this address the Manjuis 
 claimed that he had now, since liis arrival one year ago, acted 
 in perfect good faitli, with the immo\aljle intention to do all 
 in his power to cement friendship between Japan and Korea,
 
 8o IX KOREA WITH ^[ARQUIS YYO 
 
 and to dcvcloi) llie lattcr's resources. The most urgent need 
 for Korea at present was a reformed administration. Re- 
 viewing the history of the past thirty years in the V-dv Kast, 
 with which his own ex])eriences had made hini i)articularly 
 famih'ar, he recalled before them his persistent ad\'ocacy of 
 peaceful measures as opj)oscd to tliose of a punitive war. 
 But it was for Korea herself to say wliether such measures 
 should prevail as would insure her independence in home 
 affairs and ])eaceful self-development, or not. If the j^resent 
 Cabinet did not agree with him, let tliem frankly and bravely 
 say, No! If they concurred in his opinion, let them free 
 themselves of sclhsh motives and unite in bringing about the 
 common good. To this address of ^^larquis Ito, Mr. Yi, the 
 Premier, replied in behalf of his colleagues. After thanking 
 the Resident-General for his advice, he promised that the new 
 IMinistry would unite under his guidance, and "des])ite all 
 obstacles and in the face of any dangers that might lie in the 
 way, would endeavor to attain their object the best good 
 of their country." 
 
 Other measures followed rapidly, all of wliich tended to 
 constitute a Cabinet which should be a really effective 
 administrative body, relatively free from court intrigue and 
 from the fear of internal treachery. These measures, taken 
 together, secured a new ofhcial system, the Ijeginnings of real 
 government for the first time in the history of Korea, as the 
 following quotation will show: 
 
 According to the new system the present Council of State is to 
 be called hereafter the Cabinet, and the President of llic Council 
 of State the Prime iSIinister. The respective Ministers of Slate 
 shall give their advice to the Emperor, and he res])onsihlc for the 
 management of im])ortant matters of State. All laws, imperial 
 edicts, the budget, the final account, any and all c.\i)en(liture that 
 is not provided for in the budget, the a])pointment, dismissal and 
 promotion of Government officials and officers, amnesty and
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 8i 
 
 pardon, and other affairs of State, shall require the deliberation 
 and consent of all the Ministers of State as well as the counter- 
 signature of them all. In short, the new system aims at the 
 enlargement of the power of the Government in order to enable 
 it to stand independent of outward influence. 
 
 How complete a bloodless revolution was accomplished in 
 this quiet and almost unnoticed way will be made more ap- 
 parent later on when it can be viewed in its larger historical 
 and political settings. That His ^Majesty the Korean Em- 
 peror did not like the change, needs scarcely to be said. 
 The enlargement of the power of the Government meant the 
 diminishing of the Imperial power to dispose of the ofhces, 
 the possessions, not only of the Crown but also of individuals 
 and of the nation, and the lives of the subjects, without re- 
 gard to law, order, justice, or the semblance of equity. There 
 is equally little need to say that the Yang-bans and the cor- 
 rupt courtiers and local magistrates, as well as the court- 
 eunuchs and sorceresses, were in the opposition. But only 
 by such changes is to be constituted the true "Passing of 
 Korea," in a manner to commend itself to every genuine 
 patriot and to all foreigners who honestly care for the good 
 of the Koreans and for the welfare of the Far East. 
 
 The Emperor at first was reported to have attacks of being 
 "indisposed," which prevented his seeing the IMinisters when 
 they came for consultation, or for the imperial sanction to 
 their acts under the new regime. But, on the whole, his 
 health gradually so improved that he was able to accept the 
 situation with more apparent ac([uicscence, if not inner 
 complacency. And the fright which soon arose over the 
 serious consequences that were to follow his alleged Com- 
 mission of Koreans and their "foreign friend" to enter 
 formal ])rotest against Japan at The Hague Peace Confer- 
 ence, at least for the time being made tlie humiliations suf- 
 fered from his own subjects at home the easier to be borne.
 
 82 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 According to unfailing Korean custom, it was to be ex- 
 pected that the ex-Ministers would become at once opponents 
 of their successors in office and powerful factors in the in- 
 trigues designed to destroy the intluence of the latter with 
 the Emperor. The success of the new Ministry, es])ecially 
 in the matter of those reforms which made Manpiis Ito's 
 administration so obnoxious to the ruling classes, was there- 
 fore in peril from the ]\Iinistry that luid resigned. But in- 
 fluence of a private and suspicious character with His Ma- 
 jesty had become, under the new regime, less im])ortant and 
 less likely to be profitable; and the ex-Ministers were not 
 only to be rendered innocuous, even if any of them might 
 at any time be disposed to do harm, but were also them- 
 selves to be committed by motives of personal interest to a 
 more responsible, relatively reformed mode of administering 
 national affairs. The new Korean Government decided to 
 "create" the office of "Councillor in the Privy Council"; 
 the ex-Ministers were themselves promptly appointed to this 
 office. They were given comfortable salaries, and three of 
 them including the one who had been j)ublicly reported as 
 having put on a coat-of-mail and secreted himself in his own 
 house, through fear of assassination, at the time of his 
 resignation were sent on a tour of inspection to Jai)an. 
 Here they were received in audience by His Im})erial ]\[aj- 
 esty the Emperor of Japan, and so well treated that they 
 might reasonably be expected to return to their own country 
 with a spirit of hearty co-operation in measures for reforming 
 the condition of their own country after the Japanese model. 
 
 Among the other events of the spring months of 1907 was 
 one which, w^hile in itself considered, was relatively unim- 
 portant, was destined to become of no small political in- 
 fluence upon the Japanese policy in Korea and upon the 
 relation of the Emperor and the court circle to that policy. 
 This was the sudden departure, after selling his effects at
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 83 
 
 auction, bi Mr. Homer B. Hulbert. It does not belong to 
 the story wc have to tell, to speak of the previous history of 
 this gentleman in Korea, or of his views on historical sub- 
 jects when involving the character of the Japanese, except so 
 far as the statement of the facts and truths of history makes 
 such reference mostly indirect indispensable. But on this 
 particular occasion what transpired of Air. Hulbert's trans- 
 actions with the Emperor is so intimately connected with 
 the political events of the period that some special mention 
 of them cannot properly be omitted. 
 
 Immediately on my return from Chemulpo, Wednesday, 
 May 8th, I found the excitement of the day was over the 
 following questions: "What was INIr. Hulbert's motive for 
 leaving Seoul so suddenly ? Where is he going ? and What is 
 his business?" Now the Korean Daily News, the violently 
 anti- Japanese paper which was currently believed to receive 
 the support of Mr. Hulbert, in the forms of friendship with 
 its editor, writing some of its editorials, and interest in its 
 receiving subsidies, had just published as a despatch from 
 Paris (dated May 3d) the following illuminating statements: 
 "Korea will also participate in The Hague Peace Con- 
 ference"; but then again: "It is reported that Japan will 
 represent Korea at the Conference." The conjecture, 
 therefore, w^as very promptly made by those in the diplomatic 
 service in Seoul that the Emperor had again given another 
 large sum of money to the same hands, with the same hope, 
 as formerly, of procuring foreign assistance or even inter- 
 vention. This was, however, hard to credit even by those 
 most suspicious; for, from the Japanese point of \iew, such 
 a transaction would have been on the recipient's part very 
 like "obtaining money under false pretences," and on the 
 giver's i)art, a breach of the compact witli Ja})an which 
 might seriously impair, or even endanger, the imperial in- 
 terests. That such a commission was a breach of treaty-
 
 84 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 obligations will be made perfectly clear when we come to nar- 
 rate the true history of the compact made in November, 1905. 
 Inquiry resulted only in finding that Mr. Hulbert's real 
 plans in going, and even his reasons for going at all, had not 
 been confided to any of his most intimate friends. His 
 Korean associates, outside of the very few higher oftkials 
 that might be in the secret, held the a1)surd opinion that he 
 had been bought off from his devotion to them by the Mar- 
 quis Ito, to whose oflR-ial residence he had resorted for a 
 conference and an agreement as to terms. To the other 
 foreigners he had assigned the condition of his family affairs 
 as the reason for his removal. To one of his more intimate 
 friends among the missionaries he had claimed that, having 
 heard of a wealthy American who might be induced to give 
 a large sum of money to found an educational institution in 
 Korea, he was going to try to secure the gift. The only 
 points of agreement were that the journey was to be made 
 over the Siberian Railway, and that there was to be a con- 
 siderable stop in St. Petersburg. In a quite unexpected but 
 entirely authentic way it became known to me within a few 
 hours that Mr. Hulbert had indeed gone from Seoul with a 
 large gift of money from His Majesty and with an important 
 commission to execute. Although the precise amount of the 
 imperial gift continued for some time to be variously esti- 
 mated and reported, and although its precise uses may never 
 be inquired into not to say made public; that a Commis- 
 sion appeared at The Hague, and its fate, are now matters 
 of the world's political history. As such, it will be referred to 
 elsewhere.^ 
 
 * It is now proper to say, since his own abdication and the Conven- 
 tion of July, 1907, have followed, that the Korean Emj^eror after re- 
 peated denials, confessed at the time to a faithful foreign friend (not a 
 Japanese) that he had given to Mr. Hulljert a large sum of money to 
 execute a certain commission the nature of which he kept secret. In 
 spite of this friend's imjwrtunate urging and vivid representation of
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 85 
 
 It would be a great mistake, however, to suppose that 
 Seoul had no other charms for us as visitors than the oppor- 
 tunity for delivering lectures and for witnessing, from outside 
 and inside points of view, the human puppets which suppose 
 themselves to be defeating the plans of that Supreme Ethical 
 Spirit who shapes the destiny of nations, in partnership with 
 those who partake of the spirit with which He inspires the 
 "men of good-will." The Court intrigues, and even the 
 assassination of the IMinistry, had little disturbing effect upon 
 foreign business or foreign social life in the capital of Korea. 
 With the former it made no dilTerence of practical importance 
 beyond the temporary check, perhaps, to some promoting 
 scheme which depended upon the personality of the Court 
 favorites for its Imperial support. There was no particular 
 reason why society should heed such familiar occurrences. 
 The weather was line; the luxuriant bloom of the Korean 
 spring and the vivid and changeful coloring of the mountains 
 surrounding Seoul, invited to out-of-doors entertainments; 
 and no foreigner's life was then in any danger. For, as to 
 the last feature favoring open-air sociability, the foreign 
 visitor or resident need have little fear within the city walls, 
 so long as the mob is not aroused and in control. Aside 
 from one or two articles in the Seoul Press, and the grave 
 rebukes of the Resident-General, I neither heard, nor heard 
 of, any voice raised against the immorality and crime of 
 political intrigue and political assassination. There was at 
 the time no Savonarola or Martin Luther in Korea. But, 
 then, in what part of America, or country of Euro])e, is such 
 a prophet now to be found? In Korea, as elsewhere, pol- 
 
 what the consequences of the act might l)e to himself and to his family, 
 His Majesty refused to telegraph a recall of the commission. He did, 
 however, so far yield to the same ])leading as to agree not to furnish a 
 further sum of money which had been asked in behalf of the intluence 
 of another "foreign friend," tlie editor of thi- most violently anti-Japan- 
 ese newspaper.
 
 86 IN KORKA Willi MARQUIS ITO 
 
 itics and morals seemed only remotely related, even in the 
 minds of the teachers of religion. 
 
 The foreign society of Seoul, including, of course, the 
 Japanese, is small, but homogeneous and agreeable. It is, 
 indeed, com])osed of several nationalities and of varied occu- 
 pations from that of the shrewd and hardened diplomat 
 to the unsuspecting but devout missionary. But whatever 
 differences of views and habits, or more important oppositions, 
 lie hidden beneath, when the gathering is social, there is a 
 cordial interchange of courtesies and an a])j)earance of good- 
 will. There can be no douljt that much of this socially- 
 uniting intluence has its source in the will of the Japanese 
 Resident-General; and just as little doubt that the Japanese 
 Imperial treasury is somewhat hea\ily drawn upon for the 
 expenses. But it is worth for Korea all that it costs and 
 more. Especially true is this, when we consider the effect 
 which is had in this way upon the Korean upper classes 
 themselves. Indeed, it is foreign social amenities and de- 
 cencies, under the brave and efficient leadership of the lady 
 in whose house we stayed, that have made the Korean court 
 functions half-way tolerable, and that to this hour prevent 
 the housekeeping of the Palace from relapsing into an intoler- 
 able condition of filth and disorder. But what the social 
 functions that are now -encouraged by the Resident-General 
 are in a measure doing is chiefly valuable by way of bringing 
 the Korean upper classes into apparently and as, I believe, 
 the event will prove, genuinely friendly relations with the 
 Japanese. This effect has already showed itself to a con- 
 siderable extent in the case of the Korean gentlemen. Not 
 only those who have been abroad, and those who are now 
 going abroad (for the most part, to Ja})an), but even the 
 others are coming to appreciate the value of more cleanly 
 and elegant ways of enjoying one's self socially than were 
 conceivable by their ancestors.* Gluttony, drunkenness,
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 87 
 
 filthy habits and surroundings, seem less natural and at- 
 tractive by comparison with a few degrees of higher social 
 refinement. The hardest crust to break will doubtless be 
 that which encompasses and crushes the Korean lady. In 
 Japan there has never been anything quite comparable to the 
 still present degrading influences bearing upon the woman- 
 hood of the upper classes in Korea. But while we were in 
 Seoul, for the first time so far as known in its history, a 
 Korean lady walked upon the streets, and after making 
 several calls in this fashion, rode home in the electric car! 
 Her companion was a Japanese lady, and the two were selling 
 tickets to a public entertainment given in behalf of a benevo- 
 lent enterprise. Being present ourselves at this same en- 
 tertainment, we saw to our surprise quite one hundred Korean 
 women, dressed in their native costume, enter the theatre, 
 and seat themselves among the Japanese of their own sex. 
 If this thing goes on, racial hatred is doomed. For soon it is 
 to be hoped, or feared, according to one's point of \iew, that 
 Korean ladies will attend garden parties and, perhaps, 
 finally, frec|uent afternoon teas and evening receptions, at 
 which foreigners of both sexes are present. And this, I am 
 sure, is a sight never as yet beheld by mortal eyes; at least 
 my eyes saw no sign of its beginning as yet in the now half- 
 opened "Hermit Kingdom." 
 
 A few days after our arrival our host gave us an afternoon 
 reception at the Residency House. It was a beautiful day; 
 and the grounds, which had been decorated as it is difficult 
 for other tlian the Japanese professionals to do, were beau- 
 tiful as was the day. The first two hours were si)ent upon 
 the hill above tlie Residence, from wliich there are fine and 
 extensive views of Seoul and its environing mountains. 
 There, in the several well-situated bootlis and tea-houses, 
 light refreshments were ser\ed. Tlicre, too, we were intro- 
 duced to the whole of Seoul "society," some of whom we
 
 88 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 were glad to call our "friends," when we ])arted from them 
 nearly two months later. The Jaj)anese officials, the foreign 
 Consuls, with their wi\es and daughters, the Korean officials 
 without their families, the Roman Catholic Archbishop and 
 the Protestant missionaries, and a few of the leading business 
 people, made up that sort of a gathering wliich is most 
 thoroughly human and most interesting. A collation, with 
 chatting and hand-shaking, in tlie Alanpiis' apartments 
 closed a delightful afternoon. 
 
 Of the various garden jjarties, luncheons, dinners, and 
 receptions, which followed and not only enlivened the other- 
 wise somewhat dull life of lecturing, reading, consulting, and 
 observing, it is not necessary to speak in detail. The \isit 
 of Prince Tokugawa and his j^arty to Seoul, which was 
 extended for some ten days, was very pro])erly made the occa- 
 sion of a series of festivities, at most of which they were the 
 guests of honor;, but at the last of which a reception gi\en 
 in Miss Sontag's house Prince Tokugawa was himself the 
 host. The unaffected friendly bearing of these Japanese 
 gentlemen toward the Koreans, with whom they were thus 
 brought in contact, helped to soften the anti- Japanese feeling; 
 and since on one, at least, of these occasions, the reception gi\en 
 by Mr. Megata, not only the foreign diplomats but also a 
 number of the foreign missionaries were invited, it gave to 
 the latter a somewhat unaccustomed opportunity to observe 
 at close hand the enlightening fact that Jai)an, like all other 
 so-called civilized nations, does not have its true character 
 best represented by its coolies, low-lived adventurers, camp- 
 followers, and land-grabbing pioneers. 
 
 I close this brief description of our varied ex])eriences in 
 Seoul with a warning against a very common but, in my judg- 
 ment, quite fallacious view of the relation in whicli the capital 
 city stands to the entire country of Korea. It is customary 
 to say that " Seoul is Korea" just as " Paris is France." But
 
 LIFE IN SEOUL 89 
 
 this is even less true in the macrocosm of Seoul than in the 
 macrocosm of Paris. It is indeed true, as Dr. Jones has said, 
 that "as the capital of the Empire its political pre-eminence 
 is undisputed. Intellectually and socially it has ruled Korea 
 with an iron hand for half a millennium." But it is also true 
 that the real interests and undeveloped material and human 
 resources of the nation are in the country; and that the 
 uneconomical, ignorant, and depressed condition of the pco])lc 
 outside of Seoul is the chief concern of all who really care for 
 the welfare of Korea. The local magistrates must be re- 
 formed, or the well-nigh hopeless task of reforming the 
 corrupt Court at Seoul would be, if it could be accomplished, 
 of little value to the nation. And if it becomes necessary, in 
 order to effect this reform, and so to bring about the redemp- 
 tion, industrially, educationally, morally and religiously, of 
 the people of the country, then the "iron hand" which rules 
 them from Seoul must be either gloved or broken in pieces. 
 But, in truth, the idol at Seoul which the Koreans worship is 
 an image of clay.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 A VISIT TO PYENG-YANG 
 
 From the historical, as well as the geographical and com- 
 mercial points of view, the city of Pyeng-yang (spelled also 
 Pyong-yang and in various other ways) is the most important 
 place in all Northern Korea. It has fre([uently been be- 
 sieged and assaulted, both by Japanese invaders from the 
 south and by various forces Mongolian, Chinese, ]Manchu 
 coming down from the north to pour their devastating hordes 
 over the country. It was hither that the Korean king fled 
 before the armies of "men in fierce-looking helmets and 
 bright armor with little pennons at their backs bearing their 
 names and family badges," which were sent against him by 
 Hideyoshi more than three hundred years ago. The city 
 is beautifully situated; it is by nature constituted for all time 
 as a principal centre for distributing over the Yellow Sea the 
 industrial products of fertile North Korea and for receiving 
 in return whatever the adjoining parts of China and ]Manchu- 
 ria may furnish for coastwise trade. 
 
 Previous to the China- Japan war there were probably not 
 more than a half-score of Japanese within tlie walled city of 
 Pyeng-yang. But some two years after tlie end of this war 
 the Japanese colony had grown to several hundred souls. 
 During and after the war with Russia, however, the increase 
 of this colony was so rapid that it could find no room within 
 the walls of the city. It therefore burst through, as it 
 were, the barrier of these walls and built a new city for
 
 A VISIT TO PYENG-YANG 91 
 
 itself outside the South Gate, which, hke all similar en- 
 terprises in Korea, by its neat dwellings and shops, its 
 clean and broad streets, and its general air of prosperity, 
 contrasts with, and forms an object lesson to, the Korean 
 city within the walls. 
 
 The original inhabitants of the Ja})anese city were by no 
 means altogether of the class most creditable to Japan, or 
 comfortable as neighbors for the Korean population. There 
 were many adventurers, hangers-on and panderers to the 
 army, who did not stop at either fraud or violence in their 
 treatment of the native population of Pyeng-yang. And 
 while the Japanese army during the war beliaved with most 
 admirable moderation and discipline here, as elsewhere in 
 Korea and Manchuria, at its close even the military authorities 
 were not as scrupulous as they should have been by way of 
 appropriating land and other necessaries for their permanent 
 occupation. The wrongs which were then committed are, 
 however, as far as possible in such cases, now being measure- 
 ably remedied or compensated for; and in spite of the fact 
 that the withdrawal of the divisional headquarters of the 
 Japanese army has affected somewhat seriously the retail 
 trade, and there still continues to be more or less of disturbing 
 friction between dealers of the two nationalities, and a crop 
 of disputes over land-claims that need settlement, there is 
 now a prosperous Japanese city, with some 5,000 inhabitants. 
 The Korean city is also growing in numbers and prosperity. 
 As the two nationalities come to know and understand each 
 other better, that will inevitably, but ha})pily, take place here 
 which has already taken place at Chemulpo. They will 
 learn the better to respect each other, and each other's rights; 
 and to live together in freedom from outbreaking strife and 
 sullen bitterness, if not in perfect harmony. It was a good 
 indication of this possibility to learn tliat tlie Jai)anc^e 
 Resident in Pyeng-yang already has coming to his court for
 
 92 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 adjustment more cases of Koreans against Koreans than of 
 Koreans against liis own countrymen. 
 
 The invitation to \isit this interesting and important city 
 was most j)rom])t and cordial. It came within a few days 
 of our arrival in Seoul. In spite, therefore, of the fact that 
 I was suffering from a somewhat severe attack of influenza, 
 brought on in the (|uitc ordinary way of breathing in the dust 
 of the streets of the capital city, we started for Pyeng-yang, 
 accompanied by Mr. Zumoto, by the early morning train of 
 April 5th, To make the journey more surely comfortable, 
 and to em])hasizc the relation of the travellers to the Resident- 
 General, the party was escorted about half-way by one rail- 
 road official, who, having committed us to another that had 
 come on from Pyeng-yang for the purpose, himself returned 
 to his duties at Seoul. 
 
 The night before had been rainy a somewhat unusual 
 thing in such abundance at this time of year; but by noon 
 the sky and air had cleared, and the strong sunlight brought 
 out the colors of the landscape in a way characteristic of the 
 usual climate of Korea in the early Spring. The railway 
 from Seoul to Wiju is being very largely built over again; 
 so that part of the time our train was running over the perma- 
 nent way and part of the time over the military road which 
 was quite too hastily constructed to be left after the war in 
 a satisfactory state. This process of reconstruction consists 
 in straightening curves, adjusting grades, erecting stone 
 sustaining-walls and heavy, steel bridges; as well as in mak- 
 ing the old bed, where it is followed, more solid and better 
 ballasted. The part of Korea through which we were 
 now passing was obviously more fertile and better cultivated 
 than the part lying between Fusan and Seoul. There were 
 even some portions of the main highway which resembled a 
 passable jinrikisha road in Japan, instead of the wretched 
 and well-nigh impassable footpaths which are often the only
 
 A VISIT TO PYENG-YANG 93 
 
 thoroughfares further south. In places, also, the peasants 
 seemed to have overcome their fears, both of the laws punish- 
 ing sacrilege and also of the avenging spirits of the dead; 
 for the burial mounds had been replaced by terraces \\-hich 
 enabled the fields to be cultivated nearly or quite to the tops 
 of the hills. 
 
 On our arrival at the station in Pyeng-yang two of the 
 missionaries met us with a friendly greeting. Before taking 
 our jinrikishas for the house of Dr. Nol^le, who was to be our 
 host, I w^alked for a short distance over the gravelled plain 
 surrounding the station to where some 100 or 120 school-boys 
 were drawn up in military line to give the foreign teacher a 
 welcome. This promptly took his mind and heart back to 
 Japan as well as carried it forward to the future generation of 
 Korean men. On one side, dressed in kakhi and looking 
 very important, stood the larger number, who were members 
 of the Christian school, connected with the ]Methodist mission. 
 But right op})osite in Korean costume of plum-colored cloth 
 were arrayed some thirty or forty pupils of a neighboring 
 Confucian school. It was a matter of interest and significance 
 to learn that just recently the latter, on receiving overtures of 
 friendly alliance, had agreed to a meeting for the discussion of 
 terms; and when the proposal had been made that the 
 "heathen school" should become Christian, it had been 
 promptly accepted! This was, of course, a way of ac]iie\ing 
 unity entirely satisfactory to the missionaries. At the time 
 of our visit the wife of the head-master of the Confucian 
 school and the wife.of one of the teachers had become earnest 
 and active Bible-women. 
 
 While we were being conveyed in jinrikishas to the foot 
 of the hill on which stands the liouse of our liost, and as well 
 the church and other buildings belonging to the mission, the 
 Doctor himself was getting liome in a different way. This 
 was bv means of a tram, tlie rude car of which seated six
 
 94 TX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 })crsons, three on each side, facing outward and back to back, 
 but with Korean coohes for their moti\e power thus reviving, 
 of course, in new form the time-worn joke about the Far 
 East's "Pullman car." As lo tlie position and significance 
 of the group of buildings, in one of wliich we were to be 
 entertained for nearly a week, 1 avail myself of the description 
 in the Seoul Press, published subse([uently by its editor wlio 
 was the Japanese friend and companion of this trip. ''As 
 his railway train ap])roaches the city, the first o])jects that 
 catch his eyes are a cluster of buildings, some in foreign style, 
 others in half foreign and lialf Korean style, wliich crown the 
 hill-to])s and constitute the most consi)icuous feature of the 
 magnificent landscape that developes itself before his eyes. 
 His wonder increases still more, as the visitor incjuires into 
 the result of the great missionary activity of whicli these 
 buildings are outward manifestations. How great the success 
 has been may be imagined, when it is com])uted by a very 
 competent authority that fully one-third of the entire Korean 
 population of the city (roughly estimated at between 40,000 
 and 50,000) arc professing Christians. There are Koreans 
 and Japanese, apparently in a position to know, wlio put the 
 proportion of the Christian section of the population at much 
 higher figures; they confidently say that cjuite one-lialf of 
 the whole population belongs to the new faith. . . . The 
 success which the work of Christian propagandism has at- 
 tained in Pyeng-yang is all the more marvellous when it is 
 remembered that the work was commenced scarcely more than 
 fifteen years ago. The success of the work has not been 
 coilfined to the city alone; it is noticeable, though not cjuite 
 in like degree, in the adjacent districts and all over North 
 Korea which looks up to Pyeng-yang as the fountain and 
 centre 01 the new religious life." 
 
 On the following day, which was Saturday, T had my first 
 experience with one of the larger Korean audiences. The
 
 A VISIT TO PYENG-YANG 95 
 
 numbers in Seoul had been, at most, some 500 or 600. 
 But here, ahhough the address was in the afternoon, no 
 fewer than 1,700, all, with the exception of a few foreign 
 ladies, of the male sex, assembled in the Methodist meeting- 
 house which was just across a narrow lane from the gate of 
 Dr. Noble's residence. The peculiarities of such an audi- 
 ence are worthy of a brief description. All were seated on 
 the floor. Close around the platform, on which were a few 
 of the missionaries and of the Japanese officials, were grouped 
 several hundred school-boys, packed as thickly as herrings 
 in a box. These were dressed in garments of many and 
 bright colors. Back of them and reaching to the doors, 
 massed solidly with no aisles or empty spaces left between, 
 were Korean men, in their picturesque monotone of white 
 clothing and black crinoline hats. The audiences at Pyeng- 
 yang, as at Seoul, were much more restless and seemingly 
 volatile than those of the same size which I had addressed in 
 Japan; although it should be remembered that the latter were 
 chiefly composed of teachers, officials, and men prominent 
 in business and in the professions, whereas this audience, 
 although largely Christian, was of the lowly and compara- 
 tively ignorant. A distinctly religious character was given 
 to all the meetings in Pyeng-yang by prayer and by the sing- 
 ing of Christian hymns. The tunes were familiar; and al- 
 though the language wa? far removed in structure and 
 vocabulary, the attempt had evidently been made, with only 
 a partial success, to reproduce in a rhythmic way the Enghsh 
 words which had been set to them. The singing was led by 
 a Korean chorister who used his baton in a vigorous ana 
 fairly effective, if not wholly intelligent, fashion. Tlie cabinet 
 organ was also played by a young Korean man. Thf" mis- 
 sionaries say that the people show great interest and even 
 enthusiasm in learning foreign music; and that tliey are apt 
 pupils so far as the singing of hymns is concerned. The
 
 96 IN KOREA WITH AIARQUIS ITO 
 
 favorite native music is a dismal wailing uj)on j)ii)es and 
 rude tlute-like instruments, ace()m])anied by tlie toni-tom of 
 drums. The address on this occasion was u])on the relation 
 of education to the social welfare; it was interpreted by Dr. 
 Noble with ob\ious clearness and vigor. 
 
 The audience next morning (Sunday, A{)ril 7th) was not 
 so large, but was scarcely less interesting. It comprised both 
 sexes, separated, howexer, ])y a tiglit screen which ran from 
 the platform through tlie middle of the church to the oj)po- 
 sitc wall. The numbers ])resent were some 1,400, aljout 
 ecjually divided between the two sexes. The girls on the one 
 side, and the boys on the other, in their gaily colored clothing, 
 were massed about the ])latform; and back of them the 
 women and the men Ijoth in white, but the former topped 
 out with white turljans and the latter with their black hats. 
 The entire audience marked out upon the floor an im])ressive 
 color-scheme. It was said that there were enough of the 
 population of the city attending Christian services at that 
 same hour to make three congregations of the same size. 
 The afternoon gathering for Bible study and the e\ening 
 services were even more crowded; so that the aggregate 
 number of church-goers that Sunday in this Korean city of 
 somewhat more than 40,000 could not have been less than 
 13,000 or 14,000 souls. Considering also the fact that each 
 service was stretched out to the minimum length of two 
 hours, there was probably no place in the United States that 
 could compete with Pyeng-yang for its percentage of church- 
 goers on that day. Yet ten years ago there was in all the 
 region scarcely the beginning of a Christian congregation. 
 
 In the afternoon I spoke to about thirty of the mission- 
 aries, telling them, in informal address, of certain economic, 
 social, and religious changes in the United States, which 
 seemed to me destined profoundly to affect the nature of 
 Christian missions in so-called "heathen lands." Nor did
 
 A VISIT TO PYENG-YANG 97 
 
 it seem incongruous when prayer was offered that the "home 
 land" might receive in its present great need some of the 
 blessings which were being experienced in heathen Korea. 
 For I had long been of the opinion that if the word "heathen" 
 is to be used with that tinge of moral and intellectual oppro- 
 bium which usually attaches to it, all so-called Christian 
 countries are in some important respects very considerably 
 entitled to the term. And, indeed, who that understands the 
 true spirit of the religion of Christ shall hesitate to confess 
 that America and American churches as sorely need deliver- 
 ance from the demons of cowardice, avarice, and pride, as do 
 the Koreans from the superstitious fear of devils or of the 
 spirits of their own ancestors? 
 
 The audience of ^Monday morning numbered 800; it 
 seemed, however, from the point of view which regards social 
 and political standing, to be of decidedly superior quality. 
 This was probably due, in part at least, to the nature of 
 the theme, which was "Education and the Stability and 
 Progress of the Nation." The attention, too, appeared to 
 be more thoughtful and unwavering at this meeting. 
 
 The public speaking at Pyeng-yang was concluded by an 
 address, especially designed for the Japanese official classes 
 and prominent business men, and given in the hall of the 
 Japanese Club on the afternoon of the day before leaving 
 the city. There were present about one hundred and fifty 
 of this class of hearers. To them I spoke very plainly, 
 praising their preparation for, and conduct of, the war with 
 Russia; then warning them of the difficulties and dangers in 
 business and politics which the rivalries of peace would com- 
 pel the nation to face; and, finally, exhorting them to main- 
 tain the honor of Japan in Korea, before the civilized world, 
 by treating the Koreans in an honorable way. Although, 
 according to the testimony of llie Japanese friend who inter- 
 preted this address, there were uneasy consciences in the
 
 oS IX KORKA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 audience, the warning and the rebuke, as well as the praise, 
 were received with ccjual appreciation and gratitude. I lake 
 this opportunity to testify that, instead of deserving the rc])U- 
 tation often given to the Jai)anesc, of being abnormally and 
 even ridiculously sensitive to criticism, I have found tliem, 
 on the contrary, remarkably willing to be told of their failures 
 and faults, and ready to receive, at least with the appearance 
 of respect and kindness, suggestions for their correction and 
 amendment. 
 
 Aly engagements in Pyeng-yang came so near to the limit 
 of exhausting my time and strength that I was unable to see 
 as much as would have been otherwise desirable of the 
 externals, and of the antiquities, of the neighborhood. From 
 the ])iazza in front of our host's house nearly the whole of the 
 Korean city lies literally spread out, as all the cities of the 
 country are, beneath the eye of the observer from a sur- 
 rounding hill. The streets within the walls are, with one 
 or two exceptions, narrow, winding, and made disgusting by 
 foul sights and smells. Here there has been little or none 
 of that widening of thoroughfares and superficial cleaning 
 which has given a partial relief, both to the aspect and to 
 the reality of Seoul. But, as has already been said, the 
 natural situation is beautiful. Under the advice of Japan, a 
 part of the now useless city wall went to make a fine bund; 
 while the spact; left by the clearing was converted into a 
 street. On ])assing through an indescribably foul, narrow 
 lane, which makes a disgraceful break between the broad, 
 clean thoroughfare of the Japanese settlement and the 
 fairly broad but dirty street of the Korean city, we were 
 told the following story of the recent attemjjt of the Resi- 
 dent to get this passage widened. The story is so charac- 
 teristic of relations between the two peoples that I turn aside 
 to tell it. 
 
 Feeling the great and obvious importance of having this
 
 A VISIT TO PYENG-YANG 99 
 
 public improvement made, the Resident called a meeting of 
 the adjoining property-owners to discuss the terms which 
 would be satisfactory to them. The Japanese owners agreed 
 to contribute the land necessary for the purpose and to move 
 back the buildings at their own expense; the Korean owners 
 agreed to cede the land if the expense of moving the buildings 
 was borne by the Government. The Resident went for a 
 few weeks to Japan, expecting that the agreement would 
 stand, and that by. his return the improvement would be 
 well begun. Immediately after his departure, however, two 
 Korean Christians, who had remained away from the meeting 
 for discussing terms, induced the other Koreans to break 
 their compact and refuse to surrender the land for less than 
 200 yen per tsubo (6x6 ft.) an absurdly extravagant price. 
 The attempt at doing this much-needed work came, there- 
 fore, to a complete standstill. The whole transaction was 
 reported by the Korean Daily News of Seoul with its cus- 
 tomary felicitous (?) misrepresentation, as follows: "People 
 in Pyeng-yang are greatly stirred up over the demand of the 
 Japanese that the Korean houses on each side of the road 
 outside the South Gate be torn down to widen the road. The 
 people gathered at the office of the prefect and protested 
 against such seizure without proper compensation, and they 
 said they would die sooner than give in to such an imposi- 
 tion." I can assure the reader that much of the fraud and 
 oppression charged against the Japanese by the Koreans 
 and by their so-called "foreign friends" (even including 
 some of the missionaries) is of the same order. [A letter 
 from Pyeng-yang to the Seoul Press, published not long after 
 our return, announced that the "widening of the approach 
 between the Japanese city and the old town of Pyeng-yang 
 is now under way, and soon a fme wide road will lead from 
 the railway station to the Gate" all of which means that 
 when the Korean property-owners found their attempts at
 
 loo IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 lvin<^ and swindling were nol goint^ to succeed, they saw tlie 
 achantage of renewing the original contract.] 
 
 A row up the river in his boat, kindh' furnished Ijy Mr. 
 Kikuciii, the Japanese Resident, alTorded several j)leasant 
 hours of recreation as well as an opjiortunity to see for our- 
 selves something more of the ])resent condition and future 
 jjrospects of the chief city of Northern Korea. The city 
 gate through which we reached the river is the finest thing 
 about its ancient fortifications. The views of the bank, which 
 rises in most j)laces bluff and high above the water, are very 
 picturesque and crowded with scenes of both immediate and 
 historical interest. Scores, of junks and sampans, .loaded 
 with many kinds of goods for the most part, however, of no 
 great value are either moored to the narrow beach below 
 the bank or are slowly finding their way up and down the 
 river. At different heights of the banks, standing on pro- 
 jecting ledges or on platforms, men were cutting inscriptions 
 upon the rocky sides in Chinese characters. These were 
 designed to celebrate for future generations the virtues and 
 successes of living merchants and magistrates; but these 
 workmen of to-day were only adding a few more to the much 
 more numerous inscriptions commemorating the otherwise 
 forgotten and, for the most part undoubtedly, really ignoble 
 dead. By the brink of the river were the Korean women at 
 their never-ceasing task of washing and pounding dry the 
 white clothing of their male lords. At one bend in the river, 
 where the projecting cliff acts as an effective breakwater 
 against the winter ice and the summer frCshets, the top is 
 crowned by a ])avilion which "Occupies the place where nego- 
 tiations went on between the Chinese and the Japanese at the 
 time of the Hideyoshi invasion. 
 
 The boat landed us at the foot of the celebrated "Peony 
 Hill," part way up which is situated the decayed pa\ilion in 
 which royalty used to be fed and given to drink on the occa-
 
 A VISIT TO PYEXG-YANG loi 
 
 sion of excursions from the city to this sightly place. From 
 this point the views bring the past history and the present 
 prospects of Pyeng-yang together in an interesting wav. 
 For, looking to the right, one sees an ancient pagoda and the 
 remains of a Buddhist temple. Looking forward and down- 
 ward, the eye is well pleased by taking in at once the pleasant 
 prospect of water and rock and fields which the ascent has 
 given only bit by bit, as it were. Looking upward one sees 
 the difficult heights which the Japanese troops stormed so 
 unexpectedly but successfully in the invasion of more than 
 three centuries ago; and also in the war with China, when 
 they turned the guns of the Chinese forces from their own 
 fortifications upon themselves and slaughtered the unfor- 
 tunate until the streets of the city were choked with corpses. 
 But to the left, and lying just below, is the green island on 
 which the pumping-works to supply the foul city with cleans- 
 ing streams are soon to be erected. Beyond the island across 
 the river are the pastures, where the breeding of improved 
 horses is to be carried on by a partnership of both govern- 
 ments; and still further beyond are the coal fields which the 
 Residency-General is trying to preserve for the Crown against 
 the efforts of both native and foreign promoters, to exploit 
 them to their own rather than to the nation's advantage. 
 But the story of these and similar efforts will be told in other 
 places of our narrative; and for the moment we will forget 
 the interests of history and of present adventures, and will 
 just thoughtlessly submit ourselves to the pleasure of being 
 rowed down the beautiful river to the dirty and seditious cit}-. 
 For it is a story of a nearl}- successful attempt at a seditious 
 outbreak which would have had a most unfortunate and 
 surely unsuccessful ending, that must now engage the atten- 
 tion. This story also, illustrates tlie Korean character, tlie 
 Korean situation, and the relations of the two ])eoj)les, in no 
 doubtful wav.
 
 102 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 The evening before, on Tuesday, April (;th, a committee 
 of sludenls from the missionary theological school had 
 recjuesled an interview with me on the following day; and 
 the morning hour of eight o'clock had l^een appointed. At 
 the time set they arrived three in numljcr and the inter- 
 view was held in Dr. Noble's study or " work-sho])." My 
 visitors began, Korean fashion, far off from their Jlnal goal, 
 and meandered around it rather tlian toward it, like ])oachers 
 feeling their way in the dark. An awkward pause was fmally 
 broken by my exhorting them to s])eak ])lainly and freely; 
 at which they replied that their country's condition was much 
 misunderstood and that it was hoped that I would imder- 
 stand and symi:)athize witli them. Of my desire to do this 
 I at once assured them; but when the rec^uest seemed to be 
 taking a more political turn, I rei^lied that my interests, 
 inlluence, and work, were all directed along the lines of 
 morals, education, and religion. As a teacher, it was only 
 as my teaching could get a hearing and have an inlluence 
 on life, that my stay in Korea could benefit the Koreans 
 themselves. At the same time, I could assure them of my 
 confidence in Marcjuis Ito's intention to administer his office 
 in the interests of their countrymen. 
 
 During all this conversation there was the appearance, in 
 general characteristic of all similar interviews between natives 
 and -foreigners, of a mixture of suspicion and du])licity which 
 is well calculated to betray the unwary into serious mistakes. 
 Certainly, the real motive for their coming was being kept 
 back; the suppressed undercurrent of feeling that could be 
 detected was such as by no means to encourage the confidence 
 that the feeling of race-hatred had been tliorouglily purged 
 away from these theological students by the meeting for 
 prayer and confession of the night before. But just as I was 
 obliged to excuse myself in order to keep another engagement 
 the true cause of their request for an interview suddenly
 
 A MSIT TO PYENG-YANG 103 
 
 sprang into the light. All the night before, they said, the 
 Korean city of Pyeng-yang had been in a slate of the most 
 intense excitement over the report from Seoul that their 
 Emperor was going to be deposed by the Japanese! There 
 was just then only time for me to learn from my Japanese 
 companion that he had not the slightest suspicion of how the 
 report, even, could have originated, and to send word to this 
 committee of interviewers that neither he nor I gave the 
 slightest credence to so absurd a rumor. 
 
 But this matter did not end with a single inter\icw con- 
 ducted by the deputation of Christian students. Word had 
 previously been sent that the Korean governor of Pyeng-yang 
 desired to call upon me, and the promise had been made that 
 he should be received in apj^ropriate manner at noon of the 
 same day. Soon after our return from the tri}) up the river, 
 His Excellency a])])eared, accompanied by his secretary and 
 by one of the committee of tlie morning wlio acted also as 
 spokesman of this second deputation. Eor sucli it really was, 
 rather than a merely friendly call from the chief nati\e 
 magistrate of the city. The Governor seemed exceedingly 
 ill at ease; there was in even greater degree than had been 
 the case with my visitors of the early morning, an ajjpcarance 
 of mingled sus])icion and suppressed excitement, of fear and 
 of hatred. In this case, however, the real matter of concern- 
 ment did not come at all to the fore. The conversation ended 
 when there had been repeated declarations of my visitor's 
 interest in the improvement of education among his own 
 countrymen, to which I liad replied that I Ix'lieved this to be 
 the important work whicli sliould occu])y all Korean |)atri()ts 
 and all the wise and true foreign friends of Korea. 
 
 It afterward came to my knowledge tliat the Governor, 
 although not himself a Christian, on leaving tlie liouse, went 
 with his secretary and the tlieological studi'nl into tlie ad- 
 joining church of the Methodist mission, and tliere fell u})on
 
 104 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 liis fail- and Ix'gan to beat liis forc-lu-ad on tlic floor and 
 l)C'\vail tlu' llirfuk'ning situation for himself as the responsible 
 magistrate, and the sad fate awaiting his country at the hands' 
 of the Jai)anese. The thought of the enormous interval 
 between this conduct and that of any Japanese official, 
 similarly situated, remains with me to reveal in vivid colors 
 the difference of the two peoples. But all this was only in 
 the small, essentially the same thing which has been going on 
 in the large, throughout the centuries of Korean history. 
 
 On my return from the address to the Japanese I was 
 almost immediately visited by a third deputation which con- 
 sisted of the same theological student who had called twice 
 before on this same day, and of two others whom I did not 
 recognize. This time also the conversation began in similar 
 roundabout fashion; indeed, this time the };oint of starting 
 was even more remote in character from the real end which 
 it was intended to reach. There was a ])reliminary recital 
 of their country's weakness, poverty, and need of foreign 
 assistance; this was accompanied by the suggestion that 
 possibly I might have some rich friend willing to contribute 
 liberally to their mission school, or to the much needed en- 
 largement of the church edifice. Again, the visitors were 
 assured of my deep interest in the welfare of Korea and of my 
 sincere desire to do what lay within my power to promote 
 this welfare.. It must be remembered, however, that I my- 
 self belonged to the class of teachers who, even in rich 
 America, have little wealth at their disposal. To the best 
 of my knowledge, I had not a single friend among the Amer- 
 ican millionaires. Should it ever be possible, however, 
 nothing would be more to my mind than to direct some of 
 the overflow of my country's wealth into the channels of 
 educational and religious work in needy Korea. I was sin- 
 cerely impressed with the need and with the opportunity. 
 
 Now, plainly, all this was not at all to the point of the
 
 A VISIT TO PYENG-YANG 105 
 
 interest weighing upon the minds of my auditors. Suddenly, 
 and in a startling manner, the real cause of the three formal 
 visits from as many different deputations, made itself known. 
 With lips white and trembling, the same theological student 
 who had been present at each visit, drew from his sleeve an 
 envelope, and from the envelope a document printed in mixed 
 Chinese and Korean, the purport of which he began to ex- 
 plain to my interpreter in a highly excited and rhetorical way. 
 This document purported to be an elaborate statement of 
 no fewer than forty-eight reasons why Japan should annex 
 Korea and reduce its Emperor to the grade of a peer of 
 Japan. "Where did this remarkable pronunciamento come 
 from?" was, of course, my first inquiry. Why, from Seoul, 
 from the Court; but it was originally a production of the 
 Japanese Government which, fortunately, had been discov- 
 ered in time and which was now officially sent out in order 
 to warn all Korean patriots against this outrageous plot 
 concocted by the Japanese! 
 
 The situation was obviously serious, if not threatening. 
 On inquiry it was soon disclosed that for two days and nights 
 the entire native city of Pycng-yang had been in such a state 
 of excitement as is not easily made credible to citizens of a 
 country accustomed to the exercise of sound political sense 
 and self-control. No business had been done, no buying or 
 selling, on the last market day. All night long the men and 
 women of the city had been sleepless and engaged in wailing 
 and beating the ground and the floor of their houses with their 
 heads. Not a few of the worst classes including, I fear, 
 some professing Christians had been working tliemselves 
 and others up to threats of violence and of murder. 
 
 The silliness of mind, the almost hopeless and incurable 
 credulity and absence of sound judgment which characterizes, 
 with exceedingly few exceptions, the ])olitical views and 
 actions of even the official and educated classes in Korea, was
 
 io6 IX KOREA WJTil MARQUIS ITO 
 
 the imprrssion iiKule upon mc by this, as l)y all my experienced 
 (lurinii; my sUi) in the land. I assured these visitors, however, 
 that there could be no doul^t alK)ul this document being a 
 forgery -as, indeed, it turned out to be. Manjuis llo and 
 the Jai)anese Ciovernment had no such immediate intention; 
 and, indeed, if the Resident-General entertained the thought, 
 he surely was not foolish enough to {)roceed in any such way. 
 Such childisli behavior on their own ])art, I added, was very 
 discouraging to their friends. What could be done by others 
 for a country where the men who should be leaders behaved 
 habitually in a so unmanly way? Let them quiet themselves, 
 tell their Governor what I had said, and bid him use all 
 his authority to quiet their fellow-citizens. This advice was 
 com])lied with, as the event showed; the Korean governor 
 was reassured and promised to unite his inlluencc with that 
 of the Christian forces to secure a return of the populace to 
 their normal (juiet. It was gratifying afterwards to have 
 this official's expression of gratitude for what was then done 
 to assist in the peace-promoting administration of his office. 
 Dr. Noble, at once upon the departure of this committee, 
 gave orders that the church bell should be rung to assemljle 
 the Christian community; and in such manner as to indicate 
 to them that they were called together to hear "good news," 
 An hour later, when wc were going down the hill to dine w-ith 
 the Japanese Resident, the peoj)le had not yet assembled; but 
 on our return in the evening they were departing to their 
 homes, quieted by two hours of opportunity to express their 
 excited feeling in the Korean fashion of wailing, sobbing, and 
 beating their foreheads upon the mats assisted by the com- 
 forting and reassuring words of those to whom they looked 
 as having knowledge and authority. It afterward transpired' 
 
 ' This document prol)ably emanated from the same press in Seoul 
 conducted by a subject of Jai)an's frienrlly ally, Great Britain from 
 which came the lying bulletin that afterward caused s<j much bloodshed
 
 A VISIT TO PYENG-YANG 107 
 
 that a young Korean, one An Chimg-ho, who had become 
 by foreign residence injected, rather than instructed, with 
 certain so-called "modern ideas," had busied himself, as the 
 agent of the seditious intriguers at Seoul, in distributing this 
 forged document and in haranguing the people with a view 
 to excite a popular uprising against the Japanese. It is 
 needless to say that the document itself was nol printed in 
 Japan. But the next morning's sunlight saw the mist and 
 the threatening storm-cloud cleared away. 
 
 It was during this visit to Pyeng-yang that I saw something 
 of the remarkable features of the religious movement which 
 was most intense there, but which spread, during the winter 
 of i9o6-'o7, widely over Korea. The "revival" began and, 
 indeed, as regards its principal immediate results, it consisted 
 largely in the irresistible tendency to confession, contrition, 
 and prayer for forgiveness, among Christians themselves. 
 The confessions, while in general they embraced such familiar 
 topics as pride, envy, unfaithfulness, and coldness in the 
 Christian life, very naturally soon revealed the characteristic 
 vices and weaknesses of the Korean character. Taken at 
 their own estimate, and making all reasonable allowances for 
 the exaggerations of temporary excitement, they made obvious 
 the fact that lying, stealing, cheating, and impurity, had been 
 nearly universal in the hitherto existing Christian communities 
 of Korea. In many cases these "spiritual exercises" were 
 accompanied by the most violent physical demonstrations, 
 such as sobbing, wailing, beating the forehead on the lloor, 
 and even falling down unconscious and frothing at the mouth. 
 
 A more graphic picture of these religious meetings can per- 
 haps be obtained by a brief description of one which I at- 
 
 on the morning of Friday, July 191)1. It, is a comfort to know that this 
 same editor has since been indicted by his own Government for the 
 crime of stirring up sedition, condemned to give bonds, and tlireatened 
 with deportation if his offences are repeated.
 
 io8 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 tended, where, liowever, the dcmonstralions were all of a 
 relatively mild order. This was the evening gathering of the 
 theological students on a day during the whole of which they 
 had been holding a series of similar gatherings. As we 
 arrived in front of the building in which the meeting was held, 
 there pierced the silent night air a voice of wailing rather than 
 of articulate speaking, in a high-i)itche(l key and with extreme 
 rapidity of utterance. On entering, some sixty Korean men 
 appeared, seated on the floor with their heads bowed in their 
 hands; three or four missionaries were occupying a bench 
 which ran across one end of the room. At the other end stood 
 one of the students swaying back and forth; it was his con- 
 fession of sin that we had heard while still outside. Precisely 
 what the confession was, there was no opportunity to learn; 
 for after speaking a few sentences more, wdth ever increasing 
 rapidity and shrillness of tone, the speaker fell to the floor 
 sobbing and moaning convulsively and began beating the 
 mats with fists and with forehead. One of the missionaries 
 stepped carefully between the stooping bodies of his com- 
 rades, found his way to the prostrate sinner, and by words 
 and gentle blows upon the back attempted to revive and 
 comfort him. 
 
 Then followed a series of similar confessions, interspersed 
 with prayers for forgiveness, none of which, however, at- 
 tained the same degree of vehemence and physical excess. 
 The substance of sins confessed by these Korean students of 
 divinity was most illuminating. The next penitent wished 
 it to be known that he had broken all the commandments; 
 although it appeared that this far limit had been reached 
 before his profession of Christianity, and that he had been 
 guilty of murder rather in the spirit than in fact. \'arious 
 following narratives of experience, made with varying de- 
 grees of emotional excitement, included forms of wrong- 
 doing common to most church members in all countries,
 
 A VISIT TO PYENG-YANG 109 
 
 such as pride, envy, deceit, infidelity, and impurity of thought, 
 if not of hfe. But the chmax was fairly reached when one 
 man of early middle-age arose, and in a markedly unemo- 
 tional way asserted that, although he had formerly resisted 
 all efforts to make him tell the truth as to his real manner 
 of living, he now felt that the time had come when this 
 painful duty could no longer be postponed. How to repent, 
 however, he did not know. The story which was told in 
 cold-blooded fashion was, briefly, as follows: Before pro- 
 fessing Christian conversion he had been a wild fellow, and 
 among other crimes had twice set fire to the houses of his 
 neighbors. After profession of conversion he had been em- 
 ployed as a colporteur. In this connection he had thrown 
 away or destroyed the books he was paid to distribute, had 
 told his employer that robbers had attacked him and stolen 
 them, and thus had collected his full salary. Still later he 
 had renounced all pretence of Christianity and had himself 
 become a robber. His life as a theological student up to the 
 present time had been characterized by pride, envy, and 
 constant secret hatred of those of his fellow-students who had 
 surpassed him in their studies. 
 
 Among the most significant of the confessions were those 
 of bitter hatred of the Japanese, and even of murderous 
 thoughts and plans toward them. These wholesome self- 
 accusations were in several instances followed by earnest and 
 pathetic petitions not only for forgiveness of themselves, 
 but for the Divine blessing upon their enemies. [In this 
 connection it is pertinent to remark that, while tliere has 
 undoubtedly been much ill-treatment of Koreans by Japan- 
 ese, I have never known of any of that bitter race-hatred 
 toward the former by the latter, whicli undoubtedly at the 
 present time permeates a large part of the Korean popula- 
 tion toward tlie Japanese.] On Ijcing asked to say a few 
 words to these students, I s])oke of the unreasonaljle and un-
 
 no IX KOREA WITJI AIARQUJS ITO 
 
 Christian character of race-hatred and asked them to put 
 from their minds all such foolish and wicked feelings. And 
 then, as though to emphasize the beauty and brightness of 
 nature as conrasted with the unseemly and dark condi- 
 tion of man, we came out imder a sky as clear and alight 
 with scintillating stars as 1 have ever seen in Jndia or in 
 i-:gypt. 
 
 On our arrival at the station of Pyeng-yang, to return to 
 Seoul, on the morning of Wednesday, April lotli, the little 
 fellows from tlie Presbyterian mission-school were there 
 before us, already in line with Korean and American tlags 
 flying, and with drums and trumi)ets making a creditable 
 noise. The ap])roj)riate parting address to this school had 
 scarcely been finished, when another school appeared in the 
 distance, on the double-cjuick for the station, to whom, when 
 they had got themselves into })roi)er shape. Dr. Noble re- 
 peated the substance of the words just spoken to their com- 
 rades earlier arrived. Scarcely was this finished, when, for 
 the third time and now it was the pupils from the Con- 
 fucian school a troo}) of boys came scurrying through the 
 dust, lined up, and claimed their share of the foreign sahib's 
 parting salutation and advice. And then we were slowly 
 drawn out of the station, and leaving behind on tlie fence 
 the several hundred school-children and on the platform the 
 several score of Korean Christians and of Ja])anese wlio liad 
 come to send us off, we returned without further incident 
 to Seoul. 
 
 The few crowded days at Pyeng-yang appear in retrosi)ect 
 as an e])itome of Korean history, Korean temjjerament, and 
 the physical and social relations sustained in the i)ast and at 
 the present time between Korea and Ja])an. Im])rovement 
 may confidently be expected in the near future, according 
 as the economical and social forces are comjjined with the 
 moral and the religious to bear upon the population now
 
 A VISIT TO PYENG-YANG m 
 
 adult. But the larger and more permanent hopes for the 
 future, depend upon the school-children, who, even to-day, 
 are becoming more intelligent, orderly, and self-controlled 
 than their ancestors ever have been.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 
 
 Besides Seoul and Pyeng-yang the two most important 
 seaports of Korea, which are Chemulpo and Fusan, were the 
 only places in the peninsula where it seemed possible to arrange 
 for even a single address. An honest attempt was made by 
 a personal visit of the foreign secretary of the Young Men's 
 Christian Association to "negotiate" an invitation from the 
 Koreans of Song-do, the ancient capital under the dynasty 
 preceding that at present on the throne. But Song-do is 
 an exceedingly conservative city, and the family of Yun Chi- 
 ho is influential there. Thus, even its Korean Christians 
 did not care to hear addresses on matters of morals and 
 religion from a guest of the Japanese Resident-General. 
 It is well to recall again in this connection the fact that, 
 although Pyeng-yang has actually suffered more at the hands 
 of Japanese invaders than any other city of Korea, the influ- 
 ence of the Christian missionaries and 'their converts was so 
 powerful there that the most sympathetic and crowded 
 native audiences greeted the "friend of Ja])an" in that city. 
 There, too, in connection with Dr. Noble, presiding elder 
 of the Methodist missions in all that part of the country, I 
 was able to be of most service to both countries in a time of 
 rather unusual threatening and exigency. This fact con- 
 firms the impression that, in Seoul, fear of the Court and 
 of the Yang-bans is cramping the work even of the foreign 
 religious teachers. But Chemulpo and Fusan are the
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 113 
 
 places in Korea where the two peoples have been longest 
 in the compelling contact of common business interests. 
 Observation of results in these places had, therefore, some 
 special value. The visit to Fusan came later, and properly 
 belongs to the story of our departure from Korea. But the 
 visit to Chemulpo and its experiences may fitly be spoken of 
 in this place. 
 
 The invitation to speak at Chemulpo came from the Japan- 
 ese Resident and from the ]\'Iayor, as official representatives 
 of the educational interests of the city. The affair was, there- 
 fore, conducted much more in the familiar Japanese style than 
 were the invitations to speak in Seoul or Pyeng-yang. At the 
 same time, it had been decided that I was to address a 
 Korean audience in Chemulpo, and Dr. Jones had consented 
 to make this possible by the help of his valuable skill in inter- 
 pretation. It had been arranged that we should meet him 
 and Mr. Zumoto, who was to interpret the address to the Jap- 
 anese, at the South Gate station for the 11.40 a.m. express. 
 But as the time of leaving approached, it appeared that 
 something was detaining the Doctor; finally we were obliged 
 to go on without him. In person he appeared at Chemulpo 
 in the early afternoon and explained that he had been de- 
 tained in order to prepare for the funeral of one of the native 
 members of his church; several hours still later, while we 
 were taking tea at the Resident's house, we were handed 
 (as an example of the despatch with which this service is at 
 present rendered in Korea) the explanatory telegram which 
 had been sent in the early morning. 
 
 The fields between Seoul and Chemulpo, on the morning 
 of May 6, 1907, were beautifully green, for the spring rains 
 had been unusually abundant and the crops were corre- 
 spondingly promising. Combined with the darker green of 
 the pines, and contrasted with the red and yellow of the 
 sand and rocks, they gave back to the eye that more vivid
 
 114 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 but less soothing j)lcasurc of the Korean landsca])e to which 
 reference has already been so frefjuently made. Along this 
 line of railway, as everywhere, there is the same ynpression 
 of undeveloped agricultural resources; there is also the same 
 temptation to imagine how it will all look in the years to 
 come, when Korea has been lifted out of its low industrial 
 conflition. 
 
 At the station we were met by the official deputation and 
 escorted to the Japanese Club. The impression made by 
 the streets through which we passed was not pleasing; for 
 there had been rain, the air was laden with cold moisture, 
 and the ground was either rough or torn up for repairs and 
 heavy for the jinrikisha pullers with its coating of mud. 
 But it should be remembered that this part of Chemulpo is 
 in the making, whereas the older part had a few weeks be- 
 fore been swept by a destructive fire. The Chinese town, 
 through which we now passed, bore a decayed air; but 
 when the Japanese quarter was reached, in spite of the recent 
 loss of some 400 houses, there was a thrifty and prosperous 
 look, an appearance of determination, of not-to-mind-what- 
 cannot-be-helped, so characteristic of the people themselves. 
 The work of rebuilding this quarter was going briskly forward. 
 
 The population of Chemulpo consisted at that time of 
 some 12,000 Japanese, from 15,000 to 20,000 Koreans, and 
 about 2,000 Chinese (before the Japan-China war the num- 
 ber of the Chinese was about 5,000). There are less than 
 100 European and American residents. It is hoped by those 
 interested in the business prospects of the city that, after 
 the through all-rail route from Tairen to St. Petersburg is 
 made in all respects first-class and the consummation of 
 this project will quickly follow under the management of 
 Baron Goto and the Russian authorities, as soon as the com- 
 mercial treaty between Japan and Russia takes effect 
 Chemulpo will be an important port of entry for the in-
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 115 
 
 creasing trade of Korea. But the harborage is now so poor 
 that ships of any considerable size have to he far out in the 
 offing, and the sand-bars between this anchorage and the 
 wharfs are constantly forming and shifting their location. 
 This coast of Korea is also made very dangerous by numerous 
 rocky islands and sunken reefs, by variable and strong cur- 
 rents, and by one of the highest average tides to be found 
 anywhere in the world. Plans for improving the harbor are, 
 therefo e, very important. Right in front of the Chinese 
 hotel where we spent the night, the flats are being filled in, 
 apparently with the double purpose of securing an extension 
 of building lots, and also of shortening somewhat the distance 
 between the city and the shipping at low tide. But the per- 
 manent improvement of the harbor of Chemulpo and this 
 is equivalent to securing one good port of entry for the 
 entire western coast of Korea offers a difficult problem. 
 Either of the two ways of solving the problem which have 
 hitherto been considered would be exceedingly expensive. 
 To enclose a basin with a sea-wall and shut in the tide- 
 water by gates, or to extend the wharf out some two miles 
 to deep water, would cost many millions of yen. 
 
 After an excellent tiffin at the club, where we met some 
 twenty Japanese ladies and gentlemen, I spoke to an audience 
 of not more than one hundred and fifty of this nationality 
 almost exclusively but of both sexes. The audience rep- 
 resented the educational and official interests of the city 
 which, as is customary in Japan and elsewhere, are not 
 paramount in places devoted to trade and commerce. Air. 
 Zumoto interpreted; the ethical and hortatory turn given 
 to the remarks made them, apparently, no less but even 
 more heartily received. I have already called attention to 
 the striking fact that the thoughtful Ja]:)anese are becoming 
 more impressed with the truth of the old-fashioned, but not 
 as yet quite defunct, thought that it is, after all, "righteous-
 
 ii6 IX KORKA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 nc'ss which cxallclh a nation." But tlu- Koreans, as a 
 people, ha\"e slill to awake to tiie impression that either 
 science or morality has any important bearing on the ma- 
 terial and social welfare of the nation's life. Following the 
 lecture, there was tea at the Residency Mouse; after which 
 we were taken to one of those curious l)ut by no means un- 
 comfortable hostlerics which one comes upon in the Vnr 
 East. It was under the sign of "E. I). Steward & Co., 
 Store. Keeper. & Hotel and Ship.Compradore." The name 
 "Steward" was assumed by its Chinese owner because he 
 had filled this oiTice on a small stcamshij) for some years 
 before. The advertisement did not at all exaggerate the 
 variety of enterprises carried on under the same extensi\e 
 roof by this example of a thrifty race. In the rooms over the 
 store the representative of Mr. "Steward" (for we did not 
 learn his true designation, either for this life of ])usiness or 
 his "heavenly name") cared for his guests as well as could 
 reasonably be ex])ected. 
 
 Most of the following morning was spent in con\ersation 
 with Mr. W. D. Townsend, who has been in Korea since 
 May, 1884, when he arrived at Chemulpo to open a branch 
 of the "American Trading Co." He thus antedates the 
 founding of missionary work in Korea, although Dr. R. S. 
 McClay had visited Seoul in June, 1883, to make arrange- 
 ments for a mission; and Dr. Horace N. Allen, who afterward 
 served as the representative of the United States Govern- 
 ment, reached Korea in the September following. Tliis 
 conversation, continued on during luncheon at Mr. Town- 
 send's house, gave me incidents and opinions illustrating the 
 problem I was studying as it ai)j)ears to a shrewd and ex- 
 perienced man of business. Facts and opinions from this 
 point of view were, I believed, no less important and in- 
 forming than those to be learned from the missionary or the 
 native or foreign official.
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 117 
 
 In the afternoon I spoke on the "Five Elements of Na- 
 tional Prosperity" to an audience of about 600 Koreans, 
 fully half of whom were children, and part of whom kept 
 coming and going. The Japanese Resident, Mr. Kenochi, 
 was present. The quality of the attention and interest did 
 not seem to me to reach the level of the audiences in Seoul; 
 but this was only what was to be expected from the nature 
 of the population and the occupations of the Koreans in 
 Chemulpo. From the church we had a not unpleasant walk 
 to the suburban station, accompanied by a number of the 
 Japanese gentlemen and ladies who felt it their official but 
 friendly duty to see us off for Seoul. On reaching Miss 
 Sontag's house we dined with the German Consul, Dr. Ney, 
 Mr. Eckert, the skilful trainer of the Korean band, and 
 other German friends, on invitation of our hostess. 
 
 With reference to the improvements already accomplished 
 in Korea, and to a considerable extent through Japanese 
 official influence and unofficial example, Mr. Townsend called 
 my attention to the following particulars. Previous to the 
 opening of the country to foreign trade there was no possi- 
 bihty of accumulating wealth in Korea. For, as one of the 
 few thoughtful Koreans had remarked: "If there was a 
 large crop of rice and beans, there was no one to buy it, and 
 it would not keep over for two years. Therefore we ate more 
 and worked less; for what could we do with the surplus but 
 eat it ? But when the crops failed, we star\'cd or died of 
 the pest that followed." It so happened, in fact, that the year 
 after the opening of the country there was a large crop; and 
 now for the first time in the history of Korea, tliere was not 
 only something to sell but a market for it. There had, in- 
 deed, been trade for centuries between the southern part of 
 the country and the adjoining regions of Japan, especially 
 the island of Tsushima. But in this trade Korea parted 
 with its gold, out of which tlie Jajjanese themselves were
 
 ii8 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 subsccjucntly cheated by the Dutch, who took it off to Hol- 
 land. Tlius neither of the nations in the Far East was en- 
 riched in any permanent way; both were the rather im- 
 poverished as respects their store of resources for the future. 
 
 Under the Japanese, Mr. Townsend was confident as is 
 every one accjuainted with the ])ast and j)resent conditions 
 that there would soon be a very considerable development of 
 the country's resources. This would take place especially 
 in the lines of silk-culture, raising rice and beans, and graz- 
 ing and dairy products. For all these forms of material 
 prosperity the country was by soil and climate admirably 
 adapted. Up to this time the rinderpest had been allowed to 
 ravage the herds unchecked. In a single year it had carried 
 off thousands of bullocks, so that the following spring the 
 entire family of the peasants would have to join forces 
 men, women, and children to pull their rude ploughs 
 through the stiff mud. As to the culture of fruit, the out- 
 look did not seem so hopeful. The market was limited; 
 the various pests were unlimited in number of species and 
 individuals, and in voracity. A certain kind of caterj)illars 
 eat pine-needles only; and some gentlemen, in order to 
 protect the pine-trees in their yards, were obliged to hire 
 Koreans to pick these pests off the trees, one by one, by the 
 pailful at a time. It seems to me, however, that in time 
 these difficulties may be overcome by the very favorable 
 character of soil and climate for many kinds of fruits, by the 
 possibility of ridding the country of the pests and of im- 
 proving the already excellent varieties of fruits, and by the 
 development of the canning industry. 
 
 As to the effect of the Japanese Protectorate upon the 
 business of foreign firms, Mr. Townsend assured me that 
 the honorable firms were pleased with it and considered it 
 favorable to the extension of legitimate business. Un- 
 scrupulous promoters do not, of course, enjoy being checked
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 119 
 
 by the Resident- General in their efforts to pkinder the Korean 
 resources. In this conversation with Air. Townsend I learned 
 the details of one of those dishonorable promoting schemes 
 which have been, and still are, the disgrace of some of the 
 foreign residents in Korea. But this is not the worst of 
 them. They become the disgrace of the countries from 
 which the promoters come, so often as the latter can success- 
 fully appeal to the consuls or other diplomatic representa- 
 tives of their nationals for official support in their nefarious 
 schemes. 
 
 The relations, both business and social, between the 
 Japanese and the Koreans in Chemulpo are now much 
 improved. Indeed, there is at present an almost complete 
 absence of race-hatred between the two. Formerly, on some 
 trifling occasion of a quarrel started between a Japanese 
 and a Korean, an angry mob of several hundred on each side 
 would quickly gather; and unless the other foreigners inter- 
 fered in time, there was sure to be serious flghting and even 
 bloodshed. Butthe growing number of those belonging to both 
 nations who understand each other's language and each other's 
 customs has almost entirely done away with the tendency 
 to similar riots. Indeed, a positive feeling of friendliness is 
 springing up between certain individuals and families of the 
 two nationalities. All of which tends to conilrm the state- 
 ment of another business man this time of Seoul, where 
 the hatred of the Koreans for the Japanese is studiously kept 
 aglow by Korean officialdom and by selfislily interested 
 foreigners that in fifty years, or less, no difference would 
 be known between the two. There will then, per]-ia])S, be 
 Koreans boasting of their Japanese ck'scent and Japanese 
 boasting of tlieir Korean descent; and a mukilude of the 
 ])eopIe who will not even raise the cjueslion for themselves 
 as to which kind of blood is thickest in their veins. E\ery- 
 where on the face of the earth elhnolo^v is teaching the
 
 120 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 k'sson that "purity" of blood is as niucli a fiction as is tlie 
 so-called "jjrimitivc man." 
 
 According to Mr. Townscnd, one cause of the deforestation 
 of so large regions of Korea in former times was the fear of 
 tigers; this fear was, of course, greatly increased by the fact 
 that the Government did not dare to entrust the peojjle with 
 firearms. The tiger-hunters were, it will Ije remembered, a 
 species of officials who com])Osed the bravest, and oftentimes 
 the only brave, troo])s in the king's army. As late as about 
 sixty years ago the ])rincipal road to Pyeng-yang from Seoul 
 j)assed through a stretch of dense forest infested with tigers. 
 As long as the slaughter by these beasts did not average more 
 than one man a week, the peo])le thought it could be borne; 
 but when the numljer killed in this way rose to one or two a 
 day, they applied to the Tai Won Kun, and j^ermission was 
 given to cut down the forest. 
 
 The ]jrevalence of the tiger and also the method of go\ern- 
 mental control over their capture and over the sale of their 
 skins is well illustrated by the following amusing story. 
 Recently, a foreigner who was fond of hunting big game, 
 brought a letter of introduction to Mr. Townscnd and asked 
 him to negotiate for him with two tiger-hunters for a trip to 
 the region of Alokpo. Knowing well the Korean character 
 as respects veracity, it was necessary for the incjuirer to 
 discover in indirect ways whether the men were really 
 courageous and skilful hunters, as well as whether tigers 
 were really to be met in the region over whicli it was pro- 
 posed to hunt. Something like the following conversation 
 then took place: "You claim to be brave tiger-hunters, Ijut 
 have you ever actually killed a tiger?" "Yes, of course, 
 many of them." " But what are you hunting at the present 
 time?" "Just now we are hunting ducks." "How much 
 is a tiger worth to you when you succeed in getting one?" 
 "Well, if we can have all there is of him the skin, the
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 121 
 
 L)ones" (vviiich, when powdered, make a medicine much 
 prized by the Chinese on account of its supposed efficacy in 
 imparting vigor or restoring strength), "and all the rest, we 
 should make at least no yen.^^ "Why, then, do you hunt 
 ducks which bring you so little, when you might kiU tigers, 
 which are worth so much?" "Yes, but if I kill a tiger, the 
 magistrate hears of it and sends for me; and he says: 'You 
 are a brave man, for you have killed a tiger. You deserve 
 a reward for your courage. Here are five yen; but the 
 tiger, you know, belongs to the Crown, and I will take that 
 in the name of His Alajesty.' Now do you think I am going 
 to risk my life to earn 120 yen for the magistrate, who squeezes 
 me enough anyway, and get only 5 yen for myself?" 
 
 "But, tell me truly, are there really tigers to be found in 
 that neighborhood?" "Yes, indeed, there are." "How 
 do you know that?" "Why, just recently two men of the 
 neighborhood were eaten by tigers." "Indeed, that is cer- 
 tainly encouraging." "It may be encouraging for the 
 foreign gentleman who wishes to* hunt the tiger, but it was 
 not very encouraging for the Korean gentlemen who were 
 eaten by tigers." The grim humor of all this will be the 
 better appreciated when it is remembered how omniscient 
 and -omnivorous, are the Korean magistrates as "sr^ueezcrs"; 
 and how large the chances of the tiger are against the hunter, 
 when the latter is equipped only with an old-fashioned musket 
 and a slow-burning powder which must be lighted by a fuse. 
 
 A story of a quite different order will always attach itself 
 in my memory to the name of Chemulpo. During the Chino- 
 Japan War one of the missionary families, now in Seoul, was 
 living in the part near the barracks where the Japanese 
 soldiers were quartered until they could be sent by sea to the 
 front. One day a petty officer came up on the porch of the 
 house, uninvited; but after accepting gratefully tlie cup of 
 tea offered to him, being unable to speak any English, he
 
 122 IN KORKA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 went awav, k'a\ing the object of liis apparent intrusion 
 (jiiite unexplained. Soon after, howexer, he returned willi 
 some twenty of his comrades, mostly i)etty oiTicers, accom- 
 ])anying him; and when tlie hostess was becoming somewhat 
 alarmed at the number for whom she might be expected to 
 furnish tea and cakes, one of tlie company, who could best 
 express their wishes in the foreign language, revealed the 
 motive of the soldiers' visit. He ex})lained in Ijroken Eng- 
 lish that they had come to see the baby a girl about two 
 years old. The little one was then brought out by the 
 mother and placed in the arms of the speaker, who carried 
 the child along the line formed of his comrades and gave 
 each one a chance to see her, to smile at her, and to say a 
 few words to her in an unknown tongue. On going away, 
 after this somewhat formal paying of respects to "the baby," 
 the Japanese officer still further explained: "Madam," said 
 he, "to-morrow morning we are going to the front and wc 
 do not expect ever to return. But before we go to die, we 
 wanted to bid good-by to the baby." In the Russo-Japanese 
 war nothing else so cheered the soldiers of Japan on their 
 way to the transports for Manchuria as the crowds of school- 
 children at all the railway stations, with their flags and their 
 banzais. The number of the regiment to which these sol- 
 diers, who bade good-by to the American baby before they 
 went forth to die, was taken note of by the mother. Their 
 expectation came true; they did not return. 
 
 The only other excursion by rail from Seoul which we 
 made during our visit to Korea was to attend the formal 
 opening ceremony of the Agricultural and Industrial Model 
 Station at Suwon. The history of its founding is copied 
 from the account of the Seoul Press: 
 
 Shortly after the inauguration of the Residency-Gcnenil last 
 year, the Korean Government was induced to engage a number
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 123 
 
 of Japanese experts well versed in agriculture and dendrology 
 with a view to the organizing and conducting a school for training 
 young Koreans in the principles and practice of scientific hus- 
 bandry and forestry. The establishment of such a school was 
 absolutely necessary in order to insure success to the work of 
 improving agriculture and forestry, to which the Resident-General 
 wisely attached great importance. 
 
 At the suggestion of these experts, it was decided to establish 
 the school in question at Suwon, on a site adjacent to the Agri- 
 cultural and Industrial !Model Station there, the proximity of 
 these two institutions being attended by various obvious advan- 
 tages. The school-buildings and dormitories, together with houses 
 for members of the faculty, were erected at a total outlay of a 
 little over 44,000 yen, being completed by the end of 1906. 
 
 Pending the completion of the buildings, instruction was, for 
 the time being, given in the class-rooms of the former Agricultural, 
 Commercial and Industrial School at Seoul from the loth of Sep- 
 tember, 1906. The last-mentioned school had been established 
 a few years ago under the control of the Department of Educa- 
 tion. Its organization was too imperfect to make it possible for 
 it to attain the object for which it was established. 
 
 Early this year the School of Agriculture and Dendrology re- 
 moved to its new quarters at Suwon. The post of principal is 
 filled by the director of the Agricultural Bureau in the Depart- 
 ment of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry. The teaching 
 staff consists of five professors (Japanese) and two assistant pro- 
 fessors (Koreans). 
 
 There are two departments: (i) the Ordinary, and (2) the 
 Special. The Ordinary Department extends over two years and 
 the Special Department one year. The latter Department con- 
 sists of two separate courses, namely, agricultural and dendro- 
 iogical. These courses are open to such of tlie graduates of the 
 Ordinary Department as may desire still further to prosecute 
 their studies in their respective special branches. Besides the 
 above-mentioned departments, there is a practical training course 
 for giving elementary instruction in some special subjects connected 
 with agriculture or forestrv. The term is not more than one vear.
 
 124 IN KOREA WITH .MARQUIS ITO 
 
 It may he intcrcstinj^ to tabulate the various subjects tau<:;ht in 
 the rcsj)cctive departments. Tliey are as foHows: 
 
 Ordinary Dki'Artmkxt: Morals, Jajxmese, Mathematics, 
 Physics and Meteorology, Natural History, Outlines of Agricul- 
 ture, Soil and Manures, Crops, Dairy Produce, Sericulture, Agri- 
 culture, Agricultural Manufacture, Outlines of Dendrology, Out- 
 lines of Afforestation, Outlines of \'eterinary Medicine, and 
 Political Economy and Law. 
 
 Special Dkpartmknt (Agricultural Course) :^Soil, Manure, 
 Physiological Botany, Diseases of Crops, Injurious Insects, Dairy 
 Troduce, Sericulture and Spinning of Silk Yarns, Agricultural 
 Manufactures, and Agronomy. 
 
 Specl\l Dkpartmext (Dendrological Course): Dendrological 
 Mathematics, Afforestation and Forest Protection, Forest Econ- 
 omy, Utilization of Forests, Forest Administration. 
 
 Instruction in these subjects is given through the medium of 
 interpreters, the last-mentioned office being fulfilled by the Korean 
 Assistant Professors. The number of students fixed for the re- 
 spective departments, is 80 for the Ordinary, and 40 for the 
 Special Department, the number for the practical Training course 
 being fixed each time according to the requirements. The num- 
 ber of students at present receiving instruction is 26 in the Ordi- 
 nary Department, and 12 in the Practical Training course. It 
 is ver\' satisfactory to learn that these students are highly com- 
 mended for obedience, good conduct, and industry. This prom- 
 ises well, not only for the success of the school, but for the progress 
 of the nation. 
 
 This lengthy account of the founding and progress of the 
 school and station, whose opening ceremonial was to be cele- 
 brated on Wednesday, May 15, 1907, is given because of 
 the great importance of the relation which every such enter- 
 prise sustains to the lasting success of the Japanese Pro- 
 tectorate and to the welfare of Korea under this Protectorate. 
 Hitherto, the considerable sums of money which have been 
 from time to time obtained from the Korean Government to
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 125 
 
 found and to foster schemes for improved education or 
 industrial development have almost without exception been 
 unfruitful expenditures. The appropriation has either been 
 absorbed by the promoters of the schemes, or if really spent 
 upon the objects for which it was appropriated, both interest 
 and care have ceased with the spending of the money. Even 
 the missionary schools, which have up to very recent times 
 afforded the only means for obtaining the elements of a good 
 modern education valuable as they have been, especially 
 as means of propagandism have too often resulted in send- 
 ing out graduates who, if they could not get the coveted 
 official positions, were fit for nothing else. In Korea, as in 
 India to take a conspicuous example the students from 
 these schools have sometimes become rather more practically 
 worthless for the service of their nation, or even positively 
 mischievous, than they could have been if left uneducated. 
 But what Korea now most imperatively needs is educated 
 men, who are not afraid of honest work; men, also, who will 
 not accept ofhcial position at the expense of their manly in- 
 dependence and moral character, or gain it by means of 
 intrigue and corruption. But "honest work" must, for a 
 considerable time to come, be chiefly connected with the 
 agricultural and industrial development of the country. 
 Moreover, the institution at Suwon is demonstrating that 
 the Koreans can make good students and skilful practitioners 
 in the, to them, new sciences which give control over nature's 
 resources for the beneiit of man. The Confucian education 
 hitherto dominant in this country has chiefly resulted in cul- 
 tivating scholars who either sacrificed usefulness in service to 
 the false sentiment of honor, or else subordinated the most 
 fundamental principles of morality to that skill in oflicial 
 positions which secured the maximum of sc|ueezes with the 
 minimum of resistance. And, iinally, nothing so under- 
 mines and destroys race-hatred as the prolonged association
 
 126 IN KORKA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 of tlic two races in Ihc j)caccabk' relations of teacher and 
 ])U])il; or of teachers and })U|)ils with their respective col- 
 leagues. 
 
 Six car-loads of invited guests, belonging to all classes of 
 the most intluential peo[)le of Seoul and Chemul])o, left the 
 South-Gate Station on a Sj)ecial train at one and a half 
 o'clock, on that Wednesday afternoon, for Suwon. Manjuis 
 Ito and his staff, and other Japanese officials, Korean Min- 
 isters and their guards, all the foreign Consuls, the })rinci])al 
 men of business, representatives of the ])ress, and Christian 
 missionaries were of the party. The day was warm, but 
 fine; the landscape was even more beautiful in its coloring 
 than usual. On arrival at the station of Suwon, the guests 
 were met by the ^Minister and \'ice-]\Iinister of Agriculture, 
 Commerce and Industry, by Dr. Honda, the director of the 
 ]\Iodel Station, and others, who escorted them on foot over 
 a newly made road through the paddy fields belonging to 
 the station. It did not need an expert eye to see the immense 
 difference, as regards economy of arrangement and efficiency 
 of culture, between these fields and the relatively uneconomi- 
 cally arranged and unj)roductive fields along the railway by 
 which we had passed as we came to Suwon. 
 
 The Agricultural School and Station are beautifully lo- 
 cated; the lake, which has been made by damming a stream, 
 with the plain under improved cultivation, and the surround- 
 ing mountains, all comljine to produce a charming scene. 
 On reaching the Model Station itself a brief time for rest 
 was allowed; this could be impro\ed by those who wished 
 to inspect the rooms where the specimens were displayed, 
 and the laboratories of various kinds. The ceremonial j)ro- 
 ccedings were opened by the director. Dr. Honda, who re- 
 ported the progress already made and defined the work which 
 was to be attempted for the future. The work was to con- 
 sist in the improvement of the cjuality of the seeds, the in-
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 127 
 
 troduction and acclimatization of new varieties of farm 
 products, the instruction of the farmers, the supply of ma- 
 nures, the effecting of improved irrigation, drainage, and pro- 
 tection against inundation, the improvement of poultry and 
 dairy farming, the introduction and encouragement of seri- 
 culture, and the securing of more by-products on the farms. 
 
 After a few words from Mr. Song, the Korean ^Minister of 
 Agriculture, Marquis Ito made a somewhat lengthy ad- 
 dress. He spoke frankly in criticism of the failures which 
 the Korean Government had hitherto made in its various 
 attempts to accomplish anything for improving the miserable 
 lot of the toiling millions of the Korean people. "Not only 
 had nothing been done to ameliorate their condition, but 
 much had been done to injure their interests and aggravate 
 their miseries. Let those who boasted of their knowledge 
 of Chinese philosophy remember the well-known teaching 
 that the secret of statesmanship consists in securing the con- 
 tentment of the people." His Excellency then referred to the 
 example of the great Okubo in Japan, who founded an 
 agricultural college there in 1875, spoke of the brilliant 
 results which- had followed this improved instruction and 
 practice, and hoped that the Korean officials, in whose 
 charge this well-equipped institution was now placed, would 
 make it equally useful to the Korean people. 
 
 The ceremonial part of the day was closed by an address 
 by Mr. Kwon, the Minister of War, who had formerly been, 
 although, as he confessed, without any knowledge of such 
 matters, head of the Department of Agriculture, Commerce 
 and Industry. It was indeed fourteen years since a depart- 
 ment had been founded for the improvement of agriculture; 
 but "nothing worth speaking of had been initiated by that 
 department." After spending 170,000 yen on the station, 
 Japan had kindly consented to turn it o\er to the Korean 
 Government. He was hopeful that the change already
 
 128 IX KOREA WITH .MARQUIS ITO 
 
 beginning to be felt in the interests of the farming population 
 of his country would in the near future result in a large im- 
 provement in their condition, [it does not need to be said 
 to those ac(|uainted with the way in which sucli projects for 
 developing the resources of Korea ha\e liitherto been con- 
 ducted, that both the grave rebuke of Marquis Ito and the 
 confessions of the Korean Ministers are am])ly warranti'd.] 
 
 The ceremony concluded, refreshments were served in 
 and about an old and historically interesting Korean Iniild- 
 ing, which is situated a few rods below the farm station and 
 just above the nearer end of the dam. After tliis, the wliole 
 company walked back to the railway by a road laid out on 
 the back of the dam, which is shaded with young trees and 
 made attractive by views of lake, fertile ])lains, and hill- 
 sides and mountains in the distance on every side. On the 
 plain below the dam some Koreans were holding a panto- 
 mimic celebration, or merry-making, of the sort which it is 
 their custom to commit to liired bands of men skilful in 
 affording this species of amusement. On the hill-sides at 
 the end of the dam, and above the track of the railway, 
 hundreds of other Koreans adults in glistening white and 
 children in colors of varied and deepest dyes w^ere ([uietly 
 enjoying the scene. When the train stopped at the point 
 nearest the end of the pleasant walk, it was, I am sure, a 
 well satisfied crowd of guests which returned by it to Seoul. 
 
 W''ith this ceremony at Suwon another which I had ])re- 
 viously attended in Seoul naturally connects itself. Tlu's 
 was the opening of the Industrial Training School, the 
 initial outlay for which, including the cost of buildings and 
 apparatus, amounted to a little more than 110,000 yen. 
 The signihcancc of this enterprise will be the better under- 
 stood when it is remarked that the nati\'e workmen of to- 
 day make nothing whatever, with the exception of a few 
 cheap brasses and the attractive Korean chests, that any
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 129 
 
 foreigner would be inclined to buy. Moreover, their own 
 tools and machinery of every description are exceedingly 
 crude and old-fashioned. At the ceremony in Seoul ad- 
 dresses were made similiar to those listened to at the Suwon 
 affair. Mr. Yamada, the principal of the Institute, reported 
 that out of the eleven hundred applicants who had presented 
 themselves for examination, fifty students had been admitted. 
 Marquis Ito and the Korean speakers dwelt upon the same 
 facts namely, the deplorable backwardness of the nation in 
 industrial matters, the unsatisfactory results of past endeavors 
 at improvement, and the needs and hopes of the future. 
 After the addresses, the guests visited the different workshops, 
 where the Korean students were to be given manual training; 
 and then resorted to the sides of the mountain above, where 
 refreshments were served. The decorative features of the 
 festivities consisting of the Korean crowds on the upper 
 mountain sides, the uniformed officials in and around the 
 refreshment booths, and the brilliant bloom of the cherry 
 bushes and plum trees were even more striking than at 
 Suwon. On this occasion it was my pleasure to receive a 
 cordial greeting from some of the Korean officials, among 
 whom was the ]\Iinister of the Interior, the cousin of the 
 Governor at Pyeng-yang. It was evident that he had heard 
 from his cousin of the assistance rendered directly by the 
 missionaries and indirectly l^y me, in the way of quieting the 
 excited condition of the Korean population at the time of 
 our visit. 
 
 If official corruption can be kept aloof from these enter- 
 prises, and an honest and intelligent endeavor made to carry 
 out the plans of the Japanese Government under Marquis 
 Ito for the agricultural and industrial development of Korea, 
 there is little reason to doubt that a speedy and great im- 
 provement will result. That the Korean common people, 
 in spite of their characteristic air of indifference and their
 
 I30 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 appearance of indolence, can be stirred willi ambition, and 
 that when aroused they will make fairly industrious and apt 
 learners, there is, in my judgment, no good reason to deny. 
 The experience of the "Seoul Electric Railway," and of 
 other similar enterprises, favors tliis judgment. Not to 
 speak of the financial methods of this company, and after 
 admitting that the jjhysical condition of its property and the 
 character of its service leave much to be desired, it lias been, 
 on the whole, successful in demonstrating the possibility of 
 conducting such business enterprises by means of Korean 
 labor. Mr. Morris, its manager, who came to Seoul in July, 
 1899, told me the interesting story of his earlier ex])eriences. 
 The working of the road during the first years of its running 
 was accom])anied by enormous difilculties. Neither the pas- 
 sengers, nor the motormen and the conductors liad any 
 respect for the value of time; most of the employees had even 
 to learn how to tell time by their watches. The j)oj)ulace 
 thought it proper for the cars to stop anywhere, and for any 
 length of period which seemed convenient to them. If the 
 car did not stop, the passengers made a mad rush for it and 
 attempted to jump on; they also jumped off wherever they 
 wished, whether the car stopped or not. This practice re- 
 sulted in serious bruises and fractured skulls as an almost 
 daily occurrence. Native pedestrians in the streets of Seoul 
 were not content to walk stolidly and with a dignified strut 
 (which is still the habit of the Korean before an approaching 
 Japanese jinrikisha) along the track in tlie daylight, with 
 the expectation that the car would go around them; but at 
 evening they utilized the road-bed by lying down to sleep on 
 the track with their heads on boards placed across its rails. 
 One dark night in the first summer three men were killed by 
 the last trip between the river and the city. In tliose days 
 the broad thoroughfare, which is now kept open for its entire 
 length, was greatly narrowed by rows of booths and "chow"
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 131 
 
 shops on either side. Here the men from the country would 
 tie their ponies (the Korean pony is notable for his vicious 
 temper when excited) to the tables, and, reclining upon the 
 same tables, would proceed to enjoy their portion of food. 
 When the electric car came through the centre of the street, 
 the beasts went wild with fright; sometimes they dashed 
 into the shops; sometimes they fled down the street dragging 
 the tables and scattering "chow" and men in every direc- 
 tion. At one place the line to the river runs over a low hill 
 which is, in the popular superstition, a part of the body of 
 the rain-bringing Dragon, In a dry season the people be- 
 came greatly excited and threatened violence to those who 
 had brought upon them the calamity of drought by such 
 sacrilege done to the body of this deity. Mr. Morris had 
 himself fled for his life before a Korean mob who were ready 
 to tear him in pieces to avenge the killing of a child by the 
 car. At the present time, however, there were fewer acci- 
 dents in Seoul than on the electric car-lines of Japan; and 
 many fewer than those from the same cause in the larger 
 cities of the United States. In one of the more recent years 
 they had carried 6,000,000 passengers and had only killed 
 one. This is certainly not a bad record; for while, on the one 
 hand, the service of the road is relatively slow and infrequent, 
 on the other hand, in Seoul there are no sidewalks and the 
 streets are thronged with foot-passengers and with children 
 at play. 
 
