''^i^B^kt^,^^ : REESE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. l^eceived , igo . / an aesthetic confusion in the use of the word "order" — which is either i' categorical or teleological. Further, Conscience has categorical powers and as such passes into the idea of will. Therefore the Tiyrj/jLoviKSv leaves a dualism between "understanding" and will. This reintroduces the former difficulty of the rational elements in Calm Benevolence and thus there is a doubt both as to what is the moral faculty and what is its object. This is disguised by ffisthetic references. Is the Will free? Determinism of the Inquiry. The inconsistencies of the Fassiuns prepare the way for "Liberty of Suspense." The CONTENTS. XIX PAGE position of the System and "Compends." The mind as tahula rasa and res acttiosa — but from the former we cannot reach the latter nor viee versa. This theoretical difticnlty absorbs the practical one of the second period. Hutcheson's Eclecticism. CHAPTER XIII. HuTCHESOx's General Ixfluence upon the "Enlightenment" 257 Hutcheson the leading figure of the "Enlightenment" in Scotland. His Philosophy was («) popular, (b) eclectic. The resemblances and differences between the Scottish and the French and German Enlighten- ments. The bearing of Hutcheson's Puritanism upon his work — it leads to a departure from Shaftesbury's Hellenism, for which is substituted the Classicism of the Eoman Empire. This explains the increase of Eclecticism in Hutcheson's work, which made it more of a popular Philosophy : and also the precedence he gives Benevolence (following the later Stoics). Hence Hutcheson is a "Pseudo- Classic," and Monboddo — the last of his followers of this tendency of his system — is hostile to Eoman Literature. Was Hutcheson the founder of the "Scottish School"? 1. If this term means " Philosophy produced by persons connected with Scotland" it is unjust to Hutcheson's predecessors there. M^'Cosh understands it in this sense, yet he excludes Kant and includes Shaftesbury. M'Cosh's further "test" for admission to the school would exclude many whom he admits. As applied to Hutcheson, it is doubtful whether he would con- form to it, and, even if so, his thought being borrowed from the later Stoics, they, not he, would be the founders. 2. If " Scottish School " be taken as equivalent to Natural Eealism, Hutcheson was not the founder of it as he was not a Natural Eealist. Prof. J. Seth's claim, that Hutcheson was original, discussed. Hutcheson's true place in the History of Philosophy — both logically and chronologically he was earlier than Hume. He is really a leader of the British Enlightenment, an eclectic and popular thinker, who prepared the way for Hume's Scepticism — thus he not onlj' trained those who succeeded him, but found an audience for them. Hutcheson was influenced by the English Enlightenment through Butler, and in turn, he influenced the Enlightenment in Germany. His influence upon the next generation was considerable, an instance of this deduced from his Naturalism, e.g. "Natural Signs" (Eeid): ''Natural Eealism" (Hamilton): Natural Faculties (Dr Martineau). Naturalism, from his historical origin (with the Stoics), involves an apparent con- tradiction, as defined by Prof. Sorley, the reason of this and hence Hutcheson's point of contact with a portion of the Enlightenment in France. ,i XX CONTENTS. CHAPTER XIV. PAGE IIuTCHEsox'.s Positive Contribution to Philosophy . . .271 1. Was Hutcheson's Intuitionalism a positive contribution to Pliilosophy? His indebtedness to Cicero here, and, what is new is chiefly the emphasis with which he repeats Cicero's ideas. 2. His relation to UniversaUstic Hedonism. The third period is Utilitarian. (a) Hutcheson originates the expression "greatest happiness of the greatest number," its history from Hutcheson to Bentham through Priestley and Becearia. This formula traceable from Hutcheson to the latter Stoics. Instances from Cicero. Hutcheson uses several variants, (a) "The general good of all" or "common interest of all," instances from Simplicius, Seneca, Cicero, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. {(3) "The good of the greatest ichole" or "system" — anticipa- tions from the same authors. (7) The greatest good of all rational agents. (5) The greatest good of all sensitive beings. Anticipations of these. The logical order of the different variants, which are all ti-aceable to Stoic influence and hence the paradox that the Stoics have provided the formula for Hedonism. Utilitarianism starts from one variant, Adam Smith from another, Hume from a third. How Hutcheson's rational Beings are related to those of Kant. {h) By an inconsistency, Hutcheson's anticipates both Bentham's and Mill's valuations of "pleasures." (c) He also anticipates the distinction between motive and inten- tion. ((/) A suppressed Premiss in Mill's Proof of Utilitarianism supplied by Adam Smith and Hutcheson, in the Economics of the former as a postulate, which, again, is deducible as a Metaphysical thesis from the teaching of the latter. (e) Hutcheson and Association of Ideas. 3. His relation to Esthetics and Teleology. His Inquiry concerning Beauty, the first modern sesthetic treatise. The definition of Beauty. Hutcheson's Beauty is really a teleological conception. His share in the renaissance of teleology and more especially his contribution to the doctrine of Final Causes. Conclusion 285 INTRODUCTORY. In many respects Francis Hntcheson is an interesting, if somewhat mysterious, figure in the History of Modern Thought. Ahiiost all writers upon the development of Philosophy in Britain assign him an important share in its growth, yet there is no little uncertainty, when any attempt is made to specify his exact sphere of influence. From his arrival at Glasgow, in 1730, until his death, in « 1746, he published nothin g f>f mamp.nf, ; so that, it has been \ generally assumed, that his mode of thought was fully formed [ during his residence at Dublin, before his removal to Scotland. The influences to which he was subjected, in the earlier period, constitute a lost chapter in the history of Philosophy, and therefore an attempt is made, in the first three chapters of the following narrative, to supply the blank. If Hutcheson had any share in the renaissance of speculative activity in Scotland — and many writers assign hini a most important one — the whole course of thought after him is divorced from its historical continuity until this question has been in- vestigated. Yet it will be found that Hutcheson's life in Ireland, while interesting in itself, is little more than a preparation for his activities in Scotland. The former is the promise of youth, the latter its fulfilment. In fact, with Hutcheson, more than most thinkers since Socrates, his life was his best legacy to S. H. 1 l\> 5i INTRODUCTORY. posterity ; and, therefore, such data as can be recovered are recorded to enable the reader to form some picture of his personality (Chapters IV — VII). This was at once his strength and the source of the power he exercised over his con- temporaries. All high aims in life, any practical activities, even though apparently trivial, that tended towards the "common good," commanded his sympathy and support ; and, therefore, his ideal of academic teaching was exceptionally stimulating both to pupils and those who fell under his influence. The Classicism he received from Shaftesbury, as he modified it, opened a new horizon to university-men in Scotland ; while his exposition of it secured continuity between his successors and the past. His eclectic type of thought was what the country required to transplant Philosophy from the region of "dry-as- dust" academicism to the hearts and lives of the people. Thus he may not inaptly be termed a leader in the Scottish En- lightenment. More than this, his intense interest in the elevation of life, his passion for the improvement and advance- ment of mankind made him a pioneer of the movement, which is generally attributed to Utilitarianism. To modify a phrase of Mr Austin Dobson's, he was a paladin of Philosophic Phi- lanthropy, Hutcheson's life being his strongest argument — full as it is of noble aims, and disinterested endeavour — one can scarcely avoid feeling that there is a certain injustice to him in any investigation of his thought as published. It will be shown that his books are but incomplete reproductions of his actual teaching. Yet, since they constitute all that is left of it, they need to be investigated in the light of the additional informa- tion upon his life — for his biography is the best commentary upon his books. Since there is much that is common to Shal'tcsbuiy and Hutcheson, some account is required of the virtuoso-cult of the former. This will be found in Chapter VIII. Then both from internal and external considerations there are reasons to believe that Hutcheson's works are far from being a homogeneous whole. Quite apart from fundamental in- consistencies, inherent in his Eclecticism, he passed through INTRODUCTORY. 3 four distinct "periods," and these are characterized in Chap- ters IX— XII. Finally it only remains to sum up his position as a writer upon philosophic subjects, and an estimation of his place in the " Enlightenment " is contained in Chapter XIII ; and, in Chapter XIV, some of his positive contributions to the thought of his successors are noted. CHAPTER I. EARLY YEARS. From the time of the Plantation of Ulster by James I, there had been a steady immigration of Scotsmen to the North of Ireland, wlio brought with them their native frugality and perseverance, " their love of education and desire to have an educated ministry ; their attachment to the Bible and the simple Presbyterian worship\" Many ministers, too, came from Scotland to attend to the spiritual wants of the Scottish colony in Ireland, and amongst these was Alexander Hutchcson, a member of a reputable family of Monkwood, in Ayr-shii-e, and the grandfather of Francis, the future philosopher. He came to Ireland temporarily, and was soon " called " to the congregation of Saintfield in Co. -Down^. It was not long before " his pleasiug manners, social disposition and excellent talents " won him friends^, amongst whom he was proud to number the Hon. Brigadier Price of Hollymount* and the Earl of Granard^; by the latter acquaintance, forming a connection with County Longford, which was destined to influence his descendants materially for the next two generations. Still stronger ties arose by marriage and the acquisition of landed property, for he became possessed of the townland of Drumalig (or Drum- malig)" in Co. Down, a considerable estate, which, in the 1 The Scottish Philosojjhij, by James M^Cosli, LL.D., Loudon, 1875, p. 49. " History of Armagh, by Stuart, Newiy, 1819, p. 486. 3 Ibid. 4 Will of Alex. Hutclieson iu the Public Record Office, Dublin. 5 Wodrow's Analccta, iv. p. 231. fi Belfast Monthly Magazine, xi, volume for 1813. Will of Alex. Hutcheson, ut supra. EARLY YEARS. disturbed state' of the country during the closing years of the seventeenth century, brought him many cares owing to the "Tories" or robbers who preyed upon landholders, in the country districts^ However he had, doubtless, some com- pensation in the future prospects of his property, which at the time of the Ordnance Survey was described as containing 78 houses, 81 families, and 386 persons, the land being of the best quality and fetching from 20s. to 30s. an acre"'. Alexander Hutcheson had only one surviving son^ who was named John, and who was also a Presbyterian minister. John Hutcheson partly from his father's position, partly from his " good understanding and reputation for piety, probity and all virtue*," was a success in the Church. His first charge w^is at Downpatrick, whence he was called to Armagh. From Armagh he went to the congregation of Capel Street, Dublin, in 1090 ; but Dublin did not suit his health, and he returned to Armagh in 1692, where he remained until his death. John Hutcheson was prominent amongst his brother ministers, first by the peart he took in politics, enrolling men to bear arms in favour of the " protestant succession " during the years of trouble before the Rebellion of 1715"; and secondly in ecclesiastical controversy, in which he evinced a warm interest. After the dispute of the Seven Synods, or the " Seven Years War " of the Irish Presby- terian Church, which began in 1720, John Hutcheson was asked to answ^er the " Narrative " of the Non-Subscribers, and members of his own party quote his account with high com- mendations ^ John Hutcheson was thrice married; his first wife bore him three sons, the eldest being named Hans and the second Francis. His second wife was a Miss Wilson of Tully in Co. 1 MS. Minutes of Presbytery of Down in Library, "Magee College." 2 MS. Reports of the Survey (Co. Down) in the Library, Koyal Irish Academy. 3 Or, at least, one son who was alive in 1711, as Alex. Hutcheson, in his will, speaks of "his only son, John." There were two daughters. * Account of the Life of Francis Hutcheson, by William Leechnian, prefixed to the System of Moral Philosophy, London, 1755. 5 Wodrow's Analecta, iv. p. 233. 6 Wodrow's MS. Letters, vol. xxii. No. lU-1. Witherow's Memorials of the Presbyterian Church, First Series, p. 343. 6 EARLY YEARS. Longford, and from this marriage there resulted a large second fajnily^ Francis was therefore the second son. He was born on August 8th, 1694. It is related that the birth took place at Drumalig (not at Armagh), a fact that is explained by the supposition that John Hutcheson, having returned from Dublin two years before, was probably engaged in building his house at a place called Ballyrea, about two miles from Armagh- — a situation somewhat historic owing to its vicinity to " The Navan," an immense earthen mound surrounded by the remains of a high embankment or wall. This tumulus is similar to the more celebrated examples at Newgrange and Dowth (near Drogheda), but it has never been excavated. Archaeologists believe that this was the site of the residence of one of the Celtic royal families of the North of Ireland. Soon after the family settled at Ballyrea, Francis was brought there, and he remained with his parents until he was eight years old, when the question of his education was debated^ Possibly Armagh, the seat of the Irish Primate, afforded few facilities for the training of a Presbyterian child, or it may have been that the grandfather, now an old man, longed for the company of his grandson in the lonely manse at Drumalig. It is known that Alexander Hutcheson had con- ceived an old man's partiality for the child, almost while in long clothes. Seeing him, when three years of age, the old man is reported to have said — " Francis, I predict, thou wilt one day be a very eminent man'"' — and, for once, the future did not falsify the prophecy of affection. So Francis, with his elder brother, Hans, went to their grandfather in the adjoining ^ Stuart's Hist, of Aniiaiih, iit siqjra. Belfast Monthly Magazine, ut supra. The MS. Register of Baptisms of the First Armagh Congregation contains the following entries : "Sepf 30th 1714 Ehoda, dan. of John Hutcheson, Bap^i March 5 171G-17 Margaret d. of John Hutcheson Bap^." ' Stuart's Hist, of Armagh, ut supra. ^ Another possible cause of the child being sent from home so young may have been the presence of a step-mother and a second family. However without the aid of the marriage certificate this is mere conjecture. * Stuart's Armagh, vt siyj?-a. EARLY YEARS. 7 county, where both attended a school, kept by John Hamilton, in a disused Meeting House near Saintfield\ where a good classical education was obtainable, and was probably more prized, inasmuch as it had a flavour of the contraband. At this time the Established Church jealously guarded the monopoly of education and viewed all teaching by Dissenters with suspicion, even if the statutory penalties were not enforced. When this furtive character of education amongst Dissenters is remembered, as well as the general neglect of external aids to culture, w^iich, indeed, seem to have been especially ignored in this district — so much so that a Church of Ireland school, in the same village nearly a century later, is officially described as " Saintfield Old School, existing from time immemorial, a small cabin, with clay floor, uncoiled, and very much out of repair-" — it wall not be difficult to imagine that Francis Hutcheson acquired the "rudiments" without having opportunities of cultivating the taste for luxury. At this school he gained the basis, of his classical education, which proved serviceable to him, not only in his literary and professional work, but also in the society he mixed with, as a young man, in Dublin, where the making of an epigram or the capping of a quotation was a ready road to favour and patronage. At this period, too, we gain a brief glimpse of Hutcheson's character. The grandfather was partial to his favourite and over-valued his progress as compared with that of his less-gifted elder brother. Francis is recorded to have been pained by this preference and he found no joy in any praise his brother did not share, so that he employed " all means and innocent arti- fices in his power to make his brother appear equally deserving of his grandfather's regard I" Meanwhile the boys were growing up, and, when Francis \vas about fourteen, the problem of his higher education arose. The Ulster Presbyterians were in a difficult position in this matter, as no University was open to them nearer than Scotland, and to meet this difficulty private "academies" were established to provide teaching in the 1 Belfast Monthly Magazine, ut siqjra. 2 MS. Survey of Co. Down, R. I. A. Library. ■* Leechmau; Stuart, ut siq)ra. 8 EARLY YEARS. "higher branches." These were in f;xct small denominational Colleges — little side-currents in the advanced education of the time, necessarily fleeting individually, but accomplishing valu- able work as a whole. Members of other Churches admitted that there " was a great deal of philosophical knowledge amongst the Dissenting teachers^" and the reputation of some of the pupils (as for instance Butler) is high in the annals of philosophy. It was one of these academies that Hutcheson himself founded, ht a later date, in Dublin. The quaint little town of Killyleagh in Co. Dowai had been fixed upon as a site for one of these seminaries as early as 10971 "When Hutcheson attended it, the teacher was the Rev. James MacAlpin, who enjoyed a considerable local reputa- tion amongst Presbyterians as a learned teacher of philosophy. He appears to have had classes in Classics, Scholastic Philo- sophy', and probably Theology. Here Hutcheson, no doubt, received early and lasting impressions of the beautiful pastoral landscape around, which inspired many passages in his early works. Here, too, he probably made the acquaintance of his cousin William Bruce, son of the minister of Killyleagh, who became his lifelong friend. At this Academy Hutcheson made rapid progress, and he was certified to be able " to stand the test of the most severe examinations, and his intimate acquaint- ances are satisfied that the most severe scrutiny into his character and conduct would tend to his advantage*." At the age of sixteen Hutcheson was taken from the Academy ; his grandfather was now in failing health, and he may have desired the presence of his favourite grandson. Probably fjxmily matters were discussed and the old man must have expressed an intention to provide handsomely for Francis. Leechman says that " when his grandfather made an alteration of a prior settlement of his family affairs in his [i.e. Francis'] favour, though many arguments were used by his relations to 1 MS. Letter of Lord Monboddo to Horsley. - Christian Moderator, i. p. 429. 2 Leechman, iit supra. M<^Creery's Preshyterian Ministers of KiUileai/h, p. 110. ■* Belfast Monthly Magazine, ut snjjra. EARLY YEARS. 9 prevail with him to accept of it, he peremptorily refused and insisted to the last that the first settlement should actually take placed" Inasmuch as the "final settlement" is a will dated a few days before the testator's death^, and, as it pro- vides for Francis beyond the expectations of a second child, it may be worth while to trace the disposition of the property, especially as an exact statement of Hutchesou's pecuniary position throws light on a remarkable crisis in his later career. Alexander Hutcheson had given before his death one half of his landed property in the townlaud of Drumalig to the elder brother Hans^; and the other half is willed to John Hutcheson, (the father of Hans and Francis) for his life, and then is strictly entailed to Francis. John Hutcheson besides is residuary legatee, and the personal estate is bequeathed to fifteen grandchildren, the issue of the two daughters of the testator. Further the lands entailed to Francis are charged with an annuity to the third son by John Hutcheson's first marriage. It will, therefore, be seen that Francis obtained absolutely no benefit under this will during his father's life- time, and that he could not interfere with the disposition of the propert}^ owing to the entail. When he actually came into possession of the property, he Avas freed from responsibility- regarding his elder brother, Hans, who was without cliildren, and whose half of the Drumalig estate eventually returned to the only surviving son of Francis^. Several of the other brothers were well-to-do, and there only remained one full and one half brother for whom he was anxious to provide. The means by which he endeavours to secure them an interest in his properties are exceedingly complicated ^ and any account of the perplexing legal devices would be beyond the scope of this narrative; but they suffice to prove that the disinterestedness, manifested by Hutcheson as an inexperienced youth, continued 1 Leechman, p. ii. ■^ The will is dated Sept. 5th, 1711. This will as well as others referred to below are preserved in the Public Eecord Ofllce (" Four Courts"), Dublin. •' Wills of Hans and Francis Hutcheson. •* Will of Hans Hutcheson, ut supra; Stuart's Armagh. 5 Will of Francis Hutcheson, dated June 30th, 1716, ut mtpra. (He died in Dublin on August 8th of the same year.) 10 EAELY YEARS. up to the close of his life and that experience of the world had not weakened the dictates of his early enthusiasm. The death of Alexander Hutcheson in 1711 deprived Francis of a warm and indulgent friend, but the same event secured easy circumstances to John Hutcheson, who might otherwise have experienced some difficulty in educating his large family. The descendants of the Scottish settlers in Ulster have always proved their appreciation of the ad- vantages of education for their children, and it is probable that John Hutcheson would have made sacrifices for the son who already showed such brilliant promise, but the legacy of Alexander Hutcheson made matters easy' ; indeed it may have been that the old man expressed a wish that some of the income accruing from the life-interest in Drumalig should be spent in educating Francis^ However this may be, Hutcheson matriculated at the Uni- versity of Glasgow in the year 1711, being then in his seven- teenth year. He is described as " Scotus Hibernus," and he probably had many friends amongst his fellow-students, as more than half of those entered under J. Loudon, the Regent, were similarly designated^ The change from the humble "Academy" at Kiliylcagh must have been great — indeed it was Hutcheson's first acquaintance with a large town, since, in all probability, his previous experience was confined to villages and his native city of Armagh, which from its antiquarian and ^ John Hutcheson has been called "a poor Presbyterian minister" — an assertion true enough if he had had only his stipend to depend upon ; but quite apart from the life-interest in Drumalig, beginning in 1711, he possessed considerable property in Co. Monaghan (as is proved by his will), and the fact that he built a handsome residence, before the end of the seventeenth century, is enough to .show that, even then, he was in easy circumstances. - Francis himself left £100 sterling to be expended in educating the children of a relative. It is quite possible that .John Hutcheson may have considered himself merely trustee for Francis, and that he paid him part or the whole of the income. This conjecture is founded on the fact that Francis acknowledges a sum of money from his father in 1726, at a time when he must have been in affluent circumstances. ^ Munimenta Alme Universitatis Glasgiiemis, Bk. iii. p. 196. In a later entry he is described as "Britanno-Hibernus," which may be accounted for by his mother being of English extraction. EARLY YEARS. 11 ecclesiastical associations has some claim to the title of the St Andrews of Ireland. As early as 1574, it had been said, " there is no place, in Europe, comparable to Glasgow for a plentifull and gude chepe mercat of all kind of langages artes and sciences'"; but two widely different causes had tended to injure the efficiency of the University in the early years of the eighteenth century. The re-establishment of Episcopacy after the Restoration had deprived it of the greater part of its revenues and in the year 1701 the College was in a pitiable condition. The staff was reduced to the Principal, one Pro- fessor of Divinity and four Regents of Philosophy — "who taught Philosophy and Greek by turns, one Professor of Mathematics, but without any fund for a salary and no other Professor of any sort whatsoever"." It must be remembered too that a second cause for the decadence of the University lay in the want of enlightenment in the West of Scotland. After the Revolution " the new Professors were more remarkable for orthodoxy and zeal than for literary accomplishments. From tlie parochial clergy, professors in Colleges are usually taken. If tradition may be trusted, which is, at best, a sorry guide in matters where party has any share, some of the ministers of Glasgow at that period would be regarded novv-a-days as weak vulgar men. But as they were much liked by their flocks, so it is hardly fliir to estimate the men and manners of simple times by those of a more fastidious age, which judges of every thing by the polish of elegance. If that were the case in great towns, it may be presumed that the members of the university were little distin- guished in those days^" This want of culture proved a much greater disadvantage to the University than the want of funds. Hutcheson was fortunate in arriving at a time when the sphere of educational usefidness was widening ; indeed, during the years of his attendance no less than three Professorships were revived or created. The low level of manners and culture, amongst the (0 1 Diary of James Melville, p. 50. 2 MS. "Memorial of the University of Glasgow as it was Seiitembcr 18th, 1701, and as it is now in 1717." Wodrow Papcr.i, 41, No. 102. * Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Centurij from MSS. of John Ramsay of Ochtertyre. Ed. Alex. Allaidyce, 1888, vol. i. p. '271. 12 EARLY YEARS. Professors themselves, was an evil that needed time to mend, and the final raising of the standard was almost wholly due to Hutclieson and his friends. At his matriculation the teaching staff contained representatives of the old and now tendencies. Robert Simson, the eminent mathematician, had just been appointed, nnd like many other distinguished geometricians, he was a man whose nature had no place for the graces of life. He was a Dr Johnson in carelessness of externals, and in an eccentric habit of counting posts or steps — he was a Boswell in a childish curiosity \ From contemporary anecdotes it appears that, while cultivating some sides of traditional Cynicism, he neglected such precepts as related to the virtue of temperance — indeed it is significant of the social standard of the time that the gossips objected rather to his admitting "all and sundry to his symposia at a public-house " than to the " symposia " taking place-. Another original, though more polished teacher was the Professor of Medicine, John Johnston, " a free-liver and what was more in those days, a free-thinker." Johnston is supposed to have been the prototype of " Crab " in Roderick Random, and, owing to his opinions, "his fund of wit and humour and even of profanity peculiar to himself," he was looked upon as a kind of heathen by the citizens'l Andrew Rosse, the Professor of Humanity, appears to have been undistinguished; his leanings seem to have been to the old school. The other Professors were men of a different type. Gershom Carmichael has left an honourable name as a thinker. Alexander Dunlop, the Pro- fessor of Greek, was doing all that lay in his power to revive the study of his subject. " He was universally beloved and respected for his worth and humanity as well as for his blame- less, dignified manners, and what endeared him especially to his class was the pains he took to foster the blossoms of genius of which he was a good judge''." John Simpson, the Professor of Divinity — "a man of more culture and erudition than most of * There is an anecdote cooceininy; R. Simson and Louden (afterwards Prof, of Logic) exenii)lifying this side of his character in Scotland and Scotsmen, i. pp. 278—9. ^ Strang's Glasgow Clubs, pp. 20—21; MacGregor's History of Glasgow. * Scotland and Scotsmen, ut supra, i. p. 277. ^ Ibid. EARLY YEARS. 13 his contemporaries" — was tlie leader of the attack upon the prevailing provincialism, and his attitude brought him into continual conflict with the Church, which eventually cul- minated in his trial upon the charge of heresy. In fact there appear to have been two issues involved, the cause of secular culture and the advocacy of a more liberal tone in theology ; and Simpson, by urging the claims of both, consolidated the opposition to both. It was under these teachers that Hutcheson studied. The University, about this date, was described as " the chief orna- ment of the City, a magnificent and stately fabrick, consisting of several courts; the first towards the city is of hewn stone and excellent architecture, the precincts of it were lately enlarged by some acres of ground, purchased for it by the King and the State, and it is separated from the rest of the city by a very high wall^" Hutcheson found little to attract him in the conservative methods of some of the teachers, and one cannot wonder at his sympathy with the new culture from the very fact of the unattractive nature of the old methods. Fortu- nately these have been recorded, at first hand, by one of the Regents in Philosophy, a John Low ; and the document may be dated about this time. Low seems to have considered that the old way could not be improved upon ; " it is," he says, " the same old way y' I was taught myself and has long been in use in this College, by dited notes and disputs in all the parts of philo- sophy." In the Logic year the students were taught, two months, from a text-book, to dispute three days a week " when they were ready for it," also to read Greek and ' to get lessons by heart." He adds, enigmatically, "I have been in use to teach something of Arithmetick and Geometry in the luay of didats... sometime exegeses in the Class, but not every year, nor yet always in every course finding y'' performances but very weak sometimes-." It is little wonder that Hutcheson found refuge from "Geometry by way of dictats," in the enthusiasm of the Class-work done for Dunlop ; and it is probable that to this influence may be attributed his study of Greek Literature, 1 The Present State of Scutlaml, 1715. 2 Lit. 2Iemuriah of the IlUtonj of Glas/juw, pp. 1'24— 5. 14 EARLY YEARS. for which he was well known in later life. The Lectures in Natural Philosophy were taken early in his course, though the College records contain repeated rules between the years 1710- 28 that this class should not be taken before the third year^ He must also have given a considerable amount of time to Mathematics, as he seems to have had a taste for the subject, which even led him so far as to introduce mathematical formulae, to express ethical facts, in the first edition of the Inquiry concerning Beauty and Virtue. It has been customary to assume that " the influence of Carmichael is manifest on the whole cast of Hutcheson's thought'^"; but Carmichael was largely a Cartesian'', and it is difiicult to see how Cartesianism could jjrompt the letter written a few years after to Clarke; there are, besides, certain traces of Berkeleyanism'* in his first work that show his mental development was much more complex than critics have hitherto believed. It will therefore be safer not to dogmatize but rather trace out the indications that help us to follow the growth of his thought. It would doubtless be premature to attribute to him at this period the thoughts he expressed three years later in a letter to Clarke, and yet the mere fact of the criticism being written shows that, even as a student, his attitude to Cartesianism cannot have been that of an enthusiastic disciple. It is a fact, not without significance, that in his Inaugural Lecture, delivered thirteen years after leaving the University, he enlarges rather upon his recollections of classical than of philosophical works'. Probably of all his 1 Munimenta Glan., ut supra, jyassim. These lectures must have been popular, for in Arbuckle's poem Glotta more space is given to this subject than to all the rest put together. - Veitch on "Philosophy in Scottish Universities" in Mind, ii. pp. 210 — 12 ; and hence, because Dr M'Cosh finds Carmichael the teacher of Hutcheson, the former is named "the true father of Scottish Philosophy" — in fact Scottish PhilosoiDhy has had so many reputed fathers that one is reminded of the ancient saw "'tis a wise child knows its own father." "^ Cf. "Or what more nearly touches human-kind, The powers and nature of Eternal mind. Which only conscious of its being knoivs Th^ Eternal source from whence that being flows." Glotta— a Poem. Glas., 1721. •» Cf. infra, p. 30. ■'' De Naturali Hoininmn Socialitatc, Glasgoviae, 1730. EARLY YEARS. 15 teachers, he was attracted most by Cicero, for whom he always professed the greatest admiration, and this inflnence is impor- tant as aiding the comprehension of his attitude towards Clarke. After obtaining his M.A. Degree Hutcheson entered upon a new phase of College life by joining the Theological department in 17VS\ which exercised a greater influence upon his sub- sequent career. At this time Simpson was in the midst of his trials before the ecclesiastical courts upon charges of holding doctrines inconsistent with the " Confession of Faith." He was supposed to be doubtful about punishment for original sin and to have believed in Free- Will and the possibility of the salva- tion of the heathen. It is certain that Hutcheson Avas largely influenced by these views; for, when he himself became a preacher, some of his hearers objected to traces of these heresies in his sermons'^ Midway in Hutcheson's theological course Glasgow passed through the throes of the Rebellion of 1715. During the month of August, the "masters" agreed to maintain a company not under 50 men, " engaging to make good and thankfull payment of 6d. per diem to each soldier^." Entrenchments were thrown up outside the city, volunteers were armed, barricades erected in the streets and armed with cannon, martial law proclaimed'*. It is probable that Hutcheson did not return from Ireland till the time of panic was passed, but he must have been keenly interested in the struggle for which his father had raised men a few years before. It is strange, too, that Hutcheson, a member of a Whig family, became tutor, about this time, to the young Earl of Kilmarnock ^ who was executed after the second rising in 1745. While studying under Simpson, Hutcheson seems to have been gradually forming philosophical and theological opinions, and in 1717 he sent a letter to Clarke criticizing the a priori 1 Munimenta, lit supra, in. p. 253. 2 Vide infra, p. 20. ^ Munimenta, lit supra, u. p. 416. 4 Annals of Glasgow, by W. Clelland; MacGregor's Hist, of Glasgow, p. 292; Eae's History of the late Rebellion. 5 Wodrow's Analecta, iv. p. 99. 16 EARLY YEARS. proof of the existence of God. This letter was probably written immediately after the close of his University career. Though there is no record of the time at which he com- pleted his theological course, there is sufficient evidence to fix an approximate date. Hutcheson is recorded to have expressed the opinion that six years was the proper period for a student to remain at the Univer.sity and that this was the duration of his own time of residence ^ Now in 1717 this period of six years would have just been completed. During his last session, Hutcheson seems to have turned his attention to philosophical literature. Clarke's works were much discussed, and, in their relation to theology, seem to have made him enquire into the validity of the proof employed. Hutcheson, like Kames-, doubted whether an a priori proof was possible, and (like Kant later) he urged the danger of applying demonstration in a sphere in which it was inadmissible^, thereby leading to dG THE VICE- REGAL COURT. that, even if his opinions were different, he could not stoop to the " vile compliance," he believed to be a necessary step to gain anything worthy of acceptance. These reasons are charac- terized by the historian of the Irish Presbyterian Church, as " exceedingly frivolous, and the whole answer is written in a strain which indicates how far his mind was now perverted by the speculations of a false philosophy^" — a statement which leads to the interesting conclusiou that zeal for civil and religious liberty, filial affection and sturdy independence are to be found in a mind "perverted by the speculations of a false pliilosophy" — for it must be remembered that Hutcheson refused the prefer- ment and that ho never conformed to the Church ! At the same time there is something wanting in the tone of the letter. If his father was anxious lest he should go over to the Established Church, one would imagine that a sufficient answer could have been given in a sentence ; and that the disquisition on Church History, Controversial Literature, and the relation of Civil to Canon Law was wholly unnecessary. To Hutcheson 's honour, it should be remarked that he does not discuss the bribery implied in the offer of a " good living," but takes higher ground throughout — in fact, such an offer would present small temptation to a man of his temperament, circum- stances and expectations. Nevertheless, he seems almost to protest too much, though it may well be — especially when one remembers his scrupulous honesty as a child in refusing praise he knew he did not wholly deserve, — that, knowing his father would approve his decision, he did not wish to gain a good opinion of his conduct without stating the motives from which it resulted, which he felt would not be praised so unreservedly. The spirit of the whole letter is liable to misinterpretation, without that of John Hutcheson's to which it is an answer. Probably the father first mentioned Hutcheson's philosophical opinions, and to this he replies by upholding the innocency of singular opinions upon some subjects. Then John Hutcheson may have mentioned the reports of his conforming to the Church, possibly alluding to some case of a person who had sacrificed religious principle to temporal advancement. This 1 Hist. Irish Pres. Church, iv. p. 295. THE YICE-REGAL COURT. 47 clue explains much of the complexity of Hutcheson's reply. While he states that he himself had no intention of conforming, he is careful to add that he would not condemn another who acted differentl3^ Moreover one can Avell believe, that alto- gether apart from the difference of opinion on the New Light controversy, the points of view of fether and son were neces- sarily divergent. The latter had experienced all the clemency and none of the rigours of the Established Church. He was in touch with both sides of the question ; and, meeting religious opponents in friendly intercourse, he saw many of the points of difficulty were little more than vain trifles, exaggerated by heat of temper^: and therefore he considered himself justified in accepting the favour shown him as a scholar, as long as he refused any material advantage that would bind him to the sacrifice of his freedom of thought^ At the time, this plan of action was a dangerous one and liable to be misunderstood. Once it was known that the Court party had approached him with offers of advancement, his wisest course would have been to put his position beyond all doubt. Instead of declaring his own opinions, he admits that he " kept his mind very much to himself," " generally evaded the debate" or discussed the position in the abstract. Perhaps, even if so disposed, he found it difficult to give a direct refusal — indeed Carteret was too much of a diplomatist to make a definite offer until he was sure of Hutcheson's attitude to the Establishment. This he contrived to conceal, for he was proud of his social success and of the fact that he was on a friendly footing where few of his biith and religion had been received before, and he douljtless feared to risk the favour he enjoyed. In his letter he feels that this temporizing had been injudicious, and hence the prolix nature of his answer. He was prepared to refuse preferment ; but, at first, he cfjuld not bring himself to be sufficiently decisive in his reply to silence rumour. Doubtless he was wrong, but he was a young man, dazzled by ^ Inquiry, p. "ill. ^ It is not without bearing upon this question that such influence as was used afterwards during the election to the Professorship at Glasgow came from Hutcheson's own family. 48 THE VICE-REGAL COURT. an unexpected success and the change from dissenting society to that in a brilliant Court. His own opinions too made his position more difficult. From his leaning to the " New Light," he could not approve unreservedly of everything Presbyterian ; and, when the Thirty-nine Articles and the Westminster Confession were used as the respective cries of political parties, it is little wonder that a man who found fault with some of the views held by adherents of both might be misunderstood, especially by those who were anxious that he should conform to the Church. This error is one of the very few in a singularly perfect life, and against it is to be set the actual refusal of the overtures and still more the higher virtue by which Hutcheson showed he was incapable of treating matters of belief in the mercenary manner too common amongst his contemporaries \ Hutcheson's refusal of Carteret's good offices did not injure him with his would-be benefactor, indeed it rather advanced him in favour. Carteret had found his Court crowded with place-hunters — as he explained to Swift, " My very good Dean, none ever comes here But has something to hope, or something to fear," and the society of a man who neither hoped nor feared anything from him must have been an agreeable change. This contrast between self-seeking ecclesiastics and the independent Dis- senter may have cooperated with weightier reasons in making him more favourably disposed to the Presbyterians than the majority of his predecessors. In the discourses upon religious questions, Hutcheson had at least defended his own faith in the abstract ; and he solemnly declared to his father " that he held it his duty continually, as far as his influence could go, to promote its interests." That such advocacy weighed with the Viceroy is confirmed by the fact, that when Hutcheson returned to Ireland after a year's residence in Glasgow, he was pained to find Carteret less favourably disposed to the Presbyterians than > About the same date Clarke writes that he would not accept "any see unless it were the higliest which would make him independent of his brethren on the bench... the expectation of which might incline him to use more caution not to make himself incapable of it." Letters to Emlyn, quoted in Christian Moderator, i. p. 128. THE VICE-REGAL COURT. 49 he had been a few years before ^ This change of front coin- ciding with Hutcheson's departure from Dublin may be merely fortuitous, but the coincidence gains additional weight from the fjict that the most tolerant Churchmen of the day — Primate Boulter and Edward Synge — were also his friends; and if this be so, if Hutcheson endeavoured to use his influence in favour of the Dissenters, such action is the most complete answer to the doubts thrown upon his disinterestedness and honesty. The favour wliich Hutcheson received at Court was only a portion of his social success in Dublin. Upon the publication of the Inquiri/ one of his friends, Charles Moore, had given him the following letter of introduction to Archbishop King- : " The author of this book, which you will receive along with this, thought it proper to coiicetxl himself, till he saw how it would be received by the world. This reason prevented him from presenting it to your Grace sooner ; but, since he finds it has pleased some very great names, he humbly presumes it will not be disagreeable to your Grace, and that he shall make some small return in kind, for the great pleasure he has lately received by reading your Grace's book upon a subject, which has oft per- plexed his thoughts, De Oriyine IfalP." This introduction stood Hutcheson in good stead, since " two several attempts were made to prosecute him in the Archbishop's Court, for daring to take upon himself the educa- tion of youth, without having qualified himself by subscribing the ecclesiastical canons and obtaining a licence from the Bishop. Both these attempts were effectually discouraged by his Grace, with expressions of hearty displeasure against the persons who were so forward as to commence them*." The fact that these prosecutions were started between 1725 and King's death in the beginning of 1729, rather than at an earlier date, may be traced to jealousy, and not to an et^brt to enforce canon law ; indeed it is by no means improbable that the first charge wys brought forward immediately after Carteret's offer of the "good living" — it would have been an amusing eighteenth century cause celebre to find the Court Philosopher and a possible Dean charged in the police-court of the Church. 1 Wodrow's Analectti, iv. p. 298. - Christian Moderator, ii. pp. 849 — 350. ■* Published 1702. ■* Leechman, ut siqira, p. viii. S. H. 4 50 THE VICE-REGAL COURT. King was no doubt favourably disposed towards Hutcheson, being engaged in similar studies, which he continued up to the end of his life. In addition, it must however be remembered, that he was deeply impressed with the inexpediency of putting the law in force against Dissenters. The argument derived from the emigration of Presbyterians had considerable weight with the Government, and, as the depression in trade continued, the same reasons for inactivity would hold with even greater force. As late as 172G he says that "Ireland is in a more poor and miserable condition than I ever knew it to be since the Revolution','' a,nd, soon after the passing of the " Toleratioii Act," he had stated in his " Charge " that the " Clergy should remember the late Act of Parliament, by which a full liberty is given to all sects to set up their meetings, and to propagate what doctrines they please, by this neither the Civil nor Ecclesiastical Courts have any power over them''." From this it would appear that the projected prosecutions were wholly malicious, and King's letters contain no reference to them^; but the fact of such attempts may have made Hutcheson more anxious to be successful in his application for the Professorship at GlasgoAv, which became vacant after he had lost the protec- tion of King. Meanwhile Hutcheson had been building up a considerable reputation as an author. No doubt the Lord-Lieutenant's [interest in the Inquiry may have helped ; but the backbone of \his popularity was the public demand for the book in England, Which was quite independent of Carteret's favour, since a Second edition was published, within six months after the appearance of the first. As in the case of other works of the period, it is difficult to collect the opinions of contemporary thinkers, many of which were expressed in letters, and a few in 1 Letter to Molineux, April 5, 172(j; King's MSS., ut supra. 2 To Archbishop of Tuam, April 24, 1720. 3 King, writing to the Eev. Mr RadcliiJe on June 25, 1725, says— "I looked over your discourse against Dr Hutchinson and gave Dr Travers my sense of it" — which "sense" appears from a subsequent letter to have prevented the pub- lication of it. This "Dr Hutchinson" (whose Christian name was also Francis) was a Churcliman who afterwards became Bishop of Down. THE VICE-REGAL COURT. 51 conversation, all of which are now irrecoverable \ John Clarke <-a<4^'^^ of Hull had objected to the Moral Sense theory fi-om the stand- point of the Selfish Moralists, in a criticism of the Inquiry contained in his Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice, deducing all affections from Self-Love ; and, as the result of a subsequent conversation, Hutcheson admits that his deduction "seemed more ingenious than any which he ever saw in print'-." The first part of Balguy's Foundation of Moral Goodness 'o/^^^^ appeared in 1728, simultaneously with Hutcheson's next work, the Essay on the Passions. Of other criticisms Hutcheson says generally, that " the gentlemen, who have opposed some other sentiments of the author of the Inquiry, seem convinced of a Moral Sense " — a statement which is interesting owing to the fact that, later, the Moral Sense bore the brunt of criticism. Almost the only touch of bitterness occurs in Hutcheson's answer to Le Clerc's comments on the Inquiry, which, he contends, show such a want of appreciation that " either I don't understand his French, or he my English, or that he has never read mure than the titles of some of the sections ; and if any one of the three be the case, we are not fit for a controversy^" The longest investigation of Hutcheson's work appeared in// ^ . - a series of "letters" written to the London Journal during the// slimmef~ofT.728. These letters were signed " Philaretus," and were written by Gilbert Burnet — a sou of Bishop Burnet. He examined the Moral Sense, from the standpoint of Clarke, alleging that it gave no sufficiently certain foundation for Moral Philosophy. This criticism applied more especially to tlie editions Burnet had before him, which contained the mathe- matical formulae. Hutcheson replied to each letter, and the discussion continued more amicably than most of its kind, until Hutcheson found that he could not give sufficient time to the preparation of his replies, when he wrote to Burnet privately, sajdng that he was prepared to continue the discussion later when he hoped to have more leisured The death of ^ Essay on the Passions, Preface. - Ibid., p. xii ; infra, p. 109. ^ ^ Essay on the Passions, iit sujira, p. xxii. * Ibid., p. XX. ^^~^ 4—2 )/ 52 THE VICE-REGAL COURT, Burnet ended the correspondence, and the letters and replies, with an additional note by Burnet, were published in 1735. This controversy was helpful to Hutcheson by bringing him into direct contact with an opposing theory, and the probable explanation of his withdrawal from the discussion was that he felt the need of strengthening the statement of his own opinions, and this again led to the composition of the con- cluding " treatise on the Moral Sense " in his work published in the same year (1728) and entitled an Essay on the Passions. Though Burnet's letters occasioned the publication of this work, it owed much to Butler and Wollaston — the Sermons of the one and the Religion of Nature Delineated^ of the other having both been published in 1726. To each of these Hutcheson was much indebted, but in different ways. While criticizing Wollaston'^ he learnt from his work to supplement some of his own defects of terminology. His relation to Butler is very much closer. With the power of rapid assimilation of ideas he undoubtedly possessed, Hutcheson soon made the principles of the Sermons his own, and hence one finds the Essay on the Passions full of echoes of Butler, Quite apart from competent criticism Hutcheson had to face the strictures of persons who honestly believed that his speculations ran counter to some popular or favourite theological dogma. At this time it was a bold act to have placed Shaftes- bury's name upon the title-page of the Inquiry — in fact Shaftesbury was then tlie bete noire of the combative theologian. Leland classed him amongst the English Deists, and by many he was thought to be a dangerous opponent of religion, an opinion which Hutcheson had endeavoured to counteract in the preface of his first work. A satirical writer ironically suggests the foundation of a University for the encouragement of " Free- thinking," and he proposes Shaftesbury's Characteristics as one of the text-books to be mastered before a student can rise from the first class, " Risor," to the second, that of the 1 An edition of the Ilelig. Nat. Del. had been ijiinted in 1722, "four or five copies" of which were given away and some others sold privatel3', unknown to the author. 2 Esmij vit the Passions, Treatise ii. § 3. , THE VICE-REGAL COURT. 53 Irrisors'. While popular opinion was in this condition, Hutchcson must have suffered several attacks. A pamphlet, published in Dublin with the quaint title St Paul against Sliafteshwry in 1734 '^j may have been intended to confute the writer's conception of Hutcheson's teaching of Shaftesbury's heresies ; and Dr Calamy, an English Non-Confurmist, when he heard of the election to the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, said " that ho was not for Scotland as he thought from his book ; that he would be reckoned as unorthodox as Mr Simpson-l" Such criticism, joined with the dissatisfaction which must have been occasioned by the favour Hutcheson enjoyed at Court, no doubt raised detractors if not enemies, and one would expect that some of these would have expended their venom outside the ecclesias- tical courts, in anonymous pamphlets, after the ftxshion of the time ; but, if such attacks were made, they cannot now be traced. The following lines may indeed possibly refer to Hutcheson, though it is more probable they were directed against Thomas Sheridan, a friend of Swift, a teacher who was frequently ridiculed under the name of Punsibi : "The linsey-woolsey poor objections Of his illiterate reflections Have fully proved how ill the Fool Hath read the authors of his school. Ye hapless youths who pay him sterling For puddling through unclassic learning, Who hear him oft torment Apollo, His sad example doomed to follow^, etc." The years 1728 and 1729 were full of incident for Hutche- son. Besides his letters published in the London Journal and the Essay on the Passions, the same year saw an Irish edition of the latter work published by his friends Smith and Wm. Bruce, " with the errors of the London Edition emended^" In 1 Essay for tlic Better Improve)nent of Free-thinkhui — in a letter to a Friend. London, 1732. 2 Haliday Pamphlets, R. I. A. ^ Wodrow'.s Analecta, iv. p. 227. ■• A Libel upon the Dublin Dunces — Printed in the year 1734. 5 Advertisement in the Dublin Intellifiencer, March 23, 1727-8. Tlie London edition was sold for 5*-. 5d. and the Dublin one is announced at "two British Shillings." 