MOLTKE'S TACTICAL PROBLEMS. 
 
MOLTKE'S 
 
 II 
 
 TACTICAL PROBLEMS 
 
 FROM 1858 TO 1882. 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 THE PRUSSIAN GRAND GENERAL STAFF. 
 
 (DEPARTMENT FOR MILITARY HISTORY.) 
 
 WITH TWENTY-SEVEN PLANS, NINE SKETCH MAPS, AND 
 TWO SKETCHES IN THE TEXT. 
 
 AUTHORISED TRANSLATION 
 BY 
 
 KARL VON DONAT. 
 
 LATE LIEUTENANT EAST PRUSSIAN FUSILIER REGIMENT NO. 33 (NOW " REGIMENT 
 
 COUNT ROON ") ; 
 AUTHOR OF "STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS." 
 
 ^ESE 
 
 (UNIVERSITY 
 
 ^CAL 
 
 LONDON 
 
 W. H. ALLEN & CO, LIMITED, 13, WATERLOO PLACE. 
 
 to t$e 6ia 
 1894. 
 
M7 
 
 WYMAN AND SONS, LIMITED, 
 
 PRINTERS, 
 LONDON AND REDHILL. 
 
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 ALL soldiers must feel indebted to the Prussian Grand 
 General Staff for the publication of Field-Marshal von 
 Moltke's Tactical Problems, and to my former brother officer, 
 Major W. Bigge, of the Military History Department, for the 
 care with which they have been collected and edited. I con- 
 sider myself fortunate in being able, by special permission of 
 the General Staff, to present this translation to the officers of 
 the British Service. 
 
 It has been my aim to adhere closely to the original, 
 rather than to render it into elegant English, which, although 
 it might have been more readable, would have been a less 
 exact and trustworthy guide for the student. 
 
 I desire to acknowledge the help which I have received 
 in this work from Lieut.-Colonel John Graham, late 4th 
 Brigade Welsh Division R.A. ; and I have also to thank 
 Captain John Marshall-West, 4th Somerset Light Infantry 
 (and late I3th L.I.), and Lieutenant Stewart Murray, ist Bat. 
 Gordon Highlanders, for kindly assisting to revise the manu- 
 script. 
 
 In a small Appendix will be found : 
 
 1. Details of strength of the various tactical units 
 
 mentioned in the Problems if not apparent in 
 the text. 
 
 2. A vocabulary of the German terms as an aid in 
 
 finding the places on the maps, which are pro- 
 duced from the original plates. 
 
 3. Some explanations of the marginal notes on the 
 
 maps. 
 
 When " miles " are mentioned in the text they are to be 
 understood as " English miles," which are equal to 2,000 paces 
 (Schritt) on the scales given on the maps. 
 
 KARL VON DONAT. 
 
 4, Canning Place, Kensington Gate, 
 London, W., January, 1894. 
 
- i 
 
PREFACE 
 
 (BY THE PRUSSIAN GRAND GENERAL STAFF). 
 
 IN order to comply with a wish frequently expressed in the 
 Army, the General Staff has determined to edit the 
 Tactical Problems set by the late Field-Marshal General 
 Count von Moltke during the years 1858 to 1882 in his 
 capacity as Chief of the General Staff of the Army. Solutions 
 are added as far as they could be ascertained with certainty to 
 be those of General von Moltke. Unfortunately this was not 
 possible with some ; to others, however, it was possible to 
 add, besides the General's written solutions, the oral summing 
 up in his actual words, taken down in writing at the time of 
 their delivery. 
 
 Some of the problems and solutions naturally appear 
 somewhat obsolete, considered from the present point of view 
 of troop-leading; others offer, according to our present ideas, 
 little opportunity for any divergence in the decisions to be 
 arrived at. Nevertheless, all of them will, on account of their 
 lucidity and surprising simplicity, ever remain model de- 
 cisions, and afford by their pronounced originality a fountain 
 of suggestion and information. 
 
I. 
 
 PROBLEMS 
 
IST PROBLEM. 1858. 
 
 Vide Plan i. 
 
 The Advanced Guard of a Corps moving from the south on 
 Magdeburg has reached Cothen. 
 
 It is heard there that the Magdeburg garrison has sent a detach- 
 ment to defend the Saale. 
 
 STRENGTH OF THE ADVANCED GUARD Reliable information indicates 
 
 OF THE SOUTHERN CORPS : thaf . Bernburg and the Castle on 
 
 2nd Batt. 1st Batt. . . , -it 
 
 i the right bank are occupied by a 
 
 Fusilier Batt. Battalion, and that the Saale bridge 
 
 /2-pr. Battery. j s prepared for demolition. The 
 
 iji I|II|M|II|II|M|M|I 
 
 i Pontoon Train Troop rest of the Magdeburg detachment 
 
 I I is stationed behind Calbe ; strength, 
 
 with its complement of Engineers. 2 Battalions, \ Squadron, and i 
 
 Field Battery (8 6-pr. guns). All ferry-boats are beached on the 
 further bank ; the railway bridge below Calbe is destroyed. 
 
 The Commander of the Advanced Guard of the Southern Corps 
 requests his General Staff Officer to report : 
 
 1. Where on the following day the crossing of the Saale should 
 
 be effected. 
 
 2. In what manner the various troops will have to be employed 
 
 in this enterprise. 
 
 The Saale is on an average 50 paces wide. The meadows are 
 hard, the dykes, partly enclosing them, are only 4 to 5 feet high. 
 The weather is bright. 
 
 2ND PROBLEM. 1858. 
 
 Vide Plan 2 and Sketch Map i. 
 
 An Eastern Army is pursuing the enemy from Coblenz in the 
 direction of Trier. 
 
 At Liitzerath it receives information that a Division is advancing 
 from the Maas by Malmedy in support of the Western Army ; it 
 therefore also detaches a Division by Gerolstein, in order not to he 
 disturbed in its pursuit. 
 
 The Eastern Division has reached Biidesheim, and from there 
 reconnoitred the enemy behind Priim. The Tetenbusch was found 
 to be occupied. At the south-end of this wood 3 Battalions and I 
 
 B 2 
 
3RD PROBLEM. 1858. 
 
 Battery are bivouacking ; 3 more Battalions, 2 Squadrons, and I 
 Battery stood between Priim and Nieder-Priim on the near slope of 
 the Calvarien-Berg, and also I Battery at the south-western exit of 
 the town. 
 
 The inhabitants declare with certainty the enemy's strength 
 to be : 
 
 12 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 5 Batteries. 
 
 Strength of the Eastern Division : 
 
 12 Battalions, 12 Squadrons, 6 Batteries. 
 
 Disposition for the attack on the enemy's position behind the 
 Priim on the following day. 
 
 3RD PROBLEM. 1858. 
 
 Vide Plan 3. 
 
 A Western Army is to be assembled at Paderborn. 
 To cover this concentration and the magazines collected for this 
 purpose, a body of troops, strength as per margin, has encamped in 
 huts near the " Landwehr " east of the town. 
 
 The Advanced Guard being 
 pushed out towards Driburg re- 
 ports that the enemy passed Bra- 
 kel this afternoon about 20,000 
 strong, and has gone into bivouac 
 west of that place. 
 
 A General Staff Officer is or- 
 dered to select, between Paderborn 
 and Driburg, a position in which the 
 Western Corps will to-morrow op- 
 pose the enemy and accept battle. 
 He is, further, in conjunction 
 with the Commander of the Ad- 
 vanced Guard having regard to 
 the ground chosen and the prob- 
 able features of the fight the next 
 day to agree upon the disposition 
 of the Advanced Guard for the 
 night, and the direction of its 
 retirement on the position of the 
 
 ADVANCED GUARD : 
 
 1st Infantry Regiment. 
 3rd Batt. 2nd Batt. 1st Batt. 
 
 2 Squadrons of the 1st Cavalry Regiment. 
 ^ of 6-pr. Battery No. I. 
 
 MAIN BODY : 
 5th Infantry Regt. 3rd Infantry Regt. 
 
 6th Infantry Regt. 4th Infantry Regt. 
 6-pr. Battery No. 3. 6-pr. Battery No. 2. 
 
 3rd Caralry Regiment. 
 
 RESERVE : 
 2nd Infantry Regiment. 
 
 2nd Cavalry Regiment. 
 2 Squadrons of the 1st Cavalry Regiment. 
 
 Horse Artillery 
 Batten 
 
 12-pr. Battery. 
 ,|M|M|.I|.I|M|M|M|I 
 
 Battery No. i. 
 "l"l"l' 
 
 18 Battalions, 12 Squadrons, 5 Batteries. 
 
 ittery. 
 
 H"l"!"l' 
 
 ^ of 6-pr. 
 
 Main Body. 
 
4TH PROBLEM. 1858. 
 
 5 
 
 A report to be written by this officer to the Commander on 
 these subjects. 
 
 The ground allotted to the various bodies in the position selected 
 is to be shown on a sketch, which need only give a few points of the 
 map for reference. 
 
 4TH PROBLEM. 1858. 
 
 Vide Plan 4 and Sketch Map 2. 
 
 A Western Corps having beaten in the neighbourhood of Eisleben 
 an Eastern Corps, based on Leipzig and of about equal strength, in- 
 tends to make this victory decisive by the most vigorous pursuit. 
 
 WESTERN CORPS. The 1st Infantry Bri- 
 
 ADVANCED GUARD: gade with the 12-pr. Battery, 
 
 ist Infantry Brigade. Rifle Battalion. strengthened by l6 Squad- 
 
 rons and I Battery Horse 
 Artillery, is formed for this 
 object as an Advanced Guard. 
 
 The enemy is withdraw- 
 ing by Langenbogen and 
 Schraplau on Halle as well 
 as on Merseburg, that is to 
 say, in the former direction 
 with the main body of the 
 Infantry, the Artillery and 
 the trains, and in the latter 
 direction with the greatest 
 part of his Cavalry. 
 
 The Rear Guard of the 
 Eastern Corps offered a good 
 resistance in the strong posi- 
 tions in advance of Bennstedt 
 and behind Deutschenthal, 
 and only towards evening 
 could it be dislodged. The 
 enemy's Rear Guard retiring 
 on the high road to Halle 
 makes however another stand 
 at Nietleben. He remains in 
 occupation of the Dolauer 
 
 12-pr. Battery. 
 i|i i|i i|i i|i i|i i|i i|i i|i 
 
 1st Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 Horse Artillery Battery. 
 
 .|..|..|..|M|..|.,|M|, 
 
 MAIN BODY: 
 
 2nd Division. 
 
 4th Infantry Brig. 3rd Infantry Brig. 
 
 6-pr. Battery. 6-pr. Battery. 
 
 I|II|II|II|II|II|M|II|I i|i I|M|II|II|II|I i|n|i 
 
 Cavalry Regiment of the 2nd Brigade. 
 
 RESERVE : 
 2nd Infantry Brigade. 
 
 6-pr. Battery. 
 i|i i|i i|i i|i i|i i|i iji i|i 
 
 2nd Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 h- 
 
 RESERVE ARTILLERY : 
 
 Detachment of Engineers. 
 
 ^J Pontoon train. 
 Ammunition and Provision Columns. 
 
6 5 PROBLEM. 1858. 
 
 Heide, and an Infantry column is again noticed advancing from Halle 
 towards Passendorf. Very many vehicles still remain on the road 
 this side of the long Saale defile. 
 
 In consideration of the good countenance shown by the enemy 
 and on account of approaching darkness the Commander of the 
 Advanced Guard issues the order that the line Zscherben-Linden 
 Berg is not to be passed to-day. 
 
 The Main Body of the Western Corps has meanwhile arrived at 
 Langenbogen, where it goes into bivouac. 
 
 The Commander of the Corps is not satisfied with the results 
 obtained by the Advanced Guard. 
 
 He orders that the enemy withdrawing on Merseburg is to be 
 followed and observed by a body of Cavalry only, but all remaining 
 forces to be united against his Main Body retiring on Halle. 
 
 He requires from his Chief of the Staff : 
 
 1 . An opinion on what can be undertaken the next day, in 
 order to damage the enemy as much as possible to 
 prevent him from halting behind the Saale, and from 
 concentrating for renewed resistance under the protection 
 of this obstacle ; also 
 
 2. The drawing up of an identical order to the Command- 
 ing Officers for the execution of the plan determined 
 upon. The weather is bright and dry. Daybreak at 
 6 o'clock. 
 
 5TH PROBLEM. 1858. 
 
 Vide Plan 5 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 An Eastern Corps, strength a mobile Prussian Army Corps,* is 
 advancing from Posen towards the Oder, to prevent the enemy 
 from crossing this river ; in any case, to prevent his advance. 
 
 The Main Body of the Eastern Corps has arrived at Drossen in 
 the evening of the I2th March, its ist Infantry Division ; namely : 
 
 12 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, I 12-pr., I 6-pr. Batteries, is marching 
 on Frankfurt. 
 
 At Zohlow the Commander of the ist Division receives from the 
 head of his Advanced Guard the report that the Laudons Berge were 
 
 . * It is apparent from the problems following and their solutions, that the Eastern 
 Corps consists of two Infantry Divisions (12 Battalions and two Batteries each), one 
 Cavalry Division (24 Squadrons) and an Artillery Reserve (6 Batteries). 
 
6TH PROBLEM. 1858. J 
 
 found to be entrenched and occupied, that 6 Battalions and some 
 Artillery are bivouacking south of the Damm-Vorstadt, that large 
 masses are visible on the heights behind the town, and troops 
 continually defiling over the bridge. 
 
 The report is dispatched at 4 p.m. There are still two hours of 
 daylight. The Commander of the Division knows that the Western 
 Corps is about equal in numerical strength to the Eastern Corps, and 
 only stronger in Cavalry. 
 
 What will he determine under these conditions ? What measures 
 will he adopt to carry out what has been determined upon ? 
 
 6TH PROBLEM. 1858. 
 
 Vide Plan 5 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 WESTERN CORPS. 
 
 tst Infantry Division: 13 Battalions 4 Squadrons 2 Batteries 
 
 2nd 12 4 2 
 
 ist Cavalry Division : 32 I 
 
 Reserve Artillery : 6 
 
 25 Battalions 40 Squadrons n Batteries. 
 
 The Western Corps which is in possession of the Oder bridges at 
 Ciistrin, Frankfurt, and Crossen, has concentrated at Frankfurt, 
 occupied with the ist Infantry Brigade the field entrenchments on 
 the Laudons Berge, the Rothe Vorwerk, and the Damm-Vorstadt; 
 and has placed the 2nd Infantry Brigade behind these as a sup- 
 port. 
 
 At noon intelligence comes in that a hostile column is advancing 
 by Drossen. 
 
 The Commander orders the 2nd Infantry Division to cross on 
 the same afternoon to the right bank of the Oder, the Cavalry 
 Division and the Reserve Artillery however to follow early on the 
 1 3th, so that the whole Army Corps will stand behind the Laudons 
 Berge ready to advance at 8 a.m. 
 
 A reconnaissance, ordered in the afternoon of the I2th, repulsed 
 the hostile advanced bodies, but finds the position of Kunersdorf 
 occupied by Infantry and Artillery. Approaching darkness prevents 
 an attempt against this position. 
 
 Trustworthy reports say that a Division of the enemy started 
 
3 ?TH PROBLEM. 1858. 
 
 from Drossen early on the I2th in the direction of Frankfurt, but 
 that in the evening two other Divisions* arrived in Drossen. 
 
 The Western Corps has orders to bring on an engagement, even- 
 tually to force the enemy from his line of retreat on Posen, and to 
 press him against the Warthe-Bruch. 
 
 Preceding reconnaissances have shown that the meadows adjoin- 
 ing the Dreist and Haupt Graben are swampy and only passable by 
 bad roads. The wood on the sandy heights consists of tall pines ; 
 the roads and even the rides through it are fit for waggons. 
 
 The dispositions of the General commanding the Western Corps 
 for the 1 3th are to be given. 
 
 Note : The order is to be addressed to the three Divisions and 
 the Commander of the Advanced Guard, and in identical form. It 
 must clearly show the intention of the General commanding, and 
 yet contain nothing which the subordinate Commanders, who have 
 to execute it, can arrange for themselves. 
 
 Just as details are inadmissible, so there must be no statement of 
 reasons. If such are considered necessary, they are to be added 
 marginally or separately. 
 
 7TH PROBLEM. 1858. 
 
 Vide Plan 5 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 EASTERN CORPS. 
 
 The Eastern Corps, whose object it is to cover the siege of Posen, 
 and which has been unable any longer to prevent the enemy from 
 crossing the Oder, has been marching since 6 a.m. on the ijth on 
 Zohlow, in support of its 1st Division. 
 
 The following report arrives from the Commander of that 
 Division : 
 
 Kunersdorf, I3th March, n a.m. 
 
 My left Flank Detachment has been attacked about 10 
 o'clock by very superior forces from the direction of the 
 Schwetiger Revier (Forest). In compliance with its orders 
 it is slowly retiring on Sorge, where it is to offer the most 
 obstinate resistance. 
 
 Soon after 10 o'clock the enemy advanced with a Divi- 
 sion against the front of my position. He is firing with 24 
 guns, but still holding back hrs Infantry. 
 
 * The and Infantry and the Cavalry Division of the Eastern Corps. 
 
8TH PROBLEM. 1858. 9 
 
 At 10.30 the heads of the hostile columns, which drove 
 away the Flank Detachment, showed themselves at the 
 exits of the Frankfurter Forst on my left Flank. I have 
 sent against them 3 Battalions, 2 Squadrons, and I Battery 
 from the reserve, and have so far prevented their debouching. 
 
 Since the enemy, up till now, is nowhere showing 
 Cavalry masses, it may be inferred that they have marched 
 through the Neuendorfsche Forst.* 
 
 In order not to get into a situation too disadvantageous, 
 I have now resolved to retreat. 
 
 Kunersdorf will be set on fire and the crossing south of 
 it disputed by Artillery as long as possible. The Rear Guard 
 takes post near the wood. If I should be pressed much, I 
 shall perhaps be obliged to cross the Hiihner Fliess below 
 the Drossen road and to retire through the close country of 
 
 Bischofsee. 
 
 N. N. 
 
 The General commanding receives this report at 1 1.30 in Zohlow, 
 where the head of his Main Body has just arrived. 
 What does he resolve to do ? 
 
 STH PROBLEM. 1858. 
 
 Vide Plan 6 and Sketch Map 4. 
 
 The mobile 6th Army Corps is concentrating in the neighbour- 
 hood of Schweidnitz. 
 
 The 1 2th Infantry Division, to which are attached the 6th 
 Hussar Regiment, the ist 12-pr. and the 1st 6-pr. Batteries of the 
 6th Artillery Regiment, is sent to the county of Glatz, in order to 
 cover the arming of the fortresses of Glatz, Silberberg and Neisse 
 against an enemy, who is concentrating in Bohemia near Konig- 
 gratz. 
 
 Hostile Detachments near Rothwasser, Nachod and Braunau 
 prevent us from learning what is happening behind the ridge of the 
 Sudeten, still impassable on account of snow. But it is certain that 
 the enemy, about 16,000 strong, intends to penetrate into the county 
 of Glatz on one, or eventually on several, of the existing roads. The 
 road from Braunau to Ober Steine, although not metalled, is fit for 
 wheeled traffic. 
 
 * Konigl. Keppensche Fst. 
 
10 QTH PROBLEM. 1859. IOTH PROBLEM. 1859. 
 
 How does the Commander of the I2th Division intend to per- 
 form the duty imposed on him? Where will he accordingly place 
 his troops ? 
 
 9TH PROBLEM. 1859. 
 
 Vide Plan 7 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 A mobile Infantry Division, strengthened by two Cavalry Regi- 
 ments, has been pushed out to Werneuchen towards the Oder, to 
 cover Berlin. 
 
 From trustworthy sources it is heard there that the enemy 
 crossed that river to-day at Freienwalde and Wrietzen in two 
 columns, each 10,000 strong. 
 
 The Division went into bivouac near the farm of Werftpfuhl. 
 The outposts are standing in the line Heidekrug, Tiefensee towards 
 Freudenberg. Hostile watchfires are seen behind Protzel and near 
 Vw. Torgelow. 
 
 In what manner does the Commander, in these circumstances, 
 think he would best be able to cover the capital ? 
 
 Dispositions for this purpose. 
 
 IOTH PROBLEM. 1859. 
 
 Vide Plan 8 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 A Western Division : 12 Battalions, 12 Squadrons, i Battery 
 Horse Artillery, and 2 6-pr. Batteries, had pushed out as far as 
 Storkow, and is to-day retiring in the direction of Senzig on the 
 advance of the enemy, who has 1 5 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, and 3 
 Batteries. The Rear Guard has halted in Bindow ; the Commander 
 of the Western Division, while still on the march, receives, however, 
 the report that the enemy is following there with a strong Advanced 
 Guard, but directing his Main Body by Prieros ; furthermore, that 
 reinforcements, consisting of 2 Battalions and I 12-pr. Battery, have 
 occupied the strong defile of Konigs-Wusterhausen. 
 
 The Commander determines to halt behind a suitable position, 
 and, if necessary, to risk a battle for the covering of the capital. 
 
 The bridges at Copenick and Schmockwitz are destroyed. The 
 low ground of the Fang-Graben* and of the Notte can only be 
 crossed by the existing roads, the other meadows are hard. 
 
 * Efflux of the Zeesener See into the Dahme. 
 
IITH PROBLEM. i860. I2TH PROBLEM. l86o. II 
 
 What orders will the Commander to-day give to his Advanced 
 Guard ? What sections of the ground will the Division occupy ? 
 Where bivouac? Where eventually fight ? 
 
 IITH PROBLEM. 1860. 
 
 Vide Plan 9 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 An Eastern Corps is advancing by rapid marches through Ciistrin 
 and Frankfurt to reach Berlin before strong forces can be assembled 
 there for its protection. 
 
 A Western Division : 1 3 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 3 Batteries, 
 with orders to cover the capital, is standing between Vogelsdorf and 
 Tasdorf, which latter defile is entrenched. 
 
 The Commander of this Division hears on the ist June that both 
 Miincheberg and Fiirstenwalde are ordered to furnish bivouac re- 
 quirements for 10,000 men, who will arrive in the evening. 
 
 The reconnaissances, pushed out in both directions, find the 
 Heidekrug and the Hinter-Heide (between Kl.-Wall on the 
 Locknitz and Alt-Monchwinkel on the Spree) strongly occupied by 
 the enemy. 
 
 What does the Commander of the Western Division intend to do 
 on the 2nd June ? 
 
 I2TH PROBLEM. 1860. 
 
 Vide Plan 9 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The Western Division on the morning of the 2nd June was 
 standing under cover behind Herzfelde. Its Advanced Guard let the 
 enemy cross the Zinndorf brook, and retired behind the Biesel Berg. 
 
 When the enemy pressed forward, the Division advanced to 
 attack with all its forces, and threw him back with considerable loss 
 behind the defiles near Heidekrug and Liebenberg. Hostile 
 Detachments advancing from the Mittel Heide against Kagel 
 appeared in the afternoon, but they found this village already 
 occupied. Strong columns arrived in the evening behind the 
 Locknitz near Kienbaum. 
 
 The enemy during the night remains in occupation of Heide- 
 krug, Liebenberg and Kienbaum ; numerous fires are burning there 
 and near Hoppegarten. 
 
 What position will the Western Division occupy in the evening 
 of the 2nd, and what does it intend for the 3rd June? 
 
12 1 3TH PROBLEM. 1 860. I4TH PROBLEM. l86l. 
 
 PROBLEM. 1860. 
 
 Vide Plan 9 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The Division determined to give up the offensive against the 
 enemy, who having united his forces is now in superior strength, but 
 to observe him still as much as possible. 
 
 A reinforcement of 2 Battalions and i Battery is moving to-day, 
 the 3rd June, into the entrenchments of Tasdorf. 
 
 When the Advanced Guard early alarms the enemy's outposts, 
 it meets with violent resistance. 
 
 At 10 o'clock, however, Kienbaum and Liebenberg, then also 
 Heidekrug are evacuated. 
 
 A Detachment following on the Miincheberg high road reports 
 the enemy's Rear Guard to have turned from Hoppegarten north- 
 ward into the Sieversdorfer Forest, and that Neubodengriin was 
 found occupied. 
 
 Hostile Cavalry near Eggersdorf prevents our patrols from 
 penetrating beyond Schonfeld. In the evening a report comes in 
 from Wrietzen that a hostile Battalion has arrived there. 
 
 What is to be concluded from all these reports ? 
 
 What further measures does the Division find it necessary to 
 adopt? 
 
 I4TH PROBLEM. 1861. 
 
 > 
 
 Vide Plan IO and Sketch Map 5. 
 
 GENERAL IDEA. 
 
 (Holds good also for the next two problems. ) 
 
 While the Prussian Army is on the Rhine, a hostile Corps has 
 landed at Wollin, blockaded Alt-Damm and detached a force on 
 Greiffenberg towards Colberg. A Division has advanced to Labes to 
 cover the siege of Stettin, which is intended as soon as a second 
 landing has been effected. 
 
 A Prussian Division has assembled near Schneidemiihl and 
 advanced to Falkenberg. 
 
 PROBLEM : 
 
 The Commander of the Eastern Division is without any precise 
 instructions at this unexpected turn of events ; he has to act entirely 
 according to his own judgment. 
 
 Colberg has its complete war garrison, and is abundantly pro- 
 
I$TH PROBLEM. l86l. 13 
 
 visioned. Stettin is weakly occupied, but for the moment protected 
 by its situation on the left bank of the Oder. 
 
 From Greiffenberg it is heard that 2 Battalions, I Squadron, and 
 Battery are stationed there, for purposes of observation. 
 
 3 Battalions, I Squadron, i Battery, are near Alt-Damm. 
 
 The strength of the enemy near Labes is stated to be 9 Bat- 
 talions, 2 Squadrons, and 2 Batteries. 
 
 The outposts are near Woitzel and Bonin. 
 
 The Eastern Division numbers 13 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, 
 and 3 Batteries. For the present it cannot count upon reinforce- 
 ments. 
 
 The Drage as far as Dramburg can only be crossed on the exist- 
 ing roads on account of the swampy state of the meadows ; the same 
 is the case with the Miihlen Fliess of the Dolgen See*). Below 
 Dramburg, which is hardly tenable, bridging over the Drage is pos- 
 sible. The Ahl brook is swampy ; a strong position with front to the 
 East will be found near Rosenfelde. Labes has little defensive 
 capability, but the Rega cannot be crossed without preparation. 
 
 How does the Commander view his situation, and what object 
 does he aim at ? Against which portion of the enemy will he turn, 
 and in what direction ? 
 
 In harmony with these objects the following questions are to 
 be answered. 
 
 1. Where does the Division, assembled around Falkenberg, 
 
 bivouac to-night, the 1st April, and where will the 
 Advanced Guard and outposts be posted respectively? 
 
 2. What are the dispositions for the march to-morrow, the 
 
 2nd April ? 
 
 PROBLEM. 1861. 
 
 Vide Plan 10 and Sketch Map 5. 
 
 The Eastern Division took a position near Sarranzig at noon, 
 the 2nd April, until its Advanced Guard at the Dolgen See could 
 discover the measures adopted by the enemy. 
 
 The Cavalry of the Advanced Guard found Woitzel and Bonin 
 evacuated by the enemy, and Labes weakly occupied. It was learned 
 
 * Here is meant the Dolgen See between Dramburg and Schonwalde, as also the 
 stream running north from it into the Mandelkow See. 
 
14 1 6TH PROBLEM. l86l. I7TH PROBLEM. 1862. 
 
 that the enemy had left there this morning by the Wangerin high- 
 road. 
 
 A left Flank Detachment of the Advanced Guard fell in, at the 
 Vw. Louisenhof on the Sabitz See, with hostile Infantry, which with- 
 drew. A hostile Battery opened fire to cover its retreat behind the 
 Rosenfeld bridge. 
 
 Arrangements for the 2nd and dispositions for the 3rd April. 
 
 i6TH PROBLEM. 1861. 
 
 Vide Map 10 and Sketch I\Iap 5. 
 
 The Advanced Guard attacked the position of Rosenfelde on the 
 3rd April, but with the intention only of holding the enemy there in 
 check during that day, and has done so successfully. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Main Body of the Division, with the Artillery, 
 marched by Schonwalde on Bonin ; the Cavalry by Altkist, covered 
 by the wooded country, drove away, without fighting, the enemy's 
 posts at the Lessentiner Mill, and occupied the bridge there and that 
 on the high-road. 
 
 Bivouac in the Boniner Heide* without fires. Labes and the 
 Vw. Kotentow observed. 
 
 After dusk the Advanced Guard was withdrawn to Kotentow, 
 the Rosenfelder Mill and the Vw. Louisenhof being only observed by 
 Cavalry. 
 
 On the 4th the Division is about to attack by the Wangerin and 
 Claushagen road, when the Detachment against Labes is suddenly 
 and vigorously attacked from that place, and, cannonaded by Artillery, 
 thrown back by superior Infantry and pursued by Cavalry as far as 
 the Heide brook. 
 
 What is the significance of this attack, and what resolutions are 
 adopted for to-day ? 
 
 I;TH PROBLEM. 1862. 
 
 Vide Plan 1 1 and Sketch Map 2. 
 
 A Southern Army, concentrated between Gera and Altenburg, 
 has pushed out a Division towards Weissenfels to oppose the advance 
 
 * Vor- Heide. 
 
l8TH PROBLEM. 1862. 1 5 
 
 of a Northern Army, which is expected from the direction of 
 Querfurt and Artern. 
 
 SOUTHERN DIVISION. The Southern Division halted 
 
 ADVANCED GUARD : at Dippelsdorf in the afternoon of 
 
 Uhlan Squadron. which has already met the advanced 
 
 t party of the enemy in Weissenfels, 
 
 6-pr. Field Battery. . . . 
 
 I|II|II|II|M|M|II|M|I drives it out and secures the road 
 
 MAIN BODY : an d railway bridges there. 
 
 3rd Infantry Regt. ist infantry Regt. The action arising therefrom 
 
 Rifle Battalion. 2nd Infantry Regt. induces the enemy to get under 
 
 ~En"gineer De"^ne"n7~ arms in rder to ward ff a Possible 
 
 ! attack. From the high crest on 
 
 Uhlan Regiment. Hussar Regiment. 
 
 h the right of the valley, a Battery of 
 
 1 2-pr. Battery. Horse Artillery Battery. 1 6 guns IS observed Unlimbering 
 ill ill ill ill ill ill iti ill ill iti ill ill ih ih ilnli 
 
 west of the Kaffeehaus, and 10 
 
 Rifled Battery. 
 
 I|II|M|II|M|II|M|M|I Battalions, 4 Squadrons, and 16 
 
 guns more are counted on the open ground between Marktwerben 
 and Burgwerben. It cannot be ascertained what may still be in and 
 behind these villages. 
 
 After having reported, the Divisional Commander is directed to 
 hold Weissenfels, but at the same time to obtain definite information 
 as to whether the Main Body of the enemy is following its Division 
 sent in advance thither, or is aiming at another point on the Saale. 
 
 The inundated meadows of the Saale preclude at present the 
 possibility of bridging ; on the other hand, all permanent crossings 
 over this stream are intact and passable for all arms. 
 
 What measures does the Commander adopt for the 2nd June ? 
 
 i8TH PROBLEM. 1862. 
 
 Vide Plan II ami Sketch Map 2. 
 
 The Southern Division remained at Dippelsdorf on the 2nd 
 June. 
 
 The Advanced Guard was strengthened by \ 12-pr. Battery and 
 directed to maintain the defile of Weissenfels, in itself difficult to 
 force, against any attack. 
 
 For purposes of a reconnaissance the 
 3rd Infantry Regiment, 
 2 Companies Rifles, 
 
l6 iSTH PROBLEM. 1862. 
 
 i Company Engineers, 
 6 Squadrons, and 
 i Battery Horse Artillery 
 
 will march to-morrow at 5 a.m. by Plotha and the railway bridge 
 above Eulau on the left bank of the Saale. 
 
 One Battalion was detached from there to the Nackte Henne 
 (about I mile north of Naumburg*). One Battalion went by Eulau 
 to Goseck, the rest of the Infantry and Rifles together with two guns 
 occupied the forest west to Goseck and the corner of the wood south 
 of Dobichau. Between the two the Cavalry with two guns then ad- 
 vanced at 10 o'clock at a trot, round Marckrohlitz as far as Luftschiff 
 without discovering anything of the enemy, notwithstanding the 
 extensive view. 
 
 Single officers with well mounted orderlies dashed forward as far 
 as Zeuchfeld, Grost, and Lunstadt ; patrols from Nackte Henne 
 reached Freiburg, yet nowhere was the enemy met with. 
 
 At 9 o'clock the enemy had reconnoitred towards Weissenfels 
 and come under fire of the 12-prs., posted at Trompete. He imme- 
 diately gave up the attack, when disturbed on his right flank near 
 Uechteritz from the direction of Goseck, but kept the mouth of 
 the defile of Weissenfels under the effective fire of a battery east of 
 Markwerben, protected by gun pits on the crest overlooking the 
 valley. Uechteritz was occupied by him at noon ; Cavalry and 
 Artillery moved on Obschiitz and caused the Cavalry of the Southern 
 Division to retire on its Infantry. 
 
 Nothing of the enemy was to be seen in Diirrenberg or 
 Merseburg. 
 
 Reports received as late as 6 p.m. bring in nothing new. 
 
 The Southern Army moved to-day as far as the Rippach between 
 Teuchern and Molsen. It intends to advance by Weissenfels. 
 
 The General commanding requires : 
 
 1. Brief information as to what can be inferred from the 
 
 negative results of the reconnaissance as to the approach 
 of the enemy's Main Army. 
 
 2. A suggestion as to how the debouching of the Main 
 
 Army by Weissenfels is to be facilitated and secured by 
 the Southern Division. 
 
 * Crossing of the high-road over the Saale to Freiburg. 
 
PROBLEM. 1862. 20TH PROBLEM. 1 862. 1 7 
 
 I9TH PROBLEM. 1862. 
 
 Vide Plan 1 1 and Sketch Map 2. 
 
 The Northern Army had sent a Division two marches ahead as 
 an Advanced Guard to secure the Saale bridge at Weissenfels. The 
 enemy forestalled it by only a few hours. 
 NORTHERN DIVISION : The Northern Division confined itself on the 
 
 15 Battalions 2 nd June to preventing the enemy from getting 
 
 8 Squadrons across the defile, but while doing this found itself 
 
 4 Batteries threatened on its left flank. 
 
 If this attack had been carried out with adequate forces, the 
 Division must have given up its position before Weissenfels. The 
 enemy, however, for the most part, showed only Cavalry, and with- 
 drew before that of our side. 
 
 The Main Army arrives to-day, late in the evening, behind 
 Miicheln. 
 
 It would be welcome news for the General to hear of the enemy 
 crossing the Saale. He will accept battle in a position near Pettstadt, 
 left wing towards Lunstadt, the right south of Bornthal, attacking 
 which the enemy will have the defiles close in his rear. 
 
 The Northern Division is to secure time for the Army to move 
 into the position indicated, without hurry, and after it has cooked. 
 
 How does the Northern Division intend to solve its problem on 
 June 3rd? 
 
 20TH PROBLEM. 1862. 
 
 Vide Plan 1 1 and Sketch Map 2. 
 
 The Northern Division held Markwerhen with 2 Battalions, 
 Uechteritz with I Battalion, and left a Battery of Horse Artillery 
 opposite Weissenfels, under escort of 2 Squadrons. 
 
 In Marckrohlitz stood I Battalion ; behind it were placed, as a 
 reserve, 2 Battalions, 2 Squadrons and I Battery. 
 
 The rest of the Division, 9 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, 2 Batteries, 
 was concentrated in a covered position in Brosig-Grund. 
 
 The enemy opened a lively cannonade from the heights north 
 of Weissenfels at 6 a.m. on June 3rd. A Rifled Battery near Beu- 
 titz forced at 9 a.m. the Horse Artillery Battery of the Northern 
 Division to retire, whereupon Infantry immediately crossed the 
 bridge. The Horse Artillery Battery took up a new position at 
 
 C 
 
1 8 2IST PROBLEM. 1863. 
 
 the hollow road to Tagewerben, and prevented by effective fire 
 the advance of the enemy until he, on his part, brought up Artil- 
 lery. It then withdrew on Markwerben, and a hostile Brigade 
 deployed between Burgwerben and Kaffeehaus. 
 
 On the right wing a Brigade of Infantry, together with Cavalry 
 and Artillery, advanced at 9 o'clock on the Naumburg road and from 
 the Goseck wood against Marckrohlitz. Guns were brought into 
 action against the village. 
 
 Simultaneously three Battalions advanced from Lobitsch towards 
 Uechteritz, but came to a standstill owing to the advance of Infantry 
 on their left flank from the Brosig-Grund. 
 
 Markwerben was lost meanwhile, and the Detachment with- 
 drew by Storkau and Obschiitz. Uechteritz was then abandoned 
 voluntarily. 
 
 A hot struggle for Marckrohlitz, steadily supported by the 
 Northern Division, was still going on, when about noon the heads 
 of the columns of the Northern Army became visible on the heights 
 of Pettstadt. The enemy did not follow beyond Markwerben, and 
 broke off the fight at Marckrohlitz. 
 
 The attack was not renewed in the course of the day. 
 
 A strong reconnaissance in the evening found Goseck, Dobichau, 
 and Podelist occupied, and encountered an obstinate resistance. 
 
 What conclusions can be drawn from these events with regard 
 to the intentions of the Southern Army, which the day before had 
 arrived on the Rippach and is aware that the Northern Army is still 
 expecting reinforcements ? 
 
 2IST PROBLEM. 1863. 
 
 Vide Plan 9 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 An Eastern Army is advancing towards the Oder in order to 
 reach Berlin by Frankfurt. 
 
 The leading Army Corps moves on the ist March from Drossen 
 close to Custrin, and simultaneously occupies Frankfurt with the 
 combined ist Brigade : 
 
 7 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, I 6-pr. Rifled Battery and I 6-pr. 
 Horse Artillery Battery. 
 
 On the news that a Division, 10,000 to 12,000 strong, is said to 
 be already on the march from Berlin towards the Oder, also the 2nd 
 Brigade namely : 
 
22ND PROBLEM. 1863. \Q 
 
 6 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, 2 12-pr. Batteries, 
 is, on the 2nd March, transported across the river above Ciistrin. 
 
 The General of Division in Frankfurt receives the order to 
 advance at once on the Berlin high-road with the 1st Brigade, leav- 
 ing only i Battalion behind, to watch the enemy's movements, to 
 unite at a convenient place with the 2nd Brigade advancing from 
 Ciistrin ; at any rate to secure the debouching, later on, of the Army 
 by Frankfurt and, if possible, to arrange for its undisturbed advance 
 on Berlin by dispersing the enemy. 
 
 In consequence of this the 1st Brigade marched on the 3rd 
 March as far as the neighbourhood of Heinersdorf and is sending its 
 Advanced Guard : 
 
 2 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, 2 guns Horse Artillery, 
 forward on Miincheberg. 
 
 The leading bodies of the 2nd Brigade have reached Diedersdorf, 
 its main body standing near Seelow. 
 
 Whilst still on the march the General of Division hears' that 
 Hoppegarten was reached by the enemy to-day, and that his masses 
 are in bivouac close behind it. 
 
 PROBLEMS : 
 
 1. What does the Commander of the Eastern Division in- 
 
 tend to do on the 4th March ? 
 
 2. What orders does he issue accordingly 
 
 (a) to the 2nd Brigade for to-morrow ? 
 
 (b) to the Advanced Guard, still on its march to 
 Miincheberg, for to-day and to-morrow ? 
 
 22ND PROBLEM. 1863. 
 
 Vide Plan 9 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The Commander of the Eastern Division withdrew his Advanced 
 Guard before it was attacked. He will meet an advance of the enemy 
 on Frankfurt at Heinersdorf. 
 
 The 2nd Brigade is directed by Diedersdorf or Marxdorf, where 
 it is to receive further orders. 
 
 At 9 o'clock it is ready in rendezvous position between Marxdorf 
 and the Krumme See, the Cavalry Regiment under cover at the 
 western edge of the Behlendorfer Heide. 
 
 If the advance of the enemy, observed by the Cavalry of the 
 
 C 2 
 
2O 23RD PROBLEM. 1863. 
 
 Advanced Guard and distantly visible, happens to be made on the 
 Miincheberg high-road, the 2nd Brigade is to attack his left flank by 
 Behlendorf. 
 
 If, however, it is directed by Tempelberg, the Brigade will move 
 into a defensive position from behind the Heinersdorfer See, which 
 position near Heinersdorf the ist Brigade will hold by itself for the 
 present. 
 
 Accordingly, a position is to be selected for the ist Brigade in 
 the neighbourhood of Heinersdorf, in which it can accept a first 
 attack. 
 
 When occupying the most important points of the ground 
 regard should be had to the eventual arrival of the 2nd Brigade in 
 position. 
 
 PROBLEM : 
 
 1. Show on the accompanying plan the position chosen. 
 
 The units of the ist Brigade are to be shown as they 
 would stand when the attack was immediately expected, 
 but its direction not yet defined. 
 
 2. Show the units of the 2nd Brigade (with another colour in 
 
 pencil or ink), assuming that the enemy's attack is 
 coming by Tempelberg and that the 2nd Brigade has 
 moved into the position. 
 
 23RD PROBLEM. 1863. 
 
 Vide Plan 9 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The Western Division is charged with the duty of throwing back 
 across the Oder the enemy who has penetrated beyond Frankfurt. It 
 is to seize the Frankfurt bridge, which the nearest Corps of the 
 Eastern Army cannot reach under four or five days. 
 
 The Division has left the necessary troops at the entrenched 
 defiles of Tasdorf and Erkner, in order to make sure of them, and on 
 the 3rd March advanced beyond the Rothe Luch with altogether 
 9 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 4 Batteries. 
 
 Meanwhile it was learned that a second hostile body had crossed 
 the Oder near Ciistrin. The strength and nearness of this body were 
 unknown. It appeared, therefore, inadvisable immediately to attack 
 the enemy at Heinersdorf. 
 
 The Division, on the 4th March, had pushed out only Cavalry in 
 
24TH PROBLEM. 1863. 21 
 
 that direction, and had itself marched to Miincheberg and reconnoitred 
 beyond Jahnsfelde. It became clear that both hostile columns, about 
 14,000 strong, were already standing concentrated between Marxdorf 
 and Heinersdorf. Until evening no detachments of any strength had 
 penetrated beyond this line. 
 A Brigade of 
 
 6 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, and I Battery 
 
 has been sent by rail from Stettin by Eberswalde as a reinforcement, 
 which will arrive to-morrow evening, March 5th, at Tiefensee (about 
 1 8 miles behind Miincheberg). 
 
 PROBLEM : 
 
 1. How does the Commander of the Western Division intend 
 
 to operate further ? 
 
 2. What position does the Division take up on the evening 
 
 of the 4th March ? 
 
 3. What orders does the Divisional Commander issue 
 
 (a) to the Division for the 5th March ? 
 
 (b) to the Brigade at Tiefensee for the 6th March ? 
 
 24TH PROBLEM. 1863. 
 
 Vide Plan 9 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The Western Division retired on the 5th March from Miincheberg 
 northward round the Rothe Luch. 
 
 Favoured by a series of defiles, the Rear Guard has delayed the 
 enemy's advance during the whole day, and only towards evening it is 
 driven out of Wiisten-Sieversdorf. 
 
 The Stettin Brigade reports that it will be ready without fail at 
 10 a.m. to-morrow, the 6th March, behind Klosterdorf. 
 
 Till that hour the Division will to-morrow oppose the enemy, 
 hitherto superior, at any suitable point in this neighbourhood, but 
 on the arrival of the reinforcement will immediately assume the 
 offensive. 
 
 It may be assumed that the sending of the Brigade from Stettin 
 remained unknown to the enemy, and the Divisional Commander 
 counts upon its sudden appearance, if possible while the enemy is 
 already in action. 
 
 In consideration of these circumstances, where will the Division, 
 
22 25TH PROBLEM. 1864. 
 
 where the Rear Guard, go into bivouac for the night before the 6th 
 March? 
 
 The reasons for the positions chosen are to be based upon the 
 possible or probable enterprises of the enemy. 
 
 25T.H PROBLEM. 1864. 
 
 Vide Plan 13 and Sketch Map I. 
 
 GENERAL IDEA. 
 
 (Holds good also for the three following problems.} 
 
 The 1 6th Infantry Division is standing at Sirzenich, not far 
 from Trier. It is to defend the Mosel line in order to secure the 
 approach of reinforcements from Coin and Coblenz. 
 
 A hostile Corps has invested Saarlouis on the ist April, and after 
 doing so is still 20,000 strong. 
 
 If this Corps advances straight on Trier, or turns more to the 
 west towards Echternach, the Division will await the attack behind 
 the Mosel or the Sauer, where the ground amply counterbalances the 
 superiority of the enemy. If, however, the Corps directs its advance 
 more to the east, somewhere in the direction of the Lower Mosel, the 
 Division cannot remain at Trier. For instance, the enemy has a 
 four days' march to Berncastel, the Division only two days, but to 
 execute the latter in time it must have sure intelligence .of the 
 enemy's movements. 
 
 The 1 6th Division has therefore occupied Wasserbillig, Conz, and 
 Schweich in front of its position. An Advanced Guard is observing 
 Saarburg and Nieder-Zerf from Pellingen. But besides this an 
 independent Detachment consisting of 
 
 The ist and 2nd Battalions of the 4Oth Fusilier Regiment, 
 The ist and 2nd Squadrons of the 9th Hussars, and 
 4 6-pr. Guns 
 
 is sent ahead towards Nonnweiler, to operate quite independently, 
 according to its own judgment and as circumstances demand, in 
 order to ascertain the enemy's movements on the right bank of the 
 Mosel. 
 
 PROBLEM : 
 
 The Detachment in its advance towards Nonnweiler got as far 
 as the neighbourhood of Hermeskeil at noon on the 2nd April. It 
 halts to cook behind the Dorren brook, occupies Hermeskeil with two 
 
26TH PROBLEM. 1864. 27TH PROBLEM. l86 4- 23 
 
 Companies, and is sending Cavalry patrols forward on the road to 
 Nonnweiler. 
 
 When at 4 o'clock the Detachment is resuming its march, the 
 patrols return to Hermeskeil, pursued by a Squadron of the enemy. 
 Soon afterwards hostile Infantry is visible at the edge of the wood 
 south of this place. Three Battalions are forming up there, and a 
 Battery is unlimbering by the side of the road. 
 
 This deployment occupies a quarter of an hour. 
 
 What determination has the Commander of the Detachment 
 meanwhile come to ? 
 
 How does he intend to act further in the spirit of his instruc- 
 tions ? 
 
 26TH PROBLEM. 1864. 
 
 Vide Plan 13 and Sketch Map I. 
 
 On the appearance of the enemy from Nonnweiler the Detach- 
 ment took the road to Thalfang, and halted behind the Thron 
 brook, as the leading columns of the enemy followed only as far as 
 Thiergarten. 
 
 What position does it take up for the night .preceding April 3rd, 
 and what measures of security will be adopted ? 
 
