LIBRARY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 University of California. 
 
 RECEIVED BY EXCHANGE 
 
 Class 
 
Ube mmverstts ot uincaao 
 
 POUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 
 
 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 AS FOUND IN THE "ANNALS" 
 
 OF TACITUS 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS 
 
 AND LITERATURE IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE 
 
 OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 (department of latin) 
 
 BY 
 
 DRAPER T. SCHOONOVER 
 
Ube *Glnf\>ersitE ot Gbtcaao 
 
 FOUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 
 
 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 AS FOUND IN THE "ANNALS" 
 
 OF TACITUS 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS 
 
 AND LITERATURE IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE 
 
 OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 (DEPARTMENT OF LATIN) 
 
 BY 
 
 DRAPER T. SCHOONOVER 
 
 CHICAGO 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 
 
 1909 
 
Copyright 1909 By 
 The University of Chicago 
 
 Published March iqog 
 
 Composed and Printed By 
 
 The University of Chicago Press 
 
 Chicago, Illinois, U. S. A. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The subject of this dissertation was suggested by Professor G. L. Hen- 
 drickson in a course given by him on the minor works of Tacitus at The 
 University of Chicago in the summer of 1906. The work was carried on 
 under his supervision and I am greatly indebted to him for kind and helpful 
 suggestions. My thanks are due also to Professor Frank Frost Abbott 
 who read the manuscript and made valuable criticisms. 
 
 D.T. S. 
 
 Marietta, Ohio 
 
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS 
 
 Introduction 
 
 Views held by previous scholars regarding the account of Corbulo in the 
 Annals of Tacitus— Statement of the thesis— Tacitus used some encomi- 
 astic biography of unknown source. 
 
 Difference between Biography and History .... 
 
 One of technique— Clearly recognized by the ancients— History concerned 
 with facts of history per se— Biography concerned with facts to illustrate a 
 man's character. 
 
 Tacitus' Treatment of Leading Characters in His Histories— 
 Ostorius Scapula — Propraetor to Britain — Immediate action against the 
 natives— Revolt of the Brigantes and the Silures— Treatment of Caratacus 
 — Death of Ostorius — No sacrificing of historical narration. 
 Suetonius Paulinus—ln Britain— Invades the island of Mona— Descrip- 
 tion of the natives— Revolt of Boudicca — Defeat of Romans under Cerialis 
 — Suetonius' march to Londinium — Defeats the Britons — Tacitus again 
 adheres to the technique of history. 
 
 Chronology 
 
 No attempt to work out in detail— Campaign against the Chauci, 47 a.d. 
 — Corbulo appointed to the command in Armenia in 54 — In Artaxata in 59 
 
 — The miraculum in xiii. 41 taken to refer to the eclipse of April 30, 59 
 
 Corbulo reaches Tigranocerta in the fall of 59 — Under the year 62 events 
 narrated which occurred during the years 60-62— Corbulo in Armenia 
 in 63 brings about peace— No regard paid to narrating events in annalistic 
 order — The writer paid no attention to time. 
 
 Topography 
 
 Aegea— By inference winter quarters placed in northwest Armenia — 
 
 Trapezus — Volandum somewhere between Trapezus and Artaxata 
 
 Artaxata on the Araxes river— March along the borders of the Mardi— 
 Reaches Tigranocerta— Nisibis 37 (?) miles from Tigranocerta— The 
 writer had no clear idea of topography as shown by indefinite topographi- 
 cal statements — Corbulo in Syria — Paetus north of Mt. Taurus on the 
 Arsanias river— Withdraws to Cappadocia after his defeat— Corbulo 
 crosses the Euphrates at Melitene— Meets the Parthians at an unnamed 
 place to adjudicate matters finally— Detailed geography can be worked 
 out only by the aid of Strabo, Dio, and Plutarch— Little definite knowledge 
 secured from Tacitus — Writer not concerned with topography but used 
 the places as a means to lend praise to Corbulo. 
 
 Exposition 
 
 Selections from the Annals dealing with Corbulo — First campaigns against 
 the Chauci— Corbulo characterized in the phrase magna cum cura et mox 
 gloria which points to the praise of the man— Restores the army veterem 
 v 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I 
 
 14 
 
 17 
 
VI SUMMARY OF CONTENTS 
 
 ad morem — His power as a disciplinarian illustrated by the punishment 
 of two soldiers — Criticism of Corbulo by the minority but not by the writer 
 — Ordered to return to the south of the Rhine by Claudius, he still main- 
 tained military discipline in the army — Granted the insignia of a triumph 
 — Appointed to command in Armenia because of his virtutes— Meaning 
 of the phrase per recentem gloriam — Chronology disregarded — Narrative 
 highly encomiastic as shown by direct characterization and by the prefer- 
 ence of all classes for Corbulo — Wins distinction by his own merits and 
 without the aid of the emperors. 
 
 War Against the Parthians — An implied <rvyKpi<7ts between Corbulo and 
 Lucullus — The description of the terribly demoralized condition of the 
 army affords a dark background against which to set the good qualities 
 of Corbulo — Severity of the winter 57-58 — The strictness of Corbulo in 
 discipline again emphasized — Disobedience and defeat of Paccius Orfitus 
 which proved the wisdom of Corbulo in understanding a situation — First 
 active operations against the Parthians show Corbulo's adaptability to 
 circumstances — Foresight further shown by his detecting the designs of 
 the enemy — Capture of Volandum treated with an elaborate rhetorical 
 averts to add praise to the general — Volandum not identical with'OXa^ 
 of Strabo — Foresight of Corbulo shown in his march to Artaxata — Con- 
 trasted with Tiridates — Surrender and destruction of Artaxata and the 
 reasons for its destruction — The miraculum, an encomiastic treatment of an 
 eclipse — The treatment of the incident by three different persons indicated 
 — March to Tigranocerta — Indefiniteness of topography — An elaborate 
 characterization of Corbulo — Arrival of Tigranes and his establishment 
 on the throne — Withdrawal of Corbulo to Syria — The description of the 
 situation of the Parthians in their helplessness against the skilful plans of 
 Corbulo affords a strong irx#a crvyKpiriKSv — Criticism of Corbulo by 
 the minority again implied — Arrival of Paetus — Contrasted with Corbulo 
 — Boastful, cowardly, inefficient in conducting a campaign and unable 
 to maintain any advantage he gained — Defeated by the Parthians — Sur- 
 rendered when he could have held out — His army demoralized — The whole 
 an amplified description of the inefficiency of Paetus who serves as a foil 
 to set off the efficiency and cleverness of Corbulo — Corbulo again in com- 
 mand in Armenia — Compared to Lucullus in his plans to overrun Armenia 
 — Description of his operations against the Parthians — His cleverness in 
 dealing with men — Use of the term gloria — Entirely successful in his oper- 
 ations against the Parthians yet free from all boastfulness which contrasts 
 strongly with the actions of Paetus — No data to determine what the source 
 of Tacitus was — Indication of sources in the Annates — An encomiastic 
 treatment given the account which is unique in the historical works of 
 Tacitus. 
 
 The Account of Corbulo's Campaigns in Cassius Dio . . 53 
 
 Dio's account of Corbulo's campaign against the Chauci is essentially 
 the same as that given by Tacitus but omits the elements of characteriza- 
 tion — Brief statement given of Corbulo's taking charge of affairs in the 
 East — No mention made of the severe winter 57-58 — No mention made 
 
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS 
 
 of Volandum nor of the miraculum — The account of the march to Tigrano- 
 certa the same as in Tacitus but with all personal characterization omitted 
 — Paetus at Rhandeia on the Arsanias River — Paetus defeated and the 
 withdrawal of the Romans from Armenia — Corbulo again placed in com- 
 mand in Armenia — Agreement finally made at Rhandeia — Facts of his- 
 tory in the two authors essentially the same but treated with rhetorical 
 elaboration in Tacitus. 
 
UNIVERSITY 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 All scholars will agree that the account of Corbulo's campaigns given 
 in the Annals of Tacitus goes back to the Memoirs of Corbulo as its ultimate 
 source. Those who have discussed the subject have assumed that Tacitus 
 had at hand the Memoirs and drew upon them for material for the narrative 
 as we have it. The treatment of Corbulo is so unique and so at variance 
 with what one expects to find in the history of Tacitus that it has led some 
 scholars, as Held, Fabia,;and Imendorffer 1 to assume that he made use of 
 other works at his command to correct and supplement the Memoirs. 
 But the general view has been that the Memoirs were the basis for the 
 account which Tacitus gives. It is from this general view that I dissent; 
 I wish to show that so far as the account in the Annals goes Tacitus did not 
 
 1 The following quotations will illustrate the views of scholars relating to this 
 subject: 
 
 Egli Feldziige in Armenien Budinger, p. 333: "Die Geschichte der armensch- 
 parthischen Feldziige nach Tacitus wird nach ihrer geschichtlichen und geograph- 
 ischen Seite durchaus von dem Gesichtspunkte einer verherrlichenden Lebensbeschrei- 
 bung des Corbulo beherrscht oder: 
 
 "Der Zweck. des Tacitus war die Lebensbeschreibung seines Helden Corbulo auf 
 der Folie des weltgeschichtlichen Theina's der Eroberung Armeniens." 
 
 Held De Gn. Domitio Corbulone, p. 24: "Triplex sane in rerum enarratione argu- 
 mentorum et testimoniorum genus agnosces: unum, ex quo diversorum scriptorum 
 opera in iudicium vocata ab annalium auctore sentias, alterum, quo epistolarum a 
 Corbulone ad Caesarem missarum et procul dubio actis imperialibus adiectarum usum 
 non recusatum esse comprobetur; tertium, ex quo emergat ex historia rerum a Cor- 
 bulone confecta tamquam ex fonte Cornelium Taciturn hausisse." 
 
 A. v. Gutschmid "Geschichte Irans und seiner Nachbarlander," in Schanz 
 Rom. Lit., sec. 442: "Die beiden Berichte, die wir iiber diese (armenischen) Ereig- 
 nisse haben, der des Tacitus und der des Dio gehen auf eine und dieselbe Quelle zuriick, 
 die Memoiren des Corbulo." 
 
 Imendorffer Beitrdge zur Quellenkitnde der seeks letzten B ticker der Annalen des 
 Tacitus, pp. 5, 6: ". . . . darf man dagegen mit einiger Zuversicht vermuthen, dass 
 Tacitus die von dem romischen Feldherrn Domitius Corbulo gelieferte Beschreibung 
 des von ihm selbst geleiteten Feldzuges gegen die Parther allerdings ausgiebig benutz 
 hat. . . . Es ist also recht wohl moglich, dass Tacitus die Angaben Corbulos durch 
 die einer anderen Quelle hie und da erganzt und corrigiert hat, worauf aus das 'reliqua 
 non in obscuro habentur' hinzuweisen scheint." 
 
 Fabia Les sources de Tacite dans les Histolres et les Annates, p. 336: Si Tacite 
 n'a pas pris pour source principale les Memoires de Corbulon, e'est d'abord qu'il le 
 soupconnait de n'avoir pas toujours dit la verite." Cf. Furneaux Annals of Tac, 
 Vol. II, p. iog. 
 
2 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 use the Memoirs, but employed and partially incorporated into his history 
 an encomiastic biography of unknown source. Paucity of historical fact 
 and an excess of personal characterization have been observed by com- 
 mentators and such treatment of a subject is not in keeping with true objec- 
 tive historical narration. While history and biography overlap, yet the 
 ancients recognized pretty clearly the function of each. 
 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BIOGRAPHY AND HISTORY 
 
 The difference between biography and history is the basis of an impor- 
 tant difference between the literary technique of biography and of history 
 which is not always observed consistently, but is to be looked upon as 
 definitely recognized. So, for example, in the early books of the Annals 
 Tacitus gives a careful account of the campaigns of Germanicus. The 
 temptation to treat Germanicus biographically must have been very great, 
 yet he confines himself strictly to the technique of history, which required 
 the suppression of individual figures and the paying of due consideration 
 to chronology and topography. Whatever Tacitus affords for the'charac- 
 terization of Germanicus he affords indirectly 1 by allowing his merits to 
 come out from the facts of history treated as such. The ancient rhetoricians 
 afford a clearly defined theory of history, 2 but not of biography. So far 
 as a theory of biography is afforded, it is to be found in the theory of enco- 
 mium. For though biography became different from formal encomium, 
 yet the aim of both was essentially the same: the presentation of character 
 and merit (^0os and dpeT^p Biography was concerned with facts of 
 history only in so far as they served to illustrate these. It neglected chron- 
 ology and topography which were the concern of the historian. For its 
 object was not to narrate the facts of history per se, but only to use the 
 deeds of its subject as indicative of his virtue. This is true of the Agricola, 
 for "although the external form of historiography is preserved, yet in its 
 essence the account is in the manner of encomium, in which the 7rpd£cis 
 are adduced, not as historical events per se, but as indications of traits of 
 character."-* From this point of view all ancient biography was written 
 from the Euagoras of Isocrates on, and almost without exception the 
 
 1 Bruns Die Personlichheit in der Geschichtsschreibung der Allen, p. 71: "Bei den 
 beiden ersten (Augustus, Germanicus) hat sich Tacitus auf das erste Hauptmittel 
 des indirekten Stils beschrankt, das Urtheil durch Andere." 
 
 2 Rhet. Lat. Min., ed. Halm, p. 588: "Historici officii sunt tria: ut veras res, ut 
 dilucide, ut breviter exponat." 
 
 3 Leo Die griechisch-romische Biographie, p. 147: "'urTopta erzahlt die irpd^ett 
 von Volkern und Mannern, /3ios schildert das 1)6os eines Mannes. Diesem Zwecke 
 dient im pios die Erzahlung der irpd^eis, nur soviel wird von den der Geschichte ange- 
 horenden irpd£eis ausgewahlte und nur soweit wird von den ausgewahlten berichtet, 
 als es fur die Schilderung des fjdos dienlich ist." 
 
 4 Hendrickson The Proconsulate of Julius Agricola, p. 20. 
 
 3 
 
4 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 writers of ancient biography have given utterance to their realization of 
 the difference between biography and history. 5 
 
 But neither Germanicus nor Agricola affords the best comparison with 
 Corbulo, because Germanicus was a prince and naturally held a conspicu- 
 ous place in the eyes of the Roman world. The Agricola was written out 
 of filial devotion and received an encomiastic treatment. The best exam- 
 ples for comparison will be afforded by men of like position with Corbulo 
 and in these we have Suetonius Paulinus and Ostorius Scapula, of whom 
 a more detailed account will be given as showing Tacitus' method of treat- 
 ing leading generals in his histories. 
 
 OSTORIUS SCAPULA 
 
 Ostorius Scapula was appointed propraetor to Britain where, on his 
 arrival, he found the natives in a state of insurrection. They thought no 
 active movements would be taken against them because the general was 
 unacquainted with the army and winter was approaching. But in this 
 they were deceived, for Ostorius knew the effect that an immediate offen- 
 sive movement would have in striking dismay into the enemy and in increas- 
 ing the confidence of his own troops. He caught the enemy unawares 
 and routed it. Tacitus then gives an account of the revolt of the Iceni 
 and a description of their stronghold. This place, though difficult of access, 
 was captured by Ostorius without any legionary force and among the deeds 
 of valor displayed was the saving the life of a citizen by the lieutenant's 
 son. After this battle the tribes were quiet, at least nominally so, and 
 the army was led among the Ceangi. Devastation of the fields went 
 on where there was any unrest on the part of the natives. Ostorius 
 was ready to cross over into Ireland when news came of the revolt 
 of the Brigantes. This tribe was soon subdued, but the Silures, who were 
 now in revolt under the leadership of Caratacus were not put down so 
 quickly. 
 
 5 Plut. Alexander i : otire yap Icrroplas ypdcpo/j-ev, d\X& fliovs, oftre reus kiricpavund- 
 rais irpd^ecri iravrcas tvecm drjXwcns aperrjs -fj Kcuc/as, d\Aa wpayna @paxi> voWdKis Kal 
 prj/xa Kal iraiSid tis Hfupatriv tfffovs tirolr/cre p.a\\ov fj /U<£x at fxvpibveKpot. Kal irapard^eLS ai 
 p.eyiffTa.1 Kal TroXiopidai irbXewv. Nepos Pelopidas i : "cuius de virtutibus dubito quern 
 ad modum exponam, quod vereor, si res explicare incipiam ne non vitara eius enarrare, 
 sed historiam videar scribere. Epaminondas i : "cum autem exprimere imaginem con- 
 suetudinis atque vitae velimus Epaminondae, nihil videmur debere praetermittere, 
 quod pertineat ad earn declarandam," and at the close of this same life Nepos adds: 
 "huius de virtutibus vitaque satis erit dictum." Polybius x. 21 (24), 5 ff.: iitrirep yap 
 iKeivos 6 t6ttos, xnrdpxoiv iyKW/JuatrriKdi, dir-rJTei t6v K€<pa\aid>dr) Kal /uer' aircrews tCiv 
 TTpd^eojv awo\oyian6v ovtcds 6 rrjs icrroplas, kolv6s &v eiralvov Kal \f/6yov, £r]Tet t6v d\T)drj 
 Kal rbv /tier' diroSel^etvs Kal t&v eKdo-rois Trapeiro/x^vwu crvWoy lit /j,6v. 
 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BIOGRAPHY AND HISTORY 5 
 
 At this point Caratacus becomes the leading figure in the narrative. 
 The historian, after giving a careful description of the barbarian stronghold, 
 adds an epitomized speech of Caratacus to his followers just before the 
 battle. The enthusiasm displayed by the barbarians amazed Ostorius, 
 but the Roman officers and troops were confident and urged him to lead 
 them against the enemy. After a description of the fight, Tacitus turns 
 to an extended account of the long struggle of Caratacus against the Roman 
 power, his capture, his reputation throughout the islands, Gaul, and 'even 
 Italy, so that the emperor to satisfy the curiosity of the Roman populace 
 had Caratacus, his wife, daughters, and brothers exhibited in public. He 
 characterizes him as he stood before the imperial tribunal and gives an 
 epitome of the speech he delivered. 
 
 Turning to the senate Tacitus says it spoke eloquently on the capture 
 of Caratacus, likening it to the capture of Syphax by Scipio and of Perses 
 by Paulus. It voted the insignia of a triumph to Ostorius. But soon the 
 followers of the barbarian chieftain in Britain revolted and the writer 
 gives an account of the loss of some Roman troops and of the guerrilla 
 warfare that was carried on. In the midst of these troubles Ostorius 
 died and where the historian might have been tempted to add a direct 
 characterization of the general he has not done so, but has adhered to the 
 technique of history. The writer was concerned primarily with facts of 
 history, and so far as a characterization of Ostorius is afforded, it is afforded 
 indirectly and without any sacrifice of the narrative of events. There is 
 no mention of the personal appearance of Ostorius, of his power of disci- 
 pline, of the special inclination of the soldiers and natives toward him, of 
 his sharing the hardships of his soldiers, of his shrewdness in detecting the 
 schemes of the enemy and of pitting one tribe against another, of his modera- 
 tion in success, and there is no contrast with another general. Greater 
 prominence is given the situation in Britain as Ostorius found it, the revolt 
 of the Iceni and Brigantes, the campaigns against the Silurae and Ordo- 
 vices, the position of the conquered Caratacus, and the guerrilla warfare 
 carried on until the death of Ostorius. 
 
