1 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 :p 
 
 
 U 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 ^^^s 
 
 J> 
 
 6 
 
 == 
 
 F 
 
 !=i 
 
 -1 
 
 8 
 
 
 DE PEYSTER 
 Practical Strategy
 
 ...iR» 
 
 PRACTICAL STRATEGY 
 
 AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE 
 
 LIFE AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
 OP A 
 
 MASTER OF THE ART, 
 
 THE 
 
 M^itim MM MmM 
 
 (50 
 
 TRAUN. 
 
 FKEDERIC THE GREAT'S PRECEPTOR 
 
 IN THE 
 
 ART OF WAR. 
 
 " Marshal Traxjn, tJuit vm a Man indeed P' 
 
 "■ I went to 8c7ml to TuAmty 
 
 Fbbderic thb 6bba¥. 
 
 CATSKIl-l- _^ _, 
 
 JOSEPH .lOESBURY, BOOK AND JOB PRINTBB, "JOURNAL OFPICS. 
 1868. 
 
 A. 
 
 Q^
 
 ^TA 
 
 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 
 
 "Je n' al rleu £ait pour la poetcrite, ponrtant"— ajoata-t^il, en designant son front 
 
 -^''j'avais la quclqnc chose." 
 
 Andre-Marie Cdenieb, 
 
 About to die by the Guillotine, 25th July, 1794. 
 
 Waste of Life DXJKiNa the present Wab. 
 
 {Could' it not have Iteen obviated by tJie Gomprehension of 
 Practical Strategy ?) 
 
 " The natural principle of war is to do the most harm to our 
 enemy ■with the least harm to ourselves, and this, of course, is to- be 
 effected by stratagem," (i. e., practical strategy.) 
 
 Washikqton Irving, 
 
 " A victory is twice itself, when the achiever brings home full 
 numbers." Shakspeare, Mwh Ado. I, 1. 
 
 7 I I 
 
 This pamplilet was prepared in a great measure about 
 a year since, and finished witliin the montli. It is called 
 forth by the contemplation of resultless, or comparatively 
 resultless combats, and a prodigal waste of such a Per- 
 sonal as has never before constituted the bulk of armies. 
 The Loyal North has sufiered such repeated sacrifices of 
 superior men, that the question forces itself upon the 
 mind, whether such expenditure of life was absolutely 
 necessary, and whether or not it was not chargeable to 
 ignorance or incomprehension of the plainest rules of true 
 generalship, Practical Strategy. 
 
 The most thoughtless and unfeeling man could scarcely 
 repress a shudder, if he would only pause to reflect upon 
 instances of the fearful waste of our best, bravest and 
 most experienced oflSicers and privates, staked with «, 
 desperation, unworthy the military art, upon almost im-
 
 3 
 
 possible results; regular Balaclava charges, presenting 
 equal chances of destruction with far inferior chances of 
 success and glory. These sacrifices are not necessarily 
 attributable to leaders in the field. Like the Balaclava 
 charge, they may have originated in orders sent from- 
 superiors at a distance, and given in ignorance of the 
 actual condition of afi^irs upon the spot. It is the ftinc- 
 tion of the future to place the guilt where it belongs. — . 
 Unfortunately public men are put on trial too late to 
 expiate their sins in person, they only suffer in reputation, 
 and veiy few men, especially political men, in this country, 
 care for posthumous reputation. The only rewards they 
 seek are tangible omes. 
 
 Before entering upon tbe career of the General selected 
 as an example of what can be accomplished by scientific 
 practical strategy, it would be well to consider what tlie 
 greatest military authorities have remarked about fighting 
 battles, and that ^Itiiough men may not have any value 
 in the eyes of extemporised leaders, they were nevertheiefli 
 rated at their true value by the most scientific and suc- 
 cessful generals who have lived. And it would be well 
 to remember that even the victorious and magnificent 
 Marlborough owed his disgrace and supersedure in a. 
 great measure to the obloquy which fell npon him, in 
 consequence of what was considered his" wanton sacri-- 
 fice of so many gallant men to his personal ambition, 
 without any solid benefit to the allies," his reckless waste 
 <rf his best troops npon the ^' triple linee" of MalplaqueL 
 
 "Every war," remarked Napoleon, "dshould be «ya- 
 tematical, because every war should have an object, and 
 should be carried on according to the principles and rules 
 of the art (of war). A war should be prosecuted widi 
 forces (material as well as personal) proportionate to the 
 obstacles which have to be overcome."
 
 4 
 Have our Generals, with the exception perhaps of 
 Rosecrans and Gilmore, paid due attention to this maxim ? 
 Have they ever apparently weighed means and obstacles ; 
 materials in hand with materials indispensable to the 
 object ? In fact, how many military maxims of acknowl- 
 edged authority have our generals ignored? And if 
 every hour c<)nceded to the enemy for fortification be 
 ■equal to the reinforcement of a battalion to that enemy, 
 against what odds have our soldiers been called upon to 
 combat? with what disproportionate means have our 
 leaders undertaken to compel victory ? How many of 
 our Generals have ever been influenced in their action by 
 the maxim : 
 
 " If your enemy is entrenching, and it is your intention 
 to attack his position, do not delay a moment. Every 
 hour's delay may cost the loss of a thousand men in an 
 assault." This was Marlborough's opinion. 
 
 The greatest test, as well as the duty of a General, is 
 to avoid an uni^ecessary battle. The grandest general- 
 ship is to conquer without fighting. To fight requires 
 mere courage ; to coerce without fighting, science. 
 
 The campaign of the Allied Spanish-French army under 
 the orders of the Duke of Berwick, against the Portu- 
 guese, in 1706, serves as a useful study in regard to 
 offensive defensive operations, or practical strategy, car^ 
 ried out in actuality. The two artnies, thrusting and 
 parrying, made almost a circuit of Spain. They opened 
 the campaign near Bajados, (extreme '\l''est,) manoeuvred 
 across Old ("West-North and Centre) and New (Ea^t- 
 eentre) Castile, and finished the fencing bout in Valentia 
 (East) and Murcia (South-East). The army of the Duke 
 of Berwick occupied not less tlian 85 different campfi, 
 and, although the campaign presents no pitched battle,
 
 5 
 
 the Portuguese army, opposed to the Anglo-French leader, 
 lost in prisoners alone, about 10,000 men. 
 
 When the Duke of Alva, one of the great capt.iiii^ <>f 
 modern times, was reproached with manoeuvering too 
 much, and too often avoiding an engagement in which 
 the chances appeared to be in his favor, the astute Span- 
 iard replied, the object, invariably, of every General is to 
 get the better of, or conquer, his opponent or the enemy, 
 and not always to light, for, when a campaign has been 
 carried on successfully, a General has triumphed, whether 
 he has fought a battle or not. 
 
 Macchiavelli, who lived and wrote two centuries pre- 
 vious, expressed this idea much more neatly, " Good 
 Generals," he remarked, " only fight battles when neces- 
 sity compels them to, or the opportunity is eminently 
 propitious." 
 
 This idea, however^ does not originate with either of 
 thfi above, for Pericles, the Athenian, that spoiled child 
 of fortune, who flourished in the beginning of the Vth 
 Century B. C, asserted that "it was often the last resource 
 and tlie proof of a poor general to fight a battle, and, on 
 the other hand, the evidence of superlative generalship to 
 triumph without fighting." 
 
 Napoleon Bonaparte enunciated the same great truth 
 rather by his action than by his teaching, although he 
 often expressed the same adviee more at length. 
 
 And Frederic the Great, far superior to either of the 
 preceding, put more faith in Practical Strategy than in 
 downright fighting, and like Hannibal, his prototype in 
 antiquity, preferred successes achieved by manceuvring to 
 those won by hammer and tongs work, although he did 
 eiiough of both. He left behind him many wise counselH^^ 
 not the least of which " Always be beforehand with, or
 
 c 
 
 trip lip, tlie enemy," and the strenuous advice to spare no 
 pains to preserve an anny acclimated to war. 
 
 Finally, in regard to the comparative value of Veterans 
 and Recruits, listen to the experience of the astute Duke 
 of Alva, and the great (great in every sense) Gustavus 
 Adolphus, and the sagacious Frederic of Prussia, and the 
 interestedly wise and superlatively cunning Napoleon, 
 and, tlien, when their testimony has been duly weighed, 
 ttere are few but will decide with Augustus Caesar : 
 
 "Festina fenfe," 1. c_ " Haeten Blowly." 
 
 " Do not let Impetuosity betray ioto imprudence." 
 
 witli Vauban, and with Traun, that it is better to wait a 
 little and let science compensate for valor and blood, and 
 that the greatest generalship is to preserve valuable lives 
 by vigilance and address : 
 
 *' Festinare rwcet, nocet el cunctatio smpe : 
 Tempore qu<zque mo grd/acit, ille ««i)i^"— [Ovid. 
 
 " It is injurious to be precipitate, and delay is also fre- 
 quently injurious. That man is wise, who does every 
 thing in its proper time " — and thus reserves his good 
 troops for tlie hour when a decisive blow can be struck. 
 
 *' It was a saying of Gustavus, that he never desired to 
 place himself at the head of more than 40,000 men ; pay- 
 ing no regard to a military maxim equally profane and 
 foolish, namely, that the Supreme Being always favore 
 the greater squadrons ; (a constant saying of "Walstein, 
 attributed in error to Frederic the Great and others,) that 
 <t, larger number of troops was only matter of parade and 
 mxiurnbraTice^ iruisTrmch os no general could compel him 
 m the aforenrventioned circwmsto/nces, to accept a hattZe «aj- 
 ■G&pt lie chose it, whilst in the interim he could dispose of 
 superfluous forces to better advantage elsewhere. Con- 
 currently with what is here asserted, it was the opinion
 
 both of Dure d' Alva and Turenne, that no army ought 
 to consist of more than 50,000 men ; and the former used 
 always to say, that veteran troops loere the hones and 
 niusdes of the military hody, and that nevo raised recmiits 
 only filled %i/p the interstices with shape and phtTnpnessP 
 
 " Great commanders are tied up to no such rvles, (i. e., 
 coDecting huge armies to watch repo^'ted Imgc annies,) 
 and hi^ Prussian Majesty, (Fkedebio the Great,) not 
 dissatisfied to imniitate Gustavus in most things, has 
 subdivided liis armies in the same manner as that Prince 
 would do were he now living. If one general portions 
 out his troops with proper precaution, the other will be 
 compelled to follow the example. Walstein, who first 
 invented tliis method of waging war, played the artifice 
 upon Gustavus ; for he wanted, like our dextrous neigh- 
 bors, to protract the time, and plunge his enemies into 
 enormous expenses, which is true policy with respect to 
 opposing any army that carries on a war out of its own 
 country ; but Gustavus despised the futility of this strat- 
 agem, and though he had only 18,000 men wherewith to 
 confront above 50,000, he allowed three separate bodies 
 of his own troops to range freely throughout the empire, 
 and entrenched himself imder the beard of the Imperial 
 General, who in the event was obliged to decamp, and 
 take such cards as the Swedish monarch was pleased to 
 deal him.'' 
 
 Neitlier should the lessons ever be forgotton, nor the 
 consideration be neglected, of " the extraordinai^y advan- 
 tages he (Gustavus) extracted from Winter Camtaigns ; 
 which may be considered, partly, as a new military 
 practice (at his era)'; and it was from the same principle, 
 that he gave little or no countenance to councils of wai\" 
 Since the essence of true practical strategy is secresy, in 
 that the plan of operations which succeeds best is ever
 
 that one of which the enemy is kept in total ignorance, 
 the blow following the order as the hand obeys the brain. 
 
 "This obliges me (Fkederic the Great,) to observe that, 
 a General would be wrong should he be in haste to attack 
 the enemy in hilly posts, or on broken ground. I have 
 sometimes, by necessity, been forced to this extremity ; 
 but, when war is made with equal jxywers, Ojd/GanMges 
 vbore ceHmn may he procv/red Iry stratagemn and "address, 
 and without exposing an a/rmy to equal danger. The sum 
 of many small advantages will be great. The attack of a 
 well defended post is beside a bone of hard digestion, and 
 the assailant is liable to be repulsed and beaten, (witness 
 Fredericksburg let and 2d.) It is only to be carried by 
 the sacrifice of from 15 to 20,000 men, which makes a 
 wide breach in an army. Recruits, supposing they are to 
 be plentifully obtained, will fill up numbers, but will not 
 Bupply the qualities of the soldiers that have been lost. — 
 The kingdom becomes depopulated by renewing the ar- 
 my ; the troops degenerate ; and, if the war is long, the 
 General will find himself at the liead of ill disciplined 
 ])easant8, with whom he scarcely dares appear in face of 
 the enemy. In any violent conjuncture, I grant, it is nec- 
 essary to depart from rules, and to have recourse to des- 
 perate remedies ; as poison is given to the sick, when there 
 are no other means of cure. But, such cases excepted, it 
 is requisite, in my opinion, to proceed with more caution ; 
 to weigh and to measure ; because that the General who 
 allows the least to cha/nce is the most ahle.''^ 
 
 " When a nation has neither Cadres," (which after all 
 is but another word for veteeanb, or experienced troops 
 and officers, or synonymous in a gi*eat measure,) says 
 Napoleon, "and the Elements of Military Organization, 
 it is very difficult for that country to organize an army." 
 Now who else but men who have learned their business
 
 in {ictUal War, aud by the observation of military crises, 
 can provide such Elements. If Generals waste their best 
 men and officers, particularly against works and cannon, 
 for the best men always suffer where courage and ability 
 is required, a country must eventually depend opon the 
 refuse which remains behind, inferior indeed in head work, 
 hand work, and heart work. "The^r*^ quality of a sol- 
 dier is fortitude in supporting fatigues and privation, 
 VALOR is but 81ECONDARY." *^ To a soMicr two qualities are 
 indispensable, J^ortittede and Discipline ; Courage itself 
 is but secondary^' Fortitude and Discipline are the attri- 
 butes of old troops. YoXing troops are often as brave or 
 reckless as veterans as tar as r^ards throwing life away^ 
 "Want, privations and suffering, are the best school of a 
 soldier. Young troops cannot possess those qualities be- 
 cause to acquire such properties requires a long course of 
 education or trainings To sacrifice good old regiments is 
 like turning th« intelligent and industrious out of school 
 and keeping on only with the dunces and slothful. "To 
 fight and to suffer" is the soldiers motto. Many great 
 Generals have testified that young troops have fought 
 desperately, but they have also added that sufferings they 
 could not encounter or support. 
 