54 THE VICE-llEGAL COURT. the next year a third edition of the Inquiry was published in London, and his letters to the Dublin Journal were reprinted in the collected edition by Arbuckle, and attributed to " the learned and ingenious author of the Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue^." These literary successes were unfortunately more than counterbalanced by domestic trials. His father — "the best friend he had in the world" — died in February, 1729'"', and he lost a child about the same time, a double affliction which preyed upon his spirits for a considerable period^. Hutcheson now succeeded to the income of one-half of the Co. Down property, under the will of his grandfather Alexander Hutche- son ; and his father devised to him his books and manuscripts, though it is probable that he transferred such of the latter as concerned Presbyterian affairs to the editor who prepared John Hutcheson's Narrative of the Seven Synods for the press*. During Hutcheson's visits to his father at Armagh, and, subsequently, when winding up his affairs^ he became ac- quainted with Primate Boulter, who had just arrived from England to become head of the Irish Church. He was, therefore, able to approach Irish religious controversies without local prejudice, and Hutcheson seems to have influenced him in ftivour of the Presbyterians^ It was through Hutcheson that Boulter gave a sum of money to the University of Glasgow at a later date. The mention of Hutcheson's connection with Glasgow leads up to his appointment as Professor of Mural Philosophy. In 1729 his old teacher, Gershom Carmichael, had died, and three candidates were thought of for the vacant chair— a Mr Warner, Frederick Carmichael, son of the deceased Professor, and Hutcheson. The election soon resolved itself into a struggle between the adherents of the old spirit and those of the new in ^ Hibernicus's Letters, ut supra, ii. p. 429. 2 Keid's History, ut supra; Witherow's Memorials. 3 Wodrow's Annh'cta, iv. p. 191. * Will of John Hutcheson. Public Eecord Oflice, Dublin. 5 The will of John Hutcheson is endorsed—" sworn to by Francis Hutcheson, one of the executors, April 6, 1729," at the Archbishop's Court, Armagh. '' Cf. Stuart's Armugh, p. 482. THK VICE-REGAL COURT. 55 the University. The Principal and others of the old school supported Carmichael ; while Alexander Dunlop, the Professor of Greek, and the younger men were in favour of Hutcheson. He was eventually elected, on December 19, 1729, by a majority of one vote. According to Wodrow, this result was due to in- fluence exerted by Dunlop, who was keenly interested in the contest, partly from opposition to the Principal, partly through family reasons, having recently married " Hutcheson's aunt's daughter^" The following is the official account of the meet- ing and election : "At the College of Glasgow 19tli December, 1729, Sederunt Mr Xeil Campbell Principal, Mr Will. Wi.shart, D.F., Mr J". Simpson, S.T.P., et alii — This being the day appointed for the election of a person to supply the vacancy caused by Mr Carmichael's death, the Principal produced a letter from the Rector, dated Edinburgh, 16th inst., signifying he was sorry it was not possible he could be present at the election upon this day, and wishing a happy choice for the good of the University. Then, after several of the members had discoursed about a fit person, the question was put, who shall lie elected to the vacant profession of Philosophy. And, the Clerk having called the roll, it was carried by a majority, that Mr Francis Hutcheson, of Dublin, should be elected. And, therefore the faculty, in consideration of the known merit, learning and good repute of the said Mr Hutcheson and of his other good quahties, elect him in the aforesaid terms to succeed to the vacant profession of Philosophy in this University"^." On February 20, l7oU, "the Faculty appointed the following subjects to be given to Mr Hutcheson, in order to his making discourses upon them, to be delivered in presence of the Faculty, viz. : In Logick — ' De Scieutia, Fide et Opinione inter se coUatis.' In Ethicks — 'An sit una tantum morum lex fundamentalis, vel, si sint plures, quacuarn sint.' In Physicks — ' De Gravitatione Corporum versus se mutuo (sic).' " Hutcheson does not appear to have moved finally to Glasgow until the latter part of the year 1730. After his election he seems to have remained in Dublin and to have continued the ^ Analecta, iv. p. 99. - Munimenta Univ. Glas., ut sjqjia, iii. p. ■1U2. 56 THE VICE-REGAL COURT. work of tlic Academy, and then to have transferred the majority of his pupils to Glasgow in time for the beginning of the next academic year'. He arrived in Glasgow in October, signed the Confession of Faith upon the 29th of the month, and was co-opted "in numerum magistrorum " on November 3rd^. On the 30th of the month he was publicly admitted, when he gave his inaugural lecture De Naturali Homimtm Socialitate, de- fending his principle of Benevolence ; but owing to his "deliver- ing it very fast and low, being a modest man, it was not well undcrstood^" ^ Wodrow, tit siqwa. • MS. Records, University of Glasgow. ^ "Wodrow, IV. p. 167. CHAPTER IV. hutcheson's influence as a professor. HuTCHESON, upon his arrival at Glasgow, doubtless found the University greatly changed. Dui'ing the thirteen years of his absence, difficulties, that had not yet come to the surface while he was a student, had plunged the academic body into strife and dissension. The old contest between mediaeval- ism and modernism still continued, but this was necessarily confined to the Professors and their relations with the Chin-ch. Naturally the Professor of Divinity suffered most, and the sus- pension of Simpson marks a temporary triumph of the devotees of conservatism in knowledge and of the opponents of a liberal- izing culture. It reasserted the claim of the established Church that the University should be an appendage of the Presbytery, that the teaching staff should be recruited from the West- country ministry, and above all that the orthodoxy of the , University should be under the control of the General Assem- bly. Such claims are common to the histories of different universities during the first half of last century, and, even at the present day, though they are little known in higher educa- tion, they still revive spasmodically in the working of secondary schools. A peculiar interest centres round the insistence upon them by the clergy in the neighbourhood of Glasgow, since, though all testimony is in favour of their religious zeal, there can be little doubt that they were far from being intellec- tually distinguished^ With them the ideal of a university was a severe rigid orthodoxy, and some of them looked upon all culture and style with a certain amount of suspicion. In 1 Scotland and Scotsinen, i. p. 271. 58 hutcheson's influence as a professor. the language of Matthew Arnold they aimed at making the university religiously provincial, and, had they eventually triumphed, it would probably have become the seminary of a sect, not an important educational establishment representing a national Church. If one pictures Hutcheson, the disciple of Shaftesbury, fresh from the traditions of a somewhat brilliant Court, a young man valuing the showy culture of the society of his day, all the more, perhaps, because he was scarcely to the manner born, but had won it by his merits, according to his friends, or by chance, as no doubt his detractors said ; if one adds, too, a tolerance partly constitutional and partly a result of his fashionable training, it is easy to understand that he must, inevitably, have taken sides with the more modern and progressive party. Besides, there was a personal element that converted him from a passive sympathizer into an active partizan. However the Scottish Presbyterian might differ from the colony of the same Church in the north of Ireland, there was more than a . superficial resemblance between the more conservative clergy in both countries. The Ulster Presbyterian in the earlier part of the eighteenth century had emerged from a time of struggle, and, remembering the "massacres" of 1641, and Cromwell's demand for " an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," and their ancestors' sacrifices during the siege of Derry, it is little wonder that they looked upon themselves as God's garrison in a conquered country, holding the outposts of the true fixith against the Anglo-Irish Episcopalian and the Celtic Roman Catholic. Such historical facts naturally led to a rigour and sternness that left little room for the graces of culture. The religious life was intensely serious, having involved, in the past, enormous sacrifices and, arguing from the past, as their descend- ants do at the present day, likely to involve further sacrifices in the future ; for it is always to be remembered that Ireland is the home of Churches militant, and, then as now, each religious body stood at arms, dreading the aggi'ession of its neighbours. Such an attitude had made the Presbyterian Church intolerable to the group of younger men known as the " Belfast Society," who later became the "Non-Subscribers." Nearly all of hutcheson's influence as a professor. 59 these were Hutcheson's friends, and he could hardly fail to condemn what he no doubt considered the shortsightedness of a Church that had deprived itself of such a vigorous offshoot. Upon his arrival in Scotland he identified the more conserva- tive West-country ministers with the non- progressive Irish party ; and therefore he was not only opposed to them from his whole cast of thought, but also on account of the mis- fortunes of his friends. Such is the complex interweaving of historical events that the schism in the Ulster Presbyterian Church had a considerable intluenec in the liberalizing of the University of Glasgow ! Quite apart from the clerical aspect of the question, there were numerous elements leading to a great change in the University. Uuring Hutcheson's absence in Ireland, the aca- demic body had been trying to readjust itself after the con- fusion of the Rebellion. The Principal, John Sterling, who had been appointed in 1701, seems to have been a better pilot in stormy than in calm waters. In his old age he endeavoured to enforce the severe disciplinary measures that had been neces- sary during the troubles. About the year 1720 the students were in a ferment, owing to their being deprived of the privilege of electing a Rector, the decision having been usurped by the Principal and Regents. Sterling, too, was charged with forming a party and transacting important business during vacations, when only his own supporters weie present in the Senatus. It was alleged that, being the sole custodian of all documents, the minutes were " frequently scored, interlined and margined," with his consent \ With such complaints in the air there was insubordination amongst the students ; some were expelled, with the result of a Visitation and appeals to the Courts. The Principal's supporters adopted an overbearing tone to the students, as for instance, when one of the students, who had been expelled for lighting a bonfire and drinking (amongst other healths) the liberties of the Students of Glasgow, returned with a suspension of his expulsion, Simson told him " he might light his pipe " with the document. On the other side some of 1 A Short Account of the late Trealmcnt of the Students of the University of Glasgoiv, Dubliu, 1722. 60 hutcheson's influence as a professor. the Regents who opposed the Principal were charged with inciting the students to riot', so that, on the whole, discipline for a time seemed to be in abeyance. One of the results of this state of affairs was that a Com- mission was appointed, which, by a Statute and Act of 1727, revolutionized the whole system of teaching, by changing the mediaeval system of Regents into the modern professorial one. The Regents represented a tutorial system, by which each student entered under a certain Regent or "master," who taught him throughout his course, and they were also responsible for the conduct of their owai pupils, much like college tutors else- where. As Glasgow College last century had chambers for a number of students, this system was possessed of obvious advantages, and, in fact, the method of teaching, by " Regents," died hard in some of the other Scottish Universities. At Glasgow, the new method was accepted with little difficulty considering the magnitude of the change, but it is obvious that the fact of Hutcheson's coming at such a time led to his being more and more identified w^ith the progressive party. In so far as the change affected the Philosophical Classes, the language of the Act of 1727 is sufficiently precise. "The Commission having recommended to the Masters of the saids three Philo- sophical Classes, to make their election, which of the classes they were severally to take, and they having agreed amongst themselves, and Mr G. Carmichael (Hutcheson's predecessor) having made choice of the Ethick Class, Mr John Loudoun of the Logick Class, and the teaching of the Physick Class falling to Mr Dick, the Commissioners statute and ordain that the saids persons, respective, shall, in time coming, have the teaching of the said severall classes, by them chosen, and Mr R. Dick teach the class falling to him, and that they remain so fixed to the said classes, and that all other and subsequent Professors of Philosophy, coming in to the said university, shall be still fixed to one class, and the teaching of the forsaid parts of philosophy allotted to the class in which he shall be fixed," Further, since it had been customary for the Regents to delay 1 Wodiow MSS. 41, Nos. 95—99. hutcheson's influence as a professor. G1 the opening of the Classes until December or even JanuaryS the Act further determines " that the Professors above specified shall either continue their Colleges from the first day of November to the last day of May yearly, or, if their classes be sooner finished, that they shall weekly thereafter give public prelections to the last day of May," a course which Hutcheson seems to have always followed, though he complained that it prevented his visiting friends in Ireland, besides depriving liim of leisure for literary work. It is, therefore, easy to guess that Hutcheson, entering upon a new field of work at Glasgow, with a reputation little likely to recommend him to old-fashioned people, found himself in a troubled atmosphere that needed all his tact. Towards the middle of the century academic differences between the "gown" and " other " professors had degenerated into petty squabbles, but, from 1728 to 1750, the University was divided upon lines of a broad policy, as to whether its whole tendency should be progressive or stationary — if not I'etrogressive. Hutcheson's arrival gave him a foretaste of the reactionary ideas of some of his new colleagues. William Anderson, who had been appointed Professor of Ecclesiastical History in 1721, had been selected to teach the Moral Philosophy Class after Carmichael's death^; but, at the beginning of the session in 1730, Loudon, Hutcheson's old teacher in Logic, and now Professor of the same subject, claimed that he had " a right to make choice of the Ethick Class under the late Commission of Visitation." However, some twenty English students, who had come for the session, upon the express understanding that Hutcheson was " to teach morality," sent in a petition stating that, unless Hutcheson lectured in Moral Philosophy, they would go to Edinburgh, and, though such dictation from the class must have been galling, Loudon had to yield. He managed at least to retreat with decency as he represented that, " in regard his state of health was not so firm as to allow him to venture upon a change now, he resolved to keep the semi-class^" — 1 Literary Memorials of Glascjow, p. 122. - MS. Records of Glasgow Uiiiv. 3 Ibid. 62 hutcheson's influence as a professor. evidently the eighteenth century Professor knew the value of the " diplomatic cold " ! The extraordinary feature of the whole affair is that, while Hutcheson had been elected to the Chair of Moral Philosophy, and the Act of 1727 expressly states that Carmichael, Loudon and Dick should remain " fixed " to the respective classes they had chosen, the Senatus records that Loudon " had the right " of choice, plainly showing that Univer- sity statutes were at the mercy of the majority of the dominant party. About the middle of October Hutcheson arrived from Dublin, bringing eighteen or twenty of his old pupils with i him\ Upon October 29th he subscribed the Confession of Faith, and upon the 3rd of November was admitted " in numerum magistrorumV being publicly admitted on the 30th. Wodrow, whose sympathies were rather with the old school, says he was "well spoken of"; and, writing later in December, adds that " he was much commended," especially as he did not frequent taverns, like Simson. " That he carried himself gravely " was in part due to grief for the loss of his father and one of his children. His chief friends were the William Anderson already mentioned and John M''Laurin, a minister, whose name is remembered as brother of a celebrated Edinburgh professor, a prominent Glasgow minister, writer of tracts, and as an unsuccessful candidate for the Chair of Divinit}". "In party matters," Wodrow adds, ''and some politicks, as to smaller matters, it's like he will be on the side with Mr DunlopV' who was Professor of Greek, and, though far from a young man, was wholly on the side of reform and progress. Hutcheson's first step was to discipline his class, "by keep- ing the students to rules, catalogues, exact hours &c. wherein there is certainly a very great decay*," and then to organize the class work. This was altogether a new departure, as, under the Regent system, much time was spent in elementary work. Hutcheson, instead of confining himself to an oral commentary ^ Wodiow's Jnalecta, iv. p. 185. - Glasgow Univ. Records. '•'' Wodrow's Analecta, iv. pp. 190 — 1. * Ibid. hutcheson'h influence as a professor. 63 in Latin upon some scholastic text-book, inaugurated a new )/ method ofJiidJixinguij^JEBglish, and ho covered the whole field <-: of "Natural Religion, Morals^ Jurisprudence and Government," in the five daily lectures he gave each week\ At first, he Jn^j^itr-P-uihiidcLrf and the "Gornpend" of his predecessor Car- michaeP, butlater, he delivered written lectures with many digressions and additions, which were substantially the same as the System of Moral Philosophy, edited after his death byj Leechman, and which varied little from year to year-'. Oni' three days each week he co-operated with his friend Dunlop by lechiring'jijgonancient ethics, thereby fostering the renaissance of ^the study of Greek whrch both had at heart, besides following the Shaftesbury precept 7jf iiiculcating the excellence of the moiillsystems^ of the ancients. Though these lectures were useful to the students, they were far from gaining the approval of Hutchesou's opponents, and it is probably this side of his work that called forth the elephantine satire of Witherspoon— " Recommending virtue from the authority and examples of the heathen is not only highly proper, because they were highly virtuous, but has this manifest advantage attending it, that it is a proper way of reasoning to two (juite opposite kinds of persons.... It is well known there are multitudes in our islands who reckon Socrates and Plato to have been greater men than the Apostles.... Therefore let religion be constantly and uni- formly called virtue, and let the heathen philosophers be set up as the great patterns and promoters of it*." Hutcheson also held private classes, like most of the other professors, which were largely attended by "tradesmen and youths from the town " ; and, on Sundays, he gave lectures on the evidences of Christianity, and, either upon Sunday night or Monday morning, he examined his class very closely on the Sermon as well as liis own lectured These Sunday lectures followed Grotius De Veritate Religionis Christiauae, but the 1 Leecbman's Life of Hutcheson, p. xxxvi. 2 Wodrow's AnaUcta, iv. p. 185. 3 Leechnian's Life, p. xxxiv. * Witheispoon's Works, 2nd Edition, p. 17. 5 Wodrow's Aiuih'cta, iv. p. 185. 64 hutcheson's influence as a professor. subject was treated both popularly and with eloquence, so that, as no fee was charged, there was alwaj-s a very large outside audience \ Not only was the lecturing in English a new departure, but Hutcheson's whole manner was a revelation to the students. He was in the habit of walking up and down " the arena of the room " as he spoke. " Since his elocution was good and his voice and manner pleasing, he raised the attention of his hearers at all times, and, when the subject led him to enforce if I his moral duties and virtues, he displayed a fervent and per- j / suasive eloquence which was irresistible*." Leech man, who was later his colleague and biographer, mentions that "his happy talent of speaking with ease, with propriety and spirit, ren- dered him one of the most masterly and engaging teachers that has appeared in our age I" He did not confine himself to the mere teaching of Philosophy, but aimed at making his students moral men, in other words his work included more of the art .than the science of Ethics. Here he proved himself the disciple— 1 1 of Shaftesbury in his enthusiasm for virtue, which led him into \ 'frequent bursts of eloquence, in praise of aU^ that was nobls^ I ^and beautiful in a rightly ordered life. ^JThus he dealt diffu- sively " upon such moral considerations as are suitable to touch the heart and raise a relish for virtue," for he regarded the "culture of the heart as a main end of all moral instruction VI_ Such lectures constituted a revolution in academic teaching. In his popular mode of exposition and comprehension of other theories, Hutcheson was admittedly the superior of his prede- cessors, but to this he added the rare gift of eloquent expression, brightening his argument with the graces of oratory, and joining to the knowledge of the Professor the fervour of a preacher. The freshness of his thought, its departure from the usual academic spirit, his eloquence and earnestness all tend t(» justify the wonderful hold he had upon the minds of young men. But it needed something more to explain his remarkable personal influence, and here the key-note will be found in the fact that he was a Professor-preacher, intertwining, in a double expression, ' Carlyle's Autohiographij , jj. 70. - Ibid. 2 Leechman's Life of Hutcheson, pp. xxx, xxxi. ■* Ibid. ^ hutcheson's influence as a professor. 65 two different gospels, one the claim for the modern spirit, for light and culture, the enthusiasm for Benevolence and Beauty; and the other, of an artistic nature, in so far as he endeavoured to mould the plastic young minds around him into so many living realisations of his ethical ideal. Further, in his lectures on the State (which gave Adam Smith an interest in Political Economy), he always insisted " with the greatest strength of argument and earnestness of persuasion " upon the then burning questions of civil and religious liberty ; and as most young men are Idealists, if not Radicals, in politics, one can readily credit Leechman's statement that " few, if any, of his pupils, ever left him without favourable notions of that side of the question which he espoused and defended \" It will have been seen that Hutcheson's influence as an author was felt to a large degree outside the university, and that this influence was but a faint reflex of his own personal magnetism inside the class-room. He felt that his life-work/ lay in the moulding of young men's characters, and mere ] academic teaching was always secondary to this. " What he thought, he loved ; a,nd what he taught, he was " — indeed, one might add, what he loved, he tried not merely to teach but to make his students ^ This side of Hutcheson's life-work suggests the reflection of the diversity of the world's monuments to great men — for, without doubt, Hutcheson was a grea t teac her, and that in the most important and difficult sphere, the university. Possibly it would have been almost better had " he scorned the untruth of leaving books behind " him, for his works give little clue to the force of speech that gave a new horizon to the Glasgow students of his day. Such notice as he had received depends upon his positive contributions to philosophy, drawn from these very works, and yet with him theory was always secondary to prac- tice. He was in no sense a system-builder, but rather a teacher who ])7^eached Philosophy, to whom a positive system was little more than a text, and, it will be seen, these texts were drawn from different sources and not always quite 1 Leechman's Life of Hutcheson, p. xxxvi. - Maitineau, Types of Ethical Theory, ii. p. 524. S. H. 5 66 hutcheson's influence as a professor, consistently. And while those who have come after him have given him false honour for the discovery of a " moral sense " which was not his but Shaftesbury's, or for the foundation of a " school " which involves a historical anachronism — his life, wherein lay his power, has been overlooked, and one is inclined to charge his contemporaries with lack of taste when they speak, as one man, of his personal charm, his earnest power of conviction, and remarkable or " irresistible " oratory. Still even here, on looking deeper, there is found a strange historical compensation ; and that too the stranger, because it has worked unconsciously or automatically. While posterity has neglected Hutcheson's true claim to fame, and left him without a real monument, all the time, history, tradition, or chance has given him the monument he himself would have chosen, for the didactic element in his teaching has become and remained a characteristic of the Chairs of Moral Philosophy in the Scottish universities — a feature found nowhere else — and continues a dominant influence down to the present day. In all other universities, where Philosophy is taught as an Arts subject (as apart from Theology) Mental and Moral Philosophy are on an exact footing of equality ; in Scotland, on the other hand, there is a tradition, now, perhaps, half obliterated by time and progress, yet still very prevalent, especially outside the univer- sities, that there should be a difference between the teaching of the two Chairs. Mental Philosophy is more precise and scientific, while Moral Philosophy is wider in its scope, more didactic, and supposed to exert an actual ethical influence — the force of this belief is still to be noticed in the preference of Theological students for Moral Philosoj^hy. It is a little curious to think that in the long range of Scottish Professors of Moral Philosophy, after Hutcheson, however far many of them may have diverged from his system and beliefs, all .have been, more or less, according to their characters and surround- ings, influenced, in the form of teaching, by the lost lectures delivered over a hundred and fifty years ago at Glasgow'. 1 A receut instance of Hutcheson's enduring intiuenee in Scotland may be noted in the tribute to his memory by Prof. James Seth in his Inaugural Lecture, Oct. 21, 1898, The Scottish Contribution to Moral Philosophij, pp. 7—17. hutcheson's influence as a professor. 67 The permanence of such an ideal is a most remarkable testimony to Hutcheson's influence, which would, possibly, only have endured in the conservative atmosphere of a university — one could scarcely mention a single maxim in state-craft of the same date that remains a motive force in modern politics. This may in part be explained by the fact that, at this time, politics were governed, in a large degree, by the two Stuart rebellions (these nearly coinciding with Hutcheson's whole connection with Glasgow), which were unsuccessful; whereas Hutcheson's teaching was one element in a change — almost an academic revolution — which was so successful that antecedent conditions are of merely historical interest. , »*( The power of this tradition of Hutcheson's methods naturally \ ■ raises the question of the value of his educational aspirations ; / for it would appear that the Scottish universities are beginning to emerge from the influence of this ideal of last century. Owing to the empiricism of universities even yet, it is exceed- ingly difficult to give any definite answer. Is the ideal of a university to turn out morally good men, or intellectually strong men or is one a consequence of the other ? Hutcheson's , whole life was an eloquent defence of the first alternative, and, if modern higher education is to contain any didactic elements, these find a place most readily in the teaching of Moral Philo- sophy. Upon the other hand, it must be remembered, that since Hutcheson's day Modern Philosophy has been practically reborn, and that the limited time at the Professor's disposal, as well as the more minute analysis and greater technicality of the more important systems, practically force the teacher to recognize, that entering upon didactic details is liable to involve a certain superficiality of treatment, and that, if "the heart is cultivated," the head is likely to sutfer. It will be seen,.too, in the sequel that Hutcheson had certain ecclesiastical ends in view, and this throws some light upon the difficulty. In that complete university of the future, which, as yet, remains for the contemplation of the wise, in the heavens, teaching such as Hutcheson's would find its fittest place as an adjunct to the Theological School or College, where its eloquence and earnest- ness would be both of moral and educational value, while the 5—2 68 hutcheson's influence as a professor. more scientific exposition of the subject would be the proper care of the Arts Chair. At the same time, whatever may be the opinion formed upon methods of teaching Moral Philosophy, there can be little doubt that it is to Hutcheson's, and the general acceptance of it, under different modifications, as applied to different subjects, that Scotland owes the peculiar clearness and finish of the generality of the university lectures, which distinguish them from the professorial or tutorial teach- ing of other universities ; and it was thus peculiarly appropriate that Hutcheson's arrival at Glasgow almost coincided with the conversion of the " regents " into professors, for it was the standard he set as a lecturer, that made the paper change a really effective one. Quite apart from Hutcheson's activity in the class-room was another and even more important side of his work in the university or rather in the College. Complaints had often been made of the aloofness of the Professors^ Hutcheson immediately set himself to remedy this. " He did not confine himself to the pupils i4nmediately under his care, but laid himself out to be useful to the students of all the different faculties, whenever any opportunity offered : and he was espe- cially solicitous to be serviceable to the students of Divinity, endeavouring, among other important instructions, to give them just notions of the main design of preaching-." Not only did he take an active interest in the students, but he met them outside the class-room in a friendly spirit. His kindness of heart and freedom from false pride is shown by an anecdote of Carlyle, who was a student of Divinity in 1743-4. "Not long afterwards," he writes, " I had certain proof of the candour and gentleness of this eminent Professor ; for, when I had delivered a discourse in the Divinity Hall, it happened to please the Professor (Leechman) so much that Hutcheson wished to see it. When he read it he returned it with unqualified applause, though it contained some things which a jealous mind might have interpreted as an attack upon his favourite doctrine of a 1 A Short Account of the late Treatment of the Students of the University of Glasgoic, Dublin, 1722. " Leechman's Life of Hutcheson, i^. xxxviii. hutcheson's influence as a professor. *69 moral sense'." It was not only by advice and conversation that he aided students, but also, having since his father's death a considerable private income, by more material help ; to some students who needed it, he gave money delicately, and ad- mitted many others to his classes without recjuiring the usual fees"-^. One can readily understand that he had a warm corner in his heart for students who had come like himself from Ireland, especially as some of these were relatives of his friends. These Irish students, so far from home — as far in time, then, as the American student in Europe is now — were subject to many temptations. A moderator of the Synod of Ulster and graduate of Glasgow University sums up their position as follows : " They are left with little check or controul over them ; they seldom brought letters of introduction ; they had no acquaintance, and they kept almost entirely to themselves ; even, in the Divinity Hall, they generally sat, in a back place, by themselves, and formed little acquaintance with the other students. Besides what they did there was unknown to their parents and guar- dians here ; and, from what I have heard, I have no doubt that many of them fall into practices very dangerous to them I" Many of the Professors used to dread the high spirits of the Irish students, who, less under restraint than the rest, seemed to have endeavoured to shock the sober people of Glasgow. Reid always spoke of them as " the wild Irish teagues." Hutche- son himself complains that " our countrymen very generally have such an affectation of being men and gentlemen imme- diately and of despising everything in Scotland, that they neglect a great deal of good, wise instruction they might have here. I am truly mortified with a vanity and foppery prevail- ing among our countrymen, beyond what I see in others ; and a sauntering forsooth which makes them incapable of any hearty drudgery at books. We have five or six young gentlemen, from Edinburgh, men of fortune and fine genius, at my class, and studying law. Our Irishmen thought them poor book- 1 Carlyle's Autobiography, p. 101. 2 Leechman's Life of Hutclieson, p. xxvi. 3 Christian Moderator, ii. p. '2G4. 70 hutcheson's influence as a professor. worms; and indeed they dreaded contracting acquaintance with Blackwood* and Haliday^ in particular." Hutcheson acted as banker, friend and guardian to all these youths, encouraging one or admonishing another. His letters to his former colleague, Thomas Drennan, who was now settled in Belfast as assistant to the Rev. S. Haliday, show his earnest care of the young men, besides throwing interesting side-lights upon the student-life of the time. The following may be taken as an instance of his difficulties as the students' banker. " Glasgow, January 31, 1737. "Dear Thom, Yours of the 20th instant surprised me much. Mr Arbucle sent over in December a letter to John Stark giving credit to Mr WilHam- son for £40. The boy brought it to me, I went ^^'lth him to John Stark, and having to pay masters for the whole Session, a gown, books, a quarter's lodging, he took the value of £20 Irish, viz. £17. 18s. %d. This he employed me to pay out for him and give him as he needed, and, before me, drew a bill for £20 Irish on Mr Arbucle, which he gave to John Stark. The boy received lao more money from any mortal but from me and has drawn for no more than the said £20 Irish. Stark died about eight days after this payment, his executors showed me his letter-book ; and besides, in conse- quence of Mr Arbucle's letter, Mr Hartson should pay Mr Arbucle only for what Mr Williamson draws and not any draughts on John Stark .... I ffincy you need not let ]\Ir Hartson be in any trouble, in this matter, I will advance Mr "Williamson what he shall further need and draw on Mr Hartson in favour of Brother Robin at as low exchange as anyone here. I happen to want to remit, which is very seldom the case with me. Pray let Mr Duchal know that I am concerned that Mr Shane has not returned this Session, that I lent him, in May last, two guineas and have not heard anything about him since." There is a touch of unconscious humour in the last sentence, which shows that even the eighteenth century Professor had made acquaintance with the proverbial shyness of the debtor. ^ Sir John Blackwood of Ballyleady, Co. Down. 2 A son of Haliday, a uon-subscribing minister in Belfast, who had been senior colleague of Drennan, Hutcheson's assistant in Dublin, to whom this letter is written. hutcheson's influence as a professor. 71 Sometimes students, specially recommended, ill repaid Hutcheson's care of them. A little later he writes : "You recommended to me, one James Stuart, from Dublin College. I wish he had continued there. I am cautious of hurting a lad's character, but I much fear, he has had some bad influence, to lead some people you wish very well to, into idleness and drinking. We almost constantly suffer by such as come from Dublin College. I never desire to see one of them. He is straitened for money, has not paid his lodging yet, and I am sure 'tis not from any high payments made to masters. I wish their friends would employ some merchant in town to pay honest fair amounts for them and give them what they are allowed for pocket-money. There is such suspicion of his conduct here, that I believe it will be insisted upon by severals of the Professours that he bring certificates of his regular deportment in Dublin College, attested to be genuine by some hand we know. If you are concerned about him you can get me a certificate from one or two of the Fellows of his good behaviour. Jack Smith 1 meets them often and his attesting the genuineness of the certificate will do. Without this I cnnnot agree to his getting a degree. We have been hurt by such steps formerly. I would not have you divulge my bad impression of him but to such friends as could either influence him to better conduct here and pay his debts or remove him in time." From a subsequent letter it appears that the student's friends employed Hutcheson to find out his debts and pay them. Soon after the death of Haliday (Drennan's colleague) his son Robert Haliday, who was a student at Glasgow, gave Hutcheson considerable anxiety. Owing to Drennan's connec- tion with the family Hutcheson's letters to him record in detail his struggle with an imj^etuous young man, and the final success that rewarded his tactful labours. As this was in all probability only one of many similar missionary efforts, the account of it is worth recording as a hidden side of his character. " Glasgow, Ju7ie 1, 1741. "Dear Thom, ... I must next write you about an affair that gives me a great deal of trouble. Bob Haliday is not in a right way as to his conduct. 1 Hutchesou's publisher in Dublin. 72 hutcheson's influence as a professor. I gave him several of the strongest admonitions I could, I had many fine promises, I confined him in his expenses, he seemed to take all well and to promise diligence. All seemed to me tolerable, till of late, that I find he has run in debt with comerads, and for some trifles in shops ; and is quite idling away his time. Nay, what is worse, I fear, he is hurting others. The boy has a good genius, but that is the poorest satisfaction, to me, about anyone I wish well to. He is conccity, thinks himself a wit and scorns advice from Gabriel Cornwall or Mr McMeehan, and trifles away money and time for nothing. I know not how to write to Mrs Haliday, but, as matters appear to me, at present, there is little hope of his succeeding in any learned Pro- fession, and, consequently, he can have no business here. Cornwall and Mr McMeehan dread him about their pupils, and both set upon me to send him home as soon as possible. I am distressed about Mrs Haliday, whom I used to encourage with the best accounts of things. I would not send him home suddenly, till she were in some way prepared for it, and must beg it of you to begin the matter, and prepare her to receive him. If any friends were for giving him a further trial, as to study, they should send him, without my knowledge, about £10 to pay oft' concealed debts. . . . I have mortified Haliday very heartily last night. His spirits will perhaps be up today or tomorrow. . . . You must not show this to Mrs Haliday, but let her know that I wrote you, that I cannot get him to be tolerably diligent, or cautious in his expenses. Pray write Bob Haliday as soon as you receive this, and don't fail to write me, upon chatting with Mrs Haliday. Bob wants a companion. I have said a great deal against the army, as the last [of] all good shifts, to men who have not interest in Shires or votes in Parliament. But I fear nothing else will suit his turn of temper, unless he alters a good deal. I shall be impatient to hear from you. I am, dear Thom, Your most obedient Friend and Comerad, Fran. Hutcheson." " Glasgow, Jitm 15, 1741. "Dear Thom, My last which was a most necessary step, would give you and poor Mrs Haliday so much pain that I am again impatient to write you. I find my discourse and some other engines I have employed about Bob Haliday have had such effects, as begin to give me better hopes, and some discreet folks, particularly ]\IcMeehan, who were most earnest for my sending him home are now encouraging me to let him stay. HUTCHESOX'S INFLUENCE AS A PROFESSOR. 73 I find he is heartily mortified, and has continued so, this fortnight, retired and studious and owning his faults. The boy has a good genius and worth the taking care of, provided I could fall on the way to do it to purpose. You can scarce imagine how desolate we are in Glasgow, and how safe during the Summer. Pray let Mrs Haliday know this. I don't profess reconciliation yet, to him, Ijut I cannot conceal my agreeable hopes from her. Pray write to Bob, now and then, in a very grave strain, exhorting him to caution and spiriting him to a generous ambition. The wretched turn their minds take is to the silly manliness of taverns. Jack Blackwood was a bad sight this way to lads of smaller fortunes, tho' otherways of a fine temper. But this expense always leads to disingenuous shifts and to some other mischiefs. Satisfy poor IMrs Halidaj^ I hope all will go well." " Glasgow, Ajvil 12, 1742. "Dear Thom, . . . My present occasion of writing is that you should deliver the enclosed to Mrs Haliday yom*self and give her what advice you can about her son. He has not yet got habits of vice in the sense of the world. But I fear he is conceited, pert and self-willed. I have often told him my mind very freely. He was in haste to be a man, and thought company in taverns mighty genteel and could rally the folly of bookish studious lads and saw too much of the vanity of the sciences. I write freely his ftiults that you may the better direct your conversation with him. I am at a loss how he explains his accounts to Mrs Haliday, she allowed him £10 or £9. 5s. British, for any secret accounts. But I gave him, in the beginning of November, £3. 12s. to pay Anatomy lectures and some books, and two guineas, for the surgeon, whose shop he attended for the Materia Medica. But I found he applied the money to other purposes, as he had done two guineas I had given him the former year to pay for a class, and I had this to charge in the account again. This discouraged me about him : otherways I had entrusted him with his money this year. He has spent £120 these two Sessions, and there is not twenty of this for cloathes or books. There's another point you must manage and discreetly as you can. About this time two years, I had given him four guineas, to give, as a compensation to a very worthy lad, one Whitley, who had assisted him all the preceding winter. He had offered it, as I hear, but at the same time made such intreaties and representations of his distress, how to clear some little debts, that Mr Whitley returned it to him, for that purpose. ^\Tiitley is a very worthy lad and indigent, 'tis cpiite wrong he should want it. 74 HUTCHESOX'S INFLUENCE AS A PROFESSOR. I cannot give Mrs Haliday the i)ain of writing this to her now, 1 )ut you can take a proper season for it. I have had a great deal of pain by Bob HaUday, and to little purpose. I believe he is at present confounded ; good company and advice may perhaps do him more good, now, than at another time. We all ow this to his worthy father, and all is not lost, that's in danger. My wife's and my most hearty respects to Mrs Drcnnan. I am, dear Thom, Yours most heartily, Fran. Hutcheson." It is satisfactory to learn from a letter dated Feb. 20, 1744, that Hutcheson at length believed that his anxiety in this case was lessened. He writes, " Pray tell Mrs Haliday her son is doing very well, that she should hear from me often did I not trust to Mr Brown's informing her." It will have been seen from Hutcheson's efforts in this single instance that he was not merclj' a brilliant, enthusiastic lecturer, but the earnest and far-seeing friend of the student outside the class-room. Either side of his character would have won him the respect, which the Scotch student always yields unsparingly to his Professor, but both together made him venerated by the young men throughout the University. The ideal of life he showed them was such that " they panted to be what they beheld \" " He spread such an ardour of knowledge," Leechman says, " and such a spirit of enquiry everywhere around him, that the conversation of the students at their social walks and visits turned upon subjects of learning and taste, and contributed greatly to carry them forward in the most valuable pursuits^" When the impression he made was so powerful, it is little wonder that '' students, advanced in j^ears and knowledge," paid him the remarkable tribute of attending his lectures four, five or even six sessions^ Adam Smith, who attended his class in 1740, spoke of him as "the never to be forgotten Hutcheson." Dugald Stewart sums up the impression of his work in the following passage : " Those 1 Leechman, Life of Hutcheson, p. xxxiii. 2 Ibid., p. xxxvii. ■* Ibid., p. xxxiii. // hutcheson's influence as a professor. 75 who liavc derived their knowledge of Dr Hiitcheson solely ^lJ/'^ j^ from his publications may perhaps be inclined to dispute the IV-S^''^ propriety of the epithet ' eloquent,' when applied to any of his \ * compositions ; more particularly when applied to the System of Moral Philosophij, which was published after his death, as the substance of his lectures in the University of Glasgow. His talents, however, as a public speaker must have been of a far higher order than what he has displayed as a writer ; all his \ pupils whom I have happened to meet with (some of them, certainly, very competent judges) having agreed exactly with each other in their accounts of the extraordinary impression ,; | which they made on the minds of his hearers. I have mentioned, ' ; in the text, Mr Smith as one of his warmest admirers ; and to his name I shall take this opportunity of adding those of the late Earl of Selkirk, the late Lord President Miller, the late Dr Archibald Maclaine, the very learned and judicious trans- lator of Mosheims Ecclesiastical History. My father^ too, who had attended "Dr Hutcheson's Lectures, never spoke of them withouj; much sensibility . . . His great and deserved fame in this country rests now chicHy on the traditionary history of his academical lectures, which appear to have contributed ve^iy powerfully to diffuse in Scotland that taste for analytical discussion and that spirit of liberal enquiry, to which the world is indebted for some of the most valuable productions of the eighteenth century"." Ramsay of Ochtertyre says that " long after his death I have heard orthodox useful ministers, who spoke of their old Professor with enthusiastic veneration^." A more powerful testimony than any of these occurs in a tract, written as late as 1772 — thirty-six years after Hutcheson's death — expressly to discredit the methods of teach- ing at Glasgow. Amidst universal censure the writer is constrained to speak in high terms of "this illustrious teacher of morality, himself a perfect and ready master of Greek and Latin. He introduced or revived a high taste for Classical learning in this place, and, while ho lived, he kept it alive. Ifl 1 Dr Matthew Stewart, Professor of Mathematics at Edinburgh. - Smith's Works, Eil. Stewart, v. pp. 523 — 5, Note B. ■* Scotland and Scotsmen, i. p. 276. 76 hutcheson's influence as a professor, ever a Professor had the art of communicating knowledge and of raising an esteem and desire of it in the minds of his scholars; if ever one had the magical power to inspire the noblest sentiments and to warm the hearts of youth with an admiration and love of virtue ; if ever one had the art to create an esteem for Liberty and a contempt for tyranny and tyrants, he \vas the man ! What a pity was it, that, for three or four months a year, such superior talents should have been thrown [^ away on metaphysical and fruitless disputations! When these \\ were got over, how delightful and edifying it was to hear ' himM" Knowing that Hutcheson himself refused offers of Church /■ patronage it is a curious instance of the irony of history to find I an appreciation of his works exacted from candidates for \ preferment. The circumstances are thus related in Burdy's Life of the Rev. Philip Skelton. In 1749 Skelton paid a visit "to a distant northern Bishop of great consequence, whose wife was what you may call a learned woman, and had such influence over her husband as often to dispose of the livings to her own favourites ; so that, as Mr Skelton remarked, the lady was a sort of bishop herself. She was on this account courted by the clergy, who humoured her in all her notions. She professed herself an admirer of Hutcheson's system of Moral Philosophy and the clergy consequently approved her taste . . . Having lately got a new book by one of Hutcheson's disciples, she ordered it to be put in the room where he (Skelton) slept . . , In the morning an Archdeacon, by the lady's directions, came to Skelton 's room to sound him on the book , . , Skelton said he would lay him a wager, that opening the book at any page he pleased, he would show him nonsense in it. The Archdeacon agreed, and, while he was reading the page, Skelton stopped him now and then and said, ' That's nonsense.' ' Yes, it is,' he owned, and thus he was forced to admit there was nonsense in every page . , , The Bishop's lady, when she knew how con- temptibly he spoke of the book . . , could hardly keep her temper . . , Accordingly after dinner, before the Bishop and a large company of clergy and others, she said to him, ' Mr 1 The Defects of an University Education, London, 1772, p. 9. hutcheson's influence as a professor. 77 Skelton, I heard you preached in St James's Chapel when you were in London.' — 'Yes, Madam, I did.' — 'Well, Sir, a lady friend of mine, who heard you, told me you preached very absurdly, talking of Hell's fire and such coarse subjects, as one never introduced in so polite a place.' " l^ CHAPTER V. NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. Though some of the older or the reactionary Professors were suspicious of Hutcheson's methods, one or two of the more envious a little jealous of his influence over the students, yet the academic body, as a whole, was prepared to trust to his experience of the world and knowledge of business. Even amongst the students it was well known that Hutcheson had much to do with the finance of the College. Carlyle says that Dunlop, " with the aid of Hutcheson, directed and managed all the affairs of the University (for it is a wealthy corporation, and has much business), besides the charge of presiding over literature, and maintaining the discipline of the College\" Evidently the Senatus did not believe in specialisation in matters of business, since Hutcheson, soon after his arrival, was a member of every Committee, upon all kinds of different affairs. Academic bodies at this time — not unlike other public boards, of much later date — seem to have found a Committee the universal panacea for all their ills, and hence they appointed one upon the most trivial occasions. Thus, in 1731, Hutcheson was delegated, with others, " to view Mr Rosse's'^ class-room, and to order the placing of the seats, in the most convenient orders" About the same time, it is of some interest to note, the Senatus " enacted and ordained that, after the ending of the present Session of the College, the least payment to be made to any of the Professors of Philosophy, Mathematics, Greek and Latin shall hot be less than 306". sterling : but^ it is ^ Autobiography, p. 71. ■^ Andrew Eosse, Professor of Humanity (1706-1735). •^ MS. Records of University of Glasgow. NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. 79 hereby declared that this act shall not extend to any of the ^^f^V private Colleges given by the said Professors^" " y?'^ ' At different times, Hutcheson was a member of the Library ^ o^^' Committee, the Committee appointed to draw up a Library Catalogue, the Committee to inspect the College property and another to inspect the College lands. He was regularly included in any Committee to wait on Presbyteries, generally in reference to the appointment of a minister to a Professorship, when a Committee from the University prayed the Presbytery " to loose him from his charge." In 1740 he was one of a Committee to write to Lord Panmure to ask for a copy of the Chartulary of Glasgow Cathedral, and we find him later again on a Com- mittee to consider the terms of Snell's Will, and here there is rather an interesting example of individuality, as, having enquired into the matter, and having learnt that an action was pending, he proposed that the case should not be prosecuted beyond one hearing in Chancery. He also was one of the keepers of the Charter Chest, and on all occasions when - Simson, the regular clerk of the Senatus, was absent, he was appointed clerk p/-o tempore. As Quaestor from June 26, 1732 to 1734, he had the control of the small sum given in aid of the Library and also of some other funds. As there was no regular librarian at this date, the superintendence of the Library being divided between the Quaestor and one of the Bursars, this office must have made considerable inroads upon his scanty leisure during the Session, It was unfortunate that Loudon, the previous Quaestor, had ordered so many books at the auction of Le Clerc's Library at Amsterdam, that Hutcheson had no funds at his disposal during the first year he held the office. In the second Session he received Loudon's accounts calculated down to the fraction of a penny — one wonders how the item of "two pennies and three-fourths" arose — and it is rather sur- prising to notice that his additions include no modern works, though ancient Philosophy is fairly well represented*. Upon matters more in his own hands he expended most time, and left traces of his individuality. Archbishop Boulter of Armagh had given the University a sum of money through 1 MS. Records of University of Glasgow. - Ihid. 80 NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. Hutcheson, which was received in April, 1733, and this was invested in lands at Provanside, which fact accounts for the exceedingly satisfactory return upon the capital yielded, at present, to the Armagh Bursars, this being the title under which the benefixction is now known. Hutcheson himself left £100 sterling in his will to be added to the fund\ In 1737 he was added to Dunlop and Morthland to deal Avith the Professors' houses, the " Glasgow Professors' Manses " as Mr Rae calls them. Dunlop and Morthland appear to have acted as contractors for the University and to have built six new houses. The project had been started in 1724 but it was not until 1737 that their accounts were ready to be audited. Hutcheson reported favourably and both Professors were thanked by the Senatus. Still the matter was far from being ended. In the first place there were two " old houses " which were not considered as desirable as the new ones. Then, as there were not enough houses to go |^ind, a complicated scheme was devised whereby each Professor who had a " College house " made an annual paj^ment to thpisc who had not. Such payments were difficult to assess, owin^^fcthe fact that a debt had been incurred, upon which all the 8^fessors, who had College houses, paid interest. Evidently hdHn^ numerous elements calcu- lated to cause a consideraj^^BJount of friction. In 1739 Hutcheson proposed a plaW^^to the Committee, which was calculated to make matt^pr. simpler. The debt was to be extinguished, and an annu^value put upon the old and new houses respectively. This >Ba\ ing been accepted by the Pro- fessors, it was a mere mai&ter of arithmetic to calculate how much each Professor, who^'^cupied a new house, owed to one who was content with an.jb'ld one, and finally how much each class should pay to those who were too junior to have a residence of either kind. This decision seems to have given satisfaction ; but the University householders, having agreed amongst themselves, had next to deal with the town authorities who promptly taxed the new houses at £10 per annum. The occupiers refused to pay, and the town adopted the very effectual old-fashioned method of " distress," by quartering soldiers upon 1 Will of Francis Hutcheson. Public Record Office, Dublin. NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. 