 SUETONIUS PAULINUS 
 
 The field of action of Suetonius Paulinus also was Britain. On arriving 
 there he at once made preparations to invade the island of Mona. After 
 a brief statement of the preparations made, Tacitus gives a description of 
 the motley host of Druids, women with fire-brands running to and fro and 
 soldiers assembled on the shore to meet the Romans who crossed against 
 them, some by wading and swimming and some by means of boats. The 
 
6 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 Romans were victorious. In the midst of their success news came of the 
 rising of the Iceni under Boudicca, and the causes leading to the revolt 
 are narrated in a way that implies criticism of the conduct of the Romans 
 toward the natives and their lack of preparations against a possible rebel- 
 lion. An account is given of the omens observed which the Britons regarded 
 as foreboding the defeat of the Romans. The outbreak came in the absence 
 of Paulinus and the Romans were annihilated. A force under Cerialis 
 coming to their assistance lost all its infantry, while Cerialis and the cavalry 
 escaped. Suetonius marched straight through the enemy to Londinium 
 and after viewing the situation resolved to sacrifice one town in order to 
 save all. Against the prayers of the people he marched away, but granted 
 all who wished to follow, a place in the line of march. Of those who 
 remained behind, the Britons slew eighty thousand and ravaged at will 
 in vengeance for the wrongs that had been inflicted upon them. 
 
 When Suetonius was ready to meet the enemy he chose a place for 
 battle in a defile with narrow opening facing the enemy and hedged in by 
 a forest behind, so that he feared no ambush. Then Tacitus gives a descrip- 
 tion of the gathered mass of Britons and of the activity of Boudicca in urg- 
 ing on her followers. He shows how Suetonius by a speech aroused the 
 ardor of his soldiers to such a pitch that he was sure of the outcome and 
 gave the command to attack. A description of the attack and defeat of 
 the Britons follows. Eighty thousand Britons were said to have perished 
 and only four hundred Romans. Boudicca took poison and Poeninus 
 Postumus who had disobeyed the orders of his superior and cheated his 
 legion out of a share in the honor of victory, committed suicide when news 
 of the success reached him. Then the troops, brought together and aug- 
 mented by additional forces from Germany, went into winter quarters. 
 Many of the rebellious tribes were brought to terms by fire and sword, but 
 the more spirited slowly yielded by reason of the lack of harmony between 
 Suetonius and Julius Classicianus the procurator who had succeeded 
 Catus. 
 
 In this account also we find that Tacitus has adhered strictly to the 
 technique of history. An excellent opportunity to characterize Suetonius 
 was afforded by his march through the enemy to Londinium, but no descrip- 
 tion of the march is given. In the accounts of both generals whatever 
 encomiastic touches occur are merely incidental and the elements of encom- 
 iastic treatment do not occur in anything like the amplification in which 
 we shall find them in the account of Corbulo. The narration of facts 
 is faithfully kept. The leaders are conspicuous figures, but not more so 
 than we should expect. 
 
CHRONOLOGY 
 
 In dealing with the question of the chronology of Corbulo's life and 
 campaigns my aim will be to show that Tacitus (and his source) followed 
 merely the sequence of events, and that he either had no clear idea of the 
 chronology or, if he had, did not care to make use of it. In the account 
 of the campaign against the Chauci, 1 Nipperdey regards the events as 
 spread over more than one year, although they are given as having taken 
 place in the year 47, and there is nothing in the narrative itself to show 
 that they extended over a longer period. 
 
 The question of chronology which has caused so much discussion, begins 
 with the appointment of Corbulo to take charge of affairs in Armenia. 
 Nero came to the throne in October of 54, and one of his first acts was to 
 appoint Corbulo to command in the East. While not expressly so stated, 
 the natural inference is that he went to the East in the spring of 55, but the 
 events narrated in xiii. 8, 9, must have extended over more than one year. 3 
 When we come to the account in xiii. 34-41, we again find events given 
 under the year 58, which must have extended over more than one year. 
 The chronology of the chapters and the assignment of events depends some- 
 what on the way in which we interpret the " miraculum" in chap. 41 . Egli 
 takes it to refer to the eclipse of April 30, 59, mentioned by Pliny, N. H. 
 ii. 180, and thus assigns a definite date for the destruction of Artaxata. 
 Laufenburg, Furneaux, and Henderson reject Egli's argument on the 
 ground that such a description could not refer to an eclipse and that Cor- 
 bulo could not have reached Artaxata so soon in the spring. Henderson 
 explains it as some effect of cloud and sunshine. They all admit that 
 Tacitus knew of the above eclipse and refers to it in xiv. 12, where he says: 
 iam sol repente obscuratus et tactae de coelo quattuordecim urbis regiones. 
 
 Now there were just two eclipses which Corbulo in Armenia might 
 have seen. A total eclipse April 30, 59, and a partial eclipse October 13, 
 60. 3 Of these the latter is not to be taken into consideration because it 
 was not one of any magnitude and for the further reason that Pliny very 
 definitely gives the year in which Corbulo observed the eclipse reported: 
 Solis defectum Vipstano et Fonteio coss. These men were consuls for the 
 year 59. As Corbulo reported an eclipse for this year and the one of April 
 
 1 xi. 18, 19. 
 
 2 Cf. "quae in alios consules egressa coniunxi." 
 
 3 See Ginzel Spezieller Canon der Finstemisse, p. 77. 
 
 7 
 
8 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 30 was the only one he could have seen in Armenia in that year the ques- 
 tion resolves itself into this: Could the description in Tacitus refer to 
 an eclipse and could Corbulo have been in Artaxata at the time of its occur- 
 rence ? In the description as we have it commentators have made the mis- 
 take of assuming that Tacitus took it from Corbulo's Memoirs. Hender- 
 son says that it is best to dissociate the account in Pliny from that in Tac- 
 itus, but gives no adequate reason for doing so. The two accounts in a 
 certain sense are to be dissociated, namely in this: in the account of Pliny 
 we have the record of an eclipse given by a historian and as he found it 
 in Corbulo's Memoirs, and in the passage of Tacitus we have a rhetorical 
 amplification of the same phenomena used by an encomiast to exalt the 
 praises of the general by enlisting, so to speak, the co-operation of nature 
 itself. The purpose of the one is to set forth truthfully facts of history, 
 that of the other is to glorify the man he is describing, and he makes all 
 facts serve this purpose. 
 
 No doubt the phenomena observed by Corbulo were very unusual. 
 That phenomena observed at times of eclipses are very remarkable, is a 
 well-known fact. The following is a description from Monroe B. Synder: 
 
 As totality approaches, a pale-purple coloring spreads over the landscape. 
 Within a minute of the total phase, the phenomena begin to succeed each other 
 so rapidly that no single observer can note them all. By those glancing at the 
 landscape in the direction of the approaching shadow a majestic darkness will 
 be seen to sweep forward with a swiftness truly impressive. Those looking at 
 the earth, and away from the eclipsing sun, will see a succession of flitting bands, 
 alternately dark and bright, known as the shadow bands, which for many decades 
 remained an unexplained puzzle. 4 
 
 4 Cyclopedia Americana under "Eclipse." For further evidence of the strange- 
 ness of the phenomena we may compare the following: "The most instantaneous 
 darkening of the orb of day, more particularly when it is unlooked for, is calculated 
 to impress a spectator with vague terror; even when expected, it fills the mind with 
 awe, as a demonstration of the forces and motions of the mechanism of the universe. 
 The sudden darkness, too, is impressive from its strangeness as much as occurring by 
 
 day; it resembles neither the darkness of night nor the gloom of twilight Stars 
 
 and planets appear, and all animals are dismayed by the general aspect of nature." 
 — The International Cyclopedia, Vol. V, p. 257. "When the sun was reduced to a 
 small crescent, the shadows of all objects were depicted with great severity and blackness 
 reminding one of the effects of illumination with the electric light. The sky at this 
 period assumed an indigo tint, and the landscape was tinged with a bronze hue." — 
 Warren De La Rue Athenaeum, Vol. II, p. 269. "On looking up one of the grandest 
 spectacles of which it is possible to conceive met the eye. Surrounding the dark body 
 of the moon was a crown of light, with rays shooting out in five great sheaths to a dis- 
 tance equal to the sun's diameter, or nearly a million of miles. No painting can 
 represent it and no pen can describe it." — Quoted by Newcomb of an eclipse observed 
 in the United States, August 7, 1869, Universal Encyclopedia, under "Eclipse." 
 
CHRONOLOGY 9 
 
 While the quotations given refer to total eclipses, yet the phenomena 
 might very well be true in great measure of a partial eclipse of the magni- 
 tude of the one in question, which for Artaxata was 9?8. s I think the two 
 accounts in Tacitus and Pliny refer to the same eclipse, and that Artaxata 
 was destroyed April 30, 59. 
 
 As to the argument that Corbulo could not have reached Artaxata so 
 soon, it is not proven because we do not know where Corbulo spent the 
 winter. There is absolutely no hint of winter quarters nor that Corbulo 
 still drew his supplies from Trapezus. It seems far more reasonable to 
 assume that he did winter within striking distance of Artaxata. More- 
 over, after his successful campaign of 58 there would be no enemy between 
 his camp and Trapezus, if he still wished to draw supplies from that place 
 and we know that he won over the Moschi to an alliance. It is more plaus- 
 ible to suppose that the three forts were taken in 58, whence arose the con- 
 fidence of taking Artaxata, but the season was too far spent to permit of 
 preparations and a march against that city. Then with no enemy behind 
 him Corbulo would go into winter quarters preparatory for an early march 
 in the spring on Artaxata. Tiridates would most naturally withdraw to 
 Artaxata after the failure of the negotiations and winter there. This 
 assumption is strengthened by the fact that we hear nothing of him until 
 Corbulo is close to the city. Under ordinary circumstances an army would 
 not leave its winter quarters until there was a reasonable assurance of fair 
 weather, but the hardships of an early march would not be greater than 
 those endured in the winter quarters of 57-58. The very thing that Cor- 
 bulo would do would be to strike early and rapidly in order to take the 
 enemy by surprise and catch him unprepared. That the Romans met 
 with no serious opposition is a just inference from the fact that none is 
 recorded until the day before the surrender of Artaxata. In view of this 
 a march of 150 or 200 miles would be entirely possible in early spring. 
 
 It seems best to take the winter referred to in xiii. 35 as that of 57-58, 
 or the one previous to the opening of an active campaign. The events 
 narrated up to and including the taking of the three forts, I believe, all 
 happened in the year 58. Most editors regard Volandum as identical 
 with 'OAavr; 6 of Strabo, from the resemblance the words bear to each other. 
 To my mind the evidence is not conclusive, and the identity of the two 
 places is highly improbable from the situation as we have it. Those who 
 believe in the identity of the two names also believe that the capture of 
 Artaxata followed immediately the capture of the three forts in one and the 
 same year. They are led to this belief from the fact that all chronological 
 s Ginzel, p. 202. 6 Strabo xi. 14. 6. 
 
IO A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 data are lacking. But this is a place where the writer has disregarded the 
 time element. It seems more likely that Volandum was some stronghold 
 in northwest Armenia where Corbulo was when the negotiations between 
 him and Tiridates were broken off in 58. Corbulo had hoped to adjudicate 
 matters by negotiation, and avoid the necessity of overrunning Armenia — 
 a method which he followed consistently throughout his entire command. 
 The most natural inference is that no extensive plans had been laid for 
 overrunning Armenia, and going to Artaxata until after the first negotia- 
 tions had failed. This belief is strengthened by the fact that he did not 
 understand the Parthians at first, as is shown by his seeking long and in 
 vain to get a battle with them on Roman lines of fighting. 7 The negotia- 
 tions having failed, he at once began active operations, captured the three 
 forts, and then conceived the idea of aiming a blow directly at the capital, 
 as is shown by these words: unde orta fiducia caput gentis Artaxata adgre- 
 diendi. & Now if Volandum was the same as 'OXavrj and if Corbulo had 
 captured it with so little effort, and had come so near Artaxata, there would 
 have been no need to say that the capture of Volandum "inspired a reso- 
 lution to attempt Artaxata," for he never would have reached Volandum 
 without having resolved to attack Artaxata. The words above do have 
 their proper significance if they are applied to the capture of the fort in the 
 year previous to the capture of the Armenian capital, and if that fort was 
 at a considerable distance from Artaxata. 
 
 The situation up to this point resolves itself into this. Armenia was to 
 be the field of action. Corbulo in Cappadocia made his levy of troops 
 from that and the adjoining states, but could not take the field for some 
 years owing to the demoralized condition of the army. Fortunately for 
 the Romans the Parthians were distracted by a revolt. When Corbulo 
 felt strong enough to take the field he led his troops into winter quarters 
 somewhere in northwest Armenia. That he was in this region is shown 
 by the fact that Tiridates broke off the negotiations in order to intercept 
 provisions coming to the Romans by way of Trapezus. In these winter 
 quarters the discipline of the troops would be completed for the coming 
 campaigns and a Roman army on Armenian soil would serve to bring the 
 Parthians to some sort of understanding. The following season would be 
 given up to the negotiations and the first year's campaign, concluding with 
 the capture of the three forts. Corbulo would then go into winter quarters 
 near where he had been carrying on his campaign and where supplies could 
 still reach him from Trapezus if he wished to draw from that place, as the 
 enemy would have been forced back toward Artaxata and the country 
 1 xiii. 37. 8 xiii. 39. 
 
CHRONOLOGY 1 1 
 
 would be free from an enemy behind him. His safety, moreover, would 
 be further insured by an alliance with the Moschi. 9 In these winter quar- 
 ters he would make ready for a rapid march on Artaxata in the spring 
 when he must have cut loose from his base of supplies. He would make 
 an early and rapid march in order to take the enemy by surprise and con- 
 fuse him by the very rapidity of his movements. 
 
 It will be observed that no mention is made of the winter 58-59. 
 Events are run together without reference to when they occurred, showing 
 that the writer had in mind some other purpose than annalistic narra- 
 tion ; it made no difference to him whether the forts were taken in 58 or 59. 
 
 I think we can assume that Artaxata was immediately destroyed after 
 its surrender and that Corbulo at once set out for Tigranocerta. Furneaux 
 is of a different opinion, but this is the view of Egli and Henderson, and 
 such is the plain statement of the text. It would be the very course to be 
 expected — rapid, decisive movements on the part of the Romans. Nothing 
 else would have such disheartening effect on the Parthians and Armenians 
 who were opposed to them. 
 
 In the summer of 59, probably about the middle of August, 10 Corbulo 
 was in Tauronitium. For just before reaching this place the army had 
 come into cultivated fields and had reaped the crops. Not long after this 
 ambassadors came from Tigranocerta offering the surrender of the city. 
 All commentators save Furneaux are agreed that Corbulo reached Tigrano- 
 certa in the fall of 59. Now whether the capture of Legerda and the 
 return of the Hyrcanian ambassadors took place in the year 59 or 60 is 
 uncertain from the account in Tacitus. But the events narrated in xiv. 
 23, 24 must have followed immediately after the destruction of Artaxata 
 and it seems best to assume at least the capture of Legerda in the year 59, 
 assuming that this place was some fort not far from Tigranocerta. The 
 return of the Hyrcanian embassy could hardly have occurred in the year 
 59 for the reason that Corbulo reached Tigranocerta late in the year, and 
 it would not be likely that news could have reached the ambassadors in 
 time to permit of their arrival in the fall or winter. Then, too, the territory 
 which they would have had to cross from the borders of Syria would have 
 
 9 xiii. 37. 
 
 10 Egli Feldsuge in Armenien Biidinger p. 288. In den Sommer 59 fallt der 
 Marsch des Corbulo von Artaxata nach Tigranocerta mit dem Angriff der Marder. 
 .... Schon vorher war in Hocharmenien das Getreide geerntet worden, was friih- 
 estens im August geschehen sein konnte; denn in der milden Tauraunitis sah Brandt 
 (Bei Ritter. Erdkunde X, 671) am 7. August trotz starker Sommerhitze das Ge- 
 treide noch ungereift. Corbulo hatte aber schon vor Ankunft in der Tauraunitis, 
 also in einer hoher liegenden, nicht so milden Gegend geerntet. 
 
12 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 been more or less hostile. But the account as we have it gives everything 
 as happening in one year, the march from Artaxata, the return of the 
 embassy, the thwarting of Tiridates' attempts, the coming of Tigranes 
 and the return of Corbulo to Syria. Manifestly we have here events nar- 
 rated which refer to two years, but no mention is made of the winter 59-60. 
 Commentators seem agreed that Corbulo spent one winter in Tigranocerta, 
 and that it must have been this winter, but Tacitus makes no mention of 
 such a thing. It is simply an inference from the fact that too many things 
 are narrated to have occurred in one year. Possibly the capture of Legerda 
 ended the campaign of 59. Then Corbulo wintered in Tigranocerta and 
 during the winter, or far more likely the following spring, the Hyrcanian 
 embassy returned, while the year 60 was given up to a campaign against 
 Tiridates, the setting-up of Tigranes, and the withdrawal of Corbulo to 
 Syria. As before, we see here a disregard for the annalistic arrangement. 
 There is a sequence of events, but so closely interwoven that no one can 
 tell which of them belong to the year 59, and which to the year 60. 
 
 This running of events together is seen in xv. 1-17. Under the year 
 62 events are narrated which must belong to three different years for three 
 separate winters are referred to: hibemavisse; 11 hieme; 12 and hibernavit. 13 
 Furneaux, following Nipperdey, takes hibemavisse as referring to the winter 
 of 61-62, but it must refer to that of 60-61 , as will be seen from what follows. 
 Hibernavit refers to 62-63, the winter after the defeat of Paetus. 14 This 
 leaves two winters unaccounted for. Instante iam hieme must be the 
 winter previous to the defeat of Paetus, or 61-62. Then hibemavisse 
 refers to the winter 60-61. That hibemavisse refers to this winter is shown 
 by the implied criticism of Corbulo in his withdrawal from Tigranocerta 
 to hastily constructed winter quarters on the borders of Syria. So we have 
 the following: For the year 59, the taking of Artaxata, march to Tigrano- 
 certa and its surrender, the capture of Legerda and winter quarters at 
 Tigranocerta; 60, the coming of the Hyrcanian embassy, overrunning of 
 Armenia, establishment of Tigranes on the throne, and the withdrawal of 
 Corbulo to Syria; 61, Corbulo in Syria fortifies the Euphrates, compels 
 Vologeses to come to terms; Paetus arrives; he crosses the Taurus on an 
 expedition against Tigranocerta late in the season, it seems, and without 
 any apparent success; 62, Corbulo guards Cappadocia; Paetus is defeated; 
 winter in Cappadocia. The events narrated in xv. 25-31 are given as 
 having taken place in the following year, 63. 
 
 From this we see that no attention is paid to the narrating of events in 
 
 11 xv. 6. I3 xv. 8. J 3 xv. 17. 
 
 J 4 " Exim Paetus per Cappadociam hibernavit;' ' see xv. 23 which begins the year 63. 
 
CHRONOLOGY 13 
 
 regular annalistic order. They are run together in such a way that it is 
 impossible to assign definitely to the exact year the events as they occurred. 
 That such is the case one has only to read the accounts of the commentators 
 already mentioned. The writer had another purpose in mind, and was 
 not concerned with an impartial recording of facts of history. He seized 
 such facts in the life and campaigns of Corbulo as served his purpose and 
 wherever chronological data are afforded they are afforded only incidentally. 
 
TOPOGRAPHY 
 
 When we come to consider the topography of Corbulo's campaigns 
 we find even greater disregard for places than we found for time in the 
 matter of chronology. The mention of places is merely incidental and it 
 is not likely that a definite geography will ever be made out. The question 
 has been carefully studied by Egli and Henderson. 1 The latter makes 
 a careful comparison of the ancient authorities in regard to the positions 
 of Tigranocerta and of Rhandeia. He further compares the views of the 
 modern writers who have discussed the subject and concludes by agreeing 
 with none of them in all points. 
 