 Consequently Practical Strategy, which preserves 
 iifo, is as much an obligation upon a General as it is the 
 duty of a surgeon to preserve a limb by treatment. The 
 poorest surgeon can hasher off a member, but it is often 
 the highest glory of the best surgeon to save one. To 
 what then are we to attribute the prodigal waste of life 
 which has characterized this war. To all those appoint- 
 ers and appointees who have underestimated and miscom- 
 prehended Practical Strategy. To prove what a Master 
 of the Art did accomplish through the observance and 
 application of its Rules, and to show what can be effected
 
 10 
 hj a General, hailed by his soldiers on a bloody field a» 
 " Onr Father !" who valued the lives of his troops, under- 
 stood his business, and knew how to economize them, thi& 
 little work has been written, ANCHOR. 
 
 TivoU, Isf August, 1863.
 
 FREDERIC THE GREAT'S PRECEPTOR 
 
 IN THE 
 
 ART OF 1VA.R, 
 
 FIELD MARSHAL TRAUN, 
 
 A MASTER OF PRACTICAL STRATEGY. 
 
 '■'■I went *o Bclvool to TVaww."— Fbkdebio thb Gbeat. ; ■ 
 
 All men do not believe with Dryden that — 
 
 " Time, place, and action, may with pains be wroueht. 
 But (jenim must be born, and never can be taught. 
 
 hut rather with Wilcox, that — 
 
 r 
 
 " The lamp of genius, tho'' by n-ature lit. 
 If not protected, pmri'd and fed with care, 
 Soon dies, or rum to waste withji{ftd glare." 
 
 Oonsequently, wlienever nations acknowledge the pre- 
 eminence of a. leader, they naturally inquire "Where did 
 this man or hero learn to be so great 2" " Who was 
 his instructor and exemplar V " Who and what kindled 
 his latent talent into efficient brilliancy?" It is not 
 always easy to answer, " Few minds are sunlike, sources 
 of light in themselves and to others," particularly among 
 Generals. Sometimes pre-eminence has been due in a 
 ^eat measure, nay almost entirely, to inborn properties, 
 as in the cases of Caesar, Conde, the great Gustavus, 
 Torstenson, Cromwell, but more particularly Clive. In 
 the last instance it may justly be credited to the individual 
 himself. At other times, as in the case of Washington, 
 to a good ; and of Napoleon, in fact both the successful
 
 12 
 
 Napoleons, to u sagacious mother. Hannibal owed hi& 
 greatness to his great father and race, his surrounding& 
 and circumstances ; Charles X^ Gustarns, of Sweden, and 
 Wrangel to Torstenson ; Torstenson, as far as example 
 and opportunity, JBaner and Bernard of Saxe-Weimar to 
 Gustavus Adolphus. Turenne and Montecuculi grew into 
 eminent commanders. In both, their great and peculiar 
 talents were the result of profound study. As Napoleon 
 remarked, the former was the only General who con- 
 stantly gained by experience. 
 
 Frederic the Great was in some respects a born, in 
 many others a made General. His innate properties 
 were due to position, his acquired to opportunities di- 
 gested by capacity and applied with intelligence. Ma- 
 cauley demonstrates this with his peculiar clearness, and 
 every history testifies, that Frederic had a Master in the 
 Art of War. To whom, then, did the great Prussian 
 attribute his final practically strategic superiority ? The 
 King himself has told us, and cotemporaries have corro- 
 borated the fact. To Marshal Traun, who manoeuvred 
 him out of Bohemia in 1744. 
 
 " It was in the midst of difficulty and disgrace (wrote 
 Macauley) that he caught the first clear glimpse of the 
 principles of the military art. * * * This year (1745) 
 is memorable in the life of Frederic, as the date at which 
 his noviciate in the art of war may be said to have termi- 
 nated. There have been great captains whose precocious 
 and self taught military skill resembled intuition, Conde, 
 Clive, and Napoleon are examples. But Frederic was 
 not one of these brilliant portents. His proficiency in 
 military science was simply the proficiency which a man 
 of vigorous faculties makes in any science to which he 
 applies his mind with earnestness and industry." 
 
 " Da you know who taught me the little I know in
 
 13 
 
 military matters V* said Frederic to the Prince de Ligne 
 in 1770. ^^Your old (the Austrian) Ma/rshoZ Tkaun, 
 THAT WAS A MAN INDEED !" At another time he confessed 
 he " went to school to TraunP 
 
 Who was this Traxjn, this touch-stone to reveal the 
 true metal which lay hid in the great Frederic % Let us 
 see. His biography is worth reading, and new to the 
 American public, and not so well known as it should be 
 in Europe. The foil and competitor of so great a monarch- 
 general must have been a man indeed to receive such an 
 eulogy from his lips. 
 
 Otto Ferdinand, Count of Abensburg find Tkaun, 
 Royal-Imperial (Austrian) Field Marshal, Privy Council- 
 or, Commander in Chief in Transylvania, Knight of the 
 Golden Fleece, (fee, was born 27th August 1677, and 
 died at Herman-Stadt, capital of his Province, 10th 
 February 1748. He sprang from one of the ancient 
 and one of the most noble families of Bavaria, and 
 was at first destined for a civil or administrative 
 career. But no man thoroughly imbued with a con- 
 viction of his true destination can, in the end, mislead his 
 instinctive inclinations for the profession, nature herself 
 has prepared him to shine in. Circumstances may delay 
 or suppress the operation of these instincts, but, earlier or 
 later, they will exert a controlling influence. So it was 
 with the young Traun. No sooner had he learned the 
 death of his father and thereby become master of his own 
 movements, than he left the High School at Halle and, 
 entered the Brandenburgh contingent to the Imperial 
 army. He was present at the famous siege of Namur in 
 1695, which, Louis XIV, by Yauban, after its capture in 
 1692, had made the strongest fortress in the Netherlands. 
 So strong was it considered that it displayed over its gate 
 the inscription "Restored it may be, captured it can never
 
 14 
 he". In furious assaults and sallies, the besiegers and tlie 
 besieged lost, within 67 days, not less than 40,000 men. — 
 At last the persevering courage and efforts of the great 
 William (III) of Orange, directed by the genius of Cohom 
 as great and famous although not as well known as his 
 cotemporary rival and antagonist, Yauban, proved success- 
 ful and, in sight of a French army, over 100,000 in number, 
 under the Marshal Villeroi, 'sent to relieve them, the gar- 
 rison capitulated notwithstanding the boasting motto over 
 the gates. 
 
 Soon after Count Traun entered the Imperial service, 
 made, 1702 "to 1708, the campaigns, on the Rhine and in 
 Italy, during the war of the Spanish Succession, but only 
 rose step by etep, because he neither accepted promotion 
 at the expense of his seniors nor would owe his advance, 
 ment to the advantages of his birth and its influences. 
 
 Nevertheless, in 1704, at the age of 27, his merits had 
 already made him Colonel and Adjutant-General. 
 
 The best witness of Tkaujsts' ability was his selection by 
 the wise, brave and distinguished Guido, of Starhemberg 
 to accompany him as adjutant-general, to Spain, wliere he 
 co-operated notably in the preparation and execution of 
 the many glorious undertakings of this justly styled "great 
 Captain." To reward his services, he received, in 1712, 
 the command of the so styled Eckish (Austrian) Infantry 
 regiment, coupled with tlie truly honorable request to 
 -continue with the army in Spain. "This young man will 
 "Command armies," answered the cold, astute Starhemberg 
 to the British cx)mmandcr, Stanhope, when the latter saw 
 Traun, aged 35, for the first time at the former's head- 
 quarters, and, misled by his frank boyish expression, ask- 
 •ed in a somewhat scornful tone "Who then is this young 
 man ?" 
 
 But neither time nor space permit us to follow step by
 
 15 
 
 step Traun^s progress in the military career. Sufficetfi, 
 he was always at the post of duty and danger and in the 
 battle of Franca Villa, 17th (20th ?) June 1719, which 
 lost the Spaniards, Sicily, received a dangerous wound. 
 
 In 1723, Traun became Major-Oeneral ; in 1727 Gov- 
 ernor of Messina, and subsequently Governor-General of 
 Sicily, whence he was re-called for the defence of Naples 
 in the impending general conflict. 
 
 When the War of the Polish Succession, 1733, caused 
 by the double election, by contending parties, of two 
 rival kings at Warsaw and Cracow, kindled a general war 
 in Europe,' Austria, opposed again to Spain, made Italy, 
 (always the principal battle field between Germany and 
 the Western powers) the especial theatre of the contest — 
 With prescience and emphasis. Count Tbaun had urged 
 upon his (the Austrian) government (even as fruitlessly 
 however as Moreau counselled Macdonald, to the same 
 effect, in 1799) to concentrate their scanty forces into a 
 single army in Lower Italy and march at onee. boldly, to 
 meet the Spanish army advancing from Tuscany under 
 the Infant, Don Carlos, a young leader, active, ambitious 
 and not without personal ability. He had 16,000 foot 
 and 6,000 horse, the Austrians not more than 10,000 in 
 the whole peninsula. Naples had been committed ta 
 the protection of -its militia (vain reliance as it proved) 
 and its immediate garrison. Austria, as usual (as is gen- 
 erally the case imder similar circumstances, as has been 
 proved more than once at home during our present war) 
 wished to keep all, occupied each castle and every fort, and 
 scattered her forces^ whUe the enemy concefitrated theirs^ 
 amd thus lost everything. With not more than 3,000 men 
 Traun threw himself into the boundary pass of St. Ger- 
 maho, at the foot of Monte Cassino, through the mountain
 
 16 
 
 Hue stretching across Italy from Gaeta to Termoli ;-— 
 showed face to the enemy, maintained his post 23 days, 
 prayed earnestly for reinforcements and- — found no hear- 
 ing for his desperate appeals. Then, he resolved by a 
 bold, well-combined march to get the start of the enemy 
 and unite himself with another Austrian corps at Capua 
 and there, under the protection of this fortress, again make 
 bold front to the enemy. But, how great was his aston- 
 ishment, when he arrived at Capua to find it by no means 
 in the condition nor as susceptible of defence as he had 
 hoped. A less able and energetic commander, misled by 
 the desperate condition of affairs and when he found the 
 defences dismantled, would have considered his duty ful- 
 filled, if he had quietly waited for the enemy to present 
 themselves in outnumbering forces, and then have yielded 
 gracefully, feeling he had done all could have been ex- 
 pected of him, according to old, but bad old custom.-— 
 This is the way, the bad old custom, our generals,, ordina- 
 rily, seem justified in following. 
 
 But Traun was of another mould. He thought nothing 
 was done so long as anything remained to be done, and a 
 determined spirit is an inexhaustible mine of resources. 
 He threw himself in the fortress of Capua, repaired the 
 walls as quickly as possible, cast up new outworks, and 
 made every imaginable preparation for the most perse- 
 vering and courageous resistance. Two glorious enter- 
 prises particularly distinguished this defence. The first, 
 in which he captured from the enemy, in a hardy sally, 40 
 provision and ammunition wagons, together with 70,000 
 ducats [say $225,000 in hard cash] ; the second, in which 
 he enticed the Spaniards under a masked battery, and 
 caused a horrible slaughter. Reference to the famous 
 Zedler Lexicon, Vol. 45, published in 1745, furnishes the 
 details of the latter success which are worthy of consider-
 
 lY 
 
 ation. Among the outworks Traun constructed were 
 three small forts, skillfully disposed to facilitate and cover 
 his intended sallies. When these were finished, Traun 
 traced out a fourth, working with great diligence, but 
 left a gap in the connecting lines, where he felt assured 
 that the Spaniards would attack him, to prevent the com- 
 pletion of tlie work. During the night of the 21st-22d 
 September, he moved out of Capua with fi\-e to six hun- 
 dred men and several cannon, and posted them about the 
 locality he had planned as a trap, using every precaution 
 to prevent the Spaniards from discovering that he had 
 artillery with him. The Austrians then sent forward 
 working parties, and began to dig as if they intended to 
 perfect their earthwork during the darkness. The bait 
 took, and they were at once attacked by 1500 Spaniards. 
 A brisk skirmisli ensued, the Austrian outposts, after a 
 little, falling back steadily, so as to entice the enemy on. 
 When the assailants had reached the spot where Traun 
 desired to have them, whose bearings and ranges had 
 been properly taken the preceding day, Traun's artillery 
 opened upon them instantly with cannister shot, and kept 
 up such a quick and steady cross-fire, that a perfect mas- 
 sacre ensued. The Spaniards were too bewildered and 
 shattered to make good thfeir escape, until 500 had been 
 killed who were counted upon the ground next morning ; 
 their wounded were estimated at an equal number. This 
 stratagem won great credit for Traun, 
 
 But truly after Yisconti's disgraceful abandonment 
 of Naples ; after the bloody defeat of the Imperialists 
 at Bitonto, by Montemar [25th May, 1734],— [where the 
 Austro-Neapolitan army was composed principally of 
 Lower-Italian Militia, who [or iimkH with militia when 
 opposed to old troops in fhsjield] ran away and left their 
 Austrian officers to fight like common soldiers gloriously
 
 18 
 feiit in vain] ; — after the fall of Gaeta, in August, and all 
 the remaining strong places, affairs in Lower Italy could 
 not be restored or longer maintained by any genius or 
 exertion. So Capua had at last — it had the honor to be 
 the last — to capitulate, 24th November, but not before 
 Tkaun's heroic declaration, " That the besiegers could 
 only wrest his weapons out of his hands when dead," had 
 won from the besiegers, so overpowering in numbers, the 
 most honorable terms, and permission for him to retire 
 not only with his garrison but with his whole war material, 
 and with all the honors of war. The IS^eapolitan his- 
 torian, General CoUetta, after eulogising the defence, and 
 stating that when Capua surrendered the magazines were 
 £ViVpty and the hospitals full^ adds, "Traun's military 
 glory was increased by his ill-fortune." 
 
 In 1Y33, Traun had attained the rank of Field Mar 
 •fihal Lieutenant, in 1735 that of Feld-zeicg-meister, [some- 
 times, in error, translated General of Artillery or Master 
 General of the Ordnance, in reality equivalent to Senior- 
 Generul of Infantry,] inferior only to that of Field 
 Marshaly the highest in the scale of the Austrian military 
 liierarchy. In this capacity he was employed to put 
 down an outbreak at home. 
 
 The dignity of Privy Comnselor and the nomination as 
 Commander-in-Chief and Provisional Viceroy in the duke- 
 dom of Milan, in 1736, recompensed the sagacity, prompt- 
 ness and determination Traun had displayed in crushing 
 out the insurrection of the Coruzzin^ or Cross Betheren, 
 inhabitants of Eastern Hungary along the Koros river, 
 bordering on Transylvania, in the previous year, 1735. 
 With noble self-denial he offered to be satisfied with one 
 lialf the salary which the former Viceroy liad enjoyed, 
 when he learned the empty condition of the treasury of
 
 1^ 
 
 his new juriadictioii. In 1737, Farma, Piacenza and 
 Mantua were added to his government. In this capacity 
 of Imperial representative, after the death of Charles VI, 
 he received the homage of these dukedoms in behalf of 
 tlxat monai^h's daughter, Maria Theresa, 21st January, 
 1741. In the preceding March, 1740, Traun had reached 
 the summit of military dignity by his appointment as 
 General-Field-Marshal. 
 
