REESE LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 , ^Accession No. y& O > 3 - Class No. 
 
 Luu 
 
STUDIES IN ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
 EDITED BY PROFESSOR W. A. S. HEWINS, M.A. 
 
 THE REFERENDUM IN 
 SWITZERLAND 
 
THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
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THE REFERENDUM 
 SWITZERLAND 
 
 BY SIMON DEPLOIGE 
 
 ADVOCATE 
 WITH A LETTER ON THE 
 
 REFERENDUM IN BELGIUM 
 
 BY M. J. VAN DEN HEUVEL 
 
 PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE 
 UNIVEItSITY OF I.OUVAIN 
 
 TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH 
 BY C. P. TREVELYAN, M.A. 
 
 TRINITY COLLEGK, CAMBRIDGE 
 
 EDITED WITH NOTES, INTRODUCTION, AND APPENDICES 
 BY LILIAN TOMN 
 
 OIRTON COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 
 
 LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 
 
 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON 
 NEW YORK AND BOMBAY 
 
 1898 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
STUDIES IN ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
 Published under the auspices of the London School of Economics and 
 Political Science, and Edited by Professor W. A. S. HEWINS, M.A., 
 Director of the School. 
 
 1. THE HISTORY OF LOCAL EATES IN ENGLAND. 
 
 By EDWIN CANNAN, M.A., Balliol College, Oxford. Crown 8vo, 
 
 28. 6d. 
 
 "An interesting summary of the development of one element of taxation. It 
 is still more interesting as the first publication of the newly-established London 
 School of Economics and Political Science, which is attempting to do, though 
 on different lines, a work analogous to that which has been for some years 
 carried on by M. Boutmy's well-known Ecole des Sciences Politiques in Paris." 
 Times. 
 
 2. SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING THE HIS- 
 
 TORY OF TRADE UNIONISM, i. THE TAILORING TRADE. 
 E'litpd by F. W. GALTON. With a Preface by SIDNEY WEBB, 
 LL.B. 
 
 " What Professor Brentano failed to find when he collected the 
 materials for his memorable essay ' On the History and Develop- 
 ment of Guilds and the Origin of Trade Unions,' Mr. Galton has 
 discovered in great abundance, setting forth in his introduction 
 the historical sequence and the economic significance of the docu- 
 ments themselves, and the movements they illustrate, with no 
 little skill and insight." Times. 
 
 3. GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY. By the Hon. BERTRAND 
 
 RUSSELL, B.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 
 "A history of the movement during the last thirty years, and of the abortive 
 efforts to retard its growth, leads up to the consideration of its present position, 
 which is approached in a fair-minded spirit and discussed with insight and judg- 
 ment." limes. 
 
 4. THE REFERENDUM IN SWITZERLAND. By SIMON 
 
 DEPLOIGE, Uni versity of Louvain. Translated by C. P. TREVELYAN, 
 M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge, and Edited with Notes, Intro- 
 duction, and Appendices, by LILIAN TOMN, Girton College, 
 Cambridge. 
 
 5. LOCAL VARIATIONS OF RATES OF WAGES. By F. 
 
 W. LAURENCE, B.A., Trinity College, Cambridge; Adam Smith 
 Prizeman, Cambridge, 1896. [To be published shortly. 
 
 6. THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF COLBERT. By A. J. 
 
 SARGENT, B.A., Brazenose College, Oxford ; Hulme Exhibitioner 
 and Whately Prizeman, Trinity College, Dublin, 1897. 
 
 [To be published shortly. 
 
 7. SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING THE STATE 
 
 REGULATION OF WAGES. Edited, with Introduction and 
 Notes, by W. A. S. HEWINS, M.A., Tooke Professor of Economic 
 Science and Statistics at King's College, London ; Director of 
 the London School of Economics and Political Science. 
 
 [In preparation. 
 And other Volumes. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 THE Swiss have systematised direct legislation by 
 means of two institutions, the referendum and the 
 popular initiative. The referendum is a popular vote"' 
 on laws or legislative questions which have already 
 been discussed by the representative body. The 
 popular initiative is a further development of the 
 principle of direct legislation, by which sections of 
 the community are able to draft a law themselves 
 on any subject, or to insist that the Legislature shall 
 do so. 
 
 Proposals to establish some kind of direct legis- 
 lation, and especially the milder form of it, the re- 
 ferendum, have been made in the Belgian and 
 Australasian Parliaments, in the first case as a sub- 
 stitute for the royal veto, and in the second as a 
 way out of deadlocks between the two houses of 
 the Legislature. In the French Parliament various 
 attempts have been made of late years to get certain 
 laws submitted to the people, and to introduce the 
 referendum into the communes. 1 The introduction 
 of a communal referendum has also been proposed 
 in the Italian Parliament. 
 
 In the United Kingdom the referendum has been 
 advocated by writers of more or less eminence as a 
 substitute for the House of Lords, and as a corrective 
 
 1 See J. Signorel, Le Referendum legislatif, pp. 171-181. 
 v 
 
vi Introduction 
 
 for all the evils of party and parliamentary govern- 
 ment. 1 The referendum has been extensively used 
 in the British Trade Union world, 2 and has existed 
 for over a century in many of the states of America 
 in the form of a popular vote on constitutional 
 changes. 3 A Direct Legislation League was formed 
 there in 1894 to secure the introduction of the re- 
 ferendum and initiative in the Swiss form, not only 
 in all the American states and municipalities, but 
 also in the Federal Government, as a remedy for the 
 prevalent corruption of political life. 4 
 
 The expediency of direct legislation by the people 
 is therefore more than a question of speculative in- 
 terest : it has become a question of practical politics. 
 
 M. Deploige's objective and impartial study of the 
 historical development and actual working of the 
 referendum and the initiative in Switzerland the 
 country which has the most extensive experience of 
 direct legislation by the people will therefore interest 
 not only the student, but the politician and the intel- 
 ligent citizen. It is, however, most important to bear 
 in mind that direct legislation of the people as prac- 
 tised in Switzerland forms a part of a peculiar and 
 complicated constitution. To study it without con- 
 sidering the people who work it, the system for which 
 it was designed, and the circumstances in which it 
 
 1 See Contemporary Review, April 1890, "Ought the Referendum 
 to be introduced into England ? " A. V. Dicey ; also the discussion 
 on the subject in the National Review, 1894, by Professor Dicey, Mr. 
 Curzon, Admiral Maxse, Lord Grey, and Mr. St. Looe Strachey. 
 
 2 See Industrial Democracy, S. & B. Webb, 1898. 
 
 3 The Referendum in America, E. P. Oberholtzer, 1893, and the 
 Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions, C. Borgeaud, 1895. 
 
 4 The organ of the League is the Direct Legislation Record, pub- 
 lished quarterly. Editor, J. Eltweed Pomeroy. 
 
Introduction vii 
 
 originated, is like examining and criticising a set of 
 wheels without inquiring whether they are intended 
 for a perambulator, a coach, or an engine. For we 
 must remember that in Switzerland the people have 
 an Executive which does not resign when out-voted 
 by the Parliament, a Parliament which does not dis- 
 solve when its measures are negatived by the people, 
 and an electorate who, whilst constantly rejecting 
 the laws made by their representatives, nevertheless 
 usually send back those same representatives to serve 
 for the same term of years. Party organisation, as 
 we understand it, seems to be almost unknown in the 
 Swiss Kepublic. The referendum, in fact, exists in 
 Switzerland under circumstances and amid surround- 
 ings that are without parallel hi any other country. 
 M. Nuina Droz, who has been President of the 
 Confederation, and who is one of the most able of 
 the Swiss constitutional writers, has expressed grave 
 doubts as to the possibility of successfully introducing 
 it into other countries without at the same time ac- 
 cepting other parts of the Swiss Constitution. Indeed, 
 it is only by realising the peculiarities of the Swiss 
 Constitution that the referendum appears in its 
 true light as part and parcel of the Swiss ideal of 
 democracy. 
 
 The Swiss Republic, though but a speck on the map 
 of Europe, is composed of twenty- two " sovereign '\ 
 states united in a Confederation, " in order to ensure '= 
 the independence of the country against foreign 
 nations, to maintain internal tranquillity, to protect 
 the liberty and rights of the confederated citizens, 
 and to increase their common prosperity." 1 
 
 1 See Swiss Constitution, 1874. 
 
viii Introduction 
 
 Three of the twenty-two cantons are subdivided 
 into demi-cantons, and each of the twenty-five has its 
 own Constitution and special laws, its own legislative, 
 executive, and judicial authority. They differ from 
 each other in race, language, religion, and habits of 
 thought. The French occupy the cantons of Vaud, 
 Geneva, Neuchatel, and parts of Fribourg, the Valais, 
 and Berne ; the Italians spread over Ticino and part 
 of the Orisons, which is inhabited for the greater part 
 by Romance-speaking people, and German is spoken 
 by the majority of the people in fifteen cantons. 1 
 All official documents, laws, and administrative orders 
 issued by the Federal Government are published in 
 three languages German, French, and Italian while 
 in a canton like Berne, where the people are partly 
 French and partly German, the cantonal laws and 
 decrees are published in both languages. The can- 
 tons can be classified according to religion just as 
 easily as according to race, but the lines of race and 
 religion do not coincide. 2 
 
 The government of Switzerland could not, under 
 these circumstances, be highly centralised, yet union 
 of some kind is an absolute necessity. The Swiss 
 
 1 According to the last census, 634,613 speak French, 155,130 
 Italian, and 38,335 Romance, and no less than 2,083,097 German ; 
 Zurich, Basle (Rural and Urban), Aargau, Thurgau, Schaffhausen, 
 Appenzell (Inner and Outer Rhodes), Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden 
 (Obwald and Nidwald), Zug, Glarus, St. Gall, Lucerne, Solothurn, 
 and Vaud are almost entirely German. 
 
 2 Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Fribourg, Ticino, 
 Valais, Appenzell (Inner Rhodes), and Solothurn are Catholic ; 
 Zurich, Berne, Schaffhausen, Appenzell (Outer Rhodes), Vaud, and 
 Neuchatel are Protestant ; Glarus, Basle, Thurgau, and St. Gall 
 have a Protestant majority ; while the Grisons, Aargau, and Geneva 
 are equally divided. According to the census of 1888, there are 
 about 1,716,548 Protestants to 1,183,828 Catholics. 
 
Introduction ix 
 
 cantons are so small that the population in the largest 
 numbers scarcely half a million, and in the smaller 
 ones about 13,000. To avoid absorption in their 
 powerful neighbours and to preserve their independ- 
 ence, they have entered into an alliance, of which 
 the Federal Government is the political expression. 
 Hence we find in Switzerland an intense local patriot- 
 ism and a very real national patriotism, great jealousy 
 of any encroachment by the Central Government, and 
 also the firm intention of supportingTtTat all hazards. 
 The Swiss citizen is first of all a member of a com- 
 mune, then a member of a canton, and last of all 
 a member of the Federal Government. The three 
 thousand communes into which the country is divided 
 are, in fact, the basis of the Swiss Constitution, for 
 it is only by being a member of a commune that a 
 Swiss becomes a citizen of the republic. The com- 
 munes vary in size and extent, those that include the 
 large towns being in a different position as regards 
 wealth and population from those in the purely agri- 
 cultural districts. Each commune, whether large or 
 small, is practically a state in miniature, with an 
 organised government, consisting of a deliberative 
 and an executive body. In the German parts of 
 Switzerland the deliberative body, known as the Com- 
 munal Assembly, is composed of all the resident male 
 citizens. They meet together at regular intervals, 
 and decide all questions relating to IqcaLpolice, sani- 
 tation, the main tenancy jof highways, the erection 7 / 
 of buildings, and the sale of landed property. 1 At 
 
 1 The descendants of the original settlers alone have the right of 
 managing the communal lands. They are known as the Burger or 
 citizens, and the assembly in which they discuss these questions is 
 
x Introduction 
 
 these meetings they fix the annual budget, pass the 
 accounts, levy new taxes, and elect the Executive 
 Council and other local officials. 
 
 Any member of the Assembly may offer motions or 
 amendments at the meeting, but usually these are 
 brought forward by the Executive, or referred to that 
 body before being finally voted on. 
 
 The Executive, which is generally known as the 
 Communal Council, consists of a body of three or 
 four members, one of whom is chosen as president or 
 mayor. Their function is to carry on the current 
 business of the commune. 
 
 In the towns of Berne and Zurich it has become 
 impossible for the people to assemble together in 
 a mass meeting, owing to the growth of popula- 
 tion, and we therefore get the councils elected by 
 the people. In Berne since 1887 there is a Com- 
 munal Council of nine members, and a Municipal 
 Council, which supervises the Communal Council. 
 The inhabitants of the commune elect these councils 
 annually, but they do not surrender their powers 
 to them. A communal voting by ballot takes place 
 once a year_ at_least. in which the people decide 
 on all important questions, the town being divided 
 into several districts for the purpose of voting. 1 In 
 
 called the Biirgergemeinde. The difference between this assembly 
 and the Communal Assembly is very slight in practice. When the 
 question of communal lands comes up, the later settlers or "ill- 
 habitants " abstain from voting. 
 
 1 At these communal votings the citizens assent to the annual 
 budget, fix the local rates, and decide questions as to the purchase 
 or sale of property the value of which is more than 100,000 francs. 
 On June 28, 1896, the people of Berne rejected a proposal to elect 
 the Communal Council by proportional representation, they rejected 
 
Introduction xi 
 
 addition to this, any 500 citizens may bring forward 
 any proposal which is submitted by the councils to 
 the people. 
 
 The commune of Ziirich was reorganised in 1891, 
 and possesses now a council of nine members, which 
 act as the executive, and a " Great Municipal Council," 
 which is the deliberative body. In this case, also, the 
 electors vote finally on all important matters, and on 
 all appropriations over a certain amount. 1 
 
 The right of the people to initiate proposals them- 
 selves is also recognised in Ziirich, and is vested in 
 any 800 citizens. 
 
 In most of the French communes the general body v 
 of inhabitants elect a council which attends to the\ ^ 
 matters ordinarily dealt with by the people in the 
 German communes. There are, therefore, two coun- 
 cils, one dealing with general policy and matters of 
 importance, and a smaller executive body with a 
 mayor at its head. 
 
 In the canton of Geneva a communal referendum 
 was established, in 1894, much like that of Berne 
 and Zurich. The difference is, that in Berne and 
 Zurich certain questions must go to the people and 
 be voted on, whereas in Geneva a voting only takes 
 place when a demand to that effect has been pre- 
 sented by a certain number of citizens. In the 
 
 a plan to organise a fire brigade, they accepted a proposal to lower 
 the price of gas, and a proposal providing for the maintenance of 
 the cathedral tower. 
 
 1 In December 1894 the people of Zurich decided to buy up the 
 existing tramways. In June 1896 they agreed to lay down three 
 more lines, at an estimated outlay of 2,000,000 francs. They also 
 decided on buying up land to the value of 950,000 francs to build 
 artisan dwellings. 
 
xii Introduction 
 
 municipality of Geneva any 1200 electors may de- 
 mand a referendum on any resolution of the council 
 within thirty days after it has been passed. The 
 budget is, however, excepted. This is never laid 
 before the people. In the other communes of Geneva 
 the number is fixed at one-third of the voters, and 
 the demand must be sent in within fourteen days. 
 The people of Geneva also have the right of initiative. 
 Any 1 200 citizens can either draw up a scheme, which 
 must be sent to the electorate without alteration, or 
 they may smuggest a project to the councils in general 
 terms, leaving them to work it out. In the first case, 
 the council has the right of proposing an alternative 
 scheme to the people, or can merely advise that the 
 popular proposal be accepted or rejected. 
 
 Besides these communal assemblies there are parish 
 meetings, which are assemblies of all the members of 
 the same confession living within the boundaries of the 
 commune. The people in every canton decide what 
 form of religion shall be the State religion. In nine 
 cantons they have adopted Roman Catholicism, in six 
 others both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, 
 while in five others there are three State Churches, 
 and Neuchatel supports an Israelitish society besides 
 three Christian sects. The State denominations are 
 supported by the public .treasury, 1 but local matters 
 concerning the Church are considered in the parish 
 meetings. The questions dealt with in the meetings 
 include the election of pastors, the building and main- 
 
 1 The funds are provided by a tax in some states, and in others 
 out of the proceeds of the Church lands taken over by the State. 
 See Vincent, p. 179, and Orelli, Stautsrecht, &c., p. 156, for further 
 information on Church matters. 
 
Introduction xiii 
 
 tenance of houses of worship, and the management of 
 Church funds. The members of this assembly also 
 elect the Church officers, who administer the affairs 
 of the society, supervise the work of the pastor, and 
 in some states act as a board of overseers of the 
 poor. 
 
 The School District Assembly is another of these 
 local mass-meetings. The members of the commune 
 or, in the case of the small communes, the members 
 of several communes meet together to elect a school 
 board, and to exercise a general supervision over all 
 educational matters. The necessary funds are pro- 
 vided partly by the State and partly by a local rate 
 levied by the school assembly when it meets. The 
 amount to which the State subsidises the^commune 
 varies according to the wealth of the commune. 
 
 It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of these 
 local assemblies upon the development of Swiss de- 
 mocracy. The introduction of the referendum or 
 initiative into the cantonal and federal constitutions 
 is of recent date; but the people have been trained 
 to direct legislation in their local assemblies~for half 
 a thousand years. " Democracy in Switzerland," says 
 Mr. Lowell, "is not merely a national or cantonal 
 matter, but has its roots far down in the local bodies, 
 and this gives it a stability and conservatism which 
 it lacks in most other Continental nations." 
 
 The connecting link between the canton and the 
 commune is supplied by the district, which is estab- 
 lished merely for the convenience of administration, 
 and has no separate political life of its own. The 
 head of the district is the agent of the cantonal 
 government in the territory over which he is placed. 
 
xiv Introduction 
 
 He carries out the laws enacted by the cantonal 
 legislature, and enforces the orders of the cantonal 
 executive. He is usually elected by popular vote 
 and is sometimes assisted by a council. 1 
 
 The Swiss cantons are the democratic workshops 
 of Europe. 2 On their twenty-five anvils are hammered 
 out almost every conceivable experiment in political 
 mechanics; and if a particular experiment proves 
 successful, it is adopted by one canton after another, 
 until it ultimately receives a definite consecration by 
 becoming part of the Federal Constitution, which is, 
 indeed, largely moulded on cantonal experience. The 
 cantons are, so to say, the " seed-trial " grounds of the 
 various forms of popular government, and offer an 
 unrivalled field to those who wish to study the latest 
 phases and expedients of democracy. 
 f The cantons are free to adopt what form of con- 
 stitution they like, so long as it is republican, and 
 contains nothing contrary to the Federal Constitution. 
 Therefore all the constitutions and constitutional 
 amendments must be " guaranteed," i.e. sanctioned by 
 the Federal Assembly. 3 
 
 1 In several states of small territory the district is dispensed 
 with altogether, the cantons dealing directly with the communes. 
 
 2 The Swiss Confederation is said to consist of twenty -two 
 cantons ; but three of these are divided politically, and are to all 
 intents and purposes separate cantons. Basle is divided into Urban 
 Basle and Kural Basle, Appenzell into Inner and Outer Rhodes, and 
 Unterwalden into Obwald and Nidwald. These half cantons only 
 differ from whole cantons in that they send but one deputy each 
 to the Council of States, and count only as half a vote when the 
 State votes are counted in the case of a federal referendum on 
 constitutional amendments. 
 
 3 Constitutional changes are very frequent. Between 1891 and 
 1895 there were twenty-three revisions, four of which were total 
 revisions. 
 
Introduction xv 
 
 The spirit of the cantonal constitutions is fittingly 
 expressed by the following phrases: "Sovereignty 
 resides in the mass of the people. It is exercised 
 directly by the electorsTSnd indirectly by the autho- 
 rities and officials" (The Constitution of Berne, 1893). 
 " The people, in virtue of their sovereignty, give 
 themselves the following constitution " (Constitution 
 of Zurich, 1868). 
 
 The Swiss cantons fall into two classes the cantons 
 with elected legislatures, and the cantons with a 
 system of legislation by mass-meeting. __ faZ^m 
 
 Eighteen of the cantons have a Legislature con- 
 sisting of a single chamber, called the Great Council 
 (sometimes the Kantonsrath or Landrath), the mem- 
 bers of which are chosen by universal suffrage for 
 periods ranging from two to five years. The usual 
 term is, however, three or four years. 1 
 
 1 In Zurich there is one deputy for every 1200 of the population ;< ^ 
 in Geneva, one to every 666 persons ; and the largest proportion in any ! 
 canton is one member to 2000 people. In Ticino, Geneva, Neuchatel, 
 Zug, and Solothurn, proportional representation has been intro- 
 duced since 1891 for the election of the Great Councils. It was 
 also proposed in St. Gall in 1895, and in Berne in 1896, but was 
 vetoed in each case by the people. 
 
 For an account of the different systems of proportional represen- 
 tation tried in each canton, see Les Lois Suisscs dc la Representation 
 proportioned comparecs et commences, par Alphonse Frey, in Le Bulletin 
 de la Socie'te' Suisse pour la Representation proportionate, Geneva and 
 Basle, Librairie Georg. The system in Geneva is also described in 
 the Annals of the American Academy, November 1895, by Professor 
 Wuarin, of Geneva. See also Droz, Etudes et portraits politiques; 
 La Suisse Jugie par un Americain, pp. 500-504. The method of pro- 
 cedure is of a complicated type, as there are usually several parties 
 at Swiss elections. The system varies considerably in the different 
 cantons. It is a subject which would well repay study. The 
 first elections by proportional representation took place in Ticino 
 in 1892. 
 
 
 
xvi Introduction 
 
 The work of the Legislature is to pass the laws, 
 vote the taxes and appropriations, and supervise the 
 administration. The people are the check on the 
 Legislature, and they act as a check in three ways. 
 
 In the first place, they can veto legislation by 
 means of the referendum, and can make an im- 
 perative suggestion as to the subject of legislation by 
 means of the initiative. The different forms which 
 these institutions take are considered in detail by 
 M. Deploige. It is sufficient to say here that the 
 referendum is always compulsory in constitutional 
 amendments, i.e. no constitutional change can be- 
 come law without the popular assent expressly given. 
 In the domain of ordinary legislation there is only 
 one canton, Fribourg, in which the referendum is not 
 recognised in some form or other. It is compulsory 
 in the case of every law in nine and a half cantons, it 
 may take place upon demand in six and a half cantons, 
 and in two it is compulsory for financial questions 
 only. 
 
 Every canton, except one, recognises the right of the 
 people to demand, by means of the initiative, either a 
 partial or a total revision of the constitution. 1 
 
 Nineteen cantons recognise the right of initiative in 
 ordinary legislation. 
 
 The second check on the Assembly is the popular 
 right of bringing about a dissolution, which is, how- 
 ever, only found in six of the German cantons. A 
 petition for a dissolution is signed by the statutory 
 number of citizens and sent in to the Executive, who 
 
 1 Geneva, which is the exception, puts the question of revision 
 to the people periodically every fifteen years. Schaffhausen only 
 recognises the initiative in the case of a total revision, 
 
Introduction xvii 
 
 are obliged to put the question to the whole people, 
 " Shall the Great Council be dissolved or no ? " If 
 the people reply in the affirmative, the Council is 
 ipso facto dissolved, and a new election takes place. 
 " This device," says Mr. Lowell, " has not, however, 
 proved to be of much importance. Formerly it was 
 sometimes used, and in one case, at least, with suc- 
 cess ; but owing to the shortening of the periods for 
 which the councils are elected, and the general 
 introduction of the referendum, it is practically 
 obsolete." l 
 
 Another method of getting rid of the Great Council 
 is occasionally tried. In every cantonal constitution, 
 except Geneva, the people have the right of demand- 
 ing a total revision of the constitution. The law in 
 most cases provides that if the people decide in the 
 affirmative, the Great Council must dissolve, as a sort 
 of penalty for driving the people to extreme mea- 
 sures and not anticipating the general wish. A new 
 Council is then elected to carry out the revision. 
 This exceptional method was last tried in Ticino in 
 1 890. As a rule, however, the life of the Legislature 
 is measured by the constitution, and not by the 
 exigencies of politics. The Executive 2 is usually 
 elected for the same term as the Legislature, and 
 generally consists of five or seven members. 3 It is 
 of the nature of a business committee of the Legis- 
 lature, and each member has charge of a separate 
 department. 
 
 1 Lowell, p. 230. 
 
 2 Called sometimes Conseil d'Etut, sometimes Kleine Rath, and 
 Regierungsrath. 
 
 3 In Berne, of nine, 
 
xviii Introduction 
 
 It is elected directly by the people in eleven of 
 these cantons, so that there are only eight in which 
 the Executive is elected by the Great Council. 1 
 
 The members of the Executive do not sit in the 
 Great Council, but appear there to make reports on 
 the administration, propose measures, and take part 
 freely in debate without voting. They are the motive 
 power in legislation, and yet are quite subordinate. 2 
 
 The absence of party, which we shall notice at 
 greater length when we come to deal with the Federal 
 Government, is very marked in both the cantonal 
 executives and legislatures. The party in the minority 
 usually have seats allotted to them in the Executive 
 Council, and in Berne and Aargau the constitution 
 expressly directs that this shall be done. 3 
 
 It is a curious fact that direct popular election does 
 not produce a homogeneous Executive any more than 
 election by the Legislature. The minority is, in fact, 
 represented in the Executive in every canton except 
 two, and these are two of the cantons which leave the 
 choice to the Great Council. 
 
 The members of the Executive .do not resign when 
 they come into conflict with the Assembly, but sub- 
 mit, retain their places, and carry out the orders of the 
 larger Council. Both the members of the Executive 
 and Legislature enjoy practically permanent tenure, 
 the people seeing no reason why they should not 
 
 1 The eight are Neuchatel, Vaud, Valais, Fribourg, Berne, Lu- 
 cerne, Schwyz, and Aargau. In Ticino, Geneva, and Zug the 
 executive is elected by proportional representation. 
 
 2 The Council of State in Geneva can, however, send any measure 
 it did not itself introduce back to the Council for reconsideration. 
 
 3 " The minority shall be equitably represented in the Executive 
 Council " (Constitution of Berne, 1893), 
 
Introduction xix 
 
 continue to re-elect a good man, even though his 
 views may not always coincide with their own. 1 
 
 In three cantons 2 the people have the right of 
 dissolving their Executive by presenting a demand to 
 that effect, which is referred to the whole people, as 
 in the case of the Great Councils. 
 
 The second group of cantons have a much more 
 historic and picturesque form of government than 
 those we have just been considering. In six small and 
 very conservative cantons, or rather in two cantons 
 and four half cantons, 3 there is a system of govern- 
 ment known as the Landsgemeinde. 
 
 These assemblies consist of the whole of the adult 
 male population, who meet once a year, and are the 
 supreme authority of the canton. The power of the 
 Landsgemeinde is set forth in the Constitution of Uri 
 (Art. 51) in the following words: "Whatever the 
 Landsgemeinde within the limits of its constitution 
 ordains, is the law of the land, and as such shall be 
 obeyed." 
 
 Then it continues : " The guiding principle of the 
 Landsgemeinde shall be justice and the welfare of 
 the Fatherland, not wilfulness nor the power of the 
 strongest." 
 
 It differs from an ordinary mass-meeting, says Mr. 
 Vincent, "in the respect that the voter not only 
 expresses his political_opinions, but instantly gives 
 effect to them. The majority does not imply, wish, 
 or demand the passage of a measure, but enacts it 
 
 1 See Graphisch-statistischer A tlas dcr Schweiz, 1897, for the average 
 terms during which the members have sat continuously. 
 
 2 Schaffhausen, Solothurn, and Thurgan. 
 
 3 These are Glarus, Uri, the two Unterwalden, and the two 
 Appenzells. Until 1848 it existed in Schwyz and Zug also. 
 
xx Introduction 
 
 at once, and the vote is a solemn legal proceed- 
 
 mg-" 1 
 
 The business to be laid before the Landsgemeinde 
 is carefully prepared beforehand by a Council. This 
 Council is generally known as the Landrath or Kan- 
 tonsrath. Its members are not elected at the mass- 
 meeting, but by separate electoral districts. It is 
 described by Mr. Lowell as a sort of subsidiary legis- 
 lature which attends to all the details that cannot 
 well be brought before the people. It passes adminis- 
 trative resolutions, votes the smaller appropriations, 
 examines the accounts, and appoints the minor 
 officials. 2 
 
 There is also an executive body elected by the 
 Landsgemeinde known as the Regierungsrath or 
 Standescommission. It is usually composed of 
 from five to nine members, one of whom is Presi- 
 dent, and is officially known as the Landarnman. 
 
 Each state has practically an independent judicial 
 system of its own, for the Federal Tribunal is not 
 a regular Court of Appeal. The organisation of the 
 Judiciary varies in the different states. There is a 
 Justice of the Peace or Official Mediator, whose duty 
 it is to try and settle the matter in a friendly way. 
 Then there is the District Court, consisting of a 
 bench of judges, and above that the Cantonal Court. 
 Criminal matters go before special tribunals. In 
 certain cantons the people elect all the judges from 
 the highest to the lowest; in others they elect the 
 
 1 State and Federal Government in Switzerland, p. 109. 
 
 2 Lowell, p. 225, op. cit. Mr. Vincent points out that in this body 
 there is one delegate for every 400 inhabitants in Uri ; in Nidwald, 
 Appenzell, and Inner Rhodes, one to every 250 ; and in Obwald as 
 many as one to 187. 
 
Introduction xxi 
 
 Juge de la Paix and the members of the District 
 Court. The tendency is for the people to extend 
 their powers in this direction. The judges are elected 
 for stated periods, generally four or six years, at the 
 end of which they have to be re-elected. In Zug 
 even the judges are elected by the system of propor- 
 tional representation a very curious development of 
 the system. The Swiss cantonal tribunals do not, like 
 the American State Courts, try acts of the Legislature. 
 Only in two of the Landsgemeinde cantons, Uri and 
 Nidwald, does the constitution provide that a person 
 injured in his private property or rights by a deter- 
 mination of the Landsgemeinde may protest, and if 
 the meeting disregards the protest, the judge shall 
 decide between the people and the plaintiff. 
 
 By the Federal Constitution the Swiss National 
 Government has only power to legislate on a certain 
 number of subjects, and all powers not expressly con- 
 ferred upon the Federal Government are vested in 
 the States. 1 The constitution provides no special 
 machinery for executing the federal laws or judg- 
 ments, these are carried out by cantonal authorities ; 
 and by cantonal machinery. 
 
 The Federal Government consists of a Legislature, 
 an Executive, and a Judiciary. The Federal Legis- 
 lature or Federal Assembly, as it is called, is com- 
 posed of two Houses, the National Council and the 
 Council of States. The National Council, consisting 
 of 147 members, is elected for a term of three years 
 by universal suffrage. The Council of States corre- 
 sponds to the American Senate, and is the final repre- 
 sentative of the old Diet of Ambassadors. Each state 
 
 1 See Federal Constitution of 1874 and amendments. 
 
xx ii Introduction 
 
 sends two members to the Council, and if the canton 
 be subdivided, each half canton sends one. The 
 Council of States thus numbers forty-four members. 1 
 The Federal Assembly meets twice a year, in June 
 and December, for about four weeks; and there is 
 usually an extra session in March, which is even 
 shorter still. The debates are not officially reported, 
 and only meagre accounts of them appear in the 
 papers. The whole of the proceedings are very quiet, 
 business-like, and rather informal. The two Houses 
 are exactly equal as to powers. Any proposition, 
 even those of a financial nature, may be introduced 
 in either House. The motions or bills, when discussed 
 and adopted by one Chamber, are then sent to the 
 other. The rejection of a proposal by the House 
 which first discusses it does not prevent the other 
 House taking it up. In 1883, for instance, a law 
 relating to civil status and marriage was rejected by 
 the National Council, taken up by the Council of 
 States, and finally passed by both Houses. Bills 
 amended in either Chamber pass to and fro until 
 some compromise is arrived at, or until both agree 
 that it shall be dropped. Grave conflicts between 
 the Houses never occur. If one Chamber continues 
 
 1 The deputies to the Council of States are elected directly by 
 the people in some cantons, in others they are appointed by the 
 cantonal legislatures. There is no uniformity either of payment 
 or of the length of period for which they are elected, some being 
 sent for a year, others for four. The growing tendency is for the 
 people to directly elect the members of the second Chamber as well 
 as the popular Chamber. Ten cantons and six half cantons have 
 now adopted the system. It is becoming the custom to elect the 
 members for three years, so that both elections should coincide, and 
 both Houses be renewed at the same time. This is now done in nine 
 cantons and four half cantons. 
 
] -*(k**>^ 
 Introduction xxiii 
 
 to energetically oppose a project adopted by the other, 
 the latter submits with a good grace. 
 
 The two Houses sit together for three purposes: 
 to elect the Federal Council and the commander- 
 in-chief, to exercise the right of pardon, and to 
 decide conflicts of jurisdiction between the cantonal 
 authorities. 
 
 The Executive consists of a Federal Council of 
 seven members, who are elected for the three years 
 by each new Federal Assembly as soon as it meets. 1 
 Each Councillor presides over a separate department, 
 and for the sake of convenience he usually retains 
 the same one continuously, though the re-allotment 
 is supposed to be made every year. One of the seven 
 Councillors is elected each year to the supreme office 
 of President of the Federal Council, and is officially 
 recognised as " President of the Swiss Confederation." 
 Another Councillor is elected at the same time to 
 the office of Vice-President. Neither the President or 
 the Vice-PresidenT may hold office for more than one 
 year, and the custom is for the Vice-President to be 
 elected President, so that the office really passes in 
 rotation through the Council. The President receives 
 a salary of ^540 a year, the other Councillors ^480, 
 and none of them are allowed to pursue any other 
 profession or business while in office. The President 
 has no special powers. He is merely the annual 
 chairman of the committee and titular head of the 
 State, and has charge of any one of the seven depart- 
 ments. His position is very inferior to that of any 
 
 1 The Council cannot contain two men from the same canton, 
 and by tradition certain cantons are entitled to special considera- 
 tion. Berne and Zurich, for instance, have always been represented. 
 
xxiv Introduction 
 
 individual head of any known executive. Apart from 
 his colleagues he has no power, nor has he any power 
 over them. He is, however, one of a body of seven 
 that count for a great deal. The Council has not 
 any c^r_ejpt executive functions, except in the depart- 
 ment of foreign affairs, the customs, postal and tele- 
 graph services, the polytechnic school, the arsenal, 
 and the alcohol monopoly. It acts by way of_Jn- 
 spection and supervision. 
 
 The Executive have important legislative as well 
 as administrative functions. The Federal Council 
 as a body have the right of initiating legislation. 
 They also report in practice on all proposals brought 
 forward in the Chambers before these become the 
 subject of serious debate. It is also very common 
 for the Chambers to pass a resolution, called a "pos- 
 tulat" requesting the Council to prepare a bill on 
 some subject. Thus the Federal Council can intro- 
 duce,, draft, and reportrtm legislation; but the Presi- 
 dent has no vote, no power of suspending or annulling 
 laws. 
 
 The relations of the Executive and Legislature are 
 peculiar. The members of the Executive are not 
 allowed to sit in the Assembly. They may, however, 
 take an active part in the debates, though, of course, 
 they may not vote. The Executive has no power 
 over the Assembly. It cannot prevent the Assembly 
 meeting, prorogue it or dissolve it, and can only 
 summon it on extraordinary occasions. 
 
 The Federal Tribunal, the chief judicial body of 
 the Confederation, does not occupy anything like the 
 position of the American Supreme Court. It is not 
 the guardian of the constitution, and has no power to 
 
Introduction xxv 
 
 pronounce any Act passed by the Federal Parliament 
 unconstitutional and therefore void. 
 
 So far we have dealt with the dry bones of the 
 Swiss Constitution. Now we have to consider its two 
 unique and distinguishing marks on the one hand 
 the absence -ottke^party system, and on the other the 
 direct intervention of the people in the work of legis- 
 lation by the referendum and the initiative. 
 
 The Federal Council represents no one body in the 
 Federal Assembly. It is usually composed of mem- 
 bers of the left and centre groups that is to say, of 
 Radicals and Liberal-Conservatives; but in 1891 a 
 member of the extreme right, Dr. Zemp, the clerical 
 representative of Lucerne, was elected Councillor, and 
 in 1894 was promoted by a three-to-one vote of a 
 dominantly Radical Assembly to the office of Presi- 
 dent. Nor is it even necessary that the majority of 
 the Council should share the opinion of the majority 
 of the Assembly. From 1876-1883 four of the seven 
 members were Liberals and three Radicals, though 
 the majority of the people's representatives were 
 Radicals. 
 
 It follows from this non-party character that the 
 Federal Executive is not expected to be unanimous. 
 No measure, it is true, may be brought before the 
 Assembly unless it has received the votes of the 
 other ministers, but it is a mere matter of form, and 
 a Councillor feels himself in no way bound to support 
 a bill of his colleague because he has been obliging 
 enough to give it his vote in order that it may be 
 debated in the Assembly. What is more, he has no 
 hesitation in opposing it openly, and members of the 
 
xxvi Introduction 
 
 Council have even been known to argue against each 
 other in the Assembly. 
 
 To Englishmen it would seem impossible that an 
 Executive made up of persons of different political 
 views, and unconnected by any ties of party loyalty, 
 should constitute a strong and efficient administrative 
 body. One would expect such a casual coalition to 
 spend its time in quarrels and fruitless discussions. 
 As a matter of fact, however, it works very smoothly. 
 This is partly due to the placid dispositions of the 
 Swiss Councillors and their readiness to accept a 
 compromise. But such a result could not be possible 
 if the Federal Council were in any sense a " responsible 
 Cabinet," obliged themselves to lay before Parliament 
 and the country a distinct policy, and expected to 
 resign collectively or individually if that policy or 
 any part of it were defeated. No idea of responsible 
 leadership, enters into the relationship between the 
 Federal Council and the Federal Assembly. Each 
 minister is elected as an executive official to carry out 
 within his own department the will of the Assembly, 
 and ultimately of the whole electorate. The Coun- 
 cillors are not expected to~shine as so many stars 
 in the political firmament. Whatever their politics, 
 they are expected to obey the orders of the Assembly. 1 
 
 Thus no minister thinks of resigning if his measure 
 is vetoed either by the Assembly or by the people at 
 a referendum. If either the Legislature, or in the last 
 resort the electorate, show by their vote that they 
 disagree with him, he submits, and prepares another 
 bill more in harmony with the wishes of his em- 
 
 1 See article by M. Numa Droz, "The Election of the Federal 
 Council," in Etudes et portraits politiq ties. 
 
Introduction xxvii 
 
 ployers. Thus a bill on the construction of railways 
 by private enterprise was substituted for a bill in 
 which the Council had proposed that the railways 
 should be a monopoly of the Confederation, and this 
 without any change in the Government. Since 1848 
 there have been only two cases of resignation on 
 political grounds, and only one of these was caused 
 by a conflict with the Legislature. When M. Welti 
 resigned in 1891 because his project for the purchase 
 of the Central Railway was rejected by a referendum, 
 his resignation created a great sensation, and was 
 even said to be "unconstitutional." To the Swiss 
 democrat it seems irrational for the State to lose a 
 valuable administrator on account of a difference of 
 opinion. No censure is implied by a hostile vote, 
 the servant has merely misunderstood his master's 
 views. The relationship between the Federal As- 
 sembly and the Executive is in fact much like that of 
 a man with his old and trusted family solicitor. The 
 solicitor manages his legal business, persuades him 
 for his own good, and is a factor which cannot 
 be neglected although nominally subordinate. The 
 client usually defers to his advice, and takes no im- 
 portant legal action without consulting his lawyer, 
 but he retains full freedom to take his own course 
 without giving offence, and there arises no question 
 of resignation or dismissal on either side. But this 
 analogy from common Me hardly does justice to the 
 real power of the Swiss Executive over the Assembly. 
 For whilst a solicitor advises a client how to act, the 
 Federal Council not only advises as to policy, but is 
 itself the only authority charged with carrying out 
 that policy. 
 
xxviii Introduction 
 
 Another important outcome of the non-party char- 
 acter of the Government is the tendency for the 
 Federal Council to become a permanent body. From 
 1848 to 1895 there have been only thirty-three 
 Federal Councillors, the average period of service 
 being over ten years. 1 Only two Councillors who 
 were willing to serve have failed to be re-elected, one 
 of whom lost his seat in 1854, and the other in 1872, 
 when party passions ran high. The Swiss Federal 
 Council is, in fact, far more akin to a body of elected 
 civil servants than to the responsible ministry which 
 governs the United Kingdom, or to its analogues in 
 some European countries or in the self-governing 
 British colonies. 
 
 The same absence of party spirit characterises the 
 election of members to the Federal Assembly as well 
 as to the Federal Council. The Swiss have it so 
 firmly rooted in their minds, that there is no need to 
 dismiss a good man because you disagree with him, 
 that the certainty of the result prevents the elections 
 from being contested. Only forty per cent, of the seats, 
 for instance, were disputed in 1887. No great effort, 
 therefore, is needed to retain seats ; and as the minority 
 know they have no chance of controlling the Govern- 
 ment, they cease to agitate, and there is an absence 
 of excitement about elections generally. 2 M. Borgeaud 
 
 1 Four have served over twenty years ; and Herr Carl Schenk, 
 who died in office in 1895. was elected in 1863, served, therefore, 
 thirty-three years, and was six times President. (See Graphisch- 
 statistischer Atlas der Schweiz, 1897). 
 
 2 M. Numa Droz says : " When the people reject a law in virtue 
 of their sovereign right, there is no entering into a state of conflict. 
 The craftsman carries out the work to his satisfaction; the em- 
 ployer who gave the order is of a different opinion, and sends it 
 
Introduction xxix 
 
 has described the motives which influence the average 
 Swiss elector: "If the candidate is obliging and affable,-" 
 he says, " and if he is a neighbour and a decent fellow 
 generally, and if he belongs to the party from which 
 the elector has been hi a habit of choosing, then the 
 elector argues thus : Would it not be an undeserved 
 reproach to turn X out ? His opinions may be 
 different from my own, well ! what of that ! If he 
 does it again, one can always say No." l The Swiss 
 elector is, on the whole, more interested in the person 
 of his representatives tharuin his politics. The re- 
 jection of laws by the referendum seems, in fact, to 
 take the place of a change of parties. When the 
 Government is unpopular or times have been bad, and 
 people are generally discontented, they do not give 
 vent to their dissatisfaction by turning their repre- 
 sentatives out of office, but they promptly vote down 
 the measures their representatives have prepared. 
 Thus the fate of a law depends a great deal more on 
 the immediate popularity of the Government than on 
 its own merits or defects. It is a novel method of 
 rebuking the party in power, but it is not ineffective. 
 It makes them careful not to offend if possible, and 
 it has the merit of avoiding all violent changes. 2 
 
 back to be altered. The legislator is not discredited. He is in 
 the position of a deputy whose bill has not passed ; there is no 
 want of confidence." (See Contemporary Review, March 1895.) This 
 is typical of the way in which the Swiss regard the question. 
 
 1 Revue du Droit Public, Nov.-Dec. 1896 : " In the elections which 
 took place in October 1896, out of the 160 members in the National 
 Council there were only 25 new ones, and in the Council of States 
 only 8 new ones. Between 1888 and 1896 the National Council has 
 only lost 20 of its members by non-re-election, while 62 retired 
 voluntarily." 
 
 2 There is also an absence of party machinery and organisation 
 outside the houses of the Legislature. "There are in the Con- 
 
xxx Introduction 
 
 Whether an Executive Government elected on 
 these principles is more or less harmful than a Cabinet 
 representing one party or the other is an interesting 
 problem of political science. One thing is certain, both 
 the Council and the Assembly are less susceptible to 
 popular influence in that they do not change with the 
 changing ideas of the people. The Executive Council 
 in particular pursues its own course, guiding and lead- 
 ing the Legislature in virtue of its superior capacity 
 and experience, telling them what they ought to do, 
 producing the necessary documents, and finally see- 
 ing that the orders of the Assembly are carried out. 
 The Council has therefore been called the mainspring 
 or balance-wheel of the constitution. 
 
 How far the aloofness of the Executive from the 
 popular currents of opinion in the State is responsible 
 for the desire of the people to intervene directly in 
 public affairs, or, on the other hand, how far such a 
 stable and permanent government is rendered possible 
 by the safety-valve of direct legislation; how far, in 
 short, the absence of party government causes direct 
 legislation, or direct legislation contributes to the 
 absence of party government, is a delicate question 
 for political philosophers to decide. 1 
 
 federation," says Mr. Lowell (p. 313), "no national committees, no 
 elaborate system of primary caucuses and general conventions, no 
 men who make a business of arranging nominations and managing 
 campaigns. The Clericals and the Kadicals do occasionally hold 
 Congresses, but these are simply intended to prevent disruption by 
 discussing the questions of the day ; they take no part in the 
 nomination of candidates." Parties, however, play an important 
 part in getting up demands for the referendum still more in 
 drafting initiative demands. There are a group of professional 
 politicians, the neinsager, who make a business of collecting signa- 
 tures against federal laws, and raising an opposition. 
 
 1 Mr. Lowell says, " The causes of the peculiar relation of Swiss 
 
Introduction xxxi 
 
 With regard to the organisation and actual working 
 of the referendum and the initiative, M. Deploige's 
 careful study will speak for itself. Though the Swiss 
 experiments in direct legislation have, during the last 
 ten years, excited much interest in the United King- 
 parties to the Government, and of the condition of the parties 
 themselves, may be sought in various directions." He attributes 
 the low development of party to the shortness of the sessions of 
 the Federal Assembly, which give little opportunity for the develop- 
 ment of a party policy or the consolidation of party ties ; also to 
 the fact that the Government has little patronage to bestow, and 
 that the deputies to the Federal Legislature are elected on local 
 rather than national issues. In the case of all elected represen- 
 tatives, the Swiss votes for men with whom he is personally 
 acquainted, and this obviates the need of party machinery for the 
 selection of candidates. No doubt the fact that Switzerland is 
 divided internally by race and religion also prevents the growth of 
 strong compact parties. The referendum itself, Mr. Lowell con- 
 siders, "tends in a variety of ways to lessen the importance and 
 increase the stability of parties." It tends to split up the issues. 
 "The referendum entails a decision only on the special measure 
 under consideration, and hence the people are never called upon 
 either at an election or a referendum to judge the conduct of the 
 party as a whole. It is no doubt largely for this reason that 
 Swiss political parties have no very definite programmes and little 
 organisation." 
 
 Again, Mr. Lowell points out that the referendum tends to draw 
 attention to measures instead of men, " and it is the personal 
 admiration or dislike of public men that forms a great deal of the 
 fibre of party allegiance." 
 
 Moreover, the referendum weakens the motives for a change of 
 parties. "If a law is unpopular the people simply refuse to sanc- 
 tion it, and this prevents an outcry against the party that enacted 
 it. If, on the other hand, the people ratify it, there is clearly no use 
 in trying to persuade them that the men in power were very wrong 
 in passing it, and ought to be turned out for doing so. Nor is 
 there any chance for an opposition to work on the popular fears 
 by foretelling the bad laws the ruling party is likely to pass if 
 continued in power, because the people can always reject measures 
 they do not like. Hence it is not easy to finds arguments for 
 electing a new set of representatives drawn either from the past 
 or the future." 
 
 c 
 
xxxii Introduction 
 
 dom, they have been more often popularly described 
 than precisely studied. In particular the use of the 
 referendum and the initiative in the government of 
 the canton as distinguished from the Federation 
 has received but scanty notice. In M. Deploige's 
 excellent work the English student will find a 
 more precise and detailed account of these re- 
 markable experiments than in any other volume 
 known to me. 
 
 Mr. Lowell, after praising the excellence of the Swiss 
 government, points out that Switzerland is free from 
 many of the difficulties that perplex other nations. 
 Her population is, after all, very small, only three 
 millions in all, " and experience proves that the 
 larger the population the harder is the problem of 
 free government." 
 
 These three million inhabitants are not recruited 
 from without by a long line of immigrants which 
 have to be absorbed and to be educated into useful 
 citizens. They are not divided by any glaring in- 
 equalities of wealth. There are no very rich or very 
 poor, no millionaires and but few paupers. The Swiss 
 are, therefore, not confronted with the great problem 
 of poverty. There are no eager capitalists always 
 seeking new fields for investment with the attendant 
 result of inflation and crashes. They have no great 
 undeveloped countries to be opened up with untold 
 possibilities of mineral wealth, which arouse all the 
 gambling instincts of a nation. Social equality, too, 
 is very marked. There are no " classes " and "masses," 
 and no great class differences. The people are de- 
 cidedly stationary, not moving about from one part 
 of the country to another, or rising or falling in 
 
Introduction xxxiii 
 
 the social scale. 1 Two-thirds of the population are 
 engaged in agriculture, and the manufacturing ele- 
 ment is comparatively small. The great industrial 
 struggles which convulse other countries and paralyse 
 trade are therefore non-existent. 
 
 There are no very large cities. In 1 893 the popu- 
 lation of Ziirich was 130,000, including suburbs; 
 Geneva, 78,777, including suburbs; Basle, 75,114; 
 Berne, 47,620 ; Lausanne, 35,626. There are no others 
 with a population over 30,000. There are in conse- 
 quence no great congested and discontented masses 
 of unemployed with their burden of poverty and vice, 
 with which most modern governments attempt to 
 cope in vain. 
 
 For the Swiss foreign policy is a negligible quan- 
 tity. Their neutrality is guaranteed, and they are 
 not hampered by belonging to the European Con- 
 cert, and are not obliged to make enormous sacri- 
 fices of men and money in order to keep up military 
 appearances. 
 
 " The Swiss Confederation," says Mr. Lowell, " is 
 on the whole the most siiccessfuL-deiiiocracy in the 
 world. . . . The people are contented ; the Govern- 
 ment is patriotic, far-sighted, efficient, and economical, 
 steady in its policy, not changing its course with party 
 
 fluctuations. Corruption in public life is unknown 
 
 Officials are selected on their merits, and retained as 
 long as they can do their work, and yet the evils of 
 a bureaucracy scarcely exist. . . . The Swiss states- 
 men deserve the highest praise for their labours and 
 
 1 Cf. New South Wales, which proposes to introduce the referen- 
 dum. Fifty thousand were disfranchised in 1893 who had voted 
 in 1892, because they had changed their residence. 
 
xxxiv Introduction 
 
 the greatest admiration for their success, but we 
 must beware of thinking that their methods would 
 produce the same effects under different conditions. 
 The problem they have had to solve is that of self- 
 government among a small, stable, and frugal people, 
 and this is far simpler than self-government in a 
 great, rich, and ambitious nation. " l 
 
 I have endeavoured in my footnotes to bring up 
 to date the mass of material on the referendum 
 and initiative which M. Deploige has so clearly mar- 
 shalled, and I have ventured in a few places to add 
 some further references and explanations likely to be 
 of use to the English reader. 
 
 L. TOMN. 
 
 1 " Lowell," pp. 335-336. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAOE 
 
 INTRODUCTION v 
 
 AUTHOR'S PREFACE xxxvii 
 
 LETTER OP M. VAN DEN HEUVEL ON THE REFERENDUM 
 
 IN BELGIUM . xxxix 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY IN SWITZERLAND 
 
 BEFORE 1798 : 
 
 I. The Landsgemeinde 3 
 
 II. The Referendum in the Orisons and in Valais 
 
 The Rittinghausen System . . . .27 
 III. Popular Institutions in the Canton of Berne . . 44 
 AFTER 1798 : 
 
 I. Public Law in the Federation and in the Cantons 
 
 from 1 798 to 1830 50 
 
 II. The Growth of the " Rights of the People " in the 
 
 Cantons 68 
 
 III. The "Rights of the People" in the Confederation 91 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE MODERN ORGANISATION OF "LEGISLATION 
 BY THE PEOPLE " 
 
 SECTION I. THE "RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE" WITH REGARD 
 TO THE CONSTITUTION : , 
 
 1. In the Confederation 124 
 
 2. In the Cantons 136 
 
xxxvi Contents 
 
 PAGE 
 
 SECTION II. THE "EIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE" WITH REGARD 
 TO THE ORDINARY LAWS : 
 
 1. In the Confederation ' . .144 
 
 2. In the Cantons 171 
 
 I. The Optional Referendum 171 
 
 II. The Compulsory Referendum . . . .176 
 III. The Popular Initiative 189 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE RESULTS 
 
 SECTION I. THE PRINCIPAL VOTINGS ON FEDERAL AND 
 CANTONAL LAWS 211 
 
 SECTION II. THE REFERENDUM FROM THE Swiss POINT OF 
 VIEW 266 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 APPENDIX 
 
 I. The Popular Initiative in the Federal Constitu- 
 tion 297 
 
 II. Constitutional Revision in the Cantons . . 305 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 315 
 
 INDEX 323 
 
AUTHOR'S PREFACE 
 
 THE letter published at the commencement of this 
 volume absolves me from the necessity of a long ex- 
 planation as to my motives for undertaking a study 
 of the Swiss referendum. 
 
 The Belgian Chambers are about to discuss the 
 important proposal for a royal referendum, and I have 
 thought that it might be useful at this juncture to 
 make the Swiss referendum known in this country. 
 Although they differ in certain respects, yet these 
 institutions have one thing in common they are 
 both concerned with the direct intervention of the 
 electorate in the legislation of the country. 
 
 I have endeavoured to describe the historical origin 
 of the referendum, to demonstrate its mechanism, and 
 to set forth its results, without taking a side, or being 
 actuated by any prejudices. 
 
 My book would have been very incomplete had I 
 confined myself to the works on the subject. The 
 referendum has attracted but little attention up to 
 the present, and has not hitherto been examined as 
 a whole. I have therefore prosecuted my inquiries 
 in Switzerland in person, hi order to become initiated 
 into the working of the institution. I now offer the 
 fruits of this twofold investigation to the public. 
 
 I must not omit to express my gratitude to those 
 Swiss gentlemen who have given me both useful 
 
 xxxvii 
 
xxxviii Author's Preface 
 
 advice and valuable information. My thanks are 
 especially due to MM. Ruchonnet and Droz, Federal 
 Councillors; to MM. Naville and Respini, National 
 Councillors; and to Professors Hilty of Berne, Ped- 
 razzini of Fribourg, and Wuarin of Geneva. 
 
 S. DEPLOIGE. 
 TONGRES, Sth March 1892. 
 
A LETTEK ON 
 THE EEFERENDUM IN BELGIUM 
 
 BY 
 
 M. J. VAN DEN HEUVEL 
 
 DEAR SIR, Your book is most opportune. Yester- 
 day no one spoke of the referendum without a smile. 
 The direct intervention of the people in legislation 
 was looked upon as a democratic dream, which could 
 only be realised under exceptional and transitory 
 circumstances, or in countries where legislation was 
 in a primitive stage. It was clearly understood that 
 a permanent system of popular consultations was 
 quite a different thing from those unfortunate plebis- 
 cites which have taken place from time to time in 
 France, and from those solemn ratifications of con- 
 stitutional reforms which are prescribed by the 
 constitutions of the American States. But quite 
 suddenly one fine morning, in the midst of the din 
 of party strife over electoral reform in Belgium, a 
 powerful voice was heard above the rest, demanding 
 the immediate introduction of the referendum for a 
 reason which had not occurred to any one up to that 
 time, namely, in order to strengthen the royal autho- 
 rity. 1 There was a pause for the moment out of sheer 
 
 1 [On the 27th November 1890, six Liberal members proposed that 
 there should be a revision of the constitution, and, the idea was to 
 
 xxxix 
 
xl The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 surprise. Then the controversy broke out, and dis- 
 cussion began to rage. 
 
 Those who are not enamoured of sudden and un- 
 tried political reforms have had recourse to the legis- 
 lation of other countries for guidance and instruction. 
 In spite of a thorough and searching examination, 
 however, they have not been able to find a single 
 country with a monarchical government in which 
 any one has thought of establishing the referendum 
 for the sake of strengthening the influence of the 
 sovereign. And, indeed, in no country have they 
 discovered any attempt to combine the rights of a 
 constitutionally limited head with so democratic an 
 institution as the referendum. The only country 
 which afforded a suitable field of observation was 
 
 introduce universal suffrage for the election of members of the 
 two Chambers. M. Beernaert, one of the ministers, suggested 
 instead, in March 1891, that the suffrage should be extended, 
 but that it should not be universal, and also that the Execu- 
 tive should be invested with power to consult the electorate on 
 a law which had been proposed but not yet passed, or on a law 
 which had passed but to which the King had not yet given his 
 assent. The idea was that the referendum would strengthen the 
 royal power, and compensate for the practically obsolete veto of 
 the Crown. The proposal was adopted in the two Houses, with 
 the proviso that the conditions under which the King should 
 directly consult the electorate should be afterwards deter- 
 mined by a law. The Belgian constitution directs that the 
 Parliament, after having voted for a revision, should dissolve, 
 and the question be taken up by a new Parliament. When the 
 next Parliament met, a commission to revise the constitution was 
 appointed; but on the 26th of November 1892 the Minister of the 
 Interior declared that, in view of the unfavourable reception which 
 the referendum had met with both in Parliament and in the coun- 
 try, the Government would officially withdraw its proposals. Three 
 members took the referendum proposal up, but the commission of re- 
 vision rejected it by 15 votes to 3. The question of electoral reform 
 still remained to be solved, and the discussions seemed so inter- 
 
The Referendum in Belgium xli 
 
 Switzerland, a federation of a group of republican 
 cantons. The referendum has existed there for cen- 
 turies, in the seclusion of a few cantons, like some 
 rare alpine plant, and needed the atmosphere of 
 modern ideas and the aid of special circumstances 
 to revivify it, develop it, and make it spread over 
 the whole country. 
 
 Your work has a twofold merit. It portrays the 
 referendum for us as a living, working institution, with 
 its almost invariable accompaniment and younger 
 sister, the popular initiative. Your observations have 
 been made on the spot, and are taken from life, and 
 every page of your description irresistibly leads our 
 thoughts back to our own country in order to com- 
 pare the situations, and to prophesy the results of 
 
 minable that the people of Brussels determined to undertake a 
 referendum on the subject. They applied to Jhe municipal autho- 
 rities to organise it, and a referendum was taken in four communes 
 on the five different propositions of electoral reform. There were 
 many protests as to the unconstitutionality of the proceeding, and 
 finally, on the I4th February 1893, the King annulled the proceed- 
 ings, and commanded the authorities not to interfere. The Liberal 
 Association then took the matter up, and summoned 111,837 citizens 
 of Brussels, over twenty-one years of age, to vote ; 60,732 voted, 
 and 56,338 were in favour of universal suffrage, but as the opponents 
 of universal suffrage had recommended their party not to vote, and 
 as 50 per cent, of those summoned did not vote at all, the result 
 cannot be said to be decisive one way or the other. 
 
 For a history of the proposed introduction of the referendum, 
 and a discussion of the principles involved, see Arnaud, La Revision 
 beige, Paris, 1893 '> Fuld, Die versuchte Einfiihrung des Referendums in 
 Bclgien, in the Archiv fur o/entliches Recht, 1893, pp. 558-567 ; De 
 Gamond, De la Revision constitulionelle en JBelgique, Belgique Judi- 
 ciaire, 1893 ; the Revue ginerale d' Administration, November 1893 ; 
 Wuarin, Le Referendum beige, in the Revue des deux Mondes, ist August 
 1891 ; Lorand, Le Referendum, Brussels, 1890; Deploige, Le Referen- 
 dum en Bclgique, Revue gc'ne'rale, December 1891 ; Hauleville, Le 
 Referendum royal, Brussels, 1892. ED.] 
 
xlii The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 a referendum in Belgium by the habitual results of 
 the referendum in Switzerland. Your book is a book 
 of living politics, and one which is very suggestive. 
 
 Three forms of the referendum are discussed in 
 Belgium. To distinguish them I have ventured to 
 term them 
 
 The Initiative Referendum (Le Referendum 
 
 d Initiative). 
 The Referendum of Appeal (Le Referendum de 
 
 Partage). 
 The Corrective Referendum (Le Referendum de 
 
 Correction). 
 
 All these three forms seem to me equally bad, 
 because they all proceed from the same principle, the 
 direct intervention of the people in legislation, which 
 in Belgium at th. present day could not but result in 
 a state of things directly opposed to political progress. 
 Public opinion, however adverse it may be to the 
 referendum in itself, seems to me to vary in its degree 
 of opposition. It is entirely hostile to the referendum 
 of initiative ; it regards the referendum of appeal 
 with more or less indifference, but rather unfavour- 
 ably on the whole; it dislikes and almost fears the 
 corrective referendum. 
 
 I. THE INITIATIVE REFEKENDUM. 
 
 This referendum, according to its supporters, ought 
 to take place before every deliberation of the Chambers. 
 It is an attempt to engraft the popular initiative on 
 to the parliamentary system. What a combination ! 
 The people are to be consulted on principles which 
 
The Referendum in Belgium xliii 
 
 are likely to be more vague and dubious than usual, 
 since they are drawn up in general terms, and not 
 elucidated previously by any public discussion be- 
 tween those interested on different sides. The Parlia- 
 ment will moreover be bound to take a certain course 
 without having been first heard. It will be obliged 
 to submit to and accept the vote, however brutally 
 bald and laconic may have been its expression. Such 
 a referendum would resemble an imperative mandate. 
 It would be the immediate ruin of parliamentary 
 government. Popular opinion has been so unanimous, 
 and has opposed the proposal for an initiative re- 
 ferendum with so much energy, that it now seems to 
 be definitely abandoned. 
 
 II. THE REFERENDUM OF APPEAL. 
 
 Many worthy people then bethought themselves of a 
 compromise, and proposed to utilise the referendum 
 in the case of a conflict between the two Chambers. 
 
 " A serious disagreement between the Senate and 
 the Chamber of Representatives," they say, " is a crisis 
 to be regretted, for it prevents the regular and normal 
 conduct of business. Surely the most natural and 
 simple course is to end the conflict by an appeal to 
 the opinion of the electors, and to make them act 
 as arbiters." 
 
 This concession seems at first sight to be un- 
 important, but appearances are deceptive, and it 
 is, in reality, an innovation which needs careful 
 consideration. 
 
 At the present day conflicts between the two Houses 
 rarely occur. If the majority in the two Houses are 
 
xliv The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 actuated by different principles, both of them try to 
 come to an agreement, and make attempts to find 
 a common ground on which they can meet. They 
 know that the solution of the difficulty depends upon 
 themselves alone, and upon their mutually concilia- 
 tory attitude to each other. When once the dispute 
 can be settled by a third party, the position will be 
 immediately changed, the obstinacy of majorities will 
 increase, and the concessions will be less frequent; 
 each Chamber will wish to show that it knows itself 
 to be in the right, and will have fewer scruples in 
 opposing the other, because it knows that there is an 
 easy method of deciding the matter and ending the 
 struggle. 
 
 The dominant thought will no longer be that of 
 mutual conciliation. When once the two Houses are 
 certain that they cannot agree, their one object will 
 be to formulate their opinions in those terms which 
 are most likely to win for them the sympathy and 
 favour of the arbiter, the people. 
 
 The referendum is not only open to the grave 
 objection of increasing the temptation to disagree, 
 but it is also liable to determine the dispute in such 
 a manner that the result obtained is either bad or at 
 least more incomplete and inadequate than would 
 have been obtained had other means been adopted. 
 
 If the two Chambers continue to keep the same 
 electoral origin which seems to be the wish of the 
 actual majority of the Senate then, if the matter in 
 question is important, and its solution too urgent to 
 be postponed, the dispute ought to result in a dis- 
 solution. The Crown intervenes in this case without 
 incurring any personal responsibility, takes note of 
 
TJie Referendum in Belgium xlv 
 
 the deadlock, ascertains its gravity and the necessity 
 of ending it by the method laid down in the constitu- 
 tion. If, however, the two Chambers shall be chosen 
 on a different electoral basis and this seemed to be 
 what the Government desired at first then, when the 
 revision takes place, some other expedient ought to 
 be devised by which a conflict may be avoided. For 
 instance, mixed commissions might be instituted 
 which should be composed of deputies and senators 
 similar to those which take place hi the United States. 
 Were the electoral basis different for each House, a 
 referendum would be an appeal to the electoral body 
 who chose the Chamber, and this would be to sub- 
 ordinate the Senate to the Chamber, and a priori to 
 relegate to a second place those authorities who have 
 received the title of senators. 
 
 The organisation of the referendum of appeal would 
 moreover be far from simple. Nothing would, in fact, 
 be more complicated. At what precise moment can 
 it be definitely said that there is a conflict ? Upon 
 what sort of questions are the people to give judg- 
 ment ? What is to be the result of the popular vote ? 
 These are all difficult points. 
 
 It might often happen that dispute would not merely 
 arise over the question of maintaining the status quo 
 or replacing it by some other definite system. It 
 might not unfrequently be a question of two systems 
 of reform one desired by the Chamber, the other by 
 the Senate. Can you submit all sorts of projects and 
 counter-projects to the electors? Poor elector! He 
 is to be forced to legislate himself when he has chosen 
 reliable men whose business it is to find the right path 
 in the midst of a labyrinth of controversies. 
 
xlvi The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 III. THE CORRECTIVE REFERENDUM. 
 
 In reality all the heat of the discussion in Belgium 
 is concentrated in the third form of referendum. It 
 is proposed that the King should have the right to 
 appeal to the referendum after the two Chambers 
 have voted, in order that it may guide him in exer- 
 cising his right of consent, and enable him effec- 
 tually to quash the decision of the parliamentary 
 majority. 
 
 Your book is principally concerned with the study 
 of the Swiss institution, its legislative vicissitudes, and 
 its relation to the social and economic conditions of 
 the nation. 
 
 But when one reads what you have written, and 
 then thinks of our own country, what vital differences 
 there are between the Swiss and the Royal referen- 
 dum. The mechanism of the political machinery is 
 apparently identical in both cases. But when the 
 institutions are examined more closely, and due 
 attention is paid to the political surroundings of 
 which they form part, it is obvious that the resem- 
 blance is merely superficial, and that the two are 
 quite opposed. The Executive, the Parliament, the 
 Ministry, the organisation of parties, the education of 
 the people all these primordial elements which con- 
 stitute the characteristic features of a State are utterly 
 and entirely different in Switzerland and in Belgium. 
 
 The King. 
 
 In Switzerland the right of appealing to the referen- 
 dum is not confided to the executive power. It is in 
 the hands of permanently organised groups, such as 
 
The Referendum in Belgium xlvii 
 
 the cantons, or accidental groups, consisting of a cer- 
 tain number of persons who sign a petition and who 
 are bound by no legal tie. In Belgium the idea is to 
 place the referendum in the hands of the King, who 
 is to be the judge as to whether a solemn appeal to 
 the nation shall or shall not be made. 
 
 The justification of this royal referendum is given 
 as follows : 
 
 " The monarch, it is said, does not enjoy hi prac- 
 tice the authority which he has in theory and which 
 the texts ascribe to him. By the constitution he 
 has the right to assent to laws, the right of dissolving 
 the Chambers, the right of choosing and dismissing 
 the Ministers. But apart from certain exceptional 
 and unimportant circumstances, it would be morally 
 impossible for the King to avail himself of his prero- 
 gative of veto. It would be a power at once too great, 
 too weighty, and too perilous. The King could only 
 refuse his assent, and put himself in opposition to his 
 Parliament, if he felt himself supported by the general 
 will of the country. Every time he refused his assent 
 it would lead to a political upheaval and a dissolution. 
 Every refusal would affect the personal responsibility 
 of the King, and would affect it very seriously should 
 he have wrongly interpreted the state of public 
 opinion, and the same majority be returned after the 
 dissolution. The referendum will solve these diffi- 
 culties without the necessity of proceeding to extreme 
 measures ; it will make the sentiments of the electo- 
 rate known by national and legal methods. The King 
 will henceforward be able to act with certainty ; he will 
 see clearly which side is taken by public opinion, and 
 whether he should or should not refuse his assent." 
 
 d 
 
xlviii The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 Such is the argument. It seems to me, however, 
 that it contains two errors, one of principle and the 
 other of fact. 
 
 In principle the King has the right of sanctioning or 
 refusing laws, not only according to the text of the con- 
 stitution, but according to the ideas which actuated 
 the national Congress. It is for the King to follow 
 the dictates of his conscience and his reason in the 
 exercise of this right. It is certainly an extremely 
 dangerous and undefined power ; but it is irrational 
 to conclude that because its character is thorny and 
 difficult it is therefore non-existent. The right of 
 sanction, like the veto, when actually exercised, also 
 affects the moral responsibility of the King there can 
 never be any question of his legal responsibility but 
 it is impossible to modify this situation by a reform 
 in procedure, and the notion of right cannot be 
 separated from the notion of responsibility. 
 
 Two theories are really advanced here. According 
 to the first, which I consider absolutely untenable, 
 the consent of the King must depend solely upon his 
 interpretation of the true feeling of the country. The 
 opinion of the country will be the opinion of half the 
 citizens plus one who enjoy the franchise, and who have 
 answered either yes or no. It is this majority which 
 decides in the last resort as to the justice and utility 
 of the law. 
 
 According to a second theory, which seems to 
 me the only one based on law and on reason, the 
 assent of the King must depend on his personal 
 opinion of the justice and utility of the measure 
 under discussion; but in forming that opinion he 
 must give serious consideration to the opinion of the 
 
The Referendum in Belgium xlix 
 
 country ; and the opinion which he ought to regard 
 is the opinion expressed, according to party rules, by 
 the majority of the deputies who enjoy the confidence 
 of their electors, and who have been chosen by legal 
 methods. 
 
 As a matter of fact, it is a great mistake to imagine 
 that the referendum is a kind of present to the Crown. 
 The King will gain nothing by this new right. He 
 will neither be free to consult the people when it 
 pleases him, nor will he be able to retain the power of 
 decision in his own hands after the people have been 
 consulted. If no text regulates the conditions under 
 which the monarch shall exercise his right, he will be 
 at the mercy of mass-meetings and petitions organised 
 by the different parties, or even of disturbances and 
 agitations in the street. The King will be obliged to 
 resort to popular consultations every time that he 
 thinks the Government powerless to cope with a 
 difficulty. 
 
 A future Parliament, in order to avoid such a state 
 of things, might draw up an explicit text, which should 
 state the conditions under which the right should be 
 exercised, and should limit it to the case in which a 
 preliminary demand has been made either by a cer- 
 tain number of members of Parliament or by certain 
 provincial and local bodies. These persons or bodies 
 would then become " the ruling powers." On the one 
 hand, the King could not appeal to the people unless 
 those authorities were to agitate for it. On the other 
 hand, if they were unanimous, he could not refuse to 
 grant the referendum if they demanded it. Moreover, 
 the people would be excited by parliamentary discus- 
 sions, the press would become verY_jaoisv, and the 
 
1 The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 party in a minority would move heaven and earth 
 to defeat their opponents. 
 
 Various suggestions of a different nature have been 
 put forward by the press. I shall only quote one of 
 them here. It has been proposed that the King 
 should have recourse to the referendum when a law 
 has only passed one of the two Houses by a small 
 majority. Such a provision would be equally disas- 
 trous to any freedom of action on the part of the King. 
 Every time that a law is much disputed, and does not 
 obtain a certain specified majority, the monarch must 
 inevitably appeal to the electors, unless he would 
 incur the reproach of being partial. 
 
 Laws which bear on matters which are the special 
 province of the King, and which are likely to impose 
 heavy charges on the country, such as military laws 
 and estimates for the construction of fortified works, 
 would in all probability be generally submitted to 
 the electorate, in consequence of the agitation of the 
 opposition. 
 
 Let us now turn to another side of the question, 
 and consider the result of the popular consultation. 
 If it is to be regarded as final, then the King has only to 
 submit he loses all personal freedom hi the matter. 
 Supposing, however, that the referendum is only re- 
 garded as a solemn piece of advice. Then the mon- 
 arch is placed in a most embarrassing position. There 
 is no difficulty evidently if there is a large majority ; 
 but how is he to decide if the figures are almost 
 equally balanced, or if the number of negative 
 tickets are not equal to half the number of the 
 registered electors ? How is he to decide if the 
 total number of electors against the law is less than 
 
The Referendum in Belgium li 
 
 the total number of suffrages received by the parlia- 
 mentary majority at the election ? How is he to 
 decide if cases of fraud and undue influence come to 
 light which would be sufficient to annul an ordinary 
 election ? 
 
 Is it not true, then, to say that the Crown will not 
 gain anything by the referendum, neither power or 
 relief? 
 
 The referendum will, moreover, imperil the other 
 powers which the monarch actually possesses. 
 
 As to the right of veto, it is not necessary to dwell 
 upon it. This right will be entirely lost. 
 
 The right of dissolution will be fatally restricted. 
 Those powers appointed by law to make a demand 
 for the referendum will consider themselves bound 
 to point out in how far the parliamentary majority 
 and the people are at variance. How then can the 
 King tell the country that a dissolution is necessary 
 because the Parliament seems to him opposed to the 
 general opinion of the country, when these authorised 
 powers have made no sign or refuse to declare that 
 the Parliament no longer represents the feeling of the 
 nation on some particular point. The right of dis- 
 solution ought especially to be preserved from all new 
 complications just now, as its exercise will become a 
 more difficult matter in consequence of the proposed 
 electoral reform by which general, provincial, and 
 communal elections are to be placed on the same elec- 
 toral footing. Formerly the results of the local elec- 
 tions were made use of to influence the parliamentary 
 majorities, although the composition of the electoral 
 bodies in each case might be very different. In the 
 future it is to be feared that these attempts will 
 
lii The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 be renewed with more semblance of reason, unless 
 public opinion comes at last to realise that local 
 elections are principally concerned with administra- 
 tive questions. 
 
 In short, to introduce the referendum in the in- 
 terest of the Crown is to pursue an illusion. Instead 
 of being a benefit to the monarch who wishes to 
 preserve a strictly constitutional attitude, it can only 
 bring about many unfortunate complications, and 
 lead eventually to loss of power. 
 
 The Parliament. 
 
 The Swiss Parliament and the Belgian Parliament 
 have nothing in common. The important points of 
 difference must be specially noticed. 
 
 The first is a difference in the fundamental ideas of 
 government. My colleague and friend, M. Dupriez, 1 
 has recently described it to me as follows : 
 
 " Switzerland is a democratic republic. The prin- 
 ciple of popular sovereignty applied in its purest form 
 has produced results in the constitutional organism 
 and on political customs which are quite peculiar to 
 that country. Every man who forms part of the 
 Legislature, Executive, or Judiciary, is appointed for 
 a fixed term. Each person elected is imbued with 
 the idea of the sovereignty of the people, and uses 
 the power delegated to him according to what he 
 believes to be the wish of those who sent him. If 
 he has made a mistake as to their wishes, he hastens 
 to repair his error, and does not think of refusing his 
 
 1 Author of that remarkable work, Les Ministres dans les priiicipaux 
 pays (T Europe et d'Amtrique. 
 
The Referendum in Belgium liii 
 
 consent. Thus the members of the Federal Assembly 
 whose opinions have been disavowed by their electors 
 do not vacate their seats, the Ministers whose personal 
 wishes are thwarted by the votes of the Assembly or 
 the people nevertheless remain at their posts. In 
 Switzerland the authorities do not resign, they always 
 submit. 
 
 The organisation of the Federal Assembly con- 
 stitutes a second great difference between the two 
 countries. The electoral districts are so mapped out 
 that one of the parties has a great advantage, and 
 the parliamentary majority does not always represent 
 the majority of the electors. 
 
 Finally, the third difference consists in the auto- 
 nomy of the cantons, and in the fact that the Federal 
 Parliament has only very limited powers. On an 
 average it passes about two or three laws a year. 
 The ordinary session only lasts eight weeks. As to 
 the cantonal assemblies, they scarcely sit longer than 
 our provincial councils. 
 
 These three striking features of Swiss political or- 
 ganisation explain why the electors consider them- 
 selves authorised to interfere in legislation, either by 
 means of the popular initiative or the referendum. 
 According to their theories they are the great motive 
 power, and ought to command the legislative assem- 
 blies to halt, or to advance, or to take a certain 
 direction. Turbulent minorities avail themselves of 
 the initiative as a means of dividing parties, and of 
 the referendum as a means of obstruction. 
 
 The country, as a whole, only bestirs itself on cer- 
 tain occasions. It then protests against the parlia- 
 mentary majority, and either gives the Legislature 
 
liv The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 an imperative mandate to legislate by means of the 
 initiative, or it makes use of the referendum to curb 
 tendencies which are too pronounced. But the elec- 
 tors do not intervene except at long intervals, because 
 they do not live in a unitary country under the 
 direction of a general Parliament whose activity is 
 unceasing. To introduce the referendum into Bel- 
 gium is to make an attempt to bridge, by means of a 
 badly poised plank, the abyss which separates the 
 system of popular government from the true parlia- 
 mentary system. 
 
 In England and Belgium the deputies are appointed 
 by the electors, but they are not commanded by the 
 electors. They must enjoy the confidence of the 
 country, but they preserve an independence of thought 
 and action. Our political conceptions are opposed to 
 the idea of imperative mandates of any kind whatso- 
 ever. The members of the minority as well as the 
 majority represent the nation. They guard between 
 them both private and public interests. The referen- 
 dum will degrade their position in the eyes of the 
 electorate, who will ask why the choice of representa- 
 tives is so important when their resolutions are not 
 final. It will weaken their prestige and destroy the 
 principle of their responsibility. Every deputy will 
 realise that his vote is only equivalent to a piece of 
 advice which the electorate may adopt or reject, 
 and that it is the majority of the electors who decide 
 either by tacit ratification or express decision. The 
 position of members and senators will be that of 
 political pioneers, their mission being confined to 
 discovering the land, and to pointing out the advan- 
 tages and the dangers of the situation. 
 
The Referendum in Belgium Iv 
 
 There are also other drawbacks. If the two 
 Chambers have a different origin, the Senate will be 
 annihilated, and the principle of the duality of the 
 Assembly will only be a hollow mockery. 
 
 Again, if the number of electors who are success- 
 fully opposed to the Government at the referendum 
 is less than the number of suffrages obtained on the 
 day of the election of the deputies of the parlia- 
 mentary majority, this majority will be able to say 
 that it is overcome and oppressed by the minority. 
 In this way the dignity and force of Parliament will 
 be irretrievably compromised. 
 
 Once a start has been made in the direction of 
 popular concessions, it will not be easy to turn 
 back. Even if the referendum should lead to un- 
 fortunate results, it would be difficult to abolish it, 
 because it would be necessary to persuade the people 
 themselves that they have been in the wrong, that 
 they must make a public acknowledgment of the 
 fact, and that they must renounce rights which seem 
 to them to be rights lawfully acquired. No ! the 
 step once taken can never be retraced; and when 
 the idea is followed out to its logical consequences by 
 the rival parties, the result will be a series of legis- 
 lative efforts much more advanced than those pro- 
 posed to-day. 
 
 It will be necessary to revise Article 131 of the 
 Constitution, which relates to constitutional reforms, 
 and Article 85, which deals with the final choice of 
 a new dynasty. These two articles provide a method 
 of popular consultation quite different from the 
 referendum. The country is appealed to for its 
 opinion by means of a dissolution. This system will 
 
Ivi The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 have then to be discarded as old-fashioned. It will 
 also be necessary later on to introduce the popular 
 initiative, which is an inevitable consequence of the 
 referendum. The people will not only have the 
 right of putting the drag on the legislative coach, 
 they will also insist on giving it a start. Finally, the 
 referendum and the initiative will be introduced 
 with more show of reason for local, provincial, and 
 communal affairs. 1 
 
 The introduction of the referendum into our par- 
 liamentary organisation will not be merely a slight 
 modification of the constitution, unnoticeable in its 
 effects: it will be the germ of a new departure, or, 
 to speak more exactly, the commencement of a com- 
 plete political revolution. 
 
 The Ministers. 
 
 It is very rare for the chiefs of the administrative 
 departments to resign in Switzerland when they have 
 experienced a rebuff or a check at a referendum. 
 
 The attitude of the Belgian Ministers is very dif- 
 ferent. It is dictated, not by constitutional or legal 
 texts, but by ancient and unchanging traditions. 
 
 Let us consider two distinct cases. Suppose, first 
 of all, that an important law is passed by the two 
 Chambers, and is supported by the Ministry, who 
 stake their existence on it either implicitly or in 
 express terms. 
 
 As matters stand to-day, should the King refuse 
 
 1 The referendum has nothing in common with the inquiry which 
 the local authorities are authorised to institute by Article 75 of 
 the Communal Law, in order to gain information before making a 
 decision. 
 
The Referendum in Belgium Ivii 
 
 his assent to such a law, the logical course for him to 
 pursue is to change the Ministry, or even dissolve the 
 Chambers. But if the referendum is introduced into 
 our constitution, it is quite a mistake to suppose 
 that the situation will be simplified. It will instead 
 be extremely complicated, not only before but after 
 the popular consultation. 
 
 When the persons or bodies authorised to demand 
 the referendum from royalty exercise their right, or, 
 to speak more generally, when the specified conditions 
 to be determined by a future Parliament shall be 
 fulfilled, the Cabinet will assemble in all haste ; they 
 will discuss the point as to whether they are obliged 
 to give their countersign in order that a work which 
 they regard as most important shall be called in 
 question at a popular consultation. 
 
 The parliamentary supporters of the party will be 
 convoked in a special meeting. If they are of opinion 
 that the chances are that the consultation will be 
 favourable to them, they will permit the Ministers to 
 countersign without raising any difficulties. If, on 
 the other hand, they consider that an isolated con- 
 sultation would be a bad piece of policy, and that 
 they would be more likely to succeed in a dissolu- 
 tion, they will decide upon resistance, and begin the 
 struggle from above. The Ministers will be obliged 
 to openly refuse their countersign and to send in 
 their resignation, or allow themselves to be dismissed. 
 If they fear, however, both the consultation and the 
 dissolution, they will then face the referendum with 
 the courage with which we face the lesser of two 
 evils. 
 