 One other excursion from Seoul is, perhaps, worthy of 
 record as throwing some sidelights upon Korea this time, 
 however, chiefly an affair of recreation. This was the ascent 
 of Puk Han, the ancient place of royal refuge in cases of 
 revolt or foreign invasion. The party consisted of Air. 
 Cockburn, the British Consul-General; Mr. Davidson, the 
 successor of J. McLeavy Brown in the Department of Cus- 
 toms; Dr. and Airs. Wm. B. Scranton, and Aladam Scranton,
 
 1^2 IN KOREA Wrril- MARQUIS JTO 
 
 the mother of the Doctor. Mr. Cockburn and Mr. David- 
 son made the ascent as far as was j)ossil)le in jinrikishas, 
 and the rest of the j)arty in chairs carried by four or six 
 cooh'es each. By the k)nger way out wlu'cli the party took, 
 there was, however, much walking (but no iiard chmbing) 
 to do; and by the shorter way home, with its much steeper 
 descent, there was little besides walking which could safely 
 be done by any one. 
 
 The actual start was preceded by the customary bargain- 
 ing with the coolies. This resulted in reducing by one-half 
 the original charge only to fmd the head man ai)plying 
 late in the evening after our return for an additional " ])resent " 
 direct from me, in reliance on my ignorance of the fact that 
 a handsome present had already been given through the 
 friend who made the arrangement. But, then, such sf[ueezes 
 are not confined to Korea in the Far East, nor are they 
 peculiar to the Far East and infrec[uent in London, Paris, 
 and New York. 
 
 Under "Independence Arch," where, as we have already 
 seen, the promise of a new and really independent Korea is 
 built into the form of a monument of stone, the whole party 
 were photographed, x^t a small village some three miles 
 from Seoul, the coolies made another stop; here they re- 
 ceived their first advance of money for "chow." In the 
 street of the village was standing one of those gorgeous 
 palancjuins which serve as biers, and which give the lifeless 
 body of the poorest Korean his one ride in state to the hill- 
 sides where the tombs of the dead hold the ground against 
 the fields needed for cultivation by the living. But these 
 hill-sides at least serve the living to some good purpose as 
 preferred places for recreation and for intercourse with 
 nature, as well as, in some sort, with their deceased ancestors. 
 In Korea, as in India, birth, marriage, and death are exi)en- 
 sive luxuries for the poor; to get into the world, to beget an
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 133 
 
 heir, and to get out of the world again, absorb all the accu- 
 mulated resources of a lifetime of toil for the average Korean. 
 Surely, under such circumstances, "the will to live" lays 
 itself open to the charge of Schopenhauer that it is blind 
 and working ever to the production of increased misery. 
 Industrial development, firmly coupled with improved moral- 
 ity, and with the cheer and hopes of an elevating religion, 
 as a true "psychical uplift," are the only sufficient cure for 
 such pessimistic tendencies. 
 
 Among the several attempts at photographing made on 
 the way to Puk Han, were some intended to catch one of the 
 numerous Korean children who appeared puris in natural- 
 ihns. These were uniformly unsuccessful. Pictures of this 
 characteristic sort were not to be had by us foreigners, al- 
 though the attempts were supported by the offer of sizable 
 coins. At the first motion to point the camera toward these 
 features of the landscape, they took to their heels and fled 
 afar with urgent precipitancy. 
 
 Within perhaps two miles of the Outer Gate of the moun- 
 tain Fortress we were obliged to dismount, the way having 
 become too rough and difificult even for chairs with four 
 coolies each. Puk Han's wall was built in 171 1; although 
 there is a not altogether improbable tradition that the moun- 
 tain, which is somewhat more than 2,000 feet high, was 
 fortified long before, under the Pakjc kingdom. The gate 
 through which one enters tlie walled enclosure is picturesque 
 and interesting. Not far inside the wall, across a little valley, 
 are to be seen the solid stone foundations of the new Bud- 
 dhist temple which is to take the place of one that was de- 
 stroyed by fire. This is one of several indications that the 
 introduction of modern civilization and of Christian missions 
 is to be followed in Korea, as it certainly has been followed 
 in Japan and elsewhere, by a revi\al of the spirit, and an 
 imorovement in the form and efficacv, of the older religion of
 
 134 iN' K(M<KA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 the country. Riuldliism has, indecfl, been for centuries 
 largely lacking in all moral force and spiritual satisfactions in 
 Korea. Hut I cannot agree with those wlio are so sure that 
 it is not capable of revival there, of inipro\ement, and even 
 of offering a vigorous comjx'tition to Christian evangelizing. 
 
 As we climbed uj) toward the pa\ilion in which wc were 
 to take our luncheon, we saw few ruins of tlie structures which 
 were once scattered over the area within the mountain's 
 wall; but everywhere was an abundance of beautiful wild 
 flowers and flowering shrubs. Among the many varieties 
 were wigelia, cypripedium, several kinds of iris, Solomon's- 
 seal, syringa, hydrangea, giant saxifrage, large white cle- 
 matis, hawthorne, jassamine, lilies of the valley, many kinds 
 of violets and azaleas, wild white roses, viburnum, Allegheny 
 vine, and wild cherry. 
 
 About twenty minutes before we reached the pavilion where 
 it was proposed to spread out our luncheon, great drops of 
 rain caused us to quicken our pace; and the following smart 
 shower which crept by the brow of the overhanging moun- 
 tain, in spite of the protection of our umljrellas, gave the 
 party somew^hat of a wetting before shelter was reached. 
 But soon the rain was over; the sun came gloriously out; 
 the mountain stream which was just below the outer wall 
 of the pavilion ran fuller and more merrily; and the food 
 w^as more comforting in contrast with the slight })receding 
 discomfort. 
 
 Lying in the sun on a shelving rock, I had an interesting 
 conversation with the English Consul-General. In the 
 course of this Air. Cockljurn expressed the amazement of 
 his country at what he graciously called the "patience" of 
 Americans in putting up so cjuietly with })olitical and social 
 wrongs which the English had refused any longer to suffer, 
 now nearly a century ago. He seemed sincerely gratified 
 at my assurance that the feeling of the United States toward
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 135 
 
 England is more cordial and appreciative of our common 
 good and common mission in the world than was the case 
 twenty-five and thirty years ago. I found myself also in 
 hearty agreement with his view that the treaty between Great 
 Britain and Japan, whether it should prove of commercial 
 advantage to the former, or not, was fruitful of good to the 
 latter nation, to the Far East, and to mankind as interested 
 in the world's peace. 
 
 At about four o'clock the party started on its return to 
 Seoul. The distance was some ten miles, most of which 
 must be walked, by a rather steep descent in places over 
 barren surfaces of granite rock. But the path at first led 
 us still higher up the mountain until, having passed through 
 an inner gate, we reached the outer wall upon the other side 
 of the whole enclosure. For as much of the slope of Puk 
 Han, as somewhat more than two miles of rambling wall can 
 embrace, constitutes this fortified retreat of the Korean 
 monarchy. Thus, with its stores of provisions and implements 
 of war, the cultivated fields, palaces, and other official and 
 unofficial residences inside, it was intended that Puk Han, 
 like its somewhat earlier colleague, the fortresses of Kang 
 Wha, should resist siege by any numbers and for any length 
 of time. But from prehistoric times to Port Arthur, and all 
 over the earth from Sevastopol to Daulatabad, the experi- 
 ences of history have shown how vain is the hope of the rulers 
 of men to ward off the results of moral and ])olitical degen- 
 eracy by walls of stone and implements of iron. 
 
 Far away on the very top of the mountain, to the left of 
 our path, stood a watch-tower which commanded a view of 
 all this part of Korea. From both of tlie gates in this por- 
 tion of the wall, which, although they are only a short dis- 
 tance apart, look toward different })oints of the compass, 
 the views are extensive and cliarming. To the southward 
 one could look down the steep mountain side, over a valley
 
 136 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 from which rose rocky but brilliantly colored hills, bare for 
 the most part of foliage, and through which the silvery 
 thread of the River Han wound its way, upon a series of 
 mountain ranges bounded only by the horizon. From the 
 Western gate were to be seen Chemulpo and its island-dotted 
 harbor, and ])eyond the open sea. 
 
 The downward path of Puk Han winds around the moun- 
 tain, from the Southern gate in the wall toward the north- 
 west; and although it is quite too steep and rough for safe 
 descent in chairs, it is not particularly dilTicult for those who 
 walk it with sound knee-joints and ordinarily careful and 
 judicious feet. For the first five or six miles it affords an 
 uninterrupted series of interesting and beautiful views. 
 Here the colors of the rock, when seen in full sunlight, were 
 trying for all' but the most insensitive eyes. But as the light 
 was modified by the occasional passing of clouds, or by the 
 changes in the relation of the path to the points of the com- 
 pass, the effect was kaleidoscopic in character on a mag- 
 nificent scale. On this side of the mountain the shapes of 
 the rocks are peculiar. In general, each mountain-ridge 
 supreme, subordinate, or still inferior is -composed of a 
 series of pyramidally-shaped granite structures, rising higher 
 and higher as to their visible summits; but with their sides 
 welded, as it were, together, and their surfaces of disintegrated 
 yellowish or reddish rock. Between the sides of the pyramids 
 in each series, and between the different series, and between 
 the higher ranges composed of the series, are dry ravines, 
 down, which the summer rains -descend in torrents, keeping 
 the slopes of all these rocky elevations almost bare of verdure. 
 Thus there is produced an aspect of severe grandeur (juite 
 out of proportion to the real height of the mountains. But 
 this aspect is relieved by an abundant growth of wild tlowers 
 and flowering shrubs such as have been already named and 
 still others with more gorgeous blossoms than I have anv-
 
 CHEMULPO AND OTHER PLACES 137 
 
 where else seen produced by the same species. With these 
 the ladies filled all hands, and all the luncheon baskets and 
 then even the chairs, which, however, we took again as soon 
 as it became practicable, to the relief of feet and knees; and 
 thus we entered the city by the North-West Gate, where we 
 stopped awhile to rest the men and to enjoy the magnificent 
 view of Seoul from the inside of the gate. 
 
 The excursion up Puk Han will certainly be remembered 
 by some of the party as one of the most enjoyable to be 
 obtained anywhere. It far surpasses most of those much- 
 lauded by the guide-books in other more frequented but 
 really less rewarding portions of the world. 
 
 If time had permitted, by turning aside an hour or two, 
 the ascent of Puk Han might have been varied by a visit 
 to the "Great White Buddha." This rather interesting relic 
 of a long-time decaying, but possibly now to be revived. 
 Buddhism, I visited one morning in company with ]\[r. 
 Gillett. The path to it leaves the main road some miles out 
 of the city; where it begins to wind through the paddy fields 
 it becomes somewhat difi^icult for jinrikishas. On the way 
 one passes shrines such as are used not infrequently for the 
 now forbidden exorcising ceremonies of the sorceresses, and 
 heaps of stones that are continually being piled upon by the 
 passers along the way, who wish thus to propitiate the spirits 
 and to obtain good luck. The Buddha itself is a large and 
 rudely-shaped figure, whitewashed on to the face of a rock, 
 which has been escarped and covered with a pavilion, having 
 a highly decorative frieze and a roof set 'On granite pillars. 
 A few women were there worshipping in tlie manner common 
 to the ignorant populace in Korea and Japan /. c, clapping 
 the hands, offering a small coin or two, and mumbling a 
 prayer. A dirty, disreputable-looking priest was assiduously 
 gathering up the coins, for they had merel}' been ])laced upon 
 a table before the Buddha, instead of beinji; thrown into an
 
 138 IN KOREA WITH iMARQUIS ITO 
 
 enclosed box. He volunteered the exj)lanation that this was 
 the most celebrated* i)lace in all Korea at which to offer 
 effective prayer for a son; childless women, and also men, 
 canie from all o\er the land to worship at this shrine. In 
 Korea, as well as in India and China, tliis vulgar and degrad- 
 ing superstition is connected with ancestor worship namely, 
 that the welfare of the living and the dead, in this world and 
 in the next, is somehow insei)arably bound up with begetting 
 and bearing, or somehow ])Ossessing, a male descendant. 
 No heavier curse is put on woman; no subtler form of temi)ta- 
 tion to lust for man; no more burdensome restriction on 
 society; and no more eflicicnt check to a spiritual faith and 
 a spiritual development exists among the civilized peoples of 
 the world than this ancient but unworthy superstition. Even 
 devil-worship is scarcely less cruel and socially degrading. 
 
 It was with sincere regret that I left Korea without the 
 opportunity to see the country even more widely, to feel more 
 profoundly the spirit of its national life, and to become more 
 accjuainted in a relatively "lirst-hand" way with its history 
 and its antiquities. I was confident that I had gained 
 sufficient trustworthy information to judge fairly of the 
 character of the nati\e government Emperor and Court 
 and Yang-bans to estimate in a measure the difficulties 
 which encompassed the position of the Resident-General, 
 and to appreciate the sincerity and self-sacrificing nature of 
 his plans and the value of his achievements. But there are 
 few countries in the world to-day where richer rewards await 
 the expert and patient investigator of history and of an- 
 tiquities. The history of Korea remains to be written; its 
 antiquities are there to be explored.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE DEPARTURE 
 
 Soon after breakfast on the morning of the day before 
 our stay in Seoul came to an end (Monday, May 27th), a 
 telephone message was reported with the inquiry whether we 
 expected to be at home at ten o'clock. Contrary to the un- 
 derstanding of the servant who brought the report, it proved 
 to be Marquis Ito himself who, accompanied by General 
 Murata, had kindly taken the time from his always busy 
 morning hours to call in person and bid his guests good-by. 
 Speaking with his customary cjuiet deliberation, brevity, and 
 sincerity. His Excellency thanked me for the services ren- 
 dered to him and to his nation, both directly and indirectly, 
 by the visit to Korea; and the words which added a promise 
 of continued friendship will always remain among the choicest 
 of memories. In reply with more adequate reason but with 
 no less sincerity and earnestness I thanked the Marquis for 
 the confidence he had reposed in me, and as v/ell for the 
 experience which his invitation had furnished. If I had been 
 of some small service, I had received a much more than 
 adequate reward in the opportunity of seeing an interesting 
 side of human hfe which had hitherto been, for the most 
 part, unfamiliar to me. I also expressed my iDcIief in a 
 universal and omnipotent S])irit of Righteousness, who 
 shapes the destinies of men and of nations, and who uses us 
 all in His service if we so will to our own real wcll-ljeing 
 and to the good of humanity. God has so bound together
 
 I40 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Japan and Korea, both physically and ])olitically, that their 
 interests cannot be sej)arated, whether for weal or for woe. 
 
 In the afternoon of the same day, at the house of Mr. D. 
 W. Stevens, whose hos|)itality we had before enjo}ed and 
 whose friendshi]) we had learned highly to prize, we met at 
 tea some twenty-five of the most intimate of the acquaintances 
 made during the j)revious two months. This was not, how- 
 ever, our tmal leave-taking of these friends. P'or the next 
 morning at 8.50, at the South-Gate Station, most of the same 
 persons gathered to give us one of those partings which one 
 would not gladly miss, but which are always a mixture of sad 
 pleasure and sweet pain. The insight of the Japanese lan- 
 guage into such human experiences is shown by the fact 
 that it has a single word which combines all these complex 
 elements, and expresses them in itself. Nor do I fmd that 
 the repetition of many such experiences in different far- 
 away lands at all changes the intrinsic character of the feel- 
 ings they excite. To make friends away from home is the 
 traveller's choicest pleasure; to part soon from these friends 
 is the traveller's keenest pain. 
 
 The journey from Seoul to Fusan was without incident 
 and accomplished on time. As furnishing a change in the 
 character of the surroundings, it is almost equivalent to 
 going from Korea to Ja]:)an. For Fusan is essentially a 
 Japanese city, and has been such for many years. The 
 greeting given us on arrival was also characteristically Japan- 
 ese. There, on the platform, were thirty or more of both 
 sexes, including the Resident and other officials, whose cards 
 were handed to us with such speed and profusion that to 
 recognize names was impossible, and even to avoid dropping 
 some of the pieces was difficult. The harbor launch again 
 served us, as it had done before, for transportation between 
 railroad station and Japanese settlement. Only twenty 
 minutes were allowed for effecting a presentable appearance
 
 THE DEPARTURE 141 
 
 after the day's travel; and then we were ushered to the 
 dining-room, where about fifty persons had gathered for a 
 complimentary banquet. i\fter this, the Resident intro- 
 duced, welcomed, and proposed a toast for the guests, and 
 jNIr. Zumoto interpreted the response. The banquet finished, 
 there followed, in another part of the hotel, an entertainment 
 of juggling, a farce, and dancing to samisen and koto all by 
 amateur performers. The day had certainly, when it ended, 
 been sufficiently full of incident. But a real old-fashioned 
 Japanese bath, in a deliciously soft wooden tub, with water 
 at 108*^ Fahrenheit the first I had been able to obtain 
 during this visit to Japan took away all soreness of flesh 
 and weariness of spirit, and secured a good night's rest. 
 
 The following morning in Fusan was dull and unpromising 
 there was drizzle, cloud, and fog over land and sea, and a 
 fresh breeze. In spite of the weather, however, we were 
 taken in jinrikishas to the villa of ]Mr. Kuruda, one of the 
 oldest of the Japanese settlers, a prosperous commission 
 merchant and manufacturer of sake. This villa is seated 
 on the mountain's side and is surrounded by as fine an ex- 
 ample of a certain style of Japanese gardening as I have 
 ever seen. Here is a profusion of artistic rock arrangement, 
 decorated with shrubs and flowers, for the most part brought 
 from Japan, and marking out ponds, paths, and favored 
 points of view" from which can be had glimpses of the charm- 
 ing harbor and surrounding hills. The owner was ])roud to 
 have us know that Marquis Ito makes the villa his home 
 when journeying between Korea and Jaj^an. Among other 
 objects of interest in the garden is a huge boulder which feU 
 from the mountain's side some twenty years ago; near this 
 the owner of the garden has chosen his last resting-place, and 
 upon it the proper inscription has already been prepared. 
 
 Ahcr leaving the villa we were shown o^'er one of the public 
 schools which has been founded for the children of Japanese
 
 142 IN KOREA WITH MARQUTS ITO 
 
 residents, and were Ijidden to notice how its reports showed 
 the high average attendance of from 93 per cent, to 98 ])er 
 cent., and even above, in the different grades, for the entire 
 year. Next came a visit to a private school for girls, which 
 is under the patronage of Japanese ladies, and which gives 
 an education of a more distinctly domestic type. Here we 
 were served with an excellent luncheon in foreign style, 
 cooked by the pupils of the school; during and after which 
 there was an entertainment consisting of tableaux vivants 
 and a musical performance that miglit best be described as a 
 trio of kotos with a violin obligato. One of these tableaux 
 represented three young girls defending a castle wall with 
 bow and arrow a scene corresponding to actual events of 
 history; for, in fact, the loyalty of certain clans in the north 
 of Japan carried thefn to such extremes in support of the 
 Tokugawa dynasty. Indeed, through many centuries, Japan- 
 ese women and girls have been far braver and more loyal in 
 defence of their liege lord than Korean men ha\e been. 
 
 From this school we were taken to the ])ark on the moun- 
 tain, with its trees brought from Tsushima some two hundred 
 years ago, to which reference has already been made (p. 15) 
 as the only one in all Korea. The Shinto temj^le upon the 
 hill-top is equally old, and was originally dedicated to no 
 fewer than nine different divinities the goddess, Ama- 
 terasu (the "Heaven-Shiner," or Sun-goddess), born from 
 the left eye of the Creator Izanagi, whose principal shrine is 
 now at Ise, being the chief. 
 
 The lecture of the afternoon was given to an audience of 
 about six hundred, upon a topic selected by those who had 
 extended the invitation. This topic was "The Necessity of 
 an Improved Commercial INIorality"; it was expected that 
 the speaker would enforce and illustrate the thought by the 
 situation at the present time in Korea, and by an ajjpeal to 
 Japanese patriotism to show their nation worthy of setting
 
 THE DEPARTURE 143 
 
 a good example, and capable of accomplishing the task of 
 industrial development and political redemption in the land 
 which was now so dependent upon Ja})an for its future. 
 Mrs. Ladd also said a few words expressing her interest in 
 what we had seen in the morning illustrating the education 
 given to Japanese girls in Fusan, and also the hope that 
 something similar might soon be possible for their Korean 
 sisters. The heartiness with which these suggestions were 
 received in this, the principal Japanese settlement of the 
 Peninsula, shows that the better classes of settlers are honor- 
 ably sensitive to the obligation to redeem the fair fame of 
 their nation from the injury which it has received in the past 
 at the hands of the inferior and baser elements of their own 
 countrymen. 
 
 That this determination was not beyond reasonable hope 
 of speedy realization was made more evident to me by con- 
 versation with the agent of the Transportation Company oper- 
 ating between Shimonoseki and Fusan. A careful investiga- 
 tion of its records had revealed the fact that for some months 
 past about 200 Japanese passengers were, on the average, 
 daily coming into Korea, and only about 150 returning from 
 Korea to Japan. Of the fifty who, presumably, remained 
 as settlers, about one-half chose for their home either the 
 city of Fusan or the surrounding country; the other half 
 went by rail inland, chiefly to Seoul and Chemulpo. There 
 had also been of late an obvious change in the character and 
 intention of these immigrants. Formerly, they were largely 
 young fellows of the type of adventurers; Ijut now the old 
 people, and the women and children, were coming with tlie 
 men an indication that their business was no temporary 
 venture, but a purpose to remain and make homes for them- 
 selves. When it is understood that these figures are ex- 
 clusive of the Japanese military and ci\il officials, they com- 
 pare very closely with the results of the census taken just
 
 144 IN KORKA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 before our departure. On taking passage from Shimonoseki 
 to Fusan we had noticed that the passengers which crowded 
 and overflowed the second- and third-class cabin accommo- 
 dations of the steamer a])peared to l)e very decent folk. 
 Many of them had brought along, not only their luggage, but 
 also their agricultural implements and mechanic's tools. 
 Ikit the subject of Japanese settlement in Korea, and its 
 effect upon both countries concerned, is so im])ortant as to 
 deserve further discussion of such statistics as are now 
 available. 
 
 We went on board the Iki Mam early enough to axoid the 
 crowd that woukl come by the afternoon train from Seoul. 
 After bidding good-by to the score of ladies and gentlemen 
 who had come down to the wharf to see us off, there was 
 time for dinner before the steamer sailed. As we watched 
 the retreating shores of Korea, we remembered the morning 
 of two months before when these shores had first come into 
 view. It was Japanese friends who had then welcomed us 
 the same friends who had just bidden us farewell. But be- 
 tween the two experiences lay a busy period of work and of 
 observation which had resulted in making more friends, 
 Japanese and foreign, in Korea itself. But how about the 
 Koreans themselves; had we won, even to the beginnings of 
 real and constant friendly feeling, any among their number? 
 I was unable confidently to say. The Koreans are s]X)ken 
 of, by the missionaries especially, as notably kind and af- 
 fectionate in disposition and easily attached to the foreigner 
 by friendly ties. By the diplomats and business men they 
 are, for the most ])art, distrusted and despisefl. As the 
 guests of Marquis Ito, it was not strange that we did not 
 quickly gain any assurance of genuine and trustworthy 
 friendliness on their part. But this, too, is a subject which 
 requires consideration from a more impersonal |)oint of view. 
 For there is something startling in the wide divergencies, and
 
 THE DEPARTURE 145 
 
 c\-en sharp antagonisms, of the estimates of Korean character 
 which any serious and disinterested inc^uiry evokes. 
 
 The night of ]\Iay 29th was rough, and our ship rolled con- 
 siderably while crossing the straits between Korea and Japan. 
 But by early morning we were in smooth water. The like- 
 nesses and the contrasts of the two countries were even more 
 impressive than they had been when we first landed in 
 Fusan and passed on to Seoul. Soil and landscape, as un- 
 modified by man, are in this part of Japan almost exactly 
 similar to southern Korea. Indeed, geologically speaking, 
 they are the same continent; at one time in the past they 
 were doubtless physically united. But how different the two 
 countries at the present time, in respect of all the signs of 
 human activity and human enterprise! Our Japanese com- 
 panion explained the prosperity of this part of his native land 
 as growing out of the nature of its early history. Prince 
 IMori was formerly lord of all this part of Japan, nearly as 
 far eastward as Hiogo. When driven by Hideyoshi to its 
 western extremity, he had taken with him a large number 
 of his best retainers. Their support in the two or three dis- 
 tricts which he was still allowed to retain became at once a 
 most difficult practical problem. But it was solved by 
 stimulating the farmers and the trading classes to the highest 
 possible activity in improving the natural resources, which 
 were by no means unusually great in this part of Japan. 
 Thus it was the men who made the country rich, and not the 
 country that made the men rich. One other illustration of 
 the characteristically different spirit of the two countries was 
 mentioned in the same connection. At one time when 
 Hideyoshi was making war upon Prince Mori, he was called 
 back by a rebellion in his own rear. One of his most de- 
 voted friends and adherents had been murdered by the 
 rebels. Whereupon, Hideyoshi summoned his enemy, told 
 him frankly the truth as to the necessity of his abandoning
 
 146 IX KOREA WITH AIARQUIS ITO 
 
 for the present his intention to (lepri\-e him of all his domin- 
 ions, and suggested that the time would be oj)portune for 
 the Prince to recover much of his lost ancestral estate. But 
 Prince ]VIori declined to take advantage of Hideyoshi's neces- 
 sity, since the latter was going, as in knightly-honor bound, 
 to avenge the death of a friend. 
 
 On coming to anchor in the harbor of Sliimonoseki we 
 found the superintendent of the port ready witli his launch 
 to convey us to the shore. After an hour at the hotel, during 
 which the chief of police made an official call to ])ay his 
 respects and give us additional assurance that we were to be 
 well protected, we ])arted at the train, with sincere regret, 
 from the Japanese friend who had so kindly arranged all 
 for our comfort during our two months in Korea. 
 
 The appearance of the country along the western end of 
 the Sanyo Railway on this last day of ]May, 1907, fully con- 
 firmed the account of the character and the policy of the men 
 who, since the time of Hidcyoshi, have developed it. The 
 views of the sea on the right-hand side of the train cannot 
 easily be surpassed anywhere in the world. On the other 
 side, the fields in the valleys, and the terraces on the hills, 
 constitute one almost continuous, highly cultivated garden 
 for more than one hundred miles. The tops of the mountains, 
 except in a few unfavorable spots, are covered with forests of 
 thickly-set and varied arborage. The comparatively damp 
 climate of Japan covers with that excjuisite soft haze which 
 the Japanese artists appreciate so highly and reproduce so 
 well, the same kind of soil and of rocks which shine out so 
 bright and strong in their coloring across the straits in Korea. 
 
 In the train, my next neighbor on my right a big German 
 who smoked strong cigars incessantly, and who said that he 
 had been in the Orient for forty years declared unhesitatingly 
 that the people of Japan, outside of a certain portion of a 
 few cities where foreign influences had operated most strongly,
 
 THE DEPARTURE 147 
 
 were all savages to-day, as they were when the country was 
 first opened to Western civilization. When he was reminded 
 that the percentage of children in actual attendance in the 
 public schools was much larger than in the United States, and 
 at least equal to the most favored parts of Germany, he re- 
 plied that the children were never reahy being taught in 
 school, but always to be seen out of doors, going through 
 some kind of "fanatics" or gymnastics ! It is no wonder that 
 this comment elicited no reply. But the picture of the more 
 than a score of thousands of eager and attentive teachers and 
 students to whom I had spoken not by way of occasional, 
 popular speeches, but in courses of lectures and addresses on 
 serious themes left me unconvinced. Nor was the remark 
 attributed to the inferior insight of his own nation, whose 
 scholastic training for diplomatic service has been superior to 
 that of other countries, and whose commercial education is 
 fast approaching the same grade of excellence. But it was 
 another lesson in the purely external and untrustworthy 
 character of the prevailing knowledge of the Far East, its 
 people, their excellences and their faults; and, per contra, 
 of the only way reasonably to estimate and effectually to 
 attain friendly relations with men in general and with Oriental 
 peoples in particular. The views of the "old resident" 
 missionary, diplomat, or business man as such, are of little 
 or no value. This is especially true as touching the rela- 
 tions of Japan and Korea.
 
 CHAPTER VHI 
 
 PERSONAL REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 
 
 Before leaving Seoul I ventured to send to His Imperial 
 Majesty of Korea, through one of his most intimate, de- 
 voted, and consistent friends of long standing, a message 
 that should embody some of my impressions regarding his 
 own best interests and the essential conditions for the future 
 welfare of his country. I had already frecjuently addressed 
 his people with great plainness, relying upon an imjjlied con- 
 fidence in the sincerity of their monarch's words, spoken at 
 the time of my audience at the Court. It will be remembered 
 (see p. 46) that the Emperor had then said: "He was glad 
 to learn I had come to instruct his people in right ways"; 
 "he hoped they would open their minds to enlightenment 
 and to modern ideas"; he wished "my addresses would con- 
 tribute to their progress." The speaker had, therefore, not 
 only royal permission but that request, which, according to 
 the etiquette of this and other Eastern courts, is the ecjuiva- 
 lent of a command, when he warned his Korean audiences 
 that the real prosperity of their country could not be obtained 
 by intrigue and assassination, but only by cultivating the 
 industries and arts, by improving education, and by regulat- 
 ing their conduct according to the unchanging principles of 
 a pure morality and a truly spiritual religion. Aloreover, it 
 should be remembered that, while Oriental monarchs are 
 accustomed to think of themselves as entitled to rule without 
 regard to constitutional restrictions and in defiance of control
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 149 
 
 by any legal code, the Confucian ethics requires them to 
 submit patiently to rebuke and exhortation, on moral grounds. 
 It also exalts the position of the teacher of practical philosophy 
 (or ethics) to the highest rank in the service of the State. 
 Nor had I forgotten the earnest words of the aged Japanese 
 physician at a banquet held on the evening of the preceding 
 nth of February, in the city of Osaka, by which the one 
 hundred and fifty leading citizens assembled there were re- 
 minded that, when the ancient Oriental teacher and the 
 modern teacher from the West agree in the doctrine "It is 
 righteousness which exalteth a nation" their agreement 
 is significant of the important conclusion that the doctrine is 
 true. It did not seem improper, therefore, to call his Maj- 
 esty's attention to the rocks just ahead, directly for which, 
 under the piloting of evil domestic and foreign counsellors, 
 he was steering the ship of State. 
 
 The message emphasized especially the following par- 
 ticulars. Inasmuch as Japan had already fought one in- 
 ternal and two foreign wars, at a cost of millions of treasure 
 and thousands of lives, on account of the political weakness 
 and misrule of Korea, it could not possibly, with a wise regard 
 either for its own interests or for those of the Korean people 
 themselves, allow the repetition of similarly disastrous 
 events. The two nations must learn to live together in 
 amity and with their common interests guarded against in- 
 vasion and injury from without. History had amply shown 
 that this end could not be secured under existing conditions 
 by Korea alone. The most sacred obligations, not only of 
 self-interest, but also of a truly wise regard for the Emperor 
 and his subjects, bound the Japanese Government to estab- 
 lish and maintain its protectorate over Korea. 
 
 Further: no foreign nation, least of all my own, whose 
 constitution and traditional practice forl)ade such a thing, 
 was at all likely to intervene between Ja})an and Korea.
 
 150 IX KORKA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Those counsellors who had led him to hope for such inler- 
 venlion were deceiving liim; and ihe money which he had 
 contributed to their schemes was not simply spent in \ain; 
 it was beguiled from him to his own hurt and to the great 
 injury of his own j)eople, who needed that e\ery yoi of it 
 should be judiciously expended upon developing the resources 
 of the country and im])roving tlieir own material condition. 
 
 From these })oints of view, which had regard chielly, or 
 even solely, to the interests of the crown and the Korean 
 nation, I regarded the Resident-General as Korea's best 
 friend; and also if the Em])cror would have it so his own 
 best friend. Of Marc[uis Ito's sincere and intelligent in- 
 terest in Korea, no one who knew him could have the slight- 
 est doubt; the Emperor must see that the Manjuis, as 
 Resident-General, was in a ])osition of power. To act truth- 
 fully and sincerely in his relations with this powerful friend, 
 and to co-operate with his endeavors at the improvement of 
 the national condition, would, then, be his own best way to 
 secure for his people "instruction in right ways," "the open- 
 ing of their minds to enlightenment and modern ideas," and 
 an effective "contribution to their progress." 
 
 Moreover, it must be remembered that there had been for 
 centuries, and there were still, two parties in Japan, with 
 reference to the proper treatment of Korea. One was the 
 party which favored friendship between the two countries 
 and a peaceful development of the interests so important to 
 them both; the other was the party of the strong hand, which 
 was always urging the immediate aj)plication of the most 
 drastic measures. If it seemed desirable at any time for 
 Japan to do so, the latter party was ready for subjugation of 
 the country by the military and for jmtting it under military 
 control. jSIarquis Ito had always been one of the foremost 
 leaders. of the party of peace; he had indeed risked not only 
 his reputation as a far-seeing statesman, but even his per-
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 151 
 
 sonal safety and his life, in behalf of tlie peaceful policy. 
 Let His ^lajesty carefully reflect upon what it would mean 
 for him and for his country for the present peaceful plans of 
 the Japanese Government, under the present Resident- 
 General, to prove unavailing for their dithcult task. 
 
 But if His ^lajcsty continued to fail of an appreciation of 
 the real situation, if he persisted in trusting those who were 
 deceiving him with vain hopes and robbing him and the nation 
 of its resources and its opportunity, I had the gravest fears 
 that ruin would follow for him and for his house; and then 
 great increase of trouble for the people of the land. All this 
 I wished to say to him, not at all as a politician or as a diplo- 
 mat, but as a teacher of morals and an observer of human 
 affairs. Nor did I speak on account of my friendship for 
 Marquis Ito simply; and not at all by His Excellency's 
 instigation or rccjuest. I was moved by a sincere desire to 
 see Korea really prosperous and, if it might be so, to con- 
 tribute in some small way to the instruction, enlightenment, 
 and progress of its people. 
 
 This message was in due time faithfully transmitted to 
 the Emperor of Korea, and was listened to with attention and 
 apparently with the same friendly spirit with which it was 
 sent. Its reception was followed by the "sincere (?) prom- 
 ise to heed its injunctions and with a protestation of respect 
 and affection for IMarquis Ito." This is His Alajesty's habit 
 when he is not excited for the moment by the jmssions of 
 anger or fear. "In at one ear and out at the otlier" such 
 is the description which those who have liad most ex})erience 
 with this monarcli testify as to tlie real clTect uj)on liim of 
 all such advice. If any honest intention is e\-er rcall}- formed 
 to keep the promises, to Ijc true to tlie ])rotestations and 
 pledges made on such occasions, it is habituall}' scattered to 
 the winds by the next im{)ure Ijreatli which blows u})on him. 
 A master of intrigue himself (an intrigue of tlie Korean type
 
 152 IX KOREA Wiril MARQUIS WO 
 
 wliich coml)incs as, perhaps, nowlicre else in the world the 
 unmixed elements of a tenuous subtlety and a fatuous silli- 
 ness), the EmjxTor of Korea is also the \ietim and willini!; 
 subject of intriguing eunuchs, concubines, sorceresses, Yang- 
 bans, and unscru])ulous and unsavory foreign ad\enturers. 
 From his ])oint of view, his missionary ph\sician is his spy; 
 and, from the same point of view, the guest of Alanpiis Ito 
 was, as a matter of course, suspected of being a spy in the 
 one case in behalf of, in the other case against, his cherished 
 interests. And these interests are not the welfare of his 
 country, or even those more important and lasting interests 
 that concern his own crown and the perpetuation of the 
 royal house. They are sensuous and personal. Yet this 
 complex character is truthfully described as amiable, kindle- 
 by preference, and ready to smile upon and give gifts to all. 
 But this, too, is a problem which requires further considera- 
 tion, as one of interest from the psychologist's point of view not 
 only, but also and chiefly, from the point of \iew which regards 
 the social and political relations of Japan and Korea. At the 
 time my message was delivered, and even before it was sent, 
 the fatal mistake of sending a Commission to The Hague 
 had been made. In the case of monarchs and of nations, 
 as in the case of common folk individuals and communitiL-s 
 there are promises sincerely made, but made too late, and 
 penitence which follows but does not anticipate and pre\ent 
 the last fatal consequences of years of folly and of crime. 
 
 To these results of my observations in Korea the following 
 particulars should be added in this place. As has just been 
 indicated, one of the strongest and most fixed impressions 
 made was that of the well-nigh hopeless corruption of the 
 Korean Court. Of intrigue and corruption there is doubt- 
 less enough in all courts, especially in those of Oriental 
 countries. Nor are these evils by any means absent from the 
 political centres of Republican Governments, whether of the
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 153 
 
 national or local character. But the intrijTuc and corruj)tion 
 of the Korean Court are of a jx'culiarly despicable and, in- 
 deed, intolerable character. The premises in which it is 
 housed at present are entirely lacking in any appearance of 
 dignity; are, indeed, almost squalid. In a commonplace brick 
 building were loflged the Emperor, the Crown Prince, I>adv 
 Om, the little Prince her son, and an innumeral)le numljcr 
 of court officials, court ladies, and eunuchs. The Cabinet 
 Ministers in attendance during the night await the Imperial 
 pleasure in a Korean house near the courtyard, in rooms 
 hardly larger than horse-stalls. At times the contents of the 
 cesspools, in close proximity to the main palace gates, offend 
 both eyes and nose. So often as the rigorous inspection of 
 the foreign lady in control of such affairs is relaxed, the filth 
 in the apartments themselves begins to accumulate. Gifts 
 to His ]\Iajesty, in value all the way from expensive screens 
 to baskets of fruit, are appropriated by the court rabble to 
 their own uses. Dishes, and even chairs, are often stolen by 
 the lackeys and coolies at the Imperial garden-parties. Yet 
 there is a marvellous display of gorgeous uniforms worn b}' 
 the court functionaries; and these functionaries are nu- 
 merous enough to cover all the usual bureaus, ceremonies, 
 decorations, and offices really existing or imaginary, with 
 the customary crowd of masters of ceremony and chamber- 
 lains thought needful for the courts of tlie largest and 
 wealthiest nations. At the time of the disbandmcnt of the 
 army, thirty generals and only ten colonels constituted the 
 corps of officers in command. 
 
 All these appointments have hitherto been dependent on 
 the "gracious favor" of His Majesty and have been dispensed 
 without regard to moral character or any form of fitness, or 
 to the real interests of the nation. Indeed, it is no exaggera- 
 tion to say that they have often been sold to those who offered 
 the highest percentage of squeezes for the outstretched royal
 
 154 IN KOREA WITH ^lARQUIS I'JX) 
 
 hand. To sccurt' thrni, access lo [hv car of tlic iMnpcror is 
 'n(lisj)cnsal)lc in most cases. Xot a few of the most low- 
 li\e(l and unscrupulous of his subjects and of foreigners have 
 been recii)ients of ro}'al faxors in tiiis \va}-. To ([uote the 
 words of one who knows: " Xow it was the interpreter of a 
 foreign legation, now a common ])olice sp\", now a minister or 
 ex-minister of State, and now some com])aralivel\' Inmible 
 member of the Im])erial ni/oiirai^c. The soothsayers, geo- 
 manccrs, and others of that ilk, were always present, and 
 frequently inlluential in devising grotesf|ue schemes wliich 
 spelled profit to themselves and to otlier hangers-on of the 
 court. But the most constant inlluence at court of late 
 years was that exercised by some of the eunuchs. Among 
 these, the chief eunuch Kang, was ])robably the most power- 
 ful. He grew rich ui)on the perciuisites of olTice, and would 
 undoubtedly be flourishing still, had it not been for the 
 famousdiouse-cleaning which the court underwent some time 
 ago. He then lied, and report has it (seemingl}- with good 
 reason) that he was harbored nearly two weeks for a sub- 
 stantial consideration, in the house -of a foreigner connected 
 in a subordinate capacity with an American business con- 
 cern. When in his heyday he exercised great ])ersonal in- 
 fluence with the Emperor, and there are well authenticated 
 instances of cabinet ministers having bribed him in order to 
 secure access to the Imperial presence." 
 
 It should also be remembered that this state of things in the 
 Court of Korea was not at all in spite of the P>m])eror, but 
 was rather of his own choosing. Indeed, his character and 
 habit of conducting his Imperial office was the principal 
 effective reason for the peri)ctuation of such corruption. 
 The signs of this stream of evil influence are by no means all 
 concealed. Every clay of my stay in Seoul I w^as witness to 
 the line of jinrikishas, and the procession of pedestrians 
 many of a by no means prepossessing appearance along
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 155 
 
 the lane on which stands the gate through which those seek- 
 ing audience were passing in to the palace enclosure. x\s to 
 foreigners who, in person, are introduced to the Emperor, 
 the Japanese Government had then a practically efficient 
 control. But for Korean subjects, and for foreigners using 
 Koreans to further their schemes, there was at that time 
 still abundant access. And the number of those who visited 
 this "prisoner in his palace" was frequently advertised in the 
 daily news as counted by scores and by hundreds. To lea\c 
 his "prison" and go out upon the streets of Seoul otherwise 
 than on those rare ceremonial occasions when everything is 
 prepared beforehand, would have been for His Majesty to 
 break with the etiquette of centuries. Now, however, that 
 the Japanese are in much more complete control, the free- 
 dom of the Emperor's movements is greatly enlarged. 
 
 I shall not easily forget how the contrast between the new 
 forces of spiritual uplift and the old forces of intellectual and 
 moral degradation came over me, as I was present one Sun- 
 day at the morning service of the Methodist church, which 
 stands just across the way from the palace enclosure. The 
 combined congregations gathered here numbered an audience 
 of more than one thousand, nearly one half of which were 
 children. Bishop Ross preached a short and simple sermon, 
 Dr. Jones interpreting. Several of the x\merican delegates 
 to the great missionary Conference in China, on their way 
 homeward, were present, surprised and rejoicing in the size 
 and enthusiasm of the Korean multitude of hearers. Tlie 
 girls from one of the schools ])atronized by I^ady Om (whose 
 true history is told in Mr. Angus Hamilton's book, and who is 
 now euphemously styled the "Emperor's consort"), which 
 had recently been complained of by the English edition of the 
 Korean Daily News for "being used to foster allegiance to 
 Japan," were singing "I surrender all to Jesus." But what 
 was then being done a few yards distant, just over the palace
 
 156 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 wall, where were living a collection of as vulgar, ignorant, 
 corru])t, and murderous men and women as were to be found 
 anywhere in so-called "heathendom"? 
 
 How the intrigue and deceitfulness, combined with weak- 
 ness, of the Korean Kmj)eror and his Korean and foreign 
 friends, terminated with the commission to The Hague Peace 
 Conference is now a matter of history. As such, it de- 
 mands a further study in its historical origins anrl historical 
 setting. 
 
 The imj)ression which I recei\cd as to the capacity and 
 character of the Korean official and Yang-ban (or "gentry") 
 class was, on the whole, not reassuring in regard to their real 
 willingness or ability to inaugurate and support govern- 
 mental and industrial reforms in Korea. It is indeed diffi- 
 cult for one born and fostered under an Occidental and, 
 perhaps, especially an American system of civilization 
 justly to appreciate the institutions and the personal charac- 
 teristics of the men of the Orient. Of this difficulty I had 
 had an initial experience on my first visit to Japan fifteen 
 years ago. Repeated visits to Japan, and intimate inter- 
 course with Japanese of various classes, together with pains- 
 taking observation of the people, had enabled me to overcome 
 this difficulty to a considerable extent, so far as the Land of 
 the Rising Sun is concerned. But, as has already been in- 
 dicated, Old Japan was really more like Mediccval Europe 
 in many of its most essential psychological and social charac- 
 teristics, than like cither modern India, or China, or Korea. 
 A winter spent in travel and lecturing rather widely over 
 India was of more important service in coming to an under- 
 standing of the upper classes in Korea. This, too, is insuffi- 
 cient for a standard of comparison. With the high-caste 
 Hindu a Westerner of reflective mind will, of course, have 
 many intellectual interests in common. With the Korean 
 Yang-ban, except in the very rarest cases, there can be no
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 157 
 
 common interests of this kind. The problems of life and 
 destiny, the Being of God, the constitution of the universe, 
 the fundamental principles of ethics, politics, and law are of 
 little concern to him. It is doubtful, indeed, whether it has 
 ever dawned upon his mind that there are such questions 
 worthy of patient consideration by the reflective powers. A 
 few, but a few only such, at any rate, was the impression 
 made upon me have a genuine, unselfish, and fairly intel- 
 ligent sentiment of patriotism as distinguished from a desire 
 to use ofiice and influence for the promotion of their own self- 
 interested ends. And these few even that still smaller 
 number who to the sentiment of patriotism add manly 
 courage, strength of purpose, and readiness to suffer are 
 incapable of combining their forces so as to carry through 
 in their own land any policy to secure the most imperati\-cly 
 needed reforms. After discussing this matter repeatedly 
 with one of Korea's most appreciative and respected foreign 
 friends, I forced him to this admission: namely, there were 
 not, then, so far as he knew, two leaders of men in all Korea 
 who could come together, trust each other, agree together, 
 and stand together, to fight and work for the good of their 
 country to the bitter end. ^Moreover, had it been possible to 
 find two, or even twenty, such strong and trusted political 
 leaders, under his late ^Majesty and the unpurged court of 
 his rule, the reformers could not have escaped exile or as- 
 sassination, so far as Majesty and Court were permitted to 
 have their own way. Indeed, it was during all that spring 
 only the determined puri)ose of the Japanese Go\ernment, 
 as administered by IMarquis Ito, that made i)ossible tlie in- 
 auguration and progress of any measure of reform. It was 
 the same wise policy that stood between tlie Emperor and a 
 fate similar to that endured by his royal consort at dawn of 
 October 8, 1895. And only after his friend, the Resident- 
 General, hoping for a long time against the repeated viola-
 
 158 IX KOREA WTl'Il MARQUIS ITO 
 
 lion of llic grounds of hope, had reached llie sad conckision 
 thai the Emperor's "disease was incurable," and that the 
 \ital interests of Korea as well as of Japan demanded the 
 termination of his unfortunate and disgraceful career, did 
 the event take place, I^ven then, however, it was forced by 
 his own cabinet ministers. 
 
 As to the general character of the administration of the 
 magistrates througliout the country of Korea, in the winter 
 and s})ring of 1906 and 1907, there can be no (h'lTerence of 
 intelligent opinion. It was essentially the same wliicli it liad 
 been for hundreds of years, ^\'ith rare exceptions, which 
 were liable to make the magistrate suspected and traduced 
 to the Emperor and his court, the local jurisdiction in Korea 
 was a system of squeezes and acts of oppression, capable of 
 classification only under two important specific differences. 
 These differences were, first, the marks of strength and cor- 
 ruption combined with cruelty, and, second, of weakness and 
 corruption without obvious cruelty. The following extracts 
 from the Korean Daily Aden's the paper which (witli its 
 native edition) Mr. Hulbert and ]Mr. Bethell, its editor, were 
 employing to excite foreign and native opposition to the 
 Japanese are only a small number of the items of news on 
 which this impression was based: 
 
 As a high official was passing through the streets heavily guarded, 
 a number of men belonging to the chain-gang were ])assecl. One 
 of them was heard to remark that if the oificial were not a criminal 
 himself he would not need the hca\y guard, and he added that 
 after his term of ])enal labor was over die first thing he would do 
 would be to kill that official and a few more like him. I'hese 
 words were heard by all and they continued until the minister 
 was out of sight. 
 
 A man of Ma-chun (near Chemulpo) was recently arrested by 
 order of the local magistrate and tortured without cause. After 
 confinement and torture for a period of eight days the man ex-
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 159 
 
 pired and his relatives are now asking the Supreme Court to look 
 into the matter and punish the magistrate. 
 
 A report from South Chul-la Province states that the people in 
 a certain section there do not look with favor on the new tax- 
 collectors; on the contrary, they say that they will tie up the 
 collectors with ropes and make life hard for them. 
 
 A Japanese report from the far Northeast sa}-s that a band of 
 500 Koreans attacked the Japanese at Whang-hai-po and some 
 people were wounded by the Koreans; they were repulsed by 
 Japanese gendarmes from Kyung-heung. 
 
 On Tuesday evening over 250 rioters marched down on Neung- 
 chon district, broke down the telegraph poles, and attacked the 
 people. The matter was reported to the police and many were 
 despatched to the scene of the outbreak. The rioters, however, 
 had dispersed before they could be arrested. 
 
 We hope it is not true, as the Koreans report, that the Governor 
 of Chung- ju has eaten the money which the Emperor gave for the 
 relief of the sufferers from the flood there last autumn. He is 
 said to have gone even further than this and compelled these 
 destitute people to give their time for nothing to public works. 
 This is worth looking into. 
 
 An armed band of robbers made a raid on the road-repairing 
 bureau at Chin-nampo the other day and carried away consider- 
 aljle jjroperty. In the struggle the Japanese engineer and two 
 Korean ot^icers were severch- wounded. 
 
 It is time that serious steps were taken U) put down the brigand- 
 age that prevails in the countrv. No one's propertv ap{)cars to be 
 safe, for we now learn that the Dongak Sa monastery in Kong Chu 
 district has Ix'cn rushed by roljbcrs and pillaged of everything 
 that was at all valuable. 
 
 It must not be supposed that these instances of disturb- 
 ance in the pro\'inees are rare and selected from a long 
 period of time. Indeed, fully one-half as many instances, 
 illustrative of the condition of things ]jre\alent in tlie country 
 districts of Korea as ha^e been gi\-en al)0\e, might ha\-e been 
 taken from single issues of this morning paper. So true is
 
 i6o IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 this that its daily column headed "Local News and Com- 
 ment," called out an ironical article from the Japanese semi- 
 official ])ai)er, the Seoul Press, entitled "Speak Well of \'our 
 Friends." In this article was the assertion: "A digest of 
 its issues (/. c, of the Korean Doily A'cu'.v) for one month, as 
 far as they relate to the Koreans, would indicate that outside 
 Seoul every third Korean was a bandit, wliile in Seoul e\erv 
 other man was cither a traitor or corrupt. This liardl}- a])- 
 pears to be the way to establish a good reputation for the 
 Koreans." One needs, howe\er, to know only a little as to 
 the proper reading between the lines, in order to discoxer 
 that the real reason why there was a deartli of good news, 
 of importance enough to print, in this anti-Japanese pa])er 
 was this: almost all such items would have accrued to the 
 credit 0} the Japanese Administration. Such items would, 
 therefore, bring into too strong contrast, to suit these foreign 
 friends of Korea, the traditional ways and results of the 
 Korean Government and the already manifest effects of the 
 reforms that were being carried through by the Resident- 
 General and his Japanese and Korean helpers. 
 
 The news from the country, as given by the pro- Japanese 
 press did not differ from that given In' this anti-Jaj)anese 
 paper from which extracts have already been made. The 
 former, however, dwelt much more upon the changes for the 
 better which were being accomplished, chiell}- at Seoul, ])ut 
 also in other cities and even in the country districts. Tlie 
 following extracts, selected from a number of similar items, 
 will show this statement to be true. Sa}s the Seoul Press: 
 
 A report received in the Police Adviser's Office here on Monday 
 night states that a body of rioters assaulted and set on fire seven 
 buildings of the District officials of Ko-syong, South Kyong-sang- 
 do. The officials have all taken refuge in Chin-nampo, and two 
 leaders of the rioters were arrested. The rioters, however, show 
 no signs of dispersing. All foreigners and the })olice are said to be
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS i6i 
 
 safe, but there were some casualties on the side of the rioters. 
 According to a later report received here from Vice-Resident 
 Wada at Masan, the rioters assembled numbered some 1,500. 
 Grievances in connection with taxation were the immediate cause 
 of the trouble. On the night of the 6th instant the mob stormed 
 the office of the District Magistrate and destroyed the jail, lil)erat- 
 ing all prisoners within. In addition, they burned down seven 
 buildings of the district officials, and some people were seriously 
 injured. Police Inspector Nakagawa's men, in conjunction with 
 the twenty troops told oS from Chin-nampo, succeeded in arrest- 
 ing three rebel leaders. The District Magistrate escaped, and all 
 the Japanese are safe. The disturbance has not yet been sup- 
 pressed. 
 
 Still another item from the Seoid Press narrates a similar 
 experience : 
 
 Disquietude of a somewhat serious nature is reported from 
 Kim-hai, under the Fusan Residency. About six o'clock in the 
 morning of the 14th inst., the Residency of Fusan received a 
 message from Kim-hai to the effect that a number of Koreans 
 were threatening to storm the District Office on account of some 
 grievance connected with taxation. Several policemen were at 
 once despatched to the scene of trouble, where they found a crowd 
 of natives actively rioting. The latter broke open the prison, set 
 all its inmates free and, far from yielding to the advice of the 
 policemen to disperse, offered obstinate resistance. The police- 
 men found the odds hopelessly great, and decided to ask for re- 
 enforcements. About this time there arrived a force of our gen- 
 darmes who hastened to the disturbed scene on receipt of the 
 news that Mr. Lyang Hong-muk, the Magistrate of Kim-hai Dis- 
 trict, had been taken prisoner by the rioters, and that our police 
 force from Kui-po, having attempted to recover the Magistrate, 
 were suffering from the violence of the furious mob. The mob, 
 however, successfully checked the advance of the gendarmes for 
 some lime by the free use of cudgels and other \vca])()iis. In the 
 meantime, Mr. Fyang was carried away by the mob and his wlicre- 
 abouts is still unknown. Police re-enforcements subsequently ar-
 
 1 62 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 rived, and ordered the rioters to go home, Ijut in vain. It is 
 slated that the situation is assuming a more serious aspect. A 
 joint force of our gendarmes and ])oh'cemen was despatched from 
 Fusan early on the morning of the 15th inst. Re])orts conllict 
 about the numl)er of rioters, l:)ut it is believed that they are some 
 400. 
 
 All this, and similar experiences, as well as the history of 
 the Korean people for two thousand years, raises the serious 
 question of the possibility of a truly national redemption. 
 Both before and during my visit to Seoul I was given to 
 understand by foreign residents, Japanese and Euro])ean, 
 that the case of the nation is hopeless; their whole social and 
 political system is decadent; they are an efTete race, destined 
 to give way before the invasion of members from any more 
 vigorous race. But Alarc^uis Ito evidently entertained no 
 such view. It was the Korean nation which he desired to 
 rescue and to lift up whether with, or without, the consent 
 and assistance of their Emperor and his court. Of the same 
 opinion with the Marquis were the missionaries. Many of 
 these were extravagant in their praises of the native character- 
 istics of their converts, and not only sincerely attached to 
 them, but also confident of their capacity for educational ad- 
 vancement and moral and social reform. To be sure, when 
 asked more particularly as to what were the precise traits of 
 character which encouraged these hopes and elicited this 
 affection, and when reminded how almost universal had been 
 the confessions, recent and still going on among the native 
 Christians, of long-continued indulgence in the vices of lying, 
 dishonesty, and impurity, there was no altogether satisfactory 
 answer to be given. The grounds for j)raise were usually 
 exhausted when the amiable and affectionate nature of the 
 Korean had been duly emphasized. To increase my dis- 
 trust of the view held by the missionaries, were the facts 
 gained in conversation with others who had been witnesses
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 163 
 
 to the actions of the excited Korean populace; who had seen 
 Korean officials that had offended this populace, or had been 
 the object of some trumped-up charge circulated by their 
 political rivals and enemies, beaten, jumped upon, smashed, 
 torn hmb from limb by their "gentle" and "amiable" fellow- 
 countrymen. Nor were these things done in remote country- 
 places, but in Seoul itself, near the Great Bell in the neighbor- 
 hood of Song-do. I had also heard from the lips of Mr. IMorris, 
 manager of the Seoul Electric Railway, the story of how, at 
 three o'clock in the morning of the night of May 27, 1900, 
 he had been called out of bed and, accompanied by an escort 
 of Japanese soldiers, taken to the prison near the Little West 
 Gate to view the bodies of An Kyun Soo and Kwan Yung 
 Chin. These were reformers who had been cajoled through 
 promises of fair treatment by the smiling Emperor and his 
 officials to return from exile in Japan; whereupon they had 
 been foully murdered. Was one to share the "shivery feel- 
 ing" with which Mr. Morris passed between the rows of in- 
 struments of torture to view the red marks of the cord with 
 which these patriots had been strangled; or was one to 
 trust the estimate of their Christian teachers regarding 
 the mild and lovable disposition of the native Koreans? 
 There was also the glimpse into the smouldering fires of 
 hatred and cruelty, mingled with cowardice and hypocrisy, 
 which I had myself had during the visit to Pyeng-yang. And 
 there were the unceasing daily items of both the pro- and the 
 anti- Japanese papers, to which reference has already been 
 made. Finally, there was the fact that these characteristics 
 of the Korean populace were historical, and were chiefly in 
 evidence among themselves, in their relations toward their 
 own countrymen rather than directed toward foreigners, even 
 including the Japanese. Out of this confusion of witnesses 
 there slowly emerged the conclusion tliat tlie mixture of good 
 and bad needed itself to Ijc liistorically explained; therefore,
 
 164 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 ncitlicr the dcnuncialions of tlic one ])arly nor llic ]^raiscs of 
 the other eoukl afford to the observer the sullkient reasons 
 for a just judgment of the native eharacter. It is, indeed, 
 on the whole, just now rather more despicaljle than tliat of 
 any other pco]:)lc wdiom I have come to know. But it is 
 not necessarily beyond redemption. At any rate, here is 
 another (juestion which needs illumining in the wliiter and 
 broader light of history. 
 
 The impressions gained as to the Koreans Emperor, 
 Court, Yang-bans, and populace were, of course, intimately 
 associated with the impressions formed as to the nature and 
 efficiency of the forces chiefly at work for the reform and 
 uplift of the nation. Such reforming and u])lifting forces 
 arc undoubtedly these two: the ])crsonality of the Resident- 
 General, assisted in his work by the ofilcial corps under him, 
 and supported by the Government of His Imperial ^Majesty 
 of Japan; and the Christian missionaries. What im])res- 
 sions, then, seemed warranted by my oljservations as to the 
 soundness and efilcacy of these two forces? 
 
 As to the sincerity of Marcjuis Ito in his self-sacrificing 
 and arduous task of effecting a reformed condition, indus- 
 trially and politically, of the Korean nation, no shadow of 
 doubt ever arose in my own mind. But this is a relatively 
 small and unimportant thing to say. It is more instructive 
 as to the truth to notice that his sincerity was, so far as I am 
 aware, never questioned by any one, not even by those most 
 hostile to his policy, except in an obviously ignorant and 
 hypocritical way. The extreme military party of Japan, the 
 advocates of the strong hand and of immediate forcible 
 annexation, as well as anti-Jaj)anese missionaries and other 
 foreigners, and even that Korean officialdom which always 
 has so much difficulty in believing that any one in office 
 can be sincere all these, as soon as ignorant prejudice be- 
 came but partially enlightened, ceased to bring the charge of
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 165 
 
 self-seeking and deceit against^ the Resident-General. For 
 he had unmistakably affirmed, both privately and publicly, 
 to his own countrymen, to the Koreans, and to the world, 
 that it was his intention to do all that in his power lay for 
 the hettennent of the condition of the Korean people them- 
 selves. When His Korean Majesty, who had not only re- 
 peatedly violated his most solemn treaty obligations, but had 
 also, with frequent prevarications, falsehoods, and treachery, 
 broken his equally solemn promises to the man who was 
 far more unselfishly interested in the welfare of Korea than 
 was its ruler, involved himself in sore trouble, he, too, turned 
 to the Marquis Ito for advice and help. That even the in- 
 sincere Korean Emperor and his corrupt Court believed in 
 the sincerity of the Resident-General I have abundant reason 
 to know. 
 
 It was not the sincerity of Marquis Ito, however, which 
 made most impression upon the leading people of Seoul; it 
 was rather the equalities of patience, pity, and gentleness. 
 Such are, indeed, not usually the mental attitudes of the diplo- 
 mat or politician toward those who are intriguing, or other- 
 wise actively endeavoring to defeat his cherished plans. It 
 should not be forgotten that less than a year before, during 
 the absence of the Resident-General, a plot had been formed 
 which involved his assassination; and that this plot had been 
 traced to those who had the entree of the Palace, in despite 
 of their well-known ])ad character, and some of whom were 
 thereognized Korean associates of the men whose "services" 
 to the Korean Emperor terminated in the commission to the 
 Peace Conference at The Hague. Of lliose Korean officials 
 who were most op|)Osed to the Japanese Protectorate, the 
 Marquis was ready to say that he sympathized with them in 
 their desire for the ])erfect independence of their country; nor 
 did he blame them for their struggles to bring a])out this result 
 so long as their wav was free from King, robberv, and mur-
 
 i66 IN KORKA Wmi MARQUIS ITO 
 
 der. But the witness of liistpry hv rc'<^ar(lc'fl as iinim])cach- 
 able proof of the incapacity of the Korean ruling classes to 
 lift up, or to rule well their own country; unaided, they could 
 never effecl the reformation of existing industrial and social 
 evils. Japan, the Far East, and the interests of the ci\ili/ed 
 world forbade their being longer })erniitted to disturb the 
 peaceful relations of foreign nations. In this connection 
 the Marquis once spoke of the dilTiculty which he exj)erienced 
 in ])rcventing his own countrymen from lliemselves degener- 
 ating in character under the morally depressing inlluences of 
 Korea. These inOuences had, in his judgment, l^een more 
 or less effective in the case of niost foreigners diplomats and 
 missionaries included who had lived for a long time in 
 Seoul. "I tell them," said he, "you must not become 
 Koreans; you are here to raise the Koreans up, and you 
 cannot do this if you sink down to their level." At a small 
 dinner party, at the house of one of the foreign consuls, the 
 Resident-General spoke more freely than is his custom aljout 
 his own early life, his observations during his several trips 
 abroad in America, Europe, and Russia, and the ideals 
 which had guided his olTicial career. In this connection, 
 w^ith reference to his present work in Korea, he referred to 
 the expressions of surprise from some of his foreign col- 
 leagues, that he could endure so calmly the ways of the 
 Koreans tow^ard him and toward his administrative efforts; 
 but "in truth," he added, "I have no feelings of anger 
 toward these people; they are so ignorant, they have been 
 so long deprived of all honest and enlightened government, 
 they are so poor and miserable, I am not angry with them. I 
 pity them," 
 
 It will doubtless seem a strange reversal of what many in 
 the United States and elsewhere have been led to believe was 
 true and certainly it is a strange reversal of what ought 
 to have been true when I say that the patience and sym-
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 167 
 
 pathy of Marquis Ito in his relations with the foreign Chris- 
 tian workers in Korea was a surprise to me. The behavior 
 of some of the missionaries and men prominent in the cirele 
 of the Young ]\Ien's Christian Association, which was in 
 receipt of a subsidy from the Japanese Government, had been 
 trying indeed. That their professed Korean converts and 
 adherents had used the name of Christian and the Christian 
 organizations for selfish political purposes could not have been 
 wholly avoided. Even the threats of legal proceedings had been 
 unable to prevent this. But that injudicious rej)orts of wrongs, 
 either exaggerated or wholly false, should be sent by private 
 and public letters to the " home country," while the recjuests of 
 the Resident-General to learn of these wrongs and to have the 
 opportunity to correct them remained wholly unheeded, con- 
 stituted a trial to patience which, I am of the opinion, few 
 men in his position would have borne so well. Emphasis was 
 given to this by the fact that some of the most violent and 
 false accusations against the Japanese Government in Seoul 
 were made in papers and books puljlished by authors who 
 were known to be on terms of friendship with foreign relig- 
 ious agencies. Even certain paid attorneys of the Imperial 
 intrigues against the Resident-General were of this connection. 
 To all this it should be added that His Excellencv was bein" 
 severely (although by no means fairly) criticized in his own 
 country for his "excessive" patience toward these teachers 
 of a foreign religion. Excited by the reports which were 
 coming from the United States (see p. 62), one of the re- 
 spectable Jai)anese papers of Tokyo (the Yomiuri, in its 
 issue of May 6th) had found it ''necessary to examine the 
 ])ast conduct of the American missionaries in Korea." It ex- 
 pressed profound admiration "for tlie personality of the 
 Founder of Christianity and higli respect for the enthusiasm 
 and de\-otion of his followers." l>ut as for those who, 
 "wearing the mask of mi.-sionarirs . . . ])an(k'r to the native
 
 i68 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 prejudices . . . and endeavor to thwart our j)()licy by dis- 
 seminating baseless rumors and mischievous insinuations, 
 there ougiit to be no hesitation to deport them out of the coun- 
 try." "Marquis Ito, as a friend of i)eace and hberty, has 
 already shown more than sulTicient concihation and patience." 
 
 The story of the better way which Manpn's Ito steadily 
 followed, with its unwavering j)olicy of conciliation and pa- 
 tience, and of its success so far as the majority of the more rep- 
 resentative and inlluential of the missionary body is concerned, 
 has already been told in part. For the small number who still 
 refuse to respond to this policy, it is, of course, not deporta- 
 tion by the Japanese Government, but counsel and rebuke 
 from their employers at home, which is the proj)er remedy. 
 But the impressions of the visitor, who had full measure of 
 the confidence of the leader of one of these two |)arties who 
 are working for the redemption of Korea, and some good 
 measure of the confidence of certain leaders of the other 
 party, can be given in no other way so well as by ({uoting 
 the following words from one of their number: 
 
 "From the Peninsula," said Dr. George Heber Jones, in 
 an address to the First General Conference of the Methodist 
 Church in Japan, "we watch with intense interest the de- 
 velopment in Japan; for Providence has bound up together 
 the destinies of the two nations. Nationally, a new life opens 
 up before Korea. Japan has sent her veteran statesman to 
 advise and guide Korea, the man to whom in the largest sense 
 Japan owes so much the most conspicuous statesman in 
 Asia to-day, IMarcjuis Ito. Plans for the reform of the 
 Government, codification of the laws, development of the 
 industry and business of the people, and extension of educa- 
 tion, have been formulated, and in a comparatively short 
 time most promising results achieved. In spite of difficulties 
 which necessarily for the present encumber the situation, 
 the outlook is most hopeful. As a church in Korea we de-
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 169 
 
 liberately stand aloof from all politics, but find our work, as 
 it relates to the production of strong character, of honest, 
 upright, true men, most intimately related to the regeneration 
 of the nation. The coming ten years promise to be the most 
 eventful in the history of Korea." 
 
 At a tea-party, given in the gardens of Dr. and j\Irs. 
 Scranton, at Seoul, where Bishop Cranston, Bishop Harris, 
 Dr. Leonard and Dr. Goucher, were among the non-resident 
 guests. Marquis Ito was present; having arrived somewhat 
 earlier than the appointed hour. After greeting the ladies 
 and gentlemen present, the Marquis spoke as follows: 
 
 I wish to take this opportunity of saying a few words to you. 
 I beg you, however, not to expect that I shall say anything new 
 or striking. I only mean to repeat to you what I have been saying 
 to the Japanese and the Koreans. If my words are not new or 
 striking, I may at least assure you that what I am going to say 
 comes from my heart, and represents just what I feel and think. 
 As the official representative of Japan in this country, my prin- 
 cipal duty consists in guiding and assisting Korea in her efforts 
 at improvement and progress. I entertain deep sympathy with 
 the people of this country; and it is my earnest ambition to help 
 in saving them from the unfortunate state in which they now iind 
 themselves. You, ladies and gentlemen, are also here for serving 
 and saving the Koreans. The only difference is that, while I seek 
 to serve them through political and administrative channels, you 
 work for the same end by means of religious influences. We 
 thus stand on common ground, we are working for a common 
 object. You will therefore believe me when I assure you tliat I 
 always take the most sympathetic interest in your noble work, 
 and that I am ever ready to co-o])crate with you, in so far as my 
 duties permit, in your efforts to further the moral and intellectual 
 elevation of this people. On the other hand, I feel confident that 
 I may rely upon a similar attitude on your part toward my en- 
 deavors for the benefit of the Koreans. As to the political rela- 
 tions between Ja|)an and Korea, it would be too long and tedious
 
 T70 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 to refer to the past; it is a long history. It is sufTirient for my 
 present purpose to say that the two countries are so situated 
 tcnvard each other that their destinies are bound together in the 
 closest manner. To maintain undisturbed the close mutual rela- 
 tions which fate has ordained for the two countries, is the object 
 for which Jaj)an is in this country; beyond that she has no otiier 
 ol)jcct. As you know very well, Korea can hardly be called an 
 organized state in the modern sense. I am trying to make it 
 such. Whether, or how far, 1 may l)e able to realize m\' oljject 
 in this work of political regeneration, as also in the task of im- 
 proving the general lot of the people, God alone knows. All that 
 I can say to you is that I shall do my best for the successful real- 
 ization (jf my mission. I may be ])ermitte(i to refer to a matter 
 in which you can do much good for Koreans. I dare say that 
 among the many thousands of Japanese in this country, there are 
 some who disgrace their nation by misconduct toward Koreans; 
 but you may rest assured that these wrong-doers find in me the 
 most uncompromising enemy. I may also say that wrong-doing 
 is not confined to the Japanese; there are similar offenders among 
 the Koreans too. While I am taking unsparing jniins to re])ress 
 wrong-doing among the Japanese, I rely upon you for your hearty 
 co-operation to the .same end among the Koreans, in so far as it lies 
 in your power as their religious teachers and leaders. 
 
 But the wisdom and firmness of the Resident-General were 
 no less impressive than were the fiualities of patience and 
 gentleness. To the student of Korean affairs, of the more 
 recently past and the present relations of the Japanese to the 
 Koreans, it soon becomes patent wdiat is chiefly needed in 
 order to mend the former and to improve the latter. It is 
 first of all the impartial administration of justice, in the way 
 of righting wrongs, so far as this is possiljle, and of securing 
 the rights of life, liberty, and property; then comes the 
 fostering of education in the industries and arts, and the 
 progressive elevation of the moral and religious condition 
 of the people. At the time of my visit there were number-
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 
 
 i/i 
 
 less claims pending of fraud and violence not so much of 
 recent occurrence as acts of some months or years old on 
 the part of Koreans against Koreans, and of Japanese and 
 Koreans against each other. Land had been seized and 
 stolen outright, or fraudulently obtained by forged deeds or 
 under false titles. Foreign promoters were clamoring over 
 privileges and concessions, which were cither purchased with 
 some show of fairness or obtained from His Alajesty, or from 
 some subject, by partnership with the crowd of Korean 
 ofhcial "squeezers." The weaker race it was claimed' 
 was oppressed, insulted, beaten, or rudely pushed around 
 not now by their own officials or by Chinese or Russians, 
 but by a people whose superiority of any sort it humiliated 
 their traditional pride even grudgingly to admit. The 
 ability of the most honest and capable local magistrate, 
 whether Japanese or Korean, to discover the truth and to do 
 any measure of justice was greatly hampered and, indeed, 
 made almost practically unavailing by the differences in the 
 two languages and by the fact that the interpreters them- 
 selves could, for the most part, in no respect be thoroughly 
 trusted. It was, indeed, a favorite trick with the average 
 Korean interpreter to hire out to one of his own countrymen 
 who had a case against some Japanese, and then to betray 
 his client for a bribe from the other side, by misstating or 
 falsifying his client's cause. And, under sucli circimistances, 
 what could any magistrate do who understood only one of 
 the two languages? ^Moreover, according to the testimony 
 of Mr. D. W. Stevens, who had made careful examination 
 into scores of such complaints, it was an extremely rare thing 
 for a Korean, even when he l\ad a ])erfectly good case, to 
 refrain from mixing a large measure of exaggeration and 
 falsehood with liis truth-teHing; nor was it eas}- to find any 
 considerable crime of fraud committed against a Korean 
 by a Japanese without uncovering a Korean partner to the
 
 172 IX KOREA WITH .MARQUIS ITO 
 
 base transaction. So crafty are the Koreans that, in most 
 cases of such partnershij), it is not the foreign member of 
 the firm who gets the larger share of the dividends resulting. 
 All these impressions as to what was most imj)eratively 
 needed for the emergencies that were daily arising I was 
 encouraged to mention to the Resident-General at any of our 
 several interviews. It was, of course, desiraljle first of all to 
 prevent the continuance of the evils which had l>een, both in 
 Korea and abroad, charged against his own nationals in their 
 treatment of the Koreans. Incpiiry and observation com- 
 bined to confirm the opinion that this was already being 
 accomplished. At that time, however, most of the riots in 
 the country districts did not appear to indicate feelings of 
 hatred on the part of the natives toward "foreign oppressors"; 
 they were only the customary expression of lawless resistance 
 to a condition of wretchedness and misrule that was of native 
 origin and indefinitely long-standing. No important acts of 
 violence on the part of Japanese toward Koreans came under 
 my observation, and none of recent occurrence were credibly 
 reported. Even of those petty deeds of rudeness and in- 
 civility, which exasperate hostile feeling far beyond their real 
 significance, I saw comparatively few. There was some 
 rather contemptuous treatment of the Korean crowd at the 
 gates of the railway stations and on the platforms of the 
 trains; but the Koreans are themselves exceedingly stupid 
 and ready to crowd others; and the handling given them by 
 the Japanese officials was in no case so rough as that which 
 the proudest American citizen is liable to receive at the 
 Brooklyn Bridge or on the Fourth A^enue street-cars. Once, 
 indeed, my jinrikisha-man, after he had several times warned, 
 by his outcry, a Korean gentleman who was occupying the 
 middle of the street with that dignified and slow-moving pace 
 so characteristic of the idle Yang-ljan, in order to avoid 
 knocking the pedestrian down with his vehicle, gave him a
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 173 
 
 somewhat ungentle push to one side. The Korean fell for- 
 ward, after the manner of a boy's tin soldier before a marble. 
 His crinoline hat rolled off his head, but alighted a short 
 distance away. At first I was alarmed lest he might be in- 
 jured, and was about to order the offending kurumaya to 
 stoj) his running that I might offer my assistance. But when 
 it api)eared that neither the victim of this scarcely avoidable 
 rudeness, nor his hat, was injured, and that no one, including 
 the man himself, seemed to consider the incident worth no- 
 ticing, I decided not to emphasize it further. Undoubtedly, 
 this would not have happened with a Japanese child or 
 woman m the adult Korean's place; it might easily have 
 happened, however, in the streets of Tokyo or Kyoto if the 
 pedestrian had been a man of obviously inferior rank. 
 
 In brief, it was the uniform testimony of those who had 
 been in Korea during the troublous times which followed the 
 war with Russia that, under Alarquis Ito's administration, 
 Japanese wrong-doers were being sought out and restrained 
 or punished, and that deerls of ^iolence and even of rudeness 
 were becoming rarer with every month of his stay. 
 
 Other measures which seemed to me desiraljle to have put 
 in operation were such as the following: a civil-service ex- 
 amination which shoukl provide that every official, Korean or 
 Japanese, whose duties brought him into intimate daily rela- 
 tions with both peoples, should have a working knowledge of 
 both languages; the organizing of a body of authorized inter- 
 preters, whose honesty and abilit}' to discharge this \-ery 
 delicate and important function of oral or written interpreta- 
 tion, in all legal causes and matters of Government business, 
 should be guaranteed, the speedy and even spectacular de- 
 monstration of the Government's inleniion to give to the 
 Korean common ])eople strict justice in all their valid com- 
 plaints against tlie Japanese; the improNcment of tlie char- 
 acter of the Japanese ci\-il ser\ice and of the Japanese ])olice
 
 174 IX KORKA Wrril MARQUIS ITO 
 
 and jK'tly olTicers of every kind; and some kind of arrange- 
 ment ])et\veen the missionary schools and the schools under 
 tlie control of Ijoth the Korean and llie Japanese authorities, 
 by which imiformity miglit be attained in tlie j)rimary educa- 
 tion, and, in the liigher stages, the mistakes made by the 
 British Government in India mighi be a\oide(L Tliese mis- 
 takes have resulted in educating a crowd of nati\e ''Ixibiis,'' 
 who are both unwilling and unfit for most kinds of ser\ice- 
 able employment in the real interests of their own nation's 
 development. As to this last matter, the statement may be 
 repeated that not a small proportion of the Koreans educated 
 abroad or in the missionary scliools, with an almost ])urely 
 literary education, have turned out either useless, or posi- 
 tively mischievous, when the practical reform and redemption 
 of their own country is to be undertaken and enforced. P'or 
 if there is any one thing which the average educated Korean 
 Yang-ban will noi do, that thing is hard and steady useful 
 work. 
 
 None of these measures it was soon made obvious were 
 to be overlooked or neglected in the large and generous plans 
 of the Resident-General for the reform and uplift of Korea. 
 Time, however, was needed for them all; they all required a 
 suj^ply of helpers, to train which tiDic was re(|uired. And 
 who that knows the lives of the great benefactors of mankinrl, 
 or is versed in the most signilicant facts and obvious truths 
 of history, does not recognize the evil clamor of the jjress, of 
 the politicians, and of the crowd, to have that done all at once 
 which cannot possibly be done without the helj) of lime. The 
 whole explanation of the delay is best summed-uj) in the 
 pregnant sentence already quoted from one of jMarcjuis Ito's 
 public addresses, which was evidently designed as a declara- 
 tion of settled {)olicy on his part. ''As you know very well," 
 said he, "Korea can hardly be called an organized state in 
 the modern sense; I am trying to make it such." But as he
 
 REMINISCENCES AND IMPRESSIONS 175 
 
 explained to me more in detail: "I have been at work on 
 these difficult problems only one short year, interrupted by 
 visits to Japan, because my own Emperor required my 
 presence; and the first half of this year was almost entirely 
 occupied with such physical improvements as various en- 
 gineering schemes, provision for hospi als, roads, and similar 
 matters. There has never been any such thing as Korean 
 law, under which justice can be administered impartially. 
 But, according to the constitution of Japan, no Japanese sub- 
 ject of His Imperial Majesty, as well as no other foreigners 
 resident in Korea, can be deprived of property, or of liberty, 
 otherwise than by due process of law. Nor is my relation to 
 the administration of justice in Korea like that of the British 
 magistrate in British India. With Korean affairs, purely 
 internal, when the attempt is made to settle them in Korean 
 fashion, I have no right, under the treaty, to interfere. And 
 the Koreans, when they could resort to legal measures for 
 settling their disputes, ordinarily will not do so; they prefer 
 to resort to the ancient jUcgal practice of running to some 
 Korean Court official and bribing him to use influence on 
 their side. As for Korean judges who can be trusted to do 
 justice, there is scarcely any raw material even for such 
 judges to be found. A carefully selected number of jurists, 
 with a large force of clerks, has, however, been brought from 
 Japan; and they are diligently at work trying to devise a 
 written code under which the ancient customs and common 
 laws of Korea, as representing its best efforts to enact and 
 establish justice, shall be made available for future use." 
 
 Meantime, as we have already seen, the Resident-General 
 was being opposed and, as far as possible, thwarted, in every 
 effort to improve the civil service and judicial administration 
 of Korea, by the corrupt Korean Court, with its mob of 
 eunuchs, palace women, sorceresses, etc., and by nearly all 
 the native officials and Yang-bans in places of influence and
 
 176 JN KOKKA WITH MARQUIS JTO 
 
 power. And the cJiicj sea/ 0] corrupCion and oj opposition to 
 genuine, effeetive rejorm was the smiling and amiable Korean 
 Emperor himselj. How effect i\el}', because wisely and firmlv, 
 Marcjuis llo initialed and advanced these reform measures 
 will receive its i:)roof, so far as ])ro()f is at ])resent ])ossible, by 
 examination of results recorded in official and other trust- 
 worthy reports. To the facts already narrated, on which my 
 personal impression of these (pialities was based, many others 
 of even a more convincing character might easily be added. 
 
 Of the feelings of admiration and friendship which grew 
 during these weeks of somewhat confidential relations, on 
 the part of the guest toward his host, it would not be fitting 
 to speak with any detail. But in closing the more exclusively 
 personal part of my narrati\e T might cpiote the words of one 
 of the Consuls-General residing in Seoul. This diplomat 
 expressed his feeling toward the jManpn's Ito as one of venera- 
 tion, beyond that which he had ever felt for any but a very 
 few of the men whom he had met in his official career. 
 
 After all, however, personal im])ressions, no matter how 
 favorable to truth the conditions under which they are de- 
 rived, are not of themselves satisfactory in answer to (|ues- 
 tions so grave and so complicated as those which encompass 
 the existing relations between Japan and Korea. Such im- 
 pressions must be subjected to the severer tests, the more 
 comprehensive considerations, the pro founder sanctions, of 
 history and of statistics. For this reason I now pass on to 
 the much more difficult task of reviewing in the light of these 
 tests, considerations, and sanctions, the impressions of my 
 visit to Korea in 1907, as the guest of Marcjuis Ito.
 
 PART II 
 
 A CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY
 
 PART II 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE problem: historical 
 
 An authentic and trustworthy history of Korea has never 
 been written; and enormous difhcuhies await the investigator 
 who, in the future, attempts this task. The native records, 
 almost down to the present time, consist of the same un- 
 critical mixture of legend, fable, oral tradition, and un- 
 verified written narrative which characterizes the earliest so- 
 called histories of all civilized peoples. But the Korean 
 civilization has not as yet produced any writer both am- 
 bitious and able to treat this material in a way corresponding 
 to the opportunity it affords. All the narratives of events, 
 except those of the most recent date, which have been written 
 by foreigners, have, of necessity, been lacking in that intimate 
 acquaintance with the Korean language, institutions, cus- 
 toms, and the temperament and spirit of the people, which is 
 the indispensable equipment of the historian. The an- 
 tiquities and other physical records of an historical character 
 have, moreover, never to any considerable extent been ex- 
 plored. A striking example of this general truth was af- 
 forded only a short time ago when Dr. George Heber Jones 
 discovered the fact that a wrong date (by a whole century) 
 had been given for the casting of the Great Bell at Chong-no 
 one of the most conspicuous public objects of interest in 
 Seoul; yet the correct date was inscribed on the bell itself!
 
 i8o IX KOREA Wrm MARQUIS ITO 
 
 The reason for this ])etty falsifying of historical fact was 
 characteristically Korean; it was in order that tlie honor of 
 casting the bell might be ascribed to the Founder of the 
 present Dynasty. 
 
 In spite of these facts, however, the main outlines of the 
 development of Korea are unmistakable. Its history has 
 been, for the ruling classes, one long, monotonous, almost 
 unbroken record of misrule and misfortune; and for the 
 people an experience of poverty, oppression, and the shedding 
 of blood. That they have endured at all as the semblance 
 of a nation, although not "as an organized state in the mod- 
 ern sense," has been due chieily to these two causes: first, to 
 a certain native quality of passive resistance, varied by 
 periods of frenzied uprising against both native and foreign 
 oppressors; and, second, to the fact that the difficulties 
 encountered in getting over mountains and sea, in order to 
 maintain a foreign rule long enough to accomplish these 
 ends, have prevented their stronger neighbors on all sides 
 from thoroughly subjugating and absorbing them. This 
 latter reason may be stated in another way: it has hitherto 
 never been worth the cost to terminate the independent 
 existence of the Korean nation. 
 
 Nor is it difficult to learn from authentic sources the two 
 most potent reasons for the unfortunate and evil state through- 
 out their history of the Korean people. These reasons are, 
 on the one hand, the physical results of repeated in\asi()ns 
 from the outside; and, on the other hand, the adojjtion and 
 perpetuation, in a yet more mischievous and degraded fashion, 
 of the civil and official corru})tions received from Korea's 
 ancient suzerain, China. It is customary to attach great 
 importance, both as respects the damage done to the ma- 
 terial interests of the country, and also as accounting for the 
 Korean hatred of the Japanese, to the invasion of Hide- 
 yoshi. But the undoubted facts do not bear out this con-
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL i8i 
 
 tention. The lasting effects of this incoming of foreign 
 armed forces from the south, and of their short-hved and 
 partial occupation of Korean territory, were relatively un- 
 important. None of the institutions of Korea were changed; 
 none of her physical resources were largely depleted. It was 
 just those places in which the Japanese remained in the most 
 intimate relations with the Koreans, where there was least 
 permanent development of race hatred. But the results of 
 the successive invasions from the north and northwest, by 
 the wild tribes, by the ^vlongols, and by the Chinese and 
 Manchu dynasties, were much more injurious in every way 
 to the physical well-being of the peninsula. 
 
 It is one of the most remarkable contrasts between Japan 
 and Korea that, whereas the more distinctly moral ele- 
 ments of Confucianism moulded a noble and knightly type 
 of character in the former country, in its neighbor the doc- 
 trines of the great Oriental teacher chiefly resulted in forming 
 the average official into a more self-conceited but really cor- 
 rupt and mischievous personality. Indeed, the baleful influ- 
 ence of China, especially since the establishment of the 
 ]\Ianchu dynasty, has been the principal hindrance to the 
 industrial and civic development of Korea. The contribu- 
 tion made to its civilization by Chinese letters, inventions, 
 and arts, has been no adequate com])cnsation for the de- 
 pressing and debasing character of the imported political and 
 social system. The official institutions and practices of the 
 suzerain have for centuries been bad enough at home; but 
 here they have been even worse, whether admiringly copied 
 or enforced Ijy the influence of its Court and the ])ower of its 
 army. And, whereas the great multitude of the Chinese 
 people have displayed for a long time the inlierent power of 
 industrial self-develo])mcnt and of successful business inter- 
 course with foreigners, the Koreans have tlius far been rela- 
 tively lacking in the equalities essential for every kind of
 
 i82 IN KOREA WITH MARQUJS ]TO 
 
 material and governmental success. Thus all the civiliza- 
 tion of Korea has been so characterized by weakness and 
 corruption as to excite contemj)t as well as disapproljation 
 from the moralist's and the economist's points of view. It 
 is China and not Jaj^an which through some 2,000 years of 
 past history has been the expensive and bloody enemy, and 
 the political seducer and corrupter of Korea. 
 
 The division of the history of Korea, made by ^^r. Homer 
 B. Hulbert, into ancient and modern the latter period be- 
 ginning in 1392, with the founding of the present dynasty 
 is entirely without warrant. "Modern history" can scarcely 
 be said to have begun in tlie so-called "Hermit Kingdom" 
 previous to the time when a treaty was concluded between 
 Japan and Korea by General Kuroda, acting as Plenij)oten- 
 tiary, on February 26, 1876. Even then, the first Korean 
 Embassy under the new regime, having arrived at Yokohama 
 by a Japanese steamer on the following May 29th, when it 
 started back to Korea a month later, refused all o\ertures of 
 Western foreigners to communicate with their country. 
 From the time when the })resent kingdom arose l;y the union 
 of the three previously existing kingdoms, the doings of the 
 Korean Court and of the Korean people ha\'c Ijcen substan- 
 tially the same. When threatened by foreign invaders or Ijy 
 popular uprisings and official rebellion at home, the Court 
 a motley crowd or mob, of King, palace officials, eunuchs, 
 concubines, blind men, sorceresses, and other similar re- 
 tainers of the j)alace has, as a rule, precipitately tied to 
 some jjlace of refuge, deserted by efficient militar}' escort and 
 in most miserable plight. Only wlien beliind walls and com- 
 pelled to fight, or when aroused to a blind fury in the form of 
 a mob, does the average Korean show the courage necessary 
 to defend or to avenge his monarch. The saying of the 
 Japanese that "the Koreans are kittens in the field and tigers 
 in the fortress" characterized their behavior during the
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL i8 
 
 o 
 
 Hideyoshi invasion; it is characteristic of them to-day. 
 Three centuries ago, when the l^ing was in Ih'ght from Seoul 
 to Pyeng-yang his own attendants stole his food and left him 
 hungry; and the Korean populace, left behind in Seoul rose 
 at once and burned and looted what the Court had not carried 
 away. "Before many days had elapsed the people found out 
 that the coming of the Japanese did not mean universal 
 slaughter, as they had supposed, and gradually they returned 
 to their lands in the city. They reo])ened their shops, and 
 as long as they attended to their own affairs they were un- 
 molested by the Japanese. Indeed, they adapted themselves 
 readily to the new order of things, and drove a lucrative trade 
 with the invaders"!^ In these respects, too, tlie voice of 
 Korean history is a witness with a monotone; as it was in 
 1592 and earlier, so it has been do'wn to the present time. 
 