 What is to be done, if the enemy attacks to-morrow ? what, if he 
 does not follow at all ? 
 
 27TH PROBLEM. 1864. 
 
 Vide Plan 13 and Sketch Map i. 
 
 At 1 1 a.m. on the 3rd April the same troops, which were seen 
 yesterday at Hermeskeil, appear on the high ground in front of 
 Malborn. 
 
 A Detachment sent by Basch to Hiittgeswasen has surprised 
 there a hostile patrol. The prisoners belong to a body of troops 
 composed of all arms, which to-day is entering Birkenfeld. Reports 
 from the country people confirm the news that several thousand 
 men are announced to arrive to-day in Birkenfeld. 
 
 It is communicated from Trier that the posts at Wasserbillig, 
 Conz, Pellingen, and Schweich have not been attacked up till now. 
 
 What opinion does the leader of the Detachment form of the 
 whole situation ? Where will the enemy advance ? Where are his 
 forces to-day ? 
 
 How will the Detachment act to-day ? . 
 
 'UNIVERSITY 
 
24 2 8TH PROBLEM. 1864. 2QTH PROBLEM. 1865. 
 
 28TH PROBLEM. 1864. 
 
 Vide Plan 13 and Sketch Map i. 
 
 Can the Division in consequence of the reports coming in from 
 the Detachment arrive in time for the defence of the Lower Mosel ? 
 Can it assume the offensive there beyond the river ? 
 
 29TH PROBLEM. 1865. 
 
 Vide Plan 14 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 A Western Army is besieging Magdeburg, and has sent a 
 Division, strength as per margin, beyond Ziesar on the 1st June to 
 cover the investment on the right bank of the Elbe. 
 
 It is known that 12,000 to 
 
 WESTERN DIVISION: I3,ooo men are available in Berlin, 
 
 2nd Brigade. ist Brigade. wno were still there at the end of 
 
 3rd Regiment. ist Regiment. 
 
 ! i 1 ! 1 the day mentioned. 3,000 men 
 
 ^jfcSftSL _!Ji2^i_ more had already advanced from 
 Dragoon Regiment. Hussar Regiment. p ots dam in a westerly direction. 
 
 Irf!" 2nd. ~~7I~ The railwa y from Berlin to 
 
 I|II|II|II|M|II|I I|II|II|M|II|II|! I|H|M|M|,I|M|, Brandenburg cannot be used in 
 
 consequence of previous events. 
 
 On the arrival of the Western Division in Glienecke, east of 
 Ziesar, on the evening of the ist June, the Detachments sent in ad- 
 vance to reconnoitre, report from Zitz and Rogasen that hostile cavalry 
 patrols withdrew by Warchau and Wusterwitz ; from Wenzlow, that 
 Infantry posts were encountered in Grliningen. 
 
 A Cavalry Patrol sent forward towards Golzow did not see any- 
 thing of the enemy. 
 
 What conclusions can be drawn from the position and intentions 
 of the enemy ? What can the Eastern Division practically do, to re- 
 pulse the weaker Western Division, and to break the investment of 
 Magdeburg ? 
 
 What does the Western Division intend to do accordingly ? 
 
 Its disposition for the 2nd June. 
 
30TH PROBLEM. 1865. 3IST PROBLEM. 1865. 2$, 
 
 30TH PROBLEM. 1865. 
 
 Vide Plan 14 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The Eastern Division marched on the 2nd June from Berlin to 
 Potsdam. 
 
 Its Advanced Guard, previously sent ahead to Brandenburg 
 retreated behind the Havel, avoiding attack by a superior force from 
 
 the direction of Rietz ; it holds 
 
 EASTERN DIVISION. the Altstadt and the bridge there 
 
 ADVANCED GUARD NEAR BRANDENBURG : b a Detachment opposite Plaue. 
 Rifle Batt. Fusilier Batt. Fusilier Batt. , T i /- r 1 
 
 JNumerous watchnres of the 
 
 i Hussar Regiment. enemy ^ burning near Rot- 
 
 Battery, No. I. Scherlinde. 
 
 'I' 'I 1 'I' 'I 1 Rain has made the meadows 
 
 MAIN BODY NEAR POTSDAM. impassable. 
 
 What operations does the 
 . Eastern Division contemplate in 
 
 4th Regiment. 2nd Regiment. 
 
 1 s s i ' order to relieve Magdeburg from 
 
 nRegiment. i Hussa^Regiment. ^ enemy , s investment on && 
 
 t Batt. right bank of the Elbe ? 
 
 n|,t;|..|.t.|M|Mln|n|M|,H,,MM|..|.,Mn|; Dispositions for the 3 rd 
 
 June. 
 
 3 IST PROBLEM. 1865. 
 
 Vide Plan 14 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The Main Body of the Western Division halted and bivouacked in 
 the neighbourhood of Rotscherlinde after forcing the enemy's Ad- 
 vanced Guard back through Brandenburg on to the right bank of the 
 Havel, in the afternoon of the 2nd June. The Altstadt Brandenburg 
 remained occupied by the enemy ; a Detachment is standing before 
 Plaue, and the bridges at both points are destroyed. The rest of the 
 Eastern Division is said to have arrived in and about Potsdam. 
 
 The siege works before Magdeburg are so far advanced that 
 any disturbance of them must be prevented. No reinforcements 
 for the Western Division are expected. It is to oppose the enemy 
 where, and as best it can. 
 
 The Commander of the Western Division determines to accept 
 battle in the neighbourhood of Lehnin. 
 
 How does he dispose his forces for this purpose ? 
 
 The position of the troops, which remain available for the in- 
 tended action, is especially to be indicated. 
 
26 
 
 32ND PROBLEM. 1 866. 
 
 32ND PROBLEM. 1866. 
 
 Vide Plan 15 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 A Southern Corps is investing the bridge-head of Torgau, and 
 has repulsed a Northern Division stationed at Herzberg ; it detaches 
 
 towards Wittenberg, and is pursu- 
 ing, with a force as per margin, 
 the enemy, who is giving way in- 
 the direction of Berlin. 
 
 On the ist June the Corps 
 gets to the neighbourhood of Zos- 
 sen and east of it. Its Advanced 
 Guard took Gr.-Machnow, and also 
 occupied, with a detachment, the 
 bridge at Mittenwalde. 
 
 The Rear Guard of the enemy 
 retired from Gr.-Machnow to Kl.- 
 Kienitz; large watchfires warrant 
 the inference that his Main Body 
 is in bivouac there. 
 
 The strength of the enemy is 
 known. It is known that the 35th 
 Infantry Regiment, belonging to 
 the Division, had marched from its 
 peace-garrisons in the direction 
 of Berlin, and that at the present 
 moment no other troops are avail- 
 able there. 
 
 The Southern Corps, under 
 these circumstances, is charged 
 with the duty of seizing the 
 enemy's capital. 
 
 PROBLEM : 
 
 Disposition of the Southern 
 Corps for June the 2nd. 
 
 The reasons for such, if con- 
 sidered necessary, are to be stated 
 separately. 
 
 SOUTHERN CORPS. 
 ADVANCED GUARD : 
 ist Infantry Regiment. 
 
 \ ist Cavalry Regiment, 
 ist 6-pr. Battery. 
 
 MAIN BODY : 
 3rd Infantry Regiment. 
 
 4th Infantry Regiment, 
 i ist Cavalry Regiment. 
 
 2nd 6-pr. Battery. 1st 12-pr. Battery. 
 
 RESERVE : 
 2nd Infantry Regiment. 
 
 5th Infantry Regiment. 
 2nd Cav. Rgt. 3rd Cav. Rgt. 4th Cav. Rgt. 
 
 3rd 6-pr. Battery. Howitzer Battery. 
 2nd 12-pr. Battery. 
 
 Total : 15 Battalions, 16 Squadrons, 6 
 Batteries. 
 
 (18,000 men, 48 guns.) 
 
 NORTHERN DIVISION. 
 
 24th Infantry Regiment. 
 
 64th 
 
 6oth 
 
 nth Uhlan Regiment. 
 
 6th Cuirassier Regiment. 
 
 3rd Hussar Regiment. 
 
 ist Horse Artillery Battery. 
 
 ist 12-pr. 
 
 4th 12-pr. 
 
 ist 6-pr. 
 
 ist 4-pr. 
 
 ist Engineer Company 
 
 Total : 9 Battalions, 12 Squadrons, 5 
 Batteries. 
 
 (12,000 men, 28 guns.) 
 
33 RD PROBLEM. l866. 34TH PROBLEM. 1 866. 
 
 33RD PROBLEM. 1866. 
 
 Vide Plan 15 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The Northern Division on the evening of the ist June is in 
 bivouac at Gr.-Kienitz and Dahlewitz, its Rear Guard having been 
 forced out of Gr.-Machnow and having halted at Kl.-Kienitz. 
 
 In Berlin, on the quite unexpected advance of a hostile Corps 
 
 from the south, no preparations of 
 any kind could be made for the 
 defence of the town, such as en- 
 trenchments, organising of troops, 
 depots, police, etc. 
 
 There is only the 3rd Battalion 
 of the 35th Regiment ; the two 
 other Battalions were directed 
 from Potsdam to Ruhlsdorf on the 
 ist June, and in the evening are 
 there ready at the disposal of the 
 General of Division. 
 
 He is charged with delaying 
 the advance of the enemy as much 
 as possible, to allow of troops being 
 dispatched to Berlin by rail. 
 
 PROBLEM : 
 
 Disposition of the Division for 
 the 2nd June. 
 
 The formation of the Division 
 for action for this day is to be 
 drawn up marginally. 
 
 REAR GUARD : 
 Fus. Batt. 64th Rgt. Fus. Batt. 24th Rgt. 
 
 2 Squadrons of the 3rd Hussar Regiment, 
 ist 4-pr. Battery. 
 
 MAIN BODY : 
 
 64th Infantry Regiment. 
 2nd. ist. 
 
 24th Infantry Regiment. 
 2nd. i Ft. 
 
 2 Squadrons 3rd Hussar Regiment, 
 ist 12-pr. Battery. 
 
 RESERVE : 
 
 6oth Infantry Regiment. 
 Fus. 2nd. ist. 
 
 nth Uhlan Regiment. 
 
 h h h h- 
 
 6th Cuirassier Regiment. 
 
 Horse Art. 
 Battery. 
 
 4th 12-pr. 
 Batter. 
 
 ist 6-pr. 
 Battery. 
 
 ist Engineer Company. 
 
 34TH PROBLEM. 1866. 
 
 Vide Plan 1 5 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The Advanced Guard of the Southern Corps in the forenoon of 
 the 2nd June, while actively pursuing the enemy's Rear Guard to- 
 wards Lichtenrade, was suddenly attacked by superior forces on its 
 flank from the direction of Mahlow, and driven towards Selchow and 
 Wassmannsdorf. The heads of the main body, just debouching from 
 Glasow and the country to the east, across the Fliess, were repulsed. 
 
28 35 TH PROBLEM. 1868. 
 
 The Southern Corps soon took possession again of these defiles. 
 The dispersed Advanced Guard joined the reserve, and a new one was 
 formed, which in the afternoon advanced, with great caution, however, 
 against Mahlow ; also a Cavalry Regiment with two guns was de- 
 tached in the direction of Berlin. 
 
 The enemy had retired, protected by his Cavalry, in the direction 
 of Giesendorf. The Advanced Guard of the Southern Corps found 
 the Becke occupied by Infantry, and halted in the evening at Osdorf. 
 
 The Detachment against Berlin met hostile Infantry at Neu- 
 Schb'neberg, Brauerei, and Hasenheide; it took post for observation 
 behind Tempelhof without being disturbed there. Reinforcements 
 had not arrived in Berlin. 
 
 The Main Body is in bivouac between Mahlow and Lichtenrade. 
 
 PROBLEM : 
 
 What does the Northern Division intend to do in order to pre- 
 vent the occupation of Berlin ? 
 
 How does therefore the Southern Corps intend to operate on 
 the 3rd June? 
 
 35TH PROBLEM. 1868. 
 
 Vide Plan 13 and Sketch Map i. 
 
 Of the 1 6th Division, 
 
 10 Battalions, 9 Squadrons, and 3 Batteries 
 
 are concentrated in the neighbourhood of Trier ; reinforcements are 
 put in motion from Coin and Coblenz on Daun and Kaiseresch. 
 
 The Division is to prevent the advance of the enemy towards 
 the Rhine fortresses, or at least to delay it as long as possible. 
 
 A Western Corps surrounded Saarlouis, and with a strength of 
 
 19 Battalions, 12 Squadrons, 6 Batteries 
 reached Saarburg on the 1st May. 
 
 Opinion of the General Staff Officer how the operations of the 
 Corps are to be conducted during the next few days in order to 
 make full use of its present great superiority. 
 
36TH PROBLEM. l868. 37TH PROBLEM. 1868. 2Q 
 
 36TH PROBLEM. 1868. 
 
 Vide Plan 13 and Sketch Map i. 
 
 The enemy did not attack Trier seriously on the 2nd May. 
 
 The General Staff Officer of the i6th Division is requested to re- 
 port at what point it would be fairly advantageous to accept battle 
 with reinforcements still on the march. In case there is such suitable 
 ground the disposition of the troops for defence of the position is to 
 be shown on a sketch (the scale being four times that of the map). 
 
 37TH PROBLEM. 1868. 
 
 Vide Plan 8 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 While a Northern and Southern Army are opposing each other 
 in Silesia, a Southern Division advances through the Mark towards 
 Berlin to oblige his opponent to weaken himself by detaching a force 
 for the protection of the capital, which is left without troops. 
 
 A Brigade only of 
 
 6 Battalions and i Battery 
 
 is, however, sent off by Frankfort-on-the-Oder, which is to be joined 
 by two Garrison Cavalry Regiments, which have completed their 
 formation at Fiirstenwalde and Beeskow. 
 
 The Southern Division, 
 
 10 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, and 3 Batteries, 
 
 arrives on the 1st June at Zossen and Schoneiche. Its Advanced 
 Guard finds Gr.-Malchow unoccupied, but meets at Mittenwalde 
 and Gallun hostile Cavalry, which retires on Deutsch-Wusterhausen 
 and Schenkendorf, where it is supported by Detachments of Infantry. 
 
 Bivouac fires are burning during the night at Konigs-Wuster- 
 hausen, Neue Miihle, and Senzig. The broad meadows of the Notte 
 above Schenkendorf and Deutsch-Wusterhausen are impassable on 
 account of rainy weather. 
 
 Taking account of the situation. 
 
 What does the Southern Division determine to do ? 
 
30 38TH PROBLEM. 1869. 39 PROBLEM. 1869. 
 
 38TH PROBLEM. 1869. 
 
 Vide Plan 16. 
 
 A Western Corps, about 24,000 strong, is advancing from Frank- 
 furt-on-the-Main to besiege Erfurt. 
 
 It has not been possible to 
 STH INFANTRY DIVISION. 
 
 ISTH INFANTRY BRIGADE: complete the inundations and the 
 
 Regiment No. 31. filling of the ditches ; the fortress 
 
 ^ir^r^o.TT" is therefore at the present moment 
 
 ! ! ! not secure against assault. 
 
 i6TH INFANTRY BRIGADE. The mobile 8th Infantry Di- 
 
 Regiment No. 72. vision is assembling in cantonments 
 
 Regiment No. 96. between Arnstadt, and Gotha, and 
 
 Thuringian Hussar Regiment No. 12 will be complete there on the ist 
 
 1_ K t_ h __t May. It is to prevent the advance 
 
 IST DIVISION FIELD ARTILLERY. o f the enemy, or at least to delay it. 
 
 .ftuM-M. ^, r ,M?,M, D^ing the day intelligence 
 
 4-pr. No. i. 4-pr. No. 2. arrives that last night the leading 
 
 'M"I"I"M' .|.i|ii|.i|i.|i|i troops of the hostile Corps had 
 
 Engineer Company. 
 
 ' : already arrived on the Werra at 
 
 Meiningen, Walldorf and Wernshausen, and that quarters and pro- 
 visions for large bodies of troops have been requisitioned for to-night. 
 
 How does the Commander of the 8th Division intend to solve 
 his problem ? 
 
 What measures does he adopt for the following day, May 
 the 2nd ? 
 
 39 TH PROBLEM. 1869. 
 
 Vide Plan 16. 
 
 The Division concentrated early on the 2nd May in the country 
 around Ohrdruf, and pushed out three Advanced Guards each con- 
 sisting of one Battalion of the Regiment No. 31, with two guns of the 
 4-pr. Battery No. i,an Engineer party and some troopers as orderlies 
 on the roads by Tambach, Oberhof, and Schmucke as far as the 
 Rennsteig. 
 
 On this latter road the three Detachments were to seek con- 
 nection, to observe to their right and left, but towards the front, to 
 
40TH PROBLEM. l8/O. 31 
 
 occupy the defiles of the ascending roads, and to maintain their de- 
 fence obstinately. 
 
 The Fusilier Battalion, however, found the Schmiicke already 
 occupied by the enemy from Zella. 
 
 On the 3rd May the enemy attacked on all three roads. The 
 Fusilier Battalion was pushed back, and about noon the enemy 
 debouched from the hills at Grafenroda ; on the two other roads, 
 however, he had been unable to gain ground up to that time. 
 
 In consequence of these reports the Commander marched with 
 the whole Main Body to Frankenhayn. 
 
 The enemy, who here appeared only with a Brigade, was 
 attacked by superior force, driven away with great loss to Ilmenau 
 and pursued, when intelligence arrived that the two other Advanced 
 Guards were obliged to evacuate their position at 4 p.m., and that 
 at 6 p.m. strong hostile columns were debouching at Schonau, 
 Georgenthal, Grafenhayn, and Stutzhaus. Both Advanced Guards 
 had united behind Ohrdruf, and were still holding this place with a 
 Rear Guard. 
 
 What does the Commander of the Division determine upon ? 
 Shall the offensive be continued on the 4th May to cover Erfurt, or a 
 defensive position be taken up ? 
 
 Either for one or the other determination the disposition of the 
 troops is to be given specially. 
 
 40TH PROBLEM. 1870. 
 
 Vide Plan 9 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 A Southern Army is advancing from the Lausitz on Berlin. Its 
 right wing (the Southern Corps) is driving back a hostile Division 
 beyond Cottbus and Beeskow. 
 
 SOUTHERN CORPS. On tlle evenin g of the 3'St 
 
 2nd Brigade. ist Brigade. March the Advanced Guard of the 
 
 2nd Rifle Battalion. ist Rifle Battalion. Southern Corps has further dlS- 
 
 3rd infantry Regt. ist infantry Regt. lodged the enemy from Fiirsten- 
 
 "^nZn^Re^T 2nd Infantry Re^T Walde > and has taken Possession 
 
 ' ! ! ! ! ! of the town and the Spree bridges 
 
 2nd 4-pr. Battery. ist 4-pr. Battery. 
 
 I|II|II|II|M|II|M|II|I I|II|II|II|M|M|M|M|I there. The enemy's bivouac fires 
 
40TH PROBLEM. 1 870. 
 
 are visible between Neuendorf and 
 the Trebuser See. 
 
 Up till now it could not be 
 ascertained from his present line 
 of retreat whether he is escaping 
 pursuit by crossing the Oder at 
 Wrietzen, or turning to Ebers- 
 walde in order to maintain him- 
 self on the left bank of the river. 
 
 In the bivouac immediately 
 south of Fiirstenwalde the Corps 
 receives the order to beat the re- 
 treating Division if possible before 
 the soon expected arrival of the 
 Main Body of the Army before 
 Berlin ; or, in case it cannot be induced to make a stand, to force it 
 across the Oder, and then to prevent the arrival of fresh troops at 
 Berlin, which are expected there by rail from Stettin. 
 
 3rd Brigade. 
 3rd Rifle Battalion. 
 
 5th Infantry Regiment. 
 6th Infantry Regiment. 
 
 3rd 4-pr. Battery. 
 I|M|M|II|II|M|II|II|I 
 
 ist Light Cavalry Division, 
 ist Hussar Regiment. 
 
 ist Dragoon Regiment. 
 
 Corps Artillery Reserve. 
 
 2nd 8-pr. Battery. ist 8-pr. Battery. 
 I|II|M|II|M|M|II|M|I i|i i|i i|i iji i|i i|i I|M|I 
 
 ist Cavalry Battery. 
 I|M|II|II|II|II|II|II|I 
 
 Total: 21 Batts., 10 Squads., 48 Guns. 
 
 PROBLEM : 
 
 1. What measures does the Commander of the Advanced 
 
 Guard (3rd Brigade and one Squadron of Hussars) 
 adopt on the evening of the 3 ist March for securing 
 the crossing of the Corps on the following morning ? 
 
 2. Draw up the Orders of the Corps Commander for the ist 
 
 April. 
 
 The Intentions on which (2) is founded may be explained, if 
 necessary, in a separate minute. 
 
4IST PROBLEM. 1870. 33 
 
 4IST PROBLEM. 1870. 
 
 Vide Plan 9 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The ist Infantry Division strengthened by Cavalry was charged 
 with drawing off from Berlin a hostile Corps advancing from the 
 Lower-Lausitz. 
 
 It is also to se- 
 IST INFANTRY DIVISION. 
 
 2nd Infantry Brigade. 1st Infantry Brigade. CUre the approach of 
 
 Infantry Regiment No. 43. Infantry Regiment No. 41. ^he 3rd Division from 
 
 Infant. Rgt. No. 3. Rifle Bat. No. I Infant. Rgt. No. i. Stettin to Berlin, 
 ist Division of Field Artillery Regiment No. I. which is effected 
 
 6-pr. No. 2. 6-pr. No. i. 4-pr. No. 2. 4-pr. No i. partly by rail, partly 
 l|M|ll|M| " 1 " 1 ' 'I 1 '!"!"!"!"! 1 i|ii|ii|ii|ii|n|i i|iiMii|n|ii|i marching by the 
 
 IST CAVALRY DIVISION : . ., 
 
 x , road, Freienwalde 
 
 Cuirassier Regiment No. 3. Uhlan Regiment No. 8. 
 
 h h Alt Landsberg. 
 
 Dragoon Regiment No. i. Uhlan Regiment No. 12. On the 1st April 
 
 - m fc the Division, under 
 
 Horse Artillery Batteries. 
 
 2nd. ist. cover of its Cavalry, 
 
 iii ih ih iii ill ill tii iii ih ih iii ih .. , ., 
 
 continued its retreat 
 
 from Fiirstenwalde, and went into bivouac behind the Gumnitz and 
 Schlagentin See. 
 
 An officer sent in advance to reconnoitre reports the ground as 
 far as Buckow to be intersected by swampy brooks, ditches, and 
 hollows, with peat and moor bottom. Isolated knolls, partly with, 
 partly without, woods, offer small positions in all directions, but 
 nowhere admit of the deployment of large forces. The roads are 
 sandy, in the woods, passable only in fours, and everywhere passable 
 for vehicles. The height between Berg Schaferei and Vw. Abendroth 
 beyond this section is cleared of wood. The Rothe Luch can only be 
 crossed at three places on wooden bridges. 
 
 The enemy's watchfires are burning between Eggersdorf and 
 Schonfeld. 
 
 PROBLEM : 
 
 Report in writing required from the General Staff Officer on the 
 most suitable mode of action for the Division on the 2nd ApriL 
 Corresponding distribution of the troops. 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
34 42ND PROBLEM. 1870. 43RD PROBLEM. 1872. 
 
 42ND PROBLEM. 1870. 
 
 Vide Plan 9 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The last echelon of the 3rd Division : the 6th Infantry Brigade, 
 Infantry Regiment No. 14 
 
 > 54 
 
 together with the Dragoon Regiment No. 3, and the 5th and 6th 6-pr. 
 Batteries had already started from Werneuchen on the 2nd April. 
 
 While on the march an action in the neighbourhood of Buckow 
 became audible. The Commander on his own responsibility struck 
 out to the left at Landsberg, and in the evening the Brigade went 
 into bivouac in the Stadt-Forst, south of the Botz See. 
 
 The ist Division retired behind the Garzin section ; authority 
 from Berlin places the 6th Brigade at its disposal for the 3rd April. 
 
 PROBLEM : 
 
 What measures are intended for that day ? 
 
 43RD PROBLEM. 1872. 
 
 Vide Plan 17 * and Sketch Map 6. 
 
 An Army is concentrating near Miilhausen with the immediate 
 object of assuming the offensive by Belfort. 
 
 On the 3rd March the 29th 
 29 TH INFANTRY DIVISION. Division is standing at Miilhausen 
 
 57th Brigade. 
 Badish Infantry Regiment No. 113. read y to start n the Allowing day. 
 
 ~TT T 7 ! On the 4th March the last 
 
 Badish Infantry Regiment No. 114. 
 
 ^ ! troops of the 28th Division will be 
 
 58th Brigade. detrained at Merxheim, those of the 
 
 Badish Infantry Regiment No. 112. 
 
 : ! ^ 3Oth Division at Miilhausen. 
 
 Westphalian 
 
 Kurmark Dragoon Regiment No. 14. the Ist March 2O,OOO to 24,OOO 
 
 French had advanced to Remire ' 
 mont, who, since then, have been 
 
 From the Engineer Battalion No. 14. One of their raiding parties suc- 
 ~dT "Company. ceeded in destroying the railway at 
 
 Valdieu,t west of Dannemarie,j 
 and rendering it useless for some time. 
 
 The garrison of Belfort is to be reinforced as quickly as possible 
 
 * For the ground not included on Plan 17 vide sections Lure 100, and Miilhausen 101 
 of the French Ordnance Map. 
 
 t Gottesthal. \ Dammerkirch. 
 
44TH PROBLEM. 1872. 
 
 35 
 
 by three Battalions of Baden Landwehr, and its provisioning to be 
 completed. 
 
 The Commander of the 29th Division, who at Miilhausen has at 
 the same time at his disposal 400 requisitioned and laden wagons, is 
 charged with effecting the above. 
 
 The Commandant of Belfort reports in the evening of the 3rd 
 March the neighbourhood of the fortress to be still free from the 
 enemy, also that his posts of observation at Giromagny and Frahier 
 have, up to the present, not been driven in. 
 
 How does the Commander of the 29th Division, considering all 
 the circumstances, think of carrying out his task ? 
 
 Dispositions for the next day's operations. 
 
 Necessary Instructions (brief abstract to be given). 
 
 IST ARMY CORPS. 
 
 IST DIVISION. 
 ist Infantry Brigade. 
 ist Infantry Regiment. 
 
 2nd Infantry Regiment. 
 ist Rifle Battalion. 
 
 2nd Infantry Brigade. 
 3rd Infantry Regiment. 
 
 4th Infantry Regiment. 
 
 44TH PROBLEM. 1872. 
 
 Vide Plan 17 and Sketch Map 6. 
 
 The ist French Corps is ordered to invest Belfort, and to prevent 
 
 the arrival of reinforcements, as 
 the siege of that weakly garrisoned 
 place is contemplated. 
 
 The 1 2th Infantry Regiment 
 of the 3rd Division with half of the 
 5th Battery occupied and en- 
 trenched the junction of the roads 
 St. Maurice and Felleringen, in 
 the mountains, and pushed out also 
 one Battalion with two guns for 
 observation as far as Thann. 
 
 A raiding party succeeded in 
 destroying the railway at Val- 
 dieu. 
 
 The ist Division having de- 
 trained at Lure arrived around 
 Champagney in the evening of the 
 4th March, also the rest of the 3rd 
 Division at Remiremont, the 2nd 
 and the Cavalry Division, with the 
 Artillery, in the neighbourhood of 
 Giromagny. A hostile post sta- 
 tioned there withdrew on Eloie. 
 
 D 2 
 
 ist Battery. 
 i IMI ii ii ii 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 Ist Battery. 2nd Battery. 
 |M|M|M|M|II|I i|t ,|. i|, ,|,,|i i| 
 
 Engineers ' - ist Company. 
 
 2ND DIVISION. 
 
 3rd Infantry Brigade. 
 
 5th Infantry Regiment. 
 
 6th Infantry Regiment. 
 2nd R|fle Battalion. 
 
 4th Infantry Brigade. 
 7th Infantry Regiment. 
 
 8th Infantry Regiment. 
 
 Ilnd Batte 
 
 Engineers 
 
 Artillery. 
 4th Battery. 
 
 rd Battery. 
 
 ... ,,,|,,|,.|,,|nj. 
 
 2nd Company. 
 
45TH PROBLEM. 1872. 
 
 3RD DIVISION. 
 
 5th Infantry Brigade. 
 
 9th Infantry Regiment. 
 
 loth Infantry Regiment. 
 3rd Rifle Battalion. 
 
 6th Infantry Brigade, 
 nth Infantry Regiment. 
 
 1 2th Infantry Regiment. 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 Illrd Battery. 6th Battery. 5th Battery. 
 i|n|n|ii|i I|M|I I|II|II|II|II|M|I I|II|II|M|II|II|I 
 
 Engineers ' 3rd Company. 
 
 CAVALRY DIVISION. 
 2nd Cavalry Brig. 1st Cavalry Brig, 
 ist Dragoon Regt. 1st Hussar Regt. 
 
 2nd Dragoon Regt. 2nd Hussar Regt. 
 
 Reserve Artillery. 
 
 IlndBt. IstBt.4thBt.3rdBt.2ndBt. istBt. 
 (Each Battery 6 guns.) 
 
 Engineer Reserve. 
 ' ' 2 Companies. 
 
 N.B. The Batteries distinguished by 
 a Roman number are Mitrailleuse Batteries. 
 
 From Felleringen intelligence 
 arrives that a hostile Division had 
 in the forenoon advanced towards 
 Thann. The Detachment there 
 took post again at St. Amarin, as 
 the enemy had given up the pur- 
 suit. 
 
 A trustworthy spy reports 
 from Altkirch that at noon a 
 column of waggons, under strong 
 escort, passed through that place, 
 and is continuing its march on the 
 road to Dannemarie. 
 
 It is known in general that 
 considerable hostile forces are as- 
 sembling around Miilhausen, but 
 that only part of them have reached 
 the left bank of the Rhine. 
 
 Opinion of the General Stafl 
 Officer on the operations to be 
 undertaken. 
 
 (The actual words of the re- 
 spective orders are not required.) 
 
 45TH PROBLEM. 1872. 
 
 Vide Plan 17 and Sketch Map 6. 
 
 The 29th Division, during its advance on the 5th March, had 
 arrived at Soppe le Bas before noon, when from the Advanced Guard, 
 which had approached La Chapelle, intelligence came in that the 
 Cavalry, reconnoitring towards St. Germain, had come under Infantry 
 fire from that place, and that very strong columns of all arms were 
 advancing by Anjoutey. 
 
 The Detachment escorting the convoy of wagons on the exposed 
 flank reports that it has taken up a position in front of Bessoncourl 
 against bodies of the enemy's Cavalry, and that the convoy was 
 approaching Belfort unmolested. 
 
45TH PROBLEM. 1872. 37 
 
 In these circumstances the General of Division determined not 
 to expose himself to an attack by superior numbers. 
 
 The Main Body took the road south to Traubach ; the Right 
 Flank Detachment, ordered back from Soppe le Haut, followed, and 
 the Advanced Guard covered this movement by marching parallel 
 along the east bank of the St. Nicolas brook, and by occupying 
 the bridges over it. When the enemy about noon advanced en masse 
 from St. Germain and Menoncourt against La Riviere and Fontane, 
 it began to retreat, now as a Rear Guard, skirmishing in the direction 
 of Traubach. 
 
 The Main Body of the enemy did not cross the brook ; only the 
 Cavalry proceeded beyond it. 
 
 The Rear Guard of the Division, therefore, continued to hold 
 Brechaumont and Bois d'Elbach ; the Division bivouacked near 
 Traubach. 
 
 Early on the 6th March there are standing : 
 
 The 28th Division at Cernay,* 
 
 The 3Oth Division with the Corps Artillery of the I4th Army 
 Corps at Miilhausen ready for action, and with the 2pth Division 
 placed under joint command of the General commanding the I4th 
 Army Corps ; a Cavalry Division is formed of four available regi - 
 ments. The further concentration of troops at Miilhausen is to be 
 covered towards the west, and the investment of Belfort to be pre- 
 vented. 
 
 Instructions of the General commanding to three Generals of 
 Division for the 6th March ? 
 
 * Sennheim. 
 
38 46TH PROBLEM. 1873. 47TH PROBLEM. 1873. 
 
 46TH PROBLEM. 1873. 
 
 Vide Plan 18 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 After an unsuccessful action on the right bank of the Oder : 
 The 2nd Army Corps retired on Ciistrin, the 5th Infantry 
 Division on Frankfurt. The enemy followed in both directions with 
 superior forces. 
 
 The 2nd Army Corps, on the 
 
 STH INFANTRY DIVISION. Ist March, took up a position at 
 
 Qth Infantry Brigade. . , , r A , . ~ 
 
 T ; 4 * Q the edge of the valley, in front of 
 
 Infantry Regiment No. 48. 
 
 ' ' ' Seelow, and is observing the river 
 
 Life Grenadier Regiment No. 8. 
 
 i_ s -- 1 above the fortress as far as Reit- 
 
 ioth Infantry Brigade. wein 
 
 Infantry Regiment No. 52. 
 
 j -- s -- 1 The 5th Infantry Division was 
 
 f Frankfurt in the 
 
 Rifle Battalion No. 3. afternoon of the same day, the 
 
 Dragoon Regiment No. 12. bridge could only be partly de- 
 
 t - -- - -- 1 stroyed. The Advanced Guard of 
 
 Field Artillery Division. 
 
 (4 Batteries, 6 guns each.) the enemy occupied Boosen and is 
 
 Engineer Company. scouring the country this evening 
 
 as far as Trepplin and Sieversdorf. 
 
 The Division bivouacs during the night near Petershagen. 
 At the present moment we have no other forces in or around 
 Berlin. 
 
 How and where does the Commander of the 5th Division intend 
 to offer resistance to the enemy's further advance ? 
 
 4/TH PROBLEM. 1873. 
 
 Vide Plan 18 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 Show on the map a " position of readiness " in which to receive 
 on the 2nd March an attack by the enemy west of the Falkenhagen 
 line of lakes. 
 
48TH PROBLEM. 1873. 49TH PROBLEM. 1874. 39 
 
 48TH PROBLEM. 1873. 
 
 Vide Plan 18 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The 2nd Army Corps could only in the course of the 2nd March 
 complete defiling through Ciistrin and is standing at Seelow. 
 
 The 8th Infantry Brigade, strengthened by the 5th Hussars and 
 a Battery, occupied Dolgelin, and is patrolling to Reitwein, Podelzig, 
 and Karzig. Small bodies of the enemy were seen in the neighbour- 
 hood of Lebus. A post of observation at Reitwein was, however, not 
 attacked, and did not notice any preparations for building a bridge 
 above Ciistrin. 
 
 It is reported from Frankfurt that the bridge there is very much 
 damaged, and that the enemy is constructing a military bridge leading 
 to the Lebuser Vorstadt. 
 
 Before Ciistrin, on the Kietzer Wiesen, detachments of the enemy 
 were seen, which, however, kept out of range. The extensive watch- 
 fires, which were burning during the night preceding the 2nd of 
 March in the country about Sonnenburg, are no more seen to-night. 
 
 The 5th Infantry Division, which early on the 2nd took up a 
 position, Falkenhagen-Arensdorf, reports that it had not been 
 attacked there. Its Rear Guard at Trepplin, it is true, was frequently 
 alarmed ; had indeed been pushed back behind the lake defile, but 
 was able to occupy the village again in the evening. 
 
 Large bivouacs of the enemy are seen near Boosen, Wiist- 
 Kunersdorf, and Rosengarten. 
 
 Dispositions of the General commanding the 2nd Army Corps 
 for all three Divisions for the 3rd March. 
 
 4QTH PROBLEM. 1874. 
 
 Vide Plan 19. 
 
 At the Grand Headquarters of His Majesty in Pont-a-Mousson 
 reports came in on the i6th August up to 5 o'clock in the afternoon 
 according to which the 3rd and loth Corps were apparently engaged 
 with the French Main Army west of Metz, and only with great 
 difficulty able to maintain themselves. 
 
 Of the 2nd Army on the evening this day : 
 
 The 2nd Corps got as far as Buchy, nine miles south of 
 Metz, after very long marches. 
 
 The 4th Corps stood at Les Saizerais, Advanced Guard 
 against Toul ; 
 
 The Guard Corps : headquarters, Bernecourt ; Ad- 
 
4O 49 PROBLEM. 1874. 
 
 vanced Guard, Rambucourt ; the Uhlan Brigade pushed out 
 towards Commercy St. Mihiel; 
 
 The 1 2th Corps was about Pont-a-Mousson, head- 
 quarters, Fey en Haye ; Advanced Guard, Regnieville en 
 Haye ; the i.?th Cavalry Division at Vigneulles ; 
 
 The 9th Corps was still partly on the right bank of the 
 Moselle, but with its leading troops as far as the battlefield. 
 Of the ist Army: 
 
 The ist Corps had to remain opposite Metz for obser- 
 vation, and to secure the communications in rear ; 
 
 The 7th and 8th Corps, on the other hand, had already 
 moved up to Corny and Arry on the Moselle respectively, 
 in order to cross the river next day on the bridges existing 
 there, but only after the pth Corps. 
 
 Prince Friedrich Karl was on the battlefield ; his quarters for 
 the night were not known ; those of General v. Steinmetz were at 
 Coin sur Seille. 
 
 A Field Telegraph was established to Fey en Haye and Berne- 
 court. 
 
 PROBLEM : 
 
 On the 1 7th of August those Corps which, in the course of the 
 day can reach the battlefield, are to be moved up as early as possible. 
 The left wing at Mars la Tour is, above all, to be reinforced. Cavalry 
 to be pushed out from there towards the roads from Metz to Etain 
 and Briey. 
 
 Toul continues to be observed, but towards the Maas only the 
 Guard Uhlan Brigade remains in observation. 
 
 The two available Corps of the ist Army are to be brought up 
 by the shortest road to the right wing of the position at Vionville. 
 
 All crossing and blocking of the Corps ordered up are to be 
 avoided. The supply of ammunition must not be forgotten. 
 
 Direct reports to His Majesty are to be sent to the height south 
 of Flavigny. 
 
 Issue of the orders for the I7th of August at the Grand Head- 
 quarters, Pont-a-Mousson, at 7 p.m. of the i6th as far as practicable 
 by wire, and as far as necessary directly to the Corps Commanders, 
 communicating at the same time to the Army Commanders what 
 has been ordered. 
 
 At the end of the telegrams the number of words is to be noted 
 (exclusive of address and signature). 
 
To Problem 51 
 
 1 s * Drag. Rgt. 
 
 Bruserulorf 
 
 Mittenwalde 
 
 \ Corps ArtOL. 
 
 \ 
 
 \ 
 
 of 
 SgtLBaggage,. 
 
 Verlag d.K^l.Bofbuchhv.E.S.MitQer& Sohn.Ber]in.(Kochstr. 68/70.) 
 
 Geogi-.lith.Inst.u. Stemdr.v.WilhelmGreve ,Berlii 
 
50TH PROBLEM. 1874. S IST PROBLEM. 1875. 41 
 
 SOTH PROBLEM. 1874. 
 
 Vide Plan 20 and SketcJi Map 7. 
 
 On the intelligence that a hostile Corps is advancing from Wir- 
 ballen on Konigsberg, the Prussian ist Army Corps is detached by 
 Lb'tzen and charged with preventing the further advance of the 
 enemy, and throwing him back, if possible, across the frontier. 
 
 The Prussian Corps, for this purpose, has been strengthened by 
 the ist and 2nd Cavalry Divisions (32 Squadrons and 2 Batteries 
 Horse Artillery). It arrives to-night at Darkehmen Advanced 
 Guard near Dinglauken and learns that the enemy is standing near 
 Stalluponen. 
 
 What measures are intended for to-morrow ? 
 
 5 IST PROBLEM. 1875. 
 
 Vide Plan 8 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 An Army Corps is advancing from the Lausitz on Berlin. 
 
 The enemy, for the protection of his capital, is said to have 
 concentrated forces in the neighbourhood of Eberswalde ; it is not 
 known in what strength and how far he has already advanced towards 
 us. 
 
 The Corps is to obtain definite information about this ; therefore 
 to act as much as possible offensively, but against superior numbers, 
 which are probable, it is to seek to maintain itself until the arrival of 
 reinforcements. 
 
 On the ist of March the Corps is advancing in the order of 
 march as given on the opposite page, with the ist Division by Konigs- 
 Wusterhausen, with the 2nd by Mittenwalde. The heads of both 
 Main Bodies have crossed the Notte Fliess and its bogs when the 
 following reports come in from the Advanced Guards : 
 
 1. Advanced Guard of the 2.nd Division. 
 
 Brusendorf, ist March, 10 a.m. 
 
 Advanced Cavalry reports from Selchow that its scouts 
 found Wassmannsdorf and Klein Ziethen not occupied by 
 the enemy. 
 
 2. Advanced Guard of the \st Division. 
 
 Unter-Forsterei Wustemark, ist March, 10 a.m. 
 The Dragoons received Artillery fire in the neighbour- 
 hood of the Schonfelder See from the direction of Rudow. 
 
42 5 2ND PROBLEM. 1875. 
 
 Right flank patrol found Bohnsdorf occupied by Infantry. 
 Hostile Cavalry is debouching from Glienicke, ours retiring 
 towards Waltersdorf. I have provisionally ordered 
 
 PROBLEM : 
 
 1. What measures will the Commander of the Advanced 
 
 Guard of the 1st Division on his own initiative have 
 adopted and reported ? 
 
 2. How does the Corps Commander intend to solve his 
 
 problem ? 
 
 52ND PROBLEM. 1875. 
 
 Vide Plan 8 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 On the ist March the 2nd Army Corps began crossing the Spree 
 early in the morning, making use of the Copenick bridge, of a 
 pontoon bridge north-east of Marienthal, and of the railway bridge at 
 Stralow. 
 
 The ^rd Dragoon Regiment 
 6xH DIVISION. 
 
 llth Infantry Brigade. WaS P Ushed OUt be y nd Glienicke 
 
 Regiment No. 20. f or observation of the enemy, and 
 
 I2th Infantry Brigade. in Order tO SCCUre its debouching, 
 
 Regiment No. 24. Bohnsdorf was provisionally occu- 
 
 Hussar Regiment N't. 3. P ied b ^ Infantl T in sma11 force - 
 
 ist Division Field Artillery Regt. No. 18. Reports showed that the 
 
 1st, 2nd, 3rd, Ath Batteries. j , u 
 
 enemy was advancing on the 
 
 roads by Konigs-Wusterhausen and Mittenwalde, and at 9.30 Cavalry 
 detachments of his showed themselves this side of Waltersdorf. 
 
 At that time the Corps was in rendezvous formations behind the 
 line, Rudow Gr. Ziethen. 
 
 The 6th Infantry Division, together with the 6th Cavalry Brigade, 
 has been detailed as a reinforcement for the Corps, but can only start 
 at 9 a.m. from behind Tempelhof. 
 
 1. What instructions does the Commander of the 2nd Army 
 
 Corps give to the leader of the 6th Division ? 
 
 2. How does the latter, according to these instructions, arrange 
 
 his advance? Direction and order of march are to be 
 sketched with the aid of the map. 
 
53 RD PROBLEM. 1876. 54TH PROBLEM. 1876. 4? 
 
 53RD PROBLEM. 1876. 
 
 Vide Plan 7 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The mobile 5th Infantry Division has orders to march without 
 delay from Frankfurt-on-the-Oder by Biesenthal to Zehdenick. 
 
 The Main Body of 
 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION. 
 loth Brigade. 9 th Brigade. the Division reached Bie- 
 
 Infantry Regt. No. 52. Infantry Regt. No. 48. Senthal on the evening of 
 
 Gr"eTadie"r RNTl!" Grer^dieT Rt.fo. the Ist September and 
 
 . ' ' went into bivouac around 
 
 Dragoon Regiment No. 12. 
 
 ^ _ t^_ ^ _L_ ^at pl ace - The Advan- 
 
 ist Division Field Artillery Regiment No. 18. ced Guard has pushed to 
 
 Lanke. On the rumour 
 
 ^ that during the day strong 
 
 bodies of hostile troops had been transported on the Stettin railway 
 from Berlin to Bernau, the 1st Squadron of the Dragoons was sent 
 to reconnoitre. It met Cavalry patrols of the enemy near Riidnitz,. 
 who retired on Ladeburg, which place was found to be occupied by 
 Infantry. 
 
 What measures does the Divisional Commander adopt by reason 
 of these reports ? 
 
 54TH PROBLEM. 1876. 
 
 Vide Plan 21 and Sketch Map 8. 
 
 A Southern Division is marching from Neidenburg on Osterode. 
 To protect that place a Northern Division has taken up a posi- 
 tion in advance of it. 
 
 The Southern Di- 
 SOUTIIERN DIVISION. vision ^ ^^ ^ 
 
 2nd Brigade. ist Brigade. 
 
 3 rd Regiment. 1st Regiment. Hohenstein in the 
 
 ' 77" '' '' 7t~ < ~ ! ' evening of the ist, 
 
 4th Regiment. 2nd Regiment. 
 
 : ! ' ! ' and has gone into bi- 
 
 3rd Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 TTU1 . . vouac there. Cavalry 
 
 Uhlan Regiment. Hussar Regiment. 
 
 _t t t L. _t t t t_ patrols, sent in ad- 
 
 Horse Artillery Battery. vance, encountered 
 
 'I 1 '!"!"!"!"! 1 T f c . 
 
 3 rd Artillery Brigade. Infantry posts of the 
 
 (32 guns.) enemy at Osterwein 
 
 and Gross-Groben. 
 
 What measures does the Commanding Officer of the Southern 
 Division adopt for the advance on the following day ? 
 
44 55 PROBLEM. 1877. 56TH PROBLEM. 1877. 
 
 55TH PROBLEM. 1877. 
 
 Vide Plan 4 and 1 1 and Sketch Map 2. 
 
 The mobile 8th Division is marching from Erfurt by Eckarts- 
 berga to join the 4th Army Corps assembling near Eisleben. 
 
 As the advance of a superior 
 
 STH INFANTRY DIVISION. ** i r 
 
 I6th Infantry Brig. 1 5 th Infantry Brig. h Stlle Division IS expected from 
 
 Regiment No. 96. Regiment No. 71. the direction of the Saale, a Flank 
 Regiment No. 72. Regiment No. 31. Detachment of all arms is moved 
 
 "Rtfe Battalion No.~T~ n the ISt f March b Y St Micheln 
 
 ^""^ _ and Eichstadt in order to secure 
 
 Hussar Regiment No. 12. 
 
 K ^ ^ r- h- the march from Freiburg to Quer- 
 
 2nd Division Field Artillery Regt. No. 4. furt. The trains are ordered to 
 
 i|ii|ii|ii|ii|n|i I|II|II|M|M|M|I I|M|M|II|II|II|I . 
 
 Engineer Company. take the r ad n the n g ht bank f 
 
 ! the Unstrut as far as Nebra and 
 
 Trams. 
 
 MI from there to Ziegelroda. 
 
 About midday the Commander at Steigra receives the report 
 from the Commander of the Detachment that strong columns are 
 advancing from Merseburg by the high-road to Lauchstadt, and by 
 the road to Clobicau, and that he intended for the present to halt 
 between Eichstadt and Schafstadt in order to observe. 
 
