UC-NRLF 
 
 B 3 MIT 753 
 
■^l 
 
THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 PRESENTED BY 
 
 PROF. CHARLES A. KOFOID AND 
 
 MRS. PRUDENCE W. KOFOID 
 
I 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES 
 
 OF 
 
 PHRENOLOGY, 
 
Works published by the same Author in English, 
 
 / 1. Phrenolog-y ; or, the doctrine of the Mind and its relations 
 to the Body. 
 
 2. Outlines of Phrenology. 
 
 3. Elementary Principles of Education. 
 
 4. Observations on Insanity. 
 
 5. Examination of the Objections made in Great Britain 
 
 ag-ainst Phrenolog-y. 
 
 Preparing for Publication. 
 
 1. View of the Anatomy of the Brain. 
 
 2. Outlines of his Lectures on Phrenology. 
 
 3. A Philosophical Catechism on Man. 
 
A VIEW 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES 
 
 PHRENOLOGY. 
 
 BY 
 
 G. SPURZHEIM, M.D. 
 
 OF THE UNIVERSITIES OF VIENNA AND PARIS, AND LICENTIATE OF THE 
 ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON. 
 
 THIRD EDITION, GREATLY IMPROVED. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 PUBLISHED BY TREUTTEL, WURTZ, AND RICHTER, 
 30, SOHO-SQUARE. 
 
K-BF910 
 BuKp 
 
 PREFACE, 
 
 Whoever wishes for truth is a philosopher ; and of 
 philosophers there are as many varieties as there are 
 departments of knowledge as well physical as me- 
 taphysical. The title, however, is more particularly 
 given to him who looks for exact notions and positive 
 knowledge founded on principles dependant on the 
 relations between cause and effect. 
 
 It is unfortunate for hunianity, that those who 
 assume distinctive titles do not act up to them. From 
 this cause it is that the most noble appellations fall 
 into discredit. Pretended patriots have sometimes 
 been more dangerous than declared enemies ; pre- 
 tended Christians worse than heathens. Who would 
 not be styled philosopher, or friend, or lover, of wis- 
 dom ? Yet is this name often applied to decry indi- 
 viduals and their manner of thinking. Let us only 
 observe that all who call themselves philosophers 
 deserve not the title any more than do all their's who 
 are called noble. 
 
 The ancient philosophers were, in general, meta- 
 physicians, that is, they examined objects, without 
 the reach of observation ; for instance, the primitive 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 cause of the universe, the origin of beings, the cause 
 of life, the nature of the soul, its immortality, ^c. I 
 incessantly repeat, that the aim of Phrenology is 
 never to attempt pointing out what the mind is in 
 / itself Phrenologists are observers of nature, and as 
 l_ such they examine only the manifestations of the 
 \ mind and the circumstances under which these take 
 place, i In my work, entitled " Phrenology," a great 
 mass of incontestable facts is collected. This volume 
 will contain philosophical reflections, and inferences 
 only. It will be divided into seven sections. In the 
 first I shall examine the modes of action of the fun- 
 damental powers of the mind, and the necessity of 
 rectifying by Phrenology all the systems of philo- 
 sophy which have ever been given to the world ; in 
 the second, give a new nomenclature of the fundamen- 
 tal powers of the mind, state their aim, the disorders 
 which may result from them, and the consequences of 
 their inactivity ; in the third, discuss their origin ; 
 in the fourth, the conditions of their manifestations ; 
 in the fifth, the moral nature of man ; in the sixth, 
 make some practical reflections ; and, in the seventh, 
 explain several philosophical expressions, according 
 to the fundamental powers of the mind. 
 
 The contents of this volume made a part of the two 
 first editions of the Physiognomical System. The 
 subjects, however, are here treated more in detail ; 
 new expositions are added, and the arrangement of 
 the whole is undoubtedly improved. 
 
CONTENTS, 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page 
 
 On the fundamental powers of the mind. General view - 1 \/ 
 
 Opinions of Idealogists 7 
 
 Attention ---_.___- 14 
 
 Perception -16 
 
 Memory ---__--.- 19 
 
 Reminiscence - ...20 
 
 Imagination ---._-_- 21 
 
 Judgment --_-_>-._ 23 
 
 Association ---.--.__ 27 
 
 Opinions of Moralists - 31 
 
 Will - . - - 32 
 
 Aflfections --------- 35 
 
 Passions -----,._> 39 
 
 On religion in general ------.- 41 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Fundamental powers of the mind, and their classification - 52 
 
 Affective faculties common to man and animals - - ib. 
 
 Affective faculties proper to man ^ . . ^ . ^s 
 
 Intellectual faculties - 56 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Origin of the fundamental faculties. ----- 58 
 
 All is innate in Man ------- ih. 
 
 A few general faculties produce the particular dispositions - 61 
 
 Man's faculties are the result of education - - . - ^5 
 
Vlll CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 Of the external senses as the cause of the mental powers - 67 
 Of accidental circumstances as the cause of the mental 
 
 powers ------_-_ iff. 
 
 Society 69 
 
 Misery _._-_.._. 70 
 Climate --------__72 
 
 Of prepared circumstances as the cause of our faculties - 73 
 
 Innateness of the mental faculties - - - - - 79 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 •^The brain is indispensable to the manifestations of the mind 86 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 ^ The moral character of man - - - - - _ qq 
 
 Materialism ---._-_ _ jOO • 
 
 Fatalism - - - - - -- - _ 103 
 
 Liberty - - - ^ - - - . 108 
 
 Moral Liberty II3 
 
 Morality 117 
 
 V' Origin of evil -----.___ 131 
 V Comparison between natural religion and morality and the 
 
 Christian morality -----.. 13g 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 Practical considerations •■----_. 
 
 Modifications of the affective and intellectual faculties - 155 
 
 Difficultyof judging others - - - . . _ jg^ 
 
 Sympathy and Antipathy ----._ 171 
 
 Happiness of man ----_-.. 174 
 
 •^ Bettering the lot of man ----__ jgj 
 Personal liberty - - - - - _ _ -184 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 Explanation of Philosophical expressions - - - > 193 
 
 Recapitulation and conclusion - .- - - _ 215 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL PEINCIPLES 
 
 OF 
 
 PHRENOLOGY, 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Of the Fundamental Powers of the Mind. 
 
 General View. 
 
 JlN order to prosecute advantageously the study of the mental 
 functions, a capital error must be avoided, — an error which 
 prevails in the systems of all philosophers ; it consists in their 
 having been satisfied with general ideas, and not, hke natural- 
 ists, having admitted three sorts of notions : general, common, 
 and special. This distinction is essential to the classification of 
 beings into kingdoms, classes, orders, genera, and species. In 
 knowing the general qualities of inanimate objects, such as 
 extension, configuration, consistency, colour, — even in knowing 
 the common qualities of metals, earths, or acids ; we are not 
 yet made acquainted with iron, copper, chalk, or vinegar. 
 To indicate a determinate body, its specific qualities must be 
 exposed. In natural history it is not sufficient to say that 
 we possess a stone, a plant, an animal, a bird, &c., it is in- 
 dispensable to mention the species of each possessed, and if 
 varieties exist, to state even their distinctive characters. 
 
 B 
 
^ \ PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 In the study of the human body, general and common 
 notions are also distinguished and separated from those which 
 are particular ; the body is divided into several systems, such 
 as the muscular, osseous, nervous, glandular, &c. ; determinate 
 functions, too, are specified, as the secretion of saliva, of bile, 
 tears, &c. But this distinction between general, common, and 
 special notions is entirely neglected in the study of the mind, 
 and even in that of the functions which in animals take place 
 with consciousness. 
 
 Zoologists divide and subdivide the organization of the 
 beings they study, and determine the structure of each par- 
 ticularly, but they consider their animal life, in a manner, 
 quite general. Whatever is done with consciousness is ex- 
 plained by means of the word instinct. Animals eat and . 
 drink, and construct habitations by instinct ; the nightingale 
 sings, the swallow migrates, the field-mouse makes provisions 
 for the winter, the chamois places sentinels, sheep live in 
 society, &c., and all by instinct. This is certainly a very easy 
 manner of explaining facts ; instinct is the talisman which 
 produces every variety in the actions of animals. The know- 
 ledge conveyed, however, is general, and therefore completely 
 vague. What is instinct ? Is it a personified being, an entity, 
 a principle? or does the word, according to its Latin etymo- 
 logy, signify only an internal impulse to act in a certain way in 
 ignorance of the cause ? I take it in the latter signification ; 
 thus the word instinct denotes every inclination to act arising 
 from within. 
 
 Instincts, moreover, are merely effects, and do not express 
 peculiar causes producing determinate inclinations. In stating 
 % 
 
FUNDAMENTAL FACULTIES. 3 
 
 that one animal sings and that another migrates, we specify 
 some sorts of instincts, but leave their individual causes un- 
 determined. The term instinct may be compared with that 
 of motion. Planets turn round the sun ; the moon round the 
 earth ; the magnetic needle towards the north ; rivers fall into 
 the ocean ; animals walk, run, or fly ; the blood circulates ; 
 and all these phenomena are conjoined with the idea of motion. 
 Motion certainly attends on all, just as the actions of ani- 
 mals are always joined with instinct, but the causes of the 
 various motions and of the different instincts are not alike, 
 and must, therefore, be looked for and specified. 
 
 Finally, it is an error to say that animals act solely by 
 instinct. It is true that some of their doings, such as the 
 labours of insects, are the result of mere instinctive powers, 
 but many animals modify their actions according to external 
 circumstances, they even select one among different motives, 
 and often resist their internal impulsions or instincts. A dog 
 may be hungry, but with the opportunity he will not eat, 
 because he remembers the blows which he has received for 
 having done so under similar circumstances. If, in following 
 his master, he is separated from him by a carriage, he does not 
 throw himself under the feet of the horses or its wheels, but 
 waits till it has passed, and then by increasing his speed he 
 overtakes his master. 
 
 This shews that some animals act with understanding. On 
 the other hand, though new-born children cry, and suck the 
 finger, they certainly do not act from understanding. And, if 
 men of great genius manifest talents without knowing that such 
 faculties exis if they calculate, sing, or draw, without any 
 
 JJ 2 
 
4 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 tuition, do they not so by some internal impulse or instinct, 
 as well as the animals which sing, build, migrate, and gather 
 provisions ? Instinct, then, is not confined to animals, and un- 
 derstanding is not a prerogative of mankind. 
 
 The above reflections on instinct elucidate the ideas enter- 
 tained by philosophers generally in regard to the mind and its 
 faculties. Many of them reduce all the mind's operations to 
 sensation, and all its faculties to sensibility ; others call this 
 general faculty understanding, or intellect. 
 
 Here we must make reflections on understanding similar 
 to those already made on instinct. There are, in the first 
 place, different sorts of understanding, which may exist 
 independent of each other. Great painters cannot always 
 become great musicians ; profound mathematicians may be 
 without any talent for poetry ; and excellent generals may be 
 miserable legislators. Hence, in the study of man, it is ne- 
 cessary to specify the different kinds of understanding or sen- 
 sation. For, if we say, with Destut de Tracy, that memory, 
 judgment, and imagination, are only modifications of sen- 
 sation and the effects of unknown causes, it is still necessary 
 to specify the kinds of sensation, since sensations of hunger, 
 friendship, hatred, anger, or compassion, and knowledge of 
 forms, colours, localities, &c., cannot be of one and the same 
 sort, any more than the senses of feeHng, smelhng, tasting, 
 hearmg, and seeing. Thus, then, it is necessai'y to specify the 
 various internal, as well as the external senses. 
 
 Moreover, the causes of the different kinds of understanding 
 must also be pointed out, and new observations in consequence 
 become necessary. Finally, I repeat, that man does not al- 
 
FUNDAMENTAL FACULTIES. |f 
 
 Ways act with understanding. Suddenly threatened by any 
 danger, the limbs are drawn back before there has been time 
 to think of the means of escape. All the gestures and pecuhar 
 sounds which accompany the rather energetic expression of 
 the sentiments, are as involuntary as the feelings themselves, 
 and by no means the effect of understanding. Who can say 
 that he always acts with understanding ? We too often choose 
 the worse even in knowing the better. 
 
 The greater number of philosophers explain the actions of 
 man upon the supposition of two fundamental powers : un- 
 derstanding and will. They, however, merit the same re- 
 proach as the zoologists who consider the actions of animals 
 as effects of instinct, and those of man as effects of understand- 
 ing alone. They attach themselves to generahties, and neglect 
 particidars ; they ought, however, to specify the kinds of will 
 as well as those of understanding. For it cannot be the same 
 faculty v/hich makes us love ourselves and our neighbours, 
 which is fund of destroying and of preserving, which feels 
 self-esteem or seeks others"' approbation. Moreover, the causes 
 of the different kinds of love and of will, which are taken at one 
 time in a good, at another in a bad acceptation, must be laid 
 open. Every special faculty of the mind, therefore, is to be 
 determined individually. 
 
 Though many philosophers have considered understanding 
 and will as the fundamental powers of the mind, they have 
 conceived particular modes of action in each of them. Under- 
 standing may act as perception, conception, memory, judg- 
 ment, imagination, and as attention, — one of the most impor- 
 tant of these modified operations; The will may produce 
 
6 FUNDAMENTAL FACULTIES. 
 
 sensuality, sellishness, vanity, ambition, and the love of arts 
 and sciences, in proportion as understanding is enlightened 
 and external circumstances modified. 
 
 From this it appears that philosophical considerations on 
 the mind have hitherto been general ; and whilst the study of 
 the understanding has especially engaged one class of thinkers, 
 another has devoted itself to that of the will, principally as 
 embracing the doctrine of our duties. Yet neither of them 
 has determined any special faculty. They have always taken 
 effects for causes, and confounded modes of action, in quantity 
 or quality, with fundamental faculties. They have also over- 
 looked one of the most important conditions to the exhibition 
 of affective and intellectual powers, viz., the organization of 
 the brain. 
 
 The first of these classes of philosophers is styled Idealo- 
 gians, the second Moralists. This separation, and the con- 
 sequent destruction of that harmony which ought to reign be- 
 tween the two, are to be lamented. Idealogians and moralists 
 differ not only in their pursuits, but each criminates the 
 other, and endeavours to confine it within certain limits. 
 Idealogians deride the studies of Moralists, and these often 
 decry Idealogians as the greatest enemies of mankind. 
 
 Many ponderous volumes are filled with their several 
 opinions. As, however, it is easier to look for truth alone 
 than to detect it when rapt up in error, I shall make only a 
 few summary remarks ; first, on the notions of Idealogians 
 and then on the doctrines of Moralists, and endeavour to put 
 Phrenology in harmony with both branches of philosophy. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 On the Opinions of Idealogians ; or^ on the Modes of Action 
 of the Intellectual Faculties, 
 
 The mind considered as the power which knows was the object 
 treated of in all the ancient, as it is still in all the modern, 
 philosophical systems. The Greek philosophers paid great 
 attention to this subject. The Romans made no improvement 
 in it ; they only learned from the Greeks.- — The earliest phi- 
 losophers made no distinction between considerations or 
 thoughts, and objects considered or thought of ; they parti- 
 cularly studied cosmogony, God, and the soul. Later philo- 
 sophers began to distinguish the considerations of the mind 
 from the objects which are considered. Two classes of phi-< 
 losophers, therefore, arose. Some admitted the senses as par- 
 ticular means of acquiring knowledge ; others regarded their 
 testimony as illusive, and confided in the understanding alone. 
 Democritus admitted both kinds of knowledge, but considered' 
 that obtained by the senses as changeable and not to be de- 
 pended on ; and therefore gave the preference to knowledge 
 obtained by the understanding. In their philosophical exa- 
 minations, both classes of philosophers, generally, considered 
 external objects much more than the nature of man. 
 
 Socrates gave a particular direction to philosophical inves- 
 tigation. He thought it more reasonable. to examine things 
 in relation to man, and the principles of his moral conduct, 
 than such as lie beyond the sphere and reach of the human 
 
g PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 mind, and consequently do not relate to it. The philosophy 
 of Socrates was in general practical. 
 
 Plato also distinguished the knowledge obtained by the 
 senses from that obtained from within ; and observ^ed that the 
 former is individual and simple, while the latter is general. 
 He admitted, moreover, certain considerations, in regard to 
 the mind, though destitute of all experience, as necessary and 
 positive. 
 
 After the restoration of the sciences. Bacon, Descartes, and 
 Leibnitz, were eminent in philosophy, in different ways. 
 Bacon established his philosophy upon the basis of observation 
 and induction. The essentials of Descartes' philosophy were 
 thought and the knowledge obtained by thought. Like Plato, 
 Leibnitz never arranged his philosophy methodically, but it 
 admits two kinds of perceptions, one without and the other 
 with consciousness; it considers the knowledge procured by 
 the senses as individual, accidental, and changeable ; but that 
 obtained by thinking and reasoning, as general, necessary, and 
 positive. According to this system, the reasoning power is 
 endowed with principles, and all phenomena are intellectual. 
 
 Locke maintained that all knowledge springs from expe- 
 rience, and that all conceptions are founded on sensations, 
 but that our mind never acquires any knowledge of objects 
 themselves. Condillac, and the French philosophers, agree 
 with Locke about the origin of our knowledge, and never 
 examine things in themselves, but only judge of their rela- 
 tions to each other. Hume not only confines all knowledge 
 to mere experience, but denies the necessity of causality. 
 Bt?rkdey, so far from examining objects in themselves, even 
 
m 
 
 MODES OF ACTION OF THE FACULTIES. 9 
 
 denies the possibility of proving the existence of external 
 objects. 
 
 The principal modern schools of philosophy in Germany, 
 are the critical philosophy, the transcendental idealism, and the 
 philosophy of nature. Kant, the founder of the critical phi- 
 losophy, distinguished two kinds of knowledge, one experi- 
 mental {Kritik der reinen Vernunft)^ and another founded on 
 hdiQi [(Kritik der practischen Verrmnft), He maintained 
 that the first kind is only relative, subjective, or phenomenal, 
 or that we know only the relation of the subject to the object; 
 that we do not know either the subject or the object in itself, 
 but both in their mutual relations only, and that this relation 
 constitutes their reality to us. The subject he conceived 
 endowed with particular categories which are applied to the 
 object ; whatever is general and necessary in knowledge 
 belonged to the subject, while the particular and variable is 
 the attribute of the object. Hence all experimental know- 
 ledge is founded upon dualism ; upon the union of the subject 
 and object; for, even the categories, though inherent in the 
 subject, and conceived by the mind from within, acquire ob- 
 jective reality only by their application to the object. Kant, 
 though he considered both subject and object, had, however, 
 the subject more in mind than the object. He reduced all 
 categories or forms, according to which the mind acquires 
 experimental knowledge, to four kinds — to quantity, quality, 
 relation, and modality ; of these the two first concern objects 
 in general, and the two last the relations of objects to each 
 other, and to our understanding. Thus Kant admits notions 
 independent of experience, as conceptions of space, time, 
 
10 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 cause, and others ; and considers these conceptions, not as the 
 result of external impressions, but of .the faculties of the sub- 
 ject : they exist a "priori^ and by their means we are ac- 
 quainted with the objects. Our notions of morality, of God, 
 and of immortality, are not experimental, but belong to the 
 practical understanding, and originate a priori. Liberty is a 
 postulatum. 
 
 Fichte went farther, and taught the system of transcenden- 
 tal ideahsm, according to which all certainty and reality is 
 confined to the subject, who has knowledge only of his own 
 modifications, and by means of abstraction and reflection, 
 arrives at intellectual intuition. 
 
 The philosophy of nature rejects subject and object, makes 
 no abstraction or reflection, but begins with intellectual intui- 
 tion, and professes to know objects immediately in themselves. 
 It does not consider the objects as existing but as origi- 
 nating ; it constructs them speculatively a priori. Absolute 
 liberty and existence without qualities, are the basis of this 
 system. 
 
 My mind can never rise to similar conceptions : it is con- 
 fined to analysis. Following the principle of Bacon, I wish to 
 collect as many facts as possible, to compare them, and to draw 
 conclusions, or form inductions. 
 
 As the system of Locke is the basis of the greater number 
 of philosophic opinions in England and France, I shall com- 
 pare its principles with my philosophy, and shew how far I 
 agree with him, and wherein our opinions differ. Like Locke, 
 I think that truth is to be placed above all other considerations; 
 with him, too, I think wc cannot examine the nature of the 
 
i 
 
 u 
 
 MODES OP ACTION OP THE FACULTIES. 11 
 
 mind, but only observe its faculties ; Dr. Gall and I, there- 
 fore, study the organs by means of which these are manifested. 
 With Locke, I admit innate capacities, but not innate ideas or 
 innate principles. He, however, denies the innateness of ideas 
 and principles on a ground different from mine, viz., because 
 certain children and adults, and even nations, are without 
 them, or possess them variously modified. Granting the fact 
 is so, Locke's position is not proved thereby, because inactivity 
 of the faculties is explained by insufficient development of 
 their appropriate organs ; and modifications of ideas and prin- 
 ciples result froxn different and dissimilar combinations of the 
 faculties; a. subject wMch I shall treat particularly by-and-by. 
 Locke admits only one primitive source of the activity of 
 the mind — external impressions on the senses; whilst, if I speak 
 of the mind generally, I still admit a second, which is internal. 
 According to Locke, the mind begins with external sensations, 
 and then by means of its perception, contemplation, retention, 
 comparison, and its faculties of composing and abstracting, it 
 executes all the particular operations of thinking and volition : 
 the feelings also, in his system, primitively result from external 
 impressions, and mediately from the understanding. I, on 
 the contrary, separate the propensities and sentiments of the 
 mind from its understanding; independently of which they 
 exist, and to which they bear no proportion ; they are internal 
 faculties, which, it is true, may be excited by external im- 
 pressions, but which are often active by their own inherent 
 power alone. They are innate as particular faculties, and are 
 inseparable from the nature of man, though their determinate 
 actions be not so. According to Locke, moral principles must 
 
12 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 be proved ; but T think they must be felt : reasoning does not 
 produce them any more than it produces the perception of 
 colours, or of musical tones. 
 
 In regard to the understanding, Locke thinks that it is by 
 means of the five senses and their impressions alone, that it con- 
 ceives the existence of external objects, their separable or sen- 
 Bible and their inseparable or original qualities, such as extent, 
 figure, and mobility. I am of opinion that the mind conceives 
 very few ideas by the senses alone, and that peculiar parts 
 of the brain are commonly necessary. In my physiological 
 work entitled Fhrenolo^y^ I treat of the immediate and mediate 
 functions of the five senses ; to the latter of which belong our 
 conceptions of the existence of bodies, of their form, size, weight, 
 colour, order, and number. The understanding as a reflective 
 power acts, in my opinion, not only upon the sensations and 
 conceptions of external objects, but also upon the propensities 
 and sentiments, the sources of which are internal; these, as 
 well as external sensations and perceptions, it knows, compares, 
 considers in different ways, and determines in their various 
 relations. Moreover, I do not only admit an internal activity 
 of mind independent of external experience as the propensities 
 and sentiments are concerned, but also with Kant, as under- 
 standing and experimental knowledge, even as the reflective 
 powers are implicated. The conception of dimension, that 
 the whole for instance is greater than the half, does not result 
 from experience, but from an internal faculty. The conception 
 that there is nothing without a cause, is also internal. These 
 general conceptions are the attributes of the internal faculties 
 of the understanding, just as the particular feelings are of the 
 
MODKS OP ACTION OF THE FACULTIES. 13 
 
 propensities and sentiments. The general conceptions of ex- 
 perimental knowledge which arise from within, and the primi- 
 tive feelings, are calculated for the external world ; and the 
 general conceptions of the reflective powers of the mind are 
 calculated for experimental and sentimental knowledge. This 
 second knawledge, then, is as positive as the first; for we 
 know our feelings as well as we do our sensations and percep- 
 tions by the five senses. Every determinate action of any 
 faculty whatever depends on two conditions, the faculty and 
 its object. The activity of every feeling and the general concep- 
 tions of the perceptive faculties are merely applied to the external 
 world ; whilst the general conceptions of the reflective faculties 
 are applied to experimental knowledge and to the feelings. In 
 a perfect state of mind, all conditions must agree and harmonize 
 with each other. If, for instance, external impressions do not 
 agree with the ordinary state of man, and with the respective 
 internal faculties, they are illusive ; and if internal faculties 
 suppose in external objects something which experience does 
 not confirm, they also err : each condition must correspond 
 with another, and all be conformable to the conceptions of 
 reflection ; and these again apply to the actions of the particu- 
 lar faculties. 
 
 Thus, in a perfect system of the knowledge of man, every 
 particular faculty must be pointed out and considered in its 
 concordance with every other. I recognise internal powers 
 and external faculties, by whose intermedium the mind and 
 the external world are brought into communication, and 
 made mutually influencient. The internal faculties differ 
 essentially in their nature, and may either act by their own 
 
14 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 power, or be excited by appropriate impressions from without. 
 Some of them make man act, while others modify, assist, and 
 direct his actions. Some procure a relative knowledge of ex- 
 ternal objects, and others bring all the faculties into harmony, 
 in order to constitute unity. If such a system be practical, it 
 requires first a knowledge of particulars, and if these be capable 
 of useful application, they must be reduced to generals, and 
 even to unity. All modern idealogians admit several mental 
 operations, which they ascribe to various faculties, or to parti- 
 cular laws or categories, according to which the mind acts. 
 Their opinions differ only in as far as the number of faculties, 
 or the modes in which the mind acts, are concerned. Never- 
 theless, it is certain that they have considered general opera- 
 tions and modes of action or effects only, and have discovered 
 none of the fundamental faculties of the mind. Let us examine 
 the particulars. 
 
 1. Attention, 
 
 Almost all philosophers speak of attention as a primitive 
 power of the mind, active throughout all its varied operations, 
 and the basis on which observation and reflection repose. *' It 
 is attention,*" says Helvetius*, " more or less active, which 
 fixes objects more or less in the memory.'" According to Vicq 
 d* Azyr, apes and monkeys are turbulent, because they have 
 no attention. Dr. Reid*|- makes a distinction between atten- 
 tion and consciousness, calling the first a voluntary, the second 
 
 * De Tesprit, Chap, de I'inegale capacite de rattention. 
 t Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 60, 
 
MODES OF ACTION OF THE FACULTIES. 15 
 
 an involuntary act ; while other philosophers, with Locke, 
 confound these two mental operations. 
 
 To all that has been said upon attention as a faculty of the 
 mind, I reply, that attention^ in none of its acceptations, is a 
 single faculty ; for if it were, he who possesses it in a particular 
 sense should be able to apply it universally. But how does it 
 happen that an individual animal or man pays great attention 
 to one object, and very httle or none to another ? Sheep never 
 attend to philosophy or theology ; and while the squirrel and 
 ring-dove see a hare pass with indifference, the fox and eagle 
 eye it with attention. The instinct to live on plants or flesh 
 produces unlike sorts of attention. In the human kind, indi- 
 viduals are influenced in their attention to different objects, 
 even by sex and age : little girls prefer dolls, ribands, 8^c,y as 
 play things ; boys like horses, whips, and drums. One man is 
 pleased with philosophic discussion, another with witty conver- 
 sation ; one with the recital of events which touch the heart, 
 and another with accounts of sanguinary battles, and so on. 
 
 The word attention denotes no more than the active state of 
 any intellectual faculty; or, in other terms, attention is the effect 
 of the intellectual faculties, acting either from then: proper 
 force, or from being excited by external impressions, or by one 
 or several affective faculties. Hence there are as many species 
 of attention as fundamental faculties of the mind. He who 
 has an active faculty of configuration, of locality, or of colour- 
 ing, pays attention to the objects respectively suited to gratify 
 it. In this manner we conceive why attention is so different, 
 and also why it is impossible to succeed in any pursuit or un- 
 dertaking without attention. It is, indeed, absurd to expect 
 
16 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 success in an art or science, when the individual power on 
 which its comprehension depends is inactive. Again, the 
 more active the power is, the more it is attentive. The aifec- 
 tive faculties, though they have no clear consciousness, yet 
 excite the intellectual faculties, and thereby produce attention. 
 The love of approbation, for instance, may stimulate the 
 faculty of artificial language; boys who are fond of ap- 
 plause will be apt to study with more attention and perse- 
 verance than those who are without such a motive. 
 
 ii. Consciousness or Perception. 
 
 Speculative philosophers have incessantly spoken of the 
 singleness of consciousness, and of there being nothing but 
 consciousness or sensation in animal life. Now, though it be 
 true, in a general way, that all operations of the mind are ac- 
 companied with consciousness, it by no means follows that 
 perception, or consciousness of the impressions, is one of its 
 fundamental faculties. Consciousness, in fact, is a general 
 term, and is an effect of the activity of one or several of the 
 intellectual faculties. There are, further, various kinds of per- 
 ception or consciousness, one of which, and not another, may 
 be possessed, and which, reciprocally, are in no proportion to 
 each other. It is, therefore, incumbent on philosophers to 
 specify each individual kind of perception, or consciousness. 
 These are, in fact, as numerous as the fundamental powers of 
 the mind. 
 
 Here two important questions fall to be considered : first, 
 whether all the impressions which produce consciousness, or 
 
MODES OP ACTION OP THE PACULTIES. 17 
 
 sensation, come from without through the external senses ; and 
 secondly, whether all fundamental powers of the mind are 
 perceptive, or have consciousness of their peculiar and respec- 
 tive impressions, or whether some of them procure impressions, 
 the consciousness of which is only obtained by the medium of 
 other faculties ? 
 
 The majority of modern philosophers have investigated the 
 perceptions of external impressions only, which they consider 
 as the first and single cause of every varied mental function* 
 The mind, say they, is excited by external impressions, and 
 then performs various intellectual or voluntary acts. Some 
 thinkers, however, have recognised many perceptions as de- 
 pendent on merely internal impressions. Of this kind are the 
 instinctive dispositions of animals, and all the affective powers 
 of man. Those who would consider this subject in detail,, 
 may examine, in the Phrenology, my ideas on the exter- 
 nal senses and on the affective faculties. There it will be 
 seen that I admit two kinds of perceptions, or two sources of 
 mental activity : one external and the otlier internal. 
 
 An answer to the second question is given with more diffi- 
 culty than to the first. Dr. Gall thinks that each external 
 sense and each internal organ has its peculiar consciousness 
 or perception, its memory, judgment, and imagination; in 
 short, that the modes of action are alike in each external sense 
 and in each organ of the brain. To me, however, the indi- 
 vidual faculties of the mind do not seem to have the same 
 modes of action; I conceive that the functions of several 
 faculties are confined to the procuring of impressions which 
 are perceived by other faculties. The nerves of hunger and 
 
18 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 thirst propagate their peculiar impressions to the brain, there 
 to produce sensation or perception ; and I believe the fun- 
 damental faculties, which I call affective, destined only to 
 produce impressions, which being perceived, are then called 
 inclinations, wants, or sentiments. The affective functions 
 are blind and involuntary, and have no knowledge of the 
 objects respectively suited to satisfy their activity ; the nerves 
 of hunger do not know aliments, nor circumspection, the 
 object of fear, nor veneration, the object deserving its appli- 
 cation, &c., &c. Even supposing the affective powers had an 
 obscure consciousness of their own existence, a point which, 
 by-the-by, is not proved, it is still certain that the intellectual 
 faculties alone procure clear consciousness. The internal sense 
 of Eventuality, combined with those of comparison and causa- 
 lity, determines the species of both internal and external per- 
 ceptions. As it is, however, much more difficult to specify 
 the internal than the external sensations, the species of the for- 
 mer have remained almost entirely unknown to philosophers. 
 
 Thus, perception, or consciousness, is an essential consti- 
 tuent in the nature of the intellectual faculties generally ; yet 
 it is no special faculty of the mind ; it is a mere effect of activity 
 in the perceptive powers. It may be distinguished from 
 attention (though both are modes of action), as perception 
 denotes knowledge of the external or internal impressions, 
 while attention indicates activity of the intellectual powers, 
 , and their application to their respective objects. 
 
 From the preceding considerations, it is evident that every 
 fundamental faculty of the mind is not perceptive, and that 1 
 make a distinction between perceptive powers and kinds of 
 
MODES 6p Action op trtft {'aculties. 19 
 
 perception. These latter, indeed, inhere in the whole of the 
 affective and intellectual faculties. 
 
 iii. Memory, 
 
 Memory is another mental operation which has, at all times, 
 occupied speculative philosophers. Those, too, who have 
 Written on education, have given it much consideration. It is 
 treated of as a faculty which collects the individual percep- 
 tions, and recals them when wanted ; and is further considered 
 as being assisted by the faculties of attention and association. 
 Now memory varies more in its kind than any other of the in- 
 tellectual faculties recognised by philosophers. It is notorious 
 that some children occasionally learn long passages of books by 
 heart with great facility, who cannot recollect the persons they 
 have seen before, nor the places they have visited. Others, 
 again, remember facts or events, while they cannot recal the 
 dates at which they happened; and, on the contrary, this 
 latter sort of knowledge gives great pleasure to others. The 
 Jesuits, observing nature, consequently admitted a memory of 
 facts, a local memory, a verbal memory, and so on. Even 
 the causes of these differences in memory were looked for. 
 Mallebranche supposed some peculiar and modified state of 
 the cerebral organization to explain the facts, such as soft- 
 ness and flexibility of the cerebral fibres in youth, their hard- 
 ness and stiffness in old age, &c. 
 
 Is memory, then, a fundamental power of the mind ? Dr. 
 Gall thinks not; he considers it as the second degree of 
 
 C 2 
 
go PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 activity of every organ and faculty ; and therefore admits as 
 many memories as fundamental faculties. 
 
 My opinion also is, that memory is not a fundamental fa- 
 culty, but the repetition of some previous perception, and a 
 quantitive mode of action. However, as I think the affec- 
 tive powers are blind, and without clear consciousness, I do 
 not believe they have any memory. I, consequently, con- 
 fine the mode of action under discussion to the intellectual 
 faculties, and further, distinguish between the faculties which 
 have memory and the species of notions remembered : the per- 
 ceptive faculties have memory, and all kinds of perceptions 
 are remembered. Now, as the intellectual faculties do not 
 all act with the same energy, memory necessarily varies in 
 kind and strength in each and in every individual. No one has 
 an equally strong memory for every branch of knowledge. 
 Attention too, being another name for activity of the intellec- 
 tual faculties applied to their respective objects, naturally 
 strengthens memory : it facilitates repetition. Exercise of 
 the faculties, it is further evident, must invigorate memory : 
 repetition is made more easy. 
 
 Reminiscence, 
 
 Hemlnlscence is often taken for a fundamental faculty of 
 the mind ; sometimes, also, it is considered as a modification 
 of memory. We have reminiscence, if we remember how cer- 
 tam perceptions have been acquired, while memory consists 
 in their perfect re-production. 
 
 I neither consider reminiscence as a fundamental faculty, 
 
MODES OP ACTION OP THE FACULTIES. 21 
 
 nor as a modification of memory, but as the peculiar memory 
 or repetition of the functions of Eventuality, that facuky 
 which takes cognizance of the functions of all the others. 
 
 This view shews how we may have reminiscence, but no 
 memory of the functions of our affective faculties. And also, 
 how we may remember having had a sensation which we cannot 
 re-produce, and repeat a perception without remembering how 
 it had been acquired. Thus we may recollect that we know 
 the name of a person without being able to utter it, and also 
 repeat a song without remembering where we learned it 
 The special intellectual faculties, in general, repeat their indi- 
 vidual perceptions and produce memory, while that of even- 
 tuality, in particular, recollects, or has reminiscence. Kemi- 
 niscence, then, is to eventuahty that which each kind of memory 
 is to the other intellectual faculties, 
 
 iv. Imagination, 
 
 This expression has several significations : it is employed to 
 indicate at one time a fundamental power, called also the 
 faculty of invention, and in this sense it is said to invent 
 machinery, to compose music and poetry, and in general to 
 produce every new conception. Imagination, again, is some- 
 times taken for the faculty of recalhng previously-acquired 
 notions of objects. This signification even corresponds to the 
 etymology of the word : the images exist interiorly. At another 
 time imagination indicates a lively manner of feeling and acting. 
 Imagination, in fine, is a title given to facility of combining 
 previous perceptions, and of producing new compositions. 
 
Sa PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 To the preceding considerations I answer, that imagination 
 is in no case a fundamental faculty. There can be no single 
 faculty of invention, or else he who displays it in one ought to 
 shew it in all arts and sciences. And it is notorious that 
 powers of invention are very different in the same as well as in 
 different persons. A mechanician who invents machines of 
 stupendous powers, may be almost without musical talent, and 
 a great geometrician may be perfectly insensible to the har- 
 mony of tones ; whilst the poet who can describe the most 
 pathetic situations and arouse the feelings powerfully, may be 
 quite incapable of inventing mathematical problems. Man, it 
 is certain, can only invent, or perfect, according to the sphere 
 of activity of the peculiar faculties he possesses ; and therefore 
 there can be no fundamental power of invention. Each pri- 
 mitive faculty has its laws, and he who is particularly endowed 
 in a high degree, often finds effects unknown before ; and this 
 is called invention. Imagination is, consequently, no more 
 than a quantitive mode of action of the primitive faculties, 
 combined particularly with those of causality and comparison. 
 Inventions are, probably, never made by individual faculties ; 
 several commonly act together in establishing the necessary 
 relations between effects and causes. 
 