 Let us then take one step further and consider a 
 
Iviii The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 fresh difficulty. Let us suppose that the people have 
 been appealed to, and that they have answered very 
 clearly, and have rejected the law passed by the 
 Parliament and supported by the Ministers. What 
 course is then open to the Ministers and the deputies ? 
 According to our present theories the Ministers must 
 retire before a hostile vote of the Chambers on a 
 Cabinet measure. How much more then must they 
 retire before an unfavourable decision of the country 
 itself? How could the majority remain on the front 
 benches as if nothing had happened ? How could 
 these Ministers and this majority discuss and pass 
 any other important law? They would be a mere 
 butt for the witticisms of the Opposition, who would 
 declare the Government to be destitute of all moral 
 support. It would be condemned to a policy of in- 
 action until it acquired renewed strength at a general 
 parliamentary election. 
 
 The second case is this: Suppose one of the 
 Chambers has adopted an important law in spite of 
 the opposition of the Cabinet. The Ministers have 
 done all in their power to ensure its defeat; they 
 have agitated both by speech and writing, and all to 
 no purpose: they have been beaten. To-day only 
 one course is open to them : they must give in their 
 portfolios. But when once the referendum appears 
 on the horizon, will there not be a great temptation 
 for these Ministers to resist the Chamber, and to 
 threaten it with an appeal to the electorate ? 
 
 In some countries the unfavourable vote of the 
 Senate is not regarded by the Ministry as having the 
 same significance as an adverse vote of the Chamber. 
 The Senate seems to be somewhat removed from 
 
The Referendum in Belgium lix 
 
 the people, while the Chamber seems to be closely in 
 touch with them. But it would surely be going a 
 step beyond this were the people in Belgium to 
 have the right of personally intervening in legislative 
 decisions. 
 
 If the parliamentary majority has no fear of a dis- 
 solution, it will show its teeth and resist the Cabinet, 
 and make the latter's existence an impossibility. 
 But in a country where the parties are a periodical 
 check on each other, the majority will generally be 
 in doubt as to the results of a dissolution. In this 
 case it will draw in its horns, and the Ministry will 
 remain in power, in spite of the opposition aroused. 
 This will, in fact, be personal government supported 
 by a latent and extra parliamentary force, the force 
 being a popular one, and only manifesting itself at 
 indeterminate intervals, and on questions which have 
 been cleverly chosen. 
 
 When the Cabinet shall make the bold experiment 
 of submitting even the budgets to the people, then 
 the Parliament will cease to be a necessary part of 
 our political organisation; the Ministers and those 
 who support them will be "the sovereigns of the 
 plebiscite." 
 
 Parties. 
 
 In Switzerland there are numerous dismembered 
 and divided groups, there are passing coalitions and 
 a considerable floating mass of unattached members. 
 
 In Belgium, on the contrary, the parties form two 
 armies ; they have ancient traditions, and an organisa- 
 tion extending throughout the country. They corre- 
 spond to the tendencies which manifest themselves 
 
Ix The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 in society. The extension of the franchise will perhaps 
 modify their position; it will accentuate the sub- 
 divisions. No one, however, expects a radical change 
 to take place in their composition from one day 
 to another. The tendency is for the two existing 
 currents to continue to be the dominant currents 
 for a long time to come without any mingling of 
 the waters. 
 
 The advocates of the referendum do not seem to 
 understand the necessity for the existence of parties, 
 and seem also to have no fear of the influence these 
 same parties will exercise upon general opinion. Let 
 us examine the argument advanced with such fre- 
 quency that it comes only second to the argument 
 we ha^e just examined in connection with the King. 
 They say "that the referendum must have been in- 
 vented, even if it did not already exist, in Switzerland, 
 that it is indispensable to a representative organisa- 
 tion, and that it is a happy complement of the right 
 of dissolution." If the nation and the parliamentary 
 majority be out of harmony, it is essential, so they 
 maintain, to find out the points on which the two 
 differ. If these points prove to be numerous, or if 
 there be a general disagreement, the dissolution of 
 Parliament must ensue. If the nation and Parliament 
 be merely at variance on some special question, the 
 referendum is the necessary remedy, the people will be 
 consulted on the one subject, isolated from all others, 
 and the issues will be precisely and openly stated. A 
 dissolution leads to a discussion of persons and pro- 
 grammes; the referendum abolishes personal pre- 
 ferences, and restricts the debates to the examination 
 of a particular law. A referendum and a dissolution 
 
The Referendum in Belgium Ixi 
 
 are two separate rights, corresponding to two situa- 
 tions which are in reality quite different. 
 
 Without raising any doubt as to the competence 
 of the people in legislative questions, this political 
 dilemma is capable of being satisfactorily disposed of 
 in more ways than one. Let us suppose that a party 
 has a large majority, and that the two Chambers 
 pass a bill of the first importance, and that the Crown, 
 before giving its assent, dissolves Parliament. In this 
 case the electoral struggle will surely centre round 
 this particular law. If the Opposition be successful, 
 it is easy to see that the opinion of the country is 
 unfavourable to the politics of the majority. Should 
 the King, instead of dissolving Parliament, have re- 
 course to the referendum, is it not probable that a 
 great many considerations will influence the discus- 
 sions? Again, if the referendum should result in a 
 negative answer, the real feeling of the people still 
 remains unknown. Did the country only wish to 
 reject the law, or did it wish at the same tune to 
 overthrow the majority? One thing is certain, and 
 that is that the electors who supported the majority at 
 the time of the election have now ranged themselves 
 against the law passed by that same majority. The 
 difficulty is to know whether these electors are not 
 discontented with their party as well as with the law. 
 The actual figures obtained at the referendum will 
 always be equivocal in this respect, and the public 
 mind will be full of uncertainty on the point. 
 
 The partisans of the referendum shut their eyes to 
 the practical truth. They are ingenuous enough to 
 believe that the electors, when voting, will merely 
 vote on the merits of the question, and that their 
 
Ixii The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 judgment will be as unbiassed as that of a stranger 
 who has only arrived in the country the evening 
 before. It is a curious mistake, for it is obvious 
 that the vote of the electors will be a party, and not 
 a theory vote. The electors are instructed by party 
 journals ; they attend party meetings, they belong to 
 party associations, they have fought for years on the 
 the side of a party, and have debated the party pro- 
 gramme within their circle. Is it likely that the 
 elector will be able suddenly to put off " the old 
 man " when a consultation occurs, and learn to think 
 in a new manner ? Will not even the most thoughtful 
 and least prejudiced men hesitate before separating 
 themselves from the flag which they habitually follow ? 
 The idea is to divide political programmes, but will 
 not these men see a close connection, either logical or 
 historical, between questions which are supposed to 
 be separable ? 
 
 The supporters of the referendum think that it will 
 be easy to determine whether the discord between 
 the nation and Parliament exists on a whole series of 
 questions or on some special one only. They forget, 
 however, that party programmes are often regarded 
 by the electors in the light of pieces of cloth which 
 have still to be made up. They are the expression of 
 certain tendencies which will be curtailed or developed 
 at length according to circumstances. They include 
 also traditional questions, as well as local questions 
 and questions of organisation. All the articles in the 
 programme do not possess the same characteristics of 
 urgency and importance at any one given moment, 
 but they are all connected by ties of principle or 
 interest. The political crock is always on the bubble, 
 
The Referendum in Belgium Ixiii 
 
 and sometimes it is one item and sometimes another 
 that rises to the surface. At certain times the whole 
 programme seems to be summed up in two or three 
 points, sometimes in one only. When the party in 
 power has embodied this special point in a law which 
 appears to it of the greatest importance, is it then 
 possible to distinguish, as the advocates of the re- 
 ferendum seem to wish, between the party and the 
 principle of their law, to separate the father and the 
 child, so to say, declaring ah 1 the while that to hit 
 the one is not to strike the other ? 
 
 Each time that he uses the referendum, the King 
 will be obliged to declare that there is no discord 
 between the parliamentary majority and the country, 
 and that it is not necessary to have recourse to a 
 dissolution. But he will nevertheless be obliged to 
 add that he is uncertain whether all the adherents of 
 the party in power are agreed on such and such a 
 special point, and that he thinks in this respect there 
 may be some difference of opinion between them 
 which may have arisen either before or after the 
 election. Such a proceeding would probably be a 
 great strain on a party, and might lead to general 
 confusion and a possible relaxing of party ties. It 
 seems to amount to an appeal against a compact 
 and well-disciplined group of deputies, addressed to 
 all the forces of the opposition, to all the malcontents 
 within the majority itself, and to all those whose 
 interests are more or less affected by this particular 
 law, and whose hopes in the present or in the future 
 may have received a check. The break up of parties 
 into groups would be a grave danger. A government 
 has as much need of energy as a man has of will- 
 
Ixiv The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 power, and the parliamentary government which does 
 not rest on the solid basis of a faithful majority is a 
 government which is powerless and impotent. More- 
 over, the horizon is not so clear and cloudless in 
 Belgium to-day that we can afford to weaken our 
 motive powers and content ourselves with repre- 
 sentative authorities devoid of force and stability. 
 
 Parties are a necessity in a parliamentary system, 
 and in spite of their exaggerations and inconveniences, 
 they are a distinct benefit in our country. They are 
 the intermediaries between the mass of the electors 
 and the leaders. They group and educate the citizens, 
 they register the echoes of general opinion, they sub- 
 ject complaints to a sifting process, they recommend 
 moderation to the turbulent, and tabulate the im- 
 portant matters in the order which seems to them 
 most useful. Once you divide them, break up their 
 ranks, and destroy their programmes, you will have 
 deprived the people of their necessary guides, and 
 you will only have before you a great multitude of 
 errant or indifferent electors. 
 
 The People. 
 
 The gulf between the Swiss and the Belgians is 
 quite as great as that which separates the Belgians, 
 who have always enjoyed a real independence, from 
 the French, who have been unused to self-government 
 for centuries. 
 
 Democracy has had a peaceful existence in Switzer- 
 land, for the mountains have afforded it the security 
 of a natural and impregnable fortress. The inhabit- 
 ants have learnt to regulate their affairs in a patri- 
 
The Referendum in Belgium Ixv 
 
 archal manner. Cantons with Landsgemeinde still 
 exist there to-day, and the people collect together in 
 the great valleys and decide all civil and political 
 questions as of old. In other places this primitive 
 form of government has had to be abandoned. But 
 the desire to take part in public affairs has become 
 engrained in their natures. They have been accus- 
 tomed to hear their fathers discuss problems of State, 
 and have received the best of all political educations, 
 that of experience. 
 
 The Belgian possesses a great love of liberty. He 
 reasons calmly and with much common-sense, but he 
 is not accustomed to solve administrative and social 
 difficulties by himself. He utilises division of labour, 
 he concentrates his activity on his trade or on his 
 profession, and he confides the task of guiding the 
 politics of the State to the men who seem to share 
 his views. Now all of a sudden, without preparing 
 him in the least for it, it is proposed to consult him 
 directly on the most disputed and difficult questions 
 of legislation. 
 
 Two reforms of the first importance are being dis- 
 cussed. On the one hand, the scheme is to extend 
 the suffrage, the result of which will be to summon 
 to the polls considerable numbers of electors who 
 have never taken any part in public affairs, and who 
 have perhaps been rather neglected by the parties 
 and the ruling classes, and who have as yet only 
 vague notions of politics, and aspirations rather than 
 ideas. On the other hand, it is proposed to introduce 
 the referendum, which is an appeal to the people, 
 and which presupposes that their education is already 
 made, and that all classes of society have been in 
 
Ixvi The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 close touch for a long time. There seems to be here 
 a double danger. 
 
 But there is yet another striking fact to be noticed, 
 which is this : The Swiss people themselves, whose 
 political wisdom entitles them to rank foremost among 
 the nations of Western Europe, are somewhat cautious 
 and hesitating in the use they make of the referendum. 
 In the Federal Government experience has shown 
 the wisdom of placing certain laws beyond the possi- 
 bility of popular intervention. Thus budgets, treaties, 
 and all enactments which Parliament may consider 
 to be urgent, are excepted from the referendum. 
 
 In your book there is much that is instructive on 
 the question of the vote itself, you dwell on the many 
 reforms that have been attempted or proposed in 
 Switzerland with a view to lessening the dangers of 
 the referendum. 
 
 It has been proposed to enlighten the people before 
 the popular consultation by means of the distribution 
 or publication of messages. 
 
 If these documents are business-like, the electors 
 find them long and tiresome, and the majority do not 
 take the trouble to read them. If they consist merely 
 of a short abstract, they are ridiculous, and do not 
 teach anything. 
 
 Compulsory discussion has also been suggested. 
 But such a discussion presupposes that the speakers 
 will be clear and eloquent, and the audience com- 
 plaisant, and well up in the course of events. As a 
 matter of fact, no one speaks at the meetings which 
 are held for purposes of debate. 
 
 Others again have thought that it would be wise to 
 defer the referendum until the law had come into 
 
The Referendum in Belgium Ixvii 
 
 force, and experience had proved its worth. But this 
 would be too great a check on the impatience of the 
 opposition, and in the end the referendum would fall 
 into disuse. 
 
 On the voting day abstentions are numerous. Only 
 6 1 per cent, of the electors go to the polls in the 
 case of federal laws. In several places the vote has 
 been made compulsory in the case of cantonal votings. 
 The number of voters has increased ; but, on the 
 other hand, the number of blank tickets has increased 
 also. The answer obtained at the referendum has 
 proved to be deceptive and enigmatical. The electors 
 are led to give the same vote by motives which are 
 absolutely opposed. This would be remedied, some 
 reformers think, if the answers were accompanied by 
 a statement of reasons. There are others who claim 
 for the elector the right to separate or amend the 
 proposals submitted. What a dreadful muddle there 
 would be were these plans adopted ! 
 
 Politicians in Switzerland are not slow to take advan- 
 tage of the general confusion, and have recourse to 
 all sorts of subtleties of procedure. With a view to 
 carrying measures likely to be unpopular with the 
 majority, they make the strangest combinations of 
 independent groups by tacking on provisions to win 
 their favour. When a law is rejected, they return 
 to the task and modify the form, and present the 
 same law again under new colours. At the third 
 attempt the people become tired of resisting, and 
 allow the law to pass. 
 
 There is nothing astonishing in this state of things. 
 The people are competent to choose capable men. 
 They are able to declare their general preferences, 
 
Ixviii The Referendum in Belgium 
 
 and can give judgments on questions which do not re- 
 quire expert knowledge. But to ask them to do more 
 than this is to ask them to do something they cannot 
 perform. They are incapable of making legislative de- 
 cisions ; they have not got the necessary documents, 
 nor the leisure for the necessary study. They are liable 
 to be swayed by special and transitory considerations. 
 Their "view is not a trained one, and they naturally 
 cannot see things from the same standpoint as men 
 who have been used to the conduct of affairs. 
 
 Moreover, there are certain questions the signifi- 
 cance of which would escape them altogether. I 
 will only quote one example which is deserving of 
 special consideration in Belgium, as the Swiss re- 
 ferendum does not reassure us on the point. It is 
 the colonial problem. The founding and develop- 
 ment of a colony demand enormous sacrifices of 
 men and money, of activity and devotion, for results 
 which are in the dim future, and which are very diffi- 
 cult to guarantee or even to define. The people, 
 however, are always impressed by present sacrifices, 
 and by reverses which are more or less dramatic. 
 They do not pay any heed to future benefits, and to 
 the development of individual energies. From this 
 point of view it is permissible to think that if the 
 referendum ever became an additional source of power 
 to the King of the Belgians, it would nevertheless be 
 a great weakness for the Sovereign of the Congo. 
 
 To sum up what I have been saying at perhaps too 
 great length. 
 
 The referendum would be an absolutely new insti- 
 tution in a parliamentary monarchy. 
 
The Referendum in Belgium Ixix 
 
 The Crown, whose function it would be to remain 
 neutral between the parties, would not gain in in- 
 fluence, while its authority would be lessened and 
 hampered by many complications. 
 
 The Parliament and the Ministry run the risk of 
 being irrevocably transformed. The ancient system 
 of checks and balances would be succeeded by a 
 transitory state of things which might lead either to 
 personal or to popular government. 
 
 The unity of parties would be threatened if this 
 sword of Damocles were always hanging over their 
 heads. 
 
 Finally, the people, incompetent as they are for the 
 task, would be obliged to come to the polls to give 
 their decision in spite of themselves. 
 
 These dangers are not apparent to me alone ; they 
 have already been recognised and pointed out by the 
 press and by eloquent party leaders. But the longer 
 one thinks over the question, and the more one reads 
 your book, the more one becomes convinced of the 
 gravity of the situation. 
 
 Indeed, in Belgium, it may be said, with a good deal 
 of truth, that if there should ever be a referendum on 
 the referendum, the only voters in its favour would be 
 the authors of the reform. I remain, yours sincerely, 
 
 J. VAN DEN HEUVEL. 
 LOUVAIN, March 10, 1892. 
 
THE REFERENDUM IN 
 SWITZERLAND 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY IN SWITZERLAND 
 
 THE object of this chapter is to give some account 
 of the more important parts of those political in- 
 stitutions which are essentially a product of Swiss 
 democracy, and to examine the various constitutional 
 experiments which have had as their result the direct 
 participation of the people in the work of legislation. 
 At first sight the task of tracing the evolution of 
 democracy in such a place as Switzerland would seem 
 to be an easy one, on account of the limited field 
 of observation. On closer examination, however, we 
 find that what appeared so simple is really very com- 
 plicated. More than twenty states have continued to 
 exist side by side in this little corner of the globe, 
 united from time to time, it is true, in defensive 
 alliance, but separated by lofty mountains, differing 
 from the first in language, and later in religion, and 
 enjoying varying degrees of independence from auto- 
 nomy to partial subjection, with the result that each 
 little state has worked out its own history apart from 
 
 A 
 
2 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 the rest, and so powerful have been the disintegrating 
 factors that no great current of thought seems to 
 have acted as a stimulus towards unity. 1 It naturally 
 follows that their respective governments were the 
 outcome of very different political ideals. This abso- 
 lute political separation lasted down to the time of 
 the French invasion at the end of the last century. 
 The Constitution of the i2th of April 1798, which 
 was imposed on the country by France, proclaimed 
 the Helvetic Kepublic to be "one and indivisible," 
 and it reduced the ancient states to the position of 
 mere administrative departments. Such a complete 
 revolution in the position of century-old institutions, 
 due moreover to foreign intervention, was too sudden 
 and too fundamental a change to be permanent, and 
 Switzerland quickly reverted to the state of a con- 
 federation. 
 
 Nevertheless, ephemeral though it was, the Helvetic 
 Constitution could not but exercise a considerable 
 influence in the future. It introduced a new prin- 
 ciple into the public law of the country, the principle 
 of the sovereignty of the people. From this time 
 forth all the advocates of the " rights of the people " 
 have armed themselves with these magic words, and 
 have made them the basis of a whole series of claims. 
 The Constitution of 1798 was in this way the origin 
 
 1 [For a general history of Switzerland the following works are 
 accessible in English : MacCrackan, The Rise of the Swiss Republic, 
 1892 ; Hug and Stead, Switzerland, in the Story of the Nations series, 
 1890; the article on Switzerland in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, by 
 the Kev. W. Coolidge ; E. Grenfell Baker, The Model Republic : A 
 History of the Rise and Progress of the Swiss People, 1895. An ex- 
 cellent bibliography of works on Switzerland is given by J. M. 
 Vincent, State and Federal Government of Switzerland, p. 228.] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 3 
 
 of that outburst of enthusiasm for democracy which, 
 a few years later, after the July Revolution of 1830, 
 convulsed the whole of Switzerland. Up to the end 
 of the last century direct legislation by the people had 
 been a fact, though the form which it assumed was 
 accidental. From this time forth legislation by the 
 people was demanded as a right, and publicly advo- 
 cated as the only legitimate form of government. 
 
 The study of the democratic institutions of our 
 own time becomes much easier if we realise that 
 they, too, have sprung from the very same inspira- 
 tion, and are the outcome of one and the same idea. 
 
 The veto, the referendum, and the popular initia- 
 tive, all these creations of modern democracy are like 
 organisms, which, in a more or less perfect shape, 
 and with more or less difference in their final form, 
 have all sprung from a single primordial cell. We 
 shall trace their rapid evolution in the second part 
 of this chapter. Let us pause, first of all, to examine 
 the classical and somewhat curious forms of what 
 we might term " historical " democracy. 
 
 BEFORE 1798. 
 I. The Landsgemeinde. 
 
 Direct legislation has been a regular constitutional 
 feature in Switzerland from the very beginning of its 
 history. In the republics of Uri, Schwyz, Unter- 
 walden, Appenzell, Zug, and Glarus the people have 
 never ceased to legislate for themselves and vote 
 their own taxes from the thirteenth century down- 
 wards. They met together at least once a year for 
 
4 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 the purpose in solemn conclave, called the Lands- 
 gemeinde. 1 
 
 The Landsgemeinde was an assembly of all the 
 active citizens of the canton, that is to say, of all the 
 "freie Landleute" of the age of fourteen and over, 2 
 and who were entitled to wear a sword. 3 
 
 1 The first Landsgemeinde of which we have any precise infor- 
 mation was held in the canton of Schwyz in 1294 (Blumer, Staats 
 und Rechtsgeschichte der schweizerischen Demokratien, St. Gall, 1850, 
 i. p. 135). The following study of the Landsgemeinde is based 
 throughout on this masterly work of Blumer. 
 
 [Before the thirteenth century, however, the inhabitants of the 
 Keuss valley (Uri) met to regulate all the affairs concerning their 
 pasturage, and in Schwyz for purposes of local order from very 
 early times. The records of the Landsgemeinde of 1294 prove that 
 it was then no incipient institution, but a democratic assembly in 
 which the people were sovereign with unlimited powers. 
 
 One of the explanations of the origin of the Landsgemeinde is 
 that they were the outgrowth of the feudal manorial court of Hof- 
 gericht. The countrymen of the Alpine valleys assembled together 
 at the call of the lord's bailiff or deputy, to witness trials and to 
 act as a popular jury upon disputes arising under the customary 
 law of the district. They did not legislate, they applied the law ; 
 they did not elect the magistrate, they received him. In the First 
 Perpetual League they declared that they would only have natives 
 as judges, not foreigners. It would be an easy change, when the 
 feudal power grew weaker, for the people to meet together to elect 
 a man instead of waiting for his appointment, and to assume the 
 general direction of affairs at such meetings. See Rambert, Les 
 Alpes Suisse, p. 164. M. Dunant, in Legislation par le peuple en 
 Suisse, p. 6, says that the word Landsgemeinde dates only from the 
 fifteenth century.] 
 
 2 Towards the middle of the fifteenth century the age of political 
 majority was fixed at sixteen in the cantons of Schwyz, Glarus, and 
 Appenzell, and their example was followed by Zug in the sixteenth 
 century. 
 
 3 Thieves, bankrupts, and malefactors generally, were deprived of 
 their political rights. They were ehr and gewehrlos, and were for- 
 bidden to wear a sword, the distinguishing mark of an active 
 citizen. 
 
 [If a man attended without his sword he was not allowed to vote, 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 5 
 
 It was held in the spring, before the peasants left 
 for the high Alps, on the last Sunday in April or the 
 first Sunday in May. 1 The place of meeting was 
 an open space, with the turf for a carpet, and with 
 only the boundless sky above, unter Gottes freiem 
 Himmel. What more superb council chamber could 
 be conceived than such a one in these Alpine 
 lands ? 
 
 Attendance was compulsory, 2 because on the day 
 
 and was, moreover, fined. To the present day men attend the 
 Landsgemeinde wearing swords of very ancient patterns, evidently 
 heirlooms.] 
 
 1 [In Appenzell and Unterwalden the Landsgemeinde is held on 
 the last Sunday in April, in Uri on the first Sunday in May, and 
 in Glarus, if possible, during the month of May. At Glarus and 
 Appenzell (Inner Rhodes) the Landsgemeinden meet in an open 
 space in the town. An excellent historical account, description, 
 and criticism of the Landsgemeinden is given by Rambert in Les 
 Alpes Suisse (Lausanne : F. Rouge, 1889). M. Lefevre Pontalis has 
 described them as they exist at the present day in a pamphlet 
 called Les Assemblies pUnieres de la Suisse (Paris : F. Dentu, 1896), 
 and in the Figaro of the 28th of May 1894. Prince Roland Bona- 
 parte contributed two descriptive articles on the subject in the 
 Figaro of the 28th May 1890, and in the Evinement of the 6th of 
 June 1890. 
 
 Mr. Irving Richman, in Pure Democracy and Pastoral Life in 
 Inner Rhodes (Longmans, 1895), gives a vivid account of a Lands- 
 gemeinde held in Appenzell (Inner Rhodes), which, by the way, is 
 the only account I have ever seen of a Landsgemeinde held in the 
 rain. A Landsgemeinde is also described by Adams and Cunningham 
 in The Siviss Confederation, pp. 132-33 ; by Vincent, State and Federal 
 Government of Switzerland, pp. 106-1 14 ; by W. Boyd Winchester, The 
 Swiss Republic, pp. 101-107 ; and by MacCrackan, Teutonic Switzer- 
 land, chap. xi. 
 
 The description of Freeman in chapter i. of The Growth of the 
 English Constitution is classical (London, 1892).] 
 
 2 A fine was imposed in case of absence. [Mr. Richman, in his 
 book, states that a fine of five francs is still exacted in Inner 
 Rhodes ; and in an article on Compulsory Voting (Le Vote Obliga- 
 toire), by M. Deploige, in the Revue Generale for March 1893 
 
6 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 when the Landsgemeinde was held the people had to 
 take an oath to observe the laws and customs of 
 the country. In the early morning, chanting the 
 while their patriotic hymns, these peasant legislators 
 streamed in from all the communes of the canton. The 
 chief magistrate of the state, the landamman, was ex 
 officio president of the assembly. A band of musicians 
 conducted him to the platform, erected in the middle 
 of the meadow ; the active citizens ranged themselves 
 round him in a circle ; farther off outside the circle 
 the women and children x and strangers listened and 
 looked on in silence. According to traditional prac- 
 tice, a prayer, recited in unison, and the speech of 
 the landamman, preceded the orders of the day. 
 
 Before exercising its principal function, that of 
 legislation, the Landsgemeinde proceeded to nominate 
 the state officials, 2 the governors of bailiwicks, and the 
 deputies for the federal Diet. The elections were made 
 by show of hands. The landamman, with the help 
 of his assistants, declared the result, which no one 
 was allowed to .call in question. In case of doubt, 
 
 (Brussels), M. Deploige has the following note : A deputy of the 
 canton of Appenzell writes me that the Landsgemeinde punishes 
 electors who stay away by a fine of ten francs. My correspondent 
 did not, unfortunately, send me the regulation in question.] 
 
 1 [At Glarus the children occupy reserved places in front of 
 the tribune erected for the officials, in order that they may be 
 thus instructed from their youth up in the conduct of public 
 affairs.] 
 
 2 [In Glarus, up to 1857, the candidates had to be entreated to 
 accept office. After many compliments they were elected in spite 
 of their refusals, and the majority accepted the posts offered. 
 Those who declined had to declare upon their honour, or even on 
 oath, that they would not take office before any one even thought 
 of replacing them. See Droz, Etudes et portraits politiques, " Life of 
 Landamman Heer."] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 7 
 
 either a second show of hands took place, or the 
 voters separated into two groups and were then 
 counted. 1 
 
 A not uncommon piece of tactics was to call out, 
 " Friends, hands up " Hend auf ihr Hebe Landlut 
 when any particular name was called out. It was in 
 all probability a ruse employed by the supporters of 
 a candidate to make the doubtful electors take one 
 side or another. There were laws, however, which 
 imposed a fine on this especial manoeuvre. 
 
 Every free man was eligible for office. 2 The terms 
 were short, with little if any remuneration. The 
 offices were therefore in practice only accessible to 
 persons in easy circumstances, which explains the 
 fact that in the list of landammans the same name 
 occurs again and again. 3 
 
 1 [At Appenzell (Inner Rhodes) the people enter the church by 
 different doors, and are counted as they enter.] 
 
 2 In the cantons of Uri and Glarus those employed as merce- 
 naries in foreign countries were ineligible (Blumer, ii. p. 112). The 
 Swiss were to be found in the Middle Ages in all the armies of 
 Europe, the poverty of their soil and the scarcity of employment 
 having compelled them to enrol themselves in foreign armies. The 
 cantonal governments often used to take advantage of this practice, 
 and would conclude treaties with foreign sovereigns, known as 
 military capitulations, by which they undertook to provide con- 
 tingents of soldiers. The Federal Constitution of 1848 forbade 
 military capitulations. 
 
 3 [In Uri in the Middle Ages we find one Werner d'Attinghausen 
 in office from 1294-1317. From 1317-30 there is no record. In 1331 
 we find his son in office, and again in 1333-37, and from 1346-57. 
 Thus father and son were in office at least thirty-seven years. 
 In Schwyz, Conrad ap Yberg and Werner Stauffach alternate from 
 1291-1314. From 1314-19 there is no record. Then we find a 
 Henri Stauffach in office in 1319. From that time to 1342 there 
 is no record. From 1342-73 we get a Conrad ap Ypberg (thirty-one 
 years), and from 1378 we get a line of Stauffachs. See Rambert, op. 
 
8 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 After electing the officials the people next pro- 
 ceeded to deal with the internal and external affairs 
 of the canton. In such matters the Landsgemeinde 
 was not only supreme, but a very real and effective 
 sovereign. The citizens recognised no other laws 
 than those of their own making ; l not a farthing for 
 taxation left their pockets without their consent. 
 The state contracted no alliance that was not for- 
 mally approved by the majority of the nation, and 
 
 cit. p. 1 86. It was the same later on. M. Numa Droz, in his " Life of 
 the Landamman Heer of Glarus," Etudes et portraits politiqucs, 1895, 
 says that from the eighteenth century there had been Landam- 
 mans out of the family of Heer. Cosme Heer, the grandfather, 
 had been Landamman from 1828-33; Nicolaus, the uncle, from 
 1803-21 ; and the Heer of the biography eighteen years from 
 1857-76. The same author gives the following account of the 
 duties of a landamman in Glarus : The landamman has to direct 
 the assembly of the people. He has to preside at the Council of 
 State of 9, at the Landrath of 40 members, and at the triple 
 Landrath of 117, which deliberates on the questions to be sub- 
 mitted to the Landsgemeinde. It is the landamman who elabo- 
 rates the greater part of these proposals. It is he, as a rule, who 
 draws up the memorial to be sent to each active citizen before 
 each Landsgemeinde, a memorial which contains all the proposi- 
 tions and arguments in their support. The landamman may be 
 called upon to take part in many commissions. He is the councillor 
 of all. Every one goes to him in all the difficulties of life, some- 
 times for advice on legal matters, sometimes to ask his intervention 
 in their favour when they apply to the commune for relief. The 
 landamman has no official secretary to help him in all this. Yet 
 we find constant rivalry between the different families to obtain 
 the post, and some curious scenes at election time. 
 
 The government of trades unions by general meeting, the earliest 
 form adopted, presents many analogies with the Landsgemeinde. 
 See Industrial Democracy, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, vol. i. 
 chap, i, "Primitive Democracy."] 
 
 1 In 1733 tne Council of Glarus consulted the Landsgemeinde on 
 the interpretation of an obscure law on bankruptcy. Originally the 
 Landsgemeinde administered justice and exercised the right of 
 pardon. (Blnmer, i. pp. 270-72.) 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 9 
 
 no foreigner could become a citizen of the country 
 unless admitted by the Landsgemeinde. 1 
 
 Among the series of laws enacted by the Lands- 
 gemeinde, one group ought specially to be noticed, 
 because it throws new light on the political morality 
 of those primitive democracies. I refer to the suc- 
 cession of statutes designed to prevent corruption at 
 elections. The purchase of votes seems, in fact, to 
 have been carried out on a large scale, especially by 
 candidates for the office of bailiff. This was a lucra- 
 tive post, because the bailiffs were the governors of 
 the subject domains belonging to the little republics, 
 and they did not fail to make the most out of the 
 inhabitants. The existence of these subject domains, 
 it may be mentioned in passing, is one of the curious 
 features of "historical" democracy, and those who 
 theorise about modern democracy will no doubt 
 regard their very existence as a monstrous anomaly, 
 for nothing is more at variance with the principles, 
 if not with the mode of action, of those who claim to 
 rally round the doctrines of the French Revolution. 
 
 1 [It was a very difficult matter to be admitted to citizenship in 
 another canton. For instance, in Appenzell (Outer Rhodes), in 1834, 
 a man had to reside ten years in the canton. An application then 
 had to be made to the Great Council, who minutely investigated 
 the man's antecedents, and submitted the demand to the Lands- 
 gemeinde with a favourable report. The candidate then mounted 
 the platform at the Landsgemeinde to be presented to the people, 
 who were the final judges. In Appenzell (Inner Rhodes) he and his 
 family had to take an oath before the people that they were Roman 
 Catholics and went to church regularly. The candidate had to pay 
 a fine for admission. Even if the votes at the Landsgemeinde were 
 in his favour he was ineligible for any public office during his life- 
 time, but his children were under no disability. At the present day 
 the procedure is very similar, but five years' residence only is neces- 
 sary, and the candidate is eligible for all offices.] 
 
io The Referendum in Sivitzerland 
 
 But in the old-time democracies things bore a dif- 
 ferent aspect. Their aim was independence, their bias 
 republican, but the rights of man as an abstract idea 
 was still a good deal beyond them. Liberty was much 
 more than an idea, it was an actual fact ; not a philo- 
 sophic theory, but a more or less complicated system 
 of positive rights, based on a series of enactments 
 exactly similar to those by which all other rights had 
 been acquired. Civil or political liberty, once attained, 
 was handed down as an inalienable heritage from 
 those who first acquired it to those who came after 
 them. The freeman, owing neither suit nor service 
 to any feudal superior, no less than the burgess who 
 owned no allegiance to any foreign power, would 
 never dream of quoting in support of their claims 
 to freedom the prehistoric equality of primitive 
 man ; still less would they advocate the sovereignty 
 of the people. They produced charters, they appealed 
 to the rights acquired by their fathers, they quoted 
 the concessions and exemptions obtained from former 
 lords. 1 The subject lands, however, had no charters 
 to invoke. They had ceased to exist as seignorial 
 domains, and had become republican property, gener- 
 ally as part of the spoils of conquest. They gained 
 nothing, however, by the change. Their new masters 
 were no more considerate than the old, and the 
 exactions of the republican bailiff fell in no whit 
 behind those of the feudal lords. 
 
 A bailiwick was a snug berth for the man who 
 could obtain the appointment by winning the sove- 
 reign's favour. In this case, however, the sovereign 
 was an aggregate of some thousands of peasants, all 
 
 1 Cherbuliez, De la democratic en Suisse, Geneva, 1843, vol. i. p. 39. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 1 1 
 
 of them men leading hard and parsimonious lives. 
 The way to the hearts of such men was not to be 
 found by mere flattery: a bribe of money, a good 
 meal, or a flagon of wine were better means to the 
 end, a fact which soon became apparent to any 
 candidate. Already, as far back as the sixteenth 
 century, the Landsgemeinde are found legislating 
 against the abuse. At first such legislation was con- 
 ceived in merely general terms ; then, as the candi- 
 dates continued to be successful in evading the letter 
 of the law, the statutes took a more detailed form. 1 
 Such fits of repentance on the part of a sovereign 
 people, followed by their relapse and by new projects 
 of amendment, seem strange at first, and somewhat 
 difficult of explanation. It would almost seem as if 
 these laws were due to the efforts of defeated candi- 
 dates, who took this way of revenging themselves on 
 their more fortunate rivals. 2 
 
 1 [In 1666, 1667, and 1700 the Landsgemeinde of Schwyz fixed 
 a scale of expenses for marriages, baptisms, fairs, and shooting 
 matches, which varied according to the period at which these 
 festivals took place a higher maximum being allowed in ordinary 
 times, and a lower one in the period just before the Landsgemeinde. 
 This clearly shows that these joyful occasions were utilised for 
 bribery. In Lower Unterwalden, in 1692, "giving, paying, or 
 receiving food or drink" was forbidden during the whole year 
 without distinction of person. Rambert, p. 223.] 
 
 2 [Rambert, p. 325, says : " The Landsgemeinde have always 
 retained something of the vivacity and impulsiveness of great 
 crowds. It is a nervous government which has fits of exaltation 
 and fits of depression. Glarus, where corruption was so rife, is now 
 a model Landsgemeinde. M. Heer attributes the bribery to the state 
 politics of the time, which were simply concerned with questions 
 of personal interest. Something must be allowed for the spirit of 
 emulation and competition which so quickly infects great crowds 
 when brought together."] 
 
1 2 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 Whatever the reason might be, nothing seems to 
 have put an end to the electoral corruption. Fines, 
 and the exaction of an oath from the successful can- 
 didate to the effect that he had not made use of 
 illicit tactics, seem to have been alike unsuccessful. 
 At last the bribery attained the proportions of a 
 public scandal. In 1581 it was said at the Lands- 
 gemeinde of Glarus, that if the sale of votes were 
 not put a stop to, it would " demoralise and disgrace 
 the canton." l Perhaps if there had been any power 
 superior to the Landsgemeinde, possessing the energy 
 and the will to repress the evil, it might have been 
 eradicated. But the Landsgemeinde was the sole 
 sovereign. The very sinners themselves, with their 
 accomplices, formed part of it. An unusual amount 
 of virtue and will power, therefore, on their part would 
 have been required to put an end to practices the 
 immorality of which did not appear so flagrant to 
 those concerned. 
 
 When it became clear that to eradicate the abuse 
 was to attempt the impossible, efforts were made to 
 regulate it and give it an appearance of legality. 
 What had been, up till then, a vice odious to the 
 law, became a duty imposed by the law. Under the 
 new conditions the candidate was obliged to provide 
 a dinner for the electors. In later times a sum of 
 money was substituted, to be distributed in whole or 
 in part among the voters. It goes without saying that 
 in the long run, as far as the successful bailiff was 
 concerned, it was his subjects who provided the funds. 2 
 
 1 Blumer, ii. p. 116. 
 
 2 [At Glarus, the bailiffs for Thurgau, Baden, and the Rhine 
 valley paid between six and seven hundred florins for the post, 
 and bribed heavily besides.] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 1 3 
 
 Radical as these measures appear, they were never- 
 theless inadequate. Only one resource was therefore 
 left, namely, to suppress the election itself which gave 
 rise to such fraudulent dealing. This was accordingly 
 done. As formerly in the Athenian democracy, so in 
 the latter years of the old system in Switzerland they 
 had recourse to the ballot. 1 If the lot fell to a man 
 who had not the leisure to devote to the administra- 
 tion of a bailiwick, he put his office up for sale, and 
 parted with it to the highest bidder. 
 
 These details may perhaps be resented by enthu- 
 siastic admirers of the Landsgemeinde, but that 
 is no good reason for suppressing them. The old 
 democracies will appear in a less poetic but truer 
 light, and truth is our great object. 2 
 
 The rights of the members of the Landsgemeinde, 
 
 1 [In Glarus eight citizens were nominated for each post, and 
 a child gave round eight balls wrapped in black, which, when 
 opened, contained seven silver and one golden ball, and the man 
 who had the golden ball was declared to be elected. Schwyz also 
 adopted election by lot in 1692, but it had fallen into disuse by 
 1706, and it was decided in 1718 that whoever raised the question 
 again should be outlawed. But the law continued in force in 
 Glarus till 1798, and in 1793 they even chose their landamman by 
 lot. Choice by lot was given up when the cantons became part 
 of the Confederation. One writer complains that the method of 
 electing the officers is now very dull by comparison.] 
 
 2 The existing constitutions of these cantons still forbid the 
 purchase of votes in general terms. [In Schwyz in 1 830 it ceased 
 to have a Landsgemeinde in 1848 we find that the people after 
 the Landsgemeinde went to salute the magistrates, who gave them 
 little "gratifications." This was no small tax, for there was always 
 a considerable crowd, swelled by all the children of the district. 
 The year 1824 is specially mentioned, for then the people had 
 "cider in casks, and bread and cheese as much as they liked." 
 One might criticise the ancient Landsgemeinden on other points 
 besides those of bribery. See Rambert, pp. 218-22.] 
 
14 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 as forming part of a legislative assembly, were not 
 confined merely to sanctioning laws and ratifying 
 treaties. To begin with, each citizen had in theory 
 the right of initiative, and could, therefore, himself 
 bring any proposition before the Landsgemeinde. It 
 was found necessary, however, at a later date, to 
 restrict the unlimited exercise of this privilege. 
 Certain precautionary measures were therefore in- 
 troduced, and it became the custom, some weeks 
 before the date of the Landsgemeinde, to send in 
 the measures proposed to a council called the Land- 
 rath, whose members were chosen by the people in 
 the communal assemblies. 1 It was the province of 
 the Landrath to consider all proposals sent to it. 
 Those which it approved, and to which it was ready 
 to give its support, were submitted to the Lands- 
 gemeinde before the others. 
 
 This preliminary examination undoubtedly had its 
 merits. It acted as a sifting process by which the 
 really useful and suitable measures were separated 
 from the others, and thus recommended to the 
 suffrages of the citizens. As a natural result, the 
 Landrath attempted to claim a new power which 
 
 1 The Landrath may be considered as the executive and the Lands- 
 gemeinde as the legislative power, though the sphere of each of 
 these bodies was too loosely defined for this to be strictly accurate. 
 The importance of the business affected the size of the assembly. 
 De minoribus consilium de majoribus omnes. In course of time the 
 Landsgemeinde came to deal with executive matters, and the Land- 
 rath voted the laws; but Blumer especially points out that the 
 ratification of such legislation proceeded from the people. The 
 electors were jealous of their rights, and tolerated no encroach- 
 ments on the part of the authorities. On several occasions the 
 Landsgemeinde expostulated with the Landrath on account of real 
 or fancied misuse of power. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 1 5 
 
 constituted a grave menace to the rights of the 
 people. It tried to exclude from the deliberation 
 of the Landsgemeinde all the motions to which it 
 had not given its assent. Had this been effected, 
 the popular initiative would have been reduced to 
 the mere right of petition. The people protested, 
 and would not recognise any such power. At Lower 
 Unterwalden and at Appenzell the struggle was ex- 
 citing and prolonged. Sometimes the people, some- 
 times the council gamed the upper hand. 1 
 
 The way in which the popular initiative was re- 
 gulated in the canton of Uri is worthy of special 
 notice. Each proposition had to be supported by 
 seven citizens belonging to different families before 
 
 1 Blumer, ii. pp. 132-38 ; Keller, Das Volk&initiativrecht nach den 
 schweizerischen Kantonsverfassungen, Zurich, 1889, pp. 12-27. 
 
 [SeealsoDunant^gislationparlepeupleenSuisseipp. 16-23; Desch- 
 wanden, Die Entwicklung der Landsgemeinde in Nidwalden als gesctz- 
 gebende Gewalt, in Zeitschrift fur dffentiiches Recht, vol. vi. ; Zellweger, 
 Geschichte des appenzettischen Volks, Trogen, 1830-40. The following 
 particulars are taken from Deschwanden : In Lower Unterwalden, 
 in 1688, we find that no proposition could be submitted to the Lands- 
 gemeinde by a citizen unless it had first been discussed by the 
 Landrath. In 1700 it was declared that each citizen had the right 
 to propose anything that was not contrary to the glory of God and 
 the well-being of the country. The government then claimed the 
 right of judging whether the propositions were or were not con- 
 trary to the honour of God and the welfare of the country, and 
 under this pretext they eliminated all that displeased them. The 
 Landsgemeinde then abolished these saving clauses. In 1713 a 
 great fire consumed Stanz, and the Landrath attempted to persuade 
 the people that God was angry because they were allowed to make 
 propositions which might be contrary to His glory. The Assembly 
 protested, and the Landrath retired, which prevented the Lands- 
 gemeinde from deliberating. Then the people compromised and 
 restricted the right of initiative to those propositions which con- 
 tained nothing contrary to the glory of God, but they themselves 
 were to be judges of the fact.] 
 
1 6 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 it could be submitted to the vote of the people. This 
 method of procedure was called the Siebengeschlecht- 
 begehren the demand of the seven families. 1 
 
 The preliminary deliberations of the Landrath 
 lessened the importance of the great popular dis- 
 cussions in that it made them less essential ; but 
 at the Landsgemeinde perfect freedom of speech 
 was allowed. The landamman consulted the public 
 officials and other dignitaries, as well as the people 
 generally, on each question as it arose. A fine 
 coupled with expulsion from the Assembly were the 
 penalties for interrupting a speaker, but any one 
 who considered himself injured by a speech might 
 demand redress. 2 
 
 The great difficulty was the maintenance of order 
 on such an occasion a veritable holiday for the hun- 
 
 1 Blumer, ii. p. 131. 
 
 [These seven electors dictated their motion to the Secretary of 
 State at the beginning of the Landsgemeinde, and it was dis- 
 cussed at the Nachgemeinde. It was not till 1823 that the propo- 
 sition, signed by the seven electors, had to be sent in first of all 
 to the Landrath. 
 
 In Glarus the authorities drew up in a memorial a list of mea- 
 sures for discussion. So many interruptions occurred, however, in 
 consequence of the unrestricted right of initiative, that in 1766 the 
 citizens were allowed to unite their propositions in the memorial, 
 which was sent to the communes three weeks beforehand for this 
 purpose. The measures of the Council were discussed first] 
 
 2 [In Schwyz, in the sixteenth century, we find that the inter- 
 rupter had to ask pardon of God and the magistrate ; and at Stanz 
 he had to kneel in the middle of the ring and say five pater and 
 five ave. At the present day writers always remark on the freedom 
 from interruption which the speakers enjoy. In Schwyz the injured 
 party who sought redress could demand an explanation of the 
 speaker, and then the Assembly decided if such explanation were 
 sufficient or if the complainant should be allowed to seek legal 
 redress.] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 17 
 
 dreds of legislators who attended. Men like these, 
 habitually armed with swords, were only too apt to 
 come to blows when a discussion became heated. As 
 a preventive measure the sale of wine and spirits 
 was forbidden, both directly before the meeting and 
 during its continuance. At Schwyz no one was 
 allowed to carry a stick, and if a disturbance oc- 
 curred the combatants were imprisoned on the spot. 
 At Glarus the disturber of the peace was deprived 
 of his sword and of all political rights ; was declared, 
 in fact, to be ehr and gewehrlos until he obtained a 
 pardon. It goes without saying that police regula- 
 tions such as these could only be effectual if the 
 culprits were few in number. When, as sometimes 
 happened, the excitement spread through the whole 
 mass, all attempts at suppressing the tumult were 
 useless, and the debate had to come to an end. 1 
 
 After the different opinions had been expressed, 
 the landamman summed up the amendments and 
 put them to the vote. The citizens voted by raising 
 their right hands, and the landamman counted the 
 numbers and declared the result from the tribune. 
 
 The sitting of several hours was not always long 
 enough to exhaust the orders of the day. When 
 night put an end to the meeting, still leaving several 
 matters to be discussed, the legislators arranged for 
 an after-meeting, a Nachgemeinde. At this supple- 
 mentary meeting, which was held a week or fortnight 
 later, attendance was not compulsory. It must have 
 been less well attended than the ordinary Lands- 
 gemeinde, because in the canton of Uri on two occa- 
 sions, in 1705 and again in 1753, attempts were made 
 
 1 Blumer, ii. p. 109. 
 
 B 
 
1 8 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 to attract people to the meeting by making small 
 payments to those present. 
 
 The May meeting of the Landsgerneinde and its 
 possible Nachgemeinde took place in the ordinary 
 course of events, but it remains to be noticed that 
 in case of need the authorities or a certain number 
 of citizens had the right of calling an Extraordinary 
 Landsgemeinde. 
 
 The Constitution of the Helvetic republic of the 
 1 2th of April 1798 respected neither the antiquity 
 of the Landsgemeinden nor the independence of the 
 small republics of Central Switzerland. Their indig- 
 nation was great indeed when they learned that a 
 foreign power was going to force on them a new 
 constitution. The French spoke to them of liberty, 
 of equality, of the sovereignty of the people, and of 
 political emancipation. What meaning had such 
 language for these mountaineers, already sovereign 
 legislators, and free as the eagle that soared over 
 their own Alpine snow heights, ignorant of the mean- 
 ing of feudal privileges, and emancipated for cen- 
 turies from the rule of monarchs and aristocrats? 
 They perceived merely the emptiness of all these 
 promises, and felt the hollowness of the revolutionary 
 phraseology. Their fathers had founded a genuine 
 democracy ; the democracy the invader would estab- 
 lish was only a theory on paper. 
 
 A touching letter addressed to the French Direc- 
 torate on the 5th April 1798, expresses their senti- 
 ments on the matter. It is, unfortunately, too long 
 to give in full. The following is an extract : 
 
 " Nothing can in our eyes equal the misfortune of 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 19 
 
 losing the Constitution which was founded by our 
 ancestors, which is adapted to our customs and needs, 
 and which has for centuries enabled us to reach the 
 highest attainable point of comfort and happiness. 
 Citizen directors, if you should have really come 
 to the determination to change the form of our 
 popular governments, allow us to address you on 
 the subject with frankness and freedom. We would 
 ask you if you have discovered anything in our 
 constitutions which is opposed to your own prin- 
 ciples. Could any other conceivable form of govern- 
 ment put the sovereign power so exclusively in the 
 hands of the people, or establish among all classes of 
 citizens a more perfect equality ? Under what other 
 constitution could each member of the state enjoy a 
 greater amount of liberty ? We wear no other chains 
 than the easy fetters of religion and morality, no 
 other yoke than that of the laws which we have 
 made for ourselves. In other countries, perhaps, the 
 people have still something to wish for in these 
 respects. But we, descendants of William Tell, whose 
 deeds you laud to-day ; we, whose peaceful enjoyment 
 of these constitutional privileges has never been in- 
 terrupted up to the present time, and for the main- 
 tenance of which we plead with a fervour inspired by 
 the justice of our cause, we have but one wish, and 
 in that we are unanimous : it is to remain under those 
 forms of government which the prudence and courage 
 of our ancestors have bequeathed as a heritage ; and 
 what government, citizen directors, could more accord 
 with your own ? 
 
 "We who address you are inhabitants of those 
 countries whose independence you have so often 
 
2o The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 promised to respect. We are ourselves the sove- 
 reigns of our little states. We appoint and dismiss 
 our magistrates at will. The several districts of our 
 cantons elect the councils which are our representa- 
 tives, the representatives of the people. These are, in 
 short, the very foundations of our constitution. Are 
 not your own identical ? " 
 
 The Act of Mediation of 1803 gave back a certain 
 degree of their former independence to the cantons. 
 Then the little peasant republics returned to their 
 old traditional policy, and the people once again 
 assembled every year to debate on public matters, 
 to make their laws and appoint their magistrates. 1 
 
 The Landsgemeinde meets to-day just as it did 
 in the Middle Ages. The same ceremonial is still 
 observed. There is the prayer in which all join 
 before the proceedings, the procession, and the speech 
 of the landamman, the voting by show of hands, and 
 the oath of fidelity taken by the people to observe 
 their laws and customs. Except for certain encroach- 
 ments of the central government in the domain of 
 cantonal sovereignty, the power of the Landsgemeinde 
 has remained essentially the same as in the olden 
 days. It still legislates and votes the taxes, approves 
 the estimates and the budget, appoints the officials 
 and the magistrates. In the constitutions of the 
 cantons the Landsgemeinde is declared to be the 
 
 1 [Napoleon nevertheless introduced certain habits of order which 
 were not without their influence on the Landsgemeinden held 
 after his fall. Under the Act of Mediation the discussions at the 
 Landsgemeinde had been restricted to the subjects which had been 
 sent in to the Great Council and published one month beforehand. 
 This is the practice now universally followed, with slight variations 
 in the date fixed.] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 21 
 
 sovereign legislative power, and attendance at its 
 meetings is enforced as a civic duty. 1 The citizens 
 have still in principle the right of initiating laws, and 
 of freely discussing, " under the free heaven of God," 
 the propositions brought for their consideration. 2 
 
 The demand of the seven families Siebenge- 
 schlechtbegehren that peculiar feature which has 
 existed from time immemorial in the Constitution of 
 Uri, did not disappear until 1888. Any elector since 
 that date may bring forward a proposal in the Lands- 
 gemeinde, provided it is in writing, is clearly ex- 
 pressed, contains an epitome of the arguments in 
 its favour, bears the signature of the proposer, and is 
 
 1 [Each Landsgemeinde canton has a " Landbuch," which is an 
 official record of the Landsgemeinde. Some of these Landbiicher 
 are very ancient, and date from the fifteenth century. They were 
 the only thing in the nature of a written constitution which the 
 cantons possessed ; they were merely a collection of laws, decrees, 
 and traditional practice which were altered from time to time. 
 The fact that the cantons are now obliged to have a written con- 
 stitution which is guaranteed by an outside power, which they 
 are bound to observe, and which they cannot alter without the 
 same sanction, forms no slight limitation of their power. These 
 cantons found the greatest difficulty in drawing up a written con- 
 stitution, and it was not until after 1850 that all the Landsgemeinde 
 cantons succeeded in drafting constitutions. The document drawn 
 up by the government of Uri in 1820 is very characteristic : "We, 
 Landamman, Council, &c., hereby declare that we have never had a 
 written constitution contained in one document, but our constitu- 
 tion rests on the following principles, consecrated by the usages of 
 centuries and by legal enactments, which, with the protection of the 
 Almighty, we hope to transmit to our descendants." Then follows 
 a meagre list of six articles.] 
 
 2 [It is interesting to compare the Town Meeting in the New 
 England States with the Swiss Landsgemeinde. See Professor 
 Bryce's description in the American Commonwealth, vol. i. p. 590, 
 &c., 1893. For a detailed account of the power of each Lands- 
 gemeinde, see Dunant, op. cit. pp. 14-23 ; also Signorel, Le Refe- 
 rendum legislatif, pp. 120-24, 1895.] 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
22 
 
 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 forwarded before the end of March to the Landrath, 
 which makes a report on the subject at the Lands- 
 gemeinde. The mover either makes a speech in 
 support of his own bill, or gets somebody else to 
 defend it for him. 1 The other states have constitu- 
 tional provisions of much the same character. 
 
 In the half canton of Lower Unterwalden proposals 
 must be sent in to the Landrath before the ist of 
 March. The official Gazette publishes them within 
 ten days. Within three weeks of publication, any 
 elector has the right of submitting counter-proposals 
 and amendments to the Landrath. The Landrath 
 examines these new motions, and can in its turn 
 supply others. But no proposals may be modified at 
 the Landsgemeinde. They are there put to the vote 
 as originally drafted. 2 
 
 The canton of Glarus is an exception, for its con- 
 stitution states expressly that the Landsgemeinde 
 has the right of accepting, modifying, or rejecting 
 the propositions which are presented to it, as well as 
 the power to send any measures back to the Triple 
 Council for reconsideration or ratification. 3 
 
 1 Verfassung des Kantons Uri, Arts. 26 and 28. [An amendment of 
 the constitution cannot proceed from a single person. It must be 
 supported by fifty signatures at least.] 
 
 2 Verfassung des Kantons Unterwalden nid dem Wold, Art. 41. 
 
 3 [In Glarus, according to the Constitution of 1887, citizens send 
 propositions to the Landrath to be inscribed in the memorial which 
 contains the orders of the day for the Landsgemeinde. These 
 motions, if supported by ten votes in the Council, are incorporated 
 with an explanatory clause one month before the Landsgemeinde 
 assembles. The rejected motions are also included in the memo- 
 rial, but without any recommendation. If the Landsgemeinde 
 accepts one of these latter motions, the Landrath is bound to include 
 it in the next memorial with an explanatory clause. A law cannot 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 23 
 
 The stranger who witnesses a Landsgemeinde never 
 forgets the experience, and is always profoundly im- 
 pressed. The grandeur of such a scene has affected 
 even such eminent contemporaries as Cherbuliez, 
 
 be amended until three years after its promulgation unless it is 
 prejudicial to the country. 
 
 In Appenzell (Inner Rhodes) the Constitution of 1892 stipulates 
 that the right of making propositions belongs to all citizens, 
 but the motions must previously be sent in to the Great Council. 
 If the Council will not undertake to present a particular motion, 
 any citizen may do so, provided it contains nothing contrary to 
 the federal or cantonal constitution. The regulations in Upper 
 Unterwalden are the same. 
 
 In Appenzell (Outer Rhodes), where they only vote and do not 
 discuss matters at the Landsgemeinde, the Great Council, or a 
 group of electors equal in number to the Great Council, may pro- 
 pose any law to the Landsgemeinde, but in the latter case the 
 Council has to report on it first. 
 
 Thus at the present day everything passes, first of all, through 
 the hands of the Council. They cannot, however, suppress or 
 throw out motions. They can only comment adversely. 
 
 Mr. Irving Richman gives the following account of the popular 
 initiative in Inner Rhodes : 
 
 "It has long been a constitutional rule of the state that no 
 measure can be presented at the Landsgemeinde unless it has been 
 passed upon by the Great Council. An inference from this might 
 be that the Landsgemeinde merely goes through the form of 
 accepting and rejecting what the Great Council has accepted and 
 rejected beforehand. And in matters of slight importance this is 
 usually the practice. But that it is not the practice in matters of 
 more than slight importance is shown by the following incident : 
 To the year 1891 it had been the prerogative of the Great Council 
 to choose the cantonal member of the Standerat or Senate. In the 
 Landsgemeinde of that year a citizen brought forward a measure 
 (previously passed upon adversely by the Great Council) to annul 
 this prerogative and place the election of Senator in the hands of 
 the Landsgemeinde. The vote was taken and the measure passed." 
 
 It would also seem that several measures proposed by the Council 
 have been rejected by the Landsgemeinde, the people being more 
 conservative than their councillors. See Pure Democracy and Pastoral 
 Life in Inner Rhodes, J. Irving Richman, 1895.] 
 
24 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 Dubs, and Welti, all of them confirmed opponents of 
 the popular veto and the referendum. 
 
 "The people in a pure democracy," wrote Cher- 
 buliez, "is a being morally complete in itself, a 
 unique personality with an actual existence quite 
 distinct from that of the individuals who compose it. 
 The people in a representative democracy is only an 
 abstract quantity without any corporate life, a mere 
 numerical result whose component units feel and 
 act for themselves as if there were no common tie 
 between them." * 
 
 " The Landsgemeinde," said M. Welti in his great 
 speech against the referendum in the Federal 
 Assembly of 1892, "has nothing in common with 
 the referendum. It is a real and living thing, while 
 the other is nothing but a dead form of democracy 
 on paper. In the Landsgemeinde each man feels 
 that he is also a citizen. In the Referendum the 
 ballot-paper is his substitute." 2 
 
 " A Landsgemeinde," wrote Dubs, " held on a spring 
 day, under God's free sky, with the very women and 
 children taking part in it outside the circle, with the 
 mountains as a background, those bulwarks of our 
 freedom this is the finest and most ideal personifi- 
 cation of democracy. Anything and everything that 
 might be offered in exchange would only seem a 
 feeble reflection of this living union of the people." 3 
 
 1 Cherbuliez, ii. p. 134. 
 
 2 Protocol of the deliberations of the National Swiss Council 
 concerning the revision of the Federal Constitution, 1871-72. 
 
 3 Dubs, Le droit public de la Confederation suisse, Geneva, 1878, 
 i. p. 210. 
 
 [M. Curti, in his article on the Referendum in Switzerland in 
 the Revue Politique et Parlementaire for August 1897, P 2 45 Sa 7 s 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 25 
 
 The admiration of these men, though sincere, is by 
 no means blind. They realise thoroughly that Lands- 
 gemeinden are like rare plants. They can only live in 
 special surroundings. Their admiration, moreover, is 
 shared by nearly all their fellow-countrymen. The 
 Swiss, taking them as a whole, have a weakness for 
 the Landsgemeinden of their little cantons. They 
 are historic curiosities, relics of the past, which the 
 lofty mountains seem to have preserved from the 
 adverse influences of feudalism and monarchy. No 
 one imagines, however, that they could be trans- 
 planted to a new soil. 1 Nowhere else could we find 
 the conditions universally regarded as essential to the 
 proper working of direct legislation. Such countries 
 must necessarily be small, 2 and contain a compara- 
 
 that " the success of the Landsgemeinden depends on the favour of 
 the heavens. They are magnificent to behold in fine weather, but 
 if a shower comes the business is treated with rather undignified 
 haste, while whole groups leave the meeting."] 
 
 1 Orelli, Das Staatsrecht der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, p. 
 107 ; Ernst, Die Volksrechte im JEidgenossischen Bunde in the Monat 
 Rosen, 1883-84, p. 245 ; E. Naville, La democratic representative, 
 p. 2 ; Brunialti, La legge e la libertd, i. p. 259 ; Dubs, Die schweize- 
 rische Demokratie in ihrer Fortentwicklung, pp. 30-32. 
 
 2 [The longest dimensions of any one of the Landsgemeinde 
 cantons does not exceed thirty miles. Appenzell (Inner Rhodes) 
 has the configuration of a circle, the diameter of which is only ten 
 miles across, and the seat of government is almost central. The 
 population of these Landsgemeinde cantons when we first know 
 anything of them cannot have exceeded 1500 men. The number 
 of registered electors in October 1896 was 4495 in Uri, 3824 in 
 Obwald, 2877 in Nidwald, 8323 in Glarus ; in Appenzell (Outer 
 Rhodes) 12,214, and in Inner Rhodes 3005. In addition to a small 
 territory and small population, the political unity of a canton must 
 be beyond discussion. The natural effect of Landsgemeinde is to 
 bring out geographical divisions, to which also correspond diver- 
 gencies of interest and moral differences. After the Reformation 
 there was a Protestant and a Catholic Landsgemeinde in Glarus, 
 and a Protestant and a Catholic Landsgemeinde in Uri.] 
 
26 The Referendum in Sivitzerland 
 
 tively limited number of inhabitants. 1 Nor can there 
 be found in the world at large such simplicity of life 
 and social relations, which come upon an observer of 
 these primitive democracies almost as a revelation. 2 
 
 The inhabitants of these cantons are occupied with 
 agricultural and pastoral pursuits. They do not, there- 
 fore, come in contact with all the complicated and 
 difficult problems which press so urgently for solution 
 outside their frontiers. They rarely find it necessary to 
 make new laws. Their relations with each other are 
 regulated by custom, and this is all-sufficient. Their 
 magistrates, who are upright and experienced men, 
 have an exceptional position. They are universally 
 
 1 Both Zug and Schwyz have been obliged to give up their 
 Landsgemeinde since 1848 owing to the growth of population. 
 
 [The outlying districts were jealous of Schwyz, and broke away 
 and formed a canton of Schwyz-Exterior in 1832. There were 
 struggles between the two, the Confederation intervened, and 
 the matter was compromised by the Landsgemeinde being held 
 at Roththurm in between the rival places. The parties, however, 
 fought over the elections, and maligned the men to be elected, 
 until at last the meeting became a free fight. Another Lands- 
 gemeinde was held, at which five Federal Commissioners were 
 present to keep order. The result was that the Landsgemeinde 
 was given up, and Schwyz now has practically six Landsgemeinden. 
 It is divided into six districts, and each has a Bezirksgemeinde, con- 
 sisting of all the male citizens who have attained their majority. 
 They assemble once a year, on the first Sunday in May, or they 
 may be summoned at other times by the district council, or when 
 one-fifth of the voters demand it. They elect the judges of the 
 district and the other officials. They levy taxes, approve expendi- 
 ture, and make binding agreements (Arts. 78-90, Cons, of Schwyz). 
 There were after the Reformation no less than eleven Lands- 
 gemeinden in Switzerland two in Appenzell, two in Unterwalden 
 two in Glarus (a Catholic and a Protestant one, which united in 
 1836), two in Uri, two in Schwyz, and one in Zug. There are now 
 six.] 
 
 2 See a very interesting monograph by M. Bechaux, Une demo- 
 cratic modele I' Untenvald, Paris, 1888. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 27 
 
 respected, and, thanks to the authority with which 
 they are endowed, they find no difficulty in directing 
 the great assemblies of the people. Then, too, demo- 
 cracy can never degenerate in these countries into 
 demagogy. It can never become the oppression of the 
 minority by the majority. The two principal causes 
 which rouse the great mass of people to act as despots 
 are differences in religion and social inequalities. 
 These do not exist in the cantons with Landsge- 
 meinden. The inhabitants are religious, and join in 
 the same form of worship. They are neither very 
 rich nor very poor, but possess a modest competence. 
 The enmities of religions and of class and class do 
 not find anything to thrive on, and the country is 
 preserved from those unfortunate laws which in 
 other countries make democracy sometimes so 
 dangerous to true liberty. 1 
 
 II. The Referendum in the Orisons and in Valais 
 The Rittinghausen System. 
 
 The Landsgemeinde was composed of all the citizens 
 of the country, and all the local assemblies habitually 
 held in the several communes were merged on this 
 occasion in one great central gathering. This general 
 assembly was due to the need of ascertaining public 
 opinion on matters of common interest, and of having 
 a concerted plan for the defence of the country. 
 Such a meeting was only possible, however, where 
 
 1 [It will be remembered that the word Landsgemeinde simply 
 means "National Commune," and that the principle of the mass 
 meeting obtains in almost every local division of Switzerland. See 
 Preface.] 
 
28 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 the territory was small. Hence, when this condition 
 failed, as in the Grisons and in Valais, it was out of 
 the question to collect all the people in one day at 
 the same spot. Thus, while the more ancient cantons 
 summoned their inhabitants together in one large 
 assembly, the Grisons and Valais had to leave the 
 business of debating on matters of general interest 
 to their little communal assemblies. In the one case, 
 legislation was the work of the entire nation solemnly 
 convoked for the purpose in a Landsgemeinde ; in the 
 other, it was none the less the work of the nation, but 
 of the nation acting in sections, and subdivided into 
 a number of local assemblies or Gemeinden. In the 
 former, the limited area of the country made it possible 
 to give a central organisation to popular legislation ; 
 in the latter, the people had to be content with a 
 strictly federal system. 
 
 The canton known as the Grisons was essentially 
 a federation of separate communes which during the 
 thirteenth century had succeeded in wresting their 
 independence bit by bit from their feudal superiors, 
 so that by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries they 
 were in a position to contract alliances between them- 
 selves. They first formed three leagues the Grey 
 League, the League of the House of God, and the 
 League of the Ten Jurisdictions. Finally, towards the 
 end of the fifteenth century these three leagues coal- 
 esced and formed the Rhoatian republic, and became 
 an allied canton (zugewandte Ort) of the Swiss Con- 
 federation. 1 
 
 1 Hilty, Das Referendum im schiveizerischen Staatsrccht, in the 
 Archivfur o/entliches JRecht, Z welter Band, pp. 171 and 176. 
 [See also Hilty, Die Bunde&verfassungen der schweizerischen Eid- 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 29 
 
 A Federal Assembly, consisting of delegates of the 
 communes of the three leagues, sixty-three members 
 in all, was held every summer. The meeting-place 
 was alternately Ilanz in the Grey League, Coire in 
 the League of the House of God, and Davos in the 
 League of the Ten Jurisdictions. 1 This Diet was a 
 deliberative and consultative assembly. Its members 
 came to it furnished with definite instructions, which 
 it was the custom to read out at the beginning of the 
 session. Their function was to discuss and consider 
 questions before them, but any decision they might 
 arrive at was only of a provisional nature, and was 
 adopted with the saving clause ad referendum? that 
 
 genossenschaft, an historical treatise written by request of the 
 Federal Council on the occasion of the six hundredth centenary 
 of the First Perpetual Alliance of August i, 1891 ; Revue de Droit 
 International, xxiv., 1892, pp. 384-405, 476-89, Le Referendum et 
 V Initiative en Suisse. Also Benoist, Une democratic historique in the 
 Revue des deux Mondes for August 1891 ; Vulliemin, Geschichte der 
 schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, i. p. 130. Also Rechtsquetten des 
 Canton Graubiinden, with an introduction by Wagner and Von Salis, 
 in the Zeitschrift fur schweizerisches Reckt, vol. iii. part 2, vol. iv. part 
 i, and vol. v. part 3 ; "The Early History of the Referendum" in 
 the Historical Review, vol. vi. p. 674, by W. A. A. Coolidge. The re- 
 ferendum system is fully described by Simler in his De Helvetiorum 
 Republica (1577), and by Sprecher in his Pallas Rhcetica (1617). 
 Ganzoni, in Beitrdgc zur Kenntniss des bundnerischen Referendum^, 
 p. 15, points out that though the Rhoetian and Swiss historians 
 describe the referendum very fully, yet there is very little trace of 
 it in the Rhcetian law, merely a few enactments on the subjects. 
 It was not until 1794 that the whole system was elaborately set 
 forth on paper, reformed and regulated.] 
 
 1 Curti, Geschichte der schweizerischen VolTcsgesetzgebung , Zweite 
 Auflage, Zurich, 1885, p. 1 1. This remarkable work is the best history 
 of the democratic ideas and institutions of Switzerland. 
 
 2 [The words occur apparently for the first time in Vulpius' 
 narrative, Historia Rhcetica. He died in 1706. See " Early History 
 of the Referendum," Historical Review, vol. vi. p. 681.] 
 
30 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 is, to be referred back to the constituent bodies, the 
 communes, with whom the final adoption or rejection 
 really rested. 1 Thus the communes themselves were 
 the real sovereigns of the country. In order to en- 
 able these bodies to exercise their legislative power, 
 a committee of the Diet prepared at the end of each 
 session a report of the debates, together with a list 
 of questions. In this list were set forth the different 
 subjects upon which the communes were required to 
 exercise their sovereign power of sanction or veto. 
 It had to be printed, to be expressed in a clear 
 manner without unusual words, and to be in the 
 language spoken by the people to whom it was 
 addressed. 2 The communes received the papers from 
 the hands of messengers, who had to obtain an 
 acknowledgment of their safe delivery. This was 
 called das Ausschreiben auf die Gemeinden? 
 
 1 [Mr. Coolidge, in his article on "The Early History of the 
 Referendum," Historical Review, vol. vi., p. 68 1, says that there was 
 also another assembly, a sort of standing committee, called the 
 Beitag, which also had to refer matters back to the communes. 
 He quotes the following passage from Simler, De Helvetiorum Re- 
 publica : " Quoties causse publicse agendas sunt quarum tamen causa 
 non placet indici senatum totius Rcetise, turn hi tres praecipue et 
 praeterea aliquot alii ex singulis foederibus convocantur ; sed non 
 habent plenam statuendi potestatem verum acta ad communitates 
 fcederum separatim referuntur, et quod major horum pars statuerit, 
 ratum est."] 
 
 2 According to a decree of 1794. Before that, by a decree of 1587, 
 the questions had been drawn up exclusively in German. Three 
 languages are spoken in the Grisons German, Romance, and 
 Italian. The members of the Great Council, as a rule, speak 
 in German, but they can also use Italian or Romance. There 
 are three Romance dialects the Oberland, the Oberalp, and the 
 Engadine. There are three or four newspapers in the Romance 
 language. 
 
 8 Another mode of ascertaining the opinions of the communes 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 3 1 
 
 When once a commune was duly informed of 
 some question, the citizens collected together to 
 agree upon their answer. 1 These communal assem- 
 blies, which were distributed throughout the whole 
 territory of the Grisons, each reproduced the chief 
 features of the Landsgemeinde in miniature. There 
 was this difference, however: the Landsgemeinden 
 were really sovereign, whereas the answer of one 
 commune was not decisive for the whole country 
 unless it happened that this was the opinion of the 
 majority of the communes. 
 
 As a rule, the questions submitted to the Referen- 
 dum were not of a legislative nature. Decentralisa- 
 tion was carried so far in the Grisons that each league 
 dealt separately with all matters touching civil or 
 criminal law, and in the League of the House of God 
 these subjects were even within the competence of 
 each commune. 2 
 
 was known by the name of das Rciten und Fahren auf die Gemeindcn, 
 in which messengers were sent to the sovereign communes instead 
 of circulars. 
 
 1 The electoral qualifications were not fixed by any general regu- 
 lation for the whole country. Each commune settled the matter 
 as it liked. 
 
 2 The questions which were the special province of each league 
 were also referred back to the communes of the league, and decided 
 by the vote so obtained. Finally, everything within the special 
 sphere of the communes was decided by an appeal to the citizens 
 in their local assemblies or gemeinden. (Ganzoni Beitrdge zur Kennt- 
 niss des biindnerischen JReferendums, Zurich, pp. 12 and 45.) 
 
 [Herr Ganzoni remarks that "the Eeferendum has been the 
 corner-stone of every constitution in Rhoetia up to the present 
 day." It existed in three distinct strata. There was, first of all, 
 the referendum from the Hochgerichte to the villages. The Hoch- 
 gerichte, or jurisdictions, which are described above as communes, 
 were primarily the units for judicial purposes. They were also the 
 centres of political organisation. Below them were the villages 
 
32 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 The referendum was therefore applied more espe- 
 cially to administrative matters of general interest and 
 to questions of foreign politics. The majority of the 
 communes decided, for instance, such a matter as the 
 creation or suppression of the judiciary ; they approved 
 the Federal budget, and gave their consent to the 
 public expenditure ; they passed police laws like those 
 against vagabonds or those for the suppression of 
 epidemics ; l they acted as sovereigns in all the rela- 
 
 possessing land in common, and these were known as Dorfschaften. 
 In 1839 we get the system further elaborated, though this is pro- 
 bably only a codification of customary usages. The envoys from each 
 village met in the chief assembly of the Hochgericht. When they 
 had agreed on any matter, the " little council," or executive authority 
 of the Hochgericht, had to issue a circular to the various villages 
 inquiring the opinion of each on matters specified therein. A dis- 
 cussion then took place, the result was reported by the envoys, and 
 the council announced which side was supported by the majority of 
 villages. Secondly, there was a referendum from the Diet of each 
 league to the component Hochgerichte of the league. The Diet of 
 each league was composed of envoys from the Hochgerichte of the 
 league, but in the Grey League, or Graue Bund (graue = grafen, 
 counts), the feudal lords were also members of the Diet, which had 
 therefore not such popular tendencies as the other leagues. The 
 referendum was chiefly used as a means of ascertaining the views 
 of the Hochgerichte, although when ascertained they were not 
 necessarily final. In the League of the Ten Jurisdictions the 
 referendum was much more important ; and in the League of the 
 House of God, which had been consecrated by the Bishop of Chur, 
 the referendum was of extreme importance, as everything was laid 
 before the Hochgerichte. Thirdly, there was the referendum from 
 the Diet of the Three Leagues to the Hochgerichte, described above. 
 See Coolidge, "Early History of the Keferendum."] 
 
 1 [Hilty (Le Referendum et I'Initiative en Suisse, in the Revue de 
 Droit International, 1892, No. 4, p. 317) does not seem to agree 
 with this. " The right of voting possessed by the citizens of these 
 republics (in the Grisons and Valais), the necessary majority, and 
 even the matters to be submitted to the vote, were not settled by 
 any precise rules in either country. Questions of general police 
 and financial matters were considered as outside the sphere of the 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 33 
 
 tions of their state with other states ; they nominated 
 and recalled the ambassadors ; they ratified treaties ; 
 they declared war in the last resort, and concluded 
 peace. With them rested the responsibility of plan- 
 ning the defence of the country, for it was their pro- 
 vince to sanction the construction of fortresses. In 
 addition to these powers the communes were a sort 
 of Court of Appeal, the resort of any person who con- 
 sidered himself injured by the decision of any in- 
 ferior authority. 1 Towards the end of the month of 
 January, a Congress, composed of the president and 
 three deputies from each league, twelve in all, met 
 at Coire, for the purpose of examining the answers 
 of the communes, and of ascertaining the decision of 
 the majority. 2 
 
 A more delicate and difficult mission than that of 
 their Congress can scarcely be conceived. The diffi- 
 culty lay in the fact that the questions to be answered 
 by the communal assemblies were not drawn up in 
 such a manner that their replies could be only either 
 Yes or No. A very great latitude was left these bodies 
 in the exercise of their vote. The idea was that, 
 since they had the power of wholly accepting or 
 entirely rejecting the proposals of the Diet, it was 
 possible to accept or reject conditionally. After all, 
 
 referendum, and a good deal could be included under these heads. 
 For instance, in the Grisons a forest law, which was necessary but 
 unpopular, was enforced for a long time under the title of 'General 
 police regulation concerning forests.' "] 
 
 1 Ganzoni, pp. 27-69. 
 
 2 The majority which decided a question was not the majority 
 of the electors of the whole country, but that of the communes. 
 The communes were the political units, and each possessed one or 
 more votes according to the ratio in which it contributed to the 
 taxes. (Curti, p. 11.) 
 
 C 
 
34 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 the communes were the actual sovereigns of the 
 country, and hence it logically follows that they had 
 the right to modify the projects of law submitted for 
 their consideration, and were justified in making 
 amendments. As a matter of fact they did make 
 considerable use of these prerogatives. Sometimes 
 they took the course of refusing to entertain the pro- 
 positions submitted them, and consequently declined 
 to give any answer except one to the effect that the 
 time was not ripe for the solution of such matters. 
 If the question were so thorny that silence on their 
 part would have been inexcusable, they escaped re- 
 sponsibility by sending an answer with a double 
 meaning. Heaven only knows how the members of 
 the Congress were able to evolve any sort of order 
 out of this chaos, or how they discovered the leading 
 idea among the many and varying answers. They 
 must often have had to content themselves with 
 evolving a majority out of a mere preponderance of 
 opinion in one direction or another, or even some- 
 times have been obliged to issue their questions afresh. 
 We find them more than once giving vent to their 
 extreme irritation, and upbraiding the communes 
 either for sending an answer in terms much too 
 general to be intelligible, or for not sending any 
 answer at all. In 1712 the members of the Congress 
 almost threatened to strike. They decided, in fact, 
 not to reassemble unless the majority, at least, of the 
 communes provided them with answers. The com- 
 munes, on the other hand, re-echoed the complaints 
 and protests of the Congress. They declared that it 
 had acted arbitrarily in estimating the majority, and 
 that it credited them with intentions they never con- 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 35 
 
 ceived. They ultimately demanded that a detailed 
 report of the result of the examination of the votes 
 should be communicated to them, in order that 
 they might be able to check the proceedings of the 
 Congress. 1 
 
 Such were the general features of the referendum 
 in the Grisons. It is interesting to compare this old 
 institution with the system proposed at the time of 
 the Revolution of 1848 by Rittinghausen, who, with 
 Victor Considcrant and Ledru Rollin, defended the 
 practice of direct legislation by the people against 
 Louis Blanc, fimile de Girardin, and Proudhon. 2 This 
 
 1 Ganzoni, pp. 29-75. 
 
 2 [Rittinghausen went to Paris in 1848 in order to propagate an 
 idea which he had propounded in his journal, the Wcstdeutsche 
 Zcitung, and at the Parliament of Frankfort. In his works he 
 violently attacks the representative system, and calls the legisla- 
 tive assemblies "the incarnation of incapacity and evil intentions." 
 He then goes on to consider what other form ought to replace the 
 representative system, and arrives at the conclusion that direct 
 legislation by the whole people "is the only government worthy 
 of an enlightened nation, the only one by which the theory of the 
 sovereignty of the people becomes a reality." His principal works 
 are La legislation directe par Ic peuple ou la veritable democratic, Paris, 
 1850; La legislation directe et tes advcrsaircs, Brussels, 1852; De 
 ^organisation de la legislation directe, Cologne. 1870; Refutation dcs 
 arguments produits contrc la legislation directe, Cologne, 1872 ; Die 
 direkle Gesetzgcbung durch das Volk (Zurich: Schw. Griitliverein, 1893). 
 Some of Rittinghausen's work has been translated into English. 
 See Three Letters on "Direct Legislation by the People; or, True 
 Democracy" (London: James Watson, 1851). "The Difficulty 
 Solved ; or, The Government of the People by Themselves," by 
 Victor Considcrant (J. Watson, 1851), is a translation of one of the 
 pamphlets of Rittinghausen's chief supporter. 
 
 The introduction of the referendum into, at least, one Trade 
 Union in England is ascribed to the influence of these pamphlets. 
 Joho Melson, a Liverpool printer and a Trades Unionist, urged the 
 
36 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 system is all the more interesting as a Belgian 
 politician has recently characterised it as the ideal 
 towards which all democrats ought to strive. 1 " The 
 time has now come to explain," wrote Rittinghausen, 
 " how direct legislation can be organised." 
 
 The people are to be divided into sections, each 
 containing a thousand citizens. 2 
 
 Each section is to assemble in a place suitable for 
 the purpose a school, town hall, or public building 
 and then will proceed to elect a president, who 
 will direct the debates in the mode hereinafter men- 
 tioned. 
 
 Every citizen shall be allowed to take part in the 
 discussions. 3 
 
 The voting will take place at the end of the dis- 
 cussion. 
 
 After the examination of the result the president 
 of the section forwards the number of the votes, for 
 and against, to the mayor of the commune. The 
 mayor makes a return of the votes in all the sections 
 of the commune, and communicates the result to his 
 official superior, who goes through the same process 
 for his district. He then forwards the tale of votes, 
 
 adoption of direct legislation by his Union instead of legislating by 
 what was known as a delegate meeting. He was unsuccessful at 
 first, but, as a result of his efforts, the delegate meeting was super- 
 seded in 1861 by the Keferendum (Typographical Circular for March 
 1889). See " Industrial Democracy," by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 
 1898, vol. i. p. 21, note.] 
 
 1 Lorand, Le Referendum, 1890, p. 23. 
 
 2 " It is not essential that there should be a thousand citizens in 
 each section. This number will obviously have to vary according 
 to the density and distribution of the population in the different 
 countries." Rittinghausen, La legislation dirccte, p. 39. 
 