 What measures does the General of Division adopt for the 
 evening of the ist and for the continuation of the march on the 2nd 
 March ? 
 
 56TH PROBLEM. 1877. 
 
 Vide Plan 4 and 1 1 and Sketch Map 2. 
 
 The 4th Army Corps : 25 Battalions, 30 Squadrons, 17 Batteries, 
 and the I2th 26 30 18 
 
 are to practise Field Manoeuvres against each other. 
 
 TIME TABLE. 
 4th September, Rest. 
 
 $th Review. 1 r . ., ,, ~ 
 
 \ of the 4th or I2th Corps. 
 6th Corps manoeuvre ) 
 
 " iof the 1 2th or 4th Corps. 
 
 8th ,, Corps manoeuvre J 
 
 9th Sunday rest, 
 
 loth ^ 
 
 nth > Field manoeuvre of both Corps. 
 1 2th 
 
56TH PROBLEM. 1877. 45 
 
 During the preliminary exercises the cantonments of the 4th 
 Corps extend east as far as the line Schraplau-Steigra, those of the 
 1 2th Corps west as far as the frontier, near Markranstadt and Pegau. 
 
 An officer is sent to select on the spot a favourable locality for 
 the manoeuvres. 
 
 After determining upon this he is requested to draw up : 
 
 1. A General Idea, which will hold good for all three days of 
 
 the exercise. 
 
 2. A Special Idea for the first day, and for each individual 
 
 Corps. 
 
 3. To indicate suitable depots for bivouac requisites. 
 
 4. To define the limits of the cantonments of the opposing 
 
 forces for the day of rest on the 9th of September. 
 
 REMARKS ON THE PLANNING OF MANOEUVRES. 
 
 At the three days' Field Manoeuvres of two Army Corps against 
 each other it has to be considered that during the concentration of 
 large bodies of troops every day causes a very considerable outlay. 
 
 The time table, fixed by superior authority, provides that the 
 days of rest necessary for the troops fall, as far as is practicable, on 
 the Sundays, and particularly that the Field Manoeuvres are not in- 
 terrupted by a Sunday or holiday. 
 
 For the same economic reasons the two Corps concerned will not 
 hold their divisional manoeuvres at too great a distance from each 
 other, in order to avoid long marches. It is inadmissible that one 
 Corps should have more than one day's rest because the other is still 
 marching. 
 
 The ground for the Field Manoeuvres will, therefore, as a rule, 
 have to be chosen somewhere between the cantonments in which the 
 preliminary manoeuvres of both come to an end. It is obvious that 
 a longer march can be given to that Corps which soonest concludes 
 those preliminary manoeuvres. 
 
 For the day of rest before the beginning of the Field Manoeuvres 
 the districts of the cantonments of both Corps are to be separated 
 from each other, and the rendezvous is to be determined in such a 
 manner that the parties, or at least their Advanced Guards, shall 
 actually meet on the first day. 
 
 The rearmost limits of these cantonments are determined by the 
 length of march which is permissible from the most distant quarters 
 to the place of rendezvous. The interests of the Home Office in this 
 
46 56TH PROBLEM. 1877. 
 
 matter generally clash with those of the War Office, as the former 
 demands extended cantonments, in order to ease the landlords ; the 
 latter limited ones in order to spare the physical strength of the men 
 in quarters. 
 
 The rendezvous must, therefore, not be chosen too far from the 
 centre of the cantonments in order that the Infantry may not have to 
 march to it more than about 7 miles. 
 
 With those restrictions such ground is now to be looked for as 
 most favours the deployment and effect of all arms. We will have to 
 avoid insurmountable obstacles and also the too frequent village 
 fights, which can only be imperfectly represented in manoeuvres. 
 
 According to the ground selected, a General Idea, holding good 
 for all three days, is then sketched, and at the same time a Special 
 Idea for each Corps for the first day of the exercise. 
 
 The General Idea indicates the supposed conditions of war under 
 which the two Corps oppose each other. Each of them must be able 
 to gather from that Idea where the Corps has come from, what is 
 required of it, whether and where it might eventually find support, 
 and what is known of the enemy. The drawing up of the General 
 Idea demands the greatest care. It must not contain far-fetched 
 strategical suppositions, or anything which by the nature of the thing 
 can only be known to one of the two parties. It must be precisely 
 worded and admit of no doubts ; it must be complete, and yet brief. 
 A General Idea, well thought out, will always admit of being com- 
 pressed into a few lines. 
 
 All that can be known to one party only, and is necessary for 
 it to know : more precise instructions, intelligence about advance of 
 reinforcements, reports on the position of the enemy's outposts, etc., 
 belong to the Special Idea. 
 
 The Special Idea must not restrict freedom of action when once 
 the situation is stated. It is a mistake to say, "The Commander de- 
 termines," or " The Division occupies," etc. All that must be entirely 
 left to the leaders of the troops, and from this it follows that at the 
 outset the Special Idea can only be settled for the first day of the 
 manoeuvre. In a note the rendezvous for the Main Body is stated, 
 and the hour at which the movements of the troops may begin. The 
 next Special Ideas are regulated by the course of the day's events. 
 
 But it still remains necessary at the same time to keep the 
 progress of a peace manoeuvre in a certain preconceived direction, in 
 
57TH PROBLEM. 1878. 47 
 
 order to make use of the most instructive ground, to bring about in- 
 teresting phases of battle, to feed the troops during the exercise, and 
 to facilitate their return to their garrison at the conclusion of it. 
 
 The superior commanders have sufficient means of preventing 
 the several parties from striking into quite a different direction from 
 that intended, e.g., strengthening one party by Battalions indicated 
 by flags, intelligence about the enemy, even an order changing the 
 original intention, but all those means are to be derived without 
 doing violence to the General Idea, and must be considered before- 
 hand when forming it. 
 
 The course of the whole exercise, as judged by probabilities, 
 gives a clue for indicating beforehand to the Corps Commissariat the 
 points for storing the bivouac requisites. 
 
 Large villages are to be chosen for them in which suitable build- 
 ings can be hired and teams be sheltered, such villages being close to 
 the probable bivouac, but outside the field of action. 
 
 57TH PROBLEM. 1878. 
 
 Vide Plan 22. 
 
 A Cavalry Brigade is observing our frontier from Verny. It is 
 holding with dismounted men the bridges of the Seille from Marly to 
 Cheminot, which is at this time of the year unfordable. Its patrols 
 
 are scouring the country unmolested 
 CAVALRY BRIGADE.. as faf &s ^ wooded he ^ 
 
 2nd and 1st Uhlan Regiments. 
 
 h h the right bank of the Moselle, but 
 
 2nd and ist Dragoon Regiments. they find these occupied by the 
 
 Infantry of the enemy, so that no 
 
 Horse Artillery Battery. 
 
 i|i t|i t|t i|i i|i i|i view can be obtained of the ground 
 
 RESERVE DIVISION. beyond them. 
 
 4th and 3rd Infantry Regiments. The bridge at Ars-SUr-Moselle 
 
 2nd and ist Infantry Regiments. IS OCCUpied by troops from Metz, 
 
 ~ Hussar Regime" and thence also provision has been 
 
 L_ made to guard the railway itself to 
 
 4th, 3rd, 2nd, and ist Batteries. Qaarhrii/Lwi arraiWf c -.oil ~~\A- 
 
 l|ll|ll(lljl ,1,,!,,,,,,, .[MiniMi, i|,.|,.|i,|, baar cken against small raiding 
 
 parties of the enemy. 
 
 During the ist May a Reserve Division detrained at Courcelles 
 to complete the garrison of Metz, but for the present is charged with 
 protecting the most exposed part of the line from Courcelles to Han 
 against extensive enterprises of the enemy. 
 
48 5 8TH PROBLEM. 1878. 
 
 The Cavalry Brigade is placed under the command of the 
 General of Division. 
 
 It reports that up to the evening of the 1st May its posts on the 
 Seille had not been disturbed by the enemy. 
 
 1. How does the General Commanding propose to solve his 
 
 problem ? 
 
 2. What are his first measures ? 
 
 58TH PROBLEM. 1878. 
 
 Vide Plan 22. 
 
 The Division on the 1st May had taken up its quarters in advance 
 of Courcelles as far as Mecleuves and Silly, whence it moved forward 
 in two columns to the Seille on the 2nd May. 
 
 The ist Brigade on the right detached the ist Battalion of the 
 ist Infantry Regiment with a Battery straight to Pouilly, and marched 
 by Orny and Verny, where the 2nd Battalion of the ist Regiment 
 remained, with one Squadron and the 2nd Battery, behind Louvigny. 
 To the latter place, also, the 2nd Brigade advanced by Vigny. 
 The Cavalry Brigade was ordered to march to Vigny by way of 
 -Goin. The 
 
 10 Battalions, 19 Squadrons, 3 Batteries 
 
 thus concentrated near Louvigny in the forenoon, entrenched them- 
 selves there at once in a position in advance of the road, Verny 
 Raucourt. 
 
 On the 3rd May, before noon, a hostile column showing 
 
 6 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 2 Batteries 
 
 advances from Corny against Coin les Cuvry, and shells without success 
 our posts standing under cover on the right bank of the Seille. 
 
 Repeated attempts to bring Infantry and bridging material for- 
 ward to the river, the bridges of which are destroyed and guarded 
 fail on account of the fire of the Battery on the height 203 west of 
 Pouilly, and of the skirmishers south of that place and in the patches 
 of wood west of Verny. 
 
 The enemy has advanced with considerably stronger forces from 
 Pont-a-Mousson by Les Menils. He is deploying Artillery to the 
 left near Longeville and to the right on the height 224, and soon after 
 advances with Infantry against both road bridges, which are only 
 barricaded and weakly occupied. Our post of observation is with- 
 drawing, not without some loss, in the valley on Louvigny. 
 
58TH PROBLEM. 1878. 49 
 
 The enemy occupies Cheminot, but during his further advance 
 he comes under the fire of our three Batteries, opposite to which he 
 is unable to deploy with any advantage an equal number on the 
 height 216. The village catches fire and the enemy retires behind 
 the slope to the Moselle. 
 
 A somewhat lengthy pause occurs in the action, and not before 
 the afternoon are large dust clouds observed in a southerly direction. 
 The 1st Uhlan Regiment, which trots forward by Allemont, repulses 
 near Raucourt a hostile flank detachment, and discovers from the 
 height 238 the advance, by Port sur Seille on Nomeny and Mailly, 
 of 
 
 10 Battalions, 10 Squadrons, and 4 Batteries. 
 
 The Regiment retires through St. Jure, in front of which some 
 skirmishing occurs without the enemy making any more serious attack 
 on that day. 
 
 He continued to occupy Longeville and the bridge in front of 
 Les Menils. Numerous watchfires are burning behind Mailly. 
 
 The posts at Pouilly and Verny report in the evening that the 
 enemy opposite to them is retiring on Marieulles, where watchfires 
 become visible. 
 
 How does the Commander of the Reserve Division view his 
 situation ? 
 
 What does he intend to do 
 
 1. If the enemy early on the 4th May advances against Lou- 
 
 vigny with the forces concentrated behind Raucourt ? 
 
 2. If the Cavalry ascertains that the enemy still holds the 
 height of Raucourt in order to secure his own communica- 
 tion-, but has marched off with part of his troops by 
 Secourt against the railway ? 
 
 3. If he should remain passive until the troops from Marieulles 
 
 can debouch by Cheminot ? 
 
59TH PROBLEM. 1879. 6oTH PROBLEM. 1879. 
 
 22NU INFANTRY DIVISION ; 
 
 44th Infantry Brig. 43rd Infantry Brig. 
 
 Regiment 94. Regiment 95. 
 
 59TH PROBLEM. 1879. 
 
 Vide Plan 23 and Sketch Map 9. 
 
 An Eastern Corps has beaten the enemy on the right bank of 
 the Fulda, and pushed him beyond Cassel on the 1st May. It de- 
 termines to continue the pursuit 
 during the following days in the di- 
 rection of Arolsen with the Cavalry 
 and the 2ist Infantry Division. 
 
 To secure this advance against 
 hostile forces, which are set in 
 motion from Frankfurt-on-the- 
 Main by Marburg, the 22nd In- 
 fantry Division is detached from 
 Cassel to the left. 
 
 It reaches Holzhausen on the 
 
 Regiment 32. 
 
 Regiment 83. 
 
 Uhlan Regiment 6. 
 
 2nd Division Field Artillery Regiment 27. 
 (24 guns.) 
 
 Engineer Company. 
 Divisional Pontoon Troop. 
 1 Ambulance Detachment. 
 
 2nd May, and pushes out Cavalry detachments towards the Ems. 
 
 In the evening trustworthy intelligence arrives that the enemy 
 about 20,000 strong has arrived at Kerstenhausen, on the Frankfurt 
 road. 
 
 What does the General of Division determine for the following 
 day? 
 
 6oTH PROBLEM. 1879. 
 
 Vide Plan 17 and Sketch Map 6. 
 
 The hostile Army having 
 Belfort is to be besieged. 
 
 I4TH ARMY CORPS. 
 
 28TH DIVISION : 
 56th Brigade. 55th Brigade. 
 
 22nd. 
 
 i nth. iioth. 
 
 2Oth Dragoons. 
 
 1st Division Field Artillery Regiment 30. 
 (24 guns.) 
 
 2 Companies - ' Engineers. 
 fVl Ambulance Detachment. 
 
 been repulsed beyond the Doubs, 
 
 There is in the fortress, in ad- 
 dition to its normal war garrison, 
 another mobile Brigade. 
 
 To observe the east front of 
 the place the ist Reserve Division 
 has been pushed forward by Cer- 
 nay * on Roppe and Pfaffans, the 
 2nd Reserve Division by Altkirch 
 on Vezelois and Meroux. Under 
 cover of detachments posted there, 
 
 Sennheim. 
 
6 1ST PROBLEM. l88o. 
 
 29TH DIVISION : 
 
 58th Brigade. 57th Brigade. 
 
 1 7th. H3th. 
 
 I I4th. 
 
 1 1 2th. 
 
 2 ist Dragoons. 
 
 2nd Division Field Artillery Regiment 30. 
 (24 guns.) 
 
 I Company ' Engineers. 
 >^| Ambulance Detachment. 
 
 CORPS ARTILLERY: 
 
 Field Artillery Regiment 14. 
 (48 guns.) 
 
 xj] Ambulance Detachment. 
 Trains. 
 
 Corps orders for the march 
 2nd June. 
 
 and of their outposts, the troops 
 are billeted in the villages as far 
 back as the Madeleine and St. 
 Nicolas brooks. 
 
 On the ist June, the head of 
 the 1 4th Army Corps, which is to 
 complete the investment on the 
 west bank of the Savoureuse, 
 arrives at Sermamagny from the 
 north, strength as per margin. 
 
 The close investment, at an 
 average distance of 5,000 paces 
 from the fortress, is to be com- 
 pleted by midday on the 3rd June, 
 of the 1 4th Army Corps on the 
 
 6iST PROBLEM. 1880. 
 
 Vide Plan 24. 
 
 The mobile 5th Infantry Division is on its march to the Rhine. 
 
 Regiment No. 35. Regiment No. 48. 
 Regiment No. 20. Regiment No. 8. 
 
 Rifles No. 3. 
 Dragoon Regiment No. 12. 
 
 1st Division Field Artillery Regt. No. 18. 
 
 (24 guns.) 
 ist Company \ of j? ngmeer 
 
 Battalion 
 No. 3. 
 
 Divisional Pontoon 
 Troop No. I. 
 
 ?\ Ambulance Detachment No. I. 
 
 I I Field Hospital 
 
 Nos. i and 2. 
 
 I i 
 
 I ' 
 
 Provision 
 Column No. I. 
 
 Having reached Paderborn on the 
 ist April it learns that behind 
 Haaren a hostile Division has 
 arrived, threatening the intended 
 march to Gesecke on the 2nd. 
 
 The railway is destroyed. 
 
 How will the 5th Division 
 arrange its march on the 2nd? 
 
 ^^ 
 
 OF THE ^ \ 
 
 UNIVERSITY) 
 
 *^^ 
 
 E 2 
 
52 62ND PROBLEM. l88o. 63RD PROBLEM. l88l. 
 
 62ND PROBLEM. 1880. 
 
 Vide Plan 24. 
 
 The 5th Division, on the 2nd April, reached Gesecke, its Flank 
 Detachment having been engaged. A hostile party remained during 
 the night near Drei Eichen ; large watchfires shine from the heights 
 beyond the Alme. 
 
 The 6oth Regiment has arrived at Gesecke from Erwitte as a 
 reinforcement. An attempt is to be made to defeat the enemy on the 
 3rd April. 
 
 How does the Commander of the Division intend to effect this ? 
 
 63RD PROBLEM. 1881. 
 
 Vide Plan 25. 
 
 Metz is threatened with siege. 
 
 In order to observe towards the west 
 
 3 Battalions, I Squadron, and 2 Sortie Batteries 
 are standing at Gravelotte. 
 
 They report the enemy ad- 
 Infantry Regimentals. vancing from Verdun. His lead- 
 i Squadron Dragoons No. 9. ing troops arrived at Vionville on 
 - the 1st July, and Cavalry patrols 
 
 2 Batteries. 
 
 i|ii|ii|ii|n|ii|i I|II|II|II|M|M|I of the enemy were repulsed by 
 
 50 men from the Engineer Batt. No. 15. dismounted Dragoons at Rezon- 
 
 ville in the evening. 
 
 The fortress gets its full war garrison only on the 3rd July. 
 The Governor charges the Detachment with preventing, as far as 
 possible, the enemy from establishing himself on the plateau of 
 Gravelotte until after the 2nd inst. 
 
 How will the Commander of the Detachment carry out his task ? 
 
64TH PROBLEM. 1 88 1. 
 
 53 
 
 2ND ARMY CORPS. 
 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION. 3RD INFANTRY DIVISION. 
 
 Infantry Regiments : 
 61. 49- 54- 34- 
 
 21. 
 
 2. 
 
 Rifle Battalion No. 2. 
 Hussar Regiment No. 5. Dragoon Regiment No 3. 
 
 2nd Div. of Art. Regt. 17. 
 (24 guns.) 
 
 2nd Engineer Company. 
 Divisional Pontoon Troop. 
 
 Ambulance Detach. No. 2. 
 
 1st Div. of Art. Regt. 17. 
 (24 guns.) 
 
 1st Engineer Company. 
 Divisional Pontoon Troop. 
 
 Ambulance Detach. No. I. 
 
 64TH PROBLEM. 1881. 
 
 Vide Plan 26 and Sketch Map 3. 
 
 The Army operating beyond the Oder, towards the east, has 
 received intelligence that a hostile Corps is advancing in its rear from 
 
 Stettin, on Berlin. 
 
 The 2nd Army 
 
 Corps, with the 3rd 
 Cavalry Brigade, has 
 been sent back by 
 Freienwalde for the 
 protection of the capi- 
 tal. 
 
 Arrived at Wer- 
 neuchen, it hears that 
 the enemy had passed 
 Bernau already in 
 the forenoon. His 
 strength was esti- 
 mated at about 20,000 
 men. 
 
 The patrols push- 
 ing beyond Lohme 
 were received with 
 Infantry fire from the 
 patches of wood near 
 Helenenau. 
 
 A strong reconnoi- 
 tring party advancing 
 
 beyond Seefeld got into the cross-fire of Batteries stationed behind 
 the Doring See, also behind the Pietzstall close to the high-road, and 
 on the knolls south-east of the latter. On the open heights only 
 isolated Infantry posts were seen, and west of Krummensee weak 
 Cavalry Detachments gave way before ours. 
 
 It therefore appears that the hostile Corps is concentrated in a 
 " position of readiness " at Blumberg. 
 
 The enemy being so close the Corps goes for the night into 
 bivouac near Werneuchen. 
 
 Where is the enemy to be attacked to-morrow ? 
 The answer to the question is not to be given in the shape of an 
 order, but in that of a "memoir" on the situation and on the measures 
 to be adopted. 
 
 CORPS ARTILLERY : 
 Field Artillery Regiment No. 2. 
 
 H. A. Division. 2nd Division. ist Division. 
 (54 guns.) 
 
 |)Ci Ambulance Detachment No. 3. 
 Ammunition Columns and Trains. 
 
 3RD CAVALRY BRIGADE : 
 Uhlan Regiment No. 9. Cuirassier Regiment No. I. 
 
54 6 5 TH PROBLEM. 1882. 66TH PROBLEM. 1882 
 
 65TH PROBLEM. 1882. 
 
 Vide Plan 27 and Sketch Map 8. 
 
 The 2nd Army Corps is marching from Neidenburg by Hohen- 
 stein to unite with the ist Army Corps advancing on Wormditt 
 
 The former hears at Hohen- 
 FLANK DETACHMENT: 
 
 8th infantry Brigade: \ stein that a hostile Eastern Corps 
 
 Infantry Regiment No. 21 1 Battalions is pushing towards Allenstein, and 
 Rifle Battalion No. 2] determines to make for the direc- 
 
 Dragoon Regiment No. n, 4 Squadrons. .. r ~ , 
 
 Field Artlly. Regt. No. 17, 2 Batteries. tion of Osterode. In Order to 
 
 1 Comp. Egr. Batt. No. 2, I Comp. secure j tg flank ft sends off & right 
 
 7 Battls. , 4 Squads. . 2 Batts. , I Comp. T?I i TV i. i_ i. t. r^ 
 
 Flank Detachment, which after a 
 
 long march on country roads reaches the neighbourhood of Lang- 
 guth on the evening of April the ist. 
 
 The Main Body on that day arrived at Osterode, and will, on the 
 following day, under cover of the detachment, continue its march 
 to Mohrungen. Its trains have been sent ahead under escort to 
 Reussen. 
 
 The Flank Detachment is directed not to engage without need 
 in any fight which would oblige the Main Body to interrupt its march 
 in order to support it. 
 
 Only isolated Cavalry troops of the enemy reconnoitred towards 
 the Passarge on the ist of April, and they then retired to Alt-Schone- 
 berg. 
 
 1. What measures does the Commander of the Flank Detach- 
 
 ment adopt for the night ? 
 
 2. How does he intend to solve his problem on the 2nd April ? 
 
 66TH PROBLEM. 1882. 
 
 Vide Plan 27 and Sketch Map 8. 
 
 The enemy did not attack the lake defiles during the 2nd April 
 and the Flank Detachment remained east of Horn. Dragoon patrols 
 reconnoitring beyond Seubersdorf noticed numerous watchfires near 
 Schlitt and Blankenberg, and found the enemy on the morning of the 
 3rd April engaged in constructing bridges across the Passarge above 
 and below Deppen. 
 
 On that day the Flank Detachment moved forward early, by 
 Willnau and Reichau, occupied the Ponarien Wood with Rifles, and 
 
66TH PROBLEM. 1882. 55 
 
 took up a covered " position of readiness " behind the heights east of 
 Herzogswalde. 
 
 The Main Body of the 2nd Corps starts from Mohrungen to 
 Liebstadt, where its head arrives at 10 a.m. It intends to await, in a 
 position between that place and the Passarge, the arrival of the 1st 
 Corps, which will move from Wormditt by Kalkstein to Schwenkitten,, 
 but which cannot arrive there before the evening. Both Corps will 
 then assume the offensive. 
 
 At 10 o'clock the enemy has crossed the Passarge and deployed 
 astride of the road to Waltersdorf for attacking, as it appears, the 
 2nd Corps before the 1st joins. 
 
 The Commander of the Flank Detachment did not receive 
 special instructions from the headquarters of the Corps. 
 
 How will he act in order to meet possible eventualities ? 
 
II. 
 
 SOLUTIONS AND CRITICISMS. 
 
Sketch 
 
 for the Solution of the I* 1 Problem. 
 
 Companies 
 \A 1 Smtadron 
 
 Scale 25OOO. 
 
 isoo Paces. 
 
 Verlag dKgl .Haftuchh.v.E.S.MUler & Sohn.Berlin. (Kodistr. 68/70 ) 
 
 Geogr.fcth Inst.u. Stein dr.v.^filhelm Greve.Berii 
 
SOLUTION OF THE IST PROBLEM. 
 
 Vide accompanying sketch of the position of the Advanced Guard, after a hand sketch by 
 
 General v. Moltke. 
 
 The passage of a river like the lower Saale by means of con- 
 structing a bridge cannot be effected opposite a watchful enemy 
 either by day or night without his discovering and resisting it. 
 
 It must be forced. 
 
 The means to do so are the great strength of the attacking 
 force, which can remain concentrated while the defender must divide 
 and the greater effect of the 12-pr. Battery. It is only a question of 
 making that superiority felt at the proper point. 
 
 As soon as this principle is realized there is only the choice 
 left between Drobel and Trabitz. At both places the passage can be 
 forced in the face of the enemy. 
 
 Against the former there is the difficulty of advancing further 
 beyond the steep slopes of the valley and across the Bode behind 
 which section of the ground the Battalion from Bernburg will join 
 its Main Body from Calbe. 
 
 At Trabitz we encounter at once the main force of the enemy, 
 yet he is not able to prevent a crossing, and still less to prohibit the 
 further debouching of the united Southern Detachment. 
 
 According to my opinion, Trabitz is therefore to be chosen, 12 
 miles from Cothen in the most direct line to Magdeburg. 
 
 That point is reached with ease about midday. 
 
 The passage will be effected in 2 to 3 hours, after which the 
 attack upon the enemy takes place with united forces. 
 
 Since he does not find any tenable section of the ground, is 
 much weaker than we, and is threatened on his line of retreat, he 
 will only be able to try to gain so much time as is necessary to draw 
 in his Battalion from Bernburg. 
 
6O SOLUTION OF THE 2ND PROBLEM. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 2ND PROBLEM. 
 
 The reconnaissance of yesterday showed that the enemy is 
 standing behind the Priim in a strong but somewhat extended posi- 
 tion considering the number of his troops. 
 
 Besides the detachments which he has shown, he will probably 
 have one Battalion in the Tetenbusch, and one in the town of Priim ; 
 his reserve, therefore, only about 4 Battalions, 6 Squadrons, and 2 
 Batteries, is to be looke.d for behind the Calvarien Berg as the only 
 point from which he can support both wings and secure the defile 
 of Niedermehlen, so important for his retreat. 
 
 The ground makes the left wing of the enemy and his front 
 almost unassailable ; the right wing is weaker, where the crest on 
 our side of the valley commands it. Nieder-Priim cannot be main- 
 tained by the enemy. Niedermehlen can be reached from there by a 
 shorter road than from Dausfeld or Hermespand. 
 
 An attack on the enemy's right wing bars his roads by 
 Schonecken and Liinebach, on which he can effect a junction with 
 the Western Army, and threatens his retreat by Sellerich and 
 Malmedy. 
 
 This attack would also endanger our own communications, if 
 such could not be transferred to the Schonecken road, on account of 
 the advance of the Eastern Army towards Trier. 
 
 The dispositions for attack would have to be based on these 
 circumstances. 
 
 Advanced Guard : 2 Battalions, I Troop of Cavalry, and I 
 Howitzer Battery. 
 
 Rendezvous at 5 o'clock west of Biidesheim. Advances by the 
 Priim road, forms for attack on the other side of the Nims, moves to 
 the height east of Priim. The Advanced Guard has to prevent an 
 advance of the enemy, to detain his left wing in the Tetenbusch and 
 the town, and immediately pushes home the attack, if the enemy 
 withdraws from there. 
 
 Main Body : 6 Battalions, 2 Squadrons, 2 12-pr. and I 6-pr. 
 Batteries. 
 
 Rendezvous south-west of Biidesheim. Marches in two columns, 
 each with a weak Infantry Advanced Guard close in front, by 
 Fleringen and Wallersheim respectively, on Rommersheim. The 
 columns form for attack west and south respectively of the latter 
 place. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 3RD PROBLEM. 6 1 
 
 The two 12-pr. Batteries with one Battalion form up on the 
 heights south-west of Held all the rest moving through the 
 Ellwerath gorge against Nieder-Priim, from which place the enemy, 
 if he has occupied it, is to be dislodged. Then the 6-pr. Battery on 
 the low height south of that place. Cavalry in rear. 
 
 Reserve : 4 Battalions, 9j Squadrons, and two Batteries. 
 
 Rendezvous south-west of Biidesheim. Follows for the present 
 the Main Body in two columns and halts under cover behind the 
 height west of Rommersheim until the attack on Nieder-Priim is 
 decided. Then again follows the Main Body, z.e., the Infantry and 
 Field Batteries by Nieder-Priim, while the Cavalry and Horse 
 Artillery Battery try to get over the Priim at an accelerated pace 
 lower down by Ellwerath. 
 
 If the Main Body has succeeded in debouching from Nieder- 
 Priim the 12-pr. Batteries will follow and join the reserve. 
 
 If the Advanced Guard cannot penetrate at Priim it takes up a 
 position at Held, and occupies Nieder-Priim. 
 
 An attack with 10 Battalions, 12 Squadrons, and 5 Batteries on 
 the Calvarien Berg is intended, the Cavalry on the left wing. 
 
 Reports to the General commanding are to be sent to the height 
 east of Nieder-Priim, where the 12-pr. Battery is posted. 
 
 The Trains are ordered from Gerolstein to Balesfeld. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 3RD PROBLEM. 
 
 The hilly country between Driburg and Paderborn presents 
 different sections, which are particularly suitable for defensive occu- 
 pation and do not leave to the enemy full freedom for offensive 
 movements. 
 
 For the present purpose, however, only the two sections, Bucke- 
 Schwanei and the heights north and south of the Brocks Berg should 
 be considered. A position further in advance in the direction of 
 Driburg would have to be dismissed unconditionally on account of the 
 strongly wooded Egge highlands in rear ; one further back, i.e., 
 between Paderborn and Brocks Berg, from the mere fact that these 
 positions are situated in front. 
 
 If we compare now the above-mentioned positions with each 
 other, that north and south of the Brocks Berg is the better one as a 
 defensive position. An envelopment in the north seems out of 
 
62 SOLUTION OF THE 3RD PROBLEM. 
 
 the question considering the mountainous character of the country, 
 and an attack can only take place on the high-road from Driburg. 
 Nevertheless, I do not think it suitable for our use, because the enemy 
 will not force that position. He will sweep round on Herbran and 
 Dorenhagen, and thus succeed in obliging the Corps to retire on Dahl 
 and Harter Grund without firing a single shot 
 
 The enemy, if attacked in flank, can go behind the Jageser 
 Wasser. The range of heights from Bucke to Schwanei with the 
 railway embankment in front may be therefore considered as the 
 main position. On the eastern side the enemy steps from the wood 
 on to the railway embankment, and from there he is obliged to climb 
 the sharply rising heights on open ground. On the north the position 
 is bounded by the very hilly ground of Altenbecken, on the south by 
 the swampy ground beginning at the Gefe Bruch. The enemy is 
 obliged to attack this position, if we mean at all to occupy one 
 between Driburg and Paderborn. It will then be mainly a question 
 of the terrain from Bucke to the point where the railway crosses the 
 road from Schwanei to Neuenherse extending not quite 3^ miles. 
 The enemy's attacking force in that case can either select the high- 
 road from Driburg or the road Dringenberg Neuenherse Schwanei 
 and the intermediate communications, or, what is the most likely, 
 several of these lines at the same time. But he must in any case 
 attack the position Bucke-Schwanei. These places are only 4,000 
 paces apart, they command the exits from the wood across the rail- 
 way embankment, their line of retreat leads by the high-road to 
 Paderborn, and the junction of the high-road with the road from 
 Schwanei is a position for the reserve as if meant for such by nature, 
 being admirably favoured by the ground. Whether the village of 
 Bucke itself is to be occupied for obstinate defence or whether the 
 crucial point of the position is not rather to be shifted to Schwanei 
 with the Lim Berg as Artillery position cannot be determined by the 
 map, since it will chiefly depend on the position of the railway in rela- 
 tion to the ground. 
 
 The Advanced Guard must occupy with pickets and sentries 
 the line, Stell Berg Iburg Trappisten Kloster and the Nethen 
 Berg, and select as lines of retreat the high road to Bucke, the road 
 from Koch to Schwanei and from Neuenherse to Schwanei. 
 
 The Main Body of the Advanced Guard will be best posted at 
 Koch, south of the Haus Heide, and from there be able to meet an 
 advance of the enemy in all directions. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 4TH PROBLEM. 63 
 
 If the enemy should advance in several columns, the Advanced 
 Guard will have to split accordingly, and be eventually supported by 
 the Main Body. 
 
 The heights at Lackenicht, at the Haus Heide, and the railway 
 embankment at the junction of the road to Schwanei are positions 
 for the reserves of the Advanced Guard. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 4TH PROBLEM. 
 
 To the General ist Division, 
 2nd Division, 
 
 ist Cavalry Division, 
 
 commanding Advanced Guard. 
 
 The pursuit to-morrow is to be continued with the utmost vigour. 
 
 For this purpose the Army Corps will be echeloned between 
 Passendorf and Schlettau in such a way that the enemy will be 
 thrown by superior forces into the defile of Halle, but at the same time 
 a crossing to the right bank of the Saale be effected. 
 
 The three Cavalry Regiments and the Horse Artillery Battery 
 with which the Advanced Guard was reinforced will to-night rejoin 
 the Cavalry Division, to which also the two Horse Artillery Batteries 
 of the Reserve Artillery will be handed over. 
 
 The Pontoon Train and Engineer Detachment will be for to- 
 morrow attached to the 2nd Infantry Brigade. 
 
 All the troops concentrated at Langenbogen will rendezvous 
 to-morrow morning at four o'clock in front of the bivouac, ready to 
 start. 
 
 The Cavalry Regiment of the 2nd Division and the 4th Infantry 
 Brigade direct their course by Bennstedt on Zscherben, the 3rd 
 Infantry Brigade by Eisdorf, and to the south round Zscherben. 
 
 Both Brigades form up beyond that village. The Division 
 moves at daybreak into the alignment Angersdorf Konigliche 
 Braunkohlen Grube (on the map " Kon. Brkgr."). 
 
 The Divisional Cavalry in front of the left wing of the 3rd 
 Brigade. 
 
 The 2nd Infantry Brigade, with the Pontoon Train (at the head, 
 under escort), marches by Mittel Deutschenthal Grosse Riister to 
 Schlettau. The construction of the bridges will begin at once at 
 Rohrlagge, the spot previously reconnoitered. The Brigade is to 
 employ the necessary Infantry and Artillery to carry it out. 
 
64 SOLUTION OF THE 5TH PROBLEM. 
 
 The Reserve Artillery will follow the 2nd Infantry Brigade. 
 
 The Cavalry Division will march by Ober Deutschenthal in the 
 direction of Beuchlitzer Weinberg, and form up in a covered position 
 in the valley of Sauerbreite. 
 
 The Advanced Guard covers the deployment of the 2nd Division 
 concentrates before daybreak against Pfaffendorf, briskly attacks this 
 village from the west side, and is to be supported by the 3rd Brigade 
 from the south. Nietleben will be observed by the Cavalry (two 
 Regiments). As soon as the enemy gives way he is to be vigorously 
 pursued. 
 
 I await full reports on the course of this fight at the Angersdorf 
 Galgen Berg. 
 
 As soon as the bridges are passable the 2nd Infantry Brigade 
 crosses and moves up as far as the height of Wormlitz and occupies 
 the village, the Batteries on the right wing towards Ropzig Zgl. 
 (Ziegelei). 
 
 It is immediately followed by the Cavalry Division, still consist- 
 ing of 20 Squadrons and 24 guns Horse Artillery, after deducting a 
 Regiment sent to Merseburg. The Division at once detaches a force 
 on Ammendorf in order to prevent a crossing of the Elster by hostile 
 Cavalry from Merseburg. Should the enemy already be retreat- 
 ing on Leipzig he is to be attacked without delay. 
 
 The further passage of the 4th, 3rd, and eventually of the Ad- 
 vanced Guard Brigades over the Pontoon bridge I shall order accord- 
 ing to circumstances on the spot. 
 
 The Ammunition Columns and Field Hospitals are directed to 
 Beuchlitz, the Provision Columns remain under their present escort 
 behind the Salza at Langenbogen. 
 
 Bivouac, Langenbogen, date 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE STH PROBLEM. 
 
 Missing. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 6TH PROBLEM. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 6ra PROBLEM. 
 DISPOSITION FOR THE ITII MARCH. 
 
 Headquarters, Frankfurt-on-the-Oder, 
 
 Evening, I2th March. 
 
 The Eastern Corps moved to-night into Drossen, a Division 
 occupying a position at Kunersdorf. That Division will be attacked 
 without delay to-morrow forenoon. 
 
 The ist Division has to detain the enemy in front at Kunersdorf, 
 the 4th Brigade attacks him on the left flank. The 3rd Brigade 
 opens the passage through the wood for the Cavalry, and secures its 
 debouching into the plain of Zohlow. 
 
 For this purpose the ist Division forms up behind the Laudons 
 Grund* and advances at 9.30 against Kunersdorf. 
 
 The Reserve Artillery will get its orders from the ist Division, 
 to the movements of which it will conform. 
 
 The 4th Infantry Brigade starts at 8 o'clock from the Chaussee- 
 haus near the Juden Kirchhof by the Crossen road ; 1,000 paces from 
 Chausseehaus it inclines to the left, turns the chain of lakes and 
 swamps extending down to Kunersdorf, and at once advances to 
 attack the enemy's left wing through the Frankfurter Forst. 
 
 The 3rd Brigade divides into two columns. 
 
 The 3rd Infantry Regiment and the Battery immediately follow 
 the 4th Brigade on the high-road through the Schwetiger Revier, and 
 then march without stopping from behind that Brigade by the straight 
 ride leading to the farm of Scheibler.f 
 
 The 3rd Landwehr Regiment and the Divisional Cavalry march 
 at 8 o'clock by Grund Schaferei along the rides of the Schwetiger 
 Revier, then follow the boundary path between Frankfurter and 
 Neuendorfer Forst J on Sorge. 
 
 The 3rd Brigade occupies the Schweden-Damm, Sorge, and the 
 little wood on the Birken See. 
 
 The Cavalry Division, strengthened by two Horse Artillery 
 Batteries of the Reserve, follows immediately behind the 3rd Infantry 
 Brigade, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade behind the 3rd Infantry Regiment, 
 the ist Cavalry Brigade behind the 3rd Landwehr Regiment. The 
 Division tries to reach as soon as possible the open plain of Zohlow. 
 
 * Junction of the high-road to Kunersdorf and the road to Trettin. f On the Scheibler See. 
 J Ktiniglich Reppensche Forst. 
 
66 SOLUTION OF THE 7TH PROBLEM. 
 
 The General commanding will be with the 4th Infantry Brigade and 
 then go to Sorge, whence the further movements will be regulated. 
 
 ADDITIONAL TO THE IST DIVISION : 
 
 The detachments of the ist Division left behind in the entrench- 
 ments will be drawn in as soon as it crosses the section of the ground 
 of Kunersdorf. 
 
 VERBALLY TO THE COMMISSARIAT: 
 
 All vehicles remain till further orders on the left bank of the 
 Oder ; only a light Field Hospital follows about noon by the Drossen 
 road as far as the Huhner Fliess. 
 
 To THE COMMANDER OF ARTILLERY: 
 I Ammunition Column in the same direction. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE ;TH PROBLEM. 
 
 The ground between Drossen and Kunersdorf, after this point is 
 lost, nowhere affords to the Eastern Corps a favourable battlefield. 
 The enemy is superior in numbers. A near and broad base allows 
 him the greatest freedom of movement. 
 
 All these disadvantages can only be compensated for if the Corps 
 again approaches Posen. 
 
 It will therefore not seek battle to-day, but as soon as possible 
 begin an orderly retreat. 
 
 But previously to this the ist Division must necessarily be 
 picked up, and if this cannot be done a battle must be risked for that 
 purpose. 
 
 The enemy has marched with his Infantry 9 miles, with his 
 Cavalry and Artillery 13 J miles; he had two to three Brigades in 
 action ; about noon he has not yet debouched from the wood. It is 
 therefore not probable that he can bring on anything decisive to- 
 day. But it is possible, and one must be fully prepared for action. 
 
 The Eastern Corps, under these circumstances, has the no small 
 advantage of having together two intact Divisions, while the enemy 
 must necessarily advance through the wood in separate columns. If 
 the Eastern Corps splits its forces as well, it loses the only advantage 
 it has. 
 
 The Corps, therefore," must stand ready for action and concen- 
 trated. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 7TH PROBLEM. 67 
 
 If the enemy advances by many roads he will debouch on a 
 front so much more extended ; if he uses only few roads his columns 
 will have so much greater depth. In the first case he needs time for 
 uniting, in the latter for deploying his columns. 
 
 But it is just a question of gaining time. 
 
 If the ist Division has broken off the action at the right time, it 
 is able to retreat by the Drossen road, and the junction is effected 
 without difficulty. If, on the other hand, it is forced away on Bis- 
 chofsee, it needs one to two hours in order to effect its junction with 
 the Main Body, and this time must be procured for it. 
 
 Upon this the following measures are based : 
 
 The Advanced Guard * continues to advance on the Kunersdorf 
 road, but gets the order to halt at the Schweden-Damm and to 
 occupy the bridge there and at Scheibler. 
 
 The Detachment of the ist Division stands at Sorge. 
 
 Both, the Advanced Guard and this Detachment, are hastily 
 reinforced each by | a Battery of Horse Artillery under escort of 2 
 Squadrons each. 
 
 The object is not so much to prevent his debouching as to render 
 it difficult, to delay it, and to find out where the enemy is coming 
 with his main force. 
 
 If the enemy's turning movement should make a wider sweep to 
 the right, it is just what we could desire. 
 
 All the rest of the Corps, 9 Battalions, 20 Squadrons, and 6 
 Batteries, will stand in rendezvous position at Kobert. 
 
 The ist Division, wherever it may have crossed the Fliess, will 
 get the order to retire on Zohlow. Part of the Cavalry Division is 
 available if it should require direct support. 
 
 Retreat will commence as soon as the ist Division approaches 
 Zohlow. 
 
 All three Divisions! unite at Zohlow. 
 
 The Rear Guard will be composed of the 4th Infantry Brigade, 
 the whole Cavalry Division, and three Batteries Horse Artillery. It 
 follows the Main Body at first at Artillery range. All are marching 
 in complete battle order. 
 
 Columns of route can be formed only after the enemy's pressure 
 ceases. 
 
 * Asstimed as 3 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, and 2 Batteries. 
 f Viz. , the two Infantry Divisions and the Cavalry Division. 
 
 F 2 
 
68 SOLUTION OF THE 8TH, IITH, AND I2TH PROBLEMS. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE STH PROBLEM. 
 At Glatz, at Silberberg, in order to be able to oppose in time a 
 debouching at Braunau as well as at Nachod and Reinerz. It would 
 be better further in advance, but then there is no possibility of doing 
 justice in both directions. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE QTH PROBLEM. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE IOTH PROBLEM. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE IITH PROBLEM. 
 
 The Division is ordered to cover Berlin. The enemy's columns 
 are still separated, and singly weaker than the Division. Since both 
 columns advance separately, the Division cannot bar the road to 
 Berlin by occupying the Tasdorf defile, and is, on the other hand, too 
 weak for extending as far as Erkner. 
 
 It has therefore nothing else left but to hinder the junction of the 
 hostile columns, and, in order to gain that object, to beat them singly. 
 But this again is only possible by an offensive stroke. It would 
 therefore seem the most correct to advance beyond the Tasdorf defile 
 and to oppose the hostile forces, which are advancing from Miinche- 
 berg and necessarily obliged to move on to Tasdorf. The Division 
 will therefore, on the 2nd June, be stationed near Herzfelde, and 
 attack the enemy after his debouching from the defile of Heidekrug. 
 
 The Tasdorf defile remains occupied in order that we may 
 eventually withdraw again behind it. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE I2TH PROBLEM. 
 
 The Division will be withdrawn for the night behind the defile 
 at Tasdorf, and will bivouac in the district between Tasdorf and 
 Vogelsdorf somewhere north of Griinelinde. 
 
 The Advanced Guard takes post at Herzfelde, but keeps in touch 
 with the enemy. The defile at Erkner will be occupied by one 
 
SOLUTION OF THE I3TH PROBLEM. 69 
 
 Battalion and two troops of Cavalry ; this Detachment also observes 
 the defile at Woltersdorf. 
 
 The movements on the 3rd June will depend on the enemy's 
 operations. The Division will oppose his debouching from the 
 Tasdorf defile. The Advanced Guard keeps in touch with the 
 enemy, and, if pressed by him, retires on Tasdorf. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 13 PROBLEM. 
 
 It is apparent from the enemy's enterprises on the 3rd June that 
 he feels too weak for attacking the Tasdorf defile in front. But it 
 cannot yet be discerned from his movements in what manner he 
 intends to operate further. From the intelligence about the arrival of 
 a Battalion at Wrietzen it may be concluded that reinforcements are 
 expected from there, and that next it is intended to unite with these ; 
 it is also possible that the Eastern Corps itself has detached a Bat- 
 talion there in order to gain a fresh line of retreat. 
 
 Now, if the enemy will not advance on Tasdorf, his next line of 
 operation is by Straussberg />r Wilkendorf Gielsdorf to Alt Lands- 
 berg, if he does not take the still longer detour Protzel Werneuchen. 
 
 But as the defile at Straussberg, as well as that of Tasdorf, is a 
 very important obstacle, it remains very questionable what the enemy 
 will do. 
 
 Since the Division (in all now 1 5 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, and 
 4 Batteries) is ordered to cover Berlin, and from its position at Tas- 
 dorf can advance everywhere, while, on the other hand, a useless 
 marching to and fro as long as the hostile movements do not allow us 
 to recognize a distinct intention, would only prematurely absorb the 
 strength of the troops, it appears the most practical to leave the 
 Division in its position at Griinelinde. To this end the Battalion 
 should be drawn in from Erkner, but a Regiment of Infantry, 3 
 Squadrons, and 2 guns should be detached to Straussberg. The 
 Advanced Guard, with a strength of 2 Battalions, 2 Squadrons, and 2 
 guns, occupies a position at Zinndorf. The Cavalry must keep in 
 touch with the enemy. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 14 PROBLEM. 
 
 Missing. 
 
7O SOLUTION OF THE i;TH PROBLEM. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE ISTH PROBLEM. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE i6TH PROBLEM. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE I;TH PROBLEM. 
 
 Measures of the Southern Division for the 2nd June : 
 
 1. The Advanced Guard (3 Battalions, i Squadron, and i 
 Battery) will be reinforced by a Battery from the Main 
 Body, and has to maintain Weissenfels against any 
 attack. 
 