 The first place mentioned is Aegea, a town in Cilicia on the gulf of Issus, 
 where Corbulo met Quadratus. Where he was until active campaigning 
 began we are not told except that he moved troops across Syria and made 
 levies in Galatia and Cappadocia. 2 We infer that the winter quarters of 
 57-58 were in northwest Armenia from the fact that Tiridates withdraws 
 to intercept provisions coming to the Romans by way of Trapezus. Also, 
 inlecti Moschi, 3 would indicate that Corbulo was engaged in northern 
 Armenia. The next place mentioned is Volandum, 4 but the account in 
 Tacitus gives us no clear idea as to where it was, whether near to or far 
 from Artaxata nor in what direction it lay. Three forts were taken in one 
 day, but this is the only one named. Corbulo was next in Artaxata on the 
 Araxes River. Hence it is apparent how meager is the geographical knowl- 
 edge up to this point: Aegea, Trapezus, Volandum, Artaxata. 
 
 The next objective point of Corbulo was Tigranocerta and while it 
 seems to be impossible to locate the site today yet we may rightly assume 
 that the situation caused the people of ancient times no such trouble. But 
 of the march between Artaxata and Tigranocerta only the Mardi, a people, 
 and Tauraunitium, a district, are mentioned. These are general state- 
 ments, while all geographical details are disregarded, which leads to the 
 conclusion that the writer had no general idea of the geography or else he 
 had in mind some other purpose than historical narration. As regards 
 fort Legerda* we have to infer that it was somewhere near Tigranocerta, 
 but it cannot be located. Nisibis 6 was said to be 37 miles from Tigrano- 
 certa, but if we look into modern discussions of the subject we are led to 
 the conclusion^thatj[here[again the writer did not have the situation clearly 
 
 1 The EnglishV oumal oj Philology, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 99, 271. 
 
 3 xiii. 35. 3 xiii. 37. 4 xiii. 39. s xiv. 25. 6 xv. 5. 
 
 14 
 
TOPOGRAPHY 1 5 
 
 in mind, for there is no place which will satisfy the statements given by 
 ancient writers as to the relative positions of the two cities. 
 
 The next topographical indications are general statements and might 
 apply to any one of many places. An escort was given the Hyrcanian 
 embassy to the Red Sea: ne Euphraten trans gressi kostium custodiis cir- 
 cumvenirenturJ Corbulo went to drive out Tiridates who had entered: 
 per Medos extrema Armeniae. 8 Then Corbulo withdrew into Syria: atque 
 interim reliquos legiones pro ripa Euphratis locate 
 
 Now if we turn to Paetus we find that he was north of Mt. Taurus: 
 rapit exercitum trans montem Taurum reciperandis, at ferebat, Tigranocer- 
 tis. 10 Shortly before his defeat he placed a force on Mt. Taurus: tria millia 
 delecti peditis proximo iugo imposuit, 11 and his wife in a stronghold called 
 Arsamosata: cui Arsamosata nomen est. 12 He bridged the river Arsanias 
 at a place where the stream was fordable. 13 Cassius Dio 14 says that Paetus 
 was besieged at a place called Rhandeia, on the Arsanias, but observe that 
 the account in Tacitus is not so definite. All that is given is that Paetus 
 was somewhere north of Mt. Taurus on the Arsanias. When Paetus sent 
 to Corbulo for assistance the latter hastened to him through Commagene 
 and Cappadocia: regionem Commagenam, exim Cappadociam, inde Arme- 
 nios petivit. 1 * He met Paetus on the banks of the Euphrates: Corbulo 
 cum suis copiis apud ripam Euphratis obvius. . . . praetulit, 16 and then 
 withdrew to Syria: Syriam repetiturum; and Paetus to Cappadocia: exim 
 Paetus per Cappadociam hibernavit. 1 " 1 
 
 Now where the ambassadors 18 from Vologeses and Tiridates met Cor- 
 bulo we do not know, but Corbulo crossed the Euphrates at Melitene: 
 apud Melitenen, qua tramittere Euphraten parabat 19 . And although they 
 met to adjudicate matters on the field of Paetus' disgrace, still we are not 
 given the name of the place. This is remarkable when we consider the 
 way in which the Romans viewed a defeat of that kind and the importance 
 given the place by the meeting of the Roman and Parthian forces there. 
 
 To sum up the definite geography in the account in Tacitus we have 
 Aegea, the place of landing when Corbulo went to the East, Artaxata on 
 the Araxes, Tigranocerta in the south of Armenia with Nisibis 37 ( ?) miles 
 distant, and Melitene on the Euphrates. Less definite is the situation 
 of Paetus north of Mt. Taurus on the Arsanias River and Corbulo in Syria 
 fortifying the Euphrates. Wholly general is the position of Corbulo in 
 Cappadocia and Armenia until he reaches Artaxata, the reference to places 
 
 7 xiv. 25. io xv. 8. '3 xv. 15. 16 xv . !& 18 xv. 27. 
 
 8 xiv. 26. IT xv. 10. m lxii. 21. 1. 1 7 xv. 17. I 9 XV. 26. 
 
 9 XV. 3. J 2 XV". IO. 1 S XV. 12. 
 
l6 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 on the march to Tigranocerta, the invasion and repulse of Tigranes when 
 he enters, per Medos extrema Armeniae, the withdrawal of Corbulo to the 
 Euphrates in Syria and his march through Commagene and Cappadocia 
 to aid Paetus. 
 
 Those who work out a detailed geography for Corbulo's campaigns do 
 so not from the account in Tacitus, but from that account plus Strabo, 
 Cassius Dio, and Plutarch, and that is the correct way when we wish to 
 get at the facts of topography. But if we consider the account only in 
 Tacitus, we find that very little definite knowledge can be obtained, and it 
 is quite likely that the matter was as confusing to the readers of Tacitus 
 in his day as it is to us. The explanation is that the writer whom Tacitus 
 was following was not concerned with the geography. He selected only 
 the places and made such use of them as would serve to add praise to his 
 hero. 
 

 EXPOSITION 
 
 The portions of the Annals dealing with Corbulo are here brought 
 together and printed that it may be seen how closely connected the account 
 is and its similarity to a biography. The text is that of Halm. 
 
 XI. 18. Per idem tempus Chauci, nulla dissensione domi, et morte Sanquinii 
 alacres, dum Corbulo adventat, inferiorem Germaniam incursavere duce Gan- 
 nasco, qui natione Canninefas, auxiliare stipendium meritus, post transfuga, 
 levibus navigiis praedabundus Gallorum maxime oram vastabat, non ignarus 
 dites et inbelles esse, at Corbulo provinciam ingressus magna cum cura et mox 
 gloria, cui principium ilia militia fuit, triremes alveo Rheni, ceteras navium, ut 
 quaeque habiles, per aestuaria et fossas adegit; luntribusque hostium depressis 
 et exturbato Gannasco, ubi praesentia satis composita sunt, legiones operum et 
 laboris ignavas, populationibus laetantes, veterem ad morem reduxit, ne quis 
 agmine decederet nee pugnam nisi iussus iniret. stationes, vigiliae, diurna noc- 
 turnaque munia in armis agitabantur. feruntque militem, quia vallum non accinc- 
 tus, atque alium, quia pugione tantum accinctus foderet, morte punitos. quae 
 nimia et incertum an falso iacta originem tamen e severitate ducis traxere; in ten - 
 tumque et magnis delictis inexorabilem scias, cui tantum asperitatis etiam adversus 
 levia credebatur. 
 
 19. Ceterum is terror milites hostesque in diversum adfecit: nos virtutem 
 auximus, barbari ferociam infregere. et natio Frisiorum, post rebellionem clade 
 L. Apronii coeptam infensa aut male fida, datis obsidibus consedit apud agros a 
 Corbulone descriptos: idem senatum, magistratus, leges inposuit. ac ne iussa 
 exuerent, praesidium immunivit, missis qui maiores Chaucos ad deditionem 
 pellicerent, simul Gannascum dolo adgrederentur. nee inritae aut degeneres 
 insidiae fuere adversus transfugam et violatorem fidei. sed caede eius motae Chau- 
 corum mentes, et Corbulo semina rebellionis praebebat, ut laeta apud plerosque, 
 ita apud quosdam sinistra fama. cur hostem conciret ? adversa in rem publicam 
 casura: sin prospere egisset, formidolosum paci virum insignem et ignavo principi 
 praegravem. igitur Claudius adeo novam in Germanias vim prohibuit, ut referri 
 praesidia cis Rhenum iuberet. 
 
 20. lam castra in hostili solo molienti Corbuloni eae litterae redduntur. ille 
 re subita, quamquam multa simul offunderentur, metus ex imperatore, contemptio 
 ex barbaris, ludibrium apud socios, nihil aliud prolocutus quam 'beatos quondam 
 duces Romanos', signum receptui dedit. ut tamen miles otium exueret, inter 
 Mosam Rhenumque trium et viginti milium spatio fossam perduxit, qua incerta 
 Oceani vitarentur. insigne tamen triumphi indulsit Caesar, quamvis bellum 
 negavisset. 
 
 XIII. 8 laeti, quod Domitium Corbulonem retinendae Armeniae prae- 
 
 posuerat videbaturque locus virtutibus patefactus. copiae Orientis ita dividuntur, 
 
 *7 
 
l8 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 ut pars auxiliarium cum duabus legionibus apud provinciam Suriam et legatum 
 eius Quadratum Ummidium remaneret, par civium sociorumque numerus Corbu- 
 loni esset, additis cohortibus absque, quae in Cappadocia hiemabant. socii reges, 
 prout bello conduceret, parere iussi: sed studia eorum in Corbulonem promp- 
 tiora erant. qui ut instaret famae, quae in novis coeptis validissima est, itinere 
 propere confecto apud Aegeas civitatem Ciliciae obvium Quadratum habuit, illuc 
 progressum, ne, si ad accipiendas copias Suriam intravisset Corbulo, omnium ora 
 in se verteret, corpore ingens, verbis magnificis et super experientiam sapien- 
 tiamque etiam specie inanium validus. 
 
 9. Ceterum uterque ad Vologesem regem nuntiis monebant, pacem quam 
 bellum mallet datisque obsidibus solitam prioribus reverentiam in populum 
 Romanum continuaret. et Vologeses, quo bellum ex commodo pararet, an ut 
 aemulationis suspectos per nomen obsidum amoveret, tradit nobilissimos ex 
 familia Arsacidarum. accepitque eos centurio Insteius ab Ummidio missus, 
 forte prior ea de causa adito rege. quod postquam Corbuloni cognitum est, ire 
 praefectum cohortis Arrium Varum et reciperare obsides iubet. hinc ortum inter 
 praefectum et centurionem iurgium ne diutius extends spectaculo esset, arbitrium 
 rei obsidibus legatisque, qui eos ducebant, permissum. atque illi per recentem 
 gloriam et inclinatione quadam etiam hostium Corbulonem praetulere. unde 
 discordia inter duces, querente Ummidio praerepta quae suis consiliis patravisset, 
 testante contra Corbulone non prius conversum regem ad offerendos obsides, 
 quam ipse dux bello delectus spes eius ad metum mutaret. Nero quo componeret 
 diversos, sic evulgari iussit: ob res a Quadrato et Corbulone prospere gestas 
 laurum fascibus imperatoriis addi. quae in alios consules egressa coniunxi. 
 
 34 Eius anni principio mollibus adhuc initiis prolatatum inter Parthos 
 
 Romanosque de obtinenda Armenia bellum acriter resumitur, quia nee Vologeses 
 sinebat fatrem Tiridaten dati a se regni expertem esse aut alienae id potentiae 
 donum habere, et Corbulo dignum magnitudine populi Romani rebatur parta olim a 
 Lucullo Pompeioque recipere. ad hoc Armenii ambigua fide utraque arma invita- 
 bant, situ terrarum, similitudine morum Parthis propiores conubiisque permixti 
 ac libertate ignota illuc magis ut ad servitium inclinantes. 
 
 35. Sed Corbuloni plus molis ad versus ignaviam militum quam contra per- 
 fidiam hostium erat: quippe Suria transmotae legiones, pace longa segnes, munia 
 castrorum aegerrime tolerabant. satis constitit fuisse in eo exercitu veteranos, 
 qui non stationem, non vigilias inissent, vallum fossamque quasi nova et mira 
 viserent, sine galeis, sine loricis, nitidi et quaestuosi, militia per oppida expleta. 
 igitur dimissis, quibus senectus aut valetudo adversa erat, supplementum petivit. 
 et habiti per Galatiam Cappadociamque dilectus, adiectaque ex Germania legio 
 cum equitibus alariis et peditatu cohortium. retentusque omnis exercitus sub 
 pellibus, quamvis hieme saeva adeo, ut obducta glacie nisi effossa humus ten- 
 toriis locum non praeberet. ambusti multorum artus vi frigoris et quidam 
 inter excubias exanimati sunt, adnotatusque miles, qui fascem lignorum 
 gestabat, itapraeriguisse manus, ut oneri adhaerentes truncis brachiis deciderent. 
 ipse cultu levi, capite intecto, in agmine, in laboribus frequens adesse, laudem 
 
OF / 
 
 EXPOSITION 19 
 
 strenuis, solacium invalidis, exemplum omnibus ostendere. dehinc quia duritiam 
 caeli militiaeque multi abnuebant deserebantque, remedium severitate quaesitum 
 est. nee enim, ut in aliis exercitibus, primum alterumque delictum venia prose- 
 quebatur, sed qui signa reliquerat, statim capite poenas luebat. idque usu 
 salubre et misericordia melius apparuit: quippe pauciores ilia castra deseruere 
 quam ea, in quibus ignoscebatur. 
 
 36. Interim Corbulo legionibus intra castra habitis, donee ver adolesceret, 
 dispositisque per idoneos locos cohortibus auxiliariis, ne pugnam priores auderent 
 praedicit: curam praesidiorum Paccio Orfito primi pili honore perfuncto mandat. 
 is quamquam incautos barbaros et bene gerendae rei casum offerri scripserat, 
 tenere se munimentis et maiores copias opperiri iubetur. sed rupto imperio, 
 postquam paucae e proximis castellis turmae advenerant pugnamque imperitia 
 poscebant, congressus cum hoste funditur. et damno eius exterriti qui subsidium 
 ferre debuerant, sua quisque in castra trepida fuga rediere. quod graviter Cor- 
 bulo accepit increpitumque Paccium et praefectos militesque tendere extra 
 vallum iussit; inque ea contumelia detenti nee nisi precibus universi exercitus 
 exsoluti sunt. 
 
 37. At Tiridates super proprias clientelas ope Vologesi fratris adiutus, non 
 furtim iam, sed palam bello infensare Armenian!, quosque fidos nobis rebatur, 
 depopulari, et si copiae contra ducerentur, eludere hucque et illuc volitans plura 
 fama quam pugna exterrere. igitur Corbulo quaesito diu proelio frustra habitus 
 et exemplo hostium circumferre bellum coactus, dispertit vires, ut legati prae- 
 fectique diversos locos pariter invaderent; simul regem Antiochum monet proxi- 
 mas sibi praefecturas petere. nam Pharasmanes interfecto filio Radamisto 
 quasi proditore, quo fidem in nos testaretur, vetus adversus Armenios odium 
 promptius exercebat. tuncque primum inlecti Moschi, gens ante alias socia 
 Romanis, avia Armeniae incursavit. ita consilia Tiridati in contrarium vertebant, 
 mittebatque oratores, qui suo Parthorumque nomine expostularent, cur datis 
 nuper obsidibus redintegrataque amicitia, quae novis quoque beneficiis locum 
 aperiret, vetere Armeniae possessione depelleretur. ideo nondum ipsum Vologe- 
 sen commotum, quia causa quam vi agere mallent: sin perstaretur in bello, non 
 defore Arsacidis virtutem fortunamque saepius iam clade Romana expertam. 
 ad ea Corbulo, satis comperto Vologesen defectione Hyrcaniae attineri, saudet 
 Tiridati precibus Caesarem adgredi: posse illi regnum stabile et res incruentas 
 contingere, si omissa spe longinqua et sera praesentem potioremque sequeretur. 
 
 38. Placitum dehinc, quia commeantibus in vicem nuntiis nihil in summam 
 pacis proficiebatur, conloquio ipsorum tempus locumque destinari. mille equitum 
 praesidium Tiridates adfore sibi dicebat: quantum Corbuloni cuiusque generis 
 militum adsisteret, non statuere, dum positis loricis et galeis in faciem pacis veni- 
 retur. cuicumque mortalium, nedum veteri et provido duci, barbarae astutiae 
 patuissent: ideo artum inde numerum finiri et hinc maiorem offerri, ut dolus 
 pararetur; nam equiti sagittarum usu exercito si detecta corpora obicerentur, 
 nihil profuturam multitudinem. dissimulato tamen intellectu rectius de iis, quae 
 in publicum consulerentur, totis exercitibus coram dissertaturos respondit. locum- 
 
20 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 que delegit, cuius pars altera colles erant clementer adsurgentes accipiendis pedi- 
 tum ordinibus, pars in planitiem porrigebatur ad explicandas equitum turmas. 
 dieque pacto prior Corbulo socias cohortes et auxilia regum pro cornibus, medio 
 sextam legionem constituit, cui accita per noctem aliis ex castris tria milia ter- 
 tianorum permiscuerat, una cum aquila, quasi eadem legio spectaretur. Tiri- 
 dates vergente iam die procul adstitit, unde videri magis quam audiri posset, 
 ita sine congressu dux Roman us abscedere militem sua quemque in castra iubet. 
 
 39. Rex sive fraudem suspectans, quia plura simul in loca ibatur, sive ut 
 commeatus nostras Pontico mari et Trapezunte oppido adventantes interciperet, 
 propere discedit. sed neque commeatibus vim facere potuit, quia per montes 
 ducebantur praesidiis nostris insessos, et Corbulo, ne inritum bellum traheretur 
 utque Armenios ad sua defendenda cogeret, excindere parat castella, sibique 
 quod validissimum in ea praefectura, cognomen to Volandum, sumit; minora 
 Cornelio Flacco legato et Insteio Capitoni castrorum praefecto mandat. turn 
 circumspectis munimentis et quae expugnationi idonea provisis, hortatur milites, 
 ut hostem vagum neque paci aut proelio paratum, sed perfidiam et ignaviam 
 fuga confitentem exuerent sedibus gloriaeque pariter et praedae consulerent. 
 turn quadripertito exercitu hos in testudinem conglobatos subruendo vallo inducit, 
 alios scalas moenibus admovere, multos tormentis faces et hastas incutere iubet. 
 libritoribus funditoribusque attributus locus, unde eminus glandes torquerent, 
 ne qua pars subsidium laborantibus ferret pari undique metu. tantus inde ardor 
 certantis exercitus fuit, ut intra tertiam diei partem nudati propugnatoribus muri, 
 obices portarum subversi, capta escensu munimenta omnesque puberes trucidati 
 sint, nullo milite amisso, paucis admodum vulneratis. et inbelle vulgus sub 
 corona venundatum, reliqua praeda victoribus cessit. pari fortuna legatus ac 
 praefectus usi sunt, tribusque una die castellis expugnatis cetera terrore et alia 
 sponte incolarum in deditionem veniebant. unde orta fiducia caput gentis Arta- 
 xata adgrediendi. nee tamen proximo itinera ductae legiones, quae si amnem 
 Araxen, qui moenia adluit, ponte transgrederentur, sub ictum dabantur: procul 
 et latioribus vadis transiere. 
 
 40. At Tiridates pudore et metu, ne, si concessisset obsidioni, nihil opis in 
 ipso videretur, si prohiberet, inpeditis locis seque et equestres copias inligaret, 
 statuit postremo ostendere aciem et dato die proelium incipere vel simulatione 
 fugae locum fraudi parare. igitur repente agmen Romanum circumfundit, non 
 ignaro duce nostra, qui viae pariter et pugnae composuerat exercitum. latere 
 dextro tertia legio, sinistra sexta incedebat, mediis decumanorum delectis; recepta 
 inter ordines impedimenta, et tergum mille equites tuebantur, quibus iusserat, 
 ut instantibus comminus resisterent, refugos non sequerentur. in cornibus pedes 
 Sagittarius et cetera manus equitum ibat, productiore [cornu] sinistra per ima 
 collium, ut, si hostis intravisset, fronte simul et sinu exciperetur. adsultare ex 
 diverso Tiridates, non usque ad ictum teli, sed turn minitans, turn specie trepi- 
 dantis, si laxare ordines et diversos consectari posset, ubi nihil temeritate solutum, 
 nee amplius quam decurio equitum audentius progressus et sagittis confixus 
 ceteros ad obsequium exemplo firmaverat, propinquis iam tenebris abscessit. 
 