 In one other most important respect there has been little 
 variation in the records of Korean history. Brave, loyal, and 
 good men, when they have arisen to ser\e their monarch and 
 their country, have never been permitted to flourish on 
 Korean soil. The braver, more loyal and unselfish they ha^"e 
 been, the more difficult has the path to the success of their 
 endeavors been made by a corrupt Court and an ignorant 
 and ungrateful populace. Almost without exception such 
 men rare enough at the best in Korean history have been 
 traduced by their enemies and deserted and degraded 1jy their 
 king. During tlie Hideyoslii invasion the most worthy leader 
 of the Korean forces l:)y land was General Kim Tuk-n}ung. 
 It is said tliat the Christian Japanese General Konislii liad 
 so high an opinion of General Kim tliat lie liad a portrait of 
 him made, and on seeing it exclaimed: "Tlu's man is indeed 
 a general.*' But, on account of Kim's success, liis enemies 
 maligned him; the king had him arrested, Ijrouglil to Seoul, 
 and, after a disgraceful trial, executed. In all Korea's his- 
 
 ' Hulbert, The History of Korea, I, p. 36S.
 
 i84 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 tory there has never been another man to whom the nation 
 has owed so much for his courage, devotion, and genius in 
 atTairs of war as to Admiral Yi. It was he, more than all 
 others king, oiTicers, and common soldiers who accom- 
 'i)lished the final ill-success of the Jaj)anese invasion. It was 
 Admiral Yi who destroyed all chance of re-enforcing the 
 Japanese army in Seoul, and who thus actually did what the 
 Russian fleet in the recent war could not begin to do. But 
 this great patriot and successful leader, under the same bale- 
 ful influences, was degraded to the rank of a common soldier 
 and barely escaped with his life. Quite uniformly such has 
 been the fate of the true partiots and best leaders during all 
 Korea's history, and this just because they were true and of 
 the best. Such would to-day be the fate of the saving ele- 
 ments left in Korean official circles if the hand of Ja])an were 
 withdrawn. Indeed, as we have already seen, the most 
 difficult part of the Resident-General's problem is to cultivate 
 and to protect Korean leaders of a trustworthy character. 
 It is Korea's national characteristic to "stone her ])roi)hets"; 
 but few of them have had "whited sepulchres" built to 
 them by future generations. 
 
 The more ancient relations of Japan and Korea were such 
 as are common to people who inhabit contiguous lands at 
 the corresponding stage of civilization. "As to the relations 
 between the two nations," says Brinkley,' "they were limited 
 for a long time to mutual raids." On the one side, the Ja])anese 
 could complain that, in the first century B.C., when a ])estilence 
 had reduced their forces, Korean freebooters invaded Kiu- 
 shiu and settled themselves in the desolated hamlets of the 
 Japanese; that the Koreans lent assistance to the semi- 
 savage aborigines of the same island and to the Mongol in- 
 vaders; and that their citizens who wished to enter into 
 friendly relations of commerce with the neighboring peninsula 
 
 * Japan, I, p. 69 /.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 185 
 
 were treated with scorn and even with violence. On the other 
 side, there was vaHd ground for the charge that Japanese 
 pirates, either alone or in conjunction with Chinese, often in- 
 vaded the coasts of Korea; and that Japanese traders by no 
 means always conducted themselves in a manner to win the 
 coniidence and friendship of the inhabitants of the peninsula. 
 
 The earlier trade relations between Japan and Korea were 
 irregular and by no means always satisfactory to cither party. 
 The wardens of the island of Tsushima, which is by its very 
 position a sort of natural mediating territory between the two 
 countries the So family had virtual control of the legiti- 
 mate commerce. They issued permits for fifty ships which 
 passed annually from ports in Japan to the three Japanese 
 settlements in the peninsula. These Japanese traders and 
 the Korean officials behaved toward each other in so objec- 
 tionable fashion that a revolt of the settlers in Fusan arose 
 in 16 10, in the effort to suppress which the Koreans were at 
 first defeated; but afterward, being re-enforced strongly from 
 Seoul, they compelled the settlers to retire from all the three 
 settlements; and thus for the time being the trade between 
 Japan and Korea came to an end. When, later, the Sho- 
 gunate Government complied with the demand of the Korean 
 Government that the ringleaders of this disturbance should 
 be decapitated and their heads sent to Seoul, the trade was 
 re-established. But it did not attain its previous propor- 
 tions; it was limited to twenty-five vessels annually, and the 
 settlements were abandoned. Similar troubles recurred some 
 thirty years later. The Shogun of that period, too, caused 
 the offenders to be arrested and handed over to the Korean 
 authorities,' but the Court at Seoul continued its refusal to 
 allow the commerce with the Japanese to be expanded. 
 
 The amount of contribution made by Korea to tlie civi- 
 lization of Japan in those earlier days has })robably been 
 somewhat exaggerated. Both these countries are chielly in-
 
 i86 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 delated to China for the elements of the arts and of letters, 
 and for most of the other refinements of tlieir eulture; these 
 eame to Japan, ho\ve\er, to a considerable extent through 
 Korea. According to the records of the Japanese themselves, 
 in the century before the Christian era Chinese scholars came 
 to Satsuma through Korea, Tsushima, and the intervening 
 islands. At about the same time Koreans also brought Chi- 
 nese civilization to Ja])an.^ During the reign of the Em- 
 ])cror Kimmei (555 a.d.), according to Ja])anese tradition, 
 the king of Kudara in Korea sent to Ja])an an envoy bearing 
 an image of Buddha and a copy of the Sutras. lUit while the 
 Minister-President was exj)erimenting with its worshij), the 
 occurrence of a pestilence proved that the ancestral deities 
 were angry at tlie intrusion of a foreign form of worshijj.^ 
 After the "subjugation of the three kingdoms of Korea a 
 number of Chinese and Koreans came to settle in Japan. In 
 order to avert confusion in family names and titles which 
 might have arisen from this cause, an investigation of family 
 names was made in the 1430th year after the Em.peror Jimmu 
 (about A.D. 770)." It will thus be seen that there are prob- 
 ably in both countries families which have in their veins the 
 mingled blood of both races. 
 
 Relations tending to exasperate the feeling of each country 
 against the other continued through the centuries which con- 
 stituted the Middle Ages in Euroj)e. In Japan the feudal 
 system was ap])roaching its more elaborate and j^owerful 
 development; in Korea the weakness and corruption of the 
 Court, tlie ignorance, suffering from o})pression, and lawless- 
 ness of the jK'ople were not improving. Thus tlie two na- 
 tions were drawing further and further a])art and were fol- 
 lowing the paths which have led to such a wide divergence 
 
 ^ See The History 0} the Empire of Japan, (volume prepared for the 
 World's Columbian Exposition at Chicago, 1903), p. Tfi /. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 47.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 187 
 
 in the now existing conditions mentally, politically, and 
 socially. The various embassies sent by Kublai Khan to 
 Japan during the years of 1 268-1 274 a.d. came via Korea 
 and were accompanied by Korean officials. The attempted 
 Mongol invasions of Japan were assisted by Korea. On the 
 other hand, the peninsula continued to suffer from the at- 
 tacks of Japanese pirates. The inhabitants of the Southwest 
 coasts of Japan made raids upon the opposite coasts, engag- 
 ing in open conflict with the Korean troops, killing their 
 generals, destroying their barracks, and carrying away as 
 plunder, horses, ships, and stores of grain. In these en- 
 counters the soldiers of Korea showed their traditional lack 
 of courage in the field, frequently retreating before the 
 Japanese raiders without striking a single blow. Frequent 
 envoys were sent from Korea to remonstrate and demand 
 reparation; and one of these took back with him (1377 a.d.) 
 several hundred Koreans who had been made prisoners by 
 the Japanese pirates, but were returned to their own country 
 by Imagawa Sadayo, Governor of Kiushiu. No really 
 effective measures to stop piracy were, however, taken by the 
 Japanese Government until the time of the ex-Shogun Yoshi- 
 mitsu, who on several occasions had the pirates arrested and 
 handed over to China, the suzerain of Korea. For later on 
 the Japanese pirates associated themselves with Chinese 
 pirates and pursued their business of plunder quite impar- 
 tially as against either Koreans or Chinese. WJien the 
 Koreans took reprisals upon those inhabitants of Tsushima 
 who were residing in the southern part of their land, the 
 people of that island made an attack upon Fusan and de- 
 stroyed its fortifications (1510 a.d.). 
 
 The first notable conflict between Korea and Ja])an was 
 the invasion of Hideyoshi. Various motives have been as- 
 signed for this war-like expedition; the real moti\'es were 
 probably complex. Hideyoshi was undoubtedly angry at
 
 i88 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Korea for her refusal to oi)en the country to trade with 
 Ja])an. He was willing to take his revenge for the assistance 
 that had been given to the Yuan dynasty of Mongols in their 
 attacks ui)on Japan.' But he was especially desirous to get 
 at China through Korea, and to use the latter country as a 
 base for his attack. He began (1587 a.d.) ])y sending a 
 despatch to the warden of Tsushima directing him to invite 
 the King of Korea to an audience with the Emperor of Ja])an; 
 and he accompanied the invitation with a threat of inxasion 
 unless the invitation were accepted. Next, ha\ing cjuite 
 thoroughly ''pacified" (in Caesar's %shion) his own country, 
 he sent a demand for presents plainly of a tributary char- 
 acter with the same threat accompanying. This time an 
 envoy, from his own person assured the Koreans that unless 
 they complied they would be compelled to march in the van 
 of the Japanese army for the invasion of China. Hideyoshi, 
 when this insolent demand failed of its pur[)ose, first wor- 
 shipped at the tomb of the Empress Jingo the reputed con- 
 queror of Korea in most ancient times. In April, 1592, the 
 Japanese invading force, which consisted according to the 
 Japanese records of 130,000 in eight army corps, sailed in a 
 fleet manned by 9,000 sailors with the Generals Konishi 
 Yukinaga and Kato Kiyomasa leading the van. They were 
 to carry out the threat of the Taiko for the punishment and 
 subjugation of Korea. According to the statement of the 
 authority we are following,- Hideyoshi ex])ected to conquer 
 China in two years and contemj)lated transferring the capital 
 of Japan to that country. "He even went so far as to deter- 
 mine the routine to be followed in the removal of theja])an- 
 ese Court to China." How characteristic is this detailed 
 planning, without sufficient regard for the exigencies of time, 
 the enormous intervening obstacles, and the possible adverse 
 
 ' The History of the Empire oj Japan, p. 278 /, 
 * Ibid., p. 280.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 189 
 
 will of heaven, of the national temperament even down to 
 the present time! 
 
 It is not necessary to our purpose to follow the early bril- 
 liant successes and the disastrous ending of the invasion of 
 Korea by Hideyoshi. Both nations displayed their charac- 
 teristic virtues and faults during this period of intercourse by 
 way of conflict the knightly courage and arrogant over- 
 confidence of the Japanese, the passive power of resistance 
 and the weakness and political corruption of the Koreans. 
 But as to the invasion itself our sympathies must remain with 
 Korea; it was without sufhcient warrant, conducted incau- 
 tiously, and more disastrous in its result to the invaders 
 themselves than to the country which they had, for the time 
 being, desolated. By the courage and skill of Admiral Yi 
 and by the assistance of China, the forces of Japan were 
 finally, after a period of seven years, so reduced that Hide- 
 yoshi, at the point of death, recalled them; and the war 
 came to an end in 1 598. The terms of peace agreed to were 
 on the whole humiliating to the Japanese. 
 
 The great lyeyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa Dynasty, 
 took measures, repeatedly and patiently, to renew those rela- 
 tions of a promising friendly character which had been dis- 
 solved in hatred by the invasion of Hideyoshi. He sent re- 
 peated embassies to Korea, restored prisoners that had been 
 led captive at the time of the Taiko's invasion, and spared no 
 pains to make the Koreans understand that a decided change 
 of policy had taken place in the Japanese Government toward 
 their country. From his time onu'ard, the official treatment 
 given to Korea by Japan has been conspieuous, as compared 
 with the example jurnished by other civilized coioitries under 
 similar trying conditions, jor its jair)iess and its jriendliness. 
 This fact becomes amusingly obvious when we compare the 
 way in which the claims for tribute from Korea have been 
 made by the two countries, China and Japan. Under the
 
 iQo IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Tokugawas tlie nominal soxercigns paid the l)ills; but the 
 Korean tribute-bearers (.S7V) liad a largely free junketing 
 expedition of three months' duration at the exj)ense of the 
 Ja]mnese. Under the Manchu Dynasty, however, the 
 tribute fixed for annual ])ayment took a very substantial 
 shape; it included loo ounces of gold, i,ooo ounces of silver, 
 10,000 bags of rice, 2,000 ])ieces of silk, 10,000 j)ieces of 
 cotton cloth, 10,000 rolls (50 sheets each) of large-sized 
 ])ajK'r, and other less important items. E\en then, it can 
 be seen, the Chinese greatly excelled the Japanese in their 
 business ability. jMoreovcr, when the Koreans pleaded that 
 the payment of tribute to China had so impoverished tliem 
 that they could not render what was due to Japan, the Ja])an- 
 ese forgave them the obligation (a.d. 1638)/ Nor was this 
 the last time in which the forgiveness of debts was exercised 
 toward the Korean Government in a manner unaccustomed 
 between nations of conflicting interests. 
 
 Finally the Koreans, having oljtained the consent of China, 
 sent to Japan a letter from their king, together with some 
 presents; and from this time onward, on the occasion of each 
 change of Shogun, Korean envoys came to the country to 
 offer congratulations. The Tokugawas, on their side, were 
 careful to "treat these delegates with all courtesy and con- 
 sideration"; they also discontinued the offensive custom 
 which the Ashikaga family had followed, of assuming for the 
 Shogun the title of "King of Korea." ^ ^Meantime, the So 
 family improved the opportunity which their jwsition as in- 
 termediaries between Japan and Korea afforded to renew 
 and increase the trade relations of the two countries. It is 
 probable that lasting friendly intercourse would have been 
 established from this time onward if it had not been, at this 
 period, as all through Korea's unfortunate history, for the 
 
 * See Griffis, The Hermit Nation, p. 159. 
 
 ' See The History oj the Empire of Japan, p. 304.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 191 
 
 baleful influence of China. This fact becomes prominent in 
 all the foreign relations of Korea during the half century 
 following the early attempts to open the Hermit Kingdom to 
 intercourse with other nations. The P^ench and American 
 expeditions for this ])urpose were productive only of the result 
 that the Koreans became more obstinate in their resistance 
 to outside intluences, and more secure in their pride and 
 confidence in their ability to resist successfuly through their 
 superior craft and courage in war. These expeditions illus- 
 trate, however, the policy of China in maintaining its claims 
 of suzerainty over Korea. To take, for example, the ex- 
 perience of the United States in dealing with this policy, it 
 may be summarized in somewhat the following way: 
 
 The destruction of the American schooner General Sher- 
 man, in 1866, was the occasion of some desultory correspond- 
 ence between the American and the Chinese Governments. 
 The former presented the matter at Peking because China 
 was supposed to sustain some sort of relationship of suzer- 
 ainty, not clearly understood, toward Korea. China, how- 
 ever, would not admit the existence of any kind of Ijond which 
 made her responsible for Korean acts; the Tsungli Yamen 
 said, in effect, that there had existed from ancient times a 
 certain dependency by Korea upon China; but they denied 
 in express words that it was of such a nature as to give China 
 any right to control or to interfere with tlie administration of 
 Korean foreign or domestic affairs. 
 
 It was precisely this attitude which was the jons el origo of 
 the subsef{uent trouble between China and Japan. From 
 the Chinese standpoint, as shown by official declarations and 
 acts, Korea was and was not a vassal state. She was so when 
 it suited China actively to interfere, and not so when it was 
 either difficult or dangerous, or e\en troublesome, to assume 
 the responsibilities of suzerainty. China was not even willing 
 to act the part of intermediary if b}- doing so slie could be
 
 192 IX KOREA WITH .MARQUIS ITO 
 
 held to accept the onus of making or compelling the repara- 
 tion which America demanded. 
 
 Finally the United States (Government took matters in its 
 own hands and the ex])edition under Admiral John Rodgers 
 was sent to Korea in 1871. The failure of tliat expedition to 
 accomplish anything beyond the destruction of the fort on 
 Kang-wha Island, and Commodore Sliufeldt's su]jse(|uent at- 
 tempt to o})en up communication with the Korean Govern- 
 ment, were the total of American efforts regarding Korea up 
 to the time when the Shufeldt treaty was negotiated. 
 
 After the fall of the Tokugawa Go\-ernment the Korean 
 Court desisted from the custom of sending an em]:)assy to 
 Japan to congratulate the succession to the place of su])reme 
 rule; it even declared its determination to have no further 
 relations with a country which had embraced the Western 
 civilization. When the Government of the Restoration sent 
 an envoy to Korea to announce the change and to "confirm 
 friendly relations between the two states," the Korean Court 
 refused to recognize the envoy or to receive his message. 
 The real reason for this affront was the influence of China; 
 the ostensible reason referred to the fact that the term " Great 
 Empire of Japan" was employed in the Imperial letter. As 
 says Brinklcy: "Naturally such conduct roused deep um- 
 brage in Japan. It constituted a verdict that, whereas the 
 Old Japan had been entitled to the respect and homage of 
 neighboring Powers, the New might be treated with con- 
 tumely." Thus, just when the affairs of the newly centralized 
 Government were assuming that condition of strength and 
 harmony so imperatively demanded for the present welfare 
 and future prospects of Japan, dissension arose among the 
 Ministers of the Crown with regard to the policy to be pur- 
 sued toward Korea. Bitterness of feeling had already been 
 excited by the fact that when Japan returned to their country 
 some shipwrecked Koreans, and accompanied this humane
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 193 
 
 act with other friendly advances, the advances were repulsed 
 and the Court of Korea dechned even to receive the envoy. 
 And now, among the leaders of Japan, Saigo, Soyeshima, 
 Itagaki, Goto, and Eto, insisted on war for the purpose of 
 avenging the insult; Okubo, Iwakura, and Ito advocated 
 peaceful means. Indeed, the so-called "Saga Party" was 
 confederated with these two purposes chiefly in view: (i) 
 the restoration of feudalism, and (2) the making of a punitive 
 war upon Korea, The peace party triumj)hed ; the Satsuma 
 rebellion followed ; and Japan made its first great contribution 
 of treasure and blood toward the maintenance of friendly rela- 
 tions with a Korea that, nominally independent so far as its own 
 selfish duplicity chose to consider it so, was virtually subservient 
 to all manner of foreign intrigue and unscrupulous control. 
 
 This situation and the subsequent events, however, require 
 a more detailed consideration. According to Brinkley, the 
 great Saigo Takamori, who was a member of the Cabinet at 
 this time, and who had been Chief of the Army and one of 
 the most powerful agents in bringing about the Restoration, 
 "saw in a foreign war the sole remaining chance of achieving 
 his ambition by lawful means. The Government's con- 
 scription scheme, yet in its infancy, had not produced even 
 the skeleton of an army. If Korea had to be conquered, the 
 samurai must be employed, and their employment would 
 mean, if not their rehabilitation, at least their organization 
 into a force which, under Saigo's leadership, might dictate a 
 new polity. Other members of the Cabinet believed that the 
 nation would be disgraced if it tamely endured Korea's in- 
 sults. Thus several influential voices swelled the clamor for 
 war. But a peace party offered strenuous opposition. Its 
 members perceived the collateral issues of the problem, and 
 declared that the country must not tliink of taking u]) arms 
 during a period of radical transition."' 
 
 ^ Japan, IV, p. 207.
 
 194 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 The part of China at this time, as ever, in encouraging 
 difficuh and threatening relations between Japan and Korea 
 cannot be overlooked. In the events of 1866 the Chinese did 
 not maintain neutrality as between the forces of the Shogunate 
 and of the Imperial party, but secretly sold arms to the former. 
 They also engaged in the trade of kidnapping and selling the 
 children of indigent Japanese.^ When, after the treaty of 
 1871 was concluded (namely, in 1872), the nati\-es of Formosa 
 murdered some shipwrecked Loochoo islanders, the Peking 
 Government declined to acknowledge any responsibility for 
 the conduct of the natives of Formosa. And it was only 
 through the offices of the British ^Minister that the Chinese, 
 after procrastinating and vacillating, agreed to pay 100,000 
 taels to the families of the murdered, and 400,000 /ar/.v toward 
 the cost of a punitive expedition wdiich had been despatched 
 against the Formosans. 
 
 In 1875 another envoy was sent to Korea, but he returned 
 with the customary result; and in August of the same year 
 a man-of-war en route to China, which had put into the 
 harbor of Chemulpo for fuel and water, was fired ujxjn b}- 
 the Koreans. Whereupon the crew attacked and burned the 
 Korean fortress. And now the same (question recurred in a 
 still more exasperating form: What shall Japan do with 
 Korea, for whose bad conduct China, while claiming rights 
 of suzerainty in all her foreign relations and actually exer- 
 cising a determining influence over her internal affairs, never- 
 theless declines to be responsible; and who will not of licrsclf 
 regard any of those regulations, or common decencies of 
 international intercourse, which modern civilization has es- 
 tablished as binding upon all countries? 
 
 The considerations which prevailed on former occasions 
 still held good when Korea offered this new affront. The 
 peace party, of which ^Marcpiis Ito and Count Inouye were 
 * See The History of the Empire oj Japan, p. 403 jf.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 195 
 
 prominent members the former being also a member of the 
 Cabinet thought that it was Japan's first duty to devote all 
 her energies to the task of domestic improvement, while cul- 
 tivating friendly relations with her neighbors. The problem 
 which confronted the advocates of peace was not an easy one. 
 Saigo was in retirement in his native province, surrounded 
 by his devoted supporters, and it was easily to be seen that he 
 would take umbrage if this new insult was allowed to pass 
 unavenged, and would possibly make it the pretext for some- 
 thing more serious than mere remonstrance. The decision in 
 favor of peace instead of war required a high order of courage. 
 The state of public feeling on the subject and the powerful 
 opposition on which the Government had to count was well 
 illustrated by a petition presented nearly a year later by the 
 Tosa Association, over the signature of Kataoka Kenkichi, 
 afterward speaker of the Lower House of the Diet. Ani- 
 madverting upon the Government's action, the petition said : 
 
 Our people knew that Korea is a country with which Japan has 
 had intercourse since the most ancient times. Suddenly the in- 
 tercourse was broken off, and when we sent an envoy thither he 
 was befooled and all his proposals were rejected. Not only were 
 the Koreans insulting, but they threatened hostile resistance. It 
 was proposed to send a second envoy to remonstrate (?) against 
 the treatment of the former one, but the government suddenly 
 changed its views and nothing further was done. Tiie people 
 when they learned this became enraged, and their feelings found 
 vent in the rebellion of the samurai of Saga. 
 
 This petition no doubt accurately reflects the state of pul> 
 lic feeling at the time to which it refers. The Government 
 did not, however, yield to the popular clamor for war, and 
 this was due in no small measure to the efforts of ^Marquis 
 Ito. He counselled patience and advised his colleagues from 
 the outset that advantage should be taken of the opportunity 
 to place the relations of Ja])an and Korea upon a new basis
 
 196 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 by means of a treaty of [)eacc and fricndshi]). These mod- 
 erate counsels j)revailed and the Cabinet decided with the 
 Imj)erial sanction to make the treaty, although two of its 
 members, Shimadzu Saburo and Itagaki subse<iuently re- 
 signed. 
 
 ATarquis Ito fully ap{)reciated the obstacles which the al- 
 leged suzerainty of China opposed to the establishment of 
 satisfactory treaty relations between Japan and Korea. Ac- 
 cordingly he devoted himself, with the assistance of M. Bois- 
 sonade, the distinguished French ])ublicist, and of Mr. 
 Inouye, the well-known Jajmnese authority, to a careful 
 study of this question. The decision reached was that the 
 bond uniting China and Korea was not, either historically or 
 according to the rules of international law, that of suzerain 
 and vassal state. It therefore logically followed that Korea 
 must be approached directly and dealt with as an indejjendent 
 Power. The importance of this decision cannot be o\er- 
 estimated. It was the first formal recognition of Korean 
 national independence. ]More than that, it was the declara- 
 tion on the part of Japan of a policy ha\ing in view the po- 
 litical, commercial and economical progress of her neighbor. 
 By the treaty of 1876 Japan abandoned all of her own ancient 
 claims to suzerainty and did w^hat she could to place Korea 
 upon the high road to prosperous national develojjment which 
 she herself was travelling. Xo friend of Japan will claim 
 that it was an entirely altruistic policy. Her action was dic- 
 tated as much by motives of intelligent self-interest as by 
 consideration for Korea. The fate of the })eninsular kingdom 
 was of vital importance to Ja])an. As an appanage of China 
 its condition was hazardous. Cliina had from ancient times 
 claimed suzerainty over all surrounding nations, but those 
 claims had never proved a safeguard nor prevented the sub- 
 jugation or absorption of these so-called vassal states Ijy 
 other Powers. In fact, they were an element of weakness in
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 197 
 
 quarrels where China herself was principal; for it might 
 easily happen that the vassal would be exj^osed to attack, 
 in case China herself could not easily be reached. This was 
 especially the truth as regarded Korea, concerning whom 
 China had given direct proof that while prepared to claim all 
 the prerogatives of suzerainty when it implied no risk to 
 herself, she was only too likely, when a strong Power threaten- 
 ened, to shirk all responsibility and abandon Korea to her 
 fate. To treat with Korea as an independent nation and 
 thus to set an example which would in all likelihood be fol- 
 lowed by other Powers, seemed the best way of avoiding 
 such a catastrophe. At the same time there was good reason 
 to hope, even confidently to expect, that Korea, drawn into 
 intimate intercourse with the world, would be freed from the 
 trammels which prevented progress, and would gradually 
 attain a condition where foreign aggression would be impos- 
 sible. 
 
 Count Kuroda and Count Inouye were appointed First and 
 Second Envoys, respectively, for the negotiation of the treaty. 
 The representatives of the Treaty Powers were frankly in- 
 formed of the objects of the mission. Before he left. Count 
 Inouye called u|)on Air. Bingham, the American Alinistcr, 
 who cordially sympathized with the Government's intentions, 
 and borrowed Bayard Taylor's abridged history of Commo- 
 dore Perry's expedition. The Count said he feared that the 
 Koreans might show signs of obduracy, in which case it would 
 become necessary for his colleague and himself to have re- 
 course to some of the measures which Commodore Perry 
 found so efficacious. Inouye wished to have the book so 
 that he could refresh his memory and 1)e better perfected in 
 the part if it became necessary to ])lay it.^ 
 
 As before intimated, the Japanese Government was anxious 
 
 'This is on the authority of Mr. T). \V. Stevens, wliose ar([uaintunce 
 with the facts is most accurate and full.
 
 jyS IN KORlvV Wrni MAR(^U1S I TO 
 
 that the Treaty of 1876 should ])e followed by like Treaties 
 between Korea and otlier Powers. It eordially tendered its 
 good offiees wlien Commodore Shufeldt visited Japan pre- 
 vious to tlie negotiation of the treat}' eoneluded b} Iiini, and 
 on subse([uent occasions did what was possible to facilitate 
 the conclusion of other treaties witli Korea. Its polic}' in 
 that regard was illustrated in an interesting way by the state- 
 ment of Count Inouye, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 Air. Bingham in 1882, with reference to tlie a])])ointment of 
 General Foote, the first American Minister to Korea. lie 
 said to ]\rr. Bingliam, as the latter reported to Secretary 
 Frelinghuysen, that the action of the American Government 
 "in ratifying so })rompt]y its treaty with Korea and accredit- 
 ing a minister to that kingdom gave great satisfaction to His 
 Imperial Japanese Majesty's Government, and was accepted 
 as another evidence of the policy of justice so often mani- 
 fested by the United States toward the states of Asia." He 
 also said that it was considered an act of friendship toward 
 Japan as well as Korea. 
 
 In considering all the subsequent relations of Japan and 
 Korea two things should be kept distinctly in view as deter- 
 mining questions of justice and injustice, of wisdom or un- 
 wisdom, in the policy of both countries. In the first [)lace: 
 In order to conclude "a treaty of commerce and amity which 
 recognized the independence of Korea," Japan rather than 
 engage in a punitive war, had encountered in its own terri- 
 tory a rebellion which cost the Government of the Restora- 
 tion no less than 60,000 men and 416,000,000 yen. And 
 second, in allowing this treaty to go through in the form which 
 it actually took, China had been convicted of the du{)licity and 
 wholly untenable character of its claims to exercise the rights 
 of suzerainty over Korea. On the latter point Minister 
 RockhilP affirms that the conclusion in 1876 of the treaty of 
 
 ' China's Intercourse willi Korea [ram the AT//; Century to i8()5, [). i /.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HIST(3RICAL 199 
 
 Kang-wha between Japan and Korea "marks the beginning 
 of a new era in the history of the latter country, its entry into 
 the family of nations." "Prior to the Kang-wha treaty," 
 this authority goes on to say: "The nature of Korea's relation 
 to China was a puzzle to Western nations. They were told, 
 at one and the same time, that Korea, though a vassal and 
 tributary state of China, was entirely independent so far as 
 her government, religion, and intercourse with foreign states 
 were concerned a condition of things hardly comi)atible 
 with our ideas of either absolute de})endence or com])lete in- 
 dependence." 
 
 "In 1871 the Chinese Foreign Office wrote the United 
 States Minister in Peking, Mr. Frederick F. Low, who had 
 informed it of his recent appointment by his Government as 
 special envoy to Korea, and was about proceeding there, 
 that: 'Korea is regarded as a country subordinate to China, 
 yet is wholly independent in everything that relates to her 
 government, her religion, her prohibitions, and her laws; in 
 none of these things has China hitherto interfered.'" ^ But 
 the first Article of the treaty signed in 1876 with Japan reads 
 as follows: "Chosen, being an independent state, enjoys the 
 same sovereign rights as does Japan"; and in 1882 the King 
 of Korea wrote to the President of the United States, when 
 the two countries were about to enter into treaty relations, 
 pledging his Government that the terms of the treaty should 
 be "carried into effect according to the laws of independent 
 states." 
 
 It was this not merely theoretical suzerainty, but a per- 
 nicious practice of interference and dictation on the part of 
 China over Korea, joined to the utterly corrupt and weak 
 government of tlie latter country, wliicli led inc\ilal)ly to 
 the war Ijetwecn the f(jrmcr and Japan. Similar claims of 
 the Government of Peking, under existing ])()lilical and social 
 
 ' Foreign Relations oj the United States, 1S71, p. 112.
 
 200 IX KOREA WITH .MARQUIS ITO 
 
 conditions, over the weaker states which were alleged to be 
 dejjendencies of this Government, the civilized nations of the 
 world ha\e repeatedly found themselves compelled to dis- 
 regard; and this, in the interests of the dependent people 
 themselves. 
 
 The mental attitude and practical treatment which the 
 Korean Court and Yang-ban class in general have accorded 
 to the treaties with Japan and other foreign nations have been 
 essentially unchanged from the beginning. All depends upon 
 the apparent immediate effect of foreign intercourse on their 
 ancient rights and pri\-ileges of ofhce-ljearing and official 
 "sciueezing." The Mins, the family of the late Queen, have 
 always been notoriously corru})t; and, if the Queen herself 
 was ever sincerely opposed to the anti-foreign policy, it is likely 
 that the opposition had its source in the selfish interests of 
 her own family and in her hatred of the King's father, the 
 Tai Won Kun. The latter was always consistently and 
 energetically opposed to all foreign intercourse. 
 
 The condition of affairs in Korea preceding the troubles 
 of 1882 and 1884 is graphically and truthfully described by 
 the report of Ensign George C. Foulk, of the United States 
 Navy, in which he submitted to his Government information 
 relative to the revolutionary attempt of the latter date. With 
 regard to the Government of Korea, Ensign Foulk says that 
 "it has been for an indefinite period under the ])ractical con- 
 trol of the iMin Family, of which the Queen of Korea is at 
 present the highest representative. The Ijlood of this family 
 is largely Chinese, and it has been always, and remains, the 
 desire and aim of this family to subject, and retain in sulj- 
 jection, their country to the suzerainty of China. Members 
 of this family are accorded special privileges by China, and 
 are, to the exclusion of other Korean noble families, on com- 
 paratively social terms with the Court of China, which they 
 visit frefjuently. The family is very large, and includes the
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 201 
 
 highest number of great nobles, with the greatest landed 
 estates, of all the families of the nobility in Korea. . . . The 
 great body of Korean people know little or nothing of the 
 politics of their Government, nor do they dare to use any 
 information they may by chance possess on Government 
 affairs." 
 
 Ensign Foulk then goes on to draw attention to the re- 
 markable phenomenon that, while the Chinese "are detested 
 for their appearance, conduct and customs," nothing by way 
 of cruelty and fraud that they may do awakens practical 
 resentment; but the Japanese, on the contrary, while "even 
 admired by Koreans of the present day for their appearance, 
 customs, and conduct, are so hated that the "Koreans are 
 always ready for the license when they may vent this feeling 
 in shedding Japanese blood." With regard to the real atti- 
 tude of the Queen's family, he further affirms: "This energy 
 of the i\Iins [namely, in conducting negotiations for a treaty 
 with the United States] has given them the mistaken reputa- 
 tion of being members of the progressive party in Korea; in 
 fact, they only acted in obedience to their hereditary lord, 
 China, without a thought patriotic to Korea, beyond that 
 they, in common with all Koreans at that time, felt the 
 danger of the seizure of a part of Korea by Russia." 
 
 Now, however, the Tai Won Kun, the bitter enemy of the 
 Queen, had his turn at the wheel on which the fate of this 
 unfortunate country was revolving, first in one direction and 
 then in the other. In July, 1882, taking advantage of dis- 
 affection among the soldiers of the capital, occasioned by 
 short rations issued by the ]\Iins (a "steal in army con- 
 tracts"), he directed their revolt against tliat family, and, 
 having disposed of its members, seized the Government for 
 himself. Many Alins were killed; Min Tai-lio (father of 
 Alin Yong-ik) was left, supposed to be fataHy wouncU'd, in a 
 ditch; poison was to be administered to tlie Queen, but a
 
 202 IN IvORKA WITH MARQUIS JTO 
 
 maid, personating her in disguise, took the j)oison and died 
 while the Queen escaped. Min Yong-ik sha\ed his head, 
 and, after hi(Hng in the mountains three days, walked to 
 Fusan whence he escaped to Japan in the guise of a Bud- 
 dhist j)riest. For his disobedience to its command and his 
 attempt to annihilate its royal servants, the Alins, the Chinese 
 Government sent its troo])s to Korea and carried oil into 
 banishment the Tai Won Kun; but the ])ower of the Alins 
 in China's ]:)ehalf having been greatly cut down by the 
 revolt, Chinese troops were j)laced in Seoul to strengtlien the 
 remainder, and continued there after the re\olt was sup- 
 pressed. 
 
 It was, then, in connection with the armed interference of 
 China in a domestic quarrel between the wife and the father 
 of the Emperor, China, which had repeatedly disclaimed 
 all responsibility for Korean internal affairs and which had 
 permitted Korea to make a foreign treaty on terms of equal- 
 ity, that the Korean Court offered again, in 1882, another 
 affront to Japan. This thiie, also, the insult was written in 
 blood. For through no fault or offence on their j^art, a 
 number of Japanese were killed in the course of a domestic 
 riot, and the Japanese ^Minister was obliged to flee from the cap- 
 ital and to put to sea in a fishing boat, whence he was rescued 
 by an English vessel. The provocation was greater than 
 that for which western nations have frequently exacted 
 exemplary vengeance, much greater than the offence given 
 by the rebellious Daimyo of Choshin, for which the Treaty 
 Powers had held Japan herself so strictly to account. Never- 
 theless, Japan made due allowance for the irresponsibility and 
 weakness of the Korean Government. An ajwlogy, an in- 
 demnity of 550,000 yen (50,000 being for pri\ate sufferers), 
 and a Convention of two articles defining treaty limits, etc. 
 (signed August 30, 1882), were the sum of her demands. 
 The payment of 400,000 yen of the indemnity was afterward
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 203 
 
 remitted. The instructions of the Emperor of Japan com- 
 manding this to be done contained the following declaration : 
 
 We hereby remit four hundred thousand yen oi tlie indemnity 
 of five hundred thousand yen due from Korea, wliich sum we 
 sincerely trust will be employed to supplement the funds already 
 devoted to the introduction of civilization into the country. 
 
 It is a curious coincidence that the ^Minister who, on the 
 9th of November, 1884, transmitted this message, was obliged 
 only a few weeks later to flee from Seoul like his predecessor, 
 on account of the perpetration of outrages against Japan, 
 even greater than those for which the indemnity had been 
 exacted. 
 
 This renewal of the stipulated condition of commerce and 
 amity between Japan and Korea, with its renewed act of 
 forgiveness on the part of the former toward the latter, only 
 prepared the way for the more serious outrages of 1884. 
 The Chinese force which was sent to support the anti-foreign 
 and unprogressive policy of the ]Min family, proceeded to take 
 up permanent quarters in extensive camps within the walls of 
 Seoul. They erected a fort close by the palace gates and two 
 others outside of the city, in a situation to defend the a])- 
 proaches from the river Han. A little later they increased 
 the number of Chinese troops in Seoul to 3,000 men. In the 
 opinion of Ensign Eoulk, the confession forced from certain 
 Korean officials revealed the truth that tliese foreign soldiers 
 were ciuartered in the capital city in order to enforce a secret 
 agreement between China and the Mins, representing Korea, 
 which gave to the Peking Government riglits of suzerainty 
 such as it had never even claimed before. 
 
 Then began an increasingly ])itter strife l)etween the re- 
 actionary party, sup])orted by Ciiincse soldiers, and the re- 
 form party, the leaders of which had brcn abroad (chielly in 
 Japan) and had returned determined to exert themsehes to
 
 204 IX KOREA WITH ^lARQUlS ITO 
 
 bring a))Out reforms and to introduce the benefits of Western 
 civilization in their native land. Ja])an, however, had gi\en 
 the frankest and most sincere assurances that such troops as 
 it kept in Korea were only for the defence of its own Legation, 
 and that it aimed to assist Korea in all its efforts at progress. 
 " From Japan," says Ensign Foulk, "came a number of ([uali- 
 fied Japanese, who were held in readiness to begin teacliing 
 the use of machinery, the manufacture of j)aper, j)ottery, etc. 
 Steps were also taken towards securing a director of agricul- 
 ture, school teachers, and several other foreigners for service 
 under the Korean Government. In regard to these the ini- 
 tiatory steps were taken in consultation with the progresssi\c 
 leaders, including the King, in which I was warmly invited 
 to have a voice." ^ Gradually, however, in part through 
 fear, in part through jealousy, and perhaps also with some 
 degree, in certain cases, of more intelligent and honorable 
 reasons, certain leading members of the progressive party 
 fell more and more under Chinese influences. 
 
 How insolently the foreign soldiers from China during this 
 period treated the Koreans may be learned from the following 
 incident. In August, 18S4, a Korean officer of high rank was 
 openly seized by a party of Chinese soldiers and beaten by 
 them in the street so severely that his life was despaired of; 
 this was the outcome of a quarrel between the Chinese Com- 
 missioner and the Korean officer about the right of passage 
 through a gateway of the Korean officer's house, which was 
 next to that of the Chinese officer. " On the contrary," says 
 Ensign Foulk, "the attitude of the Japanese in Seoul had 
 always been such as to indicate an earnest desire to aid the 
 party of progress, and to be on peaceable, friendly terms with 
 the people. The conduct of Japanese citizens toward 
 Koreans was commendable. As indicating great considera- 
 tion on the part of the Japanese Government toward Korea, 
 
 ' Quoted from the paper referred to above.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 205 
 
 was the restraint placed upon Japanese merchants estabhsh- 
 ing themselves in Seoul, by the Japanese Alinistcr, who evi- 
 dently in doing so followed the spirit of the treaties, by which 
 the capital was not to be thrown open to trade if the Chinese 
 left." 
 
 When their factional strifes had the customary expression 
 in revolution, arson, and bloodshed, the Koreans, aided by 
 the Chinese soldiers, turned upon the Japanese. The sub- 
 sequent occurrences and the way that the Japanese Govern- 
 ment dealt with them are narrated in the words of one who 
 was an eye-witness of, and an actor in, them:^ 
 
 With subsequent occurrences I am personally familiar, having 
 accompanied Count Inouye, Minister for Foreign Affairs, when 
 he went as Special Ambassador to Korea to settle the difficulty. 
 
 This was another occasion when public excitement ran very 
 high in Japan. The nation was clamoring for war with China, 
 and the feeling of keen indignation in Army and Navy circles was 
 strongly marked. Following so closely upon the events of 1882 
 this new outrage appeared to all classes to be the last straw. The 
 Government, however, then under the premiership of Marquis 
 Ito, was determined to have recourse to the last resort only after 
 every means of honorable accommodation had been exhausted. 
 As Marquis Ito's mission to China subsequently showed, it was 
 also determined to settle once and for all, so far as that could be 
 done, the question of China's right forcibly to interfere in Korean 
 domestic brawls, which was really the gra\'esl feature of the 
 occurrence. 
 
 The choice of an official of Count Inouyc's high rank showed 
 the importance which the government atUiched to the mission. 
 The designation of Admiral Kabayama and General Takashima, 
 typical re])rcsentativcs of the prevailing feeling in Army and Xavy 
 circles, to acc()m})any him, was most sagacious. It was proof to 
 
 ' For this account, as liere given verba!ii, T am indebted to the Hon. 
 D. \V. Stevens, who was at the time of my visit, "Adviser to the Korean 
 Council of State and Counsellor of the Resident-General."
 
 206 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 the Army and Navy, as well as to the ])e()])le at large, that nothing 
 would be done in the dark, and that no arrangement would be 
 concluded in anywise damaging to Jai)an's honor or prestige. 
 
 It must be confessed that tliere was good ground for indigna- 
 tion in Jajjan. A domestic revolution had taken place in Seoul, 
 attended by many of the incidents ccjnunon where government is 
 "despotism tempered by assassination." But neither Jaj)an nor 
 her agents were responsible for that. Mr. Takezoye, the Japanese 
 Minister, had gone to the Palace with his bodyguard, at the King's 
 request, to guard the royal person. It was a technical mistake, 
 no doubt on the Minister's part, for he should not have interfered 
 in the matter, or, at the most, should have asked the King to come 
 to the Legation. But there can be no doubt thai he acted in good 
 faith. He was an amialjle scholar rather than a diplomat and 
 had always maintained the most cordial personal relations with 
 the King. The latter was never in any sense a ])risoner in his 
 hands, as was shown conclusively by the visit of the foreign 
 representatives. The populace of Seoul, egged on by the con- 
 servatives, took a different view, however, as did also the large 
 force of Chinese troops gathered at the Chinese Legation. The 
 former slaughtered all the Japanese they could reach, and the 
 latter, some 3,000 in number, in company with several hundred 
 Korean soldiers, attacked the Japanese soldiers. The little Jap- 
 anese force (143 in number, not 400 as Hulbert states) beat them 
 off with heavy loss, without themselves suffering any serious 
 casualties. By that time, however, the conservatives had gained 
 the upper hand in the palace. The King informed Mr. Takezo}e 
 that he did not require further assistance from him, preferring to 
 be guarded by his own soldiers; wliereupon the Minister, as in 
 duty bound, returned to the Legation. He found his position 
 untenable, however, and resolved to go to Chemulpo. There were 
 about 200 non-combatants at the Legation to be cared for, among 
 them many women and children. Cuarding these as best they 
 could the little band of soldiers started for the city gate through 
 streets filled with a hostile mob. It was a dangerous march; a 
 march which foreigners who were in Seoul at the time described to 
 me with admiration. Numbers of armed Koreans were gathered
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 207 
 
 to oppose it, not the least formidable being those who threw 
 stones and other missiles from the house tops. At one point some 
 Korean soldiers brought out Gatling guns, but these were charged 
 and disabled before any use could be made of them. The Jap- 
 anese forced their way, finally, through the West Gate, and thence 
 on to Chemulpo, with casualties of one killed and a numljer 
 wounded. The Legation was looted and set on fire several hours 
 after it was deserted, and was completely destroyed. 
 
 Mr. Takezoye was at Chemulpo when Count Inou}-e arri\ed on 
 the 31st of December. The Count was also met l)y Mr. von 
 Mollendorff, a high official of the Chinese Customs, detailed for 
 duty in Korea, who likewise acted in a diplomatic capacity. 
 Count Inouye informed him that he intended to go to Seoul at 
 once and to demand an audience at the earliest practicable mo- 
 ment. Mr. von Mollendorff had various reasons to urge for 
 delay, but Count Inouye swept them aside, and the Embassy 
 proceeded to Seoul the next day; it was accompanied by about 
 400 soldiers, a smaller force having been left at Chemulpo. In 
 Seoul, where they arrived that night, the Ambassador and suite 
 were lodged in the yamen of the Governor of the City, just outside 
 the West Gate. The same night the Ambassador presented his 
 formal request for an immediate audience. It met with the 
 customary Oriental reception: His Majesty was not in robust 
 health; the Ambassador himself must be tired and in need of 
 rest after his long journey; the attention of His Majesty was 
 occupied with preparations for a fitting reception of His Excel- 
 lency, and so on. ^Ir. von Mollendorff was ke{)t very busy 
 running back and forth, but finally it was made clear to the minds 
 of the King's advjsers that Count Inouye meant exactly what he 
 said, and that disagreealjle things might hajjpen if he did not have 
 his way. 
 
 The audience was finally appointed for January 3d. On the 
 morning of that day the cavalcade set forth, a military band 
 trained by a foreign band-master in the van; then a mounted 
 guard of honor; then the Ambassador, accompanied by Admiral 
 Kabayama and General Takashima and followed by his sec- 
 retarieSj and bringing up the rear a company of infantry. As
 
 2o8 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 the proccs?ion passed through the Gate and emerged into the wide 
 street leading to tlie East (iate, a curious and ins])iriting sj)ectacle 
 presented itself. The morning was fresh and clear; tlie air crisp 
 and invigorating, and the broad, sunny street as far as the eye 
 could see was one mass of gaily clad humanity, men dressed in 
 coats of every color, white, as is usual, ])redominating. The 
 crowds parted before the head of the jirocession like waves be- 
 neath the i)row of a ship; the Korean police ran alongside inlying 
 their many-thonged whips with indiscriminate zeal; and then, 
 as if to add the last cjueer touch to the whole proceeding, the 
 band struck up "Dixie." 
 
 Nor did odd happenings end here". When the procession arrived 
 at the triple gates of the Palace, the centre gate was closed. Count 
 Inouye halted the line immediately and demanded the reason. It 
 was explained by Mr. Mollendorff that the centre gate was reserved 
 for the King, and that the side gates were used by the highest 
 dignitaries. Count Inouye replied that he was an Ambassador, 
 the personal representative of his sovereign, and that as such he 
 could not pass through an inferior entrance. Back went the 
 messenger behind the barred gate, and in a few minutes appeared 
 again breathlessly explaining that to their great chagrin and regret, 
 royal etiquette, binding upon His Majesty as upon his lowest sub- 
 ject, could not be disregarded. Upon that Count Inouye blandly 
 retorted that he also was bound by eticjuette, immutal^le and un- 
 changeable; and that if the gate was not opened within three 
 minutes, much to his regret he would be obliged to retrace his 
 steps and to report to his Imperial Master this new slight to Japan. 
 The gate was opened without further delay. 
 
 After that the audience passed off smoothly. Count Inouye 
 was careful to impress upon the King's mind, as ujjon the minds 
 of his advisers, that while his mission was one of peace, much 
 depended upon the sincerity and ])romptitude with which Korea 
 met Japan's just demands for redress and upon the guarantees 
 she gave against the recurrence of like causes of complaint. The 
 negotiations throughout were conducted in that spirit. The Am- 
 bassador was kindly and considerate, but would tolerate no palter- 
 ing or double-dealing. He couched his demands in firm but
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 209 
 
 friendly language, made even- allowance for the embarrassing 
 position in which the King found himself, placed the responsibility 
 for what had happened where it belonged, but made it very clear 
 all the while that neither he nor his government would be trifled 
 with. This was shown in a sensational way at the first formal 
 meeting of the Ambassador with the Korean plenipotentiaries. 
 The meeting had hardly convened when suddenly a bustle was 
 heard in the courtyard, and, without further notice, the Chinese 
 Consul- General entered, suavely bowing to those present. Pay- 
 ing no attention to him, Count Inouye sprang to his feet and de- 
 manded of the Chief Korean Plenipotentiary what the intrusion 
 meant, and whether the Chinese official had ventured upon this 
 extraordinary step with his knowledge and consent. If that were 
 the case, he would regard it as his duty to break off the negotia- 
 tions at once, for the Japanese Government would not tolerate for 
 a moment any interference of that kind, and would warmly resent 
 Korea's connivance with it. There was a hasty disavowal on the 
 Korean side, the Consul-General lamely adding that as China and 
 Japan and Korea were friends, and as the matter under discussion 
 was of interest to all three, he had come of his own accord to 
 participate in a friendly way in the proceedings. He thereupon 
 withdrew somewhat less blithely than he had entered. Count 
 Inouye then repeated what he had said and gave the Korean 
 plenipotentiaries clearly to understand that he would not tolerate 
 the repetition of such childish antics, but would regard them, if 
 again attempted, as reason for the gravest offence. This warning 
 had its effect; the negotiations thereafter proceeded expeditiously 
 and the Convention was signed on the 9th of January. It stipu- 
 lated an apology; the payment of an indemnity of 110,000 yen to 
 the relatives of the murdered and the merchants who had been 
 plundered; the punishment of the murderers of Captain Iso- 
 bayashi, mihtary attache; the furnishing of sites for legation and 
 consulate, materials for building the same, and 20,000 yen to pay 
 the cost of construction; the building of barracks for Japanese 
 troops adjacent to the Legation; and further that the murderers 
 of Captain Isobayashi sliould be punished within twenty days 
 after the convention was signed.
 
 2IO IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 The events of 1882 and 1884 had emphasized what the 
 entire history of the relations of Japan and Korea had made 
 manifest namely, that some distinct understanding with 
 China must be reached if the two neighboring countries were 
 ever to live together in peace. The task of estaljlishing 
 such an understanding was assigned to Marquis Ito, and in 
 the spring of 1885 he proceeded to China as Japan's special 
 Ambassador. Li Hung Chang, who was then Viceroy of 
 Chi-li, was the Ambassador appointed by the Peking Gov- 
 ernment. The latter appointment was the more significant 
 because Li was supposed to entertain a profound distrust and 
 dislike of the Japanese; moreover. Yuan Shi Kai, whose 
 subsequent career has been so important in the politics of 
 the Far East, and who had been in command of the Chinese 
 soldiers at the time of their slaughter of the Japanese in 
 1884, was a protege of Li's. In spite of the inherent diffi- 
 culties, the broad statesmanship and frankness of the Mar- 
 quis overcame them; and the intercourse of these two men, 
 whose personality and policy afterward had so much to do 
 with the history of their respective countries, resulted in their 
 becoming friends. The Chinese statesman expressed regret 
 that he had not met Ito before, since he had now for the first 
 time gained a correct conception of Japan's policy; he even 
 went so far as to ask the Marquis to mention the need of 
 governmental reforms to the Dowager Empress of China, who 
 became angry at him, her own Viceroy, when he ventured to 
 refer to the matter before her. 
 
 On the i8th of April, 1885, a Convention was signed which 
 was intended to prevent in the future all recurrence of events 
 similar to those of the previous December. The important 
 point of this Convention is that both sides pledged them- 
 selves against armed interference in Korea except in pressing 
 emergencies and after mutual consultation. This agree- 
 ment, while it saved the "face" of China a matter so im-
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 211 
 
 peratively important from the Chinese point of view was a 
 virtual abandonment of her claim of suzerainty; for it gave 
 to Japan, which made no such claim, equal interest in the 
 internal affairs of Korea and equal right to send troops into 
 its territory, in case the judgment of both countries recog- 
 nized such a need. The agreement also promised good for 
 Korea herself, since it made the use of Chinese or Japanese 
 soldiers in control of Korean affairs more unlikely for trifling 
 reasons; and, on the other hand, it safeguarded her against 
 other foreign armed intervention as the result of her domestic 
 intrigues. 
 
 The story of what followed and led up to the war with 
 Japan is, briefly, as follows: The stipulations of this Con- 
 vention were observed by Japan both in letter and in spirit, 
 and by China, upon the surface at least. For a few years 
 neither Power sent troops to Korea; and China ceased to 
 flaunt the claim to suzerainty before her neighbor's face. 
 But she still cherished the fiction and sought to maintain by 
 indirection, and by means peculiarly Chinese, what she had 
 failed to uphold in the open. Thus, in 1887, as stated in 
 Moore's Digest of International Law: "The Chinese Govern- 
 ment sought to prevent the departure of a Korean envoy to 
 the United States on the ground of the dependent relation of 
 Korea toward China. The xA.mcrican Minister at Peking 
 was instructed to express surprise and regret at this action on 
 the part of the Chinese Government. The envoy finally set 
 out on his journey, but when he arrived in the United States 
 the Chinese ^Minister at Washington wrote the Department 
 of State to the effect that the Korean envoy would, on his 
 arrival there, report to the Chinese Legation, and would be 
 presented through it to the Department of State; after which 
 he might apply for an opportunity to present his credentials 
 to the President. 
 
 " The Korean envoy, on the day after his arrival in Wash-
 
 212 IX KOREA WITH AIARQUIS ITO 
 
 ington, addressed a note to Mr. Bayard, as vSecrelary of Slate, 
 asking for an interview to arrange for the j)resentation of his 
 credentials to the President. Such an arrangement was (hily 
 made, and the envoy was presented without the intervention 
 of the Chinese Minister. 'As the United States,' said Mr. 
 Bayard, 'have no privity with the inlerrehilions of China and 
 Korea, we shall treat both as separate goNcrnments custom- 
 arily represented here by tlieir respecti\e and independent 
 agents.' " 
 
 So unmistakable a declaration as this from a friendly, im- 
 partial Power would, it might reasonably ])c tliought, have 
 caused China to abandon her shadowy pretensions. It did 
 not have that effect, however. Her agents in Korea com- 
 mitted no overt act which was likely to ])rovoke remonstrance 
 from the Treaty Powers; but they lost no opportimity of 
 preserving in the Korean mind at least the Iktion of de- 
 pendency upon China. Yuan Shi Kai, for example, 
 "Claimed, and to a large extent obtained, the position of 
 Chinese Resident at Seoul. His olTicial title was 'Director 
 General Resident in Korea of Dij)lomatic and Consular Rela- 
 tions,' and his substantive rank in his own coimtry was that 
 of Intendant of Circuit, a rank corresponding, according to 
 the Anglo-Chinese Treaty, to that of a Consul. . . . Resi- 
 dent Yuan was permitted to proceed to the Audience Hall in 
 his chair and to be seated in the presence of the King, pri\i- 
 leges not accorded to the representatives of the other Pow- 
 ers." (Wilkinson's The Government oj Korea.) Tlie ]jri\i- 
 leges thus claimed by this representative of China were ob- 
 tained in the course of several years after the conclusion of 
 the Convention of 1885. They were largely ceremonial in 
 character and none of the re})resentatives of llie Treaty 
 Powers ever recognized the right of the so-called Resident to 
 interfere in any manner in their business with the Korean 
 Government. Whatever there was peculiar in his relations
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 213 
 
 to that Government was a question of an understanding, 
 practically secret, and never formally enunciated or recog- 
 nized, between the Korean Court and himself. The condi- 
 tions then prevailing in Korea were highly conducive to the 
 existence of such anomalies. An amiable but weak King; 
 a corrupt Court and Government, with two powerful factions 
 struggling for supremacy and stopping at nothing to gain it 
 these were ideal conditions for the exercise of Chinese di- 
 plomacy. It accomplished nothing in the end, however, even 
 in the hands of such an astute and able man as Yuan Shi Kai. 
 Japan, of course, never recognized his pretensions, but, biding 
 her time and always dealing with Korea as an independent 
 state, devoted herself to the promotion of the rapidly growing 
 commercial and industrial interests of her people in the 
 peninsula. 
 
 Naturally neither the Government nor the people of Japan 
 could view without resentment the attempts on China's part 
 to maintain rights she had already practically surrendered. 
 But this feeling did not assume a defmite form until the as- 
 sassination of Kim Ok Kiun at Shanghai, in ]\Iarch, 1894, 
 and the arrest of a confederate of the murderer in Japan, who 
 confessed that he was ofiicially commissioned to murder 
 another one of the Korean political refugees. These events 
 aroused a storm of indignation in Japan. What followed 
 added fuel to the llamcs. The murderer and the body of his 
 victim were conveyed on board a Cliinese man-of-war to 
 Korea. The murderer was rewarded and the severed parts 
 of Kim's body were publicly exhibited in different ])arts of 
 Seoul. Rightly or wrongly tliis barbarous act, against which 
 the foreign representatives at tlie instance of the Japanese 
 ^Minister unofficially })rotested, was altril)ute(l to the Queen's 
 party. The excitement it caused liad not subsided when, in 
 May, came the ''Tong Hak" rebellion. Tlie Tong Haks 
 were religious fanatics, tlie chief article of whose creed was
 
 214 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 said to be the massacre of all foreigners. Seoul was rife with 
 rumors, and the utmost alarni and confusion prcNailed. Ac- 
 cording to the rej)ort of the American Minister, the rebellion 
 was j:)ractically suppressed on the 3d of June by Korean 
 troops; and on the 8th of June the Government oflicially an- 
 nounced that it was at an end. In the meantime, however, 
 the Chinese Government, without ])re\ious notice to Jai)an 
 or mutual consultation, as stipulated in the Convention of 
 1885, sent a force of 2,000 trooi)s to Korea, which on June 
 loth landed at A-San, about forty miles soutli of Chemulpo, 
 ostensibly to suppress the rebellion. The American Minister, 
 Mr. Sill, in his rej)ort on the subject to the Dei)artment of 
 State, says that "this was done at Korean request, dictated 
 and insisted on by Yuan, the Chinese Resident." Learning 
 of the purpose to send troops, the Ja})anesc Government 
 promptly remonstrated with the Government at Peking, and 
 in reply was informed (after the act) that the troops had been 
 sent because urgently needed to suppress disorders in "the 
 vassal state." There was no explanation and no apology 
 beyond this palpable and contemptuous violation of the terms 
 of the Convention of 1885. There was but one possible re- 
 sponse. On the same day that the Chinese troops landed, a 
 force of Japanese marines was sent to the capital, to be re- 
 placed a few days later by a larger body of soldiers. The 
 scene of the struggle was then transferred to Seoul. The 
 Korean Government, having brought the trouble on its own 
 head, showed its usual im})otence. It begged both Japan 
 and China to leave, and sought aid from the foreign repre- 
 sentatives in the effort to persuade them to do so. China 
 was {[uite willing to accede to these appeals. Possibly her 
 agent on the spot, it may even be the Government at Peking, 
 was startled by the prom})titude with which Japan had ac- 
 cepted the challenge. In any event, China had nothing to 
 lose and much to gain bv doing as Korea asked. She could
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 215 
 
 leave the scene with flying banners, ha^'ng shown that Korea 
 was in fact her vassal; that the Convention \\as waste paper 
 and that Japan could be flouted with imj)unity. Naturally 
 this programme did not commend itself to Japan. Accord- 
 ing to her view of the situation there were certain vital c|ues- 
 tions to be settled before the troops were withdrawn. Fore- 
 most among these was the decision of Korea's actual status; 
 then, subsidiary to this, but none the less important, the adop- 
 tion of certain reforms which, while improving the puljlic 
 administration and promoting the common weal, would 
 prevent the recurrence of disturbances which were a constant 
 menace to the welfare of Korea and her neiglibors. Accord- 
 ingly, the Japanese Alinister presented a memorial on the 
 proposed reforms and demanded a categorical statement as 
 to whether Korea was a vassal of China or not. 
 
 Regarding the latter demand the American ]\Iinister re- 
 ports that "This caused great consternation," since if they 
 (the Korean Government) answered in the negative they 
 would offend China, while an afhrmative answer would bring 
 down the wrath of Japan. After many consultations and 
 several reminders to be prompt from the Japanese, an answer 
 was given in this sense: "Korea, being an independent state, 
 enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Japan (see Treaty of 
 Kang-hwa, 1876), and that 'in both internal administration 
 and foreign intercourse Korea enjoys complete independence' 
 (see letter of the King to the President of the United States). 
 They supposed that by thus quoting the treaties which China 
 allowed them to make she cannot take offence, wlu'le Japan 
 should be content with such an answer." 
 
 The breaking out of hostilities between China and Ja])an 
 was, of course, the occasion of renewal in acute form of inter- 
 nal strife between the conservative and the progressive forces 
 in Korea. But for the time being the ])r()gressi\-e forces, 
 backed by the dominance of the Jajjanese, were the stronger.
 
 2i6 IN KOREA WITH ATARQUIS ITO 
 
 On the 5th of August, 1894, the Korean treaty witli ("liina 
 was denounced; on the 15th of the same montli it \\as 
 formally abrogated by the Korean (Government; and on the 
 19th notice of an entirely new plan of (jovernment was 
 officially issued. On September 3d Manjuis Saionji, sjjccial 
 Ambassador from the Emi)eror of Japan, had an audience 
 with the King and j^resenled him with gifts, in honor of liis 
 accession to the ])Osition of an independent sovereign. Nu- 
 merous reforms' which had been discussed in the Korean 
 Council on July 31st of this same year and agreed u])on as 
 laws to be submitted to His ^Majesty for his aj)})ro\al, instead 
 of being sincerely, wisely, and perseveringly enactefl and 
 enforced, became the causes of increased defection, intrigue, 
 and internal dissensions. 
 
 The rebellion (referred to above as the "Tong Hak" re- 
 bellion), which had been reported as suppressed the previous 
 June, broke out in a still more dreadful form on the first of 
 October (1894). The Korean rebels became a "disorganized 
 pillaging mob." Taxes were no longer paid; Korean officials 
 were robbed and mutilated or murdered; small parties of the 
 Japanese were attacked and tortured to death after tlie tra- 
 ditional manner of the nation. Meantime the Japanese 
 forces were rjuitc uniformly victorious both by land and by 
 sea; and on October 9th the last of the Chinese forces were 
 driven across the Yalu River. A solemn "oath, sworn at the 
 royal temple by His ]\Iajesty the King of Korea, while he 
 worshipped, on the 12th day of the twelfth moon of the five 
 hundred and third year of the foundation of Ta Chosen" 
 (January 7, 1895), bound him to "give up all idea of subjec- 
 tion to China and to labor firmly to estal:)lish the independ- 
 ence of Korea"; "to decide all political affairs in council with 
 
 ' The list of these reforms is given in the volume of the U. S. Foreign 
 Relations, containing the report sent to the United States by Minister 
 Sill, September 24, 1894.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 217 
 
 his Cabinet"; "lo prevent Her Majesty the Queen, his con- 
 cubines, and all the royal relations from interfering in affairs 
 of state," thus securing a separation between their affairs and 
 those of the royal household; and to introduce and foster 
 other reforms of a political and educational character. How 
 poorly His Majesty kept his solemn oath, the subser^uent his- 
 tory of his throne and of his nation abundantly shows. 
 
 By the Chino- Japan war the dominating and baleful in- 
 fluence of China was for all time removed, and to Korea was 
 secured the opportunity for an independent and progressive 
 national development under the guidance, and by the assist- 
 ance, of Japan. That the Government of Japan honestly 
 wished for this good to come to Korea, there is no reasonable 
 ground of doubt. That the good did not follow is, however, 
 due to the fault of both nations. As regards the character 
 and conduct of the average political reformer there is a 
 marked similarity between the Japanese and the Koreans. 
 Such a one is apt to be over-coni'ident, and even self-con- 
 ceited; to have only a scanty acquaintance with the funda- 
 mental principles of politics and of statesmanship; to be 
 lacking in a judicial estimate of the difficulties to be over- 
 come; to make use (often with an apparent preference for 
 them) of offensive rather than conciliatory means; and to 
 have no adequate apprehension of the value of time, and of 
 the necessity of securing time, in order to effect important 
 changes in national affairs. Neither has he learned the art 
 of compromise in consistency with the maintenance of im- 
 portant moral princi])les. That Japan has not hitherto 
 failed in reforming herself as cons]:)icuously as Korea is 
 chiefly due, after making proper allowances for the different 
 environments of the two nations, to the great difference in 
 the character of the two Emperors who have been upon their 
 thrones during the period of trial; to the fact tliat Ja{)an has 
 had a body of most conspicuously wise leaders something
 
 2i8 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Korea has coni]j]ctely lacked; and to the difference as res])ects 
 the essential s])irit of loyalt\' among the people which the 
 feudal system de\-eloped in Ja|)an, but whicli has ne\er been 
 to any extent develojK'd in Korea. 
 
 The complete inability of the Korean official to compre- 
 hend, or to sympathize witli, tlie motives whicli led the repre- 
 sentatives of Japan llrst, Mr. Otori and tlien Count In()U}e 
 to urge the adoi)tion of. administrative reforms may be 
 judged by the fact that the King's father, the Tai Won Kun, 
 handed to Inouye on his arrixal as Minister at Seoul a list of 
 sixty persons wliom he wished to have forthwith executed in 
 order to secure himself in control of affairs. Squaljljles for 
 power between the party of the Queen and the ])arty of the Tai 
 Won Kun therefore continued and even became increasingly 
 acute. The Korean hot-head progressives were ])ushing 
 reforms without sufficient regard to the existing conditions. 
 But for a time the presence of a .eal statesman as the re])re- 
 scntative of Japan in Korea kept the evil forces in check. 
 
 Count Inouye's ai)pointment to the post of Minister was 
 an eloquent proof of the profound interest which the Japanese 
 Government took in Korea, and of its earnest desire to aid 
 her in the promotion of domestic reform and progress. On 
 the Count's part, personally, the acceptance of such a task, 
 difficult and in many ways distasteful, was an exhibition of 
 self-sacrificing patriotism, to which the ])resent action of his 
 bosom friend and associate, Mar(|uis Ito, affords a striking 
 parallel. W'hile striving to reconcile the warring Korean 
 factions, he devoted himself to tlie improvement of adminis- 
 trative conditions and to the promotion of the public welfare. 
 He attained a measure of success in some directions, and 
 w^ould undoubtedly have achieved more lasting success had 
 it been possible for him to remain longer in Korea. His 
 singleness of purpose was recognized by many Koreans, and 
 the sinceritv of his endeavors to benefit Korea was acknowl-
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 219 
 
 edged by foreign observers. But the task was too heavy for 
 the time he could devote to it. 
 
 Finally, other more imperative duties called Count Inouye 
 home, and he was succeeded by Viscount Miura, a man of a 
 different stamp. Then followed the murder of the Queen, 
 with all its unhappy train of consequences. Although the 
 crime was undoubtedly concocted by the Queen's implacable 
 enemy, the Tai Won Kun, the Japanese Government never 
 sought to evade the share of responsibility imposed u])on it. 
 The tragedy was a far severer blow to Japanese interests than 
 to those of Korea, for the Queen alive, and even stih bitterly 
 hostile to Japan, could never have worked the harm that the 
 manner of her taking-off had caused. And, indeed, while 
 apology for this murder from the moral point of view cannot 
 be justified, in spite of the cruel character of the victim and 
 of the fact that there was then visited upon her only the same 
 treatment which she had herself given to scores and hundreds 
 of others, when considered from the diplomatic point of view 
 the act was even more foolish and reprehensible. 
 
 The following account from Hershey^ gives in brief, but 
 with sufficient detail for our purposes, the events of this 
 period : 
 
 The impolitic attempts at hasty and radical reform in Korea, 
 which followed the outbreak of the Chino-Japanese war, were 
 resisted by the Court party at Seoul, headed by the Queen and the 
 Min family to which she belonged. Early in October, 1895, the 
 Queen planned a coup d'etat with a view to disbanding the st)ldiers 
 who had been trained by Japanese officers, and of replacing the 
 pro- Japanese partisans of reform in the Korean Cabinet b_\- her 
 friends. The result was a counter-plot (in whicli the King's 
 father, the veteran conspirator Tai Won Kun, was a prime mover) 
 to seize the King and Queen with the aim of obtaining complete 
 control of the Korean Government in interest of the pro- Japanese 
 
 ' International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Chincsc War, p. 43 /.
 
 220 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 and reform ])arty. In carrying out tliis plot (in which the Japan- 
 ese Minister Miura seems to liave hccn an accomphce) the Queen 
 was murdered In' Japanese and Korean rufiians. 
 
 "This disgusting crime," Hcrshcy goes on to say, "al- 
 though it assured the power of the reform Cabinet for the 
 time being, reacted uj)on its per])etrators, and was followed, 
 four months later, by another ecjually re\olting, by means 
 of wdiich Russia gained control of the Government of Korea. 
 In January, 1896, there took place a slight uprising in 
 Northern Korea, at the instigation, it was said, of ])ro- 
 Russian leaders. When the major portion of the army had 
 been sent out of the capital to suppress the rebellion, 127 
 Russian marines with a cannon suddenly landed at Chemulpo 
 on February 10, and immediately entered Seoul. The next 
 day the King, accompanied by the Crown Prince and some 
 court ladies, fled in disguise to the Russian Legation, where 
 he remained until February 20, 1897." 
 
 Following this escapade the Prime Minister, Kim Hong 
 Chip, a man widely respected and in no way connected with 
 the murder of the Queen, and Chung Pyang Ha, equally in- 
 nocent of the same crime, were deliberately thrust forth from 
 the palace gates into the hands of the waiting mob, which, 
 in true Korean fashion, tore them limb from limb. Another 
 Minister was killed a few days later in the country. Thus 
 ended Japan's attempt to enter into friendly relations with 
 Korea wdiile the latter nation was in the anomalous condition 
 of an independent dependency of China. Two valuable re- 
 sults, however, had been reached: Korea had been defini- 
 tively and finally delivered from Chinese control and dominat- 
 ing influence; and her own inability to stand alone and to 
 inaugurate the needed reforms had been, it would seem, 
 quite suflficiently demonstrated. Japan, on the other hand, 
 had not as yet shown her ability wisely to inaugurate and
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 221 
 
 effectively to secure these reforms; and by the injudicious 
 action of her representative in Korea she had thrown the 
 temporary control of the Korean Court into the selfish and 
 intriguing hands of other foreigners. The events of the next 
 decade, therefore, led logically and irresistibly forward to a 
 yet more desperate struggle, at a yet more frightful cost, to 
 solve the Korean problem.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 THE problem: historical (continued) 
 
 The conclusion of the centuries of intricate and unsatis- 
 factory relations between these two countries was, to (juote 
 the words of another, that " Japan saw herself deposed from 
 the position in Korea to which her victories entitled her, by 
 a nation which appeared to be both an upstart and a usurper 
 on the Sea of Japan." For three and a quarter centuries 
 Russia had been advancing through Asia at the average rate 
 of 20,000 Sfjuare miles annually; and now, in the endeavor, 
 in itself laudable, tc secure an outlet on the Pacific for her 
 Asiatic possessions, she began extending her customary 
 policy over Alanchuria and the Peninsula. It is douljtful 
 whether the Korean King, when he took refuge in the Russian 
 Legation at Seoul, was really alarmed for his personal safety; 
 it is certain that he hated intensely the reform measures 
 which had been forced upon him, and the men among his 
 own subjects who were committed to those measures. His 
 life was, however, never in any real danger at this period. 
 His presence and his position at the Russian Legation, 
 during his entire stay there, was lacking in all semblance of 
 royal dignity. He was himself in the virtual custody of a 
 foreign power. The different Cabinet Ministers had their 
 places assigned in the dining-room of the Legation, behind 
 screens; "all except one lucky individual who secured 
 
 ' Hershey, International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Chinese 
 War, p. 44 /,
 
 THE PR0BLP:M: HISTORICAL 223 
 
 quarters for his exclusive use in an abandoned out-house 
 where wood and coal were usually stored." 
 
 There began now a game of manccuvring and intrigue in 
 which, for some years to come, the Japanese were to be at a 
 large disadvantage. The King, who has always shown him- 
 self irrevocably committed to the peculiar methods of Korean 
 politics, within Uxo weeks of the day on which he had taken 
 refuge in the Russian Legation, Ix'gan secretly communicating 
 with the Japanese ^Minister. The Russian ^Minister at that 
 time, who has been pronounced "probably the most adroit 
 representati\e of her interests whom Russia ever had in 
 Korea," proclaimed himself an unwilling victim of the King's 
 fear, which he regarded as hysterical, but could not, in com- 
 mon decency, fail to resi)ect. The Japanese v;ere in no 
 position to resent the insult or to foreguard against the 
 menace which all this involved. 
 
 Not unnaturally, the Russian representative undertook 
 promptly to avail his country of the especially favorable op- 
 portunity for promoting its interests in the Far East which 
 was offered by the intimate relations of protection established 
 over the Korean Government. For it should never be lost 
 out of mind that until years after these events, whoever had 
 dominating influence with the Korean monarch controlled, 
 in largest measure, the Korean Government. AI. Waeber, 
 among other material l^encfits, secured \aluable mining and 
 timber concessions for his countrymen; it was also, probaljly, 
 due to his influence that the Korean troops wliich had been 
 trained by the Japanese, were disbanded. There then fol- 
 lowed a radical change in the ])olicy of Japan, which is de- 
 scribed as follows l)y Hersliey:^ 
 
 In the summer of 1896 J;i})an formally departed from her policy 
 of the past two decades of upholding the independence and in- 
 
 ^ Ibid., [). 45/. See also the account of Dr. K. Asakawa, The 
 Russo-Japa)iese Coiiflicl, p. 263 //.
 
 224 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 tegrity of Korea by lier own efforts, and sought the co-operation 
 of Russia toward the same end. On May 14th, the Russian and 
 Japanese Ministers at Seoul conckided a memorandum which 
 fixed the number and disposition of Japanese troops in Korea. 
 On June 9, 1896, the Yamagata-Lobanoff ])rotocol was signed 
 at St. Petersburg. It was therel^y agreed: 
 
 (i) That the Japanese and Russian governments should unite in 
 advising the Korean Government to suppress all unnecessar)- expenses 
 and to establish an equilibrium between expenditure and revenue. If, 
 as a result of reforms which should be considered indispcnsal)le, it should 
 become necessary to have recourse to foreign dei)ts, the two govern- 
 ments should of a common accord render their su])j)ort to Korea. (2) 
 The Japanese and Russian governments should try to alxmdon to 
 Korea, in so far as the financial and economic situation of that country 
 should permit, the creation and maintenance of an armed force and of 
 a police organized of native subjects, in proportion sufficient to main- 
 tain internal order, without foreign aid. (3) Russia was to be per- 
 mitted to establish a telegraph line from Seoul to her frontier; the 
 Japanese Government being allowed to administer those lines already 
 in its possession. (4) In case the principles above exj)ounded retpiire 
 a more precise and more detailed definition, or if in the future other 
 points should arise about which it should be necessar)' to consult, the 
 representatives of the two governments should be instructed to discuss 
 them amicably. 
 
 The Protocol of June, 1896, was no sooner signed than 
 Russia proceeded to violate its terms. In the same month 
 she tried to gain control of the Korean army by ])lacing it 
 under Russian instruction and discipline; in the same year, 
 she urged the reciuest that the disjjosal of all the Korean 
 taxes and customs be placed in the hands of AI. Kir Alexeieff. 
 This plan was partly carried through the following year, and 
 Mr. J. McLeavy Brown was dismissed from the position of 
 Financial Adviser and General Director of Customs for 
 Korea, although he was soon after formally restored to tlie 
 latter office, the control of which he had never been, in fact,
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 225 
 
 induced to surrender. In August of 1897, ^^- tic Speyer 
 succeeded M. Waeber as the Representative of Russia {Con- 
 seiller d'Etat) in Korea; his conduct of Russian affairs, which 
 seems to have been quite devoid of the conciliatory policy of 
 his predecessor, lost for his country many of the advantages 
 which had already been secured. Besides the inducement 
 from this fact, the recent acquisition of Port Arthur and 
 Ta-lien-wan seemed to make it desirable for Russia, for the 
 time being at least, to conciliate Japan, And Japan, on her 
 part, definitively committed herself to the effort to conciliate 
 Russia, while at the same time safeguarding her own im- 
 portant, and indeed essentially vital, interests m the Penin- 
 sula. Accordingly there was concluded between the two na- 
 tions the Nislii-Rosen Protocol of August 25, 1898. 
 That instrument was as follows: 
 
 Article I. The Imperial governments of Japan and Russia 
 definitely recognize the sovereignty and entire hidependence of 
 Korea, and mutually engage to abstain from all direct inter- 
 ference in the affairs of that country. 
 
 Article II. Desiring to remove every possible cause of mis- 
 understanding in the future, the Imperial governments of Japan 
 and Russia mutually engage not to take any measure regarding 
 the nomination of military instructors and financial advisers with- 
 out having previously arrived at a mutual accord on the subject. 
 
 Article III. In view of the great development of the com- 
 mercial and industrial enterprise of Japan in Korea, as also the 
 considerable number of Japanese subjects residing in that country, 
 the Russian Imperial Government shall not imj^ede the develojoment 
 of commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea. 
 
 Five days later namely, on August 30th ]\Iarr[uis Ito, 
 who was visiting in Korea, and had been cordially received 
 by the Emperor and invited to dine with him, publicly rc- 
 aflirmcd the policy for wliich His Imperial Majesty of Japan 
 and he himself, as His Majesty's subject, wished to be res})on-
 
 226 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 siljle, in a speech delivered al a dinner given at the Foreign 
 Office. On that occasion the Mar([uis sj)okc as follows: 
 
 Your Excellencies and (}E^TLK^TE^: 
 
 I thank you sincerely for the kind words in which the Acting 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs has just addressed me on your behalf, 
 but at the same time I am constrained to say that I do not de- 
 serve the high comjjliments which he cliose to confer upon me. 
 Allow me to avail myself of the present ()p])ortunity to say a fe\y 
 words concerning the attitude of Ja])an toward this country. 
 You doubtless know that in 1873 a group of Japanese statesmen 
 advocated the despatch of a punitive expedition to Korea, a pro- 
 posal to which I was uncompromisingly opj)Osed from the outset, 
 because I deemed such a war not only uncalled for, but contrary 
 to the principles of humanity. You may imagine the magnitude 
 of the excitement occasioned by this question, when I tell you 
 that the split which it caused in the ranks of the Japanese states- 
 men led to a tremendous civil war a few years afterward. The 
 point to which I wish to direct your attention is that His Imperial 
 Japanese Majesty's Government did not hesitate to reject what 
 it considered to be an unjust projjosal even at such gigantic risk. 
 
 Japan's policy toward Korea has since been unchanged; in 
 other words, her object has always been to assist and befriend 
 this country. It is true that at times incidents of an unpleasant 
 nature unfortunately interfered with the maintenance of un- 
 suspecting cordiality between the two nations. But I may 
 conscientiously assure you that the real object of the Japanese 
 Government has always been to render assistance to Korea in 
 her noble endeavors to be a civilized and independent state. 
 
 I am sincerely gratified to see that to-day Korea is independent 
 and sovereign. Henceforth it will be Japan's wish to see Korea's 
 independence further strengthened and consolidated; no other 
 motive shall influence Japan's conduct toward this country. On 
 this point you need not entertain the slightest doubt. 
 
 Japan's good wishes for Korean independence are all the more 
 sincere and reliable because her vital interests arc bound up with 
 those of your country. A danger to Korean independence wiU
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 227 
 
 be a danger to Japan's safety. So you will easily recognize that 
 the strongest of human motives, namely self-interest, combines 
 with neighborly feelings to make Japan a sincere well-wisher and 
 friend of Korean independence. 
 
 Let me repeat once more that Korea may rest assured of the 
 absence of all sinister motives on Japan's part. Friendship be- 
 tween two countries in the circumstances of Japan and Korea 
 ought to be free from any trace of suspicion and doubt as to each 
 other's motives and intentions. In conclusion, allow me to express 
 my heartfulhope that you may long remain in office and assiduously 
 exert yourselves for the good of your sovereign and country. 
 
 With the coming of M. Pavloff to Korea as its Representa- 
 tive, in December, 1898, the diplomacy of Russia in this part 
 of the Orient abandoned the traditional metliod of patient, 
 persistent effort at advance, together with more or less per- 
 fect assimilation of the new tribes and peoples brought under 
 its control, and adopted the more brilliant but dangerous 
 policy of a swift promotion of obviously selfish schemes by 
 a mixture of threats and cajolery. It is not even now certain 
 how far this policy was supported by, or even known to, the 
 home government of Russia. The war with Japan, to which 
 these acts led steadily and irresistibly forward, seemed, only 
 in its actual results, to reveal at all fully to this Government 
 what its representatives had been doing in the Far East. 
 
 Among the various attempts of M. Pavloff and his co- 
 adjutors to obtain concessions for themselves and for their 
 country, those which looked toward the establishment of a 
 Russian naval base in certain localities of the Korean coast 
 were threatening to Japan. "But Russia's conduct on the 
 Northern frontier of Korea along the Tumen and Yalu 
 rivers was" to quote again from Hershey "the greatest 
 source of anxiety to Japan." 
 
 In 1896 Russia had obtained valuable mining concessions in 
 two districts near the port of Kiong-hung at the mouth of the
 
 228 IN KORKA WITH MARQUIS JTO 
 
 Tumen River, and later sought to extend her influence in that 
 region. More im]K)rtant and dangerous, liowever, to the interests 
 of Jajjan were the attempts of Russia to obtain an actual foothold 
 on Korean territory at Yong-ani-po on the Korean side of the 
 Yalu River. As far back as i8g6, when the King was a guest of 
 the Russian Legation, a Russian menliant had ol)tained timber 
 concessions on the Uining Island in the Sea of Japan and (jn the 
 Tumen and Yalu rivers. The concession along the Yalu was to 
 be forfeited unless work was begun within five )ears in the other 
 two regions. This condition does not ap])ear to have been com- 
 plied with when the Korean Government was suddenly notified 
 on April 13, 1903, that the Russian timber syndicate would at 
 once begin the work of cutting timl^er on the Yalu. I'Larly in May 
 sixty Russian soldiers in civilian dress, later increased by several 
 hundred more, were reported to have occupied Yong-am-po, a 
 point rather remote from the place where actual cutting was in 
 progress. At the same time there was taking place a mysterious 
 mobilization of troops from Liaoyang and Port Arthur toward 
 Feng-hwang-cheng and Antung on the other side of the Yalu. 
 Early in June four Russian warships paid a week's visit to Che- 
 mulpo. In August M. Pavlofif a])pears to have been on the ])oint 
 of obtaining an extension of the Yong-am-po lease, but this was 
 prevented by the receij)t of an ultimatum from the Japanese Min- 
 ister. Air. Hayashi threatened that if the Korean (lovcrnment 
 were to sign such a lease, Japan would regard diplomatic relations 
 between tho two countries as suspended, and would regard herself 
 as free to act in her own interests. 
 
 In this connection it should be said, that \vhile the Korean 
 Government did not formally renew the lease, the Em])eror 
 did secretly enter into an arrangement with ]\I. Pavloff con- 
 cerning Yong-am-po, practically conceding all that was 
 asked on Russia's behalf. This document was discovered 
 after the war began and hastily cancelled by the Emjjeror, of 
 his own accord, upon the recommendation of the Korean 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 229 
 
 Meantime another conflict of interests between Russia and 
 Japan was developing and contributing to the same resuh 
 namely, the Russo-Japanese war. This was the so-called 
 "Manchurian Question." It is not necessary for the 
 purposes of our narrative to trace with any detail the origin 
 and different stages of that succession of successful intrigues 
 and encroachments upon foreign territory whicli had been 
 for some time carried on wdth the Chinese by methods similar 
 to those now being employed in Korea. Some of the 'more 
 salient points in the history of the preceding period of nearly 
 a half-century need, however, to be called to mind. In i860, 
 when the allied forces occupied Peking, the Russian ^Minister, 
 General Ignatieff, by a brilliant stroke of diplomacy, secured 
 for his country the cession of the maritime province of 
 Manchuria, with 600 miles of coast, and the harbor of 
 Vladivostok, down to the mouth of the Tumen. For this 
 he gave nothing in return beyond the pretence that it was in 
 his power to bring pressure upon the allies and thus secure 
 their more speedy evacuation of the Chinese capital. 
 
 Thirty years later, after the new province had been devel- 
 oped and the harbor of Madivostok converted into a powerful 
 fortress, Russia determined upon building an all-rail route 
 across Siberia, and immediately began to press for other 
 concessions in Chinese territory that in 1897 resulted in the 
 association which constructed what is now known as the 
 IManchurian Railway. This enterprise was ostensibly a 
 joint affair of the two countries; but it has been fitly described 
 as "only a convenient bonnet" for an essential]}" Russian 
 undertaking. Russian engineers now came in large numljers 
 to Manchuria; Russian Cossacks accomj)anied iheni for ])ur- 
 poses of their protection. Later in the same year tlie seizure 
 by Germany of Kiao-chau, in satisfaction for outrages com- 
 mitted upon German missionaries, was followed by Russia's 
 request to the Chinese Government for permission to winter
 
 230 IX KOREA Wrni MARQUJS ITO 
 
 her Heel at Port Arlhur. In March of the next year Jaj)an 
 had the added mortihcation, bitterness, and cause for ahirm, 
 of seeing Russia tlemand and obtain from China a formal 
 lease of the same commercial and strategic j)oints of tlie 
 ])eninsula of Liao-tung of which Russia, by combining \vith 
 Germany and France, had (lepri\ed Japan when slie had 
 won them by concjuest in war. These enter])rises in Man- 
 churia were financed by the Russo-Chinese Bank, an institu- 
 tion ^\*hich had recently been founded in the Far East as a 
 branch of the Russian Ministry of P'inance. So important 
 is this last-mentioned fact that one writer ])laces upon M. 
 Pokotilofi", Chief of the Russo-Chinese Bank in Berlin, the 
 responsibility for the whole Port Arthur episode, and de- 
 clares it was he who dictated the {)olicy of Russia in Man- 
 churia after the Boxer uprising.' 
 
 The occuj^ation o' Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan (renamed 
 Dalny) was accomj)anied by assurances from the Russian 
 Government chiefly designed to quiet Great T^ritain and 
 Japan that it had "no intention of infringing the rights and 
 privileges guaranteed by existing treaties between China and 
 foreign countries;" and that no interference with Cliinese 
 sovereignty was contemj)latcd. To the ol)jections raised 
 when it proceeded to fortify Port Arthur, the rej)ly was made 
 that Russia "must have a safe harljor for her tleet, which 
 could not be at the mercy of the elements at Madivostok ov 
 dependent u])on the good-will of Japan." Under tliis ])lea 
 she refused to change the status of Port Arthur as a closed 
 and principally military port. The effect of all this upon the 
 altitude of public feeling in Japan toward Russia can easily 
 be imagined. Even when, in August, 1899, the ])ort of 
 Dalny was declared "open" by an Tm])erial ukase, regulations 
 with respect to passports and claims to a monopoly of mining 
 
 ' So Mr. WTiigham, in his admirable book on Manchuria and Korea. 
 (London, Isbiter & Company), p. 123.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 231 
 
 rights continued to lessen the confidence of other nations in 
 Russia's good faith with respect to the occupation of ]\Ian- 
 churia. It is now sufficiently well established that during 
 this period secret agreements between Li Hung Chang and 
 the Russian Government were made which enlarged the 
 special privileges of Russia in Manchuria. ^Meantime, also, 
 her military hold was being strengthened; so that by Decem- 
 ber, i8g8, she had 20,000 men at her two ports, while Cossack 
 guards " the pennons on their lances showing a combination 
 of the Russian colors and the Chinese dragon" were 
 patrolling the railway line and protecting the work of fortifica- 
 tion at Port Arthur. 
 