 3 [" Consequently every mind is at the service of the country." 
 Rittinghausen, Three Letters, &c., Letter II., p. 13.] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 37 
 
 for and against, to the head of the department, who 
 in his turn transmits the result of the vote in his 
 department to the minister, who collects the total 
 results for the whole country. By this process it can 
 be known accurately how many citizens have approved 
 and how many would reject any particular measure. 
 Its fate is decided by the will of the majority. The 
 following are the general rules for the debates : The 
 president shall direct the discussion. No bills shall 
 be presented to the people. The only initiative pos- 
 sessed by the ministry, elected by the whole people 
 for a certain time, consists in determining that on 
 such and such a day, in all the sections throughout 
 the country, meetings will be held for the purpose 
 of deliberating on such and such a subject. When a 
 certain number of citizens demand a new law on any 
 matter whatsoever, or a change in some law already 
 in existence, the ministry must, within a certain pre- 
 scribed interval, summon the people to act in their 
 sovereign capacity as legislators; and it is only in 
 matters of external policy that the ministry will be 
 able to submit propositions, to be deliberated on by 
 the people, which have not previously been indicated 
 to them by the number of citizens fixed by law. 1 
 
 The law will emanate organically out of the discus- 
 sions themselves. 2 In order to attain this result, the 
 
 1 " I am of opinion that every Power is a tyranny in the bud, and 
 that democracy will never be able to neutralise it sufficiently unless 
 by taking from it all initiative in legislation." Rittinghausen, 
 
 P- 39- 
 
 2 " Laws prepared by commissions will happily become impossible 
 under this system, for their admission would also necessitate the 
 admission of every proposition involving alterations. Now, with 
 the privilege of making amendments, it would be easy to see that 
 
38 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 president will first of all bring the principle of the 
 law up for debate. He will then lead up quite natu- 
 rally to the subordinate questions in their turn. 1 
 When all the results shall have reached the ministry, 
 a drafting commission will draw up the text of a 
 clear and simple law, which will have the advantage 
 of not giving rise to several interpretations. 2 
 
 Louis Blanc, without knowing anything of the 
 working of the Rhsetian referendum, noticed immedi- 
 ately among the defects of the Rittinghausen system 
 the drawback which we criticised when consider- 
 ing the history of the referendum in the Grisons. 3 
 
 all direct legislation would be only a brilliant dream, a utopia." 
 Kittinghausen, p. 34. 
 
 " The right of amendment is a compromise, and the law does not 
 tolerate compromises. Id. p. 216. 
 
 [Every project of law produced by any commission whatever is 
 of no value, inasmuch as it is not the work of the general mind, 
 and is tainted by the self-interest of those who have prepared it."] 
 
 1 [Rittinghausen gives an example. He takes the subject of pre- 
 scription in criminal matters. First of all the president would 
 start the discussion on the question, " Shall there be prescription 
 in criminal matters or not ? " Then he will pass to the question, 
 " Shall prescriptions be the same for felonies, misdemeanours, and 
 police contraventions ? " Then, " After what period shall there be 
 prescription for felonies ? " The voter marks the figure he wishes 
 to prevail upon the ticket. The president puts the same question 
 relative to misdemeanours, and afterwards as to police contraven- 
 tions.] It will perhaps be feared that the presidents of many of 
 the sections will not know how to put the questions in the order 
 required by direct legislation ; but have we not the press, which 
 will make it its business to discuss all the matters before the time 
 fixed for the debates, which will thrash out the subject in all its 
 bearings, and, in a word, will guide those who have not the good 
 sense requisite to put a few questions of principle ? But such cases 
 will be rare." Rittinghausen, Three Letters, &c., p. 14. 
 
 2 Rittinghausen, La Legislation directe par Ic peuple et ses adversaires, 
 Brussels, 1852, pp. 24-26. 
 
 3 [Rittinghausen himself foresees that three objections will be 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 39 
 
 " Frankly speaking," said Louis Blanc, " nobody will 
 have any confidence in the system. Moreover, M. 
 Rittinghausen does not seem to realise that eight 
 figures, and only eight, combined in every possible 
 way, two and two, three and three, four and four, 
 can form as many as 40,000 combinations. A law 
 containing eight principal clauses could therefore give 
 10,000 assemblies for 10,000 different bills. How would 
 he propose out of these 10,000 opinions, all differently 
 expressed, to extract the will of the people, who are 
 thus directly governing themselves ? And what is it 
 that he proposes the ministry should add up ? ' When 
 all the data are in the hands of the ministry/ says 
 Rittinghausen, 'a commission shall draft the text 
 of a clear and simple law.' The task before your 
 commission is to frame a clear and simple law 
 
 brought against his scheme, and, as he considers, answers them 
 satisfactorily. 
 
 1. That the people are too ignorant. He combats this by urging 
 that in legislative assemblies real talent is swamped by the medio- 
 crities, but in the popular reunions opportunity will be given for all 
 lights to shine. There will, moreover, he says, be no tumult or dis- 
 order in these popular assemblies ; for when the people deliberate, 
 it is quieter and more dignified than the great legislative assemblies. 
 Free masses, he says, "listen generally to every opinion, and I have 
 often remarked that they do not scruple to sacrifice a favourite orator 
 to the first-comer with better arguments." Personal animosity will 
 give place to an enthusiasm for principles. Direct legislation will 
 elevate and improve the press, whose columns will no longer be 
 soiled by the efforts of parties to mutually annihilate each other. 
 
 2. That the people will not have time for law-making. The 
 matters for legislation will not be numerous. At the end of three 
 years, after deliberating twice a week in the sections, the people 
 will hardly have anything to legislate about. 
 
 3. That direct legislation is not the ideal of democracy. Ritting- 
 hausen admits this, but says it is the decisive step to be taken 
 towards the brilliant future which humanity has before it. See 
 Three Letters, &c., pp. 17-28.] 
 
40 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 out of five, six, even ten thousand bills, and to 
 do it, moreover, in such a way that it shall be 
 the expression of the direct united will of five, 
 six, or ten thousand sections, who will each have 
 given a different reason for their vote. I defy any 
 commission to do it. It is absurd even to suppose 
 that this clear and simple law, when finally drafted, 
 would be regarded by the various sections as the 
 exact expression of their wishes, and as the result of 
 the direct self-government of the people, when such 
 a law is not the exact reproduction of their work. 
 It is just as far-fetched to imagine that this com- 
 mission could possibly compose, out of so many data, 
 the text of a clear and precise law, without exercising 
 a power a hundred times more irritating than that 
 of a legislative assembly elected by universal suffrage. 
 For it might happen, indeed it would almost always 
 happen, that, from the very fact of the multiplicity 
 and diversity of the data, the text of the clear and 
 precise law would not harmonise exactly with any of 
 the proposals drawn up by the majority of the sec- 
 tions. They would then say to the drafting com- 
 mission : You not only make a law quite different to 
 what we desired, but you have done so in the face of 
 our formally expressed wish to the contrary. You 
 are arrogant usurpers." J 
 
 Rittinghausen was deeply wounded by this biting 
 criticism. 2 Although he believed thoroughly in his 
 
 1 Louis Blanc, Plus de Girondins, quoted by Rittinghausen, 
 pp. 140-42. 
 
 2 " You, Louis Blanc, the renowned writer, are the only one who 
 needs an explanation of my system. The proletariat has always 
 understood me without the slightest effort ; to them my scheme 
 has always appeared clear, and devoid of all superfluous or incom- 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 41 
 
 system, which he considered as his own invention, 1 
 he was so much disturbed by the attack of Louis 
 Blanc that, without seeming to be in the least 
 aware of it, he threw over an essential part of the 
 mechanism of his institution. 
 
 "Let the drafting commission," he wrote, "just 
 try to follow that constitutional tradition which has 
 shown itself to be representative, and the people will 
 soon make up their minds. For, after all, a drafting 
 commission is not indispensable. WHAT is THE 
 GOOD of insisting on FORMULATING THE TEXT OF 
 A LAW when the answers to the questions, once in 
 the hands of the central authority, will serve the 
 same purpose? If only the counting of the votes 
 be honestly carried out by that central authority, the 
 people can, if they please, dispense with the services 
 of the drafting commission." 2 
 
 And after having written that, Rittinghausen enters 
 the lists against the Anarchists. Has he, however, 
 any right to attack them? He upholds against 
 
 prehensible phrases with double meanings." Rittinghausen, p. 
 143- 
 
 1 Rittinghausen wrote in answer to Proudhon: "The direct 
 legislation of the Greeks, Romans, and Germans has never been 
 organised as I propose. My method will infallibly be adopted, for 
 it is the only organisation that is reasonable. I can claim it as my 
 own invention, and it is neither more nor less than the art, hitherto 
 unknown, of producing laws spontaneously and organically from 
 the free deliberations of the whole people. I can claim to have 
 made the science of legislation enter upon a new phase." Id. 
 p. 184. 
 
 2 Rittinghausen, p. 146. [For a scathing criticism of Ritting- 
 hausen, see Idee gtntrale dela Revolution au XIX Siecle, by Proudhon, 
 in vol. ix. of his complete works. See also an article by M. Agathon 
 de Potter, called Rittinghausen et son systeme, in the Philosophic de 
 I'Avcnir, igth year, No. 176.] 
 
42 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 Proudhon " the necessity of a social interpretation of 
 natural right" But where could one find in his 
 mutilated system, without its drafting committee, 
 any "social interpretation of right" stated, as he 
 demands, in the text of a clear and simple law which 
 will not admit of several interpretations? Bitting- 
 hausen has condemned his own work. He has him- 
 self proved that his invention belongs to the domain 
 of dreams and Utopias. 
 
 It is therefore very gratifying to see M. Lorand 
 bringing up the subject again to-day, and trying to 
 put it in the place of honour. What a curious turn 
 of fortune's wheel. 1 
 
 A referendum much like that of the Grisons formed 
 part of the constitution of Upper Valais. This canton 
 was allied to the Confederation, and was divided 
 into seven districts called Dixains. The Upper 
 Valais was governed by a " Great Council," in 
 which sat the Bishop of Sion, the president of the 
 canton, and twenty-eight deputies nominated by the 
 councils of the Dixains.' 1 All affairs of importance 
 which occupied the attention of the Council were 
 
 1 [Direct legislation has also its advocates in France to-day. It 
 is advocated in the Petite republique francaise of the 2nd of Feb- 
 ruary 1895, and in an article in the Almanack de la question sociale 
 of 1895. There is in Paris a league, founded in May 1895, called 
 the " Socialist and revolutionary league for republican, socialistic, 
 and direct revision by the people, deliberating and voting in its 
 assemblies." On the nth November 1895 a memorial on the 
 subject was presented to the Chamber of Deputies in Paris, 
 signed by the leaders of the socialistic party. See Signorel, Le 
 Referendum Ugislatif, pp. 147-53.] 
 
 [This meeting is first mentioned in 1339 under the name of 
 concilium generate. Later it was called the Landrath, and took 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 43 
 
 communicated to the people, who discussed them in 
 the communal assemblies. The results of their deli- 
 berations, and of the popular votings, were transmitted 
 to the president of the canton and to the Chancellor, 
 who laid them before the Great Council. No law 
 could come into force unless it had been accepted 
 by the majority of the Dixains that is to say, by 
 four out of the seven. 1 
 
 place regularly twice a year. The object was not to unite the 
 districts to each other, but to control the action of the Bishop. 
 See "Early History of the Referendum," Coolidge, and Rechtsquellen 
 des Cantons Wattis, Heusler, 1890 (Basle, Detloff).] 
 
 1 Hilty, op. cit. 172. [From instances given by Professor Heusler 
 in his introduction to Rechtsquellen des Cantons Wallis, Zeitschrift 
 filr schweizcrisches Recht, vol. vii. and ix. (or published separately 
 in 1890, Basle, Detloff), it would seem that some measures at least 
 required the assent of every Dixain. These instances are quoted 
 by Coolidge, "Early History of the Referendum," Historical Revieic, 
 vol. vi. p. 678, who says that no measure was valid unless it 
 obtained the whole of the votes. This system lasted in Valais 
 down to 1802, when Napoleon then incorporated the canton with 
 France, and the referendum disappeared. In 1815 it was restored, 
 and we get the first constitutional statement of this popular right : 
 "The Diet exercises the legislative power. Laws are drafted by 
 the Council of State, and cannot be enforced until they have been 
 referred to the councils of the Dixains and sanctioned by the majo- 
 rity of these councils. When there is a question of financial laws, 
 of military capitulations, and of naturalisation, these are referred 
 not only to the councils of the Dixains, but to those of the com- 
 munes. The referendum is not applicable to the affairs which con- 
 cern the Valais as a Swiss canton." In 1839 the referendum gave 
 place to the veto (see p. 75), and it was no longer the majority of 
 the Dixains, but the majority of the people, that decided the matter. 
 The right of legislation by the people is now restricted to financial 
 matters only.] 
 
44 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 III. Popular Institutions in the Canton 
 of Berne. 
 
 Communal assemblies were also held in the canton 
 of Berne from the fifteenth to the seventeenth cen- 
 tury, for the purpose of deliberating and voting on 
 questions of general interest. In external character 
 they resemble the local gemeinden of the Orisons, but 
 from the point of view of public law they approxi- 
 mate to a very different type. The communes of the 
 Grisons were independent of each other, and on an 
 equality among themselves. Their assemblies each 
 formed a part of a sovereign nation ; when united, they 
 constituted the supreme power in the state. The com- 
 munes of the canton of Berne, on the contrary, had 
 not been able to preserve their freedom. They had 
 fallen into a state of dependence on the town, and were 
 governed by the patrician families of Berne. There 
 was no question of their participating in any way 
 whatever, either directly or indirectly, in the sove- 
 reign functions of government. They neither elected 
 the deputies nor gave their assent to the laws. Poli- 
 tically they were non-existent. They were, in fact, 
 possessions of the city of Berne, and had to provide 
 her with the sinews of war soldiers and money. If 
 the inhabitants of the country sometimes met in con- 
 sultation about affairs of state, it was not in virtue of 
 any right to do so. It was the result of a manifesta- 
 tion of good-will on the part of the government, who, 
 when in a critical position, wished to assure them- 
 selves of the support of the country, or even to shift 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 45 
 
 the responsibility of an important decision on to the 
 shoulders of the people. 1 
 
 To put it shortly : The referendum in the Grisons 
 was compulsory ; in the canton of Berne it was only 
 optional, the option resting with the government. 
 The communal assemblies in the Bernese territory 
 were presided over by a member of the council of the 
 town, or by the president of the commune. Attend- 
 ance does not seem to have been compulsory. Only 
 now and again, when some very important question 
 came up for discussion, was the delegate of the 
 council who presided over the gathering obliged to 
 ask if everybody were present. 2 The age of political 
 majority was fixed at fourteen years. In 1503 chil- 
 dren of twelve could take part in the voting. From 
 1535 to 1546 eighteen was the statutory age, and then 
 it was reduced again to fourteen. 3 
 
 The first popular meeting took place in 1449. The 
 city of Berne applied to the people for authority to 
 exact a special tax to meet the debts contracted 
 during a war. From this year up to the end of the 
 fifteenth century there were eight similar meetings. 
 In the sixteenth century we hear of sixty-eight, and 
 in the seventeenth only one, in the year 1610. Most 
 
 1 [M. Hilty says that the object of these popular consultations 
 was twofold. In the first place, to get at the voice of the people, 
 which was by no means the voice of God in the eyes of the aristo- 
 cratic council, but which was nevertheless instructive. In the 
 second place, the object was so to direct public opinion that the 
 government would not meet with an obstinate resistance on the 
 part of the people should it wish to embark on a more or less 
 uncertain enterprise. Le Referendum et V Initiative en Suisse, Revue 
 de droit international, 1892, p. 389.] 
 
 - Von Stiirler, Die Volksanfragen im alien Bern, Berne, 1869, P- J 4- 
 
 3 Von Stiirler, op. cit. pp. 14-15. 
 
46 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 of the questions submitted to the people were of a 
 military character such as the undertaking of an 
 expedition, the conclusion of peace, the making of 
 treaties and alliances, the expediency of prohibiting 
 the enlistment of citizens as mercenaries, the im- 
 position of a war tax, and, at a later date, religious 
 matters. At the time of the Eeformation the people 
 were called upon to decide in the communal assem- 
 blies whether they would adopt or reject the new 
 form of worship. Finally, very occasionally they 
 discussed economic questions. 1 
 
 The city of Berne, as sovereign, decided on the 
 subject to be discussed, and fixed the time for its 
 discussion, and also settled the form in which the 
 appeal to the people should be made. These appeals 
 were carried out in three different ways. 2 Some- 
 times the city of Berne summoned deputies from 
 the country districts to a council. In this case, 
 circulars were addressed to the communes stating 
 the question that was pending. It requested the 
 inhabitants to meet together to deliberate on the 
 matter, and to entrust their resolutions to two 
 deputies who were to appear on a certain day at 
 Berne. On the appointed day each deputation 
 announced to the council the view taken by its 
 commune, and these opinions were embodied in 
 the formal report. At a later date the government 
 
 1 [In January 1590 a very interesting consultation took place. 
 The Bernese Council had signed a peace with the Duke of Savoy, 
 by which treaty Berne kept Vaud and abandoned its ally Geneva 
 to the Duke. The people of Berne would not accept the treaty, 
 the peace was not adhered to, and Geneva was saved for the Con- 
 federation.] 
 
 2 Von Stiirler, op. cit. pp. 16-18, 
 
The Evolution of 
 
 communicated its own decision to the communes. 
 It would be difficult to say, considering the optional 
 nature of the referendum, how far the government 
 took the will of the country into consideration. Von 
 Stiirler, the historian of the ancient Bernese referen- 
 dum, has estimated that fifty consultations resulted 
 in favourable replies to the previously expressed 
 opinion of the government. The people gave a 
 negative answer on fourteen questions only. In the 
 remaining cases we are either ignorant of the result, 
 or the people merely stated beforehand that they 
 would be content to leave the matter in the hands 
 of the government. 
 
 This method of getting to know the feeling in the 
 country was frequently employed in early times, but 
 Berne ceased to have recourse to it later on, and, 
 instead, sent her own delegates from the city to the 
 country districts. 1 The presidents of the communes 
 were ordered on such an occasion to call the in- 
 habitants together. The delegate from Berne first 
 of all greeted his audience hi the name of the 
 government, and stated the reason for the summons 
 and the subject to be discussed. If he were asked 
 to do so, he explained the matter more in detail; 
 then, finally, he took the vote of the meeting by 
 
 1 [The reason for this is given by the chronicler Anselm, who 
 says that the government in 1509 "preferred to send their own 
 messengers rather than make their subjects quasi-councillors, for 
 such a proceeding rarely happened without being harmful to those 
 in authority ; for these country-folk were apt to encroach on the 
 rights of the government, to discuss other matters, and to support 
 and create intrigues and misunderstandings." As a matter of fact, 
 we find that these peasants, when they were once consulted, pro- 
 fited by the occasion to give utterance to many grievances. See 
 Hilty, Revue de droit, &c. } 1892, p. 389.] 
 
48 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 saying: "Will those who agree with our lords and 
 masters of Berne remain in their places ? Will those 
 who are of a contrary opinion go to the side?" 
 The result of the vote was communicated to the 
 government by the delegate, or by a letter from 
 the president of the commune. When Berne did 
 not think it advisable to send out members of her 
 government as delegates, she issued a circular letter 
 to the presidents of the communes, in which the object 
 of the referendum was indicated. The communes 
 were allowed a specified time in which to consider 
 their answers. Each president then assembled the 
 electors and directed the discussion on the matter. 
 After the debates he drew up a report of the meet- 
 ing, signed it and sealed it, and sent it to the Council 
 at Berne. 
 
 Then these reports were sorted according to their 
 contents into two groups, those for and those against 
 the project of the government. Each commune, what- 
 ever its population, possessed one vote, and an absolute 
 majority of the communes decided the question. 
 
 The practice of thus consulting the people fell 
 into disuse in the seventeenth century. The Bernese 
 patrician families, who had organised themselves into 
 a powerful and exclusive oligarchy, would not, from 
 that time onwards, allow the inhabitants of the coun- 
 try .districts to have any controlling voice. However, 
 on two occasions the rural inhabitants succeeded in 
 treating on equal terms with their lords of the city. 
 In 1513 the government was obliged to promise not 
 to contract any alliance without the consent of the 
 people, and in 1531 it undertook not to go to war 
 unless the people had previously given their assent. 
 
Hie Evolution of Democracy 49 
 
 These conventions, by which the referendum be- 
 came a popular right, and, therefore, part of the 
 constitution, continued to be observed for some time. 
 Unfortunately, the peasants lacked cohesion and guid- 
 ance. They had the advantage of numbers, and could, 
 in times of excitement, force the government to yield 
 to their demands. To maintain their position, how- 
 ever, they required leaders endowed with energy and 
 perseverance, they needed an understanding between 
 themselves, and a certain amount of discipline ; but 
 they had none of these. Their isolation and im- 
 potence resulted in the triumph of the patrician 
 families, who were the sole and uncontrolled legis- 
 lators down to I798. 1 
 
 1 [i. In discussing the history of the referendum before 1798, 
 one might also notice the traces we find in Zurich, in Geneva, in 
 Lucerne, and also a curious form of military referendum known 
 as the Kricgsyemcinde. 
 
 In Zurich we find the city council consulting the communes by 
 a very similar method to that employed by Berne. Delegates were 
 sent to the communes to explain the matter, and brought back the 
 opinions of the people in each locality. They only seem to have 
 been consulted on matters of foreign politics or administrative 
 affairs of great importance, and the answers sent back were long, 
 and contained a full account of their reasons for voting as they 
 did. They voted on such questions as the alliance with France, on 
 religious questions arising out of the Reformation, and on foreign 
 enlistments. The first official mention we get of the referendum 
 in Zurich is in the Waldmannischer Spruchbrief of 1489, and in the 
 Kappdcr Brief oi 1531, which are almost our only authorities. 
 
 This letter contains a promise on the part of the government not 
 to commence any war against the wish of the country, and to 
 ascertain the views of the good people of the country upon all 
 important affairs. The referendum disappeared in the seven- 
 teenth century, and those who attempted to revive it were pun- 
 ished as traitors. Bluntschli attributes its disappearance to the 
 exhaustion after the struggles of the Reformation, combined with 
 unlucky foreign wars and the visitations of the plague, when the 
 
 D 
 
50 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 AFTER 1798. 
 
 I. Public Law in the Federation and in the 
 Cantons from 1798 to 1830. 
 
 Under the old system Switzerland was a confedera- 
 tion of states, having no federal constitution properly 
 speaking, nor any central organised authority. The 
 confederate cantons were independent states, sove- 
 
 bare necessity of existence dwarfed all political aspirations of a 
 popular nature. A very amusing extract is given by M. Dunant in 
 Legislation par le peuple en Suisse, p. 34, which shows, as he says, that 
 democratic notions were not very advanced in Zurich at that time. 
 
 2. The history of popular rights at Geneva is interesting because 
 of their connection with the writings of Rousseau. Geneva did not, 
 however, become part of the Swiss Confederation until 1815. We 
 find the government in the fifteenth century in the hands of a 
 council of fifty, which was afterwards increased to sixty, and then 
 to two hundred. These councils took over all the rights which had 
 belonged up to that time to the general council of all the citizens; 
 but in order that the laws and decrees passed by them should come 
 into force, they had to be approved by the assembly of the citizens. 
 The aristocratic government established under the influence of 
 Calvin reduced the powers of the popular assembly. They no 
 longer had the right of deliberating on the laws and on the consti- 
 tution ; they had only the right of voting, not of discussing. In the 
 eighteenth century (1707) a democratic reaction took place, and 
 under the popular pressure certain reforms were granted. The 
 elections were to take place by secret ballot, and no new law could 
 come into force without having been approved by the assembly of 
 the citizens, which was to meet every five years. 
 
 Further disturbances took place, however, and France, Berne, 
 and Ziirich intervened in 1738, and a new constitution was drawn 
 up. Under this constitution the assembly of citizens had full rights 
 of legislating, but the right of initiating laws was reserved to the 
 authorities. All citizens had, however, the right of petition. At the 
 time of the French Revolution, 1794, the assembly of citizens declared 
 that they alone had the right of approving, rejecting, modifying, 
 interpreting, or abrogating laws or edicts ; and by a revision of the 
 constitution in 1796, the right of initiative also was given to the 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 5 1 
 
 reign within the limits of their respective frontiers. 
 They established, according to their inclinations, in 
 the one place a democratic government, 1 in another 
 an exclusive aristocracy, 2 and in others a federal 
 republic. 3 
 
 A common danger, and the need of combining 
 their separate forces against powerful enemies, had 
 given birth to the Swiss Confederation. This alliance 
 was strengthened by the desire to settle by arbitration 
 the disputes which arose between the states. The 
 bond was still further cemented by common financial 
 interests in the administration of the domains or 
 
 assembly, or to 700 citizens in the case of an ordinary law, of 1000 
 in the case of an amendment of the constitution. When Geneva 
 was incorporated with the French republic, these rights were cur- 
 tailed, and it was not until 1830 that the people regained their 
 position. See Fazy, Les Constitutions de la RepuUique de Geneve, 
 1870. 
 
 3. A system of appeal to the people by the authorities was in 
 operation in Lucerne in 1513, but it only lasted until 1525. 
 
 4. We find in the military history of Switzerland a sort of military 
 referendum. In the case of the more important campaigns the 
 districts used to send certain councillors with their captains, so 
 that a parliament could be practically held on the field. This par- 
 liament often concerned itself with the most important matters, 
 such as armistices and terms of peace, and their conclusions were 
 announced to the districts by means of the councillors. In many 
 cases, too, we find a sort of military Landsgemeinde of the whole 
 army, which decided any great military question. The battle of 
 Marignano and the battle of Bicocca were both resolved on after 
 this fashion. Hilty, Das Referendum im schweizerischcn Staatsrecht, 
 in the Archivfur offentliches Redd, vol. ii. p. 203.] 
 
 1 [As in the Landsgemeinde cantons.] 
 
 2 [Cf. Berne, Zurich, and Lucerne.] 
 
 3 [Cf. the Orisons, which belonged to the class of friendly allies, 
 who were more or less under the protection of the cantons. There 
 were also feudal seigniories, ecclesiastical principalities, such as 
 B&le, republics of various kinds, and even one monarchy, Neuchatel, 
 besides the bailiwicks of the subject territories.] 
 
5 2 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 subject territories which the states had acquired, and 
 which were held in common. 
 
 The adjustment of these different interests led to 
 the annual meeting of a Federal Diet, in which each 
 state was equally represented. The members of the 
 Diet were merely delegates bound by instructions 
 given by their states. If a new question were raised 
 they had to return to refer it (ad referendum) to 
 the government of their canton, which alone had 
 the right of coming to a decision. As a rule no 
 decision obtained the force of law unless it were 
 unanimously adopted by the Diet. 1 
 
 1 [In the earliest times the Diets met at uncertain intervals ; 
 later it became the custom for them to meet regularly in July. 
 The Diet was held in any canton, and even on foreign territory ; 
 but from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century they usually 
 assembled at Baden, and after that at Frauenfeld. Each deputation 
 in later times reported itself to Ziirich on its arrival, for Ziirich was 
 practically the presiding canton. They were then informed of the 
 hour of the opening. The first part of the session was public, when 
 the premier deputy of each state publicly greeted the Federation 
 in the name of his canton. The deliberations which followed were 
 held in private. These were afterwards drawn up into a report, of 
 which each deputation received a copy, with the necessary par- 
 ticulars attached. As a rule each canton was represented by two 
 deputies, the allies by one only. The premier deputy was generally 
 the first magistrate of the canton, with the exception of Berne, and 
 the second deputy an important member of the council. Some- 
 times the younger members of the aristocratic families were sent 
 as "Councillors of the Legation," in order that they might get to 
 know the important members of the Confederation. [See Hilty, 
 Die Bundesverfassungen der schiveizerishen Eidgenossenschaft, pp. 
 320-21. 
 
 There were, in fact, two kinds of Diets : the general Diets, or 
 aUgcmeine Tage, which were chiefly concerned with ratifying 
 treaties of peace (see Hilty, Eidgcnossischc Abschiedc, ii. 518, 525 ; 
 iii. 638, 646), and the Federal Diets of the twelve cantons, which 
 the allies did not necessarily attend. After the Reformation 
 we get Diets of those of the same faith, Konfessionelle Sonder- 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 53 
 
 The wars carried on by the combined cantons to 
 defend the independence of their country created at 
 first a strong feeling of unity between them. After 
 the lapse of years, however, the memory of the 
 glorious struggles of the past became dim, the federal 
 tie relaxed, and at the time of the Reformation, when 
 the country became divided into Catholic states and 
 Protestant states, a complete rupture seemed immi- 
 nent. The religious schism caused Swiss to arm 
 against Swiss, and separate private alliances were 
 formed, based upon a common faith and religion ; so 
 that when the day came for them again to defend 
 
 tage, held at Lucerne and Aarau, and those of the cantons who were 
 over lords of bailiwicks, Syndikatstage, which met at Frauenfeld 
 and Lugano. The Diets were more or less of the nature of diplo- 
 matic conferences. We find them settling the differences between 
 cantons (1348) ; drawing up a military code, and legislating about 
 fairs and the protection of churches and convents (1393) ; drawing 
 up a new constitution (1481); coming to an agreement about 
 coinage for ten years (1389), and then later for fifty years (1425). 
 There were various police regulations agreed on at these Diets, con- 
 cerning the pursuit of murderers, the prohibition of the Vekmgericht, 
 laws against vagabonds and idle people who would not work, 
 against Jews and sorcerers, also regulations for the protection of 
 the trade routes, and on navigation and fisheries. It was at one 
 of these Diets in 1477 that Burgundy was sold to Louis XL for 
 150,000 florins (see Hilty, Eidgenossische Abschiede). Although a 
 state might have two deputies, it was only considered to have a 
 single vote. Cf. Bluntschli, Geschichte des schweizerischen Bundes- 
 rechtcs, i. p. 419 ;] Blumer, Handbuch des schweizerischen Bundes- 
 staatsrechtcs, i. pp. 3-18 ; Id., Staats und Rechtsgeschichte der 
 schweizerischen Demokratien, i. pp. 328, 360, ii. pp. 74-85 ; Curti, 
 Geschichte der schweizerischen Volksgesetzgebung, Berne, 1882, pp. 
 13- 38. 
 
 [The " Referendum " was often made use of to drag out the em- 
 barrassing or difficult questions, for by constantly referring things 
 back it was easy to prevent anything definite being settled. Cf> 
 Benoist, " Une democratic historique " in La Revue des deux Mond 
 January 1895, p. 285.] 
 
54 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 their native country against an enemy, the weakened 
 sentiment for a common Fatherland was no longer 
 powerful enough to rouse all Swiss people to gather 
 under the same flag. Thus, when the armies of the 
 Directory invaded the country at the end of the last 
 century, though the French troops were here and 
 there heroically opposed, yet the resistance offered 
 was partial, isolated, disconnected, and consequently 
 ineffectual. The invader, moreover, found willing 
 supporters among the people themselves. The ideas 
 of the Revolution had preceded its armies, and in 
 certain social circles they had aroused an ardent 
 sympathy for France. This was natural enough, for 
 at the time of the French Revolution three-fourths 
 of the citizens of Switzerland were nothing more or 
 less than political nonentities. In the aristocratic 
 cantons the peasants of the country districts were 
 excluded by the burghers or the patrician families of 
 the principal towns from all share in the government. 
 In the subject territories the whole of the inhabitants 
 were in a state of complete dependence on the sove- 
 reign states. How could men thus robbed of their 
 heritage resist the seductions of the new ideas of 
 liberty, equality, and the sovereignty of the people ? 
 They joyfully hailed the arrival of the French, whom 
 they regarded as saviours. The feeling of patriotism, 
 the love of independence, and the sentiment of 
 nationality had been extinguished by the grievances 
 of a state of political helotism. 1 
 
 The French, once masters of the country, swept 
 away all the institutions peculiar to the people, and 
 the historic forms handed down from the past. They 
 
 1 Curti, Geachichte, &c., pp. 91-92. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 5 5 
 
 endowed Switzerland with her first constitution, the 
 Constitution of the Helvetic Republic of the I2th 
 of April 1798. The old Swiss Confederation, the 
 frontiers of the several cantons, the separate sove- 
 reign states, the subject countries, and class privi- 
 leges were all abolished. By a sudden transition, 
 forcibly effected, without any previous preparation 
 for such a change, a military republic was set up 
 in the place of the old Confederation, divided, more- 
 over, into prefectures, and furnished with a repre- 
 sentative government, in which the sovereignty was 
 vested in the general body of citizens, and which 
 established political equality, freedom of opinion, and 
 liberty of the press. 1 
 
 This complete revolution of the old order of things 
 was a piece of ill-considered Radicalism. The fragile 
 constitutional structure of the Helvetic republic was 
 scarcely erected before it cracked on every side. Its 
 authors had not only violently broken away from 
 tradition, but the constitution was not a national 
 production, and it had not been consecrated by the 
 people. 2 
 
 1 [Switzerland was divided into eighteen prefectures, consisting 
 of the cantons, the allies, and the bailiwicks, parcelled out, not 
 according to the historic past of any of them, but according to 
 physical geography. The obligation of military service was im- 
 posed, their religious festivals were diminished, and, as a set off, 
 they had freedom of commerce and industry, both of which were 
 unknown to them.] 
 
 2 [Provision was made in this constitution for amendments of 
 the constitution by popular consent. Title XL was as follows : 
 "Art. 106. The Senate shall propose these changes, but proposi- 
 tions of this character shall become resolutions only after having 
 been twice decreed, a space of five years intervening between the 
 decrees. These resolutions shall then be rejected or ratified by the 
 Great Council, and, in case of ratification only, shall be laid before 
 
56 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 Some attempts to modify or otherwise revise this 
 constitution were made by Bonaparte, who, acting 
 as "mediator," summoned the Swiss delegates to 
 Malmaison towards the end of the month of April 
 1 80 1, in order to submit the scheme of a new con- 
 stitution for their consideration. This draft made 
 some important concessions to the Federalist party, 
 whose aim was to preserve the cantonal sovereignty 
 from the would-be centralisers. It was provisionally 
 adopted on the 29th of May 1801 by the Legislative 
 Council of the Helvetic republic, but was altered by 
 the Centralist party on the 24th October 1801, and 
 remodelled again by the Federalist party on the 27th 
 of February 1802. 
 
 Finally, after a great deal of political agitation, we 
 get the Constitution of the 2Oth of May 1802. This 
 last is the only one of all the ephemeral constitutions 
 of the epoch which is of interest to us, and then 
 not so much by reason of its contents as from the 
 manner in which it came into operation. 
 
 All the citizens who had reached twenty years of 
 age were called upon to ratify this constitution in 
 their respective communes. For this purpose re- 
 gisters were placed for four days in the various 
 communal chanceries, in order that each citizen 
 might enter his name as either accepting or re- 
 jecting the constitution. The result was that 72,453 
 citizens voted for it and 92,423 voted against, while 
 167,172 refrained from voting altogether. Although 
 
 the primary assemblies for adoption or rejection." "Art. 107. If 
 the primary assemblies accept them, they shall become a funda- 
 mental part of the constitution." This provision never came into 
 practice. See Borgeaud, p. 260.] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 5 7 
 
 the majority of those who actually voted had pro- 
 nounced against the constitution, those who had 
 not voted at all either way were considered as 
 having tacitly expressed approval, and therefore it 
 was declared to be adopted. 1 
 
 Such was the first appearance in federal law of 
 the popular veto on a matter directly affecting the 
 constitution. 2 
 
 1 [The words were : "The project has received the assent of the 
 great majority of the citizens in Helvetia who are qualified to 
 vote." It was therefore declared to be "the fundamental law of 
 the republic."] 
 
 2 [There were many precedents in France for submitting the con- 
 stitution to the popular vote. The Constitution of 1793 was sub - 
 mitted to the people in their primary assemblies, and the result 
 announced on the ist of August was that 1,801,918 were in favour 
 of accepting it and 11,610 were against it. It has been proved by 
 M. Taine and others that the vote was not free. This constitution, 
 however, never came into force. The next constitution, that of the 
 year III., was also submitted to the people and accepted by them 
 by 1,057,390 votes against 49,977, and this time the vote seems to 
 have been an honest one. The Constitution of the year VIII. was 
 also submitted to the acceptance of the French people. It received 
 3,000,000 votes in its favour, and only 1500 were registered in 
 opposition. This voting did not take place in the primary 
 assemblies, but in the capitals of the communes, by signatures 
 publicly inscribed in registers specially set apart for the purpose. 
 This system, which had been proposed in France by Bourdon at 
 the time of the Revolutionary commune, was practically a register 
 of those who disapproved of the government. It is not strange, 
 then, that there should have been a certain reluctance to sign in 
 opposition. Bonaparte was appointed Consul for life in 1802 by 
 one of these plebiscitary votings, and from that time they ceased 
 to be of importance as a method of legislation, though plebiscites 
 were taken in 1804 and 1815. 
 
 Nothing is more natural, therefore, than that the Swiss Constitu- 
 tion, framed under the influence of France, should have been sub- 
 mitted to the people. It is interesting to compare the contemporary 
 systems of constitutional votings in vogue in Massachusetts and 
 New Hampshire with the French and Swiss system, especially as 
 
58 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 The Federalists nevertheless objected to the new 
 constitution, on the ground that it made too many 
 concessions to the Centralist party. They attempted 
 to bring about a fresh revision in September of the 
 same year. Napoleon therefore intervened, and forced 
 on all parties his Act of Mediation, which was in- 
 tended to put an end to the political strife, the result 
 
 Condorcet, the author of the Lettres d'un bourgeois de New Haven 
 (Paris, 1788), was the soul of the committee appointed in 1793 to 
 draw up the French Constitution. The "projet Girondin" of 1793 
 has been described as "the result of a systematic union of the 
 principles of New England and those of the eighteenth-century 
 French philosophy. ... In it the primary assemblies take the place 
 of the town meetings." (Borgeaud, Adoption and Amendment of 
 Constitutions, pp. 206-7.) 
 
 In Massachusetts, as early as 1778, the new constitution was sub- 
 mitted to the town meetings for ratification and rejected by them. 
 In 1779 the people were asked whether there should be a convention 
 to draw up a constitution. This was decided in the affirmative. 
 A constitution was framed and presented to the town meetings, 
 and finally, in 1780, it was found that 'a majority of more than 
 two-thirds had pronounced for its ratification. In New Hampshire 
 the first Constitution of 1779 was rejected by the town meetings. 
 A second plan was accepted in 1781 on the condition that certain 
 alterations be made, and in 1 783 the Constitution was finally adopted. 
 In 1791 the town meetings were asked to declare whether they 
 wished any amendments, and an affirmative answer being obtained, 
 a convention was elected to prepare them. The reformed con- 
 stitution was then divided up into a number of subjects, which 
 were submitted separately to the approval of the citizens. Some 
 were accepted and some rejected, and the convention took up the 
 work again, and the Constitution, as finally drawn up, obtained a 
 two-thirds majority. The example of these states was followed 
 by Mississippi in 1817, and Missouri in 1820. In 1821 the practice 
 was adopted by New York, and since that time it has become 
 almost universal (Oberholtzer, The Referendum in America, ch. 2). 
 In Switzerland no federal constitutional question was brought 
 before the people until 1848, and the cantons, with the exception 
 of those with Landsgemeinde, did not begin to submit their con- 
 stitutions to the people until 1830, and it was not until 1848 that 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 59 
 
 of which had been no less than half a dozen con- 
 stitutional experiments in the space of five years. 1 
 
 The Act of Mediation of the igth of February 1803 
 drew up a constitution for the Swiss Confederation, 
 but it also contained separate constitutions for the 
 different cantons. 2 It is, as Cherbuliez expressed it, 
 a cross between the historic law of Switzerland and 
 the philosophic law of the French Revolution, a com- 
 promise between old facts and new ideas. It lays 
 down as a principle "that there no longer exist hi 
 Switzerland either subject lands, or privileges of place, 
 birth, persons, or families." This is the advance. It 
 maintains, however, the cantonal sovereignty. " The 
 cantons shall exercise all the powers which have not 
 been expressly delegated to the federal authority," 
 and in this the new constitution adheres to tradition. 
 
 The constitutions accorded to the cantons varied 
 in the different states. The Landsgemeinden were 
 re-established in the democratic cantons, but certain 
 modifications were introduced with reference to the 
 age of political majority, and the popular initiative 
 
 the Federal Constitution made voting on constitutions compulsory. 
 The point I wish to bring out is, that although Switzerland may be 
 said to have invented the referendum in matters of ordinary legis- 
 lation, yet the principle that a sanction by popular vote is necessary 
 for the adoption of a constitution was known and acted upon in 
 America for more than fifty years before it was nationalised in 
 Switzerland. Where there had been popular votings in Switzerland, 
 the vote of individuals was not considered ; it was always the vote 
 of the commune that counted except in the Landsgemeinde can- 
 tons, and even there voting on a written constitution was a novelty. 
 See Borgeaud, op. cit. bk. i. ch. 2 ; bk. ii. ch. 2, 3,4; also Lowell, 
 Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, pp. 244-45.] 
 
 1 Blumer, Handbuch, &c., vi. pp. 21-33 ; Curti, Geschichte, &c., 
 pp. 105-11. 
 
 2 Blumer, i. pp. 33-45 ; Curti, 111-17. 
 
60 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 in legislative matters. 1 The referendum reappears 
 in the Grisons with a more systematic organisation. 2 
 In the other cantons that is to say, in the states 
 already sovereign before 1 798 and not included in 
 the preceding category 3 as well as in the new cantons 
 created out of the territories which used to be subject 
 to the original cantons, 4 the Act of Mediation estab- 
 lished representative government based on equal 
 electoral districts. In the old sovereign cantons the 
 balance of political equality between the citizens was 
 considerably altered in favour of the towns, who were 
 allowed a share in the representation of the canton 
 quite out of proportion to the number of their active 
 citizens. 5 
 
 The constitutions imposed by the Act of Media- 
 tion did not survive the decline in the fortunes of 
 their author. Before the fall of Napoleon, when his 
 
 1 Keller, Das Volksinitiativrecht, &c., pp. 7, 10, 18, 25. 
 
 2 Ganzoni, Beitrage, &c., pp. 78-85. 
 
 3 Basle, Berne, Fribourg, Lucerne, Schaffhausen, Solothurn, and 
 Zurich. 
 
 4 Aargau, St. Gall, Ticino, Thurgau, and Vaud. 
 
 5 At Basle and at Schaffhausen the towns sent one-third of the 
 representatives ; in Berne, Zurich, Lucerne, Fribourg, and Solothurn 
 the proportion was a fifth. 
 
 [A few other points may be noticed about this constitution. 
 The Diet was not held two years following in the same place, 
 but met in turn at Fribourg, Berne, Solothurn, Basle, Zurich, and 
 Lucerne. The canton in which the Diet was held was the "pre- 
 siding canton." The deputy of this canton was called "the 
 Landamman of Switzerland." He was the president of the Diet 
 and the head of the republic, and he had the right of convoking 
 extraordinary Diets. The presiding canton was obliged to provide 
 a guard of honour for the deputies of the other cantons, and to 
 lodge them suitably and pay the current expenses of the Diet. (See 
 Hilty, Die Bundesvcrfassungen, &c., pp. 423, 427). This has given rise 
 to the tradition that certain cantons have an especial right to be 
 represented in the Federal Council.] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 61 
 
 star began to pale, the aristocratic spirit revived 
 in the states that had formerly been sovereign, and 
 particularly in Berne. These cantons had undergone 
 a considerable reduction in territory by the conver- 
 sion of the subject countries into independent states, 
 and they now manifested a decided intention of re- 
 entering into their possessions and of extending their 
 domains to the limits of their original frontiers. The 
 intervention of the Allied Powers, however, happily 
 averted this, and the Congress of Vienna insisted on 
 the independence of the existing states. They also 
 created three new cantons Geneva, Neuchatel, and 
 Valais. 1 
 
 These twenty-two cantons took an oath, on the 7th 
 of August 181 5, to observe the " Federal Agreement." 2 
 By this agreement "the XXII sovereign cantons of 
 Switzerland to wit, Zurich, Berne, Lucerne, Uri, 
 Schwyz, Unterwalden, Glarus, Zug, Fribourg, Solo- 
 thurn, Bale, Schaff hausen, Appenzell (the two Rhodes), 
 St. Gall, the Grisons, Aargau, Thurgau, Ticino, Vaud, 
 Valais, Neuchatel, and Geneva unite for their com- 
 mon safety and for the preservation of their liberty 
 and their independence against all foreign aggression, 
 as well as to preserve internal peace and order. They 
 mutually guarantee their constitutions, which shall 
 be established by the supreme authority of each can- 
 ton, in conformity with the principles of the Federal 
 Agreement. 3 They also mutually guarantee their re- 
 
 1 Blumer, i. pp. 45-49. 
 
 3 Blumer, i. pp. 49-57 ; Curti, pp. 119-23. 
 
 3 [" It regarded the point as already won that the public law of 
 the different cantons was or should be codified. A copy of the 
 constitutions was to be deposited in the archives of the Diet " 
 (Borgeaud, Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions, p. 27).] 
 
62 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 spective territories " (Art. i). " The Diet to which the 
 sovereign cantons have entrusted the general affairs 
 of the Confederation shall deal with them according 
 to the rules laid down in the Federal Agreement. It 
 is composed of the deputies of the XXII cantons, 
 who vote according to the instructions given by their 
 governments. Each canton has one vote. 1 . . . For 
 important decisions (war, peace, or alliances) three- 
 fourths of the votes are necessary. In all other 
 matters that have been declared to be within the 
 province of the Diet by this present Federal Agree- 
 ment an absolute majority is sufficient " (Art. 8). 
 
 The Act of Mediation being superseded, the cantons 
 were left free to change their respective constitutions 
 as they liked. The Federal Agreement laid down one 
 principle only to which all the cantons were obliged 
 to conform. " The Confederation declares this prin- 
 ciple to be inviolable : that since the XXII cantons 
 have been generally recognised as such, there are no 
 longer in Switzerland any subject countries, and, in 
 the same way, the enjoyment of political rights can 
 never in any canton be made the exclusive privilege 
 of any one class of citizens " (Art. 7). 
 
 The cantons with Landsgemeinden profited by the 
 freedom of choice thus restored them to organise the 
 right of the popular initiative on a more democratic 
 basis. 2 On the other hand, a retrograde movement 
 
 1 [In refusing the cantons a representation proportional to the 
 number of their inhabitants it made it possible for the small can- 
 tons to combine to oppress the large ones, with the result that 
 the great cantons were sure to revolt sooner or later against the 
 majority of the Diet. See Duvergier de Hauranne, La Suissc et 
 la revision de sa Constitution, Revue des deux Mondes, 1873, p. 762.] 
 
 2 Keller, Das Volksinitiavrecht, pp. 10 and 18. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 63 
 
 took place in Zug. The Landsgemeinde was deprived 
 of the right of sanctioning legislation, and only re- 
 tained the popular election of the magistrates. 1 
 
 The Grisons remained faithful to the referendum, 2 
 and the Valais, which had been separated from Swit- 
 zerland from 1802 to 1813, reintroduced it in a new 
 form into the new Constitution of May 12, 1815. 
 The clause runs as follows : " The Diet shall exercise 
 the legislative power. Bills are to be prepared by 
 the Council of State, but cannot come into force until 
 they have been referred to the councils of the Dix- 
 ains and sanctioned by the majority of the councils. 
 Financial laws, military capitulations, and the natural- 
 isation of aliens shall be referred not only to the 
 councils of the Dixains, but also to those of the com- 
 munes." Thus it was the councils of the Dixains, 
 together with the councils of the communes, and no 
 longer the electors, who from henceforth accepted or 
 rejected the laws. 
 
 In the other cantons, and particularly in those hi 
 which the aristocracy had formerly been the ruling 
 power, the principle laid down in Article 7 of the 
 Federal Agreement remained a dead letter. The 
 ancient aristocracy was already only too apt to 
 manipulate the constitutional revisions to their own 
 advantage. They were favoured in their designs by 
 the general course of foreign politics, which always 
 exercised a great influence in Switzerland, and which 
 at this time tended towards reaction and to a return 
 of the old state of things. The qualifications neces- 
 sary to be an elector and for eligibility to office were 
 retained. That was the first attack on the principle 
 
 1 Curti, Gcschichtc, &c., p. 127. 2 Ganzoni, pp. 86-90. 
 
64 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 of political equality proclaimed by the Federal Com- 
 pact. Later on the system of indirect election was 
 adopted, by which the legislators practically recruited 
 themselves. The burghers of the dominant towns 
 maintained their, influence in the direct elections, and 
 managed, moreover, to secure the larger number of 
 the seats conferred by indirect election. None of 
 these reactionary constitutions were submitted to the 
 people for their ratification. 1 
 
 " The Act of Mediation," says Cherbuliez, " had 
 created an aristocracy of ability; the Restoration 
 re-established an aristocracy of birth and the pre- 
 dominance of certain localities, the time-honoured 
 forms of which were quite out of harmony with 
 any principle adopted by the new generation. The 
 control exercised by the nation over its govern- 
 ment was not active enough to be efficient. There 
 existed no means by which the majority of the 
 representatives could be influenced according to the 
 
 1 Blumer, Sckweizerischcr Bundesstaatsrecht, i. p. 57. It is there- 
 fore not quite correct to say with M. Laveleye (Le gouvernement 
 dans la democratic, ii. p. 149) that "from 1802 it became the rule 
 that every constitution, whether it were that of a canton or of the 
 Federation itself, had to be accepted by the majority of the active 
 citizens or electors." 
 
 [M. Borgeaud, op. cit. p. 264, says of these constitutions : " They 
 were generally the work of councils more or less restored from 
 the old regime, or of new assemblies chosen by the privileged 
 classes ; the only exceptions to this were the little Landsgemeinde 
 cantons and the cantons of the Grisons and Geneva. In the two 
 Unterwalden the constitution was adopted by popular assemblies. 
 Glarus, Uri, and Schwyz simply made a digest of their traditional 
 institutions, depositing copies of them in the archives of the Diet. 
 In the Grisons the constitution was a real Federal compact; the 
 sovereign communes were called upon to ratify in the manner usual 
 among the old leagues. At Geneva . . . the constitution was sub- 
 mitted to the people 'by reason of their natural right.' "] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 65 
 
 wishes of the people, and in the interests of the 
 country as a whole. All the positions of honour 
 in the state were monopolised by certain families, 
 and thus an oligarchy of nobles was formed very 
 much like that condemned by the Revolution of 
 1798. They were soon confronted in every state by 
 an opposition party, whose aim was to put an end 
 to the political disabilities created by the Constitu- 
 tions of 1815. Freedom of the press, the extension 
 of electoral rights, the separation of powers, and the 
 power of removing public officials, were the impor- 
 tant points in their programme. This progressive 
 party was not without its supporters in the legislative 
 bodies, but it was nearly everywhere defeated by a 
 hostile majority of the legislators, who obstinately 
 declined to grant any concessions. 1 
 
 Such was the position of affairs when the French 
 Revolution of 1830 occurred with the suddenness 
 and force of an explosive, and by its example pro- 
 
 1 [Only four states revised their constitutions before the French 
 Revolution of July 1830, and only in one state was the revision 
 submitted to the people. The canton of Vaud revised its constitu- 
 tion in May 1830, and granted the exercise of political rights to all 
 citizens who could show a certain moderate property in real estate 
 or mortgages, and the electoral assemblies chosen by them received 
 the right to approve in the future all constitutional amendments. 
 The actual constitution, as then drawn up, was not submitted to 
 the people. It revised its constitution again in 1831. 
 
 In Ticino, the proposal to revise the constitution was made in 
 1829, and carried out in 1830. Sovereignty was declared to reside 
 in the whole body of citizens, and the exercise of political rights 
 was dependent merely on a small property qualification. The con- 
 stitution was laid before the people in their district assemblies, and 
 on July 4 it was accepted in all the districts but one. It was the 
 vote of the districts, and not of the individuals, that was counted 
 in the general result. Lucerne and Appenzell (Inner Rhodes) revised 
 their constitutions in 1829. See Borgeaud, Adoption, &c., pp. 265-76.] 
 
 E 
 
66 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 duced a general break-up of the existing state of 
 things in Switzerland. 1 
 
 In the space of one single year, during the year 
 1831, no less than eleven cantons 2 set up new con- 
 stitutions, modelled on the programme of the Liberal 
 party. 3 Between 1830 and 1834 there were alto- 
 gether twenty revisions of cantonal constitutions, and, 
 
 1 ["Then during the hot July days," says Henne am Khyn, " we 
 waited in vain for messengers from Paris, until one fine morning 
 we saw the French mail-post enter Basle flying the tricolour. The 
 Bourbons had fallen, the king had fled, and the Revolution was 
 master of Paris. The news produced an extraordinary commotion 
 in Switzerland. We knew that the storm was about to break over 
 us too, and we waited." 
 
 Almost everywhere great popular meetings were held. The 
 leaders harangued the people. Resolutions were adopted and 
 carried to the capital by delegates. Then when it was necessary 
 for ordinarily a mere threat sufficed arrangements were made to 
 move en masse upon the seat of government, and the authorities 
 were called upon to recognise the sovereignty of the people, and to 
 convoke a constitutional convention as quickly as possible to revise 
 the charter. In general, the rulers, not having permanent troops 
 at their disposal, yielded without serious resistance. The Federal 
 Diet having met in extraordinary session in December 1830, 
 adopted the following decree : 
 
 " The Federal Diet unanimously approves the principle that each 
 state in the Confederation, by virtue of its sovereignty, has the 
 right to make whatever amendments to its constitution it may 
 judge necessary, provided they be not contrary to the Federal 
 Agreement. The Diet will therefore not interfere in any way in 
 such constitutional reforms as have already been effected or are 
 about to be." See Borgeaud, op. cit. pp. 269-70.] 
 
 2 Chatelanat, Die schweizerische Demokratie in ihrer Fortentwick- 
 lung, Berne, 1879, p. 14. 
 
 3 [In the cantons of Valais and Schwyz the contest was more 
 prolonged and more serious, and also in Basle, when the city 
 refused to admit the citizens of the rural communes to an equality. 
 In Neuchitel, the King of Prussia, who was its sovereign, sup- 
 pressed the insurrection by force. Ticino and Geneva did not 
 make any change, nor did the purely democratic cantons of Uri, 
 Unterwalden, Zug, Glarus, Appenzell, and the Orisons.] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 67 
 
 except at Fribourg, the new constitutions were every- 
 where submitted to the people for their ratification. 1 
 
 The cantons proclaimed the sovereignty of the 
 people, and gave it visible expression in the form of 
 universal suffrage and the constitutional veto granted 
 to the electors. Proportional representation that is 
 to say, equality before the law of both the towns 
 and the country districts was in the main realised. 
 The right of petition, the liberty of the press, the 
 freedom of trade, and a more liberal law of settlement 
 were also guaranteed. 
 
 The legislative power was vested in the Great 
 Council, an assembly consisting of one chamber 
 directly elected by universal suffrage. The executive 
 power was placed in the hands of the Small Council, 
 or Council of State, whose members were nominated 
 by the Great Council, and who collectively controlled 
 the administration. 2 
 
 If at this point we pause and take a survey of the 
 cantonal constitutions of Switzerland, we see that the 
 character of the government in by far the larger 
 number of them is that of a representative demo- 
 cracy. It is, in fact, the prevailing form, except in 
 the cantons with Landsgemeinden, in the Grisons, 
 and in Valais. We shall trace in the following 
 pages how this representative democracy was super- 
 seded by a system of direct democracy, how the Great 
 Councils gradually ceased to monopolise the attri- 
 butes of sovereignty, and especially how they came 
 to share their legislative attributes with the people. 
 
 1 Vogt, Referendum, Veto, und Initiativ, in the Zeitschrift fur die 
 gesammte Staatswisscnschaft, Tubingen, 1873, p. 360. 
 
 2 Curti, pp. 124-25 ; Blumer, pp. 59-61. 
 
68 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 II. The Growth of the "Rights of the People" 
 in the Cantons. 
 
 The representative system underwent its first modi- 
 fication in 1831 in the canton of St.. Gall, one of the 
 new states formed in 1803. 
 
 Some time before the meeting of the constituent 
 assembly which was to draw up a new constitution 
 for the canton, there appeared in St. Gall an anony- 
 mous pamphlet, entitled Volkstumliche Ansichten 
 (Popular Prospects). Its author insisted on the 
 necessity of allowing the people to intervene directly 
 in the work of legislation. " The constitutional role 
 of the electors," he urged, " should not be limited to 
 the mere approval of laws. It ought also to be pos- 
 sible for them to make their own laws on any subject 
 they may desire, and therefore they need far greater 
 powers than the mere right of addressing petitions 
 to the Great Council." 
 
 The difficulty was to find any feasible plan by 
 which it should be possible for the people them- 
 selves to act as legislators a difficulty especially felt 
 at this time, when no other form of direct legisla- 
 tion could probably be conceived except that which 
 obtained in the small cantons. The author of the 
 pamphlet, recognising the impossibility of a Lands- 
 gemeinde at which all the electors of the canton of 
 St. Gall should be present, proposed to hold instead 
 a number of small Landsgemeinden, allotting one to 
 each district of the canton, which should be attended 
 by the electors within that district. Every measure 
 should be adopted by two-thirds of these Lands- 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 69 
 
 gemeinden before it could become law, and each 
 Landsgemeinde, whether large or small, had one vote. 
 " For a first attempt," as M. Curti observes, " this was 
 not a bad scheme." 
 
 It is not difficult to imagine the excitement such 
 novel proposals would cause, and the opposition they 
 would be sure to encounter. For the democrats, the 
 main thing was to secure the triumph of their prin- 
 ciple in other words, to obtain public recognition of 
 the justice of direct legislation by the people. 1 
 
 The philosopher and parliamentary orator of the 
 party, Felix Diog de Rapperswyl, undertook to cham- 
 pion the cause in the constituent assembly. "The 
 people are sovereign," said Diog. " The people, and 
 the people alone, should exercise the supreme power. 
 Their will should be law. Sovereignty cannot be 
 delegated. A sovereign who acts only through de- 
 puties may be said to have abdicated. The people 
 have been declared to be of age. It is therefore 
 out of the question that the Great Council should 
 be constituted its guardian." According to Diog, 
 republicans could not take too many precautions 
 against the despotism of a parental government. 
 He even went so far as to claim for the citizens 
 the right of accepting or rejecting simple adminis- 
 trative orders. " If he were logical," his opponents 
 said, " he ought to demand not only that the people 
 should make their own laws, but that they should 
 possess the executive and judicial powers as well." 
 
 1 [Those who advocated popular rights always did so on theoretical 
 grounds, and based their claims on principles of abstract right. 
 They never seem to have urged the utility of the measure. It was 
 on practical grounds they were always opposed.] 
 
70 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 His answer to this was: "When I can prescribe 
 how a thing shall be done, and according to what 
 principles justice shall be administered in a word, 
 when I am legislator, what does it matter to ine 
 who executes my laws or who applies them ? It is 
 not a question of who shall be administrator, but 
 rather, what he shall administer." Diog did not 
 confine himself to demanding a referendum on all 
 legislative measures; he also claimed the initiative 
 for the people that is to say, the power of the elec- 
 tors to bring forward their own bills. "Sovereignty 
 does not consist merely in the negative right of 
 refusing or vetoing a law, but in the positive right 
 of commanding what one wishes. The people cannot 
 rest contented with sanctioning laws; the very laws 
 themselves ought to be the actual expression of their 
 will." The Parliamentarians, in reply to Diog, said : 
 " The mass of the electors are not as yet enlightened 
 enough to act as legislators, nor have they the re- 
 quisite leisure. They will fall into the hands of a 
 few leaders, who will deceive them as to the true 
 value of the laws. They will be the victims of the 
 propaganda of demagogues and anarchists." It 
 seemed probable that the question would be solved 
 by brute force, for the Parliamentarians would not 
 give in, and disorderly mobs began to besiege the 
 place where the constituent assembly held its sit- 
 tings. But, on the I4th of January 1831, Dr. Henne 
 made a proposal which he thought would reconcile 
 all parties. He suggested that, three weeks before 
 the opening of the parliamentary session, the orders 
 of the day of the Great Council should be published, 
 so that the people might have an opportunity of ex- 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 7 1 
 
 pressing their wishes. Moreover, the laws, when 
 discussed and finally adopted by the Great Council, 
 should be examined by a committee of citizens ap- 
 pointed by the people, and this committee, like the 
 Roman Tribunes in the days of the Republic, should 
 be empowered to veto any new law of which they 
 disapproved. The majority of the Parliamentarians 
 were willing to support the compromise of Henne, 
 but the democrats would not abandon their pro- 
 posed system of direct legislation. When the matter 
 came to the vote, it was the democrats who were 
 defeated, by 66 votes to 75. 1 
 
 As the veto is quite an obsolete institution at the 
 present day, it is not without interest to notice the 
 way in which it was organised in St. Gall. The fol- 
 lowing are the articles of the Constitution of the ist 
 of March 1831 which relate to the subject: 
 
 Art. 2. The people of the canton are sovereign. Sove- 
 reignty, which is the sum of all the political powers, resides in 
 the whole body of the citizens. 
 
 Art. 3. It results from this that the people themselves 
 exercise the legislative power, and every law is submitted to 
 their sanction. This sanction is the right of the people to 
 refuse to recognise any law submitted to them, and to prevent 
 its execution in virtue of their sovereign power. 
 
 Art. 135. The approval of laws reserved to the people by 
 Article 3 of the Constitution applies, namely 
 
 () To all branches of legislation, civil and criminal, and to 
 the treaties which relate to these subjects. 
 
 (b) To all fiscal laws of general import. 
 
 (c) To the laws relating to the administration of the communes. 
 
 (d) To all laws on military matters. 
 
 Art. 136. The laws mentioned above come into force forty - 
 
 1 Curti, Zur Geschichte der Volksrechte, Zurich, 1881. 
 
72 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 five days after their publication, if the people have not refused 
 to sanction them before the expiration of this delay. 
 
 Art. 137. As soon as fifty citizens of a political commune 
 demand it, a communal assembly must be held to decide 
 whether the law submitted to them shall be opposed or not. 
 
 Art. 138. If the majority of the communal assembly resolve 
 to raise no opposition, the law is considered to be approved by 
 the commune. In the contrary case, the Amman of the com- 
 mune shall communicate the result at once to the Amman of 
 the district, and he in his turn shall advise the " Small Council " 
 by sending them a copy of the report of the meeting. 
 
 Art. 1 39. This document should indicate the number of active 
 citizens in the commune who have respectively voted for or 
 against the proposed law. Non-voters are classed as voting in 
 the affirmative. 
 
 Art. 141. If the number of those who have rejected a 
 law exceed the total number of citizens by one, the law falls 
 through. 
 
 Out of the total number of registered electors, 
 9190 accepted the Constitution, and 11,091 rejected 
 it ; but there were 1 2,692 who did not vote, and these 
 were counted as having accepted it. It was therefore 
 declared to be adopted "by a large majority." 
 
 The example of the canton of St. Gall was followed 
 in 1832 by the newly formed half canton of Rural- 
 Basle, 1 and, after a lapse of some years, by Lucerne in 
 1841, by a Conservative government which had just 
 come into power. 2 
 
 A section of the Conservative party in Zurich, who 
 had overthrown the Radical authorities in 1839, at- 
 tempted in the same way in 1842 to introduce the 
 
 1 Blumer, Handbuch, pp. 61-62. [The period of delay was only 
 fifteen days in Basle.] 
 
 2 Ernst, Die Volksrechte im eidgenossischen Bunde, in the Monat 
 Rosen, 1883-84, pp. 248-50. [The period of delay was fifty days.] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 73 
 
 veto into the Constitution of Zurich. 1 The petitions 
 addressed to the Great Council in support of the plan 
 urged that laws which had been sanctioned by the 
 people would be better observed, would have more 
 authority, and would last longer than laws made 
 without their approval; while the collaboration of 
 the people and the Council would ensure that per- 
 fect understanding so desirable between electors and 
 elected. In the Great Council stress was laid on the 
 fact that the veto would be a check, and that in the 
 absence of anything like a royal veto in a republic 
 of this kind, it would act as a set-off to the omnipo- 
 tence of the Great Council. At Ziirich, as everywhere 
 else, doubt was thrown on the legislative capacity of 
 the people, who, it was said, would probably prove 
 both selfish and shortsighted. " But," objected one 
 speaker, " if the people are capable of pronouncing on 
 constitutional laws, why should they suddenly become 
 incompetent when it is a question of ordinary laws ? 
 Why should they be unable to judge of one particular 
 law when, by electing their representatives, they are 
 obliged to form an estimate of the legislative work of 
 those representatives for several years ? " 
 
 The veto, although advocated with much ingenuity, 
 obtained but few supporters. In the Great Council 
 only 54 votes were given for it, whilst there were 
 1 1 5 against. The reason was, that since it had been 
 adopted by the Conservative Government of Lucerne, 
 the Liberals distrusted the scheme, and regarded it 
 as a reactionary institution. 
 
 "It is scarcely possible," Cherbuliez wrote in 1843, 
 
 1 Stxissi, Referendum u. Initiativ im Kanton Zurich, pp. 9-12 ; Curti, 
 Geschichte, pp. 142-48. 
 
74 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 " to regard the veto as a harmless innovation, espe- 
 cially when one recalls that in St. Gall it was used to 
 reject a liberal law on the relations of Church and 
 State, and that the same influence which has recently 
 effected changes in the Constitution of Lucerne in 
 obedience to ultramontane prejudices, has also been 
 the very one to introduce the legislative veto." 1 And 
 further on, when criticising both the referendum in 
 the Grisons and the veto, the same author wrote: 
 " The legislative veto in its two forms, and particularly 
 in the first, constitutes the worst kind of democracy, 
 for the people are never so incapable of considering 
 the general interests of all as when they are broken 
 up in local assemblies. There is only one opinion in 
 Switzerland on the referendum, and that is, that it is 
 an obstacle to the rational development of political 
 and civil institutions, it frustrates the most urgent 
 improvements, and negatives those justifiable reforms 
 in the system of organic laws on which the intel- 
 lectual and moral condition of the nation depends." 2 
 Nevertheless the veto was but a timid step on the 
 road along which the Swiss were destined to proceed 
 much farther. 
 
 In comparison with later institutions it was the 
 least disturbing of reforms, inasmuch as it had been 
 arranged in such a manner as to render any real 
 popular intervention as difficult as possible. In St. 
 Gall, for instance, before a commune could meet to 
 exercise the veto, fifty electors had to transmit a 
 written demand to the president of the commune, 
 and then the negative votes given in the commune 
 
 1 Cherbuliez, De la democratic en Suisse, Geneva, 1843, * PP- 94~95- 
 
 2 Idem, ii. p. 43. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 75 
 
 were not counted in the total unless these votes 
 had constituted the actual majority in the commune 
 itself. In Rural-Basle the law could only be rejected 
 by two-thirds of the total number of active citizens. 
 
 In 1839 the Valais revised its constitution and 
 substituted a new institution for the referendum of 
 1815, which might be called the "compulsory veto." 
 
 "All laws, military capitulations, financial decrees, or acts of 
 naturalisation resolved on by the Great Council cannot be en- 
 forced until thirty days after their publication. Within this 
 interval the majority of the citizens of the Valais may reject any 
 such law if they think fit. For this purpose the president of 
 the commune is required to convoke the primary assembly on 
 the third Sunday after the publication of a law. He will make 
 a report of the voting and forward the same to the president of 
 the Dixain" 
 
 As in the cantons with the veto, no law could be 
 rejected save by an absolute majority of the regis- 
 tered electors. But in the Valais the meeting of the 
 communal assemblies was made compulsory by the 
 constitution; while in St. Gall, Lucerne, and Rural- 
 Basle these assemblies were only held upon the ex- 
 press demand of a certain number of electors. There 
 was a fresh revision in Valais in 1 844, when all trace 
 of the veto disappeared, and the compulsory refer- 
 endum appears in its place. 
 
 " All laws, military capitulations, financial decrees, and acts of 
 naturalisation shall be referred to the primary assemblies, and 
 shall not come into force until they have been adopted by a 
 majority of the citizens who have taken part in the voting." 
 
 If we compare the texts of the two laws, it is easy 
 to grasp the difference between the veto and the 
 referendum. The veto is in reality the right of the 
 body of electors to reject within a given time a law 
 
76 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 passed by the Great Council. The requisite majority, 
 however, is that of the electors actually registered. 
 The referendum is the right of the electoral body to 
 sanction new laws that is to say, to either accept or 
 reject them within a specified interval. This right 
 belongs, not to the majority of the registered electors, 
 but to the majority of those who have voted* 
 
 In 1 846 the Constitution of Berne conferred upon 
 the Great Council the right of submitting laws or 
 decrees to the electors at their discretion. 
 
 " The political assemblies (that is to say, all the active citi- 
 zens living within the jurisdiction of a parish) are to be called 
 together to vote on matters which shall be referred to their 
 decision by law. Such issues will be decided by the majority 
 of the aggregate number of citizens actually voting in the whole 
 canton." 
 
 This is the referendum at the option of the Great 
 Council? A similar provision was subsequently in- 
 serted in most of the cantonal constitutions, but it 
 was expressed in greater detail, and was more care- 
 fully defined. 
 
 The canton of Vaud about this time adopted an 
 institution which had hitherto been unknown outside 
 the little cantons with Landsgemeinden. According 
 
 1 ["In other words, the men who do not vote at the referen- 
 dum are neglected, while in the veto they are treated as if they 
 had voted affirmatively." Lowell, Governments and Parties in Con- 
 tinental Europe, 1896, p. 249.] 
 
 2 Whenever the term optional referendum is used in the course 
 of this work, it means the referendum at the option of the electors 
 that is to say, the popular voting which a certain number of 
 electors have the right to demand in the case of a law passed by 
 the Chamber. M. de Laveleye is wrong in speaking of the Bernese 
 referendum of 1846 as a referendum at the option of the people. 
 Le gourernement dans la democratic, ii. p. 150. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 77 
 
 to the Constitution of 1845 (Art. 21), if 8000 citizens 
 demanded a popular vote on any question whatever, 
 whether it were the making of a new law or the 
 repeal of one already in existence, the legislative 
 assembly was obliged to comply with this demand. 
 This was the popular initiative, unlimited as to its 
 scope. 
 
 The veto was not introduced into the Constitution 
 of Vaud, because of its essentially negative character. 
 " Laws submitted to the referendum," said a speaker, 
 " are, no doubt, sometimes accepted ; but when they 
 are rejected, the positive wishes of the country still find 
 no expression. How can you reasonably expect the 
 people to pronounce immediately on a new and com- 
 plicated law? By means of the initiative they will 
 be able to obtain the laws they wish, and can demand 
 the repeal of those they do not care for, after having 
 had experience of their working." x 
 
 From 1830 onwards the cantons began to introduce 
 modifications into their constitutions, all conceived in 
 a more or less democratic spirit. In some cases the 
 form of a representative democracy was still retained, 
 but in others there was a distinct trend towards a 
 system of pure democracy. The result was that one 
 canton after another repealed the reactionary clauses 
 in their constitutions which had been inserted at the 
 time of the Restoration. Of all the legislative work 
 of 1815 the Federal Agreement was soon the only 
 thing left intact, the only surviving relic of an epoch 
 that had passed away. 
 
 The Federal Agreement was merely a contract 
 made between sovereign states acting through their 
 
 1 Curti, Geschickte, pp. 148-58. 
 
78 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 respective governments, and not a constitution drawn 
 up by the representatives of the people and adopted 
 by the electorate. The Federal Diet which it had 
 created was not composed of representatives of the 
 Swiss nation, but of the ambassadors of the sovereign 
 states, bound by definite instructions. It expressed 
 the wishes of a majority of the states, not of the 
 majority of the Swiss people. It was not so much a 
 legislative assembly as an international congress. In 
 all these respects the Federal Agreement was directly 
 opposed to the principles which were embodied in the 
 cantonal constitutions. It therefore became neces- 
 sary to revise it, in order to make the public federal 
 law harmonise with the public law of the cantons. 
 The aim of the Radical party was to effect a complete 
 rupture with the past, and to let nothing remain 
 which should recall the sovereignty of the several 
 states. For the Federal Diet they wished to establish 
 a national assembly which, like the Great Councils of 
 the cantons, should consist of one Chamber, whose 
 members should be elected directly by the people. 
 
 They were only partly successful, however. They 
 effected a compromise with the Federalists, the result 
 of which was to introduce the system of two Chambers 
 into the Confederation. 1 
 
 1 [One of the immediate causes of the new constitution was the 
 war which followed the attempt of the seven Catholic cantons to 
 secede. These cantons Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, 
 Fribourg, and the Valais formed themselves into a confederation 
 called the " Sonderbund," for purposes of mutual defence of terri- 
 tory and powers. A war followed, in which these cantons were 
 defeated and forced to rejoin the Confederation. But it was felt 
 that some change in the constitution should be undertaken. The 
 direction of that change was due to the influence of the French 
 Revolution of 1830 and the democratic ideas prevailing in the 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 79 
 
 By the terms of the Federal Constitution of 1848 
 " the supreme authority of the Confederation is vested 
 in the Federal Assembly, which is composed of two 
 sections or councils, to wit : (a) the National Council ; 
 (6) the Council of States " (Art. 60). 
 
 The National Council is composed of representatives of the 
 Swiss people, chosen in the ratio of one member for each 
 20,000 persons of the total population. Fractions of upwards of 
 10,000 persons are reckoned as 20,000. Every canton, and in 
 the divided cantons every half canton, chooses at least one repre- 
 sentative (Art. 61). 
 
 The elections for the National Council are direct. They are 
 held in federal electoral districts, which in no case shall be 
 formed out of parts of different cantons (Art. 62). 
 
 Every Swiss citizen who has reached twenty years of age, and 
 who in addition is not excluded from the rights of an active 
 citizen by the legislation of the canton in which he is domiciled, 
 has the right to vote at elections (Art. 63). 
 
 Every Swiss citizen who is a layman, and who has the right 
 to vote, is eligible for membership in the National Council 
 (Art. 64). 
 
 The National Council is chosen for three years, and is entirely 
 renewed at each general election (Art. 65). 
 
 The Council of States consists of forty-four representatives 
 from the cantons. Each canton appoints two representatives ; 
 in the divided cantons each half canton chooses one (Art. 69). 
 
 Members of either council vote without instructions (Art. 79). 
 
 At the same time the Constitution of 1 848 created 
 a federal executive authority, which, under the 
 Federal Agreement of 1815, had existed only in 
 name. 
 
 cantons. This constitution was first of all discussed by a commis- 
 sion of twenty- five members. It was accepted in the Diet by 
 13^ votes against 6J, and on the ist September 1848 by 15^ cantons 
 and 169,743 electors against 17,899. Hilty, Die Bundesferfassungcn, 
 &c., p. 402.] 
 
8o The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 The supreme direction and executive authority of the Con- 
 federation is exercised by a Federal Council composed of seven 
 members (Art. 83). 
 
 The members of the Federal Council are chosen for three 
 years, by the councils in joint session, from among all the Swiss 
 citizens eligible to the National Council, But not more than 
 one member of the Federal Council shall be chosen from the 
 same canton. The Federal Council is chosen anew after each 
 election of the National Council (Art. 84). 
 
 The rights of the people were recognised by the 
 Constitution of 1 848 in two ways. The electors could, 
 firstly, demand the revision of the constitution then 
 in force; and, secondly, they could accept or reject 
 a new constitution rights which applied equally to 
 cantonal and federal constitutions. 
 
 The cantons are bound to ask of the Confederation the 
 guarantee of their constitutions. This guarantee is accorded, 
 provided (c) that the constitutions have been ratified by the 
 people, and may be amended whenever the majority of all the 
 citizens demand it (Art. 6). 
 
 The Federal Constitution may be amended at any time 
 (Art. in). 
 
 Amendment is secured through the forms required for passing 
 federal laws (Art. 112). 
 
 When either council of the Federal Assembly passes a resolu- 
 tion for the amendment of the Federal Constitution and the 
 other council does not agree, or when fifty thousand Swiss voters 
 demand a revision, the question whether the Federal Constitu- 
 tion ought to be revised is, in either case, submitted to a vote of 
 the Swiss people, voting Yes or No. If, in either case, the 
 majority of the Swiss citizens who vote pronounce in the 
 affirmative, there shall be a new election of both councils for 
 the purpose of preparing a draft of the revised constitution 
 (Art. 113). 
 
 The revised Federal Constitution shall come into force when 
 it has been adopted by the majority of Swiss citizens who 
 take part in the vote thereon and by a majority of the states 
 (Art. 114). 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 81 
 
 The Federal Constitution of 1848 had the effect 
 of making the representative system temporarily 
 popular, and seemed likely to arrest the tendency 
 of public cantonal law to become purely demo- 
 cratic. Schwyz and Zug gave up their Landsge- 
 meinden, and the referendum disappeared from the 
 constitution of the Valais. This proved, however, 
 to be only a passing check. Thurgau in 1849, and 
 Schaffhausen in 1853, adopted the system of the 
 veto, whilst in 1852 the referendum again made its 
 appearance in the Valais in the following form: 
 "Every change in the financial system, and every 
 proposed increase in taxation, must be submitted 
 to the people for ratification" (Constitution of the 
 23rd December 1852, Art. 72). 
 
 In the same year the initiative gained a foothold in 
 Aargau, but its scope was much narrower than in the 
 canton of Vaud. " Any law in force shall be wholly 
 or partially changed or modified when a demand to 
 that effect is made by 5000 citizens, giving their 
 reasons for desiring such a change, and provided also 
 that when the proposed change is brought before the 
 electors in the communal assemblies, the majority of 
 those voting shall be in favour of such a change." 
 
 The following year the referendum in the Grisons 
 was modernised, and from henceforth the adoption or 
 rejection of laws depended on the majority of the 
 electors who voted, and not, as heretofore, on the 
 majority of the communes. 
 
 In 1856 Solothurn adopted the optional refer- 
 endum, i.e. the referendum at the option of the 
 electors, though, as a matter of fact, it was called 
 the veto. " Laws shall be submitted to the people 
 
82 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 for their acceptance or rejection when 3000 electors 
 demand the veto, giving their reasons within thirty 
 days after the publication of a law. The fate of the 
 law is decided by the majority of the electors taking 
 part in the vote." 
 
 In 1858 the constituent assembly of Neuchatel 
 decided that for the future every loan or financial 
 undertaking exceeding the sum of 500,000 francs 
 should be submitted to the people for their ratifi- 
 cation. This was the financial referendum, and it 
 was adopted hi 1861 by the canton of Vaud, and 
 later by several others. The people of Neuchatel 
 had introduced this form of referendum in conse- 
 quence of a vote of the Great Council by which a 
 very high subsidy had been given to a railway of 
 merely local importance. 
 
 The progress of democracy up to this date had 
 been somewhat uncertain. Fears were entertained 
 of the results of the direct interference of the people, 
 owing to their inexperience, their shortsightedness, 
 their caprices and passions. It seemed as if the 
 mind of the masses had not yet reached that stage 
 of political maturity when it would be safe to dis- 
 pense with the tutelage of the ruling classes. The 
 Great Councils, after drawing back several times, 
 at length regretfully relinquished their prerogatives, 
 and shared their powers with their electors. 
 
 The time came at last, however, when all counsels 
 of prudence and moderation were thrown to the 
 winds. Soon after 1 860 a perfect wave of democracy 
 seemed suddenly to sweep over the country, carrying 
 all before it, and in a very short space of time the 
 
TJie Evolution of Democracy 83 
 
 representative system was ousted from the position 
 which up to that time it had succeeded in main- 
 taining. Rural-Basle was the first to break through 
 the barriers which the authorities had succeeded in 
 raising, with the result that the people became really 
 and effectively sovereign. 
 
 The veto of 1832 was suppressed, as being an in- 
 stitution that was out of date. Its place was taken 
 by the compulsory referendum and the popular 
 initiative. " No law or important decree can come 
 into force without having been approved by the 
 referendum; and, furthermore, any 1500 electors 
 have the right of provoking a vote of the people 
 at any time on the question of the repeal or amend- 
 ment of a law in force" (Constitution of the 6th 
 of May 1863). This was the greatest advance that 
 had as yet been made by any canton towards direct 
 legislation by the people. 
 
 A few years after, Zurich, Berne, Solothurn, 
 Thurgati, and Aargau, within a few months of each 
 other, followed the example of Rural-Basle, and 
 adopted the compulsory referendum; while all ex- 
 cept Berne adopted the popular initiative. At Berne 
 the Radical majority had voted subsidies to new 
 railways which had exceeded the ordinary revenue 
 of the state. The Conservative minority thereupon 
 urged the adoption of the financial referendum, think- 
 ing that it might put a stop to any increase of the 
 deficit. The radical Democrats cleverly managed to 
 excite both parties in such a manner that a race 
 for popular favour took place between them, and 
 neither Radicals nor Conservatives would let them- 
 selves be outdone by the other in proving the 
 
84 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 confidence they felt in the people. 1 Large sections 
 of both parties, therefore, agreed in supporting a 
 compulsory referendum (i) on all laws; (2) on the 
 orders of the Great Council, involving an outlay of 
 more than 500,000 francs for the same object; (3) 
 on the state budget when drawn up for a period of 
 four years. 2 
 
 At Ziirich the debates were concerned with the 
 practical rather than the theoretical aspect of reform, 
 and the discussions centred round the questions of 
 compulsory voting, and of open as opposed to secret 
 voting. The advanced democrats proposed to divide 
 the people into sections, which should assemble on 
 the same day in the principal place of each district 
 to debate and vote on the laws. The advantages of 
 this scheme, they maintained, were as follows: In 
 the first place, it will provide for a preliminary public 
 discussion, which is essential if the referendum is to 
 contribute to the political education of the people. 
 Secondly, at these sectional assemblies the deputies 
 will get to know the needs of the people, they will 
 be made acquainted with the objections of those 
 in opposition, and will discover the omissions and 
 weak points of the law in question. The meetings 
 will thus differ from the meetings got up in the 
 ordinary way by the different parties, where laws are 
 never discussed except from one point of view, and 
 the explanatory messages of the government, so far 
 
 1 Bandelier, Du Referendum au point de vue jurassicn Porrentruy, 
 1869, p. 15 ; Gengel, Die Erweiterung der Volksrechte, Berne, 1868, 
 p. ii. 
 
 2 Law of the igth of May 1869 to carry out Article 6, section 4, 
 of the Constitution. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 85 
 
 from being impartial commentaries, are themselves 
 only expressions of personal opinions. It has been 
 said that the press will inform the electors of the 
 advantages and disadvantages of a law. This may 
 be true for the electors who read journals of all 
 shades of opinion, but the great majority of men 
 only take in one newspaper. 
 
 The other side dwelt successfully on the incon- 
 veniences of the popular vote, on the difficulty of 
 introducing what was termed compulsory political 
 instruction, and on the impossibility of discussing 
 one or more laws seriously in a popular assembly 
 which could only meet for a few hours. 
 