EXPOSITION 2 1 
 
 41. Et Corbulo castra in loco metatus, an expeditis legionibus nocte Artaxata 
 pergeret obsidioque circumdaret agitavit, concessisse illuc Tiridaten ratus. dein 
 postquam exploratores attulere longinquum regis iter et Medi an Albani peteren- 
 tur incertum, lucem opperitur, praemissaque levis armatura, quae muros interim 
 ambiret oppugnationemque eminus inciperet. sed oppidani portis sponte pate- 
 factis se suaque Romanis permisere, quod salutem ipsis tulit: Artaxatis ignis 
 inmissus deletaque et solo aequata sunt, quia nee teneri poterant sine valido 
 praesidio ob magnitudinem moenium, nee id nobis virium erat, quod firmando 
 praesidio et capessendo bello divideretur, vel si integra et incustodita relinqueren- 
 ■ tur, nulla in eo utilitas aut gloria, quod capta essent. adicitur miraculum velut 
 numine oblatum: nam cuncta Artaxatis tenus sole inlustria fuere; quod moenibus 
 cingebatur, repente ita atra nube coopertum fulguribusque discretum est, ut 
 quasi infensantibus deis exitio tradi crederetur. 
 
 XIV. 23. At Corbulo post deleta Artaxata utendum recenti terrore ratus ad 
 occupanda Tigranocerta, quibus excisis metum hostium intenderet vel, si peper- 
 cisset, clementiae famam adipisceretur, illuc pergit, non infenso exercitu, ne spem 
 veniae auferret, neque tamen remissa cura, gnarus facilem mutatu gentem, ut 
 segnem ad pericula, ita infidam ad occasiones. barbari, pro ingenio quisque, alii 
 preces offerre, quidam deserere vicos et in avia digredi; ac fuere qui se speluncis 
 et carissima secum abderent. igitur dux Romanus diversis artibus, misericordia 
 adversus supplices, celeritate adversus profugos, inmitis iis, qui latebras insederant, 
 ora et exitus specuum sarmentis virgultisque completos igni exurit. atque ilium 
 fines suos praegredientem incursavere Mardi, latrociniis exerciti contraque inrum- 
 pentem montibus defensi; quos Corbulo inmissis Hiberis vastavit hostilemque 
 audaciam externo sanguine ultus est. 
 
 24. Ipse exercitusque ut nullis ex proelio damnis, ita per inopiam et labores 
 fatiscebant, carne pecudum propulsare famem adacti. ad hoc penuria aquae, 
 fervida aestas, longinqua itinera sola ducis patientia mitigabantur, eadem pluraque 
 gregario milite tolerantis. ventum dehinc in locos cultos demessaeque segetes, 
 et ex duobus castellis, in quae confugerant Armenii, alteram impetu captum; 
 qui primam vim depulerant, obsidione coguntur. unde in regionem Taurauni- 
 tium transgressus inprovisum periculum vitavit. nam haud procul tentorio 
 eius non ignobilis barbarus cum telo repertus ordinem insidiaram seque auctorem 
 et socios per tormenta edidit, convictique et puniti sunt qui specie amicitiae dolum 
 parabant. nee multo post legati Tigranocerta missi patere moenia adferant, 
 intentos popularis ad iussa: simul hospitale donum, coronam auream, tradebant. 
 accepitque cum honore, nee quicquam urbi detractum, quo promptius obsequium 
 integri retinerent. 
 
 25. At praesidium Legerda, quod ferox iuventus clauserat, non sine certamine 
 expugnatum est: nam et proelium pro muris ausi erant et pulsi intra munimenta 
 aggeri demum et inrumpentium armis cessere. quae facilius proveniebant, quia 
 Parthi Hyrcano bello distinebantur. miserant que Hyrcani ad principem Romanum 
 societatem oratum, attineri a se Vologesen pro pignore amicitiae ostentantes. 
 eos regredientes Corbulo, ne Euphraten transgressi hostium custodiis circum- 
 
22 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 venirentur, dato praesidio ad litora maris rubri deduxit, unde vitatis Parthorum 
 finibus patrias in sedes remeavere. 
 
 26. Quin et Tiridaten per Medos extrema Armeniae intrantem, praemisso 
 cum auxiliis Verulano legato atque ipse legionibus citis, abire procul ac spem 
 belli amittere subegit; quosque nobis aversos animis cognoverat, caedibus et 
 incendiis perpopulatus possessionem Armeniae usurpabat, cum advenit Tigranes 
 a Nerone ad capessendum imperium delectus, Cappadocum ex nobilitate, regis 
 Archelai nepos, sed quod diu obses apud urbem fuerat, usque ad servilem 
 patientiam demissus. nee consensu acceptus, durante apud quosdam favore 
 Arsacidarum. at plerique superbiam Parthorum perosi datum a Romanis regem 
 malebant. additum ei praesidium mille legionarii, tres sociorum cohortes 
 duaeque equitum alae, et quo facilius novum regnum tueretur, partes Armeniae, 
 ut cuique finitima, Pharasmani Polemonique et Aristobulo atque Antiocho parere 
 iussae sunt. Corbulo in Suriam abscessit, morte Ummidii legati vacuam ac sibi 
 permissam. 
 
 XV. 1. Interea rex Parthorum Vologeses cognitis Corbulonis rebus regemque 
 alienigenam Tigranen Armeniae impositum, simul fratre Tiridate pulso spretum 
 Arsacidarum fastigium ire ultum volens, magnitudine rursum Romana et con- 
 tinui foederis reverentia diversas ad curas trahebatur, cunctator ingenio et defec- 
 tione Hyrcanorum, gentis validae, multisque ex eo bellis inligatus. atque ilium 
 ambiguum novus insuper nuntius contumeliae exstimulat: quippe egressus 
 Armenia Tigranes Adiabenos, conterminam nationem, latius ac diutius quam 
 per latrocinia vastaverat, idque primores gentium aegre tolerabant: eo contemp- 
 tionis descensum, ut ne duce quidem Romano incursarentur, sed temeritate 
 obsidis tot per annos inter mancipia habiti. accendebat dolorem eorum Mono- 
 bazus, quern penes Adiabenum regimen, quod praesidium aut unde peteret rogi- 
 tans. iam de Armenia concessum, proxima trahi; et nisi defendant Parthi, levius 
 servitium apud Romanos deditis quam captis esse. Tiridates quoque regni 
 profugus per silentium aut modice querendo gravior erat: non enim ignavia 
 magna imperia contineri; virorum armorumque faciendum certamen; id in 
 summa fortuna aequius quod validius, et sua retinere privatae domus, de alienis 
 certare regiam laudem esse. 
 
 2. Igitur commotus his Vologeses concilium vocat et proximum sibi Tiridaten 
 constituit atque ita orditur: c hunc ego eodem mecum patre genitum, cum mihi 
 per aetatem summo nomine concessisset, in possessionem Armeniae deduxi, qui 
 tertius potentiae gradus habetur: nam Medos Pacorus ante ceperat. videbarque 
 contra Vetera fratrum odia et certamina familiae nostrae penates rite composuisse. 
 prohibent Romani et pacem numquam ipsis prospere lacessitam nunc quoque 
 in exitium suum abrumpunt. non ibo infitias: aequitate quam sanguine, causa 
 quam armis retinere parta maioribus malueram. si cunctatione deliqui, virtute 
 corrigam. vestra quidem vis et gloria in integro est, addita modestiae fama, quae 
 neque summis mortalium spernenda est et a dis aestimatur'. simul diademate 
 caput Tiridatis evinxit, promptam equitum manum, quae regem ex more sectatur, 
 Monaesi nobili viro tradidit, adiectis Abiabenorum auxiliis, mandavitque Ti- 
 
EXPOSITION 23 
 
 granen Armenia exturbare, dum ipse positis adversus Hyrcanos discordiis vires 
 intimas molemque belli ciet, provinciis Romanis minitans. 
 
 3. Quae ubi Corbuloni certis nuntiis audita sunt, legiones duas cum Veru- 
 lano Severo et Vettio Bolano subsidium Tigrani mittit, occulto praecepto, com- 
 positius cuncta quam festinantius agerent: quippe bellum habere quam gerere 
 malebat. Scripseratque Caesari proprio duce opus esse, qui Armeniam def enderet : 
 Suriam ingruente Vologese acriore in discrimine esse, atque interim reliquas 
 legiones pro ripa Euphratis locat, tumultuariam provincialium manum armat, 
 hostiles ingressus praesidiis intercipit. et quia egena aquarum regio est, castella 
 fontibus inposita; quosdam rivos congestu harenae abdidit. 
 
 4. Ea dum a Corbulone tuendae Suriae parantur, acto raptim agmine 
 Monaeses, ut famam sui praeiret, non ideo nescium aut incautum Tigranen 
 offendit. occupaverat Tigranocertam, urbem copia defensorum et magnitudine 
 moenium validam. ad hoc Nicephorius amnis haud spernenda latitudine partem 
 murorum ambit, et ducta ingens fossa, qua fluvio diffidebatur. inerantque milites 
 et provisi ante commeatus, quorum subvectu pauci avidius progressi et repentinis 
 hostibus circumventi ira magis quam metu ceteros accenderant. sed Partho ad 
 exsequendas obsidiones nulla comminus audacia: raris sagittis neque clausos 
 exterret et semet frustratur. Adiabeni cum promovere scalas et machinamenta 
 inciperent, facile detrusi, mox erumpentibus nostris caeduntur. 
 
 5. Corbulo tamen, quamvis secundis rebus suis, moderandum fortunae ratus 
 misit ad Vologesen, qui expostularent vim provinciae inlatam: socium amicumque 
 regem, cohortes Romanas circumsideri. omitteret potius obsidionem, aut se 
 quoque in agro hostili castra positurum. Casperius centurio in earn legationem 
 delectus apud oppidum Nisibin, septem et triginta milibus passuum a Tigrano- 
 certa distantem, adiit regem et mandata ferociter edidit. Vologesi vetus et penitus 
 infixum erat arma Romana vitandi, nee praesentia prospere fluebant. inritum 
 obsidium, tutus manu et copiis Tigranes, fugati qui expugnationem sumpserant, 
 missae in Armeniam legiones, et aliae pro Suria paratae ultro inrumpere; sibi 
 inbecillum equitem pabuli inopia: nam exorta vis locustarum ambederat quid- 
 quid herbidum aut frondosum. igitur metu abstruso mitiora obtendens, mis- 
 surum ad imperatorem Romanum legatos super petenda Armenia et firmanda 
 pace respondet. Monaesen omittere Tigranocertam iubet, ipse retro concedit. 
 
 6. Haec plures ut formidine regis et Corbulonis minis patrata ac magnifica 
 extollebant: alii occulte pepigisse interpretabantur, ut omisso utrimque bello et 
 abeunte Vologese Tigranes quoque Armenia abscederet. cur enim exercitum 
 Romanum a Tigranocertis deductum ? cur deserta per otium quae bello defen- 
 derant ? an melius hibernavisse in extrema Cappadocia, raptim erectis tuguriis, 
 quam in sede regni modo retenti ? dilata prorsus arma, ut Vologeses cum alio 
 quam cum Corbulone certaret, Corbulo meritae tot per annos gloriae non ultra 
 periculum faceret. nam, ut rettuli, proprium ducem tuendae Armeniae poposcerat 
 et adventare Caesennius Paetus audiebatur. iamque aderat, copiis ita divisis, 
 ut quarta et duodecuma legiones addita quinta, quae recens e Moesis excita erat, 
 simul Pontica et Galatarum Cappadocumque auxilia Paeto oboedirent, tertia et 
 
24 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 sexta et decuma legion es priorque Suriae miles apud Corbulonem manerent; 
 cetera ex rerum usu sociarent partirenturve. sed neque Corbulo aemuli patiens, 
 et Paetus, cui satis ad gloriam erat, si proximus haberetur, despiciebat gesta, 
 nihil caedis aut praedae, usurpatas nomine tenus urbium expugnationes dictitans : 
 se tributa ac leges et pro umbra regis Romanum ius victis impositurum. 
 
 7. Sub idem tempus legati Vologesis, quos ad principem missos memoravi, 
 revertere inriti bellumque propalam sumptum a Parthis. nee Paetus detrectavit, 
 sed duabus legionibus, quarum quartam Funisulanus Vettonianus eo in tempore, 
 duodecumam Calavius Sabinus regebant, Armeniam intrat tristi omine. nam 
 in transgressu Euphratis, quern ponte tramittebant, nulla palam causa turbatus 
 equus, qui consularia insignia gestabat, retro evasit. hostiaque, quae munieban- 
 tur, hibemaculis adsistens semifacta opera fuga perrupit seque vallo extulit. et 
 pila militum arsere, magis insigni prodigio, quia Parthus hostis missilibus telis 
 decertat. 
 
 8. Ceterum Paetus spretis ominibus, necdum satis firmatis hibemaculis, 
 nullo rei frumentariae provisu, rapit exercitum trans montem Taurum reciperandis, 
 ut ferebat, Tigranocertis vastandisque regionibus, quas Corbuio integras omi- 
 sisset. et capta quaedam castella, gloriaeque et praedae nonnihil partum, si aut 
 gloriam cum modo aut praedam cum cura habuisset. longinquis itineribus per- 
 cursando quae obtineri nequibant, corrupto qui captus erat commeatu et instante 
 iam hieme, reduxit exercitum conposuitque ad Caesarem litteras quasi confecto 
 bello, verbis magnificis, rerum vacuas. 
 
 9. Interim Corbulo numquam neglectam Euphratis ripam crebrioribus prae- 
 sidiis insedit; et ne ponti iniciendo impedimentum hostiles turmae adferrent 
 (iam enim subiectis campis magna specie volitabant), naves magnitudine prae- 
 stantes et conexas trabibus ac turribus auctas agit per amnem catapultisque et 
 balistis proturbat barbaros, in quos saxa et hastae longius permeabant, quam ut 
 contrario sagittarum iactu adaequarentur. dein pons continuatus collesque 
 adversi per socias cohortes, post legionum castris occupantur, tanta celeritate et 
 ostentatione virium, ut Parthi omisso paratu invadendae Suriae spem omnem in 
 Armeniam verterent, ubi Paetus imminentium nescius quintam legionem procul 
 in Ponto habebat, reliquas promiscis miiitum commeatibus infirmaverat, donee 
 adventare Vologesen magno et infenso agmine auditum. 
 
 10. Accitur legio duodecuma, et unde famam aucti exercitus speraverat, 
 prodita infrequentia, qua tamen retineri castra et eludi Parthus tractu belli poterat, 
 si Paeto aut in suis aut in alienis consiliis constantia fuisset: verum ubi a viris 
 militaribus adversus urguentes casus firmatus erat, rursus, ne alienae sententiae 
 indigens videretur, in diversa ac deteriora transibat. et tunc relictis hibernis non 
 fossam neque vallum sibi, sed corpora et arma in hostem data clamitans, duxit 
 legiones quasi proelio certaturus. deinde amisso centurione et paucis militibus, 
 quos visendis hostium copiis praemiserat, trepidus remeavit. et quia minus 
 acriter Vologeses institerat, vana rursus fiducia tria milia delecti peditis proximo 
 Tauri iugo imposuit, quo transitum regis arcerent; alares quoque Pannonios, 
 robur equitatus, in parte campi locat. coniunx ac filius castello, cui Arsamosata 
 
EXPOSITION 25 
 
 nomen est, abciiti, data in praesidium cohorte ac disperso milite, qui in uno habitus 
 vagum hostem promptius sustentavisset. aegre compulsum ferunt, ut instantem 
 Corbuloni fateretur. nee a Corbulone properatum, quo gliscentibus periculis 
 etiam subsidii laus augeretur. expediri tamen itineri singula milia ex tribus 
 legionibus et alarios octingentos, parem numerum e cohortibus iussit. 
 
 11. At Vologeses, quamvis obsessa a Paeto itinera hinc peditatu inde equite 
 accepisset, nihil mutato consilio, sed vi ac minis alares exterruit, legionarios obtri- 
 vit, uno tan turn centurione Tarquitio Crescente turrim, in qua praesidium agitabat, 
 defendere auso factaque saepius eruptione et caesis, qui barbarorum propius 
 suggrediebantur, donee ignium iactu circumveniretur. peditum si quis integer 
 longinqua et avia, vulnerati castra repetivere, virtutem regis, saevitiam et copias 
 gentium, cuncta metu extollentes, facili credulitate eorum, qui eadem pavebant. 
 ne dux quidem obniti adversis, sed cuncta militiae munia deseruerat, missis iterum 
 ad Corbulonem precibus, veniret propere, signa et aquilas et nomen reliquum 
 infelicis exercitus tueretur: se fidem interim, donee vita subpeditet, retenturos. 
 
 12. Me interritus et parte copiarum apud Suriam relicta, ut munimenta 
 Euphrati inposita retinerentur, qua proximum et commeatibus non egenum, 
 regionem Commagenam, exim Cappadociam, inde Armenios petivit. comitaban- 
 tur exercitum praeter alia sueta bello magna vis camelorum onusta frumenti, ut 
 simul hostem famemque depelleret. primum e perculsis Paccium primi pili cen- 
 turionem obvium habuit, dein plerosque militum; quos diversas fugae causas 
 obtendentes redire ad signa et clementiam Paeti experiri monebat: se nisi victori- 
 bus immitem esse, simul suas legiones adire, hortari, priorum admonere, novam 
 gloriam ostendere. non vicos aut oppida Armeniorum, sed castra Romana duas- 
 que in iis legiones pretium laboris peti. si singulis manipularibus praecipua ser- 
 vati civis corona imperatoria manu tribueretur, quod illud et quantum decus, 
 ubi par eorum numerus aspiceretur, qui adtulissent salutem et qui accepissent ! 
 his atque talibus in commune alacres (et erant quos pericula fratrum aut propin- 
 quorum propriis stimulis incenderent) continuum diu noctuque iter properabant. 
 
 13. Eoque intentius Vologeses premere obsessos, modo vallum legionum, 
 modo castellum, quo inbellis aetas defendebatur, adpugnare, propius incedens 
 quam mos Parthis, si ea temeritate hostem in proelium eliceret. at illi vix contu- 
 berniis extracti, nee aliud quam munimenta propugnabant, pars iussu ducis, et 
 alii propria ignavia aut Corbulonem opperientes, ac vis si ingrueret, provisis 
 exemplis cladis Caudinae Numantinaeque; neque eandem vim Samnitibus, Italico 
 populo, ac Parthis, Romani imperii aemulis. validam quoque et laudatam anti- 
 quitatem, quotiens fortuna contra daret, saluti consuluisse. qua desperatione 
 exercitus dux subactus primas tamen litteras ad Vologesen non supplices, sed in 
 modum querentis composuit, quod pro Armeniis semper Romanae dicionis aut 
 subiectis regi, quem imperator delegisset, hostilia faceret: pacem ex aequo utilem; 
 ne praesentia tantum spectaret. ipsum adversus duas legiones totis regni viribus 
 advenisse: at Romanis orbem terrarum reliquum, quo bellum iuvarent. 
 