 During these yqars the Japanese Government was watching 
 with quiet but painful solicitude the movements going forward 
 in China. When ]\Iarquis Ito visited Peking and the Yang- 
 tse provinces in the summer of 1898, he was received with 
 marked attention, esj)ecially by the reform party among the 
 leading Chinese officials; but the baleful inlluence of the 
 Dowager-Empress, and of the party opposed to everything 
 likely to curtail their power, arrested the attempts at rap- 
 prochement between China and Japan. It was the so-called 
 "Boxer ^Movement," however, which gave to Russia a new 
 claim of right to interfere in Chinese affairs and to establish 
 more firmly than ever before her special privileges in ]Man- 
 churia. The history of this movement of the way in which 
 Russia dealt with its extension into Alanchuria, of tlie siege 
 of Peking and the doings of ihe allied forces, and of tlie subse- 
 (juent behavior of tlie Russians Avitli regard to tlie evacuation 
 of Alanchuria is now well known, or easil}' accessible, l)y 
 all students of the period. 
 
 In spite of re])eated promises to evacuate the ])oints seized 
 and held by Russian forces when, after the reh"ef of tlie Lega- 
 tions, these forces were withdrawn from Peking and Chi-li 
 to be concentrated in ]\Ianchuria, and in disregard of the
 
 232 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 interests of the other alHcs, the pohcy of keeping all that 
 she had gained, and of gaining more as far as possible, was 
 steadily pursued by Russia. On November ii, 1900, an 
 agreement was made between the Representative of Admiral 
 Alexcieff and the Tartar General at Mukden, the most 
 significant point of which was the promise of the Chinese 
 official to provide the Russian trooi)s with lodging and pro- 
 visions, to disarm and disband all Chinese soldiers and hand 
 over all arms and ammunition to the Russians, and to dis- 
 mantle all forts and defences not occupied by the Russians. 
 
 It was the probable effect of a continued occupation of 
 Manchuria by Russia upon their business interests which led 
 Great Britain and America to wish that the repeated Russian 
 assurances of good faith toward China and toward all foreign 
 nations should manifest themselves in works. The case 
 could not be wholly the same with Japan. Her interests of 
 trade were, indeed, if not at the time so large, more close and 
 vital than those of any other nation outside of China. But 
 her other interests were incomparable. So that when Russia 
 failed to carry out her engagements, even under a convention 
 which was so much in her favor, there was a rcN'ival of sus- 
 picion and apprehension on the part of the Japanese Govern- 
 ment and the Japanese people. Manchuria and Korea both 
 pointed an index finger of warning directed toward Russia. 
 
 It was to further a peaceful adjustment of all the disturbed 
 condition of the interests of Russia and Japan in the Far East 
 that Marquis Ito went, on his way home from his visit to the 
 United States, at the end of 1901, on an unofficial mission to 
 St. Petersburg. The failure of the overtures which he bore 
 discouraged those of the leading Ja])anese statesmen who 
 were hoping for some reconciliation which might take the 
 shape of allowing Russian ascendency in Manchuria and 
 Japanese ascendency in Korea. It also strengthened the 
 conviction which prevailed among the younger statesmen that
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 233 
 
 the St. Petersburg Government regarded ]\Ianchuria as not 
 only its fortress in the Far East, but also as its path to the 
 peninsula lying within sight of Japan's shores. "The 
 Japanese Government," says Mr. D. W. Stevens, "at last 
 felt that the vital interests of Japan might be irrevocably 
 jeopardized in Korea as well as in Manchuria, if it continued 
 to remain a mere passive spectator of Russian encroachments; 
 and in August, 1903, it resolved to take a decisive step. In 
 the most courteous form and through the usual diplomatic 
 channels Japan intimated at St. Petersburg that her voice 
 must be heard, and listened to, in connection with Far 
 Eastern questions in which her interests were vitally con- 
 cerned." The answer of Russia was the appointment of 
 Admiral Alexeieff as Viceroy over the Czar's possessions in 
 the Far East, with executive and administrative powers of a 
 semi-autocratic character. 
 
 But let us return to Korea and inquire: What was the 
 policy with which its Emperor and his Court met the exceed- 
 ingly critical situation into which the country was being forced 
 by the conflict going on between Russia and Japan both 
 within, and just outside of, its borders? The answer is not 
 dubious. It was the policy, in yet more aggravated form, 
 of folly, weakness, intrigue, and corruption, both in the 
 administration of internal affairs and also in the management 
 of the now very delicate foreign relations. The Emperor 
 was to use the descriptive phrase of another enjoying "an 
 orgy of independence." The former restraints which had been 
 imposed upon him by Chinese domination, by the personal 
 influence of the Tai Won Kun, or of the Queen, by his fears of 
 the reformers, and even by any passi\e emotional impulses of 
 his own, leading to reformation, were now ah removed. While 
 he was a "guest" at the Russian Legation there was certainly 
 no direct influence exerted by his hosts, to assist, advise, or 
 guide him into better ways. It was not the policy of Russia to
 
 234 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS 1T(3 
 
 effect at least for the ])resent or immediately prospective 
 occasion any moral betterment of the administration of 
 Korean home and foreign affairs. Under the regency of his 
 father, the Government had Ijeen cruel, despotic, and mur- 
 derous toward both native and foreign Christians. But the 
 Tai Won Kun had some regard for ancient common laws 
 and usages. Under him the peojde were reasonably sure of 
 such rights, protection, and privileges of public domain, as 
 their ancestors had enjoyed. The puljlic granaries were kept 
 full against the time of famine. The timber and fire- wood on 
 the hills was not given over to any one who could Ijribe or 
 cajole the corrupt officials; and the line of demarcation be- 
 tween ro}'al and po|)ular rights was more clearly drawn and 
 better understood. But now all this was changed for the 
 worse. The King declared himself the sole and private 
 owner to dispose of as he saw fit of all the properties which 
 had formerly been considered as belonging to the state. 
 Low-born favorites appropriated or laid waste the public 
 domain. The country's resources were wasted; the people 
 were subjected to new and irregular exactions, levied by ir- 
 regular people for illegal purposes. A succession of the most 
 consummate rascals which ever afflicted any country came 
 into virtual control. They were endowed with offlces pur- 
 chased or extorted from the head ruler. Eunuchs were sent 
 out from the palace on "still hunts," so to speak, to discover 
 any kind of property which, by any pretext whatever, could 
 be claimed; and to seize such property in the name of His 
 Majesty, or of the King's concubine, Lady ()m, or of some 
 one of the Imperial Princes. Laws which were intended to 
 promote the ends of justice were twisted from their purpose 
 and made to serve the ends of j^lunder. Such privileges as 
 that of coining and counterfeiting the currency were sold to 
 private persons. 
 
 Then began also that squandering of the nation's most
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 235 
 
 valuable resources which, under the name of "concessions" 
 to foreigners who generally allied themselves for this end wdth 
 corrupt Korean officials, has continued down to the present 
 time; and the adjustment of wdiich is still giving the Resident- 
 General and his judicial advisers some of their most serious 
 problems. To quote the description of this period by a dis- 
 tinguished foreigner, long in the Korean service: "Nothing 
 in this country is safe from the horde which surrounds His 
 Majesty and seemingly has his confidence. Public office is 
 bought and sold without even the pretence of concealment. 
 Officials share with the palace the plunder whicli they extort 
 from the people. So and So (naming a prominent Korean 
 Official) is said to owe his influence there largely to the fact 
 that out of every ten thousand yen which he collects he sur- 
 renders seven thousand to the Emperor, retaining only tliree 
 for himself. With his colleagues it is usually the otlier way, 
 about." According to tlie same authority, many kinds of 
 property which were formerly regarded as belonging to the 
 state were now being appropriated to the Emperor's use, or 
 to that of his favorites, without any pretext, under the rule 
 that "might makes right." Torturing, strangling, and de- 
 capitation, were no infrequent methods of accomphshing the 
 imperial will; though it should be said that these favors were 
 somewhat impartially distributed. Sometimes it was the 
 secret strangling in prison of such patriots as An K}un-su and 
 Kwan Yung-chin, on the night of May 27, 1900 tlian which, 
 it has truly been said, "no more dastardly crime ever stained 
 the annals of this or any other government " : sometimes it was 
 the torturing and execution of such unspeakable rascals as the 
 ex-court-favorites, Kim Yung-chun (1901), Yi Yong-ik, and 
 Yi Kcun-tak (1902). In a word, iJic period oj " inde pendenee,^' 
 to ivhich the Emperor has beeji lately imphving his on'n 
 subjects and tJie civilized world to restore him, was the period 
 in ivhich he took wJiat, and gave away what, and did what lie
 
 236 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 chose, under the basest influences, jor the most worthless or 
 mischievous ends, without law or pretence oj justice or goodness 
 oj heart, to the lasting disgrace and essential ruin oj the nation. 
 
 Such is a summary of the doings during the years preceding 
 the Russo-Japanese war, on the })art of the Korean Emperor 
 and his Court, "Through all this })eriod," says Mr. Hulbert/ 
 " Russian inlluence was cjuietly at work securing its hold upon 
 the Korean Court and upon such members of the government 
 as it could win over. The general populace was always 
 suspicious of her, however, and always preferred the rougher 
 hand of Japan to the soft but heavy hand of Russia." The 
 threatening nature of the situation created by these Russian 
 encroachments was as well understood at Washington and 
 London as at Tokyo. It was intimately connected with the 
 Manchurian question to the untangling of which IMr. Hay 
 had devoted so much thought. 
 
 But Russia's action in Manchuria, threatening as it was to 
 the interests, not alone of Japan but also of other foreign 
 powers, did not call upon the Japanese Government for armed 
 interference.^ As the behavior of Japan showed during the 
 Boxer troubles in China, she had learned caution with resi)ect 
 to fighting the battles of civilized Europe and America, at her 
 own expense and without show^ of gratitude from others. 
 
 As we have already seen, the most threatening feature of 
 the situation for Japan was Russia's activity upon the Yalu, 
 especially at Yong-am-po. In the interests of peace ]\[r. Hay 
 supplemented his efforts to maintain the principle of the open 
 door and equal opportunity in iNIanchuria, by an earnest 
 endeavor (which had Lord Lansdowne's cordial support) to 
 fend off the impending quarrel between Japan and Russia. 
 Since all the Treaty Powers were interested in the matter of 
 
 ' The Passing oj Korea, p. 167. 
 
 * See on this and allied points, the lecture delivered by Mr. Rock- 
 hill, at the United States Naval War College, Newport, August 5, 1904.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 237 
 
 treaty ports in Korea, the method that most readily sug- 
 gested itself was the opening of Wiju and Yong-am-po, 
 which would remove any question of the latter place being 
 used as a military or naval base. The request was reasonable 
 from every point of view, since Wiju, as the market town, and 
 Yong-am-po, as the port, were naturally the complement, on 
 the Korean side of the Yalu, of Antung then recently declared 
 an open port on the Manchurian. Indeed, other considera- 
 tions apart, some such action was imperatively necessary from 
 the Korean standpoint, inasmuch as an open port in Chinese 
 territory, without a corresponding port of entry in neighboring 
 Korean territory, could not fail to be prejudicial to the inter- 
 ests of Korea. Accordingly the American and British 
 representatives at Seoul were instructed to urge upon the 
 Korean Government the necessity of opening these ports. 
 
 This was done, but the attempt to persuade the Emperor 
 met with strenuous opposition on M. Pavloff's part, and 
 finally failed, apparently because of the incapacity of His 
 Majesty's nearest advisers to grasp the real significance of the 
 crisis and the momentous effect which the decision must have 
 upon Korea's fortunes. The struggle was a fierce one while 
 it lasted and, among other niinor results, led to the resigna- 
 tion of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The gentleman who 
 succeeded him, as Acting Minister, was disposed to favor 
 the opening of the ports, in spite of the strong opposition of 
 the palace coterie. He went so far as to prepare letters to the 
 foreign representatives declaring the ports open, and was 
 actually about sending them out, on his own responsibility, 
 when he was stopped, partly by a percmptor}- order from the 
 palace, and partly by the persuasion of his friends who 
 represented to him the great personal danger he would incur 
 by such a step. 
 
 The narrative of this official throws a curious side-light 
 upon ]M. Pavloff's methods and shows in an interesting way
 
 238 IX KORKA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 his jxTsistencc, even at a time when the correspondence be- 
 tween Russia and Jaj)an ])receding tlie war had reached a 
 critical stage, in endeavoring by every means at his command 
 to carry tlirough the \er\' intrigue which formed {hi.- gravanwn 
 of Japan's strongest reason for com})laining. Jt is easy, in the 
 h'ght of what has ha])])ened, to condemn tliis action; but 
 even at the time it must have seemed to im])artial observers 
 more hke the infatuation of ades])erate gambler tlian Ihewell- 
 considered moves of a shrewd diplomatist. It was all done, 
 too, in support of a transj)arent subterfuge, namely: that 
 Russia had no arrangement witli Korea which gave to the 
 proposed use of Yong-am-po any otlier character than that of 
 an entirely peaceful occu])ation for legitimate commercial 
 purposes; and that her agents had done absolutely nothing 
 in the way of preparing the ])lace for military occu[)ation. 
 When he was urging upon the Acting Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs reasons for not opening Yong-am-])o, the latter en- 
 quired: "Why have you staked off such a large extent of 
 territory, and why are you building a fort?" AI. Pavloff 
 instantly denied in emphatic terms tliat anything of the kind 
 had been done. "For the past ten days," (piietly replied the 
 Korean official, "I have had two men whom I trust tlioroughly 
 on the spot, and my question is the result of telegra])hic 
 reports I have received from tlieni." The interview did not 
 continue, but within forty-eiglit hours his scouts reported to 
 the Acting Minister that all the stakes liad Ijeen remoNcd, 
 There had not been time, they said, thoroughly to remove all 
 traces of works upon the fortifications, but that as mucli of 
 the works as possible had been levelled and the whole co\ered 
 up with loose earth, tree-trunks and branches. Such 
 effrontery seems incredible; but these are facts, and others 
 like them equally typical of M. Pavloff's methods could be 
 recited. It is doubtful whether even his own government 
 knew all the circumstances, or was fully aware, until it was
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 239 
 
 too late, what he had done and was continuing to do to arouse 
 Japanese suspicion and resentment. 
 
 The negotiations having in view the peaceful adjustment 
 of the conflicting interests of Russia and Japan in the Far 
 East, which were begun by the latter country in the summer 
 of 1903, were further continued. ]\Ir. Kurino, the Japanese 
 Minister at St. Petersburg, was informed by Baron Komura, 
 who was then Japanese ^Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the 
 recent conduct of Russia at Peking, in ]\Ianchuria, and in 
 Korea, was the cause of grave concern to the Government at 
 Tokyo. "The unconditional and permanent occupation of 
 Manchuria by Russia would," said Baron Komura, "create 
 a state of things prejudicial to the security and interests of 
 Japan. The principle of equal opportunity would thereby 
 be annulled, and the territorial integrity of China be im- 
 paired. There is, however, a still more serious consideration 
 for the Japanese Go\'ernment; that is to say, if Russia was 
 established on the flank of Korea it would be a constant 
 menace to the separate existence of that empire, or at least 
 would make Russia the dominant power in Korea. But 
 Korea is an important outpost in Japan's line of defence, and 
 Japan consequently considers its independence absolutely 
 essential to her own repose and safety. ^Moreover, the 
 political as well as tlie commercial and industrial interests 
 and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are paramount 
 over those of other Powers. These interests and this influ- 
 ence Japan, having regard to her own security, cannot consent 
 to surrender to, or share with, another Power." 
 
 In view of these reasons, ]\Ir. Kurino was instructed to 
 present the following note to Count LamsdorU", the Russian 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs: "The Japanese Government 
 desires to remove from the relations of tlie two empires 
 every cause of future misunderstanding, and believes that 
 the Russian Government shares the same desire. The
 
 240 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Japanese Government would therefore be glad to enter with 
 the Russian Imperial (jrovernment upon an examination of 
 the condition of affairs in the regions of the extreme East, 
 where their interests meet, with a view of defining their 
 respective special interests in those regions. If this sug- 
 gestion fortunately meets with the approval, in ])rinciple, of 
 the Russian Government, the Japanese (government will 
 be prepared to present to the Russian Government their 
 views as to the nature and scope of the proposed under- 
 standing." 
 
 The consent of Count Lamsdorff and the Czar ha\ing been 
 obtained, on August 12th articles were prepared and sub- 
 mitted by the Japanese Government which it wished to ha\e 
 serve as a basis of understanding between the two countries. 
 The essential agreements to be secured by these articles 
 were: (i) A mutual engagement to respect the independence 
 and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean emj^ires, 
 and to maintain the "open door" in these countries; and (2) 
 a reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests 
 in Korea and of Russia's special interests in Manchuria. 
 These demands were not altered in any \ery imj)ortant way 
 by Japan during all the subsecpient negotiations. It was 
 their persistent rejection by Russia, together with her long 
 delays in replying while she was meantime making ob\ious 
 preparations of a warlike character, which preciiMtated tlie 
 tremendous conflict that followed some months later. In 
 her first reply with counter ])roposals which was made nearly 
 eight weeks later through Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister 
 at Tokyo, Russia not only reduced Japan's demands regard- 
 ing Korea, but even proposed new restrictions upon her in tliat 
 country. But what was ec^ually significant, the counter- 
 proposals took no account of the demand for an agreement 
 as to the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese 
 empire, or as to the policy of the "open door" in Man-
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 241 
 
 churia and Korea. On the contrary, they required Japan 
 expressly to recognize Alanchuria as "in all respects outside 
 her sphere of interest." ^Meantime Russia was increasing 
 her commercial and military activity in both the territorial 
 spheres where the question of interests and rights was under 
 dispute. 
 
 In the second overture of October 30th, several important 
 concessions were made by Japan, to which on December nth 
 Russia replied with a repetition of the former counter- 
 proposal omitting, however, the offensive clause regarding 
 Manchuria and inserting the Japanese proposal relating to 
 the connection of the Korean and the Chinese-Eastern rail- 
 ways. Ten days later the Japanese Government presented 
 a third overture in which Baron Komura tried to make it 
 clear to the Russian Government that Japan desired "to 
 bring within the purview of the proposed arrangement all 
 those regions in the Far East where the interests of the two 
 empires meet." But when the reply of Russia was received 
 in Tokyo on January 6, 1904, it was found that not only was 
 there no mention made of the territorial integrity of China 
 in Manchuria, but that Russia again insisted upon Japan's 
 regarding the "Manchurian Question" and the littoral of 
 Manchuria as quite outside her sphere of interest. Russia, 
 indeed, agreed "not to impede Japan or the other Powers in 
 the enjoyment of the rights and privileges acquired by them 
 under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establish- 
 ment of settlements" ; but only on condition that Japan would 
 agree not to use any part of the territory of Korea for strateg- 
 ical purposes, and also to the establishment of a neutral 
 zone in Northern Korea. In spite of the fact that the two 
 governments were still as far a{)art as at the beginning in 
 regard to the most \ital points of interest, Ja])an made 
 another and fourth attempt. This overture was presented 
 to Count Lamsdorff on January 13th and, in spite of the urgent
 
 242 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 request for an early reply, this did not come until February 7, 
 the day following the severing of diplomatic relations between 
 the two countries. Negotiations were then ended; a])])eal was 
 now made to the "arbitrament of war," so-called. 
 
 It is not our puri)ose to discuss in detail the (juestion of 
 rights, as involved in these negotiations, whether from the 
 political or the moral j)oint of view, or to consider whether 
 Japan's method of initiating hostilities was in accordance 
 with law, or with precedent as established, if such it can be 
 said to be, by the usage of civilized nations. In both regards 
 we believe, however, that the claims of Japan to ha\e the 
 right upon her side are in all important particulars defensible. 
 But having begun the war with Russia it can be seen that to 
 secure free passage for her troojjs through Korea, and to 
 secure Korea in the rear of her troops as they passed to the 
 front, were necessities imposed upon Japan in a yet more ab- 
 solute and indisputable fashion than was the undertaking of 
 the war itself. If it was necessary in order to maintain the 
 integrity and free, peaceful development of Japan that, all 
 other means having failed, she should resort to arms in the 
 effort to check the dangerous encroachments of Russia in 
 Manchuria and Korea, it was immediately and essentially 
 necessary for any measure of success in this last resort, that 
 she should gain and hold control over the conduct of the 
 Korean Court and the Korean populace during the war. 
 What were the nature and the habitual modes of behavior of 
 both Court and people has already been m.ade clear; more 
 information on these subjects will be afforded in subser^uent 
 chapters. As to danger of treachery we may note in pass- 
 ing that, while friendship was being protested to the face of 
 the Japanese in Korea, a boat was picked up in the Yellow 
 Sea, late in January, 1904 that is, a few days before the 
 outbreak of the war which bore a Korean messenger with a 
 letter to Port Arthur asking for Russian troops to be sent to
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 243 
 
 Korea. The resort to valuable concessions as a bribe for 
 foreign influence became at once, on the beginning of hostili- 
 ties, more active even than before. On this latter point we 
 quote the words of Mr. D, W. Stevens: 
 
 The outbreak of the war created a veritable storm of terror in 
 the ranks of Korean officialdom. JMany of its members who were 
 known as Russian sympathizers tied to the country; a few took 
 refuge in the houses of foreign friends. Palace circles were in 
 particular profoundly agitated. There was a curious manifesta- 
 tion of the trend of the Korean official mind toward the belief 
 that political support can be bought. Those were golden days for 
 the foreigner who, willing to trade upon Korean ignorance and 
 credulity, cared to let it be understood, either openly or tacitly, 
 that his government would appreciate favors shown to himself. 
 One foreign minister was surprised by the offer of a mining con- 
 cession which before that he had unsuccessfully tried to obtain. 
 Having due regard for his own and his country's reputation he 
 naturally declined. Others, private individuals, were not so 
 scrupulous; and there are to-day extant exceptionally favorable 
 public grants, both claimed and actually enjoyed, which were thus, 
 as it has been put, "obtained in the shadow of the war." 
 
 At this time the Emperor was dominated by the influence 
 of a courtier named Yi Yong-ik, whose foreign afffliations 
 were wholly Russian. The Palace coterie, even including 
 this man's bitter political enemies, was almost entirely pro- 
 Russian. But the Emperor was also, of course, much afraid 
 of the Japanese, who were now near at hand, whereas the 
 Russians and their Korean coadjutors had either fled the 
 country or gone into retirement. Eor the time being, there- 
 fore, Japan had control of the Imperial environment. ^lean- 
 time, one of two courses only seemed open to the Japanese 
 themselves: they could either set aside the Emperor and his 
 untrustworthy oflicials, and assume com])lete control of 
 Korean afl'airs; or they could make some sort of arrange-
 
 244 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 ment which would secure an alhame witli Korea. If faithful 
 to this alliance, the Emj)eror would be assured of his j)ersonal 
 safety and of his throne; and the country would be jjlaced 
 definitively under Japanese ])rotection. The leaders in Jaj)an 
 knew ])crfectly well that His Korean Majesty was anti^ 
 Ja])anese and characteristically false and treacherous; but 
 they hoped by moderation to win him over to at least a 
 partial and temporary fulfilment of the obligations under 
 which he would be placed by the adoption of the more 
 friendly course. 
 
 There were also military reasons why a sort of ])rotectorate 
 and alliance seemed necessary; and if possible in a way to 
 avoid the troubles of a forcible annexation. For, very special 
 and momently imminent dangers threatened the construction 
 and use of the railway by which the Japanese were transport- 
 ing their troops and supplies through Korea to the seat of the 
 war. In several instances armed attacks were made upon 
 the workmen and the track was torn up. In another con- 
 nection it will be shown that the charge of extreme cruelty 
 and wholesale slaughter made by ]\Ir. Hulljcrt ^ (and illustrated 
 by a picture designed to excite })athos), because the Japanese 
 military authorities executed some of the leaders of these 
 dangerous riots, is quite unwarranted by the facts. The 
 same thing may be said of the charge that the Po-an, or 
 " Society for the Promotion of Peace and Safety," was illegally 
 and wantonly suppressed by the Japanese in July of 1904. 
 The simple truth is that this society bore about the same 
 relation to the cause of "peace and safety" which has been 
 borne during the past two years by the several associations 
 for intrigue and murder which have masqueraded under titles 
 suggestive of the most noble schemes for promoting the in- 
 terests of patriotism, education, morals and religion. It 
 must be either a dull or a prejudiced mind, indeed, that can 
 ' The Passing oj Korea, p. 210 /.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 245 
 
 take in the atmosphere of Korean pohiics for even a few 
 months not to say, years of residence in the land, and 
 not understand the threatening significance of these associa- 
 tions. On the other hand, the question of propriety in deahng 
 summarily with those who persist in tearing up the tracks 
 of a military road in time of war may confidently be left to 
 those who are experienced in such matters. 
 
 Indeed, with regard to the entire conduct of affairs by the 
 Japanese during this period, we may ask the question, and 
 give the answer, of Mr. Whigham:^ "What, then, is 
 Japan to do? Is she to sit down and watch the Russian 
 flood descending on her fields without attempting to set up a 
 barrier? The answer is very simple. Japan must take 
 Korea and do it very quickly, too." 
 
 It was such a situation of extreme peril and emergency 
 which compelled the Japanese Government to secure formal 
 recognition in an agreement with the Korean Government 
 so far as such a thing as government then existed in Korea 
 that should admit of no misunderstanding. This necessity 
 gave rise to the Conventions of February 23, 1904, and of 
 August 22 of the same year. The latter of these conven- 
 tions was the logical sequence and supplement of the former. 
 By the first of the Protocols'- it was designed to secure neces- 
 sary reforms in the administration of Korea and, besides, such 
 an alliance between the two governments that Jaj)an should 
 guard the Korean Emperor and liis people against foreign 
 aggressions in the future and secure for lierself tlie furtherance 
 of her military operations against Russia. Of more ])crma- 
 nent importance still was the prevention in tlie future of all 
 such experiences as she had passed tlirougli in 1894-1805, and 
 was passing through at the present time. The Convention 
 of Februar}', however, was no sooner concluded than His 
 
 ^ Ma)icJiuria oid Korea, p. 119. 
 ^ See Appendix A for its text.
 
 246 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 ]\Iajcsty ])egan plotting to prc\'cnt its going into effect. With 
 the eonckict of military matters he was indeed powerless to 
 interfere; but every attempt at reform met with either his 
 passive resistance or ojjen opj^osition. This attitude of his 
 made necessary the additional jjrovisions stipulated in tlie 
 supplementary Protocol of August 22, 1904/ In this, pro- 
 vision was made for the a])i)ointment by the Korean (iovern- 
 ment of a Japanese recommended by the Japanese Oovernment 
 as "Financial Adviser," and of some foreigner, also to be 
 recommended by the Japanese Government, as "Adviser to 
 the Department of Foreign Affairs." The a])])ointees to these 
 positions were Mr. Megata and ]\[r. D. W. Stevens. 
 
 But still the intrigue and treachery of His Majesty went on. 
 In spite of the excellent service of ]\Ir. jMegata in straightening 
 out the confusion of the Korean fmances, and in utter dis- 
 regard of Mr. Stevens' advices and endeavors to make the 
 new Protocols both appear, and actually to be, greatly to the 
 advantage of the Emperor and of his country, the imperial 
 ways remained unchanged. His own Foreign Ministers were 
 either disregarded or made tools of intrigue. Even after the 
 Treaty of November, 1905, Flis ^Majesty sent secret telegrams 
 from the Palace ordering the Foreign ^Ministers of other 
 Governments to pay no attention to the directions of his own 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, while the latter was arranging 
 for the closing of the Legations according to the terms of the 
 Treaty. During the entire war he was in secret communica- 
 tion with Japan's enemies, while claiming Japan's protection 
 under the Protocols of February and August, 1904. This 
 treacherous correspondence was carried on through emissaries 
 at Shanghai; and large sums of money, which the Japanese 
 Financial Adviser had somehow to provide, were wasted 
 upon these futile efforts to change the course of events. 
 Indeed, in this correspondence and in the distribution of this 
 
 ' See Appendix B.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 247 
 
 money, it is probable that the chief agent in Shanghai was 
 the same person as the chief agent of Russia herself. 
 
 The subsequent history of the relations of Japan and 
 Korea, as these relations resulted through the events of July, 
 1907, in establishing a protectorate which placed all important 
 Korean affairs, both internal and foreign, under the control 
 of the Japanese Resident -General, cannot be understood or 
 judged without keeping the necessity and the significance 
 of these Protocols steadily in mind. Of the Convention of 
 February, 1904, LawTence significantly says:^ 
 
 Japan took the earliest opportunity of regularizing her position 
 by a Protocol negotiated with the native Government, and com- 
 municated with Tokyo to her Legations abroad on February 27th. 
 In this, the last of the long series of diplomatic agreements relating 
 to the subject, the fiction of Korean independence is still kept up, 
 while the fact of Japanese control is further accentuated. By the 
 third Article Japan " guarantees the independence and territorial 
 integrity of the Korean Fmpire "; and by the second she covenants 
 to ensure " the safety and repose of the Imjjcrial Household of 
 Korea." The Korean Government, on its part, covenants to adopt 
 the advice of Japan in regard to improvements in administration, 
 and to give full facilities for the promoUon of an}' measures the 
 Japanese Government may undertake to protect Korea against 
 foreign aggressions or internal disturbances. It also agrees that 
 for the promotion of these objects Jay)an may occupy strategic 
 points in Korean territory. 
 
 The effect of this agreement has been to ])lace the resources of 
 Korea at the (lis]>osal of Japan in the j)resent war. The victorious 
 armywhich forced the passage of the Vaki so hriUianth- on i\hi\- ist 
 was landed at Korean ])orts, concentrated on Korean soil, and 
 supplied from Korean liarl)()rs. In the ])()h'tical s[)liere Korea 
 has denounced, as having been made under compulsion, all her 
 treaties with Russia and all concessions granted to Russian sub- 
 jects. On the other hand, Russia has declared that she will 
 
 ' U'ar and Xcuiralily hi the Far Hast, p. 216 /.
 
 248 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 regard as null and void all the acts of the Korean Government 
 while under Japanese tutelage, and her ne\vs|)a])ers loudh' pro- 
 claim that, if our (English) neutrality were getuiine, we should 
 raise objections against the Protocol, as being inconsistent with 
 the Treaty of 1902, whereby we, in conjunction with Ja])an, mu- 
 tually recognize the inde|)endence of Korea. In reality there is no 
 inconsistency, because, as we have just seen, it is clear from the 
 first Article of the Treaty that the independence is not an ordinary 
 independence, but a diplomatic variety which was ])erfectly con- 
 sistent with recurring interventions to ward off foreign aggression 
 and put down domestic revolt. In other words, it was a dependent 
 independence, or no independence at all, and such it remains 
 under the agreement of February, 1904. That instrument un- 
 doubtedly establishes a Japanese Protectorate over Korea, and 
 the beauty of Protectorates is their indefmiteness. As Professor 
 Nye, the great Belgian jurist, says in his recently j)ul)lishe(l work 
 on Le Droit International : "Le terme 'protectorat,' designe la 
 situation creee par le traite de protection. . . . Le ])rotectorat a 
 plus ou moins de developpement; rien n'est fixe dans la theorie; 
 il est cependant un trait caracteristique commun aux F.tats 
 proteges c'est qu'ils ne sont pas entierement independants dans 
 leurs relations avec les autres Etats." These words exacth' fit 
 the condition of Korea under its recent agreement witli Japan. 
 Indeed, the description might be extended to its internal affairs 
 also. Susceptibilities are soothed, and possibly diplomatic difh- 
 culties are turned, by calling it independent; but in reality it is 
 as much under Japanese protection as Egypt is under ours; all 
 state-paper description to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 The new Treaty of /\.ugusl 22, 1904, shows that tliis is 
 fully understood at Tokyo. A financial adviser and a diplo- 
 matic adviser arc to be appointed by the Korean Govern- 
 ment on the recommendation of Japan, and nothing im- 
 portant is to be done in their departments without their 
 advice. No treaties with Foreign Powers are to be con- 
 cluded, and no concessions to foreigners granted, without 
 previous consultation with the Japanese Government.
 
 THE PROBLEAI: HISTORICAL ^49 
 
 That the view of this authority as to the significance of the 
 Conventions of 1904 is not the view of any individual alone 
 has been clearly demonstrated by the acceptance of its con- 
 clusions, in a practical way, though the otiicial action of 
 foreign governments since the date of the conventions them- 
 selves. 
 
 In particular it is to be noted that the Government of the 
 United States has expressed an opinion touching the effect in 
 international law upon the status of Korea of the February 
 and August Protocols which is substantially identical with 
 that of Professor Lawrence. Before there was anv occasion 
 for a formal expression of opinion a significant indication of 
 the views of the Department of State upon the subject could be 
 found in the Foreign Relations for 1904. Over the Protocols 
 as pubhshed therein may be found the caption " Protectorate 
 by Japan over Korea." (437 f.) Later on, Secretary Root 
 had occasion expressly to state this opinion. This was when, 
 in December, 1905, ]Mr. ]\Iin Yung-chan, whilom Korean 
 Minister to France, came to the United States for the purpose 
 of protesting against recognition by the United States of the 
 Treaty of November 17th of the same year. In a letter to 
 Mr. Min, explaining the rfcasons which made it impossible 
 for the American Government not to recognize the binding 
 force of that instrument, the Secretary added that there was 
 another and a conclusive reason against interference in the 
 matter. This reason, he said, was to be found in the circum- 
 stance that Korea had previously concluded with Japan two 
 agreements which, in principle and in practice, established a 
 Japanese Protectorate in Korea, and to the force of which in 
 that particular the Treaty of November 17 added nothing. 
 
 To this view of the virtual significance of these earlier 
 Protocols there is only to be opposed the demonstrably false 
 assertions of the now ex-Emperor and the o])inions and 
 affirmations cjuite unwarranted as the next chapter will
 
 250 TX KORKA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 show of wriUTs like Mr. Ilulhert, Mr. Story, and other 
 so-ealled "foreign friends" of Mis Majesty. These assertions 
 and opinions are eertainly not made any more credil)le by 
 the willingness of iheir authors to denounce the President 
 and Acting Foreign Minister of the L'nited States in Korea, 
 and, by implication, all the other heads of foreign governments 
 who neither share their opinion, nor approve of their conduct 
 in support of the opinion!^ 
 
 By the Treaty of Portsmouth the Russian Government not 
 only defmitely relinf[uished all the j)olitical interests she had 
 previously claimetl to possess in Korea, but also recognized 
 in all important particulars the rights acquired in the same 
 country by Japan through the Conventions of February and 
 August, 1904. Article Second of the Treaty stipulates: "The 
 Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan 
 possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economi- 
 cal interests, engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with 
 the measures of guidance, protection and control which the 
 Imperial Government of Japan may fmd it necessary to take 
 in Korea." 
 
 Thus did the war with Russia, which was fought over the 
 relations between Jaj^an and Korea as an issue of supreme 
 importance, terminate the second main [)eriod in the history 
 of these relations. The Chino-Ja])an war removed forever 
 that foreign influence which had continued through centuries, 
 not only to prevent the immediate realization of a true national 
 independence on the part of Korea, but also to unfit the 
 Korean Government to maintain such independence when 
 conferred upon it as the gift of another nation. The Russo- 
 Japanese war terminated the attempt of a more jjowerful 
 foreign nation to supersede the controlling influence of 
 Japan in Korea. At the same time it gave a convincing 
 further demonstration of Korea's inherent and hopeless 
 
 ' See especially Hulbert, The Passing oj Korea, p. 464 /.
 
 THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL 251 
 
 inability to control herself, under any existing conditions of 
 her government or of her system of civihzation. Thus the 
 provisions for a Japanese Protectorate, which shall secure 
 for both nations the largest possible measure of good, offered 
 to the Marquis Ito his difficult problem as Imperial Com- 
 missioner to Korea in November, iqov
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE COMPACT 
 
 It will need no argument for those familiar with the habit- 
 ual ways of the Korean Government in dealing with foreign 
 affairs to establish the necessity that Japan should make 
 more definite, explicit, and comprehensive, the Protocols of 
 February 23 and August 22, 1904. Foreign affairs have 
 always been with the Emperor and Court of Korea a par- 
 ticularly favorable but mischievous sphere for intrigue and 
 intermeddhng. The Foreign Office has never had any real 
 control over the agents of the government, who have been the 
 tools of the Emperor in their dealings with foreign Legations. 
 The Korean Foreign Minister in 1905 was not an efficient and 
 responsible representative of either the intentions or the trans- 
 actions of his own government ; instructions were frec[uently 
 sent direct from the Palace to Ministers in other countries; 
 foreign Legations had, each one, a separate cipher to be 
 used for such communications; and there were several 
 instances of clandestine communication with agents abroad, 
 even during the Russo-Japanese war. To guard, therefore, 
 against the repetition of occurrences similar to those which 
 had already cost her so dearly, Japan's interests demanded 
 that her control over the management of Korea's foreign 
 affairs should be undivided and unquestioned. 
 
 It was not, however, in the interests of Japan alone that 
 the management of Korea's foreign affairs was to pass out 
 of her own hands. It was distinctly, as events are fast proving
 
 THE COMPACT 253 
 
 beyond a reasonable doubt, for the advantage of Korea her- 
 self. In any valid meaning of the word, Korea had never 
 been "independent" of foreign influences, dominating over 
 her and corrupting the officials within her own borders. 
 For centuries these influences came chiefly from China; for 
 a decade, chiefly from Russia and other Western nations. 
 The Treaty of 1905 was also, just as distinctly so, we be- 
 lieve, the events will ultimately prove for the advantage of 
 these Western nations, and of the entire Far East. 
 
 It is, therefore, highly desirable, not only as vindicating 
 the honor of Marquis Ito and of the Japanese Government, 
 but also as establishing the Protectorate of Japan over 
 Korea upon foundations of veracity and justice, that the 
 exact and full truth should be known and placed on record 
 before the world, concerning the Convention of November, 
 1905. This is the more desirable because of the gross and 
 persistent misrepresentations of the facts which have been re- 
 peated over and over again chiefly by the same persons 
 down to the time of tlie appearance of the so-called Korean 
 Commission at The Hague Conference of 1907.' His Maj- 
 esty the Emperor (now ex-Emperor) of Korea has, indeed, 
 publicly proclaimed his intention not to keep a treaty "made 
 under duress" and through fears of ''personal violence"; 
 
 ' Tlie narrative wliich follows may be trusted to correct most of 
 these misstatements. But among them, some of the more important 
 may here be categorically contradicted. Such are, for example, the 
 statements that armed force was used; that General Masegawa half 
 drew his sword to intimidate Mr. Han; that Hagiwara seized the 
 latter with the aid of gendarmes and police; that the Minister of Agri- 
 culture continued to hold out; that he and Minister Pak, during the 
 conference, withdrew from the Japanese Legation and betook them- 
 selves to the Palace, denouncing the compact (something no one ac- 
 quainted with the geographical relations of the two places would be 
 likely to assert with a sincere belief) ; that the Emperor ordered the 
 consenting Ministers to be assassinated; that Japanese troops pa- 
 trolled the streets all night, etc., etc. One curiously characteristic 
 error of Mr. Hulbert is involved in the statement, published in one of
 
 254 J^^ KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 he has also made it ap])ear that the signatures and the Tm- 
 ])erial seal upon the document were fraudulently obtained. 
 Meantime, he has sedulously (and, we believe, with such 
 sincerity as his nature admits) cultivated and cherished the 
 friendship of the Ja])anese Resident-(jeneral who nego- 
 tiated, and who has administered affairs under, the Treaty. 
 How he lost his crown, at the hands of his own Ministry, 
 for his last violation of the most solemn ])rovisions of the 
 same treaty, is now a matter of universal history. 
 
 Marquis Ito arrived at Seoul, as the Representative of tlic 
 Japanese Government, to conclude a new Convention with 
 Korea, ''during the first week of November, 1905. He was 
 the bearer of a letter from his own Emperor to the Em])eror 
 of Korea, which frankly ex])lained the object of his mission. 
 What follows is the substance of His Japanese IMajesty's 
 letter. 
 
 "Japan, in self-defence and for the preservation of the 
 peace and security of the Far East, had been forced to go 
 to war with Russia; but now, after a struggle of twenty 
 months, hostilities were ended. During their continuance 
 the Emperor of Korea and his people, no doubt, shared the 
 anxiety felt by the Emperor and people of Japan. In tlie 
 mind of His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, the most ab- 
 
 the papers of the United States, which makes his commission hv the 
 Korean Emperor to lodge an appeal with President Roosevelt the 
 cause of hastening the Japanese Government in their iniquitous coup 
 d'etat. The truth is that the Japanese Government had made all the 
 preparations for Marquis Ito's departure, and the plan afterward 
 carried out had been carefully formulated, weeks before it was known 
 that Mr. Hulbert was going to the United States. The ^larquis was 
 only waiting the return of Baron Komura to Japan before leaving for 
 Korea. No thought whatever was at any time given to Mr. Hulbert. 
 It is, in general, late now to say that the efforts of those "friends of 
 Korea," who have taken the Korean ex-Emperor's money while holding 
 out to him the hope of foreign intervention, have done him and his 
 country, rather than Japan, an injury impossible to repair.
 
 THE COMPACT 255 
 
 sorbing thought and purpose now was to safeguard the 
 future peace and security of the two Empires, and to aug- 
 ment and strengthen the friendly relations existing between 
 them. Unfortunately, however, Korea was not yet in a 
 state of good defence, nor was the basis for a system of 
 effective self-defence yet created. Her weakness in these 
 regards was in itself a menace to the peace of the Far East 
 as well as to her own security. That this was unhappily the 
 case was a matter of as much regret to His Majesty as it 
 could be to the Emperor of Korea; and for this reason the 
 safety of Korea was as much a matter of anxiety to him as 
 was that of his own country. His Majesty had already com- 
 manded his Government to conclude the Protocols of Feb- 
 ruary and August, 1904, for the defence of Korea. Now, 
 in order to preserve the peace which had been secured, and 
 to guard against future dangers arising from the defenceless 
 condition of Korea, it was necessary that the bonds which 
 united the two countries should be closer and stronger than 
 ever before. Having this end in view. His Majesty had 
 commanded His Government to study the question and to 
 devise means of attaining this desirable result. The pres- 
 ervation and protection of the dignity, privileges, and tran- 
 quillity of the Imperial House of Korea would, as a matter 
 of course, be one of the first considerations kept in view, 
 
 "His Majesty felt sure that if the P^mperor of Korea would 
 carefully consider the general situation and its bearing upon 
 the interests and welfare of his country and people, he would 
 decide to take the advice now earnestly tendered to him." 
 
 It should be noticed that this address from His Imperial 
 Majesty of Japan to the Korean Emj)cror the sincerity of 
 which cannot be questioned is pervaded with the same 
 spirit as that which has characterized the administration, 
 hitherto, of the Japanese Residency-General. 
 
 Marquis Ito informed the Korean Emperor that he would
 
 256 jx K()Ri:a with marquis rro 
 
 ask for anotlicr audience in a few days. Ilis ^^ajesty con- 
 sented, adding that in the meantime he desired carefully to 
 study the letter from the iMnperor of Ja])an.^ 
 
 On the 15th of Xo\eml)er, Mar(iuis Ito had a ])ri\ate 
 audience which lasted about four liours, and in which he 
 frankly explained the object of his mission. . . . The 
 Km])eror began the inter\iew b\- comi)hiining of certain in- 
 juries done by the Japanese ci\ il and military authorities 
 during the war. He dwell at length upon ])ast ex'cnts, 
 saying, among other things, that he had not wished to go 
 to the Russian Legation in 1895, but had been over-per- 
 suaded by those about his ])erson. 
 
 ]Marquis Ito re])lied that as he would remain in Korea 
 for some time, there would be ample opportunity for a full 
 exchange of views regarding the matters to which His Ma- 
 jesty referred. At the present moment he felt it to be his 
 imperative duty to beg His ^^^lajesty to hear the particulars 
 of the mission with which he had been charged b}' his Im- 
 perial Master. From 1885 onward, he went on to say, Japan 
 had earnestly endeavored to maintain tlie independence of 
 Korea. Unfortunately, Korea herself had rendered but 
 little aid in the struggle which Ja])an had maintained in her 
 behalf. Nevertheless, these efforts had preser\ed His 
 IMajesty's Em])ire, and, although there miglit ha\e Ijcen 
 causes of com])laint, such as those to wliich His ^Majesty liad 
 just referred, in justice to Jai)an it sliould not be forgotten 
 that in the midst of the great struggle in which she liad Ix'cn 
 engaged, it was unhappily not possil)le wholly to a\oid such 
 
 ' In order to understand the followinf^ ncnolialions and all similar 
 transactions conducted in characteristic Korean style, it should he 
 remembered that delay, however reasonai)le it may seem or really be, 
 is in fact utilized for purposes not of reflection and iudicious planning,' 
 for future emergencies, but the rather for arranging intrigues, securing 
 apparent chances of escape from tlie really ine\itable, with the result of 
 an increasing unsettlement of the Imj)erial mind.
 
 THE COMPACT 257 
 
 occurrences. If His Majesty would consider all the circum- 
 stances, he would undoubtedly realize that in the midst of 
 the absorbing anxiety of that momentous contest and of the 
 heavy burdens it imposed upon Japan, whatever fault might 
 attach to her as regarded the matters of which His ]\[ajesty 
 had spoken was at least excusable. Korea, on tlie other 
 hand, had borne but a small portion of the burden created 
 by the necessity of defending and maintaining a principle in 
 which she was as deeply interested as Japan namely, the 
 peace and security of the Far East. Turning to the future7 
 however, it could l^e clearly perceived that in order effecti^ely 
 to ensure the future peace and security of the Far East, it 
 was imperatively necessary that the bonds uniting the two 
 countries should be drawn closer. For that purpose, and 
 with that object in view. His Alajesty the Emperor of Japan 
 had graciously entrusted him with the task of explaining the 
 means which, after mature and careful deliberation, it had 
 been concluded should be adopted. 
 
 The sul3stance of the plan which had been thus formulated 
 might be summed up as follows: . . . The Japanese Gov- 
 ernment, with the consent of the Government of Korea, to 
 have the right to control and direct the foreign affairs of 
 Korea, while the internal autonomy of the Empire would be 
 maintained; and, of course, His ^sJajesty's Government, 
 under His ^Majesty's direction, would continue as at the 
 present time. 
 
 Explaining the objects of the Agreement thus outlined, 
 the ^Marquis pointed out that it would effectively safeguard 
 the security and prestige of the Imperial House of Korea, 
 while affording the surest means of augmenting the liappi- 
 ness and ])rosperity of tlie people. For tlie reasons stated, 
 and for these alone, the Marquis went on to say, he strongly 
 advised the Em])eror to accept this plan; and, taking into 
 account the general situation, and tlic conch'lion of Korea in
 
 258 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 particular, he earnestly hoped that His Majesty would con- 
 sent. The Japanese Minister was authorized to discuss the 
 details with His Majesty's Ministers. 
 
 The Emperor in reply ex])ressed his appreciation of the 
 manifestation of sincere good-will on the i)art of the I'^m- 
 peror of Jaj)an, and his thanks. Although he would not 
 absolutely reject the proposal, it was his earnest desire to 
 retain some outward form of control over the external affairs 
 of Korea. As to the actual exercise of such control by Japan, 
 and in what manner it should be exercised, he had no oljjec- 
 tions to urge. 
 
 Marrjuis Ito enquired what was meant by "outward 
 form." 
 
 The Emperor replied, "the right to maintain Legations 
 abroad." 
 
 The Marcjuis then stated that, in accordance with diplo- 
 matic rules and usage, there was in that case no difference 
 between the form and the substance of control. Therefore 
 he could not accept the suggestion. If Korea were to con- 
 tinue to have Legations abroad, she would in fact retain 
 control of the external relations of the Em])ire. The s/a/us 
 quo would be perpetuated; there would be constant danger 
 of the renewal of past dilTiculties; and again the ])eace of 
 the East would be threatened. It was absolutely necessary 
 that Japan should control and direct the external relations 
 of Korea. This decision was the result of most careful in- 
 vestigations and deliberations; it could not be changed. 
 Marquis Ito further stated that he had brought a memo- 
 randum of the agreement which it was desired to conclude; 
 and this he then handed to the Emperor. 
 
 The Emperor, having read it, expressed his implicit trust 
 in Marquis Ito, saying that he ])laced more reliance upon 
 what he said than upon the re])resentations of his own 
 subjects. [It may seem a strange comment upon the work-
 
 THE COMPACT 259 
 
 ing of His iSlajesty's mind, but all my observations and ex- 
 periences, while in Korea, lead me to believe in the veracity 
 of this declaration. To the last, the Emperor trusted the 
 word of the Marquis Ito.] ... If, however, he accepted 
 the agreement and retained no outward form of control over 
 Korean foreign affairs, the relations of Japan and Korea 
 would be like those of Austria and Hungary; or Korea's 
 condition would be like that of one of the African tribes. 
 
 Marquis Ito begged leave to dissent. Austria and Hun- 
 gary were ruled by one monarch; whereas in this case His 
 Majesty would still be Emperor of Korea, and would con- 
 tinue as before to exercise his Imperial prerogatives. As for 
 the presumed resemblance to an African tribe, that could 
 hardly be considered in point; since Korea had a Govern- 
 ment established for centuries and therefore a national 
 organization and forms of administration such as no Ravage 
 tribe possessed. 
 
 The Emperor expressed appreciation of what the Marquis 
 said, but repeated that he did not care for the substance, 
 and only wished to retain some external form of control over 
 Korea's foreign affairs. He therefore hoped that the Mar- 
 quis would inform his Emperor and the Japanese Govern- 
 ment of this wish and would induce them to change the 
 plan proposed; this wish he reiterated a number of times. 
 [There were undoubtedly two reasons, entirely valid from his 
 point of view, for the endeavor to secure this change. The 
 first was the very natural desire to "save his face"; and the 
 second was the with him scarcely less natural desire to 
 leave room for intrigue to contest the scope of the terms 
 agreed upon while claiming to be faithful to their substance.] 
 
 The ^Marquis stated that he could not comply with the 
 request of His Majesty. The draft was the definitive ex- 
 pression of the views of the Japanese Government after most 
 careful consideration, and could not be changed as His
 
 2()o IN KOREA WITH MAR(,)IIS ITO 
 
 Alajesly (k'sircd. lie then (|iiol('(l the Article in tlic Ports- 
 mouth Treaty wherein Russia reeoj^nizes tlie paramount 
 political, commercial, and economic interests of Japan in 
 Korea. There was only one alternative, he added: either to 
 accept or to refuse. lie cou.ld not ])redict what the result 
 would be if His Majesty refused, but he feared that it might 
 be less acceptable than what he now pr(^])osed. If His 
 Majesty refused, he must clearly understand this. 
 
 The Emperor replied that he did not hesitate because he 
 was ignorant of this fact, but because he could not himself 
 decide at that moment. He must consult his Ministers and 
 ascertain also "the intention of the peoi)le at large." 
 
 The Manjuis replied that His Alajesty was, of course, ([uite 
 right in desiring to consult his Ministers, but he could 
 not understand what was meant by consulting "the intention 
 of the people." Inasmuch as Korea did not have a constitu- 
 tional form of government, and conse([uently no Diet, it 
 seemed rather a strange ])roceeding to consult "the intention 
 of the people." If such action should lead to popular ferment 
 and excitement and possibly public disturbances, he must 
 respectfully point out that the responsibility would rest with 
 His Majesty. 
 
 Finally, after some further discussion, the Em})eror re- 
 quested ^larcjuis Ito to have Minister Hayashi (who held 
 the ])0\ver to negotiate the pro})Ose(l agreement) consult with 
 his own Minister for Foreign Affairs. Tlie result could ]je 
 submitted to the Cabinet; and wlien tliat bod}- had reached 
 a decision His Alajesty's appro\al could be asked. 
 
 Marquis Ito said that j)rompt action was necessary, and 
 recjuested His Majesty to summon the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs at once, and to instruct him to negotiate and sign 
 the agreement. The Emperor replied that he would give 
 instructions to the ^Minister for Foreign Affairs to that effect, 
 Marcjuis Ito stated that he would remain awaiting the con-
 
 THE COMPACT 261 
 
 elusion of that agreement, and would again request His 
 Majesty to grant him an audience. 
 
 Before this first audience ended the Emperor again aslced 
 Marquis Ito to persuade His Majesty of Japan to consent 
 that Korea should retain some outward form of control over 
 her foreign affairs; but again Marquis Ito refused. This 
 repeated refusal of Japan's Representative to concede any- 
 thing whatever as an abatement of his country's control in 
 the future over Korea's relations to foreign countries distinctly 
 reveals the nature of the only treaty that could then })ossibly 
 have been concluded between the two Powers. On the fol- 
 lowing day, the i6th of November, Marquis Ito had a con- 
 ference with all of the Cabinet Ministers, except the Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs, wlio on the same day began negotiations 
 with Minister Hayashi. Marquis Ito explained fully to the 
 Korean Alinisters the object of his mission and the views of 
 his Government. 
 
 On the 17th of November, at 11 a. m., all of the Korean 
 Ministers went to the Japanese Legation, lunched there, and 
 conferred with Mr. Hayashi until 3 o'clock, when they ad- 
 journed to the Palace and held a meeting in the Emperor's 
 presence. Their decision was, finally, to refuse to agree to 
 the Treaty in the form in which it had been proposed. 
 Marcjuis Ito was taking dinner with General Hasegawa, when, 
 at 7.30, he received a message from Mr. Ha}'ashi conveying 
 this intehigencc and a re(|uest to come to the Palace.^ Ac- 
 cordingly, at 8 o'clock, he went to tlie Palace in comipany 
 with General Hasegawa, the hitter's aide, and the tlirce or 
 four mounted gendarmes, who accom})anicd ]\rar(|u;s Ito 
 wherever he went. There n'ere no olhcr Japanese guards or 
 soldiers in attendance, and none in the immediate vieinity 0} 
 
 ^ He was preparing to <^o when the Minister of tlie I h)u.se!iol(l called 
 with a message requestinji the Marcjuis to postpone the conckision ol 
 the Treaty two or three daws.
 
 262 IN KORKA Wrni MARQUIS ITO 
 
 tJic Palace, llie gendarmes ivho accompanied the Marqiih 
 did not enter the Palace precincts, and all the i^ates and en- 
 trances were guarded as usual by Korean soldiers, Korean 
 geiularmes and Korean policemen. Precautions had indeed 
 been taken to preserve order in the city, as some outl)urst of 
 mob violence was ])ossible. Tlie necessity of this precaution 
 was shown later in the night when an attempt was made to 
 set fire to the house of Mr. Yi Wan-yong, Minister of Educa- 
 tion (now Prime Minister). It was only when the confer- 
 ence was ended that, at the express recpiest of the Korean 
 Ministers, a small number of gendarmes was summoned 
 to accompany them to their homes. [This precaution will 
 not seem excessive, or threatening of violence to others, in the 
 eyes of one who, like myself, has spent a period of two months 
 in Korea, characteri/.ed by re])eated attempts to assassinate 
 the Ministers, who always went guarded by Korean and 
 Ja])anesc gendarmes. See pp. 66 IT.] 
 
 Upon arriving at the Palace, Marquis Ito was informed 
 by Mr. Hayashi that, although His Majesty had ordered 
 the Cabinet to come to an agreement which would establish 
 a cordial entente with Japan, and although tlie majority of 
 the Cabinet Ministers were ready to ol^ey His Majesty's 
 commands, Mr. Han, the Prime ^linister, ])ersistently re- 
 fused to obey. Manpiis Ito thereupon, through the Tvlinister 
 of the Household, recjuestcd a private audience with His 
 Majesty. 
 
 It should be explained here that during all of the ])roceed- 
 ings, which took place in the rooms on the lower lloor of the 
 "Library," the Emperor was in his rooms in the U[)per 
 story, and was never personally approached by any one ex- 
 cept, as hereafter stated, by his own ^Ministers. It ma}' also 
 be added, in explanation of the time of the conference, that 
 it had been His ^Majesty's in\aria])le practice for years to 
 transact important public business at night. He turned
 
 THE COMPACT 26 
 
 night into day in that regard and the Cabinet Ministers had 
 customarily been obhged to attend in turn at the Palace and 
 remain there all night long. 
 
 To the rec[ucst for a private audience tlie Emperor re- 
 plied that although he would be pleased to grant an audience 
 at once, he was very tired and was suffering from sore throat 
 the plea of indisposition being one to which he is accustomed 
 to resort for avoiding audiences. Therefore he j^refered that 
 Marquis Ito should consult with his ^Ministers whom he would 
 instruct to negotiate and conclude an agreement establishing 
 a cordial entente between Korea and Japan. At the same 
 time that the Em])eror requested the Marc^uis to consult 
 with the Cabinet for that purpose, the ]\Iinister of the House- 
 hold informed the Cabinet ^linisters that His Majesty com- 
 manded them to negotiate with Alarquis Ito. 
 
 Marquis Ito then turned to the Prime Minister, and, 
 repeating what Mr. Hayashi had told him, enciuired wliether 
 the statement correctly represented his attitude. The 
 Prime JMinister replied that it was correct. His Majesty 
 had often commanded him to come to an understanding 
 with the Japanese IMinister, but he had refused. Then the 
 other jMinisters had accused him of disloyalty in disobeying 
 His Majesty's commands. He himself could not but feel 
 that the accusation was well founded and, on that account, 
 he wished immediately to resign his office and to await tlie 
 Imperial punishment for his disobedience. As he had in- 
 formed ]\Iarciuis Ito the day before, although he was per- 
 fectly well aware that Korea could not maintain her inde- 
 pendence by her own unaided efforts, he still wislied to retain 
 the outward semblance of control over the Xat ion's foreign 
 relations. 
 
 Thereupon ]Marc|uis Ito said that the last thoiiglit in his 
 mind would be to try to force tlie Prime Minister to do any 
 thin" which would destrov his countrv. The Minister had
 
 264 IX KOREA WITH MARQLIS IIX) 
 
 said, liowcN'cr, that he wished to resign because he had Ijeen 
 disloyal in disobeying the Em})eror's commands. Tl did not 
 seem to him, the ]\Iar(iuis, that this was either a dignified, or a 
 sensible course for a M inister of State to adopt. Tiie manage- 
 ment of public affairs reciuired decision. If the Prime 
 Minister could not come to some understanding with Jajjan's 
 representatives, as his own Majesty the Emperor had com- 
 manded him to do, he was seriously jeopardizing his country's 
 interests. The Marcjuis could not believe that this was 
 genuine loyalty. There was only one alternative before the 
 Prime Minister, either to obey the Imperial order, or, care- 
 fully considering the gravity of the situation, to do what he 
 could to change the Imperial opinion. He then asked 
 the Prime ^Minister to request the other ^Ministers, in accord- 
 ance with the Emperor's command, conveyed through the 
 JNIinister of the Household, to give their views regarding the 
 proposed agreement. This the Prime Minister proceeded 
 to do. 
 
 The Minister for Foreign x^ffairs, Mr. Pak Chi-sun (after- 
 wards Acting Prime Minister) stated that, as he had informed 
 the Japanese Minister, he was opposed to the treaty and did not 
 wish to negotiate it; but if he was ordered to do so, he would 
 comply. The Marquis asked what he meant by "ordered"; 
 did he mean an Imperial order? ^Ir. Pak assented. 
 
 The ^Minister of Finance, Mr. ]Min Yong-ki, said that he 
 was opposed to the treaty. (He remained in ofhce for a year 
 and a half after the conclusion of the treaty, considering, no 
 doubt, that the Imperial command absolved him from 
 responsibility.) 
 
 The ^Minister of Education, Air. Yi Wan-yong (now 
 Prime Minister), replied that he had already expressed his 
 opinion fully in His Majesty's presence. The request of 
 Japan was the logical result of existing conditions in the East. 
 The diplomacy of Korea, always changing, had forced Japan
 
 THE COMPACT 265 
 
 into a great war which had entailed on her heavy sacrifices, 
 and in which, finally, she had been victorious. Korea must 
 accept the result and aid in maintaining the future peace of 
 the East by loyally co-operating with Japan. 
 
 The Minister of Justice, Mr. Yi Ha-yung (who had been 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs during the war), stated that, in 
 his opinion, the Protocols of February 23 and August 22, 
 1904, already gave Japan practically all that she now asked. 
 Consequently he did not think that the new Treaty was neces- 
 sary. 
 
 Marquis Ito then said to him that the opinion he had 
 expressed at the conference of the previous day was some- 
 what different, and that he had appeared at that time to be 
 in favor of the Treaty. The IMinister assented, but added 
 that then, as now, he thought that the Protocols would 
 have been amply sufficient if Korea herself had faithfully 
 observed the obligations they imposed upon her. 
 
 The Minister of War, ]\Ir. Yi Kun-tak, stated that in His 
 Majesty's presence he had supported the ^linister of Educa- 
 tion in the position described by the latter. Finally, how- 
 ever, he had cast his vote in favor of the Prime ^Minister's 
 proposal that they should insist upon a Treaty which re- 
 tained to Korea the outward form of control over her foreign 
 relations. He would now agree to the proposed treaty, how- 
 ever. 
 
 The Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Yi Chi-yung, said that 
 having negotiated and signed the Protocol of February 23, 
 1904, he had naturally associated himself with the Minister 
 of Education in His ^lajcsty's ])rescnce, and he now (Hd the 
 same. 
 
 The ^Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and Inchistry, Air. 
 Kwon Chong-hiun, said that he liad seconded llie proposal 
 of the Minister of Education and was of course m fa\or of the 
 Treaty. He desired, however, to suggest several amendments.
 
 266 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 After some further consultation, Marquis Ito turned to the 
 Prime Minister, and said that there were but two of the 
 Ministers oi)])osed to the Treaty. The recognized method 
 of decicHng such ([uestions was Ijy a majority vote, and, as 
 the Prime Minister had seen, the majority of the Cabinet 
 were in favor of negotiating and concluding the Treaty. It 
 was the duty of the Prime Minister accordingly, bearing in 
 mind the Imperial command, to proceed to accomplish this 
 result in due form. Thereupon the Prime Minister, say- 
 ing somethmg about disloyalty, burst into tears and went 
 hastily into the next room. After a few moments Marquis 
 Ito followed him, and found him still greatly agitated. The 
 Marquis spoke to him gently, and, repeating his former argu- 
 ments, tried to persuade him that it was his duty as a loyal 
 servant to obey the Imperial command by assisting in the 
 negotiation and conclusion of the Treaty. Finding, however, 
 that his efforts were fruitless. Marquis Ito returned to the 
 other room, leaving Mr. Han alone.^ 
 
 ' None of the party gathered in the council chamber saw Mr. Han 
 after that. It seems from the accounts subsequently given by Palace 
 ofTicials that a little later Mr. Han went upstairs still deeply agitated. 
 His evident purpose was to gain access to the Emperor, which, as he 
 had not requested an audience, was a flagrant violation of etiquette 
 from the Korean point of view. But the poor man in his confusion 
 turned the wrong way and stumbled into Lady Om's quarters. Some 
 of the officials led him to a small retiring room, where he spent the 
 night. The next morning it was ofTicially announced that he had been 
 dismissed from office in disgrace and would be severely punished. 
 Marquis Ito immediately begged tliat the Emperor would pardon him, 
 and, in deference to this request, Mr. Han was permitted to go into 
 retirement with no other punishment than the loss of his office. The 
 whole proceeding waS'One of those things which apparently can happen 
 only in Korea and not excite any one's special wonder. No one 
 seemed to know precisely why the Minister was punished. He was 
 amiable, not very strong mentally, but well-meaning and of compara- 
 tively good repute; he had done his best to carry out the Emperor's 
 wishes as he understood them, and, having failed, as was inevitable, 
 his grief was the best proof possible of his sincerity; and one would
 
 THE COMPACT 267 
 
 After Mr. Han's disappearance from the scene, and 
 upon the Marquis' return to tlie room, the latter addressed 
 the Minister of the Household, stating that, as he had seen, 
 the Cabinet Ministers, with two exceptions, had expressed 
 their willingness to accept the Treaty in principle ; and of the 
 two dissenting Ministers one, the ^Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 had said that he would sign the Treaty if he received the 
 Imperial command to do so. Turning then to the ^Ministers, 
 he enquired w'hether they were willing to proceed as com- 
 manded by His Majesty, with the consideration of the Treaty, 
 and of the amendments, which several of their number had 
 expressed a desire to present. The Ministers replied that 
 they were ready to do so, but wished the ^linister of the 
 Household to be present. Accordingly the deliberations were 
 conducted in the presence of that official. 
 
 The Treaty was then considered in detail. The Minister 
 of Education proposed an amendment, stipulating that the 
 functions of control to be exercised by Japan should be con- 
 fined exclusively to administration of the foreign relations 
 of Korea. ]Marquis Ito rephed that he could not accept 
 this amendment, but after some discussion ])roposcd the 
 insertion of the word "primarily" in the Article.^ 
 
 think it might have excited sufficient pity to preclude resentment. 
 However, it should be added that the 'sincerity manifest in Mr. Han's 
 grief did not extend to his memor\- or his powers of narration. At 
 least that is an inference which one may draw from certain published 
 accounts of these occurrences Mr. Ilan having seemingly been the 
 fountain-head of the information. 
 
 * The Marquis' reasons for refusing hardly need explanation. Japan 
 had already secured some measure of control over the internal adminis- 
 tration of Korea by previous arrangements. The acceptance ot the 
 proposed amendment would have been virtually an abrogation of these 
 arrangements, notablv of the most im])ortant ])orti<)n of iIk' Protocols of 
 February 23 and August 22. To that, of course, the Marquis could 
 not agree. Besides this, the control of Korea's foreign relations neces- 
 sarily rerjuired some measure of control and guidance over the adminis- 
 tration of her internal affairs. The relations between external and inter-
 
 268 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 The Minister of Justice ])roposecl an amendment stipulat- 
 ing that Japan would guarantee to maintain the peace, 
 security and prestige of the Imj)erial Household. This 
 jVIarcjuis Ito accepted and wrote the amendment with his 
 own hand. 
 
 After some further delil)eration the treaty in its amended 
 form was agreed to. The Minister of the Household, ac- 
 companied by Mr. \'i Chi-yung, Minister of Home Affairs, 
 then took the document to the Emperor. After a time they 
 returned, saying that His Majesty was satisfied with the in- 
 strument as amended and gave it his sanction. He in- 
 structed them to say, however, that he desired to add one 
 more amendment. It was to insert in the preamble a stipu- 
 lation to the effect that when Korea became able again to 
 exercise the functions surrendered to Japan by the Treaty, 
 she would be entitled to resume the control of her foreign 
 relations. To this proposal Marcjuis Ito assented, and 
 again wrote the amendment with his own hand. The two 
 Ministers took the completed instrument to His Alajesty, 
 and in a short time returned saying His Majesty was "cjuite 
 satisfied and ap]: roved the Treat}'." 
 
 The coi)yists then began preparing the copies for signa- 
 ture, and the ^Minister of Foreign Affairs went to the tele- 
 phone and ordered the clerk in charge to bring the seal of 
 the Foreign Office to the Palace. 
 
 The Minister of the Household, who had again repaired to 
 the Imperial presence, returned while this was going on 
 with the following message from the Emj^eror to ^Marcjuis 
 
 nal affairs, their frequent interdependence, is so intimate, that it would 
 have been a grave mistake to assume the otjhgations which the one 
 imposed without the power to guard against complications which might 
 follow from maladministration of the other. As the case stands, the 
 insertion of the word "primarily," while soothing Korean suscepti- 
 bilities, does not affect the control of the Protectorate in any material 
 respect.
 
 THE COMPACT 269 
 
 Ito, which is here repeated verbatim: "Now that this new 
 Agreement has been concluded our countries should mutually 
 congratulate each other. We feel tired, as we are not well, 
 and shall retire. You, who have reached an advanced age 
 and have remained awake until this late hour, must also be 
 greatly fatigued. Please, therefore, return to your home 
 and sleep well." 
 
 Marquis Ito returned thanks for this gracious message, 
 but remained until the Treaty had been copied and dulv 
 signed by Mr. Pak, the Korean ^Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 and by Mr. Hayashi, the Japanese ^Minister. He then re- 
 turned to his hotel. In a short time the seal of the Foreign 
 Ofhce was brought to the Palace, and INIr. Pak, with his 
 own hand, affixed it to "the four copies of the instrument 
 which had been made.^ 
 
 The conclusion of the Treaty was not followed by any 
 noticeably great public excitement in Seoul. Crowds col- 
 lected in the streets, and there were one or two trifling brawls, 
 but nothing of great consequence. The policing of the streets 
 
 ^ The following facts with regard to the possession of the Imperial 
 seal of Korea and its affixing to this important document, are given on 
 the authority of Mr. D. W. Stevens. They are a complete refutation 
 of the charges which have been made regarding this part of the entire 
 transaction. It was the unavoidable delay in bringing the seal to the 
 Palace which gave rise to these extraordinarv' stories. "What actually 
 happened," says Mr. Stevens,- "was this. While the treaty was being 
 copied, Mr. Pak went to the telephone and directed the clerk in charge 
 of the seal at the Foreigai Office to bring it to the Palace. After some 
 delay he went again to the telephone and repeated the order. At tlie 
 time the only two jiersons in the office were the clerk in charge of the 
 seal and ^Ir. Xumano, my Ja])anese a.ssistanl. Poth were just then 
 reading in the room where the clerk slc])t and where ihc seal was kej)!. 
 The telejjhone bell rang, and the clerk who answered it informed Mr. 
 Numano that Mr. I'ak had ordered the seal to be brought to the Palace. 
 He was putting on his street clothing preparatory to obeying the order 
 when the Chief of the Diplomatic Pureau of the l^'oreign Office came 
 into the room and asked the clerk where he v.as going. The clerk in-
 
 270 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 was entirely in tlie hands of tlie Korean gendarmes and the 
 mixed force of Korean and Japanese police under the direc- 
 tion of Mr. Maruyama, Police Adxiser to the Korean Gov- 
 ernment. Nor, in order to preser\e the pubhc ])eace, was 
 there at any time necessary any e.xliibiiion of a large force, 
 either of police or of gendarmes in an}' one locahty. They 
 went about singly or in twos or threes, and the crowds were, 
 as a rule, orderl}-. 
 
 TheConvention thus concluded on November 17, iQ05,with 
 the object of strengthening the principle of solidarity which 
 unites the two Empires, provides that the complete control 
 and direction of Korean affairs shall hereafter rest with the 
 Japanese Government, and that a Resident-General shall 
 reside in Seoul, "primarily for the purpose of taking charge 
 of and directing matters relating to dijjlomatic affairs." It 
 also provides for the appointment of Residents, subordinate 
 to the Resident-General, who shall occupy the open ports 
 and such other places in Korea as the Japanese Government 
 may deem necessary. Article IV stipulates that all treaties 
 and agreements subsisting between Japan and Korea, not 
 
 formed him, whereupon he went to the telephone and called up Mr. 
 Pak. He implored the latter not to agree to the Treaty and, finally, 
 receiving Mr. Pak's peremptory order to cease interfering, threw liim- 
 self down upon the clerk's bed in great grief. After this, there was no 
 further interruption from any quarter, and the seal was taken quietly 
 to the Palace." 
 
 It throws light upon the control and u.se of this seal to observe that, 
 when in the summer of 1907 he was committed to the responsibility for 
 the Commission to The Hague Conference by the fact that the com- 
 missioners were ready to prove their Imperial authorization by showing 
 the Imperial seal, His Majesty did not admit this as evidence in proof 
 of their claim. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that this use of his seal 
 was al.so with his knowledge and permission. And, now, in connection 
 with the various details inaugurated under the new Treaty which fol- 
 lowed this violation of the Treaty of November, 1905, we are told that 
 henceforth the Imperial seal will be kept in a safe esjjecially prepared 
 for it, and carefully protected from intrusion.
 
 THE COMPACT 271 
 
 inconsistent with the provisions of the Convention itself, shall 
 continue in force. Furthermore, Japan engages to maintain 
 the welfare and dignity of the Imperial House of Korea. 
 
 This is the substance of the Convention of 1905. Its effect 
 was to substitute Japan for Korea in all official relations with 
 foreign Powers, past as well as future. In other words, 
 foreign nations must hereafter deal directly and exclusively 
 with Japan in everything affecting thck diplomatic relations 
 with Korea. Japan, on her part, is equally bound to re- 
 spect and maintain all treaty rights and all treaty engage- 
 ments granted by Korea in the past. The "principle of 
 sohdarity which unites the two Empires" implies, and in 
 fact actually includes, even more than this. While the func- 
 tions of Japan's direct and exclusive control were primarily 
 confined to matters connected with the direction of foreign 
 affairs, some measure of control over Korea's domestic 
 affairs also is necessarily imphed. It is not to be supposed, 
 for example, that Japan could permit internal disorders, or 
 the perpetuation of domestic abuses, or, in brief, any of 
 those disturbing conditions which had hitherto prevented 
 Korean progress and development. International control, 
 dissociated from an orderly and progressive domestic policy, 
 is not practicable; it is not even conceivable. The com- 
 plications and embarrassments which would inevitably arise 
 from such a complete dissociation of the two functions of 
 government would far outweigh the advantages. One of 
 the most fruitful sources of international difficulties in Korea 
 has always Ijcen found in domestic misgovernment. Having 
 assumed the responsibility and the obligations incident to the 
 direction of foreign affairs, Japan has the riglit to ask, and, 
 if need be, to insist, that her task shall not be fnade heavier 
 by Korea herself. This did not, indeed, imply, tliat Japan 
 should assume charge of the administrative machinery of 
 the Korean Government, but that she shoukl enjoy the right
 
 272 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 to have recourse to those measures of guidance which natu- 
 rally and proi)erly fall within the sphere of the duties she had 
 assumed. Fortunately, however, any discussion relating 
 to this question must of necessity l:)e ])urely academic; since 
 not only the Convention of Novem])er 17th, but also the 
 Protocols and other Agreements concluded before that time 
 give ample warrant for everything Japan has attempted or 
 accomplished in this regard. 
 
 If corroborative evidence is needed for the account just 
 given of the negotiations which ended in the Convention of 
 November, 1905, and upon the basis of which Manjuis Ito, 
 as the Representative of the Japanese Government, had 
 been conducting his administration in Korea up to the time 
 of the new Convention of July, 1907, it is afforded in fullest 
 measure *in the following manner. A notable "Memorial" 
 regarding the circumstances under which the earlier agreement 
 was formed was presented to the Korean Emperor on the fif- 
 teenth of December of the same year; this document lends 
 the authority of all the other chief actors in this event to 
 every important detail of the account as already given.' 
 
 The memorialists were Pak Chi-sun, former ^linister for 
 Foreign Affairs; Yi Wan-yong, Minister of Education; 
 Kwan Chung-hiun, Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and 
 Industry; Yi Chi-yung, Minister of Home Affairs; and 
 Yi Kun-tak, Minister of War. The occasion of the me- 
 morial was the agitation against the Treaty which was then 
 at its height, and on account of which these five Alinisters 
 
 ^ It is a significant fact that this memorial which is here followed 
 very closely and in the most important places even literally has 
 received no attention from the hostile critics of Japan. It would seem 
 as though neither Mr. Hulbert nor Mr. Story is aware of the existence 
 of such a memorial. This is the more remarkable in the case of the 
 former, because he was for years resident in Seoul, was familiar with 
 the Korean language, and was gathering material for his written ac- 
 count of the affair while upon the ground.
 
 THE COMPACT 273 
 
 were being denounced in petitions to the Throne, and in the 
 pubKc press, as traitors to their country. The purpose of 
 the merhorial was to show that the actual responsibihty for 
 the conclusion of the Treaty rested with the Emperor him- 
 self. By relating all the circumstances in detail (in particular 
 the occurrences at the conference on the evening of November 
 17th) the memorialists brought this fact out into the boldest 
 prominence. Their memorial was, in effect, both a charge 
 which fixed the responsibility for the Treaty on the Em- 
 peror, and a challenge to the Emperor to deny that the 
 Treaty was concluded in accordance with his own orders. 
 It was a challenge which His Majesty did not accept; on the 
 contrary, by approving the memorial, as he did formally, 
 he acknowledged the truth of the statements it contained. 
 It was, indeed, officially published at the time, as approved 
 by the Emperor.^ Moreover, this memorial was prepared by 
 its authors and presented to the Throne without the previous 
 knowledge of the Japanese authorities. In fact, it contained 
 certain interesting and important details of which they then 
 learned for the first time. 
 
 The memorialists began with the statement that, by reason 
 of His Majesty's generosity, they are entrusted with the re- 
 sponsibilities of Ministers of State, although they do not 
 merit such distinction. They have seen the petitions de- 
 nouncing them to the Emperor as traitors. Those petitions 
 affirm that the state has been destroyed; that the people 
 have become slaves; and that Korean territory is now the 
 
 ' It will, therefore, clearly appear that no one acquainted with this 
 memorial can honestly place any confidence in His Majesty's subse- 
 quent denials of the significance of these facts. Shall we not also be 
 obliged to add, that no one who is acquainted with the memorial is 
 entitled to the confidence of any one else, if he puts confidence in the 
 denials of the Emperor. Amazement at the audacity of the falsehoods 
 which have been told with regard to this historically important transac- 
 tion would seem to be the fitting attitude of mind .
 
 274 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 property of another state. These opinions are indeed almost 
 too absurd to be noticed; but since they affect the inde- 
 pendence and dignity of the nation, the memoriahsts cannot 
 ])ermit them to pass without protest. The new Treaty with 
 Japan does not change the title of the Empire or affect its 
 real independence. The i)restige of the Imperial House re- 
 mains as before; the social fabric of the Em])ire is un- 
 affected; and the country is in a peaceful condition. The 
 only change is that the management of the foreign affairs of 
 the country has been placed under the control of a neigh- 
 boring state. Besides, the Treaty which brings about this 
 result is by no means a new arrangement. It is the direct 
 result of the Protocols concluded in 1904, and does not 
 differ from them in object or in principle. If these persons 
 who now so loudly proclaim their patriotism are really sin- 
 cere and courageous men, why did they not denounce those 
 Protocols when they were made and maintain their opposi- 
 tion with their lives? None of them did that then; yet now 
 they clamor for the abolition of all these arrangements and 
 for the restoration of the old order of things. It is im- 
 possible to agree with them. 
 
 We desire, the memorialists go on to say, now to state the 
 actual facts of the conclusion of the new Treaty: 
 
 When the Japanese Envoy arrived in Korea all the people, even 
 the children, knew that a grave crisis had arisen. And on the 
 15th of November when Your Majesty received the Envoy he 
 presented a most important document. On the following day 
 the Prime Minister, with the other memljers of the Cabinet, 
 except the Minister for Foreign Affairs, conferred with the Envoy; 
 while the Minister for Foreign Affairs did the same with the 
 Japanese Minister. At the former conference Sim San-kiun, 
 Imperial Treasurer (former Prime Minister and one of the Em- 
 peror's favorites), was also present. We discussed the matter 
 fully with the Envoy, but did not agree to the proposals he made.
 
 THE COMPACT 275 
 
 In the evening we were received in audience by your Majesty and 
 reported all that had occurred. We stated to your Majesty that 
 if we went to the Japanese Legation the next day, as had been 
 proposed, we should continue to refuse to accede to the Japanese 
 proposals. On the next day, we went in a body to the Legation 
 and there conferred at lengtli with the Minister upon the subject. 
 Finally, as we still refused to concur in what the Minister pro- 
 posed, he stated that further conference would be a waste of time; 
 that your Majesty alone had authority to decide, and that he had 
 asked for an audience through the ^linister of the Imperial House- 
 hold. Thereupon the whole party repaired to the Palace. Your 
 Majesty received the members of the Cabinet in audience, and we 
 reported what had happened at the Legation, and assured Your 
 Majesty that we were still prepared to continue to refuse to 
 accede to the Japanese demands. Your IMajesty expressed 
 anxiety regarding the course to be adopted, and said that, as we 
 could not refuse positively, it would be better to postpone nego- 
 tiations. 
 
 Then Yi Wan-yong addressed Your Majesty. He said that the 
 matter was one which vitally affected the state; and that all of 
 the vassals and servants of Your Majesty must refuse to accept 
 terms injurious to the state. But the relationship of the monarch 
 to his vassals is like that of a father to his sons, and therefore the 
 members of the Cabinet were bound by every tie of duty to speak 
 frankly to their Master. He must, therefore, call His Majesty's 
 attention to the fact that the visit of tlie Envoy to Korea, and the 
 coming of the Japanese ^linistcr to the Palace that evening, had 
 one object and one only namely, the conclusion of the Treaty. 
 Therefore it was necessary to decide at once upon what was to be 
 done; the matter did not admit of procrastination. It is easy for us 
 eight Ministers to say " No "; but our refusal alone docs not -decide 
 the matter. We are vassals mcrelv, and only the word of the 
 monarch is final. The Envoy will undoubtedly ask for an audi- 
 ence. When that occurs, if Your Majesty continues firmly to 
 refuse to the end, it is all right. But if Your ^lajesty's generosity 
 should at last induce you to. yield, what shall be done then? 
 This is a question which we must consider and settle beforehand.
 
 276 IN KOREA WITH .MARQUIS JTO 
 
 When Your Majesty received us in audience last evening you ex- 
 pressed no opinion. 
 
 As the other Ministers said notliing, Yi Wan-yong went on to 
 explain that what he meant In- studying the subject beforehand 
 was to examine the provisions of the Convention, several of which 
 he was of opinion should be changed. Concerning such matters 
 it was necessary to consult and to come to some decision before- 
 hand. 
 
 Then Your Majesty said that Marquis Ito had informed you 
 that if we wished to modify the wording of the Convention there 
 was a way to do so. Your Majesty thought that if we rejected the 
 Convention categorically, the good relations of Korea and Japan 
 could not be maintained, and, in Your Majesty's ojM'nion, it was 
 possible to have some of the Articles changed. Therefore, what 
 Yi Wan-yong had proposed was ])ro])er. 
 
 Upon that Kwan Chung-hiun said that the IMinister of Educa- 
 tion had not advised His Majesty to accept the Convention, but 
 to consider the matter upon the supposition that some amend- 
 ment was possible. Your Majesty replied that you understood 
 that, but that the difference was not of j^ractical consecjuence. 
 The other Ministers expressed the same opinion. Your Majesty 
 then called for a draft of the Convention and asked for oi)inions 
 regarding the amendments which should he made. 
 
 The memorial then goes on to consider the amendments^ 
 which it was thought would be desirable, and which Avere 
 those subsequently proposed at the conference with ^Manjuis 
 Ito. The Emperor approved these amendments and liim- 
 self suggested an amendment to tlie effect that in Article I of 
 the convention the word "sole" in the sentence "shall lia\'e 
 sole control" should be omitted. [This word, it may Ije 
 remarked in passing, appeared in the original draft, but was 
 not included in the Article as fmally agreed to.j 
 
 Finally, when these deliberations terminated, the Ministers 
 
 * This part of the memorial agrees closely with the statements in the 
 first part of the chapter, as to -what was then said.
 
 THE COMPACT 277 
 
 collectively addressed the Emperor, and stated that although 
 they had conferred upon the adoption of possible amend- 
 ments, they were still prepared, if His ^Majesty so ordered 
 them, to refuse altogether to accept the Japanese proposals. 
 In reply the Emperor commanded them not to reject the 
 Treaty finally and conclusively. On leaving, j\Ir. Han, 
 speaking as Prime ^Minister, and Mr. Pak, as jMinister for 
 Foreign Affairs, stated that tlicy would not disobey His 
 Majesty's commands. 
 
 Then follows the account of the Conference with Mr. 
 Hayashi, in which it is stated that the Prime ^Minister, while 
 acknowledging that the Emperor had ordered him and his 
 colleagues to come to some arrangement with the Japanese 
 Minister, refused to consider any of the various proposals 
 made by the latter. After that Marquis Ito arrived and the 
 account of what happened subsequently, as given in the 
 memorial, is the same in all essential details as that related 
 in the first part of this chapter.^ 
 
 With regard to this Treaty as a whole no advocate of Japan 
 will, of course, claim that it was entered into by Korea witli 
 a willing heart much less, in a jubilant spirit. It is seldom, 
 indeed, that treaties of any sort are concluded between two 
 countries with apparently conflicting interests, where both 
 are ec^ually well satisfied with tlicir terms. In all cases in 
 whicli one party is compelled on grounds of expediency, or 
 
 ' The purpose of this significant Memo rial, wc re])cat,isseli-evident. The 
 Ministers, who had agreed to the Treaty by the Emperor's commands 
 and with his concurrence and approval, were being attacked as traitors. 
 The Emperor himself was secretly favoring the attack and endeavor- 
 ing to create the impression that he had not agreed to the Treaty, but 
 that it was the work of the recreant Cabinet without his approval. The 
 Memorial forced him to abandon that position once and for all. As 
 before stated, it was officially promulgated with the Imperial sanction, 
 and should have ended all controversy at once. In any country but 
 Korea, and with any but the class of writers whom these incidents have 
 developed, that would have been its result.
 
 278 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 of fear that greater evils will follow the rejection of the terms 
 proposed by the other party, there is a sense in which it may 
 be said that the will is not free, but thai the deed is done 
 ''under a sort of compulsion." But if all treaties made 
 under such conditions may be re})udiated when conditions 
 are changed, or if either of the parlies to a treaty may act 
 with treachery, and without ])unishment, when called upon 
 to carry out faithfully the contracts thus entered into, the 
 peace of the world cannot be secured or e\-en promoted by 
 any number of treaties. A feeling of regret and chagrin, 
 especially on the part of the official classes and, indeed, of the 
 educated men of Korea in general, was to be expected. So 
 far as it was sincere and unselfish, the feeling was honorable; 
 and for it the Resident-General and all those agreeing with 
 his pohcy have never shown any lack of respect. But, as 
 has already been made clear, the important thing with the 
 millions of Korea is not, who are Cabinet Ministers, or who 
 manages the foreign affairs of the country, or even who is 
 Emperor; for them the important thing is the character of 
 the local magistrates and the amount of their "scjueezes." 
 
 Protests and petitions followed the enactment of the 
 Treaty of November, 1905. The Emperor refused to receive 
 the petitions or to give audience to the petitioners. And 
 when two men, among the most sincere and blameless of his 
 subjects General Min Yung-whong and Mr. Choi Tk-hiun 
 persisted in petitioning to Ixj punished (as woukl have been in 
 accordance with Korean custom under similar circumstances) 
 for their disobedience to the Emperor's commands in refusing 
 to accept the Treaty, the Emperor declined to punish them. 
 The petitioners then transferred their efforts from the Palace 
 to the Supreme Court, and were disappointed there also. 
 One of them, perhaps both, undertook to punish themselves 
 by suicide. General Alin thus became the typical martyr of 
 the period. He is described by one who knew him well as " a
 
 THE COMPACT 279 
 
 man of amiable character, of dignified manners, and pleasing 
 address. He was known at one time as the 'good Min,' to 
 distinguish him from the other members of the family to 
 which the late Queen belonged." But it has already been 
 shown that, during the entire course of Korea's history, such 
 men have almost always been without sufficient infiuence, or 
 strength of character, to serve their country well and escape 
 death usually, at the hands of the I^mpcror or their rivals, 
 sometimes, however, by their own hands. For a time the air 
 was full of rumors of suicide and uprisings; but in fact there 
 was little of anything of the kind, even in Seoul; the stories 
 of wholesale suicides are false. Beyond Seoul, and outside 
 of a few of the larger towns in which greater numbers of the 
 Yang-bans resided, there was scarcely any excitement of any 
 kind. The Treaty then went into effect, on the whole 
 quietly, under ^Marquis Ito who had negotiated it as the 
 Representative of Japan. 
 
 In this way the Japanese Government in Korea was sub- 
 stituted for the Korean Government in all matters affecting 
 the relations of foreign countries, and their nationals, to the 
 peninsula. The retirement of the Foreign Legations fol- 
 lowed logically and as a matter of course. It is needless to 
 say that this change of responsibility for the conduct of these 
 relations was accepted without dissent or formal protest from 
 the Governments of the civilized world. Indeed, with tlie 
 exception of Russia, all the nations supremely interested ha:' 
 acknowledged already that, under the Protocols of 1904, 
 Korea had lost its claim to Ijc recognized as an independent 
 state in respect of its foreign affairs.
 