 After the revisions of 1869 there were only three 
 and a half cantons in which the representative system 
 still held its ground. They were Geneva, Ticino, 
 Fribourg, and Basle-City. To-day Fribourg is the 
 only one. Everywhere else the Great Councils have 
 ceased to be the sole legislative powers, and the 
 electors themselves may now propose or ratify laws. 
 
 When we examine the causes of this general trans- 
 formation of representative democracy into pure de- 
 mocracy, and the reasons for the displacement of the 
 centre of political gravity; when we search among 
 the contemporary pamphlets and interrogate the poli- 
 ticians of those times, we find a general agreement 
 that all the cantonal constitutions which resulted 
 from the revolutionary movement of 1830 were 
 fundamentally defective. They were hastily framed 
 by men beside themselves with enthusiasm for de- 
 mocracy. They were incongruous from the very 
 first, and were constructed with a complete disregard 
 of the laws of political equilibrium. The dominant 
 
86 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 idea of the framers of these constitutions was to en- 
 sure political equality, and to establish the sovereignty 
 of the people as an unassailable principle. They 
 believed that this problem was solved when they 
 had given every citizen a right to vote, and had 
 vested all the powers in the direct representatives 
 of the nation. The whole authority of government 
 was accordingly concentrated in a single assembly, 
 the Great Council. The logical application of their 
 principles implied that there could be no independent 
 authority. The Great Council was itself sovereign 
 by delegation, and it would have been a contradic- 
 tion to admit any independent power side by side 
 with it. The Great Council was not only the legis- 
 lative assembly of the canton, but it was itself the 
 source of all the powers not expressly attributed to 
 it by the constitution. It elected the judicial authori- 
 ties, and it appointed and dismissed the members of 
 the government. There was no separation of powers 
 in a constitution of this kind. The other parts of 
 the body politic, dependent as they were on the legis- 
 lative assembly, were absolutely incapable of acting 
 as checks on it. By the very fact of their origin 
 they were reduced to the position of subordinate 
 authorities, either administrative or judicial. Un- 
 fortunately the councils themselves did not provide 
 any safeguards against too hasty legislation on their 
 part. In the absence of any external controlling 
 power, it was especially important that measures 
 should not be rushed into laws, but that their pro- 
 gress should be slow and deliberate, and that there 
 should be certain delays fixed by law. The regula- 
 tions for debate in the majority of the Great Councils 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 87 
 
 did not, however, contain any such provision. It is 
 true that in some cantons measures had to undergo 
 a second and even a third reading, but administrative 
 orders were generally free from this restriction. More- 
 over, there was nothing beyond the power of the Great 
 Council, no executive measure which it could not en- 
 force by an order or resolution as soon as it believed 
 itself secure from an immediate reaction of popular 
 opinion. The Great Council was everything, and did 
 everything. The men who imagined that they had 
 put an end to despotism in 1830 were mistaken. 
 They had only substituted the omnipotence of the 
 elected council for the omnipotence of the aristo- 
 cratic families. Democracy had not really been 
 established. The work was yet to do. Although 
 all were agreed as to the necessity for a revision, 
 politicians could not come to an understanding as 
 to the nature of the revision itself. Some proposed 
 to reform the existing system, others to abolish it. 
 The former party did not like the idea of taking a 
 leap in the dark. They were willing to take measures 
 against the omnipotence of the Great Council, in 
 whose hands all the powers were now collected, but 
 they were also desirous of retaining the representa- 
 tive system. 
 
 The other party, however, would be satisfied with 
 nothing less than a complete reform. "That the people 
 are sovereign is a point on which we are all agreed," 
 they said ; " but under the representative system, as 
 soon as the people have once delegated their autho- 
 rity to their representatives, that sovereignty becomes 
 a mere farce, and they are cheated out of their rights. 
 Hence checks of doubtful efficacy are not sufficient to 
 
88 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 provide against the abuse of power by the representa- 
 tive assembly. The evil must be cut off at the root 
 by abolishing representation." The parliamentarians, 
 for their part, proposed to limit the duration of each 
 assembly to one or two years, and to put both the 
 right of dissolving the Great Council and the election 
 of the executive in the hands of the people. 1 
 
 These were measures of which the "democrats" 
 approved, only they did not wish to stop here. " As 
 long as the Great Council can legislate at will for the 
 people," they said, " and as long as the people submit 
 to their rule, we shall not be a true democracy. The 
 people are sovereign, the sovereign is he who com- 
 mands, he cannot be commanded, and, therefore, the 
 people being sovereign, must make the law. The 
 function of the members of the Great Council should 
 be to act as councillors of the people, to make com- 
 plicated and difficult questions clear, and to generally 
 instruct the people. But the people themselves must 
 
 1 The right of dissolution is recognised by the Constitution of 
 Aargau (Art. 29), of Solothurn (Art. 25), of Kural-Basle (Arts. 2 and 
 53), of Thurgau (Art. 5), of Berne (Art. 22), of Schaffhausen (Art. 44), 
 of Lucerne (Art. 44). In all these cantons the government is obliged 
 to bring the question of the dissolution of the Great Council before 
 the electors as soon as the requisite number have made a demand 
 to that effect. 
 
 [It will be noticed that these cantons are all German cantons. 
 "The German cantons;" says Mr. Lowell, p. 230, "though more 
 socialistic, are less ready to be guided and controlled by the 
 government, while the French are inclined to respect public autho- 
 rities, and regard them as commissioned to rule the people as their 
 superior wisdom may direct. Hence it is in German Switzerland 
 that we find most highly developed those institutions which are 
 intended to limit the powers of the Great Council and enable the 
 people to protect themselves against any possible oppression on its 
 part ; that we find, in short, the greatest desire to substitute a pure 
 for a representative democracy."] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 89 
 
 have the right of initiating, discussing, and sanction- 
 ing their own laws." Such were the views of the 
 democrats, and the abuses of power by the parlia- 
 mentary majorities at once justified and ensured the 
 success of the " democratic " claims, which enlisted to 
 a certain extent the sympathies of the mass of the 
 people. Public opinion at length became sufficiently 
 aroused for both parties to exploit it in their own 
 interests. Sometimes those in opposition headed 
 their programme with "Extension of the rights of 
 the people," hoping by this means to attract all mal- 
 contents to their standard and thus get into power. 
 Sometimes the party in power made use of the cry, 
 fearing a possible defeat, and wishing to arm them- 
 selves against the time when they too should be in 
 a minority. The parliamentarians, who had treated 
 the democrats as " demagogues " and " anarchists," 
 began to see that they must advance with the times, 
 and adopt some of the new ideas. But their con- 
 cessions were niggardly in the extreme. They in- 
 cluded, for instance, the veto, but they hedged it 
 round with so many checks that it was almost 
 impossible for it to be used. They also added the 
 referendum at the option of the Great Council, and 
 then, after a good deal of hesitation, the referendum 
 at the option of the people. The parliamentarians 
 considered that the Great Council was the sum of 
 the intelligence of the canton, and ought therefore 
 to be the principal legislator, the intervention of 
 the ignorant mass of the people being advisable 
 only very occasionally, and under exceptional cir- 
 cumstances. The democrats regarded the matter 
 from quite a different standpoint, and never ceased 
 
90 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 clamouring and agitating until the triumph of the 
 compulsory referendum and the popular initiative 
 was assured until, in fact, they had established the 
 modern forms of legislation by the people. Direct 
 legislation proved infectious, and spread from canton 
 to canton, its introduction being mainly due to its 
 inclusion in the programmes of political parties. 
 
 It still remains an interesting question whether 
 the representative system would have been so easily 
 dethroned if the constitutions of 1830 had been 
 differently framed ; if, for instance, a second Chamber 
 had been set up side by side with the Great Council, 
 or if, at least, the government of the canton had 
 not so frequently fallen into the hands of fictitious 
 majorities obtained by gerrymandering the consti- 
 tuencies. My own opinion is, that even had these 
 things been differently organised, yet the result would 
 have been the same. The one idea of the constitu- 
 tion makers of 1830 was to introduce an all-powerful 
 authority into the machine of government. No 
 system of checks was devised, and, as a result, they 
 were obliged to seek for some controlling force out- 
 side the constitution, and found it in the people, who, 
 unintelligent and wayward though they might fye, 
 could alone exercise a real control over the Great 
 Council. The sovereign people were the only limit 
 which could possibly be placed on the encroach- 
 ments of this sovereign assembly and on the omni- 
 potence of the Great Council, and in this fact lies 
 the explanation of the evolution of democracy in the 
 Swiss cantons. 1 
 
 1 [Mr. Lowell also comes to the same conclusion, "that the 
 ultimate basis of the demand for the referendum, the real founda- 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 91 
 
 III. The "Rights of the People" in the 
 Confederation. 
 
 The question of revising the Federal Constitution 
 of 1 848 arose for the first time in 1 864, and was the 
 result of a commercial treaty made with France on 
 
 tion of the belief in the right of the people to take a direct part 
 in legislation, lay in the defective condition of the representative 
 system." He points out that the Swiss had no experience of repre- 
 sentative government. " Except for the Orisons and the Valais, 
 with their peculiar federal structure, the cantons either made 
 their laws by means of Landsgemeinden, or else the country districts 
 were ruled by the dominant city, and the city by a few patrician 
 families ; while the Confederation itself was so loosely organised, 
 that the Diet was not a true legislative body, but rather a congress 
 of ambassadors. 
 
 "It is curious that in Switzerland alone, among the countries 
 north of the Alps, representative government did not arise spon- 
 taneously. The fact is, that owing to the absence of royal power, 
 which was the great unifying force in the Middle Ages, the country 
 did not become sufficiently consolidated to have a central legisla- 
 ture, and no one of the separate communities that made up the 
 Confederation was large enough by itself to need a representative 
 system. . . . The result was, that when representative institutions 
 were copied from other countries, the Swiss were not accustomed 
 to them. In the first place, they did not know how to provide the 
 necessary checks and balances ; and in the second, they had not 
 learned to make their Chambers reflect public opinion. The people 
 had not acquired the art of limiting or controlling the representa- 
 tive bodies. They continued to be jealous of the men they elected, 
 and the legislatures were or, what for political purposes is the same 
 thing, were believed to be out of sympathy with the majority of 
 the people. 
 
 "The struggle for political equality was, therefore, no sooner at 
 an end, and representative bodies based on universal suffrage were 
 no sooner established, than the demand for direct popular legisla- 
 tion began. Its introduction has acted like oil upon troubled 
 waters. The referendum, by putting an end to doubts about the 
 real opinion of the majority upon disputed questions, has removed 
 at once a means of agitation and a source of discontent." See 
 Governments, &c., pp. 238, 246.] 
 
92 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 the 3<Dth of June in that year. This treaty granted 
 the right of settlement in Switzerland to all French- 
 men, without distinction of creed. The Constitution 
 of 1848, however, only granted the right of free 
 settlement to those Swiss citizens who belonged to 
 the Christian faith. The Swiss Jews immediately 
 availed themselves of the treaty to demand a re- 
 vision of the Federal Constitution in order that they 
 might be placed on the same footing as their French 
 co-religionists. On the 3Oth of September 1864 the 
 Federal Assembly ratified the treaty with France, 
 although the rights of settlement accorded were con- 
 trary to the provisions of the Constitution of 1848. 
 On the same day, however, it invited the Federal 
 Council to report on the question as soon as possible, 
 and to present a scheme in which the right of settle- 
 ment should not be affected by the religious belief of 
 the citizen. The Federal Council replied to this 
 request by a message of the ist of July 1865. I n 
 their report, however, they did not confine themselves 
 to the one subject, but enumerated several points 
 which, in their opinion, might be profitably added or 
 amended. Most of these suggestions were concerned 
 with the right of settlement ; the others proposed that 
 the federal government should have its legislative 
 domain extended, and should be empowered to take 
 measures to protect literary and artistic copyright, to 
 regulate commerce and transport, and to establish a 
 uniform system of weights and measures. 
 
 On the 1 4th of January 1866 the electors were 
 summoned to vote on the new articles proposed by 
 the Federal Assembly. Of the nine amendments 
 which were submitted to the referendum, two only 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 93 
 
 found favour with the people, and these only obtained 
 a small majority. They were the amendments which 
 conferred the right of civil equality on the Jews, and 
 which established a uniform system of weights and 
 measures. 1 
 
 Many Radicals, while approving these new clauses, 
 had nevertheless voted No, because they were not 
 satisfied with a mere partial revision, and they hoped 
 by bringing about the rejection of these amendments 
 to lead up to a total revision. Their tactics were 
 successful, and it became patent after the popular 
 voting of the I4th of January that the Constitution 
 of 1848 would have ere long to be very considerably 
 altered. 
 
 The Radicals of German Switzerland were at the 
 head of the party of revision. They wished to limit 
 the autonomy of the cantons, and to strengthen the 
 central government, partly in order to give the great 
 German cantons a preponderating influence, and partly 
 also to be able more easily to restrict the liberty of 
 the Church in the Catholic cantons. Their programme 
 may be summed up in three phrases one army, one 
 system of law, and no ultramontanism. 2 The citizens 
 of the larger cantons, notably Berne and Zurich, were 
 not only engaged on a campaign to bring about a 
 federal revision; they were also striving to obtain 
 
 1 [The first amendment obtained 170,032 votes, while 149,401 were 
 recorded against it. The second, on weights and measures, obtained 
 159,202 for and 156,396 against, but it was rejected by a majority 
 of the cantons, and so fell through. It is the only instance in 
 which a law that has been sanctioned by a numerical majority has 
 failed to obtain the necessary cantonal majority. The net result 
 is that only one law came into force.] 
 
 2 Von Segesser, Sammlung kleiner Schriften, iii. p. 347. 
 
94 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 an extension of popular rights in the cantons the 
 two agitations going on at the same time. We have 
 already seen that the compulsory referendum was 
 the result of their efforts in Berne and . Zurich, and 
 that Thurgau, Solothurn, and Aargau followed their 
 example. 
 
 From this time onwards it became certain that the 
 federal revision so ardently desired by the Radicals 
 would have to be undertaken in a democratic spirit, 
 and that any addition to the powers of the central 
 government must be accompanied by an extension 
 of the rights of the people. To transfer the right of 
 legislating on civil, criminal, and commercial matters 
 from the Great Councils to the Federal Assembly, 
 without at the same time giving the Swiss electors 
 an opportunity to pronounce on these same subjects 
 when embodied in federal laws, would have deprived 
 the people in the democratic cantons of the fruit of 
 their recent victories, and would have been a retro- 
 grade step. 
 
 The democrats, who were in reality struggling for 
 the rights of the people, recognised this so clearly 
 that they made centralisation their aim, as the surest 
 way of obtaining the referendum in federal matters. 
 
 Long before the question came up in the Federal 
 Assembly, the contest between the parliamentarians 
 and democrats began in the press and in pamphlets. 
 The following is but a summary of the arguments 
 used by each side. 
 
 The parliamentarians possessed a champion of the 
 first order hi M. Dubs, a distinguished lawyer and 
 member of the Federal Council. M. Dubs expressed 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 
 
 his ideas on the subject in a pamphlet which made 
 a great sensation. 1 
 
 "We ought," he wrote, "to try to reconcile the 
 liberty of action necessary to the representatives with 
 the rights that are inherent in the sovereign people. 
 The people delegate power to their deputies, who are 
 responsible for its proper use, and ought therefore to 
 be accorded a certain latitude ; but, at the same time, 
 the people ought to possess some guarantee against 
 the independence of their deputies. Without some 
 such safeguard their sovereignty is imperilled, and 
 there is a risk of its becoming a mere empty phrase. 
 Now, how is it possible to reconcile these two essentials 1. 
 
 "(i) The people must ratify the constitution of the 
 state. They should have the right to accept or reject 
 it, not as a whole, but article by article. They ought 
 besides to be able to revise it at any time, hi whole 
 or in part. 
 
 "(2) The electors ought to have the power of de- 
 manding new laws, but the Chamber should remain 
 free to deal with their petition. As to the laws 
 already voted by parliament, a certain number of the 
 electors, to be fixed hereafter, ought to have at all 
 times the right of demanding the repeal of a law by 
 presenting a petition to that effect, which should also 
 contain the reasons for desiring such a change. If 
 the adversaries of a law can collect the requisite 
 number of signatures, the electoral body will be con- 
 sulted, and will decide whether the law in question 
 shall remain in force or not. 
 
 "(3) There should be no longer general elections at 
 
 1 Dubs, Die schweizerische Democratic in ihrer Fortentwicklung, 
 1868. 
 
g6 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 fixed intervals, but the electors should be able at any 
 time to bring about the dissolution of the Chamber, 
 or, in other words, to dismiss their representatives. 
 
 " (4) The people ought to appoint and dismiss the 
 members of the government. They ought also to 
 settle disputes between the government and the 
 Chambers." 
 
 The system of M. Dubs was the result of a train of 
 argument in which the conclusions were rigorously 
 and correctly reasoned out. When, however, his 
 opponents began to reckon up the democratic reforms 
 included, they regarded them as quite insufficient. 
 There was no referendum, either compulsory or op- 
 tional; nothing but the right of initiative, limited 
 to the repeal of existing laws. They could never be 
 content with such trifling concessions. 
 
 The views of the democratic party were defended 
 by M. Gengel, the editor of the Bund. 1 
 
 " Under the system to which the name representa- 
 tive democracy has been given, the sovereignty of the 
 people is only a fiction ; the people are, in fact, sub- 
 ordinate, and the supreme power is in the hands of 
 the Chamber. To say that popular sovereignty and 
 universal suffrage are one and the same thing is 
 ridiculous. Once the elections are past the electors 
 have no possible influence over the Chamber. They 
 do not take part in the sittings; they do not read 
 the parliamentary reports, even if they exist ; and in 
 the newspapers they only get mutilated and abbrevi- 
 ated accounts of what has taken place. In order that 
 popular sovereignty should not be an empty phrase, 
 and democracy a lie, the people ought themselves to 
 
 1 Gengel, Aphorismen iiber detnokratifchcs Staatsrecht, Berne, 1864. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 97 
 
 approve their laws, appoint the executive, and elect 
 the judges." l 
 
 Gengel was also a zealous advocate of the com- 
 pulsory referendum. " Under a democratic system," 
 he said, " all the laws passed by the Chamber ought 
 to be submitted ipso jure to the sanction of the 
 people. When the representatives know that the 
 laws will finally go to the people, they will make 
 it their business to frame them in harmony with 
 popular ideas and needs, and will try to supply the 
 omissions. Having the final decision in their hands, 
 the people, too, will make a careful study of the laws. 
 With the compulsory referendum the people will give 
 their votes as a matter of course, whereas in the case 
 of the optional referendum they will only do so after a 
 certain amount of agitation. The optional referendum 
 is a weapon of opposition. It can only reject. The 
 compulsory referendum, on the contrary, is the means 
 of expressing the popular will and ratifying the acts 
 of those in power. The optional referendum does 
 not occur, like the compulsory referendum, at certain 
 stated intervals. It is the outburst of a discontent 
 which has been smouldering and increasing, until at 
 last it breaks out when opportunity offers. It is, in 
 fact, a safety-valve. But the compulsory referendum 
 is the normal and peaceable exercise of an established 
 right, by a people that has attained its political 
 majority. Those who advocate the optional refer- 
 endum attempt to restrict the exercise of this popular 
 right to the smallest possible number of cases. The 
 compulsory referendum, on the contrary, is the solemn 
 recognition and practical affirmation of the sovereign 
 power of the people." 
 
 1 Gengel, Die Erwdterung der Volksrechte, Berne, 1868. 
 
 G 
 
98 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 Another publicist, M. Bernet, entered upon the task 
 of demolishing the veto with great vigour. 
 
 "The statesmen of 1830 invented the veto as a 
 sort of lightning-conductor for democratic claims. 
 It was necessary to give the people something, but 
 their object was to give as little as possible. The 
 veto was a pis alter. The legislation on the veto was, 
 generally speaking, a sad piece of bungling eine 
 traurige stumperei. The legislators have tried to 
 stifle the expression of the popular will by all kinds 
 of devices. They either fixed the necessary number 
 of signatures at a very high percentage of the total, 
 or they counted those who were absent as having 
 accepted ; or the period during which the operation of 
 the law was suspended, in order to allow the demand 
 for the referendum to take place, was made as short 
 as possible. The result has been, therefore, that for 
 the greater part of the time the veto has only been a 
 counterfeit of a popular right." 1 
 
 The referendum itself was severely criticised by 
 M. Dubs. 
 
 " The people are asked," he said, " to give a delibe- 
 rate judgment, either affirmative or negative, directly 
 after the publication of a law. But, as a rule, the 
 people will not be disposed to give their decision 
 under these conditions. They will prefer to wait and 
 see how the new law works. And what is the objec- 
 tion to their doing so ? The mistake which is made 
 by those who theorise about democracy is in imagin- 
 ing that the people think as easily and as rapidly as 
 they do themselves. It is not abstract theory, but 
 
 1 Bernet, Nach zwanziy Jahren, 1868. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 99 
 
 practical experience, that instructs the great mass of 
 men. Their judgment is as sound as that of Parlia- 
 ment as long as they have been allowed to form it in 
 their own way. 1 If you introduce the referendum 
 Parliament becomes merely a consultative committee. 
 Its responsibility disappears, because it no longer de- 
 cides anything definitely when the people pronounce 
 in the last instance. You would do better to suppress 
 the Parliament and replace it by special committees 
 composed of competent men, whose duty it should be 
 to draft bills. Under the present system the majority 
 of the deputies exercise the functions of a jury ; they 
 listen to the debates carried on by specialists, and 
 vote in the best interests of the people. If, however, 
 the people are to be the judges of their own interests, 
 there is no need for such a jury. 
 
 " Does any reasonable man think that the sum of the 
 votes given in the communes is the exact expression of 
 the national will ? This may be true as regards quan- 
 tity, but not as regards quality ; for such small local 
 assemblies always judge everything from an egotistical 
 and utilitarian standpoint. It has been said that the 
 referendum is an excellent means of politically edu- 
 
 1 Dubs, Die schweizerische Demokratie in ihrer Fortentwicklung, 
 pp. 16-19. M. Buzberger, a deputy, expressed the same idea at a 
 later date in the National Council. " The people," he declared, " can 
 scarcely be expected to pronounce upon a law unless it has been in 
 force a certain time." And M. Taine also says : " A people, when 
 consulted, would probably be able to say what form of government 
 pleases them, but not what form of government they need. They 
 will only find that out by experience. You must give them time to 
 see if the political structure, is adequate, solid, and capable of re- 
 sisting gusts of fanaticism ; whether it be suited to their customs, 
 to their occupations, their character, peculiarities, and eccentrici- 
 ties " (UAncicn Rfyimc, Preface, p. n). 
 
ioo The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 eating the people. This would be true enough if the 
 people were united in one large assembly, and heard 
 the laws discussed first in principle and then in detail, 
 and could listen to the arguments advanced by com- 
 petent men on both sides. The referendum is not, 
 however, of much use if each individual elector has 
 to study the law by himself. Where are the great 
 mass of men to find the time to do this, even if they 
 possess the will ? The great majority will always vote 
 on party lines, or else in accordance with the oracles 
 of the village inn, or the advice of any man in whom 
 they have confidence." 
 
 M. Hilty answered the criticisms of M. Dubs by 
 setting forth the advantages of the referendum. 
 According to him, "the majority of votes, whether 
 for or against a law, will be recorded in such a calm 
 and decisive manner as to leave no room for dispute ; 
 the people will no longer be subordinate; the refer- 
 endum will be the best means of interesting the 
 mass of electors in public affairs; popular voting is 
 a natural and necessary factor in law-making, and 
 laws so made will have a truly national character." J 
 
 The Federal Assembly met in November 1871 for 
 the purpose of discussing the question of revision. 2 
 The President of the National Council, M. Brunner, 
 
 1 Hilty, Theorctiker und Idealistcn der DenwTcratie, Berne, 1868. 
 [M. Hilty concluded by referring to the referendum "as the stone 
 which the builders rejected, and which nevertheless became the 
 head stone of the corner."] 
 
 2 [An appeal had already appeared in the official Gazette of 
 August and September 1870, inviting all Swiss citizens, communes, 
 or corporations to transmit to the Federal Chancery their desires 
 with reference to the constitution. See Fcuille fiddrale, October 22, 
 1870, for the result ; or Borgeaud, p. 298.] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy i o i 
 
 in his opening speech, touched upon each of the 
 important points in the programme of revision. 
 " The question to be decided," he said, " is to know 
 whether the direct intervention of the people in 
 legislation is admissible, and what should be the 
 limits assigned it. These are the points upon which 
 opinions clash. Since the majority of the cantons 
 have accepted the referendum, it has in my opinion 
 become impossible, politically speaking, to effect any 
 revision of the Federal Constitution which shall in- 
 volve increased centralisation without at the same 
 time bestowing upon the Swiss people as a whole 
 the right of which the majority of them have been 
 deprived as members of a canton." l 
 
 The Assembly was unanimous as to the necessity 
 for a new constitution which should entail a greater 
 amount of centralisation. 2 Differences of opinion 
 arose only on questions of detail. The referendum 
 therefore seemed to be inevitable. 
 
 It encountered, however, a good deal of opposition 
 among the more eminent members of the Chamber. 
 A speech of M. Welti, in particular, made a great im- 
 pression. The following are some extracts from it: 
 
 1 This quotation and those that follow are taken from the " Report 
 of the debates of the Swiss National Council on the revision of the 
 Federal Constitution," 1871-72. 
 
 2 [In 1870 the war between France and Germany had broken out, 
 and the success of the Germans pointed very significantly to the 
 results attained by centralisation. Moreover, there was the danger 
 that Switzerland could be invaded by one or other of the hostile 
 armies, and the necessity of giving the central government greater 
 power in military matters became apparent. In 1869 the National 
 Council had proposed to revise the constitution by means of nine 
 amendments. They now decided to examine each of the articles of 
 the constitution in turn, to see if they required modification.] 
 
102 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 " It has been asserted several times that the repre- 
 sentative form of government is inadequate, and that 
 it ought to be looked upon as dead and buried. Yet 
 the freest and greatest nations are, nevertheless, 
 those living under this form of government. It is no 
 invention of politicians, but the outcome of natural 
 causes, and cannot therefore be quietly put on one 
 side. 
 
 " The representative system will always reappear in 
 some shape or another. Many reproaches have been 
 levelled against this present age, especially since 1830. 
 It has been said that it is a period of political over- 
 production, that the wants of the people have not 
 been comprehended, and that we have gone too 
 fast. The reproach is an honourable one, for, at 
 any rate, the power has not been used by any one 
 section representing property, money, or the church, 
 as is so generally the rule nowadays. But once in- 
 troduce the referendum, and all the elements which 
 we believed we had succeeded in repressing will again 
 rise up to confront us; and twenty years hence, 
 perhaps, the sovereign people will have fallen under 
 the yoke of social autocrats, the great manufacturers 
 and the clergy. 
 
 "Up to the present time the people, in spite of 
 the absence of the referendum, have not lacked 
 the means of getting rid of an institution they dis- 
 liked. We have universal suffrage, the freedom of 
 the press, the right of public meeting, and in each 
 house a Vetterli. 1 These are the real guarantees of 
 liberty. If we do not make use of them, the fault 
 lies, not with our institutions, but in ourselves. For 
 
 1 A rifle. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 103 
 
 my part, I am convinced that the people will be 
 found incapable of fulfilling the functions of a legis- 
 lator." 
 
 M. Gonzenbach also made a speech much to the 
 same effect, and said: "When there is an assembly 
 consisting of one house, as in the cantons, the refer- 
 endum may perhaps be looked on as a necessity; 
 but in the Confederation, when we have two coun- 
 cils, the fact that laws have to run the gauntlet of 
 two houses is a better guarantee than the popular 
 vote. If you wish to cite an example of a state 
 that is really free and well organised, and which has 
 attained a high intellectual level, you do not think 
 of quoting the cantons with Landsgemeinden or the 
 Orisons or Valais. Progressive ideas are not the 
 privilege of the masses, but of isolated individuals. 
 It is a mistake to suppose that the referendum 
 will make it easier to execute the laws. A law 
 which has been accepted by only a small majority 
 will be very difficult to enforce." 
 
 M. Ziegler replied to these criticisms in words 
 which have since been often quoted. 
 
 "You call the people incapable," he said, "yet 
 they are eminently capable of electing representa- 
 tives, which is quite as difficult a task as voting 
 on laws. How can it be said that the people are 
 incompetent to vote on laws when it is an estab- 
 lished principle that ignorance of law is no excuse for 
 breaking it, and in the ordinary affairs of life every 
 one is required to know the law he lives under ? " 
 
 M. Carteret, of Geneva, of whose pronounced 
 
iO4 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 Radicalism there can be no doubt, repudiated alike 
 the referendum, the veto, and the initiative. He 
 was, however, a supporter of the popular right of 
 dissolving the Assembly, by which the electors would 
 be able to change their delegates when they no longer 
 represented their wishes and their ideas. He pro- 
 posed that the National Council should adopt an 
 article framed as follows: "The question of the 
 renewal of the Federal Assembly shall be brought 
 before the electors when 30,000 citizens who have 
 the right to vote shall make a demand to that effect." 
 
 " Such a method of dissolving the Federal Assem- 
 bly," said M. Scherer, " is a violent measure, and one 
 that it would be hardly ever advisable to adopt, 
 especially as the public officials are now elected for 
 such short terms as to make it unnecessary. The 
 people can at present always weed out those they 
 may dislike by refusing to re-elect them." 
 
 When put to the vote, this motion of M. Carteret 
 was rejected by 61 votes to 38. 
 
 The referendum at the option of the Federal 
 Legislature was suggested by M. Borel, and met 
 with even less encouragement. "A referendum 
 which is dependent on the good- will of the councils," 
 M. Brunner remarked, "will not help us much. A 
 similar institution was introduced into the Constitu- 
 tion of Berne in 1 846, giving the Great Council the 
 option of submitting a law or a decree to the people 
 when they thought it advisable. The minority made 
 several attempts to induce them to use this power, 
 but the majority always refused to accede to their 
 request." " This form of the referendum," M. Scherer 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 105 
 
 said, "would only be used when the councils are 
 afraid to take the responsibility of a law on them- 
 selves, and wish to shift the burden of it on the 
 people." The referendum at the option of the Legis- 
 lature was rejected by 64 votes to 34. 
 
 M. Anderwert was willing to go further in the 
 matter of making concessions to the people, and 
 proposed the veto. " It is admitted," he said, " that 
 the people ought to have some direct influence over 
 legislation secured to them. Experience has proved 
 that the actual voters are not usually a large propor- 
 tion of the total number. In the cantons this is 
 partly due to lack of interest and deficient education, 
 but in a greater measure also to the geographical 
 peculiarities of the country. We cannot expect, 
 therefore, to be much more fortunate in the votings 
 on federal laws. It is quite conceivable that the 
 most important laws may fail owing to the indiffer- 
 ence of the majority and the opposition of a weak 
 minority. We ought, therefore, to consider carefully 
 whether a well-arranged veto would not be preferable 
 to a referendum." 
 
 The organisation of the veto as proposed by M. 
 Anderwert was very simple. A certain interval was 
 to be fixed during which the operation of every 
 new law should be suspended, in order to enable its 
 opponents to place their negative votes in the urns 
 provided in the chancery of each commune. If, at 
 the end of the suspensory period, the votes, when 
 counted, proved that a majority of the registered 
 electors were opposed to the law, it should remain 
 a dead-letter. The veto, which had become merely 
 
io6 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 an historical institution at the date of the federal 
 revision, only obtained 19 votes against 69. 
 
 The compulsory referendum found an ardent sup- 
 porter in M. Scherer. " The veto," he said, " merely 
 confers the power of refusal. Failure to say No is 
 regarded as tantamount to acquiescence in every- 
 thing. This system, therefore, counts the indolent 
 on the one hand, while on the other it has the effect 
 of rousing the passions of the rest of the population, 
 who possess more energy and activity. The refer- 
 endum is a most effective method of politically 
 educating the citizen. In order to give his vote 
 he must necessarily study the questions at issue, 
 and make up his mind whether any particular law 
 is framed in the best interests of the country, and 
 whether the time is ripe for introducing a law of 
 this kind. The political societies, the press, and the 
 government messages which will be attached to the 
 bills, will provide excellent opportunities for the 
 citizen to get information and instruction. Finally, 
 it is quite in harmony with the spirit of republi- 
 canism that the representatives of the people should 
 explain to their constituents the motives which in- 
 duced them to support any particular proposal, and 
 should, moreover, be able to do so without incurring 
 any loss of prestige." 
 
 " The referendum should be preferred to the veto, 
 then, because it makes the citizen think, because it 
 contributes to his self-respect, and because it com- 
 bats that indolence which is the great danger of 
 republicanism. It will have this further advantage, 
 that we shall make fewer laws, but that they will 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 107 
 
 be clearer and shorter, and we shall get rid of legis- 
 lation framed to suit the exigencies of the moment." 
 
 The majority of the Federal Assembly were in 
 favour of the referendum, but they thought it suffi- 
 cient to grant any five cantons or 50,000 active 
 citizens the right of claiming a direct appeal to the 
 people. In technical terms, they rejected the com- 
 pulsory referendum, but supported the optional re- 
 ferendum. They were actuated by a fear that the 
 electors would get weary if they were obliged to vote 
 on all federal laws when their time was already so 
 much taken up with the questions that arose in their 
 own canton or commune. The optional referendum 
 seemed to offer the electors every facility for getting 
 rid of unpopular laws. It was, moreover, a com- 
 promise between the adherents of the representative 
 system and the partisans of the compulsory refer- 
 endum. It then became necessary to settle the 
 scope of the referendum, and to determine the 
 subjects on which a demand could be made. 
 M. Brunner proposed, but without success, that 
 only the essential principles underlying a law should 
 be submitted to the people. M. Buzberger replied 
 that if a vote is to be a really popular one, a law 
 must be submitted to the people in its entirety, in 
 order that the people should not afterwards say that 
 if they had known the details they would not have 
 accepted the principle of the law. 
 
 M. Scherer made a distinction between laws and 
 resolutions. " Laws are concerned more especially 
 with the internal organisation, with the political 
 life and domestic politics, of the state. Our policy 
 
io8 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 with regard to matters outside this sphere finds its 
 expression in resolutions, and financial matters are 
 generally settled by means of resolutions. It would 
 not be suitable to confine the referendum to certain 
 subjects. Such a limitation would, in fact, be impos- 
 sible, because the different kinds of laws cannot be 
 classified without infringing the rights of the people. 
 But the right of issuing decrees ought to belong 
 exclusively to the Federal Council. Were such re- 
 solutions submitted to the referendum, it would be 
 impossible to have a good administration, for, as a 
 rule, and especially in the case of finance, peace and 
 war, resolutions require to be carried out promptly." 
 The Federal Assembly finally decided that the refer- 
 endum might be demanded (i) on all laws, (2) on all 
 resolutions which were not of special urgency. 
 
 There still remained a difficult question, and one 
 which, in the eyes of many of the deputies, appeared 
 the most important of all. It was this: Should a 
 majority of the Swiss people alone decide the fate 
 of a law, or should a majority of the cantons be 
 required as well ? 
 
 The Radicals of German Switzerland were anxious 
 that if a majority of Swiss electors had pronounced 
 for or against a law, that law should be declared to 
 be accepted or rejected as the case might be. They 
 feared their plans for centralisation would receive a 
 check if laws had to be referred for approval to the 
 cantons as electoral units. 
 
 The Catholic deputies and the deputies of Romance 
 Switzerland, however, made the cantonal vote a con- 
 dition of their adherence to the referendum. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 109 
 
 The President, M. Brunner, attempted to allay their 
 apprehensions in his opening speech. " The fear that 
 a referendum of the Swiss people without the addition 
 of the restraining vote of the states will lead to our 
 becoming a unitary state seems to me," he said, " to be 
 based only on theory. It is true that, in a confedera- 
 tion of states, all centralising steps lead towards the 
 establishment of a unitary state, and it follows from 
 this that the present Federal Constitution is a great 
 step in that direction. Nevertheless, the cantons up 
 to the present time have found an ample guarantee 
 of their constitutional sovereignty in the strongly 
 federal feeling which prevails in the Assembly itself. 
 A further guarantee is the existence of the same 
 feeling among the Swiss people, where it is even more 
 strongly marked, and it will make itself felt when 
 they have to pronounce on the work of the Legislature. 
 The history of our country, the diversity of our 
 political life, the natural repugnance of our people to 
 anything approaching bureaucratic government, will 
 be for a long time an insurmountable obstacle to our 
 becoming a unitary state." 
 
 M. Dubs and M. Segesser, the leader of the Right, 
 brilliantly defended the rights of the cantons, but 
 they did not succeed in winning their case. The 
 National Council, by 54 votes to 52, and the Council 
 of States, by 20 to 19, decided that laws, when sub- 
 mitted to the popular vote, needed but a majority of 
 "the people" to decide their adoption or rejection. 1 
 
 To the optional referendum thus organised, the 
 
 1 [It will be remembered that a constitutional law has to be 
 accepted or rejected by a majority of the people and the cantons.] 
 
1 1 o The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 popular initiative was added. This gave any 50,000 
 citizens, or five cantons, the right of demanding, firstly, 
 that the Federal Assembly should draft a law or a 
 decree on any subject desired; and secondly, that they 
 should repeal or modify any law then in force. The 
 initiative found supporters even amongst the oppo- 
 nents of the referendum. Thus M. Feer Herzog, who 
 opposed the referendum, supported the initiative, 
 because " it establishes a right which is the natural 
 inheritance of the people, because it is already fore- 
 shadowed in the right of petition guaranteed by the 
 existing constitution, because it is not merely a piece 
 of state mechanism, but depends on a long experience 
 of the laws by the people and on agreement as to 
 their defects, because it merely wants good sense 
 to enable it to work, because it respects and even 
 strengthens the representative system, because it is 
 of the essence of the sovereignty of the people, be- 
 cause it is the spontaneous manifestation of the real 
 will of the people." 
 
 " By means of the initiative," M. Scherer said, " the 
 sovereignty of the people finds real expression, and 
 acquires its natural influence over the legislators. 
 Moreover, it will afford the authorities a valuable 
 indication of the popular will, and it ought there- 
 fore to be welcomed by them." " It would be better," 
 he added, " not to submit to the people actual bills 
 prepared by a group of citizens, but to leave the 
 drafting of the measures to the councils." 
 
 On the 12th of May 1872, the constitution, as 
 drawn up by the Federal Councils, was submitted as 
 it stood to the popular vote. In thirteen cantons out 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 1 1 1 
 
 of the twenty- two the majority of the electors voted 
 No. The total number of votes was 255,609 for and 
 261,072 against the constitution. It was therefore 
 rejected by a majority of the people and by a majority 
 of the cantons. 
 
 The opposition which proved so successful came 
 principally from the Catholic and the Romance speak- 
 ing cantons. The former feared the consequences on 
 religious politics, and the latter were actuated by a 
 dislike of centralisation. 1 
 
 The constitution as then drawn up proposed to 
 transfer from the cantons to the Federal Govern- 
 ment (i) the organisation and administration of 
 the army ; (2) the right of superintendence over dike 
 and forest police ; (3) the right to make legislative 
 enactments for the regulation of fishing and hunting ; 
 (4) the right of legislating upon the construction and 
 management of railroads; (5) the customs revenue 
 without the obligation of indemnifying the cantons ; 
 (6) the power to legislate on the protection of work- 
 men engaged in unhealthy and dangerous employ- 
 ments, and on the labour of children in factories ; (7) 
 the supervision and power to legislate on the trans- 
 actions of emigration agents, and on organisations for 
 
 1 [For the first time in Swiss history party lines were determined 
 by race, and it may therefore be regarded as fortunate that this 
 constitution was rejected. The feelings on the question of revision 
 were so strong that it affected even the Federal Council. M. Dubs 
 resigned as a protest against the new constitution, and M. Cballet- 
 Venel was refused re-election by a majority of the Assembly be- 
 cause he had opposed revision. Only one other Federal councillor 
 has ever been refused re-election if he desired it, Herr Ochsenbein 
 in 1854, and no other Federal councillor has resigned because he 
 disapproved of the policy of the Chambers. See Droz, Etudes et 
 portraits politiques, p. 359.] 
 
1 1 2 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 insurance not instituted by the state ; (8) the power 
 to make, by law, general provisions for the issue and 
 redemption of bank notes; (9) the civil law; (10) 
 civil procedure; (u) criminal law; (12) criminal 
 procedure; and (13) electoral legislation. 
 
 This draft provided not only a highly centralised 
 constitution, as can be seen from the provisions 
 mentioned above, but it was, in addition, an act of 
 religious persecution. 
 
 (1) Priests were rendered liable to military service. 
 " No person shall on account of a religious belief 
 release himself from the performance of a civil 
 duty." 
 
 (2) The churches were forced to submit to decisions 
 of the civil authority. " The free exercise of religious 
 worship is guaranteed within the limits compatible 
 with public order and good morals. The cantons and 
 the Confederation may take suitable measures for the 
 preservation of public order and peace between the 
 members of different religious bodies, and also against 
 encroachments of ecclesiastical authorities upon the 
 rights of citizens and of the state. The order of the 
 Jesuits and the societies affiliated with them shall 
 not be admitted into any part of Switzerland, and 
 their members are forbidden to teach in the church 
 or in the schools." 
 
 (3) It deprived the Church of all its marriage 
 jurisdiction. "No limitation upon marriage shall be 
 based upon sectarian grounds, and no one shall be 
 forced to submit to any ecclesiastical jurisdiction in 
 the matter of marriage." 
 
 (4) Finally, though it left elementary education 
 to fohe cantons, it opened a door to the interference 
 of the central authority. " The Confederation may 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 1 13 
 
 fix by legislative enactment a minimum standard to 
 be exacted from elementary schools." 
 
 Some months later, in October 1872, the general 
 elections for the renewal of the Federal Assembly took 
 place. Fifty-six of the seventy-eight members who 
 had voted for the constitution rejected on the I2th 
 of May were re-elected, and twenty-seven of the thirty- 
 six members who had opposed it. This result was 
 not what one would have anticipated from the elec- 
 tors after the referendum of the i2th of May; but, 
 as a matter of fact, it was not that the electors had 
 changed their minds, but that the constituencies had 
 been skilfully gerrymandered. Although the party 
 of revision had gained only a show of success, they 
 did not fail to declare in speech and writing that the 
 electors had given them a vote of confidence. 
 
 When the Chambers reassembled in December, 
 seventy-four deputies of the National Council sup- 
 ported a motion by which the Federal Council was 
 invited to report and make proposals on the way in 
 which a revision of the Federal Constitution could 
 again be undertaken. The motion was adopted unani- 
 mously. The Federalists and Catholics themselves 
 desired revision, though only on condition that can- 
 tonal sovereignty was not seriously affected thereby. 
 The efforts of the Radicals were directed to breaking 
 up what they termed " the unnatural coalition of the 
 French Protestants and German Catholics." With 
 a view to bringing the former round to their anti- 
 clerical programme, they threw over certain provisions 
 and certain articles relating to the unification of the 
 law. For instance, there was an article (No. 5 5) in the 
 
 H 
 
1 1 4 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 scheme of 1872 which declared that " civil law and 
 civil procedure are within the province of the Confe- 
 deration. The Confederation shall also have the right 
 to legislate on criminal law and criminal procedure." 
 This article now disappeared, and was replaced by 
 the following article : " The Confederation has power 
 to make laws on matters of civil rights, on all legal 
 questions relating to commerce, and to transactions 
 affecting chattels (law of commercial obligations in- 
 cluding commercial law and the law of exchange), on 
 literary and artistic copyright, on the collection of 
 debts, and on bankruptcy. The administration of 
 justice remains with the cantons save as affected by 
 the powers of the Federal Court." But, on the other 
 hand, fresh provisions inimical to the Catholics were 
 added. 
 
 (1) Primary instruction shall be placed exclusively 
 under the direction of the secular authorities (Art. 
 
 27). 
 
 (2) No one shall incur penalties of any kind what- 
 ever on account of religious opinion (Art. 49). This 
 was a prohibition of excommunication. 
 
 (3) Contests in public or private law which arise 
 out of the formation or the division of religious 
 bodies may be brought by appeal before the com- 
 petent Federal authorities (Art. 50). The object of 
 this article was to enable the Old Catholics to rob 
 the Roman Catholics. 1 
 
 (4) No bishopric shall be created upon Swiss 
 
 1 [The Koman Catholic Church of Switzerland is governed by 
 the same forms and authorities that are usually found in other 
 countries. The Old Catholics are a body of seceders who separated 
 from the Roman Church during the agitation caused by the pro- 
 clamation of the doctrine of Papal infallibility.] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 1 1 5 
 
 territory without the consent of the Confederation 
 (Art. 50). 
 
 (5) The prohibition of the Jesuits, which was part 
 of the programme of 1 872, " may be extended also by 
 Federal ordinance to other religious orders whose 
 action is considered dangerous to the state or dis- 
 turbs the peace between the sects" (Art. 51). 
 
 (6) The foundation of new convents or religious 
 orders and the re-establishment of those which have 
 been suppressed are forbidden (Art. 52). 
 
 (7) The control of places of burial is placed in the 
 hands of the civil authority (Art. 53). 
 
 The tactics of the German Radicals were completely 
 successful. The spectre of ultramontanism was so 
 persistently dangled before the eyes of the French 
 Protestants that their hatred of the Church over- 
 came their objection to centralisation. Those who 
 had been enemies yesterday now became good friends. 
 There were no longer Centralists or Federalists ; they 
 were all anti-clericals. Wir haben auf dem Rucken 
 der Ultramontanen mit den Waadt-Ldndern Frieden 
 geschlossen "We have concluded peace with the Vau- 
 dois by trampling the ul tramontanes under foot " is 
 what I was told last year by a Radical deputy whom 
 I was questioning about the Federal revision, and the 
 compromises, and the political jobbery of this time ; 
 and he chuckled still with pleasure to think of his 
 youthful achievements. 1 
 
 Whilst the Radical fanatics were then rejoicing over 
 their fallen adversaries, the ultramontanes, the articles 
 in the abortive scheme of 1872 which were concerned 
 
 1 [In the National Council the new constitution was adopted by 
 103 votes to 20, and in the Council of States by 25 to 14.] 
 
1 1 6 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 with the rights of the people underwent certain 
 modifications. The first thing to be dropped was the 
 popular initiative, which had conferred upon any 
 50,000 electors the right to demand that the Federal 
 Assembly should draft a new law or repeal an existing 
 one. The optional referendum, too, underwent certain 
 alterations. It was now settled that a demand for 
 the referendum must come from eight cantons, while 
 the proposal of 1872 had required only five. As a 
 matter of fact, it would have made it too easy for the 
 Catholic cantons to oppose the Federal Assembly if 
 five cantons had been the minimum. To avoid the 
 reproach of being anti-democratic in the suppression 
 of the initiative, the number of signatures necessary 
 for demanding the referendum was lowered from 50,000 
 to 30,000. After these modifications the article in- 
 troducing the referendum read as follows : 
 
 Art. 89. " Federal laws shall be submitted for the 
 acceptance or rejection of the people if the demand 
 is made by 30,000 active citizens or by eight cantons. 
 The same principle applies to Federal decrees which 
 have a general application, and which are not of an 
 urgent nature." l 
 
 The new constitution was accepted on the iQth of 
 April 1874 by 340,199 votes against 198,013, and by 
 13^ cantons (Zurich, Berne, Glarus, Solothurn, Basle- 
 City, Rural -Basle, Schaffhausen, Appenzell (Outer 
 Rhodes), St. Gall, the Grisons, Aargau, Thurgau, 
 Vaud, Neuchatel, Geneva). It was rejected by 8J 
 
 1 [A new article was also added, experience having proved the 
 need of it. " In counting up the votes of the states, the vote of a 
 demi-canton is counted as half a vote. The result of the popular 
 vote in each canton is considered to be the vote of the state" 
 (Art. 121.) Thus everything is made to rest finally on the people.] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 1 1 7 
 
 cantons (Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, 
 Fribourg, Appenzell (Inner Rhodes), Ticino, Valais), 
 all of them Catholic. 1 The Bund of Berne summed 
 up the result in these words. " The vote of Sunday," 
 it said, "has been a defeat for the Ultramontane 
 party only. Ultrainontanisni has received a fatal 
 blow." 
 
 Attempts have been made since the constitution 
 has come into force to revise Article 89. We shall 
 have occasion to notice them later, but up to this 
 time nothing has resulted from them. 
 
 1 [The number of cantons by which the constitution was rejected 
 is given as 7^ by Hilty, Die Bundesverfassungen der schweizerischen 
 Eidyenosscnschaft, p. 407, and also by Curti, p. 294, Geschichte, and 
 De Salis in Le droit federal Suisse, 1892. They reckon Ticino as 
 one of those accepting. The Federal Council, when submitting the 
 constitution to the popular vote, accompanied it by a manifesto 
 in which they said that a second rejection would be a national 
 misfortune, and they implored the people to put aside private pre- 
 judice and vote only in the best interests of the country. 
 
 The report on the popular vote of the igth of April was presented 
 to the committee of the Council of States by Herr Kappeler, and 
 in it he called attention to three features of the vote 
 
 (a) The unlimited discussion preliminary to the vote, to which no 
 opposition was offered by any party or local authority. 
 
 (6) The large percentage of voters who went to the polls. About 
 five-sixths of the entire electoral body went to the polls, or about 
 85 per cent, of the registered voters. 
 
 (c) The quiet and dignified way in which the election was con- 
 ducted. Throughout the entire country there was no trace of 
 trouble or violence. 
 
 He concluded with these words : "And that is why this consti- 
 tution has become not only formally in law, but in the most profound 
 meaning of the word, in fact, the fundamental law of Switzerland, 
 a law that no party will attack, because no party will be able to 
 attack it, but still more because no party will wish to, so great is 
 the respect which a legal majority inspires in this country." See 
 Borgeaud, op. cit., pp. 301-6.] 
 
1 1 8 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 An important right has been conferred upon the 
 people quite recently, but it is only concerned with 
 the Federal Constitution, and does not affect ordi- 
 nary legislation. 1 It is the popular initiative, which 
 is now enlarged to include a partial revision of the 
 constitution. 
 
 It will be remembered that the Constitution of 
 1848 gave the people the right of demanding a re- 
 vision of the Federal Constitution. In the discussions 
 which took place in the Diet, it was understood that 
 this right would include partial as well as total re- 
 visions. 2 However, subsequent demands for a partial 
 revision were laid aside by the Federal authorities, 
 who, basing their decisions on the letter of the con- 
 stitution, declared that demands for revision could 
 only take a general and indeterminate form. 3 
 
 Thus when, in 1880, 56,526 electors demanded that 
 Article 39 of the Constitution should be replaced by 
 a new article, the electors had to resign themselves 
 
 1 [The popular initiative was only intended to apply to the revision 
 of constitutional articles, but in practice it has really the same effect 
 as if it were expressly introduced for matters of ordinary legislation. 
 Any proposition, of whatever nature, may be submitted to the people 
 if it is presented in the form of a constitutional article. There is 
 no clause in the Federal Constitution defining a constitutional 
 article. Thus any citizen, if supported by 49,999 others, may pro- 
 voke the vote of the Swiss people on any proposition whatever, as 
 long as they demand at the same time that their project be incor- 
 porated in the constitution. The effect in practice has been to 
 introduce an article regulating the mode of slaughtering cattle. 
 Ordinary legislation moves within certain fixed limits determined 
 by the constitution, but there is nothing to determine the limit of 
 a constitutional revision. The new amendment covers the ground 
 of ordinary legislation and a great deal more.] 
 
 2 Curti, Geschichte der schweizerischen Volksyesetzgebung, p. 185. 
 
 3 Blumer, Handbuch des schweizerischen Bundesstaatsrcchtes, vol. 
 iii. pp. 241-46. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy i 1 9 
 
 to seeing their demand for a partial revision taken as 
 a demand for a general revision and submitted to 
 the people in this form. 1 
 
 In order to free the people from this trouble- 
 some restriction, some of the deputies of the Right 
 
 1 [In 1848 the constituent assembly inserted a declaration in the 
 minutes that in the opinion of a majority of its members a partial 
 revision might be undertaken under t-he same conditions as a total 
 revision. The Councils in 1865 undertook to insert some amend- 
 ments, the fate of which we have already noticed. The Assembly, 
 therefore, was quite prepared to exercise its right of initiative 
 in partial revision. In 1879 a petition containing more than the 
 requisite number of signatures was received, demanding that the 
 Confederation be invested with the monopoly of bank notes, and the 
 text of the article was subjoined. The Federal Council declared 
 that, according to Article 120, only the question of a total revision 
 should be laid before the people, and they submitted the demand 
 to the country in this form : " Ought the present Federal Constitu- 
 tion to be revised ? " The reasons given for taking this step are 
 quoted and severely criticised by M. Borgeaud, op. cit., p. 309, &c. 
 
 It was clearly illogical that if the people could demand a revision 
 of the whole, they should be constitutionally incapable of de- 
 manding the revision of a part of the whole without imperilling 
 the whole constitution in order to insert a clause. 
 
 M. Droz, writing in 1894, gives the following reasons for the 
 expediency of not admitting partial revisions by the people. He 
 points out that the Federal Constitution is a compromise between 
 the central and local sovereigns. Its aim has been to respect as 
 far as possible the different languages, customs, institutions, and 
 interests of those states which form part of the Confederation. 
 If such a constitution could be demolished bit by bit by tem- 
 porary coalitions varying according to their object, where would be 
 the security of these interests ? Either German Switzerland would 
 be able by sheer majority to swamp Romance Switzerland, or the 
 Catholics would be oppressed by the Protestants. If the people are 
 invested with the right of demanding partial revisions, then under 
 the influence of any special event or fleeting emotion 50,000 citizens 
 could demand the revision of any article without giving a thought 
 to its connection with other dispositions, or its place as part of 
 a whole " (La democratic en Suisse). See Etudes et portraits politiques, 
 pp. 469-70.] 
 
1 20 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 demanded that the right of the people to claim 
 the revision of specified articles of the constitution 
 should be formally recognised. The Federal Council 
 was ordered to consider and report on the proposals, 
 and declared itself favourable to the amendment. 
 "The question of deciding whether the Federal 
 Constitution ought to be revised," they said, "is an 
 altogether different matter for the people than de- 
 ciding if such and such an article ought to be 
 repealed,, modified, or amplified. The uncertainty 
 attending the probable results of a revision, combined 
 with the inevitable dissolution of the Chambers in 
 the case of an affirmative answer, always makes the 
 balance incline decisively towards rejection. It is 
 therefore practically impossible to discover by means 
 of the popular initiative, as regulated in Article 120, 
 either the true feeling of the people with regard 
 to the modification of the constitution, or to do it 
 justice when discovered. 1 
 
 The debates on the proposal commenced in the 
 Federal Assembly in September 1890. They were 
 carried on all through December, and taken up again 
 and brought to a close in April iSpi. 2 
 
 All the interest of the debates centred round the 
 form in which the popular initiative should be exer- 
 cised. The Federal Council presented the following 
 scheme : " The repeal or modification of particular 
 
 1 Message of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly con- 
 cerning the revision of the third chapter of the Federal Constitu- 
 tion, 1 3th June 1890, p. 5. 
 
 2 One of the newspapers of Berne, the Bund, has given a report 
 of the debates almost in full. See the numbers of the 25th and 26th 
 September and of the i8th, iQth, and 2oth of December 1890, and 
 of the Qth and roth of April 1891. 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 121 
 
 articles of the Federal Constitution, as well as the 
 insertion of new constitutional clauses, may be de- 
 manded through the medium of the popular initia- 
 tive. As soon as 50,000 Swiss citizens, having the 
 right to vote, shall present a demand of this kind, 
 the question whether such a revision shall take place 
 will depend upon the majority of the citizens taking 
 part in the vote. Should it be in the affirmative, the 
 Federal Assembly shall proceed with the revision." 
 
 To some of the deputies the great defect of this 
 proposal was that it left the hands of the Chambers 
 too free. As long as the power of giving effect to the 
 demand was vested in the Chambers, the door was 
 always left open for them to tamper as they liked 
 with the expression of the popular will. These depu- 
 ties, who included among their number the members 
 of the Right, the democrats, the socialists, and some 
 Radical democrats, proposed to confer on 50,000 elec- 
 tors the right of presenting a fully drafted bill, which 
 should be submitted to the people in its original 
 form, and should be inserted as it stood in the Con- 
 stitution were it adopted. 
 
 It was urged against this " that it would be most 
 dangerous to allow a bill framed by an anonymous 
 committee to become part of the constitution with- 
 out giving any opportunity for modification. The 
 least important of laws are not made by the Federal 
 Assembly without a great deal of work, careful study, 
 and public discussion on both sides. The initiative 
 by formulated bill allows a small group of persons to 
 encroach on the rights of the Federal Assembly, a 
 consummation which ought to be prevented." 
 
 A Radical deputy naively gave the true reason for 
 
1 2 2 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 his opposition to the formulated bill ; he considered 
 that it would be furnishing a weapon to the minority. 
 " The fear is," said he, " that the people will take too 
 many reactionary measures. Surprises ought to be 
 avoided at all costs, for there is no knowing, when 
 once the proposals of the minority have been accepted, 
 whether they might not proceed to demand a refer- 
 endum on the law of civil status or on that of 
 marriage itself. It is dangerous to go too far, for 
 it is possible that the people, in moments of anger, 
 passion, or ill-humour, may do very foolish things. 
 The people is sovereign, but it is not a legislator." 
 
 What appeared to this speaker the great evil of 
 the popular initiative appeared to others to be its 
 greatest merit. " The popular initiative," a demo- 
 cratic deputy said, " is the best kind of proportional 
 representation that we can get. It is an instrument 
 ready to the hand of any minority, and is the quickest 
 and most legal means of bringing before the people 
 those questions that have arisen among the different 
 sections of the nation. Thanks to the initiative, it 
 will no longer be possible to stifle ideas that have a 
 popular origin. The minority thus obtains the right 
 to appeal directly to the highest power in a demo- 
 cratic republic, the sovereign people. The popular 
 initiative respects the rights of minorities more 
 efficiently than all the so-called systems of propor- 
 tional representation, which always leave some groups 
 unrepresented." The initiative by a fully drafted bill 
 the " formulated initiative," as it is termed * which 
 had already for some time past obtained a sympa- 
 
 1 [The idea of the " formulated initiative " was taken from the 
 canton of Zurich, where it had been in use since 1869.] 
 
The Evolution of Democracy 1 2 3 
 
 thetic reception in the Council of States, was adopted 
 in the National Council on the 8th April 1891 by 
 71 votes to 63.* 
 
 The Federal decree of the 8th of April 1891, modi- 
 fying the constitution, and enlarging the sphere of 
 the popular initiative to include partial revisions as 
 well as total, was adopted on July 5, 1891, by the 
 people and by the cantons. The result was that 
 181,882 Ayes and 120,372 Noes were recorded. In 
 four cantons only was there a majority against the 
 amendment, in the two half cantons of Rural-Basle 
 and Appenzell (Outer Rhodes), and in the cantons of 
 Aargau, Thurgau, and Vaud all cantons that were 
 intensely Radical. 2 
 
 1 [M. Borgeaud, p. 315, thus describes the way in which the new 
 amendment became law : " A mass of individual propositions came 
 to the surface, and amendments to every plan. The last days of 
 the session had begun. Work was still accumulating in the com- 
 mittees, and the Council soon tired of these discussions of com- 
 plicated propositions and abstract political theories. After debates 
 which, considering their importance, were too short, and so con- 
 fused that the newspapers gave up reporting them, a vote was 
 hastily brought on, and, in spite of the efforts of the government 
 and the committee, the formula of the Council of States was 
 adopted by 71 votes to 63."] 
 
 2 [It is a curious change of front for the Radicals to oppose the 
 initiative, since they were so anxious to extend popular rights in 
 1874. The fact is, that though they have been in power the whole 
 time, their work has been so often rejected by the referendum that 
 they are not now anxious to extend the popular rights, though they 
 do not like to openly oppose them. It will be noticed that, since 
 50,000 citizens can now initiate by means of a bill drafted by them- 
 selves, any 50,000 citizens of the same opinion are, in matters of 
 legislation, equal to the two houses of the Federal Assembly.] 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE MODERN ORGANISATION OF "LEGISLATION 
 BY THE PEOPLE" 
 
 IN the first chapter of this book we have examined the 
 different forms which direct legislation by the people 
 has assumed in Switzerland during the course of the 
 centuries. In this rapid survey of the various develop- 
 ments of the one fundamental idea, we have only super- 
 ficially touched upon the modern forms of democracy. 
 The second chapter will therefore be devoted to the 
 detailed study of the Referendum and the Popular 
 Initiative. We shall examine carefully the rights 
 which the initiative and the referendum confer upon 
 the people in the Confederation and in the cantons, 
 both with regard to the constitution and with regard to 
 legislation generally, and attempt to describe these in- 
 stitutions in such a way as to show their practical work- 
 ing. We shall also point out their defects where they 
 exist, and the expedients suggested by way of remedy. 
 
 SECTION I. THE "RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE" WITH 
 REGARD TO THE CONSTITUTION. 
 
 I. In the Confederation. 
 
 The rights of the people with regard to the Federal 
 Constitution are set forth in Articles 118-123 of the 
 Constitution of the 2Qth of May 1874, as recast by 
 
 the Federal decree of the 8th April 1891. 
 
 124 
 
" Legislation by the People " 125 
 
 The articles relating to the revision of the consti- 
 tution are as follows : 
 
 Art. 1 1 8. The Federal Constitution may at any time be 
 wholly or partially amended. 1 
 
 Art. 119. A total revision is effected through the forms 
 required for passing federal laws. 
 
 Art. 120. When either house of the Federal Assembly passes 
 a resolution for the total revision of the constitution and the 
 other council does not agree, or when 50,000 Swiss voters 
 demand a total revision, the question whether the constitution 
 ought to be amended is in either case submitted to the Swiss 
 people, who vote Yes or No. 
 
 If in either case the majority of the Swiss citizens who vote 
 pronounce in the affirmative, there shall be a new election of 
 both councils for the purpose of undertaking the revision. 
 
 Art. 121. A partial revision may take place by means of the 
 popular initiative, or through the forms prescribed for ordinary 
 federal legislation. The popular initiative consists in a demand by 
 50,000 Swiss voters for the addition of a new article to the constitu- 
 tion, or the repeal or modification of certain constitutional articles 
 already in force. 
 
 When the popular initiative is used for the purpose of amending 
 or inserting various articles in the Federal Constitution, each modifi- 
 cation or addition must form the subject of a separate initiative demand. 
 
 The demand by initiative may be presented in the form of a 
 proposal in general terms, or as a bill complete in all its details. 
 
 When a demand is couched in general terms, and the Federal 
 Assembly approves it in substance, it is the duty of that body to draw 
 up a partial revision in the sense of the petitioners, and to refer it to 
 the cantons for acceptance or rejection. 
 
 If the Federal Assembly does not approve tJie proposal, then the 
 question whether there shall be a partial revision or not must be 
 submitted to the vote of the people ; and if the majority of Swiss 
 citizens taking part in the vote express themselves in the affirmative, 
 the revision shall be undertaken by the Federal Assembly, in con- 
 formity with the popular decision. 
 
 When a demand is presented in the form of a bill complete in all 
 
 1 The passages in italics are the new clauses introduced by the 
 Federal decree of the 8th April 1891. 
 
126 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 its details, and the Federal Assembly approve it, the bill shall be re- 
 ferred to the people and the cantons for acceptance or rejection. 
 
 In case the Federal Assembly does not agree, that body may draft 
 a bill of its own, or move that the people reject the demand ; and it 
 may submit its own bill or proposal for rejection to the vote of the 
 people at the same time as the bill emanating from the popular 
 initiative. 
 
 Art. 122. A federal law shall determine more precisely the 
 manner of procedure in the case of demands by popular initiative 
 and in the votings on amendments to the Federal Constitution. 1 
 
 Art. 123. The revised Federal Constitution, or the revised 
 part thereof, shall take effect when it has been adopted by the 
 majority of Swiss citizens who take part in the vote thereon and 
 by a majority of the states. 
 
 In making up the majority of the cantons the vote of a half 
 canton is counted as half a vote. 
 
 The result of the popular vote in each canton is considered to 
 be the vote of the canton. 
 
 The distinction made by the constitution between 
 a total and a partial revision is not, as a matter of 
 fact, a scientific distinction. At what point does a 
 revision cease to be partial and become total ? There 
 is a lack of precision in the classification. Generally 
 speaking, a revision is looked upon as " total " when 
 the whole of the constitution is overhauled, and as 
 partial when it is confined to certain articles speci- 
 fied beforehand. But, as a deputy of the Council 
 of States lately remarked, this is by no means an 
 infallible criterion. 
 
 " Suppose," he said, " that it was proposed to sup- 
 press the Council of States, or to vest the executive 
 power in the hands of a president elected for life, no 
 one would call this a partial revision, but an impor- 
 
 1 [This law, which was not voted when M. Deploige wrote, has 
 since been passed. For its contents see notes on following pages, 
 and also Appendix on the Popular Initiative.] 
 
" Legislation by the People " 127 
 
 tant fundamental change, although only one or 
 two articles would be affected by it. It is therefore 
 impossible to give an exact definition of a partial 
 revision, or to draw any precise distinction between a 
 total and a partial revision." x 
 
 In reality the distinction simply recalls a stage 
 in the evolution of democracy when the Federal 
 Assembly tried to prevent the people claiming a 
 revision of specified articles of the constitution, and 
 obliged them to make the demand in general terms 
 without specially indicating the articles on which a 
 revision was desired. 2 
 
 1 Session of the Council of States, i;th December 1891. The 
 Bund reports it in its issue of the 2Oth December. 
 
 2 [M. Borgeaud considers that there is in the amendment a con- 
 fusion between the plural initiative and the popular initiative, i.e. 
 between the initiative of a certain number and the initiative of the 
 whole people. The popular initiative is only exercised when the 
 majority of the people in practice, the majority of those voting- 
 command that a revision shall be undertaken. 
 
 The amendment says that "the popular initiative consists in a 
 demand by 50,000 Swiss voters for the addition of a new article, or 
 the repeal or modification of certain articles already in force." 
 
 This M. Borgeaud considers to be technically wrong, for the 
 initiative of 50,000 persons, i.e. of one-fourteenth of the present vot- 
 ing population, is not the same thing as the initiative of the whole 
 people, which is exercised when they are asked, " Do you wish for 
 a revision of the constitution ? " and answer " Yes." The 50,000 
 citizens may make a demand for the popular initiative, and do *o 
 when they ask in general terms that the constitution be revised. 
 The question then goes to the people, who take the initiative and 
 give their commands to the Legislature. The 50,000 voters can 
 rouse the popular initiative to action ; they are not then exercising 
 the popular initiative themselves, but the plural initiative ; and when 
 they initiate by means of a complete bill, the people, instead of 
 being the starting-point of the revision, do not vote on the question 
 until it is brought before them in its final shape. There is there- 
 fore no question of the popular initiative in this case. It is the 
 plural initiative. See op. cit., p. 321.] 
 
128 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 Since the federal law of April 1891 has come into 
 force, the distinction between a partial and a total 
 revision has lost much of its importance. Neverthe- 
 less, as the procedure in the two cases is not the 
 same, we shall retain the distinction made by the 
 Federal Constitution. 
 
 1. The total revision of the Federal Constitution 
 may be brought about in three different ways : 
 
 i. The revision can be undertaken by the Federal 
 Assembly and carried out by the agreement of the 
 two councils (Arts. 84 and 85, No. 14), as in the case 
 of an ordinary federal law. The proposal for a re- 
 vision may be brought before the Assembly either 
 by the initiative of the members (Art. 93), or by a 
 message from the government of a canton (Art. 93), 
 or by a message from the Federal Council (Art. 102, 
 sec. 4). The two councils debate separately, and the 
 bill passes from one to the other until an agreement 
 is arrived at. It is only when the two houses have 
 come to an agreement on the subject of a new con- 
 stitution that the procedure begins to differ from 
 that adopted in the case of an ordinary federal law. 
 The constitution as drawn up by the councils must, 
 firstly, be always submitted to the popular vote ; and 
 secondly, cannot come into force unless it has been 
 adopted by a majority of the people and by a majority 
 of the cantons. 
 
 2. If one Chamber has voted for a total revision 
 and the other does not give its assent, it is the people 
 who are called upon to intervene as sovereign, and 
 they decide if a revision shall take place or not. 
 They do not indicate, however, in what sense the 
 
" Legislation by the People" 129 
 
 revision shall be undertaken, nor what it ought to 
 aim at, nor how far it shall extend. The question 
 put before the electors is the general one: Do you 
 wish the constitution to be revised ; yes or no ? This 
 intervention of the people is contrary to Article 119, 
 by the terms of which a total revision takes place, 
 according to the forms laid down for federal legis- 
 lation. Should the two houses differ in the case 
 of an ordinary law, the bill is simply dropped, and 
 that is an end of it. 
 
 This modification of Article 1 19 is only explained 
 by regarding Article 1 20 as having been levelled at 
 the Council of States, and due to the fear entertained 
 by the authors of the constitution that the second 
 Chamber would systematically oppose the proposals 
 for revision which might originate in the National 
 Council. The framers of the constitution were actu- 
 ated by the same motive when they excluded the 
 cantonal vote on the general question of revision or 
 no revision, and made the vote of the people alone 
 decisive. (Art. 120.) 
 
 If the majority of the electors taking part in the 
 vote support a revision, the two Chambers are thereby 
 dissolved, and the work of revision devolves upon 
 the new Federal Assembly. 
 
 The appeal to the people, when made in such 
 general terms, leaves the Assembly entirely unfettered 
 in drafting the new constitution. It has received the 
 order to revise, but it can carry out that revision as 
 it judges best. What would happen, then, if the two 
 Chambers could not agree upon the scheme ? Would 
 the old constitution remain in force, or would the 
 people be again consulted, and would the Federal 
 
 i 
 
130 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 Assembly be again dissolved in the case of an 
 affirmative answer? The case is not provided for 
 by the constitution, although it might easily arise. 
 The division of the constituencies is so arbitrary that 
 it not unfrequently happens that the opinions of the 
 majority of the deputies do not reflect the opinions 
 of the majority of the electors. 
 
 3. Should 50,000 citizens sign a demand for a total 
 revision, the procedure is the same as in the pre- 
 ceding case. The same preliminary question is put 
 to the electoral body, and if the majority decide for 
 a revision, the two councils are renewed to carry out 
 the popular wish. It is difficult to see why there 
 should be a preliminary referendum in this case. The 
 framers of the constitution probably considered that 
 when the partisans of a revision had recourse to such 
 an extreme measure as the popular initiative, it would 
 probably mean that all other methods of bringing 
 pressure to bear upon the Legislature had been tried 
 and failed, and that the Federal Assembly then in 
 existence would be openly hostile to any constitu- 
 tional change. The appeal to the people will show 
 whether the revision has their support, and if the 
 answer be in the affirmative, it would be as well to 
 elect a new revising assembly. It is, however, theo- 
 retically possible that the Chambers might agree with 
 the demand of the 50,000 petitioners. In such a 
 case, a dissolution occurring as the result of an appeal 
 to the people would be useless, because the Federal 
 Assembly has the power to undertake a revision of 
 the constitution " at any time," on its own autho- 
 rity (Art. 85, sec. 14, and Art. 118 of the Federal 
 Constitution.) 
 
" Legislation by the People " 131 
 
 II. A partial revision which embraces one or more 
 articles of the constitution can take place : 
 
 1. According to the forms prescribed for federal 
 legislation, that is to say, by the two Chambers in the 
 ordinary process of law. The articles so revised must 
 always be accepted by the people and the cantons. 
 
 It should be remembered that when the Chambers 
 disagree on the subject of a partial revision, the diffi- 
 culty cannot be solved by an appeal to the people as 
 in the case of a total revision. When one Chamber 
 takes the initiative in the case of a partial revision 
 and the other refuses its consent, the only result is 
 that the question of revision is shelved until a more 
 favourable time. 
 
 2. A partial revision may also take place by means 
 of the popular initiative, which is defined by the 
 constitution as follows: "A demand presented by 
 50,000 Swiss voters for the adoption of a new article, 
 or the repeal or modification of certain specified 
 articles of the constitution then in force." x 
 
 When 50,000 electors make use of their right of 
 initiative, they cannot include in the same petition 
 propositions concerned with different subjects. They 
 must make as many distinct demands as there are 
 subjects to be revised (Art. 121, paragraph 3). The 
 message of the Federal Council of the 1 3th of June 
 1 890 gives the reason for this regulation : " This 
 separation of subjects has the advantage of giving 
 more liberty to the citizens. A demand by initia- 
 tive should not be drawn up in such a way that 
 
 1 [By the law of January 17, 1892, all signatures which are more 
 than six months old are invalid. The names, therefore, cannot be 
 collected gradually.] 
 
1 3 2 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 a citizen who wishes for a revision on one of the 
 subjects mentioned, and does not wish for a revi- 
 sion on others, is nevertheless obliged to sign for 
 all or not sign at all. This method affords, more- 
 over, the only effective guarantee to the great body 
 of electors, who go to the polls upon the initiative of 
 a relatively small proportion of their number, that a 
 revision has really been demanded by the regulation 
 number of qualified voters on each separate subject." 
 The electors who wish to bring about a partial re- 
 vision of the constitution can do so by one of two 
 methods. They may demand in general terms that 
 a certain article should be revised in a certain sense, 
 or that a new article should be inserted in the con- 
 stitution. They may also draft the new article them- 
 selves. They are then said to make use of "the 
 formulated initiative." * 
 
 (A) When the demand is drawn up in general 
 terms, two courses are open to the Assembly : 
 
 (a) If it agrees with the petitioners, it proceeds to 
 effect the revision without further preliminaries, by 
 framing the articles which shall embody the popular 
 proposals. 2 
 
 (b) If, on the other hand, the Federal Council does 
 not hold the same views as the 50,000 petitioners, then 
 
 1 [There is no provision made for the cantons as such to use the 
 "formulated initiative." They can only initiate "in the forms 
 required for ordinary legislation."] 
 
 2 [By the law of January 17, 1892, the Assembly must decide 
 within a year whether it agrees with the petition or not. They may, 
 however, take their time about drafting the law proposed, as no 
 time limit is fixed in which it must be ready. If the Assembly does 
 not decide within the year whether it will accept or reject the 
 proposal, then the popular suggestion is submitted by the Federal 
 Council to the vote of the people, as if the Assembly had rejected it.] 
 
" Legislation by the People " 133 
 
 the electoral body settles the dispute and decides by 
 means of a referendum whether the partial revision 
 demanded shall take place or not. If the reply is hi 
 the negative, the revision is dropped. If, however, 
 the people decide in its favour, the revision de- 
 manded must be carried out by the -existing legis- 
 lative assembly, because no provision is made either 
 for a dissolution or a renewal of the Chambers, as is 
 the case when a total revision is demanded by the 
 popular vote. 
 
 This method of procedure quite changes the char- 
 acter of the Federal Assembly. It ceases to be a 
 parliament, and becomes merely a drafting committee. 
 As a rule, the members of the Federal Council vote 
 according to their personal convictions, and on their 
 own judgment. Even the Federal Council expressly 
 guarantees their liberty of thought and action, for 
 Article 91 enacts that "the members of the two councils 
 shall vote without instructions." In direct opposition 
 to this principle, they are obliged by Article 121 to 
 vote in accordance with the laconic order of an anony- 
 mous body of citizens, which forces them to contradict 
 their public declarations by their actions. 
 
 They have given their reasons for their attitude ; 
 they have thought over and studied the matter, they 
 have made it the subject of lengthy debate. But 
 when the contents of the ballot-box have been 
 counted the result becomes law, and whatever may 
 have been the opinion of the deputies, they have to 
 acquiesce in the decision and say "Yes," although 
 only a few weeks ago they may have advanced the 
 most potent reasons for saying No. Their final vote 
 is, therefore, the expression of an opinion which is 
 
134 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 not only not theirs, but one of which they actually 
 disapprove. 1 
 
 The passive role imposed by the Federal Constitu- 
 tion upon the Swiss deputies will doubtless scandalise 
 the citizens of a country which has adopted the repre- 
 sentative system. In Switzerland, however, this is 
 considered highly democratic. In other countries 
 the initiative comes from above ; the parliament and 
 the king are together the legal sovereign. In Switzer- 
 land it comes from below, for the legal sovereign is 
 the electorate. It gives its commands, and does not 
 attempt to justify its orders. 
 
 (E) When 50,000 electors draw up a bill complete 
 in all its details, it cannot be amended by the Federal 
 Assembly, but must be submitted to the referendum 
 in the form in which it has been received, either 
 without comment or accompanied by a counter pro- 
 posal. The Federal Assembly, as a matter of fact, 
 examines the popular proposal, and then as a result 
 may take any of the following courses : 
 
 (a) If it agrees with the petitioners on all points, 
 
 1 [Two further points should be noticed about this demand in 
 general terms. The fact that the Assembly may decide within a 
 year, merely whether it will accept or reject the popular proposal, 
 means that it may practically take its own time to draft the law 
 should it decide to act upon the demand. Should it refuse it, 
 however, and the people decide in favour of it, then it may also 
 take its own time to act upon the mandate, and thus may consider- 
 ably delay the amendment by mere inertia. Then when they have 
 finally drafted the law in "the sense indicated," it has to undergo 
 the final test of being voted on. They are, moreover, left to inter- 
 pret what the petitioners actually meant by the demand. 
 
 Again, if the project drawn up by the Federal Assembly be 
 rejected, it is not stated whether the Assembly must go on making 
 new schemes, or whether the question of a revision is to be con- 
 sidered at an end.] 
 
" Legislation by the People " 135 
 
 it can simply submit the proposal to the popular 
 vote. 
 
 (6) If it disapprove of either the principle or the 
 details of the popular proposal, it may present a 
 counter-project of its own. 1 
 
 (c) If it consider that it is not a fitting opportunity 
 for revision, the Assembly may simply propose that 
 the people shall reject the proposal of the 50,000. 
 In the two last cases, the counter-proposal or motion 
 for rejection is submitted to the people at the same 
 time as the popular proposal. 2 
 
 III. Whatever form the revision takes, or whatever 
 its aim may be; whether it be undertaken by the 
 Federal Assembly of its own accord, or 50,000 citizens 
 make use of their right of initiative ; whether it be a 
 question of a fundamental change in the constitution, 
 
 1 [By the law of January 17, 1892, the Federal Assembly must 
 decide upon its course of action within a year, and if they decide 
 to present a counter proposal, must also have that ready within the 
 year. There is no possible means of delay open in this case as in 
 the preceding one.] 
 
 2 [M. Hilty, Professor of Law at Berne, and one of the best known 
 of the Swiss constitutional writers, proposed a scheme to the 
 National Council in which the distinction between a partial and 
 a total revision was abolished, the same procedure being made 
 applicable to both. The cantons were given the same share as 
 the people in proposing or vetoing a law or preliminary proposal. 
 The initiative could only be exercised by means of a bill complete 
 in all its details ; but whenever a demand was received, the people 
 were to be asked first of all, "Do you wish for a revision on this 
 particular point ? " In case of an affirmative answer, the popular 
 bill, accompanied by a counter-proposal at the option of the 
 Assembly, should be laid before the people for their vote. Owing 
 to the stress of business and the rush at the end, this proposal 
 did not obtain the consideration it deserved. Both M. Borgeaud 
 (p. 316) and M. Dunant (Legislation par le peuple en Suisse, p. 123) 
 characterise it as preferable to the scheme adopted.] 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
136 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 or of the modification of a single article, there is 
 always a final popular vote on the new constitution 
 or on the new article. In other words, in constitu- 
 tional matters the referendum is obligatory. 
 
 Moreover, the revised constitution or the revised 
 articles cannot come into force unless they have re- 
 ceived a double majority. In the first place, half the 
 electors plus one who take part in the vote must have 
 voted " Yes ; " and in the second, in half the cantons 
 plus one the majority who vote must have voted 
 "Yes." The revision falls to the ground if it does 
 not obtain this double majority. 1 
 
 In a unitary republic it would be sufficient if the 
 majority of the people should sanction a revision of 
 the constitution. In a federal state like Switzerland, 
 in which national and cantonal sovereignty coexist, 
 .a modification of the fundamental law is not possible 
 without the assent of both the people and the cantons. 
 
 2. The " Rights of the People " with regard to 
 Constitutional Changes in the Cantons. 
 
 The rights of the people, in so far as the cantonal 
 constitutions are concerned, are contained in Article 6 
 of the Federal Constitution of 1874, which is a literal 
 reproduction of Article 6 of the Constitution of 1 848. 
 
 " The cantons are obliged to obtain the guaranty of their con- 
 stitutions from the Confederation. This guaranty is given pro- 
 vided that these constitutions have been previously accepted 
 
 1 [Only one constitutional amendment has ever failed to get a 
 majority in the majority of the cantons when it had obtained a 
 numerical majority in the country. This was the amendment on 
 weights and measures brought forward in 1872.] 
 
"Legislation by the People " 137 
 
 by the people, and that they may be revised when an absolute 
 majority of the citizens demand it." l 
 
 Therefore, according to the principle laid down in 
 this article, the electors of a canton have in consti- 
 tutional matters (i) the right of initiative; (2) the 
 right of approval. 
 
 If we leave the cantons with Landsgemeinden out 
 of account, we find that a minimum number of signa- 
 tures is fixed by the constitution of each canton, and 
 that those who desire to bring about a revision must 
 collect at least that number before their demand can 
 obtain official recognition. 2 
 
 The number is fixed at 1000 in Basle-City, Schaff- 
 hausen, and Zug, at 1 500 in Rural-Basle, at 2000 in 
 Schwyz, at 2500 in the canton of Thurgau, at 3000 in 
 Neuchatel and in Solothurn, at 5000 in the cantons 
 of Aargau, the Orisons, Lucerne, and Ziirich, at 6000 
 in Fribourg, Vaud, and Valais, at 7000 in Ticino, at 
 8000 in Berne, and at 10,000 in St. Gall. 3 
 
 1 [This clause was due to the fact that a graat many of the con- 
 stitutions made after 1830 declared that the revision of the consti- 
 tution could not be mooted until a certain time had elapsed. In 
 several cantons the people went beyond the law, and illegally re- 
 vised their constitutions in spite of the statutory delay. In other 
 cases the Council had the exclusive right to the initiative, and often 
 refused to use it. The result was that outbreaks occurred and new 
 authorities were created. Hence the insertion of Article 6 in the 
 constitution. See Borgeaud, p. 176.] 
 