 2. The Main Body of the Division remains on the 2nd June 
 at Dippelsdorf. 
 
 3. It is to be ascertained by reconnaissance whether the 
 Main Body of the enemy is following its advanced 
 Division, which is in bivouac with its Main Body behind 
 and between Markwerben and Burgwerben, or moving 
 towards another point of the Saale. Two Detachments 
 are sent out for this purpose : 
 
 (a) The 3rd Infantry Regiment, 
 2 Companies Rifles, 
 
 i Detachment Engineers, 
 
 6 Squadrons (3 Squadrons Uhlans and 3 Squadrons 
 Hussars), 
 
 4 guns Horse Artillery, 
 
 move across the Saale by Plotha and the railway 
 bridge above Eulau at 5 a.m. on the 2nd June. 
 From there a Battalion is to be detached to the 
 Saale bridge north of Naumburg, reconnoitring 
 to Freiburg. The rest of the Infantry, the Rifles, 
 and two guns occupy Goseck and the wood 
 south of Dobichau. The Cavalry with two 
 Horse Artillery guns advance by Marckrohlitz. 
 Individual officers with well-mounted orderlies 
 are to be sent forward as far as possible. 
 
 (b) I Company Rifles \ __ 
 
 c On wagons, 
 i Detachment Engineers ) 
 
SOLUTION OF THE l8TH PROBLEM. J\ 
 
 1 Squadron Hussars, 
 
 2 guns Horse Artillery, 
 
 will march to Diirrenberg at 3 a.m. on the 2nd 
 June. The Rifles occupy Fahrendorf. The 
 Squadron on Rossbach and as far as Merseburg. 
 The two guns are only eventually taken over 
 the bridge ; the Engineers prepare the bridge for 
 demolition. 
 
 Both Detachments remain in their positions until further orders. 
 
 The rapid transmission of reports is to be ensured by Cavalry 
 relays, the positions of which are to be reported here. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE i8TH PROBLEM. 
 
 Dippelsdorf, 6 p.m. 
 
 1. As learned from the reconnaissance, the enemy's Main Army 
 had, up to this hour, not yet advanced as far as the Saale. I expect, 
 therefore, to be able to advance to-morrow, the 3rd June, in the early 
 morning, unmolested by it on the left bank of the Saale by Eulau, so 
 as to force the Northern Division to give up its position at Markwer- 
 ben by threatening its right flank or by an attack on its right wing. 
 
 2. I perceive therein the most suitable means for enabling the 
 Southern Army to debouch from Weissenfels, and have therefore 
 already ordered the reconnoitring troops on the other side of the river 
 to remain west of Goseck, under cover of the strongly occupied 
 patches of wood, and their Main Body with the Cavalry to bivouac 
 near Eulau ; both bridges will be specially guarded. 
 
 The Advanced Guard will remain at Weissenfels, and I request 
 that a Rifled Battery be sent there to-day, which to-morrow morning 
 from Beutitz, supported by the 12-pr. Battery near Trompete, will 
 force the enemy's Batteries east of Markwerben to limber up, or will 
 silence them. Only when this is done are two Battalions of the 
 Advanced Guard to cross the bridges ; one will remain in occupation 
 of the town. All the rest of the Division will march to-morrow at 
 4 a.m. to the Eulau bridge, form up on the other side west of the 
 village of Eulau, and then advance, 10 Battalions, 7 Squadrons, and 
 3^ Batteries strong, in the direction of Marckrohlitz. The Cavalry on 
 the left wing will reconnoitre the ground on the left flank, to the 
 greatest distance possible. All further measures will be adopted on 
 the spot in proportion to the enemy's resistance. 
 
 OF THE 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
72 SOLUTION OF THE igTH PROBLEM. 
 
 The advance against Marckrohlitz cannot take place before 9 
 o'clock, but will be carried out by 10 o'clock at the latest, conformably 
 to which the advance of the Army from the Rippach to the Saale is 
 to be timed. 
 
 The effect of my attack on the behaviour of the enemy at Marck- 
 rohlitz will be perfectly visible from the heights of Weissenfels, and 
 the Army will begin to debouch in accordance therewith. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE IQTH PROBLEM, 
 
 The measures of the Northern Division will have to be such as 
 cause delay, since it is not a question of preventing the passage of the 
 hostile Army, but rather of permitting it, and of temporizing the 
 action only long enough for our own Army to take up the in- 
 tended position, in such a manner, however, that our movements are 
 screened. 
 
 In order to attain that object the Division will hold the line, 
 Marckrohlitz Obschiitz. 
 
 Against bodies debouching from Weissenfels, there remain in 
 
 position : 
 
 2 Battalions, 
 
 2 Squadrons, 
 i Battery Horse Artillery. 
 
 The Infantry occupies Markwerben. The Horse Artillery Battery, 
 under escort of both Squadrons, keeps the bridge under fire ; against 
 superior Artillery it will draw in towards Markwerben. 
 
 If Markwerben is forced, the Detachment retires slowly on Stor- 
 kau Obschiitz. 
 
 For opposing the passage over the Eulau bridge, 
 3 Battalions, 
 2 Squadrons, 
 I Battery 
 
 are detached to Marckrohlitz. Marckrohlitz will be occupied by one 
 Battalion ; the rest remains behind that village as a reserve. Marck- 
 rohlitz is to be obstinately defended. One Battalion remains ad- 
 vanced towards Uechteritz, and will retire on the Main Body if 
 Markwerben is given up. 
 
 The Main Body : 9 Battalions, 
 4 Squadrons, 
 2 Batteries 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 2OTH AND 25TH PROBLEMS. 73 
 
 takes up a position hidden in the Brosig Grund ; in case of the enemy 
 advancing from Guseck on Uechteritz, it will strike against his 
 flank. 
 
 At sunrise to-morrow, about 4 o'clock, the Division will have 
 taken up the positions referred to. 
 
 Reports will find the Commander on the Donners Berg, north of 
 the Brosig Grund. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 2OTH PROBLEM. 
 
 From the course of the action it may be concluded that the 
 Southern Army will not cross the Saale in the face of the enemy and 
 accept a battle with the Saale defiles in its rear. It has secured the 
 defiles in order to be able to assume the offensive at any moment, as 
 soon as the Northern Army withdraws. 
 
 By its position on the Rippach, it seems inclined to defend the 
 Saale line from Naumburg, downwards, as far as the Diirrenberg rail- 
 way bridge, and, in consequence of its possession of the defiles, is in 
 a position to watch the movements of the Northern Army. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 2isx PROBLEM. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 22ND PROBLEM. 
 Missing. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 23RD PROBLEM. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 241*1 PROBLEM. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 25 PROBLEM. 
 The Commander of the Detachment determines not to hold 
 Hermeskeil, but rather to retire slowly and to make for the road to 
 Malborn, in order to be able to observe the road by Birkenfeld. He 
 intends to retire only so far as the hostile Detachment follows, so as 
 not to lose touch of it. 
 
74 SOLUTION OF THE 26TH AND 27TH PROBLEMS. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 26TH PROBLEM. 
 
 The Main Body will bivouac in the valley of the Thalfanger 
 Bach, at the northern exit of Thronecken. The outposts (2 Com- 
 panies and ^ Squadron) have to cover the section Geisfeld Malborn 
 road from Thronecken, on the Malborn brook, on both flanks. 
 Cavalry patrols are to be pushed out on the following morning by 
 the roads Thalfang Birkenfeld and Trier Hermeskeil. 
 
 If the enemy attacks on the 3rd April, the Detachment will with- 
 draw on Thalfang Morbach, should that road be still free ; other- 
 wise the Detachment will give way on Berg, subsequently taking the 
 direction of Miilheim. If the enemy does not follow, the Detachment 
 will remain until the patrols, sent by the road Trier Hermeskeil, 
 bring definite information ; the Advanced Guard (2 Companies and 
 ^ Squadron) moves again towards the Thiergarten settlement, in 
 order not to lose touch. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 2/TH PROBLEM. 
 
 From the movements of the enemy, it can be gathered that he 
 has not chosen the direction of Trier, but of Berncastel Trarbach. 
 Whether he is marching in two columns by the roads Nohfelden 
 Birkenfeld and Wadern Hermeskeil, or whether a strong Detach- 
 ment is marching only by the latter as a Flank Guard, cannot be 
 determined with certainty. From what the prisoners and country 
 folks say it is not quite clear whether it is the Main Body of the 
 Corps which is announced to arrive at Birkenfeld, or whether it is 
 not rather its Advanced Guard only. As the Corps became available 
 at Saarlouis on the 1st April, and can thus arrive at Birkenfeld on 
 the 3rd, the distance being only two marches, it is, in any case, to be 
 assumed that the enemy has arrived with his available forces about as 
 far as Birkenfeld. 
 
 On the further advance of the enemy the Detachment will there- 
 fore retire on Berncastel, first gaining the road Morbach Berncastel, 
 and then continuing observations. It will at once detach a force 
 to Berncastel in order to keep open its retreat by this point. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 28TH AND 2QTH PROBLEMS. 75 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 28TH PROBLEM. 
 
 The 1 6th Division can still very well arrive at Berncastel for the 
 defence of the Lower Mosel. At midday on the 3rd April it receives 
 the intelligence referred to, and has therefore the 4th and 5th April 
 still available, since the enemy cannot reach the Mosel with his lead- 
 ing troops before the 5th April, and thus cannot force it until the 6th. 
 
 To cross the Mosel would not appear suitable, as retreat is 
 endangered by the superiority of the enemy and as the Division 
 can much more successfully oppose his passage ; neither does a direct 
 defence of the Mosel seem to answer the purpose, since the point of 
 crossing remains doubtful and the attempt at defence would only 
 result in a frittering away of the forces. 
 
 If the Division keeps concentrated at Flatten, occupying the 
 bridges at Berncastel and Mulheim, it is in a position to make a timely 
 advance in every direction and to fall upon the flank of anything 
 debouching from Berncastel or Mulheim. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 2QTH PROBLEM. 
 
 From the reports of the advanced Detachments we may conclude 
 that, on the day of arrival of the Division on the ist June, the 3,000 
 men from Potsdam have arrived at Brandenburg. 
 
 This body seems to be pushed forward as an Advanced Guard in 
 order to secure Brandenburg with its bridge at Plaue. 
 
 The Eastern Division, following behind, will therefore base itself 
 on Brandenburg. On the ist June, in the evening, it is still at 
 Berlin ; it will not march therefore until the 2nd June to Potsdam, 
 and from there advance on the 3rd. It will probably not use the high- 
 road to Brandenburg, as the ground adjoining the high-road is not 
 passable, and as the straight line from Potsdam to Magdeburg leads 
 by Lehnin Ziesar. It will therefore on the 3rd June push by Lehnin 
 on Golzow and on the following day move towards the high-road 
 which leads from Ziesar to Mockern. At Ziesar it will unite with the 
 Advanced Guard sent ahead to keep open its line of retreat by 
 Griiningen on Brandenburg. A small detachment at Plaue suffices 
 for the defence of the bridge there ; the Division is therefore secure on 
 that flank. 
 
 If the Eastern Division has reached Ziesar and united with the 
 Advanced Guard it is 15,000 to 16,000 strong, superior to our Division, 
 
76 SOLUTION OF THE 3OTH PROBLEM. 
 
 well based, and has got over the most difficult part of the ground. 
 From that moment the Western Division will hardly still be able to 
 prevent a further advance of the Eastern Division. 
 
 Thus, the mode of action for the Western Division is apparent. 
 It must prevent a junction of the Advanced Guard with the Eastern 
 Division. As it need not yet anticipate a collision with the Eastern Divi- 
 sion, on the following day (2nd June), it must attack the Advanced 
 Guard at Brandenburg, take possession of Brandenburg, and thus 
 delay a junction of the Advanced Guard with its Division. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 3 OTH PROBLEM. 
 
 The Western Division which is to cover the investment of Mag- 
 deburg will oppose the advance of the Eastern Division everywhere, 
 wherever it may happen to be. The operations of the Eastern Divi- 
 sion must therefore be directed towards reaching Magdeburg by the 
 shortest road, and accepting battle wherever offered. An advance by 
 the high-road from Potsdam to Magdeburg is out of the ques- 
 tion, as the ground does not permit movements astride the high- 
 road or of the railway embankment, and the enemy, in possession of 
 Brandenburg, can successfully oppose any attack. The Division must 
 therefore choose the only remaining and shortest line, Lehnin 
 Golzow Ziesar. There are in this direction two large sections of 
 the ground at Lehnin and Golzow ; the latter especially is of par- 
 ticular importance, as the soft meadows and the swampy ground allow 
 an advance on only a few roads. There are no points of crossing at 
 all except at Reckahn Golzow Cammer, if the Division will not turn 
 still further south as far as Briick, whereby, however, it would entirely 
 give up the connection with its Advanced Guard. 
 
 It remains now questionable whether the enemy will not, after 
 all, resist at the first section, namely, that of Lehnin. 
 
 This, it is true, may be assumed from his bivouac fires at Rot- 
 scherlinde, as he would otherwise probably have already retired behind 
 the second obstacle. The Eastern Division can wish for nothing 
 better than to succeed in bringing about an action there. 
 
 If it succeeds in pushing the enemy away on Brandenburg he 
 loses his line of retreat, and can no longer hinder the Division in its 
 further advance. 
 
 It is difficult to force Lehnin itself, and in the north there is only 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 3OTH PROBLEM. 77 
 
 Nahmitz, where an advance could be made ; but this would draw the 
 enemy off from Brandenburg. No other course is therefore left but to 
 turn the position from the south. 
 
 DISPOSITION. 
 
 The Division will continue its march to-morrow on Magdeburg 
 and take the direction Baumgartenbriick Petzow Bliesendorf 
 Lehnin Michelsdorf. It is probable that the Division will be engaged 
 in an action, and the troops have therefore to march prepared for that 
 before reaching Petzow. 
 
 The Division will start in two columns. 
 
 The right column, consisting of 6 Battalions, 2 Squadrons, and 
 2 Batteries, follows the direction above ordered as far as Bliesendorf,, 
 preceded by a special Advanced Guard. If Lehnin is occupied it 
 takes the direction of Schwiena Radel, where it will fight a tem- 
 porising action, until the left column begins to act. 
 
 The left column, 4 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, and ij Batteries, will 
 march from Petzow on Claistow, turn the Luch near Canin in a 
 southerly direction, and march to Busendorf. Thence it moves on 
 Tornow farm, leaving Radel to the north. 
 
 As soon as the left column has arrived, the right column moves 
 on Michelsdorf, while the former marches on Oberjiinne, envelops 
 the enemy's right wing, and tries to act upon the rear of the position. 
 The cavalry will find opportunity for action in the clearings of the 
 wood. Towards Golzow must be observed. 
 
 The left column starts at 6 a.m., the right column follows at 7. The 
 Commander will accompany the Advanced Guard of the right 
 column. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 3 1ST PROBLEM. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 3 IST PROBLEM. 
 
 The position of the defile of Lehnin has its weakness on the 
 right flank and in rear ; especially any retreat is dangerous, because 
 it must go through the difficult defile of Reckahn Golzow. 
 
 If, however, battle is to be ac- 
 cepted there, it will not be confined 
 to the defence of the defiles of 
 Lehnin, but the main issue will 
 rather have to be shifted to the 
 debouchment of the enemy from 
 the wood between Radel and Ober- 
 jiinne. The enemy cannot frontally 
 force the section Nahmitz Lehnin 
 Schwiena Radel ; few troops 
 will suffice to prevent any advance. 
 The enemy is therefore obliged 
 to make a turning movement, and 
 this he can execute only between 
 Radel and Oberjiinne. 
 
 It appears, therefore, the most 
 practical course to concentrate the 
 main forces west of Michelsdorf in 
 order to be able to deal blows in 
 all directions. At the same time, 
 however, Golzow must be strongly 
 occupied in order to secure the line 
 of retreat and to threaten any advance by Oberjiinne. 
 
 The passage of the Havel will be prevented, or at least made 
 seriously difficult to the hostile Advanced Guard, which is in Bran- 
 denburg, by a few troops, as it can execute it only in face of the 
 enemy. 
 
 To this end the following should therefore be ordered : 
 The Division will oppose to-morrow, the 3rd June, the advance 
 of the enemy from Potsdam, and accept battle in the neighbourhood 
 of Lehnin. 
 
 The Advanced Guard starts at 5 a.m., and moves into the position 
 Nahmitz Lehnin Schwiena Radel; the Cavalry goes towards 
 Bliesendorf, and as far as the neighbourhood of Petzow. 
 
 The Main Body and the Reserve Detachment cook in Golzow 
 
 ADVANCED GUARD : 
 ist Regiment. 
 
 Hussar Regiment. 
 
 ist Battery. 
 i|i i|i i|i i|i ,ji i|i 
 
 MAIN BODY : 
 3rd Regiment. 
 
 2 Battalions 4th Regiment, 
 if Squadron Dragoons. 
 
 2nd Battery. 
 i|i i|. i|i i|. if. i|i 
 
 RESERVE DETACHMENT IN GOLZOW: 
 2 Battalions 2nd Regiment. 
 
 i Troop Dragoons. 
 
 3rd Battery, 
 .[i .|. i|. 
 
 DETACHMENT BEFORE BRANDENBURG : 
 i Battn. 2nd Regt. I Battn. 4th Regt. 
 
 2 Squadrons Dragoons. 
 
 3rd Battery. 
 .i ,, ,, 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 32ND PROBLEM. jg 
 
 and have to arrange so that at 10 a.m. the former is concentrated in 
 a position west of Michelsdorf (the Battery on the Windmill height 
 east of the place, the two Squadrons behind it), the latter in Golzow. 
 
 The outposts, as before, remain in their position at Brandenburg, 
 and have to observe as far as Plaue. If, after all, the enemy effects a 
 crossing, they will retire eventually on Gottin and Reckahn. 
 
 I shall be on the height west of the Gohlitz See. 
 
 All carriages are to be directed by Golzow on Ziesar. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 3 2ND PROBLEM. 
 DISPOSITION OF THE SOUTHERN CORPS FOR THE 2ND JUNE. 
 
 Zossen, ist June, 1866, 6 p.m. 
 
 The Corps will continue its advance to-morrow on Berlin, and 
 attack the enemy wherever he makes a stand. 
 
 His Rear Guard is to be drawn into a vigorous action in order to 
 oblige the enemy to come to the rescue with larger forces. For this 
 purpose the Advanced Guard will to-morrow be strengthened by the 
 2nd Cavalry Regiment and the Howitzer Battery, which are to be 
 sent from the Reserve so as to reach Gross Machnow at 5.45. 
 
 The Advanced Guard, 3 Battalions, 6 Squadrons, and 2 Batteries, 
 starts at 6 a.m. from Gross Machnow, and Mittenwalde respectively, 
 and marches on Klein Kienitz. 
 
 The Main Body marches in two columns, viz. : 
 
 Left column, the Reserve : 6 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, and 2 
 Batteries from Zossen, by Gross Machnow, on Dahlewitz. Time of 
 starting from Zossen, 4 a.m. 
 
 Right column, the Main Body : 6 Battalions, 2 Squadrons, and 2 
 Batteries, by Mittenwalde and Gross Kienitz. Time of starting from 
 Mittenwalde, 5 a.m. 
 
 Both columns will therefore march abreast beyond Machnow and 
 Mittenwalde. 
 
 Should the enemy defend the bog section at Kienitz, the left 
 column continues marching to Dahlewitz without stopping, and attacks 
 from there. If the enemy tries to maintain himself behind the section 
 of Glasow, I shall issue the orders for the attack from the Gross 
 Kienitz hill. 
 
 If the enemy still further persists in retreating without interrup- 
 tion, the Advanced Guard will continue its pursuit as far as its 
 
8O SOLUTION OF THE 33RD PROBLEM. 
 
 strength will permit. It will be supported therein by the Reserve 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Both columns, so far as they are not immediately covered by 
 the Advanced Guard, have to reconnoitre in front and on the flanks 
 with their Cavalry, particularly beyond the Glasow section, the left 
 column on its left flank. 
 
 The Trains, leaving the high-road clear, remain east of Zossen 
 until orders arrive to advance. 
 
 The Commander will march with the right column. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 33RD PROBLEM. 
 DISPOSITION OF THE NORTHERN DIVISION FOR THE 2ND JUNE. 
 
 Glasow, ist June, 6 p.m. 
 
 The Division, early to-morrow, takes up a covered rendezvous 
 position behind the patches of wood between Mahlow and Blanken- 
 felde, front towards the high-road Glasow Lichtenrade. The particu- 
 lars of occupation will be indicated on the spot by the Major of the 
 General Staff. 
 
 From the Reserve at Dahlewitz, 
 The Uhlan Regiment, 
 
 The Fusilier Battalion of the 6oth Infantry Regiment, 
 The Engineer Company, 
 take the Blankenfelde road. 
 
 The bridge over the stream will be removed, the Battalion leaves 
 a Company in the little wood close to the west of it, and remains with 
 2 guns in Blankenfelde. 
 
 The Artillery of the Reserve and the Cuirassier Regiment move 
 by Glasow to the rendezvous. Time of starting from Dahlewitz, 
 4 a.m. 
 
 The Main Body follows by Glasow. Time of starting from 
 Gross Kienitz, 4.30 a.m. 
 
 Both bridges at Glasow remain for the present occupied by small 
 Infantry Detachments. 
 
 The Rear Guard starts from Klein Kienitz at 5 a.m., and leaves 
 only a Cavalry post there to observe the approach of the enemy. It 
 marches by Gross Kienitz on Glasow, and prepares for defence be- 
 yond that village. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 34TH PROBLEM. gj 
 
 It is also specially communicated to the Commander of the Rear 
 Guard that an eventual retreat will be effected, according to circum- 
 stances, on Spandau or on Potsdam, that the Rear Guard has to draw 
 the enemy at Glasow into an action which should, as much as possible, 
 develop into a general action, that it has itself to retire in the direction 
 of Lichtenrade, and that it should draw the enemy in the same direc- 
 tion. As soon as this succeeds, the Division will assume the offensive 
 against any body that has crossed the stream. 
 
 In case of success, the Rear Guard will try to rejoin the Division 
 on the battlefield ; otherwise it will do so northwards round Mahlow. 
 
 The Commander of the 35th Regiment receives the order 'to 
 occupy Gross Beeren to-morrow morning with one Battalion, with the 
 other, Heinersdorf, as an eventual support for the Division. 
 
 The Engineer Company after destroying the bridge of the 
 Blankenfeld road will be ordered to march to Gross Beeren, and there 
 to throw bridges across the stream. 
 
 The Trains are directed to Giesendorf. 
 
 The General Staff Officer has to arrange the rendezvous position 
 so that it is entirely withdrawn from the enemy's view. Two Batteries 
 are to be placed under cover in the salient patches of wood. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 34 PROBLEM. 
 
 The Northern Division will have occupied a "position o 
 readiness " behind Lichterfelde, as this is the most feasible, in order 
 to be able to deploy either on the left wing towards Steglitz or on the 
 right near the little Giesendorf wood. 
 
 In presence of the United Southern Corps it is confined to the 
 defensive, but neither with a part nor with the whole of its strength 
 will that Corps be able to enter Berlin without the Northern Division 
 at once acting offensively and severing all our communications. This 
 Division therefore must necessarily first be attacked and driven across 
 the Havel. To force it against this river, cutting off at the same 
 time its retreat on Potsdam and on Spandau, is certainly desirable, 
 but hardly practicable ; the enemy is therefore to be pushed towards 
 Potsdam, if feasible, since from Spandau he could immediately on the 
 following day again act effectively on our flank. 
 
 The point is, to make him suffer a real defeat. The strength of 
 the Corps permits us to attack on a front which the enemy is unable 
 to keep occupied. 
 
 G 
 
82 SOLUTION OF THE 3$TH PROBLEM. 
 
 The Detachment before Berlin during the advance of the Corps 
 remains in observation at Tempelhof. 
 
 The Advanced Guard starts at 5 a.m. for Giesendorf and prepares 
 to cross the bridge, but awaits the attack of the Main Body before 
 actually doing so. 
 
 The Main Body starts at 5 a.m. from the bivouac, and marches 
 by Marienfelde and Lankwitz, the Reserve at the same hour by 
 Lichtenrade and Mariendorf. Deployment of both columns at the 
 Steglitzer Fichten Berg, facing west. 
 
 The attack on Steglitz will be made about 10 o'clock, and is to be 
 supported by the simultaneous advance of the Advanced Guard on 
 Lichterfelde. The Cavalry Regiment is to be drawn in from Berlin, 
 and, with the Reserve Cavalry (altogether 12 Squadrons), passes 
 between Steglitz and Dahlem to bar the enemy's retreat on Schloss 
 Grunewald and to pursue him across the open. 
 
 Verbal remark of General von Moltke ; that the task of the 
 Southern Corps can hardly at all any longer be executed, after the 
 Northern Division has reached its flanking position ; that under all 
 circumstances 1 8,000 men were not sufficient to enter Berlin, and that, 
 to make this probable, a much larger body had to be supposed ; but 
 that the solution essentially depended only on the attitude of both 
 bodies of troops. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 35TH PROBLEM. 
 
 If the enemy intends to maintain himself in the position, very 
 strong in itself, on the left bank of the Mpsel behind Trier, he can 
 base himself only on the road ta Priim. Then he gives up the 
 junction with his reinforcements, which is for him a vital object. 
 
 Wittlich is the natural point for this junction. The enemy will 
 therefore place himself on the Coblenz road, and try to maintain him- 
 self in front of, or at least near, Wittlich. 
 
 The Corps can turn this position on the left flank, if it marches by 
 Thalfang on Berncastel, but to do so requires at least three days, and 
 runs the risk of being obliged to force, on the fourth day, the difficult 
 passage across the Mosel against the enemy, who has already been 
 reinforced. Besides, it would have to leave a Detachment against 
 Trier in order to secure the communications with its own country and 
 the investment of Saarlouis. 
 
 It is therefore more correct to make use of the existing superiority 
 as soon as possible. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 35TH PROBLEM. 83 
 
 Our advance by Conz drives the enemy back on his reinforce- 
 ments, and allows him to make full use of all the advantages of the 
 ground in the narrow valley of the Mosel. 
 
 The enemy cannot keep Trier itself, but the further advance from 
 there is extremely difficult for us and without danger for him, if he 
 occupies Quint and Schweich in good time. 
 
 A direct advance against Schweich on our part obliges the enemy 
 to evacuate the defiles of Trier, Ehrang, and Quint at once with his 
 main forces, and to retire nearly as far as Hetzerath. 
 
 The Mosel at Schweich cannot be reached in one march, nor 
 can it be if one wished to go by Trier, where the road would be under 
 fire from the other bank. 
 
 The nearest road just passable for service wagons leads from 
 Saarburg by Zerf, along the high ridge to Filsch and down to Casel. 
 Reconnaissance of the enemy must then show whether one can get 
 into the plain towards Schweich at Ruwer, Kenn, or Kirsch, in order 
 to bridge across the river under cover of strong Batteries on the 
 heights of this side. 
 
 I would therefore propose (by merely observing with patrols to- 
 wards Conz and Igel) to march with the Corps to-morrow by Zerf 
 on Pellingen. 
 
 The Advanced Guard, at the most 3 Battalions, I Squadron, and 
 2 guns, throws the outposts, which the enemy may have pushed for- 
 ward, back on Feyen ; its Main Guard remains at Nieder Mennig. 
 
 The rest of the Corps, 16 Battalions, n Squadrons, 46 guns, and 
 the Pontoon train, turns to the right before reaching Pellingen and 
 bivouacs east of Filsch, as much as possible covered in the Ruwer 
 valley. 
 
 The day after to-morrow the Advanced Guard demonstrates 
 against Trier, occupies the enemy there, and tries to hold him fast. 
 Should he have already evacuated the neighbourhood, it rejoins the 
 Corps by Ehrang, or supports its attack. 
 
 The passage at Schweich is to be prepared by gun-emplacements 
 on the height west of Kirsch as well as in the plain, and to be 
 supported by ferrying Infantry across at Longuich. When advancing, 
 the Reserve Artillery will therefore follow immediately behind the 
 newly-formed Advanced Guard of the Main Body. 
 
 All further arrangements must be left to the Commander on the 
 spot, after taking note of the enemy's measures. 
 
 G 2 
 
84 SOLUTION OF THE 36TH PROBLEM. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 36 PROBLEM. 
 
 Movements parallel with the Mosel can only be effected either in 
 its valley or on the main ridge of the neighbouring range of heights, their 
 slopes being impracticable for large bodies of troops. Should such a 
 body descend to the river at any point and the valley be blocked, it 
 cannot reach any other point on it, except by a very roundabout way. 
 
 The Mosel itself forms a barrier of the valley at its bend from 
 Quint to Schweich. 
 
 A position for the Division, there, is supplied with that obstacle 
 in front, which is always desirable for the weaker side ; the right wing 
 leans against the strong defile of Quint, the right flank the very one 
 whence reinforcements are expected cannot be endangered. Per- 
 pendicular to the front, two high-roads lead to the rear. Only the 
 left wing is assailable ; but since the enemy can only ferry across or 
 pass over by a bridge, it is in our power to break off the action at any 
 moment so as to resume the retreat without danger. In any case the 
 enemy is to be delayed here for a day. 
 
 I would not evacuate Trier so summarily on the 2nd May. 
 
 A Detachment of one Battalion, a 4-pr. Battery (a troop of 
 Cavalry for observation against Conz) will render the enemy's 
 debouching from Pallien a matter of considerable difficulty. 
 
 On the 3rd, of course the Detachment would have to be with- 
 drawn, if the enemy does not attack by Trier in a westerly direction. 
 But it need not be withdrawn at once beyond the Quint ; rather will 
 the i Battery find an opportunity for taking up flanking positions 
 in the plain of Pfalzel and Ehrang, which will incommode the enemy 
 very much indeed in his attack on our front. 
 
 The rest of the Division goes back on Schweich on the 2nd May. 
 
 We cannot enter upon a real duel with the enemy's Artillery, 
 which is double our strength. In general, our Batteries will have to 
 be placed about 1,800 paces in rear of the Mosel, so as to escape the 
 greatest effect of the enemy's fire, but to keep the river still under an 
 effective fire, as well as the construction of the bridge in all probability 
 intended to be effected there. A Battery, however, will have to be 
 built where the road from Trier leaves the Quint defile, whence the 
 river can be enfiladed. 
 
 Quint is to be occupied by 2 Companies, Schweich by 4 ; 6 
 Companies go to the Mehringer Berg, to observe as far as Mehring, 
 and prevent the crossing of small hostile bodies. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 37TH PROBLEM. 85 
 
 The Reserves, 6 Battalions and the Cavalry on the covered 
 ground north of Issel, assume the offensive when the passage is being 
 effected, and the hostile Artillery is at least partly masked thereby. 
 
 But I hardly believe that the enemy can force a passage here. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 3 ;TH PROBLEM. 
 
 If it were wished to continue the march on Berlin and to confine 
 oneself to leave behind a body of about equal strength for observation 
 of the enemy, the Division would be too weak for entering a large 
 city. 
 
 If we succeeded in throwing the enemy across the Spree and 
 destroying the bridge, the latter could be barred with little effort, 
 and also a renewed advance of the enemy prevented at Schmockwitz 
 and Copenick. 
 
 It would, however, be indisputably the most advantageous to 
 force a battle upon the enemy and to annihilate him with our 
 superior strength. 
 
 If the Division advances on the 2nd June by Schenkendorf 
 Krummensee, the enemy can, in order to evade the fight, bring his 
 troops from Kb'nigs-Wusterhausen and Senzig by Neue Miihle in 
 safety behind the Spree ; but he can also concentrate the whole in a 
 very strong position between Konigs and Deutsch Wusterhausen, 
 which is difficult to force from the south. If this succeeds, he is after 
 all only pushed back on Berlin. 
 
 If we advance by Ragow north round the bog, the enemy will 
 find south of Konigs-Wusterhausen a far less strong position, which 
 can probably be forced by superior numbers. But he will defend it 
 only with his Rear Guard, and give way with his Main Body to the 
 south. A further pursuit draws the Division completely away from 
 its real object, without giving it the certainty of bringing the enemy 
 to bay anywhere, owing to the superiority of his Cavalry. 
 
 If we then wish to return from Wusterhausen and march on Berlin, 
 the enemy will at once follow, interrupt all communications, and place 
 us in the most awkward position between an unbeaten enemy and the 
 hostile capital. 
 
 According to my opinion there remains only an advance with 
 the Division south of the bog on the 2nd June. If the enemy with- 
 draws behind the Spree, Neue Miihle will be occupied, the bridge 
 
86 SOLUTION OF THE 38TH PROBLEM. 
 
 there destroyed, and the march continued on Berlin by Konigs-Wus- 
 terhausen. 
 
 If the enemy gives way by Senzig, the whole Division will follow, 
 and there is then every prospect of beating him at Bindow, Gussow, or 
 Prieros. 
 
 If, however, as is probable, he takes up the position at Wuster- 
 hausen, the bridge at Neue Muhle is to be destroyed and his 
 debouching towards the south to be rendered as difficult as possible 
 by abattis, gun-emplacements, etc. 
 
 This ground remains occupied by the Advanced Guard, 3 Battalions, 
 i Battery, and J a Squadron. The Main Body has not followed further 
 than is necessary, probably not beyond the line Schenkendorf 
 Krummensee. It starts early on the 3rd, marches through and 
 alongside Mittenwalde on Ragow, in the direction of Hoherlehme a 
 march of seven miles and attacks the enemy as soon as possible, if 
 he tries to break through to the south, or gives way to the north. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 38TH PROBLEM. 
 
 The march of the enemy over the mountains cannot be executed 
 in one day, particularly if he encounters some resistance. 
 
 It must further be made in separate columns, if one will not run 
 the risk of seeing all brought to a stand by resistance at one point. 
 
 In order to debouch simultaneously with these columns, the Main 
 Body of the enemy will, on the 2nd May, move up to the line Suhl 
 Zella Mehlis Benshausen Schmalkalden, which are the only places 
 where billets are to be found. 
 
 From there to the open plain the distance is, on the average, 12 
 to 14 miles by the nearest roads, which lead into the line Frankenhain 
 Waltershausen. 
 
 If the enemy turns further east, he can debouch only on the 4th 
 May ; if he takes a more westerly direction, he endangers his com- 
 munications without threatening ours with Erfurt. 
 
 The Division will concentrate around Ohrdruf, where it has the 
 best lateral communications, in order to throw itself with all available 
 forces upon one of the debouching columns. But at the same time 
 the advance of the others must still be hindered as much as possible 
 in the mountains. 
 
 The barriers, there, are] situated close to, but beyond, the Renn- 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 3QTH PROBLEM. 87 
 
 steig. The Advanced Guards of the enemy will thus try to get hold 
 of them as early as the 2nd May. The Division will therefore 
 concentrate early in the morning of the 2nd May. It forms 3 
 Advanced Guards, each consisting of I Battalion of the 3ist Regi- 
 ment, two 4-pr. guns of Battery No. I, some troopers as orderlies, 
 and a Detachment of Engineers. 
 
 The Advanced Guards move along the roads by Tambach, Ober- 
 hof, and Schmucke, as far as the Rennsteig, on which they seek 
 connection, observe to the left and right, but occupy difficult passes 
 forward, and attempt to defend them obstinately. Resistance will 
 also be continued in the valleys of the northern slopes of the moun- 
 tains, in order to ensure that one or the other column will debouch 
 later than the rest. 
 
 The General of Division will then base his determination for the 
 offensive on the reports coming in from the Advanced Guards. 
 
 He will, at the same time, have to consider that a rush of hostile 
 columns against his left wing would threaten his communications with 
 Erfurt more than one would against his right wing, or a turning move- 
 ment round the latter, perhaps by Friedrichsroda or Brotterode, to 
 which place he will detach a party only for observation. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 39 PROBLEM. 
 
 A hostile Brigade is beaten, and its reappearance is not to be 
 expected in the immediate future. 
 
 But if the enemy is 24,000 strong he can now have assembled 
 18,000 on this side of the mountains. If we attack these behind the 
 Apfelstedt with 13,000 we shall, in case of mishap, be thrown back in 
 an easterly direction, and Erfurt, which is not yet defensible, runs the 
 risk of being taken by assault. 
 
 I would decide for the defensive and take post west of Arnstadt. 
 
 The enemy has on the 2nd May marched and fought till evening ; 
 he can undertake nothing more on that day ; yet neither can we 
 execute a march, but only start early in the morning. 
 
 The enemy is as close to Arnstadt as we are, but it is not at all 
 to be assumed that he will summarily march on Erfurt, knowing 
 us to be in his rear at Elgersburg. He will without doubt march 
 first in that direction, if it were only to disengage his 4th Brigade and 
 to draw it in again if possible. 
 
88 SOLUTION OF THE 4OTH PROBLEM. 
 
 Only the 2 Battalions at Ohrdruf, therefore, which are too 
 much exposed, will be recalled on the 3rd, that is to say, to Wolfis. 
 
 At 4 o'clock a.m., on the 4th, the I2th Hussar Regiment 
 advances by Angelroda, Liebenstein, towards Wolfis, to pick up the 
 2 Battalions, and to observe the further march of the enemy. 
 These 2 Battalions, 5 Squadrons, and 4 4-prs. withdraw, if pressed, 
 by the Tambusch on Bittstedt. 
 
 The Regiment No. 71 and 2 4-pr. guns, as a flank guard, fol- 
 low the Hussars as far as Liebenstein, and strike out thence in the 
 direction of Vw. Eikfeld, yet so slowly, that they still cover the rear 
 of the Main Body, which moves on the high-road by Plaue, through 
 and round Arnstadt, into a covered bivouac behind the Pfennigs 
 Berg. 
 
 The 2 6-pr. Batteries move at once up to the height mentioned 
 and prepare gun-emplacements. All the rest holds itself in readiness 
 to deploy to the left or right of this Artillery position, according to 
 how the enemy advances. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 40 PROBLEM. 
 
 i. 
 
 Only 2 Battalions of the Advanced Guard with some Cavalry 
 detachments remain in the town during the night. The 3rd Rifle 
 Battalion occupies the railway station with i Company, and the north- 
 ern exit of the town with i Company, to which are attached 2 guns ; 
 2 Companies bivouac in the market-place. The outposts are pushed 
 out only 500 to 600 paces, the nearest ground is to be reconnoitred 
 by continual patrolling, but the enemy is not to be alarmed. The ist 
 Battalion of the 5th Regiment will be sheltered in alarm-houses. 
 The rest of the Advanced Guard bivouacs close behind the town 
 south of the Spree. The 2nd Battalion will furnish i officer and 50 
 men as a guard for the bridge. 
 
 2. 
 DISPOSITION FOR THE IST APRIL. 
 
 Headquarters, Ketschendorf, 
 
 3 ist March, 1870, 9 p.m. 
 
 The 3rd Brigade will to-morrow form the Advanced Guard. It 
 starts at 6 a.m., and takes possession of the vineyards near Vw. 
 Fiirstenwalde. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 4 1ST PROBLEM. 89 
 
 At the same hour will stand : 
 
 The ist Brigade on the Langenwahl road, 
 
 2nd Rauen 
 
 the Cavalry Brigade between both, all 1,000 paces this side of the 
 Spree bridge in rendezvous formation ready to start. The Reserve 
 Artillery moves into a position on the left bank of the Spree east of 
 the suburb. Should the enemy offer resistance to the Advanced 
 Guard, the ist Brigade will first defile, further orders being held over. 
 If, on the contrary, the enemy continues his retreat, about which the 
 Advanced Guard has to report without delay, the Cavalry Brigade 
 with the Batteries will advance first to reinforce it. Colonel N. takes 
 command of the Advanced Guard Cavalry, has to overtake the enemy 
 and force him to fight, if possible, "on the open ground this side of 
 Miincheberg. The 2nd Brigade then defiles behind the Cavalry, and 
 marches, without waiting for the ist Brigade, by Barenfelde and 
 Schonfelde ; the ist Brigade with the Corps Reserve Artillery follows 
 the Advanced Guard on the road by Golsdorf. The General com- 
 manding is with the ist Infantry Brigade. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 4 iST PROBLEM. 
 
 If the Division deploys where it is in bivouac, it will find in its 
 front an exceedingly strong position between Dahmsdorf and Maus 
 Bridge. It is not to be apprehended that the enemy will turn this 
 position on the left ; he would thereby expose his own communica- 
 tions and commit himself to very difficult ground. On the other 
 hand, it is probable that he will advance on our right flank through 
 the Sieversdorfer Forst, thus threatening the retreat to the high-road 
 and forcing us away towards the north, where the line of communica- 
 tion of the 3rd Division would then no longer be protected. The 
 direction taken to-day by a hostile column to Schonfelde seems to 
 indicate this intention. 
 
 We shall therefore be obliged to occupy with the Main Body of 
 the Division at once that position, in which we will offer resistance, 
 and this can only be the height on which the road from Berg 
 Schaferei stretches to Vw. Abendroth. It can only be attacked in 
 front, and under the fire of the Reserve Artillery to be placed there. 
 Intermediate positions in advance of this position are not to be 
 recommended. The ground nowhere admits of the full deployment 
 
OX) SOLUTION OF THE 4IST PROBLEM. 
 
 of the Division, and it would run the risk of being hustled on to the 
 main position. 
 
 On the other hand, the Rear Guard finds on this very ground 
 everywhere opportunity of hampering the march of the enemy and 
 securing ours ; only it must not withdraw on the main position, but, 
 unmasking it, has to turn north of Buckow to Bollersdorf. The 
 enemy can hardly risk a serious attack on the Main Body before 
 pushing back the Detachment standing at that moment on his right 
 flank. Its withdrawal, when finally forced by superior numbers, will 
 be favoured exceedingly by the ground, the enemy will be turned off 
 in a direction advantageous to us, and his advance retarded by con- 
 tinually renewed small Rear Guard actions. At Bollersdorf the Rear 
 Guard covers the line of communications, and the junction of the 
 former with its Main Body under cover of the Cavalry Division, 
 which is to be stationed at Hasenholz, can hardly be endangered. 
 The enemy has to march, continually fighting, 9 miles to Bollersdorf, 
 and it is very doubtful whether he will gain any ground to-morrow. 
 Should he still succeed in penetrating at Bollersdorf or Berg 
 Shaferei, the junction with the Division will take place behind the 
 obstacle of Garzin. It remains to be considered that the direction 
 of the enemy's attack through the Sieversdorfer Forst is certainly 
 probable, but that he can also advance from Mtincheberg by the high- 
 road and the road parallel to it. 
 
 I accordingly propose the following : 
 
 The Rear Guard : Infantry Regiment No. 41, Rifle Battalion 
 No. I, 1st 4-pr. Battery, and 2 Squadrons Dragoons, stand at 4 a.m. 
 under cover behind Schlagenthin. The Rifle Battalion occupies Dahms- 
 dorf with I Company, the lake defile with I Section, to which 2 guns 
 will be attached, and the Maus Bridge with i Section. It is in the power 
 of the Commander of the Rear Guard to reinforce rapidly these points 
 since the hostile advance can be perfectly overlooked. The Fusilier 
 Battalion and I Squadron are detached to Neubodengriin and the 
 Strill Berg (east of Hoppegarten). They reconnoitre towards Schon- 
 felde and Eggersdorf. 
 
 The Cavalry Division halts at 5 o'clock north of Dahmsdorf, and 
 reconnoitres towards Miincheberg. The Main Body starts also at 
 5 a.m., retreating by the high-road, first the Trains, which continue to 
 march as far as Garzin, then the Artillery, which moves into posi- 
 tion on the heights already mentioned, then the ist Brigade follows. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 42ND PROBLEM. 91 
 
 To carry out this withdrawal undisturbed, by one road, i^ hours are 
 needed, which the resistance of the Rear Guard must procure. Its 
 conduct will be determined by the reports from Dahmsdorf and 
 Neubodengriin respectively. If the enemy advances between Rothe 
 Luch and Gumnitz, the Cavalry Division, which is to be apprised 
 immediately, marches by the Buckow road, then south round the 
 Schermiitzel See to Hasenholz. The Infantry of the Rear Guard 
 moves by the road leading from Schlagenthin to Hoppegarten, in 
 order to pick up the Fusilier Battalion No. 41, but the Squadron and 
 the Battery by the high-road direct, as far as over the bridge at 
 Wiisten Sieversdorf, where the whole Rear Guard then will again 
 assemble in order to continue the retreat on Buckow, fighting in the 
 manner already indicated. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 42ND PROBLEM. 
 The 6th Brigade is summoned early (4 o'clock) to Vw. Anitz by 
 Garzau, the Division holding the position of Garzin until its arrival. 
 The two 6-pr. Batteries move up to the heights south-east of Hohen- 
 stein, which flank this position. The 1st Infantry Brigade occupies 
 the crest on this side of the valley, and the village of Garzin, the 2nd 
 Brigade with the 4-pr. Battery stands in reserve covered in the valley 
 west of Garzin Mill. The Dragoon Regiment halts behind Hohen- 
 stein, both Uhlan Regiments and the Cuirassier Regiment place them- 
 selves under cover behind the wood east of Vw. Anitz. From there 
 the offensive will be assumed as soon as the enemy is engaged and 
 the 6th Brigade has arrived. Should the enemy turn our position 
 north by Ruhlsdorf, the 2nd Brigade goes to meet him between 
 Hohenstein and the 6-pr. Batteries ; the ist Brigade joins by Garzin 
 the advance of the 6th Brigade and of the Cavalry Division on 
 Liebenhof. It is also possible that the enemy on the 3rd April 
 altogether gives up further pursuit, in order to join the Main 
 Army before Berlin, whereby we shall then be in possession of the 
 shorter route to Berlin. If no attack ensues till 8 o'clock, the Cavalry 
 with the Horse Artillery, and one Battalion, advance against the Berg 
 Schaferei. The latter drives in the enemy's posts and reconnoitres 
 the march of the enemy. The Cavalry eventually follows his move- 
 ments north of the Rothe Luch, and stations itself for observation 
 towards Heidekrug. The 6th Brigade takes the direction from Anitz 
 by Zinndorf on Herzfelde, where it remains as a Rear Guard. The 
 
92 SOLUTION OF THE 43RD PROBLEM. 
 
 Division marches by Hennickendorf, the Trains by Forsthaus Schlag 
 to Tasdorf, into bivouac. By holding this defile, Berlin can then be 
 reached in one march, and sooner than by the enemy. An offensive 
 over the difficult ground of Buckow I do not consider advisable, as 
 even in case of success it only drives the hostile Corps back on the 
 Main Body of its Army, but separates us from Berlin, where, 
 probably, all forces are wanted for a decisive battle. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 43RD PROBLEM, 
 i. 
 
 The Division has two things to keep in view: firstly, the bring- 
 ing up of the reinforcements into Belfort, but then also the securing 
 of the concentration at Miilhausen during the 4th March, on which 
 day the 28th Division cannot yet undertake this. 
 
 Both objects are attained if one prevents the enemy from de- 
 bouching from the mountains. This he can only do on two roads: by 
 Thann or by Giromagny. The valley of Massevaux*, according to 
 the map, cannot be used by large bodies. 
 
 The road by Giromagny leads the enemy straight to Belfort. 
 He is obliged to make a detour which, towards the left, is rendered 
 difficult by the wood d'Arsot, and towards the right costs him two 
 marches, in order to turn the fortress on the south. 
 
 Advancing by Thann, however, the enemy can, as regards time, 
 have reached the neighbourhood of Felleringen St. Amarin, by the 
 3rd March, and on the 4th can threaten the communication between 
 Miilhausen and Belfort. 
 
 To hinder this the Division needs all its forces. It will therefore 
 advance on the 4th with its full strength against Thann, but despatch 
 the convoy and the Landwehr on the road by Altkirch to Danne- 
 marie,f which, owing to the Rhone Canal and the distance, is the 
 most secure. 
 