 14. Ad ea Vologeses nihil pro causa, sed opperiendos sibi fratres Pacorum ac 
 Tiridaten rescripsit; ilium locum tempusque consilio destinatum, quid de Armenia 
 
26 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 cernerent; adiecisse deos dignum Arsacidarum, simul ut de legionibus Romanis 
 statuerent. missi posthac Paeto nuntii et regis conloquium petitum, qui Vasacen 
 praefectum equitatus ire iussit. turn Paetus Lucullos, Pompeios et si qua Caesares 
 optinendae donandaeve Armeniae egerant, Vasaces imaginem retinendi largiendive 
 penes nos, vim penes Parthos memorat. et multum in vicem disceptato, Mono- 
 bazus Adiabenus in diem posterum testis iis quae pepigissent adhibetur. placuit- 
 que liberari obsidio legiones et decedere omnem militem finibus Armeniorum 
 castellaque et commeatus Parthis tradi, quibus perpetratis copia Vologesi fieret 
 mittendi ad Neronem legatos. 
 
 15. Interim flumini Arsaniae (is castra praefluebat) pontem imposuit, specie 
 sibi illud iter expedientis, sed Parthi quasi documentum victoriae iusserant; nam- 
 que iis usui fuit, nostri per diversum iere. addidit rumor sub iugum missas legiones 
 et alia ex rebus infaustis, quorum simulacrum ab Armeniis usurpatum est. nam- 
 que et munimenta ingressi sunt, antequam agmen Romanum excederet, et cir- 
 cumstetere vias, captiva olim mancipia aut iumenta adgnoscentes abstrahentesque : 
 raptae etiam vestes, retenta arma, pavido milite et concedente, ne qua proelii 
 causa existeret. Vologeses armis et corporibus caesorum aggeratis, quo cladem 
 nostram testaretur, visu fugientium legionum abstinuit: fama moderationis 
 quaerebatur, postquam superbiam expleverat. flumen Arsaniam elephanto 
 insidens, proximus quisque regem vi equorum perrupere, quia rumor incesserat 
 pontem cessurum oneri dolo fabricantium: sed qui ingredi ausi sunt, validum et 
 fidum intellexere. 
 
 16. Ceterum obsessis adeo suppeditavisse rem frumentariam constitit, ut 
 horreis ignem inicerent, contraque prodiderit Corbulo Parthos inopes copiarum 
 et pabulo attrito relicturos oppugnationem, neque se plus tridui itinere afuisse. 
 adicit iure iurando Paeti cautum apud signa, adstantibus iis, quos testificando 
 rex misisset, neminem Romanum Armeniam ingressurum, donee referrentur 
 litterae Neronis, an paci adnueret. quae ut augendae infamiae composita, sic 
 reliqua non in obscuro habentur, una die quadraginta milium spatium emensum 
 esse Paetum, desertis passim sauciis, neque minus deformem illam fugientium 
 trepidationem, quam si terga in acie vertissent. Corbulo cum suis copiis apud 
 ripam Euphratis obvius non earn speciem insignium et armorum praetulit, ut 
 diversitatem exprobraret. maesti manipuli ac vicem commilitonum miserantes 
 ne lacrimis quidem temperare; vix prae fietu usurpata consalutatio. decesserat 
 certamen virtutis et ambitio gloriae, felicium hominum adfectus: sola misericordia 
 valebat, et apud minores magis. 
 
 17. Ducum inter se brevis sermo secutus est, hoc conquerente iam inritum 
 laborem, potuisse bellum fuga Parthorum finiri: ille integra utrique cuncta 
 respondit: converterent aquilas et iuncti invaderent Armeniam abscessu Vologe- 
 sis infirmatam. non ea imperatoris habere mandata Corbulo: periculo legio- 
 num commotum e provincia egressum; quando in incerto habeantur Parthorum 
 conatus, Suriam repetiturum: sic quoque optimam fortunam orandam, ut pedes 
 confectus spatiis itinerum alacrem et facilitate camporum praevenientem equitem 
 adsequeretur. exim Paetus per Cappadociam hibernavit: at Vologesis ad Cor- 
 
-EXPOSITION 27 
 
 bulonem missi nuntii, detraheret castella trans Euphraten amnemque, ut olim, 
 medium faceret. ille Armeniam quoque diversis praesidiis vacuam fieri expostu- 
 labat. et postremo concessit rex; dirutaque quae Euphraten ultra communi- 
 verat Corbulo, et Armenii sine arbitro relicti sunt. 
 
 24. Inter quae veris principio legati Parthorum mandata regis Vologesis lit- 
 terasque in eandem formam attulere: se priora et totiens iactata super optinenda 
 Armenia nunc omittere, quoniam di, quamvis potentium populorum arbitri, 
 possessionem Parthis non sine ignominia Romana tradidissent. nuper clausum 
 Tigranen; post Paetum legionesque, cum opprimere posset, incolumes dimisisse. 
 satis adprobatam vim; datum et lenitatis experimentum. nee recusaturum Tiri- 
 daten accipiendo diademati in urbem venire, nisi sacerdotii religione attineretur. 
 iturum ad signa et effigies principis, ubi legionibus coram regnum auspicaretur. 
 
 25. Talibus Vologesis litteris, quia Paetus diversa tamquam rebus integris 
 scribebat, interrogatus centurio, qui cum legatis advenerat, quo in statu Armenia 
 esset, omnes inde Romanos excessisse respondit. turn intellecto barbarum inrisu, 
 qui peterent quod eripuerant, consuluit inter primores civitatis Nero, bellum 
 anceps an pax inhonesta placeret. nee dubitatum de bello. et Corbulo militum 
 atque hostium tot per annos gnarus gerendae rei praeflcitur, ne cuius alterius 
 inscitia rursum peccaretur, quia Paeti piguerat. igitur inriti remittuntur, cum 
 donis tamen, unde spes fieret non frustra eadem oraturum Tiridaten, si preces 
 ipse attulisset. Suriaeque executio C. Cestio, copiae militares Corbuloni permis- 
 sae, et quinta decuma legio ducente Mario Celso e Pannonia adiecta est. scribitur 
 tetrarchis ac regibus praefectisque et procuratoribus et qui praetorum finitimas 
 provincias regebant, iussis Corbulonis obsequi, in tantum ferme modum aucta 
 potestate, quern populus Romanus Cn. Pompeio bellum piraticum gesturo dederat. 
 regressum Paetum, cum graviora metueret, facetiis insectari satis habuit Caesar, 
 his ferme verbis: ignoscere se statim, ne tarn promptus in pavorem longiore sol- 
 licitudine aegresceret. 
 
 26. At Corbulo quarta et duodecuma legionibus, quae fortissimo quoque 
 amisso et ceteris exterritis parum habiles proelio videbantur, in Suriam translatis, 
 sextam inde ac tertiam legiones, integrum militem et crebris ac prosperis labori- 
 bus exercitum, in Armeniam ducit. addiditque legionem quintam, quae per 
 Pontum agens expers cladis fuerat, simul quintadecumanos recens adductos et 
 vexilla delectorum ex Illyrico et Aegypto, quodque alarum cohortiumque, et auxi- 
 lia regum in unum conducta apud Melitenen, qua tramittere Euphraten parabat. 
 turn lustratum rite exercitum ad contionem vocat orditurque magnifica de auspiciis 
 imperatoris rebusque a se gestis, adversa in inscitiam Paeti declinans, multa 
 auctoritate, quae viro militari pro facundia erat. 
 
 27. Mox iter L. Lucullo quondam penetratum, apertis quae vetustas obsaep- 
 serat, pergit. et venientes Tiridatis Vologesisque de pace legates haud asperna- 
 tus, adiungit iis centuriones cum mandatis non inmitibus: nee enim adhuc eo 
 ventum, ut certamine extremo opus esset. multa Romanis secunda, quaedam 
 Parthis evenisse, documento adversus superbiam. proinde et Tiridati conducere 
 intactum vastationibus regnum dono accipere, et Vologesen melius societate 
 
28 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 Romana quam damnis mutuis genti Parthorum consulturum. scire, quantum 
 intus discordiarum quamque indomitas et praeferoces nationes regeret: contra 
 imperatori suo immotam ubique pacem et unum id bellum esse, simul consilio 
 terrorem adicere, et megistanas Armenios, qui primi a nobis defecerant, pellit 
 sedibus, castella eorum excindit, plana edita, validos invalidosque pari metu 
 complet. 
 
 28. Non infensum nee cum hostili odio Corbulonis nomen etiam barbaris 
 habebatur, eoque consilium eius fidum credebant. ergo Vologeses neque atrox 
 in summam, et quibusdam praefecturis indutias petit: Tiridates locum diemque 
 conloquio poscit. tempus propinquum, locus, in quo nuper obsessae cum Paeto 
 legiones erant, cum barbaris delectus esset ob memoriam laetioris sibi rei, Corbulo 
 non vitavit, ut dissimilitudo fortunae gloriam augeret. neque infamia Paeti 
 angebatur, quod eo maxime patuit, quia filio eius tribuno ducere manipulos 
 atque operire reliquias make pugnae imperavit. die pacta Tiberius Alexander, 
 inlustris eques Romanus, minister bello datus, et Vinicianus Annius, gener Cor- 
 bulonis, nondum senatoria aetate, set pro legato quintae legioni inpositus, in castra 
 Tiridatis venere, honori eius ac ne metueret insidias tali pignore; viceni dehinc 
 equites adsumpti. et viso Corbulone rex prior equo desiluit; nee cunctatus Cor- 
 bulo, sed pedes uterque dexteras miscuere. 
 
 29. Exim Romanus laudat iuvenem omissis praecipitibus tuta et salutaria 
 capessentem. ille de nobilitate generis multum praefatus, cetera temperanter 
 adiungit: iturum quippe Romam laturumque novum Caesari decus,non adversis 
 Parthorum rebus supplicem Arsaciden. turn placuit Tiridaten ponere apud 
 effigiem Caesaris insigne regium nee nisi manu Neronis resumere; et conloquium 
 osculo finitum. dein paucis diebus interiectis, magna utrimque specie, inde eques 
 compositus per turmas et insignibus patriis, hinc agmina legionum stetere fulgen- 
 tibus aquilis signisque et simulacris deum in modum templi: medio tribunal 
 sedem curulem et sedes effigiem Neronis sustinebat. ad quam progressus Tirida- 
 tes, caesis ex more victimis, sublatum capiti diadema imagini subiecit, magnis 
 apud cunctos animorum motibus, quos augebat insita adhuc oculis exercituum 
 Romanorum caedes aut obsidio. at nunc versos casus: iturum Tiridaten ostentui 
 gentibus, quanto minus quam captivum? 
 
 30. Addidit gloriae Corbulo comitatem epulasque; et rogitante rege causas, 
 quotiens novum aliquid adverterat, ut initia vigiliarum per centurionem nuntiari, 
 convivium bucina dimitti et structam ante augurale aram subdita face accendi, 
 cuncta in maius attollens admiratione prisci moris adfecit. postero die spatium 
 oravit, quo tantum itineris aditurus fratres ante matremque viseret; obsidem 
 interea filiam tradit litterasque supplices ad Neronem. 
 
 31. Et digressus Pacorum apud Medos, Vologesen Ecbatanis repperit, non 
 incuriosum fratris: quippe et propriis nuntiis a Corbulone petierat, ne quam 
 imaginem servitii Tiridates perferret neu ferrum traderet aut complexu provin- 
 cias optinentium arceretur foribusve eorum adsisteret, tantusque ei Romae quan- 
 tus consulibus honor esset. scilicet externae superbiae sueto non inerat notitia 
 nostri, apud quos vis imperii valet, inania tramittuntur. 
 
EXPOSITION 29 
 
 T.he first account of Corbulo we have is that of his campaign against 
 the Chauci, who were ravaging the Gauls. He enters his province magna 
 cum cura et mox gloria. In the second sentence of this opening passage 
 we have a direct characterization of the general in the way in which he 
 enters the province. The author wishes his readers to feel that this gen- 
 eral is not a man who will be caught off his guard, but that success will 
 attend him. The words mox gloria 1 point to the narration of such events 
 as will add to this man's praise, and if we keep this in mind I think that 
 some of the difficulties of interpreting the Corbulo episode will find an 
 explanation. The term "gloria" is often used of a man who has 
 attained some distinction, or as a worthy goal toward which he strives. 
 It is used several times of Corbulo, and always in a commendatory way. 
 The expression is applied repeatedly to Agricola 2 in the monograph which 
 bears his name, and which has been shown to be an encomiastic treatise. 3 
 
 After a brief account of the preparation of boats on the Rhine, and 
 of the destruction of the barbarian rafts, the narrative at once turns to a 
 more detailed description of the military discipline of Corbulo. He at 
 first led back the army, idle and delighting in plundering, to the old custom 
 and would allow no one to depart from the line nor enter into a fight unless 
 ordered. Discipline in an army is always commendable, and while we do 
 not know what the morale of the army was when Corbulo took command, 
 the implication is that discipline had been broken down, and it is to Cor- 
 bulo's praise that he restored it veterem ad morem. When we bear in mind 
 that to the Romans everything old was best, and that the ideals were to 
 be found in the past, this phrase has special significance. Corbulo brings 
 the discipline up to the best standard and the conclusion must be that in 
 this respect he is one of the best generals. 
 
 Corbulo's strict disciplinary power is further illustrated by the account 
 of one man being put to death because he was digging a trench without side 
 arms, and another because he was girded merely with a dagger. This 
 story, whether true or false, Tacitus says, had its origin in the severity of 
 the leader. It also serves to show why men believed that he, whose repu- 
 tation for harshness towards slight offenses was such, was strict and inexor- 
 able in the case of great evils. At this point I believe Tacitus expresses his 
 dissent from his source. He found that the author he was following, in 
 
 2 "Intravit animum (Agricolae) militaris gloriae cupido." — Chap. 5. "Mox 
 et gloriam communicabat." — Chap. 8. "Sic Agricola simul suis virtutibus, simul 
 vitiis aliorum in ipsam gloriam praeceps agebatur." — Chap. 41. 
 
 3 G. L. Hendrickson The Proconsulate of Julius Agricola. 
 
30 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 order to show the disciplinary power of Corbulo, had so exaggerated an 
 incident that he could not believe it, and so he says that, whether true or 
 false, the story had its origin in the severity of the leader. As a fact of 
 history, this incident is of minor importance, but as an element of charac- 
 terization it serves excellently to bring out the quality of the general as a 
 stern disciplinarian. Further emphasis is added to the idea by showing 
 that the course of Corbulo was commendable from the results that followed. 
 These were two: nos virtntem auximus, and barbari ferociam infregere. 
 
 A passing notice is given to the Frisii, and this adds to the praise of Cor- 
 bulo by showing his ability to govern in a civil as well as a military capacity. 
 He imposed upon the natives a senate, magistrates, and laws, and took 
 proper precaution that they should not throw off his commands. He 
 sent men to induce the Greater Chauci to surrender, and he assailed Gan- 
 nascus with craft. The dark side of Gannascus is shown. He was said 
 to be a transfugam et violatorem fidei. 
 
 Still by the death of Gannascus Corbulo was said to be affording the 
 occasion of a rebellion. With most people, apud plerosque, his course of 
 action was commendable; with certain ones, apud quosdam, it caused mis- 
 givings. For, they ask, why should he arouse the enemy? In case of 
 defeat the misfortune would fall upon the State, the very thing which Cor- 
 bulo would not want. But, on the other hand, suppose that he had been 
 successful. In that case in the eyes of a prince who was ignavus he would 
 be a dangerous man to the peace of a nation. This passage has been 
 interpreted as a criticism of Tacitus on Corbulo, but I think Tacitus is 
 following quite closely his source. In that the author was aware of some 
 criticism of Corbulo's actions. It would have been something unusual 
 for so prominent a man to escape criticism entirely. However, it was the 
 majority who commended Corbulo. Even with "the certain ones," what 
 is given in the text shows not so much criticism as it does their inability to 
 understand the meaning of Corbulo's actions. Any other interpretation 
 for the words, cur hostem conciret? Adversa in rem publicam casura is 
 meaningless, when one takes into account the whole conduct of Corbulo. 
 It is a question that shows perplexity in the mind. The words sin prospere 
 egisset formidolosum pact virum insignem et ignavo principem praegravent, 
 cannot be a criticism of Tacitus on Corbulo unless we are ready to admit 
 one of two things, either that Tacitus criticizes him for his success which 
 thereby endangers the peace, or else that he criticizes him for exposing 
 himself to the danger of a base prince. The criticism for either course 
 would be absurd. That the author felt that no blame was to be attached 
 to Corbulo in this matter is shown by the way in which he represents Cor- 
 
EXPOSITION 3 1 
 
 bulo's immediate withdrawal to this side of the Rhine when so ordered 
 by Claudius. Corbulo exacted strict obedience to his own commands. 
 He knew how to obey his superior. 4 His greatness is shown in his obedience 
 and this is emphasized by showing the embarrassing situation in which he 
 was placed. For, it is said, there were pouring into his mind fear from the 
 emperor, scorn from the barbarians, and mockery from among the allies. 
 Yet he obeyed, saying only: beatos quondam duces RomanosJ 
 
 After his withdrawal across the Rhine Corbulo set his troops to digging 
 a canal as a protection against the tides from the ocean in order that they 
 might not become demoralized by inactivity. He received the insignia of 
 a triumph, although the right to wage war had been denied him. If we 
 look into the account in Tacitus for good reasons why the insignia should 
 have been given him, we fail to find them. The idea most emphasized in 
 these three chapters is the ability of Corbulo as a commander, and his 
 obedience to orders from his superior even under trying circumstances. 
 Did he deserve the insignia ? Possibly he did, but the facts in the narration 
 do not show it, and the explanation is that Tacitus' source was not con- 
 cerned with the facts of history per se, but used them to bring out the meri- 
 torious qualities of the general. 
 
 Corbulo 6 is next mentioned in the encomiastic phrase: videbaturquc 
 locus virtutibus patejaciusJ Now what opportunity would Corbulo have 
 
 4 For a commendation of obedience to orders under analogous circumstances cf . 
 Nepos Ages. 4: "qui cum victori praeesset exercitui maximamque haberet fiduciam 
 regni Persarum potiundi. tanta modestia dicto audiens fuit iussis absentium magis- 
 tratum, ut si privatus in comitio esset Spartae. cuius exemplum utinam imperatores 
 nostri sequi voluissent." 
 
 s xi. 20. The account here describes the hard situation under which it was dim- 
 cult to obey and thereby allows the character of Corbulo to reveal itself in his obedience, 
 while in Cassius Dio lx. 30, the thought that his recall was due to the envy of Claudius 
 is the rather emphasized. r-r\v re yap dpeTrjv avrov kclI tt]v (LffK-rjcyLV p.aOwv ovk iirtrpe- 
 ipev avrip iwl tt\4ov avi-Tjdijvai. irvdbp.evo's bk tovto 6 KopfiovXojv eiravTjXde, togovtov p.bvov 
 dvafibrjoas " t5 p.aKapioi io ndXai vori <TTpaTr)yr)(ravT€s''' etr b-qXuxnv tin rots fiiv diciv8i!r- 
 vus dvbpayadl^eadat. i^rjv, aiirbs S' vwb tov avTOKpdropos bid tov (pdbvov eveirobiaBtj. 
 
 6 The account of Corbulo's campaign against the Chauci is given as taking place 
 in the year 47. He has no new command until appointed by Nero in 54 to take charge 
 of the situation in Armenia. What he was doing during this time we do not know. 
 Henderson in The Lije and Principate oj the Emperor Nero, p. 165, says: "He stayed 
 in Rome, amusing the Senate by his bluntness of speech, until about the year a.d. 51 
 he was sent to govern the rich and peaceful province of Asia." But in all these years 
 from 47 to 54 we do not have a single mention of him in Tacitus. When he is again 
 brought to our attention in xiii. 8, it is in connection with his appointment to have 
 charge of the war against the Parthians. 
 