 2 [All the Landsgemeinde cantons except Glarus and Appenzell 
 (Inner Rhodes) fix a minimun number of signatures for a constitu- 
 tional revision. See Appendix II.] 
 
 3 [The proportion of these numbers to the voting population is 
 given in the Appendix. The number in Berne was raised in 1893 
 to 15,000. Several of the cantons fix a lower number for ordinary 
 legislation, which will be seen by comparing the figures here with 
 those given on p. 173. 
 
 The cantonal constitutions have undergone so many important 
 
1 3 8 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 A revision may now be undertaken " at any time," 
 either on the initiative of the people or on that of 
 the legislative assembly J (Great Council or Cantonal 
 Council). About 1830, on the other hand, a certain 
 time had to elapse after the making of the constitu- 
 tion before it could be altered. At the end of this 
 period, which varied in length in the different can- 
 tons, the people decided if the constitution should 
 remain in force or if it should be amended. To-day 
 
 changes since M. Deploige wrote, that this chapter has practically 
 had to be rewritten. (See Appendix. ) The details here and in the 
 Appendix have been taken from the official collection of the can- 
 tonal constitutions, a supplement of which appears every year. 
 
 There were ten revisions in 1892, three in 1893, seven in 1894, six 
 in 1895, and four in 1896. Five of these were total revisions. The 
 dates of the present constitutional articles relating to revision are 
 as follows: Geneva, 1847 and 1894; Obwald, 1867; Neuch&tel, 
 1858; Thurgau, 1869; Zurich, 1869, 1891, 1893, and 1894; the 
 Valais, 1895 ; Nidwald, 1897 ; Appenzell (Outer Khodes), 1880 and 
 1892 ; Appenzell (Inner Rhodes), 1880 and 1883 ; Schwyz, 1884 and 
 1891 ; Aargau, 1885 ; Vaud, 1885 ; Fribourg, 1885, 1893, and 1894 ; 
 Solothurn, 1885 and 1887; Schaffhausen, 1891 and 1892; Uri, 1891 
 and 1892 ; City-Basle, 1891 ; Ticino, 1891 and 1892 ; the Grisons, 
 1892; Rural-Basle, 1892; Glarus, 1892 and 1894; Berne, 1893 ; and 
 Zug, 1894. Thus no less than fourteen of the cantons have altered 
 the articles relating to revision in some way or other between 1891 
 and 1895.] 
 
 1 [It would seem that in Ticino the Legislature has no initiative 
 in partial revision. It belongs to the executive. In the case of a 
 total revision it belongs to either the executive or the Legislature. 
 (See Appendix.) M. Borgeaud considers that the popular initiative is 
 only exercised when the people are asked the general question, "Do 
 you wish for a revision ? " and answer in the affirmative. In the case 
 of a revision brought about by a demand in the form of a complete 
 bill, he considers that the initiative proceeds from a fraction of 
 the people merely, as neither the Legislature or the electorate have 
 any say until the matter comes before them in its final form. (See 
 Appendix, where the constitutions are classified according to this 
 distinction. ) The extent of the initiative by the citizens and of the 
 initiative by the Assembly is given at length in the Appendix.] 
 
" Legislation by the People " 139 
 
 there are only two constitutions which still retain the 
 practice of periodical revision. They are the consti- 
 tutions of Rural-Basle and that of Geneva. 1 " Every 
 fifteen years the question of a total revision of 
 the constitution shall be laid before the general 
 council" [electorate] (Art. 153 of the Constitution 
 of Geneva). 
 
 In the majority of the cantonal constitutions partial 
 and total revisions are expressly distinguished, and 
 the electors have the right to demand either the one 
 or the other. 2 There are, however, certain differences 
 of procedure in each case, just as there are in the 
 Confederation. 3 
 
 1 [Rural-Basle in its new constitution (1893) no longer admits the 
 principle of periodical revision. Its last constitution dated from 
 1863. I n J875, at the end of the regulation twelve years the people 
 were asked if they desired a revision. The answer was, No. In 
 1887 they were again asked, and by a small majority answered, 
 Yes. In 1889 the newly revised constitution was negatived by the 
 people ; a second one was drafted and again rejected. Then the 
 people were asked if they still wished for a revision, and answered, 
 No. Four years later we get a total revision. This periodical con- 
 sultation was an expedient borrowed from the United States. 
 In New York the people are consulted upon the necessity of a 
 constitutional convention every twenty years, and also in Ohio, 
 Maryland, and Virginia. In Michigan it is sixteen years, and in 
 Iowa ten years. In New Hampshire the people decide every seven 
 years. M. Borgeaud says that it would be wiser to adopt the 
 Swiss system, which allows a revision to be brought about when 
 the need is really felt for a constitutional change. It is now left 
 to the chance of dates chosen arbitrarily. See Borgeaud, op. cit., 
 pp. 182, 183.] 
 
 2 [All the cantons now make the distinction. The last two to 
 adopt it were Berne in 1893 and Solothurn in 1895.] 
 
 3 [Certain cantons now recognise the right of the electors to 
 initiate by a bill complete in all its details. These cantons are 
 given in the Appendix. For the differences in procedure when the 
 demand is for a total revision, for a partial revision by a motion, 
 
140 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 When the requisite number of electors demand a 
 revision, the people are first of all consulted on the 
 question whether there shall be a revision or not. 1 
 This is the general rule except in City-Basle. There 
 the preliminary voting takes place only if the Great 
 Council does not agree with the demand. 2 
 
 The people decide at the same time whether the 
 revision shall be undertaken by the ordinary legis- 
 lative assembly or by a constituent assembly in 
 City-Basle, Berne, St. Gall, Neuchatel, Schaffhausen, 
 Ticino, Thurgau, Vaud, and Valais ; and in the Grisons 
 whether the Great Council shall be dissolved and 
 another be elected to carry out the revision. 3 As an 
 example we may cite the text of the Bernese Consti- 
 tution on the matter : 
 
 Art. 91. "As soon as a demand is made (for a 
 revision), the Great Council shall submit the fol- 
 lowing questions to the decision of the political 
 assemblies : 
 
 or for a partial revision by a bill, see Appendix. There are also 
 certain differences of procedure when the initiative for a total or a 
 partial revision emanates from the Legislature. See Appendix.] 
 
 1 [In the case of a total revision ; not always in the case of a 
 partial revision, and never if the demand is by bill and not by 
 motion. See Appendix.] 
 
 2 [The preliminary voting always takes place in City-Basle in the 
 case of a total revision (Article 54 of the Constitution of December 
 1891) ; in the case of a partial revision only if the council does not 
 agree. This is, however, the case in several other cantons. See 
 Appendix. 
 
 In some cases the councils must draft the revision required 
 without consulting the people, whether they agree with the de- 
 mand presented or not.] 
 
 3 [There are other differences of procedure, according as the 
 demand for revision proceeds from the people or from the Legisla- 
 ture, and also in the case of a partial and a total revision. See 
 Appendix.] 
 
"Legislation by the People" 141 
 
 (1) Shall a revision of the Constitution take place ? 
 And in the case of an affirmative answer 
 
 (2) Shall the revision be undertaken by the Great 
 Council or by a constituent assembly ? x 
 
 In this preliminary referendum it is the majority 
 of the electors who actually vote who decide. Lucerne 
 is an exception. By the terms of Articles 31 and 33 
 of the Constitution, a revision cannot be proceeded 
 with unless a majority of the registered electors give 
 their assent. The Constitution of Fribourg, though 
 not so clearly expressed as that of Lucerne, has been 
 interpreted in the same sense. By the terms of 
 Article 79, 2 the question of deciding whether the con- 
 stitution ought to be revised is submitted to the 
 vote of the people, and if an absolute majority of 
 the active citizens pronounce in the affirmative, the 
 revision shall be undertaken. 
 
 In 1884 the Radicals of Fribourg collected 10,000 
 signatures to back a demand for a revision, with the 
 object of making the mayoralty of the communes an 
 elective office. 3 The Catholic party decided not to 
 
 1 [In Berne there was no express provision made for the case of a 
 partial revision. This has been altered now, and the text quoted 
 above only applies to the case of a total revision. A partial re- 
 vision is carried out in the same way as an ordinary law. The 
 electors either draft the law, or demand that it shall be drafted. 
 The Great Council in the latter case undertakes the drafting.] 
 
 - The electors who were prevented from attending, and who 
 excused themselves, in writing, to the president of the commune 
 before the vote took place, are left out of account. [This has been 
 altered by the constitutional amendment of November 1890, and 
 the majority required is the majority of those who actually vote.] 
 
 3 In the state of Fribourg the mayors are nominated by the 
 government ; in all the other cantons they are elected by the 
 electors of the commune. [The mayors are now chosen by the people. 
 See Hilty, Politisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz, 1894, vol. ix. p. 398.] 
 
142 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 take part in the preliminary vote, which took place 
 on the 25th of January 1885. The result was that 
 only 6000 electors presented themselves at the polls 
 in support of the Radical demand. The government 
 of Fribourg, basing its decision on the text of the 
 constitution, declared that the verdict of the refer- 
 endum was directly opposed to the revision, since 
 only one-fourth of the electors had recorded their 
 vote in favour of the change. 1 
 
 In the cantons of Aargau, Rural-Basle, Fribourg, 
 Geneva, Lucerne, Schwyz, and Solothurn the revision 
 is always undertaken by a constituent assembly. 2 In 
 consequence, only the question of revision or no 
 revision is put to the electors. The prelimi- 
 nary referendum is also confined to the one ques- 
 tion in Zurich and in Zug, but in Zug the revision 
 is undertaken by the existing Cantonal Council, 
 whilst in Zurich the Great Council is dissolved as 
 a matter of course, and is renewed to work at the 
 revision. 
 
 The revised constitution, or the constitutional 
 amendment, is always submitted to the people in 
 every canton, and does not come into force unless 
 
 1 There are about 28,000 electors in the canton of Fribourg. 
 [This has been altered by the constitutional amendment of the 
 I4th of January 51894. The requisite majority, as in Lucerne, is 
 that of the electors who actually vote.] 
 
 2 [Only in cases of total revision (see Appendix). In Rural-Basle 
 the people decide whether it shall be by a constituent assembly or 
 not, even in the case of a total revision, and also in Zug. In all 
 the other cantons quoted, the Great Council carries out a partial 
 revision (see Appendix). Rural-Basle, Solothurn, Zug, and Geneva 
 (probably) recognise the right of the people to draft their own 
 amendment.] 
 
11 Legislation by the People" 143 
 
 the majority of the electors decide to accept it. 1 
 This majority is that of the electors who take part in 
 the vote. Zug, however, is an exception. There the 
 constitution (Article 33) declares that the majority 
 shall be that of the registered electors. 2 In the 
 cantons of Aargau and St. Gajl, if the revision is only 
 partial, the people do not vote upon the new articles 
 as a whole, but upon each one separately. 3 
 
 Many of the cantons do not make special regula- 
 tions to meet the case of a rejection of the con- 
 stitution. 
 
 In City-Basle and in Lucerne the old constitution 
 remains in force. In Schaffhausen the constituent 
 assembly or the cantonal council drafts a new pro- 
 posal. In the canton of Aargau the people are asked 
 whether the revision shall be undertaken a second 
 time, and, in the case of an affirmative answer, 
 whether it shall be by the existing or by a new 
 constituent assembly. At Fribourg and in Solothurn, 
 if a revised constitution is rejected by the majority of 
 the active citizens taking part in the vote, the same 
 constituent assembly draws up a second scheme, and 
 if this second scheme is again rejected, a new con- 
 stituent assembly is elected in Fribourg, but in Solo- 
 thurn, after the second scheme is rejected, the people 
 are consulted as to whether the revision shall be 
 
 1 [The constitution bears the date of its adoption by the people, 
 not of its ratification by the Confederation, in Zurich, Lucerne, 
 Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Glarus, Solothurn, Appenzell, St. Gall, 
 Thurgau, Vaud, Neuchatel, Geneva, Fribourg, Berne, and the 
 Grisons.] 
 
 2 [This is now altered. It is the majority who actually vote. 
 See Constitution, 1894, sec. 83.] 
 
 3 [Also in some other cantons. See Appendix.] 
 
144 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 proceeded with, and if the answer be in the affirma- 
 tive, a new constituent assembly is then nominated. 1 
 
 SECTION II. THE "RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE" WITH 
 
 REGARD TO THE ORDINARY LAWS. 
 
 i. In the Confederation. 
 
 We have seen in Chapter I. by what means the 
 optional referendum was introduced into the Federal 
 Constitution of 1874. We are now going to study 
 the working of the institution in detail. 
 
 This right is contained in Articles 89 and 90 of the 
 Constitution, which are as follows: 
 
 " Federal laws, decrees, and resolutions can only be passed by 
 the agreement of the two councils. Federal laws are submitted 
 to the people, to be accepted or rejected by them, it' a demand 
 be made by 30,000 active citizens or by eight cantons. Federal 
 decrees which are of general application, and which are not 
 specially urgent, are likewise submitted upon demand " (Art. 89). 
 
 "The Confederation shall by law establish the forms and 
 suspensory intervals to be observed in the case of the popular 
 votes " (Art. go).' 2 
 
 The two councils of whom mention is made in the 
 first paragraph of Article 89 are the National Council 
 and the Council of States. They meet in ordinary 
 session as the Federal Assembly each year at Berne, 
 on the first Monday in June and the first Monday in 
 
 1 [For further details see Appendix.] 
 
 2 The law of which mention is made above was passed imme- 
 diately after the Federal Constitution came into force. It is the 
 Federal Law concerning the popular votings on laws and federal resolu- 
 tions, dated June 17, 1874. It was amplified later by a decree of the 
 Federal Council dated May 2, 1879. 
 
" Legislation by the People" 145 
 
 December. They can be summoned on extraordinary 
 occasions by the Federal Council, or upon the demand 
 of a fourth of the members of the National Council, 
 or of any five cantons. The ordinary sessions last, 
 as a rule, about three weeks. The right of initiative 
 belongs (i) to each of the two councils, and to any 
 one of their members; (2) to the Federal Council; 
 and (3) to the cantons, who may exercise their right 
 by correspondence. Every bill, from whomsoever it 
 originates, must pass through the hands of the Federal 
 Council. Before each legislative session the Federal 
 Council prepares a list of so-called tractandas, which 
 serves as a basis for the division of the business 
 between the two houses. One-half of the tractandas 
 are discussed first of all in the National Council, and 
 the other half in the Council of States. The two 
 Chambers debate separately, but neither council can 
 debate at all unless the deputies present are a majority 
 of the total number of members. Divisions are de- 
 cided by the majority of those who vote. When the 
 council that has first discussed the affair has finished 
 its examination, it communicates the result to the other 
 council within forty-eight hours. If the other council 
 is of the same opinion, it sends a message to that 
 effect to the first council, who sends the bill on to 
 the Federal Council to be carried into effect. If the 
 second council does not agree, however, it states the 
 points of disagreement to the first council, and they 
 form the subject of a new debate. In this second 
 deliberation there is no debate on those clauses of a 
 law or decree on which the councils are agreed. The 
 result of the second deliberation is again communi- 
 cated to the second council, and this goes on until all 
 
 K 
 
146 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 matters in dispute are settled, or until the Chambers 
 declare definitely that they cannot see their way to 
 reconciling their divergent opinions. In this latter 
 case there is nothing more to be done, and the 
 question remains unsolved until it be again put on 
 the order of the day. In practice, the two Chambers 
 habitually make reciprocal concessions, and a final 
 agreement is the general rule. 1 
 
 II. The discussions of the Federal Assembly have, 
 as a rule, only a provisional character. 2 Neither their 
 
 1 [For further details on the Federal Council and the Assembly 
 see Preface.] 
 
 2 Art. 85. The subjects within the competence of the two 
 councils are the following : 
 
 1. Laws on the organisation and election of federal authorities. 
 
 2. Laws and ordinances on subjects which by the constitution 
 are placed within the federal competence. 
 
 3. The salaries and compensation of members of the federal 
 governing bodies and of the Federal Chancery, the creation of 
 permanent federal posts, and the determination of the salaries 
 connected therewith. 
 
 4. The election of the Federal Council, of the Federal Tribunal, 
 of the Chancellor, and also of the Commander-in-chief of the 
 federal army. The Confederation may by law assign to the Federal 
 Assembly other powers of election or confirmation. 
 
 5. Alliances and treaties with foreign powers, and also the ap- 
 proval of treaties made by the cantons between themselves or with 
 foreign powers; nevertheless, the treaties made by the cantons 
 shall be brought before the Federal Assembly only in case the 
 Federal Council or another canton protests. 
 
 6. Measures for external safety, and also for the maintenance of 
 the independence and neutrality of Switzerland ; the declaration 
 of war and the conclusion of peace. 
 
 7. The guaranty of the constitution and of the territory of the 
 cantons ; intervention in consequence of such guaranty ; measures 
 for the internal safety of Switzerland, for the maintenance of peace 
 and order ; amnesty and pardon. 
 
 8. Measures for the preservation of the constitution, for carrying 
 
"Legislation by the People" 147 
 
 vote on federal laws or on federal decrees is neces- 
 sarily final. Both the laws and the decrees these 
 latter provided only that they are of general import 
 and are not urgent are submitted to the people for 
 their sanction if a valid demand for a referendum 
 be received within three months from 30,000 active 
 citizens or eight cantons. 
 
 Federal decrees differ from federal laws in that 
 they escape the referendum hi two cases ; and it is, 
 therefore, of importance to know what distinguishes 
 a law from a decree, and when the decrees are urgent 
 or " not of general import." 
 
 There are no definitions in the Federal Constitu- 
 tion to help us, nor are there any in the law of the 
 1 7th June 1874 which regulates the popular votings. 
 In the message which accompanied this law the 
 Federal Council asked "whether it would not be 
 advisable to give an exact definition of a law and 
 a decree, 1 in order that there might be in future 
 some method in the classification of the decrees of 
 
 out the guaranty of the cantonal constitutions, and for fulfilling 
 federal obligations. 
 
 9. The power of controlling the federal army. 
 
 10. The determination of the annual budget ; the audit of public 
 accounts, and federal ordinances authorising loans. 
 
 11. The superintendence of federal administration and of federal 
 courts. 
 
 12. Appeals against the judgments of the Federal Council in 
 administrative disputes. 
 
 13. Conflicts of jurisdiction between federal authorities. 
 
 14. The revision of the Federal Constitution. 
 
 [This translation has been adopted from Vincent, State and Federal 
 Government of Switzerland, in which the whole of the Federal 
 Constitution is translated into English.] 
 
 1 [The French word is arrtte, which means the decision of an 
 administrative authority.] 
 
148 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 the Federal Assembly, and in the absence of which 
 the Federal Assembly might be tempted to give a 
 legislative decree an arbitrary interpretation, and 
 order its immediate execution, thus removing it 
 from the sphere of the optional referendum ? " " We 
 have not thought it necessary, however," the authors 
 of the message continued, "to follow out this idea 
 by inserting in the law itself a theoretical definition 
 of a law. We do not think that such a definition 
 would constitute any guarantee against proceedings 
 which are arbitrary or opposed to the spirit of the 
 constitution ; for, however good it be, a definition 
 can always be differently interpreted, especially when 
 it becomes a question of applying it in a doubtful 
 case. The necessary guarantees are to be found in 
 the Federal Assembly itself, in the fact that both 
 councils must be hi agreement, and in the public 
 opinion of the Swiss people." 
 
 Finding it impossible to establish any satisfactory 
 test, the Federal Council proposed that the Federal 
 Assembly should settle in each case whether a bill were 
 a law or a decree, and also if a decree were " general " 
 in its character, and whether the measures and orders 
 contained in it were urgent or not. The Chambers 
 approved this proposal, and the result is embodied 
 in Article 2 of the Law of the I7th of June 1874. 
 
 "The right of deciding that an order is urgent, 
 or that it is not general in its application, belongs 
 to the Federal Assembly, and the resolution to that 
 effect must in each case be formally attached to the 
 order itself." l 
 
 1 [M. Berney (L' Initiative populaire, p. n) criticises the distinc- 
 tion as vague and arbitrary, and shows that in practice curious 
 
" Legislation by the People " 149 
 
 The Swiss jurists are unanimous in the opinion 
 that the existence of such discretionary power in the 
 hands of the Federal Assembly is anti-democratic. 
 
 results have been obtained. " In theory one understands by a law, 
 general abstract rules which are applicable to all cases, and which 
 are in force for an unlimited time ; and by a decree, a decision 
 in a concrete case." He then goes on to show that persons born 
 before 1855 have been exempted from military service by a law, 
 and that grants to the Alpine railways have been made by a law. 
 On the other hand, the investment of the funds of the Confedera- 
 tion and the bounty on sugar have been regulated by decrees. The 
 post of engineer of public works has been created by a decree, 
 a similar post in the statistical department by a law. The 
 meteorological station was established by a decree, the Poly- 
 technic School by a law. 
 
 The words "general in character" are also criticised by him. 
 The French words are d'une portde gtndrale, which are a translation 
 of the German allgemein verbindliche Beschlilsse, which were taken 
 from the Constitution of Basle, and mean resolutions binding on 
 the majority, or which are intended to apply to the whole country ; 
 resolutions, in fact, which apply to all, and which must be observed 
 by all. 
 
 Basle-City, however, did not consider this clause precise enough, 
 and has substituted for it in the new constitution the words, " re- 
 solutions which have not a personal character." 
 
 One would have thought that a loan would certainly be regarded 
 as general in character. We find, however, that an order of the 
 26th June 1889, changing the equipment of the infantry and 
 authorising a loan of sixteen millions, was said to be "not general," 
 as well as another in the same year giving the Federal Council 
 a credit of seven and a half millions. The price of stamped 
 envelopes was, however, fixed by a law, and a grant of 10,000 
 francs to the legation at Washington was considered "general in 
 character," and was voted on by the people at a referendum. 
 
 Again, resolutions are apt to be considered "urgent" in rather a 
 curious way. The situation of the National Museum was settled 
 by a decree, and was characterised as urgent, it being undesir- 
 able to submit the question to the referendum on account of the 
 cantonal jealousy. The purchase of a drill-ground at Frauenfeld 
 was also withdrawn from the popular vote on account of urgency. 
 
 Those laws and orders which can be submitted to the referendum 
 have a special "referendum clause " attached.] 
 
1 50 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 By a mere majority of the members present the 
 Assembly is able to decide that such and such a 
 resolution shall not be submitted to the people, 
 but shall come immediately into force. There is no 
 means of appeal against this decision, and the people 
 have no legal means by which they can defend them- 
 selves. 
 
 " There ought to be a more exact definition of the 
 cases in which the referendum can be exercised," 
 wrote M. Numa Droz, one of the members of the 
 Federal Council. "As little margin as possible 
 should be left for arbitrary decisions by the Federal 
 Assembly. For instance, it is admitted that neither 
 the budget nor international treatises come within 
 the scope of the referendum,^although the constitu- 
 tion is not at all explicit on the subject. Neverthe- 
 less, more than one attempt has been made to apply 
 it to these subjects also. The debates which have 
 taken place in the Federal Assembly on more than 
 one occasion and on more than one subject have 
 shown that there is a tendency among a considerable 
 number of members to submit everything without 
 exception to the referendum. There are many 
 deputies who dare not oppose this course, lest their 
 popularity should suffer. Let us profit, therefore, by 
 the experience we have gained, and replace an am- 
 biguously worded article by a clear text, in which it 
 shall be intelligible to every man what are the rights 
 of the people and what are the powers of the Federal 
 Assembly." ! 
 
 1 Numa Droz, La revision fddtralc, in the JBibliothtque Univeraellc, 
 xxv. p. 30. 
 [M. Droz, writing in 1894, ten years later, still regrets the 
 
" Legislation by the People " 151 
 
 M. Numa Droz wrote these lines in 1 884. Nothing 
 has been done, however, since that time by way of sub- 
 stituting a clearly worded provision for the ambiguous 
 text of Article 89. The uncertainty as to what can 
 or can not be submitted to the referendum continues 
 therefore to exist. 1 Until such uncertainty be removed 
 by definite legislation, the following are the subjects 
 
 deficiencies of the law, but does not now seem to consider it 
 advisable to alter it. A list of subjects would have to be drawn 
 up, he thinks, on which the referendum might be demanded, and 
 it would be very difficult to exclude anything from the popular 
 vote. Any attempt to do so would be characterised as undemocratic, 
 and there would be a great outcry. He considers, however, that 
 everything ought not to be submitted to the people, and that under 
 the circumstances it would be better to let the text of Article 89 
 stand. In practice he thinks that it has not worked badly, though 
 there have been a few anomalies. See Ibtudes et portraits politiques, 
 pp. 465, 466.] 
 
 1 I have a clear recollection, while I am writing this, of being 
 present during June of last year at a very lively debate in the 
 National Council on this subject of the application of Article 89. 
 A federal decree of amnesty to the revolutionaries of Ticino of 
 September 11, 1890, was before the house. The Federal Council 
 held that, as it applied to a concrete case, the decree had no general 
 application. A member of the Right, M. Python, from Fribourg, 
 objected to this interpretation. He argued that the decree ought 
 to have a clause attached permitting the referendum, on the 
 ground that it suspended a law which all citizens were bound to 
 observe. I am sorry that it is impossible for me, owing to the 
 absence of Swiss parliamentary reports, to give the reader the text 
 of M. Python's logical sequence of arguments. 
 
 I may say that the amnesty was not voted, and that the revolu- 
 tionaries of Ticino came up for trial at the federal assizes of Zurich 
 in the following July. The prisoners were acquitted, but the result 
 gave rise to much scandal. One of the principal witnesses in the 
 trial, M. Respini, who had been president in the government which 
 the revolution overturned, told me that he hoped to throw some 
 light upon the events which had occurred in Ticino of late years. 
 His book, which will appear shortly, will certainly be an interesting 
 episode in Swiss Radicalism. 
 
1 5 2 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 which have been regarded as outside the sphere of 
 the referendum according to the practice followed 
 since 1874: 
 
 1. Treaties with foreign states. 
 
 A vote took place on this question when the Federal 
 Constitution of 1 872 was being drawn up. The National 
 Council then decided, by 67 votes to 31, that treaties 
 should not be submitted to the referendum. The 
 objections were that the omnipotence of the Federal 
 Assembly in this matter gave it power to favour 
 foreigners to the detriment of their own countrymen. 
 This actually happened as a matter of fact when the 
 Federal Assembly concluded the treaty of 1864 with 
 France. The French Jews were thereby given the 
 right of free settlement, a right which up to that 
 time had been withheld from the Swiss Jews. 1 
 
 2. Resolutions which are only intended to apply 
 to special cases, such as those which guarantee the 
 cantonal constitutions, and the decisions given in 
 administrative disputes. 
 
 1 [M. Droz says, in his article on "Swiss Democracy and the 
 Popular Initiative," that it was solemnly understood at the time 
 of the federal revision that neither the budget nor international 
 treaties should be submitted to the referendum. To do so would 
 be a continual peril to the internal and external welfare of the 
 country, a menace to her very existence. 
 
 M. Hilty also says that before the compulsory referendum can 
 be introduced into the federal domain it will be necessary to find a 
 formula by which not only the resolutions of slight importance, but 
 also diplomatic affairs, international treaties, decisions on peace and 
 war, may be withdrawn from the popular vote. 
 
 Thus two of the greatest-Swiss statesmen are of an opinion that it 
 would on no account be advisable to submit these questions. They 
 are submitted in the cantons, but the limits with which the cantons 
 may conclude treaties, either with foreign countries or with one 
 another, are very narrow, and the Federal Government can always 
 quash any treaty which contravenes the Federal Constitution.] 
 
" Legislation by the People " 153 
 
 3. Financial matters. These include the annual 
 budget and state estimates, and the appropriations 
 voted for the purpose of acquiring war material. 1 
 
 4. Federal resolutions granting subsidies for the 
 diking of rivers and construction of roads. 2 
 
 III. The two classes of legislative decrees mentioned 
 in Article 89, i.e. laws and orders of universal applica- 
 tion and which are not urgent, are forwarded to the 
 Federal Council immediately after they are passed. 
 The Federal Council proceeds to publish them in the 
 official Gazette (Feuille Federate), and sends, at the 
 same time, a certain number of copies to the can- 
 tonal governments, who then distribute them among 
 the communes. The object of thus publishing the 
 law is to bring it before the people, and a certain 
 period has been fixed during which bills and decrees 
 of general application are suspended, and during 
 which demands for the referendum may be sent in. 
 
 1 [Certain expenses are sometimes incorporated with the budget 
 to prevent their going to the referendum, as the grant to the St. 
 Gothard Railway.] 
 
 2 " It has been argued from this that the financial referendum is 
 not to be found in the Confederation. It appears to me that those 
 who speak thus have formed a false idea of our referendum. Owing 
 to its purely optional character, there is no need to specially mention 
 the financial referendum. The decrees on financial questions are 
 bound by the same rules as all other decrees. As subsidies can 
 only be granted by means of laws or decrees which are binding on 
 all, all subsidies are subjects for the referendum by the ordinary 
 rules of law which permit any federal decree to be submitted to 
 the people provided that it is concerned with public and not with 
 private interests. I cannot understand the distinction which the 
 Assembly has been pleased to make between grants for improving 
 the waterways and subsidies to the railways." Dubs, Ledroit public 
 de la Confederation Snisse, vol. ii. p. 153. 
 
154 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 This period has been fixed by the law of the i;th 
 of June 1874 at ninety days, reckoned from the 
 day of publication. 1 (Law of the i/th of June 1874, 
 Art. 4.) 
 
 IV. The referendum may be demanded during 
 these ninety days by 30,000 active citizens, or by 
 eight cantons (Art. 89 of the Federal Constitution). 
 It may be said at once, that since the Federal Con- 
 stitution of 1874 came into force the cantons have 
 never made use of their right. This will easily be 
 understood when we think of the complicated pro- 
 cedure which is connected with such a demand. The 
 federal law requires, as a matter of fact, that the 
 demand shall emanate from the legislative authority 
 of the canton. Assuming, first of all, that a prelimi- 
 nary understanding exists between the opposition in 
 eight different states, it would be necessary, as a rule, 
 to summon an extraordinary session of the Lands- 
 gemeinde or Great Council. That is the first diffi- 
 culty. Then if the Great Council, in each case, 
 should decide on claiming the referendum against 
 a federal law, the next step would be to get its 
 decision approved by the majority of the electors 
 within the canton (Law of the I7th of June 1874, 
 Art. 6). 2 All this would have to be done within three 
 
 1 [The period is really ninety- two days. It is counted as begin- 
 ning on the day after the publication of the law; and a demand 
 posted on the last day, which reached the office the day after the 
 delay expired, would nevertheless be counted. It is not necessary, 
 however, to wait until the expiration of the delay if the necessary 
 figures are collected sooner.] 
 
 2 [I do not understand from Article 6 that the decision of the 
 Council must be approved by the people to be valid. It seems to 
 
" Legislation by the People " 155 
 
 months, in eight cantons at the least. Within the 
 same tune it is evidently much easier to collect 
 the signatures of 30,000 electors all over Switzer- 
 land. 
 
 Let us now examine the regulations affecting the 
 demand for a referendum made by 30,000 active 
 citizens. 
 
 The law lays down as a principle that a citizen 
 who makes or who backs a demand must sign it 
 personally (Law of the i;th of June 1874, Art. 5). It 
 follows that (i) he is forbidden to sign for a third 
 person, even if he add to the signature the words 
 " by order," or " with assent " ; (2) if the electors of a 
 commune decide in the communal assembly * to claim 
 the referendum, and forward a demand to that effect 
 to the Federal Council, only the number of signatures 
 which actually back the written demand will be taken 
 into account, and not the number of electors who 
 have voted for the demand in the communal assembly. 
 It is a doubtful question whether the elector must 
 actually sign his name himself. The law is not precise 
 
 me that if the cantonal constitutions choose to enact that such 
 decisions shall be approved by the people, the federal law recog- 
 nises their right to do so. Certain cantons, such as Berne, Basle- 
 City, Aargau, and Vaud, do not seem to recognise any necessity 
 for an appeal to the people. In Zurich a decision of the Great 
 Council to demand the referendum is subject to the optional 
 referendum upon the demand of 5000 citizens, or one-third of the 
 members of the Legislature. This would seem also to be the case 
 in Schaffhausen, the number of citizens being 1000.] 
 
 1 The electors of the communes of German Switzerland are in the 
 habit of assembling in gemeinde to settle all local affairs of import- 
 ance. The communal assemblies are not peculiar to Switzerland. 
 Many existed in the Middle Ages in different countries, in Italy, in 
 Spain, in England, and in the province of Liege. (De Laveleye, Le 
 gouvernement dans la democratic, ii. pp. 312, 329, 338, 365). 
 
156 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 on the point, and the inference is that illiterates can 
 sign with a cross or some sort of a mark. 
 
 The law only makes one stipulation, that individuals 
 who demand the referendum should be in enjoyment 
 of their political rights; and illiterates enjoy these 
 rights as well as others. A case in point arose in 
 1885, on the occasion of the demand for a cantonal 
 referendum in Ticino. The government of Ticino 
 had cancelled more than 600 signatures which had 
 been given in the form of a cross. The question came 
 before the Federal Council, who reversed this decision, 
 and from that time crosses have been considered as 
 valid signatures. As the power of demanding the 
 referendum belongs only to active citizens, signatures 
 have to be attested by the communal authorities of 
 the locality in which the demand is signed, in order 
 to certify that those who sign are in possession of 
 their political rights. This attestation has to appear 
 at the foot of each list, and is somewhat as follows : 
 
 " The undersigned, president (or other title) of the commune 
 
 of , certifies the right to vote of the (number) 
 
 persons who have signed the above list, and declares that they 
 are in full enjoyment of their political rights in this commune." 
 
 The date and the signature of the president follow. 
 No charge is made for his attestation. 
 
 It is obvious that 30,000 signatures do not collect 
 themselves. Who, then, is it that takes the initiative 
 in a movement for the referendum, and how do the 
 agitators obtain the necessary number of signatures ? 
 In practice this varies according to circumstances. 
 When a party law is in question, the deputies of 
 the Catholic opposition are naturally singled out to 
 
" Legislation by the People " 157 
 
 inaugurate the campaign. As a rule they obtain great 
 support from the Berner Volkspartei, and sometimes 
 also from the Eidgenossische Verein. 
 
 The Berner Volkspartei is the Conservative opposi- 
 tion in the canton of Berne, and is composed mostly 
 of peasants. The Eidgenossische Verein is mainly 
 composed of the Conservative Protestants of Zurich, 
 Basle, and Berne. When the three groups work 
 together they nominate a committee, which sees to 
 the printing of the sheets to be signed. These sheets 
 are sent at once to trustworthy persons in the com- 
 munes. Sometimes it is thought better to carry on 
 the campaign more or less secretly. In that case 
 election agents present the sheets at the houses of 
 men of whom they are certain, and individual per- 
 suasion between man and man is the important 
 feature. 
 
 At other times the lists are deposited in public 
 places. For instance, while I was passing through 
 Geneva, a referendum was being organised against an 
 excise law, and I saw placards in the beer-shops with 
 these words, " The demand for the referendum may 
 be signed here." 
 
 When those in favour of a referendum thus openly 
 organise a campaign, there is no reason why they 
 should keep silence, and they make a good deal of 
 stir. They get up public meetings, issue circulars, 
 cover the walls with placards, and make use of all 
 the newspapers they retain. The localities or classes 
 of citizens specially affected by a law such as the 
 excise law which I have just mentioned, organise 
 the opposition. Those interested in the rejection of 
 the law band themselves together without distinc- 
 
1 5 8 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 tion of party, and committees are set on foot to 
 spread their views and collect signatures. These 
 coalitions and committees have merely an ephemeral 
 existence, and they dissolve and disappear as soon 
 as they have effected their purpose. 
 
 When the campaign is conducted by men who 
 understand their business, the necessary number of 
 signatures has been collected in a month. As a 
 general rule, however, they aim at considerably ex- 
 ceeding the 30,000. It makes a good impression on 
 the electorate at large. 
 
 A well-known agitator in the canton of Berne, M. 
 Diirrenmatt, who thoroughly understands the working 
 of the referendum, has told me that he proposed in 
 his paper to found a Referendum Society to demand 
 the referendum on every law voted by the Federal 
 Assembly. This society would include 3000 members, 
 each of whom would undertake to find ten signatures. 
 Even with an opposition less well organised, it ought 
 not to be difficult to find 30,000 men ready and willing 
 to sign all demands for a referendum that are pre- 
 sented to them. Among a body of over 600,000 
 electors, there are always a certain number who are 
 discontented, and who are perhaps on the side of the 
 opposition owing to certain peculiarities of character, 
 temperament, or even caprice. Many sign by con- 
 viction because they are democrats, and wish the 
 people to legislate on every subject. Others good- 
 naturedly sign to please their friends. 1 
 
 1 [M. Hilty says : It is quite certain that the signatures for the 
 referendum are not always obtained without the help of agents 
 paid for their trouble. I remember very well asking a sturdy peasant 
 why all the men in his village had signed a demand for the 
 referendum. He told me that a native from his valley had come 
 
" Legislation by the People " 159 
 
 M. Chatelanat, formerly chief of the statistical 
 department at Berne, has drawn up a list of the 
 cantons, and has classified them according to the 
 tendency to demand the referendum. The Catholic 
 cantons head the list, Fribourg being the first. Then 
 come Uri, Valais, Upper Unterwalden, Geneva, and 
 the canton of Vaud. On the other hand, the Radical 
 cantons of Thurgau, Solothurn, Glarus, and Zurich 
 furnish the smallest number of signatures. The 
 statistics of M. Chatelanat are only based on the 
 experience of five years, but compared with the 
 figures that I have been able to collect in Switzer- 
 land, they are correct for the years that follow. 
 
 V. Before the ninety days have expired the signed 
 
 from the capital of the canton to collect signatures. " He told us," 
 the man continued, "that he should receive ten centimes (id.) 
 per signature, which was a very good thing for him, whilst it 
 was all the same to us whether the law passed or not. And so 
 we signed." 
 
 M. Hilty goes on to say that this would not be the case when the 
 people thoroughly understood the meaning and aims of the law, but 
 he says "the history of the optional referendum proves that it is 
 not always the worst laws that are attacked " (Le Referendum et 
 V Initiative en Suissc, Revue dc Droit intemationale, 1892, p. 397). 
 
 When the socialists were getting up the initiative petition known 
 as "the right to work," their agents obtained 2d. per signature 
 (Signorel, p. 333). M. Droz, when criticising Mr. MacCrackan's book, 
 What is the Referendum? Swiss Solutions of American Problems, says : 
 " Far from the referendum having got rid of professional politicians, 
 it has rather encouraged them. It has favoured the development 
 of a school who are systematically negative, the neinsager, led by all 
 the discontented spirits, who only think of spreading that discontent 
 among others which is seething within themselves " (La Suissejugee 
 par un Americain). See also "The Referendum in Switzerland," 
 Contemporary Revieiv, 1895, p. 328. 
 
 It is worth noticing that there have been only six demands which 
 did not obtain the necessary number of signatures. They are given 
 by De Salis, Le Droit federal Suissc, i. p. 457, &c.] 
 
1 60 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 lists have to be forwarded to the Federal Council, 
 who has them examined to see if they meet the 
 requirements of the law. 1 If there is no attestation 
 by the president of the commune at the bottom of 
 the list, all the signatures in it are considered null 
 and void. If the attestation is inexact, or there 
 is no declaration as to the right to vote, or of the 
 domicile of one or more of the citizens who sign, the 
 signatures in question are cancelled as null and void. 
 If several signatures on the list are evidently written 
 in the same handwriting, all these signatures except 
 one are also declared to be null. 
 
 It is not at all uncommon to find that two or three 
 thousand names are thus cancelled, and these figures 
 would probably be considerably increased if the 
 Department of the Interior could spend more time 
 in verifying the signatures. 2 
 
 When the examination of the signatures is con- 
 cluded, the Federal Council informs the cantonal 
 
 1 Chatelanat, Die schweizerische Demokratie in ihrcr Fortentwick- 
 lung, Berne, 1879, p. 12. [The demands may be posted on the 
 ninetieth day.] 
 
 2 [In the message of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly 
 concerning the popular voting of the 4th of October 1896, the fol- 
 lowing are the number of cancelled signatures : On the first law, 
 on the punishments for breach of discipline in the army, there were 
 64,025 valid signatures, 5361 doubtful, and 676 invalid ; on the 
 guarantee to be given with cattle, 43,964 good, 2018 doubtful, 350 
 bad ; in the law on railway accounts, 3293 were doubtful and 513 
 bad. In 1898, on the purchase of the railways by the State, 3082 
 were doubtful and 723 bad ; out of these 374 were rejected because 
 they were written in the same hand. Two representatives of the 
 Ultramontane party in 1882 proposed that the signatures should 
 be kept secret after reaching the Federal Chancery, in order to 
 avoid any intimidation. They were told that in public affairs 
 publicity was the rule.] 
 
" Legislation by the People" 161 
 
 authorities of any glaring irregularities, and they 
 punish the guilty parties according to the penal laws. 1 
 
 If no demand for a popular voting has been drawn 
 up during the ninety days which follow the publi- 
 cation of a law or a federal order in the Feuille 
 Federate, or if the official scrutiny prove that the 
 demand sent in is not signed by 30,000 citizens, then 
 the Federal Council decrees that the said law or 
 resolution is to come into force, and makes provision 
 for carrying it into effect, and it is then added to the 
 official collection of the laws of the Confederation. 
 
 The exact number of signatures collected in each 
 canton and commune is published in the Feuille 
 Fdddrale, and the Federal Council communicates the 
 figures to the Chambers at their next session. 
 
 Should the petitions, when duly counted and 
 examined, prove that the demand is supported by 
 the requisite number of electors, the Federal Council 
 organises the popular voting. It first of all informs 
 the cantonal councils, and takes the necessary steps 
 to ensure the prompt and general publication of the 
 law or order which is going to be voted on. 2 
 
 The day on which the voting shall take place is 
 fixed by the council, and announced at the same time. 
 It is the same day for all Switzerland. 
 
 1 All the legal regulations as to the signatures for a referendum 
 demand are also in force in the case of the signatures to a demand 
 for a revision of the Federal Constitution, except that the number 
 of signatures to be collected is larger. 
 
 [In the case of a partial revision the signatures must be collected 
 within six months, and each sheet must contain the text of the law 
 to be inserted or altered, so that each elector may know what he 
 is demanding.] 
 
 2 [Sometimes three laws are voted on at once. The Federal 
 Council arranges matters so that there shall only be one voting.] 
 
 L 
 
1 62 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 The voting may not take place until four weeks at 
 least have elapsed after the law or order has been 
 sufficiently published. This publication is carried out 
 by sending a copy of the law to every voter. 1 
 
 A proposal has been made in the Chambers that 
 an explanatory message should be drawn up by the 
 Federal Council or by one house of the Federal 
 Assembly, and be sent round with the law. This sug- 
 gestion was, however, negatived.' 2 The result is, that 
 the electors have to form their opinion of the law 
 from its bare text. They have no official document to 
 guide them, and there are no reports of the debates. 
 
 Thus, while the deputies only decide after studying 
 the question at length, whilst they have in their 
 hands all the useful documents, reports of commis- 
 sions, and messages of the Federal Council ; while 
 
 1 [The Federal Council publishes the fact that a voting will take 
 place, and the date, in the Feuille Federate. It sends a message to 
 all the cantons, directing them to see that a copy of the law is sent 
 to every elector, and that the decree as to the voting is posted up. 
 It reminds the governments that the law must be in the hands of 
 the electors four weeks before the vote takes place, and that each 
 commune must be furnished with the official paper, on which the 
 result shall be reported. It further states that the result must 
 reach the Federal Chancery at latest within ten days after the poll, 
 and that the canton must seal and keep the tickets. The results 
 are to be telegraphed, so that there may be as little delay as 
 possible. 
 
 The Federal Chancery prints all the laws and voting tickets, and 
 sends them to the cantonal governments for distribution. 
 
 The time it takes to vote on a law may be seen by the threefold 
 voting which took place in October 1896. Three laws were passed 
 in March ; the referendum respite expired on the i;th of June, and 
 the demands had been duly sent in. They were examined, and the 
 Federal Assembly, who announced the result, fixed the date by 
 a decree dated the loth of July. The voting took place on the 4th 
 of October. The day fixed is nearly always a Sunday.] 
 
 2 Hilty, Das Referendum, p. 382. 
 
" Legislation by the People" 163 
 
 they discuss the bill from every point of view, and 
 not only the principles involved, but also the minute 
 details ; the electors have, on the contrary, only the 
 letter of the law put before them, an abstruse docu- 
 ment in which experts themselves can hardly find 
 their way about. It seems to me that the non-exist- 
 ence of any means by which the electors may receive 
 positive information or have the matter impartially 
 explained is one of the greatest shortcomings of the 
 federal referendum. No doubt there is the press, 
 and a federal councillor writing lately thus describes 
 the influence of the press : " When I consider with 
 what passion, or rather with what bad faith, certain 
 questions are presented to the people in the press in 
 spite of its almost unique opportunity for obtaining 
 correct information, I consider, thorough democrat 
 as I am, that in our federal state, with the influence 
 of the state governments often opposed to the central 
 power, the compulsory referendum in the case of all 
 laws would be a mischievous institution." l 
 
 With the optional referendum, it is true, the press 
 has fewer opportunities of misleading the people and 
 of tampering with the popular judgment, but the 
 
 1 Numa Droz, La Revision fidtrah, in the Bibliothequc universelle, 
 vol. xxv. 
 
 [The question was debated in 1875, l88 5> and again in January 
 1892. The reason why it has always been unsuccessful is that the 
 message has always been looked upon as a complement of the com- 
 pulsory referendum, when a vote is certain to take place. When 
 the referendum is optional, it is impossible to decide at what time 
 the council ought to address the people. Shall it be issued when the 
 law is just passed, and when no one dreams, perhaps, of demanding 
 a referendum ; or shall it be issued when the voting is to take place ? 
 In this latter case the message would not seem impartial, but rather 
 'a defence of the law attacked. See Hilty, Revue de Droit inter- 
 nationale, 1892, p. 404.] 
 
1 64 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 ardour with which the newspapers enter into the 
 contest is all the greater when the occasion arises. 
 
 This was the only reason which led James Fazy, of 
 Geneva, to oppose the introduction of the federal 
 referendum in 1891. "You are only making a laugh- 
 ing-stock of the people," he said, "when you make 
 them vote and at the same time withhold from them 
 the means of doing so intelligently. How can the 
 Swiss people, who never obtain any accurate account 
 of the debates of their federal representatives through 
 the scanty reports of the press, be expected to vote 
 reasonably when whole codes are presented to them ? 
 Is it fair to give the people the right of voting on 
 the laws without giving them the opportunity of 
 reading the debates upon those laws ? I would not 
 deny the right of the people to vote on the laws 
 which their representatives prepare, but what I do 
 ask is that the process should not be a mere farce." l 
 
 The plan on which the referendum is now organised 
 is not calculated to assist the majority of the electors 
 in forming a judicious and discriminating opinion on 
 a law that is at all complicated. Most men vote from 
 prejudice rather than conviction, or according to the 
 word of command "accept" or "reject" given by the 
 party leaders, or according to the advice of men in 
 whom they have confidence. As for the independent 
 and conscientious electors who have no time to study 
 the law, they refrain as a rule from voting. 
 
 VI. The voting takes place on the same day 
 throughout the whole of the Swiss Confederation. 
 
 1 J. Fazy, De la revision de la Constitution federate, Geneva, 1871, 
 pp. 90-92. 
 
" Legislation by the People " 165 
 
 The right to vote belongs to every Swiss citizen who 
 is twenty years of age and who is not deprived of his 
 political rights by the law of the canton in which he 
 is settled. There is no federal law which determines 
 when electors ought to be deprived of the franchise. 
 The absence of such a law is due to the referendum 
 itself. Two attempts have been made since 1 874 to 
 codify the electoral legislation of the cantons. The 
 first was the law of the 24th of December 1 874, which 
 was rejected by the people on the 23rd of May 1875 
 by a majority of 4680 votes ; the second, a law of 
 the 28th of March 1877, was rejected on the 2ist 
 of October following by a majority of 81,673 votes. 
 The result of the two appeals to the people is that 
 very different regulations prevail in the different can- 
 tons as to the causes which suffice to deprive a man 
 of his political rights. For instance, in the German 
 cantons paupers and insolvents cannot be electors, 
 and a debtor is made bankrupt for the smallest sum. 
 In the Romance cantons, on the other hand, paupers 
 have the franchise, and only persons who are declared 
 to be fraudulent bankrupts are deprived of their 
 political rights. 
 
 Before the vote takes place each elector receives 
 a voting paper, on which the following question is 
 printed, and which he is expected to answer : " Do 
 you accept the law (or order) of the (date) con- 
 cerning (the title of the law or resolution), Yes or 
 No ? " The elector writes his answer, Yes or No, in 
 the blank space to the right of the question. He has 
 to accept or reject the law in its entirety. He has to 
 pronounce on all the articles and contents of a law 
 at once, and cannot separate or amend them. The 
 
1 66 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 press has already demanded that the minority of the 
 Federal Assembly, if it attains a certain figure, should 
 be allowed to submit a counter-proposal to the people, 
 to be voted on at the same time as the bill passed by 
 the majority. If this innovation were adopted, the 
 electors would have a little more freedom of choice. 
 However reasonable the suggestion may appear, it 
 has been put aside for the present, because it would 
 make the voting complicated, and would only confuse 
 the electors. 
 
 Another intrinsic defect of the referendum is that 
 whenever a law is rejected it leaves the federal 
 authorities in ignorance of the real feelings and 
 wishes of the people. That they do not want the 
 law is a fact to which the figures curtly testify. But 
 what is it that has caused these thousands of legis- 
 lators, intelligent and interested men for the most 
 part, to form an opinion which has proved fatal to 
 the work of the Federal Assembly ? What are the 
 premises from which the people reach those conclu- 
 sions which they demonstrate so forcibly ? In what 
 direction shall the legislators next proceed, since they 
 have already made a false start ? To all these ques- 
 tions no answer is given. When a law is rejected the 
 result of the referendum is purely negative. 
 
 M. Diirrenmatt once proposed that the electors 
 should state the reasons which actuated them when 
 giving their vote. " The more intelligent, at any rate," 
 he said, " would be able to do this, and it would prove 
 a valuable guide to Parliament as to the state of public 
 opinion when a legislative vote has taken place." 
 
 M. Durrenmatt has even gone so far as to print 
 some voting papers in the Berner Volkszeitung which 
 
"Legislation by the People" 167 
 
 might serve as models, and in which the reply was 
 followed by a few words summing up the reasons of 
 the electors. This scheme has had no result, how- 
 ever. The task of the elector, in such a case, would 
 not be so easy as might be thought at first, and the 
 handwriting, moreover, would make secrecy in voting 
 impossible. 
 
 We ought to notice yet another attempt to modify 
 Article 89 of the Constitution as regards the question 
 to be brought before the electors, proposed by a member 
 from Zurich, Herr Vogelin, in 1 884. " To submit to the 
 people the complete draft of a bill which the deputies 
 themselves scarcely understand is to make a fool of 
 the people," he said. " I own frankly that I should 
 prefer no referendum at all to that caricature of it 
 we possess to-day. In the Middle Ages the questions 
 put to the people were simple, clear, and easy to 
 understand, and they summed up the fundamental 
 principle of a law. Then, after the vote had taken 
 place, the government drafted the law hi accordance 
 with the expressed wishes of the nation. Why not 
 return to these ancient traditions ? The first objec- 
 tion that will be urged is that the legislators may 
 not always faithfully interpret the thoughts of the 
 people. Well then, let us give the people the right 
 of initiative. They will then be able to modify laws 
 which have been made against their will. I would 
 propose to give 50,000 electors the right of initiative, 
 and to substitute the following provision for Article 
 89 : ' Each federal law will confine itself to expressing 
 some principle or fundamental proposition, and will 
 be submitted to the referendum in this form. If 
 the people accept it, a federal decree will supply the 
 
1 68 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 details.' " l Since 1 884 the motion of Herr Vogelin has 
 been often under consideration. 
 
 VII. When the votes have all been given, a report 
 is drawn up in each commune or electoral district, 
 which consists of four columns, hi one of which the 
 number of registered electors is entered, in another 
 the total number of voters, in the third the number 
 of those who have accepted the law or order in 
 question, and in the fourth the number of those 
 who have rejected it. The cantonal governments 
 correct the reports of the communes, and forward 
 them to the Federal Council within ten days. 
 They keep the voting tickets, however, in case 
 the Council should wish to see them. The Federal 
 Council calculates the result of the vote from these 
 reports. If the majority of the electors who have 
 taken part in the vote have written " Yes " on their 
 voting paper, the law or resolution is considered as 
 having been accepted, the Federal Council takes the 
 necessary steps to bring it into force, and it is in- 
 serted in the official collection of the laws of the 
 Confederation. 
 
 If it appear that the majority of voters have 
 rejected the law or resolution which has been sub- 
 mitted, this law or resolution is considered to be 
 null and void, and does not become law. In both 
 cases the results of the voting are published in the 
 Feuille Fdcttrale, and the Federal Council informs 
 the Chambers of the result at their next session. 
 
 Vogelin presented his motion to the National Council. I 
 found his speech in a Zurich journal, the Zuricher Post of the I2th 
 of July 1884, which M. Curti kindly sent me. 
 
" Legislation by the People " 169 
 
 VIII. There is one last question in connection 
 with the referendum which is especially interesting 
 to the head of the financial department, and by 
 which also the tax-payers are indirectly affected, and 
 that is the financial outlay in the case of a popular 
 vote. The necessary cost of printing a law on the 
 recovery of debts and on bankruptcy amounted to 
 47,696 francs. With the other expenses, the voting on 
 this law alone cost the Confederation about 130,000 
 francs, and this is by no means exceptional. 1 
 
 IX. In conclusion, let us sum up the differences 
 between the referendum on a revision of the Federal 
 Constitution and one which is merely concerned with 
 federal laws or ordinary federal decrees. 
 
 (1) The constitutional referendum is compulsory 
 that is to say, the vote is enjoined by the con- 
 stitution, and takes place as a regular part of the 
 procedure, no demand being necessary. 
 
 The legislative referendum is optional. The right 
 of demanding it is vested in any 30,000 electors or 
 eight cantons, and the popular voting only takes 
 place if a demand be made in accordance with the 
 rules laid down by law. 
 
 (2) A federal decree revising the constitution does 
 not become law unless it obtains a numerical majority 
 
 1 Adams, La, Confederation Suissc, Basle, 1890, p. 98. 
 
 [M. Hilty says that more than 600,000 copies of the law have 
 to be printed in different languages, and are, of course, distributed 
 gratis to the citizens. The expenses depend on the length of the 
 law. He gives the printing expenses of the first law against bank 
 notes, which was rejected, as 14,425 francs 95 cents ; the expenses 
 of the law on military taxation as 14,485 francs ; and the three 
 laws which were voted on in October 1877 cost 20,843 francs. See 
 Revue dc Droit, &c., p. 405.] 
 
170 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 in the country at large, and also a numerical majority 
 in the majority of the cantons. 
 
 An ordinary federal law which has been voted on 
 by the people can come into force as soon as the bare 
 majority of the Swiss electors accept it, without any 
 reference to the fact that the electors in the majority 
 of the cantons may have rejected it. For instance, the 
 law on marriage of the 24th of December 1874 only 
 obtained a majority in nine and a half cantons, but 
 in the whole country it obtained 213,199 votes to 
 205,069. In the same way, the bankruptcy law passed 
 on the 1 7th November 1889 by a majority of 26,396 
 votes, although it only obtained a majority in eight can- 
 tons. The argument used to justify the disregard of 
 the cantonal vote in the case of ordinary laws is the 
 following : By the constitution certain powers have 
 been given over to the central government, and this 
 surrender has been made with the assent of the 
 majority of the cantons. By that act of cession the 
 cantons have lost their right to interfere in these 
 matters, or in the legislation affecting them. The 
 supporters of the cantonal sovereignty answer this 
 argument by reasoning as follows : The Confederation 
 is a community. There can be no question of any 
 individual surrender of powers, when they belong to 
 the community as a whole. It is inherent in the 
 very idea of a confederation that those who compose 
 the community should be able to make themselves 
 heard on all questions. 
 
" Legislation by the People " 1 7 1 
 
 2. . The " Rights of the People " with regard to 
 the Ordinary Laws in the Cantons. 
 
 I. The Optional Referendum. 
 
 The optional referendum has been adopted by 
 the cantons of Lucerne, Zug, Schaffhausen, St. Gall, 
 Vaud, Neuchatel, Geneva, and the half canton of 
 Basle-City. 1 
 
 We have just discussed the federal referendum so 
 fully that it will be unnecessary for us to enter into 
 many details here, for the optional referendum is 
 organised on much the same plan everywhere. 
 
 The following matters may be submitted to the 
 popular vote : 
 
 1. The laws in those cantons we have just men- 
 tioned. 
 
 2. Certain decrees. In Basle-City and in Neu- 
 chatel they are decrees which are of general import 
 and which are not urgent ; 2 in St. Gall, decrees 
 which are general, not urgent, and which the consti- 
 tution of that canton does not declare to be within 
 the exclusive jurisdiction of the Great Council. 
 
 1 [Schaffhausen has now adopted the compulsory referendum ; 
 Ticino also has the optional referendum. Certain cantons have 
 the optional referendum on certain subjects. It is optional in 
 Schwyz for treaties, decrees, and orders, but is compulsory for 
 laws. In the Orisons it is optional in the case of resolutions 
 which are not urgent. Vaud, it may be mentioned, has a com- 
 pulsory financial referendum. In Basle-City all laws and reso- 
 lutions which the people initiate are subject to the compulsory 
 referendum.] 
 
 2 [In Basle-City the words used are " nicht personliche natur" (not 
 of a personal nature). In Neuchatel " urgency " requires a majority 
 of two-thirds of the Council.] 
 
r 72 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 In Lucerne, Zug, and Schaffhausen, decrees which 
 grant money over a certain sum are also subject to 
 the optional referendum. 1 In the canton of Vaud 
 " any law or decree passed by the Great Council," 
 in Geneva "laws and decrees which are not of an 
 exceptionally urgent character," are within the sphere 
 of the referendum. The cantonal law of Geneva ex- 
 pressly excludes " the annual law for expenditure and 
 revenue as a whole," but special provisions of this law 
 can always be submitted to the referendum if ( i ) they 
 impose a new tax, or increase a tax already existing ; 
 or (2) if they propose an issue of stock, or a loan in 
 some other form. 2 
 
 3. Treaties in the cantons of Lucerne, Zug, and 
 Schaffhausen. By the Federal Constitution the 
 cantons have the right of making treaties with one 
 another about subjects for legislation, or on adminis- 
 trative and judicial matters (Art. 7). In some ex- 
 ceptional cases they have the right of concluding 
 treaties with foreign states in matters which concern 
 the public economy and questions of local relations 
 and police (Art. 9). Treaties which come under either 
 of these two heads are submitted to the optional 
 referendum in the three cantons quoted above. 3 
 
 1 The sums are 200,000 francs in Lucerne, 40,000 francs in Zug, 
 and 150,000 francs in Schaffhausen. 
 
 2 [In practice the budget is never submitted in any state.] 
 
 3 [In Schwyz also they are subject to the optional referendum, but 
 now in Schaffhausen to the compulsory referendum. 
 
 The treaties between the cantons can always be submitted to the 
 Federal Council, should that body desire it or another canton 
 raise a protest ; and if they contain anything contrary to the, 
 articles of the Confederation, or if they injure the rights of the 
 other cantons in any way, they are annulled by the Council. 
 
 Treaties with foreign countries on subordinate questions men- 
 tioned above are also submitted to the Council, and are annulled 
 
UNIVERSITY 
 " Legislation by the People " 
 
 " 
 
 The number of signatures necessary to bring about 
 a popular vote are 500 in Zug, 1000 in Basle-City 
 and Schaffhausen, 3000 in Neuchatel, 3500 in 
 Geneva, 1 4000 in St. Gall, 5000 at Lucerne and 
 in Ticino, and 6000 in the canton of Vaud. More- 
 over, the demand for a referendum must be pre- 
 sented within thirty days after the publication of 
 the law, resolution, or treaty in the Feuille officielle 
 (Gazette). 2 In Lucerne and Zug laws are only pub- 
 lished at the end of the legislative session. In the 
 other cantons a law or decree is published imme- 
 diately after it has passed the Great Council. 3 In 
 Schaffhausen all the legislative acts which come 
 within the scope of the referendum are sent to the 
 electors, with an explanatory message, within eight 
 days after their publication. 4 
 
 in like manner if they contain anything contrary to the Confedera- 
 tion or the rights of other cantons. On important matters the 
 cantons can only treat with other countries through the Federal 
 Council, and the Federal Council concludes treaties with other 
 countries in the name of the canton, as in the case of the treaty 
 between France and Geneva in 1858, and between Great Britain 
 and Vaud in 1872.] 
 
 1 [It is now 2500 in Geneva.] 
 
 2 In Neuchatel and Lucerne the referendary respite is forty 
 days, in Basle-City six weeks. The laws and legislative decrees do 
 not come into force until the expiration of the respite, and, if a 
 referendum be demanded, not until the people have pronounced. 
 [In many cantons provision is made that the voting must take 
 place within the next forty or fifty days after a referendum is 
 inevitable.] 
 
 3 [In Neuchatel, if a law is too long to send around to the 
 electors, the title is printed and sent round, with the intimation 
 that the law itself can be studied in the communal Chancery. 
 In Lucerne and Zug the laws are deposited in the communal 
 Chanceries at the end of every session for perusal.] 
 
 4 [In Schaffhausen the voting now takes place once a year, in 
 spring.] 
 
174 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 The electors who claim the referendum put their 
 signatures at the foot of a written demand, as in 
 the case of a federal law. In Ticino the signature 
 must be given by the elector in person in the com- 
 munal offices, in the presence of some delegate 
 of the Chancery. In Neuchatel and Geneva, the 
 electors who support the demand for a referendum 
 must sign personally. In the two former cantons 
 he must give his Christian name, surname, address, 
 age, and profession. In the cantons of Lucerne, 
 Zug, and Schaffhausen the Great Council has power 
 to divide up a law in certain exceptional cases when 
 a referendum has been demanded, and may submit 
 the different provisions separately to the popular 
 vote. 1 
 
 In Schaffhausen voting is compulsory, and the 
 penalty for not voting is a fine of two francs. 
 
 Everywhere except in Zug the majority of those 
 voting decides whether a law shall be accepted or 
 rejected. In this canton a law is not considered 
 as rejected unless the majority of registered electors 
 have voted "No." 2 This is a survival of the old 
 popular veto, when the principle was applied that 
 qui tacet, consentire videtur. 
 
 The name optional referendum is also given some- 
 times to the popular voting on laws and orders, 
 which takes place at the instance of the Great 
 Council itself or at the request of a group of 
 
 1 [Also in Zurich, Solothurn, and Aargau, where voting is com- 
 pulsory.] 
 
 2 [This is now altered in the new Constitution of 1894, and Zug is 
 no longer an exception.] 
 
" Legislation by the People " 175 
 
 deputies. This referendum at the option of the 
 Legislature exists in some of the cantons we are 
 now considering. 
 
 In Lucerne and Zug the Great Council has power 
 to consult the people on a resolution it has just 
 passed. Moreover, in the canton of Zug, laws, 
 treaties, and financial decrees are submitted to the 
 people if one-third of the deputies demand the 
 referendum, as soon as the final vote on a law, 
 treaty, or decree has been taken by the cantonal 
 council. 
 
 In Rural-Basle laws and resolutions when general 
 in character are submitted to the referendum upon 
 demand of 4000 electors, or in consequence of a 
 decision of the Great Council to that effect. 
 
 Finally, in St Gall there is a referendum when 
 4000 electors claim it, or if one-third of the Great 
 Council demand it directly the law is passed. In 
 this latter case the majority of the Great Council 
 can always insist that the popular vote shall be taken 
 on the separate provisions of the law and not on the 
 law as a whole. 1 
 
 The referendum at the option of the Great Council 
 is an institution which is scarcely ever used, and to 
 which the Swiss democrats do not attach any par- 
 ticular value. It has been criticised as follows by 
 M. Hilty, a National Councillor and a Professor of 
 Law in the University of Berne : 
 
 "This form of referendum cannot be highly re- 
 commended, for it does not seem right in principle 
 
 1 [In St. Gall the Great Council may also consult the people 
 during the making of the law, and ask them whether certain pro- 
 visions shall be put in or not.] 
 
176 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 that the representatives of the people should be able 
 arbitrarily to submit or withhold laws according to 
 their will and pleasure. The real danger is that 
 the questions referred will be those which are 
 certain to be accepted, and on which the govern- 
 ment does not run the risk of rejection, or those 
 for which the government does not wish to take 
 the responsibility, or perhaps those in which many 
 members have voted against their inclination and 
 wish to raise the question again by bringing it before 
 the people." 1 
 
 II. The Compulsory Referendum. 
 
 The compulsory referendum has been adopted in 
 the cantons of Zurich, Berne, Schwyz, Solothurn, the 
 Grisons, Aargau, Thurgau, the Valais, and in the half 
 canton of Rural-Basle. 2 In all these states the laws, 
 and at least a certain number of legislative decrees, 
 do not come into force until they have been expressly 
 ratified by the people. A popular voting always takes 
 place on all matters which are not placed exclusively 
 within the province of the Great Council by the con- 
 stitution. There is no need for a fraction of the 
 electoral body to demand the referendum. It takes 
 place as a matter of right, ipso jure, and no one can 
 prevent it without violating the constitution. 
 
 M. Hilty considers that the organisation of the 
 
 1 Hilty, Das Referendum im schweizerischen Staatsrecht, p. 415. The 
 criticism of M. Hilty seems only directed against the referendum 
 which may be demanded by the parliamentary majority. 
 
 2 [Also Schaffhausen since 1895.] 
 
" Legislation by the People " 177 
 
 powers of the state differs essentially according to 
 the form of referendum adopted. 1 To that we cannot, 
 however, assent. 
 
 Under the optional, as under the compulsory re- 
 ferendum, the Great Council ceases to be the sole 
 legislator and sovereign of the country. In both 
 cases its duty is to prepare the laws, and these laws 
 do not come into force until they have received the 
 popular sanction. The distinction between the two 
 institutions is that in the cantons where the compul- 
 sory referendum is in force the popular sanction is 
 always expressed, in the optional referendum cantons 
 it is sometimes expressed and sometimes tacit, accord- 
 ing to the inclination of the electors. The difference 
 is, therefore, obviously merely external. In practice 
 it may be important ; as a matter of right there is no 
 difference at all. 
 
 Before describing the machinery of the compulsory 
 referendum, let us see, first of all, what are the sub- 
 jects upon which the people have to regularly give 
 their opinion. 
 
 In one of the cantons with the compulsory referen- 
 dum, the Yalais, the influence of the people is reduced 
 almost to a minimum. " Every decision of the Great 
 
 1 Hilty, Das Referendum im schwcizcrischen Staatsrecht, p. 411. [He 
 there says that in the optional referendum the fundamental idea is 
 not that the legislative power should be exercised through the 
 people, but that they should have a more or less restricted control 
 or power of criticism, a kind of justified opposition to the Legisla- 
 ture, and that their intervention in legislative work is an excep- 
 tional occurrence. A state that has the optional referendum is 
 always a representative democracy in which certain concessions 
 have been made to the people.] 
 
 M 
 
178 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 Council which entails an extraordinary expense of 
 60,000 francs, or during a term of three years an 
 average expense of 20,000 francs, has to be submitted 
 to the people for their approval or veto, if this ex- 
 pense cannot be covered by the ordinary revenue of 
 the budget" (Art. 15). This is merely the financial 
 referendum (Finanz Referendum). 
 
 But the electors enjoy much more extensive rights 
 in other cantons. They pronounce 
 
 1 i ) Upon the laws. 
 
 (2) On the treaties which the cantons may con- 
 clude within the limits assigned by Articles 7 and 
 9 of the Federal Constitution. In the canton of 
 Aargau treaties are said to belong exclusively to the 
 Great Council. 1 
 
 (3) On certain orders or decrees passed by the 
 Great Council. 2 
 
 It is worthy of notice that several of the cantonal 
 constitutions, those of Aargau and Zurich for example, 
 have put an end to the irritating uncertainty which 
 exists in public federal law between the rights of the 
 people and the duties of the Chamber. They have 
 solved the difficulty, not by making abstract defini- 
 tions of a law or a decree, but by drawing up a list of 
 
 1 [In Schwyz treaties are subject to the optional referendum, and 
 also in Berne, in so far as they are not of a legislative nature. In 
 some of the Landsgemeinde cantons, it is worth noticing, Uri, 
 Obwald, and Appenzell (Inner Rhodes), treaties also belong exclu- 
 sively to the Great Council.] 
 
 2 [In the Grisons all orders creating new officials or bodies are 
 subject to the compulsory referendum. The optional referendum 
 applies to all resolutions which are not urgent, upon the demand of 
 3000 voters. Schwyz, Aargau, Thurgau, and Berne do not seem 
 to recognise a referendum on decrees and resolutions other than 
 financial ones.] 
 
" Legislation by the People " 179 
 
 the subjects upon which the Great Council can legis- 
 late without consulting the people. 1 
 
 Financial decrees deserve special mention, for they 
 always require the popular approval. All estimates 
 voted by the Chamber which exceed a certain sum 
 must be approved by the people. 2 In the canton 
 of Solothurn, the state cannot borrow more than 
 500,000 francs without the consent of the electorate. 
 This sum is fixed at 1,000,000 in the canton of 
 Aargau. 
 
 From 1869 onwards even the state budget was 
 submitted to the referendum in the Canton Berne. 
 The clause ran as follows : " The budget containing 
 
 1 [The Constitution of the Grisons also defines the laws that are 
 to be submitted to the people. They are 
 
 (1) "Organic laws." These are said to be "civil laws, penal 
 laws, those that regulate the procedure in civil and criminal 
 matters, and also in matters of police." 
 
 (2) Administrative laws, especially those relating to excise, 
 education, keeping of the highways, forests, game and fishing 
 rights, sanitary matters, and poor law, as well as other matters 
 of administration relating to the public welfare.] 
 
 2 500,000 francs in Berne, 250,000 in Zurich, 50,000 in Schwyz, 
 100,000 at Solothurn, 100,000 in the Grisons, 250,000 in Aargau, 
 and 50,000 in Thurgau. 
 
 [These constitutions all provide also that the annual expenditure 
 shall not be increased beyond a certain amount without a popular 
 vote. The sums are 20,000 francs in Zurich, 10,000 in Schwyz, 
 15,000 in Solothurn, 20,000 in the Grisons, 25,000 in Aargau, and 
 10,000 in Thurgau. 
 
 M. Hilty says of the financial referendum, that of all the forms of 
 the referendum this is the one which is the least to be recommended. 
 Financial matters are the point in which the people are most want- 
 ing in insight and in foresight. They cannot have that grasp over 
 the whole financial question which is necessary for a right judg- 
 ment. The most important state works which affect future genera- 
 tions may thus be crippled through the niggardliness of those 
 who will not sacrifice anything for posterity. Das Referendum im 
 
 hwtizerischen Staatsrccht, ] 
 
i8o The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 the estimates, drawn up for a period of four years, 
 shall be laid before the people for their approval 
 or rejection. It shall not become law unless it has 
 been accepted by the majority of those voting in the 
 canton" (Law of the iQth May 1869, Arts. 3 and 4). 
 
 The people of Berne having refused several times 
 to pass the budget, the government was forced in 
 1880 to abolish this species of referendum. 1 They 
 encountered a great deal of opposition, but they 
 triumphed at last by a very simple expedient. They 
 inserted the article abolishing this disputed right 
 in a law of the i6th of May 1880 which was very 
 popular with the people because it suppressed several 
 public posts. The pill being thus gilded, the people 
 swallowed it without hesitation. 
 
 We may take the canton of Ziirich as a typical 
 example of the way in which the popular vote is 
 organised in cantons where the referendum is com- 
 pulsory. After having discussed and passed a law 
 the Great Council sends it on to the executive with 
 the request that they will submit it to the refer- 
 endum. At the same time it charges the govern- 
 ment, or a special commission, with the task of 
 
 1 [The budget was also submitted in Aargau, and there, too, the 
 government was left without funds, and it was found necessary to 
 give up the practice.] 
 
 Except in Berne and Rural-Basle the Great Council still has the 
 right of consulting the people on decrees which do not come within 
 the scope of the compulsory referendum. In Schwyz it looks as 
 if the legislators had aimed at enumerating all the possible forms 
 of referendum. First of all, the laws are subject to the compul- 
 sory referendum ; then the cantonal council, or 2000 electors, may 
 claim a referendum upon decrees ; finally, the cantonal council may 
 ask the people for power to bring a law into force at once. This 
 last plebiscite is peculiar to this canton. 
 
" Legislation by the People " 181 
 
 drawing up an explanatory message for the people. 
 The government immediately organises the popular 
 vote by a decree which is published in the Feuille 
 officielle, and which is sent to the communal 
 councils. The cantonal chancery is responsible for 
 printing the laws, messages, and voting tickets, and 
 must see that each elector receives a copy of the 
 law and official message thirty days before the vote 
 at the latest. 1 
 
 This message is one of the special features of the 
 compulsory referendum. Its object is to explain the 
 law, its character, its advantages and disadvantages, 
 and thereby to enable each person to weigh the pros 
 and cons, form a reasonable opinion for themselves, 
 and give an intelligent vote. 
 
 As a matter of fact, the message is unfortunately 
 by no means the impartial comment it ought to be. 
 I have read a great number of them in the different 
 cantons. With one accord they all dwell upon the 
 advantages of the law, they aim at prepossessing 
 the electors in its favour, and advise them to give 
 an affirmative vote. 2 The electors know so well the 
 form which the message will take that they do not 
 even trouble to read it. My informants are unani- 
 mous on this point. 3 
 
 1 In the canton of Aargau, when the law is a lengthy one, a few 
 copies are sent to the communal chancery, and the electors may 
 see it there. 
 
 2 The message does not always recommend the law. A deputy 
 from the canton of Thurgau has told me that his government once 
 sent a message to the electors in which they were advised to vote 
 No. The government of Thurgau can afford to be so independent, for 
 it is elected directly by the people and not by the Great Council. 
 
 3 It was thought probable that the electors did nof, read the 
 explanatory messages because they were too long. It has now 
 
1 82 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 We find thus in the cantons which have the obliga- 
 tory referendum the same defect that we have already 
 noticed in the case of the optional referendum in the 
 Confederation; that is to say, there is no valuable 
 means by which the electors may be instructed as to 
 the value of the laws, a defect which becomes more 
 serious in this case because the votings take place so 
 frequently. 
 
 It is not in the least astonishing to find that 
 M. Herzog, who is a thorough democrat, neverthe- 
 less considers the present form of the compulsory 
 referendum to be absolutely detestable. " I am con- 
 vinced," he says, " that posterity will wonder how we 
 could possibly acquiesce in a system which is so 
 obviously defective." But M. Herzog does more than 
 criticise. He makes an ingenious suggestion by 
 which the present system may be improved. He 
 proposes that public meetings should be held be- 
 tween the first and second reading of a law, at which 
 the deputies should be obliged by the terms of the 
 constitution to inform the electors as to the object of 
 the law, its contents, advantages and disadvantages. 
 Attendance at these meetings would be compulsory 
 for all the electors. 
 
 A whole series of arguments, so M. Herzog says, 
 can be adduced in favour of this proposal. 
 
 (i) Every decision arrived at by associations, or by 
 
 become the custom to make them shorter. I have before me the 
 Civil Code of the canton of Solothurn which was sanctioned by the 
 people on the 5th of July 1891. This code contains 905 articles 
 (175 pages in I2mo). The message which accompanies it covers 
 five pages. I know a great many law students who would rejoice 
 if their professors could summarise their explanations like the 
 government of Solothurn. 
 
" Legislation by the People " 183 
 
 communes, congresses, or commissions of any kind 
 whatever, has always been made the subject of abun- 
 dant discussion and debate. The popular votings 
 on bills are the only exception to the general rule. 
 They are left to chance. What should we say if the 
 constitution were to authorise Parliament to vote 
 laws offhand without discussing them ? Yet debates 
 are less necessary in Parliament, because the members 
 who compose it are most of them intelligent men. 
 Let us, therefore, make the discussion as much an 
 integral part of the referendum as the vote. 
 
 (2) The electorate would be able to exercise a real 
 control over the parliamentary action of their deputies. 
 
 (3) It is not at all an uncommon sight at the present 
 day to see the citizens giving hi their ballot-papers 
 without knowing what it is they accept or reject. If, 
 however, all the electors heard the law commented on 
 by their representatives, who had studied it at the 
 first reading, this would no longer be possible. 
 
 (4) It will be an important means of completing 
 the political education of the people, and they will 
 learn to think and judge for themselves. 
 
 (5) These meetings held between the two readings 
 of a bill will enable the electors to take an active part 
 in legislation, and will give them an opportunity of 
 expressing their opinion on the law and of proposing 
 amendments. 
 
 (6) That systematic opposition, to some extent a 
 matter of instinct, which exists between the people 
 and the legislative assemblies will disappear. 
 
 (7) It will no longer be possible for deputies to 
 vote according to the orders of a party chief. 
 
 (8) The people will get to know their deputies 
 
1 84 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 better, and will be able to judge whether they should 
 be returned at the next election. 
 
 As far as I know, the system of M. Herzog has never 
 been tried but once up to the present time. That 
 was on a recent occasion in the canton of Berne, when 
 an educational law was under discussion. During 
 the interval of three months between the first and 
 second reading of the law, the educational committees 
 of the communes were ordered to call together the 
 heads of families in public meetings, and to invite 
 their comments on the bill as it stood after its first 
 reading in the Great Council. A member of the 
 Great Council told me that if the attempt succeeded 
 he should propose to make those intermediate con- 
 sultations compulsory in the case of all important 
 laws. In the cantons of Aargau and Thurgau the 
 constitution requires that a public meeting should be 
 held before the voting takes place, in which the elec- 
 tors may discuss the law to be voted on. 1 But in 
 these cantons the electors have no power to change 
 or amend the law; they can only accept or reject 
 the law as it is submitted to them. 2 
 
 I have made inquiries in these cantons with a view 
 to ascertaining whether the electors obtain any advan- 
 
 1 [In Aargau and Berne every law must be published before the 
 second reading, in order to give the people an opportunity to take 
 exception to it. In Thurgau all laws proposed must, as a rule, be 
 published four weeks before they come up for debate.] 
 
 2 [According to Stiissi, Referendum und Initiativ in den Schweizcr- 
 cantonen, p. 151, such meetings also take place in Lucerne and 
 Schaffhausen (Lucerne has the optional referendum, it will be 
 remembered). If several proposals come before the people to be 
 voted on, it is provided that a debate shall take place on each 
 separately.] 
 
" Legislation by the People " 185 
 
 tage from the discussions which precede the vote. I 
 have been told that a debate is an unheard-of thing, 
 and that an exchange of opinions at these meetings 
 never takes place. The mayor of the commune con- 
 tents himself with asking at the meeting if any elector 
 wishes to speak, but no one answers; the audience 
 have made up their minds beforehand, and are anxious 
 to vote at once. 
 
 The method of voting is the same whether the 
 referendum be compulsory or optional. Every active 
 citizen receives his voting-ticket and his elector's 
 card during the week preceding the vote. 1 On the 
 voting-paper the question is printed, " Do you accept 
 the law, Yes or No ? " The elector writes his answer 
 to the right of the question. He always accepts or 
 
 1 [Most cantonal constitutions, whether the referendum is com- 
 pulsory or optional, provide that the voting shall take place on a 
 Sunday. In Zurich the elector gets his card some days before- 
 hand, and his voting-ticket, and fills the voting-ticket in at home 
 and deposits it in the urn (Stimmurnc] after giving up his ticket to 
 the presiding official. The urn is generally set up in some public 
 place, such as a school- house. When the poll is closed the urn is 
 opened in some public place, often in an inn, and the votes are 
 counted. 
 
 The electors do not seem to get their voting-ticket beforehand in 
 every canton. In some cases they have to go to the polling-place 
 and fetch it, and fill in the ticket there and then. In Lucerne the 
 elector gets his ticket, fills it in in a private place, puts it in an 
 envelope given him for the purpose, and gives it in again. This 
 preserves the secrecy of the vote. 
 
 Again, according to another system, the electors collect in the 
 communes, and the voting-tickets are dealt out, and people fill 
 them in there, and they are then collected (Thurgau), or they have 
 to meet in the communes and give their tickets up in alphabetical 
 order, which they have filled in at home (Fribourg). See Stiissi, 
 op. '., p. 150.] 
 
1 86 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 rejects the law as a whole. In two cantons, however, 
 in Ziirich and in Aargau, the cantonal council can 
 in exceptional circumstances order that the law shall 
 be voted on in sections. 
 
 In Ziirich the cantonal council has sometimes 
 availed itself of this right. 1 
 
 In the cantons of Zurich, Aargau, Solothurn, Thur- 
 gau, and Rural-Basle voting is compulsory, in that 
 the constitution authorises the communes to fine the 
 electors who stay away. 2 
 
 In the canton of Zurich, and only in that canton, 
 voting by proxy is permitted. An elector may place 
 three voting-papers in the ballot-box his own and 
 those of two friends provided that he shows their 
 elector's card. 3 But he is not allowed to give in more 
 than three voting-papers. The counting takes place 
 immediately after the poll is closed, and each com- 
 mune forwards a report of the result to the capital of 
 the canton. The fate of the law is decided by the 
 majority of the electors who have taken part in the 
 vote. If the majority vote "Yes," the law is consi- 
 dered to be accepted ; if they vote " No," it is rejected. 
 In Rural-Basle a law is not considered to be accepted 
 unless it is supported by a majority of those voting ; 
 
 1 Stiissi, Referendum und Initiativ im Kanton Zurich, p. 38. 
 
 2 [A most interesting account of the compulsory voting is given 
 by M. Deploige in the Revue de Bdgique for March 1893, in an article 
 entitled Le Vote Obligatoire.] 
 