 In 1742- the deatli of the Emperer Charles VI, once 
 more brought aU the nations of Europe into the arena of 
 battle, and, according to invariable rule, Italy was the 
 stage whereon blood flowed in torrents, in a quarrel, in a 
 great measure, foreign to its people. Traun commanded 
 the Austrian forces, in conjuiiction with the Sardinians, 
 at first under their king, and afterwards under the 
 Count of Aspremonte, and after beating and manoeu- 
 vering his antagonist, the Spanish General, the Duke de 
 Montemar, victor of Bitonto, out of Northern Italy, 
 with the loss of half his araiy, he defeated Montemar's 
 successor, the Spanish Marshal Count deG^es, at Campo 
 Santo, 8th February in the succeeding y^ar 1743. Many 
 incidents connected with this conflict resemble those pre- 
 ceding Waterloo. The Spanish oflieers [like Welling- 
 ton's] were at a Grand Ball, given by tlie city of Bologna, 
 [in 1815 at Brussels] when their General's intention to 
 march to attack Traun was quietly communicated to thera 
 at the height of the festivity. One by one tliey slipped 
 out, joined their troops already in order of march and 
 thus, a force variously estimated at from 12,400 to 24,000 
 Spaniards moved to catch Traun napping, and found him 
 wide awake to greet them with bullets. It is said that 
 the Spaniards had carefully guarded all the gates and 
 modes of egress from Bologna and observed the greateit 
 secresy, but that a friend of the Austrians found means At
 
 20 
 the risk of liis lite to give warning to Traun. Traun did 
 not spare himself on this occasion, but threw himself with- 
 out thought of self into the bloodiest mid-melee to enflame 
 his troops by word and deed, since his forces — especially 
 the cavalry — had suffered severely in the beginning of 
 the battle. Two horses, one after the other, were shot 
 tmder. him. With youthful ardor altho' he bore the weight 
 of 66 years, Traun sprang upon the third, and amid the 
 cry of "Our father lives I" broke through the ranks of the 
 Spanish grenadiers. The victory would have been more 
 complete if he had been able to follow up the enemy, 
 which he could have done to their destruction, had the 
 reinforcements, hastening to join him, arrived, as was ex- 
 pected, two days earlier. (How many reverses must 
 be charged to the non-arrival of promised reinforce- 
 ments, withheld or delayed.) Nevertheless, the Spaniards 
 lost eventually, in consequence of their defeat 12,000 men, 
 half their whole force, upon the immediate theatre of 
 hostilities. 
 
 * * * * * * 
 
 The campaign of Traun and Charles Emanuel III, 
 King of Sardinia, in Northern and Central Italy, against 
 Montemar and the Hispano-Neapolitan forces, in July- 
 August, 1742, resembles somewhat that of the Duke of 
 Berwick against the Portuguese, cited by Decker and 
 referred to in the Introduction (Page 4-5) to this Biogra- 
 phy. Traun moved from his head-quarters at Coreggio, 
 in the Modenese, and, in July, took Mirandola, a town of 
 note, strongly fortiiied for the era, in the N. E. angle of 
 the same duchy, Colletta estimates that the coalesced 
 Austro-Sardinian forces equalled those of the Spaniards 
 and Neapolitans combined, but there is nothing else- 
 where which corroborates this large estimate. This 
 conquest and subsequent manceuvres compelled Monte-
 
 mar, although at the head of 40,000 men, good troops, 
 for the offensive and protection of the Mondenese, to 
 abandon even the Bolognese. He broke up his camp 
 at Bondeno, on the Panaro, in the N. W. Ferrarese, 
 whence he retreated, in the hastiest manner, through 
 San Giorsjio and Argenta, to Ravenna, thence by 
 Cesena, Rimini, Pesaro, and Fano, that is down along 
 the coast of the Adriatic, whence from Fano he moved 
 across the Apennines, whose desolateness in this locality- 
 give them an aspect of altitude they do not in reaUty 
 possess, to Foligno, about midway between the seas 
 which wash the Peninsula, This retreat is the more 
 inexplicable as he ignored the defensibleness of tlie Passo 
 del Furlo and narrow vallies of the Metauro and Cantiano, 
 through which his route lay. It has been alleged as an 
 excuse for Montemar's hurried retreat, that it was owing 
 to the desertion of the l!s^eapolitans. This could not be so 
 since they did not separate from the Spaniards and march 
 off homewards until Montemar had retreated twice, al- 
 together 250 miles. Abandoned to his own resources, 
 Montemar continued his retrograde into the Stato degli 
 Presidii, on the Tuscan coast and Canal of Elba, a terri- 
 tory held at this time by the Spaniards to faciHtate their 
 military communications between the Milanese and 
 Naples. 
 
 As far as Foligno, 250 miles, the Austro-Sardinians 
 kept up a hot pursuit of the enemy. Thence, owing to 
 the invasion of Savoy by the French, which called away 
 the King of Sardinia to the defence of this duchy, the 
 germ of his kingdom, the farther retreat of the Spaniards, 
 about 100 miles, was unmolested. 
 
 After the departure of Charles Emanuel, whose race, 
 however heroic, have ever proved inconstant and unre- 
 liable in their alliances, where interest conflicted with
 
 22 
 compacts, Traun fell back and occupied the line of the 
 Panaro, from Buonporto, South, to Solaro, North, to 
 cover the recently conquered Modenese. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Spanish forces, recruited in every sense, 
 under a new commander. Marshal, Count of Gages, had 
 retraced their steps, eastwards and northwards, by the 
 very roads upon which they had retreated. In October, 
 Gages was again in the presence of the Austrians, with 
 positive orders to seek out the enemy and to oflFer them 
 battle. Whether and when it would be accepted, how- 
 ever, depended upon the jjlans of the Austrian practical 
 strategist, not the will of the Spanish Count Marshal. 
 
 Traun had assumed the defensive against his will and 
 conviction. The Austrian army was not strong enough 
 to act independently even of the small subsidiary Sar- 
 dinian force, which its king had left with Traun, under 
 the Count of Aspremonte. This latter General had re- 
 ceived commands to co-operate with the Austrians, if the 
 Spaniards crossed the Panaro to attack them, but in no 
 event to pass that river and act offensively against the 
 enemy, the Spaniards. 
 
 Traun was too good a commander to remain on the sim- 
 ple defensive, and his offensive-defensive was dashing for 
 his era. From his camps on the Panaro, his detachments 
 operated as far Imola and Ravenna, 40 to 60 miles to the 
 front, and his hussars, even when compelled to fall back, 
 inflicted severe losses upon the enemy following them up. 
 
 Both armies occupied an antagonistic position on the 
 Panaro analagous to that of the Pebel and Federal forces 
 along the Potomac, 1861-'2, with this difference that Traun 
 Avith inferior numbers held Gages in check just as the 
 Rebels paralyzed the far more numerous Loyal army. — 
 What renders the resemblance more striking is that Traun 
 pushed a column across to Bazzano, 11 miles W. of Bol-
 
 33 
 
 « 
 
 ogna, which would not inaptly represent our operations 
 towards Martinsburg and Winchester. Here the Aus- 
 trians however strongly entrenched themselves and pre- 
 vented any forward movement of the enemy. Finally, 
 McDowell and Gages delivered battles in obedience to 
 orders or under the pressure of popular clamor and were 
 defeated. ■*■ 
 
 The Spanish Generals now resolved to make an attempt 
 to quarter themselves upon abundant Tuscany hitherto 
 spared the presence of an enemy. At once Traun des- 
 patched a corps of 5 to 6,000 men across the rude moun- 
 tains of Po(a)retta, {Al^i JPannie or Apucme ;) famous 
 for sulphur baths, about midway an air line between Mo- 
 dena and Prato, to join a corps under General Breit- 
 witz, stationed at Pistqja, and prevent the Spaniards from 
 occupying those rich districts. This was an energetic 
 move at so late a season and in so treacherous a mountain 
 district as the Apennines. It was successful. 
 
 Both armies, now, went into winter (174:2-'3) quarters. 
 Traun's head-quarters were at Carpi, the apex of the tri- 
 angle occupied by his forces, whose base was the Panaro. 
 His troops were so posted that while they sufficiently 
 protected the whole Eastern boundary of the Modenese 
 they could be concentrated with the utmost ease and cel- 
 erity. 
 
 Spurred into sudden action by orders from his distant 
 and imrailitary superiors, by news of reverses experienced 
 by tlie Sardinians on their western frontier a,t the hands 
 of the French and Spaniards, by his expectations of talc- 
 ing Traun by surprise, and by his calculations of over- 
 whelming the Austrians in detail before they had receiv- 
 ed the promised reinforcements already on the mai-cli froin 
 Germany, Marshal Gages plunged forward witli violence 
 and was hurled back with destruction. This i-esult proves
 
 u 
 
 the necessity of making such a disposition of troops as to 
 favor their immediate concentration, and the bringing of 
 their forces as a unit to bear upon a, fraction of the enemy, 
 and of tlie necessity of understanding the simple rules by 
 which it can be done. There is no doubt that any man 
 who possesses the requisite Combination of qualities to 
 understand and apply such rules will make a better gen- 
 eral than the most scientifically educated officer without 
 the necessary aptitude. Banks is an example. "Welling- 
 ton showed his strong sense by the following remark, here 
 truly apposite, which, put in practice by him, won all his 
 successes. "I know (quoting Oust,) that one man occu- 
 pies 2 feet of front ; therefore, as the soldiers are in 2 
 ranks, each man may be said to occupy '4 sq. ft.' of ground ; 
 therefore, 5,000 men occupy a mile in length ; and, con- 
 sequently, it will require the same time that a man can 
 march a mile to bring up the rear of a column of 5,000 
 men to the point from which the head has started." 
 
 The battle of Campo Santo has been deemed worthy 
 of particular elucidation by Yon Kauslee in his celebra- 
 ted "Atlas and Text of Memorable Battles," &c. In 
 some respects, throwing out Sedgwick's corps and taking 
 no account of the difierence in numbers, but only the 
 manoeuvering and dispositions of the troops, it may be 
 considered as bearing some resemblance to the battle of 
 Chancellorsville, pai'ticularly as regards the position of 
 the armies as to each other and to the Panaro, the atten- 
 dant circumstances and the result : — that is as far as little 
 battles can be compared with large ones. 
 
 As above mentioned Marshal Count of Gages hurried 
 forwards, 1st February, 1743, from Bologna, crossed the 
 Panaro [navigable at this point,] 4th February, on two 
 bridges of boats, near Campo Santo, and pushed on as far 
 as Solaro, hoping to surprise the Austro-Piedmontese in
 
 S5 
 their winter quarters in the Modenese. Having learned 
 from spies and scouts that Traun had concentrated his 
 troops at Buonporto, he, Gages, abandoned the offensive 
 and fell back rapidly upon Bologna. On the 6th of Feb- 
 ruary his troopis ^ere again at Campo Santo, and, on the 
 7th, the Spanish train commenced their retreat over the 
 Panaro. This movement continued throughout that day 
 and was not completed on the morning of the 8th, when 
 the troops themselves made ready to follow their equipages. 
 
 While the Spaniards were thus losing time in accor- 
 dance with their usual sluggish mode of procedure, Traun 
 was following them up upon the road from Mirandola to 
 Campo Santo. On the night of the 7th-8th Febraary, he 
 encamped on the little marshy stream of La Reggiana, 
 just across from San Felice, about thi*ee miles from the 
 enemy. He halted, because he hoped by the delay to 
 catch the Spaniards, just as Meade ought to have caught 
 the rebels, while actually crossing the liver in their rear, 
 with part of their forces on this, and part of their forces 
 on that, side of it. 'hs 
 
 On the morning of the Sthj Traun sent for,ward de- 
 tachments of light infantry and cavalry, under Colonel 
 Hohenau, to reconnoitre the Spanish position. The 
 Spanish artillery was actually in movement to cross the 
 river in. their rear, when Traun's advance showed them; 
 selves on their extreme left. That Traun sent forward 
 Hohenau at ^ajil proved a great mistake on his part, for, 
 as soon as his eclaireurs showed themselves. Marshal 
 Gages saw it was impossible to effectuate his retreat in 
 l-hie presence of the enemy, and rapidly formed his line of 
 Rattle. His left rested upon the Panaro, and his right 
 upon three large ponds, mar&hes, country houses and farm 
 buildings, (casinpSy) presenting an obtuse angle to the
 
 Anstro-PietTinoutese, whose apex was neai' the road upon 
 which the Allies were advancing. 
 
 Gages had 31 battalions of regular infantiy and 2 com- 
 panies of volunteers, 10,000, and 4 regiments of cavalry, 
 2,400, total, 12,400 men. The Anstro-Fiedmontese, 24 
 battalions of infantry, 8,000, and 4 regiments of cavalry, 
 and 1 of Sclavonians serving like voltigeurs proper, both 
 on foot and on horseback, 2,600, total, 10,600 men. 
 
 Traim advanced in columns with the majority of the 
 artillery on his right w^ing, which he appears to have in- 
 tended to refuse w^hile he occupied therewith the attention 
 of the Spanish left. The majority of his cavalry consti- 
 tuted his right wing which were to make a flank move- 
 ment and turn the Austrian right over marshy ground, 
 frozen however at this time, which the Austrians had not 
 occupied, between the ponds and river. This neglect, 
 although at one period, apparently retrieved, no doubt 
 lost the battle, since it necessitated the transferral of troops 
 from the left to right and much manceuvering under fire, 
 always unadvisable even with the best of soldiers. 
 
 As soon as the Austro-Piedmontese advanced to the 
 attack, the Spanish general sent detachments to occupy the 
 space between their right and the Panaro and charged 
 the Austrian cavalry, in the act of deploying to charge the 
 Spanish infantry. This counter-charge, elegantly executed, 
 like that of Seydlitz at Rossbach, was completely success- 
 ful, and the Austro-Piedmontese cavalry were so effectually 
 broken that they may be said to have taken no farther 
 part in the battle. They appeared again when it was 
 about over, but even then accomplished little or nothing. 
 The Spanish cavalry, however, were equally culpable, 
 and seemed content with their success. Instead of throw- . 
 ing themselves upon the allies left, entirely denuded of 
 cavalry, they returned to their original position by the
 
 2ir * 
 
 ponds, and took, apparently, no farther notable part iu tht 
 action. 
 