81 them. Then the Universit}^ grew indignant and declared that " the imposing any stent or burden by the town of Glasgow on any of the members of the University, or houses possessed by them, is directly contrary to the privileges of the University " . . . and they " do, therefore, order the agent to raise a process of declarator ... for the reduction of the said stent\" It is little wonder, amongst these multifiirious College duties, Hutcheson complains to his friend Drennan that he is " much hurried by many letters of business." Yet he found, time to assist any deserving project that came under his notice. It is thus we find him giving advice and assistance towards the foundation of the publishing house of the brothers Foulis. Robert Foulis had attended Hutcheson's lectures and attracted his notice. Under the Professor's patronage he started business as a printer and bookseller in 1741, and, as a publisher, the following year^ Hutcheson watched the progress of the young firm with attention, and never tired of recommending its work. Thus we find him writing to Drennan : "A worthy lad of this town, one Rob* Fouli.s, out of a true public spirit, luidei-took to reprint, for the populace, an old excellent book, A Persuasive to Mutual Love and Charity, 'RTote by 'V^^lite, Oliver Crom- well's Chaplain, jt is a divine, old fashioned thing. Some are cast off, in better paper and sold at 9(7. , in marble paper, the coarse ones are sold at bd. in blue paper and at 4f/. to booksellei-s. I wish yom- bookseller would commission a parcel of both sorts.... The Persuasive is, in the old edition, an half-crown Itook." Again, under date May 31st, 1742, he writes : " The bearer Mr Hay takes over some copies of a new translation of Antoninus, tl^reater^ half of which, and more, was my amusement last summer, for the sake of a singular worthy soul, one Foulis, but I don't let my name appear in it, nor indeed have I told it to any here, but the man concerned. I hope you'll like it, ^e rest was done by a very ingenious lad, one Moore *. Pray tr>- your critical faculty, in finding out what parts I did ^ MS. Kecords, Univ. Glasgow. In the next generation the same point arose in reference to the*ytown dues demanded from Students upon the meal brought from home for their food during the session. Life of Adam Smith, by John Eae. London, 1895, p. G7. - Memorials of Literary History of Glasgow, p. 12. 2 The word "first" erased and "greater" written over it. From a note in Foulis's catalogue of books, it appears that Moore translated the first two books and Hutcheson the remainder, infra, p. 144. ■* Moore succeeded Dunlop as Professor of Greek, infra, p. 95. S. H. 6 82 NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. and what he did. I did not translate books in a suite, but, I, one or two, and, he, one or two. I hope if you like it, it may sell pretty well, with you, about Belfast. I am sure it is doing a public good to diffuse the sentiments, and, if you knew Foulis, you would think he well deserved all encourage- ment." It was probably owing to Hutcheson's influence tliat Foulis was appointed University Printer in March 1743, the following being the minute of appointment : — " Robert Foulis, having this day given in a petition to the University that he had provided himself with fine types, both Greek and Latin, and desiring that he may be made University Printer, the Meeting, having seen specimens of his printing, and found it such as he deserves very well to be encouraged, did choose the said Robert Foulis into the office of University Printer and grant luito him all the privileges belonging thereto, upon this condition, viz. that he shall not use the designation of University Printer, without allowance from the University Meeting, in any books, excepting those of ancient authors ^" The subsequent history of this celebrated firm " whose Homers and Horaces more than rivalled the Elzevirs and Etiennes of the past," fiills outside the limits of Hutcheson's life ; but one can see that the two brothers never forgot their early benefactor, to whom they owed the first impulse that had started them on the road to fame. As long as the business continued, they printed all Hutcheson's works, and even col- lected his occasional papers, and earlier books of which frequent editions were issued. Besides these public engagements, there was a distinct and very different undercurrent in Hutcheson's relation to the University and his colleagues. Like most reformers, he was in a minority ; though unlike many, it was not a minority of one, for he had the support of Dunlop — " old Dunlop," as he affectionately calls him, " the greatest hero I have known, who, under two most formidable growing distempers, keeps his heart and teaches with great reputation and spirit- " ; Simson, whom with equal enthusiasm he calls " the best geometer in the world V' and he could occasionally count upon the support of Hamilton the eccentric Professor of Anatomy, and Rosse, who 1 MS. Eecorcls, Univ. of Glasgow. "^ Letter to Drennan. Undated owing to a money order having been written at the top and cut off — but from the context evideutly written Sept. — Nov., 1744. 3 Ihid.,k\xg. 5, 1743. NEW LIGHT IX THE UNIVERSITY. 83 held the Chair of Humanity. Ahnost all the others belonged to the Principal's party — Neil Campbell having succeeded John Sterling in 1728. This was the party of reaction. Hutcheson's first open rupture occurred in 1736 over a matter of favouritism. In 1724 Clotlnvorthy O'NeiP, a member of a distinguished Antrim family, had matriculated, but, being " too gay and expensive," left the University without taking a degree. Later on, when he had learnt the value of an academic title, he adopted a graceful and polished method of obtaining the missing distinction by purchase, through a donation of £20 to the University Library. The Senatus gravely carried out its part of the farce in the following terms : — " Clothworthy O'Neil, Esquire, at present High Sheriff of the County of Antrim, in the Kingdom of Ireland, having applied for the degree of M.A., the Faculty, considering that he had formerly studied Philo- sophy in this University, and that the Masters, whose scholar he was, give him a good testimony, and that he is one of the best families in Ireland, resolved to o-ive him the Deg-ree of Master of Arts and appoint a diploma to be expeded to him. Mr Hutcheson desired it to be marked that he dissented^." The grounds of Hutcheson's protest are to be found in a letter to Drennan showing the principle for which he contended. "I must now tell you a shamefull story of our College. My letter I wrote from Dublin stopped Clothworthy O'Neil's getting his degree upon his first application. He got some folks, in this country, who are tools of the Court, to recommend the matter to our Principal. He made a compliment of 20 guineas to the College Library, and the Principal watched an oppor- tunity, when there was a thin meeting, but his tools all present, and carrying to give him a Degree in [Arts] and that, too, only an honorary one, and declared so in the Diploma, without any certifying to his learning or manners. My dissent is entered in the books and four more masters declined signing it." Such a state of tension was doubtless considerably aggra- vated by the prosecution of Hutcheson, by the Presbytery of 1 Amongst the Students who entered under Loudon in 1724 was Cloth- worthius O'Neil, filius natu secundus Joannis O'Neil de Shanes Castle in Comitatu de Antrim Hibernus. 2Iuit. Univ. Glas., in. p. 227. ■^ MS. Records, Univ. of Glasgow. 6—2 84 NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. Glasgow, for " teaching to his students in contravention to the Westminster Confession the following two false and dangerous 1^ doctrines, first that the standard of moral goodness was the promotion of the happiness of others ; and second that we could have a knowledge of good and evil, without, and prior to a knowledge of God." This trial of course excited the profoundest feeling among the students, and they actually made a formal appearance before the Presbytery and defended their hero both by word and writing^ Though Hutcheson spoke of this to ^ Drennan as the " whimsical buffonery about his heresy," it taught him that there was war to the knife between the old and the new spirit ; and from this time onwards lie, in conjunc- tion with Dunlop, prepared a counter plan of campaign, which was designed to give his party a majority, in course of time, upon the Senatus. A further element in the scheme was the carrying the war into the enemy's country b}^ influencing the teaching of Theology. Whatever may have been the tactical merits of such aggressive operations, it must be admitted that Hutcheson was going beyond his own sphere of duties in interfering in the teaching of Theology. He claimed that the ministers had no right to influence his own work, and yet he himself adopts precisely the same attitude through his interfer- ence with the teaching of Divinity. " He laid himself out," his biographer says, " to be especially useful to students of Divinity," and even went so far as to give them hints on the preparation of sermons. This was a distinct and scarcely legitimate addition to the methodology of Moral Philosophy. Yet at the same time one can hardly judge these envenomed disputes by the canons of the present day. We may not be better — nor even more decorous — in wrangles over public affairs, but our Jin-de-siecle egoism tells us that the matters of contention are more important, and better worth the fighting for — but will this be the judgment of history? At least there is this excuse for Hutcheson, that he was thoroughly sincere, in his belief, that he was fighting for the future of the University — a contest which had two sides, the one of a public nature in the championing of the modern spirit ^ Life of Adam Sinitli, by John Eae, p. 13. NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. 85 of " unmuzzled Philosophy " and of culture generally — the other, of a personal nature, since, if his schemes ended in failure, it might have led to his own suspension. Whatever may be one's opinion as to the justice of Hutcheson's position, there can be little doubt of the consummate ability with which he and the veteran Dunlop took the field against their opponents. Nothing was hurried and every step was made sure before the next was attempted. Thus, the first election of a Professor after Hutche- son's arrival at Glasgow, though it happened to be the crucical one of Divinity which was vacant in 1740, passed without a sign, Hutcheson and Dunlop voting with the majority for Michael Potter as against McLaurin, the Glasgow minister already mentioned. Hutcheson in fact was one of the Com- mittee who waited on the Presbytery of Dunblane and laid before it the fact of Potter's election\ Probably he and Dunlop had no candidate ready, though they had one in view in William Leechman, whom Dunlop " had always wished to get into the College I" Leechman's connection with Hutcheson is of considerable interest, as throwing light upon the characters of both and showing how careful had been Hutcheson's proving of the man he supported afterwards as a colleague. Leechman was born in 1706, being twelve years younger than Hutcheson, and educated at the University of Edinburgh. In 1727 he became tutor to Mure of Caldwell, who afterwards became the friend of Hume and a Baron of the Exchequer in Scotland. Through the influence of the Caldwell family he was made minister of Beith in Ayrshire in 1736; and notwithstanding that the temperateness of his views was little likely to recommend him in the stormy days of the Secession, he was elected moderator of the Provincial Synod at Irvine in 1740^* and preached the Synod Sermon on " the Temper, Character and Duty of a minister of the Gospel." The following undated letter may refer to the composition of this very sermon. ' MS. Records, Univ. of Glasgow. " Sermons by William Leechman, edited by James Wodiow, Loudon, 1789, p. 18, and Hutcheson's letter quoted below, p. 88, where he says Leechman "was the man I wished" to be, in the first place, our Professor of Divinity." 3 Leechman's Sermuns, ut supra, pp. 1 — 16. 86 NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. [? end of 1740 or beginning of 1741.] "Dear Thom, The enclosed you're not obliged to rue for. I was intreated by an old friend, who was to preach a synod sermon, to suggest him some materials, which I midertook, and, thinking of you, cast them into form, with some enlargements, but really, in great haste, while I was in a gentleman's house ^ in the country, and interrupted every half hour. They're not in method, have repetitions and things proper to this country only. My friend here used a good deal of it, in a better method and a diction more suited to this country, and made an admirable sermon ; but, tho' it were printed, few would ever dream he had seen the inclosed, tho' they read both, and you are only the third person who knows anything of the matter. If it proves of little use to you, I have got it franked for you, otherways it would have cost you too dear." If the materials mentioned were used by Leechman, Hutcheson would probably have supplied the general headings and several remarks. The following passage in the sermon, for instance, whether actually written from Hutcheson's material or not, certainly recalls his general mode of thought and style ; it agrees too with what Leechman himself says of Hutcheson's teaching with regard to the composition of sermons, and is besides of interest as giving evidence of the tendency for which he was reproved by Witherspoon and others of the old school. "After having studied the great principles of natural religion and morality, and learning the important" truths of Christianity from an honest enquiry into divine revelation, it must be our next care to store our minds with a large treasure of the best moral and divine sentiments : these are the choice furniture of our souls ; and, from a plentiful store of them, we shall find we are both qualified and disposed to teach others in the most instructive and effective manner. The Holy Scriptures will furnish us with a rich variety of the purest and sublimest sentiments, moral and divine: and in other writers, ancient and modern, we shall find a great number more, or, at least the same greatly divei'sified and set in a thousand beautiful and striking lights. That our minds may be replenished with an abundant store and 1 If the Sermon was intended for Leechman the gentleman's house may have been Mure of Caldwell, with whom Hutcheson was intimate, NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. 87 delightful variety of such thoughts, sentiments and impressions as the best of mankind have felt and described, concerning God, Providence and Virtue, and everything relating to the great interest of mankind, we must gather from all quarters : whether the writers be Christian or Pagan, let us think it our duty to borrow whatever is good and true, whatever bears the marks of a heart smitten with the love of truth and virtue \" The following sentences too seem to have a ring of Hutcheson. "The heart is the seat of all the virtues-." "What appears fair and beautiful to men in the theory, they are inclined to believe must have possession of their hearts and a mighty influence on their livesl" " The heart really and justly moved, never fails to dictate a language plain and easy, full of natural and continued vigour, which has in it nothing soft, nothing languishing. All is nervous and strong, and does not so much please the ear as still and ravish the soul. Further let it be taken notice of, as a thing of the utmost importance, that sincerity alone, and a real desire to interest and persuade, will banish all affectation, either of sentiment or language*." Leechman's next publication was a sermon " on Prayer," which Hutcheson calls " a noble one, by one of my Scotch intimates who sees all as I do^" The first edition was sent to Hume, who waxs then a young man, by Mure of Caldwell ; and it is interesting, though somewhat incongruous, when one remembers Hume's later reputation for scepticism, to imagine him gravely commenting upon this subject, at some length. " 'Tis a natural infirmity of men," he concludes, "to imagine that their prayers have a direct influence ; and this infirmity must be extremely fostered and encouraged by the constant use of prayer. Thus all wise men have excluded the use of images and pictures in prayer, though they certainly enliven devotion ; because 'tis found by experience that with the vulgar these visible representations draw too much towards them, and become the only objects of devotion'V ^ Leecbmau's Serinuns, i. pp. Ill — 12. - Ibid., p. 115. ^ Ibid., p. 145. ■* Ibid., p. IGO. •' Drennan Letters — June 15, 1741. « Life and Corrcspomlence of David Hume by John Hill Burton. Edinburgh, 1846, I. p. 164. 88 NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. Soon after Leechman's marriage, which took place in 1743, he received a call from an iinp(n-tant Belfast congregation — the vacancy having arisen through the death of Hutcheson's friend Dr Kilpatrick — which would have yielded him a better stipend'. The negotiations were conducted through Hutcheson, and his interest in the matter may be gathered from the follow- ing letters. " Glasgow, August 5, 1743. " Dear Thom, I have had two letters of late from Mr Mussenden, one about five weeks ago, with an invitation to Mr Leechman to succeed Dr Kilj^at- rick. Leechman was then just upon his marriage. I concluded the matter quite impracticable and returned an answer to that purpose, and, upon conversing with Leechman, found I was not then mistaken. He was lately very ill-treated by our judges, in a discretionary augmentation he applied for, which they could have given with full consent of parties. His wife [is] not so averse to removal as formerly. Indeed, you never knew a better, sweeter man ; of excellent literature, and, except his air, and a little roughness of voice, the best preacher imaginable. You could not get a greater blessing among you of that kind. As I have heard nothing from other hands, I want fuller information. Are the people hearty for Leecliman, upon the character they hear ? Is there no other worthy man in the field ? Unless these points be cleared, he will take no steps. I remember one Millar, an assistant, pray is he to be continued, and no way afronted or neglected in this design ? Leechman is well as he is and happy, tho' preaching to a pack of horse copers and smugglers of the rudest sort. He would do nothing hard or disagreeable to any worthy man and has no desire of change. But, if the field be clear, it would he peccare in publica comnwda, not to force him out of that obscure hole, where he is so much lost''^. Pray don't fail to write me fully next post. He was the man I wished to be, in the first place, our Professor of Theology." " Glasgow, September 20, 1743. "Kev. and Dear Sir, I had the favour of yours by Mr Blow, but could not return an answer by him, being much employed in promoting the affair you wrote 1 Leechman's Sermons, p. 18. ^ Beith, siqjra, p. 85. NEW LIGHT IX THK UNIVERSITY. 89 about. I had also very urgent letters from Messrs Mains and Duchal to the same piu'pose. 'Tis very difficult to persujide a modest worthy man, who is tolerably settled, to adventm-e upon a new scene of afi'airs among strangers. I shall use my utmost endeavoiu-s to prevail upon him, as I have been doing for some time past. I am sorry I cannot give you great hopes of success ; but, I don't yet so desjjair as to quit solicitation, as he is exceedingly moved b\' the affection and generosity of that people. My most humble and hearty respects to your brethren of yom* Presby- tery, whom I shall always remember with the greatest esteem and affection. I am, Sir, Your most obedient and humble Servant, Fkancis Hutcheson. To the Rev. Mr John Henderson or Mr Thomas Drennan in Belfast." " Glasgow, October 29, 1743. "Dear Thom^ I am very sorr}- to tell you [that] my utmost importunities had no effect [upon Mr] Leechman. His wife's- friends seemed to [incline to it, but it was] with such ^■iews as Mr Leechman [would have] never come into ; that is to make Belfast [a mere step], till they tryed for some time what [interest they] could make to remove him thence to Edinbm-gh. In that view Mr Leechman abhorred to go to such a kind generous people ; and his wife's friends, as well as his own, urged much, that he should not go with a view to setle in Belfost for life. For my own part, I would jarefer Belfost to either Edinijurgh or Glasgow, unless one had many sons, disposed to be scholars. 1 am hciirtily sorry you're disappointed." The arriere pensee, in the minds of Leechmau's friends may have been an expected vacancy in the Chair of Divinity. At •all events Potter died on Nov. 23, and Hutcheson writes, in the last week of the mouth — between four and five weeks later than the foregoing letter — saying, " I have been these ten days in great hurry and perplexity, as I have for that time foreseen the death of our Professor, who died last Wednesday, and some of my colleagues join me in labouring for Leechman to succeed. We cannot be certain of the event, but have good hopes. If he succeeds, it will put a new face upon Theology in Scotland." 1 The MS. of this letter is very imperfect. The words in brackets are supplied to give the general sense. " His wife was "Mrs Bridget Balfour of the family Pilrig uear Edinburgh." Leechinan's Sermons, p. 17. 90 NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. Here at last Hutcheson declares himself, and confesses to his friend the true object of the campaign — to liberalize theology or in his own forcible words " put a new face upon Theology in Scotland." Some idea of the keenness of the contest may be gathered from the following letter, written to Mure of Caldwell, which is unsigned but evidently Hutcheson's, from the style. " Glasgow, November 23, 1743. "Dear Sir, Our Professor died this iiiorning. Beside the letters from Messrs Rosse to George (who I believe is fixed our friend already) could you not obtain a letter from the Duke [of Montrose], our Chancellor, to Charles Morthland [Professor of Oriental Languages]. You may represent Leechman as acceptable to the best of this society of his friends viz. Messrs Dunlop [Professor of Greek], Simson [Professor of Mathematics], Hamilton [Professor of Anatomy], Rosse [Professor of Humanity] and myself : nay Morthland pretends to be for him too : only Loudon [Pro- fessor of Logic] and Anderson [Professor of Church History], our standard of orthodoxy, oppose him ; but that, his Grace's letter to Morthland would not only fix him but perhaps Loudon and Forbes [Professor of Civil Law]. You may represent, what is abundantly known, that he is universally approved of for literature and eloquence *, and, that Anderson, who is his chief opposer, made himself ridiculous to all men of sense by dangling after Whitefield and McCullogh. I want this to be known to Andrew Mitchel [Private Secretary to Marquis of Tweeddale] and Tweedale [Secre- tary of State for Scotland] ; that, we are not without hope of carrying him, by some of the other side, which might be thought a disagreeable obliga- tion, and [we] would far rather have him attached by this favour of his Grace. He can scarce scruple to write a letter to his old friend ]\Iorthland, to be communicated to Loudon and others, representing his good impressions of Mr Leechman, and zeal to oblige some friends of Mr Lecchman's, who applied on his behalf, for his Grace's recommendation, that, so he may be carried by his Grace's friends. If you get C'^ Rosse or other members to join with you, in this respect, so much the better. I am perhaps too sanguine, but even Mr Dick is declaring for him, but you know his instability. I am Yoirrs, You know my hand. 1 Ante, p. 88. NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. 91 You might show this letter, if my name could ilo any thing, or tell the contents, only my name must not be mentioned in his Grace's letter to his friends herei." The late Dr McCosh speaks of Hiitchesoii's " bringing inflnence of a very unscrupulous character (as I reckon it) to caiTy his point," and adds, that " it seems that the advocates of liberality could not tolerate that a man should be favourable to a revival of religion I" In this he altogether misapprehends Hutcheson's argument. If the right of a professor bringing in- fluence of any kind to bear upon tlie election to a Professorship be admitted, Hutcheson's letter is forcible as an unanswerable argumentum ad homivem. Anderson posed as ultra-orthodox, and yet a little before he had taken a prominent part in such heterodoxy as " revival meetings " — plainly the cry of orthodoxy merely veiled the antagonism of the old spirit to the new. Besides Leechman there were at first two other candidates, Craig and McLaurin, who had been defeated by Potter. The latter appears to have been a nian of sterling character, of the old school, and though a contemporary compared his tracts to Butler's Sermons^, he was, b}" his own admission, far from being a stylist, as he writes that the roughness of his " style is not so polite as to please the palates of some'*." Leechman's biographer thus relates the course of the contest. " The election was in the hands of the Faculty ; that is, the Court of ordinary Professors, who, in some former important questions, had been accustomed to divide into two nearly equal parties. In the one party Mr Craig, then a minister in the city, had some who preferred him to all others, but he from modesty, friendship, and a regard to the interests of religion, refused to interfere at all ; so that this party soon united in favour of Mr Leechman. The other party pitched upon Mr John Maclaurin, one of the ministers of Glasgow ; a candidate, highly respectable for his learning and piety, and well qualified for the station, had he had tJie same aptness to ^ Caldwell Papers, Part ii. vol. i. p. 53. ^ Scottish Philosoplnj, p. 65. * Gillies, Historical Collections, Edinburgh, 1796. * Scotland and Scotsmen, i. p. 272. 92 NEW LIGHT IX THE UNIVERSITY. teach with his rival. The people of the city and neighbourhood interested themselves warmly in the fate of this election ; as it was indeed an event of no small consequence to the future education of their clergy. They befriended one or the other candidate according to their acquaintance with him, and their opinion of the conformity of his religious sentiments to their own. Mr Leechman had the good wishes of all the hearers of his friend Craig, who considered themselves as the people of taste and education ; and Mr Maclaurin the good Avishes of a much larger body, even all the rest of the town^" The election was held upon December 13th, less than three weeks after Potter's death, thus presenting a startling contrast to the leisurely proceedings in vogue at present. It is interest- ing to notice that Hutcheson's machinations against Morthland appear to have been successful as he did not vote for McLaurin. Even after this secession the reactionary party was strong, as Loudon, Anderson and Forbes f(jllowed the course Hutcheson had outlined in his letter, and they were supported by the " instable " Dick, Principal Campbell and Johnston (Pro- fessor of Medicine). This left the votes of the two parties exactly equal, and one needs little imagination to picture the excitement when Bogle, the Rector, gave his casting vote in favour of Leechman, who was accordinglj' declared duly elected, whereupon Anderson protested against the appointment being determined by the casting vote of the Rector, and Dunlop " counter protested^." This was far from being the end of the matter, for when Hutcheson and Hamilton made a formal appearance before the Presbytery of Lwine and laid the appointment before it, Anderson also appeared on behalf of the minority and endeav- oured to prove a controverted election. This plea broke down, and Leechman got as far as Glasgow, where the Presbytery refused to allow him to take the necessary formal steps prior to the commencement of his teaching. This forced him to appeal to the Synod against the action of the Presbytery and after some delay he was enabled to lecture by the end of the Session. ^ Leechmaa's Sertiionx, ut supra, i. pp. 18 — 19. - MS. Records, Glasgow University. NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. 93 Even yet his troubles were far from being ended, as he had next to face a " process of heresy " founded upon certain expressions in his Sermon on Prayer^ All these proceedings Hutcheson seems to have viewed with a chastened joy — he had won a hard- fouHit battle, and the futile efforts of his adversaries to avoid the confession of defeat were not altogether displeasing. Thus he writes to Drennan, complaining of his being a bad correspondent, and to pique him into writing remarks as it were incidentally under date of Feb. 20, 1744': "I could tell you a good deal of news upon the unexpected election of a Professor of Divinity and the furious indignation of our zealots ^ but you deserve no news from anybody." Towards the end of the year he writes : " We have at last got a right Professor of Theology, the only thoroughly right one in Scotland. The numbers of young Divines are not half what they used to be, all over Scotland, and yet we have already more than I ever remember here." This testimony of Leech man's popularity is confirmed from other sources. Wodrow his biographer says that " the Divinity Hall at Glasgow was crowded in his time with a greater number of Scholars than any other in Scotland I" Carlyle, who attended the class during the Session 1743-4, mentions that "his judicious choice and arrangement of his matter formed the most instruc- tive set of lectures on Theology that had, it was thought, ever been delivered in Scotland. It was, no doubt, owing to him and his friend and colleague, Mr Hutcheson, that a better taste and greater liberality of sentiment were introduced among the clergy in the western provinces of Scotland^" This led to the formation " of a new school in place of the former narrow and bigoted clergy' who had never ventured to range in their mind 1 Leechman's Sermons, ut supra, p. '22. 2 A term borrowed from Shaftesbury — it occurs frequently in A Letter concerning Enthusiasm and the Essay on the Ereedoni of Wit and Ilnniour. •'* Leechman's Sermons, i. p. 70. * Autohioriraplry, iJ. 68. ^ The following anecdote shows there was some need for Hutchesou's cam- paign in favour of more culture amongst the clergy. "In a parish near Glasgow a candidate preached who had a very severe cold. Having forgot his handker- chief, he was obliged often, while breathing, to wipe his nose with his hand. The people fixed on him as a homely lad, that blew his nose on his loof.'" Scotland and Scotsmen, ii. p. 554. 94 NEW LIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. beyond the bounds of strict orthodoxy. For though neither of these Professors taught any heresy, yet they opened and en- larged the minds of tlie students, which soon gave them a turn for free enquiry, the result of which was candour and liberality of sentiment*." It will thus be seen that the " putting of a new face upon Theology in Scotland " was soon started, and the effort was now made to send from the University "a polite and pious, a philosophical and useful clergy, who, without neglecting the common people, should strain every nerve to make the higher classes of men devout and exemplary ... It is allowed that the clergy under Leechman's auspices were inferior to none in the kingdom in elegant accomplishments. A number of them would have done credit to any church in the present times. If others of them who had shining talents took a worse turn and were little useful, the ftiult did not lie in their professor'''." Such is the contemporary judgment upon the revolution in flivour of culture amongst the clergy and a resulting liberality in the universities; and so far Hutcheson's campaign had been liighly successful. Evidently the feeling aroused by Leechman's " unexpected " election had greatly enraged the other party, which Hutcheson speaks of as the "zealots." It left the two parties exactly equal, since at the last trial of strength, Morthland had, to use a vulgarism, been " squared " by titled influence. Therefore so far there was no decisive victory, and the two factions gathered their forces for the final trial of strength, which took place eighteen months later in the summer of 1746. This contest must have been epoch-making in the history of the University, but, following so soon upon the other, contemporary comments upon it are few. It arose through Dunlop's resignation of the Chair of Greek, and one gains a faint idea of the sturdy old diplomat's tactics from the fact that his resignation was some time in doubt owing to certain curious stipulations he endeav- oured to enforce about continuing to occupy his Professor's house^; probably this was a ruse to bring on the election at 1 Carlyle's Autohiogra'phy, pp. 84 — 5. ^ Scotland and Scotsmen, i. p. 283. ^ Lit. Memorials of Glasyow, p. 128. NEW LIOHT IN THE UNIVERSITY. 9o a favourable opportunity, at all events he no doubt timed his retirement to suit his friends. The Culture or New Light Party had a strong candidate in James Moor, who had joined with Hutcheson in the translation already mentioned, and who Avas now University Librarian. Hutcheson fully realized the importance of the contest and writes to Drennan with considerable anxiety about this " most intricate business, upon which the very soul of this College depends, and all may be ruined by the want of one vote." The election took place upon June 27th, and, after an exceedingly close contest, Moor was elected. From this event may be dated the triumph of the new party, which culminated in Leechman's election as Principal in 1761, but it must have been a victory marred by sorrow, for Hutcheson only survived it by just six weeks, and his name must be added to the long list of those who have died in the hour of success. For him, as for others, after a long sojourn in a wilderness of strife, there remained only a Pisgali glimpse of the " Promised Land," for which he had toiled, but which he was doomed not to enjoy. CHAPTER YI. LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. In the midst of the campaign in favour of freedom in the University, Hutcheson bore his part in the literary movements of the time. Although his works, written in Dublin, had appeared anonymously, he was well known as the author, and their success had shown that the " virtuosoship " of Shaftesbury had now to be reckoned with as a serious philosophical de- velopment ; for under no other hypothesis can the fresh attention given to Shaftesbury's theories after the publication of Hutcheson's Inquiry be explained. It is impossible to decide vj how much of this movement is due to the vitality of Shaftes- Lbury's work and how much to Hutcheson's restatement and lij systematisation of the theory — just as the resultant of two '.) forces follows the direction of neither of them, or as one of two confluent rivers appears to absorb the other, so here, opponents and supporters, alike, find a point of contact with Shaftesbury, and single out his name either for criticism or praise. That this should be so, follows naturally from Hutcheson's identifi- cation of his own work with Shaftesbury's, even to the printing of the name of the latter upon the title-page of the early editions, which were the only ones, at this time, before the public. Yet, while there are no data for determining the respective spheres of influence, it is certain that a definite one belongs to Hutcheson, even though he is not mentioned by name. It is, therefore, not surprising that the two leading thinkers of the day — Butler and Berkeley both — not only mention Shaftesbury's theorj', but, by a curious coincidence, return to it, by adding to works already published. It will be LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. 1)7 remembered that Hutcheson in liis Essay on the Fassiuns (which appeared in 172S) seemed inclined to count Butler as an adherent of the " Benevolent system of morals^" and it is probably to corrfect this misapprehension that Butler endeavours to show, in the Preface to the second Edition of his Sermons, published in 1729, that Benevolence (which he admits) is not a sufficient moral criterion, without enforcing upon ourselves the Ij authority of " Conscien'ce'V his argument being reducible to the |( contention that Shaftesbury postulates Optimism, and therefore "a sceptic not convinced of the happy tendency of virtue" would be under no moral obligation ; whereas such Pessimism would, on his owursystem, " still leave men under the strictest moral obligations." In the second " Dissertation," published with the Analog)/ in 1737, he probably had Huiicheson before his mind, when he wrote that "some of great and distinguished merit Kave, I think, expressed theraselves^n a manner, Avhich may occasion some danger, to careless readers, of imagining ' the whole of Virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness of i mankind in the present state^ " — against which he contends! f that the "extension" of the term virtue should be widened to contain the two remaining members of his trinity of human; j obligations, Justice and Veracity. For reasons that will ap-; 1 pear, in their proper place, Hutcheson did not reply to this; ' criticism. With regard to Berkeley, it must be remembered that, during the five years of Hutcheson's popularity in Dublin, he had been absent in Derry and afterwards in America, suffering the sickness of hope deferred, in his missionary schemes. In 1732 Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher appeared, and the third Dialogue is an open attack upon Shaftesbury. Speaking of the Moral Sense, he writes, " Seized and rapt with this sublime idea, our Philosophers do infinitely despise and pity, whoever shalU propose or accept any other motive to virtue."... i\ Cri. : " The love, therefore, that you bear to Moral Beauty, and your passion for abstracted truth, will not suffer you to think with patience of those fraudulent impositions upon mankind, 1\ 1 p. xix. - P23- xvi, xvii. » Analomj, (OxfoiJ Edition) p. 325. S. H. 7 98 LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. Providence, the Immortality of the Soul, and a future retri- bution of rewards and punishments^" Later on, one finds that Berkeley limits the perception of Beauty to the mere usefulness of the beautiful object, and to this criticism, alone, Hutcheson replied in the fourth edition of his Tnquiri/, published in 1738. It is a curious effect of the exigencies of controversy upon natural tastes, that ' Berkelej^, in his anxiety for religion, de- preciates Beauty, though his letters from Italy show an ap- preciation of Art, far beyond anything contained in Hutcheson's writings, who rarely ventures beyond vague generalities, in speaking of Music, Painting or Sculpture*. Upon Berkeley's return from America, he found the Shaftesbury Philosophy making progress rather than losing ground, and, in the Tlteory of Vision, Vindicated and Explained, published in 1733, he uses " a harshness eqlial-ly unwonted^a;nd un warranted l" | There is certainly a/v greater acerbity in the later remarks, wnich may possibly 'be attributed to the importance given to Shaftesbury's theory by Hutcheson-^s two early works.'. "There seems to be a certain way of writing,", hre says, " \yhether good or bad, tinsel or Stirling, sense or nonsense, which,' being suited to that size of understanding, that qualifies its owners for the minute Philosophy, botja marvellously strike and dazzle these ingeneous men, who-^re by this mean^ condupted they know not how, and they know not whither... All that is said' of a vital principle of order, harmony and proportion, all that is said of the natural decorum and fitness of things, all that is said of taste and enthusiasm may very well consist and be supported without a grain even of natural religion, without any notion of Law or - Duty, any belief of a Lord oi' Judge or any religious sense of a God — the contemplation of the mind upon the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, and order and fitness, being one thing, and a sense of religion another. So long as we admit no principle of good actions but natural affections... so long as we apprehend no ! judgment, harbour no fears and cherish no hopes of a future state, but laugh at all these with the author of the Ghai^acter- ^ § 3. "' Vide infrd, Chapter IX. 3 Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, hy Sir James Mackintosh. Edinburgh, 1836, p. 158. LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. 99 istics, and those whom he esteems the liberal and polished part of mankind, how can we be said to be religious in any sense^ 2 " ' These attacks upon the Shaftesbury point of view called forth a counterblast, the author of which is true to Shaftes- . bury's application of ridicule, by affecting to defend Berkeley from the " scandalous imputation " of being the writer of Al'ciphron, and he points out Butler's indebtedness to the much maligned Characteristics'-. The general tone of Berkeley's remarks, as well as the possible slighting reference to Hutcheson, in the phrase " ideas of Beauty and Virtue," which appears in the title of Hutche- son's first work, gives some slight negative evidence towards the solution of the biographical problem as to whether the two men had met at Dublin. On the one hand it might be argued that both having a connnon friend in Synge, with whom they each corresponded, both having the entree of the Vice-regal Court, and a common circle of friends and being the best known philosophical writers in Ireland, they would, in all probabilitj^ have met ; and to all this must be added certain half unconscious traces of Berkeleyanism in Hutclieson's earlier works. Yet on the other hand, had they met, it is difficult to see how two men of such high and similar ideals could have failed to appreciate each other: and the caustic criticism of some of Hutcheson's favourite philosophical beliefs by Berkeley is quite inconsistent with any such theory. In the beginning of last century to impugn an opponent's religious beliefs was as unforgiveable as to accuse the modern member of Parliament of peculation of public moneys. Therefore it may be concluded that the two had never been intimates, and the few echoes of Berkeley in Hutcheson may be explained as having filtered through Synge, or some other of Berkeley's friends amongst the Molesworth coterie. In this unsatisfactorj' state the diffi- culty must rest, failing additional evidence, for the further 1 Eraser's Berkeley, i. p. 373. ^ A Vindication of the Rev. D B y from the scandalous imputa- tion of being author of a late Book entitled AlcipJiroii or the Minute Philosopher, 1734. 7—2 100 LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. question whether the two may have exchanged greetings at a levee is quite unimportant. Another event of quite a different nature that added very much more to the popularity of Shaftesb.ury's ideas than the support of sympathizers, or the envenomed criticisms of op- ponents, was the publication of Pope's Essay on Man in 1733-4. Here may be noticed an example of a rule, of general applica- tion, in Modern Philosophy, that a system, to exercise a vital influence, is always aided by the picturesqueness and popularity of literary expression as such. It has indeed been said, and with considerable reason, that, when a philosophy has been popularized, it ceased to be strictly philosophy ; but, at the same time, the literary expression of a philosophy is far from being a popular philosophy, in any bad sense, — rather, such literary expression is the natural complement of any system worthy of the name. For, if it is to be an intellectual power, it must, in the first place, have had its origin in a great national need, and iu such cases the philosophical solution of necessity finds its expression in Literature, which crystallizes conclusions, quite apart from the systematic nexus of logical proof from which these conclusions have been logically deduced. Every man may be potentially a philosopher, but the point of view is different. Given the national need or the intellectual need, the professed thinker concentrates his attention on the process of proof; he requires some kind of " Dialectic moment "; whereas the plain man of Butler (whether " honest " or not) demands a picture of the system, brought into focus with his requirements, knowledge and other beliefs. This is not a matter of profundity, but rather of artistic insight ; Pope himself, curiously enough, expresses this idea in a letter he wrote to Warburton thanking him for his defence of the Essay on Man, against Crousaz— " It is indeed the same system as mine, but illustrated with a ray of your own, as they say our natural body is the same still when it is glorified... You under- stand me as well as I do myself, but you express me better than I could express myself ^" It may perhaps be said that the Essay on Man is to be 1 Pope's Works. Dublin, 1764, x. p. 283. LITEKARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. 101 traced directly to the influence of Bolingbroke, who gave Pope the skeleton outlines, and who is eulogized as the poet's "guide, philosopher and friend." While there does not appear any reason to doubt that while Bolingbroke supplied the " first principles," his ideas were slightly modified to make them palatable to Pope, and this led at once to the suppression of some of Bolingbroke's naturalistic views and to a closer approximation to Shaftesbury ^ Amongst others, Voltaire Avas quick to recognize how much Pope was indebted to the ideas of the Characteristics. He says " IJ Essay sur VHomme de Pope me parait le plus beau poeme dedactique, le plus utile, le plus sublime qu'on ait jamais fait dans aucune langue. II est vrai que le fond s'en trouve tout entier dans les Caracteristiques du lord Shaftesbury ; et je ne sais pourquoi M. Pope en fait uniquement honneur a M. de Bolingbroke sans dire uu mot du c^lebre Shaftesbury, eleve de Locke-." Pope is especially close to Shaftesbury in his optimism, the idea of a system of the universe, of harmony and proportion, as he expresses it : " All nature is but Art, unknown to thee, All chance, direction, which thou canst not see ; All discord, harmony not luiderstood ; All partial evil, universal good. And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite, One truth is clear. Whatever is, is right." At the same time, he MthfuUy follows Bolingbroke, and diverges from Shaftesbury (and still more from Hutcheson) in making Self-Love that " master passion in the breast. Like Aaron's serpent, swallow all the rest." Plainly, here, there is no room left for Benevolence, which, absorbed in Self-Love, becomes merely " The scale to measure others' wants by thine." Doubtless Hutcheson had such a train of thought before his mind, when he speaks of those who " plead that our most 1 Cf. Johnson's Life of Fope — lAvea of the Poets, ii. p. 350. Works of William Wen-burton. London, 1811, vol. xii. p. 335. 2 GHuvres Completes de Voltaire. Paris, 1879, xxn. j). 178. He adds epigraniniatically, iu comparing Plato and Pope, that the former wrote as a poet in prose, the latter as a philosopher in verse. 102 LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. generous affections are subordinate to private interest, by means of sympathy, which makes the pleasures and pains, the happiness or misery of others, the constant causes of pleasure or pain in ourselves' " — a view which, of course, he criticizes. Besides these important names that are landmarks in the history of Philosophy, there are very many minor writers, whose activity makes the interval between the publication of the Essay on the Passions and Hutcheson's next work — that is from 1728-1734-5— one of varied if not very profound criticism. It would be difficult to select any other six or seven years, during which so many works of a philosophical period appeared, and there is probably no other instance of such a rapid production of books being so speedily forgotten. Tindal's Christianity as old as the Creation (1732) may be remembered as having caused Butler's Analogy ; Bishop Peter Browne, once Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, as an ardent Jacobite, who wrote pamphlets showing the folly of Irish Orangemen " drinking to the memory of the dead " King William ; as well as the acute criticism of Locke in the Procedure and Liynits of the Human Understanding (1728, and 2nd edition, 1729) and Things Divine and Supernatural conceived by Analogy with things Natural and Human (1738). It may be mentioned, too, that Dr Watts, the writer of certain well-known hymns, was also a controversialist, having written Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects (1733, 2nd edition, 1734) as well as his Treatise on Logic. Besides these there were many, even less known works, some arising out of the dregs of the Lockian controversy, such as Samuel' Colliber's Free Thoughts concerning Soids (1734), Conyers Place's Essay toiuards Vindication of the Visible Creation (1729) and Zachary Mayne's Two Dissertations con- cerning Sense and the Imagination, witJi an Essay on Conscious- 'ness (1727). Others continued the metaphysical side of the controversy over Clarke's systerh, which somewhat resembles a family feud, owing to the fact of so many of the combatants, on both sides, bearing the same name. Edmund Law of St Jt)hn's College, Cambridge, afterwards Bishop of Carlisle, started the dispute in his translation of Archbishop King's De Origine 1 System of Moral Philosophy, i. p. 47. LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. 108 Mali in 1731, which he afterwards followed by the Inqum/^ into Space, Time, Immensity and Eternity &c. (1734). Then a brother of Samuel Clarke — John Clarke, Dean of Sarum— re- plied, also strange to say, another John Clarke of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. These defences were attacked By~a Joseph Clarke, Fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge, in one of those comprehensively named treatises, the title-page of wdiich was also a table of contents— Dr Clarke's Notions of Space Examined in Vindication of the Translator of Archbishop Kings Origin of Evil — Being an Ansiver to two late Pamphlets, entitled, the one, " A Defence of Dr Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God'' etc. Lond. 1733, and the other A Second Defence. A further pamphlet was equally explicit, A Farther Examination of Dr Clarke's notions of Space ; with some considerations on the possibility of eternal Creation, in reply to Mr John Clarke's Third Defence of Dr Samuel Clarke's Demonstrations.. . .London, l73-t. It will be seen presently that the followers of Clarke were simultaneously defending them- selves against Hutcheson's exposition of Shaftesbury, and this eventually became the more important discussion of the two. To rightly understand the criticism of the period which is somewhat involved it is necessary to remember that it really resolves itself into a complicated "triangular duel." There were at least three distinct tendencies — the Shaftesbury- Hutcheson, Moral Sense and Benevolent theory, various theories of "egoistic hedonism," and finally the "rational moralists," and each of these was subject to the attacks of the pther two — for instance Hutcheson's theory of a Moral Sense, approving of Benevolence, was attacked by the Rational Moralists as^ sensuous, and by the egoistic hedonists, because of its uni-|: versalistic tendencies— for after all, with Hutchesjon, Benevo-, lence is sometimes not distinguishable from universalistic Hedonism. Mr Selby-Bigge says tliat " for the sentimentalist, therefore, it was 'a war with two fronts,' and, when he faces one enemy, he generally exposes his flank to the other^" — and, to continue the metaphor, one might add that every ^ British Moralists, heing selections from Writers jiriin-ipdlli/ of the Eiijhteeitth Century, by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford, 1897, i. p. xli. 104 LITERARY WORK ])UR1NG THE GLASGOW PERIOD. advance must be made under a cross-fire. It is not altogether uninteresting to notice Hutcheson entering upon this dangerous " zone," where the first criticisms against him, in point of time, and perhaps of importance, were made by John Balguy, Vicar of Northallerton, who published a number of Treatises between 172G' and 1733, in which latter year they were collected. In his Foundation of Moral Goodness, the first part being published in 1728, and the second the following year, Balguy speaks as a follower of Clarke, and his criticisms partly derive force from the general position of the " Rational- ists," partly from the view he took of Hutcheson's exposition of Shaftesbury. The following are his chief objections in the First Part of the Foundation of Moral Goodness; («) Yirtiie, as founded upon " Instincts," is arbitrary-, {h) If men_iiad had_.no naTural affections towards Benevolence, and " notwithstanding Intelligence, Reason _and_Liberty^" there would have been no such thing as -Virtue, (c) Balguy s third criticism raises a more interesting pointpHamely that Hutcheson's system would allow some "degree of Morality" to the animal creation — this corollary, though drawn by an opponent, is a partial anticipation or rather a mention of the present-day sub-human morality ^ These criticisms will serve as a specimen of Balguy's work — they are chiefly interesting historically, as showing the Pseudo-Platonism of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson attacked by Platonic arguments. Tlie Second Part of the Foundation of Moral Goodness is more important both to Balguy and Hutcheson. A defender of Hutcheson is supposed to have sent Balguy objections to his first part which he answers one by one. The question, as to how moral distinctions are apprehended, having arisen, Balguy explains his term " Moral Perception," which, he claims, can give absolute " relations " (not merely relative ones, like a sense), but he admits that Moral Perception is immediate and passive*. This concession is of considerable importance in the ^ Letter to a Deist — directed against Shaftesbury. '^ The Foiuidatioit of Moral Goodness or A Further Inquiry into the Original of our Idea of Virtue. Edition 4, 1734, pp. 46, 47. British Moralists, ii. p. Gl. 3 Cf. Hutcheson's formula for his Benevolent Principle — "The greatest Happiness of the sensitive system," infra, Ch. XIV. * Balguy's Tracts, 151—157. LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. ] 0.") growth of Hutchesou's system, and in his next work he will be found speaking of Moral Perception as an alternative to the Moral Sense with which he started. In the Second Letter to a Deist (1731) perhaps the most striking part relating to Hutcheson, is the defence of the Sublimity of Christianity'. The tract Divine Rectitude performs the same function of criticism towards Hutcheson's ^Esthetics, that the Foundation of Moral Goodness did to his Ethics. Balguy here contends that Hutcheson's " Uniformity amidst Variety " consists of "real relations," and that relations can only be perceived by the Understanding ; therefore he concludes " there is an in- tellectual perception of Beauty as well as the sensation of pleasured" This, like many other doctrines of the time, has a suggestion of Hamilton's Perception proper and Sensation proper. The rational point of view in this pamphlet found an answer in another, entitled Divine Benevolence, and there was also a third, published in 1734, under the title Wisdom tJie First Spring of Action in the Deity, both of which show traces of Shaftesbury's influence, and the second of which was answered by Balguy, in his Supplement to the Latu of Truth (1734). The slight approximation between the Rational Moralists (as represented by Balguy) and Hutcheson, has already been noticed. This was further accentuated in Balguy 's Sermons, published at a later date, where he claims for the "supreme faculty" of Reason or Intelligence, " the apprehension of moral relations, the discernment of Right and Wrong, Good and Evil. Again, hence it is that we can turn our thoughts back upon themselves, and clearly perceive the powers and operations of our own minds^" that is, " intellectual perception " becomes the equivalent of Locke's reflection, and this again is Hutche- son's later Internal Sense, and the sole question that remains in dispute is its " subjectivity." While Hutcheson drops some of the Hedonism with which he had started in his rapprocJiement to the followers of Clarke, 1 Balguy's Tracts, p. 293. 