 The fundamental faculties sometimes act spontaneously, or 
 by their internal power, and this degree of activity is then 
 called imagination also. In this sense imagination is as va- 
 rious in its kinds as the primitive faculties. Birds build their 
 nests, or sing, without having been taught,, and men of great 
 minds do acts which they had never either seen or heard of. 
 In calling the degi'ee of activity of the faculties which produces 
 
MODES. OF ACTION OP THE FACULTIES. 2S 
 
 these effects imagination, it is still a mere result of existing 
 individual powers. All that has been said of imagination, as 
 the faculty of recalling impressions, is referable to the mode of 
 action styled memory of the intellectual facuties, and is not 
 an effect of any single power. 
 
 Finally, imagination, used synonymously with exaltation, or 
 poetic fire, results from activity of the fundamental faculty 
 which I call ideality, and to the consideration of which mental 
 power in the Phrenology, I refer my reader for farther infor- 
 mation. 
 
 From the preceding reflections on perception, attention, 
 memory, and imagination, it follows, that they are quantitive 
 modes of action of the fundamental faculties, each of which may 
 act spontaneously, or be roused by external impressions. The 
 intellectual faculties alone perceive or know impression^ and 
 being directed towards the objects of which respectively they 
 have cognizance, produce attention ; repeating notions already 
 perceived, they exert memory ; and being so active as to cause 
 effects as yet unknown, they may be said to elicit imagination. 
 
 v. Judgment, 
 
 Judgment is commonly beheved to be a fundamental power 
 of the mind. It is said to have been given to counterbalance 
 imagination and the passions, and to rectify the errors of in- 
 tellect. Memory and judgment are sometimes also maintained 
 to exclude each other. Experience, however, shows this 
 opinion to be erroneous, for some persons possess excellent 
 memory as Avell as great judgment. These two kinds of ma- 
 nifestations, however, also exist separately ; and the conclu- 
 
04 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND, 
 
 sion then follows, that they are neither the same faculty nor 
 the same mode of action. But let us now see whether judg- 
 ment be a fundamental power or not. 
 
 Dr. Gall, observing that the same person may possess excel- 
 lent judgment of one kind, and have httle or none of another, 
 that a great judge of mathematics, for instance, may have 
 almost no capacity to judge of colours or of tones, considers 
 judgment as the third degree of activity of every fundamental 
 faculty ; and admitting as many kinds of judgment as special 
 faculties, denies it the prerogative of being looked on as a 
 primitive power. In his opinion, every fundamental faculty 
 has four degrees of activity : the first is perception ; the 
 second, memory ; the third, judgment ; and the fourth, ima- 
 gination. 
 
 I, myself, neither consider judgment as a fundamental fa- 
 culty, nor with Dr. Gall, as a degree of activity, or as a mode 
 of action to every faculty. Judgment cannot be a quantitive 
 mode, and certainly not the third in degree, for some indi- 
 viduals judge very accurately of impressions as soon as per- 
 ceived, without possessing the memory of them to a great 
 extent ; and others, with an excellent memory of particular 
 kinds of impressions, judge very indifferently of the same. It 
 even happens that certain faculties are in the highest degree, 
 or spontaneously, active, while the judgment in relation to 
 these very powers is bad. In other cases, the faculties are 
 exceedingly active, and also judge with perfect propriety. 
 Moreover, judgment cannot be an attribute of every funda- 
 mental faculty of the mind. The affective powers are blind, 
 and neither recollect nor judge their actions. What judgments 
 have physical love, pride, circumspection, and all the other feel- 
 
MODES OP ACTION OF THE FACULTIES. 25 
 
 ings ? They require to be enlightened by the understanding, 
 or intellectual faculties ; and on this account it is, that when 
 left to themselves they occasion so many disorders. And not 
 only does this remark apply to the inferior but also to the 
 superior affective powers ; to hope and veneration, as well as 
 to the love of approbation and circumspection ; we may fear 
 things innocent or noxious, and venerate idols as well as the 
 God of the true Christian. 
 
 I conceive, then, that judgment is a mode of action of the in- 
 tellectual faculties only ; and not a mode of quantity but of 
 quality. The better to understand this my meaning, let us 
 observe, that there is a relation between external objects them- 
 selves, and also between external objects and the affective and 
 intellectual faculties of man and animals. These relations are 
 even determinate, and in their essence invariable ; they admit 
 modifications only. Hunger and aliment, this and digestion 
 have a mutual relation. Now, if these relations are seen to be 
 perfect and to exist as they are usually found, we say the func- 
 tion is good or healthy. If the sense of taste approve of ali- 
 ments which man commonly employs and digests, the taste is 
 good and perfect ; but if it select articles generally esteemed 
 filthy or unfit for food, such as chalk, charcoal, tallow, Sfc, 
 the taste is disordered. — There is disorder or aberration when- 
 ever the functions depart from their ordinary modes of mani- 
 festing themselves. 
 
 The intellectual faculties are in relation with the affective 
 powers and with external objects, and their functions are sub- 
 ject to determinate laws. The faculties of colouring and of 
 melody cannot arbitrarily be pleased, the one with every dis- 
 
26 PHILOSOPHY OB^ THE MIND. 
 
 position of colours, and the other with every combination of 
 tones. Now, the functions of the intellectual faculties may be 
 perfect or imperfect, that is, be in harmony, or the contrary, 
 with their innate laws, and the product of these two states 
 announced is judgment ; for the intellectual faculties alone 
 know their own and the relations of the affective powers with 
 the external world. The expression judgment, however, it 
 must be observed, is used to indicate as well the power of 
 perceiving the relations that subsist between impressions 
 themselves, as the manner in which this power is affected by 
 these. We distinguish different savours from each other, 
 and we feel the different impressions they make. In both 
 these operations we judge. The same thing holds in regard to 
 all the perceptive faculties : they perceive the relations of their 
 appropriate and peculiar impressions, and recognise the effect 
 this act of perception produces. The faculty of colouring, for 
 instance, perceives several colours, and is then affected agree- 
 ably or disagreeably; in consequence, it approves or disap- 
 proves of their arrangement. The operation, however, is the 
 same in regard to each individual colour as to many together. 
 The perception of any relation whatever is the essence of 
 judgment. 
 
 The judgment of the faculties which perceive the physical 
 qualities of external objects, even of tones or melody, is also 
 called taste, We are said to have a good or a bad taste or 
 judgment, in colouring, drawing, and music. 
 
 Each perceptive faculty feels impressions and relations of 
 one kind only ; that of configuration knows forms ; that of 
 colouring colours ; and that of melody tones. The judgment 
 
MODES OP ACTION OF THE FACULTIES. 27 
 
 6f *each is in like manner confined to its special function. 
 There are consequently as many kinds of judgment as percep- 
 tive faculities. The regular and perfect manifestation of the 
 functions of the two reflective powers, however, examining 
 the relations of all the intellectual and afl*ective faculties to 
 their respective objects, and the relations of the various powers 
 among themselves, particularly deserves the name judgment ; 
 it essentially constitutes the philosophic judgment, which is 
 applicable to every sort of notion. It is synonymous with 
 reasoning. 
 
 The different kinds of judgment must not be confounded 
 with one another ; each may exist separately, and is important 
 in the same proportion as is the faculty on which it depends. 
 Causality is the highest intellectual power, and an essential and 
 necessary part of a reasonable being ; its perfect action or good 
 judgment is consequently above all other kinds of judgment, 
 
 vi. Association, 
 
 Several philosophers in Great Britain, and especially Mr. 
 Dugald Stewart, have lately spoken much of a peculiar faculty 
 of association. They have examined the laws of its activity, 
 and ascribed to it a great influence on our manner of thinking 
 and feeling ; they have even considered it as the cause of the 
 sublime and beautiful. 
 
 These propositions I conceive are erroneous ; association, 
 in my opinion, being but an effect of the mutual influence of 
 the fundamental faculties. One being active, excites another, 
 or several, and the phenomenon is association, which occurs 
 
^ PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 not only among the intellectual faculties, when what is called 
 association of ideas results, but also among the affective and 
 intellectual together, and, indeed, among all the fundamental 
 faculties. The sight of a rose may recal one we love ; ambi- 
 tion may excite courage, or an intellectual faculty ; artificial 
 signs may arouse the perceptive faculties ; and these, in their 
 turn, make us remember arbitrary signs. 
 
 Association is a phenomenon of some importance in the prac- 
 tical part of anthropology ; and when I come to speak of the 
 modifications of the mental functions, I shall enter into its 
 consideration at some length. 
 
 The principles of association are the same as those of sym- 
 pathy. Faculties whose organs are situated near each other, 
 or which act at the same time, will readily excite one another. 
 Faculties also, which contribute to the same pecuhar function, 
 will be apt to exert a mutual influence. The strongest of the 
 faculties will further excite and overwhelm the weaker with 
 ease. 
 
 The mutual influence or association of the fundamental 
 faculties explains the principles of Mnemonics, or the science of 
 artificial memory, and shows its importance. To enable us to 
 recal ideas or words, we may call in any of our other faculties 
 which acts with great energy to assist. If that of locality, for 
 instance, be vigorous, ideas will be easily recollected through the 
 assistance of localities; that is, by associating ideas with 
 localities. — Local memory will remember the peculiar ideas 
 associated with particular places. The same means or facul- 
 ties, however, it must be understood, will not serve in every 
 case. Individuals must severally make use of their strongest 
 
MODES OP ACTION OP THE FACULTIES, S9 
 
 id excite their weakest powers; one will employ form, a 
 second colour, a third places, and others numbers, analogies of 
 sounds, causes, and so on, with success. 
 
 This consideration in its whole extent may be kept in view 
 with advantage in education. No intellectual faculty is ever 
 to be tutored singly, but all which are necessary to the perfect 
 understanding of a subject are to be exercised together. Geo- 
 graphy will aid the memory of events, and the reverse ; and so 
 on with the rest. 
 
 Association also elucidates the common saying, We think in 
 our mother tongue. The meaning of this phrase is not deter- 
 mined ; if language be supposed primitively to produce thought, 
 a grave error is committed ; for we think in no language ; the 
 feelings and ideas existed before the signs which express them, 
 and we may have feelings and thoughts without a term to 
 make them known. Language is only associated with the 
 feelings and thoughts ; but as this is done very frequently and 
 with extreme rapidity, even -in conformity with the succession 
 of thoughts, we are said to think in our native language. The 
 fact, however, is interesting in itself, and proves the importance 
 of the mutual influence of the faculties. Several of the mo- 
 dem languages^ it is true, have a determinate structure, and do 
 not admit of inversions, and ideas consequently follow regularly 
 in a certain order ; but ideas are not therefore results of the 
 signs by which they are expressed. It is obvious, however, 
 that the structure of a language must give a peculiar direction 
 to the mental operations ; and again, that the prevailing spirit 
 or general mental constitution of every nation may be known by 
 its language. The French directs the mind especially to 
 
80 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 individual objects and their qualities; the German, on the 
 contrary, forces it to combine, at once, all particular notions. 
 Notwithstanding these admitted effects of language, signs must 
 neyer be confounded with ideas, nor simultaneous action mis- 
 taken for identity. 
 
 The second idea which Mr. Alison and others entertain of 
 association as the source of the beautiful and of the pleasure that 
 flows from it, is also unsupported by observation. Pleasure 
 does not derive from association only. Every faculty is in rela- 
 tion to certain impressions; these, being either in harmony 
 with it, or the reverse, produce pleasure or pain. — The power of 
 configuration is pleased with certain forms, and displeased with 
 others. The faculty of colouring likes certain colours, and 
 dislikes others. In the same way impressions of tones are 
 immediately pronounced agreeable or disagreeable. 
 
 But it is also certain that association may increase or di- 
 minish the absolute pleasure or pain. Pleased with a rose in 
 itself, we may call it beautiful; but the pleasure and the 
 beauty may still be heightened by recollections of the person who 
 planted or presented it. Impressions, little agreeable in them- 
 selves, may gain by association. A national air may rank 
 very low as a musical composition, and even offend a scientific 
 ear, and yet delight him, the scenes of whose boyhood, and of 
 whose home, the remembrances of whose relations and friends, 
 it recals. 
 
 I shall conclude this chapter by stating that even those who 
 recognise certain laws, or categories, according to which the 
 mind operates, have never carried their considerations beyond 
 general views If Kant, in his treatise on Experimental 
 
MODES OP ACTION OP THE FACULTIES. 31 
 
 Kjiowledge, admits a category of quality, his conception is 
 still general. We know, it is true, the qualities of natural 
 objects, but there are various kinds of these, and none of them 
 is either specified in Kant's philosophy, or considered as a fun- 
 damental faculty of the mind. 
 
 Idealogians have therefore recognised certain effects and 
 modes of action of the mental powers, and certain laws ac- 
 cording to which the mind acts, but none of the fundamental 
 faculties of the understanding. Their conceptions exist in 
 nature, but they are defective, and need rectification, that is, 
 the faculties must be specified ; in this way alone will philo- 
 sophy become apphcable to man in his social relations. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 On the Opinions of Moralists ; or on the Modes of Action of 
 the Feelings. 
 
 Man must soon have felt that every kind of mental operation 
 could not be called intellectual. Philosophers have accordingly 
 acknowledged a second, and a different sort, which they 
 name Will. 
 
 Living ih society, man is in relation with his parents, his 
 friends, his enemies, with those who are inferior or superior, 
 and by an innate power he examines his actions in a moral 
 point of view. In conceiving supernatural beings, and ad- 
 mitting their influence on his situation, he also contrived 
 means to render himself agreeable to them. 
 
3S 1»HIL0S0PHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 Those philosopliers, then, who examine the moral conduct of 
 man, and its rules, viz. Morahsts, are particularly interested 
 in the knowledge, not only of the intellectual faculties and 
 their modes of action, but also of the inclinations and senti- 
 ments, of the affections and passions, of the motives of our 
 actions, of the aim of our faculties, and of the means of ar- 
 riving at it. The study of morahsts, however, is not more 
 exact than that of idealogians. Like them, ignorant of the fun- 
 damental powers of the mind, they confound modes of action 
 with the faculties themselves, disagree about the origin of 
 morality, its nature, and the means of advancing it. I shall 
 first, for clearness"* sake, inquire into the motives of our actions, 
 then into the origin of morality and its nature. The exami- 
 nation of the motives of our actions includes the philosophic 
 doctrines of the Will, affections and passions, and of the 
 influence of religion on mankind. 
 
 Will. 
 
 Many philosophers understand by the expression Will, all 
 sorts and all degrees of inclinations, desires, and sentiments. 
 Morahsts commonly say that the will alone is the cause of our 
 actions and omissions, and even that mankind is degraded by 
 any other explanation than this. The will is styled weak or 
 strong, good or bad. These terms, however, are vague, and 
 require consideration. 
 
 In the common acceptation of the word. Will is no more 
 a fundamental power than the instinct of animals, it is only 
 the effect of every primitive faculty of the mind ; for each 
 
MODES OP ACTION OF THE FACULTIES. 33 
 
 each of them being active produces an inclination, a desire, or 
 a kind of will ; and there are consequently as many species of 
 will as fundamental faculties ; the strength of each, too, is in 
 proportion to the activity of the individual faculties, and exists 
 involuntarily. Such a sweeping and general acceptation of the 
 term Will, then, is evidently defective. That desire again, 
 which overwhelms the others is also called will. Now, in this 
 sense, every faculty in its turn may become will. A dog, for 
 instance, is hungry, but having been punished for eating the 
 meat he found upon the table, he, without ceasing to feel ap- 
 petite, for fear of a repetition of the blows, does not indulge ; 
 he desires to eat, but he will not. Will, therefore, in this ac- 
 ceptation, cannot be any fundamental power, it is only an effect. 
 Let us here ask whether man in his healthy state of mind is 
 compelled by nature to consider certain desires as superior and 
 others as inferior ? The answer is affirmative. I shall detail 
 this point later, in speaking of the moral nature of man ; mean- 
 while I adopt it as quite positive, and only add that the pre- 
 ference given is founded on intelligence which knows the dif- 
 ferent desires, and determines the election which is made. 
 By calling the mental operation will, which appreciates the 
 value of the desires, and chooses among them, it is evident 
 that it depends on, and is proportionate to, intellect ; hence, 
 that it is not a fundamental faculty. 
 
 It is of the utmost importance to be aware that there is no 
 will without intelligence, though this does not constitute will, 
 and that will is no fundamental power, but the effect of the 
 reflecting faculties apphed to the affective and perceptive 
 powers of the mind. 
 
S4i PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 Legislation, in genetal, recognises intelligence as an indis- 
 pensable condition of will. Idiots, and the insane, therefore, 
 are not answerable for their actions. All the affective faculties, 
 indeed, are blind, and dispose us to act according to pleasure, 
 not according to will, which may frequently be opposed to 
 pleasure. The moral code of Christianity distinguishes be- 
 tween desires and will. Let us for a moment suppose that 
 will is a fundamental power, and of a higher order than intel- 
 lect ; but, on this hypothesis, how can will act at one time in 
 this and at another in the opposite direction ? How happens 
 it, that in one the will looks only for selfish gratifications, and 
 in another for general happiness ? Can will take a determi- 
 nate direction without any cause ? Is it different in itself, or 
 is it influenced by other causes — ^may it, for instance, be ex- 
 cited by the feelings ? In this case, however, it would become 
 dependent and exposed to aberrations. 
 
 The Christian law commands the will to resist inferior 
 temptations, and to follow the inspirations of the spirit. Pious 
 persons, also, in their addresses to the Great Guiding Power, 
 pray that their will may be directed towards certain actions, 
 and turned away from others. This proves that they consider 
 will as susceptible of being influenced, and by no means as 
 independent, and acting without any cause. Such an inde- 
 pendent will would, indeed, be a principle, and could have 
 only one, never opposite tendencies. 
 
 Thus, in the world, will has been separated from mere de- 
 sires, or from the affective faculties; and intelh'gence been 
 considered a condition necessary to its manifestations. Yet 
 intelligence does not constitute will ; for a person with an ex- 
 
MODES OF ACTION OP THE FACULTIES. 35 
 
 cellent intellect may take very little interest in the welfare of 
 other beings. He may acknowledge the better, and still incline 
 and even yield to his inclination to pursue the worse, Two 
 conditions then, the feelings and intellect, are necessary to wiU ; 
 in other terms, will consists in the application of reason to the 
 affective and perceptive faculties. 
 
 The greater number of persons take their individual inclina- 
 tions and pleasures for will, forgetting that these give motives 
 blindly and involuntarily. We may, indeed, say, that the 
 exhibition of true will is very rare ; it is too generally in oppo- 
 sition to our inclinations. This state has been noticed by 
 several morahsts " The spirit," it is said, " is wilhng, but 
 the flesh is weak*.'' " For that which I do," says the Apostle 
 Paul, «I allow not: for what I would that do I not ; but what 
 I hate that do If"* 
 
 I shall afterwards show that will, properly so called, is the 
 basis of liberty. Here it is sufficient to know that it can neither 
 be confounded with the individual inclinations nor with intel- 
 lect ; and that it is no special faculty, but the application of 
 reason, or the reflective powers, to our desires and notions. 
 
 Affections. 
 
 There is a great confusion of ideas in the works which treat 
 of the affections. The name affection is sometimes given to 
 fundamental powers, as to physical love, to self-love, to the love 
 of approbation, and to hope. Affections are also confounded 
 with passions. Moreover, affections are occasionally put for 
 
 * Matt. xxvi. 41. t Rom. vii. 15. 
 
 D 2 
 
36 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 the pathognomical signs, which indicate different states of satis- 
 faction or discontent of the fundamental powers ; for instance, 
 smiling, laughing, sighing, yawning, shedding tears, ^c 
 
 I employ the word in none of the preceding significations, 
 but solely according to its etymology, to indicate the different 
 states of being affected of the fundamental powers. The sense 
 of feeling, for instance, may convey tickling, itching, burning, 
 or lancinating pain ; its various modes of sensation are affec- 
 tions. In the same way the internal faculties may be differently 
 affected. 
 
 The affections of the fundamental faculties may be divided 
 into qualitive and quantitive. The former may again be sub- 
 divided into five sorts : 1st, general, which exist in each funda- 
 mental power ; 2d, common, which inhere in several faculties ; 
 3d, special, which belong to individual powers ; 4th, simple or 
 compound : finally, 5th, which are common to man and ani- 
 mals, and which are proper and peculiar to man. 
 
 The quantitive affections may be subdivided into two sorts : 
 1st, the fundamental powers and their quahtive affections may 
 be active in very different degrees, from indolence to pas- 
 sion ; and 2d, they may act with more or less quickness and 
 uration. 
 
 Among the qualitive and quantitive, and among the simple 
 and compound affections, we may also distinguish those which 
 appear in the state of health from those which occur in disease. 
 Let us now quote examples of each kind. 
 
 A general mode of action or affection is desire : each faculty 
 being active desires ; hence, there are as many sorts of desire 
 as fundamental faculties. The sensations of pleasure and pain 
 
MODES OP ACTION OF THE FACULTIES. 37 
 
 are other sorts of general affections ; they are effects, and hap- 
 pen, the former if any faculty be satisfied, the latter if its 
 desire be not complied with. There are consequently as many 
 kinds of pleasure and of pain as individual faculties. 
 
 The mode of being affected, called sentiment^ is common to 
 several affective faculties. That known under the name of 
 memory, belongs to the intellectual faculties. Fury is com^ 
 mon to combativity and destructiveness. Anger, in my 
 opinion, is a special affection of combativeness ; fear, of cir- 
 cumspection ; compassion, of benevolence ; and repentance or 
 remorse, of conscientiousness. 
 
 Simple affections take place in individual faculties. Jealousy, 
 again, is a compound affection. Egotism is its essence, and it 
 is modified according to the peculiar faculties which desire ; 
 for instance, physical love, friendship, love of approbation^ 
 Envy is another compound affection : it is jealousy without 
 benevolence ; it increases by the want of the superior feelings. 
 An envious person covets for himself alone ; he would possess 
 all enjoyments, to the entire exclusion of others ; while a jea- 
 lous man is more especially careful not to lose possession of 
 the pleasure he enjoys. 
 
 The affections common to man and animals, and those pro- 
 per to man, depend on the respective faculties. Anger, fear, 
 jealousy, envy, appear in man and animals, as the faculties io 
 which these affections belong inhere in both ; while adoration, 
 repentance, admiration, and shame, pertain, like the faculties^ 
 from which they arise, to man alone. 
 
 Let us now remark that the fundamental powers and their 
 qualitive affections may be more or less active or strong. The 
 
38 PHILOSOPHy OF THE MIND. 
 
 different degrees of activity are called velleitj, desire, ardent 
 desire, passion ; of the agreeable affections, pleasure, joy, and 
 ecstacy ; and of the disagreeable affections, pain, grief, and 
 misery. 
 
 The nervous irritability, which is styled sentimentality in 
 friendship, irascibihty in courage, sensibility in benevolence, 
 indicates only a higher degree of excitability or activity of the 
 fundamental powers, and irregularity of application. 
 
 The affections may, further, be sudden and transitory, or 
 slow and durable. Finally, the difference of the affections in 
 the healthy and diseased state is easily understood. The com- 
 plete absence of a faculty may be called imbecility, if it never 
 existed, and fatuity, if it have been destroyed by disease. 
 Fury, melancholy, despair, and irresistibility of any incli- 
 nation, are diseased affections. But this subject is treated of 
 at greater length in my work on Insanity, and I shall not 
 dwell longer on it here. 
 
 Physicians, as well as moralists, must study the doctrine of 
 the affections, on account of their influence on the vital functions 
 and on man's actions in society. The same may be said in 
 regard to the following article on 
 
 Passions, 
 
 This word Passion is commonly confounded with affection. 
 What I have stated upon the affections, however, being known, 
 the signification which I attach to the term passion will be 
 easily understood ; I use it to indicate only the highest degree 
 of activity of any faculty. Passions, therefore, are not funda- 
 
MODES OF ACTION OF THE FACULTIES. 39 
 
 mental powers, but quantitive modes of action, and effects ; 
 there are, consequently, as many sorts of passions as of 
 faculties. 
 
 Physicians, idealogians, and moralists, incessantly complain 
 of the influence of the passions. They ruin health and often 
 occasion insanity ; they disorder judgment, cloud reason, and 
 are causes of many errors and criminal actions. 
 
 Passions being the highest degree of activity of every fa- 
 culty, we easily conceive why great results, whether good or 
 bad, follow from them ; why they advance the arts and 
 sciences, and why they may be excessively dangerous. This 
 depends on the nature of the faculties which act with the ut- 
 most degree of energy. The lower feelings, however, let me 
 remark, are commonly the most active; and in speaking of 
 passions, we are apt to think of them. Still, the superior sen- 
 timents and the reflecting powers also act with passion in some, 
 that is, they act with the greatest possible energy. Two feelings, 
 selfishness and the love of glory, have been considered by 
 Helvetius as the greatest, or principal passions, and the cause 
 of all our actions. There is no doubt that these two feelings 
 are very active in the majority of individuals, and excite and 
 employ the other faculties to procure their satisfaction. But 
 certain it is, also, that they cannot produce talents. There are 
 ambitious people eager for distinction, who labour hard, and 
 who notwithstanding all, never excel in any one particular. 
 
 As there reigns a natural harmony among the fundamental 
 powers, those faculties which are too energetic, or which act 
 with passion, must obviously disturb this balance or order. 
 In complaining of the passions, we do not, however, stigmatize 
 
40 P^^IILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 the fundamental powers themselves, but only their too great 
 energy. This remark applies to the rehgious and moral feehngs, 
 as well as to the most brutal propensities. Selfishness, though 
 it undermines morality, is still necessary to self-preservation. 
 The love of approbation, though the main cause of political 
 slavery, has a useful destination in private life. And rehgion, 
 though the source of incalculable misery, procures the greatest 
 consolation to humanity. 
 
 I shall make one observation more upon passions : the fac- 
 titious passions, spoken of in books, do not exist. The pri- 
 mitive powers, on which they depend, are innate ; their appli- 
 cations alone may be called factitious. Love of approbation 
 is inherent in human nature ; its satisfaction by external marks, 
 titles. Sec, is artificial. 
 
 Influence of Religion on our Actions, 
 
 In examining the motives of human actions, it is indis- 
 pensable to consider religion. Among ancient nations, all 
 systems of morality were intimately connected with religious 
 opinions ; moral rules of conduct were always represented as 
 divine revelations, and governments were mostly theocratical. 
 
 Philosophers in all ages have disputed — and the discussion 
 still lasts, whether or not there be a moral sense inherent in 
 human nature. Some believe that there is, others deny it, 
 and ascribe all morality of conduct to revelation. In con- 
 sidering morality, therefore, we must examine what belongs to 
 nature and what to revelation. But let us previously see 
 whether religion and morahty are inseparable, or whether 
 they exist independently of each other. 
 
CAUSES INFLUENCING MAN's ACTIONS. 41 
 
 On Religion in general. 
 
 The same spirit has always guided those who call themselves 
 the ministers or confidants of God, and there is something 
 common to all the religious creeds both of ancient and modern 
 times. Every religion has its miracles, mysteries, and martyrs. 
 Each boasts of the most irrefragable testimonies, the most re- 
 spectable authorities, and the most plausible reasons ; each is 
 proposed as true, and requires unbounded belief and blind 
 obedience. The Indians who rub themselves with cow's-dung ; 
 the Jews who eat no pork ; the Mahometans who neither drink 
 wine nor eat pork, but make, at least, one pilgrimage to Mecca 
 during their lives ; the inhabitants of New England, who con- 
 sider long hair as an abomination; and the behevers in the in- 
 finite number of other religious creeds scattered over the world, 
 have all received special revelations. Diametrically opposite 
 and even immoral opinions, have been defended even to 
 death, and always in the persuasion that God was rather to 
 be obeyed than man. If any article of faith be found irra- 
 tional, it is called a mystery, and belief in it is not at all less 
 obhgatory. Who does not know that it is the will of God, 
 and necessary to salvation, to make war, or to maintain peace, 
 to immolate victims, or to preserve that which God has 
 created, to sing kneeling or standing upright, the head co- 
 vered or uncovered, to repeat certain prayers in a foreign 
 language, to eat certain dishes on certain days, to eat them 
 cold or warm, to burn perfumes, &c., &c. ? However dis- 
 similar religious doctrines may be in regard to the attributes of 
 
4S PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 God, to his influence on us, to the nature of the soul and its 
 future state, belief is always supported by revelation ; it is 
 always God who has spoken either immediately or by means 
 of his messengers. 
 
 Religious behef has its advantages and disadvantages. It is 
 a powerful motive of action among men. The reasonable 
 and noble-minded, therefore, wiU never object to revealed laws; 
 they will, however, pay more attention to their nature than 
 to the time when, the place where, and the means by which 
 they were revealed. The merits of Christian morality have 
 been and will always be the same, independently of time or 
 place, for it is universally adapted to human nature. I con- 
 sider it my duty to admit every revelation or cognition of any 
 im^rnutable law, whether physical or moral, and to submit to 
 it as the "will of God. Truth has its own intrinsic value ; it 
 does not acquire its worth from those who teach it. It is 
 therefore essential to point out means of distinguishing truth 
 from error, true from false prophets, and voluntary from in- 
 voluntary deceivers. Such is the course which reason indicates. 
 The ignorant, on the contrary, are satisfied with faith. They 
 obey every commandment which is proposed as divine. They 
 attach themselves more to the legislator and to the manner of 
 communicating his will, than to the excellency of his precepts. 
 They look for miracles from those who announce the law. It is 
 obvious, therefore, why pretended ministers of God have al- 
 ways been, and are still interested in representing ignorance 
 as a virtue, and in preventing thinking people from commu- 
 nicating their opinions freely. As their religious interpretations 
 do not always agree with the innate laws of intellect, it is 
 
CAUSES INFLUENCING MAN'S ACTIONS. 43' 
 
 rather convenient to interdict the exercise of reason. Igno- 
 rance can alone excuse those who forget that the superior 
 qualities called Theological are given for the general wel- 
 fare, and not to gratify the selfish ends of individuals, nor to 
 entail misery upon mankind. Ignorance is the sole plea for 
 pardon to those also who impose duties on others which they 
 themselves neglect, and who have too often compassed their 
 personal views by confounding their own with the cause of 
 the Supreme Being. Unfortunately, the number of persons 
 who reason and discriminate is small ; hypocrites succeed even 
 too easily. In my opinion no one ought to arrogate the right 
 of commanding in the name of God. History furnishes ex- 
 amples, too numerous to be cited here, of disorders consequent 
 on such presumptuous conduct. It is of consummate im- 
 portance ever to bear in mind, that the pretended ministers of 
 God are men, and are therefore liable to be deceived them- 
 selves, as well as likely to deceive others ; and never to forget 
 that contradictions of a necessity give a death blow to all 
 assumed prerogatives of infallibility. 
 
 It is not my intention to examine the various systems of 
 religion which have governed mankind at different times or 
 in different countries. I shall, however, say a few words on 
 the doctrines of Christianity. This moral code seems to me 
 the most pure, the most noble, and the most salutary, of all 
 which are mentioned in history. Its laws alone are universal 
 and invariable. It alone appeals to reasoning and to the con- 
 sequences of its knowledge as the best proofs of its excellency ; 
 alone it is forbearing; alone it invites examination, and 
 •asks the inquirer to hold by that which is true ; it alone is 
 
44? PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 founded on the faculties proper to man, alone places gene- 
 ral happiness above patrial love and personal interest, and 
 alone agrees with the natural law of morality. I do not 
 hesitate to say that, in my opinion, true Christianity is little 
 understood. Many, many changes must take place before it 
 can be re-established in its primitive purity. 
 
 Theocracy, in the common signification of the word, I do 
 not think exists in the nations of Europe now ; though in 
 some countries, the terms irreligious and immoral are still 
 forced to be taken as synonymous j and many in consequence 
 hypocrites. The only means of seeing clearly, and of uniting 
 philosophy, and religion, seems to me to depend on separating 
 strictly religious ideas from ideas of morality, that is, ideas 
 relative to God, from such as implicate our duties as social 
 beings. 
 
 The power of priesthood has gradually diminished, and 
 civil governments have established a moral code independently 
 of religious faith, so that now-a-days we distinguish between 
 civil laws and the rules of religious legislators. Formerly the 
 priesthood laid down all the moral precepts, but civil govern- 
 ments now decide even on the value of religious systems. They 
 declare one preferable and dominant, and merely tolerate every 
 other. Extremes in all cases do harm, and extremes and 
 mischief will be unavoidable so long as religion and morality 
 are under the direction of two distinct classes of governors. 
 Sacerdotal supremacy must terminate ; meanwhile it is upheld 
 by civil rulers, wlio appreciating its influence duly, have 
 united with priests for their mutual advantage. Civil govern- 
 mentsj however, begin to feel their rights and their duties. 
 
CAUSES INFLUENCING MAN'S ACTIONS. 45 
 
 They endeavour to promote general happiness and order in 
 society. They ah-eady separate duties towards the admini- 
 stration and our neighbours from those which are, strictly 
 speaking, rehgious. The enactments of civil powers are now 
 generally much wiser than the interpretations of revealed legis- 
 lation ; they are also more forbearing than the statutes of the 
 priesthood. History, indeed, proves that religious govern- 
 ments have done more mischief to mankind than civil ones, 
 which have in fact been faulty and injurious in the ratio of 
 their interference with religion. The contest between the 
 civil and religious powers is not yet at an end, and it is im- 
 possible to prevent the disorders which result from it. I sin- 
 cerely wish that governments would abstain from meddling with 
 any religious belief which is not inconsistent with the general 
 order. There should be no exception in the civil code. It 
 should be the same for every member of the community it 
 governs ; for those who sing to the glory of God, and for 
 those who do 'not sing; for those who eat flesh as for those 
 who eat vegetables ; for the rich and the poor ; for the gay 
 and the gloomy. It should have only one aim, — ^general hap- 
 piness. Whatever does not concern this ought to be out of 
 its province. 
 
 Obstacles of every description have been opposed to the 
 examination of this subject, and the knowledge of man's moral 
 and religious nature is little advanced. Its progress indeed 
 must be slow, so long as the investigation is trammelled, and 
 so long as it is not admitted that no religious nor moral opinion 
 can be true unless it be in harmony with the nature of man. 
 It is very unfortunate, that more attention is given to the mar- 
 vellous conceptions and dogmas of rehgion than to its moral 
 
4iS . PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 part. This indeed is rarely, if ever, viewed as the main object 
 of true religion. 
 
 I have already said that Socrates, among the ancient philo- 
 sophers, directed his views particularly towards morality and 
 man's relations in society. His ideas, and those of Plato, seem 
 to me very interesting. Socrates was just, noble-minded, and 
 firm in his resolves. Possessed with strong love of practical 
 knowledge, he despised all useless and metaphysical study, neg- 
 lecting even geometry, astronomy, and the physical sciences, 
 inasmuch as they are inapplicable to the interests of society. He 
 also maintained that knowing and acting ought to be inseparable 
 from each other. He believed in the existence of God, and 
 said he felt his influence through an internal voice, which dic- 
 tated to him all that he was to do or to omit. He thought 
 himself specially called to teach virtue, and considered the 
 moral law as innate, and destined to promote the happiness of 
 individuals and of the community. The principal virtues, 
 according to him, were temperance, strength, and justice. He 
 thought that the man who endeavours to be morally good alone 
 deserves the name of wise. Morahty and happiness he re- 
 garded as synonymous. Socrates, however, it is to be observed, 
 recognised an exclusive morality, by admitting it just to injure 
 enemies. Finally, he believed in the immortality of the 
 soul, its reward for good works, and its punishment for the evil 
 it had done. 
 
 Plato, though he was on his guard not to offend the religion 
 of the state, may still be considered as the founder of ration- 
 alism in moral philosophy. He rejected every conception that 
 was not in harmony with the laws of reason. He looked every- 
 where for concord. In his opinion, God could not be the 
 
CAUSES INFLUENCING MAN'S ACTIONS. 47 
 
 cause of evil. Evil therefore has another cause, or is only 
 apparent. God acts according to invariable laws, and neither 
 prayers nor offerings can change his decrees. Plato does not 
 develope his ideas on the duties of man sufficiently ; he was the 
 first, however, who opposed the propriety of doing injuries or 
 injustices to enemies. 
 
 Various opinions of moralists might here be examined, but 
 I shall confine myself to some remarks on the origin of morality. 
 I have stated, that some philosophers consider the moral sense 
 as innate, and that others derive it from revelation. I now 
 add, that there are others still who ascribe it to intelligence, 
 and even to personal interest. 
 
 The origin of morality must be elucidated in the same way 
 as the origin of every faculty. I therefore refer the reader to 
 the special treatise on the moral powers in the Phrenology. 
 There I have shown that the feelings exist independent 
 of intellect, and that this can only excite and appreciate the 
 impressions of the affective powers. I have then only to con- 
 sider personal interest as the cause of morality. 
 
 Man, say the partisans of selfishness, acts by interest ; he 
 does that which gives him the greatest pleasure, or seems the 
 most advantageous. Egotism, continue they, is not confined 
 to the search after the pleasures of the body or of sense, but ex- 
 tends over all internal sensations, and all moral and intellectual 
 enjoyments. To act, in order to experience pleasure in the 
 moment of action, or to obtain reward either in this life or in 
 that which is to come, is still to act from self-interest. 
 