 At 4 P. M., the hour at which some authors state the 
 battle became general, the Spanish infantry of the right 
 wing ekai^ged the Austrian centre, and broke through its 
 first line, but was repulsed by the second and forced back 
 gradually, by numbers superior at the point of decision. 
 AtJter sunset, 3 battalions of Walloon infantry, of the 
 Spanish extreme right, under General Jauehe, tired of 
 their iuaetion throughout the day, advanced to charge 
 the op.posing right of the Allies, refused. Gages incon- 
 siderately recalled them, but, almost simultaneously, 
 pereeiving what important effects might result from this 
 movement, he commanded Jauehe to resume the of- 
 fensive, and ordered up the rest of the infantry of his left 
 wing to support the Walloons. These baitalions, ad- 
 vanoing by echelons, mistook each other in the twilight 
 for enemies, commenced fii-ing upon each other, and did 
 not discover the error until they had mutually inflicted a 
 very heavy loss. This accident, very common to such 
 movements with young troops, may explain why our 
 battles have been fought on fii*st principles in continuous 
 lines, and without attempts at manoeuvring. 
 
 Meanwhile the Spanish right, which had b©«i worsted 
 several hours before, was thoroughly beaten, the <K)untry 
 houses, buildings, and positions about the ponds carried, 
 and one battalion captured. 
 
 ^ Why Traun did not press home and destroy the Span- 
 iards, who continued to retreat across the river during 
 the night by moonlight, and broke down their bridge 
 behind them, can only be explained by the fact that his 
 infantry, which had marched, manoeuvred and fought the 
 whole day, were completely fagged out, and tliat B5s
 
 28^' 
 cavalry, tliorouglily beaten in tlie morning, were not in 
 hand, condition or spirits. 
 
 He lost 1,T03 dead, wounded and prisoners ; among these 
 2 generals killed, and 2 wounded. Strange to say the 
 Spaniards had also 2 generals killed and 2 wounded, 1,755 
 killed, 1,397 wounded and 824 prisoners. Traun's report 
 riehds that hi^'- total casualties did not exceed 1,200, 
 knd that many stragglers rejoined him within the next 
 few days. He estimated the losses of de Gages in, and 
 in consequence of, this defeat, as high as 6,000, half 
 his force present, according to Yon Kausler. Gages who 
 efajoyed a great reputation in his day, deserves but little 
 credit for his dispositions in this battle, and fought it very 
 badly. There were orders and counter orders, and as 
 usual, consequent disorders throughout. Nevertheless he 
 showed great calmness and soldiership in the manner in 
 ■v^hich he eflPectied his reti^t. As some excuse for the 
 Spanish Marshal, it 5fi Irell to remember that "having 
 received repeated (iomiiiands to miss no opportunity of 
 iattacking the enemy," he acted as too many Generals 
 have done under similar cilxjumstances. Obeyed blindly 
 and failed. Gages fought " more with a view to satisfy 
 the court in Madrid, than perhaps with the hope of any 
 splendid result." No administration in a capital can or 
 should attempt to direct movements in the field. Such 
 guidance is beyond the scope of mortality's reason and 
 
 vision. 
 
 ****** 
 
 Notwithstanding his successes, malign influences soon 
 after led to Traun's resigning the command in Italy, 
 Where he liad conducted atfairs with so much ability and 
 glory. SchloBser insinuates that Trauii hd'd been emi- 
 i^ntly successful, and states that he "might als6 have 
 taken Naples," if affairs had been left to his sole direction,
 
 29 
 and if "a General of disti/ngidshed rank (equivalent under 
 •the Austrian administration to a political appointee in 
 the U. S.) bad not arrived (to replace him), instead of qua 
 of very great abilities." -^vi 
 
 Perhaps, more properly speaking, under-currents of 
 intrigue as well as public clamor, both so potential in 
 this country, led to Traun's recall. Military writers ascribe 
 it to his determined refusal not to adventure into a hos- 
 tile and difficult country, occupied by far superior forces,, 
 and imperil his communications witli his base of supplies, 
 until furnished with adequate means to carry out orders 
 received as well as his own plans. If this was the reason 
 it reflects the more honor on Traun. How seldom will t^ 
 general or official relinquish high positions until compel' 
 led to do so. We, hower^if, have recently seen notable 
 examples in the generous Burnside and intrepid Hooker,, 
 Common history attributes Traun's supersedure to 
 the clamors of allies who -desired protection without 
 being willing to bear any share of the burthens im- 
 posed by the presence of their protectors ; to the slan- 
 ders always occasioned by the conduct of an upright 
 leader, whose liberality base men style, to suit their pur- 
 poses, prodigality, and whose economy, avarice ; and to the 
 jealousy of inferior merit of equal rank but subordinate 
 position. Have our generals and armies witnessed no 
 striking instances of the success of such concurring in- 
 fluences ? At all events, one or all of these combined (as 
 more than once during this war at home) occasioned 
 Traun's resignation or recall. Before he left Italy the 
 King of Sardinia addressed him a most elegant letter of 
 commendation, and added his own portrait set with 
 diamonds to the value of $12,000. 
 
 Thus highly honored, by the King of Sardinia, 
 whose general's jealousy had latterly neutralized Traun's
 
 3(5 
 science, Traun hastened to throw himself at the Jeet 
 9{ his Empress-Queen, and demand a most searching , 
 enquiry into his official conduct. Maria Theresa raised 
 her gallant defender with tlie remark "I think of you as 
 I do of every honest man," and bestowed upon him the 
 order of the golden fleece, the highest honor in her power. 
 This was in January, 174i. The same month he was 
 made General-in-Chief in Bohemia and Moravia, the 
 bulwarks of Austria against the encroachments of Prussia. 
 
 Then, when Khevenhuller died, 26th Jan'y, of the same 
 year, 1744, she sent him to occupy that great general's 
 place as counsellor and assistant to the Austrian Com- 
 mander-in-Chief on the Rhine, Prince Charles of Lorraine, 
 who enjoys the fame which Traun alone deserves and ac* 
 quired for his superior. To Prince Charles, Traun acted 
 at once as Chief of his Staff, and military adviser (ad la- 
 TU8 is the proper term or alter ego) and held in regard 
 to his general the same relation that Hess occupied under 
 Radetsky in 1848-'9 in Italy, and under the present Em- 
 peror of Austria, in the Solferino campaign. In fact in the 
 ensuing campaigns, Austrian military annalists indicate 
 Traun as the actual planner, motor and director, even 
 where they write of the operations in which the Prince 
 himself commanded. "We now enter upon that year and 
 a half of PRACTICAL strategy which entitles Traun to 
 particular attention, his greatest n^onument and his last 
 efforts as a general in the true sense of the word, not a 
 mere jighter. 
 
 As a preface to the narratives of these achievments, it 
 will be well to consider what Schlosser, the Historian of 
 the XVIII Century, remarks in relation to Traun's in- 
 strumentality therein : 
 
 *' Whikt the king, (Louis XV, of France,) began his 
 
 \ 
 
 \
 
 31 
 
 operations in the Netherlands, Count Traux in reality 
 Inade an admirable campaign on the Khine, and Prince 
 Charles (brother of the Archduke Francis, Grand Duke 
 of Tuscany^ afterwards the Emperor Francis I., of Aus- 
 tria, and husband of Maria Theresa,) also, at least accord- 
 ing to the newspapers and liistories of those times, whose 
 peculiar vocation and purpose it was to flatter their rulers. 
 Traun had been recalled from Italy, where he had gath- 
 ered his laurels at Campo Santo, and sent as an assistant 
 to prince Charles, who knew much better how to help 
 himself at table and to the bottle, than in the field," and 
 '"''hy lending his name^ sometimes to General Brown and 
 sometimes to General Traun, did much more evil than 
 good." "Frederick II (the great) remarks, with great jus- 
 tice, that Austria treated Traun ('who received the com- 
 mand of the grand army which bore the name of the 
 Prince of Lorraine') very ungratefully on this occasion. 
 Not the slightest mention had hitherto been made of him 
 in the public reports. Lobkowitz {ajprince) was sent to 
 Italy to gather the laurels which he had really won, and 
 he was only sent back into Italy after he had command- 
 ed in two admirably well conducted campaigns on the 
 Rhine and in Bohemia (in 1744 and 1745), on which 
 occasion also no public notice whatever was taken of his 
 services. Even the Austrian official historian, who gives 
 an account of every year of this war in a thick octavo 
 volume, composed in the most repulsive chancery style, 
 ventures gently to hint, that the court party, in the year 
 1744, had behaved with great injustice to the valiant 
 Traun." 
 
 " There was a general expectation," testifies the court 
 historiographer, " that the house of Austria had found in 
 this valiant general some corapenbation for the loss of
 
 32 
 
 Kheveiihuller. Even the queen acted cbs ^f she placed 
 her whole relAmice on him. For that reason, I know not 
 why it is that so little is heard since then of that brave 
 gentleman. Li the accounts from the army there is 
 scarcely any allusion to him, which circumstance gives 
 rise to much conjecture." 
 
 Compare these remarks with what is becoming history 
 around us. Has the favoritism of despotic rule found its 
 counterpart or parallel in the favoritism of popular gov- 
 ernment ? Has the expii'ing influence of the Aulic Coun- 
 cil of Vienna, and of the Camarilla of Madi-id, or the 
 proscription and partiality of the Cabal of Charles 11, of 
 the Seggi of Kaples, or of the Ten of Venice, revived 
 with like mysterious and ubiquitous power under Demo- 
 cratic institutions? That there was already a strong 
 resemblance some years since, the following occurrence 
 will prove : 
 
 An Austrian military officer or agent was in conver- 
 sation with one of our most distinguished generals, since 
 gloriously dead upon the battle field, sacrificed by a 
 popular appointee. The latter had coinmenced to explain 
 how it was that generalships in this country M'ere con- 
 fided to influential civilians, instead of meritorious men 
 of military education, reputation or experience, when the 
 foreigner made the following reply : " I understand it. 
 In Austria chief commands are destined for the princes of 
 the blood and high aristocracy ; in the United States they 
 are given to political magnates and favorites of the 
 administration in power : merit or services are not taken 
 into consideration in either country unless compulsorily. 
 The principle is the same." 
 
 Thus extremes meet, and the people everywhere sacri- 
 ' ficed. As Napoleon remarked, " There is but one step 
 from the sublime to the ridiculous." This war was to
 
 have broken the fetters politicians had imposed upon the 
 people. Has it done so as yet ? Has it not riveted their 
 yoke upon the patriotic, industrial, producing middle 
 classes. 
 
 * * * it * * * 
 
 In April, 1744, Traun led the Austrian army, 40 to 
 60,000 strong in four columns out of their winter quarters 
 in the camp at Heilbronn, on the Neckar, where Prince 
 Charles had concentrated and organized them and settled 
 upon the plan of operations, and then crossed the iN'eckar 
 in order to invade Alsace. The French army under 
 Marshal de Coigny, 60 battalions and 100 squadrons 
 strong, which extended along the west bank of the river 
 from Gemersheim (50 miles, air line, below Strasburg) to 
 "Worms ; on the 30th July, drew together and united itself 
 with the Bavarian army. In order to mislead the French 
 in regard to his plan of crossing over the Khine into Al- 
 sace, whichj with the exception of the Commander-in- 
 Chief Prince, Charles of Lorraine, was known only to 
 Generals Traun and Nadasdy, the army made various 
 demonstrations and appeared to wish to attempt the pas- 
 sage at different points but especially in the neighborhood 
 of Stockstadt and Ketsch (village, east bank, one-third dis- 
 tance from Spires to Manheim.) The operation was also, 
 in appearance, actually carried out in the neighborhood of 
 Stockstadt and General Barenklau threw a bridge across 
 an arm of the Rhine. Prince Charles made at the same 
 time a movement, as if it was his intention to pass over 
 the Neckar and effect a junction with Barenklau. The 
 Marshal de Coigny, deceived by this manceuvre, made 
 the double mistake, that he sent the Bavarian Field Mar- 
 shal Seckendorf over the Rhine, in order to undertake the 
 defence of the river between Spires and Lauterburg, (west 
 shore, 34 miles N". E. of Strasburg,) and that ho himself
 
 34 
 
 broke up liis camp and marched off with army to Wonii& 
 and Frankenthal, instead of posting, as he should have 
 done, the united Frencli-Bavarian army, at least 76,000 
 strong, between the rivers Queich and Speyerbach, while 
 he stretched out a line of small detachments from Fort 
 Louis, midway between Strasburg and Lauterburg, to 
 Philipsburg, 
 
 As soon as Prince Charles and Field Marshal Traun 
 received news of these erroneous movements, they ex- 
 pedited the order to General Nadasdy to send, at the 
 village of Schroeck (east shore, 10 miles, S. by W. of Phil- 
 ipsburg), now known as Leopoldshafen, 2,000 Croats in 
 skiffs over the Rhine. These, under the known partisan 
 Trenck, surprised on the French, left or opposite, shore 
 three Bavarian regiments posted there, and converted the 
 confusion occasioned by their unexpected appearance into 
 precipitate flight. Nadasdy himself, meanwhile, at the 
 head of 9,000 Hussars, crossed the main stream, whilst 
 the engineers were most diligently occupied behind him 
 in finishing the pontoon bridges already commenced. 
 
 At the first alarm and news of this passage, Seckendorf 
 indeed hastened thither with his whole army, but instead 
 of boldly attacking Nadasdy, before the Prince of Wal- 
 deck with the infantry could join him, he was satisfied 
 with wasting the precious time in indecisive and half 
 hearted encounters, until he received the news of Coigny's 
 retreat to Landau, whereupon he fell back thither, through 
 Germersheim, fearing lest he should be entirely cut off 
 from the French main anny. 
 
 Meanwhile General Barenklau with his corps had like- 
 wise crossed over the Rhine in the neighborhood of 
 Mayence, and the Austrian main army had perfected 
 jtheir pontoon bridges so that, on the 3d July, the whole
 
 35 
 
 of Prince Charles' torces bad been trausfeiTed to the 
 French side of the river. 
 
 Thus was the forever memorable passage of the Rhine 
 by the Austrians (in 1744), in the face of the French and 
 Bavarians, carried out without loss. Prince Charles 
 truly acquired thereby the amplest renown, but in it our 
 Traun assuredly had the greater merit With these 
 very significant words Joseph Freyherm Von Hormayr, 
 author of the Austrian Plutarch, closes his succinct 
 account- He, a most reliable, has hitherto been the 
 chief, authority for this exploit. 
 
 For those readers, who are fond of details, tlie follow- 
 ing description has been collected from the best authori- 
 ties and maps, particularly Zedler's Lexicon and Fessler's 
 compilation of "Nadasdy's Relation," embodied in the 
 "History and Acliievements of Maria Theresa," the very 
 work which concedes that Austrian officials were so unjust 
 to Traun: 
 
 On the 19th-29th May, 1744, Charles of LoiTaine with 
 a mighty army, commenced his march from Heilbronu to 
 the Rhine, where for him and his Ad-latus Tkaun, actually 
 chief, nominally second in command, the hero Fba-nz 
 Nadasdy, and the Hungarian contingent under his com- 
 mand, imperishable laurels were prepared. 
 
 He proved his military ability by his victorious cam- 
 paign upon, and passage over the Rhine. On the west 
 bank of that river stood Marshal Coiony who had pledg- 
 ed his head to his king (Louis XV) tliat, so long as he 
 retained the command, no Austrian should live to plant 
 }us foot on the French side. 
 