2 Ibid., pp. 226 — 232. Cf. passages cited from Hutcheson, infra, pp. 210—7, 222. •* Balguy's Sermons, i. 361. lOG LITICRARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. he is the more exposed to the criticisms of his other opponents, for his " benevolence " has now become less hedonistic, and he is gradually feeling his way to an approach to Butler's 1 supremacy of Conscience, in so far as he has an uncertain tendency to give the highest place in the mental hierarchy to something other than feeling: this tendenc}^ was accentuated \by the attacks of his hedonistic critics. One of the first hedonistic criticisms appeared under the title of 'Aperrj Aoyla early in 1728*. The authorship of this work, which is of considerable length, is of some interest. It was really written by Archibald Campbell, Professor of Ecclesi- astical History at St Andrews, but the first edition of 1728 appeared under the name of Alexander Iniies, who had only contributed the prefatory Introduction (in which he says Hutcheson is all soul and Mandeville all body-) and gome marginal notes, which Campbell described as blunders showing a " shameful ignorance of the meaning of the text^" The second edition almost rivals Cudworth's work, in its wealth of classical quotation, and it contains a considerable number of additions. In it, Campbell complains somewhat bitterly of the reception given to his work", after he had owned it, by some who boldly affirmed that it was " that hellish system of im- morality, which the fallen angels and ungodly men are governed by*." Such forcible expressions lead the reader to expect some pungent writing, and he is not disappointed. Campbell com- plains that Hutcheson was " so much out of temper," as to brand hedonists as follawers of Epicurus. " I do not indeed complain," he says, "of scurrilous treatment or any personal reflections against those whom he makes to differ from him... But to what purpose does this learned gentleman go about to ' 'ApeTTj Ao7ta or an Enquiry into the Original of Moral Virtue dr., by Alexander Innes. Westminster, 1728. - Ibid., p. xxxix. 3 All Enquiry into the Original of floral Virtue, wherein it is shewn (again.it the author of the Fable of the Bees, iCx.) that Virtue is found in the Nature of tilings. ...With some reflections on a late book, intitled, an Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, by Arcbibakl Campbell. Edinbm-gh, 1733, p. xxxii. ■* Ibid., p. vi. LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. 107 brand us with this odious character ? I am only sorry he would have the world to think of us, that we are no better than the disciples of Epicurus \" To which censure of Hutcheson's, he provides an argumentnin ad hominem by virtually accusing him of " snobishness," with a considerable amount of sarcasm about " polite Virtue " and its relation to the " beau vionde and the fashionable part of the world-." After several similar person- alities, there is a certain humorous naivete in his remark, " I would fain think I have said nothing in the course of my argument that does not sute [sic] with justice and honour... But if any one will be pleased to point me out any thing I have said any where unhandsom and ungentlemanny [sic], I do here promise, if my book comes to another impression, to take care to have it rectify'd^" After these preliminary skirmishes, he comes to the direct attack and endeavours to show that Hutcheson's Benevolence is merely Self-Love disguised, and that the Moral Sense is a mere instinct. Lest the pleasures which form the basis of Self-Love should be held to be similar irrational quantities, he is careful to show a means of estimating their values, and this is worthy of note as one of the earliest, if/ not the first explicit attempts at a "hedonistic calculus." Firsil of all, pleasures are to be reckoned in respect of value, as positive, pains as negative quantities. There are three elements to be considered : Degree, Duration and Consequents, i.e. " the degrees of pleasure or pain in the consequent perceptions." From these data, we reach the formula of the calculus — to multiply Degrees into Duration and add (or subtract) the Consequents ■». 1 Ibid., p. xiii. 2 Ibid., p. 325, Ed. 1, p. 231. ^ Ibid., p. xviii. 4 Ibid., p. 275, Ed. 1, p. 197. The following is an example of the Calculus in operation : A and B are two possible pleasures — A has degrees 15 pleasure ,, duration 20 hrs. B ,, degrees 12 pleasure ,, duration GO hrs. consequent^ 20 hrs. j^ G degrees jja in, therefore A -.By. (20 x 15) = 300 : [(12 x G0) = 720- (G x 20) = 120] = C00 or .1 :i^::300:G00. 108 LITEIIAIIV WOIIK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. At the risk of a brief digression it may be worth mention- ing, that a work written less than twenty years afterwards, named An Enquiry into the Origin of the Human Appetites and Affections, shoiuing how each arises from Association, with an Account of the Entrance of Moral Evil into the World: Written for the use of the Young Gentlemen at the Universities [of Oxford and Cambridge], Lincohi, 1747^ has a somewhat similar calculus, rejecting however the " consequents " of Campbell. " All pleasure is relative to the faculty perceiving it and is in compound ratio of its intenseness and duration. Hence, in equal degrees of intenseness, the pleasure is as the duration ; and in equal durations as the intenseness. Consequently, when the intenseness of one pleasure is to the intenseness of another, as the duration of this is to the duration of that, the pleasures, strictly speaking, are equal, and it is perfectly in- different whether of them be chosen, provided man's existence is commensurate to each, and the enjoyment of neither of them incompatible with the enjoyment of others. Whence we see that an infinitely small pleasure may be preferable to an infinitely great one, jjrovided the duration of the former surpasses the duration of the latter in a greater ratio than the intenseness of the one exceeds the intenseness of the other-." The author of this important work has not been discovered, but it seems probable that the tract may be attributed to John Gay of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, whose Dissertation concerning the Fundamental Principle of Vii^tue or Morality, had been published in 1731 as a prefix to Edmund Law's Translation of King's De Origine Mali. In the Dissertation Gay accuses Hutcheson of "rather cutting the knot of difficulty (connected with the approval of Virtue) than untying it," by a Moral Sense that verges closely on the heresies of occult qualities, Innate Ideas and instincts-'. Further he argues that a Moral Sense is unnecessary since "our approbation of Morality and all affections whatsoever, are finally resolved 1 Metaphysical Tracts hi/ Emjlhli Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century. Prepared for the Press by the late Eev. Samuel Parr, D.D. London, 1847. •^ Ibid., p. 1C8. * Dissertation — Britisli Moralists, itt supra, ii. 270. LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. 109 into reason pointing out private happiness... and that, whenever this end is not perceived, they are to be accounted for by Association of Ideas\" This sentence is the text for the later work which, long before Hartley wrote, lays down the main principles of Associationalist Psychology ; and it may be noted ill passing that the autlior, whether Gay or some unknown writer, is in advance of similar British work, done towards the end of the century, in explicitly laying down the principle of "indissoluble associations," which he speaks of as an "insepar- able union" of ideas, and also in anticipating, in almost identical terms, Hamilton's theory of latent mental moditications, which he calls "dormant latent impressions"." Hutcheson's works, as will be seen, were written too early to enable him to make any use either of Hume's custom or the theory of Association of the Author of the Enquinj into the Origin of the Human Appetites and Affections, &c., but it may have been Gay's early W'Ork that he had in his mind, when he admitted somewhat inconsistently the influence of Association " to represent certain actions as J good, others as evil''." Besides the critics already mentioned, the same fruitful period produced Thomas Johnston's Essay on Moral Obligation, 1731, Philip Glover's Discourse Concerning Virtue, &c., 1732, ^ and Joseph Foster's Two Essays: The one on the Origin of ^ ^\l( Evil; the other on the Foundation of Morality, 11 M. More im- ti-'^ portant than these is the work of yet another John Clarke, who V' was Master of the Grammar School at Hull, and who had already /■f{/ti' published several works dealing with Latin texts, and in 1725, An Examination of the Notion of Moral Good and Evil, ad- vanced in a late hook entitled The Religion of Nature Delineated. Between 1725 and 1728"', he published Tlie Foundation of 1 Ibid. 2 Dr Parr's Tracts, id siiprn; Enquiry, tOc, pp. (38, 73. 3 Hutcheson's System, ut supra, i. p. 80. * This book was published at York without any date on the title-page. Mr Selby-Bigge consequently dates it 1730 (British Moralists, ii. 387), but Hutcheson in the Essay on the Passions (1728), in defending his system against egoistic criticism, gives as his reference "see Mr Clarke of Hull, his remarks on Treatise 2," i.e. Second Treatise in the Inquiry (Essay on Passions, p. 14), therefore Clarke's book must have appeared before the Essay on the Passions, and after the Inquiry, i.e. between 172.j and 1728. 110 LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. Moralitij in Theori/ and Practice considered in an Examination of Dr Samuel Clarke's opinion concerning the Ot'iginal of 31 oral Obligation : as also the notion of Vir-tue advanced in a late hook entitled an Enquiry concerning our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, in which he criticizes Hutcheson's views on Benevolence, from the stand-point of the " Selfish School." " The love of a Benefactor," he writes, " does as certainly arise from Self-Love as the Love of Oysters'." Clarke's criticism has at least one point of individuality, namely his admission of Hutcheson's Moral Sense, for purposes of Egoistic Hedonism. He en- deavours to show that it cannot approve of Benevolence to the exclusion of other affections, since Benevolence is at bottom " Self-Love," but yet after depriving the Moral Sense of the function Hutcheson had given it, he does not dismiss it as a useless mental supernumerary ; on the contrary, " the main use of the Moral Sense and the principal Intention of Nature therein seems to be to put the mind of man upon the hunt, to see if such actions as appear at first sight beautiful, may not be attended with greater pleasures than the first view presents ^" Another writer, John Brown, whose Essays on the Character- istics appeared later", may be mentioned here as evidencing the same general line of criticism as Clarke. He is rather original in twitting Hutcheson with speaking metaphorically of the beauty of Virtue, as if he had been describing the charms of some " sovereign fair," of whom he was enamoured, and there- fore accusing his opponents of " either wanting eyes or common discernment, in not at first sight falling in love with this matchless lady"*." Contemporaneously with these various attacks, the Shaftes- bury-Hutcheson Philosophy received a considerable amount of support. Besides Pope, whose Essay on Man has been men- tioned above, the polite world gave its adhesion, but this was not productive of literary expression. The great contributors to Philosophy at the time. Bishops, Deans and other clergymen, 1 British Sloralists, ut sitjrra, ii. p. 233. 2 Ibid., p. 242. 3 The Second Edition appeared in 1751. * p. 162. LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. 1 1 1 for conscientious or professional reasons, were opposed to it, and so its supporters are to be found amongst the freelances of controversy, men like Thomas Chubb, the glover of Sarum, who were free to write as they pleased. It is curious that of all the writers of the day, Chubb is perhaps the most modern in his terminology, but, at the same time, he is flir from being one of the most consistent of the group. The following are his chief ethical tracts: A Discourse concerning Reason, &c., 1731 ; The Sufficiency of Reason farther considered, 1731 ; Some Reflections ujjon the Comparative Excellence of Moi-al and Positive Duties, 1731 ; A Vindication of God's Moral Character^ ; in the last of which one notes the influence of Hutcheson in the prominent position he gives to the Beauty of the Divine Character". In 1730 he published two volumes containing thirty-five tracts or pamphlets ; the most important of which are Some Short Reflections on Virtue and Happiness, wherein it is shewn... that Virtue is solely founded on Benevolence, &c., and Further Short Reflect ions... wherein it is shewn what kind of Virtue is in Reason rewardahle, kc"^ Though it was not till 1745, that The Ground and Foundation of Morality considered: wherein it is shewn that disinterested Benevolence is a proper and a tuorthy Principle for Intelligent Beings, &c. &c.-', was published, this tract also may be mentioned for the sake of completeness. Another work, published a little later, should be noted here, which, though written under the influence of Clark e^ also shows traces of the influence of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. This is the Moral Philosopher (1737), by Thomas Morgan, to which Warburton replied in his Divine Legation of Moses. The following passage is one of several, showing his indebtedness to Shaftesbury. "Let our Moralist now look w^ith(jut him and contemplate the vast stupendous fabrick of the Heavens and Earth... He will see an innumerable family of creatures raised and provided for by an unseen hand, and contrived and placed 1 Contained in Chubb's Collected Works, voL iv. 2 Ihid.y p. 51. 3 Chubb's Works, voL ii. •* Ibid., voL III. 5 The author says that "by moral Truth, Reason and the fitness of things he means the same as Dr Clarke." Letter to Eusebius. 112 LITERARY WORK DURING THE (JLASGOW PERIOD. in a mutual dependence and necessary relation to each other, by an invisible unsearchable Wisdom. And when he carries his sight farther, he will still discover uKjre and more wonders in infinitum, and be more and more charmed and delighted with new Beauty, Order and Proportion \" To all these numerous works may be added two others, which, though they occupy an isolated position, influenced Hutcheson. The first of these was Cudworth's Treatise con- cerning Etei'nal and Immutable Morality, which, though written long before, was first published in 1731 ^ and the second, " Immateriality" Baxter's Inquiry into the nature of the Human Soul, which appeared in 1733^ and to which Hutcheson refers in his System of Moral Philosophy*. The effect of such intellectual movements and so much criticism, joined with the experience of lecturing upon his system, taught Hutcheson much ; and hence soon after his arrival at Glasgow, he is reported to have wished to recast his Philosophy. Wodrow writes that " he [i.e. Hutcheson] sayes, on reflection he sayes, he is not thoroughly satisfyed in the principles or rather some superstructures, npon which his book the Beauty of Virtue [is founded], and, if he publish another edition, he designs to alter severall things'." Whether the dissatisfaction mentioned extended to principles or details is an important point which may with advantage be discussed below. It has already been mentioned that the mathematical formulae were withdrawn and an addendum, printed in the fourth edition, published in 1738. Besides, beginning with the third edition, 1729, and still more in the fourth edition, there were many important changes made in the text. Several of these were replies to criticisms, and others were designed to bring the fourth edition of the Inquiry into line with Hutche- son's new mode of thought ; some of these are exceedingly ^ Moral Philosopher, i. p. 442. - Of. Hutcheson's System of Moral Philosophij, i. 273, "Precepts of the law of Nature, or these practical observations are deemed immutable and eternal," etc. ^ Scottish Philosophy, ut supra, p. 44. * I. p. 200. ^ Analecta, iv. p. 190 — . LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. 113 important as a coinincntarj upon the System of Moral Philosoijhy, which is, as will be seen, of about the same date. But it was impossible to completely re-create the Inquiry, and therefore Hutcheson determined to prepare an altogether new work. Inasmuch as an investigation of the date of the composition of this book — the System of Moral Pliilosophy — is important in estimating Hutcheson's mental growth, some facts connected with the writing of it deserve to be told in detail. Dr Martineau very ingeniously conjectures "that the volumes contain internal evidence of a mixed fabrication," which he attributes to the imperfect literary form of the notes from which Hutcheson had lectured, and the consequent necessity imjjosed upon the editor of filling them up by reference to the rejDorts taken down by his most assiduous students'. Hutcheson's own letters show that the manuscript was in a much more complete state than might have been supposed from the date of publica- tion, having been begun in 1734 or 1735, while they confirm the sujjposition of " mixed ftibrication," besides giving an interesting account of the travels of the original rough draught. Under the date of Sept. 21st, 1737, he writes to Drennau, " I hope before it will be very long to let you see in print what has employed my leism-e hours for several summers past ; but I am at a loss how to get a right printer to emplo}', being a stranger in London. I don't incline to put my name to what I print or give any proofs of the author to any wasps in this country. 'Tis a ' System of i\Iorality ' in English, larger than both my former books. You need not talk of this." Five months later, on February 27th, 1738, he returns to the tale of the MS., now complete — " You would readily hear that in November last I sent some papers, at Will Bruce's- desire, to be perused by Dr Rundle-^; a traik, as they call it iiere, attends them. They came to Will only ye 8th of February, by contrary winds ; and, though my design was to get Will's and Abernethy's opinion, he, without looking into them, gave them immediately to the Bishop, where perhaps they may lye a good time to little purpose ; and it may be resented unless Synge sees them too. But I am in no haste about them." 1 Types of Ethical Theory, ii. p. 522.. - Hutcheson '.s cousin, vide supra, p. 26. ■^ Bundle, Bishop of Derry. S. H. 8 114 LlTEllAllY WOKIv DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. Again, on April l7tli of the same year, he writes, " About November last I sent a MS. to Will Bruce, chiefly for his and Mr Aberncthy's perusal. He shewed it to ye Bishop of Derry, who, it seems, was much pleased with it, and promises me a long epistle soon. I heartily wish you had seen it, but it did not get to Dublin till February and was in the Bishop's hands till the beginning of this month. I believe Will is perusing it now. I am not expecting it back again speedily. During our College Session I get nothing done ; but, if I get them back during our vacation, with remarks of my friends, I shall endeavour to put the last hand to them." A letter written on June loth, 1741, more than three years later, gives a despairing account of the delay in the final touches. " I shall not leave Glasgow, except about three weeks in July, for this whole vacation, but have more avocations, by too numerous an acquaint- ance, than you can imagine. In short Thorn, I find old age, not in grey hairs and other trifles, but in an incapacity of mind for such close thinking and composition as I once had, and have pretty much dropped the thoughts of some great designs I had once sketched out. In running over my papers, I am quite dissatisfied with method, style and some reasonings, tho' I don't repent my labour, as by it and the thoughts suggested by friends, a multitude of which I had from W. Bruce and Synge and still more in number from some excellent hands here, that I am fitter for my business ; but, as to composing in order, I am quite bewildered, and am adding confusedly to a confused book all valuable remarks in a farrago, to refresh my memory in my class lectures on several subjects." From this time, on to Hutcheson's death, there is no further mention of the System of Moral Philosophy. There are several reasons to account for this. The want of " capacity for close thinking " is in all probability to be attributed less to failing powers than to the fact that Hutcheson could only work in solitude and free from all distractions ; besides the " too numerous acquaintance," his energies were dissipated by the contest inside the University, which was much in his thoughts. Moreover, the publication of the System had been too long delayed. It represents a stage of thought, intermediate between the early works written in Dublin, and the short LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. 115 Gompends written after it, but published earlier. It is easy to imagine that, when in 17:39 or 1740, he was face to face with his own MS. it would be irksome to modify it to represent his later views. To a man of his impulsive, impatient tempera- ment, it was easier to begin again, and warned by the delay in the completion of the larger undertaking, he adopted the refuge of the busy man, of writing a series of short works, which were to be published as "Compends" or Synopses. These were originally all written in Latin, and two of them, the MetapJiijsicae Synopsis and the PhilosopJdae Mwalis Insti- tutio Conipendicvria, were published in 1742, and the Logicae Compendium in 175G. Writing to Drennan on Oct. 29th, 1743, Hutcheson gives an account of the publication of the Meta- pliysicae Synopsis and his own opinion of the books. " I send you," he writes, "by the bearer, Dr Thompson, two^ copies of a trifle which I dou't own, as it was first most imperfectly and foolishly printed without my knowledge, from some loose hastily wrote pajjers ; and now, tho' much enlarged and altered, yet I have not leisure, either to examine the whole thoroughly or to coi-rect the Latin. I am sure it will match De Vries, and I therefore teach the third part of it De Deo. I see [upon reading] my Compound of Morals^ a good many de[fects and] oversights. But I am so diverted by vain [jaunts and] business, that I must do every thing by starts. [I am...] and have something desultory in me, [with the tur]n of my mind, besides something of old [age cre]eping on." The nature of the "Compends" may be best illustrated by reference to Hutcheson's relations with Hume, which extended over a period of six years. There is a peculiar interest in the encounter, both of the men and the philosophies — Hutcheson, the enthusiast in the cause of virtue and universal happiness, now verging upon middle age, but the more impulsive of the two ; and Hume, the anatomist of human nature, that looked rather to the articulations of the skeleton, than the beauty of the flesh tints. As to the philosophies, whether one ranks Hutcheson as the most renowned upholder of the old order that Hume was to overthrow, or as the anticipator of later ^ He adds at the end, "Pray send, by first safe liand the copy directed to Bishop Synge. I had a very fond letter from him, but a very melancholy one, last summer; he is wanting such elementary books for his son." S_'7 IIG LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. answers to sccpticism\ it can scarcely fail to be of interest to see the philosophy of the man of fashion and philanthropist subjected to the disintegrating force of criticism. In 1737 Hume, at the age of twenty-six, had returned from France with the MS. of the first two parts of his Treatise on Human Nature. It is unnecessary to retell his struggles in London, and his disappointment at the chilling reception given to the cherished child of his brain, from which he had expected so much. It was published early in l7o9, and in a letter written to Henry Home, afterwards Lord Kames, on Feb. 13, there may be a hint of the chain of events that led to his connection with Hutcheson. Failing to get any public recog- nition of his work, he writes to his friend, " If you know anyone that is a judge, you would do me a sensible favour in engaging him to a serious perusal of the book. 'Tis so rare to meet with one that will take pains on a book that does not come recommended by some great name or authority, that I must confess I am as fond of meeting with such a one as if I were sure of his appro- bation 2." Whether this request of Hume's led to his book being brought under Hutcheson's notice, or whether he had already been interested in theyoung philosopher, we find that the two men were soon engaged in a literary correspondence, and Hutcheson had consented to send Hume his remarks upon the unpublished parts. The promise must have been fulfilled in the summer or autumn of 1739, as Hume replies as follows: /P 3 / "^Z. ^ '^V^- l''^'> 1739. " Sir, ^ I am much obliged to you for your reflections on my papers.. I have perused them with care, and find they will be of use to me. You have mistaken my meaning in some passages, which, upon examination, I have found to proceed from some ambiguity in my expression. " What affected me most in your remarks, is your observing that there wants a certain warmth in the cause of virtue, which you think all good men would relish and [which] could not displease amidst abstract 1 This question will be found discussed in Chapter XIII. 2 Life and Correspondence of David Hiunc, by John Hill Burton. Edinburgh, 1840, I. p. 106. LITERARY WORK DURIXG THE GLASGOW PERIOD. 117 enquiries. .J_inust own this has not happened by chance, but is the effect of a reasoning good or bad. There are different ways of examining the mind as well as tlie body. One may consider it either as an anatomist or as a painter^: either to discover its most secret springs and principles, or to describe the grace and beauty of its actions. I imagine it impossible to combine these two views. Where you pull off the skin and display all the minute parts, there appears something trivial, even in the noblest attitudes and most vigorous actions ; nor can you ever render the object graceful or engaging, but by clothing the parts again with skin and flesh, and presenting only their bare outside. An anatomist, however, caa give very good advice to a painter or statuary. And, in like manner, I am persucxded that a metaphysician may be very helpful to a moralist, though I cannot esasily- conceive these two characters in the same work.^ I Any warm sentiment of morals I am afraid would have the air of \ dedfcm'Utioirirmidsf abstract reasonings, and'wouU be esteemed contrary i»/ / lo good taste. And though I am much more ambitious of being esteemed ' a friend to virtue than a writer of taste, yet I must always carry the latter in my eye, otherwise I must despair of ever being sei-viceable ^o virtue. I hope these reasons will satisfy you J though, at the same time, I intend to make a new trial, if it be possible to make the moralist and metaphysician agree a little better. •[ , ^ . I cannot agree to your .sense of ^ tiaturcd'^' )'Tis founded on final j causes, which is a consideration that appears to me pretty uncertain :' - and unphilosophical. For, pray, what is the end of man ? Is he created ^ -tl/^ for happiness, or for virtue ? for this life, or for the next ? for himself, -^ *' "'^^ or for his Maker ? Your definition of natural depends on solving these questions, which are endless and quite wide of my purpose. I have * never called justice unnatural, but only artificial. Atque ipsa ntilitas, justi prope mater et cequi^, says one of the best moralists of antiquity. I JGrotius and Puffendorf, to be consistent, must assert the sa me.]_ ^ It is interesting to note that this letter to Hutcheson formed the germ of the comparison of the "easy" and " profound" philosophies of the opening pages of the Enquiry 'concerning Humun Understanding; where the siruile appears as follows— J" The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and '; disagreeable objects'; but his science is useful to the painter in delineating a ' Venus or a Helen. While the latter employs all the richest colours of his art, , and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs, he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body, the position of the \ muscles, the fabrick of the bones, and the use and figure of every part or ' organ." | - In reference to Hutchesou's criticism of the discussion as to whether moral distinctions and justice are "natural" in the Treatise, pp. 471 — 3 (edition edited by Selby-Bigge), evidently Hutcheson's criticism, though not used in the Treatise, bore fruit, later, in the Enquiry, wbei-e in Appendix III and in Note [QQ] Hume re-states his position on the "naturalness" of justice. ' Horat. Lib. i. Sat. iii. 98. 118 LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. "Whether natural abilities be virtue, is a dispute of words^ I think I follow the common use of language ; virtus signified chiefly courage among the Romans. Tl was just now reading this character of Alexander VI. in Guicciardin, " In Alessandro sesto fu solertia et sagacitk singulare ; consiglio eccelente, efficacia a persuadere maravigliosa, et a tute le faciende gravi, sollicitudine, et destrezza incredibile. Ma erano quests virtu avanzate di grande intervallo da vitii.^ "Were benevolence the only virtue, no characters would be mixed, but would depend entirely on their degrees of benevolencej Upon the whole, I desire to take my catalogue of virtue from Cicero's Offices, not from The Whole Duty of Man., I had indeed the former book in jny eye, in all my reasonings. I have many other reflections to communicate to you but it would be troul)lesome. I shall therefore conclude by telling you that I intend to follow your advice in altering most of those passages you have remarked as defective in point of prudence \ though I nuist own, I think you are a little too delicate. Except a man be in orders, or be im- mediately concerned in the instruction of youth, I do not think his character depends upon his philosophical speculations, as the world is now modelled ; and a little liberty seems requisite to bring into the public notice a book, which is calculated for few readers. I hope you will allow me the freedom of consulting yoix when I am in any difliculty andjjelieve me &c. •; P.S. I canno t forbear recommending another thing to your con- sideration.) Actions are not virtuous nor vicious, but only so far as they are proofs of certain qualities as durable principles in the mind.J This is a point I should have established more expressly than I have done 2. jNow, I desire you to 'consider if there be any quality that is virtuous, without being a tendency either to the public good or the good of the person who possesses it. If there be none without these tendencies, we may conclude that their merit is derived /rom sympathy. I I desire you would only consider the tendencies of qualities, not their actual operations which depend ou' chance.. Brutus riveted the chains of Rome faster by his opposition, but the natural tendency of his noble dispositions — his public spirit and magnanimity — was to establish her liberty^ You are a great admirer of Cicero as well as I am. Please to review the fourth book, De Finihus Bonorum et Malorum, where you will find him prove against the Stoics, that, if there be no other goods but virtue, 'tis impossible there can be any virtue, because the mind would then want all motives to begin its actions upon ; and 'tis upon the goodness or badness of the motives that the virtue of the action depends. This pro\-es that to every virtuous action there must be a motive or impelling ^ Treatise, Bk. iii. Pt. in. § 1, i.e. whether "non-artificial" abilities are virtues? - Treatise, nt supra, p. 575. Huiue returned to this point in the Enquiry, Note [DD]. '^^^ ^ LITERARY WORK DURING THE GLASGOW PERIOD. 119 ^'^"^ t^" passion, distinct from the virtue, and tliat virtue can never be the sole motive to any action. You do not assent to this : though I think there can be no proposition more certain or important. I must own my l^roofs were not distinct enougli and must be altered i. You see with what reluctance I part with you, though I believe it is time I should ask 3'our pardon for so much trouble 2." At first sight it would appear that Hume, while flattered by Hutcheson's notice, was somewhat impatient of his criticism, except upon points of prudence. Yet it is also true that Hutcheson's few suggestions, though not used in the Treatise on Human Nature, germinated in his mind, and led to additions in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, which was published after Hutcheson's death, and this is the more re- markable both because Hume himself considered it to " contain his philosophical sentiments and principles," and also because, as a rule, it is little more than an abridged summary of the earlier work. In the March of the following year, Hume follow^s up his acquaintance with Hutcheson, by the request contained in the following letter. " NiNEWELLS, March 4t/i, 1740. " Dear Sir, You will find the good nature and friendly disposition which I have experienced in you, is like to occasion you more trouble ; and 'tis very happy that the same good nature which occasions the trouble, will incline you to excuse it. Since I saw you I have been very busy in correcting and finishing the Discourse concerning Morals which you perused ; and I flatter myself, that the alterations I have made have improved it very much, both in point of prudence and Philosophy. I shall set out to London in three weeks or a month, with an intention of publishing it. The bookseller, who printed the fii-st two volumas, is very willing to engage for this ; and he tells me that the sale of the first two volumes, though not very quick, yet it improves. I have no acquaintance among these folks, and very little skill in making bargains. There are, therefore, two favours, I must ask of you, viz. to tell me what copy-money I may reasonably expect for one edition of a thousand of this volume, which will make a four shillings 1 Treatise, lit' supra, pp. 478—9, ^ Burton's Hume, ut supni, i. pp. 112 — 115. 120 LITERARY WOllK DURING THE GLASGOAV PERIOD. Look : and, if yon know any honest man in this trade, to send me a letter of recommendation to him, that I may have the chance of more than one to bargain with. 'Tis with much reluctance I ask this last favour, the' I know your authority will go a great way to make the matter easy for me. I am sensible that the matter is a little delicate. Perhaps you may not care to recommend, even to a bookseller, a book that may give offence to religious people. Perhaps you may not think it calculated for public sale. I assure you, therefore, that I shall not take it the least amiss, if you refuse me. I shall only say, with regard to the first article, that the book is pretty much altered since you saw it, and tho' the clergy be always enemys to innovators in Philosophy, yet I do not think they will find any great matter of oftence in this volume. On the contrary, I shall be disappointed, if impartial judges be not much pleased with the soundness of my Morals. I have sent you the Conclusion as I have altered it, that you may see I desire to keep on good terms even with the strictest and most rigid. You need not return this copy, unless you point out any passage which you think it proper for me to alter^." Hutcheson in the kindness of his heart went over and returned this MS., erasing the words " both our s'elfishness and pride " in the first sentence of the last paragraph of the Treatise, which reads as follows in the MS.: "The same system may help us to form a just notion of our happiness as well as the dignity of Virtue, and may interest every principle of our nature, both our selfishness and pride, in the embracing and cherishing this noble quality'^" Hume continues his letter b}' saying, " My bookseller has sent ]Mr Smith a copy of my book, which I hope he has received, as well as 3'our letter. I have not yet heard what he has done with the abstract, perhaps you have. I have got it printed in London, liut not in the Works of the Learned, there having been an article with regard to my book, somewhat abusive, printed in that work, before I sent up the abstract^." Both Burton and Mr Rae, the biographer of Adam Smith, agree in thinking that this refers to the future economist, who had just been appointed to a Snell exhibition at Oxford, but was probably at this time at home in Kirkcaldy^ From 1 Hume MSS., Library, Eoyal Society of Ediuburgh. - Hume MSS. ^ Burton's Hume, lit supra, i. pp. 109 — 111. ■» Burton's Hume, i. p. 116; Eae's !>?/ A^_ '^Glasgow, 1742: 2n(l Ed. 1749 : 3nl 17:)2: 1704. N.B. There is the following Note in Foulis's Catalogue of Books, " The two first books by Professor Moor, and the rest by Dr Francis Hutcheson'." Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria, Ethices et JurisprudenfiaTl^I^Tralis' EJenient(i amtinens, Lihri Tres. Glasgow, 1742 : 2n(l Edition ["auctior et cuK'iidatior " (see p. 115)], 1745: 3rd, 1755. Rotterdam, 1745. Strasburg, 1772. Dublin, 1787. The same translated into English and published as A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy in Three Books, containing the Elements of Ethics and the Law of Nature. Glasgow, 1747: 2nd Edition, 1753: 3rd, 1764: 4th, 1772. Metaphysicae Synopsis Ontologiam et Pneumatologiam complectens. 1 Notices and Documents Illustrative of the Literary History of Glasgow, p. 49. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS. 145 Glasgow, 1742: 2nd Edition, 1744: 3rd, 1749: 4th, 175G : 5th, 1762 : 6th, 1774. Strasburg, 1772. A System of Moral Philosophy in Three Books, written by the late Francis Hutclieson, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philo- sophy in the University of Glasgoiu. PahlisJied from the original MS. by his son Francis Hutclieson, &c. Glasgow, 1755. Logicce Compendium, &.c. Glasgow, 1756: 2nd Edition (" Pra^fixa est Dissertatio de Philosophiac Origine, ej usque inventoribus aut exeultoribus praecipuis "), 1759: 5th, 1764, 1772. Strasburg, 1772. Perhaps a clearer proof of Hutcheson's popularity than the foregoing dry enumeration of dates will be found in the fact that Foulis' Catalogue records eight publications for the year 1772 and of these no less than five are editions of various works by Hutclieson. It may possibly be of interest to record the published price of some of these books. The first edition of the Essay on the Passions was sold in London at 5s. 5d., the Dublin edition at 2 " British Shillings " ; Foulis' third edition, "fine" copies 2s. Qd., "common" Is. 2d. Foulis' "common" copies of the Inquiry were also Is. 2d., the "fine" ones being 2s. Sd. The System cost 15s., the reprint of the Burnet Correspondence (Foulis) " fine " copies Is. 2d., " common " 9d. and the Oratio Tnauguralis 9d.^. 1 Mem. Glas., ut supra. S. H. 10 CHAPTER VIII. HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. The whole tenour of Hutcheson's life produces a vivid impression of the power of his personality. He was one of the rare spirits who exercise a gracious influence over those they meet. His ideal of life was high, and his exposition of it, alike by word and deed, made both friends and students desirous of following his example. In Scotland he introduced — or rather revived — a spirit of culture and broadmindedness, and at the same time his own character was a living exemplar of lofty aims and noble aspirations. Therefore it is, that a distinct and definite influence is traceable to his personal magnetism, beyond that of most other thinkers and writers. The word that was spoken and, at the same time, lived, was the true vehicle in which he clothed his ideal ; and, to this, his writings were of merely secondary importance. What he wrote seems to have an accidental character. All his works are mere obiter dicta, some " hastily written and published without his knowledge," and others — such as the System and Compendium Logicae — he does not appear to have considered worthy of publication. With him Philosophy was essentially living and organic, it was an enthusiasm for the ideal, and as such, was always active expression and endeavour, always free and fresh, and not to be stereotyped in the printed book. In fact, he shared with Shaftesbury the Stoic conception of Philosophy as the " Art of Life " ; and under the analogy of the arts, which so pow^erfully dominated the outlook of both, Hutcheson recognised that Philosophy, being an art, cannot be taught, and all that can be done is to show right examples. Just as ^Esthetic culture HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. 147 grows out of the study of masterpieces, so he endeavoured to " teach morality," by exhibiting a gallery of the world's heroes, giving in place of a metaph3^sic of ethics, a cult of hero-worship. In this his quick sympathy with what was noble made his subject near and living, while his eloquence fired the imagination of all who came in contact with him. Thus he understood teaching — partly, from his general position, as culture by fomili- arity with the most perfect originals ; partly, perhaps, through a personal peculiarity, he needed an actual audience. The " reading public " was too vague and also too cold to fire his ^ enthusiasm as a writer, and, therefore, from all that one can / r* gather, his books are merely skeleton outlines of his real teaching. It was the power of this personal teaching that made his fame in Scotland, and that left permanent traces upon the education and thought of the country. Such an influence is difficult, if not impossible, to deal with. It remains apart from the books written by the man who exerts* it ; from contemporary evidence it is recognised as real at the time, yet in looking back from an interval it will be found to have been absorbed and assimilated, so that but few instances of its existence can be isolated and exhibited. How this influence operated, and how Hutcheson himself so lived to make his life his strongest argument, may perhaps be faintly gathered from the account already given of the main facts of his various activities ; and it is to be regretted that the information avail- able still leaves the data all too scanty. Though Hutcheson's literary expression of his views was altogether secondary to the purely personal one, still it exerted a considerable power outside the more favoured circle that he addressed by word of mouth — ^just as the sermons of a great preacher carry weight primarily as delivered, with all the power of oratory and religious accessories of time and place, and _^ secondarily as printed in book form. Such a comparison too / may be less inapt, when it is remembered that Hutcheson was, / before all else, a preacher of morals, or as he himself would I have said, of philosophy. This aspect of his character forces a | comparison, or rather a contrast, between his writings and those j of his greater contemporary, Butler. Hutcheson, nominally a ,' 10—2 148 HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. Professor, was in reality a preacher in the University ; and it was in this character that his influence was most widely felt ; while that of his books was of less importance. Butler, on the other hand, though a preacher by profession, has exerted a vastly greater power by his writings than by his Sermons as actually delivered — Hutcheson's influence in fact passed directly ' into men ; Butler's remained in his books. To estimate Hutcheson's published works it is necessary to set him in his due historical perspective and especially to trace his relations to Shaftesbury and to note the attitude of both to the problems of the age. Though Shaftesbury laid great claims to cosmopolitanism his Philosophy was, in reality, called forth by an English need ; and, to say the need was English, is to implicitly affirm that it was an ethical one, and consequently the prevailing character of Shaftesbury's Philosophy is ethical. Further, like every system called forth by a national need, it begins by a series of revolts against tendencies either exaggerated so as to be hurtful, or on the other hand harmless in practice but erroneous in theory. In the first place Shaftesbury lived at a time when the more extreme tendencies of Puritanism had become exhausted. The ideal of a Theocracy or God-governed state was impregnated with the "subjectivity" of the Reformation, and only the iron hand of Cromwell had mitigated the confusion of contradictory interpretations of the will of Heaven. In the politico-religions movement of the Civil Wars there was an inevitable lack of unity. Even in the revolt against oppressive religious and civil enactments, there was no fixed policy amongst the supporters of the Parliament, as to how far the revolt should extend, and when the time came for political reconstruction the views of the various sectaries were still more diverse. Carlyle has shown Puritanism as heroic — " the last heroic age " — " because it had declared war to the death with quackeries and knaveries, and would have neither truce nor treaty with these ; and went forth flame-crowned, as with bared sword, and called the Most High to witness that it could not endure these \" This strength of a nation's uprising, " by wager of battle, is the ^ Life and Letters of Oliver Crormvell, vol. i. p. 72. HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. 149 measure of all worth V' from which the " lightnings " of Carlyle's eloquence make a nimbus for the spirit of Puritanism. Side by side with the genius of idealised Puritanism are many less heroic spirits, forming part of the broad Puritan revolt. The combination of all these appeared one tendency to the thinkers of the age, who rushed to the opposite extreme after the Restoration. Now Puritanism, in its most thoroughgoing forms, had changed the religious and social life of Britain. It had banished Beauty and martyrized the whole sensuous man. In place of these, it gave a profound religious and mystic nearness to the world to come, towards which the present life is a "weary pilgrimage," but in which the pilgrim is always a soldier, either actually at war or merely resting between two battles. This state is necessary owing to the magnitude of the opposing forces. Everything is at war with the elect, and the Christian life is one long vista of battlefields — not merely metaphorically but in many cases actually, when Puritanism was forced to send its Ironsides to destroy utterly '■ root and branch " the licence represented by roistering malignants. One cannot but admire the readiness of the conscientious Puritan to follow the guidance of an idea and the stern unbending tenacity of purpose arising out of a religious enthusiasm, "with its undying wrath at evil... its spirit of indignation against every form of oppression and injustice, especially when they touch the religious life of the individual-." To such a sj)irit the world is not merely coupled with the flesh and the devil, it is both flesh and devil ; some- thing to which the soldier-soul is alien and hostile. Hence some of the Puritans used the world as an enemy's country, to be plundered and despoiled, but never enjoyed; for enjoyment was a snare of the enem3\ Therefore, however much it is to be regretted, one cannot help admitting the severe logic of the destruction of pictures, statuary, church decorations of all kinds, laces, fine textile work and historic architecture. Such things were dangerous and therefore better burnt. Thus the whole 1 Heroes and Hero Worship, p. 132. 2 The Evolution of Religion, Gifford Lectures, St Andrews, 1890 — 2, by Edward Caird, LL.D., D.C.L., voL ii. pp. 81, 304. 150 HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. spirit of a certain section of the Puritan movement was at war with Beaut}' and enjoyment. It was wholly ascetic ; and not inerely inartistic but hostile to Art. Therefore a first national need to be answered by Shaftesbury's Philosophy was the ,j protest against the unloveliness of Puritanism, to relieve life of its predominant greyness and restore colour and harmony of outline — after the Restoration of the dynasty must come the restoration of the graces of life. There are several aspects of the protest against unloveliness of life. The need for a counter doctrine to the condemnation of the aesthetic standpoint by ascetics goes back far beyond the Puritanism of the seventeenth century. The cry for mortifica- tion of the flesh had found its way into the early Church, possibly as a relic of Neo-Pythagoreanism, and had continued through the long line of hermits into the Monasteries, and again on to the various Protestant Churches. " Through Sense came corruption and through the mortification of sense, alone, can the corruption be purged " seems to have been the general tendency of religious history. Hence almost every fresh re- vival and purification of the Churches finds the Senses lowered and with them the Esthetic feelings. It is this long-standing campaign against Beauty, in the Mediseval and Modern World, that gives more permanence to the protest against it by Shaftesbury, than it could have had, were it only directed against the asceticism of Puritanism. Another aspect of the protest against unloveliness of life is wider than the controversy with the asceticism of Puritanism. Hitherto Art had been a chance visitor to Great Britain ; it was an imported, not yet a native product. Though the country had shared in the general revival, originated by the Renaissance, in renewed culture, freedom of thought and material advantages, the progress of the Arts had lagged behind. From the time of Henry VIII., all the artists of any renown were foreigners, either refugees from their own countries or tempted by offers of patronage. Thus in the reign of Henry VIII. we have Holbein and Lucas Cornellius ; in that of Mary, Joas Van Cleeve and Sir Antonio More of Utrecht ; under Elizabeth, Zucch'ero, Lucas de Heere, Cornelius Ketler, HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. 151 Garrard of Bruges ; under James I., Paul Vansomer of Antwerp, Cornelius Jansen, Daniel Mytens. Charles I. was a munificent patron of Art and his Court was celebrated as including Van Dyck, Rubens, Henry Stienwyck the younger, Cornelius Polen- berg, Abraham Diepenbeck, besides a host of other foreigners of inferior merit. Naturally, Art was in slight request under Cromwell, when the Protector himself was able to acquire the Raphael Cartoons for £300 and a Holy Family by Van Dyck for £40'. If Painting was despised during the Commonwealth, it was degraded after the Restoration, and the artists of the Court of Charles II.