 CHAPTER XTI 
 
 RULERS AND PEOPLE 
 
 A JUST apprecialion of the mental and moral character- 
 istics of alien races is a delicate and difficult task to achieve, 
 even for the experienced student of such su])jects. From 
 others it is scarcely fair, no matter how favoraljle the op])or- 
 tunities for observation may have been, to expect any large 
 measure of real success in the accomplishment of this task. 
 The more important reasons for the failure of most attempts 
 in race psychology may be resolved into the following two: 
 a limitation of the observer's own experiences, which ]:)revents 
 sympathy and, therefore, breadth of interpretation; and the 
 inability to rise above the more strictly personal point of view. 
 In both these respects, women are on the whole decidedly 
 inferior to men; accordingly, their account of the ethnic 
 peculiarities of the ideas, motives, and morals of foreign 
 peoples is customarily less trustworthy. The inquirer after 
 a judicial estimate of the native character will find this fact 
 amply illustrated in Korea. But what is more weighty in its 
 influence as bearing upon such a problem as that now 
 under discussion is this: all the inherent difficulties are en- 
 hanced wdien it is re([uired to understand and a})preciate an 
 Oriental race by a member of a distinctively Western civiliza- 
 tion. It is without doubt true that all men, of whatever race 
 or degree of civilization, are essentially alike; they constitute 
 what certain authorities in anthropology have fitly called "a 
 spiritual unity." But for the individual who cannot expect
 
 RULERS AND PEOPLE 
 
 21 
 
 to find within himself whatever is necessary to understand 
 and interpret this unity, and especially for the observer who 
 does not care even to detect and recognize the existence of 
 such a unity, the difference between Orient and Occident is 
 a puzzle perpetually baffling and seemingly insoluble. 
 
 Now in some not wholly unimportant aspects of Korean 
 character and Korean civilization, these difficulties exist in 
 an exaggerated form. Korea is old in its enforced ignorance, 
 sloth, and corruption; but Korea is new to rawness, in its 
 response to the stimulus of foreign and Western ideas, and 
 in its exposure to the observation, either careless and casual 
 or patient and studious, of visitors and residents from 
 abroad. Korea has not yet been awakened to any definite 
 form of intelligent, national self-consciousness. At the same 
 time, neither its material resources, nor its physical character- 
 istics, nor its history and antiquities, nor its educational 
 possibilities, nor the distinctive spirit of its people, have ever 
 been at all thoroughly investigated by others. No wonder, 
 then, that the views expressed by the "oldest residents" in 
 Korea regarding the characteristics of its rulers and its 
 people Emperor, late Queen, Yang-bans, pedlers, and 
 peasants (for there is almost no middle class) are strangely 
 conflicting. Diverse and even contradictory traits of char- 
 acter are, with equal confidence and on the basis of an equally 
 long and intimate acquaintance, ascribed by dift'erent persons 
 to all these classes. 
 
 The true and satisfactory account of these differences of 
 opinion is not, however, to be found by wholly denying the 
 justness of either of the opposite points of view. Contradic- 
 tions are inherent in that /ery type of character of which the 
 Koreans afford so many striking examples. Indeed, all peo- 
 ples, when at a-certain stage of race-culture, and the multitudes 
 in all civilizations, are just that bundles of confused and 
 conflicting ideas, impulses, and practices, which have never
 
 282 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS IT(J 
 
 been unified into a consistent "characler." The average 
 Korean is not only liable to be called, he is liable actually to be, 
 kindly and yet cruel, generous and }el intensely avaricious, 
 with a certain sense of honor and yet hopelessly corrupt in 
 his otTicial relations. Accordingly, as one puts emphasis on 
 this virtue to the exclusion or suppression of that vice, or 
 turns the eye upon the dark and disgusting side of the ])icture 
 and shuts out the side that might afford pleasure and hope, 
 will one's estimate be made of the actual condition and future 
 prospects of the nation. 
 
 But let us begin our brief description with the man who has 
 been for more than a generation the chief ruler of Korea, the 
 now ex-Emperor. He is a typical Korean especially in 
 respect of his characteristic weakness of character, his taste 
 for and adeptness at intrigue, his readiness to deceive and 
 corrupt others, and himself to be deceived and corrupted. 
 For all this no specially occult reasons need to be assigned. 
 With a weak nature, his youth spent under the ])ernicious 
 influence of eunuchs and court concubines and hangers-on, 
 his manhood dominated by an unceasing and bloody feud 
 between his wife and his father, his brief period of " inde- 
 pendence" one orgy of misrule, and his latest years con- 
 trolled by sorceresses,, soothsayers, low-born and high-born 
 intriguers, and selfish and unwise foreign advisers: what but 
 incurably unsound character, uncontrollable instability of 
 conduct, and a destiny fated to be full of disaster, could be 
 expected from such a man so placed ? 
 
 The father of the ex-Em])eror was Yi Ha-eung, Prince of 
 Heung Song, who was long the so-called "Regent" or 
 "Prince-Parent," and is best known in history as the "Tai 
 Won Kun." It has been said of him that "he was the 
 grandson of a great and unfortunate crown prince, the 
 great-grandson of a famous king, the nephew of another 
 king, and the father of still another king." The lineal an-
 
 RULERS AND PEOPLE 283 
 
 cestor of the Tai Won Kun was Yong-jong, who reigned 
 from 1724 to 1776, This sovereign quarrelled with his own 
 son and had him put to death as insane; but other issue 
 faihng, the crown descended through the murdered crown 
 prince, and from him through three Hncs of monarchs. 
 Until his son was chosen to occupy the throne, the Tai Won 
 Kun, although he had married into the powerful Min family, 
 does not seem to have exercised much influence in politics. 
 But in 1864, on the death of the king, without male issue 
 the Dowager Queen Cho, by what is reported to have been 
 a not altogether legitimate procedure, proclaimed the second 
 son of the Tai Won Kun, then a boy of only twelve years, 
 as the successor to the throne. 
 
 Little is exactly known as to the care or education of the 
 boyish king during his earliest years. It is commonly re- 
 ported that he was fond of outdoor sports, especially of 
 archery, and disinclined to study. Yet he is reputed to be 
 a fine Chinese penman and to be well accjuainted with the 
 Chinese classics. His father was a strict disciplinarian and, 
 although he was never legally in control of affairs during his 
 son's minority, his influence was dominant so long as he 
 kept on good terms with the wily Queen Dowager and the 
 ^Ministers of her selection. The failure of all foreign at- 
 tempts to enter into friendly relations with the Koreans, 
 and the persecution and slaughter of foreign Christian 
 priests and of thousands of Korean Christians during this 
 period, are customarily attributed to the influence of the 
 Tai Won Kun. 
 
 When thirteen years of age, the new king was married to 
 a girl selected for him from the Min family. But until 1873 
 his position as ruler was only nominal; on tlie altainmenl of 
 his majority, however, the deadl}' struggle between the wife 
 and the father, the Queen and the Prince Parent, ])egan to 
 be revealed. A word as to the character of the woman is
 
 284 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 necessary in this ])lace, in order to understand the conduct of 
 the King and, as well, the recent history of Korea. The 
 Queen was, without doubt, an unusually gifted and attractive 
 woman, with the ability to attach others to her, both men 
 and women, in a powerful way. But a more unscrupulous 
 and horribly cruel character has rarely disgraced a throne, 
 whether in ancient or in modern times. Her rivals among 
 the women of the court were tortured and killed at her 
 command; the adherents of the Tai Won Kun were de- 
 capitated and their bodies thrown into the streets or their 
 heads used to festoon the gateway. One of the Koreans 
 acquainted with court affairs during her reign informed a 
 friend of the writer that, by careful calculation, he had 
 reckoned the number of 2,867 persons put to death as the 
 victims of her personal hatred and ambition. The number 
 seems incredible, afid there is no way to verify it; but no 
 one who knows the history of the Korean Court, even down 
 to very recent years, will assert that it cannot be correct. 
 The tragic death of this woman, not improperly, drew tem- 
 porarily a veil over these atrocities. But their existence is 
 a part of the proof that, pernicious as was much of the 
 father's influence over the king, the influence of the wife and 
 her family was yet more pernicious. 
 
 It was under influences such as these that the royal char- 
 acter of Yi-Hy-eung, now ex-Emperor, developed, and that 
 all the earlier part of his reign was concluded. The result 
 was to be expected namely, an amiable and weak nature 
 rendered deceitful, cruel, and corrupt. The impression 
 made by his presence as already described (see p. 46 f.) 
 is not one of dignity and strength of character; but the voice 
 is pleasant, the smile is winsome, the willingness to forgive 
 and to do a good turn, if cither or both can be done without 
 too much sacrifice or inconvenience, is prompt and motived 
 by kindly feeling. His Majesty is usually ready to listen
 
 The Ex-Emperor and Present Emperor.
 
 RULERS AND PEOPLE 285 
 
 without malignant anger or lasting resentment to unwelcome 
 advice and even to stern rebuke. On the other hand, as 
 already said, he is a master of intrigue; and more than once, 
 until very lately, he has succeeded in c^uite surpassing at 
 their own tricks the wily foreigners who thought to get an 
 advantage over him. On the other hand, his ignorance and 
 credulity have often rendered him an easy victim to the in- 
 trigue of others. As one foreign minister, a stanch friend, 
 said of him: "You may give His Majesty the best advice, 
 the only sensible advice possible under the circumstances; 
 he will assent cordially to all you say, and you leave him 
 confident that your advice will be followed. Then some 
 worthless fellow comes in, tells him something else, and what 
 you have said is all wiped off the slate." 
 
 In spite of his natural amiability this ruler has frequently 
 shown a cold-blooded and calculating cruelty, made more 
 conspicuous by ingratitude and treachery; and his reign 
 has been throughout characterized by a callous disregard of 
 the sufferings of the people through the injustice of his own 
 minions. To quote again the estimate of a foreign minister : 
 "His Majesty loves power, but seems color-blind when it 
 comes to- the faculty of distinguishing between the true and 
 the false. He would rather have one of the Government 
 Departments pay 20,000 yen in satisfaction of a debt which 
 he owes than pay 5,000 yen out of his own purse. ^ And he 
 allows himself to be cheated with the same sense of tolcra- 
 
 ' An amusing illustration of the ex-Emperor's way of filling his privy 
 purse is found in the following authentic incident. At one time the 
 large sum of 270,000 yen was wanted in cash to pay a bill for silks and 
 jades which, it was alleged, had been purchased in China for Lady Om. 
 When the request was made to exhibit the precious goods which had 
 cost so enormous a sum, and which were going to make so large an 
 unexpected drain upon insufficient revenues, the show of materials was 
 entirely unsatisfactory. But, if not the goods, at least the bill it.self 
 could be produced. A bill was then brought to light, with the items
 
 286 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 lion which he has for those who cheat tlic Government, pro- 
 vided that the culprit has the saving grace of a pleasing de- 
 portment." One of his most able and u])right Korean 
 officials once declared: "It is true I am devoted to His 
 iMajcsty, and I am sure he likes me; but if I were to be 
 executed for some crime of which I was completely inno- 
 cent, and a friend were to come to ?Iis Majesty, while he 
 was at dinner, and implore his intercession, if it meant any 
 danger, even the slightest, to him, he would lea\e me to my 
 fate and go on eating with a good appetite." During the 
 Boxer troubles in China a plot was devised by the reigning 
 favorite of the Emperor, Yi Yong-ik, to kill all the foreigners 
 in Korea; the plot was exposed, but the favorite did not 
 suffer in his influence over the Emperor. Over and over 
 again, in earlier days, the missionaries have appealed to him 
 in vain to secure their converts against robbery and death 
 at the hands of imperial favorites. It was formerly his 
 custom to have at stated inten-als large numbers of persons 
 executed inconvenient witnesses, political suspects, ene- 
 mies of men in power. This custom of indiscriminate "jail- 
 cleaning" was, as far as it was safe and allowable under the 
 growing foreign influences, continued down toward the 
 present time. 
 
 That the foregoing account of the character of the man 
 who came to the throne of Korea, as a boy of twelve, in 1864, 
 and abdicated this throne in 1907, is a true picture needs no 
 
 made out in due form, but by a Chinese firm of merchants in Seoul 
 instead of in China. The Chinese Consul-General, on being inquired 
 of, repHed that there was indeed such a reputable Chinese firm in the 
 city; and he desired to have the matter further investigated lest the 
 credit and business honor of his countrymen might suffer by connection 
 of this sort with His Majesty's efforts to obtain ready money. Investiga- 
 tion elicited the fact that a certain Court official had visited this firm 
 and inquired how much such and such things would cost, if purchased 
 in Shanghai. But no goods had been delivered or even actually ordered!
 
 RULERS AND PEOPLE 287 
 
 additional evidence to that now available by the world at 
 large. Strangely inconsistent in some of its features as it 
 may seem to be, the portrait is unmistakablv true to life. 
 No wonder then, that, after exhausting all his resources of 
 advice, rebuke, and warning, the Resident-General was 
 regretfully forced to this conclusion : no cure for the tempera- 
 ment and habits of His ^Majesty of Korea could possibly be 
 found. But this had long been the conclusion of his own 
 Cabinet ^linisters and all others among the wiser of the 
 Korean officials. It was finally by these ]Ministers, without 
 the orders, consent, or even knowledg', of the Marquis Ito, that 
 in order to save the country from more serious humiliation 
 and disaster, movements were initiated to secure his abdica- 
 tion of the throne he had disgraced for more than forty years. 
 
 As to the Korean ruling classes generally, the Yang-bans 
 so-called, it may be said that for centuries they have been, 
 with few exceptions, of a character lo correspond with their 
 monarchs. The latter have also bc.n. with few exceptions, 
 such in character as to represent eitlvr the weak side or the 
 corrupt and cruel side, or both, of t!e r ner just described. 
 This truth of "like king, like no' ^''.," was amply illus- 
 trated by the case of Kwang-ha, h 'he early years of the 
 seventeenth century. When the mo 1-. , . ..ng-ji induced this 
 king to build the so-called "]\Iulberry !\^:.ce," thousands of 
 houses were razed, the people oppressed with taxation, and 
 the public ofhces sokl in order to raise tlie funds. When the 
 same monarch, yielding to the inlluences of his concubine 
 and her partv, committed the infamy of expelling the Queen- 
 Dowager from Seoul, only one prominent courtier, Yi Hang- 
 bok, with eight others, stood out against 930 officials and 
 170 of the king's relatives who were ready to vote for the 
 shameful deed.^ 
 
 The proportion of courageous and honest officials con- 
 
 ' Sec Hulbert, The History oj Korea, IT, p. 61 /.
 
 288 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 ncclcd with the Korean Court had not greatly increased up 
 to the time when jSIarcjuis Ito undertook the task of its 
 jjurification. This fact, in itself, so discouraging to the 
 effort at instituting reforms from abo\e downward on the 
 part of the Koreans themselves, is made obvious in a strik- 
 ing way by the analysis of a brief, confidential descri])tion 
 (a sort of official Korean "Who is Wlio?") of ninety-six 
 persons, prepared by one well ac(|uainted with the men and 
 their history, but favorably disposed toward even ])reju- 
 diced in favor of the side of Korea. Of these ninety-six 
 ofiicials, only five are [pronounced thoroughly honorable and 
 trustworthy characters; twenty-seven are classed as fairly 
 good; the remainder are denominated very weak, or very 
 bad. Subsequent developments have revealed the weakness 
 or corruption of most of those whom this paper less than 
 ten years ago pronounced to be on the whole cither hopeful 
 or positively good. W^hat this means for Korea to-day can 
 be judged by the following selected examples: (i) "A rallier 
 
 proud and rich member of the Clan; a notorious 
 
 sc|ueezer, and one whose services may always be had for a 
 price; absolutely unreliable and incapable of patriotic im- 
 pulses." (2) "A contemptible but rich member of the 
 
 Clan; a most detestable opi)ressor of the people as shown in 
 Pyeng Yang; incapable of good impulses apparently." (3) 
 "A slippery self-made man; Emperor's ])ri\ate treasurer; 
 Vice-Minister of Interior for many years; rose through in- 
 fluence of his cousin, but not loyal to latter's memory; can- 
 not be influenced except through fear or fa\"or." (4) "A 
 self-made man who might better have let out the job; has 
 courage, and is unmercifully cruel and oppressive; is the 
 most ignorant official in high office during twenty years." 
 Yet this low-born and ignorant fellow had almost absolute 
 control of the Emperor and of the country's finances for 
 several years.
 
 RULERS AND PEOPLE 289 
 
 The examples given above may serve to describe the one- 
 third of the ninety-six officials characterized by extreme im- 
 morality. Of the other one-third, whose services to their 
 country arc rendered available only for evil on account of 
 their weakness, the following examples afford a sufficiently 
 accurate description: (i) "Foreign Minister repeatedly; very 
 deficient in intelligence, but says little and looks wise; too 
 feeble to be dishonest, but an easy tool for one who cares to 
 
 use him." (2) "Governor of ; a weak, abominable 
 
 man, who has done well at , because kept in check by 
 
 the Japanese; would be a scoundrel if the opportunity 
 offered; a tool of Yi Yong-ik" (a man notorious for his 
 corruption and oppression, on account of which some of the 
 highest officials knelt before the Palace gate during the entire 
 day and night of November 28, 1902, praying for his trial 
 and punishment; but he was saved by the Emperor, who 
 feared him; he was even subsec^uently brought back from 
 banishment and restored to his post as "Director of the 
 Imperial Estates"). (3) "An old man of remarkable his- 
 tory; has been on all sides of the political fence; is good at 
 times, and apparently a patriot, and then he will turn up on 
 quite the opposite side." 
 
 It cannot be supposed that an official class, so constituted 
 and so thoroughly imbued with such unwholesome charac- 
 teristics, woukl easily form within itself a i)arty loyal to 
 reform, and brave and strong enough to carry its loyalty out 
 into practical effect. As a matter of fact no such jwlitical 
 party has ever Ijcen formed and maintained to any successful 
 issue, in the history of Korea. For this we may take the 
 word of Mr. Homer B. Hull)ert, who savs,^ regarding the 
 formation of ])arties in 1575: "These ])arties have ne\er 
 represented any ])rin(i])le wliatever. They ha\e ne\-er had 
 any platforms, but ha\e been, and are, simply political clans 
 
 ' The History oj Korea, I., p. 339.
 
 290 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 bent upon securing tlie royal favor and the offices and emolu- 
 ments that go therewith." In another work of the same 
 author we are told: "From that day onward (middle of the 
 sixteenth century) politics has been a war of factions, strug- 
 gling for wealth and })Ower, with no scru})les against murder 
 or other crime." The Koreans are, indeed, given to the 
 formation of societies and parties of various descriptions; 
 the more improper or nearly im])ossible are the ends to be 
 reached, and the more clandestine and illicit the means cm- 
 ployed, the greater the temporary enthusiasm which they 
 are likely to excite. All these ])arties have therefore one 
 plank and one plan of action: to get the ear of the king, to 
 seize upon and control the office-making ])ower, and so to 
 put in every lucrative or honorable position their own ])ar- 
 tisans. It is "the spoils system sublimated"; for there is 
 "absolutely no admixture of any other element."^ 
 
 On the other hand, this same factional and corrupt spirit 
 among the ruling classes has made it certain that, "however 
 good a statesman a man might be, the other side would try 
 to get his head removed from his shoulders at the first op- 
 portunity; and the more distinguished he became, the 
 greater this desire would be. From that time (again the 
 middle of the sixteenth century) to this, almost all the really 
 great men of Korea have met a violent death." . . . "No 
 matter how long one lives in this country, he will never get 
 to understand how a people can ])ossibly drop to such a low 
 estate as to be willing to live without the remotest hope of 
 receiving even-handed justice. Not a week passes but you 
 come in personal contact with cases of injustice and bru- 
 tality that would mean a riot in any civilized country."^ 
 
 As to the public justice when administered by such a 
 ruling class, this has actually been what might have been 
 
 See Hulbert, The History of Korea, II., p. 54. 
 
 * Hulbert, The Passing of Korea, pp. 50, 58.
 
 RULERS AND PEOPLE 291 
 
 expected. The one judicial principle universally recognized 
 is that justice is worth its price; the side which can offer the 
 largest bribe of money or influence will uniformly win its 
 case. Of justice in Korea, to quote from Mr. Hulbert again/ 
 there is "not much more than is absolutely necessary to hold 
 the fabric of the commonwealth from disintegration." Until 
 the Chino- Japan war, when Japanese influence made itself 
 felt in a controlling way, the brutal spectacles were not in- 
 frecjuent of men having their heads hacked off with dull 
 swords, or their bones broken by beating with a huge paddle. 
 Death by poison with extract made by boiling the centipede 
 was administered to prisoners. It was not till 1895 that the 
 law was abolished which required the poisoning of mother, 
 wife, and daughter for the man's treason, the poisoning of 
 wife for his crime of murder or arson, and the enslaving of 
 wife for his theft. When the reformers of 1894 ordered the 
 restoration to their lawful owners of the lands and houses 
 which had been illegally seized, numerous offlcials some of 
 whom were well known in foreign circles as partners of con- 
 cessions obtained through influence lost large fractions of 
 their wealth because of the decree. 
 
 After describing the Yang-ban as one sees him upon the 
 streets or meets him in social gatherings at Seoul in the fol- 
 lowing terms a "dignified, stately gentleman, self-centred, 
 self-contented, naively curious about the foreigner, albeit in 
 a slightly contemptuous fashion" a writer well acquainted 
 with the Korean gentry goes on to say: "Experience teaches 
 that this fine gentleman is not ashamed to live upon liis 
 relatives, to the remotest degree; that he disdains labor and 
 knows nothing of business; that he is not a liar from malice, 
 but that he is a })revaricator by instinct and habit. Even 
 when he wishes to tell the truth, and nothing but the truth, 
 it leaves his lips so embroidered with fanciful elaborations 
 
 ' The Passing oj Korea, p. 67.
 
 292 IN KORKA WWW MAR(,)IIS ITO 
 
 that the Father of lies would be glad to elaim it for his own. 
 With all that, he may, aecording to the aceepted standards 
 of his elass, be an u])right eilizen, a kind husband, and a 
 conscientious parent. And just as likely as not, he may 
 possess c[ualities which endear him to the foreign observer." 
 
 Under centuries of subjection to a ruling class having the 
 character described above, the menial and moral character- 
 istics of the Korean people have been developed as might 
 have been expected. The ethnic mixture from Avhich the 
 race has sprung is possessed of fine physical and s{)iritual 
 qualities. The male members of the race, esi)ecially, are in 
 general of good height, well formed, and ca])able of endur- 
 ance and achievement in enterprises demanding bcKlily 
 strength. They are undoubtedly fond of their ease and even 
 slothful for man when not stimulated by hope or necessity 
 is naturally a lazy animal as the impression from the rows 
 of coolies and peasants squatted upon the ground and 
 sucking their pipes, or lying prone in the sunlight, during 
 the working hours of the day, bears witness. As for the 
 Yang-ban, on no account will he do manual work. Hut, on 
 the other hand, the lower classes make good workmen, when 
 well taught and properly ''bossed"; and their miners, for 
 example, are said by experts to be among the best in the 
 world. The success in manual pursuits of those who emi- 
 grated to Hawaii some years ago testifies also to their inherent 
 capacity. As has already been said, the Koreans are much 
 given to forming all manner of associations; they are "grega- 
 rious in their crimes as in their pastimes." When well treated 
 they are generally good-natured and docile easy to control 
 under even a tolerably just administration. Nor are they, 
 probably, such cowards that they cannot be trained to acquit 
 themselves well in war. 
 
 The prevailing, the practically universal vices and crimes 
 are those which are inevitable under any such government, if
 
 RULERS AND PE(3PLE 293 
 
 long continued, as that which has burdened and degraded 
 the Korean populace from the beginning of their obscure 
 history as a complex of kingdoms down to the present time. 
 What their vices and crimes are can be learned even better 
 from the lips of their professed friends than from those whom 
 they regard as their open or secret enemies. Of the average 
 Korean Mr. Hulbert^ affirms: "You may call him a liar or 
 a libertine, and he will laugh it off; but call him mean and 
 you flick him on the raw." ''In Korea it is as common to 
 use the expression, 'You are a liar' as it is with us to say, 
 'You don't say.' ... A Korean sees about as mucli moral 
 turpitude in a lie as we see in a mixed metaphor or a s})lit 
 infinitive." As to his good nature: "Any accession of im- 
 portance or prestige goes to his head like new wine and is 
 apt to make him offensive." The same author, after saying 
 of the Korean bullock, "This heavy, slow-plodding animal, 
 docile, long-suffering, uncomplaining, would make a fitting 
 emblem of the Korean people," goes on to describe his own 
 disgust at the frequent sight of the drunken, brutal bullock- 
 driver, venting his spleen on some fellow Korean by cruelly 
 beating his own bullock. Torturing animals is a favorite 
 pastime for both children and adults. The horrid brutality 
 of the Korean mob, to which reference has already been 
 repeatedly made, has been more than once witnessed by those 
 now hving in Seoul; it would speedily be witnessed again, if 
 the hand of the Japanese Protectorate were withdrawn. 
 For the Korean, when angry, is recklessly cruel and entirely 
 careless of life, and resembles nothing else so much as a 
 "fanged beast."" When combined with tlie superstition and 
 the incredible credulity which prevail among the populace, 
 this brutality constitutes a standing menace to the peace and 
 life of the foreign population resicHng in the midst of them. 
 
 " TJte Passing oj Korea, pp. 38, 41. 
 2 Ibid., p. 43.
 
 294 ]N KOREA WWII MARQUIS ITO 
 
 It was as lale as 1888 that \hv niol), excited by the rei)ort tliat 
 the Americans and luiropeans were en^a,t^ed in tlie l)usiness, 
 for profit, of kilh'ng Korean Ijabic's and of cutting off the 
 breasts of Korean women to use in the manufacture of con- 
 densed milk, were scarcely repressed from wholesale arson 
 and murder.^ 
 
 The anti-Japanese natives and foreigners have with more 
 or less good reason complained that an increase of sexual 
 impurity and of licensed vice has resulted from the Japanese 
 Protectorate over Korea. Without entering upon the dis- 
 cussion of the difficult problem involved in these charges, it 
 is enough to say that "corruption of the Koreans" in this 
 regard is scarcely a proper claim to bring forward, under 
 any circumstances. It is of no particular significance to de- 
 termine whether the statement of a recent writer that the 
 exposure of their breasts on the streets is characteristic of 
 Korean women generally, is a libel, or not. It is true, indeed, 
 that the foreign lady who has done much to encourage among 
 the natives of her own sex in Seoul a certain regard for the 
 decencies of civilization, was accustomed, not many years ago, 
 to provide herself with safety-pins and accompany their use 
 upon the garments of the lower classes (women of the higher 
 classes do not appear upon the streets) with a moral lecture. 
 But to one acquainted with the unimportant inlluence of 
 such exposure upon really vicious conduct among jjeoples of a 
 certain grade of race-culture, the charge, whether true or not, 
 is com])aratively petty. Much more determinative is it to 
 learn from their friendly historians that only one in ten of 
 their songs could with decency be published; that almost all 
 their stories are of a salacious character and, "however dis- 
 creditable it may fee, they are a true picture of the morals of 
 Korea to-day"; and that among the lower classes "the utmost 
 
 'See the account of the "Ba1)y War'' and "Breast Hunters," The 
 History oj Korea, II., p. 245.
 
 RULERS AND PEOPLE 
 
 295 
 
 promiscuity prevails. "A man may have half-a-dozen wives 
 a year in succession. No ceremony is recjuired, and it is 
 simply a mutual agreement of a more or less temporary 
 nature."^ 
 
 As to business honesty or respect for property rights, as 
 such, there is almost none of it among the people of Korea. 
 But what else could be expected of pedlers, peasants, and 
 coolies, who have lived under the corrupt and oppressive 
 government of such rulers during centuries of time? To 
 quote again from the friendly historian -.^ "In case a man 
 has to foreclose a mortgage and enter upon possession of the 
 property, he will need the sanction of the authorities, since 
 possession here, as elsewhere, is nine points of the law. The 
 trouble is that a large fraction of the remaining point is de- 
 pendent upon the caprice or the venality of the official whose 
 duty is to adjudicate the case. In a land where bribery is 
 almost second nature, and where private rights are of small 
 account unless backed by some kind of influence, the thwart- 
 ing of justice is exceedingly common." j\Iore astonishing 
 still, from our point of view, is the use made of the public 
 properties, which until recently prevailed even in the city of 
 Seoul, by the lowest of the people. Any Korean might extend 
 his temporary booth or shop out into the street, and then, 
 when people had become accustomed to this, quietly plant 
 permanent posts at the extreme limit of his illicit appropria- 
 tion. On being expostulated with, "he will put on a look of 
 innocence and assert that he has been using the space for 
 many years";'' indeed, "he inherited it from his father or 
 father's father." To this day the making of false deeds, or 
 the deeding of the same i)ro]iert}' lo two different purchasers 
 (by one false deed and one genuine, or b}' both false) is an 
 
 ' TJie Passing oj Korea, pp. 311, 31Q, 369. 
 ^ Ibid., J). 283. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 247.
 
 296 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 exceedingly common occurrence. If the native wanted a 
 place for the deposit of his filth, and the drain near his house 
 was already full, he dug a hole in the street; if he wanted dirt 
 for his own use, he took it from the street. "Scores of 
 times," says Hulbert, "I have come upon places where a hole 
 has been dug in the street large enough to bury an ox." 
 Meanwhile, petty stealing and highway robbery have been 
 going on all over the land. This, too, is the practical morality 
 of the Korean populace, when unrestrained by foreign con- 
 trol, even down to the present time. 
 
 A curious confirmation of the foregoing estimate of the 
 mental and moral character of the people of Korea was 
 afforded by the "confessions" which poured forth in perfervid 
 language, ending not infrequently in a falling fit or a lapse 
 into half-consciousness, from thousands of native Christians 
 during the revival of 1906-1907, The sins which were con- 
 fessed to have been committed since their profession of 
 Christianity, were in the main these same characteristic vices 
 of the Korean people. They included not only pride, jeal- 
 ousy, and hatred, but habitual lying, cheating, stealing, and 
 acts of impurity. 
 
 It is, then, no cause for surprise that a recent writer^ affirms: 
 "If it seems a hopeless task to lift the Chinaman out of his 
 groove, it is a hundred times more difficult to change the 
 habits of a Korean. . . . The Korean has al^solutely nothing 
 to recommend him save his good nature. He is a standing 
 w^aming to those who o])pose progress. Some one has said 
 that the answer to Confucianism is China; but the best and 
 most completely damning answer is Korea." 
 
 Can Korea such a people, with such rulers be reformed 
 and redeemed ? Can her rulers be made to rule at least in 
 some semblance of righteousness, as preparatory to its more 
 perfect and substantial form ? Can the people learn to prize 
 
 ' Whigham, Manchuria and Korea, p. 185.
 
 RULERS AND PEOPLE 297 
 
 order, to obey law, and to respect human rights ? Probably, 
 yes; but certainly never without help from the outside. 
 And this help must be something more than the missionary 
 can give. It must lay foundations of industrial, judicial, and 
 governmental reform: it must also enforce them Such 
 political disease does not, if left alone, perfect its own cure. 
 The knife of the surgeon is first of all needed; the tonic of 
 the physician and the nourishment of good food and the 
 bracing of a purer air come afterward. We cannot, there- 
 fore, agree with the small body of Christian workmen now, 
 happily, a minority who try to believe that the needed 
 redemption of Korea could be effected by their unaided 
 forces. A union of law, enforced by police and military, with 
 the spiritual influences of education and religion, is alone 
 available in so desperate a case as that of Korea to-day. 
 It is to the task of a political reformation and education for 
 both rulers and people in Korea that Japan stands com- 
 mitted before the world at the present time. As represented 
 by the Marquis Ito, she has undertaken this task with a good 
 conscience and with a reasonable amount of hope. Among 
 the administrative reforms in Korea^ one of the most im- 
 portant is the "Purification of the Imperial Court." This 
 "singular operation the Resident-General caused to be 
 resolutely carried out in July, 1906." At that time "men 
 and women of uncertain origin and questionable character 
 . . . had, in a considerable number, come to find their way 
 into the royal palace, until it had become a veritable rendez- 
 vous of adventurers and conspirators. Divining, fortune- 
 telling and spirit-incanting found favor there, and knaves 
 and villains plotted and intrigued within the very gates of the 
 Court, in co-operation with native and foreign schemers 
 
 ' See a pamphlet bearing this title as an "Authorized Translation of 
 Official Documents published by the Resident-C'icneral, in Seoul, 
 January, 1907," p. 7.
 
 298 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 without. By cheating and chicanery, they relieved the 
 Imperial treasury of its funds, and in their eagerness to fdl 
 their i)Ockets never stopj)ed to tliink of what (Umgerous seeds 
 of (hsorder and rapine they were scattering broadcast over 
 the benighted peninsula." 
 
 It must doubtless be confessed that under the ex-Emperor 
 the efforts of the Residency- General to effect the needed 
 reforms were successful only to a limited extent. But with 
 his last piece of intriguing to "relieve the Imperial treasury 
 of its funds," by sending a commission to the Hague Con- 
 ference, "in co-operation with native and foreign schemers," 
 the old era came c|uickly to an end. The history of its 
 termination will be told elsewhere; but the fact has illumined 
 and strengthened the hope that Korea, too, can in time 
 produce men fit to rule with some semblance of honesty, 
 fidelity, and righteousness. Meantime, they must be largely 
 ruled from without. 
 
 How this hope of industrial and political redemption may 
 be extended to the people at large and applied to the different 
 important interests of the nation, both in its internal and 
 foreign relations, will be illustrated in the several following 
 chapters. Now that the Emperor ^ is publicly committed 
 to an extended policy of reform; that the Ministers are for 
 the first time in the history of Korea really a Cabinet exer- 
 cising some control; that the Resident-General has the 
 right and the duty to guide and to enforce all the important 
 
 ^ During all my visit in Korea it was commonly rc]:K)rted by those 
 intimate at Court that the Crown Prince was an iml^ecile l:>oth in body 
 and in mind. But in his boyhood he was rather more than ordinarily 
 bright, and his mother, the murdered Queen, was the most clever and 
 brilliant Korean woman of her time. It is not strange, then, that smce 
 his accession to the throne and in view of his obviously sensible way of 
 yielding to good advice from others, in spite of the evil influence of his 
 father, the impression has been made that he might have been feigning 
 imbecility in order to escape plots to assassinate him, which were formed 
 in the interests of a rival claimant to the throne.
 
 RULERS AND PEOPLE 299 
 
 measures necessary to achieve reform; that the foreign na- 
 tions chiefly interested have definitively recognized the 
 Japanese Protectorate; and that the leaders of the foreign 
 moral and religious forces are so largely in harmony with 
 the plans of Japan; now that all this is matter of past 
 achievement, the prospects for the future of Korea are 
 brighter than they have ever been before. One may reason- 
 ably hope that the time is not far distant when both rulers and 
 people will be consciously the happier and more prosperous, 
 because they have been compelled by a foreign and hated 
 neighbor to submit to a reformation imposed from without. 
 That they would ever have reformed themselves is not to be 
 believed by those who know intimately the mental and moral 
 history and characteristics of the Koreans.
 
 CHAPTER XITI 
 
 RESOURCES AND FINANCE 
 
 The resources of the Korean peninsula have never been 
 systematically developed; indeed, until a very recent date no 
 intelligent attemjjt has ever been made to determine what 
 they actually are. The Korean Government has usually 
 been content with such an adjustment of "scjueezes'' as 
 seemed best to meet the exigencies of the times admin- 
 istered according to the temperament and interests of the 
 local magistracy. At intervals, however, the Court officials 
 have carried their more erratic and incalculable method of 
 extortion and of j)lundering the people rather widely into 
 effect. Then those of their numljer who chanced to be His 
 Majesty's favorites of the hour have enjoyed most of the 
 surplus; the people have submitted to, or savagely and 
 desperately revolted against, the inevitable; but the country 
 at large has continued poor at all times, and has fre(|uently 
 been devastated by famine. As to the exploiting of Korea's 
 resources by foreign capital, the facts have been (juite uni- 
 formly these : a combination of adventurers from abroad with 
 Koreans who either possessed themselves, or through others 
 could obtain "influence" at Court has been effected; some- 
 times, but by no means always, the Emperor's privy purse 
 has profited temporarily; but the main part of the proceeds 
 has been divided among the native and foreign promoters. 
 Of late years, some of the "concessions" have been almost, 
 or quite, given away in the hope of thus obtaining foreign in-
 
 RESOURCES AND FINANCE 301 
 
 terference or sympathy. In only rare instances has the 
 national wealth been greatly increased in this way, or even 
 the treasury of the Government been made much the 
 richer. 
 
 It is plain, then, that if the Japanese Protectorate is to be 
 made really effective for the industrial uplift and develop- 
 ment of the Korean people, as well as capable of rewarding 
 Japan for its expenditure in substantial ways, the resources 
 of the country must be intelligently explored and system- 
 atically developed. Here is where the work of reform must 
 begin. In intimate relations with this work stands, of course, 
 the establishment of a sound and stable currency. For the 
 financial condition of Korea up to very recent times was as 
 disgraceful as its industrial condition was deplorable. To 
 this important task of developing the resources of Korea and 
 reforming its fmances, Marc^uis Ito, as Resident-General, 
 and Mr. jMegata, as Financial Adviser, have devoted them- 
 selves with a patience, self-sacrifice, and skill, which ought 
 ultimately to overcome the tremendous difficulties involved. 
 
 "Korea," says the Seoul Press, "is essentially an agricul- 
 tural country. Eighty per cent, of her population till the 
 soil, and stinted as are the returns which the soil is will- 
 ing to yield under the present method of cultivation, the 
 produce from land constitutes at least ninety per cent, of 
 the annual income of the country. To improve tlie lot of 
 the toiling miUions on the farms is therefore to improve the 
 lot of virtually the whole nation. It was in recognition of 
 this obvious fact that ]\Iar(|uis Ito, in addressing the leading 
 editors of Tokyo, in February, igo6, previous to his de])arture 
 for Korea to assume the duties of his newly appointed j)Ost as 
 Resident-General, laid particular emi)hasis on the urgent 
 importance of introducing agricultural im])rovements in this 
 country. This question was consecjuently the very first to 
 engage the serious attention of the authorities of the Resi-
 
 302 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 dcncy-Gcncral.'" The statistics for the year ending De- 
 cember 31, 1906, show that out of an amount of taxes esti- 
 mated at 6,422,744 yen, tlie sum of 5,208,228 yen was 
 apportioned to the land tax, and 23i,o()(^) vr;/ to llie house 
 tax. The dilTieuUv of collecting tlie taxes, either through 
 the corruption of the olTicials, or 1)\- reason of the in- 
 ability or inexcusable and often \iolent resistance of the 
 })Cople, can be estimated by tlie fact that, of the land tax 
 2,2i4,823+y^' was still "outstanding," and of the house 
 tax, 68,794+yc.- 
 
 The institution of an Experimental Station and Agricul- 
 tural School at Suwon has already been descriljed (]>. 122 f.). 
 But in order to accomplish the needed development of Korea's 
 agricultural resources, the j)casant farmers must themselves 
 be induced to reform their methods of cultivation. As might 
 be expected, however, the Korean peasant farmer is sus- 
 picious of all attempts to improve his wasteful methods, is 
 extremely "conservative" (a much-abused word) in his 
 habits, and slow to learn. Some good work has, however, 
 already been done by way of opening his eyes. The example 
 of the Model Farm, which is limited to one locality, is sup- 
 plemented by the example of the Japanese farmers who are 
 settling in numerous localities. To take an instance: im- 
 proved Japanese rice seed was distributed gra/is in various 
 parts of the country. But even then it was necessar}- to 
 guarantee the farmers against loss in order to induce tliem 
 to try the experiment of cultivating it. The result of the ex- 
 periment was most encouraging. The yiekl was in e\ery 
 case greater than that obtained from the native seed ; in some 
 cases the gain in the product being as much as from six to 
 ten to (3-5 bushels) per tan (j acre). Similar experiments 
 
 * Issue of Saturday, ^Slarch 16, 1907. 
 
 ^ So the report on the "State of the Progress of the Reorganization of 
 the Finances of Korea, March, 1907."
 
 RESOURCES AND FINANCE 303 
 
 arc now in progress with the seed of barley and wheat, im- 
 ported from Japan, America, and Europe. 
 
 In intimate connection with tlicse plans for developing the 
 agricultural resources of Korea stands tlie })roject for utilizing 
 the unreclaimed state lands. And surely here, at least, all 
 those who have the slightest honest feeling of regard for the 
 real interests of the country ought to wish that the people, 
 and not the Court, and not the foreign promoter, should be 
 primarily considered and protected. How great are the 
 chances for waste, fraud, and unwise action in the distribu- 
 tion of this form of the nation's resources, no other country 
 has had better reason to know than has the United States. 
 
 For the purpose of "Utilization of Unreclaimed State 
 Lands" a law was prepared under tlie advice, and by the 
 urgency, of the Japanese Go\ernment, and promulgated in 
 ]March of 1907. This law, including the Supplement, con- 
 sists of seventeen articles, according to which all uncul- 
 tivated lands, marshes and dry beaches not constituting 
 private properties, will be included in the category. On 
 ap])lication to the jNIinistcr of Agriculture, Commerce and 
 Industry, these lands will be leased for a period not exceeding 
 ten years. The ^Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and 
 Industry is authorized to sell or give gratis the leased lands 
 to lessees who ha\"e succcssfull}' carried out tlie prescril)ed 
 work on them. For the fi\'e years foUoNving the year in 
 which such a sale or bestowal has taken place, taxation on 
 these lands will be at the rate of one-third of the tax le\-ied 
 on the lowest class lands of tlie pro\ince of which they form 
 a part. The lessees will be unaljle to sell, transfer or mort- 
 gage the leased lands without permission of the Minister 
 above mentioned. Charters for lands on which tlie pre- 
 scribed work lias not been started witliiti one year of tlie date 
 of their granting shall be cancelled, also those for lands on 
 which the work, after commencement, does not make sufh-.
 
 304 
 
 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 cicnt progress -unless ])ropt'r reason for that can I)e sliovvn. 
 Any person who utilizes unreclaimed stale lands in \ iolation 
 of the i)resent law will be lial)le to a fine of between fwv and 
 two hundred yen inclusixe. In the case of the utilization of 
 unreclaimed state land less than three ilio (some 7 acres) in 
 area, the present law will not be applied for tlie time being, 
 the old custom in force being adhered to. Possessors of 
 charters for the utilization of unreclaimed state lands which 
 have been obtained before the ])romulgation of the new law 
 and which are still valid must apply to the Minister of Agri- 
 culture, Commerce and Industry for their recognition within 
 three months of the date of enforcement of the present 
 law. When the lessees who have obtained such recognition 
 have succeeded in carrying out the j^rescribed work on the 
 leased lands, the lands will be })resented to them by the 
 Government. 
 
 Another important part of the development of the agricul- 
 tural resources of Korea is the introduction of wholly or 
 largely new products of the land. This is, indeed, a more 
 truly "experimental," and in some cases highly speculative, 
 procedure. There will doubtless be, as its ine\ilable ac- 
 companiment, a larger percentage of failures; tliere may be, if 
 the experiments are not intelligently made and hedged about 
 with educational and legal precautions, hnancial losses which 
 the poverty of the country can ill afford to bear. There is, 
 perhaps, peculiar danger of this under the dominant Ja])an- 
 cse intluences; for Japan has herself not as yet, industrially 
 and fmancially, got her heel I'lrmly -on the ground. Experi- 
 ments of various kinds, of a highly speculative character, 
 arc still according to the mind of the nation at large. But 
 the Government of Japan is meantime training its own 
 young men to a more thorough scientific acquaintance with 
 the facts and laws which determine industrial prosperity; 
 and under the administration of the Residency-General in
 
 RESOURCES AND FINANCE 305 
 
 Korea the Japanese Government is committed to the plan 
 of giving to the Koreans also the fullest share in the benefits 
 of this training. 
 
 To mention a single instance of the class of projects to 
 which reference has just been made, we quote the following 
 paragraph from an official paper :^ 
 
 The climate of Korea is thought to be well suited for cotton 
 cultivation. Whether through misjudgment in the choice of the 
 seed, or blunders in the method, the experiments made in this 
 direction have, however, been so far fruitless of satisfactory re- 
 sults. Taking this fact to heart, those Japanese and Koreans in- 
 terested in the matter, some time ago formed "A Cotton Cultiva- 
 tion Association," and memorialized the Korean Government of 
 their resolution to carry through their aim. Lending its ears to 
 their memorial, the Government decided on a plan to open a 
 cotton nursery, to be first sown with the imported, continental 
 seed, then to distribute among planters at large the seed obtain- 
 able from the crop; and also to start a cotton-ginning factory 
 with the special object of preventing the seed from being waste- 
 fully thrown away. It was then arranged for this purpose to dis- 
 burse a sum of 100,000 yen, distributed over several years, com- 
 mencing in 1906. The management of the undertaking was first 
 placed wholly in the hands of the "Cotton Cultivation Association," 
 and the Resident-General intrusted the supervision of the Associa- 
 tion's work to the Residency-General's Industrial Model Farm. 
 In its turn, however, the Association asked the Farm to take over 
 the entire business primarily i)laced in its contrc^l. The request 
 being granted, the P'arm o])cned a l^ranch office at Mok-plio on 
 the 15th of June, 1906, calling it the " Kwang-yo Mohanjo Mok- 
 pho Branch." There were selected ten sites for cotton beds 
 (covering altogether 51 cho,^ six tan, or about 120 acres, of land in 
 Mok-pho); and forthwith commenced work. The site for the 
 cotton-ginning factory was chosen in JMok-pho, and its buildings 
 are now completed. 
 
 ' Administrative Rejorms in Korea, p. 18, 
 " A cho is nearly 23 acres.
 
 3o6 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Of the same character as the project for raising cotton in 
 Korea, although rather less experimental, are the j)lans for 
 increasing the ])ro(luct of tobacco. Of this Mr. Megata says 
 in his last re])ort: "Investigations are being made of tlie 
 various sources of wealth, of which tobacco is regarded as 
 the most promising. Practical examination as to the state 
 of tobacco manufacture in this country was started in the 
 preceding years. Exertion is being made by the Oovern- 
 ment for the extension of the general demand for Korean 
 tobacco. Better qualities of it were selected and sent to the 
 Tobacco Monopoly Bureau of Japan for trial manufacture. 
 The improvement of its planting and manufacture and of 
 the selection of seed is being studied. For the purpose of 
 investigating the relation between the climate and toljacco- 
 planting, the survey of the climate of the country was com- 
 menced; and the result of the investigation is now to be 
 taken into consideration for the safety and progress of that 
 industry in this country. Korean youths to engage in the 
 investigation of the resources of national wealth are being 
 trained for the task." 
 
 Next to agriculture in importance stands the development 
 of forestation in Korea. The Koreans have never given any 
 attention to the art of growing trees cither for timber or for 
 fuel. The late Tai Won Kun, as one of the ways adopted by 
 him for ruining the country while building a palace for his 
 son, ordered every owner of large, serviceable trees througli- 
 out the land to cut them down and transport them to Seoul 
 at his own expense. Day by day, and hour by hour, the 
 Korean populace, to the number of thousands of okl men, 
 women, and boys, with hundreds of bullocks and ponies, 
 are engaged in exterminating the future forests in order to 
 })rovide themselves with fuel, of which they will not be 
 persuaded to make economical use, and which they cannot 
 dispense with so long as their present tastes and contrivances
 
 RESOURCES AND EINANCE 307 
 
 for heating themselves and cooking their food are not changed. 
 Hence, all over the more frequented parts of Korea the 
 hills and mountains, unless in comparatively rare cases 
 they are especially protected, are denuded and barren. 
 This constant deforestation has its customar}' inevitable 
 results. In dry seasons there are those chronic water 
 famines which discourage the farmer's cheerful industry, 
 and which encourage him to hatred of the government, to 
 refusal to pay taxes, and to violent and murderous revolt. 
 But when there is abundance of rain, then follow inundations, 
 almost as destructive to the fields as are the droughts. Min- 
 ing and all other industries suffer from the same source. 
 Thus, as says the Report of the Residency-General, when 
 *'seen from the economic, sanitary, or political point of view, 
 one of the greatest needs of Korea at present is the rehabilita- 
 tion of its forests." The task involved in this matter of 
 industrial reform and development of resources is, however, 
 of the most difficult order. The rights of the people, not 
 only to use as they please their own trees, but to plunder 
 the hill and mountain sides of their fuel, regardless of 
 ownership, are firmly established by usage. In the bitter 
 weather of winter much suffering would ensue, and its 
 consequent political disturbance, if these customs were 
 suddenly and extensively controlled. Nevertheless, model 
 forests have been established and instruction in foresta- 
 tion is given to Korean youths in a school founded for that 
 purpose. Below are given the names of localities and the 
 sizes of the model forests so far established, with their 
 outlays : ^ 
 
 '^ Koan-ak-san and three other places in the vicinity of 
 Seoul. Total area 2,060 cho. Outlay, about 152,000 yen, 
 distriljuted over five years, commencing 1907. 
 
 '' I'ai-syoiig-siDi and two other places in the vicinity of 
 
 ' Sec Admijiislrativc Rcjorms in Korea, p. 19.
 
 3o8 IN KOREA WITH MAR(JL1S I'lO 
 
 Pycng-yang. Total area 6jo cho. Outlay, about 63,000 
 yen, distributed over five years, commencing 1908. [Xursery 
 beds exj)ected to be opened in 1907.] 
 
 '' Oa-yong-san and one otlier place in tlie \icinily of 'i'aiku. 
 Total area 650 cho. Outki}', about 63,000 yen, distributed 
 over six years, commencing 1908. [Xursery beds expected 
 to be started in 1907.]" 
 
 The more important resources of this class are, however, tlie 
 existing forests along the banks of the Valu and Amur ri\ers. 
 Indeed, the desire to gain control of tliis wealth of timl)er 
 was one^ of the more immediate causes leading to the Russo- 
 Japanese war; it is still one of the more dilTicult ])oints for 
 satisfactory adjustment on the part of the three nations chieily 
 concerned. For the development of these resources an agree- 
 ment between Japan and Korea was signed on October 19, 
 1906, by the Marquis Ito and the Korean Prime Minister, 
 the ^Minister of Finance, and the Minister of Agriculture, 
 Commerce and Industry. The text of this agreement and 
 a brief introduction, stating its importance, is given in Mr. 
 Alegata's last report.^ "The banks along the Yalu and 
 Amur," says this report, "are rich in forests which ha\e 
 never been cut. Proper management of those forests would 
 yield a considerable revenue to the treasur}-; but at the 
 same time it would rec^uire not a little expense. In the 
 present condition of the Korean finances it would not be 
 wise to undertake this on the account of Korea alone, although 
 the opening up of such a source of wealth is highly necessary. 
 An agreement was concluded between the go\ernments of 
 Japan and Korea in October last to carry on the forestry 
 along those banks on their joint account, each go\ernment 
 investing 600,000 yen. The agreement newly concluded 
 reads as follows: 
 
 ' State oj the Progress of the Reorganization oj the Fina>ices oj Korea, 
 March, 1907, p. 20.
 
 RESOURCES AND FINAAX^E 309 
 
 The Governments of Japan and Korea, regarding the forests 
 in the districts along the Yaki and Amur rivers to be the richest 
 source of weakh on the Korean frontier, hereby agree on the 
 terms mentioned below as to the management of those forests: 
 
 Art. I. The forests in the districts along the Yalu and Amur 
 rivers shall be subject to the joint management of the Govern- 
 ments of Japan and Korea. 
 
 Art. 2. The fund for the management shall be 1,200,000 yen, 
 a half of which shall be invested by each Government. 
 
 x\rt. 3. As to the management of the forests and its income 
 and expenditure, a special account shall be created in order to 
 make them clear. 
 
 The details of the account shall ])e notified to each Government 
 once a year. 
 
 Art. 4. The profit or loss of the undertaking shall be divided 
 between the two Governments in proportion to the amounts of 
 their investments. 
 
 Art. 5. In case necessity arises to increase the investment 
 stated in the Art. 2, it shall be done, on the recognition of both 
 Governments. 
 
 Art. 6. In case necessity arises to enact detailed rules in (jrder 
 to enforce the present agreement, it shall be submitted to the 
 hands of commissioners appointed l^y both Governments. 
 
 Art. 7. On the progress of the undertaking, when necessity 
 arises to change its organization into a company so as to enable 
 the subjects of both the countries to join in the undertaking, 
 the necessary processes shall be determined by an agreement 
 of both Governments. 
 
 For centuries Korea has been reputed lo be ricli in deposits 
 of gold; and it is a fact tliat Japan, by trading Avitli Korea, 
 obtained most of this jjrecious metal, which the Duicli, by 
 shrewd management of their relations in trade witli Ja])an, 
 carried off to Holland. Both these Oriental countries in 
 this way contributed to the enricliment of a limited number 
 of Euroj^eans. But the real condition of the mining re-
 
 310 IX KOREA Wrril MARQUIS JTO 
 
 sources of the peninsula has never been investigated; even 
 the amount of the annual product of gold has never been 
 accurately ascertained; and worst of all there have ne\er 
 been any laws or accepted princij)les to govern the mining 
 industry. The result of all this ignorance, confusion and 
 fraud is not difficult to conjecture. "Some mines," says 
 the ofhcial report, " are under tlie <lirect control of the Minister 
 of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry; with others the 
 granting of a concession rests with the Cliief of the Mining 
 Bureau; with others again, the suljordinale officials on the 
 spot have it in their power to allow or disallow their working; 
 and to make confusion worse confounded, there are even 
 mines operated under patents secretly granted by the Em- 
 peror without consulting the Cabinet. This chaotic state 
 of things is bad enough, but it does not stop here. For in 
 some cases the concessions granted are cancelled without 
 compensation; while in other cases, one and the same mining 
 district has been leased to several ])ersons one after another 
 until it has become utterly impossible to tell which is the 
 rightful concessionaire. Then, again, there arc cases in 
 which the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce and 
 Industry, of Finance, and of the Imperial Household, 
 severally and independently, have levied mining taxes to 
 suit their own convenience; while in others, the provincial 
 authorities quite arbitrarily collect imposts. In the midst 
 of this indescribable confusion, the cunning and unscrupulous 
 have not been slow to make the most of the situation, by 
 having recourse to bribery, instigation, intimidation, and 
 other unlawful schemes, until vast tracts of mining lands 
 have come under their control."^ 
 
 To remedy, as far as possible, these evils and to limit their 
 continuance into the future, a General Alining Law was 
 jjroclaimed on July 12, 1906, and a Placer Mining Law on 
 
 ' Administrative Reforms in Korea, p. 15.
 
 RESOURCES AX I) El XANTE 311 
 
 the 28th of the same month. Both these laws were ac- 
 companied by the enactment of detailed rules. The principal 
 features of these laws provided that mines, whose ownership 
 could not be dehnilely ascertained, should revert to the state; 
 that the limits of mining concessions should be defmitely 
 prescribed; that mining rights which could Ije established as 
 legally gained should be legahy j^rotected; that the taxes 
 on mining properties should be unified; and that prioritv of 
 ap])lication, in cases of competing concessions, sliould, until 
 examination could be made, stop the granting to others of the 
 same concession in an arbitrary way. In tlie effort to put into 
 effective operation these legal enactments it was necessary 
 to call upon the Korean authorities to promulgate a list of 
 the mines belonging to the Imperial Household, and also a 
 list of such Crown mines as the Household might intend 
 to work for itself. But the Korean authorities, either from 
 ignorance, sloth, or other even less creditable reasons, did not 
 make haste to prej)are such a list. Meantime, all mining 
 rights were, legally considered, in abeyance. It was only 
 after repeated and urgent remonstrances from the Resident- 
 General, and as late as Xovember 17, 1906, that the recjuired 
 list was promulgated. .It then appeared that the Im])erial 
 Household not only laid claim to mines claimed b}- Japanese, 
 but also by American and European concessionaires. 
 
 The falsity of the statement, so repeatedly made abroad, that 
 the Koreans are being robbed by Japanese, to the detriment 
 of the interests of other foreigners, under the {)rotection of 
 the Japanese Government in Korea, is made obvious by the 
 folloAving, among other facts. Had the a])])licants to these 
 contested claims been only Japanese or Koreans, ilie}' would 
 have been recjuired to stn"vey llie ])roi)enics and make out 
 maps at their own expense; biU in deference to the intere>ts 
 of tlie American and luiro])ean elaimanls llie sur\e_\ was 
 made by experts at the ex])ense of the stale. And while only
 
 312 L\ KOREA WITH .MARQUIS ITO 
 
 twenty per cent, of the 200 applications made by Japanese 
 were granted, "virtually all the applications made by Amer- 
 icans and Europeans were granted." 
 
 Besides gold, which is found es})ecially in the form of gold- 
 dust, there are in Korea silver, copper, graphite, and coal. 
 The coal is not good for steaming purposes, nor fitted for 
 export; but when made, by mixing it with earth, into bricks 
 or balls, it is valuable as fuel for tliose wlio can afford its use. 
 The total annual value of these mineral j)roducts, for reasons 
 already explained, cannot be accurately ascertained. Hith- 
 erto-much of the gold has been smuggled out of the country 
 in order to escape the export and other taxes. It is calculated, 
 however, by the Residency-General that in the aggregate 
 these products do not fall below 6,000,000 yen. 
 
 We shall not attempt to speak in detail of the other natural 
 resources of Korea, of its fisheries, or its sericulture, or its 
 raising of fruit. But all these have been in the past left in a 
 lamentable condition of ignorance and disorder; and all 
 of these are to be made objects of attention, with the purpose 
 of reform, by the Korean Government under the Japanese 
 Protectorate. 
 
 What has been show^n to be true of the natural resources of 
 Korea, in soil, forests, mines, and other products, is true of its 
 manufacturing industries. Early in her history Korea 
 attained a considerable development in the arts of weaving, 
 pottery, paper-making, metal-casting, and the dressing of 
 skins. Jn several instances Japan borrowed her models 
 from Korea in all these lines of the industrial arts. But 
 to-day there is absolutely nothing that a foreign traveller 
 would covet to take away from Korea except, perhaps, a 
 Korean brass-bound chest or a set of its rude brass utensils 
 for holding food. The founding of an Industrial Training 
 Institute in the spring of 1907, and a statement of what it 
 proposes to try to accomplish for the revival and development
 
 RESOURCES AND FINANX^E 313 
 
 of Korean industrial arts, have been referred to in an earlier 
 chapter (p. i28f.). Its practical results must be awaited with 
 patience; but now that the control of the Resident-General 
 over internal affairs in Korea is increased by the Convention 
 of July, 1907, we may reasonably anticipate favorable results 
 in due time. 
 
 The matter of the Customs stands midway between the 
 development of the natural resources and the control of 
 finance; it therefore concerns both the topics which are being 
 briefly treated in this chapter. The following cpiotation 
 from the last report of the Financial Adviser to the Korean 
 Government gives all the information necessary to our 
 purpose upon this point: 
 
 On the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war, trade on the 
 Yalu River became suddenly prosperous. It is a well-known 
 fact that the districts along the river are rich in various sources 
 of wealth, the opening up of which depends greatly upon the 
 facility of transportation, as well as the prosperity of trade in 
 those districts. While making arrangements for the convenience 
 of traders at large, the prevention of illegal traders, as smugglers, 
 is being carried out more strictly than ever before; and a healthy 
 development of the trade is thus aimed at. On the seventh of 
 June, a branch office of the Chemulpo Customs was established in 
 Shin-Wiju. On the third of August last, a Customs x\gency of 
 this branch office was commenced at Yong-am-po, and an Inspec- 
 tion Station at Wiju. On the first of October last the Chin- 
 nam-po Branch Office of the Chemulpo Customs was promoted to 
 an independent office, and the abo\'c-meiUioned brancli offices, 
 agency, and station were transferred to Its jurisdiction. 
 
 The increase of trade after the Russo-Japanese war was nt)t 
 limited to the banks of the Yalu River. A similar increase was 
 also shown in Northern Korea, and a sufficient equipment to 
 meet the customs demands of this increase was lacking. As a 
 means of meeting the present requirements, the retonstruttion of 
 the .Song-chin Customs Codown, whiih had hern deslrcned by
 
 314 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 fire during the war, was commenced in June last, and completed 
 in the following October. In Se|)teml)er last, the construction of 
 the Customs Wharf at Song-chin was commenced and completed 
 in November. The Wonsan Customs had not been i)ro\ided with 
 sufTicient sheds, and consecjuently damage tt) the goods was an 
 affair of frecjuent occurrence. Sheds were newl_\- built there in 
 December last. Steam launches were provided in the Customs 
 of Chemul{)o, Fusan, Wonsan, Chinnam-]Jo and Mokpo, for 
 purposes of inspection. 
 
 Though Japanese have now been a])pointed as Commissioners 
 at Chemul])o and Fusan, the customs business is being managed 
 in essentially the same way as when those ofhces were being held 
 by Europeans, but not without some changes. From the first of 
 September last, the institution of new customs regulations was 
 undertaken. In October the service rules for customs officials 
 were issued, and uniforms were prescribed for officials of the out- 
 door service. In November the jurisdiction of each customs office 
 was clearly defined. Uniformity of taxes was arranged. The 
 work was divided into several departments and sections. Various 
 procedures in the collection of customs were altered. The new- 
 arrangements are intended both to regulate and to ex]:)edite the 
 work of customs; but the before-mentioned concern matters of 
 internal administration only. As to the reform of more funda- 
 mental matters, this must be undertaken in connection with the 
 reconstruction of harbors, customs, accommodations on land, and 
 the building of lighthouses. The Customs ^laritime Works De- 
 partment has been organized for this purpose the first stage of 
 the work to be concluded in 191 1. As the port regulations now 
 in force do not fit the present conditions in each })ort, alterations 
 are now being planned. In February last the method of quaran- 
 tine inspection was altered. The accounts of the Korean Cus- 
 toms Department have hitherto been separate from the Korean 
 Government accounts the revenue and expenditure of the former 
 not being entered in the annual budget. [On the last item the 
 Report of the Residency-General upon Administrative Reforms 
 remarks that the imj)ropriety of this omission is obvious.] They 
 are, however, entered in the budget of 1907 for the first time.
 
 RESOURCES AND FINANCE 315 
 
 The development of the resources of any country is, of 
 course, intimately dependent upon tlie soundness and wis- 
 dom of its financial pohcy and administration. This is in- 
 creasingly so under modern conch'tions in countries wliere 
 international relations are of the greatest importance. Noth- 
 ing could have been worse than the chaotic condition of 
 the Korean finances when ]Mr. ]\Jegata, in conformity with 
 the Convention signed between Ja])an and Korea on tlie 22d 
 of August, 1905, was ajDpointed Financial Adviser to the 
 Korean Government by the Imperial Japanese Govern- 
 ment.^ ]Mr. Hulbert, who afterward became the most un- 
 sparing critic of Air. Megata's policy, himself wrote in the 
 Korean Review, in 1903: "It is encouraging to note that 
 every part of the Korean Executive has come to the conclu- 
 sion that something has got to be done to put Korea's money 
 system on a more secure foundation." It Was, howe\er, 
 largely this same "Korean Executive" which had been 
 chiefly responsible for the deterioration of the currency and 
 for the entire confusion in the financial condition of the 
 country. On this matter of the deterioration of the currency, 
 the Financial Ad\iser says in one of his Rei)orts:- "The 
 currency of Korea, though nominally on a silver i)asis, has 
 hitherto in reality possessed no standard, and only cash and 
 nickel coins have been in circulation. Before the com- 
 mencement of tlie reorganization of tlie currency, the market 
 rate of the nickel coins fell to 250 i^oii for 100 yen in gold 
 (Japanese currency); while that of the cash fluctuated from 
 100 per cent, to 60 per cent, premium. All casli pass at a 
 uniform rate in spite of their difl'erent sizes and weights. 
 The market rate varies according to the condition of su])ply 
 
 ' It should be noted in tin's connection lliat this appointment is one 
 of the very few which, like that of the Resident-General, i)roceed 
 directly from the Emperor of Jai)an himself. 
 
 -Summary 0} the Financial Ajjairs oj Korea, p. 5.
 
 3i6 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 and demand. When the market rate is eiiuivalent to one 
 ;-/;/ (i-iooo yen Jai)anese currency) it is called par; when it 
 is 2 riH, the cash is at loo per cent. ])remium. Cash arc pre- 
 ferred in some ])rovinces, nickel coins in other i)ro\'inces. 
 Since the commencement of the withdrawal of the old nickel 
 coins in June, 1905, the market rate has gradually risen, and 
 at j)resent it is steady at the normal rate of 200 icon to 100 
 yen. (According to the Currency Law, the face \aluc of 
 the old nickel coin is 2.5 sen, its intrinsic value being 2 .vc;?)." ' 
 Nor was the chaotic state of the currency the only evil con- 
 nected with its use. The cash, w^hile having the preference 
 over the nickel coins because its intrinsic value was more 
 nearly equal to its market value, and it was therefore more 
 stable, was intolerably inconvenient for monetary transac- 
 tions of any considerable size. Its value was so low as to 
 make it not worth the risk of counterfeiting. But even the 
 traveller for a few weeks in the country could pay his expenses 
 only by taking along several mule-loads of these petty coins. 
 The nickels, on the contrary, were exceedingly unstable, and 
 were subject to wholesale debasement and counterfeiting. 
 It is true, as Mr. Hulbert charges, that "counterfeit nickels 
 were made largely by the Jai)anesc in Osaka"; but it is also 
 true that these coins wTrc counterfeited in laige quantities by 
 the Chinese, and that the worst offenders were the Koreans 
 themselves. Here, as everyw^herc during the contempo- 
 raneous history of Korean affairs, it was the " Korean Execu- 
 tive" which was chiefly to blame. In some cases the Govern- 
 ment loaned its coining machine for a money consideration; 
 in others, the "promoter of the minting industry" was 
 obliged to content himself with a manufacturing outfit ob- 
 tained on private account. In this connection the author 
 
 ' In interpreting this it should be remembered that the Japanese sen 
 is equal in value to one-half a cent in American gold, or about one 
 farthing in English currency. 100 sen=i yen, and 1,000 rin=i yen.
 
 RESOURCES AND FINANCE 317 
 
 calls to mind an astonishing but authentic story of how a 
 boy, deputed by his father to return to a benevolent associa- 
 tion in Seoul a sum of money which had been originally 
 stolen by the trusted agent of this association and loaned to 
 the father, stole tlie money again and spent it in the purchase 
 of a counterfeiting machine. It should be added that these 
 remarkable transactions were of recent occurrence, 
 
 Japanese counterfeiters were arrested, tried and punished, 
 after the passage of a law by the Diet making it an offence to 
 counterfeit foreign money in Japan, with the same ])enalties 
 as those applied to cases of counterfeiting Japanese money/ 
 Even before that, administrative measures were taken by the 
 Japanese to break up the illicit industry. So far as Korean 
 offenders were concerned, nothing was done to punish the 
 chief culprits. In fact, the Korean Government was hardly 
 in a position to do anything, having itself made large over- 
 issues of nickels, and even surreptitiously farmed out the 
 right to private individuals to coin them. This right was 
 exercised, among others, by a relative of the Emperor. 
 Doubtless this official malfeasance is what Mr. Hulbert al- 
 ludes to when he speaks of the " prime movers in the deteriora- 
 tion of the currency." 
 
 The history of this nickel coinage is another illustration of 
 
 ' "There had been," says Mr. D. W. Stevens, "some criticism be- 
 cause such a law was considered necessar}-; and Japanese legal pro- 
 cedure was accused of being defective, on this account, by certain 
 foreign critics. But in the late seventies the British Court at \'oko- 
 hama released a man who had been detected counterfeiting Japanese 
 money, on the ground that there was no British law under which to 
 punish him, and that Japanese law against counterfeiting did not apply 
 to British subjects in Japan. And the highest British courts have held 
 that a contract to smuggle goods into a foreign country is a valid con- 
 tract as between British subjects in Great Britain." The entire matter 
 is dwelt upon at such length because it illustrates so well the inability of 
 the Koreans for "inde|>endent" management of their own internal 
 affairs, and also the animus and propriety of much of the anti-Japanese 
 criticism.
 
 o 
 
 i8 IN KOREA WITH MAROUIS ITO 
 
 the opera houfjc methods wliich characterize Korean public 
 achninislration. The discovery of the j)otentiah'ties of fiat 
 currency ])robal)ly came in tlie nature of a rexelation to 
 Korean officialdom. It opened vistas of ])rorit ne\er l)efore 
 dreamed of; all that was needed was the raw material and a 
 macliine. I'^inally the industry ceased to be as remunerali\e 
 as at first; and the "Korean Executive," all Ijranclies 
 of it, discovered (in 1903) that, sooner or later, e\en a nickel 
 coinage will find its true level. 
 
 Such, briefly descriljed, was the deplorable state of the 
 financial affairs of Korea when ^Nfr. Megata's administration 
 began. This was only a brief time ago, or in 1905. What 
 has already been accomplished for the reform of the Ko- 
 rean finances may be summari/X'd as follows.^ Tlie first 
 step taken was the adoption of the gold standard, followed 
 by the promulgation of a law strictly prohibiting the private 
 minting of nickel coins, and the endea\or to recall this cur- 
 rency already in circulation. Measures were also taken to 
 popularize the circulation of notes issued by the Dai Ichi 
 Ginko (First Bank), and to enlarge the sphere of circulation 
 for the coins newly introduced. "The organ for the circula- 
 tion of money and the collection of the taxes having been 
 now fairly well provided, efforts will be made to restrict and 
 ultimately prohibit the circulation of the fractional cash now 
 in use in the three southern provinces, by encouraging the 
 employment of notes in accordance with the law regulating 
 currency." "As regards the l)ank-notes issued by the 
 General Office of the First Bank in Korea, the Korean Gov- 
 ernment has officially sanctioned their compulsory circula- 
 tion. But, it being deemed desirable to have said Govern- 
 ment grow firm and content in the idea that the notes are the 
 national currency, a contract was concluded in July, last 
 
 ' The quotations are from the pamphlet, Administrative Rejorms in 
 Korea, p. 11 /.
 
 RESOURCES AND FINANCE 319 
 
 year (1906), between the Government and the First Bank, 
 providing that the pattern and denomination of the notes 
 shall be subject to the approval of the Resident-General and 
 the Korean Minister of Finance; that the amount of their 
 issue and of the reserve be reported every week to the said 
 Minister; that the Korean Government have the ])o\ver to 
 institute inquiries and examinations with respect to the 
 issue of notes; and that the bank be placed under reasonable 
 obligations in return for the exclusive pri\ilege of issuing 
 notes." 
 
 The General Office of the First Bank at Seoul has now 
 been made the Central Treasury of the Government of 
 Korea; and therefore receives on deposit and pays out tlie 
 exchec|uer funds. It is under the competent management 
 of Mr. Ichihara, who, after several years of study of eco- 
 nomics and finance in the United States, became prominent 
 as a banker in Japan, and was subsecjuently chosen jNIayor 
 of Yokohama. Its branches and sub-branches throughout 
 Korea are assisted l^y the postal organs in handling the 
 exchequer funds. "Notes xA.ssociations," which undertake 
 to popularize the circulation of reliable negotiable bills, and 
 Agricultural and Industrial Banks, established at different 
 centres for the accommodation of long loans, are also in 
 part the results of Mr. Megata's reform of the Korean 
 finances. The most important, and doubtless most difficult, 
 thing remaining to be done is the purifying and reorganization 
 of the re\enue system. For, as has already been repeatedly 
 indicated, nolliing can exceed tlie measure of ignorance, 
 extortion and corruption, which has hitlierto characterized 
 the conduct of the provincial administrative organs. 
 
 Perha])S the most difficult problem witli whicli the newly 
 appointed Financial Adviser to tlie Korean Go\-ernment liarl 
 to cope was the retirement of the nickel currency. The solu- 
 tion of this problem was indeed diffiicult, but it was abso-
 
 ;,2o IN KOREA WIT 1 1 MARQUIS I TO 
 
 lutcly indispensable to the very beginning of any systematic 
 reform. The distinction between spurious and genuine 
 coins was scarcely j)ossible; the distinction between those 
 counterfeited without, and those counterfeited with, the 
 sanction of the "Korean Executive" was imjjossible. The 
 amount of both kinds was hard to determine. According to 
 Mr. Mcgata's calculation, the old nickel coins minted by 
 the Government amounted in value to 17.000,000 ^con; 
 while the si)urious, but not debased, coins in circulation may 
 have amounted to some 4,000,000 icon.* IIis plan involved 
 both the exchange of the old nickel coins for new coins of a 
 standard value and issued under proper safeguards and re- 
 strictions, in accordance with the newly inaugurated gold 
 basis; and also the reduction of the cash by re-minting such 
 coins as were deficient and returning the balance to circula- 
 tion. From October, 1905, the coinage of silver icn-sen 
 pieces and of bronze onc-seii and one-hvL\i-sc7i pieces was 
 begun. By these it was intended to displace the circulation 
 of the old nickel coins. The coins tendered for exchange 
 were classified into three classes: Class A coins exchanged 
 at the rate of 2 old for i new coin; Class B coins exchanged 
 at the rate of 5 old for i new coin; and Class C counterfeit 
 and debased coins, defaced and returned to the applicants. 
 By these means there was withdrawn from circulation of old 
 coins, between July i and October 15, 1905, in Korean 
 dollars to the amount of 10,722,162,. of which, however, 
 1,411,184 were received in ])ayment of taxes. 
 
 So radical a change in the currency of the country could 
 not be accomplished without working hardship in certain 
 directions. But those who have carefully examined the 
 existing condition of Korean finances and the working in 
 detail of the plans for reform find reason for praising the 
 prudence and skill of Mr. Megata's way of accomj)lishing a 
 
 ' See Summary of the Financial Afjairs oj Korea, p. 5.
 
 RESOURCES AND FINANCE 321 
 
 most difficult task. The details are to be found, carefully 
 worked out and tabulated, in the official reports. It is enough 
 for us to recognize the enormous change for the better which 
 has taken place during the past two years in the fmancial 
 condition of the peninsula, and in all the foreign fmancial 
 relations to Korean business affairs; and, at the same time, 
 to reply with a brief, categorical denial to certain criticisms 
 from unfriendly and prejudiced sources. As to the latter 
 point, "it is untrue," says a trustworthy informant, "that 
 any Korean capitalists came forward with a bona fide offer of 
 a loan at a lower rate of interest than that procured by the 
 Japanese Government for the retirement of the old nickel 
 coinage. The only plan of the kind which was ever mooted 
 had in view the borrowing of foreign capital, not Japanese. 
 A great deal was said, ajter the }acl, about the readiness of 
 these capitalists to inten'ene; but Mr. ]\Iegata was never 
 given an opportunity to avail himself of their alleged willing- 
 ness to advance the funds until it was too late. ISIr. Ale- 
 gata's first object was, of course, to obtain the money as 
 cheaply as possible. It was not until he had looked the 
 situation over very carefully, and had made enquiries con- 
 cerning the possibility of making better arrangements with 
 foreign capitalists that he finally concluded the arrangement 
 with the Dai Ichi Ginko." 
 
 Another example of the same species of criticism is shown 
 in connection with the story that the Korean Emperor desired 
 to advance to the merchants of Seoul 300,000 yen to relieve 
 the distress over the increased stringency in the money market, 
 which was, of course, one of the first results of the conversion 
 of the nickel-coin currency. "For this offer," the authority 
 just quoted says, "the underlying motive was undoubtedly 
 political. There was distress among the merchants of Seoul, 
 but there was no necessity for the Emperor's direct inter- 
 vention. If, indeed, the distress had been as great as was
 
 322 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 represented at the time, the sum offered, 300,000 yen, was not 
 sufficient to afford permanent reh'cf. The offer of the money 
 was merely another instance of Korean methods. The 
 process of reasoning was simple: Financial distress existed, 
 due to the action of the Jajjanese Financial Adviser; His 
 ]Majesty generously came to the assistance of his embarrassed 
 subjects; hence gratitude to His Majesty and humiliation 
 for the discredited Japanese Adviser. Mr. Megata did 
 no more than to treat the matter as its childish nature war- 
 ranted. It should be added that, in addition to the genuine 
 distress caused by the stringency of the money market, there 
 was a patent attempt to heighten the resultant agitation for 
 political effect. This was met by offers, due to ]Mr. Megata's 
 initiative, to advance money on easy terms in deserving cases. 
 The native capitalists made no move to relieve the situation 
 at this supposedly critical juncture." 
 
 The recent condition of the resources and finance of Korea 
 can be discovered in the most trustworthy way possible under 
 existing circumstances, only by a critical study of the detailed 
 reports to which reference has already been made in this 
 chapter. The following more important items are taken 
 from the Report of March, 1907. In this report the total 
 estimated revenue for 1907 is given at 13,189,336 yen, which 
 is an increase of 5,704,592 yen over that of 1906. Of this 
 total, however, 3,624,233 yen is extraordinary. The total 
 estimated expenditure for the same year is 13,963,035 yen, 
 w^hich is in excess of that of the year of 1906, by the sum of 
 5,995,647 yen. The increase in expenditure is partly to 
 provide for increase in salaries a necessary measure if the 
 amount of "squeezes" is to be reduced and a sufficient 
 number of competent and honest officials secured; but more 
 largely for the reform of the educational organization, for 
 the founding and support of technical schools, for the exten- 
 sion of engineering works, the building of roads, of law
 
 RESOURCES AND FINANCE 323 
 
 courts, and other public buildings, the founding of hospitals; 
 and for the extension of the })olice and judicial systems. 
 As to individual items it is noticeable that the military 
 estimates have been reduced from 2,426,087 yen, in 1905, 
 when they were 26 per cent, of the total expenditure, to 
 1,522,209 yen, or 11 per cent, of the total expenditure for the 
 year 1907. This sum has now further been much reduced 
 by the disbanding of the Korean army, with the exception 
 of a body of palace guards, as a consequence of the new 
 Convention of July, 1907. 
 
 One-tenth of the entire estimated expenditure or, more 
 precisely, 1,309,000 yen is attributed to the Imperial House- 
 hold. But even this by no means represents the cost to the 
 nation of the Emperor and his Court under the former occu- 
 pant of the throne. For all manner of irregular, illicit, and 
 scandalous ways of obtaining money for his privy purse were 
 resorted to by the ruler, whose character and habits in the 
 obtaining and use of money have already been sufficiently 
 described.^ The trials which have come upon the Financial 
 Adviser of the Korean Government since his appointment, 
 through the behavior of the so-called "Korean Executive," 
 can scarcely be exaggerated. One of the questions pending 
 when Mr. Megata first assumed office concerned the size of 
 the allowance for the expenses of the Crown Princess' funeral. 
 The Emperor's private funds were at a low cl^b (tlicy always 
 are); the national treasury was impo\'crishcd (it always had 
 been). Yet the Imj)erial Treasurer, an official of the old- 
 time stamj), insisted that one million yen was absolutely 
 indispensable for the ])ro]jer carrying out of tlie burial 
 ceremony (!). This way of ])lun(lering the treasury of the 
 country, which was considered especially legitimate by the 
 Korean Court and its parasites, ]\Ir. Megata dealt with in 
 
 ' See the incidents which arc of a sort to be ahnost indefinitely mul- 
 n[)lied on page 285 f.
 
 IN KOREA WITH MAROUIS ITO 
 
 that spirit of "philosophical humor" which is characteristic 
 of him. He patiently pointed out that the estimated prices 
 of rnany of the items called for were greatly in excess of their 
 market value. In this manner he finally reduced the wily 
 claims of the Korean ofilcial to the modest sum of a half- 
 million yen. Two full-dress rehersals, which dilTered from 
 the actual ceremony only in the circumstance that the colTm 
 was empty and no official invitations to attend were issued, 
 preceded the final pagent. On each of these occasions the 
 long procession marched pompously through the streets, 
 which were crowded w^ith wrangling lantern-bearers, chair 
 coolies, and the innumerable other horde of a low-lived 
 Korean populace, to the dissipation of all the solemnity of 
 a death-ceremonial, but to the delectation of the sj)ectators 
 as well as the participants. 
 
 The public debt of Korea in March, 1907, is here exhibited 
 in tabular form: 
 
 TABLE OF NATIONAL DEBT 
 
 Name of Loan 
 
 Treasury Bonds 
 
 Currency Adjustment . . . . 
 For Increased Circulation. 
 New Enterprises 
 
 Date of Issue 
 
 Amount 
 
 Interest 
 
 June, 1005 
 
 1005 
 
 Dec, 1905 
 
 March, 1906 
 
 $2,000,000 
 3,000,000 
 1,500,000 
 5,000,000 
 
 7 % 
 6 % 
 6 So 
 6i% 
 
 Term _ [ Date of 
 Outstanding 1 Redemption 
 
 June, iQio 
 June, 1015 
 Dec, 1912 
 March, 1916 
 
 This debt, while insignificant as compared with that of 
 civilized nations generally, is by no means so when compared 
 with the poverty of Korea. And it will doubtless be largely 
 increased in the near future by the necessity of putting into 
 operation many imperative reforms and improvements of the 
 existing material condition of the country. Tlic possibility, 
 however, of a rapid development of the resources and increase 
 of revenue is also great. To take a single item: while the 
 amount estimated from Port Duties for the year ending 
 December 31, 1906, was only 850,000 yen, the actual income
 
 RESOURCES AND FINANCE 325 
 
 was 2,434,118 yen. Some reduction in the items allowed for 
 expenditure is also possible for example, that of the Im- 
 perial Household, and for the Alilitary (a reduction already 
 accomplished). Under a just administration, with a revision 
 of the system of taxation, the resources and the revenue can 
 probably be doubled in a few years, and at the same time 
 the material welfare of the people improved. With the 
 pohcy of the present Resident-General continued in force, 
 the prospect is therefore by no means without dominant 
 elements of hope for Korea's future.
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 
 
 Until recently neitlier ])iiblic eflucalion nor ])ul)lic justice, 
 in the modern meaning of these terms, has had an\- existence 
 in Korea. Even those who were regarded as ])referred 
 candidates for government jjosilions in e(hicational and 
 judicial fields were not really fitted for the intelligent and 
 faithful jjerformance of their duties supposing (what, in 
 most cases, was not true) that they really desired efiiciency 
 and true success. For the common people of Korea, indeed 
 for all excej)t the most highly privileged classes, there was no 
 opportunity for learning and no conception or ex[)erience of 
 the fair, legal safeguarding of human interests and human 
 rights. The older educational methods, so far as method 
 existed at all, were ])attcrncd after those of China; l^ut they 
 were never so thorough or excellent of their kind as were the 
 Chinese. Civil service examinations were indeed required 
 for official preferment.' These examinations were exceed- 
 ingly superficial, and were not guarded against fraud; so that 
 the selection of successful candidates was too freciuently 
 made on quite other grounds than those of su])erior excellence 
 in ])assing the examinations. To this latter fact the Korean 
 stories of poor and worthy candidates who ha\ e been unjustly 
 deprived of the offices to which they were entitled bear an 
 ample and often dramatically pathetic witness. While, as 
 to the almost total absence of e\en-handed justice, from the 
 central government at the Court down to the most ])etty of 
 the local magistrates, the entire history of Korea is one con- 
 tinued pitiful story. 
 
 326
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 327 
 
 With regard to the condition of the jnibhc education as 
 late as just previous to, and even after the attempted re- 
 forms of 1894, we quote the following description from the 
 Korean Revieiv of November of 1904: 
 
 According to Korean custom and tradition, any man who 
 knows Chinese fairly well can become a teacher. There is no 
 such thing as a science of teaching, and the general average of 
 instruction is wretchedly poor. The teacher gets only his deserts, 
 which are extremely small. The traditional Korean school- 
 teacher, while receiving some small degree of social considera- 
 tion because of his knowledge of the Chinese characters, is looked 
 upon as more or less of a mendicant. Only the j)oorest will en- 
 gage in this work, and they do it on a pittance which just keeps 
 them above the starvation line. It has l)een ingrained in the 
 Korean character to reckon the profession of pcdagt)g}' as a mere 
 makeshift which is only better than actual beggary. If you ex- 
 amine the pay-list even of the Government schools, you will fmd 
 that the ordinary wage is about thirty Korean dollars. This 
 means about fifteen yen a month, and is almost precisely the 
 amount that an ordinary coolie receives. This wretchedly low 
 estimate of the value of a teacher's services debauches the whole 
 system. The men who hold these positions are doing so because 
 nothing better has turned up, and they get their revenge for the in- 
 adequacy of the salary by shirking their work as much as possible. 
 
 It would seem from this account that the contcm])lated 
 reforms of the educational system, wliich had been inaugu- 
 rated ten years before, when the okhfaslnoned ci\il-ser\-ice 
 examinations were abolished, had remained, as is customary 
 with all reforms in Korea if not enforced from without, 
 merely matters of so much paper. Another writer' about 
 midway in this decade gives a somewhat better accoimt of 
 Korean educational affairs after the Chino- Japan war. 
 
 ' Dr. Allen, then .\mencan Consul-Cleiu-ral, in a report u\Hm I'.diica- 
 tional Institutions and Methods in Korea, 1S98.
 
 328 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 The "present favorable aspect of education" at that time 
 this writer attributes to the intluence of the war. It is to be 
 noted, however, that the "favorable aspect" covers, for the 
 most part, only the special schools established in Seoul and 
 does not regard the unimproved and still deplorable state 
 of the pubhc education in the country at large. Stricter 
 attention to the extent of this alleged imj)rovement, even 
 within the city of Seoul, shows how limited it really was. 
 Besides well-deserved praise bestowed upon the few missionary 
 schools, only the governmental so-called "Normal School," 
 in which 30 scholars were enrolled, and which was presided 
 over by Mr. Homer B. Hulbert, and a school for teaching 
 Enghsh to the sons of nobles, numbering 35 pupils, are 
 given as examples. Inasmuch as the latter school had the 
 same teacher, and he was justly complaining that his obliga- 
 tion to teach the young Yang-bans interfered with his legiti- 
 mate work, the cause of the public education could not have 
 made any considerable advances at this time. The same 
 report speaks of a Japanese school maintained in Seoul by 
 the Foreign Education Society of Japan, in the following 
 significant way: "It was organized in April, 1898, as a 
 token of the sincere sympathy for the lack of a sound educa- 
 tional basis in Korea, with the view of giving a thorough 
 elementary course of instruction to Korean youths, and ' thus 
 aiming to form a true foundation of the undisputed inde- 
 pendence of that country.'" 
 
 In further proof of the undoubted fact that the reforms of 
 1894 had accomplished little in Seoul itself, and almost noth- 
 ing at all in Korea outside of the capital, we may appeal 
 again to the testimony of the writer in the Korean Review: 
 "We do not see," says this writer, "how the government can 
 be made to realize the importance of this work. When no 
 protest is made against the appropriation of a paltry $60,000 
 a year for education as compared with $4,000,000 for the
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 32^ 
 
 Korean army, there is little use in expecting a change in the 
 near future. The government could do nothing better than 
 reverse these figures; but the age of miracles is past." 
 
 "Before suggesting a possible solution of the question," 
 this writer goes on to say, ''we should note with care what 
 is at present being done to provide young men with an 
 education. There are the seven or eight primary schools in 
 Seoul with a possible attendance of forty boys each. This 
 means a good deal less than 500 boys in this city of over 
 200,000 people, including the immediate suburbs. At the 
 least estimate there ought to be 6,000 boys in school between 
 the ages of ten and sixteen. Practically nothing is being done. 
 As for intermediate education there is a Middle School, with 
 a corps of eight teachers and an average attendance of about 
 thirty boys. The building, the apparatus, and the teaching 
 staff would suffice for about four hundred pupils. There are 
 several foreign language schools, with an attendance of any- 
 where from twenty to eighty each, and they are fairly success- 
 ful. . . . Then there are the several private schools, almost 
 every one of which is in a languishing condition. A Korean 
 will start a private school on the least provocation. It runs 
 a few months and then closes, nobody being the wiser, 
 though some be sadder. When we come to reckon up the 
 number of young Koreans who are pursuing a course of 
 instruction along modern lines, we find that they represent a 
 fraction of less than one per cent, of the men who ought to 
 attend, and might easily be doing so." Such was tlien the 
 condition of the public education in Korea even down until 
 after the beginning of the Russo-Jaj)anese war, or in Novem- 
 Ijcr of 1904. 
 
 The foregoing true account of educational matters in Korea 
 is further confirmed and expanded b}- the Official Report 
 more recently given out in the name of the Residency-General.^ 
 
 ' See Administralhx Re j arms in Korea, p. 4 /.
 
 330 IX KORKA Wmi MARQUIS ITO 
 
 The report, liowcvtT, nolites the existence of llie acce])le(l 
 means of education for the villaj^e children in the jjro\inces. 
 I'hese means were em])lo}ed, after a debased Confucian 
 system, in so-called Syo-baiig by a sort of village dominie, 
 who gathered about him the children of the neighborhood 
 and taught them the rudiments of reading and writing the 
 vernacular. There were in 1894 some ten thousand of these 
 scliools scattered throughout the ])eninsula. In the barest 
 rudiments of the native language the instruction they gave 
 was deficient; of modern education in other matters, there 
 was nothing. In Seoul there was also a high-school of 
 Confucian learning (a Syong-Kyun-Koan), where the students 
 were taught the three "Primary" and the four "Middle 
 Classics," and were given some lessons in history, geography, 
 com])osition and mathematics. 
 