 Such a basis of morality is unworth}^, ignoble, and uncertain 
 at the same time. Wherever it prevails man will be unhappy ; 
 
48 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 and agreement, in regard to that which is morally good, im- 
 possible. Individual inclinations of legislators will determine 
 the laws ; and their self-satisfaction be the principal motive of 
 their regulations. This is the law of the strongest, assisted 
 by intelligence. It advises governments to treat subjects 
 with benevolence and justice, because in this they find their 
 own advantage; to keep the community in ignorance, as it is 
 easier to persuade and arbitrarily to guide ignorant people 
 than to convince those with cultivated understandings ; and to 
 foster superstition, since it is an excellent means of effecting 
 whatever seems convenient. 
 
 The insufficiency of this morality has been felt, and there- 
 fore it has been deemed necessary to add, that every one has a 
 title to satisfy his selfish desires, provided he does not trench 
 on the rights of others. This is the doctrine which moralists 
 of modern times endeavour to establish. It is certainly far 
 superior to the vile system founded on the right of the 
 strongest, which, for so many centuries, has desolated the 
 world. Self-love, which undoubtedly exists in man, is here 
 combined with love of others, — also an inherent principle in 
 human nature. 
 
 This doctrine, if followed, will put an end to many abuses, 
 and prevent numerous disorders ; in many respects it will also 
 promote general happiness. Whoever loves humanity must 
 therefore desire to see it propagated. Nevertheless, the doc- 
 trine is founded on the inferior motive of personal interest ; 
 and in the fourth Section of this volume I shall show that it is 
 neither what Nature nor Christianity teaches. 
 
 Other philosophers, still considering self-interest and intelli- 
 
CAUSES INFLUENCING MAN*S ACTIONS, 49 
 
 gence as the cause of morality, say that the strong govern the 
 weak ; and that if the weak occasionally become the strong, 
 they throw off the yoke, and impose their own will in turn. 
 Thus it is always the strong who govern. In these circum- 
 stances one fears another, and then both agree upon what 
 shall be considered as law. This system, therefore, is founded 
 on convention or agreement between the governors and the 
 governed, for their common advantage. 
 
 I repeat, that no sentiment results from any other, nor from 
 intelligence. Fear then cannot produce the moral sense. 
 Animals are sensible to fear, and yet are ruled by the right of 
 the strongest. Fear, it is true, may become a motive to act 
 and to make laws ; but it neither conceives the necessity nor 
 the justice of making laws. And further, as I shall prove in 
 the fourth Section of this volume, the human kind will never 
 be happy so long as the faculties common to man and animals 
 dictate laws to society. Those powers which are peculiar to 
 man, and constitute his moral nature, ought to determine what 
 is to be done or to be avoided. 
 
 Positive facts then, and reasoning, prove, that the basis of 
 morality is inherent in human nature. Let us consider in 
 what it has been deemed to consist by various philosophers 
 who admit its innateness. 
 
 All morahsts treat of justice and virtue, but all do not 
 attach the same meaning to these expressions ; both are taken 
 at one time for faculties, and atanother for actions ; and then, 
 in each sense, they are general terms. In the first, we speak 
 even of the virtues of plants. In considering virtues, too, as 
 good actions, and in maintaining that every good action which 
 has required an inward struggle is virtuous, the meaning of 
 
50 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND* 
 
 the word virtue, in this way apphed, is still very variable. 
 The same thing happens with the terms vice, immoral or 
 unjust, and sin, in the language of religion. Did virtue 
 depend on circumstances, it might be contradictory, and could 
 never be absolute. 
 
 We may say, that religious and civil governments have 
 hitherto decided on what they desired should be called virtue 
 or vice. The same action has, according to circumstances, 
 been declared on one occasion a virtue, and on another a vice. 
 Courage is virtuous in conquerors as well as in those who de* 
 fend themselves against aggressors. The church of Rome 
 commands celibacy as a virtue, while other governments 
 reward those who bring up a family. It is remarkable, that 
 all codes, revealed or profane, with one exception, have declared 
 the amor yatricR, or love of country, a principal virtue. The 
 Christian doctrine alone acknowledges no exclusionary patriot- 
 ism ; it alone commands universal love. 
 
 The ancient philosophers spoke of cardinal virtues, but 
 these are only the just employment of certain fundamental 
 powers. Temperance, for instance, is the right use of the 
 pleasures of sense; prudence, of circumspection and intelli* 
 gence ; force, of courage and firmness ; justice, of conscien- 
 tiousness, benevolence, and self-love, together. 
 
 The virtues styled theological result from three fundamen- 
 tal faculties : hope and charity belong to primitive sentiments^ 
 faith depends on hope and marvellousness. 
 
 From the preceding considerations, I infer, that neither 
 idealogians nor moralists are sufficiently acquainted with the 
 nature of man ; that they have considered modes of action as 
 faculties, and that they require to study the fundamental 
 
CAUSES INFLUENCING MAN's ACTIONS. 51 
 
 powers of the mind, their origin, their modes of action, the 
 effects of their mutual influence, the conditions of their mani- 
 festations, and the laws of their improvement. 
 
 It is a pity that man is so much inclined to run into ex- 
 tremes. Idealogists have commonly too much confidence in 
 their reasoning powers; they neglect observation, consider 
 religion and morahly as mere means of leading mankind, and 
 assume their own manner of thinking and of feeUng as a type 
 of the human race ; while moralists demand blind and un- 
 bounded confidence in their assertions as emanating from a 
 superior authority, and discountenance or interdict reasoning. 
 In this way, idealogians and moralists wage continual warfare, 
 mutually disparage their subjects, and retard the knowledge 
 of the nature of man. If they love truth, let both parties 
 examine, without prejudice. Philosophers will find that man 
 is naturally inchned to religious and moral considerations ; land 
 the interpreters of the will of God, if they do not act from 
 selfish motives, will not reject the light of reason; they will 
 soon be convinced that the feelings are blind, and must be 
 guided by reflection, which can alone establish harmony among 
 the fundamental powers and their functions. 
 
 Conclusion, 
 
 I have had in view, in this Section, to prove that idealogians 
 
 and moralists do not know the fundamental powers of man ; 
 
 that they have taken effects for causes, and confounded modes 
 
 of action with primitive powers ; and that Phrenology alone 
 
 can rectify their errors, and furnish a basis 'for a practical 
 
 philosophy of mind, 
 
 £3 
 
52 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Fundamental Faculties of the Mind, and their Classification, 
 ORDER I. 
 
 Affective Faculties or Feelings, 
 
 The essential nature of the affective faculties is to feel emo- 
 tions. I shall indicate their nature, the aim of their existence, 
 the disorders to which they dispose, and the consequences of 
 their inactivity. 
 
 Genus I. — Feelings common to Man and Animals. 
 
 Hunger and thirst are desires felt and known by means of 
 the brain, but I do not think that there is a special organ in 
 which these impressions inhere. They reach the brain by the 
 intermedium of peculiar nerves. The aim of hunger and 
 thirst is nutrition ; their disordej-s are gluttony and drunken- 
 ness. 
 
 Physical love — (Amativeness.) 
 
 Aim : The propagation of the species. 
 Disorders : Fornication, adultery, incest, and other illegiti- 
 mate modes of satisfaction. 
 
 Jts inactivity predisposes to passive continency. 
 
 Love of Offspring — (Philoprogenitiveness,) 
 Aim : The preservation of the offspring. 
 
FUNDAMENTAL FACULTIES OP THE MIND. 55 
 
 Disorders: Too active; it spoils children, or causes their 
 loss to be felt as an insupportable calamity. 
 
 Its inactivity disposes to neglect, or to abandon the progeny. 
 
 . Inhabitiveness, 
 
 Animals have peculiar instincts to dwell in determinate 
 localities. Nature destined all places to be inhabited. 
 
 Attachment — {Adhesiveness.) 
 
 Aim : Attachment to all around us. It appears variously 
 modified, and produces friendship, marriage, society, habit, 
 and general attachment. 
 
 Disorders : Nostalgia : Inconsolable grief for the loss of a 
 friend. 
 
 Its inactivity predisposes to carelessness about others. 
 
 Courage — {Combativeness.) 
 
 Aim : Intrepidity and defence. 
 
 Disorders : Quarrelsomeness, disputation, attack, anger. 
 
 Its inactivity predisposes to cowardice, timidity, and fear. 
 
 Destkuctiveness. 
 
 Aim : Destruction, and the violent death of animals, for the 
 sake of living on their flesh. 
 Disorders : Murder, cruelty. 
 Its inactivity prevents destruction. 
 
 Secretiveness. 
 Aim : To conceal. 
 
i54i PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 Disorders: Cunning, duplicity, falsehood, hypocrisy, dissi- 
 mulation, intriguing, lying. 
 
 Its inactwity predisposes to be deceived by others. 
 
 AcaUISITIVENESS. 
 
 Aim: To acquire that which is necessary to our preserva- 
 tion. 
 
 Disorders : Theft, fraud, usury, corruptibility. 
 Its inactivity makes one's own interest be neglected. 
 
 CONSTRUCTIVENESS. 
 
 Aim : Construction in general. 
 
 Self-esteem. 
 
 Aim: 3elf-esteem. 
 
 Disorders : Pride, haughtiness, disdain, arrogance, insolence. 
 
 Its inactivity predisposes to humility. 
 
 Love of ApmoBATioN. '" 
 
 Aim : Love of approbation and distinction. 
 
 Disorders: Vain glory, vanity, ambition, titles, distinc- 
 tions. 
 
 Its inactivity predisposes to indifference about the opinion 
 of others. 
 
 Cautiousness. 
 
 Aim : To be cautious and circumspect. 
 Disorders : Uncertainty, irresolution, anxiety, fear, melan- 
 choly. 
 Its inactivity predisposes to levity. 
 
FUNDAMENTAL FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 55 
 
 Genus II. — Affective Faculties proper to Man*, 
 
 Benevolence. 
 
 Aim : Benevolence in general. 
 
 Disorders : Benevolence to the undeserving, or at the ex- 
 pense of others. 
 
 Its inactivity predisposes to selfishness, and not to regard 
 
 others. 
 
 Veneration. 
 
 Aim : To respect what is venerable. 
 
 Disorders : Idolatry, bigotry. 
 
 Its inactivity predisposes to irreverence. 
 
 Firmness. 
 Aim : Firmness. 
 
 Disorders : Stubbornness, obstinacy, and disobedience. 
 Its inactivity predisposes to inconstancy and changeableness. 
 
 :^ Consciousness. 
 Aim : Justice, conscientiousness, and duty. 
 Disorders : Remorse for actions which are innocent, or of 
 no importance. 
 Its inactivity predisposes to forgetfulness of duty. 
 
 Hope. 
 Aim: Hope. 
 
 Disorders : Love of scheming. 
 Its inactivity predisposes to despair. 
 
 * The rudiments of some of them exist also in animals ; but they are 
 much strong-er and more extensive in their sphere of application in man. 
 
56 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 Maevellousness. 
 
 Aim : Admiration, and belief in supernaturality. 
 Disorders : Sorcery, astrology, the belief in demons. 
 Its inactivity predisposes to incredulity in revealed ideas. 
 
 Ideality, 
 Aim : Perfect on. 
 
 Disorders : Too great exaltation, eccentricity. 
 Its inactivity predisposes to taking things as they are. 
 
 MiRTHFULNESS, OR GaYNESS. 
 
 Aim : Glee, mirth, laughter. 
 
 Disorders : Raillery, mockery, irony, satire. 
 
 Its inactivity predisposes to seriousness. 
 
 Imitation. 
 
 Aim : Imitation, expression in the arts. 
 Disorders : Buffoonery, grimaces. 
 
 Its inactivity hinders e-xTpression in the arts, and imitation 
 in general. 
 
 ORDER II. 
 
 Intellectual Faculties, 
 
 The essential nature of the intellectual faculties is to pro- 
 cure knowledge. 
 
 Genus I. External senses. 
 
 Genus II. Internal senses which procure knowledge of 
 external objects and their qualities. 
 
FUNDAMENTAL FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 57 
 
 Individuality. 
 
 Configuration. 
 
 Size. 
 
 Weight and resistance. 
 
 Colouring. 
 
 Genus III. Internal senses which procure knowledge of 
 the relations of objects. 
 Locality. 
 Calculation. 
 Order. 
 Eventuality. 
 Time. 
 Melody. 
 Language. 
 
 Genus IV. Reflective Faculties, 
 
 Comparison. 
 Causahty. 
 
58 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Origin of the Mental Faculties, 
 
 Not the nature of the mental powers only, but their origin, 
 or the cause of their existence also, has constantly been an 
 object of investigation. Philosophers have never diiFered in 
 opinion upon the vegetative qualities of man. His digestion, 
 circulation, respiration, and various secretions and excretions, 
 are natural functions, and cannot be acquired by will nor in- 
 telligence ; but, in regard to the origin of the mental powers, 
 many, and different opinions, have been, and are still, en- 
 tertained. According to some, man is every thing by nature ; 
 to others, there are a few general fundamental faculties which 
 produce all particular manifestations ; whilst others, again, 
 hold that man is born without any determinate disposition, 
 a tabula rasa, or blank sheet, and that his faculties are the 
 result of external impressions both natural and artificial. Let 
 us examine these different opinions, and see how far each is 
 exaggerated. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Man is every thing by Nature, or, all is innate in Man, 
 
 According to the philosphers of antiquity, we look in vain 
 for qualities in man which are not given to him from birth. 
 
ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. |^ 
 
 This language was used both by profane and religious writers. 
 Plato, in his Republic, considers philosophical and mathema- 
 tical talents, memory, and the sentiments of pride, ambition, 
 courage, sensuality, &c., as innate. Hippocrates, in treating 
 of the qualities necessary for a physician, speaks of natural 
 and innate dispositions. Aristotle, in his work on Political 
 Science, adopts the principle, that some are born to govern and 
 others to obey. Quintilian said, " If precepts could produce 
 eloquence, who would not be eloquent ?^' Cicero, Seneca, &c., 
 were of opinion that religion is innate ; so thought Lavater 
 also. Herder* considered man's sociability, his benevolence, 
 his incKnation to venerate a superior being, his love of reli- 
 gion, &c., as innate. Condillacf says, " Man does not know 
 what he can do, till experience has shown what he is capable 
 of doing by the force of nature alone ; therefore, he never 
 does any thing purposely till he has once done it instinctively. 
 I think this observation will be found to be permanent and 
 general. I think also that, if it had been duly considered, 
 philosophers would have reasoned better than they have done. 
 Man makes analyses only after having observed that he has 
 analyzed. He makes a language after having observed that 
 he had been understood. In this manner poets and orators 
 began before they thought of their peculiar talents. In one 
 word, all that man does he did at first from nature alone. 
 Nature commences, and always commences well. This is a 
 truth that cannot be repeated too frequently." 
 
 * Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie der Menschelt. Th. 1. S. 252. 
 t CEuv. Coinpl. 8vo. T. III. p. 115. . 
 
60 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 " When the laws," says he in another passage*, «' are con- 
 ventions, they are arbitrary. This may be the case ; and, 
 indeed, there are too many arbitrary laws ; but those which 
 determine the morality of our actions cannot be arbitrary. 
 They are our work in as far as they are conventional ; but we 
 alone did not make them ; nature dictated them to us, and it 
 was not in our power to make them otherwise than they are. 
 The wants and faculties of man being given, laws are given 
 also ; and, though we make them, God, who created us with 
 such wants and such faculties, is, in fact, our sole legislator. 
 In following these laws conformably to nature we obey God ; 
 and this is the completion of the morality of our actions." 
 
 The ancient institution of castes, or tribes, in eastern coun- 
 tries, shows that endeavours were made to preserve the purity 
 of the races. The prejudice of nobihty in certain families can 
 be explained only by admitting the innateness of dispositions. 
 
 The rehgion of Christ also recognises the innateness of the 
 faculties. According to it, all is given from above. " A man 
 can receive nothing, except it be given to him from Heavenf ." 
 " No one can come unto me except it were given to him by 
 my FatherJ." '' Who hath ears to hear, let him hear§." 
 " All men cannot receive this saying, save they to whom it is 
 given Ij." St. Paul says, "When the Gentiles which have 
 not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, 
 these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves : which 
 show the word of the law written in their heai'ts, their con- 
 
 * Loc. cit. p. 65. t John, iii. 27. :j: John, vi. 65. 
 
 § Matt. xiii. 9. II Matt. xix. U. 
 
ORIGIN OF rilE MENTAL FACULTIES. 61 
 
 science also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean- 
 while accusing or else excusing one another*." 
 
 The doctrine of predestination is also conformable to the 
 opinion that every thing is innate. Pious persons implore 
 the influence of God and of various spirits. The doctrine 
 of divine grace also agrees with the principle that man has 
 natural gifts. 
 
 Thus the principle of innateness is obvious, and has been 
 admitted from the remotest antiquity ; but what it is that is 
 innate, and how it is so, are points not sufficiently known. 
 Before T examine them, however, I shall rectify the two other 
 notions, already mentioned, in regard to the origin of the 
 faculties of the mind. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 A few general Faculties produce all particular 
 Dispositions 
 
 In the first section of this volume, I have spoken of the 
 fondness of philosophers for general conceptions. The same 
 liking prevails in their explanation of the causes of our actions. 
 A certain activity of the mind is commonly admitted as ne- 
 cessary to profit being made of external impressions; but 
 some general modes of action have seemed sufficient to account 
 for all the particulars. 
 
 * Rom. ii. 14, 15. 
 
b2 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 i. Wants and Passions produce our Faculties. 
 
 The expression Want is here taken as synonymous with 
 desire, and from what I have said in the first section, it results, 
 that this general term designates no determinate faculty, but the 
 ejGTect of each power being active ; that there are as many wants, 
 or desires, as fundamental faculties, and that these wants ate 
 proportionate to the activity of the faculties. Those, there- 
 fore, who speak of wants, in this sense, must specify them, 
 and point out their individual causes. For it cannot be the 
 same cause which finds pleasure in construction and in de- 
 molition ; in benevolence and in cruelty ; in righteousness and 
 in sensual enjoyments ; in the study of history and of ma- 
 thematics ; in poetry and in ascetic contemplations, &c. 
 Thus the general proposition of philosophers, that desire of 
 pleasure and aversion to pain produce our actions, must be 
 rectified. Pleasures are different, and are effects of individual 
 active faculties. These must therefore be made known, and 
 the objects of their satisfaction indicated. But there is neither 
 desire nor pleasure without the special faculties. My ideas 
 on the passions are explained in the first section of this vo- 
 lume, and they who know them can rectify the erroneous 
 opinion which considers them as the cause of man's special 
 mental faculties. 
 
 ii. Attention is the cause of our Faculties, 
 
 Attention is very commonly considered as the cause of all In- 
 ternal faculties. Helvetius even said, that each well-organised 
 
ORIGIN OP THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 63 
 
 person might exercise his faculties by means of his attention, 
 with such success, as to arrive at the first rank in society. 
 
 I have already shown* that the word attention has two 
 acceptations : that it denotes consciousness in general ; and 
 consequently, in this sense, accompanies the activity of every 
 faculty; and that it explains why one animal or man pays 
 great attention to one object, and very little or none to 
 another; why individuals are attentive to different objects, 
 even according to sex and age ; and why attention is propor- 
 tionate to the activity of the respective faculty, so that, if the 
 senses be not exercised, much stronger impressions are re*» 
 quired to arouse their attention. The attention, therefore, 
 of every faculty may be cultivated and improved by its ex- 
 ercise; but attention, as a general quality, cannot be the 
 appanage of any particular power. 
 
 Moreover, as attention also denotes a distinct consciousness, 
 a reflection on sensations and actions, the aptitudes and in- 
 stincts of animals cannot certainly be its effect in this signifi- 
 cation. No one will maintain, that the rabbit, badger, mole, 
 marmot, or hamster, make burrows, because they have ex- 
 amined with attention the advantages of such dwellings ; or 
 that the beaver builds a cottage, because it has studied the 
 laws of mechanics. Among men, geniuses also burst forth 
 quite unconscious of their talents. This kind of attention 
 then may excite, but can never produce, the particular fa- 
 culties. 
 
 * Page 14. 
 
64. PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 iii. Understanding is the cause of our Faculties. 
 
 This proposition is also cleared up by Phrenology. The 
 affective powers must be separated from the intellectual facul- 
 ties, and there are several sorts of understanding. 
 
 iv. The Will is the cause of our Faculties. 
 
 In answer to this opinion, I again refer to what has been 
 already said in this vol. p. 32, et sequent, of will. 
 
 It is, however, objected, that as his will is their only cause, 
 man is degraded by having his actions explained. Those who 
 use such language seem to me to speak without attaching any 
 meaning to their words. Is man degraded by having it said 
 that he must submit to the laws of the creation? Can he 
 change the laws of his organization, of his senses, of his 
 understanding, or alter the principles of music, algebra, &c.? 
 Were man degraded by a determinate nature, all beings are 
 so, even God himself, seeing that, by his nature, he cannot 
 will evil, nor do an injustice. Now, if God act according 
 to his nature, man cannot be degraded by laws dictated to 
 him by the Creator, or by his will not being absolute. 
 
 Let us see further, whether man is degraded by our saying 
 that he cannot produce the talents and feehngs he desires. 
 I suppose that every dreamer in philosophy has occasionally 
 felt the limits of his faculties, and has done things disap- 
 proved of by reason. What had then become of his will? 
 ^fy manner of thinking here is also conformable to Chris- 
 
ORIGIN OP THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 65 
 
 tianity, which renders man answerable only for the gifts he 
 has received. 
 
 Thus, the doctrine of the will is not sufficient to explain 
 the mental functions of man ; all our considerations, indeed, 
 lead us to see more and more clearly that no single condition 
 is adequate to account for all the actions of mankind. Several 
 united constantly determine them. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Man's Faculties are the result of Education. 
 
 The doctrine of innate ideas and of innate moral principles 
 lost its authority by degrees, and it was easy to combat it, as 
 it is not conformable to nature. That so many errors on this 
 point should have prevailed during centuries is almost in* 
 conceivable ; for every day observation belies the principle. 
 How could philosophers maintain that man is every thing from 
 birth, with the fact before them of the dijfference in so many 
 particulars between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, occa- 
 sioned by the dissimilarity of the laws which governed each 
 nation ? And is it not obvious too, that several modern nations 
 neglect the arts and sciences only because their religious creeds 
 interdict such pursuits ? And further, is not every one of us 
 aware that his notions and his actions are modified by external 
 circumstances, and by the education he has received ? The 
 doctrme of universal innateness has been examined and re- 
 
eie'^ PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 futed by Locke, Condillac, and others, and I find it super- 
 fluous to say more on the subject here. But these authors and 
 their followers fell into the opposite extreme, and conceived 
 men and animals born indifferent — ifa6w/<« rasce^ or blank 
 sheets, and maintained all the instincts of animals, from the 
 insect to the dog and elephant, to be the consequences of 
 instruction. Helvetius is the great champion of this opinion* 
 According to him, foxes hunt because they have learnt hunting 
 from their parents ; birds sing and build nests in consequence 
 of instruction ; and man becomes man by education. 
 
 The brief answer to these positions is, that education pro- 
 duces no faculty whatever either in man or animals. The 
 opinion of Helvetius and his school, being still much ac- 
 credited, and many institutions being founded on it, deserves 
 a particular examination. According to their hypothesis, arts 
 and sciences ought to improve in proportion as they are taught, 
 and mankind ought to become perfect under the care of moral 
 and rehgious preachers. Why then is the progress of the 
 arts and sciences so slow "i Why are we forced to aUow that 
 men of genius are born ? Why has every one of us certain fa- 
 ^eulties stronger than others ? Truth lies at neither of the ex- 
 tremes, but between the two, and this is what I shall endeavour 
 to prove. I shall consider, under three separate heads, the ideas 
 according to which man acquires his affective and intellectual 
 faculties by education. The first concerns the external senses ; 
 the second fortuitous circimistances ; and the third, instruc- 
 tion and the external circumstances which are voluntarily pre- 
 pared. 
 
ORIGIN OP THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 67 
 
 i. Of the external Senses as cause of the mental Faculties. 
 
 The external senses, it is certain, are indispensable to the 
 acquiring of knowledge of the internal world, and to the 
 fulfilment of social duties; it is also certain that they are 
 given by nature. Now it is only because they are absolutely 
 necessary to our actions that they have been considered as 
 their cause. 
 
 This subject has already been particularly examined*, and 
 I shall only repeat that the external faculties are not in pro- 
 portion to the internal senses, and that these are mere inter- 
 media. The hands may be used to take food, to write to a 
 friend, to draw, to play on a musical instrument, &c. ; but 
 they do not produce hunger, friendship, drawing, music, &c. 
 Let us observe instead of supposing, and we shall find that 
 the internal faculties are only manifested by means of the ex- 
 ternal senses and of voluntary motion. 
 
 ii. Of fortuitous or accidental Circumstances as the cause of 
 our Faculties. 
 
 The following language is very common : — Necessity makes 
 man act and invent; occasions produce talents; revolutions 
 bring forth great men ; danger gives courage ; society causes 
 the passions, and these are the principal motives of our actions ; 
 climate and food beget powers, &c. ; in short, circumstances 
 produce the mental faculties. 
 
 Whatever has been said of fortuitous circumstances as the 
 
 Vide Phrenology, page 216 et sequent 
 
 F9 
 
68 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 cause of faculties, may be reduced to two considerations : 
 they present the faculties with opportunities necessary to the 
 exhibition of their activity; or they excite the faculties, 
 without, however, originating them. 
 
 '« Demosthenes," says Helvetius, "became eloquent because 
 the eloquence of CaUistratus made so deep an impression on 
 his mind that he aspired only to this talent." According to 
 the same author, '' Vaucanson became famous in mechanics, 
 because, being left alone in the waiting-room of his mother's 
 confessor, when a child, he chanced to find a clock, and after 
 examining its wheels, endeavouring, with a bad knife, to make 
 a similar machine of wood. He succeeded, and therefore con- 
 structed his surprising machines, the automatons. Milton 
 would not have written his Paradise Lost, had he not lost his 
 place of secretary to Cromwell. Shakspeare composed his 
 plays because he was an actor ; and he became an actor be- 
 cause he was forced to leave his native county on account of 
 some juvenile errors. Corneille fell in love, and made verses 
 to the object of his passion, and therefore became famous in 
 poetry. Newton saw an apple falling, and this revealed to 
 him the law of gravitation, Sec." 
 
 In this manner of reasoning the origin of the faculties is 
 confounded either with the opportunity necessary for their 
 manifestation, or with some external excitement. Now it is 
 evident that external circumstances must permit the internal 
 faculties to act; opportunities, however, do not, therefore 
 produce faculties. Without food I cannot eat ; but I am not 
 hungry because food exists. A dog cannot hunt if it be shut 
 up, but its desire of hunting is not produced by leading it 
 
ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 69 
 
 into the fields. Many millions are often placed in the same 
 circumstances, and, perhaps, a single individual alone takes 
 advantage of them. Jlevolutions make great men, not because 
 they produce faculties, but because they offer opportunities 
 necessary to their display. Circumstances often favour the 
 attainment of distinction and the acquisition of celebrity, but 
 every individual does not reach an eminent place. It is 
 not certainly enough to be an actor in order to compose such 
 plays as those of Shakspeare. How many children are ex- 
 posed to similar influences without manifesting the same energy 
 of faculties, while, on the contrary, some individuals not only 
 make use of occasions present, but prepare and produce others 
 which permit their faculties a still greater sphere of activity ! 
 
 On the other hand, it is true that our faculties are often 
 excited by events, and that without external excitement they 
 would remain inactive. However useful, therefore, the study 
 of excellent models may be in the arts, I am still convinced 
 that the principles of every science, art, and profession, are 
 readily conceived by those who possess the faculties each re- 
 quires in a high degree. This is the case with moral prin- 
 ciples and religion also, which are easily developed if the in- 
 nate conditions on which they depend be possessed. 
 
 Society, 
 
 Many authors treat of the natural state of man in opposition 
 to his social condition, and consider numerous qualities as the 
 result of society. According to their hypothesis, man is made 
 for solitude ; the social state is contrary to his nature ; and 
 many of his virtues and vices would never h^ve existed, ha^:! 
 he not abandoned his state of isolation, 
 
70 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 Excepting certain idiots, however, where, and at what time, 
 has man lived a solitary being ? History, so far as it goes, 
 shows that he has always lived in society ; in families, at least ; 
 and families, though scattered through the woods, form com- 
 munities. As we find man everywhere united in societies, 
 then, is it not natural to conclude that he is a social being ? 
 Animals, it is necessary to recollect, in regard to the instinct of 
 sociability, are divided into two classes : several species are des- 
 tined to live in society, as sheep, monkies, crows, 8^c. ; oth^s 
 to live solitary, as the fox, hare, magpie, 8^c. Man belongs to 
 the social class. Now we may easily conceive that the social 
 animals are endowed with faculties destined for society, and 
 that these cannot act without it. And every individual is, in 
 fact, generally calculated for society ; all his faculties are in 
 harmony with this aim. Bustards and cranes place sentinels ; 
 a flock of wild geese forms a triangle in flying ; a herd of cha- 
 mois is led by a female ; bees act in concert, 8^c, ; and all these 
 peculiarities inhere in animals along with the social instinct. 
 Consequently society is itself a natural institution; — a law 
 established by creation, and the faculties of social animals are 
 not the result of society. This proposition is also proved by 
 the fact of social animals having different and often opposite 
 faculties ; which if society produced any of them could never 
 happen. 
 
 Misery, 
 
 Want, that is, some disagreeable sensation, misery, poverty, 
 or painful situation, is often considered as the source of the 
 instincts, propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties of 
 man and animals. 
 
ORIGIN OP THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 71 
 
 Want, in this signification, certainly excites the internal 
 faculties, but it is not true that it produces them ; or else the 
 same external wants ought to create the same faculties in ani- 
 mals and in man : yet we observe that not merely every kind 
 of animal, but even every individual, acts differently under 
 like impressions from without. The partridge dies of hunger 
 and cold during sharp winters, and the sparrow falls benumbed 
 from the house-top, while the nightingale and quail take wing 
 to temperate climes before the season of want arrives. The 
 cuckoo requires a nest to lay its eggs in as well as the wagtail 
 or the redbreast, and yet builds none. The idiot makes no 
 effort to defend himself from the inclemencies of the weather, 
 while the reasonable man covers himself with clothing. More- 
 over, the faculties of animals and man are active, without any 
 necessity from external circumstances. The beaver, though 
 shut up and protected against the weather, builds its hut ; and 
 the weaver bird, though in a cage, makes its tissue. It conse- 
 quently follows, that external wants excite the activity of the 
 internal faculties, but do not produce them ; and in this respect 
 their influence is important. The faculties of the poor, for 
 instance, are more active than those of the affluent ; when the 
 faculties, however, have not been given by nature, external 
 wants cannot excite them. 
 
 I have already shown that the expression Want, taken as sy- 
 nonymous with inclination or desire, is the effect and not the 
 cause of the internal faculties ; that there are as many wants as 
 different faculties; and that wants are proportionate to the 
 axjtivity of these. 
 
7^ PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 Climate and Mode of Living. 
 
 Several philosophers have supposed that climate, mode of 
 living, and even the nurse's milk, might be the cause of man's 
 faculties; 
 
 In this manner of thinking, the modifications are confounded 
 with the origin of our faculties. The opinion, however, must 
 be considered. The arguments adduced in support of it only 
 prove that manifestation of the faculties depends on the organi- 
 zation; for climate, eating, drinking, ^c, have a powerful 
 influence upon the body. Instead, therefore, of denying the 
 influence of climate, food, air, light, S^c, I consider it as of 
 great importance, in as far as the activity of the faculties is 
 concerned. The milk of nurses certainly contributes to the 
 growth and organic constitution of children, and consequently 
 to the manifestation of the affective and intellectual faculties, 
 inasniuch as the body is necessary to this. AH these external 
 influences, however, cannot, it is evident, produce any faculty. 
 If parents were right in attributing the inferior propensities of 
 their children to the nourishment they had received, why 
 should not grown-up people, who live on beef, veal, mutton, 
 pork, S^c.^i accuse the ox, calf, sheep, and pig, for their want of 
 intelligence and their peculiar character ? The activity of our 
 faculties varies with the modifications of our organization, 
 just as the milk and butter of cows vary according to the food 
 they live on ; or as the flesh and fat of animals are modified 
 according to the articles with which they are fattened. The 
 activity of men fed on game differs much from the activity of 
 men living upon potatoes and other vegetables ; and it seems 
 
ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 73 
 
 possible to show the influence of different aliments upon certain 
 systems in the healthy state, just as it may be shown that some 
 medicines act more upon one than upon another. From the 
 same reason we may also conceive the utility of certain rules of 
 fasting in subduing sensual appetites. Particular degrees of 
 excitement suppress the activity of certain faculties, while they 
 increase that of others. 
 
 Climate certainly exerts a great influence upon the organiza- 
 tion, and it is natural to suppose that one contributes more 
 than another to develop certain faculties. The influence of 
 climate is not, however, so powerful on man as on animals ; 
 for man, by means of his intellectual faculties, opposes its 
 eff*ects. The Jews are a proof of this. They are dispersed over 
 the whole world, and though somewhat modified in different 
 countries, their primitive and characteristic organization is still 
 everywhere the same. The effects of innateness and of the 
 laws of propagation are much more potent than those of any 
 thing external* In saying, therefore, that climate and food 
 influence the activity of the faculties, this is not to be con- 
 founded with their primitive origin. 
 
 iii. Of pre'pared Circumstances, and Instruction as the cause 
 of our Faculties. 
 
 Having once considered external circumstances as cause 
 of the mental faculties, men naturally thought that to teach 
 arts and sciences, and moral and religious principles, to 
 found academies and schools, to pay large sums to masters. 
 
w 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 and to study the works of great men, might be sufficient to 
 produce superior talents. 
 
 This opinion must be opposed, by observing :-« 
 
 i. The Constancy of the Nature of Animals and Man. 
 
 Were animals susceptible of change from every impression and 
 not endowed with determinate natures, how comes it that every 
 species always preserves the same characters ? Why do not fowls 
 coo when they are reared with pigeons ? Why do not female 
 nightingales sing like males ? Why do birds of one kind, 
 hatched by those of another, display the habits and instincts 
 of their parents ? Why does the duck, hatched by a hen, run 
 towards the water ? Why does not the cuckoo sing like the 
 bird that reared it ? Why do squirrels, when pursued, climb 
 trees, and rabbits hide themselves in burrows ? Why are dogs 
 attachcji in despite of the unkind blows they receive, S^^c. ? It 
 is true that animals are not confined in their actions solely to 
 such as are required for their preservation. They vary their 
 manners according to the circumstances in which they live; 
 and are susceptible of an education beyond their wants. 
 Horses, monkeys, dogs, c^c, may be taught to play various 
 tricks. This power, however, of modifying their actions is 
 still limited, and is always conformable to their nature. 
 
 The same reasoning applies to man. If his faculties be the 
 result of external influences, why does he never manifest any 
 other nature but his own ? Children pass most of their time 
 with mothers and nurses ; yet boys and girls, from the earliest 
 infancy, shew the distinctive characters wliich continue ancl 
 mark them through life. 
 
ORIGIN OP THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 75 
 
 ii. The Occurrence of Geniuses among Animals and Men, 
 
 Did animals and men learn all from others, why should indi- 
 viduals, similarly circumstanced in regard to manner of living 
 and instruction, excel the rest ? Why should one nightingale 
 sing better than another living in the same wood ? Why, 
 amongst a drove of oxen, or horses, is one individual good- 
 tempered and meek, and another ill-natured and savage? 
 M. Dupont de Nemours had a cow which singly knew how to 
 open the gates of an enclosure ; none of the herd ever learned 
 to imitate its procedure, but waited impatiently near the 
 entrance for their leader. I have the history of a pointer, 
 which, when kept out of a place near the fire by the other dogs 
 of the family, used to go into the yard and bark ; all imme- 
 diately came and did the same ; meanwhile he ran in, and 
 secured the best place. Though his companions were often 
 deceived, none of them ever imitated his stratagem. I also 
 knew of a little dog, which, when eating with large ones, be- 
 haved in the same manner, in order to secure his portion, or to 
 catch some good bits. These are instances of genius among 
 animals which are by no means the result of instruction. 
 
 Children often show particular dispositions and talents be- 
 fore they have received any kind of education. Almost every 
 great man has, in infancy, given earnests of future eminence. 
 Achilles, hidden in Pyrrha''s clothes, took the sword from 
 among the presents of Ulysses. Themistocles, when a child, 
 said that he knew how to aggrandize and render a state power- 
 ful. Alexander would not dispute any prize at the Olympic 
 
^6 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 games, unless his rivals were kings. At fourteen years of age, 
 Cato of Utica shewed the greatest aversion to tyranny. Nero 
 was cruel from his cradle. Pascal, when twelve years old, 
 published his treatise on Conic Sections. Voltaire made verses 
 when only seven years of age. The number of such instances 
 is very great, and it is unnecessary to mention more here, as 
 they must be within the scope of every one*'s knowledge. 
 
 iii. Individualities among Animals and Men, 
 
 Individual animals of every species have imiversally some- 
 thing particular in their mental constitution ; every bird of the 
 same brood does not acquire its song with equal facility ; one 
 horse is fitter for the race than another ; and sportsmen know 
 very well that there is a great diiFerence among dogs. It is 
 the same with the human kind. Children of the same parents 
 differ in talents and disposition, though their education has 
 been the same. How then should the same education possibly 
 produce the peculiarities of different children.? Or why 
 have not teachers yet found means to confer imderstanding, 
 judgment, and all other good qualities ? Why are we not 
 all geniuses? Why cannot moral and satirical discourses 
 keep us from abusing our faculties.'^ And why must we 
 lament so many errors and crimes ? 
 