— such as Simon Varelst and Antonio Verrio — would be best passed over in silence — were it not for the names of Lely and the Van-der-Veldes. With the accession of William III. came a fresh troop of foreigners, amongst whom were Kneller, Godfrey Schalken and Marco and Sebastian Ricci. Plainly Britain was neglectful of Art. Amongst so many strangers there was the merest sprinkling of native painters, and none of these of great importance. The Olivers, the Coopers — all miniature painters — George Jameson — "the Van Dyck of Scotland," John Hoskins, William Dobson and Robert Streater were little more than imitators. In fact, so far Art was an exotic, and as yet the work of the Renaissance was incomplete. Not only must the appreciation of Beauty be f\ restored, but the cultivation of it in Art required to be made indigenous — indeed both expressions are merely variants of the same historical fact; if Beauty were appreciated Art would have been native to the country and vice versa. Therefore con-, currently with the defence of Beauty must come the last step of the Renaissance, the awakening of the country to the value of) Art and hence the formation of a National School of painting". | Yet another aspect of the revolt against Puritanism was the demand for a return to the Literature and thought of the past. The more extreme Puritans had condemned all non- Biblical Literatures, in reaction against the "Paganised 1 Anecdotes of Paintinij in Enrjland, by H. Walpole, 1820, ii. 137, 138. " It is interesting to note that Shaftesbury, in his Letter concerning the Art or Science of Design, predicts the formation of a national Art in "United Britain." Of. Fowler's Shaftesbury, pp. 60, CI. 152 HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. Christianity" of the Mediseval Church. As the Children of Israel were the historical prototypes of the religious soldiers of the Parliament, so the Old Testament was their favourite reading. All Literature, outside the Bible, was " profane," and to the more thoroughgoing sectaries it could teach nothing. In this banishment of pagan thought. Classical writings were of course included ; and so England was in danger of losing much that had only just been learnt after the Revival , of Learning. The Greek ideal of life especially was not merely incomprehensible, but was also condemned in the strongest terms by the Puritans. After the Civil Wars there was no place left for it. It was heathen and all the more reprehensible because its authors were civilized and not savages. Yet, though the yearning for the reposeful Beauty of a well-ordered simplicity may be temporarily repressed, it breaks forth again all the more insistently, after the ecstatic enthusiasms of a faith that over-rides the world and man. The Greek spirit takes its revenge in demanding a more unquestioning desire for its supreme calm — a calm that can never come to the modern world in its fulness, for it has been always sought as a reaction after undue spiritual exaltation or sensuous excitement. After a one-sided activity people long for the duly ordered activity of the whole man as one unity, with each part or faculty of his nature performing its own proper function — to to. uvtov irprmeLv, as Plato happily expresses it. Therefore with the reinstatement of Beauty must come the parallel reinstatement of the fairest expression of it, primarily in the Greek life, and in a lesser degree in Greek Art. In the second place another clamorous British need was that of a reply to the prevailing selfishness of life and the reiterated demands of Self- Love as the only Ethical principle. Not to go further back than the seventeenth century, Hobbes I had denied the objective reality of morality, giving in return no basis, save a subjective convention. Prior to this convention every man fought for his own hand, and the ultimate result of Hobbes' theory was the definition of practical life as an Ishmael- state, in which everyone claimed all that he had power to hold. In this view, too, life was a battle, in which the fighter strove. HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. 153 not for any spiritual end, but merely for his own personal good, under whatever shape he had conceived it. Self-Love, in fact, was not merely the " master-passion," as Pope later charac- terized it, but also the one primary synthesis of desires, from which all others, though apparently independent, had been originally derived. These views created a great sensation. " The answers to , the Leviathan alone would form a library ^ " ; Warburton saysl i that " the Philosopher of Malmesbury was the terror of the last! ] age, as Tindal and Collins had been of this. The Press sweat ' with controversy, and every young Churchman militant would needs try his arms in thundering upon Hobbes's steel cap-." In this controvers}^ especially after the Restoration, the " Church Militant " made certain concessions and a tendency gradually became manifest to reinforce the claims of religion, by laying emphasis on future rewards and punishments. Thus, to the Hobbist, men were moral upon purely selfish grounds, through dread of the punishments of the State ; while to the Restora- tion Divines they were moral through the greater dread of eternal sufferings. In either case the " soldier " was a mere mercenary, fighting "the good fight" for the sake of the pay, in the one case to be taken hedonistically in the present ; and in the other, in the future" ; the latter being but a system of deferred payment ; as the matter has been profanely exjJressed in modern commercial phraseology, as a " fire insurance policy." Against both views Shaftesbury contended with vehemence — against the latter especially. It was not so much the doctrine itself, that aroused his indignation, as some of its implied consequences, which Mr Leslie Stephen has generalised y as " the blasphemy of God, the World and Man^." This view i blasphemed God, because " representing Him as angry with His ' 1 Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philoso2}hij, Sir James Mackintosh, p. 133. - The Divine Legation of Moses, Books iv. — vi. , Preface, Works, iv. p. 31. Cf. Hobbes, by G. Croom Eobertson, pp. 207—222. 3 Shaftesbury's 3Ioralists, Part 2, § 3. ^ Article on Shaftesbury's Characteristics in Eraser's Magazine, January, 1873, vol. VII. New Series, p. 88. 154 HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. creatures, as punishing the innocent for the guilty, and appeased by the sufferings of the virtuous." It " paints the world in the darkest colours, in order to throw a future world into relief" " But, most of all, it blasphemes man." " In its zeal to vindicate God, it pronounced all our own qualities to be essentially vile. It gave our virtues to God, and left us merely the refuse of selfish- ness and sensuality \" This triple blasphemy roused Shaftesbury to the bitterest indignation. His main polemic against self-love is an integral part of his system, but the violence of his attack upon the consequences, drawn from the hedonistic conclusions of the current theology, may well be isolated from his general standpoint. Such a view, he holds, is fit only for slaves, not for free men, much less for the moral exquisite with whom he generally deals-. So far from being an argument in favour of Morality, it is absolutely " fatal " to its very existence^ ; for a virtue that needs reward is not worth rewarding^ With regard to the subordinate position, that punishment is valuable, as a deterrent from vicious conduct, he is even more emphatic. /'Those who have no better a reason for being honest than the fear of a gibbet or a jail — I should not, I confess, much covet their company or acquaintance... If a saint had no other virtue than what was raised in him by the same objects of reward and punishment in a more distant state ; I know not whose love or esteem he might gain besides ; but for my own part, I should never think him worthy ofmine^" "There is no more of recti- tude in a person thus reformed [i.e. by fear of punishment] than there is of meekness or gentleness in a tiger strongly chained, or innocence or sobriety in a monkey under the discipline of the whip"." Both these forms of Egoism have several consequences. Practical life to them is essentially atomic, each pleasure-giving or pain-bearing state has value in itself as a component part of 1 Fraser's Magazine, 1873, p. 88. ~ Moralists, Tart 2, § 3, ^ Inquiry, Book i. Part 3, § 3. ■* Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour, Part 2, § 3. 5 Ibid. Part 3, § 4. •■' Inquiry, Book i. Part 3, § 3. The relation of Shaftesbury's Philosophy to the religious thought of the time is fully dealt with in Die Fhilosophie des Graf en von Shafteshury von Dr Gideon Spicker, Frihurg, 1872, Erster Theil. HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. 155 the mass of satisfactions, either pi-esent or future. Further, just as each state stands alone, so each man is a distinct practical atom, hedonistically isolated. Thus the tendency of both views was eminently individualistic. Again, to each of them life is purely mechanical. As a last result everything is to be interpretable in hedonistic terms, and as such knows nothing of Teleology. The practical world is pure mechanism, or at best susceptible of dynamic explanation. The causal nexus — as efficient cause — rules all actions, and therefore when the logical conclusion is boldly drawn, as by Hobbes, nothing remains but the most complete Determinism. Teleology finds no place a)nid the rigour of an universal mechanism. Such then were the two main problems confronting Shaftes- bury — the need for protests against the neglect of Beauty and against the prevailing selfishness of the current views of life. It is difficult to determine which need he felt to be the more imperative, and the question is of some importance for the right understanding of his point of view, since his double answer , contains inconsistent elements, and the ascertaining of the, priority of one of the two problems, will explain a corresponding preponderance of one element, and its consequences, in the solution. Shaftesbury's whole outlook and personal peculiarities tend to show that the Renaissance of Beauty and Art was prior in order of time if not of importance. With a double question to face he had only one way open to seek the answer, namely by a return to the past. As a lover of Greek Literature and the Fine Arts he found little, if any guidance, in the works of his contemporaries, and therefore his inclination and training forced him back to the Greek world for inspiration. Now Greek thought only gave him aid towards the restoration of the appreciation of Beauty, and therefore it is that of the two problems, this is first to be dealt with. Such a return to the ancient world naturally suggests a comparison with the Cambridge Platonists, who also sought old world inspiration against the " heresies " of Hobbes. Yet the diflference is no less marked than the resemblance. The whole force of the position of the Cambridge Platonists depends upon the validity of theii* identification of the ethical teaching of 156 HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. Hobbes with that of the Sophists. Plato destroyed the So- phistic position, therefore his arguments are of equal force against that of Hobbes. Consequently much of the work of the Cambridge Platonists is little more than a restatement of certain arguments of Plato's. It is not even that the Philosophy of Hobbes is confronted by Plato's system as a whole, but rather that isolated parts of his polemic against the Sophists are quoted ; since Hobbes and the Sophists represent identical tendencies, and what was efficacious against the latter must, ipso facto, hold good against the former. Quite apart from the weakness involved in the identification of the two tendencies, there is the further want of power in reproducing Plato piece- meal. This was avoided by Shaftesbury. He does not borrow the mere arguments or even the spirit of Plato, but rather the broad outlines of the Hellenic spirit—" the mind of Plato is not to be exhibited by a Chinese catalogue, but is to be appre- hended by an original mind in the exercise of its original power*." To reinstate Beauty in the modern world is to re- produce the Greek life, and show it as it was in outward mani- festation and inner meaning. Shaftesbury was unable to win his way to a full comprehen- sion of the Hellenic Ideal, yet he saw it in many aspects. It gave him primarily a great peace for the existing warfare between the world and man, and relieved things of sense both from degradation on the one hand and from over-valuation on the other. In Great Britain, before his time, the outer world had been only partially reinstated. At the Baconian revival it had been opened up to all the early scientific enquiries con- nected with utility, but beyond utility remained Beauty and Art, both of which were far from being indigenous. To naturalise both Shaftesbury gives rather an sesthetic cult than a Philosophy proper. He endeavours to restore the Greek "worldliness" by reviving the conviction of the nearness of man and Nature. To the true Greek, in the best days of his history, there was no breach between the two, and Beauty was an integral part of himself and his environment. Natural and artistic Beauty went hand in hand, each expressing and supple- menting the other. Nature was half-human and man was an ^ Emcrson''s Works, George Bell and Sons, i. p. 296. HELLENIC AND PHILANTHKOPIC IDEALS. 157 artist to his finger-tips, not merely reproducing his ideals in material form, but in the institutions of the state and especially in life. This was the highest art— namely that whose vehicle was man himself. It was not only an ideal of a lovely environ- ment ; but, further, this environment was the background for a beautiful and self-complete life. Thus there is a rhythm rumiing through all expressions of Greek life, at once a harmony in variety, never allowed to dissipate itself in vagueness but always centralised. The ruling ideas throughout are the laws and restraints of artistic expression ; so that together with a com- plete centralisation there is, at the same time, perfect freedom — " each alike was Greek, alike was free." Just because the key- note of action was a regard for the Beautiful, everything worked under aesthetic rules, subject to law, yet without consciousness of restraint. What was inwardly ideal, materialised itself outwardly ; and the outer world was idealised by a spiritual interpretation. Thus the two spheres, so sharply distinguished in the modern world, each interpenetrated the other, and that too automatically. There was no duality, only an all-pervading unity. This unity was not individualistic but universal — the generality or breadth, which Mr Pater called "the supreme characteristic of the Hellenic ideal'," is the unity of the various parts of man's nature and further of man with the world. It is a complex wholeness of differences, never sufficiently accen- tuated to become ojoposites; and therefore the artistic synthesis has neither thesis nor antithesis, it is rather a series of graduated transitions. The result of this unity is a " blitheness " of life, a wide serenity, a reposeful calm. Life is satisfying like any other perfect work of art, executed under the canons of a severe simplicity, in which nothing is superfluous, nothing redundant. This " everlasting calm " of the highest Greek Art is based upon the wholeness of the many-sided Greek life. Each individual falls into his proper place spontaneously, so that the state or a group of individuals or a single life is a work of art, graceful and artistically satisfying throughout. Underlying the Greek breadth and calm is the ruling idea 1 The Renaissance, p. 226. 158 HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. of a Cosmos, in which each part performs its proper function and works organically for the good of the whole. This fitness for its proper task is the basis for the due performance which, when carried out in unison, becomes the excellence of both whole and part. Such graduated excellences of function give the calm satisfaction of balance, symmetry, proportion, order, harmony ; all of which are expressions for various relations within any given Cosmos. These ideas are of great importance to Shaftesbury, since they form the basis of his general cult of Beauty. The Universe as a whole is a Cosmos, so also is human life. There- fore all the due performances of the different functions manifest innumerable harmonies ; the appreciation of which was less a matter of argument than of insight. Harmony, excellence, TO Kokov were everywhere ; and he, who was rightly constituted and trained, could not fail to experience the joyous emotions, due to this universal loveliness. All that was needed was the right point of view ; given that, appreciation was inevitably rewarded. Shaftesbury was much perplexed for want of a terminology. As a man of fashion and keen critic of " dry-as-dust " academ- icism, he could not perpetrate the barbarisms of Cudworth, in loading his essays with Greek terms, so he is in want of a word to express the idea of a Cosmos ; he most often uses " System," which Butler afterwards made so celebrated, " Q^conomy " or " Whole and Parts\" " Whatever things have order, the same have unity of design, and concur in one, are parts of one Whole, or are in themselves intire Systems . . . Now in this, which we call the Universe, whatever the perfection may be of any particular systems; or whatever single parts may have Pro- portion, Unity or Form within themselves ; yet if they are not united, all in general, in one System, but are in respect of one another, as the driven sands, or clouds or breaking waves ; then — there being no Coherency in the.whole — there can be inferred no order, no proportion, and consequently no project or design I" " Nothing," he continues, " is more strongly imprinted on our "~-A 1 These terms were derived from the later Stoics: vide infra, ch. xiv. --^"^ 2 Moralists, Part 2, § 4. HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. 159 minds, or more closely interwoven with our souls than the idea or sense of Order and Proportion... What a difference there is between Harmony and Discord ! between composed and ordered motion, and that which is ungoverned and accidental ! between the regular and uniform pile of some architect and a heap of sand or stones ! and between an organiz'd body and a mist or cloud driven by the winder' "The Ballauce of Europe, of ^ trade, of power is strictly sought after, while few have heard ofl the ballance of the passions, or thought of holding these scales even. Few are acquainted with this province, or knowing in these affairs. But were we more so (as this Inquiry would make us) we should then see Beauty and Decorum here, as , well as elsewhere in Nature ; and the order of the Moral j World would equal that of the natural'." Elsewhere he writes, " Knowing as you [i.e. Palemon] are, well knowing and experienced in all the degrees and orders of Beauty, in all the mysterious charms of the particular forms^ you rise to what is more general; and, with a larger heart and mind more com- prehensive, you generously seek that which is highest in the kind. Not captivated by the lineaments of a fjiir ftice or the well-drawn proportions of a human body, you view the life itself, and embrace rather the mind that adds the lustre and renders chiefly amiable. Nor is the enjoyment of such a single Beauty sufficient to satisfy such an aspiring soul. It seeks how to combine more Beautys, and by what Coalition of these to form a beautiful society. It views communitys, friendships, relations, dutys ; and considers by what Harmony of particular minds the general harmony is composed^" This excellence of the Cosmos is fundamentally artistic ; and it is from this side that Shaftesbury speaks of " the consummate Art exhibited through all the works of Nature. Our weak eyes, helped by mechanick Art, discover in these works a hidden scene of w^onders ; worlds within worlds, of infinite minuteness, though, as to Art, equal to the greatest, and pregnant with more wonders than the most discerning sense, joined with the greatest Art, or the acutest reason, can penetrate or unfolds" The whole universe is the masterpiece of an infinite artist, and it is 1 Moralists, Part 2, % i.^^ ^ Ibid. 3 Ibid. Part 1, § 3. * Ibid. Part 3, § 1. 160 HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. sharply defined as the perfect example of the Greek Ideal, being, like all art, sublimely simple in conception without redundancy in execution, even to the minutest particular^ Shaftesbury's whole S3^stem revolves round the idea of a Cosmos, beautiful and perfect, in which there is room, not merely for natural Beauty, but also for loveliness of life, which is the higher type of the two. This restoration of the Hellenic ideal of life is Shaftesbury's reply to the banishment of beauty by the Puritans. As already stated, it is less a theory than a cult ; indeed, appealing, as it does, to the aesthetic sense, it tends to be exclusive, or rather it will not condescend to argue with those who have failed to realise its conditions of attaining to the right point of view. But it is one thing to protest and quite another to maintain the validity of one's protest, and Shaftesbury laboured under the disadvantage of requiring a return to an impossible state. The Greek life was a phase in the history of humanity not its goal. To regain it would be to reproduce all the multifarious conditions of the Age of Pericles, natural, social, racial, linguistic and economic. This would be as gigantic a task as a fresh creation ex nihilo. The reason that the way is barred for any complete return to the Greek life is well characterized by Mr Pater, when he said, " The Greek mind had advanced to a peculiar stage of self-reflexion, but was careful never to pass beyond it. In Greek thought, the ' lordship of the soul ' is recognised ; that lordship gives authority and divinity to human hands and eyes and feet ; inanimate nature is thrown into the back-ground. But just here Greek thought finds its happy limits" Even amongst the later Greeks this happy limit was^ passed ; and therefore much more had modern life gone beyond it. Further, there could be no real return. The devotion of the Greeks to youth for the sake of its grace and beauty had passed with the youthfulness of the world, and any attempted revival of it is as out of place, as age, enamelled and tight-laced, dancing in short-frocks with school girls. The modern woi-ld has succeeded to a heritage of problems, which leave life divided into sharply defined and often contradictory parts, for which ^ Advice to an Author, Part 1, § 3. ^ The Renaissance, p. 218. HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. 161 reconciliations must be found ; and in its complexity such solutions present no small difficulty. Therefore the unity that was unquestioned amongst the Greeks can only come to us with toil and pain. Thus it is that the spontaneity of the Greek ideal is unattainable, and the progress of time stands for the flaming sword that for ever bars humanity from this lost Eden. If Shaftesbury had followed out his renaissance of the idea of a Cosmos throughout, he would have been able to deduce a system of Ethics in several directions as the excellence of human action, and thereby have endeavoured to confute the " Selfish " moralists \ Yet the problem he had to face can'ied him beyond the Hellenic outlook, to which man played his part in the theatre of the Cosmos without a desired precedence over the other non-human actors. From the esthetic point of view, man was seen from the outside, and the question was less why he acted in a certain way, than hoiu he acted, and, further, hoiu his acts harmonized in a general scheme. The Greeks had avoided abstruse introspection and casuistic analysis of motive ; what concerned them was ro e/jyoy— man's deed, and this should be excellent. As Dryden expresses it, the diapason of universal harmony, '^ closes full in man " ; there is no jarring note in the human part of the chorus nor any too obtrusive minor key. Now hedonistic sj^stems had passed this limit— just as if a child had broken all the strings of an instrument, then twisted them together, and expected harmony by a simple process of eliminating, not overcoming, differences. Hence, when Shaftes- bury stands face to face with the second great national need — the necessity for a reply to the prevailing selfishness in life and theory — he finds that the Greek ideal can no longer help him, since his opponents had already passed beyond it. Man's " lordship " in the world had been questioned and to assert it he had long been at war with the world, so that the old alliance had gone never to return. Still the problem confronted Shaftesbury, and some solution was required. Fortunately he lived just at the end of a period of historical anachronisms. If poets and painters had found ' Of. Hutcheson's "third period" in chapter xi. S. H. 11 162 HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. uothing incongruous in mixing Greek sages with Jewish Apostles, it was unlikely that Shaftesbury would find any in- congruity in blending a precept of exclusively Christian Ethics into a Greek ideal of a cosmos. Thus the maxim " Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" becomes the root of Shaftesbury's reply to the Egoist. To selfishness he opposes unselfishness, to Egoism, Benevolence. To the pagan conception of the life beautiful, he adds the Christmas message of " Good-will to men." That is — he is first forced to break into his system of harmony, in deference to the spirit of his age, then he endeavours to heal the breach by introducing an altogether foreign concep- tion. Nature and God are still contemplated each as expressed, both are viewed from the outside, while man, on the contrary, is to be seen from within in his character or " temper." This is the same inconsistency as if an artist painted all the persons of a group, except one, in the usual way and that one as seen by the Rontgen Rays ! Obviously the aesthetic and ethical views were in conflict; and Shaftesbury, by identifying the two, ignores the difference. " Benevolence is beautiful, and all beauty in human action is due to a benevolent disposition. Yet even here the inconsistency is. only concealed, for " the good kind affections " are no longer spontaneous. The harmony of Beauty is reached only indirectly through a step in the dark, altogether outside the view of gestheticism. Another difficulty consists in the manner of apprehension of moral states. This is to be intuitive. Now, if the rightness of an affection be the object of immediate per- ception, it is dealt with in isolation, and the whole cosmic theory is lost with its harmony and symmetry, and we have ethical atomism ; on the other hand, if the act is to be approved of, in the long series of its effects, the intuitive side of the theory must go by the board ; and with it Shaftesbury's main defence against the Hobbist. Such difficulties were concealed by the fact that the ideal of the comely life was rather a cult than a theory, while in the Benevolent interpretation of it, argumentation preponderates — the first Shaftesbury had borrowed, the second was more his own, and besides it was more necessary to defend, owing to the HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. 163 exigencies of controversy. Further, he endeavoured to find a point of" union in showing the benevolent life as the beautiful life. Having already justified Beauty by appeal to the Esthetic sense, he then shows the man of good impulses — nature's gentle- man — and asks "Is not his life also beautiful?" Elsewhere, in dealing with Beauty, Shaftesbury is satisfied to show the - existence of harmonious and symmetrical relations, but in human character the mere existence of relations is not sufficient; they must be of a certain kind, namely dispositions of character that lead to the good of the "system" as a whole. Thus, in ^^^ ■ human character, there is to be a censorship, not required else- ^..^-^'^^ where. -j^o' The necessity for such censorship is, as far as possible, concealed, and the identification of the beautiful with the benevolent life is skilfully made by directing the reader's atten- tion to the Harmony of the benevolent character. First of all Shaftesbury clearly explains that what he calls goodness has to do exclusively with character or " temper." " That which is not done through any affection at all, makes neither Good nor 111 in the nature of that creature ; who, then, is only supposed good, when the good or ill of the System, to which he has relation, is the immediate object of some passion or affection moving him^" "Nothing therefore being properly either goodness or illness, in a creature, but what is natural temper ; a good creature is such a one as by the natural temper or bent of his affections is carried primarily and immediately, and not secondarily and accidentally, to Good and against 111 : and an ill creature is just the contrary — viz. one who is wanting in right affections, of force enough to carry him directly towards Good ; or who is carried by other affections to 111 and against Good. When in general all the affections or passions are suited to the Publick Good or Good of the SpOcies, as above mentioned, then is the natural temper intirely good'." Further, Shaftes"- bury distinguishes between isolated affections and the union of these in a good character, which is possessed of that sound and well-established Reason, " which alone constitutes a just affec- 1 Inquiry, Book i. Part 2, § 1. - Ibid. § 2. 11—2 IV 164 HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. tion, a uniform and steddy [sic] will and resolution^." Such a fixed character is that of a " rational being," who is able to attain to " virtue in itself" The following is Shaftesbury's account of the rise and scope of the public affections. " If any appetite or sense be natural, the sense of fellowship is the same. If there be anything of Nature in that affection, which is between the sexes, the affec- tion is certainly as natural towards the consequent offspring ; and so again between the offspring themselves, as kinsmen and companions, bred under the same discipline and oeconomy. And thus a clan or tribe is gradually formed ; a Public is recog- nised, and besides the pleasure found in social entertainment, language and discourse, there is so apparent a necessity for continuing this good correspondency and union, that to have no sense or feeling of this kind, no love of Country, Community, or anything in Common, would be the same as to be insensible, even of the plainest means of self-preservation, and most necessary condition of self-enjoyment... Universal good or the interest of the W07dd in general is a kind of remote Philo- sophical object. That greater community falls not easily under the eye"''. Nor is a national interest, or that of a whole people or body politick, so readily apprehended. In less parties, men may be intimately conversant and acquainted with one another. They can there better taste society, and enjoy the common good and interest in a more contracted publick. They view the whole compass and extent of their community, and see and know particularly whom 'tis they serve and to what end they associate and conspire. All men have naturally their share of this associating and combining principle : and they, who are of the sprightliest and most active faculties, have so large a share of it that, unless it be happily directed by right ReasQii, it can never find exercise for itself in so remote a sphere as that of the body politick at large. For, here, perhaps the thousandth part of those whose interests are concerned are scarce as much as known by sight. No visible band is formed, no strict alliance, but the conjunction is made with different 1 Inqutrii, Book i. Part 2, § 4. - Contrast Hutcheson's "second and third periods," chapters x. and si. HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. 165 persons, orders, and ranks of men, not sensibly, but tn idea, according to the general view or notion of a state or Common- wealth i." That " universal good is a kind of remote philosophical ' object " sufficiently differentiates Shaftesbury's Philanthropy from Stoic Cosmopolitanism. Even, in the eclectic form, in which Cicero reproduced the theory — for it must be remembered that "Tully" was a household word amongst people of culture during the first half of last century — the firmest bond of union was that amongst the Wise I The Stoic " citizenship of the world " was an ideal for the Philosopher and too much inclined to despise the rights and interests of the rest of mankind, mostly, if not all, fools : it was an abstract universal working downwards, yet failing to reach the particular : it was, to • borrow a phrase of Kant's, rational, not pathological, love. '^^^^ Shaftesbury's philanthropy, on the contrary, started from the ,n-< ,£r- family grouping of individuals ; and from this basis found it difficult to reach " the greater community that falls not easily under the eye," because it was founded on actual affection and love for tlie individual as such. Shaftesbury's expressions in favour of altruism are not to be understood in the sense that the " self-affections " are to be suppressed, though they are to be kept in bounds ; they are to be used to make the individual as efficient as possible for the service of the community. He is to be, from the Greek point of view, excellent throughout. From Shaftesbury's position, what he calls " self-affections," are to be held in trust for the public goodl The moral state of the individual is a fiduciary one, his nature, in itself a microcosm, might be com- pared to a joint-stock Company, which would be a " system," in Shaftesbury's sense, though sometimes, perhaps, not a very 1 Essriy on the Freedom of Wit and Ilnniour, Part 3, § 2. Of. Butler's \ Sermons, Oxford, p. 12. "Men are so much one body, that, in a peculiar ■ manner, they feel for each other, shame, sudden auger, resentment, prosperity, distress ; one or another or all of these, from the social nature in general, from Benevolence, upon the occasion of natural relation, protection, acquaintance, dependence — each of these being distinct cements of Society." - De Officiis, I. ch. xvii. * Inquiry, Book i. Part 2, § 2. 16G HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. "harmonious" one. A director's private advantage in any contract in which both he and the Company were concerned would correspond to the Self-affections, while the interests of the general body of Shareholders might be compared to the objects of the Public affections. ' Now as according to recent legal decisions in such a case, the Director is a trustee for the Shareholders, so the moral man uses his self-affections as a trustee for the community at large. Individual excellence is not an end-in-itself for the individual, and is only his end, rightly, in so far as it is serviceable to the community. Here then is a second censorship, since the Self-affections must be approved of by the Public ones, before resulting in right conduct; and, conversely, the Public stimulate the Self-affec- tions after the latter have been unreservedly approved. Obviously this is a refinement of the theory, and not a very stable one ; for the " immediate object of an affection " which is originally approved becomes the approval by the public affec- tions of a remote object of the self-affections — that is in fact the affection of an affection. Having explained the nature of affections towards the public good, and supplemented the pagan life by the Ethics of Philanthropy, it remains for Shaftesbury to make the two cohere together. This, as already hinted, is effected by ex- hibitinsf kind affections as excellent and also as instances of harmony and order. This excellent ethical condition is the "due ballance and counterpoise of the affections. In every different creature and distinct sex, there is a different and distinct order, set or suit of Passions, proportionable to the different order of life and different functions and capacities assigned to each. As the operations and effects are different, so are the springs and causes in each System. The inside work is fitted to the outward action and performance \" This same idea is developed under all the alternative expressions of union, order, symmetry and harmony — in the latter case by the simile of the lyre, which is in proper tune, each string ready to give due expression to its appropriate note of melody^. 1 Inquiry, Book ii. Part 2, § 1. ^ j^^i p^rt 1, § 3. HELLENIC AND PHILANTHROPIC IDEALS. 167 This symmetry of affection, then further, is beautiful. " No sooner," Shaftesbury says, "are human affections and passions discerned (and they are most of them as soon discerned as felt) ^ 4 than straight an inivard eye distinguishes, and sees the fair ^^if^^ and shapely, the amiable and admirable, apart from the ^^ deformed, the foul, the odious or the despicahleK" "Whoever has any impression of what we call gentility or politeness is already so acquainted with the decorum and grace of things that he will readily confess a pleasure and enjoyment in the very survey and contemplation of this kind. Now, if, in the way of polite pleasure, the study and love of Beauty be essential, the study and love of Symmetry and Order, on which Beauty depends must also be essential in the same respect... Should not this (one would imagine) be still the same case and hold equally as to the Mind ? Is there no natural tenour, tone or j.^ order of the passions or affections ? No Beauty or Deformity in this moral kind ? Will it not be found, in this respect, above all 'That what is beautiful is harmonious and pro- ^ portionable : What is harmonious and proportionable is true: J ^ presses himself very loosely, this is the general drift of the ^"^ Inquiry, and the ambiguity is occasioned by his interpreting ^ acts as signs or sj^mbols of character in others, and retaining the same form of expression, when speaking of the Moral Sense of the individual, applied to his own disposition. Though Hutcheson appears to have separated the objects of his Esthetic and Moral Senses, as a matter of fact, they are more closely related than the different kinds of Beauty, which Shaftesbury embraced under the province of his single sense. Beauty, understood as regularity or uniformity, has always with Hutcheson a precise reference to an end, conceived by some intelligent "designer"; and hence the engineer is his type of the producer of " Beauty " so called, rather than the Artist proper, as with Shaftesbury. Every ordered scheme of parts has relation to the idea of a Cosmos, in which it finds its proper place ; and, so the whole is to be interpreted in relation to the part or vice versa, as effects of the design of some intelligent agent. As Hutcheson expresses it: — " We see this confirmed __^^ by our constant experience, that regularit}^ never arises from any undesigned force of ours ; and from this we conclude, that wherever there is any regularity in the disposition of a system, capable of many other positions, there must have been Design in the Cause ; and the force of this evidence increases, ac- cording to the multiplicity of parts employed^" ..."The recurrence of any effect, oftener than the laws of hazard do determine, gives presimiption of Design ; and the combinations, which no undesigned force could give us reason to exjject, must necessarily prove the same ; and with superior probability, as the multitude of cases in which the contrary might possibly happen, surpass all the cases in which this could happen, which appears to be, in the simplest cases at least, as infinity does to unity"." In this way the regularity of each cosmos or system, and especially the regularity of the whole macrocosm, proves the existence of an intelligent '" arti- ficer " of it. Hutcheson, at first, claims no " apodictic " rigour 1 Inquhi/, Tr. i. § 5, p. i-i. ~ Ibid. jjp. 50, 51. a 192 hutcheson's philosophy. for his proof, which is simply based upon an enormous number of observed instances of uniformity, but afterwards, he gives it a demonstrative aspect, when formulating, mathematically, the overwhelming evidence in favour of his argument. The chances against are not even one to infinity, but barely one to infinity to the third power, and finally one to infinity to the ?ith power — still the " one " chance remains experience's irreducible minimum, that stamps the conclusion with the birth-mark of its origin. Further " Beauty " or uniformity is more than an argument for an intelligent artificer ; it also proves that the designer has wisdom and Benevolence. For the fact that regularity is pleasing to the appropriate sense, forces us to suppose that " the Happiness of mankind is desirable or good to the Supreme Cause, and that this form pleases us in an argument of his Wisdom,"... and, "upon the supposition of a Benevolent Deity, all the apparent Beauty produced is an evidence of the execu- tion of a Benevolent design, to give them [i.e. Rational agents] the pleasures of Beauty. But what more immediately proves Wisdom, is this ; when we see any machine with a vast complication of parts actually obtaining an End, we justly conclude, ' That, since this could not have been the effect of Chance, it must have been intended for that End which is obtained by it, and then, the Ends or intentions, being in part known, the complication of Organs and their nice disposition adajjted to this end, is an evidence of a comprehensive, large understanding in the Cause, according to the nmltijolicity of Parts and the Appositeness of their structure, even when we do not know the intention of the Wholes'" Thus, by two brief steps, Hutcheson's aesthetics pass into Teleology and from Teleology to the Metaphysic of Ethics ; for regularity presupposes design and design a Benevolent Cause. In effecting this transition, Shaftesbury's Hellenic ideal is largely displaced by his Christian one. The supieme artist passes into the background, to give place to the good and benevolent God of Hutcheson's Ballyrae sermon. It follows, therefore, that the object of the sense of " Beauty " is the series 1 Inquiry, ])p. 60, 61. hutcheson's philosophy. 193 of acts of the Benevolent first cause, as regular and uniform ; and so the pleasures of Beauty constitute human hedonistic recognition of all such acts ; and -Esthetics become a species of Divine ethics. Similarly, the object of the Moral Sense is found by applying the same thought within the sphere of the micro- cosm, namely man's recognition of human acts and dispositions, -^^ which, as benevolent, are also regular and uniform. Under this ' y3- form, Shaftesbury's harmony of the character of the microcosm with the end of the macrocosm, reappears in man, who becomes ip 'JJC' a parvus Deus Benevolens. The chief difference between the two kinds of regularity is that the Sense of Beauty only gives pleasure, " it is designed to give us positive Pleasure, but not a positive Pain or disgust, any fixrther than what arises from dis- appointment*." The inner reason of this depends upon the implied optimism of the world as the product of a benevolent First Cause ; whereas, in the microcosm, the regularity of action and character tending towards public good, is not always attained, and therefore the Moral Sense is not only a capacity for pleasure, but also for pain. The general drift of Hutcheson's thought tends to make the objects of the Moral Sense a subdivision of those of the Sense of "Beauty"; and so, though he starts by dividing Internal Sense, he virtually ends in subsuming the second Sense under the first^ Such a cosmic theory of Ethics naturally sacrifices the microcosm to the macrocosm and therefore it is not surprising to find Hutcheson reducing the moral import of Self-Love still more than Shaftesbury, " Actions which flow- solely fi'om Self- Love," he writes, "and yet evidence no want of Benevolence, having no hurtful effects upon others, seem perfectly indifferent in a moral sense'\" From this point of view, things and actions become in- telligible, as instances of Benevolence — things as examples of divine, and actions of human. Benevolence — and therefore the macrocosm as a whole, is uniform, because ruled by ethical springs. Tlius the true •' Welt-anschauung " is an ethical idealism. This ethical idealism is painfully embarrassed by _^ 1 Inquiry, Tr. i. § 6, p. 66, ^"""^ 2 jiia, Tr. II. § 3, p. 160. S. H. 13 194 HUTCHESON's philosophy. '^^^"'^-^ C^J ^f-'^tJjL^ Lockiau pre-suppositions. Hutclieson can give his reader no help in explaining the genesis of the idea of an end. Besides the aesthetic and Moral Senses, there are only the " Ideas of Sensation " and Reason, as a faculty for compounding them. Reason has no power to add anything to the given material, and the only possible supposition is that the idea of end is interpolated. Not only so, but Hutclieson is face to face with a very pressing difficulty in the apprehension of this idea, however obtained. The " Internal Senses " are only capacities for feeling, as he himself says, they are " faculties of perceiving pleasure^" and how is an end to be apprehended hedonistically ? Reason, even in the limited sense in which the term is used, can only discover the presence of adaptation, and therefore, reason must re-arrange the elements originally presented, and when this process is carried out (of which no account is given), Internal Sense is pleasantly affected. But suppose the same steps be traced in the opposite direction and a start is made from the actual feeling. Feeling is genericall}' the same, and how is a given feeling to indicate the presentation of a cosmos or system rather than some quite different source ? Hutcheson, 1)00, was convinced of the subjectivity of feeling as such and with Locke he held that the Secondary Qualities " denote the Sensations in our minds, to which perhaps there is no re- semblance in the objects which excite these ideas in us^"; while Primary Qualities " inay " have a " nearer " resemblance to objects. Now it is obvious that, even if the pleasure of Internal Sense were analogous to the Primary Qualities, it could only give a guarantee of contingent objectivity ; while, on the contrary, being feeling and feeling only, it finds its analogue in the " Secondary Sensatiuns " " as a modification of the perceiving mindl" If this be so, granting that ends may be expressed hedonistically, there is no guarantee for the accuracy of the re-translation of feeling back to ends. In fact the Self, being wholly passive, absorbs everything and gives back nothing. Hutcheson was conscious of this difficulty and made some attempt to meet it, by asserting that Uniformity depends upon 1 Iiiquirij, Tr. i. § 8, p. 88. - Ibid. Tr. i. § 1, pp. 13, 14. ^ j^/^. hutcheson's philosophy. 195 the perception of some Primary Quality^ but this is altogether beside the point. Even if the Regularity were due to a re- grouping of the elements of a Primary Qualit}^ its objectivity would remain doubtful. Besides, the only Uniformity, derived from Primary Qualities, is that of a geometrical nature, and this is a type, not the whole of Beauty. It leaves no room for the regularity of character and action, which is the object of the Moral Sense. In fact, the Moral Sense is in the dilemma of dealing either with a hypothetical object or else being left without any object — for, if character be the object, it can only be guessed from the actions which express it ; on the other hand, actions constitute no object at all, in Hutcheson's sense, since, as has been seen, actions apparently attributable to Benevolence may be morally vitiated, by being afterwards proved the results of an undetected egoistic motive. Conse- quently the Moral Sense is even less objective than the ^Esthetic one. Further, the object of the Internal Senses, being subjective, the hedonistic register of_it^is doubly sub- jective as feeling and feeling only, and therefore it can give no possible criterion. ^ Quite apart from the general difficulties of a Sensationalistic theory, Hutcheson has left himself no outlet from the indi- \ g^\fj-~ vidual subjectivity as solely sensitive. All uniformity is ' uniformity oi Ideas of Sensation, and therefore all conclusions founded upon it remain conclusions "in idea." Further, feelings, either aesthetic or moral, are merely signals of certain dis- positions or groupings of others already experienced, and as repetitions are objectively weaker. Therefore, neither the uniformity of ideas nor the feeling occasioned by them is any guarantee of objective design and hence the whole " physico-theological " proof of the existence of a supreme Benevolent Designer falls to pieces. If the Hedonistic effects upon the Sense are alone considered, Hutche- son is imprisoned within the disconnected consciousnesses of minima of feeling ; if he bursts through these, there is a petitio principii. He saw that his standpoint involved some such difficulty, and he endeavours to solve it by declaring it to be 1 Inquiry, p. 13. 13—2 196 hutcheson's philosophy. no difficulty at all. After saying all " Beauty is relative to the Sense of some mind perceiving it^" — that is hedonistically relative — he continues, "the preceding reasoning, from the frequency of regular bodies and the combination of various bodies is entirely independent of any perception of Beauty, and would equally prove design in the Cause, although there were no being which perceived Beauty in any form what- soever^" It is true that the sesthetic and moral feelings add nothing to the cogency of the proof since they are feelings from an end not of an end. But Hutcheson has overlooked his previous statements which place the Uniformity from which the feeling results amongst the ideas of Sensation and conse- quently it cannot be more objective than the ideas of which it is a relation. Thus Locke's idea of the mind as a tabula rasa, supplemented by doubts as to the objectivity of the Primary Qualities confines uniformity to the subjective sphere, while the hypothetical derivation of character from actions never brings the Moral Sense into immediate contact with its object. The hedonistic deliverances of the Moral Sense may indeed authenticate themselves as feeliugs but not the object which is to be presumed or imagined before being presented ; and so, it will be found, that followers of Clarke, such as Gilbert Burnet, drew attention to the difficulties attending an '' instinctive " moral criterion. To meet such objections, Hutcheson in the Essay on the Passions (1728) gives up much of his original Hedonistic position by borrowing from Butler, whose Sermons had appeared in 1726. Before investigating Hutcheson's theory as recast, it may not be out of place to determine Butler's relation to Shaftes- bury in order to ascertain how far Hutcheson in borrowing from Butler returned to Shaftesbury, and how far he modified his adaptation of Shaftesbury's theory by additions foreign to it. Butler was at once a critic and pupil of the two contem- porary tendencies of his time. From the rational moralists he learnt the need for an authoritative principle that could justify 1 Inquiry, Tr. i. § 4, also § 6, pp. 35, 65. - Ibid. § 5, p. 50. hutcheson's philosophy. 197 itself and give fixity to the moral code. On the other hand, he held that Moral Philosophy is something more than an ethical geometry, and he was therefore opposed to the bold speculative flights of Clarke. At the same time, he would not accept the popular hedonistic interpretation of the Moral Sense, while he followed Shaftesbury in his moral teleology. Butler, therefore, mediated between the two opposite tendencies ; but there are two kinds of mediation — either eclectic or by the resolution of differences in a higher unity. Butler's mediation partakes of both characteristics, since he failed in thoroughly synthesizing the two groups of opponents, through his neglect of a true Metaphysic. In Ethics proper, he partly overcomes the opposi- tion by uniting thoughts from both sides in a higher theory, partly by adapting eclectically portions of the respective theories for his own purposes. CHAPTER X. HUTCHESON'S philosophy — SECOND FORM, IN THE TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE MORAL SENSE, BEING THE BEGINNING OF THE INFLUENCE OF BUTLER. In many respects, the Treatise on the Passions and Illustra- tions of the Moral Sense, which were published together in one volume (1728), constitute an exceedingly interesting book. As a contribution to the Psychology of the emotions, the former treatise has still an historical value ; while the work, as a whole, is important as explaining the alteration in Hutcheson's stand- point. Running all through, there is the general' position of the Inquiry overlaid by a different theory due to the influence of Butler and others. If the rationale of each can be dis- entangled, it will to a large degree explain the various incon- sistencies by tracing them to necessities of Hutcheson's general outlook. The whole inner tendency of the Essay on the Passions, is to give content to expressions of the Inquiry. These may be grouped under two heads, namely the System, as individual, and the System, as a whole — in other words, the microcosm and the macrocosm. In fact, the Inquiry had effected little more than to accept Shaftesbury's statement that the micro- cosm was a system, without even giving Shaftesbury's reasons for such assertion. With regard to the macrocosm, the difficulty was exactly the opposite — for Hutcheson had gone farther than Shaftesbury in establishing its cosmical character ; but, on the other hand, in developing the Moral Sense, he had, unfortu- nately, by " hedonizing " it, isolated the individual, or at least hutcheson's philosophy. 199 endangered his connection with the whole of which he formed ^ a constituent part. With regard to the Microcosm, which is now not to be merely so described but 'proved to be such, Hutcheson begins by entirely adopting the results of Butler's Sermons, with a reservation as to the supreme authority of Conscience. In the Inquiry, the various Springs of action are mentioned by name, as for instance, Malice, Friendship, Gratitude, Compassion, &c., without any attempt at classification, whereas, now, they are ranked in a hierarchy, up to a certain point, exactly with Butler's Terminology. First, or rather lowest in rank, are the " Propensions " or Instincts, then the Particular Affections, both of which classes again are capable of subdivision as tending directly, in some instances to private, in other instances to public good. Hutcheson, even, goes slightly beyond Butler ; since the latter only contends that " there are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that we were made for society, and to do good to our fellow creatures, as that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and private good','' while Hutcheson claims that there is an exact " Balance." " With this balance of public passions against the private... we find that human nature may be really amiable... provided we vigorously exercise the powers we have, in keeping this balance of Affections, and checking any passion that grows.^ ^ so violent, as to be inconsistent with the Public Good. If we / s have selfish passions! for our own preservation, we have also \^i'— '^ Public passions which may engage us into vigorous and ^-^^^ laborious services to offspring, friends, Countries." In this division also, one notes how quickly Hutcheson learnt, from the Sermons on Resentment, to find in Angfer " one of the cements of society." Further, following Butler, Hutcheson distinguishes Reason as applied to unify the two classes under the heads of ^elf-Love and iBenevolence. In following Butler so far, Hutcheson has contradicted his previous expressions, since if there is to be a " balance," it would follow that Self- Love should have equal rights with Benevolence, in case of any conflict arising. ^ Sermons, Oxford, p. 4. 