 In a defensive position between Auberge de la Croisiere and 
 Aspach le Haut it will render the deployment of even superior 
 hostile forces exceedingly difficult, secure the detraining at Merx- 
 heim and Miilhausen, and cover the march of the convoy. 
 
 By the energy with which the enemy tries to debouch it will be 
 
 * Masmiinster. f Dammerkirch. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 43RD PROBLEM. 93 
 
 recognised whether one has to deal here with his main force. In such 
 a case the Division will certainly have also to maintain its position on 
 the 5th March until it is strengthened or relieved by the 28th Divi- 
 sion. But then the march of the convoy to Belfort will be free from 
 danger on that day. 
 
 If, however, on the 4th March the enemy's attack is beaten off 
 with ease, or does not take place at all, it may be expected that he 
 has taken the direction of Giromagny with his Main Body. 
 
 In that case the 28th Division must undertake the observation of 
 the mountain-road by occupying Cernay,* but the 2Qth Division, 
 while securing its right flank by an Infantry Flank Guard, must 
 advance by La Chapelle and St. Germain, in order to cover the 
 march of the convoy according to circumstances. 
 
 If the enemy were not yet near, the Division could, by occupying 
 the wood d'Arsot, take up an Advanced Guard position for the advance 
 of the Army ; if the enemy has already debouched in superior num- 
 bers there remains for the Division the retreat behind the Rhone 
 Canal. 
 
 2. 
 DISPOSITION FOR THE 4. MARCH. 
 
 Miilhausen, 3rd March, 6 p.m. 
 
 The Division starts to-morrow, the 4th March, at 6 a.m., in two 
 columns, in the direction of Thann. 
 
 ist column : 57th Brigade, 3rd and 4th light 
 Batteries, and 2nd Engineer 
 Company, 
 
 on the road by Pfastadt and Lutterbach. It reconnoitres the Non- 
 nenbruch by skirmishers, who, as soon as possible, occupy the north- 
 western edge of the wood. 
 
 2nd column : 58th Brigade, 3rd and 4th heavy 
 Batteries, and 3rd Engineer 
 Company, 
 
 by Nieder Morschwiller and Renningen to Aspach. Its Advanced 
 Guard will be formed by the Fusilier Battalion of Regiment No. 17; 
 the Artillery march behind the 2nd Battalion of this Regiment. 
 
 The Dragoon Regiment places itself at the head of the ist 
 column but leaves the high-road at Lutterbach, advances at a trot, 
 
 Sennheim. 
 
 UNIVRSITY 
 
 OF 
 
94 SOLUTION OF THE 44TH PROBLEM. 
 
 leaving the Nonnenbruch to the right, reconnoitres against Vieux 
 Thann,* and reports to both columns. 
 
 Only two Ambulance Detachments from the Train will follow. 
 
 The convoy which is intended for Belfort marches on the 4th 
 under escort of the Landwehr and of the Cavalry orderlies attached 
 to it, by Altkirch to Dannemarie, and, if no special obstacles are met, 
 continues the march from there to Belfort on the 5th. 
 
 The Divisional Commander reserves to himself to order verbally ; 
 
 If the Dragoon Regiment does not encounter the enemy to- 
 morrow when reconnoitring, the Fusilier Battalion of Regiment 
 No. 17 enters Thann and patrols by Wilier. The Division goes into 
 close cantonments on the line Cernay Michelbach, and secures itself 
 by outposts towards the mountains. 
 
 If, however, the Cavalry meets the enemy already in the act of 
 debouching the Division will attack him unhesitatingly and throw 
 him back into the defile. 
 
 To this end the 57th Brigade deploys to the left at Ochsenfeld, 
 the 58th Brigade to the right in advance of Aspach le Haut. The 
 latter occupies at once with both heavy Batteries and the Fusilier 
 Battalion of the I7th Regiment the height north-west of this village. 
 
 3- 
 
 The Commandant of Belfort is to be informed of the march of 
 the convoy. He is requested to detach a party towards the latter, 
 and to occupy if possible the wood d'Arsot. 
 
 Report to the headquarters of the I4th Army Corps on the 
 intended advance of the Division, and request to have Cernay occu- 
 pied by the 28th Division as early as possible on the 5th March. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 44 PROBLEM. 
 
 The investment of Belfort towards the east cannot be carried out 
 as long as there is a hostile Division close to the place in the open field. 
 
 If success is at all to be gained it can only be by the Corps 
 assuming the offensive before larger hostile masses concentrate, there- 
 fore without delay and with all available forces. The investment of 
 the west front of the fortress will therefore be confined at first to a 
 mere observation, in order to prevent any requisitioning in the neigh- 
 bouring country. 
 
 * Alt Thann. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 44TH PROBLEM. 95 
 
 To turn Belfort in the south would cost two days, and in the 
 north the only available road is that by Magny and Anjoutey, as 
 the valley of Offemont is thoroughly commanded by the fort la 
 Miotte. 
 
 The following is proposed : 
 
 The nth Infantry Regiment, with Battery No. 5, advances by 
 the road towards Belfort, occupies the height north of Valdoye, clears 
 the wood d'Arsot from the enemy, and observes the fortress 
 
 The rest of the 3rd Division : the 5th Infantry Brigade, with 2 
 Batteries, strengthened by the 2nd Hussar Regiment, forms the Ad- 
 vanced Guard, and marches by Magny, Etueffont, and Anjoutey, 
 occupies St. Germain, reconnoitres with the Cavalry the ground lying 
 ahead, and occupies the bridge over the Madelaine brook. 
 
 The 2nd Division, and then the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, follow at 
 short distances as soon as the road is clear. The former moves from 
 Anjoutey south towards Menoncourt, the latter halts until further 
 orders at Anjoutey. 
 
 The ist Division detaches the 4th Infantry Regiment with the 
 ist Battery from Ronchamp by Frahier to Chalonvillars. It is joined 
 by the ist Hussar Regiment from Giromagny, by Chaux and Errevet. 
 The detachment is charged with observing the west front of the for- 
 tress without exposing itself to its fire, and puts itself, by Mont 
 Salbert, into communication with the post before Valdoye. 
 
 The rest of the Division advances from Champagney by Auxelles, 
 Giromagny towards Gros Magny. The Division will find there the 
 order whether it is to continue the march or to cook. 
 
 All the columns will start simultaneously (6 a.m.) 
 
 Although the 2nd and 3rd Divisions have only to march 9 miles, 
 as far as beyond Anjoutey, they cannot be counted upon being 
 assembled there sooner than midday, as there is only one mountain 
 road available. 
 
 If the enemy is met he will be attacked without hesitation, and 
 also the ist Division be ordered up. 
 
 If the enemy gives way the pursuit cannot be carried far on that 
 day. 
 
 If the enemy is not discovered, the position St. Germain Menon- 
 court becomes, by securing the only road for retreat, suitable for 
 meeting by a flank attack the advance of the enemy, be that on the 
 northern road by Soppe or the southern by Altkirch. 
 
96 SOLUTION OF THE 45TH PROBLEM. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 45 PROBLEM. 
 
 To the Commanders of the 28th, 29th, 3Oth Infantry, and of the 
 Cavalry Division (identical). 
 
 Miilhausen, 5th March, 6 p.m. 
 
 In case of an attack by the enemy in superior numbers the 29th 
 Division continues its retreat to-morrow, the 6th March, from Trau- 
 bach by Balschwiller to Spechbach le Haut, behind which place it will 
 then take up a position. Since, however, it is desirable to draw the 
 enemy in that direction the Rear Guard will fight where it is standing ; 
 the Division will provide for intermediate positions as far as may be 
 required for the Rear Guard to fall back upon. It will then send in 
 advance both heavy Batteries, which will unlimber on the height east 
 of Spechbach le Haut. The Division keeps the village occupied, de- 
 ploys with the Main Body on the high ridge to the right of the Battery 
 with the right wing touching the road from Bernwiller to Galfingen. 
 The Rear Guard rallies as a Reserve on the reverse slope of the heights. 
 
 The 3Oth Division will advance at 6 a.m. from Miilhausen by 
 Galfingen. It deploys for action on the height between the road 
 already indicated and the Freywald, occupying the latter with 
 skirmishers. 
 
 Both Divisions send forward their whole Artillery ; the Infantry 
 and, behind it, the Divisional Cavalry, place themselves in a position 
 covered by the height. The details of occupation I shall arrange on 
 the spot. 
 
 The 28th Division also starts at 6 a.m. from Cernay, and forms 
 up in rendezvous position under cover behind Burnhaupt le Bas. It 
 puts itself into communication with the 3Oth Division through the 
 Freywald, and observes through the Langelittenhaag towards Soppe. 
 
 The Cavalry Division assembles in the clearing of the wood east 
 of Burnhaupt, the Corps Artillery south of Galfingen. 
 
 It is intended, as soon as the enemy is engaged in front of the 
 29th and 3<Dth Divisions, to attack his flank with the 28th Division. 
 
 Should he advance by Soppe, the offensive will be assumed from 
 the direction of our left wing. 
 
 I shall stop during the fight on the height south of Galfingen. 
 
 If the enemy to-morrow should not attack at all seriously, the 
 Advanced Guard of the 29th Division will maintain its position in 
 advance of Traubach. 
 
 The further orders are to be issued in accordance with the above. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 46TH AND 47TH PROBLEMS. Q,/ 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 46TH AND 47x11 PROBLEMS. 
 Shorthand report of the verbal criticism of General v. Moltke. 
 In the first problem (46) I had set my eye upon a flanking 
 position, the special occupation of which was required in the follow- 
 ing problem. 
 
 Where it is not absolutely necessary to hold on to a distinct line 
 of operation, as in an enemy's country, one can change one's base of 
 operation according to circumstances, therefore, remove the line of 
 retreat either to fortresses or to one's own bodies of troops. Here, 
 there was no necessity for holding on to the road to Berlin ; the 2nd 
 Corps rather presented the most natural objective for a retreat, and 
 support was to be expected from it. 
 
 But if it is desired to occupy a flanking position, one cannot form 
 up on an open plain, perhaps parallel to the road by which the ad- 
 vance of the enemy is expected, for otherwise the enemy would 
 attack the nearest wing and gain for himself the full effect of a flank 
 attack. A flanking position must rather be chosen so that with the 
 wings leaning as much as possible on strong points it can have a 
 surprising effect. 
 
 All this the 5th Division will find in the position Arensdorf 
 Falkenhagen. We may bet a hundred to one that the enemy who 
 has followed us for 3 or 4 days in a distinct direction will continue 
 his advance for the present in the same direction, namely, by the 
 high-road Muncheberg Berlin. Now, in order to confirm him in the 
 assumption that he will still meet the 5th Division on that road, a 
 Rear Guard, strength : I Battalion of Infantry, the whole of the 
 Cavalry and I Battery, should remain as outposts near Petershagen, 
 retire at the approach of the enemy, and only at Georgenthal offer 
 serious resistance until the enemy arrives within the effective fire of 
 the Batteries of the Main Body, so as then rapidly to clear the front 
 of the Division by retreating on Arensdorf. 
 
 The rest of the Division occupies the following position : The 
 3 Batteries north-west of the defile between Schmerlen and Kalk 
 See ; I Regiment of the 9th Brigade north-west of Georgenthal, 
 the other north-west of it in reserve ; the loth Brigade north-west of 
 Hinterste Graning ; the Rifle Battalion at the defiles of Falkenhagen. 
 If the enemy's Advanced Guard follows our Rear Guard beyond 
 Georgenthal, it is taken under effective fire and obliged to give way 
 to the south towards Wilmersdorf. 
 
 H 
 
98 SOLUTION OF THE 48TH PROBLEM. 
 
 The Main Body of the enemy has a threefold choice : i. It gives 
 way to the north to get thereby into the rear of our position. (It is 
 assumed here that it has precise intelligence from its Advanced 
 Guard.) The enemy will not do this, however, for he will thereby be 
 in danger of being attacked sideways by the 2nd Corps, and 
 he entirely loses connection with his Advanced Guard. 2. The 
 Main Body continues to advance by the road ; then the Division 
 attains its object. 3. The Main Body bends towards the south, to 
 attack our front, together with its Advanced Guard ; but then it has at 
 its disposal only the roads by Madlitz and Briesen. The former is, 
 however, not suitable for the use of the Main Body of an Army Corps. 
 It will therefore have to sweep round by Briesen ; that is 13 miles. 
 It is doubtful whether the enemy will still be able to attack after 
 marching 13 miles. If he does so, the Division stands opposite him 
 in a favourable position, completely rested, with its line of retreat on 
 the 2nd Army Corps, from which it can receive support. 
 
 If the enemy does not attack we have gained a day, and operations 
 can be mutually arranged with the 2nd Army Corps. The enemy is 
 thereby in a position of having entirely deviated from his line of 
 retreat. This is for him the more disadvantageous, as his base lies 
 very near. For the Frankfurt Oder bridge forms here his base ex- 
 clusively ; it has shrunk to this one point. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 48 PROBLEM. 
 
 Shorthand report of the verbal criticism of General v. Moltke. 
 
 The situation of the enemy is given in the problem as clearly as 
 it can really be wished for. It is certain that the greater part of the 
 enemy, which had followed our Corps, has disappeared from Sonnen- 
 burg ; it is also to be assumed with certainty that on the 2nd March 
 only weak hostile forces were concentrated on the left bank of the 
 Oder. The enemy has not tried to turn us out for good at Trepplin, 
 consequently, he thinks himself not strong enough to attack. Further, 
 no attempt has been made to cross the Oder between Ciistrin and 
 Lebus. Such a crossing is also not so quickly effected. Our skir- 
 mishers, who are lying behind the Oder embankments, must above all 
 be driven away by the enemy, and he must commence a cannonade 
 before he can think at all about constructing a bridge. 
 
 An offensive on our part is therefore advisable. One must 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 48 PROBLEM. 99 
 
 decidedly make use of the time and opportunity for making our 
 momentary superiority felt. One could without doubt retire un- 
 molested on this day (3rd March), and concentrate all forces perhaps 
 in the neighbourhood of Heinersdorf and Miincheberg, but then one 
 would have to oppose, on the 4th March, the same superiority on the 
 left bank of the Oder which one could not cope with on the right 
 bank. 
 
 The majority of gentlemen have accordingly proceeded offen- 
 sively, and led their forces forward as they were standing at the 
 moment, viz. : the 2nd Corps on Schonfliess and the 5th Division on 
 Boosen. But one must be clear at the same time how the enemy will 
 act. If we succeed in attacking him on two sides and in effecting the 
 junction of two columns on the battlefield, the greatest results are 
 certainly to be expected. So we have done, for example, at Konig- 
 gratz in 1866. But is it permissible to suppose this here? No! 
 The enemy will evade such an attack or assume the offensive himself 
 in order to fall upon one of Our separate bodies with superior num- 
 bers. 
 
 The latter must be assumed as the more likely, because it is for 
 him a question of procuring room for the troops which have crossed 
 the river. 
 
 The position between Malnow and the Aalkasten See has an ex- 
 tent of little over a mile ; it can therefore just be occupied by a 
 Division. The 4th Division, of which the 8th Brigade is already in 
 Dolgelin as an Advanced Guard, must be formed up there ; the 3rd 
 Division will be assembled behind it at Karzig Alter Weinberg. 
 Finally, the 5th Division is to close in. Its Rear Guard holds for 
 this purpose the road defile on the Treppliner See. One Brigade 
 will march straight by Falkenhagen to Hohen Jesar, the other 
 advances to Petershagen, in order to support at first the very isolated 
 Rear Guard and to prevent the enemy from advancing to the west. 
 This Brigade then also goes to Hohen Jesar, and the Advanced 
 Guard follows it there by Sieversdorf and Wald Mill. I would fix 
 the times by ordering the Divisions to have reached the positions 
 mentioned at 9 o'clock ; the Divisions will calculate accordingly their 
 own hours of starting. The troops can start in March at 6 o'clock. 
 
 If the enemy advances on Trepplin and Falkenhagen |he will 
 deliver a blow into the air. If he turns towards Hohen Jesar against 
 the 5th Division, the 2nd Corps will attack him. 
 
 H 2 
 
IOO SOLUTION OF THE 49TH PROBLEM.* 
 
 If he turns straight to the north the 5th Division advances 
 against his flank. The latter will have placed its Artillery on the 
 heights south of Hohen Jesar, and sweep with its fire the ground 
 towards Wulkow and Schonfliess. It also occupies Alt Zeschdorf 
 and the little wood north of it. Thus we can, after a defensive 
 attitude, assume a successful offensive. Everything seems to warrant 
 that we can occupy the position. Wiist Kunersdorf is not much 
 nearer to the Aalkasten See than Dolgelin, and Frankfurt not nearer 
 than Seelow. It is always most essential to make dispositions for 
 only so much as can be executed with certainty. The General 
 commanding will be at the north-east corner of the Aalkasten See, 
 whence to the nearest Divisional Commander it is only about a 
 mile. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 4QTH PROBLEM. 
 Shorthand report of the verbal criticism of General v. Moltke. 
 
 The problem was one of a nature purely editorial. Three 
 questions were concerned here : To whom ? What ? How ? 
 Brevity is herein absolutely necessary, but completeness the main 
 thing. 
 
 i, To WHOM? 
 
 Is an order to be sent also to the 2nd and 4th Army Corps ? A 
 mistake it would not be, for one cannot be too strong at the decisive 
 moment. But neither is it absolutely necessary ; for it was said in 
 the problem : only those Corps should be summoned up which could 
 reach the battlefield in the course of that day. If one wished to do 
 so, one Division of the 4th Corps would for instance be ordered up to 
 Thiaucourt, the 2nd Corps to the bridges at Corny and Arry. The 
 2nd Corps must not go to Pont-a-Mousson, because from the direction 
 of Corny and Arry the covering of the Mosel with its roads, as also 
 the support of the right wing of the 2nd Army, is more easily effected. 
 
 To the Guard and 12th Army Corps orders must be sent at any 
 rate directly from Grand Headquarters, for if they pass through the 
 headquarters of the Army it will be too late, particularly as the 
 quarters of the latter for the night are unknown. To the /th and 8th 
 Army Corps, however, no direct orders are to be issued but through 
 the headquarters of the 1st Army, as these latter are only about 5 
 miles distant. The regular channels are therefore always to be made 
 use of unless deviation therefrom becomes an urgent necessity. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 49TH PROBLEM. IO1 
 
 This is not the case here, as the /th and 8th Army Corps need only 
 to start the next morning. Neither must the 9th Army Corps 
 be immediately disposed of, as the headquarters of the Army pro- 
 bably have already ordered its closing up. These orders are therefore 
 to be issued in writing to the two headquarters of the 7th and 8th, 
 and the 2nd, 4th, and 9th Army Corps respectively, and directly by 
 wire to the Guard and I2th Army Corps. 
 
 2. WHAT? 
 
 In the telegrams the general situation must be briefly stated. 
 This is necessary in order to explain the change in the direction of 
 march. This general information must be identical, if possible, so 
 that everyone is informed of the duties of the neighbouring bodies. 
 The 1 2th Cavalry Division must not be ordered directly because it is 
 placed under the command of the I2th Army Corps, and because this 
 Corps will have more secure and more rapid communication (Relais) 
 with it. 
 
 The general information for the two Army Headquarters need 
 not be identical, nor are times to be indicated for the marches, as one 
 surely cannot calculate beforehand at the Grand Headquarters the 
 marches of 18 to 23 miles of the different Corps. One would only 
 unnecessarily increase one's own responsibility by such detailed 
 arrangements. To select the various routes for marching is also the 
 business of the chiefs of the Staffs of the Armies and Army Corps, 
 who can have them previously reconnoitred by officers. Neither to 
 the Guard and I2th Corps nor to the 7th and 8th are therefore 
 distinct roads to be assigned, but only the general directions, and the 
 objects on which to march, are to be indicated. 
 
 3. How? 
 
 A. To the Headquarters of the 1st Army at Coin sur Seille. (JBy 
 Orderly Officer^ 
 
 Pont-a-Mousson, i6th August, 1870, 7 p.m. 
 
 3rd and loth Corps have maintained themselves to-day west of 
 Metz against great superiority of the enemy. Guard and I2th Corps 
 are set in motion on Mars la Tour. The 7th and 8th Corps are to be 
 moved up across the Mosel at Corny and Arry to the right wing of 
 the battlefield at Vionville, but only after the 9th Corps, and by the 
 shortest road. The Trains remain on this side of the Mosel. Ammu- 
 nition Columns are to be brought up to supply the 3rd Corps also. 
 
IQ2 SOLUTION OF THE 5OTH PROBLEM. 
 
 Reports to His Majesty are to be directed to-morrow morning to 
 the height south of Flavigny. 
 
 B. To the Headquarters of the 2nd Army by Noveant-Gorze. 
 
 (In duplicate, by t^vo Officers?) 
 
 Pont-a-Mousson, i6th August, 1870, 7 p.m. 
 
 By wire from here the Guard and I2th Army Corps have been 
 ordered up to Mars la Tour by Beney and Thiaucourt, the former to 
 the left, the latter to the right ; I2th Cavalry Division to advance as 
 early as possible for observation of the roads from Etain and Briey to 
 Metz. The 7th and 8th Corps cross the Mosel to-morrow after the Qth 
 Corps, and move by the shortest road to the right wing of the battle- 
 field at Vionville. His Majesty arrives to-morrow morning at the 
 height south of Flavigny. 
 
 C. Telegram to the Headquarters of the Guard Corps at Bernecourt. 
 
 Pont-a-Mousson, i6th August, 1870, 7 p.m. 
 
 3rd and loth Corps fought to-day west of Metz against a 
 superior enemy. Guard and I2th Corps will march this night to 
 Mars la Tour by Beney to the left and Thiaucourt to the right. 
 1 2th Cavalry Division to be moved forward against roads from 
 Etain and Briey to Metz. Guard Uhlan Brigade remains against 
 Maas. Bring up Ammunition Columns. 
 
 D Telegram to the Headquarters of the \2th Corps at Fey en Haye 
 (Identical). 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE SOTH PROBLEM. 
 
 A. Written solution by General v. Moltke. 
 
 A defensive position at Gumbinnen behind the Rominte and 
 Lower Pissa would not, according to my opinion, fulfil its purpose. It 
 precludes us from following up at once any success by an offensive 
 movement. The fight for the town would mean its destruction. If 
 unsuccessful we have the defiles of the Angerapp behind us. It is 
 also possible that the enemy anticipates us in Gumbinnen. 
 
 I would propose a flanking position, with the left wing on the 
 Angerapp, with the right on the Augskallner or Plickner Berge. 
 
 Whether the position on the heights in advance of Gerwischken 
 Szublauken,or one still further forward nearPagramutschen Wilken is 
 to be chosen, must be decided on the spot by a General Staff Officer, 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 5OTH PROBLEM. 1 03 
 
 who is to be sent in advance with an escort. In both cases the 
 Cavalry Division under cover behind the hills, in order to rush at the 
 right moment upon the enemy's left flank ; the most important 
 tactical pivots of the open front occupied by Artillery ; Infantry on 
 the hilly ground unseen as long as possible. The Horse Artillery 
 Batteries under Cavalry escort pushed forward against the Rominte 
 and Pissa, to make the enemy's passage difficult and to mark it. 
 
 The enemy cannot pass our position without giving up all his 
 communications. If he would succeed in driving us out of it, all 
 bridges over the Angerapp from Nemmersdorf to Darkehmen can be 
 used successively, in order to rally beyond the river again on the 
 flank of the enemy's advance. 
 
 B. Verbatim shorthand report of General v. Moltke's verbal 
 criticism. 
 
 Gentlemen, I should like, before discussing the problem with 
 you, to make some remarks which have also a general application. 
 
 If we consider the geographical features, we see that the enemy 
 is advancing from east to west, we from south to north. Both lines 
 of march must therefore cross, and this they will do, if both parties 
 continue in the direction indicated, at Gumbinnen, since both parties 
 are equally distant from there. If we bar the enemy at Gumbinnen, 
 we must turn to the right, and therefore shift our line of retreat from 
 the south to the west, while the enemy retains his directly behind 
 himself to the east. Matters are changed, if we do not march as far 
 as Gumbinnen, but halt south of it. Thereby we oblige the enemy 
 on his part to turn to the left, if he wishes to attack us ; he then gets 
 his line of retreat on his left flank while ours remains behind us to the 
 south. But the shifting of his line of retreat is much more dangerous 
 to him than to us, as we are in our own country, while he can be 
 forced against the Haff as occasion may arise. 
 
 One can in general deduce from this that flanking positions will 
 mostly be taken up only in one's own country, while invading Armies 
 can but rarely do so. This sounds somewhat abstract and academic, 
 but it is indeed always a precarious thing in war to fight on a front 
 reversed. We did so, it is true, on the i8th of August, 1870, but we 
 could do it because we had gained victories on the I4th and i6th 
 and because we had a great superiority over the enemy. Whether 
 here the shifting of one's own line of retreat would be injurious cannot 
 
IO4 SOLUTION OF THE 5OTH PROBLEM. 
 
 be ascertained, as it depends on many other circumstances which were 
 not apparent from the problem. 
 
 If, now, we wish to take up such a flanking position, we must 
 require that the flank which it presents to the enemy is resting 
 on, or otherwise protected by, the ground, by favourable Artillery 
 positions, or by the position of the reserve. Imagine, gentlemen, 
 that we take up a flanking position on perfectly open ground, the 
 enemy would surely not do us the favour of deploying in front of us 
 in order to attack us from there, but he would advance obliquely 
 against the wing nearest to him and roll up our position. The right 
 flank, which is threatened here, has a good support on the Plickner 
 Berge. The effect of a flanking position, besides, need not alone 
 depend on keeping the enemy's line of advance under an effective 
 fire, but it can make itself also felt by an offensive movement from 
 the position. This, gentlemen, is, as it were, the general skeleton 
 around which the other measures must now arrange themselves as 
 flesh and blood. 
 
 Those gentlemen who have marched to Gumbinnen fulfil the 
 first part of the problem, for they bar thereby the enemy's further 
 advance to Konigsberg ; but it is a question whether they have in 
 doing so made use of all the advantages which the situation offered. 
 It appears to me more advantageous to remain south of Gumbinnen. 
 It certainly is not absolutely necessary for the enemy to advance by 
 Gumbinnen ; but, gentlemen, if you allow probability to have any 
 influence, you may very well assume this. The enemy has been 
 advancing from east to west for several days ; he will therefore 
 probably, if there are no special reasons, continue in this direction ; 
 because it is important for him to reach Gumbinnen, as he can 
 quarter a great part of his Corps in the town and secure the defiles 
 there. It is improbable that the enemy will evade us towards the 
 north, because he would then have to fight on a reversed front. Such 
 things do not happen in reality. Besides, he would be voluntarily 
 going into the great moor and swamp district. It is most probable, 
 therefore, that he advances on Gumbinnen. If, now, we ourselves do 
 not wish to go there, it must be asked, how far do we remain south 
 of it, or how near must we approach ? Many of the gentlemen have 
 taken post about the level of Kuttkulmen, but the ground there is 
 quite open ; the enemy can overlook our position in his advance from 
 the east, he can advance east of Gumbinnen across the Rominte and 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 5OTH PROBLEM. IO$ 
 
 Fissa, and we must then deploy with the front towards the east. I 
 think it would be best to remain about 4 miles from Gumbinnen and 
 to place oneself in a position of readiness under cover behind the 
 Plickner Berge. 
 
 But in taking up such an " alert position " one must always keep 
 an eye on a position in which one will eventually defend oneself. 
 Such a position cannot be exactly determined by the map, but must 
 be selected on the ground. The General commanding sends with this 
 object a General Staff Officer ahead, and himself rides there after- 
 wards. The position behind the Plickner Berge seems to me at the 
 same time favourable as a defensive position. The Cavalry can be 
 placed under cover on the right wing ; the front has a clear field of 
 fire, and the left wing is also leaning against the Angerapp, the less v 
 it is true, the nearer we advance towards Gumbinnen. We now will 
 have to send Horse Artillery under escort of Cavalry by the high-road 
 against the enemy in order to gain touch of him. He will not leave 
 us in possession of Gumbinnen ; he will drive away our Advanced 
 Guard, which in its retreat towards the west can still take up an 
 intermediate position. His Advanced Guard, which he doubtless will 
 have formed, will then follow by Gumbinnen, and perhaps be still 
 further strengthened from the Main Body. 
 
 The enemy now hears of our flanking position. He can then 
 either retire again behind Gumbinnen with all his forces, or he can 
 collect everything and attack us. The former, I daresay, he will 
 not be able to carry out unmolested by us, as we assume the offensive, 
 Cavalry ahead. In the other case we can remain for the present on 
 the defensive. According to my opinion, owing to the improvements 
 in firearms, the tactical defensive has gained a great advantage over 
 the tactical offensive. We were always offensive, certainly, in the 
 campaign of 1870, and attacked and captured the strongest positions 
 of the enemy ; but, gentlemen, with what sacrifices ! It appears to me 
 more favourable if the offensive is only assumed after repulsing several 
 attacks of the enemy. 
 
 The question is now, whether we shall occupy Gumbinnen ? 
 Those gentlemen who approached very close to it had to do so ; but 
 I would not occupy Gumbinnen because I attach no value to its 
 being passed by the enemy, and because I should more easily betray 
 my intentions to the enemy. 
 
 Finally, I should like to add some further general remarks on 
 
IC>6 SOLUTION OF THE 5 1ST PROBLEM. 
 
 the mode and manner in which some gentlemen have disposed of 
 their Cavalry. The ist Corps has a very strong Cavalry, 2 Divisions. 
 All gentlemen have sent forward both against the enemy. We 
 certainly had in 1870 also the mass of our Horse in front of the Army, 
 but only so long as both Armies were still far distant from each 
 other and when we were not yet acquainted with the enemy's 
 position. But here, when we know where the enemy is, where both 
 parties have approached each other to within some 28 miles, the 
 Cavalry in front has no real object. It can only remain there halted 
 or retire on the other bodies of the Corps. The Cavalry's place is 
 behind the front at such a short distance from the enemy, and it will 
 only be employed during the course of the battle, probably at the 
 end of it. 
 
 I would try to gain touch of the enemy by the Cavalry on the 
 high-road only, but send nothing south of it across the Rominte. A 
 well-mounted officer suffices there. It is here not a question of delay- 
 ing the enemy, but of only learning whether he is advancing, and in 
 what direction. This an officer, who only relies upon his horse, will 
 report to me just as well as a large mass of Cavalry. Besides, the 
 enemy's attention would only be roused by its appearance on his left 
 flank, which must be avoided. 
 
 In general, all gentlemen have worked intelligently, though they 
 have not made use of all the advantages which the situation offered. 
 They have proved that they understand how to lead mixed forces, 
 which is after all the final aim of all our efforts. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 5 IST PROBLEM. 
 
 A. Written solution by General v. Moltke. 
 
 I. 
 
 The leader of the Advanced Guard will hold the obstacle of the 
 Fluth Graben, which in any case he can reach sooner than the enemy, 
 and thereby procure time for the Corps to assemble. 
 
 But in order also to facilitate an offensive advance, if such be 
 the intention of the General commanding, he will, as the next step, 
 occupy Waltersdorf as well. 
 
 He sends orders to the Dragoon Regiment not to retire further 
 than it is obliged, to observe the enemy, and to maintain Waltersdorf 
 by dismounted Dragoons until relieved. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 5 1ST PROBLEM. IO7 
 
 The ist Battalion of Regiment No. I marches at once to Kieke- 
 busch and occupies the village, the windmill, and the bridge. 
 
 The first 6-pr. Battery unlimbers to the left on the height 149 
 under escort of a Company of this Battalion. 
 
 ' The 2nd Battalion turns off to the right through the nearest ride 
 to Schulzendorf, and sends forward two Companies together with the 
 Engineer Company to Waltersdorf, which is to be prepared for 
 defence. 
 
 The 3rd Battalion, as a reserve, halts in the north corner of the 
 Forst Wiistemark. 
 
 Report thereon to the General commanding, intelligence to the 
 Advanced Guard of the 2nd Division. 
 
 For the offensive as well as for the defensive solution of this 
 problem the General commanding must first of all assemble his 
 Corps. 
 
 He needs at least two hours to move up to the Advanced Guard 
 behind the Fluth Graben with the leading troops of the columns of 
 the Main Body. After the lapse of that time the enemy also may 
 appear before this obstacle. 
 
 The 2nd Division receives orders to occupy with the Advanced 
 Guard, Selchow and the bridges there, also to reconnoitre with its 
 Cavalry the ground beyond Gr. Ziethen and Lichtenrade. 
 
 The Main Body of the Division marches by Rotzis to the 
 Hohen Fichten. The 3 Batteries of the Division, accompanied by 2 
 Squadrons, trot ahead and take post west of the Fichten. 
 
 The ist Division continues to advance by the high-road. 
 
 The General commanding goes himself to the height 149 at 
 Kiekebusch, and eventually to the Marien Berg, where he can over- 
 look the situation during the arrival of the columns. 
 
 If the enemy should already be advancing close to us with equal 
 or superior strength his attack would have to be awaited. 
 
 The Infantry of the 2nd Division deploys to the left of the 
 Fichten, and the position there can be strengthened by the calling up 
 of Batteries of the Corps Artillery at an accelerated pace. 
 
 If there is still time for it, the 2nd Brigade of the ist Division 
 will advance by Waltersdorf and occupy the Marien Berg with 3 
 Battalions. From Selchow to Waltersdorf there is a front of about 
 4 miles. 
 
IO8 SOLUTION OF THE 5 1ST PROBLEM. 
 
 If, however, the enemy has not advanced on his side, it may be 
 concluded that he has not yet collected his forces. In order, now, to 
 form an opinion on his strength, it becomes necessary to force him to 
 deploy by approaching closer to him, and eventually to force him to 
 retire. 
 
 The Battalions remain in column of route, use the existing 
 bridges over the Fluth Graben, and only beyond it form up in mass of 
 Brigades in line of columns of Regiments. 
 
 It is not probable that the enemy has squeezed himself into the 
 ground between the line of lakes and the Spree ; we may presume 
 him to be in the line, Rudow Gr. Ziethen. 
 
 The Advanced Guard of the 2nd Division occupies Wassmanns- 
 dorf as a pivot for a left wheel of our front. 
 
 The leading Battalions of the 4th and 2nd Brigades extend in 
 Company columns and send out skirmishers, and the Artillery moves 
 into the alignment, Wassmannsdorf Schonefeld line of lakes. In 
 any case, the enemy will now have to show his full strength and to 
 decide for himself whether to accept battle or to retire. 
 
 If the attack is to be carried through on our part the Main 
 Bodies of the 4th and the 2nd Brigades will follow, and the 3rd and 
 the ist form the reserve. The latter Brigade, in order to make sure 
 of an eventual retreat, keeps the Marien Berg occupied. 
 
 The further measures will result from the course of the action. 
 
 The Trains remain behind the Notte bog. 
 
 B. Verbatim shorthand report of General v. Moltkes verbal 
 criticism. 
 
 When considering a tactical problem one must in the first 
 instance place oneself in the exact position of the enemy, and always 
 assume him to adopt the most correct measures. The problem says, 
 that hostile forces have collected in the neighbourhood of Eberswalde 
 for the protection of Berlin. In what strength and how far the enemy 
 has already advanced towards us is unknown. The straightest line 
 for him is that by Copenick. If we advance in the direction of the 
 capital we must encounter him. 
 
 So far, hostile troops which have advanced are ascertained : In- 
 fantry at Bohnsdorf, Artillery at Rudow, and Cavalry debouching at 
 Glienicke. It may be presumed as likely that the enemy, in order to 
 reconnoitre the ground to the south, has sent forward Cavalry, and, in 
 order to secure its debouching, has already Infantry and Artillery 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 5 1ST PROBLEM. 1 09 
 
 standing in front of the defile. In no way would it be permissible to 
 assume that the enemy stands in a position, Rudow Bohnsdorf. 
 This flanking position, with its rear towards the Miiggel See and 
 the swamp and wood defiles of the Spree, would be very disad- 
 vantageous. The enemy will also have tried to get on the roads 
 by which we are advancing, and therefore positions Rudow Buckow, 
 or Rudow Gr. Ziethen are more likely than one with its rear 
 towards the Spree. If, therefore, the 2nd Division would advance on 
 Rudow under the former supposition, it probably would not come in 
 contact with the right wing, but with the left wing of the enemy, and 
 get into a dangerous situation. 
 
 One more general remark I should like to advance. In order to 
 make headway we need deep columns of route ; but before an action 
 we must close up. If we close up too early, we don't gain ground 
 and are unnecessarily fatiguing our troops. If we close up too late 
 the enemy can drive back the detachments covering us and attack us 
 while we deploy. How, then, shall the closing up be carried out? 
 There exists no rule for it ; in each case that which is the most prac- 
 tical in the circumstances is to be done. But we have a medium still 
 between the columns of route and the formed-up front : the marching 
 of columns beside each other and a " position of readiness." Let us 
 now turn to the problem itself, and first to the measures of the Com- 
 mander of the Advanced Guard. Every Advanced Guard is to 
 procure its Main Body time to prepare for action. It will be well if 
 the Advanced Guard does so by making use of a favourable section of 
 the ground for defensive action. Already from the map I : 100,000 
 it can be gathered that a pretty broad strip of meadow with ditches 
 extends between Kiekebusch and Schulzendorf, offering advantages 
 for defence. 
 
 The importance of Waltersdorf for a future offensive is evident, and 
 this almost all gentlemen have recognised. An offensive on our part 
 is not feasible if the enemy is in occupation of Waltersdorf. It only 
 appears questionable whether we still reach that place before the 
 enemy. If gentlemen send their Advanced Guard Battery thither, it 
 may get into danger if a retreat by the Cavalry becomes necessary. 
 The Commander of the Advanced Guard therefore would occupy the 
 section Kiekebusch Schulzendorf, and hold it under all circumstances, 
 and next, if possible, take possession of Waltersdorf. The Advanced 
 Guard has still an hour's march to Waltersdorf, and therefore a dis- 
 
HO SOLUTION OF THE 5 1ST PROBLEM. 
 
 mounted Squadron is to be charged for the present with its occupa- 
 tion until relieved by Infantry. The Commander of the Cavalry 
 Regiment, I daresay, would in actual warfare do so on his own 
 account ; yet it does not seem to me superfluous to direct special 
 attention to it. The rest of the Regiment would then have to stay in 
 the neighbourhood, since part of it must always be ready to charge, if 
 part is dismounted or holding horses. If this Cavalry is dislodged by 
 Infantry the Dragoons certainly run as quickly as Infantry, but they 
 can only be picked up if a part advances to charge the Infantry. 
 
 As regards the arrangements of the Commander of the Corps, he 
 has a very difficult task ; he does not know the strength of the enemy. 
 It may happen to him as to the man who looked for the track of the 
 lion and found the lion himself. He may find the enemy stronger 
 than he thought. It is so easily said, to break off" the fight and to re- 
 tire behind the Notte bog. but it is difficult to withdraw the Corps 
 from action, if part, perhaps a great part of it, is already engaged. 
 For one must first get into column of route before one can march. In 
 most cases it is better to carry through an action once begun, though 
 it does not turn out favourably, than to break it off. Resistance must 
 not be offered close in front of the defile ; just as bad is it to occupy 
 Mittenwalde and Konigs-Wusterhausen ; we weaken ourselves and are 
 posted in the defile. The covering of a withdrawal can only be at- 
 tained by a position lying far to the front of the defile. It results 
 from this, that the General commanding has to take up a position in 
 which he can accept the attack, from which he can assume the offen- 
 sive, and into which he can retreat if the enemy is stronger. This 
 position must be situated so that the enemy cannot reach it before 
 us. 
 
 A position, Selchow Kiekebusch, would fulfil these requirements ; 
 on the right wing it is already occupied by our Advanced Guard, and 
 the Advanced Guard of the 2nd Division can soon reach Selchow. 
 The difficulty of the obstacle in front cannot exactly be ascertained 
 from the map I : 100,000, but in reality we have no better maps. It 
 seems, at any rate, that the Fluth Graben can contribute to the 
 strength of our defensive. The extent of the position is about four 
 miles, an extent which an Army Corps may well embrace. The 
 Corps will be deployed for attack on the line, Selchow Kiekebusch 
 if the enemy attacks or assembles for attack. When we speak of 
 assembling we do not mean thereby the concentration at one point, 
 
SOLUTION OF THE $2ND PROBLEM. I i i 
 
 but that the heads of columns are directed to a distinct point. The 
 Advanced Guard of the 2nd Division at Selchow undertakes the 
 securing of the left flank, the head of the Main Body would be 
 directed by Rotzis to the patches of wood east of Selchow and there 
 deploy to the left. 
 
 Whether on the arrival of the troops the position is to be taken 
 up between Selchow and Kiekebusch or between Wassmannsdorf and 
 the Marien Berg can only be decided on the spot after exact know- 
 ledge of it, and it further depends on the enemy's measures. The 
 General commanding will himself go to the Advanced Guard of the 
 1st Division. His place during the action is in rear, but before the 
 action the height at Kiekebusch (149) or the Marien Berg, if he can 
 reach it, will offer him a good view for observing the enemy's 
 measures and for forming his own resolutions. His columns, besides, 
 have still a two hours' march to the position ; it will therefore be 
 taken up only between i and 2 o'clock. If the enemy is in the act 
 of advancing, the Corps Artillery will be moved up at a trot ; if the 
 enemy is inactive, and therefore either too weak or not yet assembled, 
 one's own advance is to be executed with great caution. It is not 
 necessary to commence it with the former Advanced Guards, but 
 these will hold Selchow and Waltersdorf occupied as pivots. The 
 offensive movement is to be initiated from the centre by deploying 
 only the heads of the columns, and is then to be continued by a left 
 wheel. If we are on a level with Wassmannsdorf we will probably 
 know what the enemy's intentions are. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 52ND PROBLEM. 
 Verbatim shorthand report of General v. Moltke's verbal criticism. 
 
 Some gentlemen have been doubtful from what hour the instruc- 
 tion to the General of Division is to be dated. I grant that the 
 gentlemen would perhaps have seen it sooner if it were said in the 
 problem " has .... given." But, surely, it might have been 
 assumed that the General of Division must have had this instruction 
 before he started on his march, which certainly should have begun at 
 9 o'clock even without instruction. But if he had received it only 
 during his march, he could not have changed his order of march with- 
 out loss of time and disorder. But the General commanding could also 
 issue this instruction sooner, as he had already early in the morning 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
H2 SOLUTION OF THE 52ND PROBLEM. 
 
 knowledge of the enemy's advance by Konigs-Wusterhausen and 
 Mittenwalde. For the appearance of hostile columns at Waltersdorf 
 was immaterial to him ; at the utmost it gave him the certainty that 
 the hostile columns were at that time still engaged in the defiles of 
 the Notte, and that he therefore had still several hours' time before 
 the enemy could get near his position. He further knew that about 
 midday the 6th Division could arrive in support of him, and he could 
 hope therefore to maintain himself in his position up to that time. 
 Its left flank was less endangered than the right. In order to attack 
 the former the enemy had to expose his own left flank and line of 
 retreat. An attack of the enemy on the centre and right wing of the 
 position at Gr. Ziethen was therefore more probable. His position 
 was only about 2\ miles long ; for the above reasons alone he would 
 have concentrated his reserves behind the right wing. Now, could it 
 be more desirable for him to move up to it also the Division from 
 Tempelhof, or should he not have rather wished to employ it along- 
 side in prolongation, or still better in advance of it ? 
 
 He would have sent to the General of Division perhaps the fol- 
 lowing order : " I shall try to maintain myself in the position, Gr. Zie- 
 then Rudow. I count upon your being able to arrive in advance 
 of my right flank about midday. If the enemy up to your arrival has 
 not attacked I shall myself advance against him, and you at the same 
 time have to form a right, advanced echelon of the 2nd Corps. While 
 advancing in echelon you have to try by your offensive movements to 
 drive the enemy from his line of retreat across the Notte defiles against 
 the Spree." 
 
 This instruction had to suffice. The Divisional Commander is 
 an old, experienced General, who can clearly discern his task from this 
 brief instruction. It is a grateful one, for while the Corps was even- 
 tually undergoing a tedious frontal attack, his was the grateful task of 
 attacking the left flank of the enemy with all the favourable results 
 arising from the direction of such an attack. 
 
 Let us now turn to the General of Division. The 6th Division 
 could march as far as Gr. Ziethen without being disturbed. Up to 
 that point no enemy was in front, nor any on the flank. Still, in that 
 direction it was necessary to reconnoitre towards Gr. Machnow. One 
 to two Squadrons and some Officers' Patrols were sufficient for this. It 
 is not necessary to send the whole Cavalry Regiment for this purpose, 
 and it is disadvantageous to send the Cavalry Brigade. One must 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 5 2ND PROBLEM. 1 13 
 
 not arouse the enemy's attention too early by deploying strong 
 Cavalry. For this reason I should not have patrolled further than this, 
 so as not to attract the enemy's attention to his left flank too early. 
 But as soon as the Division advances beyond the front of the 2nd 
 Corps it will have the enemy probably on its left flank. Therefore the 
 Division must assume an order of march which considerably departs 
 from that otherwise usual with us, and move so that by a simple " Left 
 turn " it can form up in battle order. In the first instance, the order 
 of march will differ from the usual one in that the Division does not 
 need an Advanced Guard, or if it forms one, in that it is closely fol- 
 lowed by its Main Body. 
 
 Further, notwithstanding that the Division is marching to the 
 south, it will still engage the enemy first, towards the east. But we 
 form in two lines for action ; therefore the Division will march also in 
 two columns, in order to bring about by a simple " Halt, Front," the for- 
 mation in two lines. Now, in both columns, we must in the first in- 
 stance march with those arms which are first to come in contact with 
 the enemy. But Infantry and Artillery are needed first. In the left 
 column, therefore, will march the whole Artillery under protection of 3 
 Battalions at the head and again 3 Battalions in rear ; in the right 
 column, the other 6 Battalions followed by the Cavalry Brigade. 
 The latter we then can easily move up for action on this open ground 
 if wanted. Many gentlemen have attached this Brigade to the 2nd 
 Army Corps. I do not think this practical. Others have retained the 
 Brigade with the Division or placed it at the disposal of the General 
 commanding. But the Brigade is attached to the Division, and one 
 does not like to give away what is handed over to one. Besides, the 
 Commander of the Corps is at Gr. Ziethen, and cannot judge from 
 there when the moment has come for the action of the Cavalry 
 Brigade on the right wing ; the General of Division can judge better, 
 still better the General of Brigade himself. A third difference in the 
 order of march is that we do not march with a complete Brigade in 
 each column, but in both columns with a Regiment of each Brigade, 
 so that by a simple " Left turn," we can obtain the normal formation 
 for the single Brigades. 
 