 His army was stretched ont from Oppenheim (about 15 
 miles above Mayence) below, to Spires (40 miles, not 
 <jounting the bends of the river) above, while, midway, at 
 •Worms, 10,000 men were encamped who furnished ganv
 
 sons for all the intervening poets. Meanwhile from Hun- 
 ningen (just below Basle) to Spires [an arc of over 150 
 miles] a chain of militia sentinels, posted 100 paces apart, 
 maintained a constant watch. Seckendorf had assem- 
 bled the remainder of the Bavarian Army from their scat- 
 tered cantonments and established them on the east shore 
 of the Rhine under the protection of field works and the 
 strong fortress of Phi lipsburg. But when Barenklau and 
 Prince Anthony Eszterhazy moved forward with the 
 advance guard of 14,000 Infantry and 18,000 Cavalry to 
 Stockstadt, and the entire Austrian army had been aug- 
 mented, according to various estimates, to GO, and even 
 to 90,000 men, Seckendorf, continually harassed by Na- 
 daedy, saw himself compelled to transport his forces over 
 the Rhine and unite them with those under Coigny. This 
 was on the 2Tth June. After he had encamped around 
 Germersheim [3 to 6 miles W. by S. of Philipsburg] and 
 3Iodersheim, the French moved from Spires down [25 
 jniles] to "Worms and Oppenheim [about two thirds dis- 
 tance to Mayence.] The horses of Marshal Coigny were 
 kept saddled night and day, and the vigilance of his troops 
 seemed a certain assurance of the frustration of the enemy's 
 plans. 
 
 But Franz Nadasdy felt certain of the success of a plan 
 claimed to have been his conception. The time and place 
 of carrying it out was likewise a secret and left to Traun 
 and him. Prince Charles was the only other individual 
 except Traun cognizant of the projected operations, and, 
 devoid of envy and jealousy, its liberal promoter. Eight 
 days previous the Austrian troops had been occupied in, 
 to spies and strangers, unintelligible marches and counter- 
 marches, thereby, as well as through false reports of de- 
 serters and traitors, to deceive Coigny and Seckendorf. 
 After Nadasdy had made all the necessary preparation.
 
 37 
 Col., Adjutant-Geueral, Count Ostein, on the evening of 
 the 30th June, invited the foreign embassies and nobility 
 of Mayence to a grand ball, at which Barenklau and 
 Joseph Eszterhazy were purposely and conspicuously 
 present. On the same evening Prince Charles of Lor- 
 raine gave a costly collation to his Marshals, Generals 
 and Colonels. At this entertainment, as well as that 
 given by Ostein, nothing else was talked about except 
 the difficulty and impossibility of the passage of a river so 
 strongly defended as the Ehine. Meanwhile they paid no 
 attention to the attentive spies and listeners, who were 
 not wanting at either feast, and assuredly would convey 
 such consoling news as speedily as possible to the enemy. 
 Barenklau and Eszterhazy stole opportunely away from 
 Ostein's well-dnmken company and Prince Charles dis- 
 tributed sealed orders to the commanders departing from 
 him about midnight, with directions to open them at the 
 sound of the first signal gun and fulfill them instantly and 
 upon the spot. At daybreak on Wedn^ay, the 1st July, 
 the thunder of six cannons gave the signal for carrying 
 out a Master-piece of Tactics, the greatest perhaps of the 
 century. The assembled divisions between Neudorf and 
 Graben [villages 5 to 10 miles S. S. E. of Philipsburg] 
 commenced their movements at once. Not a man failed 
 in his company, rank or place ; yet no one knew whither 
 he was going or whither he was to be led. The forced 
 march was directed upon the village Schroeck [right bank, 
 a poor village, now Leopoldshafen] opposite the town 
 Rheinzaberen. Already Nadasdy, to whom the execution 
 of the movement had been confided, stood upon the bank 
 of the river. Confidence of success shone in his eye and 
 was stamped upon his features. Around him were group- 
 ed his subordinates, who placed as implicit confidence in 
 him as he did in the concerted plan. Coupt Fuebla,
 
 3$ 
 Strasoldo, Desoelfy, Forgacs, Botta and Moroetz. Under 
 tlie command of Trenck, 1,300 Pandours took the in- 
 itiative. Tliese Pandours were light infantry, clad in the 
 old Turkish costume ; sometimes, a kind of light cav- 
 alry. "Upwards of 160 large boats lashed together into 
 flying bridges, mounted with 8 field pieces, had been pre- 
 pared to carry them over. The Pandours pushed ahead. 
 The first attack had been assigned to them. The enemy's 
 shore was defended by 6,400 Dragoons, who fired a few 
 shots but the furious onset of the terrible, disembarking 
 Pandours, and their wild cry of Allah ! Allah ! first 
 heard in this war, under Chrietian leaders, upon the great 
 German river, frightened the French out of their lin^, 
 and three of their works were captured. 
 
 "And one enormoti* flhout of "Allah !" rose 
 
 In the game moment, loud ae even the roar 
 Of war's most martial engines, to their foes 
 
 Hurling defiance : city, etream and shore 
 Resounded "Allah !" and the clouds which close 
 
 With thickening canopy the conflict o'er. 
 Vibrate to the Eternal Name. Hark ! through 
 
 All sounds it pierceth, "Allah ! Allah I Hal" 
 
 In crowds the glorious Magyar leaders led their Hun- 
 garians, Carlstadters (South-western Croats), Warasdiners 
 (North-eastern Croats), and Talpatches (Hungarian foot 
 from the Koros district), savage, danger and death despis- 
 ing troops, to reinforce the Pandours. 250 Hussars rowed, 
 separately, in small boats across the river (here about 
 1200 feet wic'e with a strong current), and by 5, A. M., 
 not a single Frenchman remained upon the shore. The 
 brave Austrians were masters of it and the adjoining 
 wood. In the meanwhile thousands, with unremitting 
 labor, worked upon the main bridges of boats, which were 
 completed about mid-day. In the space of 8 hours, 15 
 legions of Cavalry and Infantry had passed over, and by 
 the next morning the rest of the foot and horse were 
 established on the French shore of the Rhine.
 
 39 
 
 The secoud point of passage, according to Kadasdy'a 
 plan, approved by Tiaun, for the crossing of tlie Rhine, 
 was G2 to 70 Englisli miles below Schroeck, near Bibe- 
 rich (right, east shore), about 5 English miles below 
 Mayence. Fortunately, without the loss of a man, 
 Barenklau and Joseph Eszterhazy solved on the same day 
 the difficult military problem confided to them. On 
 Tuesday they ordered 3,000 Croats and Hussars over the 
 Mayn at Kostheim, to seize every thing available as 
 means of transport above Mayence which they could dis- 
 cover by land or by water. At 10, P. M., they reached 
 the Ehine at "Wolffen, not far from Biberich, with a great 
 number of boats, rafts and whatever would float, which 
 they had brought with them out of the Mayn. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus, when he crossed the Rhine at En- 
 felden, a little above Oppenheim, so gloriously, in the 
 teeth of the Spaniards, Dec. 7, 1631, is said to have been 
 ferried over on a barn door ; his troops made the passage 
 singing a psalm. 
 
 By means of the appliances collected, the Croats .and 
 Hussars transported themselves across the river [1500 to 
 ITOO feet in width with a stronger current than abovq 
 where Kadasdy passed] and heralded their approach to 
 the French shore by their terrific and peculiar shout of 
 victory Urli ! Urli ! The French outposts were either put 
 to flight or cut to pieces. A signal, by means of rockets 
 and cannon shots, announced their successful crossing to 
 their associates above at Neustadt and Philipsburg. At 
 4 A. M., Wednesday, they marched upon the draw of the 
 bridge of boats [1666 feet long] opposite Mayence at the 
 Carthauserhofe. About 4 P. M., Barenklau and Eszter- 
 hazy led over 10,000 men, artillery, equipages and biBig-
 
 40 
 jjage. On tlie 2d July, Prince Charles of Lorraine and 
 Traiin crossed with the rest of the troops above Manheim^ 
 
 Tliis, and numberless other instances, prove that large 
 rivers are by no means impassable barriers for any coun- 
 try. This Napoleon admits. No great army, ably com- 
 manded and supplied with commensurate pontoon trains 
 and bridge resources, can be prevented from passing an 
 ordinary sized river even by an army equal in numbers 
 and under good officers. The only explanation for this 
 apparently strange fesult is that offence has always the 
 advamiage of defence, since it can choose its time, place 
 and opportunity. 
 
 In headlong career of victory, the Austrian army press- 
 ed forward, overran a great part of AlsarCd, and threatened 
 Lorraine. Traun stood ready for decisive action in the 
 neighborhood of Strasburg, when a courier dashed up to 
 the headquarters and announced that in consequence of 
 the Frankfort Convention, of the 13th May, 1Y44, Bohe- 
 mia had again been invaded by the Prussian armies.- — 
 This was the opening scene of the Second Silesian "War, 
 from which Frederic issued triumphant the ensuing year, 
 although as will be shown, Traun traversed his first moves 
 and rendered almost nugatory his first campaign. On 
 the 2l8t August, a Council of^War was summoned, com- 
 posed of Traun^ the Senior Generals of Inftmtry and 
 Cavalry and Field-Marsh al-Licuten ants. Unanimously 
 these decided upon a retreat over the Rhine. 
 
 To effect this repassage, however, without loss, was a 
 much harder task than to resolve upon it, since the French 
 and Bavarians counted 116,000 men, including 40,000 
 picked troops, brought up from the Netherlands, The 
 Austrians, according to Cust's "Annals of the Wars," had 
 only Y0,000, whose actual commander, fortunately for 
 them, was Traun. The Allies were under three French
 
 41 
 and one Bavarian Marshal. All of these had distinguish- 
 ed themselves at one period or another. Coigny received 
 his baton for his brilliant victory of Guastalla, in 1734 ; 
 ^^Toailles, as wise in council as brave in the field, for many 
 distinguished services, particularly at the f^iege of Phil- 
 ipsburg in 1734 ; Belleisle, indomitable and fertile in re- 
 sources, never can nor should be forgotten for his wonder- 
 ful retreat from Prague, 1742-'3 ; Seclcendorf had been 
 created Field Marshal chiefly for successes gained over 
 two of his associates, Coigny and Belleisle, in 1735, alter 
 which he displayed at times real ability by his re-conquest 
 of Bavaria in 1742, and operations against Traun's pre- 
 decessor, Khevenhuller. Perhaps one cause of Traun's 
 decided success was this coalition of military magnates, 
 either of whom would have been more dangerous alone. 
 
 It was plain then to foresee that the French would fol- 
 low up the first movement of retreat vrith all their forces 
 and take advantage of the first favorable opportunity to 
 fall with superior numbers upon the Austrian army or at 
 least upon one or more of its dislocated columns. This 
 circumstance made the greatest caution necessary. The 
 Austrians had to be prepai-ed not only to resist, but also 
 to be able to meet each attack with an energetic counter- 
 buff. On the other side celerity was no less urgent than 
 prudence in conducting this retreat, since the Bavarians, 
 under Seckendorf, had made all possible preparations to 
 get ahead of the Austrians, and, by the destruction of 
 their bridges, cut off their return to Germany. 
 
 On the 15th of August, (he heavy baggage began to 
 defile in retreat. Swiftly and altogether unexpectedly to 
 the enemy, the army followed and fell back across the 
 Zoor (affluent "West of Khine) before the French could 
 come up with it. At Benheim fW. shore, 25 N. N. E. 
 of Strasburg) near 8elz, 2l5t-23d August, the Austrians
 
 42 
 fl^w up in order of battle, and invited a conilict wliicL 
 the three Frencli Marslials "to the amazement of all Eu- 
 rope did not" dare to accept. 
 
 y (J ,^p General Dauii had been confided the command of 
 t^ vaij-guard of grenadiers to assure the passage of the 
 river and now again to his resolution was assigned the 
 command of the rear-guard, consisting of one infantry 
 (grenadier) and two dragoon regiments, to cover the re- 
 ti'eat, This Daun was afterwards Frederic the Great's 
 successful antagofflist at Kollin in 1T5T, and that monarch'* 
 unsuccessfml opponent at Hochkirehen in. 1758, and at Lieg- 
 nitz and Torgau in ITGO. Proteeted by a morass he gal- 
 lantly repulsed the attack of the French vanguai'd. la 
 this campaign another great Austrian General, afterwards 
 Field Marshal Laudon, was serving under the notorious 
 Trenck. He distinguished himself, and was shot through 
 and through the chest and shoulder blade, a button of his 
 dolman accompanying the ball.. 
 
 Meanwhile Traun, oa the night of the 23d-24tli Au- 
 gust, transported the whole Austriaja army, over hm pon- 
 toon bridges, to the ea»t bank ©f the Rhine. Before 
 break of day, 4 P. M., 24th August, the return passage 
 was safely accomplished, and the bridges broken up. The 
 same day the Austrians encamped at Ottersdouf, a ssaall 
 village, neai'ly opposite Benheimy 5 miles W.. of Rastadt^ 
 on Baden soil, whence with -'incredible expedition" Traua 
 advanced to Donauwerth, 50 miles N. "W. of Munich. 
 
 Much is to be observed here. On the one hand this 
 passage and re-passage of the Rhine presents strong points 
 of resemblance to the crossing and re-crossing of the 
 Rappahannock, before and after Fredericksburg, Ist and 
 2d, ja^d: Chancelloreyille. All these were achieved suc- 
 cessiully in the face of a superior or equal enemy, prepar- 
 ed to resist and pursue. It is nothing new, it is thus
 
 43 
 
 proved, to cross and re-cross great rivers sattiy. iu tlie 
 presence and against the will of an experienced, active, 
 and determined opponent. But, on the other hand, contrast 
 Daun's successful defence, with three regiments and with- 
 out field works, against a very numerous anny, with the 
 abandonment of more than one fortified position by our 
 'ComMnan«clier&, although at the head of garrisons, bnt little 
 infeiioi* in numbers to the assailing or menacing force. — 
 A brave and successful maintenance of a post is a great 
 ^lory to an officer and often of incalculable impoitancc 
 to a co-operating army. 
 
 At Donauwerth on the 9th Sept. Prince Charles re-' 
 linquished the command-in-chief, nominally his, of the 
 army to Count Traun, always in reality its actual com- 
 mander. This latter led his troops by forced marches by 
 the way of Ratisbon, on the Danube, to Bruck, near 
 Waldmunchen, on the frontier of Bohemia and road to 
 Pilsen. He reached this point on the 22d Sept., having 
 accomplished from 250 to 300 miles in 29 days. On his 
 passage through the Upper Palatinate he laid this district 
 under contribution. On I'eaching the frontier of Bohemia, 
 he made his dispositions to free the kingdom from the 
 victorious Prussians. These invaders had, meanwhile 
 captured its capital, Prague, 16th Sept. 1744, and com- 
 pelled the city a second time, to do homage to Charles 
 VII, the psuedo-Bavaro-elector-emperor. 
 