200 hutcheson's philosophy. Having followed Butler to this point, Hutcheson's original position returns upon him, and he has a sword of Brennus to throw into the " balance " in favour of Benevolence, Self-Love unifies particular affections according to a scale of natural good merely, that is pleasure and pleasure only. Benevolence, on the other hand, deals with moral good, which is not individual pleasure but universalistic happiness with a reference to per- fection. Thus, Happiness, as a result of Self-Love, is a sum of personal or individual pleasures — it " denotes pleasant sensation of any kind or a continued state of such Sensations^ " — and, as such, the individual is looked upon as isolated, and his relation to the macrocosm is destroyed. On the other hand, the Happiness which Benevolence seeks, is the union of the individual with the system as a whole; and, being universal- istic, includes a reference to the perfection of that whole". Further the perfection of the individual is not only included as that of a part of the Macrocosm, bat also the perfection of the individual as in himself a microcosm. In fact, by following Self-Love, the individual cannot be perfect since he is no longer a system or microcosm, while, by acting benevolently, he realises the cosmic relation and thereby perfects himself \ In the Treatise on the Passions, the references to Perfection are slight and are rather hints of a theory to come, than the theory itself in actual realisation. Not only does the object of Benevolence take precedence of that of Self-Love, but the principle of Benevolence is assigned a distinct superiority. Hutcheson in fact further weights the altruistic side of his balance by introducing two new " Senses " — the one a " Public Sense," viz. " our determination to be pleased with the Happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their misery^"; and the other, "a Sense of Honour, which makes the Approbation or gratitude of others for any good action we have done, the necessary occasion of pleasure." The latter in fact is a correlative of the Moral Sense, which primarily ap- 1 Essay on the Passions, p, 205. ^ The idea of Perfection is incidental in the Essay on the Passions, but in the next period it becomes of cardinal importances^ 3 Essay on the Passions, 1728, pp. 200—203. ^ Ibid. p. 5. hutcheson's philosophy. 201 proves the character inferred from the actions of others, while the Sense of Honour is the agent's recognition of the action of the Moral Sense of those benefited by him. Obviously, there- fore, it constitutes a hedonistic quid pro quo, and is a survival of the position of the Inquiry. Now, the Public Sense is pleased with any affection tending to the interests of others, however conceived, or however contracted the sphere of those included by it — it constitutes in fact a " natural " solatium for all donors of misdirected charities. Therefore, it follows tha>, since admittedly all altruistic impulses do not contributed to the greatest moment of good toward the most extensive system to which they can reach^," a further principle is needed " so as to limit and counteract not only the selfish Passions, but even the particular kind affections." This principle is " universal calm Benevolence," which is " the perfection of Virtue." To fully appreciate the import of this admission, it is necessary to digress very briefly, in order t(/ investigate Hutche- son's view of the distinction between tlie different springs of action. These are broadly three, namdy "affection," passion and desire. By affection is meant the "/Perceptions of Pleasure or pain, not directly raised by the preseice or operation of the event or object, but by our reflection u^on, or apprehension of their present or certainly future existence ; so that we may be sure the object or event will raise the direct sensations in us^" Passions constitute a sub-class of Affections, including " a con- fused sensation, either of pleasure or .pain, occasioned or attended by some violent bodily motions, which keeps the mind much employed upon the present affair, to the exclusion of everything else, and prolongs or strengthens the affections, sometimes to such a degree, as to prevent all deliberate reason- ing about our conducts" Opposed to these are the Calm or " pure " Affections which are without this confusion — in this distinction Hutcheson is following MalebrancheNand Butler, with a return to Shaftesbury's " rational affectionx" Green, when writing of Hutcheson, seems to think that he made no distinction between desire and affection or Passion^. Evidently X ^ Essay on the Passions, p. xvii. - Ibid. p. 28. ^ Ibid. p. 29. * Green's Works, i. p. 326. ■J ■r 202 hutcheson's philosophy. Green had the Inquiry and System in his mind, at the time : for, in the Essay on the Passioris, a distinction is repeatedly drawn. Desire begins where affection ends. Having " an apprehension of good or evil in ' oTjjects, actions or events " desires arise '^^'^from the frame of our nature to obtain for ourselves or others, the agreeable sensation, when the object or event is good or to prevent the uneasy sensation when it is evil\" This definition only includes part of what Hutcheson means by desire, since it leaves no room for the idea of the good of others as perfection, and it affords a striking example of how far exceptions are to prove the rule, when, as afterwards appears, the " agreeable Sensation " is shown to be inadmissible, and the definition is revised as follows, namely, that "" the ap- prehension of good, either to ourselves or others, as attainable, raises Desired" The reason for the cliange is that Hutcheson often follows Butler, in making all Desire terminate upon its object, which thus constitutes its end, and he clearly diffe- rentiates it from the uneasiness preceding it on the one hand, and from the personal pleasure attending its gratification, on the otherl " It is certaio," he writes, " that Desire of the Happiness of others, which we account virtuous, is not directly excited by prospects of any secular advantages, Wealth, Power, Pleasure of the external Senses, reward from the Deity or future pleasures of Self-Approbation." By this reservation, Hutcheson here endeavours to establish the disinterestedness of Desire, that is, that its object is not the pleasure of the individual, but it remains an open question, whether beyond the direct object, there may, or may not be, the pleasure of the particular system towards whose " good " the desire is directed. Further Desires may be either " confused " and " passionate " or pure and calm. There appear to be finally only two " calm " desires, Self-Love and Benevolence. Self-Love, being morally, in so far as legitimated, instead of the balanced antithesis of Benevolence, subsumed by it-; and thus the sole morally right desire becomes " calm Benevolence." Since it is " pure desire " the element of uneasiness is reduced to a minimum, or indeed I Essay on the Passions, p. 7. ^ I^id. p. Gl. » Ibid. p. 16. hutcheson's philosophy. 203 may disappear altogether — "if we consult ourselves, and not the common systems, we shall perhaps find that the noblest desire in our nature, that of universal Happiness, is generally calm, and wholly free from any confused uneasiness^" This Desire of Universal Happiness is a somewhat compli- cated product. Acting upon the basis of some particular public affections, it first of all sees how these cohere with the idea or ideal of the Macrocosm, whether conceived in its entirety or as that "universe" to which the individual is immediately related by means of imagination and reason, and Hutcheson even goes so far as to state that " we obtain command over the particular passions, principally by strengthening the general desires [these being further resolved into universal calm Benevolence], through frequent reflection and making them habitual, so as to obtain strength superior to the particular passions-." " Discipline of our passions is in general necessary... And, consequently, it must be of the highest importance to all, to strengthen as much as possible, by frequent meditation and reflection, the calm desires, either public or private, rather than the particular passions and to make the calm universal Benevolence superior to them^" The function of reason, understanding or wisdom is important, as these faculties ascertain " the tendency " of actions. Green accepts the expressions "tendency" or " tending to" as equivalent to the motive"*; and, undoubtedly, this mean- ing is often intended, but more frequently there is a double reference, on one side to the harmony of the character or act of the microcosm with the end of the macrocosm, and, on the other side, as expressing the consequences of an action in terms of general Happiness. For instance, " Our Passions are often matters of uneasiness to ourselves, and sometimes occasion misery to others, when any one is indulged into a degree of strength beyond its proportion... They are by nature balanced against each other, like the antagonistic muscles of the body ; either of which separately would have occasioned distortion and irregular motion, yet jointly they form a machine, most accurately subservient to the necessities, convenience and ^ Essay on the Passiuns, p. 44. - Ibid. p. 30. 3 Ibid. p. 1G7. ^ Green's Works, i. p. 328. / 204 hutcheson's philosophy. Happiness of a Rational System. We have a power of reason and reflection, by which we may see what course of action will tend to procure us the most valuable gratifications of our Desires, and prevent any intolerable or unnecessary pains, or provide some support under them. We have wisdom, sufficient to form Ideas of Rights, Laws, Constitutions, so as to preserve large societies in peace and prosperity and promote a general good amidst all the private interests ^" " In governing our Moral Sense and desires of Virtue, notRing is more necessary than to study the nature and tendencies of actions, and to extend our views to the whole species, or to all sensitive natures, as fjir as they can be affected by our conduct\" " When the Moral Sense is thus assisted by a sound under- standing and application, our own actions may be a constant source of solid pleasured" "It cannot be an indifferent matter to an agent with a Moral Sense, what opinions he forms of the tendencies of actions ; what partial attachments of Love he has towards parties or factions. If he has true opinions of the tendencies of actions, if he carefully examines the real dignity of persons and causes, he may be sure the conduct which he now approves he shall always approve^" It will thus be seen that Hutcheson assigns an important if somewhat vague position to reason in the process attending moral decisions. In fact so far from reason being " expressly excluded ^" it has the function of " assisting," even of " governing " the Moral _Sense and " commanding " particular affections. Further, if wisdom can form the idea of a political constitution or a " system " of individuals with harmonized rights, there does not appear to be any cause why the same faculty should not form the idea of a universal system, or that of the Macrocosm as a whole, with a clear view, as to its supreme end. This is clearly inconsistent with the frequently expressed dictum that reason gives no ultimate end, but the real contradiction results from the instability of the hedonistic view of the Moral Sense, repeated from the Inquiry. In fact it now appears, the 1 Essay on the Passions, p. 181. - Ibid. p. 191. 3 Ibid. p. 109. ^ Ibid. p. 106. '' Green's ]Vo7-ks, i. pp. 328, 331. . ^ hutcheson's philosophy-. 205 culture of Benevolence is the condition of the stability of the Moral Sense — " the Moral Sense/' Hutcheson says, " if we form true opinions of the tendencies of actions and the affections whence they spring, as it is the fountain of the most intense pleasure, so it is, in itself, constant, not subject to caprice or^ changed" It is "universal calm Benevolence," as a reasoned view of the^l-elation of the individual to the Macrocosm, that is the true faculty of moral decision, since it is both clirouo- logically and logically prior to the Moral Sense. This desire, \l now, does the whole work and it only remains for the Moral Sense to " approve " of it, as presented. If there is any error " in examination " the blame rests wholly with the calculating faculty ; and therefore it should be entitled to any credit there may be, when it has come to a right decision. From this point of view, the pleasure resulting from the Moral Sense is a " hall- mark " and that only ; while the whole " assaying " has been ^ done by the various steps, which generate the universal desire -i. of calm Benevolence. Benevolence then takes the place of the '•' ^ ' Moral Sense as the Moral Axculty. This is obviously a con- clusion unconsciously developed from Butler. " When Benevo- lence is said to be the sum of virtue it is not spoken of as a blind propension, but as a principle in reasonable creatures, for reason and reflection come into our notion of a moral agent... Thus upon supposition that it were in the strictest sense true, without limitation, that Benevolence includes in it all virtues, yet reason must come in as its guide and director, in order to attain its own end, the end of Benevolence, the greatest public goodl" Thus Benevolence becomes the cuckoo . ,v in the nest that eventually thrusts out the Moral Sense and ',^^ usurps its original function. ^ 'o-'"^^ Benevolence then gains more than the Moral Sense loses. ^■ In the Inquiry, the Moral Sense was " superior " — a species of Psychological labour-saving machine — and its main use was to '» render Reason, as applied to action, unnecessary-—" Must a ' i man," Hutcheson asks in the Inquiry, " have the reflection of Cumberland or Pufifendorf to admire generosity, Mth, 1 Essay on the Passions, p. 158. 2 Butler's Sermons, Ser. xii. (Oxford Edition, pp. 166 — 167). 206 hutcheson's philosophy. humanity, gratitude? Or reason so nicely to apprehend the evil in cruelty, treachery, ingratitude ? Do not the former excite our admiration and love and study of imitation, wherqver we see them, without any such Reflection, and the latter are contempt and abhorrence ? Unhappy would it be for mankind, if a Sense of Virtue was of as narrow an extent as a capacity for such Metaphysics 1 ! " In the Treatise on the Passions Benevolence, which now does the work of the Moral Sense of the Inquiry, in making moral decisions, requires reason, reflection, suspense of judgment and command over the par- ticular affections, while it is no longer "a kind of Ithuriel's spear, which, when brought in contact with our affections, reveals their true quality, showing the angelic nature of those which are conducive to the public good and the diabolical character of those which are opposed to it. Or it resembles the fabulous cups which detected the poison lurking in any drink poured into them ; and enables us to reject the anti-social and accept the social"'*." In fact the comparison of the imagined results of carrying out any particular altruistic affection with the agent's idea of a macrocosm, constitutes the essential element in the mental state preceding action ; and, if Benevolence gives a ftivourable verdict, the Moral Sense experiences those refined pleasures which Hutcheson calls the perfection of the Self, because they are wholly its owiiV Such additions to the scope of Benevolence mark a wide divergence from the idea of a symmetrically balanced micro- cosm, in the interests of which they are introduced. The result is that Hutcheson is forced to expel one order of the powders in Butler's " hierarchy," namely Self-Love and (Butler's) Benevolence. There remain then egoistic and altruistic in- stincts and affections, which may be unified by a modified Self- Love and a partial Benevolence, while both these and the original affections are judged by Universal Calm Benevolence ; and the Moral Sense becomes a supernumerary, called in not to 1 Inquiry, Tr. ii. § 1. (Ed. i. p. 115). 2 History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, by Leslie Stephen, London, 1870, ii. p. 62. ^ Treatise on the Passions, p. 160. hutcheson's philosophy. 207 ratify the decision of Benevolence, but to merely grace the occasion aud provide an unsought reward. Notwithstanding the many defects of psychology, here Hutcheson has stumbled on a clue to extricate himself from the labyrinth of the micro- cosm, but unfortunately he refuses to recognise the rational element in the presentation of cosmic good by Benevolence to the Moral Sense. He cannot reconcile himself to making the Moral Sense a supernumerary and he still insists that it does the work really performed by the genesis of a Benevolent desire. Consequently when he is asked by the Rational )\ Moralists to justify the Moral Sense, he can only reiterate his claim that its action is a f;ict, but he is unable to provide any explanation. Towards the objectivity of physical and moral order he contributes several new distinctions, clearly pointing out that Reflection ought to rank equally with Sensation as a " power of Perception" or source of ideas', and he adds several important remarks upon the " universal concomitant ideas " or Primary Qualities " which are reputed images of something external ^" Instead of Internal Senses being mere " determinations " as in the Inquiry (though the old definition is repeated in another 'T^ place) they are now the " pleasures perceived upon the previous y^^. reception and comparison of various sensible perceptions, with their concomitant ideas or intellectual ideas, when we find uniformity or resemblance among theml" Yet the reinstate- ment of Reflection is profitless, since Hutcheson deliberately ^Jj, y^*^ , gives away his whole case by denying the objectivity of all ideas of Relation, amongst which uniformity is included, "That, upon comparing two ideas there arises a relative idea, generally when the two ideas compared have in them any modes of the i > same Simple Idea, is obvious.... This may let us see that; Relations are not real qualities inherent in external natures, but only ideas necessarily accompanying our Perception of two J objects at once and comparing them^*." Thus, as in the Inquiry, there is no escape from the Microcosm to the Macrocosm ; aud 1 Treatise on the Passions, p. xi. 2 Ibid. p. 4. 3 u^i^^ * Ibid. p. 246. 208 hutcheson's philosophy. therefore there is no reliance to be placed either on the world- order or the world-orderer. It is somewhat remarkable that Hutcheson does not even attempt to maintain the universality of the Moral Sense, apart from the rational process involved in the formation of the universally benevolent character. "Everyone," he says, "judges the affections of others by his own Sense, so that it seems not impossible that in these Senses men may differ as they do in Taste \" " Whether our Moral Sense be subject to such a disorder, as to have different perceptions from the same appre- hended affections, in an agent at different times, as the eye may have of the colours of an unaltered object, 'tis not easy to determine. Perhaps it will be hard to find any instance of such a changed" This subjectivity of the Moral Sense is the penalty Hutcheson has to pay for his enlistment of Pleasure on the side of Virtue, and for his extensive critique of all pleasures according to their intensity and duration to prove the superiority of those of the moral sense^ and finally for his rhapsodies on the delights of right living. " These pleasures cannot indeed wholly secure us against all kinds of uneasiness, yet they never tend naturally to increase them. On the contrary their tendency is to lead the virtuous agent into all pleasures, in the highest degree, in which they are consistent with each other.... Where Virtue costs us much its own pleasures are the more sublime. It directly advances the pleasures of the Public Sense, by leading us to promote the Public Happiness, and Honour is its natural and ordinary attendant. If it cannot remove the necessary pains of life yet it is the best support under them. These moral pleasures do some way more nearly affect us than any other. They make us delight in ourselves and relish our very nature. By these we perceive an internal dignity and worth and seem to have a pleasure like to that ascribed often to the Deity, by which we enjoy our own Perfection and that of every other being^" ^^ Even though the Moral Sense can make the good man a y^ kind of ethical Narcissus, in love with his own image, and 1 j{^ * 1 Essay on the Passions, p. 234. ^ j^jf^. p_ 283. ' , V^ ^ ^Ihid.%5. ' ), ,/ , ^I&id. p. 159, ^ /■//.- (/' ^^ -^o>^ HUTCH eson's philosophy. 209 ■ certain upon every disinterested excursion of a return to an atmosphere pulsating with tlie most "intense" and "sublime" emotion (though this is not to be the motive !), the penalty must be paid for the lack of consistency. If the Moral Sense is to reproduce ends in hedonistic terms, all other faculties only deal with means, and in being " pleased with " particular kind affections we must run the risk of doing what is " absolutely pernicioifey' through limitation of the affection itself The Sense can give no justification of its action ; neither approve nor disapprove — in fact the usual Platonic arguments against Sensationalism apply. On the other hand, if the moral decision is really made during the growth of the calm universal benevo- lent desire, then the Moral Sense ceases to be the power of apprehending the ultimate end and it sinks to the mere hedonistic endorsement of the discovery by a different power. These two opposite points of view run throughout the Essay on /the Passions and Hutcheson interchanges them according to / his purpose at the moment. When virtue is to be made stable, I calm Benevolence is most prominent : and, on the other hand, when, as is most usual, he is anxious "to recommend Virtue" 1 the Moral Sense engrosses his attention. 4^^^^ \ 1 Essay on the Passions, p. 278. T •■y J S. H. 14 CHAPTER XI. Part I. hutcheson's philosophy^ — third form, in the SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, AND ALTERATIONS IN THE FOURTH EDITION OF THE IXQUIRY, FROM 1730 — 1738. THE INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTLE. In the two periods of Hutcheson's thought which have been dealt with in the previous chapters, his internal development coincides with the outer chronological expression in different works. There still remain the "Compends"of Metaphysics and Morals (1742), the System of Moral Philosophy and Gompend of Logic, both published after his death, atid to these may be added the additions made to the Inquiry in the fourth edition. Here the order of publication is no longer a guide to the development of thought; for, from Hutcheson's own letters, it appears that the System of Moral Philosophy was finished by November, 1737, having probably been commenced from 1733 — 1735 ^ As the fourth edition of the Inquiry was published in 1738, the fresh matter it contains may be assigned to the same date as the System. Here however a slight complication may be noticed. The MS. remained a long time in Ireland, and, when it was returned, Hutcheson showed it to some of his friends at Glasgow — thus the time slipped away. He speaks of " being bewildered " and of " adding confusedly to a confused book all vahiable remarks in a farrago-."' Therefore to the original MS., finished in 1 737, were added the " valuable " remarks upon it from various sources. Hutcheson's language 1 Supra, Chap. vi. p. 113. ^ Supra, p. 114, hutcheson's philosophy. 211 seems to convey the idea that he made no attempt at systema- tization of the new material, but simply incorporated it as received, to refresh his memory when lecturing. Some of the " remarks " may be detected, since they contain references to Butler's Analogy which did not appear until 1737; thus there is a note upon the passage treating of Justice, which refers to the theory of punishment in " that excellent book Bishop Butler's Analogy^." The proof of Immortality as well as certain remarks on "Moral Government" read like echoes of Butler — especially the former — though it is quite possible that Hutcheson may have arrived at both quite independently of the Analogy. But beyond isolated expressions there is nothing in the structure of the argument that is based upon Butler's later work, though there is much that shows a deeper compre- hension of the Sermons than is to be found in the Essay on the Passions. It is interesting to note this influence of the Molesworth- Shaftesbury school at Dublin upon Hutcheson's more mature woik. He specially acknowledges a "multitude" of valuable thoughts from Wm. Bruce and Synge, besides others from Abernethy and Bundle, Bishof) of Derry, who was a friend of Butler's-. To these must be added " still more in number from some excellent Ijands here," of whom there is no record, though one might conjecture Moor, who helped in the trans- lation of Marcus Aurelius and perhaps Dunlop and Leechman. To understand the transition from the Essay on the Passions to the System of Moral Philosophy, it is necessary to remember two general series of facts, the one being the remarkable output of controversial literature during the interval, tmd the other Hutcheson's own experience as a lecturer. His return to Glasgow brought him into contact with the academic side of the Hellenic revival ; and it can readily be imagined that after his training in Shaftesbury's Philosophy he would be a much more enthusiastic supporter of Dunlop's renaissance of the study of Greek Literature, than he could have been when leaving the University in 1717. Further, he was not merely a sympathiser with Dunlop, but an active 1 System, i. p. 256. ^ Su^ra, p. 114. 14—2 212 hutcheson's philosophy. supporter of the same movement, even going so far as to devote a considerable number of lectures to the exposition of Ancient Philosophy'. This work had an important bearing on his own mode of thought, and in the System of Moral Pldlosophy there is a new wave of Classicism. It is worthy of note too that Hutcheson has now fallen very greatly under the influence of Aristotle, and this shows a somewhat striking divergence from Shaftesbury, who was rather a Platonist than an Aristoteliau, which difference of inspiration will be found to have an impor- tant bearing upon the general drift of this phase of Hutcheson's thought. In the second place allowance must be made for the effect of the great mass of philosophical literature which appeared between 1728 and 1737. No doubt the issues debated were some- what fluctuating and confused, besides in many instances being confined to discussion of details rather than of principles. Hence it is that in no other instance in the histoiy of thought has so much writing produced so little i-esult, or left so slight an impress upon the general progress of historical and rational culture. Just as in the development of national life, there have been periods when factions or parties, were enormously sub- divided, and the efforts of each group contributed little or nothing to the progress of the people as a whole, so here the division of philosophical thought precluded any broad conten- tion for or against principles of permanent importance. Such division was far from being an accidental phenomenon, it was the direct result of the individualism of the age ; while at the same time, by diffusing Philosophic ideas, it aided in no small degree the growth of the Enlightenment'''. Yet amongst so much concentration on details certain broad lines of historical demarcation in Moral Philosophy emerge as a i-esult of the various contentions — on the one hand egoistic individualism, and on the other rational universalism, amongst followers of Clarke. Hutcheson was related to both and yet he 1 From various references iu his works, it is probable that Ancient Philo- sophy, with Hutcheson, meant primarily, but not altogether, Cicero and other Roman Moralists (cf. Chapters xiii. and xiv.). 2 Cf. Chapter xiii. hutcheson's philosophy. 213 differed fundamentally from either tendency. His rooted belief in a macrocosm of ethical ends was entirely universalistic ; and yet his epistemological point of contact was quite opposed to that of Clarke. With regard to the other group, while in so far as he accepted a hedonistic valuation of ends, he was at one with the egoists, at the same time his universalism necessarily separated him from them. Thus his hedonism and universalism drew his sympathies in two different directions, and conversely this separation of interests made him subject to two different attacks'. Hutcheson was better prepared to resist the assault of the egoists than that of the " Rational Moralists " ; for even in the Inquiry and his Letters to the Dublin Journal, he had prepared himself against the arguments of supporters of Hobbes, and hence he had only to meet any new objections brought forward by thinkers like John Clarke of Hull or Archibald Campbell. His true weakness was upon the other flank, exposed to the assaults of the " Rational Moralists." When his beloved Moral Sense was satirized as a mere instinct, he was left without a reply, and his only answer was really an equivocation, in so far as he attempted to show that Reason and Reason alone either , presupposed some emotive spring or else never effected any- , W thing in the moral sphere'. The early stages of this contro- y^ ' versy present a somewhat comic picture of " one party milking "' the he-goat while the other held the sieve"; since tlie Clarke school contended that the Moral Standard was wholly a matter of reason ; while Hutcheson in his early work is inclined to reply with the counter-assertion that it is wholly a matter of a "natural" emotion or feeling. However his strong common sense tends to save him from this extreme position, even at the expense of consistency ; since, as has been seen in the second phase of his thought, he admits many rational elements, in the formation of the Benevolent desire. After a further considera- tion of the arguments on both sides he endeavours doubly to strengthen his position not only against followers of Clarke but also against the egoists, in the third form of his system, first by 1 Cf. supra Chcapter vi. pp. 103—4. - Cf. Essay on Passions. Illustrations of a Moral Sense, passim. 214 hutcheson's philosophy. making morality consist, neither altogether in feeling nor in Reason, but in the will, and secondly by a further revision of his theory of the Moral Sense. To a certain extent the third period might be described as an explication of the implications of the second, since much is repeated from the Essay on the Passions; and the order is the same, namely beginning from the niicrocosm and ending with the macrocosm, whereas in the Inquiry this arrangement is reversed. But on the other hand there is much that is new — not merely in matter but also in theory and form. In addition to the tendency giving prominence to the position of Will in Morality, the ideas of Perfection and Dignity (which received mere incidental mention in the Essay on the Passions) now constitute an integral part of the revised system. The enume- ration of the Internal Senses is extended in several directions ; and most important of all, following this fresh arrangement of the microcosm, the Moral Sense is subjected to changed con- ditions ; in fact the Moral Sense of the second period is the final determinant on the side of Benevolence ; but now, in its charge over a more extensive " constitution," it must be supposed at least to have acquired fresh functions, and hence the chief characteristic of the System is the use of the expression Moral Faculty as the equivalent of the Moral Sense. The starting-point of the second phase of Hutcheson's thought was the revision of the microcosm to prove its cosmic character, and similarly the beginning of the third phase is also a revision of the microcosm, but in a practical rather than aesthetic interest, that is to exhibit it, not so much as a " balanced or symmetrical system " (which effort broke down in the Essay on the Passioiis) but rather as conducive to a summum honum of Happiness and Perfection'. Hitherto the end of Hutcheson's work has been always frankly eudaemonistic, and further since Happiness was merely a sum of pleasures, it was nothing more than hedonism ; now, on the contrary, Happiness and Perfection become twin ends, presumably coincident. It is true that the earlier view still maintains its ground, since ^ System of Moral Philosophy , i. p. 1. hutcheson's philosophy. 215 j ^ Happiness is defined as " the state of soul arising from its several grateful perceptions or modifications^"; elsewhere it is "the full enjoyment of all the gratifications its [i.e. "a being's"] nature desires and is capable of-." The point of transition is to be found in an explanation of Aristotle's celebrated defi- nition {ivepyeia kut aperrjv (iptcrTrjv iv l3i(p reXeieo) as " con- sisting in the compleat exercise of all these nobler virtues, especially that entire love and resignation to God, and of all the inferior virtues which do not interfere with the superior ; and in the enjoyment of such external prosperity as we can consistently with virtue obtain^" Thus the idea of a£eTj becomes a prominent characteristic of Hutcheson's third period, as q£jj^ovia was in the second. Joined with the notion of human Perfection, as ivipjeia Kar apeTip', there is another which introduces quite a contrary train of thought, namely a development of Locke's "Reflection" (which began in the Essay on the Passions). This is now described as " an inward perception, sensation or consciousness of all the acts, passions and modifications of the mind, by which its own perceptions, judgments, reasonings, affections, feelings, may become its object, it knows them and fixes their names^" Apparently here the mind is jussive, whereas the idea of excellence or perfection refers to it as active ; and the contra- diction is intensified when both these characteristics are used simultaneously, if not in the deduction of the Internal Senses, at least as rubrics, under which they are classified. From the point of view of Reflection, certain things, whether objects or ~i-^ actions, become causes which affect the mind, and the result is recorded by an Internal Sense which is internal because distinct from the bodily Senses. This distinction gives no clue as to how the various internal Senses are to be differentiated. From the second point of view every "natural" activity has a possi- bility of excellence, and when such excellence is realized the result is perceived and pleasure follows. That is, the faculty of action must be " natural " — (f)vcr€i, not either the result of as- sociation or education — its excellence is known either intuitively '- System of Moral Philosophy, i. p. 2. ^ Ibid. i. p. 100. 3 Ibid. I. p. '222. ^ Ibid. I. p. 6. 216 hutcheson's philosophy. or by comparison with an ideal >, and lastly, being recognised, the pleasure resulting retains a graduated scale of dignity according to that of the realised activity"'. While both these principles of division to all appearance diverge from the aesthetic stand- point, it is really through it that they meet. The Internal Senses as derived from Reflection, representing the attitude of. the " Spectator " or observer in a picture gallery, while on the other hand, as deduced from ive^yei^. they find a parallel in the artist's own consciousness of success in his work — thus the former might be called static and the latter dynamic conscious- ness, or in the special case of Morality, the first applies primarily to approval of the acts of others, the second to each individual's approval of his own conduct. The prominence of the second principle in the System is important as showing that Hutcheson is now looking at action, not as externalised, but rather as expressing an energy just put forth and now completed. It^ must be noted however that he is by no means consistent in this position. . When the Internal Senses are to be deduced from these two opposite principles, a considerable amount of confusion is to be expected. The fir.st group consists of a revised edition of the Sense of Beauty of the Inquiry, which is now called the Sense of Beauty and Harmony, which gives the " pleasures of imagi- nation." This Sense, which Hutcheson finds difficult to name, has the following subdivisions. (a) The perception of Beauty and consequent pleasure in all objects where " uniformity or equality of proportion among the parts is observable I" It is important to note that the perception of Beauty is now clearly distinguished from the subsequent pleasure — "the bare idea of Form," Hutcheson adds, "is something separable from pleasure.... Similitude, Proportion, Analogy or Equality of Proportion, are objects of the understanding and must be actually known before we know the natural causes of our pleasure'*." Though Hutcheson after- 1 In the use of natural, in this period, Hutcheson follows Aristotle whose two main uses of (pvtni were (1) "the original" (2) "the ideal." Natural Rights, by D. G. Ritchie, M.A., Lond. 1895, p. 28. 2 Sijstem, I. p. 29. ^ Ibid. i. p. 15. * Inquinj, Ed. 4, p. 10. Cf. Balgny, passages quoted, infra, p. 104 — 5. hutcheson's philosophy. 217 wards partially qualifies this statement, he subsequently strengthens it in reference to the Moral Sense, when he says that the " perception of the approver, though attended with pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct frum this pleasure, even as the perception of external forms is attended with pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from this pleasure^" Secondly, it is interesting to remark that "the variety," in the oft-repeated formula of the Inquiry, has dropped out of the definition — the reason being that this is now a special province of the general Esthetic Sense". (b) The next subdivision is the perception and pleasure from the observation of imitation. These two divisions to- gether correspond to the " Absolute and Relative Beauty " of the Inquiry. (c) Harmony or Music calls for no special comment. (d) The appreciation of Design is an important subdivision. It is rather the recognition of an end attained, than the active attaining of it. The inclusion of it under the general .Esthetic sense shows Hutcheson's conception of Beauty to have been devoid of the unconscious element in art. " In works of art," he says, " we are pleased to see intermixed the beauty of form and imitation, as far as consists with the design." The mental basis of this appreciation throws some light upon the difficulty mentioned in connection with Hutcheson's conception of Reason in his earlier works. "As we are endued with Reason to discern the fitness of means foi- an end and the several relations and connections of things, so there is an immediate pleasure in knowledge, distinct from the judgment itself, though naturally joined with it^" Elsewhere Reason is denied the power of conceiving an ultimate end, this being the function of " some sense aiid some determination of will^" (e) It is doubtful whether Hutcheson intended to include the "grateful connnotion" due to "novelty" under the Esthetic Sense. In the System this pleasure is the result of a cognitive activity, subsequent upon the perception of novelty ; and there- fore there is no direct connection between the two. Anything 1 Iitqiiinj. Ed. 4, p. 131. " Vide infra (e). 3 System i. i>. 16. * Ibid. i. p. 58. \yr 218 hutcheson's philosophy. new raises a desire of further knowledge, and thus the pleasure is a pleasure following the cognitive activity. Probably the inclusion of this characteristic is an attempt to reinstate the Variety of the first period as an element in aesthetic appreciations. (/) Lastly the recognition of grandeur is a further aspect or subdivision of the ^Esthetic Sense. If Novelty be omitted, it will be found that the Sense of Beauty includes Esthetic appreciation as the Beautiful and Sublime — the former being further subdivided into Beauty in nature, art and music — and also the recognition of a realised end^ Of these the latter as teleological dominates the other aspects, since order or proportion of any kind is order towards some end ; so that, as in the Inquiry, Esthetics ultimately result in a comprehensive teleology. In the iEsthetic Sense the point of view is that of Locke : the object, as aesthetic, is also the object of the sense. It is supposed to meet a certain determination of a passive or receptive mind which it affects, and from this contact percep- tion and feeling result. Yet even here this attitude is not consistently maintained since the justification of our gratification by a realised end depends upon the prior consciousness of our own individual power in realising an end^ and further the " pleasures of knowledge " resulting from " novelty " depend upon the effort, not the results After the subdivisions of the Esthetic Sense Hutcheson next mentions what he calls the Senses of Sympathy and Con- gratulation, but it is difficult to see the grounds for their inclusion, else ever}' afiection would be equally a " Sense." It seems the position assigned to Sympathy is a survival from the Essay on the Passions, where a Public Sense was added to the two taken over from the Inquiry ; at the same time, such a 1 Hutebesou's Pleasures of Imagination result from / rm Nature (division {a) of Sense) from Uniformity Beauty proper ■' m ^Jr^ ( ,, (b) ,, ) Hutcheson's "Imitation" I in Music ( „ (c) ,, ) ,, Harmony the Sublime (/) [Novelty] ((') Design (d). 2 System i. pp. 16, 17. » Ibid. i. p. 19. hutcheson's philosophy. 219 concession to the divisions of the second period involves a lack of consistency, since the perceptive element of the other Senses is wanting here ; and the same remark applies to the parental and conjugal affections, which Hutcheson sometimes seems inclined to admit as a Sense, because they are naturals After the Sympathetic comes the Moral Sense, or " Faculty of perceiving moral excellence^." Its object, as in the Essay on the Passions, is "calm Benevolence," which is now attributed to a "settled disposition of the Will." As Hutcheson puts it, " the irpoalpeai^ which is necessary to virtuous actions is 6pe^L System, i. p. 67. ^ Ibid. I. p. 66. Contrast Inquiry, Ed. 4, p. 201. 220 hutcheson's philosophy. The interaction of Aristotelian and Lockian stand-points, in distinguisliiug the revised list of Internal Senses, makes it difficult to obtain a general statement of Hutcheson's dominant idea. On the one hand that strange compound with Locke — the mind — which is sometimes as useful and elsewhere as un- manageable as " the child " of the modern Psychologist, is supposed to make an object of its own activities dealing with Sensation, and then adopt a passive role to observe, and, as Hutcheson says, " to know and name " what it has done. " Reflection," then, through the personalization of faculties or powers, is an observer, and so is affected by objects or its own past acts. From the other point of view each active power is capable of excellence in use, and such exercise of it is perceived in and with the activity'. Consequently excellence of function displaces " good " as the end of action, and strictly speaking all activities should be enumerated, and their respective excel- lences noted ; but Hutcheson does not attempt this, nor does he explain how the individual excellences of the different faculties are to be synthesized ; unless he intends the ideal of perfection to perform this office, in reference to the consolidated activity of the individual as a whole. If then each faculty has its proper excellence, what is the " differentia " of moral excellence ? Possibly the answer may be found in a further examination of the various excellences of the different activities. It is noteworthy that Hutcheson does not endeavour to include the ^Esthetic sense under this division, except by a single incidental reference^ ; and hence, in this phase of his thought, there is less mention of the "Beauty of virtue " than in his other works. Passing the problem of how the excellences of different faculties are united, it will be found that a threefold division is implied. First the excellence of all cognitive faculties, which, to a certain extent, is covered by the Sense of Novelty ; though by a strange inconsistency, novelty starts the process, and does not, as in the case of all other senses, recognise the excellence of the result. In fact, the observation of Novelty, Hutcheson admits, produces the curiosity that Hamilton later used so 1 System, i. p. 59. "^ Ibid. i. p. 59. hutcheson's philosophy. 221 freely, and therefore, neither the one nor the other can deal with the result. In the second place, the excellence of activities in which will largely preponderates is perceived by the Sense of Decorum, and finally the object of the Moral Sense or Faculty might be described as the excellence of both cognitive and practical activities, starting from the basis of a particular altruistic affection ; and therefore it is human energy as a unit, constituting the power of the individual realized to the highest degree of discui'sive and practical reason. The " extensive view of the tendencies of actions " is plainly a cognitive act ; and the suspense in carrying it out till the examination is complete, or the deliberative stage, followed by the " settled determination," is to be attributed to the will. Moral excellence, then, is the excellence of the whole man for the good of the macrocosm. This line of thought naturally leads to the transition from Moral excellence to individual Perfection, which now becomes an alternative for the highest Self-Love. Yet this transition suggests the obvious difficulty as to whether it would not be probable that the desire of individual perfection of the micro- cosm would lead to a different valuation of natural activities from that following from the desire of moral excellence, which concerns itself with the macrocosm. To this there are three replies — first there can be no conflict, when perfection and moral excellence are rightly conceived ; secondly, supposing there were a divergency of valuation of ends or activities, the Moral Sense would decide in favour of Benevolence, and it is a superior Sense just to exercise such control. Here it is obvious that, as already shown, tlie decision or approbation is valueless, since it depends altogether upon the presented scheme of conduct as benevolent ; or, thirdly, Hutcheson contends that there is an inherent dignity in the exercise of different activi- ties, and that this dignity is graduated according to the scale of faculties from the exercise of which it results, and that the highest form of it is that shown by the most extensive principle. Now such dignity is nut an attribute of the Moral Sense, but rather of the activity, and therefore justifiable oidy by means of a prior justification of the examination, deliberation and 222 HUTCH eson's philosophy. determination from which the extensive principle results. Thus again the Moral Sense is a supernumerary. In fact Hutcheson was so fully aware of this that he changes the function of the Sense repeatedly. Sometimes it is one with, and indistinguisable from the activity. Excellence, and pre- eminently moral excellence, is perceivable or knowable, and the Moral Sense is nothing more than such bare recognition. Therefore, and this is a wide divergence from the Inquiry, it has no necessary hedonistic element. This idea is suggested upon several occasions and plainly stated as follows — "When we are under the influence of a virtuous temper, and thereby engaged in virtuous actions, tve are not always conscious of any pleasure nor are we only pursuing private pleasures, as will appear hereafter : 'tis only by rejiex Acts upon our Temper and Conduct that we enjoy the delights of Virtue \" In connection with the description of material and formal good — the former being that " which tends to the interest of the system as far as we can judge of its tendency, or to the good of some part, consistent with that of the system, whatever were the affections of the agent " ; and " formal good," when " an action flows from good affections in a just proportion'"^" — the "reflex acts" become partia'ly identified with what is called Conscientia subsequens, which deals with past actions in connection with the motive, abstracting from effects^ while the Conscientia antecedens, being prior to action, is the true faculty of moral decision, and it invariably prefers " that which appears most conducive to the virtue and happiness of mankind^." In this distinction Hutcheson anticipates Mill's well-known contrast between the estimation of motive and intention'. The same general tendency is shown in the criticism of the Golden Rule as the sole ethical principle, which " is mistaken by some authors who, without acknowledging any prior principle of moral Reasoning or any inward immediate taste of action, would make this proposition an axiom whence they would deduce all rules of conduct " — its use being " to prepare the heart for an 1 Inquirij, Ed. 4, p. 130. ^ System, i. p. 252. 3 Ibid. I. p. 253. •« Ibid. ^ Utilitarianism, p. 27. HUTCHESOX'S PHILOSOPHY, 223 impartial discernment of what is just and honourable, and what not, by making the Selfish Passions operate a little on the other side'." Again, in distinguishing the threefold signification of Conscience, we find it sometimes "denotes the Moral Faculty itself," or "the judgment of the understanding concerning the springs and effects of actions, upon which the Moral Sense ap- proves or condemns them " ; or else our judgment concerning actions compared with the law-." The idea of law is new and requires some explanation. Here it applies to moral rules, un- derstood as the commands of God ; but, later, " the notion of a law shows how justly the practical conclusions of right reason, from the order of Nature constituted by God, and laid open to our observation, are called laws of nature and laws of God^" These laws further, though discovered by reason, are deemed immutable and eternal^ as being rules relative to the permanent tendency of certain courses of conduct to the end of the macrocosm. Therefore the last two aspects of Conscience ultimately coincide with regard to their content : for both are different aspects of the same element in the moral decision, the one being tiie con- dition of the will tested by Reason, and the other — the relation to law — being the conclusions of Reason enforced upon the Will. Both then, as dealing with "material good," are different sides of the Conscientia antecedens, while the first (namely Conscience as denoting the moral faculty) ma}' be identified with the Con- scientia subseqxens or " the reflex acts." If such identification be just, the Moral Sense, strictly speaking, refers only to the accidental hedonistic consecpient of right conduct ; and, since it is no integral part of the moral state, it cannot be the criterion. In so far as Hutcheson emphasizes moral excellence as the result of activity, this appears to be his meaning, but there is also a marked tendency to assign the work of the Conscientia antecedens to the Moral Sense, which is often spoken of as the hedonistic determinant of the moral decision. Thus there are many expressions, repeated from the Inquvnj, as to virtue being recognized by a taste or relish, that " the approbation of moral 1 System, II. p. 16. 2 j^,-,/. i_ p_ 234. 3 Ihid. I. p. 268. Cf. also i. p. 271. * Ibid. I, p. 273. 224 hutcheson's philosophy. excellence is a grateful action or sensation of the mindS" right conduct raises "the moat joyful sensations of approbation and inward satisfaction- " ; " we improve our moral taste by present- ing larger systems to the niind^" and it acts through "recom- mending the generous part by an immediate uudefinable perception ■*." Further, to provide an object for the Moral Sense independent of " moral reasoning," Hutcheson explicitly states that it " immediately approves the particular altruistic affections, irrespective of their tendency to the good of a system ^" yet this is only a provisional approval, subject to no counter protest being entered by the principle of calm Bene- volence, and so the Moral Sense in this aspect of its work is forced to borrow from the Ethics of a schoolboy, Avho acts as he pleases until he has received an express prohibition. So employed, the Moral Sense is reduced to Sympathy — indeed Hutcheson only escaped this identification by appealing from the instability of the latter to the permanent character imported into the moral decision by the settled determination involved in calm Benevolence. Again, he carries his distrust of cognitive elements in Morality so far that he sometimes excludes reason altogether as " too slow, too full of doubt and hesitation to serve us in every exigency," and therefore just as the external Senses are "expeditious monitors and importunate solicitors'*" for the preservation of the body, so some such rapidity is to be found in the Moral Sense, apart from the rational and deliberative process involved in calm Benevolence or the Gonscientia antece- dens. Finally, if there be any doubt as to the Standard, "moral reasoning " is only admitted to be censured virtually for securing the " approbation " of the " Sense " upon false pretences — though, if the Moral Faculty is unable to detect any oversight in investigation of the tendencies of actions, the alleged " com- manding nature" (which is " proved by appeal to our hearts'") is, to say the least of it, useless — and if the verdict of the heart is not accepted, Hutcheson, rather than discuss the " immutable 1 Sijstem, I. p. 53. - Ihld. i. p. 24. 3 Ihid. I. p. 60. * Ihid. i. p. 77. 5 Ihid. I. p. 254. « Inquiry, Ed. 4, p. 272. "^ System, i. p. 61. hutcheson's philosophy. 225 law of nature," derived from practical reason, appeals upon the authority of Aristotle to the "sensation of the truly good man^" "whose sentiments must be the last resort in intricate eases^" But, while the hedonism of the moral Sense still survives in the third phase of Hutcheson's thought, he has made a distinct advance from the position of the Essay on the Passions. There the stability of the moral Sense depended upon the cognitive elements, presupposed iu the genesis of the calm Benevolent Desire. Now, on the contrary, he has become aware of this inconsistency, and he has at least endeavoured to readjust his theory to meet it. At the same time there is still the same clinging to the " pleasures of virtue," and therefore concessions must be made, so that " moral reasoning," " the settled determi- nation of the will," " the law of Reason," while admitted into the system, are certainly unwelcome auxiliaries; but, as in certain historical instances, the mercenaries are likely to subvert the government which they were called in to support. The numerous additions to the list of Internal Senses proved unmanageable when it became necessary to arrange the moral constitution as a microcosm ; in fact Hutcheson makes no attempt to deal with them as parts of an ordered whole. On the contrary he reverts to the method of the Essay on the Passions by arranging all particular affections under the headings of Self-Love and Perfection on the one side, and Calm Benevolence on the other. The addition of Perfection to Self- Love, as its highest development, makes the "balance" more symmetrical; but it leaves the theory weaker, since, if the Moral Sense is barely a hedonistic determination to be pleased with a presented end, its pleasure is unintelligible either to Self-Love or Benevolence— if, on the other hand. Moral Reason- ing—the Conscientia antecedens—he the faculty of moral decision, it is merely a reduplication of the idea of moral excellence, which gave birth to Calm Benevolence as now understood. Indeed the apparent similarity of Perfection for the individual and Moral Excellence must have disguised the difficulty; yet, unless the presupposed harmony of the two 1 System, i. p. 237. ^ H>id. n. p. 140. 