 Some gentlemen have assigned to the Division a position of readi- 
 ness. This requires a closing up at the least, and as the columns are 
 2^ to 3J miles long, this forming-up would occupy more than one 
 hour. Besides, one does not know where this position of readiness 
 
 I 
 
I 14 SOLUTION OF THE $2ND PROBLEM. 
 
 is to be taken up. If we form up at Lichtenrade and the enemy 
 has not yet advanced beyond Selchow, we would have to get into 
 column of route again for continuing the march, and thereby have 
 lost two hours' time. Just as disadvantageous is it to order : 
 "The Division will march to such-and-such a place, where it 
 will await further orders." Gentlemen, in that case the General of 
 Division does nothing at. all. The orders which he was to be given 
 could just as well have been sent to meet him on the march. Neither 
 do I think it practical to let the left column march by Britz and 
 Buckow. It there encounters first the Trains, then the reserves of the 
 2nd Corps south of Buckow, and then would either have to turn to 
 Lichtenrade or to engage frontally at Gr. Ziethen. 
 
 I think it better to march with both columns on the high-road by 
 Mariendorf Lichtenrade, that is, to move the right column with a 
 small detour by Lankwitz Marienfelde, and thence over the open 
 fields in the direction of the small bushes at Mahlow. 
 
 If we are marching then as indicated we form the order of battle 
 by " Halt, Front." The Infantry wheels to the left, the wagons of 
 the Artillery have to cover only 1,000 paces in order to reach their 
 Batteries, and the second line places itself in proper order. Where 
 this " Halt, Front," will take place depends upon the enemy. If he 
 is standing already at Kl. Ziethen, the Artillery must unlimber east of 
 Lichtenrade and the Division deploy for attack at that same place. 
 If he were standing still at Wassmannsdorf or Selchow, one could have 
 continued advancing ; if he were already retiring it would have been 
 necessary first to occupy the heights of Gr. Kienitz with Infantry, in 
 order then to move the Artillery up thither, and finally, if the enemy 
 were still further back, one could have marched eventually as far as 
 Gross or Klein Kienitz, in order to reach him on this side of the de- 
 file, where he was bound to lose time. 
 
 In war the measures depend on the circumstances as we find 
 them. I believe that by these measures the greatest success can be 
 obtained, though some of the different measures of several gentlemen 
 would have also been fairly successful. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 53RD PROBLEM. 1 1 IJ 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 5 3 RD PROBLEM. 
 Verbatim shorthand report of General v. Moltke's verbal criticism. 
 
 Gentlemen, the problem had placed the Division for you in a 
 somewhat difficult situation : March with exposed flank. Some of 
 the gentlemen now have tried to improve the situation by letting the 
 Division continue its march at once on the same evening. They will 
 thus certainly reach Zehdenick safely ; but, gentlemen, you can do 
 that only on paper, not in reality : there it would be quite different. 
 
 Others let the Trains start on the same night. Well, gentlemen, 
 the troops want the Trains in the bivouac, and if you take these from 
 them they simply become a hindrance. But if you still let them 
 march in the evening, then go at once farther, at least as far as behind 
 the Finow Canal, and not only into an intermediate position at 
 Prenden. Others, again, have shifted the bivouacs in the evening, 
 which, according to the problem, were round Biesenthal, to the west 
 of that place. Gentlemen, imagine the situation as it is in reality. 
 The Division only moved into bivouac in the evening, and therefore 
 after a long march ; the kitchens are dug, the kettles on the fire. 
 Then comes a General Staff Officer, and says : " The bivouac is to be 
 shifted, you must move a little bit farther." Then the men must 
 start again, the horses must be harnessed, the meat cannot be boiled ; 
 one does not do so in reality. 
 
 Some other gentlemen have made the situation still more difficult 
 for themselves than that which the problem presented, and have 
 assumed that the enemy is standing already at Basdorf and had 
 already occupied the defiles of the Wandlitzer See and at Stolzen- 
 hagen. There are some even who imagine the enemy to be already 
 at Zerpenschleuse. They said to themselves : " Since the enemy 
 comes from Berlin, he can just as well march those 16 miles to 
 Basdorf." Well, it is possible, but the problem says nothing about it. 
 The enemy can certainly march with the Cavalry and Artillery and 
 let the Infantry go by rail to Bernau, in order to keep it as fresh as 
 possible. 
 
 I admit that the whole situation, so briefly stated, is somewhat 
 improbable. A Prussian Division is marching from Frankfurt to 
 Zehdenick while the enemy is at Berlin. But to state everything in 
 the problem the whole history of a campaign would have to be given 
 as an introduction. Not till then could one say: "That is possible and 
 that is impossible." 
 
 I 2 
 
Il6 SOLUTION OF THE 53RD PROBLEM. 
 
 I have taken the 5th Division because its composition is very 
 simple and known to all. I could just as well have taken a Swedish 
 or Russian Division, but then we had to work with troops unknown to 
 us. Gentlemen had therefore to accept the situation simply as the prob- 
 lem stated it, and not to look for anything special beyond what is given, 
 otherwise there is no limit to speculation. The enemy need not at all 
 come from Berlin ; he can also come from a greater distance. You 
 therefore must not look behind the situation for a special trick, and 
 think we wish to lay a trap for you. 
 
 We will now first ask ourselves, What can the enemy do ? It is 
 not probable that he will attack us at night. He must march through 
 an extensive wood, and would then have made by the evening of the 
 1st September such preparations that he could not have taken so 
 quietly our reconnaissances on Riidnitz and Ladeburg. It is just as 
 improbable that he will march the next day on Biesenthal ; he would 
 then march behind us and drive us, if circumstances were most favour- 
 able to him, in a direction where we wish to go. But if he were to 
 march by the high-road from Berlin to Basdorf, he would make a 
 great detour. If you measure it you will find that he has to cover 
 about 4^ miles more. It is most probable, there fore, that he will advance 
 in a straight line on Lanke or Forst Haus Liepnitz. 
 
 Now, almost all of the gentlemen have understood that the 
 Division can no longer continue marching in its former direction by 
 Lanke and make from there a turn by Klosterfelde, and almost 
 all have therefore placed themselves on the road to Prenden. But 
 they wanted to occupy simultaneously all the defiles as far as the 
 Wandlitzer See, and thereby extended over 7 miles. That, however, 
 is not at all necessary ; one is perfectly in time, if one occupies one 
 after the other of these defiles. Utzdorf and Lanke must, in any 
 case, have been previously occupied. 
 
 The present Advanced Guard, however, can no longer reach the 
 defiles on the high-road in time. At first it has a very unfavour- 
 able march through the wood. Already the march from Lanke to 
 Utzdorf is difficult ; one cannot march with a column of all arms 
 north of the swampy meadows ; one must therefore go round south 
 of them. But one cannot give way there, and the Advanced Guard 
 may get here into an unfavourable situation, if the enemy attacks 
 from the south. Afterwards the Advanced Guard has to debouch 
 from the wood at Forst Haus Liepnitz with a long column of route, 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 53RD PROBLEM. 117 
 
 and will hardly be able to form up in time and reach a defensive posi- 
 tion behind the denies at the Heilige Pfuhl. The Advanced Guard 
 must remain therefore, and the denies on the high-road must be 
 secured by a special detachment from the direction of Klosterfelde. 
 
 Some gentlemen wished to await further reports first. But 
 much time is then lost, and they still will get only reports that 
 patrols met patrols. Precious time is lost before they know from 
 where the enemy is coming. 
 
 One of the gentlemen has hit upon quite a different solution. 
 This gentleman, while remaining with the Main Body on the high- 
 road by Lanke, goes with the present Advanced Guard offensively 
 against Ladeburg. It is right ; one can imagine every situation, de- 
 fensively and offensively; but one does not know here the strength of 
 the enemy, and has to make a march through a long wood defile. I 
 have calculated on the particular paper the circumstances as they 
 would arise if both parties started from Biesenthal and Bernau at the 
 same time, and you will see that they are not favourable to us. 
 
 It seems to me the simplest and shortest way, if I read to you 
 what I think the solution should be. It is advisable in such problems 
 to draw up an order of march (ad margineni)^ so that it is at once 
 seen from where the Regiments are taken. 
 
 i. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NIGHT. 
 
 Fusilier Battalion No. 8 (assumed by me as being with the Main 
 Body) moves at once to the bridge over the Pfauen Fliess, posts pickets 
 on the Langeronner Fliess, sentries at the edge of the wood. The 1st 
 Squadron of Dragoon Regiment No. 12 goes back to Danewitz, 
 patrolling during the night towards Ladeburg and Bernau. The roads 
 from Biesenthal leading through the Stadt Heide to Marienwerder 
 are to be reconnoitered at once. The Advanced Guard is informed of 
 these arrangements, as well as of the intelligence received about the 
 enemy. It pushes a Battalion out to the Vw. Utzdorf to-day, if pos- 
 sible, otherwise to-morrow very early ; it occupies the Hell Miihle and 
 the bridges between the Hell lakes with Infantry, and causes Infantry 
 to patrol towards the road Bernau Basdorf. Lanke and Utzdorf are 
 to be prepared for defence. 
 
 2. DISPOSITIONS FOR THE 2ND SEPTEMBER. 
 
 (The order of march is to be represented graphically ad marginem^} 
 
 H.Q. Biesenthal, ist September, 8 p.m. 
 
 The Division continues its march to-morrow by Prenden, the 
 
Il8 SOLUTION OF THE 54TH PROBLEM. 
 
 present Advanced Guard covering it as a Flank Guard. The Trains 
 of the Division are assembled at 5 a.m. at the eastern exit of Biesenthal 
 and march under escort of I Company of the Grenadier Regiment 
 No. 8, and i a Troop of the 1st Squadron of the Dragoon Regiment 
 No. 12, by Unter Forsterei Eiserbude on Marienwerder, where they 
 will find further orders. 
 
 A new Advanced Guard is formed by the Grenadier Regiment 
 No. 12, the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons of Dragoon Regiment No. 12, 
 and the 2nd Battery, who will march at 5 a.m. by Prenden to 
 Klosterfelde. The Main Body follows immediately behind this 
 Advanced Guard, but moves at Neudorfchen to the Prenzlau high- 
 road at the Lottsche See, north of Klosterfelde. 
 
 At 7 a.m. the former Advanced Guard evacuates Lanke and 
 Vw. Utzdorf and rejoins the Main Body by Prenden. The Division 
 probably will be assembled at 9 o'clock on the Prenzlau high-road, 
 and the newly-formed Advanced Guard (Regiment No 12) will from 
 that moment form the Rear Guard to a further retreat, for which I 
 shall issue the further orders on the spot. 
 
 3. EXPLANATIONS. 
 
 If the Main Body faces about on the Prenzlau high-road at the 
 Lottsche See, it has its line of retreat on Berg and the Zerpenschleuse 
 straight in its rear, and, accordingly, as the enemy follows by Lanke or 
 Forsthaus, the I2th or 52nd Regiment* before it to cover further 
 retreat. It can reinforce the one Regiment, or draw in the other, 
 perhaps assume the offensive, according to circumstances, or retire 
 at once behind the Finow Canal. 
 
 This, gentlemen, is only an example ; in it I have given you 
 only my opinions ; this does not preclude others from being equally 
 correct. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 54 PROBLEM. 
 Verbatim shorthand report of General i 1 . Moltk&s verbal criticism. 
 
 The problem prescribed that the arrangements for the advance 
 of the Division on Osterode were to be given ; it is not meant by this 
 that the enemy is to be attacked to-morrow as well. The distance to 
 him is very great. Even if we assume our Advanced Guard to be in 
 the neighbourhood of Platteinen, we have still 9 miles to the villages 
 
 * Assumed as the former Advanced Guard. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 54TH PROBLEM. I 19 
 
 occupied by the enemy. It is therefore not wrong if we only ad- 
 vance to-morrow in order to attack him on the day after to-morrow. 
 But, gentlemen, we have to consider at the same time that we will 
 not gain the defiles, which are difficult to seize as they are, more 
 easily on the next day ; for if we delay the attack till after to-morrow 
 the enemy will be able to adopt his counter measures as well for that 
 day. It is therefore better if we carry out the attack on the same 
 day (therefore to-morrow). Besides, the position in which we may 
 suppose the enemy to stand is generally so strong that a frontal 
 attack does 'not promise success, and that we must envelop the 
 enemy, and therefore divide our forces. But it is impossible for us 
 to bivouac for the night in two or three different bodies without 
 exposing ourselves to the danger of being attacked by the enemy 
 with superior force at one place. 
 
 Furthermore, it was said by some : The intelligence about the 
 enemy is so scanty that I cannot yet form thereon a disposition for 
 attack. That is indeed correct, but we need not base ourselves alone 
 upon what we know, but may do so also on what we can assume as 
 probable. Now, in order to learn more, many gentlemen have sent 
 their whole Cavalry Brigade across the Grabitscheck. They will not 
 learn more thereby than they know already. The Cavalry will also 
 very soon encounter Infantry posts of the enemy there and not learn 
 more. You can find out the same by single officers with some 
 orderlies. But if we send the Cavalry across the Grabitscheck it is 
 out of our hands. 
 
 I have previously mentioned that we could conclude with some 
 probability where the enemy is to be found. He is standing in 
 advance of Osterode, and here, as it were, in a square redoubt con- 
 structed by nature, with high parapets and wet ditches around. The 
 key of this position, Hirschberg and Klein Groben, he will have 
 occupied with Infantry, having pushed forward two posts in order 
 to hear of our advance ; he then will deploy where that advance 
 occurs. 
 
 Place yourself in the position of the enemy who is at Osterode. 
 He will, at any rate, have occupied a position on the high-road to 
 Hohenstein, that is, on both sides of the deep ravine at Warneinen. 
 One could have reckoned on this in one's disposition. Now, the 
 attack on this position will always remain difficult, but I have already 
 mentioned that we would [have to envelop the position, that is, we 
 
I2O SOLUTION OF THE 54TH PROBLEM. 
 
 must divide our force. This we can also do, because we are superior, 
 I have given you a normal Russian Division, while the enemy at 
 Osterode has a Prussian Division. We thereby have a superiority of 
 4 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, and 14 guns. We can therefore divide 
 ourselves, and it is only a question where we wish to advance for the 
 main attack. We have three sections of ground here for an advance, 
 which are defined by the deep ravines of the Grabitscheck and the 
 Drewenz. If we advance on all three we have nowhere superiority, 
 and risk an offensive by the enemy. We must therefore advance 
 with one main column only. If we advance to the left of the 
 Grabitscheck, which very many gentlemen have done, we separate 
 ourselves from our own communications. And though one can 
 effect one's retreat on Frogenau, to which place some gentlemen 
 have directed their Trains, it is, after all, not altogether our line oi 
 retreat. That line was by Hohenstein, where most gentlemen have 
 kept their Trains. Besides, we then have the enemy still in front in 
 his exceedingly strong position, with the lake defiles and the deep 
 valleys ahead of us. 
 
 Now, some gentlemen have marched across from Schildeck to 
 Dohringen and left against Gross Groben a few Battalions only, and 
 often only Cavalry. But this march was only possible if Gross 
 Groben was taken. The attack on Gross Groben is therefore the 
 very first thing. Others went across the Grabitscheck, west of 
 Reichenau. Gentlemen, that is a ticklish matter. Nothing at all 
 prevents the enemy, when we are crossing the Grabitscheck, from 
 advancing from Warneinen by Schildeck, and then he is between us. 
 Besides, only two roads, and these, according to the map, not good 
 ones (field-paths), lead from Reichenau over the Grabitscheck. I 
 consider this the least favourable direction. 
 
 Some have advanced on the right bank of the Drewenz. Thereby 
 one secures one's own communications best. One can attack Oster- 
 wein successively by Wittigwalde and Jugendfeld ; that will not be 
 difficult; one will meet but little resistance. One can then by en- 
 veloping the position still further push on to Hirschberg, and from 
 there to Lubainen. We thereby bring the enemy into a very dis- 
 advantageous situation, because he then leans with his rear against 
 the row of lakes at Warneinen, and thus gives up Osterode. 
 
 But opposed to these advantages are also considerable objections. 
 First of all we have for our advance only bad forest-paths, which 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 54TH PROBLEM. 121 
 
 mostly run in zigzag ; it will be impossible to march in more than 
 two columns. If we have taken Osterwein the ground very much 
 narrows between the Osterweiner and Schilling lakes. There is no 
 possibility of deploying our Artillery on that ground, while the 
 enemy faces us on the heights at Hirschberg with strong Artillery 
 on a broad front. Debouching from the wood at Bunken Miihle 
 would be very difficult. You therefore see that by choosing this 
 direction the advantages and disadvantages are pretty evenly 
 balanced. 
 
 The same is the case with the third direction, if we advance by 
 Reichenau. The Cavalry advances first of all, namely, before the 
 Advanced Guard, and reconnoitres the ground as far as towards Gross 
 Groben. It will not be able to get any further in that direction, for 
 we cannot expect it to attack Gross Groben. Only the Advanced 
 Guard can do that, and this it is able to do because it can attack and 
 envelop the enemy. But in spite of this the further attack will still 
 be very difficult, and only promise success if we oblige the enemy by 
 demonstrations to detach a force from his position at Warneinen to 
 Hirschberg. This can already be attained by weak forces. Not 
 Regiments, or even Brigades, but only a few Battalions with some 
 guns will be sufficient, because the enemy cannot discern our weak- 
 ness in the close country in front of him, and does not know what may 
 be hidden in the wood. But these troops must not then go beyond 
 the wood, so as not to betray their weakness. This small detachment 
 therefore is sufficient for demonstrating, and is besides so small that 
 it can perhaps rejoin by the high-road by Osterwein, if the enemy 
 drives it back. If we hold Gross Groben, we can detach in the first 
 instance Artillery under escort of Infantry from that place to Lich- 
 teinen, although not Cavalry. It will find there on the heights west 
 of Lichteinen lake and at Lichteinen quite excellent positions. It 
 can enfilade here the front of the enemy from Lichteinen to Warneinen, 
 it facilitates the opening of the defile of Lichteinen by Infantry, which 
 can then advance further from there. Nevertheless, the attack even in 
 this manner has its difficulties, and we expose our own rearward com- 
 munications as well. Both directions, therefore, have their advantages 
 and disadvantages ; we cannot say the one is wrong, the other is 
 right. All we want is to see the measures properly carried out. 
 
 But of one thing I should still like to warn you, gentlemen, 
 namely, not to say : " The troops are to wait for further orders." Such 
 
122 SOLUTION OF THE 55TH PROBLEM. 
 
 a measure paralyses the independent action of the subordinate leaders. 
 The leader of the detachment, for instance, sees that he can easily 
 take Osterwein, but he dare not ; or he sees that he can easily pene- 
 trate into Hirschberg simultaneously with the enemy, but he 
 dare not because he is waiting for an order. The right 
 moment is then easily missed. You must consider at the same time 
 that you surely can send him without difficulty an order altering 
 the former one. To detached leaders one must give only general 
 instructions by which they can act freely. Such a measure is, however, 
 quite useless for the Main Body of the troops, because the Commander. 
 in-Chief will in most instances be present with that body. 
 
 It was further said : " I reserve to myself the further orders." 
 Well, gentlemen, this is all very well in a disposition ; there one need 
 not give any further explanations and reasons. You can hide your 
 further intentions from your subordinate leaders, but in an examination 
 question you must not withhold from us your further intentions, because 
 you are to be judged by these. Well, gentlemen, I must unfortunately 
 break off these exercises. I think, if we had still more time and could 
 discuss some of the answers, we would very easily come to an under- 
 standing. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 55 PROBLEM. 
 
 A. Written solution by General v. Moltke. 
 
 The Flank Detachment (3ist Regiment, 1st and 2nd Squadrons 
 Hussars No. 12 and I Battery) receives orders not to engage in an 
 action, but, if the enemy advances as far as Schafstadt, to occupy the 
 line Obhausen Barnstadt, where the Detachment will be reinforced. 
 A Company each will occupy Obhausen Barnstadt, Nemsdorf, Gohren- 
 dorf ; two Battalions, one Battery bivouac south of Grosse Miihle, 
 Cavalry at Obhausen patrols against Schafstadt and Eichstadt. These 
 troops form the Rear Guard. 
 
 Advanced Guard (/ist Regiment, 3rd and 4th Squadrons Hussars 
 No. 12 and I Battery) still occupies to-night the line Roblingen 
 Stedten, with I Company each ; 2\ Battalions bivouac on the height 
 near Laura Schacht, Cavalry in Schraplau, reconnoitres towards 
 Steuden. 
 
 Both bodies of troops maintain connection and observe the 
 ravine. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 55TH PROBLEM. 123 
 
 1 6th Brigade : 96th Regiment alarm quarters, Querfurt. 
 
 72nd Lodersleben, 
 
 Docklitz and 
 Gatterstedt, 
 Artillery and 5th Squadron I2th Hussar Regiment 
 
 at Farnstedt. 
 
 For to-morrow : The Division continues its march on Eisleben. 
 The 1 6th Brigade, rendezvous 6 o'clock, north of Docklitz. In case 
 the enemy advances sooner against Querfurt, the Rear Guard, main- 
 taining Obhausen and occupying Querfurt, withdraws behind the 
 valley between these places. Should the Rear Guard be severely 
 pressed, the Main Body of the Division will take up a position on the 
 heights behind Hornburg, the Advance Guard joining it behind 
 Erdeborn. 
 
 Trains early by Wolferstedt and Bornstedt to Eisleben. 
 
 B. Verbatim short Jiand report of General v. Moltke's verbal criticism. 
 
 Some gentlemen have rendered the problem more easy for them- 
 selves by marching beyond Querfurt. One could, perhaps, under 
 present circumstances consider it advisable to make a very long 
 march : occasionally that is the only safeguard. I remind you of the 
 Corps Vinoy which marched day and night, and could only thus escape 
 to Paris. But in what state did it arrive there ! Here, there was no 
 necessity for making a forced march. We had 14 miles to Querfurt, 
 and that is for a Division marching on one road a sufficiently long 
 march. Querfurt offers an opportunity for sheltering the troops well ; 
 bivouacking at the beginning of March is no pleasure, and particularly 
 harmful to horses. Moreover, it was distinctly stated in the problem 
 that the Division was to march from Freiburg to Querfurt on the ist 
 March. 
 
 Other gentlemen bring in an arbitrary condition by counting 
 upon reinforcements. But nothing was said of this in the problem. 
 They count upon the support of the 7th Division, and together with 
 it want to assume the offensive. But they did not know at all whether 
 the Division had already arrived at Eisleben. I also find fault with the 
 moving up of an ammunition column. That measure points to an 
 intention to court a decisive battle, and yet it ought to be your 
 endeavour to get away if possible without any fighting. You ought 
 to have been glad of having your Trains so far away. 
 
 The enemy at midday had been seen advancing from Merseburg 
 
124 SOLUTION OF THE 55TH PROBLEM. 
 
 on Lauchstadt and Clobicau. You do not know much about him. 
 Nevertheless it is not possible to say : " I shall await further reports 
 before I form further resolutions." I have already on a former oc- 
 casion spoken against ordering troops to march to there and there 
 and to await there further orders. By such an order you cause that 
 nothing at all is done. One must give a distinct order for acting, and 
 can, in case of necessity, send an altered order afterwards. Whether, 
 now, the enemy halts to-day at Lauchstadt Clobicau and only with 
 the Advanced Guard goes forward to Schafstadt Eichstadt or on 
 Steuden, or whether he marches still further, you cannot know. It is 
 not probable, but it is possible, and you must at any rate secure your- 
 self against it. 
 
 If the enemy does not attack on the 1st March, his attack on the 
 2nd is not to be expected in the direction of Querfurt, but in that of 
 Stedten. In the former direction he would attain nothing but the 
 retirement of your Rear Guard, and, that, just to the place whither it 
 is your intention that it should retire. The enemy would therefore 
 march behind you. 
 
 The enemy's attack is to be expected with certainty on the 2nd 
 March. We would therefore secure the ground here by a well-timed 
 defence of this section which is so advantageous. In doing so we 
 could adopt two modes, both of which I consider correct. Either the 
 Flank Guard gives way on Stedten and the covering at Obhausen is 
 to be undertaken by the Advanced Guard of the Division, which at 
 Goritz turns off to that place, or the Flank Guard retires to Obhausen 
 and the Division pushes out a Detachment (Advanced Guard) by 
 Querfurt to Schraplau and Stedten. 
 
 I prefer the second solution because it is the simplest. But at any 
 rate it is necessary that the Detachment, which is sent to Schraplau, 
 receives the peremptory order to occupy the section of the ground 
 there and to hold it. Some papers contain a solution, which is a 
 very near approach to the correct one, but the order for each Detach- 
 ment is not clearly expressed. Other papers miss the point, but are 
 worded so precisely and clearly that one must say the writer is well 
 able to solve another problem correctly. 
 
 Where several of the papers have adopted the half measure of 
 letting the Detachment designated for Stedten march on the ist March 
 only as far as Docklitz or Schafsee, they have thereby implied the 
 apprehension that the whole distance might be too far. I think that 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 5/TH PROBLEM. 125 
 
 in the present instance the distant march was justifiable and could 
 very well be executed by the Detachment ; a Regiment marches its 
 1 8 miles much more easily than a whole Division. 
 
 As regards now the further advance of the Division on the 2nd 
 March, I should like to pronounce against a start during the night. 
 By an early start merely there is no security attainable, for the enemy 
 can start on his march just as early as we can. I am especially 
 against a night march of the Trains ; they are really safe enough 
 .already owing to their distance. 
 
 By which road now is the Division to march? Very many 
 gentlemen started by the high-road ; it certainly is the safest road. 
 But if the Division marches there, you surely place your Detachment 
 .at Stedten in a very serious position. Either it has to give way 
 before hostile superiority, and then you are very soon disturbed in your 
 .advance (for if the enemy approaches only to within 2\ miles you 
 must get off the road and at least partly deploy against him), or you 
 expose your Detachment to annihilation, if it has to hold on (for the 
 distance from Rothen and Schirmbach is too great for an eventual sup- 
 port). I would march in two columns by Alberstadt and Hornburg; 
 .a timely support of the Detachment is then ensured 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 56TH PROBLEM. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 57x11 PROBLEM. 
 A. Written solution by General v. Moltke. 
 
 I. 
 
 The General Commanding will accomplish his task best by 
 a position in advance of the railway line which is to be 
 protected. He thus gains in his front the strong obstacle of the Seille, 
 .secures, later on, his retreat on Metz, and at any rate prolongs the 
 time which the enemy needs to reach the railway. 
 
 There is every probability that the enemy will use the permanent 
 bridge over the Mosel at Pont-a-Mousson, which he is in possession of, 
 .and the roads leading therefrom. This determines the direction for the 
 advance of the Main Body of the Division. 
 
126 SOLUTION OF THE 57TH PROBLEM. 
 
 The necessity, however, of covering the right flank makes the 
 sending of strong Detachments to the lower Settle unavoidable. 
 
 Whether it will be possible as the next step to advance as far as 
 the Mosel cannot at this moment be determined. 
 
 Since the Settle is still in our possession, the Division, after a 
 fatiguing railway journey, may be granted the benefit of billets in can- 
 tonments in advance of Courcelles as far as Mecleuves and Silly ; the 
 advance from there can also be made in separate columns of route. 
 
 At daybreak at 5 o'clock on the 2nd May the 1st Infantry 
 Brigade, the ist Squadron of Hussars, the 1st and 2nd Batteries 
 assemble at Mecleuves. 
 
 The ist Battalion of the 1st Regiment, together with the ist 
 Battery, march straight to Pouilly and put Marly in a state of defence 
 with one Company, destroying the bridge there. The Battery will 
 take up a position, according to the probable enterprises of the enemy, 
 on the height 203 west of or eventually south of Pouilly, whence the 
 flat and open ground is commanded from Augny as far as Coin. 
 
 The Main Body of the Brigade marches by Orny and Verny as 
 far as Louvigny,but leaves the 2nd Battalion of the ist Regiment, to- 
 gether with the 2nd Battery at Verny, and occupies both the Bois de 
 Lamence and Pommerieux with one Company. The bridge leading 
 to Coin is to be destroyed, that to Sillegny as well, and to be swept 
 by fire from the Battery close to and east of Pommerieux. 
 
 The Cavalry Brigade, which withdraws its patrols from the other 
 bank of the Settle and posts a line of relais on the road Pouilly 
 Louvigny, moves from Verny to Vigny, and places itself under cover 
 in the valley south-west of the latter place. 
 
 The 2nd Infantry Brigade, the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Squadrons of 
 Hussars, the 3rd and 4th Batteries also, assemble at 5 o'clock at Silly, 
 and advance by Vigny towards Louvigny. 
 
 The 10 Battalions, 19 Squadrons, and 3 Batteries, which are 
 assembled here, occupy a position on the height 253 in advance of the 
 road Verny Raucourt. Louvigny and St. Jure on both wings will be 
 occupied. A Detachment at la Hautonnerie destroys and watches 
 the bridge at Moulin Neuf. Only a post of observation will be sent 
 forward to Cheminot, which can be enveloped on all sides. 
 
 In front of the position of Louvigny, in which the attack of the 
 enemy can be awaited, shelter-trenches are to be dug at once, giving 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 57TH PROBLEM. I2/ 
 
 cover to the men lying down without appreciably hampering an 
 offensive advance even of Cavalry. 
 
 Gun-emplacements are to be constructed for the Artillery at the 
 points most suitable, the Batteries, however, remaining at disposal in 
 rear until a hostile attack has declared itself. 
 
 The permanent bridges at Longeville and Les Menils being in 
 any case not easily destroyed, are only to be barricaded, because the 
 attack from there is desired, and also in order to preserve the possi- 
 bility of an advance against the Mosel. 
 
 B. Verbatim shortJiand report of General v. Moltke' s verbal criticism. 
 
 It was our task to cover the most exposed part of the Metz 
 Saarbrucken railway, the part from Courcelles to Han, against 
 extensive enterprises of the enemy, probably because still further 
 transport was to be conducted into Metz. It is certainly clear that in 
 order to solve this problem we must occupy a position in advance of 
 the railway concerned. Imagine, gentlemen, that we could, for 
 instance, execute six marches more towards the enemy, we would 
 then be in a position to keep him off the railway for five days without 
 fighting, and during that time several Army-Corps could have been 
 sent off. 
 
 Here the circumstances are not so favourable, as the Division is 
 to complete the garrison of Metz later on. An offensive against the 
 Mosel is thus precluded from the outset. We must rather act, there- 
 fore, on the defensive, and make use here of the features of the 
 ground. Since we can execute only a single march without en- 
 countering the enemy, we must try to reach the Seille on the 2nd 
 May ; at what point of the stream we shall decide later on. 
 
 In the papers of the gentlemen three kinds of solutions are dis- 
 tinctly discernible. To begin with, several of you have advanced to 
 Buchy or its neighbourhood (Soigne, Luppy). But there you find no 
 support at all from the ground ; you can be outflanked and driven 
 away from the railway, as well as from Metz. That fortress not only 
 lies on the flank of your position, but even in advance of the pro- 
 longation of the front of the Division. 
 
 Some gentlemen for that reason do not intend to remain at 
 Buchy ; they wish to await further reports, and then to advance 
 against the enemy. But till to-morrow morning you will not get any 
 further reports about the enemy, and what was heard about him to- 
 day, that you know already. To-morrow you can, in addition, learn 
 
128 SOLUTION OF THE 57TH PROBLEM. 
 
 at the most that the Cavalry patrols received just the same Infantry 
 fire from Nomeny, whither the enemy meanwhile has advanced, as 
 they received from the heights on the Mosel on the 1st of May. If 
 you then march against the enemy you can no longer prevent his 
 debouching, and must perhaps fight on quite unfavourable ground ; 
 for you do not exactly know where you will encounter him. 
 
 Those gentlemen who wish to await further events at Buchy do 
 not fulfil the demands made upon them. They express, thereby, that 
 the General Idea, which was given to them, is incomplete, and that 
 they expect a new one. Some gentlemen have moved into a flanking 
 position at Verney. Something may be said in its favour, but 
 there are also objections to it ; for that position does not quite 
 fulfil one of the most important requirements of a flanking posi- 
 tion, namely, that we can act upon the enemy's line of retreat. 
 While we base ourselves upon the single point, Metz, the enemy 
 has a much greater choice he can retire everywhere on the 
 wide arc of Pont-a-Mousson by Nomeny, and still further to the 
 east If, for instance, he has crossed at Cheminot, and then has to 
 face towards Verny, he has Nomeny in his rear. 
 
 The destruction of the bridges, with the object of securing the 
 right flank, I consider practical, because for an eventual vigorous 
 offensive one surely sticks to the high-roads. But, at any rate, some- 
 thing besides must be done for securing the rear, as otherwise the 
 enemy can make us very uneasy by demonstrating on the Lower 
 Seille whilst crossing at the Upper Seille. 
 
 I would have detached a Battalion with a Battery to Pouilly. 
 The Battalion would have occupied both Pouilly and Marly with I 
 Company, while the Battery commanded the whole country at Cuvry 
 and Coin from the height east of Marly. The enemy cannot then 
 attempt bridging operations at that place. 
 
 With the Main Body I would have marched to Louvigny. If, in 
 that case, we detach another Battalion with another Battery to Verny, 
 the Lower Seille is completely secured. If the enemy then crosses at 
 Cheminot, which is the most favourable point for him, he cannot 
 comfortably deploy on the narrow strip of country east of that place, 
 while we meet him on a broad front. If he advances from Nomeny 
 we can just as well meet him at Louvigny. I therefore consider a 
 position at Buchy as faulty, and an advance from there as of doubtful 
 success. A flanking position at Verny can perhaps attain good 
 results, but I myself would have gone to Louvigny. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE $8TH PROBLEM. 
 
 Those gentlemen who were of a different opinion have developed 
 their views often very clearly and distinctly, although they arrived at 
 different results. I willingly grant that the problem was difficult. 
 One thing more I should like to notice : Many gentlemen, and par- 
 ticularly those who are mounted, have not used their Cavalry properly. 
 They order it to " maintain " the Seille line. I think that is demanding 
 too much ; this the Cavalry cannot be asked to do. It always feels 
 uncomfortable on foot, and I think it is more easy to attack a village 
 with dismounted men than to defend it. The garrison of a village 
 does not know what is going on outside it is afraid of the led horses 
 being moved away, etc. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 58TH PROBLEM. 
 A. Written solution by General v. Moltke, 
 
 The high ground at Louvigny offers, also with the front to the 
 south, a position with a clear field of fire in front and dominating the 
 opposite slopes, in which the Division has its line of communications 
 with Metz perpendicular in its rear. The enemy has his communi- 
 cations on the flank, and cannot march past our position without 
 laying them entirely open. 
 
 After the attack on the Lower Seille has been repulsed and after 
 the enemy's departure from there, it will be admissible to charge the 
 ist Battalion of the ist Regiment and the Battery alone with the 
 guarding of the stream upwards as far as Pommerieux, and to draw in 
 the 2nd Battalion and Battery No. 2 from Verny to Louvigny the 
 same night. 
 
 I. 
 
 The Division faces south and awaits the attack of the enemy. 
 
 The existing field work on the height 253 serves as a pivot for 
 the right wing. The crest of the valley of the Vigny brook will the 
 same night (otherwise to-morrow morning) be provided with shelter- 
 trenches and gun-emplacements. St. Jure and Allemont, lying within 
 the most effective fire of our Artillery, will be occupied and put in a 
 state of defence. After occupying the shelter-trenches the Infantry 
 posts itself for the present under complete cover of the reverse slope 
 of the heights, the Cavalry behind Vigny, whence it threatens the 
 enemy's advance on his right flank. 
 
 K 
 
I3O SOLUTION OF THE 58TH PROBLEM. 
 
 The distance from Louvigny to Vigny is too great for completely 
 occupying it with one Division. Both villages, however, receive a 
 small Infantry garrison, and one or the other may be reinforced 
 according to the progress of the fight. 
 
 2. 
 
 The Division attacks the enemy opposing it. 
 
 The enemy has retained posts at Longeville and Les Menils. 
 The Detachment at Marieulles has to march 3 to 4 hours if it wishes 
 to unite with its Main Body at Raucourt. If the enemy weakens 
 himself there by advancing with strong Detachments against the 
 railway (small ones our Cavalry will prevent) we are superior in 
 numbers when acting offensively, and there is a probability of beating 
 the enemy at Raucourt before the arrival of his reinforcements from 
 Marieulles. 
 
 Under cover of our Artillery the Battalions cross the Vigny 
 brook ; with St. Jure, eventually Allemont, as a pivot, they form in two 
 lines on the left bank. The Cavalry advances at a trot by the high- 
 road towards Louvigny, crosses the brook at Moulin de Moince, and 
 places itself on the right wing of the Infantry, where it will find the 
 best ground for charging, threatening at the same time the enemy's 
 retreat. Two Batteries thereupon follow the movements of the 
 Infantry and direct their fire at short ranges against Raucourt and the 
 salient of the wood of Ressaincourt. 
 
 The enemy will have to recall his Detachments from Secourt 
 with the utmost speed to Mailly, but probably be already defeated at 
 Raucourt. 
 
 This offensive movement would be in that case no longer possible 
 should the troops from Marieulles have previously joined at Raucourt. 
 Even a defence on the heights of Louvigny appears no longer advis- 
 able if these troops have already reached Cheminot. 
 
 3- 
 
 The Division retires on Verny. It is reinforced by the 1st 
 Battalion and the ist Battery. 
 
 The retirement is made by four parallel roads between Pom- 
 merieux and Liehon, screened by the high ridge of Louvigny, with 
 the Battalions first, then with the Artillery in echelon, finally with the 
 firing line and the Cavalry flanking it. 
 
 The height between Verny and Cherisey affords to a force like 
 

 SOLUTION OF THE 58TH PROBLEM. 13 I 
 
 the Division a position with a clear field of fire ; to the right the Bois 
 d'Avigy to be occupied. Reserves screened. 
 
 The enemy will hardly dare continue marching in an easterly 
 direction without attacking the Division standing at the same mo- 
 ment on his left flank at a distance of only 2\ miles. 
 
 The position at Verny can only be enveloped on its left wing 
 where Orny and Bois des Veaux then afford fresh pivots to the 
 defender. The assailant has also to make ample provision for secur- 
 ing his own lines of communication. 
 
 Against a decisive superiority the Division can no longer carry 
 out both tasks, but only one of them, the reinforcing of Metz. But 
 after having gained 5 to 6 days the covering of the railway is perhaps 
 no longer necessary, or is undertaken by other troops. 
 
 B. Verbatim shorthand report of General v. Moltke's verbal criticism. 
 
 On the evening of the 3rd May we are well acquainted with the 
 state of affairs on the enemy's side. There is no reason for assuming 
 that after to-day's vain attempts to cross the stream at Verny 
 Marly he will again advance to-morrow against the lower Seille. We 
 can therefore draw in the Verny Detachment to the Division and the 
 Pouilly Detachment to Verny. I think we can even order the Battery 
 of the latter to come .up, which, for greater security, perhaps, would 
 leave a few guns at Pommrieux. All these movements would of 
 course have to be executed in the evening of the 3rd, and this by way 
 of Coin, in order to remain unnoticed by the enemy. 
 
 The enemy is opposed to us in two separate groups ; the situation 
 of the Reserve Division is therefore clear. Now, most gentlemen 
 have said that, in case the enemy attacks to-morrow from the direc- 
 tion of Raucourt, they will remain at Louvigny. I assume they dc 
 not mean to imply to-day's position, for that was facing towards the 
 west, and would therefore present its left'flank to the enemy. Now, I 
 should have liked those gentlemen to furnish a description of the 
 position facing south, for surely one must be clear beforehand how 
 one wishes to use one's troops. Some gentlemen wish to transfer 
 their left wing to Allemont. But this has the disadvantage of being 
 commanded by the height west of the Bois de Ressaincourt and of 
 dividing the position into two parts by the Vigny brook, which 
 renders the movements of troops very difficult. I would have posted 
 myself on the line Louvigny Vigny, where I start from the supposition 
 that the troops are bivoucking along the road connecting those places 
 
 TT~WTVT. T5 
 
132 SOLUTION OF THE 58TH PROBLEM. 
 
 with outposts pushed towards St. Jure and Cheminot But the 
 position Louvigny Vigny is 4,000 paces long, and that is too much for 
 a Division. The right wing will have to be formed therefore by a 
 Battery on the height 253 (south of Louvigny), which may be there 
 already as a result of yesterday's entrenching. It flanks the ravines 
 of the Vigny brook and of the Seille. A second Battery would have 
 to be constructed about 2,500 paces east of Louvigny as a support for 
 the left flank ; in addition to this a slight shelter-trench is to be 
 excavated along the crest of the valley so that our skirmishers can 
 easily sweep the bottom. Allemont, St. Jure and Moulin de Moince 
 are to be occupied by advanced posts. The two former places would 
 have to be obstinately defended, as they are within effective range of 
 our Artillery ; the Mill, however, is to be occupied only slightly, for 
 there are 6 to 8 crossings. Generally, such a brook is not a real 
 obstacle at all. At Worth we went through a very different kind of 
 water. Also to Louvigny and Vigny I would detach only a few 
 troops, but should circumstances afterwards demand it I can always 
 reinforce the garrison there. The Cavalry is standing screened 
 behind Vigny, the Reserves behind the left wing, for that is refused ; 
 and the greatest danger for us is to be pushed against the Seille and 
 to be driven away from Metz. 
 
 On this occasion I must refer to some of the papers, the writers 
 of which have in an independent clear exposition decided in favour 
 of the offensive. Therewith they settle indeed all three possibilities, 
 that is to say, if they are victorious. But, surely, that is very doubtful, 
 for if we ourselves attack we transfer all advantages of the defence to 
 an equally strong opponent. We must attack frontally, and that 
 surely would be very unsafe, for experiences of the last war teach us 
 that the attacking party only succeeded when enveloping one wing. 
 But to do so a superiority is wanted which we do not possess. Our 
 attack will be brought about quite naturally if the enemy commits the 
 blunder of detaching a force against the railway, and of consequently 
 weakening himself before he has defeated the Division. If he 
 detaches a weak force he will not get to the railway at all ; if he 
 detaches a strong one we beat the part left behind the more easily, 
 and the rest retreats as a matter of course. 
 
 The mode of attack may vary much, as is always the case with 
 such things. In illustration I will mention here only one such case, 
 namely, a right wheel of the Division while maintaining St. Jure 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 58TH PROBLEM. 133 
 
 The close country there I like much better for the decisive arm than 
 the open ground further west. I first concentrate my Artillery fire 
 on the Bois de Ressaincourt, and then have it stormed by an Infantry 
 Regiment from Allemont. The possession of this wood has a two- 
 fold value. Firstly, I can collect behind it everything, and from there 
 easily take possession of the village of Ressaincourt. Secondly, the 
 wood affords to me a pivot against the hostile Detachment returning 
 from the east. After gaining the line St. Jure Ressaincourt, the 
 Division advances to attack the main position at Raucourt. The 
 Cavalry finds employment partly on the left wing in reconnoitring 
 towards the east, partly it has to act on the right wing on the open 
 ground towards Eply. This is only one example ; there are many 
 possibilities. 
 
 Some gentlemen follow the enemy by Buchy. But the enemy 
 has a start ; he can have occupied the height in the neighbourhood of 
 that place .at least with a Detachment before we have come up. The 
 Division must then either attack this strong position or remain halted 
 at Vigny. But it can get there into an awkward position ; if the 
 enemy advances from Buchy and Raucourt it must then go back to 
 Verny. Finally, on the departure of the Division to Buchy, a Rear 
 Guard, which is left behind at Louvigny in order to cover this flank- 
 ing movement, may, in case it does not follow quickly enough, be 
 driven away from its Main Body by the enemy coming from Rau- 
 court. 
 
 As regards the third case, some gentlemen say that they remain 
 at Louvigny until they have forced the enemy to deploy. But that 
 is not at all necessary, for the enemy will deploy of his own accord. 
 We cannot control the departure of the party from Marieulles, but 
 certainly the arrival of that column. If the enemy advances on 
 Cheminot, it is high time to retire, for the covering of the railway 
 must give way here to the safe retreat on Metz. 
 
 The Division had to go back in the first instance as far as 
 Verny. If the Rear Guard, which must remain at Louvigny only up 
 to the moment at which the enemy advances from Cheminot or St. 
 Jure, should be pressed, detachments could then occupy the Bois de 
 la Hautonnerie for the Rear Guard to fall back upon. But it is not 
 right to make the whole Division go only as far as Hautonnerie. 
 
 According to the map the position at Verny is moreover not bad, 
 the right wing is covered by the Seille, a possible still further retreat 
 
134 SOLUTION OF THE 5QTH PROBLEM. 
 
 is also favoured by the woods situated in the north. Those parts of 
 the enemy which started from Marieulles will have already marched 
 more than 9 miles when they arrive before Verny, which is also not 
 quite unimportant. 
 
 This is nearly all that I have to say in reference to these papers. 
 If one wishes to answer such questions as are set here, one likes to look 
 for certain rules and axioms. Such can, however, be only offered by 
 science, and that, in our case, is strategy. But strategy is not of a kind 
 like the abstract sciences. These have their invariable and precise 
 truths upon which we can build, and from which we can draw further 
 conclusions. The square on the hypotenuse is always equal to the 
 sum of the squares described on the sides which contain the right 
 angle ; that remains always true, be the right-angled triangle large or 
 small, be its vertex turned to the east or the west. 
 
 Now, we read much in theoretical books about the advantages of 
 " operating on the inner lines." In spite of that we must still ask our- 
 selves in each case what at the moment is the most advantageous. In 
 our last problem we were standing also on the inner line, and knew the 
 enemy's weakness at Marieulles, yet to none of the gentlemen did it 
 occur to advance across the Seille against Marieulles. 
 
 Strategy is the application of common sense to the conduct of 
 war. The difficulty lies in its execution, for we are dependent on an 
 infinite number of factors, like wind and weather, fogs, wrong reports, 
 etc. If, therefore, theoretical science alone will never lead us to 
 victory we must nevertheless not entirely disregard it. General v. 
 Willisen very truly says : " It is only a step from knowing to doing, 
 but it is a still greater from not knowing to doing." The best lessons 
 for the future we draw from our own experience ; but as that must 
 always be limited we must make use of the experience of others by 
 studying military history. Besides which, another means of further- 
 ing our education is the working out of such supposed warlike situa- 
 tions as our problems present. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 5 9 TH PROBLEM. 
 A. Written solution by General v. Moltke. 
 
 The enemy advancing from Frankfurt may have the intention 
 either of directly joining by two marches from Kerstenhausen the 
 defeated Corps about Wolfhagen, or of disengaging it by advancing 
 against the left flank of the pursuers. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 5QTH PROBLEM. 135 
 
 In the former case he will take the road by Fritzlar Lohne, in 
 the latter by Dorla and by Nieder Vorschiitz. To occupy the three 
 points mentioned would scatter the forces of the division ; it is advis- 
 able to keep it collected for the present at Gudensberg until the 
 advance of the enemy can be ascertained. 
 
 For that purpose the Cavalry, with some Horse Artillery guns, 
 is to be pushed out towards Fritzlar, Ober and Nieder Mollrich ; 
 Infantry posts in support of them at Werkel, Ober, and Nieder 
 Vorschiitz. 
 
 If the enemy crosses the Eder at Nieder Mollrich with his Main 
 Body, a position can immediately be taken up towards Nieder Vor- 
 schiitz. Right wing occupying Ober Vorschiitz strongly, left wing 
 Maderstein and Landen Berg weakly, reserve behind Maderstein, 
 Artillery on the Maderholzfeld. 
 