 The same Report further agrees with the Article in the Ko- 
 rean Review in considering the reforms proclaimed in 1894 by 
 the government as ineffective. The schools which sprung uj:) 
 under the " Primary School Ordinance," with the intention of 
 introducing the Western system of education, were almost 
 without exception of the old (SJwbo) character. And, in- 
 deed, how could it be otherwise, when there were no teach- 
 ers who could give the rudiments of a modern education, 
 and few pupils who desired such an education? As for 
 the middle-grade education which the Seoul schools pro- 
 fessed to give, there was little or nothing to bear out tlieir 
 pretensions. 
 
 The Residency-General aims, therefore, "at nothing less 
 than the establishment of an entirely new system of education 
 for Korea." But the system does not propose to interfere 
 with, much less wholly to close, the existing old-fashioned 
 Confucian institutions. It will, the rather, gradually displace 
 them by something better. The Government system as now 
 planned contemplates supplying the nation with the necessary
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 331 
 
 schools of the different grades^ in accordance with the outline 
 of reforms given below. 
 
 1. The former "Primary Schools" have been renamed "Com- 
 mon Schools." The Common School Ordinance and Regulations 
 have been drawn up and put in j)ractice; the ten primary schools 
 of various kinds in Seoul having been turned into Government 
 Common Schools, and the thirteen Primary Schools in the prov- 
 inces into Public Common Schools. The class work under the 
 new regime was begun in September, 1905, in all these schools. 
 It has been arranged, further, to establish Public Common Schools 
 in twenty-seven principal cities and towns of the provinces in 
 April this year. 
 
 2. The former "Middle Schools" have been renamed "High 
 Schools"; and the "High School" Ordinance and Regulations 
 issued. The period of study in these schools has been fixed at 
 four years, and graduates of the Common Schools are to be taken 
 without the examination, which is, however, required in the case 
 of other candidates for admission. The number of regular course 
 students in each of these schools is fixed at 200, with the proviso 
 that they may open a HosJiii-kica class (or interim class for those 
 who need to complete their qualification before taking up the 
 regular course). 
 
 3. Reforms and the expansion of the scope of work, judged 
 necessarv and advisable, have been effected for the Normal, and 
 the Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Scliools, which all 
 retain their old names, while tlic IMedical Scliool has been at- 
 tached to the Tai-Jian-iii-icon (or "Clreat Korean Hospital"). 
 
 4. Out of tlie 500,000 yen provided for the extension of tlic 
 educational system, a sum of 340,000 yen lias beeii expended in 
 newlv constructing, renovating, or enlarging tlie Common School 
 buildings. The remaining 160,000 yen lias been put in part to 
 the service of new buildings for the Normal, the Agricultural and 
 Forestrv, and the Commercial Schools; and in ])art to the fund 
 for necessary construction work and ecjuipment for the schools of 
 the Middle Grade. 
 
 5. Besides the schools described above, a special institution
 
 332 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 having the name of Syu-liak-n'oii has been cstabhshed for giving 
 education to the children of the Im])crial and aristocratic families. 
 It has been placed under the sui)erintendence of the Minister of 
 the Household. The regular number of scholars received into 
 this institution is fixed at twenty. The course of instruction given 
 is not dissimilar to that in the common schools. 
 
 Any account of educational reforms in Korea would be 
 quite inadequate if it did not include mention of the new 
 provisions for medical and surgical treatment and for the 
 education of native physicians and surgeons. Incredible as 
 it may seem, it is true that there was in the spring of 1907 
 only one native in all Korea who had received a thorough 
 modern medical education; and this one was a woman who 
 had studied in the United States and was connected with the 
 medical work of the 2vIethodist Mission at Pyeng-yang. In 
 connection with one of the three small hospitals hitherto 
 existing in Seoul there has been for some seven years a 
 Seoul Medical College, with only one Japanese instructor. 
 The hospitals are now to be united in a single large institution, 
 for which 280,000 je;^, to be spent in construction, and 123,600 
 yen, for maintenance, have already been provided. This 
 hospital will also have charge of training for the medical 
 profession and for hygienic and sanitary administration. 
 The site has been secured and the construction of the buildings 
 begun, wnth the expectation of having them completed during 
 the year 1907. 
 
 The educational work thus far actually accomplished in 
 Korea has been chiefly done by the missionary schools. 
 Among these schools those belonging to the Korean Mission 
 of the Presbyterian Church in the United States are most 
 numerous and effective. The Annual Report of this Mission 
 for the year 1906, under the head of "Educational Work," 
 furnishes information as to the following among other par- 
 ticulars. The total enrolment of the "Academy" was 160,
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 333 
 
 of whom 104 remained in school till the close of the year. 
 In the autumn of 1905, twelve of the students, "contrary to 
 advice and orders, left the school and joined the throng at 
 Seoul, who wanted to lay their lives on the altar of their 
 country in the effort to retain their national independence. 
 The twelve were suspended for the year. Order was finally 
 restored, and the remaining pupils returned to their work 
 with renewed zeal." The class which graduated in June, 
 1906, consisted of four members. In the fall of 1906 a sum 
 of money amounting to somewhat more than $2,000 was col- 
 lected with a view to starting a so-called "college." The 
 theological instruction which was carried on at Pyeng-yang 
 during the months of April, May, and June, of the same 
 year, became the germ of a developing "Theological Semi- 
 nary" for the training of an educated native ministry. An 
 advanced school for girls and women had an enrolment of 
 53 for the year. The number of local primary schools was 
 4 for boys and 3 for girls, with a total attendance of 494; 
 to these should be added, of the "country schools," 62 for 
 boys and 8 for girls, with a total attendance of 1,266. Such 
 is the report of the "Pyeng-yang Station." In the "Seoul 
 Station," for the same year (1906) the report shows a total 
 of 105 boys, in 4 schools, under 5 teachers, and of 48 girls, 
 in 4 schools, under 4 teachers (rated as "Primary Schools"), 
 in the city of Seoul; and 27 schools with 303 boys and 35 
 girls, belonging to the churches in this station, outside of 
 Seoul. There was also in this district one "Intermediate 
 and Boarding School," with 60 boys and 23 girls numbered 
 among its pupils. While the building to accommodate the 
 boys of this school was in process of erection, they were com- 
 bined with those of a corresponding school belonging to the 
 Methodist Mission; and the united work carried on in the 
 building belonging to the latter iSlission thus attained a 
 total enrolment of 150 pupils. Without mentioning the
 
 3,u IN KOREA WITH ^lARQUIS ITO 
 
 educational work done in less im])orlanl stations of this 
 Mission, it is enough to say that in the year 1906 there were 
 7 schools of a grade above the j)rimary, gi\ing instruction to 
 255 boys and 125 girls, and 208 schools of the lower grade 
 with an enrolment of 3,116 Ijoys and 795 girls as the aggre- 
 gate number of their i)U])ils. Most of the schools of the 
 j)rimary grade, however, consist of "classes" somewhat ir- 
 regularly taught, insufficiently supplied witli teachers, and 
 wholly without adecjuate permanent accommodations. 
 
 Into the actual condition of educational work in Korea, 
 so far as such work is dependent u])on tlie attitude of the 
 Koreans themselves, the following extract from the Report 
 of the Union High School gives a significant glim])se:' 
 
 Union school work was opened up in the building known as 
 Pai-chai, and was carried on there during the year. As is usually 
 the case in opening a term in Korea, the fir.st two weeks were a 
 period of growth. The students who were with us last year came 
 straggling along, while those who came for initial matriculation 
 found their way to us from day to day, until about 130 names 
 were on the roll. It will be a day of rejoicing when Korean .stu- 
 dents come to appreciate the opening day and are to be found in 
 their places on that day, ready for work. As it is now, a day or 
 two, a week or two, or even a longer ])eriod, matters little to them; 
 they come to take up their work when it is wholly convenient to 
 them. It is easy to see that this slip-shod way of doing things is 
 a serious drawback in school work, and it is hoped that in some 
 way it may be brought about that every day late at opening will 
 be counted a day lost by the student himself. But this can be 
 secured only when a higher value is placed upon time than it now 
 has. Now that our boys are fairl\- well classified, it is hoped that 
 the difficulty may in a measure be remedied by compelling those 
 students to drop back one form whose general attendance grade, 
 class-room work, and examinations do not come up to the pre- 
 scribed standard. 
 
 ^ Official Minutes of the Korean Mission Conference, 1906, p. 41.
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 335 
 
 The Mission of the ^Methodist Episcopal Church in Korea, 
 in its Conference Report for the year 1906, gives the number of 
 its so-called "High Schools" as 2, with 3 teachers and 93 
 pupils, and of its "other schools" as 54, with an enrolment 
 of 1,564 day scholars. A year later the statistics presented 
 to the Conference stated: "The Mission maintains 106 
 schools with 3,787 pupils under instruction." 
 
 In connection with the hospitals under both these Mis- 
 sions at Seoul and at Pyeng-yang, a beginning has been made 
 in the preparation of medical text-books for native use, and 
 in the training of natives for the medical profession. 
 
 The showing made by the facts just stated is meagre 
 enough, when we consider that it is the best that can honestly 
 be made for a modern nation of about ten millions. There 
 is reason to believe, however, that the statistics exaggerate, 
 rather than minimize, the results already achieved along 
 educational lines. There has, indeed, Ijeen a beginning, 
 but only a beginning. There are generous plans ado])ted 
 and set in operation; but the effectual working of these plans 
 on any considerable scale remains for the future to bring 
 about. The interest of the Emperor and his Court in the 
 educational reform of Korea was no more to be depended 
 upon than was their interest in an}- other reform, or real and 
 substantial good, accruing to the benefit of the Korean 
 public. So far as these influences pre\'ailcd, the Korean 
 system v.as in 1904, and would ha\e remained, an affair of 
 paper only. Rut the Korean De[)artmcnt of Education, 
 under the Residency-General, has co-operated faithfully in 
 efforts to give to tlie country an efficient system of jjublic 
 education. The former Minister of Education, now (1907) 
 Prime ]\rinister Yi, has been at once the strongest and the 
 most sincere of the Korean officials under \hv Ja])anese 
 Protectorate. The liope of Korea, and the realization of 
 the hopes of the ]\Iarquis Ito for Korea, depend upon the
 
 336 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 initiation and execution of a wise Government policy of edu- 
 cation more tlian upon any otlier one influence. Unaided by 
 Japan, Korea would never bring tliis about. As said Mr. 
 Hulbert, when in his better mind:' ''Wh.at Korea wcni/s is 
 cdncation; and until ste])S are taken in that line there is no 
 use in hoping for a genuinely independent Korea. Now we 
 believe that a large majority of the best informed Koreans 
 realize that Japan and Japanese influence stand for educa- 
 tion and enliglitenment; and that ^vhile the {paramount influ- 
 ence of any one outside power is in some sense a liumiliation, 
 the paramount influence of Japan will furnish far less genuine 
 cause for humiliation than has the paramount influence of 
 Russia. Russia secured her predominance by pandering to 
 the worst elements in Korean officialdom. Japan holds it 
 by strength of arm, but she holds it in such a way as to give 
 promise of something better. The word reform never j)assed 
 the Russian's lips. It is the insistent cry of Ja])an. The 
 welfare of the Korean people never showed its head al)o\e 
 the Russian horizon, but it fills the whole vision of Japan; not 
 from altruistic motives mainly, but because the prosperity 
 of Korea and that of Japan rise and fall with the same tide."- 
 In the future development and administration of educa- 
 
 ' Korean Review, of February, 1904. 
 
 ^ It is significant to notice in this connection that {irevious to his 
 several commissions from the Korean Emperor, this writer held a quite 
 different view from that which he afterward advocated with regard 
 to the underlying principle of all the recent relations between the 
 two countries. In the same article he says: "The present chaotic 
 state of the national finances and of jjopular discontent, show some- 
 thing of what Russian influence has accomplished in Korea; and the 
 people are coming to realize the fact. They are passionately attached 
 to the theor)' of national 'independence.' We say theory advisedly. 
 This word 'independence' is a sort of fetich to which they bow, but 
 they think that independence means liberation from outside control 
 alone, forgetting that genuine independence means likewise a lit^eralion 
 from evil influences within, and that liberty, so far from being carle 
 blanche to do as one pleases, is in truth the apotheosis of law."
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 337 
 
 tional affairs in Korea two principles are especially important 
 to be kept in mind. The first is the necessity for co-operation 
 on the part of all the educative forces under some system or 
 general plan. On the one hand, the private and missionary 
 schools could never suffice for the educational reform of the 
 nation; neither could they supply adequately the needed 
 number or kind of schools for its proper educational develop- 
 ment. In general, missionary schools belong to the planting 
 and earlier stages of religious propagandism among peoples 
 who have either no system of pubhc education or a system 
 which is hostile to religious influences. Missionary schools 
 are of necessity foreign schools; when they have effectually 
 performed their initial work, they should somehow become a 
 part of the native equipment for educating the people. As 
 we have already said, they have until recently been almost 
 the only though exceedingly meagre and faulty means for 
 giving the rudiments of a modern education to a small fraction 
 of Korean youth. They never could be developed, if they 
 remain simply missionary schools, so as to cope with the 
 entire educational problem in this land of public ignorance 
 and of intellectual and moral degradation. Those who are 
 in charge of them, therefore, should be among the most 
 forward to welcome cordially, and eft'ccti^'cly to assist, the 
 organization and advance of a national system of public 
 education in Korea. Otherwise their highest ser\-ice can 
 never be rendered to the country; their most important and 
 ultimate purpose of contributing toward the evolving of an 
 intelligent Christian nation can never be realized. 
 
 On the other hand, any plans for the establishing and 
 developing of a system of education in Korea at the present 
 time should be wise and generous in the matter of taking into 
 its confidence, and availing itself of, the assistance of the 
 mission schools. So misera])ly poor is Korea in all resources 
 of this character, that the barest principles of economics en-
 
 338 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 force the necessity of her availing herself of all jiossible helps. 
 jMoreover, the converts to Christianity although a very con- 
 siderable proportion of them are ignorant of the truths, and 
 negligent of the morals, of the foreign religion they su!)pose 
 themselves to have espoused are multiplying rapid 1}-, and 
 are destined to become of more and more jKjlitical and social 
 significance in the near future. Some sort of regulated co- 
 operation and conformity to a general plan should, therefore, 
 as speedily as possible be secured between the Government 
 and the private Christian schools. The Japanese and 
 Korean Governments and the Missionary Boards should 
 speedily agree upon some common plan for the recjuirements 
 of the primary and secondary grades of instruction, and thus 
 actively assist each other in the attainment of their com- 
 mon end. That this cannot be done without sacrificing the 
 special interests deemed most important to each, it would be 
 in contempt of the good sense and sincerity of both to 
 affirm. 
 
 The second most important principle to set in control of the 
 educational system of Korea is this. At first, and for a long 
 time to come, it should be pretty strictly limited to fitting the 
 Koreans themselves for a serviceable life, in Korea, and under 
 the conditions, physical, social, and economic and ])olitical, 
 of Korea. To educate after the fashion followed too much 
 by Great Britain in India thousands of Korean babus, who 
 thus become unfitted for the pressing needs of their country 
 at this present day, and inclined to idleness rather than" any 
 hard and disagreeable but useful work, would be a mistake 
 which neither the Government nor the ^Missions can afford 
 to make. It is a fact, however, that, up to the ])resent time, 
 too large a proportion of the Korean }-outh, whether educated 
 abroad or in the missionary schools at home, have la|)sed into 
 this worthless class. When called ujjon to icork manfullv, 
 faithfully, persistently, doing with his might what his hand
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 339 
 
 finds to do the Korean, like the Indian babu, is likclv to 
 show that his modern education has the more unfitted, rather 
 than the better fitted, him for the efi'ectual service of his 
 country. If this should be the result of modern education, 
 it would be scarcely more to be commended, under existing 
 conditions in Korea, than was the education of the old-time 
 Confucian schools. 
 
 The extension of the educational system of Korea ought, 
 therefore, for some time to come to be almost exclusively 
 limited to these two lines namely, to providing the barest 
 elements of a modern education for all the children of Korea, 
 and to the equipping and developing of the means for fitting 
 the youths of both sexes for the most needed forms of public 
 service. The time to spend large sums of money on tlie 
 higher branches of a liberal culture has not come as yet for 
 Korea. The present urgent need of the country is for men 
 who will tend her fields and forests, develop her mines and 
 manual arts and manufactures with intelligence; run her 
 railroad trains with safety; who will occupy her magistracies 
 with some knowledge of ethics and of law; and care for her 
 sick and injured with skill in medicine and surgery. Colleges 
 and universities for rearing scholars, authors, philosophers, or 
 gentlemen of learned leisure with Government sinecures, can 
 bide their time. 
 
 The deplorable condition of the Public Justice in Korea, 
 from the beginnings of the history of the United Kingdom 
 down to the present time, has been both assumed and illus- 
 trated in the i)receding pages. It is difilcult to give any 
 adequate ])icture of this condition in few words. The re- 
 straints of a constitution or a recognized legal code haw had 
 no existence. Court and local magistrates have been alike, 
 with rare exceptions, either inelTicient or wholly corrupt. 
 The administrative and judicial functions have not been dis- 
 tinguished, and both have been under the control of "infiu-
 
 340 IN KOREA Wmi MARQUIS ITO 
 
 cnce," and dcvoled to "squeezes" and bribes. Of this illegal 
 and unjust condition the police and tlie army were, under 
 the old system, the instruments. And whenexer during lliese 
 sad centuries of injustice an occasional monarch, or a few 
 of the inferior olTicials, attempted reform, if in the one case 
 the attempt was j)artially successful, the old condition soon 
 returned; while the inferior oflkial wlio wislied to be more- 
 just than his colleagues, by this very attem])t risked his po- 
 sition or even his head. 
 
 Among the reforms contem])oraneous with the Cliino- 
 Japan war (1894), the remedy for the existing maladminis- 
 tration of justice in Korea naturally had a ])rominent place. 
 Some of the forms of injustice then in common use such as 
 the bribing of judges and the punishment of accused ])ersons 
 without even the semblance of a trial had no justification 
 under Korean law, so far as law existed at that time. Other 
 equally deplorable forms of injustice were, however, strictly 
 legal; as, for example, the infliction of penalties on the in- 
 nocent relatives of a condemned criminal, and the imjjrison- 
 ment of the household of an official charged with extortion. 
 In particular, the use of torture barbarous in kind and ex- 
 treme in cruelty was in "full accord" with the legal s}stem 
 of the IMing dynasty in China, which formed the basis of the 
 Korean code. Of the older forms of torture some, such as 
 crushing the knee-caps, slitting the nostrils, applying ])incers 
 or hot irons, had already been in 1894 abolished by the Ming 
 dynasty; but a great number of equally painful forms of 
 torture were still legally in practice at that time. Among 
 such were seating the victim on hot coals, driving splinters 
 under the toe-nails, applying fire to the feet and hands, 
 pounding the shins, and squeezing the ankles. On the 
 eleventh of January, 1895, however, the Minister of Justice 
 obtained the king's assent to the abolition of all tlie more 
 severe forms of torture except in capital cases. To enforce
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 341 
 
 confession of guilt by beating with a stick was still to be 
 allowed/ 
 
 The reforms promised and inaugurated in 1895, with re- 
 spect to the improvement of the administration of justice, 
 like all the other reforms of that time, scarcely went beyond 
 the so-called "paper stage." Some forms of torture were, 
 indeed, no longer customarily practised; but on the whole 
 the barbarous treatment of accused and convicted criminals 
 was not greatly improved. In civil cases the practice of the 
 Court and of the magistrates was never w^orsc than during 
 the period preceding the Russo-Japanese war. It was, as 
 has already been shown (p. 233 /.), "an orgy of indepen- 
 dence." 
 
 In the opinion of Marquis Ito, when he became Resident- 
 General, the primary and most important thing in the in- 
 terests of the public justice was the discovery, systematizing, 
 and promulgation of the "law of the land." But how should 
 this difficult task be accomplished? Or as involving sub- 
 ordinate questions of great importance upon what founda- 
 tion of principles should the task be undertaken? In the 
 reforms of 1894-95 the plans of the Korean and Japanese 
 
 ' Among the many falsehoods told by the Koreans arjd their "Foreign 
 Friends," in their endeavors to excite pity for themselves, and, pos- 
 sibly, interference with the Japanese Administration in Korea, none is 
 more ridiculous than that the latter were reviving the use of torture. 
 It should be borne in mind that, previous to the Convention of July, 
 1907, which followed upon the promulgation of this and other more 
 important false charges by the commissioners to The Hague Con- 
 ference, the Japanese Residency-General's power did not extend to the 
 interference with the execution of the Korean law upon Korean crim- 
 inals. Preliminary examination Ijy beating with a stick was then 
 legal; according to credible current report it was practiced ujjon the 
 vice-Minister of Education, when, during my visit to Korea, lie was 
 accused of having contributed money toward effecting the assassination 
 of the Ministry (see p. 51). All this is (pn'te different from tlie ri'tort 
 which might be made to critics from the United Stales to remember 
 the practice of "water-cure" in the i'hilippines, etc.
 
 342 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 enthusiasts invoUed tlie sudden making of all things new. 
 At once, a tolerably complete modern code was to be devised 
 and forced u])()n the peojjle of Korea. In accordance witli 
 these plans an abundance of legislation was enacted; but 
 most of it was, of necessity, ineffective, since it was neither 
 adapted to the ])rcsent condition of Korean civilization nor 
 ever honestly applied. At the present lime in Jajjan and in 
 view of the large increase of i)Ower given to the Resident- 
 General by the Convention of 1907, there is a difference of 
 opinion as to the j^ropcr procedure in the reform of the jHiblic 
 justice in Korea. A certain parly would re])cat the mistakes 
 of more than a decade ago. They would have the Japanese 
 Protectorate secure the "entire adoption of the new Japanese 
 Criminal Code, and in civil suits provide Korea with 'an 
 entirely new set of laws' patterned after those of modern 
 civilized nations." This would be a comparatively easy 
 matter, so far as the preparation oj a code is concerned. 
 But it would undoubtedly be rclati\ ely defective so far as the 
 actual reform of justice in Korea is concerned. "The 
 Resident-General," says j\Ir. Stevens, "is manifestly deter- 
 mined to avoid this mistake, and to provide, in the first place, 
 some adccjuatc means for the enforcement of the law." 
 Meantime, the work of codification is proceeding cautiously. 
 The first step in this work was directed toward the "law 
 affecting real estate." 
 
 "This law" namely, the law affecting real estate "has 
 been taken up before all others, because, despite the fact that 
 in the present economic condition of the country immovables 
 form the most important object of ownershi]), Korea as yet 
 possesses no law of any real efi'iciency to protect rights 
 relating to real i)ro])erty. For instance, in selling and buying 
 a piece of land or in mortgaging it, the ])arties concerned 
 have nothing to go by but to follow the old custom of hand- 
 ing over and receiving the bnnki, or title deeds, which arc
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 343 
 
 generally in the form of a file of documents vouchsafing the 
 transaction. It so happens that the country is now Hooded 
 with forged buiikis, and there is really no security for prop- 
 erty. For this reason, in July last (1906) the Resident- 
 General caused the Korean Government to institute a Real 
 Property Law Investigation Commission, and urged the in- 
 vestigation of established customs and usages pertaining to 
 immovables, with a view to drafting with the utmost de- 
 spatch a law of real property of a simple and concise char- 
 acter. The Commission made rapid progress in its work, 
 and in consequence of this the Land and Buildings Certifica- 
 tion Regulations (Imperial Ordinance) and the Detailed 
 Rules of operation thereof (Justice Department Ordinance) 
 were promulgated respectively on the 31st of October and 
 the 7th of NovemlxT following. According to the Regula- 
 tions, in the case of transfer of land lots and buildings by 
 sale, exchange, or gift, and in that of mortgaging them, the 
 contracts are certified to by a Kun magistrate or Pu pre- 
 fect; and a contract thus certified constitutes a full legal 
 document, by \irtue of whicli the transfer may be validly 
 carried out without decisions of any law court. When, how- 
 ever, one of the parties to the contract happens to be an 
 alien, not a Korean subject, the document needs to be addi- 
 tionally examined and certified to by a Resident, otherwise 
 the document is lacking in legal efllcacy. \Mien neither of 
 the parties are Korean subjects, certification by a Resident 
 alone is sufficient. Simple as the law is, its effect is far- 
 reaching. To give an instance, originally treaties with. Korea 
 took cognizance of .a foreigner's, right lo ])ossess land only 
 within the settlements and one ri zone around lliem, and 
 hitherto all foreigners have ex])erienced considcraljlc (h'lli- 
 cult}' in securing landed ])ro]>ert}' in tlir interior of the 
 country; but now. the aboxe Regulations recognize tlie right 
 of foreigners to possess land in tlie interior, and the result of
 
 344 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 their promulgation is the ])ractical opening of the whole 
 empire to foreigners. 
 
 "Following this line of action, the Real Property Investiga- 
 tion Commission is steadily working on laws of various de- 
 scriptions, and it is exjjccted that before long that body 
 will be able to recommend some ])lan to jjlace the land sys- 
 tem of Korea on a solid and fair basis. As soon as the Real 
 Property Law is drawn up and ])romulgated in a j)erfected 
 form, the codification of other laws will be taken in 
 hand." ' 
 
 The necessity for providing means effectively to enforce the 
 existing and the newly to be enacted laws is obvious to any 
 one who is acrjuainted with the methods of Korean justice 
 down to the i)resent time. This necessity becomes the more 
 imperative on account of the condition of dissatisfaction and 
 unrest which followed the Russo-Jajmnese war and the 
 establishment of the Japanese Protectorate over Korea, It 
 was further emphasized and brought to an acute form at the 
 time when the abdication of the Emperor and the disband- 
 ment of the Korean army, on the one hand, exaggerated the 
 alleged reasons for revolt, and, on the other hand, let loose 
 the forces most ready and ap})ropriate to make revolt effect- 
 ive. The experience in connection with the repeated at- 
 tempts made to assassinate the Korean ]\Iinistry showed 
 plainly enough that Korean police and military could not be 
 depended upon to protect the rights or the lives of their own 
 countrymen. Subsecjuent events showed that these same 
 "minions of the law" were most dangerous to the [property 
 and lives of foreigners. Hence tlie im])erative need of a 
 
 ' Quoted, as are the following paragraphs bearing quotation marks, 
 from the pamphlet prepared under the su])ervision of the Resident- 
 General, and published in Seoul, Januar}-, IQ07, on Administrative 
 Reforms in Korea. [These quotations are made exactly, and without 
 attempt to change the language in accordance with our use of legal 
 terms.]
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 345 
 
 reorganization of the police. On this matter of reform, the 
 Report of the Resident-General discourses as follows: 
 
 In olden times Korea had practically no j^olice system. Under 
 the central Government there was indeed the "Burglar Capture 
 Ofhce," while the provincial Governors were privileged to exer- 
 cise police powers for the maintenance of peace and order. But 
 the evil practice of selling offices being prevalent, the officials 
 made it their business to extort unjust exactions, and die ])eople 
 enjoyed no security of life and property. In the year 503 of the 
 Korean national era (1894) the "Burglar Capture Office" was 
 closed and replaced by a '' Kyong-mu-chyong" (Police Office), 
 the latter being entrusted with the work of administering and 
 superintending the police and prison affairs within the city of 
 Seoul. The capital was then divided into five wards with a 
 police station in each. Furtlier, the Korean Government en- 
 gaged advisers from among police inspectors of our Aletropolitan 
 Police Board, and put in force various laws and ordinances, de- 
 fining and regulating the duties of the police force, besides adopt- 
 ing fixed uniforms for men and officers, all in imitation of the 
 Japanese system. At the same time the " Ky(")ng-mu-koan" was 
 created in the provincial Governor's Offices, for the exclusive 
 management of local police affairs. Since then numerous changes 
 have followed, and the Japanese police advisers have been dis- 
 missed. In 1895 the Kyong-mu-chyong was al)olished, and a 
 new Department of Police was established. Then the police ad- 
 ministration of the whole country was centralized in the hands of 
 the Minister of Police. This innovation was, however, l)ut short 
 lived, and the Kyong-mu-chyong came to be resuscitated, tlie whole 
 police system being now placed in the control of the Minister of 
 Home Affairs. At that time, in virtue of lier treaty with Korea, 
 Japan not only took her own means of ])r()lccliiig her suljjects 
 residing in that country, but despatched police ofhcials who were 
 required in carrying out her rights connected with her Consular 
 Courts. Subsequent to the Jai)an-China war, the nuniljer of 
 Japanese resident in Korea steadily increased, and as \cars went 
 by a similar change took place with regard to the number of our
 
 346 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 police attached to tlic Consulates, so thai the latter harl i'lnally to 
 have a rej^ular jxjlice station within each Consular compound. 
 Thus it hai)pene(l that I)y the time of the Russo Ja])anese war, 
 Korea had come to liave two police systems in force in the land. 
 When the war broke out Korea engaged Ja])anese advisers for 
 her police administration, and everything connected therewith, 
 large or small, underwent changes in accordance with tlieir views. 
 At that juncture there was necessit}-, for military reasons, of in- 
 troducing into Korea Ja])anese military ])olice or gendarmerie, so 
 that the country has since come to have simultaneously within her 
 bounds three police organizations namely, the native police, the 
 Japanese Consulate })olice, and the gendarmerie. 
 
 On the establishment of the Residency-General, after the ter- 
 mination of the war, all three systems were brought under the 
 unified control of the Resident-General, in such a manner as to 
 promote the national trancjuillily of Korea, each su])plementing 
 the work of the other. Under the new arrangement all ordinary 
 police work is placed in the hands either of the Japanese or of the 
 Korean police, to suit the needs of the localities concerned; while 
 the gendarmes are to look after the higher class of ])()lice affairs 
 or those relating to acts that tend to endanger the safety of the 
 Korean Imperial House, or to defy the authority of the Korean 
 Government, or to disturl) the friendly relations between Japan 
 and Korea. At one time the gendarmerie was divided into twelve 
 sub-companies, and fifty-five detail stations were established for 
 them. Under the new regime 184 men have been honorably dis- 
 charged, having been retained in tlie service beyond their regular 
 term, or belonging to the reserve. At the same time the numl)er 
 of detail stations was reduced to thirty-two. The need of aug- 
 menting the strength of the Japanese and native police being in- 
 creasingly felt, measures are being steadily taken in tliis direction 
 within the limits which the circumstances allow. 
 
 The laws of the land may be enlightened in their construc- 
 tion, and the j^olice thoroughly well organized and efficient; 
 but if the courts of justice are not intelligent and honest, 
 the pubHc justice is not secure. In Korea, as in China, from
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 347 
 
 which country she derived her administrative and judicial 
 system, two principal evil influences have prevented any 
 effectual reform in the judiciary. These are the failure to 
 separate the executive and judiciary Ijranches of government, 
 and the fact that olTicials generally ha\'e not been dependent 
 upon sufficient salaries for their reward, but, chiefly, upon the 
 amounts which could be squeezed out of the offices. 
 
 "The way in which justice has been administrated in 
 Korea," says the Report, "is too revolting to all sense of 
 decency to be told in detail. Her political development has 
 never yet attained that stage when the executive and judiciary 
 branches of government separate and become independent 
 of each other. The privilege of meting out justice has always 
 been in the hands of executive officials, and abuses have 
 grown up in consequence of this. Justice, which should 
 always be fair and upright, has generally allowed itself to be 
 influenced by the amount of l^ril^e offered, and right or wrong 
 often changed places according to the power and influence 
 of the parties concerned. The conviction of innocent people, 
 the confiscation of their property, and the liberation of the 
 guilty, all under a travesty of trials, have been common 
 occurrences; very frequently, too, contril)utions in money or 
 in kind have been extorted under threats of litigation. Korea, 
 indeed, possesses a law court organization by virtue of a law 
 promulgated in 1895, and according to it the courts are of tlic 
 following descriptions: i. Special Court of Law (tries 
 crimes committed by members of the Imperial family). 
 2. Court of Cassation. 3. Circuit Courts. 4. (Seoul) The 
 Trade Port Courts (courts of first resort). 5. District 
 Courts (courts of first resort), and tlieir branches (when 
 needed)." 
 
 "The truth is, however, that this organization exists 
 merely on paper, tlie only courts in actual existence being the 
 Court of Cassation and the Seoul Court. In the provinces,
 
 348 IX KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 the governors, commissioners and superintendents are, as 
 of old, also judges and hear and judge both civil and criminal 
 cases. The Kun magistrates, too, retain their judiciary 
 powers, which are, however, limited in extent. Even at the 
 indej)endent courts, such as the Court of Cassation and the 
 Seoul Court, judges and prosecutors are men totally deficient 
 in legal knowledge and training, and their judgments often 
 end in the miscarriage of justice. It is not surj)rising that 
 justice is generally made the object of ridicule and contempt 
 in Korea both by the natives and by foreigners. Treaties 
 give foreigners from the West the right to bring an action 
 against the natives in the Korean Courts in cases of a certain 
 description; but none of them has ever made use of such a 
 right. When any legal dispute arises, these foreigners always 
 make an international question of it and bring it before the 
 Residency-General. Leave the situation as it at present is, 
 and the day will never come when Korea may be freed from 
 the system of extra-territoriality. It being evident that the 
 chief cause responsible for this regrettable state of things lies 
 in the judiciary in force and the incompetency of judges, the 
 Resident-General has decided first to effect reform on these 
 two points, with others to follow gradually. The reforms 
 he has already put in practice for this purpose may be 
 outlined as follows" [Here given only in summary form]: 
 
 The creation of the ofl'ice of Chief Councillor in the Depart- 
 ment of Justice (the incumbent to be a Jajjanese); increase 
 in the number of judges, procurators, and clerks; the con- 
 stituting of the Prefects of the eleven Prefectures to act as 
 Judges; provision for proper ofiices and for the traveUing 
 and other expenses of the Judges and the Law Courts; the 
 introduction of rules of the civil service order, so that care 
 may be exercised in the appointment of judiciary ofiicials, etc. 
 
 It has already been made sufiiciently clear, however, that 
 the one instrument of the public justice which comes closest
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 349 
 
 to the common people of Korea, and which determines more 
 than any other the spirit of satisfaction with their condition 
 or of unrest and revoh, is the local magistracy. On the 
 "Reform of Local Administration" the Report remarks as 
 follows : 
 
 One thing that has defied satisfactory solution ever since the 
 beginning of the present Yi dynasty is the problem of the political 
 division of Korea. Soon after the Japan-China war, Pak Yong- 
 hyo, who was then Minister of Home Aifairs, tried a radical 
 change by turning the country into 23 prefectures. It was an 
 innovation indeed, but short-lived, for not long after the country 
 returned practically to its former division of 13 provinces, one 
 crown district, three prefectures and 341 districts (excepting Han- 
 Yang pu), with a Governor for each j)rovince, a Crown Commis- 
 sioner for the crown district, a Magistrate for each district, a 
 Prefect for each prefecture, and a Superintendent for each open 
 port. Nor has this division seen much change since then. It is 
 true that the question of local administration was one of the 
 many that confronted the Residency-General when it set out on 
 its work of politically regenerating Korea. A special Commission 
 was instituted, and under the direction of the Resident-General 
 its members carried investigations deep into the root of the evils 
 and abuses to be removed. As the result all changes, sudden 
 and radical, from fear of unnecessarily provoking popular excite- 
 ment, were carefully avoided. Having in view, however, the new 
 condition of things, the Commission decided on a plan of pro- 
 vincial reforms, which took the form of an Im])erial Onh'nance 
 proclaiming a "New Official Organization" and "Detailed Rules" 
 for its operation. These were issued on the 28th of September 
 last and put in force on the ist of October. 
 
 The more detailed features of the reforms proposed are 
 uninteresting and difficult to understand for one not making 
 a special study of Korean local achninistration from the 
 expert's point of view. In general, the reforms are intended 
 to separate the appointment and control of the local magis-
 
 350 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 tracy from Court and other forrupl offKial intlucnccs; to -put 
 a sto]) to the e\il practice ''of selHnjj; offices by holding 
 examinations for official candidates"; to reduce tlie tempta- 
 tion to increase the sciuee/es, l)y increasing the legitimate 
 salarv and by ]:)roviding projjerl}' for office, tra\elling, and 
 other exjicnses; and to adoj)t and install ''a new official 
 organization for the ])rovincial governors and tlieir suljordi- 
 nates, classifying the nature of the business to be managed 
 by ihem and defining their i)owers of issuing administrative 
 orders, of levying local taxes and of conducting other affairs." 
 These reforms reciuirc a considerable increase in the number 
 of officials in both the Do (or Province) and Pii (or Prefecture) ; 
 but they leave the Kuns (or smaller districts) substantially 
 unchanged in this regard. 
 
 Besides the above changes, the Residency- General has 
 already established a Residency or a Branch Residency in 
 each of the provincial ca[)itals. Further, the Local Adminis- 
 tration Investigation Commission is nov/ making enc^uiries 
 into village constitutions, village assembly regulations, and 
 other village association systems, handed down from olden 
 times. From the data thus obtained, a j)lan will be drawn 
 up for the ultimate introduction of the system of local auton- 
 omy. As to the reorganization of the Taw Court system, 
 the inde})cndence of the Department of Justice, the se])aration 
 of tax collection from routine executive business as the 
 result of the establishment of a new Taxation Bureau witli 
 a chief of its own, etc., these form, no doubt, a part of local 
 administration reform. 
 
 Only the result can tell how far, and how soon, these 
 plans for the reform of the public justice in Korea can so 
 change its present deplorable condition in this regard as to 
 satisfy the reasonable wishes of the Alarcjuis I to, and the 
 Japanese Government, so far as it is supporting him in his 
 peaceful and benevolent plans. The events which have oc-
 
 EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC JUSTICE 351 
 
 curred since this Report on Administrative Reforms was 
 composed, have, on the one side, given to tlic Resident- 
 General and his helpers a freer hand in a more open field, 
 but on the other they have augmented the responsibilities 
 and in some respects increased the difficulties of their task.
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 FOREIGNERS AND ] OREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 By the Protocols of February and August, 1904, and still 
 more perfectly by the Convention of November, 1905, Jaj)an 
 became the sole oiTicial medium for communication between 
 Korea and all other foreign Powers. Indeed, as the history 
 of the relations between the two countries already narrated 
 in summary form abundantly shows, thus much of control 
 over Korean affairs had been demonstrated to be necessary 
 for the welfare of both. But apart from considerations 
 which are fitted to influence the judgment of either Japanese 
 or Koreans, the question arises: How is the Protectorate of 
 Japan likely to affect other foreigners in their relations to 
 Korea? At present the foreign interests concerned in the 
 solution of the general problem are chiefly of two orders: 
 they are the interests of trade and commerce, and the mis- 
 sionary interests. The larger diplomatic controversies, 
 except so far as these may possibly arise in adjusting these 
 two classes of interests, have now, it would seem, l^cen satis- 
 factorily arranged for some time to come. The recent 
 treaties concluded between Japan on the one side, and 
 Great Britain, France, and Russia on the other, all ex- 
 pressly guarantee respect for Japan's control over the penin- 
 sula. In addition to the arrangement for a sort of reciprocal 
 "hands-off" from each other's possessions and "paramount 
 interests" in the Far East, into which France and Russia 
 have entered, Great Britain has pledged her support in de- 
 fence of the Protectorate. All these nations have, more-
 
 FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 353 
 
 over, solemnly committed themselves to the maintenance of 
 the integrity of the Empire of China and to the policy of the 
 so-called "open door." How unhkely it is, then, that the 
 Japanese Government should proceed at once to violate 
 treaty obligations which it has itself been at such pains and 
 expense of men and money to secure, and the maintenance 
 of which, to the satisfaction of its foreign allies, so intimately 
 concerns its own future welfare. 
 
 These same Conventions which confer certain rights upon 
 the Japanese Government in Korea just as plainly put this 
 Government under certain solemn obligations. The foreign 
 Powers have, strictly speaking, no diplomatic corps at Seoul. 
 Their Ambassadors and ^Ministers at Tokyo are their repre- 
 sentatives for Korea as well as for Japan. All foreign 
 Powers are represented by officials residing in the capital 
 city of Korea who have consular functions only. Since, 
 however, such functions must, in general, be exercised on the 
 spot, and since other business can often be transacted only 
 there, with any tolerable degree of convenience, the Consuls 
 at Seoul are admitted to correspond with the Residency- 
 General and with the various subordinate Residencies. 
 Naming them in the order of their seniority, Belgium, China, 
 Great Britain, Russia, France, and the United States are 
 now (in 1907) each represented by a Consul-Gcneral, and 
 Italy by a Consul. "Where foreign rights of any kind," says 
 ]Mr. Stevens who in saying this speaks both as Adviser to 
 the Korean Council of State and also as Counsellor to the 
 Resident-General "are threatened or molested, it is the 
 duty of the Japanese Government to furnish safeguards or 
 to provide a remedy. The Japanese Government has the 
 right to employ for that purpose all the machinery which the 
 laws of Korea place in its hands; and it would seem logically 
 to follow, also, that where such means prove inadequate, it is 
 the right, as well as the duty, of the Japanese Government to
 
 354 iN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 insist that the dcficicncv shall be supplied by appropriate 
 legislation or by such other method as may be reasonable 
 and just under the circumstances," 
 
 It does not follow from this, however, that either the rights 
 of the Japanese Go\ernment allow, or their obligations 
 compel, it to go to any length demanded by foreign business 
 men, or concessionaires, or e\cn by foreign missionaries, in 
 promoting their real or fancied inlerests, or in redressing 
 their fancied as well as their real wrongs. Tliere are j)lainly 
 limits to be observed in meeting demanrls and recpiests of 
 this character. It may be the duty of the Japanese (}o\ern- 
 ment, for exam{)le, to secure and defend all the mining and 
 other concessions made to foreigners which can prove them- 
 selves to have been honestly obtained and administered in 
 substantial accord with the initial contract. Inasmuch as 
 few concessions of any sort among those obtained from the 
 last Emperor can stand the test of honesty, or even of 
 tolerable freedom from corruption, it will doubtless be well 
 for the Japanese Government not to be over-scrupulous or 
 too curiously enquiring in many cases. But it certainly is 
 not its duty to allow the Iniperial treasury to be plundered 
 ad libilmn by contracts made, and concessions obtained, 
 through combinations of corrupt Korean officials with greedy 
 and unscrupulous foreigners. Again: it may be the duty 
 of the Japanese Government to protect a certain "freedom 
 of the ])ress," in the case of })uljlications owned and managed 
 by foreigners, even if {)rinted in t!ie vernacular and distriljuted 
 widely among the more ignorant and excitable of the native 
 population. It is certainly greatly to the credit of the Japanese 
 officials to have borne so quietly the slanderous and abusive 
 attacks upon their government of one such publication in 
 Seoul. But surely there may be a hmit here also. Un- 
 doubtedly that limit was reached, when the vernacular 
 edition of this publication excited the natives to sedition,
 
 FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 355 
 
 revolt, and assassination, especially at so critical a juncture 
 in the national affairs as occurred during the spring and 
 summer of 1907. Possibly, there is also a limit beyond 
 which misrepresentation and falsehood directed against 
 individuals not connected witli the government ought not 
 to be allowed to pass.^ 
 
 It must also be remembered that the success of the Resi- 
 dency-General in the economic, educational, and judicial 
 reform of Korea depends largely upon husbanding and 
 developing the resources of Korea. In all this, Mr. Megata, 
 the Plnancial Adviser, has been the right-hand man of 
 Marquis Ito, the Resident-General. If these resources are 
 squandered, or "conceded" in such a way as to deprive the 
 Korean Government and the Korean people of the natural 
 wealth of their own land, then the plans for e\ery kind of 
 reform will be crippled, if not wholly thwarted. To en- 
 courage legitimate business with all nations is for the ad- 
 vantage of both the Jaj^anese and the Korean Governments; 
 such a policy is directly in the line of Marquis Ito's intentions 
 
 ' The following incident illustrates the habitual behavior of the Korean 
 Daily News, edited by Mr. Bethell, in both an English and a native 
 edition. Dr. Jones, one of the most faithful and useful of the Mis- 
 sionary body in Korea, had previously incurred the bitter enmity of 
 this paper by publicly announcing (see p. 6if.) the intention to assist 
 the Resident-General in his plans, so far as his own work as a mis- 
 sionary' permitted, for the up-raising of Korea. At the time when the 
 Korean troops, in a wholly unprovoked way, fired upon the crowd in 
 the streets of Seoul, Dr. Jones published in the Seoul Press an account 
 of what he himself saw. The account was not accompanied by any 
 harsh criticism of the conduct of the troops. But "shortly afterwards 
 a Korean attached to the vernacular paper visited him and, attacking 
 him fiercely, denoimced him as an enemy of Korea. This was followed 
 by a savage attack in the Korean edition of the AV7i'.v, giving an en- 
 tirely false account of what Dr. Jones had done and said. It was in 
 fact an invitation to murder." Dr. Jones at once appealed to the 
 American Consul-Oeneral and he to the British. The editor was 
 forced to retract and a])()Iogize, but this by no means comj)ensated for 
 the damage his article had done.
 
 356 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 for the reform and iinlifting of ihc rcononiic condition of ihc 
 peninsula. No one ])ers()n would suffer so severely in mind 
 and in rej)Ulation as would the Resident-General himself 
 if this policy failed through any fault of his own or of his 
 country's administration in Korea. Hut, on the other hand, 
 to check the evil conse(iuences of illegitimate scliemes of ])ro- 
 motion already accom])lished, and to pre\ent tlie initiation 
 of such schemes in the future, is an ecjually necessary part 
 of this policy. 
 
 On the whole subject of the attitude of the Japanese (iov- 
 crnmcnt toward foreign business interests in Korea the follow- 
 ing lengthy cjuotations may be considered as authoritative: 
 
 The foreign trade of Korea has been steadily increasing, es- 
 pecially during the past six years. Making due allowance for the 
 increase of imports brought about by the war, the proportion of 
 normal increase gives every sign of healthy growth. Japan's 
 trade is much the largest. Korean exports go almost exclusively 
 to Japan, except ginseng, which is sent to China. Of the im- 
 ports from Japan a large proportion are foreign, as Japan is ])ut 
 down in the Customs Returns as the country from which the 
 importation was made, the country of origin not being given. 
 As Japan is the place of transhipment for much of the trade, and 
 as much of it passes through Japanese hands, it would be difficult 
 to differentiate. There are certain important staples, however, 
 concerning which there can l)e no ambiguity American kerosene, 
 for example, which practically monopolizes the market. Rails 
 and railway equipment also come from foreign countries, the cars 
 and engines from the United States. As Korea increases in 
 wealth and her purchasing capacity grows correspondingly, tlicre 
 will be a field for other machinery, modern farming iinplemcnts 
 among the rest, no doubt. 
 
 American and European enterprise has not been so cons})icuous 
 in the field of ordinary commercial enterprise as in other direc- 
 tions. Concessions of one kind and another have attracted more 
 attention than trade and commerce. Tlie most conspicuous and
 
 FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 357 
 
 successful undertaking of this kind is the (3riental Consolidated 
 Mining Company at Unsan in Northern Korea, originally Amer- 
 ican; now it is generally understood to be largely English in 
 ownership. This was the first mining concession ever granted to 
 foreigners in Korea. His IVIajesty the Emperor was originally a 
 half owner in the company, but sold out his interest for 300,000 
 yen and a payment of 25,000 yen per annum. The company's 
 concession covers a large area, and the capital is $5,000,000, 
 American money. At the outset the enterprise did not look very 
 promising, but by skilful management it grew until it reached its 
 present important proportions. 
 
 It would probably be idle to attempt an analysis of the advan- 
 tages and disadvantages to Korea of enterprises of this kind. 
 Certainly, if there are any advantages, the Unsan concession should 
 be a favorable example. That it has been of great advantage to 
 Korea is at least an open question. On the one side, in its favor, 
 may be set the large amounts annually expended by the company 
 in wages, etc. This is undoul^tedly a good thing while it lasts; 
 but gold mines are exhausted sooner or later, and the benefits 
 they confer are only temporary. The abandoned mining sites in 
 America, no matter how prosperous in their day, can hardly be 
 instanced as examples of prosperity for the people of the country 
 in which they are located, who are not owners of successful mines. 
 . . . Against this, and other like enterprises, may be cited, for 
 one thing, the disadvantage of the wholesale destruction of timber. 
 The country about Unsan has been practically denuded of timber, 
 and in an agricultural country like Korea this is undoubted!}' an 
 evil. 
 
 This much has l)een said of the effects of the ojjcrations of a 
 successful company, conducted on a conservative ])asis, mcrel}- to 
 show that the advantages of the development of Korean resources 
 about which so much lias been said, are not unmixed blessings. 
 The matter is of some importance in tlie light of all that has l)een 
 published of late upon the subject. . . . J'^.nglish and German 
 companies each obtained a mining concession, but neither proved 
 financially successful. Japanese also obtained one concession, in 
 which American capital is at ])resent interested. . . . The
 
 358 IN KOREA WITH AIARQUIS ITO 
 
 system of granting mining concessions was open to so many 
 objections that foreign representatives fre(jucntly importuned 
 the Korean (iovernment lo issue mining regulations under 
 which the mineral resources of the country could be system- 
 atically developed. Nothing was done, however, until after the 
 establishment of the Residency-Cieneral, when a mining law was 
 j)assed. This law ])rovides for mining imder ])roper safeguards 
 as regards public and private interests. Under the old system, or 
 rather lack of system, the concessionaire could do ])ractically 
 what he pleased within the limits of his concession. Now he 
 must conform to laws and regulations which i^ermit him to carry 
 on his business under conditions which promote the interests and 
 conserve the rights of all concerned. 
 
 The business methods which have develo])ed in Korea since 
 intercourse with foreigners began are the natural outgrowth of 
 the circumstances and of the practices prevailing before that 
 time. Reference is not here intended to ordinary commercial 
 transactions, but to that species of business which has its rise in 
 government favors and thrives by government patronage. In a 
 country where the Government is the fountain-head of favors of 
 every description, it was perha})s inevitable that the results should 
 be those which we see in Korea. Viewed from the most favorable 
 standpoint they certainly leave much to be desired. The Gov- 
 ernment, or, as has really been the actual fact, the I">mperor, has 
 been persuaded to enter into a number of business enterprises, 
 both puljlic and private, not a single one of which has been suc- 
 cessful and every one of which has been the occasion of loss either 
 to the public treasury or to His Majesty's ])rivy purse. Under- 
 takings of various kinds wooden manufactories, glass factories, 
 railways, etc. have been projected, but have gone no further than 
 the stage of involving the employment of foreign directors, as- 
 sistants, and the like, and have stop])ed there. Sometimes foreign 
 experts have been employed who were reallv capable of conducting 
 the business for which their services were secured. They have 
 come to Korea, only to discover that no preparations have been 
 made to carry on the enterprises with which they were to be con- 
 nected. In other cases, the persons engaged to oversee the pro-
 
 FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 359 
 
 jected enterprises have been notoriously incompetent, and the 
 whole affair has smacked largely of fraud from beginning to end. 
 It would require too much space to recount the various under- 
 takings of a public nature which have been attempted and have 
 ignominiously failed. The result has been monotonously the same 
 in every instance namely, the payment Ijy the Korean Govern- 
 ment of large sums of money for useless material and for services 
 never rendered. Another source of heavy loss has been the con- 
 tracts made on behalf of the Government for all sorts of things 
 rice that was never needed, arms and ammunition which were 
 worthless, railroad material which was never delivered, and so on 
 through the long list of wasteful expenditure of the public funds. 
 It is something hardly capable of direct proof, but there is no reas- 
 onable doubt that almost every one of these enterprises had its 
 inspiration in the desire for illicit gain by one or another of the 
 officials interested. The explanation of the foreigners interested 
 may be summed up in the phrase, "that is the way business is 
 done in Korea." The Empire has been the happy hunting- 
 ground for the foreign business man not over-scrupulous as to the 
 methods by which money was to be made. Equally it has held 
 out golden opportunities to the promoter and hunter for "con- 
 cessions." This does not include those foreigners who are willing 
 to take the chances of success and the pecuniary risks inseparable 
 from enterprises like mining, for example, but that other class of 
 promoters who desire to get something for nothing, and then sell 
 it to others. The gentlemen who have so much to say about 
 "enlisting foreign capital" in the development of Korea's re- 
 sources will generally l)e found upon investigation to be prepared 
 only to "enlist" some one else's ca])ital. Tlie jjromotcr has his 
 uses, no doubt, and, as a pioneer in new fields, unquestionably 
 accomplishes good in some cases. I'nfortunately, in Korea the 
 results of his activities can hardly be classed in this category. . . . 
 Especially is this true of those enterprises with wln'ch His 
 Majesty has l)een most prominently identified as an investor. As 
 before said, they have invariably resuhed in lieav_\- losses to tlie 
 privy purse. Various explanations have been given lor tliis, but 
 the fact remains and cannot be disputed. Others have pros-
 
 3()o IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 pcred, but 30 far as His Majesty is concerned, the balance has 
 always been on the debit side of the ledger. 
 
 If it were necessary to multiply instances of the injury clone 
 to the economic interests of the Korean people, and of the 
 (lifllculty of adjusting in any half-satisfactory way the claims 
 of foreign promoters and concessionaires, it could easil}- he 
 done upon good evidence. But mention of a few such in- 
 stances only ^with the suppression of names and details, for 
 obvious reasons will suffice to convince the reader, ho\ve\er 
 "patriotic" in such matters, who has even the semblance of 
 a candid mind. Prominent among examples is that of a 
 foreign company of contractors, who have obtained from 
 the Korean Government a variety of claims, such as puljlic- 
 utility franchises, and a mining concession. Of the former, 
 one franchise had cost the Privy Purse of the Korean V.m- 
 peror not less than 600,000 yoi up to 1902; and when it was 
 sold to satisfy a mortgage held by these same contractors, 
 although Air. J. jNIcLeavy Brown, at the time Commissioner- 
 General of Customs, who had been appointed to audit the 
 accounts, recommended that items aggregating 1,100,000 yen 
 should be disallowed, and gave his judgment to the effect 
 that foreclosure would be a grave injustice to His Majesty, 
 the latter was induced to buy one-half of the pro])erty at 
 750,000 ye7i. The whole of the same property not long be- 
 fore had been offered at 800,000 yen! This ])ublic utility 
 still fails to yield a dollar in dividends to the royal in- 
 vestor. 
 
 Another franchise of this same company has been sold, 
 without any investment of capital on their ])art, to an English 
 company for ;;(^i5,ooo cash and ;^5o,ooo in fully paid-up 
 ordinary shares. Under the apparent impression that they 
 have even yet not sufficiently profited from the Privy Purse 
 of the Emperor and the national treasury of this poverty-
 
 FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 361 
 
 stricken land, the same company is bringing all possible 
 "influence" to bear in order to validate their claims to a 
 "Mining Concession." With regard to this last claim, which 
 is still contested, it is enough for our purposes to say that it 
 was surreptitiously obtained; that the stipulation which re- 
 quired a capital of $1,000,000 fully paid up at the time of 
 incorporation has been violated; and that the provision 
 which guarantees that no other mining concession should be 
 made to any one, native or foreign, until these concession- 
 aires had made their choice, is plainly contra bonos mores. 
 Moreover, negotiations have been entered into by this 
 company for the sale of this concession to another foreign 
 syndicate. 
 
 The mining claim of these foreign promoters, although it 
 has not yet been wholly adjusted is, indeed, a cause c'elebre 
 on account of the large sums involved ; but it only illustrates 
 a special combination of the elements which are found, with 
 a difference of mixture, in all the cases of this general char- 
 acter. There was the foolish and wanton Emperor, who has 
 little intelligent care for the material or other interests of his 
 people; the crafty and corrupt Koreans, officials and ex- 
 officials; the land rich in unexplored and undeveloped re- 
 sources, and the "enterprising" foreigner, unscrupulous as 
 to his methods and ready to utilize either truly or falsely 
 his alleged "influence" with the officials of his own Govern- 
 ment. Another case, in which all the participants were 
 Koreans with the exce]Jtion of one foreigner, has also been 
 charged to the account of the Japanese Government on the 
 debit side. This foreigner, having put forth the claim to Ijc 
 a mining engineer (he was in truth only a miner a so-called 
 "thrce-yew-a-day" man), associated himself with a Korean, 
 popularly known as "Pak the liar," and through the latter 
 obtained the assistance at Court of a powerful official and his 
 friends. A "company" was formed, which obtained from
 
 362 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 the Emperor an elaborate document of the ''franchise" sort, 
 giving them the exclusive right to hnd t'oal oil where no 
 coal-oil was, to bottle mineral water from springs which have 
 no valuable qualities to their water, and to export coal which 
 was totally unlit for export. Ap])eals were constantly made, 
 and answered, for funds to further this enterprise, until His 
 Majesty became tired, and tlie whole affair was wound u]). 
 This was done by ])a}ing the foreigner 12,000 yen claimed as 
 back pay. He then departed to his native land to complain 
 that the Japanese were inimical to the investment of foreign 
 capital in Korea. The net result was a few thousand tons of 
 coal taken from one small mine sold, but the proceeds never 
 accounted for; an expenditure from the Privy Purse variously 
 estimated at from 300,000 yen to 400,000 yen; and the en- 
 richment of certain Korean olTicials and ex-officials. For 
 all this ]Mr. ]\Iegata, the Japanese Financial Adviser, had 
 to provide the money. The "Poong Poo" Company 
 itself never had any money to put into its "promoting" 
 schemes. 
 
 That the charge of favoring their own countr}-mcn in the 
 matter of concessions and monopolies, which has been some- 
 what freely made abroad against the Japanese Government 
 in Korea, is not justifiable, the following proof may be cited. 
 At some time between January 15 and January 29 of 1905, 
 Mr. Yi-chai-kuk, then Minister of the Im])erial Houseliold of 
 Korea, recognized and signed no fewer than twenty-three 
 concessions granted to one Yi-Sei-chik, a Korean, and his 
 four Japanese associates. These concessions included the 
 consolidation of taxation on land, the utilization of the 
 water-ways for various purposes, and state mono]>olies of 
 tobacco, salt, kerosene, etc. Imperial orders were secretly 
 given to the same Yi to raise a foreign loan of several 
 million yen for the purpose of detecting the secrets of 
 the Military Headc[uartcrs stationed in Korea, as well as
 
 FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 363 
 
 of the Tokyo Government, and to make reports about 
 them/ 
 
 These iniquitous transactions in which Koreans and Jap- 
 anese were concerned were made, when discovered, the occa- 
 sion of a memorandum of protest. This memorandum re- 
 minded the Korean Government and Court that they have 
 often been unfaithful to the "general plan of administrative 
 reform," based upon the com})act made Ijctwecn Korea and 
 Japan, by granting to foreigners various important conces- 
 sions in secret ways. "With a view of putting an end to 
 any further recurrence of such complications, an express 
 Agreement was entered into, August, 1904, by which "it 
 was stipulated that, in case of granting concessions to foreign- 
 ers, or of making contracts with foreigners, the Imperial 
 Governments should first be informed and consulted with." 
 The memorandum then goes on to express profound regret 
 that "His Majesty and his Court" had attempted by these 
 concessions, " in dellance of this provision, a breach of faith." 
 Then follows the demand upon the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs of Korea to take the following steps: 
 
 1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, after stating to His 
 Majesty the above facts and reasons, shall announce in a most 
 public way under the Imperial order that the concessions al)ovc 
 mentioned are null and void, as they have failed to ol)serve the 
 provisions of the Agreement between Korea and Japan. 
 
 2. It shall also be most j)ublicl}- announced under the Im- 
 perial order that, in any case of granting concessions to foreigners, 
 eitlier the Korean Government or the Court shall hrsl con^ult 
 with the Imperial Government. 
 
 This memorandum bears date of July ir, TQ05. But this 
 
 instance of the most decisive steps taken l)y tlic Japanese 
 
 ' This fact has been clearly proven l:)y j^ajicrs found on the body of 
 Yi-Sei-chik, when he was afterward arrested and detained at head- 
 quarters, as well as by his personal statements.
 
 364 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Government to ])revent its own subjects from j)roriting by 
 secret and corrupt alliance witli Korean officials, for the ol)- 
 taining of concessions and contracts, is by no means an 
 isolated one. In truth, tJie Japanese Protectorate is more 
 severe in dealing ivith such cases where Japanese are con- 
 cerned, than where other foreigners have the chief interests. 
 And repeatedly has the Resident-Cjcneral assured his own 
 countrymen that they must ex])ect no favors in business 
 schemes for exploiting Korea to their own advantage, but to 
 the injury of the Koreans themselves. Indeed, he lias 
 publicly declared to all such Japanese: ^' Yoii have me for 
 your enemy.'''' 
 
 More recently effective measures have been enacted and 
 put into force to make impossible the recurrence of the old- 
 time ways of robbing Korea by schemes for "promoting" 
 her business enterprises and by secret ways of obtaining 
 concessions. Among such measures is the safeguarding of 
 the "Imperial black seal" (the Emj)eror's })rivate seal), 
 which could formerly be used to plunder the treasury with- 
 out the knowledge or consent of its legalized guardians, or 
 even of the Emperor himself. Under the new regulations, 
 the black seal cannot be legally used except with the knowl- 
 edge and attestation of the Minister of the Household and 
 his Imperial Treasurer. 
 
 Among the other foreign relations into which Japan has 
 entered, to substitute for Korea, is the protection of Korean 
 emigrants. Although Korea needs, and can for a long 
 time to come su})port, all its own natural increase of 
 native population, and .several millions of foreign immigrants 
 besides, the complete lack of opportunity for "getting ahead" 
 in their native land caused a considerable exodus of her own 
 population some six or seven years ago. At the instance of 
 an American, about 8,000 Korean men and 400 Korean 
 women emigrated to Hawaii. In 1905 a Mexican prevailed
 
 FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 365 
 
 upon 1,300 natives to goto Mexico. This experience led the 
 Korean Government, in April, 1905, to issue an order pro- 
 hibiting the emigration of Korean laborers. Under the 
 Japanese Protectorate, however, in July, 1906, "An Emi- 
 grant Protection Law," with detailed rules for its operation, 
 was enacted, which came into force on the 15th of September 
 of the same year. 
 
 With regard to all foreign relations with Korea, whether of 
 legitimate business, of commerce, or of emigration, the civi- 
 lized world is undoubtedly much better off now that their 
 custody is in the hands of the Japanese Residency-General. 
 In our judgment the same thing is true of those moral and 
 religious interests represented by the missionary bodies al- 
 ready established, or to be established in the future, in the 
 Korean peninsula. This is not, indeed, the opinion of all 
 the missionaries themselves. As regards the whole subject 
 of the effect of the Protectorate upon mission work past, 
 present, and future there is a difference of opinion among 
 the missionaries themselves. As to the attitude of Marquis 
 Ito there can be nc reasonable doubt. His expressions of 
 feeling and intention have been frequently mentioned in the 
 earlier chapters of this book. The missionary problem will 
 be discussed, apart, in a later chapter. 
 
 As tc the general feeling of the Koreans themselves toward 
 foreigners, the loUowing quotations are believed to express 
 the truth: 
 
 Since the mauguration ot toreign intercourse the anti-foreign 
 feeling oi which the Tai Won Kun was so prominent an exponent, 
 appears tc have died out. Possibly it may linger still in the minds 
 of some ot the old-fashioned Confucian scholars, but not to any 
 appreciable extent. Formerly it was, no doubt, ])ossil)le to excite 
 the people against foreigners for slight cause; but exhibitions of 
 anti-foreign sentiment in recent times appear to have been 
 officially instigated, as, for example, the massacre of the French
 
 360 IN KORIOA WITH iMARQUIS ITO 
 
 missionaries and their converts, for which the Tai Won Kun is 
 held responsil:)le. More intimate intercourse with the representa- 
 tives of Western civih'zation, and especially missionary labor 
 which has been so <j!;enuinely successful, seem to have eliminated 
 anything like a general feeling of dislike for foreigners. 
 
 The case of the Ja])ancse stands by itself in this regard. Much 
 has been written of the ancient hatred of Koreans for Japanese. 
 Traces of that feeling may linger, but that it is an ineradicable 
 national trait, as some would seem to hold, hardly seems ])os- 
 sible. Koreans and Japanese have lived together in complete 
 amity and good fellowship in the past, and there is no good reason 
 why they should not live side by side on the best of terms in the 
 future. Certainly none in the sentiment of dislike on one side, 
 for the origin of which \xc must go back nearly three centuries. 
 The practical difficulty, the dislike which really counts, is of more 
 modern origin. Korea and Japan have been jostled together, as 
 it were, by two wars in recent times, and the weaker of the two 
 has suffered a circumstance to be regretted, no doubt, but still 
 inevitable. Korea has experienced some of the evils which follow 
 in war's train; and while they were not nearly so disastrous as 
 has been represented, they have left a feeling of dislike and dis- 
 trust for those who are held responsible. This was to have been 
 expected and counted upon; for the remedy we must await the 
 wider and more intelligent comprehension of the real meaning of 
 the new order of things. When it is finally understood that even- 
 handed justice is the rule, that the life and property of every man, 
 no matter how humble, are safe under the law, and that the pres- 
 ence of the alien does not mean licensed extortion and o])pression, 
 we shall not hear anything more of that racial hatred upon which 
 so much stress has been laid.
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 wrongs: real and fancied 
 
 Among the many embarrassments encountered by Marquis 
 Ito as Japanese Resident-General in his eiTorts to reform 
 and elevate Korea, there is perhaps no one more persistent 
 and hard to overcome than the charges of fraud and violence 
 made against his own countrymen. These charges come 
 from various sources and are promulgated in a variety of 
 ways. Sometimes they take the form of a book as, for 
 example, Mr. Hulbert's "Passing of Korea." For months 
 the Korean Daily Neivs, under the editorship of Mr. Bethell, 
 in both its native and its English editions, filled its daily 
 columns with complaints, wearisomely reiterated after they 
 had been repeatedly disproved, or made anew on insufficient 
 grounds and c\'en without any trustworthy evidence what- 
 ever. In scarcely less degree, the same thing has been true 
 of certain English papers printed outside of Korea, especially 
 in China. i\Iore effective still in producing an impression 
 abroad, but not more trustworthy, ha\e l)een the published 
 letters of many travellers and newspaper correspondents. 
 Conspicuous among the latter class was the letter of Mr. 
 William T. Ellis to the Xew York Tri-Wcekly Tribune, in 
 which it was stated that, under the then existing Japanese 
 Government, "robbery, abuse, oppression, injustice, and 
 even murder are the lot of the Korean common people."^ 
 
 ' This serious charge was made by the writer and published to a 
 friendly nation, on the basis of no personal knowledge, not to say care- 
 ful investigation, and after casual conversation with a small number of 
 witnesses who belong to the class peculiarly liable to be deceived both 
 as to facts and as to causes of such alleged incidents. 
 
 367
 
 368 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Most deplorable' of all arc the liasly and inconsiderate charges 
 believed on exaggerated or wholly false accounts of the 
 Koreans themselves, and jjropagated Ijy the relatively small 
 body of missionaries who have remained for reasons to 
 be considered subse(|iiently in an attitude of open or secret 
 hostility to the Ja[)anese Protectorate, 
 
 The charges against tlie Japanese of violence and fraud 
 in Korea may be divided into four classes: those which are 
 important and true; those wliich are tri\ial and onl}- ])artly 
 true; those which are exaggerated; and those which are 
 wholly false. Of the first kind there are a few only; of the 
 second there arc many; of the third there are even a greater 
 number; and of the fourth there are not a few. In judging 
 the conduct of the Japanese Government and its officials 
 of all ranks and classes, as distinguished from the conduct 
 of adventurous and unscrupulous individual Ja])anese, tlie 
 material and social condition of affairs in the ])eninsula during 
 and immediately after the Russo-Japanese war cannot fairly 
 be left out of the account. One complaint brought by its 
 most unsympathetic critics against the Government is tliat 
 it did not foresee the influx of undesiraljle cliaracters into 
 Korea during the war and make sufficient provision for their 
 control. But precisely the opposite of this com])laint is true. 
 The military and other coolies and camp-follo\vers had gi\cn 
 much trouble and embarrassment to the Japanese officials 
 in the war with China. Accordingly, the military autliorities 
 determined at the beginning of the war with Russia to avoid 
 such complications by composing the military train wholly 
 of enlisted men. Thus many recruits students, j^rofes- 
 sional men, and tradesmen who did not come up to tlie 
 standard set for the soldier, or who were not ready for ser\ice 
 
 ' Deplorable, on account of its effect, direct and indirect, upon tlie 
 Koreans, upon Marquis Ito's efforts at reform, and upon the mis- 
 sionary cause in Japan as well as Korea.
 
 WRONGS: REAL AND FANCIED 369 
 
 in the ranks, served as cart-pullers, burden-bearers, and in 
 other laborious and humble ways. The conduct of the 
 army, and of the enlisted men generally, in Korea and 
 Manchuria, was so admirable as to call out the quite unex- 
 ampled approval of all candid observers. Looting was 
 almost absolutely prevented; the extremely rare cases of 
 rape were punished with death as soon as the offence was 
 proved; violence or insult toward all non-combatants was 
 of rare occurrence; and the treatment of the Russian prison- 
 ers of war evoked the gratitude of the prisoners themselves. 
 In all these respects, the difference between the Japanese 
 and the Chinese and Russians was indeed remarkable. 
 
 At the beginning of the war the Tokyo government, per- 
 ceiving that the civil authorities in Korea were already over- 
 burdened with labors consequent upon the great influx of 
 Japanese many of them belonging to the lower classes 
 proposed a bill to establish new courts and an increased force 
 of police. In the pressure of important business connected 
 with the life-or-death struggle in which Japan was then 
 engaged, the bill did not pass. A Police Adviser to the 
 Korean Government was, however, appointed. What must 
 have been the complete incompetency of the Korean magis- 
 trates and police at such a time of confusion may be faintly 
 imagined by one who like the author has seen how in- 
 effectively they still discharged their functions, for the pro- 
 tection of their own officials and for the maintenance of 
 order in the country, at the time of his visit in the spring of 
 1907. It would have been strange, then, if anything ap- 
 proaching an e^'en-handed justice througli the courts, or a 
 complete condition of order by fear of the police, could have 
 been secured in Korea in 1904 and 1905. No such justice 
 or order has ever existed in tliis land of misrule. Ja])an 
 secured it (hiring the occupation of war, so far as ils own 
 enlisted men were concerned; but its ri,<j;;hts as "Protector"
 
 370 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 were not fully gained and defined until after the close of the 
 war. 
 
 Among the most serious of the charges which are imi)ortant 
 and, in certain instances, true, is that made against the mili- 
 tary authorities for the a])propriation of lands for military 
 and railway uses, to an unreasonable extent, and in unfair 
 ways. "There can be no question," says ]\rr. D. W. Stevens, 
 "that at the outset the military authorities in Korea did 
 intimate an intention of taking more land for these uses 
 than seemed reasonable. They proceeded upon the ])rinci]^le 
 that the Korean Government had bound itself to grant all 
 land necessary for railway and military uses, and itself to 
 indemnify the owners an assumption which was technically 
 correct. But the owners, knowing the custom of their own 
 government under such circumstances, were hopeless of 
 obtaining anything like adecjuate redress. This, it should be 
 remembered, happened during the war, when martial law 
 was in the ascendant." When peace came, other counsels 
 prevailed; the intention to appropriate additional large tracts 
 was abandoned; and the amount staked off for military 
 purposes was greatly reduced was, indeed, in se\"eral 
 instances, made only a fraction of the original amount. For 
 all the domain granted or ap{)ropriated by the Korean 
 Government there has already accrued to the country, in 
 transportation facilities and other economic and political 
 aflvantages, far more than its actual \alue at the time of its 
 granting or appropriation. For the private land owned by 
 Koreans a fair price was paid in the majority of cases. The 
 prohibition of the owners within the delimited areas to sell 
 their lands and houses was designed to prevent prior purchase 
 by speculators and other indirect attempts to ol)tain extrava- 
 gant prices. The military authorities, under the pressure of 
 what they regarded as necessity, solved these difficulties in 
 the military way a way that certainly does not commend
 
 WRONGS: REAL AND FANCIED 371 
 
 itself to civilians in times of peace, but which has been 
 employed too often by all the other civilized nations to enable 
 them to cast stones freely at the Japanese. Even by these 
 high-handed measures they could not avoid, in certain cases, 
 paying much more for land owned by foreigners than it was 
 really worth.^ 
 
 It must further be confessed that a considerable number 
 of Japanese sharpers for the most part usurious money- 
 lenders have obtained land from Koreans in unjust and 
 oppressive ways. This s])ccies of robbery is made the more 
 difficult to detect and punish for the following reasons: 
 The Korean customs and laws concerning the transference 
 of titles to land are inadequate and confusing (for this reason, 
 some of the landed property belonging to other foreigners 
 than the Japanese, and even to the missionary bodies, would 
 have no little difficulty in establishing title); the Koreans are 
 given to issuing false and forged deeds, or in their ignorance 
 claiming title and conferring title where no such right ex- 
 ists; finally, in numerous instances, both Korean .or foreign 
 "squatters" (see p. 295 f.) and the government or some of its 
 officials are asserting, either honestly or fraudulently, their 
 holding of good title to the same piece of land. On all this 
 class of oft'ences we may trust implicitly the statement of the 
 foreign official (an American) whose duty has led him to 
 examine into a large number of these cases: "The theft of 
 
 ' It has been asserted that the value of the land staked off by the 
 Japanese military authorities near Seoul was 6,000,000 yoi. As the 
 result of a "painstaking and impartial investigation'' it \vas found that, 
 at the highest market price, this land would not have brought more 
 than 750,000 to 1,000,000 yen. The Korean way in such matters is 
 well illustrated by the experience of the Young Men's Christian Asso- 
 ciation in Seoul, who, when one small piece of land was needed to 
 complete their site, were obliged to invoke an otficial order preventing 
 the sale to any other party; and even then paid a price probably two 
 or three times its true market value. Compare also what is said, p. g8 f., 
 uijout the Pyeng-yang affair.
 
 372 IN KORKA Wnil MAR(^)UIS ITO 
 
 land ])} eviction, false deeds, etc.," sa}s this authority, ''is 
 another offence iijjon whicli great stress has been laid. l"n- 
 doubledly there were a nuniljer of cases of this kim], allliough 
 here again exaggeration has Ijcen at work. Tlie commonest 
 instances were those where money-lenders were concerned; 
 and, in these cases, as in almost all otliers of the kind, Koreans 
 were associated in some way or otiier with the frauds wliich 
 were j)er]jetrated. A spendthrift son or nepliew would gi\-e 
 false title-deeds, or even ])awn the genuine ones witliout 
 authority; a Korean rascal would cons])ire with a Japanese 
 of the same kidney to defraud other Koreans, and so on 
 through the long gamut of fraud wherein Korean conni\ancc 
 was an indispensable prcrcc^uisitc to success. The offences 
 relating to land have now been rendered ])ractically impossible 
 through the promulgation of land regulations by the Residency- 
 General." 
 
 In a word, offences of this kind committed by the Ja])anese 
 against the Koreans, however numerous and grie\'ous they 
 may have been, have proved short-lived; tliey were formerly 
 due to the distur1:)ed conditions of a period of war, and 
 will now speedily be brought to an end. Summing them all 
 up, and even without making allowance for exaggerations, 
 the cry of the Koreans against the Japanese on the charge of 
 fraud and o])pression touching tlieir land is only as a drop to 
 a good-sized bucket compared with the cry of the Irisli against 
 the English, or of the Koreans themsehes against their own 
 countrymen. The wrongs are small indeed as com])ared 
 with those which have characterized the behavior of Amer- 
 icans against Americans in our own West.^ 
 
 ' What is the state of the case in certain portions of the West is truth- 
 fully told in the following paragraph quoted from a jjopular journal: 
 "In the matter of cheating Indians and acquiring public lands in ways 
 which bear all the ethical aspects of theft, there is no puijlic or ])rivate 
 morality either in Oklahoma or any other of those Western States 
 where Indians and Dublic lands continue to exist."
 
 WRONGS: REAL AND FANCIED 373 
 
 Of ^brutal and murderous assaults from Japanese upon 
 Korean men and women there are indeed instances; but 
 the cases prove on examination to have been by no means 
 frequent. They have been, on the whole, fewer than such 
 crimes are accustomed to be between peoples of two nations 
 similarly placed. Indeed, they have been fe^^'er than those 
 occurring to-day between different classes and different 
 nationals in many of the civilized countries of the Western 
 World. They bear no comparison to the horrors whicli 
 have for centuries been familiar in most of the Orient, in- 
 cluding Korea itself. ''Wholesale military executions," for 
 example, of the Koreans who tore up the track of the military 
 railroad have been charged against the Japanese as virtually 
 murders. But during the entire war there was never a 
 single instance of what is known as "drum-head court 
 martial" of a Korean for such an offence. After the trial the 
 evidence in eacli case was transmitted to the Headcjuartcrs at 
 Seoul, where the case was confirmed, modilled, or reversed. 
 The Japanese military authorities consented to have a Korean 
 official present at each trial as an amicus curies of the defend- 
 ant; but the Korean Government declined to Ix? represented 
 and claimed tliat all such cases should Ix.' tried Ix^fore their 
 own officials onl}'. What would have been the outcome of 
 such a committal of the most vital military interests of Jaj)an 
 to Korean magistrates it needs no great amount of experience 
 to judge. A Korean, for example, wlio had been arrested by 
 a Jai)ancse goidarnie and taken before a nati\'e magistrate 
 was duly punished for "throwing a stone at tlie railway!" 
 But on liis being rearrested and tried Ijefore a military court 
 it was established that the man liad been rejjeatedly con- 
 victed of piling stones upon the track willi a \-iew to wreck tlie 
 trains conveying tlie Japanese soldiers; w]iereu])on the sen- 
 tence of the military court was confirmed from Headquarters 
 and the man was (juite properly executed.
 
 374 IN IvORKA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Of llic killintf of "Rorcans, unj)rovoke(l and without the 
 excuse of self-defence, by Ja])anese, there have been at no 
 time any considerable number of cases. Indeed, the murders 
 of men and women of the otlier nationality, while in the (|uiet 
 discharge of their official dut}' or in their homes, have been 
 far more numerous. Tliis was es])ecially true while the 
 country \vas stirred to riot and bloodslied Ijy the abdication 
 of the Emperor in July, 1907, and by the disbandment of 
 the Korean army, when mistaken or feigned "patriotism" 
 was showing itself in the customary Korean way. But that 
 there is nothing new about all this, a reference to cha])ters 
 which have sketched (IX and X) the history of the relations 
 of the countries in the ])ast centuries will alnmdantly show. 
 
 Of serious and unprovoked assaults of Koreans by Jap- 
 anese there have been, doubtless, a considerable number. 
 It would be impossible to tell just how many, even as a result 
 of the most patient and candid investigation; if for no other 
 reason, because the Korean habit of exaggeration and lying 
 renders almost all the uncorroborated testimony of the 
 natives untrustworthy. This experience with official lying 
 to cover their own countrymen against the demands of 
 "foreigners for justice, or to enforce inrlemnity in cases of 
 false charges made against foreigners for assault on Koreans, 
 is not confined to the Japanese. It is the common experience 
 with all Korean judicial procedure.' 
 
 Among the more serious unproved charges against Japan- 
 
 ' On one occasion the British and Chinese Ministers jointly urged 
 the payment of indemnity in the case of two Chinamen, one a liritish 
 protege, who had been injured in a fight with tax-collecting oflkials at 
 a place to which Chinese junks were in the habit of resorting. The 
 British protege had died of his wounds, both he and his companion 
 having been confined after the fight in the magistrate's yamen. The 
 Korean local officials contended that only one person had been killed 
 namely, the wounded Chinaman. When confronted with the fact 
 that, according to their own report, there was a dead Chinaman in the
 
 WRONGS: REAL AND FANCIED 375 
 
 ese officials was that of torturing Korean prisoners by Jap- 
 anese gendarmes at the time of the so-called "cleansing" of 
 the Palace. Mr. Hulbert pubhshed this charge and specified, 
 on the authority of "numerous witnesses," the exact char- 
 acter of the torture -namely, by a kind of iron instrument 
 designed to squeeze the head. Immediately Marquis Ito 
 took up the matter and sent a messenger to Mr. Hulbert to 
 express his earnest desire to probe the matter thoroughly; 
 and his intention, in case the charge was proved, to punish 
 the offenders severely. This request im])lied, as a matter 
 of course, the pledge of protection to the witnesses; and Mr. 
 Hulbert agreed to furnish the evidence. But when this 
 could not be done, the excuse was first offered that the wit- 
 nesses were afraid to come forward; and next, the "nu- 
 merous witnesses" resolved themselves into one person, who 
 had "gone into the country." When still further ])ressed to 
 furnish the promised evidence, the story of the iron head- 
 rack was altogether abandoned, and for it was substituted 
 the charge that a certain eunuch had been arrested and 
 beaten by the police. But this, if it occurred, is only ac- 
 cording to the Korean custom of judicial procedure, still to 
 be allowed, after the torture of criminals had been legally 
 abolished under Japanese infiuence. Nevertheless, this con- 
 fessedly false charge was afterward included in a pamphlet 
 by the same authority as another instance of Japanese out- 
 rages in Korea. ^ 
 
 yamen the morning after, they replied that this man was not in the 
 fracas at all; he had merely crawled into tlie yamen during the night, 
 and had died of some unknown disease. The ])icture of this shrewd 
 Celestial going to the yamen to die, a])parenlly for the i)ur])ose of fraud- 
 ulently foisting an incriminating corpus delicti upon the innocent Ko- 
 rean official, did not a[)peal to the British Minister, and he got his 
 indemnity. 
 
 ' See "The Jaixuiese in Korea," fl.xtracts from I'lie Korean Review, 
 p. 46 /.
 
 3/0 JX KORKA WITH MARQUJS JTO 
 
 Of rudeness and ])eUy assaults the Koreans have, no doubt, 
 had much to enchire at the hands of the coohes and other low- 
 class Japanese. But not so much as the Burmese and East 
 Indians have had to endure from the British soldier and 
 petty oilicial in their own home land; or the Chinese and 
 Japanese on the Pacific Coast of the United States; and, 
 {)robably, not more than the Japanese themselves during 
 the earlier days of the entrance of foreigners into Ja])an. 
 While the atrocious treatment of the natives by the Belgians 
 in Africa, by the French in Madagascar, by the Russians in 
 many parts of Asia, is as midnight darkness to twilight 
 or full dawn when compared with anything done to Koreans 
 of late years by the Japanese. 
 
 In order to understand, but not to excuse, this harsh and 
 bullying attitude of the foreigner toward the native, two 
 things need to be borne in mind. The first is this: Korea 
 has never been a land where the common people have been 
 treated with any decency, ?iot to say respect. In the old days 
 the days to change which the Japanese Government is 
 planning and doing more than any other human agency 
 the attendants of officials beat every commoner who came 
 within their reach; this was as a matter of course; it was an 
 evidence, not much resented by the people, of the superiority 
 of their master. Lieutenant Foulk describes how, when he 
 was travelling in the country, his chair coolies on approaching 
 an inn would accelerate their pace and, rushing into the yard 
 at the top of their speed, would begin to belabor every one 
 in sight. "In 1885," says Mr. Stevens, "I was riding 
 through the streets of Seoul on official business. Among my 
 attendants were several policemen armed with the many- 
 thonged whips carried in those days. The ])olicemen slashed 
 with these at the curious who pressed around the chair, re- 
 gardless of where the blows fell. One old woman, lashed in 
 the face until the blood came, still pressed forward when the
 
 WRONGS: REAL AND FANCIED 377 
 
 policeman had passed, eager to see the foreigner close at 
 hand, and apparently regarding the blows as a matter of 
 course." To-day such cruelty is in no respect rare among 
 the "amiable Koreans." Indeed, without something of 
 this kind, it is diilicult in the country for the traveller, whether 
 native or foreigner, to get anything done. " During the first 
 two days," says ]Mr. Henry Norman,^ "I was greatly an- 
 noyed by my mapous, whom I could not get along at all. At 
 the midday halt they would lie about for a couple of hours, 
 and in the morning it was two or three hours after I was up 
 before I could get them to start. On the third morning I 
 lost my temper, and going into their room, I kicked them one 
 after the other into the yard. This was evidently what they 
 expected, for they set to work immediately. Unless they 
 were kicked they could not believe the hurry was real. After- 
 ward, by a similar procedure, I started whenever I wished." 
 Again, Mr. Angus Hamilton, after bringing a railing accusa- 
 tion against the Japanese for their bullying methods with 
 the Koreans, recommends that the Korean interpreter "be 
 flogged" if he suggests the employment of too many servants, 
 asserts that "an occasional kick" is helpful to convert the 
 Korean into a "w^illing if uninteUigent servant," and closes 
 his book with the frank narrative of his falling into a blind 
 rage and taking vengeance right and left because of his 
 disappointment over the defeat of a scheme for an exploring 
 and sporting trip to the northern part of the peninsula.- 
 
 The second consideration to which reference was made 
 brings out the more humorous side of tlie picture. In Korea 
 
 ' The Far East (London, T. Fisher Unwin, igoi), p. _:;37 /. 
 
 '^ Korea (Chas. Scribner's Sons, i()04), pj). 128 /.; 274 /. Perha])s 
 the underlying reason for much of Mr. Tlamilton's rather viuii)crative 
 criticism of aflairs in Korea may be found in Cha])ter XII, where 
 Japanese, American, and British merchants, and Lord Sahsbury are 
 all severely taken to task because too mucli of Korea's trade is falling 
 into other than English hands.
 
 378 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 it makes a great difference, not only whose ox is gored, but 
 "who gores the ox. Small favors of the kind which are re- 
 ceived uncom])lainingly almost gratefully from their own 
 oflicials, and even from other friends, are by no means just 
 now received in the same way from the Japanese. Of tliis 
 fact Dr. Gale gives an admirable descrijjtion: it is that of a 
 Korean lounging along in the middle of the road and smoking 
 the pipe of contemplati\e abstraction a habit indulged in 
 by almost all Koreans in the most inconvenient places. A 
 Ja])anese jinrikisha-man pushes him rudely to one side, and 
 not being at all firm upon his legs, he goes sprawling on the 
 ground (comp. p. 172 f.). Eyes raised to heaven, he calls 
 upon the skies to fall; for the end of all things has come. 
 "But," says the passing stranger, "a missionary pushed you 
 out of the way yesterday; another foreigner beat you the day 
 before;' your own people have always kicked and cuffed you." 
 "YeSj yes, but a Japanese! Only think of it a Japanese!" 
 Among the partially true, but greatly exaggerated, charges 
 of petty oppression and injustice must be classed the claim 
 that the labor on the Jajjanese military railway was enforced 
 by personal cruelties and paid for at unfair j^riccs. Again, 
 it must be remembered that the prom])t conclusion of this 
 work was a military necessity of the first importance. In 
 the rush and confusion which accompanied its execution, it 
 would have been strange if there had not been cases of harsh 
 treatment of laborers by the Japanese sub-contractors. 
 Where an appeal, accompanied by trustworthy evidence, was 
 taken to the higher authorities, it was jjossible to obtain re- 
 dress in almost every instance. But there was another class 
 of cases where it was almost impossible to secure anything 
 like decent reparation; these were chiefly under the manage- 
 ment of the Koreans themselves. Concerning such cases, 
 the statement of an authority, made on grounds of personal 
 knowledge, is quoted below:
 
 WRONGS: REAL AND FANCIED 379 
 
 Complaints came from various sources, all of the same tenor. 
 Laborers living long distances from the railway were compelled 
 to come to work at wages which hardly paid for their food. Yet 
 at this time the authorities were paying wages much higher than 
 any that could be earned by these men in other occupations. As 
 the laborers could not appeal, or did not appeal, directly to the 
 military authorities, but usually waited until their return home to 
 repeat the story of their wrongs, it was difficult to ascertain the 
 truth. Whenever an investigation was possible, ho\\ever, it was 
 usually discovered that the ill-treatment was due to a combina- 
 tion between interpreters, sub-contractors, and local officials. 
 The sub-contractors had to have men, and, either through inter- 
 preters or directly, would make contracts with the local officials 
 to supply a certain number of laborers. These were almost in- 
 variably secured one or two day's journey from the railway line: 
 as it would not do to attract too much attention by interfering 
 with the people living near the railway. The laborers would be 
 compelled to work for about one-fourth of the wages reallv paid, 
 and the balance would be divided between the interpreters and 
 local officials. In certain cases the people were allowed exemp- 
 tion from this drafting system upon the payment of ransom, 
 estimated upon the basis of the number of men which the\' had 
 been asked to supply. Only recently an officer, who during the 
 war had charge of the construction of an important section of 
 the Seoul-Wiju line, related a case of this kind. He was pac- 
 ing one dollar and thirty cents, Korean money, as a da_\'s 
 wages; the men were well treated, and food was clieaj) and 
 abundant. Still tlicre was constant trouble on account of in 
 sufficient sup])ly of labor, the reason for wln'ch tlie closest investiga- 
 tion failed to reveal. But only a few months ago (more tlian two 
 years, that is, after the experience) the officer met a man wlio 
 explained the reason. It seemed that the Korean Governor of 
 the province had an arrangement with tlie interpreters which was 
 mutually profitable even when lal)orers were not actuall}- ])rocure(i 
 for the work. The operations were carried on over a large exleiU 
 of territory distant, as was customar}-, several da_\'s journe}- from 
 the railway. As many laborers as c(Hild be induced, or forced, to
 
 38o IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 come, were ])ai(l thirty-five cents a day the conspirators pocketing 
 the balance. In tlie majority of cases where the people preferred 
 to purchase exemption, these ])recious rascals collected consider- 
 able sums. And, of course, the military authorities got all the 
 blame, as all this was done in their name. Sometimes the sub- 
 contractors assisted by sending out parties, Korean and Japanese, 
 armed with swords and pistols, for the purpose of intimidating 
 the unwilling or the recalcitrant. On several occasions condign 
 punishment was inllicted for offences of this kind, but as actual 
 violence was very rarely committed and the intimidation was 
 carried on quietly, where it could not easily be discovered, it was 
 difficult to secure convincing proof against the culprits. 
 