 7 The translator in Bonn's Library renders thus: "it seemed to open a place and 
 standing for virtue." This makes the statement a general one. But obviously it refers 
 
32 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 had of showing the virtutes of a general during the years of quiet between 
 his campaign against the Chauci and his appointment to command in the 
 East ? None whatever. The virtutibus refer to Corbulo's success in 
 Germany and to his military discipline, and so are to be taken in close con- 
 nection therewith. This is further shown by the phrase per recentem 
 gloriam. 8 This is given as one of the reasons why the hostages given by 
 Vologeses preferred Corbulo to Quadratus. Corbulo having no command 
 during those seven or eight years of inactivity could have won no victory, 
 and a victory won seven years before is too old to speak of as recentem. 
 The explanation is to be found in the author's disregard for chronology, 
 as I have shown above. Not finding anything in this period which he 
 cares to record, and not concerned with a time element, he makes the recen- 
 tem victoriam refer back to the German campaign. 
 
 The narrative of these two chapters 9 is highly encomiastic. After 
 Corbulo's appointment and a statement of the division of the troops we 
 have the phrase: sed studia eorum in Corbulonem promptiora. Again, 
 when the question of choosing between Corbulo and Quadratus is left to 
 the hostages they choose the former: per recentem gloriam et inclinations 
 quadam etiam hostium Corbulonem praetulere. Preference was again shown 
 for Corbulo when Quadratus heard that he was coming and hastened to 
 Cilicia: ne, si ad accipiendas copias Suriam intravisset Corbulo, omnium 
 ora in se verteret. This preference was due to Corbulo's being corpore 
 ingens, verbis magnificis et super experientiam sapientiamque etiam specie 
 inanium validus. Physical qualities are one of the things enumerated by 
 the rhetoricians to be praised. 10 
 
 The phrase verbis magnificis has been interpreted as a criticism of 
 Tacitus on Corbulo, but the author simply meant to express by it the elo- 
 quence of the general as one of the many good qualities possessed by him 
 and which he is here enumerating. 
 
 The sending of instructions to Vologeses by both Corbulo and Quad- 
 ratus to maintain the usual relations toward the Roman Empire and the 
 
 directly to the "virtutes" of Corbulo and this view is supported by Dio lxii. 19, where he 
 says: Sp-oia yap 5t/ tois irp&rois 'Pwpalwv, ovx Sti t<j) y4vei \apirpbs 7) rep athpaTi iirxvpbs, 
 dXXa Kal tt) if/vxTI dpTi<ppwv 7jv /ecu 7ro\i) p&v rb avbpeiov 7ro\i> 8t Kal rb Slicaiov t6 re iria- 
 rbv is Tr&vTa.s /ecu rovs olksIovs Kal tovs TroXeplovs elxev. v<p' 1 ovirep Kal 6 NVpwj' iirl rbv 
 irb\ep.ov avrbv dvd' eavrov airforeiXe, bvvap.iv aurcjj 8<tt]v ovbevl tiiXXip iwirpe^/e, iricrTeiHras 
 6/xoiws Kal tovs /3ap/3dpous avrbv KaTepydoevdai Kal avrQ p,r) iiravacrT^aeadai. 
 
 8 xiii. q. 9 xiii. 8, 9. 
 
 io^p«s yap vepl p.iv cribparos Sri Ka\bs, Sri ju^yas, 6Vt raxvs, 8tl Icrxvpbs. — 
 Spengel II, p. 12. Cf. Nepos I ph. 3: "Fuit autem et animo magno et corpore impera- 
 toriaque forma ut ipso aspectu cuivis iniceret admirationem sui." 
 
EXPOSITION 33 
 
 giving of hostages by Vologeses afford the occasion for a quarrel between 
 the centurion and the praefect, and this quarrel serves to bring out the pre- 
 ference of the natives for Corbulo. The quarrel is of slight importance except 
 in so far as it adds an encomiastic touch to Corbulo. It now develops into 
 a disagreement between Quadratus and Corbulo. The former contended 
 that his victories had been wrenched from him, while the latter claimed 
 that no hostages were offered until he had been chosen to conduct the war. 
 That the writer believed that Corbulo's claim was correct is clearly shown 
 from what has already been stated in regard to the preference of all classes 
 for, him, the implication being that whatever advantage Quadratus had 
 gained was wholly due to the influence of Corbulo. And yet while the 
 success thus far gained was due to the influence of Corbulo on the natives 
 of the East, Nero, in order to settle the dispute, ordered the laurel to be 
 added to the imperial fasces. The situation as here represented is similar 
 to that when Corbulo was forbidden to conduct further operations against 
 the Chauci. The writer's object was to make his readers feel that Corbulo 
 received no assistance from the emperors, but that it was by his own abilities 
 that he acquired distinction and glory. 
 
 The war against the Parthians 1 1 which had been prolonged with little 
 vigor was now taken up in earnest, because Vologeses would neither allow 
 his brother Tiridates to be deprived of the kingdom which he had given 
 him, nor would he allow him to hold it as a gift from a foreign power. 
 This situation served to give an encomiastic touch to the narrative in the 
 comparison of Corbulo with Lucullus. It is a case of avyKpi<n<i as recog- 
 nized by the rhetoricians. Lucullus and Pompey were two of Rome's 
 greatest generals. Their campaigns had taken place in Armenia, but since 
 their day Roman prestige had waned much in the East. The author repre- 
 sents Corbulo as thinking it worthy of the greatness of the Roman people 
 to recover what these two generals of an earlier age had acquired. 
 
 It would be difficult to find a more elaborate characterization of a man 
 than we have in chap. 35. There is first given a statement of the deplora- 
 ble condition of affairs which had to be corrected before anything could be 
 accomplished in the way of active military operations. It is a dark back- 
 ground over against which are set the meritorious qualities of the strict and 
 inexorable disciplinarian. The difficulty of fighting one enemy is great 
 
 11 We have no further mention of Corbulo until that given under the year 58. The 
 time included from the date of his landing in the East and this date was doubtless spent 
 in collecting and disciplining an army. And as the author was not concerned with a 
 time element and was dealing primarily with the irpd£eis he very likely passed these 
 years over in silence. 
 
34 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 enough, but here Corbulo has a greater task in contending against the 
 ignaviam of the soldiers than against the perfidiam of the enemy. The 
 difficulties he has to contend with are shown by depicting the condition of 
 the army: soldiers sluggish from a long peace and most reluctantly per- 
 forming the duties of the camp; veterans in the army who had never per- 
 formed picket duty nor acted as sentinels and who would have regarded a 
 rampart or foss as something strange and marvelous; without helmets 
 and cuirasses, dandified, avaricious, performing their military service in 
 the towns. In this situation there is an implied avyKptais in Corbulo's 
 favor. For the demoralized condition of the troops is due wholly or in 
 great measure to 1 the inefficiency of previous commanders, and this state 
 of affairs he succeeds in entirely changing. He begins by dismissing all 
 who were incapacitated by age or sickness. He made new levies through- 
 out Galatia and Cappadocia and a force was summoned from Germany. 
 Such was the condition which Corbulo found and changed — demoraliza- 
 tion of the army, on the one hand, the levying of new troops and their 
 training and the summoning of a legion from far distant Germany, on the 
 other. To complete the discipline the troops were kept under tents in one 
 of the most severe winters. The limbs of many were frost-bitten and it 
 was observed of one soldier that as he carried a bundle of wood his hands 
 were so frozen that they fell off, still clinging to their burden — a palpable 
 exaggeration, but exaggeration is an element commonly found in encomias- 
 tic treatments. The story is simply told to magnify the severity of the 
 winter and the strictness of the general in his discipline. And now we are 
 given a picture of the general, the very type of a great leader who shares 
 the hardships of his soldiers but who has in him that stern and unyielding 
 nature of the old Roman of early days. The description of him is given 
 added force by the rhetorical device of asyndeton; ipse cultu levi, capite 
 intecto, in agmine, in laboribus frequens adesse, laudem strenuis, solarium 
 invalidis, exemplum omnibus ostendere. The severity of the winter and 
 service caused many to desert, but not as in the case of other armies, where 
 a first or second offense was pardoned, did Corbulo let his soldiers go free. 
 Death was the penalty for desertion and this strict discipline was justified 
 from the results which followed, namely, that there were fewer desertions 
 than in those camps where pardon was granted. 
 
 In this chap. 36 we have an implied o-vyKptats between Corbulo and 
 Paccius Orfitus. Corbulo kept his troops in camp until spring should 
 open. But Paccius Orfitus who seems to have been in a camp at some 
 distance was eager to attack the barbarians while off their guard, as he 
 thought, and he had written Corbulo to this effect, but was ordered by his 
 
EXPOSITION 35 
 
 superior to keep within his fortifications and await greater forces. These 
 commands he disobeyed and was defeated, which so displeased Corbulo 
 that he ordered Paccius and his troops to keep outside the rampart. From 
 this disgrace they were released only by the prayers of the entire army. 
 Herein we see two qualities of Corbulo — his wisdom in foreseeing danger 
 and judging a situation and, though strict and severe, his willingness to 
 yield to the prayers of the whole army. In this chapter there is not a single 
 historical event recorded. Paccius Orfitus, a subordinate officer who 
 disobeys orders and is punished, is used simply as a foil to Corbulo. 
 
 Active operations now begin for the first time. Tiridates supported 
 by his brother Vologeses begins to make war openly in Armenia, but in 
 what part of Armenia we are not told. He avoided a conflict with the 
 united forces of the Romans, flitting hither and thither in keeping with 
 Parthian tactics. Corbulo tried long in vain to get a battle, but was com- 
 pelled to divide his forces and invade different places at the same time. He 
 also won over the Moschi who proved a valuable ally to the Romans. So 
 the plans of Tiridates miscarried and he sent a committee to expostulate 
 with Corbulo. In this the encomiastic element consists in Corbulo's adap- 
 tability. He tried to win a battle on Roman lines of fighting, but could 
 not because the enemy would not fight that way. So he divided his troops, 
 used Parthian tactics, and met with complete success. The tone of Tiri- 
 dates' message as delivered by his ambassadors was one of complaint and 
 haughty braggadocio: sin per star etur in bello, non defore Arsacidis virtutem 
 fortunamque saepius iam clade Romana expertam. In contrast to this we 
 have in Corbulo a commander conscious of his victory and his mastery of 
 the situation, self-possessed, and free from any spirit of boastfulness: ad ea 
 Corbulo, satis comperto Vologeses defectione Hyrcaniae attineri, suadet 
 Tiridati precibus Caesarem adgredi. This characterization of Corbulo as 
 moderate in the use of his victories, as seeking substantial results and not 
 mere pomp and display is one that is consistent throughout the narrative 
 and must not be lost sight of. 
 
 The shrewdness of Corbulo in detecting the designs of his enemy is 
 further amplified in chap. 38. A conference had been arranged for between 
 Corbulo and Tiridates. To this conference Tiridates stipulated that he 
 would bring a thousand troops, but that Corbulo might bring as many as 
 he pleased, provided they came without helmets and corselets. Such a 
 trick would be apparent to any man, to say nothing of a vetus et providus 
 dux, for any number of such troops would be useless against a cavalry 
 using arrows. Nevertheless Corbulo does not pretend to understand 
 the trick, but proceeds to arrange for the conference. His cleverness is 
 
36 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 shown in choosing a place for the deploying of troops, in his arranging the 
 allied cohorts and auxiliaries on the wings, the sixth legion in the center, 
 with three thousand added from the third legion — all under one eagle, 
 so that the appearance was that of one legion. However, the conference 
 came to naught, either because Tiridates suspected some trick, or else he 
 hoped to intercept the provisions which he had heard were coming to the 
 Romans by way of Trapezus. But in this again he was unsuccessful by 
 reason of the precautions taken by Corbulo, who had the supplies brought 
 in under escort. The name of Trapezus is mentioned only incidentally 
 and it is from this that we get the first clue as to Corbulo's location. The 
 name is brought in only incidentally and gives an encomiastic touch to the 
 narrative in showing the foresight taken by Corbulo for his commissary 
 department. 
 
 The negotiations having failed, Corbulo determined that the war should 
 not needlessly be dragged on longer and that he would compel the Armen- 
 ians to defend their own possessions. The characterizing element comes 
 out in Corbulo's choosing the most formidable stronghold in all that 
 praefecture which he himself will storm. Volandum being the strongest 
 fort he takes upon himself the heaviest task in its reduction, but in destroy- 
 ing it he wins the greatest glory. Observe that two other nameless forts 
 of lesser significance are assigned to a lieutenant and a praefect of the 
 camp respectively and although they were captured they are dismissed 
 with the bare statement: pari fortuna legatus ac praefectus usi sunt. But 
 we have an elaborate description of the taking of Volandum. First an 
 inspection of the fort and its suitable points of attack is made. The soldiers 
 are urged to punish perfidy and cowardice and win glory and booty. The 
 army of attack is divided into four divisions. Some form a testudo to 
 undermine the walls; others bring scaling ladders; many throw firebrands, 
 and spears are hurled from engines of war; leaden slugs were hurled from 
 close range; and such was the zeal of the soldiers that within the third part 
 of a day the walls were stripped of defenders and the towers of the gates 
 came tumbling down. The place was taken by storm and with what 
 result ? Simply, omnes puberes trucidati sunt, nullo milite omisso, paucis 
 admodum vulneratis. Surely this is a very elaborate description of a 
 fight in which the Romans lost not a soldier. The account is a charac- 
 terizing description pure and simple. Everything that does not lend itself 
 to this purpose is left out. We are not told where Volandum was nor how 
 many troops there were in it. I believe that it was some place of very 
 minor importance, and was used simply as a means to bring out the praise 
 of Corbulo. The encomiast has exalted its capture into a great victory for 
 
EXPOSITION 37 
 
 him who took it, but the facts will scarcely bear out the idea of its being a 
 great stronghold. While the taking of the other two forts is so briefly 
 narrated, yet what is said serves to amplify the praise of Corbulo by showing 
 that his general plan met with entire success. The omission of their names 
 and the description of their capture make more prominent the part played 
 by Corbulo. 
 
 After the capture of the three forts and the surrender of various unnamed 
 places we are told that confidence arose that Artaxata could be captured. 
 At this point we have one of the clearest indications of the author's disregard 
 for chronology. In the context there is not a hint as to the location of 
 Volandum, nor the time when it was taken. I have given my reasons for 
 believing that it was not the 'OXavrj of Strabo and that it was captured in 
 the year 58. But no mention whatever is made of the winter quarters 
 58-59, nor of the march to Artaxata. I cannot believe that a careful 
 annalist in seeking to give a careful record of events would have omitted 
 such important facts in the march of Corbulo from the western border of 
 Armenia up to Artaxata, had he been writing history at first hand. Taci- 
 tus has evidently followed the account of some writer who was not concerned 
 with historical facts per se, but picked out and made use of such points only 
 as lent themselves most readily to an encomiastic treatment. 
 
 We are at once told of the precautions taken by Corbulo to prevent a 
 surprise by the enemy while he is marching to Artaxata. As further proof 
 of the encomiastic trend of the narrative we are not given a hint as to where 
 Tiridates has been or what he has been doing. He is brought on the 
 scene as a foil to the Roman leader to show the effectiveness of the latter's 
 plans on the march. Corbulo does not lead his troops by the direct route 
 to Artaxata, for in that case they would have been exposed to greater danger 
 and herein is shown again, as we have already seen, that foresight 
 of a cautious general. A brief picture of Tiridates follows, but it adds no 
 historical fact of importance. Out of shame and fear, pudore el metu, he 
 is forced to take some active measures against the Romans, but they are 
 of no effect against the well-laid plans of Corbulo. He resolved to offer 
 battle or rather to lure the Romans into an ambush by pretending flight. 
 This statement then leads to the encomiastic phrase, non ignaro duce nostro, 
 qui viae pariter et pugnae composuerat exercitum, and we have a careful 
 description of the plans for the march made by Corbulo. We are told 
 what legion was placed on the right wing and what on the left ; what forces 
 were stationed in the center; and how many soldiers guarded the rear and 
 the commands given them. We are told where the bowmen and other 
 cavalry forces were stationed. In the whole description we have an elabor- 
 
38 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 rate o-vyKptats. Tiridates out of shame and fear is driven to do something, 
 but our general, non ignaro duce nostro, goes forward with the consciousness 
 of plans so well laid that victory is sure to follow. To add emphasis to 
 the validity of Corbulo's plans it is said that one decurio militum advanced 
 too boldly and was slain by the archers of the enemy, which incident served 
 as a wholesome example to the rest of the troops of the necessity of obedience. 
 This way of lauding the wisdom of Corbulo's plans by picking out one or 
 two characters who act contrary to them and are punished is a favorite 
 method. For example, we recall the story of the two men punished in the 
 camp, the one for having no side arms, and the other for being girt with a 
 dagger only, and the disobedience of Paccius Orfitus. The loss of one 
 nameless decurio militum was certainly an insignificant thing in itself but 
 served admirably well to show the wisdom of the leader's plans. 
 
 Tiridates, failing in his attempts to draw Corbulo from his fixed purpose, 
 and night coming on, withdrew, while Corbulo measured off a camp. 
 The latter, not sure as to what Tiridates intended, was in doubt whether 
 to go on to Artaxata that same night. But scouts sent out brought back 
 word that the enemy was withdrawing either to the Medians or Albanians, 
 so he waited till the following day, on which, when preparations for storm- 
 ing the city had been made, Artaxata surrendered. The inhabitants secured 
 safety by surrendering, but we must understand by this their lives only, 
 for the city was at once burned to the ground. The reasons for doing so 
 are given. The city, on account of the size of the walls, could not be held 
 without a strong garrison, and that was not available. Then, if the city 
 should be left intact and ungarrisoned, there would be nulla utilitas aut 
 gloria in its capture. It is not likely that Corbulo in his Memoirs would 
 have given as a reason for destroying the city, nulla gloria. The whole 
 course of his life, as we have it, shows clearly that he was not seeking glory 
 for glory's sake. "Gloria" followed as a consequence from his successful 
 career, but his encomiast represented him as seeking after it. The whole 
 incident as a historical fact is treated very cursorily, and this is due to the 
 fact that the writer is concerned with the praise of his hero and not with 
 facts as facts of history. He uses them only so far as they lend themselves 
 to characterization. 
 
 We have here the much-disputed question of the "miraculum." Was 
 it an eclipse or not ? All commentators save Egli assume that it was not. 
 Henderson says: "The identification is impossible. Not only could Cor- 
 bulo scarcely have reached the city so soon, but the description of the mira- 
 culum in Tac. Ann. xiii. 41.4 is inconsistent with any possible effect of an 
 eclipse, however partial. And to go on to accuse Corbulo of not knowing 
 
EXPOSITION 39 
 
 an eclipse when he saw it, and thus describing it wrongly, is a perversely- 
 topsy-turvy argument." 12 But Henderson himself turns around and 
 indulges in a "perversely topsy-turvy argument" in assuming that a body 
 of legionary soldiers would not understand, but could be so moved by an 
 "atmospheric effect of cloud and sunshine." Such effects of cloud and 
 sunshine do not occur, and how he can say that Corbulo described a "novel 
 effect of cloud, sunshine, and storm, .... clearly and well," if he saw it, 
 is hard to comprehend. But as will be seen from the quotations regarding 
 eclipses which I have given in the chapter on "Chronology," there is a 
 similarity of description between them and this passage. There is an ele- 
 ment in this description which is true of an eclipse but could never be true 
 of "cloud and sunshine," and that is the strange effect which eclipses of the 
 sun always produce on men's minds. This is a fact so well known that it 
 scarcely needs comment. In Ann. i. 2. 8, during a meeting in camp an 
 eclipse of the moon occurred, and to avoid the evil predicted thereby the 
 legionaries clashed bronze instruments. Here, be it observed, the clouds 
 played a part, but it was the eclipse itself which affected their minds. The 
 effect of an eclipse on the minds of the Athenian troops before Syracuse, 
 Thuc. vii. 50. 4, is familiar. St. Maximus of Turin rebuked the people 
 in the following words for making a clamor to avert the evils of an 
 eclipse: 
 
 Cum ante dies plerosque de veslrae avaritiae cupiditate pulsaverim, ipsa die 
 circa vesperum tanta vociferatio populi extilit, ut religiositas eius penetraret ad 
 caelum. Quod cum requirerem, quid sibi clamor hie velit, dixerunt mihi, quod 
 laboranti lunae vesira vociferatio subveniret et defectum eius suis clamoribus adiu- 
 varet. 13 
 
 The references might be multiplied ad libitum but never do we hear of 
 any such effect produced by clouds and sunshine. 
 