 3 [In some of the cantons voting by proxy is forbidden, under 
 various penalties. In Valais there is a penalty of 50 francs. In 
 some cantons other voting-tickets than the official ones are recog- 
 nised as valid. They are generally printed by one or other of the 
 parties. In St. Gall M. Stiissi says they must be on white paper, 
 and contain the question exactly as it is stated on the official 
 paper.] 
 
" Legislation by the People " 187 
 
 and secondly, the total number of those voting either 
 one way or the other must amount to an absolute 
 majority of the registered electors. 1 
 
 The foreign reader will no doubt inquire whether 
 the citizens of those states which have a compulsory 
 referendum are frequently called upon to exercise 
 their legislative powers or not. The following are 
 the provisions of some of the cantonal constitutions 
 in the matter. In Zurich, Thurgau, and Aargau the 
 popular votings take place twice a year one in spring, 
 on the bills passed during the winter session, and the 
 other in autumn, on the bills passed in the summer 
 session. In case of need, however, the Great Council 
 may order an extraordinary voting. In Rural-Basle 
 two votings per annum are fixed as a maximum. In 
 Berne, by the terms of the law of 1 869, the vote takes 
 place as a rule on the first Sunday in May in each 
 year, also at any time that the Great Council may 
 order an extraordinary voting. 2 
 
 1 [This is now altered in the Constitution of 1892. The reason is 
 furnished by M. Deploige when discussing the results of the refer- 
 endum in the cantons. Out of 102 laws voted on in the twenty 
 years between 1864 and 1884, no less than twenty-six fell through 
 altogether because a majority of electors did not take part in the 
 vote. Between 1881 and 1884, out of seventeen laws submitted, nine 
 failed through lack of attendance and five were rejected.] 
 
 2 [M. Droz, writing in 1895, and speaking of Berne, says that he 
 had been summoned to the polls no less than a dozen times during 
 the past year to vote at various elections and on federal and can- 
 tonal laws. He says he received a dozen laws which he was sup- 
 posed to study before voting, but he confesses that, although he is 
 accustomed to public business and the wording of such laws, he 
 has not always been able to go into the question, and has often 
 voted on the strength of what he has been told about them. See 
 La democratic en Suisse et I'initiative populaire, p. 464, in the Etudes 
 et portraits politiques.] 
 
1 88 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 M. Stiissi, who has written an interesting mono- 
 graph on the referendum in Zurich, remarks that the 
 article of the constitution which limits the number 
 of the ordinary votings to two is in reality a dead- 
 letter. In 1870 there were three votings one in 
 February, one in April, and the last in May ; in 1 87 1 
 three votings in January, in June, and in October. 
 Between 1870 and 1886 there were thirty -seven 
 votings, and only one of these was formally called 
 extraordinary. 
 
 The points of difference between the compul- 
 sory and optional referendum in practice are as 
 follows : 
 
 (1) Under the compulsory system, as we have 
 already seen, the popular voting takes place as a 
 matter of course, whilst under the optional system 
 it must be demanded by a certain number of 
 electors. 
 
 (2) In all the cantons where the referendum is 
 compulsory, the law is accompanied by an explana- 
 tory message. 
 
 (3) There is a marked tendency in the cantons 
 to make it compulsory for the electors to vote, to 
 convert the right into a duty in fact, by imposing 
 a fine on those electors who do not put a ballot- 
 paper in the box. 
 
 Schaff hausen occupies the unique position of being 
 the only canton with the optional referendum in 
 which the electors are obliged to vote, and in which 
 there is an explanatory message. 1 
 
 1 [It has already been pointed out that by a constitutional amend- 
 ment of 1895 Schaff hausen has introduced compulsory voting. The 
 votings take place, however, only once a year. It may be useful to 
 
" Legislation by the People " 189 
 
 III. The Popular Initiative. 
 
 While the referendum has been an object of great 
 interest to jurists and constitutional writers gene- 
 rally, the popular initiative, on the contrary, has 
 remained almost unnoticed, and has, in fact, been 
 the least studied of the Swiss democratic institu- 
 tions. It is a curious fact that it should be so, for 
 it is a striking innovation, and one that is far more 
 important in its consequences than the referendum. 1 
 
 give here a table of the cantons according as they have adopted the 
 system of optional or compulsory referendum. 
 
 ZURICH ...... Compulsory, 1869. 
 
 BERN'S ...... Compulsbry, 1867. 
 
 LUCERNE ..... Optional, 1869. 
 
 ZUG ....... Optional, 1877. 
 
 Representative government, i.e. none. 
 
 I Compulsory, 1869. 
 SOLOTHURN . . . . j 
 
 BASLE (City) .... Optional, 1875. 
 BASbE (Rural) .... Compulsory, 1863. 
 i Compulsory, 1895. 
 
 SCHAFFHAUSEN . . j Optional, 1 8 7 6. 
 
 ST. GALL ..... Optional, 1861 and 1875. 
 
 I CompuAsorv, 1852 (federal referenda 
 GRISO * S ...... 1 before).' 
 
 AARGAU ...... Compulsory, 1870. 
 
 THURSAU ..... Compulsory, 1869. 
 
 TICINO ...... Optional, 1883 and 1892. 
 
 j Optional, 1885. 
 VAUT> ....... j Compulsory (for finance), 1861. 
 
 VALAIS ...... Compulsory (for finance), 1852. 
 
 i \ Optional, 1879. 
 
 ' ' ' ' ( Compulsory (for finance), 1858. 
 GENEVA ...... Optional, 1879.] 
 
 1 I only know one professorial work on the popular initiative. 
 That is an inaugural dissertation by a doctor of law of Zurich. The 
 
 \ < 
 
190 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 The principle is an old one. We find that it has 
 already been recognised for several centuries in the 
 cantons with Landsgemeinden, and its essential char- 
 acter has hardly changed at all in all those years. 
 The form in which it is now exercised and the way 
 in which it is organised are of comparatively recent 
 date, and it may therefore be termed the latest 
 conquest of democracy. 
 
 The reader will remember that Major Diog tried 
 as early as 1831 to introduce it in St. Gall, but 
 without success. From that time the popular initia- 
 tive became a prominent feature in the programmes 
 of speculative democrats, who advocated it as the 
 most effective expression of popular sovereignty. 
 Its introduction into the cantonal constitution was 
 retarded for some time by the violent opposition 
 of the partisans of the representative system, who 
 looked upon it as an anarchical institution, and one 
 calculated to introduce uncertainty and confusion 
 into legislation, and generally overturn the whole 
 order of things. The people, on the other hand, 
 took a long time to fully grasp the power con- 
 ferred by the new right. They understood perfectly 
 that the referendum was a defensive weapon against 
 the abuse of power by a despotic assembly, but they 
 could not realise being called upon to make the laws 
 themselves. To reject an unpopular decree of the 
 Chambers is right enough, so they argued, but to 
 'legislate for oneself, no thank you ! Moreover, what 
 
 title is, Das Volksinitiativrecht nach den schweizerischen Kantonsver- 
 fassungen, Zurich, 1889. [Heir Stiissi has written a very interesting 
 account of the referendum and initiative in the Swiss cantons-^ Das 
 Referendum und Initidtiv in den Sckweizerkantonen, 1893.] 
 
" Legislation by the People " 191 
 
 they heard and read about the subject was not 
 calculated to rouse them to any great pitch of en- 
 thusiasm. The initiative was too often compared 
 to the right of petition, and not having derived 
 any particular benefit from this latter right, they 
 attached very little importance to the former. 
 
 The comparison which is often made even at 
 the present day between the popular initiative and 
 the right of petition is nevertheless radically false. 
 According to M. Keller, there are four points of 
 difference between the two institutions. 
 
 1 i ) A demand by initiative is a proposition made 
 to the people as the supreme legislative power. A 
 petition is a request which may be addressed to 
 any official body. 
 
 (2) A demand by initiative must be supported by 
 a certain definite number of signatures given by 
 citizens who are in full possession of their political 
 rights. A petition may be presented by one person 
 only, and he need not necessarily be an elector, and 
 may even be a foreigner. 
 
 (3) A demand by initiative is always concerned 
 with some question of legislation, either the making 
 of a new law or the repeal of one already in force, 
 Petitions may be presented on any subject. 
 
 (4) The representative assembly is not free to deal 
 with an initiative demand as it pleases. It may 
 examine the demand, discuss and criticise it, but 
 in the end it must go to the electorate. The fate 
 of a petition rests entirely in the hands of the 
 Chamber. 1 
 
 1 [The difference has been well stated by Mr. Lowell, who says : 
 " A petition is merely a suggestion made to the Legislature, which 
 
192 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 It is also quite as misleading to draw comparisons 
 between the optional referendum and the popular 
 initiative, as was once done by a speaker in the 
 National Council. " There is no great difference be- 
 tween these two institutions," he said, " for they both 
 give to a certain number of electors the right of 
 provoking a popular vote on a legislative measure." 
 This deputy was wrong. The initiative has merely 
 a superficial resemblance to the optional referendum 
 for the following reasons : 
 
 (1) By the right of initiative the electors can pro- 
 pose a new law, or demand the repeal of a law in 
 existence. By the optional referendum they only 
 have the right of making an appeal to the people 
 on the subject of a bill which has not yet become 
 law. 
 
 (2) A demand by initiative may be made at any 
 time; a demand for the referendum must be made 
 within a certain time fixed by law. 1 
 
 may act upon it or not as it sees fit ; but the initiative takes effect 
 without regard to the opinion of the Legislature, and even against 
 its wishes " (op. cit., p. 280). 
 
 M. Berney points out that the initiative is the right of provoking 
 a decision of the sovereign, the referendum the right of ratifying 
 the decision of an authority. ] 
 
 1 [Two other features may be pointed out : 
 
 (1) That the people in the case of a referendum are part of the 
 ordinary procedure ; their assent, tacit or express, is a necessary 
 part of the constitutional machinery. The demand by initiative is 
 not part of the ordinary procedure, but an exceptional occurrence. 
 
 (2) The initiative renders the optional referendum practically use- 
 less, because it can do all the optional referendum can do and more. 
 It is only limited by the fact that nothing may be proposed which 
 contravenes the Federal Constitution. By its means a law can be 
 repealed once it has come into force ; it is bound to no fixed time 
 in making its adverse decision known as in the case of the refer- 
 endum. It may act at any time, and call in question decrees 
 
" Legislation by the People" 193 
 
 The popular initiative is, therefore, quite distinct 
 from the other political institutions of Switzerland. 
 
 From the legal point of view, the introduction of 
 the popular initiative makes democracy enter upon 
 a new phase. The result of the referendum was to 
 establish a perfect equality between the two factors 
 of legislation, the parliament and the electoral body. 
 Neither of them could do anything without the other. 
 No bill could be drawn up without the intervention 
 of the Chamber, no law could come into force with- 
 out the express or tacit assent of the people. The 
 Chamber and the people were on the same footing, 
 and both took an equal share in the work of legisla- 
 tion, the former by means of its right of initiative, 
 the latter by its right of approval. The introduction 
 of the popular initiative has disturbed this equili- 
 brium and displaced the centre of political gravity. 
 The Chamber has been forced to share with the elec- 
 tors its right of proposing the laws. It has ceased to 
 be an indispensable part of the legislative machine. 
 The people can from henceforward legislate without 
 it, in spite of it, and against it. In all the cantons 
 where it exists, the popular initiative has either 
 accompanied, or more often followed the referendum, 
 as a natural and inevitable consequence of the latter, 
 its necessary complement, in fact. 1 We have already 
 seen that when the referendum says No, it does not 
 create, it destroys. The popular will has, therefore, 
 
 which are withdrawn from the referendum because they are urgent, 
 not general in character, or because they belong exclusively to the 
 Great Council.] 
 
 1 Except in the cantons of Vaud and Aargau, where, as a matter 
 of fact, it has hardly ever been used. Cf. Chatelanat, Die schwei- 
 zerische Demokratie, p. 5. 
 
 N 
 
194 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 no means of positive expression. Nevertheless, among 
 the mass of electors who reject a law, there must be 
 some who are not merely habitual malcontents. There 
 must be men who know what they want, and who 
 have a clear idea of the changes which ought to be 
 brought about, and the evils to be remedied. The 
 course of events is somewhat as follows. These men, 
 or their representatives, are treated with indifference 
 by a transitory parliamentary majority. They petition 
 and express their wishes both in speeches and in 
 writings, and all to no effect. The majority in the 
 Chamber have already formed their opinion, and are 
 not to be moved from the position they have taken 
 up. After encountering defeat in the Chamber, the 
 opposition then turn to the nation, and, by working 
 upon the electorate, are finally successful in getting 
 the law rejected. 
 
 They soon become desirous of doing more than 
 this, however, and are fired with the ambition to 
 triumph by means of the people, and that in spite 
 of and in opposition to parliament. Once the idea 
 takes shape, the result is the initiative. 
 
 The initiative figured for a long time hi the pro- 
 grammes of certain speculative thinkers, but it would 
 never have taken form and become law if the referen- 
 dum had not already existed, and was found to be so 
 imperfect a means of expressing the popular will that 
 it required supplementing. 
 
 In order to make a systematic study of the popular 
 initiative as it is organised in the Swiss cantons where 
 there is no Landsgemeinde, we shall have to ask, 
 firstly, by whom is the initiative organised ? secondly, 
 what subjects come within its range ? thirdly, in what 
 
" Legislation by the People " 195 
 
 form must the popular proposals be made ? fourthly, 
 what are the rights of the Chamber with respect to 
 the demand ? and, lastly, what is the final result of a 
 demand ? 
 
 I. The right of initiative may be exercised by any 
 active citizen who can induce a certain number of 
 electors to sign their names to his demand. This 
 number varies in the different cantons. 1 It is fixed 
 at 1000 in the cantons of Zug, Basle-City, and 
 Schaifhausen, at 1500 in Rural-Basle, at 2000 in 
 Schwyz and Solothurn, at 2500 in Geneva and in 
 Thurgau, at 3000 in Neuchatel, at 4000 in St. Gall, 
 at 5000 in Zurich, Aargau, and in the Grisons, 2 and 
 at 6000 in the canton of Vaud. 3 In the canton of 
 Zurich, and in that canton alone, does the constitu- 
 
 1 [Only three cantons do not possess the initiative in ordinary 
 legislation Lucerne, Fribourg, and Valais.J 
 
 2 [The Grisons has now reduced the number to 3000. Ticino and 
 Berne have also adopted the principle, and the number is fixed at 
 5000 in the case of Ticino and 12,000 in the case of Berne.] 
 
 3 In the canton of Neuchatel every elector who signs a demand 
 must do so in person, giving his Christian name, surname, address, 
 age, and profession (Law of igth November 1895 on ^ e exercise 
 of the right of initiative, Art. 2). In the canton of Vaud every 
 demand to submit a proposition to the vote of the communal 
 assemblies must be placed in the cantonal chancery before being 
 sent round. Any signatures collected before this formality is com- 
 plied with are null and void (Law of the i6th September 1885 on 
 the exercise of political rights, Art. 66). 
 
 [In Basle-City, Ticino, Vaud, Aargau, and Geneva the person 
 who signs must do so personally. Various penalties are imposed 
 by these cantons if a man should sign for another or sign more 
 than one sheet. In Vaud the offender is deprived of his political 
 rights for two years. In Ticino he is deprived of his political 
 rights altogether. In Zurich there is a fine of eighty francs. 
 
 A period is appointed in every case after which the signatures 
 cease to be valid. In Zurich and Thurgau they are good for six 
 months, in the Grisons and Neuchatel for a year. In Aargau it 
 
196 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 tion recognise both the individual and the collective 
 initiative. A demand signed by a single elector is 
 treated in the same manner as a demand signed by 
 5000, the moment it obtains the support of a third 
 of the members of the cantonal council. 1 
 
 II. The electors are entitled to make use of the 
 initiative : 
 
 (1) To propose a new law except in the half-canton 
 of Kural-Basle. 
 
 (2) To demand the repeal or modification of a 
 law in force, except in the canton of Schaffhausen. 
 In the Orisons and St. Gall the revision of a law 
 may not be demanded unless it has been in force 
 
 is forbidden to collect the signatures by going from house to house. 
 The demand has to be given up to the mayor of the commune, and 
 for a week he has to be present at a certain hour in case any one 
 should wish to sign. 
 
 In Ticino, as soon as the demand has three signatures, it has to be 
 given in to the state chancery, who publish it in the Gazette. The 
 lists to be signed are placed in the communal chancery, and can 
 be signed during the following week between nine and five, and 
 also on Sunday. An official is there to witness the signatures. If 
 signed in any other way, all signatures have to be witnessed by 
 a notary or the president of the commune. See Stussi, op. cit., 
 pp. 120-22.] 
 
 1 [In 1893 it was proposed that if 500 citizens sign a demand for 
 a law, the council should send it to the communal assemblies when 
 the next periodical vote was taken. If the demand were then sup- 
 ported by 5000 people, it should be treated as a demand by 5000 
 citizens, and be considered by the council and treated as an 
 ordinary initiative demand. It was not adopted. In Zurich the 
 electors can meet together in a communal assembly and there and 
 then state how many of them support the demand, instead of 
 writing their names on the paper when it is brought round to them. 
 In Zurich it is also open to any official body to make a demand by 
 initiative, but such a demand requires the support of a third of the 
 council. So that in Zurich the initiative is formally recognised as be- 
 longing to a single individual, a corporate body, and 5000 citizens.] 
 
" Legislation by the People" 197 
 
 a certain time two years in the Grisons and three 
 years in St. Gall. 
 
 (3) To propose a decree or legislative resolution, 
 except in the cantons of Schwyz, Aargau, and Schatf- 
 hausen. By the terms of the Constitution of Rural- 
 Basle decrees emanating from the popular initiative 
 must be decrees of general import. In the Grisons 
 no initiative demand is valid which proposes the 
 repeal of a decree which has been declared urgent 
 by the Great Council. 1 
 
 III. A demand by popular initiative may take two 
 forms: it may either be a suggestion in general terms, 
 or a bill or decree with all the details filled in. This 
 latter form is known as the " formulated initiative." 
 The majority of the cantonal constitutions do not make 
 this distinction. They do not expressly exclude the 
 formulated initiative, but they seem only to recognise 
 the proposal in general terms (die blose Anregung). 
 The only constitutions that formally mention the two 
 are Zurich, Solothurn, St. Gall, and Geneva. 2 
 
 1 [In Thurgau the popular initiative can only be exercised on 
 the subject of a new decree, not the alteration of one already in 
 force ; and in Zurich, St. Gall, Geneva, and Ticino on all decrees 
 which are not placed within the exclusive province of the Great 
 Council by the constitution.] 
 
 2 [Berne, Schaff hausen, the Grisons, Basle-City, and Ticino ex- 
 pressly recognise the two forms, bringing the number up to eight and 
 a half. In Neuchatel it is doubtful whether the formulated initiative 
 is recognised or not. The phrase is, " Droit de proposer au Grand Con- 
 seil ^adoption, Vtlaboration . . . d'une loi ou d'un dtcrct." Aargau, 
 Rural-Basle, and Schwyz do not admit the possibility of the formu- 
 lated initiative. The Constitution of Vaud directs that if the popular 
 proposal be so drafted that the answer to it must be either Yes or 
 No, then it is submitted to the people as it stands. If it is more com- 
 plicated, the Great Council drafts the alteration or new law required.] 
 
198 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 The demand, whatever its form, must be addressed 
 to the ordinary legislative assembly of the canton 
 (Great Council or Cantonal Council). 1 In the can- 
 tons of Zurich, Solothurn, Aargau, Zug, and Geneva, 
 a statement as to the motives of the demand must be 
 handed in at the same time as the demand itself. 2 
 
 IV. To determine between the rights and duties of 
 the Chamber when a demand for the popular initia- 
 tive is backed by the requisite number of signatures, 
 we must first distinguish between demands preferred 
 in general terms and bills expounded in detail by their 
 authors. 
 
 (a) Demands in general terms. Three systems are 
 in vogue. 
 
 (1) In the cantons of Schaffhausen and Thurgau 
 the Great Council immediately drafts the bill required 
 by those who sign the demand. 3 
 
 (2) In Kural-Basle, in the Grisons, and in Yaud, 
 the demand is at once submitted to the vote of the 
 people, and they decide whether the Great Council 
 shall consider the proposal or not. If the majority of 
 the electors decide against the proposal, it is simply 
 dropped. If, on the other hand, the people approve 
 its tenor, the Great Council proceeds to draft the 
 bill or resolution demanded. 4 
 
 (3) In the other cantons the Great Council first of 
 
 1 The demand is sometimes addressed to the government (Council 
 of State), which then transmits it to the Chamber. 
 
 2 [Also in St. Gall.] 
 
 8 [In Ticino, also, the Council have to draft the law in the sense 
 demanded, but it can make a counter-proposal. In Schaffhausen, 
 too, the Great Council has the same right.] 
 
 4 [Also in Schwyz and St. Gall.] 
 
" Legislation by the People " 199 
 
 all examines and discusses the demand. 1 Then, if it 
 approves it, it drafts the law. If not, it submits the 
 demand to the people, and they decide whether it 
 shall be carried into effect or not. If the answer be 
 negative, the demand is laid aside ; but if it is in the 
 affirmative, the Great Council is bound to draw up 
 the bill which it had previously declined to draft 
 before consulting the people. 
 
 (b) Demands made in the form of bills already 
 drafted. Where the formulated initiative exists, the 
 bill drafted by a group of electors must remain 
 intact. The Chamber cannot alter it in any way. It 
 has merely the right of presenting a counter-proposal 
 if it does not approve of the contents or the form of 
 the popular proposal. 2 
 
 It should be clearly understood that, whatever the 
 form chosen by the electors, their demand is in reality 
 a proposal made to the people. The preliminary 
 examination by the Great Council constitutes part of 
 the machinery of the popular initiative at present, 
 but this examination is by no means essential. Even 
 when the Chamber drafts the law itself, it merely 
 
 1 In Zurich the author of a demand may come and defend his 
 proposal in person before the cantonal council, if he obtain the 
 support of a third of the deputies, or if twenty-five of them consent 
 to his being present. 
 
 2 [In Berne the Great Council is expressly commanded to state 
 its views, be they favourable or unfavourable, with regard to the 
 law, but has no right of presenting a counter-proposal. The 
 counter-proposal may take the form of a recommendation that the 
 popular proposal be rejected, or may be merely an improved draft. 
 
 In Zurich, if the demand is made in the form of a bill, the 
 council may decide by a resolution that the author may take part in 
 the debate on the clauses of the bill. The commission whose duty it 
 is to consider the bill and report on it to the house can always summon 
 the author to explain his meaning should it desire to do so.] 
 
2oo The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 occupies the position of a drafting committee, and it 
 could be replaced by any assembly of jurists. Again, 
 when the popular proposal is already drafted, the 
 Chamber is little more than a registration depart- 
 ment. It receives and forwards to the people the 
 written and printed documents addressed to them. 
 The right given it by the constitution to present a 
 counter-proposal is a privilege which is shared with 
 others. Any new group of citizens, provided they are 
 sufficiently numerous, can, in virtue of their right 
 of initiative, draw up amendments to the proposals 
 of the first group, and present them to the people at 
 the same time. 
 
 V. As the initiative demand is essentially a pro- 
 posal made by a certain number of electors to the 
 whole body of active citizens, any proposal emanating 
 from the popular initiative is necessarily submitted 
 to the popular vote for acceptance or rejection. It 
 is equally true of bills presented in their final shape 
 as of those which are made in the form of general 
 suggestions and which are drafted by the Great 
 Council. It is also true of all the cantons, whether 
 their form of referendum be compulsory or optional. 1 
 
 As a result, every elector receives the text of the 
 bill and also the text of the counter-proposal of the 
 Chamber. In certain cantons the bill is accompanied 
 by an explanatory message, which is a summary of 
 the arguments given by the authors of the demand. 2 
 
 1 [In Neuchatel, if the Great Council accept the proposal pure- 
 merit et simplement, it is treated as an ordinary law, and subject to 
 the optional referendum.] 
 
 2 [This is the case in Zurich and Solothurn. In Solothurn it is 
 expressly stated that the arguments in favour of the law given by 
 
" Legislation by the People " 201 
 
 If the Chamber presents a counter-proposal, it natu- 
 rally has the right of attaching an explanation of its 
 own attitude. 1 
 
 The popular initiative has not been made use of 
 frequently enough for us to criticise it by the light 
 of experience. It is interesting, however, to read 
 the views of M. Stiissi, a democrat of Zurich, who 
 comments on the result of the popular initiative. 2 
 He considers that the actual organisation of the ini- 
 tiative is defective in two respects : 
 
 (r) "The author of a demand can only appeal 
 
 the initiants shall be sent round to every citizen at the expense of 
 the state.] 
 
 1 [In Schaffhausen and Ticino the method of voting on the two 
 proposals is interesting. 
 
 In Ticino, if the demand is made as a complete bill, and the 
 council makes a counter-proposal, the two are voted on at the same 
 time. Then there is a second voting, at which the proposal that has 
 received the largest number of votes is submitted alone, the question 
 being, " Do you accept this proposal or not ? " The alternative is 
 the status quo. In Schaffhausen the counter-proposal of the Great 
 Council is voted on first. If this is negatived, then the popular 
 proposal is submitted to the electorate. 
 
 In Zurich, Berne, Rural-Basle, Solothurn, the Grisons, City-Basle, 
 Ticino, Schaffhausen, Thurgau, Vaud, and Neuchatel various time 
 limits are fixed during which the Great Council must discuss the 
 demand and resolve on its course. In Solothurn and Thurgau the 
 matter must be submitted to the people within two months, in 
 the Grisons within a year and a half. Other cantons fix periods 
 between these two. In Vaud the Great Council has to be sum- 
 moned at once in extraordinary session.] 
 
 2 [The results of the initiative in Zurich are interesting. The 
 right was introduced in 1869, and first made use of in 1871. Be- 
 tween 1871 and 1893 there were twenty-one demands by initiative. 
 The result has been summarised by Mr. Lowell. He points out that 
 the net result of twenty-four years of the initiative has been the 
 adoption of two laws of doubtful value. One of them established a 
 house of correction for tramps, and the other abolished compulsory 
 vaccination. See pp. 285-87.] 
 
202 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 to the electors known to himself and his friends. 
 In this narrow circle it is necessary to bring every 
 influence to bear to collect the necessary signa- 
 tures. Party interests are appealed to, personal 
 persuasion is tried, friends are asked to prove their 
 friendship, the case is pleaded before the ladies, and, 
 as a last resort, they are asked to sign for their 
 husbands or sons. People who refuse to sign are 
 worried to such an extent that they sign for the sake 
 of peace. As a rule, they hardly know the contents 
 of the paper to which they affix their signature. 
 Is legislation by the people worthy of the name, 
 when the exercise of the right of initiative becomes 
 the monopoly of such privileged persons as have the 
 money, the leisure, or the taste for intrigue? Is 
 there anything in it calculated to educate the people 
 politically ? " 
 
 (2) " The popular bill, if it be accepted by the 
 electorate, becomes part of our code, without any 
 modification or amendment being possible. This is 
 an extraordinary proceeding when one thinks of it. 
 When a department of the Council of State * sees fit 
 to propose a law, it consults experts first of all ; then 
 the bill is prepared, after mature consideration, by 
 competent men. It is sent to the Council of State, 
 and goes through successive readings. Then the 
 proposals of the Council of State are sent to a com- 
 mission of the cantonal council, which can introduce 
 amendments. A public discussion follows, in which 
 the matter is thoroughly debated from different points 
 of view in the cantonal council ; and, finally, a special 
 committee revises the bill for the last time, and cor- 
 
 1 A ministerial department. 
 
"Legislation by the People" 203 
 
 rects faults or obscurities in the draft. None of these 
 precautions are taken when a bill is brought forward 
 by the popular initiative. It is impossible that a few 
 individuals unfamiliar with legislation and adminis- 
 tration can succeed at once in drawing up a satis- 
 factory law. Perhaps it might be said, ' If this is 
 true, the remedy is to abolish the formulated initia- 
 tive and restrict the right of the people to pre- 
 senting general propositions.' I do not consider that 
 this would be advisable. A mere proposal does not 
 deserve the honour of a popular vote. 
 
 " The individual who wishes to be a legislator ought 
 to know exactly what he wants, and also the form in 
 which his ideas ought to be embodied how they fit 
 in with the system of laws already in force, and what 
 changes would be produced were his proposal adopted. 
 It is quite ridiculous to call upon the people to vote on 
 a vague formula whose significance and scope there is 
 no means of ascertaining." 
 
 After having thus criticised the actual system, M. 
 Stiissi mentions with approval a scheme drawn up by 
 the Griitliverein of Zurich several years ago bearing 
 on the exercise of the popular initiative. The following 
 are the main outlines of the scheme : 
 
 "When a citizen shall make a proposal to the 
 cantonal council, the proposition shall be imme- 
 diately published in the Feuille officielle, with an 
 invitation to all the electors to make amend- 
 ments and communicate them to the office of the 
 cantonal council within a month. The author of the 
 demand shall be informed as to the amendments 
 sent in. 
 
 "A special commission of the cantonal council 
 
2O4 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 shall discuss the amendments within two months, 
 with the assistance of the author of the demand. 
 
 " An additional two months shall be granted to the 
 author to allow him to decide whether he will still 
 maintain his proposition, either in its original or 
 amended form ; and if he shall decide to do so, he 
 shall send it to the cantonal council, accompanied 
 by a statement as to the motives which actuated 
 him. 
 
 "The proposal shall be discussed at latest in the 
 second ordinary session of the council held after the 
 demand has been received. 
 
 " If the proposal is supported by one-third of the 
 members of the cantonal council, the author has 
 the right to demand that it should be submitted 
 to the people on the occasion of the next popular 
 vote. 1 
 
 " If 5000 electors support it, it shall be submitted 
 to a second vote for definite acceptance." 
 
 When the proposal was brought forward it was 
 attacked with so much bitterness that the authors 
 did not even succeed in obtaining the 5000 sig- 
 natures required by the Constitution of Zurich to 
 enable them to submit it by initiative demand to the 
 people. 
 
 1 " All the difficulties of the existing system with regard to the 
 collection of the 5000 signatures are got rid of by this preliminary 
 plebiscite," says M. Stiissi. "In the proposal of the Grutliverein 
 the proposal of one elector is brought before all the citizens, its 
 supporters have time to think, and are not forced to declare them- 
 selves. All the measures now taken against false signatures would 
 become useless, as obviously only electors could vote for or against 
 the bill." 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE RESULTS 
 
 IN the first chapter we summed up the arguments 
 which were formerly adduced both for and against 
 the introduction of the referendum. We described 
 the fears of its opposers and the hopes of its sup- 
 porters. Now that the referendum has been in force 
 a certain number of years, we should like to know 
 how far the apprehensions of the one or the confi- 
 dence of the other were exaggerated, and whether 
 the future has justified those who fought against 
 legislation by the people or those who guided it to 
 victory. These questions are, however, so difficult 
 and complicated that I cannot pretend to give any 
 decided answer one way or the other. To give a 
 scientific judgment on the results of the referendum, 
 it would be necessary to have an intimate knowledge 
 of the history of twenty different states, their tradi- 
 tions, their needs, the character of the inhabitants, 
 the impressionable nature of the electors generally, 
 the organisation of parties, the action of the press, 
 the influence of the authorities, the contents and 
 defects of the laws which have been submitted to 
 the people, and the circumstances which called them 
 forth. Such historical, psychological, social, adminis- 
 trative, and judicial studies are an indispensable 
 preliminary to a true estimate of the referendum; 
 but where is the man who has made them ? In 
 
206 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 my opinion, those democratic fanatics who blindly 
 do obeisance to "His Majesty the Popular Will" 
 as no courtier ever bowed down before an oriental 
 potentate, only make themselves ridiculous. Neither 
 do I sympathise with those who condemn demo- 
 cratic institutions without examination, or after a 
 merely superficial one. It is, however, doubtful 
 whether the \\\&Q has arrived for us definitely to 
 pronounce judgment. Switzerland has only just 
 begun her experience of direct legislation. We must 
 leave her at present to experiment, to develop and 
 perfect her institutions, which are rudimentary and 
 incomplete as yet. We must give the masses time 
 to become familiar with the new machinery of govern- 
 ment. Some time must still elapse before we can 
 actually approve or condemn the system. 
 
 In writing these chapters on the results of the 
 referendum, my sole aim is to furnish some data for 
 criticism, which are, to my regret, only too incom- 
 plete. With this end in view, I propose to describe, 
 first of all, the principal legislative votes which have 
 taken place in the Confederation and in the cantons, 
 and then I shall quote some of the most interesting 
 criticisms of the Swiss themselves on the referendum. 
 Now and again it will be necessary to comment on 
 certain laws and the results of votes, and where this 
 is done, it is always based on information obtained 
 from good authorities. Exaggeration in these ques- 
 tions is, however, easy, for almost everything is rela- 
 tive, and therefore, in spite of all precautions, it is 
 quite possible that my views may be erroneous and 
 inexact. If this is so, I am ready to correct them, 
 and shall thank those beforehand who will have the 
 kindness to set me right. 
 
Results 
 
 207 
 
 tf P? 
 
 1 
 
 O^ CO OO tx, *} CO 
 
 HI IO O M W 04 
 
 No. of Signatures 
 demanding the 
 Referendum. 
 
 S ci 
 I* o 
 
208 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 Rejec 
 
 03* PS" 
 
 <5 <5 
 
 vo" es ^f oo" 
 xo to M 
 
 10 to 
 
The Results 
 
 209 
 
 8, 
 
 ted 
 
 s 
 
 ;l Si 
 
 Hi 
 111 
 
 
 o o n 
 
 M CO ON 
 
 " - 
 
 * 
 
 & 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 3-g 
 
 odd\ o" 
 
 0)0! CO 
 
210 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 Re 
 
 
 Accepted 
 
 *3S 
 
 3g- 
 
 cHl 
 
 4-. 5 1> 
 
 o S'sa 
 
 04 
 
 <i 
 
 iS 1 si 
 
 t 
 
 gj R 
 
 B, &| - 
 
 sg a 1 (| ^ 
 
 H H M M Hd W 
 
 00 CN 
 
 I I I I 
 
 co" I I* 
 
 I I 
 
 CO CO CO CO 
 
 S 
 
 COCOCOCO V ^* 
 
 i il U 11 1 Ulli 1' 
 
 i l! lli 1: i |**I| Ij 
 
 ^Ml-jll-^-'-^rg^n 
 
 Ul*ml?11|! l hliiitl 
 
 =35 f|l|1 l^2 ??js .Ills-sill 
 
The Results 2 1 1 
 
 I. The Principal Votings on Federal and 
 Cantonal Laws. 
 
 The foregoing table gives the title of the federal 
 laws which have been submitted to the people, the 
 date of the vote, the number of signatures col- 
 lected for the referendum demand, and the result 
 of the poll. Between 1874 and 1891 the Federal 
 Assembly has passed about one hundred and fifty 
 laws and resolutions of universal application. Most 
 of these legislative decrees have come into force with 
 the tacit consent of the people ; nineteen have, how- 
 ever, been submitted to the referendum on the de- 
 mand of larger or smaller groups of electors. Out 
 of this number thirteen have been rejected and six 
 accepted. 
 
 Besides these legislative referendums, there have 
 been eight compulsory votings on partial revisions of 
 the constitutions, so that the people have pronounced 
 on twenty-seven laws in all. 1 
 
 Before a referendum can take place 30,000 signa- 
 tures must be collected. The reader will see, on 
 consulting the third column of the list, that the 
 
 1 [The figures up to February 1898 are as follows : There 
 have been two hundred and eight laws which might have been 
 voted on; twenty-six have been submitted to the people upon 
 demand, of which seventeen have been rejected and nine ac- 
 cepted. There have been thirteen compulsory votings, by which 
 five of the laws were rejected and eight accepted. In addition 
 to these there have been three compulsory votings on initiative 
 demands ; one of the proposals was accepted and two were rejected. 
 The people have, therefore, decided the fate of forty-two laws 
 altogether. Between 1892 and February 1898 there have been 
 fourteen votings and five laws accepted. Referendums Tafel.] 
 
2i2 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 number of signatures is no certain indication of the 
 result of the vote. Some laws have been accepted 
 when there has been an immense petition against 
 them; others have been rejected when the number 
 of signatures demanding the referendum has been in- 
 considerable. The fourth and fifth columns contain 
 the numbers of the electors who have respectively 
 accepted and rejected the laws. The total number 
 of citizens who have taken part in each vote will be 
 obtained by adding the Ayes and Noes together. In 
 comparing this number with that of the registered 
 electors, which is now about 650,000^ it will be seen 
 that there is a considerable discrepancy. It would 
 seem that scarcely half the electors go to the polls. 
 
 According to the statistics published in 1879 by 
 M.Chatelanat, 61 per cent, of the electors on an average 
 took part in the federal vote during the first five years 
 after the referendum came into force. It will be seen 
 that the percentage of those who stay away has not 
 grown much less since that time. 2 
 
 1 [According to the statistics given in the Statistisches Jahrbuch 
 der Schweiz for 1896, the registered electors number 709,788, and 
 are divided as follows: Zurich, 92,783; Berne, 120,673; Lucerne, 
 34,034; Uri,4495 ; Schwyz, 12,891 ; Obwald, 3824; Nidwald, 2877 ; 
 Glarus, 8323; Zug, 6207; Fribourg, 29,882; Solothurn, 21,800; 
 Basle -City, 15,407 ; Rural -Basle, 13,272 ; Schaffhausen, 7993 ; 
 Appenzell (Outer Rhodes), 12,214 ; Appenzell (Inner Rhodes), 3005 ; 
 St. Gall, 51,695 ; Orisons, 22,599 ; Aargau, 43, 145 ; Thurgau, ^24,243 ; 
 Ticino, 37,792; Vaud, 64,000; Valais, 27,744; NeucMtel, 27,256; 
 Geneva, 21,634.] 
 
 2 According to the statistics given in the Statistisches Jahrbuch, 
 1896, it will be seen that between 1879 and 1891 the average 
 number who went to the polls was 58.5 per cent., and that between 
 1891 and 1895 *t ^ as fallen to 53.9. In the case of the initiative 
 demand with regard to the disposal of the surplus from the custom 
 duties, the percentage rose as high as 71.9 per cent. It fell as low 
 
The Results 2 1 3 
 
 M. Chatelanat also remarked that the chief oppo- 
 sition always came from the same cantons. This 
 conclusion, arrived at in 1879, has remained true 
 for subsequent votes. The states which exhibit the 
 most striking tendency to reject laws are : Appenzell 
 (Inner Rhodes), Uri, Valais, Fribourg, Unterwalden. 
 Then follow Vaud, Schwyz, Lucerne, and Zug. On 
 the other hand, Schaffhausen, Zurich, Basle, Thur- 
 gau, and Glarus are the most inclined to vote 
 "Yes." 1 
 
 It is important that the reader should notice this, 
 in order that he may not attach an exaggerated im- 
 portance to the reasons which may seem to have con- 
 tributed to the rejection of any particular law. It is 
 clear that the leaders of the opposition will not invoke 
 the referendum against laws which are irreproachable 
 in tenor, because they themselves will lose in the 
 end both in reputation and prestige. It is, however, 
 none the less true that a law which is merely unob- 
 jectionable, or does not rise above the level of medio- 
 crity, will be judged more or less severely according 
 as it comes before electors who share or oppose 
 the political opinions of the parliamentary majority. 
 The majority of the Federal Assembly is composed 
 of Germans, Centralists, and Free-thinkers. It is not 
 astonishing that a prejudice against federal laws 
 should exist among those groups in the nation who 
 are opposed to one or other of the three character- 
 istics of the majority; nor is it surprising that the 
 
 as 43.5 per cent, in the case of the constitutional amendment on 
 small industries. In the three votes in October 1896, 56.3 per cent, 
 took part.] 
 
 1 [The figures of the voting of October 1896, given in the Statis- 
 tiaches Jahrbuch for 1896, still bear this out (p. 295).] 
 
2 1 4 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 Romance cantons, which dread the excessive influence 
 of the great German cantons, should oppose any 
 new encroachment by the Confederation, or that the 
 Catholic cantons, which were the victims of a factious 
 coalition in 1874, should take their revenge when 
 they find an opportunity, or that the inhabitants of 
 the small primitive cantons, who retain an excessive 
 love of independence, should show a dislike to inno- 
 vations which attack their secular institutions, and 
 object to laws which restrict their liberties, disturb 
 their habits, and make life more complicated. To 
 estimate the real influence of these prejudices, which 
 are always at work in the different groups in different 
 parts of the country, and to attempt to fathom the 
 exact degree to which these three or four hundred 
 thousand minds have been affected by a priori argu- 
 ment, is an impossible task. The reader should, 
 however, never lose sight of the fact that the im- 
 perfections of the laws we are going to examine 
 have not been the only factor in determining their 
 fate at the hands of the people. 
 
 The first law which had to face the popular vote 
 after the introduction of the federal referendum was 
 a law on marriage and the civil rite, of the 24th of De- 
 cember 1 874. By the terms of this law, " the civil rite 
 and the custody of the registers which refer to it are 
 a matter for the civil authorities throughout the whole 
 territory of the Confederation. The officers who per- 
 form the civil rite must be laymen, and are the only 
 persons competent to make entries of the civil rite 
 in the registers" (Art. i). Before 1874 the regis- 
 ters were kept by the clergy in the majority of the 
 cantons. 
 
The Results 2 1 5 
 
 " No conditions in restraint of marriage may be im- 
 posed founded on differences of creed or the poverty 
 of one or other of the parties" (Art. 25). Before 
 this, the Church on one side, and the cantonal and 
 communal authorities on the other, restricted the 
 right of marriage the Church prohibiting mixed 
 marriages, the communes the marriage of paupers, 
 with the aim of preventing the propagation of pauper 
 families whom they would have to support. 
 
 "A religious ceremony cannot take place until 
 after the legal celebration of marriage by the civil 
 official, and upon the presentation of the certificate 
 of marriage " (Art. 40). " A fine not exceeding 300 
 francs shall be imposed upon all clerics who act con- 
 trary to the dispositions of Article 40. In the case of 
 a second offence the fine is doubled." 
 
 In paragraph 5, after enumerating a certain num- 
 ber of reasons which form sufficient grounds for a 
 divorce, the law continues : " If none of these grounds 
 for divorce exist, and nevertheless the circumstances 
 are such that the conjugal relations are severely 
 strained, the court may give judgment for either a 
 divorce or a separation." "A separation cannot be 
 effected for longer than two years. If no recon- 
 ciliation takes place between husband and wife during 
 that time, a divorce may again be sued for, and the 
 court may then freely give judgment according to its 
 convictions " (Art. 47). 
 
 This law was the inauguration of the policy of cen- 
 tralisation and secularisation which was foreshadowed 
 in the Federal Constitution of 1 874. It encountered 
 a great deal of opposition in Parliament, especially 
 the clauses relating to marriage and divorce. When 
 
2 1 6 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 it was finally passed, 106,560 electors, Catholics and 
 conservative Protestants, signed a demand for a refer- 
 endum. The opposition were defeated in their cam- 
 paign, and the law was accepted by the people by a 
 small majority. The Catholic writers regard this 
 first law as one of the most mischievous results of 
 the referendum. "The effect of this unfortunate 
 law," says M. Ernst, " has been to confer upon Switzer- 
 land the doubtful honour of heading the European 
 divorce statistics." l 
 
 M. Ernest Naville, an eminent Protestant, whose 
 labours in philosophy reflect lustre on his country, is 
 also among those who deplore the result of this first 
 popular vote. He erplains the favourable majority 
 as follows : " We have in Switzerland a law on mar- 
 riage and divorce which has an injurious effect on 
 family life, and this law has been ratified by a plebi- 
 scite. At the same time it is probable that if it had 
 been submitted alone to the popular vote, it would 
 have been rejected. To think otherwise would be to 
 do the Swiss people an injustice. The fact was that 
 the proposals with regard to marriage and divorce 
 were contained in the same law as other clauses 
 relating to the civil ceremony for which the need 
 was obvious. It was necessary, however, to adopt or 
 reject the whole, and it is my firm conviction that a 
 great many citizens who voted Yes for the law as it 
 stood did so reluctantly, and would have voted No 
 
 1 Ernst, Die Volksrechte im Eidgenossischen Bundc, in the Monat 
 Rosen, 1883-84, p. 399. "It is only fair to say," wrote a Protes- 
 tant pastor, " that in the Catholic cantons the percentage of divorce 
 is smaller than in the Protestant states. This fact is easily under- 
 stood by any one who knows the nature of the Catholic creed " 
 (Marsauche, Confederation Helvetique, Paris, 1891, p. 205). 
 
The Results 21? 
 
 on the question of marriage if it had been submitted 
 separately." 1 
 
 On the same day that the people accepted the law 
 on marriage they rejected a law relating to the right 
 of the Swiss citizens to the franchise. Before 1874 
 the cantons were sovereign in this matter, and each 
 of them determined the grounds on which its citi- 
 zens might be deprived of their political rights. The 
 result was a great diversity in the laws, especially in 
 the matter of the franchise of bankrupts and paupers. 
 These two classes of citizens were treated much more 
 favourably in the Romance cantons than in the Ger- 
 man cantons. The new Constitution of 1874 autho- 
 rised the Chambers to reduce the laws on the franchise 
 to uniformity. Accordingly they at once proceeded 
 to draft an electoral law. This law was rejected by 
 the people on the 23rd of May 1875. It was pre- 
 sented again at a later date, and this time was not 
 only rejected, but rejected by a much larger majority, 
 This repeated refusal has left the cantons in enjoy- 
 ment of their ancient independence, and the franchise 
 is still regulated by each canton according to its own 
 will and pleasure. 
 
 It would be somewhat difficult to say why the 
 people pronounced against the law of the i8th of 
 September 1875 on the issue and repayment of 
 bank notes. I asked a member of the National 
 Council about it, and he told me that the experts 
 did not agree. Some wished that the issue should 
 be absolutely unrestricted, others wished for a mono- 
 
 1 E. Naville, A propos du Referendum in the Representation propor- 
 tionnelle, vi. p. 58, Brussels, 1887. 
 
2 1 8 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 poly. The bulk of the electors, however, had no 
 opinion one way or the other. They- were in the 
 same position as the Ephesians mentioned in the 
 1 9th chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, " The 
 assembly was confused ; and the more part knew not 
 wherefore they were come together." A new law on 
 the subject which placed the banks of issue under 
 the control of the Confederation came into force in 
 1 88 1, and it does not seem to have occurred to any 
 one to demand a referendum on this occasion. A 
 short time before, on the 3ist of October 1880, 
 the people had pronounced against the demand for 
 a constitutional revision the aim of which was to 
 create a monopoly of issuing bank notes in favour 
 of the Confederation. The proposal was started by 
 means of the popular initiative, but was rejected 
 finally by the enormous majority of 139,027 votes. 
 Ten years later, on the i8th of October 1891, the 
 question came before the people again, and this time 
 they gave a quite different verdict, for by 228,286 
 votes to 150,268 they bestowed the monopoly of 
 bank notes on the Confederation. 1 
 
 The two federal laws on the subject of the tax 
 on exemption from military service of the 23rd of 
 December 1875 and the 27th of March 1877 imposed 
 
 1 The question now is whether the monopoly shall be given to 
 a state bank, or whether it shall be exercised by a national bank 
 created by the issue of shares and having an independent adminis- 
 tration. The new constitutional provision leaves the way open for 
 either to be established. In whatever way the matter is finally 
 settled there will be another demand for the referendum. [The 
 proposal took the form of a state bank, and the law was voted 
 down in February 1897.] 
 
The Results 219 
 
 an annual tax on every Swiss citizen capable of bear- 
 ing arms who did not personally perform his military 
 service. The tax was graduated according to the in- 
 come of those liable. In estimating the income of 
 the person exempted, the fortune he would inherit 
 from his parents or other relatives was taken into 
 account. It had always been possible for the cantons 
 to levy this tax, but only some of them had done so. 
 The federal law therefore appeared in the disagreeable 
 light of a fiscal law imposing a new tax on a large 
 number of citizens. A third edition of the law (28th 
 June 1878) at last escaped the referendum. "It 
 seems to me," wrote M. Naville, " that this result was 
 due not so much to the modifications introduced into 
 the original bill as to the indifference of the people, 
 who felt that the matter must be settled." * 
 
 By this law every Swiss who, from any reason, fails 
 to perform his service is obliged to pay an annual 
 tax. This tax comprises, firstly, a capitation tax of 
 six francs ; and secondly, a further tax of one franc 
 fifty centimes for every thousand francs of capital or 
 every one hundred francs of income. This graduated 
 tax is paid until the person liable reaches the age of 
 thirty-two. Between thirty-two and forty-four the 
 amounts are reduced by one-half. 2 
 
 The votes of the 2ist of October 1877 and the iQth 
 of January 1879 are two which are worth record- 
 ing. By the first the people accepted the law regu- 
 lating labour in factories an excellent law, which 
 
 1 An attempt was made, chiefly in Geneva, to get up a petition for 
 a referendum, but only 5513 signatures were obtained. 
 
 2 The military tax yielded 2,670,000 francs in 1886, and 2,470,000 
 francs in 1887. The receipts from this source are divided equally 
 between the Confederation and the cantons. 
 
22O The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 triumphed in spite of the opposition in the indus- 
 trial centres. 1 By the second the federal law 
 granting subsidies to the. Alpine railways was also 
 accepted. 2 
 
 The Swiss people had already proved their hostility 
 to the Federal Constitution and to centralisation 
 several times, but they had only been able to express 
 it by negative votes. They could only vote down the 
 laws prepared by the Chambers in virtue of the 
 powers given them by the constitution. By the 
 referendum of the 4th of April 1879 they were able 
 to assert their attachment to cantonal independence 
 in a positive manner by restoring to the cantons the 
 right to inflict capital punishment, which had been 
 entirely abolished by Article 65 of the Federal Con- 
 stitution of 1874. Whether rightly or wrongly, the 
 abolition of capital punishment was said to have 
 caused a fresh outbreak of crime. A popular agita- 
 tion was organised, and a deputy of the Council of 
 States proposed that Article 65 should be revised. 
 The Assembly were afraid of seeing the demand for 
 a revision supported by 50,000 signatures, and after- 
 wards approved by the majority of the people, the 
 result of which would have been the re-election of 
 the two Chambers. They therefore yielded to the 
 popular outcry and passed the amendment. A great 
 many members who voted for it hoped nevertheless 
 that the people would reject it. But the people dis- 
 
 1 [See Lowell, "The Keferendum in relation to Labour," in The 
 InternationalJournal of Ethics, vol. vi. ; also Governments and Parties 
 in Continental Europe, vol. ii. pp. 265-69]. 
 
 2 Of the 37,803 electors who signed the demand against this law, 
 32,308 belonged to the canton of Vaud. 
 
The Results 221 
 
 appointed them. The revision was ratified by fifteen 
 cantons to seven, and by 200,485 votes to 181,588. As 
 a result of this vote the cantons are now free to re- 
 establish the death penalty for crimes at common 
 law. Many have already done so, but the penalty 
 has in no case been exacted as yet. 1 
 
 During the period between 1881 and 1884 not a 
 single law submitted to the referendum found favour 
 with the people. The Federal Assembly gave great 
 dissatisfaction to the Conservative minority by pass- 
 ing a law, towards the end of the year 1881, which 
 was intended to increase the Radical majority in the 
 National Council. Ticino was divided into two elec- 
 toral districts, one of which contained five Conserva- 
 tive subdivisions and the other two. The latter district 
 was carved out in such a way as to make it possible 
 for Radicals to be returned. They also created a new 
 district in the canton of Fribourg, with a purely fancy 
 boundary, in order to still further increase their party 
 in the Chamber by the addition of two Radicals from 
 that canton. 2 When the minority demanded that the 
 Bernese Jura, Aargau, Neuchatel, and Geneva should 
 be similarly divided, their demand was refused, for 
 in those cases the minority might possibly have 
 won some seats. The injustice of these proceedings 
 
 1 In the canton of Lucerne two death sentences have been com- 
 muted to imprisonment for life the one in 1885, the other in 
 1890. [The other cantons which have re-introduced capital punish- 
 ment are Uri, Schwyz, Obwald, Zug, Appenzell (Inner Rhodes), 
 St. Gall, and Valais.] 
 
 - The Radicals of Ticino have succeeded in holding their own in 
 the constituency which was constructed to suit them, but those cf 
 Fribourg lost their seats in the second election of 1884. 
 
222 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 made the opposition furious, and they decided to 
 avail themselves of every opportunity of retaliation. 
 The referendum was the natural means at hand, and 
 they made use of it several times, and always with 
 success. 
 
 Two measures were submitted to the people on 
 the 3oth of July 1882. The first was a law respect- 
 ing the measures to be taken for the prevention 
 of epidemics, and the other a federal decree on 
 patents. 
 
 The law on epidemics was rejected by the immense 
 majority of 254,340 votes to 68,027. Vaccination 
 was made compulsory, and the most stringent regu- 
 lations were laid down to ensure isolation in case 
 of illness. These were the principal reasons which 
 caused the law to be rejected. The feeling against 
 the law was so irresistible that the federal resolution 
 on patents was involved in the ruin. Had it been 
 presented by itself it would probably have been 
 accepted. It was laid before the people again on 
 the loth of July 1887, and received 203,506 affirma- 
 tive and 57,862 negative votes, and a majority in 
 20 J cantons to ij. Nor was the law on epidemics 
 given up. Compulsory vaccination was dropped, and 
 being thus modified, the law came into force on the 
 ist of January 1887, without a referendum being 
 even demanded. 
 
 Of all the popular votes which have taken place 
 since the introduction of the federal referendum, that 
 of the 26th of November 1882 is unquestionably the 
 most notable, both from the importance of the question 
 voted on and from the large number of electors who 
 
The Results 223 
 
 went to the polls. The people were called upon to 
 approve a federal decree passed by the Chambers in 
 pursuance of the terms of Article 27 of the Constitu- 
 tion. By that article, " the cantons shall make pro- 
 vision for elementary education, which must be 
 adequate, and placed exclusively under the direction 
 of the civil authority. Such instruction shall be 
 obligatory, and in the public schools free of charge. 
 The public schools must be so organised that they 
 may be frequented by those belonging to all denomi- 
 nations without prejudice to their freedom of belief 
 or of conscience. The Confederation shall take such 
 measures as may seem necessary against cantons who 
 do not fulfil their obligations in this matter." 
 
 Since 1874 no steps have been taken to enable the 
 Confederation to exercise its right of control over 
 elementary education. The entire organisation, ad- 
 ministration, and supervision of the public schools 
 were left to the cantonal councils, and the pro- 
 visions of Article 27 as to non-sectarian teach- 
 ing were nowhere observed. In deference to the 
 wishes of their citizens, the state had continued 
 religious teaching within the schools, and in a great 
 many of the communes of the Catholic cantons 
 the teachers were members of recognised religious 
 associations. 
 
 Such a state of things seemed intolerable to the 
 Radical majority in the Federal Assembly. They 
 envied the laurels gamed by Liberalism in other 
 countries, and, doubtless in obedience to cosmo- 
 politan Freemasonry, they resolved to make educa- 
 tion the field for religious warfare. To start the 
 campaign, they voted an inquiry into the methods 
 
224 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 of teaching in the Swiss cantons by a resolution 
 framed as follows : 
 
 " Art. i. The Federal Council are asked to make immediate 
 inquiry, through the Department of the Interior, into the con- 
 dition of the schools in the cantons, and to make the necessary 
 investigations in order to ensure that Article 27 be fully carried 
 out, and to collect evidence which may form the basis of future 
 legislation on the subject. 
 
 " Art. 2. To enable the State Department to perform its task, a 
 special Secretary is to be appointed (Secretary of Public Instruc- 
 tion), whose annual salary shall be 6000 francs (^240). His powers 
 shall be determined by a special order of the Federal Council. 
 
 The proposed inquiry was bound to reveal that 
 Article 27 had been disregarded in many places, 
 and the immediate result was bound to be a new 
 law on elementary education. 
 
 The lines upon which this law would be framed was 
 clearly indicated by a federal councillor when called 
 upon for an explanation from the platform. Elemen- 
 tary education would be made either non-sectarian 
 or secular. The staff would be laymen, the subjects 
 secular, the methods secular, the school-houses secular. 
 Education would be secular down to the most minute 
 details, even in the purely Catholic communes. 
 
 The publication of the federal resolution was the 
 signal for a general outcry in protest. " God in the 
 schools " was the motto adopted by Catholics and 
 orthodox Protestants throughout the whole of Swit- 
 zerland. A vast petition was organised within a short 
 tune, to which 180,995 signatures were appended. No 
 demand for a referendum had ever been so strongly 
 supported before. It is easy to imagine the energy 
 with which the campaign was conducted up to the 
 day of voting. The authors and partisans of the reso- 
 
The Results 225 
 
 lution used every means in their power to ensure 
 success. They raised a bogus cry against Catholicism, 
 denounced the danger of clericalism, and, as a supreme 
 argument, represented the Jesuits as waiting to enter 
 the country. It was all in vain. The common-sense 
 of the country asserted itself, and could not be ex- 
 ploited as in 1 874. All these intrigues were estimated 
 at their real worth, and on the 26th of November the 
 federal resolution was rejected by 318,139 votes to 
 172,010. 
 
 Catholics, Federalists, orthodox Protestants, and re- 
 ligious people generally, united to vote "No." The 
 minority was composed of German Radicals, Free- 
 thinkers, and Socialists. The referendum on this occa- 
 sion did good service for Switzerland. It checked the 
 advance of anti-religious Radicalism at the very first 
 step, and saved the country from the educational 
 struggle and its deplorable consequences. 
 
 The following year the referendum was claimed on 
 no less than four laws which had been passed in 
 December 1883. They were: 
 
 (1) A law organising the Federal Department of 
 Justice and Police. 
 
 (2) A federal resolution on licences to commercial 
 travellers. This resolution enabled Swiss travellers 
 to take orders on samples without special licence, an 
 immunity which foreign travellers already enjoyed 
 by means of treaties. 
 
 (3) A federal resolution granting a subsidy of 
 10,000 francs to the Swiss Legation at Washington 
 for the expenses of its secretariat. 
 
 (4) The law of the iQth of December 1883 which 
 
226 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 contained an addition to the federal penal code, 
 framed as follows: 
 
 " When the independence or impartiality of the can- 
 tonal tribunals are likely to suffer in consequence of 
 political agitation, the Federal Council may remove 
 a criminal case from the cantonal jurisdiction to the 
 federal tribunal, which shall hear and determine the 
 case." 
 
 This last law was the only one which gave rise to 
 serious complaint. Its object was to make an excep- 
 tion in favour of the Radicals of Ticino, who had been 
 the cause of the disturbances in Stabio, and thereby 
 to remove these voters from the jurisdiction of the 
 courts of Ticino. Many of the electors, and especially 
 the Federalists, disliked the idea of placing the honour 
 and reputation of the cantonal tribunals at the mercy 
 of the political authorities. The other measures were 
 indeed subjected to a searching criticism. 1 Although 
 in ordinary times they would certainly have been 
 accepted, and no one, as a matter of fact, would ever 
 have thought of a referendum. 2 But the majority in 
 Parliament had been carrying matters with a high 
 hand, and had alienated the sympathies of a con- 
 siderable number of electors. The people therefore 
 rejected all four laws by large majorities without 
 making any distinction. It is a question whether 
 the laws were really unpopular, but the people dis- 
 
 1 For instance, the law dealing with the legal system was char- 
 acterised as an attempt to start a costly and superfluous bureau- 
 cratic institution by creating a special department for justice and 
 legislation. Again, the decree relating to the Washington Embassy 
 was said to involve the country in useless expenditure, c. 
 
 2 [The law on commercial travellers came into force in January 
 1893 without a referendum being demanded.] 
 
The Results 227 
 
 liked the general policy of the government, and took 
 this means of showing their discontent. 
 
 The general elections for the National Council 
 took place in the following October. It would be 
 only natural to expect that the people, who had so 
 energetically disclaimed the policy of the majority 
 of the Federal Assembly, would disavow their re- 
 presentatives as they had their politics, and would 
 confide the power to other hands when they had the 
 chance. But nothing of the sort happened, and a 
 Radical majority almost as large as that of 1881 was 
 returned to the National Council. The people may 
 perhaps have thought that the lesson of the nth of 
 May was sufficient, and that it would produce the 
 desired result. It is impossible to say what the 
 reason was, but this is by no means the only case 
 in which the Swiss electorate have rejected Radical 
 laws and, to the general astonishment, have never- 
 theless soon afterwards re-elected the very deputies 
 who passed these laws. 1 
 
 I have made many inquiries among political men 
 in Switzerland in order to solve the enigma. I was 
 told by one that when the elector is confronted with 
 the text of a law, he does not think of the legislator 
 who is behind it, but concentrates his attention on 
 the law itself. When he has a ballot-paper before 
 him, then he will vote according to his personal pre- 
 ferences and sympathies, and, in considering the good 
 or bad qualities of the man, he forgets all about the 
 legislator and his past history. " It would be very 
 foolish for us to excite ourselves about elections as 
 you do in Belgium," said another. u It makes no great 
 
 1 [See also the last elections in October 1896, in Preface.] 
 
228 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 difference to electors who are not fanatics whether 
 Mr. X. or Mr. Y. is seated on the parliamentary bench, 
 as long as the Chambers can take no important de- 
 cision against the will of the people, and as long as 
 we have the referendum by which we can reject the 
 laws we do not like. It is really of no matter to us 
 whether the Chamber is composed of this or that 
 party, for it does not govern us. We ourselves are 
 the sovereigns of the country." 
 
 The supporters of proportional representation and 
 the men who have dabbled in electoral intrigue 
 generally attribute the difference between the result 
 of the referendum votes and the result of the elec- 
 tions to the gerrymandering of the constituencies, 
 which are always created on party lines. 
 
 "All these explanations," an old journalist told me 
 one day, "do not satisfy me at all. I am utterly 
 at a loss when I think of the contradictions of the 
 electoral body. If a fortune could be made at my 
 profession in Switzerland I would start a competi- 
 tion, and offer a prize to the man who should give 
 the most complete and satisfactory answer to that 
 question." 
 
 To us it appears quite as remarkable that a legis- 
 lative assembly should be able to remain in power 
 after having received such a stinging rebuff from the 
 electors. It is certain that, in a country with a 
 parliamentary system, a popular vote similar to 
 that of nth May would have brought about the 
 dissolution of the Chambers within forty-eight hours. 
 In Switzerland the disagreement between electors 
 and elected does not produce such serious results. 
 " To submit to the sovereign and to obey him seems 
 
The Results 229 
 
 to us more democratic than to resign," was the reply 
 of a venerable National Councillor in answer to my 
 queries. Then he added: "A party does not willingly 
 give place to its adversaries, because it generally finds 
 it to its own advantage to remain in power." 
 
 The popular vote which took place on the 28th 
 of November 1885 was compulsory. It was an 
 amendment of the Federal Constitution, the object 
 of which was to invest the state with the mono- 
 poly of the manufacture and sale of distilled spirits. 
 The revision was energetically opposed by the in- 
 terested parties a not very attractive company of 
 schnaps drinkers, alcohol merchants, potato growers, 
 and distillers. The Socialists also ranged themselves 
 on the side of the opposition, saying that the govern- 
 ment was going to raise the price of " the poor man's 
 schnaps," and that it would be better to tax the wine 
 and fine liqueurs of the well-to-do. Their argument 
 was based on a false assumption, for the fine liqueurs 
 and the wine had to pay the new duty accord- 
 ing to the amount of alcohol they contained. The 
 financial question was, however, a secondary matter 
 compared with the great social importance of the 
 revision, the aim of which was to mitigate the evils 
 of alcoholism. 
 
 The revision was approved by the people and by 
 the majority of the cantons, but the law on spirituous 
 liquors, which was drafted soon after, again en- 
 countered the same opposition. A demand for the 
 referendum was signed by 52,412 electors, the 
 signatures including 18,000 schnaps merchants of 
 Berne and 5000 absinthe dealers of Neuchatel. At 
 
230 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 the referendum, however, the law was accepted by 
 267,122 votes to 1 3 8,496.! 
 
 The federal law on the procedure in cases of debt 
 and bankruptcy is one of the most complicated that 
 the Assembly has been obliged to draft in pursuance 
 of the Constitution of 1874. During fifteen years this 
 law remained under discussion, undergoing many 
 transformations in the Chambers, and being consider- 
 ably modified in parts by special commissions. It 
 was no slight task to reduce the law to uniformity 
 on so important a subject, especially when it had 
 hitherto been regulated by the legislatures of twenty- 
 five cantons on different and sometimes very diver- 
 gent principles. The jurists say that the authors of 
 the law, of whom M. Ruchonnet was one, have been 
 entirely successful in their delicate and difficult task. 
 In spite of its merits the law did not escape the re- 
 ferendum, which was demanded out of hostility to 
 the parliamentary majority rather than from any 
 rooted objection to the law. The Conservatives felt 
 aggrieved at the interference of the federal authori- 
 ties in Ticino on behalf of the Radicals in the canton. 
 The majority were also accused of having given a 
 biassed judgment in an appeal on an education 
 question. 2 
 
 1 Before the law came into force the distilleries in Switzerland 
 amounted to several thousand. They were for the most part small 
 concerns with one still, and were frequented by the villagers. 
 Adams and Cunningham, The Swiss Confederation, p. 238. 
 
 2 The case was an appeal from a commune in the canton of 
 St. Gall. In this canton the schools were separated according to 
 sects, and the Federal Council, basing its interference on Article 27 
 of the Constitution, suggested tliat the schools should be amal- 
 
The Results 2.3 i 
 
 The opposition came chiefly from the cantons of 
 Lucerne, Fribourg, Valais, and Ticino ; and 62,948 sig- 
 natures were soon collected. Oddly enough, though 
 German Switzerland would have gained by the adop- 
 tion of the law, which was much more lenient than 
 the cantonal laws on the subject, yet the majo- 
 rity against the law came chiefly from the German 
 cantons. The Protestant Romance cantons and the 
 canton of Zurich gave an almost solid vote for the 
 law, and thus carried the day. It was accepted by 
 244,317 votes to 217,921. 
 
 In the voting of the 26th of October 1890, the 
 people and the cantons accepted an addition to 
 Article 34 of the Federal Constitution. This new 
 clause is as follows : " The Confederation shall intro- 
 duce, by means of legislation, a system of insurance 
 against sickness and accidents, taking into account 
 the existing friendly societies. It can declare that all 
 persons shall compulsorily insure themselves, or may 
 confine it to certain classes of citizens." l 
 
 The federal law of the 26th of September 1 890, con- 
 
 gamated. The commune of Lichtensteg decided by a majority to 
 pay no attention to this demand, but the minority appealed first to 
 the government and then to the Great Council of St. Gall. Being 
 unsuccessful there, they addressed themselves to the Federal 
 Council, who gave judgment against them. Finally the case 
 came before the Chambers, when a long discussion took place, 
 with the result that the appeal was dismissed by eighty-eight to 
 thirty-eight votes. 
 
 1 [The law on the subject has been under discussion for some 
 time. The commission has reported in favour of compulsory in- 
 surance in case of sickness and accidents, and the matter was 
 discussed in the National Council in June 1897. The law has 
 passed the National Council, and now (October 1897) has to pass 
 the Council of States.] 
 
532 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 cerning the officials and federal employees who have 
 become incapable of fulfilling their duties, authorised 
 the Federal Council " to pay a pension upon retire- 
 ment or non-reappointment to those officials who have 
 become incapable of adequately fulfilling their duties 
 through age, or infirmities contracted during their 
 period of service, and who have rendered at least 
 fifteen years' faithful and conscientious service to the 
 federal administration " (Art. I.). 
 
 Such a law was a novelty in Switzerland, for retir- 
 ing pensions for officials are unknown in the Con- 
 federation and in the majority of the cantons. But 
 they are unknown in name rather than in fact, for 
 the administration has been in the habit of keeping 
 on and paying their old employees as long as pos- 
 sible, their work being done for them by paid clerks. 
 
 The law, therefore, could not be accused of burden- 
 ing the budget with a new charge. It was, however, 
 rejected by the largest majority ever known since 1874. 
 There were 353,977 Noes to 91,851 Ayes. I was 
 in Switzerland shortly after this voting, when people 
 were still talking of the result. One day I asked a 
 Bernese peasant why he had voted No. "When I 
 am old and past work I do not get a pension," he 
 said. "Then why should these gentlemen in the 
 federal offices get one ? Their income is much 
 larger than that of many a citizen." No doubt many 
 other people on the I5th of March reasoned like this 
 Bernese peasant. 
 
 On the 1 8th of October 1891 a large majority 
 accepted a new tariff, framed in an aggressive spirit, 
 with the object of bringing pressure to bear in the 
 
The Results 233 
 
 matter of certain commercial treaties which were 
 about to be renewed. 1 
 
 The last federal vote that we must notice is that 
 of the 6th of December 1891. The question was the 
 purchase of the stock of the Central Railway by the 
 Confederation. Although the principle of national- 
 isation of railways had many supporters among men 
 of all parties, the resolution to purchase the Swiss 
 Central was rejected by an enormous majority. 
 
 The opposition appealed to the referendum for two 
 reasons, the one political, the other financial. The 
 purchase, they said, would result in the increase of 
 federal bureaucracy ; it would strengthen the central 
 power, by placing under its orders a whole legion of 
 public servants. Financially they would, moreover, 
 do a bad stroke of business ; for the Berlin Jews, ex- 
 pecting a large profit, had bought up the shares of 
 the Central some months before. They were quite 
 ready to sell them now at prices thoroughly favour- 
 able to themselves. The people showed great sense in 
 not accepting the purchase under these conditions. 2 
 
 1 The signatures of the referendum were collected chiefly in 
 Geneva. A cheap-food league (Ligue centre la rcnchdrisscment dc la vie) 
 was even formed in the town. As the centre of a district divided 
 by the frontier, Geneva needs more than any other canton the 
 power of free exchange with neighbouring states. In fighting for 
 the freedom of export it was fighting for its economic existence. 
 
 2 M. Welti, the President of the Confederation, resigned on 
 account of the vote of December 6. As head of the Railway Depart- 
 ment, he had been very prominent in the purchase question. He 
 had defended the plan not only before the Federal Assembly, but 
 also at public meetings held in the different towns. His resigna- 
 tion, which he could not be persuaded to withdraw, was naturally 
 deeply regretted by all parties. It is necessary to notice it here, 
 because the decision of M. Welti has created a very important 
 precedent. No federal councillor up to this time ever dreamt of 
 
234 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 It is not possible as yet to record the results of the 
 popular initiative in constitutional questions, as the 
 electors have not had time to use their right. The 
 Berner Volkszeitung suggests the following series of 
 reforms that might be brought about by means of the 
 formulated initiative l : 
 
 1 i ) A fresh distribution of constituencies ; elec- 
 toral tickets containing only one name (scrutin uni- 
 nominal), or proportional representation. 
 
 (2) The compulsory referendum. 
 
 (3) The election of the Federal Council by the 
 people. 2 
 
 resigning when the law for which he was responsible was voted 
 down either by the Chambers or the people. In 1882, for instance, 
 when the educational inquiry was rejected by the people, it never 
 occurred to the federal councillor who openly avowed himself the 
 author of the resolution that he was bound in any way to resign in 
 consequence. The Federal Council has always been considered to 
 be unanimous in its decisions, and only to be responsible to the 
 Federal Assembly. If the example of M. Welti be followed, the 
 chiefs of the department will become personally responsible to the 
 people instead of collectively responsible to the Chambers. 
 
 1 Berner Volkszeitung, July 8, 1891. 
 
 2 In the Easier Volksblatt, one of the principal Catholic organs in 
 German Switzerland, it is stated that a committee of deputies, 
 composed of Radical democrats, has already been formed, with a 
 view to provoking a popular movement in favour of the election of 
 the Federal Council by the people. In a long article the Easier 
 Volksblatt declares that the Catholics will support this reform on 
 condition that the election of the Council shall take place by pro- 
 portional representation (Easier Volksblatt of February 6, 8, and 9, 
 1892). In 1884, M.Vb'gelin, of Zurich, had already demanded that the 
 minority should be represented in the Federal Council. " Seventy- 
 two men," he said, "have passed through the Federal Council since 
 1848, but a Catholic has never been considered worthy to enter it. 
 And you are surprised, gentlemen of the Federal Council, to see 
 the people distrusting the decrees of the Federal Council and the 
 laws voted by the Assembly that elects this Council. You are 
 astonished when these laws are rejected as party laws. You should 
 
The Results 235 
 
 (4) A reform in the law of marriage and divorce. 
 
 (5) The reduction of the salaries of federal public 
 servants to sums not exceeding 5000 francs (200). 
 
 (6) The reduction of the military budget. 
 
 (7) The suppression of costly and useless embassies. 
 
 (8) Free education. 
 
 VOTES ON FEDERAL LAWS AND INITIATIVE DEMANDS 
 FROM 1892 TO DECEMBER 1897 [EDITOR]. 
 
 During 1892 no referendum took place, but in 1893 we get a 
 voting on a constitutional article drawn up by 50,000 citizens. 
 It may be said that the first use of this new right was not such 
 as to encourage much hope of its value in the future. A certain 
 group of persons (see Table) professing to be actuated by humane 
 motives, but still more, it would seem, by a feeling of intolerance 
 towards the Jews, drafted an amendment to the effect that animals 
 should not be killed without having been previously stunned, 
 thus rendering it impossible for the Jews to bleed their animals 
 as enjoined by the Mosaic law. The agitation began first of all 
 in Aargau and Berne. In both cantons the Great Councils for- 
 bade the Jewish practices, and declared that all animals must 
 be slaughtered according to Christian methods. The Jews then 
 appealed to the Federal Council, who investigated the matter 
 thoroughly, and reported that the Hebraic mode of slaughter 
 was not more cruel than the ordinary method, if anything per- 
 haps less so. In any case, interference in the matter was con- 
 trary to the principles of religious liberty guaranteed by the 
 
 remember that your exclusiveness does not only injure your col- 
 leagues of the Right, but the whole Catholic party. You have lost 
 the confidence of the people. You will not win it back till you 
 make up your minds to render justice to all, and not only to your 
 partisans" (Zilrichcr Post, July 10, 1884). The first attempt in this 
 direction has been made recently. One of the chiefs of the Right, 
 M. Zemp, of Lucerne, has recently been elected a member of the 
 Federal Council in place of M. Welti. 
 
236 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 constitution. The result was that the Federal Council quashed 
 the order of the Argovian and Bernese Councils. The Anti- 
 Semitists then appealed to the Federal Assembly, who supported 
 the decision of the Federal Council by a large majority. The 
 Anti-Semitic Committee next took up the new constitutional 
 instrument, and drafted the so-called u slaughter-house " article, 
 which was signed by 83,159 voters. The Federal Assembly, 
 when submitting the article to the referendum in August 1 893, 
 recommended that it should be rejected, but in spite of this 
 advice a majority both of the people and the cantons voted in 
 favour of the amendment, " thus placing Switzerland among the 
 nations that oppress the Jews, and this by a method of petty 
 persecution unworthy of an enlightened community." l It may 
 be noticed, however, that the particular kind of animal is not 
 denned, nor is it stated what mode of stunning should be em- 
 ployed ; nor is there any punishment provided should these 
 regulations be transgressed, which makes the article a dead -letter 
 in those cantons which do not choose to enforce it. The Federal 
 Assembly has been petitioned to enact a law which shall provide 
 a penalty, but it has always refused to entertain the proposal. 
 
 On March 5, 1894, a vote took place on the constitutional 
 amendment giving the Confederation the right to legislate for 
 small industries. The Federal Government, under Article 34, 
 has the right of legislating on the work of children in factories, 
 on the length of the working day, and on the protection to be 
 accorded to workmen in insanitary or dangerous industries. 
 The Factory Act passed in consequence of this was accepted by 
 the people, and seems to have worked very well. The govern- 
 ment, therefore, proposed to add another constitutional article, 
 in virtue of which they would have the right of legislating for 
 small establishments. The avowed object of the amendment was 
 to permit the elaboration of a law which should apply the pro- 
 visions of the Factory Acts to those employed in small work- 
 shops. The clause, however, was so broad in its terms that it 
 gave the Confederation the right to legislate on labour organisa- 
 tions, and they might even go so far as to pass a law compelling 
 workmen to join in trades unions. The debates brought this out 
 very clearly. The Council of States was quite willing to adopt 
 the amendment, but would have nothing to do with compulsorily 
 
 1 Lowell, op. cit., vol. ii. p. 285. 
 
The Results 237 
 
 forcing people to join in labour organisations. This was also the 
 attitude of the majority of the National Council. It was said 
 that many members voted for the bill merely in order to let it 
 come before the people, when it was sure to be voted down. The 
 law was not only unpopular on account of its socialistic ten- 
 dencies, but it was regarded as bestowing fresh powers upon the 
 central government, and as having a unifying tendency gene- 
 rally. This is often a fatal objection to a law in Switzerland, 
 and so the amendment was rejected by 158,492 to 135,713 votes, 
 arid by 13^ to 8^ cantons. Only about 43 per cent, of the 
 electors went to the polls. 
 
 The next popular voting took place three months after, in 
 June 1894, on a constitutional amendment proposed by the 
 popular initiative. It was of a socialistic nature, and origi- 
 nated with the Socialist party. The text of the demand ran 
 as follows : 
 
 " The right to have adequately paid work provided belongs to 
 each Swiss citizen. Federal legislation and cantonal and com- 
 munal laws are to render this right effective by every means 
 possible. In particular the following measures are to be taken : 
 
 " (ft) The hours of work are to be reduced in the greatest possible 
 number of branches of industry, with the aim of making work 
 more plentiful. 
 
 "(6) Institutions such as workmen's exchanges are to be organ- 
 ised, in order to procure work gratuitously for workmen. Work- 
 men are to be legally protected against unjustifiable dismissal. 
 
 " (<l) Workmen are to be insured in such a manner that they 
 shall be protected against the consequences of loss of work, either 
 by means of a public insurance, or by insuring workmen in 
 private institutions by the aid of public funds. 
 
 " (e) The right of meeting is to be efficaciously protected, so that 
 the formation of associations to protect workmen against their 
 masters shall never be prevented, nor the right of joining in such 
 associations be interfered with. 
 
 " (/) An official board shall be established to which workmen 
 might appeal against their masters ; and work in the factories 
 and workshops is to be organised in a democratic manner, espe- 
 cially in the factories and workshops managed by the state and 
 the communes." 
 
 This proposal was signed by 52,387 names, but when put to 
 
238 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 the vote was defeated by the enormous majority of 232,409 votes, 
 only 75,880 having been recorded in its favour. 
 
 The Socialists meanwhile had been preparing a second demand, 
 on the subject of gratuitous medical attendance. 
 
 A law was under discussion in the Federal Assembly on the 
 subject of the insurance of workmen in case of sickness or acci- 
 dent. The Socialists were not satisfied with this law, because 
 both workmen and employers were to co-operate in the adminis- 
 tration of the insurance funds. They wished to exclude the 
 employer from all participation in the administration. To effect 
 this they proposed that the insurance funds should only be used 
 in case of loss of work, and should be supported and managed 
 by workmen only. The Confederation should provide gratui- 
 tous medical attendance for all, and the masters should support 
 and maintain an insurance against accidents. This project did 
 not succeed in getting more than 40,000 signatures, and there- 
 fore had to be dropped. The Griitliverein was responsible for 
 this attempt. 
 
 The third voting, which took place in 1894, created an enor- 
 mous amount of excitement in Switzerland, and was known as 
 "the Spoil's Campaign." In 1850 the custom duties yielded 
 between four and five million francs. In 1894 they had in- 
 creased to thirty-five millions. As a result there was a consider- 
 able surplus, which has been employed in subsidising railways, 
 in vast works of fortification, in grants to native manufactures, 
 and in erecting public buildings. Some cantons were thus subsi- 
 dised at the rate of i franc 33 cents, per head of the population, 
 while others obtained 154 francs. The mutual jealousy of the 
 cantons was aroused, and an initiative amendment was set on foot 
 signed by 67,828 citizens, by which the surplus was to be distri- 
 buted among the cantons at the rate of 2 francs per head. The 
 Swiss are always very chary of expenditure. Thus the amend- 
 ment was specially calculated to appeal to them. Pamphlets were 
 circulated giving an account of the salaries of the public officials, 
 and brilliant schemes were propounded as to what the cantons 
 could do with the money. The opposition were quite as active, for 
 the initiative was an attack on the whole system of federal finance 
 and administration. If an amendment could be thus incor- 
 porated into the constitution by which the people should be paid 
 2 francs a head, the cantons to spend the money as they liked, 
 with no supervision from the central government, it was prac- 
 
The Results 239 
 
 tically turning the Federation into a company for the distribution 
 of dividends to the shareholders. After a period of great poli- 
 tical agitation, in which 496,601 voters out of 700,000 registered 
 electors went to the polls, the motion was lost by 205,177 votes. 
 An act of religious intolerance, an extremely advanced social- 
 istic measure, and the attempted pillage of the Federal Treasury 
 to the tune of six million francs, have been the result of the latest 
 experiment in direct legislation. The fact that the last two were 
 rejected is not a guarantee that such things will always be re- 
 jected, and the new federal initiative has been the cause of great 
 anxiety in Switzerland. 1 
 
 The year 1895 was characterised, from the referendum point of 
 view, by three constitutional amendments. The first vote was 
 taken in February 1895, on a ^ aw regulating the diplomatic and 
 consular service. Diplomatic posts, and the salaries attached to 
 them, have always been dealt with in the Chambers by means of 
 a decree. Consuls, on the other hand, have been appointed when 
 necessary by the Federal Council, and the necessary expenses 
 included in the budget. The Federal Council proposed to place 
 the creation of diplomatic posts on the same footing as consular 
 appointments. 
 