 To prove that man acquires his affective and intellectual 
 faculties by education, some assert that the savages who have 
 been found in the woods, and destitute of all human faculties, 
 resemble beasts only because they have not received any 
 education* 
 
ORIGIN OP THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 7*7 
 
 This presumption is refuted as soon as the condition of these 
 unfortunate beings is known. They may be referred to two 
 classes ; being ordinarily defective in organization, with large 
 dropsical heads, or brains too small and deformed. They are 
 almost always scrofulous, have hanging lips, a thick tongue, 
 swollen neck, bad general constitution, and an unsteady gait ; 
 they are more or less completely idiots, and have commonly been 
 exposed and left to the care of Providence, having been found 
 burthens by their parents. In some countries, the lower classes 
 consider such unhappily-constituted creatures as bewitched, 
 and take no care of them. Idiots too have sometimes a deter- 
 minate propensity to live alone, and consequently escape to 
 the woods. At Haina, near Marbourg, where there is a great 
 hospital. Dr. Gall and I were told, that on sending people to 
 search for some idiots who had escaped, others were found who 
 had fled from different places. We saw a mad woman near 
 Augsburg, who had been found in a wood. At Brunswick we 
 saw a woman also found in a forest, who was incapable of pro- 
 nouncing a single word. The pretended savage of Aveyron, 
 kept in the Institution of the Deaf and Dumb at Paris, is an 
 idiot in a high degree. His forehead is very small, and much 
 compressed in the superior part ; his eyes are small, and lie 
 deep in the orbits, and we could not convince ourselves that he 
 hears ; for he paid no attention to our calls, nor to the sound of 
 a glass struck behind him. He stands and sits decently, but 
 moves his head and body incessantly from side to side. He 
 knows several written signs and words, and points out the 
 objects noted by them. His most remarkable instinct, how- 
 ever, is love of order ; for, as soon as any thing is displaced in 
 the room, he goes and puts it to rights. 
 
78 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 Such unfortunate beings, then, are idiots, not because they 
 are uneducated, but because their imbecihty unfits them to 
 receive education. It is difficult to conceive a well-organized 
 person long wandering about like a savage in our populous 
 countries without being discovered. Were such an individual, 
 however, to escape in infancy, and be afterwards discovered in 
 a forest, though he could not be acquainted with our manners, 
 and the sciences we teach, he would still manifest the essential 
 and characteristic faculties of the human kind, and would soon 
 imitate our customs and receive our instructions. The girl of 
 Champaigne proves this assertion. 
 
 Thus, education produces no faculty either in man or in 
 animals ; but let us not conclude that education is superfluous. 
 My ideas on education are published in a separate volume, 
 and I only remark here that it excites, exercises, deter- 
 mines the applica'tion, and prevents the abuses of the innate 
 faculties; and that on this account it is of the highest im- 
 portance. Mechanics and peasants, confined to their laborious 
 occupations, are frequently ignorant ; but many of them, with 
 a good education, might surpass thousands of those who have 
 enjoyed its advantages. 
 
 From the preceding considerations on external circumstances, 
 it results, that they either present opportunities which favour 
 the activity of the faculties, or excite and guide, but do not 
 in any wise produce them. 
 
 I shall now consider the share Nature has in originating the 
 powers of man and animals, in the following chapter. 
 
79 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 On the Innateness of the Mental Faculties, 
 
 The fundamental powers of the mind, as well as the organi- 
 zation, are given to man by Nature. The constancy of human 
 nature affords the first proof of this position. The human 
 kind, in as far as its history is known, has ever been the same, 
 not only as regards organic, but also as concerns animal life. 
 The skeletons of ancient mummies are the very same as those 
 of the men at the present day ; and all ages have exhibited 
 virtues and vices essentially similar. Thus, the special facul- 
 ties of man have ever been the same; the only difference 
 observable at different times, is, that they have been more or 
 less active, and variously modified in individuals. Here one 
 has unjustly seized a piece of ground, there a place of distinc- 
 tion ; here mistresses have been celebrated on an oaten-reed, 
 there on a harp ; conquerors in one quarter have been deco- 
 rated with feathers, in another with purple and crowns, and 
 so on ; these modifications are, however, all grounded upon 
 primitive faculties essentially the same. And man, though 
 endowed with proper and peculiar faculties, still receives them 
 from creation; the truly human nature is as determinate 
 as the nature of every other being. Though man compares 
 his sensations and ideas, inquires into the causes of phenomena, 
 draws consequences, discovers laws and general principles, 
 measures immense distances and times, and circumnavigates 
 the globe ; though he acknowledges culpability and worthiness. 
 
80 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 bears a monitor in his interior, and raises his mind to conceive 
 and to adore a God, — ^yet none of the faculties which cause 
 these acts results either from accidental external influences or 
 from his own will. How indeed could the Creator abandon and 
 give man up to chance in the noblest and most important of 
 all his doings ? Impossible ! Here, as in all besides, he has 
 prescribed laws to man, and guided his steps in a determinate 
 path. He has secured the continuance of the same essen- 
 tial faculties in the human kind, — ^faculties whose existence we 
 should never have conceived had nature not bestowed them 
 upon us. 
 
 The uniformity of the essential faculties of mankind, not- 
 withstanding the influence of society, climate, modes of living, 
 laws, religion, education, and fortuitous events, affords another 
 great proof that nothing can change the institutions of nature. 
 We everywhere find the same species ; whether man clothe 
 himself or go naked, fight with slings or artillery, stain his 
 skin, or powder his hair, dance to the sound of a drum or the 
 music of a concert, adore the sun, moon, and stars, or in his 
 religion be guided by Christian principles, his special faculties 
 are universally the same. 
 
 I have also spoken of genius, in order to prove that edu- 
 cation does not produce our faculties, and mentioned that 
 children often show peculiar faculties before they have re- 
 ceived any kind of instruction. External circumstances are 
 sometimes very unfavourable to the exhibition of genius ; but 
 gifted individuals do not always wait for opportunities, they 
 even make them, and leave parents, professions, and all be- 
 hind, to be at liberty to follow thefr natural inclinations. 
 
ORIGIN OP THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 81 
 
 Moses, David, Tamerlane, and Pope Sixtus the Fifth, were 
 shepherds ; Socrates, Pythagoras, Theophrastus, Demos- 
 thenes, Mohere, Rousseau, and a thousand others, who have 
 lived to adorn the world, were the sons of artificers. Geniuses 
 sometimes surmount great difficulties, and vanquish innume- 
 rable impediments before their character prevails, and they 
 assume their natural place. Such individuals, prevented by 
 circumstances from following their natural bent, still find their 
 favourite amusement in pursuing it. Hence peasants, shep- 
 herds, and artisans, have become astronomers, poets, and phi- 
 losophers ; and, on the other hand, kings, and prime ministers, 
 employed themselves in the mechanical arts ; all, indeed, unites 
 to prove the innateness of the primitive mental faculties. 
 
 Men of genius, however, have been said to form a particular 
 class, and to be incomparable with persons whose faculties are 
 of middling excellence. 
 
 This, however, is the same as saying that hunger and cir- 
 culation do not depend on organization, because all have not 
 immoderate appetite and fever ; or that the mole does not see 
 with its eyes, because the stag sees better ; or that man has 
 no smell, since the dog's is superior. But, if we admit that 
 organization causes the highest degree of activity of the dif- 
 ferent faculties, the lowest degree must also depend on it. 
 Moreover, the greatest genius in one particular is often very 
 weak in others. William Crotch, at six years of age, asto- 
 nished all who heard him by his musical talents ; but in every 
 other respect he was a child. Caesar could never have become 
 a Horace or a Virgil, nor Alexander a Homer. Newton 
 could not have been changed into so great a poet as he was an 
 
 a 
 
8^ !>HILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 astronomer ; nor Milton into so great an astronomer as he was 
 a poet. Nay, Michael Angelo could not have composed the 
 pictures of Raphael, or the contrary; nor Albano those of 
 Titian, and so on. 
 
 The mental faculties again must be innatcj since, although 
 essentially the same in both sexes, they present modifications 
 in each. Some are more energetic in Women, others in men. 
 The feelings are, in geneMl, stronger in womenj the intellec-^ 
 tUal faculties more active in men. These modifications inhere 
 naturally, and it is impossible to give to ohe sex the disposi- 
 tions of the other. 
 
 We may add, that in every nation, notwithstanding the 
 uniformity of its opinions, customs, prbfessiohg) afts^ Sciencesj 
 laws, religion, and all its positive institutionsj each individual 
 composing it differs from every other by sjome peculiarity of 
 character. Each has greater capacity and inclinktlbn in on6 thati 
 fai another direction, and even in childhood manifests his own 
 manner of thinking aiid feeling. Every one excuses his frail- 
 ties by saying, It is my nature ; it is strotigef thah I ; I 
 eannot help it, &c» Eveii brothers atid sfeters bfteii dltfer 
 extremely, though their education is unlfofm. The edMse of 
 difference, must, therefore, bfe interiial. 
 
 The innateness of the faculties must also be admitted, be- 
 cause there is a direct relation between their manifestations 
 and a certain organic apparatus. 
 
 Finally, if we believe that man is a being of creation, it is 
 only rational to suppose that his faculties are determinate arid 
 ordained. 1 consequently, with all these considerations in view, 
 contend for the innateness of every faculty of the mind. But 
 
ORIGIN OP THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 8S 
 
 here it is of importance to notice an observation of Locke upon 
 innateness. He, to shew that ideas are innate, stated that 
 children do not manifest certain qualities, and that different 
 nations have different, nay, opposite principles of morality. 
 This position, however, in relation to the innateness of ideas 
 and moral principles, must not be confounded with the innate- 
 ness of the faculties. No sensation, no idea, no principle, is 
 innate. Sensations and ideas of external objects follow from 
 external impressions, and these being accidental, ideas of them 
 cannot be innate ; but the faculties which perceive impres- 
 sions, and conceive ideas, are innate. Thus the idea of a 
 stone, plant, or animal, is not innate ; but these objects make 
 impressions on the senses, which produce sensations or ideas 
 in the mind, and both the senses and the mental faculties are 
 innate. In the same manner, sensations and ideas of external 
 and accidental events, and, in general^ determinate actions of 
 the faculties, are not innate. The propensity to love, and not 
 the object of love ; the faculty of speaking, not the peculiar 
 language; the faculty of comparing and judging, not the 
 determinate judgment ; the faculty of poetry, not the parti- 
 cular poem, &c., is innate. There is, therefore, a great differ- 
 ence between innate faculties and innate ideas and sensations. 
 
 It is also true that children do not manifest all the faculties, 
 but we cannot from this conclude that these are not innate. 
 Birds do not make nests, the hamster and marmot do not 
 collect provisions, the swallow does not migrate immediately 
 after birth ; neither do animals propagate, nor females give 
 suck, when they come into the world ; yet all these qualities 
 are innate. This difficulty is easily Explained. Every faculty 
 
 G 2 
 
84 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 has its own organ, in proportion to whose development are its 
 manifestations. Now in childhood several organs are very 
 little, and in adult age very greatly developed ; and while some 
 are proportionately larger in children than in the grown-up, 
 others are fully developed in both. The manifestations of 
 the faculties being, as I have stated, always proportionate to 
 the development and activity of their organs, it becomes evident 
 why some of them do not appear in infancy. 
 
 Why moral principles differ in different nations is also 
 obvious. I agree with Locke that they are not innate, but 
 maintain that the faculties which form them are. I shall 
 afterwards show that moral principles depend on several facul- 
 ties, and vary in nations in consequence of different combi- 
 nations of their organs ; the justice of a libertine without be- 
 nevolence and veneration must differ entirely from that of a 
 charitable, modest, and continent person. The same funda- 
 mental faculties exist everywhere, but their manifestations are 
 universally modified. Men everywhere adore a Supreme 
 Being ; they everywhere have marks of honour and of infamy ; 
 there are everywhere masters and servants ; all nations make 
 war, whether with clubs and arrows, or with muskets and 
 artillery ; and everywhere the dead are lamented, and their 
 remembrance cherished, whether it be by embalming their 
 bodies, by putting their ashes into an urn, or by depositing 
 their remains in the tomb. Hence, though the functions of 
 the faculties in general are modified in different nations, and 
 of those consequently wl^ch determine the moral principles 
 also, the same fundamental powers still appear in the cus- 
 toms, manners, and laws of all. 
 
 #» 
 
 u 
 
ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 85 
 
 An essential part of the study of man, therefore, is to 
 show that his nature is determinate, that all his faculties are 
 innate, and that nature's first prerogative is to maintain the 
 number and the essence of his special powers, whilst she per- 
 mits many modifications of the functions of all, in the same 
 way precisely as she preserves species, but continually sacri- 
 fices individuals. 
 
 The second right of nature is to allow more or less ac- 
 tivity to individual faculties in different persons ; that is, she 
 endows all with the same faculties, but gives them in very dif- \/ 
 ferent degrees. Some few are geniuses, but the majority are 
 middling in all respects. Nature then produces genius, and 
 the individual dispositions of every one. 
 
 Finally, nature has stamped a difference upon the sexes : \ 
 some faculties are more active in women, others in men. Men 
 will never feel like women, and women will never think like 
 men. 
 
 These are facts which observation proves. Philosophers, 
 therefore, can only examine how nature produces such phe- 
 nomena, and see whether it is possible to imitate and to assist 
 her. 
 
 Thus, the second principle of Phrenology— the faculties of 
 the mind are innate — is also indubitable. 
 
86 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 The Brain is indispensable to thfi MCi?iif ^stations of thff 
 affective and intellectual Faculties of Man. 
 
 After having seen what nature does in man, let us inquire 
 into the means by which she effects it. Religious people com- 
 monly believe in a mere supernatural dispensation of gifts ; 
 but there cannot be a doubt of natural causes also contributing 
 to produce the phenomena spoken of in the preceding section. 
 These are the organic conditions necessary to the manifesta- 
 tions of mind. 
 
 I m.ay follow the example of other natural philosophers, 
 and confine myself to proving a relation between the body and 
 the manifestations of the mind, or, I may endeavour to deter- 
 mine it exactly. This latter task has been accomplished in 
 my book entitled Phrenology . Here I shall only shew, in a 
 summary way, how reasoning coincides with observation. It 
 is important duly to appreciate my expressions upon this sub- 
 ject: I do not say that the organization produces the affec- 
 tive and intellectual faculties of man's mind, as a tree brings 
 forth fruit, or an animal procreates its kind ; I only say that 
 organic conditions are necessary to every manifestation of 
 mind. 
 
 I never venture beyond experience ; and therefore consider 
 the faculties of the mind only in as far as they become appa- 
 rent by the organization. Neither denying nor affirming any 
 thing which cannot be verified by experiment, I make no 
 
DEPENDENCE OP THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 87 
 
 researches on the lifeless body nor on the soul alone, but on 
 man as a living agent. I never question what the affective and 
 intellectual faculties may be in themselves, do not attempt to 
 explain how the body and soul are united and exercise a 
 mutual influence, nor examine what the soul can effect with- 
 out the body. The soul may be united to the body at the 
 moment of conception or afterwards ; it may be different in 
 every individual, or be jof the same kind in all ; it may be an 
 emanation from God, or something else. Whatever meta- 
 physicians and theologians may decide in regard to these 
 various points, the position, that manifestation of the faculties 
 of the mind depend, in this life, on organization, cannot be 
 shaken. Let us then consider the proofs which reasoning 
 affords of this third principle of Phrenology. 
 
 i. Difference of the Sexes. 
 
 The faculties of the mind are modified in the sexes : some 
 are more energetic in men, others in women. Do then the 
 souls of men and women differ, or is it more probable, that the 
 faculties are modified because their organs or instruments 
 vary ? I have already mentioned that Malebranche* ascribes 
 the different manners of thinking and feeling in the sexes, to 
 the difference of delicacy of the cerebral fibres, in the male 
 and female. Phrenology shews that certain parts of the brain 
 are more developed in men, others more in women ; and thus 
 renders the pecuHarities in the mental manifestations of each. 
 
 * T. i. .5me. Edit. p. 13o. 
 
88 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 easily explicable. There are, however, many instances in which 
 the intellectual faculties of women resemble those of men, and 
 the contrary. 
 
 ii. Individuality of every Person. 
 
 The mental faculties are modified in every individual. Now, 
 is it probable that the soul differs universally, or is it more 
 likely, that as the whole human kind has descended from an 
 original pair, all modifications of the faculties may be ex- 
 plained by differences in the organs on which each respectively 
 depends ? Like species of animals, and man also, have essen- 
 tially the same corporeal structure ; there is merely difference 
 of proportion and development in the various parts of which the 
 body is composed ; and these differences in the organs produce 
 corresponding varieties in the functions attached to them. 
 
 iii. Ages, 
 
 Mental manifestations are modified by age. Either the 
 soul, or its instruments, therefore, must produce these modified 
 manifestations. It is ascertained that certain faculties appear 
 early in life, or at a later period, according as the peculiar or- 
 gans of each are developed. 
 
 The same law holds in both affective and intellectual facul- 
 ties : the manifestations of all are not simultaneous. Several of 
 both orders appear in infancy, others not before maturer years ; 
 several, too, disappear earlier, whilst others endure till the end 
 of life. Now as we know that manifestations of the mental 
 powers always accord with certain organic conditions, it is 
 impossible to overlook their dependence on organization. 
 
DEPENDENCE OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 89 
 
 iv. Influence of Physical Conditions, 
 
 All that disorders, weakens, or excites the organization of 
 the nervous system, influences especially the manifestation of 
 the mental faculties also. It is generally observed that organs 
 are enfeebled if their growth be very rapid ; their functions 
 too, are, in consequence, less energetic. This is chiefly re- 
 markable in the climacteric years, or periods of increase ; a 
 knowledge of which is so very important in practical medicine. 
 Vegetables are known to increase particularly at two periods ; 
 in the spring, and in the middle of summer. The growth of 
 the human body is also more rapid at certain times than at 
 others. Now rapid growth weakens the organs, both of vege- 
 tative and animal life, and consequently the functions they 
 perform respectively. Girls who grow too suddenly turn 
 pale, chlorotic, and consumptive, &c. Individuals, therefore, 
 during the periods of growth, are not fit for active business, 
 and ought not to exercise their intellectual faculties much. 
 Rest is necessary till the organs acquire maturity, when all 
 the faculties of the mind and body will resume their energy. 
 Organs of particular faculties are occasionally too soon de- 
 veloped, and are then apt to be exercised overmuch. Incur- 
 able exhaustion often results from this, and early genius is 
 nipt in the bud. 
 
 Adult men and animals are still subjected to variable de- 
 grees of excitement from seasons, temperature, food, and 
 especially from particular laws to which the organization is 
 subjected. We see animals resume and abandon at different 
 periods, their instinct to sing, to biiild, to gather provisions, 
 to live solitarily or in society, to migrate, &;c. ; and the 
 
90 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 faculties of man do not always act with the same degree 
 of energy. Who can overlook the influence of such evacua- 
 tions as the catamena, hemorrhoids, &c. 5 or of pregnancy, 
 digestion, fasting, and whatever exhausts the corporeal powers ? 
 Who can deny the effects of disease upon the manifestation 
 of our faculties ; or of external and internal excitements, as 
 of agreeable impressions, fine weather, music, dancing, conver- 
 sation, &c. ? Now all these act upon the organization only ; 
 manifestation of the mental faculties consequently depends on 
 the organization. 
 
 Exceedingly defective mental powers have been known to 
 grow very active when excited by external or internal causes. 
 Haller relates the case of an idiot, who happening to be 
 wounded on the head, manifested great understanding so 
 long as the wound remained open, but who, as soon as this 
 healed up, fell into his former stupidity. He speaks of another 
 patient whose eye being inflamed, saw perfectly during the 
 night whilst the inflammation lasted. Father Mabillon, in 
 his infancy, gave little promise of superior abilities; but, 
 having received a blow on his head, he, from that moment, 
 displayed talents. I have heard of a boy who, at the age of 
 fourteen, seemed incapable of improvement ; having fallen down 
 stairs one day, however, and got several wounds in his head, 
 he afterwards began to excel in his studies. I have seen a 
 girl, nine years old, whose right arm grew gradually weak 
 and almost paralytic, in consequence of a blow on the same 
 side of the head ; her lower jaw trembled incessantly, and she 
 was often convulsed; but her intellectu^ faculties had ac- 
 quired great energy and perfection; her. whole deportment 
 indeed, was exceedingly imposing. I shall mention only one 
 
DEPENDENCE OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 91 
 
 other c$^ of thijs kind from the Edinburgh Kevjew ^, in an 
 artide upgn the Jietreat, an institution neai' York for insane 
 persons of the Society of Friend^ : '-A youi^' wopian, who 
 was employed as a domestic servant by the father of the re- 
 later when he was fi boy, becgime insane, ^nd, §it length, sunk 
 into a state pf perfect idiocy. In this condition she remained 
 for many years, when she was attacked by a typhus fever ; 
 and my friend, having then practised some time, attended her. 
 He was surprised to observe, as the fever advanced, a develop- 
 ment of the mental powers. During that period of the fever 
 when others are delirious, this patient was entirely rational. 
 She recognised, in the face of her medical attendant, the son 
 of her old master, whom she had known so many years be- 
 fore, and she related many circumstances respecting his family 
 and others, which had happened to herself in her earlier days. 
 But, alas ! it was only the gleam of reason ; as the fever 
 abated, clouds again enveloped the mind ; she sunk into her 
 former deplorable state, and remained in it until her death, 
 which happened a few years afterwards." These facts are 
 positive, and there can be no doubt of similar causes influ- 
 encing the faculties of the mind surprisingly ; yet they can 
 only act immediately upon the organization. We must per- 
 force conclude, that when physical and organic causes excite 
 the most impudent lasciviousness, the most arrogant pride, 
 despair which rejects all consolation, and so on, these various 
 manifestations depend on the organization. 
 
 V. Sleeping and Dreaming. 
 The states of watching, sleeping, and dreaming, also prove 
 * No. XLV. p. 1§7. 
 
92 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 the manifestations of the mind dependent on organization ; 
 for corporeal organs can alone be fatigued and exhausted. 
 Now it is known that mental operations cannot be continued 
 incessantly, that rest is indispensable, and that a regular re- 
 currence of that inactive state of the mental faculties called 
 sleep, is necessary to enable them to display their perfect 
 energies. 
 
 If single organs be by any cause excited, and enter into 
 action while the others are inactive, partial sensations and 
 ideas, or dreams^ arise. Dreams, then, are almost always the 
 result of certain material causes, and are conformable to the 
 age and organic constitution of the dreamer. Men and women 
 of an irritable habit of body, find difficulties and endless im- 
 pediments in their dreams, and generally suffer pain, and feel 
 anxiety and alarm. This constant relation between dreams 
 and bodily frame, which has been verified by an infinity of 
 observations, proves further that the mental manifestations 
 depend on organization. 
 
 vi. Exercise, 
 
 The possibiHty of exercising and of training the faculties of 
 the mind, also shews their dependence on the organization ; 
 for that an immaterial being can be exercised is inconceivable. 
 
 vii. Relation between the Brain and the manifestations of 
 
 the Mind. 
 
 The preceding arguments are founded on reasoning, 
 and prove that all manifestations of the mind depend on 
 organic conditions. In my physiological work on Phre- 
 
DEPENDENCE OP THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 93 
 
 nology, it is demonstrated that individual faculties manifest 
 themselves by means of particular cerebral parts, and that 
 the faculties appear, increase in strength, and diminish in 
 vigour, in proportion as the organs on which they depend are 
 developed, increase in size, and shrink again. The brain of 
 the new-born child scarcely shows any traces of fibres ; these 
 appear, become firmer by degrees, and attain perfection be- 
 tween the twentieth and fortieth year. As years accumulate, 
 its convolutions, which had been plump, become flabby, and 
 are less closely packed together. 
 
 In conformity with the state of the brain at birth, animal 
 life is confined to spontaneous motions, to the perception of 
 hunger and thirst, to some obscure sensation of pain and 
 pleasure, and to an imperfect state of the external senses. 
 By degrees the number and energy of the affective and intel- 
 lectual faculties augment, and the child begins to acquire know- 
 ledge and determinate ideas of external objects. Through the 
 periods of boyhood and adolescence the faculties gradually 
 gain strength ; and, in manhood, they at length manifest the 
 greatest degree of energy. From this state of perfection, 
 however, they soon begin to decline ; and, in extreme old age, 
 the propensities are blunted, the sentiments weakened, ana 
 the intellectual faculties almost or entirely annihilated. 
 
 If the organs of the faculties, however, do not follow the usual 
 order of increase, but be either precocious or tardy, their re- 
 spective functions are also manifested with corresponding varia- 
 tions. If the intellectual faculties are often more energetic 
 in rickety children than beseems their age, their brain will 
 also be found extraordinarily developed or irritable. Inde- 
 
94 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 pendently of all disease, however, particular portions of the 
 brain are occasionally developed at too early a period, and then 
 their functions likewise appear prematurely. 
 
 On the other hand, when parts of the brain or its whole 
 mass arrives very late at maturity, the inental imperfections of 
 childhood remain longer than usual, sometimes till about the 
 tenth or twelfth year, so that parents despair of the rationality 
 of their children. After this age, however, the cerebral organs 
 will often take on a particular growth, and the faculties then 
 appear with great vigour. One of the most distinguished phy- 
 sicians at fierlin, when ten years old, could not use his organs 
 of speech, and Gessner, at the same age, had made such slender 
 progress in his studies, that his preceptor declared him half an 
 idiot ; yet it is known how famous he became afterwards. 
 
 If the growth of the cerebral organs be incomplete, the 
 fadulties of the mind are equally defective. It is impossible to 
 determine with exactness the degree of organic development 
 necessary to the due manifestation of the mental powers ; for 
 this depends not on the size of the organs alone, but on their 
 peculiar constitution also. A very small braitt, however, is 
 always accompanied with imbecility. 
 
 Children have sometimes the same organic constitution of 
 brain as their parents, and then manifest precisely similar 
 affective and intellectual faculties. Characteristic forms of 
 head are often transmitted from generation to generation ; and 
 thus are mental faculties propagated in families during cen- 
 turies. It is an acknowledged fact that children who re- 
 semble each other or their parents, manifest similar faculties, 
 making allowances for difference of age and sex, I have seen 
 
DEPENDENCE OP THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 05 
 
 twin-boys so like each other that it was almost impossible to 
 distinguish them ; their inchnations and talents were also 
 strikingly similar. Two others, twin-sisters, are very dif- 
 ferent : the muscular system in the one being most developed, 
 the nervous in the other ; and while the first has little under- 
 standing, the second is eminently talented. 
 
 To conclude this point, I say, that as the peculiar organs of 
 the affective and intellectual faculties can positively be demon- 
 strated, it is impossible to deny their dependence on the orga- 
 nization. 
 
 The third principle of Phrenology, therefore, — the manifes- 
 tations of the affective and intellectual faculties depend on the 
 brjttn-4s also ascertained. 
 
96 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 The Moral Character of Man. 
 
 It is my intention to show that " there is a much more 
 exact correspondence between the natural and moral world than 
 we are apt to take notice of*"" ; and that truth and the know- 
 ledge of nature are neither dangerous nor in opposition to 
 morahty and true religion. It is proved by incontestible facts, 
 that the affective and intellectual faculties are inherent in the 
 nature of man, and that their manifestations depend on the cere- 
 bral organization ; but ignorance, and hypocrisy, and envy, have 
 taken part in the discussion. The basis of Phrenology is not 
 now attacked : it seems more convenient to blame its conse- 
 quences, and without knowing why or explaining how, to cry 
 out that it is dangerous. This, in all ages, has been the recep- 
 tion of every discovery. The disciples of the various philoso- 
 phical schools of Greece inveighed against each other, and 
 made reciprocal accusations of impiety and perjury. The 
 people, in their turn, detested the philosophers, and accused 
 those who investigated the causes of things of presumptuously 
 invading the rights of the Divinity. Pythagoras was driven 
 from Athens, and Anaxagoras was imprisoned, on account of 
 their novel opinions ; Democritus was treated as insane by the 
 Abderites, for his attempts to find out the cause of madness by 
 
 * BUhop Butler, Sermon vi. 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OP MAN. 97 
 
 dissections ; and Socrates, for having demonstrated the unity of 
 God, was forced to drink the juice of the hemlock. Several 
 of those who excelled in physics in the fourteenth century 
 were punished with death as sorcerers or magicians. Galileo, 
 when seventy years of age, was cast into prison for having 
 proved the motion of the earth. Vesalius, Varolius, and Har- 
 vey, were persecuted on account of their discoveries. Those 
 who first maintained the influence of climate upon the intellec- 
 tual faculties of man were suspected of materialism. The pious 
 philosopher Bonnet, Linnaeus, Buffon, the virtuous Lavater, 
 and many others, have been treated as materialists and fa- 
 talists. 
 
 The instances of Aristotle and Descartes may be quoted, to 
 show the good and bad fortune of new doctrines. The ancient 
 antagonists of Aristotle caused his books to be burned ; but in 
 the time of Francis I. the writings of Ramus against Aristotle 
 were similarly treated, his adversaries were declared heretics, 
 and under pain of being sent to the galleys, philosophers were 
 prohibited from combating his opinions. At the present day, 
 the philosophy of Aristotle is no longer spoken of. Descartes 
 was persecuted for teaching the doctrine of innate ideas ; he 
 was accused of atheism, though he had written on the existence 
 of God ; and his books were burnt by order of the university 
 of Paris. Shortly afterwards, however, the same learned body 
 adopted the doctrine of innate ideas, and when Locke and 
 Condillac attacked it, the cry of materialism and fatalism was 
 turned against them. Thus the same opinions have been con- 
 sidered at one time as dangerous because they were new, and at 
 
 H 
 
98 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 another as useful because they were ancient. What is to be 
 inferred from this, but that man deserves to be pitied ; that the 
 opinions of contemporaries on the truth or falsehood, the good 
 or bad consequences of a new doctrine are always to be sus- 
 pected ; and that the only object of an author ought to be to 
 point out the truth. Ancillon is therefore right in saying with 
 Bonnet: Reason does not know any useless or dangerous 
 truth. That which is, is. This is the proper answer for those 
 who, valuing things only by the advantage they themselves 
 may reap, are incessantly asking, Cui bono — what is this good 
 for ? and for those also who anxiously ask. To what does this 
 lead ? Jesus, the son of Sirach, long ago said, " We ought 
 not to demand what is this good for ; the usefulness of every 
 thing will be known in its due time." 
 
 Dr. Gall and I never doubted that ignorance and knavery 
 would attack our doctrine with abuse; what does not man 
 abuse ? Tell him that he ought to expiate his sins, and in his 
 superstition he will immolate his children. Have not Lucre- 
 tius and his disciples bent all their powers to prove, that belief 
 in the immortality of the soul inspires fear of death, and poisons 
 every enjoyment of life? while Christians consider it as the 
 basis of order, of happiness, of morality, and the chief and best 
 solace amid all the calamities that assail them. Establishments 
 for vaccination, and conductors for lightning upon buildings, 
 are, in the opinion of some, laudable and beneficial to humanity ; 
 but, in the eyes of others, they are offences against Divine 
 Providence. In one word, man finds some cause of complaint 
 in all ; but we may say with St. Bernard, " We ought to judge 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN. 09 
 
 differently the complaints of the ignorant and those of the hy- 
 pocritical. The former complain from ignorance, the latter 
 from mahce; the first because they do not know the truth, the 
 second because they hate it."" 
 
 Malebranche has very well painted the enemies of new 
 truths. " Persons of sohd and true piety," says he, " never 
 condemn what they do not understand ; but the ignorant, the 
 superstitious, and the hypocritical do. The superstitious by a 
 slavish fear are enraged when they see an ingenious and pene- 
 trating man. If he assign the natural causes of thunder and 
 its efibcts, they deem him an atheist. Hypocrites, on the con- 
 trary, though led by particular motives, make use of notions 
 generally venerated, and combat new truths under the mask of 
 some other truth ; sometimes they secretly deride what every 
 one respects, and produce in the minds of others a reputation 
 which is the more to be feared, in proportion as the things 
 which they abuse are more sacred.'** 
 
 Maintaining that the manifestations of the mind depend on 
 the brain, it is objected that Phrenology establishes materialism ; 
 and contending that all the faculties of man are inherent in his 
 nature, it is said that it leads to fatalism. I shall divide this 
 Section into three chapters. In the first, I shall answer the 
 objection on the score of Materialism ; in the second, on that 
 of Fatalism ; and in the third, I shall treat of Moral Liberty, 
 and of Morality in general. 
 
 H 2 
 
100 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 CHAPTER 1. 
 
 Materialism, 
 
 If the manifestation of the faculties of the mind depend on 
 the organization, materialism, it is said, will be established. 
 Materialism, let us set out by observing, is a word that has 
 two different significations. One class of materialists maintain 
 that there is no Creator ; that matter has always existed ; and 
 that all the phenomena of the world are effects of matter. The 
 ancient Romish church used materialism in this sense, and, at 
 the present day, the word is often taken as synonymous with 
 atheism. The position, that mental manifestations depend on 
 the organization, has nothing in common with this sort of 
 materialism. He who inquires into the laws of phenomena, 
 cannot be an atheist ; he cannot consider the admirable and 
 wise concatenation of all things in nature, and their mutual 
 relations, as existing without a primitive cause. He is obHged, 
 by the very laws of thought, to admit such a cause, — a su- 
 preme understanding, an all-wise Creator. 
 * Another kind of materialism is taught by those who admit a 
 Creator, but maintain that man does not consist of two different 
 entities — ^body and soul ; and that all phenomena, ordinarily 
 attributed to the soul, result only from forms and combinations 
 of matter. The soul, in their opinion, is a fluid of extreme 
 tenuity distributed over all things, and enhvening the whole or- 
 ganization. Neither has Phrenology any thing in common with 
 this opinion. Nor Dr. Gall nor myself have ever endeavoured 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN. 301 
 
 to explain final causes; we have always declared, that we 
 make no inquiry into the nature of the soul, nor into that of 
 the body ; that we are led solely by experiment. Now we 
 have seen that every faculty is manifested by means of the 
 organization. When our antagonists, however, maintain that 
 we are materialists, they ought to shew where we teach that 
 there is nothing but matter. The entire falsehood of the accu- 
 sation is made obvious by a review of the following consi- 
 derations : The expression organ designates an instrument by 
 means of which some faculty proclaims itself ; the muscles, for 
 example, are the organs of voluntary motion, but they are not 
 the moving power ; the eyes are the organ of sight, but they 
 are not the faculty of seeing. We separate the faculties of the 
 soul or of the mind from the organs, and consider the cerebral 
 parts as the instruments by means of which they manifest 
 themselves. Now, even the adversaries of Phrenology must, 
 to a certain extent, admit the dependence of the soul on the 
 body. In the very same passage in which Professor Walter of 
 Berlin imputes materialism to our physiology of the brain, he 
 says : " The brain of children is pulpy, and in decrepit old age 
 it is hard. It must have a certain degree of firmness and elas- 
 ticity, that the soul may manifest itself with great splendour. 
 But this consideration does not lead to materiahsm, it shows 
 only the mutual union of the body and soul." 
 
 We are therefore no more materialists than our predecessors, 
 whether anatomists, physiologists, or physicians, or the great 
 number of philosophers and moralists who have admitted the 
 dependence of the soul on the body. For the materialism is 
 essentially the same, whether the faculties of the mind be said 
 
10^ PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 to depend on the whole body, on the whole brain, or individual 
 powers on particular parts of the brain : the faculties still 
 depend on organization for their exhibition. 
 
 To show that all ancient and modern philosophers and the 
 fathers of the Christian church agree with us that the manifes- 
 tations of the mind depend on the body, I shall quote a few of 
 their opinions. Plato considered the body as a prison of the 
 soul. Seneca says : " Corpus hoc animi posna ac pondus 
 esty (Epist. 66.) The Cartesians, by their doctrine of the 
 tracts which they suppose in the brain, admit the influence of 
 organization on the intellectual operations. Malebranche, 
 when explaining the difference in the faculties of the sexes, and 
 the various and peculiar tastes of nations and individuals, by 
 the firmness and softness, dryness and moisture of the cerebral 
 fibres, remarks, that our time cannot be better employed than 
 in investigating the material causes of human phenomena. 
 Charles Bonnet said, " That mankind can only be known and 
 penetrated by their physical nature." St. Thomas* said, 
 " Though the spirit is no corporeal faculty, the spiritual func- 
 tions, as memory, imagination, cannot take place without the 
 bodily organization. Therefore, if the organs cannot exercise 
 their activity, the spiritual functions are disturbed. For the 
 same reason a happy organization of the human body is always 
 accompanied with excellent intellectual faculties." St. Grego- 
 rius Nyssenusf compared the body of man to a musical instru- 
 ment. " It sometimes happens," says he, " that excellent 
 musicians cannot show their talent because their instrument is 
 
 * Contra Gentiles, c 13. n. 9. f De hominis opificio, c. 1«. 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OP MAN. 103 
 
 in a bad state. It is the same with the functions of the soul ; 
 they are disturbed or suspended according to the changes 
 which take place in the organs ; for it is the nature of the 
 spirit, that it cannot exercise conveniently its functions but by 
 sound organs.'' St. Augustine*, St. Cyprian fj St. Ambrose J, 
 St. Chrysostom^, Eusebius, and many other religious and 
 profane writers, consider the body or even the brain, as the 
 instrument of the soul, and distinctly teach that the mind is 
 regulated to the state of the body. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Fatalism. 
 