 With reference to the description, we may ask what is the significance 
 of it as given in Tacitus? Did Corbulo describe the eclipse as we have 
 it recorded ? That he did so may very well be questioned. But that the 
 phenomena observed were very unusual is a reasonable inference. The 
 eclipse afforded an excellent excuse for the destruction of the city when 
 we recall the way in which the ancient peoples looked upon such phenomena. 
 The explanation is that we have here an account as given by some pane- 
 gyrist whose aim was not one of historical accuracy, but a characterization 
 of the Roman leader. It is an exaggeration with the aim of showing that 
 even the forces of nature were working to aid in the fulfilment of Corbulo's 
 12 The Life and Principate oj the Emperor Nero, p. 473. 
 
 '3 Quoted by Ginzel Spezieller Canon der Finsternisse, p. 219. 
 
40 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 plan. It was used to justify his destruction of the city. As I have stated 
 before, it was a commonplace with ancient encomiasts to exaggerate any 
 fact which thereby would amplify the praise of the person concerned. Even 
 Cicero in lauding the good qualities of Pompey says: vend tempestatesque 
 obsecundarint. 14 In the account of this miraculum in Tacitus, I think we 
 can see indicated the handling of it by three different persons. The first was 
 Corbulo, who saw the eclipse and described in his Memoirs the strange 
 phenomena which he observed; the second was some panegyrist, who took 
 the incident and gave to it an exaggerated interpretation as a miraculum velut 
 numine oblatum for the praise of Corbulo; the third was Tacitus, who felt 
 that the account he was following was too exaggerated to be true, and 
 that he did not care to give it as a statement of fact and so introduced it 
 with the qualifying word adicitur. And more especially do the words ut 
 .... crederetur show that Tacitus stands apart from the account that 
 was given. 
 
 Beginning with ob haec consulates, in chap. 41, 1 believe we have Tacitus' 
 own words, while that which goes immediately before was taken almost 
 bodily from his source. The narrative continues in xiv. 23 without the 
 least break in thought with what precedes. Artaxata once destroyed, 
 Corbulo is represented as that providus dux. He knew how to make use of 
 a victory and at once set out for Tigranocerta. News of the destruction of 
 Artaxata would either inspire fear in the enemy, or else, if he should spare 
 Tigranocerta, would win for him a reputation for clemency. The narra- 
 tion at once passes into a characterization of the general. This is apparent 
 from the absence of all data in chaps. 23, 24, relating to the march, except 
 the two very general and indefinite statements that the Romans passed 
 along the borders of the Mardi and that they came into Tauronitium. The 
 whole account is given up to a personal record of Corbulo. The march 
 is described: turn infenso exercitu, ne spem auferret, neque tamen remissa 
 cura, which recalls the way in which he went against the Chauci, magna 
 cum cura. We have his dealings with the submissive: misericordia adver- 
 sus supplices; with the fugitives: celeritate adversus prqfugus, and with 
 the stubborn: inmitis Us. Even the mention of the Mardi serves only to 
 show Corbulo's economy of Roman lives: quos Corbulo inmissis Hiberis 
 vastavit hostilemque audaciam externo sanguine ultus est. We have stand- 
 ing out conspicuously his heroic example in endurance of drought, heat, 
 and long marches as we had it before in the piercing cold of the camp : ad 
 hoc penuria aquae, fervida aestas, longinqua itinera sola ducis patientia 
 mittigabantur , eadem pluraque gregio milite tolerantis. We have his peril 
 
 '4 Pro Man. 48. 
 
EXPOSITION 41 
 
 from threatened assassination. His dementia is shown in his treatment 
 of the surrendered city Tigranocerta, in not allowing any plundering to 
 take place in it. In regard to the fort Legerda we have the mere statement 
 that it was taken by storm because the hot-headed young men had shut it 
 up, without being given a hint as to its location or its strength. Then the 
 return of the Hyrcanian embassy and the escort assigned it so far as the 
 Red Sea and the repulse of Tiridates, who had entered per Medos extrema 
 Armeniae, are recounted. But these statements with the following one, 
 caedibus et incendiis perpopulatus possessionem Armeniae usurpabat, simply 
 conform to the general indefiniteness of the historical narrative which we 
 have observed throughout the whole. They are not used as facts of history 
 per se. 
 
 Chap. 26 closes with an account of the arrival of Tigranes, his estab- 
 lishment on the throne, preparations made for his defense and the with- 
 drawal of Corbulo to Syria. The narrative continues at the beginning of 
 book xv. and without any apparent break. In chaps. 1 and 2 there is an 
 account of the attitude of the Parthians. Tiridates was naturally hesitat- 
 ing. He wished to exact vengeance for the slights inflicted upon the race 
 of the Arsacidae, yet he was held back by a consciousness of Roman great- 
 ness and by reverence for a continued and unbroken treaty. He was 
 incensed by Tigranes' plundering expedition among the Adiabenians. 
 Other nations were looking to him for assistance, and were placed in such 
 a situatipn that unless they received it they would be compelled to make 
 terms with the Romans. He was an exile from his kingdom, and by his 
 very silence greatly moved the people. In this situation Vologeses called 
 an assembly, and his address is given in chap. 2, together with a brief sum- 
 mary of the preparations made to drive out the Romans. It might seem 
 that here we have a narration of events pure and simple, such as would be 
 in keeping with an annalistic arrangement and this is true, but the narrating 
 of historical events is not inconsistent with encomiastic treatment. I have 
 already shown that these events did not happen in the year under which 
 they are recorded. All geographical data which might enable us to locate 
 the Parthians are lacking, and we get no clue as to where they were until 
 the description of Tigranocerta given in chap. 4. It is simply a crxxi xa 
 avyicpiTiKov. The account given aims to depict the feelings and desperate 
 situation of the Parthians, which would lead them to put forth every possible 
 effort to recover their lost territory, which loss had come about by Corbulo's 
 overrunning Armenia. But the attempt to recover met with dismal failure, 
 for Corbulo had heard of their intentions and even before had taken such 
 precautions for the defense of Tigranocerta that their assaults were of no 
 
42 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 avail. They were the plans of a providus dux, and in encountering them 
 the enemy semet frustratur . The siege was a dismal failure. Those who 
 had engaged in it had been routed. Tigranes and his forces were safe 
 within their walls, while legions had been sent into Armenia and others 
 were prepared to break in from the borders of Syria and in lieu of this 
 situation an embassy was sent to the Roman leader and Monaeses was 
 ordered to quit Tigranocerta. 
 
 Chap. 6 contains a series of questions which evidently give the criticism 
 of Corbulo's opponents. Some commentators claim to see herein a criti- 
 cism of him by Tacitus, but I think that Tacitus is not voicing a personal 
 opinion, but is simply following his source. The situation is similar to 
 that as given in Ann. xi. 19, in which case it has been said that Corbulo 
 was criticized by Tacitus. We saw, at that point, that most people, plerosque, 
 commended him, while certain ones, quosdam, criticized. So here, the 
 majority, plures, approved Corbulo's course, and only some, alii, inter- 
 preted his actions as due to some secret compact. There was, no doubt, 
 criticism of Corbulo, but in each case the author makes it clear that it came 
 from the minority while the majority approved. And in view of Corbulo's 
 career, before and after this, entirely successful and honorable, there was 
 absolutely nothing to justify the criticism of the minority. Not one of his 
 plans had miscarried, except in a case or two where a subordinate officer 
 was disobedient to commands, but in no instance was any reflection cast 
 upon Corbulo. Rather, it only went to prove his wisdom. 
 
 Paetus, who had been appointed by the Roman government to take 
 charge of Armenia, now appears, and a division of the forces is made. 
 Corbulo was to remain in Syria. From this point to the end of the account 
 we have a strong contrast between the two generals. On the one hand, 
 is the reserved, effective commander; on the other, the boastful, timid, 
 inefficient. To say, as some have said, that Corbulo in his Memoirs has 
 blackened Paetus' record for his own glorification, is gratuitous. Doubt- 
 less he did depict that man as a sorry general, but his encomiast to bring 
 out the contrast more strongly has selected the weak points in his charac- 
 ter and painted them in a bad light. There was some justification for the 
 criticism, but I doubt whether the writer was concerned about that phase 
 of the question. The phrase, neque aemidi patiens, has been interpreted 
 by Furneaux as implying criticism of Corbulo, but we must interpret this 
 in the light of the whole context and of the intent of the author in using the 
 phrase. He felt it no criticism to say that Corbulo could brook no rival 
 when that rival was such a person as he has depicted him to be, a boastful, 
 inefficient leader, just arrived to take charge of a work of which he knew 
 
EXPOSITION 43 
 
 nothing. He meant it in commendation of him as is shown by the very 
 next sentence: Paetus, cut satis ad gloriam erat, si proximus haberctur, 
 despiciebat gesta. 
 
 The character of Paetus at once appears in contrast with that of Corbulo 
 by his boastfulness. He said that Corbulo had made a practice of storming 
 cities only in name: usurpatas nomine tenus iirbium expugationes dictitans, 
 while he would thoroughly subdue and reduce to a province: se tributa ac 
 leges et pro umbra regis Romanum ius victis impositurum. The embassy 
 sent to Rome by Vologeses having returned without being successful in its 
 mission, the war was again taken up by the Parthians, and we are told that 
 Paetus did not decline it. However, at the very outset his conduct is shown 
 in an unfavorable light by his utter disregard for the omens. The horse 
 bearing the consular insignia refused to cross a bridge; a sacrificial victim 
 escaped out of the rampart and javelins of the soldiers took fire, but all these 
 Paetus scorned. This action is in contrast to that of Corbulo when, on 
 entering Armenia to recover what Paetus had lost, he first performed in 
 due order the lustrum. Paetus is further contrasted by his lack of pre- 
 paration and foresight and his hastiness in action : necdum satis firmatis 
 hibernaculis, nullo rei frumentariae provisu, rapit exercitum trans montem 
 Taurum reciperandis, ut ferebat, Tigranocertis vastandisque regionibus, 
 quas Corbulo integras omisisset. But in spite of this, he did gain some 
 success, yet did not know how to preserve it, and the author seems to 
 have disparaged even this: gloriaeque et praedae nonnihil partum, si aut 
 gloriam cum modo aut praedam cum cura habuisset. Corbulo knew how 
 to turn a victory to account, as we saw in the case of the destruction of 
 Artaxata. We saw that he came to the Chauci magna cum cura, and his 
 carefulness all the way through in the laying of his plans. Though 
 Paetus captured a few forts, the impression the writer aims to give us is 
 that his campaign was entirely without results, except to show his incapacity 
 and boastfulness, for he wrote to Nero in a manner as if the war were 
 already ended, in grandiloquent style, but void of results: verbis magnificis 
 rerum vacuas. 
 
 The author has shown the inefficiency of Paetus in conducting a cam- 
 paign, and his inability to maintain whatever advantage he might have 
 gained. In contrast to this, he now turns to Corbulo and shows his activity 
 and energy in fortifying the Euphrates. 
 
 While the enemy were present in the plains on the Armenian side, they 
 were prevented from interfering with the bridge-building by the diligent 
 use of catapulta and ballista. Then when the bridge was completed and 
 the troops had seized the opposite hills, by the mere display of such activity 
 
44 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 and strength, tanta celeritate et ostentatione virium, the enemy ceased their 
 demonstrations against Corbulo and turned their attention to Paetus. 
 We are now reminded of the incompetency of Paetus, imminentium nescins, 
 who had the fifth legion far off in Pontus and had weakened the rest of his 
 forces by indiscriminate furloughs. Still in spite of his weakened condition 
 he could have held his camp and warded off the Parthians but he lacked 
 steadfastness in his own plans and those of others: si Paeto aid in suis aut 
 in aliis consiliis constantia juisset. He left the winter quarters with a boast 
 that not a foss and rampart but their bodies and arms would be opposed to 
 the enemy. After the loss of a few men he returned in consternation to his 
 fortifications, and when the Parthians did not press on immediately, with idle 
 confidence, vana fiducia, he placed three thousand of his legionaries on 
 Mt. Taurus, thinking the enemy thereby could be checked. He placed his 
 wife and son in Arsamosata for protection and reluctantly informed Cor- 
 bulo of his situation. Vologeses pressed on. The auxiliaries were frightened 
 away. The legionaries were cut down and the one fort, a turris, which 
 held out for a time, was taken by storm. As the sound and the wounded 
 came straggling into camp the confusion increased. Paetus made no 
 effort to control the situation, but sent a second urgent request for assist- 
 ance to Corbulo: ne dux quidem obniti adversis, sed cuncta militiae munia 
 deseruerat, missis iterant ad Corbulonem precibus, veniret propere, signa et 
 aquilas et nomen reliquum infelicis exercitus tuerelur. With Paetus every- 
 thing was confusion and demoralization, while with Corbulo there was 
 energetic action with calm deliberation. He is undismayed, leaves a part 
 of his troops to guard the Euphrates and with thorough preparation hastens 
 by forced marches to Paetus' relief. He ordered the first of the defeated 
 troops who met him to return and seek the clemency of Paetus. Then 
 by a speech to his own men he fired them to a zeal of marching day and 
 night to rescue the Roman camp and R.oman legions. 
 
 In chaps. 13, 14 we have a further description of the demoralized con- 
 dition among Paetus' troops and his own lack of control over them. He 
 was reduced to the point of being compelled to write a letter to Vologeses, 
 not, we are told, as a suppliant, but as complaining of Vologeses' action 
 in resisting the king of Roman choice. Paetus is put in the attitude in 
 which we saw Tiridates put in xiii. 37, that of a leader already defeated 
 and making an outcry against the injustice done him. He reminded Volo- 
 geses that all the rest of the Roman world was at peace, while he was making 
 his attack upon but two legions. He reminded him of the careers of Lucul- 
 lus, Pompey, and Caesar in Armenia. But what a contrast between them 
 and him, while Corbulo is compared favorably with them. To these com- 
 
EXPOSITION 45 
 
 plaints Vologeses replied that the name of holding and bestowing might 
 rest with the Romans, but the power was with the Parthians. It was 
 finally agreed between Paetus and Vologeses that all Roman forces were 
 to withdraw from Armenia. The forts and provisions were to be turned 
 over to the Parthians, and to heap insult on injury, the Romans were 
 forced to build a bridge over the Arsanias as a monument of the Parthian 
 victory. Rumor had it that the legions were sent under the yoke. At any 
 rate the withdrawal was a most disgraceful one, for the Parthians lined 
 the roads and took away the slaves, clothing and arms, while the Roman 
 troops fled in fear, avoiding anything which might occasion a conflict. It 
 is evident that Paetus had abundant supplies, while on Corbulo's authority 
 the statement was made that the Parthians were in need of supplies, and 
 that they would have given up the siege and that he himself was but three 
 days' march away. Paetus in the presence of envoys from Vologeses is 
 represented as having taken an oath that no Roman should enter Armenia 
 until word was brought back from Nero. At this point Tacitus again 
 expresses his dissent from his source. He felt that the rhetorical elabora- 
 tion was too great to be consistent with the facts, and that the author had 
 gone too far in blackening Paetus' character, so he says that granting that 
 some of these things were given to increase the disgrace of Paetus, quae ut 
 augendae infamiae composita, eis reliqua non in obscuro habentur, yet there 
 is no doubt that Paetus marched forty miles in one day after his defeat and 
 that the wounded were abandoned everywhere so that the retreat was 
 more like a rout. 
 
 Corbulo met the retreating army on the Euphrates River, and out of 
 compassion for the defeated and bedraggled troops, he did not present a 
 display of standards and arms. It shows his compassion for the common 
 soldier, as we have seen before in his enduring with them the hardships 
 of camp and march, and it contrasts him strongly with Paetus, who had fled 
 leaving the wounded all along the road. Between the generals, the con- 
 ference was brief. Paetus was for invading Armenia at once with their 
 united forces, and claimed that everything was as it had been before his 
 capitulation. But that would have been in violation of the oath he had 
 taken that no Roman should enter Armenia until word had been received 
 from Rome. Further, his troops were either destroyed or utterly demoral- 
 ized. The two men could not have worked together, for the author has 
 told us that Corbulo could "brook no rival," and he shows that he had no 
 orders from Rome to enter Armenia, and we have seen that he was a man 
 who strictly obeyed orders. Whether the arguments given by Paetus in 
 regard to the immediate invasion of Armenia, or those given by Corbulo 
 
46 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 for not doing so, be right, does not concern the present discussion. I think 
 it clear that the writer wanted his readers to feel that the course of Corbulo 
 was the correct one. 
 
 We find in the account from the time Paetus appears down to his defeat 
 not much more than an amplified description of his inefficiency. In one 
 year he has lost practically all that Corbulo had won in several years of 
 arduous preparation and campaign. It is only a description which paints 
 in darkest colors the defeated general. Paetus was a poor general, and we 
 may assume that Corbulo described him so, but whoever wrote the account 
 from which Tacitus drew chose to magnify the worse side of Paetus and 
 pass over any good qualities he may have possessed. The whole is an 
 elaborate rhetorical avyKpicns which serves to bring out most distinctly 
 the meritorious qualities of the general Corbulo. This becomes more 
 apparent when we bear in mind the disregard for all chronology and topo- 
 graphy. The withdrawal into winter quarters is mentioned, but we have 
 to take the whole episode into consideration and by laborious inference 
 determine what winter quarters are meant, but we have no clue as to their 
 locations. Arsamosata, a fort, is mentioned in the most incidental way, 
 while we learn that Paetus was somewhere on the Arsanias River north of 
 Mt. Taurus, but nothing more definitely. Armenia was lost and we have 
 now again to follow the successful course of Corbulo. 
 
 During the winter the commission from Vologeses went to Rome and 
 returned without any success. The war was now put entirely into Corbu- 
 lo's hands. All the military forces of the East were turned over to him 
 while the native rulers of dependent states were ordered to obey him. The 
 encomiastic nature of this comes out when we are told that Corbulo's power 
 was almost equal to that of Pompey in the war with the pirates: in tan turn 
 ferine modum aucta potestate quern populns Rom anus Cn. Pompeio bell urn 
 piraticum gesturo dederat. An account of the careful preparations made 
 to invade Armenia follows. The least efficient troops were transferred 
 to Syria for garrison duty, while the best were assembled for the expedition. 
 Then in contrast to Paetus who had disregarded important omens, he 
 performs the lustrum in due form and addresses his troops. 
 