 The Federal Assembly amended this proposal, with the result 
 that a law was passed declaring that no new post should be 
 created by the Federal Council without the sanction of the 
 Assembly, but that such appointments should not be submitted 
 to the referendum. It is difficult for the ordinary citizen to 
 judge of the importance of a diplomatic post, and the diplomatic 
 representatives do not seem to be popular in Switzerland. They 
 seem to be regarded as a set who get excellent salaries for doing 
 very little. Those parts of the country which had few relations 
 with foreign lands objected to the law on the ground that it 
 would involve additional expense, and others objected to having 
 such questions taken from the sphere of the referendum, and 
 recalled how they had been able to put a stop to the extra 10,000 
 francs a year to the Legation at Washington. Thus jealousy of 
 their own rights, fear of the encroachments of the central govern- 
 ment, and the dislike of increased expenditure, were all sufficient 
 
 1 See Borpeaud, Revue du Droit Public, November-December 1894. 
 Also Nuraa Droz, Etudes et portraits politiques ; Le Referendum ct I' Ini- 
 tiative pop ulairc en Suissc, La Suisse juyee par un Americain, 
 
240 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 to ensure the rejection of the law by a 50,000 majority. Only 
 about 44 per cent, of the electors went to the poll, however. 
 
 The next voting was on a constitutional article giving the 
 Federal Government the monopoly of making matches. 1 The object 
 of this amendment was a purely humanitarian one. The opera- 
 tives in the match factories, most of which were situated in 
 Frutigen, in Berne, were in a most miserable condition owing 
 to the prevalence of necrosis, a sort of cancer brought on 
 by the effects of yellow phosphorus. Many attempts had been 
 made to remedy this condition of things. Domestic work at 
 matches had been forbidden, and in 1879 the manufacture of 
 matches with yellow phosphorus was forbidden altogether. 
 These precautions proved useless, as the matches were made 
 and sold secretly ; so the law was repealed. The masters were 
 made responsible for every case of necrosis occurring in their 
 factories, and there were stringent regulations as to the sanitary 
 condition of the factories. Nothing, however, seems to have been 
 of any use, and finally the Federal Council proposed to estab- 
 lish a monopoly. The particular objection to this course, apart 
 from any objection that might apply to monopolies in general, 
 were : 
 
 (1) If the principle is once recognised that the government 
 should buy up a manufacture when it is dangerous, where will 
 you stop ? 
 
 (2) The Factory Acts are sufficient to meet the case ; why not 
 enforce them ? 
 
 (3) By buying out the masters the country is virtually paying 
 them for the harm they have caused, and offering a direct induce- 
 ment for laws to be neglected. 
 
 It is said that the opponents of this measure did not bestir 
 themselves very actively against the law in the Assembly, i.e., 
 they voted for it in order to let the question be finally voted 
 down by the people, who disliked it on account of the monopoly, 
 because it was supported by the Socialists, who were unpopular 
 at the time, and because it increased the power of the central 
 government. 
 
 In November another voting took place, on a constitutional 
 amendment centralising the army. By the Constitution of 1874 
 
 1 See Rcvne Politiquc ct Parlementaire for July 1894, p. 116. 
 
The Results 241 
 
 the control of the army in time of peace was divided between 
 the cantons and the Confederation. To the cantons were con- 
 fided the duties of executing the military laws, and providing 
 the clothing and rations of the troops. The various corps were 
 composed, as far as possible, of men from the same canton ; and 
 the composition of such corps, their efficiency, and the appoint- 
 ment and promotion of the officers, were all left to the states, 
 subject to general rules to be established by the Confederation. 
 
 The new amendment placed the army almost entirely under 
 the control of the Federal Government. It declared that " every- 
 thing which concerns the army is within the province of the 
 Confederation. For the future the Confederation shall not only 
 make the military laws, but shall execute them, and shall make 
 provision for the administration, the instruction, the clothing 
 and subsistence of the army." The cantons still retained the 
 right, under these new provisions, of disposing of the military 
 forces in their territory, but they were no longer to appoint any 
 but the under-officers, the principal officers being appointed by 
 the Confederation. Special administrative districts were to be 
 created for the control of the army by the central government, 
 and each district was to coincide, as far as possible, with the 
 boundary of a canton. 
 
 The object of these changes was to secure the greater efficiency 
 of the army, and to introduce some sort of uniformity into the 
 equipment and training of the troops. The appointment of the 
 principal officers was to be placed in the hands of the Confedera- 
 tion, in order that men should not be appointed for merely local 
 reasons. This law passed the Federal Council and the Chambers 
 almost unanimously. The Radicals were in favour of the law, 
 the Socialists against, and the Conservatives neutral. The press 
 was on the side of revision. Appeals were made to patriotism. 
 Europe was represented as waiting to take advantage of Swiss 
 military weakness, and those who voted against the reform 
 were denounced as traitors to their country. The law, however, 
 was rejected. The people were afraid that the schools for 
 recruits and the periods of annual training would be increased. 
 Many military men argued in favour of a longer period of 
 military service, and looked upon the revision as a means of 
 bringing this about, and this naturally did not increase the 
 popularity of the measure. The idea of administrative districts 
 was also disliked. These reasons, joined to the diminution of the 
 
 Q 
 
242 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 cantonal authority, and the increase of power to the central govern- 
 ment, involved in the change, were quite sufficient to kill the bill. 
 
 Three laws were voted on at once in October 1896. The law 
 that created the greatest amount of excitement was one which 
 directed that the railways should prepare a statement of their 
 accounts. This measure was strongly opposed in Eomance 
 Switzerland. It was said to be an insidious attempt to commit 
 the people to the state ownership of railways. It was also 
 accused of being an attempt to reduce the price at which the 
 state would buy up the shares. Another argument urged 
 against the law was, that it would frighten away capitalists 
 from investing in Swiss railways, especially in the mountain 
 lines of the Simplon, the Engadiiie, and the Spliigen. Public 
 opinion was so excited on the subject that it almost became a 
 race conflict. The Romance Swiss were represented as enemies 
 to federal progress, whose resistance must be broken down. 
 The German deputies had nearly all voted for the law, and 
 those that had voted against it dared not openly oppose it before 
 the people on the eve of the general elections. 
 
 The law was warmly supported by M. Zemp, the federal coun- 
 cillor in charge of the bill, who had taken the place of M. Welti 
 on the latter's resignation. He represented the Catholic party, 
 who were opposed to the law ; but he defended it so well that 
 he practically carried his party with him. He pointed out that 
 this bill was only a step towards the elucidation of the question 
 on which the people would be able to give judgment later, and 
 a clearer judgment in consequence of the accounts being pro- 
 perly drawn up. It is said that the victory of the law was due 
 largely to M. Zemp's exertions, for it was calculated that between 
 30,000 and 40,000 Catholics voted on his side, and the law was 
 carried by a majority of 46,000. The bill is known as the 
 " Zempacher Sieg." 
 
 The same day as the law on railway accounts was passed, the 
 law on discipline in the federal army was heavily voted down, 
 not one canton having pronounced in its favour. The objections 
 levelled against it were that it increased the federal military 
 authority, and that the general was invested with powers in time 
 of peace which he formerly only possessed in time of war. The 
 majority against the law was the large one of 232,676. 
 
The Results 243 
 
 The law which regulated the trade in cattle was voted down 
 by a small majority. It enacted that guarantees given with 
 animals should not form sufficient ground for rescission of con- 
 tract unless they were in writing. This was contrary to the 
 custom in certain cantons, and the law was therefore defeated. 
 
 The question of a state bank, which was voted on in February 
 1897, is one which has been pending ever since the constitutional 
 amendment of 1891 was passed. A great many persons then 
 voted for it, thinking that it would be a mixed bank. The 
 bank, however, that was proposed was a state bank. The can- 
 tons were invited to subscribe towards it, but were to have no 
 part in the administration. The great argument against it was 
 that a state bank of this kind would be at the mercy of politicians. 
 It was said that if the law passed, the government could com- 
 promise the credit of the country at any time, and would, more- 
 over, be incompetent in a time of crisis. The law was adopted 
 in the National Council by a small majority, and nearly failed 
 to pass the Council of States, so many members having stayed 
 away in order not to have the responsibility of voting. The 
 authors of the law threatened to make use of the initiative if the 
 law were not passed. The opposition therefore gave in, in order 
 to appeal to the referendum, and the result justified their expec- 
 tations, the law was voted down by a majority of 60,220. 
 
 On the i ith of July 1897 two constitutional amendments were 
 submitted to the people, both of which were accepted. One of these 
 gave the Confederation the power to legislate on food-stuffs. A 
 certain uniformity of regulation in the matter of the standard 
 and purity and control of food sold is very necessary. Some 
 people were afraid that this would involve protection under the 
 pretence of hygiene, but the change was not really unpopular, 
 and so was accepted. 
 
 The other amendment had to do with the regulation of forests. 
 Those in the mountainous regions were already under the control 
 of the Confederation. By this amendment all the forests were 
 placed under the central government. 
 
 On 2oth February 1898 a very important voting took place on 
 the question of the purchase of the railways by the Confedera- 
 tion. The concessions granted by the government to the private 
 companies expire on the ist of May 1903, and this is regarded 
 
244 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 by many as a suitable time to effect their purchase by the state. 
 Five years' notice to the companies was, however, necessary, and 
 the question of the state ownership of railways had therefore to 
 be settled by May 1898. 
 
 A demand emanating from the popular initiative was pre- 
 pared in 1896, to the effect that the Confederation should take 
 in hand the management of the railways for five years, and then 
 should take over all the lines at twenty-five times the average 
 annual value. The Federal Council was about to bring in a bill 
 on the subject, and so the initiative demand was not presented, 
 although the requisite number of signatures was obtained. All 
 through 1897 the Assembly were occupied with the question, 
 and the bill authorising the repurchase was passed on the 1 5th 
 of October. A referendum was then demanded, and the measure 
 was finally carried in February by 386,634 votes to 182,718. 
 This is a very different result from 'that obtained in 1891, when 
 a proposal to buy up only one of the great lines was rejected. 
 
 The Federal Council have been working towards this end for 
 nearly half a century. The question came up in 1848, and the 
 Council reported in favour of state ownership in 1852, but the 
 Assembly could not then face the responsibility of developing 
 the railway system. In 1883 the government brought the ques- 
 tion up again, and suggested that the railways should be re- 
 purchased in 1888, but their efforts were unsuccessful. In 1887 
 the Council proposed that the Confederation should take over 
 the lines of the North-Eastern, but again the Assembly would 
 not support them. 
 
 In 1890, however, the Assembly seems to have changed its 
 attitude, and purchased so many shares in the Jura-Simplon 
 railway that they became entitled to a considerable voice in its 
 management. Then they passed a bill in 1891 authorising the 
 purchase of the " Central " by the state. The measure was, how- 
 ever, rejected by the people. The bill on railway accounts passed 
 in 1896 had the effect of preparing popular opinion to receive 
 the larger question favourably, so that in February 1898 the 
 majority in favour of the state ownership of railways was double 
 as large as the minority against. Public opinion has thus com- 
 pletely changed round since 1891. 
 
 It is proposed to divide the railway management up into five 
 districts, corresponding to the five great lines, with a general 
 directory above them. Only the five great lines are to be taken 
 
The Results 245 
 
 over at first ; the St. Gothard cannot be bought up till two 
 years later. The smaller lines and " funiculaires " up the moun- 
 tain sides are still to be left to local management. The price of 
 the repurchase is to be twenty-five times the average profits for 
 the past ten years. The Federal Council has estimated that the 
 cost will be about 962 million francs, and that a further 42 
 millions will be needed for new works. The companies are 
 almost certain to object to this price as being too low, and the 
 matter will finally be fought out before the Federal Tribunal. 
 The immediate effect has been a fall in the price of Swiss rail- 
 way stock. 
 
 The message of the Federal Council sent to the Assembly on 
 the 25th March 1897, and which was circulated amongst the 
 people before the voting day, set out both the history of the 
 movement and the advantages of the proposal very fully. The 
 Council stated the old argument, that whereas the rival com- 
 panies are mainly concerned with dividends, the chief interest 
 of the state was the convenience of the public. They also stated 
 that all profits should go to the improvement of the service and 
 the lowering of fares. They declared that one of the advantages 
 would be unity of administration, involving a saving of labour 
 and expense, and ensuring greater security of traffic. They 
 promised a limitation of hours for the employees, and better 
 arrangements for pensions and sick benefit. They dwelt on 
 the cheapening of fares both for passengers and carriage of 
 goods, and proposed the establishment of a sinking fund for the 
 redemption of the original capital. Another advantage urged 
 was, that there would be a freedom from foreign influence 
 which may creep in with foreign shareholders. 
 
 It was urged against the law that the profits will not be such 
 as to enable the Confederation to carry out these reforms. The 
 railways have been paying 3.7 per cent, dividend on an average. 
 If the Confederation borrows money at 3.5 per cent, as proposed, 
 how are they to carry out the necessary reforms, such as the 
 increase of stations, reduction of fares, the augmentation of 
 salaries, and the reduction of hours worked by the officials on 
 the 0.2 per cent, profit? 1 
 
 1 For a resume of the arguments against the purchase, see the 
 articles on Switzerland by M. Droz in the Revue Politique, &c., for 
 June and December 1897. 
 
246 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 But the people were sanguine, and of late years there has been 
 a strong feeling in favour of state ownership. Every time a 
 train was behind time, or a parcel went wrong, or anything 
 happened, the cry always was, " Oh, if the state only owned the 
 railways." The prospect of cheap fares and better service out- 
 weighed the objection to increased centralisation. 
 
 The Chambers have been very busy discussing the question of 
 the unification of the law, and also the question of compulsory 
 insurance. 1 
 
 The unification of the law must be voted on by the people, 
 since it is a constitutional amendment, and this will probably 
 take place in 1898. 
 
 We see that on the whole the result of the referendum in 
 Switzerland has been Conservative, and that it to some extent 
 bears out the dictum of Sir Henry Maine, who says : " It is 
 possible by agitation or exhortation to produce in the mind of 
 the average citizen a vague impression that he desires a par- 
 ticular change. But when the agitation has settled down on the 
 dregs, when the excitement has died away, when the subject has 
 been threshed out, when the law is before him in all its detail, 
 he is sure to find in it much that is likely to disturb his habits, 
 his ideas, his prejudices, or his interests, and so in the long run 
 he votes 'No' to every proposal." 2 
 
 The Factory Act, the alcohol law, and the amendment on the 
 compulsory insurance of workmen, are Radical measures that 
 have been sanctioned by the people. The law on epidemics, on 
 education, on state railways, on the state bank, the amendments 
 dealing with legislation on trades and on matches, may be cori- 
 
 1 The only way to keep up to date in the Swiss votings is to 
 follow the course of events month by month in the Bibliotheque 
 Universelle, and to read up M. Droz's admirable summaries in the 
 June and December numbers of the Revue Politiquc et Parlemcntaire. 
 M. Borgeaud and other well-known Swiss writers also give an 
 account of the political doings of Switzerland from time to time in 
 the Revue du Droit Public. The Swiss Government publishes every 
 year a Jahrbuchfiir schweizerische Statistik, which gives the statistics 
 of the federal votings for the year. The text of the laws and the 
 messages of the Federal Council are always given in the Feuillc 
 ftdtrale. 
 
 2 Maine, Popular Government, p. 97. 
 
The Results 247 
 
 sidered as Radical measures defeated at the polls. We have 
 examined in detail the reasons why each law was accepted or 
 rejected. 
 
 The results have, however, been summarised by several writers. 
 Mr. Lowell points out that there is a tendency to reject measures 
 that are in any way Radical, and he continues : " This is a very 
 instructive fact, because it means that the people are really more 
 Conservative than their representatives." He also remarks that 
 the people object to laws which cover a great deal of ground, 
 which are complicated, or try to effect too much at once. " The 
 symptom," he says, " is a very healthy one, for it shows that the 
 people want to understand the laws they are enacting, and cannot 
 be driven or hurried into measures whose bearing is not clear 
 to them." Another characteristic discernible in these popular 
 votings is the dislike of spending money. " The fact is, that in 
 Switzerland there are no great cities with an enormous proletariat 
 class which does not feel the weight of public burdens, or realise 
 that an increase of taxation affects its own comfort and prosperity; 
 and, on the other hand, the peasants are in the habit of dealing 
 with small sums, and do not see the need of liberal salaries for 
 the men who do the public work." l 
 
 M. Hilty points out that it is not always the worst laws that 
 are attacked, and says : " I consider that of all the laws and 
 decrees rejected, only one, that giving retiring pensions, and 
 perhaps the order creating a Federal Secretary of Education, have 
 been really unpopular on account of their contents, and not on 
 account of their form." 2 In considering whether the referendum 
 is satisfactory or not, he thus describes certain elements of re- 
 ferendum politics 3 : 
 
 In the first place, " nothing is more fatal to a law than the 
 recommendation of the foreign journals. If the wind is in that 
 quarter the cause is lost." 
 
 Secondly, he considers it very ill-advised to consult the people 
 on several questions in the same voting when one law is espe- 
 cially doubtful. The hand which writes the first "No" easily 
 repeats it a second time. 
 
 Thirdly, the season at which the voting takes place is not 
 
 1 Lowell, vol. ii. pp. 269-72. 
 
 2 Hilty, Revue de Droit internationale, 1892, p. 397. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 479. 
 
248 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 without influence. When people are very busy in the fields, 
 the rural population do not hasten to the polls. 
 
 " As for the campaign in the press, experience proves that it 
 should not begin too early, and naturally also not too late. In 
 all these affairs there is an advance-guard which engages first, 
 but which does not decide the day. As the voting approaches 
 one gets to know the way in which public opinion is being 
 formed. It is at that moment that the real speaking and writ- 
 ing should be done. What happens later is labour lost." 
 
 M. Hilty considers that the speeches made by members of the 
 government at public meetings in favour of the law only preju- 
 dice people against it. They say, " He must have his reasons 
 for being infatuated with the law." 
 
 He accounts for the fact that laws have been rejected the first 
 time and accepted the second time, by saying that the first time 
 many people did not vote through sheer carelessness, thinking it 
 all safe. 
 
 The Conservative result of the referendum has also been attri- 
 buted by other writers to the fact that the opponents of the law 
 go to the polls in much greater numbers than the supporters of 
 a law. 
 
 M. Signorel considers that laws have been voted down, firstly, 
 out of a real opposition to the views of the Federal Assembly ; 
 and secondly, out of a dislike to the general policy of the govern- 
 ment. He points out that there are two ways of getting people 
 to accept a law : 
 
 (1) By incorporating some popular provisions with the un- 
 popular ones, so that one carries the other. 
 
 (2) By presenting the law time after time until it is accepted. 1 
 The Conservative result is said also to be due largely to the 
 
 fact that the federal referendum is optional. M. Droz says : 2 
 "In order to obtain signatures, the opposition has to create a 
 sort of adverse current which is afterwards very difficult to 
 control. It is to this fact that the defeats suffered by the 
 Federal Assembly on very advanced measures, and also on some 
 very insignificant ones, are mainly attributed." 
 
 M. Dunant says that in examining the results two facts may 
 be noted. The first is, the attachment of the cantons to their 
 
 1 Le Referendum legislatif, p. 398. 
 
 a Contemporary Review, vol. Ixvii. p. 337. 
 
UNIVERSITY 
 The Results\^>F 249 
 
 independence, which they regard as an historical right ; and the 
 second is, a dislike for all expenses for which the people do not 
 see the immediate utility. " The referendum has made the people 
 Conservative," he says, " and it has often made laws fail which 
 are very strongly supported and very cleverly defended. It is 
 sufficient on these occasions for the different minorities to unite 
 at the poll in order to obtain a compact and decisive majority." J 
 Nearly all the writers agree in saying that laws have been 
 voted down more out of hostility to the government than out 
 of hostility to the laws. All writers are unanimous in praising 
 the Swiss for the great moderation they have shown. There 
 have never been any troubles or acts of violence at any of the 
 votings. 
 
 Let us now see what the results of the referendum 
 have been in the different cantons, taking the German 
 cantons first. 
 
 Herr Stussi, in an interesting monograph on the 
 referendum in Zurich, gives a description of the prin- 
 cipal popular votes which have taken place in his 
 canton from 1869 to i885, 2 an( ^ although he makes 
 no secret of his preference for direct legislation, he 
 seems to have made an impartial examination of 
 the facts. He sums up the result in the following 
 words: 
 
 "All the laws useful to the canton have been 
 accepted, even those which demanded considerable 
 money sacrifices from the people. No law which 
 
 1 Legislation par le peuple en Suisse, pp. 113 and 115. 
 
 2 Stussi, Referendum und Initiativ im Kanton Zurich, Horgen, 
 1886. It would be a good thing if the example of Herr Stussi, 
 Secretary of State for Zurich, were followed elsewhere. It has 
 been impossible for me to obtain exact information in many cantons 
 on the results of the referendum. The heads of the administra- 
 tion who have the necessary documents in their possession could 
 easily draw up complete tables of comparative statistics on the 
 subject of the popular votings. 
 
250 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 would have really advanced either moral or material 
 progress has been definitely laid aside. 1 
 
 " In those rare cases which seem to contradict this 
 conclusion the referendum has simply displayed its 
 inherent ultra-Conservative character, and delayed an 
 advance which would seem to most too rapid." 2 
 
 1 The author means by this that laws which have perhaps been 
 rejected a first time have always been accepted by the people at a 
 later date. 
 
 2 [Mr. Lowell says that the tendency to reject measures that are 
 in any way Radical is more noticeable in the cantons than in the 
 Confederation. He says : " Strange as it may seem, the dislike of 
 Radical projects applies to labour laws and other measures designed 
 to improve the condition of the working classes, although laws of 
 that kind are commonly believed to be highly popular with the 
 vast majority of people." To illustrate this, Mr. Lowell quotes the 
 canton of Zurich, which is largely devoted to manufacturing : 
 
 "In 1870 the people rejected there a cantonal law which limited 
 the duration of labour in factories to twelve hours a day, which 
 protected the women who work in them, and forbade the employ- 
 ment of children during the years when they were required to go 
 to school. In 1877 they voted against a federal factory law in- 
 tended for a similar purpose. In the following year they rejected 
 a cantonal law to establish a school of weaving ; and in 1881 they 
 voted down another law providing for the compulsory insurance of 
 workmen against sickness, regulating their relations with their 
 employers, and making the latter liable for injuries to their em- 
 ployees caused by accidents. Moreover, they have repeatedly 
 rejected measures for increasing the amount of education required 
 in the public schools, and they have refused to provide free text- 
 books for the children. All this does not mean that the people 
 are certain to reject laws intended for the benefit of the working 
 classes ; on the contrary, they voted in Zurich heavily in favour of 
 the recent amendment to the Federal Constitution giving the Con- 
 federation power to enact a statute on the compulsory insurance 
 of workmen. But it does mean that they are less ready to 
 sanction measures of this character than the Legislature is to 
 pass them. 
 
 "Every law designed for the benefit of the working man involves, 
 or rather is liable to involve, a present sacrifice on his part ; but the 
 sacrifice is not evident so long as the principle of the law is merely 
 
The Results 2 5 1 
 
 Herr Stiissi gives at the end of his pamphlet a 
 list of the votes which have taken place during 
 the fifteen years of which he treats. We find that 
 1 20 bills have been presented for the sanction of 
 the people, and that of this number 80 have been 
 accepted and 40 rejected. I was enabled to take 
 some notes myself at the cantonal chancery, and 
 find that between 1886 and 1890 there were thirteen 
 
 stated in general terms. Any working man, for example, can easily 
 understand the wisdom of forbidding the labour of children of im- 
 mature years, but it is not easy for him to see how he gains anything 
 by losing the wages his son has been earning in the mill. Hence the 
 same man may very well vote for a candidate or a party that pro- 
 poses to enact a labour law, and yet find himself bitterly opposed 
 to that very law when it is presented to him for approval. More- 
 over, the referendum places in the hands of the employers a 
 means of exerting a direct pressure upon their operatives, which 
 a secret ballot has not the slightest tendency to mitigate. 
 The rejection of the first Factory Act in Zurich is said to 
 have been largely due to the influence of the mill-owners, 
 and a little reflection will show how they might bring about 
 the defeat of a labour law. Suppose, for example, that an 
 act limiting the hours of work in factories is passed by the 
 Legislature, and that a demand is made for the popular vote. 
 Then suppose the employers announce that if the law is ratified 
 they will be obliged to cut down wages. In such a case many of 
 the operatives, not caring to run the risk of a decrease in wages 
 or a strike, will be likely to vote against the act and kill it." 
 Government, &c., pp. 268-69. 
 
 M. Curti says that a whole series of good laws have been adopted 
 in Zurich laws in favour of agriculture, laws reforming the penal 
 system, laws on the construction of several large hospitals, on the 
 contribution of the state to the expenses of communal poor-houses, 
 and on grants to the construction of railways, as well as a great 
 many other propositions concerning the administration of justice, 
 police, education, and other questions of public administration. 
 Quite lately, he says, the working day of those employed in shops 
 and domestic industries has been limited to ten hours, and the bill 
 was accepted by the people by 45,309 votes to 12,356. See Revue 
 Politique et Parlemcntaire, August 1897.] 
 
252 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 votes, four of which have resulted in the rejection 
 of the proposed law or resolution. 1 
 
 When the electors have to sanction all laws as in 
 Zurich, the number of voters who go to the poll is a 
 matter of considerable importance. M. Stiissi has 
 calculated that, on an average, 74 per cent, of the 
 registered electors have either deposited or sent their 
 ballot-paper. The first thing that affects the size of 
 the vote is clearly the law itself. If it is a party 
 measure and rouses the passions of the bulk of the 
 electors, or if it is a financial law and closely affects 
 the material interests of the citizens, immediately a 
 large majority of electors make use of their right. If, 
 
 1 The figures are given from 1869-96 by M. Curti, Le Referendum 
 Suisse, p. 232 of the Revue Politique ct Parlementaire for August 1897. 
 He says there have been seven votes on constitutional laws, 137 on 
 laws passed by the cantonal council, two on treaties with other 
 cantons, and twenty-five on initiative demands. He does not, how- 
 ever, give the results of the voting. These are given in Herr Stlissi's 
 latest book, Referendum und Initiativ in den Schiveizer Ifantonen, 
 for the years 1869-93. Of 128 measures passed by the council, 
 ninety -nine were accepted and twenty-nine rejected. Of the thirty 
 federal questions voted on, the people approved twenty-three, in- 
 cluding the initiative demand on the Slaughterhouse Act, and 
 voted against seven. 
 
 The popular initiative has been no mere formality in Zurich, for 
 there were twenty-two initiative amendments in this period. It will 
 be remembered that any 5000 voters can propose a law in this way 
 and require it to be submitted to the people, and any one person 
 can do the same with the consent of one-third of the cantonal 
 council. 
 
 The petition of the single person has only been made use of twice 
 between 1869 and 1893. In l88 3 a bil1 tnat came before the people 
 in this way was rejected. In 1871 two measures proposed in this 
 way were accepted by the people, but they were adopted by a majo- 
 rity of the Council, and have therefore been classified by Stiissi as 
 petitions. Four of the demands, made by 5000 citizens, were ap- 
 proved by the Council ; of these two were accepted and two rejected. 
 
The Results 253 
 
 on the contrary, the country takes little interest in the 
 law, the number of citizens who will go out of their 
 way to express their opinion will be inconsiderable. 
 They will consist of public servants and employees of 
 the state, certain fanatical believers in direct legisla- 
 tion, and sometimes malcontents who vote " No " 
 out of pure opposition, and who, calculating on the 
 numerous abstentions, hope to defeat the law. 
 
 There is an external factor which may contribute 
 to increase the number of voters, and that is, the 
 coincidence of the referendum with an election. 
 Although elections have not the importance in 
 Switzerland that they have in Belgium, since the 
 representatives chosen by the people cannot pass 
 legislation which is final, their laws being always 
 amenable to the popular tribunal, yet it is an obvious 
 and universal fact that the elections are better at- 
 tended than the referendary votings. Probably 
 politicians work harder to ensure their own success 
 
 In two other cases the Council prepared an alternative which was 
 ratified, while of the remaining fifteen only three were adopted by 
 the people. Of these one established a house of correction for 
 tramps, another re-established the death penalty (but the people 
 afterwards negatived the statute for carrying it into effect), and the 
 third abolished compulsory vaccination. Only three laws opposed 
 by the Legislature have therefore been adopted by the people 
 during twenty-four years, and of these Mr. Lowell says : " One was 
 of doubtful value, about another the people seem to have changed 
 their minds, and in the opinion of most educated people the third 
 was clearly bad." See vol. ii. p. 287. 
 
 M. Curti's criticism of the initiative is as follows : "It must be 
 acknowledged that the initiative has not always been well directed. 
 Those who have used the initiative have often propounded questions 
 which were not urgent, or have drawn up their demands in such a 
 way that they could not withstand criticism. But the institution 
 has always had the advantage of acting as a safety-valve for political 
 passions." See Revue Politique et Parlementaire, August 1897. 
 
254 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 than the success of their laws. However that may 
 be, we can state as a fact that at Zurich, when there 
 is a referendum and an election on the same day, 
 the average number of electors who pronounce on 
 the law or decree submitted to the vote rises from 
 74 to 79 per cent. 1 
 
 There is a third factor which contributes materially 
 towards filling the ballot-boxes, and that is, the power 
 of the communes to inflict a fine on the electors who 
 abstain from voting. Herr Stiissi gives some sur- 
 prising figures on this subject. On the occasion of 
 the referendum on the 25th of June 1871, it was 
 calculated that 97, 94, and 59 per cent, of the elec- 
 tors voted in the communes of Uster, Horgen, and 
 Riesbach respectively, while in the communes of 
 Zurich, Glattfelden, and Aussersihl the percentage 
 was only 19, 14, and 10 respectively. In the first 
 three communes the vote was compulsory, in the 
 others it was optional. These figures were so re- 
 markable that it was proposed to pass a cantonal 
 law which should introduce compulsory voting into 
 all the communes without distinction. The first bill 
 drafted for this purpose was rejected by the people, 
 and a motion on the same subject, made somewhat 
 later in the cantonal council, only obtained 50 votes 
 against 90. The communes, therefore, remained free 
 to establish compulsory voting or not as they liked, 
 and we are thus enabled to judge accurately as to 
 how far the threat of a fine increases the vigilance 
 of the electors. 
 
 On the occasion of the referendum of the 4th of 
 
 1 In Zurich, for example, an average of 81 per cent, of the elec- 
 tors take part in an election. 
 
The Results 255 
 
 May 1 879, the average of electors voting was 90 per 
 cent, in the 121 communes where the voting was 
 compulsory, and only 70 per cent, in the communes 
 where the voting was optional. On the occasion of 
 the referendum of the 28th of April 1878, the pro- 
 portion was respectively 86 per cent, and 5 5 per cent. 
 Compulsory voting produces another result to which 
 it is important to draw attention, namely, a marked 
 increase in the number of blank ballot-papers. In 
 the two votings we have just mentioned, there was 
 an average of 21 and 24 per cent, of blank tickets 
 in the communes where the voting was compulsory, 
 and only from 17 to 20 per cent, in the communes 
 where the voting was optional. 
 
 Voting by proxy, which is peculiar to Zurich, also 
 tends to increase the number of blank ballot-papers. 
 If the elector is obliged to go and give his vote in 
 person, he likes, when he has exerted himself so far, 
 to influence the result to some extent, and therefore 
 fills in the ballot-paper. On the other hand, a man 
 who, merely to escape the fine, sends the ballot-paper 
 by a third person, takes little interest in the result of 
 the voting, and will easily abstain from giving any 
 opinion at all. However that may be, the proportion 
 of blank ballot-papers to the whole number placed in 
 the ballot-boxes has been 1 1 per cent, during the five 
 years between 1869 and 1874. It rose to 19 per cent, 
 in the following period ; from 1875 to 1880. It has 
 fallen to 18 per cent, from 1881 to 1885. Looking at 
 these numbers, the conclusion is that on an average, 
 from 1869 to 1885, 62 per cent, only of the registered 
 electors have given a vote which is worth anything ; 
 and in that way it has happened that in 100 votes out 
 
256 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 of 1 20 the minority has given the law to the majority. 
 " After all," says Herr Stlissi, " is not that preferable to 
 submitting to a law voted by 150 or 200 deputies?" 
 Yes, it is preferable, if votes only are counted. Perhaps 
 it is not if it were a question of the worth of the vote. 
 
 In the canton of Berne sixty-eight laws have run 
 the gauntlet of the referendum between 1869 and 
 1 880. Of these fifty have passed safe and sound, and 
 eighteen have not found favour with the people. 1 
 
 M. Chatelanat published in 1 877 2 some very detailed 
 statistics about the Bernese referendum. We see from 
 them that only 45 per cent, of the electors took part 
 in referendary votings. This proportion has remained 
 the same for the years after 1 877 ; but of 1 1 0,000 
 active citizens only 48,000 on an average take the 
 
 1 [M. Curti says that one hundred cantonal laws and initiative 
 demands have been submitted to the vote between 1869 and 1896, 
 and of these thirty-one have been voted down. The people, he 
 says, have several times displayed their opposition to laws on 
 salaries, pensions, and other fiscal questions. On the other hand, 
 they consented to state subsidies being given to the railways, 
 they increased the salaries of teachers in the elementary schools, 
 and decided on the construction or enlargement of scholastic 
 institutions and hospitals. 
 
 The popular initiative, introduced in 1893, has been twice used in 
 Berne with success firstly, to abolish compulsory vaccination ; and 
 secondly, to introduce a system of bounties for the rearing of cattle 
 and horses. A law on this latter subject, prepared by the Great 
 Council, had been voted down owing to the objection of the small 
 farmers, who did not consider the subsidy fairly distributed. The 
 popular law was accepted. The election of the Executive, the 
 Great Council, and the deputies to the Council of States, by the 
 system of proportional representation, was also claimed by the 
 popular initiative, but was rejected by the people.] 
 
 2 Chatelanat, Die Wirkungen dcs Referendums im Kanton Bern, in 
 the Zeitsc/trift fur schweizcrische Slatistik, 1877, p. 193. 
 
The Results 257 
 
 trouble to drop a ballot-paper into the box when 
 there is a law to sanction. On the other hand, when 
 the Great Council is to be elected, immediately the 
 number of electors that go to the poll is considerably 
 increased. On an average they amount to 69,000. 
 During the period of twenty years which have passed 
 since the introduction of the referendum into Berne, 
 an absolute majority of the electors has only nine 
 times taken part in the votes. Of the sixty-eight laws 
 submitted to the referendum only one has obtained 
 more than half the votes of the registered electors. 
 In all other cases the result has been decided by the 
 minority. 1 
 
 Herr Diirrenmatt, a member of the Great Council 
 at Berne, considers that the considerable number of 
 abstentions is partly due to the unwieldy size of the 
 constituencies. He intends to introduce a motion 
 that the vote should henceforth take place in the 
 commune. If his preliminary proposal is adopted, 
 he intends claiming compulsory voting, and the pay- 
 ment of a franc to those who come to vote. This last 
 idea is not new. In olden days, at one period of the 
 Athenian democracy, the citizens present at the meet- 
 ings of the Ecclesia were also indemnified. There 
 
 1 [Mr. Lowell (p. 272) points out that between 1869 and 1878 the 
 percentage of those who took part in the vote varied from 81.6 to 
 20.2 per cent. "It is worth while to observe that the largest vote 
 was cast on religious questions, the next on political ones ; then 
 came railroad, then school, then financial, then economic ones ; 
 whilst the smallest vote was polled on administrative regulations, 
 no doubt because the people felt that they did not understand 
 them. This list of subjects shows that cool, and sensible as 
 the Swiss are, they are not exempt from the popular tendency, 
 good or bad, to take more interest in sensational than practical 
 matters."] 
 
 R 
 
258 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 is only one kind of law which seems to have been able 
 to arouse the Bernese from their habitual indifference. 
 When it was necessary, on the 1 8th of January 1 874, 
 to vote on a religious law which placed the Church in 
 absolute dependence upon the state and the people, 
 then 69,478 electors thought it their duty to go and 
 vote for its acceptance. The minority which voted 
 "No" was composed of 17,133 votes. In all there 
 were 86,6 1 1 votes given. The majority comprised the 
 Protestants and Old Catholics, who assumed by this 
 means the right of regulating the religious affairs of 
 the Catholics. 1 
 
 In the canton of Solothurn, from 1870, to 1891, 
 fifty-one laws have been adopted, and fifteen have 
 been rejected. 
 
 The laws which the people are most ready to refuse 
 are in Solothurn, as elsewhere, those which concern 
 the payment of public servants. The officials often 
 suffer from the dislike which the peasant feels for a 
 bureaucracy. Colonel Vigier of Solothurn has sent 
 me the reports of the Central Department responsible 
 for ascertaining the result of the ballots. It would 
 appear from the results of the twenty-two votes con- 
 tained in the reports, that out of 17,000 electors 8300 
 on an average appear at the poll. The smallest 
 number that took part in a single vote has been 
 4998, the highest 12,620. On the other hand, when 
 
 1 It should be remarked that this is not the only case in which 
 democracy has been oppressive to liberty, and that it is not only at 
 Ber that the government of the people has been the domination 
 of numbers, in which the minority has been disarmed and oppressed 
 by a sectarian majority. The exact details are given by M. Woeste 
 in his Histoire du Cultwkampf en Suisse, Brussels, 1887, pp. 45, 59, 
 
 122. 
 
The Results 259 
 
 an election took place on the 2Oth of November 
 1887, for the re-election of the Council of State, 
 no less than 15,548 voted out of 17,591 registered 
 electors. 
 
 In the half canton of Rural-Basle the people have 
 been required to give their decision on ninety-four laws 
 from 1 864 to 1 88 1 . The net result has been that forty- 
 five laws have been accepted and twenty-three have 
 been rejected. Seventeen times the referendum has 
 come to nothing because a majority of electors have 
 not taken part in the vote. 1 
 
 From 1 88 1 to 1884, out of seventeen laws sub- 
 mitted to the people, three only have been accepted, 
 five have been rejected, and more than half of the 
 laws failed because an absolute majority of the electors 
 did not go to the poll. 2 
 
 I have not been able to obtain the statistics of 
 the number of voters in the canton of Aargau. The 
 number of laws rejected by the people there is con- 
 siderable. Between 1870 and 1883 twenty-one laws 
 out of forty-eight were rejected, and four out of ten 
 between 1885 and 1889. The people have a special 
 aversion to laws on taxation. From 1878 to 1885 they 
 constantly refused to vote the state budget. 3 The 
 majority has now succeeded by making some con- 
 
 1 Amtsbericht des Rcyierungsrathes des Kantons Basel Landschaft 
 vom Jahre 1880. 
 
 2 Amtsbericht vom Jahre 1884. [These figures show that the ten- 
 dency to stay away has increased of late years. In the new Con- 
 stitution of 1894 the majority of those who take part in the vote is 
 decisive whether a majority of electors take part or not.] 
 
 3 Aargau was the only canton besides Berne which was in the 
 habit of submitting the budget to the referendum. 
 
260 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 cessions to the opposition in striking the budget out 
 of the list of subjects which must be submitted to 
 the referendum. 1 
 
 In passing to the French cantons we are at once 
 struck with the fact that legislation by the people is 
 much less developed there than in the German can- 
 tons. Three of them, Geneva, Vaud, and Neuchatel, 
 only possess the optional referendum. Fribourg has 
 always adhered to the representative system pure 
 and simple. 2 
 
 I spent a long time trying to discover the reason 
 
 1 [The particulars of the votings in the canton of St. Gall are 
 given by M. Curti. Between 1831 and 1894 there were 336 laws 
 passed, twenty of which have been submitted to the referendum. 
 Of these two passed, eighteen failed. Therefore, whenever a refer- 
 endum has been demanded, the law has nearly always been voted 
 down. The laws rejected have usually been tax laws. The two laws 
 accepted have a political-religious character ; the first proposed 
 to remove funerals from ecclesiastical influence, and the second 
 imposed penalties on priests who attempted to stir up religious 
 dissensions. Both were carried by a small majority of about 300. 
 
 The initiative has been made use of to introduce proportional 
 representation, but it was negatived by 22,143 votes to 19,875. It 
 has also been made use of to lower the rate of interest on mort- 
 gages from five to four per cent., which was accepted by 22,642 to 
 12,859 votes. Compulsory voting exists in this canton, but it is 
 doubtful whether the fines are strictly enforced. They are, how- 
 ever, very political in St. Gall. There are 5 1,430 registered electors, 
 and no less than forty political newspapers.] 
 
 2 Politicians conclude from that that Fribourg is the most retro- 
 grade and reactionary canton in Switzerland. They would probably 
 not express this opinion if Fribourg were not a Catholic canton. In 
 fact, the representative system has not prevented the starting of a 
 university calculated to become a scientific institution of the first 
 rank, and subsidised by the Great Council in December 1886 to 
 the extent of 2,500,000 francs. Adams, The Swiss Confederation, 
 French edition, p. 227. 
 
The Results 261 
 
 of the difference between the German cantons and 
 the French, a difference which is gradually becoming 
 less marked in course of time, owing to what one 
 might call the "contagion of example." I am in- 
 clined to believe that the difference is due to the 
 fact that the citizens of Romance Switzerland were 
 not brought up in the elementary school of liberty 
 like those in German Switzerland. The citizens of 
 the German communes have always been accustomed 
 to meet in Gemeinden to discuss all important matters 
 which interest the communes. They soon become 
 ambitious to enlarge their sphere and to extend it 
 to the domain of cantonal interests whenever they 
 consider that these interests have been inefficiently 
 dealt with by the Great Council. Their French 
 fellow-citizens have not enjoyed this preliminary 
 political training. " In Romance Switzerland," wrote 
 M. Dubs, " there is a general idea that communal life 
 emanates from above, and we have no sort of com- 
 munal assembly. Sometimes the communal electors 
 merely have the right of electing the communal 
 council, 1 which is responsible for nominating the 
 municipal council or executive. This lack of com- 
 munal life reacts on the political life, and the Romance 
 peoples are much too ready to listen to those in 
 power and wait for them to take the initiative." 2 
 
 1 A deliberate assembly. 
 
 2 Dubs, Le droit public de la Confederation Suisse, vol. i. p. 282. [The 
 difference is thus summed up by Mr. Lowell : "Among the Germans 
 there is more jealousy and distrust of the government and more 
 confidence in the direct action of the people, while the French are 
 less democratic in the Swiss sense of the term and more inclined to 
 follow the lead of the regular authorities. Hence the referendum 
 is peculiarly a German institution."] 
 
262 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 There can be no doubt, with our present informa- 
 tion, that the Valais shares with the Grisons the 
 honour of having been the cradle of the referendum. 
 The referendum exists there in the compulsory form, 
 which is considered more democratic than the op- 
 tional ; but the only laws upon which the people pro- 
 nounce are those which involve an outlay of more 
 than 60,000 francs. As a matter of fact, the electors 
 never have the opportunity of using their right. " We 
 always try," a member of the canton told me, " not 
 to exceed the sum of 60,000 francs on any single 
 occasion." 
 
 The referendum has existed in Geneva since 1879. 
 It has only been used twice once against a law 
 ordering the construction of a railway from Geneva 
 to Annemasse ; and secondly, against a cantonal reso- 
 lution granting a subsidy of 400,000 francs to a railway 
 of local importance constructed by a private company. 
 The law was accepted, the resolution rejected. 
 
 In Neuchatel the referendum has only been set in 
 motion twice since 1 879 once against a law creating 
 a state bank, which was accepted by the people ; and 
 secondly, against a law on the licences of inns a good 
 law, so I was told, but which was rejected. 
 
 The electors have twice made use of their right of 
 initiative. In 1884 they demanded the purchase by 
 the state of a little line of railway which was being 
 mismanaged. The purchase was decided by 9358 
 votes to 6772. In 1888, the Conservatives, who are 
 in a minority in the canton, but were assisted on this 
 occasion by a group of Radicals, demanded that the 
 
The Results 263 
 
 law should declare it impossible for a man to be at 
 the same time a National Councillor and an official 
 in the cantonal administration. This proposal was 
 supported by the people. 
 
 In the canton of Vaud the referendum does not 
 seem to have been made use of at all, and the popular 
 initiative has only been resorted to once, and that 
 was in 1883. On that occasion the Conservatives 
 demanded, like those of Neuchatel, that a man should 
 be declared incapable of being at the same time an 
 official in the cantonal administration and a deputy 
 to the Federal Chambers. The people accepted the 
 law, but its authors paid dearly for their success. 
 The Radicals sought for revenge, and introduced pro- 
 gressive taxation on capital in the cantonal constitu- 
 tion of 1885. They persuaded the people that the 
 public revenue ought to be drawn almost exclusively 
 from the leisured classes, and that the taxes paid by 
 poor citizens would be reduced in consequence. When 
 the constitution was submitted to the popular vote, it 
 was accepted by 30,000 citizens and rejected by 20,000 
 out of 60,000 registered electors. The result of the 
 adoption of progressive taxation is easy to imagine. 
 M. Wuarin, without expressly mentioning the canton 
 of Vaud, enables us to recognise it in the following 
 passage in his interesting book The Tasc-payer : 
 
 " What has happened where the graduated tax has 
 been directed with openly hostile intention against 
 large fortunes ? The holders of great fortunes who 
 are not ready to bear much ill-treatment have been 
 driven from the country. It has given rise to a 
 certain number of family arrangements in order to 
 
264 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 divide up great fortunes so as to bring the higher 
 classes of taxable capital within the range of lower 
 taxation. Moreover, people living abroad, and pos- 
 sessed of a comfortable fortune, have lost all wish to 
 enter a country so inhospitable to wealth, even though 
 it be their own native place." l 
 
 The political editor of the Revue Suisse character- 
 ises the law of Vaud on graduated taxation as " abso- 
 lutely monstrous." It not only levies an enormous 
 toll on great fortunes, but it puts every one under a 
 sort of inquisition, and subjects them to proceedings 
 which are the negation of liberty and personal inde- 
 pendence. The citizens, bound hand and foot, are 
 practically delivered into the hands of commissioners 
 named by the government or in its employ, and they 
 are not even able to invoke the protection of the law 
 courts. 
 
 The reason that the referendum does not work in 
 the canton of Yaud is due to the fact that the oppo- 
 sition is numerically in a hopeless minority. The 
 Radical party is supreme in the canton, for out of more 
 than two hundred members of the Grand Council 
 the Conservatives can scarcely count sixty, of whom 
 eighteen come from the town of Lausanne. Under 
 these conditions, the minority has no interest in 
 making use of the referendum. For any appeal to 
 the electoral body to be effective, it is necessary that 
 those who make the appeal should not be opposed 
 
 1 Wuarin, Le Contribuable, Paris, 1889, pp. 118-19. Also L' evolu- 
 tion de la democratic en Suisse, in the Revue des deux Mondes, August i, 
 1891. [See also Lowell, p. 267 and note. In the Revue Socialiste, 
 1894, pp. 567-88, there is a very interesting article by M. Henri 
 Mayr on " Progressive Taxation in the Canton of Vaud."] 
 
The Results 265 
 
 by an overwhelming majority which votes solid at 
 the bidding of its leaders. 
 
 If, on the other hand, there are two parties in a 
 state fc both of whom are well organised and highly 
 disciplined, and nearly equal in strength, then the 
 referendum is bound to become a weapon of the 
 opposition, and, as a matter of fact, this is what 
 actually happened in the Italian canton of Ticino. 1 
 
 For forty years the Liberals had been hi power, 
 thanks often to illegal and revolutionary means. In 
 1875, when the religious struggle had reached the 
 stage of acute exasperation, a violent reaction took 
 place, and a Conservative majority was sent to the 
 Great Council. As Ticino did not then possess the 
 referendum, the Conservative leaders thought fit to 
 introduce it in 1883. They might be turned out any 
 day and a Liberal majority might return to power, 
 in which case the persecution of the Church would 
 begin. It was prudent when in power to make sure 
 of having a weapon against the Radical laws of the 
 future. Unfortunately they put their scheme into 
 execution rather too soon. If the Conservatives had 
 introduced the referendum on the eve of an election 
 when they expected a reverse, it would have been 
 excellent policy; but in 1883 their position was still 
 too strong, and their new law reacted on themselves. 
 
 Shortly after the introduction of the referendum, 
 the Great Council passed a law dealing with the 
 
 1 At the elections of March 3, 1889, on the dissolution of the 
 Great Council, the average poll of the Conservatives was 12,653, of 
 the Liberals 12,018 (La question Electorate dans le canton de Tcssin, 
 Berne, 1890). 
 
266 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 development of Ticino. "The proposal," said the 
 political editor of the Revue Suisse, " was altogether 
 advantageous to the canton. To improve a great 
 valley, to protect it against periodical floods, to bring 
 into cultivation some very important land at a rela- 
 tively small cost, 1 might have been expected to meet 
 with the approval of all men." But politics inter- 
 fered, and the Kadicals voted to a man against the 
 proposal. They very cleverly exploited the jealousy 
 which the Sotto Genere felt towards the Sopra Genere, 
 .for whose advantage the improvement was under- 
 taken. The result was that the law was rejected, 
 and the State Council resigned. 2 
 
 SECTION II. THE REFERENDUM FROM THE Swiss 
 POINT OF VIEW. 
 
 Tot capit^ tot sensus. I came back from Switzer- 
 land with a large memorandum-book crammed full 
 of notes, taken here, there, and everywhere, just 
 as I happened to meet my informants, professors, 
 deputies, journalists, public servants, popular leaders, 
 Catholics, Socialists, and Radicals. In this curious 
 collection, violent abuse and enthusiastic eulogies 
 
 1 The Confederation paid fifty per cent, of the expense, the land- 
 owners interested thirty per cent., so that the canton was only 
 called on for twenty per cent. 
 
 2 In 1886 the Radicals collected 8000 signatures against a law 
 which would have given the Church more independence in its 
 dealings with the state. Fortunately, however, the law was passed 
 on the 2ist March 1880 by a small majority, the votes being 11,651 
 to 10,410. The year before, an excellent financial law was rejected 
 without even a plausible reason being given, out of pure party 
 spite. 
 
The Results 267 
 
 mingle on every page. The referendum is an 
 excellent thing, an incomparable institution : you 
 turn a leaf, and this wonder is suddenly termed 
 a reactionary measure, a clog and a hindrance to 
 progress. 
 
 In order to spare the reader the sort of confusion 
 I experienced during the first part of my stay in 
 Switzerland under this flood of contradictory opinions, 
 I will try and classify these criticisms, to some extent, 
 according to the special point of view from which 
 the different people whom I consulted regarded the 
 referendum. It will help to explain the divergencies 
 of opinion to a certain extent. 
 
 We will see, first of all, what the politicians think of 
 " Monseigneur the Referendum," as M. Carteret ex- 
 pressed himself one day ; for they are the people who 
 have the closest and longest acquaintance with his 
 lordship. 
 
 I. "Parties," wrote a foreign observer, "judge the 
 institution [the referendum] not according to its in- 
 trinsic value, but according to the services which it 
 renders or is capable of rendering them. This ex- 
 plains why a further extension of the rights of the 
 people is claimed by different parties in different 
 cantons, in Basle by the Radicals, in St. Gall by 
 the Ultramontanes." 1 This observation of Signor 
 Brunialti is a just one. 
 
 Those devoted to active politics are utilitarians. 
 With them it is a matter of calculating the gains and 
 advantages that their party or their cause may hope 
 
 1 Brunialti, La leggc e la liberth, vol. i. p. 270. 
 
268 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 to obtain from the referendum. It is not surprising, 
 therefore, that the members of the government and 
 the majority should speak ill of the referendum, or 
 that the chiefs of the opposition should have no 
 terms too flattering to apply to it. The former owe 
 nothing to the institution, quite the contrary. 
 
 A great many of their laws, it is true, have obtained 
 the sanction of the people, but how many others 
 have been rejected after having been drafted with 
 great labour, and defended clause by clause against 
 the minority, and from which its supporters hoped 
 for valuable results for the whole country, and espe- 
 cially for their party ? The opposition does not 
 experience these regrets. It considers the laws that 
 it has succeeded in rejecting as so many acts of 
 revenge, or as so many landmarks on the road to 
 power. In its hands the referendum has become a 
 weapon with which to do battle, and it has often 
 proved victorious. 
 
 All politicians do not regard the referendum in 
 this light. There are some rare exceptions. I have 
 met men who struggled in their youth with all the 
 energy of sincere conviction for the success of demo- 
 cratic institutions. The fortune of elections has 
 brought them into power, and the referendum has 
 done them a bad turn. All the same they have 
 remained faithful to it, and pardoned it with a good 
 grace. I do not undertake to say whether this is 
 the result of democratic conviction or amour propre. 
 I simply state the fact as a somewhat exceptional 
 one. 
 
 As a general rule, the opposition, whether it be 
 Catholic or Liberal, is satisfied with the referendum. 
 
The Results 269 
 
 The majority, on the contrary, whatever its political 
 complexion, wishes to be rid of it. Signor Brunialti 
 quotes two cantons as examples, and I would add those 
 of Geneva, Fribourg, Berne, Lucerne, Aargau, the 
 Grisons, and others. Fribourg is the most curious of 
 all. The cantonal referendum is one of the planks of 
 the Radical platform, and the government and the 
 majority will not have it at any price. It has been 
 said, therefore, that Fribourg is not a democratic 
 canton. If, on the other hand, the eagerness with 
 which the electors go to the ballot-box on voting days 
 is any criterion of the intensity of the democratic 
 opinion in that country, then Fribourg is one of the 
 most democratic cantons in Switzerland. A consider- 
 able number of Fribourg voters, moreover, take part 
 in each federal referendum. 
 
 What is true of the different cantons in particular 
 is also true of the Confederation in general. 
 
 I will not prove the point by quoting the declara- 
 tions that have been made to me by important 
 members of the Federal Councils. It is only neces- 
 sary to mention two facts in the parliamentary and 
 political history of Switzerland which every one there 
 knows. One of these is of recent date, and the other 
 several years old. 
 
 The question of conferring on the electors the 
 right of initiative afforded the Radical party on three 
 occasions the opportunity of disclosing its enmity 
 towards any measure which increased the legislative 
 power of the people. 
 
 In the Assembly the " formulated " initiative, which 
 was advocated by the Right, was resisted by nearly all 
 the speakers on the side of the majority. The Right 
 
 \ . = 
 
270 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 were successful, thanks to the support of the Socialists 
 and the adhesion of a section of the Radical demo- 
 crats. But the Federal resolution had still to obtain 
 the sanction of the people, and with few exceptions 
 the Radical newspapers recommended their readers to 
 vote "No." In spite of their eloquence the resolu- 
 tion was adopted, and the result of the poll clearly 
 showed who were the partisans and who the opponents 
 of democracy. 
 
 The Journal de Geneve contained the following 
 paragraph on the day after the voting of the 5th of 
 July 1891: "Three cantons, Aargau, Thurgau, and 
 Vaud, and two half cantons, Rural-Basle and Appen- 
 zell (Outer Rhodes), have been the only ones to vote 
 'No.' In all these states the majority is Radical. 
 There are also very large minorities against the 
 initiative in the Radical cantons of Berne, Schaff- 
 hausen, and Neuchatel. If we except Basle-City, 
 Solothurn, and Geneva, the largest majorities in 
 favour of the resolution have been given in the 
 Catholic cantons. We might say that the revision 
 which has just been carried is the work of the opposi- 
 tion, supported by a section of the Radicals, who act 
 consistently with the democratic principles which 
 they profess." x 
 
 But the Radical majority had already shown on a 
 previous occasion in the Chamber how little sympathy 
 it had with the " rights of the people." That was in 
 1884, on the day after the referendum of the i ith of 
 May, when the people rejected four laws at once. 
 
 On the 6th of June three members of the Right, 
 MM. Zemp, Keel, and Pedrazzini, raised a demand in 
 
 1 Journal de Geneve, July 7, 1891. 
 
The Results 271 
 
 the Chamber for constitutional revision, and specially 
 claimed a larger extension of popular rights. There 
 is nothing more instructive than to read the debates 
 on this motion. I will only give two typical extracts. 
 
 M. Zemp, in demanding the compulsory referendum 
 and popular initiative, said: "Ten years ago we watched 
 the introduction of the referendum into the constitu- 
 tion with considerable anxiety, but to-day our fears 
 have been dissipated. As Federalists we were in 
 doubt in 1 874 as to the result of the exclusion of the 
 vote by cantons. We were all labouring under a wrong 
 impression at that time, and we have been taught by 
 experience that the Swiss people are distinctly more 
 Conservative than their representatives." l 
 
 M. Carteret answered M. Zemp, and did not try to 
 conceal his opinion. " I should like," he said, " to see 
 the referendum completely suppressed, and, above all, 
 I want no compulsory referendum. As to the popular 
 initiative, I dread it as a sort of legislative dynamite. 
 In a word, the so-called rights of the people seem to 
 me nothing more than democratic clap-trap. In the 
 hands of the clerical party they are only used to 
 impede progress." 2 
 
 In less picturesque terms, most of the speakers of 
 the majority expressed the same sentiments; and, 
 some months after the discussion, M. Nurna Droz 
 re-echoed them in a long article in the Revue Suisse, 
 which he devoted to an examination of the proposi- 
 tions of M. Zemp and his allies. 3 
 
 1 Zuricher Post of 2ist June 1884. 
 
 2 Zuricher Post of 23rd June 1884. 
 
 3 Numa Droz, La revision federate, in the Bibliotheque Universelle, 
 vol. xxv. It is interesting to compare this article by M. Droz with 
 one he wrote three years later, which ended with the words : 
 
272 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 Thus in ten years the attitude of the parties with 
 regard to the federal referendum was completely 
 changed. The Radicals, who introduced it in 1874, 
 arrayed themselves against it; while the Conserva- 
 tives, who were opposed to it at first, demanded that 
 it should be made more complete, that its domain 
 should be extended, and that it should be made easier 
 in practice. 
 
 II. The political philosophers and jurists who judge 
 the referendum from a more scientific standpoint, and 
 to whom the immediate results or advantages of the 
 system are not of paramount importance, neverthe- 
 less differ in their conclusions quite as widely as the 
 politicians. 
 
 First of all, let us notice the opinion of M. Ernest 
 Naville, who is an avowed adversary of the referendum, 
 but who differs from other people in that he does not 
 mind saying so openly : 
 
 " Only the very unsophisticated could believe that 
 each citizen, after mature consideration, forms a de- 
 
 " Switzerland is undoubtedly taking an unprecedented step in 
 resigning the sovereign legislative power into the hands of a body 
 of more than 600,000 electors. If we succeed, our descendants will 
 be able to pride themselves on having been the first to make one of 
 the greatest advances in civilisation and political progress. And I 
 am convinced we are on the way to success " (Numa Droz, La 
 democratic et son avenir, in the Biblioihbque Univcrselle, vol. xvi.). 
 [Writing in 1895, M. Droz says: "It seems to me that this institu- 
 tion, which is of a frankly Conservative character, has done more 
 good than harm. Although I am a friend of progress, I do not 
 desire that it should be hasty, inconsiderate, or turbulent. The 
 democratic machine, like any other, has need of a counter-check, 
 and for that reason I support it" (La democratic en Suissc, Etudes et 
 portraits politiques, p. 467). He is a most inveterate opponent of 
 the popular initiative.] 
 
The Results 273 
 
 cided opinion of his own on every law. In order that 
 all the shepherds of the mountains, all the farmers of 
 the valleys, and all the dwellers in the towns of Swit- 
 zerland might have an intelligent personal opinion on 
 the often very complicated laws, they would require 
 an amount of culture and leisure which is at present, 
 and always will be, beyond the reach of the great 
 majority of the population." 
 
 " It is argued," wrote M. Naville further on, " that, 
 since the laws are submitted to the people, nothing 
 contrary to their wishes can be imposed upon them. 
 That is true enough when the laws are clearly ex- 
 pressed, and are confined to one particular point. 
 Such laws are, however, very exceptional. In the 
 majority of cases the leaders of the political party in 
 the majority in the councils have certain methods by 
 which they induce the people to assent to the wishes 
 of the party instead of asserting their own. One of 
 these consists in incorporating several laws referring 
 to different questions into one act, and submitting it 
 as it stands to the popular vote. The second ex- 
 pedient is to make some slight alterations in a law 
 that has been refused, and then it is submitted a 
 second, and even a third time, if necessary. 
 
 "Independently of these considerations, the im- 
 portant fact which makes it impossible to attribute 
 to the referendum the value in practice which it has 
 in theory is, that such a large number do not vote 
 at all. ' The people ' who are said to have accepted 
 or refused a law are too often only a very small part 
 of the whole electorate. 
 
 " Legislation by the people, in the sense that every 
 citizen is able to study the laws proposed, and is 
 
274 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 capable of criticising and of forming an independent 
 judgment on their merits, is, and probably always 
 will be, a chimera, in spite of free and compulsory 
 education. 
 
 " The plebiscite is in its proper place when it is a 
 question of voting on constitutions, 1 but, as far as 
 law-making is concerned, the representative system is 
 the only one capable of adequately expressing demo- 
 cracy under the conditions of modern society." 2 
 
 The opinions of M. Wuarin, Professor of Sociology 
 in the University of Geneva, are altogether different. 
 Instead of wishing to restrict the right of the electors 
 to votes in the revision of constitutions, he demands 
 that the referendum should be extended to embrace 
 a special domain from which it has hitherto been 
 thought prudent to exclude it. In his book Le Con- 
 tribuable (The Tax-payer), M. Wuarin enters upon 
 an examination of the possible means by which the 
 deterioration of public finance may be ameliorated 
 or prevented ; and an extension of popular rights to 
 include a vote on the budgets and taxes is one of 
 the remedies for which he expresses the strongest 
 approval. * 
 
 " The man who pays," he says, " ought to have the 
 real control ; and the public officials, who are only his 
 
 1 Herr von Orelli also considers that the referendum ought to be 
 confined to constitutional revisions. He adds that the vote should 
 always be preceded by public meetings, in which the members 
 could explain to their constituents the subjects they are expected to 
 vote upon. Von Orelli, Das Staatsrecht der schweizerischen Eidgenos- 
 enschaft, p. 107. 
 
 2 E. Naville, A propos du referendum, in Representation proportion- 
 nette, April 1887. See, by the same author, La question electorate, 
 Geneva, 1871, p. x. ; La democratic representative, Paris, 1881. 
 
The Results 275 
 
 business agents, ought to be really dependent on him. 
 In finance, as in everything else, the policy of the 
 country should be directed by the country. The 
 way to effect this is to put two levers into the 
 hands of the people the right of veto or the refer- 
 endum, and the right of initiative." The referendum, 
 according to M. Wuarin, should be extended in four 
 respects : 
 
 (1) The referendum as it now actually exists is 
 more political than administrative, and it ought to 
 be both. 
 
 As a matter of fact, financial decisions are among 
 the questions on which the country can pronounce, 
 but they have to assume a certain form, for the 
 budgets, properly so called, are excepted from the 
 popular control. 
 
 (2) The power of declaring a law to be urgent, by 
 which it is removed from the sphere of the referen- 
 dum, ought at least to be expressly restricted to a 
 limited number of cases. 
 
 (3) The referendum ought to be compulsory. 
 
 (4) It ought also to be introduced for communal 
 matters. 1 
 
 M. Dubs, formerly one of the most formidable 
 opponents of the referendum, recognises regretfully 
 that it is now an accomplished fact. 
 
 " The compulsory referendum," he writes, " is the 
 only form which gives due expression to the idea 
 that the people must share directly in the work 
 of legislation. But, on the other hand, it is im- 
 possible to deny that as soon as the state has 
 
 1 [This has now been done in Geneva. There is also a referendum 
 in the towns of Berne and Zurich. See Preface.] 
 
276 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 increased in powers or 'in territory, this method 
 of legislation becomes very burdensome and costly. 
 Many laws have no great interest for the people in 
 general ; many have a special and technical character 
 about which the great mass of the voters have not, 
 and cannot have, any opinion. The people are 
 forced to vote, with no wish to do so; they have 
 a responsibility imposed upon them which they are 
 not qualified to bear, while the council gets rid of 
 a responsibility which is part of its duty. 
 
 " The optional referendum, by which the people 
 do not participate in legislation, except on direct 
 demand, seems to be open to none of these objec- 
 tions. But, as a matter of fact, the veto long ago 
 rejected as undesirable, is there still, though under 
 another name. The popular right of intervention 
 has only been made exceptional. The agitation 
 which necessarily precedes each popular voting in 
 order to bring it about, paralyses the ordinary work- 
 ing of the political machinery, inflames the minds 
 of the people, and leads to unnatural coalitions. 
 More than all this, the idea of the regular co-opera- 
 tion of the sovereign people in legislation is definitely 
 abandoned. Whatever be the form of the referen- 
 dum, whether it be compulsory or optional, it is 
 nevertheless but a poor substitute for a Landsge- 
 meinde, owing to the fact that people are scattered 
 at the time of voting, and that there is, as a rule, 
 no previous discussion. The Landsgeineinde is the 
 visible expression of the unity of the country, and 
 the idea of this unity has a powerful and ennobling 
 influence on the individual. No such feeling is 
 aroused, however, by the mere fact of dropping a 
 
The Results 277 
 
 paper into the ballot-box, without anything approach- 
 ing a discussion having preceded the mere writing 
 of Yes or No on the ticket. 
 
 " The idea is in itself truly democratic, and it will 
 be a task for future generations to evolve a method 
 by which it may be better realised. 
 
 "It is still a new question, and experience will 
 throw light on many points." J 
 
 M. Hilty, who defended the rights of the people 
 against M. Dubs in 1868, has remained faithful to 
 his original convictions. He published in 1887 a 
 remarkable study of the Swiss referendum, in the 
 Archiv fur offentliches Recht. While considering 
 that the time had not come to pronounce a definite 
 judgment, as Switzerland was only going through 
 its apprenticeship to the system, he considers that 
 the results of the referendum have not been dis- 
 couraging. "It goes without saying," he concludes 
 " that it would be unreasonable to propose the refer- 
 endum in any country taken hap-hazard; but when 
 the electorate possesses the essential qualities, the 
 referendum is to be preferred to the representative 
 system, for the four following reasons: 
 
 "(i) Legislation acquires a doubly popular char- 
 acter. The people learn to understand the laws 
 better, especially when they are accompanied by 
 explanatory messages. On the other hand, the 
 Chamber is obliged to draft laws that are short, 
 simple, and intelligible to the majority. 
 
 "(2) The referendum encourages and strengthens 
 patriotism, for government no longer appears the 
 
 1 Dubs, Lc droit public de la Confederation Suisse, Geneva, 1878, 
 vol. i. p. 214. 
 
278 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 privilege of an exclusive class. It develops also a 
 feeling of responsibility in the electors, by calling 
 upon them to make important decisions likely to 
 influence the future of their country. 
 
 " (3) The great advantage of the referendum is to 
 show on which side the majority lies, and to give a 
 sharp and conclusive reply to the protests of the 
 minority. 
 
 " (4) The referendum, finally, offers an inducement 
 to the ruling classes to remain in permanent contact 
 with the lower classes, and to take an active interest 
 in their political education." J 
 
 III. It only remains for us to mention a very 
 interesting discussion which has taken place dur- 
 ing the last few years between the partisans of the 
 
 1 Unlike M. Wuarin, M. Hilty, although he supports the refer- 
 endum, would not think it prudent to submit financial questions 
 to the vote (p. 416). 
 
 [M. Hilty, in his article in the Revue de Droit Internationale, 
 1892, pp. 396-98, seems to consider that the optional form of 
 the referendum is best at present, but that the compulsory re- 
 ferendum is the "system of the future," not only in the cantons, 
 but in the Confederation. He says that the optional referendum, 
 when put into force, is always an act of hostility against the 
 government. The rejection of a law by the people is a censure, 
 and a law accepted in spite of the opposition of a large minority 
 has suffered a loss of prestige in public opinion. If the referendum 
 were often demanded, the real direction of public affairs would 
 pass into the hands of the popular coalitions, organised to collect 
 the necessary number of votes and to direct this kind of poli- 
 tical campaign. "On the other hand," M. Hilty continues, "the 
 optional referendum, being less frequent than the compulsory, is 
 a sort of apprenticeship in legislation which is by no means to 
 be despised. The difficulty about the compulsory referendum is to 
 define the exceptions, so as to withdraw from the popular vote 
 unimportant administrative regulations, diplomatic matters, inter- 
 national treaties, and the decisions in case of peace and war."] 
 
The Results 279 
 
 referendum and the partisans of proportional repre- 
 sentation. An article by M. Numa Droz appeared 
 in 1882 in the Bibliothdque Uni verselle which gave 
 the adherents of electoral reform the opportunity 
 of comparing their system with the referendum. 
 M. Numa Droz, in mentioning the various advan- 
 tages of the referendum, laid special stress on the 
 fact that it made the question of proportional repre- 
 sentation less acute. 
 
 " When Parliament can decide everything." he said, 
 "the desire to be represented there is very strong; 
 but when the people have the last word, the majority 
 is less anxious to exclude the minorities, whose 
 opinion may be so useful to the success of a law. 
 The minorities, on the other hand, are less liable 
 to be treated unjustly or to be excluded, because 
 they can urge before the people themselves those 
 ideas which they have not been able to express in 
 the Council Chamber." * 
 
 Two years later, MM. Zemp, Keel, and Pedrazzini 
 demanded the application of the principle of pro- 
 portional representation in the case of the elections 
 to the National Council. In the speech which he 
 made to support his motion, M. Pedrazzini replied 
 to the arguments of M. Droz. "It has been stated 
 in the Revue Suisse," he said, " that minority repre- 
 sentation is less necessary in our country because 
 we possess the referendum. I cannot share that 
 view. In its essence the referendum is only a 
 machine for saying Aye or No to a law which has 
 been already framed. It is of vital importance that 
 
 1 Numa Droz, La democratic et son avenir, in the Bibliothtque 
 Univcrselle, vol. xvi. p. 411. 
 
280 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 in Parliament, when the laws are discussed, every 
 shade of opinion should find expression." 1 
 
 M. de Laveleye reproduced the arguments of 
 M. Numa Droz in an article on the referendum 
 which appeared in the Revue Internationale, Feb- 
 ruary 10, iSS/. 2 
 
 M. Ernest Naville answered him in the following 
 month in the same review. 3 According to that 
 eminent Genevan lawyer, the Swiss referendum, so 
 far from diminishing the importance of electoral 
 reform, is the indisputable proof of its necessity 
 and urgency. The rejection of a large number of 
 laws submitted to the people proves that there is 
 a real divergency of opinion between the majority 
 of the electors and the majority of the elected. This 
 divergency, according to M. Naville, is only due to 
 a bad electoral system, which leaves large bodies of 
 electors without any representation. 
 
 " Proportional representation of all sections of the 
 electors will, as far as institutions can effect it, make 
 the majority of the representatives correspond to the 
 majority of the electors. When this result has been 
 brought about, the demand for a legislative plebiscite 
 will only be justified in exceptional circumstances, 
 and will become very rare." 
 
 As a matter of fact, M. Naville does not deny that 
 the referendum may correct the injustices and defects 
 
 1 Extract from an evidently incomplete report of M. Pedrazzini's 
 arguments which appeared in the Zuricher Post of 2ist June 1884. 
 
 2 The article by M. de Laveleye, first printed separately in Rome 
 by Forzani, has been incorporated in his later work, Le gouvcrne- 
 ment dans la democratic, vol. ii. ch. 4. 
 
 3 M. de Naville's article has been reprinted by the Representation 
 proportionnelle, April 1887. 
 
The Results 281 
 
 of the existing electoral system; but the foregoing 
 quotations show clearly that he attaches very little 
 value to this palliative. He considers that it would 
 be better policy to prevent the evil than to look 
 exclusively for a remedy. 
 
 " To say that the referendum makes electoral re- 
 form less necessary and urgent, since the people are 
 thereby enabled to give their opinion on the decisions 
 of the councils, is much the same as reasoning in this 
 way : We have doctors and medicines, so hygienic 
 precautions to prevent illness have lost much of their 
 importance." l 
 
 The ideas which M. Naville defends with so much 
 talent and perseverance unfortunately still lack the 
 weight of practical experience. 2 Electoral reform is 
 only making slow progress. Ticino and Neuchatel 
 have recently obtained proportional representation. 
 Geneva and Basle-City have made many attempts to 
 introduce it ; in many other cantons the opposition, 
 Catholic or Liberal, claims a fairer distribution of seats, 
 but everywhere it encounters the same obstinate 
 refusal on the part of the majority. 3 In the Con- 
 
 1 M. Walras, Professor of Political Economy at the University 
 of Lausanne, told me that he shared M. Naville's views on the re- 
 ferendum. But it is from the representation of interests that M. 
 Walras expects to obtain the results which M. Naville hopes from 
 proportional representation. 
 
 2 See also an interesting article by M. Naville entitled, " M. Numa 
 Droz's Views on Proportional Representation," in the Bulletin de la 
 Societe Suisse pour la representation proportionnette, August 1888. 
 
 3 [Up to 1896 Ticino, Geneva, Neuchatel, Zug, and Solothurn had 
 adopted proportional representation for the election of the Great 
 Councils. In Ticino, Geneva, and Zug the executive is also elected 
 by the same method. It had been voted down by the. people in 
 St. Gall in 1893, and in Berne in 1896.] 
 
282 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 federation, electoral reform now has many supporters 
 among the Right ; but on the day that a motion is 
 brought forward from this quarter to obtain pro- 
 portional elections for the National Council, the 
 Radicals would immediately claim the revision of 
 Article 80 of the Constitution. They would demand 
 that each canton, instead of invariably sending two 
 members to the Council of State, should enjoy a 
 representation proportional to the number of its in- 
 habitants. The prospect of so fundamental a change 
 in the organisation of the Second Chamber will pro- 
 bably prevent, for a considerable time to come, any 
 serious attempt that might be made to introduce the 
 system of proportional representation in elections to 
 the National Council. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 THE referendum the origin, forms, and results of 
 which we have just studied may in conclusion be 
 considered from two directly opposite points of view. 
 It can either be regarded as a complement to, and a 
 corrective of, the abuses of a democratic representa- 
 tive system ; or, on the other hand, as an institution 
 which inaugurates, in states of a certain size, govern- 
 ment by direct legislation, which is incompatible with 
 the representative system. 
 
 Representative government rests on the principle 
 and practice of delegation of power. The nation, by 
 means of the electoral body, periodically gives men 
 in whom it has confidence a mandate to legislate for 
 the general good. Whatever solution of the very 
 difficult problem of representation is adopted, it is 
 to be feared that an elected assembly, if left with 
 the sole power, will not be able to escape the natural 
 tendency to abuse its authority. 
 
 " That there should be in every polity a centre of 
 resistance to the predominant power in the constitu- 
 tion I have already maintained, and I regard it as a 
 fundamental maxim of government," says John Stuart 
 Mill. 1 He thinks that the centre of resistance ought 
 to be found in a Second Chamber. But in spite of 
 
 1 Stuart Mill, Representative Government, p. 242. 
 
284 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 all precautions to ensure harmony between the repre- 
 tatives of the nation and the nation itself, it is impos- 
 sible to prevent an occasional disagreement between 
 them. Whenever a crisis of this sort occurs in the 
 course of a parliament, the difficulty can be over- 
 come in two ways. If parliament has clearly lost 
 the confidence of the body of electors, there is no 
 resource but a dissolution. If, without losing this 
 confidence, it has passed an unpopular measure, then 
 it is only necessary to prevent this measure being 
 carried into effect. 
 
 In a monarchy, the nation recognises in the king 
 the right of veto and the right to dissolve parlia- 
 ment. In a republic, these prerogatives may belong 
 to a president elected by the people. But when there 
 is neither king nor president, evidently the people, 
 in whom the sovereignty resides, must be invested 
 with the right of dissolution and the right of veto. 
 This is exactly what it has Keen necessary to do hi 
 Switzerland. 
 
 After the French Revolution of 1830, when a repre- 
 sentative democracy was substituted for aristocratic 
 republicanism, neither proportional representation 
 nor the representation of interests obtained any 
 recognition, and no acceptable basis could be found 
 for the institution of a Second Chamber. When it 
 became necessary to put some check on the Great 
 Council, against the omnipotence of which no pre- 
 ventive measures had been taken, it was impossible 
 to consider the project of endowing the executive 
 with the right of veto, for it was nominated by the 
 Great Council as in the aristocratic constitution 
 before 1830. To set against the elected assembly 
 
Conclusion 285 
 
 there was only the power of the people, which had 
 been proclaimed sovereign by all the constitutions. 
 
 It is no more derogatory to representative demo- 
 cracy to arm this sovereign with the right of veto, 
 and the power of dissolving the Chamber, than to 
 give these prerogatives to a king in a constitutional 
 monarchy. The system of representative democracy, 
 as it is understood in the United States, is the delega- 
 tion and not the abdication of power by the people. 1 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to add that, regarded from 
 this point of view, the referendum ought necessarily 
 to take the optional form. In practice 2 the Chamber 
 always remains invested with legislative power ; it is 
 only exceptionally that the people intervene directly 
 to oppose the execution of laws which displease 
 them. 
 
 As a form of popular veto, the referendum exists 
 to-day in the Confederation and in a certain number 
 of cantons. As we have seen, its method is defective 
 and its results are questionable. No one denies that 
 in the past there has been an absolute necessity for 
 some such system, both in the cantons 3 and in the Con- 
 federation, 4 but to-day it is subject to the influence of 
 two opposite tendencies : some wish to change it into 
 
 1 In countries which have copied the main features of the English 
 Constitution it would be paradoxical to suggest that the referendum 
 is compatible with representative government, because the duty of 
 electors is limited to choosing the members, while the veto is exer- 
 cised by higher authorities. But in Switzerland, where representa- 
 tive government does not follow the classical model of England, the 
 referendum has been found to fit in naturally with the rest of the 
 body politic. 
 
 - In principle it is not so, as I have shown above (p. 177). 
 
 3 See above, pp. 85-90. 
 
 4 Pp 93 94' 100-102. 
 
286 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 a compulsory referendum ; others, without thinking of 
 abolishing it, are seeking to make it of less frequent 
 occurrence. 
 
 In this contest between democrats and parliamen- 
 tarians, everything will depend on the tactics of the 
 two parties. The compulsory referendum and pro- 
 portional representation appear together in the. pro- 
 gramme of the opposition. In several cantons the 
 leaders of the minority seem ready to let the question 
 of the compulsory referendum alone, if they are given 
 a number of seats in the Great Council proportional 
 to the numerical strength of their party. They are 
 generally of M. Naville's opinion, that electoral reform 
 will make the referendum unnecessary. If propor- 
 tional representation realises the hopes of its parti- 
 sans, it will be the means of diminishing the number 
 of plebiscites. 
 
 But there is another and perhaps more efficient 
 method of attaining that result. Up till now it has 
 been impossible to give the power of resistance to the 
 Council of State (the executive authority), because it 
 has been responsible to the Chamber ; but now that 
 its position has been altered so that in many cantons 
 it is directly elected by the people, it might be possible 
 to invest it, as in the United States, with the right of 
 veto in the name of the people. In its hands the 
 veto would run less risk of becoming a weapon of the 
 opposition, which is the actual result of the referendum 
 when parties are almost equal. 
 
 In the cantons where the minority is very small, 
 it will find the veto of the executive power a more 
 valuable protection than the referendum. 
 
 Finally, the veto will no longer be capriciously 
 
Conclusion 287 
 
 exercised, or a law voted down for reasons which 
 have no connection with the bill in question. Unlike 
 the electors, the Council of State would be able to 
 give the grounds of its refusal; it would know the 
 faults and omissions of the laws better than any 
 one else, since it gives advice to the Chaniber on 
 all legislative measures of any importance. 1 
 
 Representative democracy, although it can work 
 sometimes in harmony with the referendum, is, in 
 the eyes of the Swiss democrats, a form of govern- 
 ment which has had its day, and which is doomed 
 to disappear. If one may believe them, the people 
 will in future no longer delegate their sovereignty 
 to elected representatives, but will exercise it directly 
 themselves. 
 
 The type of government which most exactly corre- 
 sponds to this idea is found in the Landsgemeinden 
 of the cantons. There the people nominate the judge 
 and the members of the executive. They have the 
 right of initiative, and meet in a general assembly to 
 discuss and pass the laws. 
 
 In larger states, legislation by the people has always 
 been considered a Utopia; but the Swiss democrats 
 have openly defied the received opinion. They have 
 aimed at proving practically, not theoretically, the 
 futility of the objections brought against direct legis- 
 lation. By the compulsory referendum which is the 
 first, though incomplete, realisation of their system 
 
 1 The Genevan State Council, which has been elective since 1847, 
 has from that date had the right to temporarily suspend bills which 
 have been drafted against its wish (Art. 54 of the Cantonal Consti- 
 tution of Geneva). This may have been one of the reasons which 
 prevented the introduction of the referendum in Geneva till 1879. 
 
288 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 they have taken the final decision in legislation out 
 of the hands of the Chamber to place it in those of 
 the people. 
 
 We may ask whether their bold experiment has 
 succeeded, and whether it would be possible to say 
 from henceforward that direct legislation is a possible 
 and practicable form of government even in great 
 states. In my opinion, the experience in the cantons 
 which enjoy the compulsory referendum is far from 
 conclusive. It has not been possible, in the first 
 place, to find a fairly satisfactory method of working 
 the referendum. "We do not demand," the demo- 
 crats said at first, " that the people should make the 
 laws, but only that they should vote on them." l 
 
 Their claim had an importance which they did 
 not seem to realise. The elector who writes Aye or 
 No on his ballot-paper performs an act the apparent 
 simplicity of which has attracted the democrats, but 
 this act is, as a matter of fact, a very complex one. 
 It requires that each voter should be able not only 
 to understand why legislation is necessary, but also 
 should be able to judge whether the law in question 
 is adequate to meet the case. Nothing effectual has 
 as yet been devised which would assist the elector 
 in forming a personal opinion on such a subject. If 
 the original supporters of the compulsory referendum 
 really knew what they wanted, they are open to the 
 reproach of having aimed at an end without con- 
 sidering the means, and with having made a start 
 without even asking if there was any chance of 
 arriving at the goal. 
 
 1 Gengel, Aphorismen iiber demokratisches Staatsrecht, p. 25 ; Die 
 Erweiterung der Volksrechte, p. 52. 
 
Conclusion 289 
 
 The organisation of the compulsory referendum 
 being so obviously defective, its partisans should 
 have been satisfied with demanding the active co- 
 operation of the electorate in legislation in a limited 
 number of cases. On the contrary, however, they 
 wished to begin on a large scale, and claimed that 
 all legislative measures without exception should 
 be submitted to the people. The result has only 
 brought discredit on their system. 
 