 Objections are also taken to Phrenology on the score of its 
 tendency to fatalism. The exact meaning of this term must 
 be determined. Certain writers understand by fatalism, every 
 thing in the world and the world itself as existing by necessity ; 
 and all events as results of change, and not of supreme and 
 guiding intelligence. This fatalism involves atheism ; and is 
 evidently very different from a doctrine according to which 
 man has received faculties, and a determinate nature from 
 creation. 
 
 Another kind of fatalism teaches that all physical, intellec- 
 tual, and moral laws are created and fixed ; that there is no 
 
 * De lib. arbit, t De operibus Christi. 
 
 % De Offic. $ Homil. II. III. super Epist. ad Heb. 
 
104 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 liberty of action ; that man does good or evil according to his 
 faculties ; that he cannot* change his character ; that his actg 
 are irresistible ; consequently, that he cannot be rewarded or 
 punished for them. 
 
 Now we must here make an important distinction. It is 
 quite certain that the faculties of the mind are not equally dis- 
 tributed ; individuals are deaf, blind, stupid, idiotic, and intel- 
 hgent from birth. Bishop Butler* says, " If, in considering 
 our state of trial, we go on to observe how mankind behave 
 under it, we shall find that some have so little sense of it, that 
 they scarce look beyond the passing day ; they are so taken up 
 with present gratifications as to have in a manner no feeling of 
 consequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this 
 life, any more than to their happiness in another. Some ap- 
 pear to be blinded and deceived by inordinate passion in their 
 worldly concerns as well as in religion ; others are not deceived, 
 but, as it were, forcibly carried away by the little passions, 
 against their better judgment and feeble resolutions, too, of 
 acting better ; and there are men, and truly there are not a 
 few, who shamelessly avow, not their interest, but their mere 
 will and pleasure to be their law of life, and who, in open de- 
 fiance of every thing that is reasonable, will go on in a course of 
 vicious extravagance, foreseeing with no remorse and little fear 
 that it will be their temporal ruin ; and some of them under 
 the apprehension of the consequences of wickedness in another 
 state. And to speak in the most moderate way, human crea- 
 tures are not only continually liable to go wrong voluntarily, 
 
 * Analogy of Religion, p. 92. 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN. 105 
 
 but we see likewise that they often actually do so with respect 
 to their temporal interests as well as with respect to religion."" 
 Daily experience, indeed, shows, that in different persons the 
 various feelings of the mind are active in different degrees, and 
 hence these phenomena. 
 
 It is also certain that the faculties of mankind and the laws 
 of nature in general are fixed by creation. All the faculties are 
 given, and their laws are determinate in vegetative and in ani- 
 mal life. Who, for example, has called himself into being ? 
 Does it depend on the will of any one to be born in this or in 
 that country ? of these or those parents ? under this or that 
 system of government, or of rehgion ? Who has determined 
 his sex ? Who can say : I am the eldest or youngest because 
 it was my choice ? Who has chosen the circumstances sur- 
 rounded by which he sees the light, the capacities of teachers, 
 the mental frame of those about him from earliest infancy, and 
 the thousand other accidents that influence him through future 
 life ? The organs of vegetative life perform their determinate 
 functions without our will ; the liver can never perform diges- 
 tion ; the kidneys can never secrete bile ; what is poison can 
 never become wholesome aliment, and so on. It is the same 
 with animal life. The existence of the five external senses and 
 their laws are an effect of creation. It does not depend on our 
 will to have the power of seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, 
 and tasting ; we can never hear or see with our fingers, nor 
 smell with our lips, &c. It is impossible to see as red that 
 which is blue, or to see as great that which is small. The de- 
 terminateness of these faculties may doubtless be termed 
 fatalism. Dr. Gall and I, in the same manner, maintain, that 
 
1^ PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 all propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties, their 
 mutual influence, and their various relations to each other, are 
 innate, and determined by creation. There is, however, a 
 great difference between admitting the innateness of faculties 
 and irresistibility of actions. The faculties are given, and 
 without them no action is possible ; but have w*e, therefore, no 
 liberty ? Are the actions of man and animals necessarily irre- 
 sistible ? 
 
 Neither in animals nor in the human kind are all the facul- 
 ties active at the same moment and irresistible. It often hap- 
 pens, that one acts whilst the others are quiescent ; and that 
 one deed rather than another is done. If this were not so, it 
 would be the height of cruelty to punish animals to prevent 
 peculiar actions. If a dog be punished for having eaten under 
 certain circumstances, do we not see, that though hungry, he 
 will not touch a bit under the same on another occasion ? And 
 is it not precisely thus with man ? He has a great number of 
 faculties ; are they always active, are they irresistible ? We 
 can walk, dance, and sing, but are we forced to do so ? Who 
 does not often feel within himself a wish for something, or an 
 inclination to do some act, which he combats by other motives ? 
 Indubitably, then, neither animals nor man are irresistibly 
 forced to act. 
 
 The faculties which constitute, and the motives which deter- 
 mine the will, it is true, are given and innate. And fatahsm, 
 in this sense, must be admitted not only in man, but even in 
 the Supreme Being ; for perfection and infinite goodness inhere 
 in the nature of God, and he cannot desire evil. So also the 
 superior faculties of man's nature, called his divine part, must 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN. 107 
 
 desire the true good of all. Hence a certain fatalism is founded 
 in nature ; and therefore the philosophers of China, Hindostan, 
 and Greece, the eastern and western Christians, and the followers 
 of Mahomet, have blended it with their religious opinions. 
 Indeed, it cannot be dangerous to insist on such a fatalism in 
 so far as it exists. Christ, his apostles, and the fathers of the 
 church have done so. A proverb of Solomon is, " The Lord 
 gives wisdom;'** — according to Christianity, " The tree is 
 known by its fruit* ;" — St. Paul says, " And we know that 
 all things work together for good to them that love God, to 
 them who are the called according to his purpose. For whom 
 he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to 
 the image of his Son ; that he might be the first-born among 
 many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them 
 he also called : and whom he called, them he also justified : 
 and whom he justified, them he also glorified -f-."" — And again: 
 " Who maketh thee to differ from another ? and what hast 
 thou that thou didst not receive^.?" St. Augustine taught 
 openly and distinctly our dependance on God, and commanded 
 the preaching of this truth. '■'As no one," says he, " can 
 give to himself life, so nobody can give to himself understand- 
 ing §." He calls gifts of God, all good quaUties, as the fear of 
 God, charity, faith, obedience, justice, veracity. — He says ||, 
 that God has not distributed in an equal manner noble senti- 
 ments any more than temporal good, as health, strength, 
 riches, honours, the gifts of arts and sciences. It is positive, 
 then, that the faculties are innate ; but I must also say with 
 
 ♦ Matt. xii. 33. t Rom. viii. 28—30. % 1 Cor. iv. 7. 
 
 $ Lib. de Fide, c. 1. |j Lib. de Coreptione et Gratia. 
 
108 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 St. Augustine'^, " God in giving the power does not inflict 
 the necessity." Thus, I do not see that admission of the 
 innateness of the faculties impHes irresistibihty of action ; nor 
 do I fear any physical truth as dangerous. The whole 
 constitution of man is determined by creation ; but this axiom 
 does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and action 
 from certain principles and to certain ends ; because all this is 
 matter of experience universally acknowledged, and is that of 
 which every man must every moment be conscious. I recog- 
 nise one sole Creator, who has rendered physical and moral 
 truths universally consistent. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Liberty, 
 
 Being free is the reverse of being forced; liberty is the 
 opposite of irresistibility. As Dr. Gall and I maintain that all 
 faculties are innate, our adversaries object that all actions must 
 therefore be unavoidable, necessary, and irresistible. I have 
 already said, that with St. Augustine we think, that God, in 
 giving power, (faculty) does not impose necessity. Let us then 
 ask in what liberty consists, and what faculties produce it.? 
 Some philosophers attribute unbounded liberty to man ; 
 according to them he creates, so to say, his own nature ; he is 
 
 * Lib. de Litera et Spiritu, c. 31. 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OP MAN. 109 
 
 independent of every natural law, and his will is the sole cause 
 of his actions. Such liberty in a created being is contradictory ; 
 hence all that can be said in favour of it must be destitute of 
 signification. 
 
 Others maintain that the liberty of man is absolute, and that 
 he acts without any motive. This is the same as saying, there 
 is an effect without a cause ; and such an assertion is against 
 the law of understanding. Moreover, liberty without motives 
 would be contradictory in itself; for one would act reasonably 
 or unreasonably, justly or unjustly, well or ill, and always 
 without any motive. Finally, in this supposition, all institu- 
 tions which implicate the happiness of mankind would be use- 
 less. Education, morality, religion, punishment, and reward, 
 would all be inefficient, man being determined by no motive. 
 And we might expect from every one hatred and perfidy as 
 well as friendship and fidelity, virtue as well as vice. Such 
 notions of liberty are merely speculative. We can admit that 
 liberty alone which harmonizes with the general laws of nature, 
 and with the constitution of humanity. If we admit that 
 man acts by motives, he, like the rest of nature, will then be 
 subjected to the law of cause and effect. This kind of liberty 
 alone has been professed by ancient philosophers and legislators, 
 and supposed by morality and religion, which furnish powerful 
 and noble motives to direct man in his actions. Liberty con^ 
 sists in the 'possibility of doing or of not doing any thing, 
 and in the faculty of knowing motives and of determining 
 one's-self according to them. Three things then must be 
 considered in liberty ; Will, the plurality of motives, and the 
 influence of the will upon actions. 
 
ilH PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 The first object to be considered is that in which Will con- 
 sists. Many authors confound it with the propensities, inclina- 
 tions, or concupiscences, and deny the existence of free-will. 
 Internal satisfaction and free-will are, indeed, very different 
 things. Satisfaction accompanies the fulfilling of every desire. 
 The sheep and tiger do not act freely because they are pleased, 
 the one with grazing, and the other with tearing his prey in 
 pieces. Each faculty of animal life being active, gives a desire 
 or an inclination which man and animals experience involun- 
 tarily. They are forced to feel hunger if the nerves of the 
 stomach act in a certain manner ; they must see if the light 
 strikes the retina of their eyes, &c. Man, then, has neither any 
 power upon accidental external impressions, nor over the ex- 
 istence of internal feelings. He must feel an inclination if its 
 appropriate organ be excited ; and not master of this, he can- 
 not be answerable for it. But inclinations, propensities, or 
 desires, are not will, because man and animals often have these, 
 and yet will not. A hungry dog, for example, which has 
 been beaten, occasionally refuses the food offered to him ; — ^he 
 is hungry, he wants, but wills not to eat. — It is the same with 
 man. How often are we all obliged to act against our inclina- 
 tions ? Thus, experience proves not only that the faculties 
 do not act irresistibly either in man or in animals, or, in other 
 words, that there exists liberty or freedom^ but also that incli- 
 nations are not yet loill. Freedom, however, presupposes 
 will. How then is will originated ? 
 
 To have will, to decide /br or against ^ I must evidently know 
 what is to happen or has passed ; I must compare : hence, will 
 begins with the perceptive and reflective faculties, i. e, with un- 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OP MAN. Ill 
 
 derstanding ; the will of every animal is therefore proportionate 
 to its understanding. Man has the greatest freedom, because 
 his will has the widest range ; and this because he has the most 
 understanding. He knows more than any animal ; compares 
 the present with the past ; foresees future events ; and discovers 
 the relation between cause and effect. It is even to be ob- 
 served that not only willf but also our participation and ac- 
 countableness, begin with the perceptive faculties. Idiots have 
 sometimes inchnations, but they are neither free nor answer- 
 able. It is the same with children before a certain age ; they 
 are said not to be capable of distinguishing good from evil. A 
 man of great understanding and good education is also more 
 blameable for a fault than an uncultivated and stupid indi- 
 vidual. 
 
 The faculties that will^ however, are not given up to chance, 
 but subjected to certain rules ; for the laws of the understand- 
 ing are as determinate by creation as are those of nutrition. 
 Man cannot will any thing which does not seem good to him. 
 
 The first condition to freedom is will, an effect of knowledge 
 and reflection ; the second concerns what is to be known and 
 compared, viz. motives. Will is the decision of the understand- 
 ing, but is adopted according to motives. These result princi- 
 pally from the propensities and sentiments, and sometimes from 
 the perceptive faculties ; hence they are as numerous and 
 energetic as these, and the animal which has many and powerful 
 faculties, has many and vigorous motives, and freedom in pro- 
 portion. The plurality of motives, then, is the second condition 
 to liberty. An animal endowed with only one faculty could 
 
113 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 act but in one way, and cease from action only when this became 
 inactive. If, on the contrary, it were endowed with several 
 faculties, it would be susceptible of different motives, and a 
 choice would become possible. Yet a plurahty of motives is 
 not alone sufficient to freedom of action ; for, in that case, the 
 stronger faculty would occasion the deed. If you offer food to a 
 hungry dog, and at the same moment make a hare run before 
 him, he will eat, or follow the hare, according to his strongest 
 propensity. This is not freedom ; the strongest propensity 
 only prevails. If, on the contrary, the dog, endowed with the 
 faculty of knowing and comparing, has been punished for 
 following hares, he may tremble and have palpitations without 
 pursuing; he chooses between different motives, he desires, 
 but he remembers the chastisement, and he will not. Thus 
 liberty is founded on will and a plurahty of motives. It, how- 
 ever, demands still a third condition, viz,^ the influence of the 
 will upon actions. 
 
 In cases of disease, it sometimes happens that different mo- 
 tives are known, and that the will has no influence upon actions. 
 It is remarkable, too, that the will may put certain faculties 
 into action, while others are abstracted from its influence. It 
 cannot excite the affective faculties, nor prevent their activity, 
 and therefore we are not answerable for our feelings ; but it 
 has greater power on the intellectual faculties, and can repro- 
 duce their actions in thinking of their functions. It also in- 
 fluences the external senses by means of voluntary motion, and 
 thus has power over the instruments of action. This is the 
 reason why man is accountable for actions proceeding from 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN. 113 
 
 feelings, though these themselves ai'e involuntary. As soon as 
 voluntary motion is withdrawn from the government of the 
 will, liberty, responsibility, and guilt, are no more. 
 
 Thus true liberty is founded on three conditions united, 
 and ceases as soon as any one of them is wanting. Such li- 
 berty, however, has not yet a moral character, for many ani- 
 mals exhibit it in different degrees. We must, consequently, 
 examine where the morality of actions begins. 
 
 Moral Liberty, 
 
 Whatever may be said against the plurality of the faculties 
 and their peculiar organs, they nmst be admitted. Both 
 vegetative and animal hfe is, in fact, more or less compli- 
 cated in the different orders of animals. The vegetative is 
 exceedingly simple in the lowest tribes of all. Nutrition is 
 limited to mere intussusception, absorption, and assimilation. 
 It becomes comphcated by degrees, and in the mammalia in- 
 cludes mastication, deglutition, digestion, chylification, san- 
 guification, respiration, circulation, assimilation, and a great 
 number of secondary and auxiliary functions, as the secretion 
 of bile, of pancreatic juice, of urine, &c. Even the particular 
 functions which aid in reproducing the organization, as intus- 
 susception, digestion, respiration, circulation, &c., are per- 
 formed by a greater or less quantity of apparatus. Yet in the 
 most complex, as in the most simple animals, the end is the 
 same, viz., the preservation of the individual. 
 
 Animal life is also very simple in the most inferior classes 
 of living beings. It begins with the sense of feeling, is com- 
 
 I 
 
114 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 plicated by tlie addition of taste, smell, hearing, and seeing ; 
 by various instincts or propensities, sentiments, and intellectual 
 faculties ; and, finally, attains its utmost complexity in man. 
 He alone unites all the faculties which are dispersed among 
 dilFerent animals; and, further, is endowed with several in 
 peculiar. The faculties of man, then, are multiplied. Let us 
 now examine whether there be any subordination among them 
 or not; — let us see if they be all equally important. Neither in 
 vegetative nor in animal life is every function of like excel- 
 lence. Mastication, and the mixture of saliva with the food, 
 are less important than digestion, circulation, and assimilation. 
 The secretion of certain glands is less necessary than respi- 
 ration, &c. The same law holds in animal Hfe. Of the ex- 
 ternal senses, every one would rather lose the sense of smell 
 than of sight. Who would not rather give up some talent, 
 as drawing, music, painting, than the faculty of reflection and 
 reason ? Every one is offended if we call him stupid ; not if 
 we say that he wants such or such a talent. If we further 
 examine the influence of different faculties of animal life upon 
 the happiness and preservation of mankind, we shall be con- 
 vinced that several are much more important than others. The 
 love of approbation is of far less consequence than benevolence ; 
 the Christian rehgion, indeed, ranks charity above all the other 
 virtues. It must, therefore, be granted that the faculties of 
 anhnal life are important in different degrees. A great line of 
 distinction between them may at once be drawn by separating 
 such as are common to animals and man, from such as are 
 proper to man. A double nature of man was long ago re- 
 marked, and has been designated by different expressions ; as 
 
IP 
 
 THE MORAL CHARACTER OP MAN. 115 
 
 the flesh and the spirit ; the animal and the man, or the carnal 
 and spiritual part of man. 
 
 Now, whether are the faculties common to animals and man, 
 or those proper to humanity, to have the superiority ? The 
 answer is obvious. The general law of nature is, that inferior 
 are subordinate to superior faculties. Physical are subject to 
 chemical laws ; gravity, for instance, is modified by chemical 
 affinity: the particles of a salt attract each other in op- 
 position to their gravity, and form crystals. Again, phy- 
 sical and chemical laws, though existing in organic beings, 
 are modified by those of organization. Plants do not in- 
 crease by juxtaposition ; nor do they assimilate mere homo- 
 geneous substances. In the muscular and circulatory systems, 
 the physical laws of motion and hydraulics are preserved, but 
 they are influenced by the laws of life. Chemical laws remain 
 in digestion, but swayed by organic laws. Physical, chemical, 
 and vegetative laws exist in living creatures, but modified by 
 those of phrenomatic life. Animals take food, so do plants ; 
 but animals choose it, guided by the sense of taste. Plants 
 propagate their species automatically ; animals feel a propensity 
 to do so. The propensities, sentiments, and intellectual facul- 
 ties of animals, consequently modify the properties of their 
 organization extremely. 
 
 The same principle must be applied in regard to the dis- 
 tinguishing part of human nature : all inferior laws, physical, 
 chemical, organic, and animal, are subordinate to those of the 
 peculiarly human faculties. These, therefore, compose the 
 moral character of man. Thus, as the faculties are not equally 
 important, and as some must be subordinate to others, I divide 
 them, in relation to actions, into three orders : one excites man 
 
 I 2 
 
I16C PHILOSOPIIV OP THE MIND. 
 
 and animals to determinate actions, as hunger, physical love, 
 the propensity to fight, to build, to gather provision, &c. ; 
 I style these faculties of action ; another, because they assist 
 and modify those of the first kind, I call auxiliary ; and ano- 
 ther, which ought to direct, I term directing faculties. 
 
 The faculties proper to man are obviously superior to those 
 common to him and animals, since, by means of his pecuhar 
 nature he is master of all that breathes, and, therefore, ought 
 to be master of his own animal nature also. I, consequently, 
 iay down the following principle : — The faculties proper to 
 man constitute his moral nature and his absolute conscience, 
 that is, all actions conformable to them are absolutely good. 
 And now, moral liberty appears, or liberty assumes a moral 
 character, if the will produce actions flowing from motives 
 which are proper to man. Man, then, has not only the largest 
 share of liberty, from his superior will and great number of 
 motives, but he alone possesses moral liberty. The feehng of 
 conscientiousness is to morality, that which will or the perceptive 
 and reflective faculties are to liberty. As long as actions 
 spring from motives common to man and animals, they are 
 not primitively moral, though they may be conformable to 
 morality. Inferior motives, however, must still be employed 
 in guiding mankind, and must frequently supply the place of 
 such as are moral. Purely moral motives have, unfortunately, 
 but little influence in the world. 
 
 From what I have said on moral liberty, it follows that 
 there is no accountableness without liberty, that liberty begins 
 with the understanding, or with the faculties which know and 
 choose among motives, that man has the greatest liberty of 
 any being, and alone has moral liberty. 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN. 117 
 
 Of Morality. 
 
 The natural law of the subordination of the faculties leads 
 us immediately to take a view of the morality of our actions, 
 or to consider moral good and moral evil. The first step will 
 l)e to inquire whether evil exists or not. Having settled this 
 point, I shall then discuss its nature and examine its origin. 
 
 Two kinds of evil are commonly spoken of; the one 
 physical, the other moral. There is an evident opposition 
 throughout all nature. Earth, water, and air, present a 
 perpetual scene of destruction and reproduction, of pain and 
 pleasure. And even as temporal good is often distributed 
 unequally and without personal desert, so physical evil is 
 frequently inflicted without any fault on the part of the 
 sufferer, and this both among animals and the human kind. 
 Why should domestic animals so often be ill fed and harshly 
 treated in reward for their services ? Why should all suffer by 
 contagious diseases ? Wherefore must the children begotten in 
 debauchery, expiate the sins of their parents ? Why, when 
 the hail-storm ravages the wide-spread harvest of the indolent 
 and rich man, does it not spare the little garden of the labo- 
 rious poor? Such melancholy queries have been put at all 
 times. The preacher says, " There is a just man that pe- 
 risheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that 
 prolongeth his life in his wickedness*." *' All things," says 
 he, " come alike to all : there is one event to the righteous 
 and to the wicked ; to the good, and to the clean, and to the 
 
 * Eccles. vii. 15." 
 
118 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth 
 not : as is the good, so is the sinner ; and he that sweareth, 
 as he that feareth an oath. This is an evil among all things 
 that are done under the sun, that there is one event unto all ; 
 yea, also the heart of the sons of men is full of evil, and 
 madness is in their heart while they live, and after that they 
 go to the dead*." In another passage he continues ; ^* I re- 
 turned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the 
 swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the 
 wise^ nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour 
 to men of skill : but time and chance happeneth to them allf." 
 Physical evil, indeed, does not merely exist, it even invades 
 all according to the established laws of creation. 
 
 Moral, no less than physical evil, occurs in the world. Even 
 in thinking himself abased by his wickedness and imperfection, 
 man must acknowledge its existence. Moses said, " God saw 
 that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that 
 every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil 
 continually J." David thought, that "there is none that 
 doeth good, no not oneg." Christ taught, that " out of 
 the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornica^ 
 tions, thefts, false witnessing, blasphemies ||." St. Paul speaks 
 of men being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, 
 wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness, envy, murder, debate, 
 deceit, malignity; and of whisperers, backbiters, haters of 
 Ood, despiteful, proud, boastful, inventors of evil things, dis- 
 
 * Eccles. ix. 2, 3. t Eccles. ix. 11, 12. % Gen. vi. 5. 
 
 § Ps. xiv. 3, Ij Matt, xv. 19, 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN. 119 
 
 obedient to parents, without understanding, covenant breakers, 
 without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful ; who know- 
 ing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things 
 are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure 
 in them that do them. Moral, as well as physical evil, then, 
 has always existed, and the time when it will be rooted out 
 seems yet to be far off. 
 
 Let us now examine the nature of moral evil. Some actions 
 in the Christian doctrine are styled good, and others bad or 
 sinful ; and whilst the first are commanded, the last are for- 
 bidden. Good actions are further stated to be done after the 
 spirit, and sins after the flesh, though the flesh is allowed not 
 to be evil in itself. If actions, however, be not specified, 
 how can we know which are good and which are bad ? Is there 
 no standard according to which they may be judged uni- 
 versally ? 
 
 In every branch of natural science, positive and exact know- 
 ledge is sought after. I think that the same ought to be done 
 in regard to the moral nature of man. Mere faith will no 
 longer suffice, the reign of positive truth should begin. The 
 moral nature of man ought to be examined with observation as 
 a guide, and reduced to principles capable of general appli- 
 cation. Invention cannot now be permitted, and arbitrary 
 interpretations must give place to invariable laws ; actions, 
 done in conformity with which will be declared as good, and 
 not in conformity, as bad. 
 
 It is of the highest importance to be convinced that human 
 nature is governed by moral laws, very different from super- 
 stitions and prejudices. The nature" of every bdng is regu- 
 
1'^ PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 lated by laws ; the human body is so evidently. The child 
 born of disorderly parents suffers for their faults ; and, as 
 the laws of organization cannot be changed, we may, from 
 analogy, conclude, that the moral nature of man is not left to 
 the guidance of chance. But in what do the moral laws 
 consist, or how are they to be determined? shall it be by 
 force, by a majority of votes, or are they to be sought for 
 ^mong the works of the Creator ? 
 
 I have already stated that, in my opinion, the faculties 
 proper to man (though not all equally important), constitute his 
 moral nature. This is the basis, — what then is the aim of 
 natural morality ? Man alone raises his mind to a Creator, 
 Conceives relations between himself and the Deity, and con- 
 siders his actions in the point of duty. The superior fa- 
 culties, from which these results flow, reveal the existence and 
 the necessity of moral laws. These may, therefore, be divided 
 into two orders ; one concerns our relationship with God, 
 and another regulates our conduct towards ourselves, our 
 fellow men, and the other beings of creation. The first are 
 Irehgious, the second moral. It is understood that I speak 
 neither of positive religious creeds, nor of positive civil 
 legislative codes, but solely of natural religion and natural 
 morality. 
 
 Dr. Gall admits a fundamental faculty of God and religion. 
 In my opinion, the faculty of causality searches for a cause of 
 every thing, and of every event. Individuality personifies the 
 Supreme cause it arrives at ; another faculty inspires admi- 
 ration and wonder; and another induces respect and veneration. 
 Kehgion is founded on these faculties, and is strengthened by 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN, 121 
 
 those of hope, conscientiousness, and circumspection. More- 
 over, the religion which promises most, and flatters the feel- 
 ings of man to the greatest amount, will be apt to be the most 
 readily admitted. 
 
 Natural religion, as well as all the systems which have 
 been announced as revealed, is destined to make us ac- 
 quainted with our duties to God, or with what we must do to 
 render ourselves agreeable to him. Now reason tells us, that 
 the Supreme Being is all perfection, and can neither gain nor 
 lose in felicity by the terrestrial creation. If his happiness 
 depended on his creatures, on their respect to him or on their 
 regulations, his nature were imperfect. " The giving glory to 
 God,"" says Bishop Taylor*, " and doing homage to him, are 
 nothing for his advantage, but only for our's ; and God created 
 us, not that we can increase his felicity, but that he might 
 have a subject receptive of felicity from him." It seems, on the 
 other hand, reasonable to admit that all sentient beings have 
 been created for their own happiness, and that to secure this 
 the Creator has traced them determinate laws. The end of 
 natural religion, then, is an entire submission to the Will of the 
 Creator, be it accomplished by love or by fear ; " For this is 
 the love of God," says St. Johnf? " that we keep his com- 
 mandments." We may suppose that he prefers the motive 
 of love to that of fear, which, however, is also reasonable, 
 since he makes no exceptions, but applies his laws inva- 
 riably. Thus, if we can do nothing for the sake of God, 
 nothing to promote his happiness, it follows that all our 
 
 ♦ Sermon xii. t Firbt Epistle, v. 3. 
 
122 PHILOSOPHY OF .THE MIND. 
 
 doings concern ourselves, our like, and the other beings of 
 creation, or that in this life religion consists in morality. All 
 religious regulations, therefore, are only auxiliary means of 
 rendering mankind morally good. Hence it is presumptuous 
 and pitiful to perform ceremonies by way of rendering ser\dce 
 to God. The ceremonies destined to glorify God are often 
 ridiculous, and rather calculated to amuse children than to 
 edify reasonable beings. Their aim, which may be laudable 
 and respectable, ought never to be disguised, nor obscured 
 by absurdities or immoral proceedings. It is edifying to 
 assemble and to sing together the greatness of God's perfect 
 tions, but it is ridiculous to attribute to him qualities for 
 which we despise each other in society ; let us reflect on the 
 benevolence and justice of the Supreme being, but let us not 
 debase him by low passions; particularly, let us never lose sight 
 of the principal object of religion, viz., the moral improvement 
 of man. In regard to morality, the first question concerns its 
 extent. Is man the only aim of the terrestrial creation, that is, 
 is all the rest made for his sake ? An affirmative answer can 
 only be the result of too much self-esteem; the contrary 
 appears evident, since nature produces poisons for man as well 
 as for other animals. Geology also proves that many beings 
 existed before man. It is, however, a natural law that 
 superior employ inferior beings to their advantage, and, in 
 consequence of his superiority, man, as he is their master, 
 may make use of all the other creatures upon earth. Still 
 this does not prove that every thing exists merely for the sake 
 of man. The human kind may govern all animals, but it has 
 also certain duties towards them, and I cannot believe that 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN. 123 
 
 man has any right to torment animals for his gratification or 
 amusement. 
 
 Man's duties towards his Uke form the principal object of 
 morality. We must, therefore, examine the destination of 
 man. It is commonly stated that he is created to be happy. 
 This proposition, however, is vague, and individual happiness 
 is too often confounded with the general weal : the former 
 results from the satisfaction of the faculties each person is 
 more particularly endowed with, but it varies, since individual 
 gifts differ widely ; hence it can never become the universal 
 standard of moral actions : actions which are evidently bad 
 may be accompanied with pleasure. Mere pleasure, there- 
 fore, is not the aim of man's existence any more than indi- 
 vidual happiness ; these, indeed, are synonymous expressions. 
 
 I am of opinion, that the Creator vicAved general happiness 
 as superior to that of individuals, and that he intended to 
 produce the second by the first. All nature seems to prove 
 this idea. In considering the immense system of the celestial 
 bodies, it is probable that the earth might rather perish than 
 the universe be destroyed. Geology teaches that our globe 
 has continued to exist while many kinds of animals have dis- 
 appeared from its surface. Species are preserved while indi- 
 viduals die. The totality of living bodies exists, but particular 
 parts perish. Again, nature has established a law of violent 
 death, and of the sacrifice of individuals, for the sake of 
 general preservation. All animate beings exist at the expense 
 of each other, and all are thereby preserved. 
 
 Man makes no exception from this general arrangement, 
 and it is, therefore, quite certain that the happiness of all man- 
 
l^ls PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 kind is preferable to that of nations ; this to that of famiUes, 
 and this again to that of individuals. Personal interests, it is 
 allowed, must be neglected sooner than those of our country, 
 or than family affections. But the same reasons that lead to 
 this conclusion, prove also that the species is more worthy of 
 our love than our native country. 
 
 The superiority of general happiness is also confirmed by 
 the essential difference of the two natures of man. The 
 greater number of animals find their enjoyments in selfishness ; 
 some, however, live in society, are attached to each other, 
 and feel a kind of love for the country of their birth ; but 
 man alone is susceptible of exercising good- will towards the 
 whole of his own species, and every other being of creation. 
 I am confirmed in my opinion, that general happiness is the 
 aim of man's existence, since I see the truth of what afflicts 
 many amiable minds, that the just perishes in his righteous- 
 ness, while the unjust prospers in his wickedness. This hap- 
 pens under the government of the animal nature, which feels 
 no pleasure in general happiness, nor pain in the commis- 
 sion of injustice. It shows the predominance of the animal 
 nature, then, but is it not probable that the Creator intended 
 the satisfaction of those faculties which are proper to man as 
 well as of those he holds in common with the brutes ? There 
 can be no doubt he did. I think that both natures are to be 
 gratified, that no faculty is made in vain, and that all that 
 stamps superiority upon man is not merely bestowed to make 
 him unhappy. Now, as the more noble powers are not sa- 
 tisfied in the actual state of things, religious people hope 
 that they will be ininistcrcd to in another life, find this is co^- 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OP MAN. 125 
 
 sidered as a conclusive argument in favour of the immortality 
 of the soul. As the peculiarly human nature, however, is 
 preferable to the animal, it must follow that even in this life, 
 its satisfaction is superior to that of the other. I entertain 
 this opinion the rather because the animal part may be satisfied 
 under the dominion of the human, which leads to the recog- 
 nition of duty universally; while the brute nature has no 
 feelings of obligation, and looks for mere selfish enjoyments 
 only. 
 
 Thus, I do not believe that in the eye of God, the unjust 
 who thrives is worth the just who perishes; I rank the un- 
 just among animals ; like them he is pleased with what flatters 
 himself alone ; he is even more dangerous than they, on ac- 
 count of his superior understanding. 
 
 The proposition (it is one which troubles many minds) — 
 moral errors are unavoidably punished in this life — ^finds its so- 
 lution also, in the superiority of general happiness. The strong 
 and able-bodied man may not seem to suffer from excesses 
 and sensuality; but his descendants have often to pay the 
 penalty. The love of domination is ministered to by the ig- 
 norance and servility of nations ; these, however, must bear its 
 blighting influence. He who begins by subjecting his coun- 
 trymen to his will, and finishes by aiming at the empire of 
 the world, must injure, and make thousands and millions 
 wretched. The few who amass riches do so at the expense 
 of the many who remain poor, and so on. Thus the evil 
 which results from any infraction of the natural laws, is not 
 always felt by him who is its first cause ; it is, however, cer- 
 tainly experienced sooner or later 
 
1^6 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 Finally, as I perceive that, in the kingdom of justice, and 
 of general happiness, the individual is never forgotten, whilst 
 individuals enjoying happiness so easily forget their neigh- 
 bours, and the general weal, I most anxiously wish the king- 
 dom of individual happiness at an end. 
 
 Thus, general happiness appears to me the principal aim of 
 animal life, as the preservation of the species is the chief end 
 of vegetative life. General happiness is the touch-stone for 
 all natural morality, for all social institutions, and for all the 
 actions of man. Every deed which favours the general weal 
 is good, and the more this is opposed the worse is the act. 
 
 Here we may ask, whether there are certain races of men in 
 civilized society, or certain classes, who deserve the lot of mere 
 animals ? These, on account of their inferiority, are employed 
 by man for his pleasures and purposes; are the superiorly 
 gifted among the human kind also permitted to use for their ad- 
 vantage those who are less favoured by nature ? Or, are there 
 individuals who may arrogate privileges, and claim immu- 
 nities ? 
 
 To reply in the affirmative would be against natural mora- 
 lity. This declares God to be the impartial parent of all, and 
 permits man only to do good to his fellow man ; it does not 
 exclude the agency of self-love, but makes it, along with all 
 other faculties common to man and animals, subordinate to 
 those proper to man. Indeed, I know of nothing more im- 
 portant than it is to prove the existence of natural morality, 
 and to specify its laws. For, as mankind must be governed, 
 a true legislation is extremely desirable. 
 
 It is well known that the most ancient governments were 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN. 127 
 
 theocratical ; and that both religious and civil regiments have 
 done immense injury to mankind, and this in proportion as 
 the inferior faculties, such as self-love, love of approbation, 
 courage, destructiveness, and even attachment and circum- 
 spection, have dictated their positive laws. The animal is 
 the enemy of man, it justifies absolute power, the right of the 
 strongest, the spirit of party and of sect, national pride and 
 hatred, and every kind of personal design. It looks only for 
 convenience. Religion itself is employed as a tool in its pur- 
 poses. The misery of man will certainly endure so long as 
 the faculties common to him and animals determine that 
 which is to be done or omitted. 
 
 Attempts have been made, with more or less success, to 
 improve legislation, but all the means have been derived from 
 inferior faculties. Evils, therefore, may have been mitigated, 
 but they could not be entirely abolished. Final success de- 
 pends altogether on the sacrifice of personal interest, or of 
 individual to general happiness. 
 
 All positive laws are imposed, hence the obligation of bow- 
 ing to them is no proof of their being what they ought to be. 
 Indeed, the most opposite rules of conduct have, at different 
 times, been enjoined even as divine and infallible, and it has 
 not generally appeared singular that divine laws have varied 
 according to persons, localities, and circumstances. I cannot, 
 however, help saying, that my esteem is not great for a legis- 
 lator, who is constantly in contradiction with himself, who 
 desires moral good, but who, notwithstanding his omni- 
 potence, corrects only by exterminating; who punishes the 
 innocent on account of the guilty. Sec. My intention in this 
 
128 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 is only to show that belief, or the necessity of obeying, does 
 not prove the perfection of positive laws. 
 
 The case is very different in regard to natural laws. Their 
 basis is the same, at all times and in all countries ; they are 
 independent of personal and of local circumstances. Were it 
 not presumptuous, even absurd, in naturalists to endeavour to 
 create physical and chemical laws, and in gardeners to change 
 the laws of vegetation ? Those who breed and rear animals 
 must treat them according to their nature ; they will never 
 feed parrots with bitter almonds or parsley. The organization 
 of man is also allowed to be subject to natural laws, though 
 several are unknown or neglected in social life. 
 
 That the five senses, in their healthy state, propagate ex- 
 ternal impressions according to determinate laws, is further 
 admitted. No one can see as great th^t which is small ; taste 
 as sweet that which is sour ; nor see as blue that which is 
 scarlet. Without perfect regularity in the functions of the 
 senses, it were altogether impossible to acquire any positive 
 knowledge of the physical qualities of external objects. 
 