 Fair-minded persons, familiar with the facts, know that the 
 military authorities did all that could have reasonably been asked 
 to put a stop to such practices; but, occurring during a time of 
 war, many of these irregularities were of a nature which it was 
 difficult wholly to prevent. That officers in the field and at head- 
 quarters were always ready to listen to complaints and, so far as 
 lay in their power, to rectify wrongs, is an indisputable fact. 
 
 The reputation of the Japanese army, civil government, 
 and the people generally has suffered m^ore from the long- 
 standing and the more recent relations Ijetween Japan and 
 Korea than is customary elsewhere under similar circum- 
 stances. This is due partly to inexperience and over self- 
 confidence on their own part; but also in larger measure to 
 the, untrustworthy and corrupt witness of the Korean officials 
 and to the ignorance and credulity of the Korean ])eo])le; 
 most of all, however, to the prejudiced or malignant, untrue 
 reports of certain foreigners. During the occupation and 
 transit of the Japanese army in the late war, the charges of 
 cruelty and injustice on its part were not confined to the 
 construction and service of the military railway. While the 
 commissary de])artment was paying to the Korean con- 
 tractors the full market price for provisions and other su])- 
 plies, the contractors were compelling the Korean people to
 
 WRONGS: REAL AND FANCIED 381 
 
 furnish the supplies, either without pay or at greatly reduced 
 rates. From time immemorial, the people of Korea have 
 been accustomed to have their rice, chickens, ponies, and 
 service, levied upon by their own officials; in the present case 
 they, as a matter of course, attributed the sam.e manner of 
 getting what you want by taking what you see, to the 
 Japanese/ 
 
 Ignorance of the Korean language and customs is another 
 fruitful scource of l)ad repute for the Ja})anese. Even now, 
 in the city of Seoul, the Japanese who blunders into the 
 women's cjuarters, or even into their too near vicinity, in the 
 discharge of his duty to collect a bill, to make an inspection 
 or a report of some official cliaracter, or to inquire his way, 
 is liable to be charged with an intent to commit rape or some 
 other form of assault. The Japanese collector of taxes, or 
 customs, or the Japanese policeman who protects the ob- 
 noxious Korean official, or even the "impatriotic" Cabinet 
 Minister, is a particular object of Korean falsehood and 
 hatred. But all these complaints, althougli they have been 
 made much of by the anti-Ja])anese "friends" of Korea, and 
 in spite of the undoubted fact that they greatly increase the 
 feeling of bitterness between the two peoples and interfere 
 with the benevolent plans of the Resident-General, are in 
 themselves comparatively trivial. 
 
 Wholly false charges of o])pression and fraud of a much 
 more important character have been made against tlie Jap- 
 anese Go\'emment in Korea, eitlier in ignorance or with 
 malignity, and liave industrioush' Ijcen si)rcad al)road b}- tlie 
 subsidized or the deceived "foreign friends" of the Korean 
 Court. One of the most notable of such charges concerned 
 
 ' According to the testimony of travellers in llie interior of Korea, 
 it is extremely dilTicult to get any food, accommodation, or service, 
 even when desirous of ])aying the highest prict'S, on account of the ex- 
 perience with their own travelling officials, who never expect to pay 
 for anything exacted from the country people.
 
 J 
 
 82 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 the so-called "fisheries com])any." Its history is briefly this. 
 Certain Koreans came to a ''missionary friend" complaining 
 that the Resident-General had ])eremptorily dissolved a 
 Korean company which had a legal concession to develop 
 the fisheries industry, thus involving the shareholders in 
 hca\y losses. The presumption was that the unjust act was 
 intended to further in the future the Japanese interest in 
 this same industry. But the truth was that the Minister of 
 Agriculture, Commerce and Industry had in the Fall of 1906, 
 at the solicitation of a "Korean, notorious for previous par- 
 ticipation in malodorous schemes," secretly granted to a 
 native company a monopoly of all the fishing rights upon the 
 entire Korean coasts, except the whale fisheries. In addition 
 to this, this same company was given the exclusive right of 
 control o\cr all the fish markets in the Emj)ire, so that no 
 fish could be sold except at places designated by it and upon 
 payment to it of such sums as it might choose to exact. 
 When, however, sufficient funds were not speedily available 
 from Korean subscribers to float this monstrous and totally 
 illegal monopoly, a Japanese visiting capitalist was ap- 
 proached by the Korean promoter and asked to buy a half- 
 share of the enterprise. His mention of the investment 
 offered to him gave to the Residency-General its first knowl- 
 edge of the scheme. The Minister of Agriculture, Com- 
 merce and Industry was immech'ately informed tliat such a 
 concession was in ])lain violation of treaty riglils and highly 
 prejudicial to Korean private and public interests. The 
 Minister was also warned that the concession slioukl be can- 
 celled; he promised to do this, and it was supposed that he 
 had kept his word. But either through cowardice or con- 
 nivance at corruption, the promise was not fulfilled. Months 
 later, therefore, the Chief of the Commercial Department of 
 the Residency-General, Mr. Kiuchi, while making a tour of 
 inspection in Southeastern Korea, received a petition from,
 
 WRONGS: REAL AND FANCIED 383 
 
 the fishermen of the district, complaining that this same 
 company was levying taxes upon them and forbidding those 
 who did not pay the taxes to continue their fishing. The 
 complete dissolution of this illegal monopoly was saved from 
 being the object of popular resentment only by the fact that 
 its promoters had been ready to share their plunder with a 
 Japanese ! ^ 
 
 Another instance which illustrates, however, the habitual 
 exaggeration and ignorant credulity of the Koreans rather 
 than their well-known official capacity for fraud, is connected 
 with the estabhshment of the royal "stud-farm" near Pveng- 
 yang. In this case two native pastors from this city, as 
 members of a deputation to petition the redress of a great 
 wrong, came to a missionary friend in Seoul in great distress. 
 Their story was that the Korean officials of the Household 
 Department, in complicity with the Japanese officials, had 
 enclosed in stakes a territory having a population of fiftv 
 thousand people and comprising a vast quantity of arable 
 land. Within this large area, no one could sell the land, or 
 cut timber or grass, or plant crops, or bury the dead; or, in 
 brief, put the land to any of its ordinary uses. These official 
 prohibitions were said to have been inscribed upon the 
 stakes although the petitioners, on being questioned, could 
 not tell upon just how many of them. xAt Seoul, neither the 
 Korean nor the Japanese officials knew of any sucli project 
 in connection with the proposed stud-farm; allhougli it was 
 true that such a farm was to be established, under the joint 
 patronage of their jMajesties, the Emperors of Japan and 
 Korea. Communication with Marquis Ito, who was llicn in 
 Tokyo, brought a reassuring telegram from lu'm. Investiga- 
 tion showed that no notice of the kind had been put upon 
 any of the stakes which had been erected to sliow tliat all 
 
 ' It furnished Mr. Hulbert and Mr. Bethclf however, with a strikinj^ 
 instance of the way in which the Japanese are robbini,^ the Koreans.
 
 384 IN KOREA Wrril MARQUIS ITO 
 
 the government lands within the area deh'mitcd were re- 
 served for the uses of the farm. Nor did the pUicing of the 
 stakes put any restrictions wliatever upon the people, so far 
 as concerned their own pro})erty. The one stake on which 
 the mysterious notice did apj)ear had been driv-en some time 
 previous to the very existence of the scheme for a royal farm; 
 and it had reference to a totally different ])iecc of Imj)erial 
 property which it had been rlesigned to guard against en- 
 croachments from both Koreans and Ja])anese dwelling in 
 Pyeng-yang. All this excitement could ha\e been avoided 
 if the Korean officials had done their duty by way of inform- 
 ing and instructing the ])eoplc. But the simple truth is that 
 many of them and of the "foreign friends" of Korea do not 
 wish to avoid any popular excitement which will contribute 
 to the embarrassment and discredit of the Japanese Govern- 
 ment in Korea. The rather do they welcome all such excite- 
 ment. 
 
 The truth of this last remark is amply illustrated by the 
 treatment given to the "Pagoda Incident" one of the 
 "flagrant wrongs" done to Korea by the Japanese which was 
 on the carpet during our entire stay of two months in the 
 land. Viscount Tanaka, who is descrilxxl as "an ardent 
 virtuoso and collector," while visiting in Seoul was ap- 
 proached by a Japanese curio dealer with the suggestion that 
 he might add to his collection the ancient but neglected 
 pagoda then situated near Song-do. ^Mention of the matter 
 was made to the Korean ^Ministers of the Interior and of the 
 Household, and their approval obtained; and through them 
 the sanction of the Emperor was gained for its removal, as a 
 present to his distinguished guest. The actual work of the 
 removal was committed to the dealer who made the un- 
 fortunate suggestion, and who executed his job "with his 
 characteristic skill and audacity." Previous to its removal 
 this relic of former grandeur had for a long time been wholly
 
 The Stone-Turtle Monument.
 
 WRONGS: REAL AND FANCIED 385 
 
 neglected by the Korean Government and was, in fact, in 
 process of destruction by the Korean people, who were in the 
 habit of removing bits from it to use as medicine. At once, 
 however, a storm of indignant protest broke out; not, indeed, 
 among the Koreans left to themselves so much as on the part 
 of the "foreign friends" of Korea in their English papers and 
 foreign correspondence. The Viscount was called by terms 
 applicable to a common thief; the "robbery of the Pagoda," 
 the "rape of the Pagoda," the plunder of this "precious 
 religious relic" of Korea's former grandeur, was deplored 
 and abjurgated in the most extravagant terms. The Em- 
 peror doubtless chuckled; for while he cared little for the 
 Pagoda, he cared much for the discredit which the taking 
 away of it brought upon the Japanese. The unwise act was 
 virtually disowned by the Residency-General (Marquis Ito 
 was absent in Japan at the time of its removal), and was 
 severely criticised by the Japanese themselves; with the de- 
 parture of Mr. Hulbert for Russia the excitement over this 
 act of oppression gave way to more important political affairs . 
 Most ludicrous and pathetic but highly characteristic 
 of all these popular excitements was, perhaps, that which 
 arose through the mere proposal of a subject of debate by 
 a Japanese student in Waseda University, Japan: Whether 
 the Korean Emperor should not be made a noble of Japan ? 
 (Thus implying, of course, his descent from his Imperial 
 dignity and the virtual annexation of Korea.) The pro]:)Osal 
 was indeed never ado])lcd, and the ddjate never look i)lacc. 
 But the intolcral:)le insult to the Korean students at the 
 same university, and to the whole nation of Korea although 
 the authorities of Waseda at once rebuked the unfortunate 
 student was dwelt u])on, and exaggerated, and rub])ed into 
 the inflamed and sensitive skins of the people, with all the 
 vigor which the Korean patriots and their "foreign friends" 
 could command. And when some obscure but self-conceited
 
 386 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Japanese official, in Japan and not at all in Korea, published 
 a brochure giving fully two-score and more reasons why 
 Japan should promptly annex Korea, these same j^at riots and 
 their friends made all the use in their power of this insignificant 
 document to stir up sedition and murderous revolt. It was 
 the issue of it as a forgery bearing the official authorization 
 of the Ja])anese Government, which caused the excitement in 
 Pyeng-yang the story of which has already been told 
 (see p. 104 f.).' 
 
 It is not necessary, however, to multiply instances under 
 any of these heads. All classes of wrongs done the Koreans 
 by the Japanese important and trivial, real, exaggerated, or 
 falsely claimed are fast diminishing and are destined in time 
 to be reduced to a minimum. The Korean Central Govern- 
 ment is now more genuine, more intelligent, and more 
 efficient as distinguished from the mere wilfulness of the ex- 
 Emperor than it has ever been before. The reforms possi- 
 ble under the Convention of July, 1907, will afford a judiciary 
 system and judicial procedure hitherto impossible as respects 
 the administration of justice. The control of the local 
 magistrate and of the policing of city and country will con- 
 
 ' An occurrence, which mif;ht easily have become a much celebrated 
 instance of a Japanese attempt at robbery and oppression of the Ko- 
 reans, came to the writer's notice in a private but entirely trustworthy 
 way. One of the ex-Emperor's real foreign friends was sent for some 
 time ago and found His Majesty in a state of intense alarm and excite- 
 ment over a plot of the Residency-General which had just Ijcen made 
 known to him. A certain foreigner had authorized the story that the 
 Japanese authorities were trying to purchase three houses owned l;y a 
 Chinese and situated just opposite the Palace, with a view to tear them 
 down and erect barracks for the Japanese soldiers on the s[)ot. The 
 price offered by the Japanese was 60,000 yen; but if His Majesty 
 would furnish 65,000 yen, this friendly foreigner would buy the prop- 
 erty for him, and so defeat the nefarious project of the Japanese. 
 The Emperor wished at once to borrow the money. It was suggested, 
 however, that His Majesty should allow inquiry to be made before 
 parting with so much of his privy purse, ^\'hereupon, the following
 
 WRONGS: REAL AND FANCIED 387 
 
 tribute something quite new in the way of the blessings of 
 peace and prosperity to the common people. The reforms in 
 the public fmance and in taxation will stimulate trade and 
 commerce; the industrial and common-school education will 
 bring about an economic redemption. And if the teachers of 
 morals and religion, both native and foreign, behave with a 
 reasonable wisdom and self-control in the future, and with the 
 same devotion and enthusiasm which they have displa\ed in 
 the recent years, wrongs will be righted; justice will be done; 
 enlightenment will be spread abroad; and the Korea of the 
 near future will be a quite dilTerent nation from the Korea 
 of the long-continued, disgraceful, and distressful past. 
 
 conversation was held between the Chinese owner and the person to 
 whom the Emperor looked to procure for him the needed sum: 
 
 "I understand the three houses you own are offered for sale." 
 
 "Well, I do not particularly wish to sell them; but that Frenchman, 
 
 Mr. , has been here and wanted to get them. He said he wished 
 
 to put up a large store in their place." 
 
 "How much do you ask for the houses?" 
 
 "They are worth 13,000 yen; but if any one will take all three of 
 them, he may have them for 12,000 yen in cash." 
 
 "Is that so? I understood the Japanese wanted them to build bar- 
 racks for their soldiers on the land." 
 
 "I have not heard anything about the Japanese wanting them; it 
 was that Frenchman who said he wanted them, to build a store there." 
 
 The benevolent spirit of this enterprising foreign friend is revealed 
 more intimately when we learn that he threatened to shoot on the spot, 
 if he could only find out who he was, the man that had thwarted his 
 plan for this bit of real-estate speculation. The same intention was 
 avowed by the American miner against the foreign official of the Korean 
 Government whom he regarded as standing in the way of the success 
 of the "Poong Poo" Company (see p. 361 f.).
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 MISSIONS AND MISSIONARIES 
 
 Among the many vexatious problems occasioned in moflern 
 times by the increased intercourse of Western nations with 
 the Orient, those which arise in connection with the advent 
 and development of Christian missions are of no small im- 
 portance. In general, in this Cjuarter of the world the dij)lo- 
 mats and business men are upon one side of most of the con- 
 troverted questions; the missionaries and their supporters upon 
 the other. It is inevitable, and not necessarily discreditable 
 to either party, that dilTerences of opinion should exist between 
 these two classes as to the best practical answer to some of 
 these questions. Those few of the former class, who are 
 sincerely and unselfishly interested in moral and spiritual 
 things, and in the higher welfare of the world, and the scarcely 
 greater number of the latter class who have the spirit of 
 knightly gentlemen, a thorough culture, and are also of a wise 
 and broad mind, can usually approach very closely to a 
 sympathetic understanding of each other, if not toward 
 active co-operation. If, however, the di])lomat or business 
 man, as is so frequently the case, does not like to see the cause 
 of religion advancing, because of the sure instinct that its 
 success will limit, or stoj), many a nefarious or morally 
 doubtful practice, then, of course, the support of all who care 
 for the higher values must be given to the side of the mis- 
 sionaries. On the other hand, if the narrow prejudice, fanat- 
 icism, or intellectual and ethical weakness of the teacher of 
 foreign religion are seriously interfering with the legitimate
 
 MISSIONS AND MISSIONARIES 389 
 
 practices of diplomacy or commerce, our sympathies can 
 scarcely fail to turn in the other direction. Especially is this 
 true where such interference tends to produce disturbance of 
 the public order and to check genuine political and economic 
 reform. Yet in the one case, we cannot forget the injunction 
 of the Founder of Christianity to his disciples: "Be ye wise 
 as serpents and harmless as doves"; or the rebuke implied 
 in the declaration: "The children of this world are wiser in 
 their generation than the children of light." In the other case, 
 we have ringing in our ears the declaration which so many 
 centuries of history have confirmed: "Think not that I 
 came to send peace on the earth; I came not to send peace 
 but a sword." 
 
 In most cases of prolonged controversy over the conduct 
 of the missionary and the character of his work, there is more 
 or less of misunderstanding and of faulty behavior on both 
 sides. For missionaries are but men; and like men of all 
 other trades, businesses, professions, or callings, tlieyhave their 
 peculiar temptations, their liability to peculiar mistakes, and 
 to use the theological term their besetting sins. The past 
 and present relations of Christian missions to the Government 
 and people of Korea will be the better understood if we 
 consider briefly what some of these temptations arc. One 
 of the most potent, if not important, is the temptation to 
 make a good showing in the matter of statistics. That the 
 workman on the field should rejoice in a bountiful harvest 
 is not, in itself, a matter for surprise or relnike; just the con- 
 trary is true. Nor is it necessarily ])rcju(hcial to tlie real 
 good of the cau.->e, if the home officers and su})porlers of tlie 
 foreign denominational enter])rise implicitly seem to recjuire, 
 as a prerequisite to their continued zeal and generous sub- 
 scriptions, a fair annual showing as to tlic increase in the 
 number of converts. Ikit especially in Korea at tlie present' 
 time, it is quality and not numbers that ought chiclly to be
 
 390 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 allowed to count. And yet it is numbers and not quality 
 which is most reasonaljly to be expected and most likely 
 to be found, for two or three generations to come. 
 
 The paradox involved in the last sentences requires further 
 ex])lanation. In her interesting but higlily colored and ])y 
 no means altogether trustworthy book on Korea, Mrs. Bishoj) 
 makes the following declarations: "The idea of a nation 
 destitute of a religion and gladly accepting one brought by a 
 foreigner, must be dropped. The religion the Korean would 
 accept is one which would show him how to g<^'t money with- 
 out working for it. The indifference is extreme; the religious 
 faculty is absent; there are no religious ideas to api)eal to, 
 and the moral teachings of Confucius have little influence 
 with any class." ^ Of these declarations the last is the only 
 one which is wholly true. Moral teachings -of any kind ha\'e 
 had little effect hitherto in Korea. Briefly stated, and as 
 seen from the point of view afforded through a survey of the 
 history of man's religious exjjerience and of the ])rogress of 
 Christian missionary enterprise, the condition of the Korean 
 people is this. They are a nation by no means indifferent 
 to religion, or destitute of religious faculty and religious ideas. 
 But the religion almost universally prevalent has been for 
 centuries a low form of spiritism largely, devil-worship. 
 Even Korean ancestor-worship, unlike that in Japan, is still 
 almost exclusively motived and characterized by sujjer- 
 stitious and degrading fears rather than by the spirit of 
 reverence, loyalty, and affection. Among the so-called 
 civilized nations of the world there is jjrobably not another 
 where the prevalent native religion is of a more depressing 
 and degrading character than in Korea. 
 
 Now it is an experience very easy to explain from the 
 psychological point of view that where the other elements of 
 "uplift" begin to work powerfully among a people of a low 
 
 ' Korea and Her Neighbors, by Isabella Bird Bishop, p. 64.
 
 MISSIONS AND MISSIONARIES 391 
 
 form of religion, any imported religious faith and worship 
 which seems to offer help to, or to be in conformity with, this 
 work, may speedily secure the adherence of great multitudes 
 of the people. In Korea, for example, there is absolutely no 
 religion to compete with an imported Christianity. There is 
 no developed Confucianism as there is in China; no re- 
 formed or reflectively elaborated Buddhism, as there is in 
 Japan; no refined religious philosoj^hy and complicated 
 caste system as there is in India, x^ny kind of ferment in the 
 ancient but deplorably sad and oppressive conditions of the 
 popular life will inevitably, therefore, prove favorable to the 
 rapid spread of a modern and improved form of religion. 
 For the people must have some religion; and in Korea, what 
 is there to rival, for what it promises and performs, the 
 religion of the American and English missionaries? It is 
 this kind of nation which, so far as statistics that can boast 
 millions of converts are concerned, may under favorable 
 conditions be " born in a day." At the .same time, how- 
 ever, it is this kind of nation whose multitude of converts 
 will almost surely fail to apprehend or to appreciate the really 
 important things about the new faith which they hasten to 
 profess. It is this kind of nation that most needs, through 
 three or more generations, the solid work of education, and 
 the purifying process of severe discipline, in order to secure 
 the genuine spirit and true practice of the religion of Christ. 
 Education and prolonged moral discipline arc imperati\'e for 
 the establishment ^of a trustworthy Christian population in 
 Korea. Here the necessity for careful sifting and severe ])run- 
 ing is exaggerated beyond most precedents, because of the 
 undoubted fact that the underlying motives for a first ad- 
 herence to Cliristianity are, in a large i)ercentage of the so- 
 called converts, economic and j)olitical ratlier than moral and 
 spiritual. And, indeed, how-can the Korean common ])eople, 
 with their low intellectual, material, and moral ideals, rise en
 
 392 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 masse from the condition of superstitious and immoral devil- 
 worshippers to the faith and practice of a pure Christianity? 
 The most fundamental conceptions of God, of Christian 
 duty and Christian character, of the spiritual life, and of the 
 Divine relations to man, arc as yet almost totally lacking. 
 If the number of recent con\erts in Korea furnishes just cause 
 for ho])e and rejoicing, the character of these con\erts and 
 of their environment gives also cause for foreboding. 
 
 Closely connected with this tem[)tation is anotlier which is 
 less obvious and therefore more suljtle and dangerous. It 
 is the temptation to a wrong which has done more by far than 
 all the heresies to disgrace and damage the Christian Church 
 during the centuries of its history. This is tlie temptation, 
 even unconsciously, to make use for one's self, or for one's 
 converts, of the "double ethical standard." Neither in 
 Korea nor elsewhere can the missionary permit himself to 
 be betrayed into words and conduct which he would con- 
 sider unworthy of a "heathen" gentleman; or allow his dis- 
 ciples, without rebuke and discipline, in the practice of the 
 very vices for which he despises the Japanese or Chinese 
 coolie or tradesman. There are no two standards of moral- 
 ity one for the American or English teacher of religion and 
 another for the Korean or Japanese official; one for the ])riest 
 and another for the layman; one for the Korean confessor 
 and another for the foreign oi)pressor. It is true that for a 
 long time to come great discretion and much leniency must 
 be shown toward the Korean convert who continues in the 
 beliefs, or who relapses into the practices, of the low-grade 
 spiritism out of which he emerged when he became a Chris- 
 tian adherent. It is not impossible, however, that there has 
 been up to the present time too much of praise and too little 
 of rebuke and instruction meted out to the "adherents" of 
 Christianity in Korea. Indulgence in the vices of lying, dis- 
 honesty, intrigue, avarice, 'impurity, and race-hatred, cannot
 
 MISSIONS AND MISSIONARIES 393 
 
 be condoned by a display of amiability. Flagrant cases of 
 sexual misdemeanors ha\e, indeed, in comparatively few- 
 cases been made subjects for the severer discipline. But the 
 prophetic voice, raised unmistakably in evidence of the high 
 standard of morahty characteristic of "the religion of Christ " 
 is rec[uired under all such circumstances as those which 
 prevail among the Korean Christians thousands of whom, 
 during the religious awakening of the winter of 1906 and 
 1907, confessed to having lived for years in the habitual 
 practice of the vices enumerated above. 
 
 All of this, and even more of similar experiences connected 
 with the planting and growth of Christian missions in Korean 
 soil, is by no means necessarily discreditable to the mission- 
 aries themselves. On the contrary, much of it is ine\itable; 
 it is the same thing which has been the accompaniment of 
 the early stages of Christian propagandism in all ages, when 
 conducted in the midst of similar conditions. So-called 
 "conversions" may be rapid; the process of selection and the 
 labor of instruction and edifying follow more slowly, in due 
 time. The lower the existing religious condition of the 
 multitude, when the higher form of religion appeals to them, 
 the more prompt and extensive is the religious uplift of this 
 multitude; but the larger the number of the con\erts, tlie 
 more need of discretion and diligence for the process of im- 
 proving their cjuality. It is a reasonable ho])e tliat tlie same 
 workmen who ha\'e in the main })roved so successful in tlie 
 one form of Cliristian work will prove e(|ually successtul in 
 the somewhat different work whicli the future dcxi'lopmvnt 
 of Cliristian institutions in Korea im])oses upon ihcm. 
 
 There is another form of temptation against \\hicli il is 
 much easier for the religious ])ropagan(list to guard, but 
 which has been rather unusually strong and ])ervasi\r in 
 the recent history of Korean missions. This is the tempta- 
 tion to underestimate, or even des[)ise, the auxiliaries which
 
 304 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 are offered by an improved condition of llie material, legal, 
 and educational facilities to the more definitively religious 
 u})lift of the people. The missionary can contribute the 
 share of religion to progress and reform; and he can make 
 that a large share. But it is safe and wise for him not to 
 under-estimate or despise the support of the ci\il arm. Korea 
 is to-day, as has been already sliown in detail, a land un- 
 blessed by any of the institutions of a prosperous and ecpii- 
 table civil government of the modern Cliristian type, estab- 
 lished and fostered by its own ruling classes. The multitude 
 of its people arc even more than its rulers incapable of taking 
 the initiative in founding such institutions. The dawning 
 of the very idea of good go\'ernment has scarcely as yet risen 
 upon them. 
 
 Early Christianity was propagated in the Roman world 
 largely by making aNailable for its uses the means furnished 
 by the Roman Em])ire. And the early Christians were ex- 
 pressly enjoined to welcome all the support offered from, 
 and to offer their support to, whatever was good and helpful 
 in the existing civil government. It is then a conceit which 
 is unwarranted by the history of the Christian church that 
 makes the missionary tJiink, by "preaching the Gos])er' to 
 effect all which is necessary toward reforming a nation in the 
 condition of Korea at the present time, ]\^oreo^er, the 
 claim that it was Christianity especially in the form of a 
 so-called preaching of the Gospel which, unaided by other 
 historical and moral forces, ga\e to the Western world its 
 "democratic" advantages, is no longer tenable. The ex- 
 perience with Coptic Christianity in Egypt, with Armenian 
 Christianity in Western Asia, with the Greek Church in 
 Holy Russia, and with Roman Catholicism in S])ain and 
 South America (not to mention other notable examj)les) con- 
 tradicts this claim. In Korea itself it is not the Christian 
 Missionary who is building railways, making harbors, plant-
 
 MISSIONS AND MISSIONARIES 395 
 
 ing light-houses, devising a legal code, introducing a sound 
 currency, and attempting the task of reforming the finances, 
 the judiciary, the police, and the local magistracy. Even 
 granted that he is setting at work moral and spiritual forces 
 which will ultimately bring to pass all these public benefits, 
 it would take five hundred years for Korea wiiliout foreign 
 assistance from other forms of civilizing energv, to secure 
 these benefits. It is with no intention to depreciate the 
 work of missions in Korea that attention is called to this 
 obvious fact; its workmen had very unusual opportunities 
 to assist in improving the moral character of the Emperor, 
 the late Queen, the Court, and the other officials; and vet 
 they signally failed in this regard. Nor could they, unaided 
 by the civil arm of foreign powers, accomplish mucli toward 
 relieving the miserable and oppressed and immoral conditions 
 of living prevalent among the common people of Korea. 
 Just here, however that is, in the sphere of moral and 
 spiritual influence upon personal character, whether of 
 prince or peasant is where the influence of religion 
 ought to show itself supreme. The "])uriflcation" of 
 Korea recjuired, and still recjuires, the firm, strong liand of 
 the civil power. We cannot, then, credit any such sentiment 
 as that expressed in the following statement : ^ '' The inilucnce 
 of Christianity, so largely and ra])idly increasing in the 
 country, holds out a better prospect of siX)ntancous reform 
 than the outside, violent interference of a money-grabbing 
 and hated heathen enemy." In answer to e\'er}- such ex- 
 pression of sentiment, the protestation of the Resident- 
 General has been perfectly clear; and as fast and as far as 
 his influence could make itself felt, tlie conduct of affairs has 
 
 'Quoted from an anonymous letter, signed ''foreigner," and pub- 
 lished in thie Seoul Press, date of August '^6, 1007. The spirit of this 
 passage is characteristic of the entire letter, whicli was nearly a colunui 
 long, and which was, alas! written by a missionary.
 
 396 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS TTO 
 
 confirmed the protestation: "It is Japan's honest and sin- 
 cere purpose to make of the Koreans a self-rehant and re- 
 spectable people. Let there be an end, then, to the malign 
 and mischief-making efforts to alienate the Koreans from 
 those who to-day are through the sure work of History 
 charged with responsibility for this nation." ^ 
 
 It would seem, then, that prompt, open, and hearty co- 
 operation with all the efforts, of every kind, made by the 
 Japanese Protectorate to lift up the Korean people is the 
 only truly wise and Christian policy on the part of the mis- 
 sions in Korea.^ 
 
 How far the Korean missionaries have yielded to these and 
 other temptations and have behaved unwisely toward the 
 Japanese Government and before their Korean converts, it 
 is not our purpose to discuss in detail. And yet we cannot 
 avoid all reference to this delicate and unwelcome theme. 
 Wholesale charges of political intrigue and other unbecoming 
 conduct directed against the Residency-General have been 
 met by emphatic and equally wholesale denials especially 
 during the troubled times of 1906 and 1907. The charges, 
 on the one hand, have been made not simply by an irre- 
 sponsible Japanese press, but by several of the more reputa- 
 ble and generally trustworthy of its papers. On the other 
 hand, all similar charges arc met by Bishop M. C. Harris^ 
 
 * Editorial in the Seoul Press, August 8, 1907. 
 
 - In this connection it should be remembered that the Young Men's 
 Christian Association in Seoul is heavily subsidized by the Residency- 
 General in recognition of its services for the good of the Koreans; that 
 Marquis Ito sent a message of welcome, accompanied by a gift of 
 10,000 yen, to the "World's Christian Student Federation" at its meet- 
 ing in April, 1907, in Tokyo; and that His Excellency has taken all 
 possible pains to assure the Christian missionaries in Korea of his 
 desire for their active co-operation, by use of the moral and spiritual 
 forces which they wield, with his plan to use the allied economic and 
 educational forces, for the betterment of the Korean nation. 
 
 ^ Letter to the Japan Times, published, Tokyo, May 9, 1907.
 
 MISSIONS AND MISSIONARIES 397 
 
 with the assurance " because of full knowledge of the sit- 
 uation in Korea covering the space of three years," "that 
 no American missionary has been identified with poHtical 
 movements," . . . but that "in all the far-reaching plans 
 of the Residency- General to promote the welfare of Korea 
 and Japan as well, the missionaries are in hcartv accord." 
 Yet again, on the other side, repeated representations of a 
 quite opposite character to that of Bishop Harris have fre- 
 quently appeared, both in letters and papers, in the United 
 States and in England. 
 
 The exact truth is with neither of these contentions; to 
 appreciate it one must bear in mind the difficult situation in 
 w^hich the missionaries in Korea have been placed. All the 
 wrongs (as their story has been told in the last chapter), 
 real or fancied, important and trivial but true, or important 
 and trivial but falsely alleged, have been appealed to them by 
 their Korean converts and also by Korean adventurers, with 
 claims for sympathy and for assistance. What was said of the 
 Cretans in old times may be said of the Koreans to-day: 
 they are liars quite generaUy. Even when they do not intend 
 deliberately to deceive, they find it impossible to refrain from 
 gross exaggeration. On the other hand, the missionaries, 
 where their sympathies are wrought upon by their own chil- 
 dren in the faith all the more on account of the mental and 
 moral weakness of those children are a])t to be over- 
 credulous, and are not always sane in judgment or ]~)rudent 
 in conduct. These virtues are ])erl"iaps too mucli to ex])ect; 
 perhaps they are not e\en the appro|)riate \irtues for a 
 Christian woman when one of her own sex ex])oses Ijruises 
 which she ahcges to have ])cen inllicted Ijy the hands of a 
 "heathen coolie." At sucli moments it is not eas}- to re- 
 member the deeds of her own countrywomen in the South, 
 or of her own countrymen in San Francisco, in the Phihp- 
 pines, or in South Africa.
 
 398 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Furthermore, it eannot l3C truthfully claimed that none of 
 the missionaries have ever meddled in j)olitics with a view 
 to injure the Japanese Government in Korea. It was, in 
 fact, an American missionary who, after one of his colleagues 
 upon the mission field, while expressing his sympathy with 
 the Korean Emperor, had refused to send a secret telegram 
 asking for interference from the President of the United 
 States, did send such a telegram; and when sternly rebuked 
 by the diplomatic representative of his own nation for con- 
 duct so unbecoming to his profession, he re[)lied with an 
 assertion of the right to do as he pleased in all such matters. 
 Others have, from time to time, allowed themselves to be 
 used by the more wily Korean, whether un-Christian official 
 or Christian convert, so as to involve themselves in implied 
 comphcity with poHtical intrigues. If it is a mistake or 
 even worse than a mistake to circulate reports of evil with- 
 out examination into their accuracy, and to allow in all one's 
 attitude toward the powers that be, unverified suspicions and 
 secret hostilities to dominate, then a considerable number of 
 the missionary body in Korea must plead guilty in the past 
 to this mistake. But most of all has this body suffered from 
 its failure to disavow and practically to dissolve all connection 
 with those other "foreign friends" of Korea who have during 
 the past few years brought upon her Emperor and her people 
 much more of misery and of harm than has been WTought by 
 all the irresponsible and disreputable Japanese adventurers 
 taken together. 
 
 A marked improvement, however, in the relations between 
 the missionaries and the Japanese Government in Korea has 
 characterized the treatment of the more recent events. For, 
 although there was inevitable a certain intensifying of hostile 
 feeling by the uprising and bloodshed that followed the Con- 
 vention of July, 1907, the active co-operation of the most 
 influential majority of the missionaries in the plans of the
 
 MISSIONS AND :^IISSIONARIES 399 
 
 Residency-General for the future welfare of the Korean people 
 seemed to have been by this time assured. During the 
 recent troublous times in spite of charges to the contrary 
 they appear to have remained, almost without exception, 
 faithful to their true calling and reasonably effective in limit- 
 ing or preventing the yet sorer evils that might ha\-e followed 
 the abdication of the Emperor, the disbandment of the 
 Korean army, and the tightening of Japan's grip upon 
 Korean internal affairs. With certain, not very numerous, 
 exceptions and those mostly among the spurious Christians 
 who used the title only as a cover of selfish or foolish political 
 aims the converts also acc[uitted themselves well. The 
 Korean Christians and their foreign leaders were favored by 
 the Japanese Government with special protection when the 
 mad and cruel Korean mob rose up, in veritable ancient 
 fashion, to plunder and to murder atrociously, in spots 
 favorable to such activity througliout the land. Thus in the 
 emergency which, thanks to the wisdom of both kinds of re- 
 forming and restraining forces, was after all far less great 
 than miglit have been expected, Korea made at comparatively 
 small expense a great stej) forward toward the position of a 
 truly civilized and prosperous nation. And if these same two 
 forces the economical and judicial, backed Ijy the police 
 and the military, and the moral and s])iritual force on which 
 Christianity relies continue to work in accord, as we may 
 hope they will, the full redemption of Korea in the nearer 
 future is assured. 
 
 Of the administrative mistakes wliich liavc hindered the 
 progress of modern missions elsewhere there appear to have 
 been comparative!}- few in Korea. Among such mistakes, 
 perhaps the following two are most important: first, the 
 failure to occupy strongly certain strategic centres with mis- 
 sionary institutions, and to postpone the occupation of other 
 less important places for the work of tlie trained native helper,
 
 400 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Biblc-rcadcr, evangelist, or pastor; and, second, the rivalries 
 and waste of denominational jealousy and exclusiveness. In 
 Korea, the iwo cities of Seoul and Pveng-yang have wisely been 
 selected as centres in which to build up a " plant " of Christian 
 institutions of various kinds churches, schools, hospitals, and 
 seminaries for the training of native assistants. Further, the 
 two largest missionary bodies namely, the American Metho- 
 dists and American Presbyterians, have worked together with 
 admirable respect for each other's rights, and in sincere co- 
 operation. 
 
 There is one other matter of policy touching the adminis- 
 tration of missions which, in this connection, it is fitting to 
 mention, but about which anyone with the views of the 
 writer might well hesitate to express publicly an opinion. 
 It is true, however, in the judgment of many of the wisest 
 friends of missions, that in the Far East the sphere of woman 
 in missionary work should be more carefully guarded and 
 even restricted. It is impossible to make the inhabitants of 
 the Orient, in general, understand the propriety of foreign 
 women being on terms of intimacy, even as religious teach- 
 ers, with 'native young men. On the other hand, women 
 must, as a matter of course, be employed in all the work 
 of the most intimate character, and within the home circle, 
 which concerns their own sex. It is also true that not a few 
 of the most serious difficulties and perplexing cases of friction 
 between the missionaries and the diplomats and civil magis- 
 trates, when traced to their real origin, are due to the more 
 personal and emotional way in which matters of public 
 interest are regarded b_y the gentler sex. The legitimate 
 work of foreign Christian women in the Far East is invalu- 
 able; but it should be private and confined, for the most 
 part if not exclusively, to intercourse with native girls and 
 AA'omen. In all administrative affairs, and in general where 
 the missions come into closest contact with the civil authori-
 
 MISSIONS AND MISSIONARIES 401 
 
 tieS; it is better to-day, as it was in the days of earlv Christi- 
 anity, that her voice should not be heard. 
 
 The recent history of the planting and growth of Christian 
 missions in Korea shows a period of blood}^ persecution which 
 was followed, less than a score of years later, by a period of re- 
 markably rapid increase. In 1707 some French priests from 
 Peking visited the northern border of the peninsula, but were 
 unable to enter the country. It was three-quarters of a 
 century later (1783) that Thomas Kim, a Korean youth who 
 had been converted to Christianity under the Portuguese 
 bishop, Alexandria de Gloria, came over from China and 
 succeeded in introducing the foreign religion into his native 
 land. A year later a royal decree was issued against Chris- 
 tianity, and Thomas Kim was executed for his faith's sake. 
 But, although two other Korean Christians who had been 
 baptized in Peking were beheaded in Seoul, Decemlx^r 8, 
 1 791, the new religion began to spread rapidly in Korea. 
 The usual course of such efforts was being run: others were 
 executed, a new edict in 1802 was issued against Christianity, 
 and yet, "this added much to the knowledge of the faith." 
 In 1836, Pierre ]\Iaubant, the second Papal nominee to the 
 post of Vicar Apostolic of Korea, reached Seoul after an 
 arduous journey; and when three years later still another 
 murderous edict was issued, this Christian Apostle and the 
 two other French missionaries who had subsequently joined 
 him, under instruction from one of the three. Bishop Imbert, 
 surrendered themselves to martyrdom in the hope of staying 
 the persecution of their Korean converts. Still Christianity 
 continued to grow in the number of its adherents; and ])y the 
 year i860, the foreign religion counted nearly 20,000 native 
 converts. Then began, in the carl\- part of 1866, the infamous 
 slaughter of the faithful under the Tai Won Kun, tlie father 
 of the "amiable" ex-Em])eror, and the man "with thelx)wels 
 of iron and the heart of stone." Within some Ine vears
 
 402 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 about one-half of the entire number of converts had paid the 
 j)enalty with their lives. 
 
 It is not well to forget these facts of history in connection 
 with our estimate of the character of the Korean (iovernment, 
 the Korean [)eople, and the development of Christian Missions 
 in Korea. Under the son of this cruel father, the late Em- 
 peror, precisely the same thing might have taken place at 
 any time, had it been for his interests, in his own sight, to 
 have it so; and had it not been for his fear of the conse- 
 quences, after foreign control began to exercise some restraint 
 over native cruelty. It is foolish to suppose that the religion 
 or the life of the Protestant missionary, for example, who has 
 served the ex-Emperor as physician, are any dearer to His 
 Majesty than were the religion and the services of the French 
 Roman Catholic priests to the Tai Won Kun. The first 
 thing, indeed, which the earlier treaties with foreign nations 
 demanded as their right was the "free exercise of their 
 religion in the treaty ports for the subjects of the signatory 
 Powers; nor to this day does any article, expressly' sanction- 
 ing missionary enterprise, appear in any of the treaties." 
 That the Emperor, when freed from the influence of the Tai 
 Won Kun, was in his youth somewhat sincerely inclined to a 
 more liberal policy toward foreign religions is undoubtedly 
 true; but almost as undoubtedly, that his kindness toward 
 American missionaries has been from a purely jjolilical 
 motive and that his use of them has been, not at all to learn 
 the truths of the Christian religion, but to discover through 
 them new and improved methods of soliciting and procuring 
 "help" from so-called Christian nations. 
 
 In recent years, moreover, repeated instances have occurred 
 of the indisposition or inability of the Korean Government to 
 protect either the foreign missionaries or their native converts. 
 
 ' See Problems of the Far East, by the Hon. George N. Curzon, M.P. 
 (1894), pp. 192-197.
 
 MISSIONS AND MISSIONARIES 403 
 
 During the second Tong Hak uprising in the South, in May 
 of 1894, the American missionaries were called into Seoul 
 for their safe protection. The Chinese army in Korea during 
 the Chino- Japan war was everywhere a source of terror to 
 the foreign preachers of Christian doctrine and to their 
 avowed Korean converts; and in July of 1894 a French 
 priest was murdered by Chinese soldiers at Kong Hyen, near 
 Asan. On the contrary, both the foreign and the native 
 Christians felt quite free from anxiety when the troops of 
 Japan were in control of Korean territory. The spirit of the 
 official classes toward the foreign religion was revealed in 
 clear light when the Korean ^Minister of Education, in October 
 of 1896, issued a book entitled "The Warp and Woof of 
 Confucianism," which was so offensive that it was objected to 
 by the Foreign Representatives in a body as being disrespect- 
 ful to them. In general, the capricious favors of an unscrupu- 
 lous monarch, who would readily and even gladly deliver to 
 death those whom he has tried to make, whether with success 
 or not, his tools to help carve a way through confining sur- 
 roundings, are a poor substitute for a system of law and 
 justice, as a soil into which to pour the seed of Christian truth. 
 There are said now to be thousands of native Roman- 
 Catholic Christians scattered about in the country of Korea. 
 Many of the priests, who are natives, live with their converts; 
 but it is the policy of the Church to have every one of its 
 members visited once in each year by his spiritual father. 
 The French CathoHc Cathedral (dedicated ]\Iay 29, 1898) 
 and establishment is one of the most cons])icuous ol)jects in 
 Seoul. The archljishop in charge is an intelligent, kindly, and 
 devout man. Wliile speaking with mild disapproval of the 
 treatment received by his converts a year or two before the 
 arrival of the Resident-General, and exjjressing his fear that 
 the Koreans might inevitablv be driven to the wall by the 
 multitudinous incoming
 
 464 IN KORKA Wmi MARQUIS ITO 
 
 race, he gratefully admitted the marked improvement in con- 
 ditions which Marcjuis Ito was bringing to pass. To " the 
 Church," however, all political institutions were indifferent : 
 Her work remained ever one and the same, and ever ecjualiy 
 secure. 
 
 The story of Protestant missionary enterprise in Korea 
 since the arrival, in June, 1883, on a tour of inspection, of 
 Dr. R. S. McClay, has been frequently told. It need not be 
 repeated here; for the ])urpose of this chapter is onl}- to sketch 
 in barest outline the relations existing between the reforms 
 planned by the Residency-General and the welfare of Korea 
 as depending upon the progress of the Christian religion there. 
 General Foote, who was then United .States ^Minister, pre- 
 sented to the Emperor a statement of the object of the pro- 
 posed mission which, it was understood, would be encouraged 
 to work most acceptably along medical and educational 
 lines. The summary of what has actually been accomplished 
 along these particular lines has already been given (Chap. 
 XIV). Acting on the suggestion of Dr. McClay, the Board 
 of Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the 
 United States sent out two missionaries, one a graduate of tlie 
 College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York City (Dr. 
 Scranton, who, after a long and useful service as a missionary, 
 has recently been made a Professor in the Government 
 Medical School), and the other a graduate of Drew Theolog- 
 ical Seminary, Mr. Henry Gerhardt Appenzeller. Before 
 these gentlemen reached Seoul the bloody events of 1884 had 
 taken place. In 1887 followed Rev. George Heber Jones; and 
 in the same year Rev. Franklin Ohlinger was transferred from 
 China to Korea. Other helpers were added to this mission, 
 as the demands of the work grew, until the report for 1907 
 shows that forty-two foreign members and thirty-five Korean 
 preachers, ten of whom are ordained, are engaged under its 
 auspices in the work of pro])agating Christianity on Korean
 
 MISSIONS AND MISSIONARIES 405 
 
 soil. In recent years the more visible signs of success have 
 greatly increased. The summary of statistics presented 
 before the Korean ^Mission Conference at its session of June, 
 1906, was as follows: Full members, 2,810; probationers, 
 9,981; Sunday Schools, 116, with teachers and scholars 
 numbering 8,943. But only a year later, the total connection 
 of the Church of this denomination in Korea was given at 
 23,453- of which 19,570 were probationers a gain over the 
 preceding year of 10,664, or nearly one hundred ])er cent. 
 During the same year 3,553 persons had been baptized. 
 
 It was on April 5, 1885, that Rev. H. G. Undcnvood -of tlic 
 American Presbyterian Mission arrived and "formally 
 opened Protestant clerical mission work." He was followed, 
 on June 21st of the same year, by J. W. Heron, j\I.D., who 
 died in Seoul, July 26, 1890. To this mission other workmen 
 were added from time to time; and in November of 1892 a 
 mission of the Southern Presbyterian Church of America was 
 started by Messrs. Junkin, Reynolds, and Tate, and a ]\Iiss 
 Davis. Still later, on September 7, 1898, three clergymen of 
 the Canadian Presbyterian Church ^Vlessrs. Foote, ^^IcRae, 
 and Dr. Grierson arrived to open a mission of this denomi- 
 nation. These several Presbyterian missions have been, on 
 the whole, well supported from the churches at home, well 
 manned, and more than ordinarily successful in planting and 
 upbuilding the various classes of missionary institutions. 
 The table compiled from the council statistics of these 
 missions for the year-ending June 30, 1906, makes the follow- 
 ing exhibit of results. The total number of missionaries was 
 then 77, of whom 41 were women, and 12 Avcre engaged in 
 medical work. The native heljjers numbered 373, of whom 
 81 were unordained preachers, and 201 teachers (men), with 
 42 Bible women and women teachers. The fruits of these 
 laborers were 20 fuHy organized cluirches and 628 out- 
 stations, or places of "regular meeting," of which 48:. were
 
 4o6 IX KORKA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 put down as "entirely self-supporting." Connected with them 
 were 12,546 communicants, of which 2,811 had been ad- 
 ded during the year, and 44,587 "adherents," with 11,025 
 "catechumens" and 36,975 memlxTs of the Sunday Schools. 
 The average attendance uj)on these regular meetings was 
 35,262; and the total of native contributions was $27,418.89, 
 as reckoned in United Stales gold. When the })overty of the 
 average Korean Christians and the difficulties of various 
 kinds which hinder them from the regular discliarge of any 
 of their obligations are considered, this showing of attendance 
 at church services and of liberality in giving cannot be 
 pronounced otherwise than remarkable. Tlie increase in 
 every form of work since the rej^ort, the statistics of which 
 have just been (pioted, is no less remarkable in the Presby- 
 terian Missions than in that of the ^Methodist Episcopal 
 Church. 
 
 These two American missions are, among those of the Prot- 
 estant churches, much the most active and successful in 
 showing such results as can take the form of a statistical 
 exhibit. But other missionary enterprises are wortliy of 
 mention. In September of 1S90 Bishop Corfe (whose 
 diocese was Korea and Shing-king, /. c, Manchuria) arrived 
 at Seoul to establish a Church of England Mission. He was 
 preceded by Dr. Julius Wiles, De{)Uty Surgeon-General 
 Retired, who opened medical work for the mission and who 
 was succeeded in 1893 by Dr. E. H. Baklock. With the addi- 
 tional help of other clergy anrl lay helpers, and of sisters of 
 St. Paul's, Kilburn, the customary forms of church work- 
 evangelizing, translating and printing a Korean prayer- 
 book and other i)ublications, hospital work and care of 
 the poor and sick have been undertaken with that rare 
 good sense and self-flenial which cliaracterize so much of 
 the missionary enterprise of this Church. 
 
 It was not until 18(^9, in the month of January, that the
 
 MISSIONS AND MISSIONARIES 407 
 
 Russian Church Alission arrived in Seoul. It consisted of the 
 Rev. Deacon Nicholas; and he was followed by the Right 
 Rev. Archimandrite Chrisanff and ^Ir. Jonas Levtchenke, 
 Psalmist, on February 12, 1900. The dwellings and school- 
 houses for this mission were estabhshed near the West 
 Gate and were first occupied in the summer of the same 
 year. 
 
 No complete account or just estimate of the Christian forces 
 now at work for the religious and moral uplift of Korea could 
 be given without emphasizing the presence and fine progress 
 of the Young Men's Christian Association at Seoul. The 
 operations of this association did not begin until November 
 of 1 90 1. Their work has been much embarrassed in the 
 country places by the illicit use of their name to cover and 
 commend various unwise and sometimes corrupt and danger- 
 ous attempts at so-called "reform," or even at sedition and 
 revolution. In Seoul itself where is the only legitimate and 
 recognized Y. M. C. A. some of their make-believe or would- 
 be friends have done their good cause much more of damage 
 than has been done by any of their avowed enemies. In 
 spite of these embarrassments, however, and of others to which 
 fuller reference need not be made in this connection, the 
 work of this benevolent association has been most successful. 
 x'\s we have already said, the value of this work for the 
 moral, industrial, and educational reform of the Koreans has 
 been ofiicially recognized by a generous subsidy from the 
 Government. Its efficiency and extent cannot fail to be 
 greatly increased when its new building, so commodious and 
 centrally located, has been in use for a number of years. 
 The writer gratefully acknowledges that during his visit in 
 April and Alay, of 1907, it was largely through the manly 
 courage and good sense of its foreign oflicers, and of that 
 portion of its native ofllcial and other membership which 
 followed the lead of these foreign ofiicers, that he was able
 
 4o8 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 to leave any impression upon the Korean Christians. Indeed, 
 in the ea])ital city, no other means were found for even saving 
 a private word to the Koreans in behalf of education, morals, 
 or religion. It was only when away from the pernicious inllu- 
 cnces of the Court notably at Pyeng-yang that the courage 
 of the missionaries seemed sufficient to sustain a platform for 
 such efforts, on the part of the guest of Marcjuis Ito, in the 
 churches themselves.* 
 
 The "Great Revival'' of 1906-1907, which added so 
 much to the encouragement of the missionaries and to tlie 
 number of their converts, can best be understood in its most 
 characteristic features when viewed in the light of what has 
 already been said about the nature of the Koreans themselves. 
 After a period of silent and slow preparation, a sudden seizure 
 of the impulse to repent and confess came upon the entire 
 body of native Christians, and even carried away the foreign 
 teachers and preachers also. Night after night, and several 
 times each Sunday, the churches were crowded to suffoca- 
 tion with hearers of their strange words, and witnesses of their 
 unwonted actions. Especially at Pyeng-yang did the j)eoj)le, 
 both Christian and non-Christian, flock in from the surround- 
 ing country first to "look-see," perhaps, and then to j)artici- 
 patc in these extraordinary performances. In numerous 
 instances, the penitent rose with an appearance of enforced 
 calmness and began cjuietly to tell of the sinful experiences 
 of the years both preceding and following his ado})tion of tlie 
 Christian name. But as he proceeded his excitement grew; 
 his voice rose to a higher and yet higher j)itch and assumed 
 a tone of ever-increasing shrillness; sobbing and wailing in- 
 tervened; and, finally, he began to sway to and fro, to beat 
 his head against the mats, sometimes so violently as to cause 
 the blood to flow; then he fell to the floor, where he ended 
 his experiences in a complete nervous collapse and lay pros- 
 
 ' Compare the narratives of Part I, pp. 37-64; 90-1 11.
 
 MISSIONS AND MISSIONARIES 409 
 
 trate, frothing at the mouth and groaning piteously, or became 
 quite unconscious. 
 
 What may be considered as an official account by an eye- 
 witness of two of these remarkable meetings gives the follow- 
 ing description of the phenomena: 
 
 All were prostrate on their faces, and all alike, with the excep- 
 tion of the few who had already received a blessing, were in an 
 agony of repentance. Sometimes they beat their foreheads and 
 hands against the floor, sometimes they literally writhed in an- 
 guish, roaring as if the very devils were tearing them; and then 
 at last, when there seemed no more power of resistance left, they 
 would spring to their feet and with terrible sobs and crying, pour 
 out their confessions of sin. And such confessions! It was like 
 hell uncovered. Everything from murder, adultery, and the most 
 inconceivable abominations of uncleanness, through arson, drunk- 
 enness, robbery, thieving, lying, down to hatreds, spites, and 
 envyings, was emptied out, and with what shame and loathing! 
 
 At the meeting of the second evening, before even the leader 
 took his place, the tide of prayer began rising, and although three 
 young men arose one after another, and attempted to lead in 
 prayer, their voices were not heard in the tumult of intercessory 
 supplication that broke out. As prayer continued the building 
 began to resound with groans and cries. Many fell forward on 
 their faces and wallowed on the floor. When something like a 
 semblance of order could be restored, an opportunity was given to 
 all who had any ill-feeling toward any one present, or who had 
 wronged any of the others in any way, to make confession and 
 ask forgiveness. In a very few minutes the meeting was resolved 
 into numberless groups of students weeping in each other's arms. 
 Nor did the members of the faculty escape; and it was interesting 
 to see them, with perhaps two or three bo_\s weeping at their 
 knees, and others hanging about their necks. 
 
 In the later stages of the revival, those wlio went to mock 
 remained to be carried away by the same im])ulse; and when 
 they were exhorted by the foreign or nati\e helpers, cither
 
 4IO IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 at their place, wedged in among tlie others (for the Korean 
 audiences sit ])acked together on the floor), or were dragged 
 or helped forward to the altar, they experienced the relief and 
 ha])i)iness of "being converted.'' 
 
 From the princij)al centres of this religious movement it 
 s])read to surrounding places sometimes through those who 
 returned home from these centres, sometimes through 
 delegates sent out from the same centres. One of the most 
 remarkable of the latter cases was the exj)erience of the 
 delegates deputed from P}'eng-yang to visit Chemulpo. At 
 first, when the church at the latter place saw the brethren 
 from the northern city, heard their tale, and witnessed their 
 testimony and procedure, they were greatly alarmed. It was 
 even suggested that one of the visiting brethren should be 
 put to death as an emissary of the devil, if not a devil him- 
 self. But the zeal of the preachers from Pyeng-yang 
 finally triumphed; and the church at Chemulpo itself be- 
 came the scene of similar confessions and convulsions of 
 penitence. 
 
 The student of similar phenomena in the past will have 
 no difficulty in understanding and appreciating at their true 
 value the experiences of the ''great revival" in Korea. 
 Similar emotional manifestations are common enough on a 
 variety of occasions, as well in the Korea of the past as in the 
 Korea of to-day. Indeed, at the very time that the native 
 Christians of Pyeng-yang were wailing and sobbing, and 
 beating their heads on the mats, on account of their sins, the 
 multitude of the same city were doing the same things because 
 they had been deceived into believing that their Emperor was 
 to be dethroned and carried off to Japan. From time 
 immemorial, the proper official way to attract the attention 
 of His Majesty to any request of his officials, or of the people, 
 has been to make somewhat similar demonstrations before 
 the palace gates or inside the palace walls. In a word, such
 
 MISSIONS AND MISSIONARIES 411 
 
 is the Korean mode of manifesting any strong emotional 
 excitement. 
 
 But to discredit altogether the sincerity of these confessions 
 or the genuineness of the following conversion would be a 
 no less grave mistake, from every point of view, than to place 
 a specially high value on them because of their abnormal ' 
 psychological character. It is not strange that the Korean 
 populace is Korean still, when it suddenly takes to some new 
 kind of reform, or adopts some new kind of religion. Such 
 strong and contradictory, and even convulsive, reactions 
 characterize the native in his politics, his morals, his religion, 
 and his behavior generally. The amiably cruel Emperor, 
 the smiling and good-natured but, on occasion, atrociously 
 barbarous court official, the peasant who seems as gentle as 
 his ox until he turns upon the ox, or upon his neighbor, or 
 upon the local magistrate, to tear in pieces, reveal essentially 
 the same psychical characteristics. 
 
 But how, it may be asked, as to the kind of Christian 
 father or mother. Christian citizen, Christian leader, which 
 will be evolved from this multitude of converts? Here, again, 
 the only fair and reasonable answer will avoid the two alike 
 tempting but, in the end, disappointing extremes. During 
 the writer's stay in Korea, Dr. George Heber Jones, who 
 fifteen years before had been barred outside of tlie gates, 
 preached at Kang Wha to a congregation of lifteen hundrerl 
 willing hearers, about one thousand of whom were professing 
 Christians. Multitudes in the whole Island were just then 
 turning toward Christianity entire schools and, in some 
 instances, almost entire villages, were professing the new 
 faith. In their burning zeal the converts were even resorting 
 to a sort of boycott in order to compel recalcitrants to the 
 adoption of this foreign religion. Yet when a colleague of 
 
 ' "Abnormal," i. e., from the point of view of what would be expected 
 from minds of a higher degree of culture and of self-control.
 
 412 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 this missionary, a member of the same mission, was a few 
 weeks later urged to baptize some sixty converts in one village, 
 he refused to comply with the recjuest in the case of a single 
 ])erson, because examination showed that none of the sixty 
 had as yet sufficient knowledge of what was really meant by 
 j)roclaiming themselves Christians. 
 
 Here, again, however, the student wise in the things of man's 
 religious experience will not depreciate the value of such 
 early but ignorant steps, wherever they are taken from a 
 motive not too degradedly selfish, toward a higher spiritual 
 life. The infancy of the Church in Korea will, as a matter 
 of course, be characterized by the infantile condition of the 
 Korean mind, united, alas! with a morality that is far removed 
 from the innocence customarily attributed to the human 
 infant. But already the later experiences of modern missions 
 fully authorizes the expectation that what Roman Catholicism 
 earlier did to fit the Koreans for martyrdom under the Tai 
 Won Kun, will be much surpassed in what the combined 
 efforts of all the Christian institutions now planted in Korea 
 will do to fit her children for a nobler and happier life under 
 the Japanese Protectorate. 
 
 In fine, the Japanese Protectorate under the present 
 Resident-General, and the foreign Christian missionaries with 
 their native converts, command the two sources of power 
 and influence which must unitedly work for the uplift of the 
 Korean nation. That His Excellency, the Marquis Ito, takes 
 this view of the matter, he has both by speech and action 
 made sufficiently clear. That the majority of the missionary 
 body are taking the same view of the same matter is becoming 
 every day more clear. If, through any honest difference of 
 opinion upon important matters of policy, the leaders of 
 these two forces should fail to co-operate in the future, it 
 would be deplorable indeed. But if either one of the two 
 should, whether through avoidable misunderstanding or
 
 MISSIONS AND MISSIONARIES 413 
 
 because of the decline in an intelligent and conscientious 
 desire for the good of Korea, refuse to co-operate, the refusal 
 would be no less of a misfortune; it would be also worthy 
 to be called a crime.
 
 CHAPTER XVTIT 
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTKRWARD 
 
 A TELEGRAM from Thc Hague to the Orient, bearing date 
 of July I, 1907, announced the arrival of three Koreans at 
 the place of Peace Conference, and the publication over their 
 signatures, in a French ]japer called The Peace Cunjcrence 
 Times, of an open letter addressed to the delegates of all the 
 Powers. In their letter these men claimed to have been au- 
 thorized by the Emperor, in a document bearing his seal, to 
 take part in the Conference as thc delegates of Korea. In 
 this connection they repeated thc time-worn falsehoods as 
 to the conditions under which the Treaty of November, 1905, 
 was signed, and as to the present treatment accorded by the 
 Japanese to the ruler and people of Korea. In view of these 
 alleged facts they made in behalf of their country an appeal 
 for pity and for relief to all the foreign delegates, kz was 
 inevitable from the beginning, the efforts of this deputation at 
 The Hague came to naught; and after the death of one of 
 their number they departed to carry on their mission of aj)- 
 peal, first in England and afterward in the United States. 
 So thoroughly discredited, however, had the word of such 
 Koreans and of their ''foreign friends" already become in 
 the hearing of all acquainted with the facts, that the mission 
 met with as little real success in these other foreign countries 
 as at The Hague. So far as its original purpose was con- 
 cerned, it ended in failure miserable and complete. But in 
 Korea itself the results were by no means transient or trivial. 
 
 The news of the appearance of the so-called Korean dele-
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 415 
 
 gates at the World's Peace Conference was received in Seoul 
 on July 3d. It will be remembered (see p. 83 f.) that to 
 quote from the Seoul Press of the next day "when ]\Ir. H. 
 B. Hulbert left for Europe under peculiar circumstances, 
 there were rumors that he was charged by the Emperor of 
 Korea with some political mission to The Hague." This 
 paper then goes on to say that it did not attach much im- 
 poirtance to the rumor at the time, being unable to reconcile 
 such an enterprise with the reputation for shrewdness of the 
 chief foreign commissioner, and also "with the expressions 
 of good will and friendship which the Emperor of Korea has 
 repeated to Japan and her Representative over and over 
 again." But there were even more important reasons why 
 the rumor should seem antecedently incredible. No one of 
 the present Cabinet, or of the previously existing Cabinet, ap- 
 peared to have any knowledge of so serious an affair of 
 State; no one of either of these bodies had even been con- 
 sulted by His ^Majesty about the possibility of such an under- 
 taking. " Even the best informed did not dream that a step 
 so palpably useless and treacherous would be taken." The 
 conclusion followed that, if the rumor proved true, the act 
 W'as ascribable to the Emperor alone, as "instigated no doubt 
 by the coterie of irresponsible native counsellors and their ob- 
 scure foreign coadjutors whose mischievous advice has already 
 so often led His ^Majesty astray." Such a movement was ren- 
 dered all the more untimely, not to say unnecessary, because 
 under the new ^Ministry and the wise and kindly leadership of 
 the Residency-General, all the foreign and domestic affairs of 
 the country were now proceeding in the most orderly and 
 satisfactory manner. Whatever ground for protest and ap- 
 peal against the treatment of Korea by the Japanese Govern- 
 ment may have existed in the past, everything in the situa- 
 tion of the spring and early summer of 1907 called for hopeful 
 and active co-operation on the part of all forces interested in
 
 4i6 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS IT(3 
 
 the welfare of the land. The stirring of the elements always 
 ready for riot, sedition, arson, and bloodshed, was, under 
 the circumstances, both a folly and a crime. 
 
 On the morning of the same day on which the news of the 
 affair at The Hague reached Seoul, the Emperor sent the 
 Minister of the Imperial Household to Marcjuis Ito with a 
 message disavowing all responsibil'ty for the delegation and 
 for the protest adrlressed by it to the Peace Conference. 
 This was precisely what the delegation had already informed 
 all Europe His Korean Majesty would certainly do. But 
 then there was their word against the T^mperor's word; and 
 they claimed that the document in their possession bore the 
 Imperial seal. There was, moreover, for the very few who 
 knew the circumstances under which the alleged foreign mem- 
 ber of the delegation left Seoul, the previous private confession 
 of His Majesty made to be sure only after repeated private 
 denials. The situation was, therefore, so far as the testimony 
 of Koreans went, rather comjjlex. His Majesty was now 
 publicly denying what he had formerly, in private, both 
 affirmed and denied; his delegates were publicly affirming 
 what he was publicly denying, but had previously, in private, 
 both denied and affirmed. To the Minister of the Imperial 
 Household Marquis Ito replied that, in view of all the cir- 
 cumstances which had come to his knowledge not the least 
 significant of which was the public declaration of the Im- 
 perial sanction, made by the delegation and su])])orted by its 
 offer to submit its credentials to the inspection of the Con- 
 ference the force of His Majesty's disavowal was weakened. 
 At any rate, the situation had now become so grave that the 
 only course the Resident-General could pursue was to sub- 
 mit the whole matter to his own Government and await its 
 decision.^ 
 
 ' With regard to the personnel of the Korean members of this com- 
 mission, the head was Yi Sung-sol, who had formerly been a Cabinet
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 417 
 
 The news from The Hague at once provoked a hvely dis- 
 cussion on the part of the Japanese press and the pohtical 
 parties as to the proper treatment of Korea and her Emperor 
 for this breach of treaty faith. Aleetings were held by the 
 leaders of the principal parties to determine the policy which 
 should, in their judgment, be followed by the Government; 
 and several of the more prominent statesmen allowed them- 
 selves to be interviewed for pubhcation of their views upon 
 this important national affair. Count Okuma was reported 
 as having suggested that His ]\Iajesty of Korea, in case he 
 had authorized a scheme so lacking in common sense, could 
 not be in his right mind, and might, not improperly, be placed 
 under restraint. Count Inouye, whose successful manage- 
 ment of Korean affairs at the close of the Chino- Japan war 
 entitled his judgment to public confidence, thought that if 
 the Emperor could be induced, or compelled, to come to 
 Japan and see for himself what Japan had done by way 
 of recent developments, and what Japan wished to do for 
 Korea, he would voluntarily cease from his unfriendly and 
 
 Councillor. With him were associated Yi Chun-yong, a Judge of the 
 Supreme Court, and Yi Wi-chong, who was at one time secretary to the 
 Foreign Legation at Russia. The two former seem to have taken the 
 Siberian route to St. Petersburg, where they arrived about April 20th, 
 and were met there by Yi Wi-chong. The Russian Government, being 
 at that time negotiating a treaty with Japan which was to recognize 
 in most explicit terms the Japanese Protectorate over Korea, and give 
 to it a "free hand" in the management of Korean affairs, naturally 
 enough, gave no encouragement to the Koreans or to their "foreign 
 friend." 
 
 In view of the large sum of money which, according to rumor at the 
 time, the Emperor contributed to this purpose, it seems scarcely credi- 
 ble that the Korean delegates should feel compelled at The Hague 
 "to stay at a low-class hotel where the meals cost about 50 5e" (or 
 25 cents in gold), as the cable despatch reports. Xo less a sum than 
 240,000 yen was subsequently traced to expenditure upon this futile 
 scheme; and 100,000 yen additional was suspected on good grounds. 
 In addition to this, as the event proved, it cost the Emperor his crown.
 
 4i8 LN KORKA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 treacherous policy.* Of the political bodies, the Constitu- 
 tionalists, or party now in control of the Government, took 
 the entire matter most quietly, and exj)ressed itself as entirely 
 ready to leave the whole situation in the hands of the Resident- 
 General, as advised or instructed by the Tokyo authorities. 
 Prime ^linister Saionji, to whose cool judgment and quiet 
 temper the nation is greatly indel^ted at all times for allaying 
 tendencies to undue excitement, assured the Daido delegates, 
 on July 1 2th, that the policy toward Korea had alread\- been 
 established and that there was really no need of making 
 "much fuss" over the matter. The Progressives, or strong- 
 est anti-Government party, took the most vehement position 
 of urgency for prompt action and for punitive measures. 
 Some of its papers went so far as again to call in question 
 the entire policy of Marquis Ito, with its plan for secur- 
 ing a peaceful development of Korea under a Japanese Pro- 
 tectorate; but only a few called for immediate forcible an- 
 nexation. 
 
 On the whole, and considering the great and repeated pro- 
 vocations offered to Japan by the Korean Emperor and his 
 Government, the Japanese nation kept its temper in a truly 
 admirable way. While agreeing that some means must at 
 last be found to stop the interference of His Majesty of 
 Korea with all attempts to reform internal affairs, and the 
 better in the future to control foreign intrigues, the general 
 opinion favored strongly an increased confidence in the 
 character and policy of the existing Residency-General. 
 The situation in Japan itself was faithfully described as 
 follows in the Japan Times, in its issue of July 14th: 
 
 ' It should be understood that the proposal of Count Inouye did not 
 contemplate taking the Korean Emperor prisoner and carrying him 
 off by force to Japan. It expressed simply the belief on the Count's 
 part that the shortest way of making Korea accept Japan's guidance 
 was to cause the Emperor to become acquainted with Japan by per- 
 sonal observation. ^
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 419 
 
 The Hague Deputation question continues to attract serious 
 attention. The whole Press is practically unanimous in urging 
 the adoption of such measures as would efifectively prevent the 
 recurrence of similar incidents. The matter has also been taken 
 up by nearly all the important political parties, and the attitude 
 adopted by them is tantamount to an endorsement of the view so 
 unanimously expressed through the newspaper organs. Very 
 little attempt has been made, however, to point out in a concrete 
 form the line of action to be taken. It is evident that, although a 
 small section of the Press unfavorably criticizes jNIarquis Ito's 
 leniency in dealing with the Emperor, the important organs of 
 opinion have so much confidence in His Excellency's ability to 
 cope with the situation with his characteristic wisdom and 
 efficiency, that they do not think it necessary to trouble him with 
 suggestions at to matters of procedure and detail. 
 
 The Tokyo Government acted with promptness and de- 
 cision in dealing with this latest phase of the everlasting 
 Korean problem. On July i6th it was publicly announced 
 that the Government had determined to "go along with the 
 opinion of the people," and adopt "a strong line of action 
 toward Korea." Viscount Hayashi, ^Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, was forthwith appointed to convey in person the 
 views of the Government to His Excellency Marquis Ito, 
 and was commissioned with the disposal of Korean affairs 
 after consultation with the jMarquis on the s])ot. Hayashi 
 bore with him several somewhat different plans, among which 
 decision was to be reached after his arrival at Seoul; but all 
 of them contemplated leaving the details very largely to the 
 Resident-General. It is ])crtinent to say, ivitJi aufliorily, in 
 this connection, that none of these plans included, much less 
 suggested or rcc^uired, the abdication of the Emperor; al- 
 though, as w^c have already seen, ]\[arquis Ito had become 
 quite conclusively convinced that the reform of Korean 
 affairs could never be accomplished with the co-operation of
 
 420 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 the present ruler of tlic land, or, indeed, otherwise than in 
 spite of his utmost o])jJOsilion. 
 
 Meantime there was a great stir taking place among the 
 members of the different ])olitical factions in Seoul. The 
 Emperor himself, now that his own foolisli treachery had 
 been brought to light, was daily becoming more alarmed. 
 The Court intriguers of necessity shared in this growing alarm. 
 Before the departure of Viscount Hayashi, the Imperial Oov- 
 ernment of Jajjan had received a telegram from Mr. Motono, 
 Minister in St. Petersburg, which stated that the new Russo- 
 Japanese Convention would recognize Japan's rights in 
 Korea even more completely tlian the Peace of Portsmouth 
 had done. The fact, now made evident to the Korean 
 ofihcials, that the backs of all the nations w^ere turned toward 
 the verbal and practical falsehoods of their Emperor and of 
 his intriguing foreign friends, and that the judgment of all 
 those wise in respect of Korean history and Korean charac- 
 teristics saw no hope for their country except through the 
 aid of Japan, tended as a matter of course to deepen this 
 alarm. And when the determination of the Japanese Gov- 
 ernment to send one of its Cabinet ^Ministers to Korea, in 
 order at once and finally to put an end to Korea's power, in 
 treachery, intrigue, and assassination, to work her own woe 
 and to jeopard the peace of the Far PLast, was made known, 
 the consternation in Seoul officialdom reached its heiglit. 
 
 The only persons among the Koreans who could Ije relied 
 upon in any measure to save the country from well -merited 
 punishment for this last act of insane treachery on tlie part of 
 the Emperor and his Court were the newly ap])ointed Korean 
 Cabinet. It was a great piece of good fortune for Korea tliat 
 this Cabinet had previously Ijcen appointed and ])ledged to 
 fidelity to the interests of the whole country rather than to 
 connivance at His IVIajesty's intriguing ways. On the whole, 
 in this extreme emergency, the Korean Government beliaved
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 421 
 
 wisely, patriotically, and in a way to secure the crown and 
 the people against the worst results of the Emperor's policy. 
 They began their efforts, indeed, in the vain attempt to dis- 
 cover the plans of the Japanese Government through the 
 Resident- General and to get His Excellency's advice upon the 
 best course of action on their part in order to meet these plans. 
 But Aiarquis Ito refrained alike from indicating the steps 
 which would probably be taken by Japan and also from ad- 
 vising as to the steps which it was best for Korea to take. 
 
 The Korean Ministers were by this time holding daily 
 conferences of several hours in length. The result of these 
 conferences was the conclusion on their part that the abdica- 
 tion of the Emperor offered the only escape from the direful 
 condition in which he had himself placed his country. As 
 early, therefore, as an audience on the 6th of July, they 
 began collectively and individually to urge upon His Majesty 
 the advisability of this step. There is no doubt that they 
 gave this advice the more heartily because, apart from the 
 present dilemma, they were profoundly convinced that he 
 was a bad and dangerous ruler, and that comparatively little 
 could be done for the improvement of Korean affairs as long 
 as he sat upon the throne of Korea. The occasion was op- 
 portune, then, for terminating such weak misrule and 
 perversion of Imperial power. 
 
 Viscount Hayashi arrived at Seoul on the evening of July 
 i8th. In the afternoon of the same day Manpiis Ito visited 
 the Palace at the request of the Korean Emperor. He found 
 that His Majesty had no suggestions to make as to the 
 solution of the grave problem before the two governments: 
 His Majesty continued, however, to disavow the Hague 
 delegation and to suggest the severe punishment of its mem- 
 bers.^ The more important reason for the recjuest for this 
 
 ' The mixture of ij^norance and craft of which the ex-Emperor is 
 capaijlc was illustrated in a humorous way by his inc|uir)' of ]Marquis
 
 422 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 inler\ie\v uppearccl A\lu'n llu- l^mpcror slated that liis Cabinet 
 were urging him to abdicate and suggested that he supjjo.-ed 
 they were prom[)ted to do so by Manjuis Ito. Tliis the 
 Marquis emphatically denied : so far as tlie Resident-(}eneral 
 was concerned, the Korean Cabinet were in all res])ects 
 acting on their own initiali\e. His Excellency was himself 
 still awaiting the decision of his own (io\-ernment at Tokyo; 
 and until that Avas announced he had notliing to say as to 
 what Jaj)an was likel}' to do. Moreover, since he was not a 
 subject of the Emperor of Korea he should refrain from 
 advising His Majesty in any way about the matter of his 
 abdication.^ 
 
 Meantime the Korean Cabinet continued to press upon the 
 Emperor the necessity of his abdication in the interests of the 
 country at large. On Wednesday, July lyth, they proceeded 
 in a body to the Palace, where His Majesty is said to have 
 kept them waiting for their audience with him for nearly 
 three hours. At this audience, however, they again explained 
 the nature of the present crisis, and again besought liim to 
 save his country by sacrificing the crown for himself. After 
 a prolonged interview they are said to have left the Emperor 
 much enraged and still refusing. But on the next day the 
 Cabinet Ministers repaired again to the Palace at a cjuarter 
 to five in the afternoon. Before this meeting could be over 
 the train bearing the Viscount Hayashi woukl roll into the 
 South-Gate Station. The whole affair was culminating; 
 the national crisis was imminent. Eor more than three hours 
 
 Ito whether the Japanese Govcrnrncnt woukl not undertake the arrest 
 and punishment of his own emissaries at The ttaj^aie! The reply was, 
 of course, that Japan could no more do such a thing in Holland than 
 Korea in Japan. 
 
 ' This double policy of soliciting advice and help from Marquis Ito, 
 as his most true and powerful friend, while acting contrary to the ad- 
 vice when given and rendering the hclj) difficult or impossible, has 
 characterized the Emperor throughout in his relations with the Marquis.
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 423 
 
 the Ministers pressed for their Sovereign's abdication, with a 
 most bold and insistent attitude. It was after eleven o'clock 
 that evening when the Emperor began to show signs of giving 
 way, and ordered summons to be issued to assemble the 
 Elder Statesmen. These men soon arrived at the Palace 
 and held a secret conference among themselves, during which 
 they, too, arrived at the decision that there was really no 
 alternative for the Emperor; he should yield to the advice 
 of his ^linisters; and the throne was at once memorialized 
 to this effect. At three o'clock on the morning of the nine- 
 teenth the Emperor agreed to retire in favor of the Crown 
 Prince, and a decree announcing this fact was published in 
 the Official Gazette at a later hour the same morning. 
 
 From about ten o'clock on Thursday night the people began 
 to assemble in front of the Palace. By one o'clock in the 
 morning of Friday the crowd had become dense and began 
 to show threatening signs of a riotous character; but they 
 dispersed by degrees without serious incidents, until at dawn 
 scarcely one hundred men were remaining in the neighbor- 
 hood. Rumors of the Emperor's abdication were spread 
 abroad after sunrise; and again the crowd of excited people 
 increased in front of the main gate of the Palace and in the 
 streets adjoining. A hand-bill, circulated from the same 
 source of so much pernicious misinformation namely, the 
 native edition of the Korean Daily Neics which asserted 
 that the Em])eror had 1jeen de})osed and was going to be 
 carried off to Ja])an by Mscount Hayashi, added greatly to 
 the popular excitement. The Korean ])olice, under Police 
 Adviser Maru}-ama, liowever, had the matter well in hand; 
 and luiving been earnestly advised by the Resiflent-General 
 to avoid all unnec"essary harshness, they succeeded in dis- 
 persing the people with only a few trilhng encounters. In the 
 work of restoring order and preventing riot and bloodshed, 
 the police were doubtless greatly assisted by a timely down-
 
 424 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 pour of rain. For of all people under the sun it is i)rol3able 
 that a Korean crowd of men, with their exj)ensive and 
 cherished crinoline hats and their lustrous white raiment, 
 most object to getting thoroughly wet. Patriot isni of the 
 intcnscst heat can scarcely bear this natural process of cooling. 
 At 7.15 P. M. on July 19th the Korean Minister of Justice 
 called on the Resident-General and delivered to him the 
 following message from His Majesty: 
 
 In alxlicating my throne I acted in obedience to the dictate of 
 my conviction; my action was not tlie result of any outside advice 
 or pressure. 
 
 During the ])ast ten years I have had an intention to cause the 
 Crown Prince to conduct the affairs of State, but, no opi)ortunity 
 presenting itself, my intention has to this day remained unrealized. 
 Believing, however, that such opportunity has now arrived, I have 
 abdicated in favor of the Crown Prince. In taking tlu's step I 
 have followed a natural order of things, and its consummation is 
 a matter of congratulation for the sake of my d\-nasty and country. 
 Yet I am grieved to have to observe that some of my ignorant sub- 
 jects, laboring under a mistaken conception of my motives and in 
 access of wanton indignation, may be betrayed into acts of violence. 
 In reliance, therefore, upon the Resident-General, I entrust him 
 with the power of preventing or suppressing such acts of violence. 
 
 This appeal to the Residency-General to preserve order in 
 Seoul was made in view of events which had occurred earlier 
 in the afternoon of the same day. About a cpiarter to four a 
 Japanese military officer on horseback was stopped by the 
 mob while passing in front of the main gate of the Palace; 
 and when the Japanese policemen in the Korean service 
 came to his rescue and attem])ted to open a path for him 
 through the crowd, both they and tlie officer were more or less 
 seriously wounded by stones. The mob, on being disj)ersed, 
 retreated in the neighborhood of Chong-no. Plere a party 
 of Korean soldiers, wdio had deserted from the barracks since
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 425 
 
 the previous night, joined the crowds under the command of 
 an officer. Soon after five o'clock these soldiers, without 
 either provocation or warning, fired a succession of volleys 
 upon a party of police officers, killing and wounding more 
 than a score; whereupon the fury of the mob broke out anew, 
 and several more were killed and wounded on both sides. 
 The total number of police officers who lost their lives in this 
 way was ten, and some thirty or more others were more or 
 less severely wounded.^ After this dastardly action the 
 Korean soldiers ran away. 
 
 As to the unprovoked character of this deplorable incident 
 the testimony of eye-witnesses is quite conclusive. Dr. 
 George Heber Jones, who was on the spot soon after the first 
 sound of firing, says: "In fact all through the excitement 
 I was impressed with the moderation and self-control shown 
 by the public officers in dealing with the crowds which had 
 been surging about them since Thursday night. Their con- 
 duct was admirable." After narrating the experiences of 
 himself and his companion as they came upon the dead and 
 wounded lying in the streets and alleys of the district, the 
 wrecked police-boxes and the officers covered with blood, 
 this witness goes on to say: "The Pyeng-yang soldiers in the 
 barracks just north of Chong-no, becoming restive, in the after- 
 noon broke into the magazine of their barracks and supplied 
 themselves with ammunition. One company of them then 
 broke out, and under command it is said, of a captain who 
 was mounted suddenly appeared at Chong-no and without 
 warning began firing on the policemen who were trying to 
 preserve order in the crowds. ... A mania of destruction 
 
 ' It was subsequently reported that the number of Koreans injured 
 during the disturbances of this Friday was 210; since the majority of 
 these had bullet wounds and the Japanese police were not armed with 
 rifles, the conclusion is inevitable that most of these casualties were 
 occasioned by the firing upon the crowd of the mutinous Korean sol- 
 diers.
 
 426 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 look poRscssion of the people for a time, and there are reports 
 of assauUs on Japanese ci\ihans in various ])arts of the city; 
 and from what I personally witnessed there is little doubt of 
 this, tliat the scenes of \-iolence which occurred in 1884 were 
 repeated yesterday."^ 
 
 As a result of the Emperor's rerpiest following upon this 
 outljreak of serious disorder, tlie city of Seoul was put in 
 charge of Japanese police and gendarmes. A strong body of 
 Japanese trooi)S was posted outside the Palace, and four 
 machine guns were placed in front of the Taihan or Main 
 Gate. A battalion of infantry was summoned froni P}eng- 
 yang, and a squadron of the artillery regiment at Yong-san. 
 The riotous outbreaks were now mainly directed against those 
 Korean officials who had brought about the abdication of the 
 Emperor. Over one thousand rioters assembled near the 
 Kwang-song Oate and, after a short debate, proceeded to 
 assault and set on fire the residence of the Prime Minister, 
 Mr. Yi Wan-yong. In sjjite of the efforts of the Japanese 
 troops and gendarmes, as well as of the fire brigades, a large 
 portion of the residence was destroyed. Part of a Korean 
 battalion also assaulted the prison at Chong-no, where the 
 headquarters of the Japanese police had been established, Ijut 
 were driven away. At 6 p. m. of Tuesday, July 23d, a huge 
 crowd assembled and "passed resolutions" that at sunset 
 the headquarters of the II Chin-hoi, or i)arty most prominent 
 in its den;and for reforms, should be set on fire, and after this 
 several other buildings were marked for destruction. These 
 attempts were, however, frustrated; but the \illas of ^^r. Yi 
 Kun-tak and Mr. Yi Chi-yung, the former ^finisters of War 
 and of Home Affairs, outside tlie small East Oate, were 
 
 ' These quotations arc from the article, the pu1)lication of which was 
 followed by the incident already narrated (p. 355, note). This ex- 
 ample is typical of the temper and methods of the anti-Japanese leaders 
 and their foreign friends.
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 427 
 
 burned. Finally, these demonstrations of rowdyism came 
 to a point of cessation, and the usual order of Seoul was 
 restored. During the period of rioting the Korean crowd 
 was, as usual, tolerably impartial in the distribution of its 
 faxors; in addition to Japanese and Koreans, a few Chinese 
 and other foreigners were assaulted or shot at. 
 
 i\ll these events made it entirely obvious, even to the most 
 prejudiced observer, that the Korean Go\ernment was still 
 as incapable of securing and preserving order in times of 
 popular excitement as it has ever been. It could not guar- 
 antee the safety of its own officials or of foreigners of any 
 nationality, without outside assistance. Unless the controlling 
 influence of the Japanese authorities had been exercised, there 
 cannot be the slightest doubt that a frightful reign of anarchy 
 and bloodshed would have ensued upon the abdication of the 
 Emperor; and no one acquainted with the Korean mob, 
 when once let loose, will venture to predict how many, and 
 whom, it might have involved. Thus far these authorities 
 had done nothing beyond lending an indispensable support 
 and assistance to the Korean Government. They were 
 acting wholly in its interests as centralized in the newly 
 declared Emperor and in the Cabinet Ministers. One 
 other thing, however, was also made equally obvious. The 
 Korean army could not be trusted; its continuance as at 
 present constituted was an intolerable menace to both 
 governments, as well as to the interests of the people at 
 large. It was intrinsically worthless for the legitimate pur- 
 poses of an army, and dangerous in the extreme as a force 
 to provoke and to intensify all manner of lawlessness. If 
 it had not been for the mutinous action of these undis- 
 ciplined troops, who became centres of all the forces of 
 sedition, arson, and murder, there would probably have 
 been little or no bloodshed connected with the events of 
 July, 1907.
 
 428 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 It should not be forgotten that the Korean Ministers were 
 influenced by patriotic moti\es in unanimously and urgently 
 demanding the abdication of the Emperor.* It imme- 
 diately became evident, ho\ve\er, that His Majesty did 
 not intend really to abdicate, but that he was continuing his 
 old tricks of intrigue, double-dealing, and instigating assas- 
 sination. There was well-founded suspicion to cpiote a 
 statement based on trustworthy information that "the 
 unfortunate incident of Friday last and the mutinous spirit 
 prevailing among the Korean troops were the result of an 
 understanding between the ex-Emperor and his abettors and 
 supporters in Seoul." There was even proof of a cons|)iracy to 
 have the Korean troops rise in a body, kill the entire Korean 
 Cabinet, and rescue from their dominating influence his 
 "oppressed" Majesty. Whatever may be the full measure 
 of truth as to these and other secret intrigues and plots for 
 sedition and murder, certain actions were publicly avowed 
 that were unmistakably in open defiance of the new Emperor 
 and his Ministers, as well as complete j)roof that by abdication 
 His Majesty meant something cjuite different from what the 
 word was properly held to signify. [This Korean word was 
 indeed capable of two interpretations; it was, however, the 
 term customarily employed to signify the relinquishment of 
 Imperial control and responsibility, while at the same time 
 "saving the face " of the person abdicating and often increas- 
 ing his real influence for evil.] 
 