15 S. H. 226 hutcheson's philosophy. remains unbroken, the Perfection of the individual is in danger of losing its rights as a member of the balance, since, whether the moral faculty be rational judge or aesthetic pleader, its verdict is already pledged in favour of Benevolence. While Hutcheson's idea of the microcosm was subject to changes during each stage of his thought, that of the macrocosm is much more constant. In the System of Moral Philosophy, he becomes something more of an ethical idealist by endeavour- ing to utilise the Moral Faculty as a connecting link in addition to the conclusions of his teleology. " The Moral Faculty," he writes, " itself seems that peculiar part of our nature most adapted to promote this correspondence of every rational mind with the great Source of our being and of all Perfection, as it immediately approves all moral excellence, and determines the soul to the love of it, and approves this love as the greatest excellence of mind, which too is the most useful to the system V' This use of the moral faculty, in part, accounts for the intro- duction of the fresh view already mentioned of its functions, since within the microcosm it is a matter of indifference how \ the " Sense " is conceived ; whereas, if it be a connecting link with the macrocosm it must, to be serviceable, have at least one side as Conscientia antecedens, and all that this implies in reaction upon the theory generally. As the Moral Faculty is, in its highest form, the best ex- pression of all human power, excluding the ^Esthetic sense, so the transition from the microcosm to the macrocosm includes, besides moral excellence, teleological considerations. When in- vestigating the "natural" tendency towards Religion, Hutcheson finds that " as the several classes of animals and vegetables display in their whole frame exquisite mechanism and regular structure, evidencing counsel, art, and contrivance for certain ends, men of genius and attention must soon discover some intelligent beings one or more, presiding in all this comely order and magnificence"." Later on, teleology justifies the existence of an " intelligent artificer^' and the lengthy proof proceeds to establish his benevolent character. This follows 1 System, i. p. 210. - Ibid. i. p. 35. =* Ibid. I. pp. 168—174. hutcheson's philosophy. 227 directly from Hutcheson's Optimism, which is now reinforced by the dignity or difiference in kind of the pleasures of the higher internal Senses, and is further strengthened by the proof of the immortality of the Soul. This addition to the argument involves the abandonment of Lockian empiricism, taken over with the idea of Reflection from the Essay on the Passions. The soul is now conceived as " active," and as such, inconsistent with the passiveness of matter^ All activities of thought and will we "feel to be the immediate qualities of this Self, the personal excellencies in which all its true dignity consists "....Nature thus intimates to us a spirit distinct from the body over which it presides. ... Nay it intimates a greater difiference or disparity of substance." Therefore, as with Butler, in the Analogy, the soul, "being disparate from matter, is unaffected by any change, such as death in the body," and so any possible objections to the Optimistic belief are met by the certainty '= that the evils of these few years, during oiir mortal state, are not worthy of regard ; they are not once to be compared with the happiness to ensue V Therefore the "great Architect" is benevolent, and finally, following Descartes and Spinoza, the " Physico-theological" proof culminates in the Ontological, w^hich shows that God is infinite, " uncaused," One, a Spirit, omnipotent and omnipresent^ Thus the whole macrocosm is graduated, according to degrees of excellence, " from the meanest animal to the in- finite Deity." To Hutcheson, however, the " system as a whole " is to be conceived rather as the social organism, and therefore the principles of Jurisprudence, Government and Economics, con- stitute not merely an appendix but rather an integral part of the theory. For, since the Conscieutia antecedens deals with the tendencies of actions in reference to the public good, the general rules or maxims of estimation are at once ethical and social laws^ Many of Hutcheson's summaries of tendencies have " come down through Roman judicial theory from the specula- 1 System, i. p. 200. ^ Ibid. i. pp. 202, 205. ^ Ibid. I. p. 201. * Ibid. I. pp. 205, 206. 5 Ibid. I. p. 227. 15—2 228 hutcheson's philosophy. tions of Greece^" and their chief interest consists in the ingenious manner in which he has united or " deduced " them from the general ethical position. In fact, as Teleology has been reduced to a system of both Universal Happiness and Perfection, so now the apparently egoistic ideas of Property and individual rights must be ranked under the same principle. The " State of Nature " is not one of war, but of mutual offices of good-will. " In the first state constituted by Nature itself, we must discern abundantly, from the preceding book, that there are many sacred rights competent to men, and many obligations incumbent on each towards his fellows. The whole system of the mind, especially our moral faculty, shows that we are under natural bonds of beneficence and humanity toward all, and under many more special tyes to some of our fellows, binding us to many services of an higher kind than what the rest can claim: nor need we other proofs here that this fii-st state, founded by nature, is so far from being that of war and enmity, that it is a state where we are obliged by the natural feelings of our hearts, and by many tender affections, to innocence and beneficence toward all : and that war is one of the accidental states arising solely from injury, when we or some of our fellows have counteracted the dictates of their nature-." Thus natural rights depend upon the moral faculty, and arise as follows — " when a man's acting, possessing, or obtaining from another, in these circumstances, tends to the good of Society, or to the in- terests of the individual consistently with the rights of others and the general good of Society and [when] obstructing him would have the contrary tendency^" and so every "proper right is in some way conducive to the public interest and is founded on some such tendency^" Thus the natural right of liberty "is not only snggested by the selfish part of our constitution but by many generous affections and the moral Sense, which repre- sents our voluntary actions as the grand dignity and perfection of our nature*^" ; and similarly the right over one's own life is held, in trust, to be devoted to the public good, if necessary. ^ History of Political Economy, by Rev. John Kells Ingrain, p. 61. 2 S%jstem, I. p. 281. » Ihid. i. p. 253. * Ibid. I. p. 257. 5 jtj^_ i_ p^ 295. HUTCHESOXS PHILOSOPHY. 229 At the same time, the mere admission of Natural right, if only in a modified form, is sufficient to cause a lapse from the extreme form of Benevolence, for if the Rights of the individual are to be worthy of the name, he must hold them as his own, not merely upon behalf of the social organism as represented in his own person. To further reinforce societ}' against the indi- vidual, Hutcheson introduces an extended scheme of rights due from the individual to the general body of his fellows\ which are obviously intended to outweigh the claims of any single ' member. Even the " adventitious right " of the possession of property is to be explained upon altruistic principles. It I depends upon the right of the first occupant to such " things as are fit for supporting ourselves or those who are dear to us'-," and is confirmed as an incentive to industry, which contributes to the general interest. "Diligence will never be universal, unless men's own necessities and the love of families and friends excite them^." In this connection, Hutcheson admits that the general Benevolent disposition, which plaj'ed such an important part in the earlier portion of the theory, would not be a sufficient motive to labour. Further, while the right to property is bene- fiHaT to the social system as promoting indu.stry, the motive of the individual — failing calm Benevolence, which is admittedly insufficient — can only be either selfish or a narrow particular altruistic affection, which is subject to considerable suspicion from the moral point of view, until legitimated by Benevolence. Indeed Hutcheson admits that the desire for the possession of property is primarily egoistic, for the satisfaction of pressing wants, and he endeavours to offset this admission by insisting upon the duties of persons in easy circumstances, in a civilized community, to devote themselves gratuitously to aiding in movements of public utility. 1 System, ii. p. 105. - Ibid. I. p. 317. 3 Ibid. I. p. 321. CHAPTER XI. (continued). Part II. hutcheson's economics and his relation TO ADAM SMITH. In connection with Hutcheson's remarks concerning property, as well as elsewhere in his later works, there occur some opinions upon economic principles. These possess considerable importance, when it is remembered that Adam Smith had been a student at Glasgow from 1737 — 1740, that he had attended Hutcheson's class and had been much impressed by the person- ality of his teacher. Mr Cannan states that the discovery of Smith's Glasgoiu LeGtu7Xs conclusively proves that much of the theory of the Wealth of Nations had been thought out and taught in class long before Smith became acquainted with the work of the Physiocrats and of Turgot in particular^ He further conjec- tures that the germ of Smith's theory is to be found in the chapter " Concerning the Values or Prices of Goods " in the CoTtipend of Morals \ Additional information concerning Hutcheson enables one to add something to the chain of historical continuity, through connecting Smith's economic work with that of his predecessors as he found it focussed by Hutcheson. Regarding the relations of the two, Mr Cannan gives an interesting psychological account explaining the great influence of the older thinker upon the younger. "In the work of professors, as in other things, a kind of atavism is often observable. A professor has rarely been a student under his 1 Lectures on Justice, Police Revenues, and Arms, by Adam Smith, edited by Edwin Cannan, Oxford, 1896, p. xxiv. - Book II. cb. XII. Smith's Glasgow Lectures, iit supra, p. xxvi, hutcheson's philosophy. 231 immediate predecessor in the chair. While he has been ob- taining experience in a less dignified post, or has been absent acquiring the honour which it is proverbially difficult for a prophet to obtain in his own country, his master has died or retired and been succeeded by a man of an intermediate generation 1 and probably of intermediate views, whom he very likely regards with that slight dash of contempt which men are apt to feel for those who are older than themselves, but yet not old enough to obtain from them the respect universally and fortunately accorded to the surviving lights of a past age and an 'old school,' whose virtues have become uncommon, and whose weaknesses and eccentricities, instead of annoying or disgusting, afford kindly amusement. We should do well, therefore, to look in Adam Smith's work for important traces of the influence of Francis Hutcheson...to whom Smith acknow- ledged obligations and of whom he used warm words of praise ^" It is important to note that Mr Cannan bases his claim for the recognition of Hutcheson's influence upon Smith on the Com- pend of Morals, and the discovery of new light on Hutcheson's life and works adds additional weight to it. In the first place it has been shown that the MS. of the System of Moral Philosophy was used by Hutcheson for his class lectures about 1737, that is before the time Smith attended his class; there- fore, as a student, the latter must have been familiar with the economic data contained in it; and, as will be shown below, these are more considerable than one would expect. Furtherj the System contains many reproductions of views of Pufendorf,; Grotius and Locke upon Politics and Economics. Similar' passages, as Mr Cannan shows by many references, reappear in| Smith's works; and Hutcheson's function was to collect andj classify them, so that they were available for Smith. It might of course be contended that Smith consulted the authorities direct ; but when it is remembered that he heard these very passages read and expounded in the Glasgow class-room, and 1 The following are the names of Professors of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow: 1727 Gershom Carmichael, 1730 Francis Hutcheson, 1746 Thomas Craigie, 1752 Adam Smith, 1764 Thomas Reid. 2 Smith's Glasgow Lectures, ut supra, p. xxv. 232 hutcheson's philosophy. further that the System was published a few years after his appointment to the Chair of Moral Philosophy, when he would be preparing his own lectures, it seems only reasonable to trace Hutcheson's influence here. Thus, in this case as elsewhere, he belonged to the Enlightenment, preparing a thesaurus of valuable material for his successor. In the second place. Smith is indebted to Hutcheson for jthe general philosophical position that is presupposed by his Economics. In both thinkers we find the same natural liberty, Optimism and Naturalism generally, with Smith as an assump- tion with Hutcheson as a thesis. It is true that the same general point of view reappears amongst the Physiocrats, and it has been pointed out that its appearance in France was due to the influence of Shaftesbury ^ Indeed it was this common ground that made the affiliation of Physiocratic principles to those derived from Hutcheson possible for Smith in the Wealth of Nations. But here, as in the former case, the fortunate find of the Glasgow Lectures conclusively settles the question : for these lectures might be best described as a brilliant and original commentary upon those of the "never- to-be-forgotten Hutcheson." At first sight it would appear that there was little similarity between the two sets of lectures, which by a curious coincidence were not intended by either professor for publication. The difference however is largely one of arrangement, Smith, as he explicitly mentions, reversing the order of " others," therein including Hutcheson-. The System and Conipend of Morals are very badly divided. The first book in each case deals with Ethics, the second begins with Ethical investigations and continues with Rights and Property, the third contains some economical matter and the theory of the State. Now Smith in his lectures first dealt with Ethics — and this part of his course is represented by the Theory of Moral Sentiments — next he treated Economics separately, giving this subject a distinct position under the head of ^ Die allgemeinen Phil. Grmidlagen der von F. Quesnay und Adam Smith begriindeten Pol. Oecon., von W. Hasbacb, p. 59. 2 Smith's Glasgow Lectures, p. 8. hutcheson's philosophy. 233 " Police'." The remainder of Hutcheson's material constitutes three groups of subjects ; and, following the hint in the intro- duction of Smith's Glasgow Lectures, it will be found that Hutcheson's order is reversed. Thus the treatment of the two men runs as follows : Hutcheson's System Smith's Glasqoxo Lectures Book II. chaps. 6 — 13, .subject-matter treated in Part i. Division iii. )) III- It ^ '5 11 11 11 11 11 1'- » III- 11 -1 — 8 )> )) 11 11 11 1- It need scarcely be added that, as Mr Caiman shows. Smith's work is a distinct advance upon that of Hutcheson, and here one might conjecture that Smith's admirable historical treatment may have been suggested by the example of Hume. Notwithstanding the excellent work done in tracing out the growth of Adam Smith's theory of Economics, it would appear that Hutcheson's contribution towards its development has failed to secure sufficient notice. The importance of his influence upon Smith's Ethics has indeed been fully recognised, but most writers, as for instance Skarzj^nski, after a bare mention of Hutcheson's economic work, emphasize Smith's indebtedness to Hume-. Now there is not the least doubt,"^' , that there is much common to Hutcheson and Hume as "'^ ^ economists; and this may readily be accounted for by their close personal relations, and also by that great deference already mentioned which Hume showed to Hutcheson's opinions. Therefore if Smith had not known Hutcheson, nor heard his lectures, many of the views of the earlier thinker would, in all probability, have found their way into his lectures and thence to the Wealth of Nations through Hume. But it has already been shown that Hutcheson's work had made a great impression upon Smith and so it might have been conjectured that he would have availed himself of such material as proved suitable directly. Not only so, but in certain directions Hutcheson in \ Economics is closer than Hume to Adam Smith — in fact many ^ Part II. Division ii., "Of Cheapness and Plenty." '^ Adam Smith als Moralithilosoph und Schopfer der Nationalokonomie, passim. 234 HUTCHESONS PHILOSOPHY. of the principles used by both the later thinkers are traceable to the earlier one. To Hume Adam Smith may owe a working example of the value of historical treatment and detail, which may have led to that " copiousness of felicitous illustration," for which he is justly celebrated ^ These characteristics, though not altogether wanting, are certainly far from prominent in the System. Several writers have drawn attention to Hutcheson's chapter on the " Values of Goods in Commerce and the Nature of Coin-," and this is often spoken of as his sole contribution to Political Economy. As a matter of fact there are several important remarks upon economics which occur in odd and unlikely corners of the System. If these are read together important parallels to well-known passages in Smith's Avork will at once be noticed. Needless to say the Wealth of Nations is immensely more full of detail ; but if we compare these passages in Hutcheson with the corresponding sections of "Cheapness and Plenty" in the Glasgow Lectures, it will appear that the difference between the latter work and Hutcheson's is no greater than between the Lectures and the WealtJi of Nations. Upon looking into the subject-matter of Hutcheson's economical work a striking example of Smith's indebtedness to his old teacher, rather than to Hume, at once becomes apparent in the order of treatment adopted. Hume, it need scarcely be remarked, dealt with economics in a series of disconnected essays, and " some have represented Smith's work as of so loose a texture and so defective in arrangement, that it may be justly described as a series of monographs^" It would therefore appear that the alleged discontinuity of the Wealth of Nations might be due to Hume's mode of expression, but a closer examination shows that the order of the topics discussed in the economic portions of Hutcheson's System is repeated in Smith's Glasgow Lectures and again in the Wealth of Nations. The 1 A Short History of Political Economy in England, by L. L. Price, M.A., p. li. ■-' System, ii. p. 53 ; Intr. Mor. Phil. p. 199. ■* History of Political Economy, by John Kells Ingram, p. 93. HUTCHESON S PHILOSOPHY. 235 following table, showing the order of treatment in the three books will make this point clear, though of course the parallelism may be nothing more than coincidence. Adam Smith Hutcheson s System Subjects Glo sgow Lectures Wealth of Nations Bk. II. Ch. IV. Division of Labour /"Necessaries and comforts require Pt. II Div. II. §§ 3- -5 Bk. I. Ch 1,2 5 » VI. - an universal labo- ' )) )) )) » rious industry " J) XII. Value )) )j )) ») 4 5) )) Value in use and ii exchange 1 J) §7 )> )) )) )) » Money medium of' exchange )) )) Money standard of value y » §8 5) 5> 4—5 }1 )) Price )) §7 » )> 7 )) >5 Wages )) §7 )' )) 8 )5 XIII. Theory and rate o interest f »> §14 )) )) 9—10 )5 )) Explanation of Ren t )> §16 )) )) 11 Bk. Ill Ch. IX. State and Foreig 1 Trade )) §§10- 12 Book IV n Maxims of Taxatioi 1 Part [II. Book V. Probably the first subject mentioned (namely the Division of Labour), as being dealt with by Hutcheson, may amuse the reader, who credits writers of monographs with a more or less praisew^orthy endeavour to show that their "author" has " anticipated " the largest possible number of later theories. Consequently one rather shrinks from claiming priority for Hutcheson in this case, were it not that a passage in his System seems to have been before the mind of Adam Smith when writing of the advantages of the organization of industry., Hutcheson, having justified the state of liberty, proceeds to' show that we are indebted for comforts and conveniences of life "to the friendly aids of onr fellows." " 'Tis plain," he continues, " that a man in absolute solitude, though he were of mature strength, and fully instructed in all our arts of life, could scarcely procure to himself the bare necessaries of life, 23G hutcheson's philosophy. /even in the best soils or climates; much less could he procure any grateful conveniences.... The mutual aids of a few in a small 1 family may procure most of the necessaries of life and diminish ; dangers, and aftbrd room for some social joys, as well as finer pleasures. The same advantages could still be obtained more effectually and copiously by the mutual assistance of a few such families, living in one neighbourhood, as they could execute more operose designs for the common good of all ; and would furnish more joyful exercises of our social dispositions. " Nay 'tis well known that the produce of the labours of any given number, twenty for instance, in providing the necessaries or conveniences of life, shall be much greater by assigning to one a certain sort of work of one kind, in which he will soon acquire skill and dexterity, and to another assigning work of a different kind, than if each one of the twenty were obliged to employ himself by turns in all the different sorts of labour re(][uisite for his subsistence, without sufficient dexterity in any. In the former method each procures a great quantity of goods of one kind, and can exchange a part of it for such goods, obtained by the labours of others as he shall stand in need of. One grows expert in tillage, another in pasture and breeding cattle, a third in masonry, a fourth in the chace, a fifth in iron- works, a sixth in the arts of the loom, and so on throughout the rest. Thus all are supplied by means of barter with the works of complete artists. In the other method, scarce any one could be dexterous and skilful in any one sort of labour. "Again some works of the highest use to multitudes can be effectually executed by the joint labours of many, which the separate labours of the same numbers could never have exe- cuted. The joint force of many can repel dangers arising from savage beasts or bands of robbers, which might have been fatal to many individuals were they separately to encounter them. The joint labours of twenty men will cultivate forests or drain marshes for farms to each one, and jjrovide houses for habi- tation and inclosures for their flocks, much sooner than the separate labours of the same number. By concert and alternate relief they can keep a perpetual watch, which without concert they could not accomplish. hutcheson's philosophy. 237 "Larger associations may further enlarge our means of enjoy- ment, and give more extensive and delightful exercise to our powers of every kind. The inventions, experience and arts of multitudes are communicated, knowledge is increased and social affections more diffused. Larger societies have force to execute greater designs of more lasting and extensive advantaged" In this passage Hutcheson anticipates Adam Smith's claim for the advantages of Division of Labour in the separation of employments and the increase of dexterity, while the growth of invention and the distinction between simple and complex co- operation are also implied. What is new in Smith's Lectures is the direct application of the principle to existing industrial conditions. In treating of Hutcheson's work upon the theory of Value, Mr Rae mentions that his remarks read " like a first draft of Smith's famous passage on value in use and value in ex- change-." Further, though Hutcheson does not use Smith's terms, his language suggests them. " The natural ground of all value or price is some sort of use which goods afford in life ; this is prerequisite to all estimation. But the prices or values in commerce do not at all follow the real use or importance of goods for the support or natural pleasure of life I" Utility or "use" means "not only a natural subserviency to our support or some natural pleasure, but any tendency to give any satis- faction by prevailing custom or fancy, as a matter of ornament or distinction^" The differentia between utility and wealth is found in the presence of labour as an essential characteristic of the latter. Dr Bonar mentions that it was " perhaps due to Hutcheson ^ " that Smith makes " labour the real measure of the exchangfe- o able value of all commodities"; but it should be noted that while Hutcheson emphasizes the position of labour he does not make it the sole distinguishing characteristic of wealth, for he also adds the limitation of supply and appropriation — as for ^ j >■ System, i. pp. 287—290. - Life of Adam Smith, p. 14. / 3 System, ii. p. 53. ■* Ibid. ii. p. 54. 5 Philosophy and Political Economy, p. 118. 238 hutcheson's philosophy. instance, " the rarity or scarcity' of the materials in nature, or such accidents as prevent plentiful crops of certain fruits of the earth ; and the great ingenuity and taste requisite in the artists to finish well some works of art, as men of such genius are rare. The value is also raised by the dignity of station in which, according to the custom of a country, the men must live who provide us with certain goods or works of art>." It is interesting to notice that, when this passage was revised in the Gompend of Morals, it is added that some things possessed of utility are not separable from commodities but that they possess value as enhancing the price of that of which they are " appendages," as for instance "a fine prospect" increases the price of a dwelling-house-. It is not contended that Hutcheson was the discoverer of the advantages of Division of Labour, nor of the importance of labour an an element in Wealth, only that he influenced Adam Smith. With regard to the former, the priority of Plato has long been recognized, but it may not be out of place to add that Hutcheson's treatment of Labour is expanded from Cicero's De Officiis'\ an indebtedness which Hutcheson himself acknowledges*. Adam Smith follows Hutcheson closely in the section on 'Money, except that in the more systematic treatment of the later writer it is closely connected with Division of Labour — a conclusion that indeed follows logically from the passage quoted above from the System-'. Hutcheson treats money as a medium of exchange, and as a standard both of value and of deferred payments. The following passage shows the character of his work on this head— "The qualities requisite to the most perfect standard are these ; it must be something generally desired, so that men are willing to take it in exchange. The very making any sort of goods the standard will of itself give them this quality. It must be portable ; which will often be the case if it be rare, so that small quantities are of great value. It must 1 System, ii. p. 55. With regard to appropriation, cf. Ibid. u. Chap. vi. passim. 2 Intr. to Moral Phil. p. 200. ^ n. chap. 3—5. * System, i. p. 290. ^ Supra, p. 236. hutcheson's philosophy. 239 be divisible without loss into small parts, so as to be suited to the values of all sorts of goods ; and it must be durable, not easily wearing by use or perishing in its nature." He also investigates the effect of the production of the precious metals and concludes that "the most invariable salary would be so many days' labour of men, or a fixed quantity of goods produced by the plain inartificial labours, such goods as answer the ordinary purposes of life\" Hutcheson writes on Money with a remarkable freedom from Mercantile sympathies. " Coin," he says, " is ever valued as a commodity in commerce, as well as other goods^" and he strongly condemns governmental interference either with the export of the precious metals or in tampering with the coinage. To debase the coinage means "cheating" the subjects of the state — and in this connection Adam Smith's expression "de- frauding" will be remembered. Quite the most significant side of Hutcheson's relation to Adam Smith appears in connection with Distribution. The Glasgow Lectures are almost silent upon this subject and it is more than a coincidence that the same remark applies to Hutcheson's Economic work. With reference to wages there is nothing in Hutcheson and very little in the Glasgoiu Lectures, while both Capital and Rent are treated very slightly indeed — Smith has more detail, but Hutcheson comes nearer the enunciation of principles. Mr Cannan conjectures that the dissertations on division of labour, money, prices, &c. existed " very nearly in their present form " before Smith went to France, and that he acquired the idea of a scheme of distribution from the Physiocrats'. Mr Higgs is loth to accept this statement, and he shows, on the other hand, that there is "no reason for supposing Smith was entirely ignorant of French economics in 1768 " by the citation of many works of the Physiocrats published before this date^ Still the question is not so much whether Smith might have known 1 System, i. p. 63 ; cf. authorities cited by Mr Caunan, Smith's Glasgow Lectures, pp. 185, 186, note. - Ibid. I. p. 57. * Glasgow Lectures, p. xxxi. * The Economic Journal, vi. p. 611. 240 hutcheson's philosophy. French work in 1763 as whether, as a matter of fact, he was mainly, then, under English or French influence, and secondly how the differences between the Lectures and the Wealth of Nations are to be accounted for. The second problem is outside the range of the present work ; but, with regard to the first, a preliminary difficulty should be cleared up. Writers on Eco- nomics are most acquainted with Natural Liberty or Naturalism in the work of the Physiocrats, but a cursory examination of Hutcheson's Philosophy will show that he too held this view, and, at the risk of repetition, it may again be added that he was Smith's teacher. Now the Naturalism of Hutcheson and the Physiocrats had a common origin in Shaftesbury. Not even in Laputa could it be maintained that the Physiocrats influenced Hutcheson, since he was dead before they began to write ; on the other side, it is quite possible that Hutcheson may have exerted some influence upon the Physiocrats, since his works were popular in France and had been translated. Therefore on the whole the evidence is convincing that Smith learnt of Natural Liberty in the Glasgow class-room. Next, to come to points of detail, the chief matters of interest dealt with in the Glasgow Lectures had appeared in Hutcheson's System and had been spoken of long before in the class. More remarkable still there is a certain similarity between the work of the two men. As has been shown, some of what Smith has to say upon division of labour, labour as the standard of value, value in use and in exchange, money and also some of the maxims of taxation, had been anticipated by Hutcheson. So far both agree, and finally we reach something of the nature of an instantia cruets, when it has been found, as has been shown above, that both Smith's Ljectures and Hutcheson's work differ from the Wealth of Nations in giving only the slightest possible treatment of Distribution. Therefore the main influence in the Glasgow Lectures must be that of Hutcheson. This does not amount to a claim for originality upon behalf of Hutcheson, many of whose views (as in his Philosophy) were borrowed. Few as Hutcheson's remarks upon Distribution are, they are not without historical interest. " Price," presumably in- hutcheson's philosophy. 241 eluding wages, is resolvable into, in addition, remuneration of the employer. Rent and Interest. " Wages of Superintendence" depend upon the " labours " of the emploj^er, " the care, atten- tion, accounts and correspondence about themS and in some cases take in also the condition of the person so employed, according to the custom of our country. The expence of his station in life must be defrayed by the price of such labours, and they deserve compensation as well as any other. This additional price of their hxbours is the just foundation of the ordinary profits of merchants'." It is also worth mentioning that Hutchesou subsequently makes provision for insurance against risk of loss of capital employed in trade. The few sentences given to the explanation of rent arej interesting as showing a divergence of Smith from Hutcheson.^ According to the former, landlords "love to reap where they, have not sowed," but Hiitcheson, himself a landowner, found nothing extraordinary in this. Having established private property, as in the general interest, and also the rights of bequests and inheritance, he states "that some goods bear natural fruits or increase, as lands, tiocks, herds, gardens. The grant of these fruits naturally desen^es a price or rent^" A consideration of some importance emerges in Hutcheson's theory of Interest which is not followed by Smith. Bohm- Bawerk mentions Turgot as the first to express the " Fructifica- tion Theory^." Now twenty-one years before the publication of Turgot's Reflexions this theory was outlined in Hutcheson's System, and the idea was probably given in lectures some nineteen years earlier. After the passage quoted above on Rent, Hutcheson continues— " Tho' goods have no fruits or increase, yet, if they yield gi'eat convenience in life, and have cost such labour or expence as would have acquired goods naturally fruitful, if the proprietor grants the use of them — he may justly demand a price, such as he would have had, if he had employed his money or labour on goods naturally fruitful.^ This is the case in the setting of houses. 1 Hutcheson's letters show he had personal experience of this kind of "labour." 2 Sxjstem, II. p. G.3. ^ Ibid. ii. p. 71. 4 Kapital unci Kiqntahins, Eng. Tr. p. 61. S. H. l^ 242 hutcheson's philosophy. "If, in any way of trade, men can make far greater gains by help of a large stock of money, than they could without it, 'tis but just that he who supplies them with the money— the necessary means of this gain— should have for the use of it some share of the profit he could have made by purchasing things naturally fruitful. This shows the just foundation of interest upon money lent^." The repetition of the word "just" suggests rather the moral doctrinaire than the economist ; but when Hutcheson subsequently comes to discuss the rate of interest, he bases his conclusions upon Demand and Supply, and in the course of his work there is much that is repeated both by Hume and Smith. The next economic topic that Hutcheson reaches is the relation of the State to foreign trade. Mr Price has shown that Adam Smith's position with regard to Free Trade rests on his "conception of the functions of money, combined... with his belief in the advantages of the division of labour-." Now both of these were in germ in Hutcheson's work, and yet when he comes to deal with international trade, it cannot be said that he has in any way anticipated Smith's deduction from the premisses common to both. Though he is not a pronounced Mercantilist, he writes of increase in wealth as due to a surplus of exports over imports. All exports should be free of duties and taxes, as well as all imported necessaries. Young in- dustries and import of raw material should be encouraged by bounties ^ Hutcheson's remarks upon Taxation are brief, but, more than much of his work, condensed ; and one can scarcely avoid the conclusion that they suggested Adam Smith's maxims of Taxation. It is true there is no trace of the second (the certainty of the tax). " Conveniency " is contained in embryo, and may have been expanded from the expression that taxes are " most convenient which are laid on matters of luxury and splendour^" The fourth and first are explicitly mentioned — 1 System, ii. p. 71. 2 Short History of Political Economy in England, p. 29. 3 System, ii. pp. 318, 319, Hutcheson also proposes that unmarried persons should pay higher taxes, and that " sloth should be punished by temporary servitude at least ! " * Ibid. II. p. 341, Cf. Wealth of Nations, Book v. Chap. 2, § 3. hutcheson's philosophy. 243 the fourth under the head of the advantage of taxes " which can be easily raised without many expensive offices for collecting them " — and the first is specially emphasized. " But above all a just proportion to the wealth of the people should be observed in whatever is raised from them." The means by which the necessary information might be obtained are discussed. This is spoken of as a " census or estimation of all the wealth of private families at frequently recurring periods"; by such a census, " all would be burdened proportionately to their wealth'." Finally, inasmuch as the plan of the present work involves the isolation of Hutcheson's works of a period later than the System in the following chapter, certain revisions of his eco- nomic theory, contained in the Conipend of Murals, should logicallj' find their jjlace there ; but since these changes are trifling it may not be out of place to conclude the present account of his economics with some mention of them: — especially as a return to this subject later would involve a want of continuity of treatment. Besides the addition of " fine pros- pects" to individual wealth (rather than to national) the following changes may be noticed. Hutcheson appears to have anticipated Prof Smart in making goods convertible with "services^." In restating his views on Rent, he touches the border-line of a " tenants-gain." — " As in lands all the profits of a plentiful year fall to the tenant, so he must bear the casual losses of a less fortunate one. Indeed the rarer cases of extra- ordinary losses, such as wars^, inundations, pestilence, seem to be just exceptions ; as the tenant cannot be presumed to have subjected himself to rents in such cases. And in most of contracts the agreements of parties alter the obligations"*." Also he adds a stipulation to his treatment of currency, that bank-notes should be convertible — " when notes or tickets pass for money, their value depends on this, that they give good security for the payment of certain sums in gold or silver'." 1 System, n. p. 341. 2 Int. to Mor. Phil. Glas. 1753, p. 199. Cf. Distribution of Income, passim. •' I.e. civil wars, of which, it will be remembered, Hutcheson had personal experience. ^ Ibid. p. 208. 5 xiifi ii_ p 203. 16—2 CHAPTER XIL HUTCHESON's philosophy — FOURTH FORM, IN THE COMPEXDS — THE INFLUENCE OF THE STOICS, THROUGH MARCUS AURELIUS. It would seem reasonable to expect that the Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Gompendiaria published in 1742, and after- wards translated into English as A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, would be simply a summary of the argument of the System of Moral Philosophy. This however is not so, as a careful comparison of the smaller with the larger work proves that, in the interval between the composition of the latter and the publication of the former, Hutcheson had again fallen under a fresh influence, which leads to a further exposition and modi- fication of his theory. In fact these three Compends — of Morals and Metaphysics (both published in 1742) and of Logic (1756) — have been too much neglected, in expositions of Hutche- son's work ; this may be, in part, due to the natural expectation that they are merely summaries of views elsewhere expressed more fully ; and, in part, to their unpretentious appearance as compared with the "large paper" form, in which the System was published. Together they constitute three small pocket volumes, and the Logicae Compendivm is a very thin one, and it is difficult to realize that together they contain almost as much matter as the System. Nor can it be maintained that the Compend of Morals is only a j^opular exposition, designed for students and the general reader; since, though dedicated " to Students in the universities," it contains more references to authorities than any other of Hutcheson's works — indeed he hutcheson's philosophy. 245 states that he had intended " to make references " to the more eminent writers, ancient and modern, who treated of the subjects It may be thought that there is a want of historical completeness in assigning chronological priority to the System, upon the ground of the date of its composition, as compared with that of the publicatio)i of the " Compends " ; for it could be contended that the latter works might possibly have been in MS. for a considerable time, and therefore they might be even earlier than the publications treated of in what has been called Hutcheson's " third period." But there is some external and much internal evidence against this view. With regard to the former, in the letters to Drennan, it appears that the " Compends " of Morals and Metaphysics were printed from "some loose, hastily wrote papers^," and that, in Oct. 1743, Hutcheson taught the third part — De Deo — of the Synopsis Metaphysieae to his class. Now in 1741 it appears he had been using the MS. of the System for this purpose^ so that, though the evidence is not conclusive it seems that the two "Compends," published in 1742, were printed very soon after they had been written. This conjecture is confirmed by several internal cha- racteristics. First, one might apply a test to Hutcheson's work, founded on the canon of Shakesperian criticism, connected with the lateness of " weak endings " ; namely an increase in the number of Senses, which multiplied approximately at the rate of one for every two years. Between the Inquiry and the Essay on the Passions there is an interval of nearly four years ; and, in the latter, two new Senses are added. Between the Essay on the Passions and the System there is an interval of about nine years, and there are several new Senses added ; if " novelty " and " grandeur " be taken as distinct, not as aspects or subdivisions of the general vEsthetic Sense, Novelty is a distinct addition, and Grandeur might perhaps be added ; " Reflection " or " Consciousness " is sometimes spoken of as a Sense, Decorum is new and also Sympathy, unless it be treated 1 Short Introduction to Moral Philoeophij, Preface. '■^ Vide letter quoted above, p. 115. » Vide p. 114. J A m. 24G hutcheson's philosophy. as an equivalent of the Public Sense of the Passions, so that though the exact number of the additions in the System may be uncertain, it might be averaged at from three to five, and ^^this is proportionate to the interval of time. Now both the " Compends " agree in retaining all the Internal Senses of the System and besides add two new ones, the Senses of the Ridiculous and of Veracity'. Tliis again corresponds with the "Tiormal rate of increase, namely two new Senses to an interval ^ of four or five years._ Needless to say, this mathematical rate of progression should not be insisted upon — it is a mere coincidence that there is a rough ratio in the growth of Hutcheson's new discoveries or analyses ; but, at the same time, it is an undoubted fact that each later work shows a tendency to add to the number, and that, therefore, the presence of new senses in the " Compends" is strong evidence that they were written later than the System. Secondly, it is worth mentioning that each period of Hutcheson's work contains the germ of the dominant idea of that which follows it — for instance, the Essay on the Passions introduces incidentally the ideas of Dignity and Perfection, which become essential in the System. Now the System similarly introduces incidentally the idea of Conscience as an alternative for the Moral Faculty, and, in the " Compends," Conscience is the regvdar synonym — this in all probability is due to the Essay on Virtue, published with Butler's Analogy in 1737 ; and, therefore, too late to affect the System in its structure. In the third place, a cursory inspection of the " Compends " — and especially that of Morals — shows that there is a large increase in Stoic terminology and modes of thought, and this is explicable by the influence of Marcus Aurelius, whose works were translated by Hutcheson and Moor during the summer of 1741^. This characteristic, which is quite unmistakeable, con- clusively shows that the translation of Marcus Aurelius and the "Compends" belong to the same date — probably from 1740 to the beginning of 1742. 1 Veracity, it need scarcely be remarked, is obviously borrowed from Butler. - Letter quoted above, p. 81. hutcheson's philosophy. 247 Though Hutcheson had known Aurelius before under- taking the translation — indeed he frequently owns his in- debtedness in the Inquiry and the Essay on the Passions^ — a closer acquaintance drew him nearer to the Stoic point of view. As with many other tliinkers of his time, Cicero was, for him, the only historian of ancient Philosophy ; and hence one finds him prone to refer rather to minor writers — such as little- known Peripatetics or Platonists — than to seek inspiration from the masters of Greek Thought. It is a curious coincidence that the same remark applies to Shaftesbury's relation to Art — he mentions Carlo Maratti as one of the painters whom he would have wished to treat the "Judgment of Herculesl" It is strange, too, that Hutcheson does not take his Stoicism from the fountain head, but rather adopts it directly from Marcus Aurelius, and hence one finds no reference to the theory as held by Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus. Though Aurelius was the " last of the Stoics," he held the theory in a modified form ; and this, added to Hutcheson's early acquaintance with it through Cicero, made its incorporation in the " Compends " possible. To the general Stoic position may be attributed the importance now assigned to the " life according to Nature" and, as against the Clarke school, " conformity to Nature " (not to Reason) the ideal of the "good man"; many references to Perfection (in the Stoic sense), the prominence of ''' impulse " ; the position of Conscience as to yjyefjLovtKov and the introduction of "right Reason" — the 6pOc% vP /- CHAPTER XIII. hutcheson's general influence upon the " enlightenment " in scotland. The access to fresh sources of information, concerning Hutcheson's personality and mode of thought, renders a re- vahiation of his historical position and influence necessary. All thinkers of importance, who succeeded him in Scotland, left materials for exhaustive biographies behind them, and they themselves were at no small pains to characterise their relation to the problems of the age. Hutcheson's personality has been shrouded in mystery ; and, in default of fact, a certain amount of fiction or myth has grown up round his contribution to the intellectual progress of his adopted country. From the foregoing narrative of his life — wanting, though it be, in the detail that renders a biography of interest — there is no difficulty in gathering the impression, from its broad outlines, of what he conceived his message to his generation to be and the effects which resulted from it. He himself says, " I am called ' New Light ' here," and this expression embodies the whole secret of his attitude to the questions of his time. He^ was pre-eminently the messenger of culture and opponent of Philistinism, whether in the Church, the University, or social life. In a word he was a Philosopher of the Enlighten- ment in Scotland. While the expression — A ufkldrung— is a commonplace in accounts of German and French Philosophy of the last century, it has seldom, if ever, been used in reference to this country ; yet the remarkable output of metaphysical and ethical works, already noticed i, would lead one to expect 1 Chapter vi. S. H. 17 258 hutcheson's general influence some exponent of a poiDular philosophy which aided in pre- paring the way for Hume and subsequent thinkers from 1740 onwards. Indeed, since Hutcheson bore the brunt of criticisms upon the British Enlightenment, and was generally acknow- ledged as a leader, if not the leader of it, in his lifetime, it would be scarcely just that he should be denied the honour, such as it is, after his death. Already many of the salient features of his popular mode of thought have been sketched ; and these suggest some com- parisons of interest between the Enlightenment in Scotland and that in Germany and, later, in France. In all cases there was a popularisation of knowledge, but more especially in France, owing to the tendency of the ecclesiastics to monopolise culture. Despite the general high level of learning both in Germany and Scotland, it is a remarkable fact, that it was left to Hutcheson to revive the study of Greek Literature at Glasgow, and this achievement is chronicled by his biographer, as one of his most important legacies to posterity^ \ It will have been noticed, too, that in Scotland, as in Germany, the new Philosophy was eclectic, therein differing from that of the French Enlightenment. In all three countries there is the same quest for "the natural," but though the tendencies may be generalised under this single expression, the diverse interpretations part into contraries; for, in France, in the latter half of the century, there was a tendency to accept the " natural " as man's powers expressed " in their lowest terms," while Hutcheson aimed, at least, at expanding them to the highest. Hutcheson's Philosophy of the Enlightenment, too, is thoroughly differentiated from that of Germany, by his in- sistency upon Benevolence as opposed to the Egoistic Idealism of the thought before Kant. Further, the cardinal position he gives to Beauty, though, as it has been shown, in a merely mathematical sense, is worthy of note. In fact, if one may risk a broad generalisation, the tendency of the French Enlighten- ment was egoistic and hedonistic in ethics, realistic in meta- physics, and anarchic in its theory of the State : that of Germany was also egoistic in ethics and sentimental perhaps 1 Leecbman, ut supra. UPON THE " ENLIGHTENMENT " IN SCOTLAND. 259 rather than sensuous : that in Scotland, as represented by Hutcheson, his pupils and followers, was altruistic and esthetic in ethics, — what it was in metaphysics, in view of current con- tradictory estimates, must be postponed for future consideration. The Enlightenment in Scotland, as expounded by Hutcheson, has certain features of interest, when one remembers that he was a follower of Shaftesbury and the Hellenism of the latter with his protest against the unloveliness of Puritanism. Omitting for the moment Hutcheson's applications of these in minor matters, the question remains, what was his position to these foci of Shaftesbury's system ? Did he return to Scotland, the home of the Puritan spirit, as a deserter or as a repentant prodigal ? Possibly the answer that would be truest was that he was partly one, partly the other; though he certainly conceived himself as in opposition to the " zealots " — a soldier in the liberation war of humanity — as Heine ex- presses it. Yet there was such a persistence in the Puritan spirit, that it leavens the descendants of all those who have participated in it (as Hutcheson's ancestors had), and this inheritance runs through and determines his whole outlook. It is to be remembered also that he was a "child of the manse," in fact, doubly so, since both his grandfather and father were Presbyterian ministers, and there is no doubt that his early training left indelible traces upon his mind. Con- sequently, however thorough he imagined his revolt to be, it was still Puritanism modified from within, not revolutionised from without, and this fact probably explains the leverage that gave him much of his influence in Scotland. At no point is Hutcheson's difference, when compared with Shaftesbury, more marked than here. The Hellenism of the latter was, at least, an endeavour to reproduce the broad outlines of the Greek Ideal of life ; while Hutcheson, on the contrary, evidently found it wanting in moral earnestness, and hence he draws his in- spiration from Cicero and the Stoic moralists of the Roman Empire. Thus we find that, while Hutcheson protests against Class- ical literature being placed upon a Puritan " index " of pro- hibited books, this same Puritanism determines his choice of 17—2 260 hutcheson's general influence authors in a manner exclusive of the main end which dictated Shaftesbury's Hellenic revival. This characteristic has several important consequences. In the first place it inevitably adds to the already large amount of Eclecticism Hutcheson had learnt from Shaftesbury. Starting from Cicero, as he explicitly states in his first work, he has a natural tendency to avoid all metaphysical problems, and there are few writers who more persistently evade supplying answers, or, when one is im- perative, give the perplexed reader a larger number to choose from. Further, Shaftesbury aimed at a renaissance rather of the Greek Ideal than of Greek Philosophy as such; while Hutcheson's Classicism being derived from Philosophical writers inevitably tends to revive many of their opinions. When it is added that his favourite authorities were Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, it is easy to see that his debt to "the Antients" resembles a mosaic, in being composed of separate borrowings from many sources. Further, Hutcheson, like Shaftesbury, differed from the Cambridge Platonists, in endeavouring to come to terms with contempo- rary thought ; and here, again, his procedure was eclectic. He borrows alike from Descartes, Locke, Wolff and Berkeley, so that the final result is an eclectic treatment of modern Philosophy, superimposed upon Ancient Eclecticism. Such a type of thought could not be expected to be consistent, but it was eminently popular and educational, and therefore served its purpose as a philosophic enlightenment. In the second place, Hutcheson's modification of Shaftes- bury's Hellenism is of importance in stamping his preference for one of the two answers to national needs already indicated^ ; with him, when his Stoic training is remembered, Benevolence takes precedence of Beauty, and, thus an explanation is found for his concentration of attention upon the former, and for the practical ignoring of the essential features of the latter. This is all the more curious, since, through the accident of his having written a separate treatise on Beauty, Hutcheson is often named as the founder of modern aesthetics, though either Shaftesbury or Arbuckle might be mentioned, as having 1 Chapter viii, pp. 148—155. UPON THE " ENLIGHTENMENT " IN SCOTLAND. 