 If the enemy advances by Fritzlar, a position is to be occupied 
 at Dorla : Artillery on both sides of the village commands the 
 approaches to Werkel and Wehren, as also the lowlands of the Ems. 
 Ober Vorschiitz will be sufficiently occupied by Infantry. The Main 
 Body of the Division stands perfectly covered from view behind the 
 Nacken, and can support the one or the other wing as required. 
 
 If the enemy takes the road by Lohne, he cannot pass the 
 Division, as he is still within effective range of our guns ; he would 
 have to attack the steep heights of the Weissenborner Feld across 
 the Ems. 
 
 B. Verbatim short Jiand report of General v. Moltke's verbal criticism. 
 
 We will place ourselves at once in the position of the Corps 
 advancing from the south. It appears that it was meant to advance 
 as a reinforcement for the Western Corps. Meanwhile the latter has 
 suffered a defeat, and is pushed back. Now, what can the Southern 
 party do ? Two things : It can advance either by the road north- 
 ward in direct support of its defeated countrymen, or it can continue 
 its march on Cassel, and aid them indirectly by threatening our own 
 line of communication. As regards the former, it is doubtful whether 
 this Southern Detachment will find the Western Corps still at Arol- 
 sen ; where, and whether at all, cannot be foreseen. It depends on 
 the condition of the Western troops and the energy of the pursuit. 
 
 Perhaps the other means lead to the goal more surely : threaten- 
 ing the hostile communications by an advance on Cassel. But the 
 party advancing from the south now learns that a Division of the 
 
136 SOLUTION OF THE 59TH PROBLEM. 
 
 enemy has meanwhile advanced south of Cassel. That Division is 
 exceedingly awkward for it ; the Division can move against its flank 
 when it is marching towards the north, or oppose it frontally when 
 advancing towards Cassel. It is in the interest of the Southern 
 Detachment to attack the Division on the morning of the 3rd May, 
 and from this I conclude that we, the 22nd Division, are justified 
 in waiting and permitting an attack on us, if that is in our interest. 
 
 I think that some gentlemen have attached too great value to 
 the apprehension that the enemy could march past us, and too little 
 value to the preservation of their communications. If two bodies 
 have approached to within a distance of one day's march, they would 
 in reality not march past each other. On the other hand, one's own 
 line of communication is an exceedingly ticklish thing. We had such 
 a case, as you may remember, in the last war. Before Metz, we were 
 standing on the i8th of August with the front facing east, but, mark 
 you, after we had gained a battle two days previously. Up to that 
 time we had wisely enough left the 1st Army on the east side for the 
 protection of our communications. Still more dangerous was the 
 situation in January, 1871, in the south-east of France. The greatest 
 crisis would have occurred if General v. Werder had been beaten there 
 by Bourbaki, and if the latter had advanced on our communications 
 in a northerly direction. We would have been obliged to form quite 
 a new Army in order to prevent all that. 
 
 Now, if we were equal to the enemy or stronger than he, we could 
 do nothing better than to advance on Fritzlar, in order to accept the 
 final issue on the open field there between Ems and Eder ; we there- 
 by would prevent his advance towards Arolsen and Cassel. But 
 since we know that we are weaker, considerably weaker, we must look 
 round whether the ground offers compensation for our numerical 
 weakness. Then the line of the Ems presents itself to us, and we can 
 reach it in any case before the enemy. It offers us a succession of 
 good positions, for the northern bank almost throughout commands 
 the southern, and in each of the positions we have excellent pivots 
 and a clear field of fire. Our great want is to know where we are to 
 stand on the Ems, for the whole arc Kirchberg to Boddiger we 
 cannot occupy in a proper tactical manner. 
 
 Most gentlemen have also said very correctly : " At Holzhausen 
 we cannot remain, we must advance further. We will take up a 
 position of readiness at Gudensberg ; anything beyond that measure 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 5QTH PROBLEM. 137 
 
 must then depend on those of the enemy." Whether at Gudensberg, 
 south-west of Gudensberg, at the Nacken, or at the Wein Berg, is 
 nearly all the same. Gudensberg lies in the centre of the arc which 
 the Ems here describes. For that reason you were not asked in the 
 problem for a Divisional order ; there could be nothing else stated in 
 it but a simple order of march of the Division. All the rest must 
 be reserved, for we do not know what is going to happen. 
 
 It, further, is a general rule in war that a body of troops does not 
 march without an Advanced Guard ; but in war it is always a ques- 
 tion of adopting for each particular case what is the most practical 
 without adhering to unvarying general rules. Here we wish to take 
 up a position of readiness from which to change at once into the 
 fighting position. Now, several gentlemen have formed strong 
 Advanced Guards : 3 Battalions, several Squadrons, I Battery, and 
 then became embarrassed as what to do with them. They sent them 
 to Dorla, and that is intrinsically a judicious direction ; for it is most 
 likely that the enemy will advance by Werkel. But what if the 
 enemy came after all by Nieder Vorschiitz and we were attacked 
 there? We would then miss a good part of our forces ; they would 
 have to be called in first. It is therefore essential to keep the forces 
 together. What afterwards should be done from the direction of 
 Gudensberg some gentlemen have tried to elaborate in an abstract 
 manner on generally perfectly correct theoretical grounds, and have 
 overlooked thereby that it is a question of finding out what the enemy 
 could do on the 3rd May, what intentions he could carry into execu- 
 tion. We can find it out only by our Cavalry. Certainly, most 
 gentlemen said " We must reconnoitre ; we send forward officers and 
 patrols." But, gentlemen, these meet hostile patrols, and if the latter 
 are stronger, they must go back, and are prevented from seeing. The 
 Cavalry, it is true, is not to fight battles ; it is only to see, yet I 
 believe it was advisable to push out the whole Uhlan Regiment. 
 The enemy evidently must cross one of the bridges of the Eder, 
 either at Fritzlar or at Nieder Mollrich. I would send, therefore, I 
 Squadron towards Fritzlar, 4 a Squadron towards both Ober and 
 Nieder Mollrich, and would keep 2 Squadrons in reserve. Surely, 
 the enemy would have to be advancing in great force, if our Cavalry 
 could not have an opportunity of watching his movements beyond the 
 Eder. We cannot go beyond the Eder, as it will be occupied ; but I 
 believe that such a strong force of Cavalry can remain on the northern 
 
138 SOLUTION OF THE 5QTH PROBLEM. 
 
 bank of the Eder until clouds of dust or the heads of columns of the 
 advancing enemy become visible. If the enemy is marching by 
 Fritzlar or Nieder Mollrich we know whether to advance to Dorla or 
 to Maden. 
 
 If you look at the map in these two main directions you will find 
 that we have everywhere very good positions. At Maden we can post 
 the Reserves behind the village or at the Maderstein, Artillery pushed 
 out on the Maderholzfeld, to the right Ober Vorschutz strongly 
 occupied, to the left the Itters Berg, that is a strong position. But if 
 the enemy should wish to envelop our left flank, we find a new position 
 further to the rear. The three bridges (Werkel, Ober, and Nieder 
 Vorschiitz) must certainly be occupied, but only with weak Infantry 
 Detachments, not Battalions ; that enables the Cavalry to remain 
 longer in advance, and to observe more securely. At Dorla there is 
 also a good position. Werkel, situated in advance of the salient, we 
 certainly cannot maintain to the end. At last, also, the Artillery 
 positions on the Miihlenberg would have to be evacuated if the enemy 
 advances from the direction of Wehren, but at the beginning it would 
 have a fine effect on the enemy's advance. We then would find 
 behind Dorla a second position with pivots for the wings on both 
 sides, and we retain our line of retreat straight in our rear. 
 
 It still remains to be settled what would happen if the enemy 
 marches away to the north. Some gentlemen want to go across the 
 Ems in order to attack him, or to march by Kirchberg or Wichdorf 
 Merxhausen, in order to take up a position in the valley of the upper 
 Ems. This I would not advise in any circumstances. There is no 
 position in the valley of the upper Ems, no obstacle is found there in 
 front, and if the enemy leaves opposed to our front an equally strong 
 force he can envelop our right flank with his overplus, and drive us 
 against the defiles of the Ems, which just there are very difficult. We 
 certainly have then, in the most favourable case, our retreat still on 
 our 2 ist Division ; but if we arrive defeated not much good is gained. 
 On the other hand, since the enemy will attack us in all circumstances, 
 we find, in case of his advance to the north, a good position between 
 Kirchberg and Dorla. 
 
 Therefore, a position of readiness at Gudensberg, such as was 
 taken up by most gentlemen, but then : reconnaissance of what the 
 enemy is carrying out on the morning of the next day, and accord- 
 ingly adoption of the further measures that appears to me the 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 6oTH PROBLEM. 139 
 
 correct solution of the question. I grant, the problem was difficult, 
 because we know so little of what the enemy is doing ; but so it 
 happens to the weaker side in war as a rule. 
 
 You will get one more problem which is simpler, and you will 
 work it out simply also, and not bring in things which lie outside of 
 it. If gentlemen have puzzled their heads as to whether the I2th 
 and 1 3th Army Corps are following behind the nth Army Corps, if 
 they ask : What will happen if the enemy makes a left turn at Ker- 
 stenhausen in order to unite with the Western Corps somewhere in 
 Westphalia, or if he advances on Cassel on the right bank of the 
 Fulda ? well, gentlemen, these are quite new problems, and all the 
 military, strategical, and political circumstances would have to be 
 presented to you. You must confine yourselves to what is given. 
 
 In conclusion, I wish further to remark that a logical develop- 
 ment of the idea, a correct and clear manner of writing, and a good 
 style are also factors which have something to say when the problem 
 is criticised, even if it is not solved exactly in the sense which presents 
 itself to me as correct. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 6oTH PROBLEM. 
 
 A. Written solution by General v. Moltke. 
 
 La Chapelle, ist June, 1879, 6 p.m. 
 CORPS ORDER. 
 
 The 2Qth Division hands over I Squadron, I Battery, and the 
 Engineer Company to the 5 8th Brigade, which is to stand south of 
 Sermamagny ready to start to-morrow morning at 5 o'clock. 
 
 The Brigade advances to Valdoye, takes possession of that 
 village, and at once intrenches itself behind the Savoureuse. The 
 wooded heights d'Arsot and du Salbert will be occupied by Infantry. 
 When this has been carried out, the Regiment 1 12 continues its march 
 by the road round the northern foot of the Salbert to Chalonvillars, 
 where it either awaits the arrival of the 57th Brigade or follows it. 
 
 The remaining troops of the Division advance to-morrow morning 
 at 6 o'clock from south of Chaux by Sermamagny, Evette, Le Haut 
 d'Evette to Chalonvillars, occupy the heights of Le Coudrai and La 
 Cote on their front, and prepare Essert for defence. 
 
 The 28th Division, Corps Artillery as well as the ist and 2nd 
 Engineer Companies, assemble at La Chapelle at 6 a.m., and march 
 
140 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 6oTH PROBLEM. 
 
 by Errevet, Frahier, and Chagey as far as Buc Echenans. The 
 Advanced Guard, to be formed of all arms, occupies Urcerey and 
 Argiesans. The Corps Artillery at the tail of the column halts at 
 Chagey. 
 
 The Trains follow their troops in the afternoon. 
 
 The investment will be completed on the 3rd, by advancing the 
 right wing as far as the lower Savoureuse. 
 
 Dispatched in writing : identically to the 28th and 29th Divisions. 
 Verbally to the Commanders of the Artillery, the Trains and Com- 
 missariat. 
 
 B. Verbatim shorthand report of General v. Moltke's verbal criticism. 
 
 I thought I had given you a very easy problem, but it is surprising 
 how few gentlemen have hit upon the right thing. I already took 
 occasion at the last discussion to call your attention to the fact that 
 one must not tie oneself down too stringently to general rules, but 
 that departures from such are admissible. I think I have proved to 
 you that in the former problem it was not absolutely necessary to 
 form an Advanced Guard ; I should also like to convince you that it 
 was here not necessary nor advisable to form a Reserve which in the 
 event of an action was to move up as a reinforcement. A Reserve 
 stands best behind the centre of the straight front, taking into con- 
 sideration, of course, the roads and the ground ; a still more advan- 
 tageous station is behind a line bent outwards, whence it can advance 
 on any radius ; but the most inconvenient station is behind the convex 
 line, t.e. y one curved inwardly. If you post the Reserve at Frahier, it 
 has to march 4^ miles in order to support the left wing at Valdoye, 
 and 9 miles to support the right wing, by Chagey to Echenans, further 
 south. The Reserve will consequently arrive everywhere too late for 
 action. 
 
 I think it therefore more practical to leave the units which are 
 at our disposal, in this instance the Brigades, intact, so that they are 
 as strong as possible, and each able to form its own reserve. To this 
 end the Brigades must, of course, be made independent ; they must be 
 provided with the special arms, which the Infantry Brigades, as matters 
 stand, do not possess. I think you could apportion to each Brigade 
 a Troop of Cavalry for orderly purposes, 2 complete Batteries, and 
 an Engineer Company ; in that case you retain the whole Corps 
 Artillery and a part of the Engineers. The Engineer Battalion has, 
 unfortunately, only 3 Companies of Sappers, which will be much 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 6OTH PROBLEM. 14! 
 
 wanted during the investment. A reserve of Sappers, of whom the 
 General commanding could dispose, will, however, as a matter of 
 course, be set free when the Brigades have taken up their defensive 
 positions, and we see the ground and ascertain where extensive 
 entrenchments are to be executed. We will then send them there, 
 and send the Artillery to places where extensive positions for guns 
 offer themselves. 
 
 I believe therefore that support by one's own and the neighbour- 
 ing Brigades will be better and more rapidly insured than support 
 from the General Reserve, which can find no favourable position here. 
 Imagine that Valdoye is attacked before the Reserve arrives ; it is 
 then surely more advantageous if support comes from Cravanche 
 against the enemy's flank. A sortie from the fortress is always very 
 difficult ; a small detachment acting on the flank will have a much 
 greater effect than if 20 Battalions were stationed behind Valdoye; 
 the enemy has always to bear in mind that he has to go back again 
 into the fortress. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the garrison, 
 which is reinforced by only I mobile Brigade, has also to watch 
 towards the east, and that the garrison at first is fully occupied with 
 preparing and arming the fortress, that scarcely more than a Brigade 
 will advance to attack, and that when we are established it will be 
 very difficult for the enemy to push back even a single Brigade, if 
 both neighbours are on the alert and ready to aid. But if it is 
 absolutely wished to form a reserve, the distribution of the troops 
 must head the Corps Order after first briefly explaining the general 
 situation, so that each Brigadier knows what remains at his disposal. 
 
 Before we put ourselves in motion we must consider to what 
 point we wish to march and where the positions are which we need 
 for the investment. Valdoye then meets our eye first. It is a 
 matter of regret to me that only very few gentlemen have occupied 
 Valdoye ; it is certainly within the fire of the fortress ; but before 
 Paris we went much nearer than within range. To stop this gap of 
 Valdoye is for us of the very greatest importance. The eastern part 
 of the investment has in its rear the railway, if that is not destroyed ; 
 but we expect the whole of our materials by the northern road of 
 Giromagny and Sermamagny. We must not allow that one to be 
 interrupted, for by it will march during the following days large trains 
 with provisions ; by it must be brought up if the fortress is to be 
 besieged the whole Siege Train ,and the Ammunition Columns. 
 
142 SOLUTION OF THE 6oTH PROBLEM. 
 
 That road must therefore be secured under all circumstances ; but it 
 is only secured if we occupy Valdoye and the wooded heights on both 
 sides. I would not rely, then, at all on the 1st Reserve Division, but 
 say to myself: That village I occupy, and so also the east corner of 
 the Foret d'Arsot. Therefore, capture we must Valdoye under all cir- 
 cumstances, and I would order a Brigade to do it, so that we may 
 be sure of getting that village and the wooded heights. It is sufficient 
 if Valdoye is taken and rapidly put in a state of defence, quite as a 
 small post, which gives us timely warning for taking up our position 
 behind Valdoye, where we can deploy our whole Artillery. 
 
 It is now really indifferent whether the 29th Division stands on 
 the left, the 28th on the right, or vice versa. It is natural that we have 
 regard to the order of battle if the whole Army-Corps is together, that 
 we therefore use the 28th Division on the south-west and the 29th on 
 the north-west. If I now assume that we are standing with the 29th 
 Division on the north-west, the 58th Brigade would be designated to 
 occupy Valdoye and the wooded slopes on both sides of the valley, 
 and to keep them permanently occupied., With the remaining Brigades, 
 it is true, we would have to make flank marches, in so far as the 
 Brigades with numerous Artillery on mountain-roads present their 
 left flank to the fortress, up to the moment when they have arrived at 
 a point where they wheel to the left. They can then rely upon them- 
 selves ; but so long as they are engaged in the forest-roads and march- 
 ing in long columns it is necessary to cover their march. The 28th 
 Division is particularly affected by this as long as it is marching on 
 Chagey, because from there it turns towards the fortress. The position 
 next required for covering the movements appears necessary at Cha- 
 lonvillars, and I would order the 5 7th Brigade to that place. There 
 is no doubt that the Brigades of the left wing can unhesitatingly take 
 up their defensive positions already on the same day in the way they 
 have to maintain them subsequently during the investment. 
 
 Some gentlemen who occupied Valdoye have been over-cautious ; 
 they wished to delay the march until Valdoye was taken. That has 
 the disadvantage that the troops arrive too late, and that they have 
 no time left for adopting the preliminary measures for defence. It 
 remains to be considered, at the same time, that a full hour will elapse 
 before the whole Army-Corps gets into march ; therefore a Brigade of 
 the 28th Division may still be available for supporting an action at 
 Valdoye. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 6oTH PROBLEM. 143 
 
 The 57th Brigade is to be put in motion at once by Evette on 
 Chalonvillars, as most gentlemen have done, but where is it to 
 stand ? I believe it is necessary to occupy Essert and the two wooded 
 heights north and south of it. It certainly is still nearer to the 
 fortress than Valdoye, but it would only be seen into perhaps from the 
 Donjon ; the height in front is 1,200 feet, the valley 1,100 feet. Yet 
 should it be exposed to view we would have to confine ourselves to 
 occupying the western part of Essert, but particularly the wooded 
 heights on both sides similarly as at Valdoye for the possession of 
 the village depends on these heights. If Essert is occupied we can 
 take up a good defensive position in advance of Chalonvillars ; that 
 village must therefore certainly be occupied on the 2nd. You thus 
 cover the whole march of the 28th Division, to which for convenience 
 sake a special road must be assigned. It is to be found by Errevet 
 and Frahier. Now, how far is the 28th Division to march ? Some 
 gentlemen said it should go as far as Hericourt or even Brevilliers. 
 I do not consider that necessary. That is a march of 18 miles through 
 the mountains, and there is no urgent reason for marching so far. If 
 you assume the leading Brigade, the 56th, to advance by Chagey as 
 far as Buc Mandrevillars and Echenans, the 55th on the other hand 
 to halt in the neighbourhood of Chagey, Luze, and Couthenans, you 
 have the whole Division assembled. Should the enemy make a 
 sortie in that direction you are strong enough to repulse it. For the 
 3rd there remains then only an advance as far as the neighbourhood 
 of Botans. 
 
 As regards the defensive position, it would still be very desirable 
 for the 56th Brigade to advance at once as far as Buc, in order to 
 occupy the heights in a northern direction as far as Chaufour ; Val- 
 doye, Essert, and Urcery would then indicate the line. It would be a 
 question with the right Brigade, the 55th, whether one would push it 
 out as far as Botans or retain it at Dorans. Afterwards it will advance 
 to the Grand Bois, just as the investment on the other bank will pro- 
 ceed to Danjoutin. The last Brigade would arrive towards midday ; 
 whether it marches by Hericourt or takes the nearer road by Echenans 
 depends on circumstances. The investment would thus be com- 
 pleted. 
 
 I should like to mention some further details. Several gentle- 
 men wished to destroy the railway ; but that is no part of the prob- 
 lem. We do not know where the Army is standing, nor whether we 
 
144 SOLUTION OF THE 6lST PROBLEM 
 
 have to reconnoitre as far as Vesoul or towards the south. In order 
 to judge of that, all the circumstances connected with the Army, etc., 
 would have to be precisely stated. If in the problem 'nothing is said 
 about it you may assume that nothing is to be feared from that 
 quarter. The destruction of railways is, moreover, a two-edged 
 sword, it may be useless or very detrimental ; one must think twice 
 before doing it. 
 
 Some papers have not hit upon the solution as I have thought it 
 out for myself, but are very intelligent in judging the situation, which 
 still, however, leads sometimes to defective measures, e.g., it would be 
 quite impossible to remain at the halt between Evette and Chalon- 
 villars before the wood of Salbert has been captured. In some papers, 
 also, Artillery have got to the head of the columns, in consequence of 
 indistinct modes of expression. But if a handful of Franctireurs is 
 ensconced in the woods it cannot get any further. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 6iST PROBLEM. 
 
 A. Written solution by General v. Moltke. 
 
 Advanced Guard : 3 Battalions, 3 Squadrons, I Battery, and 
 i Ambulance Section, starts in good time, marches as Flank Guard 
 by Wever, Ober Tudorf, along the Haarweg, Cavalry ahead, and 
 opposes the enemy where he attempts to cross the Alme. 
 
 Main Body : 10 Battalions, i Squadron, 3 Batteries, and all the 
 Trains, in one column by the high-road, abreast of the Detachment, 
 the Squadron in advance, Trains in rear, Artillery behind the 3rd 
 Battalion. 
 
 Reinforcing the Detachment only so far as is necessary. 
 
 Defence, eventually, of the wooded district. Breaking off the 
 action from the left wing, gaining the position Oster Schledde. 
 
 If the whole Division is obliged to deploy, the leading Regiment 
 of the Main Body makes a left turn ; while it is advancing the loth 
 Brigade moves forward by the high-road into the second line. The 
 Trains continue the march along the high-road in rear of the fight. 
 
 B. Verbatim shorthand report of General v, Moltke 's verbal criticism. 
 
 The problem shows us the Division marching to the Rhine, and 
 in the first instance it is to march from Paderborn to Gesecke on the 
 2nd April ; perhaps its punctual arrival on the Rhine is of the 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 6lST PROBLEM. 145 
 
 greatest importance. The march, therefore, is the main object upon 
 which we have to direct our attention. We have no order to attack 
 the enemy, who has shown himself south of Haaren ; we shall by no 
 means go across the Alme and give battle. Our object is simply to 
 march to Gesecke. Neither shall we occupy a position on the way 
 for the enemy to attack us, if we can avoid it. If we cannot we will 
 have to take care, as far as is possible at least, that we are not attacked 
 in a position which is facing west, for then we could only continue 
 our march after completely defeating the enemy. But we are not 
 justified in supposing this, if the enemy, as is probable, is as strong as 
 we are. We therefore shall, if obliged to take up a position, be it 
 with a part, or be it with the whole Division, do so if possible with 
 the front facing south-east, for then we fight only a Rear Guard action, 
 and at the worst are pushed towards the object of our march. If we 
 can at all avoid it, we shall do so ; but you see the problem already 
 calls attention to a danger which could arise from the enemy, who has 
 shown himself south of Haaren, throwing himself upon our line of 
 march. 
 
 All the gentlemen have quite correctly recognised that it is 
 necessary to secure the left flank, that opportunity for doing so is 
 afforded by the apparently very considerable obstacle of the Alme, 
 which runs pretty well parallel to our direction of march. Various 
 means, however, have been proposed. If we first cast a glance on the 
 map, we see that the distance from Paderborn to Gesecke is less than 
 that from the south of Haaren to, let us say, Salzkotten, if the 
 enemy, as is probable, takes the most direct road ; that is to say, if he 
 advances by Wevelsburg. 
 
 We would accordingly have arrived with our leading troops in 
 the neighbourhood of Gesecke when the enemy arrives at Upsprunge. 
 But our column is more than 4^ miles long ; the enemy would there- 
 fore certainly encounter at least the rear of the column, if we do not 
 take precautions. Defiling will certainly cost him time ; he must 
 afterwards form up and advance with a deployed front ; but that is 
 not sufficient ; he must encounter at those defiles an active resistance 
 on our part. 
 
 Now, some papers have proposed to march with the whole 
 Division along the Alme. That would, I think, not be advisable. If 
 the column has a normal depth of more than 4^ miles it will extend 
 to 9 miles going by the field-paths ; it would need hours before the 
 
 L 
 
146 SOLUTION OF THE 6lST PROBLEM. 
 
 rear could close on to the head. It will surely be much more easily 
 able to support the Flank Guard if it remains with its Main Body on 
 the high-road. Moreover, a large body, as, for example, a Division of 
 all arms, does not leave the road unless absolutely obliged to do so. 
 
 Represent to yourselves the Flank Guard as fighting at Wevels- 
 burg ; you would then much more easily be able to support it from the 
 high-road ; that distance is much shorter than the length of the 
 column when marching by the field-paths. Now, if support of the 
 Flank Guard is necessary, the 3 Battalions of the leading Regi- 
 ment would simply make a left turn, and be at once ready for the 
 Flank Guard to fall back upon at perhaps the southern edge of the 
 zone of woods. The correct thing, we may say, is for the Main Body 
 to remain on the high-road, and a strong Flank Guard to march along 
 the Alme. Most of the gentlemen also have rightly understood that. 
 
 I will make a further interpolation here with a view to examining 
 the situation : a Prussian Division is marching to the Prussian 
 Rhine ; from that direction, therefore though it is not expressly 
 stated surely no danger is to be apprehended. Notwithstanding, 
 some gentlemen have thought the Division might be attacked from 
 the south as well as at the same time from the west. But surely it 
 cannot be my intention to lay a trap for you, gentlemen. Several 
 gentlemen, nevertheless, sent a strong Advanced Guard of 3 to 
 4 Battalions, with Artillery and Cavalry, ahead by the high-road. It 
 is, of course, in other circumstances a general rule that a body of 
 troops does not march forward without an Advanced Guard ; but 
 science does not give us a fundamental maxim which we must follow 
 everywhere ; it does not give us a formula which helps us over all 
 difficulties. In war the essential thing is to grasp every situation 
 correctly, and to adopt the measures most appropriate to the 
 situation. 
 
 Here, according to my opinion, we would not need an Advanced 
 Guard at all ; our Advanced Guard is the Flank Guard which is 
 marching in that direction where danger threatens. It is sufficient if 
 a Troop of Dragoons is sent ahead in order to see what is going on. 
 One must therefore under certain conditions know how to cast one- 
 self loose from general rules. Advanced Guard and Main Body 
 would here be in proper relation if any help was needed for the Flank 
 Guard. 
 
 Now, most gentlemen have correctly recognised that they must 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 6lST PROBLEM. 147 
 
 form a strong Flank Guard for delaying the advance of the enemy ; 
 they have in some cases furnished it with 4 to 5 Battalions and 2 to 3 
 Batteries. I don't consider that necessary ; i Regiment and I Bat- 
 tery would for the present be ample. It is also desirable to make the 
 columns not too long ; a small column marches more rapidly. 
 Strangely enough, almost all gentlemen when doing so have under- 
 stood the matter in such a way as to direct the leader of the Detach- 
 ment to occupy a position. How can you know where the man has 
 to take up a position ? That depends upon the enemy. It is sufficient 
 to say to the Commander of the Advanced Guard : You have to pre- 
 vent the enemy crossing the Alme. He will then go of himself where 
 the enemy is crossing. The man will be reasonable ; he will not remain 
 at Tudorf if the enemy is crossing at Ahden or somewhere else. But 
 with a position, e.g., at the Stiissauer Teich or behind the Lohn with 
 the wood close in front how, in that case, will you regain contact 
 with the Flank Guard if the column continues marching on ? You 
 would then have to halt with the Division at Salzkotten. 
 
 The Flank Guard, to which I would attach the whole of the 
 Cavalry, will send it forward at a trot : it probably arrives on the 
 Alme simultaneously with the enemy. If we assume the Advanced 
 Guard of the Division to be at Wever on the evening of the 1st, it is 
 standing nearer to Graffeln than the enemy, who is behind Haaren. 
 Our Cavalry will probably arrive sooner at the defile than the enemy's 
 Infantry, and will occupy it provisionally with dismounted Dragoons. 
 The reports of the carbines will then apprise the Commander to what 
 point he has to hasten his march. 
 
 It would not be right to indicate to the Detachment a point 
 where it should halt while the enemy is crossing perhaps further up. 
 If, nevertheless, the enemy could not be prevented from crossing the 
 Alme, if he should have already a number of troops across (which is 
 not probable), and if the Flank Guard were obliged to retire, the 
 Division would be obliged to detach a force upon which it could fall 
 back. I am even of opinion that at that time we would already be 
 between Gesecke and Salzkotten, and would advance with a Regi- 
 ment to the edge of the wood or with as much as we think necessary. 
 We then have the retreat open to Gesecke ; nothing further can 
 happen to us than being slightly pressed, but we get to Gesecke. 
 There we find a position which can be occupied, the Oster Schledde. 
 
 I have previously mentioned that one does not take up a posi- 
 
 L 2 
 
148 SOLUTION OF THE 6lST PROBLEM. 
 
 tion en route. Now there exists a similarity in a group of papers 
 which, all quite rightly, send a Flank Guard along the Alme, but 
 which would, with the Main Body, take up an intermediate posi- 
 tion behind Upsprunge merely for the sake of the Trains ; these 
 were to march on behind it. The Train is, however, not the main 
 object, but the Division. You will require at least an hour for 
 getting into the intermediate position, and then you expose the 
 Division for several hours to the danger of being attacked by an 
 equally strong enemy in a situation in which it has its rear against 
 the bridge of the Lippe and the direction of march in prolongation of 
 the flank. I don't consider that safe, and it is not necessary. Either 
 the Flank Guard alone keeps back the enemy the Division then 
 continues marching unmolested or you must support it ; then an 
 action develops alongside the road. 
 
 To leave the Trains behind entirely would be a very bad measure 
 We do not know at all yet whether the enemy will advance in the 
 direction of Salzkotten. If he hears of the presence of a large column 
 at Paderborn we hardly will see the Trains again. 
 
 I will just read to you my rough copy of the solution : The 
 Division continues its march by Salzkotten on the 2nd April. The 
 former Advanced Guard, brought up to 3 Battalions, 3 Squadrons, 
 i Battery, and I Ambulance Section, advances as a left Flank Guard 
 at 5 o'clock, by Wever and Ober Tudorf, along the Haarweg, the 
 Cavalry at an accelerated rate in advance. The Detachment opposes 
 the enemy where he will cross the Alme. (Thus full freedom is left 
 to the Commander.) 
 
 The Main Body : 10 Battalions, I Squadron, 3 Batteries, i 
 Engineer Company, with Divisional Pontoon Troop and i Ambu- 
 lance Section, marches on a level with the Flank Guard, the Squad- 
 ron in advance, Artillery behind the 3rd Battalion of the column, all 
 Trains closing up immediately at the tail of the column. Reinforcing 
 the Flank Detachment only so far as is necessary to be able to con- 
 tinue the march with the Main Body. Support for the Flank Guard 
 at the southern edge of the woods. If it becomes necessary to deploy 
 with the whole Division, the leading Regiment makes a left turn. 
 While it is moving off the other Brigade moves by the road into its 
 proper righting position. 
 
 The Trains continue their march. Breaking off the action from the 
 left wing. Gaining the section of ground behind the Oster Schledde. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 62ND PROBLEM. 149 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 62ND PROBLEM. 
 
 A. Written solution by General v. Moltke, 
 
 The mere frontal advance against the apparently very tenable 
 defiles of the Alme promises little success ; at the best we force the 
 enemy to an orderly retreat. 
 
 The Regiment No. 60, strengthened by I Battery and \ a 
 Squadron, marches through the Prowenz wood, and posts itself under 
 cover at Steinhaus. 
 
 The Division advances against Drei Eichen, the Advanced Guard 
 deploys for action against that point. 
 
 From the attitude of the enemy's Advanced Guard it will soon 
 be discerned whether he intends to continue his offensive or not. 
 
 If it offers vigorous resistance, the Main Body forms up in ad- 
 vance of the Oster Schledde, the Regiment No. 60 moves in the 
 direction of Hannebols Linde on the flank of the columns advancing 
 across the Alme, and the Main Body assumes the offensive at the 
 proper moment. 
 
 If the Advanced Guard, after a slight skirmish, gives way before 
 an attack, the Division continues its advance against the Alme, the 
 Regiment No. 60 marches by Biiren against the enemy's flank. 
 
 B. Verbatim shorthand report of General v. Moltke 's verbal criticism. 
 
 The Division is charged with inflicting a defeat on the enemy if 
 possible. I can imagine that this order was subjected to some criti- 
 cism at headquarters in Gesecke. They would say : " We are to make 
 the enemy suffer a defeat ; the enemy stands in a formidable position 
 behind the river. How are we to set about this ? It is our business to 
 march to the Rhine. How far are we to run after him ? " The Com- 
 mander-in-Chief is responsible for that order, but the Division for its 
 execution. The Commander-in-Chief surely may also have had his 
 reasons for issuing that order. It is perhaps very inconvenient for 
 the Commander-in-Chief to see a hostile Division remaining so close 
 to a road, which is perhaps to be a line of communication. The 
 6oth Regiment is just available ; it is handed over to us, and we are 
 desired to provide against the above-mentioned inconvenience by a 
 rapid blow. Willingly or unwillingly we will have to undertake the 
 business after all. 
 
 Now we next would have to ask : What may the probable in- 
 tentions of the enemy be? And then we find that only two cases are 
 
I5O SOLUTION OF THE 62ND PROBLEM. 
 
 possible. A third one is at once to be eliminated from consideration, 
 namely, that the enemy withdraws without at all accepting battle. 
 Then we can only report to headquarters that the enemy could not 
 be made to suffer a defeat, because he is no longer there : that goes 
 without saying. There remain, therefore, only two cases to be 
 examined : either the hostile Division comes across the Alme in 
 order to attack us, or it remains halting, and will defend itself behind 
 the river. You will learn at once what the enemy's intentions are so 
 soon as you attack the position at Drei Eichen. If there is in that 
 position an Advanced Guard of a Division advancing to attack, it will 
 accept the fight and carry it through to the end, sure of the arrival at 
 any moment of the Division which is following in support. If, how- 
 ever, in the position at Drei Eichen the Rear Guard of a Division is 
 standing which is halting or even retiring, it will not accept an action, 
 certainly not in advance of the defile, but it will retire. Although 
 you will learn the intentions of the enemy by this attack, yet that 
 would be too late for adopting measures suitable to all cases. It will 
 therefore be necessary to arrange matters from the beginning in such 
 a way that they fit the one case as well as the other. 
 
 Some gentlemen made their resolutions dependent on a previous 
 reconnaissance by the Cavalry. Thereby you surrender the initiative. 
 The forenoon will pass, and by the Cavalry alone you will learn 
 nothing ; for the enemy will not give up the position at Drei Eichen 
 merely in the face of Cavalry. Still less can you expect the Cavalry 
 to bring intelligence whether the enemy is marching back behind the 
 Alme or not. It is better that you form your resolutions at once 
 from the outset. 
 
 Some gentlemen have proposed a position in the neighbourhood 
 of Gesecke ; they wish to let the enemy come up, and then in turn 
 to become offensive against him. Well, gentlemen, but if he does not 
 come ? Shall we report : We have had the good intention of making 
 the enemy suffer a defeat, but he did not come ? That will not do ; 
 that would not be carrying out the order. It happens that in fact 
 there is no position in the neighbourhood of Gesecke which could be 
 at all recommended. The position at the Elsinger Warthe has the 
 large wood of Prowenz close in front. We do not learn that the enemy 
 is moving against it; but he will probably attack our right wing. 
 Still less can we occupy a position further in advance with the wood 
 closer in front. The position at Wester Warthe also in no way com- 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 62ND PROBLEM. 15! 
 
 mends itself. The ground does not favour it ; the deep ravine rather 
 divides the battlefield into two parts and interrupts the communica- 
 tions in rear of the position. Altogether I would not advise the 
 occupation of a position at Gesecke which, the nearer it is taken up 
 to our road, will bring that road the more in prolongation of our 
 front, and, in case of an unsuccessful issue of the battle which, 
 surely, is always possible would lead the Division northward across 
 the road into very disagreeable terrain. 
 
 We are now justified in saying, that although we have grown 
 stronger by 3 Battalions, on account of the 6oth Regiment being 
 brought up, which may follow in Reserve or serve to prolong 
 the front of attack a purely frontal attack can hardly succeed 
 against that position. We must certainly keep our forces collected 
 on the northern bank of the Alme. If the enemy attacks us there, we 
 must, in a measure, oppose to him an equal force. We then still 
 retain an overplus of forces which we can use to advantage only 
 against his flank, naturally only against his left flank. If you strengthen 
 the 6oth Regiment by a Battery of 4 guns, and allow it to advance as an 
 independent Detachment against Steinhaus, it will render you there the 
 very best services. It is quite understood that the Commander must 
 be ordered and he would also do so of his own accord that, if the 
 enemy advances across the Alme, he is to advance against his left 
 flank ; that will stop the enemy's advance at once. The enemy will 
 be obliged to detach a force towards his left, and thus make it easy 
 for the Division to issue from the wood. If the enemy is standing 
 behind the Alme, the Commander will have to seize Biiren. Even if 
 Biiren is actually occupied by the enemy, he still has every prospect, 
 owing to the formation of the defile here, of forcing his way in. He 
 can then boldly advance against the enemy's left wing or against his 
 communications. No misfortune can befall him ; he cannot be very 
 much pressed in the wood, and has his line of retreat on Erwitte 
 straight in rear. This advance will have the greatest influence on 
 the maintenance* of the position on the Alme. For the enemy 
 necessarily must as he cannot at all overlook what is coming against 
 him in the wood detach a force against it and weaken himself in 
 front. That gives to the Main Body an opportunity of perhaps 
 capturing the formidable bridges. 
 
 The question now is : How shall we dispose of the Main Body of 
 the Division ? I am delighted to have seen very many of the gentle- 
 
152 SOLUTION OF THE 63RD PROBLEM. 
 
 men correctly grasping the idea, that we can fight only with a front 
 facing east. They have caused an Advanced Guard to move against 
 Drei Eichen, but they did so somewhat late, when getting into motion 
 with the Main Body. They advance through the wood in several 
 columns, with the left flank refused so that they can form front by a 
 simple left wheel, if the enemy crosses the Alme. They thus place 
 the enemy, after he has crossed, in a most critical situation : he is 
 obliged to make a left turn, and has the defiles on his left flank. 
 They have, indeed, every chance of gaining a decisive success. But 
 if he remains behind the Alme, it is, according to my opinion, only 
 possible to lay hold of him by Buren. Unfortunately, also, those 
 gentlemen who have made such practical dispositions in the manner 
 above described, have scarcely, or not at all, taken into consideration 
 the second case, that of the enemy remaining behind the Alme. But 
 surely that is absolutely necessary for carrying out the orders. Other 
 gentlemen have arrived at different results. That cannot be wondered 
 at ; different opinions may exist, if they are only brought out in a 
 logical and clear manner. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 6$RD PROBLEM. 
 A. Written Solution by General v. Moltke. 
 
 The Detachment can oppose the enemy already on the heights 
 behind Rezonville. But it has nothing to lean on there ; on the con- 
 trary it has the defile in rear, and will very soon be enveloped and 
 driven back by the undoubtedly great superiority of the enemy. 
 
 A position at Gravelotte is somewhat better. The enemy is 
 obliged to advance by the road under the fire of our Batteries or 
 through the bottom of the valley under that of our skirmishers. The 
 defence of the village and farms may detain him for hours. But 
 when the Detachment finds itself in the end obliged to give up its 
 position, its retreat will be a very difficult one. We must, moreover, 
 consider that a renewed advance across the deeply-cut Mance valley 
 will hardly be possible, even for the troops of the reinforced gar- 
 rison. 
 
 A flanking position at Malmaison, front facing south, exposes 
 the Detachment to the danger of being altogether unable to return 
 again to Metz. 
 
 On the other hand, such a position at the Bois des Ognons facing 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 63RD PROBLEM. I 53 
 
 north would most surely fulfil its purpose. Connection with Metz is 
 ensured by two bridges at Ars sur Moselle. 
 
 The Battalions occupy the edge of the wood ; the Cavalry posts 
 itself under cover east of the north corner of the wood. The Batteries 
 stand at the corner of the wood protected from enfilade fire, and 
 keep the road-bridge under a most effective fire, and the skirmishers 
 pushed in advance render it difficult to cross the bottom of the valley. 
 Even a support by the heavy ordnance from the high-lying forts, 
 which are thus no longer masked by us, is not precluded, although 
 the range is 6,000 metres. 
 
 The enemy is quite unable to gauge how strong we are in the 
 wood. As long as we are stationed there on his flank he cannot 
 establish himself on the plateau ; he must drive us away. Even after 
 loss of the edge, such a fight in the wood, in which the enemy cannot 
 make his superiority felt, may last the whole day long. 
 
 If the Detachment is not entirely driven across the Moselle on 
 the 2nd, the Bois des Ognons is the most favourable line of approach 
 for the reinforcements from the garrison of the fortress for recapturing 
 the heights. 
 B. Verbatim shorthand report of General v. Moltke's verbal criticism. 
 
 The problem said that " Metz is threatened with siege," and that 
 we are to prevent the enemy from taking possession of the plateau 
 of Gravelotte. Well, with a weak force one cannot besiege Metz ; we 
 may be, therefore, sure of the enemy arriving in considerable force. 
 At least 80,000 to 100,000 men are required for the siege of Metz. 
 Whether the heads only of such a force have provisionally arrived, 
 whether they are advancing by one or by several roads, that is all 
 unknown ; but we may assume with certainty that the enemy is 
 greatly superior. Offensive proceedings can, therefore, hardly lead to 
 any success, but may well lead to catastrophes. We must, therefore, 
 make up for our weakness by using advantageous ground, and look 
 for a defensive position. 
 
 There presents itself first the position on the height east of 
 Rezonville. But that village lies in the valley, which there presents 
 no frontal obstacle ; pivots for the wings do not exist at all, and there 
 is no time for entrenchments. We will arrive at Rezonville perhaps 
 simultaneously with the enemy. Moreover, the position can be 
 turned on all sides : the enemy can advance by the Romer Strasse 
 and envelop our right wing. The intention of those gentlemen who 
 
154 SOLUTION OF THE 63RD PBOBLEM. 
 
 have taken up that position is intrinsically quite correct : they wish 
 to force the enemy to an early deployment, and thus to gain time 
 which is certainly of importance. But it makes a great difference 
 whether a strong or quite a weak body is acting in that way. In the 
 former case, if we oblige, for instance, an Army-Corps, marching by 
 one road, to deploy, it takes 3 to 4 hours ; but the enemy will 
 deploy here only with his Advanced Guard. The deployment of 5 
 or 6 Battalions does not take long, and if we then have to move off 
 we have gained little time. But, if we accept battle, we run the risk 
 of being followed at once by the enemy. He need not for this 
 purpose break off the engagement ; he can follow us deployed for 
 action, and arrive simultaneously with us on the plateau of Grave- 
 lotte. But if we wish to retire slowly, and repeatedly to face 
 about, it is illusory, and would certainly not be done in actual 
 warfare. 
 
 A second position is that behind the upper valley of the Gorze 
 brook. Those gentlemen who occupied that position have placed 
 their Artillery on the heights 956 and 964. That is quite right, 
 for the Artillery must advance close to the edge in order to keep 
 the convex slope of the ravine under fire. But that position is com- 
 manded by the opposite bank, and in front of the right wing there 
 lies the wood, which it is impossible for us to occupy with our small 
 force. If the enemy penetrates as far as this, he drives away our 
 Artillery with Infantry fire. The right wing is altogether most in 
 danger ; a long resistance, I believe, will not be possible here either. 
 
 The position at Gravelotte Mogador after all keeps the forces 
 concentrated, and we have ample time to fortify it. Both roads join 
 there, an envelopment of the position is therefore more difficult for 
 the enemy, but we have a formidable defile immediately in rear. If 
 the enemy envelops our right wing (it is supposed that we have 
 occupied Malmaison for observation and that those troops after- 
 wards withdraw again to Gravelotte) and advances as far as the 
 hollow road, retreat becomes impossible. But, in case we go back 
 betimes to the plateau of St. Hubert, every prospect of an offensive 
 subsequently vanishes, if on the next day the complete war garrison 
 arrives. 
 
 All the gentlemen have rightly recognised and expressed the 
 difficulties of all these positions ; but, notwithstanding that, they 
 thought they must occupy at least the best of them. I can imagine 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 63RD PROBLEM. 155 
 
 that they said to themselves, This is a curious problem ; it cannot 
 be solved at all. I also believe that no position facing the enemy 
 answers the purpose. But we can perhaps elude the enemy. 
 
 Let us figure to ourselves for one moment the idea of a flanking 
 position. A flanking position is a position which is taken up near 
 and parallel to the enemy's line of operation a position which the 
 enemy cannot pass without laying open his lines of communication 
 a position which he cannot attack without changing his front, thus 
 getting his communications on his flank a position where a vic- 
 torious action and a pursuit divert him from his original object. 
 At the same time we must consider of course that we also abandon 
 our line of retreat. A flanking position can therefore as a rule only 
 be taken up in our own country, where a friendly hinterland exists 
 upon which we can live. That will be much more difficult in an 
 enemy's country. We, moreover, offer one wing to the enemy ; it 
 is therefore a condition that this wing finds a strong support in the 
 ground otherwise the enemy advances obliquely, and thence rolls 
 up our position. 
 
 Several flanking positions have been taken up. Firstly, one 
 facing south in the wood alongside the Romer Strasse. But the 
 edge of that wood is 3,000 paces long ; an adequate occupation is 
 therefore not possible. The right wing finds no other support but 
 the edge of the wood, and the enemy would very soon take pos- 
 session of the corner of the wood. If he should advance thought- 
 lessly against Rezonville, an opportunity would perhaps be found 
 of creating much confusion among his Advanced Guard by a sudden 
 rush forward. A particular success, however, would not be gained 
 thereby. Another flanking position was taken up at Malmaison. 
 The same holds good for that one as for the former. Those gentle- 
 men who have selected one of these positions should have made one 
 thing clear to themselves : namely, that, if they accept battle, they 
 could not count upon getting back into Gravelotte by a left turn. 
 They would have got back into Metz perhaps by a roundabout 
 way through Chautrenne and then by Woippy ; but there is always 
 a danger attending it. 
 
 Somewhat better is a flanking position in the neighbourhood of 
 Flavigny, facing north, and with its line of retreat, although by 
 decidedly circuitous roads, just behind it. The enemy will then 
 certainly be obliged to deviate from his original direction ; but the 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
156 SOLUTION OF THE 63RD PROBLEM. 
 
 plateau of Gravelotte remains perfectly open. The position is, more- 
 over, too far in advance, and the march to it exceedingly difficult. 
 If we advance by the high-road, an encounter with the enemy may 
 take place already at Rezonville ; but hardly any roads at all lead 
 through the wood. 
 