 Now, why should not the same determinateness pervade the 
 affective and intellectual faculties ? It is, indeed, commonly 
 admitted in as far as the intellectual operations are concerned. 
 The principles of the arts and sciences are always pointed out. 
 Who doubts of the mechanical laws ? They are the same now 
 as they were in ancient times. The mechanician never attempts 
 to warp or change them in constructing machines; in in- 
 venting, he only makes new apphcations of laws that are in- 
 variable. Mathematical laws, also, have not changed with 
 ages ; every mathematician, whether aware of them or not, 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OP MAN. 129 
 
 applies them in his calculations. A great musical genius pro- 
 duces harmonious tones, and a great painter agreement of 
 colours, according to natural principles, and without previous 
 study. The laws of all arts exist in nature, and are only dis- 
 covered, not created. A deep thinker needs no logical pre- 
 cepts to enable him to perceive sound from false reasoning. 
 Thus the intellectual operations of the mind are governed by 
 natural laws which can neither be changed by revelation nor 
 by human enactments, neither by praying, by fasting, nor by 
 offerings. They who are born gifted with great talents dis- 
 cover the laws of their faculties, make these known to the less 
 favoured in capacities, who then learn and apply them in their 
 mental operations. 
 
 , And now we may ask whether the religious and moral laws 
 are not equally inherent in the nature of man? It is remark- 
 able, that hitherto all nations have adopted some "sort of 
 revelation from which they derive their moral and religious 
 laws. We may readily conceive, then, that the priesthood 
 will still continue to estimate their services highly, and to 
 make their own interpretations pass as religion and Chris- 
 tianity. It therefore becomes of the utmost importance to 
 separate the pretended ministers of God and their versions 
 from the Creator and his eternal decrees. 
 
 Many philosophers have acknowledged the existence of na- 
 tural laws of morality as well as of organization. In the 
 opinion of Confucius, " law is that which is conformable to 
 nature."' Cicero thinks that the law cannot vary, but that it 
 is the same for every nation; and that no injustice, whatever 
 
 name is given to it, can be considered as law, though a whole 
 
 K 
 
130 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 nation may submit to its infliction. Bacon calls the laws of 
 nature the laws of laws. Cherron says that wise tnen conduct 
 themselves-, that nature is their guide^ and that the laws are at 
 the bottom of their heatts. Montesquieu observes, that to say 
 there is neither justice tior injustice except that which is so 
 declared by positive laws, is to say that the radii of a circle are 
 Hot equal before it is traced* Nevertheless, this writer allowed 
 governments the power of determining or making the law ; his 
 comparison, however, proves that this exists prior to govern- 
 ments, which are established merely to Watch over its execu- 
 tion ; the number of governors is here a secondary point, the 
 object remains invariably the same ; viz.y the enforcement of 
 the natural law. St. Paul speaks in the most decisive manner 
 of natural morality^ in stating that some persons without the 
 law, do things ordered by the law, since this is written in their 
 hearts. 
 
 They, indeed, whose peculiarly human faculties hold such as 
 are common to man and animals in subordination, act in a 
 moral way without precept, and even with pleasure; nay, if 
 constrained to do evil, they would feel positive pain, precisely 
 Jas does the great musician from bad music. Moral precepts are 
 necessary to those only who do not possess them in their interior. 
 When, therefore, will ^ran cease to invent lawsj and begin to 
 study those the Creator has traced for his guidance ? And 
 when will he be wise enough to submit to the immutable laws 
 of nature ? 
 
 Unluckily, the majority of every existing community re- 
 quire to be conducted by regulations, which must even be 
 imposed on them in a dogmatic way, or as articles of faith. 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OP MAN. 131 
 
 A very few only are capable of understanding the concatenation 
 of causes and effects, the natural laws are therefore incompre- 
 hensible dogmas to tJie great mass of mankind. Belief in, and 
 submission to, these laws are quite indispensable to the well- 
 being of man, and hence, obligatory upon all, but especially 
 upon those who know them. 
 
 From the great influence of Ihe natural laws upon the con- 
 dition of mankind, it follows that it is exceedingly important 
 not to err in their determination. I repeat that I consider the 
 faculties proper to man as the basis of religion and morality ; 
 that, in my opinion, natural religion consists in the beHef in a 
 Supreme Being, and in yielding implicit obedience to his will, 
 that is, to the natural laws ; and that such actions only as are 
 in perfect conformity to the whole of the peculiarly human 
 faculties are morally good. 
 
 Such an idea of natural religion and natural morality may 
 become universal; it unites every characteristic of a true 
 legislation. Natural religion and natural morality acknowledge 
 all that enters into the constitution of man, and they employ 
 the faculties only to good purposes ; that is, to further general 
 happiness. 
 
 Origin of Evil. 
 
 The origin of evil has been a fertile subject of discussion. 
 Evil seemed incompatible with a perfect Creator. The notion 
 of a malevolent principle, therefore, came to be entertained. 
 This still prevails among those who, personifying evil, speak of 
 a devil. To explain the existence of evil, however, is a simple 
 and easy task. It is only necessary to know that all natural 
 
 K2 
 
132 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 phenomena depend on certain conditions or circumstances ; 
 that things are in relation to each other, and that these relations 
 generally are governed by fixed laws. Now, as soon as the 
 conditions are wanting or their laws violated, proper effects are 
 not elicited, and evil results. In the inanimate as well as in 
 the animated world, the natural laws must still be rigorously 
 followed. The chemist must obey the laws of chemistry to 
 produce chrystals ; plants grow well if they be cultivated ac- 
 cording to their habits and wants, — it matters not whether the 
 cultivators be Roman Catholics or Heretics, Jews or Mussul- 
 mans. Man enjoys good health or suffers from infirmity in 
 proportion as he attends to or neglects the laws of his vegeta- 
 tive functions. Neither prayers, nor offerings, nor any other 
 religious ceremony whatever, suspend these natural laws ; their 
 execution is invariably and without distinction rewarded, and 
 their neglect indiscriminately and regularly punished. The 
 infidel who lives moderately and observes all the dietetic rules, 
 has always better health than the orthodox believer who neg- 
 lects the natural laws of his organization, but prays loudly 
 for soundness of body. The former, if he practice the laws of 
 propagation, will have children preferable to those of the pious 
 man who chooses his wife for her wealth or mere exterior. I 
 suppose, that one without religious faith, even an Atheist, sub- 
 mits to the natural laws of the vegetative functions ; that he 
 avoids all noxious influences, is laborious, industrious, and 
 regular in his business, while another is very religious in the 
 common acceptation, sings, prays, fasts, eats no meat on 
 Fridays, recommends his soul to God, &c., but, at the same 
 time, is lazy, intemperate, disorderly hi his business ; and I ask. 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN. 139 
 
 of these two, whose condition in life will be the most flourish- 
 ing ? Thus, physical evil results from the infraction of the 
 physical laws, and moral evil from the infraction of the moral 
 laws of creation. 
 
 I pass over in silence the opinion which recognises two 
 creative principles — one good and another bad. Neither do I 
 speak of original sin in the first man, nor of the origin of evil 
 in admitting free-will ; for, in this I find no explanation of its 
 existence. It is true, that without liberty there can be no 
 guilt ; but its admission gives no idea of the origin of evil. 
 For as soon as free-will is spoken of, good and evil are sup- 
 posed : or to what purpose free-will, were there not two dif- 
 ferent things, good and evil, between which the free agent may 
 choose ? It is said, that man abuses his liberty ; but by what / 
 motive does he so, if there be not something within which pro- / 
 vokes him to act badly ? Therefore liberty is neither sufficient y 
 to explain the nature nor the origin of moral evil. 
 
 Are there any bad faculties ? Dr. Gall is disposed to admit ; 
 wicked propensities. He says, that man must submit to the 
 laws of creation in regard to moral as in regard to physical 
 evil ; that no one can say he is without temptations ; and that \ 
 all thoughts and inclinations are not innocent or virtuous. He 
 even thinks that moral evil enters into the plan of the Creator. 
 
 If he say, however, that excessive activity of certain facul- 
 ties produces illegal actions or moral evil, morality is not yet 
 proved as a natural science; it is at most conventional. I am 
 intimately convinced that no faculty in itself can be bad, and 
 that all the innate powers of man have some aim ; that every one 
 is necessary ; that none leads inevitably to evil ; but that each 
 
 V 
 
 ^ 
 
X.. 
 
 184 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 ftao-y produce abuses. The faculties are no more bad than any 
 other entity in nature. I think with Philo the Jew, Eusebius*, 
 and St. Augustine, that nothing — ^fire, water, iron, &c., is bad 
 in itself, or a cause of evil; with Augustuief in particular, 
 that evil is not a substance, and that abuses only are ills. 
 Hence, I consider no faculty in itself as either good or bad. 
 Evil results only from infringing the natural laws of morahty. 
 The faculties common to man and brutes act in animals in the 
 same way as in man ; but they are never said to sin or commit 
 a crime. This is a new proof that liberty has not produced 
 moral evil, for animals modify their conduct and suppress 
 various instincts by other motives ; but none of their actions 
 can be considered in relation to morality. 
 
 ""^^« Man," says VolneyJ, " hke the whole world, of which he 
 is a part, is ruled by natural laws, which are invariable in their 
 essence, regular in their application, consequent in their ejffects, 
 and the common cause both of good and evil. They are not 
 written in the stars, nor hidden in mysterious codes, but in- 
 herent in human nature, and identified with man's existence. 
 They act on his senses, advertise his intelligence, and bring 
 with every action penalty or reward. Let man learn these laws, 
 let him understand his own, and the nature of the things around 
 him, and he will know the cause of his griefs and the remedy.'"' 
 Volney believed in the existence of natural laws; but he 
 did not, in my opinion, understand the basis of natural 
 morality, when he conceived that it was self-preservation. In 
 his hypothesis, animals should have a moral nature ; but, from 
 
 * Pricpar. Evan^. Lib. vii. n. 22. t Lib. dc Ycvk Rclig^ionc, c. 20. 
 - % Ruins, chap, v. 
 
THE MORAL CHARACTER OF MAN. 135 
 
 what I have said in the first and in this Section, it follows that 
 neither personal interest, nor selfishness of any kind, can be 
 recognised as the foundation of morality. 
 
 The Philosophers who maintain man to be born good or bad, 
 are not acquainted with the fundamental powers of his mind, 
 nor with their mutual relations. This knowledge would have / 
 guarded them from such an error, by satisfactorily explaining \ 
 the nature and origin of evil. I repeat onpe more, that moral \ 
 evil consists in actions which are not conformable to the whole 
 of tHe faculties pxojger to manTand tEaT^e ^ry a ction ^n- ) 
 formable to these is morally good. Animals consequently can- / 
 not sin, and no action can be criminal in idiots, they being 
 deprived of the characteristic and distinguishing attributes of , 
 humanity. 
 
 Practical Reflections, 
 
 I firmly believe that it is under the government of the natu- 
 ral laws alone that mankind will ever or can ever become one 
 family ; these, however, are still very obscure, and it will be 
 long before they can be thoroughly understood. Mankind, 
 indeed, is not prepared to submit to the precepts of natural 
 morality. The spirit of selfishness, obscurantism, and super- 
 stition, — these natural enemies of truth, is still too powerful. 
 Yet the only remark to be made is, that the laws of nature are 
 invariable and indispensable tx) the happiness of man ; that he 
 must submit to them or sufter,*^and that without submission 
 the common weal is impossible ; that all partial views must 
 disappear ; finally, that arbitrary regulations may last years 
 and centuries, but must come to an end at last, whilst the 
 
 f 
 
136 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 empire of creation will endure as long as the human kind 
 remains. 
 
 Comparison of Natural Religion and Morality^ with the 
 Christian Morality. 
 
 The preceding considerations on natural religion and mo- 
 rality, may, I fear, offend the timorous ; if they sincerely love 
 truth, however, they may be easy and remain quiet. For if 
 "we admit that the author of the universe and the God who 
 gave VIS a revelation are one and the same Supreme Being, we 
 must also allow that the revelation. made in time cannot be at 
 variance with the laws of creation, otherwise God would have 
 been in contradiction with himself. An impostor, like Maho- 
 met, changes his decrees as convenience requires, or as caprice 
 impels ; but reason will never admit contradictions in a 
 Divine legislation. To conceive revelation in opposition to 
 natural laws, is either to prove it false, or to advance that the 
 Creator of all things is not the God who revealed the law ; or 
 that Supreme intelligence may change its decrees, endow man 
 with natural faculties, and then command these to cease en- 
 ely from acting, or to act in opposition to their nature. I am 
 \ of their opinion who think that the Christian morality is the 
 same as the morality of nature, and that its revealed law is 
 merely a repetition in positive terms of the natural law. With 
 this view present, we conceive why the master of Christianity 
 said, " that light is made to give light." I hope the time will 
 come when Christianity will be purged of all paganism and 
 superstition. The purity and excellence of its moral precepts, 
 indeed, will be more justly appreciated ^s human nature Js 
 
 / /'wi' 
 
 [ 
 
THE CHRISTIAN MORALITY, 137 
 
 better understood, and the superior feelings become more 
 energetic. 
 
 Christian morality, like that of nature, is reduced to a few 
 principles which are simple, invariable, and applicable in all 
 situations, and under all circumstances. It considers our duties 
 towards God and our duties towards our like. The former are 
 called love of God, the latter love of our neighbour. 
 
 The meaning of the particular precepts of Christianity still 
 gives rise to many discussions. Various interpretations have 
 been disseminated and even absurdities been substituted for the 
 wise regulations of the Gospel. It was, therefore, a point of 
 some importance to prevent man from reading and reflecting 
 on the scriptures. The result, however, has been, that the 
 Gospel legislation has fallen into discredit; for the arbitrary 
 interpretations of individuals have been confounded with its 
 primitive laws. Every friend of humanity must grieve to see 
 absurdities put into the mouth of the Supreme Being. Were 
 merely rational interpretations of scripture given, there would 
 be less cause to complain of the general want of religious and 
 moral feelings. The human understanding is too much en- 
 hghtened now to be satisfied with superstitious doctrines, which 
 are useless both to God and to man, or to reject salutary pre- 
 cepts. Let us proceed then, and consider some of the leading 
 points of Christian morality. 
 
 Jesus Christ reduced his moral doctrine to two grand heads : 
 the love of God, and the love of our neighbour. " On these 
 two commandments," says he*, " hang all the law and the 
 
 * Matt. xxii. i% 
 
138 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 prophets.'' It is therefore of the highest importance to under- 
 stand their meaning. 
 
 The first admits the existence of a God, the Creator of all. 
 Besides, it commands respect towards him, and obedience to 
 his will. " Thy kingdom come,'' says Christ*, " thy will be 
 done on earth as it is in heaven." " This is the love of God," 
 says St. Johnf, " that we keep his commandments." 
 
 The human understanding cannot but look for the workman, 
 or cause of all that exists. By his powers of reasoning, man 
 arrives at a first cause, Avhich, being personified, is styled God. 
 The Gospel inculcates the same idea. St. Paul says J : " Every 
 house is builded by some man ; but he that built all things is 
 God." 
 
 Reason further judges of the qualities of God according to 
 his works. " The invisible things of God," says St. Paul 
 also§, " from the creation of the world are clearly seen ; being 
 understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power 
 and Godhead." .-—...-- 
 
 Here it is of exceeding importance to be convinced that the 
 natural laws are the will of God. Jesus Christ makes a dis- 
 tinction between things as they were from the beginning and 
 the legislation of Moses II . He speaks of things which have 
 been kept secret from the foundation of the world ^, and of 
 things which his apostles could not bear *^. The first great 
 commandment of Christ, is not, I think, sufficiently under- 
 stood ; it has, indeed, been abused in the most detestable man- 
 
 * Matt. vi. 10. t 1st St. John, v. 3. % Heb^ iii. 4. § Rom. i. 20. 
 II St. Matt. xix. 8. *1I St. Matt. xiii. 35. ** St. John xvi. 1^. 
 
THE CHRISTIAN MORALITY. 13Q 
 
 ner. Arbitrary, contradictory, and absurd interpretations were 
 imposed in the name of God; and dissension was, therefore, un- 
 avoidable. Those who governed found it convenient to inter- 
 dict reflection, and to command blind obedience and prostration 
 of the understanding. 
 
 This was an excellent means of securing themselves in per- 
 sonal enjoyments, of concealing selfish intentions, and of en- 
 forcing conviction of their infallibility ; but it does not prove that 
 the Gospel prohibits us from reasoning, from examining, from 
 believing that which is true, or rejecting that which is palpably 
 false and absurd. Jesus said, many times, " Let them hear, 
 who have ears to hear." " Are ye also," said he to his disci- 
 ples*, <' yet without understanding.?" *' I speak as to wise 
 men," says St. Paul to the Corinthians^- ; *' judge ye what I 
 say." '' Prove all things," says the same apostle to the Thes- 
 saloniansj, " and hold fast that which is good." " Beloved," 
 says St. John, '* believe not every spirit, but try the spirits 
 whether they are of God§." 
 
 Thus, I believe that all natural laws of the vegetative func« 
 tions, of intelligence, and of morality, are part of the will of 
 God. If we submit to them, their influence will be more 
 marked and more salutary than any adherence to arbitrary 
 regulations. Man ought to know that he can create nothing, 
 but that he has imderstanding to recognise whatever is, and the 
 conditions under which it is. He may only imitate the pro- 
 ceeding of nature, that is, obey the will of the Creator, to 
 
 * St. Matt. XV. 16. t 1st Cor. x. 15. 
 
 $ 1st Thess. V. 21. § 1st St. John, iv. 1. 
 
lliO PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 elicit what is for his good. " The Son of God can do nothing, 
 if he have not seen it done by the Father,"" said Jesus. 
 .■ The first commandment of Christianity embraces all kinds 
 of truth, and ought never to be lost sight of; it explains every 
 thing as happening by the will of God. Fire burns, water 
 extinguishes fire; hemlock kills man, and nourishes the goat; 
 fertile countries, when well cultivated, yield abundant harvests ; 
 industrious and orderly individuals and nations prosper ; in- 
 temperate persons ruin their health ; ignorance commits errors, 
 intelligence avoids them; the animal part of man looks for 
 selfish and lowly gratifications ; the peculiarly human nature 
 finds satisfaction amid the joys of general happiness ; and all 
 this occurs by the will of God. Let us then admit it as the 
 will of God also, that the faculties proper to man are to be the 
 sole guides of human actions. 
 
 In examining natural morality, we have seen that we can do 
 nothing to advantage the Supreme Being; that our relations 
 with him consist in respect for, and submission to, his will. 
 Hence, that true religion is summed up in the fulfilment of our 
 duties to ourselves, to our like, and to the other beings that 
 taste along with us the sweets of existence. 
 
 The worship prescribed by Christianity is also reasonable 
 and spiritual ; it consists not in what we are to eat or. drink, 
 nor in any difference to be made between the days lent us 
 to enjoy. The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the 
 Sabbath. " The hour comes, and now is, when the true wor- 
 shippers shall worship the Father in Spirit and in Truth. — 
 God that made the world and all things therein;, seeing that 
 
THE CHRISTIAN MORALITY. 141 
 
 he is Lord of heaven and earlh, dwells not in temples made 
 with hands, neither is he worshipped with men's hands, as 
 though he needed any thing; he who gives to all life, and 
 breath, and all things. — When ye pray, use not vain re- 
 petitions as the heathen do; for they think that they shall be 
 heard for their much speaking/' Finally, prayers are heard 
 if they be conformable to the will of God. 
 
 Thus, the first great commandment of Christianity is per- 
 fectly agreeable to the experience of all tipfies, and is the basis 
 of all positive regulations ; it even includes the second. This, 
 however, on account of its importance, has been announced 
 separately ; it is : Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself. 
 
 This precept is very simple; but, like the first, has not 
 escaped manifold abuses. It has always been, and is still 
 eluded by various interpretations. A great number flatter 
 themselves that they are Christians, without ever expending a 
 thought on the happiness of their neighbours. 
 
 In combining this second precept with several passages of 
 the Gospel, some have discussed the question whether Chris- 
 tianity abolishes private property and establishes community of 
 goods or not ? The early Christians made a trial of a true 
 commonwealth ; several religious orders or monasteries did the 
 same; but experience has shown that mankind is not yet 
 in a condition to live in such a state of purity. Nevertheless, 
 it is certain, that if the second commandment were fulfilled, 
 there would be no peculiar property. 
 
 To this may be started the objection of there being a funda- 
 mental feehng in which inheres the desire to acquire, a feeling 
 
1418 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND, 
 
 very active in animals and in man. Now, Christianity opposes 
 no natural disposition ; on the contrary, it commands acknow- 
 ledgment of the natural order, and, indeed, is declared to be 
 destined to re-establish things as they were in the beginning. 
 The propensity to acquire certainly exists in man as well as in 
 animals ; man is also influenced by attachment to his family 
 and country, and both of these feelings are powerful motives 
 to action ; yet they also give rise to many disorders, and occa- 
 sion a great deal of mischief. They are not interdicted by the 
 second precept of Christianity, but they are placed under the 
 dominion of a superior sentiment, which desires general happi- 
 ness, and places the well-being of others on a level with our 
 own, our family's, and our country's. 
 
 Christianity consequently commands, *' Therefore all things 
 whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so 
 to them ; for this is the law and the prophets*". As well as 
 nature, Christianity proclaims original differences among men. 
 It allows that some are more, others less, talented ; but it makes 
 each answerable only for the gifts he has received ; commanding 
 that those who have received much, give much ; that is, con- 
 tribute largely to the general happiness. Thus, true Christians 
 form a separate society ; they receive among them none who are 
 profligate, selfish, ambitious, or who are governed by inferior 
 faculties ; but only those who find pleasure in the satisfaction 
 of their peculiarly human powers. They scout idleness with 
 its attendant vices from among them. They have many mem- 
 
 * St. Matt. vii. 12. 
 
THE CHRISTIAN MORALITY. ItH 
 
 bers in one body, and all members have not the same office * ; 
 there are diversities of gifts, but the same spirit ; and the mani- 
 festation of the spirit is given to every one to profit withal -|-. 
 In short, they consider as brothers and sisters those only who 
 do the will of God ; who love each other as themselves. 
 
 The accompKshment of tliis precept is extremely difficult, 
 but it is essential to see that it is indispensable to the constitu- 
 tion of a Christian. To maintain that it is not, is to be de- 
 ceived, or to be a hypocrite. Christ constantly admonished his 
 disciples to love one another J. " By this shall all men know 
 that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one for another §." 
 
 Many flatter themselves with being Christians, when they 
 say that they beheve in the divinity of Christ, in his mission 
 and miraculous actions ; and all the while neglect the moral 
 principles he inculcated. Jesus, however, has loudly declared, 
 that practice of his commandments is indispensable, in order to 
 enter into the kingdom of God. St. Paul also says ||, " The 
 kingdom of God is not in word, but in power." 
 
 It is, indeed, scarcely possible to find a true Christian ; but 
 the unbeliever who deems Christian morality merely fanciful, 
 is more excusable than those who call themselves its disciples, 
 but suit Christianity to their own tastes. Such conduct has 
 done incalculable injury to mankind, and by spreading abroad 
 false conceptions of its nature, has greatly lowered the Chris- 
 tian system of morality in general estimation. 
 
 The second precept of Christianity is, therefore, also con- 
 
 ♦ Rom. Xii. 4. t 1st Cor. xii. 7. t St. John, xv. 12. 
 
 $ St. John, t\il 35. I|- Ist Cor. iv. 20. 
 
144 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 formable to natural morality, or to the faculties proper to 
 man. For these look for general happiness, and are satisfied 
 with neighbourly love, without any regard to personal dis- 
 tinctions. 
 
 The third precept of Christian morality concerns its propa- 
 gation. Jesus commands his disciples to preach his doctrine as 
 preferable to all other systems of morality ; to be indulgent 
 and forbearing; to give freely, as they have freely received^; 
 and to pardon faults and errors, provided they be corrected. 
 He who does not act according to the law is to be excluded 
 from their society ; excommunication, therefore, is the severest 
 punishment it admits. 
 
 How lamentable it is that these sublime principles of mora- 
 lity have been so dreadfully disfigured, as now not to be re- 
 cognisable in social intercourse ! Understanding has, from 
 time to time, endeavoured to oppose arbitrary interpretations, 
 and hence divisions arose. Unfortunately, and in direct con- 
 tradiction to the mild spirit of Christianity, unbelievers in 
 its doctrines have been persecuted. This was the most 
 certain means of confirming dissensions, and is the more to 
 be regretted, as these have always been based upon secondary 
 things, which in themselves never had and never will have any 
 influence on mankind. By degrees the essential was distin- 
 guished from the indifferent portion, and in several countries 
 men are now permitted to do whatever they think agreeable 
 to God, provided it do not trouble the order of society. Civil 
 governments are at present superior to the priesthood in 
 
 * St. Matt. X. 8. 
 
THE CHRISTIAN MORALITY, ' 144 
 
 wisdom. They allow people to believe that God is fond of 
 perfumes, of music, and of various ceremonies, and they tole- 
 rate those who shew their love of God by fulfiUing their social 
 duties, by esteeming every day alike, and saying with St. Paul*, 
 " the kingdom of God is not meat and drink." Let us hope 
 that religious toleration will become general, and that the aim 
 may be no longer confounded with the means : the aim must 
 be the same everywhere and at all times ; the means must 
 vary according to the natural dispositions of individuals, to 
 the education they have received, and to the circumstances in 
 which they are placed, but still be dictated by the faculties 
 proper to man. . ^" 
 
 It is indispensable to obey the will of God, but it is by no 
 means hkely that he is pleased with the errors of his creatures, 
 or that he leads them into temptation by trifling and insig- 
 nificant commandments. Is it not rather probable that he has 
 given to them, and identified with their being, such laws as 
 are necessary to their happiness ? Surely it is. They, there- 
 fore, who call themselves the ministers of God, ought to make 
 it a principal business to study his will, especially the laws of 
 nature, and to consider it an imperious duty to teach these, 
 and by submission to them, to give an example of belief in 
 their truth and excellence. 
 
 Those who understand the natural morality of man, will 
 approve of several propositions of Christianity, which are 
 sometimes declared to be unnatural and absurd. These they 
 will consider as inherent in man, nbble in their application, 
 
 ♦ Rom. xiv, 17. 
 
146 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 beneficial in their effects, and conformable to the law of nature. 
 They will allow that all the faculties common to man and 
 animals are to be subjected to those proper to man. For 
 clearness' sake, let us call to mind the three kinds of positive 
 legislation in the order of their imperfection or excellence. 
 In the first, there are only absolute masters, who arbitrarily 
 determine what is to be done or omitted, whose pleasure, in 
 fine, is the only reason of their regulations. This administra- 
 tion is the morality of the strongest ; it prevails among bar- 
 barous nations. 
 
 The second, which is established among civilized nations, 
 rejects the right of the strongest, and all sorts of privileges. 
 The animal faculties, however, are permitted full scope for 
 their activity, but without having power to constrain other 
 persons to minister to their desires. This morality abolishes 
 slavery, the rights of feudality, and allows every one to exert 
 his faculties for his own advantage, under the sole restriction, 
 not to take aught that belongs to them from others. It com- 
 mands us not to do to others what we would not that they did 
 to us. Thus, the inferior animal faculties still dictate the 
 law, though they are hmited by those which are proper 
 to man. Many are susceptible of living under the reign of 
 this degree of moral perfection. Their selfishness opposes 
 the grant of privileges to others, and their moral feelings 
 reject them as unjust. The desire to acquire, and attachment, 
 that is, commerce and exclusionary patriotism, here exert a 
 very great influence. Nations, therefore, thus far advanced, are 
 united and powerful, and defend their situation vigorously. 
 They use every effort to advantage their community; but, 
 
THE CHRISTIAN MORALITY. 147 
 
 besides, every one lives for himself, brings up his children for 
 his private ends, and uses all his energies to increase his wealth. 
 
 The third, and most perfect legislation, results from the 
 supremacy of the peculiarly human nature. The faculties 
 proper to man guide the aim of every action ; all are there- 
 fore directed towards the universal good. The animal nature 
 becomes a mere auxiliary to this end. Natural morality even 
 here differs in nothing from that of Christianity. And, if 
 Jesus desire his disciples to abandon their wives and children 
 rather than the doctrine he teaches, he but places man above 
 animals. He does not command abandonment of wives and 
 children, if they love each other as themselves, but of those 
 only who do not the will of God. Animals love their off* 
 spring, but parental love is certainly inferior to the love of 
 mankind. Jesus therefore acknowledges as mother, brother, 
 or sister, those only who love their neighbours as themselves. 
 He wished man to be and to act according to the faculties proper 
 to human nature. If this were so, all would work with plea- 
 Sure for the common happiness ; those who engaged with great 
 talents, would require the same recompense as those who were 
 industrious with slender endowments, private property would 
 be at an end, and general peace would reign on earth. 
 
 Jesus felt that his doctrine was too difficult for man as he 
 is, but he supported its superiority by its salutary effects and 
 by experience, which shows that it is perfect. Moreover, he 
 attended to the motives of reward and punislnnent. He was 
 also prepared for the disputes his teaching occasioned. Who- 
 ever proposes a new doctrine brings forth an object of diffe- 
 rence. Now the moral principles of Christ being especially 
 
14& PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 opposed to riches and worldly distinctions, to that, therefore, 
 which man desires most eagerly, necessarily excited adver- 
 saries and caused persecutions. He came not on purpose to 
 excite dissensions between brothers, relations, or man and 
 jnan ; but he knew that dissensions were unavoidable in the 
 natural order of things. Now let every one judge for himself^ 
 whether it were better to live quietly in error and in injustice, 
 than to suffer and struggle for truth and general happiness. 
 Thus, my conviction is, that the moral precepts of Chris- 
 tianity are those of nature. I cannot, however, believe that 
 such a pure system of morality will be easily, or soon adopted. 
 But this can take nothing away from its perfection. It will 
 ever remain the object all regulations ought to have in view, 
 for its reception is the indispensable condition to universal 
 peace. In my work on Education, I speak of what will 
 avail in procuring the conditions under which man can receive 
 this moral doctrine. Meanwhile, it is certain that they 
 only usurp the name of Christians, who by their enactments 
 prove that their sole aim is individual happiness; or, who 
 strive after riches and worldly distinctions, and other advance- 
 ment of their merely private estates ; or, who live at the 
 expense of others ; or, finally, who are apt enough to laud, 
 but ever ready to act in contradiction to the precepts of 
 Christianity. It is, indeed, blasphemous to bear the title of 
 Christian without acting up to the sacred duties it requires. 
 Let us, therefore, in acknowledging the purity of Christian 
 morality, put it in practice, before we dare to arrogate the 
 noble name of Christians. 
 
NATURAL GOODNESS. 149 
 
 Of Persons who are naturally Good. 
 
 There is, undoubtedly, a great deal of moral evil in the 
 world. Man, it is also certain, is commonly inclined to evil^ 
 that is, to follow the activity of the animal faculties, which 
 are, for the most part, very energetic, and submit with diffi- 
 culty to the guidance of the powers proper to man. I am, 
 nevertheless, astonished to observe so much goodness in the 
 world. Its abundance evidently proves that man is naturally 
 good, and by no means in consequence of his social institu- 
 tions ; these, indeed, are for the most part, calculated to per-* 
 vert him. The poor are surrounded with temptation and 
 exposed to corruption on all hands, and the lives led by 
 the rich, especially their idleness and luxury, invite them to 
 immorality. All ranks have their superstitions, and all believe 
 in error, as well as in truth ; all pay for temporal and also for 
 eternal happiness, and all subscribe to the first dogma pro- 
 claimed necessary to secure the good things here, or to pur- 
 chase the joys of immortality hereafter, — an entire abnegation 
 of reason. 
 
 A true picture of society would, indeed, be frightful. Hap- 
 pily, man had received from the Creator so large an infusion 
 of goodness, that it is not to be annihilated. It is lamentable, 
 then, that certain persons attach themselves more to the letter 
 than to the spirit of some symbolic propositions of the gospel, 
 and that mystical, contradictory, and noxious interpretations 
 are rather beheve^ in than simple, reasonable, and salutary 
 views. 
 
ts6 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 There are some naturally good, some who instinctively, so to 
 say, do the things which Christian morality commands. But, 
 have we not all heard religious people say, that this natural 
 disposition to do well profits those who exert it in nowise ? 
 Let us, however, e^xamine into the origin of faith and of chaiity, 
 discuss their comparative excellence, and determine the merit 
 which belongs to natural benevolence. 
 
 In regard to the origin of faith and charity, I refer to the 
 Phrenological part of this work. I shall only repeat that 
 they spring not from the same fundamental faculty, that they 
 may exist separately or conjoined, and that they may be 
 active in very different degrees. These propositions are as 
 important as those according to which charity and the dispo- 
 sition to faith are inherent in the nature of man. We may, 
 therefore, proceed to ask which of the two is the more im- 
 portant .? 
 
 Pious people commonly decide on this question according 
 to their individual feelings. But this manner of judging fre- 
 quently leads into error, and is apt to deceive. Let us, there- 
 fore, make abstraction of ourselves, and consider the subject 
 generally. 
 
 We are very ready to believe that which we Hke; this 
 however, is not always truth • Religious systems, and the 
 various sects of each are all founded on belief. Jews, Roman 
 Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, Inquisitors, Quakers, &c., 
 all fancy they possess the true revelation. Hence, simple 
 faith does not indicate abstract truth. Faith is the result of 
 feelings, and all feelings, without exception, are blind ; faith, 
 consequently, may be deceived ; and I think it causes error 
 
NATURAL GOODNESS. 151 
 
 whenever the faculty on which it depends ceases to act in 
 harmony with the other powers proper to man. Faith has, 
 unquestionably, done a great deal of liarm in the world. 
 Some standard, by which its manifestations may be regulated, 
 is therefore extremely desirable. 
 
 Christ desired that his disciples might be known by their 
 works, and the excellence of his doctrine by its effects. Such 
 a basis is unobjectionable, it includes its validity in itself, 
 and soon changes faith into conviction. Now as pure charity 
 is the aim of the doctrine, and was the practice of the life of 
 Jesus, charity is evidently the chief of his precepts. 
 
 Further, the tendency of charity is solely to do good ; but 
 faith may do evil too ; it easily finds an excuse for self-love, 
 personal views, and abuses of many complexions. 
 
 We may add, that faith without works is dead, and that 
 every hjrpocrite may say, / believe. Faith, therefore, can be 
 considered only as an additional motive to exercise charity ; 
 in its inferiority, then, it should never be the basis of any reli- 
 gious doctrine. 
 
 " Beware of false prophets," says Christ *, " which come 
 to you in sheep''s clothing, but inwardly they are ravening 
 wolves. Ye will know them by their fruits." 
 
 Finally, even those who have no religious faith, still admit 
 charity and its good effects. Thus, I do not hesitate to 
 place, with St. Paulf, charity above faith. 
 
 In regard to the merit of natural benevolence, I think, 
 that the moral laws are as positive and inherent in our 
 
 * St. Matt. vii. 15. * ... 1 Cor. xiii. 
 
152 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 nature as are those of vision, and of the harmony of co- 
 lours and tones; I also conceive that Christ has com- 
 manded certain works because they are good in themselves 
 and according to the will of the Creator ; and, further, that 
 the truth of religious interpretations is proclaimed by their 
 compatibility with general happiness. Those, therefore, who 
 say that natural human benevolence is worthless, might also 
 say that the goodness, of God is without value. 
 
 Persons, it is true, who are naturally good, deserve less 
 credit for their beneficent actions than those who do good 
 principally because it is commanded. The former are chari- 
 table because they find pleasure in charity, while the others of 
 charity make an act of virtue. In reference to energy and 
 effect, however, natural benevolence is superior to that which 
 results from faith. The faculties which act from internal 
 vigour are rewarded by their indulgence; they persevere 
 with pleasure and constantly tend to action, while those which 
 must be excited by other motives become inactive as soon as 
 these cease to operate. The naturally good do more acts of 
 beneficence without faith than those who, httle endowed with 
 primitive charity, take mere faith as their guide and rule 
 of conduct. Those, however, who unite natural charity 
 and faith are the most assiduous in doing good ; but, to 
 reject natural benevolence is equivalent to saying that pure 
 and natural gold is not worth such as is extracted from very 
 heterogeneous minerals, and that a swift and willing horse is 
 inferior to one which must be spurred to go quickly. 
 
 I finish this section by asking, what individual can determine 
 moral evil and moral good, that is, dictate the moral laws ? 
 
NATURAL GOODNESS. 153 
 
 I think that it is with moral as with all other principles ; a 
 blind man cannot establish the principles of colouring, nor one 
 born deaf those of music ; the great painter gives the rules of 
 his art, and the great genius for music indicates the laws of 
 harmony. In the same way, he who possesses the faculties 
 proper to man in the highest perfection, and in whose actions 
 they predominate, he who can challenge the world to convict 
 him of sin, has a right to determine moral principles, and to 
 fix rules of moral conduct. Those, therefore, who would 
 make exception and say. Follow my words and not my deeds, 
 have no title to give rules of action to the community, or to 
 superintend their practice. How noble was the saying of 
 Christ in reference to this point *, '^ If I do not the works of 
 my Father, believe me notJ" 
 
 * St. John, X. 37. 
 
154 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 Practical Considerations » 
 
 In every science the theoretical must be distinguished from 
 the practical part. The former considers principles, the latter 
 apphes them. I think with Socrates, that knowing and acting 
 ought to be inseparable, and that useful knowledge is alone 
 worth attending to ; no philosophy, therefore, which cannot 
 be applied in social life deserves to have a student. The 
 knowledge of the human mind is interesting to physicians in 
 reference to insanity, and to teachers and legislators in de- 
 termining the means of perfecting mankind. I have treated 
 these subjects in separate volumes ; I shall here add some con- 
 siderations which concern us in our social intercourse, and 
 which may contribute to further general happiness. This I 
 shall do in four chapters. The first will treat of the modifi- 
 cations of the affective and intellectual functions in individuals; 
 the second, of the difficulty of judging the actions of others ; 
 the third, of sympathy and antipathy ; and the fourth, of 
 the happiness of man. 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, 155 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 On the Modifications of the Affective and Intellectual 
 Functions. 
 