 Corbulo is represented as following the line of march, by which Lucul- 
 lus had at one time penetrated into the country, but the reasons for this are 
 hard to see, for the army never seems to have gone farther than the scene 
 of Paetus' defeat, which was not more than two ordinary days' march from 
 the Euphrates. It is evidently a straining after a comparison with that 
 famous general for the purpose of lauding Corbulo. When ambassadors 
 came from Tiridates and Vologeses, who were soon forced to send them, 
 
EXPOSITION 47 
 
 Corbulo did not scorn them : venientes Tiridatis Vologesisque de pace legalos 
 hand aspernatus. This is a quality of Corbulo which is followed consist- 
 ently throughout. He is free from all spirit of boastfulness, and while 
 always successful he tempers his success with sound judgment. When, 
 as we saw in xiii. 37 he had forced Tiridates to send an embassy to Nero 
 to seek a settlement, although he knew he was master of the situation, yet 
 he followed a moderate course of action: satis comperto Vologesen defec- 
 tione Hyrcaniae attineri, suadet Tiridati Caesarem adgredi. In the cam- 
 paign against Vologeses, again entirely successful, he thought he should 
 moderate his victory: quamvis secundis rebus suis, moderandum fortunae 
 ratus misit ad Vologesen.* 5 With this calm deliberation on the part of 
 Corbulo we have contrasted the impulsiveness of the centurion Casperius 
 who was sent in the embassy to Vologeses and who delivered his commands 
 ferociter. Just why he should have done so there is no apparent reason, 
 but his action contrasts remarkably with that of Corbulo. In the final 
 settlement with the Parthians when Corbulo is represented as having 
 everything in his own hands he moderates his victory, allowing Vologeses 
 to have his own way in non-essentials. Yet, while seeming to make some 
 concessions, he is really successful at every point : scilicet externae superbiae 
 sueto non inerat notitia nostri, apud quos vis imperii valet, inania tramittun- 
 tur. 16 
 
 In his negotiations 17 with Tiridates Corbulo did not relax active opera- 
 tions against the enemy, for the wholesome effect it would have of inspiring 
 fear in them. He drove them from their homes, destroyed their forts, 
 devastated their land and filled the strong and weak alike with fear. Yet 
 in spite of this the barbarians were said to have had a natural liking and 
 admiration for him: non infensum nee cum hostili odio Corbulonis no men 
 etiam barbaris habebatur, eoque consilium eius fidum credebant. We saw 
 such inclination of the enemy shown for him at the time he came to the East 
 when the hostages preferred him to Quadratus. 18 In the above we see Cor- 
 bulo's cleverness in dealing with men, and this quality will be brought out 
 more strongly in what follows. When Tiridates chose as a place of meeting 
 the scene of Paetus' defeat, Corbulo offered no objection because, it is said, 
 the dissimilarity of fortune would add to his glory: Corbulo non vitavit, 
 ut dissimilitudo fortunae gloriam augeret. 19 We may question in our own 
 minds whether it did add to his glory, but certainly there was no such 
 question in the mind of his encomiast. This tendency to give the glory 
 of Corbulo has led the writer into some peculiar statements. At the very 
 outset it was said that Corbulo came among the Chauci, magna cum cura 
 
 •5 xv. 5. l6 xv. 31. i7 xv. 27. lS xiii. 9. J ?> xv. 28. 
 
48 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 et mox gloria, which prepared the reader's mind for an encomiastic account 
 of the hero. One reason why the hostages preferred Corbulo to Quad- 
 ratic was: per recentem gloriam. When Artaxata was destroyed a reason 
 assigned for its destruction was that there would be no glory in having taken 
 it if it should be left intact : nulla in eo utilitas aut gloria, quod capta essent. 
 It was said of Paetus that his glory would have been sufficient had he been 
 subordinate to Corbulo: Paetus, cui satis ad gloriam erat, si proximus 
 haberetur. But what astonishes us at first reading is to be told that when 
 Paetus sent word informing Corbulo of his situation, Corbulo made no 
 haste, in order to let the danger increase, so that by bringing help he might 
 win the greater glory : nee a Corbulone properatum, quo gliscentibus peri- 
 culis etiam subsidii laus augeretur 2 ° This, too, has been used as grounds 
 for the criticism of Corbulo, but nothing can be more unlikely in view of 
 the whole account and especially that which follows, because Corbulo did 
 at once set about making preparation to go to the relief of Paetus, and when 
 the second summons came he hastened by forced marches and so inspired 
 his troops that they marched day and night: diu noctuque iter pro perabant. 21 
 The aim of the encomiast was to represent in a laudatory way the glory 
 which would come to Corbulo by rescuing Paetus from the greater danger, 
 and so from our point of view he has fallen into an unhappy characteriza- 
 tion in his endeavor to represent Corbulo as winning a greater glory, but 
 he has evidently intended it as an encomiastic statement. Corbulo in his 
 Memoirs would never have used such a flimsy pretext for not going to the 
 assistance of Paetus. One of the last characterizations of Corbulo is that 
 to his "glory he added the charm of affability: he invited the king to a 
 banquet." He was conspicuous in the social world as well as a general and 
 statesman: addidit gloriae comitatem epulasque. 22 And it is in view of this 
 whole course of striving after glory which the writer insists upon that we 
 must interpret those few passages which seem to imply a base motive. 
 
 The statesmanship of Corbulo is further shown when he sends his son- 
 in-law, Vinicianus Annius, to the camp of Tiridates to do him honor. When 
 the two opposing generals met, Corbulo followed the eastern custom in 
 the matter of salutation. In this is seen his adaptation to a given circum- 
 stance. He praised Tiridates for his wisdom in choosing a pacific course 
 of action, although as a matter of fact Corbulo had forced him to do so : 
 exim Romanus laudat iuvenem omissis praecipitibus tuta et salutaria capes- 
 sentem. 23 And now from this diplomacy of Corbulo Tiridates is led to seek 
 the kingdom from Nero. Although Corbulo had been entirely successful 
 in the field and had forced the Parthians to terms by means of arms, yet 
 
 20 XV. IO. 2I XV. 12. " XV. 30. 3 3 XV. 29. 
 
EXPOSITION 49 
 
 it is his cleverness in diplomacy which leads Tiridates apparently to forget 
 that and seek terms on which the Roman and Parthian could agree. Cor- 
 bulo wins for the Romans what they desire, but lets the enemy believe that 
 he is having his own way. For on the appointed day Tiridates in the pres- 
 ence of all the Parthians and Romans came to a tribunal on which was 
 a statue of Nero, removed the crown from his own head and placed it on the 
 head of the statue with the resolve not to take it back until he received it 
 from the hand of Nero. This description leads Tacitus to add one of those 
 tags which are so common in his writings: at nunc versos casus; iturum 
 Tiridaten ostentui gentibus quanto minus quam captivum ? 3 * As already 
 stated, Corbulo was affable toward the Parthians and gave a banquet. 
 When his wondering guest wished to know the meaning of everything he 
 saw or heard, Corbulo, exaggerating, moved him to an admiration of the 
 old customs: prisci moris. We saw the encomiastic character of such a 
 feeling at the very start when Corbulo brought the troops back veterem ad 
 moretn. And now, before going to Rome, Vologeses requests of Corbulo 
 that Tiridates may not have to endure any appearance of slavery, nor give 
 up his sword, nor be kept from embracing the governors of the provinces, 
 nor be obliged to stand at their doors. This no doubt was granted and 
 Tacitus is led again to say: scilicet externae superbiae sueto non inerat 
 notitia nostri, apud quos vis imperii valet, inania tramittuntur. 25 
 
 What a contrast this campaign of Corbulo affords with that of Paetus 
 in the preceding year: thorough preparation, complete success in offensive 
 warfare, absence of boastfulness on the part of the leader, the accomplish- 
 ment of his purpose by diplomacy, and the establishment of friendly relations 
 between Rome and the king whom he has conquered. The characteriz- 
 ing element is everywhere present. There is no mention of a single place 
 after Corbulo leaves Melitene, and this is remarkable when we remember 
 that the meeting took place on the site of Paetus' defeat. We cannot 
 believe that Corbulo in his Memoirs was so careless of topography and 
 chronology. It is unthinkable that any man in writing an account of his 
 own campaigns would be so. But his encomiast found no occasion for 
 using the places mentioned, and consequently l,eft them out. What 
 became of Tigranes who had been made king of Armenia we are not 
 told, but a careful historian would not have passed by such a person in 
 silence, so we are forced to conclude that Tigranes could serve no further 
 purpose in the characterization of Corbulo, and was no longer men- 
 tioned. The policy of the Roman government, if it had any, is passed >" 
 over in silence. 
 
 34 XV. 29. 2 5 XV. 31. 
 
50 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 I have shown that the writer had no chronology other than a natural 
 sequence of events and that he disregarded all topography save such places 
 as served to lend an encomiastic touch to Corbulo. The different persons 
 also are used for this purpose. Tiridates appears conducting negotiations 
 in the year 58, and serves for a time as a foil to Corbulo, but soon disappears 
 and we hear nothing of him until the day before Corbulo reaches Artaxata. 
 where he serves to show the splendid arrangement of Corbulo's plan of 
 marching and fighting. He then disappears again, and we do not hear of 
 him until the following year, 60, when he comes in per Medos extrema Armen- 
 iae, and affords Corbulo an opportunity of overrunning Armenia. Again 
 he disappears, and we know nothing of his movements until he threatens 
 Corbulo and finally defeats Paetus in 62. From this on he is used as a 
 foil to Corbulo in setting off the latter's good qualities. 
 
 All lack of chronology in the original led Tacitus into the inconsistency 
 of narrating under one year events which spread over several years, though 
 perhaps we should not call it an inconsistency, for he, like modern scholars, 
 found the narrative so constructed that it was impossible to separate and 
 make definite assignments of events. 
 
 In the account itself, there are no data to determine what the source 
 of Tacitus was. As I stated in the introduction, the Memoirs of Corbulo 
 will be the ultimate source of all accounts dealing with his campaigns. 
 This source is indicated in Tacitus where, in giving an account of the dis- 
 pute between Corbulo and Quadratus, he uses the expression: testante 
 contra Corbulone. 26 Again, in showing that the situation of Paetus at the 
 time of his surrender to the Parthians, was by no means desperate, he 
 employs the phrase : prodiderit Corbulo. 27 Some may see in these statements 
 a direct reference to the Memoirs of Corbulo, but that does not necessarily 
 follow. They simply show that Corbulo was authority for the statements 
 given. There is nothing in the character of the expressions nor in the way 
 in which they are used, to preclude their having been employed in any 
 writing from which Tacitus may have drawn. 
 
 There are other statements not so definite as these, and which, at least, 
 show that the Memoirs were not the only source. Tacitus might have used 
 these expressions as his own if he had been using other records of the cam- 
 paigns of Corbulo. They are expressions such as are found in any writing 
 of a historical character and simply point to what is generally accepted, 
 or believed about a thing without indicating any particular author. They 
 are: feruntque mililem; 28 aegre compulsum ferunt; 29 addidit rumor, 3 ° and 
 
 26 xiii. 9. a8 xi. 18. 30 xv. 15. 
 
 3 ? xv. 16. 3 9 xv. 10. 
 
EXPOSITION 5 1 
 
 satis constitit fuisse in eo exercitu. 31 Furthermore, there are expres- 
 sions which Corbulo would never have used in his Memoirs. It is not likely, 
 for example, that he would have used the expressions last quoted above 
 for his knowledge would have been definite, and he could have spoken 
 with positiveness. When Paetus sent to him for aid he would never have 
 given as an excuse for not hastening: quo, gliscentibus periculis, etiam sub- 
 sidii laus auger etur. 32 Nor when Tiridates proposed the place of Paetus' 
 defeat as a place of meeting, would he have said: Corbulo non vitavit, ut 
 dissimilitudo fortunae gloriam augeret. 33 I have already referred to the 
 excuse given for the destruction of Artaxata, that if it had not been destroyed 
 there would have been no "glory" in having taken it. It is unthinkable to 
 suppose that Corbulo would have represented himself as striving after glory 
 simply in such cases. He may have been vain-glorious, but the accounts 
 of him in Tacitus and Cassius Dio do not reveal it even though that in 
 Tacitus represents him as striving after glory. I think, too, that Corbulo 
 would have avoided such expressions as the following: verbis magnificis 
 et super experientiam sapientiamque etiam specie inanium validus. 34 I 
 have also referred to places where Tacitus expresses dissent from his 
 source, or where he uses some such phrase as "adicitur," not caring to 
 give full assent to the statement made. The cases in which he expresses 
 disagreement are those in which exaggeration was used: for example, 
 that of the punishment of the two soldiers for not being properly armed 
 when working in the trenches, where the writer wanted to show the 
 severity of the leader as a disciplinarian, and again where he says that 
 certain statements were made to exaggerate the infamy of Paetus on the 
 occasion of his defeat. 
 
 Now the Memoirs of Corbulo might have been the authority for Tacitus' 
 statement: contraque prodiderit Corbulo Parthos inopes copiarum et pabulo 
 attrito relicturos oppugnationem, neque se plus tridui itinere afuisse. 35 But 
 I take the words quae .... composita, to refer to all that precedes in chaps. 
 15 and 16, and another source than the Memoirs of Corbulo is indicated 
 in the words addidit rumor of chap. 15, and constitit of chap. 16. The 
 word contra also indicates this as it shows that what follows is given distinctly 
 on the authority of Corbulo. 
 
 It cannot be stated whether Tacitus had at hand the Memoirs of Cor- 
 bulo or not. If he had, he certainly would have given more information 
 in regard to the topography and chronology which Corbulo must have 
 given in his Memoirs. Bruns has shown that Tacitus characterizes by 
 
 31 xiii. 35. 33 xv. 28. 35 xv. 16. 
 
 3* xv. 10. 34 xiii. 8. 
 
52 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 means of the indirect method, but we have seen in the account of Corbulo 
 that elaborate, direct characterization was employed, and that the technique 
 of history was departed from. The whole account has a distinct encom- 
 iastic treatment, which is unique in the historical works of Tacitus, and 
 it is for these reasons that I am led to the belief that he^employed some 
 encomiastic biographical account as his source. 
 
THE ACCOUNT OF CORBULO'S CAMPAIGNS IN 
 CASSIUS DIO 
 
 Cassius Dio 1 gives an account of Corbulo's campaign against the Chauci 
 in which he says that Corbulo united the armies and conquered the Chauci, 
 but that when Claudius heard of his success, he recalled him out of envy 
 and fear, lest a private citizen by his successes, should become too promi- 
 nent a person. Corbulo obeyed, saying only: 2> jua/capioi oJ 7raAai ttotI 
 o-TpaT-qyrjcravTes. However, he was accorded the insignia of a triumph, 
 and intrusted with an army which he set to digging a canal between the 
 Rhine and the Meuse. Dio makes no mention of the personal qualities 
 of Corbulo and his power as a disciplinarian. He omits the story of Gan- 
 nascus and the punishment of two soldiers for not being properly armed 
 when working in the trenches. The account in Tacitus eulogizes Corbulo 
 for bringing back the army veterem ad morem. Dio says of him: oTpaTrj- 
 ywv Ta re OTpaTevp-aTa ovv€Kp0TrjO€, Kal twv fiap/3dpo}v dAAous tc kul ov? 
 CKaAow Kav^ors iK&Kwoe. 
 
 An elaborate description is given in Tacitus of the way in which Corbulo 
 was received when he went to take charge of affairs in the East; of the pre- 
 ference shown him by the natives; of the demoralized condition of the army; 
 of the strictness of discipline in the severe winter quarters, 57-58 (?); 
 and of the heroic figure of the commander conspicuous in the midst of it 
 all. Dio simply states that Corbulo brought together and disciplined the 
 scattered, demoralized army; that he filled Vologeses and Tiridates with 
 fear; and that he did these things: ofy on tw yeVei \ap,Trp6<; r) tw aw/ua™ 
 
 lo^ypos, dAAa. Kal Trj ^XV o.pTicf>po)v rjv, Kal wo\v p.\v to avopeiov 7roA.i> Se Kal 
 to oiKaiov to tc ttlo-tov h 7ravTas Kal tovs otKei'ous Kai tous 7roAeju,i'ovs £tX cv - 
 This is the most elaborate personal description, if we may call it elaborate, 
 that Dio gives of Corbulo. He makes no mention of winter quarters, of 
 negotiation with Vologeses, or the capture of any forts. He does not even 
 mention Volandum, the capture of which is so elaborately described in 
 Tacitus, which fact strengthens my belief that it was a place of no great 
 importance. He makes no mention of the march to Artaxata, but simply 
 states that Corbulo took the city without a struggle and destroyed it. He 
 omits all reference to the miraculum. 
 
 The account of the march from Artaxata to Tigranocerta is substantially 
 the same in Dio as in Tacitus, but is made briefer by omitting all personal 
 1 Cassius Dio lx. 30; lxii. 19-23. 
 
 53 
 
54 A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO 
 
 characterization of the general. If anything worth mentioning took place 
 between the surrender of Tigranocerta and the establishment of Tigranes 
 on the throne in that place, Dio does not record it. He gives an account 
 of the efforts of Vologeses to overthrow Tigranes, which agrees with the 
 account in Tacitus, so far as facts go, but omits all personal characteriza- 
 tion of Corbulo. 
 
 Vologeses, at a later time, attacked Tigranocerta. Paetus came to its 
 relief, but was driven back over Mount Taurus, and shut up in a place 
 called Rhandeia, on the Arsanias river. Tacitus does not give the name 
 of this place. According to Dio, Paetus could have held out against the 
 Parthians had he not been a coward, for the enemy was without heavy- 
 armed troops and provisions, and could not have carried on a siege. But 
 Paetus sent to Vologeses a commission, and made an agreement whereby 
 the Romans were to give up Armenia. The Parthians imposed on the 
 Romans the task of bridging the Arsanias as a token of their defeat. In 
 the meantime Corbulo, with his army, had reached the Euphrates River 
 where he awaited Paetus. Vologeses sent a commission to Corbulo to 
 demand the withdrawal of the Romans from beyond the Euphrates to which 
 demand Corbulo agreed, on condition that the Parthians withdraw from 
 Armenia. 
 
 Dio omits all reference to the strained relations between Corbulo and 
 Paetus. Tacitus had found in his source that the army of Paetus was sent 
 under the yoke, a statement which he doubted, and thought was added to 
 increase the disgrace of Paetus. Dio makes no allusion to such a thing, 
 which, I think, shows that Tacitus was following an author who blackened 
 Paetus' character in order to make that of Corbulo stand out more con- 
 spicuously. 
 
 After the agreement between Corbulo and Vologeses at the Euphrates 
 River, the latter sent an embassy to Nero, but it returned without having 
 accomplished much. Corbulo was again placed in command of affairs in 
 Armenia, and openly prepared to make war on the Parthians, but secretly 
 advised Vologeses to send his brother, Tiridates, to Nero to seek the king- 
 dom, which he did. The Romans and Parthians met to adjudicate matters 
 at Rhandeia, as that place was acceptable to both: tovto yap to x<i>piov 
 
 d/u.<pOT€/30is r/peo-e, tw p.ev on airo\aft6vT€<i es avro tovs 'Pw/Wovs viroo-novtovs 
 affrrjuav, 77-jOos tv8ei$iv o)v cvrjpyerrjvTO tw 8e otl tyjv <5vo-/<A.€iav T-qv ev avr<S 
 ■nporepov crvp.f3a.o-av <r<f>i(nv airoTpiif/€(r6ai tp.eXX.ov. The account in Tacitus 
 makes Corbulo choose this place: ut dissimilitudo fortunae gloriam 
 augeret. But this is in keeping with the author's effort to show that 
 Corbulo acquired "glory." I think we have the correct explanation in Dio. 
 
THE ACCOUNT OF CORBULO S CAMPAIGNS IN CASSIUS DIO 55 
 
 The account of the erection of a platform, the setting-up of an image of 
 Nero, and the removal by Vologeses of the crown from his own head, and 
 placing it on the image, is substantially the same in both authors, but in 
 Tacitus we have an amplified description of the military preparations 
 made by Corbulo, of his complete success, and of the "glory" he acquired 
 in giving a banquet to his wondering guest. 
 
 A comparison of the two authors will show that so far as facts of history 
 go, the two accounts are essentially the same. It is true that what we have 
 from Dio is an epitomized account. But the author has adhered strictly 
 to the technique of history, while in Tacitus we have the same historical 
 facts somewhat amplified with the addition of elaborate, direct, personal 
 characterization. 
 
 
 
LOAN DEPT. 
 
 
 -imvr-mrrt^rn*^ 
 
 I i D2lA-40w-8, , 72 
 (QU738l0)476-A-32 
 
 General Library . 
 University of California 
 Berkeley 
 
ov-tr 
 
 185'