 At midnight on Saturday, July 20th, the ex-Emperor 
 summoned to the Palace and personally appointed Pak 
 
 ' This is perhaps the place to deny, authoritatively and finally, that 
 Marquis Ito procured, counselled, or even gave consent to, the act of 
 abdication. Indeed, the members of the Residency-General, and the 
 Japanese in Seoul generally, who approved of the more strenuou 
 measures to be taken against Korea, regretted to have the abdication 
 take place. To use the expression of one of them: "It dulled the edge 
 of the Japanese sword "
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 429 
 
 Yong-hio to be "Minister of the Imperial Household."^ 
 Upon this Mr. Pak had the impudence to call upon IMarquis 
 Ito on the following Sunday morning and announce his 
 appointment. It is probable that he did not meet with a 
 very cordial reception, or succeed well in impressing His 
 Excellency with the dignity and value of his new office. 
 Not satisfied w^ith this practical retraction of his own deposi- 
 tion of Imperial functions, when the Cabinet submitted to the 
 Throne for Imperial signature a draft of an edict calling upon 
 the people to keep peace and order, the ex-Emperor prohibited 
 his son, now the reigning Emperor, from signing it and in- 
 sisted that the edict should be issued in his own name. 
 In view of all this manoeuvering, the Cabinet Ministers spent 
 another whole night closeted with the ex-Emperor: they 
 emerged from this new contention with a renewed and per- 
 fectly positive declaration of abdication. At the same time 
 the new Emperor issued over his own name an edict in which 
 his subjects were warned against all disloyalty to him, 
 and were exhorted to turn their energies, in reliance upon 
 his guidance, to the advancement of civilization and of the 
 national interests. 
 
 ' It should be understood that this office is the most important and 
 influential of all the Korean offices, so far as private transactions with 
 the Emperor are concerned. Now Pak Yong-hio, after a life of idle- 
 ness and debauchery in Japan, whither he had fled some years before, 
 and where he had been supported by the kindness of Japanese and 
 Korean friends, had recently been pardoned and allowed to return to 
 Korea. In petitioning for permission to return, Pak dwelt in pathetic 
 terms on his "home-sickness," and expressly promised in the future to 
 refrain from political intrigue. But he had scarcely set foot on the 
 soil of Korea before he began a most dislionest and disgraceful course 
 of political intrigue. A little more than twenty-four hours after his 
 pseudo-appointment as Minister of the Imperial Household, the Cabinet 
 Ministers ordered his arrest, and he was subsequently condemned to 
 be punished with eighty lashes and banished for life to the Island of 
 Quelpart. Such are the vicissitudes of Korean political careers when 
 most free from foreign influence!
 
 430 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 Nothing could, of course, be done toward settlement of 
 the problem of future relations between the Governments of 
 Korea and Jajjan until })ublic order was restored. But 
 s])eculation was eager and varied as to what would then take 
 ])lace: for neither had the Marquis Ito disclosed his views 
 upon this subject, nor had the instructions of Minister 
 Hayashi been made known to tlie ])ublic. Tlie telegrams 
 .wliich came into Seoul from all (|uarters sliowed that the 
 civilized world, both diplomatic and business, expected the 
 out-and-out annexation of Korea by Japan, and the conse- 
 cjuent dethronement of the Imj)erial house. The Koreans 
 themselves expected little less; in addition to this they feared 
 the immediate and open humiliation of having the ex-Emperor 
 carried off to the enemies' country. Indeed, it was this 
 severe calamity which the Korean Cabinet hoped to mitigate 
 by procuring His Majesty's abdication. In the same hope 
 the most numerous of the several Korean societies of an alleged 
 patriotic character the // Chin-hoi, or '^'\ll-for-Progress 
 Society" sent in a petition, or "pathetic memorial," to the 
 Residency-General. After acknowledging "the policy of 
 mildness and conciliation" which had won for His Excellency 
 the hearts of the Korean peoj)le, the memorial proceeds in 
 substance as follows: "The offence which the Emperor has 
 committed in connection with the Hague question is great 
 as a mountain; His Majesty has been very deficient in having 
 a pro})er sense of what he owes to Japan. But what fault is 
 there in the people who know nothing al^out the affair? 
 Or what culpability in the land and soil of Korea ? They are 
 in no way related to the dynasty of Korea. When we think 
 over these things we cannot stop the flow of tears in a thousand 
 drops. Your Excellency, we pray you to have mercy on the 
 mountains and seas of Korea and to place in a position of 
 safety the 20,000,000 souls, the 3,000,000 homesteads, and the 
 nation of 500 years." [The customary expedient of Korean
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 431 
 
 rhetoric is to be noted in doubling the number of the popula- 
 tion of the ])eninsula.J 
 
 It has been said of the Japanese that they treat no one else 
 so generously as their defeated and prostrate enemy. How- 
 ever this may be, it is matter of historical truth that after 
 some particularly aggravating offence from Korea, what 
 Western nations generally would regard as an excess of chival- 
 ric and totally unappreciated kindness has C[uite uniformly 
 characterized the treatment accorded to this country by the 
 Japanese Government. The Bismarckian pohcy of "making 
 your enemy cough up all }'ou can when you have him by the 
 throat" has never been the policy of Japan in dealing with 
 the peninsula. And yet, at last, it should have been perfectly 
 evident to every true friend of both countries that the Korean 
 Government traditionally corrupt, cruel, and regardless of 
 the Korean nation must no longer be allowed to stand 
 betw^een this nation and the plans for bringing it into an 
 improved internal condition and into safer relations with 
 foreign Powers. That formal annexation was never con- 
 templated by the Tokyo Government became evident when, 
 on the evening of July 21st, a congratulatory telegram was 
 received by the new Emperor from His Imperial Majesty, 
 the Emperor of Japan, To this telegram a reply was sent 
 on the next day, which read, in effect, as follows: "By 
 the order of my Im])erial father I have ascended the 
 throne at this difficult crisis, and being conscious of my 
 unworthincss, I am hlled with apprehensions. I beg Your 
 ^lajesty to accept my profound thanks for Your ^Majesty's 
 courteous telegram of congratulations. I warmly recip- 
 rocate Your Majesty's wishes for still more intimate rela- 
 tionship between the two countries and between our Im- 
 perial Houses." 
 
 After a numjjcr of consultations between Minister Hayashi 
 and the Residency-General, and between the Japanese repre-
 
 432 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 sentativcs and the Korean Cabinet (who, in their turn, con- 
 suhed among themselves and with the new Emj)eror), at 
 noon of Wednesday, July 24th, Marquis Ito handed over to 
 the Korean Government a document conveying Japan's 
 proposals as the basis of a new Jaj)anese-Korean agreement. 
 After the Korean ^Ministers had again conferred with one 
 another, the Premier and the Minister of War, at four o'clock 
 p. M. of the same day, had a brief audience with their Emperor. 
 Other conferences continued througli the whole of this 
 memorable night with the result that at a later audience 
 Mr. Yi W^an-yong, the Premier, was invested Ijy His ?vlajesty 
 with authority to sign the new Convention. It is understood 
 that on this occasion, as on that former ecjually memorable 
 night in November of 1905, ^NTan^uis Ito used the authority 
 given him to modify some of the details, so as to make 
 them seem less harsh while preserving the substance of the 
 contract, in order to "save the face" of the Korean 
 Government. When this Convention was published in the 
 Official Gazette, the Korean politicians of the Palace 
 "gang" were congratulating themselves on ha\'ing es- 
 caped so easily from the risk of a punitive expedition to 
 which their Emperor, by their own assistance, had sub- 
 jected them; the Korean Cabinet were congratulating 
 themselves on the deliverance of their country from the 
 peril of annexation; while the majority of the Korean peo- 
 ple, even in Seoul, seemed -ciuite indifferent to wliat had 
 happened. 
 
 Immediately upon the conclusion of the new Convention 
 Marquis Ito summoned to his residence the princi{)al Resi- 
 dency-General officials and acquainted them with its terms. 
 He also informed them that he should himself adhere con- 
 stantly and firmly to the policy of carrying out its stipulations; 
 and he exhorted them to bear in mind what he had just said 
 and to spare no pains to discharge their own duties with
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 433 
 
 moderation and efficiency. The officials, in their turn, 
 congratulated the Resident-General upon his brilliant suc- 
 cess, and promised their co-operation in the new plans now 
 before them. 
 
 The Agreement of July 24, 1907, definitively places the 
 enactment of all laws and ordinances, the administration of 
 all important Korean Government affairs, and all official 
 appointments which relate to internal administration, under 
 the control of the Japanese Resident-General. Its preamble 
 renews the assertion which has governed the policy of jNIarquis 
 Ito throughout namely, that the motive is to be found in 
 " the early attainment of the prosperity and strength of Korea," 
 and the "speedy promotion of the welfare of the Korean 
 people." ]\Ioreover, it pledges the Korean Government to 
 keep judicial affairs distinct from administrative affairs. 
 With regard to the appointment and dismissal of officials of 
 the higher rank, whether native or foreign, it is specified that 
 the consent of the Resident-General must be secured; and 
 also that his recommendations for the appointment of Japan- 
 ese to official positions shall be followed. Taken in connec- 
 tion with the Convention of November, 1905, therefore, the 
 present condition of "Korea is undoubtedly that of a country 
 completely dependent upon Japan for both internal govern- 
 ment and also for commercial and diplomatic relations with 
 all foreign countries. For the present the autonomy of 
 Korea, except so far as it is preserved in certain customs 
 and laws which even the source of control would be forced 
 to regard, and in the nominal preservation of the Ko- 
 rean crown and its Cabinet jNIinisters, is suspended. The 
 native government can suggest, propose, and assimilate sug- 
 gestions and proposals; but they can neither initiate nor 
 control in important affairs without the consent of the 
 representative of Japan. On the other hand, the plans and 
 proposals of the Japanese Resident-General must be ac-
 
 434 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 ceptcd and carried out under his supervision and ultimate 
 control/ 
 
 The clause in the new Convention which gave most offence 
 to the official classes and to tlie Yang-bans generally in Korea 
 was that which opened the door, per force as it were, to the 
 appointment of Jaj^anese to all kinds of official positions in 
 the peninsula. Although it has Ijeen the declared ])()licy of 
 the present Resident-General to retain the Korean C'aljinet 
 Ministers, the agreement })lainly makes it easily possible for 
 the Japanese Government to treat desirable appointments in 
 Korea as freely in the interests of its own countrymen as is 
 possible for the British Government in British India. The 
 pledge, however, to maintain the Imperial House in the 
 nominal possession of the crown, and in the show of authority 
 and dignity which go with this possession, appears still to be 
 binding upon Japan. From this time onward, the Resident- 
 General becomes the uncrowned king of Korea. 
 
 In spite of this, and of all the other features of these re- 
 formed relations which might seem offensive and humiliating 
 to Korean officialdom, it is altogether likely that no consider- 
 able disturbance would anywhere have taken place, had it not 
 been for the action of the same disorderly and rebellious 
 factors which occasioned the bloodshed and confusion of 
 Friday, July igth.'^ These were the Korean troops belonging 
 
 ' For the text of this new Convention, which is remarkable at once 
 for its brevity and its comprehensive indefiniteness, the reader is re- 
 ferred to Appendix C. In vew of the claims that the Convention of 
 1905 could not have been consented to by the Emperor because it does 
 not bear his signature, or that it did not have the consent of the Minis- 
 ters, because they did not all sign it, attention is called to the fact that 
 the new Convention is signed only by Marquis Ito and the Korean 
 Prime Minister. 
 
 ^ One of the leaders of the riot of July 19th confessed that he was 
 betrayed into his action by the false report of the Taihan Mai-il Shimpo 
 (or Korean edition of the Korean Daily News Mr. Bethell's paper), 
 that the Emperor would be forced to go to Japan to apologize for The
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 435 
 
 to the barracks at Seoul. Let it be distinctly understood that 
 these troops were not disciplined soldiers; much less were 
 they sincere though misguided patriots. They were largely 
 untrained rowdies, who cared chiefly for the pay, prestige, and 
 idle life which their employment as so-called palace guards 
 gave to them. At the time of the conclusion of the Convention 
 an understanding probably existed between the Resident- 
 General and the Korean Ministry, who were themselves 
 threatened with assassination and the defeat of all their 
 work by these same armed and unscrupulous fellows, that the 
 Korean army should be disbanded. 
 
 Late on Wednesday night, July 31st, an Imperial rescript 
 was issued which ordered the disbandment of the Korean 
 Army. The reason assigned was the necessity of economizing 
 all superfluous expenses and applying the funds thus saved 
 to material improvement. The existing army was called 
 "mercenaries"^ and said to be "unfit for purposes of national 
 defense." The intention was announced to remodel the entire 
 military system and, for the present time, to attend chiefly 
 to the training of officers for a national army in the future. 
 A small select force was to be retained as guardians of the 
 Imperial House, and a gratuity in money was to be bestowed 
 upon every one of the disbanded troops, according to rank. 
 All the reasons here given for this action were quite in ac- 
 cordance with the facts; but the most important of all was, 
 of course, concealed namely, that the existing army was the 
 
 Hague incident. On reading the Japanese-Korean Convention, how- 
 ever, he was surprised at the moderation of Japan, and considered him- 
 self a fool for being deceived by the paper. This is only one of in- 
 numerable instances illustrating the truth that the English editor of 
 this paper, and his American coadjutor have, of late, probably done 
 more mischief to the Korean nation than any other persons except the 
 Emperor and his small coterie of corrupt Court officials. 
 
 'The word thus translated, however, means "paid" troops rather 
 than volunteers.
 
 436 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 most serious of all menaces to good order and to peace. It 
 was sure to be the tool, for purposes of assassination, of the 
 reactionary party. 
 
 Early the following morning Thursday, July 31st the 
 superior officers were summoned to the residence of (General 
 Hasegawa, where General Yi, the Korean Minister of War, 
 read to them the rescript of disbandment. After conference- 
 it was decided that the non-commissioned officers and men 
 of all the battalions in Seoul should be marched without arms 
 to the parade ground inside the East (}ate of the city and there 
 be dismissed after receiving their gratuities from the Em- 
 peror. They were to be present for this ])urpose ])y ten 
 o'clock of the same morning. Soon after eight o'clock, as 
 the Japanese instructor of the Korean Army was engaged, 
 in its barracks, in drawing up the first battalion of the Eirst 
 Korean Regiment, a great noise of weeping and groaning 
 was heard, and the fact was made know^n that its commander 
 had committed suicide. This was the signal for the springing 
 up of a great excitement, during which the troops broke 
 their ranks and threatened the Ja[)anese officer with a mur- 
 derous attack. The mutiny spread at once to another 
 battalion occupying adjoining barracks. The mutineers 
 then proceeded to break open the magazines and, arming 
 themselves, they rushed out of the barracks. They thereupon 
 posted sentinels around the barracks where the majority of 
 the forces still remained, who began to fire aimless shots 
 from within upon the passers-by. ]Mcantime some of the 
 troops ran away. 
 
 From this centre the mutiny spread, the mutineers rushing 
 out from the barracks to fire upon the Japanese officers who 
 were conducting to the parade ground the other Korean 
 battalions; but soon after the appointed time of ten o'clock all 
 the Korean forces had reported there, W'ith the exception of 
 the two mutinous battalions. The reduction of the mutinous
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 437 
 
 soldiers was no easy matter, for the main force was en- 
 trenched behind stone walls near the centre of the city, and 
 the Japanese forces attacking them were much embarrassed 
 by being fired upon by those of the number who had rushed 
 out from the barracks. But the use of several machine guns 
 two of which, after being planted on the wall of the Great 
 South Gate, were trained so as to cover the advance of the 
 Japanese infantry and a hand-to-hand light with bayonets 
 and hand-grenades at the barracks soon reduced the mutinous 
 Korean soldiers. By 10.50 a. m. the barracks were com])letcly 
 in the hands of the Japanese. The casualties as estimated in 
 the official report o^ General Hasegawa were, on the side of 
 the Japanese, 3 killed, and 2 officers and 20 men wounded; 
 on the side of the Koreans, 11 officers and 57 men killed, and 
 100 officers and men wounded. Korean officers and men, to 
 the number of 516, were taken prisoners. The best possible 
 care was given to the wounded, both Koreans and Japanese, 
 in the government and missionary hospitals Marquis Ito, 
 and his suite, and the prominent Japanese ladies belonging 
 to the Red Cross Society and Patriotic Associations, visiting 
 them in the hospitals and making generous contributions to 
 their assistance and comfort. 
 
 In one respect, however, the Japanese military authorities 
 made a mistake which their hostile critics were not slow to 
 seize upon and exaggerate to the discredit of their management 
 generally. It appears that the services of some thirty 
 civilians were volunteered and accepted to assist the police 
 and soldiers in searching for the fugiti\e mutineers. Much 
 bad blood had been stirred up between the two nationalities 
 by the pre\-ious un])rovoked attack and murder of the Japan- 
 ese police at the hands of mutinous Konvan soldiers. In the 
 spirit of vengeance, therefore, there was no doubt considerable 
 return of excesses on the part of irresponsible individuals 
 among the Jajjanese civilian \olunteers. Otlierwise, the \ery
 
 438 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 trving situation in wliicli tlu'sc revolts of tlic Korean military 
 forces ])lace(l the Japanese (jo\ernment in Seoul was appar- 
 ently met with commendable moderation and skill. 
 
 One of the most notewortliy features of this entire disturb- 
 ance was the complete aloofness of tlie people of Seoul from 
 any hostile demonstration toward the Japanese. Within 
 forty-eight hours of this battle between their own disbanded 
 troops and tlie foreign military, the city rt'sumed its normal 
 appearance; the people went about their accustomed occupa- 
 tions; the full tide of business began to How as usual. Such 
 behavior as this, under anything resembling similar condi- 
 tions, has seldom or never before characterized the pojjulace 
 of Seoul. It must be interpreted as a hopeful sign for the 
 future good order and prosperity of the city. 
 
 The disbandment of the Korean pro\incial garrisons for the 
 most part proceeded quietly. But the disl^anded soldiers in 
 considerable numbers allied themselves with other elements 
 of riot and unrest, and local disturbances of a more or less 
 serious character continued to break out and demand sup- 
 pression by the police and the military, here and lliere in 
 various parts of the peninsula. This state of things continued 
 for weeks and, in a diminishing degree, for months following 
 the Convention of July, 1907. But the detailed account of 
 these transactions does not concern our narrative. Under 
 the circumstances they may be considered as temporary but 
 unavoidable incidents in the practical solution of this complex 
 and difficult historical problem of the relations to be estab- 
 lished between Japan and Korea. Among the mutinous 
 and riotous outbreaks that at Kang-wha Island the scene 
 in the past of so many acute conflicts between Korea and 
 foreign nations was typical and also, perha])S, one of the 
 most important. When the Jajmnese cajjtain in command 
 of a detachment of Japanese troo])S, and accomjjanicd by the 
 Korean commander of the native battalion at Suwon, arrived
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 439 
 
 to disband the Korean garrison and to distribute the gratuities, 
 they were met by a shower of bullets })Oured u})on them \\ hile 
 landing on the island. The Korean mutineers retreated to 
 the city of Kang-vvha, where they were joined by some 300 
 rioters. Under cover of the city walls they offered a some- 
 what stubborn resistance to the attacking forces, but were 
 finally dislodged and tied in various directions. It was 
 afterward learned that the Korean troops, in defiance of their 
 own officers, had broken open the military magazine, mur- 
 dered the magistrate of the island and several policemen, and 
 had then forced some hundreds of the citizens, by threats of 
 death, to join with them in fighting the Japanese. When 
 the real fighting began, they ran away. 
 
 The procedure at Kang-wha, we repeat, was typical. 
 It is a specimen of the Korean ancestral way of resisting 
 every form of government. The method of these "patriotic" 
 uprisings was everywhere similar. Several score or hun- 
 dreds of Koreans, stirred and led by the disbanded soldiers, 
 came together, killed the Japanese old men, women, and 
 children as well as the police officials, shot some of their 
 own countrymen, chiefly those suspected of not being sufli- 
 ciently violent in their anti- Japanese sentiments, burned and 
 plundered indiscriminately; and then when the Japanese 
 military or police approached in any formidable numbers 
 they ran away and liid themselves. In view of these dis- 
 turljed conditions and the alleged connection of some of their 
 converts with these uprisings, the missionaries were anew 
 placed in a difficult and delicate situation. This, however, 
 like the greater number of similar i)revious trials, was not 
 prim.arily due to the Jaj)anese Protectorate, Init to the Koreans 
 themsehes Emperor, officials, and common i)eoi)le. There 
 were numerous ])lausible charges made against the mission- 
 aries and their converts of liarboring Korean rioters and even 
 of lending countenance to the rioting under the pretence of
 
 440 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 patriotism. There can be little doubt, however, that these 
 charges were, almost if not (juite without exception, either 
 misunderstandings or malicious falsehoods. The misunder- 
 standings were, in view of the past, not altogetlier unreason- 
 able; the falsehoods were such as are encountered by the 
 religious teacher wherever he seems to stand in the way of 
 unlimited greed or unchecked violence. On the whole, as 
 has already been said, there can be no doubt that the mission- 
 aries and their Korean converts exerted a notable inOuence 
 in favor of (juietness, peace, and the observance of law and 
 order. That the native Christians were alarmed, and stood 
 in fear both of the Japanese and of their own countrymen, 
 was a thing to be expected. But probably their experience 
 in this time of trial with the behavior of these foreign police- 
 men and soldiers tended to diminish the native dislike and 
 dread of the Japanese Protectorate. 
 
 At once the strength of the reform party among the Koreans 
 themselves began to make itself felt under the terms of the 
 new Convention. On the date of August 15th anlm])erial 
 rescript forbade boys under seventeen years of age, and 
 girls under fifteen, from contracting marriages. The same 
 day the new Emperor proclaimed the purpose, which he 
 afterward carried out, to cut his hair on the occasion of his 
 formal accession to the throne and to dress himself in 
 military uniform from that time. The ex-Emperor, in spite 
 of the fact that he had formerly been glad to see his people 
 excited to rebellion and murder by a similar proposal for 
 changing the fashion of the Korean gentleman's head-dress, 
 and in spite also of the fact that weeping eunuchs and ancient 
 Court officials besought him not to |)roceed to such lengths 
 in breaking with the past, actually did subsequently join in 
 the new custom. And when the deed was done, ?Iis ex- 
 Majesty was pleased to command the objectors to do likewise, 
 and to say for himself that the change was really not half so
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 441 
 
 bad as he had thought it would be. Now, altliough these are 
 not trivial matters in Korea, or mere straws which show the 
 way of the blowing of the wind, a more important result of 
 the new Convention was this: after due deliberation, the 
 Cabinet jMinisters decided that the young son of Lady Om 
 who had already been proclaimed Crown Prince, must in 
 future really attend to his lessons and become educated in 
 some manner befitting his future expectations. Although it 
 was doubted whether His Imperial Highness was not still too 
 young to go to Japan for study, he was required to Ijcgin the 
 study of the Japanese language in addition to ELngh'sh and 
 Chinese. Left to the inlluence of the eunuchs and palace 
 women, he was sure to be debauched and ruined. Educated, 
 he may easily make the best sovereign Korea has enjoyed for 
 centuries. 
 
 At once also the Resident-General began to mature the 
 larger plans for carrying out his purposes toward Korea 
 which the new Convention made possible. For now upon 
 the Japanese Government in Korea rented the responsibility, 
 not only for the satisfactory and safe management of the 
 country's foreign relations, but directly and more hea\ily 
 than ever before, the readjustment, reform, and successful 
 management of all its internal affairs. To report to the 
 Emperor of Japan, and to consult with His ^Majesty and with 
 the Japanese Government about the form and successful 
 execution of the measures made necessary or desirable by the 
 new Convention, ]\Iarquis Ito paid a visit to his native land. 
 Leaving Seoul by special train for Chemulpo on the afternoon 
 of August nth. His Excellency arrived at Oiso five days later; 
 and on the Tuesday following, August 2olh, received at 
 Shimbashi Station in Tokyo a reception, both by the official 
 class and by the crowds, such as has seldom or nexer been 
 accorded to a civilian before in the history of Japan. 71ie 
 reception given to him by the Emperor, who had sent an
 
 442 IN KOREA WITH TvIARQUIS ITO 
 
 Imperial Chamberlain to intimate his desire to consult with 
 tlie Resident-General, was seareely less uni(|iie. 
 
 In the many public addresses wliich followed, at the various 
 ban(iuets and receptions given to the JNIanjuis, he took ])ains 
 to make it perfectly clear that his benevolent intentions 
 toward the Korean people had in no respect suffered a change. 
 Of liimself he declared that he was neither elated in spirit over 
 the success of the new treaty, nor depressed in s])irit before 
 the new difficulties which must be encountered. He wislicd 
 his countrymen to remember that the Korean problem was 
 not political, not one of the successful exploitation of a 
 weaker nation by a stronger, but a question of that policy 
 which should be for the highest interests and best welfare of 
 both nations. The need of the hour was the need of men 
 both Japanese and Koreans who could stand in the places 
 of responsibility and influence, and discharge their duties 
 faithfully, honestly, unselfishly. The work which he had 
 undertaken to do in Korea was only a beginning; and on 
 account of advancing age he must soon let it go from his hand. 
 At })resent, however, he was in harness and must remain so. 
 When the time came for him to resign, he hoped sincerely 
 that some able and wise successor in the ofilce now so in- 
 creasingly responsible of Japanese Resident-General in 
 Korea might somewhere be found. 
 
 This historical and critical sketch of the relations between 
 the two nations of Japan and Korea fitly closes with the \isit 
 of Marquis now Prince Ito to Tokyo in August of 1907. 
 The results to follow from the j)lans which were then matured 
 for the administration of the ofilces of the Residency-General 
 and for the more ultimate solution of the delicate and com- 
 plex problem of bringing about a state of affairs which shall 
 at the same time redeem Korea and deliver Japan from the 
 constant menace which the peninsula has hitherto been 
 and not only this, but shall bind the two nations together
 
 JULY, 1907, AND AFTERWARD 443 
 
 in a common prosperity under terms of friendship and 
 good-will, are destined to form important items in the future 
 history of the Far East. It remains only to add tliat no one 
 who could have heard the firm and feeling-full declaration 
 made to the writer by His Excellency when the latter was 
 on the eve of returning to Seoul, would question the wisdom, 
 honesty, or benevolence of the Japanese Resident-General in 
 Korea. As fast and far as Jie can have his way, this long- 
 time misgoverned and wretched nation will 1x' reformed and 
 uplifted to an unwonted economical and political prosperity.
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 The role of the pro])hcl in his ])rc(licli\c function, and 
 with reference to the destiny of nations, is ahvays a dehcate 
 and dangerous part to ])lay. The danger is particularly 
 great when the complex and largely unfamiliar ideas and 
 emotions of Oriental peoples constitute the controlling factors 
 in the situation; it is made still greater at the present time, 
 as regards the future of the Far East, by the increasing 
 admixture of foreign and Western influences. Above all, 
 however, is the situation complicated by the unsettled and 
 totally uncertain condition of China. Here arc countless 
 millions of an industrious, patient, and tlirifty, but almost 
 incredibly ignorant and superstitious, ])oj)ulation; corru])t 
 and intriguing official classes and an essentially foreign 
 Court; indefinitely great resources of soil and mines, and an 
 almost limitless capacity for foreign trade, which makes it 
 the coveted territory for ex]:)loiting schemes by both P^uroj)ean 
 and Asiatic nations. Into this hitherto relati\ely inert mass 
 the ferment of new conceptions of civilization and of life, of 
 the things which are worth the having and which may Ijc had, 
 if men will struggle and fight for them, is now being every- 
 where introduced. The restlessness of feeling, with its 
 stimulus to violence, which has formerly resulted for the most 
 part in local uprisings against excessive sfjueezing from their 
 own officials, or against too obvious interference with their 
 ancient institutions and present material interests by for- 
 eigners, is now taking the form of a purpose which may 
 
 444
 
 THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM 445 
 
 quickly change, and by bloody revolution if necessary, the 
 character of the Chinese Government and even the nature of 
 Chinese characteristic civilization. What will be the effect 
 of all this upon the entire Far East, is a question which would 
 recjuire of any student of history a bold, an audacious front 
 to answer in a confident tone.^ 
 
 In this uncertainty as to the future of the Far East, Korea 
 shares, as a matter of course, to a large extent. For, even now 
 that certain important factors in the problem of the Japanese 
 Protectorate over Korea seem to be relatively stable, the 
 problem as a whole remains exceedingly difficult and com- 
 plex. How will Japan succeed in solving this problem? 
 Will it be by the way of developing the material resources of 
 the land, on the whole peacefully, and chiefly for the benefit 
 of the Koreans themselves; of reforming the economic, ad- 
 ministrative, and judicial condition of the common people; 
 and of making a foreign rule to be esteemed a blessing rather 
 than an odious imposition? Or, will it be by the way of 
 reducing Korea to a condition of virtual vassalage, and of 
 making its people a dissatisfied nation, ever ready for revolt 
 and only kept down from successful revolt by the strong arm 
 of a foreign police and a foreign military force ? Will Japan 
 really succeed in solving this problem at all ? All suggestions 
 in answer to these and similar questions are of value only as 
 they are rendered more or less probable in view of such facts 
 
 ' How dangerous is prophecy touching the future of the I-"ar East is 
 well illustrated by the following passage quoted from ^Ir. Whigham's 
 generally calm and fair book on Mancliuria ami Korea, p. 49. Speak- 
 ing of the mistake which Japan made in not preventing Russia from 
 building the Manchurian Railway, jNIr. Whigham says: "On the other 
 hand, one is more and more convinced that what used to be talked 
 about a short time ago as the inevitable war between Russia and Japan 
 is destined to end in smoke, since the Japanese have already lost their 
 great opportunity." This was written as of July, igoi. Less than three 
 years later "the inevitable war" began in the "smoke" of battle, and 
 ended with Japan in possession of this same Manchurian Railway.
 
 446 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 as those to which attention has been (hrected in the preced- 
 ing chapters of this book. 
 
 The future of Korea and of the Japanese Protectorate over 
 Korea will inevitably depend U])on the action and reaction 
 of three classes of factors. These are the attitude and be- 
 havior of other foreign nations; the nati\e capacity for self- 
 government and the actual conduct of the Koreans them- 
 selves; and the policy of Jaj)an, not as a theor}' or an e.xj)eri- 
 ment merely, but as embodied in industries, laws, institutions 
 and other forms of practical effect. 
 
 In all past time, but especially during the last half-century, 
 the relations of Japan and Korea have been chiefly determined 
 by the attitude and behavior of other foreign nations, both 
 toward and within the Korean peninsula. It was the desire 
 of Japan to get at China through Korea, and the determination 
 of the Chinese Government to resist and thwart this desire, 
 and to retain for itself the supremacy in the control of Korean 
 affairs, which brought about the invasion of Hideyoshi, with 
 its persistent train of consecjuences lasting well down into 
 modern times. Until the end of the Chino-Japan war, and 
 especially in the events of 1882 and 1884, as well as in those 
 events which immediately preceded the war, it was what 
 China did or proposed to do, which formed the principal 
 influence to determine the relations of Ja])an and Korea. 
 After this war had definitively and finally delivered the 
 peninsula from all Chinese claims to suzeraint}-, or even to 
 predominating influence, it was chiefly the attitude and 
 actions of Russia which decided the more active relations of 
 Japanese to the Korean Government. France and Germany 
 at the close of the war with China, and France during the 
 period just preceding the war with Russia, exercised consider- 
 able influence of a less obvious and direct character, how- 
 ever upon the relations of these two governments. During 
 the last three or four years which cover the period that began
 
 THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM 447 
 
 toward the close of the Russo-Japanese compaignings, Great 
 Britain and the United States have powerfully, but for the 
 most part indirectly, affected the newer relations that have 
 been in the process of forming between Japan and Korea. 
 The Government of Great Britain has been the fair alh' and 
 sensible counsellor of the Japanese Government; the United 
 States, while maintaining an official attitude distinctly favor- 
 able to giving the Residency-General a "free hand" for his 
 plans to accomplish reforms in Korea, has been, by complicity 
 of some of its private citizens with a false and corrupt Emperor, 
 a no inconsiderable source of embarrassment. The same 
 thing would have to be said of some of the British residents 
 in Korea. 
 
 Recent Treaties and Conventions with Great Britain, 
 France, and Russia, have now, however, made it as certain as 
 anything in the political future of human affairs can well be, 
 that none of these powerful nations will for some years to 
 come interfere in the policy or administration of the Japanese 
 Protectorate in Korea. So far as their action is concerned, 
 Japan has only to maintain her pledges of "equal oppor- 
 tunity," the "open door," and "hands-off" from China for 
 purposes of plundering its territory, and she may now try 
 without foreign interference her plans for the improvement of 
 her relations with this hitherto most troublesome neighbor. 
 Indeed, the way in which the Convention of July, 1907, with 
 its increase of legal rights to control the internal administra- 
 tion and reshape the entire code and economic and social 
 system of the Korean peninsula, has been received by the 
 Powers generally, shows that no formidable objection from 
 without would be raised if Japan should substitute out-and- 
 out annexation for the now-existing Protectorate. The four 
 great nations whose territorial possessions give them a su- 
 preme interest in the Far East, have already formally ac- 
 cepted the existing situation; there is less and less likelihood
 
 448 IX KORKA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 of meddling, as aulhorizcd by other European or American 
 nations, on the part of their (h'plomatic re[)resentatives. 
 
 Furthermore, in Korea itself, those scjuabbles with foreign- 
 ers which have arisen out of conHicting ])romoting schemes 
 and claims to concessions, since order is being rapidly brought 
 out of the confusion they have occasioned, are likely to cut 
 less of a figure in the future. Tlic anti-Japanese missionaries 
 and other foreign residents in Seoul are being either won ()\er, 
 or their complaints silenced, by the policy of the Residency- 
 General. If the criticisms of the dealings of Ja])an with Korea 
 were much more just and severe, they would not ])e likel}' to 
 involve international complications of any serious magnitude. 
 Only China remains huge, mysterious, incalculable both for 
 good and for evil, a vast overhanging cloud, with here and 
 there a flash of lightning or streak of sunlight shining through. 
 But for some time to come it is altogether unlikely that the 
 Celestial Empire will be able, however willing, to re-establish 
 any claims to a dominating influence, much less to a restorerl 
 suzerainty, in the Korean peninsula. This first class of 
 factors, which have been so influential and even determinative 
 in the past, may therefore not imi)roperly be eliminated in 
 making up one's calculations as to the j)rol:)able future. In 
 other w^ords, the issue will now be determined by the behavior 
 toward each other of the two peoples immediately concerned. 
 Japanese and Koreans will now be allowed to work out the 
 problem of the relations for the weal or for the woe of both 
 peoples to exist and prove eO'ective between Japan and 
 Korea. 
 
 What shall be said, however, as to the ])art which the 
 Korean Government and the Korean people themselves are 
 likely to contribute toward solving the difficult and intricate 
 problem of the future relations of the two nations? The 
 basis for a plausible answer to this question must be found 
 in an estimate of the material resources of Korea and in a
 
 THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM 449 
 
 calculation as to the share which the Koreans are destined 
 to have in the improved conditions brought about by the 
 development of these resources. It has already been shown 
 that the soil of the peninsula, under improved methods of 
 cultivation, can easily be made to support double the existing 
 population. Reforestation and proper treatment of the 
 forests remaining can easily supply this increased population 
 with fuel and with timber. The introduction of new crops, 
 and the increase of the products of cotton and silk, the 
 fostering of such forms of manufacture as are fitted to the 
 country, and the development of the mines, can just as easily 
 be made to place this two-folded population in circumstances 
 of greatly increased comfort and prosperity. And with it all 
 will go, of course, the building up of foreign trade and the 
 securing of all the benefits that follow in its train. But 
 who will actually possess the fruits of this development; 
 will it be the Koreans themselves, or the Japanese immi- 
 grants ? 
 
 So far as the answer to this question depends upon the 
 enactment and the enforcement of a just legal code the 
 right to an equal chance, and security of this right if only the 
 man is able to seize and improve it the Japanese Residency- 
 General is solemnly pledged and actually committed. But 
 laws, courts, educational institutions, and banking facilities 
 cannot do everything. After all these, and in the midst of 
 all these, there is the man his physical and mental cliaracter- 
 istics, his moral and spiritual impulses. Overwhelming 
 Japanese immigration is perhaps, tlien, greatly to be dreaded 
 ])v the Koreans, even when the former can no longer take 
 from the latter by fraud or by violence. The dread, however, 
 that the Koreans will be supplanted by the Japanese would 
 seem bv no means to be wholly warranted in view of existing 
 facts. The actual native population of the Korean ])eninsula 
 :s difficult to ascertain; but the latest census, taken in the
 
 450 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 spring of 1907, shows that it was probably greatly over- 
 estimated by the previous statistics. This census gave the 
 numbers as 9,638,578 peoi)le inhabiting 2,322,457 houses. 
 A census of the Japanese population in Korea, January 31, 
 1907, returned the figures of 81,657 in all, of which 31,754 
 were females. As compared with the returns for Alarch 31, 
 
 1906, this census showed an increase of about 20,000 in the 
 non-official Japanese population (a calculation not differing 
 greatly from that based uj)on the returns of the steamship 
 agency at Fusan, see p. 143 f.). Making allowance for those 
 immigrants who failed to register, we may calculate that not 
 far from 100,000 Japanese, exclusive of the army and the 
 civil officials, were resident in Korea during the summer of 
 
 1907. The great majority of these immigrants were traders, 
 artisans, and common laborers; but an increasing numljer 
 of Japanese farmers were settling, especially in the fertile 
 valleys of Kyung-sang-do and Cholla-do. Of these traders, 
 artisans, and common laborers, many are engaged in 1:)uilding 
 Japanese houses and in construction work on the Japanese 
 railways; by no means all such immigrants are likely to 
 become permanent residents in Korea. With the farmers 
 the case is not the same. 
 
 Is the annual rate of Japanese immigration into Korea 
 likely to increase greatly in the future? No one can tell 
 positively; but the negative answer seems much the more 
 Hkely. The day of temptation to the mere adventurer is 
 largely gone by ; the Koreans themselves are likely to become 
 acquainted with the way of doing things as the Japanese 
 demand requires they should be done, and then many of 
 these foreign traders, artisans, and laborers will have their 
 places taken by Koreans. Formosa, Manchuria, and Hok- 
 kaido are rivals of Korea for the Japanese agriculturists and 
 other kinds of permanent settlers; South America and other 
 countries offer greater inducements to the emigration com-
 
 THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM 451 
 
 panics. Moreover, at about the same time that the results 
 of these censuses were published, a local paper in Seoul 
 published the birth and death statistics of the Japanese 
 colony there. These statistics showed that during the pre- 
 vious year there had been an excess of deaths over births 
 among the Japanese in Seoul, Of births there w^re 312 
 187 male and 125 female, while the deaths amounted to a 
 total of 464 308 male and 156 female. And yet there are 
 few old people, and almost none w^ho came as invalids, in 
 this foreign population. 
 
 Let it be supposed, however, that the annual net increase 
 of Japanese population in Korea amounts to 20,000 for the 
 next fifty years. There wall then be only somewhat more than 
 one million of this now foreign population. But meantime 
 the Korean peninsula will have become quite capable of 
 supporting double its present native population. Besides 
 this, there are those to the opinion of whom the present 
 writer is strongly inclined who feel confident that fifty 
 years from now the distinction between Korean and Japanese, 
 among the common people, will be very nearly, if not quite 
 completely, wiped out. And, indeed, the two nations are of 
 essentially the same derivation, so far as their dominant 
 strains of ancestral blood are concerned ; and great as are the 
 present differences between the Japanese in Japan and the 
 Koreans in Korea, there is no real reason why both Japanese 
 and Koreans should not become essentially one people in 
 Korea. 
 
 There is then, it would seem, no essential and permanent 
 reason of a material sort why Korea should not remain Korean 
 in its principal features, if the next half-century shows the 
 expected results in its material development. We have seen 
 that the present Residency-General is committed to the policy 
 of developing the land in the behalf of its own inhabitants, 
 while according all just and natural rights, and all reasonable
 
 15^ IX K()Ki:.\ wrrii marquis rro 
 
 encouragement, to foreign ininiignilion and to foreign cajMlal. 
 Again, however, the same decisive but as yet unanswered 
 (juestions return: Can the Court he purified? Can an 
 iionest and elTicient Korean official chiss l)e secured, trained, 
 and supported Ijy the nation? Can that nu'ddle chiss 
 which is in all modern nations the source of tlie controlling 
 economic and moral factors be constituted out of the body 
 of the Korean peoi)le? And, finally, can tlie great multitude, 
 the Korean })oi)ulace, be made more intelligent, law-abiding, 
 and morally sound? 
 
 As to the purification of the Court at Seoul under tlie ex- 
 Emperor, and so far as his influence could be extended sucli 
 a thing was found impossible by the Residenl-Ceneral. 
 Warnings, advice, experience of evil results all were of no 
 avail. This weak and corrupt nature would not free itself 
 from its environment of sorceresses, eunuchs, soolhsaxers, 
 and selfish or desperate, corruj^t, and lowdived native and 
 foreign advisers; and without the conversion of the Emperor, 
 under the former conditions, the Court could not be made 
 more intelligent, honest and patriotic. So long and so far as 
 the ex-Emperor can exercise his parental influence uj)on the 
 present Emperor in national affairs, the ])art whicli tlie Court 
 plays in the redemption of the nation will be com))aratively 
 small. But this influence is now broken; and the measures 
 which are being taken wholly to nullify it can scarcelx' fail 
 to succeed. If it becomes necessar\', Mis ex-Maje<ly can be 
 given a residence remote from Seoul. The Con\ention of 
 July, 1907, gives to the Japanese Resident-Ceneral a liillierto 
 impossible control over the entourage of the Kmjjcror. It is 
 therefore altogether unlikely that any future ruler of Korea, 
 even if he should wish to follow this bad examj)le, tlu's most 
 disastrous precedent, will be able to rival for mischief his 
 predecessors, by way of encouraging fraud, violence. and sedi- 
 tion at home, and foreign misunderstandings and interferences
 
 THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM 453 
 
 through the help of unwise or unscrupulous "foreign friends." 
 IMoreover, the present Emperor, so far as can be judged by 
 the brief experience under his rule, is either not disposed, or 
 not able, to continue the evil practices of his Imperial an- 
 cestor. The proposals for reform brought before His Korean 
 INIajesty seem now to meet with neither open nor secret 
 opposition. Best of all, the palace horde of evil men and 
 women is being reduced from within, and excluded from 
 without; and this, in the absence of complaints and petitions 
 for pity, sent over the civilized world, from the royal "pris- 
 oner" under a blood-thirsty Japanese guard! Thus there is 
 solid ground on which to build hopes of a far less corrupt, 
 a much more intelligent and honest, Korean Court. 
 
 That honorable and brave leaders generals, civil rulers, 
 magistrates, and judges can come out of Korean ancestry, 
 there is the evidence of history to show. True, the number 
 of such leaders, through all the past centuries of Korea's 
 sad and disgraceful career, has been relatively small. But, as 
 has been repeatedly pointed out, this fact has been largely 
 due to the corrupt official system, and the ever-present cor- 
 rupting influence, which has come from across the Yellow 
 Sea that is, from China. The Cabinet officials who had to 
 meet the severely trying emergency which ended with the 
 abdication of the Emperor, a new Convention with Japan, 
 and the pacification of a people much given over to local 
 disorders and to the spreading of the spirit of riot an<l 
 sedition, on the whole acquitted themselves well. It is, 
 indeed, dirficult to see how they could have done Ijetter 
 for the country under the existing circumstances. Tliat 
 timber can be grown in Korea, out of which may l^e hewn 
 in the future enough material for a sound and fair of- 
 ficial edifice, tlicre is, we think, no good reason to doubt. 
 Under tlie recent Convention the res])onsibility for framing 
 laws, policing the country, securing order, appointing a just
 
 454 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 and intelligent magistracy, as well as (lcveloj)ing schools 
 and industries and arts, rests jjrimarily upon the Japanese 
 Government. If moderation and wisdom can be secured 
 here, a sullicient force of native official helpers and partners 
 in all the benevolent projects of the Marquis I to can probably 
 in due time also be secured. In order, however, that Japan- 
 ese and Korean olTicials should co-operate heartily, and should 
 live and work together in peace, it is necessary that the under- 
 lying principle of their co-operation should be not selfish, but 
 controlled by devotion to duty and by an intelligent and 
 sincere desire to secure the welfare of both nations. Only 
 such high motives can unite men of different nationalities, or 
 even of the same nation, in works of economic reform and 
 moral improvement. This is only to say that in Korea, as 
 evernvhere else in the ancient and the modern world alike, 
 the real and lasting success of the government must depend 
 upon its intelligence and its righteousness. It is to be hoped 
 that the capacity for both these essential classes of qualifica- 
 tions for self-government is in the Korean blood, if only it 
 can have tuition, example, and freedom for development. 
 
 With the improvement of the economic and industrial 
 conditions in Korea, and especially with the enlarged op- 
 portunities for foreign commerce, a fairly intelligent and well- 
 to-do middle class population is likely to result from the 
 Japanese Protectorate. This class is in a process of evolution 
 in Japan itself. It is essentially the ])roduct, "natural" so 
 to say where public schools exist and thrive, and where the 
 conditions are favorable to manufacture, trade, and agri- 
 culture on any large scale. But especially is such a class 
 one of the most sure and valualjle results of a more highly 
 moral and spiritual religion. Christianity distinctly favors, 
 when it becomes practically o})erative, the formation of a 
 middle class. In Korea hitherto' there have been only, as a 
 rule, corrupt and oppressive rulers and officials, and ignorant,
 
 THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM 455 
 
 oppressed, and degraded multitudes. The foundation of 
 schools of the modem type, especially for technical and man- 
 ual training, and the spread of Christianity, will, almost 
 inevitably, combine to raise a body of thrifty, fairly intelligent, 
 and upright, self-respecting citizens. This will go far 
 toward solving the problem of the reform and redemption 
 of Korea. 
 
 As to the destiny of considerable numbers of the lower 
 orders of the people, that is perhaps unavoidably true which 
 has been said of the Korean farmers : "A large percentage of 
 them are past all hope of salvation." The professional 
 robbers and beggars, the riotous "pedlers," the seditious 
 among the disbanded troops or the "tiger hunters," the wild 
 and savage inhabitants of the mountainous regions, the people 
 who live by thieving, counterfeiting, soothsaying, divin- 
 ing, and other illicit ways, will have to submit, reform, or 
 be exterminated. Doubtless, many of them will prefer to be 
 exterminated. But our examination of the previous chapters 
 encourages and confirms the hope that something much 
 better than this is possible for the great multitude of the 
 peasants among the Korean people. ]\Iarquis Ito has set his 
 heart on helping this class toward a much improved condi- 
 tion. The promise of this he has distinctly affirmed in both 
 private and public addresses, and has indeed done all that 
 he possibly could to confirm. It is this also upon which every 
 true-hearted missionary is most intently bent. For it was to 
 these same multitudes sheep without a shepherd^that 
 Jesus came; on their uplift and salvation he set his heart. 
 It would be contrary to the experience of the centuries to 
 suppose that an enlightened form of education and a spiritual 
 religion could combine in the effort to raise the multitudes of 
 any nation, without resulting in a large measure of success. 
 . It would seem, then, that the responsibility for a successful 
 and relatively permanent solution of the difficult problem
 
 456 IN KORKA WI'iMl M.\R(JUIS ITO 
 
 offered by the geographical, historical and otlier important 
 relations of Japan and Korea, untler the now existing Con- 
 vention between the two governments, rests most hi'a\il\' 
 upon the Japanese themselves. The}' have at last '"a free 
 hand"; the material with wliicli they have to deal in order 
 to construct anew and inijjroved national structure is, indeed, 
 in bad and largely unsound condition; but it is not ho])eless, 
 and it is not radically deficient in llie (pialities necessary for a 
 sound and durable structure. Korea is, inherently considered, 
 capable of reform; but at present it is not capable of self- 
 government, much less of self-instituted and wliolly self- 
 controlled reform. Japan has taken u})on herself the task 
 of furnishing example, stimulus, guidance, and elTective 
 forces, to set this desirable ideal into reality. Xo other 
 nation has this task; no other nation is going seriously to 
 interfere with Japan in its task. On the Japanese (jONern- 
 ment and the Japanese people rests the heavy responsibility 
 of securing a new and greatly improved national life for tlie 
 millions of the Korean [)eninsula; if they succeed, to lliem 
 will chiefly be the praise and the profit; if they fail, to tliem 
 will chiefly be the shame and the loss. At ])resent, and in 
 the near future, it is the last of these three sets of determining 
 factors namely, the policy and practice of Jaj^an herself 
 with reference to Korea which will have the final word to 
 say in the solution of this dilTicult problem. The judgment 
 of the civilized world is already pronounced upon this matter. 
 Korea has already been judged imj)otent and unworthy to 
 be trusted with the management either of her own internal 
 affairs or of her relations to other nations in the Far East 
 and in the world at large. Japan has been judged to be 
 most favorably situated and, for the protection of her own 
 interests, best entitled to undertake and to carry through 
 the reform and reconstitulion of Korea. Japan also will 
 in the future be judged, by the judgment of the civilized
 
 THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM 457 
 
 world and by the verdict of history, according to the way in 
 which she fulfils her duties, and accomplishes her task, in 
 Korea. 
 
 \\\\\ Japan prove equal to the management and the de- 
 velopment of the internal resources, civil government, and 
 foreign relations, of her weaker neighljor in such a way as to 
 command the title to a righteous and genuine success? No 
 one can answer this question with a })erfect confidence. In 
 many important respects the present is an exceedingly critical 
 time for the Japanese Government and the Japanese nation 
 in respect of the condition of its own internal affairs. The 
 same thing is true of Ja})an's relations to foreign nations. 
 The army and na\}' deser\-ed and won praise from all the 
 civilized workl for its bravery, skill, and moderation in the 
 last war. And after the war terminated in a treaty of peace 
 which, while it was at the time wisely made on tlie part of 
 the real leaders of the nation, was exceedingly disappointing 
 to the military and naval forces and to the peojjle at large, 
 the whole of Japan, with the exception of few and brief de- 
 monstrations of resentment, obeyed the wise counsels and 
 injunctions of His Imperial Majesty, its Emperor. In obe- 
 dience to these injunctions the nation turned quietly and 
 diligently to the pursuits of peace. But in these pursuits 
 Japan is by no means so far advanced, when judged b}' mod- 
 ern standards, as she was in the preparation for, and conduct 
 of, war both b}' land and Ijy sea. In manufactures and e\"er\' 
 form of industr}', in trade and commcrci', in tlie de\ i-ing and 
 management of the means of com.munit-ation. in education, 
 science, and literature everywliere in these lines of i)eaceful 
 national activity there is a great deficiency of trained and 
 trustworthy helpers, even for the su])p]y of her own immediate 
 needs. In all these matters of national interest and im))ort, 
 the cry of her leaders is for tlie right sort of luai. How, then, 
 shall Japan at the present juncture supply in sufficient num-
 
 458 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 bcrs the workmen to meet the needs of the hour in the reform 
 and uphfl of Korea? 
 
 jMoreover, as the nation of Japan advances in these many 
 Hnes, it is inevitable that it should meet the same difficullies, 
 embarrassments, and dangers which in yet severer form are 
 testing the leading nations of Europe and America. Trusts 
 and labor unions both likely to become the enemies of tlie 
 Empire as they have so largely in the United States become 
 the enemies of the Republic are already growing apace. 
 Even more, perhaps, than anywhere else outside of Russia 
 and parts of Germany, insane theories of ethics, ])hilosophy, 
 and religion, are captivating the minds, and controlling the 
 conduct, of not a few of her students and other young men. 
 As in the United States, especially, but also in all the countries 
 of Europe, the old-fashioned parental control and discipline 
 of the home-life is being greatly relaxed. The over-estimate 
 of so-called science and the conceit of modernity are working 
 mischief in the character of not a few. And the life of tlie 
 millions of the people is not yet lifted to the higher grades of 
 morality and religion. 
 
 With regard to the right national policy toward Korea 
 there has also been, as we have seen, a long-standing difference 
 of opinion. This difference still exists, although it was for 
 the time submerged by the tide of enthusiastic approval 
 which welcomed the policy of Marquis Ito when, under the 
 grant of liberty of action from His Imperial Majesty, with the 
 consent of the Elder Statesmen, and the co-operation of Minis- 
 ter Hayashi, the Convention of July, 1Q07, was successfully 
 concluded. Many of the military leaders, however, continue 
 to favor a more punitive and war-like attitude toward an\' 
 resistance on the part of the Koreans. The mailed fist, with 
 its threats, rather than the open palm, with its promise of 
 friendly assistance, seems to them better fitted to the situation. 
 And it can never be expected that there will be a cessation
 
 THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM 459 
 
 of the desires and efforts of that crowd of Japanese ad- 
 venturers, promoters, and unscrupulous traders, who are as 
 ready to make game of the resources of Korea as are the smaller 
 number of no less selfish foreigners residing in the peninsula 
 but claiming the protection for their schemes of other nation- 
 alities. Of the two, the latter are in not a few cases much 
 the more difficult to deal with in a manner satisfactory both 
 to the honor of the Japanese Protectorate and also to the 
 interests of the Korean people. All these schemers, as a 
 matter of course, have scanty faith in the slow and patient 
 methods of education, economic and judicial reform, which 
 are deliberately chosen and persistently followed by the 
 present Residency- General. 
 
 Such tendencies as those just mentioned undoubtedly make 
 it more difficult to predict with confidence the success of Japan 
 in the task of building up a strong and healthy national existence 
 out of the so largely dead and decayed material furnished to 
 its hand. But there are other tendencies, and other forms 
 of influence, now existing and growing in vigor among the 
 Japanese of to-day, which strongly encourage the hopeful 
 view. The nation emerged from the war with Russia in 
 much more sober and thoughtful frame of mind than that 
 which followed upon the close of the Chino- Japan war. 
 The enormous losses of life, and the heavy debt left upon 
 them by the expenditure of treasure, tended to keep down 
 the self-conceit and headiness whicli might have followed an 
 easier victory. And in spite of the immediate disadvantages 
 growing out of the fact that the terms of the Treaty of Ports- 
 mouth fell so far below their expectations, and below what 
 seemed to them at the time their just deserts, it was probably 
 best in the preparation for their future enterprises and strug- 
 gles to have the war end as it did. Of the sincere desire of 
 Japan for peace willi the whole world, no one who knows the 
 nation can have the slicrhtest honest doubt.
 
 _i6o IN k()ri:a wrrii M.\R(,)ris iio 
 
 Tlierc lias also l)L'cn a great awakcnint^ of inlcrcsl in 
 moral problems since the Russo-Japanese war. This interest 
 is not confined to any one class. In all the (government 
 schools, of every description, esj)ccial attention is being given 
 to ethics. This is the one study which is kept most constantly 
 before the minds of the ])upils, from the earliest stages of their 
 training to the end of the graduate courses in the university. 
 Aware of the unworthy reputation of its business men, in 
 res[)ect of business morality, the commen ial scliools, higher 
 and lower, government and private, are placing emphasis 
 upon the side of moral instruction and disci])line in ])re])ara- 
 tion for business life. The men, now ])ast middle life, who 
 were trained to the respect for honor and the feelings of devo- 
 tion which characterized the Samurai (or Puritan knights) 
 of the old regime, and who have been the inspircrs and guides 
 of all that has been best in the "New Japan," are still, 
 though they arc growing old and fewer in number, controlling 
 the destinies of the nation They have the confidence of 
 His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, who steadily 
 throws the great weight of his influence upon the side which 
 favors combining these ancient virtues with a mcxlern 
 education. Among the men in middle life there still lingers, 
 indeed, much of those influences and ])ractices which have 
 cost the New Japan so dearly, in loss of reputation and of 
 failure to make good use of some of her choicest o|)portunitics. 
 But the new and better s})irit is most conspicuous with 
 the younger educated men; the boys and girls in the public 
 schools are receiving a form of education and discipline 
 which, considering Japan's poverty and newness of resources, 
 surpasses that of any other country in the ci\ilized world. 
 Moreover, the ear of the nation is open to religion as never 
 before in its history. This increased feeling of*need, and this 
 higher estimate of the value of an improved morality and a 
 more spiritual religion, together with the arousing and
 
 THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM 461 
 
 directing of the nation's energies into the development of its 
 material resources and its foreign trade, are the distinctive 
 features of the national life of the Japanese at the present 
 lime. 
 
 There is another thing about the temperament of the 
 Japanese which is often of most powerful influence, and yet 
 most difticult for foreigners to appreciate. This is the force 
 of sentimental considerations, which frecjuently triumph over 
 those considerations that are regarded by other peoples as of 
 more importance in practical affairs. Already, the senti- 
 ments of generosity, of pity, and of a sort of condescending 
 kindness, have triumphed in the management of Korean af- 
 fairs by the Japanese. The history of the relations of the 
 two countries has amply illustrated this fact. These senti- 
 ments, which are certainly dominant to a large extent with 
 the Residency- General, when reenforced by the growing re- 
 spect for morality and religion, will it seems fair to sup- 
 pose be even more powerful in the future. 
 
 Still further, Japan has successfully overcome many 
 enormous difficulties, and has bravely and well met many most 
 threatening emergencies, during the last fifty years. Over 
 and over again during this ]K^riod, her case has seemed 
 almost desperate. But each time the nation has rallied and 
 has climbed upward to a higher and better level in its na- 
 tionalhfe. True, this has been due, to a large extent, to the 
 wisdom and skill of the men who have thus far led the nation. 
 And they are passing off the stage. Tliat the younger spirits 
 who are coming on will serve their day with equal courage, 
 wisdom, and success, is our hope and our belief. Then 
 there will be assured the third and most important class of 
 the factors which, in their comljination with the otiier two, 
 will secure the new, redeemed Korea in friendly relations, 
 in amity and unity, with Jai)an, her benefactor as well as 
 her protector.
 
 462 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 There is no essential reason why Japanese and Koreans 
 should not become one nation in Korea. Whether this 
 nation will be called Korea or Japan, time alone can tell. 
 That it will be a happier, more pros])erous, more moral and 
 truly religious people than the i:)resent Korean people, there 
 is sufficient reason to predict. Indeed, considering the brief 
 time which has elapsed since tlie Convention of Novemlx-r 
 17, 1905, the improvement already accomplislied under the 
 control of the Japanese Residency-General, if not all that 
 could be wished, has been all that could reasonably have 
 been expected. The two peoples have learned to live peace- 
 fully and happily together, in certain places, both of Japan 
 and of Korea, in past times. The conditions favoring their 
 union, and indeed amalgamation, in Kc ,^ itself are to-day 
 incomparably better than they ever were, in any large way, 
 before. If ]Marquis Ito, and his sympathetic, effective sup- 
 porters, at home and in the Residency- General, can be sus- 
 tained for five years, and can be succeeded for a generation by 
 those of Hke purpose and character, then the problem of the 
 relations of Japan and Korea will have been soh'ed. The 
 present opportunity has cost ' both countries centuries of 
 trouble, strife, and loss. That all the difficulties should ])e 
 at once removed, and all the reforms at once efficiently be 
 carried out, it is not reasonable to expect. But now that 
 Japan has won this cherished opportunity, the civilized world 
 requires, and the civilized world may expect, that the oppor- 
 tunity will be on the whole well improved. Such will un- 
 doubtedly be the issue if His Imperial Majesty of Japan, the 
 Marquis Ito, and others of like mind, have their way. 
 
 The Korean problem has become a part of the larger 
 problem namely, the realization by Japan of a worthy 
 national ideal. We close, then, this narrative of personal 
 experiences, and its following presentation and discussion of 
 diplomatic proceedings and historical facts, with a quotation
 
 THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM 463 
 
 that expresses our hopes and our behefs, and that is taken 
 from a bronze tablet which is to stand in the campus of the 
 Government School of Commerce at Nagasaki, Japan: 
 
 By a happ\' union of modern education and the spirit of Bushido, 
 inherited from countless generations of ancestors, Japan has 
 triumphed in war. By ceaseless improvement of the one, com- 
 bined with enlargement and elevation of the other, she must win 
 in the future the no less noble and difficult victories of peace. 
 
 In Industry and Art, in Science, Morals, and Religion, may 
 Dai Nippon secure and maintain a well-merited place among the 
 foremost nations of the civilized world thus enjoying prosperity 
 at home and contributing her full share toward the blessing of 
 mankind.
 
 APPENDIX A 
 
 PROTOCOL SIGNED FEBRUARY 23, 1904 
 
 Article I 
 
 For the purpose of maintaining a permanent and solid friend- 
 ship between Japan and Korea, and firmly establishing peace in 
 the Far East, the Imperial Government of Korea shall place 
 full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan and ado])t 
 the advice of the latter in regard to improvements in adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 Article II 
 
 The Imperial Government of Japan shall in a spirit of firm 
 friendship ensure the safety and repose of the Imperial House 
 of Korea. 
 
 Article III 
 
 The Imperial Government of Japan definitely guarantees the 
 inde])cndence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire. 
 
 Article IV 
 
 In case the welfare of the Imperial House of Korea or the 
 territorial integrity of Korea is endangered b}- aggression of a 
 third Power or internal disturbances, the Imjicrial Government 
 of J;ipan sliall immediately take such necessary measures as the 
 cinumslanccs r(M|uire; and in such cases tiie Imperial Government 
 of Korea shall give full facilities to promote the action of the 
 lni|)eriai Jaj)aiie^e (jo\ei"iinieiU. 
 
 4<JS
 
 466 IN KOREA WITH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 The Imperial Govcrnmcnl of Japan may, for the attainment of 
 tlic above-mentioned object, occupy, when the circumstances 
 require it, such places as may be necessary from strategical points 
 of view. 
 
 Articlk V 
 
 The Governments of the two countries shall not in future, 
 without mutual consent, conclude with a third Power such an 
 arrangement as may be contrary to the princi])les of the ])resent 
 Protocol. 
 
 Article VI 
 
 Details in connection with the present Protocol shall be ar- 
 ranged as the circumstances may require between the Representa- 
 tive of Japan and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of 
 Korea.
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
 PROTOCOL SIGNED AUGUST 22, 1904 
 
 Article I 
 
 The Korean Government shall engage as Financial Adviser 
 to the Korean Government, a Japanese subject recommended by 
 the Japanese Government, and all matters concerning finance 
 shall be dealt with after his counsel being taken. 
 
 Article II 
 
 The Korean Government shall engage as diplomatic adviser 
 to the Department of Foreign Affairs, a foreigner recommended 
 by the Japanese Government, and all important matters concern- 
 ing foreign relations shall be dealt with after his counsel being 
 taken. 
 
 Article III 
 
 The Korean Government shall previously consult the Japanese 
 Government in concluding treaties and conventions with foreign 
 Powers, and in dealing with other important diplomatic affairs, 
 such as the grant of concessions to, or contracts with, foreigners. 
 
 467
 
 . APPENDIX C 
 
 CONVENTION OF JULY 24, 1907 
 
 The Governments of Japan and Korea, \\ith a \ie\v to the earl\- 
 attainment of the prosperity and strength of Korea, and to the 
 speedy promotion of the welfare of the Korean ])eople, have a^greed 
 upon and concluded the following sti])ulali()ns: 
 
 Articlk I. The Government of Korea sliall follow the direc- 
 tion of the Resident-General in connection with tlie reform of 
 the administration. 
 
 Article II. The Government of Korea shall not enact anv 
 law or ordinance, or carry out any important administrative 
 measure, except with the previous approval of the Resident- 
 General. 
 
 Article III. The judicial affairs of Korea sliall ])e ke])t 
 distinct from the ordinary administrative affairs. 
 
 Article IV. No appointment or dismissal of Korean olTicials 
 of the higher grade shall be made without the consent of the 
 Resident-General. 
 
 Article V. The Government of Korea shall appoint to 
 official positions under it such Jai)anese as ma}' he recwmniendcd 
 by the Resident-General. 
 
 Article VI. The Government of Korea sliall not engagi- 
 any foreigner without the consent of the Resident-General. 
 
 Article VII. The first clause of the Agreemeni between 
 Japan and Korea, signed on the 2 2d day of the 8th month of the 
 37th year of Meiji, is herewith abrogated.
 
 APPENDIX 469 
 
 In faith wliorcof, the undersigned, duly authorized hy tlieir 
 respective (lovernments, liave signed this agreement a.nd affixed 
 their seals theretti. 
 
 (L. S.) Marquis HiROsiiMi Ito, 
 
 H. I. J. M's. Resident-General . 
 The 24th day of the 7th month of the 40th year of Meiji. 
 
 (L. S.) Yi Wan-voxo, 
 
 H. I. K. M's. Minister, President oj Stiitc. 
 The 24th day of the 7th month of the nth year of K\vang-mu. 
 
 [The clause in the Protocol of August, 1904, which is declared 
 abrogated by the seventh article of the new Convention, apparently 
 refers to the promise of the Korean Government to engage a 
 Japanese subject as their ofBcial Financial Adviser. It was, oi 
 course, rendered unnecessary by the new Convention.]
 
 APPENDIX D 
 
 SUMMARY OF THE MOST RKCENT MEASURES FOR 
 
 THE ORGANIZATION OF THi: KOREAN 
 
 GOVERNMENT 
 
 The revised Organic Regulations of the Korean Government, 
 published by an extra of the O/ficial Gazette (December 23, 1907), 
 cover the five Administrative Departments for Home Affairs, Fi- 
 nance, Justice, Education, and AgricuUure, Commerce and In- 
 dustry. As for the Cabinet and War Oflfice, they had not as yet 
 reported any changes introduced in their Regulations. In addi- 
 tion to the particular Organic Regulations for each de])artment 
 there are Regulations common to all the Departments, the War 
 Office not being excepted. The latter Regulations consist of 21 
 articles which outline the responsibility and duty of the ^Ministers, 
 Vice-Ministers, and other officials, and fix the date for the enforce- 
 ment of all the revised Regulations for January i, 1908. Regu- 
 lations for the organization of the different offices under the De- 
 partments of Home, Finance, and Justice \\ere promulgated at the 
 same time, including the Provincial Governor's Ofhce, Metro- 
 politan Police Office and Customs Office. 
 
 To give a brief epitome of the Regulations for each adminis- 
 trative department: The Home Office is to contain three bureaus 
 for local affairs Police, Engineering, and Hygienics, with a Di- 
 rector for each. The rest of the staff consists of 12 secretaries, 5 
 commissioners, 5 engineering experts, 3 translators, 62 clerks, 10 
 police sergeants, 5 assistant engineering experts and a number of 
 policemen. The Finance Department contains the three bureaus 
 of Revenue, Accounts, and Managing Finance, each with a Di- 
 
 470
 
 APPENDIX 471 
 
 rector. Thirteen secretaries, 7 commissioners, 2 translators, and 
 100 clerks constitute the staff of this Department. The Depart- 
 ment of Justice will have bureaus for Civil and Criminal Affairs, 
 and each bureau is controlled by a Director. The regular staff 
 of this department comprises 9 secretaries, 4 commissioners, 3 
 translators, and 40 clerks. In the Department of Education there 
 are bureaus for School Affairs and for Edition and Compilation, 
 with a Director each. The regular staff includes 7 secretaries, 4 
 commissioners, 3 engineering experts, 28 clerks, and 6 assistant 
 engineering experts. The Department of Agriculture, Commerce 
 and Industry will be divided into five bureaus namely, Agricul- 
 ture, Commercial and Industrial, Forestry, Mining, and Marine 
 Products; and each bureau has a Director at its head. The 
 regular staff of this Department includes 8 secretaries, 5 com- 
 missioners, 15 technical experts, i translator, 49 clerks, and 60 
 assistant technical experts. 
 
 In addition, each Department has a Minister's Chamber, and a 
 private secretary will be appointed to each Minister of State. 
 
 The Regulations for the Financial Department provide for the 
 creation of a Temporary Bureau for investigation of the national 
 resources, with a staff consisting of a Director, a secretary, 3 
 commissioners, and 5 technical experts. 
 
 Alore detailed regulations for the different offices under these 
 departments are to be issued later. 
 
 The most recent advices from Korea report that the rioting, 
 arson, and murder, headed by the disbanded Korean soldiers, is 
 greatly diminished, and that the country is reverting to its normal 
 condition so far as deeds of disorder and violence are concerned. 
 The visit of the Crown Prince of Japan greatly gratified the pride 
 and appeased the fears of the Imperial family and Yang-bans of 
 Korea. Before leaving Seoul, Prince Ito laid the corner-stone of 
 the new building of the Young Men's Christian Association in that 
 city. The Crown Prince of Korea, the son of Lady Om, whose 
 guardianship Prince Ito has taken upon himself, accompanied by 
 Ito, arrived in Tokyo, where he is to be placed in the Peers School, 
 and was received with distinguished honors both by the Imperial 
 Family of Japan and bv the populace. The reports also show
 
 472 IX KORKA WrFH MARQUIS ITO 
 
 that the Iradi- rrlations liavc had a si^iiifica.nt iiicri'asc hctwccn 
 the two (ouiilrii'.-.; l)Ut tlic most .-igiiitu aiit item is this: the ex 
 ])orts of Korean pnxhuts, \vhi( h are t'or the most part rice and 
 lieans, exceed the im})orls from Ja])an hy some* _^, 000,000 yni. 
 The cstabHshment of friendly relations between the two countries 
 ai)pcars, therefore, to be movinc; forward rapidly; and the {)C)lit- 
 ical and economical redemy)lion of the peninsula a])pears to have 
 been successfully betjjun. I'he hrst and, of necessitx', most doubt- 
 ful and diflicult in the stages of the Passing of the Old Kore;- 
 ma\- therefore be said to have been already acccjmplished.
 
 INDEX 
 
 Agricuxture, state of, 92/., 122/., 
 127/., 301/., 303, 304/.; founding 
 Station and School of, 122/., 126, 
 302 
 
 Alexeieff, M. Kir, doings of, in Ko- 
 rea, 224/. 
 
 Allen, H. N. (Acting ^^linister), on 
 education in Korea, 327 
 
 An Chung-ho, 107 
 
 Bell, the Great, at Seoul, 26, 31/., 
 
 179/- 
 Bethell, Mr., Editor Korean Daily 
 
 Neics, 158 
 Bingham, Minister, 197/. 
 Bishop, Mrs., quoted, 390 
 Brinkley, quoted, 184, 192, 193 
 Brown, Mr. J. McLcavy, Director of 
 
 Customs, 224/., 360 
 Buddha, "The Great White," 137/. 
 Buddhism, condition of, in Korea, 
 
 133/-, 137 
 Bunki, nature of, 342/. 
 
 Chemulpo, visit to, 113/.; popula- 
 tion of, 114; appearance of, 114/.; 
 harbor of, 115 
 
 China, influence of, on Korea, iSi/., 
 190, 194, 202/., 253, 296; its 
 claims of suzerainty, 189/., 191/., 
 194, 196/., 199, 203, 211/., 216/.; 
 soldiers of, in Korea, 203/., 205/., 
 214; war with, 214/.; present con- 
 dition of, 444/. 
 
 Cockhurn, Mr., British Coiisul-Gcn- 
 eral, 131/, 134/ 
 
 Confucianism, of Korea, character- 
 ized, 181/., 296 
 
 Conventions (see also Treaties), with 
 China, 210/.; Yamagata-Loban- 
 off, 224/.; of Nov., 1904, with 
 Korea, 252-279, 414; of July, 
 1907, 419, 431/., 433; disorder fol- 
 lowing, 434/ 
 
 Councillor, in Privy Council, new 
 
 oiTice created, 82 
 Court, the Korean, corruptions of, 
 
 151/., 297, 452; cowardice of, 
 
 182/.; "Purification" of, 297, 
 
 452/. 
 Crown Prince (now Emperor), 29S 
 
 note 
 Curzon, Hon. George X., ([uoted, 
 
 402 
 Daily Neivs, the Korean, 42, 52, 
 
 62/.; annoimces commission to 
 
 The Hague, 83/.; attacks Dr. 
 
 Jones, 355 
 
 Education", condition of, in Korea, 
 325-339; earlier efforts at reform 
 of, 327/.; modern organization of, 
 Z3>'~^J-^ 3?iSf-i missionary work in, 
 332/.; attitude of Koreans toward, 
 334; interest of Japan in, 336 
 
 Ellis, Mr. \Vm. T., 367 
 
 Emperor, of Korea (now ex-Emper- 
 or), audience with, 44/., 147/.; 
 personal appearance of, 44/.; 
 message to, 148/.; character of, 
 151/r 154/-, 158, 175/-. 235/., 
 282/., 2S6/.; renounces suzerainty 
 of Chin.a, 216 f.; tlees to Russian 
 Legation, 220; subsequent be- 
 havior, 233/.; treachery of, 242, 
 244, 246, 2g8, 361, 415, 428/.; re- 
 cei\-es letter from I'^mperor of 
 jajjan, 254; his part in Coin-en- 
 tion of roc4. 256 /'., 250/"., 2()8/., 
 274/"., 415/'.,' al)(liiaiion of, 42-;, 
 , 428" 
 
 l-'.pv.'orth League, fate of, in Korea, 
 38 
 
 Eui W'ha, Prince, 17, 75/. 
 
 Foulk, Ensign CU-orgi- C, report of, 
 to L.'nite<l States, 200/., 203, 204/.; 
 (juoted, 37()
 
 474 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Fusan, town of, 15/., 140/., 142; 
 public park in, 15, 142; reception 
 at, 16/., 140/., 143; lectures at, 
 142; schools of, 142; revolt of 
 settlers in, 185 
 
 Gale, Dr., qucHed, 378 
 General Sherman, the visit of the, to 
 Korea, 191 
 
 Hague, Peace Conference of, Ko- 
 rean Commissioners to, 83/., 298, 
 414, 416; Japanese press concern- 
 ing, 418/.; action of Tokyo Gov- 
 ernment, 419 
 
 Hai-tai, the, 28 
 
 Hall, of "Audience," 29; of "Con- 
 gratulations," 30 
 
 Hamilton, Angus, quoted, 377 
 
 Han, Korean Prime Minister in 1904, 
 263/., 266 note, 267 
 
 Hanyang, town of, predecessor to 
 Seoul, 22, 32 
 
 Harris, Bishop M. C, quoted, 397 
 
 Hay, Secretary, efforts of, 236/. 
 
 Hayashi, Minister in Korea, 260, 
 263, 269; special Ambassador to 
 Korea, 419/., 421/. 
 
 Hershey, quoted, 219/., 223/. 
 
 Hideyoshi, the invasion of, 15/., 25, 
 90/., 183/., 187/.; war with 
 Prince Mori, 145 
 
 Hiro-Mura, trip to, 6/. 
 
 Hulbert, Mr. Homer B., leaves Seoul, 
 83/.; on Korean history, 182; 
 quoted, 183, 236, 289, 290, 291, 
 293, 295, 336; charges of, ex- 
 amined, 375 
 
 ICHIHARA, Mr., President of "Econ- 
 omies Club," 55/. 
 
 II Chin-hcji (Society), memorial of, to 
 Ministers, 76/.; to Residency- 
 General, 430/. 
 
 Independence Arch, 43, 132 
 
 Independence Hall, 43; lecture at, 
 52 _ 
 
 Industrial Training School, founded 
 at Seoul, 128/. 
 
 Inouye, Count, negotiates treaty with 
 Korea, 107/.; later visit of, as 
 ambassador, 205/.; administra- 
 tion in Korea, 218 /. ; views on 
 Commission to The Hague, 417/- 
 
 Ito, Prince HiroliumJ, invitation of, 
 3/-, ^f; 14, 37/, 40/., S(r, alti- 
 tudeof, toward Korea, 8/., 55/., 64, 
 1.S9, T57, 164/., i6()/., 226, 3g5/.; 
 work of, ill Korea, 86/., lOS/., 
 I7,S/, 253/., 287/., 2g8, 301/., 
 330/-, 341/-, 355/. 412; nego- 
 tiates treaty with China, 194/., 
 210/.; speech of (1898), 226/.; 
 visits Peking, 23i;jind St. Peters- 
 burg, 232; negotiates Conven- 
 tions with Korea, 252/., 256, 260/.; 
 in Convention of 1907, 421, 42.;, 
 432/.; enlarged plans of, 441; 
 visits Tokyo, Aug., 1907, 442 
 
 Ivevasu, treatment of Korea bv, 
 ' 189/ 
 
 Jap.xnese, characteristics of, i J., 55, 
 T2i/., 183, 431/, 454, 457; "- 
 vasion by, 15/., 25, 183/.; settle- 
 ments of, in Korea, 15/., 19, 114, 
 143/., 450/.,- as an audience, 55, 
 97; relations of, to Koreans, 55/., 
 59/., 91, 109/., 119/., 150/., 
 171/., 202/., 368/., 393/., 45'"^; 
 ladies in Seoul, 57/. 
 
 Japan Times, quoted, 418/. 
 
 Jones, Dr. G. Ileber, (juoted, 22, 23, 
 27, 89, 168/., 179, 425; assistance 
 by, in work, 48, 49, 52/., 59, 1 13/.; 
 interview of, with AIar([iiis llo, 
 63/.; attack upon, 355 note 
 
 Justice, the Public, jjrevious condi- 
 tion of, 340/., 343, 345. 347/. 
 369; use of torture, 340/., 375/.; 
 attempts at reform of, 341/., 
 343/, 349/-.' police system, 345/; 
 courts of, 347/. 
 
 Kahayama, Admiral, visits Korea, 
 205/. 
 
 Kang, chief Eunuch, 154 
 
 Kenochi, Mr., Resident at Chemul- 
 po, 117 
 
 Kikuchi, Mr., Resident at Pyeng- 
 yang, 100 
 
 Kimmei, Korean envoy to, 186 
 
 Kim Ok-kiun, 31; murder of, 213 
 
 Kim Tuk-nvung, K(jrean general, 
 183 
 
 Korea, country of, 19/., 92/., 113/., 
 301; hunting tigers in, 120/.; his- 
 torical relations of, to Japan, 179-
 
 INDEX 
 
 475 
 
 251; reasons for its degradation, 
 180/.; treaty of 1876 with, 182; 
 trade relations witli Japan, 185/., 
 356; control of, by Japan, 242/., 
 452/.; resources of, 300/., 303/., 
 310/., 322/.; reforestation of, 
 306/., 308/.; mines of, 309/., 
 361/.; customs of, 313/-, 324/.; 
 finances of, 315/., 318/, 320/., 
 356/.; debt of, 324; foreign trade 
 
 of, 356/. 
 
 Koreans, the condition of, 8/., 60, 
 158/., 160/., 180/.; characteris- 
 tics of, 86/., 105/., 120, 129, 162/., 
 180/., 289/., 295/., 428/.,- inde- 
 pendence of, 8/., 169, 174/-, 
 216/., 296/., 336 note; intrigues 
 of, 8, 10/., 66, 68/., 85/, 105, 
 171/., 201/., 218/., ^'Jif.; appear- 
 ance of, 18, 47/.,. 292, 294; super- 
 stitions of, 23/,' 131, 293/., 391; 
 burial places of, 23/, 132/; as 
 an audience, 47/, Si/-/ women, 
 57/, 86/, 294; murder Japanese, 
 202, 206/, 399, 425; as workmen, 
 292/; emigration of, 364/; re- 
 ligious condition of, 390/., 392/ 
 
 Korean Review, quoted, 315, 327, 
 328/ 
 
 Kublai Khan, Embassy of, 187 
 
 Kuroda, General' makes treaty with 
 Korea, 182, 197/. 
 
 Kuruda, Mr., villa of, 141/. 
 
 Kwon, Minister of War, attempted 
 assassination of, 66/., 70/.; ad- 
 dress of, at Suwon, 127 
 
 Lady Om, address at school of, 54/, 
 
 155 
 
 Lawrence, Prof., on Convention of 
 Feb., 1904, 247/ 
 
 Laws, aVjsence of code of, 341/; af- 
 fecting real estate, 342/; and 
 mines, 362/ 
 
 Li Hung Chang, 13; negotiates 
 treaty with Japan, 209 
 
 Maxchurian Question, the, 229- 
 
 233> 236 
 Megata, Mr., appointed "Financial 
 
 Adviser," 246/, 315; work of, 
 
 246/, 301, 308, 315/, 318/-, 
 
 320/-, 355 
 Min, the Family, 200, 201/., 203/ 
 
 ]\'Iin Hyung-sik, Yice-Minister of 
 Education, 51, 72, 74 
 
 Min Yung-whong, commits suicide, 
 278/ 
 
 Ministry, the Korean, change in 
 personnel, 76/.; and character of 
 ofiice, 80/, 246, 252; position of, 
 in Russian Legation, 222/.; be- 
 havior of, in 1907, 420, 421 
 
 Missions, success of, in Korea, 61, 
 93/-> 404/, 408/, 441; founding 
 of, 116, 401, 403, 404/; schools of, 
 332/; differing views as to, 388/, 
 400; need of civil support, 394/, 
 412; work of woman in, 400/; 
 persecution of, by Koreans, 401, 
 402; the Roman Catholic, 403/.; 
 the Protestant, 404/; "Great Re- 
 vival" among the, 408/, 410/. 
 
 Missionaries, attitude of, 58/, 60, 
 166/., 396/., 398; complaints of, 
 62/., 368; educational work of, 
 332/; difficulties of, 392/; 401/; 
 martyrs among, 401/ 
 
 Mollendorff, M. von, action of, in 
 Korea, 207/ 
 
 Mongols, invasions of, 184/ 
 
 Moore, Digest of International Law, 
 quoted, 211/ 
 
 Nagasaki, visit to, 12/. 
 Nam-san, view from, 23, 40; wild- 
 cats on, 39/. 
 Noble, Dr., 93, 102, 106, no 
 Norman, Henry, quoted, 377 
 
 P.\GODA, the Marble, 32/.; the "Pa- 
 goda Incident," 384 
 
 Pak, Acting Prime Minister, at- 
 temptefl assassination of, 66; re- 
 signs, 77; action as Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs, 264, 268/ 
 
 Pak Yong-hio, conduct of, 428/ 
 
 Pak Yong-hwa, assassination of, 
 68 
 
 Palaces, the "Special South," 27; 
 the "^lulberry," 27/, 287; the 
 "Palace of Beautiful Blessing," 
 28/; I'^ast Palace, 30/; the pres- 
 ent residence, described, 44/., 
 
 153/ 
 Pavloll, M., Minister to Korea, 
 
 227/, 237/. 
 "Peony PoiiU," \isit tt), 100/
 
 47^> 
 
 INDEX 
 
 I'o-iiu, Secret Soricty, suppressed, 
 244 
 
 Prince, the "little" (Son of Lady 
 ()m), apf)earancc of, 44/-; mafic 
 Crown I'rince, 441 
 
 I'rotectorate, tlie Japanese, effect of, 
 on l)iisiness, i 18/., 352/.,- Proto- 
 cols estal dishing, 245/., 24S, 25,^, 
 4^^y, Prof, !,a\^ren( e on, 247/.; as 
 arranged in Nov., igo4, 253/., 
 264/., 272/.; fal,-,e rei)orts con- 
 cerning, 25,-; note f., ,S7^>/.," iis af- 
 fecting foreign relations, ,^52/., 
 354/.; exti'iided to home affairs, 
 4,^3/.; prosjK'cts of, 44ft/. 
 
 Protocols, with Russia (1896), 224; 
 Nishi-Roscn (1898), 225; with 
 Korea (Feb., 1904), 245/., 255, 
 273; and (Aug., 1904), 245/., 248, 
 
 .-55' 273 
 
 Puk Han, as mountain fortress, 22, 
 133; excursion to, 131/.; walls of, 
 T-Z?)^ 135/; flora of, 134 
 
 Pycng-yang, invitation to, 43/-,' 
 history of, 90/., 100/.; Jai)anese 
 in, 91, 97/., 383/.; visit t(j, 90/., 
 no; missions in, 63/., 107/., no; 
 audiences in, 93/., 96/-, 107; im- 
 provements in, 98/., loi; theolog- 
 ical students of, 102/., 104, 107/.; 
 Governor of, 10^/.; slud-farm at, 
 .383/- 
 
 Queen, the late, her assassination, 
 30, 219/.; character of, 283/. 
 
 Railway.s, Fusan-Seoul, 16/., 139/., 
 Seoul-Pyeng-yang, 92; Seoul- 
 Electric, 230/.; the Sanyo, 246; 
 construction of, in Korea, 373/-, 
 37<>/ 
 
 Resident-Cieneral {sec also Ito), 
 interests of, 8/., 122/., 129/., 
 169/.. 175/., .social influence of, 
 86/.; creation of oftlce of, 270/; 
 scope of present power of, 452/. 
 
 Reynolds. Rev. Mr., skill as linguist, 
 48/. 
 
 Rockhill, Minister, on China's suzer- 
 ainty over Korea, 198/.; on the 
 Manchurian (Question, 236 
 
 Rcxtt, Secretary, ret ognizes Japanese 
 Protectorate, 249 
 
 Russia, Treaty of, with Japan. 9/.; 
 
 domination of, in Korea. 221 /"., 
 227/., 230/., 236/.; ni'gotiations 
 with, 239/. 
 
 Sao.n Party, the, 193 /. 
 
 Saionji, AIar(|uis, .Vnihassador to 
 
 Korea, 216 
 S( hools, in Kori-a, 17/., 142, 32^, 
 
 .;,iO> 332, 3,i.S 
 Si ranton. Dr. W. T)., 63, .^04 
 Seoul, arri\(.'d at, 19/.,' a^pci is of, 
 20/., 23, ,; 4 A, i,i"; incaniiig of 
 word, 22; walls of, 24/.,' gates of, 
 25/.; palaces of, 27/.,' lerturis at, 
 43/> 54/; foreigners in, 85/.; in- 
 fluence as t:a])ital cit_\-, 88/.; de- 
 parture from, i3(;/. 
 Seoul Press, the, (juoted, 66/., 70/, 
 
 99/., 122/, 160/, 301/., 415 
 Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 13 
 Sill, American Minister, report of, 
 214/. 
 
 Soi!-()-gO>lg, 26 
 
 Sontag, Miss, 20 
 
 Sj)eyer, M. de, policy of, 225 
 
 Stevens, Hon. D. W., 140, 203 /.; 
 on Korean complaints, 171/; his 
 account oi Count Inou\e's Em- 
 ba.ssy, 205-209; on outbreak of 
 war, 243; ap{)ointed "Adviser" on 
 Foreign AtTairs, 246; cjufjled, 260, 
 3^5, 342, 353, 370, 376 
 
 Suwon, Agricultural Station and 
 School at, 122/., 126/.; excursion 
 to, 126/ 
 
 Tablet, the Tortoise, t,t, 
 
 Tai Won Kun, the quarrels of, with 
 
 Queen, 26, 201/., 218, 219/., 284; 
 
 builds palace, 28, 306; characti-r 
 
 of, 282/, 401, 402; persecutes 
 
 Christians, 400, 401/ 
 7'akezoye, Minister at Korea, 405/. 
 Tokugawa, Prince, his \isit to Koiea. 
 
 . , '^^" ^^ 
 
 I'okugawas, the, their treatment of 
 
 Korea, 189/ 
 Tong Hak, rebellion of, 2137 , 216/. 
 Townsend, Mr. W. D., 116, 118/ 
 Treaties (sec also Conventions), with 
 
 Japan, in 1876, 1S2, 197/; the 
 
 Shufeldt, 192; Japan and Chinaj 
 
 210/
 
 INDEX 
 
 477 
 
 Tsusliima, relations of, to Korea, 15, 
 185 
 
 United States, relations of, to Ko- 
 rea, 191/., i97/-> i99> 211/., 216, 
 236, 249; Foreign Relations (Re- 
 ports), quoted, 216, 240; recog- 
 nizes Japanese Protectorate, 249/. 
 
 Waeber, M., Russian Minister in 
 
 Korea, 223 
 Wakavama, visit to, 8/. 
 Walls," of Seoul, 24/.; of Puk Han, 
 
 i33> 135 
 Whigham, quoted, 245, 296, 445 note 
 Wilkinson, Tlie Government of Ko- 
 rea, quoted, 212/. 
 
 Yagi, Capt., if. 
 
 Yang-ban, the Korean, 39, 74, 156; 
 baleful influence of, 112/., 156/"., 
 2S7/.; character of certain, de- 
 scribed, 288/., 291 
 
 Yi, Korean admiral, 183, 189 
 
 Yi Hy-eung [sec Emperor, now ex- 
 Emperor) 
 
 Yi \\'an-yong, appointed Prime Min- 
 ister, 77/.," action of, in Nov., 
 1904, 264/.; signs Convention of 
 i(K>7, 432 
 
 Yi \'<jng-ik, lunpcror's fa\orite, 235, 
 243, 286 
 
 Yi "\'ong-tai, 70, 73, 74 
 
 Y/iiiiuri, Japanese paper, extract 
 from, i()7 /'. 
 
 "S'cnmg Men's C"lu-ist;an Association, 
 in\italii)n from, 38/., 42; assist- 
 ance of, 42/., 53, 407; lectures at, 
 4,i/-i 47/-) 54/-)' Korean helpers 
 of, 50/., 83/.; subsidy to, 396; 
 success of, 407 
 
 Yuan Shi Kai, doings in Korea, 31, 
 210/., 212 
 
 Yun Clii-lu), Zvlr., 39 
 
 ZuiiOTO, Mr., 13, 92, 113 
 
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