 When we examine the statistics of the votings in 
 the case of the compulsory referendum, we find that 
 the first condition of success has been wanting. " The 
 people have only to express their will," Herr Gengel 
 said, " and direct legislation becomes an accomplished 
 fact." 1 That is, however, exactly what the people will 
 not do, and it is a little ridiculous to talk of legis- 
 lation by the people when more than half the 
 citizens refuse to exercise their legislative rights. 
 An attempt is now being made to conceal this check 
 by introducing the compulsory vote. 2 The tactics 
 are bad, because the blank ballot-papers clearly de- 
 monstrate that though the elector may be forced 
 to put a paper in the ballot-box, he does not neces- 
 sarily vote when he does so. 
 
 The experiment of the democrats cannot be said 
 to have met with success. If they wish to avoid 
 complete failure they must do two things, and do 
 them quickly. They must first find a better method 
 
 1 Gengel, Die Enveiterung der Volksrechte, p. 59. 
 
 2 "To establish true democracy it is necessary to be consistent, 
 and when an election or a voting takes place the real sovereign 
 must decide, and not only a section of the whole. Attendance at 
 the polling-booth ought to be as compulsory as it is in the case of 
 juries or military drill." Wuarin, Le Contribuable, p. 282. 
 
 T 
 
2 po The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 of direct legislation, and secondly, they must confine 
 the referendum to a small number of laws. Then, 
 perhaps, with a people as well prepared for direct 
 government as the Swiss, they may succeed in prov- 
 ing that their system is not a mere Utopia, and that 
 it is possible without any great danger under certain 
 special circumstances. 
 
 There are indications to-day in different quarters 
 that the referendum will not remain the monopoly 
 of Switzerland, but that the question of its adoption 
 will soon be considered in other countries. 1 
 
 1 [The referendum is recognised in all the states of the United 
 States, except Delaware, for changes in the constitution. There is, 
 moreover, a tendency to elaborate and add to the constitutions, so 
 that they cover a great deal of ground, and the range of subjects con- 
 trolled by the popular vote is a very wide one. See Bryce, American 
 Commonwealth ; Oberholtzer, The Referendum in America, chap. ii. 
 
 Some of the constitutions also expressly provide for a popular 
 vote on certain subjects not included in the constitution, such as the 
 power of the Legislature to contract debts above a certain sum, the 
 alienation of property, the expenditure of money beyond a certain 
 amount, the creation of state banks, and the location of the state 
 capital. 
 
 There is also a local referendum, "which has developed," says 
 Mr. Oberholtzer, "until at this time there is not a state in the 
 Union in which local questions of certain given classes are not 
 submitted to the popular vote. In Iowa the advance has been 
 almost to that point which the referendum has attained in Switzer- 
 land." See Oberholtzer, The Referendum in America. 
 
 The referendum has also been proposed in five of the Australasian 
 parliaments, and a referendum on the education question was actu- 
 ally taken in South Australia in 1896. See article on the Referendum 
 in Australia and New Zealand, Contemporary Revieiv, August 1897. 
 
 The new Federal Constitution of Australasia was submitted to the 
 popular vote in June 1898, and was rejected in New South Wales. 
 
 As to the question of its adoption into England, see the article 
 by Professor Dicey, " Ought the Referendum to be introduced into 
 England?" Contemporary Review, April 1890; also the discussion 
 of the subject by various writers in the National Review, 1894. See 
 also W. H. Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, vol. i. pp. 237-43.] 
 
Conclusion 291 
 
 As early as September 1869, the question of direct 
 legislation, by means of the compulsory referendum 
 and popular initiative, was brought up at a congress 
 held by the old International at Basle. 1 Legislation 
 by the people has become since then one of the de- 
 mands of international socialism. It appeared in the 
 programme of Gotha in 1895, and last year it found 
 a place in the programme of the Congress of Erfurt. 
 
 In Belgium, Article i of the programme of the 
 workmen's party runs as follows: "Universal suffrage, 
 direct legislation by the people that is to say, 
 popular sanction of, and initiative in, legislation 
 with secret and compulsory voting. Elections to 
 take place on Sunday." 2 
 
 1 Burkli, Direkte Gesetzgebung durcli das Volk. 
 
 2 It has been proposed in some countries to leave the decision in 
 all communal questions to the electors of the commune. 
 
 In 1880 a bill for a municipal referendum was presented in the 
 Italian Chamber (ef. Crivellari, II referendum nella Svizzera la 
 sua introduzione net diritto amministrativo Italiano, in the Archivio 
 giuridico of Serafini, vol. xxxiv. pp. 377-423 ; Brunialti, La legge e 
 la liberta, pp. 283-286). A similar proposal has recently been made in 
 France by M. de Mackau and some of the Bonapartists. The Chamber 
 has not debated it. See Journal officiel, June 17, 1890, pp. 1083-89. 
 
 The subject of a communal referendum has not yet been dis- 
 cussed in the Belgian Chamber, but in several communes the 
 people have already been consulted on local questions. 
 
 [M. Jean Signorel, in his book, Le Referendum Ugislatif, 
 devotes the second chapter of Book III. to giving an account 
 of the eight different propositions with regard to the re- 
 ferendum which have been presented in the French Chamber 
 of Deputies between 1881 and November 1895. In Book III., 
 pp. 181-89, M. Signorel gives an account of some of the various 
 referendum proposals made in Socialist journals and at Socialist 
 congresses. The introduction of the municipal referendum in 
 France is advocated by M. de la Sizeranne in a small book en- 
 titled Le Referendum Communal. M. Signorel gives, on p. 189, a 
 list of French towns in which a referendum has been taken on 
 questions of local importance.] 
 
292 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 On the other hand, the referendum has been sug- 
 gested as a means by which the sovereign in a con- 
 stitutional monarchy could avoid having recourse to 
 a dissolution of parliament. A Prussian statesman 
 not long ago put forward and supported this idea in 
 a pamphlet. 1 The idea was taken up by the Belgian 
 Government, and the result was a proposal for the 
 royal referendum? 
 
 Whenever the referendum is discussed in the press 
 or in the parliaments of other countries, its partisans 
 and opponents will naturally turn their attention to 
 Switzerland, and will ask what its effect has been 
 there. This will be the surest means of never coming 
 to an agreement. In 1872, when the referendum 
 was discussed in the Federal Assembly, the various 
 speakers dwelt on the results of the institution in 
 the cantons. Some of them considered these votings 
 excellent, whilst others characterised them as detest- 
 able. 3 A stranger would probably be equally at a 
 loss, for there are so many different ways of regarding 
 progress, and no two men regard it from the same 
 standpoint. 
 
 The acceptance or rejection of laws which are at 
 all complicated cannot be ascribed to either the good 
 sense or the ignorance of the people ; for, as the Swiss 
 referendum is at present organised, the mass of the 
 people has no opportunity of estimating the value of 
 these laws. The actual result of a vote may be either 
 good or bad, but it proves nothing for or against the 
 
 1 Hoffmann, Das Plebiscit als Correctiv der Wahlen, Berlin, 1884. 
 3 I have discussed this proposal in the Revue generate of Decem- 
 ber I, 1891. (S. Deploige, Le Referendum royal.} 
 
 3 Curti, Geschichte der schweizerischen Volksgesetzyebung, p. 254. 
 
Conclusion 293 
 
 people as voters. The result of a vote may be 
 fortunate or unfortunate, but it has been determined 
 as a matter of fact by a thousand different influences, 
 and to speak of it as the expression of a thoughtful 
 and conscientious popular judgment is only to juggle 
 with words. 
 
 It is, however, of considerable importance to de- 
 termine the circumstances which make the direct 
 interference of the Swiss people in legislation 
 almost harmless. Some of the safeguards are as 
 follows : 
 
 ( i ) If the evolution of democracy in Switzerland is 
 followed with attention, it is quite obvious that the 
 referendum has not been introduced without due 
 consideration, or merely to satisfy theorists. The 
 popular veto, as we have seen, was a reform which 
 was necessary on account of the unsatisfactory work- 
 ing of the existing public bodies. The great expec- 
 tations cherished by the authors of the compulsory 
 referendum have been falsified by experience, but 
 no reproach attaches to them for having believed 
 in the possibility of success. The people in the 
 cantons in which there is a compulsory referendum 
 were better prepared than any other for the exercise 
 of direct government. They had undergone a poli- 
 tical education in the communes, and had been 
 trained there in the discussion of public matters. 
 There were many reasons for supposing that they 
 were sufficiently advanced to be able to undertake 
 cantonal legislation as well. One of the great faults 
 of the democrats has been to wish to rush imme- 
 diately to extremes, and to hurry on the people too 
 fast. 
 
294 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 (2) The popular initiative, which has followed the 
 referendum by a natural evolution, may, it is true, 
 excite some apprehensions. But first of all it must 
 be noticed, that for legislative purposes it only 
 exists as yet in a few cantons. Further, as M. Droz 
 very cogently observed, " The citizens can no doubt 
 demand what they like, but if they exceed the limits 
 of cantonal sovereignty, there is above them the 
 federal sovereignty, which has power to make them 
 keep within bounds. For instance, some years ago 
 a proposal was brought before the people of Zurich 
 by means of the popular initiative, the object of 
 which was to establish a monopoly in the issue of 
 bank notes. The proposal was adopted, but the 
 Federal Council quashed the law, as contrary to 
 Article 39 of the Federal Constitution. The Federal 
 Tribunal has more than once declared the laws or 
 resolutions of the cantons to be invalid, and contrary 
 to the constitution of the cantons as guaranteed by 
 the Constitution." x 
 
 (3) Federal and cantonal laws have frequently been 
 rejected by means of the referendum, yet these deci- 
 sions of the electorate have never been taken as an 
 order of dismissal to the legislative assembly. Could 
 this be so in a country where the parliamentary system 
 has a different meaning to what it has in Switzerland ? 
 nor are Ministerial crises known in Switzerland ; 
 the government does not invite the formation of 
 another Cabinet by resigning. If it is impossible to 
 come to an amicable solution of the difference by 
 mutual concessions, they are content to postpone 
 
 1 Numa Droz, La revision fedfralc, in the Bibliothkque UniverseUe, 
 vol. xxv. p. 29. 
 
Conclusion 29$ 
 
 the settlement of the question to a more suitable 
 time. 
 
 (4) Owing to the limitations of the federal power, 
 the Swiss people as a whole do not often have the 
 opportunity of giving a vote. The cantons are still 
 sovereign states, which have only handed over to the 
 central power duties which concern the whole popu- 
 lation. Their sovereignty has remained intact within 
 a very extended sphere the civil law of persons, the 
 law of real property, criminal law, 1 civil and criminal 
 procedure, cantonal and local police, the organisation 
 of the communes, public works, the organisation of 
 education of all grades, &c. 
 
 Even within the narrow limits of the federal autho- 
 rity, restrictions and obstacles have been placed in 
 the way of the direct interference of the people. The 
 Federal Assembly, by its power of declaring urgency, 
 can remove federal resolutions out of the reach of the 
 referendum. There are, moreover, certain classes of 
 laws which are never made the subject of an appeal 
 to the people, such as international treaties, budget 
 laws, estimates, &c. 
 
 (5) Finally, the federal referendum could never 
 become an instrument of systematic opposition, or 
 paralyse the ordinary progress of government. Swit- 
 zerland is divided into twenty-five autonomous states, 
 differing in language, in religion, and in traditions, 
 all of which are insurmountable barriers to the 
 creation of strong currents of opinion. There are 
 
 1 [The Federal Council sent a message to the Assembly in 1897 
 suggesting that the civil and criminal law should be codified. The 
 constitutional amendment giving them the power to do this will 
 probably be voted upon this year, 1898.] 
 
296 The Referendum in Switzerland 
 
 no two great political parties in Switzerland. The 
 Radical party, which, is in a majority, is as united as 
 ever when measures are being taken hostile to the 
 Church, but it splits up when cantonal sovereignty 
 is the question. On the other hand, no opposition 
 group is sufficiently strong in itself to decide the 
 result of a vote. Coalitions are always necessary to 
 secure the rejection of a law, and these coalitions are 
 difficult to form, because they require compromise 
 and mutual sacrifices which are unpopular with the 
 leaders of a party. 
 
 These, then, are some of the peculiar circumstances 
 which explain the history, the development, and the 
 results of the referendum. It is important to bring 
 them out into strong relief, because they are very 
 important. If they are altered in Switzerland, the 
 referendum and the popular initiative will in their 
 turn be fundamentally affected. If they are not found 
 in a foreign country which desires to transplant the 
 system of popular consultations, then the result can 
 only be a succession of surprises. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 THE POPULAR INITIATIVE IN THE FEDERAL 
 CONSTITUTION 
 
 THE popular initiative, as at present organised in the Swiss 
 Confederation, is a very important innovation. The right 
 of initiating laws now belongs to an indeterminate body 
 who are as important as the Government and Legislature 
 put together. When 50,000 citizens use their right of ini- 
 tiative and bring forward a complete bill, it goes to the 
 people as it stands, just as a law would do which has passed 
 the two houses of the Federal Assembly. Thus any chance 
 combination of citizens unknown, and perhaps unskilled, 
 possess the drafting powers of the Federal Council and the 
 legislative powers of the National Council and the Council 
 of States. 
 
 By the amendment of 1891, these 50,000 citizens have 
 the right of demanding that a new constitutional article 
 be inserted or an old one altered or abolished. But a con- 
 stitutional article is nowhere denned. Any proposition of 
 whatever nature may now be submitted to the people if 
 only it be called a constitutional article. 
 
 " By means of the initiative," says M. Jacques Berney, 
 Professor in the Lausanne Faculty of Law, " the Swiss 
 people may govern themselves freely in every domain. 
 They may enact laws, adopt a penal code, naturalise 
 
 foreigners, grant amnesties, contract loans, convert the 
 
 297 
 
298 Appendix 
 
 public debt, grant subsidies, conclude or reject treaties, 
 declare war, make peace, frame a revenue tariff, abolish 
 duties, try cases, pronounce judgments, annul sentences 
 of the court, condemn citizens to death, &c. They may 
 do anything they will, upon the sole condition that they 
 inscribe it in the constitution." This is, of course, an ex- 
 treme statement, but it brings out very forcibly the scope 
 of the new initiative amendment. Thus, under cover of a 
 constituent power, the people have secured an important 
 legislative right subject to none of the limitations of ordi- 
 nary legislation which must move in the groove prescribed 
 by the constitution. There is no existing power in the 
 constitution which can restrict the exercise of the new 
 right to any particular subject, or which can quash any law 
 brought forward by the initiative as unconstitutional. 
 
 The right of thus initiating laws or constitutional changes 
 is a very different thing from the right of petition, as M. 
 Deploige has already pointed out. The initiative is an 
 appeal to the people ; a petition is a suggestion to the 
 Government. The former must be attended to within 
 the prescribed time and in the specified way, even against 
 the wishes of the Government; the fate of the latter is 
 entirely in the hands of the Government. Any number 
 of people may sign a petition without any formalities and 
 within any time. A petition, moreover, is not submitted 
 to the popular vote. An initiative demand must be signed 
 by 50,000 citizens, i.e. by one-fourteenth of the present 
 voting population, and its fate rests with the sovereign 
 people. 
 
 There is, however, a certain superficial similarity between 
 the initiative and the optional referendum, which only takes 
 place when 30,000 citizens demand that a law shall be re- 
 ferred to the people. The resemblance lies in the fact that 
 both are the spontaneous movement of a certain number 
 of citizens to determine the vote of the people. The 
 sphere of the optional referendum is, however, confined 
 
Appendix 299 
 
 to the decisions of the legislative authority, and, as the 
 activity of the State cannot rest for ever in suspense, a 
 certain time is fixed within which action must be taken. 
 After ninety days the people in Switzerland are powerless. 
 They have thus to pronounce on laws before they can esti- 
 mate their effect. By means of the initiative, however, 
 a law can be repealed at any time. 
 
 Again, the referendum places the people in the same 
 position as a sovereign in a monarchy. Their sanction, 
 which may be express or tacit, is a necessary part of the 
 constitutional machinery, and no law can come into force 
 without it. The people invested with the right of initiat- 
 ing laws do not ordinarily co-operate in legislation. They 
 only intervene accidentally, exceptionally, and on extraordi- 
 nary occasions. 
 
 In the federal domain only " laws and decrees of a gene- 
 ral character, and which are not urgent, are subjects for 
 the referendum. It has been possible for the Federal 
 Assembly to treat certain decrees as " urgent," or not 
 general in character, and so withdraw them from the 
 popular vote. Treaties and the budget are also outside the 
 scope of the referendum. 
 
 By means of the initiative the people are able to obtain 
 a decision on any question whether qualified as " urgent " 
 or " not general," whether it be a treaty or the Federal 
 Budget. Its domain is therefore much wider than the 
 referendum. The initiative can do all that the optional 
 referendum can do, and a great deal more. The optional 
 referendum is therefore practically unnecessary in a State 
 that has the popular initiative. 
 
 The organisation of the initiative is much the same as 
 that of the optional referendum. There are the same 
 regulations as to personal signature and attestation. In 
 the demand by initiative each list of signatures must 
 contain the text of the demand, so that each person may 
 know what he is signing ; and if this formality be omitted, 
 
300 Appendix 
 
 all the signatures on that paper are null and void. The 
 signatures have to be collected within six months, or they 
 are not counted in the total. 
 
 The demand when ready is sent in to the Federal Council. 
 They examine it and lay it before the Assembly at the 
 next session, with their report on the subject, dealing with 
 both the form and the matter of the demand. The As- 
 sembly must decide upon its attitude within a year. If the 
 proposal be by general motion, they decide whether they 
 agree with the proposal, in which case they can practically 
 take their own time in framing the law ; or they may decide 
 against the petition, and consult the people as to whether a 
 revision in this sense shall be undertaken. If the answer 
 be in the affirmative they proceed to draft the law. All 
 they are bound to do, however, is to determine on one 
 course or another within a year. If the formulated initia- 
 tive be used, they have to decide within a year whether 
 they will accept or reject the popular law, .or whether they 
 will present a counter proposal. If they decide on a counter 
 proposal, it has to be ready within the year. The for- 
 mulated initiative is therefore more expeditious, and it also 
 ensures that the Assembly does not misinterpret the wishes 
 of the people. 
 
 The organisation of the voting in the case of the Federal 
 Assembly presenting a counter project, gave rise to a great 
 deal of discussion. The Federal Council proposed to sub- 
 mit the two schemes to the popular vote, and then have a 
 second voting, in which the proposal which obtained the 
 majority should be submitted as opposed to the status quo. 
 Another system proposed was that three questions should 
 be stamped on the voting papers : (i) Is there any neces- 
 sity for a revision ? (2) If so, do you approve the proposal 
 of the initiants ? (3) Do you approve the proposal of the 
 Assembly ? 1 The proposal finally adopted was that of the 
 
 1 These proposals are discussed by M. Jacques Berney, IS Initiative 
 populaire, p. 19. 
 
Appendix 301 
 
 National Council, and the result is that two questions are 
 to be stamped on the voting papers 
 
 I. Do you approve the proposal of the Assembly ? 
 
 II. Do you approve the proposal of the petitioners 1 
 The voters may put a NO against either of them, or a 
 
 NO against one and a YES against the other. If, however, 
 YES be placed against both, the vote is invalid. This 
 system is favourable to the status quo for two reasons : (i) 
 The partisans of the status quo possess two votes, the parti- 
 sans of a reform only one. Those who vote against one pro- 
 posal because they prefer the other are in reality voting 
 for the status quo in preference to the proposal they have 
 vetoed, whereas, as a matter of fact, they might prefer that 
 proposal to no reform at all. They cannot place them in 
 order of merit. Should the proposal they have voted for 
 be rejected, they are in the same position as if they had 
 voted against any change. 
 
 (2) It is possible for the Federal Assembly to present a 
 proposal differing but slightly from the popular proposal. 
 This would split the votes of those who wished for a 
 reform, and play into the hands of those who wished for no 
 change. This was brought out very clearly in 1845, wnen 
 the Great Council of Vaud was discussing the question of 
 the introduction of the initiative. The deputies were pretty 
 generally agreed on the advisability of introducing the 
 initiative, but as each voted for his own system of working 
 it, none of the proposals gained a majority, and the tem- 
 porary result was no initiative at all. 
 
 When the Assembly does not present a counter proposal, 
 it merely advises that the law drawn up by the initiants be 
 " accepted " or that it be " rejected," and the law is printed 
 and sent round to the electors with the voting-ticket, in the 
 same way as a constitutional law which has passed both 
 houses. The elector writes his "Yes" or "No" on the 
 ticket which contains the title of the law, and it is adopted 
 if there is a double majority in its favour a majority of 
 
3O2 Appendix 
 
 the people and a majority of the cantons. If either a 
 majority of the people or a majority of the cantons pro- 
 nounce against the law, it means that the partisans of 
 reform have failed. The opponents of a constitutional law 
 need only the one majority, the reformers need two. 
 
 In theory, of course, the initiative is a logical conse- 
 quence of the referendum. If you allow the people to 
 say, " We don't want this," you cannot deny that it would 
 be only sensible to let them say what they do want. The 
 actual legislative results of the method have accordingly 
 been described when we discussed the legislative results of 
 the referendum. We saw that between 1893 and 1894 there 
 were three initiative demands, each of which was presented 
 in the form of a " complete bill." In each case the Assembly 
 advised the rejection of the proposed measure. One was 
 eventually carried, and two were voted down. I would 
 merely reproduce here some of the criticisms of the initia- 
 tive given by writers on the Swiss Constitution. 
 
 M. Borgeaud points out that the initiative by bill and 
 not by general motion has greatly increased the power of 
 two factors in public life, viz., political clubs and the press : 
 No one citizen would conceive the idea of drawing up a 
 law all by himself and going round and getting 50,000 
 others to sign ; it would be impossible. A question must 
 either be taken up by the press or by some political asso- 
 ciation. The evil is that [in this case a law proceeds from 
 powers that are anonymous and irresponsible. The article 
 which may one day become an integral part of the consti- 
 tution of the land, which will stand as a model for future 
 legislation, which judges will have to apply and jurists to 
 expound and interpret according to the intention of the 
 framers this law may be drawn up behind closed doors, 
 or around the council board of some committee, who are 
 then of as much importance as the regular Government. 
 As soon as there are two signatures the law is unalterable, 
 and goes forth to challenge the suffrages of the Swiss. 
 
Appendix 303 
 
 people. There is no room for compromise, or debate, or 
 mutual concession. (Borgeaud, op. cit., p. 325.) 
 
 The same opinion has been expressed very forcibly by 
 M. Droz : "It is now generally agreed," he says, "that 
 the popular initiative might at any time place the country 
 in very considerable danger. From the moment that the 
 regular representatives of the people have no more to say 
 in the matter than an irresponsible committee drawing up 
 articles in a bar parlour, it is clear that the limits of sound 
 democracy have been passed and that the reign of dema- 
 gogy has begun. The shaping of a wise constitution must 
 always be a matter of weighing and balancing. It cannot 
 be permitted that the gravest decisions should be the work 
 of impulse or surprise. The generally adopted system of 
 two Chambers and of two or three readings for every bill, 
 is a recognition of this fact. It cannot be denied that the 
 Swiss people have shown a want of wisdom in adopting a 
 system of initiative which places all our institutions at the 
 mercy of any daring attempt instigated by the demagogue, 
 and favoured by precisely such circumstances as should 
 rather incline us to take time for reflection." (Contem- 
 porary Review, p. 342, Nov. 1895.) 
 
 Both these objections are levelled against the system of 
 initiative by completed bill. Mr. Lowell has pointed out that 
 the differences between the initiative by completed bill and 
 by general motion are not always so great as one would 
 suppose, and that when the article is simple the same 
 results would probably be brought about by either method. 
 See p. 289. 
 
 The whole of the Federal Constitution is a carefully 
 elaborated compromise, the aim of which was to reconcile 
 opposing interests of canton and Confederation. By the 
 initiative they are now placed at the mercy of any chance 
 majority. The way is opened to both capricious legisla- 
 tion and clumsy legislation. The people, only interfering 
 accidentally in public affairs and on exceptional occasions^ 
 cannot take account as well as the legislative body of the 
 
304 Appendix 
 
 binding character of the engagements entered into by the 
 latter in the name of the state. They cannot perceive the 
 harmony which ought to exist between the different parts of 
 the edifice, or the necessary inter- connect ion of laws. There 
 is a danger that, by means of the initiative, encroachments 
 may be made upon the rights acquired against the state by 
 other states or by individuals. There is no supreme court, 
 as in America, to quash a law of this kind, and no person or 
 state injured has any redress. When the cantons overstep 
 their limits they can be checked by the federal authorities, 
 but there is no constitutional check except the people in 
 the Swiss Confederation. 
 
 M. Droz looks upon the popular initiative as destined 
 to accomplish a work of disintegration and destruction. 
 He considers that whereas democracy ought to rest on a 
 solid basis, it is now put in peril at every moment, and 
 he suggests a total revision by which the representative 
 Assembly may be strengthened, and the whole question 
 put on a more solid basis. 
 
 M. Hilty, writing in 1892, says, " The initiative is a two- 
 edged sword, and one does not know against whom it will 
 first be turned." The unfavourable criticisms have been 
 borne out by the results of the initiative in practice. For 
 further criticisms see M. Numa Droz's articles in the Con- 
 temporary Review, March 1895, in his Etudes et Portraits 
 politiques, La Democratie en Suisse et V Initiative populaire, 
 and La Suisse jugee par un Americain. Also Borgeaud, 
 Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions, pp. 306-332; 
 Signorel, Le Referendum legislatif, pp. 80-85 ) -H-ilty, Le 
 Referendum en Suisse et V Initiative populaire, in the Revue 
 de Droit International, 1892, No. 5, 484-489; Berney, 
 L 'Initiative populaire en Droit public federal, and Lowell, 
 Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, pp. 280-292. 
 See also Progressive Review, July 1897, "The Latest Phase 
 of Direct Legislation," by L. Tomn, and " Some Recent 
 Political Experiments in Switzerland," by L. Waurin, in 
 the Annals of the American Academy, Nov. 1895. 
 
Appendix 305 
 
 II 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN THE CANTONS 
 
 I. Every constitution recognises the right of the citizens 
 to demand a revision of the constitution, 2 and fixes the 
 statutory number of signatures necessary to make such a 
 demand valid. 
 
 The numbers are as follows : 
 
 i person in Glarus (8276 electors) 3 and in Appenzell, Inner 
 
 Rhodes (3111). 
 
 i person, with support of one-third of the council, in Zurich. 
 50 in Uri (4178). 
 
 70 in Appenzell, Outer Rhodes (12,314). 
 500 in Obwalden (3643). 
 400 in Nidwalden (2933). 
 
 looo in Zug (5746), City Basle (12,450), and Schaffhausen (8123). 
 1500 in Rural Basle (11,516). 
 2000 in Schwyz (12,500 dr.}. 
 2500 in Tlmrgau (24,030), and Geneva (18,909). 
 
 1 See Stiissi, Referendum und Initiativ in den Schweizer cantonen. 
 
 2 In Geneva the people are consulted on the question of a total 
 revision every fifteen years. No provision is made by which they can 
 demand a total revision during the interval. Article 152 says that 
 "all projects of amendment "which would seem to mean partial 
 revisions "shall be deliberated according to the form prescribed for 
 ordinary laws." In 1891 a constitutional amendment was passed by 
 which 2500 citizens could demand any ordinary law by means of a 
 general motion or by bill. It would seem, therefore, as if the consti- 
 tution now recognised the right of the people to initiate a partial 
 revision. M. Arnoult (La Revision des Constitutions) seems to be of 
 this opinion (see pp. 690-691), but M. Borgeaud (Adoption and 
 Amendment of Constitutions) is doubtful. The new law does not in 
 any way refer to Article 152, and the identification of ordinary and 
 constitutional laws, M. Borgeaud thinks, is contrary to the spirit of 
 the constitution. 
 
 3 These figures in brackets are the number of registered electors 
 according to the census of 1891. 
 
 U 
 
306 Appendix 
 
 3000 in Solothurn (18,374) and Neuchatel (25,407). 
 
 5000 in Zurich (80,317), Lucerne (30,212), the Grisons (21,865), 
 
 and Aargau (39,475)- 
 
 6000 in Fribourg (28,733), Vaud (61,258), and Valais (27,414). 
 7000 in Ticino (29,500). 
 10,000 in St. Gall (51,639). 
 15,000 in Berne (112,269). 
 
 II. Every constitution, with perhaps the exception of 
 Geneva, distinguishes in some way between partial and 
 total revisions, and allows its citizens to demand either one 
 or the other. 
 
 In the case of a total revision the right of the citizens 
 seems to be limited to presenting a general request for a 
 revision, which is carried out by the Legislature. No 
 canton expressly recognises the right of the people to draft 
 a total revision themselves. 1 In every canton, when a total 
 revision is demanded by a certain number of electors, the 
 people are first of all consulted on the general principle, 
 and are asked, " Do you wish for a total revision ? " This 
 preliminary question is not always necessary when a total 
 revision is proposed by the Legislature. 
 
 In the case of partial revisions two methods of procedure 
 are recognised. In every canton the statutory number of 
 citizens may present a general motion or request for a 
 revision (einfache Anreyung). In certain cantons they may, 
 if they choose, demand the change by means of a bill on 
 the subject drafted by themselves (ausgearleiter Entwurf). 
 
 (i.) The procedure in the case of a general motion is as 
 follows : 
 
 (a) The partial revision proposed by the statutory number 
 of citizens is laid before the people at once in Glarus, Fri- 
 bourg, Rural Basle, Appenzell (Outer Rhodes), Obwalden, 
 Nidwalden, St. Gall, the Grisons, Thurgau, Vaud, Valais, 
 
 1 The canton of Appenzell (Inner Rhodes) leaves the matter doubt- 
 ful : "Any citizen may propose to the Landsgemeinde either the 
 total or partial revision of the constitution." 
 
Appendix 307 
 
 Neuchatel, and Zug. In some of these cantons the Legis- 
 lature reports for or against the popular proposal. 
 
 (b) In certain cantons, should the Great Council agree 
 to the popular proposal, they draft the article without 
 more ado ; but should they not agree with the reform 
 demanded, they can consult the people. These cantons 
 are Zurich, Berne, Aargau, Lucerne, Basle City, and Solo- 
 thurn. In the case of an affirmative answer they must 
 carry out the revision. 
 
 (c) In Schwyz, Ticino, and in Schaffhausen the Great 
 Council must undertake the revision at once, whether they 
 approve or no, and carry it out in the sense of the peti- 
 tioners. It comes before the people to be voted on in its 
 final shape. 
 
 (ii.) The initiative by bill is only recognised in certain 
 cantons. They are Zurich, Schaffhausen, the Grisons. Ticino, 
 Berne, Solothurn, and probably Geneva. In Schaffhausen, 
 Zurich, and Berne, it it is expressly stated that partial revisions 
 may be carried out like ordinary legislation, which may be 
 initiated either by motion or bill. In Geneva the same 
 identification of ordinary and constitutional laws is implied. 
 
 In every case the popular bill is voted on as it stands. 
 The Legislature may present a counter proposal in Zurich, 
 Schaffhausen, the Grisons, Ticino, and Solothurn. In 
 Berne the popular proposal must be accompanied by a 
 Government message explaining the views held by the 
 Legislature one way or the other. 
 
 III. In many of the cantons the people do not merely 
 decide on the revision of the constitution when they vote; 
 they also decide by what body it shall be undertaken. 
 
 (a) In the following cantons the people, when they vote 
 on any revision, total or partial, determine also whether it 
 shall be undertaken by a constituent assembly or by the 
 ordinary legislature : they are Nidwald, Obwald, City Basle 
 and Rural Basle, St. Gall, Thurgau, Yaud, Valais, and 
 Neuchatel. 
 
308 Appendix 
 
 (b) In the case of a total revision only do the people in 
 the following cantons decide whether the revision shall 
 be undertaken by the Great Council or by a constituent 
 assembly partial revisions are undertaken by the Great 
 Council they are Berne, Schaffhausen, Appenzell (Outer 
 Rhodes), Zug, Ticino, Glarus, and Grisons. 
 
 (c) The constitution provides that a total revision shall 
 be undertaken by a constituent assembly, a partial one 
 by the ordinary legislature, in the following cantons 
 Fribourg, Aargau, Solothurn, Geneva, Lucerne, Uri, and 
 Schwyz. 
 
 (d) In Zurich, in the case of a total revision, the Great 
 Council has to be renewed for the purpose of carrying out 
 the contemplated change. 
 
 IV. Provision is made in the constitutions of many of 
 the cantons that the initiative demands shall receive due 
 attention from the Legislature, and not be put on one side. 
 In many cases a month is given for the Great Council to 
 decide on its course. In other cases the Great Council has 
 to go into the matter "without delay." Should it be 
 decided that the revision is to take place by means of a 
 constituent assembly, it is often directed that the election 
 of its members must be preceded with at once. In Zug 
 the maximum time during which the Great Council can 
 consider the demand, the maximum time during which they 
 must appoint a constituent assembly, and the maximum 
 time in which that assembly must have finished the revi- 
 sion, are all fixed. We find various provisions to guard 
 against unwarrantable delays in Ziirich, Berne, Lucerne, 
 Solothurn, Zug, St. Gall, Aargau, and Ticino. In the 
 Landsgemeinde cantons the proposals must be laid before 
 the next Landsgemeinde. 
 
 V. The Great Councils have also the right to pro- 
 pose revisions either with or without consulting the 
 people. 
 
 (a) The Great Councils may undertake a partial or a 
 
Appendix 309 
 
 total revision on their own authority in Ziirich, Zug, 
 Valais, Thurgau, the Grisons, Solothurn, and Appenzell 
 (Inner Rhodes). In the Grisons the councils may, if they 
 prefer it, consult the people first ; and in Zug the council 
 must consult the people on the question of revision, if it be 
 only decided on by a relative majority of the members, 
 not by an absolute majority of all the members. The 
 result is, that in every canton, except those just mentioned, 
 the people are always asked, "Do you wish for a total 
 revision ? " whenever a total revision is proposed, whether 
 it be proposed by the Legislature or by a certain statutory 
 number of citizens. 
 
 (b) The councils cannot undertake either a partial or a 
 total revision without first asking the people, "Do you 
 wish for a revision ? " in the following cantons Fribourg, 
 Obwald, Nidwald, Basle (Rural), and Neuchatel. Ticino 
 may be classed with the group. The Executive, which is a 
 body of five, chosen directly by the people, can propose 
 either a total revision or a partial revision, but the people 
 must first of all be consulted. In the case of an affirmative 
 answer the revision is carried out by the Legislature if they 
 agree with the proposed revision ; if they disapprove, by a 
 constituent assembly. The Legislature has no initiative for 
 a partial revision, only for a total revision, and in that 
 case the people must first be consulted. 
 
 (c) In City Basle the council has to consult the people 
 on the question of a total revision, should it wish to under- 
 take it. A partial revision may, however, be resolved on 
 without an appeal to the people ; and the council may 
 decide, moreover, whether it will undertake it itself or 
 appoint a constituent assembly. The resolution on the 
 subject is, however, submitted to the referendum upon 
 demand. 
 
 (d) A fourth group give the legislative council the power 
 to initiate and carry through partial revisions, but a total 
 revision needs a consultation of the people : these are 
 
310 Appendix 
 
 Berne, Schwyz, Glarus, Schaffhausen, Appenzell (Outer 
 Rhodes), St. Gall, and Aargau. 
 
 (e) In Geneva the Great Council seems to be able to 
 undertake and carry through partial revisions, but does not 
 seem to have any power to bring about a total one. 
 
 VI. Certain cantons provide special regulations for the 
 passing of the proposed revision, whether it be undertaken 
 in conseqiience of a demand by the people, or in conse- 
 quence of a resolution of the Legislature. 
 
 In Berne the constitutional amendment must obtain a 
 two-thirds majority of those voting. In Schwyz, Aargau, 
 and Ticino, the proposal for a total revision needs an 
 absolute majority of the members ; in Zug an absolute 
 majority is necessary for either partial or total revisions ; 
 and in St. Gall, for partial revisions. In Fribourg six 
 months must elapse between the first and second reading 
 of the revision bill. Yalais, Solothurn, St. Gall, Aargau, 
 Berne, Lucerne, Zug, Thurgau, and Zurich, all fix a certain 
 statutory interval between the two readings. 
 
 VII. In some of the cantons it is expressly stated, that if 
 a partial revision of the constitution bears on several points, 
 they are to be voted on by the people separately : these are 
 Ticino, Lucerne, Aargau, and Solothurn. St. Gall, how- 
 ever, provides that a total revision shall be voted on en bloc, 
 and a partial one according to the articles revised. Zug 
 directs that the constitutional amendments may be pre- 
 sented in groups (gruppemveise) or en bloc. The different 
 provisions are sometimes separated in practice by a resolu- 
 tion of the Great Council. 
 
 VIII. In either the preliminary or the final voting, it is 
 the absolute majority of the electors voting who decide 
 whether the constitution or the amendment shall be 
 accepted or not. Every constitutional change in its final 
 form must be voted on by the people before it can come 
 into force. 
 
 IX. If a constitution or a constitutional amendment 
 
Appendix 3 1 1 
 
 be rejected, several constitutions expressly state that the 
 old one remains in force. When it is not expressed, it is 
 understood, unless something else is determined upon. In 
 Obwald and Nidwald the Landsgemeinde decides whether 
 the revision shall again be undertaken or not, and by what 
 body. In Glarus the proposal may be sent back to the 
 Landrath for further consideration. 
 
 In Solothurn and Fribourg a second scheme has to be 
 worked out after the first is rejected. If this is again re- 
 jected, the people are asked if the revision shall take place. 
 If so, a new assembly is chosen. In Rural Basle, Berne, 
 Zug, a second project is elaborated, and if that is rejected, 
 the old constitution remains in force. 
 
 In Schaffhausen the constituent assembly must go on 
 drawing up new schemes until it either satisfies the citizens, 
 or a demand has been made by 1000 voters for its dis- 
 solution. It may also itself refer the question of its own 
 dissolution to the people. In Aargau the people are con- 
 sulted on the question of going on with the revision when 
 the first draft is rejected, and if they still wish a revision, 
 they are asked whether it shall be undertaken by a new or 
 by the old constituent assembly. 
 
 X. Many constitutions provide that after a total re- 
 vision has been accepted, the Great Council is ipso facto 
 dissolved, and fresh Elections must take place. This is the 
 case in Schaffhausen and Thurgau. The Constitutions of 
 Lucerne, Zug, and Solothurn declare a renewal of the Legis- 
 lature to be necessary only when the revision has been 
 demanded by the people. The Constitutions of Thurgau 
 and Solothurn not only provide for a renewal of the Great 
 Council, but declare that all officials must be re-elected. 
 The temporary provisions of a new constitution often 
 contain some such provision. 1 
 
 1 See Constitution of Zug, 1894. Such a clause was incorporated 
 into the last Constitution of Rural Basle, and omitted in the present 
 one of 1893. 
 
3 1 2 Appendix 
 
 M. Borgeaud, in his book on the Amendment and Adop- 
 tion of Constitutions, distinguishes between the popular 
 and the plural initiative in constitutional matters. The 
 distinction has been adopted by M. Arnoult in his book on 
 the Revision of Constitutions (Paris, 1896). 
 
 The popular initiative is said to be exercised when the 
 people decide as a necessary preliminary that a constitu- 
 tional revision shall take place. The popular initiative may 
 be invoked by a certain number of citizens or by a specified 
 authority ; but when no body is competent to undertake a 
 revision unless commanded to do so by the majority of the 
 people (in practice the majority of those voting), then the 
 initiative may be said to belong to the people. 
 
 The plural initiative is exercised when a certain specified 
 number, not a majority of the whole, are sufficient to bring 
 about a revision without any preliminary popular con- 
 sultation. 
 
 There are practically four steps in bringing about a 
 revision by means of the popular initiative : 
 
 (1) A preliminary demand by a certain number of 
 citizens, or by a certain body, that the majority will exer- 
 cise their right. 
 
 (2) The exercise of the right by the majority of those 
 voting. 
 
 (3) The drafting of the scheme proposed. 
 
 (4) The final voting of the people on the scheme drawn up. 
 In the case of the plural initiative 
 
 (1) A bill is drafted by one or more persons. 
 
 (2) A certain specified number of citizens sign it. 
 
 (3) It is sent to the council, who forward it to the 
 people as it stands, and until it comes before the people 
 in this way for final acceptance or rejection they have no 
 voice in the matter. 
 
 The plural initiative may, however, be exercised in 
 another way. 
 
 (i) A certain number of citizens demand a revision. 
 
Appendix 313 
 
 (2) The drafting is done by the council upon the petition 
 of this certain number. The council has not the option 
 of refusing to comply with their demand, but must draw 
 up the scheme required. 
 
 (3) The scheme is voted on by the people. 
 
 The Swiss Constitutions themselves do not seem to grasp 
 or express the significance of the distinction in many cases. 
 There is, nevertheless, a fundamental difference. In the 
 one case the people are the starting-point for the revision ; 
 in the other, a fraction of the whole people. 
 
 The initiative may be said to belong to the Legislature 
 when the council may decide on a revision on its own 
 authority (von sich aus), and carry it through without any 
 popular consultation, only submitting the finished scheme 
 to the people for their acceptance or rejection. 
 
 We find in the twenty-five Swiss cantons examples of 
 all three forms. They have been classified by M. Arnoult 
 as follows : 
 
 (1) In certain cantons the initiative in the case of a 
 partial or total revision belongs either to the Legislature 
 or to the people. These cantons are Thurgau and Valais. 
 
 (2) The initiative in the case of a partial revision belongs 
 either to the people or the Legislature. The initiative in 
 the case of a total revision belongs to the people alone. 
 These cantons are Lucerne, Aargau, St. Gall, Basle City, 
 and Schwyz. 
 
 This means that in the case of a total revision there 
 must always be a popular consultation. In the case of a 
 partial revision there may be a popular consultation. 
 
 The great feature of groups i and 2 is that the initiative 
 in matters of revision does not belong exclusively to the 
 people ; it is shared with the council. 
 
 (3) The popular initiative is compulsory in every case in 
 certain cantons. The council can undertake no revision, 
 whether partial or total, without first consulting the people. 
 These cantons are Fribourg, Rural Basle, Neuchatel, 
 
314 Appendix 
 
 Vaud, Unterwalden (Obwald and Nidwald). Either the 
 council or a certain number of citizens can provoke the 
 popular initiative by a demand for a total revision. 
 
 (4) Certain cantons recognise the popular initiative, the 
 plural initiative, and the initiative of the Legislature. 
 
 (i.) They recognise the popular initiative and the legis- 
 lative initiative in both partial and total revisions. 
 
 (ii.) They recognise the plural initiative in partial re- 
 visions as well. The plural initiative is exercised by a bill 
 drafted by the electors themselves. Neither the majority 
 of the people nor the Legislature play any part in deter- 
 mining whether the revision shall or shall not be under- 
 taken. The revision comes before the people in its final 
 shape. These cantons are Zurich, the Grisons, Berne, Zug, 
 Solothurn, and probably Geneva. 
 
 (5) The fifth group of cantons do not recognise the 
 popular initiative in partial revisions at all; only the 
 initiative of the Legislature and the plural initiative. 
 These cantons are the Grisons, Uri, Appenzell (Outer 
 Khodes), Schaffhausen, and Schwyz. There is no preliminary 
 consultation whether the initiative be by bill or motion. 
 If the initiative be by motion, the council has no option, 
 but must draft the law demanded. 
 
 (6) A revision, whether total or partial, may be proposed 
 by any one single person, and laid before the whole body 
 of electors, in Glarus and Inner Rhodes, and also in Ziirich 
 if the demand be supported by one-third of the council. 
 This is the individual initiative group. 
 
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 ADAMS (Sir Francis Ottiwell), and C. D. Cunningham. 
 
 " Tlie Swiss Confederation" The French edition, by 
 
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 " Annuaire de la legislation etr anger e" from 1872. 
 ARNAUD. " La revision beige ." Paris, 1893. 
 ARNOULT. "Revision des Constitutions" Paris, 1896. 
 BANDELIER. " Du referendum au point de vue jurassien." 
 
 Porentruy, 1869. 
 BAUMGARTNER. " Geschiclite des schiveizerischen Freistaats 
 
 und Kantons St. Gallen." 
 BECHAUX. " Le referendum," in the " Correspondent " of 
 
 the 25th April 1892, p. 247. 
 
 " Une democratic modeled Unterwald" Paris, 1888. 
 BENOIST. " Une democratie historique, la Suisse," in the 
 
 " Revue des deux mondes" January 15, 1895. 
 BERNET. "Nach zwanziy Jahren" 1868. 
 BERNEY, Professor J. " L' initiative populaire en Droit 
 
 public federal" Lausanne, 1893. 
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 Demokratien." St. Gall, 1850-58. 
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 2 vols. 
 
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 1886. 
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 gebung" Zurich, 1885. 
 
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3 i 8 Bibliography 
 
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 1879. 
 
 FREEMAN. "The Growth of the English Constitution" (de- 
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 FULD. " Die versuchte Einfiihrung des Referendums in 
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 F ii RRER. * ' Histoire du Valais. ' ' 
 
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 GANZONI. " Beitrdge zur Kenntniss des bundnerischen Re- 
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 Berne, 1864. 
 
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 GROTE. " Seven Letters from Switzerland." 1847. 
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 HERZOG. " Das Referendum in der Schweiz." Berlin, 1885. 
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 HILTY. "Das Referendum im schweizerischen Staatsrecht, 
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 1868. 
 
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 nossenschaft" 1891. 
 
UNIVEBSIT 
 bibliography ^^ p 3 1 9 
 
 HILTY. " Le referendum et V initiative en Suisse," in the 
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 1892. 
 
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 LAVELEYE. " Le gouvernement dans la democratie" Paris, 
 
 1891. Vol. ii. 
 
 LECKY. " Democracy and Liberty" Vol. i. 
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 " The Referendum and Initiative : their Relation to 
 
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 1891. 
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 1893. 
 
320 Bibliography 
 
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322 Bibliography 
 
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 1830-70. 
 
INDEX 
 
INDEX 
 
 AARAU, 52 n. i 
 
 Aargau, viii r?., xviii, 81, 83, 
 
 - 88 n. i, 116, 123, 137, 142, 143, 
 
 154 n. 2, 174 n. i, 176, 178, 
 
 179 n. i, 180 n. i, 181 n. i, 
 
 184, 186, 187, 188 n. i, 193 
 . m i, I95 *97 198, 212 n. i, 
 
 221, 235, 259, 270, 307, 308, 
 
 310, 311, 313 
 Act of Mediation, 20, 58, 59, 60, 
 
 62,64 
 Age of Political Majority, 4, 45, 
 
 165 
 
 Allrjcmeine Tayc, 52 w. I 
 Allied Powers, 6 1 
 Ambassadors, 33 
 America, United States of, vi, 
 
 285, 286, 290 n. I, 304 
 Amman, 72 
 
 Amnesty, 146 n. 2, 151 n. I 
 Anderwert, M., 105 
 Annemasse, 262 
 Anti-Semitism, 235, 236 
 Appenzell, xiv n. 2, 3, 4 w. 2, 
 . 5 n. I, 7 n. i, 15 
 
 - (Inner Rhodes), 5 n. 2, 
 
 9 n. I, 22 n. 3, 65 n. i, 117, 
 
 137 n - 3 2I2 n - !> 2I 3> 221 
 
 i, 305. 309, 3 ! 4 
 (Outer Rhodes), 9 n. I, 22 
 
 ?i. 3,25 n. 2, 116, 123, 137 n. 3, 
 
 212 n. I, 270, 305, 306, 308, 
 
 3'> 3H 
 
 Army, control of, ill, 146 n. 2, 
 241 
 
 Army, discipline in, 242 
 Attestation of signatures, 156, 
 
 160 
 
 Athenian democracy, 257 
 Ausschreiben auf die Gemelnden, 
 
 29 
 
 Aussersihl, 254 
 Australasia, v, 290 n. i 
 
 BADEN, 12 n. 2, 52 n. i 
 Bailiff, 4 n. I, 9 et seq. 
 Bailiwicks, 6, 52 n. I 
 Bankruptcy, 114, 170, 230 
 Bankrupts, 4 n. 3, 165, 217 
 Basle, xiv n. 2, 51 n. 3, 60 n. 5, 
 66 n. 3, 213, 267 
 
 - City, xxxiii, 85, 116, 137, 
 140, 143, 148 n. I, 154 n. 2, 
 171, 173, 188 n. i, 195, 197 
 n. 2, 201 n. I, 212 n. I, 281, 
 
 305 > 307, 309. 3 1 3 
 
 - Rural, 72, 75, 83, 88 n. i, 
 116, 123, 137, 139, 142, 175, 
 176, 180 n. i, 186, 187, 188 
 w. i, 195, 196, 197, 198, 201 
 n. I, 212 n. I, 259, 270, 305, 
 306, 309, 311, 313 
 
 Easier Volksblatt, 234 n. 2. 
 
 Beitag, 30 w. I 
 
 Belgium, proposed referendum in, 
 v, xxxix et seq. 
 
 Belgian Communes, 291 n. 2 
 
 Berne, x n. I, xv, xviii, xxii, 
 44 et seq., 51 n. I, 60 n. 5, 76, 
 83, 88 ?i. i, 93, 94, 104, 116 
 
 325 
 
326 
 
 Index 
 
 137, 139 2, 140, 154 n- 2, 
 176, 179, 180, 184, 187, 188 
 n. i, 195 w. 2, 197, 199 n. 2, 
 201 n. i, 212 w. i, 229, 235, 
 256 et seq., 269, 270, 275 n. I, 
 281 n. 3, 306, 307, 308, 310, 
 
 3ii 3H 
 
 Berne, town of, x, xxxiii, 144 
 Bcrner VolJcspartei, 157 
 Berner Volkszeituny, 166, 234 
 Bernese Jura, 221 
 Bicocca, 49 n. i 
 Bishoprics, creation of, 114 
 Blanc, Louis, 35 
 Blank ballot papers, 255, 289 
 Borel, M., 104 
 Bourdon, 57 n. 2 
 Bribery, legislation against, 9 et 
 
 seq. 
 
 Brunner, M., 100, 104, 107, 109 
 Budget, cantonal, 84, 172 n. 2, 
 
 178, 179, 1 80 
 
 federal, 146 n. 2, 153, 299 
 
 Bund (of Berne), 96, 117, I2O 
 
 n. 2 
 
 Burgergemeinde, ix n. I 
 Burgundy, 52 n. i 
 Buzberger, 107 
 
 CALVIN, 49 n. i 
 
 Cantonal chancery, 181 
 council, 138 
 
 government, 103 
 
 jealousy, 238 
 
 jurisdiction, attempt to in- 
 terfere with, 226 
 
 message, 181 
 
 vote. See Vote, cantonal. 
 
 Cantons, independence of, xii et 
 seq., i, 20, 50, 56, 59, 66 n. i, 
 78, 93, 109, 191 n. i, 217, 220, 
 241, 295 
 
 list of, 6 1 
 
 population of, ix 
 
 Cantons, representation of, in 
 Council of States, xxii, 79 ; in 
 Federal Assembly, 79, 282 ; 
 in Federal Council, xxiii, 80; in 
 Federal Diet, 52 n. I 
 
 representative government 
 
 in, 60 
 
 with Landsgemeinden, xix n. 
 
 3, 3, 25 n. 2, 26, 57 n. 2, 62, 287 
 
 Capital punishment, 220, 252 n. I 
 
 Carteret, M., 103 
 
 Catholic cantons, viii n. 2, III, 
 
 116, 159,214,270 
 
 minority, treatment of, 234 
 
 n. 2 
 -opposition, 108, 113, 116, 
 
 117, 141, 156, 216, 224 
 Cattle rearing, 256 n. I 
 slaughtering of, 118 n. I 
 
 - trade, 243 
 Centralisation, 55, 94, 101, 108, 
 
 in, 115, 215, 230 
 
 dislike of, 237, 242, 249 
 
 Challet-Venel, in n. I 
 Chancellor, election of, 146 n. 2 
 Civil law, 31, 112, 114, 179 n. i, 
 
 295 n. I 
 
 of persons, 295 
 
 Civil procedure, 1 1 2, 114, 179 n. I, 
 
 295 
 rights, federal jurisdiction 
 
 in, 114 
 Coire, 29, 33 
 Commander-in-chief, election of, 
 
 xxiii, 146 71. 2 
 Commerce, freedom of, 55 n. i, 67 
 
 regulation of, 92, 114 
 
 Commercial travellers, 225, 226 
 Communal assembly, ix, 155 ; 
 
 defect of, 99 
 council, x, 261 
 
 vote, 57 n. 2 
 Communes, independence of, ix, 
 
 31, 34, 36, 44, 254, 295 
 
Index 
 
 327 
 
 Communes of Berne, 44 
 Concilium Generate, 42 
 Condorcet, 57 n. 2 
 Congress of the Rhcetian republic, 
 
 33 
 
 Congress of Vienna, 61 
 
 Conseil d'Etat, xvii. n. 2 
 
 Conservatives, 72, 83, 157, 263, 
 265, 272 
 
 Considerant, Victor, 35 
 
 Constituencies, manipulation of, 
 113, 130, 221, 228 
 
 size of, 257 
 
 Constitutions, cantonal, xiv et seq., 
 21 n. i, 59 ct seq., 71 et seq., 
 85, 136 et seq. ; date of, 143 n. 
 I ; guarantee of, 80, 136, 14671- 
 2, 152; provisions for revision, 
 80, 137 et seq., 139, 305 et seq. 
 - Federal, 50, 78, 109, 192 n. 
 
 I, 303 
 
 Constitution, Federal, of April 12, 
 1798, 2, 1 8, 55 ; provision for 
 revision, 55 n. 2 
 
 of May 20, 1802, 56, 
 
 57 2 
 
 of 1848, 7 n. 2, 79 
 et seq., 118, 119 n. I ; art. 6 of, 
 80, 136 ; provision for revision, 
 80 
 
 - of May 29, 1894, 
 114 et seq., 124 et seq., 136, 144, 
 146 n. 2, 172, 223, 231, 282, 
 294 ; arts. 7 and 9 of, 172, 178 ; 
 art. 27 of, 114, 223, 230 n. 2; 
 art. 89 of, 116, 117, 144, 151, 
 153, 167; provision for revision 
 of, 125 et seq., 161 n. i 
 Constitutional article, 118 n. I, 
 
 297 
 check, lack of, 86, 304 
 
 decree, federal, 169 
 
 Consular service, 239 
 Convents, 115 
 
 Copyright, literary and artistic, 
 
 92, 114 
 
 Councillors of the Legation, 52 n. I 
 Council of States, xvi, xxii n., 
 
 79, 109, 115 w. I, 123, 129, 144 
 
 xvii n. 2, 7 n. 3, 67, 202, 286 
 Counter-proposal, right of sub- 
 mitting, 22, 134, 199, 200, 300, 
 
 307 
 
 Court of Appeal, 31 
 Criminal law, 31, 1 12, 179 n. I, 
 
 295 
 
 procedure, 1 12, 179 n. I, 295 
 Currency, 52 n. I 
 
 (bank-notes), 112, 119 n. I, 
 217, 218, 294 
 
 Customs, in, 232 
 
 revenue, 238 
 
 DAVOS, 29 
 
 Debts, 114, 230 
 
 Decree, lack of definition, 147 
 
 Delaware, 290 n. I 
 
 Delay caused by referendum, 162 
 
 n. I 
 Democrats, 69, 71, 83, 88, 89, 94, 
 
 121, 158, 190, 286, 288 
 
 proposals of, 84 
 
 Diet of Ambassadors. See Federal 
 
 Diet. 
 Democracies, characteristics of 
 
 old-time, 10 
 Democracy, direct, 67, 134 
 
 evolution of, in Switzerland, 
 82, 293 
 
 Deputies, role of, 133, 134 
 
 Dikes of rivers, in, 153 
 
 Diog, Major Felix de Rapper- 
 swyl, 69, 190 
 
 Diplomatic service, 239 
 
 Directorate, letter to French, 18 
 et seq. 
 
 Direct Legislation League (Ameri- 
 can), vi 
 
328 
 
 Index 
 
 Disfranchisement, 165 
 
 Dissolution of the Federal Assem- 
 bly, 1 20, 129 
 
 Dissolution, right of, 104, 284 ; 
 (in the cantons) 88 n. i 
 
 Distilleries, 230 n. I 
 
 District, xiii 
 
 Division of Switzerland, vii, 
 viii, xiv, 53, 54, in 
 
 Divorce, 215, 235 
 
 Dixains, 42, 63, 75 
 
 Dorfschaften, 31 n. 2 
 
 Duke of Savoy, 46 n. I 
 
 Diirrenmatt, M., 158, 1 66 
 
 EDUCATION, 295 
 
 Education, elementary, 1 12, 114, 
 223, 256 n. i 
 
 free, 235 
 
 sectarian, 230 n. 2 
 
 Educational measures in the can- 
 tons, 250 n. 2 
 
 Eidgenossische Verein, 157 
 
 Elections, 113, 227, 253, 257 
 
 Electors, number of, 212 n. I 
 
 Electoral Legislation, 112 
 
 Emigration agents, 1 1 1 
 
 England, 155 n. i, 173 
 
 Epidemics, 32, 222 
 
 Erfurt, 291 
 
 Excise, 179 n. i 
 
 Excommunication prohibited, 114 
 
 Executive of the Great Council, 
 xvii 
 
 Expenditure, dislike of, 179 n. 2, 
 247, 249, 256 n. I, 239, 258 
 
 FACTORY legislation, in, 219, 
 
 236, 240, 250 n. 2 
 Fazy, James, 164 
 Federal Agreement, 61, 62, 63, 
 
 77> 78, 79 
 
 administration, xvi 
 
 Federal Assembly, xxi, xxv, 
 
 79. 94, loo, no, 114, 120, 123 
 n. 2, 127, 128, 129, 133, 134, 
 I44 ; 145, 146, 148, 150, 221, 
 
 292, 297, 300 
 
 Federal Chancery, 162 n. I 
 
 Council, xxiii et seq., So, 
 
 92, 108, in n. i, 117 n. i, 118 
 n. i, 120, 128, 133, 145, 146 n. 
 2, r 53> !5 6 l6o 161, 162 n. i, 
 1 68, 172 n. 3, 234, 294, 300 
 
 Decree of April 8, 1891, 
 123, 124, 125 n. i 
 
 Federal Diet, xxi, 6, 52, 60 n. 5, 
 62, 66 n. i, 78 
 
 Executive, xxiii, 79 
 
 Federal government, 103 
 
 Treasury, 238 
 
 Tribunal, xxiv, 146 n. 2 
 Feuille Federate, 153, 1 6 1, 162 n. 
 
 I, 168, 246 n. i 
 
 Feuille officiellc, 22, 173, 181, 203 
 Financial affairs, 3, 8, 20, 32, 63, 
 
 75, 81, 82, 84, 108, 153, 172, 
 
 179, 1 80, 295 
 Fishing, in, 179/1. i 
 First perpetual League, 4 n. i 
 Food stuffs, regulations affecting, 
 
 243 
 
 Forests, 32 n. I, ill, 179 n. I, 243 
 Foreigners, treatment of, 9, 92, 
 
 152 
 
 Foreign politics, influence of, 63 
 France, v, 49 n. I, 54, 91, 152, 
 
 172 n. 3, 291 n. 2 
 
 constitution imposed by, 2, 
 18, 35, 56 
 
 revolutionary constitutions 
 
 of, 57 n. 2 
 
 French cantons, viii, 260 
 Franchise, 4, 45, 56, 62, 67, 79, 
 
 86, 165, 217 
 
 Franco-German war, 101 n. 2. 
 Frankfort, parliament of, 35 n. 2 
 Frauenfeld, 52 n. i, 148/1. i 
 
Index 
 
 329 
 
 Freedom of speech, 16 
 
 Fribourg, xvi, 60 n. 5, 67, 78 
 n. I, 85, 117, 137, 141, 142, 
 H3> : 59> 185 n. i, 188 n. I, 
 195 n. i, 213, 212 n. i, 221, 
 260, 269, 306, 308, 309, 310, 
 
 3" 
 
 Frutigen, 240 
 
 GEMEINDEN, 28 
 
 Geneva, xi et seq., xvi n. I, 
 xxxiii, 46 n. I, 49 n. I, 61, 85, 
 116, 137 7*. 3, 139, 142, 157, 
 159, 171, 173, 174, 188 w. 
 i. 195, '97, 198, 212 n. i, 
 219 n. i, 221, 233 n. I, 260, 
 262, 269, 270, 275 w. i, 281, 
 287 n. i, 305, 307, 308, 310, 
 3H 
 
 German cantons, viii, 88 n. i, 93, 
 109, 113 
 
 Girardin, Emile de, 35 
 
 Glarus, 3, 4 n. 2, 5 n. I, 6 71. 2, 
 8 n. i, n n. 2, 12, 13 n. i, 
 16 n. i, 17, 22, 25 7i. 2, 116, 
 137 n. 2 and 3, 159, 212 n. i, 
 213, 305, 36> 308, 310, 311, 
 3H 
 
 Glattfolden, 254 
 
 Gonzenbach, M., 103 
 
 Gotha, 291 
 
 Great Council, xv, xvii, 22 n. 3, 
 67, 70, 73, 76, 82, 85 ct seq., 94, 
 137 n. i, 138, 140, 174, 177, 
 180 n. I, 187, 198, 284, 307, 
 308 
 
 Grey League, 28, 29, 31 7?. 2 
 
 Grisons, 27 ct seq.j 38, 51, 60, 63, 
 67,81,90 71. i, 116, 137, 140, 
 171 n. I, 176, 179, 188 rt. i, 
 
 , 195, 196, 197, 198, 201 71. I, 
 212 71. I, 262, 306, 307, 308, 
 
 309, 3H 
 Griitliverein, 203, 238 
 
 HEER, Landamman, 7 n. 3 
 Henne, Dr., 70 
 Hochgerichte, 31 n. 2 
 Hofgericht, 4 n. I 
 Horgen, 254 
 Hunting, in, 179 n. I 
 
 ILANZ, 29 
 
 Industry, freedom of, 55 n. I 
 Information supplied to voters, 
 30, 46, 47, 48, 106, 153, 161, 
 162, 164, 173, 181, 188, 200, 
 245 30i, 307 
 
 Initiative, popular, v. 3, 189 et 
 seq., 302 et seq 
 
 - in cantonal affairs, 
 14, 15, 49 n. i, 62, 77, 81, 83, 
 90, 137, 195 ct seq., 252 7i. i, 
 256 7i. i, 260 71. r, 262, 263, 
 294; "formulated," 122 n. I, 
 I39W-3, 199. 197 
 
 in federal affairs, 
 1 10, 116, 118. 121 ct seq., 127 
 n. 2, 130, 131, 145, 167, 218, 
 244, 269, 297 et seq., 312; 
 "formulated," 122, 132, 134, 
 300 
 
 Insurance, State, 231, 238 
 Insurance, private companies, 112 
 International, the, 291 
 Italy, v, 155 n. I, 291 n. 2 
 Iowa, 139 n. I, 290 n. I 
 
 JAHRBUCH flir schweizerische 
 
 Statistik, 246 n. I 
 Jesuits, 115 
 Jews, xii, 52 n. I, 92, 93, 152, 
 
 233 2 35 
 
 Journal de Geneve, 270 
 Judicial administration, xx, 114 
 
 KANTONSRATH, xv, xx 
 Kappeler, Herr, 1 1 7 n. i 
 Kappeler Brief, 49 n. I 
 
330 
 
 Index 
 
 Keel, M., 270, 279 
 Kleine Rath, xvii 
 Konfessionelle Sondertage, 52 n. I 
 Kriegsgemeinde, 49 n. I 
 
 LANDAMMAN, xx, 6, 7, 16, 17 
 Landamman of Switzerland, 60 
 
 5 
 
 Landbuch, 21 n. i 
 Landrath, xv, xx, 7 n. 3, 14 e 
 
 5^7., 15 7i. I, 22, 42 n. 2 
 
 triple, 7 n. 3 
 Landsgemeinde, xix e se., 3 e 
 
 s<??., 26 n. i, 27, 31, 59, 67,68, 
 
 76, 81, 103, 137, 190, 194, 264, 
 
 276, 287 
 
 Lausanne, population of, xxxiii 
 League of the House of God, 28 
 
 et seq. 
 League of the Ten Jurisdictions, 
 
 28 et seq. 
 Legation at Washington, 14871. I, 
 
 225, 226 n. i 
 Liberals. See Radicals 
 Lichtensteg, 230 n. 2 
 Liege, 155 n. I 
 Louis XI., 52 n. i 
 Lucerne, 49 n. I, 51 n - 2, $2 n. I, 
 
 60 n. 5, 65*1. 1,72, 75, 78 n. i, 
 
 88 n. i, 117, 137, 141, 142, 143, 
 
 171, 172, 173, 175, 184 71. 2, 
 
 185 n. i, 188 n. i, 195 n. i, 
 212 n. i, 213, 231, 306, 307, 
 308, 310, 311, 313 
 Lugano, 52 n. i 
 
 MAGISTRATES, 20, 26, 63 
 Majority in Federal Assembly, 
 
 xxv, 213, 226 
 effective, how constituted, 
 
 57, 72, 75, 76, 81, 82, 108, 136, 
 
 141, 142 n. I, 143, 170, 174, 
 
 186, 302, 310 
 Malmaison, 56 
 
 Marignano, 49 n. I 
 Marriage, 112, 170, 214, 215 
 Maryland, 139 n. i 
 Massachusetts, 57 n. 2 
 Match-making monopoly, 240 
 Mayors of Communes, 141 n. 3 
 Message of I3th June 1890, 131 
 Michigan, 139 n. i 
 Military capitulations, 7 71. 2, 46, 
 49 n. i, 63, 75 
 
 service, 55 n. I, 112, 218, 219 
 Minority, treatment of, xviii, 234 
 
 n. 2 
 
 Mississippi, 57 n. 2 
 Missouri, 57 n. 2 
 Municipal Council, x. 
 
 NACHGEMEINDE, 16 n. i, 17 
 Napoleon, 20 n. i, 43 n. i, 56, 
 
 57 7i. 2, 58, 60 
 National Council, xxi, 79, 109, 
 
 115 w. I, 123, 129, 144, 227 
 
 museum, 148 n. I 
 Naturalisation, 9, 63, 75 
 Neuchatel, 5 1 n. 3, 6 1, 66 n. 3, 82, 
 
 116, 137, 140, 171, 172, 18871. i, 
 J 95> r 97 n - 2 > 2 , 20 1 n ' i, 
 212 n. i, 221, 229, 260, 262, 
 270, 281, 306, 307, 309, 313 
 New England, town-meetings, 21 
 
 71. 2 
 
 Hampshire, 57 n. 2, 139 n. I 
 
 South Wales, xxxiii n. I, 
 290 n. I 
 
 New York, 57 n. 2, 139 n. i 
 Nidwald, xxi, n n. I, 15, 22, 
 
 25 n. 2, 137 n. 3, 212 n. I, 305, 
 
 306, 309, 311, 314 
 
 OBWALD, 25 n. 2, 139 n. 3, 159, 
 212 n. i, 221 n. i, 305, 306, 
 309, 311, 314 
 
 Ochsenbein, Herr, in ?i. I 
 Office, eligibility for, 7, 9 n. I 
 
Index 
 
 33i 
 
 Office, plurality of, 263 
 
 tenure of, xxiii, xxviii, 7 n. 3 
 Officials, removal of public, 65 
 
 salaries of, xxiii, 146, 235 
 
 Ohio, 139 n. I 
 
 Old Catholics, 114, 258 
 Opposition in Federal Assembly, 
 the, 215, 222, 286 
 
 PARDON, right of, xxiii, 146 n. 2 
 
 Parish meetings, xii 
 
 Party system, absence of, xxv 
 
 et seq., 296 
 
 Patents, decree concerning, 222 
 Patrician families, 44, 48, 49, 54, 
 
 61, 63, 64, 65, 90 n. I, 165 
 Paupers, 165, 215, 217 
 Peace, conclusion of, 33, 46, 62, 
 
 108, 146 n. 2 
 Pedrazzini, M., 270, 279 
 Pensions, 232, 256 n. I 
 Petition, definition of, 298 
 
 right of, 67, 1 10, 191 
 Places of burial, 115 
 Police, 32, 52 n. i, 172, 295 
 Political societies, influence of, 
 
 106, 302 
 
 Poor law, 179 ?i. i 
 Population, ix, x xxiii, 25 n. 2 
 Postulat, xxiv 
 Prefectures, 55 
 President of the confederation, 
 
 xxiv 
 
 " Presiding canton," 60 n. 5 
 Press, freedom of, 65, 67, 102 
 influence of, 85, 106, 163, 
 
 302 ; foreign, 247 
 Priests, 112 
 Primary assemblies, 75 
 Privileges, abolition of, 59, 62, 
 
 158 n. I, 263 
 
 Projet Girondin of 1793, 57 n. 2 
 Proletariat, absence of, xxxiii, 247 
 Property, law of real, 295 
 
 Proportional representation, xv 
 n. 9, xviii, xxi, 60, 67, 122, 234, 
 256 n. I, 279, 280, 281, 286 
 
 Proudhon, 35 
 
 Proxy vote, 186, 256 
 
 Prussia, King of, 66 
 
 Publication of laws, 153, 173 
 
 Publicity, 1 60 n. 2 
 
 Public meeting, right of, 102 
 works, 295 
 
 Python, M., 151 11. i 
 
 RADICALS, xxv, 72, 78, 83, 93, 
 
 IO8, 113, 115, 123, 141, 221, 
 223, 225, 227, 264, 266, 269, 
 270, 272, 296 
 
 Radical measures, popular dislike 
 
 of, 247, 250 n. 2 
 Railway, Jura Simplon, 244 
 
 St. Gothard, 153 n. i, 245 
 Swiss Central, 233 
 
 Railways, 82, 83, ill, 233, 244-5, 
 256 ?i. I, 262 
 
 accounts demanded, 242 
 Alpine, 220 
 
 funicular, 245 
 
 Referendary delay, cantonal, 173 ; 
 
 federal, 154, 299 
 Referendum, v, 3, 29 n. 2, 76, 
 
 117 n. I, 150, 190, 193, 226, 
 
 268, 285 
 
 at the option of the Legis- 
 lature, 174 etseq. 
 
 Referendum in cantonal affairs, 
 29 et seq., 38, 42, 45 et seq., 
 49 n. i, 60, 63, 75, 76, 81 et 
 seq., 89 ; compulsory, 45, 75, 84, 
 137, 140, 141, 142, 176 et seq., 
 188, 262, 278 n. i, 287; 
 optional, 45, 76 n. 2, 171 et 
 seq., 183, 192, 278 n. I 
 
 Referendum in federal affairs, 52, 
 56, 101 et seq., 147 et seq., 295 ; 
 compulsory, xvi, 125 et seq. 
 
332 
 
 Index 
 
 136, 169, 211, 278 n. i, 287; 
 
 optional, 76 n. 2, 169, 192, 278 
 
 n. I, 298 
 Referendum, in financial matters, 
 
 153 n. 2, 275 
 conservatism of, 246 et seq,, 
 
 250 n. 2, 271 
 
 cost of, 169 
 
 criticisms of, 24, 166, 266 et 
 
 seq. 
 delay caused by, 162 n. I 
 
 matter exempted from, 152 
 
 7i. 3 
 
 manipulation of, 180, 216, 
 
 248, 273 
 
 procedure, 154 et seq., 174 et 
 seq., 1 80 et seq., 249 
 
 results of, in, 116, 123; 
 
 table of results, 207 et seq., 249 
 et seq. 
 
 royal, xxxvii, xlvi, 292 
 
 training for, 293 
 
 Reformation, 46 
 Regierungsrath, xvii n. 2, xx 
 Reiten und Fahren auf die Ge- 
 
 meinden, 30 n. 3 
 Religious orders, 115 
 
 teaching in schools, 223 et 
 
 seq. 
 Representative system, 35 n. 2, 
 
 60, 67, 68, 77, 81, 83, 85, 87, 
 
 90, 95, 102, 107, 134, 177 n. i, 
 
 190, 228, 260, 283, 285, 287 
 Respini, M., 151 n. i 
 Revision, total, of the Constitution 
 
 of 1848, 91 ct seq., 100 et seq., 
 
 113 et seq. 
 partial, of the Constitution 
 
 of 1874, 123, 229, 231, 235 et 
 
 seq. 
 of the cantonal constitution. 
 
 xiv n. 3, 62, 68 et seq., 136 ct 
 
 seq. 
 periodical, xvi n. i, 305 n. 2 
 
 Restoration, effect of, 64 
 Revolution of July 1830, 3, 65, 
 
 66 n. I, 284 
 Revue Internationale, 280 
 
 Suisse, 264, 279 
 Rhine Valley, 12 n. 2 
 Rhoetian Republic, 28, 31 n. 2 ; 
 
 Diet of, 29, 33 et seq. 
 Riesbach, 254 
 
 Right, the, 109, 12 1, 254 n. 2, 270 
 Rittinghausen, 35, 38 ct seq. 
 Roads, 52 n. I, 153, 179 n. I 
 Rollin, Ledru, 35 
 Romance cantons, viii, 108, ill, 
 
 165, 214, 217, 231, 242, 261 
 Rousseau, 49 n. i 
 Ruchonnet, M., 230 
 
 ST. GALL, 68 et seq., 74, 116, 137, 
 140, 143, 171, 173, 175, 1 86 7i. 
 3, 1 88 7i. i, 190, 195, 196, 197, 
 198 n. 2, 212 n. i, 221 n. i, 
 
 23O 71. 2, 26O, 267, 28l 71. 3, 
 
 306, 310, 313 
 
 Sanitary Legislation, 32, 179 n. I, 
 
 222 
 
 Schaffhausen, xvi n. I, 60 u. 5, 
 81, 88 n. i, 116, 137, 140, 143, 
 154 7i. 2, 171, 172, 173, 184 n. 
 2, 188, 195, 196, 197, 198, 201 
 
 71. I, 212 71. I, 213, 270, 305, 
 307, 308,310, 311, 314 
 
 Schenk, Karl, xxviii 
 Scherer, M., 104, 106, 107, no 
 School District Assembly, xiii 
 Schwyz, 3, 4, n n. i, 13 n. 2, 
 16 71. 2, 17, 26 n. I, 78 71. i, 
 81, 117, 137, 142, 171 n. i, 
 172 n. 3, 176, 179 7i. i, 180 n. 
 I, 188 n. i, 195, 197, 198 n. 4, 
 
 212 71. I, 213, 221 71. I, 305, 
 
 307, 308, 310, 313, 314 
 
 Secession, attempted, 78 n. I 
 Second Chamber, use of, 283 
 
Index 
 
 333 
 
 Sectarian animosities, 9 n. i, 25 
 n. 2, 46, 49 n. I, 53, 74, 93, 
 108, in, 112, 114, 235, 258, 
 265, 268 n. 2, 296 
 Segesser, M., 109 
 
 Settlement, right of, 67, 92 
 
 Siebengeschlechtsbegehren, 16, 21 
 
 Signatures, collection of, 131 n. I, 
 155, 158, 161, 174, 195 n. 3, 202 
 
 Sion, Bishop of, 42 
 
 Slaughter-houses, 236 
 
 Small Council, 67, 72 
 
 Social conditions of Switzerland, 
 xxxii, 247 
 
 Socialists, 121, 158?!. i, 225,229, 
 237, 238, 291 
 
 Solothurn, 60 n. 5, 81, 83, 88 n. 
 I, 116, 137, 139 n. 2, 142, 143, 
 159, 174 n. i, 176, 179, 181 n. 
 3, 186, 188 n. i, 195, 197, 198, 
 200 n. 2, 201 n. i, 212 n. i, 
 258, 270, 281 n. 3, 306, 307, 
 308, 309, 310, 311, 314 
 
 Sonderbund, 78 n. I 
 
 Sopra Genere, 266 
 
 Sotto Genere, 266 
 
 South Australia, 290 n. I 
 
 Spain, 155 n. i 
 
 Spirituous liquors, law on, 229 
 
 "Spoil's Campaign," 238 
 
 Stabio, 226 
 
 Staiidescommission, xx 
 
 Stand erat, 22 n. 3 
 
 Stanz, 15 n. I, 16 n. 2 
 
 State bank, 243 
 
 in Neuchatel, 262 
 
 State churches, xii 
 
 Statistischcs Jahrbuch, 212 n. 2 
 
 Stamped envelopes, 148/1. I 
 
 Subject domains, 9, 10, 54, 59, 
 60, 61, 62 
 
 Surplus, division of, 238 
 
 Sword, wearing of a, 4 
 
 Syndikatstac/e, 52 n. i 
 
 THURGAU, 12 n. 2, 81, 83, 88 n. i, 
 116, 123, 137, 140, 159, 176, 
 179 n. i, 181 n. 2, 184, 185 n. 
 i, 186, 187, 188 n. i, 195, 197 
 n. I, 198, 201 n. i, 212 n. I, 
 213, 270, 305, 306, 309, 310, 
 
 311, 3'3 
 
 Ticino, viii, 65 n. I, 66 n. 3, 85, 
 H7> 137, I3 8 n. I, HO, 151 n. 
 I, 156, 171 n. i, 173, 188 n. i, 
 195 n. 2 and 3, 197 n. i, 198 
 n. 2 and 3, 201 n. i, 212 n. i, 
 221, 226, 230, 231, 265, 281, 
 306, 307, 308, 309, 310 
 
 Town meetings, New England, 
 21 n. 2 
 
 " Tractandas," 145 
 
 Trade, freedom of. See Commerce. 
 
 Trade unions, vi, 7 n. I, 35 w. 2 
 
 Tramps, 201 n. 2, 252 n. I 
 
 Treaties, 8, 14, 33, 46, 48, 62, 146 
 n. 2, 152,172, 175,178,295,299 
 
 Triple Council, 22 
 
 ULTRAMONTANES, 74, 115, 117, 
 
 1 60, 267 
 
 United States. See America. 
 Universal suffrage, 291 
 Unterwalden, xiv n. 2, 3, 5 n. I, 
 
 78 n. I, 117, 213 
 
 Lower. See Nidwald 
 
 Urgency, 116, 144, 148, 171, 197, 
 
 275, 295, 299 
 Uri, viii, xiv, xxi, 3, 4 w. I, 5 n. 
 
 i, 15 et seq., 19, 21, 22 n. i, 
 
 25 n. 2, 78 n. i, 117, 137 n. 3, 
 
 159, 212 n. I, 213, 221 n i, 35, 
 
 308, 314 
 Uster, 254 
 
 VACCINATION, 201 n. 2, 222, 252 
 
 n. i, 256 n. i 
 Valais, viii, 27 et seq., 32 n. I, 42, 
 
 43, 61, 63, 66 n. 3, 75, 78 n. i, 
 
334 
 
 Index 
 
 81, 90 n. i, 117, 137, 140, 159, 
 176, 177, 186 n. 3, 188 n. I, 
 195 w. i, 212 n. i, 213, 221 n. 1, 
 231, 262, 306, 309, 310, 313 
 Vaud, viii, 46 n. i, 65 n. I, 76, 
 77, 82, 1 1 6, 123, 140, 1541*. 2, 
 159, 171, 172, 1 88 n. i, 193 n. 
 J > J 95> J 97 ** 2, 198, 201 w. i, 
 
 212 W. I, 213, 22O W. 2, 260, 
 263, 270, 301, 306, 314 
 
 Vetting ericht, 52 w. I 
 
 Veto, 3, 30, 57, 67, 71, 73, 74, 
 
 75 77, 81, 83, 89,98, 105, 174, 
 
 284, 285, 286, 293 
 Vetterli, 102 
 Vincent, Mr. G. M., xix 
 Virginia, 139 n. i 
 Vogelin, M., 167 
 Volkstumliche Ansichten, 68 
 Votes, cancelled, 160 
 Vote, the cantonal, 62, 80, 108, 
 
 116 n. i, 129, 136, 170, 302 
 Vote, communal, 48, 57 n. 2 
 Vote, compulsory, 5, 174, 186, 
 
 254, 257, 260 n. I, 289, 291 
 Voters, number of, 105, 212, 240, 
 
 252, 255, 256, 258, 259, 273, 
 
 289 
 
 Votes of illiterates, 156 
 Voting, arrangements for, 185 
 Voting day, 161, 162 n. i, 164, 
 
 185 n. I, 291 
 
 Voting-paper, form of, 165, 301 
 Votings, frequency of, 187, 188 
 
 Waldmannischer Spruchbrief, 49 
 
 n. I 
 
 War, civil, 78 n. I 
 War, declaration of, 33, 46, 48, 
 
 62, 108, 146 n. 2 
 Weights and measures, uniformity 
 
 of, 92, 93, 136 n. i 
 Welti, M., xxvii, 101, 233 n. 2 
 Workmen's party, programme of, 
 
 291 
 
 ZKMP, M., xxv, 234 n. 2, 242, 
 270, 279 
 
 " Zempacher Sieg," 242 
 
 Ziegler, M., 103 
 
 Zug, viii n. I, xxi, 4 n. 2, 26 
 n. i, 63, 78 n. i, 81, 117, 137, 
 142, 143, 171, 172, 173, 174 
 n. i, 175, 188 n. i, 195, 198, 
 212 n. i, 213, 221 n. 3, 281 
 n - 3 305 5 37> 308, 309, 310, 
 3", 3H 
 
 Zurich, viii n., xv, xxiii, 49 
 n. I, 51, 52 n. I, 60 n. 5, 83, 
 84, 93, 94, ! i6, 122 n. i, 137, 
 151 n. i, 154 n. 2, 157, 159, 
 176, 178, 179 n. i, 180 n. i, 
 185 n. i, 186, 187, 188 n. i, 
 195, 197, 198, 199 *. I, 200 
 n. 2, 201 n. i, 212 n. i, 213, 
 231, 249 et seq., 275 n. I, 294, 
 305, 36, 307, 30 8 , 309, 310, 
 314 
 
 town of, xi, xxxiii 
 
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