 In philosophy it is commonly admitted, that the world is 
 different to every species of animals, and even to every indi- 
 vidual of the same species. This is easily understood, when 
 we consider that all the beings of nature are in relation one to 
 another, and that these, endowed with consciousness, recog- 
 nise this, in other terms, perceive various impressions made 
 on them by other beings. Now, it is evident that each must 
 perceive impressions in proportion to the number and energy 
 of its sentient faculties. Hence it results that the world differs 
 to different species of animals ; that it is essentially the same, 
 but modified to individuals of the same kinds ; and that man, 
 who unites all the faculties distributed among the other living 
 tribes, and possesses some peculiarly and alone, has, so to 
 speak, the most extended world, though this be still modified 
 to individuals, as it is among animals of the same species. 
 
 I shall now investigate the modifications of the faculties 
 more in detail. First then, the manifestations of every faculty 
 are greatly modified in different kinds of beings. This ap- 
 pears from the functions of those faculties, both of vegetative 
 and animal life, which are common to man and animals. The 
 liver secretes bile, the kidneys secrete urine, the saKvary 
 glands saliva, &c. ; yet these secretions vary in different 
 kinds of animals ; and are even modified in individuals of the 
 
l$Q PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 same species. The power of motion is modified in different 
 kinds of animals, and the consistence, texture, and taste of 
 its organs, the muscles, also vary. The external senses offer 
 modifications according to species and individuals. Now, are 
 the faculties attached to the brain also modified in different 
 animals ? 
 
 . If we examine their applications, there can remain no doubt 
 of it. The function of the cerebellum must be modified in 
 every species, because the individuals of each prefer others of 
 their own kind. Sometimes also it is quite inordinate. Mo- 
 difications of philoprogenitiveness are not less certain. Animals 
 love the young of their own more than those of other kinds, 
 Inhabitiveness must be modified in animals which live in the 
 water, on dry land, in the air, and at greater or less elevations. 
 Adhesiveness presents many modifications in solitary and in 
 social animals. Destructiveness and constructiveness are much 
 modified ; all animals do not kill in one way, and the nests of 
 all birds are not built in the same manner. The song of 
 birds, and the instinct to migrate, are modified universally. 
 Similar observations might readily be made in regard to the 
 whole of the propensities, sentiments, and intellectual facul- 
 ties. Thus it is certain that all are modified both in species 
 and in individuals. Nay, it seems to me that there are 
 idiosyncrasies of all the mental functions, as well as of diges- 
 tion and the external senses. Certain stomachs do not digest 
 some particular substances ; some individuals cannot bear 
 certain odours, savours, colours, and sounds ; and some cannot 
 endure certain modes of feeling or thinking, certain successions 
 of tones, of ideas, and so on. The sajne thing is approved or 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 157 
 
 disapproved of by different people according to the manner in 
 which it is proposed. 
 
 Another cause of the modified manifestations of the facul- 
 ties is their mutual influence. I only consider the human 
 kind at present. It is indubitable that if two or more persons 
 do the same thing, it will be done in a modified way by every 
 one. Inasmuch as the faculties are essentially the same, the 
 same actions are observed in all mankind : nay, in as far as 
 nations have similar predominating faculties, there prevails a 
 certain analogy in their actions and manners, because these 
 are effects of the special faculties and their combinations ; it is 
 only their modifications and different combinations that pro- 
 duce varieties in action. Every faculty may act combined 
 with one, or two, or more. The number of binary, ternary, 
 and more multiplied combinations is, therefore, immense, 
 especially if it be remembered that each may be modified in 
 itself, and may be more or less energetic. As this subject, 
 however, is of the highest importance in anthropology, and 
 indispensable to the elucidation of my ideas, I shall treat it 
 somewhat in detail, and choose examples easily understood, 
 and interesting to every one. 
 
 Physical love alone, combined with adhesiveness, philopro- 
 genitiveness, benevolence and veneration, or with the propen- 
 sities to fight and to destroy, acts very differently. Two affec- 
 tionate mothers, of whom the one has philoprogenitiveness com- 
 bined with much self-esteem, much firmness, a great propensity 
 to fight, and little benevolence, and the second philoprogeni- 
 tiveness combined with adhesiveness, benevolence, veneration, 
 and very little self-esteem and propensity to fight, will love 
 
158 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND, 
 
 their children in vei-y different manners. Determinate or indi- 
 vidual justice varies extremely. Justice gives laws universally, 
 but these are modified according to the particular and com- 
 bined faculties of legislators. What a difference in the charac- 
 ters of Lycurgus and Solon ; but what a difference in their 
 precepts also ! Socrates and his disciples looked on happiness 
 as the aim of all action. Socrates placed it in moral and vir- 
 tuous conduct ; his disciple , Aristippus, in agreeable impres- 
 sions on the senses ; Anniceris in pleasant sensations and moral 
 feelings ; Antisthenes in self-satisfaction ; Hegesias, a disciple 
 of Aristippus, in voluptuousness ; Theodorus, another disciple 
 of Aristippus, considered every action which procured pleasure 
 as good in itself and virtuous ; Diogenes, a disciple of Antis- 
 thenes, raised his mind to an absolute independence of circum- 
 stances : he became almost a savage, and respected nothing. 
 
 Man universally believes in one or several Gods ; but what 
 a difference between the Gods of different nations, and even of 
 different men ! The Gods seem to me everywhere represented 
 with faculties conformable to those of the nations by whom they 
 are adored, or of the religious legislators who have commanded 
 in their name. The God of the Jews, particularly of Joshua, 
 and the Deity of the true Christian, are extremely modified. 
 If different individuals, even of the §ame rehgion, be asked 
 their opinion about God, we observe great diversities. St. Peter 
 and [ St. John speak, the former with fear, the latter with 
 meekness and love, of the same Christian Deity. If we 
 examine the opinions of the reformers, Luther, Calvin, Zwin- 
 gle, and others, do we not always observe the faculties of the 
 individuals ? Who, for instance, finds not in the principles of 
 
PRApTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 159 
 
 Melancthon, tlie mildness and moderation of liis character ? A 
 person endowed with veneration, combined with charity, at- 
 tachment, and understanding, without pride, destructiveness, 
 and amativeness, will establish a system of rehgious observance 
 (juite different from his who is endowed with veneration com- 
 bined with covetiveness, pride, amativeness, and destructive- 
 ness, without charity and understanding. 
 
 Music is different in every nation. We easily distinguish 
 that of the ItaHans, Germans, French, Scots, &c. Even the 
 music of each composer offers something particular, and con- 
 noisseurs distinguish that of Gluck, Mozart, Haydn, and 
 others. It is the same with painting. All painters are colour- 
 ists, but there is a difference in their modes of colouring ; and 
 every one as regularly prefers certain colours as subjects. 
 Hence the difference in the pictures of Titian, Kembrandt, 
 Paul Veronese, Albano, and others. The canvas of Titian 
 shows reflexion and combination ; that of Paul Veronese his 
 fondness for architecture ; Albano again betrays his amorous 
 inclination ; and so of the rest. 
 
 The languages of different nations present fine examples of 
 modifications produced by the mutual influence of the faculties. 
 I even admit as a principle, that the spirit of its language 
 proclaims the predominating faculties of a nation. I have 
 spoken of a faculty which learns and knows the signs invented 
 by the superior intellectual faculties to express the feelings and 
 ideas. It is evident, therefore, that a nation with many feelings 
 or ideas must have many signs, and that the number of any one 
 kind of these indicates the energy of the faculty they represent. 
 Thus, the Greek and French languages have a greater number 
 
160 PHILOSOPHr OP THE MIND. 
 
 of tenses than the German and English. The French, on the 
 contrary^ is poor in expressions of reflexion and of sentiment ; 
 moreover, it has few that are figurative ; while the German 
 is rich in all of these, and has also many more signs of disjunc- 
 tion. Frenchmen have the organs of individuality and even- 
 tuality very much developed, and are therefore fond of facts ; 
 but their faculties of comparison and causality are commonly 
 smaller. In consequence of this, the French Institute does not 
 admit analogies as proofs ; these consist according to it only in 
 facts. The Germans, on the other hand, are fond of analogies, 
 perhaps too much so, for they compare and wish to explain 
 every thing. French expressions are individual, without any 
 comparison; therefore, similar sounds denote many different 
 objects. From this it appears that the discriminating faculties 
 are not very active in Frenchmen. The same deficiency is 
 evident in the very different names they give to very similar 
 objects. The German and English tongues are more syste- 
 matic than the French. The common language of Germany is 
 even conformable to the system of Linnaeus. Whilst the 
 French say, bouvreuil, chardonneret, pingon, Sec, the Ger- 
 mans and English preserve the generic name Jink, or finch, and 
 join to it a sign of distinction. In the same way, while the 
 French say, rasoir, couteau, canif, serpette, &c. ; in German 
 and Enghsh the generic name messer or knife is retained, and 
 a sign of particular destination affixed, as feder -messer, or 
 pen-knife; taf el -messer , or table-knife; &c. For this 
 reason also, the number of roots of the French language 
 is much more considerable, though that of its words be much 
 smaller than those of the German. Another proof that the 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 161 
 
 Prench language is very unsystematic, lies in the fact of its 
 very often having a substantive without its derivative adjective, 
 or the contrary, to designate the same idea. These illustra- 
 tions show the evident influence of the faculties generally, in 
 establishing languages. Thus the number and nature of signs 
 is in relation to the special powers of the mind which invent 
 them. The faculties of individuahty and eventuality being the 
 first active in children, we may understand why nouns and 
 verbs are soonest employed, and constitute almost the whole 
 artificial language of infancy ; and why all words may be re- 
 duced etymologically to these signs. By degrees, as other 
 faculties become active, other significations of signs are dis- 
 covered, even though their roots remain the same. 
 
 The construction of languages proves also the modified man- 
 ners of thinking of different nations. The French Hke facts, 
 and direct their attention to them, without first considering 
 causes. It is natural, indeed, to begin with the subject, then 
 to join the action of the subject, and after this to express other 
 circumstances. This the French do regularly. If cause and 
 efl*ect be considered, they always begin with the effect, and 
 relate the cause afterwards. The Germans proceed in a very 
 different manner, and their tongue in this respect requires 
 much more attention than the French. It also ordinarily be- 
 gins with the subject ; then follow expressions of the relation 
 between subject and object, both of which are mentioned ; and 
 lastly, the action of the subject upon the object is considered. 
 If an effect and its cause, again, are spoken of, the cause is 
 commonly denoted first and the effect after it. Certain languages 
 are known to admit of a great number pf inversions, others of 
 
 M 
 
162 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 very few. The former appear to me the more logical ; for it 
 seems natural that attention should be given first to the most 
 important object. The French language begins almost always 
 with the fact : hence French understandings consider the fact 
 as the most important. 
 
 From these observations upon language, we may conceive 
 that the spirit of no one language can become general. I am 
 of opinion that the spirit of the French will never please Ger- 
 mans ; and that Frenchmen, on the other hand, will always 
 dislike that of the German ; because the manner of thinking, 
 and the enchainment of ideas, are quite dissimilar in the two 
 nations. 
 
 I am further convinced that different philosophical systems 
 have resulted from various combinations of faculties in their 
 authors. He who has much of the faculty of eventuality will 
 never neglect facts. He who possesses less of it, and a great 
 deal of the faculties of comparison and causaHty, will begin to 
 philosophize with causes, and construct the world, instead of 
 observing its existence. He, on the contrary, in whom the 
 faculty of causality is less active, will reject this mode of consi- 
 deration, and may think it unphilosophical to admit a primitive 
 cause. The philosopher in whom the superior sentiments are 
 very energetic, directs his mind principally to moral principles, 
 and then we have various systems of virtue and morality, ac- 
 cording to the predominance of one or other of these. One 
 makes virtue consist in prudence, another in benevolence. One 
 considers all actions as done from love of praise or from vanity ; 
 another from self-esteem, from love of self-preservation, and 
 so on. Philosophers as well as other men think differently, and 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. IQ$ 
 
 each is also apt to consider his own manner of thinking and 
 feeling as the best ; his consciousness tells him it is so ; but I 
 think he errs who assumes himself as a measure of the absolute 
 nature of man. I opine that we ought, in examining human 
 nature, to make abstraction of ourselves entirely ; we ought 
 never to admit in man a feeling as the strongest, and a manner 
 of thinking as the best, solely because they are conformable to 
 our own ; nor ought we ever to deny in others what we our- 
 selves do not possess. We should observe mental operations, 
 in the conviction that all the essential kinds or particular facul- 
 ties inhere in human nature ; and we should observe how and 
 under what circumstances each faculty can and does act. In 
 this way I think it possible to determine the absolute nature of 
 man, and to become acquainted with the infinity of modifica- 
 tions occurring in individuals. 
 
 It would be easy to quote examples in the case of ev^'y 
 faculty, to prove the mutual influence of the whole ; but I shall 
 only dwell on this principle, in reference to abuses of the 
 faculties, for the sake of showing how pecuharities may be 
 explained which seem inconceivable to those who know nothing 
 of Phrenology. 
 
 Suppose, for instance, we are told that of two inveterate 
 thieves presented to us, one has never scrupled to rob churches 
 whilst the other has, the robber of the church may be dis^ 
 tinguished from the other : he who has the smallest organ of 
 veneration is the thief of the holy articles. Suppose we see two 
 women in confinement, and are told that one has stolen, and 
 that the other has concealed the stolen things ; the former will 
 have the organ of acquisitiveness larger, and that of the pro- 
 
 M 2 
 
164 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 Density to conceal less, while the second will have the organ of 
 secretivenesi wiuch developed. If we would detect the chief of 
 a robber band, we .examine the organs of self-esteem and deter- 
 minateness. We may distinguish an habitual vagabond tliief 
 from a coiner of false money by his having, besides the organ of 
 acquisitiveness, the organ of locality larger, and smaller organs 
 of cautiousness and of constructiveness. We may also distin- 
 guish dangerous and incorrigible criminals from the less des- 
 perate and more easily amended. They who have the organs 
 of the sentiments proper to man and of intellect very small, 
 but those of the propensities to fight, to destroy, to conceal, 
 and to acquire, very much developed, will be corrected with 
 far more difficulty than such as have the organ of acquisitive- 
 ness very much developed, but at the same time the organs of 
 the human faculties and of intellect large, who, in short, are 
 susceptible of moral will. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 On the difficulty of judging others. 
 
 Having examined the modified manifestations of the faculties 
 of the mind, natural order leads me to consider the difficulty of 
 judging, and of determining the motives and actions of others. 
 From the preceding views it follows, first, that the judgment 
 of every one as well as all his other functions must be modified. 
 If we but attend to the judgments of different individuals upon 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 165 
 
 the same object, if we note their reflections, anS consider what 
 each praises or blames, we may speedily be convinced by ex- 
 perience of the truth of this. It may, indeed, be admitted as 
 a principle, that every one judges according to the natural 
 modifications and the mutual influence of his faculties ; — that all 
 judge others by their own nature, or take themselves as the 
 measure of good and evil. Therefore it is that God has at 
 all times been anthropomorphosed ; every one has modified the 
 Divinity, and conceived a Creator conformable to his own man- 
 ner of judging and feeling. And when philosophers, morahsts, 
 and the virtuous, regard conscience as the severest judge of 
 malefactors generally, they suppose in these degenerate beings 
 the sentiment they feel themselves ; — they judge themselves 
 in the actions of others. In the same way, whatever is con- 
 formable to our manner of feeling and thinking is apt to-be 
 approved, and the contrary to be disapproved of. To judge 
 well, therefore, we must first distinguish the common nature of 
 man from the modifications of every individual ; and then we 
 must know our own nature and the modifications of our facul- 
 ties to avoid censuring or lauding others according to our own 
 favourite sentiments or ideas. We must, in fact, judge others 
 and ourselves by one and the same standard — absolute good 
 and evil*. 
 
 It is also difficult to judge of the actions of others, and to 
 determine their real motives, because the motives of the same 
 action may be quite different. Appearances are proverbially 
 deceitful. I shall quote but a few examples in illustration ; a 
 
 ♦ See page 116. 
 
166 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 very superficial glance, however, will, at all times, shew us 
 many motives for the same act done by different individuals^ 
 One gives to the poor from ostentation, another from duty, a 
 third from the hope of gaining heaven, and others again from 
 real charity. One wishes to know the history and situation of 
 the unfortunate, — ^if he be of his sect or party, S^c.^ before he 
 does good ; another relieves as soon as he sees misery, every 
 one is his neighbour, his left-hand knows not what his right- 
 hand does. One goes to church because it is usual ; another 
 to see or to be seen ; another to obtain the good opinion of the 
 pious ; and another from feelings of sincere veneration. One 
 is neat and clean only when he goes into society, while another 
 is so at all times, even in solitude. One cultivates an art or 
 science from vanity ; another because he is charmed with it ; 
 and a third because he finds it advantageous, 8^c. 
 
 It is the same with the abstaining from abuses. One, for 
 instance, from charity does not steaJ; another steals eveiy- 
 where except in the house where he lives; another robs 
 churches, but not the poor ; another does not steal, for fear of 
 being punished, for fear of injuring his reputation, or from 
 a sense of duty and justice, 8^c. In short, every one knows 
 that the same action he did, or abstained from, has not always 
 followed from the same motive. Thus, if an action or omission 
 is to be judged, it is necessary to consider whether it resulted 
 from the natural energy or inactivity of the respective faculty, 
 or whether other faculties exerted a determinative influence. 
 In judging others, we must remember that every faculty may 
 be active by its own energy or by the excitement of other 
 powers, and, again, may be inactive by its own insufficient 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 167 
 
 energy, or by the influence of other faculties. Hence it follows, 
 that, on one hand, every function does not suppose large de- 
 velopement of the respective organ ; and, on the other, that 
 organs may be greatly developed without producing abuses. 
 The organ of acquisitiveness may be very large without causing 
 theft ; the organ of amativeness much developed without occa- 
 sioning libertinism ; and so of the rest. The functions of very 
 large organs may be suppressed, though certainly not without 
 difficulty. The activity of every organ only produces a parti- 
 cular inclination ; the faculties mutually influence each other, 
 and regulate their subordination. Thus we cannot judge of 
 other persons from our own sentiments and intellectual endow- . 
 ments, nor by one or several, but by the whole of their faculties 
 together ; and then only censure or praise their actions as they 
 disagree or harmonize with the absolute moral nature of man. 
 
 The principle that every faculty may be active by its inter- 
 nal energy, answers the question so oftgn proposed in books : 
 What is the origin of the arts and sciences ? In examining 
 their source, writers commonly begin from remote antiquity, 
 and endeavour to show how external circumstances have pro- 
 duced and improved them. Without denying the importance 
 of external circumstances as exciting causes, I still think that 
 the most important, the primary cause, indeed, is overlooked, 
 that, namely, which exists in the conate organization ; the same, 
 in fact, as that of the instinctive labours of animals. Man in- 
 vents and cultivates arts and sciences in the same way and for 
 the same reason that the beaver builds its hut, and the night- 
 ingale sings. Every sentiment and every intellectual faculty 
 
168 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 ijiay act by its internal activity without external excitement ; 
 and this is the primitive source of the arts and sciences. 
 Scarcely could Handel speak, before he articulated musical 
 sounds, and his father, grieved at the child's propensity to 
 music, banished all musical instruments from his house ; but 
 this sublime genius was not to be extinguished by the caprice 
 of a mistaken parent ; for the boy contrived to get a little 
 clavichord into a garret, and applying himself to this after the 
 family retired to rest, he soon learnt to produce both melody 
 and harmony. 
 
 Nature, then, invented arts and sciences, and revealed them to 
 man by means of his organization. Arts and sciences are also 
 gradually perfected only in proportion as they who cultivate 
 them are possessed of energetic organs. 
 
 Inferences. 
 
 9 
 
 The consideration of the two sources of activity of the facul- 
 ties leads me to the following question : What actions in re- 
 ference to morality deserve the greatest confidence, those which 
 result from the goodness of nature, or those which are the effect of 
 virtue ? Though I think that good is always good in itself, and 
 must ever be approved of, I still allow that there is greater merit 
 in virtue than in natural goodness. I agree -with the definition 
 of virtue which all the great ancient and modern philosophers 
 have given, as Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Kant, and 
 others. I admit that those who have vanquished temptations 
 deserve particularly to be rewarded, and that by the possibility 
 
170 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 From the modifications of our faculties results still another 
 very important practical rule — indulgence. It is impossible 
 that others should feel and think on every point as we do. 
 Precisely as it is generally admitted, that the functions of the 
 external senses cannot be altogether the same, and without any 
 modification — and as it is proverbially said, De gustibus non 
 est disputandum, so also are the internal faculties modified, 
 and no one has a right to desire another to feel and think with 
 him. A certain indulgence is indispensable in society, I do 
 not maintain that every manner of feeling and thinking, and 
 every action, are to be tolerated. There is a common touch- 
 stone for all mankind. Feelings, thoughts, and actions, must 
 be conformable to the absolute conscience of man ; but all other 
 modifications ought to be permitted. This principle may be 
 applied to both sexes, and to all conditions, and to all ages ; 
 no friendship can be permanent without indulgence upon many 
 modifications in the manner of feeling and thinking. It is the 
 same in regard to religious and other opinions. St. Paul said 
 to the Romans, " One believeth that he may eat all things ; 
 another, who is weak, eateth herbs ; let not him that eateth 
 despise him that eateth not, and let not him that eateth not 
 judge him that eateth. One man esteemeth one day above 
 another, another esteemeth every day alike. Let eVery man 
 be fully persuaded in his own mind. We then that are strong 
 ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please our- 
 selves. The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but 
 righteousness and peace.*" 
 
171 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 On Sympathy and Antipathy. 
 
 The principle of the universally-modified manifestations of 
 the faculties leads me also to the consideration of sympathy 
 and antipathy. Throughout all nature, beings have relations 
 with each other. As we have seen that there are relations 
 between the faculties of the same individual, so there exist 
 relations between the faculties of different individuals. Indeed 
 it is generally observed, that certain beings cannot exist toge- 
 ther in society, while others dwell in harmony and peace. 
 Attraction and repulsion in physics, and affinities in chemistry, \ 
 are remarkable and well known ; and even among vegetables, 
 some species perish in the neighbourhood of certain others, 
 while many species increase and prosper very well together. 
 Among animals, the same law obtains, not only as different 
 species, but also as different individuals of the same kind are 
 concerned. Certain individuals of the same species manifest 
 a particular attachment, while others cannot bear with each 
 other. In a herd of cows, the bull is commonly more attach- 
 ed to one than to any of the rest ; birds, too, pair off by 
 choice, &c. 
 
 It is the same with mankind. Be it, however, remembered, 
 that I do not speak of sympathy and antipathy in the same 
 sense as many authors do when they discuss the sympathies 
 and antipathies of the stomach and the five senses. They 
 then describe what is called idiosyncrasy. Certain persons, 
 for instance, cannot digest a particular kind of food, cannot 
 
172 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 endure certain odours, are disgusted with particular savours, 
 and cannot look at certain figures, or touch certain bodies. 
 I have alreadv said that I admit idiosyncrasies in the internal 
 faculties ; but I here speak of the natural relations between 
 the faculties of different individuals. Some are, as it were, 
 born for each other, while others mutually feel an invincible 
 aversion. This may be explained in the following manner : 
 First, certain faculties of man are eminently social, as attach- 
 ment and charity ; others are quite the contrary, for instance, 
 selfishness and pride. Again, according to a general rule, 
 every faculty desires to be satisfied. Hence every one is 
 pleased with whatever is conformable to his manner of feeling 
 and thinking : every one wishes to enjoy ; therefore every one 
 likes those who procure or permit him enjoyments. It is 
 consequently evident, that there is no single and invariable com- 
 bination on which sympathy depends. These vary in the 
 same degree as the faculties of different individuals are mo- 
 dified. Before we can decide whether two individuals will 
 sympathize or not, we must consider all their faculties ; and 
 then we can see as certain that understanding must like un- 
 derstanding, and every intellectual faculty manifestations of 
 a similar power in others. The musician is pleased with 
 music ; a mathematician with mathematics ; a philosopher 
 with philosophical ideas ; a philologist with languages, &c. 
 In the same way, the sentiments proper to man look for and 
 sympathize with similar sentiments. A charitable man likes 
 mild and benevolent people ; the religious choose the society 
 of the devout, and so on. Thus, the faculties of the under- 
 standing and the sentiments proper to man fervour sociality. 
 
PRACTICAL CONSfDERATIONS. 173 
 
 It is not precisely tluis with tlie faculties common to man 
 and animal. Some of them, however, are social, as attach- 
 ment, and, in a certain degree, amativeness and philoprogeni- 
 tiveness; but the greatest number are eminently antisocial. 
 The interested, for instance, do not like the interested, except 
 in as far as their own selfishness is satisfied. Proud persons 
 cannot suffer others endowed with the same feeling:. The 
 haughty and interested not only dislike one another, but are 
 also dishked by those who are possessed of the superior senti- 
 ments. This is the case, too, with the propensities to fight 
 and to destroy. Thus every one will sympathize with those 
 in whose society his faculties are satisfied ; and antipathy will 
 be proportionate to the obstacles in the way of this, that is, 
 to the prevention of enjoyment. 
 
 It is the animal nature which causes so many unhappy and 
 ill-assorted marriages. Amativeness or adhesiveness brings 
 husband and wife together; perhaps they have thought 
 of money, beauty, sometimes of health and intelligence, but 
 they have forgotten the other dispositions, which are inde- 
 pendent of physical love and of attachment, which cannot be 
 bought, and which no intelligence can give, but which, never- 
 theless, contribute greatly to the happiness of those who bind 
 themselves by indissoluble ties. All the other numerous 
 faculties which are not satisfied soon change the original sym- 
 pathy of the couple into indifference or even into antipathy, 
 and then follow disorder and misery. 
 
It^ PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 On the Ha'ppiness of Ma7i, 
 
 " I HAVE travelled over the world," says Volney *, " I have 
 visited villages and towns, and perceiving misery and desola- 
 tion over all, my soul has been deeply afflicted by the ills 
 which weigh heavily upon mankind. With a sigh I have 
 said, And is man then born only to suffer misery and pain ? 
 I shall ask the ashes of legislators, how empires rise and 
 fall ; in what reside the causes of the prosperity or decay of 
 nations ; on what principles the peace of society and the hapi- 
 piness of mankind must be based ?*" 
 
 Reason compels us to think that the Lord of the universe, 
 in his goodness and perfection, destined man to be happy. It 
 is, however, certain, that to whatever side we turn our eyes, 
 we perceive individuals who suffer, who are unhappy, and 
 who lament their lot. Let us first examine in what the hap- 
 piness of man consists. 
 
 I have already mentioned that the expressions happiness and 
 unhappiness are synonymous with pleasure and pain ; that every 
 faculty of thepind being active, desires, and that being satisfied, 
 it procures pleasure, or one kind of happiness. This, conse- 
 quently, cannot be the same in all individuals, since dispositions 
 differ universally. One is amused by fishing or hunting, another 
 is fond of sensual pleasures ; one finds his happiness in the study 
 of the arts, another in the examination of metaphysical ques- 
 
 * Ruins, c, iv. 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 175 
 
 tions ; and another in religious proselytism. Servile minds 
 despair of supporting existence in a free state, while the 
 truly civilized consider liberty as the greatest good upon earth. 
 Thus, every one individually finds his happiness in the gra- 
 tification of his peculiar faculties ; in the same way as the 
 sheep whilst feeding on grass, and the tiger whilst devouring 
 its prey, are happy, each in its own manner. It is also con- 
 ceivable that the same thing may give pleasure to one, may be 
 indifferent to another, and insupportable to a third ; thence 
 that he is in the wrong who would measure the happiness of 
 others by his own. 
 
 The happiness of man may be divided according to his 
 fundamental faculties into oorporeal, affective^ and intellectual, 
 and according to his two natures into animal or inferior, and 
 human or superior. 
 
 It is a matter of fact, that by far the greater number look 
 for their individual happiness in the satisfaction of the faculties 
 common to man and animals, as of physical love, self-esteem, 
 the love of approbation, the love of acquiring, and so on. In 
 certain countries, inferior pleasures are alone permitted ; even 
 religious enjoyments are made to consist in puerile and super- 
 stitious ceremonies. Means of subsistence are abundantly 
 provided ; the people have plenty to eat and to drink, but 
 intellectual and all pleasures beyond the range of mere ani- 
 maUty are interdicted. 
 
 Very few cultivate the arts and sciences for the sake of the 
 pleasure alone they derive from them ; it is mostly done to 
 satisfy some inferior desire. Finally, those who are happy by 
 the exercise of the faculties proper to man are extremely rare. 
 
176 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 They are those who, as St. Paul says, " have the law writ- 
 ten in their hearts ;*" those who in religion are called chosen ; 
 those who find their happiness in actions of charity, and in 
 the abnegation of selfish desires ; those who, in the eyes of 
 common persons, pass for dreamers or fools. 
 
 Let us now examine the causes of the unhappiness of man- 
 kind. The first depends on the actual state of the funda- 
 mental faculties, and on the different degrees of their activity, 
 or on the struggle between the two natures of man, and on 
 the resistance of the inferior to the superior. For, as the 
 moral laws exist, and as few feel naturally disposed to submit 
 to them, the greater number have to combat their animal pro- 
 pensities. Now, as pain is felt each time any inclination is 
 opposed, or any law is obeyed, which would willingly be 
 eluded, or whose necessity is not understood, it is obvious 
 that in the actual state of things the virtuously good must spend 
 a life of suffering. 
 
 These ideas are admirably developed in the doctrine of 
 Christianity. Morality is there declared the aim which must 
 be obtained, whether with ease or with difficulty, with pleasure 
 or with pain, through love or through fekr. The great dif- 
 ficulty of vanquishing the brute nature is acknowledged, but 
 the necessity of fulfilling the law or will of the Creator is stiJl 
 insisted on. For this, therefore, reward is also in proportion 
 to the pains of success ; eternal life is promised to those who 
 gain the victory, and the "joy in Heaven over one sinner that 
 repenteth shall be more than over ninety-and-nine just persons 
 which need not repentance *." 
 
 * St. Luke XV. 7. • 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 177 
 
 The second cause of unhappiness is the great activity of 
 the powers common to man and animals, altogether indepen- 
 dently of the moral relation of the faculties. Many of those 
 who have no moraKty, or who neglect its voice without pain, 
 are still very unhappy by reason of the impossibility of satis- 
 fying their excessively energetic inferior feelings. Philosophers 
 allude to this unfortunate state when they speak of wants, 
 and say, that man, to be happy, ought to have few wants. 
 
 The expression want is here synonymous with desire, is 
 consequently an effect of every faculty's activity, and is as 
 various in kind as the fundamental faculties ; each want indi- 
 vidually being proportionate to the activity of the power from 
 which it results. Wants, it follows, like faculties, are either 
 of an inferior or a superior nature. To be just is a want for 
 the righteous, as to take nourishment is for him who is hungry. 
 As, however, the animal faculties are the most generally active , 
 in man, if wants are spoken of, we commonly think of inferior 
 powers, as of self-esteem, ambition, personal interest, &c. Now, 
 as happiness depends on the gratification of active faculties, 
 and unhappiness on their non-satisfaction, it is obvious why 
 those who are fond of ostentation, luxury, riches, distinc- 
 tions, &c., are commonly discontented or unhappy : it is im- 
 possible to appease their wants or desires. 
 
 Thus, wants or desires, or, in other words, the activity of 
 the faculties, are not the immediate cause of happiness or un- 
 happiness. The whole of the mental powers acting witli 
 energy, may be sources either of bliss or of misery. This 
 follows on the possibility or impossibility of gratifying their 
 impulses. He who has many faculties active which he can 
 
 N 
 
178 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 satisfy, is more happy than the man who has no desire what- 
 ever ; it is, however, better to be without desire than to possess 
 very active faculties with no means of ministering to tlieir 
 cravings. Even those who are eminently endowed with the 
 superior faculties, and who would see every one happy, find a 
 kind of misery in the injustice of mankind. The unfortunate 
 of this kind, however, are by no means the most numerous. 
 
 Those who have studied the doctrine of wants have not 
 distinguished the faculties sufficiently from their satisfaction. 
 This may vary, and produce both good and evil. Religious 
 sentiments are. inherent in human nature, but they have been 
 fearfully abused, and done an immensity of mischief to man- 
 kind. Philosophers do ill merely to dwell on the absurdities 
 and crimes these feelings have occasioned; they ought also, 
 and rather, to indicate the manner of cultivating and directing 
 these very superior parts of our nature, to the increasing of 
 our own and our neighbour's happiness. Religion itself must 
 never be ridiculed ; certain actions, however, called religious, are 
 but too fit butts for mockery. If the vain and ostentatious be 
 prevented from carrying images of "saints in procession through 
 the streets, they will still invent new divinities, and show them 
 with pomp in the churches. It would be of essential importance 
 to enlighten the understandings of such men. We can live 
 on many and various sorts of aliments, and credulity may 
 admit reasonable things as well as absurdities. 
 
 It is the study of human nature which shows how ignorance, 
 both in governors and the governed, is the principal cause of 
 unhappiness. Our ignorance in regard to the laws of nature 
 is the most to be lamented ; for as they are constantly neglected 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. l^^ 
 
 and infringed, we are continually punished, and never know- 
 wherefore. Moreover, the principles of several governments 
 being atrocious, frequently-recurring revolutions were unavoid- 
 able, for man naturally desires to be happy ; religion too, being 
 superstitious, was of necessity exposed to change in proportion 
 as intellect improved. Many causes of unhappiness were also 
 recognised in their effects, such as ignorance, stupidity, cre- 
 duKty, want of justice, and base passions, but the circum- 
 stances or conditions constituting these causes were not known. 
 Selfishness has, in truth, the greatest influence on almost all ; 
 all expect rewards for their actions, if not in this world, at 
 least, in that which is to come. Philosophers, however, must 
 avow their ignorance in regard to the cause of this so universal 
 selfishness. 
 
 It therefore becomes extremely interesting to examine why 
 mankind are generally dull, credulous, self-interested, full of 
 vanity and pride; in brief, why their brute nature is so active, 
 or why they place happiness in the satisfaction of inferior 
 feehngs, and carry in themselves the cause of their own an^ 
 of others' misery. 
 
 Philosophers, moralists, and all religious systems treat of 
 this subject. Rehgious expositions are always founded on 
 marvellous conceptions, but these, as beyond the reach of 
 observation, and oftentimes unreasonable, requiring to be pro- 
 posed as articles of behef, do not fall within our province. 
 Philosophers and moralists again have advanced hypotheses 
 which nature and observation did not confirm. Phrenology 
 alone furnishes a palpable explanation, by showing that the 
 organic conditions on which manifestations of the mind depend, 
 
 n2 
 
180 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 rather favour the exhibition of the animal than of the pecu- 
 liarly human part of man's nature. I speak here as an observer 
 only ; I describe what exists in the world at the present day ; 
 I pretend not to know what the cerebral organization was at 
 the beginning, or whether it has suffered any change ; but, in 
 the conviction that the manifestation of the mind depends on 
 the brain, I dare to say, that the wickedness of mankind, or 
 the disobedience to the peculiarly human nature, will continue 
 so long as the brain remains such as it is. I dare answer in 
 the most positive manner the following passage of Volney* : 
 " Man who despairest of mankind, hast thou scrutinized the 
 organization of sensibility, in order to determine with precision, 
 whether the motives which dispose man to happiness are essen- 
 tially weaker than those which remove him from it ?" But I 
 still say with him, *^ If at one time, and in one place, certain 
 individuals become better, why should not the whole mass 
 improve ? If partial societies become more perfect, why should 
 it not happen with society at large ?" I, however, conclude 
 that it is indispensable to study the nature of man, and to 
 proceed accordingly. 
 
 Before we inquire into what is to be done to better the 
 lot of mankind, let us first see why so few find pleasure in 
 cultivating their intellectual faculties, and why almost all seek 
 enjoyment in gratifying some one or other of the sentiment^. 
 Our every action, indeed, which relates to others, even to God, 
 and in which individual happiness is found, springs from 
 activity of the affective faculties. We, for the most part, 
 
 * Ruins, cli, xiv. 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 181 
 
 only cultivate our understanding as a means of satisfying 
 certain feelings, especially self-esteem, love of distinctions, and 
 desire of gain. 
 
 The cerebral mass devoted to the intellectual operations is, 
 to that destined to the affective functions, scarcely as one 
 finger is to the whole hand ; and the feelings act with greater 
 energy than the intellectual faculties, in the same ratio as the 
 will effects more with the whole hand than with a single finger. 
 These observations are founded on the invariable laws of 
 nature, and it is impossible to insist too much on the error 
 of Idealogians, in considering understanding as the chief and 
 fundamental cause of our actions, and of philosophers gene- 
 rally, in overlooking the influence of the brain on the mani- 
 festations of the affective powers. Let us now examine the 
 question : 
 
 What must be done to better the Lot of Mankind ? 
 
 The friends of man have at all times been interested in this 
 matter. They have proposed many and various means, natural 
 and supernatural, according to the ideas they had conceived 
 of the cause of human misery. Hitherto, however, there has 
 been nothing effected. From this I infer that the measures 
 employed were insufficient. In my work on Education, I 
 particularly consider all that I deem requisite to improve the 
 species. Here I confine myself to a few general indications 
 which are commonly neglected by those who exercise some 
 influence on society. 
 