 This campaign has been considered at length in Ch«i]i(;' 
 IX of Frederic's "History of my own Time," To his 
 pages reference should be had. In it the practical-strate- 
 gic genius of Traun developed itself against the great 
 King and shone in its fullest brilliancy. "My grand 
 army," said Frederic, "which was to have swallowed up 
 Bohemia and to have ovemin Austria, met with the fktb
 
 44 
 
 that befel the invincible armada of Philip II of Spain." — 
 "All the advantages of this campaign were for the Aus- 
 trians, M. de Traun played therein the part of Sertorius 
 and the King that of Pompey. The conduct of M. de 
 Traun was a model of perfection.-' What more could be 
 said. 
 
 Frederic the Great has recorded his testimony that it is 
 more difficult to carry on a war in Bohemia than any- 
 where else in Middle Europe. 
 
 Bohemia is an irregular quadrilateral enclosed by four 
 mighty chains of granite mountains. The Ore mountains, 
 on the N. W., separate it from Saxony ; the Giant moun- 
 tains, on the N. E., divide it from Silesia ; and tlie Pine 
 and Forest mountains on the S. W,, swell up between it 
 and Bavaria and Austria. On the fourth side the Sudetic 
 range, from which the Giant mountains run off towards 
 the N. W., throw out a branch, the Sunken mountains, 
 V which forms the S. E. boundary. These uniting with the 
 Forest mountains interpose between Bohemia and Mora- 
 via, and Lower Austria. The spurs of all these chains 
 run in and together and through each other towards 
 Prague as a central point in a net work of ridges which, 
 whether lower or loftier, are always rude in their climate, 
 rugged in their aspect, unproductive in their soil, and 
 intersected by streams subject to furious freshets. In fkct 
 this kingdom or province will scarcely yield to any por- 
 tion of the U. S. in roughness of surface except the strip 
 of the Alleghanies, j^roper, in Virginia. The central tri- 
 angle, between the Elbe and the Moldau, the scene of 
 Traun's successful strategic operations, if not as moun- 
 tainous as the districts encompassing it, is nevertheless 
 equally difficult because the valleys are irregular and 
 subject to overflows. A birds eye Anew would present 
 as diverBified ^ country as defence could desire. Ponds,
 
 45 
 
 marshes, streams, rivers, brush, woods, forests, ravines, 
 tortuous valleys, heights, isolated conical mountains 
 crowned by old castles, and spurs of mountain ranges 
 jningle therein confusedly. Consequently those who 
 may imagine that Toretenson and Hatzfeld, Traun and 
 Frederick had an easier chess-board to make their moves 
 upon, than our Generals had to play their game on, err 
 greatly. Readers could indicate few stages for operations 
 which an ordinary General would not have selected in 
 preference. 
 
 August 13th, 1744, Frederic entered Bohemia with 
 84,000 men ; September 16th he took Prague after a ten 
 days siege. lie then captured Tabor, Budweiss, and oth- 
 er towns and made himself master of all Bohemia east of 
 the Moldau. General Batthyani with 28,000 regulars 
 and about 6,000 Croats, Hussars, and Groenitzem (Soldiers 
 from the Military Frontier) had been unable to interrupt 
 his operations or stop his progress. Even Vienna began 
 to tremble and to prepare against a siege. Suddenly 
 Traun showed himself near Pisek (m the flanks of the 
 Prussians and manifested an intention to interpose liis 
 forces between the Prussians aud the Sasawa and cut 
 them off from Prague. Oct. 2d, Traun had united his 
 columns with those of Batthyani near Mirotitz, 50 miles 
 S.*S. W. of Prague. Their combined troops amounted to 
 about 60,000 men. Besides these, Traun had a large 
 force of Hungarian partisans, wherewith to harass the 
 enemy. Taking alarm, Frederic at once commenced fall- 
 ing back on Prague, but, as he admits, did not concen- 
 trate all his forces as he should liave done. He even 
 committed the great error of leaving garrisons behind in 
 Tabor and Budweiss. Simultaneously Traun struck at 
 Frederic's communications and pounced upon his outlying 
 posts. By the 3d Oct., Tabor and Budweiss had been
 
 taken with upwards of 0,000 good soldleiv, besides inval- 
 ids, and already Traun's vanguard was liastening forward 
 to occupy the important post of Boneschau. This place 
 lies midway on the roa<l from Tabor, 25 miles S. E. of 
 Prague. The possession of this almost inexpugnable po- 
 sition could hav-e determined the fate of the war and of 
 the Prussian fbives. Fortunately for them, their Field- 
 Marshal Schwerin had already won and occupied it with 
 15,000 men, before the coming up of the Austrians. On 
 the Mth Oct. the King himself, reinforced his Lieutenant, 
 Forestalled by Schwerin, Traun fell back to Neweclow, 
 about 8 miles, "W. S. W., and, thence, to Marschowitz, 2 
 or 3 miles* to the S. E. again. Here, Oct. 22d, Traun 
 was joined by 20 or 22,000 Saxons under the Duke of Sax- 
 Weissenfels. Frederic received these tidings with great 
 pleasure. Chagrined at the loss of Tabor and Budweiss 
 and the failure of his great plans he confessed that he was 
 in hopes that the hour for vengeance had arrived. His 
 army, in eight columns, marched Oct. 24th, P. M. to seek 
 out the enemy. By roads or paths never before traversed 
 by troops they toiled forward. At night fall they arrived 
 upon a heighth less than a mile distant from the Austri- 
 ans, and drew' up in order of battle in full sight of their 
 lines. It is difficult to reconcile the difterent acrounts«3f 
 the numerical force of either army in presence. Still 
 Frederic certainly had about 70,000 men, and the Aus- 
 trians not much over that number. The Prussians have 
 been estimated at from 60 to 70,000 men, the Austrians 
 from 75 to 90,000. • 
 
 Traun, as a rule, put little confidence in Fortune. He 
 knew the jade was often accustomed to play an unlucky 
 trick with the most beautiful projects, and cut, with un- 
 expected slash, through and across the web of the most
 
 47 
 
 skilUul j)Ians. Phrync-like, slie, oftener, in preference,, 
 inspired a young impetuous warrior with conceptiona, tie 
 sources of victory, tlmn an old, reflecting and experienced 
 hero, such as himself, grown gray in arms. Consequently 
 he determined to avoid the oftered battle on which the 
 fate of Bohemia and Bavaria depended. The night passed! 
 in dispositions in accordance with this resolve. 
 
 The next morning, at break of day, Frederic and his 
 principal officers were out to reconnoitre their enemy. 
 They found that he had entirely changed the position of 
 his camp. Traun wa& now posted opposite the right 
 flank of the Prussians, upon an almost precipitous height. 
 At the foot of this elevation stretched a marshy bottom, 
 intersected by a miry stream. These impediments sepa- 
 rated the two armies. In this direction Traun was en- 
 tirely unassailable. An extensive screen of brush wood 
 aflTorded cover for the examination of Traun's right. It 
 w'as as advantageously posted as his left. The most 
 accurate reconnoissances demonstrated that Traun's posi- 
 tion was altogether unsusceptible of any successful attack. 
 Dearth of provisions constrained Frederic to retreat. — 
 Still more out of humor than when he advanced, he fell 
 back again to Beneschau. At once Traun was in move- 
 ment and followed him up close. This is an example of 
 the practical strategy which steadily pressed Frederic 
 back and out of Bohemia. 
 
 At Beneschau, Frederic, in turn, assumed an equally 
 advantageous position. Maladies and privations of all 
 kinds, and scarcity of food and forage, soon constrained 
 him to abandon it. Traun, thereupon, passed over the 
 Sasawa, affluent E. of Moldau, at Kammerburg, 25 miles 
 S. E. of Prague, and directed his march on Janowitz. — 
 This village lies in the direction of, and midway to, Czaa- 
 lau. There Frederic had been victorious in 1742, tct^
 
 48 
 niinated the First Silesian War, and I'atitiedliis claims to 
 Silesia with the sword. Jaiiowitz or Jaiiikaii was no less 
 memorable. It was the scene of Torstenson's greatest 
 victory, just 99 years previous, in 1645. Here the crip- 
 pled Swede, litter-borne, defeated the Emperor's best 
 general and destroyed his last amiy. Traun, in whom 
 was reflected the genius of "under Sweden's throne, 
 Sweden's greatest commander" was reversing the picture. 
 Under Torstenson, the Prussians had assisted in humili- 
 ating Austria. Austria, by Traun, was now humbling 
 the aggrandizement of Prussia. ' At Czaslau, near by. 
 Prince Charles, now Traun's nominal superior, had been 
 defeated, and had lost Silesia for his sister-in-law. Traun 
 was now causing double blushes and confusion of faces. 
 Prince Charles had cause to blush at the inferiority of 
 his generalship to that of Traun, successful on the very 
 fields which had witnessed his failure. Frederic at his 
 impotence in the pres^ence of the veteran Marshal, vic- 
 torious without fighting, through practical strategy, in 
 the name of the very superior, over whom he had tri- 
 umphed at the cost of such exertion and bloodshed. — 
 
 The Austrian partisan corps swarmed out in every di- 
 rection 'No stingless drones were they. They followed 
 hard upon the heels of the retreating Prussians and dog- 
 ged their every movement. They prevented the arrival 
 of supplies of every kind and intercepted couriers and 
 mails. At one period the king was four weeks without 
 receiving intelligence from Prague or news of what was 
 passing in the rest of Europe. Take one instance of their 
 ubiquitous on-falls. One night about 9 P. M., amid the 
 rain and pitch-darkness, the King was startled in the 
 suburbs of Kollin by the cymbals and barbarous Tiu-kish 
 muBic of Trenck's Pandours. The Jiext moment the
 
 49 
 
 neighboring houses burst into a blaze and from the adja- 
 cent windows issued a sharp fire of musketry. Mean" 
 while Trenck had diverted the course of a rivulet and, by 
 midnight, the horses of the Prussians were in water up 
 to their bellies. All the while musketiy and light field 
 pieces were playing upon them. The Prussians were 
 incapable of defence. Horses and men were falling every 
 minute. In a short time all, Frederic himself included, 
 would have been taken prisoners. Suddenly the attack 
 slackened. A cannon ball had crushed Trenck's foot. 
 He was carried off and, almost simultaneously, the firing 
 ceased. As Frederic left Kollin he remarked to the 
 Trenck in his service, " Your terrible cousin might have 
 given us a severe blow last night." This was one of the 
 King's many remarkable escapes. 
 
 Throughout this retreat the Austrjan light troops 
 continued to provoke the Prussians by continual skirm- 
 ishes and night attacks. Partial encounters were inces- 
 sant, but not the slightest opportunity was afibrded to 
 bring on a general engagement. Bad weather, wretched 
 roads and the want of necessaries engendered camp mala- 
 dies. Unremitting fatigue augmented the sufferings. — 
 
 "look on yonder camp! 
 
 Behold whole heaps of dead, without one wound ! 
 Behold, how like the dead the living look ! 
 So near their end, that they who wait their fViends 
 To the last rites, are burnt on the same pile I 
 The sturdy" troops "unsinew'd by diseases. 
 That firmly went, impressing deep the ground 
 On which they trod, with their large lusty strides, 
 Now scarcely crawl, supported on their arms." 
 
 Not 100 soldiers in each regiment were free from dysen- 
 teries ; the officers were as badly off as the men. Traun 
 seemed resolved to destroy the Prussians by famine. 
 Famine, however, wjw even beforehand with the enemy. 
 Frederic was caught as it were in a net. He had only 
 the unpleasant choice between Bohemia and Silesia. If
 
 $0 
 
 Frederic made up his mind fo maintain himself in Pragtie, 
 he must give up all his eoinmunieations ■with Silesia and 
 his own kingdom. If he turned aside towards Pardubitz, 
 on the main road to Silesia, Prague and Bohemia were 
 lost ; Bohemia would be delivered from every detachment 
 of the Prussian invaders. 
 
 In the present work it is needless to go farther into 
 details. Frederic neglected nothing to compel the Field 
 Marshal to accept a battle. He forbore no manceuvre to 
 avert or avoid the inevitable alternative whidi Traun 
 prescribed for his acceptance. Traun never assumed a 
 position susceptible of successful attack, Frederic had 
 per force to retire in obedience to Traun's- pressure. — 
 Miseries which every day augmented in his amiy, com- 
 pelled Frederic to fall backover the Elbe. On the 29tli 
 
 November, he recrossed that river and placed his troops 
 
 « 
 
 in cantonments, Prague had already been disgracefully 
 evacuated, on the 26th. 
 
 The surprise at Colonitz (Solonita or Teinitz, on the 
 Elbe) on the 19th November, the last encounter, was one 
 of the most aggravating incidents of the campaign. In 
 spite of all the King's proverbial caution and watchful- 
 ness, this surprise was planned and carried out by Traim 
 with even as much cunning as good fortune. Its result 
 was the entire evacuation of Bohemia by the Prussians, 
 Conquered without a battle Frederic exclaimed, "I might 
 have made with advantage to myself a couple of cam- 
 paigns under Traun." Scimtinize and compare. Will 
 any one deny that measured by the standard of Frederic, 
 the generalship of Gilmore and Eoseerans comes nearest^ 
 in its peculiarities to the practical strategy of Traun. 
 
 This anecdote leads to reflections the pen cannot re- 
 frain from expressing. War was a very diflferent thing, 
 in Traun's days from what it is now. There was a re-
 
 51 
 
 spleadency aud exhilaration, an actual elevation in the 
 military service then, which could not but exercise a 
 magic influence upon any one inclined to enterprise and 
 excitement. There was even an elegance in the career of 
 the soldier. Some of the best spirit of chivalry still lin- 
 gered about it The campaigns of Frederic and his co- 
 temporaries opposed in the arena raoes which it required 
 almost half a century and the vast, aggressive, mrelstrom- 
 influence of Napoleon to <lraw, and whirl, and confuse 
 in the maddening churm of battle upon the same ^elds. 
 When Traun commanded, the God of battles was invoked, 
 in opposing arms, by every great faith, and sect, and 
 schism, from the Yellow Sea to the Atlantic. All the 
 most picturesque, and dazzling, and bizarre • costumes 
 mingled in the strife ; while music, discordant to attem- 
 pered ears, but breathing hainnony to the untutored semi- 
 savage warrior, made itself heard amid the rattling of 
 musketry, and the dissimilar commands of conflicting 
 multitudes, while 
 
 "Soimdfl of horror chime 
 In. Ukecharch bella, with aigh, howl, grean, yell, prayw." 
 
 to the 
 
 "diapae«n of the cannonade."" 
 