 Thus, after all, no other choice is left but Occupation of the 
 northern edge of the Bois des Ognons. Gentlemen, imagine the 
 edge of that wood occupied by two Battalions deployed in company 
 columns with firing-line in front, in the square re-entering portion a 
 Battery protected against enfilade fire from the other bank. A road 
 leads from there straight to the rear. If that wood-path is im- 
 passable for Artillery both Batteries would find a position near the 
 north-east corner of the wood. That is also just the place for the 
 Cavalry, which naturally at first remains at Rezonville for observa- 
 tion ; it stands there perfectly screened. 
 
 That position fulfils the primary conditions required of a flanking 
 position. Besides the paths through the wood, there is the high-road to 
 Ars in its rear, where two bridges are found. The river itself secures 
 the connection with Metz. The left wing leans for support on the 
 ravine of the Gorze brook. However, you will say to me now : " But 
 Gravelotte remains thus quite open, and while the enemy attacks us 
 he steps on to the plateau ! " That is quite right ; but he does not 
 possess it. As long as he must expect to be attacked at any 
 moment from the wood on his flank, he cannot establish on the 
 plateau either Artillery or Engineer Park. He cannot judge, more- 
 over, what there is in the wood, and he is continually threatened 
 until he has complete possession of the wood. We have nothing to 
 fear from an occupation of the heights of St. Hubert ; the enemy 
 comes there under fire from the forts of Metz. The enemy can do 
 nothing else but attack us and drive us away. He will advance on 
 both sides of the road through the valley ; on the plateau he will 
 execute a right wheel under the fire of our Artillery, and then attack 
 the edge of the wood, which is defended by our Infantry, and which 
 we can have strengthened at our leisure. 
 
 I anticipate that the enemy will first post himself under cover 
 of the undulations, move up his Artillery, and wait until sufficient 
 forces have come up, in order to attack our left wing simultaneously 
 with the front. If we lose the edge of the wood we naturally must 
 go back, and will then slowly retire as far as the bend of the high- 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 64TH PROBLEM. 1^7 
 
 road. A perfectly parallel action then ensues in this bush, which 
 is difficult to pass on account of the dense undergrowth. The paths 
 leading through it are continuous defiles ; the enemy therefore 
 cannot make use at all of his superiority ; at the most he can only 
 bring up from behind more and more reinforcements in order to 
 fill the gaps in front. But also we have a Battalion still in 
 Reserve. Cavalry and Artillery he cannot use at all any longer, 
 after his skirmishers have gained the edge of the wood ; an en- 
 velopment is not possible, as we have deep ravines to the left and 
 right. 
 
 Thus the affair turns out to be on equal terms, and it will be an 
 arduous advance step by step. In this way the fight can be dragged 
 along till dark, and if we even maintain ourselves only at the southern 
 edge there is left the possibility of resuming from there the offensive 
 to-morrow, when reinforcements arrive. That will at least be more 
 easily done from there than by the defile of Gravelotte. In that 
 manner the difficult task is best accomplished. From those gentle- 
 men, who have not hit upon it, several good papers have been handed 
 in, which show a clear intelligence and a trained military eye for the 
 ground. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 6 4 TH PROBLEM. 
 A. Written solution by General v. Moltke. 
 
 The occupation of the gently sloping range of heights east of 
 Blumberg, extending about 5,000 paces from the Doring lake, about 
 as far as the Kibitz lake, corresponds with the strength of the hostile 
 Army Corps, at the same time permitting the retention of sufficient 
 Reserves in a covered position. The frontal attack on that position 
 will entail exceedingly great losses owing to the effect of the enemy's 
 fire, who in all probability is covered by shelter-trenches and gun- 
 emplacements. 
 
 On the other hand, the configuration of the ground permits us to 
 maintain the line Seefeld Krummensee with comparatively small 
 forces against probable offensive enterprises of the enemy, and to 
 employ a considerable part of the Army Corps for an attack on one 
 or the other of his wings. The patches of wood in front of both facili- 
 tate an approach. Now, the envelopment of the enemy's right wing 
 would at best drive him only on his line of retreat, while an advance 
 
158 SOLUTION OF THE 64TH PROBLEM. 
 
 against his left soon threatens his line of communications, which will 
 not remain without reacting on the defence of the main position. 
 
 Therefore, the 4th Division will be charged with the defence of 
 our front. 
 
 The /th Infantry Brigade moves into a covered position behind 
 the Fenn Berg. Its skirmishers are pushed out as far as the high-road,, 
 where they entrench themselves, in so far as that road and the strip 
 of wood do not already afford sufficient cover. Only a post of obser- 
 vation is sent to Krummensee, but a Battalion is posted at Seefeld. 
 It furnishes the escort for three Batteries of the Divisional Artillery, 
 which from the Spitz Berg will engage the enemy's Artillery. 
 
 The 8th Brigade, the Corps Artillery, and the 3rd Cavalry 
 Brigade, form a Reserve at the Ziegelei, at the road from Seefeld to 
 Werneuchen, in order to reinforce, according to the course of the 
 action, the front or to support the attack of the right wing. 
 
 The 3rd Division is designated to carry out that attack. Three 
 Batteries of its Artillery unlimber on the height close to and north of 
 Lohme. 
 
 The Infantry of the Division advances in echelon in such a 
 manner that the 5th Brigade with a Battery forms the furthermost 
 echelon on the right wing. It occupies the wood south of Reh Bruch, 
 and advances from there to attack the woods at Helenenau with 
 skirmishers and supports, the Battalions eventually following close 
 behind. 
 
 The 6th Brigade conforms to that movement on the left, main- 
 taining connection with the 4th Division. As soon as the Batteries at 
 Lohme are thereby masked they move up nearer to the wood. 
 
 The General commanding will attend to reinforcing with the Corps 
 Artillery ; he will also notice the proper moment for probable action of 
 the Cavalry Brigade, and finally determine when the /th Brigade is to 
 proceed with the frontal attack according to the progress of the right 
 wing at the Christinen Heide. 
 
 B. Verbatim shorthand report of General v. Moltke's verbal criticism. 
 
 Gentlemen, The situation as stated in the problem is evidently 
 exceedingly unfavourable for the hostile Army Corps. We may well 
 assume that it is surprised at the approach of the 2nd Army Corps, 
 that it received intelligence of its advance towards Werneuchen only 
 after it had already, as stated in the problem, moved through Bernau 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 64TH PROBLEM. I 59, 
 
 in the forenoon, and that the superior strength of the 2nd Army Corps 
 is unknown to it. Now, the hostile Corps, as it could not do other- 
 wise, has at once turned from Bernau to the left and occupied a posi- 
 tion at Blumberg facing east, and that is, according to my opinion at 
 least, not at all an unfavourable position. For, surely, it cannot be 
 looked upon as a considerable disadvantage if the ground rises a few 
 metres in a distance of 1,000 paces. The position has an excellent 
 field of fire on all sides. The right wing, certainly, does not find any 
 support from the ground, but it does not matter ; that defect can be 
 remedied by a Battery on the height 235. The bulk of the Corps 
 stands screened behind the heights, and can move from that place 
 under cover in all directions. Some embarrassment is felt on the left 
 wing, in so far as a complete occupation of the patches of wood in 
 advance cannot be undertaken without weakening too much the 
 defence of the front. It is of course a very great disadvantage that 
 the lines of communication are situated completely on the flank. 
 
 I daresay it is evident that the hostile Corps cannot march 
 to-morrow on Berlin. Even if the 2nd Corps does nothing whatever,, 
 and remains completely passive, it would still be a desperate situation 
 to advance against a town of a million inhabitants while a superior 
 body of troops is standing immediately in rear. We therefore have no 
 reason whatever for pushing ourselves between Berlin and the enemy. 
 
 If we place ourselves now in the enemy's position, he can in the 
 first instance collect all his forces and offensively advance on Wer- 
 neuchen. If he succeeds in driving us from our present position, the 
 conditions for his lines of communication improve at the same rate as 
 he progresses. The further he penetrates beyond Werneuchen the 
 more he gets his communications on Bernau into his rear ; if he finally 
 succeeds in completely defeating us, the road to Berlin is also open to 
 him. 
 
 How he would fare in such an enterprise, that is a different 
 question. It would certainly not be the first time that a weak body 
 defeated a stronger one, especially if the latter has previously 
 weakened it by detaching largely. That case is improbable, but 
 still possible, and we cannot disregard it entirely. We also have to 
 take care of our lines of communication : we are standing with our 
 back towards the Oder, over which there is no bridge from Ciistrin to 
 Schwedt, and we also must execute a kind of lateral movement if we 
 are beaten. In any case we must protect our Trains. 
 
I6O SOLUTION OF THE 64TH PROBLEM. 
 
 Another enterprise, or rather a different proceeding, of the hostile 
 Corps would be to do nothing at all, remaining in its position and 
 awaiting a frontal attack. Then the consideration becomes paramount 
 that in case of misfortune affairs with the enemy would take a very 
 unfavourable turn. He might be pushed away in a direction which 
 must have for him the gravest consequences. That case is therefore 
 still more improbable. 
 
 The enemy will try to extricate himself from that embarrassing 
 situation as soon as possible. That is of course not possible without 
 fighting ; the Corps are too near for that. How would the enemy 
 now be able to execute that retreat ? He probably will leave his 
 Batteries for the present in position and accept the Artillery duel, he 
 will demonstrate with Infantry on the heights, and withdraw it only 
 after the Main Body has departed. He has 3 roads to retreat by : 
 Blumberg Bornicke,Blumberg Bernau, and the road leading to Birk- 
 holz, and then into the high-road. His columns are thus considerably 
 shortened. Everything will depend upon the patches of wood being 
 maintained between Lohme and Bornicke. If he has to deploy for 
 action, which can be done by the 3 columns simply making a 
 right turn, he is formed in 3 lines which can support each other. 
 But he will do that very reluctantly, and continue marching as long 
 as possible. Therefore everything with him depends on gaining 
 time. 
 
 From that immediately follows what we have to do. If we have 
 bivouacked opposite the enemy we naturally have placed outposts 
 somewhere in a line, Lohme Seefeld Krummensee. We will have to 
 arrange our measures for the above-mentioned three cases, and the 
 strength which we give to the different bodies will be regulated by the 
 probability of these three cases respectively. 
 
 First of all the securing of our front. It is only natural if we 
 apportion the Brigade of the left wing to that duty. Some have 
 apportioned the 6th Brigade to it ; no exception can be taken to 
 that, if it was stationed on the left wing, but then it ought to have 
 been specially stated that such was the assumption. We employ the 
 8th Brigade to do so, strengthened by the Divisional Cavalry Regi- 
 ment The Brigade finds a favourable defensive position on the so- 
 called Hohen Graben. The Cavalry observes towards the enemy 
 beyond Krummensee. The Artillery will be placed with 2 Batteries 
 both behind the Fenn Berg and behind the Spitz Berg, whence they 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 64TH PROBLEM. l6l 
 
 flank the whole front in case of attack. Some gentlemen have pushed 
 the Artillery more forward, but it then stands under a convergent fire 
 of the hostile Batteries. The Brigade has two other duties besides : 
 to occupy the enemy and to detain him in his position. That is of 
 course not to be done by advancing in mass, but in the first instance 
 by skirmishers, who will surely find some cover on the ground. It 
 would finally have to carry out the frontal attack, but in order to 
 avoid unnecessary losses, not before the action on the opposite wing 
 makes itself felt. These are the duties of that Brigade. If it discovers 
 that the enemy intends to withdraw it will of course advance at once. 
 
 It is the simplest to designate the /th Brigade as a Reserve. It is 
 best placed behind Lohme, where it can reinforce the 8th Brigade and 
 also support the right wing. From Lohme it can advance also on the 
 flank of an eventual attack by the enemy. 
 
 We have the whole 3rd Division now available for advancing 
 .against the enemy. Several gentlemen have quite correctly designated 
 the 3rd Division for that object, but they advance with it by Weesow, 
 Wilmersdorf and Bornicke. That is a march of 4^ miles ; they lose 
 much time thereby which benefits the enemy. It has, moreover, the 
 disadvantage of dividing the Army Corps into two parts without con- 
 nection ; for the Reserve Brigade is insufficient for upholding that 
 connection. Some gentlemen caused additional bridges to be con- 
 structed across the Igel Pfuhl ; but that is not at all necessary ; 
 between Igel Pfuhl and Lohme there is room enough for 2 Brigades 
 If we deploy the 6th Brigade with its left wing at Lohme we have a 
 position for 3 Brigades in close contact and with a Brigade in 
 Reserve. The 5th Brigade deploys then for attack further north, in 
 order to envelop the enemy. 
 
 It is here not a question of making a turning movement, but of 
 executing an envelopment by the shortest road past the right of 
 Lohme. The 5th Brigade then advances against the Fenn Fichten, 
 the 6th against the Reh Bruch. If the patches of wood are not 
 occupied, so much the better they are serving then as pivots for a 
 further advance ; if they are occupied, we have Artillery enough for 
 preparing the attack. It depends on how rapidly we take possession 
 of all those patches of wood and what success we gain. The right 
 column of the enemy will probably no longer get to Bernau ; it will 
 have to give way beyond Zepernick or Buch, and try to rejoin its 
 Corps behind the Panke. 
 
 M 
 
1 62 SOLUTION OF THE 65TH PROBLEM. 
 
 There are several papers which have not adopted exactly the 
 same measures which I propose, but which are clearly and logically 
 written, and from which a correct military judgment may be inferred. 
 That is the main point ; for in war as well as in art there is no fixed 
 rule ; talent cannot in either be replaced by a regulation. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 65 PROBLEM. 
 
 A. Written solution by General v. Moltke. 
 
 ( Verbal criticism vide 66th Problem.} 
 
 (To i.) The Detachment bivouacs near the wood between Lang- 
 guther and Lobe lakes. Outposts on the Passarge, 
 piquet in Langguther Miihle. 
 
 (To 2.) Timely start : 6 o'clock. 
 
 The Dragoons and the Battery No. I at an accelerated pace 
 ahead. Two of their Squadrons, until the arrival of Infantry, occupy 
 the patches of wood on the line of lakes between Eissing and Mahrung 
 lakes, 4 guns behind Ramten Locken Teich (Miihlen T.). 
 
 Two Squadrons continue the march, and in tne same way occupy 
 the section between Mahrung and Narien lakes, 2 guns east of Horn. 
 
 The Infantry Brigade marches by the road to Mohrungen in the 
 order of battle in one body, the Battery between both Regiments (at 
 the present without Advanced or Rear Guards). Rifles in rear. 
 
 The outposts follow so soon as the column has passed Wor- 
 leimen. 
 
 This side of Locken the leading Battalions I. and II. of the 
 Regiment No. 2 1 turn to the right, relieve the 2 Dragoon Squadrons, 
 and eventually take up a position behind Locken Miihlen Teich. If 
 necessary : reinforcing by the Rifle Battalion and guns from the 
 Main Body. These Detachments follow the Main Body as soon as 
 it has reached Eckersdorf, and from that moment form the Rear 
 Guard. 
 
 From Eckersdorf the Fusilier Battalion of Regiment No. 21 goes 
 eastward round Horn, in order to occupy the section hitherto held by 
 the Dragoons. 
 
 The Main Body marches westward round Horn, and takes up a 
 position north of it until the Corps has passed Himmelforth, draws in 
 all the Detachments, and eventually falls back fighting on Himmel- 
 forth Pfeilin^s. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 66TH PROBLEM. 
 
 SOLUTION OF THE 66TH PROBLEM. 
 A. Written solution by General v. Moltke. 
 
 The field of attack of the Eastern Corps is limited by the Narien 
 lake and the Passarge, and lengthwise divided into two halves by 
 the lake-valley of Banners Lettau Waltersdorf. The assailant will 
 have to decide whether to advance concentrated along one of those 
 sections or separated along both. 
 
 If he has knowledge of a large Detachment of his enemy stand- 
 ing at Herzogswalde he will scarcely advance with all his forces 
 against the front of Liebstadt Pittehnen, because that Detachment 
 when advancing between Milden and Wuchsnig lakes would take his 
 attack in flank and rear. He would be obliged to move a consider- 
 able part of his forces through Lettau against that Flank Guard in 
 order to occupy and to detain it; he would arrive before the main 
 position of the 2nd Corps weakened, and the attack on it would still 
 depend on success at Herzogswalde. 
 
 If the Eastern Corps would rather determine to advance with all 
 its assembled forces ..against the Flank Detachment, the latter could 
 certainly be pushed back notwithstanding the favourable ground 
 It will then not withdraw between both lakes thus masking the front 
 of its own Corps but, still fighting, join its right wing by Workallen. 
 Any pursuit, however, would be brought to a standstill by an offensive 
 advance of the Main Body by way of Achthuben. An advance of the 
 Main Body straight forward on Banners should oblige the Eastern 
 Corps to retrace its steps at once on account of the position of its 
 lines of communication. 
 
 Hardly any other choice is therefore left to the Eastern Corps 
 but to divide its forces. 
 
 The Main Body directed against Herzogswalde does not strike 
 the vital part of the enemy, and endangers the lines of communica- 
 tion. The Flank Guard has 'therefore to expect only a secondary 
 attack, which it has to sustain on favourable ground, always ready to 
 fall with its Reserves upon the flank of the main attack. It does not 
 so very much matter whether that is done in more or less strength. 
 Only after the Flank Detachment is pushed back beyond Alt Bolitten 
 does the mutual flank defence between Detachment and Main Body 
 cease. The former will therefore not immediately join the Main 
 Body on the 3rd of April, but remain in its exceedingly favourable 
 position and establish and maintain itself there to the best of its power. 
 
 M 2 
 
164 SOLUTION OF THE 66TH PROBLEM. 
 
 B. Verbatim shorthand report of Lieutenant-General Count v. 
 Waldersee's verbal criticism (representing General v. Moltke). 
 
 Gentlemen, An Army-Corps is endeavouring to effect a junction 
 with another which is also advancing and about three or four days' 
 marches distant. It ascertains that a hostile Army-Corps is uncom- 
 fortably near its right flank. It consequently turns somewhat to the 
 left in order to avoid, as much as possible, contact with the enemy, 
 and charges a Detachment, a combined Brigade, with protecting its 
 march. That is the situation upon which both problems are based. 
 
 The two tasks demanded from the Brigade are of essentially 
 different nature on the 2nd and 3rd April. While on the 2nd it is a 
 question of covering the Army-Corps during its march, and of avoid- 
 ing at the same time as much as possible any fighting, in order that 
 the Army-Corps may not have to face about and become engaged in 
 an action, it is on the 3rd a matter of protecting, in the first instance, 
 the Army-Corps which is forming up, of covering its deployment 
 therefore, and so far from avoiding an action, even of bringing one 
 about, at least on no account of evading it, and thereby giving the 
 Army-Corps time to complete its deployment, and thus preventing its 
 being drawn into a serious action even on that day, the reason for 
 this being that the ist Army-Corps can only in the evening arrive 
 abreast of our Corps. 
 
 If we look at the ground we find the Army-Corps separated from 
 the enemy by the Passarge. The latter is at that part of its course a 
 rather unimportant little stream and not a considerable obstacle. 
 That is also apparent from the fords which can be recognised at 
 several, places by the roads leading up to them and continuing on the 
 other bank. It is altogether difficult for a Detachment of so little 
 strength to undertake the protection of such a long river line ; the 
 course of the Passarge is also unfavourable in so far as it bends to the 
 right when on a level with the Mahrung lake, and therefore approaches 
 the enemy. He would be able to cross the river before we are in a 
 position to oppose it. But the Kissing, Mahrung, and Narien line of 
 lakes, running parallel to the Passarge and to the direction of the 
 march of the Army-Corps, forms a prominent feature. These lakes 
 cover the Corps on the flank ; between them there are only two 
 defiles. It will therefore come to this, that the Detachment bars 
 these defiles against the enemy. The great majority of the gentle- 
 men have certainly hit upon the right thing by laying stress upon the 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 66TH PROBLEM. 165 
 
 defile of Locken. They have endeavoured to take post there, in 
 order to await the enemy in the first instance, and then to resume the 
 march after a certain time. Just as important, however, is the defile 
 between Manning and Narien lakes. This was not sufficiently 
 recognised by many gentlemen. The enemy can push forward there 
 just as well as further south. We do not know where the enemy was 
 met. The problem tells us : at Allenstein. That does not mean that 
 the intelligence is true ; the enemy can have also advanced further to 
 Deppen ; he can construct bridges and attempt an advance there or 
 further up. 
 
 I now turn to the measures for the evening of the 1st April. I 
 have chosen this line of argument because I wish gentlemen to see 
 that, although we had different tasks for the 1st and 2nd of April, 
 both had still to be considered together. They are most intimately 
 connected. Get used to keeping in view the duties also for the 
 following day when adopting the measures for the evening. One 
 must try to arrange the quarters for the Detachment for the night in 
 such a way that time and distance are gained thereby for the march 
 on the following day. 
 
 If gentlemen had taken that into account they would probably 
 have selected the bivouac of the Detachment further to the rear than 
 they have done. The right place for it is between Langguther and 
 Lobe lakes. It can here be altogether only a question of bivouacking, 
 for we are in the neighbourhood of the enemy. If we wished to move 
 into cantonments much time would be lost in the evening on the one 
 hand, and on the other much time would also be required for collect- 
 ing the Detachment on the following morning, and the troops would 
 thus have less rest in cantonments than in a bivouac. Truly, bivouack- 
 ing in East Prussia on the istof April is not a pleasure. The map 
 is partly very indistinct, and may have rendered the problem more 
 difficult for the gentlemen ; particularly the course^ of the Passarge 
 which runs through the Langguther lake is not easily recognised. 
 
 We have arrived at Langguth with the intention of continuing 
 the march. W T e must therefore cross the Passarge at the Langguther 
 Miihle and place it between ourselves and the enemy, owing to which 
 our measures of security are very much simplified. Some gentlemen 
 have selected a bivouac south of Langguth, and many gentlemen 
 have chosen cantonments, causing thus an undue extension. The 
 most suitable place in all the circumstances is between the two lakes 
 
1 66 SOLUTION OF THE 66TH PROBLEM. 
 
 mentioned. If there is a place near Lobkeim, billets may be drawn 
 in that village. As regards measures of security, an occupation of 
 Langguther Miihle would really suffice. But it would commend 
 itself to push the outposts farther, in order to keep open the defile at 
 all events. A natural outpost position is the course of the Alte 
 Passarge. If we push out there about 2 Companies with a few 
 orderlies and occupy with I Company Langguther Miihle, we have 
 done all that is wanted. Many gentlemen have gone too far as 
 regards the number of troops for the outposts, up to a third of 
 the total strength. These are manoeuvre ideas. We there wish to 
 practise, if possible, all our troops in outpost duty ; that is the reason 
 for the regulation that at the manoeuvres of Detachments a third of 
 the strength is to be used for that duty. In real warfare we must try 
 to do it with as few troops as possible, for they have no rest at night. 
 The fewer, the better. Here, 3 Companies with a few Troopers 
 will go a long way. Moreover, very much Cavalry was attached to 
 the outposts. There is no object in that. Cavalry also needs rest. 
 Reconnaissances by Cavalry were also ordered for the evening even. 
 Imagine patrols advancing at night on that ground ; they are fired 
 upon somewhere in the wood, they have to return, and know just as 
 much as before. Leave them in peace. For reconnaissance we need 
 daylight. 
 
 Then, some gentlemen have ordered additional measures for the 
 evening. Frequently great value has been attached to the defile of 
 Pulfnick, and they were anxious to reach and to occupy it that very 
 evening. The wording of the problem : "The Detachment after a long 
 march on country roads," etc., means that the troops are tired and 
 must have rest ; no further movements can therefore take place. 
 Movements even to Locken only are inadmissible. Give rest to 
 the troops to-day and start early to-morrow morning. It is not 
 likely that the enemy will forestall you. His patrols withdrew on 
 Alt Schoneberg ; he does not like to march at night either. 
 
 An order was also given to destroy bridges on the same evening, 
 especially that at Pulfnick. At the same time it was overlooked that 
 two fords lead at that bridge across the Passarge ; the demolition 
 is therefore to no purpose. The Engineer Company was also sent 
 abroad alone during the night with the order to destroy bridges. 
 That is inadmissible. The Cavalry also was frequently charged 
 with demolishing bridges. The Cavalry generally cannot do that ; 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 66TH PROBLEM. l6/ 
 
 for one does not known whether the bridges are of stone or of wood. 
 Those are measures which are easily adopted on paper, but rarely 
 executed in reality. 
 
 If we summarise the measures for the evening then I propose : 
 Crossing of the Detachment at the Langguther Miihle, going into 
 bivouac at a suitable place between Lobe and Langguther lakes, 
 outposts at the most 3 Companies, for the remainder rest. 
 
 The next morning an early start must be made in any case. It 
 is the ist of April, somewhat after the equinox ; the sun rises at 5.35 ; 
 towards 5 o'clock it begins to grow light. A march before that time 
 is therefore a perfect night march. I propose 6 o'clock ; we then 
 have had daylight for an hour, the troops have time to get ready and 
 to cook during daylight, only the mounted troops will have to be astir 
 somewhat sooner. 
 
 It is a question of reaching the defile between Eissing and 
 Mahrung lakes in time to bar it against the enemy. That defile is 
 connected with the Passarge bridge at Pulfnick. Several gentlemen 
 have transferred their defence to there. The ground is, however, not 
 quite suitable for it, as the Passarge on the right bank is bordered by 
 woods. We are not able to ascertain the enemy's advance : he 
 reaches the river unmolested. We stand there also somewhat 
 cramped, and have our line of retreat through an awkward defile. 
 Give up the idea, therefore ; you stand better and more concentrated 
 on the plateau near Locken with the lowlands of the lakes in front of 
 you. If you make up your mind to receive the enemy there you 
 would, I feel sure, do right. 
 
 But we must appear there early. Some gentlemen have therefore 
 sent Cavalry ahead, and ordered it to occupy a position provisionally. 
 But nobody made up his mind to attach Artillery to that Cavalry. 
 An idea prevails that Cavalry can only be accompanied by Horse 
 Artillery. That is not the case; Field Artillery is also able for this 
 duty. But attaching Artillery has here a great significance, for you are 
 to delay the enemy. If a few Squadrons are standing there, fighting on 
 foot perhaps, the enemy will go boldly forward, as carbine fire is all 
 he gets ; he will hardly suffer any long delay. But if you imagine 
 Artillery distributed, you can receive the enemy with shells soon after 
 he has crossed the bridge at Pulfnick. This causes a halt ; the enemy 
 will not march boldly forward without taking any further notice, but 
 he will reconnoitre first. Time is thereby gained, and that is just 
 
1 68 SOLUTION OF THE 66TH PROBLEM. 
 
 what we want. And so much time must be gained that the Detach- 
 ment is able to come up. Let the Dragoon Regiment therefore 
 advance early, at an accelerated pace, and attach a Battery to it. The 
 Regiment takes post behind the line of lakes with the Artillery ready 
 for action, and awaits the enemy. 
 
 The Detachment itself marches without any further subdividing, 
 because the Dragoon Regiment is its Advanced Guard. Also a Rear 
 Guard is hardly necessary, the outpost troops forming it quite naturally 
 when joining in the march at the proper distance. Let the Detachment, 
 therefore, march closed up by the high-road in one column of route, 
 the 2* Batteries perhaps behind the leading Battalion, all closed 
 up. Sqyeral gentlemen have left some troops behind at Langguth to 
 stay there for some time. That is to no purpose ; neither is the con- 
 sideration whether the enemy could push on by Langguth. If he 
 does so we can calmly let him push; he meets then only the tail of the 
 Army-Corps, which has sent its baggage in advance. If the enemy 
 comes in contact with our Rear Guard he only does what we wish 
 him to do : he drives us towards our object. We have no inducement 
 to render that movement difficult for him. He will probably not be 
 able to advance even to Locken if he ascertains that we are standing 
 there ; he has to detach a force, or his advance will be delayed. 
 
 Just as it is necessary to have troops at the defile of Locken, so 
 also is it necessary to appear with troops in time between the other two 
 lakes, viz. : east of Horn. As soon as the Detachment reaches Locken 
 with the leading troops, it will be desirable to throw a part of the 
 Cavalry and Artillery farther forward, in order to face the enemy 
 between the two lakes and to await him there. If you send perhaps 
 2 Squadrons with 2 guns they could act in the same manner as 
 was the case at Locken. That does not give absolute protection, 
 but the mere appearance of those troops will have the desired 
 effect. 
 
 The question now is, How long we shall remain at those defiles. 
 Many gentlemen have made a calculation which is mostly correct ; 
 but we must keep in constant communication with the Army-Corps, 
 as we must know where it is at any moment, in order not to err. We 
 have to arrange accordingly the moving forward of the Detachment 
 at Locken for the occupation of the defile at Horn. 
 
 * The wagons of the 2nd Battery, which is attached to the Cavalry, must be meant here, 
 as there are only 2 Batteries. TRANSLATOR. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 66TH PROBLEM. 169 
 
 In addition to these measures it will still be necessary to continue 
 reconnoitring towards the enemy. A few patrols, however, are quite 
 sufficient for that purpose. Some gentlemen have sent forward the 
 whole Dragoon Regiment, others some Squadrons. I propose to send 
 only patrols, who will have to move in the direction of Seubersdorf. 
 We must of course from the outset reconnoitre also towards Alt 
 Schoneberg. These patrols have to remain constantly on the ground 
 in advance, and to observe the march of the enemy. If it is ascer- 
 tained that the enemy is crossing at or above Kallisten on that day, 
 the Detachment at Locken will still have time to bar his advance at 
 Horn. If he crosses at Pulfnick and attacks Locken, the duration of 
 the resistance will have to be gauged by the numbers with which he 
 does so. The ground is well adapted for a Rear Guard action. We 
 evacuate the first position, withdraw behind the Locken brook, and 
 afterwards to Eckersdorf. We find everywhere supporting points for 
 the flanks, we cannot be enveloped, and we make in any case a slow 
 retreat. 
 
 Some gentlemen have taken notice of the defile at Gross Her- 
 menau. That is situated in advance of the Army-Corps which is on 
 the march, and has nothing to do with the problem. When other 
 gentlemen resolved to march from Langguth forward against the 
 enemy, they made a mistake, since the problem says : " to avoid an 
 action as much as possible." 
 
 The day has now passed without the Detachment being attacked 
 either at Locken or at Horn. The Army-Corps has executed the 
 march to Mohrungen. It will on the 3rd of April march on Lieb- 
 stadt, and again be accompanied by the Detachment on its right flank. 
 The patrols establish in the morning that the enemy in considerable 
 strength has moved to Deppen, and had bivouacked at Schlitt. After 
 an early start of the Detachment, and while it is marching to Herzogs- 
 walde, the further news arrives that the enemy intends to cross at 
 Deppen. He is constructing some other bridges in addition to those 
 already existing there a sign that he will effect a crossing with large 
 bodies of troops. 
 
 The Detachment, according to the problem, has arrived at 
 Herzogswalde and occupied the Ponarien forest with 1 the Rifle Bat- 
 talion. It is not stated in the problem where the Cavalry is. If, 
 however, gentlemen will imagine their situation they will find that its 
 place is on the right flank. I would have therefore sent forward the 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 66TH PROBLEM. 
 
 whole Cavalry Regiment to the heights at Seubersdorf, whence it can 
 observe the enemy; it can eventually move still farther to Waltersdorf. 
 It is a question of hiding as much as possible our own move- 
 ments from the enemy's view. The Army-Corps is to deploy at 
 Liebstadt. If hostile patrols get as far as Banners they can overlook 
 the deployment. That must be prevented. The Dragoon Regiment 
 must therefore be instructed to advance to Seubersdorf to watch the 
 enemy from a suitable spot, to reconnoitre his march, but at the same 
 time to prevent an advance of the hostile Cavalry on Banners, so as to 
 veil our own movements. 
 
 The enemy's advance must be considered in regard to a strip of 
 ground more than 4^ miles broad between Passarge and the line of 
 the larger lakes. That strip is again divided into two sections by the 
 smaller line of lakes stretching from Waltersdorf to the Wuchsnig 
 lake. The ground on each of these sections forms a kind of ridge, 
 which slopes down towards the lines of lakes and the Passarge. That 
 is nearly how the ground appears to me ; at any rate the high-road 
 Waltersdorf Liebstadt runs along the top of the eastern ridge. 
 By the problem we know that the Detachment is left without instruc- 
 tions. It only knows that the Army-Corps, which reaches Liebstadt 
 with the leading troops at 10 o'clock, will deploy there and await the 
 1st Army-Corps, which is advancing from Wormditt on the other 
 bank of the Passarge, but which can only arrive at Schwenkitten 
 in the evening. The distance from Kallisten to Liebstadt is about 
 7 miles. The reports say that the enemy has crossed the Passarge 
 at 10 o'clock and deployed on both sides of the Waltersdorf high- 
 road. If the enemy begins his advance unmolested he will undoubt- 
 edly reach the Corps about midday. He will either force it to fight 
 or oblige it to evade him. It will rest with the Detachment to prevent 
 this advance of the enemy, which is so dangerous. 
 
 It must therefore accept the fight independently. We must ask 
 now, What are the chances of such a fight ? The ground, as we have 
 seen, is divided into two parts by the line of little lakes. The enemy 
 can advance on the right or on the left section, or he can divide and 
 advance on both. His tendency must be, if he calculates rightly, to 
 reach the Army-Corps as early as possible, and to hurl it in a direc- 
 tion that will render its junction with the ist Army-Corps impossible. 
 That will induce him to advance on the right section. He then 
 encounters the left wing of the Army-Corps, and will eventually be in 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 66TH PROBLEM. 171 
 
 a position to drive it away from the Passarge. How can the Detach- 
 ment prevent him from doing that ? 
 
 It is standing at Herzogswalde. The nature of the map makes 
 it exceedingly difficult to judge the ground correctly. It took me 
 some time before I got a clear idea of it. I estimate that Herzogs- 
 walde lies low at its southern part and rises gently towards the 
 north ; it is commanded immediately on the south. The whole hilly 
 ground between Herzogswalde and the Wuchsnig lake is very much 
 confused. It consists of a number of knolls, which are separated by 
 irregularly-formed and sometimes deep glens. Towards the patches 
 of wood, the western part of which bears the name of Ponarien forest 
 the ground slopes gently downwards, but then rises again to sink 
 once more towards the former, but now drained, Bergling lake. In 
 short, the ground on the whole is undulating ; but even these undu- 
 lations are very much mixed, and therefore difficult to use. Of 
 prominent objects there are marked on the map : the Teufels Berg, 
 which considerably commands all the rest of the ground ; adjoining 
 that Berg is something resembling a strongly-marked plateau, which 
 gives me the impression that the Detachment could, in some measure, 
 find a position there. It would of course have in front the strip of 
 wood, and the question would therefore arise whether we should 
 occupy it for defence or not. I would decide not to do so ; it has the 
 great advantage of partly hiding us from the enemy's view. If you 
 imagine the Detachment to be posted on the plateau south of 
 Herzogswalde, then the enemy cannot very well pass it by the high- 
 road ; he would lay himself open to an attack on his flank. The 
 ground between Passarge and the line of little lakes is, moreover, 
 rather narrow, and hardly large enough for the deployment of an 
 Army-Corps. 
 
 The enemy could also determine to advance over the left plateau, 
 thus aiming the blow at the Detachment. He would then, however, 
 do only what we want : he would have to leave the Corps alone and 
 to give up attacking it on that day ; for we can count upon a consider- 
 able gain of time. The Detachment would then have to engage in a 
 fight, and, if pressed, would withdraw in the direction of Alt Bolitten, 
 in order to rejoin there the right wing of the Army-Corps. 
 
 The enemy will probably not adopt any of the possible courses 
 hitherto mentioned, but try to advance over both sections of the 
 ground. He will then be obliged to divide his forces, and to attack 
 
1/2 SOLUTION OF THE 66TH PROBLEM. 
 
 the Detachment in any case; for under no circumstances can he 
 advance by Banners so long as the Detachment stands at Herzogs- 
 walde. By holding on to that position, the deployment of the 
 Army-Corps is at all events secured, and so much time is probably 
 gained that evening comes before the enemy can begin the 
 attack. 
 
 On the whole, gentlemen have grasped in this instance the 
 situation correctly. Differences, however, are apparent in the choice 
 of the position in which the enemy is to be awaited. Some gentle- 
 men advance as far as the strip of wood, in order to await the enemy 
 there. Gentlemen, that strip of wood is almost 3 J miles long, and so 
 of far too great an extent. In doing so, they almost seem to have an 
 intention of drawing the enemy's special attention upon themselves. 
 He will, however, not advance without reconnoitring. If he learns 
 that any troops whatsoever are on his flank, he will naturally try to 
 find out how strong they are. It surely is not necessary to make him 
 particularly attentive. Some gentlemen have gone still further, and 
 wish to deal short offensive blows. That does not look healthy. 
 They move away from their Army-Corps in a manner not warranted, 
 and with the only result that the enemy would throw himself upon 
 them and annihilate them. The retreat must in all circumstances be 
 made on the right wing of the Army-Corps. Some gentlemen have 
 fixed the retreat on Liebstadt ; that is not correct. We must keep 
 the front of the Corps clear ; otherwise we would place it perhaps in 
 the position of being unable to cover even our retreat, and of still 
 being itself attacked on that same day. 
 
 It was frequently omitted in the papers to take any notice of the 
 Dragoon Regiment. It was standing at Seubersdorf or Waltersdorf, 
 and will best make its retreat by the high-road, and then rejoin the 
 Detachment by turning the Wuchsnig lake on the north. In an 
 action it can hardly be used to any advantage. But at Waltersdorf it 
 has the advantage of being able to overlook the whole advance of the 
 enemy, and is in a position to hinder him from reconnoitring the 
 Passarge downwards and getting a clear view of our situation. 
 
 The solution by the Field-Marshal once more summarised would 
 therefore be : 
 
 FOR THE EVENING OF THE IST: 
 
 Bivouac between Langguther and Lobe lakes with 'few measures 
 of security. 
 
SOLUTION OF THE 66TH PROBLEM. 173 
 
 FOR THE 2ND : 
 
 Early start (6 o'clock), pushing out to the defile at Locken the 
 Dragoon Regiment with a Battery, later on occupation of the posi- 
 tions there with the Main Body of the Detachment, advance of 2 
 Squadrons with 2 guns to Horn ; next, more reconnoitring and 
 watching until the enemy's intentions are more clearly discerned ; 
 eventually pushing forward the Detachment to Horn. 
 
 FOR THE 3RD : 
 
 Reconnaissance towards Deppen. Position of the Detachment 
 somewhere south of Herzogswalde, in which a direct attack is to be 
 awaited. 
 
 If the enemy should commit a mistake and advance by the high- 
 road only, then an attempt to fall upon his left flank. I think that 
 this will best be done past the north of the Wuchsnig lake. The 
 Detachment would be in a position, if the enemy should attack with 
 only a small fraction of his forces, to leave opposed to that, a small 
 portion of its troops, and to strike on the enemy's flank with the 
 remainder. If pressed, then retreat on the right wing of the Army- 
 Corps. Considering the distances and the daylight, we can with cer- 
 tainty count upon the enemy not succeeding in forcing the Corps to 
 give battle on that day. 
 
 In general I can say that gentlemen have had a correct concep- 
 tion, and that they have mostly also clearly developed it. The Field- 
 Marshal is less concerned with your hitting off exactly what he 
 wishes than with your developing your intentions in a clear manner. 
 There are but few gentlemen whose papers must be considered a 
 failure. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 DETAILS OF STRENGTH OF THE VARIOUS TACTICAL UNITS 
 MENTIONED IN THE PROBLEMS, NOT ALWAYS APPARENT 
 IN THE TEXT. 
 
 ONE REGIMENT OF INFANTRY = 3 Battalions, designated either ist, 2nd, and 3rd, or ist, 
 
 2nd, and Fusilier Battalions. 
 
 ONE BATTALION OF INFANTRY = 1,000 men in 4 Companies of 3 sections or Zuge. 
 ONE RIFLE BATTALION ... = the same as Infantry. 
 ONE ENGINEER BATTALION ... = do. 
 
 ONE REGIMENT OF CAVALRY, where not otherwise stated, is 600 sabres in 4 Squadrons 
 
 of 4 Ziige or Troops each. 
 
 ONE BATTERY OF ARTILLERY, where not otherwise stated, has 6 guns. 
 THE OLD GERMAN 4-pr. is equivalent to an English 9-pr. 
 ,, 8-pr. ,, ,, i6-pr. 
 
 12-pr. ,, ,, 24-pr. 
 
 2. 
 
 VOCABULARY OF GERMAN TERMS USED IN THE TEXT, AND 
 REFERRING TO THE MAP. THE NUMBERS IN BRACKETS 
 DENOTE THE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN WHICH THEY 
 OCCUR. 
 
 Alt = old (ii). 
 Alte=old (66). 
 
 A. 
 
 B. 
 
 Bach=brook, stream, rivulet (26). 
 Berg=hill (3), (34), (66). 
 Berge = hills (50). 
 Braun = brown (4). 
 
 Bruch=bog, marsh, swampy meadows (3), 
 (64). 
 
 C. 
 
 Chaussee Haus=turnpike, toll-house (6). 
 
 D. 
 
 Drei^three (53). 
 
 F. 
 
 Feld = field (59). 
 
 F. H. = Forsthaus = forester's house (42^ 
 
 (43)- 
 Fichlen = pines (51), (64). 
 
 Fliess= brook, stream (14), (53). 
 Fluth = flood (51). 
 Forst=forest, woods (51). 
 Forsthaus= forester's house (42), (53). 
 Fst.=Forst (vuteit) (7). 
 
 G. 
 
 Geographische = geographical. 
 Graben=ditch (51). 
 
 Grube=pit (4). . 
 
 Gr.= gross = great (52) 
 Grund= valley, dale, glen, bottom (3), 
 (19). 
 
 H. 
 Haff= inlets of the Baltic near Danzig, 
 
 Konigsberg, and Memel (50). 
 Hans = house (6), (42), (53). 
 Heide=heath (64). 
 IIeilige = holy (53). 
 IIinterste = hindmost (46), (47). 
 IIohen=high, tall (51). 
 Holz=wood| copse (59)- 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 175 
 
 J. 
 
 fuden Kirchhof= Jews' cemelcry (6). 
 
 K. 
 
 Kirchhof= cemetery, churchyard (6). 
 Kl.= Klein =little (11). 
 Kon. = Koniglich = royal (4) . 
 Kohlen= coals (4). 
 
 Luch = bog, marsh, meadow (30). 
 
 M.=Muhle=Mill (53), (65), (66). 
 Maasstab ) 
 
 Masstab 3 
 
 scale. 
 
 N. 
 
 Nonnenbnich=nun's bog or marsh (43). 
 
 Pfuhl = pond (53), (64). 
 
 Rennstcig=drive (38), (39). 
 o Roman (63). 
 
 Schacht = shaft, pit, mine (55). 
 Schleuse = sluice-gate, lock (53). 
 Schritt=pace, step. 
 See = lake. 
 
 Steig=path (38), (39). 
 Strasse=road (63). 
 
 T. 
 
 Teich=pond (61), (65 \ 
 Tief=deep (3). 
 
 U. 
 
 Uebersichts-vSkizzen^ sketch-maps. 
 U. F.=Unter Forsterei (53). 
 Unter-Forsterei = gamekeeper's lodge (53). 
 
 Vorstadt= suburb (48). 
 Vw.=Vorwerk-farm (9), (15), (39), (42), 
 (53)- 
 
 W. 
 
 Wasser= water, stream, brook, rivulet. 
 Wcg=path, lane, road (61). 
 
 Zgl.=Ziegelci = brickfield (4), (64). 
 
 EXPLANATION OF THE MARGINAL NOTES ON THE MAPS. 
 
 Masstab > . 
 
 Maasstab j l der natiirlichen Lange = natural scale nnnJW 
 
 PLANS L, IV., VII., IX., XIII., XIV., XV., XVI.,XVIIL, XX., XXL, XXIII., XXVI. , 
 XXVII., on right-hand bottom corner: "Die Zahlen geben," etc. =The 
 numbers indicate the absolute heights in feet above the level of the Baltic. 
 By the new measure 1,000 Prussian feet = 376,62 metres. 
 
 Pi. AN II. On right-hand bottom corner: " Preussisches Gebiet," etc. = Prussian territory 
 surveyed by the Royal Prussian General Staff, 1837-38. 
 
 Lippe territory according to the map published by the Lippe Government 
 in 1887. Waldeck territory reconnoitred, 1889. 
 Corrections up to 1890. 
 
 Pi, AN VI. Left-hand bottom corner : " Die Ilb'henzahlcn in," etc. =The heights in Austrian 
 territory refer to the level of the Adriatic. 
 
 .SE 
 OF THE 
 VERSITY 
 iLlFORNlA- 
 
THIRD AND REVISED EDITION, ROYAL 8vo., 155, NET. 
 
 MODERN TACTICS, 
 
 BY 
 
 CAPTAIN H. R. GALL 
 
 (LATE STH FUSILIERS). 
 
 This Edition has been almost rewritten, and contains upwards of 50 plates and numerous 
 ivorked-out schemes, illustrating how to dispose of a Force in a map. 
 
 OPINIONS OF THE PRESS. 
 
 "Captain Gall's book will be of great value to military students going up for 
 examination. His style is lucid and simple. The chapters upon reconnoitring 
 and outpost duty are full, and of most useful character, and the whole question of 
 attack and defence is treated with great ability. Lieutenant Eustace Balfour has 
 contributed a useful chapter on cyclist infantry. The plates admirably illustrate 
 the text.'"' Army and Navy Gazette. 
 
 " The book deals with the most recent developments of the art of war. It 
 takes into account what perhaps are the most striking factors in the study of 
 ' modern ' tactics the ever narrowing margin between armed infantry and artillery 
 fire, the increased range of both, and the consequent and paramount question of 
 lire discipline ; and finally the indispensability of the spade as a military imple- 
 ment. Lieutenant Eustace Balfour has set forth clearly and conclusively the great 
 possibilities of the cycle for military purposes in a country intersected by roads." 
 
 Saturday Review. 
 
 " Captain Gall has notably succeeded in his desire to present his teaching in 
 a simple and easy form. One great recommendation of the work is that it takes 
 cognisance of the most recent developments in the art of war such, for example, 
 as mounted infantry, machine guns, the increased range of modern artillery, and 
 cyclist infantry. The chapter on the employment of cyclist infantry is from the 
 pen of Lieutenant Eustace Balfour, and is pregnant with interest." Scotsman. 
 
 u The style is clear and simple, and the explanations, helped as they are by 
 numerous plans, will no doubt easily be grasped by those for whom they are 
 written." Morning Post. 
 
 " The work will be studied with much interest in this country, at the present 
 time, when new manuals of tactics for our army are receiving so much attention." 
 
 The Washington Army and Navy Register. 
 
 " The method of instruction employed is extremely clear and concise, and is 
 especially remarkable by the careful synopsis which the author has made of the 
 most recent innovations in the military art, and the employment of the different 
 arms. Among the rest is an extremely interesting chapter by Lieutenant Eustace 
 Balfour on the employment of infantry mounted on velocipedes. The book has a 
 much greater intrinsic value than that which the author ascribes to it. Young 
 officers who are desirous of following the advances made almost daily by tactical 
 science may read this book with advantage." Rivista Militarc Italiana. 
 
 London : W. H. ALLEN & Co., Ltd., 13, Waterloo Place. 
 
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