 It is evident, that to promote human happiness, the causes 
 
18^ PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 ♦ 
 
 which oppose it are to be removed, or, at least, diminished. 
 f Ail that can augment or excite the animal nature is therefore to 
 \ be avoided, and every condition that may develope the faculties 
 proper to man is to be encouraged. Now, it is obvious that, 
 to effect this, the fundamental powers of the mind must be de- 
 termined, and the conditions of their manifestations made 
 known. This once done, moralists will see that to preach 
 moral principles, to give alms, to found charity-houses, and to 
 cultivate the arts and sciences^ is not sufficient; they will 
 Apprehend that the evil is to be attacked at the root, that is, 
 that means are to be employed to improve the natural disposi- 
 tions, teovemments also will be shewn not to be serious in their 
 desirFTor morality, so long as they encourage lotteries, coun- 
 tenance games of hazard, and keep mercenary soldiers in pay. 
 Whatever may be done, however, the progress will necessarily 
 be slow. Governments must, as a first step, begin by nourishing 
 pure intentions, by giving up all selfish and exclusionary 
 views, and in all their particular regulations, by favouring 
 general happiness. The principal object in working for the 
 universal weal is to strengthen the peculiarly human faculties, 
 and to enfeeble those which are common to man and animals. 
 The importance of the faculties proper to man, in regard to 
 general happiness, is a point that cannot be too strongly nor 
 too often insisted upon. These are satisfied by their own 
 functions : the just, the benevolent, the religious, and the 
 disinterested, need not foreign aid to satisfy their noble feel- 
 ings. Inferior^ inclinations, on the contrary, almost always 
 depend on the caprices of others for their gratification. The 
 egotist, for instance, is opposed in his undertakings by those 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 183 
 
 who, like him, think chiefly of themselves. The ambitious 
 man is unhappy if he be not approved of, or honoured to the 
 extent he thinks he has deserved. He who, prompted by 
 charity, does good, finds his reward in the deed itself; but 
 he who does good to gain approbation, or gratitude, is liable 
 to be deceived, and, in the very act, often prepares liimself a 
 source of sorrow. In proportion, therefore, as the animal 
 nature shall lose in energy, and the peculiarly human faculties 
 gain in strength, the sum of human happiness will increase. 
 
 As man, in the actual state of things, cannot be left to 
 himself, as his actions must be directed by social institutions^ 
 it is much to be wished that these were conformable to the 
 invariable laws of natural morality. I fear, that notwith- 
 standing the sincerest love of truth and the purest intentions, 
 some means which are useless, and even noxious, will be re- 
 sorted to, on account of human nature not being sufficiently 
 known. 
 
 Let those whose duty it is to direct society, reflect on the 
 two natures of man ; on the superiority of the one over the 
 other ; and, further., on the faculties which compose each ; 
 let them be convinced that every fundamental power exists of 
 itself; that charity is not the result of faith, nor faith of 
 charity ; and that all the faculties, though existing indepen- 
 dently, may be combined, and mutually aid and excite each 
 other. 
 
 As the predominance of the animal faculties is the pnn- 
 cipal cause of human misery, their energy must, by all means, 
 be diminished ; no fundamental power, however, can be an- 
 nihilated. I have explained my ideas sufficiently, not to be 
 
184 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 suspected of speaking in favour of any arbitrary regulation ; 
 yet I shall always insist on the necessity of restraining the 
 animal faculties by those proper to man. In my opinion, 
 consequently, personal, as well as moral liberty, is limited. I 
 have already treated of moral liberty ; I shall here add my 
 views of that which is personal. 
 
 Of Personal Liberty, 
 
 Man, it is said, is born free. This proposition has been 
 used by some authors in a very extensive signification. Every 
 one, they have said, may do whatever he pleases. This inter- 
 pretation, however, is incompatible with the constitution of 
 the human mind. Let us observe the order of nature, that 
 we may understand the will of the Creator. 
 
 Personal liberty we see is first limited by the laws of nature. 
 Conception, birth, growth, health, and every function of 
 vitality, as subjected to positive circumstances, force us at 
 once to look on man as very dependent. Further, man de- 
 pends entirely upon others during his long infancy. And, 
 again, as a social being, he has duties to fulfil, and rights to 
 reclaim ; now, the idea of mutual obligation is incompatible 
 \\^th unbounded, or that liberty which admits every kind of 
 individual gratification. We must live and permit others to 
 live ; we must do our duty as child, as parent, and as citizen. 
 The elucidation of these points belongs to the study of the 
 right or law of nature. 
 
 The personal liberty of man is also limited by the reality 
 of his two natures, and by the superiority of the one. Thg 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 185 
 
 animal faculties must be subordinate to the powers proper to 
 man, and the true Christian is still the slave of justice. This 
 principle, the touch-stone of the excellence or imperfection of 
 civil laws, bounds at the same time those who govern and 
 those who are governed, and proves clearly that by the will of 
 the Creator the personal Mberty of man is limited. It has, 
 indeed, been said repeatedly, that without morality no society 
 can exist, and that liberty is not licentiousness. This is 
 strictly true. 
 
 Finally, the faculties proper to man may deviate from their 
 natural destination, and this they do each time they act sepa- 
 rately. Benevolence without justice and reflection, may do 
 much evil, and justice without benevolence may be too severe. 
 Thus even the most noble parts of man's nature are hmited, 
 and kept in check by each other ; all must act in harmony 
 to ehcit good. 
 
 The truth, that personal liberty is very much circumscribed, 
 is never neglected without great disorders following. We must, 
 however, add that no one has any natural right arbitrarily 
 and from selfish motives to hmit the personal liberty of 
 others. Volney says, '' Wheresoever I cast my eye, whatever 
 the period of which I think, I find the same principles of 
 increase or of destruction, of elevation and of decHnc. If ever 
 a nation be powerful, or an empire prosper, its conventional 
 laws are conformable to those of nature. If, on the contrary, 
 a state sink in ruin or be dissolved, the laws are imperfect or 
 vicious, or the government is corrupt and violates the laws." 
 Civil restrictions ought to be the mere application of those of 
 nature ; they ought to be the same for every member of the 
 
186 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 cbmmunity, and the aim of their imposition — the general hap- 
 piness. Nature applies its laws constantly and indiscrimi- 
 nately; nature is incorruptible, and makes no exceptions. 
 Human regulations alone are liable to this reproach. Governors 
 and the governed are subjected to the same laws of propa- 
 gation, of nutrition, of health, disease, and death. Who can 
 deny that nature is equally constant in the application of its 
 moral laws ? Happy period when every one will be obliged 
 to conform his conduct to them ! 
 
 In order to elucidate my ideas on the necessity of submitting 
 the individual desires to the natural laws of morality, I shall 
 quote physical love, attachment, self-love or covetiveness, and 
 the love of approbation, and whatever I say of them will apply 
 to the other feelings common to man and animals. The subor- 
 dination of the animal nature to proper humanity seems to me 
 as necessary to the happiness of mankind as is attention to 
 matters used as food to individual preservation. A poisonous 
 substance can never become wholesome aliment, and any 
 action inimical to the happiness of mankind will never Ibse its 
 essential and immoral character. 
 
 Is it permitted to limit physical love in society ? The fa- 
 culties proper to man decide the question. For as these are 
 destined to general happiness, physical love being an animal 
 feeling, must be restrained whenever it acts in opposition to 
 their dictates. Now, there can be no doubt that the number 
 of inhabitants in a country influences their state of being. 
 Too crowded a population imavoidably causes misery and 
 degeneration of the species. Both natural and Christian mo- 
 rality forbid us to exterminate or to forsake such unhappy 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 187 
 
 beings as exist ; society is even bound to take care of thenij 
 but their further multiplication, as well as every other cause 
 that militates against general happiness, may be lawfully op- 
 posed. 
 
 The most enlightened pvibKcists admit that population in* 
 creases in the ratio of the means of subsistence, in the same 
 way as all living beings multiply or perish, according as they 
 are well or ill supplied with nourishment. Vegetation prospers 
 if the soil be well manured. Birds that live on insects are 
 more or less numerous in districts, according to the quantity of 
 food they afford. Herbivorous animals abound in lands which 
 are rich in forage, and countries are peopled in proportion 
 as they furnish the means of living. It is true that a greater 
 number of sober and temperate than of gluttonous and lux- 
 urious persons may live in a given district, but nourishment is 
 fetill the principal condition influencing population. The 
 equilibrium between ahment and consumers is always pre- 
 served ; sometimes, however, at the expense of a vast quan- 
 tity of individual suffering. Were it not more meritorious, 
 therefore, in governments, and more beneficial to the commu- 
 nity at large, entirely to prevent the evil which becomes ne- 
 cessary to diminish the number of inhabitants ? Since beggars, 
 and those with hereditary dispositions to diseases, only proe. 
 pagate to the detriment of society and to entail misery on 
 their progeny, were it not better to prevent them from marriage 
 altogether ? 
 
 Let those who think differently reflect on the destination 
 of mankind, and on all that is done, or rather neglected in 
 
^. 
 
 188 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 society as relates to marriage, and they will not, without dis- 
 tinction, defend personal liberty in regard to propagation. 
 
 Both civil and religious regulations have, in some instances, 
 restrained the desire, or even abstracted the power of propa- 
 gation. Libertinism is interdicted in all countries, and adul- 
 tery is punished as a crime. Soldiers and sailors are prohi- 
 bited from marrying; they, however, are the stoutest and 
 best made men ; for bodily weakness and disease exempt and 
 exclude from the mihtary and naval service. Now, if society 
 can prevent the choice of its youth from propagating, nay, if 
 it think proper to make them expose their lives for the 
 common welfare, as it is said, why should it not also have the 
 right to interdict the marriages of those who propagate to the 
 common calamity ? 
 
 Let us further reflect on the celibacy of priests of the 
 Romish Church, and even on the example of Christ's apostles, 
 who were advised against marriage. Now, if the prohibition 
 of marriage be just and necessary as soldiers, sailors, and 
 priests are concerned, and if polygamy in general be inad- 
 missible, why should the propagation of infirmities and vices 
 be endured ? I think that marriages ought to be regulated 
 by the rule of natural morality, and that this is an essential 
 condition to general happiness. More details on this subject 
 are given in my work on Education. 
 
 Another point conformable to the civil laws of all countries, 
 but contrary to the morahty of nature and Christianity, con- 
 cerns exclusive love of every kind. Love of our family and 
 of our country are natural it is true, but both are common to 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 189 
 
 man and animals, hence they must be subordinate to universal 
 charity. Further, attachment to those around us is laudable, 
 but justice and truth are to precede every other consideration. 
 The man must always triumph over the animal; hence we 
 must prefer truth and general happiness before our country ; we 
 must give up national pride and the innumerable prejudices 
 and evils that result from it for the sake of entire humanity. 
 Let us appreciate things in themselves and independently of 
 occasions or causes. The Samaritan who has compasssion on 
 an unfortunate Israelite, dresses his wounds, and takes care of 
 him, is truly his neighbour, and not the Jew or the Levite who 
 looks at him and passes on. On the score of universal love, man, 
 indeed, generally, and pretended Christians particularly, are 
 very far behind. There is no nation which practises this 
 noble precept of Christianity, and nothing but a perfect 
 knowledge of human nature will ever incline men to follow 
 it, or induce them to change the erroneous and pernicious 
 opinions they entertain on this subject. 
 
 I arrive at the third point, which is equally delicate and 
 contested, but indispensable to general happiness ; I mean the 
 restriction of selfishness. This feeling is the most formidable 
 of all the enemies of mankind. It particularly induces neglect 
 of the natural laws of morality, and divides society ; it excites 
 one individual against another, family against family, and 
 nation against nation ; it saps the foundations of empires, for 
 it sells places, justice, and even puts up Heaven and immorta- 
 lity at a price ; it concentrates all power in an individual, and 
 establishes absolute governments, &c. We may therefore ask 
 
IM PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 whether society has the right of restraining the desire to 
 acquire, and how far it may enforce it ? 
 
 The answer is similar to that given to the questions impli- 
 cating the other animal faculties. The desire to acquire is a 
 fundamental power, and cannot be annihilated by any enact- 
 ment ; it is a strong motive exciting the other aptitudes and 
 dispositions, and may be most usefully employed ; however, 
 to what extent its activity is admissible is a point not yet 
 determined. As an animal feeling, it must necessarily be 
 subordinate to the moral nature; indeed, as all countries hay^ 
 laws against its abuses, the propriety of limiting its desires is 
 evident. 
 
 We are, now-a-days, permitted openly to maintain the 
 injustice and the violation of natural morality and of true 
 Christian principles, committed when individuals are secured 
 in the possession of pecuKar privileges and immunities. We 
 may now also dare to say that personal merit is preferable to 
 the pride of ancestry ; that it is more just to reward talents 
 than incapacity ; and that every one should be obliged to 
 exercise his natural powers to add to the common stock of 
 industry, and ought only to reap the fruits of his own exertions. 
 
 This, the effect of civiHzation, is a great step towards na- 
 tural morality — the only basis of general happiness ; but I 
 dare maintain that it is not yet sufficient to render it para- 
 mount. The obstacle lies in the inequality of natural talents, 
 and in the weakness of the moral sentiments, in by far the 
 greater number of individuals. So long as every one shall 
 work merely for his own interest, fortunes will necessarily be 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. J^ 
 
 unequal, A few will succeed each other in opulence, and 
 many will dwell in poverty and misery. This inconveniency 
 is mentioned in the Christian system ; a difference of natural 
 gifts is recognised; but all are commanded to employ their 
 endowments to the common advantage. 
 
 In this, as in every discussion having the actions of man 
 for its object, I start from the principle that natural morality 
 ought to govern mankind, and that general happiness is pre- 
 ferable to that of individuals. He then who uses his faculties 
 to the furtherance of the common weal, ought to enjoy full 
 liberty, and to meet encouragement in his noble purposes ; 
 while all who think only of their private interest are to be 
 superintended, lest the commonwealth suffer by their under- 
 takings. 
 
 Great manufactories, for instance, which are so apt to ruin 
 the body and the mind of those engaged in them, must be 
 overlooked ; no one has the right to make others vicious and 
 unhappy, that he may procure enjoyments or amass riches ; 
 and if personal morality suffice not to prevent the doing evil, 
 society has a prime right to interfere, and, guided by general 
 morahty, to supply all that is defective. 
 
 Hence, universal happiness, as it is the ^m of legislation 
 in general, must be the basis of all enactments relative to 
 property. So long as individuals shall be suffered to collect 
 riches without limits, the ca;uses of misery and of slavery will 
 endure. The poor will sell themselves to the rich, and the 
 rich will find easy means of imposing their arbitrary will as 
 law upon society. 
 
 This, however, is a subject surrounded by innumerable 
 
19S PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 difficulties. Much has been written upon it, but all has not yet 
 rendered it clear in every one of its points. Property must 
 be respected, otherwise civil wars and the dissolution of society 
 would be unavoidable ; but, again, if in the regulations con- 
 cerning property, general happiness be neglected, the order of 
 things established cannot be permanent. Fortunes get more 
 and more concentrated, the equilibrium is disturbed, and in 
 the end the rich to maintain possession are obliged to repel by 
 force the attacks of the poor, who think themselves strong in 
 their numbers. The division of property is, therefore, a ne- 
 cessary condition to general happiness ; hence, primogeniture 
 is inadmissible, and opposed to natural morality, which recog- 
 nises reward as well-bestowed for personal merit alone. I have 
 already said, that if it be unjust to punish children for the 
 faults of parents, it cannot be just to reward them for the 
 merits of sires ; I add- 
 That to me it seems necessary for the nations which 
 would secure a permanent existence, to fix the maximum of 
 the property that may be acquired, as well as the conditions, 
 viz., natural morality, in conformity with which it may be 
 amassed ; or else, as it seems fair that every one should enjoy 
 the fruits of his labour, parents might, under certain con- 
 ditions, be permitted to acquire to the extent they pleased, 
 but still have the power of transmitting a certain sum only to 
 their children when arrived at the age of maturity, while the 
 rest of their gains should revert to the commonwealth, and be 
 employed in purposes of public usefulness. This would be 
 the best way of doing justice to the community, and of 
 preventing idleness, that foster-parent of vice. 
 
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 193 
 
 History proves that nations attain the highest prosperity 
 when every one is permitted to work for his peculiar advan- 
 tage ; but history also proves that tliis prosperity is not per- 
 manent ; its very causes involve the elements of decline ; for 
 luxury, indolence, moral corruption, degeneracy of body, and 
 feebleness of mind, are consequences of its temporary en- 
 durance, and these are the sure precursors tp the death of 
 empires. I leave this discussion to those who are occupied 
 with politics. I am particularly interested in calling the at- 
 tention of all thinking people to the necessity of founding 
 society on the broad basis of natural morality, itself the 
 solcj sure, and unalterable foundation of universal welfare. 
 This ground is more stable than that which sensual pleasures 
 or the arts and sciences can supply. The indulgence of in- 
 ferior appetites degrades, morahty ennobles human nature, 
 and is indispensable, whilst the arts and sciences are mere 
 embellishments of existence. 
 
 To impress still more deeply the importance of subordi- 
 nating the animal feelings to the faculties proper to man, I 
 shall speak summarily of the love of approbation. This sen- 
 timent exists in animals and in man, and exercises a powerful 
 influence over all our actions in society. Still to permit it, 
 unbounded activity is a very great error. Nations in whom it 
 prevails are scarcely fit for a free government, servility, so to 
 speak, is their natural bent. Blinded by external appear- 
 ances, they overlook the common welfare. Titles, decorations, 
 encomiums are effectual instruments in the hands of their 
 governors to enslave them. 
 
 Two prime errors are to be guarded against ; in the first 
 
 o 
 
194 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 place, distinction is never to be conferred on account of 
 actions resulting from the animal nature, undirected by the 
 superior faculties, and again, distinction ought never to be the 
 aim of human actions. 
 
 From all I have said then, it follows that I consider the 
 practice of natural morality as indispensable to the welfare of 
 mankind at large, and that all social institutions ought to be 
 founded on this natural morahty, which has been, is, and will 
 ever be, invariable. Individually I call those happy who, 
 without difficulty, subject their animal nature to the faculties 
 proper to man; who, for instance, are satisfied with such 
 things as are merely necessary — with their daily bread ; who 
 desire not superfluities, luxuries, riches, or distinctions ; who 
 taste of all pleasures in moderation, enjoying every thing, but 
 abusing nothing ; who cultivate art or science for the delights 
 it affords; who in every situation do their duty, and who 
 stand not in need of others' or foreign aid, to satisfy their 
 active faculties. Unhappy, on the other hand, are almost all 
 who look for their personal welUbeing in things which are 
 opposed to natural morality ; who have many and active 
 faculties, the satisfaction of which depends on others ; whose 
 inferior faculties, in short, are the most energetic, especially if 
 they injure the health, and if their indulgence be expensive. 
 
195 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 Explanation of different Philosophical Expressions. 
 
 Nothing is more vague than the language of philosophy. 
 Many expressions have several significations, and almost every 
 term in use has been invented to designate actions, and not the 
 faculties which produce them. To make this difference felt, I 
 shall collect several of the most common words, and in one 
 column give their usual signification, in another their expla* 
 nation according to the fundamental faculties, referring the 
 reader to the passages either in the physiological or in the 
 philosophical part of this work, in which the terms as they 
 occur are more particularly explained. 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Absolute, 
 
 Unconditional ; not relative. Nothing but God is absolute. 
 
 In mati every thing is rela* 
 tive and conditional. 
 
 Admiration, 
 
 A tribute paid by individuals It is an affection of the sense 
 to whatever appears to them of marvellousness. 
 good arid excellent. 
 
 o 2 
 
196 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Adoration. 
 
 The external homage paid to The eifect of the sense of ve- 
 the Divinity. neration. 
 
 Affectation. 
 
 A singular manner of speak- It results from the love of ap- 
 ing; the making an external probation, when not com- 
 appearance in order to at- bined with understanding ; 
 tract the attention of others. it increases in combination 
 
 with secretiveness and ide- 
 ality. 
 
 Affections, 
 
 Certain states of the mind. They are the modes of being 
 
 affected of the fundamental 
 faculties. Vid. p. 35 of this 
 volume. 
 
 Ambition. 
 
 Great desire of preferment and An effect of great activity of 
 distinction. the love of approbation ap- 
 
 plied to things of impor- 
 tance. Vid. p.nSofPlu-e. 
 nology. 
 
 Anger. 
 
 A violent emotion with an in- A disagreeable affection of 
 clination to revenge. combativeness. 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 197 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Apathy, 
 
 The quality of not feeling; Inactivity of every fundamen- 
 
 exemption from passion ; tal faculty ; it is partial, or 
 
 freedom from mental exci- more or less general, 
 tatioii. 
 
 Ardour. 
 
 Heat, or eagerness in action. Great activity of every funda- 
 mental power. 
 
 Art 
 
 A word used in opposition to The result of individual pow- 
 nature ; something effected ers of the mind, 
 by skill and dexterity. 
 
 Attention. 
 
 Application of the mind t;o The result of the individual 
 any subject. intellectual faculties. Vid 
 
 p. 14 of this volume. 
 
 ft 
 
 Attrition, 
 
 Grief of sin arising from the A disagreeable affection of the 
 fear of punishment. sense of conscientiousness 
 
 caused by that of venera- 
 tion, assisted by benevo- 
 lence and circumspection. 
 
198 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Beautiful, 
 
 Each agreeable sensation by It designs the harmonious 
 means of hearing and seeing. relations between external 
 
 impressions and the intel- 
 lectual faculties of the 
 mind, principally the senses 
 of extension, configuration, 
 colouring, tone, and order. 
 
 Belief. 
 
 Credit given to something Hope disposes to belief; hope 
 which we know not of our- and marvellousness produce 
 selves. religious belief. 
 
 Benevolence. 
 
 Disposition to do good. A fundamental faculty. Vid. 
 
 p. 187 of Phrenology. 
 
 Charming, 
 
 Pleasing in the highest de- Springs from a high degree of 
 gree. satisfaction of every funda- 
 
 mental faculty. 
 
 Compassion, 
 
 Painful sympathy. A disagreeable affection, or 
 
 mode of action of benevo* 
 lence. 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 199 
 
 Common Significations. Explanations according to the Faculties. 
 
 Confusio7i, 
 
 Distraction of mind and indis- Defect of order in general, dis- 
 tinct combination of ideas. cord among the functions. 
 
 Conscience, 
 
 The faculty by which we A mode of action of congcien- 
 judge of good and evil. tiousness. j 
 
 Constancy, 
 
 Unalterable continuance. The effect of firmness assisted 
 
 by the activity of the indi- 
 vidual faculties. 
 
 Consternation, 
 
 Astonishment, accompanied An affection of marvellousness 
 with terror. and circumspection without 
 
 hope and courage. 
 
 Contempt, 
 
 The act of despising. A disagreeable affection of 
 
 self-esteem, produced by 
 various causes. 
 
 Contentment. 
 
 Acquiescence without plenary A degree of satisfaction of 
 satisfaction. every fundamental faculty. 
 
SOO PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties 
 
 Contrition, 
 
 Sorrow for sin. 
 
 A disagreeable affection of 
 conscientiousness, caused by 
 benevolence, veneration, and 
 marvellousness. 
 
 Courage. 
 
 Active fortitude. 
 
 A fundamental power, vid, 
 p. 153 of Phrenology. 
 
 Cruelty, 
 Delight taken in the pain of It results from the satisfaction 
 
 others. 
 
 Unlawful longing. 
 
 Wish to enjoy. 
 
 of destructiveness without 
 benevolence. 
 
 Cupidity. 
 
 Great activity of acquisitive- 
 ness. 
 
 Desire, 
 
 A result of every faculty in 
 action. Vid. p. 36of this vol. 
 
 Desolation. 
 
 A sort of mixture of melan- A disagreeable affection of at- 
 choly and despair. tachment, and of benevo- 
 
 lence, or of circumspection 
 without courage, hope, and 
 firmness. 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 201 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Despair. 
 
 Hopelessness. 
 
 A disagreeable affection of 
 circumspection without hope. 
 
 An act of contempt, 
 
 Despise, 
 
 A disagreeable affection of 
 self-esteem. 
 
 Want of confidence. 
 
 Diffidence, 
 
 The effect of circumspection, 
 combined with secretiveness 
 and intellect. 
 
 A sort of contempt. 
 
 Disdain, 
 
 A disagreeable affection of 
 self-esteem. 
 
 Disorder, 
 
 Irregularity, neglect of rule. Want of order and time ; of- 
 ten also want of justice and 
 benevolence. 
 
 Doubt, 
 
 Uncertainty of mind. 
 
 The effect of circumspection, 
 combined with intellect. 
 
^0S5 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Duty, 
 
 That to which a man is by The effect of conscientious- 
 any natural or legal obhga- ness. 
 tion bound. 
 
 Envy, 
 
 Pain felt at the sight of excel- The effect of selfishness, com- 
 lence or happiness in ano- bined with various inferior 
 ther. powers, and without bene- 
 
 volence. 
 
 Ecstacy, 
 
 Rapture and excessive eleva- The faculties of marvellous- 
 tion of the mind. ness, ideality, mirthfulness, 
 
 and hope, dispose to this 
 state of mind. 
 
 Faith, 
 
 Belief in the revealed truths The effect of marvellousness 
 of religion. and hope. 
 
 Friendship, 
 
 The state of minds united by A fundamental feeling. Vid. 
 mutual benevolence. Phrenology, p. 150. 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. $01 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Fright 
 
 A strong and sudden feai*. A strong and sudden affection 
 
 of circumspection. 
 
 Fury, 
 
 A violent fit of angen An affection and strong irrita^ 
 
 tion of courage and destruc- 
 tiveness, 
 
 Genim* 
 
 A man endowed with mental The highest degree of activity 
 powers in a high degree. of the individual faculties. 
 
 Grief. 
 
 Sorrow for something past. A state of dissatisfaction of 
 
 every fundamental faculty. 
 
 Hatred, 
 
 Ill-will. A compound affection ; it re- 
 
 sults from opposition to our 
 selfish views, whilst benevo- 
 lence and justice are inac- 
 tive. 
 
204 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Happiness, 
 
 State of satisfaction. 
 
 Pride, arrogance. 
 
 The effect of the satisfaction 
 of every fundamental fa- 
 culty. 
 
 Haughtiness. 
 
 The effect of self-esteem, some- 
 times combined with firm- 
 ness and justice. 
 
 Reputation, dignity. 
 
 Honour. 
 
 Its basis is the love of appro- 
 bation. It is often modified 
 by self-love and veneration. 
 
 Hope, 
 
 Expectation of something 
 which we desire. 
 
 A fundamental power, Vid. 
 Phrenology, p. 205. 
 
 Horror. 
 
 Terror, mixed with detesta- A disagreeable, more or less 
 tion. compound, affection of be- 
 
 nevolence, veneration, jus- 
 tice, circumspection, appro- 
 bation, and configuration. 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS, 205 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Idea, 
 
 Thought, mental image. The effect of each intellectual 
 
 faculty. 
 
 Imaginations 
 
 The power of forming ideas. The spontaneous and great 
 and of representing ideas of activity of every faculty ; 
 absent things. activity of ideality. Vid. 
 
 this vol. p. 21. 
 
 Impatience. 
 
 Inability to suffer delay. Great activity of every funda^ 
 
 mental faculty. 
 
 Impetuosity, 
 
 Great vivacity in action. Great and quick activity of 
 
 the fundamental faculties, 
 principally of ideality, self- 
 love, courage, of the love of 
 approbation and of mirth- 
 fulness, without circum- 
 spection. 
 
 Inattention. 
 
 Want of attenticoi* Inactivity of every intellectual 
 
 faculty. Vid. p. 14 of 
 this- vol« 
 
^# PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties 
 
 Indifference, 
 
 Unconcernedness. Little activity of every funda- 
 
 mental faculty. 
 
 Indignation, 
 
 Anger, mingled with contempt A compound aiFection of self- 
 or disgust. esteem, justice, courage, 
 
 and the love of approba- 
 tion. 
 
 Indolence, 
 
 Laziness, carelessness. Little activity of the funda- 
 
 mental faculties. 
 
 Insolence, 
 
 Pride, displayed in contemptu- The effect of great self-esteem, 
 ous treatment of others. courage, and other inferior 
 
 feelings, combined with lit- 
 tle justice. 
 
 Instinct, 
 
 An impulse to act in the mind The effect of spontaneous ac- 
 not determined by dehbe- tivity of every faculty. Vid. 
 ration. this volume, p. S. 
 
I PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. g07 
 
 Common Significations, Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Jealousy, 
 
 Suspicious caution, or rivalry. A compound affection of sel- 
 fishness, and various funda- 
 mental powers. 
 
 Joy, 
 
 A lively and agreeable emotion An agreeable affection of every 
 of the mind. fundamental faculty, parti- 
 
 cularly of the feelings. 
 
 Judgment, 
 
 The power of judging ; the A mode of action of the in- 
 determination come to. tellectual faculties , Vid. 
 
 p. 23 of this vol. 
 
 Knowledge, 
 
 Cognizance, clear perception. The effect of the activity of 
 
 every intellectual faculty. 
 
 Love (physical,) 
 
 The passion between the sexes. A fundamental power. Vid. 
 
 Phrenology, p. 128. 
 
 Lukewarm. 
 
 Indifferent, not ardent. Little activity of the funda- 
 
 mental faculties. 
 
i208 PHILOSOPHY OP THE MIND. 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Melancholy, 
 
 A gloomy temper. A disagreeable aiFectlon of the 
 
 feelings, particularly of cir- 
 cumspection. 
 
 Memory, 
 
 The power of recollecting An internal repetition of its 
 things past, function by every intellec- 
 
 tual faculty. Vid. this vol. 
 p. 19. 
 
 Modei^ation, 
 
 Forbearance ; not going to A moderate activity of every 
 extremities. faculty. 
 
 Modesty, 
 
 Decency, purity of manners. Little activity of self-esteem 
 
 wth benevolence, circum- 
 spection, and justice. 
 
 Morality. 
 
 Practice of the duties of life. The effect of the faculties pro- 
 per to man, particularly of 
 conscientiousness. 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 209 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Negligence. 
 
 The habit of omitting, or of Little activity of the indivi- 
 acting carelessly. dual faculties, particularly 
 
 of order, of the desire to ac- 
 quire, &c. 
 
 Nobility, 
 Persons of high rank. True nobility results from ac- 
 
 tivity of the superior senti- 
 ments. 
 
 Pain. 
 
 A disagreeable sensation 
 
 A disagreeable affection of 
 every fundamental faculty. 
 Vid. p. 36 of this vol. 
 
 Passion. 
 
 Violent emotion of the mind. Tlie highest degree of activity 
 
 of every faculty. Vid. 
 p. 38 of this vol. 
 
 Patience. 
 
 The power of expecting long. Moderate activity of the facul- 
 or of suffering without dis- ties, supported by circum- 
 content. . spection, firmness, and some- 
 
 times by benevolence ; also, 
 the activity of individual 
 faculties, assisted by firm- 
 
 ness. 
 
210 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Perplexity. 
 
 Distraction and irresolution of A compound aiFecticm of cir- 
 mind, cumspection, combined with 
 
 the love of approbation and 
 justice, increased by little 
 courage. 
 
 Pleasure, 
 
 Gratification of the mind. 
 
 An agreeable affection of every 
 faculty. 
 
 Pretension. 
 
 Claim, true or false. 
 
 Great activity of self-esteem, 
 increased by the love of 
 approbation. 
 
 Rage. 
 
 Violent anger. 
 
 Great activity of courage and 
 destructiveness. 
 
 Ravishment. 
 
 Violent but pleasing excitement A high degree of pleasure 
 of the mind. produced by the satisfaction 
 
 of every faculty very active. 
 
h 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 211 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Regret. 
 
 Vexation for something past. A disagreeable affection of 
 
 every faculty combined with 
 the remembrance of some 
 enjoyment lost. 
 
 Reminiscence. 
 
 Recollection. The peculiar memory of the 
 
 power of knowing facts 
 (Eventuality). Vid. p. 20 
 of this vol. 
 
 Remorse ; or, Repentance. 
 
 Pain of guilt. A disagreeable affection of 
 
 conscientiousness . 
 
 Science. 
 
 Knowledge built on principles. It is the effect of the reflective 
 ^ applied to the perceptive 
 
 faculties. 
 
 Self-esteem . 
 
 A fundamental power. Vid. 
 Phrenology, p. 173. 
 
 P 2 
 
212 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Sensation. 
 
 Perception by means of the The knowledge of every im- 
 senses. pression either external or 
 
 internal. Vid. p. 4 of this 
 vol. 
 
 Shame. 
 
 The passion felt when reputa- A disagreeable affection of the 
 
 tion is supposed to be lost, love of approbation, com- 
 
 or when a bad action is de- bined with justice and cir- 
 
 tected. cumspection. 
 
 Sorrowful. 
 
 Mournful, grieving. 
 
 A disagreeable affection of 
 every faculty. 
 
 Spite. 
 
 Malice, rancour. 
 
 A disagreeable affection of 
 self-esteem and courage. 
 
 Stupor. ^ 
 
 Great diminution, or suspen- A great degree of inactivity of 
 sion of sensibility. the faculties. 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS, 213 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Sublime. 
 
 Exalted, high in excellence. The effect of ideality, com- 
 bined with the superior sen- 
 timents, and intellectual fa- 
 culties. 
 
 Temperance. 
 
 Moderation and sedateness. A moderate activity of the in- 
 ferior feelings. 
 
 Temptation. 
 
 The act of tempting, and the The effect of every active fa- 
 state of being tempted. culty which incites to action. 
 
 Tranquil. 
 
 Quiet. The effect of little activity. 
 
 Uneasiness. 
 
 State of disquiet. The effect of great activity of 
 
 every faculty. 
 
 Unhappiness. 
 
 Distress. The state of dissatisfaction of 
 
 every active faculty. 
 
 Unreasonable. 
 
 Want of reason. Inactivity of the reflecting 
 
 faculties. 
 
214 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. 
 
 Vengeance. 
 The desire and act of render- Self-esteem being offended, 
 ing evil for evil. combined With courage, de- 
 
 structiveness, and other in- 
 ferior sentiments, whilst be- 
 nevolence and justice are 
 inactive, incites to revenge. 
 
 Virtue. 
 
 Moral goodness, that which Every action conformable to 
 gives excellence. natural morahty ; the result 
 
 of the contest between the 
 two natures of man. 
 
 Want. 
 
 The state of not having ; de- Want, in the sense of desire, 
 sire. is the effect of every active 
 
 faculty. 
 
 Will. 
 A faculty of the mind, and the Decision according to mo- 
 determination which results tives which are proper to 
 from it. man, and enlightened by 
 
 * the reflecting faculties.' — 
 
 Vid. p. m of this vol. 
 Wisdom, 
 The power of judging rightly. The regulation of every action 
 
 by the rule of natural mo- 
 rality. 
 
215 
 
 Recapitulation and Conclusion. 
 
 In this volume I flatter myself with having proved that 
 idealogeans and moralists have confined themselves to general 
 notions of the mind, and have taken mere modes of action for 
 fundamental faculties. I have proposed a new classification of 
 the faculties of the mind, capable of being ascertained by ob- 
 servation. Moreover, I have examined into the origin of the 
 fundamental faculties, and shown that neither outward circum- 
 stances, nor education, nor the external senses, nor the will, 
 explains their existence ; but that each is innate, and depends 
 on the cerebral organization for its exhibition. 
 
 I have particularly insisted on the moral nature of man, and 
 am convinced that the lovers of truth will not now accuse Phre- 
 nology of teaching either materialism or fatalism, in the sense 
 that the faculties being innate, act irresistibly in consequence. 
 I have considered the conditions necessary to liberty, the nature 
 of moral liberty, and the origin of evil. I have compared Chris- 
 tianity with the natural morality of man, and am of opinion, that 
 true Christianity will gain by the knowledge of human nature. 
 
 I have decided in favour of natural goodness, because it may 
 rather be depended on than the goodness which is prompted 
 by virtue. I have entered into some considerations relative to 
 the practical part of Phrenology, and spoken of the modifica- 
 tions observable in the manifestations of each faculty ; of the 
 difficulty of judging of others ; of the necessity of mutual 
 indulgence ; of natural sympathy and antipathy ; and of the 
 happiness of mankind. At the end I have given an explana- 
 tion of several expressions, according to the fundamental facul- 
 ties of the mind, and their modes of action. 
 
216 CONCLUSION. 
 
 The object of Phrenology, in its extensive signification, is 
 immense, extremely difficult, but important and interesting in 
 the same proportion. It will still require much exertion to be 
 rendered perfect. I sjiall be happy if I succeed in calling the 
 attention of others to the study of man, and particularly 
 to the consideration of his moral nature, which is essential to 
 general happiness, and which, I think, has been too much 
 neglected in modern times. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES, 
 
 Nuriiiuiiiberland-coiirt. 
 
RETURN 
 TO — ► 
 
 MARIAN KOSHLAND BIOSCIENCE AND 
 NATURAL RESOURCE LIBRARY 
 
 2101 Valley Life Sciences BIdg. 642-2531 
 
 LOAN PERIOD 
 
 ONE MONTH LOAN 
 
 ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS. 
 
 DUE AS STAMPED BELOW. 
 
 LIBRARY USE 
 
 JUL 1 3 2001 
 
 FORM NO. DD 8 
 24M 4-00 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY 
 Berkeley, California 94720-6500