 Never again, will an European commander hear that wild 
 Turkish music with which Trenck's Pandours and Tal- 
 patches startled Frederic amid the flames of Kollin. In 
 our war, the days of old Tilly seem to revive before us, 
 and ''a ragged soldier but a bright musket" present them- 
 selves in review, instead of the gay uniforms and clean 
 persons and elegant carriage it required so many years 
 and lucid minds to introduce, maintain, simplify and 
 utilize. 
 
 These movements and counter-movements recall a paR- 
 sage from Sir Waltertfcotts "Legend of Montrose" which 
 is exactly apposite, if it be justifiable to make comedy the
 
 52 
 exponent of tragedy. The comparison between the rel- 
 ative positions, and actions of Captain Dalgetty and the 
 "Man with the Axe" and of Frederic, wlio sought to take 
 advantage of an unguarded moment on the part of Maria 
 Theresa, and of Traun, who represents the axe bearing 
 guard, are so ridiculously alike tliat it is impossible to 
 forbear quoting the paragraph. 
 
 "Accordingly, when all was quiet, he (Frederic) opened 
 his chamber-door, (Saxony) and prepared to leave it, when 
 he saw his friend with the axe (Traun) advancing towards 
 him from the distant end of the gallery (Circles upon the 
 Rhine,) half whistling, half humming, a Gaelic (Magyar) 
 tune. To have shown any want of confidence, would 
 have been at once impolitic, and unbecoming his military 
 character, so the Captain, putting the best face upon his 
 situation he could, whistled a Swedish retreat, in a tone 
 still louder than the notes of his sentinel ; and retreating 
 pace by pace, with an air of indifference, as if his only 
 purpose had been to breathe a little fresh air, he shut the 
 door (Frontiers of Silesia) in the face of his guard (Traun) 
 when the fellow had approached within a few paces of 
 him." 
 
 "Thus ended this campaign of 1744," (to use the very 
 words of Lord Dover, Towers, Campbell, and other his- 
 torians and panegyrists of Frederic) "one of the most dis- 
 astrous which ever befell the King of Prussia." "In his 
 retreat he is stated to have lost above 30,000 men, togeth- 
 er with ' all ' his heavy baggage and artillery, and many 
 wagons laden with provisions and plunder." "The Gen- 
 eral opposed to the king, Field-Marshal Traun, who m 
 fact Gom/mamded the army of the Prince of Lorraine, was 
 also, it must be confessed, a man of talent, and took ad- 
 vantage of whatever favort^ble cii^mstances presented 
 thenjselves."
 
 o6 
 "The conduct of Marshal Traiui, iu this campaign,'* 
 remarks his opponent, "was a model of perfection, which 
 every jnilitary man lofio is fond ofhisprofession, (mght 
 to study ^ in or den' to imitate it, if he ha^ siifficient talents J^ 
 The king himself allowed, that "this campaign was his 
 SCHOOL in the art of war, and that M. de Traun was his 
 Preceptor." 
 
 Jomini in his "Treatise on Grand Military Operations" 
 remarks "This campaign did great honor to Traun who 
 operated with as great sagacity while he was yet inferior 
 in force to Frederic as he manojuvered with ability, after 
 he had been joined by Prince Charles, in order to compel 
 the Prussians to abandon Bohemia. Then, without doubt 
 lie should have accomplished more, but he had an adver- 
 sary who was not, like himself, subject to the Au lie 
 Council." 
 
 Traun achieved more than could have been expected 
 of him under existing circumstances. Prince Charles of 
 Lorraine "by lending his name to General Traun, did 
 much more evil than good." "He knew much better 
 how to help himself at table and to the bottle than in the 
 field." With Traun for ad-latus, Prince Charles achieved 
 wonders; without him he accomplished nothing but pre- 
 paring defeats for himself. With Traun in actual com- 
 mand of the armies which bore his naitie, Prince Charles 
 won nothing but laurels, laurels withered by his defeat at 
 Czaslau, in 1742, shrivelled and torn from his brow by his 
 discomfitures at Hohen-Friedberg and Sohr, in 1745, and 
 his inexcusable rout at Leuthen in 1757. Despite Prince 
 Charles and the Aulic Council, Traun very nearly deter- 
 mined the fate of the war against Frederic. Oh, that 
 Aulic Council, which has abased Austria, despite her 
 glorious armies, frc^a firet to a second rate power. Oh, 
 that Camarilla of old fogyism, tliat Cabal of self sufiicien-
 
 54 
 ■ej and Ted tape wliicli appeared to exert itself only to 
 bewilder and fetter (generals. Montecnculi is the only 
 comraamder on record who had the moral courage, to ig- 
 7iore die directions and advice expedited from Vienna. — 
 When his campaigns were ended he carefully restored to 
 tlie .111111*; Counsellors their -despatches and instructions 
 with the seals unh'ohen. "Would that our generals, in a 
 free country, could repeat the practical strategy of Traun 
 and imitate tl>e resolution of Montecuculi. 
 
 On the 20th January, 1745, the Emperor Charles VII, 
 who, in the attempt to acquire foreign states, lost his own, 
 died. Expelled, led back, driven forth and brought in 
 again, he expired, nevertheless, at last, in the castle of his 
 ancestors at Munich. His son, Maximilian Joseph, 
 warned by the sad fate of his father, acted more wisely 
 and withstood the interested cajoleries of France and 
 Prussia- April 28tlL, he subscribed the preliminaries of 
 peitee with Maria Theresa. 
 
 An election for Emperor was now to be held in the 
 Imperial city of Frankfort on the Mayn. To guarantee 
 freedom of choice to the German Electoral College, the 
 remaining Austrian forces in Bavaria appeared under 
 Traun in the circles of Suabia and Franconia. These, 
 and the districts in which Traun operated, are now the 
 kingdoms of "Wurtemberg, and the smaller States imme- 
 diately north of that kingdom and Bavaria, between the 
 Lahn, N., and the Kocher, S. ; the Fulda, Sinn, Mayn 
 and Tauber, E., and the Rhine, W., particularly Electoral 
 and Grand-ducal Hesse. 
 
 Even as he had commanded on the Rhine and in Bohe- 
 mia, in 1744, in the name of Prince Charles, even so, in 
 1745, Traun exerted his talents in the name of his brother, 
 the Arch-duke Francis, Grand Duke^ Tuscany. Mean- 
 while the King of France and his generals had pledged
 
 65 
 themselves to Frederic to oppose the election of the Arel»- 
 duke Francis, husband of Maria Theresa, even at the risk 
 •of a battle. Accordingly Louis XV sent a French army 
 of 80,000 men, under Lieutenant-General the Prince of 
 Conti, to threaten the assembled Electors. Conti, how- 
 ever little generalship he displayed in this campaign, had 
 nevertheless shown considerable enterprise and ability in 
 his operations against the Sardinians, among the Mari- 
 time Alps, in the preceding year^ 1744. 
 
 Traun had from 30 to 40,.0(X> troops. He concerted his 
 plan of operations in perfect accordance with his accus- 
 tomed mode of action. AVithont delivering^ a battle- lie 
 achieved complete success by his Practical Strategy. 
 
 May 30th, 1745, Traun led his army in three grand 
 divisions out of the Duchy of I*^euburg, on the Danube, 
 into Northern Wurteinberg, He first advanced, in the 
 direction of Heilbronn, to Hall, on the Kocher, then he 
 wheeled suddenly northwards and hastened by forced 
 marches through Mergentheim, N. extremity of Wurtem- 
 berg, to the Mayn. 
 
 At the opening of the campaign, the Prince of Conti 
 had disposed his army so as to dispute the passage of the 
 Necar, in the expectation that the Austrians intended ta 
 cross this river. Wlien, afterwards, he learned that in- 
 stead of advancing westw^ards, Traun was in reality mov- 
 ing northwards, parallel to the Neckar, the French hur- 
 ried, likewise in the same direction, by forced marches, 
 into Hesse-Darmstadt, by a route parallel to that whi^h 
 they supposed the Austrians would take. Coati encamp- 
 ed on the plains near Umstadt, 10 miles E. of Damistadt. 
 The French had mffle this movement to get ahead of 
 Traun and prevent his junction with the Austrian army-
 
 « 56 
 
 corps, under Batthyani, coming' up from the Netherlands 
 and moving southwards to. join him. 
 
 As all the places mentioned herein are laid down on 
 Jolmston's (Edinburgh) ]S"ational x\tlas, reference thereto 
 will show that the position of Umstadt was not ill chosen ; 
 that thence Conti could manoeuvre on Interior lines while 
 Traun was moving by Exterior lines, almost on the arc of 
 a circle of which TJmstad't was the centre. Keverthelesa 
 Traun marched with such celerity, even on this circum- 
 ference, that he was always ahead of the French. From 
 Umstadt, Conti should have overwlielmed Batthyani before 
 he crossed the Kinzig, and before Tralm could join him, 
 since the French were at the apex of a triangle, whose 
 much shortest side stretched towards Batthyani and whose 
 longest towards Traun. 
 
 Meanwhile Batthyani liad already parsed theLahn, and 
 was hastening on, by the way of Laubach and Birstein, 
 towns lying almost in a direct line between Giessen, on 
 the Lahn, and Salmunster, on the Kinzig. Laubach lies 
 15 miles S. E. of Giessen, in Hesse-Darmstadt ; Birstein, 
 jn Hesse-Cassel, about the same distance K. "W. of Orb, 
 on the Orb, an affluent of the Kinzig, at the extreme 
 north point of Bavaria. 
 
 Traun constantly moving on, made continual feints of 
 attacking the Prince of Conti, last mentioned as encamp- 
 ed, near Umstadt, and completely deceived him as to his 
 intentions. Conti had advanced to Aschaffenburg, on 
 the Mayn, about 12 miles N. E. of Umstadt and 23 miles 
 E. S. E. of JFrankfort. All at once Traun disappeared 
 from before the French, in position there, and was lost to 
 their reconnoissances and eclaireurs oehind the screen of 
 the foreflt-clad Speseart rtiountain*.
 
 67 
 
 This range, parallel to, and, here, north and yet west 
 of the Mayn, stretches N. N. E. to the Kinzig, where it 
 joins the western spurs of the Rhcengebirge. It formed a 
 perfect blind. In like manner the Rebels have operated, 
 protected and covered by the Blue Ridge. Down along 
 the Shenandoah, again and again, Stonewall Jackson roll- 
 ed his victorious torrent of war. Backwards and for- 
 wards, like a shuttle, rebel columns, a continual menace, 
 shot to and fro through that valley while our armies lay 
 on the Potomac from Alexandria upwards. Just so Lee 
 turned Pope under cover of the Blue Ridge. Behind the 
 double blind of the Bull Run and Kittoctan ranges and 
 of the Blue Ridge, Lee again sought to deceive Hooker. 
 
 Having thus outmanoeuvred his adversaries, Traun mo- 
 ved rapidly behind the leafy Spessart from Wertheim by 
 the way of Lolir, both on the Mayn, to Urb or Orb, and 
 united with Batthyani. With forces augmented by this 
 junction, to 70,000 men, Traun now, in turn, offered battle 
 again and again to Conti. He even detached Barenklau, 
 who passed around the French left and crossed the Rhine 
 at Biberich just below Mayence. The Prince of Conti 
 took alarm at once and retreated hurriedly down the 
 Mayn. So much was he afraid of the Austrians, that he 
 blew up the bridge at Ascliaffenburg and broke down 
 that at Hoechst and fell back to Gross-Gerau near the 
 Rhine. Traun passed the Mayn, and Barenklau, opera- 
 ting in obedience to orders, actually defeated a French 
 detachment of Conti's Free-Coi-ps near Oppenheim, di- 
 rectly in the rear of the French, on their own, the West 
 side of the Rhine, which intervened between Conti and 
 France. On receipt of this intelligence, Conti made no 
 farther attempts to hold his ground, but repassed the
 
 68 
 Khine, 18tli July, 1745, at Gernsheiin and Rheinturk- 
 beim, below Worms, and encamped near that city behind 
 the stream, Osthofen. From thence he retired to Mut- 
 terstadt. In this retreat the Prince of Conti lost his bag- 
 gage and had his troops much harassed. 
 
 "Traun^s campaign has always received high commen- 
 dation, because he compelled the French to retire behind 
 the Rhine by well-planned marches and the choice of hi& 
 positions alone. Political reasons prevented him from 
 following the French, because Austria was dependent on 
 its allies." 
 
 This is a wonderful example of a series of victories with- 
 out battles, in which Traun crossed and re-crossed the 
 Rhine successfully in the presence of an enemy vastly 
 superior in force, disconcerted all the plans of the French 
 military leaders, traversed and re-traversed Germany 
 with the speed of a cavalry corps, drove Frederic the 
 Great out of Bohemia, and the French across the Rhine, 
 and would have brought about a different result for his- 
 tory to record had he been left untrammeled by the Aulic 
 Council. 
 
 In consequence of this successful practical strategy, the 
 election at Frankfort was undisturbed and the grand duke 
 Franz Stephen, in spite of all the opposition of France 
 and Prussia, attained to the Imperial dignity. On the 
 8th Oct. 1745, the new Emperor, received his heroic wife, 
 Maria Theresa, the queen of Hungary and Bohemia, in 
 the camp at Heidelberg, and, thence, led her, thanks to 
 Traun, back in triumph to Vienna. 
 
 Thither, now, likewise journeyed the triumphant Traun 
 and, in consequence of the prospects of a general peace, 
 which every day became more hopeful, received a year's 
 leave of absence to rest his war-worn body and mind. In
 
 59 
 1747, the chief command in Transylvania was conferred 
 upon him. This dignity however, he only enjoyed for a 
 few weeks. On the 10th Feb., 1748, he died at the cap- 
 ital, Hermannstadt, at the advanced age of 70 years, not 
 less honored and blessed at his death than when he had 
 formerly laid down his vice-royal charge at Milan. 
 
 Khevenhuller and Traun have been styled "by military 
 critics, til* (Ajax) Telamon and Fabius of Austria in its 
 hour of extremest danger and its direst need. Their 
 names appear in the list of the war chiefs of a military 
 nation as those of heroes forever worthy of the highest 
 praise and enduring gratitude of their country. 
 
 That Traun is comparatively unknown is undeniable ; 
 that he was the greatest practical strategist (i. e. General 
 in the true sense of the word) of the middle half of the 
 XVIII Century is indisputable. This seems a paradox 
 and yet nothing is more susceptible of demonstration, 
 when all the facts are brought together and considered. — 
 It was Traun's misfortune throughout his career of Gen- 
 eralship to serve, even when invested with equal authori- 
 ty, with a reigning, i>owerful military king and with or 
 under, as ad-latus, [i. e Ger : zur Seite or zur Hulfe^ two 
 princes, the first of whom, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 
 was neutral as to the Spaniards, in regard to his Italian 
 dominions, while, being husband of Traun's sovereign, he 
 was actually hostile against them, and afterwards Emperor 
 of Germany ; the second, the brother of the former, a 
 prince and arch duke and a pretender to sovereign rights. 
 Serving with the King of Sardinia, Traun was eminently 
 successful against the greatest odds and accomplished 
 more than his inadequate means would seem to have justi- 
 fted his attempting. Yet the King, in general history has 
 all the glory. 
 