261 mure adequately treated the subject, the former earlier and the latter at the same time as Hutcheson^ In the third place, such Classicism was obviously im- perfect, and it failed in that there was a tendency to introduce Greek literature through Latin reproductions, and this, though in a smaller degree, was precisely the same rock upon which Scholasticism had struck. The number of editions and trans- lations of the later Stoics, mentioned above, during the first half of last century was remarkable, and though Hutcheson was prominent in popularising their opinions, he was little more than the spokesman of a broad tendency both here and in Germany. It is interesting to note how one of the many movements originating from Hutcheson swings round to precisely the opposite point from which he started. As already mentioned his Classicism begins with Cicero, who became for that gene- ration — and indeed long remained — the entrance way to Greek Philosophy. This tendency continued, but quite apart from the general line of historical development, and it may be taken to culminate in the eccentric Lord Mouboddo, who was in the habit of replying to the questions of his correspondents by sending them long extracts from Plato or Aristotle, sometimes amounting to four or five pages of ordinary type ; and, on one occasion, he expressly declares that Latin writers on Phi- losophy are "contemptible," and he would even advise every student to read Roman History only in the works of Greek writers. One of the difficulties in dealing with an eclectic writer, such as Hutcheson, is that one is forced to proceed by digres- sions, and granting that he was the prototype of the Scottish Enlightenment, it is necessary to investigate the claim adduced on more than one occasion that he was the father or founder of the " Scottish School " or of " Scottish Philosophy." If it were only possible to ascertain what these expressions were intended to convey, the whole matter could be disposed of in a few lines. Unfortunately there is no unanimity or fixed definition, and therefore it is somewhat wearisome to disen- 1 James Arhuckle in Mind, N. S. vol. viii. No. 30 (April, 1899). 26*2 hutcheson's general influence tangle the exact signification each writer intends to give his reader. Obviously " Scottish Philosophy " may mean two very different things, either (a) Philosophy produced in Scotland or by Scotsmen, or (b) the special type of thought expounded by Reid, which is also known as the Common Sense School, or Natural Realism. It might scarcely be credited that the former interpretation would be used, since it introduces an utterly false principle of classification, that of mere " provincialism " ; and to say that Hutcheson was the founder of Scottish Philosophy in this sense, is to pay a very poor compliment to the state of learning in the country prior to 1730; besides ignoring the claims of very many thinkers, whose work, if not profoundly original, was at least of sufficient importance to deserve some mention in any chronicle of the country's speculative achieve- ments. Yet this is exactly the line of argument that the late Dr M'^Cosh appears to adopt. To secure inclusion in his volume on The Scottish Philosophy, apparently, a writer should have prefaced his work with a condensed family-tree to show that he was " connected with Scotland^" Such a phrase suggests sufficiently wide possibilities and yet it is not wide enough to include all homogeneous thinkers, else how comes it that Cousin (who, according to M^'Cosh has written " a most faultless historical disquisition upon Scottish Philosophy ") is excluded? One step more is needed, namely to follow the example of certain unfortunate societies for persons belonging to some county or clan, and to offer membership not only to those with Scottish connections, but also with Scottish sym- pathies. Not only is there an error in the inclusion, but also in the exclusion, else how comes Kant to be omitted and Shaftesbury to be included ? Upon closer enquiry, however, it will be found that M'^Cosh has a somewhat lengthy test to propose before he admits persons as members of the Scottish " school " or " fraternity." They must " proceed inductively," " employing self-conscious- ness as the instrument of observation," and thereby " reach principles prior to and independent of experience-." If only this test had been fairly applied, the size of the volume would 1 p. 7. ^ Scottish Philosophy, pp. 2 — 6, UPON THE " EXLIGHTENMEXT " IN SCOTLAND. 2Go have been reduced by one-half. How can the hist chiuse be .stretched to admit Hume, or the Associationali.sts such as Brown and James Mill, and why if the latter be admitted is his son excluded ? It would be an exceedingly difficult thesis to maintain that Hutcheson conformed to all these conditions, but suppose his claim were admitted, obviously Shaftesbury has a better title to be the " founder," and again, every passage that was admitted as satisfying the test could be traced back to Cicero and other Eclectics, and here we should find the true origin of the tendency. In fact the supposition that Hutcheson had any new Philosophy or any new Philosophical method does violence to the whole texture of historical continuity. Could there be anything more farcical than to represent one of the most eclectically minded of men as founding a new school, a title which he himself invariably disclaimed in his own day while he even quoted the sources whence he had borrowed his leading ideas ? Therefore if the term " Scottish Philosophy " be taken in the widest possible sense, Hutcheson was not the founder, but merely the importer of it, and we are left with the paradox that " Scottish philosophy " is very far from being a product of Scotland : in fact it traces its origin back to the Moralists of the Roman Empire, and thence to the Stoics, and from them to Socrates. In contradistinction to this extended signification of the term, it is also found to imply adherence to the group of thinkers, called by Hamilton " Natural Realists," a signification which excludes every great Scotsman in Philosophy, except Reid. Now, Hutcheson was not the founder of the Scottish School in this sense, for the simple reason that he was not a Natural Realist. The more exact chronology of the com- position of his works determined in the preceding chapters proves that all the works of his first three periods were written prior to the appearance of Hume's Treatise, and the " Com- pends " so soon afterwards that Hutcheson had not time to grasp the true drift of Hume's scepticism. Therefore, as Avith other pre-Humian thinkers, the theory of perception was far from being the central point of a Philosophy, and thus we 264 hutcheson's general influence find Hutcheson sometimes speaking as an Occasionalist, some- times even as a follower of Berkeley. If further evidence were needed it would be found in the fact that neither Reid nor Hamilton mentions Hutcheson as an adherent of the theory ; nor does Prof. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison in his work on Scottish Philosophy, and the reason is sufficiently obvious. Since Natural Realism was the answer to a question pro- pounded by Hume, it would be absurd to expect Hutcheson to have answered it before it was asked ! In this sense we may accept Prof. James Seth's expression, "If Hutcheson is the founder of Scottish Philosophy, Reid is its second founder ^" At the same time a protest must be entered against the following summary : " in the characteristic features of his thought, in his theory of the ' Moral Sense,' and in his doctrine of Benevolence, he is profoundly originalV With regard to the Moral Sense, Hutcheson may be allowed to speak for him- self. " Some have, by a mistake, made a compliment to the author, which does not belong to him ; as if the world were any way indebted to him for this discovery [i.e. of a Moral Sense]. He has too often met with the Sensus Decori et Honesti and with the Bvpafji,i as such, should be dif- ferentiated from constructive modes of thought. If the enquiry be extended farther, and a search is made for his positive contributions to the development of thought, most readers of philosophy would probably be' inclined to instance his supposed foundation of Natural Realism and his Intuitionalism. His claims to the former have been shown to be devoid of foun- dation, and a similar remark applies, but with considerable qualifications, to the latter. No doubt Hutcheson speaks most frequently as an Intuitionalist, he never tires of entreating or even commanding his reader to consult " his heart " and observe what happens " in his breast." His catalogue of In- ternal Senses might also be mentioned in this connection ; but, if so, it is to be remembered that, too often, his " senses " are intuitional in name, but non-intuitional in use. Indeed it is difficult to find that Hutcheson has made any marked advance upon Cicero, whose Intuitionalism is but little removed from that of the non-metaphysical person. The unreflective mental attitude is generally intuitional ; and it is upon this foundation that Cicero builds. Hutcheson adds something here and there, but he never seriously sets himself to improve the stability of the edifice. A striking instance of this has already been noticed, namely, that he seems unaware of the 272 hutcheson's positive contribution to philosophy. value of the Stoic (^avraaia KaTaXrjTmKri, and hence he has no criterion for the discovery of his senses, or for the dis- crimination of a new sense from other mental data or faculties. In fact, when as in his third period he attempts any deduction, he is thrown back either on a teleology involving his own theory of the Cosmos, which generates the Sense and at the same time is proved by it, or else he works from the notion of the '•■ excellence of mental activities," which gives Senses as a recognition of the idea or of approximations towards per- fection of function. Needless to say this is not Intuitionalism as it was understood after him in Scotland. At the same time, his expressions contain the germ of much that is found in Reid, but it is a germ that needs no little culture. Thus the appeal to Introspection, with Cicero's defence of the internal -Senses, from the "consensus gentium" and the structure of language, are specific cases in which Hutcheson influenced later thought. What is his own, here, is not the message (which, after all, he only repeats) but rather the emphasis and insistency with which he expresses it. A much more definite contribution to later thought will be found in Hutcheson's relation to Universalistic Hedonism. This fact has been disguised by the prevalent idea that Hutcheson was a consistent Intuitionalist ; but, if the view of the function of the Conscientia Antecedens and the Con- scientia Subsequens, in the preceding pages is even approxi- mately correct, his third Period is simply Utilitarianism as Mill understood it, except that Hutcheson is even less In- tuitional than Mill, since, needless to say, the Conscientia Antecedens, in its calculating process, cannot avail itself of the quasi-intuitionalism borrowed from Evolution. This beino- so, the Conscientia Subsequens becomes the Moral Sanction, and neither Bentham nor Mill would be likely to object to Hutcheson's expressions regarding its effects, though they would doubtless claim to have simplified the account of its origin. ; Hutcheson's most remarkable anticipation of Universalistic Hedonism^^ was his discovery of its formula, "the greatest Happiness of the greatest number," though, as will be seen, it is only one of many variants with hinT. From Hutcheson hutcheson's positive contribution to philosophy. 273 to Bentham the history of the phrase may be traced by two curious by-ways. Mr Leslie Stephen has noted that Bentham himself admits that it was either from Priestley or Beccaria that he learnt the principle of the " greatest Happiness of the greatest number^." In reference to the former, Bentham says that it was in an early pamphlet (the Treatise on Civil Government, 1768) that he found this formula, the discovery of which " caused him the sensations of Archimedes-." Now Priestley, owing to his controversy with Reid, Beattie and Oswald, was acquainted with Hutcheson's works^ so that here the line of descent from Hutcheson to Bentham, through Priestley, is complete. Bentham seems more inclined to admit his in- debtedness to Priestley than to Beccaria. " Priestley was the first" he says "(unless it was Beccaria) who taught my mouth to pronounce this sacred truth*." " The sacred truth " aj)pears in the introduction of Dei Delitti e delle Pene (1764), where Beccaria expressly states his obligation to the " philo- sopher, who, from his study had the courage to scatter amongst the multitude the seeds of useful truth, so long un- fruitfuP." The general tenour of this reference shows that Beccaria directly traced the expression to a "philosopher," and the concluding phrase suggests that he was fully conscious that Hutcheson was the originator of the formula, since be- tween the first expression of it in the Inquiry and the date at which Beccaria wrote, an interval of forty years had elapsed. That Beccaria had read Hutcheson's Inquiry through the French Translation of 1749, would appear to be probable, since he says in one of his letters, that he owes everything to French books, especially in fostering his feelings towards hu- manity at large". Inasmuch as he expressly mentions Hume amongst these " French " works, that influenced him, it would appear highly probable that he read Hutcheson in the French 1 English Thought in the Eighteenth Centiinj, ii. p. 61. 2 Bentham' s Works, x. pp. 79, 80. 3 An Examination of Dr Eeid's Inquiry, &c., London, 1767. •» Works, X. p. 142. 5 On Crimes and Punishments, London, 1767. fi Cesare Beccaria et L'Abolizione della Pena di Morte, Milan, 1872, p. 17. S. H. 18 274 hutcheson's positive contribution to philosophy. translation; so that, both through Priestley and Beccaria, the greatest happiness formula may be traced back to Hutcheson. ^ " Though the expression — "the greatest Happiness oFthe greatest number " — found its way into English thought through SufcTieson, it does not, by any means, follow that he was the "inventor" or originator of it. This formula, now the watch- word of the Universalistic Hedonist, is ultimately traceable back to the Stoic "citizenship of the World," through Hutcheson, to his favourite authors, the eclectic Stoics, Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. The celebrated phrase itself is plainly foreshadowed in Cicero's De Finihiis, Avhich Hutcheson quotes from frequently, and which he ex- pressly mentions as an exceptionally valuable work\ Cicero, when speaking of friendship, says that one should wish his - friend " bonis affici quam maximis^." Here we find the " greatest Happiness " of the formula foreshadowed ; and, a little later, a phrase occurs, which suggests " the greatest number," when he writes, " Impellimur aiitem natura, ut prodesse velimus quam plurimisl" Further, he says that his purpose in com- posing the De Divinatione was " prodesse quam plurimis''" ; and again in the De Ojjiciis, from which Hutcheson frequently quotes, the two " maxima " occur almost together, when it is stated that the ideal condition of society would be found — "si, ut quisquis erit coniunctissimus, ita in eum henignitatis plurimum conferetur^"; and, in the next book, we find that care is to be taken, " ut iis beneficiis quam plurimos adficiamus"." Seneca, too, expresses himself in somewhat similar terms — "Hoc nempe ab homine exigitur, ut prosit hominibus, si fieri potest multis, si minus paucis'." A still more remarkable an- ticipation is to be found in a passage from the Commentary of Simplicius upon Epictetus, where the two halves of the formula, in universalized form, occur in the same sentenced Since Hutcheson himself quotes from the works mentioned, it would seem probable that the celebrated dictum is a repro- 1 Introduction to Moral Philosophy, p. vi. - De Finibus, ii. 24. 3 Ibid. III. 20. •* II. 1. 5 De Officiis, i. 16. ^ Ibid. ii. 18, cf. ii. 4. 7 De Otio, 3. •* Vide infra, 276. hutcheson's positive contribution to philosophy. 275 duction of Cicero ; and it seems likely that it was reached in the following manner. Though " the greatest happiness of the greatest number" is the expression that has since become a philosophical " party cry," it is only one of many variants used by Hutcheson, the generic type of which was the " Uni- versal Happiness" or the "general good of all"; and, it is worthy of note, that on two occasions, when these expressions are used, he refers to Marcus Aurelius " in many places'." When Hutcheson's fondness for "moral algebra" is remem- bered, it can easily be understood, that, when he works from such reproductions of later Stoicism, he easily reaches the formula of Utilitarianism. ^ The following expression, to use a Kantian phrase, may be called the deduction of this ideal of Universalistic Hedonism. " In comparing the moral qualities of actions, in order to regulate our election, among various actions proposed... we are led by our Moral Sense of Virtue to judge thus, that in equal degrees of Happiness, expected to proceed from the action, the virtue is in proportion to the number of persons to wdiom the happiness shall extend... and in equal numbers is as the quantity of the Happiness or natural good ; or that the Virtue is in a compound ratio of the quantity of good and number of enjoyers '"'... so that. That action is best wJiich procures the greatest Happiness foi- the \ greatest numbers ; and that luorst, which in like manner occasions f misery^." '^ ■ '^ »/ '' Whether Hutcheson adopted " the greatest Happiness prin- ^ ciple " from the expressions of Cicero, already quoted, or worked it out from the idea of "universal good" of the later Stoics, there is no doubt that the latter form of expression, converted into euda^monistic terms, occurs most frequently in his works. ^ ^ For instance, he speaks of " the Happiness of mankind being A - desirable, or good to the Supreme Cause*." The moral ideal '^ is "Universal HappinessV' "the general good of all"," "good ^vL ■'^-^i 1 Essay on the Passiom, p. 44. Si/stciii, i. p. 94. 2 Cf. Essay on the Passions, p. 42. 3 Inquiry, "Essay on Moral Good," iii. § 8, Edition 4, pp. 180, 181. ■* Ibid. p. 65. s Essay on the Passions, p. 44. --" ^ Introduction to Moral Philosopliy, i. p. 117: and his letter to his father quoted supra, p. 42. 18—2 276 hutcheson's positive contribution to philosophy. will to allV' "Universal good will to all-," "the common in- terest of all'l" Such expressions are echoes, indeed, qft^ Y-^ translations, from the Moralists of the Roman Empire. ISim- plicius, commenting upon the query of Epictetus as to ~wBat position the wise man will hold in the state*, says that he will co-operate in all good for all menl With Antoninus, too, the ideal is to show good will to all, to love mankind, to care --— ' for all men {KijBeaOac irdvTwv avdpo^-nwv^. According to Seneca no type of thought manifests a greater love of man or is more attentive' to the common good than his own''. Similarly, the wise man is " in comniu ne auxilium ^g ^tu s^c publi cum bonum ^"; and, in aiding others, he advances the common interest (commune agit iiegotium**). This is the -■^ teaching of nature, for " homo in adiuToriuni mutuum genitus , est^V' or, as he expresses the same thought elsewhere, ".3or jn inibus na tura niF- jiibpf, prodesse....Ubicunque homo est ibi. beneficii locus est "." Cicero too speaks of the " caritas^generis humani^V' and Epictetus says that just as nothing is more paltry than love of gain and love of pleasure, so nothing is more sublime than the love of mankind '^ So Antoninus writes that the ideal of the general good is always before his mind", and one of his maxims is (plXTjcrov to avOpwirivov Ibid. VII. 31. i« Diss. in. 24. HUTCHESONS POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO PHILOSOPHY. 277 should imitate the gods'. Simihirly the idea that Hutcheson expresses as a regard for " the common interest " is expressed by Antoninus in the maxim, firjre dK0ivu>v7jT0<; evepyei'^ or in another form, Kad' erepou /xev \6yov ^r^fxlv iariv oUeioraTov dvOpco'TTO';, KaO' oaov ev TToirjriov avTovi'^. ^ ""' ^Another form of the same idea is met with in passages where Hutcheson introduces the conception of a " system," or, transkting literally, "of a whole." Thus he speaks of "the good of the greatest luhole or of all beings"*"; or "the good of some more abstracted or general community, such as a sjoecies or system"; or again, "the greatest or most perfect good is that whole series or scheme of events, which contains a greater aggr^ate of Happiness in the vjJtole^," or, " the greatest Happiness and Perfection of the largest system within our knowledge^" Here, being nearest to the Stoic "Citizenship of the world," Hutcheson does little more than translate from his authorities. Seneca, in a well-known passage, writes " Mem- bra sumus corporis magni...haec [sc. natura] nobis amorem indidit mutuum et sociabiles fecit.... Ex illius constitutione, miserius est nocere quam ' laedi. Ex illius imperio, paratae sint iuvantis manus. Ille versus et in pectore et in ore sit, Homo sum, humani nihil a me ali^num puto'." With more literal identity to the expressions quoted from Hutcheson, Antoninus says, KaXov 8e ael Trdv to auficfiepou TftJ o\(p^: so too Zeus would not have created anything el ixrj ra> 6\(p avvicfyepev^. Similarly 7rpd^ei<; KoivcovcKal are due from us by the constitution or system of our nature (Kara Tr]v KaraaKevrjvY' and in another place he expresses the same thought, using the expression a-varrjfxa^K With Epictetus man 1 Diss. II. 14, 16. - "I- 5, cf. I. 16, &c. 3 Ibid. V. 20. ■* Inquiry, p. 44. 5 Essay on the Passions, p. 37. 6 System, i. p. 10, cf. i. p. 161. 7 Epist. Lib. XV. 52 (95). The verse is qnoted also by Cicero. The reference is Terence Heauton. Act. i. Sc. 1. 8 Marc. Aur. xii. 23, also iii. 11, &c., cf. Seneca De Ira, ii. 31. 9 ma, V. 8. ^" Ibid. VIII. 12. 11 ciffirep avTos (7v ttoKitikov (TvarrinaTO^ ffvixirXripuTiKbs el, ovtws /cat ndaa Trpo^is aov <7V/JLTr\7ipwTiK7i 'i(TTu} fw% TToXtTtK^s. lUd. IX. 23, cf. also in. 11, VII. 13. 278 hutcheson's positive contribution to philosophy. is a part (3f the social organism (/"f£09_jToXe&)?^), like hands and feet to the body, or interwoven with the others, like one thread, amongst the many, that make the pieced Even this mode of expression is not sufficiently precise for Antoninus, who, for ji€po(}, would say /u,eX,09, thereby implying that men are not merely parts of a social whole, but members of a social organism^; and all the later Stoics are rich in metaphors to emphasise the vital nature of this membership. Lastly, Hutcheson has two other closely related formulae for expressing his moral ideal. The first being the definition of the best action as " that which secures the greatest and mosi extensive happiness of all the rational agents to whom our ^" action may extend," and the other similar in form, but with J the substitution of " sensitive " instead of rational — e.g. " Uni- ^^ versal good is what tends to the whole system of sensitive beJ^ngsV' and in one instance both the rational and the sensitive boundaries of the action appear together^ When the importance of reason, even in later Stoicism, is remem- ,x' bered, the appearance of the former type of this form of the principle is explained®; and the second is deducible, as an alternative, from Hutcheson's contempt for Reason and from '^ the Hedonism that colours his whole syjtem^) Even in this instance he has failed to add anything to his favourite author, since Marcus Aurelius, when stating that men, as participating ^ '■■ ^jJui "^in JieafiQn, should be used kolvwvlicw^;,) expressly pleads for generous treatment for all animals ^ It is to be noted that there is a logical order amongst these different formulge of the principle. The most abstract is the universal good or happiness. The second is the universal happiness of the system or "good of the whole." The third interprets the system as one of sensitive beings, and the fourth as of rational beings. Finally, the most concrete is that which 1 Diss. II. 5. 2 Ihid. I. 2. 3 Ihid. VII. 13, cf. St Paul, Eomaus xii. 4 — 5. •* Essay on the Passions, p. 203, cf. p. 191, p. 35. System, i. p. 50, p. 160. Introduction to Moral Philosophy, p. 20. ^ Essay on the Passions, p. 200. « E.g. Marc. Ant. iv. 4, 24. Epict. Diss. i. 9, ii. 10. 7 Ibid. VI. 23. '^ Mt HUTCHESOX'S POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO PHILOSOPHY. 279 has become the formida of Utilitarianism — not universal hap- piness nor the greatest happiness of all — but " the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers." — ^ To prevent misconception it should perhaps be added that this logical order should not be interpreted chronf)logically, that is, no such order can be distinguished as between the different periods in Hutcheson's work. On the contrary, in- stances of each of the five formula? might be quoted from the Inquiry ; and all that can be said is, that the second and third forms of his Philosophy contain most references to the greatest happiness of all sensitive beings ; while in the last, under the Stoic influence already mentioned, he is rather inclined to return to the more general expressions, reducible to " universal happiness," or " the general good of all." It would have been unpardonable to have tried the reader's | patience with this long digression were it not necessary to establish the genealogy of the formula of Utilitarianism; and it is a strange instance of the irony of history, that the Stoics — the bitter opponents of all pleasure-theories — should have provided a rallying-cry for Hedonism, long after their school had passed away. Yet the continuity is complete. The Stoic " Citizenship of the World " is so interpreted by Cicero, Seneca, Antoninus and Epictetus, that expressions such as those quoted above are to be found in their works. These were repeated by Hutcheson in a different spirit and with a dif- ferent meaning, and we have the greatest happiness principle as accepted by Bentham. -<— - Here, when Hutcheson not only anticipates the thought but even the very words of the Universalistic Hedonist, it is to be noticed that he introduces alternatives, which were de- veloped earlier in other directions. Thus, the statement of the formula, which interprets the system as one of rational Beings, would doubtless have appealed to Adam Smith, and it may have suggested the rationality of the " Impartial Spectator." Much of Hutcheson's language in this connection, presents a striking similarity to Kant's "system of Rational Beings " and the " kingdom of ends," since Hutcheson's " system " is to be conceived teleologically. Still beneath the 280 hutcheson's positive contribution to philosophy. similarity of language there is a wide contrast of meaning, especially in Kant's clear-cut determination of the " system," as such, because rational ; and the " ends " as synthesized in a kingdom, because they are self-given, as emanating from" reason. Hutcheson's " system," being really borrowed from the Stoics, as a conclusion without its premisses^ is, according to the line of argument already indicated, either no system at all or else interpolated"-; and his position with regard to "'Xational " beings is exactly the same — either he knows nothing of rationality o r else his He donism must go. Again, the otheF side of the same formula, the happiness of all sensitive beings, is a summary of many of Hume's moral conclusions. In fact, Hume does little more than adopt Hutcheson's Philosophy of the third period and make it consistent, in the light of this aspect of the principle ; and so Hume's Moral Philosophy betrays the influence of Hutcheson's recommendation of virtue, at the expense of consistency with the remainder of the Treatise^. To return to Hutcheson's relation to Utilitarianism, the citation of the greatest happiness principle by no means exhausts its debt to him. It is strange to remark that the positions of both Bentham and Mill upon the valuation of pleasures are anticipated by Hutcheson. At first he adopted the point of view, afterwards maintained by Bentham, that pleasures differ only in quantity, afterwards having introduced, or given greater prominence to, the notion of dignity he holds that there is a difference of kind ; and it is worth mentioning, that in each case, namely in Hutcheson's mental development and also in Mill's modification of Bentham, the recognition of a difference in kind comes last. Whether this is mere co- incidence or a necessity of thought would open up a wide vista for investigation. ■* It is interesting to compare this case of suppressed premisses with that mentioned below (p. 282), in the case of the missing link of Mill's proof of Utilitarianism, where the missing premiss is partly due to Hutcheson. ^ Supra, chap. x. » Green's Works, ii. pp. 333—371. Cf. H%me by Prof. W. Knight, Black- icood's Phil. Series, " The admissions made in his ethical Philosophy are incon- sistent with, and indeed undermine his intellectual system," p. 197. hutcheson's positive contribution to philosophy. 281 Further, Hutchesou has anticipated the teaching of Bentham and Mill upon the distinction, in moral value, between motive and intention. In fact, Hutcheson is more explicit than Mill upon what he calls the " material goodness " of action, which corresponds to the intention — " that is what the agent wills to do^" — of the Utilitarian. "An action is called materially good," according to the earlier writer, " when, in fact, it tends to the interest of the system, as far as we can judge of its tendency ; or to the good of some part consistent with that s\'stem, whatever tuere the affections of the agent. ...k. good man, deliberating- which of several actions proposed he shall choose, regards and compares tlie material goodness of theni^." The " motive," with Hutcheson, is represented by what he calls " formal goodness," which is equivalent to the Conscientia suhsequens, and this is a bare " accessory after the fact," having to do, as Mill expresses it, with " our moral estimation of the agent," or, according to Hutcheson, with " the agent's own valuation of his character as a whole." Obviously, this is a wide departure from the earlier naive view of the moral sense, and it is partially withdrawn in the teaching of the last period. At the same time it is worthy of note, that the formula of Universalistic Hedonism and its distinctive tenets, such as the distinction between motive and intention as well as the problem of the valuation of j)leasures, are all anticipated by Hutcheson. Not only has Hutcheson anticipated some of the cardinal doctrines of Utilitarianism, but one of its most remarkable fallacies — namely that of " Composition," in Mill's so-called proof of the principle — may be traced to Hutcheson. " No reason can be given," Mill writes, " why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness... each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, is a good to the aggregate of all persons\" Logically, there is a premiss omitted here, which is the joint production of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Adam Smith. According to 1 Utilitarianism, p. 27, note. ^ Conscientia antecedens. ^ Sijstein, I. p. 252. * Utilitarianism, p. 53. r 282 hutcheson's positive contribution to philosophy. the Economics of the latter, perfect competition, where each man seeks his own greatest good, results in the greatest public good, through a beneficent natural oider, in which private interest is " led by an invisible hand " to eventuate in general well-being. This postulate, in Political Economy, again, is a metaphysical thesis of the Optimism of Shaftes- bury and Hutcheson. Ethically, Self-Love may be open to suspicion, but, as already indicated in the concrete case of sociology, Hutcheson is forced to provide it with a quasi- justification to enable his teaching to proceed. If all is for the best, then legitimate efforts for self-advancement must not only be permissible but contribute to the general interest Thus, Smith's economic assumption depends upon Hutcheson, and it only needs a further step in the confusion of material with eudaemonistic well-being to obtain a suppressed premiss which would justify Mill's argument from the logical point of view — a transition which is facilitated by his use of the '% word "good." It need scarcely be added that, in meaning, '^'^ the gap remains as wide as ever, since Mill has to prove that the general Happiness is desired by the individual, not that the attainment of the " good " of the individual incidentally aids in the advancement of the " general good." ' !' It may perhaps be said that a striking difference between the Universalistic Hedonism of Hutcheson, in some of his moods, and that of Mill, is to be found in the criticism of the association of ideas by the former and its acceptance by the latter. No doubt Hutcheson frequently criticises this principle, but the point here rather is that he establishes an Universal- istic Hedonism without the aid either of Intuitionalism or of Association of Ideas, and the introduction of the latter by Mill is a concession to criticisms of thinkers between Hutcheson and himself. Further, Hutcheson's relation to the Associationalistic Psychology has both an inner and an outer side. The latter is one of hostility ; he distrusts its arbitrariness and conven- tionality and refuses to believe that it can account for any " sense." Upon the inner side, again, it has been shown that Hutcheson has no real criterion of a " sense," and he is driven HUTCHESOX'S POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO PHILOSOPHY. 283 back upon a plea for its universality. But he is met with contrary cases and exceptions, and to escape this difficulty he uses " Associations of Ideas." Any variation from his own standpoint is due to '' some association." If then, association can explain the exceptions why may it not account for the rule ? Or, if the Sense is but a ps^'chological residuum that Association cannot disintegrate, may not an improvement or an extension of the method resolve the refractory mental remnant ? This view was urged by John Clark of Hull, and there is no doubt that Hutcheson's vacillating attitude, in this connection, joined with the frequent concessions he made, did much to encourage the Associatioualists. If the principle could do so much for him, how much more might it not achieve for theiul If one of the leading opponents of the method had been forced to abandon so much territory, might not a more vigorous onslaught conquer the whole of it ? In addition to this negative impetus to Associationalism, it is worthy of remark that Hutcheson, the supposed bulwark ,^ of Intuitionalism, actually on some occasions admits the whole contention of the Associationalist. For instance, he says in one place, that "Association represents actions as good or evilV after which admission, it would appear, there is nothing left to contend for by either side. There could be no stronger ' proof of Hutcheson's Eclecticism than this. Another positive contribution, made b}^ Hutcheson to Phi- O^ losophy, will be found in his additions to ^Esthetics and Teleo- '^-^^'""^ logy. He undoubtedly wrote the first modern Treatise upon \ t->^ the former subject, as distinguished from Arbuckle's articles <^ C-^ in the Dublin Journal, which again were anticipated by . Addison in the Spectator. This formula, too, of " Uniformity amidst variety," is a slight advance upon Shaftesbury's " order," '■' proportion," " harmony." It is to be added, however, that Hutcheson himself foregoes much of this development upon his teacher, since, as already shown, he is inclined in his later i work to drop the "variety" — which becomes rather cognitive than aesthetic. It is needless to repeat that Hutcheson's con- ception of "Beauty" is altogether formal, and that his definition 1 System, i. p. 30. ^ 1> 284 HUTCH eson's positive contribution to philosophy. required a content from others, such as Henry Home (Lord Kames) and Edmund Burke, from whom it passed, as modified, to the German thinkers of the Enlightenment, and from them to Kanti. 3~'' III fact, Hutcheson's " Beauty" is nothing more than the ^ Q ^ most abstract expression of the union of ends in any system. *^ This is the true " original " of the uniformity. The primary type is the Macrocosm, which according to Hutcheson's point of view is capable of division — or rather perhaps is perceived as divided — into a number of parts, each of which again is. a "cosmos." Thus, Hutcheson's sole Category is the idea of End, and inconsistencies arising out of his admission of it have ;:. already been indicated, yet without it he cannot advance a • ," single step. The renaissance of Teleology which also appeared in the system of Leibniz was a reaction against the mechanism of the general drift of thought prior to the last few years of the seventeenth century. It is quite impossible to disentangle the influence of Hutcheson from that of Shaftesbury and the Wolffian School. One instance may however be to some extent isolated, namely, Hutcheson's share in building up the proof of the existence of a personal God from " Final Causes." It has often been shown that Leibniz vacillated considerably upon the relation of God to the Monads, and very little can be ex- pected of Shaftesbury who spoke of his God as " It." Here it is plain that the Physico-Theological Proof owes very much indeed to Hutcheson. He collected data and systematised them, leaving a collection of material likely to be convincing jy- to the " plain man," though vitiated for the metaphysician by r^ 1 his inconsistencies. ^ . -^ \ ', ,■ ^ A practical contribution to the general aesthetic development will be found in Hutcheson's influence upon the Foulises, which doubtless led to the foundation of the ill-fated Glasgow Academy, which was one of the earliest provincial institutions for the encouragement of the practical study of Art. It is interest- ing to note this actual outcome of Hutcheson's aesthetic teaching, especially as it constitutes, to some extent, the remote origin of the modern " Glasgow School." Information relative to the Glasgow Academy will be found in Notices and Documents Illustrative of the Literary History of Glasgow, Glasgow, 1839, passim. CONCLUSION. The account of Hutcheson's position in the previous pages must seem very iconoclastic, when his kindly disposition as a man and his modest claims as a thinker are remembered. Yet the estimate of his work very nearly coincides with his own ; and the criticism is the unavoidable result of injudicious appraisals of his admirers, who have felicitated him either upon his borrowings or else upon what he did not attempt. It is no great compliment to a person's appearance to praise the fit of a borrowed coat or to congratulate a rider upon the hard knees of a horse hired for the day ! If Cleanthes or Aristo had known the " base uses " — as they would have considered them — to which their ideas were applied by Hutcheson, they would probably have longed for a vested interest in philosophical principles. Hutcheson's strength lay in his personality. He was a preacher, not a system builder. His personal magnetism and method of lecturinof were his main influences. The first brought him his audience, the second taught it. Shaftesbury had enlightened the Upper Classes in England ; through Hutcheson the same movement extended from the University to the masses. Thus Philosophy was brought home to the people and formed a part of the culture of every educated man. That Hutcheson was a Philosopher of the Enlightenment constitutes his chief claim upon posterity. This single title unites his liberalising influence in the University, his efforts towards a higher standard of culture amongst the clergy, and his eclectically popular type of thought. These characteristics centre round and • gain impetus from the magnetism of his character and fascinating personality. He not only popularised 286 CONCLUSION. Philosophy but made it attractive — indeed to the stern Calvin- istic spirit of his time it appeared that he made right living too alluring, and that rectitude manifesting itself "in a lovely form " was a dangerous concession to human weakness. But the popularisation of abstract thought by an uninteresting person is far from stimulating. Research, however rude or repellant in expression, possesses a certain charm as bringing with it contact with the library or laboratory. The writer, in this case, holds the reader at his mercy, and the latter must bear with vices of style as the price to be paid for the fruition of the discoveries they record. The lecturer or writer, who endeavours to popularise his subject, occupies a totally dif- ferent position. The bait he must offer to attract an audience is to be iriteresting. All contemporary evidence points to the fact that Hutcheson succeeded in this, both personally and as a lecturer. So much so indeed that he impressed his ideal of the teaching of Moral Philosophy upon the Scottish Universi- ties and, strange to say, it has persisted almost down to the present. The didactic element in Hutcheson's lectures cannot be too strongly insisted upon. H is aim was not to give his students a system of morality which would bear the searchlight of keen logical scrutiny, but rather to saturate them with a code of ethics, by which they could live — or, if need be, die by. In his own words he aimed at "touching the heart" and raising "an enthusiasm for the cause of virtue." Thus he never intended, in all probability, to systematise his indebtedness to his pre- decessors, in fact his borrowings were rather texts adopted for special occasions \ He was the sworn foe of every degraded or degrading estimate of human nature, and, like any man of generous and impulsive temperament, seeing a wrong done to humanity, he snatched at the first weapon that came to his hand. So, when Mandeville obliterated the line dividing right from wrong, he caught at Platonic and Stoic arguments 1 It has been shown that Leechmcan actually endeavoured to supply a methodology for Eclectic procedure in his Synod Sermon. If he was indebted to Hutcheson for material, the sentences quoted (p. 87) would constitute Hutcheson's own justification of his method. CONCLUSION. 287 as well as the vague Hellenic impressions of Shaftesbury. To expect consistency under these conditions is to misconceive the circumstances and the man. Enthusiasm sweeps beyond the bounds of the logical syllogism, and enthusiasm was Hutche- son's goal. If the expression may be used, he was an artistic lecturer, whose whole attention was concentrated upon the result, not upon the logical steps by which it was attained. In fine, to repeat a word used by Shaftesbury, he was primarily a " maker " of moral men, not a constructive thinker. This very weakness of thought, when compared with the greater systems, was precisely his strength in his own day, Avhen reinforced by a personal charm and moral earnestness, such as his. Neither the time nor the country was ripe for a thoroughly consistent and coherent system. If this statement be questioned, it is only necessary to refer to the chilling reception given to Hume's Treatise, even after the way had been prepared by Hutcheson. Just as Shaftesbury's mission was to make Art indigenous in England, so it was Hutcheson's to make Philosophy indigenous in Scotland. How much greater success attended his efforts as compared with those of Shaftes- bury, may be gathered from a comparison of modern British Art and Philosophy. Thus, in fact, Hutcheson is a prominent figure in the renaissance of speculative enquiry in Scotland ; and, to his honour be it recorded, that this " taste," which does not appear in his list of senses, has remained more permanent than any of the others — it has even been asserted to be " natural " to the Scottish character^ To foster the taste for Philosophy was Hutcheson's main work. It would be unreasonable to expect that he also created a Philosophy. On the contrary, he did something better under the peculiar circumstances, By compiling an anthology of the " golden thoughts," both of ancient and modern Philosophy, he left his successors a legacy, which contained much that was best in past thought, and thereby forced them to enter upon their work in continuity with ancient speculation. Indeed, instead of starting the new impetus of thought in Scotland, as has been too often represented, upon a provincial basis, his aim 1 Mackintosh Dissertation, p. 207, note. ■/% 288 CONCLUSION. was exactly the opposite ; and, as a matter of fact, solely through his exertions and his eclectic teaching, the material he provided was more cosmopolitan than the similar work undertaken later in Germany and France — or indeed than any other of last century. When thoroughly realised, this achievement is a greater one than any of those with which Hutcheson's name is generally associated. He possessed unique gifts — not those of a system builder — which made a fresh departure in British thought possible. For this he prepared the way. He gathered very many seeds, from practically unknown granaries of thought, and sowed them broadcast, only caring that they should germinate and that the crop should be luxuriant. To winnow the harvest and divide the wheat from the tares, the useful from the merely ornamental, was the work he bequeathed to his successors. INDEX. Abernethy, John 26, 32, 113-4, 211 Academies 7, 8, 10, 21-3, 25 Addison 35, 283 advisamentum 128 asstlietic spontaneity IGl — view of action 170-3 — iuevitableness 175, 252-3 — disinterestedness 183, 189 esthetics, Aibuckle's 183-4 — Hutcheson's 184, 191, 216-8, 283, vide under Shaftesbury affections (Shaftesbury) 162-4, 169, 201 — (Hutcheson) 201-3, 248 Alciphron 97-9 anachronisms, artistic 161-2 Anderson, Wm. 61-2, 90-2 Annandale, Marquis of 129 anticii^ations 174 Antrim 21 a priori 174 Arbuckle, 32-6, 54, 131, 182-4, 260 dperrj (Shaftesbury) 168 — (Hutcheson) 215-6 — Ao7ia 106-7 Aristotle 212, 219-20, 225, 247, 264 Armagh, Bursars 80 — city of 6, 10, 54 — congregation 5, 16, 20 — Presbytery of 18 — Archbishopric of 6 Arnold, M. 58, 179-80 Art of Philosophy 146-7 Art of England, exotic, 150-1 — neglected in England at Renais- sance 156 — with a purpose 169 — and Hutcheson 188 — and Arbuckle 184 S. H. Aurelius, translated by Hutcheson 81, 144, 211, 246 — quoted 180, 247, 276-8 — influences Hutcheson 247-50, 260, 274-9 Balguy 51, 104-5 Baldwin, R. 40-1 Ballyrae (near Armagh) 6, 20 Baxter 112 Beattie 273 Beauty and education 65 • — natural 168 — and Puritans 149 — (Berkeley) 98 — (Hutcheson) 187-90, 253 — (Morgan) 112 — (Shaftesbury) 159-60, 162-8, 169- 70 — and Benevolence 260-1 — and Perfection 169 — of Virtue (Brown) 110: (Shaftes- bury) 168, 172-5 : (Wodrow) 112 Beccaria 273 Beith (Ayrshire) 88 Belfast 89 — Magazine 4, 6, 8, 16, 23 — Society 58 Benevolence (Arbuckle) 184 — (Butler) 206 — (Chubb) 111 — (Hutclieson in his life) 45-9, 65: and Moral Sense 126, 190, 193 : and Self-Love 199, 200, 219, 224, 256 : Universal calm 200- 7: and Property 228-9 — (Molesworth) 27 — (Shaftesbury) 21, 162, 260-1 19 290 INDEX. Benevolence (Simpson) 15, 20, 21 — criticised (Butler) 97 — — (Balguy) 104-5 — — (Campbell) 106-7 — — (Clarke, J.) 51, 110 _ _ (Gay) 108 — — (Hume) 126 — and Beauty 162, 260-1 — and Citizenship of tlie World 165 — and Perfection 124, 221 Beutham 273, 280-1 Berkeley 28-30, 38, 96-9, 260 better self 169, 183 Blackwood, Sir J. 73 Blancbardstown 28 Blow, Eev. Mr 88-9 Bogle 92 Bohm-Bawerk 241 Bolingbroke 101 Bonar 237 Boulter, Archb. 49, 54, 79 bounty fund 21 Boyse, J. 26 — S. 35 Brown, James 263, 265 — John 110 — Mr 137 — Peter 102 Bruce, M. 18 — William 8, 26, 53, 113-4, 142, 211 — William, contributor to Christian Moderator 31, 142 Burke, Edmund 179, 284 Burnet, Gilbert 17, 51-2, 196 Burton, J. H. 120 Butler 8, 16-7, 52, 96-102, 126, 158, 165, 182, 196-202, 206, 211, 227, 246, 248, 266, 268 Caird, Ed. 149 Calamy Dr 53 calculus, hedonistic 107-8 Cambridge Platonists 155 Campbell, A. 106-8, 213 — Dr Wm. 24, 40 — Neil 55, 83, 92 Cannan, E. 230-1, 239 Capel Street Congregation 5 capital 241 Carlyle, A. 64, 68, 78, 93, 121 Carmichael, Frederick 54 — Gershom 12, 14, 19, 25, 54-5, 60, 62-3, 231 Carteret, Lord 37-40, 47-9 Cartesianism 14, 19 Christian Moderator 7, 8, 18, 22-3 Chrysippus 247 Chubb, Thomas 110 Clarke, John (of Hull) 51, 109-10, 213, 283 _ _ (of C. C. Coll. Cambridge) 103 — — (of Sarum) 103 — Joseph 103 — Samuel 14-9, 48, 51, 102-5, 110, 196, 212-3, 247 Classicism 2, 270 Cleanthes 247, 285 Cleghorn, W. 129 Cicero, influence on Hutcheson 186, 212, 238, 247, 249, 259-60, 265, 274-6, 279 — — on Scottish School 263, 272 — popularity, 18th century 165 — studied by Hume 118 — — by Hutcheson 15, 186 Cicero's Sensus Houesti 264 — anticipation of formula of Uni- versalistic Hedonism 274 Cochrane, Provost 139-40 Colliber, Samuel 102 Comber (Co. Down) 21 Conscience (Butler) 97, 106, 199 — (Hutcheson) 199, 246, 252-3 — (Shaftesbury) 176 Conscientia antecedeus 222-6, 248, 272-3 — subsequens 222-6, 272-3 Cornwall, Gabriel 72, 142 Cosmos 157, 159-62, 176, 178, 191 Coutts, John 126 Craghead, Eobert 22 Craig 91-2 Craigie, Thomas 142, 231 INDEX. 291 Creagh, Sir M. 37 Cronsaz 100 Cud worth 112, 158 Cumberland 205 De Vries 115 Delany 38-9 Descartes 227, 260 design 191-3, 217 desire 201-3 determinism 254-5 Dick, E. 60, 62, 90, 92 dignity 177-8, 214, 221, 246 distribution 239-40 Dobson, A. 2 Dominick, Dr 23 — St 23 Dorset Street 23 Downpatrick (Co. Down) 5 Drenuan, Thomas 24, 71, 81, 131-2, 137 — — Hutcheson's Letters to 70-4, 81-2, 83-4, 86-9, 93, 113- 5, 132^, 136-8, 141-2, 245 — Wilham 24 Drumalig or Drummahg 4, 6, 9, 10 Drumcondra Lane (Dublin) 23 Dryden 161 Dublin Journal 34-5 Duchal, James 26, 70, 89 Dunlop, Alex. 12-3, 55, 62-3, 78, 80-2, 90, 92, 94-5, 211 eclecticism, ancient 260 — Hutcheson's 2, 87 Tiye/xoPLKOv 247, 252—4 egoism (consequences of) 154-5 — (Hobbes) 153 — (Theological) 153 ego'ity 187 Emerson 155 end (Hutcheson) 191-6 — (Shaftesbury) 168-9 evepyeia 215-C "Enlightenment" (England) 266-7 — (France) 258-9 — (Germany) 258-9 — (Scotland) 2, 3, 212, 258-70, vide " New Light " Epictetus 260, 274, 276-9 Epicurus 107, 175 ip'fov 161 ' etiquette, moral ' 178 excellence (Greeks) 158 — (Hutcheson) 215-222 — (Shaftesbury) 165-6 faculties 254 Fichte 187 fitness 98 Forbes, Prof. 90, 92 Foster, J. 109 Fouhs, Eobt. 81-2, 135, 143-5 Fowler's Shaftesbury and Hutcheson 35, 185 Friend, the (Coleridge's) 35 Froude 29 fructification theory 241-2 Gay, John 108-9 Glasgow, City of 11, 13, 80-1, 89, 138-40 Glasgow, University of (Act of 1727) 60 — — aloofness of Professors 68 — — business of 78, 133 — — deficient Staff (1701) 11 — — described 13, 32, 57-61 — — disorder of students 33, 59 — • — election, Prof, of Divinity (1740) 85: (1743) 89-93: Greek (1746) 141-2: Moral Philosophy (1729) 23, 54-5 — — lectures in English begun 64-5 — — in Rebellion (1715) 15: (174-5) 139-40 — — Professor's Houses 80-1 — — Eevival of Greek 66, 75 — — Eegents in, 60 — — style of lecturing influenced by Hutcheson 66 Glotta 14, 32 Glover, Philip 109 Grafton, Duke of 29 Granard, Countess of 22 — Earl of 4 Green, T. H. 169-70, 201-4 Grotius 63, 117, 231 292 INDEX. Haliday, Alex. 137 — Eev. S. 70 — Robert 70-4 Hamilton, Baillie 128-9 — John 6, 82, 90 — Sir W. 105, 108, 188, 220, 2G3 Hammond 43 harmony 98, 159, 186-7 Harrington, Sir J. 43 Hartley 109 Hartson 70 Hasbach, W. 232 hedonism and a3sthetic standpoint 161 — calculus of 107 — formula of universalistic 104, 272-9 — in Hutcheson, Period i. 187, 193: ir. 208-9: in. 213, 223-5: iv. 249 — — Shaftesbury 173 — universahstic 171, 248, 272-9 Hellenism, Puritans hostile to 152 — reinstated by Shaftesbury 152-60, 259 — and Presbyterians 182, 259 — in Glasgow University 211 Hellenic and organic standjjoints 168- 70 — ideal 160, 169, 174 Hibernicus's Letters 34-5, 144, 184 Higgs, Henry 238-9 Hobbes 35, 153, 155-6, 175 Holywood (Co. Down) 24 Home, H., Lord Karnes 116, 284 honestum 168 Hume, corresponds with Hutcheson 113-27 — comments on Mor. Comp. 125-6, 250 — friction with Hutcheson 126-8 — influenced by Hutcheson 125, 265, 280 — and Enlightenment 258-70 — — his publishers 119-22 — on Prayer 87 Hume's atheism 126-8 — economics 233-4 — "custom" 109 — scepticism 123, 263-6 Hutcheson, Alexander 4-10, 54 — Hans 5, 6, 7, 9 — Francis (Prof. Glasgow) vide con- tents — Francis (Prof. Dublin), 9, 134, 143 — Francis (Rector Donaghadee) 143 — John 5-10, 16-20, 21, 24, 41, 46, 54 — Margaret 6 — Mary (wife of Francis) 24, 134, 144 — Rhoda 6 — Eobin 70 Hutchinson, Francis 50 ideas, abstract 123 — of relation 207 — of reflection 215 — of Sensation 195 — simple 207 Ingram, J. K. 228, 234 Innes, A. 106 interest 241-2 intuition 162, 172-5 Johnston, John 12 — Thomas 109 KaUv, TO 158, 168 Kames, Lord 16 Kant 16, 121, 165, 189, 262, 279, 280 Killyleagh 8, 10, 21, 24 Kilmarnock, Lord 15, 18, 138, 140-1 Kilpatrick, Dr 88 King, Archbishop 22, 27, 29, 30, 38, 49, 50, 102-3, 108 Knight, W. 280 labour 229, 237-8 — division of 235-7, 242 Langford, Sir A. 22 Law, Edmund 102, 108 Le Clerc 51, 79 Leechman 68. J5-95. 126. 142-3, 211 Leibniz 170-1, 284 Leland 25-6 Leslie case 128 Uberty 255 INDEX. 293 Locke 19, 27, 101-2, 105, 123, 171- 3, 187, 194, 196, 215, 218, 220, 231, 255, 260 Longman, Thomas 122 Loudon J. 10, 12, 60-3, 79, 90, 92, 142 Low, J. 13 Maclaine, A. 18, 75 macrocosm (Shaftesbury) 168 — (Hutcheson) 198-200, 207-9, 226- 7, 249-50, 252, 254 Magherally 21, 28 Mains 89 Malebranche 201, 250 Mandeville 35 Mansel 176 Martineau 113, 143, 185, 254-5 masters or regents 11, 15, 60-2, 70 mathematical formulae 14, 31 Maxwell, John 16, 17 Mayne, Z. 102 M'^Alpin, James 8 M<^Cartney 141 M'^Conky 41 M<^Cosh 4, 14, 91, 185, 262 M'Creery 8 M'^Laurin, J. 62, 85, 91-2 M'^^Meehan 72 Melville, James 11 Mill, James 263 — J. S. 181, 190, 222, 280-2 Millar 88 Miller, Lord Pres. 75 Mind 14, 32 Molesworth, Lord, character 26-7, 182 — corresponds with Archb. King 27, 30 — encourages Hutcheson 31, 37 — follower of Shaftesbury 27, 30, 33 — his philosophical club 28, 34, 35, 99, 182-3, 211 Molineux 50 Moor, James 81, 95, 142, 144, 211, 246 — Charles 31, 49, 132-3 monads 170 Monboddo 8, 261 money 238-9 Monkwood 4 Montesquieu 270 Moral Faculty 223, 224-6, 246 — Sense (Shaftesbury) 176 — — (Hutcheson) 190, 205-9, 214, 217, 219-222, 264, vide Sense — — controversy 103-9 — — criticised (Campbell) 106-7 — — — (Balguy) 104-5 _ _ _ (Berkeley) 97-9 — — — (Burnet) 51-2 — — — (Butler) 97 _ _ _ (Clarke, J.) 51 — — — (Gay) 108 Morgan, Thomas 111 Morthland 80, 90, 92, 94, 132 Mure of Caldwell 86-7, 90 Murray of Broughton 127 Mussenden 88 Narrative of Non-Subscribers 5 nature defined 250-2 — life according to 247-9, 252 — plastic 167 — state of 228-9 natural abilities 117 — beliefs 268 — desires 268 — faculties 269 — liberty 232, 240 — postulates 269 — Kealism 263-5, 269, 271-2 — rights 44, 204, 228 — (the Enlightenment) 258-9, 268 — — (Hutcheson) 187, 215, 249, 255 — — (Hume) 117-8 — — (Shaftesbury) 163, 175-6 — — (Stoics) 268 naturalism 232, 240, 269-71 Navan, the 6 neo-Pythagoreanism 150 "New Light" in Glasgow Univ. 83- 4, 89-95, 258, vide "En- lightenment" — — in Theology 19, 21, 47-9, 258 294 INDEX. Newtownards 21 Don- subscribers 5, 43, 58 Ogles of Drunialaine 135 O'Neil, Clothworthy 83 optimism 171, 227, 232, 251 order 98, 253-4 Ordnance Survey 5, 7 Oswald 273 pagan literature 151 paganised Christianity 151 painters, foreign in England 150-1 Panmure, Lord 79 Parnell 35 passion 201-2 Pater, W. 157, 160 (pavTaaia KaToKriTrTiKrj 272 Parr, Samuel 108 perception 105, 183, 263-4 perfection 200, 208, 214, 221, 225-6, 264 "Philaretus" ( = G. Burnet) 51 Pbilomeides ( = Hutcbeson) 35