 "The peer (Traun) slew the (Spanish i boar 
 The king (Sardiniin) had the glQire."
 
 60 
 111 1744, especially upon the Rhine, Traun is scarcely 
 noticed, and, in his operations against Frederic, Duparcq 
 in liis "Historical and Military Studies on Prussia" actu- 
 ally ascribes his actions to "Daun," and Lord Dover, in his 
 "Life of Frederic II, the Great," to Brown (Braun.) Even 
 Schlosser mistook Brown (Braun) for Traun, and repre- 
 sents the latter as fighting against the French and Span- 
 iards in Italy, when he was actually battling against his 
 own bodily infirmities at home. The result proves that all 
 Traun's achievements served only to increase the cel- 
 ebrity of superiors in political rank and the brilliancy of 
 his talents were absorbed in the splendor of the caste of 
 his coadjutors. Such is the trustworthiness of "History 
 for the Million," "the things' called histories (which) are 
 worse than 'will of the wisps'." Such is the injustice daily 
 culminating even around us. 
 
 Schlosser and Russell, and even Colletta, while admit- 
 ting that Traun covered himself with glory in Italy, in 
 1734, cannot free themselves from the weight of prejudic- 
 ed authorities so as to do justice to Traun, and make him 
 as conspicuous as he deserves. The Austro-Italian Vice- 
 roy to whom he owed obedience, ran away after he had 
 frittered away Traun's supports, and enriched himself, 
 and "left Traun to shift for himself; and Visconti's coadju- 
 tor CaraiFa, who has the suffrages of Italian historians, after 
 doing all the harm that he could do, was ordered to Vien- 
 na to justify his conduct before the Supreme Council 
 when no more harm could be done, leaving to Traun the 
 only alternative of unavailing resistance or of succumbing 
 gloriously. In a word, Traun's superiors having prepared 
 inevitable defeat, left him to suffer a certain reverse which 
 by his manner of meeting it converted Traun's mishaps 
 into the instruments of his apotheosis. 
 
 Hormayr, in his Austrian Plutarch concludes his biog-
 
 01 
 
 ruphy of Traun with eloquent reflections, of wliicli the 
 following are, in some respects, as close a translation as his 
 Gennan will permit, to avoid obscurity. 
 
 It is indeed a great glory to be the fortunate leader of 
 victorious armies at an epoch of great and general war 
 and, by success, to enlarge the dominions of a native 
 state. But such a famous and fortunate career is not 
 reserved for every general, and it is perhaps a still greater 
 glory to assume the command at the most imminent crisis 
 and the direst need of a nation and save a country, as 
 was the case with Khevenhuller and with Traun. For 
 even as that leader dares and adventures much less who 
 fights against his equal in a varying and alternately suc- 
 cessful campaign than another commander who carries on 
 a defensive campaign against long and constantly success- 
 ful superiority, or against sw4ft, ever-increasing and over- 
 powering force, furious as a mountain torrent, even so 
 HIGHER honor cannot be denied to even infeeioe genius 
 and skill when the deficiency is made up by a noble con- 
 tempt of danger and loss of reputation with the multi- 
 tude, or by indomitable force of will, the only quality 
 which presents an individual as equally great under fa- 
 vorable, or advei'se circumstances. 
 
 It was this invincible, never despairing determination 
 which made Traun so great, and greatly to be admired, 
 and it is as a, perhaps, not always victorious, but still 
 never subdued War Chief, that his image looms up be 
 fore us in the Present so strikingly grand from the misty 
 distance of a great epoch of the Past. 
 
 Tkaun should HQver be forgotten by any military stu- 
 dent as a wonderful example of skill, making amends for 
 want of Fortune, and as a Master of that Science which 
 is most needed at this juncture, the misunderstood but 
 inestimable application of Practical Strategy.
 
 62 
 
 S U MMA E Y. 
 
 "He 1e the best general who wine a decisive battl« with the lotsofthefe^oest men.''' 
 
 Many Thoughts on Many Thinor. 
 " Battles are the last Resort of a good General." 
 
 " He is one that accounts Learning the Nonrishment of Military Virtue, and 
 lays that as his first foundation. He had rather save one of his own soldiers than 
 kill ten of his enemies. * * He knows the hazards of battles — not the pomp of 
 «eremonies are soldiers" best theatres. * * He imderetands, in wars there ie 
 no means to err twice; the first and least fault being sufBcient to ruin an army; 
 faults, therefore, he pardons none ; they that are presidents of disorder ormutiny^ 
 repair it by being examples of his justice. Besiege him never so strictly, so long 
 as the air is not cut from him, his heart faints not. He hath learned aa well to 
 make use of a victory as to get it; and in pursuing his enemy, line a whirlwind^ 
 carries all afore him, being assured if ever a man will benefit himself upon his 
 foe, then is the time, when they have lost force, wisdom, coura^. and reputation. 
 • • If he cannot overcome his enemy by Force, he does it by Time. * * He 
 casts a smiling contempt upon culumny ; it meets him as if glass should en- 
 counter adamant. He thinks war is never to be given over but oh one of thews 
 three conditions : — an assured peace, absolute victory, or an honest death." 
 
 Sir Thomas Overbubt. 
 
 "Strategy may be divided into" Hypothetical (i. e. newspaper), Theoretical^ 
 A)>plied, (i. e. actual, check-mate, werkthatige), and Tactical (in which battles 
 are necessary agents). Strategy." W. P. W. 
 
 There is nothing, perhaps, so generally misunderstood, even by 
 military men, both as to definition, theory, and application, as 
 Practical (efficacious or real,) StRATEOT. The Anawnda Sys- 
 tem, once 80 vaunted, now as much reviled, which often succeedi 
 against a rebellion, particularly when that rebellion has elements of 
 discord within itself, is nothing more than one application of Prac- 
 tical (efficiently operative) Strategy. Nevertheless, to succeed, its 
 forces must be exerted just as the monster snake applies its powers. 
 It is the peculiar property of our countrymen to cry hosannas over 
 everything that is at once rtj);>ar(?«f?y successful, and condemn every- 
 thing which does not work smoothly and immediately in a bungler 's 
 hands. At first, every one was in favor of what was termed the 
 Anaconda Strategy ; now, everybody is against it. The first opinion 
 ■was correct at that time, because the country had every reason to 
 suppose there was a strong union element within the South, and the 
 second, changed, opinion may be equally right at this time, since it 
 has been proved that the union sentiment cannot exert itself eflfec- 
 tually. Both opinions may have been correct but at different times, 
 and under different circumstances. But if the Anaconda System did 
 not succeed, even apparently, why did it fail ? Because those who 
 undertook to apply it, did not study and imitate the action of the 
 anaconda itself. The colossal reptile does not simply encircle its 
 prey with an inert, flaccid coil and liring its strength to bear in 
 spasmodic, dislocated efforts, but, as soon as the object of its attack 
 is begirt with its tremendous contractile force, it exerts that force 
 with terrible, simultaneous, persistent intensity and keeps up the 
 pressure equally and everywhere, until all the power of resistance is 
 extinct, and its prey is crushed into an inert mass, fitted to be swal- 
 lowed up, to nourish and to recuperate, for new efforts, the very 
 power which destroyed it. So should our anaconda of armies and 
 fleets have acted and so should the North still continue to act 
 Until the South is crushed into a submission which could not 
 present any form or consistence to prevent the North from mould- 
 ing its future according to its will and pleasure, and thus derive, 
 from its transformed condition, adequate resources to meet new 
 enemies at home or abroad. 
 
 In one respect however our Anaconda System, let quid nuncs argue 
 what they will, did not fail after all, for what could have been ac-
 
 G3 
 
 complished bad not the blockading squadrons completed and main- 
 tained its coil. 80 vast however was the circumference embraced 
 that our efforts only amounted in some Quarters to what Decker 
 styles Paralysis of the enemy, in others to Neutralizatioa. Perhaps 
 there are no two ideas more opposite than Theoretical, dead or in- 
 operative, and Practical, or efficient. Strategy. The former may 
 have succeeded in just a sufficient number of instances to justify its 
 consideration by a military analyzer and critic. Under what head 
 can McClellan's operations on the Potomac '61-'2 be classified ? 
 Was it Practical Strategy, as Decker taught ? "Would it be unjust 
 to style it theoretical-strategicnl-neutralization of the rebel masses 
 in presence or supposed to be antagoDistic ? It certainly was not 
 Werkthatige Strategies for the Federalists were not active. 
 
 "But, when," says Decker, "theoretical strategy ventures to pretend 
 that it can force an enemy to abandon his position by simply man- 
 ©euvering and without running the risk of fighting or conflicts, this 
 magnificent theory will be very rarely realized in practice, and, even 
 then, only when the enemy proves himself extraordinarily feeble" 
 morally and physically. 
 
 That great results have been accomplished by even second class 
 generals, through their comprehension and application of Practical 
 (real) Strategy, without delivering or accepting, or without being 
 forced into a great battle, has been proved by all reliable military 
 history. Not to go back too far, let us begin with the era of Louis 
 XI, who, weighing means and results, was the greatest sovereign 
 who sat upon the throne of France, both as to practical diplomacy,' 
 practical administration, and practical strategy, as applicable in 
 accordance with the military organization of his era. Take for in- 
 stance, his successful campaign, of 1463, against the "League of the 
 Public Good. The only fit comparisons or foils to it, at hand, are one 
 or two of Frederic's Campaigns, in the Seven Years War, and Na- 
 poleon's offensive-defensive campaign of 1814 against the Allies in 
 France. Taking into consideration, time, circumstances, means and 
 forces, Louis dissolved, by head-work, heart-work and hand-work, 
 a greater Coalition, in 1463, than Frederic, in 1757-'63, and than 
 Napoleon held in check, in 1814. 
 
 As this brochure is written to do justice to one of the great men 
 obscured by the great titles and lofty positions of little men, it is 
 scarcely a digression to declare what immense strides the ill-known 
 Louis XI, almost as generally unappreciated and unknown to the 
 masses as Traun, made towards modern military systemization. — 
 He was the first who made practical and sensible ameliorations in 
 siege artillery ; he first substituted brass cannon, founded entire, 
 for iron cannon, wrought, in pieces, and cast, solid shot for cut 
 stone and marble balls. He was the creator of grand reviews, the 
 germs of camps of instruction, and military inspections, regular 
 troops with fire arms, and light cavalry proper. He, himself^ 
 encouraged printing, and he never injured the people however 
 deeply he wounded the aristocracy. Comines attests that Louis 
 XI established a Camp of Instruction at Pont de I'Arche, in which 
 he assembled 20,000 men, and kept them together for several years 
 under the strictest discipline, practicing manoeuvres and observing 
 every precaution as if in front of an enemy. As a creator Louis 
 was greater than Napoleon, as a king and a man not more selfish 
 and criminal, particularly it we take into consideration the differ- 
 ence of means, manners and morals at the epochs in which they 
 severally shone.
 
 I r 
 
 64 
 
 With but a reiereiicc to antiquity, and without groping through 
 the misty scenes ot chivalric eras or going over the whole range of 
 the military operations fff the last three centuries, simple allusions 
 to a few notable achievements will be sufficient as Examples of 
 Practical Strategy. ^ 
 
 A.moug the ancients there was no Practical Strategist who could 
 approach to Hannibal. He was Practical Strategy incarnate. Sci- 
 pio Africanus showed his comprehension ot the same art or science 
 by carrying the war into Spain and Africa, wliereby he forced 
 Hannibal to abandon Italy, and conquered Carthage. He struck 
 at his opponent's communications, and his base. 
 
 In recent times consider the 2 campaigns of Gustavus Adolphua, 
 1631-3, how influential, yet only two decisive battles :— Baner's 4 
 campaigns, 1G86-'41, how destructive, yet only one first class battle :— 
 Torstenson's 4 campaigns, 1642-45, in which he brought Austria to 
 the brink of destruction, conquered Denmark, paralyzed Saxony* 
 ruined three of the finest armies which the empire had sent into 
 the field and performed two marches which are worthy of compar- 
 ison with any recorded in ancient or modern annals, yet he fought 
 only 2 first class battles :— [to whom in this present war shall we com- 
 pare the great Swede's opponent, the popular Gallas, known in 
 military annals as the "Ruiner of (of his own) armies?"] :— Wrangel-s 
 3 campaigns, i645-'8, carried on accordin^g to the plan and under 
 the advice of Torstenson, which finished the XXX Years War, pre- 
 sent but one conflict, approaching the importance of abattle prop- 
 "erly speaking, Susmarshausen, a great surprise or vast skirmish : — 
 Turenne and Montecucnli's 2 campaigns, 1674-5, how instructive, 
 nevertheless only 2 battles :— [Turenne fell when about to deliver a 
 third, and the French had to abandon the right or east bank of 
 the Rhine:]— Prince Eugene's campaign of 1706 and flank march 
 from Trent to Turin, "a master piece of daring enterprise"' resulting 
 in a victory which swept the French ont of Italy : — Traun's 2 cam- 
 paigns of 1744-'5, without a battle, in which he nevertheless invaded 
 France, saved Bohemia, secured the election of the Emperor Fran- 
 cis and accomplished all he sought to do:— Frederic the Great's 
 campaign of Rosbach and Leuthen, 1757, superior to anything 
 ■which the world has ever yet witnessed :— Goergey's 2 campaigns 
 of 1848-9, which, if the Russians had not interfered would have 
 finished the Austrian Imperiaity:— and Radetsky's 2 campaigns 
 of 1848-9, in the first of which he dissipated the Sardinian delu- 
 sions of ambition, and in the second placed his nonagenarian heel 
 upon the neck of prostrate Sardinia herself. Three ot Frederic's 
 battles tower up like the highest peaksof the Himalayas as wonder- 
 ful examples of Practical Strategy, Rosbach and Leuthen of anni- 
 hilating superior armies, Liegnitz a double operation of paralyzing 
 one and beating another army at the same time. 
 
 As an illustration, Vauban was an example of Practical Strategy 
 in Engineering just as Rosbach and Leuthen and Liegnitz were 
 instances of Practical Strategy in Fighting, Gilmore seems to be 
 playing the Vauban in this war, expending bullets and sweat and 
 saving men and blood. Just as there was no stand stdll with Vau- 
 ban and Frederic, and in a minor sphere with Traun, just so there 
 i& no convulsive jerks forward with Gilmore and Rosecrans, but 
 assured progress. 
 
 No reference is made to the campaigns of Napoleon, because ho 
 is the writer's detestation, never referred to except necessity com- 
 pels J. Watts de Peyster, 
 
 ROSE HILL. TivoLi, September 5th, 1863.
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 Santa Barbara 
 
 THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST D 
 STAMPED BELOW.